

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

Freetown – Sierra Leone

Before: Judge Bankole Thompson, Presiding Judge
Judge Benjamin Mutanga Itoe
Judge Pierre Boutet

Registrar: Mr. Robin Vincent

Date filed: 26 April 2004

THE PROSECUTOR**Against**

**ISSA HASSAN SESAY
MORRIS KALLON
AUGUSTINE GBAO**

CASE NO. SCSL-2004-15-PT

**MATERIALS FILED PURSUANT TO ORDER TO THE PROSECUTION TO
FILE DISCLOSURE MATERIALS AND OTHER MATERIALS IN
PREPARATION FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL OF 1 APRIL 2004**

Office of the Prosecutor:

Luc Côté
Robert Petit
Paul Flynn
Abdul Tejan-Cole
Lesley Taylor
Alain Werner
Boi-Tia Stevens
Sharan Parmer
Christopher Santora
Sigall Horovitz
Xavier Cormier-Lassonde

Defence Counsel:

Timothy Clayson
Wayne Jordash
Abdul Sery-Kamal
Serata Ashraph
Shekou Touray
Andreas O'Shea
Girish Thanki
Kenneth Carr
Ben Holden
Glenna Thomson

1. The Prosecution submits these materials in compliance with the ORDER TO THE PROSECUTION TO FILE DISCLOSURE MATERIALS AND OTHER MATERIALS IN PREPARTION FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL dated 1 April 2004.
2. In compliance with Order 1, a list of the pseudonyms of each witness the Prosecution intends to call at trial appears under Cover Sheet 1.
3. In compliance with Order 2, a report indicating:
 - a. the number of witnesses for whom witness statements or summaries have been disclosed;
 - b. the date upon which statement or summary was disclosed; and
 - c. the total number of pages of each statement or summary appears under Cover Sheet 2.
4. In compliance with Order 3, a table appears under Cover Sheet 3 indicating:
 - a. a summary for each witness appearing on the list under Cover Sheet 1;
 - b. the count or counts in the indictment to which the witness will testify; and
 - c. an estimated length of time for the evidence in chief of each witness.To assist the Special Court, information detailing the disclosure of statements and/or summaries of each witness also appears in this table.
5. In compliance with Order 4, a table appears under Cover Sheet 4 detailing the exhibits the Prosecution intends to tender in evidence at trial.
6. In compliance with Order 5, a copy of each documentary exhibit appearing in the table under Cover Sheet 4, except exhibit numbers 161 to 165 inclusive, appears under Cover Sheet 5. In addition, exhibits that are photographs or video cassettes have not been reproduced. Exhibits 161 to 165, photographs and video cassettes have not been able to be reproduced before 26 April 2004

due to technical difficulties. This will be remedied as soon as practicable. In the interim, the Prosecution will facilitate inspection of these items by Counsel for the Defence upon reasonable notice being given to it.

COVER SHEET 1

WITNESS LIST

Witness List

Pseudonym (PN TF1 #)
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COVER SHEET 2**COMPLIANCE REPORT**

COMPLIANCE REPORT

RUF CASE No. SCSL-2004-15-PT

This chart indicates:

The number of witnesses from whom statements have been disclosed
 The date on which each statement, summary or confirmation interview notes (CIN) was disclosed
 The total number of pages of each statement, summary or notes.

No.	Pseudonym	Date of Statement, Summary or Notes	Date Disclosed	Accused	No. of Pages
1	TF1-001	10 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
2	TF1-002	27 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
3	TF1-003	27 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	4

		30 November 2003 (CIN)	Nov 19, 2003 7 Feb 2004	SK To all 6 accused	1
4	TF1-004	27 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
5	TF1-005	25 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
6	TF1-006	26 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
7	TF1-007	25 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
8	TF1-008	26 November 2002 25 November 2002 (typed)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003	IS MK AG	3 2

			June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	ATB BK SK	
9	TF1-009	25 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
		30 November 2003 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
10	TF1-010	24 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4 1
		30 November 2003 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	
11	TF1-011	24 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
12	TF1-012	16 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	10

			Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
		27 January 2004 (CIN)	March 18, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
13	TF1-013	18 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
		26 January 2004 (CIN)	March 18, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
14	TF1-014	16 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
15	TF1-015	15 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	13
16	TF1-016	18 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	5

		28 January 2004 (CIN)	Nov 19, 2003 March 18, 2004	SK To all 6 accused	1
17	TF1-017	16 November 2002 28 January 2004 (CIN)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 March 18, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK To all 6 accused	10 1
18	TF1-018	15 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	8
19	TF1-019	14 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
20	TF1-020	16 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1

		1 March 2004 (CIN)	March 18, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
21	TF1-021	25 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
22	TF1-022	26 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
23	TF1-023	16 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	10
24	TF1-024	20 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
25	TF1-025	19 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	3

			Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
26	TF1-026	25 February 2003 19 January 2004 (CIN)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	9 1
27	TF1-027	19 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
28	TF1-028	18 January 2003 10 April 2003 Wrong date (CIN)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Feb 24, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK To all 6 accused	15 3 1
29	TF1-029	26 February 2003 24 November 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK To all 6	6 2

		(CIN)		accused	
30	TF1-030	March 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 24, 31; April 14 & 15 Interview Transcripts	March 22, 2003	Disclosed to ISSA SESAY only. To be disclosed to other accused	1,086
31	TF1-031	19 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
32	TF1-032	18 January 2003 11 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5 3
33	TF1-033	11 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
34	TF1-034	18 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	11

			Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
35	TF1-035	16 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	10
36	TF1-036	12 October 2002 14 October 2002 11 November 2003 (Redacted Follow-up Statement) 14 August 2003 (Summary dated March 10, 2004) 28 January 2004 (CIN)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003		4 4 8 1 2
37	TF1-037	31 January 2003 14 January 2004 (CIN)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK To all 6	8 1

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38	TF1-038	3 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
39	TF1-039	4 February 2003 14 January 2004 (CIN)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK To all 6 accused	5 1
40	TF1-040	19 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
41	TF1-041	16 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
42	TF1-042	16 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003	IS MK AG	2

			June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	ATB BK SK	
43	TF1-043	16 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
44	TF1-044	16 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
45	TF1-045	5 March 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
46	TF1-046	9 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
		Unredacted Transcripts Dated as Follows: Vol.1;	27 Feb 2004.	To all six accused	Vol.1 (394)

		10/09/02; 08/10/02; 24/10/02; 01/11/02; 02/11/02: Vol. 2; 03/12/02; 05/12/02: Vol. 3; 17/02/03; 19/02/03; 20/02/03; Vol. 4; 22/02/03; 25/02/03; 25/02/03			Vol. 2 (314) Vol. 3 (542) Vol. 4 (349)
47	TF1-047	27 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
48	TF1-048	27 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
49	TF1-049	25 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
50	TF1-050	10 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	5

			Nov 19, 2003	SK	
51	TF1-051	11&12 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
52	TF1-052	24 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
53	TF1-053	26 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
54	TF1-054	26 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
55	TF1-055	18 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5

56	TF1-056	18 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
57	TF1-057	18 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	10
58	TF1-058	18 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
59	TF1-059	19 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
60	TF1-060	2 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
61	TF1-061	1 February 2003	June 2, 2003	IS	6

			May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	MK AG ATB BK SK	
62	TF1-062	16 October 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
		27 January 2004 (CIN)	March 18, 2004	To all 6 accused	2
63	TF1-063	31 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
64	TF1-064	2 December 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
65	TF1-065	14 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	11

			Nov 19, 2003	SK	
66	TF1-066	2 December 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
67	TF1-067	2 December 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
		26 January 2004 (CIN)	March 18, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
68	TF1-068	14 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
69	TF1-069	4 December 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
70	TF1-070	1 December 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003	IS MK AG	6

			June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	ATB BK SK	
71	TF1-071	16 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
72	TF1-072	No Date 26 January 2004 (CIN)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 March 18, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK To all 6 accused	6 1
73	TF1-073	18 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
74	TF1-074	16 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6

		28 January 2004 (CIN)	March 18, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
75	TF1-075	17 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
76	TF1-076	3 December 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
77	TF1-077	16 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
		27 January 2004 (CIN)	March 18, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
78	TF1-078	14 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	10
79	TF1-079	17 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003	IS MK	8

			Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	AG ATB BK SK	
80	TF1-080	14 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
81	TF1-081	14 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
		March to Dec 1999 Medical Report	March 18, 2004	To all 6 accused	2
82	TF1-082	14 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
83	TF1-083	3 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	9

84	TF1-084	22 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	8
85	TF1-085	23 February 2003 & 27 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	10
		21 November 2003 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	2
86	TF1-086	26 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
87	TF1-087	26 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
88	TF1-088	11 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	5

			Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
89	TF1-089	9 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
90	TF1-090	18 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
91	TF1-091	14 December 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	8
92	TF1-092	5 December 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
93	TF1-093	16 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	1

		7 January,2004 (CIN)	Nov 19, 2003 Feb 7, 2003	SK To all 6 accused	1
94	TF1-094	29 October 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
95	TF1-095	5 December 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
96	TF1-096	10 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
97	TF1-097	5 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	10
98	TF1-098	7 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003	IS MK AG	11

			June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	ATB BK SK	
99	TF1-099	3 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
100	TF1-100	27 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
101	TF1-101	19 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
102	TF1-102	25 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	8
103	TF1-103	16 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	1

			Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
104	TF1-104	13 February 2003 18 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7 8
105	TF1-105	29 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
106	TF1-106	16 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
107	TF1-107	24 November 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
108	TF1-108	30 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	21

		4 February 2004 (CIN)	Nov 19, 2003 Feb 24, 2004	SK To all 6 accused	2
109	TF1-109	28 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	15
110	TF1-110	29 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	13
111	TF1-111	28 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	12
112	TF1-112	28 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	8
113	TF1-113	27 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003	IS MK AG	13

		4 February 2004 (CIN)	June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Feb 24, 2004	ATB BK SK To all 6 accused	1
114	TF1-114	26 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	18
		4 February 2004 (CIN)	Feb 24, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
115	TF1-115	26 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	11
116	TF1-116	26&27 March 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
117	TF1-117	17 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	11

		28 February 2004 (CIN)	Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 March 11, 2004	BK SK To all 6 accused	1
118	TF1-118	17 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
119	TF1-119	26 March 2003 (Handwritten)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
		18 March 2003 (Typed)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
120	TF1-120	31 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
121	TF1-121	4 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003	IS MK	4

			Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	AG ATB BK SK	
122	TF1-122	30 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	9
		13 January 2004 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
123	TF1-123	28 September 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
		16 January 2004 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	2
124	TF1-124	13 September 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	9
		13 January 2004 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	1

125	TF1-125	30 January 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	11
		23 February 2004 (CIN)	March 11, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
126	TF1-126	1 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
127	TF1-127	12 September 2002	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	9
		13 January 2004 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
128	TF1-128	4 February 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
129	TF1-129	12 April 2003	June 2, 2003	IS	1

		(Summary)	May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	MK AG ATB BK SK	
		1 February 2003 19 January 2004 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3 1
130	TF1-130	10 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	11
131	TF1-131	6 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	31
132	TF1-132	5 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	9
133	TF1-133	3 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003	IS MK	6

			Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	AG ATB BK SK	
134	TF1-134	5 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	9
135	TF1-135	5 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	11
136	TF1-136	5 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
137	TF1-137	4 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
138	TF1-138	14 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003	IS MK AG	1

			June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	ATB BK SK	
139	TF1-139	16 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
140	TF1-140	7 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
141	TF1-141	6 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
142	TF1-142	4 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
143	TF1-143	7 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	16

			Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
144	TF1-144	8 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
145	TF1-145	8 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
146	TF1-146	5 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
147	TF1-147	4 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	9
148	TF1-148	8 April 2003	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	2

			Nov 19, 2003	SK	
149	TF1-149	8 April 2003 (Handwritten)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
		8 April 2003 (Typed)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
151	TF1-151	10 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
152	TF1-152	11 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
153	TF1-153	10 April 2003 (Summary)	June 2, 2003 May 26, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 June 3, 2003 Nov 6, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	1

			Nov 19, 2003	SK	
154	TF1-154	14 April 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	8
155	TF1-155	10 April 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
156	TF1-156	12 April 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
157	TF1-157	12 April 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
158	TF1-158	12 April 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7

159	TF1-159	13 April 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
160	TF1-160	9 April 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	8
		8 February 2004 (CIN)	Feb 24, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
161	TF1-161	16 April 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
162	TF1-162	10 April 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
163	TF1-163	19 January 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	8

			Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	BK SK	
164	TF1-164	23 February 2003 and 27 February 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
165	TF1-165	27 February 2003	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
166	TF1-166	22 May 2003 (Summary)	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
167	TF1-167	1 July 2003 (Summary)	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	9
168	TF1-168	1 July 2003 (Summary)	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	2

			Nov 26, 2003	SK	
169	TF1-169	12 July 2003 (Summary)	Aug 11, 2003 Aug 11, 2003 Oct 14, 2003 Sept 22, 2003 Nov 6, 2003 Nov 26, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
		22 January 2004 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	2
170	TF1-170	12 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
171	TF1-171	13 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
172	TF1-172	16 & 18 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
173	TF1-173	28 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003	IS MK AG	5

			Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	ATB BK SK	
174	TF1-174	14 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
175	TF1-175	14 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
176	TF1-176	4 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
177	TF1-177	13 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
178	TF1-178	12 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	3

			Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
179	TF1-179	5 July 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
		14 February 2004 (CIN)	Feb 24, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
180	TF1-180	12 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
		28 February 2004 (CIN)	March 11, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
181	TF1-181	14 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
182	TF1-182	7 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	9

			Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
183	TF1-183	13 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
184	TF1-184	8 August 2003 4 November 2003 (Summary)	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	10 3
185	TF1-185	11 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
186	TF1-186	19 September 2003 (Summary)	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
187	TF1-187	No Date 4 November 2003 (Summary)	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	103 3

			Nov 19, 2003	SK	
188	TF1-188	18 September 2003 (Summary)	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
189	TF1-189	22 September 2003 (Summary)	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
190	TF1-190	15 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
191	TF1-191	Statement (No Date)	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
192	TF1-192	24 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5

193	TF1-193	23 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
194	TF1-194	2/4/11/19 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
195	TF1-195	24 September 2003 28 January 2004 (CIN)	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 March 18, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK To all 6 accused	3 1
196	TF1-196	15 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
197	TF1-197	23 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	5

			Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
198	TF1-198	23 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
199	TF1-199	No Date	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
200	TF1-200	No Date	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
201	TF1-201	11 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
202	TF1-202	11 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	5

			Nov 19, 2003	SK	
203	TF1-203	13 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
204	TF1-204	14 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
205	TF1-205	18 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
		25 February 2005 (CIN)	March 18, 2005	To all 6 accused	1
206	TF1-206	18 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
207	TF1-207	12 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003	IS MK AG	2

			Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	ATB BK SK	
208	TF1-208	15 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
209	TF1-209	16 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
210	TF1-210	15 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
211	TF1-211	No Date	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
212	TF1-212	5 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	4

			Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
213	TF1-213	No Date	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
214	TF1-214	No Date	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
215	TF1-215	11 March 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
216	TF1-216	25 March 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
217	TF1-217	11 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	5

			Nov 19, 2003	SK	
218	TF1-218	5 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
219	TF1-219	5 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
220	TF1-220	2 December 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
221	TF1-221	14 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
222	TF1-222	3 December 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2

223	TF1-223	25 March 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
224	TF1-224	16 July 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
225	TF1-225	16 July 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
226	TF1-226	5 March 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
227	TF1-227	14 March 2003 17 March 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	8 5

		21 March 2003			6
		27 March 2003			7
228	TF1-228	27 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
229	TF1-229	25 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
230	TF1-230	11 January 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
231	TF1-231	1 February 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
232	TF1-232	19 February 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003	IS MK AG	2

			Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	ATB BK SK	
233	TF1-233	13 March 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
234	TF1-234	3 March 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
235	TF1-235	20 August 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
236	TF1-236	24 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
237	TF1-237	19 January 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB	2

			Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	BK SK	
238	TF1-238	18 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
239	TF1-239	18 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
240	TF1-240	13 March 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
241	TF1-241	24 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
242	TF1-242	25 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK	2

			Nov 19, 2003	SK	
243	TF1-243	10 April 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
244	TF1-244	14 April 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
245	TF1-245	28 March 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
246	TF1-246	30 March 2003 (Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	7
247	TF1-247	28 March 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	8

248	TF1-248	24 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003	IS	3
		24 November 2002	Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	MK AG ATB BK SK	2
249	TF1-249	25 November 2002	Nov 14, 2003	IS	4
			Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	MK AG ATB BK SK	
250	TF1-250	28 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003	IS	2
		28 October 2003	Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	MK AG ATB BK SK	1
251	TF1-251	29 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003	IS	2
		No date (Typed Statement)	Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	MK AG ATB BK SK	4
252	TF1-252	30 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003	IS	2
			Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	MK AG ATB BK SK	
253	TF1-253	28 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003	IS	3

		28 October 2003	Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	MK AG ATB BK SK	1
254	TF1-254	28 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
255	TF1-255	30 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
256	TF1-256	30 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
257	TF1-257	30 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
258	TF1-258	30 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003	IS MK	1

			Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	AG ATB BK SK	
259	TF1-259	30 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
260	TF1-260	30 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
261	TF1-261	30 October 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
262	TF1-262	4 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
263	TF1-263	21-22 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003	IS MK AG	10

			Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	ATB BK SK	
264	TF1-264	18 September 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
265	TF1-265	No Date	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
		18 November 2003 (CIN)	February 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	2
266	TF1-267	13 April 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
267	TF1-268	13 April 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
268	TF1-269	13 April 2003	Nov 14, 2003	IS	4

			Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	MK AG ATB BK SK	
269	TF1-270	13 April 2003	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
270	TF1-271	5 November 2002 25 February 2004 (CIN)	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 March 11, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK To all 6 accused	6 2
271	TF1-266	4 November 2003 (Summary) 5 November 2003 (Summary)	Nov 14, 2003 Dec 10, 2003 Dec 17, 2003 Nov 19, 2003 Nov 18, 2003 Nov 19, 2003	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1 1
272	TF1-272	17 January 2004 (CIN) Redacted Statement (no	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG	2 7

		date)	Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	ATB BK SK	
273	TF1-273	18 November 2003 (Transcript)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	175
274	TF1-274	21 January 2004 (Summary of 31 July 2003 statement)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
275	TF1-275	22 January 2004 (Summary of 17&21/11/03)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
276	TF1-276	23 January 2004 (Summary)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
276	TF1-276	No Date	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004	IS MK AG ATB	3

			Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	BK SK	
277	TF1-277	4 September 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
278	TF1-278	10 March 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
279	TF1-279	No Specific Date. Sept 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
		26 November 2003 (CIN)	7 Feb 2004	To all 6 accused	1
280	TF1-280	4 March 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
281	TF1-281	No date	Feb 7, 2004	IS	3

			Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	MK AG ATB BK SK	
282	TF1-282	16 September 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
283	TF1-283	18 June 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
283	TF1-283	12 July 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
284	TF1-284	18 September 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
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287	TF1-287	8 July 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
288	TF1-288	27 July 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
289	TF1-289	20 January 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
290	TF1-290	20 January 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG	1

			Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	ATB BK SK	
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292	TF1-292	20 January 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
293	TF1-293	20 January 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
294	TF1-294	16 January 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
295	TF1-295	3 February 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004	IS MK AG ATB	2

			Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	BK SK	
297	TF1-297	1 February 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
298	TF1-298	4 February 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
299	TF1-299	18 October 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
300	TF1-300	No Date	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
300	TF1-300	11 November 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004	IS MK AG ATB	2

			Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	BK SK	
302	TF1-302	No Date	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
303	TF1-303	15 November 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
304	TF1-304	16 November 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
304	TF1-304	27 January 2004 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
305	TF1-305	11 December 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2

306	TF1-306	2 December 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
		27 January 2004 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004	To all 6 accused	1
307	TF1-307	5 November 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
308	TF1-308	5 November 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
309	TF1-309	1 February 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
310	TF1-310	13 December 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004	IS MK AG ATB	2

			Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	BK SK	
311	TF1-311	11 December 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
312	TF1-312	11 December 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
313	TF1-313	3 October 2003 6 February 2004 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 24, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK To all 6 accused	6 1
314	TF1-314	29 October 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
315	TF1-315	9 October 2003	Feb 7, 2004	IS	3

			Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	MK AG ATB BK SK	
316	TF1-316	29 November 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
317	TF1-317	1 February 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
318	TF1-318	30 January 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	4
318	TF1-318	16 November 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	5
319	TF1-319	16 May 2000 & 7 June 2000	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK	11

			Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	AG ATB BK SK	
319	TF1-319	10 October 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
320	TF1-320	29 October 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
321	TF1-321	No Date	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
323	TF1-323	No Date	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	16
323	TF1-323	1 March 2004 (CIN)	March 11, 2004	To all 6 accused	1

323	TF1-323	24 November 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
324	TF1-324	7 November 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
325	TF1-325	30 January 2004 (Summary of 10/12/02 & 13/12/02 transcripts)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
326	TF1-326	30 January 2004 (Summary of 11 November 2003 statement)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
327	TF1-327	29 March 2003 4 February 2004 (CIN)	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3 1
328	TF1-328	29 November 2002	Feb 7, 2004	IS	4

			Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	MK AG ATB BK SK	
329	TF1-329	25 March 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	6
330	TF1-330	27 March 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	10
331	TF1-331	4 March 2003	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
333	TF1-333	25 November 2002	Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 6, 2004 Feb 7, 2004 Feb 7, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
334	TF1-334	5, 6, 7 & 24 November,	Feb 24, 2004	IS	5(25),

		2003 (Transcript)		MK AG ATB BK SK	6(28) 7(41) 24(29)
335	TF1-335	31 January, February 2, 23, 24, 2003	Feb 24, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	31(2), 2(8), 23(7), 24(5)
336	TF1-336	3, 10, & 11 November 2003 (Redacted Transcript)	Feb 24, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3(46), 10(34) 11(36)
337	TF1-337	20 November 2003 (Redacted Transcript)	Feb 24, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	64
338	TF1-338	March 2, 2004 (Summary)	March 11, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
339	TF1-339	July 9, 2003	March 11, 2004	IS MK	6

				AG ATB BK SK	
340	TF1-340	17 October 2002 (Unredacted Transcript)	March 18, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	39, 19
341	TF1-341	14 October 2002 (Unredacted Transcript)	March 18, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	33, 49, 39, 41
342	TF1-342	13 June 2003	March 31, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
343	TF1-343	18 March 2004	March 31, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	3
344	TF1-344	29 October 2003	March 31, 2004	IS MK AG	1

				ATB BK SK	
345	TF1-345	24 March 2004	March 31, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	2
346	TF1-346	29 October 2003	March 31, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	1
347	TF1-347	18 January 2004 & 26 March 2004	March 31, 2004	IS MK AG ATB BK SK	18(48) 26(40)

COVER SHEET 3

WITNESS SUMMARIES

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Note: The table has been divided first by crime base and secondly by evidence of individual criminal responsibility ("ICR").

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FREETOWN CRIME BASE

1. CRIME BASE WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TFI -169	<p>SESAY: 11 Aug 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 11 Aug 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 22 Sept 2003; 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 13	90 minutes	The witness is an architect and will testify that during January 1999 45 government quarters (which housed civil servants) were burned. Public buildings were also burned. These included the CID, the Ministry of Finance, the Vice President's office, the Central Police Station, the City Hall and the Ministry of Works. During the course of investigations into the burning of this property, the witness was told about the killing of civil servants and the burning of their properties.
PN TF1-339	<p>SESAY: 11 March 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 11 March 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 11 March 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 11 March 2004</p>	1, 13	90 minutes	This witness is an architect and will testify as to the scale of destruction caused by burning in Freetown during the January invasion and the measures taken to alleviate the problem of homelessness caused by the destruction.

	KAMARA: 11 March 2004 KANU: 11 March 2004			
PN TFI-021	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	60 minutes	This witness will testify that he was hiding with many other civilians in the Rogbullah mosque in Kissy on 6 January 1999. It was entered by armed men who identified themselves as the RUF and the People's Army. The group told the crowd in the mosque that they were going to kill all civilians as revenge to President Kabba. The people in the Mosque gave the rebels money. Then the group opened fire on the civilians in the mosque, killing 50 people. The witness played dead, and a rebel took money from his pocket.
PN TFI -278	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	90 minutes	This witness will testify that he lived in Falco Street. Prior to 10 January 1999 RUF rebels arrived in the area and a few days after 10 January 1999 SLA soldiers arrived. On 21 January 1999 the witness saw houses being set on fire by the soldiers. The commander ordering the burning of houses was named "Firefirst." The witness heard the rebels say that they were going to burn all the houses. The witness saw many houses burning in Kissy from 19-22 January 1999. Along with his family and other civilians the witness tried to escape on 22 January 1999. They were captured by 5 SLA

				soldiers on Parsonage Street. These soldiers killed 2 children. Then one who called himself "Captain Two Hands No Mercy" cut off both hands of another man in the group and told him to go to President Kabbah. The same man then cut off both of the witness's hands.
PN TFI -280	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	60 minutes	This witness will testify that four days after the rebels entered Freetown on 6 January 1999 they shot and killed the witness's neighbor and burned a nearby house. The rebels also tried to kill the witness, but he ran away. On 18 January 1999 the witness was searching for food for his family near Mount Oriel Terrace when he was captured by a large group of rebels. The witness was later told by his children that they were under the command of Captain Blood. The witness saw seven dead civilians at the scene. The rebels amputated the witness's hand with an axe and told him to go to Tejan Kabbah. The witness was later told that the rebel who amputated his hand was a SLA soldier.
PN TFI -265	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003; 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 17 Dec	1, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	The witness will testify that on 11 February 1998 in Lumpa village outside of Waterloo, 5 rebels came to the witness's house and killed her husband. The rebel who shot her husband was "Peleto." The witness's house was burned down by rebels retreating from Freetown. The rebels abducted the witness. The group

	<p>2003; 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003; 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 19 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p>			<p>proceeded to Konta then Lunsar, attacked Tendakum and Nonkoba on the way. The commanders of the rebels were using radios. The witness heard the rebels talking about burning down Nonkoba.</p>
PN TFI - 081	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003; 18 March 2004 KALLON: 26 May 2003; 18 March 2004 GBAO: 14 October 2003; 18 March 2004 BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 18 March 2004 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004</p>	1, 6, 7, 8, 12,13	120 minutes	<p>The witness will testify that she was working with an NGO which provided treatment and counseling for sexual and physical abuse of 1168 rebel abductees from the January 1999 Freetown invasion. The witness prepared the overall report by issued by the NGO, which states that of the 1168 abductees, most were abducted from Freetown and 58.5% were raped. The majority of the abductees were young girls. Of the abductees 23.4% were physically beaten for refusing to have sex or carry heavy goods. Most of the victims were from Freetown, specifically from Calaba Town, Wellington, Kissy.</p>

PN TFI -082	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	6, 7, 8	120 minutes	The witness will testify that she was working with an NGO which provided treatment and counseling for sexual and physical abuse of 1168 rebel abductees from the January 1999 Freetown invasion. The witness personally treated 184 cases of abductions, 85 of which were girls under age 18. Almost all of the women were used as sexual slaves. All of the women abducted were from Freetown, specifically the eastern area of Freetown. More than half were held by the rebels for over 5 months. The victims told the witness that the perpetrators were either AFRC, ex-SLA or RUF. Most of the abductees treated by the witness were taken to Lunsar, while some taken to Makeni, Port Loko and Occra Hill.
PN TFI -098	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 9, 10, 12	60 minutes	The witness will testify that he was in the Calaba Town area of Freetown on 6 January 1999 when the rebels entered Freetown, forcing civilians to carry loads. The witness recognized some of the rebels as former SLA soldiers and many spoke "Liberian language." The witness and his family were hiding in their house when the rebels burned it. On 18 January 1999 the witness and 20 other civilians were captured by the rebels while hiding in another house on Kissy Road. The witness and 10 other men were walked to a rebel base on Fatarama street where the rebels said "we are going to give you a message for Tejan Kabbah." The rebels also

				said that this was "No living thing." Then the rebels proceeded to cut hands off of the men and the witness saw about 4-5 men amputated before the witness had his left hand amputated. A total of 10 men were amputated. "Tommy" who was an ex-SLA who did the cutting. The witness was later told that "Captain Blood" was in charge of this area and that he killed many people.
PN TFI -233	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13	60 minutes	The witness will testify that as the rebels were fleeing on 22 January 1999 to the Calaba Town area of Freetown, they were trying to kill as many people as possible. The witness and 10 other civilians were hiding near the big Mosque in a compound between Bangura and Tejan Streets. On 28 January 1999 two rebels with guns found the witness and the others. The rebels demanded money and harassed the group, and forcing them to give 86 bags of rice. The group was later taken to a house with an unnamed commander who ordered the group to be amputated. The first civilian begged and was chopped to the head and later died. A rebel with a machete then cut off both hands of the witness, telling him to go tell Kabbah that if police or ECOMOG come they will get same treatment.
PN TFI -119	SESAY: 2 June 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13	90 minutes	The witness will testify that she was living in Kenema when RUF commander Sam Bockarie

	<p>KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>			<p>arrived there after the May 1997 coup d'tat. While in Kenema, Sam Bockarie and his boys raped several women from the Bondu bush society. Also in Kenema Bockarie declared "Operation Pay Yourself". During this time the rebels started burning houses at night. The witness will testify that she was in Freetown living on Ross road off Kissy Road when the rebels invaded on 6 January 1999. The rebels killed her fiancé in front of her and put his head on a stick. The rebels were RUF mixed with SLAs. The witness was taken by some RUF rebels and forced to carry looted property along the Peninsula road. Upon reaching Kambia the witness, who was pregnant, started bleeding black and realized her fetus had died. The rebels, arguing whether it was a boy or girl, cut the witness open between her anus and vagina with scissors to take out the baby. The witness fainted and the rebels left her. Since this time, the witness has had 9 operations.</p>
PN TFI -226	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 9	60 minutes	<p>The witness will testify that on 12 January 1999 she and her family and friends, about 20 civilians, were attacked in her family home on Blackhall road in Kissy by a group of 8 rebels. The commanding officer of the group identified himself as "Killer." Killer told the people in the house that he had just killed 11 other people in another house. He then opened fire on the group. Two people died immediately. The</p>

	Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			witness and another person were injured. The witness was later told that the rebel group went into another house and killed 4 people and that prior to this event, 11 people had been killed in a house next to the witness'. The witness's arm became infected from the gun shot wound and she had to have it amputated.
PN TFI -087	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 9, 10	60 minutes	The witness will testify that on Friday 22 January 1999, he and two other men were captured near St. Patrick's church in Kissy by four rebels. One rebel with an axe amputated the witness's right hand and partially amputated his left hand. After cutting his hands, the rebels told the witness to go to President Kabbah. The witness later saw many others with their hands amputated at Summertime Clinic, including a 14 year old girl and one of the men he was with when captured. That man had both hands amputated. Prior to this incident, another rebel burned the witness's house.
PN TFI -240	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18	1, 2, 9, 10	60 minutes	The witness will testify that on 20 January 1999 he was captured with 20 other civilians at a house in the Blackhall Road area of Kissy in Freetown. The rebel commander ordered that the men line up. The witness was called forward. The rebel said "You people are supporting Tejan Kabbah so if you want hands, go to him." The rebel then attempted to cut both hands off the witness. The cuts did not go all

	Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			the way through and he still has both hands, although they are permanently damaged. Later on, the witness was told that the commanding officer of the group was called CO Sullay "Cut Hand."
PN TFI -104	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	60 minutes	This witness will testify that on 18 January 1999 RUF and SLA rebels entered the Good Sheppard Hospital in Kissy. The rebels took out a man whom they accused of being a Nigerian soldier and shot and killed him. The commanding officers of the group were Captain Sheppard and Captain Blood. The rebels also rounded civilians and brought them to Parliament. The rebels started shooting them and killed 15 people. The witness was wounded and taken to hospital following which he went home. Later the rebels were burning houses on Congress Road in Kissy. The witness was locked in a house which was set alight but managed to escape.
PN TFI -083	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13	90 minutes	This witness will testify that he was with his family in Kissy on 6 January 1999 when rebels harassed and looted from civilians in the area. Ten days after they arrived, the rebels started burning many houses. The witness saw many dead bodies on Samuel Street with gun shot wounds and machete marks. The people from Kissy who escaped to Thunder Hill area of Freetown told the witness that the rebels had

	Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			started amputating hands. One week later the witness was trying to escape with a group of others, including a wounded friend, to the Ferry Junction. The group was stopped by seven rebels at Low Cost Junction and forced to strip. A rebel took Le300,000 from the witness. Two of the rebels argued over who would get to have the 14 year old sister of the witness. The witness saw many dead bodies. The commander of the rebels said that these people should have their hands cut and President Kabbah would give them new hands. The witness had his hand cut off in one chop. The rebel who cut his hand told the witness to go to Kabbah for another one. Another man was amputated. A third, after having his fingers amputated, was shot to death. At and near the Rogbollah mosque, where the witness went to seek refuge, there were dead bodies of men, women and children. The witness's 14 year old sister was taken by the rebels. She later told him that she was raped by the rebels Occra Hill and had a baby.
PN TFI -022	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13	90 minutes	This witness will testify that he was with his family in Kissy on 6 January 1999 when rebels harassed and looted from civilians in the area. There were many armed children with the rebels. On 22 January 1999 the witness was traveling four other people down Low Cost Junction, attempting to bring their injured

	2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			neighbor to the hospital. At the time many rebels were moving from Kissy to Wellington. Seven rebels forced the group to strip and then march to Winter road. Upon reaching the junction of Winter road and Old Road the commander of the seven rebels said that these people should be amputated. The witness saw seven corpses with their throats cut at the junction. A girl in the group, approximately 11 years old, was given to the commander as a "wife." One rebel with an axe proceeded to cut off the hand of another man and then cut the hand off the witness. Both hands were placed in a bag. A third man was called forward and shot to death after having his fingers cut. The 11 year old boy in the group was not heard from again. The 11 year old girl in the group was abducted. The witness was told she was held for several months then released from Occra Hill. At Connaught Hospital there were over 50 amputees. As the rebels were leaving Kissy the witness saw that there were three columns with abducted civilians in the middle so they would not escape.
PN TFI -101	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	90 minutes	The witness will testify that on 17 January 1999 his house was burned down by rebels. On 18 January 1999 he was hiding with about 50 other civilians in a house near the Kissy Mental Hospital. They were found by 7 rebels. 29 of the men, including the witness, were led out into

	BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			the street where they were ordered to sit down by the rebels. The commander of the rebels told them that because they voted for Tejan Kabbah they would be amputated. The first two picked to be amputated both refused and were shot and killed by the commanding officer. Then the commanding officer opened fire on the line, killing three more people. The commanding officer then turned to a rebel with an axe and said that he did not want to waste ammunition before shooting another 6 civilians. The rebel with the axe killed 5 more people by chopping them to the head. The rebels then amputated both of the witness's hands and the hands of another man. Colonel Rambo joined the group. The witness recognized him as one of Johnny Paul Koroma's boys. Rambo questioned his soldiers as to why they had killed and amputated. The soldiers did not respond but merely saluted him. Rambo then ordered one of the soldiers to call Captain Blood for him.
PN TFI -103	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	60 minutes	The witness will testify that he was on duty at the Connaught Hospital on 6 January 1999 when a large group of RUF soldiers under the command of Adema came into hospital. The witness was told by a friend that Sam Maskita Bockarie was visiting a white building across the street where diamond dealers lived. At least 20 patients died as a result of soldiers preventing treatment to civilians. The rebels

	Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			said their boss was Foday Sankoh and that Charles Taylor would be sending them help. On the same day the soldiers beat to death a boy they accused of being a Kamajor. Days later over 50 amputees arrived at the hospital including men, women (30-35%) and children. (20%) Most of the amputees were from Kissy and said that those who amputated them were rebels. Some victims described that soldiers would ask them if they wanted "long sleeve" or "short sleeve" to determine the length of the amputation.
PN TFI -099	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13	60 minutes	The witness will testify that on approximately 22 January 1999 she was in the Peacock Farm area of Kissy in Freetown as the rebels were withdrawing from the city. Two amputee victims ran by. One yelled that the rebels were killing people and cutting off hands. Commanders in the area who the witness heard being called included Colonel "Kill Man No Blood" and "Camra Rebel" Some rebels entered the room where the witness and others were hiding. The rebels immediately shot and killed a 60 year old man. Two other rebels proceeded to chop at a woman's head. She fell bleeding and died 7 days later. The rebels amputated one of the witness's hands and attempted to amputate the other. They looted and then set the house on fire. At Connaught hospital the witness saw many other amputees, some of whom died of

				their wounds.
PN TFI -097	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13	60 minutes	The witness will testify that he was staying near the Kissy Mental Hospital when the rebels invaded Freetown on 6 January 1999. The big commanders were based at Ferry Junction. There were many armed children with the rebels. Some in uniform were as young as 10 years old. On 8 January 1999 the rebels set his neighbors house on fire. The rebels were stealing a lot from the civilians. On 19 January 1999 the witness saw 5 civilians, 3 men and 2 women, who had their hands amputated by the rebels. On 20 January 1999, as ECOMOG was advancing, one SLA soldier named "Captain Blood," and one rebel named "the Killer" came to the witness's house. The witness was caught as he attempted to escape. They held him down and amputated his hand, telling the witness to go to Kabbah for he has many hands. The rebels also cut off both hands of the witness's nephew, who was then burned alive when the rebels set the house on fire. In the area at the time the witness also saw the rebels capture young girls, aged 13-17, and take them into houses where they would be heard screaming.
PN TFI -086	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13	60 minutes	The witness will testify that on 14 January 1999, the rebels, who identified themselves as SLA soldiers, started looting from the witness's

	<p>May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>			<p>house in Kissy. Two days earlier the rebels killed two civilians. On 20 January 1999 the witness and other civilians attempted to reach the Kissy Mental Hospital area, which they heard was safe. The witness was captured by six rebels, one of whom he recognized as "Junior", an SLA. The rebels amputated both of the witness's hands. They told him to "Go to Tejan Kabbah, he will give you hands. You will never vote again." The witness saw many amputees at Connaught hospital including three people that he knew, all of whom said that the rebels had amputated their hands.</p>
PN TF1-096	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 6, 7, 8, 9	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that the rebels looted and set fire to her house on 7 January 1999. The house at 7 Davies street was also burned. The rebels amputated the right hand of boy who lived on Rose street. During the next fortnight the rebels abducted the witness's sister and kept her for one month. The witness's sister told her grandmother that she was raped while held. On 21 January rebels took the witness out of her house, forced her to walk ½ a mile down Davies street before amputating both of her arms on the root of a Mango tree. On way to hospital the witness saw 5 other amputees (3 boys and 2 girls). At the hospital she saw many more amputees who were from the Kissy Wellington area.</p>

PN TF1-105	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 4, 5, 9	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that on 6 January 1999 four rebels including Capt Blood came to the witness's house in Calaba Town. He knew Blood because he had seen him shoot and kill a civilian next door on December 24. Captain Blood stabbed the witness in the chest and cut off four of his fingers. Blood told him to go tell Kabbah that the rebels are in Calaba Town. That night the witness hid in the swamp and saw many houses burning. He later saw many amputees in Connaught Hospital.</p>
PN TF1-287	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 3, 4, 5	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that in January 1999 he was with his family in Wellington. The witness was told that an AFRC soldier arrested newspaper deputy editor Paul Mansaray, his wife and children and 12 other church members from church. They were then taken to a rebel base and shot.</p>
PN TF1-084	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that he was with his wife at Blackhall Road in Kissy when rebels invaded on 6 January 1999. His house was looted. Col. Akim and Collins were the COs. The witness was told about rebels killing a boy who was</p>

	October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			wood seller on Davis Street. The witness saw COs giving orders to burn houses at the David Street and Blackhall Road intersection. On 18 January the witness and others were captured as they attempted to escape. The witness saw the rebels kill 7 people before they amputated his hand. The witness later met another amputee who told him that his hand had been chopped off by rebels.
PN TF1-027	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that she was part of a group of 30 women hiding in the Bundu Bush when she was captured by rebels. The witness saw rebels burn a house containing 3 people and shoot 3 people, killing 2. She also saw 20 people killed by being burned alive in Peacock Farms. Small boys were used to burn the house. The witness was taken with 30 other girls to Calaba Town. There she was put in house with 6 others. They were raped every night by different groups of men. After 14 days she was taken to Waterloo where the commander was "Eat Alive". She stayed at Waterloo for 2 months. Many young girls and boys were captured on way to Waterloo. The girls were raped at Waterloo repeatedly. All newly captured girls were raped.
PN TF1-188	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8	60 Minutes	The witness is a doctor who will testify that he heard about 20 cases of rape that occurred in the areas of Kissy, Wellington and Thunder Hill

	Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			<p>sometime after January 15 1999. The witness estimates that between January 6 and 15 50 civilians died because they were denied treatment on order of rebels. On January 7 2 civilians in the hospital were "stomped" to death. Also on January 7 the witness saw over 40 dead civilians brought to hospital. Between January 6 and 8 the witness saw 50 bodies mostly of women and children on the street near hospital. Between January 9 and 16 the witness saw 200 bodies mostly of women and children seen on street. The witness saw 2-3 cases of reported gang rape seen at the National Stadium.</p>
PN TF1-331	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9	60 Minutes	<p>The witness will testify that she was in her house when she saw rebels with civilians entering Wellington. The rebels burnt two houses on Palmer street. A week later rebels told people to come out of hiding, promising that they would not be harmed. The witness and others were taken to the Looking Town area in Kissy. When the rebels started retreating they lined the civilians up. The witness saw the rebels cut a six month old baby in half with machete. The baby's grandmother told the witness that she had been raped. The rebels beat the witness's husband with a stone. He later died. The rebels amputated the witness's left hand and told her to go to Kabbah for peace.</p>

P TF1-235.	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that his 7 children and grandchildren were executed by SLAs who accused them of supporting ECOMOG and Kabbah. Other family members were injured. The witness's house in Wellington was later burned.
PN TF1-234	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 9	45 Minutes	This witness will testify that he was in Kissy when rebels invaded. He saw the rebels take 4 men from their compound and later a neighbor told the witness that the men had been killed. The witness saw rebels set a neighbors house on fire. He also saw rebels shoot and kill his friend as friend tried to escape. The witness was taken to Samuels street where his arm was amputated by rebels.
PN TF1-106	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p>	1, 9, 10	60 minutes	The witness will testify to the way in which the AFRC/RUF executed operations during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown that focused on amputations, including "Operation Cut Hand" and "Operation Cut Limbs". The witness will provide evidence on treatment at

	BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			Connaught hospital of amputees during and after the AFRC/RUF invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999; and on the process of exhumations of civilians performed after the AFRC/RUF January 1999 invasion of Freetown.
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2. ICR WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TFI-023	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13	150 minutes	<p>The witness will testify that in January 1999, AFRC rebels looted her house in Wellington. On 13 January 1999 rebels burned the witness's house down. On 22 January 1999 she and her sister were abducted by AFRC rebels from Wellington along with many young girls from Freetown. In the Kola Tree area of Freetown the witness saw rebels amputate both hands and cut off the tongue of a man. The witness was forced to be the wife of Col. Rambo whose real name is Idrissa Kamara. She was raped on several occasions. The overall commander of the group was Brigadier Gullit. Other commanders in the group included Brigadier Bazy. While walking to Waterloo, the young girls, women and men were forced to carry looted goods. In Mile 38, the rebels killed between 10-15 civilians and placed their heads on sticks. Bazy was the commander. In Magbene Bazy beat the witness. While in Magbene the group called themselves the West Side Boys and communicated with the RUF who were based in Makeni. The group attacked Mamama, killed civilians and reported this to Bazy. The witness heard Bazy give orders to beat and kill civilians.</p>

PN TFI-093	SESAY: 2 June 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 26 May 2003; 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 14 October 2003; 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004	1, 3, 4, 5	150 minutes	This witness will testify that after the intervention but prior to the Freetown invasion she was with other rebels in Moyamba. During this time there were communications between CO Papay, Superman, Mosquito, Johnny Paul Koroma, Issa Sesay and 55. The witness will testify that she was a member of the RUF and was in command of a RUF group under Commander Superman that entered Freetown in January 1999. The group consisted of about 100 RUF members and no AFRC. Prior to the invasion Superman was in communication with 55 and Issa Sesay. The communications contained instructions for movements. Superman was also in communication with Mosquito just prior to the invasion. Superman told the witness that they were receiving help from Charles Taylor in Liberia. A large shipment of weapons came to Okkra Hills. These weapons were used by the group in the Freetown invasion. Superman told the witness that these weapons came from Charles Taylor. The witness will testify that she commanded a group in the Cline Town area of Freetown. The witness instructed the group to burn people alive in houses in the Fourah Bay and Uppgun areas. The group killed lots of people in Cline Town, Uppgun, Forah Bay and Camkeh.
TF1-092	SESAY: 2 June 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13	120 minutes	This witness will testify that she was captured from Waterloo on 12 December 1998 by a RUF

	<p>KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>		<p>under a group commanded by SAJ Musa. The group took the witness to her uncle's house in Waterloo. Her uncle gave the rebels money, after which the rebels gouged out his eyes and stabbed him to death. On 6 January 1999 the group attacked Freetown through Calaba Town. The witness escaped to her aunt's house in Kissy but on 20 January 1999 was recaptured by the rebels led by Commander 05. The rebels performed amputations near the Kissy Mental Hospital and burned people alive in houses. As the group was leaving Freetown the rebels forced people to carry things. Old people who could not carry loads were shot and killed. There were different groups of rebels. The commanders included 55, Junior and Rambo. At Magbeni CO 55 announced that they were crossing the river and those not with a group would be "left behind". This meant they would be killed. The rebels did kill some people. The witness was drugged and raped in Magbeni by her capturer Ibrahim. The witness will say that the commanders knew that women were being raped but never stopped it. Many of the girls who were captured were forced to do work like pounding rice. The small girls would cry a lot when they were forced to have sex with the rebels. At that time, the rebels were a mixed group of RUF and SLA, but mostly SLA. At 6 Mile, the rebels distributed the girls in the witness's group, 2 of whom were about 10</p>
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				years old, amongst themselves. The girls became bush wives and slept with the rebels.
PN TFI-277	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	This witness will testify that on 6 January 1999, he saw Santigue Kanu "55" in Lumpa leading rebels into the western area. The rebels consisted of both SLA soldiers and RUF rebels. In Waterloo 55 killed a 20 year old girl because his fighting men were being distracted by women and reluctant to go to the front line. After 55 went to Lumpa, the witness heard that he killed eight more people including the witness's father-in-law.
PN TFI-088	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	120 minutes	The witness will testify that the leader of the AFRC/RUF military regime was Johnny Paul Koroma and his deputy was Foday Sankoh. Sankoh was in Nigeria at the time of the Coup d' tat. Members of the Supreme Council for the AFRC/RUF regime included 55, Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazy Kamara, and Issa Sesay. Morris Kallon was the Regional Commander of the southern command and was based in Koribondo in Bo District. Tamba Brima was the overall commander of the forces that invaded Freetown in January 1999. Tamba Brima and Junior Lion attacked a house on Fort Street and abducted a girl. On 7 January 1999 Junior Johnson executed 8 women at Tower Hill

				because they were girlfriends to members of ECOMOG.
PN TFI-152	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13	150 minutes	This witness will testify as to the AFRC and RUF alliance; the AFRC/RUF commanders including "Gullit"; the AFRC/RUF attack on Freetown in January 1999; the AFRC/RUF commanders involved in the January 1999 attack on Freetown which included Gborie, Amara, and "Junior"; the AFRC/RUF retreat from Freetown; and to killings, rape, sexual slavery, abductions, forced labour, and the use of child soldiers.
PN TFI-024	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12	60 minutes	The witness will testify that he was captured by rebels from his home in Freetown along with seven others and taken to the Statehouse. There they joined about 50 other captured civilians. The commander in charge of Statehouse was "Gullit." Five of these civilians, including 3 women, who refused to join the rebels, were shot dead on Gullit's orders. The witness was at Statehouse for four nights and heard girls crying "I no de gree, me na small pikin" and being raped. The witness saw many girls being raped on the Statehouse grounds. Later the witness heard Gullit say that ECOMOG was coming and then heard Gullit's boys saying that if ECOMOG removed them

				from the Statehouse they would burn down many houses. The witness was forced to carry a B15 bomb to Calaba as they retreated. The witness escaped in Calaba Town.
PN TFI-264	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 4, 5, 7, 8	60 minutes	The witness will testify that the rebels attacked Waterloo prior to New Years Day 1999. A few weeks later the rebels again attacked Waterloo, this time from the Freetown direction. The witness and her family took refuge in the nearby village of Lumpa. In Lumpa 5 rebels came to the witness's house. One shot her father three times. The leader of the rebels in this group was Captain Peleto, who was RUF. Many people were being abducted by the rebels in the bush. One of 5 men who raided the bush tried to force the witness to have sex with the witness's in-law. She refused and had her underclothes torn from her. The witness and a few others ran towards Masiaka to hide. The witness was hiding in "Kathel" Village until it was attacked by rebels led by Colonel Pikin, Brigadier 55 and General Issa.
PN TFI-176	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19</p>	1, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	The witness will testify that in early January 1999 he was abducted from Lumpa by a group of rebels under the command of SAJ Musa. About 30 civilians, including pregnant women, children and young men, were abducted from Lumpa. At Lumpa the abductees were tied together in pairs by their clothes. They were

	Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			taken to Benguima. SAJ Musa was killed in Benguima. Superman ordered his burial and promised a state funeral after the group had completed its mission to Freetown. Issa Sesay was present at the ammunitions dump. The group remained in the hills for three days. Prior to entering Freetown Superman and Issa Sesay ordered the sacrifice of 5 women and 5 men from the abductees. They were killed with their hands behind their backs. The witness heard that Issa Sesay ordered everyone to rub the human blood on their faces before leaving for Freetown. There were approximately 250 abductees with the group before they entered Freetown. Days later Peleto, a rebel commander, was engaged in house to house executions in Lumpa.
PN TFI – 029	SESAY: 2 June 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 26 May 2003; 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 14 October 2003; 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 6	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10	100 minutes	This witness will testify that on 22 January 1999 she was abducted by the rebels from her home in the Industrial area of Freetown. She was taken to Calaba Town and Benguima with 20 other girls. The rebels were a mix of SLA, AFRC and RUF. In Calaba Town the rebels cut off the head of a captured ECOMOG soldier. In Calaba, about 20 of the girls in the group told the witness that they had been raped, often twice a day. They also said that if they refused to have sex with the rebels they would be beaten and burnt with cigarettes. The witness saw some girls with cigarette burns. The

	Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004			witness heard the shooting of a 20 year old girl by a rebel soldier and saw the body. Colonel Tito of the AFRC shot and killed 3 nuns that were among the abducted. Houses were burned in Calaba Town. On 21 January 1999 10 people were burned alive in a house. In the bush between Calaba Town and Hastings the rebels killed 15 babies by smashing them in front of their mothers. The rebels said the babies were making too much noise. The witness was raped five times by "Major" once the group reached Benguima. At least 10 other girls held with the witness were being used for sex. Over 200 civilians were captured and were used as shields against Kamajor attacks. Commander 55 was present in Benguima.
PN TFI -279	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	This witness will testify that the rebels came to Waterloo sometime in 1998 and burned houses before going to Freetown. Two days later the rebels came back and based themselves in Waterloo. One of the rebel commanders in the area was called Peleto. Another commander was Morris Kallon. While the rebels were there, Peleto entered and old woman's house and killed the two women in there. At this point the witness fled the area. When the witness returned he found five partially decomposed bodies by the side of his burnt house.

PN TFI-085	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12	120 minutes	<p>The witness will testify that on 6 January 1999 AFRC rebels took money and food from her house in the Wellington area of Freetown. On 9 January 1999 another group of rebels arrived and amputated the arm of a 5 year old girl. Then they made the witness's mother choose either to be amputated or give the rebels her daughter, being the witness. The rebels took the witness out of the house and set the house on fire. There were many armed children with the rebels, including one that was about 5 years old. The witness was abducted with 6 others and forced to carry ammunition to Allentown. There the commander of the group, Major James, raped the witness both vaginally and anally. Two other women fought off rape but were killed by the rebels. Five other civilians were also stabbed to death. 55 passed the order to abductees to eat human heart on pain of death. Also in Allentown Issa Sesay passed an order to flog the witness for setting clothes in a visible position. As the group continued to retreat but before they reached Waterloo, Commander 55 ordered CO Daramey to kill a baby boy that was crying because 55 was concerned about the noise. CO Daramey placed the baby in the grave alive. He then forced the mother to throw dirt on the grave and then to dance on it. 55 and Issa Sesay were CO Daramey's bosses. The group stayed for a day in Lumpah. The witness was taken with many</p>
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				<p>other captured civilians to Lunsar and Masiaka. There were hundreds of abducted women and girls. At Masiaka there were many commanders present including Issa Sesay. These commanders all had many wives. Many girls complained about rape to commanders 55 and Issa Sesay but were told that they were "wives" and not to complain.</p>
PN TF1-102	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that he was released from Pademba Prison on January 6 1999. He rejoined the Junta at Statehouse. Commander Bazzie and Commander Jr. Johnson were at Statehouse with their troops. The witness saw commanders ordering amputations. The overall commander was Bazzy. Gullit was the second in command. Around Black Hole road the witness saw Gullit kick open the doors of houses, take out people - mainly women and children, and shoot them. He saw him shoot 2 women and 6 children. The witness saw a lot of civilians in the group retreating from Freetown. The civilians were used to carry the heavy ammunition and other supplies. Women were also taken for bush wives and small boys to train for fighting. All the people abducted were trained to fight. This was called Junta II. The witness also saw Gullit shoot an officer because he did not want to go and fight ECOMOG. Between Kissy and Kabala town the witness saw soldiers enter houses during the</p>

				<p>night, take women out to the bush and then take them to the bush as wives. Some even raped the women inside the house. The soldiers were all under Bazzy and Gullit. Other commanders included Col. Keydo - who answered to Bazzy, Col. Rambo Red Goat, Col. 55, and Gun Boots.</p>
PN TF1-227	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that on 5 January 1999 rebels attacked near his house in the Kola Tree area. The witness knew of about 10 girls abducted by rebels occupying the area. He had been told that one was raped. On 23 January the witness was abducted. He identified AFRC commanders such as "Gunboat," "Col "Bastard," Adamu, and Baoyo. Along with about 300 other civilians the witness was forced to retreat with rebels from Kola Tree. They had to carry items. About 120 of the civilians were women and children. On 29 January he was taken with another large group of civilians to Waterloo. There he was told about the killing of a nun at Kola Tree. While in Kola Tree the witness knew of the "burning squad" that was tasked with burning houses. The squad contained two children about 14-15 years old. At Waterloo he saw 1000 abducted civilians, 600 of them were women and children. The witness will say that the AFRC and RUF were cooperating in Waterloo after the invasion. 55 was the overall commander at Benguema.</p>

				<p>Abducted women were forced to cook and clean. Many were sexually abused. At night the commanders would send for them and refusal of sex resulted in a beating. Two girls ages 15 and 16 were raped by Gunboat. 55 made two announcements during muster parades to civilians and rebels about observing certain rules. These included no raping, no stealing and no killing. The rules broken all the time. The witness never saw anyone punished. The witness saw many SBUs who were about 10 years old. The witness saw Foday Bah shoot and kill a mute civilian for lump of sugar. The witness saw that the AFRC was in communication with Rambo and the RUF. He heard that Gullit was in Makeni at time. The witness the chain of command was as follows: Gullit – Bazzy – Foday Bah. 55 – Snake. Commander Bazzy – Junior Lion were at Mile 38 in late March 1999.</p>
PNTF1- 281	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was captured in Freetown on 6 January 1999 and taken to Waterloo where 7 rebels raped her. Prior to the incident she was a virgin. Other girls were also raped, one of whom was left because she could not walk. The witness walked to Makeni with the rebels . There she was raped by Colonel Papa and used as his sex slave. The witness became pregnant by him. She received military training and was given a pistol. While in Makeni</p>

	KANU: 7 Feb 2004			the witness saw SAJ Musa, Colonel Issa and others killing those who disobeyed orders. The witness went with rebels on missions when people were captured and food items looted. Colonel Issa punished people for raping. Foday Sankoh promised to look into the complaints of the witness and to take care of baby she had with the rebel.
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BO CRIME BASE

1. CRIME BASE WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF 1-005	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	60 minutes	This witness will testify that in July 1997, heavily armed SLA/Junta forces attacked the witness's village, Gerihun, looking for Kamajors. The Kamajors had earlier fought the junta about four miles away on Bo-Gerihun highway. The Kamajors lost and were pursued by the Junta to Gerihun. The Kamajors were not in Gerihun during the attack. The witness saw one man, Alhaji Mohamed Sidikie, in his house being fatally wounded. The witness fled and later, on his return, saw this victim's body and four other dead bodies in the village, including that of the Paramount Chief A.S. Demby. Some other villagers were wounded. Attackers looted possessions. The witness saw juntas in possession of a bus packed with looted properties belonging to civilian. The bus was taken to Bo town.
PN TF1-053	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	This witness will testify that on the night of 26 June 1997, he saw well armed men in uniform enter Gerihun in vehicles. He saw five men enter Paramount Chief Demby's house. Shortly after, the witness heard one gun shot and a voice like that of Paramount Chief Demby cry out. He saw three soldiers coming out from the house. Afterwards he saw five dead people killed by these soldiers. He

	KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003			was told of other killings and saw evidence of them. The witness identifies A.B Kamara, A.F Kamara and Mohammed as amongst those who attacked.
PN TF1-006	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 13	60 minutes	This witness will testify that about two months after the overthrow of President Kabbah, he heard heavy firing as he hid in his friend's house (PN TF1-005) in Gerihun with others. He saw a soldier dressed in full military uniform enter and shoot his companion. There were only civilians in the house. His companion was injured. When they tried to escape, his companion was shot once again by soldiers. His companion died soon thereafter from the second shooting. The witness fled. When he returned to town he saw the bodies of three others who had been shot. The witness learned from others that armed men killed Paramount Chief Sandy Demby. The attackers were identified as "junta" soldiers. They robbed and pillaged. The witness states that there were no Kamajors in the village at the time of the attack. Later, the witness saw many houses burnt.
PN TF1-054	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	60 minutes	This witness will testify that in 1997, the AFRC was in power under the leadership of JP Koroma. The AFRC was in control of Bo Town. On 24 July 1997 the witness's home was looted by armed soldiers in uniforms led by AF Kamara. Later on in July 1997

	<p>14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003</p>			<p>the witness was in the Paramount Chief's house when many AFRC /SLA soldiers entered Gerihun including AF Kamara, Boisy, AB Kamara and AFRC youth leader Bo Yagah. The witness saw AF Kamara instructing men to burn Vice President's house down. The witness saw soldiers shooting at the Paramount Chief twice and then heard soldiers ordered to stab him. He then heard a gunshot and the shouting of Pa Sumaila, the Paramount Chief's caretaker. The witness later discovered him dead, shot. He fled to the bush and upon returning to the village he was told of five people killed by the soldiers. He saw the dead bodies. The witness states that there were no armed Kamajors during attack.</p>
PN TF1-050	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that about a month after the overthrow of President Kabbah, the witness saw three soldiers dressed in military combat uniform entering his house in Tikonko. They found the witness, Mama Fudia, Mama Massa Mansaray, Hawa Momoh and Hawa Mansaray inside. The soldiers ordered Mama Fudia, Mama Massa Mansaray and the witness to go outside from the parlour. The soldiers demanded money from Momoh and Mansaray, threatened them and then killed them on pretext that their brothers had killed their colleagues in Sembehun.</p>

PN TF1-003	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003; 7 Feb 2004.</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003; 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that in July, after the overthrow of President Tejan Kabbah, soldiers entered the witness's house in Tikonko. He saw three soldiers dressed in army uniform. He recognised one SLA soldier. They questioned his wife and two women, both named Hawa. The witness heard soldiers threatened to kill Hawa Momoh. He heard gunshot and a woman cry out. He heard another gun shot. Later he entered the house. Two women were lying dead. One of them was bleeding from the vagina. He observed other dead bodies in the village that day including burnt remains of one woman. The witness saw many other burnt houses in Tikonko. The dead were civilians. There was no fighting in Tikonko between the attacking soldiers and any other force such as the Kamajors that day.</p>
PN TF1-002	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	30 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that during the Junta period /dry season Tikonko was attacked. The witness fled to the bush leaving her sick brother. Upon return, she found that her brother had been mortally wounded. She was told by her brother that he had been shot by a soldier. Some personal property had been stolen. The witness saw more dead bodies: two Hawa women (Momoh and Santigie) and others. She was told they were killed by soldiers. She saw one Hawa shot in her vagina. There were no armed Kamajors in the village on the day of the attack. The</p>

	KANU: November 26, 2003			witness saw that houses had been burnt down.
PN TF1-004	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	60 minutes	This witness will testify that the witness was with soldiers as they prepared to attack the town from Tikonko junction at the end of June 1997. One Junior told the witness that soldiers were going to kill every living thing in Tikonko. When the soldiers arrived at Tikonko, the witness saw them kill five civilians and three Kamajors, the latter being distinguishable by their clothing. After the attack, the witness went into the house of a neighbour, Bangalie, and found 11 people dead. One, Mamama Bangalie, was grievously wounded (stomach spit open) but alive. Before dying she told the witness that the soldiers killed them. The witness travelled further and came across more dead bodies killed by soldiers. Nineteen people would later be buried in a mass grave. The witness saw soldiers with looted items. He describes as "soldiers" some in full uniforms and some in half uniforms with red cloth tied around their heads. He recognized three SLA soldiers: Junior Mosakpa, Brima Moisia and "Baby Daddy". Of the three Kamajors, the witness knew one was unarmed but was not certain about other two. There was no armed opposition against soldiers when they attacked.

PN TF1-001	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	This witness will testify that after the overthrow of President Kabbah in 1997, the witness saw men in combat uniforms attacking Tikonko with RPGs. He saw men entering homes. The witness hid near the village and saw soldiers attacking the village for two hours. There was no opposing fighting force. On the following days, he saw approximately twelve corpses including three Kamajors who had been on duty at a nearby junction. The remainder of those killed were unarmed civilians.
PN TF1-047	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	90 minutes	This witness will testify that after AFRC came to power, the witness was warned that AFRC would not tolerate harbouring of Kamajors. Some days later, he saw heavily armed men heading towards Tikonko accompanied by Sam Bockarie (aka Mosquito). He heard shooting coming from Tikono. The witness was told by residents that people had been killed at his house. He went to Tikonko later, where he found eleven people dead at his house. They all had gunshot wounds. Among the people were Mamei Bangali, Adama Bangali, Victor Bangali, Joseph Bangali and Mamatoma Bangali who were all grandchildren of the witness. All of them were adults. His son was also killed in the incident. Eleven people were buried in a mass grave behind the market. The witness saw many of the people killed

				around the town. He saw gunshot wounds on all the dead bodies. He saw a lot of houses burnt. All the dead bodies he saw were civilians because they had civilian dresses and he did not see weapons by them. There were no Kamajors in Tikonko at that time of the killings.
PN TF1-052	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	90 minutes	This witness will testify that he was a Kamajor soldier during the relevant period. In 1997, after the AFRC Coup, whilst hiding in the bush, he heard soldiers saying that anybody they met in Telu will be killed. Thereafter, he heard shooting for about one hour and then soldiers cheering and saying they had killed all "Kamajors" in Telu. On returning to the village, he saw one dead body and was told that two other people were killed. Telu properties were looted by the attackers. A second attack occurred 3 weeks later. Soldiers in military uniforms entered the town. The Kamajors could not fight back because they had no ammunition. The witness heard soldiers yelling "Operation Pay Yourself". He saw his village being attacked. On return, the witness counted five dead. He saw soldiers leaving village carrying looted property. He also saw soldiers launching RPG guns at thatch houses which caught fire. The next day the witness and others counted 50 houses burned down. He identified attackers as SLA Junta soldiers. One of them was Corporal Yatti.

PN TF1-107	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	This witness will testify that the SLA and RUF attacked the witness's town, Telu, during the month of July. He could tell they were SLA and RUF because of their clothing. Some were in full uniform with berets whilst others were partly dressed with bandanas. They came in six Toyota vans. The witness heard firing. He hid with his father in his house. They saw smoke coming out of one room so they tried to get out back. The witness's father had been wounded in hand by bullet while getting out. They hid behind the toilet inside the compound. However, soldiers saw bloodstains leading to the toilet. The witness hid in the bush. The soldiers found witness's father hiding behind toilet. They shot him dead. The witness also saw a house burning that day. There were no Kamajors in town during the attack.
PN TF1-011	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26,	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	This witness will testify that about six months after JP Koroma came to power, the witness's village, Telu, was attacked. He heard shooting. Then he saw a soldier dressed in full uniform. He ran away and passed by an old lady who was shot dead a moment after. The witness saw houses burnt, some still on fire. He heard of others killed and saw another dead body of an unarmed civilian. He saw a ten year old boy whose arm was wounded by a bullet. The town was attacked on other occasions. He usually ran away and came back after the attacks. During these attacks, he saw many properties looted. The witness lost a lot of property

	2003			and so did his dependants and family. There was no fighting between the attackers and the Kamajors. The witness knew about Kamajors being in Telu but did not see anyone in town at the time. The people whom were killed were not killed in any cross fire because there was no fighting or no resistance from any body in Telu.
PN TF1-010	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003; 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	60 minutes	This witness will testify that his village, Telu, was attacked by lots of well-armed soldiers in uniforms. He saw soldiers looting and burning house next to his own house. He saw dead bodies of civilians after the perpetrators had left the village. He heard soldiers saying that Mosquito was waiting on them to go to new site. The witness was informed by others that Mosquito was heard saying to soldiers in Telu that "Kamajor base in Telu must be destroyed." Mosquito also said "All those who have relatives at Telu should go back and bury their dead." There were no Kamajors to fight back with the AFRC/RUF when they attacked witness's village.
PN TF1-051	SESAY: June 2, 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	60 minutes	This witness will testify that on the day of the attack in Sembeheun, the witness heard a loud gunshot

	<p>KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003</p>			<p>and ran into her house. She hid with her grandchildren under a bed in her room when attackers entered the house. Her son (also son of TF1-049) was in his own room. The attackers forced the door of her son's room and entered into his room. She heard them arguing with her son and taking his things. Then she heard shots and ran to her son's room where he was lying dead. She was informed by residents of Sembehun that the group which attacked Sembehun was led by one Mosquito but she never saw the attackers.</p>
PN TF1-049	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that on a Monday in 1997, the witness was told that the People's Army were coming to his town. Later on, he heard sporadic shooting in Sembeheun. He hid in a house next to the house of his son. From the window, he saw men in full military uniforms and half uniforms with red pieces around their head entering his house and demanding from his son (also son of TF1- 051) "Where is your father, where does he keep money?" He also saw a man dressed in white giving command to armed men. He describes those men as SLA and People's Army soldiers. The commander ordered them to take property from houses. They loaded looted items on trucks. The witness returned to the house and found his son shot by soldiers. The following day, he went to Bo. He saw the commander who had been in Sebehun. He was told by a lot a people that this man was</p>

				Mosquito.
PN TF1-009	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003; Feb 7, 2004</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003; Feb 7 2004</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003; Feb 7 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003; Feb 7, 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003; Feb 7, 2004</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003; Feb 7, 2004</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that after the coup, SLA and RUF were a combined force. The witness saw soldiers led by Sam Bockarie (aka Mosquito) entering Sembahun in an assortment of vehicles a day after a fight with Kamajors in Korobondo. Bockarie introduced himself to the witness and others. Bockarie said that they should prepare themselves to farm and he would burn the same day. The witness fled to the bush. Whilst he was running with his wife into the bush, he saw a man with white cloth around his head (plain clothes) shoot his wife who was 3 months pregnant. He recognized the man as part of Bockarie's troops and saw him with Bockarie's troops when they first arrived. Those men refer to themselves as People's Army. The witness later learnt that his brother had been killed by the rebels. He buried both his wife and brother the following day. On return to his village, he saw houses burnt.</p>
PN TF1-008	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that after the coup in 1997, the witness saw Sam Bockarie (aka Mosquito) and his men entering Sembahun in several vehicles. One vehicle had an AA gun mount. The witness hid in bush as he heard Sam Bockarie's men opening fire on township. He returned to the town and found the remains of Mohmed Jabbi shot. He also saw the dead bodies of three other people. There was no</p>

	<p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003</p>			<p>other fighting force present during the attack. He was told of other killings. His cousin was seriously wounded by Bockarie's troop while trying to flee. The witness saw soldiers burning several houses. He saw soldiers with small plastic petrol containers. About forty-seven houses were burnt. He was also told by an injured person that Sam Bockarie's men attacked the town.</p>
PN TF1-007	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that he saw approximately 200 men in military uniforms entering the town. He saw one Caporal Yatti (SLA) entering the house of Yatti's mother in law and forcing her and two other civilians onto veranda. Thereafter, he saw the soldiers shoot all three on the veranda. The soldiers said that they came to Mamboma to kill Kamajors but there was none there so they killed civilians instead. The witness saw the body of the victims. He says there was no force fighting the group when they arrived in Mamboma. The soldiers burned twenty-six houses. The witness saw several young men being "forced" to load looted goods in vehicles after the attack before being taken away.</p>

2. THERE ARE NO ICR WITNESSES IN THIS CRIME BASE.

KENEMA CRIME BASE

1. CRIME BASE WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF -127	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003; 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that at a public meeting in June 1997 the AFRC threatened anyone who did not cooperate with them. The witness, B.S.Massoquoi (BSM) and others were later arrested and detained in the AFRC Secretariat. The witness was beaten and tortured. The witness saw Sam Bockarie (SB) beat BSM with his pistol. The witness saw SB give the order to beat one Fambuleh because Fambuleh was alleged to be a Kamajor. He was beaten to death with strips of outer tyres in front of the witness. On his release the witness was admitted to hospital suffering from his injuries. While in hospital he learned of BSM's re-arrest by SB and of the murder of BSM and others by the AFRC. The witness also learned that his goods and property had been looted or destroyed.</p>
PN TF1 -120	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003</p> <p>GBAO: October</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that on February 2 1998, on the order of his superior, the witness went to B.S. Massaquoi's (BSM) house to re-arrest him. The witness was told that Sam Bockarie (SB) had ordered police to produce BSM on threat of burning</p>

	14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003			the police station. BSM was brought to Kenema Police Station. The witness heard later that BSM was taken away and killed together with other people on orders of SB. Those who took him away signed for him and the transfer of custody was noted in the official Police Station Log book.
PN TF1 -124	SESAY: June 2, 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: May 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: October 14, 2003; 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: June 3, 2003; 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: November 6, 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KANU: November 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13	60 Minutes	The witness will testify that after AFRC/RUF took control in Kenema many people were killed in skirmishes between AFRC and Kamajors. The witness saw 3 dead bodies identified as Kamajors and about 13 other corpses in the area of Mambu Street. Several houses were burnt in follow up raids. The AFRC arrested B. S Massaquoi (BSM) and others. They were eventually handed over to police. At the Police Station the witness saw wounds on BSM and four others. The witness saw BSM in police custody at Kenema Police Station after he was rearrested and before he was handed over to the AFRC. On February 11 1998 the witness saw AFRC personnel shoot up Sayaiah St, Kenema and later observed SB ordering soldiers to loot shops and pay themselves. The witness was himself a victim of looting.

PN TF1 -122	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003; 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9,10, 13	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that on a day after the AFRC came to power in Kenema, he observed one "Bunny Wailer" (BW) in the cell at Kenema Police Station. He was dressed in military combat and his face was swollen. Later a group of soldiers from the AFRC Secretariat took him out of the cell and the Police Station. Sometime later the AFRC/RUF men brought three men to the Police Station together with BW, lined them up at the Police Compound and shot all four of them. The witness heard about arrest of B. S Massaquoi (BSM) and others. The witness saw BSM and others lying on floor of the AFRC secretariat, tied and bloody. Sam Bockarie (SB) was present. After the re-arrest of BSM, AFRC Military Police signed for him and 5 others. The witness saw a soldier stabbing BSM on the back. The witness later learned that the men had been killed. The witness went to Doorwailah and saw corpses with cement blocks put on their heads. He identified BSM. The witness's home was also looted by the AFRC /RUF.</p>
PN TF1 -123	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: June</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that in June 1997 AFRC fighters burnt down the houses of Kamajors and civilians in Kenema. B S Massaquoi (BSM), Andrew Quee and others were arrested, beaten and tortured, then transferred into police custody. They were eventually released. Almost all were rearrested and taken to the Police Station in Kenema. They were collected and signed for by AFRC Military Police. The witness saw BSM in AFRC Brigade HQ the following day. He later received information that 5 of</p>

	<p>3, 2003; 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p>			<p>them were killed. The witness attended the burial of BSM. Sam Bockarie and Eddie Kanneh were in charge of the AFRC/RUF. The witness was also present at Police Station in Kenema when 4 people were executed by the AFRC/RUF, including one Bunny Whailer. The witness saw many properties looted by the AFRC. The witness also saw Issa Sesay visit Kenema from time to time.</p>
PN TF1-125	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003; 11 March 2004</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003; 11 March 2004</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003; 11 March 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003; 11 March 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003; 11 March 2004</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003; 11 March 2004</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that when the AFRC/RUF took over Kenema they attacked Kamajor residences and looted the houses. They then attacked ECOMOG. The witness saw summary executions of 4 men at the Kenema Police Station - S Cole, One Bangura, B. Whailer and one other unknown. The witness later received information that BS Massaquoi (BSM) and others were arrested by the AFRC Junta and had been detained at the AFRC Secretariat. The witness observed wounds on BSM and other detainees when they were transferred to Police Custody. After being released, BSM and others were re-arrested in February 1998. Later the suspects were handed over to the AFRC at Kenema Police Station. The six suspects included BSM, Andrew Quee, Issa Ansumana, Abdulai Bockarie, Abdulai Saidu Quee and John Swaray. The witness states that in the police compound one of the soldiers stabbed BSM on his head with a bayonet and kicked him. The witness was later informed that</p>

				the six people were killed by soldiers and the bodies abandoned. The witness referred to the Police Record book evidencing the hand over.
PN TF1-039	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003; 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	30 Minutes	This witness will testify that he was informed that B S Massaquoi (BSM) was killed. The witness went to the mass grave at Dorwaila near Labayayei Stream, Kenema, to identify him. While the witness was at the mass grave he saw about nine corpses and identified one of them as BSM. The witness did not recognise any of the other corpses.
PN TF1 -121	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13	45 Minutes	This witness will testify to being present when Sam Bockarie (aka Mosquito) arrived to arrest Andrew Quee. Mosquito identified himself on coming out from vehicle. During the arrest Mosquito threatened to shoot the witness. The witness's belongings were also seized and taken away. The witness and others

	BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003			went to the AFRC Secretariat that evening. The witness observed wounds on Andrew Quee's (AQ) body. He was bleeding. The witness never saw AQ again.
PN TF1 -126	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	90 Minutes	The witness will testify that he learned of arrest B S Massaquoi (BSM) and his transfer to the AFRC Secretariat. The witness went there and saw BSM and others secured in a room. BSM told him that he had been arrested by SB himself on allegations of supporting the Kamajors. The witness observed that BSM and others had been seriously tortured. BSM and the others were later released. BSM was rearrested. The witness went to CID Kenema where he was informed that BSM was transferred to the AFRC Brigade HQ. The witness was advised to move very fast to save BSM. On Sunday 8 February 1998 the witness was informed that BSM and 8 others had been killed. The witness obtained information on where BSM and others were buried. In March 1998 family members exhumed the remains of BSM.
PN TF1 -128	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that sometime between June 1997 and January 1998 after AFRC/RUF had taken over control in Kenema, he was informed that one Muhalem was shot by Sam Bockarie (SB). The

	GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003			witness went to Muhalem's house in Kenema and saw his mutilated remains. The Witness also learned of BS Massaquoi's (BSM) arrest and detention. He received information that BSM and others were inhumanely treated and then killed by AFRC/RUF. The witness also received information about the site where BSM was killed and buried. He went to the mass grave and exhumed the remains of BSM. The witness saw about nine skeletal remains. He identified BSM and even saw the rope sunk in his arm with which he had been tied.
PN TF1-299	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that in February or March 1997 the AFRC/RUF took control in Tongo. They forced civilians to work for them, digging diamonds and clearing land. The RUF/AFRC would shoot people when they were digging diamonds in Cyborg. This happened daily. The witness believes that people were shot when they got tired of working. The witness saw them shooting more than 15 times. The RUF, who were guarding the slave laborers, did the shooting. The bodies were never buried.
PN TF1-060	SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12	90 Minutes	This witness will testify that AFRC/RUF attacked and took over Tongo field from Kamajors on 11 Aug 1997. The attack was led by Sam Bockarie. The witness states that many civilians were captured and forced to work at Cyborg. Many complaints were made of atrocities committed by rebels, including the rape of 4 girls. Many people died when sands

	3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003			collapsed and buried them alive in the pit. The witness states hundreds died. The witness also says that many people were shot by small boys who were armed with guns. The houses of local dignitaries were burnt. The witness saw 2 dead bodies of people killed by rebels. During and after the conflict between rebels and Kamajors, the AFRC/RUF would kill any civilians found in villages. In Bumpeh 9 people were killed by rebels on suspicion of being Kamajors. The witness was held as a hostage and threatened with death if the Kamajors attacked.
PN TF1 -062	SESAY: June 2, 2003; 18 March 2004 KALLON: May 26, 2003; 18 March 2004 GBAO: October 14, 2003; 18 March 2004 BRIMA: June 3, 2003; 18 March 2004 KAMARA: November 6, 2003; 18 March 2004 KANU: November 26, 2003; 18 March	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12	60 Minutes	The witness will testify that the Kamajors were mining up to August 1997 when the AFRC/RUF attacked and drove them off. The mine called Cyborg which Kamajors had mined with forced labor reopened under AFRC/RUF who did the same. People were forced to mine 2 days a week for the benefit of the government. Sometimes rebels shot into the general area. 200 civilians died in landslides caused by panicking miners running away.

	2004			
PN TF1 - 034	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003</p>	1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that between August 1997 and January 1998 the AFRC/RUF forced people to mine for them. Those who refused were killed. Others were killed for no cause. The witness saw a friend shot to death. Civilians were taken in large numbers to mine on the outskirts of Tongo and around Cyborg. Diamonds were taken to Kenema and given Sam Bockarie aka Mosquito to bring back arms and ammunition. Rebels shot at civilians engaged in mining at Cyborg randomly with their weapons. They did this to terrorize civilians into submission. The witness was forced to mine for the Junta's almost everyday and received no pay. From August to December 1997 Mosquito came about four times per month to collect diamonds. Mosquito would order the execution of any AFRC/RUF who tried to hide or conceal a diamond. During that time, the raping of girls and women was rampant. Although the RUF and SLA were present together, the RUF was clearly in charge. The witness heard from others that Issa Sesay came to Tongo Field.</p>
PN TF1-061	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: June</p>	3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12	90 Minutes	<p>The witness was the chairman at Cyborg Mining Pit. He saw child soldiers, called SBU's brought by Sam Bockarie (SB). The boys were around 10 years and armed with guns. They had to guard Cyborg Pit and shoot anybody who went there without authorization. The witness was beaten with sticks, rubbers and wires. SB threatened to kill him if Kamajors attacked.</p>

	3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003			Many people were killed when guns were fired and grenades thrown at miners. People were subjected to threats molestations and punishment from SB and his men.
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2. ICR WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF -129	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: June 3, 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: November 6, 2003</p> <p>KANU: November 26, 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that in October 1997 he was arrested on the instruction of Sam Bockarie (SB) for supporting the Kamajors. Issa Sesay (IS) came to witness's premises and assaulted him with a firearm. The witness was told by IS that he was to be taken to SB dead or alive on SB's orders. The witness was taken to SB at the AFRC Secretariat. There SB told him that he was going to beat him to death. Then SB and his men gave the witness a severe beating with rifles, pistols and strips of a tire. Additionally SB wounded the witness with a pistol on his forehead and SB told him to leave Kenema. The witness was arrested on 12 January 1998 and detained. The witness saw B S Massaquoi (BSM) on the 14 January 1998 and also saw SB and his men give a severe beating to BSM and others. The AFRC arrested many people on that day. Detainees were held, beaten and wounded. Kamajors were shot on the spot.</p>
PN TF -037	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: May 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: October 14, 2003; 7 Feb</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that during the AFRC/RUF regime in Kenema B.S Massaquoi (BSM) was arrested by AFRC/RUF. The witness later went to the Police Station and spoke to BSM. The witness saw evidence of torture. BSM was released but was afterwards rearrested on order of Sam Bockarie (SB). The witness slept at the Salvation Church next to Brigade HQ and saw a chain of people including</p>

	<p>2004 BRIMA: June 3, 2003; 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: November 6, 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KANU: November 26, 2003; 7 Feb 2004</p>			<p>BSM and Andrew Quee led away from the HQ. SB and RUF were there. The witness later heard a rumor that all were killed by AFRC/RUF that day. The witness was also informed about the killings of S. Kamara and M. Fitwai. Issa Sesay was one of SB's top Commanders who stayed with SB during the AFRC time in Kenema.</p>
PN TF1-035	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12	60 Minutes	<p>The witness will testify that in August 1997 Sam Bockarie (SB) came to Tongo/Cyborg Pit. Civilians were forced to mine for the AFRC/RUF for 5 hours each day. They forced 1000's to work and opened fire on people at least 20 times. 200 people died from mine collapse and from shooting. The AFRC/RUF maintained a punishment pit for civilians. Morris Kallon was present, particularly when civilians were killed. During 1997 the witness saw Kallon give an order to shoot civilians, including children. The witness often saw Issa Sesay in Tongo collecting diamonds. The witness was told that Augustine Gbao also visited the mines during this period. All of the big commanders resided at the Labo Camp, about 30-40 yards away from the Cyborg pit.</p>

KONO CRIME BASE

1. CRIME BASE WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF -222	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	3, 4, 5	30 minutes	This witness will testify that in 2001 he discovered many human bones and skulls in his compound at Gborie Street, behind Kamachende Street, Koidu and buried them in an old well in the compound. Later he heard that rebels had killed people in the compound.
PN TF1-303	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13	75 Minutes	This witness will testify that shortly after Kabbah was overthrown the rebels started killing, looting and burning houses in the Koidu Area. The witness was captured along with three other females and brought to Koidu. The Witness was held at gun point and raped each night for a week. She became a rebel's "woman". The witness fled from ECOMOG along with rebels to rebel camps. At the camps she heard the rebels talk about the number of people they killed and raped, and the number of houses burnt. She heard that Sam Bockarie aka Mosquito had sent instructions that instead of killing, the rebels were to start chopping off hands and feet and putting

				padlocks on the mouth of victims. Following subsequent raids the rebels would talk about the number of people whose hands they had chopped off, or whose feet they had chopped off.
PN TF1-217	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that after the February 1998 ECOMOG Intervention, AFRC and RUF forces occupied Koidu. Rape became frequent. The Kamajors expelled the rebels but shortly afterwards AFRC/RUF recaptured the town. After re-entry the rebels burnt the town. The rebels captured and abducted 10 girls including the witness's sister. The witness and others were later captured by mixture of AFRC and RUF rebels. The civilians were divided into 4 groups (one for young children, one for young girls, the third and fourth for men and boys). The witness saw 20 dead bodies of civilians. The witness also found the beheaded bodies of captives killed by rebels from Tombudu. The rebels put 26 people from the witness's group in house and set it on fire. The Rebel commander authorised the rape of any of the women and girls left in the groups. The witness was forced to watch his wife raped by 8 men. She and other women who had been raped were later stabbed to death. The witness then had an arm amputated after 11 strikes and was told to go to Kabbah with a message. Others were shot dead. The witness was also wounded on his back when a rebel struck him with a bayonet. The rebels identified themselves as "Juntas". The witness saw at least 4 others amputated.</p>

PN TF1-270	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12	45 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was abducted from Sulukundu by the rebels sometimes in 1996 just after "Operation Pay Yourself". Prior to her capture the witness saw rebels burning houses and people being killed. The witness was taken to Koidu. As the group proceeded they captured many civilians. The girls were given to rebels as wives and as domestic labor. The witness was told that as long as Sankoh was imprisoned she would remain captive. The witness had to perform domestic chores together with captive children. The witness was eventually taken to Borbu where she stayed for 5 years. During this time the witness saw Col. Issa and Sam Bockarie aka Mosquito visit. The witness was eventually released. The witness heard the term "Operation Pay Yourself" from other civilians. It was used in reference to the looting and burning carried out by rebels when they attacked Kono during the time witness was abducted.</p>
PN TFI-195	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003; 18 March 2004 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003; 18 March 2004 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003; 18	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was captured with 13 others by rebels. The Commander of the rebels ordered the civilians to be killed. One soldier stole money and some other small items from the witness. She and the other women were raped. The witness saw the amputation of six of the captured men. The rebels made the women clap and laugh at the amputations. They were beaten by the rebels if they did not. The rebels tried to amputate the witness's arm. A child combatant did all the amputations. She and the six other women were taken to the main</p>

	March 2004 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004 KANU: 19 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004			road, forced to strip naked and raped. Women were raped with foreign objects (sticks). The witness was raped by two rebels and beaten all over her body with gun butts. Of the seven women, five women were beaten to death. The witness said that she saw John Paul Koroma (JPK) at Komende. Three houses were burnt by JPK's men. She was told by the rebels that the operation was Operation No Living Thing.
PN TFI-074	SESAY: 2 June 2003; 18 March 2004 KALLON: 26 May 2003; 18 March 2004 GBAO: 14 October 2003; 18 March 2004 BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 18 March 2004 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004	1, 2, 9, 10, 12	45 Minutes	This witness will testify that in May 1998 he was with his family when captured by the RUF in Yomandu. His father was beaten then released. The witness and his younger brother were taken to Kaima. Thirteen more captives were brought by the rebels. The captives were invited to join rebels. An AFRC man arrived. The witness and other captives were marked. Sword blades were used to disfigure the witness and others with the symbols RUF and AFRC. The witness was given to Captain Barry. He saw Barry in possession of amputation tools and 7 amputated hands. The witness was used for domestic work for the RUF men. Some of the others were trained as rebels. They were trained to fight and were given weapons. The witness was held by RUF until disarmament in 2001.
PN TFI-202	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 12, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that in 1997 in Koidu Town she saw armed soldiers wearing full combat looting 3 stores in the Opera area. This was during

	<p>Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>			<p>Operation Pay Yourself. The witness and her family fled to Farandu village. There was also looting by soldiers in Farandu. The witness was hiding in the bush with family when they were surrounded by rebels. The rebels abducted over 20 young children aged from 7 years up. The rebels forced the abducted children to carry looted items. The rebels killed one person. Later the witness was captured again with family near Mansofinia in Koindugu District. The rebels managed to capture 16 civilians. The Rebel commander read out a letter which stated that one man should be killed and the rest should be amputated. The rebels later killed 2 and amputated 7 people. The witness said her husband's second wife, was raped by 2 rebels. She had given birth 23 days previously. After she was raped, she was released.</p>
PN TF1-067	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003; 18 March 2004 KALLON: 26 May 2003; 18 March 2004 GBAO: 14 October 2003; 18 March 2004 BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 18 March 2004 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 18</p>	1, 3, 4, 5	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify to an incident occurring during the dry season of 1998 where rebels captured and killed many of his family members at Foendor. The heads of the victims were reportedly put in a bag to be given by the rebels to their boss in Tombodu. The witness heard the killings take place as his relatives and others pleaded for their lives. Later he saw many dead bodies, some beheaded, including some dead family members but did not get a chance to confirm identification except for 2. The witness's wife confirmed killings to him. She carried severed heads in a bag to Tombodu. The Commanders were Savage, CO Staff Alhaji and CO Jbonda.</p>

	March 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004			
PN TF1-064	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 10	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that during the dry season of 1998 17 people (men women and children) were hacked to death with machetes in Foendor. The victims included 2 of the witness's children. The perpetrators beheaded the victims. The heads of the deceased were placed in a bag. The witness was ordered to carry the heads to Tombodu. At Tombodu, the leader of the perpetrators reported the killings to his superior who was dressed in full military uniform and surrounded by many soldiers in uniform. The witness saw body of another victim who had been beheaded
PN TF1-076	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 6, 8	30 Minutes	This witness will testify that during the dry season after Kabbah was overthrown she was raped by rebels wearing mixed combat/civilian clothing in bush near Foender. The witness was raped near the location where her uncle and others were hiding on Saturday. One rebel forced her to strip, tearing her lappa off and threatening to shoot her if refused or if she moved. The rebel virginated her. The witness screamed and cried in pain. The rebel again threatened to kill her if she continued to cry. The witness found by a neighbor.

PN TF1-066	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 6, 8, 9, 13	45 Minutes	This witness will testify that while in bush near Foender he was accosted and captured with his son, uncle and sister in law by armed men. He was beaten severely with a weapon and forced to give up his property. The witness saw his wife's sister being raped at gun point.
PN TFI-306	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 6, 8, 9, 13	45 Minutes	This witness will testify that in March 1998 after attack on Koidu and Foendor he fled to the bush with his family. He was confronted in the bush by 2 rebel soldiers. They were held at gunpoint. The witness sustained a severe beating from the rebels, as result of which he is suffering sequelae. One of the rebel soldiers raped his niece under threat of death in front of the witness. The soldiers then robbed him. The witness saw his nephew being escorted under gun point by a man in plain clothes. His nephew had a deep wound on his head with blood running all over his body. He told the witness that the same man wounded him with a gun.
PN TFI-068	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that on 16 June 1998 a group of men arrived and attacked his house. They rushed into the house shooting. Some went upstairs and some entered the house from downstairs. The

	GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			witness's sister was killed upstairs. The witness heard one of the attackers giving instructions to line people up against the wall and to chop off their hands. He heard the voice of the same person yell "Operation No Living Thing". The commander said all of them must be killed. The witness then heard gun shots being fired. Many rounds were fired. While the attackers were on this rampage, an armored vehicle containing ECOMOG officers arrived. The attackers fled. There were wounded and dead people outside the house. The witness counted twenty one corpses, six of which were of his family members. Prior to this incident the rebels burned down the witness's house, took his property and abducted his 13-year old daughter whom he has never seen again.
PN TFI-308	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that she was in Mortema when rebels attacked Kono on 6 June 1998. The witness was with about 50 people in a house when "rebels" attacked it. The witness heard name of Col. Issa amongst them. This was time of "Operation No Living Thing." The rebels entered the house and asked if people were Kamajors. The rebels opened fire. The witness was wounded. Of 50 people in the in house, 32 were killed. The witness was told this by her younger brother who helped in bury the dead in a mass grave at Mortema.

PN TF1 307	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that in 1998 she was in a house in Mortema, Kono when rebels attacked it. The Rebels entered the house and Col. Issa said that civilians would pay the price since they had refused AFRC rule. The witness heard that people were burned alive in houses in Koidu, including her parents, and that Col. Issa had given order for "Operation No Living Thing." The Witness was shot in the legs and arms while in the house. Lots of people were killed in this house in Mortema.
PN TF1-216	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that rebels came to Paema after the ECOMOG Intervention and commenced "Operation Pay Yourself". They looted properties and shot civilians. Later the witness was taken captive by rebels in his home village of Paema, near Tombudu. The witness was tied up at his house and his children were burned alive in his presence. In April 1998 the witness was taken with 5 others to Tombudu. There the 5 were amputated. Three died almost immediately. After the amputation the witness was told to go to Kabbah and get hands back since they voted for him. The amputation occurred on 14 April 1998. Before this time the witness saw JPK and other senior figures in Paema during Operation Pay Yourself.
PN TF1 -302	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13	75 Minutes	This witness will testify that she was captured by the RUF in Waterloo and taken to Tombudu. There were

	<p>KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>			<p>over 200-300 civilians there. Some civilians, including women, had been killed because they had tried to escape. They had been beheaded and their heads were impaled on a stick as a warning against attempts to escape. The witness saw three children being thrown into the latrines for crying. The witness was publicly raped by three rebels. The witness knows of 2 others raped. On some days up to 10 civilians would be killed by Savage or on his orders. The witness saw a house full of captured civilians burnt to death. The witness said that no one survived the incident. In Tombodu, the order was given to mark civilians who tried to escape with "RUF". They were marked with a razor blade. Witness saw about 10-15 women, men and children who had been marked.</p>
PN TF1-014	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	45 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that sometime in 1998 during the AFRC/RUF period the witness saw a group of AFRC/RUF captives brought to Tombodu. The witness identified Staff Alhaji. The witness counted twenty seven people who were all men in their thirties and forties and one boy of about eleven (11) years old who was later released. Staff Alhaji ordered their hands to be tied at their back and ordered more than ten armed AFRC/RUF men to put them in a house. The house was burnt and all in house perished.</p>

PN TFI -198	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that rebels attacked villages at the end of the 1998 dry season. The rebels robbed, looted and generally mistreated civilians for supporting President Kabbah. The rebel commander was a boy of 15. The rebels forced civilians to carry looted items. The witness and her husband were captured in the bush by rebels who stole their belongings. The witness was stripped naked and after refusing to have sex, a rebel inserted a stick in her vagina. This was witnessed by a neighbour. In turn another civilian was forced to rape that neighbor. The Rebel beat the witness and stabbed her on her right shoulder blade. The witness's husband and other men were abducted and forced to carry looted items. She learnt later that her husband was taken to Yardu where he was amputated. Her husband told her that he witnessed the killing of five men who were cut in the back of their neck by the rebels. The witness also saw people arrested and burnt
PN TF1-197	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that he saw AFRC/RUF rebels kill 2 civilians in Tombodu after the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown. The witness was captured in the bush. He was beaten and had his valuables stolen. Rebels later captured the witness again and took him to Tombodu. The witness saw rebels rape a woman and the witness and 2 other men were beaten. The witness and 5 other men taken to the parking ground in Tombodu where the witness saw 3 dead bodies. The witness escaped. Later he saw

	KANU: 19 Nov 2003			injuries sustained by friends/neighbors, one whose hand had been amputated and the other who was burnt by the rebels who poured kerosene over him. The witness was captured a third time and taken to Yardu. The rebel commander ordered his amputation. The witness's left hand was amputated. Rebels beat, cut and shot to death 6 other men. The witness given letter for Kabbah. Witness later saw 5 amputees in Koaquima whom he knew.
PN TF1- 072	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 12	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that he was captured by armed men dressed in military uniform on 8 March 1998. The witness was tied up and brought to Tombodu where there were fourteen captives. The witness was beaten by rebel commander Savage with an iron rod. Savage slashed his right leg with a machete and stabbed him with his bayonet on his side. He also cut the witness's hand because he had supported the Kabbah Government. When Savage cut the witness's hand, he said, "We are cutting off your hand because we want to attack your government, and because you voted for Tejan Kabbah." At that point the other people got up and started to run. Savage gave orders that they be shot and they were. Only two people including the witness survived. Eleven people were killed. The witness later escaped. The witness heard from others in Tombodu that Johnny Paul Koroma and his men were occupying Kwidadu, 33 miles from Kono.

PN TF1 -019	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that in 1997, shortly after the take over of the AFRC/RUF a group of soldiers and RUF men captured him and raped his wife. The perpetrators were identified as AFRC. He witnessed the rape. The men then went into house and stole the witness's goods. Afterwards he moved to Yardu On 16 April 1998 AFRC/RUF men came to the village at night and burnt houses. In a village of about one hundred houses only a few remained. The witness's grandmother was captured by the rebels who cut her throat with a knife. One other man was also killed. The witness was told that fifty or sixty people were abducted from Somoya, in the Sando Chiefdom, and brought to Tombodu. The witness heard that all of them were put into a house and burnt alive. The witness was told that the man who did this was Staff Alhaji, a soldier with the AFRC.
PN TF1 -018	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 6, 7, 8, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that while in Koidu during the Junta period he witnessed looting by the RUF/SLA. The witness was captured during Operation No Living thing by 10 armed rebels. He was taken to Tomandu where rebels had 10 abducted women and 7 men. The rebels sexually abused the women who were taken one by one to a house. Along the way to Kissi Town, in Komendeh, the rebel Commander ordered the women to be divided amongst men as wives. Each armed men took possession of a woman. The witness escaped before reaching Kissi Town. All these events happened after ECOMOG intervention in Kono.

PN TF1 -016	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004</p>	1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was captured in Tomandu. The witness saw captured men being marked with letters RUF. There were thirteen captives all together, seven women and six men. The captives were forced to carry food for the rebels to Tomandu. The witness taken to Kissy town where RUF distributed the women as wives for the rebel men. A rebel leader took witness's eleven year old daughter to a house and raped her. The witness could hear her screaming. The witness was given to a rebel as his wife. Along with the other captured women she was forced to find food and cook, wash clothes for the rebels. If they refused they were beaten. At three different times rebels tried to force the witness under threat of death to have sex.</p>
PN TF1-218	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,13	75 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that he was in Bumpah in Kono district when rebels attacked. He was captured, beaten and taken to Cookery junction with 9 other civilians. The Rebels were looting villages at that time. The rebels said that civilians were responsible for ECOMOG and therefore all villagers except one would be killed to deliver a message to Kabbah. The rebels forced a couple to have sex in public and abused the couple's 10 year old daughter. The rebels then raped the witness vaginally and anally. The witness afterwards escaped. The witness's son later told her that others</p>

				were shot and that he faked death and had slept with dead bodies. The witness heard that villagers were burned alive in Bumpeh. The witness's uncle was amputated in this attack. One of the witness's brothers almost had his hand amputated by the rebels. The witness heard that the rebels abducted many villagers.
PN TF1 -192	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that he was captured in April/May 1998 by rebels in Boimafoidu. 30 Civilians were captured. The witness saw the murder of a 60 year old woman. He was forced with 12 others to strip and have sex with captured girls. He saw the sexual mutilation of one girl for failing to arouse a man. The captured women were taken to nearby farm house and he saw rebel who inserted a stick into the vagina of one girl. The rebels then commenced to amputate arms of men. The witness was first. His arm severely injured but not severed. The witness and others were told to go to President Kabbah for new limbs. The witness also saw the abduction of 2 boys by rebels.
PN TF1-206	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that during mid April 1998 his village was attacked by 100-200 rebels pretending to be Kamajors. The houses were looted and civilians forced out at gunpoint. There were many small boys, some as young as 10 years old. The witness saw rebels cut an old woman's throat. There were 45 captive civilians. Men and women were segregated and forced to strip. The rebels then forced people to

	KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			have sex. The witness was forced to have sex with a neighbor's sister. One boy was cut on the back for refusing to have sex. The rebels then started to perform amputations. Five people who protested were killed outright with machetes. The witness's left hand was amputated and rebels then cut the right hand of the witness's small brother, but he didn't lose his hand. The rebels claimed that civilians supported Tejan Kabbah. The witness knows of 14 people who had either limbs amputated or were the subject of attempted amputations. The witness heard that hands were collected and that the rebels threatened to wear them as necklaces.
PN TFI - 305	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that during the 1998 dry season AFRC rebels captured and abducted her. There were several child combatants. The rebels stripped the witness and told her to lie on the ground. They threatened to kill her if she refused to have sex. The witness had just been initiated and was a virgin. Eight rebels raped her one after the other. The witness bled profusely. The rebels left with items that they had looted. They stole fine clothes but left the other ones. The rebels threatened to kill the witness if they ever saw her again.

2. ICR WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF1 -015	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13	120 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that in March 1998 he was captured by the RUF and taken to Koidu. The witness saw many dead bodies of men and women. He was taken before Major Rocky at premises at Kamachende Street. Men, women and children were separated. Maj. Rocky opened fire and about 100 civilians were killed. Maj. Rocky reported the killing to Rambo, who had to consult with the High Command, particularly Mosquito (aka Sam Bockerie). The witness was taken to a Mosque in Koidu. Morris Kallon was present. While in captivity the witness saw many captured civilians. There were many young girls who were used for sex. Captured women were forced to become sex partners. The witness saw the RUF sending boys to burn houses and witnessed the burning. The witness saw many captured civilians. Men and women with marked with RUF and AFRC using razor blade, knives or pieces of metals. The captured civilians were used as laborers and taken on food finding missions. They carried the loads back on their heads. If anybody complained that he was tired, he would be shot instantly.</p>
PN TF1 -263	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that he and his 3 brothers were abducted by RUF rebels in</p>

	<p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>		<p>February 1998 from Koidu. The witness spent over two years with them. His older sister and uncle were murdered by rebels and houses were burn. The witness's father suffered a single arm amputation by rebels. Two of his brothers were abducted and forced to fight or used as domestic labour. He saw rebels killing civilians in areas around Koidu Town which were under the command of Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon. There were many child soldiers under the age of 15 there. He saw older men with their hands tied behind their backs shot in the presence of Issa Sesay. All abuses were allegedly perpetrated by RUF/AFRC rebels based in Kono District. At Kissy Town camp the witness saw about 300 abducted civilians. Civilians were forced to go to Kailahun for Military training. Sam Bockarie aka Mosquito and Sesay were present on completion of the training. The witness went to Tombudu and Krubola from where attacks were carried out. The witness saw rebels raping women in Kabala. Issa Sesay went to attack Kono. Following this the RUF attacked Magburaka and Makeni. Issa Sesay and Superman were involved in the attack along with 55. UN Peacekeepers were attacked in Makeni and Issa Sesay was involved in the looting of the UN base. From Koidu trucks of soldiers and ammunition were sent to support the Freetown invasion.</p>
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PN TF1 -078	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that on 28 March 1998 the RUF captured him with his family and several other civilians. All their belongings were looted. The witness was beaten up and asked for diamonds, gold and dollars. He was taken to Koidu and there saw one hundred and eighty other captured civilians. The witness was forced to move to another town with rebels. People died of starvation. The witness became part of the RUF administration. The witness saw the open execution of RUF combatants accused of crimes. The witness learned of the mass killing of civilians by one Major Rocky. Sometime in December 1999 the AFRC and RUF captured the Kamajor Chiefdom. Most of the foods were looted so many people there died of starvation. The witness met General Issa Sesay who led the attack on Kono in December 1998. Many civilians were killed in the attack. Whilst in Koidu many civilians were captured and forced to work in the diamond mines for the RUF and AFRC. People were tied up and beaten if they refused. The captives were not fed. Issa Sesay of the RUF was there and as the overall commander and knew about abuses. Morris Kallon was a Brigade Major in Kono.</p>
PN TFI -219	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 12 and 13	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that he was in Motema when rebels attacked. There were some child combatants, about 10 years old. Rebels captured the witness but released him</p>

	GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			afterwards. The witness was wounded by a child soldier and says that the rebels threw acid on his wounds. Villagers told the witness of massacre in house in which his wife had been hiding. He found family members dead. The witness heard one rebel call Issa say lets go and rebels call Operation No Living Thing. In Bandafala the rebels burned houses and took the witness's goats. The witness also saw the rebels capture men and force them to carry loads. He heard the rebels saying that this was Operation Pay Yourself. He heard the rebels referring to their bosses who were called "Issa," "Rambo," "Killer" and "Boss Morrie" who the witness believes is Morris Kallon.
PN- TFI -071	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13	2 hours	This witness will provide evidence of the chain of command in the RUF, including how commands came from Gen. Issa to Morris Kallon to lower ranking commanders. The witness will give evidence of atrocities during the AFRC/RUF retreat to Kono after the intervention, including killings and lootings. The witness will testify to forced mining by the RUF in Kono, including the handing over of diamonds and instructions on such from Issa Sesay. The witness will give evidence of forced mining by abducted civilians who were stripped naked, beaten and not given food, and of deaths from starvation and exhaustion. The witness will give evidence of the reporting of mining activities to

				<p>Issa Sesay. The witness will provide evidence of rapes, burning of civilian homes, the mass killings of over 60 people in Koidu, and how these events were reported to the senior RUF command, including Morris Kallon. The witness will testify that for rape and innocent killings, action was taken and RUF perpetrators were executed on high command from Issa Sesay. The witness will give evidence on how abducted UNAMSIL peacekeepers were given escort en route from Makeni to Kailahun through Kono district.</p>
PN TF1 - 304	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 26 May 2003; 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 14 October 2003; 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 7 Feb 2004.</p>	1, 4, 5, 9,12	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that after February 1999 RUF rebels forced civilians to mine for them. Workers were beaten by rebels. Many people died in the mines. During the mining period Issa Sesay collected diamonds regularly. Issa Sesay gave instructions that any civilian who refused to work in mines should be disciplined. Complaints were made to mine management about the workers' treatment and conditions which were passed on to Issa Sesay, but no action was taken to prevent the abuses. If there was a reduction in manpower in the mines for any reason Issa Sesay gave instructions to go out and forcibly bring in other workers. The witness saw people shot on orders of the mine Officer in Charge.</p>

PN TF1-017	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004</p>	1, 2 ,6, 7, 8, 12	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was captured in Tombodu in 1998 at 16 years of age and raped by rebels. She moved to Superman's camp before moving to Beudu, Kailahun where she encountered Sam Bockarie (Mosquito) and Issa Sesay. She witnessed Sesay leaving to attack Kono. She witnessed many captives there including women who were given to rebels. Women did cooking, laundry and shopping. Issa Sesay threatened that anyone attempting to escape from Buedu would be killed. The witness saw at least 2 abductees subjected to sexual slavery. In Beudu the witness saw Issa Sesay order his body guards to kill a civilian after alleging that civilians were corrupting the country.</p>
PN TF1-077	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003; 18 March 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 18 March 2004</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12	60 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that in December 1999 he was captured by RUF rebels and taken to Tombodu with about fifty others. He was forced to dig for diamonds in Tombodu and told he would be killed if he refused. There were killings ordered by the RUF Officer in Charge of people who refused to mine. The witness saw people killed on orders of the OIC. No payment or food was given and miners were constantly subjected to beatings and starvation. The witness saw Issa Sesay come to Tombodu many times to pick up diamonds. Issa Sesay</p>

	KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004			had to know as he came very often and would have seen the conditions. Sesay ordered people whom he found not working to be disciplined and beaten. On occasion people would also be shot. When Sesay came the body guards who accompanied him were child soldiers from the Small Boy's Unit. During this time each week at least one hundred people were brought by force to mine in Tombodu. Sick people were killed. Small Boys Units (SBU) were used at the Tombodu mines. Small boys were instructed to kill people whenever the RUF command desired. The witness saw the SBU kill people in the mining pits and throw the bodies into the water. Captured women were used for cooking and fishing and fetching water for the wives of the rebels.
PN TF1-012	SESAY: 2 June 2003; 18 March 2004 KALLON: 26 May 2003; 18 March 2004 GBAO: 14 October 2003; 18 March 2004 BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 18 March 2004 KAMARA: 6	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that after the ECOMOG Intervention, Johnny Paul Koroma (JPK) came to Tombodu and ordered Gullit, Savage and others to kill six people who did not support the AFRC. All were all shot. On the orders of JPK, Gullit, 55 and others burnt many houses in Tombodu. The witness saw people who tried to escape caught and either killed or amputated. Women were abducted from their families and forced to become rebel wives. Savage was left in charge in Tombodu. The witness saw Savage kill people. He witnessed Savage lock a large group of people into a house in Tombodu

	Nov 2003; 18 March 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004			and set the house on fire killing all inside. Savage also amputated, killed and dumped people in a pit. Gullit also killed a lot of people. Tombodu was a killing zone. The witness saw Col. 55, Gullit and Staff Alhaji visit with Savage. General Issa was second in command to Foday Sankoh. People were caught and brought to Tombodu and forced to work in the mines. A lot of people died during this time because they were not fed and were often beaten up if they refused to work. The witness also saw Savage and Gullit kill people in connection with mining. The witness saw Issa Sesay visit the mines each day. The Chiefs made many complaints to the AFRC/RUF about the conditions and treatment of the laborers but this just resulted in them being beaten. Issa Sesay issued instructions to discipline those who did not work.
PN TF1-353	To be disclosed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	This witness will testify that he was at the RUF base on the Guinea Highway in April 1997 when Kallon arrived. The witness was told that Kallon had shot a boy. The witness later observed a boy lying dead on the ground with a gunshot wound to the chest. Approximately 2 weeks later the witness was in a village outside Koidu Town when he heard a gunshot. He ran to investigate and saw a boy writhing on the ground and Kallon and one of his body guards holding a pistol. The witness states that Sesay, Mosquito and Kallon had houses in Beudu in

				April 1997.
PN TF1-355	To be disclosed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	2 hours	This witness will testify as to a shipment of arms from Liberia to Sierra Leone in January 1998 at which Sesay and Bockarie were present.

BOMBALI CRIME BASE

1. CRIME BASE WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF1-055	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 13	60 minutes	This witness will testify that Karina Was attacked in February some time after President Kabbah's restoration to power. The witness saw attackers assembling people they had captured, both from Karina and other towns, and heard orders being given to kill them and cut them. The witness saw people being killed with machetes. People were also killed when the attackers invaded the mosque. The witness saw people being abducted, including women who were stripped naked. Prior to the attack soldiers had come frequently to rob and loot from Karina.
PN TF1-156	SESAY: 11 August 2003 KALLON: 11 August 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 22 Sept 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	45 minutes	The witness will testify that Bornoya was attacked. The witness stayed in his house. He heard noises and saw flames. When the attackers left, around 7:00 a.m., the witness saw the dead bodies of about 9 people. He recalls that about 15 people had been cut with machetes or knives and were taken for treatment. The witness's brother was abducted. His dead body was found in Karina later on the same day. Three of the witness's children were abducted and taken to Mandaha. Around the same time that morning, the witness was told that the attackers also

	2003			launched attacks on the surrounding villages of Mayombo, Karina and Dariya. The witness saw smoke and flames coming from the direction of these surrounding villages.
PN TF1-056	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12	45 minutes	This witness will testify that Daraya Village, Karina was invaded by SLA soldiers after the ECOMOG intervention. The soldiers set fire to 5 houses. When the witness asked why they were doing so, he was stabbed with a machete. The witness saw the soldiers cut the throats of a mother and son. The witness also saw abducted people, including the witness's wife and twin 5 month old babies and his 19 year old son. His son was made to carry a bag on his head. The witness later found his wife's body near a bridge with knife wounds with the 2 suckling babies, and his son's body in Manyain village.
PN TF1-059	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	45 minutes	This witness will testify that 1998 during the dry season he was in the mosque at 5am when Karina was attacked by armed men. Some of the men wore military uniforms and others civilian clothes. The witness saw armed men strike a villager with an axe in the face. Then witness heard the brother of victim cry out before hearing an instruction that he too should be killed. The witness ran from the village. Upon returning the witness saw the bodies of both brothers near the mosque. The witness also saw 3 other dead bodies. 5 houses in the town were also burnt.

PN TF1-149	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 89, 11, 12	45 minutes	This witness will testify that during May 1998 he heard of many villages being attacked and civilians killed by rebels. These included Bonoya, Mayumbo, Mandah, Kathantha. The witness saw two houses burning in Bonoya and met a woman who had had her arm amputated in Mayumbo. The rebels burnt most houses on 11 May in Kabunbgo, Maforey, Malokoko and Kakola where they also killed 1 old man. After rebels captured Makeni on December 23 1998 they came to Kamabai. The witness was told that Savage was the overall commander in the Kamabai area. The rebels had about 100 abducted civilians with them. The witness saw more than 20 child soldiers who were aged from 10 up. Savage moved to Fadugu. He took civilians from Kamabai including a 15 year old girl who was pregnant. The witness was told by her relatives that she died along the way.
PN TF1-0155	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 4, 5, 6, 8	60 minutes	This witness will testify that a large group of armed rebels wearing uniforms invaded Mandaha. She was captured along with 3 other women. The witness was stripped naked and forced to lie down. She was threatened with amputation and death if she resisted one rebel who inserted his penis into her mouth. The act was witnessed by other rebels. The rebel beat her with a stick afterwards. 5 or 6 days later the witness saw her son. His son told her that he had had his neck sliced and penis being chopped off by soldiers at Manhaha who had captured him. Her son died shortly afterwards.

PN TF1-207	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 9	60 minutes	<p>The witness will testify that following reports of rebels approaching he fled with his family to Lohindi village. On the night of the 10th May 1998 between 10:00 P.M. and 11: P.M. Rebels attacked the village and he was captured. The rebels were dressed in military combat uniforms. He was taken to the back of one house where he saw 2 adult males whose arms had already been amputated. The witness was interrogated by rebels who then amputated his right hand with a cutlass. After they had cut his hand off, one of the rebels told him that let him go to Tejan Kabbah to give him a new hand. The witness said from that point he left the scene with heavy pain and bleeding from the affected hand.</p>
PN TF1-204	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 9, 10	30 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that on 23 December 1998 he went to Makombil village and stayed there for the safety of himself and family. On the 10 February 1999 armed men identified as RUF fighters entered the village. One of men identified him as serving member of the Sierra Leone Police Force. The witness was arrested and taken to Makeni On arrival at Makeni the rebels interviewed him about his identity and he was taken to the RUF/AFRC Military Police Following further questioning he was then taken to Makeni prison, stripped naked and given two hundred (200) lashes with a rubber called "Cobra".</p>
PN TF1-290	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 7</p>	1, 3, 4, 5	30 minutes	<p>The witness will testify that the rebels attacked Gbendembu town at the end of 1998. At about 1am the witness was in his house and heard firing. He hid</p>

	Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004			under the bed with children till morning. When he came outside ECOMOG soldiers told him that the rebels had killed a lot of soldiers and civilians. The witness saw the dead bodies of soldiers and civilians. There were 21 dead soldiers and 11 dead civilians. There were also dead rebels. The Witness assisted in the burial of the 11 civilians in a mass grave.
PN TF1-286	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	45 minutes	The witness will testify that around May 1998 he others were stopped by rebels. At gun point the rebels took Le70,000, jeans and a bicycle from him. The rebels cut off the lower left arm of the witness, the hands of 2 others and the fingers of a fourth. The amputees were then told to go tell President Kabbah Kabbah to give them limbs and that the rebels were coming. One of the men in witness's group died after being amputated. The witness also saw one of the rebels kill 2 civilians who were in the witness's group with a bayonet.
PN TF1-179	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003; 24 Feb 2004 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003; 24 Feb 2004 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003; 24 Feb	1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10	60 minutes	This witness will testify that he saw the killing of one companion and the wounding of another at Batkanu village. The witness saw that the village had been burnt. On 10 May 1998 the witness and his family were traveling to Makeni. They were stopped by rebels. The rebels struck the witness's father on his right arm with a machete. They then amputated his uncle, brother in law and the witness The witness lost

	<p>2004 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003; 24 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003; 24 Feb 2004 KANU: 19 Nov 2003; 24 Feb 2004</p>			<p>his right hand. The rebels told them to tell the ECOMOG forces that they are coming and to ask President Kabbah to give them hands as it was him they had voted for in the 1996 elections. One of the rebels then stabbed his unconscious father to death. The witness's grandmother could not walk and stayed behind with the rebels. The witness was later informed that she was also killed by the rebels. The witness's uncle could not stand the pain and died shortly after reaching Mabenji village. The witness eventually reached Makeni town and was admitted to the government hospital.</p>
PN TF1-196	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was hiding in the bush near Malama when rebels attacked villages nearby. She and other civilians were captured. One of the rebels told the witness she would be raped until she was helpless. The rebel then raped her after threatening to kill her if she refused. The rebels brought them to Batmis. The witness saw armed child soldiers. The captured civilians were given rice to pound. Some civilians escaped when sent to fetch water. The leader Mosquito ordered the amputations of others as a punishment. He also ordered the witness's husband to be killed. The witness saw her husband was killed with a cutlass before both her hands were amputated. The rebels told her that she should go to Kabbah who would give her back her hands. The witness saw rebels raping young suckling mothers in public. The witness saw other civilians being killed. The witness heard the rebels say that</p>

				ten rebels had raped a woman in another village. She also heard the rebels threaten to rape women and virginate young girls.
PN TF1-343	March 31, 2004. To all six accused	1, 2, 9, 10	30 minutes	This witness will testify that in 1998 villagers would from time to time flee to the bush because of rebel activity. During 1998 while on the way to Makeni from Mateboi he and others were ambushed by armed men. They were taken before the leader of the armed men. The witness saw the double amputation of another man. The witness was ordered to stretch out his hands. The rebel told him that he would be free after having his hands cut and he should tell Tejan Kabba and ECOMOG that they were coming. Both of his hands were cut of by a man wielding and axe. The witness fainted afterwards. Upon recovering consciousness he saw the body of the other amputee.
PN TF1-267	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 6, 8	45 minutes	The witness will testify that in 1998, at the time of rice planting, Rosors was invaded by armed men. Some were in combat uniform and some in ordinary clothes. A group of them gave chase to the witness and others. The witness was raped by 4 men from this group. A few hours later the witness's daughter showed up and reported that she also had been raped by men from the same group who had chased them. The witness saw blood stains on her daughter's clothing. Prior to the rape, her daughter was a virgin.

PN TF1-269	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 6, 8, 9	45 minutes	This witness will testify that rebels invaded Rosors. Some of them were dressed in combat uniform. The witness was captured by 5 men in the bush. The witness was vaginally raped by 4 of the men. The fifth inserted his penis into her mouth. One of the men then cut her on the back of her neck with a knife. Another hit her on the left foot.
PN TF1-058	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13	60 minutes	The witness will testify that on 7 May 1998 he heard gun shots from a neighbouring village. Armed rebels then entered Karina. The witness and over 50 men and women were captured. The women were taken away and another group of strong men were given loads to carry. The remaining captives were lined up on the ground, accused of being Tejan Kabbah supporters and chopped with machetes. The witness was struck with a machete many times and was the only survivor of this group of 7. The witness saw as many as 200 armed men pass by. After attackers left, the witness saw many burnt houses in Karina and heard of others who sustained cuts and who were killed. The witness saw many dead bodies in Karina, Mayongbo, Daraya and Bomoya the following day.
PN TF1-289	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 3, 4, 5,	30 minutes	This witness will testify that she was in Gbendembu when it was attacked. She saw 11 people shot.

	<p>KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>			
PN TF1-232	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 12	30 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was in Gbendembu when it was attacked at night some years ago. The witness saw about 11 people shot after having been lined up. When it was the witness's turn to be shot, she was asked to turn her back. She had her baby girl on her back. The bullet hit her baby girl on her right foot. The witness fell to the ground over her baby. Four of the witness's children were abducted.</p>
PN TF1-266	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19</p>	1, 6, 8	45 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that during the 1998 dry season, when ploughing in the swamps had already started and brushing of farms had been completed, armed men invaded Rosors. The witness was captured and raped by 5 of them. They told her they were soldiers. One of the men hit her finger with a gun butt and stabbed the side of her neck when she</p>

	Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			began to cry. The witness also heard another woman being raped.
PN TF1-159	SESAY: 11 Aug 2003; KALLON: 11 Aug 2003; GBAO: 14 October 2003; BRIMA: 22 Sept 2003; KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; KANU: 26 Nov 2003;	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12	60 minutes	This witness will testify that he was captured when a group of armed men, women and children invaded his village of Mafabu. The witness later learned that they were "junta". The junta killed people and burnt down the entire village. The witness was taken from Mafabu to Malama and Rosors. At Malama the group also killed people and burnt houses. At Rosors the soldiers and rebels operated a military training camp where the witness observed adults and children, all boys, being trained in military tactics and weaponry. The witness estimates that there were over 30 boys of varying ages. At Rosos the witness was forced to work for the rebels and soldiers.

2. ICR WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF1-031	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13	60 minutes	<p>The witness will testify that 36 women and girls, including the witness, were captured at Karina. 55 was among the soldiers. Small boy soldiers ordered the women to undress. The witness initially refused to remove her underwear and was beaten. The women and girls were then tied together by rope and taken to Mandaha. At Mandaha girls, including some who were virgins, were raped. Older women were given to the captors as bush wives and forced to marry. Raping went on day and night, mostly to young girls. From Mandaha, the witness went to 3 villages with soldiers. 55 was in the group. The witness heard orders to burn, loot, and beat people given at these villages. The witness saw the soldiers burn many beautiful houses. The small boys wanted to kill her both others would not allow it and the witness was allowed to return to Karina with 6 small children.</p>
PN TF1-028	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17	90 minutes	<p>The witness will testify that after the ECOMOG intervention in Makeni, Karina was attacked. Gullit and 55 were among the group that attacked. The witness saw houses burnt and many people killed. The witness and other women were stripped naked and tied together. The witness was taken as a wife by one Ibrahim. The witness was to Rosors by soldiers. Gullit and 55 were among the commanders there. At</p>

	KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			Rosors, captives and children were used for forced labor. The witness traveled from village to village with soldiers and saw the burning of villages. At Kortu the witness saw the double amputation of the hands of 2 men and the soldiers put letters in the pocket of the men, telling them to take it to President Kabbah. The witness accompanied the group to Freetown and heard SAJ Musa and 55 address the group about the mission. During the Jan 6 invasion of Freetown the witness saw homes being burnt in SLA/RUF controlled areas. At Kissy Police Barracks, she saw a number of soldiers chop off hands. On the retreat from Freetown the witness saw many corpses. The witness also saw abducted UNSAMIL Personnel in Makeni.
PN TF1-174	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17	2 hours	This witness will testify that in 1998 the RUF/AFRC attacked and entered Makeni. The witness saw Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao, Gullit and 55 in Makeni. During the first 3-4 days after the invasion of Makeni, the rebels engaged in widespread raping and looting. The witness saw the gang rape of a 15 or 16 year old girl who was a suckling mother. After that time Issa Sesay ordered that the raping, looting and other violence must stop. The witness himself saw civilians raped and heard of shootings and wounding. The witness saw abductions of both girls and boys. The commanders would choose the girls they liked. The witness saw many small boys being sent for military training. The witness knew of the plan for the SLA to attack Freetown, with backup

				<p>from the RUF. Child soldiers were given drugs and the RUF did not stop recruiting them until the beginning of disarmament. Children were also used to watch the miners and punish them, by flogging or killing, if they did not work hard enough or tried to steal a diamond. Augustine Gbao threatened a NGO for assisting child soldiers. The witness also saw amputations used as a punishment. In February 2000 that Augustine Gbao gave the order to arrest all the UNAMSIL peacekeepers. The witness saw UNAMSIL hostages being mistreated and heard of the killing of one at Makeni hospital.</p>
PN TF1-243	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 4, 5, 12	45 minutes	<p>The witness will testify that after the ECOMOG intervention and the Junta flight from Freetown he was abducted from Gbendembu by soldiers/RUF. He and others were forced to carry loads to Rosos. While there he saw one man stabbed to death. An order was given to have the witness killed but it was not carried out. The witness was stabbed on the right hand as he put it up to protect his head from the blow of the cutlass. While in Rosos the witness saw Gullit and 55. After leaving Rosos Gullit told the witness he was one of the big men.</p>
PN TF1-160	<p>SESAY: 11 August 2003 KALLON: 11 August 2003 GBAO: 14</p>	1, 14, 17	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that while the AFRC were in power he heard rumours of looting by the AFRC. While in Makeni, the witness observed the abduction and confinement of UNAMSIL Kenyan and Zambian troops at the Panlamp area. The RUF commander in</p>

	<p>October 2003 BRIMA: 22 Sept 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>			<p>the area erected check points and posted RUF personnel at these check points, cut off the escape routes of the UNAMSIL troops and confined them to their base. The witness was told that these measures were taken on the instructions of the RUF high command in Makeni. The witness used to take water to the Kenyans while they were in confinement. After being confined for about 2 weeks, the Kenyans forced their way out. The witness recalls that the Zambians were abducted just a few days after the Kenyans had been in confinement. Gibril Massaquoi, Issa Sesay, Augustine Gbao and Morris Kallon were based in Makeni at the time and paid visits to the RUF Commander during the period of confinement of the UNAMSIL troops.</p>
PN TF1-297	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 14, 17	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that at the end of January 1999, he visited a friend who was a priest at UMC Church Yeyema, Kono in rebel territory. The witness was told that the Zambatt UNAMSIL soldiers who had been abducted in Makeni had been brought to the Yengema Secondary School compound overnight. The witness went to Yengema Secondary School compound and saw more than 300 Zambatt Soldiers in the compound. They were dressed only in their undershirts and shorts. Their combat clothes were worn by the rebels. The Zambatt I soldiers were guarded by more than 50 armed guards. The guards included small boys. The witness was also told that there were Zambatt I UNAMSIL Soldiers at No. 11 camp in Tumbudu. At this time the witness knew that</p>

				Issa Sesay was totally in charge of RUF Battle Field issues. He was the Battle Field Commander.
PN TF1-040	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 12, 14, 17	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that by January 1999 senior officers of RUF in Makeni included Issa Sesay, Augustine Gbao and Morris Kallon. Between 1999 and 2000 Issa Sesay left Makeni and settled in Kono, but periodically came to Makeni. In Makeni the RUF were forcing people to work for them and were also abducting people. On or about 5/5/00 the Witness saw Gbao's men seize a number of UNAMSIL vehicles after hearing Gbao give an order to do so. Later that day, at Independence Square, the witness saw a convoy of Zambian UNAMSIL Troops in their vehicles being escorted by RUF. The witness was later told that the Zambians were locked up at Teko barracks and then taken to Kono.</p>
PN TF1-041	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 14, 17	45 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that in 1991 he was abducted by the RUF and made to work in the G5 section. In 1998 he was posted to Makeni. Issa Sesay was the overall Commander. Morris Kallon and Augustine Bao were also Commanders for Makeni. During disarmament period the witness heard Gbao and Kallon say that UNAMSIL was using force to disarm combatants. The witness heard Gbao and Kallon gave instructions to fight against UNAMSIL. The Witness heard about UNAMSIL abductions from RUF and AFRC troops.</p>

PN TF1-186	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	11	60 minutes	This witness will testify that in July/August 1999 he was involved in negotiations with Meloski Kallon (RUF Commander in charge of Lunsar) about the release of 79 children. Present at this meeting were Augustine Gbao, Gibril Masaquoi, Meloski Kallon and Co. Ghadaffi. The RUF Commanders agreed that Caritas could have these children, but only after 3 attempts were the children handed over. In April 2000 the witness was involved in an attempt made to move 90 children from the Interim Care Centre in Makeni to the Western Area. Armed RUF intervened, including Augustine Gbao and Morris Kallon. They said these were their children, they would belong to their Small Boy Units (SBU's) and they wanted them back. Only after 1-2 weeks when the permission of Foday Sankoh was given were they able to transfer the children to Western Area.
PN TF1-183	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	2 hours	This witness will testify that in August 1997 he was 11 years old and captured by S.A.J. Musa's soldiers in Kabala. His chest was marked RUF with a razor blade. His mother and father were also abducted by the soldiers. His father was killed. His mother was beaten and publicly disgraced by the SLA soldiers. The witness was forced to carry loads for the soldiers, usually ammunition boxes. The commanders of the witness's group included Rambo, Commando and Gullit. The witness was given drugs. The witness was with the rebels when they attacked villages. During those attacks he saw rebels kill, rape and amputate people, and also loot. After the split

				<p>between SAJ Musa and Superman, the witness went to Makeni town with commanders like Gullit. In Kamakwie Town the witness saw Komba Gbundema and Morris Kallon kill, rape and amputate people. At this time the witness and other abductees were given 3 weeks training how to cork and fire. They were also were given drugs. In the month of February 1998 the witness and other soldiers launched attacks on government forces and their allies. Sometimes late in 1999 towards Christmas, the witness fought for two months in Kamakwie Town under the command of Morris Kallon.</p>
PN TF1-132	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14	120 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was captured by rebels at a farm near Tombodu in April/May 1998 and taken to a house in Koidu Town. The house was full of abducted owmen and looted items. The witness's sister was raped by a rebel. The witness saw General Issa Sesay, the big commander, Johnny Paul Koroma and Commande Massaquoi. Sesay ordered the abductees to carry loads to Kailahun. The witness saw burnt houses and dead bodies on the way. Women and girls were forced to marry the rebels. The witness was told that Savage killed and mutilated civilians in Tombodu. The witness was taken to Maburaka and saw Morris Kallon there. The witness was raped repeatedly in Maburaka. The witness saw that peacekeepers ahd been captured. Sesay took the peacekeepers from Tombodu to Kailahun and she saw the peackeepers looking afraid and begging for food. In Koidu the witness was marked with "RUF"</p>

				on her arm.
PN TF1-294	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 14, 17	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that on 1 May 2000 he heard firing on Magburaka road. On returning to Makeni, he was told that some UNAMSIL personnel had been abducted by the RUF and taken to the RUF headquarters at Independence Square. The witness saw a convoy of UNAMSIL vehicles coming from the Freetown direction. RUF personnel were at the sides and on board the vehicles. The RUF personnel had seized weapons from the abducted troops. The witness heard news all over Makeni that Issa Sesay has instructed that the Zambians be taken to Kono. The Zambians were escorted to Kono by group of RUF personnel.</p>
PN TF1-042	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	14, 16, 17	90 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that as a UN Milob he was taken hostage between 3 and 21 May 2000. At the Makeni DDR Camp the witness saw Gbao and Morris Kallon get into an argument with UN Milobs. Kallon try to stab one Milob and punched another. Kallon ordered three men armed with AK-47s to arrest a UN Milob. The witness was forcibly dragged to the car during which time Kallon held a dagger in his hand. The witness observed other abducted peacekeepers harassed by Kallon. One was limping and one was bleeding from his mouth. In total, 20 UN peacekeepers and military observers were detained. During this time, the abductees were mistreated and tied together. One Milob was targeted for harassment</p>

				and threats were made by rebels to kill him. During their captivity the abductees were given little food. Kallon ordered the detention of all UN vehicles. The abducted peacekeepers were taken to Issa Sesay who, on the arrival of the hostages, ordered they be untied. Sesay stated that the UN and white people were to blame for bringing problems to Africa, and that if the UN wanted to fight, his men were ready. Fifty-two detained Zambian peacekeepers arrived at the location where the other abductees were being held. The Zambians had been detained for 18 days and were visibly frightened.
PN TF1-165	SESAY: 11 August 2003 KALLON: 11 August 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 22 Sept 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	14, 16, 17	90 minutes	The witness will testify about the attacks upon UN peacekeepers and DDR Camps in the Makeni/Magburaka area during May 2000. He will say that at the Makeni Demilitarization, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Camp in April, Morris Kallon threatened peacekeepers and told them that they had 72 hours to dismantle the camp. Shooting occurred at the Makeni DDR camp. The witness spoke with the RUF High Command, which included Gbao and Kallon. At the time Issa Sesay was the head of the RUF. UN personnel were later abducted by Morris Kallon who drove them to RUF base at Tekko Barracks, Makeni. There, the car of Issa Sesay was present. At Tekko Barracks, Small Boys Units threatened to kill the hostages. The hostages were held with 15 other peacekeepers. Later, the hostages were forced to strip and bound with an electrical cable. They were then loaded into

				one vehicle and drove towards Kono. They stopped somewhere along the road and were told to dismount. Issa Sesay ordered them to line up and fired shots into the air. He said "You have killed many of my men. I could have killed all of you and nobody would question me." The hostages were then loaded into the vehicle and taken to Kono, where the witness was kept until 28 May 2000. During this time, the captors said that they were going to torture the hostages and deal with the Kenyans, but were dissuaded.
PN TF1-288	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	14, 16, 17	60 minutes	This witness will testify that in April 2000, he was deployed to Sierra Leone as commanding officer for contingent Zambatt I. Zambatt I was sent to Makeni to help restore order due to problems with RUF. The witness was abducted by the RUF and driven to Makeni blindfolded. His contingent was taken separately. Most of his contingent had been stripped of their combat. The witness met Issa Sesay. Issa Sesay ordered that the hostages be moved to another place. Sesay later ordered the gradual release of the hostages.
PN TF1-044	SESAY: 11 August 2003 KALLON: 11 August 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 22	14, 16, 17	60 minutes	This witness will testify that he was a Gambian Milob who was taken hostage by the RUF in May 2000 in Makeni. Several days before the witness saw Morris Kallon come to the Makeni DDR camp and threaten peacekeepers following the disarmament of 15 RUF soliders. On May 1 2000 the witness went to speak to RUF officers and was detained. There were 17

	<p>Sept 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>			<p>hostages, three Milobs and 14 Kenyan peacekeepers. The Small Boys threatened to kill the hostages. The witness was forced to strip and his elbows were tied together with a cable. He was then tied to a Kenyan peacekeeper. The hostages were moved from Makeni to Kono. At one point they were told to get out. Issa Sesay fired a shot in the air from his pistol and told them that he could kill them all and no one would question him. The witness was transferred to a RUF truck which crashed en route. The witness's leg was broken. At Kono the witness heard the RUF say in Krio that they were going to torture the hostages and deal with the Kenyans. The witness spoke in Krio asking them not to. The injury to the witness's leg was serious. He was eventually taken to a hospital and left Kono on 28 May.</p>
PN TFI – 043	<p>SESAY: June 2, 2003 KALLON: May 26, 2003 GBAO: October 14, 2003 BRIMA: June 3, 2003 KAMARA: November 6, 2003 KANU: November 26, 2003</p>	14, 16, 17	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that during late February/early March to May 2000, the RUF obstructed DDR operations and threatened to "arrest" humanitarian assistance personnel. The witness will provide evidence on how humanitarian personnel were denied movement at a Makeni road block by Augustine Gbao, and how Gbao had earlier demanded the return of 10 RUF combatants from the Makeni DDR camp. The witness will testify that that trucks of RUF drove through Makeni shouting they were going to attack, that peacekeepers at the camp had been surrounded by RUF and that they later attacked. The witness will testify that humanitarian personnel were forced to stay with peacekeepers at</p>

				Makeni under imminent threat of attack from the RUF, during which time the witness saw two wounded peacekeepers who had escaped the attack on peacekeepers at Magburaka. The witness will testify to the negotiation of the release of humanitarian personnel from RUF with Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon, and that Kallon later took \$5,000. The witness will testify to harassment, theft of personal and official property on threat of death and use of human shield of humanitarian personnel by the RUF. The witness will also testify to seeing RUF wearing UN peacekeeping uniforms and in possession of UN equipment.
PN TF1-349	To be disclosed	11	75 Mins	This witness is a child protection officer who will give evidence about the negotiations for the release of child combatants with the AFRC/RUF.
PN TF1-350	To be disclosed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	2 hours	This witness was present in Makeni during the December 1998 invasion by the rebels. The witness observed General Issa Sesay in command. The witness attended a town meeting during which Mosquito said that they were cutting off people's hands because the people opted for elections before peace. The rebels announced that they were going to Freetown. Sesay was a very senior man. Looting occurred in Makeni. The witness knew that Gbao was the overall security commander and responsible for all military operations. No military operations occurred without the authority of Gbao. Gbao ordered that civilians be tied up and beaten as

				<p>punishment during attacks. Gbao ordered the forcible recruitment of soliders. Abducted youths were taken to the IDA compound and to Yengama for training. Initially Sesay was in charge. Later it was Denis Mingo then Gullit. The Junta were dealing in diamonds. In 1999 Kallon was in Makeni as the Battle Group Commander.</p>
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KOINADUGU CRIME BASE

1. CRIME BASE WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF1-147	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that after ECOMOG entered Kabala the AFRC/RUF left, but had looted many homes, market stores and NGO premises (household properties, food stuffs and vehicles). Kabala Town was constantly attacked and on 27 July 1998 the AFRC/RUF entered the town, abducted men, women and children, and burnt homes. They forced captives to carry looted properties. Many people were abducted and some captives were trained at Krubola. The witness heard that amputations were done at Bafodia. The witness also heard of rapes through hospital staff in Kabala. During the 17 September 1998 attack on Kabala, the witness saw many dead bodies and over 200 burnt houses. The witness was told that houses were deliberately set on fire after they had been doused with petrol. In an attack on Malaforia houses with people inside were burnt. During these attacks, many boys and girls from 5 years old were abducted.
PN TF1-177	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that she was in Kabala on 25 July 1998. She heard about the attack in Kabala and decided to go to Makeni with others. While on their way, they got caught in an ambush. 100 people were

	GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			on the bus. Many were killed. The attackers were shouting for Superman leading the RUF. The witness was shot in the stomach. Her brother was also shot together and another person she knows was shot in the leg.
PN TF1-134	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12	60 Minutes	This witness will testify to an attack on Katombo II on 27 July 1998. Two hundred rebels came from Makakura direction (2 miles from Kabala). The witness was captured, beaten and mistreated. He recognized officers such as Savage, SAJ Musa and one Major Foday. Two policemen were murdered and their bodies split by an axe and a sword, their guts taken out and intestines pulled across the road as a checkpoint. The witness denied being a police officer and his 2 children were killed by having their throats cut. The witness saw other people killed in cold blood. The witness also saw many captives with loads and he did not know what was inside. The witness escaped and on returning to Kabala saw 4 houses burnt. In August, the witness saw the graves of 2 children in Katombo II buried in a mass grave with others killed in Katombo.
PN TF1-135	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003	1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that during the 2000 dry season he encountered Savage and his troops near Kasimbeck village. There followed a period where rebels raided food and forced civilians to carry it for

	GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			them. Civilians were forced to pound rice, and cattle were killed and looted. Women were stripped naked and beaten and the witness heard of rapes. Child soldiers between age 10 and 14 were used by the rebels at Kataooya.
PN TF1-212	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13	75 Minutes	This witness will testify as to seeing multiple killings and raping in Koinadugu by rebels commanded by "Superman". She saw houses burnt in villages and towns and people thrown into them alive. Sometime in October 1998 Superman ordered his men to kill in accordance with Operation No Living Thing. Koinadugu was burnt down by rebels apart from the mosque. Houses were looted. The witness saw a woman being kicked in the stomach following which she died. The witness's son was killed after the launch of Operation No Living Thing. She witnessed a baby being dumped over a bridge. She saw people burnt to death in houses. She also saw 48 people captured and put in burning house and 130 boys and girls aged 12-15 years taken away. Some captives had to carry loads. The witness saw 3 women raped in Kambasafe. The witness saw 5 villages burnt down by rebels. There were child soldiers among the rebels.
PN TF1-172	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9	60 minutes	This witness will testify that on May 18 1998 he was captured by rebels together with three other men.

	<p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>			<p>The attackers identified themselves as Foday Sankoh rebels. They took the witness's shirt and money. The rebels beat the men and took the four captured men into Seraduya. The rebels thought witness was a Kamajor and they tried to stab him with a bayonet. They amputated his right hand and either the right or left hands of others. When they reached Seraduya, the witness saw one dead body. After the witness' hand was amputated, rebels originally wanted to give him a letter to take to Kabbah and ECOMOG in Alikalia but changed their minds. After the amputations the rebels let the four men go, telling them to go Alikalia to inform ECOMOG that the rebels are coming. The witness and others were taken away to Freetown by helicopter. There were war-wounded on the helicopter. Five of the fifteen were amputees. One was a double amputee from Bumbuna. The witness learned that rebels attacked Seraduya when he was in Freetown. The rebels locked the Town Chief and his family members in his farm house and burnt them to death. The witness was told that many civilians were killed during this attack. The witness's wife told him that she was abducted by rebels during this attack and spent one day and one night with them. The witness said his wife was captured and raped by two rebels. The witness said that when his hand was amputated, the rebels burnt most of the remaining houses.</p>
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PN TF1-329	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13	60 minutes	This witness will testify that in late February 1998, the rebels arrived in Fadugu after they were kicked out of Freetown. They stayed for about 10 days. They wore mixed clothing. Most villagers hid in bush. Different groups of rebels passed through Fadugu. Some identified themselves as RUF. Others were AFRC. AFRC rebels stayed in Fadugu. At this time they did not harm civilians but looted. In May 1998 civilians fleeing from a rebel attack on Kafoko village arrived in Fadugu. The witness saw the rebels arrive. As the witness attempted to flee the rebels shot her and she crawled into a house. In this house, her son and two other boys were hiding. Then two rebels entered. They looted. As rebels left they set fire to house. The witness and boys escaped and hid. The witness states that in this attack rebels killed 6 civilians (men and women). About 150 houses were burnt by rebels. The rebels amputated four fingers of a woman and abducted 2-3 girls who stayed with rebels for 2-3 years. They also forced many women to marry them and forced civilians to work for them. The witness had her lower leg surgically amputated from her wound.
PN TF1-136	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 17.	75 minutes	This witness will testify that in June 2000 he was at Kamadugu Sokurala village 12 miles from Kabala. Many armed RUF men entered village with civilians (about 40 men with loads on their heads). The witness was captured with 6 other men and 3 women. The women were later released. The witness and other men were taken away. One

	2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			civilian was killed when group entered village as they were firing. The witness heard a communication with the RUF in Makeni. He was sitting near commanders and heard Bai Bureh say on the set that they had captured Komadugu Sokurala, had no problems, did not meet enemy, no RUF killed, and that they were heading for Koinadugu to Bendugu and finally Kabala. The witness heard another person praising Bai Bureh and his men, saying he knows they are hard men and he had no doubt in whatever they do. The other side also said that right now they have captured a number of UNAMSIL personnel at Makeni and have them in their custody and that once they have captured UNAMSIL personnel, "nobody can try them again because UNAMSIL represents the whole world". Bureh was speaking to Gibril Massaquoi. Properties in the village were looted by rebels. The witness's brother and a small child were killed in front of him by RUF. During the last attack on Kabala by RUF, the town was looted and houses burnt.
PN TF1-205	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003; 18 March 2004 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003; 18 March 2004	1, 2, 6, 8, 9	60 minutes	This witness will testify that she was walking from Serekolia to Benikoro when she met the rebels along the road. Witness said she was amputated on a Friday. A rebel forced the witness to put her hand in a hole in a tree and then proceeded to chop her right hand and her left hand with a cutlass. The rebel did not succeed in cutting off her left hand. The rebel gave the witness a letter and said to her "Go to Kabbah and let him fix your hand". The rebels told

	BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003; 18 March 2004 KANU: 19 Nov 2003 ; 18 March 2004			the witness that they were rebels. After being amputated, the witness was raped by the same rebel who amputated her. Before raping her, the rebel beat her with his gun butt on her back and head. He hit her as she refused at first to have sex with him. He was wearing mixed combat. The witness was captured together with B.F. who was from Benikoro. The witness saw B.F. was also bleeding from both hands. The witness said both of B.F.'s hands were injured but not amputated. She also saw M.F. and M.F.'s younger brother, Y. F. who had also been captured by the rebels. The witness saw that rebels had tried to amputate both of M.F.'s hands.
PN TF1-213	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12	60 minutes	This witness will testify that in 1998 she was 13 years old when rebels attacked Kabala. She was captured by rebel who took her to Langehkoror. The rebel told her she would be his woman. She was raped before getting to Langehkoror. When she arrived rebels argued who would have her. Two groups of rebels were present: one was Musa's group, one was Superman's group. One "Yellowman", part of Superman's group, told the witness that since no one could decide he advised that she should be killed or amputated. At this point the witness's hands tied and then struck with machete. The witness had a letter stuck to the "tail" of her cloth and was told to go deliver it to Kabbah. She walked three miles and then collapsed by a stream before being rescued by ECOMOG. She saw a man named Sheriff struck and killed with machete

				by "Yellowman." The witness saw one man have his penis cut off by rebel. The witness saw lots of child combatants with the rebels.
PN TF1-311	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	This witness will testify that on 27 April 1998 rebels had attacked Yifin and burnt houses. The witness saw smoke coming from Yifin. He went in search of family members. He was forced into a house by armed men wearing ECOMOG clothing. The witness saw men firing into the house. He recognized Superman who gave command and shot into the house, and Mamburu who also shot into the house. He had known Mamburu and Superman as rebels. Mamburu wore ECOMOG clothes during attack. Others had mixed clothes. Some people escaped through the window out into the bush. Whilst in the house the witness saw Superman enter with one other and shoot people. The witness heard Superman giving instructions for the house to be burnt because of the support Sierra Leoneans were giving ECOMOG. Only the witness and one other survived. The witness then found out that his father was burnt in his house. On 29 April 1998 the witness buried his remains at the back of the burnt house. About forty (41) people were killed at the house, including men, women and children. A lot of other people were killed in the town. The witness states that the people who held them and put them into the house were rebels.

PN TF1-310	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	This witness will testify that in 1997 or 1998 Yifin was attacked. Men in uniforms directed the witness and others, about a hundred in total, to a house. Men started firing at them through the windows and the door. The witness was shot on the breast. Almost everybody else died. The house was burnt while the witness was inside. The attackers thought their victims were the family of the Paramount Chief, who had called ECOMOG. The witness managed to get out of house and into the bush.
PN TF1-312	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 13	60 minutes	This witness will testify that he was in Yifin when the RUF attacked on 27 April 1998. The witness's father, an ex SLA, was threatened with death for supporting Tejan Kabbah, but eventually released. The witness's house was looted and burnt down. The RUF killed people, about a hundred. He was told that rebels burned a house with people in it in Yifin. The witness escaped in bush and stayed there for 1 ½ year. During that time, rebels attacked other villages and looted. The witness was captured and flogged on suspicion of being Kamajor. The witness saw the rape of woman in bush by 2 rebels.
PN TF1-214	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 12	60 minutes	This witness will testify that Koneibaia was attacked twice. The first attack occurred after the rebels had been kicked out of Freetown by ECOMOG. One man had both hands amputated and 10 houses were burned by rebels. Some civilians were forced to

	2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			push rebels' cars toward Kono. During the second attack, ECOMOG troops guarding village fled as over 300 rebels attacked. The rebels captured many villagers, including the witness, and brought them to the cotton tree in the centre of Koneibaia. The commander said "You want a civilian government, you want Tejan Kabbah. This is Operation No Living Thing." The commander then ordered a rebel to bring cutlass and amputate. The rebel amputated the witness's 6 years old daughter and then amputated the witness's hand. The rebel proceeded to amputate the hands of three other women and three men. One woman, 8 months pregnant, later died. Some men also died. The rebels also killed several villagers and burned remaining houses. The rebels abducted two women and stated that they were going to attack Fadugu. The witness heard about amputations and burning of house by rebels in Kono area.
PN TF1-215	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 12, 13	90 minutes	This witness will testify that he was in Koneibaia (Koinadugu) when "rebels" came in March 1998 after being kicked out of Freetown. They stayed for 3 weeks during which they stole properties during "Operation Pay Yourself." They wore a mix of civilian and military clothes. The witness is not sure if they were AFRC or RUF. They forced the civilian population, including the witness, to carry food and other items for them. On leaving in April 1998 they abducted several male and female civilians. The witness heard about killings, amputations and

	2003			<p>burning of houses in Yifin. When the witness returned to Koneibaia, he heard about amputations. The rebels captured three male civilians and forced them to carry loads and shot another civilian dead who refused to join them when they were all drinking palm wine. The witness says then that rebels took three men and wrote "RUF" with razor blade on their foreheads. One day the witness heard firing from Lekekoro. Three civilians were cut up in attempted amputations. The witness was then told that rebels had attacked Koneibaia. The witness returned to Koneibaia that evening and saw amputations. The rebels also abducted several men and women. On 19 May the rebels returned. The witness saw these rebels shoot 8 civilians. The rebels also burned many houses at this point. There were about 200 rebels. The commander ordered amputations of civilians. There were two rebel groups: the first was SAJ Musa's who traveled through Bafodia to Kamakwei and the other was Superman's group who traveled from Ferewa to Koneibaia to Faduga. The civilians begged but Commander said to stop begging and also said "There is no God here today." The rebels then started amputations taking "smallest hands first." They told witness that he would never be able to vote for a civilian government and to go to Kabbah. The witness had his right hand amputated. Amputations took place near the cotton tree.</p>
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2. ICR WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF1-094	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was captured by SAJ Musa (SLA/RUF) in 1998 near the bush at Kabala. She spent a year with the rebels. The witness's parents were killed. She was forced to pound rice for rebels. The witness was taken as a wife by a Lieutenant and became pregnant but lost the baby. The captured girls were forced to undress to avoid being seen by enemy. Then 2 or 3 men would rape girls. The witness walked from Kabala to Freetown with rebels. She was present during invasion. Many women and children were captured. The rebels burnt cars and houses. The witness moved around with rebels and witnessed killings, amputations, burnings and cannibalism. Captured women were gang raped. One woman was raped until she died. The witness heard that pregnant women had their stomachs slit open. The witness remembers being beaten by 55.</p>
PN TF1-146	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p>	1, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12	75 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she heard fighting in Kabala during the 27 July 1998 attack on Kabala. The witness was captured on 1 August 1998 in Katombo (Koinadugu) by an armed RUF rebel called Mohammed. Mohammed wanted to marry her. Mohammed's commander</p>

	BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			raped her twice in Kabala. He was rough and the witness was a virgin. She bled for 1 day. He threatened to kill her if she refused sex. The witness will testify that 50 other girls of same age or slightly older were abducted from Kabala and forced to marry rebels. After 2 days in Kabala, the witness was taken to Koinadugu, Makeni, Kamakwie before escaping in early 1999. The witness and 7 other girls worked for Superman's wife in Koinadugu, preparing food. Among the commanders in Kabala were SAJ Musa, Superman and Morris Kallon. The witness saw Brigadier 55 in Koinadugu. She heard from rebels that abducted children were given military training in Koinadugu. The rebels abducted many civilians.
PN TF1-209	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	120 minutes	This witness will testify that both the AFRC/RUF attacked Koinadugu before the January 6 1999 invasion. She was told of killings by poisoning and saw 2 dead bodies of civilians who had been poisoned. She was told about other civilians who died as well. Her cousin was deliberately shot in his thigh by the rebels. The witness heard that the rebels abducted civilians. One month later they returned and beat civilians. The witness was publicly raped, beaten and stabbed. She suffered a miscarriage. The witness saw more than 10 women and girls who were hiding on the farm raped. Civilians were abducted, beaten, and

				<p>subjected to looting and forced labour. The witness saw child soldiers who had received military training involved in the killing. The witness was taken as a wife by a rebel and forced to do domestic chores. Rebels told the witness that in Mongo, they split open bellies of pregnant women, having placed bets on the sex of the foetus. The rebels also told her that they amputated and initiated women. The witness heard that Gullit had told the rebels to kill the people in Koinadugu town. Many civilians including children from the age ten up were forced to undergo military training. The rebels burnt all the houses in Koinadugu town except the mosque. Eight of her relatives were burnt in these houses as well as other civilians. The witness saw three amputations. The witness heard about killing of a woman and the baby she was carrying on her.</p>
PN TF1-133	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov</p>	3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12	90 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that in early 1998 she was captured by rebels in Kumala. Brigadier Mani was the overall commander of those rebels. She heard that Savage had killed 2 SLA and 4 civilians near Kurubonla but did not see any bodies. Many abducted women were forced into marriage with rebels. They stayed in area around Kurubonla. The witness can testify to sexual slavery of at least 4 abductees. The witness saw many abductees in Kurubonla and was voted "mamy queen" by 131 (24 votes</p>

	2003			<p>for other women) abducted women near Koinadugu Town. Many women came to witness complaining that they had been raped by rebels other than their husband. The witness was stabbed in the buttocks with a bayonet by a rebel to whom she had been given. The witness saw many abducted children. The witness heard that RUF (Commanders SAJ Musa and Superman) ordered some children (about 15 years old) to be trained. The witness saw many abducted children. Many young girls were used for domestic chores. Afterwards, the witness went to Makeni where she saw Gullit, 55, 05, Issa Sesay and others. She also saw 131 abducted children there.</p>
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KAILAHUN CRIME BASE

1. CRIME BASE WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF1-111	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 12	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that he was abducted on 1 June 1991 by the RUF. He was initially held for 1½ years in Bunumbu in Kailahun. The witness was again captured on 30 December 1998 in Pendembu in Kailahun together with over 200 civilians, including his family. One of his wives told him she was raped during her captivity. The witness was forced to work. He was told that the rebels took captive women as wives.
PN TF1-247	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 9, 12, 13	60 Minutes	This witness will testify that in December 1998 the AFRC/RUF attacked Segbwema and captured civilians. Men and women were beaten by the rebels. The witness saw a group of SLA/RUF rebels carrying loads. The soldiers said they took orders from Capt. Bakar. The witness and others were tortured and beaten. The witness saw rebels looting properties in an operation they described as "Operation Pay Yourself".

1. ICR WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF1-113	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003; 24 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003; 24 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003; 24 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 24 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 24 Feb 2004</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 24 Feb 2004</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 12	90 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was captured in 1991 and moved from village to village. At this time Sam Bockarie (SB) was the commander and Issa Sesay his deputy. The witness says that after the intervention in February 1998 more than 500 abductees from all over Sierra Leone were taken to Kailahun. The witness saw the killing of 10 of 67 detainees in Kailahun Town and saw Augustine Gbao and SB present at the scene. Gbao was the overall commander on the ground when these people were killed. The witness also saw civilians being forced to work.</p>
PN TF1-108	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003; 24 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003; 24 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003; 24 Feb 2004</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12	120 minutes	<p>This witness will testify as to the make up of the High Command within the RUF from 1994 to 1996 and afterwards. The witness says Issa Sesay (IS), Morris Kallon (MK), Augustine Bao (AG), Sam Bockarie (SB) were part of the High Command and controlled the RUF. AG used forced labour for carrying loads of ammunition from Buedu to Pendembu and Mobai. AG's men would surround a town or village and</p>

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	BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 24 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 24 Feb 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 24 Feb 2004			abduct boys and young men for fighting. Women were also abducted. The women's job was to go to the front and fight and cook for the soldiers and sleep with the commanders. The witness was told that two young boys were shot because were unable to carry their loads. Before the January 99 invasion at the end of dry season, AG, MK, IS and SB were involved in the killing of 60 Kamajors held for screening.
PN TF1-112	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 12, 13	90 minutes	This witness will testify that he fled to Daru in November 1997 when the Kamajors attacked. At the time the AFRC/RUF were in control, harassing civilians for food and threatening to kill anyone who tried to escape. The witness fled from Daru to Mobai where he was captured with over 150 men, women and children (girls and boys) by combined AFRC and RUF forces. He fled Mobai with other captives. The witness was recaptured by junta forces and taken to Pendembu. The witness met other captives in Pendembu, where he saw Issa Sesay and Gibril Massaquoi. The witness was placed in a deep hole. One captor peered in and told witness he knew he was a police officer.
PN TF1-246	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10	90 Minutes	This witness will testify that he was detained in Kailahun Town after RUF rebels came to the witness's home town, stating they had been

	Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			sent by their commander, Gbao, with instructions that people coming from government controlled areas should report to him in Kailahun for investigations. This was around the dry season of 1998. The witness was arrested along 75 people from areas around his home town on orders of Gbao. The witness was told that the RUF commander in Kailahun was Gbao. The witness knows that 65 men accused of being Kamajors were detained. He later heard that they had been killed.
PN TF1-114	SESAY: 2 June 2003; 24 Feb 2004 KALLON: 26 May 2003; 24 Feb 2004 GBAO: 14 October 2003; 24 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 24 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 24 Feb 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 24 Feb 2004	1, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17	120 Minutes	This witness will testify that he went to Kailahun after the AFRC left Freetown in 1998. The AFRC stole some money from him. After complaining, the witness was beaten and then sent to the front to fight. He was unable to do so. The witness saw many abductees brought to Beudu by various commanders. Morris Kallon brought the biggest group. Issa Sesay was also involved. Captives including children who were sent for military training. In 1999 the witness saw the execution of soldiers and a civilian medic for theft. Civilians were used as slave labour on a rice farm of Sam Bockarie and Morris Kallon. Women were used as wives and for domestic purposes by the rebels. The witness was present when 15 MILOBS were abducted and their possessions looted in May 2000. He was told that Issa Sesay gave

				the command for this.
PN TF1-330	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 14, 17	90 Minutes	<p>This witness will testify that he saw forced labour up to the year 2000 and the conscription and military training of women and young children by rebels. He used to see children as young as 10 years old carrying guns. They were mostly with RUF commanders such as Issa Sesay. The witness saw captives in Kailahun Town. After July 1999 he heard that about 40 people people alleged to be Kamajors had been killed. The witness heard that Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie ordered the killings and that Augustine Gbao, whom he saw in Kailahun Town after the killings, was present during the killings. The witness lost a brother in the killings. The witness heard of captured UNAMSIL personnel in Ngiema. He was told that Sesay had ordered their capture. The witness states that he also saw looting of property by the RUF.</p>
PN TF1-313	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004; 24 Feb</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11	90 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that Augustine Gbao was the Chief Security Officer for the RUF, Issa Sesay, the Battle Field commanding officer and Morris Kallon, the Battle Group commanding officer. The witness will also testify that Gbao had Kamajors detained in Kailahun Town, in Kailahun District. Three weeks later, a RUF rebel collected three of the</p>

	<p>2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004</p>			<p>witness's relatives, saying he had instructions to collect all Kamajors. The witness was told that Sesay, Gbao and Sam Bockarie shot the Kamajors. The witness heard all the Kamajors were executed. Gbao ordered the removal of their bodies. The witness observed that child soldiers were used in different areas such as houses of commanders and on the front line.</p>
PN TF1-327	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004; 24 Feb 2004</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13	45 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that in 1998 he saw the killing of 10 people by the AFRC in Buedu. Captain Sesay, the AFRC commander in Buedu, ordered the arrest and shooting of the ten. The witness says that Morris Kallon took 40 bags of rice by force and the remainder was given to AFRC.</p>

<p>PN TF1-200</p>	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	<p>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13</p>	<p>120 Minutes</p>	<p>This witness will testify that he was abducted in 1997 in Kailahun District. He was 13 years old at that time. The Rebels (RUF) attacked the village. Their Commander was Thomas Sandy. They burned houses and looted. The rebels also abducted 7 boys and 12 men. The next morning the RUF came again. They killed 7 people. The witness was captured and had to transport goods for them. The rebels killed the witness's uncle. In Yaama the rebels gave military training to men and women and children for 3 months. During the training people died of hunger and diseases. From the 100 children in the witness's group, 30 died. Recruits too tired to continue would be beaten or flogged. The witness was trained early 1999 and given a weapon. After RUF attacked they would call the small boys to come and get the goods from the village. They gave drugs to children and to soldiers to make them braver. The chain of command was Sam Bockarie (aka Mosquito), Superman, Nabiu Lai Karimu, Bilai Karim, Issa Sesay, Tommy Sandy. Tommy Sandy gave reports to Issa Sesay about attacks.</p>
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PORT LOKO CRIME BASE

1. CRIME BASE WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF1-253	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	90 minutes	This witness will testify that the rebels interrogated them about the location of a Gbenti base and the location of ECOMOG. The witness was captured in the village of Makambisa along with 5 other people. He saw the rebels kill these 5 people. The witness was then taken to Marmarra. The rebels there told the witness that they were the men of Superman. The witness heard talk of Operation No Living Thing. The witness saw rebels kill one man and saw many people in a house in the village. They were begging for water. The house was locked from the outside. He saw the rebels burn house with petrol. After the attack the witness and other villagers counted 73 people dead in house. The witness saw the rebels in mixed civilian and military clothing perform two amputations and tell the victims to "go to Tejan Kabbah and tell him who did this." The witness was taken the by rebels to Port Loko but escaped on the third day in Port Loko. He saw many bodies in Port Loko.
PN TF1-250	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	60 minutes	This witness will testify that sometime before Peace Accord he was in the village of Magboru when it was attacked by rebels. He and his family were captured by the rebels along with many others and taken to village of Manarrma. The witness saw over 100

1972
2261
1888
1881

	2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			rebels present in Manarrma. In Manarrma, the witness was ordered to sit on ground with 4 other family members. The witness saw the rebels put five family members in a house that was later set ablaze. There were many other people in the house. The witness personally heard the CO give order to burn the house. The witness also heard people screaming from the house. The rebels then took the witness and two others, Mohamed Tarawa, Brima Koroma, and performed double amputations. The witness was told to go to Kabbah and tell him what had happened and then told to go to the people of Port Loko to tell them the rebels are coming.
PN TF1-254	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	60 minutes	This witness will testify that Manarrma was attacked in the dry season after the Freetown invasion. He saw 3 of his wives and 4 of his children ordered to sit on the ground. He saw a son and a daughter killed, one by an axe and the other by a cutlass by rebels in underpants. The witness later saw the rebels lead his three wives and two children into a house that they later set on fire. It was late in the afternoon when they burnt the house. They burnt a total of 25 houses. After the rebels left the witness and other villagers counted 73 skulls of people who were burned in this house. In total the witness lost 16 of his relatives in this attack. The witness also says that another 6 of his children were killed in Makamisa.
PM TF1-320	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10	60 minutes	This witness will testify that after the Lome Peace Accord he and his family and other people from

	<p>KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>			<p>Rotombo (nearby Manarrma) were captured and taken to Manarrma There he saw a lot of dead bodies and a man giving commands for the killing, burning and the amputation of civilians. The witness also saw armed men dressed only in under pants with red pieces tied round their head. Women who had been captured were taken into a house at the centre of the town. 70 women were detained in the house. Rebels later opened fire on house. The witness heard the women crying. Rebels with cutlasses and axes then entered the house and the butchered those who were still wailing. The house was then burnt.</p>
PN TF1-257	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12	90 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was captured in the bush by rebels and taken to "a garden." The rebels were dressed in civilian clothes and many had red cloth wrapped around their head and legs. They were armed with cutlasses and axes. Some had guns. The witness says that she observed that a good number of the rebels were young boys. In the garden, a list of the captured villagers from Tendakum was prepared. The witness is unsure how many people were put onto the list. When the rebels arrived in Tendakum, they burned down the village on the day they entered and also raped many women. The witness says that she was not raped. After the list of villagers was completed, one of the rebels said to the other rebels to take whomever they wanted, women for wives and men and children for labour. The witness said that she was taken by a</p>

				<p>rebel woman named Hawa Conteh. The witness attempted to look for her family in their hut and was told by one of the small boys that the people in the hut were killed by the rebels. A few days later the witness was told by another rebel who was in Tendakum that her father was killed. The witness later learned that 47 people from Tendakum were killed in these incidents and most were relatives of the witness. The witness was taken to Lunsar where Superman was in charge.</p>
PN TF1-256	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12	90 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that in April 1999 he was captured with many other civilians. The witness was taken to the garden of another villager, Mohamed Sankoh. The rebel group that captured the witness registered him and 66 other civilians into a notebook. On the third day of capture, the witness states that he saw a group of about 50 rebels leading away some of the captives who were from Tendakum, including the witness's son and brothers. The witness did not see what happened to these civilians but was told shortly thereafter by the rebels that those civilians had been killed. Later that day the witness saw 7 dead bodies of those among this group that were hacked to death with machetes. The witness also saw that the rebels who had led the civilians away had blood on their machetes when they returned. The witness believes that 47 people were led away and killed based on the number of people missing from the village. The witness saw that when the rebels initially arrived they took about</p>

				<p>15 women to their "booths" (make shift housing for rebels) in the garden where they were raped nightly. The witness also saw that the rebels burned the entirety of Tendakum and Nonkoba. The witness arrived after the actual burning but saw the smoke. On the 5th day of capture the witness was taken to Nonkoba along with 4 others where he was interrogated before being placed in a rice box. The following morning the witness was released from the rice box and sent to different commanders to work for them. He was forced to work mostly on domestic chores and says that he worked out of fear. While at Nonkoba Superman, who was in charge of Lunsar, sent a letter to the commander which was read out in the presence of the witness. The letter detailed that certain villagers, including the witness, were not to be killed. Superman issued orders more than once that killing should stop.</p>
PN TF1-261	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12	90 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that he was captured by rebels who brought them into "the garden" where they were registered in a book. There were children among the rebels. On the 4th day of captivity the witness saw 8 dead bodies, including those of his children and mother. The bodies had been hacked with machetes. A rebel named Malaria told the witness "See what we did here, this is an example." Malaria also said that he was an SLA. Later, in Lunsar, the witness learned that Malaria's boss was Major Cole. The witness and others were taken to Captain Richie who instructed the rebels to "knock</p>

				<p>them down". A rebel named Tyler then told the rebels to leave the witness and 3 others alive since they had already killed a good number of people. The witness was returned to the village of Tendakum and instructed by Malaria to build a "booth" – a small thatched hut with no walls. While building it Malaria told the witness and others that he wanted to take them to Kailahun to do mining. When it was discovered that his whole family had been killed the witness was put into labour for Malaria instead. While the witness was in Tendakum he heard that many of the women of Tendakum were raped by the attacking rebels. The rebels burned down all of the houses in Tendakum. The witness and three others were made to carry loads to Cucoona. Before they left, Malaria cut the marking RUF into the witness' chest. On the way, a larger group of rebels joined with them saying that they had been attacked. The group all proceeded to Lunsar. The civilians were lodged at the police barracks by Captain Richie. Superman was the commander of Lunsar and he gave an order to not kill the civilians. The witness was in Lunsar about one month before escaping.</p>
PN TF1-252	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that she was captured by rebels. While in Nokoba, the witness saw several child rebels beating an old man. They took him into the bush and returned with his cut up his body in a bowl. The cooked and ate the body parts. The rebels threatened the witness that she would be killed if she did not eat some. Other civilians were also forced to</p>

	Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			eat the flesh. Around the same time the witness saw the rebels kill a woman. She also saw the same rebels take a baby, put it in the rice pounding bowl and then pound it to death. The rebels said that their boss was Foday Sankoh. While she was in Nokoba the witness says that CO Superman came there.
PN TF1-344	March 31, 2004. To all six accused.	1, 12		This witness will testify that she was in Nonkoba when she, her mother, second mother and siblings were captured by rebels. The witness was taken away by one rebel. Upon seeing her mother again, the witness was told that she would never see her brothers and sisters again. The witness believes that the order for the people to be killed was given by Mohamed Kanu as she could tell by his behavior as he was in charge. The witness was then taken to Lunsar by Jibbo. There she heard of Superman.
PN TF1-346	March 31, 2004. To all six accused.	9, 10	30 minutes	This witness will testify that she was only an infant when the rebels came to Nonkoba. They put her into a fire where they normally cook food. The fire was right on the side of the main street near her house in the village. Her legs and feet were disfigured.
PN TF1-259	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12	60 minutes	This witness will testify that she was hiding when the rebels who attacked her village, Tendakum, found her and others hiding in bush near the village. The rebels were dressed in combat uniforms and armed with guns, knives, cutlasses and axes. She and the others were abducted and forced to pound rice for the rebels. She was captured by a rebel named

	Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			Dipolis who raped her. The witness says that the rebels killed 40 people when they attacked. The witness did not personally see the killings, but could hear the people crying as they were being killed and heard the sound of cutlasses striking the people and then later saw the dead bodies. The witness was eventually taken to Lunsar and then to Makeni. In Makeni she heard that Superman was in charge but did not see him.
PN TF1-345	March 31, 2004. To all six accused.	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12	60 minutes	This witness will testify that sometime in April or May many rebels armed with weapons passed trough Nonkoba. It was after the January 6 invasion of Freetown. She hid into the bush near Tendakum. The next morning, rebels captured her along with many other civilians. The rebels forced them to pound rice and to build huts. The witness was whipped by a rebel. A few days later the witness escaped into the bush. From there, she heard rounds of hitting and women and children crying. During the night the wife of a rebel told the witness that her four children had been killed by rebels. Thereafter, the witness went to Lunsar and stayed there for two weeks. Superman was the commander in Lunsar.

2. ICR WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF1-255	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 10 Dec 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 17 Dec 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	30 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that Tendakum attacked by rebels who came from the direction of Masiaka. The majority of the rebels were dressed in combat uniforms while some in civilian clothes. The rebels were under the command of Capt. Richie who identified himself as an SLA. The witness and other villagers were captured and taken to a garden area where kept for 2 days. On the third day, the witness saw many bodies of villagers he recognized, but did not see them killed. Many of the remaining civilians, including the witness, were taken to Lunsar. The witness says that Superman was in charge in Lunsar. The witness saw Issa Sesay come from Makeni and play football with 55, Superman and other commanders in Lunsar before match ended abruptly.</p>
PN TF1-282	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>KALLON: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>GBAO: 7 Feb 2004</p> <p>BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004</p> <p>KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004</p>	1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 12	60 minutes	<p>This witness will testify that when the rebels attacked her village she was hid in the bush about 400 metres from Mabale village. She saw the rebels loot rice, palm oil and beans from the village. The witness saw that the rebels abducted four women and one man. She was later told that the women spent 5 days with rebels during which time they were raped. The rebels attacked again and the witness was captured. Other women complained to her that they had been raped. The witness was herself raped over two</p>

	KANU: 7 Feb 2004			weeks by 55, who threatened her with a pistol. The witness heard him order looting. Witness was raped again by other rebels. The witness was "married" to a rebel. She fetched water for him, did his laundry and also cooked for him. She believed she would have been killed if she had attempted to escape. Eventually the witness ran away, but was shot in leg. The witness was taken to Connaught Hospital where she saw many injured people. The witness's brother was abducted after she had been abducted and was given military training. He was released to ECOMOG in 1999.
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CHILD WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TFI - 115	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	8, 12, 13	120 minutes	Kailahun Crime Base This witness will testify that he was captured as a young boy by Liberians, after which he carried looted properties. The witness saw SBU's in Kailahun. The witness will testify to events that occurred prior to 1997. The witness will testify that children were used for labour by the rebels. The witness has evidence on the use of children by A. Gbao and M. Kallon.
PN TFI - 271	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15	180 minutes	Bombali Crime Base This witness will testify that he was abducted when very young, took drugs, raped, amputated, killed civilians, including opening the stomach of a pregnant woman. The witness will give evidence on the transfer of diamonds to Liberia for Charles Taylor. The witness was present during the UNAMSIL attacks in Makeni and will testify as to prior planning of these attacks by Gbao.

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TFI- 143	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13	120 minutes	Koinadugu, Bombali, Freetown Crime Bases This witness was captured by mixed RUF/AFRC in September 1998 with 50 people, where there were more children his age (10 years old) than adults. The witness will testify to how young men were marked AFRC on their chests and foreheads by Cabila with a razor blade. The witness has evidence on how abductees were ordered to work by force; and how abductees, including boys and girls, were armed and sent to kill people. They would be shot if refused. The witness has evidence on how over thirty people were killed in a village on the advance to Freetown, prior to the invasion. The witness will testify to orders to kill all people on the way and to burn houses in any villages they captured. The witness and other boys as young as 10 were ordered to commit rapes. The witness has evidence on how group was split into two camps. The witness's group was led by 05, followed by Cabila, Lt. Mohamed (AFRC), then Adama Cuthand. The witness will give evidence on how the group spent 2 weeks at Koinadugu then headed for Freetown; how they burnt all houses in Moria and all deserted villages they passed by; how they captured people on their way and forced

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				them to carry loads; how the group cut hands of some people. The witness and others had to carry loads and looted items. The witness will describe how one night, a young woman was sacrificed at a burial. 05, 55, Gullit, Jr Lion and others were present at the sacrifice. In Freetown, the witness saw people being killed, houses burnt and people having their hands cut. Adama Cuthand gave orders to some young man to do so because the people had voted for Kabbah. The witness eventually escaped.
PN TFI – 180	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13	60 Minutes	Bombali Crime Base This witness will testify that he was abducted by the RUF with other children in Bombali District, prior to the AFRC coup. He was first kept in a cell with other boys, then he received military training. The small boys would attack villages in search of food. The RUF over ran Kabala. He went to Kabala. When John Paul Koroma (JPK) was in power, they fought together with AFRC. The witness attacked villages like Batodia, Kalakana, Gbakona, Madina Madingo, Maseboy, Kapunton. While in Makeni, witness saw Issa Sesay, Superman, Brigadier 55 and others. The witness will give evidence that the big commanders knew about the use of children because it

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>was reported to them from field commanders that they caught a certain amount of small children. When they went on food finding Mission in Kabala, they amputated the hands of people or killed those who did not want to give them food. When they went on attacks, they abducted young girls. Some of them were raped there. At times they would bring the girls to the base. When the Commanders would like them, they would keep them and take them as their wife. The witness heard of gang-raping but he never witnessed it.</p>
<p>PN TFI – 317</p>	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>	<p>3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13</p>	<p>45 minutes</p>	<p>Bombali Crime Base This witness was abducted by Gibril Massaquoi in 1994 and taken to Bunumbu in the Kailahun District Camp Lion for training as a fighter with 10 others his age (young boy). The witness went to Makeni during the junta, where the RUF commanders were Komba Gbundema, Gibril Massaquoi and General Issa Sesay, who was the overall commander. The witness describes the command responsibility of Gibril Massaquoi, including leading attacks (attack on Kamasundo where many civilians killed), declaring “Operation Sweep” and “Spare no zone”, told to spare no life. The witness will testify that nearly all the commanders had</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>child soldiers called Small Boys Unit (SBU), including Gibril Massaquoi, Superman, Komba Gbundema, Bupleh (sic), General Issa, who were used as bodyguards for the commanders. The witness will give evidence on how the commanders also armed the SBU's and sent them to fight against enemies and on food finding missions.</p>
<p>PN TFI – 323</p>	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004</p>	<p>6, 8, 9, 10, 11</p>	<p>60 minutes</p>	<p>Bombali, Koinadugu and Freetown Crime Bases This witness will testify that in 1994 he was abducted at age 10 in Bo by the RUF. He was trained at Koribundo with others (where boys beaten if refused to take drugs), received drugs; and was captured again in 1996 and sent to fight in the Northern Jungle. The witness states that every commander had 5 SBU's and that there were rapes by SBU's. The witness later commanded a group of his own SBU's. The witness has evidence of knowledge by JP Koroma during junta time of the use of children. The witness fought in the Northern Jungle for three months, and later in Kambia in 1998. He was then taken on the advance to Freetown and participated in the invasion. The witness states that the abductions of civilians during the advance was planned at a prior meeting. The witness gives evidence</p>

2275

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>on rampant sexual violence, including where rebels would force boys to rape so that they could “watch movie”, and on the forced marriage of abducted girls. The witness will give evidence that helicopters with the colours of the Liberian flag brought the rebels arms & ammunition. The witness was told that diamonds and money given to Mosquito would be used to buy ammunition from Charles Taylor.</p>
<p>PN TFI – 211</p>	<p>SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003</p>	<p>1, 4, 5, 11, 12</p>	<p>60 minutes</p>	<p>Kenema Crime Base This witness will testify to being captured in Makeni and taken to Kono and later Tongo with five other boys and carrying loads along the way. The witness will testify to being forced to mine diamonds in Tongo at Cyborg pit, where he received food morning and afternoon but no pay. The witness will give evidence on forced mining by rebels of civilian population, including killings of civilians who did not obey rebel instruction, all within the knowledge and presence of senior rebel commanders. The witness will give evidence of small boys guarding the Cyborg Pit who also killed civilians mining in the pit.</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TFI – 309	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 4,5, 9	60 Minutes	<p>Bombali Crime Base</p> <p>The witness will testify that he was captured by the RUF in Makeni in 1997 when he was 13 years old. He was taken to Kono and after 3 months to Kailahun. When he was taken from Makeni to Kono, houses were burnt, people were killed and new people were captured. Superman was the commander. From Kono the witness went to fight in Sewafe and Kuyor. In these two attacks civilians were killed. Superman was present during both battles. The RUF was fighting against ECOMOG and Kamajors. Whilst in Kono the witness was taken to Buedu on the order of CO. Issa. Co. Issa was the big man over Superman. In Buedu the witness was trained to fight and was turned into a rebel. There were 40 small boys in the witness's group. After training the boys were divided into 3 groups. His group went to Nyeyama, Kailahun district. The witness met CO Issa first time in Makeni. The witness met him again in Kono. He was the man in charge and giving orders, including to attack locations. He gave the order during the morning parade. The witness met him again in Kailahun. In Buedu the witness saw Issah killing a doctor who had stole medicine. He shot the doctor. The witness heard the conversation and saw</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				Issa shoot the doctor in the chest. The witness saw the doctor fall down. When ECOMOG came to Kailahun the witness escaped to Magburaka and disarmed.
PN TFI – 110	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	6, 7, 8, 11, 12	180 minutes	Kailahun Crime Base This witness will testify to abductions and training of abductees (including children who remained with the RUF after the junta) at a camp where Issa Sesay was the training commander, in 1992. The witness headed a group of children and stayed in Kailahun heading training of children. The witness will testify to abductions of children from Kono, and of Mosquito going to Liberia to fight with forced recruits from Sierra Leone. The witness participated in attacks on Kono and Makeni prior to the Freetown invasion. The witness was part of the “reinforcement force” based at Makeni for troops invading Freetown. The Kono and Makeni attacks were under the command of Col Issa. Superman was his deputy. The witness will testify to a meeting headed by Bockarie that made Sesay the “responsible commander all the way to Freetown”, and that 400- 500 troops gathered of both RUF and junta. Bockarie said that they should “all fight as one”. The witness has evidence on Sesay ordering abductions of civilians for

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				manpower, including 5 trucks of captives. The witness will testify that many girls and women were forced to be rebel wives, and to rapes by RUF commanders. The witness identifies many mid-level RUF commanders operating in the Kailahun-Kono areas.
PN TFI-057	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 4, 5, 11, 12	45 Minutes	Bombali Crime Base This witness will testify to abductions near Karina, where there were lots of soldiers dressed in full combat uniform. The witness was with soldiers for 4 years. He saw a man killed at Saramudia. The witness was taken to Kurobola along with soldiers. The witness saw the training of many small boys. The RUF/AFRC were present at Kurobola. The witness used for domestic work by a rebel and also went to the front line with him and carried his gun. The witness participated in various attacks, such as Port Loko. The witness will give evidence that the AFRC/RUF were led by Superman and SAJ Musa. The witness fought with the group led by Bazy, 55 and Gullit on the advance to Freetown.
PN TFI- 142	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003	1, 2, 3 ,4, 5, 11, 12, 13	60 minutes	Koinadugu Crime Base This witness will testify to an attack on Helma Kono village in 1998 during the dry season by Savage and a group of rebels.

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			The attack included firing all over the place, the burning of three houses, the looting of everything in town (wearing, pots, dishes, bush rice, goats, fowl), and the capture of three children by rebels. The witness will give evidence on how after this attack on Helma Kono, the rebels based themselves in one section of the town, "Kasumpe", that there were child soldiers in the group, between ages 5 and 10 yrs with heavy guns that were being dragged in the ground; and that there were abducted women in the group, including young girls. The witness heard that members of his family were killed by rebels in Kamathente. The witness travelled to this village and buried their bodies.
PN TFI – 223	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	11, 12	45 minutes	Bombali and Freetown Crime Bases This witness will testify to being abducted in Makeni after the 1997 Coup, and being forced to carry a bag of rice for rebels after they threatened to kill him if he returned to his family. The witness was with rebels for 17 days, during which time he and three other boys washed dishes, cleaned rice and did laundry, as the group went to Kabala. The witness escaped from Kabala back to Makeni but was captured one year later by the same rebels who again threatened him

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				with death if he tried to escape. The witness stayed at a RUF home for one month in Makeni, and with the rebels until disarmament by UNAMSIL. Whilst captive, the witness was given military training and went on a mission attack to Lunsar led by 55 and Superman. The witness saw Gullit in Makeni.
PN TFI – 026	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003</p> <p>KALLON: 26 May 2003</p> <p>GBAO: 14 October 2003</p> <p>BRIMA: 3 June 2003</p> <p>KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003</p> <p>KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>			<p>Freetown Crime Base</p> <p>The witness was abducted from Peacock Farms on 6 Jan by the RUF. The RUF killed the witness's 16 year old girl cousin when they arrived at the house. The group CO a Col "Rocky." In Peacock Farms Col Rocky ordered 20 men, women and children shot and killed. The witness and three others escaped, but were recaptured. After their recapture Rocky ordered them marked "RUF". The witness was taken from Peacock Farms to Cabala and saw many people killed and some amputated. The witness was abducted and raped and taken to Makeni for 4 months. The witness saw Bockarie and Sesay there. The witness was taken to Kailahun where Bockarie was in charge.</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TFI-328	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13		Bombali Crime Base This witness will testify to being abducted in 1993, with other boys and girls. The witness will give evidence of the use of child soldiers and the provision of military training for child soldiers, including giving drugs to children and threats made to them. The witness will give evidence on attacks in the Bombali District, including the looting of civilian properties, killings, the burning of civilian houses, and the abductions of civilians.
PN TFI – 251	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13		Bombali Crime Base This witness will testify to being captured and taken to Makeni under a commander who was under Morris Kallon. The witness will testify that he saw Morris Kallon giving orders to one commander who reported to him. The witness was part of food-finding missions where villagers had to give food because rebels were armed. The witness attended a meeting where Superman addressed the group where Kallon was also in attendance. The witness will testify to the command of Kallon as rebels were fighting in Rogberi against ECOMOG. The witness will testify to specific troop movements and command structure en route and during Freetown invasion. The witness was told at Makeni that Superman had sent a message

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>to Issa Sesay asking him to make contact with Sam Bockarie. The witness will testify to mass abductions of civilians during Freetown invasion used to carry loads. The witness was told that this was done by Kallon. The witness saw dead bodies when the group left Makeni, looting of vehicles by Base Marine, and burning of houses in Freetown. The witness will testify that the RUF commanders during January 6 Freetown invasion were Superman, Rambo, Komba Gbundema, Bai Bureh, Col. Snake, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao and CO Kai. The witness states that there were AFRC members but does not know their names. The witness will also testify about the attack on the UNAMSIL Malian contingent.</p>
PN TFI-140	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13	60 minutes	<p>Koinadugu Crime Base This witness will testify to being captured by Savage in Tombodu at the end of the 1998 dry season. The group was mixed RUF, soldiers and Liberians. The witness was held with men, women and children, who had to do forced labour (cooking, washing, carrying loads, food finding). Some women captives became wives of the commanders. There were also child soldiers as young as 14 among the rebels. During captivity, the witness saw Savage, Brigadier Mani and</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>other commanders leave and go to “clear Makeni” with many civilians. The witness will give evidence of how children up to 15 years old were given military training in Kamabai. The witness will testify how Savage and Mani moved to Kabala. The witness heard communications between Savage and SAJ Musa, who told him that he was going to Freetown. Savage did not go to Freetown, but went to Makeni. The witness stayed in Makeni during Kabala attacks, where he did work along with women and carried loads for the commanders.</p>
<p>PN TFI – 141</p>	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	<p>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 19, 11, 12, 13</p>	<p>180 minutes</p>	<p>Kailahun Crime Base This witness will testify to being an abductee of RUF rebels. He will provide evidence of Sam Bockarie having radio communications with Charles Taylor and Taylor ordering Bockarie to attack a village in Sierra Leone in the Kailahun district at some point in 1997 or 1998. The witness will testify that in 1998 or 1999 Sam Bockarie traveled to Liberia to obtain arms and returned with those arms to Buedu in the Kailahun district of Sierra Leone. The witness will provide evidence that Charles Taylor visited Buedu in the Kailahun district of Sierra Leone on two occasions between 1997 and 1999; and that on the second of these visits, which</p>

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PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>occurred after the July 1999 Lomé Peace Accord, Charles Taylor said that Sam Bockarie should continue the revolution and that he would continue to support the revolution. The witness has indirect knowledge that on this same visit Sam Bockarie gave Charles Taylor an unknown quantity of diamonds. The witness has direct knowledge that two or three days after this visit, Sam Bockarie went to Liberia and returned with weapons to Buedu in the Kailahun district of Sierra Leone.</p>
<p>PN TFI- 013</p>	<p>SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003</p>	<p>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13</p>	<p>60 Minutes</p>	<p>Kono Crime Base This witness will testify that in September/October 1998 a large group of AFRC/RUF men together with Johnny Paul Koroma (JPK), Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay entered Tombudu Town. Also present were CO 55 and CO Augustine Gbao, who had arrived the day before. The witness will give evidence to how the civilian populace were forcibly summoned to attend a meeting; four men and two women who attempted to run were arrested and killed right in front of the crowd by the armed men. The witness will testify to Johnny Paul Koroma ordering the killing and burning of Tombudu and of people being burnt to death; that civilian belongings were looted and more than 100</p>

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PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				civilians forced to carry them away for rebels. The witness escaped but was later captured again by rebels, whereupon the witness was forced to mine diamonds for the rebels. The witness will testify as to how mining operations continued day and night under gun point. The witness was only given gari to eat.
PN TFI – 157	SESAY: 11 August 2003 KALLON: 11 August 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 22 Sept 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 11, 13	60 Minutes	Bombali Crime Base This witness will testify that he was captured with others from Bornoya by SLA and RUF and taken to Rosos. The witness says that at Rosos 64 other small boys were trained in weaponry and military tactics. They were later met by commanders (including Brig. Mani, Col Kloyo, Brig. 55, SAJ MUSA, Adama Cut Hand) in Mamamah Village and prepared to proceed to Freetown. The witness will provide evidence of how rebels killed and looted in villages they passed through. The witness participated in the attack on Freetown. The witness will testify that Gullit and 55 were part of the group that planned the attack on Freetown.
PN TFI- 158	SESAY: 11 August 2003 KALLON: 11 August 2003	1, 4, 5, 11, 12	60 Minutes	Bombali crime base This witness will testify to capture in Bornoya, where the witness saw rebels burning houses and killing people. The

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 22 Sept 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			witness was forcibly moved with the group to Karina, which was attacked by the soldiers. The witness will testify to hearing about killings in Karina, and subsequent movement with the group from Karina through to Lunsar. The witness stayed in Lunsar before moving to Makeni. At Rosos, the witness saw many young children. These children, including the witness, received military training at Rosos. The witness heard that 55 ordered military training for the children. The witness and other boys were also used for food-finding missions. The witness will give evidence on how captured civilians were forced to carry loads of food; how Gullit used to go on food-finding missions; and that food was brought back from these missions and stored in 55's office. The witness will testify to many of the men in Rosos with "wives" who were mostly women that had been captured. The witness will testify that Gullit and 55 were the commanders in Rosos; and that soldiers asked 55 for permission to go on food-finding missions.
PN TFI – 020	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	180 minutes	Kono, Bombali and Freetown Crime bases This witness will testify that RUF/AFRC forces attacked Koidu in early 1998, where

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			JPK ordered the killings of his parents. The witness will also testify to rapes, killings, and amputations of civilians by AFRC/RUF forces during the Koidu attack, and that JPK ordered his men not to kill young boys in order to use them as fighters. The witness saw at least 100 children (9-14 years, boys and girls) abducted to Kabala, where he saw over 200 children being given military training. The witness saw young children used for chores. Brima's group had children of 14 and 15 years. The witness will testify to troop movements from Northern Districts south to the Western Area on the advance to Freetown in January 1999, which included child combatants under command of SAJ Musa, 55 and 05. The witness states that the AFRC/RUF looted civilian property, amputated, did mass killings, and abducted many civilians, including women who were raped and held as "bush wives".
PN TFI - 225	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003	3, 4, 5, 11, 12	30 minutes	This witness will testify to his abduction at age 10 (likely in 1996). He was later trained at Koribundo under Monica, where he saw 300 trained, 100 of which were witness's age or younger. The witness will testify to staying there for one year. The witness says if trainees refused to cooperate, they were buried in a hole and that if a trainee did

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			not shoot in a straight line, he would get shot. The witness states that Monica killed the boys. Boys were killed if they couldn't follow the training.
PN TFI – 199	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13	60 Minutes	Bombali and Koinadugu Crime Bases This witness will testify that in June 1998 he was abducted at age 10 with other children. He saw his parents and uncle killed. The witness will testify to killings, beatings, amputations, rapes and abductions by rebels on way to Kabala. The witness will give evidence on the military training of children and the use of children in attacks on villages to get food, and the subsequent killings of civilians. The witness will give evidence on the captured ECOMOG troops being lined up and shot; as well as rebels burning villages. The witness saw girls aged 13 or 14 raped in public, sometimes by Commanders themselves, and of commission of amputations and looting by rebels. The witness tried to escape, but was captured, beaten and flogged with machetes. At Gberi Junction, the witness saw UN vehicles driven by RUF soldiers, who were wearing UN caps.
PN TFI – 117	SESAY: 2 June 2003	1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12	120 minutes	Freetown Crime Base This witness will testify that he was

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			abducted at age 10 when RUF attacked Tongo after which he received military training. The witness will testify to being taken to Liberia to fight and was there for 6 months. Sam Bockarie (Mosquito) was there with them. The witness fled from Liberia to Kailahun, and joined in attacks by RUF on villages. He saw rapes and the burning of houses. The witness saw Augustine Gbao give an order to capture a woman, cut her open and take her liver. The liver was later buried. During the attack on Kulahun Village, the witness saw Gbao give an order to shoot civilians at random because of SLA attack. After the 1997 coup, the witness moved from Kailahun to Makeni. Later he was taken to Freetown with orders to loot. He was in Freetown for 1 week. On way to Makeni the witness was told by one of the commanders that the AFRC was unable to pay soldiers and that they should pay themselves. The witness saw many soldiers looting in Makeni.
PN TFI-131	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	150 minutes	Koinadugu, Bombali and Freetown crime bases This witness will testify to abductions in July 1998 by rebels in Katombo II village. Witness (12 yrs at time) and other captives travelled with RUF/AFRC. On their way, the

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PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			<p>abductees were forced to carry loads and weapons. Rebels used razors and printed AFRC on chest. They travelled with Northern Jungle under 05 and Cuthand to Freetown invasion. The witness saw killings of civilians, rapes, amputations, looting, burning, abductions throughout to the advance to Freetown. After amputations, civilians were told to go to Kabbah and to blame him for what happened. The witness will testify to presence of 50 captives once in Koinadugu. The witness will testify to captives being sent on food finding missions. The witness will give evidence on presence of Superman, SAJ, 05 in Koinadugu, and of 55 during Kambia/Bombali operations. The witness will give evidence on death of SAJ Musa, and amputations in Freetown invasion under Cuthand, witness states who was under 05. the witness saw military training of children. He saw Brigadier Bazzy in Koinadugu, and saw civilians under the command of 55. The witness will give evidence on rebel invasion of Freetown, including meeting RUF who were led by Superman who had come to reinforce AFRC. The witness has evidence on 55, Bazzy and Gullit were all with SAJ Musa during movement to Freetown. The witness will testify to rebel use of extensive</p>

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PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				radio communication systems, and to seeing many captured women being taken as "wives" by the AFRC/RUF.
PN TFI-130	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	120 minutes	Bombali Crime base This witness will testify to abductions of 50 children (mostly girls and 14 or younger) in 1998 during attack on Kamakwie. Just before his 15 th birthday, the witness given training and forced to fight and kill civilians who refused or could not carry loads. The witness will testify that Morris Kallon radioed Taylor requesting troops to start mining in Kono, and that Charles Taylor sent many troops. The witness will testify to rapes, abduction of women and the use of these women in domestic labours. The witness will give evidence that Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon were at the camp in Kamalu and on the chain of command. The witness given drugs. The witness saw civilians beaten and killed by other small boy combatants.
PN TF1-357	To be disclosed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	90 minutes	This witness will testify that he was abducted from the bush near Njaima Sweafe Town. The villagers were forced to hand over foodstuffs at gun point. He was taken to Koidu Town, Tombodu Town and Koinadugu Town. Along with another 34 children he

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>was given training in weapons. He saw SAJ Musa and 55 in Koinadugu. The witness was attached to a Small Boys Unit and participated in the attack on Kabala and Makeni. When child combatants were disarmed he was handed over to CARITAS in Makeni. The witness will say that prior to attacks they SBUs received instructions to loot food, clothes and other valuable items. These were handed to their immediate commanders after the attack. The witness also received orders to abduct adults and young boys. The witness saw rebels commit rapes and commanders take women as bush wives. The witness also saw the amputation of limbs in Koidu Town and Tombodu town. The witness saw the burning of houses in Koidu Town.</p>

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EXTENSIVE ICR WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TFI – 189	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12	2 hours	<p>Kailahun Crime Base This witness will testify to the command structure in Kailahun District, including the position of Issa Sesay; the mutilation of civilians in Kailahun District; sexual slavery; abductions, forced labour, military training of abductees, including children; and vehicle traffic between Liberia and Buedu, Kailahun District.</p>
PN TFI – 045	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17	5 hours	<p>Kenema, Kono, Freetown Crime Bases This witness will testify to the relationship between the RUF and Charles Taylor and his subordinates; the position of Special Forces and Vanguard, including Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, in the RUF; the AFRC/RUF alliance; and the command structure within the RUF, AFRC and AFRC/RUF alliance. The witness will give evidence on the de facto and de jure authority of senior AFRC/RUF leaders, including Foday Saybana Sankoh, Johnny Paul Koroma, Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Alex Tamba Brima, and their activities; and communication within the AFRC/RUF. The witness will give evidence of diamond mining operations in Tongo Field and Kono and the transfer of diamonds to RUF / AFRC commanders, the</p>

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PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				use of diamonds to sustain AFRC/RUF operations in Sierra Leone; mutilation of civilians; abductions, use of abductees for forced labour, sexual slavery, and military training of abductees; and the use of child soldiers. The witness will testify to the AFRC/RUF movement toward Freetown and the attack on Freetown in January 1999. The witness will give evidence on the attacks on UNAMSIL personnel, including involvement of Issa Sesay. The witness will provide evidence about the ammunition supplies for the RUF and the AFRC/RUF alliance, including supplies from Liberia.
PN TFI – 151	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2	90 minutes	Kono and Kenema Crime Bases This witness will testify to the use of diamonds from Kono and Tongo Field to sustain the AFRC/RUF operations; the relationship between the RUF, including Foday Saybana Sankoh and Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, the AFRC and Charles Taylor and his subordinates; the command structure of the RUF, including Foday Sankoh and Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon; and the supply of arms and ammunition from outside Sierra Leone, including the involvement of the AFRC and RUF.
PN TFI – 153	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	3 hours	Kono, Freetown Crime Bases This witness will testify to the relationship of senior leaders within the AFRC and AFRC/RUF alliance, including Foday Sankoh, Johnny Paul Koroma, Alex Tamba Brima, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay; the relationship between the AFRC and

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			the RUF; the de facto and de jure authority of AFRC/RUF leaders including Foday Sankoh, Johnny Paul Koroma, Mosquito, Alex Tamba Brima, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay, and their activities; the movement of the AFRC/RUF alliance forces toward Freetown; the January 1999 attack on Freetown; the retreat from Freetown; the direct command structure for the Freetown attack and retreat, including Alex Tamba Brima and Morris Kallon; the direct involvement of Alex Tamba Brima in killings in Freetown in January 1999; the direct involvement of Alex Tamba Brima in burning of civilian structures in Freetown in January 1999; communications within the AFRC/RUF alliance; abductions, including of young children, and training and use of child soldiers; the rape of civilians; the killing of civilians; the looting of civilian property; and diamond mining in Kono District and use of diamonds by the AFRC and the RUF.
PN TFI – 033	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17	3 hours	Bombali, Kono, Freetown, Koinadugu Crime Bases This witness will testify to the relationship between the AFRC and the RUF; the de facto and de jure authority of Alex Tamba Brima; the 1998 activities of the Northern Jungle group, including: attacks against Kono District in April 1998; attacks against Bombali District in June 1998; attacks against Kambia District in June 1998; and the movement toward Freetown and the activities along the route, including attacks. The witness will also give evidence on the Northern Jungle involvement in the January 1999 attacks against Freetown; the command structure, including Alex Tamba Brima, and organization of

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				the Northern Jungle group, communication between the Northern Jungle group and the RUF, within the AFRC/RUF. The witness will testify to the killing of civilians; rape and sexual slavery; mutilations of civilians; abductions of civilians; burning of civilian structures; and attacks on UNAMSIL personnel, including direct attacks by commanders such as Augustine Gbao.
PN TFI – 168	SESAY: 11 Aug 2003; KALLON: 11 Aug 2003; GBAO: 14 October 2003; BRIMA: 22 Sept 2003; KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; KANU: 26 Nov 2003;	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12	5 hours	Kenema, Kailahun Crime Bases This witness will testify that in February 1997, Steve Bio, Gibril Massaquoi and Foday Sankoh went to Nigeria to procure arms to continue the war in Sierra Leone and to topple the government. The witness says that Steve Bio boasted of contacts with members of the Sierra Leone army whom he said were ready to join and fight against the government. The witness will provide evidence on how during the AFRC regime, Mosquito was based in Kenema; and that B.S. Massaquoi and others were killed in Kenema pursuant to Mosquito's orders. The witness will testify that when the AFRC and the RUF were pushed out of Freetown in February 1998, they went to Kono where they engaged in killings and amputations of people. The witness will provide evidence of visits to Charles Taylor by Mosquito during 1998 and that Mosquito had close links with Charles Taylor. The witness will give evidence that on December 1997, the RUF, on orders from Mosquito, detained in Kailahun town 65 civilian men ranging from ages 19 to 70 and from different parts of Kailahun District, on suspicion of being Kamajors; and that in February 1998, RUF MPs under the supervision of their commander, killed 64 of these 65 men

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				by the police barracks area in Kailahun and that Augustine Gbao was the MP commander for the whole of Kailahun District, but he was not present during the killing of these men. The witness heard that the order to kill these men came from Mosquito. The witness will give evidence that Johnny Paul Koroma was kept under house arrest in Kailahun by Mosquito. The witness will testify that between June and November 1998, the RUF conducted military training of about 200 people, including boys as young as 10, in Bunubu, in Kailahun District, under the command of a Liberian woman named Col. Monica Pearson. The witness will testify that the AFRC and RUF attacked Kono around December 1998, led by Issa Sesay. The witness will testify that RUF senior commanders, Superman and Gibril Massaquoi, were not on good terms with Mosquito, and found it easier to work with the AFRC; and that senior RUF commanders were part of the troops that attacked Freetown.
PN TFI – 139	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003 BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov	1, 2	5 hours	This witness will testify that during 1990 and 1991, Charles Taylor planned, organized, trained, directed and otherwise supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) both financially and logistically, including military training, physical cash, weapons, ammunitions, food, manpower in the form of NPFL troops, transportation, strategic tactical battle-front plan and professional guidance to invade Sierra Leone from the Liberian borders in Lofa County. The witness has direct knowledge that Taylor designated Corporal Foday Sankoh as the leader of the RUF. The witness will testify that this support continued throughout

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	2003			the 1990's. The witness will give evidence that in early 1991 Taylor planned to gain access to the rich diamond fields and mines of Eastern Sierra Leone in the Kono District so that the RUF could mine the diamonds and gold in that region. The witness will provide evidence that Charles Taylor issued certain operational orders and was in frequent communications to Sankoh, Sam Bockarie and other RUF leaders and junta leaders either directly or through his aide, Benjamin Yeaton; this included encouraging the AFRC and the RUF to work together. The witness will testify that Johnny Paul Koroma agreed to cooperate with the RUF and requested a commitment for future arms should the AFRC be attacked by foreign powers. The witness will testify that Charles Taylor met with and gave instructions to Sam Bockarie in February or March of 1998 for the RUF/AFRC forces to protect the Kono region's diamond fields during the ECOMOG's intervention, which had resulted in the removal of the AFRC junta government on or about 15 February 1998. Finally, the witness will provide evidence on arms and diamonds transactions during the time period of 1997-1999, including specific arms and diamonds shipments between Charles Taylor, Ibrahim Bah and Sam Bockarie in 1997 and 1998, and that proceeds of diamond shipments would go to Charles Taylor.
PN TFI – 184	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	6 hours	Bombali, Kono, Koinadugu Crime Bases This witness will testify to coordination between the AFRC and the RUF leadership following the 1998 intervention, including meetings, troop movements and attacks

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			<p>throughout Kono and Koinadugu districts. The witness describes in-fighting between AFRC and RUF troops in the North, and activities of northern troops. The witness will testify to the sacrifice of two young children by Alex Tamba Brima at Rosos by burying them alive, and evidence of Alex Tamba Brima launching "Operation Fearful the Area"; and of Alex Tamba Brima ordering the amputations of civilians, that dead bodies be placed on the road, and ordering the burning of villages. The witness will give evidence of wide-scale abductions of civilian men, women and children, and the provision of military training at a camp at Rosos. The witness will testify that other commanders with Alex Tamba Brima included Ibrahim Bazy Kamara, Santigue Kanu and George Johnson (aka "Junior Lion"). The witness will testify to the advance of forces to invade Freetown, including the killing of civilians, amputations, abductions, burning of houses. The witness will give evidence of command structure of the group invading Freetown, which included Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazy Kamara and Santigue Kanu. The witness will provide evidence of the coordination and communications between Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazy Kamara and Bockarie prior to the invasion. The witness will testify to events during the Freetown invasion, including how Alex Tamba Brima ordered killing and the burning of houses in the State house area after losing it to ECOMOG and how witness heard that Alex Tamba Brima ordered the burning of CID headquarters; and that Alex Tamba Brima ordered amputations of civilians because they had pointed out the rebel positions to</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>ECOMOG. The witness will also testify to activities of Santigue Kanu and Ibrahim Bazy Kamara as they led troops during the Freetown invasion.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence about the retreat from Freetown, including wide-spread abductions of civilians, and the meeting of troops with the RUF stationed at Waterloo. The witness will testify that the RUF could not get past Waterloo but some RUF did manage to. The witness will give evidence of how the RUF and SLA remained at Waterloo for one week, and that they later moved to Newton, during which time they attacked Guineans and captured a large quantity of weapons.</p>
PN TFI – 325	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004	1, 2	6 hours	<p>This witness will testify to the 1991 training of the RUF in Liberia and an early attack on Sierra Leone by Charles Taylor, including the provision of arms and ammunitions from Taylor, Yeaten, and others to Sankoh. The witness will provide evidence that throughout the war, instructions were given from Taylor through to Bockarie, concerning the transfer diamonds in return for arms and ammunitions.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence of the governing body during junta regime, including the senior AFRC and RUF command, which included Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon.</p> <p>The witness will testify to much burning by SLA's and combatants in Kono in early March 1998, which was condemned by Issa Sesay.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence of the planning and organization of Kono attacks in late 1998 and that the commanding officer of the attack was Issa Sesay with Morris Kallon as his Deputy, under instruction from Sam</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>Bockarie.</p> <p>The witness will testify to the announcement of Operation Spare No Soul, by Sam Bockarie. The witness will also give evidence of mining operations in Kono. The witness will testify to having heard of the detention and execution of Kamajors in Kailahun. The witness states that Sesay said the RUF should release them, however, Bockarie returned and they were killed. The witness states that Sesay was not in favour of what Bockarie did.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence of Charles Taylor's support to the RUF throughout the war, including details of a heavy arms shipment in November/December 1998.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence of a meeting in 1998 called by Sam Bockarie of RUF Vanguard, with Morris Kallon and AFRC present, at which time "Operation Spare No Soul" was announced by Bockarie on the BBC.</p> <p>The witness will testify that the Freetown attack was not planned by the RUF, that the RUF stopped at Rogberi and that Sesay went as far as two miles from Waterloo. The witness will testify that Alex Tamba Brima and Santigue Kanu led the Freetown invasion.</p>
PN TFI – 276	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004	1, 11, 14, 17	4 hours	<p>Bombali, Kono Crime Bases</p> <p>This witness will testify that Charles Taylor provided assistance, arms, medicine and personnel to the RUF. The witness will give evidence on the arms and diamond transactions and shipments through Charles Taylor and Bockarie from Liberia. The witness will provide evidence about the RUF chain of command, and that the RUF in</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004			<p>command included Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon. The witness will testify that Small Boys Units, including boys of 10 – 12 years, were used in the Kono attacks led by Sesay and Kallon.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence that J.P. Koroma communicated with the AFRC and RUF commanders, Musa and Superman, to work together on the Freetown invasion; and that Bockarie also discussed with AFRC and RUF commanders about resolving differences to work together for the Freetown invasion.</p> <p>The witness will testify that Kallon and Gbao decided to attack UN peacekeepers in Magburaka, and that Sesay gave orders to Kallon to mobilize men to attack Kenyans in Magburaka and brought ammunition for the fight in Magburaka. The witness will also testify that Sesay gave instructions for the care of abducted peacekeepers, and that Sesay did not want to release peacekeepers being kept in Kono.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence on mining organized by Issa Sesay in 1999 in Kono, where civilians were forced to mine and were given soap and food.</p>
PN TFI – 275	SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004	1, 11, 12	4 hours	<p>Bombali, Freetown Crime Bases</p> <p>This witness will testify to the joining of the AFRC and RUF immediately following the junta coup, including communications between senior leaders. The witness will give evidence on the command structure of the AFRC and RUF, including radio communications between the two groups, and of in-fighting and subsequent re-coordination during 1998. The witness will provide evidence of an attack</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb 2004			by AFRC and RUF troops on Makeni in December 1998 on instructions from Bockarie; and on request for reinforcement from Alex Tamba Brima from SAJ Musa, who was working with RUF commander in Koinadugu. The witness will testify that he heard that Alex Tamba Brima and Ibrahim Bazy Kamara commanded the group that invaded Freetown. The witness will also testify that Morris Kallon had children who used to "take care of him"; and that Sesay, Kallon and Gbao had women. The witness will testify that punishment was given for looting, including demotions.
PN TFI – 167	SESAY: 11 Aug 2003; KALLON: 11 Aug 2003; GBAO: 14 October 2003; BRIMA: 22 Sept 2003; KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; KANU: 26 Nov 2003;	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	8 hours	Bombali, Kono, Koinadugu, Freetown, Port Loko Crime Bases This witness will testify to AFRC/RUF killings, sexual violence, looting and burning, abduction and forced labour, and the use of child soldiers throughout 1997 to 1999 throughout Sierra Leone. The witness will testify to the governing structure of the AFRC junta, including top AFRC/RUF commanders. The witness will provide evidence as to the command structure during AFRC/RUF operations in 1998, including the command authority of Issa Sesay, Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazy Kamara and Morris Kallon. The witness will testify to the AFRC involvement in the planning of mining operation in Kono during the Junta. The witness will give evidence about a joint command structure in Kono in early 1998, involving Issa Sesay, Brima, Kallon and Ibrahim Bazy Kamara. The witness will provide evidence on the participation of Sesay in the planning and

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>implementation of mining in Kono immediately after the intervention. The witness will give evidence of the distribution of arms and ammunition between the AFRC and RUF.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence on the command responsibility of Issa Sesay and of his reporting to Bockarie; of the command structure during the attack by Alex Tamba Brima's group on Karina; and of J.P. Koroma's position of authority until his arrival in Kailahun in 1998. The witness will give evidence about mining operations in the Kono area, including the transfer of diamond through Bockarie to Taylor in Liberia in return for arms and ammunition.</p> <p>The witness will testify to the movement and attacks by two main groups of troops in the North, including during the 1998 advance to Freetown; give evidence of the command responsibility of Brima and Ibrahim Bazy Kamara; and of communications and coordination between these two individuals with Bockarie prior to and following the Freetown invasion.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence of orders from Alex Tamba Brima of amputations and the implementation of "Operation No Living Thing" during the Freetown invasion.</p>
PN TFI – 138	SESAY: 2 June 2003 KALLON: 26 May 2003 GBAO: 14 October 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13	5 hours	<p>Kono Crime Base</p> <p>This witness will testify to being captured in 1997 by SLA rebels along with many civilians. The witness will provide evidence as to large scale killings, abduction of civilians, forced labour, raping (including insertion of foreign objects) looting, physical violence, property destruction by burning,</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	BRIMA: 3 June 2003 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003 KANU: 26 Nov 2003			including during Operation Pay Yourself after February 1998. The witness also saw Commanders including Savage, Ibrahim Bazy Kamara and Alex Tamba Brima killing civilians. The witness saw Alex Tamba Brima kill a young girl and boy by throwing them into a well in Kono. The witness saw 6 girls raped by rebels on veranda in Dankawalli during Operation Born Naked, which commanders witnessed but did not punish the perpetrators. The witness will testify that Morris Kallon witnessed the killing of civilians by other rebels; and that he was the overall commander in Pendembu. The witness saw 4 girls killed in Kono by Savage, who placed sticks up their vaginas once they were killed. The witness saw a big meeting between rebels in Kailahun. SAJ Musa, Brigadier Mani, Alex Tamba Brima and others participated in this meeting. The witness was herself raped many times and forced to marry a rebel. She will provide evidence that only female combatants could refuse sex and that civilian women were killed if they refused. She further states that female abductees were forced to marry rebels. Children were given military training. The witness will provide evidence of Charles Taylor at training bases in Liberia, and of the presence of Augustine Gbao with the rebels.
PN TFI – 036	SESAY: 2 June 2003; 11 March 2004; 18 March 2004 KALLON: 26 May 2003; 11	1, 2, 4, 5,	2 hours	Kenema Crime Base This witness will testify to the abduction and training of civilians by the RUF in 1991. The witness will provide evidence of the joining of the AFRC and RUF forces during the junta time between senior AFRC and RUF leaders. The witness will provide evidence of arrests, detention, and

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	<p>March 2004; 18 March 2004 GBAO: 14 October 2003; 11 March 2004; 18 March 2004 BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 11 March 2004; 18 March 2004 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 11 March 2004; 18 March 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 11 March 2004; 18 March 2004</p>			<p>killings of prominent citizens in Kenema, including B. S. Massaquoi. The witness will provide evidence of trips by Bockarie during 1998 and 1999 to Liberia and his return with ammunition on commercial trucks. The witness will testify to chain of command within the RUF.</p>
PN TFI – 274	<p>SESAY: 7 Feb 2004 KALLON: 7 Feb 2004 GBAO: 7 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 6 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 7 Feb 2004 KANU: 7 Feb</p>	<p>1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 17</p>	4 hours	<p>Kenema, Kono, Freetown Crime Bases This witness will testify as to the organization of abductions, looting of food, and the surrender of diamonds to RUF command, including Foday Sankoh. The witness will give evidence on mining at Tongo Field, where civilians were forced to mine, and fired upon indiscriminately. The witness will testify that people were mining in Tongo for Bockarie or Santigue Kanu. The witness will give evidence on radio communications amongst RUF commanders, including Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon. The witness will testify to the planning of the Kono attack in December 1998</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	2004			by the RUF command, including Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon, of communications between RUF and AFRC regarding reinforcement for the attack on Freetown, and of a dispatch of RUF to Freetown. The witness will give evidence of Bockarie disobeying instructions of Sankoh and of Issa Sesay attempting to arrest Bockarie on Sankoh's request. The witness will give evidence of hearing from Kallon and Gbao that the UN had forcibly arrested RUF; and that on Issa Sesay's instructions, peacekeepers in Kailahun were arrested. The witness will testify that later Sesay released the peacekeepers in Liberia.
PN TFI – 187	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 17	5 hours	Bombali, Kono Crime Bases This witness will testify as to the command structure, reporting and decision making within the RUF, including positions of Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon. The witness will testify to the decision making and command structures between the AFRC and RUF during and after the junta time. The witness will give evidence on the coordination between the AFRC and RUF, including meetings, communications and instances of working together, such as joint attacks throughout 1997 and 1998 and during the attacks on UN peacekeepers. The witness will testify to communications between Mosquito and Taylor, who gave instructions to Mosquito. The witness will testify that in 1997 and 1998, Morris Kallon was based in Bo, where the RUF were working with the SLA. The witness will testify to looting, sexual violence and killings during junta time, which were brought to the attention of Issa Sesay and other senior commanders. The witness will testify that relations

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				between the AFRC and RUF were not cordial in March 1998; and that following the 1998 retreat, J.P. Koroma was not given power as Bockarie discovered that he wanted to escape to Liberia with foreign currency and diamonds. The witness will testify that some RUF were given strict instructions against looting, harassment and intimidation. The witness will testify as to diamond mining in Kono, where diamonds were given to Issa Sesay, who delivered them to Bockarie; and of the RUF command in charge of diamond mining.
PN TFI – 210	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10 Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 14, 17	4 hours	Kailahun Crime Base This witness will testify to operating under Augustine Gbao, who was the commander of the RUF Internal Defence Unit in Kailahun from 1998 to 2000. The witness will give evidence on the attacks and abductions of UN peacekeepers, including how Issa Sesay passed instructions to arrest and hold the UN peacekeepers in Kailahun and how Gbao read a charge sheet to the abducted peacekeepers justifying the rebel actions. The witness will also testify to the planning of the December 1998 offensive, including a prior weapons shipment. The witness will give evidence of forced labour on farms in Kailahun, and the killing of 20 “Kamajors” by Bockarie in Kailahun while Gbao was present and in command of the area.
PN TFI – 182	SESAY: 14 Nov 2003 KALLON: 10	1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13	6 hours	Koinadugu, Bombali, Freetown Crime Bases The witness will testify to the command structure during junta period and to a shipment of arms from Liberia. The

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	Dec 2003 GBAO: 17 Dec 2003 BRIMA: 19 Nov 2003 KAMARA: 18 Nov 2003 KANU: 19 Nov 2003			<p>witness will testify that during junta period, Alex Tamba Brima oversaw mining operations in Kono. The witness will provide evidence on compliance with "Operation Pay Yourself". The witness will testify to a meeting in Masiaka of senior AFRC/RUF commanders following the retreat from Freetown to discuss movements and operations, and a later similar meeting in Makeni. The witness describes troop movement from Makeni through Kabala to Kurubonla, where witness remained with troops of SAJ Musa. The witness describes in-fighting between the RUF and SLA in Kurubonla, and the later joining of SAJ Musa's group with Alex Tamba Brima, who was based at Rosos. The witness will testify to the command structure at Rosos, which included Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazy Kamara, Santigue Kanu and George Johnson (aka "Junior Lion").</p> <p>The witness describes hearing of a sacrifice of 7 young abducted girls by Alex Tamba Brima and of a later sacrifice of 2 young girls by Alex Tamba Brima – on both occasions by burying them alive in October 1998 prior to the joining of SAJ Musa's group with that of Alex Tamba Brima.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence of troop movement on the advance to Freetown and of the commanders, including Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazy Kamara, Santigue Kanu and George Johnson (aka "Jr. Lion"). The witness will give evidence on the death of SAJ Musa at Benguima. The witness will testify that during the Freetown invasion there was widespread looting, amputations, both in the presence of Ibrahim Bazy Kamara and Santigue Kanu, who did nothing to stop the atrocities; and of Ibrahim Bazy Kamara ordering amputations.</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TFI – 334	SESAY: 24 Feb 2004 KALLON: 24 Feb 2004 GBAO: 24 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 24 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 24 Feb 2004 KANU: 24 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13	6 hours	<p>Kono, Freetown Crime Bases</p> <p>This witness will testify to operating under Alex Tamba Brima and Ibrahim Bazy Kamara during 1998 and 1999. The witness will provide evidence on troop movements, communications and orders by AFRC/RUF commanders throughout 1998.</p> <p>The witness will testify to J.P. Koroma and Issa Sesay ordering that Kono be burned down and the people of Kono be killed as they had betrayed them. The witness will testify about J.P. Koroma ordering Operation Pay Yourself to SLA and RUF at the commencement of the intervention in 1998; of the command responsibility of Issa Sesay; of joint coordination between SLA and RUF operations in Kono, and of Sesay and Kallon ordering civilian mining.</p> <p>The witness will give evidence of an arms shipment during AFRC/RUF operations in Kono. The witness will also testify that commanding officers of both the RUF and SLA knew of the activities of Savage in Kono.</p> <p>The witness will testify about Alex Tamba Brima, Santigue Kanu and Ibrahim Bazy Kamara directing an attack on Karina and other villages, including ordering attacks on civilians. The witness will provide evidence on regular communication between Alex Tamba Brima and Bockarie, and between Alex Tamba Brima and Sesay.</p> <p>The witness will provide evidence on events during the Freetown invasion, including an order by Alex Tamba Brima to go after civilians and of the coordination between troops in Freetown under Alex Tamba Brima and RUF troops under the command of Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon.</p> <p>The witness will testify about the coordination and</p>

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				cooperation between the RUF and the West Side Boys until October 1999, when the West Side Boys were under the direction of Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara, including communications between Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara and Sesay and Bockarie.
PN TF1-046	SESAY: 2 June 2003; 27 Feb 2004 KALLON: 26 May 2003; 27 Feb 2004 GBAO: 14 October 2003; 27 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 3 June 2003; 27 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 6 Nov 2003; 27 Feb 2004 KANU: 26 Nov 2003; 27 Feb 2004	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17	12 hours	This witness will testify as to the relationship between the RUF and Liberian fighters in Sierra Leone; the relationship between the RUF and Charles Taylor and his subordinates; the command structure of the RUF, AFRC and the AFRC/RUF alliance; the relationship between senior officers including Sankoh, JP Koroma, Bockarie, Sessay, Kallon, Brima and Gbao; the positions of the Special forces, Vanguard and Junior Commandos within the RUF; the de facto and de jure authority of senior RUF, AFRC and AFRC/RUF alliance leaders, including Sankoh, JP Koroma, Bockarie, Sessay, Kallon, Brima and Gbao and the communications between and activities of the same; the supply of weapons, ammunition and other material to the RUF and AFRC/RUF alliance; diamond mining operations and the use of diamonds to obtain weapons and ammunition; the advance, attack and retreat from Freetown; the commanders of the Freetown attack, including Gullit; the attacks on UNAMSIL peacekeepers in 2000 and the involvement of Kallon, Sesay and Gbao; the rape and sexual slavery of civilians; the killing of civilians; the abduction, forced labour and military training of civilians; the use of child soldiers; the mutilation of civilians; and the looting and burning of civilian structures.
PN TF1-337	SESAY: 24 Feb	1, 2, 3, 4,	4 hours	This witness will testify that he joined the RUF after being

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
	2004 KALLON: 24 Feb 2004 GBAO: 24 Feb 2004 BRIMA: 24 Feb 2004 KAMARA: 24 Feb 2004 KANU: 24 Feb 2004	5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17		abducted from the Pujehun district in April of 1991. He was trained in military tactics from April to June 1991. He operated with Augustine Gbao who was the commander or the RUF Internal Defence Unit, which was responsible for settling disputes among combatants, from 1996 until the summer of 2000. The witness was in Kailahun with Gbao, Sesay and Bockarie after the Intervention through to 2000 and the UN abductions. He states that there were communications between AFRC and RUF commanders. The witness gives evidence about the UNAMSIL abductions. He states that Sesay passed specific instructions to arrest and to hold UN peacekeepers in Kailahun. The witness saw Gbao read a charge sheet against the UN peacekeepers which justified the RUF actions. The witness also gives evidence about the planning for the December 1998 offensive, the weapons shipment preceding the offensive, JPK, forced labour on farms in Kailahun, and the killing of 20 "Kamajors" by Bockarie in Kailahun while Gbao was present and in command of the area.
PN TF1-347	March 31, 2004. To all six accused.	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16	4 hours	This witness will testify that he was a member of the RUF and will give evidence about the killing of civilians, rape, looting and abductions carried out by RUF. The witness will also give evidence about the actions of Sesay, Kallon, Gbao and Gullit throughout the relevant period.
PN TF1-352	To be disclosed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5,	4 hours	This witness will give evidence that in 1998 as a SLA he joined with the AFRC/RUF near Makeni. Gullit and 55 were present. He was in Koinadugu between June and

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				December 1998 and saw Superman, Kallon, Mosquito and Sesay present. He was present at a meeting in December 1998 at which the Makeni offensive was planned. The witness took part in the Makeni offensive and then the Freetown offensive as far as Lunsar. The witness was present with Kallon shot a civilian in Koidu Town and also when he shot a boy over the alleged stealing of a goat in another village.
PN TF1-354	To be disclosed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	4 hours	The witness joined the AFRC in 1997. In June 1997 he moved from Freetown to Kenema. At this time Sesay was based in Freetown and would travel to Kenema. In December 1997 the witness saw 150 Kamajors arrested by Bockarie in Kailahun. In October 1998 the witness arrived in Beudu after soldiers had been executed. Bockarie was present. Bockarie told the witness that he had shot B S Massaquoi and other civilians. In January / Febraury 1998 Sesay and Mosquito told the witness that it was alleged that JPK stole diamonds. The witness was told that Sesay raped JPK's wife. The witness will give evidence about an arms shipment in November 1998. The witness will also give evidence about the planning and execution of the Freetown invasion. The witness will give evidence about diamond shipments from Sesay to a diamond dealer. The witness will give evidence about Kallon killing a boy in Buedu over the stealing of a sheep.
PN TF1-356	To be disclosed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12	3 hours	This witness will testify that he was captured by the RUF in 1993 when he was 16 years old. He underwent military training. He then became an instructor at a military camp in

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				<p>Kenema District where both boys and girls were trained. Young boys and girls aged 9 to 13, who had been abducted, were kept in the billets of their commanders to perform domestic work. In 1995 the witness was sent to Kangari Hills and remained there until the 1997 coup. The witness was then sent to Hastings under the command of Superman. After the ECOMOG intervention the witness was based in Makeni. The witness saw Sesay and Kallon there in December 1998 when arrests were made. The witness was tortured on the order of Sesay. The witness will state that Sesay was in charge of all diamond activities. The witness was present in 1999 in Kono when Kallon shot and killed a 15 year old boy for stealing a sheep. The witness will say that Sesay, Kallon and Gbao visited training camps and during Sesay's regime he gave orders for all activities on the training bases. The witness will say that Seay, Kallon, Gbao, Bockarie and Gibril Massaquoi had VHF communication sets and communicated on the daily activities of the movement.</p>
PN TF1-030	ISSA SESAY: 22 May 2003. To be disclosed to other accused.	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17	6 hours	<p>This witness will give evidence as to the structure of the RUF and the joining of the RUF and AFRC from 1997 onwards. He will give evidence as to the conduct of the fighting, including many attacks on civilian villages throughout the territory of Sierra Leone. He will give evidence as to the role of JPK, Bockarie, Sankoh, Sesay, Kallon, Gbao, Brima, Kamara and Kanu. The witness will give evidence about arms and ammunition; looting; the abduction, killing and raping of civilians; and the attacks on peacekeepers.</p>

EXPERT AND OVERVIEW WITNESSES

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
PN TF1-150	To be disclosed	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12, 13	1/2 Day(s)	This witness is an expert / overview witness who will testify to as to widespread abuses committed throughout the territory of Sierra Leone during the crucial crime base period with particular focus on the Freetown Invasion of 1999, Human Rights violations, use of child soldiers and relationships between different factions.
PN TFI-272	7 Feb 2004 to IS, MK, AG, BK & SK 6 Feb 2004 to ATB	9, 10	2 Days	This witness is an expert witness and will testify as to the degree of physical violence, in particular about the amputations carried out against the civilian population during the relevant crime base periods.
PN TF1-296	To be disclosed	11	2 Days	This witness is an expert witness and will testify as to the use of child soldiers by all factions throughout the conflict and its physical and psychological effect on the child combatants.
PN TF1-301	To be disclosed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	2 Day	This witness is an military expert who will outline the military structure of the AFRC and RUF, its various chains of command and their targeting methods.
PN TF1-332	To be disclosed	6-8	2 Days	This witness is an expert on sexual/gender related violence program monitoring and evaluation. She will testify as to the degree and extent of sexual violence and gender related

PSEUDONYM	DISCLOSED	COUNTS	TIME	SUMMARY
				crimes committed against the population of Sierra Leone throughout the conflict.
PN TF1-348	To be disclosed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	75 Mins	This witness will give evidence about the TRC operations and methodology.
PN TF1-351	To be disclosed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13	75 mins	This witness will give evidence about the investigations of, evidence gathered and reports written by various NGOs in Sierra Leone.

COVER SHEET 4

EXHIBIT LIST

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Number	Item	Content
1	Salute Report	Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay, Battlefield Commander RUF S/L.
2	Salute Report	Report to the Leader of the Revolution, RUF S/L from Major General Sam Bockarie.
3	Leadership Memo	Memo to 'The Leader' from 'The Black Revolutionary Guards' 18 October 1999
4	Nominal Roll of Trained Personnel (RUF/SL) marked "Restricted"	List of thirty RUF/SL conscripts with associated RUF/AFRC commanders.
5	Diamond Production Records	Stage II Kono Production 02-03-99 to 11-1-2000 Dates, From Whom Received, No. of pieces, Caratage, Percentage (last column not clear)
6	RUF Mining Units Record Book	Tables of Areas and Diamond Mining Stages
7	Letter	Letter from Mayor P.S. Bienda to Cpl F. Sankoh 16 – 09 – 99
8	Patrick Beinda statement	Statement by Patrick Beinda on 24 September 1999 at the Presidential Guest House, Monrovia, Liberia about the order he received to help resolve dispute in RUF in Makeni in February 1999.

Number	Item	Content
9	Samual Lamboi statement	Statement to the Sierra Leone police on 7 June 2000 - Outline of radio call signals
10	Letter	Letter from Bobby Dixon to Foday Sankoh 11 Jan 2000
11	Letter	Letter to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander No date
12	Letter	Letter from Foday Sankoh to ECOMOG Major General Kpamber, ECOMOG 27 Dec 99
13	Letter	Letter from "The Operators" (radio) To: "Area Cmdr one through RUFP touris infors the leader" (sic) 28 - 04 - 00
14	Letter	Letter to Foday Sankoh from Michel 28 April 2000
15	Letter	Letter from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talabi, Libyan embassy in Accra, Ghana. 26 June 1996
16	Letter	Letter from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talabi, Libyan embassy in Accra, Ghana. December 1996
17	Radio Log Book #1 9 July 1999 - 15 February 2000 Communication	Radio transmission from SS William to Issa Sesay 5 August 1999

Number	Item	Content
18	Radio Log Book #2 28 April 1999 – 11 September 1999 Communication	Radio Communication from The Lion to S/Man Brig. Mani, Black Jah & Gaffa 30 April 1999
18	Radio Log Book #2 28 April 1999 – 11 September 1999 Communication	Radio Communication from Black Jah to the Lion 1 May 1999
18	Radio Log Book #2 28 April 1999 – 11 September 1999 Communication	Radio Communication from The Lion to Equalizer, Mani, Black Jah & Gaffa 5 May 1999
18	Radio Log Book #2 28 April 1999 – 11 September 1999 Communication	Radio Communication from Superman to The Lion 24 May 1999
18	Radio Log Book #2 28 April 1999 – 11 September 1999 Communication	Radio Communication from Time Bomb to Smile 21 June 1999
18	Radio Log Book #2 28 April 1999 – 11 September 1999 Communication	Radio Communication from SSS to Smile 25 July 1999
18	Radio Log Book #2 28 April 1999 – 11 September 1999 Communication	Request from Brigadier Bazie No date
18	Radio Log Book #2 28 April 1999 – 11 September 1999 Communication	Radio Communication from Foday Sankoh (Smile) Brig. Mani for all commanders 27 July 1999

Number	Item	Content
18	Radio Log Book #2 28 April 1999 – 11 September 1999 Communication	Radio Communication from Issa Sesay (SSS) to Foday Sankoh (Smile) 4 August 1999
18	Radio Log Book #2 28 April 1999 – 11 September 1999 Communication	Two Radio Communications from Foday Sankoh (Smile) to Brig. Bazil (Bazzie) 5 August 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message to Johnny Paul Korma and Foday Sankoh (Smile) from Col Issac 23 Sep 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message to Sam Bockarie (Concord) from Issa Sesay (SSS) 14 October 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message to Sam Bockarie (Concord) from Issa Sesay (SSS) 14 October 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message to Sam Bockarie (Concord) from Issa Sesay (SSS) 15 October 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message to Foday Sankoh 16 October 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Bishop Beguzzi to Sam Bockarie 17 October 1999

Number	Item	Content
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Foday Sankoh to Issa Sesay 23 October 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Foday Sankoh to Issa Sesay 28 October 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh. 12 November 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Superman to Foday Sankoh No date listed
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh 5 December 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from “RUF women” in Kailahun to Foday Sankoh 7 December 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Sam Bockarie 15 December 1999
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Ibrahim Bah to Foday Sankoh 28 December 1999

Number	Item	Content
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Ibrahim Bah to Foday Sankoh 12 January 2000
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message to Issa Sesay 19 March 2000
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Morris Kallon to Issa Sesay 25 March 2000
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Augustine Gbao to Foday Sankoh 18 April 2000
19	Radio Log Book #3 23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Morris Kallon to Foday Sankoh 23 April 2000
20	Radio Log Book #4 9 April 2000 – 5 May 2000 Communication	Radio message from Issa Sesay 5 May 2000
20	Radio Log Book #4 9 April 2000 – 5 May 2000 Communication	Radio message from Jackson Swarray 14 January 2000
20	Radio Log Book #4 9 April 2000 – 5 May 2000 Communication	Radio message from Makeni to Foday Sankoh 5 May 2000

Number	Item	Content
20	Radio Log Book #4 9 April 2000 – 5 May 2000 Communication	Radio message to Issa Sesay and Foday Sankoh 3 May 2000
20	Radio Log Book #4 9 April 2000 – 5 May 2000 Communication	Radio message from Foday Sankoh to Issa Sesay 3 May 2000
20	Radio Log Book #4 9 April 2000 – 5 May 2000 Communication	Radio message from Foday Sankoh to Issa Sesay 4 May 2000
21	Radio Log Book #5 4 April 2000 – 28 April 2000 Communication	Radio communication from Foday Sankoh to All Commanders 6 April 2000
21	Radio Log Book #5 4 April 2000 – 28 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from Rashid Sandy to Foday Sankoh 20 April 2000
21	Radio Log Book #5 4 April 2000 – 28 April 2000 Communication	Radio message from the Leader 28 April 2000
22	Radio Communications– miscellaneous on paper	Series of radio transmissions between Sam Bockarie, Foday Sankoh and “Blackguards.” 15-16 October 1999
23	United Nations Document	UNOMSIL – Human Rights Assessment Mission to Freetown, 25 January 1999 and 1 to 4 February 1999, Findings and Recommendations

Number	Item	Content
24	Letter	Letter from Melosky Kallon to Foday Sankoh 18 April 2000
25	Letter	Letter from John Caldwell, President of the US Trading Investment Company to Foday Sankoh 22 November 1999
26	Memorandum	Memorandum of Understanding with Samuel Isidoor Weinberger
27	Letter	Letter from Issa Sesay (signing for Sam Bockarie) People's Army to Major J.P. Koroma 13 August 1997
28	Kenema Police Report	"CID Office Station Diary" 1/98 – 7-2-98 - Pages 112 (date 28-01-98), 127 (30-01-1998) 181 (05-02-1998) 182 (06-02- 1998)
29	Letter	Letter from the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone to Corporal Foday Sankoh 26 June 1999
30	Record of Meeting	Minutes of the Family Reunion Reconciling Chairman Foday Sankoh and Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma 7 April 2000
31	Letter	Letter from John Caldwell to Pa Foday Saybana Sankoh 8 November 1999

Number	Item	Content
32	Letter	Letter from Sam Bockarie to Charles Taylor, President of Liberia 24 June 1998
33	Letter	Letter from the AFRC/RUF Headquarters, Kailahun to Lord Eric Avebury 12 May 1998
34	Six Letters	6 Letters from the AFRC/RUF Headquarters, Kailahun 12 May 1998 to the following: 1) Chairman of ECOWAS 2) OAY Secretary General 3) UN Secretary General 4) Bill Clinton, President of United States 5) Konan Bedie, President of Cote d'Ivoire 6) Nelson Mandella, President of South Africa
35	Report	Report from Camp Lion Training Base Training Comandant Beudu to G-1 Commander at Beudu on Recruits 21 May 1998
36	Letter	Letter from Administrative Office, Kono from Samuel Jabba, Lt. Col, RUF to G-1 Commander 14 August 2000
37	Report	Report of the Sierra Leone People's Army to Brigadier Peter Vandt from the Joint Security Board of Investigation 5 April 1999
38	Letter	Letter from Major AS Kallon, Chairman, Joint Security Kono to Col. Sam Bockarie 6 May 1998

Number	Item	Content
39	Report	Report from the Revolutionary United Front Administrative Headquarters, Kono Branch 19 September 2000
40	Training Manual	Revolutionary United Front Party of Sierra Leone People's Army Notes on the RUFS/I. Guerrilla Warfare For the Lion National Training Base February, 1999 WAR Office
41	Supreme Council Meeting	Minutes dated 16 August 1997 of meeting of AFRC held on 11 August 1997.
42	Speech	RUF speech to the nation (18 June 1997 – delivered on SLBS)
43	Proclamation	AFRC Proclamation – PN no.3 of 1997 (28/5/97)
44	Decree	AFRC (Establishment of Office of Principal Liaison Officer) Decree – Decree no. 3 of 1997.
45	Government Notices	Government Notices No 215 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997) of 3 September 1997 published in gazettes nos. 52 and 54 of 4 September 1997 & 18 September respectively.
46	Decrees	Decrees 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of 1997.
47	Statement to Sierra Leone Police	Statement by Martin Moinama to Sierra Leone Police 17 March 1998

Number	Item	Content
48	Speech	Address by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Head of State and Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Freetown, 1 June 1997
49	Speech	Statement on the historic return to Freetown, Sierra Leone, of the Leaders of the Alliance of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, 3 October 1999.
50	Speech	Personal Statement by Lt. JP Koroma on 1 October 1999
51	Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991	Chapter V Section 55 Chapter X Section 156
52	Order	Changes of Titles Order, 1997 – Public Notice 11 of 1997
53	United Nations Document	Statement by the President of the Security Council, 4 December 1996, S/PRST/1996/46, paragraph 2.
54	United Nations Document	Resolution 1132 (1997), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3822 nd meeting on 8 October 1997.
55	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1181 (13 July 1998), para. 1
56	United Nations Document	Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/249 (18 March 1998), paragraph 6, 20.
57	Joint Communiqué	Meeting between the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Sierra Leone and the Delegation of the Revolutionary United Front Abidjan 19-21 February 1999

Number	Item	Content
58	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 4-5 June 1997, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, para. 5.
59	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 17 July – 10 August 1999, Section 1,2,3,5.
60	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 03-09 October 1999, Section 1,2,3.
61	United Nations Document	First Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998 (S/1998/750) paras. 10, 12, 13, 14, 33, 36, 37, 38
62	United Nations Document	Second Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 16 October 1998 (S/1998/960) para. 21.
63	United Nations Document	Third Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 16 December 1998 (S/1998/1176) para. 18.
64	United Nations Document	Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 4 June 1999 (S/1999/645) para. 7, 19, 20, 30, 31, 32.
65	United Nations Document	Human Rights Situation Report and Preliminary Technical Assistance Needs Assessment 19 July 1998

Number	Item	Content
66	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 14 July 1997, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
67	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 8 September 1997, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
68	United Nations Document	Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1343 (S/2001/1015)
69	United Nations Document	Statement by the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council S/PRST/2000/24 (17 July 2000)
70	United Nations Document	Statement by the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council S/PRST/2000/14 (4 May 2000)
71	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1289 (7 February 2000) para 4.
72	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1270 (22 October 1999) para 6.
73	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1346 (30 March 2001)
74	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1313 (4 August 1999)
75	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1306 (5 July 2000)
76	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1299 (19 May 2000)
77	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1220 (12 January 1999)
78	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 7-20 November 1999, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Section 2.

Number	Item	Content
79	United Nations Document	Sierra Leonean Humanitarian Situation Report 25 July – 07 August 2000, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Section A.
80	United Nations Document	Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 19 May 2000 (S/2000/455)
81	United Nations Document	Thirteenth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 14 March 2002 (S/2002/267) para 2.
82	United Nations Document	Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 21 November 1995, S/1995/975, paragraph 2.
83	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape" Vol. 11, No. 3 (A) June 1999 p1-4, 6-54.
84	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror, Atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone," Vol. 10, No. 3 (A) July 1998 p 4, 15-23.
85	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International, "Sierra Leone 1998 – a year of atrocities against civilians". (Excerpt, pp 1, table of content (p2), 14-28)
86	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "We'll kill you if you cry, Sexual violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict" Vol. 15 No. 1 (A), January 2003

Number	Item	Content
87	Report of U.S. Government	United States Department of State, "Human Rights Practices for 1998 Report", Sierra Leone Country Report, February 1999, p. 1.
88	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International, "Sierra Leone: Childhood – a casualty of conflict", AI Index: AFR 51/69/00, 31 August 2000, p. 1.
89	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, "Child Soldiers: Global Report", Sections: Child soldiers, An Overview; Sierra Leone, May 2001.
90	Report of U.S. Government	United States Department of State, "Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997", Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, January 30, 1998, p. 1.
91	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International 1998 Annual Report on Sierra Leone (the Republic of), p.1.
92	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	International Rescue Committee, "Situation Report on Human Rights Violations in and around Makeni town, in the Bombali District, Northern Province, Sierra Leone, West Africa," (December 1998 – July 1999)
93	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Medecins San Frontieres, "Mutilation of civilians in Sierra Leone," 23 May 1999
94	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International, "Rape and other forms of sexual violence against girls and women," AFR 51/53/00, 29 June 2000

Number	Item	Content
95	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch: "World Report 1999: Sierra Leone, Human Rights Developments."
96	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	International Medical Corps – Press Release on Sierra Leone Program
97	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	International Crisis Group, "Time for a New Military and Political Strategy," 11 April 2001
98	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International, "The United Nations special conference on Sierra Leone: the protection of human rights must be a priority for the international community", AI Index: AFR 51/14/98, 24 July 1998.
99	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International Annual Report 1999, "AI Report 1999: Sierra Leone".
100	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	The Heart of the Matter (Partnership Africa Canada)
101	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Physicians for Human Rights War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone
102	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Médécins Sans Frontières, "Mutilation of civilians on the increase in Sierra Leone", 5 May 1998
103	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Médécins Sans Frontières, MSF 1998 Report, "Atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone", 1 May 1998.
104	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch: "World Report 1999: Sierra Leone, Human Rights Developments". (Excerpt, p1)
105	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International "Annual Report 2000, Sierra Leone".

Number	Item	Content
106	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Women Waging Peace and The Policy Commission, "From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone", Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson, January 2004.
107	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Report of Non-Governmental Organization No Peace Without Justice, Conflict Mapping Report (Preliminary Report, March 2004) Pages 1-64, 129-571
108	News Report	Washington Post, "An Axis connected to Gaddafi; Leaders trained in Libya have used war to safeguard wealth", Douglas Farah, 2 November 2001.
109	News Report	Ibrahim Abdullah, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone", in "African Guerrillas", Ed. Christopher Clapham
110	News Report	BBC News, "Grim Facts of Sierra Leone's War", 13 February 1999.
111	News Report	Sierra Leone News Archives for dates 25, 28 May 1997
112	News Report	Sierra Leone News Archives 25, 28, 30 June 1997
113	News Report	Sierra Leone News Archives 6, 8, 12, 13, 14, 17, 22, 26 January 1999
114	News Report	Radio Netherlands Report 21 January 2000.
115	News Report	AAP Newsfeed, "AFR: Sierra Leone Villagers tell of rebel atrocities", Clarence Roy-Macauley, 10 May 1998.

Number	Item	Content
116	News Report	BBC News, "Freetown Bears the Scars", 27 February 1999.
117	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 1 February 1999, published on the Sierra Leone Web
118	News Report	BBC News, "Covering the battle for Freetown", 18 January 1999.
119	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 5 March 1999, published on the Sierra Leone Web
120	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 25 February 1999, published on the Sierra Leone Web
121	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 20 May 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
122	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 29 April 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
123	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 13 April 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
124	News Report	"Sierra Leone-Children: Young, Armed and Dangerous" Lansana Fofana, Inter Press Service, July 1, 1997
125	News Report	Guardian Article: "UN gets evidence of war-zone diamonds trade", Richard Norton-Taylor, 1 August 2000
126	Map	Map of Sierra Leone, Scale 1:350,000

Number	Item	Content
127	Treaty	Article 3(1) of the Convention (IV) to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War Geneva 12 August 1949.
128	Treaty	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977
129	Record of States Party to Geneva Conventions	ICRC, States party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977
130	Accord	The Abidjan Peace Accord, 30 November 1996, The Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)
131	Accord	The Conakry Accord: 23 October 1997 - ECOWAS SIX-MONTH PEACE PLAN FOR SIERRA LEONE 23 OCTOBER 1997 - 22 APRIL 1998
132	Ceasefire Agreement	The Agreement on Ceasefire in Sierra Leone 18 May 1999 (Paragraph 6)
133	Accord	The Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) "The Lome Peace Accord" 7 July 1999
134	Radio communication	Radio message from The Lion 29 April 1995

Number	Item	Content
135	Radio communication	Radio message from The Lion 6 May 1995
136	Speech	Document headed "restricted" speech by AFRC Chairman (formerly no. 97)
137	Decree	AFRC (Establishment of Council of Secretaries) Decree 1997 – Decree no.2 of 1997. Signed by Johnny Paul Koroma (formerly no. 100)
138	RUFPP Parliamentary Candidates	List of RUFPP Parliamentary Candidates - Contains the full name of Accused Sesay (formerly no. 115)
139	News Report	Sierra Leone News Archives from Sierra Leone Web Dates: 29, 28, 4, 2, 1 May 2000 (formerly no. 183)
140	United Nations Document	UNCHR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Sierra Leone (Nov 98) (formerly no. 153)
141	AFRC Press Release	AFRC Press Release, 3 January 1998 (formerly no. 114)
142	Photographs	Pictures taken by OTP Investigations Unit corresponding to witness statements (formerly no. 120) This exhibit will be filed later

Number	Item	Content
143	Video cassette	Video taken by OTP Investigations Unit Corresponding to witness statements (formerly no. 121) This exhibit will be filed later
144	Video cassette	Video clips of AFRC/RUF during the Coup and video of eastern Freetown after the AFRC/RUF invasion in January 1999 (formerly no. 122) This exhibit will be filed later
145	Video cassette	Video clip of eastern Freetown as shown by witness PN TF1-093, former RUF who was part of invasion. (formerly no. 123) This exhibit will be filed later
146	Photos	Pictures taken of killed civilians during the January 1999 Freetown invasion (formerly no. 208) This exhibit will be filed later
147	Photos	Pictures taken of BS Massaquoi after his arrest in Kenema Town in 1998 (formerly no. 209) This exhibit will be filed later
148	Photos	Pictures taken of mass grave in Kailahun Town. (formerly no. 210) This exhibit will be filed later

Number	Item	Content
149	Memorandum	Memo from G5 office of the Peoples' Army to Johnny Paul Koroma signed by Lamin, dated 22 December 1997 (formerly no. 96)
150	Radio Broadcast	SLBS Radio Broadcast - 25 May 1997, 19:30 GMT (formerly no. 108)
151	Radio Broadcast	SLBS Radio Broadcast - 25 May 1997, 18:42 GMT (formerly no. 109)
152	Radio Broadcast	SLBS Radio Broadcast - 28 May 1997 10:00 GMT (formerly no. 110)
153	Radio Broadcast	SLBS Radio Broadcast - 30 May 1997 19:22 GMT (formerly no. 111)
154	Radio Broadcast	SLBS Radio Broadcast - 29 May 15:26 GMT (formerly no. 112)
155	Report	Report to Foday Sankoh from Major Francis Musa 31 August 1999 (formerly no. 61)
156	Radio Announcement	Copy of SLBS FM 99.1 radio announcement by Foday Sankoh Toward the end of May 1997
157	Letter	Letter to Sankoh from The Black Guard 14 January 2000
158	Manifesto	Footpaths to Democracy, 1995

Number	Item	Content
159	Map	Map of the city of Freetown
160	Government Notice 272	P.N. No. 3 of 1997 (formerly no. 103)
161	Report	RUF G-5 Central Command, Makeni to Regional I.O. Commander 17 September 1999 This exhibit will be filed later
162	Report	Sierra Leone People's Army – Makeni G-5 Command to Lt. Gandhi 13 October 1999 This exhibit will be filed later
163	Report	G-5 Report Not dated This exhibit will be filed later
164	Report	Restricted Report from the Sierra Leone People's Army G-5 Central Command 18 October 1999 This exhibit will be filed later
165	Notice	Notice from Revolutionary United Front Headquarters in Makeni to "Functional RUF Authorities" 13 July 2000 This exhibit will be filed later
166	Memo	Memorandum to Honourable S.B. Khanu, Ops Kono 22 August 1997 (formerly no. 60)

Number	Item	Content
167	Record of Meeting	Supreme Council Meeting, Minutes dated 23 January 1998 (formerly no. 94)
168	Memo	Memorandum from the G-5 Office, The People's Army 22 December 1997 (formerly no. 96)
169	Letter	Ministry of Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs 7 October 1997 (formerly no. 105)

COVER SHEET 5

**COPIES OF DOCUMENTARY
EXHIBITS**

1) Salute Report

Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay, Battlefield
Commander RUF S/L.

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

27th SEPTEMBER 1999

TO: THE LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION

FROM: BRIGADIER ISSA H SESAY
BATTLEFIELD COMMANDER RUF S/L

SUBJECT: SALUTE REPORT

Sir,

After working on the Draft document of the Abidjan Peace Accord, you returned behind RUF Lines to consult with the Military High Command and all combatants on the Accord and its implications. While in the Kailahun District, we received reports that Colonel Mohamed Tarawallie had been destabilized by Kamajohs and SLA troops at your former base of Camp ZOGODA.

On hearing this news, I and other senior officers conveyed from Gaima to Buedu with the leader.

The next-day, before returning to Abidjan to conclude documentation and signing of the Accord, you instructed that General Sam Bockarie (Mosquito) take over as Battle Group Commander of the RUF.

From Abidjan, the Leader instructed that men should be sent across the Moin River to receive those of our troops who were fortunate enough to have successfully retreated from ZOGODA and to actively go in search of Colonel Mohamed Tarawallie. This order was implemented in full and though we were able to rescue both soldiers and civilians that had retreated from ZOGODA, we were unable to locate Colonel Tarawallie.

From Abidjan, we received further instructions. General Mosquito was to take effective command on the ground in your

absence and to assume the assignment of Battle Field Commander, RUF S/L.

I was to assume the duties and responsibilities of Battle Group Commander and together we were to work to maintain the ground, by any means necessary.



General Mosquito was able to make positive contact with ULIMO and make all necessary arrangements to buy materials from them. The money that you had left with us on the ground (7000USD) was utilized to buy materials from ULIMO and with these materials, we were able to resist enemy advances in the Kailahun District.

It became obvious to us on the ground that the Abidjan Accord was nothing but paper, as the Kamajohs were being used against us with vicious attacks on our positions.

It was not long before we heard that the Leader had been arrested in Nigeria, and as we were trying to understand the circumstances of your arrest and implications to the RUF, we learnt that Phillip Palmer, Faia Musa and other members of the External Delegation were now claiming leadership of the RUF.

General Mosquito contacted Palmer telling him that since this was the action that they had taken, it was necessary for them to come back behind our Lines and brief the Military High Command and combatants accordingly. Palmer and others eventually agreed to meet us at the Nongowa Crossing Point. There, amidst drumming and dancing to receive them, the General was able to persuade all of the Coup plotters, including the Sierra Leone Ambassador to Guinea, Lt. Col. Djabi to cross-over into RUF zone. They were promptly arrested and their statements revealed an international conspiracy, to which they were party, aimed at changing the leadership of the RUF. They have since been in custody until your recent instruction to release them.

Soon after, we received information that Superman, who was operating as Battalion Commander for the Western Area Jungle, had arrested the bodyguards of Colonel Tarawalle and had executed two of them, namely Emannelle and Victor without consulting with and obtaining such instructions from the Military High Command left on the ground by the Leader.

An investigation was launched and before action could be taken against Superman, the SLPP Government was overthrown by the AFRC on the 25th of May 1997.

A few days later General Mosquito was instructed to move and join our SLA brothers in Freetown,

In accordance with the Leader's instructions, General Mosquito postponed action against Superman and instructed him to lead the advance team from Bradford to Freetown, whilst Colonel Isaac and Brigadier Kallon were to move to join the SLA Forces in Makeni. After ensuring that the security of the High Command was paramount, the General and I moved to Freetown.

Once in place in Freetown we assessed the security situation and deployed our troops in all strategic areas of the Capital and indeed the entire country. In accordance with the instructions of the Leader we took all instructions from Chairman J P Koroma and maintained the same sense of discipline and loyalty that we had developed growing within the ranks of the RUF.

Lt. Col. Gibril Massaquoi arrived in Freetown from Nigeria where he had been under detention with the Leader. He briefed us informally that he had been arrested together with the Leader but that he had escaped, all with the knowledge and consent of the Leader. A few days later Gibril would present a document to Chairman J P Koroma that he, Gibril alleges, was given to him by the Leader. In the document, it was instructed that no member of the RUF was to accept any Ministerial position or participate in politics in any way. It also endorsed the promotion of Gibril to the rank of a full colonel.

These events were reported to General Mosquito as he had not been in Freetown when Gibril arrived.

On the arrival of Steve Bio in Freetown, he became very closely associated with Lt. Col. Gibril and both seemed to be on their own agenda.

I left Freetown for Kenema in-order to distribute rations and morale boosters to the troops, as well as to organize the various deployments. Whilst waiting for my Jeep to be repaired, a vehicle pulled-up with Steve Bio and Lt. Col. Gibril within.

Gibril greeted me and introduced Steve Bio to me. Though I knew Steve from a brief meeting in Abidjan at the signing of the Peace Accord, I had never really talked to him or knew much about him. They then began to discuss the AFRC and complained about the way in which the RUF was being marginalised and treated with disrespect. We were in a public place and I advised that such talk from them was not to be done around civilians. On this advice, we, including Major Eddie Boekarie (who was with me) walked to a point out of the earshot of others. Gibril went on to say that our meeting was not a coincidence and that they had searched the entire town for me as they had an important issue on which they

had to brief me. Mr. Bio then stated that he had come with a special mission and was seeking my support in launching a coup. I listened as both he and Gibril went into details of the numerous grievances held against the AFRC. He said that the AFRC had refused to share power with us and had even marginalised us in the military. I told them that the instructions that we had received from the Leader called on us to join and take all orders from Chairman J P Koroma. Steve Bio responded saying that I should disregard all that as we were all young men and that this was an operation that was necessary for the four of us, Gibril, Steve, General Mosquito and myself to undertake and assume command of the Government and State. I asked them if they had already discussed this with General Mosquito as they had just left him in Freetown. Gibril replied that they had left the General in Freetown but that he was afraid of General Mosquito and could not summon the courage to approach him on such an issue. In fact it was this very reason that had made it necessary for them to search for me in Kenema. Knowing that if I could be convinced, they were close to getting General Mosquito's support.

The two of them left Kenema that night for Bo. At around 0400HRS the following morning General Mosquito arrived in Kenema. I immediately informed him of my previous day's discussions with Gibril and Steve Bio. I told the General that they were asking us to overthrow the very Government that the Leader had instructed us to join and secure. I told General Mosquito that since that dialogue I had been thinking of a secure way of informing him and was very relieved that he was in Kenema. The General was shocked to hear this and in turn informed me that he had been called to the State House in Freetown where he was informed by Chairman J P Koroma that some members of the RUF were planning a coup together with other SLA officers. The General informed me further that he had been given the instructions to investigate the situation and report back to him. That day I moved to Bo and Gibril and Steve joined my convoy to Freetown. On arrival in Freetown I asked them in the presence of Brig. Mike Lamin, Col. Isaac and other security personnel to repeat their statements made to me in Kenema. They repeated the same statements and they were detained and turned over to Army Headquarters at Cockerill.

On new-years- eve, I left home in search of a pharmacy that was still open for business as I was in poor health. I met the Late. Honorable Gborie who informed me that he had chairs for me and had been trying to get a hold of me for two days. I thanked him sincerely and accepted his gift. Despite all the allegations and testimonies against the character of this man, I say with no hesitation that he welcomed the RUF with all his heart. On

numerous occasions he would provide rations and boosters to our troops and every RUF problem was his problem. I accepted his gift in good faith only to be notified on SLDS Radio the following day that I had looted the Iranian Embassy and as a result, I had been removed from the Supreme Council and that my arrest had been ordered.

Knowing that while we the RUF were securing the Government of the AFRC, they were killing our soldiers with no action being taken and that the RUF High Command had been targeted for elimination, and knowing that I was innocent and the measures taken against me, extreme, I refused arrest and maintained the integrity of the High Command of the RUF.

In general, we were not trusted or respected by the AFRC even though they had called on us to join them. Our troops were the only ones committed to their assignments whilst the AFRC High Command rejected our war plans and strategies referring to us as 'blood-thirsty, bush-colonels'.

It became apparent to us in Freetown, that Lt. Col. Gibril had leaked information to the AFRC pertaining to Military Equipment belonging to the RUF that the Leader had kept in a safe place. Before we could confront Gibril and arrest the situation, he and the AFRC had arranged for the equipment to be delivered to them. They took delivery of the equipment without the concern or consent of the RUF High Command and stored the equipment where we had no say or access to it. When we retreated from Freetown a large quantity of the said equipment was left in storage at the residence of Chairman J P Koroma.

Due to the lack of command and control, shortage of issued materials to our front-line troops and the total lack of support of the SLA soldiers, the enemy were able to move us from Freetown and ousted the AFRC Government.

I retreated first to Waterloo and then to Masiaka. By then, the ECOMOG Force had taken Bo and Kenema and it was agreed that I should attack Bo and begin to organize to move to attack Freetown. I was successful in capturing Bo but sustained an injury that forced me to retreat back to Mile 91 and then to Makeni in search of good medical treatment.

Whilst in Makeni, I went to visit J P Koroma who was in hiding in his village. J P Koroma asked me to arrange and supervise the movement of his entire family to Kailahun as ECOMOG were advancing and the Clandestine Radio 98.1 FM, had accounted that he was in hiding in his village.

I contacted General Mosquito and the order was given to escort the Former Head of State to our Kailabuu base.

First, we had to open the road to Kono. This was done in conjunction with Superman and Brig. Mike Lamin. Having put Kono under our Control, we attacked Gandohuu with the intention of opening the road from Koidu-Geya to Sandialu but failed in our attempts. We were then ordered by General Mosquito to enter the Jungle and use the cover of the Jungle to secure J P Koroma and his family to the banks of the Moa River. Across the Moa, General Mosquito had sent vehicles ahead of us and we all reported to Buedu.

All hospitalities were extended to J P Koroma and his family and General turned over his bedroom to J P Koroma and his wife.

J P Koroma appointed General Mosquito as Chief of Defence Staff, with overall command over both the RUF and the SLA and promoted him to the rank of Brigadier General. General Mosquito called on me and informed me that since he had been made Chief of Defence Staff for both the RUF and the SLA by J P Koroma he wanted to turn over his assignment of Battle Field Commander to me and asked me to turn my assignment of Battle Group Commander over to Superman. The General said that he was doing this to draw Superman within the High Command structure of the RUF in a bid to encourage him. I accepted and assumed the assignment of Battle Field Commander and Superman assumed the assignment of Battle Group Commander.

One morning, the Chief Security Officer to the former AFRC Chairman J P Koroma informed me that his boss was planning to escape to Ghana along with his entire family. The CSO further told me that J P Koroma had a parcel of diamonds that he was planning on selling once out of the country.

This information came as a surprise to me and found it hard to believe that at a time when we were trying to put the fighting-men under command and control and provide the necessary logistics to halt our retreat and move forward, J P Koroma would keep diamonds for his own use and flee, leaving us with a problem that he had created.

Accompanied by Brig Mike Lamin and the CSO to J P Koroma I asked the latter to present the diamonds for the use of the Revolution. He complied and the matter was settled.

While in Buedu, Captain Michael Comber of the Mining Unit reported with a parcel of diamonds from Kono. The parcel was placed in my care by General Mosquito with the instructions to move with it to a transit point where I would be met

by General Ibrahim and together we were to travel to a business associate of the Leader for arrangements and procurement of Military Equipment.

I arrived at the transit point and booked into a hotel.

On the evening of my third day at the hotel, Colonel Jungle and I went across the street to a tea-shop. Whilst there, it started to rain and Jungle and I ran from the shop across the street to the hotel. As we climbed the steps to enter, I touched my pockets, as I had gotten accustomed to doing since the parcel was put in my care.

To my shock and dismay, my pockets were empty. I screamed and put my hands on my head and cried. Jungle and I then retraced our steps from the tea-shop to the hotel. We searched in the rain on our hands and knees. Staff from the hotel helped us in our search, all to no avail. For the first time in my life I contemplated suicide. I above all knew the importance attached to the materials that the diamonds were to facilitate for the movement. How could I ever look my commander in the eyes and tell him that I Issa, who could be trusted with the security of the Nation, could not secure a small parcel of diamonds. As the days went by, I grew frustrated and could not eat or sleep.

Four days after the loss, Jungle and I were sitting on his bed when we monitored National Radio announcing that diamonds had been discovered on the very same street that I had suffered my loss.

Jungle and I cried knowing that the mentioned diamonds were the property of the RUF. Till this day, people still prospect this area thinking that diamonds are underground.

General Mosquito dispatched Lt. Col. Moriba to meet me and escort me back to DHQ.

On arrival, I was met by an enraged General Mosquito who angrily chastised me for the loss. I was ordered to 'fall-out' and for over a week, the General would not talk to me or even respond to my curtsies.

Finally one morning, I was summoned by the General and instructed that I should leave Buedu and make my base at Pendembu from where I was to coordinate all Front-Line Operations.

I complied with his order and stepped-up operations against the enemy at Daru. I also launched successful Jungle Missions to Joru and Niama.

General Mosquito left on a trip to secure materials for the Movement and on his return I was issued a liberal quantity of ammunition and instructed to cross the Moa River and re-capture Kono from the enemy. Prior to this, the same instructions had been given to Superman who misused the materials given to him and failed to capture the target.

On arrival in Kono I called the Brigade Commander, Rambo and other senior officers and together we arranged a forum in which general security issues were discussed and a war-plan was made for the attack of Koindu Town.

* I instructed Brig. Kallon to move to Gold Town and 'cut-off' the enemy. I led the troops in the attack of Koidu Town, attacking the enemy at 0600HRS. They put up a strong resistance using their four Mechanized Battalions deployed to defend Kono and its diamonds. Our troops proved too aggressive for them and after fourteen hours of heated combat we captured Koindu Town. The Nigerians retreated to Bumpo. Very early the next morning we attacked their positions, at Bumpo and raised them from the town. The enemy were forced to retreat through the road leading to Massingbi where they fell in Kallons ambush. All in all. The enemy lost four war-tanks, armored cars, and a multitude of heavy artillery pieces personal rifles and huge amounts of ammunition. They also suffered heavy casualties the likes of which they have never experienced in the history of ECOMOG. They were forced to retreat on foot with not even a bicycle being able to pass our defenses.

* Our Forces moved for Massingbi, Rambo and Kallon moving with the advance team whilst I moved to repel a Kamajoh Attack at Nimikoro. Our forces had by then captured Massingbi and Magboroka and were advancing to attack Makeni. I joined them, taking with me all needed Military Materials for the attack. We quickly put the Township under our Military Control. General Mosquito called me 'on set' and instructed that we allow 'Superman' to join in the operations. The General explained that though Superman had earlier refused his orders, he Mosquito was man enough to put it behind him and accept Superman back, referring to him as 'a brother in arms.' Rambo proceeded to a village beyond Binkolo where Superman had been in hiding and brought him to Makeni. That morning the two of us met and had polite discussions. Together we attacked the Barracks and captured it. At that point, I received information that the enemy were moving to attack Ijiana-Swafe and I moved to put the situation under control. Upon my return to Makeni, Rambo and Kallon reported that all Military Equipment in their care had been reported to the G-4. They reported that Superman on the other hand had taken the Materials he collected to his house. Accompanied by Kallon, I went to Superman's house and confronted him with the issue. I informed him that it was proper procedure to report all captured Military Materials to the G-4 who would then file a comprehensive report to DHO and issue the said Materials upon instructions. I asked that

Superman present the Materials so as to ensure proper accountability. Superman led Kallon and I into the house and showed us where he had kept the Materials. I instructed that it be moved and reported to the G-4.

Two days later General Mosquito again asked for understanding and allowed Superman to rejoin the operations.

* Rambo was instructed to advance and attack Port Loko which he did, deploying his forward defensive at the Port Loko turn-table, leading to Kambia. Rambo shared the town with the enemy for seven days.

Superman, pleaded that eventhough Rambo had done well, he as Battle Group Commander knew the ground well and should take over the ground. He said that he had received Intelligence that the Leader had been moved to Lungi and wanted to advance as far as Lungi and rescue the Leader.

* At this time our forces Freetown were under enemy 'cut-off' from the rear and were in danger of being boxed-in and either captured alive or killed.

Rambo was withdrawn from his operation in Port Loko and instructed to open a through-way to connect with our men in Freetown.

Rambo then attacked and captured Masiaka, advanced and captured RDF, and attacked the Guineans at Waterloo, engaging them in combat for four days and four nights.

* The Guineans wrote us a letter asking for their safe passage back to Guinea, saying that they were taking their hands out of the war. I replied, denying their request. I told them that if they wanted 'safe passage' they should leave behind all their Military Equipment. A few days later I monitored the sound of heavy bombardment from the direction of Port Loko. On inquiring, I was informed that our troops had dissolved the ground and that the enemy were advancing towards Gberay Junction. I asked for Superman and was informed that he was in Lunsar and not on the ground that he had asked for and been given.

The Guinean convoy bulldozed all the way to Masiaka where my position was also bulldozed. Their mission was to rescue the Guineans at Waterloo. Upon reaching Waterloo they joined forces and made a 'U-turn', bulldozing my ambush for a second time at RDF. The Guinean convoy consisted of over four war-tanks, eight armored vehicles, a Forty Barrel Missile, four Anti-Aircraft Guns and countless other mounted weapons and over eight trucks full of personnel. As they moved they bombarded and assaulted, clearing a path for themselves.

I was extremely annoyed at my position being bulldozed and issued strong orders for an ambush to be set ahead of them. They fell in the ambush and my Bodyguard commander led a team of less than a squad of men in the capture of the Forty Barrel Missile and a large quantity of its bombs.

I moved to Escort the Missile to our rear and on my return, Superman asked to join Rambo at Waterloo. He sighted the fact that as the SLA Commanders had operated with him before he would be able to consolidate them and exercise command and control over them. Taking into consideration his status as Battle Group and the logic behind his explanations, I gave the OK for Superman to join Rambo in Waterloo.

At Waterloo Superman incited SLA Commanders and soldiers against Rambo and generally did his best to cause a break-down in command on the ground.

A few days later General Mosquito on hearing that Lt. Col. Gibril had been rescued and had joined operations at Waterloo, called me and asked me to inform Gibril that he was welcome back and that no ill-feelings were borne against him. Gibril was to also report to DHQ to brief the High Command and all on the condition of the Leader as they had been in prison together.

Superman, monitoring the dialogue on field-radio responded that He would not allow Gibril to come to the call of the High Command. A few days later, I received information from the Waterloo Front-Line that Superman and Gibril had retreated to Lunsar and had moved with a good number of men. As a result, the enemy had advanced and were now at Yams Farm.

I informed Rambo who was at my location on a Medical Pass. Rambo asked for ammunition to be given to him so that he could collect the Force from Lunsar and move to stop the enemy advance at Yams Farm. I arrived at Lunsar with only eight bodyguards and met Rambo and Gibril discussing. Gibril greeted me and we exchanged pleasantries. I told him that General Mosquito wanted him to report to DHQ not to face any charges but to give account of the state and condition of the Leader as they had been in prison together. Gibril complied and entered my vehicle. At that moment, Superman and his men came from the back of the building, opened suppressive fire and launched RPG rockets against my position. Gibril left my vehicle and joined Superman in attacking me. I managed to escape with my life but they had killed two RUF soldiers assigned to me as bodyguards.

I got in a vehicle with Major Kolo Mulba and escaped through Gberay Junction, Masiaka, Mile 91 to Magboroka.

Meanwhile, Superman and Gibril moved to Makeni and attacked my residence. They shot at my house, tied and beat up RUF soldiers and raised my compound. They entered my house, beating up my wife, undressing her and taunting her with rude and abusive remarks before she was able to escape under gun-fire.

Mr. B T Samara and others rescued from prison in Freetown, were staying with me in Makeni and were also molested and raised. RUF Military Materials given to me by the General for a planned re-attack of Freetown were looted along with 9,000 USD also RUF property. That same day Superman and Gibril attacked the home of Brig. Kallon. The entire house was raised and his wife was stripped off all her clothing and made to sit on the ground. Her suckling- child was snatched from her and repeatedly banged against a wall. This resulted in serious injuries to the child.

I reported the incident to General Mosquito who asked me to exercise restraint and he dispatched a Delegation headed by Col. Isaac to calm the situation down and investigate the incident. The Delegation obtained statements from me and proceeded to Lunsar to get a statement from my attackers. Superman and Gibril refused to co-operate and issued threats against the Delegates.

During this impasse the enemy had advanced to Gberay Junction. General Mosquito instructed that in the interest of the Revolution, we should put our differences aside temporarily and act to repel the enemy. Along with Kallon, Rambo and Brig. Isaac, four trucks of armed men were mobilized and we joined the Force at Lunsar and moved for Gberay Junction. Four of Rambo's men were killed in that attack by 'friendly fire' from the rear suggesting foul-play.

Again the enemy moved against our positions advancing towards Mile 91. I sent Rambo, equipping him with a Single Barrel BZT. He met and joined Col. Bai Burch and they were able to push the enemy past Moyamba Junction to Tiana Junction where they deployed our troops.

Rambo proposed an attack of BO and it was arranged that Kallon would hit Yele.

Kallon was dispatched to DHIQ to receive logistics for the said mission. Two days later I made a day's trip to Matotoka as the area was under Kamajoh threat. On returning to Makeni, Rambo visited me to inform me that he had repaired the BZT Weapon and wanted to move to capture Do the next morning. He left my house at around 2100HRS and I stayed up past mid-night. I stayed awake and at 0110HRS I heard heavy firing from outside. I entered my 'living-room' and my bodyguards were running from the direction of the firing. Some of them had been shot. I exited the house through a

back entrance and ran for cover. A RPG rocket was launched against me and I was hit in the toe by fragment from the blast. I ran as guns blazed behind me. I got to a safe place and spent the night. The next morning with the aid of civilian's, I escaped to Makali. The hunt was on for me and I had to by-pass major towns on my way. At Makali I was at the Signal Station monitoring the Network when the Leader called. I responded and reported that I was faced with a serious problem. Not wanting to let the enemy know that there was serious in-fighting going on within the RUF, I could not go into details. At the end of my dialogue with the Leader I was attacked again by Gibril. They took me by surprise as I had been very careful not to disclose my location. The people of Makali, including the Paramount Chief Pa Alimamy Kann, will testify that Gibril led the attack. He raised the town shooting and wounding people on the ground. He swore that he would kill me and take my head to Makeni where he would put it on display.

Away from my ground at Makeni, Superman took the opportunity of calling a meeting at the Town Hall where he informed those assembled that General Mosquito and I had collaborated to hijack the leadership of the RUF and sighted the Generals advise not to respond to the call of the Leader on field-radio as proof. He informed the meeting that he had received instructions from the Leader to take full command of the RUF and to arrest and execute both General Mosquito and I, Brig. Issa.

By then I had maneuvered to Kono, after spending five days in the bush as a result of the attack on me in Makali. Kallon moved to Magboroka to take command and was able to repel numerous attacks from Superman and Gibril.

X Upon receiving instructions from the Leader, through the General, calling for Kallon to take command at Makeni. I mobilized Kallon and the said operation was undertaken. We were almost in control of the entire Township when the General informed us that that the Leader wanted us to abort the operation and for Kallon to return to Makeni. A Military Order was passed and we withdrew the force to await the arrival of the Leader on the ground.

Sir, if my Report is centered on the activities of Superman and Gibril it is not so merely because of their attacks on me but rather because of the negative results their 'out-law' actions have brought to the Movement.

X

Superman sought the advise of ULIMO General Bopleh and SLA Brig. Mannic. Both strong critics and self-confessed enemies of the RUF. Superman placed Former President J S Momoh in the hands of Mannic who arranged for Momoh to escape to Guinea. Mannic refused to hand Momoh over to me stating that Momoh is SLA property and not RUF.

He incited SLA soldiers to go against RUF Command and together with Gibril sought to sabotage the progress of the movement thus delaying the release of the Leader.

Superman killed Rambo in cold blood and made several attempts on my life in a bid to eliminate the RUF High Command left on the ground by the Leader.

Sir, it has not been easy controlling my emotions and harder still controlling the men who witnessed the cold-blooded killing of Rambo.


General Mosquito, I Brig. Issa and other senior officers have obediently taken all orders from you and at this time we await most anxiously your arrival when we look to have the matter resolved by you.

Lastly Sir, the vast majority of the men are in ' high spirit ' and remain loyal to the Leadership of the RUF. They have fought hard and longed for the return of the Leader.

As Battle Field Commander I pledge my loyalty to the Leader and ask that he moves earlicst, to look into the internal-affairs of the RUF.

The High Command, officers, combatants and civillians of the RUF are on the ground and on full-alert awaiting the ' last-order ' of the Commander In Chief of the RUF S/L, Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh.

Militarily Yours,



Brigadier Issa H Sesay
Battle Field Commander
RUF S/L

2) Salute Report

Report to the Leader of the Revolution, RUF S/L from Major General Sam Bockarie.

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE RUF S/LDEFENCE HEAD QUARTERS26TH SEPTEMBER 1999

TO -- THE LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION , RUF S/L.
FROM -- MAJOR GENERAL SAM BOCKARIE
SUBJECT -- SALUTE REPORT.

The Leader Sir,

Before leaving the ground in November 1996, you placed me in command as the Battlefield Commander of the RUF S/L and instructed me to take command in your absence and to maintain the ground by any means necessary.

In that light, I have acted in the capacity you saw fit to entrust me with and done all in my power and wisdom to maintain the ground until your return to Sierra Leone.

Upon your departure I initiated contact with ULIMO as per your instructions in a bid to buy materials to repel the vicious attacks of the Kamajohs at a time when there was a peace document in place and we were not expecting to fight. At first ULIMO arrested me thinking that I had come to them to surrender. Later I was able to convince them to release me and we commenced a mutually beneficial relationship. I used the \$ 7,000 USD to purchase vitally needed materials that gave us the stance to fight and challenge the SLPP Government until they were ousted by the AFRC coup. The efforts of the civilians must be highlighted as they provided Agricultural Produce which I traded for materials during the same period.

It came as a surprise to learn that the Leader had been arrested in Nigeria and an even bigger surprise when Captain Philip Palmer and others announced a change in the Leadership of the RUF. I was able to lure them to the Sierra Leone and Guinea border crossing of Nongowa and pretending that I was in support of their actions, I was able to lure them across the river into RUF zone. I arrested all of them and obtained statements from them implicating the Kabba Government in the arrest of the Leader and indicating a greater international conspiracy to change the leadership of the RUF. These statements will be presented to you as evidence.

Meanwhile in Bradford in the Western Area Jungle, Superman had killed two of Colonel Mohamed Tarawallie's bodyguards whilst others had run for fear of being killed. Commanders from all fronts were outraged by this act and were about to move to Bradford to arrest the situation when the AFRC overthrew the Government of Tejan Kabba on 25th May 1997 and called on us to join them a few days later.

On receiving instructions from the Leader calling on the RUF to join the AFRC I decided to put the Bradford issue to rest until the return of the Leader and instructed Superman to head the advance team to Freetown from the Western Area Jungle, later to be joined by Colonel Isaac and others from Kangari Hills. After insuring that our security was paramount, Brig. Issa and I entered the city to implement your instruction to join the AFRC and ensure that the security of the nation was paramount.

Thus began the marriage of uneven and unequal partners between the AFRC and the RUF.

The RUF was assigned the Ministries of Agriculture under MR SYB Rogers, the Ministry of Trade and Industry under Major Eldred Collins, the Ministry of Energy under Colonel Lawrence Wormandia, the Deputy Ministry of Education under Major Benda, the Deputy Ministry of lands and the Environment, under Brig. Peter Vandi and the Deputy Ministry of Health, under Lt. Col. Fabai. I was offered the Ministry of Transport and Communication but declined the appointment as I had not received any instruction from the Leader to accept a political appointment and because I saw it necessary to concentrate on military issues.

Sir, within the marriage a diamond was sold by a Lebanese businessman with a commission given to the government, out of which an amount of nine million Leones (LE 9000000) was given to Colonel Superman for the entire RUF movement which he embezzled.

I decided to investigate him in my capacity as the commander you left in charge. Superman deliberately refused my order and went to the extent of challenging me. I was annoyed but was advised by the War Council Chairman Mr. SYB Rogers to wait for your return to the ground.

On the 2nd of June 1996, our forces led by Superman captured over three hundred Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers and held them under the terms and conditions of the Geneva Convention, as POW's. It was the hope of every RUF officer and combatant that these POW's would be used to negotiate the release of the Leader from Nigeria. To our dismay all three hundred and some, POW's were released without our consultation. This followed meetings between the AFRC High Command and the Nigerian ECOMOG High Command. On one occasion I was unwittingly in an office in which a meeting between the above mentioned

parties was to be held and I was asked to leave the room as nothing concerning me or the RUF were going to be discussed.

To make matters worse, no attention was paid by the AFRC to secure your release from Nigeria.

I as the Military High Command of the RUF was left floating without any military appointment as was the case of all RUF senior officers.

I advised that we attack and remove the enemy from Lungi and Jui but was instructed not to do so by J P Koroma.

In Freetown, I was met by MR Steve Bio and Gibril Massaquoi who informed me that MR Bio had been sent to me with instructions from the Leader and that he was to assume the office of Administrative Head of the RUF. This request was denied by me as I did not trust them and had begun to suspect a clandestine bond between the two.

Soon after, I was summoned to the State House where J P Koroma showed me an Intelligence report alerting of a plot by certain members of the RUF and SLA to overthrow his Government. He instructed me to investigate and arrest the situation.

Meanwhile, unknown to either of us, Steve Bio and Gibril went to Kenema and tried to persuade Brig. Issa to back them in convincing me to support a coup led by Steve Bio. Colonel Issa kept them on hold and looked for a safe way of relaying this security information to me.

By this time, there had been three attempts on my life in Freetown, our men were being killed without any action taken by the authorities and the enemy were re-enforcing their positions around the Capital. In addition I had just been briefed by the Head of State that certain members of the RUF were planning to overthrow his Government. The last thing that I wanted was to be arrested by the AFRC as it would have caused serious problems for the RUF.

I left Freetown and went to Kenema. Upon my arrival in Kenema I was briefed by Brig. Issa on the intentions of Steve Bio and Gibril. I briefed Brig. Issa on the situation in Freetown and instructed him to effect the arrest of MR Steve Bio and Gibril and to turn them over to the AFRC for investigation. They remained in the custody of the AFRC when we retreated from Freetown.

Dr S S Banya had also met us with a view of convincing us to overthrow the AFRC Government in favor of the SLPP. They were arrested by me and turned over to the AFRC government on charges of Treason. Again without our consent they were released.

Brig. Issa was instructed to go to Freetown to ensure that security was paramount for the AFRC Government and civilians of Freetown.

1499

On 31 January 1997 the Late Abu Sankoh (PLO1) and the Late Honorable Tamba Gborie looted the Iranian Embassy at Murray Town. They later called on Brig. Issa and offered him a set of chairs. Not being aware of the source of the chairs and the fact that it was indeed the Late Tamba Gborie who was instrumental in welcoming the RUF and meeting the demands of the RUF when the Government was doing every thing to discourage us, Brig. Issa accepted the gift in good faith.

Without any investigation into the issue, J P Koroma ordered that it be announced on National Radio that Brig. Issa had looted the Iranian Embassy and that as a result he was suspended from the Supreme Council of the AFRC. His arrest was ordered and it was announced that the RUF had planned a coup.

This situation led to the heightening of tension in Freetown between the RUF and the AFRC and an ultimate breakdown in its marriage.

The AFRC made available 50 Million Leones to the RUF monthly, though only for a couple of months. This and other monies received were used for providing rations to our troops and assisting all deployment areas. The civilian populace were not forgotten and special consignments were dispatched by me to Kailahun.

All financial reports and returns will be presented by Lt. Col. Kennedy who was in charge of all logistics. Kennedy you might recall Sir, is one of your senior bodyguards and served as G-SO1 (LOGISTICS) during our stay in Freetown.

Before Gibril was arrested he exposed to the AFRC, information on materials that the RUF held in stock. Unknown to me and the rest of the RUF High Command, Gibril and the AFRC made arrangements for the stock to be moved in place for their use. They then took control of the entire load leaving the bulk of it stashed away at the residence of J P Koroma and fled the city whilst our troops fought the enemy from house to house with nearly empty magazines and no support fire. In the end Freetown fell and the majority of soldiers, both RUF and SLA retreated safely from the Capital.

We also rescued J P Koroma and his family and under the escort of Brig. Issa and Brig. Mike he was brought to Kailahun as was advised by your brother. His mother-in-law had to be carried on a hammock the duration of the journey. On his arrival in Kailahun I gave-up my bedroom for J P Koroma and sought his permission to enter in order to go through my drawers.

The enemy had succeeding in demoralizing our troops and soldiers both RUF and SLA raced for the Moa River in retreat and with the intention of crossing as refugees into neighboring countries. Sensing that this would greatly deplete our fighting force, I instructed that strong gates be placed

along the Moa crossings and threatened to open fire on anyone attempting to cross , I further instructed that defensives be set in Kono and ahead and to put an effective halt to the retreat.

I immediately set about establishing a Defence Headquarters in Kailahun. It was from this DHQ that I intended to organize a stance and a counter-offensive and from where command and control would be maintained. Later when J P Koroma arrived in Kailahun, he appointed me to take over command for both the RUF and the SLA as Chief of Defence Staff with the rank of Brigadier General. In order to motivate the most senior officers, I took it upon myself to appoint Brig. Issa as Battlefield Commander and Colonel Mingo as Battle Group Commander. All this was done especially to encourage Colonel Mingo and ensure smooth operation. After our Freetown invasion in January 1999 I was again promoted by J P Koroma to the rank of Major General , Issa was promoted to Brigadier and Mike to the rank of Brigadier and other SLA officers were also promoted.

Sir, during this period I had been in contact with various diplomats and other international agencies such as the UN, Commonwealth, OAU, ECOWAS and even the Sierra Leone Government , with a view of effecting your release and a negotiated settlement of the Sierra Leonean crisis. These bodies lent deaf ears to my propositions as they thought that the Kabba government would be able to achieve military victory.

Back at headquarters I renewed my contact with ULIMO and tried to secure materials from them. It was out of these materials that I gave Superman a good quantity to attack and capture Kono. This move I thought would pressure the government into abandoning their mock trial against you and provide us with the ground necessary to move the war and the movement forward.

Superman used the materials to attack Kono and was able to control parts of Koidu Town. Though they were able to raise the ammo dump, they then concentrated on looting and later withdrew leaving the enemy to re-occupy the town. Even prior to that, all instructions to maintain the ground were not implemented.

With the captured materials from Kono, Superman went to the Kabala axis to join SAJ Musa. I instructed him to send some materials to which he agreed . Later he refused to dispatch the materials and refused to grant permission to the receiving officer to return to me.

A special forum of Vanguard's was held to brief them of happenings since the Freetown retreat and other important issues. It was in this forum that I learnt that Superman had a mixed- Lebanese girl with him who was deterring his concentration on military issues. It was reported that she would sit on his lap during meetings with officers and publicly flirt with one another . This information concerned me greatly and in the presence of all

Vanguards I instructed Superman to report for briefing. I told him that he should not be moving with his woman on a military operation such as the one he was on as it was obvious that his priority was not his military duties. In this light, I instructed him to prepare within 72 hours and to report to DHQ. He agreed to report but later sent a long message denouncing my command and refusing to come to my call. He said that he would stay where he was and would take no instructions from me until the arrival of the leader.

The War Council Chairman and other senior officers joined me in trying to convince him to report but he refused, resorting to molesting Pa Rogers and Brigadier Isaac on set, whilst all stations were monitoring. Indeed he remained in his location, threatening any soldier attempting to comply with my instruction for all loyal forces to the RUF leadership and High Command to leave his location for the closest operational area.

Prior to this, diamonds mined from Kono were given to Brigadier Issa in order for him to make contact and delivery to a business associate of yours. At his transit point, whilst awaiting General Ibrahim, Brigadier Issa reports that he had gone to a near by tea-shop and on his way back to the hotel he realized that the diamonds were missing from his pocket. His claims of the diamonds dropping from his pockets were substantiated by live broadcasts over radio announcing that diamonds had been found on the streets of the city.

Colonel Jungle was with Brig. Issa and are both in a position to better explain the events surrounding the loss of the diamonds. I was discouraged at the loss as I had planned against revenues generated from the proceeds, however, in light of the confirmed radio broadcast on the loss of diamonds a short distance from where Brig. Issa's hotel was and the fact that the situation on the ground was such that a firm grip had to be taken of the situation and the Brig. Was a very able commander, in fact the most cooperative and effective in implementing military orders and duties, I decided to refer the matter to you on your arrival whilst assigning him to the front-line at a time when the enemy were bent on flushing us out of even our Kailahun base.

During your absence, many contacts were made to sympathizers to promote the image of the movement, details of which will be presented to you in a manner so as not to cause any breach of security. Out of these contacts I was able to get the basic needs and facilitate our military move to Kono and onwards past Machine.

The entire move was under the command of the Late Boston Flamoh (Rambo) and supervised by Brig. Issa. When Rambo captured Makeni, I convinced Brig. Issa on set to call on Superman to join in operations in order to ensure that the objectives of the RUF were placed in priority.

As usual Brig. Issa was supportive and I called Superman on set and instructed him to join in the operations. I told Superman that I had forgiven him and that the past was behind us and that we were all brothers in arms. Superman accepted the call and vowed to give his fullest cooperation. To have made this call was not an easy thing for me as Superman had been asked to provide manpower for the Kono - Makeni operations, yet another order that he defied and still I was forced to exercise maturity and instructed Rambo to go and receive Superman and to continue normal operations with him. Rambo willingly complied with the order and went to meet Superman, providing vehicles for all his men. They then returned to Makeni and put the barracks under control.

Whilst the Late Rambo was busy checking captured materials for proper accountability, Superman took the opportunity of diverting captured materials for his own use.

Brig. Issa who had taken supervised the Makeni and had given instructions for the barracks to be put under full Military control whilst he was informed of the fact that Superman had illegally taken materials from the barracks and was in possession of these materials. When approached on the issue, Superman claimed that I, General Mosquito and Brig. Issa were using Rambo against him with the aim of destroying him. Brig. Issa insisted that the materials be handed over as Superman had not only misused large amounts of ammo in his failed attempt to capture Kono but had also refused to give account of materials captured when the Koidu Town ammo dump of ECOMOG was captured.

Superman continued to refuse and Brig. Issa accompanied by Brig. Kallon entered his house and arrested all materials found. He invited Superman to the HQ in Makeni so as to make plans for moving the operation to Lunsar. Superman asked to enter his bedroom to prepare for the move and took that opportunity to escape. Superman later returned and again was allowed to join the operation.

At this point I instructed the Late Rambo to advance to Port Loko whilst Superman was to secure the Freetown highway. Rambo was successful in capturing part of the town and in capturing a large quantity of materials. Superman then suggested that as he knew the terrain well, he should take over that axis and move to capture Lungi. Thinking that he was sincere we agreed and Brig. Issa gave him the opportunity to equip himself from the ammo dump for the mission.

Upon taking over at Port Loko, Superman made no effective move to capture Lungi and also lost the valuable ground of Port Loko.

Meanwhile the troops that entered Freetown had been cut off from the rear and were being encircled leaving them no way out. I was able to coordinate their operations over set and got them to combine their forces and bulldoze from the side accessing them to the mountains through which they took a by-pass to join our troops at Benguema and Waterloo as JOI was

occupied by ECOMOG . This is how the troops that entered Freetown were able to retreat . Still they sustained heavy casualties including Steve Bio, the SLPP Chairman Manakpaka and many others.

On learning that Gibril Massaquoi had been rescued from prison and had joined in the operation, I contacted him 'on set' and gave him advice and encouragement for smooth operations. Another attack of Freetown was planned but was never implemented due to the actions of Gibril, Superman and some other SLA soldiers.

Later, I was to instruct Brig. Issa to get Gibril to report to DHQ for proper briefing as he had been with you in prison and had information as to your condition. I was also of the conviction that Gibril would collaborate with Superman to go against the command that you left on the ground. I instructed Brig. Issa to assure Gibril that all was forgiven and that I held no grudge for him.

Gibril refused to come to my call, saying that he was going to operate with Superman. Superman was asked to enforce the order for Gibril to report but he also was defiant and said that he Superman was not going to make Gibril do what he himself would not do. They went on with words of insult to me and the High Command and said that they were not taking orders from me or Kailahun.

I sent Brig. Issa to the ground to invite Gibril to report to DHQ. On arrival Gibril was invited to report and he complied by entering the vehicle. At this point Superman ordered his men to open fire on Brig. Issa which they did, thus affording Gibril with the opportunity to not only escape but to take up arm against his superior command in the person of Brig. Issa, who was able to escape unhurt. Gibril and Superman went with their men to the home of Brig. Issa and commanded all the materials that had been sent there by me for use in the planned re-attack of Freetown. They vandalized the house, looting all personal properties and government funds amounting to nine thousand U.S. Dollars (9000USD).

The two, together with their men then left and based themselves in Lunsar, with the threat that ant person, including me, that tried to get to them would be killed.

I dispatched a team headed by Colonel Isaac, Major Benda, Lt. Col. Moriba, Major Jackson your bodyguard commander and Lt. Col. Sam Kpulleh, with explicit instructions to go and investigate the issue and ensure that they contain the situation and report back to me at DHQ.

I was later informed that the delegation had not been given an opportunity to investigate and were under serious armed threat by both Gibril and Superman. In time, Lt. Col. Moriba and Lt. Col. Kpulleh returned to DHQ whilst the other three stayed behind and also began to put up acts of insubordination against the High Command.

The enemy had taken this moment of internal turmoil to make advances against our positions at Benguema, Waterloo and Mile 47. The enemy then moved for Gberay Bridge. Again Superman pleaded for the opportunity to

move to repel the attack on Gberay Bridge. As enemy pressure was mounting, I gave the go-ahead to for him to take up the said operation. Superman failed to move to Gberay Bridge and instead attacked Makeni late at night with the aim of killing Brig. Issa and Rambo. The home of Rambo was attacked by Superman. The attack caught Rambo off guard as he was fast asleep. He was captured shot many times and it is reported that he was even stabbed to ensure that he did not survive the attack, remarking that he Rambo was the 'Iron Jacket' to me General Mosquito and Brig. Issa and that he would die that night in the hands of Superman.

After killing Rambo, they attacked the home of Brig. Issa, launching a RPG rocket at the house. They opened fire entering the house. Brig. Issa was able to escape through a door from his bedroom leading to the back of the house. He was spotted as he maneuvered towards the bushes and another RPG rocket was launched behind him. The explosion caused a small rock to enter the toe of Brig. Issa and against day-break was able to make his escape to Makali where he dialogued with you on set while you were still in the custody of the SLPP in Freetown.

In that attack, Gibril, Superman and their men killed and wounded many soldiers, both RUF and SLA who were performing various military duties on the ground.

The next morning Superman mobilized an armed force headed by Gibril, to re-attack Brig. Issa at Makali, having been alerted as to his location through his dialogue with the Leader. They also planned to attack Mile 91 with a view of taking command at both grounds. Again Brig. Issa was able to escape and moved to Kono. Gibril chased him as far as Makali, vowing to kill him as he had done Rambo and to display his head in Makeni. I have as evidence, a video cassette recording of the public display of the Late Rambo's body. The same cassette will help to shed light on the death of Rambo and the conspiracy and action of Gibril and Superman to kill the High Command of the RUF and assume its offices and command.

After Makeni had been captured and raised by Superman and his troops, he called a meeting at the Town Hall and confidently told the people that he was acting in compliance with instructions received from the Leader and that he had taken effective command of the RUF and that I, Major General Sam Bockarie was no longer High Command of the RUF and that he Brig. Superman was taking over from Brig. Issa in Makeni.

Superman went on to accuse me on air of hijacking the Leadership of the RUF, sigliting my call for all Signal Stations not to respond to your call, as proof of my betrayal. A charge that I not only deny but take particular offense to.

Superman later went 'on air' proclaiming that he was going to advance to Kono and further still to Kailahun where he would kill me and display my head. He went on to name his assignation list.

To contain the situation I issued materials to Brig. Kallon and instructed him to take command of Magboroka and to use the opportunity to search for Brig. Issa as he was MIA as a result of Superman's ambush of him immediately after Issa had dialogued with you on air. Kallon took command of Magboroka and was soon under the attack of Superman and Gibril. This time they did not only use RPG's and GMG's but launched mortar bombs and fired Anti-Aircraft Guns against Magboroka. Kallon was however able to repel, only for Superman to re-attack, this time capturing the Town. Three days later Brig. Kallon launched a successful counter-offensive re-capturing Magboroka. Since then the ground has been under our control but has come under a series of attacks by Superman leading to loss of life and injury to numerous soldiers and civilians.

We attacked Makeni twice with a view of re-taking command of the said ground. This because of the strategic location of the Township and the fact that Makeni was under command and control and law and order was in effect when Brig Issa was in command. Civilians moved freely, knowing that their security was paramount. These same civilians were now crying to be rescued. We were in full occupation of the Township when you instructed us to withdraw and await your arrival upon which the issue would be settled. Your order was immediately enforced and troops loyal to the RUF High Command left on the ground by the Leader, were ordered by me to withdraw. The truth is Sir, that at that time the people of Makeni, including the soldiers needed to be rescued. Living conditions were dismal and it is reported that at the time Superman was getting married at a costly ceremony soldiers were suffering and in some cases dying as a result of inadequate drugs.

Till this day Superman and Gibril are contrary to my command and continue to flaunt the direct command of the Leader. They still do not submit all reports to me for my necessary information and action and onward movement to the attention of the Leader. They reserve the mandated line of command only for messages against me or to paint themselves pretty.

When we first retreated from Freetown I contacted the Government of The Ivory Coast and in particular the Foreign Minister, MR Amara Esse. I also contacted the guarantors of the Abidjan Peace Accord to impress on them the fact that our Leader was still illegally being held by the Nigerian Government and that a negotiated settlement was the only way in which peace and security could return to Sierra Leone. I even contacted the Government of Tejan Kabba in Freetown to convince them to release you and to threaten that if they continued to exercise the military option, we the RUF would push for total military victory and would escalate the war to a point beyond imagination. All this talk fell on deaf ears as even the international media refused our calls. With our capture of Kono and the

raising of four mechanized battalions of the Nigerian ECOMOG force, our phones began to ring with calls from the worlds' elite press, and the very people who only a few weeks back were ignoring our calls, assuming that we were going to be flushed as Tejan Kabba had vowed, were now virtually begging to talk. I knew that the heat was on Kabba.

Our attack of Freetown put Kabba in a position where he was forced to talk, as I had earlier promised he would. He fled the city as did his Cabinet, the latter with a view of re-grouping in Conakry and launching a counter-offensive as they had done when ousted by the AFRC. On learning that his political strong-men such as Despond Luke and others were in Conakry, I obtained their various hotel-room numbers and systematically called each on the telephone claiming that I was also in Conakry with a squad of my best commandos and that we were on our way to the hotel. Within fifteen minutes of my first call the hotel had been sealed off by Guinean security forces, with tanks and armored-cars on every intersection. Desmond Luke and party beat a hasty retreat to secret 'safe-houses' and all boarded flights for different destinations the next day. This brought to a screeching halt the SLPP political stance during our Freetown attack and occupation.

We now had the edge over Kabba and his Government and asked for talks to take place under the auspices of the OAU Chairman, President Blais Campore. This on the grounds that it was in effect ECOWAS that had been fighting us and thus no troop contributing Member State could impartially host such talks. This basic premise for moving us to the table was eagerly accepted by MR Francis Okello, MR Moses Anafu of the Commonwealth Secretariat and even the Government of President Kabba.

After the initial joy of hearing your voice on set for the first time in a long time, military instincts alerted me that you were under duress and that slowly the Kabba Government would use you to diffuse the explosive state of affairs and move us from our position of strength and seek to move the Talks from our neutral ground of choice.

In my opinion this would not only cause us to loose our military edge but would have put your life in danger.

In view of this, I took the painful but necessary step of instructing all Signal Stations to monitor but not to respond to 'on air' calls from the Leader explaining to all the reasons for such an order.

In due cause, as a result of violations of this same order, the talks were moved from Bokina Fasso to Lome.

THE MILITARY FRONT

On the Military Front, the ground has not only remained intact but huge gains were made against the enemy.

As mentioned earlier in my report, four mechanized battalions of the Nigerian Army were raised at Kono resulting in the capture of a wide

assortment of arms and ammunition as well as armored cars. War-tanks were also captured and burnt.

We successfully took the war from Kailahun to Freetown, putting military pressure on the SLPP Government and the International Community to effect your release.

Huge amounts of arms and ammunitions were also captured by Brigadier Issa from the Guineans including a 40 Barrel Missile and its bombs. The overall G-4 Commander is in place to report on all materials captured and on stock at hand.

Within the Military Structure of the RUF , promotions were encouraged as the only due reward for Military accomplishments.

There was widespread recruiting and training of combatants to provide a beefed-up fighting force.

The Medical unit has been enhanced with regular supply of drugs and dressing materials and the infusion of new talent has resulted in an efficient unit that now handles complex gynecological cases and performs Hernia and Appendix operations to both soldiers and civilians.

A Tanks and Armored Division has been established within the Artillery Unit to utilize captured equipment from the enemy.

Daru Barracks remains under siege with Iron-Gate defensives on all approaches to the Township.

NOTE See appendix 1 for Military Structure.

THE POLITICAL FRONT

Our move to capture Kono earned marked gains for the RUF in the political front. The International Press was effectively used to educate the world as to the aims and objectives of the RUF.

The Government of Tejan Kabba was forced to negotiate with us, a move they had consistently refused to make, vowing instead to execute the Leader and flush the RUF out of Sierra Leone.

The UN and other International Organizations were also forced to talk to us.

After much Military pressure from us and diplomatic pressure from the on-looking world, the Leader was released to Togo where along with a

delegation from within the RUF on the ground in Sierra Leone a Peace Agreement was reached between the RUF and the SLPP Government.

CIVILIANS AND NON-MILITARY ISSUES

Knowing the love and respect that the Leader has for civilians, I have ensured that the status of civilians and in particular civilians behind RUF Lines has never been compromised.

They are still represented on the War Council and continue to enjoy full rights and privileges.

A Free Primary School System was launched in the Kailahun District to address the educational needs of our children. This program has been a huge success and has spread to other Districts.

The RUF and civilians behind its Lines have maintained a program of self-sufficiency and have recorded the highest production ever of rice, palm-oil and produce.

Proceeds from the sale of Agricultural Produce was used to provide much needed rations and materials for soldiers and civilians alike.

With the diamond rich ground of Kono under our control a mining unit was setup headed by Lt. Col. Kennedy who is in place to give account of all proceeds from mining operations.

Sir, I most respectfully ask you to look into the numerous complaints of both Gibril and Superman. From the execution of Vanguard in Pujehun to the killing of the bodyguards of Colonel Mohamed Tarawallie, on to the killing of Colonel Boston Flomoh (Rambo), this terrible duo have reeked havoc on the RUF. They continue to flaunt my orders and have extended the same acts of gross insubordination to the Leader.

I hasten to remind you Sir that whilst I along with Brig Issa and other loyal forces have always obeyed your orders to the letter, this duo have rejected your orders and challenged the authority of the Leader and his Military High Command.


The actions of Gibril and Superman has gone great lengths to worsen the relationship between the RUF and the SLA by the indiscriminate killing of SLA soldiers during their attacks on the RUF High Command and in their bids to capture ground, and by inciting SLA soldiers against my command. The setbacks resulting in the actions of this duo are magnanimous and have far reaching consequences.

I must also mention Sir, that all troops loyal to the Leader and the High Command of the RUF are in full readiness to take Military action against Gibril and Superman and have only halted their action to await your arrival and handling of this situation.

Sir, having obeyed all instructions given by you to me and after diligently working to maintain the ground at all cost, I will not be pacified unless just

and appropriate military action is taken by you. I along with a vast majority of our troops have borne the brunt of abuse and molestation, sabotage and cold-blooded murder, all in an effort to maintain the ground as per your instructions. Now that you are back and in full control of the RUF we anxiously await a speedy resolution of this problem.

Most Respectfully yours,



MAJOR GENERAL SAM BOCKARIE.
RUF S/L

N/S

See above report with section upon your arrival on the ground.

3) Leadership Memo

Memo to 'The Leader' from 'The Black Revolutionary Guards'
18 October 1999

**REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT – SIERRA LEONE
(RUF/SL)**

To The Leader of the Revolution

From The Black Guard Commander

Subj. **SITUATION REPORT**

Date 18th October, 1999

The Leader Sir,

I want this to claim your official attention that, the Black Guard Commander at Makeni in the person of Jackson Jakema sent a comprehensive report of situation at Makeni with reference to the skirmish between the RUF and SLA brothers. Below are as follows:-

1. On the 14th October, 1999, Brigadier I. H. Sesay and his convoy entered the Township of Makeni at about 13:00 to 14:00 hours in the afternoon. Likewise, Brigadier Superman entered from Lunsar.
2. Brigadier Superman on the 15th October, 1999, held a short meeting with the F.T.S. Heads. In the meeting, agenda lamented was to put the problem causers under control.
3. At about 15:00 – 16:00 hours, Brigadier Superman started arresting the problem causers. During this process, the SLA brothers started firing against the RUF brothers which resulted in battle between the mighty RUF and the remnants of the AFRC (SLA) problem causers. During the battle, Brigadier I. H. Sesay, fully supported by reinforcements in the form of Brigadier Superman was able to put the problem causers under complete control.
4. On the same 15th October, 1999, the two authorities were to meet face to face. But it never happened. Only the combatants were interacting with each other.

5. On the 17th October, 1999, the Black Guards wrote some observations and suggestions to the authorities. Below are as follows:-
- a. To extend defences as far as Kamrabai where the trouble-causers Commander (Brigadier Mani) is based.
 - b. To facilitate cordial relationship between the Senior Officers and the combatants as the combatants are all looking up to them to accomplish the mission.
6. For now, there is no SLA Commander in Makeni Township and its axis. Situation is under control. You only need to advise the two (2) authorities for cordial relationship so as to enhance strong security.

With much regards to you, Sir.

Obediently Submitted,

Signed:

Jackson Swarray (Major)
BLACK GUARD COMMANDER

4) Nominal Roll of Trained Personnel (RUF/SL) marked "Retricted"

List of thirty RUF/SL conscripts with associated RUF/AFRC commanders.

RESTRICTED

**REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT - SIERRA LEONE
(RUF/SL)**

NOMINAL ROLL OF TRAINED RUF PERSONNEL

S/No.	RANK	NAME	BASE TRAINED	NAME OF TRAINING COMMANDANT	YEAR TRAINED	WHERE/WHEN CAPTURED	REMARKS
1	Capt.	J. T. Bayoh	Mattru	Capt. Monica P./Lt. Tom Sandi	1995	Rutile Plant Site - 18th Jan. 1995	Trained
2	RSM	Lamin Bangura	Luawa, Kailahun	C.O. A. Gbundema	1993	Matol, By Mile 91, Yoni Chiefdom - 1993	Trained
3	S/Sgt.	Mohamed Mansaray	Bunumbu	Captain Monica Pearson	1998	Nyandehun, Boyama - 1997	Trained
4	S/Sgt.	Alusine Koroma	Bayama	C.O. Ja-Goray	1992	Koidu Town, Kono - 1992	Trained
5	Sgt.	Brima Aruna	Luawa, Kailahun	C.O. Venson	1991	Kailahun, Luawa - 1991	Trained
6	Sgt.	John A. Fangawa	Kangari Hills, North Jungle	C.O. Venson	Apr-94	Komboma, Wando Chiefdom - 1994	Trained
7	Sgt.	Senesie Musa	Bayama	C.O. Kailondo	May-92	Luawa, Kailahun - 1992	Trained
8	Sgt.	Augustine Samai	Pendembu	C.O. A. Koker	1991	Sandialu, Kailahun District - 1991	Trained
9	Sgt.	Swarray Boima	Bewala	C.O. Kooper	Mar-91	Jojoima - 1991	Trained
10	Cpl.	Omaru Sow	Jui-Koya	C.O. Momoh Rogers	1994	Upper Sama Lugbu, Bo - 1994	Trained
11	Cpl.	Nyuma Lebbie	Luawa, Kailahun	C.O. Venson/C.O. Rashid	1995	Serabu - 1995	Trained
12	Cpl.	Sylvester Labor	Kangari Hills, North Jungle	C.O. Venson/C.O. Rashid	1995	Serabu - 1995	Trained
13	Cpl.	Tejan S. Kamara	Kono	Lt.Col. Monica	1998	Makeni - 1998	Trained
14	Cpl.	Isaac Barthelomew	Kangari Hills, North Jungle	C.O. Venson/C.O. Rashid	1995	Gbatobu, Lugbu, Bo District - 1995	Trained
15	L/Cpl.	Daniel Morger	Camp Lion	C.O. DDR	1992	Mile 91 - 1992	Trained
16	L/Cpl.	Ibrahim Kabbia	Kabora, Kabala	C.O. Rambo	1997	Magburaka - 1996	Trained
17	Pte.	Foday Mansaray	Camp Lion	C.O. Nya	Apr-91	Bo Mosaba, Pujehun - 1991	Trained
18	Pte.	Abu Bakarr Kallon	Camp Lion	C.o. Manawa	1995	Konia Kpenema, L/Bambara C/om, Kenema Dist. - 1995	Trained
19	Pte.	Joe Farina	Bayama	Lt. Tom Sandi	1996	Yamandu Station - 1996	Trained
20	Pte.	Gibrilla Sankoh	Pendembu	C.O. A. Koker/C.O. Centra	May-91	Pendembu - May 1991	Trained
21	Pte.	John Forna	Koidu Town, Kono	Tension Man/Col. I. Sesay	Oct-97	Koidu Town, Kono - 1997	Trained
22	Pte.	Sahr Kainesie	Koinadugu, Kabala	Col. M. S. Kallon	Mar-98	Koidu Town, Kono - 1998	Trained
23	Pte.	Sorie Bangura	Kabala	Major Rambo	1997	Rokupr - 1997	Trained - SLA
24	Pte.	James Tamba	Pendembu	C.O. Centra	1991	Pendembu - 1991	Trained
25	Pte.	Allie Conteh	Yengema	Lt. P. Mattia/Pato-Pato	1999	Bendugu, Koinadugu District - 1999	Trained
26	Pte.	Sheku Kargbo	Mongo	C.O. Amara Gbundema	1998	Madina, Kambia District - 1998	Trained
27	Pte.	Jusu Sonie	Jui-Koya	Lt. Basiru Sheriff (Moyepe)	1994	Nyandehun, Nyama - 1994	Trained
28	Pte.	Mohamed Kaloko	Mattru	Lt. Tom Sandi/C.O. Monica	1995	Pujehun Area - 1995	Trained
29	Pte.	Alfred Bangura	Waterloo	Capt. Amara Peneto	1999	Waterloo - 1998	Trained
30	Pte.	Sahr Lamin	Korboia, Kabala	C.O. Alabama (SLA)	1998	Fanda, Kono - 1998	Trained - SLA

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REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT - SIERRA LEONE (RUF/SL)

NOMINAL ROLL OF TRAINED RUF PERSONNEL

S/No.	RANK	NAME	BASE	YEAR
1	Capt.	J. F. Bayoh	Mattru	1995
2	RSM	Lamin Bangura	Kailahun	1993
3	S/Sgt.	Mohamed Mansaray	Bunumbu	1997
4	S/Sgt.	Alusine Koroma	Bayama	1992
5	Sgt.	Brima Aruna	Kailahun	1991
6	Sgt.	John A. Fangawa	Kangari Hills - North	1994
7	Sgt.	Senesie Musa	Bayama	1992
8	Sgt.	Augustine Samai	Pendembu	1991
9	Sgt.	Swarray Boima	Bewala	1991
10	Cpl.	Omaru Sow	Jui-Koya	1994
11	Cpl.	Nyuma Lebbie	Kailahun	1991
12	Cpl.	Sylvester Labor	Kangari Hills - North	1995
13	Cpl.	Tejan S. Kamara	Kailahun	1991
14	Cpl.	Isaac Barthelomew	Kangari Hills - North	1995
15	L/Cpl.	Daniel Morgan	Camp Lion	1992
16	L/Cpl.	Ibrahim Kabbia	Korbora - Kabala	1996
17	Pte.	Foday Mansaray	Camp Lion	1991
18	Pte.	Abu Bakarr Kallon	Camp Lion	1995
19	Pte.	Joe Farma	Bayama	1996
20	Pte.	Gibrilla Sankoh	Pendembu	1991
21	Pte.	John Forna	Kono	1997
22	Pte.	Sahr Kainessie	Kabala	1998
23	Pte.	Sorie Bangura (SLA)	Kabala	1997
24	Pte.	James Tamba	Pendembu	1991
25	Pte.	Allie Conteh	Yengema - Kono	1999
26	Pte.	Sheku Kargbo	Mongo	1998
27	Pte.	Jusu Sonie	Jui-Koya	1994
28	Pte.	Mohamed Kaloko	Mattru	1995
29	Pte.	Alfred Bangura	Waterloo	1999
30	Pte.	Sahr Lamin	Kabala	1998

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(3)

**REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT - SIERRA LEONE
(RUF/SL)**

NOMINAL ROLL OF R.U.F. PERSONNEL CLASSIFIED
AS PRISONERS OF WAR (P.O.W.) BY ECOMOG
WHO WERE RELEASED ON THE 14TH AUGUST, 1999
TAKEN TO MAMMY YOKO AND THEN TO LUNGI - D.D.R.PROG.

No.	RANK	NAME	BASE TRAINED	NAME OF TRAINING COMMANDER	YEAR TRAINED	WHERE AND WHEN CAPTURED	REMARKS
1	Pte.	Hassan Gbla	Nil	Nil	Nil	Boajubu in 1993; Escaped and recaptured in 1999	Classed as P.O.W. Amnesty
2	Pte.	John B. Mansaray	Nil	Nil	Nil	Portee, Freetown on 8th February, 1999	Classified as P.O.W. by Ecomog. Released on 14th Aug.99 by Amnesty
3	Pte.	Ibrahim Kamara	Nil	Nil	Nil	Wellington in February, 1999	Classified as P.O.W. by Ecomog. Released on 14th Aug.99 by Amnesty
4	Pte.	Mustapha Turay	Nil	Nil	Nil	Kasse on 15th February, 1999	Classified as P.O.W. by Ecomog. Released on 14th Aug.99 by Amnesty
5	Pte.	Musa Mansaray	Nil	Nil	Nil	5 Green Street, Freetown in February, 1999	Classified as P.O.W. by Ecomog. Released on 14th Aug.99 by Amnesty
6	Pte.	Yera Marah	Nil	Nil	Nil	Tengbeh Town, Freetown in January, 1999	Classified as P.O.W. by Ecomog. Released on 14th Aug.99 by Amnesty
7	Pte.	Augustine Koroma	Nil	Nil	Nil	Dan Street, Freetown in January, 1999	Classified as P.O.W. by Ecomog. Released on 14th Aug.99 by Amnesty
8	Pte.	Samuel Ngegba	Nil	Nil	Nil		
9	Pte.	Ibrahim Mansaray	Nil	Nil	Nil	Mile Siaka on April, 1999	Classified as P.O.W. by Ecomog. Released on 14th Aug.99 by Amnesty
10	Pte.	Boboh Monya	Nil	Nil	Nil	Daru in 1991	UNTRAINED - He is in an abnormal state.
11	Pte.	Yusuf Cham	Nil	Nil	Nil	Waterloo on January, 1999	UNTRAINED
12	Pte.	Miss Veronica Kamara	Nil	Nil	Nil	Koidu Town, Kono on December, 1998	UNTRAINED
13	RSM	Abdul Kamara	Nil	Nil	Nil	Matotoka in 1993	UNTRAINED
14	Pte.	Olunfe A. Pelu	Nil	Nil	Nil	Ngandorhun, Kono in 1999	UNTRAINED
15	Pte.	Joseph M. Jalloh	Nil	Nil	Nil	Lunsar in 1998	UNTRAINED

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REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT - SIERRA LEONE (RUF/SL)

UNTRAINED R.U.F. PERSONNEL NOMINAL ROLL
CAPTURED BY ECOMOG PERSONNEL AND
CLASSIFIED AS P.O.W. THEN
RELEASED ON 14th OCTOBER 1999 ON AMNESTY

S/No.	RANK	NAME	REMARKS
1	Pte.	Hassan Gbla	Captured in Freetown and other places in Sierra Leone by ECOMOG Personnel, jailed and classified as P.O.W. Released on the 14th August, 1999 and taken to Mammy Yoko Hotel and later on the 14th September, 1999 taken to Lungi Garrison Barracks to undergo the DDR Programme
2	Pte.	John B. Mansaray	
3	Pte.	Ibrahim Kamara	
4	Pte.	Mustapha Turay	
5	Pte.	Musa Mansaray	
6	Pte.	Yera Marah	
7	Pte.	Augustine Koroma	
8	Pte.	Samuel Ngegba	
9	Pte.	Ibrahim Mansaray	
10	Pte.	Boboh Monya	Captured at Daru in 1991. Not trained. He is presently abnormal.
11	Pte.	Yusuf Cham	Captured at Waterloo. Not trained.
12	Pte.	Miss Veronica Kamara	Captured at Koidu, Kono in December, 1998
13	RSM	Abdul Kamara	Captured at Daru in 1993. Untrained.
14	Pte.	Olunfe A. Pelu	Alleged to be trained as RUF. His revelation is unbelievable. His story is yet to be investigated.
15	Pte.	Joseph M. Jalloh	Captured at Lunsar in 1998. Untrained.

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT - SIERRA LEONE

(RUF/SL)

TRAINED RUF/AFRC/SLA CHILD COMBATANTS AT LUNGI

S/No.	RANK	NAME	BASE TRAINED	NAME OF TRAINING COMMANDANT	YEAR TRAINED	WHERE/WHEN CAPTURED	REMARKS
1	Sgt.	Allie Brima	Pendembu	Alysious Koker	May-91	Pendembu - 1991	Trained - RUF
2	Pte.	Boboh Brima	Jui-Koya	C.O. Rashid	1994	Komboma - 1994	Trained - RUF
3	Pte.	Foday Koroma	Feradugu	C.O. Thompy-Lala	1998	Lunsar - 1998	Trained - RUF
4	Pte.	Justine Wilson	Rosos	C.O. Ranger (SLA)	1997	Waterloo - 1997	Trained - SLA
5	Pte.	Kassim Conteh	Camp Lion	C.O. Monica	1997	Makeni Town - 1997	Trained - RUF
6	Pte.	Hassan Bah	Barri Potoru	Lt. George	1997	Bandajuma Sowa - 1997	Trained - SLA
7	Pte.	Ansumana Pay	Lunsar	Lt. Alabama (SLA)	1997	Lunsar - 1997	Trained - SLA
8	Pte.	Lamin Sankoh	Camp Lion	Camp Lion	1997	Magburuka - 1997	Trained - RUF
9	Pte.	Philip Wabber	Koinadugu, Kabala	CSM Munu	1997	Makeni - 1997	Trained - SLA
10	Pte.	David Peeler	Nil	Nil	1997	Koidu Town, Kono - 1997	Untrained
11	Pte.	Thaimu Fofana	Koidu, Kono	Sgt. S. A. Junior (SLA)	1998	Koidu Town, Kono - 1998	Trained - SLA
12	Pte.	Mustapha Kargbo	Camp Rosos, Batkanu	C.O. Jaja (SLA)	1998	Kpendembu, Kalangba Chiefdom - 1998	Trained - SLA
13	Pte.	Frederick Mansaray	Lunsar	Lt. Alabama (SLA)	1999	Waterloo - 1999	Trained - SLA
14	Pte.	Adikalie Kamara	Gbera-Bana	RSM Kalawa (SLA)	1999	Kambia - 1999	Trained - SLA
15	Pte.	Ansumana Jawara	Yengema, Kono	Capt. Mandele (SLA)	1999	Sembalia, Kabala - 1999	Trained - SLA
16	Pte.	Sullay Kamara	Nil	Nil	1999	Lunsar - 1999	Untrained - SLA
17	Pte.	Murray Kakpa	Okro Hills	Sgt. Bobby (SLA)	1999	Okro Hills - 1999	Trained - SLA

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**REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT - SIERRA LEONE
(RUF/SL)**

**NOMINAL ROLL OF TRAINED RUF/SL
AFRC/SLA CHILD COMBATANTS**

S/No.	RANK	NAME	REMARKS
1	Sgt.	Allie Brima	RUF Trained - 1991
2	Pte.	Boboh Brima	RUF Trained - 1994
3	Pte.	Foday Koroma	RUF Trained - 1998
4	Pte.	Justine Wilson	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1997
5	Pte.	Kassim Conteh	RUF Trained - 1997
6	Pte.	Hassan Bah	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1997
7	Pte.	Ansumana Pay	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1997
8	Pte.	Lamin Sankoh	RUF Trained - 1997
9	Pte.	Philip Wabber	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1997
10	Pte.	David Peeler	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1997
11	Pte.	Thaimu Fofana	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1998
12	Pte.	Mustapha Kargbo	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1998
13	Pte.	Frederick Mansaray	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1999
14	Pte.	Adikalie Kamara	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1999
15	Pte.	Ansumana Jawara	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1999
16	Pte.	Sullay Kamara	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1999
17	Pte.	Murray Kakpa	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1999
18	Pte.	Joseph M. Jalloh	AFRC/SLA Trained - 1998

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5) Diamond Production Records

Stage II Kono Production
02-03-99 to 11-1-2000

Date	received From	No. of Pieces	Goratage	Percentage	Col
02-03-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	3	1	05 %	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Forday	1	-	39 %	White
✓ ✓ -	Komba Buah	2	-	05 %	Mix
03-08-99	Kai Forday	3	1	24 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	5	-	72 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohammed S. Conteh	5	2	04 %	"
04-08-99	Kai Forday	1	-	15 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	3	-	95 %	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohammed S. Conteh	1	1	36 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	10	3	28 %	Mix
05-08-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	1	9	74 %	Other
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	16	5	65 %	Mix
✓ ✓ -	Komba Buah	1	-	04 %	indus
07-08-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	1	1	19 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	18	4	60 %	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	4	-	50 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Forday	2	-	33 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Saw Bochorie	1	-	42 %	White

Grand total of diamonds = 78 pieces ✓

7-8-99 Grand goratage of Whites = 26 gorat 95 %

Grand goratage of industrial = 7 gorat 17 %

Staged Koro Production 2395

Date	received From	No of Pieces	Garatage	Percentage	Color
08-08-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	7	3	36 %	White
08-08-99	Saidu Sam (Tefeya production)	1	1	52 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	47 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	2	70 %	industria
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	14	8 5	80 %	Mix
	Tefeya total and garatage =	17	11	49 %	
	" " Gold weighed		8 GM		
09-08-99	Kombu Buah	2	—	13 %	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohammed S. Conteh	1	3	—	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	28 %	industria
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	13	2	72 %	Mix
10-08-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	15	8	54 %	Mix
11-08-99	Sam Bocharie	1	—	46 %	orange
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohammed S. Conteh	1	2	80 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	11	4	20 %	Mix
12-08-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	9	2	40 %	"
14-08-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	1	3	28 %	Coffe
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	9	3	85 %	Mix

Date	received From	NO: of Pieces	Geatage	Percentage	Color
16-08-99	Sam Bockarie	1	—	14 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	7	—	indist
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	3	74 %	orange
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	2	62 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	10	4	—	"
18-08-99	Sam Bockarie	2	—	88 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	8	1	95 %	Mi
19-08-99	Tamba Korobay	1	4	15 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	5	1	75 %	Mi
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	3	05 %	indist
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	11	3	05 %	Mi
21-08-99	Tamba Korobay	4	—	90 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	2	—	40 %	"
23-08-99	Tamba Korobay	6	1	60 %	"
24-08-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	—	42 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Tamba Korobay	5	—	80 %	Mi
25-08-99	Sam Bockarie	3	—	78 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	2	—	88 %	"
26-08-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	—	28 %	indist
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	4	—	75 %	Mi
28-08-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	—	27 %	orange

Date	Received From	No. of Pieces	Caratage	Percentage	Color
30-08-99	Sam Bockarie	1	-	05%	Industrial
31-08-99	Sam Bockarie	1	-	13%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	3	1	05%	Mix
01-09-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	3	-	46%	"
02-09-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	3	-	76%	"
04-09-99	Sam Bockarie	3	-	20%	"
07-09-99	Kai Foday	1	-	05%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	3	40%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ -	1	1	38%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	10	2	58%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Tamba Koro boy	1	6	70%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	1	5	42%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	1	3	26%	Orange
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	23	7	32%	Mix

8-9-99 Ground total and caratage of White = 81 pieces 54 carat 78
 total and weight of Colored and industrial = 131 pieces = 66.6

Ground total of diamond = 212 pieces

Caravel total weight of Gold = 8 gram (22)

Stage 13 Kono production

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Date	received From	No. of Pieces	Grantage	Percentage	Color
08-09-99	Kai Foday	4	—	88 %	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Tamba Konoboy	5	—	76 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S. Conteh	11	2	20 %	"
09-09-99	Tamba Konoboy	3	—	92 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	2	—	30 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S. Conteh	14	3	55 %	"
10-09-99	Tamba Konoboy	3	—	50	
11-09-99	Foundling diamond	1	—	08 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	1	—	05 %	Coffe
✓ ✓ ✓	Tamba Konoboy	3	—	50 %	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S. Conteh	12	4	06 %	"
13-09-99	Tamba Konoboy	3	—	35 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S. Conteh	11	5	95 %	Mix
14-09-99	Kai Foday	4	4	58 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S. Conteh	1	1	52 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	—	10	2	30 %	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	—	1	—	22 %	Coffe
15-09-99	Tamba Konoboy	7	1	—	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	1	—	22 %	includ
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S. Conteh	9	2	75 %	Mix

Date	received From	No. of Pieces	Carat	Percentage	Color
16-09-99	Tamba Kono boy	1	4	27%	orange
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	2	—	26%	indust.
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	1	—	08%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohammed S. Conteh	1	8	15%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	3	1	02%	Mix
18-9-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	6	1	78%	White
20-9-99	Sam Bockarie	1	2	96%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohammed S. Conteh	4	2	34%	Mix
21-9-99	Kai Foday	2	—	25%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohammed S. Conteh	5	1	60%	"
22-9-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	2	—	20%	"
23-9-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	3	—	80%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	1	10	40%	orange
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	1	—	15%	"
25-9-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	1	—	10%	White
27-9-99	Sam Bockarie	1	1	08%	"
28-9-99	Sam Bockarie	1	0	24%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohammed S. Conteh	1	—	75%	"
29-9-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	4	1	40%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	3	—	75%	Mi.

Date	Received From	No of Pieces	Carat	Percentage	Color
30-9-99	Kari Forlay	1	—	40%	Coffe
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Corteh	3	1	20%	White
02-10-99	Mohamed S' Corteh	7	1	68%	"
04-10-99	Mohamed S' Corteh	5	3	12%	"
05-10-99	Mohamed S' Corteh	3	—	52%	indust.
06-10-99	Sam Bockarie	1	5	75%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	—	06%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Corteh	3	—	68%	White
07-10-99	Mohamed S' Corteh	8	3	75%	"
09-10-99	Mohamed S' Corteh	2	—	90%	indust.
11-10-99	Grand total and percentage of diamond 5 pieces of Whites and total caratage = 19 : 40% 2 pieces of Orange and total caratage = 14 : 72% 14 pieces of Whites and total caratage = 8 : 10% 162 pieces of industrials and total caratage = 61 : 40%				

11-10-99	Mohamed S' Corteh	4	2	11%	White
12-10-99	Mohamed S' Corteh	1	—	28%	indust.
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	1	—	34%	"
13-10-99	Mohamed S' Corteh	2	—	64%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	1	—	15	"

Date	received From	No of Pieces	Carat	Percentage	Color
14-10-99	Sam Bockarie	1	5	33%	Coffee
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	-	25%	indust.
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	2	20%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	7	2	33%	Mix
16-10-99	Ground total of diamond = 19 pieces				
	Ground total caratage = 13 Carat 63% ind.				
<u>Stage 14 Kono Production</u>					

Date	received From	No of Pieces	Caratage	Percentage	Color
16-10-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	2	1	-	indust.
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	2	-	30%	"
18-10-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	4	6	28%	"
14-10-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	3	45%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	20%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	4	2	55%	indust.
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	1	-	25%	"
20-10-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	1	20%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	3	2	70%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bockarie	1	-	60%	Coffee
21-10-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	1	-	23%	indust.
23-10-99	Mohamed S' Conteh	3	1	03%	"
28-10-99	Sam Bockarie	1	-	10	"

Date	Received From	No. of Pieces	Gross Weight	Percentage	Color
02-11-99	Combatant 2 nd Bde	6	1	40%	indust.
02-11-99	Sami Beckharic	2	—	45%	"
08-11-99	Steven Mangyah	1	1	10%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	3	—	50%	indust.
✓ ✓ ✓	Sami Beckharic	1	—	30%	"
09-11-99	Steven Mangyah	5	1	70%	"
10-11-99	Steven Mangyah	1	1	40%	White
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	5	3	80%	indust.
11-11-99	Steven Mangyah	4	—	50%	"
16/11/99	Ground total and weight of diamonds 14 pieces of Whites weighed 17 grams 87% 36 pieces of industrials weighed 12 grams 95%				

Stage 15 Kono production

Date	No. of Pieces	Gross Weight	Percentage	Color
25/12/99	12 pieces	4	20%	Mix
29/12/99	6	3	54%	"
30-12-99	10	5	04%	"
31-12-99	22	17	54%	"
1-1-2000	16	5	25%	"

Date	No. of Pieces	Garbage	Percentage	Color
02-01-2000	11 pieces	4	07 %	Mix
03-01-2000	18	17	42 %	"
04-01-2000	36	19	97 %	"
✓ ✓ ✓	1	3	70 %	White
05-01-2000	20	10	45 %	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	1	14	66 %	White
06-01-2000	7	3	45 %	Mix
07-01-2000	9	3	60 %	"
08-01-2000	6	1	80 %	"
10-01-2000	3	1	08 %	indust
✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	61 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	1	14	85 %	indust
11-01-2000	1	7	93 %	White
✓ ✓ ✓	15	4	28 %	Mix


Start Date	End Date	No of Pieces (Diamond)	Grav
20-8-99	8-8-99	1562	2394
9-8-99	15-8-99	301	8 Gram
16-09-99	30-09-99	48	
02-10-99	28-10-99	17	
00-11-99	16-11-99	58	
08-12-99	31-12-99	32	
1-1-2000	11-1-2000	146	

2134

6) RUF Mining Units Record Book

Tables of Areas and Diamond Mining Stages

RELIGIOUS



COMPOSITION

BOOK

NAME *Capt. Joseph K. ...*

SCHOOL *... ..*

CLASS *... ..*

SUBJECT *... ..* YEAR *...*

24 PAGES

Stage 1 Karaman production

Date	received	from	No of Pieces	Garbage	Percentage	Colors
30-10-98	Abdul	Koroma	1	—	75%	White
31-10-98	Abdul	Koroma	1	—	35%	White
31-10-98	Abduraman	Kamara	1	—	65%	White
03-11-98	Abduraman	Kamara	1	—	70%	White
02-12-98	Tamba	Yilla	1	—	70%	White

Stage 2 Kono production

14-12-98	Mimmers	11 (eleven)	pieces of diamonds
20-12-98	"	21 (Twenty-one)	pieces of diamonds
21-12-98	"	11 (eleven)	pieces of diamonds
22-12-98	"	6 (Six)	pieces of diamonds
23-12-98	"	9 (nine)	pieces of diamonds
24-12-98	"	36 (Thirty-six)	pieces of diamonds
26-12-98	"	6 (Six)	pieces of diamonds
27-12-98	"	3 (Three)	pieces of diamonds
28-12-98	"	13 (Thirteen)	pieces of diamonds
29-12-98	"	10 (Ten)	pieces of diamonds
30-12-98	"	10 (Ten)	pieces of diamond
31-12-98	"	1 (One)	pieces of diamonds
02-01-99	"	2 (Two)	pieces of diamonds
03-01-99	"	2 (Two)	pieces of diamonds
04-01-99	"	1 (one)	pieces of diamond

Size from	No of Pieces	Date	received from	No of pieces	Size
Mimmers	8 (eight)	11-01-99	Mimmers	11 (eleven)	pieces of diamonds
"	9 (nine)	13-01-99	"	3 (Three)	pieces of diamonds
"	20 (Twenty)	14-01-99	"	24 (Twentyfour)	pieces of diamonds
"	8 (eight)	16-01-99	"	2 (Two)	pieces of diamonds
"	22 (Twenty-two)	19-01-99	"	1 (One)	pieces of diamonds
A white	1 (one)	20-01-99	"	2 (Two)	pieces of diamonds
100 wch production	14 (fourteen)	21-01-99	"	65 (Sixty-five)	pieces of diamonds
total and weight of diamonds weighed on the 9 th	pieces of diamonds	23-01-99	"	46 (forty-six)	pieces of diamonds
4 January	1999 = 198 pieces weighed 77 carat 20%	24-01-99	"	8 (eight)	pieces of diamonds
total of whites = 87 pieces weighed 22 carat 50%		25-01-99	"	19 (nineteen)	pieces of diamonds
total of industrials = 108 pieces weighed 25 carat 30%		26-01-99	"	12 (Twelve)	pieces of diamonds
big orange diamond = 1 piece weighed 17 carat 45%		27-01-99	"	21 (Twentyone)	pieces of diamonds
" = 1 "	8 carat 15%	28-01-99	"	49 (forty-nine)	pieces of diamonds
" = 1 "	3 carat 80%	30-01-99	"	51 (fifty-one)	pieces of diamonds
total of whites = 15 pieces weighed 5 carat 70%		31-01-99	"	58 (fifty-eight)	pieces of diamonds
total of industrials = 7 "	3 carat 55%	23-01-99	"	9 (nine)	pieces of diamonds
total of diamonds = 22 pieces "	9 • 25% ¹⁵⁰	01-02-99	"	78 (forty-eight)	pieces of diamonds
Grand total of diamonds = 220 pieces weighed 86 carat 45%		02-02-99	"	26 (Twenty-six)	pieces of diamonds
Combatant		07-02-99	"	17 (Seventeen)	pieces of diamonds
Production	= 5 pieces weighed 55% (Coffee Colour)	08-02-99	"	19 (nineteen)	pieces of diamonds
	(0.55%)	09-02-99	"	22 (Twenty-two)	pieces of diamonds

Stage 4 Tonga field production

<u>Date</u>	<u>received from</u>	<u>NO. of Pieces</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>received from</u>	<u>NO. of Pieces</u>
0-02-99	Mimmers	62 (Sixty-two) pieces of diamonds	24-2-99	Col. AKim	7 (seven) pieces of dia
3-02-99	"	64 (Sixty-four) pieces of diamonds	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓	1 (one) piece of dia
4-02-99	"	22 (Twenty-two) pieces of diamonds	27-02-99	Mimmers	8 (eight) pieces of dia
5-2-99	"	53 (fifty-three) pieces of diamonds	28-02-99	"	19 (nineteen) pieces of dia
6-02-99	"	44 (fourty-four) pieces of diamonds	01-03-99	"	16 (Sixteen) pieces of dia
7-02-99	"	84 (eighty-four) pieces of diamonds	02-03-99	"	20 (Twenty) pieces of dia
8-02-99	"	48 (fourty-eight) pieces of diamonds	03-03-99	"	14 (fourteen) pieces of dia
0-02-99	"	24 (Twenty-four) pieces of diamonds	04-03-99	"	19 (nineteen) pieces of dia
2-02-99	"	26 (twenty-six) pieces of diamonds	08-03-99	"	9 (nine) pieces of dia
3-02-99	"	28 (Twenty-eight) pieces of diamonds	10-03-99	"	11 (eleven) pieces of dia
4-02-99	"	26 (twenty six) pieces of diamonds	11-03-99	"	23 (Twentythree) pieces of dia
5-02-99	"	10 (Ten) pieces of diamonds	13-03-99	"	18 (eighteen) pieces of dia
7-02-99	"	37 (Thirty-seven) pieces of diamonds	15-03-99	"	10 (ten) pieces of dia
1-03-99	"	10 (Ten) pieces of diamonds	16-03-99	"	3 (Three) pieces of dia
1-03-99	"	18 (eighteen) pieces of diamonds	17-03-99	"	21 (Twenty one) pieces of dia
3-03-99	"	23 (Twenty-three) pieces of diamonds	18-03-99	"	24 (Twenty-four) pieces of dia
4-03-99	"	124 (one hundred and twenty four) pieces of diamonds	20-03-99	"	22 (Twenty-two) pieces of dia
-3-99	Grand total and guarantee of whites = 401 pieces weighed = 974.80%		22-03-99	"	3 (Three) pieces of dia
	Grand total and guarantee of industrial = 815 " " = 167.50%		23-03-99	"	2 (Two) pieces of dia
	Grand total of diamonds = 1216 pieces = 259.30%		25-03-99	"	3 (Three) pieces of dia
	Combatant production = 28 pieces = 6 carat 25% industrial		27-03-99	"	1 (One) piece of dia

Date	received from	No. of Pieces	Date	received from	No. of Pieces
0-03-99	Mimmers	4 (four)	11-03-99	Mimmers	14 (fourteen)
0-04-99	11	3 (Three)	13-03-99	11	29 (Twenty nine)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	16-03-99	11	3 (Three)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	17-03-99	11	80 (Eighty)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	17-03-99	11	110 (one hundred and ten)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	18-03-99	11	86 (Eighty Six)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	20-03-99	11	105 (one hundred and five)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	22-03-99	11	113 (one hundred and thirteen)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	24-03-99	11	82 (Eighty two)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	25-03-99	11	95 (ninety five)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	29-03-99	11	60 (Sixty)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	30-03-99	11	84 (Eighty four)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	31-03-99	11	66 (Sixty Six)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	01-04-99	11	68 (Sixty eight)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	03-04-99	11	61 (Sixty one)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	05-04-99	11	82 (Eighty two)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	06-04-99	11	13 (Thirteen)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	07-04-99	11	12 (Twelve)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	08-04-99	11	105 (one hundred and fifteen)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	09-04-99	11	156 (one hundred and fifty six)
0-04-99	11	1 (one)	12-04-99	11	42 (forty two)

Date	Received from	No. of Pieces	
1-04-99	Mimmers	20 (Twenty)	Pieces of diamonds
1-04-99	11	79 (Seventy nine)	Pieces of diamonds
1-04-99	11	43 (forty three)	Pieces of diamonds
1-04-99	11	91 (ninety one)	Pieces of diamonds
2-04-99	11	73 (Seventy three)	Pieces of diamonds
1-04-99	11	68 (Sixty eight)	Pieces of diamonds
1-04-99	11	76 (Seventy six)	Pieces of diamonds
4-04-99	11	73 (Seventy three)	Pieces of diamonds
5-04-99	found	25 (twenty five)	Pieces of diamonds
6-04-99	Mimmers	2 (two)	Pieces of diamonds
7-04-99	11	4 (four)	Pieces of diamonds
8-04-99	11	22 (twenty two)	Pieces of diamonds
9-04-99	11	22 (twenty two)	Pieces of diamonds
9-04-99	11	31 (Thirty one)	Pieces of diamonds
9-04-99	Kono total and weight of diamond = 2012 pieces = 4.05 gram 0.9%		
	total and weight of white = 700 " = 163 gram 7.4%		
	total and weight of industrial = 1312 " = 241 gram 3.5%		
✓	Tange field total and weight of diamonds = 252 pieces = 84.27%		
	total and weight of white = 166 pieces = 54.02%		
o	total and weight of industrial = 88 pieces = 30.25%		
✓	Comba total production = 12 pieces weight 1.25%		

Stage 5 Kono Production

2402

Date	received From	No. of Pairs	Garbage	Percentage	Colour
01-05-99	Mimmers	1	3	18%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	83	11	48%	Mix
03-05-99	✓ ✓ ✓	14	4	30%	
04-05-99	✓ ✓ ✓	11	4	95%	
05-05-99	✓ ✓ ✓	1	4	—	orange
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	50%	
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	30	5	50%	MIX
06-05-99	✓ ✓ ✓	15	3	30%	
08-05-99	✓ ✓ ✓	44	6	70%	
10-05-99	✓ ✓ ✓	1	6	88%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	30	7	35%	MIX
11-05-99	✓ ✓ ✓	31	5	50%	
12-05-99	✓ ✓ ✓	20	3	40%	
13-05-99	✓ ✓ ✓	45	13	37%	
15-05-99	✓ ✓ ✓	23	5	24%	
15-05-99	Targe production	39	13	70%	
17-05-99	Mimmers	47	6	16%	
18-05-99		55	6	95%	
19-05-99		43	6	30%	
19-05-99	founded	4	—	90%	
22-05-99	Mimmers	54	8	78%	

54

Stage 6 Kono production

Date	received from	No. of Pieces	Caratage	Percentage	Colour
07-06-99	Pa Kpakima	63	13	45%	Mix
08-06-99	Tambu Konoboy	1	9	10%	White
✓✓✓	✓	1	1	55%	"
✓✓✓	✓	43	12	80%	Mix
✓✓✓	Abu IdriSS	14	2	33%	"
✓✓✓	Bobby Rogers	3	—	20%	"
✓✓✓	Kou Foday	2	—	13%	"
✓✓✓	Sam Bochorie	1	—	12%	White
09-06-99	Sam Bochorie	4	—	50%	Mix
✓✓✓	Abu IdriSS	16	2	25%	"
✓✓✓	Bobby Rogers	1	—	40%	White
✓✓✓	Tambu Konoboy	20	7	20%	Mix
✓✓✓	Kou Foday	7	1	—	White

Grand total of diamonds = 176 pieces

9-6-99 Grand caratage of diamonds = 51 carat 50%
 total and caratage of all pieces = 54 pieces = 25 carat 20%
 total and caratage of industrials = 122 pieces = 26 carat 30%

Date	received From	No. of Pieces	Garatage	Percentage	Colour
24-05-99	Minners	40	5	6.0 %	Mix
25-05-99	✓✓✓	39	5	40 %	"
26-05-99	✓✓✓	1	2	15 %	White
✓✓✓	✓✓✓	36	4	75 %	Mix
27-05-99	✓✓✓	25	4	80 %	"
✓✓✓	found	1	—	44 %	Industrial
29-05-99	Minners	138	29	60 %	Mix
31-05-99	✓✓✓	205	42	20 %	"
01-06-99	✓✓✓	47	8	90 %	"
02-06-99	✓✓✓	49	11	65 %	"
03-06-99	✓✓✓	213	32	20 %	"
05-06-99	✓✓✓	1	1	89 %	White
✓✓✓	✓✓✓	1	1	70 %	"
✓✓✓	✓✓✓	103	19	30 %	Mix

07-06-99 Ground total of diamonds = 1495 pieces

Ground total garatage = 299 garat 50 %

total and garatage of whites = 470 pieces = 128 garat 90 %

total and garatage of industrials = 1005 pieces = 177 garat 18 %

Stage 7 Koror production

Date	Received from	No. of Pieces	Garat	Percentage	Colour
10-06-99	Abu Idriess	3	—	28%	Mix
✓ ✓ -	Tamba Korobay	12	4	15%	"
✓ ✓ -	Komba Buah	3	—	28%	"
12-06-99	Kai Mardoh	2	—	60%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Bobby Rogers	1	—	50%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	4	—	80%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Tamba Korobay	14	5	—	"
✓ - -	Abu Idriess	55	7	50%	"
✓ - -	Komba Buah	2	—	20%	"
14-06-99	Mirners	21	5	70%	"
15-06-99	✓ - ✓	33	4	—	"
16-06-99	Komba Buah	8	5	70%	"
✓ - -	Abu Idriess	23			
17-06-99	Ground total of diamonds = 182 pieces				
	Ground total garatage of diamonds = 31 garat 85%				
17-06-99	Kai Foday	1	8 ^{garat}	60%	White
✓ ✓ -	✓ - ✓	9	4	98%	Mix
✓ ✓ -	Abu Idriess	18	3	13%	"
✓ ✓ -	Bobby Rogers	1	—	05%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	6	—	90%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Ground total of diamonds = 35 pieces				
	Ground garatage of diamonds = 18 garat 11%				

Stage 2 nona rowmation

2406

Date	received from	no. of Pieces	Garbage	Percentage	Color
14-06-99	Foday Fulleh	1	5	10%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	80%	✓
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	8	7	24%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Abu IdriSS	6	1	68%	✓
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	10	1	10%	✓
20-06-99	Komba Buah	4	—	55%	✓
✓ ✓ ✓	Abu IdriSS	22	5	05%	✓
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	3	1	40%	✓
21-06-99	Komba Buah	12	2	15%	✓
✓ ✓ ✓	Abu IdriSS	11	1	40%	✓
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	1	—	25%	✓
22-06-99	Abu IdriSS	18	2	60%	✓
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	13	1	75%	✓
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	1	—	0.7%	industri
23-06-99	Abu IdriSS	16	3	10%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	2	—	32%	✓
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	7	1	12%	✓
24-06-99	Abu IdriSS	25	4	85%	✓
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Monde	1	—	85%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	1	—	0.7%	industri
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	4	—	66%	Mix

26-06-99 Ground total of White diamonds = 25 pieces
 ground total of weight of Whites = 13 carat 75%
 ground total of industrial diamonds = 152 pieces
 ground total caratage of industrials = 29 carat 75%
 ground total caratage = 43 carat 50%

Stage 9 Kono Production

Date	received From	No of Pieces	caratage	Percentage	Colour
26-06-99	Kai Foday	1	—	26%	industrial
✓✓✓	Komba Buah	5	1	15%	Mix
✓✓✓	Kai Mondeh	1	—	29%	industrial
✓✓✓	Abu Vandi	17	2	82%	Mix
27-06-99	Komba Buah	2	—	10%	"
✓✓✓	Abu Idriiss	15	2	30%	"
✓✓✓	Kai Monde	7	1	10%	"
28-06-99	Komba Buah	4	2	04%	"
✓✓✓✓	Kai Monde	1	1	—	White
✓✓✓	✓ —	3	—	80%	Mix
✓✓✓✓	Abu Idriiss	15	2	19%	"

Date	received From	Ni of Pieces	Garbage	Percentage	Colour
29-06-99	Abu IdriSS	12	2	15%	Mix
✓✓✓	Komba Buah	5	—	95%	"
✓✓✓	Kai Monde	1	—	07%	industri
30-06-99	Abu IdriSS	13	1	85%	Mix
✓✓✓	Kai Monde	3	—	52%	"
✓✓✓	Komba Buah	5	1	—	"
01-07-99	Komba Buah	3	—	34%	"
03-07-99	Komba Buah	5	1	03%	"
04-07-99	Komba Buah	1	—	03%	industri
05-07-99	Kai Foday	11	5	11%	Mix
06-07-99	Komba Buah	6	1	70%	"
✓✓✓	Tamba Koroboy	19	5	87%	"
✓✓✓	Kai Foday	3	2	49%	"
07-07-99	Komba Buah	4	1	56%	"
✓✓✓	Mohamed S'Conteh	1	—	10%	industri
✓✓✓	Tamba Koroboy	19	4	80%	Mix
✓✓✓	Kai Foday	11	8	55%	"
08-07-99	Komba Buah	2	—	06%	"
✓✓✓	Kai Foday	4	1	92%	"
✓✓✓	Tamba Koroboy	12	4	87%	"
					"

Date	received From	No. of Pieces	garatage	Percentage	Color
10-07-99	Abu Ydriss	12	2	15%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	5	2	35%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Koi Faday	2	1	07%	"
	Ground total of White =	58 pieces	20 garat	50%	
10-07-99	Ground total of industrial =	165 pieces	46 garat	—	
	Ground total of diamond	223 pieces			
	Ground garatage of diamonds =	66 garat	50%		
Stage 10 Lono Production					

Date	received From	No. of Pieces	Garatage	Percentage	Color
11-07-99	Tamba Koroboy	17	2	97%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Bobby Rogers	2	—	72%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	1	—	17%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Koi Faday	1	—	10%	"
12-07-99	Tamba Koroboy	10	2	84%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Bobby Rogers	2	—	30%	"
✓ - -	Komba Buah	3	—	44%	White
13-07-99	Komba Buah	2	—	10%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Bobby Rogers	4	—	72%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Tamba Koroboy	6	1	20%	"
14-07-99	Tamba Koroboy	9	1	08%	"

Date	received from	No. of Pieces	Boatage	Percentage	Color
15-07-99	Tamba Koro boy	13	2	98%	Mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Sam Bocharie	3	2	02%	"
17-07-99	Tamba Koro boy	9	1	33%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed's Contek	4	2	23%	"
18-07-99	Mohamed's Contek	14	6	63%	"
19-07-99	Sam Bocharie	1	7	95%	orange
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	4	1	50%	mix
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed's Contek	1	2	18%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	04%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	10	3	42%	Mix
20-07-99	Sam Bocharie	2	—	90%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed's Contek	1	1	85%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	22	9	—	Mix
21-07-99	Sam Bocharie	7	1	47%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed's Contek	1	4	62%	Coffee
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	9	2	24%	Mix
22-07-99	Sam Bocharie	2	—	26%	"
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohamed's Contek	1	2	30%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	13	5	77%	Mix

Date	received from	NO. Pieces	percentage	Percentage	Colour
24-07-99	Mohamed S. Conteh	1	2	05 %	White
✓✓✓	✓ ✓ ✓	16	5	15 %	Mix
✓✓✓	Sam Boekarie	4	—	95 %	11
✓✓✓	Komba Buah	13	4	13 %	11
✓✓✓	Kai Foday	10	3	94 %	11
25-07-99	Komba Buah	1	1	06 %	White
✓✓✓	✓ ✓	1	—	10 %	orange
✓✓✓	Kai Foday	3	—	45 %	Mix
✓✓✓	Sam Boekarie	1	—	16 %	orange
✓✓✓	Mohamed S. Conteh	1	1	82 %	White
✓✓✓	✓ ✓ ✓	18	5	78 %	Mix
26-07-99	Alusine Dumbay	1	1	02 %	White
✓✓✓	✓ ✓	291	38	28 %	Mix
✓✓✓	Sam Boekarie	6	2	95 %	11
✓✓✓	Kai Foday	4	—	96 %	11
✓✓✓	Komba Buah	1	2	06 %	White
✓✓✓	✓ ✓	3	—	38 %	Mix
✓✓✓	Mohamed S. Conteh	1	1	50 %	orange
✓✓✓	✓ ✓ ✓	18	5	24 %	Mix

Date	received from	No. of Pieces	Gravitate	Percentage	Color
27-07-99	Allusine Dumbuya	170	21	74%	MIX
✓ ✓ ✓	Soni Bochorie	1	—	40%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	3	—	98%	MIX
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	1	—	06%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohammed S. Conteh	9	1	82%	MIX
28-07-99	Allusine Dumbuya	103	11	82%	11
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	4	1	35%	11
✓ ✓ ✓	Bibby Rogers	10	4	78%	11
29-07-99	Kai Foday	2	—	59%	11
✓ ✓ ✓	Komba Buah	2	2	19%	11
✓ ✓ ✓	Mohammed S. Conteh	1	2	02%	White
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	5	1	84%	MIX
✓ ✓ ✓	Allusine Dumbuya	111	14	60%	11
31-07-99	Mohammed S. Conteh	20	10	60%	11
✓ ✓ ✓	Kai Foday	3	—	40%	11
✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	1	1	85%	White
Grand total of diamonds = 1015 pieces					
31-7-99	Grand gravitate of whites = 138 gravat 60%				
	Grand gravitate of industrials = 88 gravat 73%				

7) Letter

Letter from Mayor P.S. Bienda to Cpl F. Sankoh 16 – 09 – 99

RUFSL Abeduma Village, Kallahun
District, Republic of Sierra Leone

Date: 16/7/99

To: RUFSL Leader + Vice President Republic
of Sierra Leone, CPL F.S. Saunkah
From: Major M.S. Beinda on Executive Mission
Subject: Reports

I am writing to inform you about what
transpired during my arrival at
Foya, Lofa County Liberia on an
executive mission given by your very
self and me and Mr S. Y. Rogers to Kallahun
we departed Monrovia on Tuesday
the 5th of October at 2:00 PM and
arrived at Foya, Lofa County at 3:10
PM. Immediately we arrived Brig.
Issa, Brig. Morris Kallon Brig. Mike
Lamin and other senior officers
arrived at Foya from Buedu. I was
directed to use the Ecomog vehicle
used by Brig. Mike Lamin which was

driven by Major Mende Rambo
 my loggages were loaded in said
 vehicle together with that of Mr.
 S.Y.B. Rogers. While seated in
 said vehicle, Brig. Issa ordered
 his bodyguards to pull me out of
 the vehicle insulting me, my mother
 and father. His bodyguards held my
 right hand and pulled me out of the
 vehicle by force and ordered me to
 go to Gen. Mosquito. Brig. Issa took
 my eye glasses from my face
 and dashed it on the ground. Gen.
 Mosquito also joined them to molest
 me to the highest ~~trials~~ ~~trials~~ ~~trials~~ ~~trials~~
 their bodyguards to throw me out
 out of the vehicle and that I should
 walk from Foya to Mbeduma village
 where my wife and children are.
 Brig. Issa promised to kill me and
 told me that I have turned against
 them to form a faction in Makere
 against RUF/SL leadership. He said

he will kill me and nothing will
 come out of it. In fact he is now
 prepared fully and can live without
 RUF/SL to go anywhere in the world.
 Gen. Mosquito said if am lucky to
 live, I will never enjoy any benefit
 from RUF/SL. In fact I should not
 go ~~to any place~~ where lives as he
~~will certainly~~ disgrace me.
~~My father is~~ monitored but he
 did ~~not~~ make any comment. Brigadier
~~is~~ issued. Morris Kallen said
 that ~~the only~~ person they listen to
 in RUF/SL is Sir B. Rogers as he
 is their ~~only~~ father. Mr. Sir B. Rogers
 then intervened and begged them
 to allow me to go to my village.
 Sir, with all the instruction you
 gave to Mosquito, he did not care
 to adhere to it. He can only regard
 you when you are present.
 Presently my entire family is
 in a state of great fear. my

life is at stake. Kindly use
 the best method to secure my
 life as while in Kailashum any
 thing can happen to me. you know
 how much we all have suffered
 in this war. I have never been
 involved in any activity to sabo-
 tage the RUF/SC by any means and
 in any way. All matters are before
 you under investigation. I am
 still my life is threatened. Do help
 save my life even if I leave RUF/SC
 with nothing as a life is more important.

Kindly do not leave my life
 to be destroyed by mosquitoes and
 do act promptly to save our lives.

If you allow mosquitoes and
 others to kill me then we see
 again in the next world.

I am still
 your revolutionary brother
 Major P. S. Banda

Banda

8) Patrick Beinda statement

Statement by Patrick Beinda on 24 September 1999 at the Presidential Guest House, Monrovia, Liberia about the order he received to help resolve dispute in RUF in Makeni in February 1999.

①

Presidential Guest House
Kongo Town, Monrovia, Liberia.

Date: 24/9/99
Declaration

I H. Col. Patrick S. Beinda here
by declare that the statement
I'm making is nothing but the
truth. I am not under duress
nor promised any favour for
what I am going to say. said
statement can be used as
evidence in any court or trial
where necessary or as required
by law. So help me God.

Statement.

On the 19th of February, 1999
while I was in my rice farm at
Mbeduma Village, Buedu area
in the Kailahun District I was
informed by the M.P. to report
to General Sam Bockarie's

②

location at Buedu without
delay. I immediately reported
to General Sam Bockarie.
Upon my arrival he ordered
me to advance to Makeni
the following day to conduct
an investigation between
Brigadier Issa and Brigadier
Morris Kallon ~~as~~ one party
and Brigadier Dennis Mingo
and Col Gibbill Massagwai
as another party. Four persons
were selected or appointed by
Gen. Sam Bockarie to go on
said mission:

- ① Brigadier Isaac - Commander
 - ② Major Mulbah - member
 - ③ Major P.S. Beinda - member
 - ④ Major Tamba T. Adjutant
- We were instructed to join
Brigadier Mani, General Gblopleh
and other senior officers in
Makeni to resolve the conflict

(4)
Vandi at Kono who wasted
no time to send a honda
for me. I was then taken
to Koidu Town in Kono.
Finally we arrived at Makeni
on the 24th of Feb, 1999. Upon
arrival we were received by
the late A.B. Manah (May his
soul ~~so~~ rest in perfect peace)
Major Jabah and Morris Kallon
(Brigadier). We were then taken
to Brigadier Issa Sesay who
also welcome the delegates. The
following morning of the 25th of
February, 1999, we paid courtesy
calls on Brigadier Mani and
General Gblophoh. There, it was
decided to hold a forum on
the same day at 3:00 P.M. in
Makeni to brief them on
our mission in Makeni. The
Forum was held at 3:00 P.M.
on the 25th of Feb, 1999. The

(E)

Brigadier Isaac, Pa Bendu
Major Demba Marah and
Major Tamba T. arrived at
Kunsha to meet Brigadier
Superman and Col. Gibrill
Massagwai. We were well
received and accom~~o~~dated.
Brigadier Superman wasted
to time in briefing us on
the situation on his ground,
but Col. Gibrill Massagwai
promised to brief us later in
the morning, which he did.
Both Brigadier Dennis Inigo and
Col. Gibrill Massagwai agreed
to go to Makeni to resolve the
conflict but flatly rejected the
idea of going to Kailahun
for security reasons. At about
7:00 PM of the 27th Feb. 1999,
Major Demba Marah and I
left for Makeni while Briga-
dier Isaac and Tamba T.

me that he had briefed Gen. Mosquito that there was a serious threat on Lunska. According to Brigadier Isaac Gen. Mosquito instructed us to suspend all investigations until the situation in the

Lunska area was put under complete control. At the same time Brigadier Superman persisted that a commander be sent to Lunska to take care of the area while he and Col Gibrill Massagwa go to Makeni for immediate settlement of the conflict since our ultimate goal was to seek an unconditional release of our leader Cpl. Foday Saybana Samkoh. Troops/reinforcement was immediately mobilized and given to Brigadier Isaac to advance to Lunska for the Gbere junction attack.

(10)

incident. Brigadier Superman in his expounded on expressed regret over the death of both Major Brunu his strong body-guard and that of his brother Job Rambo. He said it was necessary to immediately set an investigation board to probe into said incident. He further said that people in Bokina, even General Mosquito will go with the idea that he killed Rambo; but according to him, he was not present when Rambo was killed. Later in the day, necessary arrangements were made for the burial of the two brothers and were buried. The following morning a meeting was held in the Nlaxeni Town Hall to explain to the masses about the incident. According to

(12)

Isaac and several other senior officers

In another development, General Mwasquito got the information about Col. Ramba's death. He immediately went in the air and responded sharply. He said that he has already mobilized troops and were on the way to Makeni. According to him Col. Ramba was killed by Superman and that he will pursue Superman and all those connected with Superman. The High Command in Makeni appealed to General Mwasquito to exercise patience for an investigation to be conducted but to no avail. I wrote a message to him he rejected it. I was in fact accused of being a part and parcel of the incident. Troops sent by General Mwasquito attacked Makeni six times

(14)

Mosquito on his wicked plan against us but Brigadier ^{Mike} flatly refused to join him. Two days later Dr. Challe Taylor invited both General Mosquito and Brigadier Superman and resolved the matter. According to them the President advised them to forget about all that transpired and crave for unity and peace among us. To my ultimate amazement General Mosquito outrightly insulted me over the radio set in Freetown about three weeks ago after I simply told Brigadier Mike to extend my greetings to him. Col. Jackson Swaray was present and did monitor. He was also insulted by General Mosquito. If at all General Mosquito has any respect for the President of this country (Liberia) then there should

(16)

only legitimate leader.

Paid fully Submitted;

W. Col. P. S. Beruda

Signed: 

9) Samual Lamboi statement

Statement to the Sierra Leone police on 7 June 2000

Name: Samuel Kamboi (Alias Ebony)

Address: No 56 spur road, Freetown.

Occupation: Radio Operator

Nationality: Sierra Leonean

Religion: Muslim

Age: 29 years.

Statement commenced at 1317 hours on Wednesday 7th June 2000, at the Pademsa Road Central Prisons, Freetown. I have been asked if I wish to say anything and cautioned that I am not obliged to say anything, unless I wish to do so. But whatever I say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence.

~~Signature~~
Spc
265
7/6/2000

~~Signature~~
Spc
1752.121
07/06/2000

~~Signature~~
7
3
2000

In addition to my statement that I made to the police on the May, 2000 I wish to give the real names of the individuals that these code names referred to.

~~Signature~~
Spc
265
7/6/2000

~~Signature~~
Spc
1752.121
07/06/2000

~~Signature~~
7/6/2000

- 2 -

and they are as follows: SMILE - Corporal
 Today Saybama Sankoh leader of the Renova-
 tionary United Front (R.U.F), this name
 (Smile) was given to Corporal Today Saybama
 Sankoh during the Lome peace Accord
 which he came up to the 8th May 2000;
 CONCORD - General Sam Bockarie alias
 Mosita, he was using this code name
 (CONCORD) during the ECOMOG intervention;

S. S. S - is referring to Brigadier Issa Sesay
 this was his code name (S.S.S) he was
 using when we launched the operation to
 capture Kono and Makeni; SURVIVAL - this
 name was the code name Brigadier
 Issa Sesay was using before he changed
 it to S.S.S code name; BLACK MOSES -
 this name is also referring to Corporal
 Today Saybama Sankoh, and he was also
 using it together with the code name
 Smile during the Lome peace Accord;
 MARTIN - this name is the real name
 of General Sam Bockarie's Telephonist

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
 265
 201

1753 ref
 1/10

7/06/00

Who was with him at his Kailahun base;
 GHAFIA - this code name is referring to
 Gibnoll Massagoué, this is the only code
 name that Gibnoll Massagoué has been
 using from the start of the fighting up to the
 8th May, 2000; LOG - this is the first code
 name of General Sam Bockarie alias
 Maskita; SHINING STAR - this code
 name is referring to Colonel Kumba
 Gbundema, he is the ~~former~~ present Comman-
 der of the Kambia Axis; GEN. ADJUTANT
 this code name is referring to the ADJUTANT
 of the Revolutionary United Front movement
 it was General Colonel Rasheed Sani
 who was acting in this position on to the
 signing of the Lome peace Accord on
 7th July, 1999; BROTHER LIONS - this code
 name is presently referring to one Colonel
 Lion whose real I do not know. He
 is presently deployed in Makeni Axis.
 VISION ONE - this code name is the call
 sign of the Control Station that was being
 used in Lome, during the peace talks

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 7/6/2000

[Signature]

[Signature] Hobson

and this same station was brought down to Freetown which was being used on the spur road on to the 8th May, 2000; C/S ESCORT - this is the call sign of our communication set that was based at Ndama Village, Keilahun District, this set was installed at Ndama Village to facilitate messages from the movement authorities to their respective families. It was installed during the ECOMOG Air raid, this was the place (Ndama Village) where all relatives of the authorities were seen safe guard; TROW MIKE - this is the name of the Brigade Commander of Keilahun town - it is referring to Colonel Momoh Rogers, he was using this code name up to the 8th May, 2000; C/S ROCK - this code name is the call sign of Beudu base; RASTA HERO - this code name is referring to Colonel Rashid Sandi which he is presently using; VULTURE - this code name is a common name that

26⁰⁷
 [Signature]
 7/6/2000

1487 col
 [Signature]
 07/06/2000

[Signature] 07/06/2000

- 5 -

the Commanders were using 'PLANC', this code name is referring to General Sam Boakoni, this was the code name he was using during the Come peace Accord talks and on to the time of his defection to Liberia and SUN RAYS - this code name is referring to all Battalion Commanders, this name is a military term that the movement has been using since the inception of the Rebel movement. Finally, I wish to state that these were the Call Signs and Codes names I was operating on during the period I was with Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, but I want to caution the authorities that if they made any attempt to call these fighters in the bush, they will not respond ^{to their} expectation either positively or negatively. I am also appealing to the Government to please allow me to establish communication

265
7/6/2000

1824
Foday Sankoh

7/6/2000

With the present High Command on the Ground who is Brigadier Issa Sesay. I strongly believe that they are presently using or operating on CODRAC Model Communication Set. I don't know their present frequencies, but if I have access to a set I will use my past experience. This is all. Statement concluded at 1415 hours. Made in Creole and recorded in English. Read over and admitted to be true and correct.

~~Handwritten signature~~
 263
 DPC
 7/6/2000

1985 of
 07/06/2000

7/6/2000

WHAT ARE THE REAL NAMES OF THE FOLLOWING?

1. SMILE — Corporal Today Soybama San Kola ²⁰³⁴
2. CONCORD — General Sam Rockome
3. S.S.S — Brigadier Issa Sesay ^{Survival Center}
4. SURVIVAL — ^{Change for}
5. BLACK MOSES — Corporal Today S. San Kola ^{with C.P. Acc}
6. MARTIN — Telephonist who was working for ^{Gen. Sa. Rockome}
7. GHAFIA — Gibnell Massaquai
8. LOG — 1st code name of Sam Rockome (1993) ^(Lice)
9. SHINNING STAR — Col. Kansa Gbandema
10. GEN. ADJUTANT — Adjutant of the movement
11. BROTHER-LIONS — Corporal Today San Kola ^(used with flight instructor on left side of Acc)
12. VISION ONE ^{QMS} — Control Station Call Sign ^{was used up to the 8/5/2000}
13. C/S ESCORT — Call sign of Radio Station based at Ndama Village, Kailahun District
14. IRON MIKE — Brigade Commander, Col. Ronald Rogers who was based in Kailahun
15. C/S ROCK — Brecken base call sign.
16. RASTA HERO — Col. Rashid Sandi
17. VULTURE — This was just a ~~common~~ ^{code} name between the commanders
18. PLANET — Sam Rockome
19. SQUARAYS — All Battalion commanders.

10) Letter

Letter from Bobby Dixon to Foday Sankoh
11 Jan 2000

HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH INFANTRY BATTALION, AFL
TUBMANBURG CITY, BOMI COUNTY
LIBERIA.

11 January, 2000

SUBJECT: Information

TO : CPL. FODAY SANKOR
Leader of Revolutionary Front
of Sierra Leone, Republic of
Sierra Leone.

FROM : COL. BOBBY Z. DIXON
Commanding Officer 6/Infantry
Battalion, AFL.

Re :
Be Inform that, I have recieved the letter that
was sent by you to the President of the Republic of Liberia.
and I will make sure it reaches the President, with out delay.

Also be Inform that I recieved the letter from COL.
Varney Kosia, and it will be delive to the President.



BOBBY Z. DIXON
COL. INF. AFL
BATTALION COMMANDER

11) Letter

Letter to Foday Sankoh (The Leader) from the Black Guard Commander

No date

TO THE LEADER,
FROM THE BLACK REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS
SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT

Sir, on behalf of the entire Black Guard unit we are hereby taking this opportunity to make a summary report to let you know or understand the situation on the ground.

To start with, we thank the Almighty God as for your previous Concentration programmes to the entire movement that this is a Holy war which everybody within the movement have realised, because in your absence the struggle continues with lot of developments.

Sir, as you left us in 1996 to go and sign the Abidjan accord, lot of enemy pressure (Isamajors) was mounted on us, but due to the dedication and loyalty of the Command you left on the ground, we were able to contain situation until the A.F.R.C Coup'd'etat, wherein you instructed the High-Command for us (R.U.F) to join the brothers in other to form the People's Army, and defend the sovereignty of our Motherland.

The external delegates who were with you in Abidjan also went over the media that they have upheld the leadership of the R.U.F, and went to extend of insighting people, but due to the witness and the security experience of the High

Command, we were able to trick them to come on the ground for us ~~to~~ work out all necessary modalities. They came through the Guinea/Sierra Leone border (Nongowa Ferry) and were finally arrested by us and brought on the ground in a locked up.

Furthermore, when we join the brothers, some of our senior officers and elders were given ministerial positions in the A.F.R.C Government. All the same things were not working well with the R.U.F members ~~the~~ in which the High-Command even decided to leave the city Freetown and decided to base in the provinces. Things were not put in a proper shape as the so called Honourables were just doing things as they like. There was no proper Command and Control until Ecomog decided to make a final strike into Freetown, in which they succeeded in driving the entire A.F.R.C from the City.

When Freetown fell in the hands of Ecomog, the High-Command therefore decided at once without any delayance as there was no Command and Control to move straight to our original base (Kailahun) and position the R.U.F Combatants to the old former 1991 defensive points, which were NIUMA, BONBOHUN and JOJOIMA. These positions were seriously defended until when the Ecomog advance to Kenema and Daru. From then, the armies had tried their level best to penetrate

the defensive position, but no chance had been given to them. In the north, the enemies captured Nakeni and tried to advance to Kono. Our men retreated and defended part of Kono.

Due to the security situation, the High-Command and therefore instructed the then B.G.C. Brigadier Issah Sesay to try by all means to report with the former A.F.B.C. Chairman J.P.K. to Kailahun. As a result, J.P.K. ~~was~~ and his body guards were brought to Kailahun as per instruction. They were welcome by the High-Command and elders. Six, at this stage, the High-Command, J.P.K., Senior Officers, Junior Officers and the entire Combatants held a forum and finally agreed to continue the struggle under one structure and Command.

Immediately Freetown and the provincial Headquarters fell in the hands of ECOMOG, the High-Command was called to report by the President of Liberia Mr Charles Taylor. Wherein the President seriously briefed the High-Command and gave him the confidence, that he should not give up but to keep up the struggle and uphold the Revolution until the Leader returns. The president gave full assurance to the High-Command, and promise to give his maximum support to the R.U.F. The president also took an oath that he will never betray his brother (one today Sankoh). From that point, the president gave huge quantity of logistics (Ammunition

to the High-Command for us to start repelling the ECOMOG advancement or to contain situation

to this development, when the High-Command returned from Liberia, he briefed J.P.K pertaining to the latest development, and met him personally to give a helping hands with diamonds or any foreign currency he had brought from Freetown for him to impress president Taylor.

As a result, J.P.K denied bitterly that he had brought no diamond with him whereas the High Command had gathered informations that J.P.K has brought lots of diamond with him, but he wants to keep it on his own without financing the movement as we are now under one umbrella.

Therefore, the High-Command gave instruction to Brigadier Issah Sesay and Brigadier Mike Lamin for them to properly search J.P.K for diamond. After the searching lots or large quantity of diamonds was taken from J.P.K and his body guards.

Later, the parcels of diamond was given to Mr Ibrahim (General) and sister Memuna for them to travel with the parcels directly to president Taylor.

to this development, the High Command was able to receive the first satellite phone from General Ibrahim which he was use to do some important contacts with.

After General Ibrahim returned back to Buxinafaso, the High-Command also received a good caraiage of diamond from Kono. He also plan to

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send another good parcel to General Ibrahim in Burkina-faso for Ammunition and Arms as he had started making some important contacts for materials. The High Command therefore decided to hand over the small parcel of diamond to the B.G.C Brigadier Issah Sesay in order for him to pass through Monrovia and make his way to Burkina-faso and meet General Ibrahim to work out first modalities to get some needed materials for us.

Brigadier Issah Sesay left the base and travel along with Col Jungle and some Liberia securities to Monrovia. He did not make his way through as he only stop in Monrovia, and information was later received by the High-Command that the parcel of diamond has dropped from Brigadier Issah. He therefore return on base and gave the same report to the High-Command.

The joint security therefore ~~then~~ investigated the B.G.C and took statement from him. Later a council was held pertaining this issue, and the senior officers and elders suggested to suspend the issue until the arrival of the Leader.

Moreso, President Taylor continues to give helping hands with logistics which involves food stuff and materials. The High Command was called in every month to report to Monrovia for briefing. The High Command later called Brigadier Denis Mingle (Superman) on a forum for a mission to be carry-out to capture the whole

of Kono. They came up with an agreement to apply some guerilla tactics to overrun the strategic positions in Kono district. A plan was drawn, but Superman never went with the plan, and the ~~the~~ mission fail without capturing Kono and over thirty (30) M.I.A on our side. and also K.I.A.

After this said mission, Superman was able to put some men-power together and proceeded to Kabala axis and created a jungle there.

In sept 1943, the High-Command called a Vanquered Forum. He addressed the Forum, and made all the Vanquards to understand that they should tighten-up their belts and officiate themselves as Vanquards of this Revolution. Also as to how best they should operate to promote the good image of the struggle.

In this forum the High-Command tried to constructively criticize the way Superman is behaving. The High Command made Superman available over the communication for a dialogue. In their dialogue, He criticize Superman for putting a Lebanese woman behind him which is delaying the operation. In fact to this, the High-Command therefore instructed Superman to report for a better plan-up, but he responded that he will not report to the Call. From that point, Superman started operating on his own.

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without taking any instruction or orders from the high Desk.

In October, the High-Command was again call by president Taylor. We therefore went along with him to Monrovia. The High Command was instructed by president Taylor to move to Burkina Faso and meet with the Burkina President.

The High-Command, the War Council chairman and one S.L.A representative Col Eddy Kankoh took the trip to Burkinafaso. They met president Blaise Compaore, and they were highly welcome. They took two weeks in Burkinafaso. They were given words of confidence and assurance by president Blaise that he will not let Cpl Feday Sankoh down at all. The president told the High-Command to be very hard in Command to uphold the movement until the arrival of the leader. Infact he instructed the High Command to forward the R.U.F. Issue to the O.A.U as is the current O.A.U Chairman.

On their return, they were given huge quantity of materials for serious offensive to start a Campaign ~~for~~ for the release of our leader. The delegation return back to Monrovia in November. The delegation return back to case and held an immediate forum for a serious offensive to Commenge.

All the Combatants were happy and agree to start the operation in capturing Kono. The said operation -

was given to the B.F.C Brigadier Issa Sesay. huge quantity ^{of material} was given to the B.F.C and he immediately left for Kono. They also held a brun in Kono and succeeded in overrunning the entire Kono district and capture some artillery weapons and huge quantity of Arms and Ammunition. The whole operation was therefore given to the Late Col Rambo who further extended the operation to Tonkolili and advance to Makeni. After the fall of Makeni, the Late Col as per instruction went and receive Brigadier Superman to join the operation.

They therefore extended the operation to port-oko as far as Waterloo and Kambia axis.

Furthermore, Col Rambo also tried his level best to link up with the other brothers that entered Freetown, but the Freetown operation was not Co-ordinated as the said Commander Blacis-Jah was not going by the instruction from the High Command. When they retreated from Freetown, the U.F.C met them and told them to present a Comprehensive report pertaining the whole Freetown operation, but they deliberately fail to do so.

According to the Black Guards security information, they brought some diamonds and lot of Foreign Currency from Freetown, but they never presented anything to the High-Command.

The late Col Rambo even arrested six hundred

thousand (600,000) U.S dollars from some of the men from Freetown, and presented the said sum to the B.F.C Brigadier Issa, and also some diamonds. Again there was instruction from the High Desk for Lt Col Gibril Massagoi to report for important enquiry and briefing, but he refused the call for over four (4) good times.

As a result, there was an instruction from the High-Command to the B.F.C for Lt Col Gibril Massagoi to be arrested and turn over.

The B.F.C further went along with the Late Col Rambo and some Black guards as per instruction to arrest Lt Col Gibril and Maj Nya.

During this process, Superman and his men put on stiff resistance and even open fire and launched some R.P.G Bombs, therefore scatter the whole group and killed some men and went to the extent of advancing to Makani and attack the residence of the B.F.C and vandalize the whole compound and took every thing in the compound including the materials for operation and enough foreign currency and diamonds. He even extended in raising the compounds of some other Senior officers.

After some days, he came for the second time and attack Makani and killed Col Rambo and some security personnels, fire some people but they missed to kill the B.F.C and chase him all the way to Makali and missed him for

the second time.

According to security findings, most of the senior officers can not give any advice to try to contain that situation. Instead they keep on insisting to spark the situation.

According to Superman, he has vowed not to ever take command from the High Command.

In regards to the mining process, it is only recently that the authorities has given the go ahead for mining to be going on. Lt Col Kennedy is the overall mining Commander. They have been getting some small, small pieces which is in our big record books.

Another development is that one businessman from Cuba by the name of Carlos offered the movement one F.M radio station, and the station itself has been built up a hill in Dodo Botoma.

Also in ~~December~~ January, the High Command organise an operation for the seghema to be captured in order to cut the supply between Daru Barracks and Kenema. The said operation went in smoothly, but unfortunately fail to capture. We in fact left another operation at hand to attack Kenema.

In Conclusion Sir, we are hereby suggesting that the issue of Superman should immediately be put under control before he try to mislead some of our struggle brothers.

Faithfully Submitted - YOUR REVOLUTIONARY
(GUARDS) R.U.F/S/K

12) Letter

Letter from Foday Sankoh to ECOMOG Major General Kpamber, ECOMOG
27 Dec 99

Revolutionary United Front Party

RUFPP

*C/o 56 Spur Road
Freetown*

Tel./Fax: 231624/232329

Major-General G. Kpamber
Force Commander
ECOMOG
Defence Headquarters
Cockerill
FREETOWN

27th December, 1999

Dear Major-General,

I write in reaction to your letters dated 23rd and 24th December, 1999 instant.

I intend to advise the AFRC Leader to take note and cognisance regarding the letter of the 23rd December, 1999 sent about the allegations of the Ex-Combatants of the AFRC planning to abduct and kidnap ECOMOG and UNAMSIL personnel and positions in the spirit of banditry on the highways. A majority of the Ex-Combatants are aware of my position re the Lome Peace Agreement implementation and they are obeying the orders given to the best of my knowledge.

With regards to the letter dated 24th December, 1999 on the issue of the Guinean ECOMOG weapons remaining in the possession of RUFPP personnel, the process of searching various locations for these items is on and I will inform you accordingly on the progress made.

With every best wish, I wish you Seasons Greetings.




Chairman Foday Saybana Sankoh
LEADER

13) Letter

Letter from "The Operators" (radio) To: "Area Cmdr one through RUFPP touris infors the leader" (sic)
28 - 04 - 00

To Area Commander one through R. u. r. p. 2451
Touris info the leader.
FM The operators

DATE 28th 04 2000.

Sir,

Be Informed that, at around 12:30

This afternoon, a pick up comprising of the
CID's and UNAMSIL personnels came and
round 300 our area, arrested the communication
radio set, Salar and other important mater
ials. According them, a gun sound was
heard from our area ^{last night} and that, they were
warranted to search the entire area
for arms.

In this light, both me and Ibrahim were
Invited to the police station. upon our arrival.
They went through all important documents
including the code and all frequencies were copied
and we were later released.

Lastly, we have been ~~not~~ noticed by pa
Mamby to hand over the room against
Monday without fail. Thanks in advance.

2/27

Morning Freq - 70847

AFT. v 70242

CH. 1 - 73737

" 2 - 78537

" 3 - 72722

" 4 - 75120

CAMP YARD 102606

CB ONE - 91170

STAND BY - 73505

TROOP CAL - 69360

GET THERE - OUT - 102009

POWERY GARDEN - 70545 - 08

① Morning Freq - 70847 ch. 00

② AFT. " 70242 - "

③ Camp yard - 102606

④ CB ONE - 91170



14) Letter

Letter to Foday Sankoh from Michel
28 April 2000

04-28-00

TO THE LEADER

From Michel

Good morning,

I met Fatou yesterday in New York. This is a recap of our meeting.

- She first asked me if there was a problem between us and why. I explained in detail why we (my partners and myself) were frustrated considering the fact that regardless what we did or suggested or proposed we did not yet had the opportunity to start, even on a little scale, the execution of our contract.

- Fatou explained to me that, starting now, she was in charge of the operation, from A to Z. She told me to forget Ibrahim, a war criminal (her own words), and to start working with her under her supervision. I answered that the leader told me to handle EVERYTHING through Ibrahim, what I did.

- At the end, she showed me the stones she brought with her. Unfortunately, regardless our contract, she told me those stones were not going to be sold to us but to somebody else, but if I agree to give more money we would do some good business in the future.

- Fatou asked me if the 80,000 \$ were still available, the answer was yes of course, however, how can I spend money (as agreed), travel all the time, work for more than a year when in return I do not get any merchandise, once again I am not asking for anything for free but just for the right to buy accordingly to our contract.

- I finally explained to Fatou that EVERYTHING was possible, money wise, if I could finally meet my partners with some decent inventory that we could buy. This would show a beginning of execution and everybody would feel more comfortable.

How can I show up in front of my partners and tell them, everything is fine, I have seen some inventory in NY, we cannot buy it but let's finance the operation a little bit more and we will be in business ?

I already know the answer, we spent over 1 million dollars so far, we cannot buy anything, they sell somewhere else and ask us to pay more without anything in return, regardless our contract, what kind of a business is this ?

15) Letter

Letter from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talabi, Libyan embassy in Accra, Ghana. 26
June 1996

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT
OF SIERRA LEONE (RUF/SL)

"2^u ident.

DATE: JUNE 26, 1996

FROM: Cpl. FODAY S. SANKOH,
LEADER, RUF/SL.

EXH. "D"
P.

TO: BROTHER MOHAMED TALIBI,
LIBYAN ARAB PEOPLES JAMAHIRIYYA,
ACCRA, GHANA.

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP REQUEST

I want to thank you and the other brothers back home again very much for the half million United States dollars (500,000 USD) which I received through you for the purchase of needed material to pursue the military mission.


However, I wish to let you all be informed that my business partners for these materials are here with me and we have had extensive discussions on this subject. Attached to this letter, you will find a list of materials (arms and ammunitions) and their costs for your serious and urgent attention. I now need one and a half million United States dollars (USD 1,500,000) in order to purchase twice the listed materials for effective and smooth operation.

My representative, Capt. PHILIP S. PALMER, will elaborate on this all important and urgent mission as he is expected to travel along with my business partners somewhere for these materials if and only if the above-mentioned amount is available. These materials will be given to me at discount rates and the requested amount plus the one already to hand will cover in addition all transportation costs for airlifting these materials.

The airlifting of these materials to our controlled territory will be done before any payment for this mission is done by me. This is why I am urgently appealing to you and the other brothers back home for your usual cooperation in providing this time the one and a half million United States dollars (USD 500,000) to be at hand with me so that my business partners and my representative can proceed for these materials very quickly for fast and smooth operation.

Kind regards.

Sign:



Cpl. FEYAY S. SANKOH,
LEADER, RUF/SL

16) Letter

Letter from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talabi, Libyan embassy in Accra, Ghana.
December 1996

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

4th Ident.

DATE: DEC. 4, 1996

FROM: Cpl. FODAY S. SANKOH,
LEADER, RUF/SL
ABIDJAN, LA COTE D'IVOIRE

TO: BROTHER MOHAMED TALIBI,
PEOPLES BUREAU OF LIBYAN ARAB PEOPLES JAMAHIRIYA
ACCRA, GHANA.

75
EXH. E
A.

SUB: URGENT INFORMATION

I received the USD 29,000 (twenty-nine thousand United States dollars) through Mr. Daniel Kallon for which I am very grateful to you and the other brothers back home. We have signed the Peace Accord on November 29, 1996 just so as to relieve our movement of the enormous pressure from the International Community while I will use this opportunity to transact my business in getting our fighting materials freely and easily.

I have already finished negotiations with my business partners and I have so far paid USD 300,000 (three hundred thousand United States dollars). Our agreement is that they should receive USD 700,000 (seven hundred thousand United States dollars) from me in Sierra Leone upon their arrival with the materials into my controlled territory. The total cost of the material is USD 2,000,000 (two million United States dollars). The balance amount will be paid when the operation is completed.

I am therefore asking you and your brothers

to urgently provide the needed USD 700,000 (Seven hundred thousand United States dollars) so that I will be in position to live up to my commitment to my business partners who will be coming very soon with these materials. As I have always learnt from you people, there is some money with the Burkina Faso Government for the provision of our needed materials. But as you might have known by now that government have really not shown any keen interest in assisting us as a movement. I even had conversation with Commandant DIENDERE these few days but with no positive result.

I would therefore suggest that you prepare a letter for me to meet President Compaore on this issue as we never received anything from them and even my delegates at Ouagadougou have returned ever since to my location here. Please advise on this issue.

When I went in last week, I was able to organize serious mining operations in precious minerals which I believe will help us to generate the needed foreign exchange for our mission. For now I am highly in need of this USD 700,000 in order to go in and be waiting for the arrival of my business partners. Please help me in this great hour of need and I promise not to let you down. Palmer will give you the rest of my message. My best regard to you and your family.


Cpl. FODAY S. SANKOH.

- 17) Radio Log Book #1
9 July 1999 – 15 February 2000



569



Schriftblok

100 vel houtvrij papier/gekleurd



82 7 10 481 0 228

Algemeen Levenszorg

Algemeen Levenszorg

Abu with Dr. Fab
 Honey Man
 SR 228520
 279507
 MSF-4857.0 USB
 Honey Man, 37 for with

1971-1972
 To: Brig Genr Essaka H. Sesay
 From: Sirimobilham National Coordinator
 Sub: Enquiry/Request
 Please advise if any information
 is available and set for
 O.S.M./N.S.M. operations in the
 Northern Province, Towns of
 Ntagbura, Bafra, Bafra, Bafra,
 Kambura etc. I would be talking
 to the [unclear] Times now and
 need to hear from you concerning
 the above areas they are planning
 to visit these areas under the
 R.U.G./S.L. Control also I would
 like to see the [unclear] and
 Commanders in these areas.

I am very grateful if you can inform the
 branches of the background. I also
 want to observe that I am not
 on the ground to be of any help. I do
 Best regard.

[Faded handwritten text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

Very grateful for the presence
 Commander was able to make
 come to the Magboraka and
 thank you for the Government
 Magboraka and encourage the
 OSM personnel to stand with
 out any other affiliation from the
 brothers. Make to see that
 your advice is to be followed
 the brotherly spirit and
 presently the situation into
 Malaya and the OSM
 perhaps we will be able to
 and blow. I do not know

Sir, the team is presently in Dara requesting to return as they were shown the wrong route leading into our zone. However, I have spoken to them and they promise to give me the responses tomorrow. Sir, another NGO team ACF is heading for Bagboko today. They will spend few hours and return tomorrow. I will advise you on their whereabouts. I am in Best regard to you. Yours faithfully, [Signature]

there is no direct communication between the OS personnel and me. As a result of the above, I'm finding it difficult to inform the present plan of work of the NGOs in the North. Sir, still suggesting that Setembe give the OS personnel in all the districts that is operating for fast operation. Best regard to you. Yours faithfully, [Signature]

To: Brig Gen. Morrison Kallor
 From: Sr. Sgt. Julian [Signature]
 Sub: Information

Sir
 Be informed that
 the UN Relief and the
 Other NGOs will be in
 Makeni, Magboroka and
 Kono on Thursday, 29/7/99
 Sir, I would be very
 grateful if you can pass
 this same information to
 the Commanders in
 Makeni and also
 inform my OSM Personnel
 If ~~you~~ Sidiki has not
 yet move to Magboroka,
 ask that he stays in Kono
 for now until we receive the
 NGO team in Kono.
 Best regards

22/7/99
 To: Brig Gen. Issah H. Sesay
 From: S. S. Williams
 Sub: Information
 Sir,
 According to MSE
 they are still ready to come to
 Pendembu. Their only concern is
 the attitude of our men from
 the first checkpoint coming up to
 Segbwema. Now they can only
 come if I can send the OSM
 Personnel to receive them at the
 first checkpoint. Also, I should
 move to Kuvia end to receive
 them at the first checkpoint. I
 will need a vehicle for this
 mission.

Sir
 Be informed that
 the UN Relief and the
 Other NGOs will be in
 Makeni, Magboroka and
 Kono on Thursday 29/7/99
 Sir, I would be very
 grateful if you can pass
 this same information to
 the Commanders concerned
 in Makeni and Kono. Also
 inform my OSM Personnel
 if possible. Sidik has not
 yet move to Magboroka. I
 ask that he stays in Kono
 for now. I will receive the
 NGO team in Kono. I
 Best regards

28/7/99
 To: Brig Gen. Issah H. Sesay
 From: S. S. William
 Sub: Information
 Sir,
 According to MSF,
 they are still ready to come to
 Pendembu. Their only concern is
 the attitude of our men from
 the first checkpoint coming up to
 Segbwema. Now they can only
 come if I can send the OSM
 Personnel to receive them at the
 first checkpoint. Also, I should
 move to Kuvia end to receive
 them at the first checkpoint. I
 will need a vehicle for this
 mission.

Also, the UN Relief and the other NGOs would like to move from Kono to Kenema using the Tongo Field route. OR from Kono to Segbwema and then to our base. Their aim is to repair all damage Bridges and recondition the road. It will help them move with their ^{Food} Trucks very fast. Sir, I need your advice on the above issues. Best regards

Passed 28/7/99

To: Brig Gen. P. B. Vandi
 From: S.S. William - Osm. Coordinator
 Sub: Information

Sir,

Be inform that a group of NGOs would be heading for your point (Kono District) anytime from Thursday the 29/7/99. Their aim is to access the road and the Civilian population for both Food and medical Supply in the Kono District. They plan to access Naama Sewa ^{first}. Sir, if Pastor Moses is around, please let him start ^{Kind} organising the Civilian with your assistance. Best regards

28/7/99

To: Brig. Gen. Morris Kallon
 From: S.S. William
 Sub: Information

Sir,

please expect another NGOs - ACF/M.S.F in your zone on Saturday 31/7/99. They will access and recommend to the Food NGOs for fast Food Supply into your zone.

Sir, I would be very grateful, if I can get feedbacks on the NGOs visit in your areas. It will help me in my operation, I'm also interested in the problems that the ^{people} here are

facing.

Best regard.

29th/8/99

TO: DR S.S. William
 FR: Alpha Vandi (ASM)
 Sub: Information

Sir, Be informed that the Military high Command at Makeni are obstructing the ASM operation. The held series of meetings with the NGOs with out our concerned and the further deal with them the grantee to

to work with there
old personnels when
the left behind and
have now meet @

Nathalie the A.C.F.
personels make it clear
to us that they can
no longer befor CED
to add people to the
capacity then already
have and even make
us to understand you
have given them the
green light only to
operate with there
personels @

Sir, Be informed that

The condition here
is very rough with us
as come on prepare.

Sir, Be also inform
that my head problem
is heighly effecting me
and I will like you to
address the issue @

Sir, your immediate
advice is needed.

Signed _____

I have already established the Osm at Mogberaka but these Ngo are not ready to take or employ them as you said early, Gastin and

Karimu Sowa are presently at Makeni

Sir, These Ngos does not take in the Osm members then our effort will go in vain

Other Ngo like Caritas, came in which we were not inform

To: Brig Gen Morris Wallen with
From: S. S. William
Sub: Information **passed**

Sir, According to the directive I first received from the Leader, ~~at~~ ^{at} M. Star contact the International NGOs and only allow the International NGOs personnel within our zone. Sir, I would be grateful if you people can only accept the International NGOs and no National NGOs. Sir, you are not to allow any ^{Ngo} Local Staff (Stereot Legans) to enter your zone

Sir, your usual co-operation is highly needed.
Best regard.

To: The leader through the High Command

Fr - S.S. William

Sub: Information

DATE: 29-07-99

Sir, Be inform that the UN Relief and the other NGOs have extended their assessment mission to our control areas in Makin Magbraba. The working relationship between the OSU and UN Relief

Some international NGOs continue improving

Sir, there is no set back in terms of communication on the part of the international NGOs. There is little set back on the side of the OSU in terms of communication and needs immediate attention as the communication link between the OSU and the NGOs in front is poor

Sir as 2 March as the NGOs operations in the North is on a high pace with regret

to inform you that the
 NGOs operations in Karamoja
 District and the rest of the
 East is very slow as
 compared to the North
 This is partly because of
 the recent attitude of
 our men at the check
 points, mounted between
 Mwanja Junction and Segbure
 There are reports of molest
 tion, wasting of their time
 unnecessarily. In Segbure,
 they stole one of their
 bags. Sir, the army will
 come checking for security
 reasons, but it should
 be constructive.

Sir, the problems in Makeni
 still remain the same.
 The OSM personnel sent
 to Makeni has no access
 to communication. Several
 reports from them are
 not forthcoming since
 they arrived in Makeni
 on the 22-07-99. I've
 made several attempts
 through C/S Fisher & Temple
 but to no avail. At one
 attempt, the operators at
 C/S Temple denied me
 talking to them. Above
 all, Sir, I still don't
 know the Commander in
 Makeni to coordinate.

the problems in Makeni
 still remain the same.
 The OSM personnel sent
 to Makeni has no access
 to communication set.
 Reports from them is
 not forthcoming since
 they arrived in Makeni
 on the 22-07-99. I've
 made several attempts
 through C/S Fisher & Temple
 but to no avail. At one
 attempt, the operator at
 C/S Temple denied me
 talking to them. Above
 all, Sir, I still don't
 know the commander in
 Makeni to coordinate
 presently in Makeni.

Sir, your usual guidance
 is needed.

Best regard.

From: CPL Today Sankoh
 TO: PR: S.S. Williams
 Sub: Respond 30th/07/99

Ref. message dated
 30th/07/99 I gave the
 instructions to the men
 at Makeni to open all
 the roads and allow the
 NGO to carry food and
 drugs for the people as
 they are in need separate
 need.

To well talk to you all
 tomorrow 31st/07/99

OSM TEAM MAKENS

TO: DR: S-S WILLIAM
 FR: DR: GASTIN AMARA
 -M.

SUB: INFORMATION AND
 INQUIRY 31ST/07/99

SIR, BEAWARE THAT
 I AM STILL WITH SOWA
 WHILE ALPHA HAVE
 GONE TO MAGBOROKA AS
 OPERATION IS NOT YET
 ON THE FOOTING AND
 WE MET WITH THE
 FOLLOWING NGO MSF
 CMM ACF CMM

CES CMM CRS AND
 CAPITAL WITH THE
 HIGH IN COMMAND ON
 THE 28TH JULY 1999 FOR
 THE FRIST TIME GAVE
 OUR GUIDLINE TO THEM
 MSF AND ACF IN OTHER
 MEETING WE HELD
 WITH THEM AND THERE
 WAS A DISAGREEMENT
 AT THE POINT WHERE
 WE STARTED IN RETURN
 ING OF OUR OWN STAFF
 AND REJECTING THEIR
 OWN BLACK EMPLOYEE

2/8/99
To: Brig. Gen. Issah H. Sesay
From: S.S. William
Sub: Information
Sir,
You are hereby
inform that MSF would be
making another ^{attempt} to enter our
Kailahun Zone on Wednesday the

REARLY HARD HERE
COMM I SUGGEST THAT
YOU DO SOMETHING
TOWARD THE COMFORT
CAME HERE ELI THINGS
WE GO BUT THAT
GREETING ALL MEMBER
AND FAMILY ☺

NATHALI (COMMANDER OF
THE MSF AND TEAM
MAKE IT CLEAR THAT
THEY ARE NOT TO DROP
SIR, OR ELSE EM STAFF
THEY WOULD NOT COME
WITH ANY RELEASE COMM
WHICH WE PLAN TO HAVE
DISCUSS WITH YOU PLEASE
CONFIRM THIS AND ADVISE
ON THIS EARLY AS POSSIBLE
I SEND SAID PLANS AND
ENQUIRE ABOUT THE
SICKNESS OF LT MORIBA
AT BAYIAMA BUT I
RECEIVED NO RESPOND
KINALLY THINGS ARE

4/7/99. As it is now the new condition given by them to receive them at our first Checkpoint, I have already sent two Osm Personnel ahead to receive them at our first Checkpoint - (Bendu Junction). Sir, I would be very grateful if you can send me the vehicle now to go and receive the MSF delegates at the other Checkpoint. Also Sir, UN Relief and the others are still awaiting to know the road they should take. Either from Kono to Sebbuma or Kono to Jongo Field via Kenema Best regard.

TO: Dr. William
 FROM: Mrs Francis MUSA
 SUB: MIFOS
 DATE: 02/08/99.

Sir, Be informed that I have arrived Sincerely with Mrs A. If your representative O.S.M. And I may like to know from you the time I will be receive the news as I will contact Kinsu father they will be arriving.

Sir, accept for your immediate action
 Best regard

① JANIJA	④ Glen
② Dr Horsen	③
③ S	Taylor
VAN JANIJA	Joseph Monro
Gerpon	Hussain
WHD/Kursal	
Gerpon	

Gerpon
 Sebellem. Post Record.
 Hope through handbook for
 should used the round from
 received. and the delegate
 Ker: your message has
 Date 02/02/99.
 Sub: Karpasa
 To: Lt. Col. Williams
 From: Lt. Col. Gerpon

TI DR. S. S. WILLIAMS
 FI ALPHA VANDI (O.S.M.)
 SI INFOS. DT. 020899

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT
 I HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED
 KARIMU SOWA FROM MAKEHI.
 ACCORDING TO HIM, THERE
 IS NO ASSES TO COMMUNI-
 CATION AT MAKEHI.

ACCORDING TO LT. COL
 TITUS, WE ARE NOT TO DE-
 TECTATE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
 M.G.O'S WHAT TO DO, DISPUTING
 WHATEVER DIRECTIVE THAT HAVE
 BEEN GIVEN TO YOU BY THE
 LEADER.

CONCERNING THESE LOCAL
 STAFF (SIERRA LEONENS)

AT MAKEWILL IS NOT SAFE
 SIR THE OSM TEAM
 SUFFERING OF THE PEOPLE.
 TEAM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
 THAT THEY WILL HOLD OSM
 WITH THE FOOD SUPPLY. THAT
 IS WHY WE ARE DEPT.
 EMPLOYMENT (OSM), THAT
 ARE ADVOCATING FOR OUR
 COL. TITUS AND THAT WE
 WITH EVER THEY WHAT. LT.
 HAS THE MIND TO DO
 THE N.G.O. AND THEREFORE
 NOT PROVIDED BY US BUT
 THAT THESE FOOD ARE
 MADE IT CLEAR TO US
 LT. COL. TITUS FURTHER

AT ALL. IN MAGBOROKA, NO
 PROBLEM AT ALL, THERE
 IS CO-ORDINATION.
 FINALLY, BE INFORM
 THAT ANY BREAK DOWN IN
 O.S.M OPERATION IN THE
 NORTHERN REGION, LT COL.
 TITUS AND OTHERS WILL BE
 RESPONSIBLE. NO FOOD HAS
 BEEN PROVIDED BY THE
 AUTHORITIES FOR THE OSM
 CO-ORDINATORS.

REGARDS.

Best regard.
with two vehicles.
there will be 5 delegates
receive and work with them.
Authorities and be ready to
today. Please inform the
heading for your location
two UN Relief NGOs will be
Be inform that

Sub: Information
To: Gastin Amara - Makem
From: S.S. William

3/8/99

To: Brig. Gen. Issah H. Sesay
From: S.S. William
3/8/99

3/8/99

To: Brig. Gen. Issah H. Sesay
From: S.S. William
Sub: Information
Sir,

PASSED

According to the
UN Relief NGOs, they are not
in position to work with the
Local Personnel that OSM will
provide. Instead, they will
only work with their Local
Staff employed by UN. Sir, I
know all the other NGOs are
going to do the same, and that
was not the mandate given to
me.

Sir, accept ^{your} for
infos for security reasons.

To: Dr. S.S. Williams
 From: S.S. Moroh, OSM, Comm (596)
 Sub: letters
 Date: 03/08/94
 Sir, The OSM team
 from Pendembu has arrived
 in Sogborenna, and the
 letters received by it are
 being given. Also will have
 already identified the guest
 house by the help of the
 Commander in charge
 Post Lodge.

Best regard.

To: Dr. S.S. Williams
 From: S.S. Moroh, OSM, Comm
 Sub: letters
 Date: 03/08/94
 Sir, The OSM arrived
 in Sogborenna.

Personnel. Sir, I am now finding it very difficult to stop both the national NGOs/their local staff whom they have already employed from F/town to enter our zone. Sir, according to Mr. Robert Pinter (UN) they are not in position to employ any body from our control zone. We are not to give or tell them who to employ to work into our zone. Sir, I'm afraid if we allow such practice from the NGOs, they will employ all their local staff in F/town leaving behind the capable and qualified Civilians that have suffered with us

991813

To: The Leader Through the High Command
 From: S. S. William
 Sub: Information
 Sir,

2/5/50

With reference to your order given to me to only contact the International and not national NGOs to come into our control zones to supply food/drugs, I regret to inform you that, the said order is not observed in Makeni. With no coordination with the High Command & me, they allowed both the national/International NGOs in Makeni, together with their national/International

Best regard. ~~by~~ forgotten.
 as the RUF ideology should not
 and support on the above issues,
 Sir, I need your advice
 food/drugs to our people.
 delaying the NGOs from supplying
 interpreted as preventing or
 the international NGOs will be
 and also the local personnels of
 the entering of the National NGOs
 without your support to stop
 as well. Sir, any attempt by me
 who have suffered with us
 provide jobs for the people
 need food and Drugs for the
 for the pass 8 to 9 years. We

4/8/99

To: Brig Gen. Issah H. Sesay

From: S.S. William

Sub: Information *passed*

Sir,

For your information
 MSF will be coming to Pendembu
 tomorrow Thursday, 5/8/99 instead
 of today. Sir, I would be very
 grateful if you can send me
 one vehicle so that I can go
 and receive them tomorrow
 Thursday 5/8/99.

Best regard.

To: Lt Col. Manawa ✓

From: S.S. William

Sub: Information

Sir
 You are hereby
 inform that the MSF team
 will be coming tomorrow
 Thursday 5/8/99. I will be
 grateful if you can inform
 your men at the various
 checkpoints. Also, I would like
 you to send Mohamed Sesay
 the Driver to the checkpoint
 according to our previous
 arrangement.
 Best regard

To: Brig. General Issah H. Sesay
 From: SS William Jasseh 5/8/99
 Sub: Urgent information.

This is to inform
 you that our men at
 Okro Hill arrested (12)
 Twelve of the UN
 monitoring ~~and~~ observers
 yesterday the 4/8/99.

According to UN (1)
 they dont know what
 our men want. As a
 result of the above
 the UN ~~with~~ Relief ^{and}
 the other NGOs plan
 Trip to Makum,
 Mogbwake via Kono

the our base were
 is cancelled for
 today the 5/8/99. You
 sir, we need
 advise for the above
 arrest as UN 1 is in
 the stands by to hear
 from UN. ~~passed~~
 Best Regards:
 Also, be inform that the MSF
 delegates will be in our zone
 tomorrow ~~Thursday~~ Friday 6/8/99.
 Sir, I would be grateful if
 you can send the vehicle so
 that I can go and receive
 them.

6th/08/99
 TO: S.S. William
 FR: ALPHA (OSM)
 SUPERVISOR
 Sub: information

Sir According to a
 letter written to me
 by Gastin the authorities
 at Makeni will only
 count a message from
 OSM at Makeni when
 the proof from the
 leader.

According to him,
 ACF Trucks came in
 with some food and
 blankets for mal-nurse

children and they
 referred to respondents
 office and camera
 on their work
 I stated them but
 they don't.
 Even now there is
 still no change
 toward the signal
 operators of Matern
 at Matern O
 Ages. Come in and
 get with out Matern
 Concept.
 According to Gauth
 Matern has referred

to accommodate any
 Osm members,
 If no action is taken
 against this, I will
 have no alternative
 but to pull out as
 the suffering is too
 much in Matern

Sir, immediate
 advice is highly
 needed.

End -

Signed

Time Rec: 10:30

4:25 P.M. hrs

passed over

stand by. Please be on the
one ready to come.
I will keep you
informed when they
UN team coming from
that point
by to proceed to ground
to receive the
you are to stand
sub: Respond passed
Dr. S.S. William local
to: Mr. S.S. Mankoski
S1819

TO: DR: S S William
FR: Maj Francis Mankoski
SUB: Information
6/11/89/99

Sir, Be informed that
I will be living for some
weeks point in respect of
the above you should
contact me at the said
location as to when
the Ngo are coming and
exact exact times.

The repeated repetition
of Osm are also going
to the said location
please accept for your
immediate understanding
Best regard.

To: Brigadier Gen. Isiah H...
 R. D. S. Williams 7/8/79
 Sub: Infos
 Be informed that we
 have returned 3 NFD's
 (MST) from Lamona.
 Their purpose of visit
 is to assess the whole
 area.
 The following areas
~~are to be assessed~~
 Penderbury
 Bawalle
 Dajome and finally
 ends at Ntshun.
 They will return
 back on Monday

Their names are
 1. Mrs. Giuseppa Scallo
 2. Mr. Yves Carrobes
 3. Dr. Ronald Gillies
 4. Mr. Thales
 9/8/79
 To: Brig. General Isiah H...
 R. D. S. Williams
 Sub: Information 9/8/79
 Be inform that the
 ISF delegates have
 returned this morning.
 Whilst they were
 with us we visited
 the following areas
 Dajome, Bawalle,
 Mobar, Kewika

into our zone.
 (A) Security quantity
 of items to be brought
 "Remember a 1500 lbs
 their delegates either
 such as base for
 discussed other issues
 Sir, we also
 to the above clinics
 distributed to bring
 to us instead they
 refused to hand over
 things which they've
 brought very few
 Sir, the 1st delegate
 respectfully
 Remember and M. G. Khan

(B) Security quantity
 of items to be brought
 into our zone
 (C) Security outlets
 of their personnels
 in case the Peace process
 fails.

Sir, details of the
 above shall be discuss
 ed upon my return.

Thank
 JASSA 12th/08/87
 10/8/99

To: Maj Gen. Sam Bockarie
 From: S. S. William
 Sub: Information
 Sir,
 With reference to

Sir, I would like to return to your location to discuss in details the 9/8/99 message sent to you. I would be grateful if a bike can be sent to collect me.
Best regard,

the Leaders order lost to all commanders not to loot, molest and harass the NGOs, I regret to inform you that some NGOs were looted in Makeni. Sir, I cannot give you the names of the NGOs because the looted NGOs failed to contact and inform me of their trip to Makeni.

12/18/99

To: The Leader Through the High Command
From: S. S. William
Sub: Information 12TH/08/99
Sir,

I regret to inform you that your order not to loot, molest and harass the NGOs into ^{our} zones is not obeyed by our brothers in Makeni. Sir, Some NGOs went to Makeni these days without first Coordinating with ~~the~~ our recognised High Command neither me, and they were looted. Sir, I cannot give you the names of the looted NGOs neither what the looted from them. It appears

Best regard, them.
 Sets in Makeni, Nogos, entering
 access to the Communication
 Makeni, still don't have any
 Magboroka, the Osm Personnel
 Personnel in Makeni through
 report received from the Osm
 Also Sir, according to
 with my Osm Personnel.
 Brothers in Makeni and not
 directly with some military
 Instead Sir, they are working
 with the High Command and me.
 that refused to go by your
 instruction to work with directly
 these are some of the Nogos

13/8/99

To: Maj Gen. Sam ~~Boekarie~~
 From: S. S. William
 Sub: Information
 Sir,

According to Brig.
 Mike Lamin, Food distribution
 for ^{our} Combatant at Okro Hill and
 Lunsar will start Tomorrow. This
 process will continue to Makeni,
 Magboroka, Kono, Bandajuma Yei
 Bunumbu, Segbwema and to your
 base. Sir, Food distribution for
 our Civilians will start next
 week. Sir, I would be grateful if
 this information can be pass to
 all the Concerned Commanders at
 the above areas.

Best regard, them.
 Sets in Makeni, Nogos, entering
 access to the Communication
 Makeni, still don't have any
 Magboroka, the Osm Personnel
 Personnel in Makeni through
 report received from the Osm
 Also Sir, according to
 with my Osm Personnel.
 Brothers in Makeni and not
 directly with some military
 Instead Sir, they are working
 with the High Command and me.
 that refused to go by hour
 instruction to work with directly
 these are some of the Nogos

13/8/99

To: Maj Gen. Sam ~~Boekarie~~
 From: S.S. William
 Sub: Information
 Sir,

According to Brig.
 Mike Lamin, Food distribution
 for ^{our} Combatant at Okro Hill and
 Lunsar will start Tomorrow. This
 process will continue to Makeni,
 Magboroka, Kono, Bandajuma Yelwa
 Bunumbu, Segbwema and to your
 base. Sir, Food distribution for
 our Civilians will start next
 week. Sir, I would be grateful if
 this information can be pass to
 all ~~the~~ Concerned Commanders at
 the above areas.

Best regards
my operations

PASSED

Soon as it is very urgent for
hoping to hear from you
distribution team, who would be moving
UN Relief and other food
ahead for to meet with the
Set. As I would like to move
me mobile with one communication
grateful if you can now make
Also Sir, I would be very

14/8/99

To: Major Gen. Sam Bockarie
From: S/Sgt William
Subj: Request

Sir,

I would like to
speak you directly on some
other important issues today.

Best regards.

According to Brig
Gen. Mike Lamin, he and the UN
Monitoring group will be visiting
Koindu. He hope to come up
with a date tomorrow.

Best regard.

PASSED

MR. COULD YOU PLEASE CONFIRM THIS.
 I HAVE BEEN START TO WORK WITH
 AND MR. TOMMY. THAT CLAIM TO
 I HAVE ALSO RECEIVED MR. JOSE
 ABOUT THE COMMIT OF THE MCD?
 SIR, WITH IS THE LATEST
 DT: 170899.
 S/ENQUIRY
 F/ S.S. MONOH
 T/ DR. S.S. WILLIAM

Best regard.
 Standby to speak you.
 Sir, I'm still on
 Civilians Population - up to here
 both the combatant and
 delay food distribution to
 as the above issue may
 Security issues at Okro Hill.
 Korom's assistance on the

16/8/99
 To: Maj. Gen. Sam Boekarie
 From: S. S. William
 Sub: Information

For your information
 distribution of food for our
 Combatants started over the
 week-end at Okro Hill / Lunsar.
 According to UN one, things
 didn't go down well at Okro
 Hill, but for Lunsar, there was
 no problem. They want to
 try again for Okro Hill coming
 to Mile Siaka. However, they
 need your and Lt Col. J.P.

Best regard
 Hoping to speak ~~with~~ you.
 to attend this meeting. I'm expected
 week in f/town. I'm expected
 Committee to meet next
 plans for the implementation
 Sir, there are
 onnel's return to them.
 we can help their pers-
 they would be glad if
 that they are with Osm.
 are very happy to know
 presently with us they
 their Personnel that are

26/8/99

Brig Gen
 To: Issah H. Sesay
 From: S.S. William
 Subj: Information

Sir

According to UN1,
 they are on their way today
 to Okro Hill to observe the
 security situation on the
 road. As plan, they want
 to go to Makeni for food
 distribution.

MSF is hoping
 to come into our zone for
 vaccination. Also, I spoke
 to the Heads of Missions;
 for PMU & ACF concerning

inform you that our Combatant
at Okro Hill and Lunsar were
supplied with food on the
14/15/8/99. Our Civilians at
Lunsar also received their
food. Food distribution for
Makeni and the rest of our
zones is not yet possible
due to the ^{disorderly} actions of our

I'm pleased to

Sir

Sub: Information

From: S. S. William

High Command

To: the Leader through the

27/8/99

Combatants at Okro Hill.
However Sir, the NGOs and
other military authorities
travelled to Makeni yesterday
and are expected to meet
today to discuss the Okro^{Hill}
Security Condition.

Sir, MSF made
their first Road trip from
Kenema to Pendembu on the
7/8/99. They were able to
access Jojoima, Baiwalla, Mobai,
Pendembu and Ngeihun Clinices.
On their way back to Kenema,
they also access the Kuvia and
Segbwema Hospital. They gave
very few drugs to the above
Clinices. Sir, there are now


Best regard
 next week.
 and I to join them in F/turn
 ing Miss Josephine Lengben
 and as such, they are expect-
 ation Committee to start working
 unt, they want the implement-
 tion Committee to start working
 Finally Sir, According to
 to work with our Personnel.
 to them also, they are willing
 Campaign next week. According
 MSF to start Vaccination
 Also, there are plans by
 Office in our Kallahan zone
 plans for MSF to open their

TO. DR. S-S. WILLIAM.
 FM. MR. AJ VANDY
 SUB. RESPONSE DATE. 28/10/99

MESSAGE REGARDING COMMUNI-
 CATION BLACKOUT WAS RECEIVED
 AND NOTED

HOWEVER EVERYBODY IS ANXIOUS
 ABOUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT
 IN RESPECT OF RELIEF AIDS

WE HAVE SENT THE WORKERS AT
 PENDEMBU TO WORK WITH THE
 MSF

REGARDS!!
 REC. FROM 1327HRS
 SIGNED: 
 28/10/99

John Phillips ^{12/10/99}

Report to ACF authorities in FT

Date: 28/10/99

Inlet Ration Programme

Incharge ~~of~~ from today's date

1. BPS stock balance 28/10/99
950 beneficiaries 0

1. BPS stock balance 15 cartons
2. Medicine balance nil
3. Bulgur - 81 1/2 kg
4. Sugar - 54 kg
5. BPS 13253 cakes
6. Oil - Nil
7. Bean - 21 1/2 cups
8. F-100 balance 842 pkts

9. F-75 balance 215 pkts

10. Semolina - 795 kg

11. CSB - 487

Regards!!

OS/SHS

Signed $\frac{28}{10}$

Edward '99

To: Brig. Issah Sebay

From: S. S. William

Sub: Infos

Sir,

There is still pressure on us from the INGOs concerning their vehicles. However, the below vehicles numbers were given to be searched and be retrieved to them; ① AAD051 (Land Cruiser) presently in Makeni; FI Truck - WU 41326; SB 24558; SB 24557 - All in Makeni. While WU 41327 is presently in Batkanu, and SM 2812 10 wheel; WU 37

905 are presently in
Fadugu.

Sir, the INGOs
have decided not to
carry out any operation
in ~~the North~~ ^{the North}
now, until all their items
and vehicles are returned.

According to them also,
CO Rockey is presently
having the ACF vehicle.

Best regard,

TRANSMITTED 2033HRS

To: Maj Gen. Sam Bockarie
From: S. S. William
Sub: Infos

Sir,

Save the
Children will be travelling
to Daru from Kenema starting
from Monday ~~1st~~ Nov. 1999.
on regular bases now. Also
Sir, they would like to
work with the OSM team
in Segbwema. Their are
plans to establish Segbwema
as one of the Save the
Children base to connect
the children with their
families.

Best regard

From: S.S. William
 To: S.S. Momoh (Segbwema)
 Sub: Infos

Be inform that
 Save the Children will
 now be travelling from
 Kenema to Daru on
 regular bases. Also, be
 prepare to work with
 Save the Children in
 Segbwema. You are to
 plan with them and
 inform all authorities
 accordingly.

Thanks

From: SURVIVAL
 TO: DR WILLIAM
 SUB: INFORMATION DATE: 1/11/99

TWO OF THE F1 TRUCK HAVE
 BEING RETRIEVED AND TURN
 OVER TO THE DRIVER AND
 THEY HAVE ALREADY LEFT FOR
 FREETOWN O

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO O

REGARDS!!

REC 21 09/99

Signed Edward
 +
 99

To: Brig. Issah Sesay
 From: S. S. William
 Sub: Infos

Sir,

Thanks very much
 for your effort as you have
 started retrieving the NGOs
 vehicles. I hope it will continue.

Sir, I would like
 to talk to you directly so that
 I can brief you in details on
 my operations here and the
 incoming NGOs missions into
 our zones.

Thanks

From: S.S. William

2/11/99

To: Paul Kpengbat

Sub: Infos

Further to our

discussions and plans last, sorry
 to inform you that; things didn't turn
 out to be as we were told by
 bro. Mike. It was good you didn't
 come.

However, you are
 to get in touch with the Co-ordina-
 tor Education for the below
 information from her;

1. Number of Schools within Kailahun
2. " " Teachers
- a. " " Trained Teachers
- b. " " UnTrained "
3. Number " Children by Classes

RUF FREE PRIMARY SCHOOL FOR THE POOR PROJECT-4/11/99
NATIONAL LABEL OF PAPERS, QUALIFIED TEACHERS AND UNQUALIFIED TEACHERS IN KALIAHAN DISTRICT P.T.D

RUF - FREE PEOPLE FOR

Best regard

You are to expect one ACI Land Cruiser and one truck today. Please inform all the authorities within your location.

From: S.S. William
3/11/99
To: Moses Sidi, Sub: Infos

You are to collect the above information from her for Kaliahan District and send them to me within the next 72 hrs. Also, OSM you are to divide into two groups or you give me the names of people that are going to work with me for the main time as Humanitarian Liaison RUF representatives in all our zones. You are to meet and draw up "By Laws" for OSM. OSM is going to be registered as one of the National NGOs.

a" Their Sec (M) (F)
b" Age Group

thanks

1. NUMBER OF SCHOOLS IN KAILASH
DISTRICT:

66

2. NO. OF TEACHERS:
186

3. NO. OF UNQUALIFIED TEACHERS
148

4. NO. OF QUALIFIED TEACHERS
38

5. NO. OF PUPILS:
5,567

6. NO. OF BOYS: 2,838

7. NO. OF GIRLS: 2,732

8. NO. OF CHIEFDOM WITH
SCHOOLS: 7

TO: DR. S S WILLIAM

FM: PASTOR MOSES

SUB: INFORMATION DATE 7/11/94

I RECEIVED A PERSONEL FROM
MANKIND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOP-
MENT ASSOCIATION MAKALI
JHAI HE IS THE FACILITATOR
FOR THE ORGANIZATION
HE TOLD ME THAT CARE IS

SUPPORTING THEM AND WE SHOULD
 ALLOW HIM TO DO REGISTRATIONS
 ACCORDING TO HIM THEY ARE
 OPERATING AT CHECKED LEVELS
 I NEED YOUR ADVICE

REGARDS!!

1734114

From: S.S. William 8/11/99
 To: Moses Sidiki
 Sub: Respond

You are not to
 allow any NGO/organisation that
~~the~~ fails to pass through the
 Right Channel. I'm not aware
 of that organisation and you
 should not allow them to

From: S.S. William 9/11/99
 To: Moses Sidiki
 Sub: Infos

Be inform that Concerned
 WorldWide will be heading for
 Makeni via your point Magburcka.
 You are to inform all authorities
 at your point. Also, you are to
 pass on the information to the
 brother Gaskin Amara of
 Makeni.

End.

I am hereby
 informing you that WFP
 IDRD VISION (Food Agency)
 will be going into our Kalahm
 zone anytime between 15/11/99
 13/1/99 to Monday 15/11/99 - Details
 on their mission regarding
 food distribution to the
 people would be discussed
 between the 13/1/99
 and 15/1/99. Also the
 WFP and IDRD
 are in the
 area of the
 Kalahm

To: Maj Gen Sam Bockarie
 From: S.S. Williams
 Sub: Infos

To: [unclear]
 From: C.O. Collins
 Sub: info

OXFarm, ICRC and Merlin
 who will be heading for
 Teng Field. I will keep
 you informed of their various
 dates.
 Best regards

From: S.S. William 24/1/99

To: Paul, Kpengbah
Sub: Infos/ Instruction

You are to send the names of five (5) Supervisors who will work with the MCH/EPI Kailahun District. The medical unit will select 12 people as Field Coordinators. I would like to get these names as soon as possible.

Also, you are to send the names of people (OSM) one each from Kailahun area, Segbwema, Tongo field to work with me in the office of the "Humanitarian Liaison".

You are to ~~talk~~ and get on the Radio so that, I can explain the above to you in details.

17:28 hrs

~~Wm~~

From: S.S. William

To: Dr Patrick Kulugbada

Sub: Infos

You are to send the names of Field Coordinators to work with MCH/EPI program within the Kailahun. There should be 2 Field Coordinators per c/dom. You are to leave Daru (Jawei) out. I suggest you include George Vandi presently serving in Mano Sewalu for Penguia c/dom

and Edith Marvel.

I hope to speak to you on the above issue. Please call me on the Radio.

16.22 TXS
~~me~~

From: S.S. William
To: Karimu Sowa
Sub: Instruction

You are to work hand in hand with Dr Gborie and send me the names of the Supervisors; F/Cooridators for the EPI programm. Please call me on the Radio for the

above details. ~~Send team~~
~~Join the office.~~
~~Send~~
From: S.S. William
To: Karimu S.S. Momeh
Sub: Infos

Be inform that World Vission are now on their way to Segbwema and Daru to give to the people who assisted them on the Road work "Food for Work". I would be very grateful if you can inform the Authorities Concerned. Also, give them your usual Cooperation.

You are to prepare a team to move to Tonga field to work with Merlin for the Polio Vaccination

End

To: Maj Sam Bockarie 27/11/99
From: S. S. William
Sub: Infos

Sir,

I would like to inform ^{you} that, the third round for Polio will be from 11 to 12 Dec. 1999. Sir, this time, the OSM and our medics are going to head the activities. A team from Kenema headed by Mr S.T. Dumbuya will join Kulugbanda to train our men. Those trained will inturn train the others.

~~...~~ Sir, Osm team should be sent to Bongo field, a team from Kenema will join them to carryout the same exercise. Also, another team will join the Osm Kono and Dr Gborie to ~~carryout~~ ^{Head} the exercise in Kono. Dr Gborie will train our people in Kono. Sir, there are plans for the Helicopter to ~~take~~ ^{take} the vaccines and few personals for the exercise.

Sir, World Vision team will be Travelling from Kenema today to give ^{for work} food, to those that ^{assisted} help in repairing the road from

Mano Junction ~~to~~ to Daru.
 After the above, plans will be
 worked out for food to go to
 Kailahun as soon as possible.

Also, ICRC had talk
 with the Leader and I to
 resume their operations within
 Kailahun (Segbwema/Daru). A
 meeting is to held between
 them and the Chairman after
 which, they will visit you in
 Buedu.

Sir, Handicap
 International is going to open
 one office in Makeni to help
 our Amputated brothers in
 the north. They will be

~~working on handicapped people
 who are in the north of the
 ICRC to help our brothers in
 Kailahun, Tongo Field, Kono
 and the ones in the north, their
 list should be given to the
 OSM in the North. Sir, I'm on
 standby to give you more details~~

Sir, I would be grateful
 if you can send me the below
 information regarding our Amputated
 brothers: Total nam

- a. Total number
 - b. Number of those whose upper
 Limb, amputated
 - c. Lower Limb amputated
- upper arm amputated
 Lower arm " for those
 in Kailahun, Tongo Field, Kono,

and the ones in the north, their
 list should be given to the
 OSM in the North. Sir, I'm on
 Standby to give you more details

and owes to your observation if you want me to.

Best regard.

~~FRANS DOTIKS~~

From: S.S. William 27/11/99
To: Karimu Sowa / Dr Gborie (Kono)
Sub: Infos

I would like the two of you to work hand in hand in selecting 168 Vaccinators plus 7 Supervisors in addition to those that carried out the Vaccination activities in Kono. The above ^{additional} Supporting Staff will enable ^{you} to cover the remaining 5 c/doms that you were not able to cover. Dr Gborie who knows

~~more about the Polio exercise,~~
~~is to head the Kono District team.~~
He is to select among the above and train them. The selected Train Personals will return Train the others. I am looking up to Dr Gborie for the success of the Train; and you for the whole exercise.

If all goes well, you are to expect an Helicopter to come with the Polio Vaccines and other materials. You people are to keep the brothers fully inform and work with them hand in hand. Many greetings from Sister Bintu Koroma and others friends from the Ministry to Dr

Gborie. Please Keep me inform as soon as you get the above figure.

End

OFFICE
EBONY
TRANS 125 HRS

From: S.S. William 27/11/99

To: Patrick Kulugbanda

Sub: Infos

You are to expect Mr S.T. Dumbuya your long time friend, and three others. They are coming to join you to ~~train~~ Train your Staff for the Polio Vaccination. You are now the NID Coordinator for Kailahan and I hope you will come up with one

~~hundred percent at the end of the exercise. I'm proud of you. The exercise is now in the hands of the OSM, MOH & MSF. Please work hand in hand with the OSM.~~

Thanks.

From: S.S. William 27/11/99

To: Paul Kpengbah

Sub: Infos

You are to expect 4 EPI personals from Kenema they will help Train our Staff for the Polio Vaccination. You are to join Kulugbanda in choose the people for the above operation. Be aware

of the fact now that the whole exercise is in the hands of OSM/MOH/MSF.

You and Kulugbanda are to work hand in hand in choosing the people for the training and the operation. You are to re-enforce S.S. Momoh to send the OSM Team to Tongo Field as soon as possible. You are to discuss that with Maj Gen. Sam Bockarie now and please act.
Thanks

27/11/99
From S.S. Momoh
To S.S. Momoh (Segbwema)
Sub: Infos

You are to expect MSF France in Segbwema today. They are coming to administer the Vitamin A Vaccine in your area. Also expect the World Vision "Food for Work" team and the food for those that assisted in the operation.

Thanks

[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

FROM: BRISIE GEORGE DIRECTOR
 IN THE DISTRICT HEALTH OFFICE
 SUB. RESPONSE
 DATE: 27/1/95

PLEASE LET ME TELL YOU
 THAT THERE ARE 12 CHIEFDOMS
 REMAINING FOR POLIO VACCINATION
 SO THE BEST WAY IS TO
 COME DOWN WITH MINISTER
 VANDY ON SUNDAY TO MAKE
 ARRANGEMENT WITH MORE STAFFS
 FOR THE TRAINING OF VACCINATORS

BEST REGARDS!!

RECD.

TO: DR WILLIAM
FROM: PASTOR MOSES
SUB: INFO

DATE: 27-11-99

SIR, MR. A.S. FIAD SANKOH IS THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OSM IN MAGBORAKO HE IS COMING TO SEE YOU IN PERSON FOR CERTAIN DISCUSSIONS AND WITH SOME LETTERS. I RECEIVED THE CO-ORDINATION OF SOCIAL AWARENESS AND DEVELOPMENT AND ACCORDING TO HIM, THEY HAVE BEING OPERATING WITHIN THE TWO CHIEFDOM IN THIS AREA AND THEY WILL EXTEND WITH IN THE DISTRICT. THEY DEPEND ON AGRICULTURE AND SOAP MAKING.

THEY ARE AT NO. 28 GORDON STREET FIDOWN. I MAY LIKE TO TALK WITH YOU WHEN YOU RECIEVE THIS MSG. BEST WISHES.

TO: DOC S.S. WILLIAMS.
FM: PASTOR MOSES.
SUB: INFO.

D-27-11-99.

I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT THE A.C.F. PERSONNELS HAD AN ACCIDENT YESTERDAY FROM MAKENI TO MAGBORAKO. A (1) THREE (3) OF THE PERSONNELS WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED NAMELY - (1) SAIDU MANSARAY (2) FRANCIS DAWEI (3) SANPA CONTEHO

THE THREE ARE PRESENTLY UNDER TREATMENT, AND THE VEHICLE WAS SERIOUSLY DAMAGED. END

From: S.S. William 30/11/99
To: Stanley Jusu (Pendambu)
Sub: Infos

Please expect the World Food Programm WFP team who are presently heading for your point. You are to work hand in hand with them. You are to inform the authorities at your point and those leading towards Segbwema. You are to keep me inform of all details.

TO S.S. WILLIAMS
Fr. PASIOR MOSES
Sub. Infos

THIS IS TO REPORT TO YOU THAT ALIE B. CONIETH (O.S.M) ARRIVED HERE YESTERDAY 03/11/99 HE HAS BRIEFED ALL THE GOODWORKING YOU ARE DOING AND WHAT YOU HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IS WELL APPRECIATED HE ALSO COME WITH THE AIDS PROGRAMME FOR KENC DISTRICT WE ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ON IT AND HE WILL RETURN TO REPORT TO YOU AS AGREED.

FIRM REGARDS

To: Maj Gen Sam Beckarie
 From: S. S. William
 Subj: Infos

Sir,

By the direction
 of the Leader, you are to
 allow the MSF France
 whom you invited to
 Buedu to please return.
 Thanks

FM. PASTOR MOSES
 TO. S.S. WILLIAMS
 SUB. INFOS RESPONSE DATE. 10/12/99

SIR, YOUR MESSAGE DATED ON THE
 8/12/99, RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGE
 BUT WE ARE STILL FACING MECHANICAL
 PROBLEM AS WE ARE STILL

FM. PASTOR MOSES
 TO. S.S. WILLIAMS
 SUB. INFOS DATE. 10/12/99

SIR, MR. ALIEU B. CENTER ARRIVED
 HERE THIS MORNING, DATED 10/12/99.
 THEY SLEPT AT MAKENI. BOTH THE VEH.
 AND THE MATERIALS ARRIVED SAFELY.
 -THEY ENCOUNTERED SOME PROBLEMS

IN MAKENI, WE WILL BE TRAVELLING
AT MAKENI AT ANY TIME FORTHNOW.
PLEASE INFORM THE MCH AND
AIDS OFFICER

WE HAVE RELEASED THE VEHICLE
TO DELIVER AT MILE 91 AND
BACK TO FREETOWN 0

FIRM REGARDS!!

FROM SS. WILLIAM
FOR MR. ALIEN B. CONIEM

15/12/99

SIR

From: S.S. William 15/12/99
 To: Mr. Alieu B. Corteh - Magboruka +
 Mr. Shillon Sesay - Makeni
 Sub: Instruction

You are to report with the Truck that went to collect the empty Polio materials. Also, you are not to leave behind the sister (Christaner) from Kono.
 Thanks

From: S.S. William 15/12/99
 To: Paul Kpengbah
 Sub: Infos

Be inform that, your wife Istata is presently in F/town here. She is worried about ^{you} and the daughter. Please try and get on the set so that you can speak to me.
 Thanks

From: S.S. William

21/12/99

To: Dr Gina-Makeni / Dr Tarawallie -
Kono

Sub: Instruction

With regard to the present development, you are hereby instructed to send the names of Three (3) Female Nurses. If all goes well, the said 3 Old Strugglers will pursue Nursing Training. Please send the names today.

Thanks

To S.S. Williams

fr. MR Paul Kpengbet

Sub. Infos

D/21-12-99

Sir,

I have long time wishing to talk to you but no way to get in contact with you. Please stage a suitable time that you will have chance to talk with me. I am always with the Radio to hear from you.

Also inform ISAIA that am happy to hear from her. I know she is worried as I am worried too. No problem with her daughter. She is with good health. Please Sir, am urgently waiting to hear from you.

From: S. S. William
To: Gasikin Amara
Sub: Respond

22/12/99

message with reference
to your ^{message} regarding the food
for your point, you can go
ahead with the distribution.
Send me all details after
the exercise.

Thanks

To: Dr. S. S. William
From: Dr. S. S. Williams
From: Dr. John Sarawalko
Sub: Response
Date: 22/12/99
Sir

Names of the

Selected Nurses:-

1. Nurse - Judith Nyumah
2. " - Ishia Bio
3. " - Mabinty Samawaitie

your brother (one men one)
is extending greetings to you.
Best Regard

Rec. Zennith

10:57am $\frac{22}{12}{99}$

SUBJECT

So PLEASE BE INFORMED ABOUT THIS

THEY EVEN USED THE NAMES OF SOME OSM PERSONNEL e.g OSM CHAIRMAN (MAGBURAKA)

ACCEPT FOR INFO AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

BEST REGARDS!!

1055HRS

SECRETARY GENERAL

FOR THE UN

THEY & GROUP OF THE

WHAT I MEAN TO

MEAN TO

2ND

IN

1

From: S.S. William 5/1/2000
 To: Paul Kpengbah
 Subj: Infos

This is to inform you that, I would be coming together with UNHCR, UNHCU and other INGOs next week. I will give you all details concerning the mission before the week ends. Please pass on the information to the other brothers. I would like you to start preparing for this mission. Please make sure Francis of Pendembu to move to longo field.

Thanks.

From: S.S. William 5/1/2000
 To: Stanley Jusu
 Sub: Infos ~~PASSED~~

There is a plan mission which I hope to join the UNHCR, UNHACU and other INGOs for Kailahun. However, you are to pass on the information and start preparing. The mission is due to kick off hopefully next week.

You are to also inform Francis to move to Tongo Field immediately to form the OSM. Subject would be visiting that point.

Thanks

From: S.S. William 5/1/2000
 To: Moses Sidikie
 Sub: Respond ~~PASSED~~

I received your message concerning the GS and their new Local NGO in Tonkolili. You are to leave them alone to go ahead with. Any Local NGO that comes within the RUF is a brain child of the OSM. I have no idea of the said Local NGO in Tonkolili. I will talk to the PA about it later, but please leave them alone, it is not easy. Those OSM persons that wants to join them can go ahead.

Thanks

To: The Commander (-Kambia) 7/1/2000
From: S.S. William (RUF Humanitarian
Coordinator)

Sub: Infos

Sir,

This is to inform you that; I am planning to travel with the INGOs; UNHCR, UNHCR and FAO to access the Humanitaria needs of the Civilians population in your area. We hope to be in your local (Kambia) Rokupr on Wednesday 11/1/2000. and return on Friday 13/1/2000.

Sir, I would be very grateful if all the Civilians population can be

organized including the Returnees. Hoping to hear from you before our visit
PASSED 8/1/2000 Best regard

To: MR. S. S. WILLIAM
FM: MR. KARIMU SOKA OSM
KONO

SUB: NIDS INFOS - KONO DIST
DATE: 8/0/ - 2000

SR BE INFORMED THAT THE POLIO VACCINATION EXERCISE IN KONO ON THE FIRST FACE HAS ENDED. REPORT STILL INTACT. SO PLEASE ADVISE ON WHAT TO DO NEXT

BEST REGARDS!!

1/0/

To: Col. Kailondo/Brig Morrison
Kallon

From: S.S. William

Sub: Infos

Date: 10/1/2000

Sir,

I would like to inform you that MSF Holland will be returning to Makeni and Magboruka to undertake their medical activities in the above Districts. Sir, please expect them tomorrow in Makeni and the next day Magboruka. There will be three delegates and if possible two vehicles.

Thanks.

From: S.S. William

To: Gaskin (Makeni) / Moses Sidikie
(Magboruka)

Sub: Infos

Be inform that MSF (H) will be coming to Makeni tomorrow to resume their medical activities in your respective districts. You are to receive them and work with them as previously planned.

I would be visiting Kambia on Wednesday 12/1/2000 with a group of UN NGOs and other NGOs. Please send me the names of the OSM Personnel in that area.

End

TO - DR S.S. WILLIAMS @ FROM -
MR. GASKIN @ 1/14th JAN 2000

I HAVE STOPPED CRS OPERATION
AT FADUGU AND KAMABAI TO THE O.S.M
PERSONNEL AT THE RESPECTIVE AREAS
AS PER YOUR INSTRUCTION @ I HAVE
ALSO RECIEVE ONE MR MAMUUD
KAMARA WITH A PROJECT CALLED
AGRICULTURE SEED DEVELOPMENT
BUT I HAVE REFERED HIM TO
YOU FOR CLEARANCE @ MR MINKAI-
LU OF HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL
IS HERE, ADVICE TO THE ABOVE
ISSUE @ OVER 8 COMMUNITY BASE
ORGANISATION (C.B.O.S) HAVE
REGISTERED WITH THE O.S.M.
AND I AM STILL EXPECTING

MORE @ SINCERE REGARDS

From: S.S. William : 14/1/2000
To: Gaskin
Sub: Respond

Your message
was well received. Tell
CRS that, If they want to
operate into our zones, let
them contact the RUF
Humanitarian Coordinator
first. Infact, you are
heading the RUF Humanitarian
Coordinating Office - Makeni.
From now onwards that is
your new title and not
OSM Supervisor Makeni.
Tell any NGO that comes

your way. I will ~~tell~~ brief
you more when I visit
Makeni

You can allow
Handicap International to
go ahead. Minkailu is to
work hand in hand with
you people. Any organisation
that registered with the
Osm and is ready to work
with you people, can go
ahead. Please pass on the
message to all Osm brothers
in the North. Make sure
Osm is form in Kambai
before our next visit

Thanks.

From: S.S. William 14/1/2000
To: Zman
Sub: Infos

According to your
brother Fayia, he is ready
to go in search of the ~~res~~
Cassette but he wants to
know the System that you
have or you are presently
using.

Hoping to hear from
you soon.

17-01-2000

FICOL KOMBA. T/DR WILLIAMS. INFO \$ EMBURY

SIR,

BE INFORMED THAT I HAVE DISPATCHED
 CAPT CONTEH (I.D. Lt. Comm 3rd SOE) AND SOME
 OF HIS PERSONNELS AT KAMBIA TO RECIEVE
 YOU @ IN RESPECT OF THIS, I WILL LIKE
 TO HEAR FROM YOU WEITHER THE PEOPLE
 ARE TO STAY PUT OR THEY ARE TO RETURN
 TO BASE @ YOUR URGENT RESPONSE WILL
 BE SOLICITED AS THE PEOPLE ARE THEIR
 WAITING @ END. END @ 1630 HR

17/1/2000

From: S.S. William

To: Col Komba

Sub: Respond

Your message was received. Sorry to inform you that the UN Humanitarian organisations didnt get the necessary security clearance for them to go to Kambia. However, they are still waiting for the clearance. They brothers are to return to Base till they hear from me. I have also instructed Gaskin of Makeni to go to Kambia and form the OSM there. I would be grateful if you can assist Gaskin in the above

Thanks

F/COL KOMBA.

D/17th JAN 2000

TO: DR S-S WILLIAMS.

1827 HRS

SUB: RESPOND.

YOUR MESSAGE RECEIVED AND CONTENTS
WELL UNDERSTOOD WITH ME, AND
MY BRIGADE, THE CIVIL HUMANITARIAN
PERSONNELS ARE WELCOME

BEST REGARDS

From: S. S. William

18/1/2000

To: Col Komba

Sub: Infos/Enquiry

Be inform that,
a Team of Caritas personnels
met me this morning Complaining
that Col Bai Burea Commandeer
their Vehicle and arrested the
Driver. The other Personnels

were allowed to come back
to F/town while the Vehicle
and the Driver are still with
Col Bai Burea.

I would be very
grateful if you can do an
immediate investigation into
the above matter. Also, to
ensure that the Caritas
Personnel and the Vehicle
are release immediately. Bro.
I don't want the Leader to
and the other NGOs to know
about it. It will creat fear
and delay the movement of
other NGOs into our zones.

PLEASED ~~BE~~ your immediate action
is needed.

Thanks.

To: Dr Williams
From: Mr. Gaskin (RUFF Humanitarian head officer)

Sub: Appreciation and enquiry
Date - 19-01-2000

Sir, I'm grateful for the new title and elevation. I would like to know if all Comrades here are aware of the new appointment more like when it concerns office establishment.

How was the reception at Kambig? Have Mahmoud Kaman of the agricultural seeds development met you?

Please confirm if my trip to Kambig should be done after your visit here and when will that be. Kindly inform me about your visit here.

Yours faithfully
Fin. Regard

To: DR S.S. WILLIAMS R. GASKIN
D-20-01-2000

- SIR, PLEASE ADVISE ON THE FOLLOWING:
1. MY BASIC DUTIES AS R.U.F.P HUMANITARIAN HEAD
 2. THE OPERATIONS OF WORLD HOPE INTERNATIONAL WHO ARE HERE TO REGISTER ALL AMPUTEES FOR LIMP FIXING AND MR MAX COATED OF ADMINISTRATION

OR ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY
RESTRUCTURING DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
2001/02
END

2541

From: S. S. William 21/1/2000
To: Gaskin
Sub: Respond

I cannot confirm any date for now concerning my coming to Makeni. I will give you the full details as soon as it is organised. Concerning your new title, I will give you the full details when I visit Makeni. I will also brief all authorities concerned. Consider yourself as someone representing

^{the AUEP}
The Humanitarian Coordinating
office F/ton posted in
Makeni.

Also, I have no idea concerning World Hope International and Association for Community Restructuring Development Project. The above groups have never met me. Mohamed Kamara have met me and I'm going to send them back to you.

FAM REGARDS!!

To: Col. Memeh Rogers 29/1/2000
From: S. S. William
Sub: Infos

Reference to relief activities all over the Country. I'm hereby informing you that, our old friends ICRC will be travelling into Kailahun District to assess situation in the District as stated below: Tuesday 1/2/2000, ICRC will travel from Kenema to Daru and pass the night there. Wednesday 2/2/2000, ICRC will travel from Daru to Kailahun, they will sleep in Kailahun. They will have meeting with you and ~~all~~

whoever is concern.

Sir, I would like you and the CSM to receive ~~this~~ mission and treat them with all due respect. Any good report from the above mission will encourage the rest of the other Humanitarian Community S/L to move in all our zones. Also, any bad report that the said mission will give, it will delay their movement into our zones. I will be grateful if you can inform all your Commanders starting from Bendu Junction to Pendembu.

TRANSMITTED Best regard

From: S. S. William 29/1/2000
 To: Paul Kpengba TRANSMITTED
 Sub: Infos

You are hereby inform that, ICRC will be coming on accessment into Kailahun starting from Tuesday 1/2/2000. They will sleep in Daru on the above ^{date}. You are to go all out as usual to ~~gather~~ ^{have} our Native Dancers to receive and entertain the ICRC mission in Kailahun on the 2/2/2000. Make sure AA Vandi and others join you for this important ICRC mission. You are hereby instructed to treat them nicely. Thanks

To: Lt Col. Dennis Lansang
 From: S. S. William
 Sub: Infos

Be inform that our old friends ICRC will be travelling from Kenema to Daru on the 1/2/2000. You are to ~~expect~~ ^{expect} them in Pendembu on Wednesday 2/2/2000. They will make a brief stay in Pendembu to talk to you and later move to Kailahun. Your usual Cooperation in Relief operation in our zones is highly needed. The above mission is important to us all
 TRANSMITTED. (S.H.H.S) Best regard

From: S.S. William 29/1/2000
 To: Stanley Jusu
 Sub: Instruction

You are hereby instructed to receive ICKC in Pendembu on Wednesday 2/2/2000. You are to travel with them to Kailahun and pass the night there. Please return the following day with them and expect anything NGO in due course.

Your last letter to me was received, Content was well noted. Please check at my house and advise on my family.

Thanks TRANSMITTED
 1548 HRS-

From: S.S. William 29/1/2000
 To: Gaskin
 Sub: Infos

Be inform that, I have met with both World Hope International and the S/Leone Red Cross (SLRC). You are to expect the World Hope International anytime from Tuesday 1/2/2000 in Makeni. You are to receive them and introduce them to all the Authorities Concern. They have been instructed to work hand in hand with you people. You can go ahead in giving your guidelines to them.

TRANSMITTED / 1529 HRS Thanks

To Brig Issah H. Sesay
From: S.S. William
Sub: Infos

I would like to thank you very much for your Cooperation in having the Caritas Driver and the Vehicle back to F/town. Also, be inform that the UN Humanitarian Assessment Team will be heading for Makeni and Magboruka respectively. As usual, I would be very grateful if the above Team can be welcome and taking care of. I'm happy to inform you that all the Humanitarian missions to this point came

back to F/town and praise you alot

Best regard,
Ack. 16 08 2000

From: S.S. William
To: GasKin
Sub: Infos

Be inform that Andrew Cox of the UN Humanitarian will be leading other INGOs to Makeni and Magboruka tomorrow. Please receive them and work with them whenever they need your service. You can also inform the Brothers in Magboruka. Please expect me at Makeni on Tuesday 8/2/2000.

I will confirm that later.

Thanks

ACK. 16:12 HRS

To: Col Momoh Rogers
From: S.S. William
Sub: Infos

Sir,

Please expect Mr Patrick Vival Head of Mission to S/Leone (ICRC) who will be heading the mission to Kailahun ^{Dist.} tomorrow. He will be accompany by 5 five others with two vehicles. I hope they will be entertain by our Native Singers and Dancers.

Best regard

To Mr. S.S William
Fr. Mr. Paul Kpengla
Sub: Report Date 03-2-2000

Sir, on the 02-2-2000 we received ICRC delegate of two (2) Whites two (2) blacks driver with two vehicles @

They were received by a large number of people including OSM personels @

The purpose of the meeting is to do assessment on agricultural programmes in the Kailahun area @ We also

discussed some medical programme and visited the hospital.

They intended to come back and take some people to Kenema for both problems.

They decided to see about the road from Daru to Kailahun as this was one of the requests made by the people.

They were received the same way we use to do, take them to the commander in charge and later to the OSU guest house at Kailahun.

They left and decided to come back in two weeks time.

Aek. 11/2/1975 Best regards!!

To: Dr. S.S. Williams
 From: Gaskin

Sub: Infos. Date: 03-2-2000

Sir, this serve to inform you that I have dispatched a three man team to establish OSU office at Kamakwe Plakoko and Kambia. I have also received world hope international and the registration is on.

Meanwhile, I haven't seen the UN humanitarian team and the Ngoso. Still awaiting confirmation of your visit.

at this point
With regards
Ack 1226HES

To: Col Momoh Rogers 4/2/2000
From: S.S. William
Sub: Infos

Thanks very much
for receiving and taken care
of the I.C.R.C mission while
they were within your areas
of control.

Also, be inform that
AFRICARE S/L will be visiting
Kailahun District starting from
the 8th - 11th Feb, 2000. The
purpose of the visit is to do
Assessment Survey in three 3

Chiefdom in the Kailahun
District - Malema, Mandu,
Dia. They will cover
Agriculture, Health, Non Food
Items and Emergency Relief
in the above 3 Chiefdoms.

This time as compare to the
past we have many NGOs
coming into Kailahun and they
are going to share responsibilities
and not one NGO going to
undertake all responsibilities

Sir, the Osm should
join them for the above
exercise. You are also expect
SAVE the CHILDREN on the
4/2/2000 CH-1000

Best regard

From: S.S. Williams 4/2/2000
 THE KCHIDWEI
 Sub: Infos / Instruction :
 You are hereby inform
 that AFRICARE S/L will be
 sending a team of 5 brothers
 on Assessment mission in the
 Kailahun District to cover
 Three 3 Chiefdoms only.
 The Chiefdoms are, Malema,
 Mandu and Dia. They are
 going to cover Agriculture,
 Health, Non food items and
 Emergency Relief. They have
 their forms which they will
 use during the Survey. As you
 may see, no one NGO is
 going to cover all the areas

Within one district. We are
 going to see so many NGOs
 in all the Districts. You are
 therefore instructed to join
 the above NGO for the survey
 with your team. Please don't
 leave A.A Vandi behind. The
 survey is from the 8-11 Feb
 2000. Also, expect to see
 children on the 7/2/2000.
 Best regard
 10. Dennis Lansana 6/2/2000
 From: S.S. Williams
 Sub: Remind to go
 Be inform that
 SAVE THE CHILDREN will be
 your point

tomorrow 7/2/2000. They
 will collect Stanley Jusu
 and then move to Kailahun
 to visit and talk to Col.
 Momoh Rogers. After which
 they will return to your
 point and conduct their
 assessment at your point.
 Also, Africare will be
 heading for Kailahun
 through your point.

Your usual Cooperation
 is highly needed. Thanks
 very much as ICRC
 Commended you alot

Best regard
 tek R19H48

To: Col. Momoh Rogers 9/2/2000
 From: S.S. William
 Sub: Infos

You are hereby
 inform that, the UN Humanitar
 Assistance Coordinating Unit
 UN HACU, 3R, INGOs and the
 RUF Humanitarian Coordinator
 will be visiting Kailahun
 District on the 16/2/2000.

Above important Team
 will sleep in Kailahun under
 your supervision and depart
 the next day. I have being
 instructed to inform you
 about the above important
 Teams visit for the information
 of all your Commanders within

back what jobs/works you
 will attend to. **Ask** **SS/**
 to **SS/** **SS/** **SS/**
From **B. B. Williams** **SS/**
Top **100** **SS/** **SS/**
Sub **Inf** **SS/** **SS/**
Special **Adm** **SS/** **SS/**
Development **SS/** **SS/**
 and **SS/** **SS/** **SS/**
 to you. You are referred to
 them. to. Know what they talk to.
 kind Objectives **SS/** **SS/**
 will **SS/** **SS/** **SS/**
 the **OSM**, let them register
 under **OSM**. **From** **SS/**
 are to talk to any local

important to you. The
 information of all your
 Commanders they are
 remove all check points
 all areas that are going
 to Unit. No **SS/** **SS/**
 melostation. That the above
 team should be receive and
 welcome by both **SS/** **SS/**
 and Commanders.
 Your usual cooperation.
 highly needed. **SS/** **SS/**
 Medium **SS/** **SS/** **SS/**
 Best regard

10/10/1971
 10/10/1971
 10/10/1971

of all your commanders within
 teams visit for the information
 about the above important
 instructed to inform you
 the next day, I have being
 your supervision and depart
 will sleep in Kailahun under
 above important team
 District on the 16/2/2000.
 will be visiting Kailahun
 RUF humanitarian Coordinator
 UNHCR, INGOs and the
 Assistance Coordinating Unit
 inform that the UN Humanitarian
 you are hereby
 Sub: Infos
 From: S.S. William
 To: Col. Momoh Rogers 9/2/2000

your control. According to
 the Chairman/Leader RUF
 there should be no checkpoints
 no harassment, no molestation.
 Both Civilians and Commanders
 are to receive and welcome
 the above team in Kailahun.
 Best regard

From: S.S. William 9/2/99
 To: S.S. Momoh (Segbewema)
 Sub: Infos

Be inform that
 ICRC will be visiting your
 point tomorrow. They will
 then pass to Daru. Also,
 SF France will be heading
 your point on Saturday 12/2/2000.

OF OFFICERS IN KATLEHRA
DATE 9th 1300
SIR THEY WANT THIS
FROM WITH (NAME) VEHICLE
AND (NAME) (NAME) (NAME)
LEFT FOR THE THREE OFFICERS
THEY ARE FROM PK-2000
CITY (NAME) (NAME) (NAME)

THEY ALSO WILL SPEND SOME
TIME WITH YOU AND THEN
MOVE TO DARI. YOU CAN PASS
ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION TO
THE AUTHORITIES CONCERN.
THANKS

Group and visit your
Office. You can request
them and later inform
Thanks

NB, The Coordinator of (SAM)
is called Abdul Jalloh

To: Brig Issah H. Sesay 9/2/2000
From: S. S. Williams
Sub: Infos

This is to inform
you that UN Humanitarian
Coordinating Unit (UNHACU)
& INGOs and the RUF
Humanitarian Coordinator
will be making a trip
on the below listed dates:
Monday 8/2/2000 F/Two to

you about the above
 instructed me to inform
 The Leader/Chairman had
 Operate in all of our zones
 Community S/L (NGOs) to
 ence in the Humanitarian
 above trip is to build confed-
 The purpose of the
 p/Loko / F/Thun
 Friday 18/2/2000 Makeni to
 Makeni (Sleep in Makeni)
 Thursday 17/2/2000 Kono to
 (to Kono. Sleep in Kono)
 Wednesday 16/2/2000 Kailahun
 Kailahun
 (Team will sleep in
 Tuesday 15/2/2000 Be to Kailahun
 Be (Sleep)

100 Participants have being
 invited including you for the
 above workshop. I shall give you
 all details when I come.

Best regard

To: Col. Momoh Rogers 13/2/2000
 From: S. S. William
 Sub: Reminder

Reference to my
 message to you dated 9/2/2000,
 Instead of visiting and
 passing the night in Kailahun
 we are only going to spend
 few hrs. I'm still pressing
 the Team to go by road
 and sleep in Kailahun.
 According to them, we are

100 Participants have being invited including you for the above workshop. I shall give you all details when I come.

Best regard
Ack -

To: Col. Momoh Rogers 13/2/2000
From: S. S. William
Sub: Reminder

Reference to my message to you dated 9/2/2000, instead of visiting and passing the night in Kailahun we are only going to spend few hrs. I'm still pressing the Team to go by road and sleep in Kailahun. According to them, we are

on Wednesday 16/2/2000 by Air after the Kailahun visit the same day. You are to inform all Authorities Concern. Make sure you come up with the name of the place of Landing as soon as possible.

Ack 11:03 AM
14/2/2000
Thanks

From: S. S. William 13/2/2000
To: Paul Kpengbah
Sub: Infos

You are to expect the Team whose message you received on the 9/2/2000. We are now coming by air on Wednesday

Please leave the children
as you are only coming to
F/town for one or two weeks.

Thanks

From: S.S. William 15/2/2000

To: Gaskin (Makeni)

Sub: Infos

I regret to inform
you that, the mission that was
due to Kailahun, Kono via
Makeni was called off by
UNMASIL.

As a matter of
urgency, I would like you
to dispatch Mr Shyllon
Sesay to me as soon as
you receive this message.

He is to come immediately.
I will pay back his transport
as soon as he gets to F/town.
He is coming to collect all
details for the 23-24/2/2000
Workshop in Makeni.

Also, please expect
UNICEF in LUNSAR and
Makeni tomorrow. They are
coming to visit some of
the schools. Please cooperate.

Thanks

ack 1804421
15/2/2000

and other representatives on Tuesday
UN Humanitarian Agencies, INGOs
I am due in Makeni with the
message to you dated 9/2/2000
With reference to my
Sub: Infos

From: S. S. William
To: Brig Issah H. Sesay 13/2/2000

Best regards
BY THE BSM AND THE ASSOCIATED
CHIEFS OF THE BSM
THE BSM WILL RECEIVE
at Makeni on 9/2/2000
THE BSM IS CURRENTLY
OPERATING IN THE
AREA OF THE BSM
AND THE ASSOCIATED
CHIEFS OF THE BSM
AND THE ASSOCIATED
CHIEFS OF THE BSM

To: Col Gboa & M. Kallon /
Gaskin & Moses Sidikie OSM
From: S. S. William
Sub: Infos.
Be inform that, I
will be ~~coming~~ at your point
with the UN Humanitarian
Agencies tomorrow. While
with you, we will have a
short meeting and return
the same day.
Best regard.

15/2/2000 instead of 14/2/2000.
We hope to Sleep in Makeni
and on ~~Wednesday~~ 15/2/2000, we hope
to travel to Kallahun by Air.
Spend Sometime and then fly to
Kono the same day. We also
hope to spend Sometime in
Kono and later return to F/town.

Sir, I would be grateful
if the above new plan is
explained to all Commanders
concerned. Also, I would like
to know the Landing Site for us
in Kono.

Also, we planned to
conduct the Community Reintegration
Rehabilitation Project (CRRP)
in Makeni from the 23-24/2/2000.

- 18) Radio Log Book #1
28 April 1989 1999 – 11 September 1999

Supra

by M. M. M. M.

grands

cahier

96

pages

FM- LOG
TO - JPR. D.A.F

28TH 04-99

INFO COPY OF MONITORED MSG. BTW S/MAN AND UNUSAL STN. TO SURRENDER WITH ELEMENTS OF THE S.L.A @ ON THIS ISSUE DIALOGUE ENDED WITH PROMISED TO SEND PARCE TO S/MAN ON FRIDAY AT A SCHEDULE POINT FOR COLLECTION @

[Signature]
28
04
99

FM- THE LION

30TH 04-99

TO - S/MAN, BRIG. MANI, BLACK JAH & GAFFA
INFO-LOG @

REF. MY DIR. RELATING YR. MOV. TO TOG I'M AGAIN RE-INFORCING THAT YOU PEOPLE SHOULD MOVE TO KAILAHUH SO THAT HELI WILL PICK YOU UP FOR TRANSMISSION TO TO @ YR. DEL. IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR US TO RECAL A UNANIMOUS PROPOSAL FOR THE FOR COMING NEGOCIATION @ LET US FORGET ALL DIFFERENCES AND COMPLY STRICTLY WITH MY DIRRECTIVES @ WHEN I COME ON THE CN I WILL SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS @ THE HELI WILL PICK YOU ALL FM THE BORDER AS THE OTH BROTHERS WHO ARE PRESENTLY IN TOGO @

[Signature]
30
04
99

TO - THE LION
FM - BLACK JAH
INFO - ALL STNS.

01ST 05 - 99

SITREP MOU. TO TOGO @ SIR, REF TO YOUR
IN RESPECT OF SUBJ. ABOVE, DELIGATION FM THIS I
HAVE FOUND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO TRAVEL TO VR
DUE TO SECURITY REASON @ THE ROUTE LEADING TO
YOUR LOC IS PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY THE EN
I THERE FOR ADVICE THE UN TO MAKE
PROPER ARRANGEMENT TO LIFT UP THE DELICIA
FM. THIS @ REMEMBER THAT THE NEGOCIATION/DIAW
IS FOR EVER LASTING PEACE IN S/LEONE AS
INDIVIDUAL MATTER BUT SHOULD INVOLVE REPRE
NTATIVES OF ALL STAKE HOLDERS @ ACCEPT FOR VO
INFO AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING @

Adonis 01
05
99

Fm - THE LION
TO - BLACK JAH, BRIG. MAMA & GAFFA
SUBJ - DIRECTIVE 1ST - 05 - 99

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW MY
DIRECTIONS DESPATCHED TO YOU RELATING TO
PARTICIPATION IN THE LOME CONSULTATION @
UN HELI. WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO PICK
YOU PEOPLE UP FROM INSIDE S/LEONE
LIBERIA @ YOU SHOULD REPORT TO KAILANTU
WHERE YOU WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO
MONROVIA FOR ONWARD TRANS. TO MY LOC
(LOME) @ STRICTLY COMPLY TO THIS ORDER
AND MAKE SURE YOU PARTICIPATE IN THE
CURRENT TALKS IN LOME @ ALSO OBEY

LAST ORDERS AND ~~AAARE~~ TRANSMITTED TO QIBRI
RELATING TO THE MOV'T. OF JOSEPH MOMOH T
KAILATHUN O HE SHOULD BY ALL MEANS REPE
TO KAILATHUN WITHOUT DELAY O

DA ⁰⁴/₀₅ / 99

Fm- THE LION

To - LOG

SUBJ- DIRECTIVE

04TH 05-99

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO SEND A
COMPRHENSIVE REPORT PERTAINING PRESENT
SIT. ON ALL THE F/LINES MORE EXPECIALLY ~~THE~~
THE BO/FREE TOWN H/WAY O

DA ⁰⁴/₀₅ / 99

Fm- THE LION

05TH 05-9

TO - EQUALIZER, BRIG. MANI, BLACK JAH & GAFFI
THROUGH - PLANET

YOU HAVE VIOLATED MY DIRECTIVES GIVE
YOU FOR MORE THAN THREE (03) DAYS O
YOU WILL BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR ANY BREAK
DOWN TOWARDS THAT AXIS O

DA ⁰⁵/₀₅ / 99

Fm- THE LION

05TH 05-99

TO - EQUALIZER, BLACK JAH, BRIG. MANI & GAFFA
THROUGH PLANET

I'M STILL INSTRUCTING THAT YOU
SHOULD MOVE TO KAILATHUN FOR MY POINT
(LOME) AS GEN. WILL BE AT KAILATHUN
TOMORROW TO RECEIVE YOU PEOPLE O

DA ⁰⁵/₀₅ / 99



TO - THE LION
FM - LOG

06TH 05-99

SUBJ - IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

SIR,

PER OUR LAST DISCUSSION I HAVE ALREADY SENT FOR THE SAID ITEM UP ON RECEIVING IT I WILL DESPATCH IT TO YOUR LOC @

DA Quile
06
05
99

FM - THE LION
TO - LOG

07TH 05-99

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO DO ALL WHAT YOU CAN TO DEFFEND KOND AND TONGO MORE OVER YOU SHOULD TRY VERY HARD TO RECAPTURE MILE-91 AND MASIARA WHILE AT THE SAME TIME YOU RESUME IMMEDIATE OFFENSIVE TOWARDS KENEMA AND BO @

ALSO MR. KAI GBANJA AND PATRIK (PRO) SHOULD COME ALONG WITH GEN. IBRAHIM @

DA Quile
07
05
99

FM - THE LION
TO - LOG

SUBJ - TWO RELIGIOUS GROUP LEADERS FM THE R.U.F

1 11 19

FM- THE LION

12TH 05-99

TO- LOG

SUBJ- TWO (2) RELIGIOUS GROUPS FROM THE RUF/SL ZONES TO TRAVEL TO TOGO-LOME (1)

THE INTER-RELIGIOUS COUNCIL OF S/LEONE (I.R.C.SL) HAVE KINDLY ASKED THE LEADER IN PERSON CPL. FODAY SANKOH TO PLEASE SEND ~~THE~~ BOTH THE HEADS OF CRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS TO TRAVEL WITH GEN. IBRAHIM TO MEET ME IN TOGO AND TO MEET THE ABOVE NAMED GROUP ALREADY APPROVED BY MEC (1)

(1) REV. M.S. ALPHA-BUEDU (1) THE C/MAN JUNGLE UNITED CRISTIAN COUNCEL (J.U.C.C)

(2) ALHAJI OMARU SESAY - NANTIMA (1) THE DISTRICT CHIEF IMAM OF THE RUF/SL LIBERATED ZONES PLEASE ARRANGE FASTER FOR THESE PEOPLE TO COME WITH GEN. IBRAHIM (1)

MANY REGARDS TO ALL (1)

20 HRS

[Signature]
12/05/99

TO- THE LION

12TH 05-99

FM- SUPER MAN

SUBJ- INFORMATION

SIR,

GAFFA AND LT COL F.A.T. SESAY HAVE LEFT ^{AS} WITH A DELIGATION TO YOUR LOCATION (1) VERY SOON YOU WILL RECEIVE THEM (1) I DID NOT GO BECAUSE OF THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE GROUND (1) I'M DOING MY LEVEL BEST TO CONTAIN SITUATION TO OUR OWN ADVANTAGE (1)

20 45

[Signature]
12/05/99

FM THE LION
TO - LOZ

12TH 05 - 99

SUBJ - DIR

BY MY DIR. YOU ARE TO DISREGARD MY PREVIOUS
ORDERS PERTAINING THE MOVEMENT OF MR. KAI GRANJA,
PATRIC AMARA AND THE RELIGIOUS HEADS @

2115 HRS ///

[Signature]
13
05
99

FM - THE LEADER

TO - S/MAN

13TH 05 - 99

SUBJ - RESPONSE

REF. YOUR LAST MSG. DATED 12TH 05 - 99,
YOUR STAYING AT OK67 IS NOT APPROVED @ BY
ME @ YOU ARE TO REPORT TO KAILAHUN FOR
ONWARDS MOVEMENT TO MY LOZ (LOME - TEGD)
AS PER MY PREVIOUS DIRECTIVE @

[Signature]
13
05
99

TO - THE LION

FM - CONCORD

17TH 05 - 99

SUBJ - INFOS

SIR,

GEN. IBRAHIM HAS BEEN DESPATCHED
TO YOUR LOC. WITH ~~BE~~ \$ 20,000 US AND ALL
MSG. FROM ME @ ALSO SIR, YOU ARE TO GIVE US
TWO WEEKS SO THAT WE CAN SEND YOU EXAM-
PLE OF A QUALITY AS WE WILL BE UNDERTAKING
A VERY SERIOUS MISSION ACTIVITY @

GREETINGS TO YOU. FM ALL THE BROTHERS AND

P.T.O

SISTERS @

PSE. ACCEPT INFO FOR NEG. ACTION @

2107 HRS

17/05/99

FM - THE LION

TO - CONCORD

17TH 05-99

SUBJ - INFOS

AS PER THE RESULT FROM THE PEOPLE CONGRESS MEETING AT YOUR LOC, THE DELEGATE THE DELEGATES WERE NOT TO ENGAGE IN ANY NEGOCIATION/PEACE TALKS WITH THE GOVT. UNLESS I AM A FREE MAN @ HOW EVER, THE DEVELOPEMENT HERE IS GEARED TOWARDS MY RELEASE THROUGH POLITICAL DIALOGUES @ III

I HAVE THEREFORE DESPATCHED BRIG. MIKE LAMIN TO BRIEF YOU AND TO GET THE VIEW OF EVERY BODY @ HE IS TO RETURN WITHIN FOUR TO FIVE DAYS TIME TO ENABLE HIM TAKE PART IN THE FORTH COMING NEGOCIATION SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE ON THE 24TH OF THIS MONTH @ HE WILL GIVE YOU DETAIL BRIEFING UPON HIS ARRIVAL @

EXTEND MY REGARDS TO EVERY ONE @

2145 HRS

17/05/99

FM - THE LION

TO - BRIG. MORRIS KALLON

17TH 05-99

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO SEND A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT PERTAINING ~~YOUR~~

P. 10

THE ENEMY MOVEMENT WITH IN YOUR AREA
OF OPERATION ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTHERN
PROVINCE ☉

2217 HRS.

DAF ¹⁷
05
99

FM- THE LION

19TH 05-99

TO - LOG

SUBJ- INFOS

REF - YOU ARE TO INFORM ALL SOLDIERS AND
CIVILIANS THAT EYE HAVE SIGNED A CEASE FIRE
AGREEMENT WITH THE S.L.P.P. GOVT. ON THE 24TH DAY OF
MAY 1999 WITH A HOPE OF CREATING AN APPROPRIATE
ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE FOR THE HOLDING OF THE
PEACE TALKS IN LOME - TOGO ☉

BELOW LISTED ARE THE RULES BINDING THE CEASE
FIRE :

- 1, AGREE TO CEASE FIRE AS FM. 24TH MAY 1999, THE DAY
THAT ~~THE~~ PRESIDENT EYADEMA INVITED FOREIGN MINISTERS
OF ECOWAS TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO S/LEONE
☉ IT WAS ~~ALSO~~ FURTHER AGREED THAT THE DIALOGUE
BTW. THE GOVT. OF S/L AND THE R.U.F WOULD COMME
NCE ON THE 25TH MAY 1999 ☉
- 2, MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT AND RESPECTIVE POSITIONS
~~IN~~ S/LEONE AS OF THE 24TH MAY 1999, AND REFRAIN FM.
ANY HOSTILE OR ~~AGGRESSIVE~~ AGGRESSIVE ACTS
WHICH COULD UNDERMINE THE PEACE PROCESS ☉
- 3, COMMIT TO START NEGOCIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH
INVOLVING ALL RELEVANT PARTIES IN THE DISCUS-

SIONS, NOT LATER THAN 25TH MAY 1999 IN LOME - TOGO

4, GUARANTEE SAFE AND UNHINDERED ACCESS BY
 HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO ALL PEOPLE
 IN NEED, ESTABLISH SAFE CORRIDORS FOR THE PRO-
 DUCION OF FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO ECONO-
 MIZERS BEHIND RUF. LINES, AND TO RUF COMBATA-
 NTS BEHIND ECONOMIC LINES ☺

5, IMM. RELEASE OF ALL ^{NON} COMBATANTS AND PRISONERS OF
 WAR ☺

6, REQ. THE UN SUBJECT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
 AUTHORIZATION TO DEPLOY MILITARY OBSERVERS AS
 SOON AS POSSIBLE TO OBSERVE COMPLIANCE BY
 THE GOVT. FORCES (ECONOMIC AND C.D.F.) AND THE
 RUF INCLUDING THE FORMER A.R.R.C FORCES,
 WITH THE CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT ☺

THIS AGREEMENT IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
 ANY OTHER AGREEMENT OR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
 WHICH MAY BE DISCUSSED DURING DIALOGUE
 BTW. THE GOVT. AND THE RUF ☺

WITH REGARDS TO THE ABOVE LISTED RUF
 SPELT OUT IN THE AGREEMENT, YOU THEREFORE
 TAKE THE FOL. POINTS IN TO CONSIDERATION

- 1, SET UP CHECK POINTS IN ALL PLACES UNDER YOUR
 CONTROL ☺
- 2, SEARCH ALL VEH. ENTERING YOUR ZONES FOR

ARMS AND AMMO ○

- 3, YOU SHOULD LOOSE NO GROUNDS ALREADY HELD AS OF THE 26TH OF MAY 1999 ○
- 4, NO MIL. VEH. OR PERS. SHOULD PASS THROUGH YR. ZONES WITH ARMS AND AMMO ○
- 5, DO NOT HARASS ANY CIV. OR TAKE ANY THING FM. THEM AS IT IS AGAINST ~~THE~~ OUR CODE OF CONDUCT ○
- 6, ANY ATTEMPT BY THE EN. TO INFILTRATE OUR POSITIONS AS THEY DID IN 1996, IS SERIOUSLY LIABLE TO REPELL AND PURSUE TO THE POINT OF ORIGIN
- 7, ALL SWRS. SHOULD KEEP TO THEIR TERRITORIES AND AVOID TOO MUCH OF PTKS. MOST ESPECIALLY THE EN. ZONES

JADG.

SWRS ALLOW HUMANITARIAN ORGANS TO PASS THROUGH YR. AREAS/ZONES AS SPELT OUT IN POINT FOUR OF THE AGREEMENT ○ BUT NOT WITH WEAPONS AND AMMO ○

MY BEST REGARDS AND GREETINGS TO ALL THE MEN ○

2125

20
05
99

TO- THE LION
 FM- BRIG. KALLON
 SUBJ- RESPONSE

21ST 05-99

SIR,

REF. TO YOUR ^{LAST} MSG. FROM KOND, MAGI
 ORAKA, MAKALI, MATODIKA, MASINGBI, MABONTO AND
 OTHRE IMPORTANT TOWNS ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL
 IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE ONLY SUPER MAN
 AND OTHERS STILL CAUSING PROBLEMS AND HARAS
 ASSING AROUND MY AREAS

2325 HRS

DA/Quire $\frac{21}{05}$
 99

TO- THE LION
 FM- SUPERMAN
 INFO ALL STATIONS
 SUBJ- RESPONSE

24TH 05-99

SIR,

YOUR MSG. WAS RECEIVED AND ALL
 CONTENTS BEARING FULL APPREHENDED
 I STAND TO RESPECT AND OBEY YOUR COM
 AND AT ANY POINTING ^{IN} TIME YOU ARE
 HONOURED AS OUR LEADER AND COMMANDE
 IN CHIEF OF THE RUF/SI

IN MY OWN CAPACITY AS A BATT
 GROUP COMMANDER APPOINTED IN YOUR AB
 ENCE BY LT COL J. P. KURUMA AN LOG, I
 WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN THE ROLE I HAV
 PLAYED AND EVEN IN YOUR ~~PRESENT~~
 PRESENT ABOVE ALL, I HAVE ALWAYS
 EXPRESSED LOYALTY AND DEDICATION TO

THE CAUSE THAT HAVE BLENDED US TOGETHER © THERE FOR ON NO ACCOUNT WILL I STAND TO CHALLENGE A COURSE THAT I KNOW STAND'S ~~FOR~~ FOR OUR BENEFIT ©

IF YOU COULD RE-CALL THERE HAS BEEN SERIES OF PROBLEMS CREATED BY PEOPLE TOWARDS OUR LIVES © EVEN BEFORE THE PHASE II (Ø2) OPERATION STARTED, I WOULD HAVE JOINED THE OPERATION ALONG WITH YOU BUT BECAUSE OF FRACAS THAT ARISED BETWEEN MY SELF AND LOG, I COULDN'T JOIN UP NOT UNTIL LATER I JOINED OPERATIONS WITH THE LATE BROTHER PAPA TO ESTABLISH A JUNGLE WITH THE SOLE INTENTION TO EASE BURDEN ON TROOPS YOU WERE ADVANCING WITH ©

OF COURSE SINCE THAT OPERATION, NOTHING ACTUALLY HAPPENED AGAIN BETWEEN MY SELF AND ANY COMMANDER © UNTIL YOU LEFT FOR THE ABIDJAN BEACE TALKS, I MAINTAINI MAINTAINED MY COMMAND AND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY © ZENO OF COURSE WAS CALLED UPON FROM MY JUNGLE TO TAKE OVER COMMAND AT ZOGODA ©

ZOGODA FELL IN YOUR ABSENCE AND UP TILL NOW ZENO IS AT LARGE © I LISTENED AND OBEIED THE INSTRUCTION SENT BY YOU TO JOIN FORCES WITH THE AFRC © BUT EVEN THAT AGAIN WAS MISCONSTRUCTED BY THE HIGH COMMAND ON BEHALF OF THE ^{ENTIRE} RUF MAIN THRUST TO F/IGN THAT

I'M SURE CAN BE POSSIBLE REASON FOR OUR UN-WARRANTED WITHDRAWAL FROM F/TOWN WITH ALL THESE MISTAKES ON THE PART OF OUR COMMANDERS, I STILL TRIED VERY HARD TO MAINTAIN MY HOLD ON KOND O AND I CAN TELL YOU THAT SINCE OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM F/TOWN THE ENEMY NEVER CAPTURED THE ENTIRE TOWN SHIP OF KONDY (KOND) O EVERY COMBATANT IN KOND CAN ATTEST TO THAT O

FROM KOND, I ORGANISED OPERATION FOR KABALA, MAKENI AND F/TOWN O BUT BEF RE THAT THERE WERE LOT OF APPREHENSIONS FROM THE SEA TOWARDS THE RUFF BECAUSE OF THE UN-LAWFUL REPUTITION OF THEIR BROTHERS O UPON ARRIVAL IN THEIR MIDST, REF YOUR MSG. AFTER THE MAY 25 CONF I WAS ABLED TO EASE THAT TENSION AND THEY GAVE THEIR FULLEST CO-OPERATION THAT REACHED US TO THIS POINT O

IN KONDADUQU AGAIN AFTER THE AT AND CAPTURE OF KABALA I WAS THREATENED BY LOG AFTER ALL MY EFFORTS O OF OUR THAT PROBLEM ACCORDING TO THE PEOPLE'S W/ COUNCIL WAS HARMONISED O BUT WHEN WE GOT AGAIN TO MAKENI AFTER A TEDIOUS FIGHT AND CASUALTY A TROUP WAS ALSO ORGANISED BRIG MORRIS KALLON AND OTHERS TO HARM O BUT BY GOD'S PRAISE I WAS ABLED TO ERADICATE THE PROBLEM THAT LED TO THE DEATH

OF RAMBO WAS NOT INTENTIONAL ○ AFTER YOU TRIED TO SPEAK LOG ON ONE OR TWO OCCASIONS, I WAS INSTRUCTED BY YOU TO TRY VERY HARD TO KNOW FROM THEM WHY THEY DIDN'T TALK TO YOU ○ ON MY WAY TO MARENJI, I WAS ARMED AND A MAJOR DIED FROM MY GROUP ○ FROM THAT TIME THERE WAS A FIERCE FIGHT THAT LED TO THE DEATH OF THE LATE BROTHER (RAMBO) ○ INDEED HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD BURIAL AT THE MARENJI TOWN HALL ○

ALSO, THE INFORMATION THAT I INSULTED ALL C/SIGNS AND THAT I SEEMINGLY BECAME AN ENEMY IS NOT CORRECT ○ IT WAS LOG THAT ORDERED ALL STATIONS TO REFRAIN FROM TALKING TO ME ○ BUT NEVER THE LESS WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE CAUSE ○

SIR, TALKING OF MY MOVEMENT TO YOUR POINT VIA KAILAHUN CAN NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF MY LIFE ○ ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THESE BROTHERS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ELIMINATE ME EXCEPT THAT THEY WISH TO SEE MY MANY YEARS STRUGGLE GO IN VAIN EVEN WITHOUT SEEN YOU ○

CONCLUSIVELY I WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN THE LOYALTY OF ALL THE SWA/RUF OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS TO OUR LIBERATION CAUSE ○

YOUR BODY GUARD RAY, JACKSON, MILHIE, LIVING STONE, VALUE AND MANY OTHERS AND EVEN PA P'S BANDA AND BRIG ISSAC ARE WITH US ○ UPON YOUR ARRIVAL SIR, YOU WILL

BE BRIEFED ABOUT ALL DEVELOPMENTS IN YOUR ABSENCE O

BEST REGARDS O

2315 HRS

[Signature]
24
05
99

TO- THE LION

FM- PLANET

SUBJ- INFOS

24th 05-99

SIR,

REPORTS FM THE VARIOUS FRONT LINES STATED THE FOLLOWING FOR TODAY O

MATOTOKA, MAGBAS AND RUKUPRUEWEN ATTACKED BY THE ENEMIES TODAY IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE O MATOTOKA ATTACK WAS REPEATEDLY REPELLED BUT DETAILS FROM RUKUPRUEWEN AND MAGBAS IS YET TO FOLLOW O

ALSO SEMBEYEMA AND KAMBOMF AROUND TUNYO FIELD IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE CAME UNDER ATTACK BUT NO DETAIL REPORT YET RECEIVED FROM THERE O

THIS IS FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ACTION O

2302 HRS

[Signature]
24
05
99

TO- PLANET

INFO- THE LION

FM- TIMING BOMB (S/MAN)

25th 05-99

SUBJ- RESPONSE

SIR,

YOUR MESSAGE YESTERDAY WAS WELL

RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD BUT SIR, I MAY FIRST
 LIKE TO GET THE STATISTICS OF MEN FROM THE
 FRONT LINE COMMANDERS FOR A PROPER HAND
 OVERLING ☺ AFTER ALL I WILL REPORT TO YOUR
 WOC ☺

PSE. ACCEPT FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING ☺

0900 HRS

APR 25
 05
 99

FM- THE LION

TO- PLANET

SUBS- DIRECTIVE

25TH 05-99

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO SEND A
 COMPREHENSIVE RESPOND MESSAGE CONCERNING
 THE MESSAGE SENT BY SUPER MAN LAST NIGHT ☺

I'M STANDING BY TO GET THE MESSAGE
 THIS MORNING ☺

1030 HRS

APR 25
 05
 99

TO- THE LION THROUGH PLANET

FM- MR. HILTON FYLE

25TH 05-99

SUBJ- INFORMATION

SIR,

GREETINGS TO YOU OUR LEADER THIS
 IS TO INFORM YOU THAT ON SATURDAY 12TH OF JUNE
 1999, WE SHALL BE MOVING THE OFFICIAL LAUNCH
 OF OUR FM STATION AND THE GRADUATION CEREMONY
 FOR THE STUDENTS WHO ARE GOING TO WORK THERE
 WE ALL WANT YOU TO COME AND BE OUR GUEST OF
 HONOUR ☺ BUT IF YOU CAN NOT COME PLEASE APPOINT

SOME ONE TO REPRESENT YOU @ WE SHALL ALL
 BE AWARDED A SPECIAL PRIZE TO THE BEST RELIGIOUS
 STUDENT @ IT IS CALLED TODAY'S KANAKA'S PRIZE @ IF
 YOU HAVE ANY SPECIAL MESSAGE OR DONATION FOR
 HIM, THAT WILL BE FINED @

WE ARE ALL PRAYING FOR VICTORY AND FOR
 YOU THE GREAT SURVIVAL @

MISS ARS *[Signature]* $\frac{25}{05}$
 99

F-SMILE

TO - PLANET

25TH MAY, 1999

SUBS-DIRECTIVE

YOU ARE TO STRICTLY ORDER ALL SENIOR
 OFFICERS, COMMANDERS, ESPECIALLY LT COL. JUNIOR LION
 DESIST FROM ANY CONTACT WITH ECOCOMMO AND
 UN-OBSERVERS @ THIS IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED @
 THEY SHOULD TAKE COMMAND/ ORDERS FROM THE
 HIGH COMMAND AT D.H.Q @

THIS DIRECTIVE IS IN REFERENCE ~~WITH~~
 THE INSTRUCTION INTERVIEW ON B.B.C. AT 1705H
 TODAY'S DATE WHERE RUFSL/AERC SLDRS MET,
 WITH ECOCOMMO 40 MILES FROM F/TOWN @

THIS IS OUT OF COURTESY AND DOES NOT
 CONFORM TO ORDERS OF THE HIGH COMMAND
 AND @ I AM SO MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT SUCH
 BEHAVIOUR AS THE NEGOTIATION HERE IS IN
 THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MOVEMENT @ THE
 SHOULD HAVE NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH
 ECOCOMMO AS THEY ARE ENEMIES THAT

HAVE CAUSED THE WAR TO BE PROLONGED
EXTEND MY SINCERE GREETINGS AND
APPRECIATIONS TO ALL

2245 HRS
27/05/99

TO - PLANET
INFO - LION
FM - TIMING BOMB

27TH - 05 - 99

SIR,

BELOW QUOTED IS A SITREP
FROM COL. KUMBA FROM COL. KUMBA
TO - T/BOMB SUBJECT SITREP DATE
26TH - 05 - 99 ON THE 24TH OF MAY, 1999
THE GUINEANS ATTACKED OUR POSITION
AT KUKUPR BUT THEY WERE REPELLED
WE GOT THREE (03) KIA, FIVE (05)
WIA AND THREE MIA IN RESPECT
OF THE ABOVE SIRA, YOUR URGENT RESPONSE
IS HIGHLY SOLICITED FOR FAST AND
SMOOTH OPERATION SIR, I DESPATCHED
ONE HUNDRED (100) MAN POWER AS
RE-ENFORCEMENT FOR THE SAID
GROUND

MORE EVER SIR, I MAY LIKE
YOU TO SEND US ONE (01) GROUND
MISSILE AND A.A. ROUNDS AS WE ARE
HIGHLY IN NEED OF THEM

UNQUOTE ACCEPT FOR YOUR
ADVICE

BEST REGARDS
2022 HRS
27/05/99

FM- PLANET
TO - TIMING BOMB
SUBJ- RESPONSE

27TH 05-99

YOUR MSG RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD YOU ARE TO FIRST WORK BY THE DIRECTIVE GIVEN BY THE LEADER FOR ME TO RE-ENFORCE YOU SHOULD DO THE HAND OVERING TO THE NEWLY APPOINTED COMMANDER WE HAVE TO DO HIS ASSIGNMENT AND SEND IN THE REPORT

PLEASE TREAT AS VERY URGENT
BEST REGARDS
2045 HRS

[Signature]
27
05
99

FM- SMILE
TO - PLANET
SUBJ- DIRECTIVE

27-05-99

BY MY DIRECTIVE TIMING BOMB IS TO DELAY THE HANDING OVER AND TAKING OVER ~~FM~~ SPARROW AND YOU SHOULD CALL ME THROUGH THE OTHER SYSTEM

BEST REGARDS
2049 HRS

[Signature]
27
05
99

FM- THE LION
TO - TIMING BOMB
SUBJ- DIRECTIVE

27TH 05-99

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU SHOULD DELAY THE HANDING OVER TO SPARROW FOR SEC REASON

B/REGARDS
2057 HRS

[Signature]
27
05
99

TO - PLANET
INFO C/S - VISSION DNE
FM - SURVIVAL
SUBS - INFOS

05TH-06-99

SIR,

BELOW ARE THE TOWNS WHERE
THE CEASE FIRE HAS BEEN VIOLATED BY THE
KAMAJORS AND THE NIGERIAN ALFA JETS

3rd page

- ① SHEGBWEMA AND MOBAI IN THE ISALLAHUN DIST
- ② *LAYIA, KAIMADO AND KOTDU TOWN IN THE KONO DIST
- ③ TONGO IN THE KENEMA DIST
- ④ *MATOTOKA AND MAKEW IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE

PSE. ACCEPT INFO FOR NEC. ACTION

BEST REGARDS

1424 HRS

[Signature]
05
06
99

TO - SMILE
FM - GAFFA
SUBJ - REPORT
SERB, 1

10TH-06-99

TO - SMILE
FM - GAFFA

11TH - 06 - 99

SUBJ - REPORT

SIR,

I SAFELY ARRIVED ON BASE ON THE 09TH 06 - 99. ALL INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO BE PASSED ON TO SUPER MAN HAS GONE THROUGH. THERE WILL BE A FORUM TOMORROW 12TH - 06 - 99 INCLUDING ALL COMMANDERS AND SENIOR OFFICERS TO PUT ALL MESSAGES TOGETHER ADRESSED TO THEM ESPECIALLY TARIK'S ORDERS FROM LOG AND ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

BESIDES THAT I MAY BE VISITING ALL TARGETS TO TALK TO THE MEN PERTAINING ALL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATIONS ABOUT HOW THE PEACE PROCESS IS GOING ON AND WHAT ARE OUR OWN STAND.

I SPENT TWO (02) DAYS IN ABIDJAN, ONE (01) DAY IN GUINEA AND JUST AFTER THAT I WAS IN OUR TERRITORY. I STARTED TALKING TO THE MEN RIGHT FROM KABALA AXIS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE INSTRUCTION GIVEN. I WILL BE TALKING TO THE SIGNALLERS TO MAKE SURE THEY ERECT THEIR ANTENNA PROPERLY FOR BETTER COMMUNICATION WITH YOU.

SIR, I WILL PUT THE FOLLOWING TO YOU AND ALL ACTIVITIES FOR AMINATA AND BABY-TEE. THE AUTHORITY SAID EXCEPT YOU INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THEIR DOCUMENTS FOR THEM TO BE INFORMED ABOUT THEIR MOVEMENT.

(THE FOREIGN MINISTER) BEFORE THE SISTERS
COULD MOVE JUST AS I TOLD YOU LAST @

GREETINGS AND BEST REGARDS @

DA [Signature] 12/06/99

0947

TO-SMILE
FM-CONCORD
SUBS-INTREP

12/06-99

SIR,

ACCORDING TO INTREP RECEIVED
THE EN. (ECOMOG) HAVE PLANED TO
LAUNCH A MASSIVE OFFENSIVE ATTACK ON
ALL OUR POSITIONS BY NEXT WEEK IN-
ORDER TO BREAK THE CEASE FIRE @ THEY
ARE PRESENTLY BUILDING UP THEIR DEFF-
ENSIVE POSITIONS AS FOLLOWS @ ALFA @
FOUR (04) PAF TRUCKS ARE LOADED WITH
EN. TROOPS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED WITHIN
GERRAY AND PORT-LOKO @

BRAND @ FM WATER LOK TO MILE-47 @
CHARLIE @ FM WATERLOO TO MABANG BRIDGE @

OWN TROOPS HAVE THERE FOREDECIDE
TO DESIST FM MOVEMEN TOWARDS EN-DEFFEN-
SIVE POSITION @ ALSO, WE ARE ALL ON
MAXIMUM ALERTNESS TO DENY ENEMY
PROPOSED INTENSION @

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND
NECESSARY ACTION @

1925 HRS

DA [Signature] 12/06/99

TO - SMILE
 FM - CONCORD
 SUBJ - SITREP

12TH-06-99

SIR,

ON THE 10TH-06-99, 14 OF OUR MEN WHICH INCLUDES SENIOR OFFICERS WENT TO TALK TO CIVILIANS IN OUR LIBERATED ZONES AT MASIN AND MARONI AND THEY WERE ADUPTED BY THE EN. (ECOMOG TPS) THAT ARE DEPLOYED AT LOKO-MASAMA @

AFTER THE ADUCTION OF OUR MEN THEY WERE TAKEN TO LUNGI GARISON AND WERE FORCEFULLY DISARMED BY THE ECOMOG COMMANDER THERE (LT. COL. BOU), LATER DESPATCHED THEM TO F/TOWN @

UP ON ARRIVAL AT F/TOWN THEY WERE GIVEN ACCESS TO COMMUNICATION BY UNIMSIL AND THROUGH THE COMMUNICATION THEY WERE ABLE TO GIVE THEIR OWN VERSION OF STORY @ I SPOKE WITH ONE UNIMSIL MAJOR AT WILBER FORCE BKS. WHO GAVE ME ASSURANCE THAT OUR MEN WILL BE WELL TAKEN CARE OF AND NOTHING WILL WRONG WITH THEM AND THEY WILL INFO GEN. GEORGIE @

SIR, I WILL INFO YOU THE LATEST UPON GETTING IN TOUCH WITH GEN. GEORGIE @ THIS IS THE PRESENT ACT OF THE ECOMOG @

PSE. ACCEPT INFO FOR YOUR NEC. ADVICE @

1750 HRS

12
06
99

TO - SMILE
 FM - CONCORD
 SUBJ - RESPONSE

14TH - 06 - 99

SIR,

BELOW IS DETAIL SCHEDULE FOR THE BROADCASTING STATION ○

- 1, THE NAME OF THE STATION IS RADIO FREEDOM
- 2, THE OFFICIAL OPENING DATE WILL BE ON THE 21ST JUNE 1999 (NEXT WEEK MONDAY) ○
- 3, OPERATION DAYS - FROM SUNDAYS TO SATURDAYS (EVERY DAY) ○
- 4, OPENING HOURS IN THE MORNING WILL BE AT 0700 HRS AND CLOSE DOWN AT 1100 HRS IN THE MORNING ○
- ⑤ THE EVENING BROADCASTING WILL BEGIN AT 1600 HRS AND CLOSE DOWN AT 2200 HRS IN THE NIGHT EVERY DAY ○ THE FREQUENCY IS 98.00 ○

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR NECESSARY INFO ○

0915 HRS

D. J. Smith $\frac{14}{06}{99}$

TO - SMILE
 FM - CONCORD
 SUBJ - REPORT

19TH - 06 - 99

SIR,

THE KAMAJORS ATTACKED KANTIA VILLAGE IN THE KAMBIA DISTRICT ON THE 16TH OF JUNE 1999 ○ WE SUCCESSFULLY REPELLED THEM AND CAPTURED THE FOLLOWING FROM THEM

- ① TWO (02) SINGLE BARRELS
- ② G-3 RIFLES - TWO (02)

ALSO I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING ITEMS FROM MEMUNA THROUGH THE BROTHER JUNGLE ○

- ① TWO (02) SATELITE TELEPHONES
- ② 56 CASSETES
- ③ ONE (01) RECORDED CASSETTE WITH YOUR VOICE ON IT
- ④ THE CODEE WORDS

SIR, THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND NECESSARY ADVICE ○

1121 HRS

DA [Signature] 19
 06
 99

TO-SMILE THROUGH LOG
 FROM-TIME BOMB
 INFO ALL STATIONS

21TH 06-99

SIR,

I HAVE LISTENED TO YOU AND ON BEHALF OF THE NORTHERN JUNGLE, I WILL REASURE YOU THAT OUR COMMITMENT AND DEDICAN TO THE STRUGGLE WHICH WE HAVE STRUGGLED FOR OVER YEARS REMAIN UNCHANGE ○ MISTAKE: THAT HAVE BEEN DONE BY THE BROTHERS WHICH I THINK NO HUMAN BEIN INFALLABLE AND AS SUCH ARE SUBJETS TO MISTAKE ○

NOT WITHSTANDING, I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CURTRAIL THIS AND WITH THE SUPPORT OF TH SENIOR OFFICERS ON THE GROUND ○ WE CAN A EVERY MISHAPENING UNDER CONTROL ○

PERMIT ME SIR TO INFORM YOU TH

WHAT YOU HEARD YESTERDAY CAN NOT BE DISPUTED OR CHALLENGED O

HOWEVER, BEFORE THE DIALOGUE THIS MORNING WITH YOU, I HAVE ALREADY DESPATCHED A FACT FINDING TO THE WESTERN END TO ASARTAIN WHAT WENT ~~WRONG~~ O

I WILL RE-ASURE YOU AGAIN THAT THE ENTIRE NORTH AND WESTERN JUNGLE ARE WITH YOU IN SPIRIT AND ASPECT O PLEASE BE ASUR OF OUR FULLEST AND UNRELENTLES SUPPORT OF A FATHERLY LOVE IN THE INTEREST OF OUR STRUGGLE

BEST REGARDS O
2230 HRS

DA ²¹ ₀₆ ₉₉

TO - THE LION INFO - CONCORD
FM - THE 1ST BDE HQ (C/S VULTURE) 22TH 06-99
SUBJ - REPORT O

SIR.

RELEASE OF OWN TROOPS ARRESTED WHILE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING O SUBJECT MATTER BEARING YESTERDAY THROUGH THE ASSISTANT OF UN MILITARY OBSERVERS IN S/LEONE O 14 OF THE MEN WERE RECEIVED AND THE OTHER ~~THREE~~ WERE NOT RELEASED O THE SAID GROUP NEVER COMPLAIN ON ANY ILL TREATMENT OR HARRASSMENT O

THE SAID OFFICERS ARE PRESENTLY UNDER MESS ARREST AND INVESTIGATION IS GOING ON O YOU WILL BE INFO OF ANY DEVELOPMENT AFIER THE INVESTIGATION O

2004 HRS

DA ^{22ND} ₀₆ ₉₉

TO. CONCORD

27TH-06-99

INFO SMILE

FROM - TIME BOMB

SUBS- INFORMATION

SIR,

TWO UNDOMSIL REPRESENTATIVES VISITED LUNBAR YESTERDAY THE 26TH JUNE 1999 BUT I ASKED THEM TO RETURN AND WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION. ○

SIR, PLEASE RESPOND QUICKLY AS THE CIVILIANS IN THIS AREA ARE IN DESPARATE NEED OF FOOD AND MEDICINE ○

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ACTION ○

BEST REGARDS

1100 HRS

B.A. Omele $\frac{27}{06}$
99

TO-SMILE

FROM- CONCORD

27TH06-99

SUBS- REPORT

SIR,

MAKONI JUNCTION WHICH IS BETWEEN MASINGBI AND MAKALI WAS ATTACKED YESTERDAY BY THE KAMAJORS BUT THEY WERE REPELLED SUCCESSFULLY

SIMULTANIOUSLY ANOTHER ATTACK WAS CARRIED ALONG THE GUINEA BORDER ALONG KONO AXIS BY BOTH THE GUINEANS AND THE KAMAJORS IN A VILLAGE CALLED GBEREFEH BUT THEY WERE ALSO REPELLED ACCORDINGLY ○ 40 KAMAJOR BADGES WERE CAPTURED INCLUDING VITAL DOCUMENTS

FROM THE GUINEANS ○

MORE OVER THE NIGERIAN ALFA JET IS STILL CARRYING ON CONTINUED RAIDS IN THE BELOW LISTED TOWNS ○

- ① MADINA ③
- ② KAMAKWE
- ③ RUKUPR
- ④ MAMEDLO AROUND KAMBIA ○

DETAILS OF THE AIR RAID WILL FOLLOW LATER ○

BEST REGARDS

1109 HRS

DA ²⁷/₀₆/₉₉

Fm - THE LION

28-06-99

TO - DR WILLIAMS THROUGH CONCORD

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE ○

YOU ARE TO GIVE A SPECIFIC LOC TO THE UNHCR TEAM AS TO WHERE YOU WANT THEIR PLANE TO LAND ○ THEY ALSO NEED CLEARANCE FROM THE HIGH COMMAND ○ THE TEAM CONSIST OF TEN DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONS EXCLUDING ANY LOCAL N.G.O ○

PSE. ORIGINATE A MSG TO THEM NOW CONCERNING THE NIGHT LOCATION AT TIME - 1700 HRS ○ WE WILL FAX ANOTHER CLEARANCE TO THEM FROM HERE (LOME)

BEST REGARDS ○

1715 HRS

DA ²⁸/₀₆/₉₉

FROM - HERO
 TO - SATELITE
 SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

29th - 06 - 99

I ADVISE YOU NOT TO ALLOW THE NIGERIANS, TOGOLAISE AND THE LIBERIAN DELIGATES TO BE PRESENT WHILE STUDING THE DOCUMENTS I SAY AGAIN, YOU SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO BE AROUND OR EVEN NOT TO INFLUENCE YOU TO TAKE DESITION O

PLEASE STUDY IT PROPERLY AND YOUR DESITION SHOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE RUF, SLA AND THE PEOPLE OF S/LEDNE O ANY DESITION TAKEN, PUT IT IN BLACK AND WHITE WHICH SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL AND GIVE TO PA. ROGERS TO COME WITH IT WITH THE REST OF THE DELIGATION O

TO RE-ENFORCE MY PREVIOUS ORDERS MAKE IT A POINT OF DUTY TO RELEASE THE 10 NIGERIANS P.O.W TO THE DELIGATION O FINALLY YOU SHOULD NOT ALLOW ANY BODY TO INFLUENCE YOU AND YOUR BROTHERS AND SISTERS O HOPE TO HEAR FROM YOU TUESDAY 29th JUNE 1999 IN RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE O

0031 HRS

D.A. [Signature] 29
 06
 99

TO- HEAD
 THROUGH SATARLITE
 FM- DR. SS. WILLIAMS (O.S.M. CO-ORDINATOR)
 SIR,

29th 06-99

BE INFORMED THAT SERIOUS CONTACT WITH THE N.C.O STARTED SINCE 20th 06-99 ○ FOLLOWING MY PREVIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE MSF BRANCH IN TOGO, I'M HAPPY TO INFORM YOU THAT WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS ○ MSF IS DUE IN OUR KAILAHUN ZONE ON THE 02th 07-99 ○ DURING WHICH WE WILL CONDUCT A JOINT SURVAY FOLLOW BY A MEETING ○ SIR ACCORDING TO THE PLAN, A CF IS COMING ALONG WITH MSF ON THE ABOVE DATE ○

ALSO SIR, CONTACT BETWEEN THE UN RELIEF STARTED ON THE 26th 06-99 ○ ACCORDING TO PLAN THEY ARE DUE IN OUR KAILAHUN ZONE ON THE 04th 07-99 ○ WE ALSO PLAN TO CONDUCT A SURVAY AND A MEETING WITH THEM ON RELIEF ISSUE ○ SIR, IT HAS BEEN AGREED BY ALL NGO'S INTERESTED TO ENTER OUR ZONE BY USING HELICOPTER FOR NOW ○

SIR, THE NGO ASKED TO USE THEIR LOGISTI IN ORDER TO ENTER OUR KAILAHUN DISTRICT BUT THE MEANS IS NOT POSSIBLE NOW AS BOTH ROADS JORU AND SHEGBWIEMA HIGH WAYS ARE PRESENTLY OUT OF USE ○ ALL NGO HELICOPTERS ARE TO EIGHTHER LAND AT GBALAHUN OR BUEDU ○ THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE GIVEN BY THE HIGH COMMAND ○

SIR, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO MAKE THE

ROAD ISSUE CLEAR TO ALL THE NGOs THAT IT IS BECAUSE OF THE PRESENT HUDDLES LEADING INTO OUR ZONES THAT I HAVE ASKED FOR THEM TO COME BY AIR. ALSO, THEY SHOULD RESERVE ALL THEIR LOCAL TASKS ON THEIR SIDE AS WE HAVE QUALIFIED TASKS TO WORK WITH THEM. SIR, THIS DECISION IS TO HELP EMPLOY ALL QUALIFIED SKILL AND UNSKILL MEN AND WOMEN ALL OVER IN OUR CONTROLLED ZONE. THIS IS POLITICS TIME WE SHOULD START PLAYING POLITICS FROM ALL QUARTERS NOW.

THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND NECESSARILY ACTION SIR.

BEST REGARDS

1140 HRS

289
56
99

TO-SMILE THROUGH CONCORD
FROM-MAJ. JACKSON SWARAY (RAY)
SUBJ - INFORMATION 01/207-99

SIR,

ALL YOUR ADVICES GIVEN CONCERNING THE INFIGHTING IS NOT IMPLEMENTED ACCORDINGLY. AS I'M SPEAKING ROCKY-CO. IS ON THE MOVE BECAUSE HE WAS ATTACKED BY TROOPS OF SPARROW LAST NIGHT. EVEN YOUR BODY GUARD MAJ. YAVAY WAS UNDER DURES AND CARRIED TO THE ZONE OF SPARROW.

MORE OVER, 200 ULIMO FIGHTERS (ARMED MEN) CHARTERED BY SSS ARE PRESENTLY AT MAGBURAKA STANDING BY TO ATTACK BOTH LUNSAK AND MAKENI.

SIR, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION
CONCORD HAS DECIDED TO BASE AT KOND TO
RECEIVE YOU AND MAKE SURE HE DRIVES OUT
SUPER MAN FROM MAKENI TO THE BUSH O
FURTHER MORE, I HOPE YOU WILL RECEIVE MY
INFORMATION FOR QUICK ACTION BEFORE IT
IS TOO LATE O

IF POSSIBLE SIR, I WOULD LIKE TO
SPEAK YOU FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING O

19 15 HRS

DA Jume $\frac{01}{07}{99}$

FROM - HERO

15 07-99

TO - SATELLITE

INFO - TANGHEST, SUDDEN & MAJ. RAY

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

YOU SHOULD INSTRUCT SPARROW WD
TO LAUNCH ANY ATTACK ON MAKENI O THIS IS
TO REINFORCE MY INSTRUCTION THE LAST TIME
THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO INFIGHTING O

REFERENCE MESSAGE FROM MY BODY
GUARD MAJ. JACKSON SWARAY (RAY) WHICH
IS UNBELIEVABLE RELATING TO AN ALLEDED
ATTACK ON MABONTOR O INVESTIGATE AND
REPORT TO ME ACCORDINGLY O IF IT IS TRUE
THOSE INVOLVED SHOULD DESIST (INFIGHTING)
IMMEDIATELY O

SUPERMAN AND MAJ. JACKSON
SWARAY SHOULD REPORT TO MY LOCATION
FOR BRIEFING O

2300 HRS

DA Jume $\frac{01}{07}{99}$

TO - SMILE
 FM - CONCORD
 SUBJ - RESPONSE
 SIR,

03rd-07-99

REFERENCE TO THE MESSAGE SENT BY MAJ. RAY, MERCENARIES HAVE NEVER FOUGHT ALONG SIDE THE RUF @ THIS IS A CLEAR INDICATION OF LACK OF RESPECT FOR COMMAND AND THE INTENSION OF SUPERMAN TO ORGANISE ALONG THE MAKENI ASCIS TO CONTINUE CAUSING PROBLEM @

FURTHER MORE SIR, THERE IS MESSAGE RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES AND INTENSION OF SUPERMAN AND HIS ALLIES @


① SPARROW REPORTED ON THE 30th JUNE 99 THAT HE HAD A DIALOGUE WITH BRIG. 55 @ HE STATED THAT HE WILL ATTACK SPARROW ON THE 1ST JULY 99 @

② A MESSAGE FROM LT. COL. GUERILLA STATED THAT ACCORDING TO CAPT. GABON, CO. ROCKY CONTACTED FROM BUMBUNA AND SAID HE WILL ATTACK MABONTOR AND MAGBURAKA @

③ MESSAGE MUSTERED BY 2ND BRIGADE COMMANDER (COL. BIG. REBEL) STATED THAT BRIG. MANNI AND PA. DEMISA ARE IN ROUT TO KAYI-MA AND THEIR ADVANCE TEAM IS ALREADY AT ALKALIA @ FOR YOUR INFOS SIR, THESE BROTHERS HAVE INTENSION TO ATTACK KOND AND ANY ATTEMPT WILL BE TREATED VERY SERIOUS @

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR NECESSARY ACTION SIR

1145 PM


 03
 07
 99

FROM - SMILE TO
TO - CONCORD

04TH JULY, 1999

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE
INFO ALL STATIONS

REFERENCE TO MY LAST INSTRUCTIONS
ANY ATTEMPT BY ANY BODY TO CREATE INFIGHT-
TING WHILE THE PEACE TALKS IS ON-GOING IN
LOME WILL FACE THE CONSEQUENCES. ALL
COMMANDERS AND THEIR TROOPS SHOULD STAY
AT THEIR LOCATIONS. I WILL NOT TOLERATE
ANY ATTEMPT THAT WILL JEOPARDISE THE PRES-
ENT PEASE TALKS. THERE FORE, ALL COMM-
ANDERS ARE TO COMPLY STRICTLY TO MY
INSTRUCTIONS.

ALSO, REF. MY LAST MESSAGE
RELATING TO THE INFORMATION RECEIVED ON
THE 1ST JULY 1999, MY ORDERS ARE HERE BY
REINFORCED THAT SUPER MAN AND MAS. JACKSON
SWARAY SHOULD REPORT TO MY LOCATION
IMMEDIATELY.

I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO ALL COMM-
ANDERS THIS EVENING. INSTRUCT ALL OPERATORS
EXPECIALLY THOSE IN THE KONO AND NORTH TO
ERECT THEIR ANTENALS FROM 18 - 24 FEET
FOR BETTER COMMUNICATION.

1130 HRS

[Signature] 04
07
99

TO - HERO
FROM - SATARLITE
SUBS - INFORMATION

04TH 07 - 99

SIR,

ACCORDING TO SPARROW THE KAMA
JOBS ATTACKED OWN POSITION AT MATODOK
THIS AFTERNOON BUT THEY WERE REPELLED
THERE WAS NO CASUALTY ON OUR SIDE

THIS IS FOR YOUR INFO. AND NECESSARY
ACTION SIR

1940 HRS

[Signature]
04
07
99

FROM - SMILE
TO - SCORPION
SUBS - FLASH

05TH 07 - 99

WITH REGARDS TO OUR LAST DISCUSSION
YOU ARE TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE
REQUESTED BROTHERS NAMELY COL. EDDIE
KANNEH, MAJOR SHEKU KUMBA AND ONE OTHER
OFFICER FROM YOUR POINT SUPERMAN, LT. COL
GIBRIL MASSAQUOT ^{AND BUN. MANI} SHOULD ALSO MOVE TODAY TO
KAILAHUN SO AS TO MOVE WITH THE DELIGATION
TO MEET ME AT LOME - TOGO

COL. EDDIE KANNEH, MAJ. SHEKU KUMBA
AND THE OTHER ONE PERSON FROM YOUR POINT
ARE TO MOVE TODAY TO FOYA AS THEY WILL
BE PICKED UP BY HELICOPTER TO MONROVIA
THEY WILL LATER JOIN PRESIDENT TAYLOR TO
MEET ME AT TOGO

1300 HRS - MANEL

1321 HRS - TEMPLE & DEFENDER

[Signature]
05
07
99

TO - HERO
 THROUGH SATELLITE
 FROM - DR. WILLIAMS (O.S.M. CO-ORDINATOR)
 SIR,

05TH-07-99

WE RECEIVED SIX (06) NGO'S
 FROM F/TOWN TO OUR ZONE FOR ACCESS-
 MENT AND SURVAY ○ THE UNDER MENT-
 IONED NGO'S WERE RECEIVED:

- ① NATHALIANE BRONUCI - HEAD OF MISSION
 ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM (ACF)
- ② MERCEDES TATAY - HEAD OF PROJECT
 DOCTOR (MSF)
- ③ MARTHA CAREY - DUT GOING HEAD OF MISSION
 (MSF)
- ④ GIUSEPPE SOOLLO - PROJECT OF MISSION
 (INCOMING - MSF)
- ⑤ JEAN-GUY VAIAUX - LOGISTICS (MSF)
- ⑥ LAWRENCE JERDEVAL - REGIONAL
 CO-ORDINATOR (ACF) ○

FOUR OF THEM LEFT BACK
~~AT~~ FOR F/TOWN TODAY AND TWO ARE
 STILL ON THE GROUND FOR ACCESSM-
 ENT ○

ALSO SIR, WE ARE EXPE-
 CTING ANOTHER NGO'S TOMORROW ○
 THE UNHCR AND THE W.F.P ○ WE
 HAVE NOT BEEN ABLED TO GET
 INTAUCH WITH THEM THIS EVENING
 G FOR CONFIRMATION ○ WE
 WILL BE VERY GREATFUL SIR IF
 SISTER JOSEPHINE COULD REACH

THEM BY TELEPHONE TO GET CONFIRMATION FROM THEM TOMORROW ○

BEST REGARDS ○

2200 HRS ○

05
07
99

07TH-07-99

FROM - THE LEADER

TO - GEN. SAM BOCKARIE INFO ALL MEN & WOMEN OF RUF/SL
SUBJ - INFORMATION

INFORM ALL THE MEN AND WOMEN OF RUF/SL, THE CIVIL SOCIETY AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS THAT I WILL BE SIGNING THE PEACE ACCORD TODAY ○ I AND MY DELEGATION IN LOME HAVE NEGOCIATED IN GOOD FAITH AND HAVE REACHED A COMPROMISE ○ LAST NIGHT FOUR (04) HEAD OF STATES - PRESIDENT CHARLSE TAYLOR OF LIBERIA, BLAISE CAMPADRI OF BURKINA FASO, OBASANJO OF NIGERIA AND NYASINGBI EYADEMA OF TOGO MET WITH ME AND PRESIDENT ○ WE HAVE MANAGED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT FINALLY ○ I WILL BE RELEASED BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE ACCORD TODAY ○

I WANT EVERY BODY TO TRUST MY LEADERSHIP ○ I WILL BE JOINING ALL THE BROTHERS AND SISTERS SO THAT WE CAN ALL WORK TOGETHER FOR CONSOLIDATING THE PEACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF RUF/SL INTO A POLITICAL MOVEMENT ○ WE SHOULD REMAIN UNITED, DEDICATED

AND SINCERE TO THE MOVEMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF S/LEONE ○ WE SHOULD GIVE PEACE A CHANCE ○

EXTEND MY REGARDS TO EVERYBODY AND I WISH THEM ALL GOD'S BLESSING ○ VERY SOON I WILL JOIN THEM ○

WHEN IT IS ANNOUNCED THAT I'M RELEASED THE SOLDIERS SHOULD NOT DISCHARGE THEIR WEAPONS ○ FIRING MUST NOT TAKE PLACE ○ EVERY SOLDIER MUST ABIDE BY THIS DIRECTIVE ○

REGARDS

1200 HRS

W. Smith
07
07
99

TO - SMILE

THROUGH CONCORD

FM - DR. WILLIAMS. SUB-INFO.

09TH - 07 - 99

Sir,

THE ACCESSMENT AND THE SURVAY SSSION HAD BEEN COMPLETED BY BOTH MS.F AND A.C.F ○ ANOTHER ACCESSMENT WAS CARRIED OUT ON THE 07TH - 07 - 99 BY (7) SEVEN UN. RELIEF NGO'S AND THEIR PERSONNELS ARE AS FOLLOWS :-

- ① MR. KINGSLEY AMANING - HEAD OF THE UN DELIGHTION
- ② MR. MARK O. MOHAMED - UN. SECURITY
- ③ MR. ROBERT PAINTSER
- ④ MR. LAKANGA TABAN - WFP
- ⑤ MRS. DEBURCA - UNICEF

- ⑥ MR. LUIS - UNOMISIL
- ⑦ MR. NATALIA ANAULT - ACF
- ⑧ MR. WEBBER - CARE INTERNATIONAL
- ⑨ MR. BAZIL TEZERA - MSF
- ⑩ MR. ANDREW - WORLD VISION

SIR, BOTH TEAMS WERE RECEIVED BY THE OSM AND WERE LEAD TO THE HIGH COMMAND RUF/SL ON THE GROUND. ACCORDING TO THEM THEY ARE NOW READY TO COME AND HELP OUR CIVILIANS.

SIR, THE TWO KEY ISSUES RAISED WERE TO OPEN THE KAILAHUN KENEMA HIGHWAY AS THE TRIP BY AIR IS VERY EXPENSIVE. CONCORD PROMISED TO GET ORDERS SO AS TO FIX THE ROAD. ALSO, THEY WANT TO VISIT AND ACCESS MAKENI. CONCORD PROMISED TO INFORM YOU AND THE BROTHERS ALSO ON THE GROUND.

SIR, I'M ON THE STAND BY TO SEND THE OSM TEAM TO MAKENI IN ORDER TO ORGANISE THE OSM IN THE ENTIRE NORTHERN PROVINCE AND TO ALSO RECEIVE THE NGO ASSESSMENT TEAM.

SIR, I'M WAITING FOR YOUR ADVICE.

BEST REGARDS
OGIS HAS

[Signature]
10/09/99

FROM - SMILE
 TO - CONCORD
 SUBJ - DIRECTIVE
 INFO - DR. WILLIAMS

10TH 07-99

REF. THE MESSAGE FROM DR. WILLIAMS DATED 10TH 07-99 YOU ARE TO OPEN THE ROADS LEADING TO OUR LIBERATED ZONES AND RE-CONSTRUCT THEM IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE NGOs TO REACH OUR PEOPLE WITH FOOD SUPPLY AND DRUGS ○ MAKE SURE YOU ~~SEARCH~~ CREAT CHECK POINTS AND SEARCH ALL VEHICLES THAT ENTER OUR ZONES ○

ALSO INSTRUCT DR. WILLIAMS TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PROPOSAL MADE BY EXTENDING THE RELIEF OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE ○ DR. WILLIAMS SHOULD ALSO CONTACT MSF AT 2006 HRS EVERY DAY ○ - EITHER MARTHA OR JOSEPHINE ○

BEST REGARDS
 2235 HRS

Smile 10
 07
 99

TO - CONCORD THROUGH BRIG. ISSAH SESAY
INFO - SMILE

FROM - BRIG. KALLONI

15TH 07 - 99

SUBJECT - REPORT

SIR,

UPON THE INSTRUCTION BY THE LEADER FOR ME TO PROCEED TO MARENJI, I DID SO THREE DAYS AGO. UPON OUR ARRIVAL AT MARENJI, WE WERE HIGHLY RECEIVED BY BRIG. MANNIE, BRIG. GUDITH AND PA. DEMBA MARA. THEY TRIED THEIR LEVEL BEST TO BRING US TOGETHER BUT UPON THE ARRIVAL OF COL. GIBRIL MASSAQUOI, LT. COL. NYA AND BRIG. ISSAC, THEY STATED THAT THEY WILL NEVER WORK WITH ME.

THEY PROVOKED ME A LOT, SAYING THAT I'M A REFUGEE. THEY DISARMED SIXTY (60) ARMS FROM MY MEN INCLUDING TWO R.P.G. TUBES WITH THREE ROCKETS AND THREE PACKETS OF AK ROUNDS. WITH ALL THIS, I WAS ADVISED BY THE ACTING PARAMOUNT CHIEF OF MARENJI INCLUDING MOST OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO BEHAVE AS A MAN AND KEEP TO MYSELF. THIS REASON GAVE ME THE CAUSE TO BASE AT TEKOR BARRACKS.

SIR, KINDLY TELL THE BROTHERS THAT WE ARE ALL THE SAME AND WE ARE ALL FIGHTING FOR THE SAME GOAL SINCE PEACE IS NOW ON THE WAY FOR US. SIR, PLEASE ACCEPT INFO FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION.

BEST REGARDS

1200 HRS

[Signature]
15
07
99

FROM - SMILE
TO - SPARROW

INFO - BRIG MANNIE AND COL. ISSAC
SUBS - RESPONSE

REF. YOUR MESSAGE DATED 15TH 07-99, IT WAS RECEIVED WITH GREAT PLEASURE ☺ BY MY DIRECTIVE I ORDER THAT YOU STAY WHERE YOU ARE PRESENTLY AND TAKE NO ACTION ☺ CONTINUE TO EXERCISE PATIENCE UNTIL MY ARRIVAL IN DUE CAUSE ☺ AS SOON AS I ARRIVE, THE ALMIGHTY GOD/ALLAH WILL SOLVE ALL THESE PROBLEMS ☺ FOR COL. ISSAC AND MAJ MASSAQUOI, YOU SHOULD RETURN ALL MIF PROPERTIES (ARMS AND AMMO.) YOU TOOK FROM SPARROW'S MEN ☺ I REPEAT, RETURN ALL ARMS AND AMMO YOU TOOK FROM SPARROW MEN ☺ UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE ☺

FOR COL. ISSAC
^ ENOUGH IS ENOUGH WE ARE NOT ENEMIES ☺ I ADVISE YOU NOT TO BE STUPID OR TO BE MISLED BY ANY ONE IN PARTICULAR MAJ GIBNIL MASSAQUOI AND OTHERS ☺ YOU ARE A VANGUARD OF THE MIF/SZ, DON'T ALLOW YOUR SELF TO BE FOOL BY ANY BODY ☺ I WILL JOIN YOU VERY SOON ☺

RE-ERECT YOUR ANTENNAS AND CHARGE YOUR BATTERIES PROPERLY AS I MAY LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ALL IN THE EVENT
BEST REGARDS ☺

1327 HRS

DAK ¹⁵07/99

FROM - SISTER JOSEPHINE
 TO - DOCTOR WILLIAMS
 SUBJECT - INFORMATION

15TH - 07 - 99

SIR,

THE MSF TEAM WILL BE WORKING ON THEIR OWN, NOT UNDER UN AS THEY CAME FIRST AND ARE NOT REGISTERED WITH UN @ THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT ORGANISATION THAT WORKS BETTER BY THEMSELVES @ BUT WE CANT TELL UN THIS @ JUST INFORM THE UN THAT THE MSF STARTED THEIR WORK EARLIER THAN THEM AND SO WE CANT MAKE NEW ARRANGEMENTS NOW AS WE HAD GIVEN THEM OUR MANDATE AND THEY HAVE ALREADY STARTED WORKING @ WE HAVE TO PUT IT IN A DIPLOMATIC WAY @

I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU TODAY @ ON THIS MATTER @

BEST REGARDS

BOB

DA Jones
 15
 07
 99

TO - SMILE
 FM - SSS
 SUBJ - INFORMATION

15TH - 07 - 99

SIR,

SITREP RECEIVED FROM GOLD TOWN AND MASINGBI STATED THAT THE KAMAJORS ATTACKED OUR POSITION AT FUTANE JUNCTION THIS EVENING AND THE FIGHTING IS STILL GOING ON @

I HAVE INSTRUCTED BRIG. PETER VANDI

TO DESPATCH RE-ENFORCEMENT TO THE SAID
POINT TO REPELL THE ATTACK ☉ DETAILS WILL
FOLLOW UPON RECEIVING THE SAID STATIONS ☉

SIR, PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO
AND NECESSARY ADVICE ☉

BEST REGARDS
2015 HRS

[Signature]

~~TO - CONCORD
THROUGH SSS
INFO - THE LION
FROM - SPARROW~~

16TH-07-99

~~SIR,
THE DIREC~~

TO - THE LION
INFO - SSS
FM - SPARROW
SUBJ - REPORT

16TH 07-99

SIR,

THE DIRECTIVE GIVEN BY YOU WAS
RECEIVED AND IMPLEMENTED ☉ I IMMEDIATELY
MOVED ~~W~~ TO MAGBURAKA WITH HONDA BUT I
LEFT SOME OF THE MEN IN THE BARRACKS AT
TEROR TO FOLLOW ME WITH THE TRUCK ☉ I
IMMEDIATELY MOVED WITH THE TWIN BARREL
TO FUTANE JUNCTION WHERE THE RAMAJOLS
ATTACKED YESTERDAY AND PUT THE SAID AREA
UNDER CONTROL ☉

UNFORTUNATELY SIR, UPON MY ARRIVAL ON
BASE FROM FUTANE JUNCTION, I RECEIVED
A LETTER FROM MY MEN THAT LEFT IN
THE BARRACKS WHICH REVEALED THAT MAJ.
GIBRIL MASSAQUOI AND OTHERS SAID THEY
CANT ALLOW THEM TO MOVE WITH THE
TRUCK ○

SIR, KINDLY ADVISE THE MEN AT
MAKENI TO ~~MONIE~~ ALLOW THE MEN TO MOVE
WITH THE TRUCK FROM THE BARRACKS ○

BEST REGARDS
1932 HRS

DA *Smile* $\frac{16}{07}$
99

FM- SMILE

TO- MAJ. MASSAQUOI

16TH-07-99

INFO- SPARROW

SUBJ- DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE ORDERED TO
RETURN TO LUN SAR WITH ALL YOUR MEN
WITHIN THE NEXT 12 HOURS ○ SPARROW'S
MEN ARE TO STAY IN THE BARRACKS AND
MAKE SURE YOU ALLOW THE TRUCK TO
RTN- TO MAGBURARA AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE ○ I REPEAT, YOU SHOULD ONLY
GO TO MAKENI WHEN YOU ARE INSTRU-
CTED BY ME ○

FOR SPARROW, YOUR MEN ARE
TO STAY IN THE BARRACKS TILL FUTHER
NOTICE ○

TAKE NOTE AND COVERN YOUR SELF

2030 HRS

DA *Smile* $\frac{16}{07}$
99

TO - CONCORD
 INFO - SMILE
 FROM - SSS
 SUBJ - INFORMATION

17TH 07 - 99

SIR,

I MAY LIKE TO ~~DESPATCH~~ PROCEED WITH THE OSM PERSONNELS TO KONDO AND SOME MATERIALS FOR THE KONDO ASKS AS THERE IS ENEMY THREAT FROM THE GUINEA BORDER AND THE HIGH WAY \odot UPON MY ARRIVAL AT ~~MAKEM~~ KOIDU I WILL DESPATCH THE OSM PEOPLE TO MAKENI AND I WILL RETURN AS FAST AS POSSIBLE \odot

SIR, PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE FOR ADVICE \odot

BEST REGARDS

0920 HRS

D. J. J. J. 17
 07
 99

TO - CONCORD
 THROUGH SSS
 INFO - SMILE
 FROM - SPARROW

17TH - 07 - 99

SIR,

THE MAN POWER THE LEADER INSTRUCTED TO STAY IN THE BARRACKS ARRIVED AT MY LOC THIS MORNING (MAGBURAKA) THE MEN MADE ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT AT AROUND 2000 HRS. LAST NIGHT, COL. ISSACK, MAJ. GIBRI MASSAQUO, CO. MATHEW BABOO AND HUGE NUMBER OF ARMED MEN INCLUDING ONE BARREL (B.Z.T. VIOLENTLY) APPROACHED ~~THE~~ THEM AND ASKED THEM

FROM - COL. ISSAC

17TH - 07 - 99

TO - BSS

INFO - SMILE AND CONCORD

SUBJ - INFORMATION

SIR,

THE COMMANDER AT LUN SAR RECEIVED TWO UNOMSIL AT 1400 HRS YESTERDAY
 ○ THE COMMANDER INSTRUCTED THEM TO PROCEED TO MAKE NI BUT THEY SAID GEN SAM BOCKALIE HAS TOLD THEM (UNOMSIL) NOT TO TRAVEL TO MAKE NI AT ALL AS HE NEVER INSTRUCTED THEM TO SUPPLY EITHER LUN SAR, MAKE NI OR KAMBIA ○

IN THIS REGARDS I'M ASKING YOU TO INFORM THE LEADER ABOUT THIS AS THE CIVILIAN POPULIST ARE IN NEED OF FOOD AND DRUGS ○ I'M AWAITING YOUR ADVICE ○

BEST REGARDS ○

16 15 HRS

 17
07
99

FM - SMILE

17TH - 07 - 99

TO - BSS

INFO - CONCORD

SUBJ - RESPONSE

REF. YOUR MSG DATED 17TH JULY 99, YOU ARE GIVEN THE GO AHEAD TO TRAVEL TO KOND AND RETURN ○

BEST REGARDS

18 15 HRS

17th-07-99

FROM - SMILE
 TO - SUPER STAR (COL. ISSAC)
 SUBJ - RESPONSE AND DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE ORDERED TO RELEASE THE TWO MEN (MAJ. GEORGE COBBE AND JR.) YOU ARRESTED YESTERDAY. I ALSO RETN ALL THE PROPERTIES YOU TOOK FROM THE MEN THAT SPARROW LEFT IN THE BARRACKS. I ORDERED SPARROW'S MEN TO STAY IN THE BKS. AND I'M STILL RE-ENFORCING MY ORDER FOR THEM TO STAY THERE.

YOU AND MAJ. GIBAL MASSACUDI SHOULD RETURN TO LUNBAR AND STAY THERE IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE. I MIND YOU THIS IS MY LAST DIRECTIVE I'M GIVING YOU PEOPLE. YOU ARE TO STOP CAUSING PROBLEM AND REALISE THAT I WILL GO BACK TO SIERRA LEONE. REF. YOUR MESSAGE DATED 16th-07-99 YOU HAVE NO BUSINESS TO DO WITH RELIEF ORGANISATION. TAKE NOTE AND GOVERN YOUR SELF.

1745

DA [Signature] 17
 07
 99

18th 07-99

TO - CONCORD
 INFO - SMILE
 FM - SSS

SIR,

GOLD TOWN AND MASINGBI WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTACKED BY THE KAMAJORS THIS AFTERNOON BUT I HAVE DESPATCHED RE-ENFORCEMENT THERE TO CONTAIN SITUATION. I WILL FURNISH YOU DETAILS UPON RECEIVING COMPREHENSIVE REPORT FROM THERE. ☺

MORE OVER, I WOULD HAVE DESPATCHED THE OSM REPRESENTATIVES TO MAKENI TODAY BUT DUE TO THE CURRENT DEVELOPEMENT FROM THE ABOVE TOWNS HAVE CAUSED THE DELAYANCE. ☺

PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE INFOS FOR YOUR NECESSARY ADVICE SIR. ☺

BEST REGARDS

1911 HRS

DA [Signature] 18/07/99

FROM - SMILE
 TO - BRIG MAANT
 SUBS-DIRECTIVE

19th 07-99

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO FIND OUT ABOUT ALHADI A. B. KAMARA. HE IS MARRAGE TO ONE OF MY SISTERS (MABINTY) AT MAKENI - BELAL MISSION. ☺ AWAITING TO RECEVE THE RESPONSE WITH IN 24 HOURS. ☺

BEST REGARDS

1755 HRS

DA [Signature] 19/07/99

THE SIERRA LEONE PEOPLE'S ARMY - SLPA
NORTHERN REGION - MAKENI
FROM - THE PEOPLE AND CHIEFDOMS OF BOMBALI
DISTRICT HQ. OF MAKENI
TO - CPL. FODAY S. SANKOH
THROUGH GEN. SAM BOCKARIE
SUBJECT - INFORMATION

SIR,

WE WISH TO CONGRATULATE YOU FOR RETURNING PEACE TO SIERRA LEONE & YOU HAVE SUCCEEDED IN HAVING THE GUN SILENT BUT WE ARE STILL LEFT WITH THE GREATEST ENEMY OF HUNGER AND NEED FOR MEDICATION & IT HAS BEEN RELIABLE LEARNT FROM THE SLPA COMMANDER IN MAKENI THAT GEN. SAMBOCKARIE HAS STOPPED THE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FROM COMING TO THE NORTH & IF THAT IS CORRECT SIR, THEN YOU WILL COME AND FIND ALL OF US STARVED TO DEATH & SO WE ARE KINDLY REQUESTING YOUR TIMELY INTERVENTION WITH THE VIEW OF ALLEVIATING THE ACUTE HUNGER AND MEDICAL CRISIS THAT WE ARE FACING & WE HOPE TO HEAR FROM YOU AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE &

2212 HRS

 18
07
99

TO - CONCORD
 INFO - SMILE
 SUBJ - INFORMATION
 FROM - SSS

19TH 07-99

SIR,

ACCORDING TO REPORT RECEIVED FROM MASINGBI AND GOLD TOWN, OUR ME HAVE REPELLED THE ENEMIES AND OUR ME ARE PRESENTLY CHASING ~~THE~~ THEM TO WHERE THEY CAME FROM. O BINGO PETER VANDI HAS PROCEEDED THERE TO MAKE SURE THE AREA IS SECURE. MORE OVER, I HAVE DESPATCHED THE OSM REPRESENTATIVES TO MAGEBURAKA FOR UNWARD'S MOVEMENT TO MAKENI. O

ACCORDING TO DR. WILLIAMS SIR, THE UNHCR WOULD LIKE TO ENTER OUR ZONE BY ROAD THROUGH MAND JUNCTION, SHEGEWEMA AND DARLI TO PENDEMBU. O IN RESPECT OF THE ABOVE SIR, DR. WILLIAMS SUGGESTED FOR US TO PROVIDE DRIVERS FOR THEM UPON THEIR ARRIVAL AT OUR ZONE. O

YOUR ADVICE IS NEEDED SIR ON THE ISSUE. O

BEST REGARDS
 1650

 19
 17
 99

FROM - SMILE

19TH-07-99

TO - SSS

SUBJ - RESPONSE

REF. YOUR MESSAGE DATED 19TH JULY 99, YOU ARE TO CHASE THE KAMAJORS TO WHERE THEY CAME FROM ○

CONTACT CONCORD TO RECEIVE THE RESPONSE PERTAINING THE MOVEMENT OF THE NGO'S ○

BEST REGARDS
1030 HRS

DA [Signature]

TO - SMILE

20TH-07-99

FROM - BRIG. MANT

SUBJ - RESPONSE

SIR,

REF. YOUR SIGNAL MESSAGE DATED 19TH JULY 99, PLEASE BE INFORM THAT I MET WITH THE SAID MAN (ALHAJI A. B. KAMARA) YESTERDAY ○ HE STAYS AT NO. 9 TURAY STREET MARENTE WITH ALL HIS CHILDREN BUT LACK OF FOOD AND MEDICINE ○ THEY ARE EXTENDING THEIR SINCERE GREETINGS TO YOU AND ALL ○ WAITING TO SEE YOU ○

BEST REGARDS ○
1130

DA [Signature] 20
07
99

21ST-07-99

TO - CONCORD
 INFO - SMILE
 SUBJ - INFORMATION
 FROM - DR WILLIAMS
 THROUGH - SSS

SIR,

I WILL BE GREATFUL IF THE PRES
 COMMANDER IN MAKENI CAN PROCEED TO MAGBURAKA
 MAGBURAKA AND RECEIVE THE OSM DELEGATES
 OR IF THE COMMANDER IN MAGBURAKA CAN
 ACCOMPANY THEM AS FAR AS MAKENI WITH
 ANY MORLESTATION FROM THE BROTHERS AT
 MAKENI ☺ THIS IS BECAUSE ACCORDING TO
 SPARROW, THE ROAD FROM MAGBURAKA TO MAKENI
 IS COMPLETELY BLOCKED BY THE BROTHERS AT
 MAKENI ☺

SIR, I'M AWAITING YOUR ADVICE AND
 INSTRUCTION FOR THE BROTHERS AS THE NGO'S
 ARE PRESENTLY SET TO MOVE INTO MAKENI
 TODAY UPON THE ARRIVAL OF THE OSM PERSON
 NELS THERE ☺

BEST REGARDS ☺

1735 HRS

Dr Williams
 21
 07
 99

FROM - SMILE
 TO - BRIG. MAWI
 INFO - ALL COMMANDERS
 SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

21ST-07-99

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE ORDERED TO
 OPEN ALL THE ROADS THAT LEADING TO MAKENI

ALSO PREPARE TO RECEIVE THE OSM DELEGATION FROM KAILAHUN WHO ARE PRESENTLY AT MAGBU-RAKA O WORK WITH THEM ACCORDINGLY AND GIVE THEM ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO ENABLE THEM CARRY ON THEIR JOB SUCCESSFULLY O

FOR SPARROW, BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO DESPATCH THE OSM DELEGATION TO MAIKENIT ^{TOMORROW} WITHOUT FAIL O

ALL COMMANDERS ARE STRICTLY ~~ADVISED~~ ^{ADVISED} TO ABIDE BY THIS DIRECTIVE AS IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR BOTH THE CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS TO START RECEIVING FOOD AND DRUGS SUPPLY O

ACCEPT FOR NEC. ACTION

2113 HRS

DA Quinn
21
07
99

* FM- THE LEADER

TO - ALL ~~COMMANDERS~~ COMMANDERS

25th-07-99

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

REF MY LAST MESSAGE DATED 25th-07-99, YOU ARE TO PREPARE TO HAND OVER THE P.O.W's AND ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS TO I.C.R.C, UNDOMSIL OR ECOMOG AT ANY TIME THEY CALL UPON YOU O

PHILIP PALMER, DEEN JALLOH, FATIA MUSA, DR. BARRIE AND GBESSAY JAMES SHOULD ALSO BE RELEASED BUT YOU ARE NOT TO ALLOW THEM TO GO ANY WHERE O THEY SHOULD STAY AT THE HQ (BUEDU) TILL ~~THE~~ I ARRIVE AT THAT LOC. O

1700 HRS

DA Quinn
25
07
99

TO - CONCORD
 INFO - ~~SMILE~~
 FM - SSS
 SUBJ - REPORT

25TH 07 - 99

SIR,

REPORT RECEIVED FROM BANDA JUMA
 YAWEI REVEALED THAT, THE KAMAJORS ATTACKED
 OUR POSITION THIS MORNING AT THE ABOVE MENTION
 TOWN @ OUR MEN REPELLED THEM AND CAPTURED
 THE UNDER MENTION ITEMS FROM THEM

- ① 6 ROCKETS OF R.P.G. AND 5 TAT'S
- ② 1 R.P.G TUBE
- ③ 5 PKTS OF AK ROUNDS

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND NECE-
 SSARY ACTION @

BEST REGARDS

1904 HRS

D.A. Smith 25
 07
 99

TO - SMILE
 FROM - SSS

25TH 07 - 99

SUBJ - INFORMATION

SIR,

YOUR MESSAGE PERTAINING THE
 RELEASE OF ALL P.O.W'S ~~WERE~~ WAS RECEIVED
 AND NOTED @ ACCORDING TO THE COMMANDER AT FREE
 TOWN HIGH WAY (BRIG. BAZIE), HE IS ASKING YOUR
 KIND PERMISSION TO CONTACT THE GUINEAN GOVT.
 TO RELEASE THE BALLANCE ECOMOG TROOPS
 (SIERRA ^{LEONE} CONTINGENT) WHO WERE ARRESTED IN
 GUINEA WHILE ENROUT TO SIERRA LEONE ABOUT
 ONE MONTH AGO @ THEY ARE ABOUT 37 IN NUMBER

vasion was to
and wit w
ren Ouag
as that I

ACCORDING TO BRIG. BARZIE, ONE OF THEM
MANAGED TO REACH THEIR LOC. AT FREETOWN
HIGH WAY AND PASSED ON THIS INFORMATION
THE OTHERS ARE STILL UNDER ARREST AND TORT-
URE O

IN REGARDS TO THE RELEASE OF THE 3
GUINEANS AND 3 MALIANS WITH BRIG. BARZIE, HE
IS KINDLY ASKING FOR THE RELEASE OF THE POW'S
TO COINSIDE WITH THE RELEASE OF OUR BROTHERS
UNDER ARREST IN GUINEA (THE SIERRA LEONE
CONTIGENT OF ECOMOG) WHO WERE BASED IN
LIBERIA O

BEST REGARDS

2030 HRS

DA *[Signature]* 25
07
99

FROM - THE LEADER

TO - SSS

25TH 07-99

INFO - ALL STATIONS

SUBJ - RESPONSE

YOUR LAST MESSAGE RECEIVED AND
UNDERSTOOD O YOU ARE TO RELEASE ALL OTHER
POW'S WITH EXCEMPTION OF THE GUINEAN ^{AND ITALIANS} POW'S

I WILL TRY TO HANDLE THE MATTER
ACCORDINGLY AS REQUIRED O

ACCEPT FOR NEC. ACTION O

2100 HRS

DA *[Signature]* 25
07
99

TO - SMILE
FROM - BRIG. MAWI
INFO - CONCORD

26TH 07 - 99

SIR.

REF. YOUR MESSAGE DATED 25TH 07 - 99
IN RESPECT OF THE RELEASE OF THE PRISONERS
OF WAR AND NON COMBATANTS, WE HAVE
ONLY TWO GUINEANS AND ONE NIGERIAN AS
PRISONERS OF WAR @ WE ARE WAITING THE
I.C.R.C TO RELEASE THE ONE NIGERIAN TO
WITH THEM AS PER YOUR INSTRUCTION @

BEST REGARDS

DAF *Amir* 26
07
99

TO - SMILE
FROM - SSS
SUBJ - RESPONSE

27TH 07 - 99

SIR,

REF. YOUR MESSAGE DATED 25TH JULY
1999, WE HAVE ONLY 12 NIGERIANS AT THE
HEAD QUARTER (BUEDU) AND ONE AT MAKERU
THEY HAVE BEEN RELEASED ONLY WAITING FOR
THE I.C.R.C TO HAND THEM OVER @ I
HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY REPORT FROM LUSAKA
DUE TO POOR COMMUNICATION @

BEST REGARDS

1159 HRS

DAF *Amir* 27
07
99

TO - CONCORD

27TH 07 - 99

THROUGH SSS

INFO - SMILE AND LT. COL. JOHNEY P. KOROMA
FROM - BRIG. MANI ARMY HEAD QUARTERS (MAKEM)

SIR,

REF. YOUR SIGNALS MESSAGE DATED
25TH JULY 1999, RELEASE OF POLITICAL AND
WAR PRISONERS & NOW THAT THESE PEOPLE
HAVE BEEN RELEASED IN RESPECT OF SUBJECT
MATTER, COULD LT. COL. J. P. KOROMA BE
PLEASE ALLOW TO TRAVEL TO THE NORTH
FOR DISCUSSION OF PERTINENT ISSUE
RELATING TO THE PEACE ACCORD

YOUR CO-OPERATION IS
HIGHLY SOLICITED ☉

1800 HRS

LA Smile 27
07
99

FROM - SMILE

27TH 07 - 99

TO - BRIG. MANI

INFO - ALL COMMANDERS

SUBJ - RESPONSE

REF. YOUR MESSAGE DATED 27TH JULY 1997
LT. COL. J. P. KOROMA IS TO WAIT AT HIS PRESENT
LOC. TILL I ARRIVE AT KAILAHUN YOU (BRIG. MA
NI), EX-PRESIDENT JOSEPH MOMOH, COL ISSAC
MAJ GIBRIEL MASSAQUOI SHOULD REPORT TO KAILA-
HUN AND WAIT FOR ME TILL MY ARRIVAL
AS THERE ARE VERY IMPORTANT ISSUES TO
BE DISCUSSED ☉

ALSO, VICTOR FOH AND ALL THE

ED PRISONERS THAT WERE RELEASED FROM PA.
DEMBA ROAD PRISON ARE TO STAY AT KAILAHUN
TILL MY ARRIVAL O VERY SOON I WILL BE AT
KAILAHUN O

THE CHILDREN AND WOMEN THAT WERE
ABDUCTED FROM A/TOWN SHOULD BE IMMEDIATE
LY RELEASED TO GO BACK TO THEIR RELATIVE
O

BEST REGARDS O

1954

LA ²⁷Quint ⁰⁷
99

TO - SMILE
THROUGH - CONCORD
FROM - SSS
SUBJ - RESPONSE

TH 27-07-49

SIA.

REF YOUR SIGNAL MESSAGE DAT
25 JUNE 1999. THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS
OF WAR O THIS HEAD QUATER ONLY HAVE 12
NIGERIAN WAR PRISONERS AND ONE AT MAI
ENI O WE ARE PRESENTLY WAITING FOR TH
INFORM TO HAND OVER THEM O FURTHER
REPORT RECEIVED FROM FREETOWN HIGH WAY
AND MAKENI STATED THAT THERE ARE THREE
GUINEANS AND THREE MALIANS AT FREETOW
HIGH WAY AND TWO GUINEANS AT MAKENI
THE GUINEAN AND MALIAN WAR PRISONERS ARE
STILL IN PRISON TILL WE HEAR FROM YOU
AS PER YOUR DIRECTIVE O

AS FOR FAYIA MUSA AND HIS GROUP,
THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN RELEASED AS PER YOUR

DIRECTIVE BUT THEY ARE PRESENTLY ON THE GROUND WITH US FOR SECURITY REASON UNTIL YOUR ARRIVAL ○

FOR THOSE POLITICIANS FREED FROM PADE-
MBA, THEY ARE FREED ○ INFACIT ACCORDING
TO THEM FROM PADEMBA, SINCE THEY HAVE
BEEN FREED BY US FROM PADEMBA PRISON, THEY
ARE NOW MEMBERS OF THE RUF/SK ○

SIR, THIS IS FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESS-
ARY ACTION ○

BEST REGARDS //

2200 HRS

27
D. H. G. 07
99

TO-SMILE

88TH-07-99

FROM-THE COMMAND HQ. MAKENT

INFO-CONCORD AND ALL COMMANDERS

SUBJ-SITREP.

SIR,

TEXT ○ SITREP AS AT 18TH JULY 1999 ○ ONE ○
GENERAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY CALM BUT
TENSE AS KAMAJORS AND GBENTIS FROM MILE-
91 ATTACKED OUR POSITIONS AT KOLISOKOR
AND SURROUNDING VILLAGES ON THE 21ST JULY 1999
KILLED THREE CIVILIANS AND CARRIED ONE CAPT.
~~BERITA~~ AND ONE RSM. IBRAHIM AS
P.O.W ○ TWO ○ THREE UNDOMSIL DELEGATES
ARRIVED MAKENTI ON THE 18TH JULY 1999 ON
A FACT FINDING MISSION ○ THEY HELD A
MEETING WITH THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF
THE NORTHERN REGION ○ SIR, RELIGIOUS BODY,

ELDERS OF THE CHIEFDOMS AND THE EXECUTIVE COMMANDER ASSURED THE ABOVE DELEGATES SECURITY AS REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLY FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH ○ THREE ○ ON RETURN OF UNDOMSIL TO FREETOWN, REPRESENTATIVES OF SEVEN RELIEF AGENCIES WHICH INCLUDED WFP CONCERN WORLD WIDE (CWW), CRISTIAN ESSENTIAL SERVICE (CES), ACF, MSF, CRS, UNICEF AND BISHOP BIGOSSI ARRIVED MAKENT BY ROAD AND SOME BY HELICOPTER TO ACCESS THE NEEDS ~~OF~~ THE PEOPLE ○ THE RELIEF AGENCIES HELD SERIES OF MEETING WITH THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND AND THE PEOPLE OF MAKENT ○ THE CHIEFDOM COMMANDERS AND THE PEOPLE REQUESTED FOR AN IMMEDIATE FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLY AS THE ARE DESPARATELY IN NEED ○ FOUR ○ THE THREE MEN DELEGATION OF O.S.M FROM KAILAHUN ARRIVED MAIKENI ON THE 22ND JULY 1999 TO WORK IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE RELIEF AGENCIES ○ THEY EXPLAINED THEIR DUTY TO THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND BRIG MANI ○ FIVE ○ ABOUT 150 TEACHERS FROM VARIOUS SCHOOLS ASSEMBLED AT OUR ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDING AT OYODHRS ON THE 26TH JULY 1999 WAITING FOR TRANSPORT AS PROMISED BY UNDOMSIL TO ENABLE THEM TRAVEL TO FREETOWN FOR THEIR SALARIES ○ SIX ○ MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIP ○

CORDIAL ○ MORAL OF TROOPS SATISFACTORY ○
 THIS IS FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ACTION SIR ○
 BEST REGARDS /// *NA June 28*
 1840 HRS *07 99*

To-SSS

INFO-SMILE AND CONCORD

28TH 07 99

FROM-SPARROW

SIR,

COL. BAI-BUREH AND MOST OF THE BRIGADE OFFICERS ARE PRESENTLY AT MAKEWI SINCE THE 21ST JULY 1999 ○ REPORT RECEIVED FROM THEM REVEALED THAT THERE IS NO PROBLEM, MORLESTATION NEITHER INTIMIDATION BETWEEN THE~~E~~ BROTHERS AND THEM BUT THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP IS NOT CORDIAL AT ALL IN RESPECT OF THE MOVEMENT ○

ALSO, I RECEIVED REPRESENTATIVES FROM VARIOUS AREAS LIKE MILE 91 AND YELE ON THE 25TH 07-99 ○ THEY ARE PRESENTLY WITH ME AT MAGBURAKA ○ ACCORDING TO THEIR COMMANDER THEY ARE MANY AND ^{ARE} WILLING TO WORK WITH US ○ THEY ARE JUST AWAITING OUR POSITIVE RESPONSE FOR THEM TO JOIN US ALONG WITH THEIR WEAPONS ○ THEY ALSO REVEALED THAT THERE IS AN INFIGHTING BETWEEN THEM (THE GBWIS AND THE ISAMAJORS ○

TO CONCLUDE SIR, BOTH THE SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS WITHIN AND AROUND MAKEWI

ARE BITTERLY CRYING FOR FOOD AND MEDICINE. THE CIVILIANS ARE WELL ORGANISE AND WILLING TO WORK WITH US IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE, UNITY AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING FOR OUR COUNTRY.

BEST REGARDS
0947

DA *Smile* 29
07
99

TO - SMILE

29TH 07 - 99

FM - SSS

THROUGH CONCORD

SUBJ - REPORT

SIR,

ON THE 24TH JULY 1999, A PATROL TEAM COMPRISING OF TEN MENPOWER WAS DESPATCHED BY LT. COL. ABDUL GASSAMA TOWARDS THE GUINEA SIERRA LEOANE BORDER TO EDUCATE OUR PEOPLE ON THE CURRENT PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED IN LOME - TOGO. IT WAS NOT TOO LONG WHEN THE KAMAJORS CAME FROM GUINEA AND ATTACKED OUR MEN IN A VILLAGE CALLED GODO. OUR MEN WERE ABLED TO REPEL THE ATTACK AND CAPTURED THE FOLLOWING MATERIALS:

- ① ONE RPG TUBE
- ② SIX RPG BOMBS AND FIVE TNT'S
- ③ 5 PACKETS OF AK ROUNDS
- ④ ONE STICK GREENNADE

THERE WAS NO CASUALITY ON OUR SIDE.

BEST REGARDS FROM EVERY ONE SIRE

1930 HRS

DA *Smile* 29
07
99

30TH 07-99

TO-SSS

INFO-SMILE, CONCORD AND ALL STATIONS

FM-BRIG. BAZIL

SUBJ-SITREP

SIR,

AS AT 290800 HRS TO 30 0800 HRS
 JULY 1999 ○ ALFA ○ GENERAL AREA CALM BUT
 TENSE AS THE ECOMOG PERSONNELS ARE IN
 THE HABIT OF KIDNAPING OUR MEN GOING
 ON FOOD FINDING INCLUDING MEN MOVING
 FROM LUNBAR TO MY LOCATION ○ BRAVO ○
 MOST OF OUR MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED
 WHILE CROSSING THE HIGH WAY FROM LUNBAR
 TO OUR ZONE ○ 25 MEN ARE PRESENTLY IN
 THE ECOMOG GUARD ROOM AT PORTFLOKO FOR
 REASON BEST KNOWN TO THEM ○ SIR, YOU
 ARE PLEASE REQUESTED TO CONTACT THE
 UNOMSIL FOR SAME ○ TREAT VERY IMMEDIATE
 FOR SMOOTH RUNNING OF THE CEASE FIRE
 AND THE PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN LOME ○
 DELTA ○ CIVILIANS AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
 CORDIAL ○

BEST REGARDS///
 1950 HRS

DAJ
 30
 07
 99

TO-SMILE

30TH 07-99

THROUGH THE HIGH COMMAND

FROM-DR S.S. WILLIAMS

SUBJ-COMPREHENSIVE REPORT

SIR, THE UN AND OTHER NGO AGEN-

CES HAVE EXTENDED THEIR RELIEF ACCESS-
 MENT MISSION INTO OUR CONTROL AREAS
 OF MAGBURAKA AND MAKENI. THE RELATION-
 SHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL NGO'S AND
 THE OSM CONTINUE TO IMPROVE. SIR, THERE
 IS SERIOUS SET BACK ON THE SIDE OF THE
 OSM IN TERMS OF COMMUNICATION. AS THERE
 IS NO SET. THIS ISSUE NEED AN IMMEDIATE
 ACTION AS THERE IS NO GOOD COMMUNICA-
 TION BETWEEN THE OSM AND THE NGO'S IN
 FREETOWN.

SIR, IN AS MUCH AS THE NGO OPERATION
 IN THE NORTH IS ON THE HIGH PACE, I REG-
 ET TO INFORM YOU THAT THE NGO OPERATION
 IN KAILAHUN DISTRICT AND THE REST OF THE
 EAST IS VERY SLOW AS COMPARED TO THE NORTH.
 THIS IS PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE ATTITUDE OF
 OUR MEN MORLESTATION, WASTING OF THEIR
 TIME AND OFF LOADING. SIR, THE OSM WILL
 COM CHECKING FOR SECURITY REASON BUT
 SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE.

SIR, THE OSM PERSONNELS SENT TO
 MAKENI HAVE NO ACCESS TO COMMUNICATION.
 FOR THIS REASON REPORT IS NOT COMING FROM
 THEM SINCE THEY ARRIVED AT THAT POINT ON
 THE 22ND-07-99. I HAVE MADE SEVERAL ATTEMPT
 TO TALK TO THEM BUT TO NO AVAIL. ABOVE
 ALL SIR I STILL DONT KNOW THE COMMANDER
 AT MAKENI TO CO-ORDINATE WITH. LASTLY
 SIR, THE COMMANDERS IN MAKENI ARE IN THE

HABIT OF COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY WITH THE
 NGOs IN FREETOWN. EVIDENCE OF THIS IS
 THE 2ND 07-99 VISIT BY THE NGOs TO MAKEW
 IT WAS CO-ORDINATED AND CLEARANCE WAS
 GIVEN TO THE NGOs. I HAVE JUST BEEN BREF
 BY THE UN THAT SOME NGOs HAVE BEEN
 PERMITTED TO GO TO KABALA.

BEST REGARDS///
 RIZZ

DA/Quinn ³⁰/₀₇/₉₉

FM-SMILE

30TH 07-99

TO-DR. WILLIAMS

SUBJ-RESPONSE

REF YOUR MESSAGE DATED 30TH 07-99, I GAVE
 THE INSTRUCTION TO THE MEN AT MAKEW TO OPEN
 ALL THE ROADS AND ALLOW THE NGOs TO CARRY FOOD
 AND DRUGS SUPPLY FOR THE PEOPLE AS THEY
 ARE IN DESPARATE NEED.

0901 HRS

DA/Quinn ³¹/₀₇/₉₉

FROM-SMILE

TO-THE O/ALL SIGNALS COMMANDER

THROUGH-SSS

INFO-ALL OPERATORS AND OSM

SUBJ-DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE ORDERED TO
 ALLOW THE OSM PERSONNELS TO USE ~~YOUR~~ ^{THE} SETS
 TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE NGOs WHENEVER THEY
 ARE IN NEED.

BEST REGARDS///

0857 HRS

DA/Quinn ³¹/₀₇/₉₉

FM- SMILE
 TO-BRIC. BAZIL
 THROUGH CONCORD
 INFO-SSS AND ALL COMMANDERS
 SUBS-RESPONSE

30TH07-99

I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE DATED 30TH07-99
 AND I'M GOING TO TAKE ACTION. I WOULD LIKE
 TO ~~TAK~~ TALK TO YOU ALL TOMORROW 31ST07-99

BEST REGARDS ///
 0855 HRS

DA/June 31
 07
 99

TO- SMILE
 INFO- CONCORD & SSS
 FROM- SUPER STAR
 SUBJECT- INFORMATION

01ST08-99

SIR,

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED
 FROM MAKENI, THE D.D.R AND THE WORLD BANK
 REPRESENTATIVES ARRIVED AT MAKENI YESTERDAY
 BY HELICOPTER. BUT WE NEVER HAD KNOWLEDGE
 ON THEIR MOVEMENT SO I INSTRUCTED THEM
 TO RETURN TILL THEY GET INTAUCH WITH
 YOU BEFORE PROCEEDING TO THIS POINT.

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR NECESSARY
 ACTION.

BEST REGARDS ///
 1930 HRS (C)

DA/June 01
 08
 99

03TH 08 - 99

TO - SMILE

INFO - CONCORD AND ALL STATIONS
 FROM - COMMAND HQ. MAKENI
 SUBJ - SITREP

SIR,

ONE ^{CALM AND QUIET} ~~OF~~ GENERAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILI-
 LITY [^] TWO [^] THE UN SECURITY AGENTS
 AND WORLD FOOD PROGRAMM (W.F.P) DELEGATES
 ARRIVED MAKENI YESTERY ON ACCESSMENT ~~XXXX~~
 ON FOOD FINDING [^] THREE [^] THE UNOMSIL DELEGATES
 ARRIVED THIS HQ AT ABOUT 1100 HRS TODAY TO
 FACILITATE THE VISIT OF THE WORLD BANK REP-
 RESENTATIVES TO MAKENI BY HELICOPTER [^] THE
 MILITARY HIGH COMMAND AT MAKENI BRIG. MANI
 IMMIDIETELY MOVED TO THE WUSUM FIELD TO RECEI-
 VE THE DELIGATES AS THEY HAVE ALREADY MOVED
 FROM FREETOWN [^] HELICOPTER LANDED ABOUT
 1250 HRS BUT THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND REFUSEI
 TALKING TO THE DELEGATES AS THE VISIT WAS NOT
 MADE KNOWN OFFICIALLY BEFORE TIME AS EXPECTED
[^] THE HELICOPTER WITH DELEGATES TOOK OFF FOR
 WHERE THEY CAME FROM AT ABOUT 1300 HRS [^] ~~FOUR~~
 INFO. COLLECTED FROM SAME UNOMSIL MAJ. KABIZA
 REVEALED THE KIDNAPPING AND ABDUCTING OF
 OWN COMBATANTS BY ECOMOG TROOPS WITHIN
 PORT LORO DISTRICT (HQ 22 INFANTRY BDE OF
 ECOMOG) [^] MESSAGE DATED 30 1100 Z JULY REFERS
 AND ECOMOG ALFA-JET WAS REPEATEDLY FLYING
 OVER RUKUPAR AND OTHER RUF HELD TERRITOR-
 IES IN THE PORT LORO DISTRICT [^] FIVE [^]

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIP VERY
CORDIAL ☉ MORALE OF TROOPS REMAIN SKY HIGH ☉
PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO ☉

BEST REGARDS FROM EVERY ONE ☉

2029 HRS ///

J. A. Ome $\frac{03}{08}{99}$

FROM: SMILE

03 - 08 - 99

TO: COMMAND HQ MAKENI

INFO: CONCORD AND ALL STATIONS

SUBJ: RESPONSE

REF. YOUR MESSAGE. HAPPY TO NOTE THAT YOUR
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY IS CALM AND QUIET AND THAT
ASSESSMENT TEAM HAS VISITED. RESPONSE TO UNCOMSIL
DELEGATES IS APPROPRIATE. ACCEPT NO VISITORS UNTIL
I AM IN THE COUNTRY, CERTAINLY NOT ECOMOG.

CONTINUE TO BE ON ALERT. I WOULD LIKE TO TALK

~~BEST REGARDS~~ TO ALL COMMANDERS TOMORROW WHEN
COMMUNICATION IS IMPROVE ☉

BEST REGARDS ///

J. A. Ome $\frac{03}{08}{99}$

2145 HRS

TO - CONCORD
FROM - SSS
INFO - SMILE
SUBS - INFORMATION

04TH-08-99

SIR,

SOURCES FROM SATELLITE PHONE FROM GEN. JOSHI REVEALED THAT FOR THE PAST THREE DAYS, UNOMSIL AND BRIG. BAZIL HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT IN ORDER TO RELEASE SIX ECOMOG WAR PRISONERS (TWO NIGERIANS, TWO GUINEANS AND TWO MALIANS) @ AS PER ARRANGEMENT A DELEGATION COMPRISING OF DR. ROBERT GRAVEWLE SENIOR, POLITICAL ADVISER UN, COL. MOTALE, COL. ZAMIR AND THREE OTHER SENIOR UNOMSIL OFFICERS, MISS JACQUELINE CENARD - UN PRO FIVE NGOs AND TWO UNICEF REPRESENTATIVES @ ACCORDING TO GEN. JOSHI OF UNOMSIL, THE OVERLAND CONVOY STOPPED BETWEEN MASIARA AND ROGBERI WHILE A TACTICAL VEHICLE ENTERED @ THE SAID COMMUNICATION LASTED FROM 1200 HRS TO 1220 HRS TODAY @ ACCORDING TO SOURCES BRIG. BAZIL HAS DETAINED THIS TEAM AT MAGBENI VILLAGE ON THE RIVER ROHEL BANK @ IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, UNOMSIL IS REQUESTING THE SWIFT AND URGENT INTERVENTION OF THE LEADER AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE RUF/SZ @ THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE PRESENT MISSION IN NEW YORK HAS BEEN INFORMED AND AN IMMERGENCY MEETING HAS BEEN CALLED @ ACCORDING TO GEN. JOSHI, THESE

PEOPLE SAID THEY WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PEACE PROCESS THAT WAS WHY THEY ARRESTED THOSE PEOPLE ☉

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION ☉

BEST REGARDS
2001 HRS

NA *Amie* $\frac{04}{08}{99}$

TO - SMILE
INFO - CONCORD
FROM - SSS
SUBJECT - INFORMATION

04TH 08-99

SIR, AS AT 2045 HOURS SOURCE FROM GEN. JOSHI OF UNOMSIL VIDE SATELITE PHONE SUBJECT OKRA HILLS SITUATION REPORT UPDATE ☉ BISHOP BIGIZI OF MAKENI AND MISS JACQUELINE CLENARD THE UN. PRO HAVE BEEN RELEASED BY BRIG. BAZIL AND HIS MEN. THEY FURNISHED GEN. JOSHI WITH THE FOLLOWING INFORMATIONS ☉

- ① THE OTHERS ARE STILL BEING HELD BY BRIG. BAZIL
- ② BRIG. BAZIL AND HIS MEN HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS
 - a) THE AFRC/SLA WERE NOT RECOGNISED IN THE LOMÉ - TOGO PEACE AGREEMENT ☉
 - b) LT. COL. J. P. KOROMA WHO IS THEIR LEADER REMAINS UNDER CUSTODY OF THE RUF/SL IN KAILAHUN.
 - c) THEY DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF

J. P. ISOROMA TO THEM AND ALSO REQUEST A DIALOGUE WITH HIM ○

D) ALL ARRESTED HAVE BEEN STRIPPED OFF VALUABLES AND CLOTHING AND ARE BEING DENIED ACCESS TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR HEAD QUARTERS ○

③ THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE NAMES OF THOSE ARRESTED BY BRIG. BAZIL AND HIS MEN:

- 1, DR. ROBERT GRAVELLE - CANADIAN (SENIOR POLITICAL ADVISER UN)

- 2, MR. PIERRE ANTHONIE - LOUIS (USA) UN.

- 3, LT. COL. ZAMIR SOVEROGLOV - KROGYSITAI (UNOMSIL)

- 4, LT. COL. JUSTIN MUTALE - ZAMBIA (UNOMSIL)

- 5, LT. COL. HOWEL WILLIAMS - UK (UNOMSIL)

- 6, MAJ. KHARADDIN - MALAYSIA (UNOMSIL)

- 7, MAJ. KRIVCHENKO - RUSSIA (UNOMSIL)

- 8, MAJ. I. KYLE - UK (UNOMSIL)

- 9, MAJ. J. MCKEOWN - UK (UNOMSIL)

- 10, MAJ. M. RAWLINGS - UK (UNOMSIL)

- 11, MAJ. P. ELLET - UK (UNOMSIL)

- 12, MAJ. G. GRADLEY UK (UNOMSIL)

- 13, SQUADRON LEADER F. CARR - UK (UNOMSIL)

- 14, CAPT. T. HICHALWE - ZAMBIA (UNOMSIL)

- 15, MAJ. A. MWALE - ZAMBIA (UNOMSIL)

CIVILIANS

- 1, MR. ADARWA - GHANA

- 2, MR. JOHNSON - SIERRA LEONE S/LEONE

- 3, MR. CAMPBELL - S/LEONE

AND ALSO 12 ECOMOG SOLDIERS ALL BELIEVED TO BE NIGERIANS ○ THE UN SECURITY

COUNCIL IS TO SIT ON THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN SIGMA LEONE ☉

BEST REGARDS
2328 HRS

DA/Smile $\frac{04}{08}{99}$

FM - SMILE
TO - BRIG. BAZIL
INFO - SSS
SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

04TH 08-99

REF. THE MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM SSS ON THE 04TH AUGUST 1999, BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE ORDERED TO RELEASE THE PEOPLE YOU ARRESTED TODAY (THE UN AND THE OTHER DELEGATES FROM FREETOWN) ☉ I AM WORKING ON THE RELEASE OF THE MEN WHO WERE ARRESTED IN GUINEA AND THOSE AT PORT LOKO ☉

NO BODY SHOULD TRY TO CAUSE PROBLEM BY GOING WITH THE IDEA THAT THE PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN LOME IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST ☉ THE MEN SHOULD DISCIPLINE THEM SELVES, SUCH ATTITUDE AMOUNTS TO BREAKING OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT AND IS A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE FIRE ☉

NO BODY SHOULD TALK TO THE UNOMSIL OR ANY OTHER ORGANISATION WITHOUT CONSULTING ME ☉

I WILL TALK TO YOU ALL TOMORROW IN THE MORNING ☉

0508 HRS

DA/Smile $\frac{05}{08}{99}$

05TH-08-99

TO - THE LEADER
 FM - COMMAND HQ. MAKENI
 INFO - GEN. SAM BOCKARIE
 SUBJECT - SITUATION REPORT

SIR, ALFA @ SITUATION CALM AND QUIET @ BRANO @ THE HUMANITARIAN AID WITH FOOD SUPPLY FOR CHILDREN UNDER 5 ARRIVED MAKENI AT 1515 HRS ON THE 3RD AUGUST 1999 @ UNDOMSIL ARRIVED TWO HOURS LATER WITH WORLD BANK REPRESENTATIVES FOR DISARMAMENT DEMOBILISATION AND RE-INTEGRATION @ THEY INFORMED THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND (BRIG. MANI) THAT THEIR MISSION WAS TO CENTRALISE ALL CHILD COMBATANTS FOR DISARMAMENT @ CHARLIE @ AT ABOUT 1400 HRS THE OTHER DAY, UNDOMSIL ARRIVED AT MAKENI FOR ASSESSMENT @ SAME EDUCATED THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND ABOUT THE OUR OWN MEN ARRESTED BY ECOMOG @ ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THEM, THEY WERE 26 BUT NOT 25 @ AS PER REPORT 18 HAVE ALREADY BEEN RELEASED BUT 16 ARE CHILD COMBATANTS, TWO ESCAPED AND TWO WERE SENT TO FREETOWN FOR VARIOUS CRIMES ^{THEY} COMMITTED AND FOUR ARE STILL HELD AS POWs @ DELTA @ BRIG. T. A. B. YAYAH (GUDITH) DEPARTED THIS HEAD QUARTER ON THE 29TH 07-99 WITH 200 ARMED MEN FOR FREETOWN HIGH WAT @ ACCORDING TO THE OFFICERS ON THE GROUND THE

ECOMOG HAVE ABDUCTED ANOTHER ~~THE~~
 ARMED MEN ○ SOURCES FROM LUN SAR
 STATED THAT BRIG. T.A.B. YATAH DISARMED
 SEVEN SUPPORT WEAPONS AND TWO
 COMMUNICATION SETS ○ ACCORDING TO
 THE OFFICERS ON THE GROUND (LUN SAR)
 THEY OPENED FIRE DURING WHICH STAFF
 SGT. SAMUEL GOT WOUNDED ○ THESE
 MEN ARE ALSO SAID TO HAVE HARRASSED
 BOTH CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS DURING THEIR
 FOUR DAYS STAY AT LUN SAR ○ ECHO ○
 MILITARY AND CIVIL RELATIONSHIP REMAIN
 CORDIAL ○ TROOPS MORALE REMAIN HIGH

BEST REGARDS///
 2300 HRS

DA/Quine $\frac{25}{68}$
 99

05TH-08-99

TO-SMILE
FROM-SSS
SUBJ-INFORMATION

SIR,

AT 2015 HOURS ON THE 05TH AUGUST 1999, GEN. JOSHI CONTACTED ON THE SATELLITE PHONE AND CONFIRM THAT TWO PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RELEASED BY BRIG. BARZIL ○

- 1, MR. PIERRE LOUIS - A UNITED STATES CITIZEN AND HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER TO THE UN ○
- 2, MR KRISTO JOHNSON - A SIERRA LEONEAN JOURNALIST ○

ACCORDING TO THEM THE OTHERS ARE STILL UNDER THE ARREST OF BRIG. BARZIL WHO STATED THAT THEIR LEADER ~~BRIG.~~ LI. COL. J.P. KOROMA IS STILL UNDER ARREST AND DURESS ○ HE WAS UNDER DURESS WHEN SPEAKING TO ~~THEM~~ THEM THIS MORNING ○ THEY MAINTAIN THAT THEY WERE NOT PART OF THE LOME PEACE AGREEMENT AND DEMAND TO BE RECOGNISED ○ THEY SAID THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD ON TO THE PEOPLE TILL THEIR DEMANDS ARE MET ○ THEY ALSO ASKED FOR FOOD AND MEDICINE TO BE AVAILABLE FOR THEM ○

GEN. JOSHI IN ACCORDANCE WITH ~~THE~~ FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE U

CITIZENS PLACED UNDER THE ARREST OF
BRIG. BAZIL ARE AGAIN APPEALING TO THE
LEADERSHIP AND THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE
RUF/SZ TO INTERVENE SWIFTLY AND MOST
URGENTLY TO BRING THIS MATTER TO A REST
○ THEY WILL CONTINUE CONTACTING THROUGH
OUT THE NIGHT ○

BEST REGARDS

2330 HRS

J.A. ⁰⁵
₀₈
99

FM - SMILE

TO - COL. ISSAC

05TH 08-99

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE I WOULD LIKE YOU TO
PROCEED TO C/S-VULTURE AND INVESTIGATE ABOUT
THE ARREST OF THE PEOPLE ARRESTED BY BRIG.
BAZIL AND MAKE SURE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE
RELEASED BUT NOT BY MEANS OF FORCE ○ I
REPEAT, DO NOT USE ANY MILITARY FORCE ○
CONVINCE THEM AS BROTHERS TO RELEASE THOSE
PEOPLE MAKE THEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE
ARE NOT BANDITS TO MAKE SUCH DEMANDS ○

BEST REGARDS

FROM - SMILE

05TH 08-99

TO - BRIG. BAZIL

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

I AM STILL ADVICING YOU TO RELEASE THE
PEOPLE UNDER YOUR ARREST ○ THAT IS NOT PART
OF OUR MOTIVE TO HELD PEOPLE AS HUSTAGEE

AND MAKE DEMANDS @ LT. COL. J. P. KOROMA IS NOT UNDER ANY ARREST OR DURESS AS WE ARE TELLING PEOPLE IN FREETOWN THAT HE WAS UNDER ARREST DURESS THIS MORNING WHILE TALKING TO YOU ON A FIELD RADIO @

BEST REGARDS

2145 HRS

CS
08
99
DA [Signature]

imm DTG - 060900 Z AUG. 99

FROM - BRIG. BAZIL

TO - SMILE

INFO - LT. COL. J. P. KOROMA

SUBJECT RESPONSE

TEXT @ REF. YOUR SIGNAL MESSAGE DATED 05TH 08-99, YOU ARE HERE BY REQUESTED TO RELEASE OUR LEADER @ WHETHER HE TALK'S UNDER ARREST OR DURESS HE SHOULD COME TO OUR LOC. AND RELEASE THE HUSTAGES @ FAILURE TO THAT, WE ARE NOT READY TO SUBDUE OUR SELVES UNDER ANY OTHER COMMAND @ ACCEPT FOR PROMPT ACTION

0920 HRS

CS
08
99
DA [Signature]

TO - SMILE

INFO - CONCORD

FM - ~~DA~~ MAJOR CI

TO - THE LEADER
 INFO - CONCORD
 FROM - MAJ. GIBRIK MASSAQUOT
 SUBJ - INFORMATION

07TH 08-99

SIR,

NO RUF/SL SOLDIER ON THIS SIDE AND NOT EVEN ALL SLA SOLDIERS ARE INVOLVED IN THE CURRENT ACT @ MY SELF, CO. ISSAL, CO. NYA AND OTHER SLA SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE BEEN TRYING AND ARE STILL TRYING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THOSE PEOPLE @ I WILL BE LEAVING THIS EVENING TO ESCORT 3 ACF NGO VEHICLES TO MAKENI AND AT THE SAME TIME TO GET IN^E TOUCH WITH BRIG. MANI WHERE EVER HE IS BECAUSE HE (BRIG. MANI) SENT A MESSAGE THIS MORNING TO ALL SLAs THAT NO ONE SHOULD INVOLVE IN SUCH AN ACT AS IT WAS THE WRONG METHOD @

BRIG. BAZIE AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN THIS ACT ARE ALL FORMER BODY GUARDS OF THE FORMER N.P.R.C. CRIMINALS AND ARE INJECTED IN THEIR BRAINS^{WITH} DRUGS AND POWER CONSCIOUSNESS @ WHEN I LEFT TOGO, I VISITED THEIR END AS YOU INSTRUCTED @ THEY BROUGHT UP THIS SAME GRIEVANCES OF LT. COL. J. P. KOROMA STILL BEING DETAINED, PEACE MAY BE TALKED TODAY AND THEY ARE CAPABLE OF DESTROYING IT @ AGAIN, IF NOT CONSIDER

RED THEM AS THEY SAID THEY WERE NOT
 PROPERLY REPRESENTED, AND THERE FOR^{ASKED} THE
 RESERVATION OF THE ABOVE \odot I SPOKE TO THE
 SO AS TO CALM THEM DOWN AND I DEEMED
 IT NECESSARY TO SEND THE MESSAGE ON THE
 22ND JUNE 99 BUT ^{o/s} MAUEL REFUSED TO RECEIVE
 THE MESSAGE \odot

SO FAR FOR LUNBAR KAMBIA AND
 MARENAT ADCIS, WE ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THE
 PRESENT ONGOING PROBLEM \odot NO PROBLEM AS
 I AM IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE OTHER
 ADCIS \odot YOUR MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED FROM
 COL. ISSAC AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO
 MEANS OF SOLVING THE PRESENT PROBLEM \odot I WILL
 NEVER BE AN OBSTACLE TO YOUR ORDERS IN
 CONNECTION WITH THE PROBLEM OF ~~THE~~ BRI
 MORRIS KALLONI \odot

GREETINGS AND BEST REGARDS

- ZOB5 HRS

DA
 07
 08
 99

FM- SMILE

07TH 08-99

TO- ALL COMMANDERS

SUBJ- DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE ALL COMMANDERS ARE
 TO ENSURE THAT MAXIMUM SECURITY IS PRO
 VIDED FOR ALL RELIEF ORGANISATIONS \odot I DON
 WANT TO HEAR ANY STORIES ABOUT LOOTING
 HARASSMENT OF THEM \odot

SUPERMAN BRIG. SGT AND MAJ. JACKSON
 SWARAY WILL BE ARRIVING BY HELICOPTER TODAY

AT MAKENI ☉ PLEASE RECEIVE THEM PROPERLY
 ALL ROADS LEADING TO MAKENI AND LINKING
 PROVINCIAL TOWNS SHOULD BE MADE ACCESS-
 SIBLE, PROVIDE SECURITY TO AND FOR CIVILIAN
 POPULATION ☉ ONLY THIS WAY WILL THE MILITARY
 WIN SUPPORT AND GOOD WILL OF PEOPLE ☉

BEST REGARDS ///

1205 HRS

07
 08
 99

TO - SMILE

10th 08 - 99

THROUGH - CONCORD

FM - DR. SS WILLIAMS

SUBJ - REPORT

SIR,

WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR MESSAGE
 GIVEN TO ME TO ONLY CONTACT NATIONAL AND
 INTERNATIONAL NGOs TO BRING FOOD AND DRUGS
 SUPPLY IN TO OUR ZONE, I ~~RE~~ REGRET TO INFORM
 YOU THAT THE SAID ORDER IS NOT IMPLEM-
 ENDED IN MAKENI AS THERE IS NO COORDINATION
 WITH THE HIGH COMMAND AND ME ☉ THEY
 ALLOW BOTH THE ~~LO~~ NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
 NGOs IN MAKENI WITH THEIR LOCAL PERSONNEL
 ☉ I AM NOW FINDING IT VERY DIFFICULT TO
 STOP BOTH THE INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL NGO
 FROM ENTERING INTO OUR ZONES WITH THE
 STAFFS WHOM THEY HAVE ALREADY EMPLOYE
 FROM FREETOWN ☉

SIR, ACCORDING TO MR. ROBERT PINTE
 (UN. 1), THEY ARE NOT READY TO EMPLOY

ANY BODY FROM OUR CONTROLLED ZONE ○ WE
 ARE NOT TO TELL THEM WHO ~~WHO~~ TO EMPLOY
 TO WORK IN ~~IN~~ OUR ZONE ○ SIR, AS REGARDS
~~THE~~ THE ABOVE, IF WE ALLOW SUCH PRACTICE
 FROM THE NGOs THEY WILL EMPLOY ALL THEIR
 LOCAL STAFF IN FREETOWN LEAVING BEHIND
 THE CAPABLE AND QUALIFIED CIVILIANS THAT
 HAVE SUFFERED WITH US FOR THE PAST 8 TO 9
 YEARS ○

SIR, ANY ATTEMPT BY ME TO STOP
 THE NGOs AND THEIR LOCAL PERSONNELS WITH
 OUT YOUR SUPPORT WILL BE INTERPRETED AS
 PREVENTING THE NGOs FROM SUPPLYING
 FOOD AND DRUGS TO OUR PEOPLE ○ SO SIR
 I NEED YOUR ADVICE ON THIS ISSUE AS
 THE RUF IDEOLOGY SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN
 ○

BEST REGARDS

1258 HAS

DA/anne $\frac{10}{08}$
 $\frac{99}{99}$

TO - SMILE
THROUGH - SSS
INFO - CONCORD
FROM - DR. S. S. WILLIAMS
SUBJ - INFORMATION

28TH 08 - 99

SIR,

OUR COMBATANTS AT OKRA HILLS AND LUN SAR WERE SUPPLIED WITH FOOD ON THE 14/15 AUGUST 1999. OUR CIVILIANS AT LUN SAR RECEIVED FOOD ALSO. FOOD DISTRIBUTION FOR MAKENI AND THE REST OF OUR ZONE IS NOT YET POSSIBLE DUE TO THE DISORDERLY CONDUCT OF OUR COMBATANTS AT OKRA HILLS.

THE MSF MADE THEIR FIRST TRIP BY ROAD FROM KENEMA TO PENDEMBU ON THE 07TH AUG. 1999. THEY WERE ABLE TO ACCESS JOJOIMA, BAIWALLA, MOBAI, PEND-EMBU AND NGIEHUN CLINICS. ON THEIR WAY BACK TO KENEMA, THEY ALSO ACCESSED THE KUIVA AND SHEGBWEMA HOSPITALS AND LEFT VERY FEW DRUGS TO THE ABOVE CLINICS. THERE ARE NOW PLANS FOR THE MSF TO OPEN THEIR OFFICES IN THE KAILAHUN ZONES AND TO START THE VACCINATION CAMPAIGN NEXT WEEK. ACCORDING TO THEM ALSO THEY ARE NOW WILLING TO WORK WITH OUR PERSONNELS. FINALLY SIR, ACCORDING TO UN 1 (ONE) THEY WANT THE

IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE TO START WORKING AND AS SUCH THEY ARE EXPECTING SISTER JOSEPHINE TENGBER AND I TO JOIN THEM NEXT WEEK TO FREETOWN O

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR NECESSARY ACTION SIR O

[Signature]
28
08
99

1930 HRS

TO - THE LEADER
FROM - COL. ISSAC
INFO - CONCORD
SUBS - INFORMATION

30TH 08 - 99

SIR,

THE FORUM WAS SUCCESSFUL THIS MORNING O THER WAS NO PROBLEM AS ALL THE OFFICERS CO-OPERATED O AWAITING TO RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS O

BEST REGARDS ///

[Signature]
30
08
99
2015 HRS.

TO - CONCORD
 FM - SSS
 INFO - SMILE
 SUBJ - INFORMATION

31ST 08-99

SIR,

ONE HELICOPTER LANDED AT KANGAMA THIS AFTERNOON WITH FIVE UN. PERSONNELS ☉ ACCORDING TO THEM IT WAS A REQUEST MADE BY LT. COL. J. P. KOR OMA FOR GEN. JOSHI TO ASSIST AIRLIFT HIS FAMILY FROM KANGAMA TO MONROVIA ☉

BELOW ARE THE NAMES OF THOSE WHO CAME WITH THE HELICOPTER ☉

1. MAJ. A. SOLANKEY - INDIAN
2. MAJ. GARRY BRADLEY - UK
3. PILOT GENNADY BELIYAYE - RUSSIAN
4. PILOT GENNADY GUPALO - RUSSIAN
5. ENGINEER GENNAY POLEKHAY - RUSSIAN

I HAVE APPREHENDED THEM INCLUDING THE HELICOPTER ☉ AWAITING TO RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTION FROM YOU ON THE ABOVE ISSUE ☉

BEST REGARDS ///
 1725 HRS ☉

[Signature] 31
 08
 99

FM - SMILE
 TO - SSS
 SUBJ - RESPONSE

31ST 08-99

REF. YOUR LAST MESSAGE YOU ARE TO RELEASE THE CREW TO GO BACK TO WHERE THEY CAME FROM WITHOUT DELAY ☉

1815 HRS *[Signature]* 31
 08
 99

SI-08-0

TO - SMILE
FROM - SSS
SUBJ - RESPONSE

SIR,

YOUR LAST DIRECTIVE WAS RECEIVED AND WELL NOTED O BUT ACCORDING TO THE CREW THEY ARE NOT ABLED TO GO BACK THIS EVENING BECAUSE TIME IS TOO LATE FOR THEM TO FLY O

SO SIR, I NEED YOUR ADVICE ON THE ABOVE ISSUE O

BEST REGARDS

19 35 HRS

[Signature] 3/00

TO - SMILE
FM - COL ISSAC
THROUGH - PLANET
SUB - INFORMATION

14 September, 1999.

SIR,

BE INFORM THAT THE GUINEE SOLDIERS BASED AT PORT LOKO HAVE ASKED OUR MEN IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM WAY TO PASS WITH THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS TO GUINEA. SO SIR I NEED YOUR ADVICE.

15 10 HRS

[Signature]

Vertical text on the left margin: 7, 0, 2, 4E, 3/9, 2G, 51, 31, 9/9

YY URWT - \$Φ's NUMBER
22 2937

69060 USB - FOR MS F
99370 USB - FOR UNITED NATION RELIEF AGENCY
— 0 — — 6 — — 0 —

TO - SMILE
FROM - CONCORD
SUBJ - INFORMATION

10TH 09 - 99

SIR,

ACCORDING TO COL. ISSAC, HE RECEIVED 2 UN. PERSONNELS FROM FREETOWN YESTERDAY ○ ACCORDING TO THEM THEY WILL BE COMING WITH RELIEF SUPPLY (FOOD AND MEDICINE) FOR THE CIVILIANS ON THE 11TH SEPT. 1999 ○

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO ○

BEST REGARDS

1225 HRS

DA [Signature] 10/09/99

TO - SMILE
FM - COL. ISSAC
THROUGH - CONCORD

11TH 09 - 99

SUBJ - INFORMATION

SIR,

THE UN. RELIEF AGENCES FROM F/TOWN ARRIVED AT MAKENI WITH (60) SIXTY TRUCKS OF RICE AND MEDICINE FOR THE CIVILIANS THIS AFTERNOON ○

BEST REGARDS

2130 HRS

DA [Signature] 11/09/99

REF. 11.306



papier 20g

19) Radio Log Book #3
23 September 1999 – 16 April 2000

M86 BOOK 56

7
CONQUERANT



EIK 702

2157

ALLIANCE FOR THAT FEL...
VEL. REG NO 10

229419 - office

JOSEPH

2652
10/4

57555

74808 ~~RED~~ CAT

James Reg
shag 2

~~Joseph~~

~~Joseph~~

~~Joseph~~

~~Joseph~~

Sully Kallon
13 Louisa St.

KUMRABAI

101234 - TIGER
72442 - 10
73442 - CO

71515
71A1A

102556

70770 - BLACK CAT

350
S.B. S. LIA
FAED
NATIONAL

FOR G. IBRAHIM

72442 - 10
73442 - CO

67880 - Step down

74442 - 6001

77880 - Step up

0070

N

70605
Pascal

77850 - member

THROUGH CONCORD
FROM - COL. ISSAC
SUBS - INFORMATION

2653

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT WE HAVE
DEVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS BY BRIG. M
AT THIS POINT O HE IS USING MOST OF
S.LAs TO TAKE COMMAND DIRECTLY FROM
AT KAMABAI WHILE THE MEN ARE BASE
MAKENI O THE INSTRUCTION HE GAVE W
BRING CONFLICT BETWEEN US HERE (MK

SIR, I CALLED RT. COL. J. P. KORT
ATTENTION TO THE PRESENT SITUATION AS W
NEED ANY CONFRONTATION BY NOW INOR
MENTAIN THE PRESENT PEACE AGREE
FOR THIS NATION O WE HOPE WE ALL BE
PEACEFUL O

MORE OVER THE FORMAL PRE
J.S. MOMOH HAS PROBLEM WITH HIS HEA
ACCORDING TO HIM HE WOULD LIKE TO GO
THE COUNTRY FOR PROPER CHECK UP O
GREAT ATTENTION IS NEEDED ON THIS

BEST REGARDS

1980

DAOM
OP.

14 - ~~PHIA~~ ~~XXXX~~ ~~OF~~ ~~XXX~~ J.D.

2654

SMILE

07TH-10-99

COM - BRIG. MIKE LAMIN

BJ - INFORMATION

SIR,
AS PER YOUR INSTRUCTION I CAME TO GET
ALL THE ~~XXXXXXXX~~ SECURITIES AND THEY ARE ALL
CONTACT AWAITING FOR TRANSPORTATION FOR YOUR LOC-
ATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PROBLEM HAVE BEEN
TRANSPORTATION AND FUEL BUT WE HAVE SOLVED EVERY-
THING AND WE ARE NOW MOVING FOR YOUR LOCATION
AT 0

BEST REGARDS

12:55 HRS 0

J. A. Quin 07
10
99

SMILE

COM - BRIG. MIKE LAMINE - DARU BKS.

BJ - INFORMATION

CB - CONCORD

SIR,
THE CHIEF INFORMATION MILITARY OFFICER
ECOMMOG HQ. IN FREE TOWN HAVE INSTRUCTED
MEN AT KENEMA NOT TO ALLOW MY FREE
PASSAGE WITH YOUR SECURITIES (30 OF THEM) TO YOUR
LOCATION. ACCORDINGLY, YOUR ADVICE IS NEEDED AS THE
MOVEMENT OF THESE SECURITIES IS TO THE
KNOWLEDGE OF COL. BUHARI MUSA 0

BEST REGARDS

J. A. Quin 08
10
99

15:59 HRS

FROM - ...

2655

SUBJ - INFORMATION

SIR,

DUE TO THE PRESENTED SITUATION ON
 GROUND ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF FOOD CON
 I HAVE DESPATCHED ALL THE SECURITIES TO SI
 MA TO WAIT TILL WE CAN RECEIVE FINAL INI
 ON ABOUT THE MOVEMENT OF THE HELICO
 TO ~~OUR~~ PICK US UP @ SECONDLY, I HAVE R
 INFORMATION FROM ECOMOG HQ IN F/TOWN TH
 MENT OF HELICOPTER ON SUNDAYS IS IMPR
 @ BUT DUE TO THE PRESENT SITUATION, I
 WKE YOU TO PUT PRESURE FOR US TO LE
 LOCATION @ PRESENTLY WITH ME HERE
 ARE 9 SENIOR OFFICERS INCLUDING TWO
 PERSONNELS @

BEST REGARDS


 *P
 1731

ER

TO - SMILE

FROM - BRIG. MIKE LAMINE

11TH - 10 - 99

SUBJ - INFORMATION

IR

INFO - CONCORD

SIR,

~~THE~~ CHIEF MILITARY INFORMATION OFFIC
 ECOMOG HQ. IN FREETOWN JUST REVEALED TO M
 HE IS IN POSITION TO AIR LIFT ONLY THE SEV
 OFFICERS WHILE THE REST OF THE SECURITIES (THE
 DS) SHOULD RETURN AND WAIT FOR YOU AS YOU W
 TOUR @ WITH REGARDS TO THIS, I NEED YOUR C
 N AND ADVICE TOWARDS THIS LATEST DEVELOPE

BEST REGARDS @

16:15 HRS


 OP

14¹¹ 10-99

TO - CONCORD

INFO - SMILE

FROM - SSS

SUBJ - INFORMATION

SIR, SINCE I ARRIVED AT TEKO BARRACKS AT A 1200 HRS TODAY, COL. ISSAC AND SUPER MAN ARE ST ORGANISING THEM SELVES WITH MORE ARMED MEN.

DEPLOYMENTS @ I'M YET TO BE RECEIVED @

SIR, PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE FOR NECESSARY

BEST REGARDS
1600 HRS

of D.A. Quil 14
10
99

TO - CONCORD

INFO - SMILE

FROM - SSS

SUBJ - SUGGESTION

14-10-99

SIR,

I SUGGEST THAT THE FIRST THING YOU ARE INFORM THE LEADER IS THAT THE MATERIALS CAPTURED FROM THE GUINEANS SHOULD BE THE FIRST THING TO HAND OVER @ ACCORDING TO INFORMATION THE AM ROUNDS IS MORE THAN 50 BOXES, MORE THAN 35 BOX OF R.P.G. BOMBS AND MORE THAN 35 BOXES OF GR NADES @ WITH MANY WEAPONS @

BEST REGARDS

of D.A. Quil 14
10
99

SIR,

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM TEN SERIOUS FIGHTING IS GOING ON BETWEEN SUPER MEN AND THE SLAs @

17:00 HRS

of D.A. Quil 15
10
99

FROM: [unclear]
SUB: INFOS

DATE 16/10/99 2657

SIR,
ACCORDING TO MUSTAPHA, YOU CAN CALL

FROM
ILL
AND
FROM

THIS TELEPHONE ~~AND~~ TOMORROW AS TO
THE HELICOPTER WILL MOVE TO PICK
TEL. NO. 023501009.

IF YOU CAN'T RECEIVE THE ABOVE S
THEN YOU WILL CALL SIKA MANSARA
SAME ISSUE.

REGARDS!!

YOUR REC. 20

SIGNED: [Signature]

16
10
90

TO
ED
S
SE
HON
PLE
AN

TO. CONCORD INFOS CHAIRMAN TODAY S. SANKOH
FROM BISHOP GEORGE BIGUZZI DATE. 17/10/99

SIR, GREETING FROM MAKENI YOU HAVE BEEN
OF THE INCIDENT THAT TOOK PLACE IN MAKENI,
MYSELF AND SEVERAL NGO WORKERS & PROPERTIES
LOOTED AND VEHICLES WERE COMMANDERED & S
WERE HARRASSED & I REPORTED THE MATTER TO
COMMANDER; THESE INCLUDED BRIGADIER ISAAC, COL
MASSAQUOL, BRIGADIER ISSA AND OTHERS &

THE COMMANDER TOOK ACTION TO PUT SITUATION
CONTROL AND TO GIVE US PROTECTION &

BRIGADIER ISSA RETRIEVED MY BISHOP RING, MY
AND OTHER PROPERTIES AND HANDED THEM OVER TO
WE ARE HERE FOR PEACE AND WE WANT EVERYBODY
AS BROTHERS AND SISTERS &

MAY GOD BLESS US ALL AND GRANT US PEACE
FIRM REGARD

SMILE

DATE. 18/10/99

SURVIVAL

A I ADVISE YOU PLEASE WAIT FOR 48 HRS FOR BETTER
SULTATION TOWARDS MSG TRANSMITTED FOR BETTER IMPL
NTATION. SIR, I WILL INFOS YOU WHEN TO MOVE FOR OUR
FIRM REGARDS!!

REC. 1924 HRS

SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE AND CONCORD

SUPERMAN

SITREP

DATE. 18/10/99

SITREP AS AT YESTERDAY 18/10/99 AT ABOUT 12 HRS, THE MEI
OKAA HILL ATTACKED THE TOWNSHIP OF LUN SAR AND
RUPTED THE ENTIRE ACTIVITIES THERE. FORTUNATELY WE WERE
E TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION AND REPEL THE ATTACK. THE
INVADING TROOP ARE YET AT LARGE IN THE NEAR BUSH
THE MOMENT. I'M YET IN LUN SAR TO MAKE SURE THE
MALCY RETURN AGAIN.
CASUALTY.

OWN TROOP - TWO (2) WIA

INVADING TROOP: YET TO BE CONFIRMED. IN VIEW OF THE ASB
WILL BE GRATEFUL IF YOU AND CONCORD SHOULD REPLEN
WITH SOME MATERIAL AND MAN POWER. ITS ALSO IMPERATIVE
I THEY GAVE US THE NEW CODE FOR OUR SECURITY INTER
COMMUNICATION.

SIR, PLEASE TREAT AS IMPORTANT AND ACKNOWLEDGE.

FIRM REGARDS!!

REC FOUR 1037 HRS

SIGNED: Edward 119
10
99

Fm. SUPERMAN

2654

SIR, I HAVE BEING ABLE TO RETRIEVE TWO (2) VEH
OWNED BY THE NGOs AND THE RELIGIOUS GROUP (CATH
MISSION) THE ONE FROM THE CATHOLIC MISSION H
RELEASED AND I AM AWAITING THE OTHER GROUP (C
TO COME AND RECIEVE THE ONE I HAVE RETRIEVED
THE STF COMMANDER IN MAKENI

THE OTHER VEHICLE WITH COL. NYA IS YET TO RE
LOCATION, BUT SAME IS EXPECTED SOONEST

SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 8:15 HR

Four

SIGNED: [Signature]

SUB. RESPOND

DATE: 2/10/99

To. SMILE

Fm. COL. NYA

SIR, I AM IN POSSESSION OF ONE LAND CRUISER WITH
WITH ONE CODAN SET. SAME WAS NOT COMMANDERED
BUT A BODY GUARD COMMANDER OF SUPERMAN

EQUALLY SO, SUPERMAN IS ALSO IN POSSESSION OF
NGO VEHICLE, ONE LAND CRUISER IN WHICH HE HAS
B M G AND ONE OTHER FROM CATHOLIC MISSION PRESENT
LED BY THE HIS SECRETARY

MOREOVER, ITS VERY NECESSARY IF ANY HANDOVER
BE DONE AS NEARLY ALL SENIOR OFFICERS

AT THIS END ARE IN POSSESSION OF NGO VEHICLE
SUPERMAN REPORTED ME, HE ORDERED ME TO ALLOW
USE THE VEHICLE WHICH I HAVE REFUSE TO DO SO.
SAY BUT UPON SEEN YOU FACE TO FACE

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 9:35 HR [Signature]

SMILE

DATE - 2/11/99

SURVIVAL


RESPONSE

SIR, AS PER INSTRUCTION THAT UPON MEETING TOGETHER SUPERMAN AND COL ISAAC, I SHOULD INFOS, WE HAVE THAT AND CAME UP WITH FRUITFUL DISCUSSION. BUT AS THEY ARRIVED THERE WAS AN INFO FROM LUNSAK SLA FROM OKRA HILL ATTACKED MAMUSA UPID RAKULAY AND ITS A ROUTE THAT YOU WILL BE TAKING MAKENI.

I, MYSELF, COL ISAAC AND SUPERMAN SAT DOWN TOGETHER WITH SOME SENIOR OFFICERS THAT BRIGADIER SUPERMAN SHOWED SOME SOLDIER TO PUT SITUATION UNDER CONTROL. FOR MAKENI TOWNSHIP, SITUATION IS UNDER COMPLETE CONTROL, SECURITY NO PROBLEM.

I WILL INFOS YOU UPON GOING THROUGH ALL CHECKS THAT MAY HINDER YOUR PROCEEDING TO THIS POINT. SIR, ACCEPT INFOS FOR NECC. ACTION.

FIRM REGARDS!!

Your REC-248THUS
SIGNED: 

21/10/99

BLACK MOSES

SUB. INFO

SURVIVAL

DATE. 22/10/99

I HAVE DISPATCHED COL EAGLE, SUPERMAN AND SOME OTHERS AT THE POINT MENTIONED YESTERDAY IN THE MSG WITH 7 TRUCKS RE-ENFORCEMENT.

I WILL INFOS YOU UPON GOING THROUGH THE EXERCISE

FIRM REGARDS!!

SIR, SLA ATTACKED OUR POSITIONS YESTERDAY (LUNSA ABOUT 1500HRS BUT SAME WAS SUCCESSFULLY REPEL ATTACK WAS CARRY ON THIS MORNING AGAIN, I WILL YOU WITH FULL REPORT UPON GOING THROUGH OUR PL

FIRM REG
YOUR REC.
SIGNED.

TO. SURVIVAL INFO BLACKMOSES

FM. SUPERMAN

SUB. SITREP DATE. 26/10/99

SIR, SITREP AS FROM 1600HRS 25/10/99 TO 1600HRS ONE (1) SLA OF LARGE NUMBER ATTACKED MY LOC (LUNSA) 0 ATTACK WAS SUCCESSFULLY REPELLED 0

TWO (2) CASUALTY - OWN TPS; 2 (TWO) KIA AND 2 (TWO)

INVADING TPS - 12 KIA AND ONE (1) CAPTURED ALIVE LATER DIED DUE TO PROFUSE BLEEDING 0

CIVILIAN CASUALTY - 2 (TWO) KIA AND 15 (FIFTEEN) HOU MALICIOUSLY BURNT DOWN BY THE INVADING TPS 0

THREE (3) ADMIN 0 AS PER THE LETTER SENT TO YOU COL. TORTOISE 0

FOUR (4) OTHER INFOS 0 INFO GATHERED FROM THE CIV WHO ESCAPED FROM THE SLA REVEALED THAT THEIR MISSION IS TO CAPTURED AND DEFEND LUNSA TO BE THE SOURCES FURTHER DISCLOSED THAT MORE ARMED FORCE EXPECTED FROM OKRA HILL IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION 0

(5) @ TPS MORALE VERY ENCOURAGING

from regards

your att. 2/24/99

Signed: ~~[Signature]~~
2/24/99

Blackmoss

DATE: 2/10/99

SUB. INFO/RESPONSE

MARTIN

I AM SUSPICIOUS THAT THE AGENCIES INVOLVED MIGHT

SHUT US DOWN.

TRIED YESTERDAY TO CALL GEN. IN SEVERAL OCCASION

IF CAN ONLY APPEAR ON THE SCREEN NOT RECEIVED

DID SIMILAR THING FEW MONTHS AGO AND UP TILL NOW

PHONE IS OUT OF SERVICE

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO CALL ME ON THIS NUMBER

THAT, I WILL BE ABLE TO NOTIFY THE PROBLEMS

BY ARE AS FOLLOWS

10874761249455 ✓

10871761875122

10871762004098

10871761932415

IN, AFTER WE HAVE TRIED, I WOULD ALSO LIKE YOU TO
SIMILAR NUMBER TO GEN. TO TRY TOO

From regards

Your regards 9/5/99

Signed: ~~[Signature]~~

SIR, WE ARE TOTALLY LACK OF FOOD AS SOLDIERS,
GRUMBING. SIR, I SUGGEST THAT IF THE FOOD CAN PR
TO ROGBERY JUNCTION, I WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO COL
TO MY POINT.

FIRM REGARDS!!
REC. YOUR (P) STAL
SIGNED. *[Signature]*

19H

5107

TO. BLACK MOSES

121

INFO. S.S.S, CONCORD AND ALL STNS.

FM. KARMOH MOHAMED

ER) DATE. 29-10-99.

SIR, ACCORDING TO WHAT I SAW IN MY DREAM LAST NIGHT, THE POL
FREEDOWN HAVE PLANNED TO FORMED A COALITION FORCE WHO
FIGHT ~~WITH~~ ^{AGAINST} THE RUFSL IN ORDER TO JEOPARDISE THE PRESENT PE

THIS COALITION FORCE IS TO BE FORMED BY THE FORM.
SOLDIERS, THE KAMAJORS AND THE POLITICIANS (C) ALL STATIONS
FORE ASK TO PERFORM A SACRIFICE TODAY WITHOUT FAIL WITH

(1) ONE BASIN OF COOKED RICE AND FANGABAMA TO COUNTER
INTENTION (C)

2. SURAT YASI SHOULD BE RECITED 7 TIMES BEFORE PERFORM
SACRIFICE AND AFTER WHICH ^{SACRIFICE} THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO

125
127
10
99

AND DISABLE PEOPLE (C) ALSO, THE RUFSL SOLDIERS SHOULD
FASTING FOR 4 DAYS AS FROM TODAY (C) THE LEADER OF
NT SHOULD DO SAME FASTING FOR THREE DAYS (C)

MAY GOD BLESS US ALL (C)

BEST REGARDS (C)

SIGNED- *[Signature]*

SURVIVAL

INFOS


12, UPON MY ARRIVAL AT MAKENI, I HAVE TRIED VERY
TO RETURN LIFE TO NORMAL AT MAKENI AND
TERRORISM AND INTIMIDATION HAS STOPPED ☺

TO MY SURPRISE YESTERDAY, (A DEMBA THE HERBALIST
MAKENI WENT TO THE MOSQUE FOR PRAYER AND GAVE
STATEMENT THAT THE PEOPLE OF THIS TOWNSHIP HAVE
ONLY THE SMOKE, THE FIRE ITSELF IS ON THE WAY
IT WILL BE FOR THEM (CIVILIANS) ☺

I WANT YOUR ADVICE AS THE CIVILIANS WERE FLEEING
TOWNSHIP SINCE LAST NIGHT ^{EVEN THOUGH} ^{SOMETHING} I HAVE DONE TOWARDS
TO MAKE THEM UNDERSTAND ☺

FIRM REGARDS!!

REC. ZOUR 1243HRS

SIGNED 

30
10
99

BLACK MOSES

DATE - 30/10/99

COL. MAMOH ROGERS

INSTRUCTION

I AM HEREBY INSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE SECURITIES FOR
NGOS WHO ARE DUE TO ARRIVE AT YOUR POINT ON
BY AT 105HRS.

THEY ARE EIGHT IN NUMBER

FOUR (FOUR) MILITARY OBSERVERS AND # (FOUR) HUMAN RIGHT WATCH
UNOMILS ☺

TREAT THEM KINDLY ☺

FIRM REGARDS!!

1992

SIR, WE HAVE RECEIVED (BIG. SEVEN (7) UNDOMSIL
OBSERVER AT SEGBWEMA WITHOUT ANY CONTACT ABOUT
ACCORDING TO THEM, THEY ONLY CAME TO ACCESS THE
LEADING FROM MY POINT (SEGBWEMA) TO KENEMA. THEY
SEVEN IN NUMBER AMONG WHICH THREE ARE MEN
AND 4 (FOUR) WHITE MEN

ACCORDING TO THEM THEY ARE ONLY TO STOP ^{AT} SEGBWEMA
AND RETURN TO KENEMA AFTER THEIR OBSERVATION ON
ROAD CONDITION LEADING FROM MY POINT TO KENEMA


AMONGST THIS SEVEN MEN; SIX ARE MAJOR AND
CAPTAIN

SIR, I NEED YOUR ADVICE.

FIRM REGARDS

YOUR REC. 1540H

SIGNED



TO - SMILE FM - GHAFIA SUB - RESPOND DATE - 2 - 11 - 99

SIR,
YOUR INSTRUCTION WAS WELL RECEIVED AND CONTENT WELL UNDERSTOOD
NOW AWAITING COL ISSAC WHO IS NOW EN ROUTE FROM KAMABAI
MOVE VERY FAST TO THE MENTIONED LOCATION WHERE WE WILL BE PICKED
YOUR LOCATION (C) SIR, ON THE ISSUE OF THE NGO'S LOST VEHICLES
TO MAKE IT VERY CLEAR TO YOU THAT I NEVER COMMANDERED

I ONLY RETRIEVE ONE NGO GRAY HILUX FROM THE
SOLDIERS DURING THE BATTLE AT BATKANU WHICH IS IN FACT
UNFUNCTIONABLE (C) THIS VEHICLE WAS CAMOUFLAGED WITH WH
AND THE WORDS ON THE SIDE OF THE VEHICLE ARE "S.L
ACTION" (C) IT WAS ALMOST SET ON FIRE BY THE S.L

ONLY BROUGHT IT UNDER CONTROL AFTER A FIERCE BATTLE (✓)
HAVE THEREFORE DISPATCHED THE SAME VEHICLE TO KONTA
WHICH IS THE NEAREST ECOMDG DEPLOYMENT AREA AS PER TOUR
INSTRUCTION TWO (2) DAYS AGO TO SURVIVAL (✓)

BEST REGARDS.

SIGNED  P. P. Johnson
OFF.

1819 HRS (PM)
02/11/99 -

SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE


SUPERMAN

INFO DATE 3/11/99

BE INFORMED THAT THE BROTHER FROM OKRA HILL
CROSSED TOWARDS OUR AXIS UPON RECEIVING THE MSG
THE DDR PROGRAMME (✓) EVEN WHEN THE ECOMDG AT
ERI JUNCTION TRIED TO CUT OFF THEM, THEY COULD NOT
LOCATE THEM ANYWHERE (✓)
YOUR ADVISE IS URGENTLY NEEDED (✓)

FIRM REGARDS!!

REC. TOUR # 2309 HRS

SIGNED  P. P. Johnson
3/11/99

[

SMILE

DATE 4/11/99

SURVIVAL
INFOS

SIR, I HAVE RECEIVED COL. EAGLE AND OTHERS BUT
HE REFUSED TO HAND OVER THE MATERIAL I ISSUED
DURING THE INCURSION AT LUNBAR. IT INCLUDES
100 BOMBS AND 7 BOXES OF AK ROUNDS.
9992

FM SMILE


DATE: 4/11/99

TO: SUPERMAN

SUB: DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU MUST HANDOVER ALL ~~THE~~ SENT BY BRIGIODEL ISSA WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT ACT ON THIS ORDER AND RESPONSE WITHIN THE ~~24 HRS~~ MATERIAL INCLUDES 14 R.P.G BOMBS AND 7 BOXES. FIRM REGARDS

TRANSMITTED FOUR


SIGNED: 

TO - SURVIVAL FM- T/B INFO - SMILE DATE - 5TH NOV 1999.

SIR, THE MESSAGE SENT WITH REGARDS TO RETURN OF MATERIAL REC FROM SURVIVAL WAS ACKNOWLEDGED SIR, BE INFORMED I ONLY ABLE TO RECIEVE FROM SURVIVAL THE FOLLOWING MATER
(1) 5 TINS OF AK 47 ROUNDS.
2. 3 TINS OF H.M.G ROUNDS
(3) 8 R.P.G. ROCKETS.

SIR, UPON THE RECEIPT OF THIS ABOVE MATERIALS, I STARRD AMONG THE SECURITIES AND HENCE THEIR IS NOTHING ON RE AND ^{FOR} THE MOMENT FOR ONWARDS DELIVERY TO SURVIVAL. MISSION FOR OKRA HILLS AS PER INSTRUCTION DID NOT WORK & MANPOWER SENT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO FACILITATE SUCH ME

SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ACT FIRM REGARD.

 2

- PA S.Y.B. ROGERS

- RECONCERN OVER DISARMAMENT OF COMBATANTS

- 17th NOV 1999

WITH MY DESIRE TO HAVE DISCUSSION WITH YOU YESTERDAY THE 10/11/99
MY OBSERVATION ON YOUR PROMPT REACTION THAT THE MATTER IS PURELY
ARY @ I DO ~~SUGGEST~~ AGREE WITH YOU, MORE OVER, PLEASE PERMIT
TO AIR MY VIEW ON THE SUBJECT AND ADVICE ON SITUATION WHICH
US ARE EXPERIENCING IN THE STRUGGLE @

AS A MEMBER OF THE CIVILIAN HIGH COMMAND IN THE
ENT AS FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR COUNCIL NOW THE
NT PEACE COUNCIL @ I CANNOT ALLOW MY SELF TO RELAX AT THIS
IAL STAGE TO SEE THINGS GOING INTO THE WRONG DIRECTION AND
RATHER ESCALATE WITHOUT MY ADVICE @ THIS HAS BEEN THE PIVOTAL
I HAVE BEEN PERFORMING SINCE MY APPOINTMENT IN 1994 TO
'S DATE @ ACCORDING TO THE LOME PEACE ACCORD, EVERY BODY KNOW
MOVEMENT THAT THE 9 YEARS OLD REBEL WAR IS OVER, UNDERSCORED
UR LEADERSHIP @ IT IS LEFT NOW WITH THE ~~COMBATANTS~~ ESPECIALLY
MENTATION AND THE METHODOLOGY WHICH CONCERN THE
FIANSIS ESPECIALLY @ WE ARE QUITE READY TO DISARM BY YOUR
GIVE AS OUR LEADER AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE RUFSL /
@ WE GAVE YOU THE ABSOLUTE MANDATE TO SIGN THE ACCORD
SHALF OF THE RUFSL / AFRC @ I AM A LIVING WITNESS TO
TO THAT AGREEMENT @ THE FIELD COMMANDER (GEN SAM BUCKRIE)
@ ME THREE DAYS AGO CONCERNING YOUR TRIP IN SEGBINEMA FOR
ENDING DISARMAMENT PROCESS @ SIR, THE ADVICE HERE IS
METHODOLOGY OF THE DISARMAMENT @ THIS IS THE CONCERN OF
IF US IN THE MOVEMENT IF THEIR IS NO HIDDEN AGENDA FOR
IF US IN THE MOVEMENT AFTER DISARMAMENT @

THEIR ^{NOT} ~~AGENDA~~ OF ~~DISARMAMENT~~

THE WHOLE BODY IN THE RUFSL IS UNDER YOUR PURVIEW
SHOULD NOT BE AN AFFRONT TO YOUR AUTHORITY EVEN IF THEIR
INFORMATION OR UNDERSTANDING ©

2069

1/1/99 EVERY BODY IS CONCERN, ABOVE ALL ELSE THE PEOPLE
LEDNE ESPECIALLY THE COMBATANTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND
THEY WILL DERIEVED © THE PEACE PROCESS HAS BEEN REHE
OUR F. M. 98 AND MAKING NOT ONLY TO THE COMBATAN
CIVIL SOCIETY AS WELL TO MY KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATED

I AM NOT HERE TO DECIEVE ANY BODY IN THIS MOVEMENT BU
THE TRUTH © THIS IS MY POSITION AND IT IS MY ROLE TO ADVICE
IN OUR MOVEMENT IN A TRUTHFULL MANNER SO THAT WE SHO
ND TO AS STRAY © BUT AGAIN, IT IS LEFT WITH US TO ACCEPT A
THIS MESSAGE IS FOR YOU ALL OF US TO PONDER IF WE ARE T
ADVICE © IN MY RESEARCH, FOR THE PAST FOUR (4) DAYS, I NOT
EVERY BODY IS DISHARTHENED ABOUT QUIT DISARMAMENT W
MOST OF THE ARTICLES ARE NOT IMPLEMENTED AND ADDRESSED ©
CONCERN ESPECIALLY THE PEOPLE BEHIND REBEL LINE © THE GOUB
THE METHODOLOGY AND THE FORCEFULL APPROACH BY ECOMUG
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE © WE SHOULD NOT RETURN TO
I.E THE LIBERIAN EXPERIENCE ALTHOUGH OURS WILL DEFINITE
NOT EXPECT © AND WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT YOU AS OUR LEAD
TO ANY FRONTLINES FOR THE PROCESS. THE NORMINEES FROM OUR
(CMC, JMC) WILL PERFORM THE EXERCISE FOR ALL OF US ©

WE ONLY NEED YOUR DIRECTIVE MORE TO THE FIELD COMMAND
BATTLE GROUP AND SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE MOVEMENT FOR TI
TANTS TO ADHERE ©


THEY ARE VERY MUCH DISHEARTHENED FOR PAST DAYS D
BETWEEN YOU AND LOG OVER THE RADIO SET INSTEAD THE ME
WE PREFER IS THE PHONING SYSTEM. WE HAVE ALL NOTED WIT
SATISFACTION THAT YOU HAVE NOW TAKEN YOUR

IS NOW BROTHERS HAVE PLANNED TO LAUNCH ATTK ON US UI
 ERE IS ~~ANOTHER~~ MAKENIO WIE HAD TO COMPLY ACCORDING I
 ESSED ~~PRESENTLY~~ LUNSAO LICOL MBAWA MOVED WITH HIS
 TION TO POLILOKO TOGETHER WITH THE RICE MEANT FOR MAKENI
 MBAWA UPON OUR ARRIVAL IN LUNSAO PROMISED TO GE
 NOT WITH THE ECOMOG FORCE COMMANDER FOR THE ATTENTION
 WILKE LEADERS IN RESPECT OF THIS UNFORSEEING DEVELOPMENT AN
 ADVISE AS TO WHAT TO BE DONE NEXT

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AND NECC. ACTION @

FIRM REGARDS

RECIEVED ZOUK :

SIGNED: 

TO. SMILE

SUB. CLARIFICATIONS

FM. SURVIVAL


DATE. 12/11/99

TANT SIR, IN RESPECT OF THE COMING OF THE ECOMOG TO
 THE YESTERDAY IN WHICH I MONITORED THAT THEY HAVE DELAY
 D MOVEMENT; SAYING THAT WE (THE BROTHERS) IN MAKENI H
 WILKE TO ATTACK THEM SO SOON AS THEY ARRIVE, IS FALSEHO
 LY, SIR, ALL ORDERS OR DIRECTIVE FROM YOU, THERE WILL
 = TO DISOBEY IT.

SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS @

FIRM REGARDS!!


REC'D. ZOUK 830H

SIGNED: 

I HAVE RECIEVE THE CONSIGNMENT (593 BAGS OF RICE) 74 BAGS ARE SERIOUSLY DAMAGE BEYOND CONSUMPTION)
 SECONDLY, YOUR MESSAGE SENT ABOUT YOUR TRIP BEEN —
 LED WAS RECIEVED BUT ONLY WITH GREAT DISAPIONTMENT
 CIVIL POPULACE WERE EAGER TO RECIEVE YOU

BEST REGARDS

01200Z 13/11/99



J. W. Johnson
 CPT.

JACK MOSES

~~SUB~~ DATE 12/11/99

SURVIVAL

REPORT REACHED ME YESTERDAY FROM THE PARAMOUNT
 IN THE MAKULO CHIEFDOM THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS
 DISTRESSMENT AND INTIMIDATION WITHIN THE CHIEFDOM.

THIS HAS CAUSED (1/4) ONE FURTH OF THE
 POPULACE TO FLEE IN THE BUSH AS EXPLAINED
 THE PARAMOUNT CHIEF

THIS AREA IS CONTROLLED BY SUPERMAN, WITH
 COMMAND OF A MAN CALLED USO

SINCE YOU INSTRUCIED SUPERMAN TO CHANGE
 AND IN THESE AREAS, NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE
 S THATO

ACCORDING TO THE PARAMOUNT CHIEF ALL THIS IS DONE,
 BECAUSE OF ILLICIT MINING THEY ARE DOING WITHIN THE
 CHIEFDOM

KINDLY ADVISE AS TO WHAT I SHOULD DO BECAUSE
 TIME PROBLEM ARISES, THESE PEOPLE CAN RUSH UP

TO/ SMILE

FROM - SURVIVAL

DATE - 13th NOV 1999

2673

EA

/ 5

SIR, I HAVE RECEIVED THE CONSIGNMENT (593 BAGS OF RICE) BUT 74 BAGS ARE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BEYOND CONSUMPTION. SECONDLY, YOUR MESSAGE SENT ABOUT YOUR TRIP BEEN CANCELLED WAS RECEIVED BUT ONLY WITH GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT AS THE CIVIL POPULACE WERE EAGER TO RECEIVE YOU.

BEST REGARDS.

01200Z 13/11/99

(Signature)
CPT.

TO: BLACK MOSES

~~SUB~~ DATE 12/11/99

FM: SURVIVAL

SIR, REPORT REACHED ME YESTERDAY FROM THE PARAMOUNT CHIEF IN THE MAKULO CHIEFDOM THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION WITHIN THE CHIEFDOM.

SIR, THIS HAS CAUSED (1/4) ONE FORTH OF THE CIVIL POPULACE TO FLEE IN THE BUSH AS EXPLAINED BY THE PARAMOUNT CHIEF.

SIR, THIS AREA IS CONTROLLED BY SUPERMAN, WITH THE COMMAND OF A MAN CALLED OSOO.

SIR, SINCE YOU INSTRUCTED SUPERMAN TO CHANGE COMMAND IN THESE AREAS, NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE TOWARDS THAT.

ACCORDING TO THE PARAMOUNT CHIEF ALL THIS IS DONE, BECAUSE OF ILLICIT MINING THEY ARE DOING WITHIN THE CHIEFDOM.

SIR, KINDLY ADVISE AS TO WHAT I SHOULD DO BECAUSE EACH TIME PROBLEM ARISES, THESE PEOPLE CAN RUSH UP TO ME DIRECTLY AND EXPLAIN THEMSELVES TO ME AND IT WILL NOT BE GOOD THAT I CANNOT SOLVE THEIR PROBLEM.

EACH TIME THEY RAN FOR SAFETY 0

SIR, YOUR KIND RESPOND ~~WILL~~ ^{WILL} BE ^{IN} PLACE AS I WANT TO DEPLOY

RICE) THERE BY FORCE IF NOTHING HEARD TO CURTAIL THIS RAMPANT
MPION) HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION TO THE CIVILIANS AROUND THAT
— AREA 0

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED ZOUR 1258HRS

SIGNE:  13/11/99

TO. PLANET INFOS BLACK MOSES

FM. SURVIVAL DATE. 18/11/99

SIR, THE BATTALION COMMANDER AT KUBULA DISPI
HIS MEN ON SY PATROL AROUND HIS AXIS AND
KAMAJORS ARRESTED 12 (Ardura) OF HIS MEN FORCEFULLY
TOOK THEM TO KABALA. SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AN
NECESSARY ADVISE 0

FIRM REGARDS!!

REC ZOUR 1258HRS

SIGNED:

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
TO: SMILE
FM: SURVIVAL
SUB: INFOS

DATE: 22/11/99

SIR, THE CDF (CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE) OPERATING WITH THE GOVT. TROOP AT KABALA ARRESTED 12 (TWELVE) OF OUR SOLDIERS WHO WERE ON SY PATROL AND FORCIBLY TOOK THEM TO KABALA. THEY ARE STILL HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL AT KABALA. SIR, LOOKING FORWARD FOR YOUR LEADERSHIP ADVISE.

FIRM REGARDS!!

RECD. YOUR 1515 HRS

SIGNED:  22/11/99

TO: SMILE
FM: LOG
SUB: RESPONSE

DATE: 22/11/99

SIR, YOUR MESSAGE RECEIVED AND SAME WILL BE IMPLEMENTED ACCORDINGLY. THEY SHOULD HAVE LEFT TODAY BUT THE HEALTH CONDITION OF BROTHER RODGERS COULDN'T PERMIT ~~THE~~ AS HE IS SUFFERING FROM MALARIA ATTACK. SO HE HAS DECIDED TO MOVE ON TUESDAY WITH ALL OTHERS AT DARU FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT TO YOUR LOCATION SIR.

ADVISE SIR.

FIRM REGARDS!!

RECD YOUR 1554 HRS

SIGNED:  22/11/99

W

TO: SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE DATE: 22/11/99

FM: SUPERMAN

SUB: RESPONSE

SIR,

REF TO THE INSTRUCTION FROM THE LEADER TO MOBILIZE CIVILIANS TO MOVE FROM OUR POINT TO FITOWN HAVE WORKED OUT ACCORDINGLY

EVERYTHING HAS SUCCESSFULLY HANDLED JOINTLY BY ME BRIG. MORIS KALLON AND COL. LAWRENCE. THE CONVOY HAS A REPRESENTATIVE OF TWO RUFSL SENIOR OFFICERS - NAMELY COL. TITUS TARAWALLY AND ONE BLACK GUARD SENIOR OFFICER LT COL. DAVID LEBBIE (DEATH SQUAD). WE ONLY REMAIN TO HOPE FOR THEIR SAFETY ARRIVAL FROM THIS POINT.

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS

FIRM REGARDS!!

RECD: TRANSMITTED YOUR 1958 HRS

SIGNED: [Signature] OPT.

TO: SMILE

FM: SURVIVAL

SUB: INQUIRY

DATE: 23/11/99

EAMEN
1

THESE

LHO

SIR, REF. TO YOUR MESSAGE IN RESPECT OF THE RECEIPT OF THE UNAMSIL INTO KOIDU FROM PORT LOKO THROUGH MAKENI IS WELL RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGED. SIR, I AM IN DOUBT, I WANT TO KNOW IF THE HELICOPTER IS LANDING WITH RE-ENFORCEMENT FOR DEPLOYMENT BECAUSE PRESENTLY WE RECEIVED INTELLIGENT INFORMATION WRITTEN US THAT ACCORDING TO RELIABLE INFORMATION IF WE RESIST TO DISARM, THEY WILL USE BOTH THE SLAS AT KABALA AND THE ECOMOG TO USE FORCE TO DISARM US.

SIR, TWELVE OF OUR MEN WERE ARRESTED BY THE CIDE AND TAKEN TO KABALA AND UP TO NOW THEY ARE STILL UNDER ARREST AT KABALA. SIR, I ADVISE THAT THOSE COMING BY LAND WILL BE OK FOR THE VISIT AT KOIDU. FOR SECURITY REASONS, THOSE THAT ARE TO BE AIR-LIFTED SHOULD BE COUNCIL FOR NOW BECAUSE IT WILL CAUSE PANIC AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATES BY HELICOPTER FLYING OR GUN-SHIP TO LAND INTO OUR LIBERATED ZONE. SIR ACCEPT FOR NECESSARY ACTION TOWARDS THIS ISSUE

FIRM REGARDS!

RECD YOUR - 08.32 HRS

SIGNED: [Signature] OPT.

DATE. 24/11/99.

TO: SMILE
FM: SURVIVAL
SUB: RESPONSE
SIL,

REF. TO MSG IN RESPECT OF THE VISIT OF THE UNAMSIL INTO KOINDU FROM PORTLOKO THROUGH MAKENI BY LAND IS WELL RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGE.

SIR, I AM IN DOUBT AND I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF THE HELICOPTER IS LANDING WITH RE-ENFORCEMENT FOR DEPLOYMENT BECAUSE WE HAVE RECEIVED AN INTELLIGENT INFORMATION WRITTEN US THAT, IF WE RESIST TO BE DISARMED, THEY WILL USE BOTH THE SLAS AT KABALA AND THE ECOMOG TO FORCIBLY DISARM US.

SIR, I AM STILL REMINDING YOU ABOUT TWELVE OF OUR MEN WHO HAVE BEING FORCIBLY TAKEN TO KABALA AND UPTILL NOW, THEY ARE STILL THERE.

SIR, I SUGGEST THAT, THOSE (UNAMSIL) COMING BY LAND SHOULD BE WELCOME BUT THOSE BY AIR SHOULD YET BE CANCELLED FOR SECURITY REASONS.

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND ALL NECC. ACTION TOWARDS THE ABOVE ISSUE.

FIRM REGARDS!!
RECD. ZOUR 0832HRS
SIGNED:

TO: SMILE
FM: SURVIVAL
SUB: INFORMATION

DATE. 24/11/99

SIR, REF. TO YOUR MESSAGE DATED THE 20/11/99, UNOMSIL WHO WERE TO PAY VISIT. AT MAGBOROKA, HAVE ARRIVED SAFELY AT MY POINT AND HAVE FURTHER THEIR JOURNEY.

SIR, ACCORDING TO THEM, THEY CAME TO ASSESS SITUATION AND BY NEXT WEEK, ~~ACCORDING TO THEM~~ ^{THEY WILL} ~~THEY WILL~~ ^{THEY WILL} ~~THEY WILL~~

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DEPLOY. SIR, I TOLD THEM THAT, THEY SHOULD CONTACT YOU FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION ON THAT @

FIRM REGARDS!!

RECD. 2001 1340 HRS

SIGNED: [Signature] 24/11/99

TO. SMILE

DATE. 24/11/99

FM. SURVIVAL

SUB. INFORMATION

SIR, ACCORDING TO MESSAGE RECIEVED, THE GBITEES HAVE MOVED FROM THEIR AREA OF CONTROL INTO OUR OWN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (MASIMRA - MARAMPA). THEY EVEN WENT TO THE EXTENT OF DISARMING FEW OF OUR MEN DEPLOYED WITHIN THE SAME AXIS @

SIR, ACCEPT INFOS FOR YOUR NECESSARY ATTENTION ON THIS ISSUE @

FIRM REGARDS

RECD. 0903 HRS

SIGNED: [Signature] 24/11/99

TO. SMILE

SUB. INFOS

FM. GAFFAR

DATE. 25/11/99

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT WE ARRIVED SAFELY AT LUN SAR AT AROUND 21 HRS - LAST NIGHT @

ALSO BE INFORMED THAT, THE BRIGADE COMMANDER AT THIS POINT IS PRESENTLY PUTTING THE MEN TOGETHER AND WE ARE LEAVING NOW

FOR MAKENI TO RECIEVE SURVIVAL AND HIS PHONE SO AS TO JOIN THE MEN AT THIS END FOR ONWARDS MOVEMENT TO PORT LOKOI

LASTLY SIR, ACCORDING TO ECONOG COMMANDER AT ROGBERI JUNCTION NO ONE SHOULD PROCEED TO PORTLOKO WITH ARM AND THAT ALL DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE DONE AT HIS POINT @


SIR, I NEED YOUR ADVICE TOWARDS THIS ISSUE 0

267A

FIRM REGARDS!!

REC'D. 10 00 HRS

SIGNED

 25/11/99


TO: SMILE FROM: LOG SUB: INFO & ASSISTANCE DATE: - 25-11-99

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT I HAVE RECEIVED SERIES OF MESSAGES FROM VARIOUS C/SIGNS IN RESPECT OF FOOD, DRUGS, SALT & MAGGI SHORTAGE AND I HAVE COMPLETELY RUN OUT OF FUNDS

SIR, WITH REGARDS TO THIS, YOUR ASSISTANCE IS HIGHLY NEEDED 0

BEST REGARDS.

SIGN:

 25/11/99

REC. 12 20 HRS

TO: SMILE FM: SUPERMAN SUB- INFORMATION DATE: - 30-11-99.

SIR, I ARRIVED AT PORT LOKO LAST NIGHT FROM KAMAKWEI AND I MET THE ECOMOG TROOPS READY FOR ONWARDS MOVEMENT TO LUN SARD 0 I MET WITH THEIR COMMANDER AND DISCUSSED ON CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP 0 SIR, LATER, I CAME TO NOTE THAT THE ECOMOG TROOPS ~~THE~~ WAS MIXED UP WITH S.L.A. SOLDIERS WELL ARMED AND IN UNIFORMS 0 ALSO PREPARED TO MOVE ALONG WITH THE ECOMOG 0 SIR, IN RESPECT OF THIS, I MADE IT VERY CLEAR TO THE COMMANDER THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE AND ASKED HIM WHETHER THAT WAS THE ARRANGEMENT 0 I TOLD THE COMMANDER THAT I WILL NOT GUARANTEE THEIR MOVEMENT SINCE THEY HAVE INCLUDED S.L.A'S AND ALL IN ARM AND UNIFORM 0

SECURITY, I TOLD THEM THAT IT WAS NOT STATED IN THE LOMBA
ACCORD THAT S.L.A SOLDIERS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED INTO OUR LIBERATED
ZONE ALONG SIDE ECOMOG@ SIR, I AM PRESENTLY IN PORT LERO WAITING
ON YOUR ADVICE ON THIS ISSUE BEFORE FURTHER MOVEMENT OF THIS TROOPS TO
LUNBARO

BEST REGARDS
E.S.D.

REC: 11500HRS 30-11-99

(Signature)
E.S.D.

TO: SMILE DATE: 30-11-99
FM: THE SURVIVAL
SUB: INFORMATION

SIR, FOR YOUR INFOS, HON PETER VANDY PRESENTLY AT MY
POINT, ACCORDING TO HIM, AS I INTERROGATED HIM, HE TOLD ME
THAT HE LEFT FITOWN FOR KONO TO COLLECT THE FAMILY @
HE IS NOT UNDER ANY INTIMIDATION NEITHER HARRASS, HE IS
UNDER HIGH RESPECT @

SIR, I AM SEEKING YOUR ADVICE @

FIRM REGARDS!!

REC'D YOUR 1845 HRS

SIGNED: *(Signature)* 30/11/99

TO: SMILE FM: SURVIVAL
SUB: RESPONSE DATE: 3/12/99

SIR FOR YOUR INFO, THE FOCUS ON AFRICA OVER BBC INRESPECT
OF AN ATTACK ON KAMBIA AXIS ABOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF R.U.F.
THEY JUST WANT TO TANISH THE IMAGE OF THE MOVEMENT. ACCORDING
TO INTELLIGENT REPORT, THE ACT WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE OKRA
HILL MEN IN THE NAME OF R.U.F. SIR, MY ADVICE IS THE
OKRA HILL MEN SHOULD BE DISARMED IMMEDIATELY @

SIR, INRESPECT OF YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING COL. KARMOH

KANNEH (EAGLE) AND COL. MARTIN GEORGE, ARE PRESENTLY AT MY TO-
LOC. AWAITING YOUR LAST INSTRUCTION. SIR I ALSO WANT YOUR FM-
ADVICE WHETHER I SHOULD DISPATCH HON. PETER VANDY WITH
THE CONVOY OF COL. KARMOH KANNEH AND COL. MARTIN GEORGE,
SINCE HE IS NOW REPRESENTATIVE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND
HE NEEDS TO ATTEND DUTY DAYS, SIR, YOUR RESPONSE IS HIGHLY
NEEDED ON ABOVE ISSUES.

FIRM REGARDS

~~TRANSMITTED~~ FOUR: 1050 HRS

SIGNED:

3/12/99

TO: SMILE,
FM: MAJOR JACKSON BODY GUARD,
S. SECURITY REPORT,
D. 3RD - 11 - 99.

SIR, BE INFORM THAT I ARRIVED SAFELY Y/D
AFTER PASS^{ING} THROUGH LUNGI, PORI/LOKO IN ORDER TO MONITOR ACTIVITIES
THERE. I WAS APPREHENDED BY THE NIGERIAN ECOMOG AT LOKOSAMA
ACCUSING ME OF BEING ONE OF THE R.U.F MEMBER WHO CARRIED
THE ATTACK IN THAT AREA THAT WAS ON FORCUS FIVE (5) DAYS AGO.
I WAS TAKEN TO LUNGI GARRISON UNDER THEIR ESCORT FOR QUESTIONING.
AFTER GETTING IN TELEPHONE CONTACT AT THE LODGE IN FREETOWN AND
THINGS WERE CONFIRMED THAT AM INNOCENT I WAS RELEASED.

ACC. TO TRUTH SOURCES, ARMED MEN FROM
WEST-SIDE JUNGLE CARRIED OUT THE SAID ATTACK I FELL INTO THEIR
AMBUSH BUT I MANAGE TO ESCAPE ALL WHICH WAS UP TO (8) EIGHT
MILES DISTANCE FROM PORI-LOKO TO LUNGI. ACC. TO SOME CAPTIVES
THE ARMED MEN PROCLAIMED TO BE R.U.F. SO THAT THEY WILL
TANISH THE GOOD IMAGE OF THE MOVEMENT.

FIRM REGARDS

RECD. FOUR 1955 HRS

SIGNED:

3/12/99

TO: THE LEADER

SUB INFORMATION

FM: SURVIVAL

DATE 5-12-99

7

SIR UPON YOUR INSTRUCTION THAT I SHOULD DEPLOY MEN AT SANDA TO RELIEVE THE CIVILIANS, SAME WAS DONE I DEPLOYED TWO (2) SQUADS ARM MEN AT SANDA WITH COL. KARANKE AS THE COMMANDED SIR, TO MY SURPRISE YESTERDAY, I RECEIVED COL. KARANKE THAT COL KOMBA TOOK 80 MAN POWER, AND WENT AND DISARMED THE TWO SQUADS AT SANDA WITH VIOLENT WHICH LED COL. KARANKE TO JUMP INTO THE BUSH TO SAVE HIS LIFE SIR, PRESENTLY THE SOLDIER IN THE BARRACKS HAVE VOWED TO GO AND REVENGE IN ORDER TO RETRIEVE THE WEAPONS FROM COL. KOMBA FOR THEIR DISARMED BROTHERS I HAVE TRIED MY LEVEL BEST TO STOP THEM UNTIL I RECIEVE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS

SIR, AS PER YOUR INSTRUCTION THAT COL. OSD SHOULD REPORT HERE AT MY POINT FOR FURTHER INTERROGATION, COL. KOMBA HAS DELIBERATELY REFUSE, QUOTING THAT UNLESS YOUR ARRIVAL BEFORE HE CAN RELEASE COL. OSD


SIR, I SUGGEST THAT YOU INVITE COL. KOMBA AND COL. BAI- BUKH FOR MILITARY BRIEFING TO YOUR POINT

SIR, NO RESPECT FOR MY COMMAND IN THE NORTHERN REGION. MOREOVER SIR, DURING THE TIME HE (COL. KOMBA) VISITED ME AT MY HQ, I APPRECIATED HIS VISIT AS A SENIOR OFFICER, I GAVE MONEY AND MORAL BOOSTER TO HIM AND HIS MEN. SIR, I ADVISE THAT LT. COL. DARWEE SHOULD TAKE OVER COMMAND UNTIL THESE TWO MEN ARE CALL FOR MILITARY BRIEFING BY YOU

SIR, I AM SEEKING YOUR ADVICE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE

FIRM REGARDS!!

RECD. 1115 HRS

SIGNED  5/12/99

45

46

42

4

TO. SMILE
FM. MORRIS KALLON
D. 6th - 12 - 99

SIR,

BE INFORMED THAT I AM PRESENTLY AT MABON
TO HOLD A MEETING WITH BOTH CIVILLIANS AND SOLDIERS
ACCEPT FOR INFOS @ FIRM REGARDS @

TO THE LEADER

FM. R.U.F. WOMEN KAILAHUN DISTRICT

SUB. ENQUIRY DATE. 7/12/99

SIR

WE THE RUF WOMEN ARE ENQUIRING FROM YOU TO KNOW WHY
YOU SENT MESSAGE TODAY THAT WE SHOULD NOT LISTEN TO THE
C. D. S. (GEN SAM BOCKRIE) ANY MORE & SINCE YOU LEFT US IN
CARE OF HIM ? @ WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THE PROBLEM BETWEEN
YOU AND HIM @ MEANWHILE, WE WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT ALL
R.U.F. WOMEN ARE DISCOURAGED OVER THIS ISSUE FOR THE
SAFETY OF US ALL @ (RUFSL WOMEN) @ WE ARE AWAITING TO HEAR
FROM YOU @

BEST REGARDS /

REC 020 OTHERS
6/12/99

TO THE LEADER

FM GBESSAY NGOBEH (CHUNKIE)

SUB. INFOS DATE. 7/12/99

SIR, I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT, WE TRAVELLED AND REACHED ON
BASE (BENDU JUNCTION) SAFELY @

YOUR MESSAGE STA TO THE COMBATANTS WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD
AND CONTENT FULLY ACCEPTED BY ALL OF THEM @

SIR, ACCORDING TO THEM, THEY ARE LOOKING UP TO YOU FOR
THEIR FUTURE

HOWEVER SIR, THERE IS SHORTAGE OF FOOD AND THEY WERE ASKING
@ YOUR ASSISTANCE. GREETINGS TO YOU AND ALL SIR REGARDS @

TO: SMILE FM: MRS MARIE TARAWALLY O SUB: INFO . D/7-12-99

SIR,

WITH REGARDS TO OUR CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT, I AM KINDLY ASKING YOU SIR, TO FACILITATE OUR MOVEMENT FROM BUEBU TO DARU AS WE HAVE SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT TO DISCUS WITH YOU.

WE THE WOMEN'S WING HAS AN INFO FOR YOU BUT DUE TO CERTAIN REASON, CHANCE CANNOT PERMIT US TO ^{DO THAT} ON THE RADIO. IN RESPECT OF THIS, SIR, WE ASK THAT YOU FACILITATE OUR MOVEMENT TO YOUR LOC. WE ARE AWAITING YOUR RESPONSE AND YOUR NOMINATION FOR THE WOMEN'S WING.

BEST REGARDS

[Signature]
REC 7/12/99

TO: SMILE FM: MADAM OLVI FATIMATA KOROMA. SUB: INFO & REQUEST 8/12/99

SIR,

WHEN YOU VISITED BUEBU, I ASKED THAT YOU WILL ALLOW ME TO GO TO MY FATHER, YOU PROMISED THAT YOU WILL RETURN TO BUEBU AFTER TWO(2) WEEKS AND ARRANGE FOR ME TO GO @ 9 AM KINDLY ASKING YOU TO NOW GIVE THE GREEN LIGHT FOR ME TO GO. I HOPE YOU WILL RESPOND TO MY MSG. BEST REGARDS.

[Signature]
REC 8/12/99

43

TO: THE LEADER

FM: OVERALL SECURITY COMMANDER (COL. AUGUSTINE A. GBOA)

SUB: INFORMATION DATE: 8/12/99

SIR, INFORMATION REACHES THE JOINT SECURITY ^{office} STATED THAT A TRAILER WHICH WAS TRAVELLING FROM F/TOWN TO MAKENI WAS AMBUSHED ON THE GBERU - LUNSAK HIGHWAY BY SLAS THIS AFTERNOON ON THE 8/12/99. ACCORDING TO THE DRIVER OF THE TRAILER AND THE PASSENGERS, THE AMBUSH FELL ABOUT 4 (FOUR) MILES OFF FROM ECOMOG CHECK POINT AT GBERU JUNCTION. THE PASSENGERS AND THE DRIVER IDENTIFY THE FOLLOWING SLAS INVOLVED:

46

2685 US

1	COL	GOLD TEETH
2	11	ADAMU
3	11	I B
4	11	RHINO
5	11	EXTERMINATOR
6	11	BIG FOOT
7	11	STALLON

AS
SOLVE
AND

AND SOME OF GOLDTEETH'S BODY GUARDS OF SUCH HANDS. IT REALLY NEEDS YOUR URGENT CONSIDERATION SO AS TO EASE THE PLIGHT OF OUR PEOPLE FLYING ON THIS ROAD.
BEST REGARDS SIR.

COMM
MARK
AUTH

RECD 2130 HRS
Signed Jehmal 8/12/99

GONE

TO: SMILE
FROM: THE WOUNDED BROTHERS
SUB: INFORS
DATE: 12/12/99.

US TO
MEDIC
ALSO
USED

SIR,

AS PRESENT CONDITION HAVE PUT US TO CONFUSION, AS MAJOR-GENERAL SAM BOCKARIE HAS BEEN TAKING CARE OF US UP TO A TIME YOU RETURNED TO BASE (KAILATHUN) BUT NOW OUR PROBLEMS ARE BACKWARD WERE IN THE BIG BROTHER HAVE BEEN CAREFULL FOR OUR LIFE.

SIR, AS YOU HAVE SAID THAT WE HAVE SACRIFICE OUR HANDS AND FEET FOR THE MOVEMENT AND THE LIBERATION OF SIERRA LEONE, BUT NOW THE NEWS AND CONFLICT ON THE GROUND BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR SON HAVE MADE US DISCOURAGE.

SIR, WE WANT YOU TO SOLVE THIS PROPLEMS WITH THE SACRIFIES YOU TOLD US WE HAVE MADE.

TO SAY MORE DURING THE TIME OF EXAMS LAST YEAR, YOUR SON SUPPLIED R.U.S.O TO ENTERTAIN

PTD

US AND WE WERE ALL HAPPY.

OUR WINES AND SECURITIES HAVE GONE TO THEIR FAMILIES AS YOU SAID THE WAR IS OVER, SO WE DEPEND ON YOU TO SOLVE MOST OF OUR PROBLEMS. NOW HAS COME AND THERE IS NO PREPARATION FOR US.

WE WILL LIKE TO HAVE A FACE TO FACE TALK IN THE COMMUNICATION SET. IF ONLY YOU LISTEN TO THE VOICE OF THE MARKET, YOU WOULDN'T BUY ANYTHING MORE AMONG THE ~~REGULATORY~~ AUTHORITIES.

AS YOU SAID, NO COMPLAIN AND LET BY GONE BE BY GONE.

NOW WE STILL HAVE SOME SERIOUS PAIN, AND YOU TOLD US THAT YOU ARE GOING TO LOOK FOR A PLACE FOR US, MORE MEDICAL ATTENTION AND ESPECIALLY THE FORCE HANDS AND FEET. ALSO WE ARE REQUESTING THAT YOU SEND FOR US SOME WEARING USED CLOTHES, AND FOOD AND DRUGS.

WE WISH YOU HAPPY EXAMS AND MAY GOD BE WITH YOU.

BEST REGARDS!

REC: ZENITH

11:15 AM / $\frac{12}{12}$ / $\frac{99}{99}$

5

4

43

46

DATE- 18 DEC 1999. 267

TO: - SMILE FM: - THE OVER ALL SECURITY COMMANDER RUFSL (C) SUB: - REPORT ON ARM PARSONNEL
ATTACK ALONG MASHIAKA MASINGBI HIGHWAY ON THE 11TH DEC 1999 (C)

SIR,
ACCORDING TO MR ABDULAI JALLOH (DRIVER) AND MR MOHAMED LAMIN
(PASSENGER) THE ABOVE NAMED DRIVER LEFT FREETOWN ON FRIDAY 10-12-99
AT 0800HRS AM AND ARRIVED AT MILE SHAKA LATE AT NIGHT WHERE THEY
PASSED THE NIGHT TOGETHER WITH ^{OTHER} VECHELES (C) THEY LEFT MASHIAKA AT
0800HRS AM ON SATURDAY 11TH DEC 1999 AND ON REACHING AT MASEMILA,
MASEMILA VILLAGE ALONG THE MASHIAKA, LINSAR HIGHWAY, ARMED
MEN EMERGED FROM THE BUSH AND HALTED THE DRIVER TO DISCONTINUE
THE TRIP WITH ADVICE THAT THE VECHELE BE TAKEN ALONG A FOOT PATH
OF A 3 MILE DISTANCE FROM THE HIGHWAY WHICH WAS DONE (C) ON ARRIVAL
AT THE POINT, ALL PASSANGERS WERE ORDERED TO DISEMBERK ^{FOR} PROPER
SEARCHING (C) ~~AND~~ THEY CONFISCATED ALL THE PASSANGERS MONEY, PERSONAL
TRAVELLING BAGS, SUGAR, SALT, SODA KEROSINE ECT ECT ALL TOTALLYING
10 MILLIONS OF LEONES (C)

SOURCES FURTHER DISCLOSED THAT NO INJURY WAS
SUSTAINED BY ANY PASSANGER THAT WERE RELEASED AFTER THE ORDEAL (C)
THESE ARMED PERSONNELS LATER CLAIMED THEMSELVES TO THE
ECOMOG TROOPS STATIONED AROUND MASEMILA VILLAGE WHO WERE
THEN GIVEN D. D. R BANGLES AND SENT TO FREETOWN (C) IT WAS
SUSPECTED THAT ECOMOG AND THESE ARMED PARSONNEL WERE COLLABORATING
IN THIS ISSUE (C)

BEST REGARDS.

07

2122
Dunfield Commander info's Smith

Mr. Col Rogers

Sub

Date. 19/12/99

Sir, with psychological tones by the entire delegate to the public in c/s rock, they diligently explained the ideology of RUF/SL yesterday, today and tomorrow. The explanation were done respectively from the soldiers to the senior officers. The cause of the Lomé Peace accord was explained. Mr. Mon's Kallon also gave briefing on the programme for wounded soldiers and those wanting education. Responses from both combatants and senior officers are more cordial than before. ☺

The populace also pleaded for a clemency on those that attended the negative forum of Sam Bockarie. With mild tears, the entire delegate felt weak and bent down on the plead as genuine. ☺

The^{TO} conclude, delegate peace Buedu got that the war is over. ☺

That with no promise, conditions will improve sooner and that in the name of the Lord, no one will succeed in war any longer. 43

That people want to go home, that Sam Bockarie wrote a letter that of resignation with threatening war like. I'm leaving but destruction that will be done in SLK will never be narrated. Also, in a letter direct outstanding. 46

Based upon the sluggish negative threats to RUF/SL and the state backed by pleads from a senior officers delegate peace to Buedu is asking permission for the security brought to stay till fortifications to eradicate panic in people and evasion and that border

between Sierra Leone - Liberia is closed until situation improved.

Faithfully Submitted

Signed

Maj. JJ Kposowa

Gen adj.

App By Mr. M Kallan

Act 1052/HRS 19/12/99

To: The RUF/SL

fr: Maj. Gen Sam Bockarie

Sub: Information and Resignation

Date: 14/12/99

On this day 14/12/99, as a result of the increasing tension within the RUF/SL and in a bid to prevent more bloodshed in this our beloved country, I Maj. Gen Sam Bockarie (Maskito) declared that, I'm no longer a member of the RUF/SL @

I thanked all the gallant men and women of the movement for their nine years of struggle. May God bless and keep you all. I leave with a clear conscience knowing that I've always worked in the interest of the movement and it's my love for the combatants and civilians that has forced all the actions against me. I remained brave, strong and intelligent @

Signed

Maj. Gen Sam Bock

OK

TO: SMILE THROUGH SURVIVAL

2692

FROM: MR. VANNY

SUB: INFORMATION DATE 22/12/99

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT AS PER YOUR INSTRUCTION, I'VE COMPLETED THE DDR PROGRAMME FROM PANLAP AS FAR AS FADUGU. THE BELOW NUMBER OF ARMS WERE DISARMED AND HANDED OVER TO UNDOMSIL.

1. PANLAP - 15 ARMS
2. KAMABAN AND GRINKOLD - 22 ARMS
3. FADUGU - 45 ARMS

TOTAL OF ARMS DISARMED - 82

SIR, BE ALSO INFORMED THAT, WE RECEIVED 50 BAGS OF RICE WITHOUT CONDIMENT FOR THOSE DISARMMENT ☺ AND WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING YET ABOUT THE UNARMED MEN WERE TAKING TO BARRACKS ☺ SIR, KINDLY ADVISE ON THE UNARMED MEN AS THERE ARE LOTS OF GUMBLING THAT THEY WERE NOT CONSIDERED ☺

SIR, THERE IS PROBLEM OF FOOD, CONDIMENT, DRUGS ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER BASIC NEEDS TO KEEP THE HUNGRY COMBATANT CALM WITHIN THE BARRACKS ☺ SIR, I HOPE YOU WILL SEE INTO THESE PROBLEMS FOR SMOOTH OPERATION ☺

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 1902 HRS

43

46

To - SMILE FROM - MR MELOSKY KALLON (C) RESPOND (V) 23-12-99

SIR, REF YOUR MESSAGE SENT IN RESPECT OF THE LOOTING OF THE LUNBAR HOSPITAL BY RUFSL/SLA IS A PROPAGANDA NO SOLDIER IS INVOLVED IN SUCH ACT AND IT IS A COMPLETE FALSE ALLEGATION ALLEGED BY THOSE THAT FORWARDED THE REPORT (C) SIR, WE HAVE ARRESTED PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THIS ACT AND THE PEOPLE WERE PROVEN TO BE BORN CITIZENS OF LUNBAR TOWN, AND WE HAVE HAND OVER TO THE CHIEF OF LUNBAR FOR INVESTIGATIONS (C) SIR, FURTHER DETAILS WILL FOLLOW AS WE WANT TO PROVE OUR INNOCENCY IN SOME OF THESE ALLEGATIONS (C) BEST REGARDS.

ISSHRS REC.

To: SMILE

From: THE CO-ORDINATOR OF SCHOOLS (MD JEMBA GDBEH.)

SUBI INFORMATION

DATE: 16th Dec 1999.

SIR, ALL R.U.F FREE PRIMARY SCHOOLS STARTED THEIR CHRISTMAS HOLIDAY ON THE 10th DEC 1999 AND ARE TO RE-OPEN ON THE 3rd JAN 2000 (C)

SIR, THE FIRST AND ONLY RUF FREE SECONDARY SCHOOL TO ACCOMMODATE PUPILS WHO FINISH THEIR PRIMARY EDUCATION AND OTHER INTERESTED STUDENTS IS TO BE OPEN AT KAILAHUN ON THE 10th JAN 2000 (C). THE STAFF, PUPILS AND TEMPORAL BUILDING FOR THIS NEW SECONDARY SCHOOL ARE AVAILABLE (C) SCHOOLS ARE DEVELOPING SATISFACTORILY (C) SIR, PRIMARY SCHOOLS AND THE NEW SECONDARY SCHOOL ARE IN ACUTE NEED OF THE FOLLOWING :- ONLY SCHOOL MATERIALS FOR EFFECTIVE WORK AND MANAGEMENT (C)

1. TEXT BOOKS FOR PRIMARY SCHOOLS - CLASSES 1-6
2. TEXT BOOKS FOR SECONDARY SCHOOLS - FORM 1-5

3. Ex
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5. 1
6. 1
7. 1
8.
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17

4. EXERCISE BOOKS FOR PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS.

5. CHALK

6. PENCILS, PEN AND ERASER.

7. REGISTERS AND SCHOOL RECORD OF WORK

8. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SYLLABUS

9. BLACK BOARD, REGENERATOR, SCHOOL CLOCK AND MAPS

10. GAMES AND SPORT EQUIPMENTS.

SIR,
THE PARENT AND STAFF OF THIS SCHOOL WOULD BE MUCH GREATFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE

ALL TEACHERS THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE MONEY YOU DONATED TO THEM OF WHICH THEY HAD EQUAL SHARE PAID ON VOUCHER PREPARED BY THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE EDUCATIONAL UNIT IS CARRYING OUT AN ANIMAL HUSBANDRY PROJECT ALONG THE BAILU ROAD IN KAILAHUN TO HELP THEM SOLVE SOME OF THEIR PROBLEMS

BEST REGARDS

15/12/99
13024RS

To: - SMILE

From: - MD MARIE TARAWAY.

Subj: - INFO

DATE: 24th DEC 1999

SIR,
AS PER YOUR INSTRUCTION TO TRAVEL TO FREETOWN,
WE ARRIVED AT DARU, SAFELY AND WE HAVE SPENT 10 DAYS IN DARU
SIR, CONDITION IS GETTING ROUGH ON US IN RESPECT OF FOOD AND
ACCOMMODATION IN LIGHT OF THIS, WE REMIND YOU AGAIN THAT WE
ARE IN DARU AND THAT YOU SHOULD PLEASE WORK OUT MODALITIES
FOR OUR MOVEMENT TO FREETOWN WE HOPE TO HEAR FROM YOU.

BEST REGARDS,

10:30 HRS

24
12
99

43

44

2693

TO: THE LEADER

FM: BRIG. ISSAH

SUB: INFOS

DATE: 24/12/99

WE ARE PRESENTLY AT KONO TRYING TO DO ALL NECESSARIES
IN THE BEST WAY POSSIBLE @

I WILL KEEP YOU FURNISH SIR @

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK: 1640 HRS

SIGNED: _____

TO: SMILE

FM: SISTER MAMIE

SUB: INFORMATION

DATE: 24/12/99

SIR, I HAVE RECIEVED A MESSAGE FROM ~~AS~~ YAHUN THAT MY
UNCLE HAS PASSED AWAY EARLY THIS MONTH HE LEFT A WIFE
AND FOUR CHILDREN AND THERE IS NOBODY TO TAKE CARE OF THEM @

THEREFORE, I AM KINDLY BEGGING TO GRANT PERMISSION IN
ORDER TO GO AND BRING THEM @

I WOULD LIKE TO MOVE UPON YOUR ADVICE @

FIRM REGARDS!!

04

2694

To:- SMILE

From- THE M.P COMMANDER SEGBWEMA OPS.

SUB- INFORMATION

DATE- 26-12-99.

SIR, FOR YOUR INFO, I HAVE ARREST ONE TRUCK FULL WITH AMMO FROM DARU THIS MORNING HELDING TO KENEMMO THE COMMANDER ON BOARD THE TRUCK IS A NIGERIAN TP R.S.M. @ YOUR IMM RESPONSE IS NEEDED.

BEST REGARDS
EBD
1440HRS REC.

To: SMILE

From: THE MP COMMANDER OPS SEGBWEMA.

SUB. RESPOND.

DATE- 26-12-99.

SIR, UPON YOUR INSTRUCTION TO SEARCH THE ARRESTED VEHICLE,

THE FOLLOWING MATERIALS WERE FOUND:-

- 1) ONE (1) 82 mm MORTA GUN.
- 2) 55 BOXES OF 82 mm BOMBS
- 3) 8 A.K RIFFELES
- 4) 11 SINGLE BARRELS
- 5) 6 PISTOLS
- 6) 52 EMPTY G-3 MAGAZINES
- 7) 71 EMPTY AK MAGAZINES
- 8) 8 BANNETS
- 9) 3 HALF BAGS OF L.M.G BELT FELT
- 10) 2 BOMB CARRIERS

SIR, YOUR ADVICE IS HIGHLY NEEDED @

BEST REGARDS
EBD
2150HRS REC.
26/12/99

45

43

44

TO: SMILE
FROM: MR YANDY KOSIA
SUB. INFORMATION
DATE: 27-12-99.

SIR
BE INFORMED THAT WE THE MONITORING COMMITTEE WILL BE PROCEEDING
TO YOUR LOCATION TOMORROW (28) OUR NAMES ARE AS FOLLOWS:-
1) MR VANDY KOSIA.
2) MR HARI B. MOMOH
3) MR FODAY KAMARA
4) MR JOHN ARUNA.
SIR, MR FODAY KAMARA AND MR HARI B. MOMOH ARE
REPLACING MR MOMOH ROGERS AND MR DENIS LANSANA SIR,
WE NEED YOUR ADVICE (1)

BEST REGARDS
1445 HRS
REC. *EBW*
27
1999

TO: GEN. IBA
TO: ~~SMILE~~ MY WIFE THROUGH SMILE
FM: GEN. IBRAHIM
SUB. ASSISTANCE DATE: 28/12/99

PLEASE INFORM MY WIFE THAT WE ARE OK AND WE SHOULD
HAVE BEING IN TOUCH, BUT THERE IS NO PHONE WITH US.
WE WILL BE AT HOME VERY SOON ALSO CALL MR. VICTO
ON THIS NO. 002258865285 TO SEND 100,000 CFA BY
WESTERN UNION TO MY WIFE AND TO INFORM HIM THAT WE
WILL BE IN ABIDJAN SOON GEN. IBRAHIM-0022-636-408
< FROM REGARDS!!

07

TO: SMILE
FM: COL. AKIM
SUB. PERMISSION
DATE: 28/12/99

SIR, KINDLY GRANT MY WIFE HAJA PERMISSION TO JOIN ME
AT THIS LOCATION. REGARD SIR!!
REC. 0840 HRS *Reply*

TO: SMILE

2696
19317

FM: MR. DENIS LANSANA

SUB: INFOS

DATE 29/12/99

SIR, WITH HONOUR, I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT I VISITED
SISTER MAMIE YESTERDAY AS YOU INSTRUCTED. LUCKILY, THE
FAMILY HAVE RETURNED FROM LIBERIA.

LUCKILY, THE FAMILY

THE ONLY PROBLEM IS THEIR HEALTH BUT TREATMENT IS
GOING ON GRADUALLY ☺

LASTLY SIR, I'M STILL REMINDING YOU ABOUT OUR LAST
ARRANGEMENT AS TIME IS AGAINST US ☺

FIRM REGARDS!!

08:00 HRS
29/12/99

REGIONAL HEADQUATER - MAKENI

29/12/99

TO: SMILE THROUGH SURVIVAL

FM: COL. VANNICIOUS VANNY (ALIAS KAILONDO)

SIR, WITH REF TO MY MESSAGE SENT TO YOU LAST, PERTAINING
ALREADY DISARMED COMBATANTS WITH ME IN THE BARRACKS, THERE
IS STILL A SHORTAGE OF FOOD, CONDIMENT, DRUGS AND OTHER
BASIC NEEDS ☺

SECONDLY, THERE IS COMPLAIN BY ALL UNARM MEN THAT
NOTHING WAS DONE ABOUT THEM AS THE UNAMSIL PERSONELS
WERE ONLY CONCERNED WITH THE ARMED MEN ☺

SIR, ACCORDING TO THE COMBATANT, THEY EXPECT TO LIVE A
HAPPY LIFE AFTER THE DISARMAMENT AND NOT TO EXPERIENCE
DISTRESS CONDITION OF LIVING ☺ (EMPTY BAG CAN'T STAND)

THE ABOVE PROBLEMS NEED AUTHORITIES ATTENTION FOR NECC
CONSIDERATION SIR ☺

P.T.O

MEANWHILE, THEY ARE STILL PATIENT AND CALM AWAITING FOR
YOUR POSITIVE RESPONSE. ALL ARE STILL RESOLUTE FOR THE
PEACE.

FAITHFULLY SUBMITTED

COL. VANICIOUS J. NANNY

TO:- SMILE

FM:- COL AKIM TURAY

SUB:- INFORMATION & REQUEST

DATE- 29th DEC 1999

SIR, FOR SMOOTH RUNNING OF OPERATION AT THIS POINT, I'M HERE BY

REQUESTING FROM YOU TO PURCHASE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:-

- (1) TEN (10) INNER TUBES-NO-13 & 10 INNER TUBES-NO-14
- (2) FIVE (5) CUPS OF EVDS TIC

BEST REGARDS

TO:- THE LEADER

FM:- BODY GUARD UNIT NORTHERN REGION

SUB:- MONTHLY REPORT

DATE 29th DEC. 1999

SIR, WITH YOUR KIND PERMISSION, WE ARE HERE BY GIVING THANKS AND
APPRECIATION TO YOU FOR ALL YOUR UNDERTAKENS AND WE PRAY THAT GOD WILL GUIDE
AND PROTECT YOU.

ON BEHALF OF THE UNIT, WE ARE HERE BY TAKEN THIS OPPORTUNITY
TO PRESENT THE BELOW INFO TO YOU AS MONTHLY REPORT.

- (1) DISARMAMENT HAS COVERED BINKOLO AS FAR AS KAMABAI AND FADHAI
AXIS AND BOTH DEMOBILISED COMBATANTS ARE PRESENTLY RESIDING AT
TEKOR BARRACKS. ACCORDING TO SOURCES GATHERED, THE C.D.F.
WHO WERE OPERATING WITHIN THIS AXIS HAVE HIDDEN THEIR ARMS
INSTEAD OF RELEASING THEM FOR DISARMAMENT.

2678
VEHICLES

THE S.L.A'S AT OKRA HILLS ARE STILL IN THE HABIT OF OFF LOADING IN ORDER TO BRING DELAYANCE IN THE PEACE PROCESS. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION GATHERED, ON THE 22ND DEC 1999, THE S.L.A'S AT OKRA HILLS WERE COLLECTED BY UNOMISIL PEACE KEEPING FORCE FROM THEIR BASE WITH THEIR ARMS FROM OKRA HILLS. UPON THEIR ARRIVAL, AT PORT LOKO, THEY PROCEEDED AT THE DEMOBILIZATION CAMP OF THE COMBATANT FROM LUNSAKW WHILST ON THE GROUND, THEY (S.L.A'S) WERE USING THREATENING REMARKS AGAINST OUR BROTHERS AT THE CAMP. IN THIS PROCESS, FIRING TOOK PLACE AND THREE (3) OF OUR MEN SUSTAINED BULLET INJURY IN THE CAMP AND LATER THEY RAIDED SOME OF THEIR PROPERTIES AND ONBOARDED IT ON VEHICLE BACK TO OKRA HILLS.

(2) DRUGS ARE NOW LESS IN THE ARAB HOSPITAL IN MAKENI. THE INFECTION OF DIARRHOEA IS SO RAMPANT AND AS A RESULT, PEOPLE ARE DYING FROM SUCH THIS OUT BREAK.

3/ SCARCITY OF FOOD IS THE MAJOR PROBLEM AFFECTING SOLDIERS RESIDING IN TEKOR BARRACKS AND AS A RESULT OF THIS, SOLDIERS ARE NOW LEAVING THE BARRACKS TO RESETTLE BACK IN THE TOWNSHIP OF MAKENI SO AS TO ENABLE THEM TO EARN THEIR LIVING.

4. WE HAVE ALREADY PUT UP THE RADIO AS PER YOUR INSTRUMENTAL INSTRUCTION FROM YOU LAST BUT WE ARE PRESENTLY FACING BOTH ^{ACID} AND BATTERY PROBLEM. SIR, WE NEED YOUR ADVICE.

SUGGESTION

IN RESPECT OF THE ABOVE MESSAGE, CONCERNING THE DISORDERLY CONDUCT OF THE S.L.A'S AT OKRA HILLS, WE ARE THEREFORE ASKING FOR THEM TO BE DISARMED BEFORE ANY OTHER DISARMAMENT WILL TAKE PLACE ON OUR SIDE.

SIR, IF THIS SUGGESTION IS NOT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IT WILL CREATE AN EMBARRASMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS. SIR, AS AT NOW, THIS IS OUR MAJOR CONCERN. ACK.

BEST REGARDS. 7:15 AM.

TO: SMILE

FM: BRIGADIER MORIS KALLON

SUB: INFORMATION

DATE: 31/12/99

SIR, SORRY TO REPORT THE SUDDEN DEATH OF LT COL MOHAMED IMURANA KALLON alias (Ziggie) my body Guard Commander WHO DIED ON THE 26 DECEMBER 1999 AT ABOUT 8:00 P.M O CAUSE OF DEATH - ROAD ACCIDENT O

SIR, WE HAVE PERFORMED THE THREE DAYS FUNNERAL AND THE 7 DAYS FUNNERAL WILL COMMENCE ON SATURDAY THE FIRST JAN. IN THE YEAR 2000

SIR, ACCEPT INFOS FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT O

FRM REGARDS!!

9 2/10/00

SIGNED:

TO: SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE

FM: MELOSKY .M. KALLON

SUB: INFORMATION

DATE 2/1/200

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT WE FELL IN AN AMBUSH BETWEEN PORT LOKO AND GBERI JUNCTION WHILE HEADING FOR LUNSAR. DURING THAT COURSE, ONE OF MY PERSONEL (CAPT SULLAY MARRAH) GOT SERIOUS WOUNDED ON HIS LEG AND IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING TREATMENT AT THE LUNSAR MOBILE CLINIC.

NO KIA ON OUR SIDE, BUT WE CAN'T TELL ON THE OTHER SIDE O

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AND NECC ACTION O

FRM REGARDS!!

REC: 0815HWS

L

TO: - SMILE

FM: - GEN IBRAHIM.

SUBJ: - INFORMATION

DATE: - 2ND JAN 2000

2725

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SIR, FOR YOUR INFO, IF WE CANNOT RECEIVE CONTACT FROM OUR FAMILIES, THEN WE ARE PLEADING TO YOU THAT WE GO BACK AND MEET WITH OUR FAMILIES AND RETURN. SIR, I NEED YOUR ADVICE.

FIRM REGARDS
2/01/2000

TO: THE LEADER

FM: SHINNING STAR.

DATE: - 4TH JAN 2000.

SIR. AS PER INSTRUCTION, I HAVE DISPATCHED FROM KAMAKWEI TO MAKENI SINCE LAST NIGHT. BUT UNFORTUNATELY, WE INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT BETWEEN GBINTI TO KAMARAKA ON THE MAKENI HIGHWAY. AND 27 MEN SUSTAINED MINOR INJURY AND I HAVE SEND THEM BACK ON BASE FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. HOWEVER WE ARRIVED WITH 500 MEN AT POMPEY LOC (MAKENI) THIS AFTER NOON.

SIR, I AM AWAITING FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION FROM YOU.

BEST REGARDS.
1704HRS. 21Z

TO: SMILE FROM COL AKIM TURAY 4/4TH JAN 2000

URGENT
2

SIR, IN RESPECT OF YOUR MOVEMENT TO KENEMA, I WILL LIKE TO BE PART OF THE TEAM YOU REQUESTED FROM TONGO TO GO AND BEEF UP SECURITY AT KENEMA. YOUR ADVICE IS HIGHLY NEEDED SIR. I AM PRESENTLY AT TONGO.

FROM - MAKENI STATION #1 -

8 TRUCKS OF KENYA CONTINGENT OR UNAMSIL INCLUDING 4 LAND ROVERS AND 2 ARMoured CAR ARRIVED MAKENI THIS NIGHT, ACCORDING TO THEM THEY WENT ON DEPLOYMENT. A COMPREHENSIVE MSG WILL FOLLOW LATER.

TO:- SMILE Fm:- COL AKIM 4/01/2000.

SIR WITH REGARDS TO YOUR MOVEMENT TO KENEMA, SIR, I WOULD LIKE TO BE PART OF THE TEAM YOU REQUESTED FOR FROM KENEMA TO GO AND BEEF UP SECURITY SIR ADVICE IS NEEDED

Fm:- MAKENI STATION

8 TRUCKS OF KENYA CONTIGENT, WITH 4 LAND ROVERS AND 2 AMOURE CARS ARRIVED MAKENI THIS NIGHT ACCORDING TO THEM, THEY WENT ON DEPLOYMENT, FURTHER DETAIL WILL FOLLOW ACCORDING TO THE COMMANDER ON THE GROUND

TO:- THE LEADER

Fm:- GEN. IBRAHIM

SUB. INFORMATION DATE. 5/01/2000

SIR, WE ARE OUT OF PROVISIONS FOR THE DDR THAT YOU INSTRUCTED ME CARED ON

SO WE ARE PLEADING TO YOUR EXELLENCY TO ALLOW US TO LEAVE FOR MORE PROVISION AND RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO CARE ON THE PROCESS

ADVISE SIR

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 1720HRS

TO. THE LEADER

Fm. COL. SHERIFF - REGIONAL COMMANDER EMC NORTHERN PROV.

SUB. REGIONAL INFOS DATE. 5/01/2000

SIR, WE REACHED MAKENI TOWN AT ABOUT 19HRS THIS EVENING WITH ALL THE PERSONELS SAFELY INCLUDING ALL LOGISTICS

SITUATION CALM AND QUIET AS AT NOW, ONLY THAT WE

MET SOME UNAMSIL ALREADY AT MUSEUM GROUND WITH
FIG. 32 VEHICLES INCLUDING 6 (SIX) ARMOUR CARS AND
ABOUT 149 ^{MEN} ALREADY WERE COMING IN, I STOPPED THEM
AT MAKARAY CHECK POINT @ BEING THAT I DIDN'T MEET
THE COMMANDER (SURVIVAL), I ASKED THEM TO RETURN TO
LUNSAK AND WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION FROM HIM @
REGARDS TO ALL BROTHERS @

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 2255HRS
S
OF
2000

To:- S.SS

INFO:- SMILE

FM:- COL SHERIFF

DATE:- 6TH JAN 2000

SIR, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE UNAMSIL ENTERED MAKENI TOWN AT
AROUND 1400 HRS YESTERDAY @ THEY ARE PRESENTLY AT MUSEUM GROUND @
THEY CAME ALONG WITH 78 TRUCKS, 7 AMOURED CARRIERS (APC) AND FIFTY (50)
PERSONNELS ALL WELL ARMED @ THEY WILL BE GOING FOR MORE MEN POWER
AT LUNGI AIR FIELD @ ACCORDING TO THEIR COMMANDERS, ONLY 8 OF THE ABOVE
MENTIONED TRUCKS WILL REMAIN ON THE GROUND FOR SMOOTH OPERATIONS @
THE COMMANDERS PRESENTLY IN CHARGE ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

- 1/ LTCOL F. K. MUSUMBU
- 2/ MAJOR NGENGE

SIR, THE OBSERVERS HAVE NOT YET ARRIVED AT MAKENI TOWN @ I
HAVE ONLY DISPATCHED MEN (C.M.C.) FOR TONKOLILI, PORT LOKO AND BOMBAT
THE OTHERS SHALL HAVE BE DISPATCHED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ^{AREAS} UPON
THEIR ARRIVAL @

LASTLY, 7 TRUCKS AND ONE LAND ROVER LEFT FOR
FREE TOWN WITH THE ITEM ON BOARD @ SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO

BEST REGARDS.

1601 HRS REC.
6/01/2000

TO-SS.S.

INFO- SMILE

FM- GHAAGA.

DATE- 09th JAN 2000.

SIR, IT HAS BEEN PROVED BY THE U.N THEMSELVES THAT WHAT SO EVER KABBA TELL THEM TO DO IS WHAT THEY WILL ^{BE} DOING. AS THEY PUT IT, WE ARE ALL PART OF KABBA'S GOVT. FROM INTELLIGENT REPORT, THE GOVT (KABBA AND HIS PEOPLE) ARE BRINGING TROOPS TO BAAMA KONIA TO BEEP UP THEIR STRENGTH THEIR. AND THE ISSUE OF GBANGUTA SHOULD BE TREATED VERY SERIOUSLY AS PLAN REVEALED TO ME FROM KABALA CONFIRMED THAT THE S.L.A'S WHO HAVE BEEP UP INSTEAD OF DISARMING, WANT TO USE THAT END TO INFILTRATE ASSAULT ON KONO JUST AFTER U.N HAVE DEPLOYED AIR MAKENI AND MAGEBRAGA. THEY WANT TO GIVE UN WEARINGS TO THEM IN DISGUISE TO INFILTRATE OUR ZONES. MEANWHILE, THE S.L.P.P. IS STILL TRAINING ULIMO "K" (LIBERIANS) ALONG WITH KAMAJORS AT ZIMMI AND KENEMA TO INFILTRATE LIBERIA. THEY HAVE NOT WITHDRAWN AT ALL FROM THEIR EVIL PLANS.

SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO.

BEST REGARDS

TO- SMILE FM- S.S.S. D/9th JAN 2000.

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT ONE OF OUR B/N COMMANDERS VERY CLOSE TO KABALA BY THE NAME OF LT COL GBANGUTA (S.L.A) WENT AND SURRENDERED AT KABALA WITH HUGE ARMS AND HAVE RETURNED TO OUR LOC WITH DIFFERENT INTENTION AND HE IS PRESENTLY UNDER ARREST.

MOST OF THE S.L.A BROS HAVE GONE TO KABALA, GBUNGBANA AND MILE 91 BECAUSE OF HIS NEGATIVE IDEOLOGY HE BROUGHT FROM KABALA. HE WENT THEIR WITH SOME OF THE S.L.A BROTHERS WITHOUT MY CONCERN. HE IS PRESENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION TO ANSWER WHY HE CARRIED OUR ARMS AND MEN POWER TO KABALA WITHOUT THE NOTICE OF ANY MILITARY HIGH COMMAND ON THE GROUND OR THE LEADER. SIR, YOUR ADVICE IS NEEDED. BEST REGARDS. 1529 HAS.

TO:- THE LEADER FROM:- MR KOMBA GBUNDEMA.

15 APR 2000
D/ 10th JAN 2000 2734

SIR
BE INFORMED THAT WE INTERCEPTED SOME GUINEAN TROOPS (ECOMOG)
YESTERDAY (6) ACCORDING TO THEM, THEY WERE HEADING FOR MILE 91 AND 80
AND THEY WERE TRAVELLING WITH WITH THREE (3) ARMoured CARS, FIVE (5) TRUCKS
AND LARGE QUANTITY OF ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS (6) WE ARRESTED THE
THREE (3) ARMoured CARS AND THE THREE (3) TRUCKS, ONE TRUCK LOADED
WITH AMMO OF ALL SORTS (6) WE LATER RELEASED TWO (2) TRUCKS WITH
ALL THE GUINEAN CONTINGENT'S BACK ON ^{THEIR} BASE (6) FURTHER MORE, WE GOT
ANOTHER INFO THAT ANOTHER GROUP OF GUINEAN TROOPS UNDER UNITED
NATION ARRIVED YESTERDAY WITH TWO (2) TANKS TO REPLACE THE
SAID CONTINGENT THAT WERE HEADING FOR 80 AND MILE 91 BUT
WE LATER UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAVE RETURNED BACK TO GUINEA
AFTER RECEIVING THE INFO ABOUT THEIR MEN BEEN INTERCEPTED BY OUR
MEN (6) DETAILS WILL FOLLOW LATER SIR (6) ACCEPT THIS FOR YOUR INFO (6)

BEST REGARDS
15 APR 2000

TO:- SMILE FROM- GEN IBRAHIM. DATE - 12th JAN 2000.

SIR,
WE ARE LEAVING FOR MONROVIA TODAY AS ALL OUR PROVISIONS
HAVE FINISHED (6) WE ARE NOT DOING ANYTHING FOR NOW (6) THE LONGER
WE DELAY FOR NOW, THE MORE WE ACCUMULATE LOSSES (6) WE HAVE
IDENTIFIED ALL THE PROBLEMS AND WE KNOW ALL THE NEEDS TO SPEED
UP THE PROCESS (6) SO WE ARE LEAVING TODAY TO SEE HOW TO PROVIDE
THEM NOW (6) ALSO SIR, WE HAVE TO SEE OUR FAMILIES URGENTLY TO
SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS AT HOME (6) SIR, ADVISE ON THE PRODUCTION
WE HAVE HERE WITH US NOW (6) WE WILL GIVE YOU EXCELLENT INFO
WHEN WE HAVE ACCESS TO COMMUNICATION (6) WE ARE ALSO PLEADING
TO YOU TO INFO MONROVIA TO PICK US AT THE BORDER TODAY OR
LATEST TOMORROW TO SPEED UP OUR MOVEMENT (6) SIR, WE ARE
AWAITING YOUR RESPONSE (6)

BEST REGARDS -

TO THE LEADER

FM SURVIVAL

SUB. INFOS DATE. 12/01/2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT, I RECEIVED AN INFORMATION THAT THE BROTHER^{OF} LOG BY THE NAME OF MAJ. MOHAMED CAME YESTERDAY AT THE BORDER (DAWA) WITH MEN DRESSED IN COMBAT. HIS INTENTION IS NOT KNOWN ACCORDING TO THE MEN ON THE GROUND. MOHAMED ALSO FURTHER TOLD TWO OF OUR MEN TO JOIN THE MEN HE CAME WITH BUT UNFORTUNATELY, THE MEN REFUSED TO DO SO.

IN LIGHT OF THIS, I'M PREPARING MEN TO THE SAID LOCATION @

ACCEPT INFOS FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION @

FIRM REGARDS!!

RECD. 1140 HRS

TO THE LEADER F/ COL MUMUH ROGERS D/ 13TH JAN 2000

SIR,

TO SURVIVAL INFOS THE LEADER

FM GEN. ADJUTANT

SUB. INFOS AND ADVISE DATE. 13/01/2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT, WE HAVE RECEIVED THE BROTHER - LIONS @

PLEASE INFORM THE CHAIRMAN THAT DUE TO THE LAST MALTREATMENT ON OUR MEN, THEY DO NOT WANT TO PROCEED TO THE PLACE OF ACTION @ THIS WILL STOP FURTHER PROBLEMS @ AND COMMUNICATION WITH THE COMMANDER WILL MAKE US TO CARRY THEM TO THE BORDER LINE @

ADVISE SIR @

FIRM REGARDS!!

2106

TO: SMILE

FROM: SURVIVAL

DATE: 13th JAN 2000

SIR, REFERENCE TO YOUR MESSAGE DATE 12th JAN 2000, WE RECEIVED THE DELEGATES THIS MORNING SAFELY. THEY WERE HIGHLY WELCOME AT MAGBOROKA LIKE WISE IN MAKENI. WE EVEN HELD MEETING WITH THEM IN RESPECT OF THE PRESENT ON GOING DISARMAMENT PROGRAMME. WE ALSO RAISED SOME POINTS PERTAINING THE S.L.A.'S. ACCORDING TO THE ~~WAR~~ ^{TO} FORCE COMMANDER, HE HAS SEING IT CLEAR AND UPON HIS ARRIVAL BACK TO FREETOWN, HE WILL DISCUSE ISSUES WITH YOU. LASTLY GAFFA ARRIVED SAFELY THIS NIGHT. BEST REGARDS
END @ 2159 HRS

TO: SMILE

FROM: SISTER MEMUNATHU.

SUB: INFORMATION

DATE: 14th JAN 2000

SIR FOR YOUR INFORMATION, OUR FOOD MONEY IS FINISHED AND SITUATION IS NOT TOO CONDUCTIVE WITH US. SIR, WITH REGARDS, WE WILL BE VERY MUCH GREATFUL IF YOU CAN SEND FOR US WHEN THE SISTER BINTU WILL BE COMMING. MORE OVER, WE STILL HAVE PROBLEM WITH COMMUNICATION BOTH THE TELEPHONE AND RADIO SET. FOR THE RADIO SET WE ONLY NEED A POWER BOX (STEP DOWN) WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO GET ONE. LASTLY SIR, I WILL LIKE FOR YOU TO INFORM MUMMY JOSEPHINE (SMILEB) TO SEND ME ONE OXFORD CONCISE DICTIONARY AND BRUNNELL BRIGHTER GRAMMER TEXT BOOK ONE AND FOUR AS WE NEED IT AT SCHOOL. EXTEND MY REGARDS TO ALL. SIR. BEST REGARDS.

TO: CIS VISION ONE

SUB: REPORT

FM: CIS ESCORT (DANA)

DATE 14/01/2000

SIR, SITREP 1519 HRS DATE

A RECCE DISPATCH ALONG BORDER LINE AND CONTACTED A GOOD NUMBER OF INSURGENCY DRESSED IN FULL COMBAT AND ARMED WITH AK'S AND ~~GP~~ R.P.G TUBES. D.T.D

AMONG THEM, WERE LT NINJA AND LOG'S SECURITIES (BODY GUARD) PRESENTLY REGROUPING ON THE LIBERIA/SIERRA LEONE BORDER LINE - DAWA TRADING SITE.

BY INFOS OF THIS, KINDLY DISPATCH RE-ENFORCEMENT DATE TO DENY THEIR INTENTION. INFO* FURTHERMORE STATED THAT, THEY ARE SEEKING OUT FOR MANPOWER TO COMMENCE THEIR UNFOLD MISSION.

ACCEPT INFOS FOR NECESSARY ACTION TO DENY THEIR EVIL INTENTIONS

FIRM REGARDS!

ACK

0915HRS

TO THE CHAIRMAN

FM COL BUHARI

SUB- INFOS

DATE. 20-01-2000

SIR ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT TEJAN KABBA, THERE WILL BE PROPOSED MEETING WHICH WILL BE HELD ON MONDAY 24-01-2000 TOGETHER WITH THE PRESIDENT OF GUINEA AT FITOWN O

THE PRESIDENT ALHAJI TEJAN KABBA IS THEREFORE WISHING FOR YOUR PRESENCE ON THE SAID MEETING O

IN LIGHT OF THIS, HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHEN AND WHERE TO SEND THE HELICOPTER TO COLLECT YOU O

MY EVERY BEST WISHES TO YOU O

FIRM REGARDS

TO SMILE

27/01/2000

FM. SISTER MAMIE

SUB. PERMISSION & DATE 27-01-2000

PLEASE SIR, FORGIVE ME FOR DISTURBING YOU SIR I HAVE A PROBLEM PERTAINING TO OUR HEALTH AFFAIRS AND JENNEH'S EDUCATION. THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM IS TO KINDLY ASK YOU TO FORGIVE ME A GREEN LIGHT TO GO SOMEWHERE ELSE FOR A MEDICAL TREATMENT AND FIND A SUITABLE PLACE FOR JENNEH TO BE ATTENDING.

I HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCING A SLIGHT EYE TROUBLE SINCE NOV 1999. PRESENTLY I CAN'T EVEN SLEEP FOR A COMPLETE HOUR AT NIGHT AND I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN APPLYING DRUGS BUT ALL IN VAIN.

MOHAMED TOU IS NOT FEELING ALRIGHT. HE IS SUFFERING FROM DYSENTERY FOR THE THIRD TIME NOW. I'M TOO WORRY ABOUT HIS PROBLEM AND YOU KNOW VERY WELL THAT TIME ^{NEAR} WAITED FOR SOMEBODY. SO PLEASE SIR, RESPOND AS EARLIER AS POSSIBLE.

THANKS 14 15 HRS

TO SMILE

FROM SURVIVAL

DATE - 27th JAN 2000

SIR, LT PHILIMON KOROMA (OPERATOR) RECEIVED A PHONE CALL AT AROUND 1830 HRS FROM MR OMRIE GOLLEY ASKING FOR MARTIN COKER. LT KOROMA ASKED HIM TO WAIT TILL HE INFORMED ME ON THE ISSUE. IN RETURN I INSTRUCTED LT KOROMA TO TELL HIM THAT THIS IS NOT MARTIN COKER'S PHONE AND HE SHOULD NOT CALL HERE ANY LONGER. SIR ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND ACK.

2040 HRS

TO: SMILE
FM: SURVIVAL
SUB: INFO

DATE: 29-01-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT UN PERSONNELS CAME IN THIS MORNING IN ORDER TO TAKE THE EIGHTY (80) MEN THAT WERE DISARMED AT FADUGA END TO THE CAMP AT P/LOK6 0
ACCEPT INFOS FOR YOUR ADVICE 0

FRM REGARDS!!
ACK. O851 HAS

TO: SMILE
FM: COL MANAWAI
SUB: RESPOND

DATE: 29TH JAN 2000.

SIR, YOUR MESSAGE SENT YESTERDAY 28-01-2000 WAS RECD I HAVE CONTACTED THE UN FOR ASSISTANCE AND ACCORDING TO THEM, THEIR WILL BE A FLIGHT FROM FREETOWN TO MY LOCATION (DARU) 0 THEY TOLD ME TO INFORM YOU SO AS TO CONTACT THEIR H/Q FOR FAST MOVEMENT TO YOUR LOCATION 0 SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO & ACK 0

945HRS

TO: SMILE FM: SURVIVAL
SUB: INFO DATE: 29-01-2000

SIR, SOME OPERATORS ARE IN THE HABIT OF DISOBLIVING THEIR ASSIGNMENT AREA TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION. SPECIAL REF TO OPT VANDY AMARA WHO LEFT HIS ASSIGNMENT AREA WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF ANY AUTHORITY AND PROCEEDED TO YOUR POINT 0

SIR, ACCORDING TO INFO, HE SAID HE IS ONE OF THE EMC MEMBER 0

SIR, ACCEPT INFOS FOR YOUR ADVICE 0 FRM REGARDS!!

TO: SMS MILE

27/02

FM: SURVIVAL

THRU THE DISTRICT CIVIL ADMINISTRATION MR BOCKARIE K. MARRAH -
KONINADUGU DISTRICT, STATION - ALIKALIA ©
DATE - 30TH JAN 2000.

SIR, I RETURNED BACK HOME FROM KOIDU TOWN ON THE 27TH JAN 2000.
I HAVE SENT CIRCULARS TO ALL R.L.F.P. CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN
THE DISTRICT AND WE ARE GOING TO MOBILIZE AND ORGANISE A
GRAND MEETING AT FIRAWA 35 MILES FROM KABALA ON THE 4TH AND
5TH FEB 2000 © FOUR DAYS MORE, WE ARE GOING TO MOVE ON THE 1ST
FEB 2000. PURPOSELY FOR:-

1. TO CONVEY YOUR MESSAGES TO ALL CONCERN KONINADUGIANS ©
2. TO ORGANISE THE PEOPLE, GET RECORD OF POPULAR CIVIL
AUTHORITIES AND TO EDUCATE THE GENERAL POPULACE ©
3. ANY MESSAGE CONCERNING THE PARTY OFFICE AT KABALA OR
ALIKALIA ©

SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO ©

BEST REGARDS ©

18:32 HRS

TO: SURVIVAL INFO: SMS MILE

FM: MR MELOSKY - M. KALLON SUB: RESPONSE DATE: 2-02-2000

SIR, I RECEIVED A REPORT OF THE HAND GRENADE INCIDENT
WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THE 01-2-2000 AT AROUND 0900 HRS
IN THE DDR CAMP AT PORT LOKO WHICH RESULTED THE DEATH
OF ONE (1) EX-COMBATANT AND WOUNDED MANY © BELOW ARE WOUNDED

1. SLA 18165846 CPL Solomon ISSA
2. David Kebbie - RUF/SL
3. Adama Sesay - RUF/SL
4. Augusta Kamara - RUF/SL
5. Sullay Bangura - RUF/SL
6. Saq Sesay - "
7. Sulaiman Conteh - "
8. Mariatu Sesay - "
9. Abdulai Kamara - RUF

SIR, ACCORDING TO THOSE WHO WERE AT THE SCENE SAID THAT IT WAS A FIGHTING BETWEEN ABDULAI KAMARA AND AUGUSTIA KAMARA WHO ARE HUSBAND AND WIFE. SIR, DURING THE FIGHTING, ABDULAI WHO WAS HOLDING THE GRENADE CONFIRMED THAT AUGUSTIA TOOK THE GRENADE FROM HIM AND OPENED IT, THUS RESULTED TO THE ABOVE DESTRUCTION.

SIR, THE KIA (KILLED IN ACTION) AND THE WIA (WOUNDED IN ACTION) HAVE BEING TAKING TO F/TOWN FOR MEDICAL CARE.

THEY WERE ESCORTED BY THE FOLLOWING EX-COMBATANTS:

- 1. LT. COL. CHARLES JABBE
- 2. MAJ. J. SAMAI
- 3. M.M. VICTOR
- 4. COL. BARRIE

THESE ALL CAME ABOUT BECAUSE THE DDR - UNAMSIL HAVE STARTED REJECTING AMMUNITION, BOMBS, AND GRENADES FROM THE EX-COMBATANT AT DDR CAMP.

SIR, I SUGGESTED THAT YOU SHOULD BE INFO ABOUT THIS ACT FROM NECESSARY IMPLEMENTATION TO AVOID DISASTER IN THE CAMP IN FUTURE.

FIRM REGARDS!!
AK-1803+HRS

TO SURVIVAL INFO SMILE
FM. IRON MIKE
SUB. INFO DATE

SIR, WE RECEIVED 100 (HUNDRED) PERSONELS OF UNAMSIL AT GREAT THIS AFTERNOON WITH 20 (TWENTY) VEHICLES AND ARE ALL IN ARM (BOTH AUTOMATIC RIFLES AND HEAVY WEAPONS).

ACCORDING TO THEM, THEY ARE HERE FOR ASSESSMENT AT LEAST ONE (1) HOUR VISIT.

SIR YOUR ADVICE IS NEEDED FOR THEIR

E
C
OL
M
R
P
DA
HE

TO: SURVIVAL INFO SMILE

FM: COL. MOMOH ROGERS

SUB: INFO

DATE: 02-2-2000

SIR, WE RECEIVED 100 (HUNDRED) PERSONELS OF UNAMSIL AT KAILAHUN THIS AFTERNOON WITH 20 (TWENTY) VEHICLES AND ALL ARE IN ARM (BOTH AUTOMATIC RIFLES AND HEAVY WEAPENS) @

ACCORDING TO THEM, THEY ARE HERE FOR ASSESSMENT AND THEY MAY LIKE TO VISIT BUEDU TOMORROW AT LEAST FOR AN HOUR VISIT @

SIR, YOUR ADVISE IS NEEDED FOR THEIR VISIT AT BUEDU POINT @

FIRM REGARDS!!
ACK 1932 HRS

TO: SMILE

FM: SURVIVAL INFO SMILE

SUB: INFO DATE: 02-2-2000

SIR, ONE SGT DANIEL SESAY WAS ARRESTED WITH 21 (TWENTY-ONE) MORNING BOMBS AT THE 6TH BN HQ MAKOKHO. ACCORDING TO HIM, HE WAS STAYING AT LUNBAR WHEN HE RECEIVED CALL FROM HIS MISTRESS - CAPT AMINATA TARAWALLY, THE WIFE OF LT COL TITUS TARAWALLY FROM PORT LOKO TO ESCORT HER TO MAKENI @ ON THEIR ARRIVAL AT MAKENI AT NO. 9 WATER WORKS RD, SHE SHOWED HIM THE 21 (TWENTY) BOMBS TO BE CARRIED TO PILOKO ON FOOT - HE SAID @ ON HIS WAY, HE WAS TRAPPED DOWN BY THE SECURITY AT MAYAMRAH VILLAGE AND BROUGHT TO BN HQ FOR INVESTIGATION @

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AND NECESSARY ADVISE @

FIRM REGARDS

ACK. 1108 HRS

TO: SURVIVAL INFO SMILE

FM: IRON MIKE

SUB: INFOS

DATE: 03 - 2 - 2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT THE UNAMSIL OF 100 MEN, WITH 100 ARMS, AND 22 VEHICLES WHICH CAME YESTERDAY @ THEY WERE WELCOME BY A LARGE CROWD AND ~~AREA~~ PROGRAMME AND PROGRAMME AT THE COMMUNITY CENTRE @ THEY HAVE VISITED AREAS LIKE THEIR LODGE WHERE THEY SELECTED ^{ARE} THE FORMER BANK, THE FORMER HOSPITAL WHERE THEY SLEPT AND THE WATER WORKS.

I CRC ALSO CAME AND PROMISED TO BRING SEEDLINGS FOR THE FARMING PURPOSES @

FROM: THE LEADER THROUGH COL. RASHID SANDY.

TO: COL. MOMOH ROGERS.

DATE: 23/02/2000.

COL. MOMOH ROGERS IS TO ENTER AND CAPTURE DARU BARACKS IN ~~GAS~~ CASE ANY ATTACK FROM THE UNAMSIL AT ~~BANDU~~ JUNCTION.

MSG PASSED BY Zenith 5:27 pm.

FROM: THE LEADER.

TO: BRIG. ISSAH H. SESAY.

YOU ARE

TO: SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE

FM: COL. MOMOH ROGERS

SUB- INFO

DATE: 03-2-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT, THE UNAMSIL PERSONELS ABOUT 100 MEN ALL IN ARM WITH 22 VEHICLES ARRIVED AT MY LOCATION YESTERDAY

THEY WERE WELCOME BY A LARGE CROWD AND A SHORT PROGRAMME WAS HELD AT COMMUNITY CENTRE. THEY ALSO VISITED AREAS LIKE THE FORMER BANK, THE FORMER HOSPITAL, WHERE THEY EVEN ~~SELECTED~~ SLEPT. THEY SELECTED THESE AREAS TO BE THEIR LODGE TEMPORARILY. THEY ALSO VISITED THE WATER WORKS.

MOREOVER SIR, ICRC ALSO CAME AND PROMISED TO BRING SEEDLING FOR THE FARMING PURPOSES.

SIR, MR ERIC KOI SENESI HAS BEING NOMINATED THE DISTRICT PARTY CHAIRMAN. HE HAS BEING GIVEN THE FORMER SOCIAL WELFARE BUILDING AS THE PARTY H/Q OFFICE. UNAMSIL HAVE RETURNED ON BASE.

PLEASE ACCEPT AND ACKNOWLEDGE.

YR. REGARDS!!

TO: SMILE THROUGH SURVIVAL

FM: COL. MOMOH ROGERS

SUB- INFO

DATE: 6/02/2000

SIR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST DIRECTIVE DATED JANUARY 26th - 1999 INDICATING THE RECONCILIATORY RETURN OF OUR BROTHERS AND SISTERS ABROAD (GUINEA AND LIBERIA). THE RESPONSE FROM THOSE AT DIASPORA IS STILL NEGATIVE. ONE HAS RETURNED WITH A SERIOUS BODY HARM. NO OTHER PERSON HAS EVER ATTEMPT TO RETURN HOME.

SIR, - EVEN EDDIE KANNEH HAS NEVER MADE ANY MOVE PROD

Your DIRECTIVE @ WE SUGGEST THAT YOU CONTACT ~~THE~~ THE
SAME ISSUE ABROAD TO ENQUIRE AND CONFIRM OUR MESSAGES

FIRM REGARDS!!

ALZ 1429HRS

9/02/2000

TO SMILE FM C/S ROCK (BUEDU) OPERATOR/S
SUB. INFORMATION DATE 6/02/2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT SINCE YOU TALKED WITH THE
BROTHERS ON THE OTHER SIDE (LIBERIA) IN ORDER FOR US TO
WORK HAND IN HAND, UP TILL NOW THE BORDER IS CLOSED
BETWEEN US BY THEM @ PEOPLE ARE VERY EAGER TO RETURN
HOME UPON YOUR INSTRUCTION BUT THEY GIVE NO CHANCE
FOR THEM TO COME @ ABOUT 50 (FIFTY) CIVILIANS CAME TO
WORSALGA BUT THE LIBERIA SECURITIES RAISED THEM AND
SEND THEM BACK FROM WHERE THEY CAME FROM @ THE
HARRASSMENT ON THE BORDER IS TOO GREAT SIR @ ALL THIS
CONFUSION IS MOSTLY CAUSED BY THE BROTHERS AT FOYAH
END @

AT VAHUN END, PEOPLE ARE MOVING IN AND OUT WITHOUT
ANY EMBARRASSMENT BUT ~~THOSE~~ THE BORDER FROM FOYAH IS
FULL OF RAISING AND HARRASSMENT OF CIVILIANS @ IN FOYAH
ITSELF, THEY HANDLE ONE KADIAM BANGURA AND GIVE HER A
MISCHIEVOUS TREATMENT @ UP TILL NOW, SHE IS VERY HOPELESS WITH
@ OF US AT BUEDU @ REFUGEES ARE LANGUISHING ON THE
BORDER LINE BETWEEN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE WITH HOME
SICKNESS @ NO CHANCE FOR THEM TO RETURN @

MAY GOD GIVE YOU THE CHANCE FOR OUR PEOPLE TO
BE REPATRIATED @

FIRM REGARDS!!

77 23HRS

9/02/2000

TO SMILE

FM MDM. MOJAMA FABAI

SUB. INFOS

DATE. 8/02/2000

SIR, I AM HERE TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE PROBLEM WHICH I AM SERIOUSLY FACING THE TIME FOR MY DELIVERY IS VERY NEAR AND ACCORDING TO THE NURSES AT THIS POINT, THEY ARE EXPECTING ME TO DELIVER TWIN ACCORDING TO THEM ALSO, THEY ADVISE THAT I SHOULD DELIVER IN AN ADVANCE HOSPITAL AS THE FETUS NOT IN PROPER POSITION

EVEN DR. FABAI KNOWS THE PROBLEM I USUALLY FACING DURING THE TIME OF DELIVERY I HAVE SENT SERIES OF MESSAGES CONCERNING THE SAID PROBLEM BUT HE HAS NEVER TURN UP

PLEASE SIR, I MAY WANT ^{FOR} YOU TO TELL DR. FABAI TO PAY ATTENTION TO MY CASE BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE AT ANYTIME I SEND MY MESSAGE TO HIM (DR. FABAI), HE WILL RESPONSE THAT HE IS ALWAYS BUSY SIR, I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR ASSISTANCE SIR

FIRM REGARDS!!
Ack 12/07/00

8
02
2000

TO THE R

TO SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE

FM COL. MOHAMMAD ROGERS

SUB. INFORMATION

DATE. 8/02/2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT WE HAVE SELECTED THE PARTY OFFICE AT KATLAHUNI TOWN BUT THE BUILDING IS LACK OF THE FOLLOWING MATERIALS ALSO THE ESTIMATED BUILDING

MATERIALS ARE AS FOLLOWS

27/7

1.

2. WINDOW GLASS - 160

3. CEILING NAILS - 40 PKTS

4. PAINTS INDOOR ROOMS

LIGHT GREEN - 16 TINS

OUTSIDE WALL

EMULSIONAL WATER PAINT - 14 TINS

CEMENT - ONE (1) BAG

5. CUTTER FOR THE EDGE OF THE HOUSE - 3 TINS

SIR, ACCEPT MYS FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 16/3/72

8/2
2/12

Time - 01

TO SMILE

FM. SURVIVAL

SUB. SUGGESTION

DATE. 8/02/2020

SIR, I SUGGESTED THAT LET THE PEOPLE MOVE TO TONGA AND WAIT THE ARRIVAL OF SPARROW FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION

SIR, I'M AWAITING YOUR ADVICE

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 17/01/72

~~ACK 17/01/72~~

TO: [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

FROM: AUGUSTINE GBOA

SUB: INFO

DATE: 9/02/2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT A DELEGATION OF TWO MILITARY OFFICERS, THREE(S) XEP STAFF AND TWO BRITISH JOURNALISTS HAVE ARRIVED AT THIS LOCATION TO ASSESS THE SECURITY AND THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE IN THIS TOWNSHIP (MAKONI) AND MAGBORAKA.

THE COUNTRY DIRECTOR MR PATRICK DUCKLAY AND HIS DELEGATION WISH TO TALK TO YOU PERSONALLY ON SENSITIVE ISSUES THEY HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED TO PROCEED TO THE EAST KAILASHUN/BUNDO ON THE SAME ASSESSMENT MISSION.

THEY ALSO INFORMED US THAT, THEY ARE GOING TO START THE MAINTENANCE OF KENEMA - BUNDO HIGHWAY VERY SHORTLY. FIRM REGARDS!

ACK 10 FEB 2000
1
12
1000

TO: SMILE

FM: COL KOMBA GBUNDEMA.

DATE: 9th FEB 2000.

SI

SIR,

A HELICOPTER GUNSHIP FLEW VERY LOW YESTERDAY OVER THE ROKUPUR MARKET GROUND LIVING BOTH CIVILLIANS AND SOLDIERS IN DISARRAY. 25 CIVILLIANS AND 12 SOLDIERS INCLUDING ONE LT BY THE NAME OF LT ABU KAMARA (BIG G) JUMPED INTO A RIVER. THE ABOVE NAMED LT GOT DROWNED IN THE RIVER AND ONLY 15 PEOPLE BOTH CIVILLIANS AND SOLDIERS HAVE SURFACED. OTHERS ARE YET TO BE SEEN. RELATIONSHIP OF CIVS AND SOLDIERS REMAIN CALM. FURTHER DETAILS WILL FOLLOW. SIR ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO & ACK.

10 FEB 2000

TO: SURVIVAL INFO SMILE

019
DIM 2 40

FM: SHINING STAR (COL - KOMBA)

SUB: INFOS AND RESPOND DATE 12/2/2000

SIR, I HAVE RECEIVED THE POWER SAW MACHINE, 48 (FOURTY EIGHT) BAGS OF RICE I AM STILL LOOKING FORWARD TO RECEIVE THE BALANCE

SIR, THE BAILING MACHINE TO INSTALL THE RESERVOIR IS NOT IN GOOD CONDITION, IT'S LACK OF SUCKER AND OUTER

SO PLEASE HELP ME FOR THESE TWO ITEMS (SUCKER AND OUTER)

FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE INSTALLED F M STATION PLEASE ASSIST US TO BOOST IT ALSO, FOR YOUR INFOS, THE NAME IS THE VOICE OF THE LION

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 1315 HRS

TO-SMILE FM-SURVIVAL SUB-INFORMATION DATE-12th FEB 2000.

ACK. 1315 HRS
12/2/2000
LWA

SIR, I RECEIVED A MESSAGE YESTERDAY FROM COL DENIS LANSANA AT PENDEMBU SAYING THAT THE MOTHER OF MADAM FATTY REACHED HER LOC 3 DAYS AGO AND ACC TO THE MOTHER, SHE WILL LIKE TO CARRY HER DAUGHTER FATTY SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR ADVICE

FM:- LT COL ALFRED TURAY TO:- SPARROW INFO:- SURVIVAL & SMILE 2/12-02-2000.

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT THE UNAMSIL WERE ABOUT TO FORCE THEIR WAY TO KOND BUT THEY WERE STOPPED BY THE CHECK POINT SOLDIERS NB TO GO UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS SECONDLY, THEY HAVE STARTED DIGGING TRENCHES ALL OVER THEIR AREAS SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND ACK

END 1559 HRS

110

100

TO: SMILE

FM: THE DISTRICT CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (BODAKRIE MARRAH)

DATE - 13th FEB 2000.

SIR,

THE 3 DAY GENERAL MEETING HELD AT FEREWIA WAS WITNESSED BY THE KOINADUGU DISTRICT RUFF COMMANDERS FOR THE C.M.C MAJ ABDUL-RAHMAN D. COBBA (BLACK MAN) AND LT COL J. ROBERT TOGETHER WITH THE JOINT SECURITY UNIT COMMANDERS 2ND BRIGADE OPS KOINADUGU DISTRICT

SIR, I AM SHORT OF STATIONARIES, THEREFORE UNABLE AT THIS MOMENT TO FURNISH YOU FULL RESULT OF THE MEETING UNTIL LATER. THE MEETING WAS GRANT AND SUCCESSFUL, MEANWHILE, ONLY (10) PARAMOUNT CHIEVES ATTENDED TO THE ABOVE MEETING AND AGREED TO WELCOME YOU ^{TO} FEREWIA, BEREWIA CHEIFDOW KOINADUGU DISTRICT. I HAVE SENT ^{TO} YOU THEIR SIGNATURES ENDORSING FEREWIA TO BE THE MEETING PLACE WITH BEARER MAJOR - ABDUL-RAHMAN COBBA. DATE OF WELCOME TO FEREWIA IS 10th MARCH 2000. PREPARATIONS ARE ALREADY IN PROGRESS. THANKS AND FAITHFULLY SUBMITTED.

TO: SMILE

FM: COL. AUGUSTINE GBOA

SUB: INFORMATION DATE 13-02-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT, HOPE AND HOMES FOR CHILDREN AT NEWSITE BACK OF BIRCH MEMORIAL SECONDARY SCHOOL HAS 8 (EIGHT) CHILDREN.

THESE NAMES ARE AS FOLLOW:

1. MODIO MANSALAY
2. SAIDU KARGBO
3. SIMA KARGBO
4. RAYMOND KARGBO
5. KUSU KARGBO
6. JOSEPHINE CONTEH

THE PRESENT CARE TAKER IS MR. FRANCIS MANSALAY

2725

PREVIOUS CARE TAKER MR PETER BRIAMA KARGISO
WITH FIG 80 (EIGHTY) AT KANPONKIE FIVE MILES OFF
KAMAKWE 0 AFTER KAMAKWE TOWARDS THE TERRIAN, YOU
WILL SEE A ROAD AT KARTEH TO KANPONKIE 6

ONE MADAM MABINTY KAMARA WAS MANNING NEW
HORIZON CHILDREN'S HOME 0 HE CARRY FIG 30 (THIRTY) CHIL-
DREN TO KAPOKO CONAKRY, GUINEA. 0 ALSO, MR. JOHN GBLA
WAS THE CARE TAKER FOR CHILD SURVIVAL CENTRE CARRIED BY
(TWENTY ^{FOUR} FIVE) AND THEY ARE ALSO RESIDING AT KAPOKO
CONAKRY BUT NOT IN THE SAME KAPOKO IN CONAKRY 0
MR. FRANCIS MANSALAY CARE TAKER FOR HOPE AND HOME
HOMES FOR CHILDREN AT NEW SITE SAID WE SHOULD
CONTACT:

- 1. LIGHT FOOT BOSTON STREET - F/TOWN FOR CORRECT
INFORMATION ABOUT THE CARE TAKER OF THE TWO ORPHAN-
NAGE HOMES LEAVING AT KAPOKO CONAKRY GUINEA 0

FIRM REGARDS!!
ACK. 21 09 HRS
13
02
2000

TO. SMILE
FROM. DISTRICT CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR
SUB. ENQUIRY FOR CLARIFICATION
DATE 26-02-2000

SIR, WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR REPLY CONCERNING
THE VENUE (FIRAWA) IN THE BARAWA CHIEFDOM - KODIADUGU DISTRICT
DISTRICT WHICH THE PARAMOUNT CHIEVES ABOUT 10 (TEN) IN
NUMBER AGREED ON TO BE THE MEETING PLACE IN RESPECT
OF YOUR HISTORICAL VISIT ON THE 10-03-2000
PREPARATIONS ARE ALREADY ON THE WAY FOR PROGRESS 0
THE PARAMOUNT CHIEVES AND THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES ARE IN
ANXIOUS MIND TO GET A CLARIFICATION AND CONFIRMATION

FROM: JONG

2722

ACCEPT INFO FOR YOUR RESPONSE

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 1135HRS

	26
	02
	2000

~~TO: I.~~

TO: SMILE

FROM: COL. MOMOH ROGERS

SUB. INFOS DATE. 29-02-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT THERE IS A GROWING ALARM OF FOOD SHORTAGE AND DRUGS AT KAILAHUN DISTRICT. THIS COMPRISES OF BUEDU, KAILAHUN, PENDEMBU, MOBAI, KUIVA, ~~AND~~ JUBIMA. AND JORU JUNGLE. THESE ARE OUR PRESENT DEPLOYMENT AREAS.

SIR, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ISSUES, SOLDIERS MORE THE WOUNDED BROTHERS HAVE DECIDED TO GO TO THEIR VARIOUS HOME WHICH I BELIEVE IS TRAGIC.

EVEN THOUGH THE VARIOUS OPS COMMANDER ARE TRYING THEIR BEST TO TALK TO THE MEN FOR THEM TO EXERCISE PATIENT AS YOU HAVE PROMISED, ALL SEEM FALLING IN A DEAF EAR AS SOME OF THEM ARE GOING.

SIR, ACCEPT INFOS FOR YOUR QUICK ACTION.

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 1520 HRS

	29
	02
	2000

~~Fm. SMILE~~
~~TO: SUREY~~

2023

3 JUNE '07

TO SURVIVAL INFO SMILE

FM. COL. ROBERT

SUB. INFO DATE. 5-03-2000

SIR, ACCORDING TO INFOS FROM THE CDF COMMANDER WORKING CORDIALLY WITH US HERE FROM KABALA THAT 15 (FIFTEEN) TRUCKS LOADED WITH UN PERSONELS ARE PREPARING TO ENTER HERE (ALIKALIA) BUT NO STATED DATE MENTIONED YET @

SIR HE (THE CDF COMMANDER) SAID THAT, THEY ARE WITH RELIEF FOOD AND DISTRIBUTION WILL TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS THEY ENTER. SIR, HAVE YOU ANY ADVICE OR INSTRUCTION ON THAT? IF ANY LET ME KNOW @

FIRM REGARDS!!
ACK. 11:57 HRS
6/5/2000

DATE. 6-03-2000

TO. SMILE

FM. SURVIVAL

SIR, THE CMC PERSONELS SENT LAST HAS ABANDONED THEIR OPERATION AREA AT DARU @

PRESENTLY, THERE IS NO ONE TO MONITOR THE UNAMSIL OPERATION AND AS SUCH I WOULD LIKE FOR THEM TO PROCEED THERE FOR SMOOTH OPERATION TOGETHER WITH ONE COMMUNICATION SET @

SIR ACKNOWLEDGE FOR NECESSARY ADVICE @

FIRM REGARDS!!
ACK. 10:30 HRS
6/05/2000

To. SMILE

FROM. COL. KOMBA

SUB. INFORMATION

DATE 7 - 03 - 2000

SIR, WITH REGARD SIR, SORRY FOR NOT INFORMING YOU ABOUT THE DELEGATES DISPATCHED FROM THIS END TO YOU. THIS INCLUDE THE BRIGADE ADJUTANT, ~~WITH~~ THE F.M OPERATOR AND THE BATTALION ADJUTANT IN RESPECT OF OUR LAST DISCUSSION.

SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 10:22 HRS
7
03
2000

To. SMILE

FM. BEN KENNEH THROUGH SURVIVAL

SUB. INFORMATION

DATE 7 - 03 - 2000

SIR, THE KOINDU UNAMSIL BASED AT KENEMA WOULD LIKE TO JOIN BEN KENNEH FOR KOINDU PARAS 24 HRS ONLY FOR RECCE PATROL. THEY TEAM WOULD LIKE TO TRAVEL THROUGH SEGBWEMA VIA BUNUM- AND TO KOINDU. YOUR KIND PERMISSION AND ADVICE IS NEEDED FOR SAID PATROL WHICH IS TO BE PLAN UPON OUR RETURN TO KENEMA.

THE CDF CMC REPRESENTATIVES FOR KONO DISTRICT MAY LIKE TO JOIN THE TRIP TO JOIN THE RUF CMC FOR JOINT OPERATION.

I AM PRESENTLY AWAITING AT BENDU JUNCTION WITH TWO (2) GAMBIAN FOR YOUR REPOSE.

WE MAY LIKE TO GO BACK TO KENEMA TO ARRANGE FOR THE TRIP UPON FREE PASSAGE APPROVAL.

LASTLY, I WILL NOTIFY YOU BEFORE ANY MOVEMENT.

FIRM REGARDS!!

MOREOVER, ACCORDING TO THESE MEN (SAVAGE AND HIS MEN) THEY ARE PLANNING TO ATTACK KAMAKWE. SIR, I'M AWAITING YOUR ADVICE.

7
03
2000

2725

TO: SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE

FM: LT. COL GASSIMU DATE: 7-03-2000

SIR, WE ARRIVED AT THIS POINT (KAIMA) AT AROUND 1130 GMT

UPON OUR ARRIVAL, WE CAME IN TOUCH WITH THE MSF DELEGATES ACCORDING TO THEM, THEY ARE HERE TO TREAT THE PEOPLE OF KOINADUGU DISTRICT. THEY ENTERED WITHOUT CONSULTING ANY COMMANDER ON THE GROUND, THEY WENT TO CLINIC CENTRE AND BEGAN TO TREAT PEOPLE.

ACCORDING TO SECURITY NETWORK THE MAIN DOCTOR BY THE NAME OF SAMURA USE TO INCITE THE COMBATANTS TO GO TO KABALA AND SURRENDER THEMSELVES. HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR COMBAT MEDIC COMMANDER WHO MOVED TO KABALA. THE DRUGS BROUGHT BY THE TEAM WAS NOT EQUIVALENT TO SERVE 1/4 (ONE FOURTH) OF POPULATION. WE TERMED THEM AS SPY. THEY ARE UNDER ARREST FOR SECURITY REASONS. SIR ASK FOR FAST ADVICE.

FRM REGARDS!!
Ack. 1218HRS

03
2725

TO: SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE

FM: GEN ADJUTANT DATE: 8-03-2000

SIR, 13 (thirteen) man delegation arrived here (els great) yesterday at 1730HRS

TO: SMILE

FM: SLA 18160505 KORBMA PS

SUB INFORMATION DATE: 11-03-2000

SIR, ON BEHALF OF ALL SLA BROTHERS WORKING WITH THE RUFF AT LUNSATR AND MAKENI ARE HERE BY REMINDING YOU ABOUT OUR BENEFIT AS IT HAS TAKING FOUR MONTHS NOW WITHOUT RECEIVING ANYTHING. SIR, WITH YOUR KINDEST PERMISSION, WE ARE INDEED ASKING YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS ISSUES.

TO: THE LEADER RUF.P.
FROM: CAPT. MUSU MANAWA
SUB: INFOS
DATE: 11/03/2000.

SIR,
BE INFORMED THAT ALL MY DAUGHTERS HAVE FULLY MATURED AND I WANT TO INITIATE THEM TO SOCIETY BUT I AM WITHOUT. AS FATHER I NEED YOUR KIND ASSISTANT.

SIR I MAY LIKE TO VISIT YOUR LOCATION, HOPE TO HEAR FROM YOU AT YOUR EARLIER CONVINENCE.

BEST REGARD!

TO: SURVIVAL THROUGH COL. ROGERS INFO SMILE
FM: MAJOR TOM SANDY
SUB: INFOS DATE: 12-03-2000

SIR, ACCORDING TO INFOS FROM THE UNAMSIL COMMANDER BASE AT DARU BARRACK, THE CHAIRMAN (CHAIRMAN FODAY SANKOH) HAS GIVEN THE GREEN LIGHT TO DEPLOY AT KAILAHUN TOWN

IN THIS REGARD, THEY WILL BE MOVING WITH ONE(1) COMPANY TO KAILAHUN TOWN TOMORROW WITHOUT FAIL

SIR, WAITING YOUR CLEARANCE \odot FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 12 15 HRS
12
03
2000

TO: SMILE Sub: INFOS
FM: SURVAL DATE: 23-03-2000

SIR, I HAVE JUST RECIEVED AN INFORMATION THIS MORNING THAT SAVAGE AND HIS MEN ATTACK OUR COMBAT CAMP MONGW WEREDALA YESTERDAY \odot TWO OF OUR MEN WERE SERUNISLY DAMAGED AND ARE PRESENTLY AS THIS POINT \odot

- 1. CAPT. AMARA JAWARD COY COMMANDER
- 2. CAPT. ~~AMARA~~ LI. ABM TULAY

SIR, WE HAVE TAKING THEM TO THE UNAMSIL H/O FOR THEM TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES. SIR ACCEPT FOR INFOS AS THIS IS PURELY A CEASE FIRE VIOLATION AND A VERY SERIOUS ONE \odot

TO : THE LEADER R.U.F.P.

2727

FROM : COL. KOMBA GBUDEMA

SUB : COMPREHENSIVE REPORT

DATE : 13/03/2000.

SIR,
I HAVE RECEIVED THE DRUGS WHICH YOU SENT. BUT FORTUNATELY THE ONE FOR ROKUPR HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THEM BEFORE MY ARRIVAL AT THIS POINT. BUT FOR THE OTHER AREAS I MYSELF DISTRIBUTED THE DRUGS TO THEM AND ALL THE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN DUPLICATE. AND I AM NOW LEAVING FOR ROKUPR TO GO AND MEET THE DOCTOR. FOR HIS OWN DOCUMENT FOR THE SUPPLY.

AFTER COLLECTING THE DOCUMENT FOR THE DRUGS SUPPLIED I WILL DISPATCH SOMEONE TO CARRY THEM TO YOU.

THE POWER SAW WHICH YOU SENT, ~~WHEN I TOOK TO~~ WAS TAKEN TO THE FOREST ALONG WITH THE OPERATOR TO BE TRIED. ACCORDING TO THE OPERATOR, IT IS TOO SMALL FOR THE OPERATION. IT IS ONLY GOOD FOR FARMING, THE BLADE EVEN BREAK AND THE COIL GET BURNED DURING THE WORK. SIR, I AM HEREBY LISTEN TO YOUR MILITARY ADVICE.

ACCORDING TO THE OPERATOR, YOU SHOULD SENT 070 MACHINE FOR THE WORK AS THIS ONE IS TOO SMALL.

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 12:42 HRS

13/03/2000.

TO: SURVIVAL INFO SMILE
FM: COL KOMBA

SUB: REPORT DATE: 13/03/00

SIR BE INFORMED THAT THE GUINEAN TROOP HAVE ARRESTED 9 (NINE) BODY GUARDS OF SURVIVAL AND TOOK THEM TO GUINEA. I WANT TO GO AND FREE THEM FROM THE PLACE THEY HAVE TAKING THEM. BUT I AM HEREBY LISTENING TO YOUR MILITARY ADVICE (1)

V. AM THIS INCIDENT HAPPENED AT THE GUINEA/S. LEONE BORDER (MADINAWULO) O

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AND NECESSARY ADVICE O

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK - 15 40

13
02
2000

TO SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE

FM. BRIG MORIS KALLON

SUB. INFOS

DATE 14-03-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT THE UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE ARE REQUESTING TO BUILD RECEPTION CENTRE FOR DDR PROGRAMME AS THEY MAY LIKE TO LOCATE ONE AT MATOTOKA, MABONTOL AND ONE AT FERRY JUNCTION O

SIR, THESE CENTRES ARE FOR RECEPTION OF COMBATANTS AND THEIR SCREENING BEFORE SENDING THEM TO THE DDR CAMP O

THE CENTRE THAT WILL BE AT MATOTOKA FOR BOTH COMBATANT FROM YELE AND MATOTOKA O ALSO THE ONE AT MABONTOL IS FOR THE COMBATANT FROM ZAE MABONTOL AND BUBUNA LIKEWISE THE ONE AT FERRY JUNCTION IS FOR BOTH THE COMBATANT FROM MAGBURKA AND BUBUNA MILE 91 O

SECONDLY SIR, ACCORDING TO THEM THE OBSERVERS WILL BE VISITING YOUR POINT (SAFE KONO) ON THURSDAY ALONG WITH TWO VEHICLES O SIR, IN RESPECT OF THIS ISSUE O I NEED YOUR POSITIVE RESPOND!!

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK: 1648HLS

14
08
2000

2729

TO: SMILE

FM: SISTER MAMIE

SUB: INFO

DATE: 14/03/2002

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT MY AUNT WHO IS LIVING IN MAKENI IS SERIOUSLY SICK AND SHE WANTS TO COME HOME & THEREFORE I WOULD LIKE TO GO AND BRING HER FOR A NATIVE TREATMENT. I NEED YOUR ADVICE SIR. O

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 14 29 HRS
14
03
2002

TO: SURVIVAL

FM: SHANNING STAR INFO SMILE

DATE: 15-03-02

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT THE GUINEA SOLDIERS WITH THEIRS GUN BOAT ALWAYS COME TO OUR AOR AND ATTACK OUR FISHERMEN ON THE SEA. THEY ALWAYS OPENED SUPPRESSIVE FIRING AGAINST OUR MEN AND TOOK AWAY EVERY THING FROM THEM INCLUDING THEIR BELONGINGS. WE HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO BLOCK THEM BUT WE NEED YOUR ADVICE. I WANT TO CHECK AND CONFIRM FROM THE SEA.

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AND REEVE NECESSARY ACTION.

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 14 29 HRS
15
03
2002

TO: SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE

FM: 7TH BN - FADUGU AND 8TH BN - GBINKOLO - COMMANDER IN CHARGE.
SUB: WEEKEND REPORT AT THESE

TO SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE

FROM: 7TH BN - FADUGU AND 8TH BN - GBINKOLO - COL BARBON

SUB. WEEKEND REPORT DATE. 19-03-2000

SIR, ACCORDING TO SECURITY INFORMATION RECORDED BY ONE MIB PERSONEL FROM PANLAP, SAVAGE AND HIS MEN ARE GETTING FULL SUPPORT FROM BRIG MANI, JOHNY PAUL KODOMA AND TEJAN KABBAN TO CARRY INCURSION IN OUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY O

FOR INSTANCE, THESE ABOVE NAMED PEOPLE ARE SERIOUSLY ENGAGE IN SENDING FOOD SUPPLY, DRUGS AND EVEN PAID THEM. THEY HAVE EVEN ADVANCE IN LARGE NUMBER (APPROXIMATELY 5000) AND OCCUPIED A VILLAGE CALLED BAFUDIYAH AND HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE THERE AS THEIR BASE. THE VILLAGE HAD BEEN UNDER OUR CONTROL O

ACCORDING TO RELIABLE SOURCE, THESE 5,000 MAN POWER UNDER THE COMMAND OF SAVAGE ARE SPECIAL CHARTERED MERCENARIES BY THESE ABOVE MENTIONED PEOPLE O

THIS STATEMENT WAS OBTAINED BY SLA S/SGT A.B.Y THULLAH (MIB) FROM KABALA O

ACCEPT INFOS FOR NECESSARY ACTION AND ADVICE SIR O

FIRM REGARDS!

ACK 10:17 HAS
19
03
2000

TO THE LEADER
FM. MAJ. SIEKU ~~CODDOR~~

TO THE LEADER

FM. RUPP ~~BRANCH~~ MAKENI BRANCH DATE 20-3-2000

SIR, A DELEGATION OF FOUR (4) IS PLANNING TO MEET YOU ON WEDNESDAY MARCH 22ND 2000 TO DISCUSS IMPORTANT ISSUES ON PARTY BASES O

Yours acting party Secretary
M. A. B. Kanyu

TO: SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE
FM: COL. MOMOH ROGERS
SUB: INFOS

DATE: 22/03/2000
SIR, ACCORDING TO THE LAST INSTRUCTION, UNAMISIL SHOULD NOT GO BEYOND KIALAHIN. OBSERVERS ARE ASKING FOR VISIT TO DAWA AND KONDHO SIR ADVICE FOR ACCEPTANCE (FARM REGARD)!

TO: BRIG. ISSAH SESAY INFOS THE LEADER

FROM: COL. MOMOH ROGERS

SUB: INFOS

DATE: 22/03/2000

SIR, DESPITE THE CLOSURE OF THE BORDER LINE ON SIERRA LEONE & LIBERIA SIDE BROTHERS FROM ACROSS YESTERDAY BITTERLY BEAT TWO OF OUR CIVILIANS WHO WERE WILLINGLY ~~RETURNING~~ RETURNING HOME (IT'S SERIOUS BEST REGARD)!

TO: THE LEADER

FROM: BRIG. ISSAH SESAY

SUB: INFOS

DATE: 22/03/2000

SIR, UPON YOUR INSTRUCTION TO PROCEED TO MAKENI SAME WAS DONE (SIR I ADVISE BRIG. MORIS KALLON IS TO TAKE COMMAND SINCE I'M YET AT KONO) SAME WAS APPROVED BY ALL OFFICERS UNTIL I RETURN TO TAKE OVER COMMAND FROM HIM (

SITREP ON THE GROUND - ACCORDING TO THEM (OFFICERS) SITUATION AND RELATIONSHIP ON THE GROUND IS CALM AND CORDIAL RESPECTIVELY (

OTHER INFOS - SIR I MAY LIKE TO RETURN TODAY FOR KONO (FARM REGARD)!

TO SMILE

FM. COL. DENIS LANSANA

SUB. SITUATION REPORT

DATE 23-03-2000

SIR, WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR LAST MESSAGE RECEIVED, THERE ARE MUCH PROBLEMS AS A WHOLE O

I HAVE PATROL WITHIN THE BRIGADE AND THE FOLLOWING SITUATIONS WERE OBSERVED O

1. ABOUT 85% OF SLA'S INCLUDING 60 RUF SOLDIERS HAVE SURRENDERED TO THE UNAMSIL AT DARU AND ARE PRESENTLY RESIDING AT THE CAMP O

2. THE MAJOR PROBLEM AFFECTING ALL AREAS IS FOOD AND DRUGS SHORTAGES O

ALL SOLDIERS ARE GRUMBLING BITTERLY OVER THIS ISSUE AS OTHER AREAS HAVE RECEIVED THEIR OWN RATION. I HAVE TALKED TO THEM OVER AND AGAIN BUT STILL THE PROBLEM IS TOO MUCH O

THIS HAS BEEN THE CAUSE FOR 60 ~~RUF~~ (SIXTY) RUF SOLDIERS TO JOIN THE SLA AT DARU AND NOW RECEIVING PAYMENT AND OTHER BENEFITS O

3. THE NGO'S OPERATION IS VERY SLOW MORE ESPECIALLY THE ICRC AND PEOPLE HAVE STARTED BURNING FARMS BUT THERE IS NO SEEDLING O

4. THE S/LEONE/LIBERIA BORDER HAS BEING CLOSED BY THE LIBERIA SOLDIERS UNKNOWINGLY TO US O

5. CURRENTLY NOMINAL ROLL FOR ALL OPS AREA

a) ~~1st BATT~~
BATTALION

TOTAL MAN POWER

a) 1st BIN

486

b) 2nd BIN

537

c) 3rd BIN

90

d) 4th BIN

1170


e) BRIGADE AND AXIS
HQ

690

	MAN POWER
B/N	
F, SEGBWEMA	312
G, BUNUMBU	124
H, KOMENDE	94
I, BENDU JUNCTION	116

2733

LASTLY SIR, WE ARE TOTALLY LACK OF MOBILITY IN OUR AREA
ACCEPT FOR INFOS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 1728 HRS


TO. SMILE
 FM. LT COL KOMBA

SUB. INFORMATION DATE. 24-03-2000

SIR, I MAY LIKE TO KNOW WHEN YOU WILL BE DISPATCHING MY BRIGADE ADJUTANT AS HE HAS OUR DOCUMENTS AND EVEN OUR NOMINAL ROLL, FOR WE HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE FIELD COMMANDER TO PRODUCE OUR NOMINAL WITHIN THE NEXT 72 HRS

MY EVERY BEST WISHES TO ALL OFFICERS ON THE GROUND

FIRM REGARDS!!
 ACK 17:43 HRS


TO. SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE
 FM. BRIGADIER MORIS KALLON

SUB. SITREP DATE. 25-03-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT, FROM THE RADIO MESSAGE RECEIVED THIS MORNING FROM ISTUALA (FADUGU GROUND) :-

ONE (1) ENEMY ACTIVITIES (1) SAVAGE AND HIS MEN ATTACKED OUR MEN FOR THE SECOND TIME AT MONGOWEREDALA YESTERDAY (2) TWO (2) OTHER INFOS (2) TWO OF OUR SOLDIER WERE FIRED BY SAVAGE AND HIS MEN (2) THEY ARE LT COL BAYOH (BIN COMMANDER) AND ONE R.S.M MOHAMED KAMARA (2)

P.T.O

THREE O OUR MEN HAVE CLEANED THEIR BASE AT BAFODIA O
PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY OUR MEN

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS O

MOREOVER, ACCORDING TO MONITORING FROM THE UNAMSIL
VHF RADIO COMMUNICATION, THEY ARE PLANNING TO SEND TWO
JET AT THE SAID POINT (BAFODIA) O

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 1242
25
03
2000

TO: THE LEADER

FM: MR. NGULULU

SUB: INFOS

DATE: 26-03-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT WE HAVE ARRIVED SAFELY FOR
THE ARRANGEMENT YOU SENT US PERTAINING THE HOUSE OWNER
BEFORE THE PEOPLE COULD HAVE INFORMED TO PAY FOR IT O
ACCORDING TO THE HOUSE OWNER, THEY HAVE ALREADY SOME
MONEY FROM ANOTHER PERSON BUT ALL THE SAME WE ARE
LOOKING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE O

MOREOVER, SIR, WE ARE HEADING FOR A NEARBY VILLAGE
(MAFUKI) FOR A MEETING, YOU WILL BE INFOS WITH THE
LATEST ACCORDINGLY O

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 1230HRS
26
03
2000

2735

TO:- SMILE

FM:- LTCOL RASHID SANDY. (BO BRANCH)

SUB- INFORMATION @

DATE- 23-04-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT WE HAVE GONE THROUGH THE WORK SHOP WITH 17 RESOLUTIONS WHICH I BELIEVED COL LAWRENCE AS A TEAM LEADER FOR OUR DELEGATION WILL SUBMIT A COPY OF THE RESOLUTIONS TO YOU @

SIR. THE CHAIRMAN FOR THE PARTY IN BO DISTRICT AND MY SELF HAVE A SERIOUS POLITICAL ISSUE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU IN PERSON AND MORE OVER, THE LODGING AND LIVING CONDITION IS ALSO A GREAT PROBLEM FACING US @ SIR, IN LIGHT OF THIS, WE ARE STILL INSISTING THAT WE MEET YOU FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING @ I HAVE ALSO RECEIVED 2/LT H. M. COKER AS ONE OF THE OPERATORS FOR OUR STATION @ SIR, I AM ANTICIPATING FOR YOUR ADVICE @ BEST REGARDS
10207783.

7E

TO: THE LEADER

FM: MR. NGULULU

SUB: INFOS DATE: 26-03-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT WE ARRIVED SAFELY FOR THE ARRANGEMENT YOU SENT US PERTAINING THE HOUSE. ^{IT} ~~ORDER~~ WAS NOT PROPERLY ARRANGED WITH THE HOUSE OWNER BEFORE THE PEOPLE COULD HAVE INFORMED TO PAY FOR IT.

ACCORDING TO THE HOUSE OWNER, THEY HAVE ALREADY SOME MONEY FROM ANOTHER PERSON BUT ALL THE SAME, WE ARE LOOKING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE.

MOOREOVER, WE ARE HEADING THIS MORNING FOR A NEARBY VILLAGE (MAFORKI) FOR A MEETING AND YOU WILL BE INFOS ACCORDINGLY.

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 12:30HRS

26
03
2000

TO: SMILE

FM: BRIGADIER MOTUS KALLON

SUB: RESPONSE DATE: 26-03-2000

REFERENCE THE RED CROSS VEHICLE MESSAGE DATED 25-03-2000, SAID VEHICLE HAD BEEN HANDED OVER TO THEM. IT WAS THE DRIVER WHO GAVE THE VEHICLE TO MAJ. BOY GEORGE TO DRIVE ON THEIR WAY HOME FROM THE BARRACKS. MAJ GEORGE HAD AN ACCIDENT WITH SAID VEHICLE AND SAID VEHICLE WAS TURN OVER TO MOTOR POOL FOR MAINTENANCE AND SAME WAS DONE.

HOWEVER, MAJOR BOY GEORGE IS UNDERGOING INVESTIGATION FOR SUCH ACT.

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK: 12:40HRS

26
03
2000

2137

FACT TO SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE

Fm. COL. BANYA (TONGO)

SUB. INFOS DATE. 27-03-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED FOUR UNAMSIL PERSONNELS FROM KENEMA TO OBSERVE THE PRESENT SITUATION AT MY POINT AS THERE ARE SERIES OF ~~PROPAGANDA~~ PROPAGANDA REPORT AGAINST THE RUFPO

SIR, ACCORDING TO MR. BEN KENNEH (C/MC PERSONNEL RUFPO) VEHICLES WERE STOPPED YESTERDAY AT KENEMA NOT TO COME TONGO BECAUSE OF THEIR HIDDEN AGENDA TOWARDS THE LUME PEACE ACCORD

SIR, ACCORDING TO MR. BEN KENNEH, THEY ARE GOING TO DEMONSTRATE AT KENEMA TODAY TO MAKE THE RUFPO APPEAR UGLY IN THE EYES OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE IN KENEMA

THE UNAMSIL PERSONNELS CAME WITH TWO VEHICLES AND I'M NOW WALKING WITH THEM IN THE TOWN TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES THEY WILL RETURN TODAY

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 16:40 HRS

27
03
2000

To. SMILE

Fm. COL. Komba

SUB. INFO DATE. 27-03-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT I HAVE A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU IN THE INTEREST OF THE MOVEMENT IN RESPECT OF THE ABOVE SIR, I WILL LIKE TO COME IMMEDIATELY I RECEIVE RESPOND FROM YOU

I WILL ALSO LIKE TO COME WITH SOME IMPORTANT PEOPLE FOR THE DISTRICT FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING BUT AWAITING YOUR URGENT RESPOND

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS

FIRM REGARDS!!
ACK. 16:50 HRS - 27-03-2000

TO. SURVIVAL INFOS THE LEADER

FM. ADJUTANT GENERAL

SUB. ADMINISTRATIVE SUGGESTION DATE. 29-03-2000

SIR, AS POLITICIANS AND POLITICS ARE EQUAL TO RUFP DECISION FOR THE BETTERMENT OF ALL SILEONEANS COMMAND, I SUGGESTED THAT YOU WRITE OR SEND A BIG BRAVO TO THE RECENT UNIVERSITY STUDENT WHO DEMONSTRATED UNDER OUR BANNER, DISARMAMENT BEFORE ELECTION - MEANING PEACE BEFORE ELECTION, THEY ARE OUR PARTISANS FOR THE COMING ELECTION. LET US BE MILD WITH ACADEMIC DEMONSTRATORS. THEY ARE CARRIERS OF IMPRINTED MEMORIES (ONE WAY TRAFFIC)

BEST REGARDS FOR POSITIVE REVOLUTION

Firm!!

ACK. 1510 HRS
29
03
2000

TO. SMILE

FM. COL RASHID SANDI

SUB. INFORMATION DATE. 1-04-2000

SIR, LET THIS CLAIM YOUR ATTENTION THAT I HAVE ARRIVED AT KAILAHUN WITH THE FOOD AND OTHER ITEMS. THE REASON FOR OUR LATE ARRIVAL IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT, WE HAD TO FACE SERIES OF TYRE PROBLEMS ON THE ROAD

SECONDLY SIR, I'M NOW WORKING OUT MODALITIES WITH COL. ROGERS WITH REGARDS TO THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN ME BY YOU

I SHALL BE HEADING BACK UPON WORKING OUT ALL NECESSARY MODALITIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

Firm REGARDS!!

ACK 14 2000

2739

To: SMILE

FM: SURVIVAL

SUB: RESPOND

DATE: 1-04-2000

SIR, I HAD NEVER INSTRUCTED CHEMICAL ~~CHEMICAL~~ TO JOIN SHARK FOR THIS END AS HE WAS SENT LAST TO THAT POINT UPON YOUR INSTRUCTION @

MOREOVER SIR, HE IS NOT MY BODY ^{GUARD} BUT BODY GUARD OF COL. LIONO @

SIR, I ONLY DID SO UPON THE PHONE CONVERSATION LAST IN RESPECT OF SHARK @

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK: 1650 HRS

1
04
2000

TO: THE LEADER RUFF

FROM: BRIG. ISSAH SESAY

SUB: INFOR

DATE: 02/04/2000.

SIR, ACCORDING TO COL. MOMOH ROGERS FROM KIRAKAHUN HE MAY LIKE TO PROCEED TO KENEMA FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.

SIR, ACKNOWLEDGE FOR NECESSARY ADVICE.

FIRM REGARD !!

11:55 AM

02/04/2000

To Smile

FROM: MR. KASSOLOA

Subject: Enquiry

Date: 3rd April, 2000

Sir Please clarify to us if the food is

TO SMILE
FM: MR KPOSOWA
SUB: ENQUIRY
DATE 3rd APRIL, 2000

SIR, PLEASE CLARIFY TO US IF THE FOOD IS FOR SOLDIERS OR CIVILLIANS?
PEOPLE ARE SAYING THAT THE FOOD IS FOR BOTH.
SORRY FOR DISTURBING YOU THE PROBLEM WAS RAISED JUST ENDED BRIEF MEETING

BEST REGARDS

TO: SMILE
FM: RASTA HERO (COL. RASHID SANDI)
SUB: SITUATION REPORT DATE: 4-04-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT I HAVE MANAGED TO GET AN OLD BATTERY WHICH THE RADIO SET IS PRESENTLY USING 0

SECONDLY SIR, I HAVE MET WITH THE PARTY CHAIRMAN FOR THE DISTRICT AND OTHER DISTRICT PARTY AUTHORITIES

AS A RESULT SIR, I HAVE DECIDED TO HOLD A MEETING WITH ALL PARTY MEMBERS ON THURSDAY THE 6TH APRIL 2000 0

THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING SHALL BE REVEALED TO YOU THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PARTY

MY ONLY MAJOR PROBLEM FOR NOW IS LODGING ISSUE FOR ME AND MY MEN ON THE GROUND.

WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF MR. JOSEPH MAMBU, WE HAVE STARTED TAKING THE MOVE AS WE MADE A TRIP TO THE AREA TODAY TO CONFIRM THINGS WITH SOME AUTHORITIES CONCERNED 0

FURTHER DETAILS SHALL BE REVEALED TO YOU LATER 0

EXTEND MY GREETING TO ALL @

2741

FIRM REGARDS

ACK. 15/04/71MS

4
64
2000

TO: SMILE

FM: COL. KOMBA

SUB- INFORMATION DATE. 5/04/2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT, WE HAVE ARRIVED SAFELY AT ROKUPR @

UPON OUR ARRIVAL ON THE GROUND, WE MET PROBLEM AMONGST SOLDIERS @

ACCORDING TO THE THIRD (3RD) BATTALION COMMANDER, THERE WAS A REPORT MADE AGAINST ONE MAJOR RAMBO WHO WAS ALLEDGED OF HARRASSING CIVILIANS @

IN LIGHT OF THIS, THE BATTALION COMMANDER SENT A MILITARY POLICE TO INVITE HIM AT THE HEAD QUARTER, IMMEDIATELY UPON REACHING TO HIS POINT, HE OPENED FIRE ON THE MILITARY POLICE AND OTHERS, THIS WOUNDING THREE (3) SOLDIERS @ ALL THREE ARE SERIOUSLY INJURED @ BELOW ARE THE NAMES OF THE WOUNDED BROTHERS -

1. THE MILITARY POLICE - CAPTAIN BULL
2. MAJOR YAMBOI
3. STAFF SERGEANT JOHNNY

SIR, IMMEDIATELY UPON THIS ACTION, HE RAN AWAY AND UPTIL NOW, WE DON'T KNOW HIS WHEREABOUT BUT SEARCHING IS STILL GOING ON FOR HIM @

SIR, RATHER THAN ABOVE ISSUES, SITUATION IS UNDER FULL CONTROL @

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS @

FIRM REGARDS!!

TO SURVIVAL INFOS SMILE
FM MAJOR JUNIOR VANDY
SUB. INFORMATION DATE. 5-04-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT THERE IS A VERY BIG PROBLEM WHICH AUTHORITIES ARE ENCOUNTERING ON THE GROUND. THE WOUNDED SOLDIERS (INPATIENT) ARE IN CONSTANT HABIT OF MAKING ROAD BLOCKS BEFORE THE UN VEHICLES. ACCORDING TO THEM, THEY ARE DOING SO BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO BE A REMEDY FOR THEIR REPAIRATION FROM ~~FROM~~ HERE (KAILAHUN) FOR BETTER MEDICAL CENTRE. WE HAVE BEEN TALKING TO THEM CONTINUOUSLY IN ORDER TO EXERCISE PATIENT UNTIL YOUR ARRIVAL BUT THEY ARE NOT READY TO LISTEN TO US ANYLONGER.

SIR, THIS IS THE MAJOR PROBLEM ON THE GROUND FOR NOW

SIR, YOUR ADVICE IS HIGHLY IN NEED

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 17:50HRS
5/4/2000

TO SURVIVAL SMILE
FM MAJOR RASHID (MONROVIA)
SUB. INFO DATE. 5-04-2000

REFERENCE TO YOUR INSTRUCTION, WE HAVE MADE ALL ARRANGEMENT TOWARDS THE TRAVELLING OF THE TWO BROTHERS TO YOUR LOCATION.

THEY WILL BE TRAVELLING THROUGH ZIMMI BY KENEMA HIGHWAY. ALSO THE CONTACT WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED US TO DO IS STILL NOT YET BECAUSE THE PHONE LINE IS DOWN.

SIR, WE NEED YOUR ADVICE TOWARDS THE TRANSPORTATION ISSUES.
ACCEPT FOR INFOS AND ACTION.
FIRM REGARDS!!

INFO SMILE

2743

FM MAJOR MORIBA KOROMA - G5 MAGBURKA

SUB INFORMATION

DATE. 5-04-2000

SIR, I HAVE ARRIVED SAFELY IN MAGBURKA BUT I MET MY CHILD SERIOUSLY SICK AND THE DOCTOR HAS ASKED ME TO PAY THE SUM OF 2,500,000 TO CONTINUE GIVING TREATMENT TO HER.

MOREOVER, I AM STILL REMINDING YOU ABOUT THE PARTY HOUSE I HAVE GOT IT AT A RENTAGE PRICE OF 10 MILLION LEONES (10,000,000) PER ANNUM. THE HOUSE OWNER IS ASKING FOR A DEPOSIT OF 10,000,000 FOR THE HOUSE TO BE HANDED OVER WHILE THE BALANCE SHOULD BE PAID IN DUE COURSE.

SIR, I AM THEREFORE ASKING FOR YOUR ADVICE.

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 18.04.00

TO THE 1ST BRIGADE COMMANDER INFO SMILE

FM THE 4TH BATTALION COMMANDER - MAJOR FAYIA SAHR - KOINDU

SUBS. SITREP

DATE. 7-04-2000

SIR, THIS IS TO KEEP YOU INFORM IN YOUR GOOD OFFICE ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN KAILAHUN DISTRICT MORE ESPECIALLY KOINDU TOWN AND ENVIRONS, BUEDU AND DAWA ENVIRONS. SIR, BELOW ARE PROBLEMS FACING THE ABOVE MENTIONED TOWNS.

1. THE RESIDING OF COMBINED FORCE OF KAMAJOR, ECOMOG, ULIMO AND THE GUINEAN TROOP IS POSING A SECURITY THREAT TO US AT KOINDU AS THEY ARE STILL OCCUPYING OUR TERRITORY AS INVADING FORCE. EVEN THE FERRY IS PRESENTLY ON OUR SIDE, IN THEIR CONTROL AREA BECAUSE

THEIR UNFOLDING PLAN O THAT IS, THEY CAN USE THE FERRY FOR ANY CLADESTINE MOVE BY TRAFFIKING ^{FROM GUINEA} AMMONITIONS AND WEAPONS AS THEY WERE DOING WHEN WE WERE ENGAGING THEM SOMETIME AGO O

THIS HAS EVEN CAUSED THE RESETLEMENT OF CIVILIANS VERY UNFRUITFUL BECAUSE TO THEIR RESPECTIVE TOWNS AND VILLAGES AROUND THE BORDER LINE VERY UNFRUITFUL BECAUSE OF FEAR OF ANY OTHER POSSIBLE INCURSION IN THE AREA O

2. SIR, THE CONSTANT HARRASSMENT OF PEACEFUL SIERRA LEONEANS RETURNES BY THE LIBERIAN SECURITY ON THE BORDER LINE IS THE ORDER OF THE DAY. THIS HAS CONTINUED FOR QUITE A LONG TIME NOW O THEY (LIBERIAN SECURITYES) ARE ALWAYS IMPEDING THE MOVEMENT OF OUR PEOPLE TO AND FRO AS THEY CLAIMED THE BORDER BEING CLOSED O

THEY CAN EVEN GO ON PROCLAIMING THAT (WE) THE RUFF HAS COLLABORATED WITH MOSQUITO SPRAY OF ULIMO TO LAUNCH ATTACK IN LIBERIA O THIS HAS GROWN A GREAT CONCERN AMONGST US SIR O

I HAVE TRIED TO PUT STOP TO SUCH A RISING TENSION BETWEEN WE AND ~~OUR~~ ^{THE} BROTHERS BUT STILL CONTINUE AND THIS IN LONG RUN WILL LEAD TO TECHNICAL SABOTAGED THIS SIMPLY MEAN, OUR PEOPLE WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO RETURN AND AS SUCH THEY WILL NOT PARTAKE IN THE FORTH COMING ELECTION. REALLY, IT NEEDS ATTENTION T

3. SIR, THERE IS NO ENOUGH DRUG, FEW MEDICAL PERSONNEL NO IDW PERSONNEL AND NO FOOD, EXCEPT THIS TRIP WE HAVE BEING SUPPLIED O

2745

LASTLY SIR, THE ROAD LEADING FROM KOINDU TOWN TO THE FERRY ON THE SIERRA LEONE/GUINEA BORDER IS TOTALLY DAMAGED BY THE GUINEAN TROOPS DURING THE TIME OF RETREATING TOWARDS THE RIVER BANK AND STILL HOLDING THAT POSITION ON OUR SOIL O

SIR, WE WOULD LIKE TO CONSTRUCT THE ROAD BUT WE NEED YOUR ADVICE O

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 1727HRS

7
of
200

TO: SMILE

FM: MUSICAL GROUP - YELLOWMAN AND OTHERS - KAILATHUN

SUBJ: REPORT DATE: 8 - 04 - 2000

SIR, ON BEHALF OF THE MUSICAL DANCE TROOP UNIT, WE ARE FULLY COMMITTED TO YOUR LEADERSHIP O

SIR, ALL THE MISSION GIVING TO US BY THE COMMANDER ARE ALWAYS ACCOMPLISH WITHOUT ANY PROBLEM ON OUR SIDE, THOUGH SOMETIME THEY CAN TREAT US BADLY O

BUT ALL THE SAME SIR, WE ARE LOOKING UP TO YOU AS ~~our~~ OUR FATHER AND WE DEPEND ON YOU FOR OUR FUTURE O

SIR, WE HAVE GROUP IN WHICH WE ARE GREATLY IN NEED FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AMONGST THE RANK AND FILE OF THE RUFF AND THE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE O THEY CAN DANCE VERY WELL BUT WE DO NOT HAVE THE CHANCE ^{TO} ACQUIRE COSTUME FOR THEM O

SIR, EVEN WHEN WE WRITE OUR REQUISITION, THE CONTRACTORS ALWAYS TURN IT DOWN O OUR REPORT WOULD HAVE COME TO YOU THROUGH CASSETTE AS MUSIC BUT WE DONOT HAVE ANY TAPE RECORDER TO DO THE RECORDING O

SIR, THE MUSIC IS VERY MUCH ENCOURAGING TO THE PEOPLE O SO THEY ALWAYS CALL UPON US TO ~~play~~ PLAY FOR THEM O

BUT CONDITION IS ROUGH AND STRAINED US ~~to~~ TO US. SIR, I MAY LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU AT YOUR OWN CONVENIENCE
TIME A
FIRM REGARDS!!

SMILE

FM. LT. COL BAIBUREH

SUB. RESPONSE DATE. 8-04-2000

SIR, THE REPORT ALLEGED AGAINST MY MEN WAS FALSE. IT ALL STARTED WHEN COL KOMBA AND THE DELEGATE LEFT FOR YOUR ENDO ON THEIR WAY, THEY WERE CAUGHT ONE ALIE KANU WITH SOME QUANTITY OF CLEAN RICE CARRYING TO FREETOWN FOR SALE.

WHEN HE WAS ASKED BY COL KOMBA ABOUT THE OWNER OF THE RICE, MR. KANU DECLARED THAT, THE RICE WAS OWNED BY THE GROUND COMMANDER OF BALASERA. AFTER FURTHER INTERROGATION, HE THEN CHANGED HIS STATEMENT THAT, HE IS THE OWNER. SIR, WITH THESE TWO ANSWERS, IT WAS COMPLICATIVE, INSTEAD, COL KOMBA INSTRUCTED THE COMMANDER TO APPREHEND THE MAN AND THE RICE.

UPON THE RETURN OF THE BOAT, THE BATTALION COMMANDER DISPATCHED THE MP TO GO AND ARREST THE CHAIRMAN BECAUSE OF THE REPORT THAT, THEY HAVE BEEN SEIZING RICE FROM PEOPLE AND TAKE IT TO FREETOWN FOR SALE.

SIR, THIS HAS BEEN THEIR USUAL HABIT AS WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING SEVERAL COMPLAINS ABOUT PEOPLE ARRESTING RICE AND CARRY IT TO MARKET FOR SALE.

FOR THIS REASON, THE ABOVE OFFICER AND CHAIRMAN AT BALASERA ARE STILL UNDER ARREST.

MOREOVER, ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED PEOPLE, THEY WILL BE IN PLACE TO GO TO YOUR LOCATION IN ORDER TO MAKE THINGS EXPLICIT.

ACCEPT FOR YOUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

FIRM REGARDS
ACK 1545HRS

g
BY
WMD

2747

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 8-04-2000

PLEASE EXPECT SISTER KEMAH AND YOUR FRIEND
TOMORROW WITHOUT FAIL AROUND 1600 HRS (4 O'CLOCK P.M.)
REGARDS TO YOU AND ALL @

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 1616 HRS

BY
2000

TO: SMILE

FM:

SUB. RESPOND DATE: 11-04-2000

SIR, THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS WENT ON SUCCESSFULLY
YESTERDAY AND WE WERE ABLE TO DISARM SEVENTY NINE (79)
MEN WITHIN SEGBWEMA TOWNSHIP AND THE DISARMAMENT IS
GOING TO CONTINUE TILL IT END WITHIN SEGBWEMA AND ITS
AXIS @ THE UNITED NATION TRUCKS HAVE EVEN LEFT
PACOMENDE STATION AND BENDU JUNCTION AS TO CONVEY THE
COMBATANT TO BE DISARMED TODAY @

SIR, YOU WILL ^{BE} GIVEN THE TOTAL FIGURE OF COMBATANT
BEING DISARMED TODAY.

SIR, I WILL KEEP YOU INFORM WITH ALL LATEST DEVELOPMENT
PERTAINING THE DISARMAMENT IN SEGBWEMA AND ITS AXIS @
THE DRUGS HAS BEING SENT TO KAILATHUN THIS MORNING
AS YOU DIRECTED US @

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 1158 HRS

BY
2000

TO: SMILE INFOS THE ~~LETTE~~ SURVIVAL
 FM: BRIGADIER MORIS KALLON

SUB: FLASH

DATE: 11-04-2000

SIR, AT 1030 HRS THIS MORNING, WE SAW THE SOKOBANA AND THE STUDENTS OF ST FRANCIS HERE IN MAKENI CLAPPING ALONG THE MAIN STREET OF MAKENI TOWNSHIP BUT IN THE FORM OF DEMONSTRATION. LATER ON, AT THE HOURS 1330 HRS THIS AFTERNOON, WE HAD TWO GUN SHOTS FROM ST. FRANCIS SCHOOLS COMPOUND. ACCORDING TO INFO, THE TEACHERS AND THE STUDENTS OF SAME SCHOOL ATTACKED THE CHILD COMBATANTS IN THE COMPOUND. IT WAS SAID BY THE TEACHERS AND THE STUDENT OF SAME SCHOOL THAT, THERE WILL BE NO SCHOOL TOMORROW. NOW, THE KENBATT AND WE (RUFEP) HAVE DEPLOYED MEN AROUND THE AREA TO MAINTAIN SECURITY THERE, AS THIS ALARMING HAVE CREATED SERIOUS FRIGHTENING IN THE TOWNSHIP OF MAKENI.

MOREOVER, SIR, FOUR OF THE CHILD COMBATANT GOT WOUNDED IN THIS ACTION.

SIR, DETAILS WILL FOLLOW AFTER WE SHALL HAVE GONE THROUGH ALL DUE PROCESS.

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS.

FRM AEGAN

ACK 1702

11
 of
 2000

2749

TO: THE CHAIRMAN

FM: MR. YUSUFU A. BANGURA

SUB. INFOS

DATE: 12-04-2000

SIR

REFERENCE PROJECT DOCUMENT WITH MR JORDAN KANY
 AS WAS INSTRUCTED IN FREETOWN BY THE LEADER LAST WEEK
 CHAIRMAN OF THE PROJECT TRAVELLED TO MAKENI FOR THE
 TRACTORS. FOUR (4) MACHINES WERE LINED UP FOR PLANNING,
 WE ACCEPTED TWO FOR LUN SAR. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE IMMEDIATELY
 REQUIRED BEFORE THE TRACTORS DISPATCH TO LUN SAR
 FOR ANY EFFECTIVE JOB

L

1. ENGINE OIL
2. DIESEL
3. GEAR OIL
4. MOTOR BATTERY - 12 VOLT BY 80 AMPS
5. FOOD FOR THE WORK
6. MEDICAL CARE

SIR, AWAIT YOUR RESPONSE

FIRM REGARDS

ACK 1150 HRS
 12/04/2000

TO: SMILE

FM: SURVIVAL

SUB. INFOS

DATE: 12-04-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT, I HAVE INSTRUCTED COL MAXIM
 GEORGE TO GO AND TAKE OVER COMMAND AT KAILAHUN
 LOCATION AS ~~THEIR~~ HEALTH CONDITION OF COL. ROGERS
 IS GETTING WORSE

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AND NECESSARY ADVISED

FIRM REGARDS

ACK 1110 HRS
 12/04/2000

TO: SMILE

FM: SURVIVAL

SUB: INFOS AND REMINDING DATE: 12-07-2000

SIR, ACCORDING TO INFOS MET ON THE GROUND FROM BRIGADIER KALLON THAT FIGURE 4 (FOUR) TRACTORS HAD BEEN SERVICED READY FOR OPERATION BUT LACK OF ENGINE OIL, DIESEL AND TRANSMISSION OIL @

SIR ACCORDING TO THE PEOPLE, THE TIME IS RUNNING OUT @ ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS @

FIRM REGARDS!

Aek 1122 HRS

2
07
2000

TO: SMILE

FM: SURVIVAL

SUB: INFO

DATE: 14th APRIL 2000

SIR, I RECIEVED A MESSAGE FROM COL KOMBA STATING THAT UDAMSIL PERSONNELS WENT AND DEPLOYED AROUND KAMBIA CHECK POINT YESTERDAY AT AROUND 1300HRS @ FURTHER THE ALFA JET FLEW OVER THEIR AXIS 100 FROM KAMBIA TO KAMAKWEI JUNCTION FOR THE REST OF THE DAY @ SIR, IN RESPECT OF THIS, YOUR ADVICE IS HIGHLY NEEDED @ BEST REGARDS @

0920 HRS
14/04/2000

TO: SMILE

FM: COL RASHID SANDY. (BO TOWN)

SUB: INFORMATION

DATE: - 14/04/2000

SIR. LET THIS CLAIM YOUR ATTENTION THAT THE DISTRICT CHAIRMAN (ALHADI ROGERS) HAS BEEN DISOWNED BY HIS FATHER BECAUSE OF THE RUFF @ THE FATHER WENT OVER THE MEDIA (FM 104) YESTERDAY AND DECLARED " THAT THE CHAIRMAN IS NO MORE HIS SON @ HE HAS EVEN DROVEN HIM OUT OF HIS HOUSE @ DESPITE ALL CONFRONTED SITUATIONS, THE BROTHERS ARE STILL DETERMINE TO ~~THE~~ PROMOTE THE IMAGE OF THE PARTY NOT ONLY IN BO TOWN BUT EVEN WITHIN THE ENTIRE REGION OF THE SOUTH @

SIR, WE ARE STILL ON THE HOUSE ISSUE WITH HOPE TO CONFIRM SAME AGAINST TOMORROW AND WE WILL MEET YOU IN FREE TOWN @

MR MAMBU IS ALSO EMBARKING ON HIS OPERATION I WILL
REF YOU IN PERSON UPON MY ARRIVAL IN FREETOWN FOR BETTER UNDER-
STANDING(S) SIR, MUCH REGARDS AND GREETINGS TO YOU

2756
BEST REGARDS
0935 HRS / 14/04/2000

EN
O/L
SMI
TO: SMILE
FM: COL AUGUSTINE GBAD
SUB: INFO
DATE: 14TH APRIL 2000

SIR,
REF YOUR INSTRUCTION YESTERDAY, I WENT AT LINSAR THIS MORNING BUT
RATHER UNFORTUNATE, I COULD NOT MEET MAJOR WAR BUS, I WAS ONLY
ABLE TO MEET LT COL GADAFI WHO IS PRESENTLY UNDER MESS ARREST
AWAITING YOUR ADVICE AS, STILL HE IS DENYING THE ALLEDGE ALLIGATION
AGAINST HIM (S) AS FOR MAJ WAR BUS, I GOT AN INFORMATION THAT HE
IS AT PORT LOKO(S) SIR ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND NEC. ADVICE(S)
1105 HRS

DAJ
Rom
ECI
SUB: SURVIVAL INFO SMILE (S)
FM: LT. COL. HARI MOMOH
DATE - 14 - 04 - 2000

SIR, THE DISARMAMENT WENT ON SUCCESSFULLY YESTERDAY
AND 39 EXCOMBATANTS WERE DISARMED (S)
ACCORDING TO THE UN COMMANDER FOR DISARMAMENT IN
THAT AREA, SAID THAT, THEY WILL NOT BE COMING AGAIN IN
SEGBWEMA. INSTEAD THEY WILL SEND VEHICLES TO BE CONVEY-
ING MEN TO DARU FOR DISARMAMENT (S)
SIR, I NEED YOUR ADVICE TOWARDS THE TRANSFERING OF
DISARMAMENT AT DARU (S)

FURTHER DETAILS WILL BE FOLLOWING IN (S)

FIRM REGARDS!!
ACK 14 22 HRS 14
04
2000

HERS
107
THO

TO: SURVIVAL INFO SMILE

FM: MAJOR CHOKIE

SUB: INFOS DATE- 14-04-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT WE SENT 50 (FIFTY) ARMED MEN AND 10 (TEN) UNARMED MEN WITH WAR MATERIALS TO THE DDR CAMPO THIS INCLUDED GRENADES, BOMBS, ETC

SIR, UPON ARRIVAL WITH THESE MATERIALS, THE UNAMSIL DISARMED ONLY THE ARMED MEN AND LEFT OUT THE TEN UNARMED MEN TO RETURN ON BASE

FURTHERMORE, WE STILL HAVE MORE UNARMED MEN ON THE GROUND WITH WAR MATERIAL

SIR, WE NEED YOUR ADVICE TOWARDS THIS PROBLEMS

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 1504 HRS

14
02
2000

TO: SMILE

FM: LICOL RASHID SANDY (BO TOWN)

SUB: INFORMATION

DATE- 14th APRIL 2000

SIR.

BE INFORM THAT AT AROUND 1245 PM THIS AFTER NOON, MR MAMBU, THE RADIO OPERATOR, AND MY SELF WERE INVITED TO THE POLICE STATION BY BOTH UNAMSIL AND POLICE OFFICIALS WITH THE PRETEXT THAT MY BEING ON THE GROUND IS NOT TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE. I MADE THEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT OUR STAYING IN THE TOWN IS UP TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE RESIDENT MINISTER AND THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE SOLTAH. THEY STILL INSISTED THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE US TO THE POLICE STATION FOR CONFIRMATION.

\$

SIR, UPON OUR ARRIVAL AT THE POLICE STATION, STATEMENTS WERE OBTAINED FROM THE THREE OF US. AT THE END, I MADE THE UNAMSIL COMMANDER IN CHARGE TO UNDERSTAND THAT I CAME WITH LEGAL DOCUMENT SIGN BY YOU

TO BOTH THE COMMISSIONER AND THE RESIDENT MINISTER SOUTH ²⁷⁵
THE UNAMSIL COMMANDER LATER TALKED TO US POLITELY AND GAVE US
VEHICLE TO TAKE US BACK HOME

SIR, THE IDEA BEHIND THE WHOLE SHOW WAS A POLITICAL
MACHINATION TO SUPPRESS US FROM OUR OPERATIONS @ BUT WE WILL
NOT RELENT TO PERFORM OUR DUTY TOGETHER WITH THE CHAIRMAN
AND OTHER DISTRICT PARTY EXECUTIVE MEMBERS @ THE DISTRICT CHAIR-
MAN, THE PUBLIC RELATION OFFICER (PRO) AND OTHERS WERE ALL
INVITED FOR CONFIRMATION, BUT WE WERE ALL RELEASED LATER TO COME
BACK HOME @ SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND ACK @

1700HRS /14/04/2000

TO - SMILE ^

FROM - COL KOMBA.

SUB- ENQUIRY. D/14th APRIL 2000.

SIR.

I MAY LIKE TO COME WITH THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS -

1. LTCOL GALIA.
2. LT COL SCORPIDON.
3. MAJ MORIE GE ~~GE~~HTO
4. CAPT EDWARD KOROMAO

SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR APPROVAL @

BEST REGARDS. 1745HRS /14/04/2000

TO. SMILE @ FROM. COL KOMBA. SUB. INFO. D/14th APRIL 2000.

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT ANOTHER 3 TRUCKS, 2 ARMoured CARRIERS
ALL LOADED WITH NIGERIAN AND GUINEAN CONTINGENT OF ~~ARMED~~ UNAMSIL
BULLDOZED THIS AFTER NOON TO KAMBIA KAMAKWEI JUNCTION @

SIR, THE INTENSION OF THEM IS SUSPICIOUS AS THEY CAME IN
AGGRESSIVELY @ I HAVE MOUNT ROAD BLOCK FOR ANY FURTHER
ACTION @ SIR YOUR RESPOND IS HIGHLY NEEDED AS MEN ARE
ON FULL ALERT @ END. 20 00HRS :

TO: ~~SATEE~~ ^{SURVIVAL} INFO THE LEADER

FM: MAJOR JOHN D. ARUNA (CMC KAILATHUN)

SUB: SECURITY INFO DATE: 15-04-2000

SIR, MYSELF, THE UNAMSIL, AND THE MILITARY OBSERVERS WENT ON VERIFICATION PATROL AT YENGA (KOINDU) YESTERDAY

SIR, THE CONTINGENT AT THE PLACE CONSIST OF KIAMAJOK, ULIMO, S/LEONE GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS AND THE GUINEAN SOLDIERS. THESE SOLDIERS ARE HEAVENLY ARMED. SIR, THE ^{DISARMAMENT} OF SOLDIERS WITHIN THE KAILATHUN ZONE BEFORE THE REMOVAL OF THEIR CONTINGENT ~~BECA~~ BASED AT YEINGA (KOINDU) IS A SECURITY RISK.

I SUGGEST THAT, THE LEADER PREVAIL OVER THE SLPP FOR THE UNAMSIL TO DISARM ALL THE SIERRA LEONEANS AT THAT AREA AND REPATRIATE THEM IMMEDIATELY. SECONDLY THE GUINEANS TO CROSS TO THEIR SIDE BEFORE ANY DISARMAMENT IN KAILATHUN DISTRICT AGAIN.

ACCEPT FOR ^{TMR} INFO AND NECESSARY ACTION.

FIRM REGARDS!!
ACK. 1020HRS

TO: SMILE
FM: RASTA HERO
SUB: INFORMATION
DATE: 15-04-2000

15
04
2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT WE HAVE FINALLY SUCCEEDED IN GETTING A NEWLY BUILT HOUSE ALONG THE BO-KENEMA HIGHWAY. THE PRICE OF THE HOUSE IS THREE THOUSAND (\$3000) DOLLARS PER YEAR WITH FOUR BED ROOMS AND ONE CAR PARK. IT IS A MODERN HOUSE WITH SELF CONTAINED.

SIR, THE OWNER OF THE HOUSE HAS MADE ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE DEAD LINE FOR THE PAYMENT IS MONDAY 17-APRIL-2000 AND THE DEMAND IS TOO GREAT.

SIR I AM THERE FORE SEEKING YOUR ADVICE.
FIRM REGARDS!!

16:05

2735

TO: SMILE

FM: DISTRICT CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR (MR. BOCKARIE K. MARRAH ALKALIA)

SUB: INFORMATION DATE: 16 - 04 - 2000

SIR, WE ARE ON THE PREPARATION TO VISIT YOU IN FREETOWN. WE ARE THREE IN NUMBER. THIS INCLUDE SECRETARY TO THE DISTRICT, CIVIL ADMIN NIP AND MYSELF. THIS JOURNEY WILL BE UNDERTAKING ANY TIME THIS MONTH.

SIR, ANY INFORMATION FOR THE RUFFSIL KOINADUGU? FROM ~~THE~~ WERE YOU RECEIVING MY LETTERS AND VERBAL MESSAGES BY RADIO SET? IF YES, WHY NO RESPOND? THE RUFF PARTY OFFICE IS ALMOST IN COMPLETION IN ALKALIA.

SIR, NO BETTER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE CMC AND RUFFSIL REPRESENTATIVES; MAJOR ABDULRAMAN KOBBA OF KABALA AND I AS THE PARTY PROMOTER - KOINADUGU DISTRICT.

FIRM REGARDS!!
AKK 1603HRS
16/04/2000

FM: LT. COL. JJP PORAJ WILCZYNSKI (MILITARY OBSERVER TEAM COMMANDER - MAKENI)

DATE: 16/4/2000

SIR, ACCORDING TO BRIGADIER KALLON, HE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM ABOVE TEAM TODAY AND THIS WAS SAID TO BE IN THE LETTER.

GREETING, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFO YOU THAT UNAMSH WILL BE READY TO START THE DDR PROGRAMME ON MONDAY 17-04-2000.

OUR INTENTION IS TO ESTABLISH TWO RECEPTION CENTRES IN MAKENI AND MAGBURAKA AREA AS TO OPEN THE

AYO
ETB

TWO DDR ON THAT DATE DDR COMMITTEE FORUM WERE HELD THIS WEEK AT MAKENI AND MAGBURAKA AND WERE ATTENDED BY A NUMBER OF YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE COMMITTEE FORUM THE NEW DDR SCHEME WAS EXPLAINED A GUIDE TO THE NEW SCHEME IS ENCLOSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION ON THE 17TH APRIL SIMULTANEOUS DDR SCHEMES RECEIVED LAUNCHED AT BO AND KENEMA THE NEW SCHEME WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRED COMBATANTS TO BE COMPULSORILY ENCAMPED, HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED BY RUF IN CONSULTATION WITH NCDDR I TRUST THAT DETAILS WILL BE OF INTEREST TO YOU

SHOULD YOU REQUIRE ANY CLARIFICATION ON THIS MATTER I AM AVAILABLE TO MEET WITH YOU TO DISCUSS YOUR CONCERN

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 17-22 HRS

4
04
2000

TO THE LEADER

FM COL AUGUSTINE GBOA

SUB INFORMATION

DATE 18/04/2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT SUPERMAN WIFE BAINDU CAME FROM FREETOWN AND COLLECTED THE FOLLOWING ITEMS FROM SUPERMAN'S HOUSE IN PORTLOKO

THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE COLLECTED:

1. ONE VIDEO CD
2. TWO SPEAKER
3. ONE MEDIUM SIZE SUIT CASE
4. TWO TV SCREENS
5. 1 VIDEO TAPE RECORDER

BAINDU AFTER PLAYING THIS HAYOC, HIRED A VEHICLE TO TRANSPORT THESE ITEMS FROM PORTLOKO TO AN UNKNOWN LOCATION

THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE WERE ACCUSED TO HAVE PLOTTED WITH BAINDU TO TAKE THESE ITEMS @

2757

1. REAGAN
2. AMADU
3. WAR BUS

THERE ARE ALSO EYE WITNESSES TO PROVE TO THIS ALLEGATION @

SEEKING YOUR ADVICE SIR @

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 16/3/72

18
1972

TO: SURVIVAL INFO SMILE
FM: COL. AUGUSTINE GBOA

SUB. REPORT DATE: 28-04-72

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT THE CRISIS AT SAINT FRANCIS SECONDARY SCHOOL BETWEEN THE PUPILS OF THE SCHOOL AND THE CARITAS CHILDREN HAS BEING INVESTIGATED AND SERIES OF ADVICE WERE DISHED OUT TO THEM @ THE FINDING WERE AS FOLLOWS -

1. THAT CARITAS SENT THEIR CHILDREN TO CLEAN OFF A BUILDING WITHIN SCHOOL COMPOUND WITHOUT INFORMING THE PRINCIPAL @

2. WHEN TWO OF SAINT FRANCIS STUDENTS MET THE CARITAS CHILDREN CLEANING THE BUILDING, THEY ASKED WHO AUTHORIZED THEM TO CLEAR UP THEIR SCHOOL BUILDING @

THE CARITAS TEACHER WHO LEAD THE CHILDREN DIDN'T GIVE ANY GOOD ANSWER TO THE PUPIL. THE FRACAS THEN ENSUED BETWEEN THE PUPIL AND THE CARITAS CHILDREN @ THE TEACHER WHO CARRIED THE CHILDREN DID NOT DO ANYTHING TO PREVENT THE FRACAS @

3. THE CARITAS OPERATION IS NOT TRANSPARENT AND THIS SOME TIME BRING FRACAS IN THE SCHOOL COMPOUND @

SOMETIME THE CARITAS CHILDREN ARE CALLED FUNNY NAME LIKE DESTROYER AND THIS ARE ALL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ESCALATION OF LAST REPORTED INCIDENTS SIR, ACCEPT FOR INFOS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FOR FAST ACTION @

INFO & SMILE

TO SURVIVAL FM COL. ROGERS

SIR, I HAVE RECEIVED COL. MARTIN GEORGE AT THIS POINT DATE @

I WANT TO MOVE WITH THE UNAMSIL HELICOPTER TO FREETOWN TOMORROW @

SIR, I NEED YOUR ADVICE TOWARDS THIS ISSUES @

FM REGARDS

ACK: 1908 HRS
OF
ZEW

TO THE LEADER

TARKU - SURVIVAL

FM - LT COL. HARRIS B. MOMOH.

D/19-04-2000.

SIR. THE DISARMAMENT AS FROM THE 10TH APRIL 2000 TO 18TH APRIL 2000 IS NOW ~~2000~~ BUT THE DISARMAMENT IS STILL GOING ON @ SIR YOU WILL BE FURNISHED WITH MORE INFORMATION AS IT IS STILL CONTINUEING @ WE HAVE 380 UNARMED MEN PRESENTLY DEPLOYED WITH US @ SIR. ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND ACK @

1127 HRS / 19/04/2000

THE LEADER

LT. COL RASHID SANDY. (BO TOWN)

INFORMATION. D/ 19-04-2000.

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT THE CCP WORKSHOP FOR EX-COMBATANTS SCHEDULED IN BO TOWN WAS OFFICIALLY OPENED YESTERDAY DESPITE ABSENT OF ALL STAKE HOLDERS AND SOME COMMANDERS WHO WERE TO ATTEND THE WORK SHOP

SIR, ON THE SIDE OF THE R.U.F.P. COL LAWRENCE, MYSELF, CHAIRMAN FOR THE DISTRICT AND THE SECRETARY WERE ALL PART OF THE MEETING WE ARE TO CONTINUE THE WORK SHOP TODAY AT 8:30 AM FURTHER DETAILS WILL BE REVEALED LATER SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND ACK

Best Regards
11/30/00

TO: SMILE

FM: LT. COL RASHID SANDY (BO TOWN)

SUB. REPORT DATE. 20-04-2000

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT JPK, VICE PRESIDENT DEMBY, THE UN AMBASSADOR TO SIERRA LEONE, AMERICA EMBASSADOR TO SIERRA LEONE AND THE UNAMSIL FORCE COMMANDER ALL ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE YESTERDAY JPK SPOKE LENGTHY ABOUT THE NEED TO ATTAIN PEACE NOW IN SIERRA LEONE AND FURTHER PLEADED TO THE PEOPLE OF BO TOWN TO FORGIVE ALL EX-COMBATANTS FOR WHATEVER DESTRUCTION CAUSED DURING THE NINE YEARS WAR

THE WHOLE CONFERENCE WAS CO-ORCATED BY THE UN AMBASSADOR IN SIERRA LEONE WHILE VICE PRESIDENT DEMBY STRESSED MORE ON THE NEED TO DISARM SO AS TO CREATE A NEW ARMY OF SIERRA LEONE BEFORE THE FORTH COMING GENERAL ELECTION

SIR, BELOW LISTED ARE SOME OF THE MAJOR KEY ISSUES PRESENTED TO THE CCP AS FACTORS DERAILING THE PEACE PROCESS ON BEHALF OF THE RUF ABOUT THE LOME PEACE ACCORD

P.F.O

- 1. ARTICLE III SUB SECTION IV
- 2. ARTICLE IV
- 3. ARTICLE VIII
- 4. ARTICLE XVI SUB SECTION I AND II
- 5. ARTICLE XII

SIR, WE MENTIONED ABOUT THE ROLES OF THE PRESS THAT THE PRESS SHOULD BE NEUTRAL, THEY SHOULD BE NEUTRAL, THEY SHOULD BE OBJECTIVES IN THEIR DUTY THEY SHOULD NOT DESIST FROM CHECK BOOK JOURNALISM AND ~~THE~~ REPORT OBJECTIVELY ON THE TRUTH THAT CAN HELP THE SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF THE WAR THAT THEY SHOULD AVOID FAVOURITISM, NEPOTISM, TRIBALISM E.T.C WE ALSO MENTIONED ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE NGOs WITH REGARDS TO RELIEF SUPPLY BEHIND THE RUPP CONTROL AREA

WE FURTHER MENTIONED WAS MADE ABOUT THE UTTERANCE OF THE CIVILIAN POPURACE WHICH SERVE AS THREAT TO THE COMBATANTS TO CONCLUDE SIR, WE ALSO APPROACHING THE DDR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ABOUT HIS OPERATIONS AND THAT A NEED TO IMPROVE A LIVING CONDITION OF THE MEN AT THEIR RESPECTIVE DEMOBILIZATION CAMP

SIR, WE HAVE TO CONTINUE THE WORKSHOP TODAY WHILE JARKI AND OTHERS WILL BE LEAVING FOR FREETOWN TODAY

FIRM REGARDS!!
 AK. 0958 HRS 20
 of
 2000

TO: SMILE

2761

FM: COL MORIS KALLON

SUB: RESPOND DATE: 22-04-2000

SIR, REF TO YOUR MESSAGE SENT THIS MORNING, I HAVE FIVE
⑤ TRACTORS ALREADY PREPARED FOR OPERATIONS. MORE OVER, I
RECEIVED THE TRUCK WITH THE DIESEL YOU SENT. SIR, ACCORDING TO THE
TRACTOR OPERATORS, THE DIESEL WILL ONLY WORK FOR EIGHT ⑧
DAYS. ⑥ ALSO, THE BULLY LAND AT MANSSAMA (YOUR VILLAGE) IS
WHAT WE WANT TO WORK AT ON FOR YOU. SIR, WE HAVE
ALSO CLEARED 300 ACRES OF LAND AT MAGBORAKA FOR RICE
FARMING BUT WE NEED ASSISTANCE FROM YOU ⑥ FOR SEED RICE
AND DIESEL. ⑥ SIR, I HAVE DISPATCHED ONE TRACTOR TO
LUNBAR WHILE THE REMAINING ONES ARE ON OPERATION AT LUNBAR,
MAGBORAKA, AND KONTORI (FARMING). ⑥

SIR, I RECEIVED MR JOHA KOROMA TODAY AND TOOK
HIM TO THE TRACTOR GARAGE. ⑥ TWO (2) OF THE TRACTORS
WERE AVAILABLE BUT HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND NEED REAL
MAINTENANCE. ⑥ SIR, OUR GREATEST DEMAND NOW IS FUEL,
AND FOOD. ⑥ SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND ACK. ⑥

1800 HRS

TO - SMILE

FM - LT COL RASHID SANDY - (BO TOWN)

SUB - RESPOND DATE - 21st APRIL 2000.

SIR,

WITH REGARDS TO YOUR ENQUIRY PERTAINING THE WAY WE WERE RECEIVED BY THE PEOPLE, SIR, YOU ARE HEREBY INFORMED THAT THE RECEPTION WAS VERY CORDIAL @ ALL THE WARRING FACTIONS WHICH INCLUDES RUF, C.D.F AND EX-S.L.A HAS TO EMBRACE ONE ANOTHER @ WE HAVE EVEN DECIDED TO PLAY A FOOTBALL MATCH FOLLOWED BY A DISCO DANCE TO SHOW A SIGN OF UNITY AMONG THE VARIOUS GROUPS @

SIR, THE CDF COMMANDERS HAVE REALLY REALIZE THAT THEY SHOULD NO MORE BE USED BY ANY BODY TO FIGHT AGAINST THEIR BROTHERS AS THEY ARE READY FOR PEACE @ SECONDLY SIR, I HAVE ALSO RECIEVE THREE (3) BROTHERS FROM KAILAHUN AXIS TO BE PART OF THE WORK SHOP @ THEY ARE -

(1) MAJOR ALBERT MUSTAPHA.

(2) CAPT SAHR JAMES.

(3) CAPT MORIE FEIKA.

SIR, WE HAVE TO MEET AGAIN TODAY WHERE IN WE ^{HAVE} REALLY DECIDED TO PUT THE FORWARD THE PROBLEMS OF THE EX-COMBATANTS TO THE C.C.P FOR NECESSARY ACTIONS @ SIR, ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND ACK @ ~~21-04-2000~~ 21/04/2000 10:25 HRS

TO: - SMILE @ FM: - SHINNING STAR @ SUB: - INFORMATION @ 2/22-04-2000

SIR, REF TO YOUR MESSAGE SENT ON THE 19th APRIL 2000, THE MEETING FOR THE KAMBIA DISTRICT CHAIRMAN, CHAIR LADY AND TRIBAL AUTHORITY WE HAVE ~~AGGA~~ AGREED UNANIMOUSLY THAT ON THE 7th MAY 2000 SHOULD BE THE DAY FOR THE MEETING @ SIR ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND ACK @

BEST REGARDS.

To: SMILE

2763

From: MR A.K MHOLOH. (RUFF CHAIRMAN PORT LOKO DIST)

SUB. INFORMATION DATE- 22-04-2000.

SIR, THIS IS TO INFORM YOU THAT SINCE WE LEFT FREETOWN, WE ^{HAVE} KEPT OURSELVES VERY BUSY ON GETTING THE TRACTOR ALRIGHT BUT I NOW HAVE TO REPORT TO YOU THAT THE TRACTOR IS NOT GOOD AND SO WE CAN NOT BE ABLE TO USE IT SIR, TO SPEED UP IN OTHER TO GET THE PEOPLE BELIEVED, I AM KINDLY ASKING YOU TO SEND US THE MACHINE YOU PROMISED TO GIVE FROM MAKENI SINCE WE HAVE GREATER AREA TO WORK ON SIR, I BEG THAT YOU LET US START WORKING FOR THE PEOPLE THIS YEAR EVEN IF WE GO HALF WAY SIR, THIS IS WHAT I AM SUGGESTING

BEST REGARDS
1830 HRS/22/04/00

To: SMILE

From: SHINNING STAR

SUB. REQUISITION. DATE: 22-04-2000.

SIR, THE FARM WORK HAVE STARTED BUT WE ARE IN NEED OF THE FOLLOWING :-

1. TWO DRUMS OF DIESEL
2. TWO TINS OF ENGINE OIL
3. ONE TIN OF ~~TANK~~ GEAR OIL

SIR, YOUR POSITIVE RESPONSE WILL BE HIGHLY SOLICITED
BEST REGARDS

TO: SMILE.

FM: BRIG MAJORS KALLON.

SUB: INFORMATION. D/ 23-04-2000.

SIR, THERE WAS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNAMSIL AS THEY AND OUR MEN AS THEY WENT AND OCCUPIED OUR HOUSES AT RESERVATION, WHILE OUR MEN ASKED THEM TO LEAVE THE AREA AS THEY DID NOT INFORMED AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, THEY RESISTED TO LEAVE THE AREA AND EVEN FLOGGED ONE OF THE FIELD COMMANDER'S SECURITY LEAVING HIM SERIOUSLY INJURED ON HIS HEAD THROUGH THIS ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNAMSIL, LED OUR TROOPS TO RETALIATION AGAINST THEM. SIR, THESE PROBLEMS ARE CAUSED BY THE INDIAN CONTINGENT AND THEY EVEN USED THREATENED REMARKS THAT IF WE DON'T WANT TO DISARM, THEY WILL USE FORCE TO DISARM US. SIR, THE HOUSE THEY HAVE OCCUPIED IS WHERE WE HAVE BEEN USING TO KEEP OUR ARMS AND AMMO AND PRESENTLY WE DON'T KNOW THE WHERE ABOUT OF OUR ARMS AND AMMO IN RESPECT OF THIS WE NEED OUR ARMS AND AMMO TAKEN BY THESE MILITARY. SIR, YOUR RESPONSE IS HIGHLY SOLICITED.

BEST REGARDS.
0910HRS.

TO: SMILE. FM: COL BARBAY SUB REPORT D/ 23-04-2000.

SIR, BE INFORMED THAT I ARRIVED AT PORT LOKO SAFELY. I MET WITH MR MELOSKY KALLON (COMMANDER AT LUDSAR) FOR COMMUNICATION SET TO BE INSTALLED AT PORT LOKO BUT ACCO TO MR KALLON, THESE SETS WERE WITH SUPER MAN, AND THEY DO NOT KNOW THE WHERE ABOUT OF THESE SETS. SIR, THERE ARE LOTS OF PROBLEMS ON THE GROUND, SO SIR, WE WILL LIKE FOR YOU TO HELP ME WITH ONE COMMUNICATION SO THAT WE CAN SEND IT IN A MESSAGE FORM TO YOU ESPECIALLY CONCERNING THE PARTY DEVELOPMENT. ALSO SIR, THE TRACTOR FOR PORT LOKO IS NOT FUNCTIONING FOR THIS SEASON AS IT NEEDS SO MANY MAINTENANCE. SIR, I WILL SEND MR MELOSKY KALLON WITH A COMPLETE SIVE REPORT TO YOU.

BEST REGARDS. 0920HRS.

2765
12TH 09-99

FROM - SMILE
TO - CONCORD
SUBJ - RESPONSE

REF. YOUR LAST MESSAGE DATED 12-09-99, I WISH TO EXTEND BRAND TO ALL THOSE WHO TOOK PART IN THE SAID OPERATION. YOU ARE TO INSTRUCT COL. ISSAC TO DESPATCH ALL (THE SAID MATERIALS) TO MAGBURAKA AND WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION.

CALL ME ON THE OTHER SYSTEM AS I MAY LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU TODAY.

BEST REGARDS
1600 HRS

OP. *DA [Signature]* 12/09/99

FROM - SMILE
TO - COL. ISSAC
SUBJ - RESPONSE

23-09-99

REF. TO YOUR LAST MESSAGE DATED 23-09-99, YOU ARE NOT TO TAKE ORDERS FROM BRIG. MANIE OR ANY OTHER COMMANDER BESIDES THE FIELD COMMANDER BESIDES THE FIELD COMMANDED (MAJ. SAM BOCKARIE).

MAKE SURE YOU DO ALL POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENTS FROM YOUR PRESENT LOC. TO KAMBIA. IF YOU ALLOW MAKENI TO FALL IN THE HANDS OF ANY GROUP YOU WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE.

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO DESPATCH ALL THE MATERIALS FROM KAMBIA TO THE PREVIOUS LOC. AS DIRECTED. YOU SHOULD DO THAT NOW ON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE AND INFORM CONCORD ACCORDINGLY. I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU UPON HAVING A WELL CHARGED BATTERY.

BEST REGARDS

2040 HRS

OP. *DA [Signature]* 23/09/99

24TH-09-99

FROM - SMILE
TO - CONCORD
SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

REF. MY LAST MESSAGE DATED 23-09-99, BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO SEND A COMPETENT COMMANDER TO MAKENI AXIS TO SETTLE PROBLEMS FOR MY VISIT. TO ORGANISE AND TO CONSOLIDATE COMMAND IN ALL THE AREAS UNDER OUR CONTROL AND MATERIALS SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO PREVIOUS AREA MENTIONED IN MY LAST TWO MESSAGES ☺

INFORM ALL COMMANDERS, COMBATANTS AND CIVILIANS THAT I WILL BE COMING NEXT WEEK, YOU ARE TO MAINTAIN THE CEASE FIRE ☺ INSTRUCT ALL COMMANDERS AND COMBATANTS IN THE NORTH AXIS NOT TO RECEIVE ANY INSTRUCTION FROM BRIG. MANIE OR ANY OTHER COMMANDER WHO IS TRYING TO MAKE CHANGES OR TO MOVE SOLDIERS FROM ONE POINT TO ANOTHER THAT WILL BE CONSIDERED AS TANTAMOUNT TO VIOLATION OF ^{THE} CEASE FIRE SO ALL COMMANDERS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM TAKING ORDERS FROM BRIG. MANIE UNTIL MY ARRIVAL NEXT WEEK ☺

TO RE-ENFORCE MY PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS/ORDERS, THE MATERIALS SHOULD ONLY BE HANDED OVER TO THE GUINEANS WHEN I'M IN FREETOWN ☺ DO NOT LISTEN TO ANY THREAT FROM ANY ONE BECAUSE I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE ECONOG FIELD COMMANDER AND GEN JOSH I WILL CONTACT YOU BY THE OTHER SYSTEM LET IT BE ON FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU ☺

BEST REGARDS

0305

OP. *BA* 24/09/99

FROM - SMILE
TO - CONCORD
SUBS - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO INSTRUCT COL. IS-
SAC TO PREPARE AND SEND ED- PRESIDENT J. S.
MOMOH TO KAILAHUN @ UPON MY ARRIVAL HIS PROB-
LEM WILL BE SOLVED @

ALSO, MADDAM MATILA YANSINEH SHOULD
TRAVEL WITH YOU TO MEET ME AT MONROVIA AC
MONDAY @

BEST REGARDS!!!
0945 HRS

OP. *[Signature]* 07/10/99

FROM - SMILE
TO - CONCORD
SUBS - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE ORDERED TO GIVE A
CLEAR PASSAGE TO UNOMSIL AS THEY WILL BE TRAVELLING
ON MONDAY 11TH OCT. 1999 TO DARU AS FAR AS TO KAILA-
HUN FOR NECESSARY DEPLOYMENTS WITH REGARDS TO
THE LOME PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN JULY 1999 @

MOREOVER, THE RELATIVES OF J.P. KOROMA SHOULD
BE ALLOWED TO BE EVACUATED TO FREE TOWN BY UNITED
NATION HELICOPTER @ SECONDLY, YOU SHOULD BE PREPARED
TO RECEIVE US ON TUESDAY THE 12TH AUG. 1999 AS I WILL
BE TRAVELLING TO THE HEAD QUARTER TO MEET WITH THE
SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS FOR BETTER PLANS TOWARDS
THE PEACE PROSSES @ WE ARE GOING TO CALL UP
A PEOPLE'S CONGRESS @ MAKE SURE YOU INFORM
EVERY BODY ABOUT THE CONGRESS @

BEST REGARDS

OP. *[Signature]* 07/10/99
15:16 HRS

11TH 10 - 99

FROM - SMILE

TO - BRIG. MIKE LAMINI

SUBJ - RESPONSE

YOUR MESSAGE DATED 11TH 10 - 99 JUST RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGED. I ADVISE YOU WAIT AT YOUR PRESENT LOCATION (DARU BKS.) TILL YOU HEAR FROM ME TOMORROW. I'M JUST FROM A MEETING WITH ALL CONCERNED AUTHORITIES IN RESPECT OF YOUR LAST MESSAGE DATED

11TH 10 - 99

ACCEPT FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE

BEST REGARDS
1835 HRS

OP. *[Signature]* 11/10/99

FROM - SMILE

TO - BRIG. MIKE LAMINE

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE ORDERED TO RETURN TO KAILAHUN WITH ALL THE SECURITIES AND WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION

BEST REGARDS ///

OP. *[Signature]* 10/10/99

12TH 10 - 99

FROM - SMILE

TO - S.S.S.

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO WAIT AT MAGBURAKA UPON YOUR ARRIVAL AT THE SAID POINT TILL YOU RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTION FROM ME

BEST REGARDS ///

OP. *[Signature]* 12/10/99

FROM - SMILE

TO - COL. ISSAC

SUBJECT - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO PROCEED TO MAGBURAKA TO RECEIVE SSS. I ORDER THAT YOU SHOULD TAKE ALL ORDERS FROM HIM AND WORK WITH HIM AS YOUR COMMANDER. S/MAN BRIG. PETER VANDY AND MAJ. JACKSON JAKEMA WILL SOON JOIN YOU

1125 HRS

12TH 10 - 99

OP. *[Signature]* 12/10/99

2769
13-10-99

Fm- SMILE
TO - THE COMMANDER INCHARGE - LUN SAR AND ENNIRONS
SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO SEND SOME MEN POWER TO
PORT-LORD AS I WILL BE TRAVELLING WITH J.P. KOROMA,
THE CDS, BDE. JOSHI. AND AND OTHER OFFICERS OF THE
D D R PROGRAMME @

YOUR RESPECTIVE DEFFENSIVES ARE NOT TO BE DESOL-
VED, YOU NEED TO KEEP STRONG AND TIGHT DEFFENSIVE
SECURITY ALONG THE LUN SAR AND PORT-LORD HIGH WAY @
BOTH J.P. KOROMA AND MYSELF HAVE TO COME AND EDUCATE
YOU PEOPLE ABOUT THE D.D.R. PROGRAM @ I SHALL BE
LEAVING AT TOWN FOR PORT-LORD AT AROUND 14:00 HRS @ MAKE
SURE YOU SEND THE MEN POWER (UNARMED) TO PORT-LORD
BEFORE MY ARRIVAL @

BEST REGARDS TO YOU ALL
0938 HRS
J.P. Koroma
13/10/99

9
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10/99
D
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29/10/99
J
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20/19
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W
2/2/99

TO. SMILE

2770

FM. BRIG. SUPERMAN

SUB. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT DATE 16/10/99

SIR, REF. TO MY LAST LETTER TO YOU EXPRESSING MY CONCERN OVER THE UNFRIENDLY SECURITY ATMOSPHERE THAT PREVAIL WITHIN LUN SAR, MAKENI, AS WELL AS KAMAKWE AXIS. WHILE I WAS AWAY I CAME DOWN TO SEE HOW BEST I CAN HURRIEDLY CURTAIL ALMOST ALL SUCH UNFORESEEN SECURITIES CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH I BELIEVE IF NOT PROPERLY ADRESSED BY ME AT THIS MATERIAL POINT IN TIME CAN INTERFERE WITH THE DETAILS OF THE PEACE ACCORD ON WHICH YOU ARE ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES. UPON MY ARRIVAL IN MAKENI ON 14/10/99 I URGENTLY DECIDED TO SUMMON SENIOR OFFICERS MEETING WITH THE BROTHER IN ARM I LEFT ON THE GROUND BUT IT WAS LATER AGREED THAT THIS KIND OF MEETING BEING POSTPONED TO THE NEXT DATE 15/10/99 AN OFFICIAL LETTER WAS CIRCULATED TO ENSURE THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF SENIOR OFFICERS CONCERNED.

UNFORTUNATELY THE MEETING DIDN'T TAKE THE SHAPE MYSELF AND THE OTHER OFFICERS WERE EXPECTING AND ALL THOSE SENIOR OFFICERS EXPECTED (PARTICULARLY THE EXSLA TO ATTEND SUCH A VIABLE MEETING TO TURN UP ON THE STIPULATED PERIOD OF TIME. UNANIMOUS DECISION BY OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WITH ME IN THE FORUM WAS TAKING TO ENSURE THAT WE GET INTOUCH WITH REGIONAL COMMANDER RESPECTIVELY.

THE EVENT JUST ABOUT THE TIME MY MAN-

APPROACH THE ROUND ABOUT (PZ) COL T...
MBA (REGIONAL COMMANDER) AND COL BAKAR (BRIGADE
COMMANDER) ALL OF EX SLA OPENED SUPPRESSIVE FIRING
AGAINST MY MAN POWER; HENCE ENSUED BETWEEN
BOTH PARTY ONLY TO SAVE ONES LIFED EVENTUALLY,
MY MAN POWER WERE VERY STRONG ENOUGH TO REEL
THEIR COMBATANT AT A DISTANCE AFAR OF COURSE
OUR REVOLUTIONARY BROTHER (RUFSL) FROM TEKO
BARRACK JOIN THE MOPING UP OPERATION TO HELP
PUTTING THE SITUATION UNDER PERFECT CONTROL

WHAT SEEMED TO BE MORE WORRYING TO ME AT THIS
POINT IS THE RAMPANT LOOTING OF CIVILIAN PROPERTIES
BY THIS SAME BROTHERS UNDER THE COMMANDERSHIP
OF BRIGADIER MORIS KALLOND

SUGGESTIONS:

I THEREFORE WOULD LIKE TO ADVISE FROM THIS POINT
THAT IN GOOD INTEREST OF EVERLASTING PEACE IN
THIS COUNTRY, YOU ENDEAVOUR TO FUTHER INSTRUCT
OUR BROTHERS WHO CAME FROM KAILAHUN AXIS THROU
GH ROAD TO GO BACK TO THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS
AS MY PRESENCE IN THE ENVIRONMENT IS QUITE
SUFFICIENT TO CALM ALL OTHER UNUSUAL SECURITIES
HABIT WHICH WOULDN'T BE IN THE PLEASANT IMAGE
OF OUR MOVEMENT ESTECIALLY WHEN ALL ARE WATCHING
US

I AM PERSONALLY INFORMING YOU FROM THIS POINT ON
THE GROUND THAT THIS INFOS CAN GUIDE YOU TO GIVE FU-
THEER CONFIDENTIAL TO ALL OTHER PARASTATALS, NGOS
AS WELL AS THE CIVILIAN POPULACE TO FEEL TROUBLE
FREE FROM ANY INTIMIDATION WITH MY PRESENCE
ON THE GROUND ALL OTHER SECURITIES ISSUE ARE
PUT UNDER CONTROL ACCORDINGLY AS A WAY

OF RESTORING SANITY TO THE CIVILIAN POPULACE
ONLY THAT, WHOEVER IS READY AND WILLING TO TAKE TO
MY STANDING ORDER WITHIN OUR LIBERATED ZONE (NORTHERN REGION) WILL BE ALLOW TO WORK WITH US
AMICABLY UNTIL THE COMBATANT FINALLY SEE YOU
ON THE GROUND SIR O

I THINK I CAN BETTER MEET THE COMMITMENT
OF BEEFING UP THE SECURITY POTENTIAL OF THIS
ENVIROMENT MORE THAN ANY OTHER COMMANDER AS
I HAVE STRONG CONFIDENCE IN THE NEUTRAL
RELATIONSHIP THAT HAD EXISTED BETWEEN ME AND
THE CIVILIAN AS WELL AS THE COMBATANT I LEFT
ON THE GROUND O

THE MAIN REASON WHILE I'M ADVISING ON THE
SUCH WITHDRAWAL OF THIS TROOP IS THAT
I WANT TO PERSONALLY AVOID ARM CONFLICT WITH
THE BROTHERS WHO WOULD LIKE TO INFILTRATE
MY AREA OF CONTROL WITH INDISCIPLINE O THE
LOYAL COMBATANT AND MYSELF ARE BETIER IN PLACE
TO CREAT AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONVINIENT FOR BOTH
THE COMBATANT AND ESPECIALLY THE CIVIL POPULACE
WITHIN OUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY SIR O

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND STEP SPEEDY
ADVISE SIR O

BEST REGARDS!!

ZOUR REG 1625 HRS
OPT 
16
10
29

2773

FROM SMILE

001

TO. SUPERMAN
SUB. DIRECTIVE

DATE 16/10/99

REF TO YOUR MSG., YOU ARE ~~HE~~ ACK. BUT YOU ARE TO CALL ME ON THE RADIO FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION.

BEST REGARDS!!

Transmitted: 17:43 HRS
Signed: Edward

16
10
99

FM: CONCORD THROUGH SMILE
TO. SPARROW SSS

002

SUB INSTRUCTION DATE 16/10/99

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO SEND BRIGADIER MORIS KALLON TO MAGBOROKA ALONG WITH HIS SECURITIES TO TAKE COMMAND POST AT THE AREA.

FROM SMILE TO: SSS/TB

003

SUB: INSTRUCTION DATE 18/10/99

YOU SHOULD ALLOW THE NGOS OPERATING AT YOUR AREA (MAKENI) TO USE THEIR FIELD RADIO TO ENABLE THEM REACH THEIR MEND ^{BY AIR} ALL PROPERTIES TAKING AWAY FROM THEM SHOULD BE HANDED OVER ~~TO THEM~~. THIS INCLUDE COMMUNICATION SET, TELEPHONE AS THEIR BROTHERS HERE ARE GRUMBLING ABOUT HOW THEY HAVE LOST CONTACT WITH THEIR MEND.

YOU SHOULD DESIST THIS HABIT OF LOOTING AND HARRASSING PEOPLE MORE THE NGOS AS ITS TOTALLY AGAINST THE HOME ACCORD AND EVEN THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REVOLUTION.

I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK WITH YOU PEOPLE ONCE MORE ON THIS ISSUE.

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED 14:50 HRS
SIGNED: Edward

18
10
99

ALL SSS'S
TRANSMITTED
T/B

FM. SMILE TO. SSS

004

SUB. ENQUIRY & INSTRUCTION

DATE 18/10/99

I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF MY VISIT AT YOUR POINT (MAKEM) WILL BE NECESSARY AGAINST TOMORROW.

IF SO, YOU SHOULD INFORM THE CIVILIAN POPULACE, THIS SHOULD INCLUDE THE PARAMOUNT CHIEVES AND CHIEFDOM AUTHORITIES

YOU SHOULD ALSO KEEP THE SENIOR OFFICERS INFORM ABOUT MY MOVEMENT AND THEY SHOULD PROTECT THE GROUND

FIRM REGARDS!!

TIME TRANSMITTED: 4:15 PM

SIGNED: Edward 12/10/99

FM. THE CHAIRMAN TODAY. S. SANKOH

005

TO. BISHOP GEORGE BIGUZZI

SUB. RESPONSE

DATE. 18/10/99

REF. TO YOUR MSG. DATED 17/10/99, ACK. I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK WITH ^{YOU} HIM EITHER THIS NIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING BY PHONE OR THE HF RADIO SYSTEM.

YOU CAN GIVE ME YOUR PHONE NO. SO THAT I WILL BE CALLING AT TIMED

FIRM REGARDS!!

TIME ~ 0713 HRS

SIGNED: Edward 19/10/99

180m
4 BOXES

FM. SMILE
TO. SSS & SUPERMAN

DATE. 19/10/99

SUB. DIRECTIVE

006

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO PURSUE THE ENEMIES AT OKRA HILL AND DESTROY THEIR BASES

YOU SHOULD CO-OPERATE WITH ONE ANOTHER TO PUT SITUATION UNDER CONTROL AND CHASE THEM OUT FROM THAT AREA TO MILE 38.

MAY GOD GUIDE AND ENDURE YOU SUCCESS,
CO-OPERATE. FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED
YOUR 10:50
SIGNED: Edward

FROM: SMILE

SUB. INSTRUCTION

007

2775

TO: SURVIVAL

DATE: 19/10/99

YOU SHOULD WITHDRAW YOUR TP IF ANY ADVANCING TO KABALA BECAUSE THE TP AT THE POINT ARE LOYAL TO THE GOVT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF S/L

BE ON DEFENSIVE AND CLEAR ALL AREAS AROUND MAKENI, LUN SAR AND SEARCH THE BUSHES^N AROUND YOUR DEFENSIVE. TAKE NOTE AND ACT ACCORDINGLY

FIRM REGARD!!

NB


YOU ARE ALSO DIRECTED TO GIVE ONE COPY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT TO THE OPERATOR OF SUPERMAN TO ENHANCE SMOOTH AND GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK WITH YOU LATER.

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED:

2002 1312 HRS

SIGNED



19
10
99

FROM: SMILE

TO: COMMANDER IN CHARGE LUN SAR INFOS T/B & SSS 008

SUB. INSTRUCTION DATE: 20/10/99

YOU SHOULD DISPATCH (30) ARM SOLDIER TO POLILOKO TO THE ^{BDE} AECOMOG COMMANDER TO PARTICIPATE ON THE DDR PROGRAMME YOU SHOULD DO IT EARLY THIS MORNING TO MEET WITH THE STIPULATED TIME AT 4 P.M. THESE MEN SHOULD BE AIRLIFTED TO FITOWN WHILE THE EXERCISE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN
FIRM REGARDS!!

KEY
WILD
SD
BORN

14
10
99

LIKE

ON

17ED
30 HRS
50 AM

FM. SMILE

DATE: 20/10/99

2776

009

TO: CONCORD

YOU SHOULD DISPATCH THE FAMILY OF J.P.K. ^{THE} WOUNDED SOLDIER, COLLINS AND THE WIFE OF COL AKIM (HAJA) WITH THE TRUCK THAT IS GOING ALONG WITH THE FOOD TO Y. POINT TO DARU

THEY SHOULD WAIT AT DARU UNTIL THEY ARE AIR LIFTED TO F/TOWN BY HELICO

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED:

FOUR 1143H

SIGNED: Edward

20/10/99

FM. SMILE

SUB. INQUIRY & INSTRUCTION

TO: THE VULTURE

DATE: 20/10/99

DD

I WOULD LIKE TO PAY A VISIT AT MAKENI ON FRIDAY. ADVISE!

IF POSSIBLE, YOU SHOULD INFORM THE CIVILIAN POPULACE IN THE TOWNSHIP, THE CHIEVES ELDER AND THE SOLDIER ON THE GROUND TO KEEP SECURITY PARAMOUNT.

I WILL BE COMING ALONG WITH J.P.K, ECOMOG FIELD COMMANDER, THE UNOMSL COMMANDER AND OTHER SPECTATOR YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM THE PEOPLE OF MAGBOROKA TO BE PREPARED ON THAT DAY

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED:

FOUR 1905HRS

SIGNED: Edward

20/10/99

277

FROM: SMILE

SUB. INFOS

012

TO: PLANET INFOS
ALL STATIONS

DATE: 21/10/99

BELOW ARE THE MINISTRIES ALLOCATED TO THE PEOPLES
ARMY OF S/LEONE; AND THE SUCCESSORS

1. MR. MIKE LAMIN - MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
2. MR. ^{PETER-B. VANDY} ALIMAMY PAULO BANGURA - MINISTER OF LAND, HOUSING
COUNTRY PLANNING AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
3. MR. ALIMAMY PAULO BANGURA } MINISTER OF ENERGY
AND POWER

DEPUTY MINISTERS

4. DR. EMMANUEL FABAI - MINISTER OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
5. MRS. SUSAN LAHAI - MINISTER OF TRANSPORT AND
COMMUNICATION
6. MR. IDRISSA KAMARA - MINISTER OF LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATION
7. MR. FRANCIS MUSA - MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE

MAY GOD GUIDE AND WISH THEM SUCCESS IN THEIR
NEW APPOINTMENTS

FIRM REGARDS!!

SIGNED:  20/10/99
OPT

ZIA 7:43:10

FROM: SMILE

SUB. INSTRUCTION

013

TO: SURVIVAL

DATE: 21/10/99

YOU SHOULD DISPATCH ADVANCE TEAM TO COME AND COLLECT
800 BGS OF RICE AT GBERU JUNCTION. THIS FOOD IS FOR
LUNBAR AND MAKENI AND ETIS SENT BY THE LOGISTIC

COMMANDER.

ACCEPT INFOS FOR QUICK ACTIONS.

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANS. 15 46 HRS
SIGNED: ~~Isaac~~ 21/10/99

FM. SMILE

DATE 21/10/99

TO. SSS

014

MY ARRIVAL WILL NOW BE EITHER SUNDAY OR MONDAY BECAUSE OF SY REASONS

YOU SHOULD NOW WORK ON YOUR SY FM NOW ~~AT~~ TO THAT TIME AND YOU SHOULD INFORM THE PEOPLE ON THE ~~RECENT~~ CURRENT DATE. SAME SHOULD BE TOLD TO THE PEOPLE OF MAGBOROKAO

FIRM REGARDS!!

SIGNED: ~~Isaac~~ ^{Booy}
CAPT. ^{Simon}
TRANSMITTED 0749HRS Am
21/10/99

FM. SMILE

TO. SURVIVAL INFO SUPERMAN, OL. ISAAC AND OTHERS

015

DATE - 21/10/99

YOU SHOULD NOT ALLOW THESE MEN TO SIT DOWN ON THAT GROUND FOR EVEN A DAY

YOU SHOULD CARRY ON WITH YOUR PLAN AND CHASE THEM AS FAR AS OKRA HILL

YOU ARE WARN NOT TO ATTACK THE ECOMOG POSITION BUT TO CHASE THESE MEN TO WHERE THEY ARE COMING FROM.

USE YOUR GUIRELLA EXPERIENCE TO DESTROY THEIR BASES BY BY-PASSING THE ECOMOG POS.

WISH YOU SUCCESS

FIRM REGARDS!!

FM: BLACK MOSES

DATE. 23/10/99

019

2779

TO. SURVIVAL

YOU ARE HEREBY INSTRUCTED TO MOBILIZE ALL SOLDIERS TO OCCUPY THE BARRACK INSTEAD OF THE PEOPLE'S HOUSES.


PEOPLE ARE ESCAPING FROM MAKENI WITH A LOT OF COMPLAINS ABOUT HARRASSMENT FROM SOLDIERS.

ALL SOLDIERS ARE WARN TO STOP HARRASSING THE PEOPLE ^{FOR} WITH ^{IT}

YOU SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE ONLY WAY TO WIN THE PEOPLES MIND IS BY ENCOURAGING ^{THEM} AND I HAVE PLAN TO COME AND TALK ^{TO} WITH EVERYBODY ON THE GROUND NOT ON MATTERS RELATING ^{TO} SUCH ISSUES ^{TO} ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND QUICK ACTION

FIRM REGARDS!!

YOUR - 1123 HRS

SIGNED 

23/10/99
1113 HRS

FM: BLACK MOSES

DATE. 23/10/99

017

TO. SURVIVAL

INFO RECEIVED FROM RELIABLE SOURCE THAT THE MEN FROM MAKENI (SLA) HAVE COME TO PORTUKO AND ^{HAVE} LINK UP WITH THEIR MEN AT OKRA HILL. THEY HAVE PLAN TO CARRY ON MASSIVE OFFENSIVE ON YOUR POSITION BOTH AT LUNJAR AND MAKENI ^{TO}

YOU ARE TO KEEP STRONG DEFENSIVE AND SET AMBUSHES ON ALL THE MAIN ROAD ROUTES AND BYPASSES ENTERING THESE TWO AREAS.

YOU SHOULD MOVE ON NOW WITH YOUR PLAN TO SABOTAGE THEIR UNDERTAKING.

THE ROUTE FROM KABALA TO MAKENI AND ALL BYPASSES LETTING IN AND OUT SHOULD BE SEALED UP TO AVOID

2780

TOWNSHIP
ENEMY INFILTRATION IN THE TOWNSHIP
YOU ARE WARN TO HEED TO THIS ADVICE. YOU SHOULD NOT ALSO FORGET BUNBUNIA AXI
MANY OF THEM ARE AROUND PLOKE AXIS AND YOU SHOULD WATCH CLOSELY THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ECONOMY
TREAT AS URGENT!!

FIRM REGARDS!!

YOUR TRANSMITTED: 2030HR

SIGNED: Edward 23/10/99

FM. BLACK MOSES

SUB. DIRECTIVE

TO. SSS

DATE. 27/10/99

018

REF TO MY MSG PREVIOUSLY IN RESPECT OF THE NGOs PROPERTIES LOOTED, YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO RE-ENFORCE MY ORDER AND MAKE SURE YOU RETRIEVE ALL ITEMS LOOTED, MORE, THE NGOs VEHICLE

ACT IMMEDIATELY ON THIS DIRECTIVE AND GIVE ME RESPON

FIRM REGARDS!!

YOUR TRANSMITTED 1030H

SIGNED:

FM. BLACK MOSES

DATE. 28/10/99

019

TO. SSS

SUB. INSTRUCTION

ST
YOU SHOULDN'T HAVE ANY HANDS WHO DEALING WITH PA DEMBA (THE JUJUMAN). I HAVE RECEIVED INTELLIGENT INFORMATION CONCERNING HIM ABOUT, HE IS TALKING A LOT

I HAVE TOLD YOU EARLIER THAT THE SUPERNATURAL (GOD) IS OUR PROTECTOR. BELIEVE IN HIM SHALL GAIN YOU SUCCESS

WARN ALL YOUR MEN ON THIS ISSUES

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED YOUR 12HRS

SIGNED: Edward 24/10/99

MLSD
9 AX
SHOW
HRS
my
ED
NSC

BLACK MOSES

SUB. INSTRUCTION

020

27/1

SSS

DATE: 28/10/99

YOU SHOULD STOP AND WARN YOUR MEN FROM HARRASSING AND INTIMIDATING PEOPLE, MORE IN GBANTI KAMARANKA CHIEFDOM AS SERIES OF COMPLAIN IS POURING IN MY OFFICE ON THIS ISSUE. ✓

I HAVE WARNED ONCE TO ADVICE YOUR MEN AND SIMILAR COMPLAIN IS STILL ALLEDATING

YOU SHOULD ALSO ALLOW EVERYBODY TO RETURN TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HOMES IN THAT AREA

TREAT AS VERY IMPORTANT

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED ZOU 1202

SIGNED: *Edward* 28/10/99

FM: BLACK MOSES

SUB. INSTRUCTION

021

TO: SURVIVAL

DATE: 29/10/99

YOU SHOULD DISPATCH MEN NOW TO MEET THE BOE COMMANDER AT PORT LOKO FOR THEM TO RECIEVE YOUR OWN CONSIGNMENT OF RICE.

THEY LOGISTIC COMMANDER WILL ISSUE ~~THEM~~ TRUCKS TO CONVEY 800 BAGS OF RICE FOR MAKENI AND THE ENVIRONS FOR KONO, I WILL PROVIDE SOMEBODY TO ESCORT THE CONSIGNMENT AND IT WILL BE DEPARTING ON MONDAY I WILL KEEP ^{you} POSTED UPON DEPARTURE OF SAID CONSIGNMENT

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED ZOU 1349HRS

SIGNED: *Edward* 29/10/99

30HRS
3A

FM. BLACK MOSES

SUB. RESPOND
DATE. 30/10/99

2782

022


TO. SURVIVAL

REF. TO YOUR MSG. YOU SHOULD CONTAIN HIM (PA DEMBA) AND WAIT FOR MY ARRIVAL. DO NOT BEAT ~~NEITHER~~ TO MALTREAT HIM BUT LET HIM BE UNDER CONTROL
IF YOU HAVE ^{MEGA PHONE} ~~LOW SPEAKER~~, TALK TO THE PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE TOWNSHIP FOR THEM TO BE CALM AS THERE IS NOTHING ON THE WAY HARMFUL. THIS MAN IS JUST TRYING TO DISRUPT THE PEACE PROCESS.

TREAT AS VERY IMPORTANT

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED ZONE 1303 HRS

SIGNED:  30/10/99

FM. BLACK MOSES

SUB. INSTRUCTION

023

TO. SSS

DATE. 31/10/99

LOCATED

IN CONNECTION OF YOUR FOOD SUPPLY, YOU WILL HEAR FROM ME ^{TOMORROW} AS I HAVE TRIED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES TO LET YOUR CONSIGNMENT ^{REACH} ~~MEET~~ YOU.

MOREOVER, YOU SHOULD WORK OUT ALL MODALITIES TO RETRIEVE ALL PROPERTIES LOTTED FROM PEOPLE DURING THE RIOT. THIS TYPE OF ACT IS TOTALLY AGAINST THE LOME ACCORD. YOUR MEN SHOULD DEVIATE. PROPERTIES LOTTED INCLUDE VEHICLES, GENERATORS AND THOSE HOUSES FURNITURE.

ABOVE COMPLAIN IS POURING IN MY OFFICE ON DAILY BASIS.

TREAT AS MANDATED

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED ZONE 1640 HRS

SIGNED

FROM BLACK MOSES

SUB. DIRECTIVE

024

2785

TO SUPERMAN

DATE. 1/11/99

D) YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO WITHDRAW FROM LUNSAK
 TREAT ALL ARMS AND MATERIALS THAT WERE CAPTURED FROM THE
 GUINEAN CONTINGENT AT KAMBIA TO MAKENI TO BE HANDED
 TIRE READY TO TURN OVER UPON MY INSTRUCTION
 N) YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM YOUR MEN AT LUNSAK TO BE
 T) PREPARED FOR THE DDR PROGRAMME WHICH WILL COMMENCE
 VERY SHORTLY @

TREAT AS URGENT @

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED FOUR 1945 HRS

SIGNED:



Edward 1/11/99

FROM B/MOSES

DATE. 3/11/99

RIC

TO ALL STATION

SUB. CLARIFICATION

RDM I HAVE MONITORED YOUR CONCERN ON THE CURRENT DDR
 PROGRAMME ON THE WAY @


ALL STATIONS ARE TO WATCH CLOSELY AND USE YOUR PAST
 EXPERIENCE AS I'M ONLY DISARMING BECAUSE OF REASON BUT
 THE STRUCTURES ARE NOT ^{YET} THERE

USE YOUR DISCRETION UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTION FROM ME @

FIRM REGARDS

TRANSMITTED FOUR 1253 HRS

SIGNED:



Edward 3/11/99

3 HRS
D
10
99

RDM

DATE

2

TO - BLACK MOSES
FM - SURVIVAL
SUB - INFORMATION
DATE - 3rd NOV, 1999.

SIR,
MAJ GIBRIL MASSAQUDI'S MEN OPEN SUPPRESSIVE FIRING WITHIN THE TOWNSHIP OF MAKENI CAUSING GREAT PANIC AMONG THE CIVILLIAN POPULATION () SIR, THEY ARE STILL CAUSING PROBLEMS IN RESPECT OF THIS, I WILL NOT TOLARATE SUCH BEHAVIORS FROM THEM. () WITH THIS YOUR ADVICE IS HIGHLY NEEDED

BEST REGARDS

SIGNED - 

RISHAS () 03/11/99.

FM. SMILE DATE 4/11/99
TO. SUPERMAN
SUB. INSTRUCTIONS

REF TO YOUR MSG DATED 3/11/99, YOU SHOULD BE ON STRONG DEFENSIVE AND WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS IN RESPECT OF MY PREVIOUS ORDER PERTAINING THE CURRENT DDR PROGRAMME ()

ACT ACCORDINGLY ()

FIRM REGARDS!!

IN RESPECT OF MY PREVIOUS PROMISES FOR MY ARRIVAL AT YOUR POINT, BE REST ASSURE, ^{THAT} I WILL BE THERE THIS COMING WEEK.

INFORM ALL PARTIES TO GET PREPARE AND YOU SHOULD MAINTAIN SANITY AND STAY IN AND AROUND THE TOWNSHIP.


FOR HOWEVER I HAVE WORKED OUT ALL NECC FOR YOUR FOOD CONSIGNMENT AND ALL WILL BE DONE TO REC: IT FOR NOW

2715

MONDAY I HAVE S
TREAT AS ^{VERY} IMPORTANT

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED FOUR 1837HRS

SIGNED:  S
11
99

FM. SMILE
TO. SUPERMAN
SUB. DIRECTIVE

DATE. 2/11/99

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO ^{DISMANTLE} ~~TAKE OFF~~ ALL
THE CHECK POINTS BETWEEN LUNSAK AND MAKENI
~~MAH~~ AS A LOT OF COMPLAINT IS POURING IN MY
OFFICE ABOUT HARASSMENT AT THESE CHECK POINTS
ACT IMMEDIATELY ON THIS DIRECTIVE AND I WOULD
SPEAK WITH YOU MORE ON THE ISSUE

FIRM REGARDS

DATE: 7/11/99

FROM: SMILE

TO: SUPERMAN

SUB: DIRECTIVE.

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO DISMANTLE ALL CHECK POINTS BETWEEN ROGBERI JUNCTION AND LUNSAN AND TO ONLY MAINTAIN A CHECK POINT WHEN ENTERING MAKENI.

THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HRS UPON THE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE TO ENSURE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE TO AND FRO. THE QUESTION OF ASKING MONEY FROM DRIVERS, PASSENGERS SHOULD STOP FORTHWITH.

ALL ARE WARN TO DESIST FROM SUCH ACT AS IT WOULD NOT PROJECT THE GOOD IMAGE OF THE MOVEMENT IN OVERSEEN THE LOME ACCORD.

YOU SHOULD ALSO LOVE AND RESPECT ONE ANOTHER AS ALL REVOLUTIONARY BROTHERS ARE ^{THE} SAME, WHETHER FROM KAILATHU OR ANY PART UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE R. U. F. LEADERSHIP.

MOREOVER, I AM STILL EMPHASIZING ON MY PREVIOUS ORDERS TO RETRIEVE ALL NGOS AND CIVILIANS PROPERTIES LOOTED FROM THEM DURING THE RIOT AND SHOULD BE HANDED OVER TO THE APPROPRIATE PEOPLE.

I HAVE A PLAN TO PAY A VISIT AT THAT AREA AND TO TALK ~~WITH~~ ^{TO} EVERYBODY, PROBABLY THIS WEEK. I WOULD NOT LIKE TO GET ANY COMPLAIN FROM ANYONE IN RESPECT OF PROPERTIES BEING LOOTED FROM THEM.

TAKE NOTE AND ACT ACCORDINGLY.

LASTLY, REFERENCE TO YOUR LETTER, ACK., BUT YOU SHOULD TAKE IT OFF FROM YOUR MIND AS EXPRESSED IN PARAGRAPH THREE (3) THAT, OTHERS ARE PLANNING TO ATTACK YOU, ARE ALL FABRICATIONS.

I HAVE EARLIER INSTRUCTED ALL HIGH COMMAND TO DESUADE FROM FIGHTING AMONG ONESELF.

PLEASE REST ASSURE THAT, NO ONE HAS A PLAN TO ATTACK YOU
NEITHER TO ARREST. BE CONFIDENT IN ME AS YOUR LEADER.
AND TRY TO TAKE AND ACT ON ALL ORDERS FROM ME O

YOU SHOULD PREPARE YOUR MEN AND READY TO COMPLY WITH
THE DDR PROGRAMME AS I WILL GIVE YOU FURTHER INSTRU-
TION ON THE ISSUE O

FROM: SMILE SUB. DIRECTIVE
TO: PLANET INFO JUMM DATE: 8/11/99

BE INFORMED THAT, I WILL BE TRAVELLING TO SEGBWEMA TOMO-
ROW TO ENSURE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE DDR PROGRAMME
YOU SHOULD INFORM THE COMMANDER AT SEGBWEMA TO BE READY
TO RECEIVE ME AND TO PREPARE HIS MEN TO BE READY TO
COMPLY WITH THE LOME ACCORD MANDATE O THEY SHOULD WAIT
FOR MY ARRIVAL O

I MET THE UNOMSILS THIS AFTERNOON AND WE DISCUSSED
LENGTHLY ON ISSUES RELATING THE DDR PROGRAMME FOR MY
MEND

YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM THE SURROUNDING AREAS LIKE KUWA,
JOJOIMA AND MOBAY TO TRAVEL THIS NIGHT AND MEET WITH
ME TOMORROW, SO THAT I WILL BE ABLE TO TALK TO THEM ALSO
ACCORDING TO THE COMBATANT, THEY WILL ONLY EMBARK ON THE
DDR WHEN I AM WITH THEM IN PERSON.


THEREFORE, TOMORROW BY GOD'S POWER, I WILL BE AT SEGBWEMA
AT AROUND 12 HRS TO TALK TO ALL SOLDIERS AND TO OVERSEE
PROCESS COMMENCE AT THAT AREA O

WISH YOU ALL GODS BLESSING O

FIRM REGARDS

TRANSMITTED 1542 HRS
ZOU

SIGNED



8/11/99

SMILE

SUB. INSTRUCTION

TO: PLANET

DATE 8/11/99

You SHOULD MAKE IT A POINT OF DUTY FOR MAJ. SHEKU COOMBER TO MOVE NOW AND LINK WITH ME AT SEGBUENA AS I WILL BE THERE AT AROUND 12HRS TOMORROW @

HE SHOULD MOVE NOW AS HE HAS BEING NOMINATED AS TO BE PART OF THE JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION (JMC) FOR RUF/SL @

HE SHOULD MOVE ALONE WITHOUT HIS FAMILY @ ~~OR ANY~~ TREAT AS URGENT FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED EDUR

SIGNED  10/11/99

To: S

FM. SMILE

SUB. DIRECTIVE

TO: SURVIVAL INFO SUPERMAN DATE: 10/11/99

MY COMING TO MAKENI FOR TOMORROW HAS BEING CANCELLED I WILL TELL YOU TOMORROW THE 10/11/99 WHEN I WILL BE COMING @

YOU SHOULD ALSO INSTRUCT THE MEN AT LUNSAR TO ALLOW 1 (ONE) COMPANY OF EDOMOG TROOP TO PASS THROUGH THEIR AREA OF COMMAND TO ENTER MAKENI AS THEY WILL BE COMING TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF THOSE I WILL BE TRAVELLING WITH THEM @

THESE (ONE) COMPANY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BE DEPLOYED IN ANY PART OF THE TOWN (MAKENI) @ NEITHER THE BARRACK BUT SHOULD BE GIVEN WUSELIM (FOOTBALL FIELD) GROUND TO ERECT THEIR TENTS @

I REPEAT, THEY ARE NOT COMING TO FORCIBLY DISARM ANYONE AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ENTER WITH ANY ARTILLERY PIECES. YOU SHOULD HAVE CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM UNTIL MY ARRIVAL AT THAT POINT @



2789


JOHNS WILL ALSO RECIEVE YOUR FOOD CONSIGNMENT ~~FR~~ FROM THEM
AS THEY WILL ^{TRAVELL} ~~GOING~~ ALONG WITH IT

REPEAT, YOU SHOULD GIVE FREE PASSAGE TO THE 1 (ONE) COM-
PANY AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE INTIMIDATED NEITHER HARRASSED
AS THEY ARE OUR BROTHERS

ACT AS DIRECTED

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED FOUR P52 HRS

SIGNED:  9/11/99


FM. SMILE SUB. INSTRUCTION

TO. MOMOH ROGERS DATE. 10/11/99

YOU ARE HEREBY INSTRUCTED TO DISTRIBUTE THE DRUGS ACCORD-
INGLY AS PER INDICATION ON THE DRUGS CARTON. YOU SHOULD
ALSO FIND OUT FROM DARU BARRACK THE ONE (1) BAG OF SUGAR
AND TWO (2) TIN OF AGO OIL I LEFT ON THE GROUND WITH THEM

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED FOUR 125 HRS

SIGNED:  10/11/99

FR FROM B/MOSES

DATE. 10/11/99

TO. SURVIVAL INFO SUPERMAN

SUB. INSTRUCTION


YOU SHOULD ^{SEND} MEN TO GO AND RECIEVE YOUR OWN CONSIGNMENT
OF FOOD AT LUNBAR. THE TOTAL OF RICE PER BAG IS 93
AND YOU SHOULD RECIEVE 593 BAGS OF WHICH SHOULD BE
DISTRIBUTED EVENLY ^{AMONGST} BETWEEN THE RUF AND SLA AT MAKENI,
MAGBURAKA, KIAMAKWE AND ~~AREAS UNDER JAIL CON~~ THE
SURROUNDING. (WHILE THREE HUNDRED BAGS SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED
ALSO AMONGST RUF AND SLA AT LUNBAR AND THE
SURROUNDING.

MOOREOVER, I AM STILL ON MY LEG IN RESPECT OF MY PREVIOUS ORDER TO BE OBEYED FOR (1) ONE COMPANY OF ECONOMY TO HAVE A FREE PASSAGE AND ENTER MAKENI AND TO BE AT MUSEUM GROUND.

BUT YOUR FOOD ISSUE COMES FIRST AND I WILL DIRECT YOU WHEN THEY ARE TO ENTER AFTER PUTTING EVERYTHING IN PLACE O

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED ZULU 1806 HRS

SIGNED:  10/11/99

TO: FM. B/MOSES

DATE: 11/11/99


TO: PLANET

SUB: DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE, MY PREVIOUS ORDER FOR BRIGADIER MORIS KALLON IS CANCELLED TO REPORT TO YOU IS CANCELLED O HE SHOULD ^{NOW} STAY AND PREPARE FOR MY ARRIVAL O

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED ZULU 1236 HRS

SIGNED:  11/10/99

FROM: SMILE

SUB: INSTRUCTION

TO: CONCORD

DATE: 12/11/99

You are instructed to send the member of the CMC and JMC who will be representing RUF on their respective jobs at district and provincial level to my location. You should also recommend and send 12 men as ^{members} of Commission of democracy for good governance to represent RUF in each district while 5 (five) ^{should} ~~will~~ be chosen from FITOWN O

You ^{are} ~~stand~~ also to recommend 5 people to serve in the parastatal unit as I have started discussing with the President. You are to recommend 2 people from Kailahun district to represent the district. You should also send ~~or~~ some one ^{who is diligent either civil/mil} to represent ~~the~~ ^{RUF} in my place on the DDR programme.

Above issues should be properly discuss with you men at that area, and I will be awaiting your nominees as soon as possible.

Make sure ^{you send} that brother Rogers as per our last tel. conversation to come and register our party (RUF) which I have plan for us to launch it next week. In this regard, Brother Rogers is to join with the others (COC and JMC) members to reach me sooner.

For the parastatals side, I have recommended Pa Kallon to be one of the nominees amongst the 5 (five) mentioned and I also suggest Martin to be our administrative Secretary for the party, so think on this issue faster as I await your response.

FIRM REGARDS!!
 TRANSMITTED FOUR 1509 HRS
 SIGNED Edward

FROM: SMILE SUB-DIRECTIVE
 TO: CONCORD DATE: 12/11/99

By my DIRECTIVE, YOU AND THE OTHER GROUP (JOURNALIST) SHOULD MEET ME IN MAKENI OR MAGBURAKA ON ^{THIS COMING} SATURDAY OR SUNDAY - RESPECTIVELY. I WISH TO SEE YOU THERE TO DISCUSS ON IMPORTANT ISSUES.

FIRM REGARDS!!

FM: SMILE
 TO: SURVIVAL

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 from

FM BLACK MOSES

8/13/11/99

TO SURVIVAL

IT'S GOD WILL THAT I DONT TRAVEL TODAY. EXTEND MY
APPOLOGY TO THE PEOPLE AND KEEP ENCOURAGING THEM UNTILL
MY ARRIVAL.

THE QUESTION OF HARRASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION IN THAT
CHIEFDOM WILL SOON COME TO HALT. KEEP CALM UNTIL MY
ARRIVAL. I REPEAT, ALL THOSE PROBLEMS WILL BE SOLVED SOON.

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED ZOUR 1417HRS

SIGNED: Edward $\frac{13}{11/99}$

FM BLACK MOSES

SUB CLARIFICATION

TO SURVIVAL

DATE 13/11/99

YOU SHOULD UPHOLD THE MSG INRESPECT OF THE WITHDRAWAL
OF THE ECOMOG UNTIL YOU HEAR FROM ME. I WILL
LAISE WITH GEN SAM BOCKARIE ON THE ISSUE THROUGH PHONE, MAY
BE HE DIDNT RECIEVE MY CONVERSATIONS CLEAR.

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED ZOUR 1445HRS

SIGNED: Edward $\frac{13}{11/99}$

FM SMILE

TO SURVIVAL AND SUPERMAN

DATE 19/11/99

SUB INSTRUCTION

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO CHATTER VEHICLES AND MOBILIZE
CIVILIANS TO ANY FIGURE TO REPORT TO MY LOCATION AGAIN
AGAINST TOMORROW WITHOUT FAIL.


DO EVERYTHING FOR THEM TO REACH MY

2793

~~RECEIVED~~ BEFORE 13HRS 0
THEIR RETURN TRIP WILL BE MY RESPONSIBILITY 0
WREAT AS URGENT 0

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED FOUR 1750HRS

SIGNED:  19/11/99


FM. SMILE
TO. SUPERMAN
SUB INSTRUCTION

DATE. 19/11/99

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO RELEASE THE VEHICLE OF COL. NJA WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT UPON THE RECEIPT OF THIS MSGD COMPLY WITH THIS INSTRUCTION TO AVOID CONFUSION AND FURTHER EMBARRASSMENT 0

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED FOUR 2000HRS

SIGNED:  19/11/99

FM. SMILE

DATE. 19/11/99

TO. ALL COMMANDERS
SUB. VOIE OF THANKS

BE INFORMED THAT WE HAVE ARRIVED SAFELY ON BASE 0
EXTEND MY THANKS AND APPRIICATIONS TO ALL INHABITANTS IN MAKENI, LUNSAR, MAGBORAKA AND THE SURROUNDING FIR THE HEARTY WELCOME THEY GAVE US 0

IT WAS REALLY FANTASTIC FOR WHAT THEY DID AND IT WILL EVER REMAIN AT THE BOTTOM OF MY HEART - SO WONDERFUL 0
MY COMPLIMENT ALSO GOES TO THE CHAIRLADY, THE SECRETARY AND THE G-5 MEMBERS FOR THEIR ^{FRUITFUL} CONTRIBUTIONS 0

I ADMONISH ALL TO ADHERE TO THE LOME PEACE ACCORD

AS THE ONLY MEANS TO REACH US TO PERMANENT PEACE IN THIS REPUBLIC

INDEED, ITS A GOOD NEWS FOR THE RUF/SL AS WE WILL BE LAUNCHING OUR PARTY ON MONDAY AT 12NOON - 22/11/99 AND I WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR ALL COMMANDERS TO PLEDGE THEIR SUPPORT TO MAKE THIS HISTORICAL CEREMONY A SUCCESSFUL ONE

ALL COMMANDERS ARE TO SEND IN THEIR G-5 REPRESENTATIVES AND SHOULD DO ALL IN THEIR UTMOST TO GEAR THIS PROCESS A FORMIDABLE ONE

MY THANKS AND APPRICIATIONS ONCE MORE TO ALL MY COMBATANTS/CIVILIANS FOR BRINGING RUF TODAY TO THIS STAGE

I WISH YOU ALL GODS BLESSING

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED: 9:59 HRS

SIGNED Edward 19/11/99

FM. SMILE

TO: SURVIVAL INFOS SUPERMAN AND SPARROW

SUB. INSTRUCTION DATE: 19/11/99

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO MOBILIZE BOTH MEN AND WOMEN INCLUDING THE G-5 REPRESENTATIVES FROM LUNSAI, MAKEKI AND MAGBOROKA TO TRAVEL TOMORROW TO REACH MY LOCATION UNDER ECOMOG ESCORT

~~YOU SHOULD ALSO~~

MAKE SURE THAT, YOU MOBILIZE A GOOD NUMBER OF CIVILIAN POPULACE FROM ALL THESE AREAS, AS I WOULD LIKE THEM TO ATTEND THE LAUNCHING ^{OF} ~~FOR~~ OUR PARTY WHICH WILL BE TAKING _{PLACE} ON THIS MONDAY COMING

ALL EXPENDITURES UNDERTAKING WILL BE REFUNDABLE

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED FOUR: 9:01

SIGNED: Edward 19/11/99

2795

FM. SMILE

TO. SURVIVAL INFOS SUPERMAN, SPARROW AND SUPERSTAR

SUB. DIRECTIVE DATE. 20/11/99

BY MY DIRECTIVE, THE DELEGATIONS SHOULD NOW MOVE FOR MY LOCATION. UPON THEIR ARRIVAL AT GBERU JUNCTION, THE COMMANDER ON THE GROUND (GBERU JUNCTION) SHOULD CONTACT THE BDE COMMANDER AT P/LOKO TO ENABLE THEM PROVIDE ECOMOG ESCORT FOR THE DELEGATIONS TO REACH MY LOCATION. I HAVE ALREADY INFORMED THE FORCE COMMANDER AND THE UNOMSIL COMMANDER ON THE MOVEMENT OF MY DELEGATIONS TO THIS LOCATION (F/T) O

AFTER THE DELEGATIONS HAS ENTERED F/TOWN, THEY SHOULD CHEER THE NAME OF THE RUF AND PRAISE THE LEADERSHIP AS THE CAMPAIGN HAVE ALREADY STARTED O

I WISH TO RECIEVE THEM ALL THIS NIGHT O

FIRM REGARDS 2128 HRS
 SIGNED: Edward 20/11/99

FM. SMILE

DATE. 20/11/99

TO. CONCORD

SUB. INSTRUCTIONS

REFERENCE TO MY PREVIOUS MSGS AND TO RE-INFORCE MY ORDERS, YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO DISPATCH MEMBERS OF THE CMC AND JMC ^{TO} DARRU TOMORROW, WHERE THEY WILL BE AIRLIFTED TO MY LOCATION AS THEIR PRESENCE IS HIGHLY IN PLACE ON THE GROUND O

BROTHER ROGERS, SHOULD ALSO BE AMONG THE DELEGATION AS HE IS THE CHAIRMAN FOR OUR PARTY

TREAT AS URGENT O

FIRM REGARDS!!
 TRANSMITTED FOUR 21/11/99
 SIGNED Edward 20/11

DATE. 20/11/99

Fm. SMILE


TO. SURVIVAL

SUB. INSTRUCTION

YOU ARE TO GRANT PERMISSION OF 2 (TWO) VEHICLES THAT ARE CARRYING 9 MILITARY OBSERVERS^{FM UNOMSIL} TO VISIT MAGBOROKA. THEY WILL PASS THROUGH P/LOKO - LUNSAK - MAKENI ~~ON~~ ON MONDAY THE 22/11/99 AND HOPING TO RETURN THE SAME DAY. TREAT THEM KINDLY O

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED EDUN 1936HRS

SIGNED:  20/11/99

Fm. SMILE

SUB. INSTRUCTION

TO. PLANET

DATE. 23/11/99

YOU ARE TO GRANT PERMISSION TO A TEAM OF UNAMSIL THAT WILL VISIT KAILATHUN ON THE 24/11/99. THEY WILL TRAVEL BY HELICOPTER. GIVE THEM LANDING PASSAGE O. MOREOVER, THE CMC AND THE JMC MEMBERS SHOULD ALSO JOIN THEM WHEN RETURNING INCLUDING PA ROGERS O. FIRM REGARDS!!

NIB

ON THE SAME DAY, 3 VEHICLES CARRYING 9 MILITARY OBSERVERS FROM UNOMSIL WILL VISIT KAILATHUN VIA ROAD THROUGH KENEMA - SEGBWEMA - DARU 24/11/99 AND WILL RETURN SAME DAY. GRANT THEM FREE PASSAGE ALSO O. TREAT AS MANDATED O

Fm. SMILE

SUB. INSTRUCTION

TO. SURVIVAL IN BDE COMMANDU - KOND

DATE. 23/11/99

YOU ARE TO GRANT PERMISSION OF 3 VEHICLES CARRYING 9 MILITARY OBSERVERS FM UNOMSIL ON VISIT TO KOIDU FM P/LOKO THROUGH MAKENI INTO KONDAM KOIDU ON THE 26/11/99

2797

... THEM ALSO TO LAND WITH THEIR HELICOPTER AT

SAME DAY

TREAT AS MANDATED

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED 2001 1455 HRS

SIGNED *[Signature]* 23/11/99

... TO SURVIVAL

Fm. SMILE

DATE 24/11/99

TO SURVIVAL

SUB. INSTRUCTION/INFO

BE INFORMED THAT, I WILL BE TRAVELLING TO LUNBAR TOMORROW TO EMBARK ON THE DDR PROGRAMME. YOU ARE TO THEREFORE INSTRUCT SUPERMAN TO PREPARE HIS MEN AND SHOULD BE READY TO RECIEVE ME

YOU ARE ALSO DIRECTED TO LAIEE WITH ME THERE TOMORROW TREAT AS IMPORTANT

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED 2001 1343 HRS

SIGNED *[Signature]* 24/11/99

Fm. SMILE

SUB. RESPONSE

TO GAFFAR

DATE 25/11/99

YOU SHOULD WORK WITH YOUR BROTHERS NOW TO GET THE MEN PREPARE WITH THEIR ARMS AND WAIT THEM

WHEN I ARRIVE AT PORT LOD, FURTHER INSTRUCTION WILL FOLLOW. DO NOT MIND ABOUT WHAT ECOMOG IS SAYING AT ROGBERI JUNCTION

MY EVERY BEST WISHES TO ALL COMBATANTS

REGARDS!! TRANSMITTED 0915 HRS

FROM: SMILE

SUB.

TO: PLANET

DATE: 25/11/99

REFERENCE TO YOUR MSG ACKNOWLEDGE.

THE FOLLOWING NAMES:

1. COL. DENIS LANSANA
2. COL. MOMOH ROGERS
3. LT. COL. MOHAMED LUKLAY

SHOULD REPORT HERE (FREETOWN) IMMEDIATELY AS PROPOSED TO ADMINISTER THE CMC AND JMC. COMMITTEES. REASONS OF THEIR DELAY TO COME MUST BE EXPLAINED FORTHWITH.

MY LAST ORDERS IS TO OPEN ALL THE ROADS AND SOLDIERS SHOULD NOT INTIMIDATE OR HARRASS CIVIL POPULACE.

CHECK POINTS SHOULD BE REDUCE FOR THE FREE MOVEMENT OF OF THE CIVIL POPULACE.

PEOPLE SHOULD RETURN TO TONGO, SEGBWEMA AND THE ENVIRONS AND SECURITY SHOULD BE PARAMOUNT.

THE ABOVE NAMES SHOULD BE HERE IN 48 HRS.

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED 2002 1547HRS
SIGNED:

[Signature] 25/11/99

FROM: SMILE

SUB: RESPONSE

TO: SURVIVAL

DATE: 30/11/99

REF TO YOUR MSG IN RESPECT OF HON. PETER VANDY, HE SHOULD BE THERE UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTION. HE IS TO HAVE RESPECT FOR RUF COMMAND. HE SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF RUF COMMAND.

FIRM REGARDS!!

DATE. 1-12-99

2799

FROM. SMILE

TO. MOMOH ROGERS

SUB INSTRUCTION

YOU SHOULD ALLOW THE BRITISH OFFICERS TRAVELLING FROM DAKH KENEMA TO DAKH KENEMA WITHOUT ANY INTIMIDATION. THEIR TRAVELLING IS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE SPONSORING AGENCIES TO GRANT THEM FREE PASSAGE OVER THE ROAD.

I ~~STILL~~ ^{STILL} ~~REFER~~ ^{REFER} ~~TO~~ ^{TO} ~~MY~~ ^{MY} PREVIOUS ORDERS FOR ALL ROADS TO BE FREE FOR TO AND FRO MOVEMENT OF BOTH PEDESTRIANS AND VEHICLES. YOU MUST REDUCE CHECK POINTS BETWEEN MAND JUNCTION TO SEGBWEMA AND HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION OF PEOPLE SHOULD STOP FORTHWITH.

ALL COMMANDERS SHOULD APPLY ~~BELOW~~ ^{ABOVE} METHOD FOR OUR PEOPLE


TO LIVE UNDER PEACEFUL ATMOSPHERIC CONDITION.

TREAT ACCORDINGLY @

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED ZOU 1315HRS

SIGNED:

 1/12/99

FROM. THE LEADER

TO. PLANET

SUB. DIRECTIVE

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From: THE LEADER

To: COL DENIS LANSANA AND A COL MANAWA

Sub: INSTRUCTION

DATE: 4/12/99

I AM VERY SORRY FOR THE DELAYANCE BECAUSE THOSE INCHARGE OF THE HELICOPTER CAN MOVE WITHOUT THE ECOMOG MANDATE. YOU ARE THEREFORE TO TRAVEL TO SEGBWEMA AND WAIT AS PEOPLE WILL BE LEAVING TOMORROW FOR THAT END UPON THEIR ARRIVAL, YOU TOO WILL BE COLLECTED TO TRAVEL TO MY LOCATION BY THE SAME MEANS THEY COULD REACH YOU.

MY EVERY BEST WISHES TO YOU ALL:

FIRM REGARDS!

TRANSMITTED FOUR

1530 HRS

SIGNED

From: Smile

To: SSS

Sub: Instruction

Date: 5/12/99

You are to send a Senior officer with Karanda to get to Kamakwe to receive the arms and to investigate the matter completely. The men you sent are to stay on that ground along with Konba's men and to work together as one body. After which Konba should report here for briefing.

You are their father and should not get vex on matters as chairman of the Northern Region, all chairmen of the various districts are to take instructions from you. I may also like to know whether the instructions I sent to you have been adhere by Supermen if not send someone there now to make sure my orders don't fall in deaf ears.

I will send a Satellite phone for you in few days. In teaching someone who will come with it.

TRANSMITTED
FOUR

12:50 HRS

From: Smile
TO: Shining Star
Sub: Instruction

5/12/99

2901

You are to return the arms to the both groups and talk between them. SSS is sending a Senior officer with Karante to iron out the problems. Both the groups are to operate as one body. There is no more war and we should be talking of brotherhood, bondlines.

After solving these problems, you are to report to my location for briefing without fail immediately. Also make sure you handover Lt-col. Oso to the officer SSS will send with Karante for discipline. You have to take orders from SSS as he is the regional Chairman over seen all of you in the various districts. So have some allegations against him.

Regards

TRANSMITTED

12 40 HR

FROM: SMILE

TO: SHINING STAR

PAGE

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HRS

FROM THE LEADER

TO: SAM BOCKARIE INFOS | ALL STATIONS
SUB: RESPONSE DATE 15/12/99

AS PER ^{YOUR} MSG. DATED YESTERDAY 14/12/99, YOU ARE NOW INSTRUCTED TO RELEASE THE MSF PERSONNELS YOU HAVE IN CUSTODY INCLUDING MY BODY GUARDS, OTHER SOLDIERS AND THE WIVES AND RELATIVES OF OTHER OFFICERS IMMEDIATELY.

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO ALSO STOP TALKING TO GEN. JOSIE AND AVOID BROADCASTING TO THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA FORTHWITH. YOU SHOULD ONLY DO SO WHEN PERMITTED.

REMEMBER THAT, ALL YOUR INTERVIEW OVER BBC, VOA HAS BEEN RECORDED, HENCE CAUSING RIFT IN THE MOVEMENT.

THE IDEA OF REQUESTING UN TO SEND THE INDIAN CONTINGENT TO OVERSEE DEARMAMENT IN KAILATHUN IS UNACCEPTABLE.

YOU CANNOT DICTATE TO ME AS THERE ARE SERIES OF PROBLEMS WHICH THIS UN NEEDS TO RECTIFY. LIKE LIFTING THE TRAVELLING BOUND ON THE APRC/RUF PERSONNELS IS STILL NOT IN PLACE.

COME WHAT MAY, NOTHING WILL OBSTRUCT THIS PEACE PROCESS WHICH THE PEOPLE (RUF/SL) GAVE ME THE MANDATE TO SIGN. I AM DOING ALL MY POSSIBLE BEST TO PUT OUR CASE ACROSS TO THE APPROPRIATE PEOPLE CONCERNED.

YOU ARE TO WORK ON THE ABOVE NOW AND REPORT TO ME IN MONROVIA. I AM PRESENTLY THERE WITH THE BROKER AWAITING YOUR ARRIVAL.

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AND NECC. ACTION.

FIRM REGARDS.

Fm. SMILE
To. Col. Momoh ROGERS

SUB. INSTRUCTION DATE 18/12/99

YOU ARE TO MOVE TO THE BORDER LINE TO RECEIVE COL. AKIM TURAY, GEN. IBRAHIM AND TWO OTHERS WHO HAVE LEFT MY LOCATION TO YOUR LOCATION TODAY.

UPON THEIR ARRIVAL AT YOUR LOC. YOU ARE TO ESCORT THEM TO CIS LION AND HAND THEM OVER TO SURVIVAL FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT. YOU ARE TO TAKE GREAT CARE OF THE GROUND AND TRY TO FIND OUT ABOUT A CONSIGNMENT OF RICE ~~THAT~~ (400 BAGS) THAT WAS SENT BY CONCORD TO VOINTAMA FOR SALE.

YOU ARE TO PREPARE A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ABOUT SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND FURNISH ME IMMEDIATELY.

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AND IMM ACTION.

FIRM REGARDS!!
1500HRS

Fm. SMILE
TO. SURVIVAL
SUB. INSTRUCTION

DATE 18/12/99

YOU ARE TO PREPARE TO RECEIVE COL. AKIM, GEN. IBRAHIM AND TWO (2) OF MY FRIENDS FROM MY PRESENT LOCATION TO YOU. YOU WILL RECEIVE THEM FROM CIS ESCORT (BORDER).

YOU ARE TO MOVE WITH THEM TO THE LOCATION AS WE DISCUSSED LAST.

GEN. IBRAHIM WILL ^{BRIEF} BRING YOU MORE AS HE HAS SOME ITEMS TO BE DELIVERED TO YOU FOR PROPER CARE TAKING.

YOU SHOULD TREAT THE PEOPLE WELL AND TAKE GREAT CARE OF THE GROUND AND PUT ALL SITUATION UNDER CONTROL.

MAY GOD BLESS YOU ALL.
Aeko

FM. SMILE

TO. SURVIVAL

SUB. DIRECTIVE

DATE. 22/12/99

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO WARN ALL SOLDIERS NOT FOR THEM TO TOUCH ANY OF THE LIBERIAN BROTHERS WHO ARE COMING TOGETHER WITH GEN. IBRAHIM AND OTHERS @ THEY ARE OUR BROTHERS


WE ARE NOT TO REVENGE FOR ANY REASONS @

SAMSON AND OTHERS ARE COMING WITH GEN IBRAHIM AND THEY SHOULD BE WELL TREATED.

J TREAT THE ABOVE WITH CARE @

FIRM REGARDS.

TRANSMITTED FOUR ^{16 HRS} ~~1800H~~

SIGNED  12/12/99

FM. SMILE

TO. ALL SURVAYS

SUB. DIRECTIVE

DATE. 25/12/99

BY MY DIRECTIVE, ALL OPS AREA ARE TO SUSPEND THE OPERATION OF ECOMO4 AND UNAMSIL WITHIN THEIR AREA UNTILL FURTHER INSTRUCTION @

THE LOME DOCUMENT WHICH WAS SIGNED EARLY JULY 7 NEEDS TO BE PROPERLY INTERPRETED OR ELSE, THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER DISARMAMENT @

STRUCTURES LAID DOWN FOR THE DDIL PROGRAMME MUST BE MET WITH BEFORE DISARMAMENT @

REMEMBER THAT, THE LOME DOCUMENT WHICH WAS SIGNED IS TO GIVE PEACE TO OUR PEOPLE. AT ANY RATE OF MERIT, PEACE MUST PUT NOT THE RUF TO BE DESITUTES OR VICTIMS OF PEACE @

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED 03 15 HRS

2805

FM. SMILE

TO. SURVIVAL

SUB. INSTRUCTION

DATE. 25/12/99

YOU ARE TO MOVE NOW TO MAKENI AND TAKE FULL CONTROL OF SITUATION. DO NOT ALLOW ANY DEPLOYMENT BY EITHER ECOTODG NOR UNAMSIL AND ALL SECURITY SETUP REMAIN AS USUAL. COL. KOMBA WILL JOIN YOU SOON FOR ALL NECESSARY IMPLEMENTATION. ACCEPT ADV. YOUR INFOS AND NECESSARY ACTION.

FIRM REGARDS

TRANSMITTED 1729HRS

FM SMILE

TO. SHINNING STAR

SUB. INSTRUCTION

DATE 29/12/99

I HAVE LEARNT THAT SOME OF YOUR MEN BASED AT TOMBOWALA HAVE SEIZED AN OUTBOARD MACHINE AND OTHER ITEMS. YOU ARE THEREFORE INSTRUCTED TO IMMEDIATELY RETRIEVE THOSE ITEMS AND TURN IT OVER TO THE OWNER.

ONE NURSE SHOULD ALSO JOIN THE OTHER ONE I SENT FOR OPS AT THAT AREA AND THEY SHOULD TREAT PEOPLE FREELY. TREAT AS DIRECTED.

FIRM REGARDS!

~~TO~~ FM. THE LEADER

TO. SURVIVAL INFOS SPARROW

SUB- INSTRUCTION

DATE. 11/01/2000

YOU ARE TO GRANT PERMISSION TO THE UN HELICOPTER WHICH IS DUE TO LAND AT YOUR POINT (MAKENI) TOMORROW. THEY WILL DEPART BY 0900HRS - 12/01/2000. SOME UN MILITARY OBSERVERS AND SOME DFID PERSONELS ARE ONBOARD THE HELICOPTER.

UPON THEIR ARRIVAL, THEY WILL DRIVE BY LAND TO MAGBURAKA AND THUS GIVE THEM FREE PASSAGE FOR THEIR TO AND FRO MOVEMENT ACCORDINGLY. REGARDS!! 1049HRS TRANSM. 01/01/00

FM. THE LEADER

2806

TO BRIG. MORIS KALLON AND THE G-5 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
MAGBURAKA

IN PWS BRIG I. H. SESAY - CHAIRMAN OF NORTHERN PROVINCE

" " CHIEF BAYASOL AND THE CHAIRLADY ISATU SANKOH

" " COL AHMID CONTEH - CHAIRMAN MANSINGBI

DATE. 24th DEC. 1999

REF REPORT AGAINST MADAM RAMATU KAMARA COMMONLY
KNOWN AS UNITY KAY OF NO. 73 B0 ROAD, MAGBURAKA

I AM IN RECEIPT OF YOUR MEMORANDUM ON THE ABOVE MENTIONED SUBJECT AND WISH TO CLARIFY THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

1. THAT AT NO TIME HAVE I APPOINTED ANY MADAM RAMATU KAMARA TO ORGANISE THE WOMEN IN THE CHIEFDOM O
2. THE PARAMOUNT CHIEF IS CAUTIONED ONCE AGAIN BY COPY OF THIS LETTER NOT TO INTERFERE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE G-5 IN MAGBURAKA O
3. THE G-5 IS TO BE MERGED INTO THE POLITICAL ARM OF THE RUFF AND THE HIERARCHY OF THE G-5 STAYS THE SAME UNTIL CHANGED BY MANDATE OF PEOPLES CONGRESS WHICH MAY BE CALLED BY EITHER THE DISTRICT CHAIRMAN OR THE LEADER OF THE RUFF AS SPECIFIED IN THE PARTY CONSTITUTION O
4. YOU ARE DIRECTED TO ENSURE THAT ALL POSITIONS AS BEFORE REMAIN THE SAME UNTIL A DECISION IS REACHED BY A DISTRICT PEOPLES CONGRESS O
5. PEACE !!!

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED 14 20 HRS

SIGNED:

2807

FM. THE LEADER
TO. BRIG. ISSA
SUB INSTRUCTION

DATE: 5/11/2000

YOU ARE TO INSTRUCT YOUR MEN AT MAKENI TO GRANT PERMISSION TO THE UNAMSIL TO BE ALLOWED TO OCCUPY THE MUSEUM GROUNDS THIS SHOULD BE DONE WHEN THE CMC MEMBERS HAVE BEING FULLY DEPLOYED @

ACT AS IT'S VERY URGENT @

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED: 14 30 HRS
9/2000

FM. THE LEADER
TO. BRIG. ISSA
SUB. INSTRUCTION

DATE. 11/01/2000

YOU ARE HEREBY TO INSTRUCT COL KOMBA TO HAND OVER ALL ARMAMENTS COLLECTED FROM THE UN GUINEAN CONTINGENT BACK TO THEM AND SHOULD GRANT THEM FREE PASSAGE TO PASS THROUGH THEIR END TO PORTLOKOO

THE UN AMBASSADOR MR FRANCIS OKELD HAS MET WITH ME THIS MORNING ON THE ISSUE AND EVERYTHING HAS ^{BEING} LAID TO REST (RESOLVED).

THEY WILL COME WITH OFFICIAL LETTER IN RESPECT OF THE ISSUE AND THUS COL. KOMBA SHOULD GO BY IT ACCORDINGLY @

LET THEM HANDOVER ALL THAT WERE TAKING FROM THEM @

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED 1252 HRS

11-0-1-2000

FROM. THE LEADER

TO. SURVIVAL INFOS SPARROW

SUB. INSTRUCTION

DATE. 12/01/2000

BE INFORMED THAT, THE FORCE COMMANDER AND MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL BE PROCEEDING TO MAGBURAKA AND MAKENI ON VISIT TO THE KENYAN BATTALION AS WELL AS PROPOSED DOR CAMPO SAID DELEGATES WILL DEPART FTW/N 0830 HRS ON 13/01/2000 USING UN HELICOPTER.

TEAM WILL LAND IN MAGBURAKA AND THEN DRIVE TO MAKENI USING 6(SIX) VEHICLES AND WILL RETURN SAME DAY.

WITH THE ABOVE, YOU ARE HEREBY TO GRANT THEM PERMISSION TO DO SO.

FIRM REGARDS!!

FROM. THE LEADER

TO. GEN. IBRAHIM

SUB. RESPONSE

DATE. 12/01/2000

YOU SHOULD WAIT FOR MY ARRIVAL WHICH WILL BE MOST LIKELY ON FRIDAY OR SATURDAY.

WHEN I REACH THERE, WE WILL BE ABLE TO ARRANGE BETTER. IT'S BETTER THAT I'M THERE FOR OTHER ARRANGEMENT BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE.

MOREOVER, I AM NOT HAPPY ABOUT THE WAY JOHN L. CADWELL IS BEHAVING i.e. TALKING THE REPUTATION OF THE ORGANISATION OUTSIDE.

FIRM REGARDS!!
TRANSMITTED 1925HRS

TO. AKIM

YOU ARE NOT TO HANDOVER ANYTHING (GEM) TO GEN. IBRAHIM EXCEPT THEY WAIT MY ARRIVAL WHICH WILL BE DUE ON EITHER FRIDAY OR SATURDAY.

GOOD LUCK!!

FIRM REGARDS!!
1940HRS TRANSMITTED

2809

FROM. THE LEADER

TO. COL. MOMOH ROGERS AND COL. DENIS LANSANA

SUB. INSTRUCTION

DATE. 13/01/2000

SAVERS
THE
SUB
TAKEN
PERMISS
S/!

You should fortify the border between Liberia ~~between~~ and Sierra Leone to avoid any infiltration by insurgencies.

Sam Bockarie is organising to destabilize elsewhere and we are not party to his intention.

According to intelligent report, soldiers are escaping your end going into Liberia because LOG is sending men to incite the soldiers on the ground. Do not just sit over there and forget about security, more especially on the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Work out everything to contain situation for stability should now prevail for our people.

Act accordingly.

Firm regards!!

TRANSMITTED: 1057MKS

IKELY
2,
FACE

FROM. THE LEADER

DATE 14/01/2000

TO. SHINNING STAR

SUB. DIRECTIVE

ELL
J

By my directive, you are to go along with all armaments and other equipments seized to Bamoi for onward delivery to UNAMSIL (GUINEAN CONTINGENT).

You should also grant them free passage to pass through with all armaments to their designated point (PORT LOKO).

with
FR

You are also to remove all roads blocks within your area of operation to ensure free movement of pedestrians, vehicle traffickers and even to help aid workers to be successful in their operation.

You are also to organise and prepare your men for disarmament ranging from KAMBIA onwards to PORT LOKO.

WHERE YOUR MEN ARE OCCUPYING

WE SHOULD NOT HOLD OUR PEOPLE TO RATION IN EXCHANGE OF PEACE,
PEACE SHOULD NOW BE GIVEN TO OUR PEOPLE IN EXCHANGE OF OUR
BALLOT BOXES TO SUPERSEDE ALL OTHERS BY THE HELP OF THE
ALMIGHTY GOD.

I WILL BE COMING THERE SHORTLY TO OVERSEE SAID PROGRAMME
TREAT IT MOST URGENT

FIRM REGARDS

1255 HRS
14
07
2000

FROM- THE LEADER

TO- MAJOR RAY

SUB- RESPOND

DATE- 15TH JAN 2000

THERE IS NO NEED TO WORRY ABOUT THE VEHICLE ISSUE
YOU ARE ALSO TO TELL THE SISTER (JOSEPHINE) TO MAKE SURE
THAT THE CHILDREN LEAVE TOMORROW FOR ADBIJAN AND START
ATTENDING THEIR SCHOOLS THEY ARE TO MOVE TOMORROW WITHOUT
FAIL ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO & ACT ACCORDINGLY

END.

Fm:- GAFFA THRU- SMILE INFO- ALL STATIONS D/17TH JAN 2000

BY THE DIRECTIVE OF THE LEADER, ALL COMMANDERS AND OPERATORS ARE
TO SEND DIRECT MESSAGES TO THE LEADER ALL MESSAGES FOR THE
LEADER ARE TO PASS THRU SURVIVAL ANY COMMANDER OR OPERATOR
FOUND DOING SO, WILL BE MILITARILY DEATH WITH ALSO, ALL ARE
AGAIN WARN TO STOP SENDING IN FALSE MESSAGES TO S.S.S.
FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE LEADER

FIRM REGARDS

1554 HRS

FROM - THE CHAIRMAN.

DTG- 193020 ZJAN 2000

TO - COL BUHARI MUSA.

2911

SUB - INFORMATION

YOUR MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT WAS WELL RELIEVED AND
CONTENT UNDERSTOOD. YOU ARE TO INFORM HIM THAT I WILL NOT
TRAVEL TO PORT LOKO BECAUSE OF INSECURITY. THE AFRC S.L.A.'S ARE
ARMBUSSING THE HIGHWAY ESPECIALLY GBERIE JUNCTION, PORT LOKO
AND LUNGI PORT LOKO HIGHWAY. THE HELICOPTER THEREFORE SHOULD
COME AND PICK ME UP AT MAKENI AT AROUND 1500 HRS TO 1600 HRS
GMT TOMORROW. GREETINGS AND BEST REGARDS. END.

TO THE CHAIRMAN

FM. COL. BUHARI

SUB. RESPONSE

DATE 20/01/2000

SIR, REF. TO YOUR MESSAGE, CONTENT WELL UNDERSTOOD
AND PROPERLY RELAYED TO FORCE COMMANDER BUT THE FORCE
COMMANDER HAS CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS.

PAE HELICOPTER OR COMMERCIAL HELICOPTER DON'T GO
ANYWHERE IF THE ECOMOG FORCE OR BIN STRENGTH IS
NOT DEPLOY THERE.

THEREFORE, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO GET PARAMOUNT
HELICOPTER TO MAKENI.

THE ONLY WAY IS PORT LOKO.
IN LIGHT OF THIS, LT. COL. BAWA WILL ORGANISE ECOMOG
ESCORT WITH RUF PERSONNEL INCLUDING MY OWN
SECURITIES WHICH I WILL SEND UPON YOUR MANDATE AS
INSTRUCTED TO ENFORCE ~~FOR~~ TO MAKE THE TRAVEL TO PORT LOKO
BE SUCCESSFUL.

PLEASE LET ME KNOW HOW THIS ARRANGEMENT CAN BE FANA-
LIZED AS I WOULD LIKE TO ACT ON IT IMMEDIATELY UPON YOUR
RESPONSE. FIRM REGARDS!! 2249HRS ACK.

ADM: THE CHAIRMAN
TO: PA KALLON
SUB: RESPONSE 20/01/2000

REFERENCE TO YOUR MESSAGE SENT PERTAINING THE LATE JAMIL, I'M PRESENTLY IN MAKENI. I HAVE ARRANGED IT WITH BRIG ISSA SESAY. HE WILL REPRESENT US THERE AND THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM WITH SECURITY.

FROM- SMILE
TO: MAJ RASHID FODAY
SUB- RESPOND
D/ 22 JAN 2000

FIRM REGARDS!
ACK. 0846HRS

YOUR MESSAGE RECEIVED AND CONTENT UNDERSTOOD. EDIE KANNE IS TO RETURN WITH ALL THE MEN AND BASE AT KAILAHUN TOWN. I WILL HAVE ARRANGE IT WITH COL MOMOH ROGERS. HE WILL RECEIVE THEM WELL AS BROTHERS. NO BODY WILL HARRASH, ARREST OR MOLEST THEM. ACK.

1207HRS REC'D

Fm: SMILE TO SEASIDE & IRON MIKE
SUB. INSTRUCTION DATE. 25-01-2000

YOU ARE HEREBY INSTRUCTED TO ALLOW ALL THE CIVILIANS WHO HAVE TAKING REFUGE IN EITHER GUINEA OR LIBERIA SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR TO RETURN HOME.

YOU SHOULD EVEN ENCOURAGE THEM TO COME AS THEY ARE OUR PEOPLE.

TREAT AS MANDATED.

FIRM REGARDS!

Fm: SMILE TO S/SIDE & IRON MIKE SUB. INSTRUCTION
DATE. 25-01-2000

YOU ARE HEREBY INFORM THAT LCRC IS DUE TO COMMENCE OPERATION AT YOUR END NEXT WEEK. YOU ARE TO THEREFORE

2913

GRANT THEM FREE PASSAGE FOR THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR OPERATION SUCCESSFULLY

REGARDING THE ISSUE OF THE CIVILIANS WHO WANT TO RETURN FOR RESETTLEMENT, SHOULD BE ALLOW IN BUT NEED BE SCREENED BEFORE DISPATCHING THEM

FRM REGARDS!!

FM: SMILE
TO: SSS
SUB: RESPOND

D- 28th JAN 2000

BY MY DIRECTIVE, VANDY AMARA SHOULD RETURN TO HIS POST OF ASSIGNMENT FORTH WITH. HE IS PRESENTLY IN MY CUSTODY TILL FURTHER NOTICE. I WILL SEND HIM BACK TO HIS POST OF ASSIGNMENT SOONEST. HE IS NO C.M.C MEMBER BUT TO RETURN TO HIS POSTING.

FM: SMILE
TO: SSS
SUB: INFO/INSTRUCTION

30-01-2000

BE INFORMED THAT WE NEED TO GIVE NAMES OF TEN (10) PERSONS MEANT TO UNDERGONE TRAINING AT AMERICAN EMBASSY FOR ON WORLD TRANSMISSION TO VARIOUS AREAS OF CONTROL IN THIS REGARDS OF THIS CMM YOU ARE TO SEND FIVE PERSONS FOR SOME PROGRAMME BUT PSE. MAKE SURE THAT THEIR QUALIFICATION SHOULD EXCEED BASIC AND A LEVELS UP TO UNIVERSITY. PSE. EXPEDITE THIS ACTION WITHIN 48 HRS. AS THE PEOPLE ARE WAITED FOR.
1915HRS

FROM: SMILE
TO: SURVIVAL
SUB: RESPONSE
DATE: 05/3/2000

YOU SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THE CMC IN QUESTION RETURN TO THEIR OPS AREA OR ELSE I WOULD STOP THEIR PAYMENT FROM THEM H/O HERE

GIVE THEM RADIO IF YOU FEEL ITS NECESSARY

FRM REGARDS!!

SMILE

TO SURVIVAL

SUB INSTRUCTION

DATE. 01-2-2000

REF TO MY CONVERSATION WITH JABBATI TO INFORM YOU ON THE ISSUES RELATING TO ARMS SEIZED FROM KENYAN UNAMSIL UNAMSIL, YOU ARE TO ASCERTAIN AND HANDOVER THOSE WEAPONS IMMEDIATELY AS THE INFORMATION PERTAINING THE SLA IS ALL FALSED LET YOUR OPERATOR INFORM MY OPERATOR UPON YOUR ARRIVAL FOR BETTER CONFIRMATION OF THINGS

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK. 1613HRS
01/2/2000

Fm SMILE

TO SURVIVAL INFOS ALL STATIONS

SUB INSTRUCTION

DATE. 2/03/2000

YOU ARE DIRECTED TO INSTRUCT ALL YOUR COMMANDERS TO GRANT FREE PASSAGE TO ALL VEHICLE TRAFFIKERS INCLUDING UNAMSIL TO TRAVEL THEIR AOR WITHOUT ANY IMPEDIMENT

MOOREOVER, THERE IS ANOTHER PLAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND THIS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT SPONSORERS SIDE BUT I WARN ALL COMMANDERS TO BE FULLY ALERT FOR ANY ATTEMPT SHOULD BE TREATED ACCORDINGLY. OF THIS DATE AND DEVELOPMENT, YOU ARE TO ADMINISTER ALL STATIONS TO MONITOR THE RADIO NET UNTIL THE STIPULATED HRS (12 MIDNIGHT)

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED 0840HRS
2/3/2000

YOU SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARING AS I HAVE PLAN FOR US TO DISARM SEGBWEMA BUT I WILL INFORM YOU ON THE TIME

FIRM REGARDS!!
ACK. 19:20HRS

Fm. SMILE
TO: COL ROGERS

SUB-RESPONSE
DATE: 1-03-2000
DATE

2815

YOU ARE TO TELL YOUR COMMANDERS TO EXERCISE RESTRAIN AS
GEN. IBLATHIM IS SOMEWHERE AND IS EXPECTED TO TRAVEL WITH FOOD
AND DRUGS TO YOUR POINT FOR EVENLY DISTRIBUTION ON THE VARIOUS
AREAS. YOU ARE TO EXPECT HIM SHORTLY.

TELL ALL COMBATANTS THAT I AM VERY MUCH CONCERN ABOUT
THEIR PLIGHT AND INDEED I'M FIGHTING HARD TO HANDLE THIS
APPALLING SITUATION.

FIRM REGARDS!!

Ack. 17/17 HRS
1/03/2000

FROM: SMILE
TO: SURVIVAL
SUB-RESPOND

DATE: 15-03-2000

REF. TO YOUR MSG FROM COL. KOMBIA IN RESPECT OF THE
GUINEAN GUN BOAT ATTACKING THEIR POSITION ON SEA. ACK O
THANK YOU FOR INFORMING ME O

WHEN YOUR POSITIONS ARE ATTK, THE ONLY OPTION IS
TO DEFEND YOURSELF O

LET HIM CARRY ON WITH HIS PLAN AS PER HIS MSG O

FIRM REGARDS!!

Ack. 20.20 HRS
15/03/2000

Fm. SMILE
TO: SURVIVAL

SUB-RESPONSE AND INSTRUCTION
DATE: 6/3/2000

REF. TO THE MESSAGE DATED 3/3/2000 PERTAINING THE INTENTION
OF THE UNAMSIL TO CARRY RELIEF TO ALIKALIA, NO PROBLEM ABOUT
THAT O YOU ARE ONCE TO INSTRUCT ALL YOUR COMMANDERS TO DISMAN-
TLE ALL ROAD BLOCKS AND TO ALLOW THE UNAMSIL, THE NGU TO
BE ASSESSIBLE TO TOWNS, VILLAGES IN OUR AREA O

7 57
2
2000
s to
g
into
e
warn
found
wish
ed
13/3/2000
r
meo

Fw
Tt

ROM. CHAIRMAN. SANKOH.

TO. COL. B.I.O MUSA.

INFO. SUB: INFORMATION.

DATE: 5TH FEB 2000.

BROTHER, I AM KINDLY ASKING YOU TO WORK OUT ALL MODALITIES IN ORDER FOR THE ESCORT VEHICLES INCLUDING MUSTA TO MOVE FOR MY LOCATION THIS NIGHT. THIS IS BECOS, I WOULD BE HAVING A MEETING TOMORROW AT AROUND 2.0 CLOCKS I WILL BE VERY MUCH GREATFUL IF YOU CAN DO THIS FOR ME. I HOPE TO HEAR A RESPOND FR YOU SOONEST.

FIRM REGARDS

2130 HRS

FR. SMILE

TO. HIGH COMMAND INFOS ALL STATIONS

SUB: INSTRUCTION DATE. 17/03/2000

REFERENCE TO MY PREVIOUS MESSAGES, I ONCE MORE ORDERED FOR ALL ROAD BLOCKS TO BE DISMANTLED IMMEDIATELY AND TO ALLOW ALL CIVIL SERVANTS TO RETURN TO THE VARIOUS ~~TOWNS~~ DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, TOWNS AND VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY HARRASSMENT OR INTIMIDATION.

THIS INCLUDE THE DISTRICT OFFICERS, POLICE COMMISSIONERS AND OTHER HIERARCHY IN THE CIVIL SERVICE.

THE PEOPLE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE AMONGST US.

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK 1131 HRS

17
03
2000

TH
B

2817

FROM: SMILE

TO: SURVIVAL

SUB: INSTRUCTION

DATE: 3-04-2020

REFERENCE TO MY PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU, GO AHEAD

YOU SHOULD NOT ALLOW SHARK TO ENTER THERE AGAIN AND EVEN HIS MEN SHOULD BE DRIVEN OUT OF THAT AREA INCLUDING WHO EVER HAS BEING ENGAGED IN MINING ACTIVITIES

YOU SHOULD NOT ALLOW ANYONE TO MINE THERE AGAIN

UPON ARRIVAL OF POWER LINE, HE SHOULD TAKE OVER THE OPERATION AND THE CAR THAT HE GAVE TO HIS BROTHER SHOULD BE TAKING ALSO

I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU THROUGH PHONE

FIRM REGARDS

ACK. 1954 HRS

[Handwritten signature]

SUBJECT
-Y/AND
VARIOUS
IT HOW
ONERS
-US

FM. SMILE

TO. COL BAIBUREH

SUB DIRECTIVE

DATE: 6/04/2000

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE THE PEOPLE WHO WERE ARRESTED AT BADESERIA TOGETHER WITH THEIR HOUSEHOLD, PROPERTIES, RICE AND OTHER STUFF.

IT IS A COMPLETELY GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION. I AM WARNING YOU ALL AGAIN TO DESIST FROM SAID HABIT FOR EVERY LITTLE THING NOW DONE.

YOU SHOULD BE ACCOUNTED FOR. MIND YOU, THE WAR IS NOW TO AN END AND WE ARE NO LONGER ON ARM CAMPAIGN BUT ON POLITICS THROUGH NEGOTIATION.

YOU SHOULD PUT AN IMMEDIATE HALT TO SAID HABIT. YOU SHOULD ALSO STOP PROVOKING THE PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLE AGAINST THEIR WISH AS THAT ^{WILL} SPARK VIOLENCE AND IT WILL NOT GO DOWN WELL IN THE RECORD OF IMPLEMENTING THE LOME ACCORD.

I REPEAT, YOU ARE TO WARN YOUR MEN TO STOP DEVIATE FROM SUCH UNHUMAN ACTION AGAINST THE PEACEFUL CIVILIANS.

MOREOVER, THE SOLDIER WHO SHOT AT HIS FRIENDS SHOULD BE ARRESTED AND BE BROUGHT TO LAW.

ACT AS MANDATED.

FIRM REGARDS!!
ACK 1848HLS

6
64
2000

2819

FROM: SMILE

TO: SPARROW

SUB: INSTRUCTION

DATE: 16/04/2000

You SHOULD NOT ALLOW ANYONE TO FOOl YOU ON ANY DISARMAMENT PROGRAMMED

THERE SHOULD BE NO DISARMAMENT IN THAT AREA FOR NOW UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTION

ANY MISTAKE TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING ABOVE SUBJECT MATTER, YOU WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO ACT AS MANDATED

FIRM REGARDS!!

ACK: 1953 HRS

[Signature]

From: Smile

TO: Survival

18/04/00

sub: Instruction

Do not give anything to Akim if you meet him to Makris. You are to wait for Gagar and handover the said ~~item~~ parcel to him. He will meet you tomorrow at Makris.

Best regards.

From: Smile

TO:

sub: Instruction

You are to make sure you work with the brothers there for smooth operation. I do not want any complain and make sure there is security alertness all over especially on the boundary and your defensiveness.

79 + 79 usb

Nicom

2820

The leader

ordinal

263412 - Bobr Daily

TO: SM/ISSA

SUB: PIC.

Date.

no. 1235
1695

You ARE DIRECTED TO PURSUE THE ENEMIES OUT OF OKRA HILL.

You SHOULD CO-OPERATE TO PUT SIT UNDER CONTROL AT OKRO HILL. BEAT FOR THEM IN BUSHES AND CHASE OUT AS FAR AS PRICE IS.

You should not advance to Kabala. If there is any tp going to Kabala, they should withdraw now and hold their old position to defend their position.

Nobody should go out now to attack his friend but stay to defend your position against any aggression.

Be on the defence and clear all avenues around Makem, Lunson and search the bushes around your defensive position.

Do not go to Kabala because the tp at Kabala are loyal to the govt.

AK

7 BOXES ADV. TEAM TO collect food at
14 R.P.G. ROL Akem Junction

The logistic command is sending food for Makem, Lunson.
888158 9191 UN

7 BAGS OF RICE IN STOCK

EFFECTIVE FM DAY ANY LIE

TAKING FM THERE

SHOULD BE TO MY KNOWLEDGE

22/11/99

81050

USB ECOMOR
FARM

10th JAN 2000 - BRAVO
KILD

2921

ECONOMY ARE TO RIL BL

14th JAN 2000

OLD FARM = WILD FIRE (EFFECT)

AFRICA = DESERT LAND

MAN = STARCO

COUNTRY BOY = ONE STEP UP

K.P. = ONE STEP DOWN

FOR ONLY CLS
VISION ONE
ROCK &
ESCORT

70066 = LET'S GO - STARCO

70066 - AGAMA

71905

71414

70044 FKT

67044 FK-ORIGINAL

71414 - TMM

71515 - TNN

70049

Wild geese

70555 - TRIPPLE VICTOR

71905 - F7 FARM

91414 Rmm

81414 Qmm

72682

72002 - TALK BACK

80808

NATIONAL
NEW FOR 665

73050 - Booklet

69940

#80. Bolis St

Finda Lansang (Sister)

Lansang Amars (husband
or Tailor)

Filyu Minnah - Owner of the Shop

69700 - NADIN

TITUS

22 62 67 - JULIUS

PAUL
MARIAN
230954

- 20) Radio Log Book #4
9 April 2000 – 5 May 2000

MSG BOOK
BO TOWN
HILL TOP

R.U.F.P.

Fm - Control station through the
over all Signal Commander.
To - All stations,
Sub - Instruction,

DATE - 9th - 04 - 2000.

1. It has come to the acknowledgement of the leader that, most stations have failed in responding, if not, no response to messages transmitted from control station.

In this regard, all stations are warned to give an immediate response to any message, not only from control station, but even from other stations. Hence any message received need to be responded, and it should be done in written.

2. Stations should effectively start submitting their ^{situational} report to control station or Brig Issah H Sesay's station for onwards transmission to control station. Operators should not only rely

on Commander to feed him or her station with information. As an operator, you are not only meant to sit behind the set, but to also find out happening around, as we are serve as one of the security agent in any operational area.

3. All stations should bear in mind that, S.S.B. unit is still under a well structured body, in the good interest of those who do not know Capt Mohamed Kabba (Touris) remain the legitimate over all Signal Commander and all are warn to educate his constructive order without fear.

In this capacity, all stations should give him chance to uphold the deteriorative situation that have been ~~amorph~~ slowly creeping in the unit.

All are to govern themselves accordingly.

4. All stations should resume morning report directly to Control Station (Freetown), or Brig Issah H. Sesay's Station (Makeni). Except if these two stations are not on, you can do same to the sub sub-control station in Freetown, or Brig Issah Sesay's sub-control station (Banbury) respectively.

Operators should come on with certain amount of discipline on the radio net, for eight years on a course, meant professionalism.

We should now be mature enough to handle the radio net perfectly.

5. Control station suggested that the ^{S.S.B.} motto to be Loyal Dedicated

and gratefulness, but awaits
approval from all stations,
May God bless us all. Signed
Recd operator
Morphy
Acknowledge the
Leader.

Fm - Maj' Sheila Coomber,
To - J.M.C. & C.M.C. representatives
Sub - Observation & Warning
DATE - 10th - 04 - 2000.

It has been observe that,
C.M.C. members are in the
habit of deserting their area
of responsibility, especially when
they receive their allowances -
All C.M.C. members who are guilty
of the above behaviour, should
desist forthwith.

Our rules of cease fire
monitors is to foster peace and
sensitize our ex-combatants
on their ways, post war
reconstruction

Any C.M.C. who absent himself
from this duty without legal
excuse, shall be queried
or made to forfeit his ~~allowance~~
allowance for current period
you are warn ~~to~~ your ^{own} int
erest.
Recd ^{with - 04.2000.}
Morphy
operator. J.M.C. represen-
tatives

10th - 04 - 00
To - MAJ. SHEILA COOMBER - J.M.C.
FR - ✓ SAMUEL MASSAQUO - C.M.C. IBO
SUB - INQUIRY
SIR, I HEARD OF YOUR CALL, BUT I
WILL BE ATTENDING MEETINGS TOMORROW. SIR
YOU ARE TO CLARIFY IF I SHOULD COME OR
IF THERE IS ANY INSTRUCTION FOR ME.
AWAITING YOUR RESPONSE

SADDAM
MSG PASSED.
TIME 10:25 AM.

11th 04 - 2000

TO: EMMANUEL JACKSON
FR: SADDAM.
SUBJ: INQUIRY

IN RESPECT OF OUR DISCUSSION LAST, THE
(VEHICLE TRUCK)
BODY, ISSUE FOR THE ENGINES WE TALK OF IS NOW
AVAILABLE. I MAY LIKE TO KNOW IF THE ENGINES
ARE STILL AVAILABLE SO AS TO WORK FAST MEDICAL
RESPONSE NEEDED.

Sign ~~Full~~
Saddam

FM - THE LEADER,
TO - MAKENI, KONO AND KAILAHUN
AXIS.

SUB - INSTRUCTION,

DATE - 12th - 04 - 2000 -

YOU ARE TO SUBMIT THREE

- (3) NAMES FROM LUNBAR AXIS
- (3) THREE FROM MAKENI AXIS,
- (3) THREE FROM KONO AND (3) THREE
FROM KAILAHUN AXIS AND ONE (1)
FROM POKOLOKO AXIS, AND THESE
MEN SHOULD STANDBY ~~AT~~ THE
BELOW MENTIONED AREAS TO BE
PICK-UP NEXT TOMORROW.

THOSE FROM POKOLOKO MAGBURAIKA
SHOULD ASSEMBLE AT POKOLOKO
WHILE THOSE FROM MAKENI
AT MAKENI, AS WELL AS THOSE
FROM KAILAHUN AXIS, AT
MOKHAI. DABU.

THESE MEN SHOULD AT LEAST
BE ABLE TO READ AND WRITE
AS THEY ARE COMING TO PART
TAKE ON THE CONSOLIDATION MEET-
ING FOR PEACE. THIS MEETING WILL
AT LEAST LAST FOR FIVE DAYS
AWAITING THESE NAMES, AS
IT IS URGENT.

MENTIONED MSG

OPERATOR

~~Handwritten signature~~
12th 04 2000

FM - THE LEADER,
TO - MR. HASHID SANDI,
SUB - RESPONSE,

DATE - 14th - 4 - 2000.
YOU ARE NOT TO COME. I WILL
BE AT YOUR POINT VERY SHORTLY
ALSO YOU ARE TO PREPARE AND
AND ATTEND A PEACE CONFERENCE
IN BO WITH THE OTHER BROTHERS
FROM THE 18th - 22nd - 04 - 2000.
UPON MY ARRIVAL THE HOUSE
ISSUE AND ALL OTHER ISSUES
WILL BE SOLVE.

ACCEPT INFOS FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.
Signed

REC'D TIME RECD

11:49 AM, Mr Hashid Sandi
14th 04 2000.

To - The Leader
From - Raslan Harid
SUB - Infos.

15-4-2000

Sir,

Be informed that we have
succeeded in getting a newly build house
along the So Kenenba Highway. The price
for the house is ~~800~~ 300 US dollars with
four bed rooms and one Carpark. It is modern
house with Self Contained. ~~The ~~price~~ amount~~
is ~~for a period of one year~~.

Sir, the offer of the house has made
me to understand that the deadline for
the payment is Monday 17th April 2000 as the
demand for the house is too great.

Sir I am therefore seeking your advise.
Best regards to you Sir

Signed Raslan Harid
15/4/2000

TO - BRIG ISSAH H. SESAY
FM - COL MARTIN BABOON
SUB - INFOS,

DATE - 17th 04 2000.

SIR,

FOR YOUR INFOS, A LETTER WAS RECEIVED FROM THE DISTRICT OFFICER KOINADUGU DISTRICT, KABALA. ADDRESSED TO THE KANSONGO CIDOM SPEAKER, CALLING ON THE KANSONGO CIDOM SPEAKER TO SEE THE D.O. KOINADUGU DISTRICT ON ~~THAT~~ MONDAY 1st MAY 2000, IN THE MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, GOVT WHARF PRETORIA, ~~BELOW~~ FOR THE DISCUSSION PERTAINING CIDOM MATTERS. BUT ACCORDING TO INFOS RECEIVED HERE, THE KANSONGO CIDOM SPEAKER WILL BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY WHEN HE ARRIVES IN FITOHA

BECAUSE, THE KANSONGO CIDOM COMMITTEE, FADUGU HAS WRITTEN A LETTER OF PROTEST TO PRESIDENT A.T. KARBIA FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A REGENT CHIEF IN FITOHA FOR KANSONGO CIDOM, WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION OF THE CIDOM AUTHORITIES.

AS RUMOURS ARE CIRCULATING ~~THAT~~ IN AND OUT OF THE CIDOM THAT A MANDINGO MAN NAMED ALHAJI ABU BAKARR HAVE BEEN APPOINTED AS REGENT CHIEF, WITHOUT GOING THROUGH THE CUSTOMARILY LAW AND USAGE, AS ESTABLISHED IN SECTION 72. ONE ~~AS~~ FOLLOWING THE (i) 1991 CONSTITUTION AND TOTALLY DISREGARD THE VOICE OF THE CIDOM AUTHORITIES IN KANSONGO CIDOM INTENDED TO

CREAT DISUNITY AMONG
THE CHIEFDOM PEOPLE WHO
HAVE STARTED ENJOYING
RELATIVES AND QUIETNESS
IN THE CHIEFDOM.

IN VIEW OF THIS, I
HAVE DECIDED FOR THE CLDOM
SPEAKER NOT TO ATTEND
TO YOUR CALL, UNTIL I
CONTACT YOU FOR NECESS
ARY ADVICE.

ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS
STANDING BY FOR ^{YOUR} QUICK
RESPOND.

MONITORED MSG FROM CIS
WINTER.

(Signature)
Operator 2000.

TO - BRIG ISSAH H. SESAY.
FM - ALIE WARATAY CIDOM
COM.

SUB - INFOS

DATE 17TH 04 2000.

SIR,

AS PER INSTRUCTION, WE ARE
READY TO PROCEED TO FREETOWN,
AS INSTRUCTED BY THE LEADER,
ON HIS LAST VISIT TO SEGB
EMA.

SIR, YOUR ARE TO ADVICE
ON THE TRANSPORTATION ISSUE.
FILM REGARD. SIGNED.

M/MSG

(Signature)
Operator 2000.

FM - THE LEADER,
TO - COL RASHID SANDI,
SUB - RESPONSE,

DATE - 19TH 04 2000.

YOUR MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED,
AND CONTENT WELL UNDERSTOOD.
I THANK YOU VERY MUCH IN-
DEED FOR A JOB WELL DONE.
I WILL BE ON THE LISTEN
OUT TO RECEIVE FURTHER DEV-
ELOPMENT FROM THE MEETING

PLEASE INFORM ME, IF -
J.R. KURUMA ATTENDED TO.
THIS MEETING. GIVE MY THANKS
AND APPRECIATION TO THE
CHAIRMAN, THE SECRETARY,
AND ALL THE PARTY MEM-
BERS. MAY GOD BLESS US
ALL. BECD

TIME FIELD *Approved*
4: 39 PM. *19th* *04* 2000.

SIGNED
COL RASHID SANDI

TO - THE LEADER,
FM - LT COL HAKIS P. MOMOH,
SUB - SITUATIONS

DATE - 19th - 04 - 2000.

SIR, THE DISARMAMENT
FIGURE, AS FROM THE 10th -
04 2000, IS NOW FOUR HUND
RED AND TWENTY (420),
BUT THE DISARMAMENT IS
STILL GOING ON.

SIR, YOU WILL BE FURNISH
WITH MORE INFORMATION, AS
IT IS STILL CONTINUING. WE
HAVE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGH
TY UNARMED MEN, PRESENTLY
DEPLOYED WITH US.
M/MSG

Approved
19th *04* 2000.

FM - THE LEADER,
TO - COL RASHID SANDI,
SUB - RESPONSE,
DATE - 20th 04 2000.

REF TO YOUR MSG
WHOLLY ACKNOWLEDGED. BUT -
CONFIRM HOW YOU WERE
RECEIVED. BY THE PEOPLE,
AS COMPARE TO MY VISIT
LAST. I THANK YOU ALL -
FOR YOUR HARD WORK.
THE TIME OF THE BARREL
IS NOW OVER. WE ARE
NOW TO EMBARK TO PO

LITICS WITHOUT BLOOD SHED
FIRM REGARD.
SIGNED

RECD

[Signature]
operator.
28th 24 2000.

FM - THE LEADER.
TO - COL RASHID SANDI,

DATE - 21st 04 2000.

YOUR MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED. BUT I STILL WANT
~~THE~~ YOU TO CONFIRM TO ME
THE RECEIPTION FROM THE CIVILIANS,
UPON THE ARRIVAL OF J. P. KOROMA,
VICE PRESIDENT AND OTHER SIGNATORIES
AS COMPARE TO MY LAST VISIT. RESPOND IS
HIGHLY NEEDED, REGARD. SIGNED

RECD

[Signature]
operator.

21st 04 2000.

COL RASH.

FM - MAJ SHEKU COOMBE,
TO - THE REGIONAL C.M.C.
NORTH.

SUB - INCREASE OF MEMBERSHIP
DATE - 21st 04 2000.

• YOU ARE TO EXPECT THE
FOLLOWING PERSONNELS, UPON
THE ^{LEADERS} DIRECTIVE, FOR REGIONAL
C.M.C. OPERATION.

1. LT COL MONICA PEARSON,
2. COL FODAY K. LANSANA,
3. MAJ PATRICK MATIA,

FROM NUMBER ONE (1) TO
THREE (3) ARE TO DEPLOY TO
NORTH SOUTH AND EAST RESPECTIVELY.
M/MSG

[Signature]
operator.

21st 04 2000.

TIME 5:45 PM.

SIR, PRESENTLY, THEIR REINFORCEMENT IS EN-ROUTE TO MY POINT FROM MARSHALL POINT.

TO CONCLUDE, ACCORDING TO THEM THEY WILL USE FORCE TO DISARM US, AND THEIR NUMBER IS INCREASING.

SIR, WE NEED YOUR ADVICE ON THIS ISSUE. REGARD SIGNED,

TO - BAIG, ISSAH H. SESAY
FM - CO MARTIN GEORGE
SUB - COMPREHENSIVE SITUATION REPORT.

DATE: 3RD 05 2000.

SIR,
AT AROUND 9:00 HRS
YESTERDAY, THE MILOB COMMANDER MET ME AT MY HOUSE AND TOLD ME THAT WE MUST PREPARE TO DISARM. I RESPOND TO HIM NO AND HE RETURN UPON

TO - BAIG ISSAH H. SESAY INFOS
THE LEADER,
FM - CO MARTIN GEORGE,
SUB - COMPREHENSIVE SITUATION REPORT.

DATE - 3RD 05 2000.

SIR,

AT AROUND 9:00 HRS
YESTERDAY, THE MILOB COMMANDER MET ME AT MY HOUSE, AND TOLD ME THAT WE MUST PREPARE TO DISARM, ON THE 02 05 2000. I RESPONDED TO HIM NO AND HE RETURNED TO THE CAMP.

THE FOLLOWING MORNING, ALL COMMANDERS AND SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE (INBATT UN-AMSIK) AND MILOB MET US AGAIN AND TOLD US THAT THEY HAVE COME TO START DISARMAMENT.

SIR, DUE TO THE PREVAILING SITUATION IN THE

NORTH AND TO AVOID CONFRONTATION ON THIS SIDE. WE DECIDED TO ARREST ALL OF THEM, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING.

1. 15 MILOBS
2. 9 INBATI UNAMSIL
3. 8 VEHICLES, ONE WITH RADIO SET
4. 1 VIDEO CAMERA
5. 10 HAND SETS (MOTOR ROLLER)
6. 1 VHF BASE RADIO SET
7. 1 SATELLITE PHONE.

ALSO WE ARRESTED A HELICOPTER WITH (4) CREWS AND (2) CIVILIANS. SIR, SITUATION IS RELATIVELY CALM AS AT NOW.

STANDING BY FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION. BEST REGARD.
RECD
SIGNED

[Signature]
3rd
05
OPT. 2000.

TO - THE LEADER,
FM - BRIG ISSAH H. SESAY,
SUB - INFOS
DATE - 3RD 05 2000.

SIR,

I HAVE RECEIVED AN INFOS THAT, THE UN. PEACE KEEPING FORCE HAVE TAKEN A LONG BYPASS FOR 91 THROUGH MARGAS, 1 FOR MY LOCATION. (MAG. WITH (15) FIFTEEN VEHICLE

I HAVE GONE THERE TO PUT SITUATION UNDER CONTROL, IN THE BEST WAY POSSIBLE.
BEST REGARD. SIGNED.

FM - THE LEADER,
TO - BRIG ISSAH H. SESAY,
SUB - INSTRUCTION,
DATE - 3RD 05 2000.

YOU ARE TO MAKE SURE THAT ALL PROPERTIES BELONGING TO N.G.O.'S

IN MAICENT, MAGIBUMARA,
AND KAILAHUN SHOULD BE
RETURN IMMEDIATELY.
ALL ITEMS IN THEIR PRE-
MISES, VEHICLES AND COMM-
UNICATION EQUIPMENT SHOU-
LD BE RETURNED TO THEM
IMMEDIATELY.

IF ANY OF THEM (N.G.O'S)
WANT TO RETURN ^{over} TO FREE-
TOWN, SHOULD BE FREE
PASSAGE. WE ARE DOING
THIS BECAUSE OF OUR PEO-
PLE NOT TO SUFFER IN
THE MERE FUTURE.

AM KINDLY ASKING YOU
TO TALK TO THE MEN TO
RETURN ALL PROPERTIES
BELONGING TO THEM.
RECD OTT: SIGNED

(Signature)
3rd 05 2000.

SIDE.

RECD ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS
SIGNED

(Signature)
4th 05 2000.

FM - THE LEADER,
FOR - THE COMMANDER IN CHARGE
INFOS BRIG ISSAH H. SESAY
SUB - INSTRUCTION.

DATE - 4th 05 2000.

YOU ARE TO GIVE FREE
PASSAGE TO M.S.F. HOLLAND
AND A.C.F. PERSONNELS (N.G.O'S)
TO TRAVEL TO FREETOWN.

YOU ARE TO PROVIDE ESCORT
FOR THE TO LUNBAR OR GBE
RAY JUNCTION, WHERE THEIR PEO-
PLE WILL GO AND RECEIVE -
THEM FROM EITHER LOCATION.

RECD
(Signature)
4th 05 2000.
SIGNED

TIME: 9: 00 (4:35 P.M.)

FM - THE LEADER,
TO BRIG ISSAH H. SESAY
INFOS ALL STATIONS,
DATE - 3RD 04 2000.
THE UNAMSIL FIELD COMM-
ANDER HAVE COME UP THE
AIR ON RADIO FRANCE INTER-
NATIONAL, THAT THEY ARE GOING
TO USE FORCE TO DISARM US
ALL AND THIS WILL BE EFF-
CTIVE TOMORROW.

MAY GOD BLESS US ALL.
BEST REGARD. SIGNED

BECD

OPN.
Moutou

FM - THE LEADER,
TO - BRIG ISSAH INFOS ALL
STATIONS,

4TH - 05 - 2000.
FOR YOUR INFORMATION, I
HAVE BEEN CUT OFF FROM
INTERNATIONAL LINE, IN TEAM
OF OUT SIDE CONTACT.

I CAN ONLY RECEIVE FROM
OUT SIDE.

FIRM REGARD. SIGNED

AK
05
2000
Moutou

TO: SP infors The Leader
From: Emmanuel Sout
Sub: infors Date: 05-05-2000

Sir,

As per instruction I have
arrived at Freetown to talk to the
UNAMSIL contingents that were
deployed in the township, but
unfortunately when leaving out (Zombid
have already left. I have found out
that many civilians have died, but
I have talked to many of them
to return to their homes.

We met one UNAMSIL officer
(Chigerson) we are now working
hard in Freetown talking to the
population and getting information
in clear channel.

To - The Leader
From - Col. Rashid
Sub - Situation Report

5-5-2000

Sir,

Reference to the ongoing situation between UNKASIS and our brothers, you are to be informed ^{all} that people are planning to execute ~~the~~ RUF members who are on the ground (BO). But the breacher Rogers has taken an over before them that the people of Bo Town will not get any confrontation from the RUF.

In the light of the above, I have even decided to go over the Kiss ID4 Radio and really give them the clear picture of the whole Schemish and that situations will come under Complete Control.


Best regard and greetings to you Sir.

To! Mr. Jackson Swartney
From! Mr. Raina B. Nyawhen
Subj! Infos.

Sir,
With the situation between the UNKASIS and our men to north has avoid the entire once in BO and as such, is a plan to victimise our P. member living in BO. Th an intelligent source received from our informants.


Best Regards

Signed 



21) Radio Log Book Communication #5

WALSLEY'S NOTE BOOK



Date - 4-4-2000

To - The Leader
From - Col. Rashid

Sub - Situation Report.
Sir

Be informed that I have managed to get an old battery which the Radio Set is presently using.


Secondly Sir I have met with the party chairman for the District and some other district party authorities. As a result I have decided to hold a meeting with all party members ~~to~~ on Thursday 6 April 2000. The out come of the meeting shall be revealed to you through the Secretary General of the party.

My only major problem for now is lodging issue for me and my men on the ground. With regards to the issue of Mr Joseph Manku, we have started taking the move as we made a trip to the area today to confirm things with

~~Some~~ Some authentic concern.

Further details shall be revealed to you later.

My best regards and greetings all.

Signed


Time transmitted
3:50 P.M.

R.U.F.P.

Fm - The Leader,


To - Mr. Rashid Sandy,

SUB - Response,

DATE - 5th 04 - 2000.


you are to lace with Mr. Ahaji Rogers for the house affairs, as preliminary discussion had been held between us.

you are to emphasize on this to them, for them to make it possible. And the house should be located at the out skirt of the town, for any reason. Best regard. Signed
Recd


Operator
5th 04
2000.

Co Rashid Sandy.

Time recd. 2:30 PM


Regional RUF Party
Representative South.

FM - THE CHAIRMAN R.U.P./SL.

TO - ALL COMMANDERS,

SUB - DIRECTIVE,

DATE - 6th - 04 - 2000.

ALL COMMANDERS ARE TO IMPLEMENT THIS INSTRUCTION OR MEMORANDUM.

1. ALL SENIOR AND JUNIOR OFFICERS ARE TO MOVE TO THE BARRACKS AND STAY THERE EFFECTIVE NOW.

NO HARASSMENT OF CIVILIANS SHOULD ^{AND} BE ENCOURAGED.

3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS SHOULD BE CORDIAL AT ALL TIME.

4. ALL LAID RULES AND REGULATIONS IN VIEW OF THE COME TO GO PEACE ACCORD MUST BE

RESPECTED BY ALL PERSONNEL

5. ALL COMMANDERS SHOULD BE THE WELFARE OF THEIR MEN

6. ALL OFFICERS SHOULD SUBMIT REPORTS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES TO THE LEADER WITHIN 72 HRS.

7. ALL SENIOR AND JUNIOR OFFICERS SHOULD CO-OPERATE AND WORK HAND IN HAND WITH THE COMMANDER ON THE GROUND.

8. ALL SOLDIERS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM IMPERSONATION AND UNMILITARY CONDUCT.

9. ALL COMMANDERS SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE AND ACCOUNTABLE FOR ALL ACTIONS WITHIN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Mr Mambu is also embarking on his operation. I will brief you in person upon my arrival in Free Town for better understanding.

Much regard and greetings to you Sir.

Signed Jmg and
14/4/2000

FM - The Leaders

TO - Mr. Hashid Sandi,

SUBS - Responses

DATE - 14th 04 2000.

You are not to come. I will be at your point very shortly.

ALSO you are to prepare and attend a peace conference in Bo with the other brothers from the 18th

to 22nd of April 2000.
UPON my arrival, the other house issues and all other issues will be (discuss) solve.

Accept for your info and acknowledgement.

REC'D Time 11:49 AM

Return for
14th - 4 - 2000

FM Hashid Sandi

to - The Leader

from - Mr Hashid Sandi

Sub - Information

Sir,

Be informed that at around 12.45 pm this afternoon, Mr Mambu, the radio operator and myself were invited to the police station by both UNAMSIL and police officers with the pretext that my beam on the ground was not up to their knowledge. I made them to understand that our staying in town

is up to the knowledge of ^{both} ~~the~~ the resident Minister did the Commissioner of police South. They still insist that they should take us to the police station for confirmation.

Sir, upon arrival at the police station, statements were obtained from the three of us. At the end, I made the UNAMSIL Commander in charge to understand that I came with a legal document signed by you to both the Commissioner and the Resident Minister South. The UNAMSIL Commander later talked to us peacefully and gave us a vehicle to take us back home.

Sir, the idea behind the whole show was a political maceration to suppress us from our operation. But we will not relent to

perform our duty together with the chairman and other ~~disputed~~ party executive members. The district chairman, the public relations officer and others were all invited for confirmation. But we were all release later to come back home safely.

Best regard to you Sir.

Sigrid J. M.
L. 11/11/2003

Date 15. 11. 2003


To: The Director
From: Mr. Keshig Samuel
Sub - Supers

Sir, Be informed that the CCP workshops for all ex-combatants scheduled

in So Town was officially opened yesterday despite the absence of all the stake holders and some Commanders who were to attend the workshop.

Sir, on the side of the RUF Col. Lawrence Womandia Mysey, the chairman for the District and the Secretary were all part of the meeting we are to continue the workshop today at 8.30 am.

Further details will be revealed later.
Best regard to you Sir

Signed

J. P. Koromia

FM - THE LEADER,
TO - MR. HASHID SANDI,
SUB - RESPONSE,


DATE - 19th 04 2000.

YOUR MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED AND CONTENT WELL UNDERSTOOD. I THANK YOU VERY MUCH ^{INDEED} FOR A JOB WELL DONE.

I WILL BE ON THE LISTEN OUT TO RECEIVE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT FROM THE MEETING. PLEASE INFORM ME, IF J. P. KOROMIA ATTENDED THE MEETING.

GIVE MY THANKS AND APPRECIATION TO THE CHAIRMAN, THE SECRETARY, AND ALL THE PARTY MEMBERS.
MAY GOD BLESS US ALL.

RECD,
SIGNED


operator
19th 04 2000

HASHID SANDI

To - Mr. Sheku Comber
FM - Mr. Mohamed Sowah,
Sub - Security Information,
DATE 19th OH 2000.

Site

The people of Bo
town have not yet agree
to the peace signed from
home (Togo) they are pre-
tending that they want
peace ~~in~~ in Sierra Leone.
But it is a big lie. It
is just a white teeth black
heart, against R.U.F. per-
sonels in Bo. To inform
you Kamajors in Bo most
of their weapon are not
going to be in a hidden
place for the election
In case the election goes
through and it happen

ed for R.U.F./SL to win or
lost the election, they will
use the weapons kept again.
st R.U.F. so it is a big
threate for any R.U.F. per-
sonel in Bo. Especially for
a place of town like Watt
nu Jong, Dpyehuns Konte
and their surrounding villages.
This problems is caused by
things Norrom, who is the
head for the Kamajors.

The disarmament should have
started first week in April
2000, but the commanders are
very stubborn to bring in
their men with weapon to dis-
armed, the Kamajors are pro-
dy saying that they will
never forgive any R.U.F./SL. But
to revenge secretly. They all

the time cost the blame
on the A.M.F. that they
don't want to disarm. These
people want but to disarm
and later caused problem on
them by ~~then~~ taken all
weapons from the brothers.

Since we arrived in Bo
no disarmament have taken
place yet, in Bo. They are
playing games. And even one
of the UAMSIA team ~~leader~~
leader said, no CMC don't
have any business with the
disarmament. He is called Lt
COL VASILYOT VLADIMIR.

Sir, The above mentioned
one the present situation on
the ground. Thanks in -
evidence. Firm regard. Signed
Capt. Sonah M.

19th 04 2000.

TO - THE LEADER,
FM - COL BASHID SANDI,
SUB - REPORT,
DATE - 20th 04 2000.

Sir,

BE INFORMED THAT
J.P. KOSOMA, VICE PRESIDENT
DEMBU, THE UN AMBA. TH
TO SIERRA LEONE AM.
AMBASSADOR TO SIERRA
AND THE UNAMSIA F.
COMMANDER, ALL AFTER
THE CONFERENCE YESTERDAY.
J.P. KOSOMA SPOKE KENYHTA
ABOUT THE NEED TO ATTAIN
PEACE NOW IN SIERRA LEONE
AND FURTHER PLEADED TO THE
PEOPLE OF BO TOWN TO -
FORGIVE ALL COMBATANTS FOR
WHATEVER DESTRUCTION CAUSED
IN THE PAST NINE (9) YEARS

WAR.

THE WHOLE CONFERENCE WAS CHAIRED BY THE UN AMBASSADOR TO SL. WHALE VICE PRESIDENT - DEMBY HAD TO STRESS MORE ON THE NEED TO DISARM SO AS TO CREAT A NEW ARMY FOR SILEONE, BEFORE THE FORIH COMING GENERAL ELECTION.

SIR, BELOW ^{LISTED} ARE SOME OF THE MAJOR KEY ISSUES WE PRESENTED TO THE C.C.P AS FACTORS DELAYING THE PEACE PROCESS ON BEHALF OF THE B.U.F.P., ABOUT THE LOME PEACE ACCORD.

1. ARTICLE III SUB SECTION FOUR (4)

2. ARTICLE IV (4)

3. " VIII (8)

4. " XVI (16)

5. ARTICLE XVII (12)

SIR, MENTIONED ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE PRESS. THE PRESS SHOULD BE NEUTRAL, THEY SHOULD BE OBJECTIVE IN THEIR DUTIES. THEY SHOULD LEARN TO DESIST FROM CHECKBOOK JOURNALISM AND REPORT OBJECTIVELY ON THE TRUTH. THIS CAN HELP THE SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. THAT THEY SHOULD AVIOD FAVORITISM, NEPOTISM, TRIBALISM AND ALL THE ISMS.

WE ALSO MENTIONED ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE N.G.O'S WITH REGARD

TO BELIEF SUPPLIES
BEHIND THE B.U.F.R. CONT
ROLLED AREAS.

FURTHER MENTIONED
WAS MADE ABOUT THE CIVIL-
ILIENANCES OF THE CIVIL-
IANS POPULACE WHICH
SERVE AS THREATS TO
THE EX-COMBATANTS. TO
CONCLUDE SIRS WE ALSO
APPROACHED THE D.O.R.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY -
ABOUT HIS OPERATION.

AND THAT HE NEEDS
TO IMPROVE THE LIVING
CONDITION OF THE MEN
IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
DEMORILIZATION CAMPS.
FIAM REGARD. SIGN

COL HASANID.

20 - 4 - 2000

To The Leader
From - Col. Rasheed.
Sub - Information.

Sir,

With regards to your
enquiry pertaining the way we were
retired by the people, you are to
be informed that the reception was
very much Corical. All the wearing
facings which includes RUF, C.A.R and
EX-S.I.A had to embrace one another.
We have even decided to play a
foot ball match tomorrow followed by
a discodance to show a sign of
unity among the various groups.

The C.A.R have really despised that
they should no more be used by
any body to fight against their brothers
as they are ready for peace.

Secondly Sir I have also received
three other letters from Katakam

to be part of the workshop.

They are (1) Major Albert Mustafaga,
2. Capt. Star James, S. Capt. Martha
Peika.

Sir, we have to meet again tomorrow
wherein we have really decided to
put forward the problems of the
Ex-combatants ~~to~~ on the ground to
the C.O.P for necessary action.
my best regard to you Sir.

MSG passed. Signed Jim
Time: 01:30 AM
and
J.M.

To - The Leader 23-4-2002
From - Col. Rashid Saadi
Sub - Report.
Sir

Be informed that we have
gone through the workshop with

Sarntem (17) Resolutions which I believe
Col Lawrence, wondering as the team
leader for our delegation will submit
a copy of the Resolution to you for
better understanding.

Sir, the Chairman for party in Bo
District and myself have serious political
issues to discuss with you in person and
moreover, the logging and living condition
is also a great problem facing us.

In light of the above Sir, we are still
inishing that we meet you for better
understanding. I have also received
Capt. H. M. Katar as one of the radio
operators for C.P.S.Hi.

Best regard as I am anticipating
for your advise.

Transmitted

Time 10:04 AM.

Signed Jim

and
23/4/2002

over all S.S.B. Cam

To Acom / Infos the leader
FM The leader operators.
SUB Report.

DATE - 28th 04 2000.

Sir,

Be informed that,
myself and Ibrahim were
again arrested at ^{around} 12:00hrs
this afternoon. This includes
the radio set, solar panel,
battery, code, and all the
important documents were
taken to the police Sta-
tion.


Upon our arrival at the
Station, they went through
all documents that was
taken from me teacher.
Therefore, the code, and
all frequencies are no
longer safe for ^{our} commu-
nication purpose.

accessing

After investigation, we were
released back home. They
also returned all properties
that were arrested from
us. Sir, the continuous arrest
of the RUF members is
a more or less a threate
to the party in ISO.

Sir, I need your urgent
advice on both the continuous arrest
and the issue ^{as we have received the model} against Monday
a without fail. Thankz.

Yours regards
Operator.



22) Radio Log Book communication – Miscellaneous on paper

Series of radio transmissions between Sam Bockarie, Foday Sankoh and “Blackguards”
15-16 October 1999

To/Concord
From/The Black Guards (Makeni)
Subj/ Infos

15th October, 1999.

Sir,

Since the arrival of Superman, Brigadier I. H. Sesay and Brigadier Morris Kallon in Makeni township, there is no cordial relationship between them. Therefore sir, we are asking you to give advice.

But for now, the township of Makeni is yet calm.

Rec. by Opt. Pascal.

Time: 15:17 hours

From/Concord
To / Time Bomb Infos SSS & Super-~~Star~~
Subj/ Instruction

15th October, 1999.

By my directive, you are to cooperate with SSS to work as one body to pursue the enemies as far as Okro Hills and keep your defensive at mile 38.

You are to by pass Okro Hills and set ambush between Okro Hills and mile 38 first before attacking Okro Hills.

Accept info for your quick action.

Transmitted by Opt. Bashiru

Time: 10:54 pm.

To/ Concord
From/ S S S
Subj/ Infos

16th October, 1999.

Sir,

Since I arrived at Makeni on the 14th of this month as per instruction given to me by the leader that I should take over command of the Northern Region, I have been facing series of problems.

Firstly, Col. Issac visited Magboroka on the 13th October, 1999 and after very fruitful discussion, he returned back to Makeni with assurance that he will receive me 3 (three) miles out of the township. As I came with some Senior Officers but we were not welcome by any of the RUF/SL High Command here in Makeni. This cause me to originate message to the effect and you advise me to exercise patient.

Yesterday, various groups of dancers came to welcome me at the Barrack's where all my men were based, and deployed. It was during the dancing that we heard serious automatic firing and bombaroment in the township. The civilians have to run for better protection of their lives. This cause a great tense of security alarm among our mist, and for security purpose I instructed Col. Bai Bureh to go and check on the security check up. We reported back to me that it is Super-Man and the SLA brothers fighting among themselves. I gave strong instruction to my men to take deployment within the barracks. Later on, Superman Radio contacted my station that I should remain calm so that he will put situation under control. But the fighting continue up till this morning and some intelligent report received that the men have retreated out of the township and regrouped to attack the township of Makeni.

I have sent Brigadier Kallon and some Senior Officers to meet Super-Man and Col. Issac to find out the problem. I am awaiting them for their salute report. I will funish you with all other details on the security situation as things are yet unholding.

Rec. by Opt. Marcus
Time: 18:29 hours

From/Concord
 To/ S S S
 Subj/Instruction

16th October, 1999.

By the directive of the Leader, sparrow is to return to Magboroka and let Col. Bai Bureh work with you. Make sure that Superman and others take all instructions from you. Moreover, Nyah is to report to Freetown and wait for the Leader.

Transmitted by Opt. Pascal
 Time 21: 20 hours

To/ Smile
 From/ Brigadier Superman
 Subj/ Comprehensive Report

16th October, 1999.

Sir,

Reference to my last message or letter to you expressing my concern over the in-friendly security atmosphere that prevail within Lunsar, Makeni as well as Kamakwe Axis whilst I was away. I came down to see how best I can hurriedly curtail almost all such unforeseen securities circumstances which I believe if not properly addressed by me at this material point in time can interfere with the detail's of the Peace Accord on which you are one of the signatories upon my arrival in Makeni on the 14th-10th October, 1999, I urgently decided to summon Senior Officers meeting with the brothers in arm. I left on the ground but it was later agreed that this kind of meeting being post poned to the next date 15th - 10th October, 1999. An Official letter was circulated to ensure the full participation of Senior Officers concerned.

Unfortunately the meeting didn't take the shape, myself and the other officers were expecting as all those Senior Officers exected particulally the ex SLA to attend such a vilable meeting to turn up on the stipulated period of time.

Unanimous decision by other Senior Officers with me in the forum was taken to ensure

that we get in touch with Regional Commander Respectively. In the event just about the time my man power approach the round about (P.Z.) Col. T.M. Yamba (Regional Commander) and Col. Bakarr (Brigade Commander) all of Ex-SLA opened suppressive firing against my man power hence ensued between both party only to save one live's. Eventually, my man power were very strong enough to repeled their combatants at the distance afar. Of course our Revolutionary Brtohers (RUF/SL) from teko Barracks join the moping up operation to help by putting the situation under perfect control.

What seemed to be rampant looting of civilian properties by the same brothers under the commander ship of Brigadier Moris Kallon.

SUGGESTIONS

I therefore would like to advice from this point that in good interest of everlasting peace in this country, you endeavour to further instruct our brothers who came from Kailahun Axis through Kono to go back to their normal location as my prensence in the environment is quite sufficient to calm all other unusual securities habit which wouldn't be in the pleasant image of our movement especially when all are watching us.

I am personally informing you from this point on the ground that this infos can guide you to give further confidential to all other rarastatals, N.G.Os as well as the wivilians populace to feel trouble free from any intimidation. With my presence on the ground all other securities issue are put under control accordingly as a way of restoring sanity to the civilians populace.

Only that who soever is ready and willing to take my standing order with in our leberated zone (Northern Region) will be allow to work us amicably until the combatants finally see you on the ground sir.

I think I can better meet the committment of beefing up the security potential of this environment more than any other commander as I have strong confidence in the neutral relationship that had existed between me and the civilians as well as the combatants I left on the ground. The main reason while I'm advicing on the such withdrawal of this troop is

that I want to personally avoid arm conflict with the brothers who would like to infiltrate my area of control with in discipline. The loyal combatant and myself are better-in place to creat an atmosphere of convinient for both the combatants and especially the civil populace within our area of responsibility sir. Accept for your infos and strep speedy advice. Received by operator: Murphy
Time: 16:25 hours.

From/ Smile
To: Super-Man
Sunj: Directive

16th - 10th October, 1999.

Reference to your message acknowledge. But you are to call me on the Radio for further instruction.

Transmitted by Opt. Murphy
Time: 17:43 hours

23) United Nations Document

UNOMSIL

Human Rights Assessment Mission to Freetown, 25 January 1999 and 1 to 4
February 1999, Finding and Recommendations

UNOMSIL

HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSEMENT MISSION TO FREETOWN

25 JANUARY AND 1 TO 4 FEBRUARY 1999

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998 and 1220 (1999) of 12 January, 1999, the Human Rights Section of UNOMSIL was instructed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to conduct an investigation mission in Freetown (hereinafter, "the mission"). The mission occurred on 25 January and from 1 to 4 February. The mission sought to assess the nature and extent of violations and/or abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law perpetrated in the period since the rebel offensive on the city on 6 January 1999.

The mission was tasked with an assessment of the actions of all relevant actors in the light of applicable law. For purposes of this report applicable law is considered to include, inter-alia, the Geneva Conventions, including Common Article 3, customary and other non-conventional international human rights law, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (all these instruments have been ratified by Sierra Leone).

Practices detailed in the report are referred to on the basis that they indicate violations, on the one hand, or abuse (i.e. actions which do not technically constitute violations), on the other, of international standards. Almost all such practices impugn or are inconsistent with multiple conventional and non-conventional standards. Accordingly, the report does not itemise the applicable legal provisions.

The report does not name victims, witnesses or alleged perpetrators. Some names or pseudonyms are on file with UNOMSIL. UNOMSIL is also in possession of or has access to documentary and photographic evidence of abusive activities.

MISSION ACTIVITIES

I. ADVANCE ACTIVITIES

Prior to the conducting of the mission, and during the period intervening between the two visits to Freetown, UNOMSIL interviewed some 35 persons, including religious and civil society leaders, who had left Freetown since January 6. These included former captives of the rebels, as well as witnesses to abusive activities of various armed forces. UNOMSIL also, to the extent possible, maintained contact with persons remaining in Freetown. Information was also provided on a regular basis by persons returning from brief visits to the city - including UNOMSIL personnel, UN agency staff and representatives of the NGO community.

II. FREETOWN PROGRAMME

The mission travelled throughout the city, visiting locations from Laka, in the Southwest, to Calaba Town in the East. Sites of incidents were visited and an overview of property damage was undertaken. Members of the mission also witnessed the perpetration of grave violations of human rights, including the right to life (see below).

Meetings were held with some 100 persons, including victims and witnesses of abusive behaviour, Government and ECOMOG officials, civil society and religious leaders, representatives of the human rights and humanitarian NGO communities, national staff of UNOMSIL and UN agencies, journalists and medical personnel. Information and views were also provided by CDF and Civil Defence Unit (CDU) personnel, medical patients, police officers and business people. The local print and broadcast media was surveyed on a daily basis.

The mission benefited from information and support provided by UNOMSIL military personnel and a UN Security Assessment Team, which were also present in Freetown during the mission dates.

III. FOLLOW UP ACTIVITIES

Following its return to Guinea, the team continued to interview persons arriving in Conakry from Freetown. Findings based on these interviews are taken account of in this report.

12/22

FINDINGS

I. REBEL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONFLICT AND THE HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY

Ultimate responsibility for the fighting, most civilian casualties and the related humanitarian emergency in Freetown rests with the rebel forces. It was the rebel forces who undertook the assault on the city and who persisted in resisting ECOMOG, thereby extending the period of fighting and destruction within an area densely populated with civilians.

The actual number of civilian casualties will never be known. One mortuary worker in Freetown stated on 25 January that over 2,000 bodies of men, women and children had already been disposed of. Observers are also of the view that a large number of bodies remain in ruined or burned buildings in the centre and east of the city. Many others have been hastily buried on waste ground or in residential compounds. Multiple reports have also been received of bodies floating in the sea and its inlets within the city, as well as on the beaches. The mission observed some body parts remaining on beaches and other locations. Most estimates put the total casualty figure conservatively at between 3 and 5,000, including up to 1,000 rebel fighters and an unknown number of ECOMOG and CDF combatants.

It is difficult to assess the extent of damage done to civilian properties. In the city centre up to 20% of the property stock may be seriously damaged. In the east the figure rises to up to 90% at locations such as Calaba Town. (See further below)

The rebel campaign, including its terrorisation elements, caused the displacement of at least 150,000 people into the city, before, during and since the battle for Freetown. The displacement has been responsible for an exacerbation of the humanitarian emergency (see the Humanitarian Plan of Action for Sierra Leone, February 1999) and the exposure of still greater numbers of civilians to conflict-related risk.

It should also be observed that abusive behaviour of rebel forces (see below) as well as the ongoing threat which they pose to Freetown form part of the background to the current perpetration by ECOMOG and CDF forces of unacceptable acts (see below)

II. KILLING OF CIVILIANS BY REBEL FORCES

Rebel forces advancing into the and through the city on 6 and 7 January frequently forced civilians into the streets for use as human shields. People who refused to comply were either killed or had their properties destroyed. Many reports have also been received of the killing of persons who refused to obey instructions to dance and make music on the streets. A number of interviewees describe the execution of the entire populations of residential compounds for such misdemeanours. There are reports of compounds housing up to 50 people being targeted in this manner. Similar reports indicate that then and later people were executed because of their efforts to deter looting and to protect family members from assault or rape (see below). Persons caught attempting to escape from rebel custody were frequently killed. One witness saw six children killed at Wellington in mid-January in one such incident.

Much of the killing also seems to have been entirely arbitrary. Witnesses report such killings of men, women and children by rebel fighters, including an instance in which the perpetrator is stated to have been about ten years old, and another implicating an eight year old boy. It is frequently stated that perpetrators of such acts were under the influence of cocaine and other drugs, including alcohol. Killing occasionally occurred in the context of games in which people were lined up and the executioners teasingly chose who to kill and who to spare. In one such incident at Fourah Bay Road, around 21 January, three children were executed and their three sisters had limbs amputated or mutilated (see below). One man has described how he was ordered to choose between the execution of his entire family and the surrender of his daughter to a rebel fighter.

Some of those who were burned to death in their homes had been locked in or first been disabled by gunshot. A number of elderly people and infants also died in this manner. Others died while attempting to jump from burning buildings or after being shot while attempting to escape. One five-year-old girl survived being thrown into a fire at Blackhall Road on 28 January. A six-year-old girl was executed, together with her mother, on 23 January, at Wellington.

Rebel forces targeted many individuals and categories of person for execution. It is reported that over 200 police officers were killed, either at home or at their barracks in such locations as CID headquarters, Kingtom and Kissy. The means of execution included knives, machete and gunshot. One incident, on January 6, at the city-centre Cotton Tree, involved the killing by stabbing of eleven policemen. A number of prison officials appear to have been killed during and after the assault on Pademba Road Prison on 6 January.

An escapee from Pademba Road is reported to have allegedly led an attack on the Solicitor General, who was killed and decapitated. Two senior Government officials, the Resident Minister for the North and an Advisor to the President, were captured and killed. At least two journalists were sought out and killed

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(while other journalists, including foreign nationals, though not specifically targeted, were killed, injured or abducted).

A senior member of the human rights monitoring committees of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR) was killed together with her husband. They had been apprehended after a servant of theirs was tortured into revealing their whereabouts. Prior to her killing, the female victim, a diabetic, was denied access to her insulin medication. Commissioners of the NCDHR and leaders of Human Rights NGOs report that they successfully evaded attempts by rebels to locate and most-likely kill them. A group of senior human rights NGO officers subsequently escaped execution when a shell blast frightened away their would be killers. Executed senior officers of the Council of Churches and the NCRRR may have been targeted on the basis of their positions. A senior judge was shot but survived. Nigerian nationals also appear to have been targeted. One witness, on 8 January, observed two Nigerian traders whose throats were cut apparently on the basis of their nationality.

It is reported, but unconfirmed, that rebels in search of a medical doctor who is a well-known advocate of democracy, having failed to locate her at the small hospital which she runs in the east of the city, killed most of the patients and nurses. Also, reports that the patients of the psychiatric hospital at Kissy have been killed and that up to 200 hundred people were executed at a Kissy Mosque remain unverified at this time.

III. REBEL PERPETRATION OF MUTILATIONS AND AMPUTATIONS

In the first days of the fighting there were very few reports of amputations or mutilations. Some incidents did occur of amputation of limbs and degradation of the bodies of ECOMOG soldiers, such as at Ferry Junction, sometime between 6 and 8 January. By 10 January, civilians were being targeted. Exact figures for the rate of amputations and mutilations are unavailable. However, by 25 January, medical sources were indicating that many hundreds of such cases had been admitted for treatment. By that date, some 70 had been treated at just one medical facility, Connaught Hospital. Doctors emphasise that many victims either fail to seek medical attention or die following the attacks.

Amputation / mutilation victims include men, women and children. One of the youngest recorded victims is a six-year-old girl whose left arm was severed by an axe at Ashobi Corner, Blackhall Road, on 21 January. Most amputations are of one or both arms. Some victims have also lost a leg. One nine-year-old boy had his right leg amputated and was shot in the other leg in an incident at Circular Road on 14 January. Mutilations are commonly of the arms and often appear to be failed attempts at amputation of the hands. Some victims have lost fingers - one 9-year-old girl had four fingers severed by machete blows in an incident at Personage Street on 15 January.

(5/22)

The mission witnessed a woman being admitted to Connaught Hospital, on 3 February, who reported that she had been injured in an otherwise unreported mutilation variant - the pouring over her body of boiling water.

IV. REBEL PERPETRATION OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ABUSE

Rape of females, including children, appears to have been a standard practice of the rebel combatants. Many people report that they witnessed acts of violent group rape, including in public places, including Kroo Town Road and Kissy. Persistent reports have been received from victims and witnesses indicating that young women and girls were rounded up in neighbourhoods of the city and obliged to report nightly to be sexually abused by rebel fighters.

The mission interviewed some of the victims of one well-documented incident of repeated rape which occurred in the Cline Town area, commencing on 8 January. The local rebel commander ordered that all virgin girls report for a physical examination. A female companion of the commander then checked the girls in order to verify their status as virgins. Those who passed the test, mostly aged between 12 and 15, were ordered to report each night for sexual abuse by the commander and his men. Some of the girls were subsequently abducted and taken away by the retreating rebels. A high incidence of rape of children is also reported from the Clay Factory Displaced Persons Centre from 15 to 25 January. Other reports have been received from the Pademba Road area, the city centre and Kingtom. One policeman in Kingtom reportedly saw his three daughters raped before they were abducted.

Former abductees of the rebels indicate that women captives were raped as a matter of course. One witness reported that female captives were told to submit or be killed. He saw three girls raped in these circumstances on 8 January. Many women and girls admitted to hospital with war-related injuries also report that they were raped.

A reliable report has been received that one pregnant woman lost her child after being raped and was paid "compensation money" by the perpetrator. Another informant reported the death of another pregnant women after she had been raped.

V. REBEL DEPLOYMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS

A number of witnesses and victims report that a significant number of the rebel combatants were children. One military official puts the figure at some 10% of the rebel force. A patient at one hospital reports that his gunshot wound was inflicted by a boy aged no more than 8 years old. Another witness states that he saw a boy of about 11 years in command of a small group of fighters active in the city centre on 7 January. There are widespread reports that the rebels used

16/22

children as snipers - one child fighter in ECOMOG custody confirmed that he had been a sniper.

A number of those reportedly summarily killed by ECOMOG for alleged rebel activities were children. An informant, described by UN officials as "reliable", states that an 8-year-old boy was executed by ECOMOG having been found with a pistol. A 14 year old boy was reportedly executed on 16 January, at Customs Post, Susan's Bay, and a 16 year old boy on 18 January, at Port Loko Wharf. (See below).

While most of the child combatants are assumed to be members of the RUF, former captives of the rebels state that a significant number of children of former SLA soldiers were active.

Many informants, including former abductees of the rebels, report that rebel child combatants were frequently under the influence of drugs and that their commanders encouraged this practice. A number of reports have been received of a high usage of cocaine, self-administered in open wounds on the arm which were then covered with adhesive tape.

VI. PERPETRATION OF ABDUCTION BY REBEL FORCES

The rebels abducted a large but unverifiable number of people. These include staff of UN agencies and NGOs, students, and people from all social backgrounds. One indication of the scale of the abductions is that childcare agencies had, by February 4, received 1192 reports of children who had gone missing since January 6. 300 of these had been physically taken from their parents by rebels. Another indication is the report of a reliable informant who escaped from the rebels that some 500 people were held together with him in just one camp in the hills to the east of Freetown. He states that 75% of the captives were women aged from 12 to 20. The youngest abductee reported to the mission is a 9-year-old girl, taken from the Clay Factory Displaced Persons Centre on 23 January. A number of abductees either escaped or were released. A number of them have provided to the mission comprehensive information on their captivity.

Escapees report that young boy abductees tended to be used as porters or were selected for training as fighters. Older men were retained solely for portage. Women and girls were retained to cook and for sexual purposes. One former abductee displayed to the mission the "brand" which rebels had applied to his arm with burning plastic.

A small number of prominent Sierra Leone personalities and foreigners were abducted and kept under close guard. The Sierra Leoneans included the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Freetown. Former President Momoh was also detained by the rebels following his removal from Pademba Road Prison. Foreign

detainees, at one time or another, included 13 Indian workers, 6 Indian and one Kenyan Roman Catholic Sisters, five Italian and one Spanish Roman Catholic priests (including Fr. Mario Guerra who had been abducted during 1998), one Spanish and one French journalist. At least eight of the abductees were killed and two others seriously injured. At least two others of the abductees were subjected to ill treatment. Most of the remainder, including the Archbishop, have either escaped or been released. It is reported that forces unknown may have killed former President Momoh. The situation of another prominent Sierra Leonean abductee is unknown.

VII. DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN AND UTILITY PROPERTIES AND LOOTING

Rebel forces are responsible for the deliberate widespread destruction of civilian property and public utilities. Rates of destruction of the property stock have been noted above as some 20% in the city centre and rising to some 90% in the most easterly of hinterland population centres. In the city centre, however, some streets, such as Pademba Road, near the prison, Canton Street, parts of Kissy Road and West Street have been comprehensively destroyed. Destruction extends to the simple dwellings of indigent people, as well as churches, mosques, schools, orphanages, medical facilities, community centres, police stations, the City Hall, Pademba Road Prison, New England Prison, SLBS and other non-military service facilities.

Many of the destruction sites appear to have been arbitrarily chosen. Others were reportedly picked out because of the refusal of the residents to hand over sufficient cash or goods to looting rebels or because the occupants failed to obey instructions to come out on the streets, serve as "human shields" or hand over girls for sexual purposes.

Some other homes, businesses and public utilities appear to have been targeted because of their function or the public profile of the occupants. These include public utility buildings and the residences and offices of human rights activists, lawyers, journalists and Government officials. The UNOMSIL headquarters was largely destroyed by fire, including the offices and library of its Human Rights Section, and severe fire damage was done to UN House and other UN facilities. A number of diplomatic facilities were attacked, including the Nigerian High Commission, which was entirely destroyed.

It is reported that a large but unverifiable number of people were killed in the process of destruction of buildings (see above).

An unascertainable degree of the damage to the property stock was inflicted by ECOMOG, including as a result of aerial bombardment. It is reported, for instance, that aerial attacks inflicted damage in Fisher Street, Nicol Street, Coker Lane, Bombay Street, Wilberforce Street, Clay Factory Displaced Persons Centre and at the Basharia Mosque in Susan's Bay.

In the first days of the rebel offensive witnesses report that some rebel commanders executed fighters who engaged in looting. However, during that period and subsequently, rebel forces did engage in widespread theft of money and looting of residences and business properties. Witnesses report that rebels came to steal or loot from residential compounds in wave after wave over a period of days. An unverifiable number of people were killed due to their failure to satisfy the looters. There are also widespread reports of people being abducted to transport looted property to rebel camps.

The looting and destruction of commercial properties and food stores has exacerbated the humanitarian situation in Freetown and renders more problematic the restoration of the essential commercial infrastructure.

VIII. ACTIVITIES OF ECOMOG

(a) Summary Executions

Since the first days of the combat in Freetown there have been reports that ECOMOG was summarily executing detainees who were allegedly either rebels or rebel sympathisers. One of the earliest reliable reports was provided by a senior official of an international organisation who witnessed an execution on 14 January. From then persistent reports were received of executions at such locations as Aberdeen Bridge, Kingtom, Brookfields, Siaka Stephens Street, Ferry Junction, Connaught Hospital, Kissy Road, Susan's Bay, the National Stadium and Lumley. Witnesses of the highest probity state that they were present at executions. One such observer noted that at the three executions he had seen on 24 January, at Ferry Junction and Connaught Hospital, the victims were given a cursory interrogation and immediately shot. It is reported that a large number of executions have been perpetrated at Aberdeen Bridge. Witnesses report the killing or disposal of up to 40 bodies at that location. It is stated that the victims at Aberdeen Bridge are the overflow population of a police holding facility at Aberdeen village. The Mission observed extensive blood stains at Aberdeen Bridge on 25 January. Another reliable witness observed the bodies of seven execution victims at Kingtom on 3 February. Ten people were reportedly executed at the National Stadium on 30/31 January.

Reference has been made above to the alleged execution of an eight-year old boy caught in possession of a pistol. Humanitarian agencies report that a 14-year-old boy was executed at the Customs Post, Susan's Bay, on 16 January. On 23 January, at the same location, ECOMOG is reported to have executed a 17-year-old girl.

The mission directly witnessed an execution at Connaught Hospital on 3 February. The following day a senior officer of an international NGO witnessed another execution at exactly the same site. In both cases the perpetrators were

in ECOMOG uniform and onlookers stated their view that the victims were rebel collaborators.

Witnesses make clear that, in all cases, the interrogation process was entirely inadequate and that there was no real effort to establish the guilt or innocence of executions victims. In one well-documented incident, on 10 January, three teenage boys were executed on Kissy Road after locals told ECOMOG that the boys were strangers to the area. The boys, all residents of Fisher Street, were returning from having buried their friend who had been killed earlier in the day.

It is reported that ECOMOG regained control of Connaught Hospital on 12 January. Well-considered witnesses allege that ECOMOG summarily executed some 20 patients who were pointed out to them to be rebels. The exact circumstances of the battle for control of the hospital and the behaviour of entering troops requires further investigation.

(b) Methods of warfare

ECOMOG jets have been employed in the conflict within the city. Certain civilian targets are listed above. Certain of the incidents have been partially documented by humanitarian workers. The bombing of a crowd of people on Wilberforce Street on 7 January resulted in the deaths of at least 20 civilians. ECOMOG described the incident as, "regrettable". The youngest reported victim of the bombing, on 14 January, of the Basharia Mosque was a ten-year-old girl. The youngest recorded victim of the 7 January bombing at Wilberforce Street, was an 8 year old girl.

On 3 February, Brigadier-General Khobe, Chief of the Sierra Leone Defence Staff, said that from now on ECOMOG would shoot at "human shields" and that, "if they try it again, we'll kill everything from the opposite direction".

(c) Other matters

ECOMOG has detained and physically mistreated national staff of a number of humanitarian NGOs and the ICRC, on the reportedly baseless grounds that they were rebel collaborators. Some are now released and the whereabouts of others are unverifiable at this time. UNOMSIL is in possession of detailed testimonies.

The mission has observed numerous incidents of ill treatment of persons detained at joint ECOMOG / CDF checkpoints. Among the forms of punishment observed are whipping, beating, varying types of public humiliation, and being bound extremely tightly.

In a welcome development, on 2 February, ECOMOG released to the care of humanitarian agencies some seven former rebel child combatants.

IX. ACTIVITIES OF CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES

Civil Defence Forces also bear responsibility for summary executions. On 3 February senior UN staff observed and photographed a newly severed human head displayed on a stick at a CDF checkpoint at Brookfields. A highly reliable witness observed the execution of a man at a checkpoint in Kingtom on 16 January. He reported that the CDF perpetrator was very excited and made no effort to interrogate the victim. Witnesses have reported a number of other such incidents to the mission. See above regarding activities at checkpoints. It is reliably reported that members of the Liberian community resident in Freetown and elsewhere, particularly those enjoying refugee status, have suffered discriminatory treatment and harassment by elements of CDF, CDU and ECOMOG.

X. USE OF THE MEDIA BY THE GOVERNMENT

The mission received repeated complaints that the Government, especially Minister Spencer, used the radio media to instil a false sense of security in residents of areas which had not yet been cleared of rebel activity. A number of informants state that relatives, friends and neighbours were killed by rebels, at locations such as Kissy, when they left their homes having heard the broadcast assurances that the areas were again under Government control.

XI. STATUS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY

This report has detailed the manner in which rebel forces targeted the lives and property of the leadership of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the human rights NGO community and civil society leaders. The destruction of the UNOMSIL human rights offices and library has also been described.

UNOMSIL facilitated the evacuation of a number of human rights activists on 27 December and was planning to extend the facility further at the time of the rebel offensive of 6 January.

Notwithstanding the difficult operational environment, the human rights community is currently active in Freetown. There is ongoing but limited monitoring of the human rights situation and chronicling of the period of rebel occupation. It is noteworthy that the human rights community is employing monitoring methodologies imparted in the various training programmes which were largely facilitated by UNOMSIL during 1998. The human rights community

is also volunteering to assist in humanitarian activities, such as registration of displaced persons and distribution of food.

UNOMSIL continues to support and provide technical assistance to the activities of the human rights community. There is also an active Sierra Leone human rights community temporarily in Conakry, Guinea. Conakry-based activities are focussed within the Human Rights Committee of the Humanitarian community and they benefit from support and assistance of UNOMSIL. The work of the Committee is described elsewhere.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended:

1. That UNOMSIL continue to closely monitor and report on the human rights situation in Freetown, including by continuation of the process of chronicling the events of the period of the rebel incursion. A comprehensive evaluation of the period will ultimately contribute to the process of peace building and effective reconciliation.
2. That UNOMSIL monitoring activities should continue to be conducted in accordance with the collaborative methods which have been developed during 1998. These methods can be rendered more effective by UNOMSIL support for the various data-gathering and analysis proposals being developed by the Human Rights community active in and concerning Sierra Leone.
3. That support and assistance continue to be provided by UNOMSIL to the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the human rights NGO community and all other elements of the human rights community both in Sierra Leone and temporarily located in Conakry. Support can be evidenced by frequent visits to Freetown and active participation in the activities of the Conakry-based Human Rights Committee.
4. That consideration be given to the timely deployment to Sierra Leone of a human rights /criminal investigation team to identify and secure evidence of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law with a view to eventual prosecution of perpetrators. Consideration should be given to the team having a rolling mandate to undertake investigations of incidents perpetrated across the country.
5. That UNOMSIL advise that any future peace settlement should not purport to confer unconditional or blanket immunity from prosecution for the perpetrators of any grave violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. In this regard consideration should be given to establishment of an appropriately modelled truth commission process in Sierra Leone.

6. That UNOMSIL continue to urge the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG to ensure their forces operate in conformity with the letter and spirit of international human rights and humanitarian law by, inter-alia, an immediate cessation of summary executions; and that UNOMSIL call on the authorities to detain and prosecute the alleged perpetrators of such acts.

7. That UNOMSIL urge the international community to provide financial or other assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to facilitate the detention and care for prisoners in conformity with security requirements and international standards for treatment of prisoners.

24) Letter

Letter from Melosky Kallon to Foday Sankoh
18 April 2000

20/4/20

Revolutionary United Front Party

To: Chairman, Foday S. Sankoh,
Leader, R.U.F. Party,
FREE TOWN.

From: MR. Melosky M. Kallon,
COMMANDER

LUNBAR - PORT LOKO.

Subject: Request & Reminder.

DATE: 18th APRIL 2000

Sir,

I wish to request for medicines for the people and Ex-Combatants in the three chiefdoms i.e. Marampa, Masimra and Biya Romende.

Within these chiefdom the population of Ex-Combatants is high and the Medical Situation is very poor.

18
As no drugs stores or pharmacies operates within these chiefdoms. And lots of health related problem arises every day. Therefore, I have no alternative but to send my request to you for your kind and usual assistance.

More over, I would like to refer to a discussion between myself and Mr Gululu who visited this area last month, concerning the mining of Gold at Masimra chiefdom.

In Order to start this work, The items such as:

- Shovels (10)
- Head-pans (8)
- Shaker (1 roll)
- Food

As I have already inform you of the above thru Mr Gululu, I

am presently facing the people with whom I have discussed together with Mr Gululu at Masimra, asking for the start of the work everyday.

IN/View of the above, I am reminding you Sir, to send the afore mentioned items as soon as possible - because the rain season is on the way.

I thank you in advance on behalf of the people and ex-Combatants in these chiefdom, for your kind and usual assistance.

With the highest regard.

Yours Faithfully

Mosesky M. Kallen

25) Letter

Letter from John Caldwell, President of the US Yrading Investment Company to Foday Sankoh , 22 November 1999



U.S. TRADING & INVESTMENT COMPANY

22 November 1999

Fax: 011-232-22-232329

Fa Foday Saybans Marikoh
Leader
Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone
Freetown, Sierra Leone

Dear Foday:

Steve Call called me today upon his return to Washington, DC.


He was very pleased with his trip to Sierra Leone, and he was very complimentary of the reception and hospitality extended to him and his photographer by you, Mosquito and Ibrahim. You all made a favorable impression on him. He assured me he was able to see everything he wanted to see and talk to everyone he wanted to talk to.

Parenthetically, he told me the only gunfire he observed during his stay was when some of your soldiers sought to shoot a passing pheasant. Since pheasant was not on the menu for dinner, he assumes the pheasant got away.

His article is planned for the Sunday Washington Post Magazine, either as the cover story or, possibly, the entire magazine. Either way, this will be a major, in-depth piece, together with color photographs. All of this means you and your colleagues will receive considerable exposure to a broad audience, including Clinton administration officials, members of Congress and opinion leaders in politics, business and, importantly, other media.

Publication of Steve's article in the Washington Post Magazine will take longer than publishing it in the daily newspaper. But, the wait will be worth it. We will be able to use this magazine to good advantage, and we will get ample copies.

340 K STREET, N.W. • SUITE 170 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20007 USA
TELEPHONE: (202) 625-7800 • FACSIMILE: (202) 625-2070



U.S. TRADING & INVESTMENT COMPANY


One final note, Steve recommends that all of you, including Mosquito, make a concerted effort to meet with journalists of major western media to get your story out to the rest of the world. Since, Mosquito is less accessible for now, I suggest that whenever he travels to Monrovia, we should arrange for selected journalists to interview him there. Of course, we will need lead time ahead of his trip. Publication of Steve's article should stimulate other media interest.

Best regards,

JOHN D. CALDWELL
President

26) Memorandum

Memorandum of Understanding with Samuel Isidoor Weinberger



U.S. TRADING & INVESTMENT COMPANY

8 November 1999

Fax: 011-232-22-232329

Pa Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader
Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone
Freetown, Sierra Leone

Dear Foday:


I thank you for your 6 November fax letter, clarifying Mr. Golley's position.

Steve Call arrived in Momrovia yesterday and, today, he and Ibrahim are to travel to Kailahun and, then, to meet you in Freetown. His visit will present to you and your colleagues an ideal opportunity to correct the media misinformation about the RUF and, through Steve Call, you will be able to reach political and business leaders worldwide; as well as to begin the process of changing public opinion about the RUF and actual socio-economic and political situation in Sierra Leone.

Respecting medical aid to Sierra Leone, I am pleased to inform you that Ms. Beth Stanford, the USAID officer in charge of this program is scheduled to arrive in Freetown on Monday, 15 November. Her mission is to meet with NGO's and assess medical needs in Sierra Leone. Her schedule of meetings is being arranged by the American Embassy in Freetown. While Ms. Stanford is in Freetown, I suggest that you have one of your deputies meet with her to tell her what medicines are required by the people in the countryside. She is concerned about the security situation. So, she needs to be given assurances that the distribution of medical aid will be secure. Your deputy should call the American Embassy to schedule a meeting with Ms. Stanford.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,



JOHN L. CALDWELL
President

3050 K STREET, N.W. • SUITE 170 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20007 USA
TELEPHONE: (202) 625-7800 • FACSIMILE: (202) 625-2070

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FROM :

FHL

Oct. 12 1999 11:11PM P2

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To: The Leader

From: Michel

full name is Michael Desaezer

Good morning

I am back in Washington I got your fax on Thursday and I will go to the embassy of SL this Monday morning for this Visa.

As soon as I will get the Visa I will fly to Freetown to meet you.

Dear Foday, let me take a few minutes of your time to explain to you what happened last week in Antwerp.

As you already know, I met my partner. You met his employee in Freetown 10 days ago. My partner is now decided to work with us without any restriction, as I told you already, with him involved in the picture money is not an issue any more.

IMPORTANT: The American, during the meetings in Freetown offered him to open a buying office in SL. They would like to see 3 buying offices working in SL.

However as my partner told me last week, all this could take X weeks or months.

You do not have any time to waste any more neither do I. This is what we suggest, he will come with me to see you next week, we will bring with us what you know.

Dear Foday, this meeting is very important, ^{Who = Charles} Charles (my partner) meets you and gets the confirmation of what I told him already, based on our agreement, he will be ahead full speed immediately.

The problem:

At this time, and after one year of efforts, I did not get anything, yet you and I know it. But, what is done is done let's forget it and move forward.

With Charles, we can BUY, I am not talking about received for free, the 10% going to Freetown but also the remaining 90% in Kono.

In short, if we put together what we have, Yourself, Charles and myself we can start immediately what we were suppose to start months ago and all of us would finally make money instead of losing money everyday.

At this time, you and I are the big losers, I don't know about you but as far as I am concerned I am tired of it.

What we have to solve:

How will you convince the people in charge in Kono to bring everything to you instead of 10% and it is not possible how are you going to convince them to sell those 90% to us instead of keeping it or selling it to the Lebanese or whoever?

The other point, if we can buy it how are we going to ship it outside? Through Freetown is probably out of question, through Monrovia is not safe either, we cannot trust those people.

Charles has the financial ability to do anything, a private jet from Belgium to Kono or to Monrovia or to Freetown or any other solution.

With Charles we can do what ever is possible it is now up to you and me to find the solution.

FROM :

PHONE NO. :

Oct. 12 1999 11:11PM P3

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Page

Foday, what I am saying is this, the money is finally on the table, you make sure that the merchandise is available one way or another and all of us will be ok.

At the minute the commission will be in place and we will have the final contract everything will be easier for all us but please let's do something in the meantime.

The ambassador of SL went to see Charles's father in Antwerp yesterday, don't forget he is the president of the association for all the diamonds buyers in Antwerp. Following our advice, Charles father told the ambassador that Antwerp was not ready to do anything until the commission is in place.

Charles is already preparing the equipment you requested last week.

Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD)
Office of the Chairman
56 Spur Road
FREETOWN
Tel/FAX: 232329/231624

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

This agreement is made this 12th day of April, 2000 between the Commission of Strategic Resources of Sierra Leone and Mr. Samuel Isidoor Weinberger of 100 Hatton Garden London ECL 8NX.

The CMRRD of Spur Road Freetown, Sierra Leone hereinafter known as 'PARTY A' and Mr. Samuel Isidoor Weinberger of 100 Hatton Garden, London ECL 8NX hereinafter known as 'PARTY B'.

The parties intend to establish and carry on business transactions in Sierra Leone for buying and selling precious stones. "PARTY A" shall act as facilitator in the business and "PARTY B" shall organize the purchase of the precious stones. The former shall use best endeavors as a facilitator for the commencement and carrying on of the business in Sierra Leone for the benefit and profit of the latter and the people of Sierra Leone in general.

All other agreement on the above mentioned issue is subject to review and rectification for establishing strong business transaction.

A final document of this agreement shall be issue later from "PARTY A" to "PARTY B" upon the full commencement of the office of the CMRRD based in Freetown Sierra Leone.

SIGNED BY
Mr. Foday Saybana Sankoh
CHAIRMAN CMRRD

SIGNED BY
Mr. Samuel Isidoor Weinberger
DIRECTOR-ISIDOR WEINBERGER

COMMISSION FOR THE MANAGEMTN OF STRATEGIC MINERAL RESOURCES,
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
C/o 56 Spur Road
Freetown
Tel/Fax 232-22-230444
232-22-232329

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I, the undersigned, FODAY SAYBANA SANKOH, Chairman of the Commission for Strategic Mineral Resources (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) acknowledging that RAYMOND CLIVE KRAMER, as Executive Officer (hereinafter collectively referred to as KRAMMER) is able to provide expert

27) Letter

Letter from Issa Sesay, People's Army to Sam Bockarie
13 August 1997

THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF SIERRA LEONE

TO:- His Excellency Major J.P. Koroma,
Head of State and Chairman
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
State House,
FREETOWN.

FROM:- The Military High Command And War Council,
People's Army of Sierra Leone.

SUBJ:- PROPOSAL FOR THE TENTATIVE INTEGRATION OF THE
PEOPLE'S ARMY INTO THE NATIONAL ARMY AND THE
POLITICAL CIRCLE

DATE:- 13th August, 1997.

Sir,

After series of deliberation, members of the Military High Command and the People's War Council of the People's Army have adopted this proposal which with all due respect is being submitted to you for your perusal and timely consideration.

I. MILITARY INTEGRATION

The People's Army deemed it expedient at this time to be tentatively integrated into the Sierra Leone Army which is to be dubbed "National Army". This will alleviate the numerous constraints which continue to bug the People's Army. Should this proposal be accepted we suggest the initial integration of Five Thousand men. In addition, we suggest the occupation of prominent positions by key Commanders of the People's Army in the integrated National Army. This is unequivocally spelled out below:

- (a) Colonel Sam Beckarie, Field Commander of the People's Army, to be the Second-in-Command to the Chief of Defence Staff (C.D.S.)
- (b) Lieutenant-Colonel Issa H. Sesay, Battle Group Commander of the People's Army, to be Second-in-Command to the Chief of Army Staff (C.O.A.S.).
- (c) Colonel Isaac Mongue to be Second-in-Command to the Chairman of Joint Security.

.../2

*Seen
file 6/12*

II. OCCUPATION OF REMAINING MINISTRIES

It has also been proposed that in order to keep the governmental machinery in motion the remaining Ministries which belong to the People's Army should be occupied by the following people.

- (a) Captain Lawrence Wormandia, Ministry of Energy and Power.
- (b) Lieutenant Elared Collins, Ministry of Trade and Industry.
- (c) Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Vandy, Under-Secretary Lands, Housing and Environment.
- (d) Captain Patrick S. Baidia, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Education.

III. SUPREME COUNCIL

A complete list of the members of the Supreme Council will be submitted soon. Colonel Michael Lamin has been named a member of the Supreme Council and the representative of the People's Army in any AFRC delegation.

Respectfully submitted.

Yours faithfully,

For [Signature]

Colonel Sam Bockarie,
Battle Field Commander,
People's Army of Sierra Leone.

- cc: The Secretary-General, AFRC, State House.
- cc: The Chief of Army Staff, AHQ, Mil. HQ, Cockerill North.
- cc: The Chief of Defence Staff, DHQ, Cockerill North.

28) Kenema Police Report

“CID Office Station Diary” 1/98 – 7-2-98 - Pages 112 (date 28-01-98), 127 (30-01-1998)
181 (05-02-1998) 182 (06-02-1998)

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Tuesday 13th January 1979.

No	Time	U/L	acc	ini
29			Hawa Koroana to have less to do with Mr. Gorman	
30	1830	32	Dept 4062 arrived - for duty	
31	1835	32	Dept 6240 arrived - for duty	
32	1900	30, 'B'	Shift personnel comprising 31 of N ^o 6240, 1608, 2725, 1, 16 35-27 and myself present and paraded for duty. They were inspected by DSGT 2057 found clean tidy and ready for duty after brief lectured on General Police routine before detailed as this. Duty officer N ^o 1608 DPE. Control, Lock up orderly N ^o 6240, D.P.C. Sowa. Crime reserve 2725 and myself, 1/c Shift N ^o 35-27 Dcpl (1) Jusu, two (3) male suspects in custody for various offences otherwise no serious complaint.	
32	2000	1448	I handed over the duties of the duty officer to the incoming orderly Dcpl 1608 at this. One telephone set and wall clock, a drink bucket and a red cap, three (3) C-4 chairs, a serial machine head	

SN	Time	C/R	Use	
			contd.	<p>One wooden hamper, two shade lamps, a box containing prisoners' properties, five tyres, two spring beds, one water pipe, One Scrap X-L. Bike, a bicycle, a HT ^{HT} Book ^{Book}, a Walter ^{Walter}, a way book, a door ^{door} frame, twelve wooden door frames, Vehicle registration number S.P. 1010, Wn 29136, Wn 14865 and a wooden cup-board otherwise no serious report</p>
33	1941	34		<p>I have ordered the N.C.O in "B" Shift to allow Mariama Kallon on open detention here until 14/1/98 as I got me one to sign for her —</p>
34	2001	33		<p>I am leaving for home after I had spoken to O.C.P. 4062 now in charge "B" Shift —</p>
35	2136	36		<p>Inspector D.F. Kolic arrived in and reported himself as orderly officer for tonight —</p>
36	2140	35		<p>Ref S/D 35 of even date Insp D.F. Kolic left the office on observation post 07 —</p>
37	2258	33		<p>I have left the office together with team for Police Barracks —</p>
38	2337	37		<p>Ref S/D 37 of above. I have returned together with Mariama from ISKS —</p>
WEDNESDAY 14th January, 1998				
1	0640	32		<p>I left for Saw mil on enquiry ^{enquiry} —</p>
2	0700	131		<p>D/Sgt. 2123 is in for duty —</p>

J

(35)

W

W

2200 JAN 19

2200 JAN 19

JAN 25

JAN 25

J

WEDNESDAY 14th January, 1998

Sl. No.	Time	Clk	Remarks	Signature
3	0705	13:	D/cpl 1675 is in for duty —	1893
4	0710	13:	D/cpl 4735 is in for duty —	4:5
5	0715	13:	I arrived in and reported for duty	1893
6	0716	7	I reported for duty —	1893
7	0720	6	Ref 870 - 6 at 2nd date I left the office for Blans Road on enquiry. 875 info med — — — —	1893
8	0725	13:	D/cpl 4878 and D/p.c. 35 arrived in for duty — — — —	1893
9	0730	13:	D/Sgt 2871 and D/p.c. 5758 are in for duty — — — —	1893
10	0735	13:	D/p.c. 5886 and D/cpl 6006 arrived in for duty — — — —	1893
11	0737	13:	D/Sgt 1521 is in for duty —	1893
12	0740	13:	D/p.c. 5604 is in for duty —	1893
13.	0745	2:3 4:5 8:9 10:11 12:12	"A" shift personnel comprising of the following NOS:- 4566, 5604, 6006, 1675, 5857, 4735, 1521, 2183, 4721, 35, 5886, 4878, 5106, 1893, 1895, 2057, 3947, SCs 11, 72, 367, ASP Ro- gers and myself present and at the same time paraded for duty. They were inspected by S/O Hyde and found clean, fit and ready for duty. They shift- obtained from general Police duty by 35 before details as follows:- Duty officer:- 5106 took up orderly:- 5604. (inval 1000. 00)	

WEDNESDAY 14th January, 1998

S/No	Time	Off	Occurrence	Sign
			Contd. duty and at the same time left the office for their quarters	2
17	0845	13	D/CPL 8947 arrived in for duty	2
18	0846	19	3 CPO 1193 Takawallie J arrested and brought in one John Kekala Lehai who escaped from Lawtel custody at the State Prison Kenema. S/O C.I.D. informed. D/Sgt 2183 dealing	2
19	0850	18 22	Ref. S/D 18 of today's I have handed over suspect John Kokula Lehai to the lock-up orderly D/A 564 F - safe custody	2
20	0901	21	By order of D.C.G.T.D. I have released Mariana Kallen and handed her over to D/Cpl. 2725 Musa	2
21	0912	20	Ref. S/D 20 above both D/Cpl. 2725 and Mariana Kallen left the office	2
22	0920	19	Ref. S/D 19 of above, by order of S/O C.I.D. suspect's statement should be obtained and taken to prison since he was a prisoner serving a sentence at the state prison yard hence he was not searched and placed in cell N.C.O. crime informed	3
23	0940	24	Semion Boyce Zorokong of #53 Lombos street, Kenema arrived in to see	3

S/No	Time	CLR	Occurrence	Sign
24	0945	23:25	Ref is 1023 of above, by order of S/O C.I.D. I have handed over one old penguin sewing machine head to Semeon Boyce Zorokong of #53 Sombor street, Kenema	5604
25	0950	24'	Ref. S/O 24, Semeon Boyce Zorokong left the office for his residence after receiving the sewing machine head	5604
26	0955	13	W/O M. C. 4378, Mr. Sappah, I left the office for Siribai	
27	0956	28	I obtained statement v/charged statement from suspect	1253
28	1000	18	Ref S/O is 9 even date, I have handed over suspect John Lahun to the prison officer and both left the office for State prisons Kenema.	1253
29	1025	50	By order of 2/C Mr Kargbo through S/Insp. Hyde, I have handed over one gear bicycle and its Key to Basma Kpakka of 1 Sama Lane Kenema and warned him to produce it at anytime it is needed by Police.	1253
30	1027	29	Basma Kpakka left the station with the said Bicycle.	1253
31	1030	34	I am leaving the office for lower police office for check up	1253
32	1040		Haja Kallon of #21 Denby street	1253

Wednesday 11th January 1998

S/No	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Sign	S/A
32			Contd in Fatmata Sheriff of No 8 Nicol street Kenema and reported that sometime in October 1992 she gave the latter her hand bag containing the sum of Le27,000/00 and various articles which the latter converted to his own use and benefit	[Signature]	4
33	1058	13:40	I am leaving the office for Ghanaika street Kenema on engine	[Signature]	4
34	1059	31	Ref SD 31 of the 9 returned to the office after evening	[Signature]	4
35	11000	36	Ibrahim Kabba of No 9 Supul street Kenema arrived in respect of Sidikie Dabor	[Signature]	4
36	1120	35:37	By order of S/O E.I.D. I handed over suspect Sidikie Dabor to Ibrahim Kabba of No 9 Supul street Kenema and warned to produced him on Monday 19th/1/98 at 12 midday with the sum of Le240,000/00	[Signature]	4
37	1080	36	Ref SD 36 of above surety and suspect left the office	[Signature]	4
38	1132	39	Onq Mohamed Shaka of No 2 Forbe street Kenema arrived in and reported that sometime this month 1998 at the above address one S-S D Officer in the person of Amady went at the above address and threaten to burn down the whole compound. C.O.O	[Signature]	4

Sign	S/No.	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Sign
	39	1135	38	Ref S/No 38 of above complainant made statements and left the office	
	40	1140	33	Vide S/O 33 today, & returned to the office from Ghanguta steel-kennema with no serious report -	
	41	1200	42	One Abubakar Barrie of No. 7 Susu Town Street Kenema arrived and reported that sometime in March 1997 he entrusted fire suit for sewing to one Ibrahim Sillah of Feringa Town which the latter had converted into his own use and benefit. S/O informed I am dealing	
	42	1201	41	Ref S/No 41 of above entry complainant left for his shop whilst I went in search of suspect	
	43	1205	59	Muhammed K. Sappah of No 65 Hongha Road Kenema arrested and brought in Morrison farm of Tonggfeld and reported that sometime that January he got information that in his absence, the latter broke into his room where he has his personal effects to be valued. Suspect had to have been stole S/O was informed, Dept 4878 dealing	



Wednesday 14th January 1958

Sl No	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Sign
			Left the office for home	
45	1340		I left the office for Domb	
			Road on Ensign	
46	1345	45	Ref SD 45 of above I returned	
			to the office after Ensign	
47	1350		D/Cpt. 6005 left the office	
			for technical institute	
			on Ensign	
48	1351	44	Ref SD 44 of above D/Sgt	
			57 and Party returned to	
			the office	
49	1440	50	One Today Moneh Amarg	
		56	of No. 71 Somba Street	
			Kerema accompanied by	
			Mohamed Amarg of the	
			same address arrived and	
			reported that at about	
			0830 hrs the sum of 174	
			6,000,00 kls handed over	
			to one Sultaman Karong	
			of the same address to	
			be delivered at Rawie	
			(Commercial) which the latter	
			have run-away with. No	
			informed. I am dealing	
50	1441	49	Ref S/S-49 of above date	
		57	with party I left the office	
			in search of suspect and	
			and Township	
51	1443	58	I left the office for Tongo	
			Post on Ensign	
52	11155	13	V.M. ...	


11/19/98

Sign	Time	CR	Occurrence	Sign
53	1540	45	Ref SD 45 of above & returned to the office for Tonga Port	
54	1544	47	Ref SD 47 of above. DCP's book returned to the office after evening	
55	1542	45	I am banking this together with Jonathan Morris on Behar Street on evening	
56	1545	50	Ref SD of today date, with stage 257, Mrs 4556, computer suspect Binu Kamma of 11276. Kamma returned to his work on evening 15/11/98 on exhibit 210 - 212 CID informed	
57	1550	50	Ref SD 50 of above, Subina Forster of No 3 Forster has arrived for VC statement 15/11/98 on 214 of today's date 14/11/98 OR CID informed	
60	1630	61	For Mansaray of No 15 Bockarie-gba street name assigned to get VC CID-W	
61	1640	60	Ref - Slobe of today's date 14/11/98 by order of OIC CID-D Mr Amara that I should handed over the suspect prison name of Tonga Field as to For Mansaray of No 15 Bockarie-gba street name not want to produce him tomorrow 15/11/98 at about	

14/11/98 For Mansaray

S/No	Time	R	Occurrence	Sign	No.
			cent. let the law take it course against the him		9
62	1642	61	Ref-SD 67 of today's date all of them left for their houses		
63	1705	64	Mohamed Fentie of 43 Algonoulango street Keneba arrived to Sec D/C.		
64	1710	63	By order of O/C C.I.D. Martin Williams is handed over to Mr. Fentie		
65	1755	64	Ref SD 55 of above returned to the office from labor street		1
66	1720	67	By order of Mr. Kevin Amara I have released suspect Suliaman Fante on his own I would report at the office tomorrow 15-1-98 at work		72
67	1725	66	Ref SD 66 of above exp to state for his residence		
68	1920	70	Dlepl 4062 arrived in for duty		
69	1925	70	I handed over the duties of the duty office - to Dlepl 3062 with on charge as per SD 104 of today's date 14/1/98 to be true and correct		1 2 3
70	1945	68	"B" Shift personnel Comprising		

No	Time	CR	Occurrence	Sign
70		Control	I change and myself present and paraded for duty, inspected after been briefly lectured found clean, tidy and ready for duty before detailed as follow. Duty officer N ^o 6240 DPC. Sowa Lock up orderly myself (N ^o 4062 Dcpl) crime reserve N ^o 1608 DPC. and 2725 Dcpl 1/2 shift N ^o 3527 Dcpl NO Suspect in Custody otherwise no serious Complaint.	JP
71	2000	72	I handed over the duties of Duty officer to N ^o 6240 DPC. Sowa with articles as per S/D 14 & 14/1/98 otherwise no Complaint.	JP
72	2005	71	I certify taking over the duties of duty officer with articles as S/D 71 to be true and correct except the bicycle which is not secure. Other wise no other complaints	JP
THURSDAY 15th January 1998				
1	0715	71	I am in for duty.	JP
2	0716	71	I arrived and reported for duty	JP
3	0720	71	I arrived together with D/P. 6006 and reported for duty	JP



Thursday 18th January 1972 12

Shafiqul H		CC. ...		12
5	0723	7:	D/Sgt 4721, 2871, 5857, 5886, 4568 1675 and S/C 367 arrived in for duty together with 35	8200 1000
6	0724	7:	D/insp Hyde and 5804 are in for duty with D/Sgt 1521 for duty	8200 1000
7	0845	11:2	"A" shift personnel comprising 315 of the following nos:- 4566, 61 5604, 6006, 1675, 5857, 4735, 1521, 2183, 4721, 35, 5886, 4878, 5106, 3947, SCS. 11, 72, 367, ASP. Rogers and myself and 1895 and 2057 present and at the same time par- aded for duty. They were ins- pected by S/O Hyde and found clean fit and ready for duty. The shift lectured on general police duty by 35 before de- tails as follows:- Duty of - ficer:- 4566, work up orderly:- 4735. Crime reserve:- 5604, 6006, 3947, 1675, 5857, 1521, 35, 5886, 4878, 5106. U.P.A. leave:- 1028. Sick:- 1893. None in custody. Yc shift:- 2057. Area seem to be quiet at the moment. Other wise no serious report. — — —	9 1080 10 080 11 080 12 085 13 091 14 09
8	0800	9	1 of wounded over the duties of duty officer to S/pc 4568 with articles on charge three five old small clock	15 100 16 100

(Handwritten signature/initials)

Time	CR	Occurrence
		property, a bucket and a cup and damaged Honda bike 243 Clair, one sewing machine load 12 wooden door frames one steel door and blanket and four vehicles SP 1010 WU 29186 WU 14865 and a ref with plastic bar one water pipe four spare tyres 2 shade lamps D/S and a many book otherwise no Complaints
9 0805	8	I Certify taken over the duties of duty-officer from DPC 6240 to be true and correct.
10 0845	11	Britu Karome arrived and re- ported her self
10 0846	10	Ref 870-10 of above date she left the office for her destination
12 0855	7	Klith 4728 & wife for an Exam 29. Cut a shield on emp -
13 0915	23	Wlith Complainant Muryatu I left the office for Drivers Union office
14 0916	28	I left the office for Forbie street to obtained witness statement in respect of sb 38 of 14/1/98
15 1000		Barbrie Mansaney of 10 Kerama street, Kenema brought in the fun of 10.05.700
16 1005	18	I am leaving the office with 367 for Nyandjama section to work on Ball line 18 Nyandjama road Kenema to do a 2nd statement


6240
WU

Thursday 15th Jan 1991

Sno	Time	C/A	Occurrence	Q
17	1025	38'	I am leaving for Magistrate Court, Kenema	5604
18	1035	16	Rel. s/d. 16 on even date. I returned to the office with s/d. 367. Kuma wanted Mr. Bull to see s/d. 1608 for statement, in respect of case of <u>hosting remarks</u>	5886 K. Orome
19	1130	25-	s/d. 1893 left for 1000 motor park to Hanged Road Kenema on enquiry	5886
20	1135	26	I left the office to Hanged Road on enquiry	5886
21	1140	22	I am leaving the office for combing road on enquiry	5886
22	1145	21/23	Ref s/d. 21 of above, I returned to the office to get Mr. Kuma of the combing road for enquiry on work for the office of foundation construction	5886
23	1150	21	Ref s/d. 21 of above. By order of Mr. Bull I have handed over master Murray Kuma to Mohammed Kuma and wanted to report on Monday 19th-1-91 at work site	5886
24	1155	12'	Vide s/d. 12 to day, with s/d. 25. I returned to	5886

Thursday 15th Jan 1995

Case No.	Time	CR	Description	Sign
5604	1203	19	Ref s/d 19 of above 9 returned to the office	1873
5776	1300	31	Kuteba brought in one Jonathan Morrison of # 10, Kibangua street Kamuru for interrogation	about 9
5886	1315	20	Ref s/d 20 of above 9 returned to the office from Hanyu Pol together with Jonathan Morris	See 1873
5977	1320	13	I returned to the office and handed over the sum of forty-four thousand leaves to S/O C.T.O Ino Inspector Hyde as exhibit in the presence of S/O 1895	1873 1873 1873
5978	1322	14	Ref s/d 14 of above 9 returned to the office	1873
5979	1326		Joseph Saffa Lohai Town Council Police Sub Inspector brought in Maniama Sheriff of 9 Busu town and Musu Sessay of 10 Davies street Kamuru with quantity of rice and a deal aged for alleged creation of s/d. Case in turned	1873



Thursday 15th Dec 1998

16

Sno	Time	CR	Description	
30	1315	31	Puma Sesay #75 Kaisamba Terrace arrived in to see D/S P Kamara	38 14 39 14
31	1317	25	Ref S/D 25 of above	
		30	By order of D/S P Kamara	
		43	Jonathan is handed over to Puma Sesay to produce him today at 1800 hrs	40 15 41 15
32	1320	33	One Ramatu Siaka of No. 2 Kai-Samba Terrace Kenema brought in Marama Bamba of Panguna Town as found child. O/C C/O informed	
33	1322	32	Ref S/D - 32 of above date by order of O/C C/O Mr. Amas Lamin found child Marama B9-15/1/98 info is handed over to Ramu in Shikha and planned to report with him tomorrow 1800 hrs for security reasons	42 15 43 15 44 15
34	1325	34/35	Ref S/D - 33 of above entry both of them left for their de- function	
35	1420	35	I have handed over the sum of sixty thousand Leones to Migayatu as his Oala in the presence of S/O C/O Inspector Hyde	
36	1421	36	Ref S/D 35 of above entry he left the office for his destina- tion	48 15

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No	Time	Op	Remarks
38	1427	17	Ref S/D 17, I returned from court - 5004
39	1446	40	I handed over the sum of Le 200,000/00 two hundred thousand Leones to Mr Demba Jabie of No 5 Supui Street Kenema. 15/1/98
40	1530	39	Ref S/D 39 of above Mr Demba Jabie left the office. 5002
41	1535	42	I handed over suspect Sidikie Jabor to Ibrahim Kabba of No 9 Supui Street Kenema and warned to produce him on the 14 th February 1998 at 10 AM with the sum of Le 232,000/00 5002
42	1540	41	Ref S/D 41 of above surety and suspect left the office. 5002
43	1548	31	Ref 3/8 31 of above Pendo Sesay brought Jonathan 5002
44	1610	45	ISSA M Richardson of # 9 Tejan Street Kenema arrived in the office and reported that on today's date 15/1/98 at about 1600 hrs, at Lambaye River, he saw a baby with After birth in the said river. M.C.P. Stone of Sgt 1895 informed. 15/1/98
48	1625	44	Ref S/D 44 of above, the complainant left with the I/D and returned office for the same. 5002

Thursday 15th Jan 1978

18

Sno	Time	Off.	Remarks	
47	1740	48	Came in for duty	54
48	1749	47	When leaving the office for Nicol street in search of suspect.	
49	1835	50	I reported in for duty	
50	1840	49	I have reported in for duty	
51	1840		1845 Sgt Mansalley left the office for his quarters	
52	1945		48 th Shift Personnel comprising of the following Nos 2725, 6240, 1608, 4062, 11c 3527 paraded for duty. They were inspected by Sgt 3527 found in fit, clean and tidy. He lectured us on general police duties and method of approach to members of the public before details made thus duty officer 1608 took up duty 2725 th Criminal Reserve 4062, 6240 and 3527 11c shift otherwise on serious report area quite	55 56 57 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
53	2000	8	I have handed over the duties of Duty Officer to Dept 4062 as per 510 8 to be true and correct otherwise no serious reports	
54	2010		I visited the C.I.D office as an order	

January 15 1998

Time	Ch.	Remarks
54 (cont)		five men on duty with no complaints.
		No. 3527 of J/cph Juse. He shift accounts for no suspect in custody and I warned him to inform me of any suspect brought in for any offence.
55	2015	Ref SID54 of above, left the office for orderly official rounds.
56	2136	57 I have left the office together with Fayah Wana for Nyodeyama.
57	2150	56 Ref SID56 of even date I have returned from Nyodeyama.
FRIDAY 16 th JANUARY 1998		
1	0710	7: I arrived in for duty.
2	0735	7: S/Pl 1675, 5886 together with S/Pl 1028, Hyde arrived in for duty.
3	0739	7: S/Pl 5857 arrived in for duty.
4	0741	7: S/Pl 2871 arrived in for duty.
5	0743	7: S/Pl 35 together with 1028, S/Pl 1875 arrived in for duty.
6	0744	7: S/Pl 6006 arrived in for duty.
7	0745	1:2 "A" shift - personnel comprising of the following UOS:- 6006, 1675, 516, 1028, 5857, 4735, 1521, 2183, 35, 4721, 5886, 4878, 5106, 4566, 5604, 3947, 1893, 1895, 2057, SCS. 11, 367, 77, ASP. ROGERS and myself present and

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature] 2725

[Marginal notes and scribbles on the left side of the page]

FRIDAY 16th JANUARY 1998

S/N	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Seq
7.	Contd.		<p>on duty. They were inspected by S/O Hyde and found clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift-lectured on general police duty by 1795 before details as follows:- Duty officer:- 72, look up orderly:- 1028. crime reserves:- 4566, 5807, 6006, 3947, 1675, 5857, 4735, 1571, 2183, 4721, 35, 5886, 4878, 5108 and 1893. None in custody. Yc shift:- 2057. Area seem to be quiet at the moment. Other wise no serious report.</p>	9 10 11
8	0800	5188	<p>handed over the duties of Duty officer to N^o 72 S/O Sidiqur with articles as follows, one telephone set, one wall clock, one wooden rag, one wooden cupboard, one trunk, one drinking bucket, one scrape XL bited, 3 C-4K chairs, twelve wooden door frames, one steel door frame, one blanket, four vehicles i.e SP 1010, 14865, 29186 & 33949. Otherwise no serious</p>	12 13 14 15

tr 9 211

Sec
J

Time	CR	Occurrence	Signature
0920	35	I am leaving with Sgt 1521 for Gangster Street, Keena...	
0930	44 & 15/1/98 24	with 2057 I left for Biopore field on enquiry. And It has been confirmed by the coroner that the object found the- wing by Lambaya stre- eam on 15/1/98 was an after birth, and not a human being. SD 44 of 15/1/98 refers.	
0935	7	I have brought in sus- pect Mohamed Tupy Jalloh in respect of CR-421/97 S/O informed.	
0937		I left the office with Dept 4878 for Coker Jah sheet on enquiry.	
0940	46	I have brought in Moh- amed Binja J. M. B. Kenta street house for en- quiry for the of the street S/O informed.	
0945	17	By the way above, by order of S/O I have handed over suspect Mohamed Binja to the S/O for safe custody.	
0955	29	I am leaving the office together with of a CIA for Moine Street.	

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21

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22

23

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1-11-11 1998


Sl. No	Date	Occurrence	Encl	Page No
17	10/00	14: Ref sh up of today date, by order of the OIC through the Inspector Mohamed Saifuddin & head of the Security Force of No 9 Jambak road		24 III
18	10/05	17 Ref sh 17/4/1998, the name of mag capt to the office		25 III
19	10/08	20 David Lahai of No 17 Hindawa Street Kenema arrived in the office and reported that on the 15/11/98 at about 11:40 P.m. A gang of armed men surrounded the house at the above address damaged the doors and entered the rooms. Stole there in various articles including one yamaha 100 with Registration number WJ 29 789 Value to follow C.P.O informed D/Off boat dealing.		26 III 27 III 28 III
20	10/10	19 Ref sp 19 of above D/Off boat left the office to the scene together with complainant		29 III
21	10/12	22 I have handed over eleven pictures to Binta Koroma S/O - C/O informed		30 III
22	10/13	21 Ref sh - 21 of above date she left for her destinations		
23	10/14	25 Lansana Kiamma of Kpage Company Kenema, arrested and brought in one mohamed Baboh of longball and reported that the latter has collected (10) ten L of ...		31 III

Friday 16th January 1998

Sl. No	Time	Sl. No	Occurrence
32	1150	31	improve D/P.C. 2566 dealing Ref 3/10/31 of above the complainant is iss. of Police medical forms and at the same time left for Government Hospital for treatment
33	1200	34	I am leaving the office together with D/A.S.P Rogers for Bicycleed
34	1210	33	Ref 3/10/33 of above I returned to the office together with A.S.P Rogers
35	1315	38 42	Mohamed Kabch Bih of Nyandayama Section, Kenema arrested and brought in Mohamed Conteh of Adams Willgoe and reported that in January 1998 he got two shares ^{in value of 200,000/000} for the purpose of mining which he converted to his own use and benefit S/O C.I.A informed of the details
36	1320	37	Fallah Krandehala of No. 8 Sheriff Street arrived in and asked for police assistant
37	1330	36, 43	Ref 3/10/36 of above with offc. 367, Complainant I left the office for No. 8 Sheriff Street on enquiry
38	1358	35	Ref 3/10/35 above Complainant made statement and left the office
39	1359	45	I am leaving the office for Nyandayama on enquiry
40	1420	46	Annamma Jayarama Kanneh No. 109 Main Street Kenema arrived and reported that on today's date 16-1-98 at

Friday 14th January 1978

Sig	Time	Occurrence	Sig
		address, but remained by one sheet breakdown of the same address 560 405	
	1425	By order of S/O C.I.D I have handed over suspect Chief Brima Kpaka to Lansana Keima and he wanted to produce him tomorrow at 900 hrs	
	1426 35	Ref S/O 35 of above date I handed over suspect to lock-up for safe custody.	
	1600 37	Ref S/O 37 of above with S/O 37 I returned to the office	
	1602	I have obtained Voluntary Cautious Statement from Suspect Theophilus Dunde Bul	
	1605 39	Ref S/O 39 of even date I returned the office with no serious report	
	1610 40	Ref S/O 40 of today doing complete Moral statement and left for his residence after being warned to produce witnesses	
	1605 26	Ref S/O 26 of above S/O 2721 and 2057 returned to office after prayers	
	1825 50	Dept 4062 in inferior "B" shift duty	
	1850 50	of rebuttal in your clarity	
	1925	"B" shift personnel comprising of No 1608, 6240, 2725, 3527 shift and myself present and paraded for duties, inspection was done by me found them to be clean, tidy and ready	




Friday 16th January 1998

Sl	Time	Duties
50	Cont'd	Centred on General Police duties before detailed as follows, Duty officer N ^o 1608 D.P.C. Cortez, Lock up order N ^o 6240 D.P.C. Souza, Crime reserve D.P.C. 2725 /c 4062 in charge Shift N ^o 3527 D.Cpl Tusey, two (2) male suspects in custody, otherwise no serious complaint.
51	1920	I handed over the duties of the duty officer 1608 D/P.C. Cortez as per entry S/D of today's date 16/1/98 otherwise no serious complaint.
52	2045	53 I arrived in on visit as an orderly officer tonight met the following personnel on duty on shift as then - 1608, 6240, 4062, 2725 /c cpl 3527 who reported of two (2) suspects in Police custody for the alleged various offences. No reports yet.
53	2100	52 D/S 1052 of area entry Sub-inspector Moriba left the office to continue his visit to the other formations.
SATURDAY 17th January, 1998		
1	0700	7; D/Sgt 2183 arrived in for duty.
2	0705	7; D/Inspector Hyde is in for duty.
3	0710	7; D/P.C. 35 and 5857 arrived in for duty.
4	0715	7; D/cpl 3947 is in for duty.
5	0720	7; D/cpl 4878 2871 1896 4721 and

1st shift 14th January, 1998

Sup	Time	ck	Occurrence	Sign
6	0730	7:	D/cpl. 6006 and 4735 arrived in for duty	6006 4735
7	0745	1:2	"A" shift - personnel comprising of	
		3:4	the following nos: - 4566, 5604, 6006,	
		5:6	3947, 1675, 1028, 5857, 4735, 1521,	
		10:59	2183, 4721, 35, 5886, 4878, 5106,	
			1893, 1895, 2057, SCS. 11, 72, 367,	
			ASP. Rogers and myself present	
			and at the same time paraded	
			for duty. They were inspected	
			by M.S.I. Kamara and found	
			clean, fit and ready for duty.	
			The shift - returned on general	
			Police duty by 4721 before de-	
			tails as follows: - Duty of-	
			ficer: - 4878, took up order by -	
			3947. Crime references: - 4566,	
			5604, 6006, 3947, 1675, 1028, 5878,	
			4735, 1521, 2183, 4721, 35, 5886,	
			5106 and 1893. Two ² suspects	
			in custody for various cri-	
			minial offences. Yc shift: -	
			2057. Area seem to be quiet	
			at the moment. Other -	
			wire no serious report. -	
8	0800	8:45	I handed over the duties of	
		16/1	duty officer to D/cpl. 4878 with	
		9/8	articles on charge as per in-	
		9:	ventory thus: one wall clock, one	
			telephone set, one drinking buc-	
			ket, a cup, one D/I, one tray	
			soak two shade lamps plus	
			a trunk containing sundries pe-	



Saturday 1st Jan 1953

No TIME C/R O C C S

3 Curt one wooden rag, one
scraped XL bike, cupboards
three C₄ chairs, twelve wooden
door frames, one blanket,
(4) four vehicles SP1010, 14865,
29186 and 33949.
Other misc no serious repair

9 0805 8: 18th shift paraded off duty
same time they left
for their various
quarters

10 0806 7 I arrived on duty
11 0830 I am leaving the office with
me 5204 for Kambali Street,
Kamara on enquiry

12 0831 14 I left the office to go
the Feltham subject Mr.
named Sabah Khan on
enquiry

13 0830 16 Mr. Augustine Barrette
arrived in for statement
enq.


14 0900 I left the office for Tor
ngo Park on enquiry

15 0905 I left the office for
Hawthorn Park on
enquiry

16 0910 13 Ref. SLD A3 of above, he
left after statement

17 0915 18 Shelia Kamara of 5 Air field
road, Yengans Road, brought

IG	TIME	C/R	O C C U R R E N C E	SIGN
			alleged fraudulent conversion involving the sum of 400,000/00 Ref S/O and O/C informed. —	ATSS
8	0920	17	Ref S/O 17 of even date, Mombasa Darany had admitted to the sum in question and had agreed to pay the said sum of the 17/4/98 at 4 p.m. which sheldu Darany had accepted. —	ATSS
9	0925	20	Ref S/O 17 and 18 of even date and Abdulai Turay of 29 ^B Tomlepda II new site Tompo field came in to stand surety for Mombasa Darany. S/O info. —	ATSS
20	0935	19	Ref S/O 19, by order of S/O C/O I have released Mombasa Darany to Abdulai Turay and to produce him on the 17/4/98 at 4 p.m. —	ATSS
11	0939	12	One Lidia Adomawa of 39 Khandah Street Kambaya arrived in to see O/C. —	ATSS
12	0945	11	By order of O/C. through the S/O Mariama Bemwa is handed over to Lidia Adomawa. —	ATSS
13	0950	15	Ref S/O 15 of above of returned to the office after evening. —	ATSS
14	1110	12	Ref S/O 12 of even date I returned to the office together with suspect. —	ATSS



Saturday 17th June 1998

Y. No. T. No. Ch.

Occurrence

			in to see s/o C.I.D
			in respect of his case -
16	1120	17	By order of DSI Ka. - I have release suspect Mohamed Dabo to Chief Brima Kpate and returned to produce him on the 10/6/98
17	1121	16	200 twenty bushel of rice of s/o 16 of above to Surety and suspect left -
18	1130	25	I left for col. Sam Botta via Kruksery -
19	1131	20	Mohamed Kourou of no 7 Mass Bheh Kourou reported that on 11th January 1998 at about 3 P.M. he gave his three pieces of diamond stones value L\$ 1500 to one Abdul Karim Kourou for the purpose of sales with the latter promised to his own use or benefit. C.I.D. division and of C.I.D. are informed. D/Seph 1521 dealing
20	1135	19	126 s/o 19 of above complainant and witness made statement
21	1230	22	One Abdul Tarawallie of #50 Circle Road Kourou arrived in the office and reported that sometime in November 1997 whilst at Tongo Field with one Lady called Porshell who was based at Tongo Field
26	1998		

O C C U R R E N C E

Log

No	Time	Q/R	Occurrence	Log
22	1240	22	water pump machine, valued the sum of Le 520,000/00 which the latter had fraudulently converted same to her own use and benefit. J.P.O. crime DRI Kama informed and I am dealing	153 11/13
23	1245	21	complainant made statement and at the same time left the office to contact witnesses for statement	153 11/13
23	1245	24	Alhaji Amadu Berruie of 17 Sena - Gu Lamb Kenema, arrested and brought in one Steven Bahu Musa of the same address, reporting that on Monday 29/12/97 he gave the latter 927 news papers for the purpose of sales, valued Le 134,400/00 which the latter had converted to his own and benefit. J.P.O crime informed. I am dealing.	153 11/13
24	1300	23	Ref no 23 above, I obtained statement from complainant, warned to produce witnesses as soon as possible and had left the office.	153 11/13
29	130218	14	Ref. S/D 14 of above, I returned to the office. Nothing of Police interest was traced.	153 11/13
30	1300	41	I left the office for Moisir Street an Empty	153 11/13
31	1330		one Sodquie Bangura of no 1 Nyanderjama Road borna and recommended by MR. Saich Bayna	

Saturday 14th January 1998

- 31 Learn to stand surety for suspect Abdul, i.e. Kamara and wanted to produce him on 19/1/98 at 1000 hrs
- 32 1400 33 By order of O/C I have released suspect Shera Daskowa and wanted to report here on Friday 23/1/98 at 0900 hrs
- 33 1400 32 Ref 87-32 of above Shera Daskowa left
- 34 1412 23 Ref 87D 22 I obtained O/C statement from suspect Steven Musa.
- 35 35
- 36 1420 36 Daniel Massogun of 17 Sembuber Lane Kenema came in to see Ali Kamara & P.O suspect Steven Musa.
- 37 1444 35 By order of O/C C.I.D through Ali Kamara I have handed over suspect Steven Musa to Daniel Massogun and wanted to produce him on Monday 19/1/98 at 1000 hrs
- 38 1448 I left the office for Circular Road to obtain statement
- 39 1450 39 one Dankoy sesay of 45 Samba Street Kenema arrested and brought in Aminata Kamara of Ellis Street Kenema and reported that sometime January 1998 she gave the latter one bag sugar valued 6/00, 000 on the 1-1-98

Refused
 10/28
 10/28

Time	CR	Occ.	Sign
		Continued. The total value of 6,610,000/00	
		D/S/ Kenema informed at the	5706
	43	Same time dealing	PK
1300	38	Ref 81038 of today's 17/1/98	
		complainant had made statement	
		at the same time left for his	PK
		quarters	PK
1305	62	D/Sgt 2871 and party left the	PK
		office for Prison Kenema	PK
1630	30	Ref SD 30 of above 9 returned	
		the office after Ensign	PK
1700	53	O/C Amara and party left	
		the office on special duty	PK
1702	39	By order of C.P.O. in division 9 have	
		released suspects Aminata Kamara	
		and Amadu Kuyateh to misbapha	
		Kuyateh and to produce them on 12/1/98	PK
1730	45	By order of S/O Kamara 9 have	
		released suspect Mustapha Man-	
		caray and handed him over	PK
		to Mr. Ibrahim Alieu Kamara	
		of No. 4 Second Street, Kenema	
		and warned to produce him	
		tomorrow 18/1/98 at 3pm.	PK
1735	44	Ref SD 44 of above both	
		suspect and surely left	PK
1735	45	D/Sgt 4878 left the office	
		left the office for	PK
		Tarace on Ensign	PK
1738	48	9 left the office to visit	
		the cells meet no company	PK
1820	44	Ref SD 44 of above 9	

Saturday, 1st June 1934

S/No	Time	cl.	Occurrence	Sign
49	1850	46	Ref SD 45 of above D.P. 100 is returned to the office after evening	
50	1852	51	I returned to the office with o/c C.I.O Mr Lamin Amang and OPC 5604 returned from Mr B.S. Mawson's residence at 1123 Trench Street, Kanungu where a search was conducted upon a warrant. In the process of search, two expired pistols/licenses were discovered, three letters dated 24-8-97, 6-10-97 and 1-12-97, a list of contributors towards Kamanga initiation, were also discovered. Other wise no serious report.	RS
51	1900	50	Ref 510 50 of even date with o/c 5604 and o/c C.I.O Mr Amang left for C.P.O's quarters with the search warrant and discoveries	RS-51
52	1925		D/O of 27.25 reported in J.P. duty	(RS)
53	1930	42	Ref 510 42 of today date, Inspector P.A.B. Posing and party returned to the office from Dr Mawson's residence after executing a search warrant at the latter's premises. During the search, nothing was noticed	

In	No	Time	CLR	Occurrence	Sign
----	----	------	-----	------------	------

571932 55 D/Cpl 4062 arrived in for duty

571940 52 54 'B' shift personnel comprising 9 N^o 1808, 6240, 2725, 3522

pc shift and myself present and paraded for duty, Inspected by Dsgt 2087 found clean, tidy and ready for duty after been lectured on General Police duties, before detailed as this Duty officer N^o 6240 D.P.C. Sowa Lock up orderly N^o 2725 D.Cpl Musa, Crime reserve 1808 D.P.C. Conteh and myself /c shift ~~by~~ 3522 D.Cpl. Jusu. One male suspect in custody otherwise no serious complaint.

571950 60 I handed over the duty of the office to D/P.C. 6240 with the following articles in charge as per handing over note as follows: one wall clock, one telephone set, two shade lamps, one wooden cupboard, one wooden range, one old damage bike, one blanket, one sewing machine head, one trunk containing ^{personal} properties, one blanket, with cup,

Wednesday 12th January 1957

Sho	Time	Occurrence	Page No
		one P.T. book, way book, three 'C' 'H' chairs, twelve wooden dog flaps, frame and four chairs nos SP1010, WR 14865, 2486, and 33949 otherwise no complain	1
57	2008	58 I returned to the office from 2 Kobbie Street Kome-mia with NRS. 2257, 5886, 1103 6203, Sgt and Insp. Olu after having searched the premises of one Mr. Korneh in the presence of his wife Mrs. Mariama Korneh in the course of searching we found one pamphlet of the S.L.P.P. the triumph and trial, one other pamphlet A.P.C. in foil to mail, one S.L.P.P. symbol bearing pictures, one S.L.P.P. Calendar know your leader and one copy of S.L.B.S. Annoucement about a failed Coup in Sierra Leone was discovered. These documents and Calendar are taken along with us. Mariama Korneh for investigation, nothing damaged or stolen	1 2 3 4 5 6
58	2006	57 Feb. 8D. 57 above Insp. Olu left with Mrs. Korneh and	

Sunday 12th January 1947

Engi	Time	CLR	Occurrence	Sign
9	2008	7	'A' Shift personnel paraded off duty and they left for their various premises	6240 JWC
10	2010	56	I certify that the countries as per 810 56 of even entry are true and correct. Other misc lines come to complainant	6240 JWC
11	2018	58'	Insp. Olu returned to the office from C.P.O's quarters who ordered the release of Mrs. Kornek and the documents handed over to him	6240 JWC
12	2030	40	Ref 810 40 of the above entry Dsgt 2872 and party returned to the office without any serious report	6240 JWC
Sunday 12th January 1947				
1	0707	5:	Dsgt 2183 arrived in for duty together with inspector Hyde	6240 JWC
2	0735	5:	Dsgt 2871 came in for duty	6240 JWC
3	0737	5:	I arrived in for duty	6240 JWC
4	0740	5:	I arrived in and reported for duty	6240 JWC
5	0743	6:	1895 reported for duty.	6240 JWC
5	0745	11:2	"A" Shift personnel comprising 3:4 of the following nos:- 2183, 6005, 5:11 3947, 1895 and myself pre-	
		10:12	sent and at the same	
		13:40	time paraded for duty.	
		20	They were inspected by me	

Sunday 18th January 1957

38

Mo Time	Occurrence	Sign
6. Contd.	<p>ready for duty. The shift detected on circumstantial law II (Rape) by 3947 before details as follows:- Duty officer:-5886, work up orderly:-6006. Crime releases 2183 and 3947. Not yet gear for duty:-4566, 5604, 1675, 1521, 35, 4878, 5106, 1893, 4779, SCs. II, 72, 367 & ASP. Rogers. One (1) suspect in custody for fraudulent conversion. Yc shift:-2057. Area seem to be quiet at the moment. Other wire no serious report. — —</p>	<p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</p>
7 0800 8	<p>I handed over the duties of duty officer to D/pc 5886 with the following as per inventory list thus: one small case, a telephone set, two shade lamps, Sewing Machine hand, a trunk containing prisoners' property, D.J. way book, two bed springs one damaged XL Gilco water pipe four spare tyres one steel chair, 12 wooden chair frames and four benches SP1010 BU 29186 UR 14885 and 33949 a drinking bucket and a cup otherwise area quiet. N. also</p>	<p>8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100</p>
	To Report	<p>101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200</p>

58

Sunday, 18th January, 1948

Time	Person	Description	Signature
		Articles of Duty Officers from D/P.C. 6240 with articles on charge per 107 of even date to be done and correct except for the way book that is not seen.	
		D/Sgt 1895 - formed	5885
7/10 310 55	B	shift personnel persuaded off duty and left the office	5886
10/10 849 6	D/Sgt 2371	left for church service	5886
11/10 850 6	I	arrived in for duty	5807
12/10 853 6	D/P.C. 35	arrived in for duty	5806
13/10 006 6:19	D/P.C. C114	arrived in the office	5886
14/10 07 6	D/Sgt 4721	arrived in the office	5886
15/10 27 10		It rained to base	5886
16/10 50 13		Sam leaving the office for lunch	
17/10 00		I left the office with one Daniel for Bonnie street on enquiry	5886
18/10 05 16		Rep 5106 of the office returned	5886
19/10 08 13	D/P.C. C114	left the office	5886
20/10 00 21		Rita's father of Mr 9 Wesley street having arrested and brought in one Mohamed Cabel of No 1 Tucker Street known and reported that somewhere last week, she gave her watch up appeared to be water which he has forwarded to his own use and blessit Sgt 2371 - formed, Sam desk	
21/10 05 20		Rep 5102 of above, ... Mohamed Cabel is released	

Sunday 18th January 1998

occurrence

SIC

water pipe, four spare tyres, One steel door, twelve (12) wooden door frames, one bucket plus one drinking cup, and vehicles nos WU 29186, SP1010, WR 14865 and 33949. Otherwise no complaint.

5886
DM4
586
M4

2003 28 I certify that the above entries is true and correct

5886
5887
5888
5889

2005 6 'A' Shift personnel proceeded off duty and left the office for their various residence

5890
5891
5892

2008 I arrived in for 'B' Shift's duty and at the same time detailed Crime Reserve

5893

2055 33 D/Sgt 4721 Arrived in the office and reported sick

5894

2100 32 Ref SD 32 D/Sgt 4721 left the office for his quarters

5895

2220 35 I arrived in the office from Luema Village on an Enquiry

5896

2230 34 Ref SD 34 of even date, I have decided to Pass the night in the office together with the night personnel due to late hours of my arrival, shift N.C.O. IC is informed.

5897

MONDAY 19th January 1998

0955 I have the office for Fendick on an Enquiry

5898

Monday 19th Jan. 1998

4 Mc

Time	Event	Signature	Time	Event	Signature
2 0700	6. Sgt 2183, 1675 6006 and 5886 arrived in for duty	[Signature]			
3 0710	6. S/Pc 1608 and 35 arrived in together with S/cpl 3947	[Signature]			
4 0711	6. I reported for duty	[Signature]			
5 0715	6. Msst 2821, 4878, 6240, 4062 arrived in for duty	[Signature]			
6. 0745	213 "A" shift - personnel comprising 415 of the following NOPS: - 6240, 24 1608, 4062, 4566, 3527, 6006, 28 3947, 1675, 1521, 2183, 5886, 62 35, 4878, 5106, 1893, 1895, 2057, SCS. 72 11, 367, ASP. Rogers and myself present and at the same time paraded for duty. They were inspected by S/Pltd and found clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift-lectured on general Police duty by 2183 before details as follows: - Duty of -				
	pick: - 6240, look-up duty: 5604. crime revenues: - 1608, 4062, 3527, 4566, 6006, 3947, 1675, 1521, 2183, 35, 5886, 4878, 5106 and 1893. Not yet seen for duty: - 4779. one (1) suspect in custody. Yc shift: - 2057. Area seem to be quiet at the moment. Otherwise no serious				
	work		8 0805	7	
			9 0815	62	
			10 0845	16	
			11 0930	25	

Monday 19th Jan. 1998

S/O	TIME	Occurrence	S/O
D F A W 68cc	10 11 12	of duty officer to Blk 6246 with articles on charge as follows: one wall clock, one telephone set, two shade lamps, one bucket, one cup, one cupboard, one hanger, three c4 chairs, two bed springs, one damage Honda, one blanket, one D/I book, one w- book , twelve (12) wooden door frame, one sewing machine head, four spare tyres, one door steel door frame vehicles nos laly 29186 sp1010, WR14865, and 33949.	S/O
A W 68cc	8 0805	7 I certify that the articles as per 107 are done and done otherwise no serious report	S/O
A W 68cc	9 0815	62 A shift person in 1 paraded off duty and left for their various promises	S/O
A W 68cc	10 0845	16 I left the office for Tong park on luy day	S/O
A W 68cc	11 0930	25 Hassan Telloh of 4610 the Williams Street, Kenema arrived in and reported that on today's date 19/98 at about 0336 hrs armed men dressed in military fatigue boots and entered into his house and made away various articles	S/O

Monday 19th Jan. 1998

DATE	TIME	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	REMARKS
			occurrence	
11	0935	11	Call of an dealing	
12	0935	11	Ref No. 11 of above with Compl- ainant; Ref No. 367 of kept the office for 16.10 the Williams Street on enquiry	
13	1005	14	Mohamed Lash Bah of Nyandoyms New Site, Kereba arrived in to see o/c C.I.S. in respect of his matter to wit, Mohamed Antel is suspect	ST.06 E.K.00000
14	1010	13 15	By order of s/o C.I.S. Inspector Hyde I handed over suspect, Mohamed Antel to complainant, Mohamed Lash Bah and warned to produce same at 1000 a.m. on Tuesday 20/1/98.	ST.06 E.K.00000
15	1012	14	Ref S/O 14 above, Suspect and left the office.	ST.06 E.K.00000
16	1015	10	Ref No. 10 of above entry with Suspect Willie Labrie of returned to the office and at the same time with the con- sent of s/o C.I.S. of Inspect- or Hyde, Suspect left the office in search of suspect Talah on his own o/c to be informed	ST.06 E.K.00000
17	1050	12	Ref No. 12 of above with Compl- ainant; Ref No. 367 I returned to the office from scene where no breakage was discovered but the armed men forced the tenant's to open the main door lead - to the main 1	

Tuesday 19th January 1999

CR

Occurrence

SIC

7/10/98 7:00 AM Thieves entered and made away with different items from different occupants no exhibit brought in as yet.

8/10/98 22 with ofc C. J. M. Amara and Party, I left the office for Seneca town on enquiry.

9/10/98 22 I left the office for Howforda Part on Enquiry

10/10/98 21 James Sankoh, of No 15 Kiasamba terrace, Kenema arrived in the office and reported that on Sunday during the afternoon hours several men dressed in combat took his vehicle type T56XSD and burnt it. Value L180,000.00 S/O C. I. O Inspector Hyde informed I am dealing

21/11/98 20 Ref S/O 20 of above complaint left and provided to come for statement

22/11/98 18 with ofc Amara and Party, I returned to the office from searching the premises of F. T. Sand. Nothing of police interest - desecrated.

23/11/98 19 Ref SD 19 of above I returned to the office after Enquiry

24/11/98 26: I/c of 2192 cost for Corana truck on enquiry

25/12/00 11: Complainant left after statement

26/12/01 I have brought in by

Monday 19th January, 1998

Date	Occurrence	Ref
27/12/97	I have handed him over to [unclear] up [unclear] for safe-keeping - [unclear]	[unclear]
27/12/97	I am leaving the office for [unclear] [unclear]	[unclear]
28/12/97	Det 3527 left the office for [unclear] Hospital Kenema on [unclear] enquiry	[unclear]
29/12/97	Det 3527 left the office for [unclear] Street in [unclear]	[unclear]
30/12/97	Amm. Mark Kame of No 2 Lane 43 [unclear] road Kenema brought in one baby child and reported that on Wednesday 14/1/98 she found the said child in Fango field whilst going towards Bondama area. No injury or [unclear] dealing.	[unclear]
31/12/97	I handed Det [unclear] Barris to 5604 for safe [unclear]	[unclear]
32/12/97	Mohamed K. Barris 87NO 10 [unclear] Road Kenema arrested and brought in one Marie Barris Kenema Town and reported that Sometime in August 1997 he entrusted an aluminium plate value about Gx 200,000/00 for the purpose making two 30 gallon p[unclear] which he converted to [unclear]	[unclear]

Monday 19th January, 1978

1/2 Tmacha

Occurrences

- 37 Cont 37 Yama Village known reporting that on 11/58 he gave the latter the sum of 1,130,000/00 for the purpose of safe keeping which he converted to his own use or benefit N.C.C. Enigma
- 38/1425 37 Informal spec 35 dealing with complainant made statement and left the office for his premises
- 39/1430 38 Complainant leaving made statement left for his house
- 40/1435 39 I left the office for Dams Road on Enigma
- 41/1436 39 Ref SID 39 of above the properties of suspect are: one rubber bag, one old cold cap, one baby picture, one black belt, one wire three rings and a pair of keys
- 42/1535 30 By order of o/c I have released said female child to Mr. Brimati Keshan of No. 2 Cemetery road Kenema
- 43/1536 43 Re SID 43 of above both parties left
- 44/1537 46 Fatmata Lahai of Nyandeyama village was brought in for interrogation
- 45/1548 51 Ref SID 45 I have released Fatmata Lahai to Borbor Garmoh to be produced any time needed by the nation

J.S.F. 7/1/78

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119 Sunday, 17th January, 1951

Occurrences

Signs

- 1830 49 One Jessie Collier of No. 4 Sec
and Street Kenema arrived to Sea
N.C.O. Crime Regt 1895
- 1830 48 Ref S/O 48 of above entry
by order of N.C.O. Crime Regt
1895 Suspect Mustafa Mansaray
is released and handed over to Senior
S/O Collier and returned to report
tomorrow 20/1/51 at about
0800 hrs
- 1830 49 Ref S/O 49 of above entry
both suspect and surety left
the office for their destination
- 1830 32 Complaint has not been
left for their own houses
while suspect is placed
in C.C.I.
- 1830 42 Ref S/O 42 of above I have released
and handed over suspects property
to him and wanted to report
here on 20/1/51 at 0900 hrs.
- 1830 47 Ref S/O 47 of above I returned
to the office same time left for
quarters
- 1838 45 I have taken notice of the
fact that S/O 33 released
one Fatmata Dahan said
to have received two
hundred thousand leones
from the money converted
to his own use and benefit.
The release was without

Monday 19th January, 1938

St. Nicholas

Blenheim Co

- 55 1900 I am leaving the office for my quarters.
- 56 1905 50 Sgt 1028 reported in for duty.
- 57 1910 50 I arrived in and reported for duty.
- 58 1912 Sgt 4735 reported in for duty.
- 59 1915 50 B Shift personnel comprising 57 of nos myself 4935, 5857, 1028, 2725 and Dlsqt 4721 present and reported for duty. They were frisked by Dlsqt 4721 and found them clean, fit and ready for duty before detailed as thus. Butts - officer Dlsqt 2725, Lockup tenderly Dlsqt 1028, crime referee 4935 and 5857 and balance shift Dlsqt 4721. Their active 58 life suspect in coll. Other believe no serious report.
- 60 2000 I handed over the duties of duty officer to Sgt 4735 ~~present~~ with articles on charge as per inventory list thus: one wall clock, one telephone, one sewing machine head, two shale lamps 3C4 class four spare tyres, one old trunk containing prisoners' property, one bucket and a can of disinfectant.

Monday 19th January, 1948

Occurrence

Sign

S/P 1010 MUM/4865 W/R 29865
and 33949, other with no
complaints —————

6240
Dewey

I hereby taken over the duties
of duty officer from D/P
6240 Lalith in handing over
note and to be true and
correct —————

(Signature)

"A" Shift Personnel paraded off
duty sometime they left —————

(Signature)

Pc 5860 Sadeba Turay of
Kenema police station arrived
in the office and reported
that on today date 19.1.48 at
about 20.00 hours at no 7 Ugon
bulango street Kenema, he was
threatening to be kill with
a rifle by one Mustafa,
attached at the military police
branch brigade headquarters. No
incharge shift informed. D/P 5857
dealing —————

(Signature)

Pc 5860 Sadeba Turay left the office and
promise to come tomorrow 20.1.48
for statement —————

(Signature)

arrived in the station
on visit as orderly officer
found the following officers
on duty D/P 1028 5857 C/P
2225, 4235 He shift sgt 4721

I am bearing the

Vertical text on the left margin, possibly a date or page number, including "2018" and "2019".

S/O Trivedi

OCE


67 22/10/66 Pat. s/o of Mr. ...
 19/1/98, I returned to the
 office after visited the
 cells found fire (5) Life
 were suspect in cells in
 good condition when
 visited the station and
 is normal nothing to
 report on

Tuesday 20 January 1998

- 1 0650 10: I reported sick S/S to
be informed
- 2 0655 I have left the office to meet a
native doctor for treatment
- 3 0700 10: I arrived in for duty
- 4 0705 5: Mohammed Bangara of 40 Circular
Road Kenninga arrived in and
reported that on 08/01/98
one Abdul Bangara went
to him at his cells and few
minutes later he fell and died.
S/O C.I.D. informed to be
informed. Dist. 2183 dealing.
- 5 0710 4: Ref s/o 4 - of above, Dist 2183
B and complainant left for the
scene of crime
- 6 0711 10: D/pc 5886 and S/O arrived in
for duty
- 7 0712 10: N/cpl 1675 and 4878 are in
duty
- 8 0713 10: N/cpl 6006 and 4555 are in
duty

Tuesday 20th January 1998

			2871 one in for duty	Sigh
0745	11.3		"A" shift - personnel comprising 6.7 of the following nos: - 6240, 8.9 1608, 4062, 3527, 4566, 5604, 35. 11. 6006, 3947, 1675, 1521, 2183, 5886, 4878, 5106, 1893, 1895, 2057, SC. 11. 72, 367, ASP. Rogers and myself present and at the same time paraded for duty. They were inspected by D/S-I. Kamara and found clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift - lectured on general Police duty by 3947 before details as follows: - Duty officer: - 4062, wife up orderly: - 35. Crime refer nos: - 6240, 1608, 3527, 4566, 5604, 6006, 3947, 1675, 1521, 2183, 5886, 4878, 5106 and 1893. Five (5) suspects in custody for various criminal offences. Xc Shift: - 2057. Area seem to be quiet - at the moment. Otherwise no serious report.	(Sigh)
0746	10		I arrived in for duty	OP 806
0749	10		I arrived in the office and reported for duty	OP 806
0800	5		Returned from Bedna of crime together with complainant Abobanad Bangura.	OP 806
0820	19		Detl 4735, myself and Complainant Abdul left the office for Hangle Road to	OP 806



Tuesday 20th January 1998

- 15 1025 16. Babba Jabbar of 47 Koromga street arrived in and reported himself. 1213
10/98
- 16 1030 15 By order of ofc. C.I.D. I have released Babba Jabbar on his own and warn him to report here on Monday 26/1/98 at 1400hrs. 1120
98
- 17 1040 I have released Fatmata Khamar alias MB on her own and warned to report here after three weeks with the sum of the forty thousand leones. 1000
98
- 18 1045 29 I am leaving the office for combeast road Kenema STH
Ken
- 19 1230 14 I left the office with Abdul for Hanga road to make suspect 1110
98
- 20 1235 28 DCP/394, 1508, left the office for Tongo Kory Past all Enyima 1110
98
- 21 1240 27 Ok Tattle and party left the office for Kenema town-ship on enyima 1120
98
- 22 1383 23 One Rugiatu Jalloh of Nlahun village Kenema arrived in the office and reported that on Wednesday 14th of January 1998 she entrusted one bundle containing wearings 1120
98

Tuesday January 1950

Date	Off	Occurrence	Sig
		for the purpose delivery, which he converted to his own use or benefit. Of C. informed of OPC 4566 dealing	✓
5/13/50	22	Complainant is now making statement to I.O. in respect of the above.	✓
5/14/50		Of C. C.I.D. and Party left the office to execute search warrant with Kenema	✓
		By order of S/O C.I.D. Insp. Hyde	
5/14/50	26	I have released and handed over Franklyn Collier to one Richard A. Sundina of No 30 Lucia Street, Kenema to produce him tomorrow 2/1/50 at 1000hrs.	✓
5/14/50	25	Surety and suspect left the office.	✓
5/14/50	21	Ref S/B 21 of above, Insp. Hunt and party returned to the office with endorsed S/W on #20, Bama Road, Kenema for arrears delivery to O/C C.I.D.	✓
5/14/50	20	Ref SD 20 of above D/Cpl 3947 1608 returned to the office after emptying	✓
5/14/50	18	Ref SD 18 of above 9 returned to the office after emptying	✓
5/14/50	31	Witness Amadu Kenema arrived in for statement	✓
		Ref SD 10 of above, I have ab.	✓

Tuesday 20th January 1998

56

SN	Time	Of	Occurrence	By
32	1530	33	One Mohamed Bangura of No. 9 Fulba Street Keneba Arrived to see S/O C.I.D.	
33	1532	32	Ref No - 32 of above date	
		34	date by order of S/O C.I.D. of Inspector Hyde suspect Murtapa Mansaray is released and handed over to Mohamed Bangura and allowed to report tomorrow 21/1/98 at about 0100 hrs	
34	1533	33	Ref No - 33 of above date both suspect and surety left for their destination	
35	1530		I have handed over suspect Morison Fama to look up duty officer of cp/462 for protective custody	
39	1535	53	S/O C.I.D. Mr Hyde left the office for Gambia Township	
40	1540	46	I am leaving the office for St Charles, an Ensign	
41	1542	42	With ASI B. Braima and Party arrived in the station from R.C.I.D. on enquiry D.C. C.I.D. Keneba to be improved	
42	1600	41	Ref No of above Nos 1593, 5886 and 1608 left with parties for the town and on enquiry	

56 Tuesday 20th January 1998 01

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Ref	chk	Occurrence	Sig
1710	45	One Abou Dabou of #26, Massaquewi street Kenema arrived in the office and reported that on 20/1/98 at about 4.30 P.m. he was bitten by a dog along Piece la Road Kenema and that he suspected that one Satta on the same street own the dog. D/C. C.I.B. informed. I am dealing with	Sig
1712	44	Ref. S/D 44 of above, the complainant left for treatment.	
1713	45	Ref. S/D 45 of above, he returned to the office.	
1730		Ref S/D 34 of above, I have arrested and brought in suspect Abu Sulaiman and handed him to lock-up for protective custody. A.C.O. Aune and S/I Cameron are injured	
1740	51	Ref S/D 49 of above, John P. Selony of No 16 Ngombungu Street Kenema arrived in to stand surety for suspect Abu Sulaiman. S/I Cameron is joined	
1810	50	Ref S/D 50 of above, I have related report to John P. Selony and arranged to have	

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24/1/98
57

Tuesday 10 January 1998

Time	Ch.	Event	Notes	
4:45	1820	43	Ref s/d 43 of today's entry myself and party returned from executing warrant of arrest ^{NO. 2/98} at No. 56 Haugh Road Kenema and at the same time arrested and brought in one Porssah Show T.P.O. crime DCI Kanara is informed for the information of c/o Amara and s/d Hade	1820
53	1825	39	Ref s/d 39 of above g returned to the office after Evening	1825
54	1900		D.P.C. 2028 Sawoh Counsel in for duty.	1900
55	1910		I am in for duty	1910
56	1912	57	I obtained voluntary out in state - went from suspect Porssah Show	1912
57	2000	58	I obtained charged statement from Porssah Show	2000
58	2008	59	Returned to the office from 1 Kenayambe street kenema where self, 4735, 5604, 4959 2821, 5106 and 1103 executed search warrant on information that petroleum was stored there, we found nothing of police interest and nothing stolen by us.	2008
59	2012	58	I am leaving for home having reported off duty	2012
60	2013		"B" shift personnel comprising of nos myself 4735, 1028, 2720 and present and paraded for	2013

Hiding 2nd January 1958

occurrence

CO

his wife Tsata Kamara of no 18 Takuba Street Ueno for the purpose of safe keeping in which the latter consented it to his own use and benefit etc. C.I.D. informed of a dealing

#1578

16: Ref- S1016 of today's date of 18: I have left the office with the complainant to interview the suspects for statement taking

#1579

17: Ref- S1017 of today's date 23/1/58 I returned to the office with the wife of the suspect for statement taking

#1580

16: I have handed over the said suspect Tsata Kamara to penitentiary lock-up on 21 w.p.c. S106 for safe custody

#1581

26 I left the office for Tougo Park on Enquiry

#1582

16: I have obtained statement from the complainant as well as the wife of the suspect Junisa

#1583

I left the office for Benue Road Kenema on Enquiry

#1584

24 Asst Regent and KC got brought in. Name of the Sybilite with receipt bearing the name of Akah only for Robin Saah's machine No PFG 305 of spec

#1585

Fortnight for Calendar

1958

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Hidden 28th January 1995

Date	Time	Event	Ref
24	1522 23	By order of S/O CID I have released Marnie Hilary Sylvester with her document same time she left the office for Kenning town Long Park (How for do)	5607
25	1505 32	I left with Franklyn & Lucia Street on Dr Jimmy	5608
26	1502	Ref S/D 20 of above & returned to the office after Evening	5609
27	1521 12, 28	Ref S/D 12 of above, suspect came and sometime made V/C statement to the police	5604
28	1535	Admitted Suspect of King Case No. 11 King's invited	5610
29	1600 27	Ref S/D 27 by order of S/O CID I have released suspect and warned to come on the 24/1/95 - at 1000 hrs for O/C's interview	5604
29	1605	I am leaving the office for Mansfield Street on evening	5611
30	1600	I am leaving the office for Mansfield Street on evening George of King's invited S/O CID King's invited in the office about app- sation about the 20/1/95 against 7.30 p.m. However Franklyn of 5 delany has lost his manuscript and has other more books of S/O CID's in a box with	5612

Friday 23rd January 1958

30

Sl. No	Time	C/R	Occ	Sign
36	Contd		On today's date 23/1/58 about 6.10 p.m. at Kwana street Kenema a group of people led by Aminata Kanya assaulted her and she sustained injuries and pains all over her body and in the fight she lost a pair of shoes and neck chain. O/C P. 3907 investigating —	4 4 4 4
37	1834	35	Ref sl. 35 of today's date. Complaint must with a police medical report in duplicate submitted to office for government hospital Kenema	4 4
38	1835	36	Ref sl. 36 of today's date, complaint to her must with a police medical report form in duplicate submitted to office for government hospital Kenema	4 4
39	1840	44	I arrived in and reported for duty —	4 4
40	1845	62.61	Musa Kanyo of No 30 Jakuba Street Kenema arrived in to see O/C C.I.D. —	4 4
41	1850	62.68	Ref sl. 68 of today's date 23/1/58 by order of O/C C.I.D. that 9 31 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100	4 4 4 4

Friday 23/1/98

01

Sign	Time	CLR	Occurrence	Sign
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	1855	60,6	By order of OIC through NCO. Crime of have handed over suspect Isata Sankoh to Musa Kargbo of 1030 Takuba street Kenema and warn to produce her when needed by police	
--	------	------	---	---

	1900	44	nb 4735 reported in for duty	
--	------	----	------------------------------	--

	1945	39	'B' Shift Personnels compare	
		43	Sign of nos myself 4735	
		48	5857, 2725 and 1028 present and proceeded for duty by me 4735. They were lecture on general police duties by me before detailed them as thus. Duty office 5857, Lockup order 2725, crime reserved 1028 and incharge shift myself 4735, sick 4721 and one suspect in coll. Other wise no serious report	

	2000	7:66	I handed over the duties of Duty officer as per s/o 7 of 23/1/98	
--	------	------	--	--

	2003	45	I certify that the above entries is true and correct	
--	------	----	--	--

	2005	6	'A' shift personnel paraded off duty and left the office	
--	------	---	--	--

	2006	44	S/O 2725 arrived in for duty	
--	------	----	------------------------------	--

	2050	50	Sub-Inspector Conteh arrived in the office and reported as orderly office to night	
--	------	----	--	--

Friday 23rd January 1998

82

S/N	Time	Officer	Occurrence	Page	Chk
51	2130		I arrived in the office as orderly officer and found 4735 & 2725 on duty on the alert. One male suspect in custody. Duty officer 5857 left his beat without making his movement known. 1028 DPC was said to have gone for prayer, no entry made about his departure. N.C.O 1/c 4735 Dept. warned to reprimand those concerned. Area quiet. NO fresh report —		6
Saturday 24 th January 1998					
1	0650		I left the office for Lydney to collect a shoe —		
2	0700	61	8/inspector Hyde, 6006, 4878 and 1608 arrived in together with 8/sgt 2871 —		
3	0705	61	8/pc 4566, 35 arrived in for duty —		7
4	0710	61	8/cpl 4062 arrived in for duty		
5	0715	61	8/pc 6240 arrived in for duty		
6	0745	213	"A" Shift personnel comprising 9:5 of the following Nos: - 6240, 1608, 4062, 3527, 4566, 5004, 6006, 3947, 1675, 1521, 2188, 355886, 4878, 5106, 1893, 1895, 2057, SCS - 11, 72, 367, ASP. Rogers and myself present and at that time made		

Saturday 24th January 1978

Time Ok Recurrence sign

checked by S/O Hyde and found clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift returned on general police duty by 1608 before details as follows:- duty officer:- 4878, lock up orderly:- 6240. crime reserves:- 1608, 4062, 3527, 4566, 35, 5604, 6006, 3947, 1675, 1521, 5886, 5106, 1893. U.P.A. leave:- 2183. I.R.P.C:- 4779. One (1) suspect in custody for larceny diamond. Yc shift:- 2057. The area seems to be quiet at the moment. Otherwise no serious report. — — —

7 0800 24. I handed over the duties of duty officer to S/O P/4878 with articles on charge as follows: one telephone set, one wall clock, two shade lamps, three C-4 chairs, one cup, one bucket, two bed springs, five tyres, one sewing machine head, one damage XL Honda, twelve (12) wooden door frame. One O/S book. Vehicles: SP1010, WR14865, by [signature]

Saturday 24th January 1998 84
Occurrences

Time Clk

8 0835 12: One Mohamed Hissumana of No 1 Kahunda Street Kerema arrived in the office on today's date 24/1/98 and reported that at about 0730hrs, he was assaulted by one Ali Fawar and three others all of the same address and he thereby sustained human bite on his back and bruises on his right knee and pain all over his body. S/O C. I. D. Informed. I am dealing ————— 1600

9 0840 ~~0857~~ — party left office for Kerema town on evening

10 1200 11 One Pateh Jalloh of No 30 Tamunya Street Kerema arrived in and reported on behalf of his brother Selaiman Bah of the same address that sometime January 1998 whilst travelling on board one identifiable vehicle from Torga to Kerema, his travelling bag containing diamonds and money value to follow fell down. S/O Hyde informed. D/Sgt. 1521 dealing ————— 1600

11 1210 10 Ref S/O 10 of above came leaving the office together with D/Sgt. + 1. in Na

Saturday 24th January 1980
DC Curran

8: Ref S102 of above complaint
is issued with Police medical
report form in duplicate and
left the office for treatment
at the Government Hospital
I am leaving the office
together with O/C C.I.D
for Kenema town ship on
eng

20 328 Complaint having made
25/27 statement and issued a
22 Police medical form left the
office for treatment at Govt
Hospital Kenema

330 I left the office for Dawn
Road on Enigma

19 By order of C.P.O C.I. Div I have
handed over suspect Susd Bamie
to wpc 3890 for safe custody

18 Steven Samba of 5 Samba Street
20 Kenema brought in Susd Bamie
21 of the same address for the offence
of fraudulent conversion in
value the sum of 139,000
C.P.O C.I. Div and O/C C.I.D info
I can deal with

19 Ref S10 19 above, statements were
21 obtained from Steven Samba
and Susd Bamie separately and
respectively. O/C informed

19 Ref S10 19 above, Susd Bamie had
20 returned the sum in question

Saturday 24th January 1998

SIN Time CR OCCURRENCE

23 1943 P115 B shift personnel comprising
 - 5 ncs myself 4735, 2725,
 1028 and 5957 present
 and proceeded for duty by
 myself 4735 and found the
 clear fit and tidy for
 duty before detailed
 as thus, duty office
 1028, Lockup and only
 2725, crime returned myself
 4735 and 5957. There is one
 suspect in cell for various
 an offence. Otherwise no
 serious report

24 2000 7: 9. handed over the
 duty of the office to D/P.C.
 1028 with the following
 article on charge as per
 per S/O 7 of today's date
 24/1/98 otherwise no
 complain

25 2120 26 8/1 Lausana arrived in the office
 on duty as an orderly officer

26 2125 25 Ref 81025 8/1 Lausana left the
 office to visit the other area

27 2127 28 One Yayah Kamera of #1 Suma
 Street Kenema arrived in the office
 and reported that at about 2100
 hours along Massagot Lane Kenema
 he was threatened to be killed with
 a + C. 1.1.1. hou

Sunday 25th January 1998

36

01

Time	Ref	Details	Remarks
0728	27	Ref S/27 informed the Complainant promised to make statement tomorrow	
Sunday 25 th January 1998			
0735	2	One Bhajka Tannawally of No. 9 Boima Kiangoo Street Kevlans was arrested and brought in for the unlawful possession of ten (10) five gallon tins of petrol. S/O Hyde informed	
0738	4	I came in for duty	
0740	4	g arrive in and reported for duty	
0745	213	"A" shift - personnel commencing of the following nos:- 9, 1608, 1893, 4062, 3527, 4566, 1521, 35, 5886, 4878, 5106, 2057, 1895, SCS. 11, 72, 367. ASP. Rogers and myself present and at the same time paraded for duty. They were inspected by S/O Hyde and found clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift - continued on general police duty by 1608 hrs. Details as follows:- Duty officer:- 1893, W/C up orderly:- 5886 Crime reserves:- 4062, 3527, 4566, 1521, 4878, 35, 5106. U.P.A. leave:- 2183. One (1) suspect in custody for larceny. Yc shift:- 2057. The area seem to be quiet.	

Sunday 25th January 1998

S/N	Time	ATO	PCR	LEN
5	0800	6	I handed over the duties of duty officer to the incoming duty officer Dcpl 1893 with the following articles on charge, as per my handing over note these are telephone set, one wall clock, two shade lamps, three C-4 chairs, one bucket, one drinking cup, two bed springs, five tyres, one sewing machine head, one scrapped XL Honda Bike, twelve (12) wooden door frames, one DJ RMC vehicle No: SP 1010, WR 14885, WU 29186, otherwise area quiet for the moment	
6	0805	5	Ref to 5 of above, I certify taking the duties of duty officer from 10:23 with the above mentioned properties - proved true and correct with the exception of the door frames which I have counted in the presence of Wpc 5825 and prove to be ten only and not twelve other wise no serious report	
7	0811	4	3 rd shift personnel paraded off duty and at the same time left the office	
8	0830	4	M Sgt 2871 left for church service	
9	0858	4	I left for Church Service	
10	0900	11	I arrived in together with Wcpl 4878 for duty	
11	0901	10	Phyl 870 10 above, Wcpl 4878 left for church service	

11/10

11/10

11/10

11/10

11/10

11/10

25/1/98

891

Time	Date	Description	Site
		with his medical paper after treatment.	
13	09/10/14	One Mahawa Kooma of #9 Davis street Kenema reported in the office and reported that on the 23/1/98 at about 9.0 A.M. at the same address, one Kinei Vandy assaulted her and thereby he sustained bruises on her jaws and pains all over the body. S/P, Hyde informed. I am clearing	
14	103020	I am leaving the office to obtain witness statement	
15	103113	Ref. S/P 13 of above, the complainant left for treatment after statement and wanted to produce her witnesses	
16	1032	I have obtained statement from complainant and wanted to produce his witnesses for statement	
17	11208	I returned to the office.	
18	1140 A	One Sallay Bamfura of no. 15 Shambuta street - Kenema, arrived in the office and reported that on the 23/1/98 at about 10: A.M, she discovered that, thief or thieves constructively broke and entered in to her shop at	

Sunday 25th January 1953 90

Sl. No.	Time	Clk	Occurrence	Sign
18	18:00		The sum of Rs 500,000.00, and jewelry suspected Mohammed Ghla and Ma- sique Bangura, all of the same address. S/O C.I.D. informed. D/cpl. 1893 dealt	
19	18:55	18:	Ref. S/O 18 above, with com- plainant - D/cpl. 1893 and I left the office for scene of crime.	
20	1305	14:	Ref. S/O 14 of above, I returned after I have obtained witnesses state- ments now attached to file	560x
21	1355		Ref S/O 21 of 24/1/53, I have handed over the sum of Rs 139,000/00 to Steven Samra in the presence of S/O C.I.D. and C.P.O.C. Divi -	
22	1357	19: 23	Ref. S/O 19 above, with com- plainant Sallay Bangura, D/PC-35, D/cpl. 1893 and I re- turned to the office from scene of crime at no. 7 Dumbura Street Kewena. At the scene, I observed that the thief or thieves used either master key or spare key to open the shop as there was no act- ual breakage done on the door. On entered the shop complainant showed	

90 Sunday 25th January 71

Signature Name of R Occurrence Sign

12 1400 22 could money. And there was still some amount of money in that said carton. However, we duly executed search warrant on nos. 7 and 15 Gbanfuta street respectively. During the course of the search, nothing of Police interest was discovered, nothing taken away by the Police and nothing damaged by the search party. The said spare key which the thief or thieves used to open the shop was handed over to us by suspect Mohamed Gbla. Both suspects Malique Bamfura and Mohamed Gbla are brought in for further investigation.

560x
 25-1-98
 22
 23

23 1400 22 By order of s/o CID through Sgt 235, I have handed over Malique Bamfura to Daman Bamfura of no 15 Gbanfuta Street Kono and at the same time left the office

24 1615 25 Haja Wali of No 21 Abacha Street Kono advised and reported that on today's date 25-1-98 at about 1400 hours

Sunday 25th January 1948

92

Date	Time	Occurrence	Sign
	1620-24	<p>she was assaulted by one Eye Constable and three others of No 3 Seiya Street Mess and she thereby sustained pain all over her body. N. C. O. Constable informed, I am dealing</p>	<p>367</p>
25	1620-24	<p>By Sgt of above, complaint is being issued with a police medical report form - duplicate same as in the office for government hospital</p>	<p>367</p>
26	2000	<p>I handed over the duties of duty officer to Supt 3947, Momen as per S.O.S. of above with all the above mentioned properties - proved to be true and correct otherwise no serious report</p>	<p>367</p>
27	2005	<p>B Shift personnel comprising of D/Cpls 6006, 3947 and myself present and paraded for duty inspected and found clean and fit for duty before detailed as thus duty officer D/Cpl 3947 locked up orderly D/Cpl 3947 not yet seen for duty 5604 and</p>	<p>367</p>

Sunday 25th January 1998

Sign	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Sign
	2035	29	I arrived in the C.I.D office as an orderly officer to night mat. The following personnel on duty nos 6006, 3947, 2725 I/C 1675, no Campbell area called and quite	(M)
	2040	28	I am leaving the office for charge office K.P.S. C.M. One male suspect in custody	(M)
			Monday 26/1/98	
	0725	8:	S/O Hyde arrived in for duty	(S/O)
	0735	8:	S/Sgt 4735 reported for duty	(4735)
	0738	8:	S/P 4878 reported in for duty	(4878)
	0740	8:	S/Sgt 1895 reported for duty	(1895)
	0741	8:	M/ser 5857, 1893, 5886, 2871, 4062, 1608 arrived in for duty	(5857)
	0742	8:	S/P 4566 reported in for duty same time reported view s/s to note	(4566)
	0743	20:	No 1098 cpl Kamea of traffic section Kamea arrived in and reported that he saw one corpse lying in a shallow stream along Jubilee Street - Kamea S/O Hyde issued	(1098)
	0745	1:2	"A" shift personnel comprising of 314 the following nos - 5857, 4735, 516, 4721, 3296, 1608, 4062, 4566, 1581, 1018, 5886, 4878, 5106, 1028, 1895, 2057, and myself present and at the same time paraded for duty. They were inspected by S/O Hyde	(5857)

Monday 25th January 1954 29704

No	Time	Chr	Occurrence
8.	contd.		<p>ready for duty. The shift- lectured on general Police duty by S/O C.I.D. before details as follows:- Duty officer:- 1608, work up orderly:- 1028. U.P.A. leave:- 2183. Not yet seen for duty:- 35, 1893 and 3527. One (1) suspect in custody for la. Army. 1/2 shift:- 2057. The area seem to be quiet at the moment. Otherwise no serious report. — — —</p>
9	0800	11:	<p>Handed over the duties of duty of officer to D/S. 1608 with stock on charge as per handing over no thus: One telephone set, one wall clock, two shade lamp, three c4 chairs, one bucket, one cup, two bed springs, five tyres, one sewing machine head, one scragged XL bi ten (10) wooden door frames, one D book, vehicles sp. 1010, wa. 14865, and wa. 29186 otherwise area quiet -</p>
10	0805	8:	<p>D/S 3527 and 35 reported in for duty — — —</p>
11	0810	9:	<p>I certify taken over the duties of duty officer from the out going duty officer D/S 3947 and believe the above- listed to be true and co- — — —</p>

Monday 26th January 1898 ⁷⁰

Attendance

TIME	HR	Attendance	SPC
0910	12	Ref s/o 12 of Even date, & returned to the office with Surety Daniel Massaguni from 17 Sengata Lane, Kenema	285
0915		I am leaving for Ffrench Street on enquiry	285
0917	16	At 15. 367 left for Duand street Kenema on enquiry	285
0920	15	By s/o 15 of above, I returned to the office after writing Memk Kogira and other be report at the office	285
0925	25	I am leaving the office for O/S quarters	285
1015	8	I am leaving the office for Blama Section on Enquiry.	285
1040	28	I am leaving the office for Sesay Street on Enquiry	285
11041	7:21	Ref s/o 7 of above Asst 2057 and party left the office for Fegbelele street to Enquiry visit scene of crime	285
11070	20	with Asst 2057 and party returned to the office having visited scene of crime where we discovered a male corpse lying between Fegbelele street and Lumbeta at a stream no strain marks were found on him photographs were taken by Asst 2057 and the coroner examine	285
		no foul	285

Monday 27th June 1978 2972

Sl No	Time	Page	Occurrence	Sl No
22	1103	14	Ref S/D 14 of 24/1/98 Complainant returned to the office with his medical paper having been treated by at Govt Hospital I.R.O. S/D 30 of 21/1/98	624
23	1107	35	Complainant and Self left to obtain witness statement at 4 George Street Kenya	6240 June
24	1110	36	I left the office to see the manager Banking N. D. B. Houghland Kenya	6240
25	1115	17	Ref S/D 17 of above returned to the office from o/c's quarters	6240
26	1200	27	One James Quee of No 23 Ngombulango Street Kenya arrived in and reported on yesterday's date 25/1/98 at about 11 am at the above address he was threaten to be kill by boy commonly called Turpack of the same street. O/c C.I.D informed I am dealing	6240
27	1205	26	Ref S/D 26 of above complainant made statement and was asked to produce witnesses -	6240
28	1210	19	Ref S/D 19 of above o/c 1893 returned to the office	6240
29	1215		I left the office for Maxwell Street on Enigma	6240
30	1230	38	I left the office for Houghland on Enigma	6240

Monday 27th January 1998
 Occurrence
 38 By order of dc. C.D. 300 James
 is withdrawn from custody and
 released when to the Kaurara
 Road above the two people
 left the office for home -
 32 1352 34 A/c/E for C.F. Police. B.P. 10/10
 The enquiry
 33 returned to the office
 36 Sandy Lonsdale of #17
 37 1310 36 5 minutes have arrived in
 the area S/B Hyde
 38 1312 35 by order of S/O Hyde
 Daniel Messinger is
 odd to the foreman to
 produce him on the 3/2/98
 not about 10 dollars -
 39 1315 37 to the office of return
 to the office of the
 40 1320 23 9 returned to the office
 from George Street
 showing of witness
 statement
 41 1325 24 9 returned to
 the office from A.D.S.
 42 1410 24 9 1000
 25/11/98 and 10/11/98
 43 1415 30 7 of above returned
 to the office with the complaint
 I am leaving the office
 39 1420

MONDAY

26 January

2974

S/N	TIME	CR	CONVENTION	SIC
41	1430	29	Ref SP 39 of above & returned to the office after Enquiry	SIC
42	1435	37	Ref SP 37 of above & handed over both suspects to W.P. 5106 for safe custody	SIC
43	1605	44	I have obtained voluntary cautioned statement from all suspects concerned	SIC
44	1703	43	Ref SP 43 of above entry by order of O/C C.I.D through W.P. 1608, suspects Ali Jawara I and Ali Jawara II were handed over Abdulai Jawara of 39 Selay Avenue and warned to produce them on Tuesday 27/1/68 at 1000 hrs.	SIC
45	1740	8:	O/C for Hospital	SIC
46	1943	48	I arrived in for duty	SIC 2725
47	1944	48	I arrived in for duty together with 6006 and 3947	SIC 1675
48	1945	46 47 10 $\frac{27}{98}$	'B' shift personnel comprising of 6006, 2725, 3947 and myself present and paraded for duty inspected and found clean and fit for duty before detailed as follows duty officer at 10 2725, locked up	SIC

ACCOUNTANCE

Crime Dept 6006 1/c shift
shift myself no suspect
in custody area quiet

1946 55 D/SPL 1675 left the office to call
on O/C CID D/OC Mr L Amara
Kamara and S/O D/Inst Hyde

1855 49 D/SI Kamara ^{arrived} in the office
G.P.O's orders

1953 52 S/S CID D/Sgt 2871 arrived in the
office on visit

1955 51 Ref S/DST S/S CID D/Sgt 2871 left the
office with no serious complaints

2000 57 D/OC CID Mr L Amara arrived in
the office on C.P.O's order

2010 53 O/C CID D/OC Mr L Amara left the office
for C.P.O's office

2035 49 Ref S/D 59 of above D/SPL 1675 returned
to the office

2036 60 D/Sgt 4721 arrived in the office
on C.P.O's order

2049 53 Ref 210 53 of above O/C CID D/OC Mr
L Amara and Party left the office
to see SDS

2155 59 visited CID met the
follow up on duty call on
the alert nos 1675 2725
6006 and 3947, alert
5604, no suspect in
custody area quiet

2156 58 leaving the office for
charge office to continue
my visit

2210 56 D/Sgt 4721 left the office for his
quarters

JAH 2725

Monday 26th January 1998

2976

100

S/N	TIME	CR	circumstance	SIG
61	2220	62	D/CPL 1675 left the office for town ship	11/2725
62	2238	61	Ref 81061 of above D/CPL 1675 returned to the office	11/2725
63	2250	64	S/O C.I.D. Insp. Hyde arrived in the office on visit	11/2725
64	2300	63	Ref 81063 of above. S/O C.I.D. Insp. Hyde left the office for his quarters	11/2725

TUESDAY 27th January 1998

1 1	0728	71	D/PC 5886 arrived in for duty	11/2725
2	0730	71	D/Sgt 4721, 4735 and 3527 arrived in for duty	11/2725
3	0740	71	D/Sgt 1895 arrived in the office for duty	11/2725
4	0741	71	D/PC 5857 together with S/O C.I.D. D/Sgt 2871 arrived in in for duty	11/272
5	0742	71	D/PC 4566, 4878, together with D/PC 1608 arrived in the office for duty	11/272
6	0743	71	S/O C.I.D. Insp. Hyde arrived in the office and reported for duty	11/272
7.	0745	1:2 3:4 5:6 14,	"A" shift personnel comprising of the following nos:- 5857, 4735, 4721, 3296, 1608, 4062, 3527, 4566, 1521, 5886, 4878, 5106, 1893, 1895, 2057, SC 72, 11, 367, ASP. Rogers and myself present and at the same time paraded for duty. They were inspected by D/S.I. Kamana Od found clean,	

d. general police duty by 1895 before details as follows:- Duty officer:- 5106, work up orderly:- 5857. crime reserves:- 1028, 4735, 4721, 3296, 1608, 4062, 3527, 4566, 1521, 5886, 4878. UPA. leave:- 2183. None in custody. Yc shift:- 2057. The area seem to be quiet at the moment. Other-wise no serious report. —

~~5106~~

0810

9 I handed over the duties of duty officer to D/WPC 5106 with articles as follows one wall clock, one telephone, one wooden hanger, two shade lamp, three C4 chairs, one bucket, one cup, two bed springs five tyres, one sewing machine head, one scrapped XL bike 10 wooden door frames, one D's book, Vehicles SF 1010, WU 14865 and WU 29186 Other wise no serious report. Area quite as yet

~~5106~~ 2725

0815

8 I custody taken over the duties of the duty officer for Diepi 2325 with article on charge as per 8108 of today's date to be true and correct

~~5106~~

0816 43 ²⁶/₉₅

'B' Shift Personnel Parade OFF duty and at the same time left the office for their quarters

~~5106~~

0820 22

9 left the office for #4 Danby Street Kenong to arrange domestic affairs —

~~5106~~

TUESDAY 27th January 1998

Nr 2970

S/No	TIME	CR	REFERENCE	STO
12	0940	7	I returned from no 8 ^B Jenner street where I met complainant Fatmata Fajarah seriously sick suffering from sickle cells. etc cis informed	5857
13	0945		Surgeon Rintu and Amineh Kuajia arrived and reported themselves	5857
14	1025	7	I am leaving the office for Blama Road on enquiry	5857
15	1030	53	By order of C.P.O K Division I left the office to see manager Banking N.D.S Kenema	5857
16	1035	20	I left the office for Kenema Town Council on Enquiry	5857
17	1135	7	I left the office for Tonga - park on enquiry	4566
18	1140	22	I left the office for Tonga Park on enquiry	5857
19	1143		I am leaving the office for Neso circular Road to Antib medicine	1293
20	1145	16	Ref SP 16 of above I returned to the office from Kenema Town Council	5857
21	1200		with D/cpl 3296 left the office for Hangl road on enquiry	5857
22	1200	11/18	Ref S/O 11 and 18 of above date MKC 1028 and 5857	5857

23 1350 24 I left the office for Koroma street in search of Mr Jabbie to see O/C C.I.D for interview

24 1400 23 Ref s/o 23 of above I returned to the office having left word for Mr Jabbie to report at this office to see O/C for interview

25 1410 26 One Mohamed Thanu Barrie of no 8 Ansu street Bo arrived in and reported that sometime in January 1997 he gave his Toyota van to Mr Jabbie for the purpose of sale which he converted to his own use and benefit. O/C informed in dealing

26 1415 25 Ref s/o 25 of above complainant made statement and left the office

27 1420 28 I am leaving the office for Tonga lorry part on Sunday


28 1420 27 Ref s/o 27 of above I returned to the office after Sunday

29 1410 30 D/S.C. 72 Sidique working with officials of the National development bank Kanema brought in one Hassan Saeed of no 7 Kama Road who is alleged to have obtained an over draft from the said bank which in the past has accumula-

[Handwritten signatures and initials in the right margin]

S/No	Time	CR	Attendance	SR
29	1750		ted to Tel, 338, 229/74 cent which he had refused to pay, C.P.O. K. C. I. D. informed, 5857 leaving the	SR
30	1757	29	Mr. Gibril Kamara clerk of N.D.B. made statement and left the office whom we warned to bring all documents relating to the case on 28/1/98	SR
31	1825	32	Ref S/D 29 of above by order of C.P.O. 'L' Division suspect Hassan S5880 is released on his own and warned to report on the 28/1/98 at 9 am and more over to produce documents to complete his statement	SR SR
32	1830	31	Ref S/D 31 of above Hassan Sasso left the office for his resident	SR
33	1832	15	Ref S/D 15 of above I returned to the office from N. 9-15	SR
34	1900		D/CPL 1675 arrived in for duty	SR
35	1905		I handed over the duties of the duty officer to D/CPL 1675 with articles one change as per S/D of even date 27-1-98 to be true and correct	SR SR
36	1910	30	I arrived in and reported	SR

WEDNESDAY 28th January 1998

SN	Time	OCCURRENCE	Sig
2.	cont'd.	<p>and found clear, fit and ready for duty. The shift lectured on general police duty by 4062 before details as follows:- Duty officer:- 3527, WPC up orderly:- 3296. Crime reserves:- 1028, 5857, 4735, 4721, 1608, 4062, 4566, 1521, 5886, 4878, 5106 + 1893. U.P. A. leave:- 2183. None in custody. Yc shift:- 2057. The area seem to be quiet at the moment. Other - will no serious report.</p>	
3.	0850:2 :5 :61	<p>Inspected over the duties offices to Capt 3527 with articles in charge. As per inventory; one watch, one telephone set, two shade lamps, one drinking bucket and one cup, three (4) chairs, one trestle with prisoners properties, one standing hanger, one soap board, two spring beds, one sewing machine head, one scraped XL bike, five tyres, ten wooden frame, one DJ and one WDY book plus 2 vehicles.</p>	

WEDNESDAY 28th JANUARY 1998

2983

N	Time	C/R	OCCURRENCE	Sig
			MU 29186. Otherwise no serious complaint	book
4	0801	12: 7:	Sgt 4721 and party left for Kainsamba Terrace on enquiry.	book
5	0805	:3	I certly taken over as duty officer from the outgoing officer to be true and correct	book
6	0806		Ofc CID arrived in the office	book
7	0810	4:	Dsgt 2871 and party left the office for Kenema town ship on enquiry	book
8	0820	:9 24	Papa Jalloh of no 3 Dowan Street Kenema arrived in the office and reported that on today's date 28/1/98 at about 0815 hours at the said address he was assaulted by one Peter Makien of Mariana Street Kenema and thereby sustained injuries on his mouth and pain all over his body. Dsgt 4735 dealt J.P.O crime informed	book
9	0825	:8	Ref s/p 8, Complainant left the office with two medical report forms for Govern. Hospital	book
10.	0840	11:	D/PC. 6240 arrived in the office and reported sick.	book
11.	0855	10:	vide s/p. 10 above, D/PC. 6240 issued with Police medical form and left for hospital	book

Wednesday 28th Jan 1978

108 2984

S/No	Time	Y/R	Occurrence	Sign
12	0857	47	Ref. S/D.4 of today's date D/Sgt 4721 and party returned to the office no complain	<i>[Signature]</i>
13	0900		D/S/I Kamara and party left the office for Secretariat office Kereena to obtain statements.	<i>[Signature]</i>
14	0901	2	I arrived in for duty	<i>[Signature]</i>
15	0902		Team leaving the office together with D/Sgt 2811 for Bona road	<i>[Signature]</i>
16	0908	49	By order of C.P.O & Division General I left the office for N.D.B. Hongah road	<i>[Signature]</i>
17	0910	18	I am leaving the with one Francis for Kpasamoi Street	<i>[Signature]</i>
18	0915	17	Ref S/D 17 of today's date I returned to the office	<i>[Signature]</i>
19	0920	20	I am leaving the office for Senabai lane on enquiry	<i>[Signature]</i>
20	0925	19 21	Ref S/D 19 of above, I returned to the office together with one Brime Tamba of No 13 Musa Street Kereena	<i>[Signature]</i>
21	0930	20	Ref S/D 20 of above, I have handed over ^{to} Vandy Solomon suspect Brime Tamba of the same address & warned to produce same at 5 pm today 28-1-78	<i>[Signature]</i>
22	0935		D/cpl 4878 left the office for magistrate Court	<i>[Signature]</i>

0941	8	Ref S/O 8 of above date, complainant returned to the office with his medical form.
094326		Myself, D/Sgt 2871 and complainant left for Hangsha road on enquiry.
095125		Ref S/O 25 of above, myself, D/Sgt 2871 and complainant returned to the office with one Peta Makkar 900 S/O 8.
1000	28	One Mohamed Abdullah Dukway of NO.1 Sama Street Kenema arrived in the office on today's date 28/1/98 and reported that on 27/1/98 at about 2130 hours, two armed men who he cannot identify placed him under gun point and robbed off his Seiko 5 wrist watch value to follow. O/C C.T.D. informed I am dealing.
1025	27	Ref S/O 27 of above I have obtained statement from complainant.
1030	34	I left the office for comben trail on Enugu.
1035	29	Ref S/O 29 of above I returned to the office after Enugu.
11041	32	Maintenant Kenema of ref-ferariat Kenema arrested and brought in Bakor Jabaly of 7 Isanya Street, Monie Kanim of 25 Hangsha Road Kenema and S.H.A.

Wednesday 28th Jan, 1998

10 2986

Sl. No	Time	Ref	Occurrence	Sign	S
31			Contd of 18 B.A. Kenema and reported that on 24/1/98 his Harina Stereo radio set value Le35,000/000 was stolen for which he suspect the latter, Of C.I.D. informed, I am dealing —		
32	1045	31	Ref. S/D 31 above the three suspects are handed over to the lock up Dept. 3296 for safe custody —		
33	1049	31	Lt. Kennel left the office promising to call later for statement as he is engaged on operational duty —		
34	1050		Ref. S/D 23 of even date I returned S/D to the office —		
35	1145	36	S/C A.S.P. Rogers and myself brought in one Mohamed Barrie of No 26 Swarray Street Kenema for interrogation in respect of a radio matter.		
36	1155	35	Ref. S/D 35 of above I have interrogated Mohamed Barrie and he left for his address.		
37	1220	28	Ref. S/D 28 of above I returned to the office after Ensign		
38	1221		Of Cabel of Bo Police Station arrived in the office to see of C.I.D.		
39	1230	29	Ref. S/D 29 of 27/1/98 Mr Hassan Sasso arrived in to complete his		

Occurrence

o	Time	L	Occurrence	Sign
6	1300	5	By order of S/O Hyde I have handed supd Peta Amara Makier to Lieutenant Brima Aliou of no 18 Dumbou Street and informed to produce sus- pect on Thursday 29/11/98 at 10 am	H/S
5	1310	4	By S/O 4 of above, left left the office	H/S
12	1420	50	One Alhaji Kamara of no. 39 Sesay street Kenema, arrested and brought in one today Kinsa of no. 2 Sincin street Kenema, and reported that, some time in March 1996 at Bewallah, he entrusted five (5) bags of coffee to the latter for the purpose of delivering same to one Mus- tapha at Yam town, which he converted to his own use or benefit - valued at 598,000.00. SO informed D/O 2871 dealp.	H/S
H3	1430	44	Kamara and myself left the office for Secretariat in respect of Kamara's suspects	H/S
H4	1435	43	Ref - S/O H3 of today's date 28/11/98 caution statement has been obtained from the suspect Abdulai Saide	H/S

Wednesday 28th Jan

2900

SNo	Time	Ref	Occurrence	Sign
44			Queue same time in the hands of the investigators D/S/Kanana	
45	1440	46	O/c. C.I.D. and Insp. Hyde leading left the office for Secretariat Kenema.	
46	1501	45 55 109 67/78	O/c. C.I.D. Insp. Hyde and team returned to the office from Secretariat Kenema On board wa. 35250 with Brima & Paka, B.S. Massaquoi, Andrew Quae, Issa Ansumana, Abdulai Beakarie and John Swagray for further investigations on subversive allegation against the State, A.C. Eastern region and G.P.O. "L" Division informed.	
47	1512	48	Ibrahim Mady Jusa #A Bindi Road 30 is brought in with two five gallon of petrol for interrogation 3/0, Hyde informed	
48	1515	47	Ref S/O 47 of petrol by order of O/c, C.I.D. The suspect is released.	
49	1518		Ref S/O 16 of above returned to the office from N.D.B.	
50	1520	42	Ref. 42 today, complainant left the office with the pro- vide statement	

Time C/Ref

Occurrence

2989

1730 52

By the order of OIC C-I-D that I should handed over the following properties to S/O C-I-D are as follows: one "X" bass tape recorder eight-battery, one jean suit, and one ^{jean}trouser and wear all of them to report drunk on 30th January 1998 at about 1000 hours

1878

1735 51

Ref- S/O ST of today's date 28/1/98 all of them left for their house

1878

1830 54

vide sp. 42 to day, by order of S/O suspect today MISA is released to Mr. John S. Tommy of no. 18 Mojama Wheel-Beneva, to produce him on 29/1/98 at 12 midday

1878

1840 53

vide sp. 53 above, both the suspect and surety left the office

1878

1841 46:56

Ref. S/O. 46 of today's date 28/1/98 statements have been obtained from all the suspects brought including Abdulai Saidu Quee C.P.O and regional commander East informed

1878

1842 55

At 1815 hours regional Comd and East and C.P.O left to inform S.O.S their state

57

1878

Wednesday 28th Jan, 1978

1172990

Sl No	Time	Officer	Occurrence	Sign
56			Could have been obtained and to sought his advice.	Am
57	1900	56	C.P.P. and Commander East returned to the office informed all suspects that all suspects should provide suitable Sureties and inform him when Sureties are available.	Am
58	1930	60	DPC 5604 reported in for duty	Am
59	1932	60	Dcp 6006 reported in for duty	Am
60	1945	61 59 58	Shift personnel comprising of 5604, 1675, and self 6006 are presently paraded and inspected by 1675 to be fit and ready for duty. Details Duty officer 6004, local up order by 5604 crime and if shift 1675, not yet seen for duty 3947 and 2725. These are male suspects in custody. Otherwise no serious report.	Am
61	2000	60 69	Ref S/O B, I handed over the duties of the duty officer to Dcp 6006 with all the articles correct	Am

Occurrence

No	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Sign
62	2001	60	Dipl 2725 arrived in for duty.	
63	2025	64	SI Stephens arrived in the office as orderly officer.	
64	2029	63	(SI Stephens) Ref 81063 SI Stephens left the office for (SS) Office	
65	2105	66	Ref 81064 of today's date 21/1/77, I arrived in the station on visit as orderly officer found the following officers on duty D.P.C. 8200 Dept 8006 2725 1/2 shift Dept 1175, and I also found the following persons on open detention being Kpaka, B.S. Mousaque, Andrew Quee, Issa Ansumana, Abdulai Bockaribe, John Swarany and Abdulai Saidu Quee from the offence of Subversion since Allegations against the State	
66	2106	65	I am leaving the office to visit the cells together with the lock up outside	
67	2107	68	By order C.P.O. Lt. Sw. Mr Issah I have handed over the following suspects to place them in cells (1) Abdulai Saidu Quee, Andrew Quee, Abdulai Bockaribe, John Swarany and Issah Ansumana to the No. 11 Cell Lock 11 Cellon	

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

Wednesday 28th Jan. 1998

S/No	Time	O/R	OC	Sign
68	2109	67	By order of S.P.O. K. S. W. Mr. Isah, through O.C.C. 19 Mr. Lamin Amara I have handed over Mr B.S. Massaguer and Brima Kpaka to S/Pl 6006 of Kadon and they warned that they should stay in open detention.	6
68	2110	66	Ref S/D 68, I returned to the office after visited the cells together with the work up and found three of the male suspect in cells for various offences.	Hms
69	2112	611	I certify taking over the duties of S/Officer as per S/D 61 checked found to be true and correct.	604
70	2140		Commissioner Mr. Lounch arrived in the office on visit.	1625
1	0138	2	I (S/Pl 290 th Jan. 1998) in the office on visit found personnel on duty and two suspect on open detention.	
2	0140	1:3	I am leaving the office to visit the cells together with DPC 6006 and S604.	
3	0141	2:4	Ref above entry I returned to the office together with	

THURSDAY 29th Jan. 1950


2993


Time	C/R	OCC.	Sign
1		for various offences against law or their wife the area and the office is quiet and normal ————	Afc.
4	0549	3:5 I arrived in the office on visit found personnel on duty	Afc.
5	0600	4:6 I am leaving the office to visit the cells together with the watch up ordinary DPC 5604 and 6006 ————	Afc.
6	0605	5:7 Def 510 5, I returned to the office after visited the cells together with DPC 6006 and 5604, found eight (8) male suspects in cells five (5) for subversive allegations against the State and three (3) for offences various offences and other two (2) suspects were found in open detention in one of the office in C 11) for the same subversive movement making the total of ten (10) suspects in the C. 11) custody. The N.C.O in charge shift Dept 1675 reported that the station area is quiet for the past night, nothing reported ————	Afc.
7	0610	6 I am leaving the office for charge office ————	Afc.
8	0700	10: With 4848, 810 Hyde, SCS-72, 367 and I reported for duty. ————	Afc. 2993 4/1/50


S/No	Time	C/R	Occurrence
9	0730	10	I am in for duty — (Signature)
10	0745	8,9	<p>"A" shift-personnel comprising of the following nos:- 4735, 4878, 505, 11, 367 and myself present and at the same time paraded for duty. They were inspected by D/S.I. Kawana and found clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift-declared by D/Sgt. 1895 before details as follows:- Duty officer:- SC. 72, lock-up orderly:- 367. Crime reserves:- 4735 and 4878. U.P.A. Leave:- 2183. On care duty:- 1028, 5857, 4721, 3296, 1608, 3527, 1521, 5106, 1893 and SC. ASP. Rogers. special duty:- 2057 and 4062. Sick:- 5886 and 4566. Not yet seen for duty:- 4779. Ten (10) suspects in custody, seven (7) for political detention and three (3) for various criminal offences. Yc shift-myself. The area seem to be quiet at the moment. Otherwise no serious report. — — —</p>
11	0800	12	<p>I handed over the duties of Officer to D/Sk 72 with the following items, a wall clock, telephone set, drinking bucket and a cup, wooden hanger and cupboard, two shade lamps,</p>

Time 7/1

Spare tyres, two (2) spring beds, a sewing machine head, two (2) water pipes, one scrap x-l bike, a steel door frame, twelve (12) wooden door frames, D.J. book, way book and vehicles, 14865, 29186 and sp1010 otherwise no serious report — 5604

12 0805 11: I certify taking over the duties of duty officer as per entry sp11 of today's date 29/1/98, checked and correct other wise no problem — 

13 1150 14 One Alpha Mahmoud Jallon of no 28 Sumaila Street Kenema, arrived in the office and reported that on Tuesday the 27/1/98 at about 2300 hours at the above address, he was assaulted by one Aousine Kamara of No 14 Sumaila Street and thereby he sustained bruises on the body and pain all over his body. D/Sr Kamara informed I am dealing 

14 1155 13 Ref S/O B 87 above, medical form is issue to complainant for treatment 

15 1203 19 Lt. Augustine L. Momoh of Peoples Army attached Guinea Base 23: Kenema arrested and brought in one Alpha Sessay of No. 6 Kekorah Street, Kenema. and reported that on Tuesday

S/No	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Sign
15	Contd		27/1/98, the latter and two soldiers converted one Yamaha bike belonging to Captain Harris B. Monoh to their own use or benefit. S/O CTD. informed and dealing.	
16	1205	17	John Stoney of No 18 Mysore Street Mysore arrived in Mysore on 15/2/98 Mr. Anura	
17	1240	16	By order of OIC sent through S/O I have handed over suspect today Mr. Anura warned to report on the 15-2-98 at 1000hrs	
18	1245	17	Ref S/O 17 of above, some suspect and security left the office for their residence	
19	1400	15	Complainant made statement and left in search of witnesses	
20	1415	18	I am leaving the office for Brigade and presby on 8/0/18.	
21	1430	22	With D/Sgt 1521 left the office for Cojai Street Mysore on enquiring	
22	1600	22	Ref- S/O 21 of today's date 29/1/98 both of us returned to the office no cause to complainant	
23	1800	15	Monoh Tucker of No 11 Seiya Street Mysore arrived to	

bicycle which sent to
one suspect now custody
of S/O 1571 today's date 29/1/98
Ref - S/O 23 of today's date
29/1/98 by order of NCO
one of name handed
over the said bicycle
to Monoh Talle of No
11 Seyid keena same
time left with the said
bicycle

1830
23
1910
28

1900 28 I arrived in for duty
1910 28 I arrived in for duty
1912 28 I arrived in for duty

1830
1910
1912
5604

1945-25 B Shift personnel comprising
26 of Dept 2725, 5604 and
27 myself present and paraded
for duty inspected and
found clean and fit
for duty before detailed
as follows duty officer
D/O 5604 took up orders
Dept 2725 1/c shift myself
suspects in custody
Other wise area quiet and
no serious complaint

1675
1675

1950 30 I handed over duties of duty
officer as per entry S/O 17 today's
date 29/1/98 other wise no serious
complain

5604
1675

2005 28 I certify taking over the duties of D/O
from S/C 72 as per his handing over note
checked found to be true and correct

5604

2010 24 S/O Mr AS Hilde arrived in
11.55

1675

S/NO	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Sign
32	2100	33	C.P.O. Mrs Issah arrived in the office on visit	2725
33	2104	32	Ref 81032 of above C.P.O. Mrs Issah left the office for town ship	2725
34	2105	31	Ref 81031 of above 810 C.P.O. Mrs AS Stude left the office for township	2725

FRIDAY 30th January 1998

1	0710	61	D/Sgt 2183 arrived in for duty	5604
2	0712	61	D/cpl 1893 arrived in for duty	5604
3	0715	61	D/Sgt 4721 arrived in for duty	5604
4	0720	61	D/PL 5857 arrived in for duty	5604
5	0725	61	With 1608, 3296, 1028, 4062, and 1895 and 9 reported for duty.	5604
6	0745	112 314 514	"A" shift - personnel comprising of the following NOS: - 1028, 5857, 4735, 4721, 3296, 1608, 4062, 3527, 1521, 2183, 4878, 5106, 1893, 1895, 2057, SCS. 11, 72, 367, ASP. Rogers, and myself present and at the same time paraded for duty. They were inspected by D/S. I. Icamang and found clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift obtained on general Police duty by 3296 before details as follows: - Duty officer: - 4062, lock up orderly: 4735. Crime reserves: - 1028, 5857, 4721, 3296, 1608, 3527, 1521, 2183, 4878	5604

could

5106 and 1893. JICPC: - 5886 and 4566. Eleven (11) suspects in custody. Seven (7) for Political detention and four (4) for various criminal offences. Yc shift - 1 - 2057. The area seem to be quiet at the moment. Other wise no serious report.

[Handwritten scribble]

0840 8

I am leaving the office for Darguin Street on evening

[Handwritten scribbles]

0915 7

Left JD 7 of above 9 returned to the office after evening

0917 9

I handed over the duties of duty officer to the incoming duty officer dept 4063 as per do 2901 29/1/98. Other wise no serious report

10 1033 15

Captain Harris Boboh Momoh of Tongo came in to make statement NRO, spots of 29/1/98.

11 1105 19

Dave Cheerinet JALPAH 7 #6 Colles Sah Street - Kenara is brought in 1RO two shipment of scales found in his premises on 27/1/98

12 1110 13

Kulim Samai of No 44 Merdeka Street was arrested for police arrest

13 1115 12

by sta 12 of above Kulim Samai has promised to go search of Bochnerie Jappa and John Bochnerie

Friday 30th January 1110

3000

S/NO	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Sigs	5/1
14	1130	19 45	One Baimba Damby of No 10 Ellie Street Kenema arrived in the office on today's date 30/1/98 and reported on 29/1/98 at about 1145 hours, he was assaulted by one Smart Kakofele of Kenema and thereby sustained injury in the face and pain all over the body. S/D informed. I am dealing	1668 [Signature]	2
15	1134		I am leaving for Hanga Road on enquiry	1893	2
16	1135	17 58	Sh B 15166333 Sgt Marah K.E.N of Brigade Head Quarters brought two Photo Copy statements of Brima Upaka and Andrew Quee and one Question paper in respect of B.S. Massagui for our document (File)	[Signature]	2
17	1140	16	Ref SD 16 Sgt Marah left for Brigade promising to come at 6 pm	[Signature]	
18	1142	14 29	Ref S/D 14 of above, complainant issued with police medical report form in duplicate and left the office for treatment at Government Hospital Kenema	[Signature]	2
19	1143	11	Ref S/D 11 of above Marissa Jalloh also arrived for statement.	[Signature]	
20	1150	40	I am leaving the office for search sheet on	[Signature]	2
21	1155	07	One Alhaji Kamel Khodg of 15/1/98		

could in and reported on behalf of his Aunt Issatu Brima of Jos Bamlawo Lane Keneba and reported that on yesterday's date 29/1/98 at about 8 PM she was assaulted by one Ibrahim Kama of the same house and she thereby sustained swollen face and pains all over her body. S/O C.I.D informed I am dealing — ~~SP~~ ~~SP~~

22 1205 21 Ref S/O 21 of above I left with 25 complainant to visit Issatu Brima at the Government Hospital who is now admitted and same time issued her with police medical report form for treatment — ~~SP~~ ~~SP~~

23 1240 31 By order of O.C. C.I.D. S.H.A. 18/17 36 39 William Jones 25/1 is handed over to Lt. Wadud Kama for disciplinary actions for his part in the theft case, S/O 31 of 28/1/98 refers — ~~SP~~ ~~SP~~

24 1245 32 4/89/1521 and party arrested and brought to one Cheriwa Jalloh of 6 Kotere Street Keneba where S/O was conducted and two scales discovered O.C. C.I.D informed I am dealing — ~~SP~~ ~~SP~~

25 1248 22 Ref S/O 22 of above I returned to the office having visited complainant at the hospital and issued her with police medical ~~SP~~ ~~SP~~

Friday 30th January 1998

1203002

S/No	Inme	CIR	Occurrence	Sign
26	1325	32 46 $\frac{16 \text{ of } 31}$ $\frac{1}{58}$	Abubakar Sisay of S Kahunka street Kenema arrested and brought in mohammed Fomnie and the latter reported that on 29/1/98 between 8 and 9 P.M. mohammed Fomnie stole from his house at Kahunka street two cotton trousers and various other articles value to follow. Case referred 1898 for investigation	Sign
27	1326	33	S/O C.I.D. Dnep. Hyde and Party left for Awana Phama at Kokeyah Street, Kenema on Search Warrant	
28	1325	32 41	One Brimo Vardam Mansaray of 52 circular road Kenema arrived in the office and reported that on today's date one mohammed Fomnie maliciously damaged two gold plated finger rings that value is 30,000.00. Pieces of the finger rings brought in as exhibit. Ref. 1608. on duty informed.	
29	1405	18	Ref S/O 18 of above, Complainant returns to the office with his police medical paper after treat- ment	
30	1406	24	Ref-24 Suspect left and warned at 21.100 at 10 AM CPO	

Time

Occurrence

Sign 3003

1501

Dsgt #3823 Fambulloh of Secretariat Kenema came in with one Junior Victor Sam as alleged Kamajor suspect together with his voluntary cautioned statement N.C.O. crime informed.

[Signature]

2. 1510

26, 28

Complainants in respect of s/o 26 and 28 of above made statement to the effect.

[Signature]

3. 1515

27.

Ref. s/o 27 today (30/1/98), with D/Inspector of party, returned to the office from no. 12 Coler Jah Street Kenema, where we duly executed search warrant and discovered the quantity of drugs suspected to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. One Thomas Kpana was also brought in as suspect. C.P.O. informed. D/cpl. 4062 dealip. One wire gatch of 8

X

[Signature]

24 1535

57, 19g, 31/1

Duawa street Kenema arrested and brought in Abu Bakar Suma and Abu Kamara and he reported that sometime between July and October 1997 the latter stole from him two pieces of diamonds value to follow. N.C.O. informed.

12/83
AD/ST

Friday 20 Jan 1998

3004

SN	Time	Cl	Description
35	1600	36	By order of 812 Contel of prosecution I have obtained C.S. from Agnes Gondolo of 7 Chish Street Kennerly 8240 ms
36	1602	35	By order of 812 Contel I have handed Agnes Gondolo to Barry Musa of 14 Yorpo St. Kennerly and warned him to produce the former to his office tomorrow 21/1/98 at 11.00 8240 ms
37	1605	38	By order of o/c C-I-D Mr Amara through S/O C-I-D that I should hand over the properties now treated as exhibits namely one x-bass tape, one jean trouser and one jean suit to complainant Issa Kama of no 17 Senabon Lane Kennerly as he is not willing to proceed further with his case 8240 ms
38	1615	37	Ref - S/O 37 of today's date 30/1/98 I have handed over one x-bass tape & recorder, one jean trouser and one jean suit to the complainant Issa Kama same time left for his house no 17 Senabon Lane Kennerly together with Ahaji Amadu Bani of the same address 8240 ms
39	1620		Dist 2871 - 4878

Time	Ref	Description	Signature
1625	20	Ref S/D 20 of above, I returned to the office otherwise our sir's report	1625
1630	28	Complainant has made statement and at the same time left the office in search of witnesses	1630
1700	43	Complainant Mohamed Selay of #27 Bang's street Kenema arrested and brought in one Abdul Sheriff of #4 Jabbe street Kenema o/c C.I.D. informed I.R.O. C/R 10/98	1630
1710	42	Ref S/D 42 of above by order of o/c C.I.D. through N.C. Crime Dept 18 95 I handed over suspect Abdul Sheriff to the lock up orderly D/cpl 4735 for safe custody for the offence of larceny	1630
1700	45	Abdul Laliq Musa of No 5 Jenuch Street Kenema arrested and brought in one Musa Selay of No 20 Kpali Street Kenema and reported that on Thursday ^{Wednesday} day 28/1/98 about 1200 hours, he gave one ^{five} hundred and seventy two cups of Ice Cream and one thousand five hundred and eighty cones of biscuit to the latter for the purpose sales under out of which he converted the sum of \$1630.00 into his own use or benefit o/c informed. I am dealing	1630
1710	44	Ref S/D 44 of above, I handed over suspect Musa Selay to the D/cpl. 4735 for safe custody	1630

Sl No	Time	CR	Occurrence	Sl No
46	1715	26	Ref S/O 26 of above, I am leaving - S/O for no 8 Icalula street to visit - scene of crime	178
47	1718		I have obtained a V.C. Statement from Thomas Kpana I.R.O. S/O 33 of above	19
48	1740	49	One Abdul Karim Mustapha Sandy of No 27 Ebonie Street, Kenema came in to see ofc C.I.D.	
49	1745	48	By order of ofc C.I.D. I have handed over suspect Thomas Kpana to surety Abdul Karim Mustapha Sandy and warned to produce him on 31/1/98 at 12 o'clock	A.K. Sandy
50	1746	51	Mr Edward Francis Mallah of No 5 Hindowa street Kenema and Mr Mohamed Minkalu Jah of no 8 Stappa Lane Kenema both arrived in the office to stand sureties for Messers B.S. Massagui and Brima Kpaka	
51	1750	50	Ref S/O 50, both sureties have been approved by the C.I.D. Div. Mr Issah	
52	1751	53	I have handed over one magnifying glass to Complainant Mohamed Mansaray	
53	1759	52	Complainant left the office at 11.15 A.M. Mansaray	

Time	Yr	Occurrence	Sign
5/18/54	34	Guinea boss Kenema arrested and brought in Musu Jalloh of 1032 Hanga Road Kenema and reported on Wednesday 28/1/98 at about 9pm to 10pm along Hanga road Kenema he entrusted one Robin 3 inches boiling machine to the latter value K 500,000/00 for the purpose of safe keeping which the latter converted to her own use and benefit. C.P.O and O/C C.I.D informed I am dealing	3007
5/18/54	34	Ref 81054 of above suspect is handed to the female lockup orderly 81056 for safe custody while complainant made statement	3007
5/18/54	46	Ref 81046 of above, I returned from visiting the scene of crime at 106 Biskub Street, at the scene of crime, I inspected a single room and parlour during the inspection, I discovered the room staple damaged and the said black portmanteau from which the articles were stolen was not found in the said room. However I also received one damaged portmanteau zip handle from complainant. O/C crime informed	3007
5/18/54	34	By order of O/C C.I.D. Mr. Lamin Amara, I have handed over suspects Abu Balcar	3007

S/N	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Slip
57	Cont'd	30	Suma and Abu Kamara to Amara Sesay of 2 Kallon Lane Kamara and warn him to Produce his fine on 31/1/98 at 11:00hrs without fail.	218
58	1905	16:54	Ref s/s 16 of 30/1/98, Sgt Manah had again brought the following statements from Brigade I.R.O Abdulai Saidu Quee, Francis from Momoh, Porima Sandy Masagna	
59	1907	55	Sgt manah left for Brigade	
60	1910		I received in for duty	
61	1912	62:63	I arrived in for duty	560x
62	1917	60:	Ref s/s 61, I am leaving the office for treatment	560x
63	1945	60:61 66	'B' Shift personnel comprising of 6006 5604 ³⁹⁴⁷ and myself present and paraded for duty inspected and found clean and fit for duty before detailed as Thurs Duty officer Dept 3847 lock up orderly D/Pc 5604 1/c shift myself eleven male and male and one female suspect no serious complaint	
64	2000	11:00 29/1 65	I handed over the duties of Duty officer to N ^o 3847 DcpL Kallon with articles as per s/n 11 of 29/1/98 no complaint.	

OCURRENCE

Sign

Time	C/R	OCURRENCE	Sign
2002	64	A shift personnel paraded off duty after talk over duties from out-going Duty Officer	(8847)
2003	63	D/Sgt 2725 arrived in for duty —	(8847)
June	c/r	Saturday 31/1/98	Sign
1 0700	9	D/Sgt. 2183 reported for duty —	(8847)
2 0800	9	D/Sgt 4721 came in for duty —	(8847)
3 0805	9	I arrived in the office and reported for duty —	(8847)
4 0807	74	At about 06:30 this morning, I left to invite witnesses at No 6 Kahula- street I.R.O. on 26 of 30/1/98 —	(1893)
5 0830	9	D/Sgt. 4062 and 4725 reported for duty	(8847)
6 0835	9	D/Sgt. Kamara reported for duty —	(8847)
7 0836	9	D/Sgt. 1895 report for duty —	(8847)
8 0900	9	D/Sgt. 2057 report in for duty —	(8847)
9 0930	1:2	A shift personnel nos. 4721, 3:5 2057, 4725, 4062, 35, 1893, 1895 6:7 Paraded for duty. They were 8. inspected and found clean and fit for duty. They were lectured on general Police duties before details were made as follows. Duty officer 1893, Lock up orderly 4878, crime, 4721, 4062, 1895 sick 4566, 5886, 3527. U.P.A leave 4779. i/c shift 2057 eleven suspects in custody.	(1893)
10 0950	25	I handed over the duties of duty officer to No. 1893 with the following items: one wall clock, one telescope, drinking bucket, and a	(1893)

- | | | | |
|----|-------|-----------------|--|
| 10 | Contd | 15 | Cup, wooden chairs and cupboard, two shade lamps, a box containing Baskets, five (5) spare tyres, two (2) spring beds, one sewing machine head, water pipe, one scraped XL grille, a steel door frame, twelve (12) wooden door frame, D.T. and way beams, vehicles: 14865, 29186 and Sp 1010 otherwise no complaint — 8/11/98 |
| 11 | 1005 | 9: | I reported for duty. 8/11/98 |
| 12 | 1006 | 13 | pa Brima Sandy Massaquoi and Brima Kpaka arrived in and reported themselves as ordered by the authorities — 8/11/98 |
| 13 | 1030 | 12 | Ref S/D 12 of above, left the office for their various homes and warned to report here on Monday 2/2/98 at 1000hrs. 8/11/98 |
| 14 | 1031 | 4 | Reference S/D 4 of above, I have obtained statement from the witness and at the same time left the office 1893 |
| 15 | 1032 | 10 | Ref S/D 10 of above, I certify taking over the duties of duty officer as per S/D 10 of above, other wise no serious report. 1893 |
| 16 | 1035 | 26 of 30 78 242 | Ref S/D 26 of above, I have with drawn suspect for voluntary confes statement. 30/1/98 1893 |
| 17 | 1040 | 18: 54: | I am leaving the office for Bra Ka die on enquiry. 8/11/98 |
| 18 | 1045 | 17: | Ref S/D 17 of even date myself Mr Sao Nabien of No 3 Makeya 9 Street Amadu Kamara of No 17 Omba Lane Karama |

returned to the office ~~_____~~ ^{5/15/08} ~~_____~~ ³⁰¹¹

1050 34 with Sgt. 1521, suspects Abu Bakar
9/30 1/1 Sung, Abu Karim, I left for
Hampden Road on enquiry. - ~~_____~~ ²¹⁸⁵

1055 55: I am leaving the office together
with one Madam Aminata
Sawh for ~~_____~~ Marcaty Street ~~_____~~
Kerema on enquiry. ~~_____~~ ^{_____}

1056 I arrived in the office
and reported for duty. ~~_____~~ ^{_____}

1100 I am leaving for Sumaila
street on enquiry. ~~_____~~ ^{_____}

1210 31 August Asuna of # 27 Sumaila
32 street Kerema arrested
and brought in one Samuel
Musa and Kikula Man
Sawh of Kerema town
who reported that on
today's date 3/1/08 at
about 12.00 Noon along
Hampden Road Kerema
the letters were found
with a Robson Spelling
Machine which sub-
jected to be the same
fully obtained value
to follow. S/P Hyslop
informed. I am dealing ~~_____~~ ^{_____}

c/r 30/9/08
Kerema

1230 16 Reg 510/16 of above, I have obtained
Voluntary Confession statement from
Suspect. ~~_____~~ ^{_____}

1235 26 Musa Lohai of #30 Lusia Street
Kerema arrived to see S/O

- could: Hyde
- 26 1348 25 Ref s/s 25 of above, by order of s/s I have handed over the sum of £10,000 to Maria Jalloh on her own
 - 27 1345 I left the office with suspect Misu Jalloh for Haughia road on Enquiry together with suspect relatives
 - 28 1346 Depn 2183 Miral left the office for Bul park (enquiry) on Enquiry
 - 29 1349 I left the office for 5050 Town Street on Enquiry
 - 30 1400 33: I am leaving the office to invite complainant at Iahula st to join me to execute search warrant in the premise of suspect at wet Air field road Kenema. UCO crime and Sp. a crime informed
 - 31 1410 23 Ref. S/S 23 of above, the Complainant left after statement.
 - 32 1412 23 I left with Keisurka for Haughia Rd. Kenema on Enquiry.
 - 33 1415 30 Ref s/s 30 of above, I have returned from Iahula street after inviting complainant
 - 34 1430 36: Mariana Jalloh of No 28 Kablu Street Kenema arrived in to see OIC C-I-D Mr Amama

31/1/98 by the order of
 C.P.O and OLC C.I. D
 the scales that was
 discovered from suspect
 Chenior Talloh of No 6 Coker
 Jah Street Kenema should
 be handed over to Mrs
 Talloh and also the suspect
 Chenior Talloh of No 6 Coker
 Jah Street

A/557

36 1448 34: 35:

Ref - 8/1035 of today's date
 31/1/98 of have handed
 over the two diamond buying
 scales to Mr Chenior Talloh
 of No 6 Coker Jah Street
 Kenema as an order
 from C.P.O "B" Division
 Mr Issa



A/557

37 1456 44

With complained suspect and op
 1028, I left to execute search-
 warrant at No 1 Harfield road
 Kenema

A/557

33 1503

I am leaving the office to attend
 to the funeral of my ad-
 duced son at No 33 Koroma Street
 Kenema N.C.O. Crime informed

A/557

34 1505 35:

suspect Brina Bortane
 is released on his own
 accord by the order of
 C.P.O.

A/557

35 1510 34:

suspect left the office

36 1555 37

By order of Sr I have
 handed over Kereba Man

Saturday 31st Jan 1998

3014

S/N	Time	No	Description
		44	Party to Anson Area of 27 similar trees to be replanted when needed
37	1520	36 38	Ref s/s 36 of above, Susana Kekura Manning driver of Peugeot Peugeot 204 ref. No. 2527 of No 4 Sena Ave Lane Kekura
38	1525	37	Ref s/s 37 of today's date, by order of s/s I have handed over Susana Kekura Manning to Judge Keh Alpha of No 11 Kborpua street and warned to report when needed
39	1528	40	Alpha Fadika of No 11 Kborpua street Kekura area in to see S/P, Hyde.
40	1530	39	By order of S/P, Hyde, Malanor Tannah is handed over to Mr. Fadika to produce him on 1/2/98 at 1000 hours
41	1535	42	Joseph Musa of No 25 Sannah Street Kekura arrived in to see S/P Hyde
42	1538	41	By order of S/P, Hyde Samuel Musa is handed over to Mr. Joseph Musa to produce him on 1/2/98 at 1000 hours
43	1540	40+42	Ref s/s 40+42 of above, all parties involved left the office for their residence
44	1630	37	Ref s/s 37 of above, party returned from not-Airfield road after Executive

Time	Date	Description
1630	37	During the course nothing of police interest was found, except one yellow NO 25 foot ball tie shirt which complainant alleged that suspect Mohamed Fornie was wearing in the night of the incident. Ok C.I.D informed
1632	14	I have obtained statements from complainant's mistresses
1635	27	Ref S/D 27 of above I returned with suspect from No 88 Hughes road where I saw two yellow Eyo 20 bailing machine packed in the house of Mr Amara Dagon when asked for the owner, I was informed that the two bailing machines belongs to complainant and within that stage, complainant and claim the two bailing machines as his property
1640	51	By order of C.P.O - L. Division through ofc C.I.D Super/ Abdul Sheriff is released and warned to report here with three gallons of petrol on the 1/2/98
1710		By order of C.P.O - through ofc. C.I.D. Property of Abdul Sheriff including 2230.00/000, rubber containing engine oil, rubber containing idolic, two inner tyres, a wallet containing driving licence and insurance and handed over to him.
1712	50	Mr. M.B. manna of Town Council Komena arrived in to see ofc.

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Saturday 31st January, 1998 1703016

S/N	Time	Ref	Remarks	Signature
50	1718	49	By order of ofc. C.I.D. mohamed Fennie is released to Mr. M.B. mainnah to produce him on Monday 2/2/98 at 10. A.M.	<i>[Signature]</i>
51	1720	47	Ref SP47 suspect left for his house	<i>[Signature]</i>
52	1730	53	By order of ofc C.I.D. I released and handed over accused person Musy Fallah on bail and warn to produce her before magistrate court Kenema on the 2/2/98 at 9 am	<i>[Signature]</i>
53	1735	52	Ref s/o 52 of above surety and accused left the office	<i>[Signature]</i>
54	1740	18	By order of S/S C.I.D Mr Rawth I have handed over Amady Kamara to Mr Joseph Way and warn him to produce the same Amady Kamara when needed	<i>[Signature]</i>
55	1745	20	Ref S/D 20 of even date returned to the office	<i>[Signature]</i>
56	1887	88	Ofc mohamed Sawa of 20 same no. R Street Kenema arrived in the office in company with Kadiatu Bundu of no. 38 Sumaira Street Kenema and reported that on 29/1/98 at Momo Junction one major Seth Marnah deployed there forcibly took one five gallon rubber of palm oil from his vehicle S/N. 29029 value to follow	<i>[Signature]</i>

Time	Clk	acc.	
1920			myself (D/P.C. 5604) and D/ep1 1675 arrived in for duty _____ 5604
1930	56		Ref S/O 56 of even date the complainant and witness left the office after statements
1945	60		'B' shift personnel comprising of D/P.C 5604 and myself present and paraded for duty inspected and found fit for duty and detailed as follows duty officer D/cpl 2725 - lock up orderly D/P.C 5604 crime 6006 and 3947 4c shift myself eight - male suspects in custody other wise area quiet _____ 1675
2000	59		I handed over the duties of duty officer to D/cpl 2725 as per S/O 10 of today's date, other wise no serious report _____ 1503
2010			I certify taking over the duties of duty officer as per S/O 10 of today's date other wise no serious complaints area quite at the moment _____ 1675
Sunday 1 st February 1998			
1	0650	7	D/Sgt 4721 arrived in for duty _____ 1675 2725
2	0700		S/O CID D/Insp Hyde arrived in for duty _____ 1675 2725
3	0815		D/cpl 1675 together with D/P.C 5604 left the office for Kaitumba terrace. _____ 1675 2725
4	0816	7	D/cpl 3527 arrived together with D/cpl 3947 arrived in for duty _____ 1675 2725
5	0820	7	D/cpl 1893 arrived in the office and reported sick _____ 1675 2725
6	0735	7	S/O 367 arrived in and reported in order _____ 1675 2725

Sunday 15th February 1998

142

SN	Time	CR	OCCURRENCE	Page
7	0745	1	'A' Shift personnel comprising of the following nos 4721, 3527, 1893 and S/C 367 paraded for duty, they were inspected by Dsp 4721 and found fit & tidy, also lectured on the general police duties before details as thus:- duty officer 367 took up orderly, Dsp 3527 not seen for duty, 1028, 5857, 4735, 4062, 1521, 5886, 4878, 5106, 4779, S/C 11, 72 and Dsp Rogers, Crime 4721, Sick 1893, eight (8) male suspects in cell for various offences otherwise no serious complaints	12
8	0800	9	I handed over the duties of duty officer to 367 as per S/O 10 of today's date other wise no serious rel etc	13
9	0805	8	'B' shift personnel paraded off duty	14
10	0810	11	Mohamed Dine of No 10 Makien Street Kenema arrived in and reported that on yesterday date 31 st -1-98 at about 18:30 hours along Makien Street, he was assaulted by one Juwan of Makien Street, Kenema and he had sustained pain from his	15

142

Sunday 1st February 1998

Time	Ref	OCURRENCE	Sign		
	4721	dealing			
10	Ref 814 10	of today's date, Compt sioner made statement sum Home issued via a police medical report form in duplicate and left for government hospital Kensington			
7	0816	7	7	Came in for duty.	
7	0817	7	7	arrived in for duty	
13	0820	13		D/Pl 4062 left the office to attend Church Service	
16	0945	16		D.P.C 6240 arrived in the office with police medical form marked E/D 7 dated 28/1/98 but with the effect from the 30/1/98 to 6/2/98. S/S to note plus of C.I.D	
15	1030	15		Ref 815 the sickly officer 6240 P.C sawa left the office for his house	
18	1035	18		Chief Sheriff Mohamed of Kampalim business town arrived in and repor ted on 31/1/98 whilst travelling on board taxi car registration no. wa 3387 his travelling bag containing money and other properties to the tune of £324,000.00 was stolen for which he suspected one Sherly Anora & others. S/O informed. S/S 347	
17	1040	17		Complainant left after statement and proposed to produce witness	
20	1045	20		Aug Aminata Nabbe of 12/13 Lucia arrested and brought	

Sunday 1st February 1968

S/N	Time	C/R	OCCURRENCE	A
19			in Aminata Turay of No 8 second street Kenema for interrogation in respect of one game dress suspected to have been stolen from Amiasa Labbie	
20	1050	19	By order of S/O C.I.D Mr Amara suspect Aminata Turay is released on her own and warned to go with the game dress	
21	1210	22	By order of S/O Akleh I have released suspect Sherry Amara to Mr. Joe Moisch of No. 11 Massaque Street Kenema and warned to produce him on 2/2/68 at 10am	
22	1230	21	By S/O 21 of above both suspect and Sherry left	
23	1310	24	A left the office for Forestry Quarters on enquiry	
24	1315	23	Ref S/O 23 of above A returned to the office	
25	1330	26	Mr. Joseph Murray Marsh of No 21 Makanya street Kenema advised via the office to see S/O C.I.D.	
26	1340	25	By order of S/O C.I.D. suspect Mohamed Lomah is handed over to S/O Akleh	

Sunday 1st Feb. 1911

Time	C/R	OCCURRENCE	Seq
1345		I have obtained voluntary con- ditioned statement from suspect Smart Kokofole — — —	2111
1400	29	One Abu Backani Kokofole of NO. 4 Neneueh Street Kenema arrived in to see S/O C. T. D. in respect of suspect Smart Kokofole — — —	2111
1430	28	Ref S/O 28 of above I have re- leased suspect to Abu Backani Kokofole and warned to pro- duce suspect on Monday the 2/2/98 at 1000 hours. — — —	2111
1432	31	One Mohamed Dakko of No 50p- ai Street Kenema arrived in the office to see S/O C. T. D. in re- spect of suspect Musa Sebay	2111
1442	30	Ref S/O 30, by order of S. P. O Crime I have released suspect to Surety and warned to prod- uce him tomorrow at 0900 hrs.	2111
1500	71	With respect - Hyde & Wright - for Hindon's steel on 2/1/98 — — —	2111
1640	34	S.O.S. East Major Manning arrived to see Regional Commander East	2111
1645	33	Ref S/O 33 of above S.O.S East left the station for his residence — — —	2111
1800	36	Chief Tusu Nandy of Wano Nigeria village Jamba Chieftain arrived at the station and	2111

Sunday 12 Feb. 1998

S/N	Time	C/R	OCCURRENCE
35			reported on today date 1/2/98 at about 1 pm ^{thru} and Lahri Garmoh of the same village got drawn in the area river. Commission impressed. Sgt-1521 dealt. —
36	1829	37	Ref 810 35 of above, the C.P.O. & 1 division and Commission East region are informed. —
37	1830	38	Ref 810 36 of above, the C.P.O. & 1 division advised over telephone that the book be bound and to report here on 1/2/98 at 12 mid day for further investigation.
38	1840		Mgt 2183 come in for duty
39	1845		Dpc 1608 arrived in for duty
40	1945		'B' shift Personnel Nos. 1608 and myself Paraded for duty. He was found clean and fit for duty. D.P.C. 1608 detailed as duty officer. Not yet seen for duty. 2725, 3296, 4566. S/O to be informed. Area quiet. (7) Sevens suspects in custody
41	2000		Dcpa 3296 come in for duty
42	2005	43	I handed over duties of the duty officer to the company

146 Sunday 1st Feb. 1998

Time B/R OCCURRENCE Sig

could check, two shade lamps, a drenching bucket with a pump, a compound, a wooden hamper, a box containing prisoners papers etc, three c-y chairs, a sewing machine head five old types, two spring bed, a water pipe, a steel door frame, twelve wooden door frames, a way book a D/I Book, Vehicles registered Number, 14805, 85186 and 1010 otherwise no serious report

2008 42 I duty, taken over the duties of duty officer and believed the above entries to be true and correct

2008 7: P shift personnel paraded off duty at the same time left the offices for their various quarters

2009 I arrived in the office and report for duty

Monday 2nd February 1998

0710 S: D/Sgt 4721, 1895, 5886, 6006, 3947 and 5857 arrived in for duty

0715 S: D/cpl 4878 and D/cpl 4735 arrived in for duty

0720 S: D/Inspector Hyde and Sgt 2871 arrived in for duty

0730 S: D/p.c. 1078 and D/cpl 4062 arrived in for duty

0745 11:2 "A" shift personnel commencing

Handwritten notes in the left margin including '1524', '1317', and other illegible scribbles.

Handwritten initials and marks in the right margin, including '317', '1128', '1697', and '1128'.

Mondar 2nd February 1998

S/N	Time	CIR	OCCURRENCE
S. Court	3.4		<p>of the following nos:- 6006, 3947, 1675, 1028, 5857, 473, 4721, 4062, 3527, 5886, 485106, 1893, 1521, 5604, SCS 117, 367 ASP. Rogers, D/Sgt S. 1895, 209 and myself present and at the same time provided for duty. They were inspected by M.S.I. Kamara and found clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift-returned on general police duty by 5106 before details as follows:- duty officer:- 5106, WPC up order 6006. crime references:- 5602, 3947, 1675, 1028, 5857, 473, 4721, 4062, 3527, 1521, 5886, 4878 and 1893. Not yet seen for duty:- 4779. Several suspects in custody for various criminal offence Yc shift:- 2057. Area seen to be quiet at the moment. Other will be seen report.</p>

6 0800 4200
1/2
98

The handed over the duties of duty officer to D/P.C. 5106 with article in charge as per inventory thus: one wall clock, one telephone set, one drinking bucket, a cup, one D/I, one way book, two table lamps plus 3. C. chair, one

Monday Feb, 2nd 1998

SN	Time	CR	OCCURRENCE
			Threat via letter to the effect at about 1.15 pm that the above address the subject resulted by the letter and thereby she sustained injury at the neck and pain along her back. She also informed I and doc- tor
13	10:12	R/L	Slb 12 of above medical file no. issued to consultant for treatment
14	10:15		Mrs Vandey of 26 Boniso Street Kenema advised by and reported that some time in 1996 he gave his double ^{bed value 24,000,000} to one Wilya of Koroma Street Kenema for safe keeping which the latter had converted to her own use or benefit. SD CW informed dealing
15	11:32	14	Rey SD 14 with 2057 and complained I left the office for Koroma Street 15 invite suspect of the instant
16	11:33	25	One Santiago Kanga of NO 53 of 44 Berabulanga Street Kenema 18 arrested and brought to station Koroma and Sahel Kenema both of the same address and reported that on the 11/2/98 = 4

Monday Feb 2nd 1998

attendance 50

Entered in to the bed room and stole therein one Travelly bag containing various wearing value to follow. Blo. C.I.D informed get D.I.P. 5857 dealing

1114 5 I am leaving the office for Massagora Street, Kenema on Enquiry.

1120 19 By order of of Awara through No Hyde I have released one carton of different drugs as per S/D. 33 of 30/1/98 to Mr. Thomas Igana of Awara Drug Store in Kenema

1130 18 Re S/D. 18 of above Mr. Thomas left after receiving his drugs

1140 21: One Sulaiman M. Mansakoro of no. 13 Humanya Avenue Kenema, arrived in and reported that, on 2/2/98 at about 9:30 A.M, he was threatened by his wife Emma Karama of No. 3 Kips Way corner Kenema, to do his harm. No if any drug deal.

1155 20: vide S/D. 20 above, no. 2299 od complainant left for Kips way on esp.

22-12-98 11 hef S/D 11 of above I returned and brought in Amin Sanyak and Mohamed Mansaray all of No. 7 Boleh street for C.P.O interview

10. S.I. C.I.D. Mr. J.S.S. Gotta

Monday Feb, 2nd 1998

152

S/P	Time	CP	Incurrence	St
23			the said premises against	11
			the 9th February 1998	32
24	1206	23	Ref s/o 23 of above both parties	11
			left the office	32
25	120	16	Ref s/o 16 of above By order of	
		32	s/o C/D & handed over suspects	
			Hassan Koroma and Salien	
			Kamara to the lockup order	
			for safe custody while	
			& left with complainant	
			to visit scene of crime	
26	1250		I am leaving the office	
			for C.R.S office on	
			enquiry	
27	1235	28	Off. S/S? arrested and brought	
			in one Adellulay Kuberan	
			of no 17 Marana Peth Kereva	
			for the house of Kereva, Kereva	
			to with the sum of Rs 25,000/00	15
			from one Hassan Fuleh of no 17	
			Hindawa Street Kereva	
28	1242	21	Ref s/o 21 of above, suspect is	
			handed over to one Karthika	
			Kumar of no 7 Anand Street	
			Kereva with the content of the	
			complaint - that suspect will	
			produce bank payment today	
			of Rs 2.58 or surety is wanted	
			to produce suspect also	
			needed by police	
29	1245	21	Vide s/o 21 today, no. 2259	

152

Monday Feb, 2nd 1978

Time C/A deverence

1250 31: court. Quama Kamara. — —

I have personnel warned both Melbort Subainman & Managwoi and wife Quama Kamara to stop issuing threats remarks against each other and to take their matter back home to be settled by their parents.

1255 30: vide 90.30 above, both parties left the office. — —

1300 25 Ref 510 25 of above I returned to the office from scene of crime where I observed that the staple was damage and through that the thief or thieves gain entrance to the room. However, the damage staple was brought in as exhibit.

1310 34 Ref 970 11 of 1/2/78 Complaint brought in NIS M.O's report and one witness.

1316 33 Ref 970 33 I have obtained statement from Mohamed James No 90 10 of 1/2/78 same time he left the office after statement.

1317 By order of D/S Kamara, I have handed both suspect Lansana Koroma and Fatma to Koroma to mustapha Senesio Koroma - of no 4 11/1/78 Koroma hand to

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Vertical handwritten notes and initials on the left margin.

Munday Feb, 20 1938		Occurrence	
36	1519 37	Suspect arrive in and reported -	
37	1400 36	By order of A.C.D. through Sgt	
		1521 suspect is released and	
		informed to report tomorrow 3/21/38	
		at 0900 hrs	
38	1425 39	Mr. John Alton Kemmle of no 5	
		Mr. Kemmle arrived	
		in the office to see A.D. to present	
		his membership	
39	1406 38/40	He returned to the office after	
		he has approved the membership	
40	1409 38	By order of A.D. L. Bro. now look	
		in the presence of 6006 Nelson	
		inspect John Swanson should be	
		released to Mr. Alton Kemmle	
		in referred to S/D 38 7 2/19 38	
41	1420 42	By order of C.P.O. - these are the	
		D/C, C.I.D. Alvin Secoy is	
		Deputy Chief of Patrol Discharge	
42	1422 41	R/S S/D 41 of release, the chief	
		left the office	
43	1423 12	Returned to the office	
		94 1430 18	
		9 have returned and left the	
		office	
45	1530 47	9 left the office for Regulate sheet	
		Kemmer on enquiry	
46	1559	I left the office for Dams	
		Book on Enquiry	
47	1600 45	Ref 8745 of even data 19 return	

Monday Feb 2 1998

Time	Q/R	Occurrence	SO
1740	50	Sub Insp M. M. Camara Sgt 4-721 Sgt 1895 all left for Gregg for statement taken in the	
1910	13	By order of CPO L Division Mr. Issa I have brought in Mr. Brian S. Massagut and at the same time handed him over to the lockup orderly #cpt. 6006 for safe custody	Walt Art Sob
1940	89	D/Sgt 2183 arrived in on duty	Sob
2005	274	I handed over the duties of the duty officer to D/Sgt 2183 with articles on charge are Per 8106 of 2-1-98 to be done and correct	Sob Pt
2008	55	C.P.O. "L" Division Mr. Issa arrived in the office on visit.	Art Sob
2010	56	S/O Hyde returned to the office on visit.	Art Sob
2021	53	C.P.O. Mr. Issa left the office after visiting.	Art Sob
2023	54	S/O Hyde left the office after visiting 40 Complain.	Art Sob
2025	58	D/cpl 2725 arrived in for duty	Art Sob
2028	57	D/cpl 2725 left the office for Government hospital on special duty.	Art Sob
2030		D/RC 1608 arrived in for duty	Art Sob
		Tuesday 3-2-98	
10730	71	D/cpl 3947 arrived in for	Art

Station			Occurrence
2	0732	7:	D/cpl. 1675 arrived in for duty
3	0735	7:	D/P.C. 5886 arrived in for duty
4	0740	7:	D/cpl. 4878 and D/Sgt 2871 arrived in for duty
5	0743	7:	D/cpl. 4735 arrived in for duty
6	0746	7:	D/cpl. 6006 is in for duty
7	0745	1:2 3:4 5:6 9:17 48:	"A" shift - personnel comprising of the following NIPs: - 6006, 3947, 1675, 1028, 5857, 4735, 4721, 4062, 3527, 1521, 5886, 4878, 5106, 1893, 1895, 2057, 5602 SCS. 11, 72, 367, 185P. Rogers and myself present and at the same time paraded for duty. They were inspected by D.S.I. Iamara and found clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift-lectured on general police duty by 6006 before details as follows: - 5886, lock up orderly: - 5604. Hospital: 1028. crime reserves: - 6006, 3947, 1675, 5857, 4735, 4721, 4062, 3527, 1521, 4878, 5106, 1893. Seven (7) suspects in custody for various criminal offences. 1/2 shift: - 2057. The area seem to be quiet - at the moment. Otherwise no serious report.
8	0815	51	I handed over the duties

Tuesday 3rd February 1948

TIME	CHG	occurrence	157
		articles on charge as per handing over note as follows: one wall clock one telephon set, one drinking bucket and cup one wooden cupboard one wooden trough, one trunk containing Presonus Papers, five tyres, one steel door, two wooden door frames. at vehicle nos. 1010, 14865, 29186 otherwise no serious report.	5800
9 0820	7	B shift personnel paraded off duty and left the office	5800
10 0825	11	one Santiago Kargbo of 53 Massagui street brought in Ibrahim Turay of 53 Algomulaga street in respect of s/o 16 of 2/2/48	5800
11 0830	10	Ref s/o 10 of above by order of s/o suspect is handed over to the lockup for safe custody	5800
12 0831	5	I returned to the office from 12 Makien Street Kenema having warned Jusu to report here for statement at 10Am	5800
13 0840	50	Mr B. S. Massagui of Kenema Town Surrendered his Mercedes Benz car EK 40404 and the	5800

Contd.

2800

210

100

5800

5800

2/2/48

Tuesday 3rd February 1998

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S/N/T/M/C/112

Occurrences

14	0842	15	By order of the C.I.U. Mr Amin Amara, I have handed over John Swaray to NO 5886 Moronia for safe custody	15 2855 K. Amin
15	0846	14	Ref S/D 14 above I have handed over John Swaray to the lock-up orderly S/P. 5804 for safe custody - 5886	
16	0945	22:	D/Cpt 1893, 5604, 325 367 and myself left the office for London section Kenema upon an information for enquiry	17/19
17	0946	7:26	of an leaving the office for brigade	
18	0950	16	I have obtained caution statement from all the suspects	
19	1010	20	The vice chairman of the United Kingdom Stars Kai Denby has been called by the C.P.O. I Division Mr. Issa Issa in his office and warned in the presence of other club members to suspend all activities of the said social club until the chairman Mustapha Fallah returns to Kenema.	
20	1015	14	Ref S/D 14 of above left the office for his residence	

Tuesday 3rd February 1998

S No	Time	Ref	Occurrence
30	1405	31	w/cpl 1699 Kamara arrested to see s/o C.I.D.
31	1407	30, 27	By order of s/o C.I.D. Inspector Hyde I have handed over suspect Emmanuel Davies to w/cpl 1699 Kamara and warned to produce same at 10.00 hours on Thursday 5/2/98.
32	1415	33	I have brought in Paula Barrie of 37 Segadu road Seferwema for interrogation.
33	1420	32	By order of Sgt. 2871 I have released suspect Paula Barrie to Mr. Amadu Sesay of No. 41 Segadu Seferwema and warned to produce him on 18/2/98.
34	1650	36	Adama Tallah of No 29 Blama Road Kenema arrested and brought in one Salme Sesay of No 1 Bockarigban Street and reported that some time in December 1997 she instructed the sum of Le 240,000/= to the latter for the purpose of buying soft drinks which he converted to his own use and benefit. O/D C.I.D. informed & am dealing.
35	1635	21	Ref SD 21 of above & returned to the office after enquiry.
36	1632	34	Ref s/o 34 above complaint made.

Tuesday 5th February

Accountance
Credited Voluntary Contion Statement - 5885

1710 38 Idina Sessay of NO 22 Dams
arrived in to see D/O C.I.D. - 5886

1718 37 By order of D/O C.I.D. through
39 Sgt 1899 and cpl 1675, I have
handed over suspect Saliou Sessay
Sessay to Idina Sessay and
wanted to produce same
at 10.00 a.m on 4/2/98. 5886

1720 38 Ref S/D 38 above parties left
the office. 5886

1721 41 Gibrilla Kaloko of No 29
33⁷ Massaqueo street, Kenema
4/2 arrived in the office and
reported that sometime
in 1997, one Ahmed Koroma
of No 16 Susu town Kenema
fraudulently converted his
from mattress mattress and
other household properties
value to follow to his
own use and benefit
of C informed I am dealing 4062

1833 40 Complainant and witnesses
made statement and left the office.

1840 Sgt 2183 arrived in for duty - 5885

1850 44 Sgt 2725 arrived in for duty - 5886

1920 43 Sgt 2725 left for Government
Hospital, Kenema on posting &
instructed by Sgt. 2723 the N.C.D.
B shift. 5886

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Tuesday 3rd February 1998

162

S/N	Time	CR	Occurrence	Sign
			Articles on charge as follows: One wall clock, One telephone set, One drinking bucket, one cup, One wooden lounge, one wooden cupboard, One trunk containing prisoners property, five tyres, one steel door frame, and Vehicles Nos 1010, 14865, 2986 otherwise no Complaint. 5886	
46	1940	45	By order of N/Sgt 233 I now hand over the duties of duty officer to S/P C 1608 as per S/D 45 of above. Other wise no Complaint. 5886	
47	1945	46	I certify taken over the duties of Duty officer order from the out going Duty officer orderly D/P C 5886 and and believed the above en- tained to be true and correct	
48	1950	7:	A' Shift personnel para- ded off duty and at the same time left the office for their various quarters	
49	1932		I arrived in the office and reported for duty	
50	1933		I arrived and reported for duty	
51	1940		Inspector Kanteh of Finan- C. Office K.P.S. arrived and reported as orderly officer	

162

Tuesday 3rd February 1998

10-

Sig	Time	Chr	Occurrence	Sig
			<p>mpained by Hindonle Simbo of No. 10 Davies Street Kenema arrived and reported that at about 2230 hrs along Labai Street Kenema he was assaulted by one Hon of No. 15 Labai Street Kenema and two peoples Army, if seen could be identified. And he thereby sustained pain all over his body. Dsgt 2183 is shift informed. I am dealing - 4566</p>	
53	2247	52	<p>Ref 8th - 52 of above en- my complainant is issued with a medical form ^{and left} for Govt. Hospital for treat- ment and promised to make ^{and left} statement after treatment - 4566</p>	

Wednesday 4th Feb. 1998

1	0700	7i	D/p.c. 5886, D/cpl. 6006 and D/ins- pector arrived in for duty -	
2	0705	7i	D/cpl. 3947 arrived in for duty -	
3	0710	7i	D/cpl. 1675, D/cpl. 4878, D/sqt 4721 and D/sqt 2871 arrived in for duty -	
4	0715	7i	D/p.c. 1028 arrived in for duty -	
5	0730	7i	D/p.c. 5857 arrived in for duty -	
6	0735	7i	D/ep. 4735 arrived in for duty -	
7.	0745	11.2	"A" shift - personnel comprising 314 of the following nos: - 5504, 1028, 5857, 4735,	

Wednesday 4th Feb 1958 164

Ab Time ck.

7. Cont'd; 4878, 5106, 1893, 1895, 2057, SCS. 11, 72, 367, ASP. Rogers and myself present and at the same time paraded for duty. They were inspected by S.I. Kamana and found clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift-returned on general police duty by 5886 before details as follows: - Duty officer: - 4878, lock up orderly: - 4735. Hospital: - 5857. Civil reserves: - 5604, 6006, 3947, 1675, 1028, 4721, 4062, 3527, 1521, 5886, 5106 and 1893 (9) suspects in custody. for various criminal offences including six (6) political prisoners. Yc shift: - 2057. The area seem to be quiet at the moment. special duty: - 3947, 1521, 2871 and S.I. Kamana Yc. Other wise no serious report.

8 0800 468 I handed over the duties of duty officer to D/Cpl. 4878 with 9 articles on charge as per inventory: one wall clock, one S.H. telephone set, one D/I, one way book, two shade lamps, one tinna bucket and one other wooden

164

Wednesday 4th Feb. 1898.

owner property, one sewing ma-
chine head, two bed springs,
(12) wooden door frames, one
steel door frame and vehicle
numbers 1010, 14865 and 2986.

other wise no serious report
9 0805 8. To certify that the above
entry is checked to be
true and correct

10 0835 23 D/S. Kanara and party left the
office for Bangha road and
Kenema Township on enquiry

11 0838 24 By order of C.P.O. Division
left the office to see Manager
Balking at Bangha road

12 0930 17 PC 6499 S/O of S/O
Branch of Kenema reported
and brought in one
Brima S/O Kaidamba
of Kenema Town and
reported that on 7/1/98
at about 8.0 A.M. at
the residence of the
latter, he received the
sum of Rs 241/-
S/O working with the
Director that he would
let him a room S/O.
Hyde informed from
Balking

13 0935 14 I am leaving the office for
no 4 Jabbar street Kenema

de-
th
sen-
e
ay
dr-
len

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1108

1108

14	1005	13	Ref S/D 13, I returned to the office together with Complainant and Superior Sater Kanara for interrogation	
15	1035	26	I am leaving for 3rd Brigade Head Quarters Kanara with D/Sgt 1995 on enquiry	5886
16	1045		D/Sgt 1721 left the office to attend court	5888
17	1047	12	Ref S/D 12 of above, the complainant left after statement	5888
18	1105	37	D/Sgt 5604 left the office to attend court	5888
19	1140	28, 25, 44	one Sattu Sesay of No. 1 Bockanigba Street Kanara arrived in the office and reported that sometime December 1997, he gave the sum of 2240,000 to one B.M. Kamma of No. 55 Hotequa Street Kanara for the purpose of buying soft drinks in which the latter converted the said money to his own use and benefit. O/C informed D/Sgt 3537 dealing	2
20	1142	19	Complainant left for statement making	2
21	1145	20	There is a letter of No. 58 Madama	

166

Wednesday 4. 10. 17 10

	22	1201	21	Ref slo 21 at above by order of slo cis & have handed over one six (6) batteries Amiga tape recorder to mc Thomas. Ceilcur and at the same time left the office	
sp- 16/11 17/11					
5886	23	1210	10	D/Sr. Kamara and party returned to the office	MISS 18/11
17/11	24	1215		Dept 3947, 1521 and S/S 2871 left the office for Kenema town ship on eng	
18/11	25	1240	19	Dept 3527 left the office together with the complainant to inspect the suspect in respect of S/O	
			26	19 of today's date 4/2/98	17/11
	26	1245	25	Ref slo 25 with the complainant returned to the office after visiting suspect	
	27	1315	35	Inspector Kamara of Kenema Police Station arrested and brought in one Osman of Circella road Kenema and reported that some time last year 1998 he gave his registered car No WK 9670 to the latter for the purpose of repairing which he maliciously burnt	
17/11				D/C ID informed him dealing	17/11
18/11	28	1317	27	Environmental Dept's brought in the Sierra watch ad. C.F. crime informed	17/11

29	cut		for Hampden road on enquiry together with D/Cpl 3296, while leaving D/Cpl 6006 to take note until I return.
30	1420 1420		I left the office for Gates Jah Street in front of Central Center.
31	1422	32	I handed over one tra- velling bag to Vandy Ka- mana containing one pair of crepe, one tray and one dish, in the presence of SC 367.
32	1425	31	vide S/O 31 above, Vandy Kamana left with his bag.
33	1440	40 g 3/2	I am leaving the office for Sumaila Street Kenema on enquiry IRD. S/O 40 g 3/2/98
34	1445	11	I returned to the office from N-3-B
35	1446	27	Ref. S/O 27 complaints and witness left the office after statement.
36	1448	15	Ref. S/O 15 of even date we returned to the office with a copy of statement made by one Boksaie Yopri and same was handed over to S/O CID.
37	1449	18	Ref. S/O 18, I returned to base
38	1450	39	Mohammed Ibrahim of No 43 Horse... Street...

Wednesday 4th Feb. 1998.

39 1500 38

By order of S/O [unclear] with
Ref 510 38 of above, with
Ref 2871, I left the office
together with Mohamed
[unclear] for the [unclear]
street on engine.

40 1645 41

S/O C. J. O. Sephenma
arrived in the office from
Sephenma Area Station
on engine.

41 1655 40

Ref 516 40 of above, I
left the office to see the C.P.O.
L. Division.

42 1704 43

Saidy Fajana arrived
in to Stald Surety
for his brothers.

43 1710 42

By order of S/O Hassan
Koroma, Salim Kamara
and Ibrahim Turay are
handed over to Saidy
Fajana of 53 Ngumbu
Lango Street to produce
them here 9/08 5/2/98.

44 1715 49

By order of C.P.O. L. Division
through of [unclear] the following
suspect Borbor Musa Kanari
and Salim Seray are
released and warned to
report here on Thursday the
5/2/98 at 10 A.M.

45 1740 46

W/SI Soffor arrived in
to see S/O, Heple.

46 1745 45

By order S/O [unclear] is handed

Wednesday 4th Feb 1998

S/No	Time	R.	Occurrence	Signature
			over to L/SGT Saffa to produce him with Le 24, and for on the 5/2/98 at about 1600 hrs	Sub
47	1845	48:	<p>Plon Bakero Kamara S.L.A SO: 18165361. Sergeant attached to 22nd B. Longs brought in Bobbie T, Alice Moisia, Mammie Moisia and Cibrilla Gillah and reported that on today's date 4/2/98 that at about 12 mid day he discovered that the sum of four thousand nine hundred dollars he gave his wife Fatu Kamara for safe keeping had been stolen, and then by suspected the latter Mr. Stone dealing N.C.O. crime informed Mr. Stone dealing</p>	Sub
48	1900	47:	<p>Ref S1047 of today's date 4/2/98 C.P.O. Division Mr. Issa informed</p>	Sub
49	1905	52:	<p>O/Sgt 2183 arrived in for duty</p>	Sub
50	1910	47:	<p>Ref-S1047 of today's date 4/2/98 of have handed over the four female suspect to N/C.O. Stone for</p>	Sub

Wednesday 4 Feb 1998

No	Time	Y/R	Occurrence	Sign
52	1915	52	D/P.C. 4566 arrived in for duty	
	52	45		
		51.57	'B' shift Personnel Nos 4566 1608 and myself Paraded for duty. They were inspected and found clean and fit for duty. They were lectured on general Police duty before details were made as follows. Duty officer 3296 Lockup orderly 1608, Crime myself and 4566. Not yet seen for duty 2725. (14) foreign suspects in custody. Area quiet.	
53	2004	68	Fawad Kallon of 8 Semab Lane Kenema arrested and brought in Borbor Garmoh and she reported that on today sometime in January 1998 she gave one bag of Gari value Le 32 500.00 which he converted to his own use and benefit. D/P.C. 4566 dealt.	
54	2005	8	Ref - 5108 of today's date 4/2/98 of 1 am handed over the duty of the office to	

Wednesday 7th Feb 1998

Time	Occurrence
55 2002	"A" Shift Personnel coming on following reported off duty and they left for their respective houses.
56 2045	S. I. Conteh by production of IC arrived and posted as orderly officer.
57 2017 52	D/cpl 2725 arrived on duty same time he left for Government hospital on special duty.
58 2030 53	Ref sp. 53 of today's date complainant left the office after statement.
59 2035 60	Tambor was brought in for interrogation.
60 2100 59	By order of N.C.O. Aimer I have released Tambor George to Abu Bakarr Kamang to produce witness here on 5/2/98 at 1000 hrs.
61 2105	I arrived in the office as orderly officer and found the following on duty 4566 3296 1608, 2183 etc. One fresh report of Larceny under investigation. Eleven (11) male and four (4) female in custody Area quiet. No personnel was reported sick or absent One male suspect Bonnie Kpakg admitted and 2725 was posted.

Thursday 5th Feb 1998

Time	R	Occurrence
2. 0730	7.	D.P.C. 5886 arrived - for duty
3. 0732	11	One Desmond T. Morris of
	16	No 6 Forbie Street Kenema
		arrived in the office and
		reported that on today's date
		at about 0100 hrs a group of
		armed men entered in to
		these compound and assault-
		ed him and stab him with
		Bayonet and all over his body
		and pain all over his body.
		S/O Hyde imposed D.P.C. 5886
		dealing.
4. 0735	7.	D/cpl 3527, 4878 and D/sgt-2871
		arrived in and reported for duty
5. 0737	7.	D/cpl 3947 and 4062 also S/I
		Kamara arrived in and repo-
		rted for duty D/cpl 6006, 4721
6. 0739	7.	D.P.C. 5857, 1028 and D/cpl 1675
		arrived in the office and
		reported for duty.
7. 0745	112	"A" shift personnel comprising
	45	of the following nos:- 5607,
	6,	6006, 3947, 1675, 1028, 5857,
	8, 12	4735, 4721, 4062, 3527,
	18,	1521, 5886, 4878, 5106,
	50	1893, 1895, 2057, SCS. 11,
		72, 367, ASP. Rogers Cd.
		myself present and at
		the same time paraded
		for duty. They were

170

Thursday 5th Feb 1998

175

Final R

Occurrence

Sig

Const

clean, fit and ready for duty. The shift-vestured on general police duty by 3527 before details as follows:- Duty officer: 4062, work up orderly:- 1028. Hospital:- 6006. crime re-views:- 5607, 3997, 1675, 5857, 4735, 4721, 3527, 1521, 5886, 4878 and 1893. Female work up orderly:- 5106. Twelve (12) suspects in custody for various criminal offences including four (4) female and six (6) political detainees. Ye shift:- 2057. The area seem to be quiet at the moment. Otherwise no serious report.

0800

12, I handed over the duties of
 14, Duty officer to D/Cpl 4062
 489 with articles on charge one
 5/2 wall clock, one telephone set, two shade lamps, one bucket with a cup, three C. H chairs, four old tyres, one D/T book, one waybook, one wooden cupboard, one wooden hanger, one trunk containing prisoner's prop

officer

2000

2000

2000

2000

Thursday 5th February
OCC

S/N	Time	R.	Description
8			and three vehicle No's S.P. 10, W.R. 14865, W.U. 29186, others in no. complain
9	0802	7	I left for Coast Hospital for special duty
10	0818	13	S/C C.I.D., Seppewme Mk. Labour arrived in the eve to see S/C C.I.D. Carter
11	0819	3 ^o 15	Ref. S/D. 3 of today's date Comp amount issued with a duplicate police medical form and he left for hospital.
12	0820	8,	I certify taking over the duties of Duty officer with articles correct.
13	0825	7	S/C C.I.D. Came in for duty
14	0827	8,	Ref s/d 8 & 9 above after carefully gone through the diary I observed some palm oil stains on pages 169 to 174, S/S informed.
15	0855	11 23	Ref s/d 11 above Complainant returned from hospital with M.D's report.
16	0905	3	Ref s/d 3 of even date Complainant brought in 8 empty shells, 1 combat issue cap, 2 pillow cases and one bayonet as exhibit and same were handed over to s/d C.I.D. for safe keeping.
17	0910	19	I am leaving the office for A.F. R.C. Secretariat N.A.M.

1975 THURSDAY 5th February 1998

sig	Time	R	occ	by
10	1003	7	D/Sr. Kamara and party left on enquiry	
19	1005	17	Ref s/s 17 of above, I returned to the office	
20	1010	21	I dep. the office for Kusa Street on enquiry	
21	1015	20	Ref s/s 25 of above, I returned to the office together with the Friday morning of No 25 Kabina Street kenema for s/s Algha 2871 - Kenema	
22	1110		I am leaving the office for Hangha road on enquiry	
23	1112	15	Complainant left after statement	5886
24	1117	38	myself (5604), D/Sr's 2057, 1895 and D/W PC 5106, ^{and suspects} left the office for #1 Dokiyai street, kenema to execute search warrant	5604
25	1130	27	D/Sr PC 16089 left the office for brigade headquarters on enquiry	
26	1135	40	I am leaving the office for Cater Tech Street on enquiry	
27	1140	25	Ref s/s 25 of above with D/Sr 16089 returned to the office	
28	1200	29	Mohamed Barrie of No 3 Momegator Street, Kenema arrived in the office and reported that on today's date ST/98 round about 5am he	

THURSDAY 5TH FEBRUARY

S/N	Time	C/R	Occurrence
28	contd		and stole one from valued 695,000/- on other articles value follow, he suspected Alpha Umaru of the address. ofc Inf of any dealing.
29	1310	28	Complainant had to visit scene of
30	1315	31	Peter - bot of No 2 K small arrival J. sto c/o T.A. of Friday Kallan
31	1325	31 30: 32	Ref sto 30 of above of sto I have to over supply F Kallan to Peter and was on 19-2-78 at a
32	1330	31	Ref #1031 of above, both ps for war residence
33	1335	34	Mohamed Koroma of que street arrived sto C/O
34	1340	33	By order of sth I have over the sum of Kc 40, to Mohamed Koroma
35	1345	7.	He left the office for he at Soni Soni Pharmacy
36	1350	37	Kemoh Siddlebae of

THURSDAY 5TH FEBRUARY 1998

No	Time	C/R	Occurrence	Sta
			Note Towards of No 9 Number Street Kenema	Kenema Station
37	1315	36 38	By order of the C.I.D I have handed over suspect Selaymoh Tawallah to security kenema Station and I wanted to report at the office on 2 nd March 1998 at 4:30 pm with the name of M50	R S S S S
38	1400	211	Ref. S/D 24 of above, myself (5604), D/Sgt 2057, 1895, 5886 and suspects returned to office after we have searched executed search Warrant at the premises of suspects at #1 Dakiyai street, Kenema and nothing of police interest found	S604
39	1410	44	With Mpc Stone I left the office for Kenema town ship	
40	1430	26	Ref. S/D 26 of above I returned to the office after being	S362 S64
41	1555	42	One Alfred Woodde of No 40 Tangha road Kenema arrived in to see C/O C.I.D in respect of suspect Borbor Charuoh	S64 S64 S64
42	1610	41	Ref. S/D 41 of above by order of C/O C.I.D through S/O Heide suspect Borbor Charuoh is released and handed over to security Alfred Woodde of No 40 Tangha	R

Thursday 5th February 1998

180

S/N	Time	CR	Occurrence
43	1630		S/sgt 2871 BAO A.S and Inspector Hyde left the office for Hindlow Street Kenema
44	1630	39	Ref 39 of above with Max 500 I returned to office attended no serious report
45	1700	47	S/sgt 2182 arrived for duty
46	1930	47	D.P.C. 1608 Came in for duty.
47	2000	45	B Shift Personnel Nos. 1608 and 46 myself Paraded for duty. 1608 was inspected and found clean and fit for duty. Details made as follows. Duty officer 1608, lockup orderly myself. Not yet seen for duty 3296, 4566, and 3727. Sp to be informed. Eight suspects in custody.
48	2000	89 512 98	I handed over the duties of Duty officer to D.P.C. 1608 Contch with articles as per 8108 of above with other no serious complaint
49	2008	48:	I certify taken over the duties of duty officer from the out going duty officer D/pt. 4062 and believe the above entries to be true and correct.
50	2007	7:	A Shift personnel paraded off

Thursday 25 February 1970

Time	CR	Details
2155	52	WSI Saffa of Kenema Police Station brought in suspect Brima Secko Kausamba and surrender him to police
2130	51	Ref 81051 of above WSI Saffa left the office for her quarters
231	47	I reported for duty
2140	53	Ref 81053 of above party I left the office for Govt. Hospital. Dept 2183 informed
2315	54	Ref 870-54 of above party I returned to the office from Govt. Hospital and met 2725 on duty. Dept 3296 informed

Friday 6th Feb. 1970

1	0700	91	D/Pl. 5886 arrived in for duty
2	0705	91	D/Pl. 4878 arrived in for duty
3	0710	91	D/Pl. 5857 and 1675 arrived in for duty
4	0720	91	D/Pl. 1895 arrived in for duty
5	0730	91	D/Pl. 3947 arrived in for duty
6	0733	91	D/Pl. 6006 arrived in for duty
7	0740	91	Lt H.B. Turay etc Military Police and party arrived in the office
8	0743	7:10	Following suspects Andrew Awee, Issa Busumana, Abdulai Boakorie, Abdulai Saidu Awee, Brima S. marbaquai and John Swaray were handed over to

Friday 6th February, 1998

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2

15 1/2 "A" shift - personnel comprising of
 3/4 the following NOS: - 5604, 6006,
 56 3947, 1675, 1028, 5857, 4735,
 7, 4721, 4062, 3527, 1521, 5886,
 4878, 5106, 1893, 1895, 2057,
 SCS 11, 72, 367, ASP. Rogers &
 myself present - and at the
 same time paraded for duty.
 They were inspected by me
 and found clean, fit &
 ready for duty. The shift-
 lectured on general Police
 duty by D/S I. Kamara be-
 fore details as thus: - Duty
 officer: - 1893, work up orderly: -
 5857. Hospital: - 1675. Crime
 reserves: - 5604, 6006, 3947,
 1028, 4735, 4721, 4062, 3527,
 1521, 5886, 4878, female
 work up orderly: - 5106. Seven
 (7) suspects in custody in-
 cluding four (4) female for
 various criminal offences.
 Yc shift: - 2057. The area
 seem to be quiet at the
 moment. Other wise no
 serious report.

10 0748 11: The military police headed
 46 by lieutenant A.B. Turay arrived
 of in the office to withdraw
 257 the Kamajors suspect B.S.
 28 Massamu a d o TT. ... 2.18

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185

Friday 6th February 1998

Time	Time	Occ	Time
07:00	10	Ref - S/1010 of today's date 6/2/98 upon the instruction of S/O C.P.O. Kema a y d and informed the C.P.O. "I" Division by telephone in which he reply me that he also will inform Commander Mr Komol of the Eastern Region	
08:00	48	I handed over the duties of duty officer to D/CP: 4411/18 1893 with articles on charge as per inventory thus: one wall clock, one telephone set, one D/I book, one way book, two shade lamps, one drinking bucket, one rubber cup plus 3 C-4 chains, five old tyres, one sewing machine head, one trunk containing prisoners property, two bed springs, (2) wooden door frames, one steel door frame, one cup head, one wooden hanger and three vehicles: S/1010, WR14365 and WA29186. other wire no serious report	
08:05		D/Inspector Landema arrived in the office on visit	
09:20	20	I left to invite Faith Kamara's mother (Uma noisig) for O/C's interview	

(Handwritten signature/initials)

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1700
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1702
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1704
1705
1706
1707
1708
1709
1710

Friday 6th February 1998

s/n Time c/s

see

16	0929	41	I left the office for the street on Sunday
17	1006	15	I returned to the office from hospital where I met D/pt. 1675 on jaw about. The suspect Bu Kpaka was seen on dip his sick bed. Otherwise serious report
18	1020	28 s/2	Ref s/1028 & s/2198, Complainant came with Alpha Ahmed Jal & N ^o 3 Monogotto Street, Kenema as suspect. N.C.O. crime and
19	1021	41	Ref SD41 of 5/1/98 suspect Ketha D. D. D. arrived in office and reported him
20	1022	14 21	Ref s/1014 of even date D/PC 5604 return to the office with Madam Umu Moisi of no 1 Boima Kumbo Street, Kenema
21	1025	20	D/PC 5604 left the office with Madam Umu Moisi for no 1 Boima Kumbo Street, Kenema to bring Madam Fatu Kama passport upon the instruction of D/PC C1
22	1030	23	I left the office to see C1 Kainent for statement
23	1045	22	Ref NP 22 I returned to the office but said he was busy
24	1200		I left the office for Friday prayers
25	1222	29	Amos Kwasi Gyasi of no 36 Korom Street, Kenema arrested and brought

Friday 6th February 1998

Time Occurrence

33 1440 28 Ref. SD 28 of above, I have obtained V/C statement from Umaru Mansaray and same time handed over to the Officer for safe custody

34 1445 I handed over Abdul Maseed to Assistant Komomo of no 40 Kanded Street and informed to produce him on 7/2/98 at 0900 hrs

35 1447 36 at about 11:00 hours I arrived in with my medical Report Form marked ED/4 that is I should R.D. on 22/2/98 D/Sgt 1521 and P. 83 2871 informed

36 1450 35 I left the office for my house at 11:00 on 6/2

37 1535 MR. T. S. Galloway of N.A. Roma chief dom. became arrested and brought Leo Sanderich for the offence of Embezzlement to wit the Le 20,000.00 but now paid Le 15,000.00 plus old payment of Le 3,500.00 all also like Brima of Roma for the offence of Embezzlement to wit Le 40,000.00. Roma is cited

38 1540 Ref SD 19 of Vabone Suspect Korbo Garmah still remained in care of Security Officer. Made no informed

Time CR FRIDAY 6th FEBRUARY 1993

OCCURRENCE

48 1735 47 Rel 810 37 of even date my Daniel Maffia left the office for his residence

49 1740 50: By order of D/sgt 152 / Justice I have handed over suspect 80ko Brun to Supt Mr Francis Side and warned to him anytime when needed

50 1750 49: Rel 810 37 of today's date Complainant left the office for his residence

51 1852 59 One James Brick Santok of no 15 Kiasamba terrace came in to see S/D C.D. in respect of suspect Solko Kiasamba in cell

52 1800 57: By order of D/sgt 2057 of course to be seen and he did suspect Solko Kiasamba to Supt James Brick Santok and returned to produce him on Saturday 7/2/93 at 0900 hrs

53 1805 Sgt 2183 and 2725 arrive in for 2nd shift duty

54 1943 T handed over the duties of the officer to D/sgt 2725, as per 810/12 of 6/2/93. Other wise no serious report

55 1950 I certify taking over the duties of

188

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Leg

Leg

IN	Time	CR	OCCURRENCE	Leg
56	2000		Sgt L 4296 together with SFC 1608 arrived in the office and reported for duty	2725
Saturday 7th February 1998				
1	0620	F.	S/Cpl 1675 arrived in the office for duty	2725
2	0635	F.	S/Sgt 1895 together with S/P 4878 arrived in for duty	2725
3	0645	F.	S/O CID Sgt Applied arrived in for duty	2725
4	0705	F.	S arrived in the office for duty	2725
5	0710	F.	S/S S/Sgt 3871 together with S/Cpl 3747 arrived in for duty	2725
6	0711	F.	S/P 5304, S/Sgt 4721, 1028 arrived in for duty	2725
7.	0745	11.2	"A" shift - personnel comm -	
		3.4	starting of the following	
		5.6	nos: - 5604, 6006, 3947, 1675	
			1028, 5857, 4735, 4721, 4062,	
			3527, 1521, 5886, 4878, 5106,	
			1893, 2057, 1895, SCS 72, 11,	
			367, ASP. Rogers and my-	
			self present and at the	
			same time paraded for	
			duty. They were inspected	
			by me and found clean,	
			fit and ready for duty.	
			The shift continued on	
			general police duty by	
			4062 before details as	
			follows:- duty officer:-	
			1028, work up orderly:- 6006,	
			Hospital:- 1675. On me	
			reserves:- 5604, 3947, 5857,	
			1028, 2027	

SFC
FA20

Stationary			7 th February 1998
S/N	Time	Q/R	OCCURRENCE
7			Female locked up orderly - S106. Jic (6) suspects in custody; including four (4) female. Yc shift 2057. The area seem to be quiet at the mo- ment. Otherwise no serious report. —
8	0800		I handed over the duties of duty officer to SPC/1028, as per S/D 12 of 7/2/98 Other wise no serious report at yet
9	0930	7.	I certify having read the Station Diary from S/D 1 of 6-2-98 to S/D 8 of 7-2-98 and corrected all grammatic and other errors to the best of my knowledge and ability —
10	0935	11:	Abu Bakar Kamara of #1 Dalaiya street, cinema brought in Isnaby Kabira of #5 Kahuna street, cinema for interoperation in respect of S/D 47 of 4/2/98 —
11	0958	10: 27	Ref. S/D 10 by other of OIC, through S/O S/O. myself, complainant, Isnaby, Kabira, S/WPC S106 and 35 left for #1 Swayay street, to execute search warrant —
12	1016		1 left for Ujandiyani or enemy/ly —
13	1020	14	One Malikie Fajrah 15 01 no 2 Dalaiya street

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Salvador 7th February 1998

Reg	Time	CR	OCCURRENCE	Reg
			office and reported that on Friday the 29/1/98 at about 6:30 am at no 6 Seng Street, Kenema. One Samuel Brown of no 6 Seng Street Kenema entered his bed room and stole the sum of Le50,000.00 and one check drawn by him with value Le25,000.00. M. G. ... informed I am dealing.	
14	1030	13	Ref S/D 13 of above left with complainant after statement for no 6 Seng Street.	
15	1035	13	Ref S/D 13 of above, got into the office with one Samuel B. Blalah for statement.	
16	1036	16	One Abass Kamara of Gbanguta Street, Kenema arrested and brought in one Baboh Lancana of no 8 Pujebai Street, Kenema and reported that sometime in July 1997, the latter falsely obtained the sum of Le150,000.00 from him with the pretext that he has a house in Kenema to let, knowing same to be false. of a CID. informed I am dealing.	
17	1045	16	Ref S/D 16 of above Francis ... Diaké Street	

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Handwritten numbers 3275 and other marks in the left margin.

Handwritten number 1440 in the left margin.

Handwritten number 5604 in the left margin.

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Saturday 7 Feb 1998

S/N	Time	DIR	OCCURRENCE
18	1050	16	I have handed over Robert Louisiana to APO Dept 6006. (M)
19	1052	23	Ref. S/O 23 on c/r 36/98. Source of MUSA is tendered to Bill of sales IRD, One Building Machine (M)
20	1053	21	Mr. Aliem New alleh of No 8 Marions Street Kevema arrived in the office to collect his house plan since John Swaray and others have been transferred to Brigade (M)
21	1055	20	By order of OC C.I.D I have handed over one house plan to Mr. Aliem New alleh as per S/O 40 of 2/2/98 (M)
22	1057	71	With 4878 I left for hospital on visit (M)
23	1123	22	vide S/O 22 above, with 4878, I returned to the office from hospital where 1675 was well on the alert. The suspect Binna Kpaka is reported to heat went. Otherwise no further report. (M)
24	1130	25	Today Kaloloh of No 6 M4889400 street Kevema arrested and Idriss of the same address and reported that on the 1st February 1998, the latter entered his " (M)

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Date	Time	O/R	OCCURRENCE	Ref.
24	1135	24	commander informed I am dealing —	S/O
25	1135	24	left S/O 24 if above suspect is handed over to the lock up orderly for safe custody while complainant made statement	S/O
26	1135	33	I am leaving the office for Kisumu Area —	S/O
27	1137	11	Ref. S/O 11 be returned to the office without executing the search warrant as we were obstructed —	S/O
28	1140	39	myself, complainant, 35, S/O 6 and two personnel left for #1 Dakigai street, on enquiry —	S/O
29	1150	44	S/O Kanara & party left for Kerema town on enquiry —	S/O
30	1155	31	One Mr. Kargbo, driver of Commercial Bank Kerema Branch, arrived at the office in an angry mood and misbehaved to me over an ageable lady named Mamie Karoma (Mrs. To whom I have no intention of being in the presence of S/O 4 & 35 Sesay, Mr. Mouch (Police labourer) and many other colleagues. He promised repeating the same act in due course S/O informed	S/O
31	1150	70	I left the office for my	S/O

Sl. No	Date	Time	Particulars	Page
33	12/35	26	I returned to the office from Fazy town Area	
34	12/40		I left the office for Hanga Rd on Enugu	
35	14/15		I left the office for Sumails street on enquiry	
36	14/16		Chief Inspector Konesie omies in vto see S/O C.W. Inspector on Hyde in respect of his suspect Osman Kamara	4
37	14/20		By order of S/O Hyde I have handed over suspect Osman Kamara to Unisa Serqun of no 37 Ngombulaga Street Lanna and returned to police station about 4pm on to date 7/2/98	49
38	15/10	41	One Babagaleh Bangwa of Noku Kpulum Street Kenema arrested and brought Corie Kamara of Noku Willie Street Kenema and reported that some time in 1997 he entrusted the sum of N6,000.00 to the latter for the purpose of buying Cola nut which the latter converted to his own use or benefit S/O Hyde informed from bleeding.	46
39	15/13	28/47	REF. DO 28. He brought in Asnata, Theresa and one mariana and his dad for further investigation.	47
				48
				49
				50

29) Letter

Letter from the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone to Corporal Foday
Sankoh
26 June 1999

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE
(UNOMSIL)

26 June 1999

Dear Corporal Sankoh,

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee for the Release of Prisoners of War and Non-Combatants, I wish to bring to your attention the Committee's concerns about the continued non-compliance of RUF/SL commanders with the "Statement on the Release of Prisoners of War and Non-Combatants", issued jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) on 2 June 1999.

For instance, on 9 June, we received notification of a release of 240 non-combatants from RUF/SL captivity in the Occra Hills. Since then several target dates for the release have been set, and each time the Committee made the necessary arrangements for the reception and transport of the individuals. However, the RUF/SL group led by Lt.Col. Junior Lion has so far failed to honour its pledge to release the 240 detainees. The group has also not responded to repeated requests from UNOMSIL military observers to free six ECOMOG soldiers held as prisoners of war. This constitutes a clear violation of the 2 June Statement and is particularly disturbing in view of the goodwill shown by ECOMOG when it released 14 captured RUF/SL combatants to the group under Lt.Col. Junior Lion on 18 June 1999.

In another incident at Kambia, the RUF/SL group under the command of Lt.Col. Boulah assured UNOMSIL military observers on 15 June of the impending release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants. This pledge was made in response to the release of all RUF/SL fighters in the custody of the Guinean contingent of ECOMOG at Kambia. However, no release from the RUF/SL side has taken place to date.

/...

Cpl. Foday S. Sankoh
Leader
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
of Sierra Leone
Lome, Togo

From Gen. Jashi

cc: Hon. Joseph Koffigoh
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lome, Togo

Hon. Solomon Berewa
Attorney-General and
Head of Delegation of the Government of Sierra Leone
Lome, Togo

30) Record of Meeting

Minutes of the Family Reunion Reconciling Chairman Foday Sankoh and Chairman
Johnny Paul Koroma
7 April 2000

Jawit

MINUTES OF THE FAMILY REUNION AIMED AT
RECONCILING CHAIRMAN FODAY SAYBANA SANKOH AND
CHAIRMAN JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA HELD AT THE OFFICE
OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOUR, SOCIAL SECURITY
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS – NEW ENGLAND ON 7TH
APRIL, 2000

ATTENDANCE

- | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Hon. Idrissa Hamid Kamara | 2. Mr. Solomon Y.B. Rogers |
| 3. Sheikh Ibrahim Fofana | 4. Mr. George Adams |
| 5. Lt. Col. Carter Tarawallie | 6. Brig. Gen. T.A.B. Yaya |
| 7. Mr. S.B. Khanu | 8. Hon. Alimamy P. Bangura |
| 9. Mr. Samuel T. Kargbo | 10. Mr. Sahr K. Kaigbanja |
| 11. Mr. I.M.F. Sesay | 12. Mr. Joseph T. Gbondo |
| 13. Mr. Amadu B. Bah | 14. Mr. Abdul L. Sesay |
| 15. Mr. Ibrahim Billah B. Sesay | 16. Mr. Brima Kamara |
| 17. Mr. Pierre Gomez | 18. Mr. Bazzy Kamara |
| 19. Hon. Mike Lamin | 20. Mr. Abdul D. Sankoh |
| 21. Mr. D.G. Kallon | 22. Mr. Eldred Collins |
| 23. Mr. Sheku Lomoh | 24. Mrs. Susan Lahai |
| 25. Major Baby Sewa | |

OPENING

The meeting was called to order by Hon. Idriss Hamid Kamara at exactly 1:00 pm. After the usual Christian and Moslem prayers, the secretary of the meeting, Mr. Sheik Ibrahim Fofana formerly introduced the Chairman, of the occasion, Hon Idriss H. Kamara. In his opening remarks, Mr. Fofana extended a warm and fraternal welcome to the participants and thanked them, on behalf of the promoters of what he described as a divinely inspired and historic event, for sparing their precious time to register their presence at the “family reunion.”

He referred to all present as children of God because they have come to make peace, according to the word of God. He told the gathering that they had come on board a ship he baptized "S.L. Peace" ready to sail to the land of peace and love.

In his introduction of the chief Promoter and chairman of the occasion, Mr. Sheik Fofana stressed the exemplary attributes of Hon. Idriss Kamara whom he described as a complete soldier in every shape and form of the word. He highlighted Hon. Kamara's primary and secondary education in a military environment as well as past and present positions of responsibility held in previous and present Governments.

Before making his keynote address, the chairman of the meeting requested all participants to introduce themselves. In his opening remarks, Hon. Idriss Kamara thanked all present for responding favourably to his invitation.

Without wasting time, he explained to the gathering, the purpose of the meeting. He recalled that the SLA and the RUF decided to come together with a view to conjugating their efforts towards total liberation of the people of this country, by bringing lasting peace and political and social stability to them. But unfortunately, Mr. Kamara stressed, the two bodies had been. But of late, deviating from their initial objective of prioritizing the interests of the majority of the Sierra Leonean populace.

Therefore, taking cognizance of this rather dangerous turn of events, it was high time we became conscious of the onerous task ahead of us and waste no time in making the appropriate amendment to control the damage before it is too late, Mr. Kamara urged. In doing so, on the occasion of this family reunion, Mr. Kamara admonished participants to refrain from personalizing issues while making their contributions towards seeking the correct solutions to our problems. He admitted that indeed, each and every one of us has blundered in one way or another.

But thank God, Hon. Kamara opined, we have timely become of conscious those errors, and the same God who taught us to re-embrace the

In concluding his opening remarks, Hon. Kamara stressed the government's deliberate oversight and non-implementation of very important clauses of the Lome Peace Accord. This Mr. Kamara believed was simply because the SLPP has observed cracks in our rank and file. He therefore urged all and sundry, irrespective of rank or status, to sacrifice personal interest and cater for the general good of the people of Sierra Leone. He thanked God for divinely inspiring and redirecting the promoters of this historic occasion and prayed that the will of God be done at the end of the deliberations to achieve our goals.

BRIGADIER GENERAL T.A.B. YAYA

Brig. Gen. Yaya the next speaker as designated by the chairman, first and foremost availed himself of the opportunity to commend the initiator and promoters of the meeting and thanked all present for making it a point of duty to attend the meeting he felt was long overdue. He expressed his personal delight and satisfaction for the holding of such a meeting aimed at bringing us back under the same umbrella as we solemnly and unanimously agreed to do in 1997. He recalled that when the marriage took place in 1997 between the two bodies, we worked together without any serious problems under the chairmanship of the former AFRC Chairman, Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma. He said things continued going fine, even while in the jungle, but confessed that he was shocked when he returned to Freetown in November to observe that the demon of strife has won the hearts of once united people to achieve a noble cause. He reechoed the adage: "Unity is Strength," emphasizing therefore, that we can only achieve God's assigned mission of returning lasting peace to our beloved country, if we are united to fight the common enemy for the general good of our people. He stressed that the only thing our people need today is peace. He told the gathering that we should be asking ourselves what good have been done for our younger brothers and sisters who fought with us. He said though government is complaining about the lack of funds to reintegrate former combatants, he was certain there were so many developmental institutions where those boys could be entered for. He felt government was getting away with its mischief because we are seen

to be in disarray. General Yaya underscored the fact that Chairman Sankoh and Chairman, Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma must be looked upon as our father and elder brother respectively. A father can wrong a younger brother and vice versa, Brig. Yaya opined. But it is left with us their commanders and close collaborators to remedy the situation.

By doing so, Brig. Yaya stressed we should avoid clans and prevent another Somalia. According to Gen. Yaya, they the commanders should be held responsible for the apparent stalemate between their two leaders because of their failure to speak the same language as the Israelites did which has made them invincible up to this day. He urged his colleagues to be visionaries and to be alert at all times to withstand the caprices of the corrupt and selfish politician. He accepted the differences in ideologies of even the most identical bodies; but opined that ideology or no ideology or no ideology; what we needed to seriously strive for is to win the people's heart everlastingly.

He said it was only they the commanders and combatants that have the solution to the slow-pace implementation of the Lome Peace Accord, adding that if we had remained united as before, Tejan Kabba should not have even headed the broad-based government.

He went further to attribute the SLPP government's moves to engage the services of expatriates in key positions in this country to the fact that we are divided and cannot therefore solidly put across our case.

He reminded the gathering that one of the import decisions of the Lome Accord is to provide free education. But is there free education today in Sierra Leone. Gen. Yaya questioned his colleagues.

To help our people live happily in a newfound land full of honey and God's blessings. Gen. Yaya concluded his contributions by appealing to his colleagues to express themselves freely and objectively, with the general interest of the people of Sierra Leone uppermost in their minds. Finally, he commended Ms. Susan Lanai and Major Baby Sewa for

attending the meeting, as they have an important role as mothers, to play in the ongoing exercise.

HON. MIKE LAMIN

Hon. Mike Lamin started his contribution by underscoring what the two previous speakers had said. He said this was the most opportune time to control the damage, but in doing so, he advised participants to refrain from finger-pointing. He emphasized that we should join forces to fight the common enemy. He lauded the army for inviting the RUF join them in 1997. He said, but for the wrongful intervention of the International community, the junta should have succeeded in its plans to salvage this country.

Hon. Mike Lamin told participants that the importance of this family reunion could not be over-emphasized. He said in making their individual contributions, participants must be thinking of:

- The plight of ex-combatants.
- The imposition of a so-called travelling bans on all former AFRC/RUF Senior Officers.
- The execution of senior qualified military officers after a stage-managed court martial.
- The future of the entire nation etc. etc.

Hon. Lamin regrettably confessed to the gathering that General mosquito was responsible for most of the frictions that took place between the RUF and the SLA.

The Hon. urged his colleagues to be more vigilant as the dangerously unbalistic civil militia, the Kamajors, led by Hinga Norman and Momoh Pujeh will never accept to see the RUF/SLA marriage succeed. According to Hon. Lamin, not only this notorious SLPP civil militia was being presently prepared to unleash hell on us, the SLPP was also busy mobilizing the international community against us.

In conclusion, Hon. Lamin intimated participants that we were running great risks of demolition by the common enemy if we didn't make haste to look in the same direction. He said the enemy is using us to neutralize ourselves, in other words, they are using the theory of "divide and rule" against us.

BRIG. BAZZY KAMARA

Brig. Bazy Kamara thanked the initiators of this noble cause to reunite us so that we would once more walk on the rediscovered path to total success. He told his colleagues that it was regrettable that even though they ruled this country for 9 months, they could not now venture to walk around the city for fear of being harmed by agents of the common enemy. He recalled that some degree of cordiality reigned amongst AFRC Ministers and other Senior Executive Officers. He wondered why we should allow ourselves to be put asunder by our detractors at this point in time of our struggle. He pointed out that their long experience with the gun coupled with their better professional training than the SLPP civil militia (Kamajor) should always serve them to neutralize the latter. He therefore appealed to participants to reflect their minds on the original intentions of the rebellion in making their contribution.

HON. SUSAN LAHAI

In her contribution, Mrs. Lahai asked the gathering to join her in prayers for unity and reconciliation, if we were really prepared for that. She told her colleagues that the demon of strife was gaining ground in our midst. And for Mrs. Lahai, that demon of strife is the bunch of corrupt politicians who are the cankerworms of our society. Mrs. Lahai told participants that we have ourselves to blame for what is happening to us. For her, people continue branding us as rebels and villains because we are not united. She urges all and sundry to bury the hatchet and to open a new page.

She outlined the following reasons why we should come together:

- To bring lasting peace to our people

- To console our colleagues ex-combatants who are the victims of our disunity.
- To enhance our credibility vis-a-vis the International community who continue to be misinformed by the SLPP Government.
- To be in readiness to counter any devilish ploys by the Kamajors and SLPP evil agents.
- To take cognizance of the fact that without us no lasting peace will return to Sierra Leone.

DR. PALLO BANGURA

Dr. Pallo Bangura thanked the organizers of the meeting and buttressed what most of the previous speakers had advanced as responsible for our discomfiture. He pointed out that though what the enemy is planning cannot be outrightly underrated or dismissed, he was of the opinion that what was more important for us was what we should embark on doing to consolidate our hard-worn peace. He impressed on the minds of all and sundry that nobody could have brought lasting peace to Sierra Leone, other than our 2 leaders, chairman Foday Sankoh and Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma, who, according to him, remain living symbols of this peace. For Dr. Pallo Bangura, that symbol could only be meaningful if we correct our individual and collective errors and come together to achieve our common dream. Dr. Pallo Bangura admonished participants not to heap all the blame on politicians, but should be honest enough to realize our mistakes which could now be rapidly corrected before it is too late. He said we should realize that the pains of the people were greater than personal ones. He opined that if we were united like before, we should not have faced all these inconveniences. He reemphasized that the enemy is capitalizing on our dis-unity. He therefore appealed to all to make personal sacrifices to conclusively resolve the stalemate hampering our total success.

BRIGADIER SAMUEL T. KARGBO

For Brigadier Kargbo, this family reunion was overdue. He strongly believes that the two camps have respect for their two leaders. He

admonished members of the two bodies to accept their individual and collective mistakes and to make apologies where necessary. Brig. Kargbo opined that the problem is not the politicians but we ourselves. We should strive to achieve lasting peace for the benefit of the people and not our personal agrandizement. We should be realistic in accepting our mistakes and be prepared to forgive and let by-gone be by-gone.

MR. D.G. KALLON

Mr. Kallon wondered what was happening to the once wonderful marriage between the SLA and the RUF as he could recall he was appointed in absentia as special adviser to the leader of the AFRC. He urged members of the two camps not to waste time in reuniting, as only unity would help us to avert pending catastrophe.

MR ELDRED COLLINS

Mr. Collins only consented to make a contribution after Mr. S.Y.B Rogers admonished him that he should take cognizance of the importance of the meeting and stay to make a statement. He opened his contribution by requesting the gathering to observe a minute silence in honour of our brothers and sisters who lost their lives during the struggle. He informed participants that Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma presided over very important meetings attended by senior commanders of the two bodies while in the jungle. He said that things went on well up to a point when relationships started deteriorating through our own fault. He opined that certain statements and counter statements of our leaders did not augur well for the achievement of our common goal. He buttressed previous speaker's statements that our lives and those of our supporters are at stake if we continue to look in different directions. He reminded members of the two bodies that our marriage was meant to bring lasting peace to our people. He stressed the need to work out realistic and practical modalities at this meeting aimed at resolving our differences once and for all. Mr. Collins begged members to do everything possible not to allow the International community to see us as a divided group. He said if we have

forgotten where we came from, we should know where we are heading for. He reminded the gathering that the ex-combatants are looking up to us to recharge their lives after the armed struggle. We should, as a priority, seek their interest and that of the general populace. Personal grievances must be forgotten.

He concluded by suggesting that this forum must map out modalities that would bring our two leaders round the peace table to iron out their differences in the interest of peace and unity. Mr. Collins also suggested that our senior commanders on the various fronts must be brought together to make their own contributions towards reuniting our two leaders and solidifying the marriage contracted in 1997.

MR KAIGBANJA

Mr. Kaigbanja buttressed everything all previous speakers had said geared towards working together as a united force to achieve our common objective. He lamented over what suffering the selfish desires of some people has caused a sizeable number of people in our fold – making a particular reference to himself. He appealed to all not to relent in striving to achieve our dreams. He underscored the difficult task ahead of us but assured everyone that a journey of 1000 miles always starts with a step. He emphasized the need to reunite if we want to avoid unpleasant surprises from the common enemy. He said God is with us; otherwise we would not have been in the know of all that the enemy is planning against us. If we fail to react accordingly, after sufficiently knowing what the enemy's plans are, we would have nobody to blame.

MR. I. M. F. SESAY

For Mr. Sesay, previous speakers had said all that ought to have been said. He found all points raised to be salient ones. He therefore suggested that the forum should come out with resolutions to be presented to the two leaders meant to guide them in resolving their differences for a total success of our noble cause.

MR. ABDUL SESAY

Mr. Sesay pointed out that Chairman Sankoh's mistake was his failure to invite Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma to hold discussions before and after the Lome Peace talks. He stressed the fact that if we remain disunited we would surely fail.

RE. LT. COL. CARTA - TARAWALIE

According to Rt. Lt. Col. Carter, Chairman Foday Sankoh deviated from what the two leaders agreed upon in a meeting between the two leaders following Chairman Sankoh's visit to Abidjan. He was however sure that it was not yet late to control the damage in the general interest of the people and the nation as a whole.

MR. AMADU B. BAH

For Mr. Bah, we have failed the people once; this should not be repeated. The RUF should not allow itself to be seen by the people of Sierra Leone and the International Community as an obstacle to peace through its actions on the ground. We should be seen as a united group. Mr. Bah was of the opinion that people like Abass Bundu and Karefa Smart and other schools of thought must be embraced.

The focus must not only be on Chairman Foday Sankoh and Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma. The different ideologies of all these people must be streamlined or seen to be identical for a clean-sweep victory. The two leaders must open up to accommodate each other. We must win credibility vis-a-vis the International Community.

MR. S. Y. B. ROGERS

Mr. Rogers thanked those who made it possible for the meeting to hold. As a Minister in the AFRC Government - which he served honestly, he did not deem it necessary to disclose military secrets. He however

pointed out that mistakes were made in Freetown during the interregnum that probably led to our demise. According to Mr. Rogers, former AFRC Chairman Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma and his former Chief Secretary of State Col. S.A.J Musa did not work as a team.

Senior Military Officers, from whom much was expected, betrayed the cause. Our two leaders have also made mistakes. Mr. Rogers thanked God that such a meeting had been convened and appealed to all present to work towards finding the way forward. With the transformation of the RUF into a political party. Mr. Rogers stressed the need to get the support of all ex-combatants. Mr. Rogers appealed to participants to think of deceased combatants and their relatives who are now looking up to us for moral and material support.

He opined that we have accepted to champion this cause because we are patriots. In conclusion, Mr. Rogers suggested that other Senior Commanders in the interior must be briefed about this meeting and be include in a special technical committee to confer, with a view to ironing out their differences for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone in general and the accomplishment of the mission we had assigned ourselves when we took up arms.

MAJOR BABY SEWA

Major Baby Sewa informed the gathering about the ill treatment meted out to Hindolo Trye in Kenema. On a more favorable note she informed the gathering that the Kamajors are now willing to team up with us and according to them (Kamajors) this country is ours if we are united.

In his closing remarks the Chairman informed the gathering that resolutions will be prepared from the minutes of the meeting for onward transmission to the two leaders who will close this ugly chapter after holding talks with senior commanders and other key players in the whole reconciliation process.

The meeting come to an end at exactly 5 p.m. with prayers said by Dr. Pallo Bangura.


Faithfully submitted by:

Mr. Sheikh Ibrahim Fofanah
Secretary to Reconciliation Committee.

31) Letter

Letter from John Caldwell to Pa Foday Saybana Sankoh
8 November 1999

23-06-2000 12:14 00 232 22 228619 P.02
NOV-08-1999 12:11



U.S. TRADING & INVESTMENT COMPANY

8 November 1999

Fax: 011-232-22-232329

Pa Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader
Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone
Freetown, Sierra Leone

Dear Foday:


I thank you for your 6 November fax letter, clarifying Mr. Golley's position.

Steve Call arrived in Monrovia yesterday and, today, he and Ibrahim are to travel to Kailahun and, then, to meet you in Freetown. His visit will present to you and your colleagues an ideal opportunity to correct the media misinformation about the RUF and, through Steve Call, you will be able to reach political and business leaders worldwide, as well as to begin the process of changing public opinion about the RUF and actual socio-economic and political situation in Sierra Leone.

Respecting medical aid to Sierra Leone, I am pleased to inform you that Ms. Beth Stanford, the USAID officer in charge of this program is scheduled to arrive in Freetown on Monday, 15 November. Her mission is to meet with NGO's and assess medical needs in Sierra Leone. Her schedule of meetings is being arranged by the American Embassy in Freetown. While Ms. Stanford is in Freetown, I suggest that you have one of your deputies meet with her to tell her what medicines are required by the people in the countryside. She is concerned about the security situation. So, she needs to be given assurances that the distribution of medical aid will be secure. Your deputy should call the American Embassy to schedule a meeting with Ms. Stanford.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,


JOHN L. CALDWELL
President

3050 K STREET, N.W. • SUITE 170 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20007 USA
TELEPHONE: (202) 425-7400 • FACSIMILE: (202) 425-2070

32) Letter

Letter from Sam Bockarie to Charles Taylor, President of Liberia
24 June 1998

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE
BRIGADE HEADQUARTER - BUEDU

24th June, 1998.

To: His Excellency,
The President of Republic of Liberia
Dr. Charles G. Taylor.

Through: The Chief of Protocol
Republic of Liberia
Alhaji Musa Sesay.

From: Brigadier Sam Bockarie (Mosquito)
Chief of Defence Staff RUFSL.

Subject: INFORMATION AND REQUEST:

Be informed that the Guinean government in collaboration with the Nigerian led Ecomog troops are carrying out a cross-border attack on our position at Koindu and Kailahun. This attack has been going on since June 15, this year and is still continuing on our ground by the river bank.

Furthermore, we are trying our best to resist their intention which is to occupy Koindu and Foya, but because of the heavy bombardment we have not been able to send them back across the border, and we do not have rockets or bombs which are badly needed to handle the situation. We are merely managing the small ammunition we have at hand as at now, but we would not want to wait till we completely run out of ammunition which may cause a big set back for all of us.

In the light of this, sir, I am hereby appealing and requesting that you please meet the President and explain things to him in detail for his immediate attention.

We appreciate the assistance we have been receiving and we want you to believe that we have no where else to cry to for help besides you and His Excellency.

We usually receive materials without bombs and not even up to twenty (20) boxes which makes the operation, to capture and defend any strategic point difficult.

To conclude sir, in the light of all the above, we are appealing that you please discuss the matter with His Excellency for his timely intervention of the situation on the ground.

Also, we hope to receive some cash for the welfare of the men as we have presently run out of cash to purchase medicine, food and morale boosters for the men.

The bearer of this letter, Prince Rennie, will explain to you in detail on situation on the ground.

May God Almighty continue guide protect and bless you always.

Your obedient son,

Signed: _____
BRIGADIER SAM BOCKARIE - CDS RUFSL.

33) Letter

Letter from the AFRC/RUF Headquarters, Kailahun to Lord Eric Avebury

12 May 1998

THE AFRC/RUF HEADQUARTERS.
KAILAHUN DISTRICT.
SIERRA LEONE.
WEST AFRICA.
12th MAY. 1998.

LORD ERIC AVEBURY.
PARLIAMENTARY HUMAN RIGHT GROUP.
LONDON.

Your Excellency Sir,

We have been making numerous statements to the International Community about Human Rights abuses in Sierra Leone in the name of return of democratically elected regime. When the ABIJAN PEACE ACCORD was signed and President Kabbah refused to implement the peace accord. He was removed from power in a military coup of May 25, 1998. He used his personal influence with the U.N. Secretariat to endorse War on this country for his return to power.

In the present circumstance the Nigerian Forces and their (Kamajors) Militia Allies are inflicting undue sufferings on innocent civilians killing and maiming some villages and towns are down completely alleging to be the bases of the ousted AFRC/RUF Government. Heavy artillery and other heavy weapons are used on defenceless citizens. The Alpha Jet is frequently in our air space targeting civilian dwellings causing uncountable deaths.

Those people who are in safe Zones of Kailahun District are finding it difficult to access food and other humanitarian assistance like drugs.

We are there asking you kindly to use your good office to facilitate aid agencies to assist our people on this side of the country.

It is important for the future of our beloved country, Sierra Leone that you are informed of the fact on the ground. The Joint High Command of the AFRC and RUF and the civil population know and believe that the only path to a peaceful resolution of our present crisis is the unconditional release of Corporal Foday Sanneh. We have always known the role of the representatives of Her Majesty's Government in encouraging the use of Military to resolve our internal crisis. We have wondered why in Northern Ireland and Palestine it is the Non-Military action that is encouraged. The problems Sierra Leone face now we believe strongly has been as the result of poor political Judgement and advice based on some prejudices held against the RUF and its leader by some of your civil servants. As we have always maintained that the civil conflict in Sierra Leone is an Internal Affairs we do not seek to interfere likewise in the Internal Affairs of your country but we fail to comment that an enlightened policy free of prejudice would have saved lives and property in Sierra Leone - children, pregnant women. Old aged have been killed senselessly by Nigerian bombs with the full knowledge and silence

of British civil servants.

We know that a word from the British Prime Minister to President Kabba can cause the immediate release of our Leader Corporal Today Sankoh.

We thank you for your co-operation and understanding.

Yours Faithfully.

.....

LT. COL. JOHNNY PAUL KORCMA
(AFRC/RUF)

BRIDG. SAM BOCKARIE
(RUF)

S.Y.B. ROGERS
CHAIRMAN PEOPLE'S WAR COUNCIL
(RUF)

34) Six Letters

6 Letters from the AFRC/RUF Headquarters, Kailahun
12 May 1998 to the following:

- 1) Chairman of ECOWAS
- 2) OAY Secretary General
- 3) UN Secretary General
- 4) Bill Clinton, President of United States
- 5) Konan Bedie, President of Cote d'Ivoire
- 6) Nelson Mandella, President of South Africa

3095

The AFRC, RUF Headquarters,
Kailahun District,
Sierra Leone,
West Africa.
12th May, 1998.

The Chairman,
Economic Community of West African States,
(ECOWAS)
Abujah, Nigeria.

Your Excellency,

Our country had been at war for six years before the Military take over in May 25th, 1997. The military take over gave birth to peace in our land. ECOWAS countries got together against the hard won peace in the name of reinstating the so called Democratically government to Sierra Leone. During this rule, the world continued with closed doors to our government to see it not successful.

Your Excellency, a military option was endorsed by the ECOWAS member countries except few to oust the AFRC which ended as planned in February 13, 1998 causing massive destructions of our land, people and property. The allied forces (Nigerians and Major Militia) are still attacking our positions and causing terrible damages to human lives.

With you as Chairman of ECOWAS and the amount of respect you carry, we have no doubt that you will bring this crisis to an end. We want to bring to your attention that we still stand firmly believing the demands of the ABIDJAN PEACE ACCORD and would be desirous to see it revisited.

We would like to state emphatically that the mass of the population of Sierra Leone know and believe that peace can only return to our country when Corporal Foday Sankoh is released. It is our hope that your Excellency and your brother President Fabba will see the future in the present and have Corporal Foday Sankoh released.


We would crave your indulgence if this is done for us at your earliest convenience.

Yours faithfully,

Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma
(AFRC, RUF)



Brig. Sam Bockarie
(RUF)



S.Y.E. Rogers
Chairman People's War
Council
(RUF)

The AFRC, RUF Headquarters,
Kailahun District,
Sierra Leone,
West Africa.
12th May, 1998.

His Excellency,
The O.A.U. Secretary General,
Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.

Your Excellency Sir,

We write to bring to your attention the on-going events in our country, Sierra Leone. We had formed a National Government, The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) after the overthrow of the SLRR Government headed by Mr. Ahmed Tejan Kabba, before this period President Kabba and our leader Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh had signed a peace pact in Abidjan which the President Kabba failed to go by and our leader was arrested and detained in Abujah, Nigeria. Not too long afterwards, the military ousted the SLRR government and called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from the bush to form a National Government, which President Kabba failed to do. Nine months later, our Government, the AFRC was ousted by the Nigerian Intervention Force in a gruesome attack that lasted nine days leaving a lot of damages to life and property.

Today, the UN is sitting quietly by the Nigerian atrocities are escalating daily. Your Excellency, you may have received several distorted information about us. We have been pointed as being inhuman, barbaric and senseless in such correspondence. Sadly, no body has taken the pains to listen to us. As head of the OAU, may we bring forward to you our concerns for your perusal.

1. We are Sierra Leoneans and owe our respect and allegiance to our country.
2. We respect the fundamental human right as stated by the United Nations Charter.
3. We believe in our fellow man's existence - his right to life.
4. We are dissatisfied about how the world looks at us (barbarians and senseless beast) and would be satisfied if we are counted upon as protecting our people, as we indeed are. We are being condemned unheard.
5. We are not in any way responsible for any atrocities committed in our

The Nigerians and their allies, (the Kamajor Militia) a private militia, the ULIMO - K are the architects of all the trouble in our country. They have concerned themselves now with maiming the families of the AFRC members their friends who sympathized with them during their rule.

- 6. In their bid to flush the AFRC, RUF remnants (as they refer to us) from the borders of Sierra Leone with approval of ECOWAS wa and the UN, they have resorted to burning down any town or village we have occupy. Forexample, the Diamond Rich Koidu Town has been burnt down completely by the Kamajors and their Nigerian allies who think that we must live in the bushes.
- 7. we love our country and would want to see it develop and without war. Because of this love and our commitment for peace as agreed in the Abidjan Peace Accord, we stand against the Nigerian aggression. Our country is being destroyed by those Nigerians. we are capable to fight back in defence of our land and people. Our country continues to to be destroyed by heavy Artillery and aerial bombardments. Innocent civilians, women and children are dying daily as a result of this inhuman acts of the Nigerians and their Kamajor allies.
- 8. we are asking the OAU through you, your Excellency to emphatically restate the Arms Embargo in Sierra Leone. The use of anti-personnel mines should also be voted against. These are the things the Nigerians are using against our people in the country side. Agricultural activities have been put to a halt by the continued aeriad bombardment which has also caused great panic.
- 9. we are very committed to the Abidjan Peace Accord to which the UN and the OAU and the Commonwealth are moral Guarantors and believe that would be the only way to peace in our country.
- 10. The UN, the OAU, and Comonwealth who are the moral guarantors of the Abidjan Peace Accord have not said anything about the release of Corporal Foday Sankoh which makes us doubt their neutrality in Sierra Leone crisis.
- 12. All Communiques signed before now had strongly made mention of the release of our leader, Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh which has not been adhered to. He still remains to be detained against his will.

Your excellency, in keeping with the demands of those accords for the sake of peace returning to Sierra Leone, we would crave your indulgence to ask for the release of our leader. May we also bring to your knowledge that we are a formidable group of concerned Citizens with


large following desiring peace and harmony for the people.

we are therefore asking you kindly to use your good office to bring the Sierra Leone crisis to a final settlement.


we thank you for your understanding and co-operation.

Yours faithfully,

Lt. Col. Hohnny Paul Koroma
(AFRC, RUF)



Bridg. Sam Bockarie
(RUF)



J.I.B. Rogers
Chairman People's War Council
(RUF)

THE AFRC/RUF HEADQUARTERS,
KAILAMA DISTRICT,
SIERRA LEONE,
12th MAY, 1998.

HIS EXCELLENCY,
THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL,
NEW YORK, N.Y.

Your Excellency Sir,

We write to bring to your attention the on-going events in our Country, Sierra Leone. We had formed a National Government, The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) after the over throw of the SLPP Government headed by Mr. Ahmed Tejan Kabba, this period President Kabba and our leader Corporal Foday Sankoh had signed a peace pact in Abidjan which the President Kabba failed to go by and our leader was arrested and detained in Abuja, Nigeria. Not too long afterwards, the Military ousted the SLPP government and called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from the bush to form a National Government, which President Kabba failed to do. Nine Months later, our Government, The AFRC was ousted by the Nigerian Intervention Force in a gruesome attack that last Nine days leaving a lot of damages to life and property.

Today, the U.N. is sitting quietly by and the Nigerian atrocities are escalation daily. Your Excellency, you may have received several distorted information about us. We have been painted as being inhuman, Barbaric and senseless in such correspondence. Sadly, no body has taken the pains to listen to us. As head of this august body (U.N.) may we bring forward to you our concerns for your perusal?

1. We are Sierra Leoneans and owe our respect and allegiance to our country.
2. We respect the fundamental Human Right as stated by the United Nations charter.
3. We believe in our fellow man's existence - his right to life.
4. We are dissatisfied about how the world looks at us (barbarians and senseless beast) and would be satisfied if we are counted upon as protecting our people, as we indeed are. We are being condemned unheard.
5. We are not in any way responsible for any atrocities committed in our beloved Country. The Nigerians and their allies, the Kamajor Militia (private Militia). The ULINC-K are the architects of all the trouble in our country.

They have concerned themselves now with maiming the families of the AFRC.

6. In their bid to flush the AFRC/RUF remnants (as they refer to us) from the borders of Sierra Leone with the approval of ECOWAS and the U.N. , they have resorted to burning down any town or village believed we have occupied. For example, the Diamond rich Koidu Town has been burnt down completely by the Kamajors and their Nigerian Allies who think that we must live in the bushes.
7. We love our country and would want to see it develop and without war. Because of this love and our commitment for peace as agreed in the Abidjan Peace Accord, we stand against the Nigerian aggression. Our country is being destroyed by these Nigerians. We are capable to fight back in defence of our land and people. Our country continues to be destroyed by heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. Innocent civilians, women children are dying.
8. We are asking the United Nations through you, your Excellency to emphatically restate the arms embargo on Sierra Leone. The use of anti-personnel mines should also be voted against. These are the things the Nigerians are using against our people in the country side. Agricultural activities have been put to a halt by the continued aerial bombardment which has also caused great panic.
9. We are very committed to the Abidjan Peace Accord to which the U.N. the O.A.U. and the Commonwealth are moral guarantors and believe that would be the only way to peace in our country.
10. The U.N., the O.A.U. the Commonwealth who are the moral guarantors of the Abidjan Peace Accord have not said anything about the release of Corporal Foday Sankoh which makes us doubt their neutrality in the Sierra Leone crisis.
11. We are concerned also about the implications of the war on our tripartite union - The Mano River Union (MRU).
12. All Communiqués signed before now had strongly made mention of the release of our leader, Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh which has not been adhered to. He still remains to be detained against his will.

Your Excellency, in keeping with the demands of those accords for the sake of peace returning to Sierra Leone, we would crave your indulgence to ask for the release of our leader. May we also bring to your knowledge that we are a formidable group of concerned citizens with large following desiring peace and harmony for

cont. 12.


for the people.

We are therefore asking you kindly to use your good office to bring the Sierra Leone crises to a final settlement.


We thank you for your understanding and co-operation.

Yours faithfully.

LT. COL. JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
AFRC/RUF.



BRIG. SAM BOCKARIE
(RUF)



S.Y.B. ROGERS
CHAIRMAN, PEOPLE'S WAR COUNCIL
(RUF)

The APRC, RUF Headquarters,
 Kailahun District,
 Sierra Leone,
 West Africa.
 12 th May, 1998.

His Excellency, Mr. Bill Clinton,
 The President,
 United States of America,
 The White House,
 United States of America.

Your Excellency Sir,

It is with a heavy and sad heart that we write this letter to you to bring to your attention a few burning issues that require your immediate action. Too much has been said about us and the world remains silent and uninterested to hear from us.

Your Excellency, may we take this opportunity to bring to your notice the deliberate constitutional miscalculations in our country that we stand against.

- 1: Our country had been at war for six years, without bringing the war to an end, the country was carjoked to go to elections which were undemocratic. Two-thirds of the electorate were not registered for the elections because of the war. Of the one-third registered, only forty percent voted. But earlier than now, the RUF went out strongly condemning the elections before peace. We therefore questioned the being democratic but we were not listened to.
2. When President Kabbah assumed power, he appointed the chairperson of the Conference (hintumani 1 and 2) which took him to the Presidency. Mrs. Shirley Gbujaana was appointed as Foreign Minister in his government and now is being maintained as a Cabinet Minister in charge of Gender Affairs. This we deem as unconstitutional. We see her appointment as a mere reward for her job done at the Conferences.
3. Dr. James Jonah, who conducted the elections of 1996 that brought Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to power was the National Chairman of the electoral commission. He was compensated as Sierra Leone's permanent representative to the United Nations with cabinet rank after the elections and now is appointed as a Cabinet Minister for Finance and Development. These appointments are also contrary to the Sierra Leone constitution.

- 4. With President Kabba again in power, he has appointed Mr. Desmond Luke as the Chief Justice in charge of the country's legal system. Mr. Desmond Luke was one time the chairman of the committee for the consolidation of peace - a peace which was never attained. He was also a Presidential Candidate with a registered party in the last elections. After losing the race, he joined forces with President Kabba in destroying our credibility. It is this man President Kabba has appointed as Chief Justice, who will sit at the apex of the judicial system to try our members, relatives and friends. We doubt the kind of justice that will prevail and constitutionally, Mr. Desmond Luke does not qualify for the position as Chief Justice.
- 5. We believe that the President is the personality who upholds the constitution. We believe he rules his subjects in accordance with the dictates of the constitution. President Kabba has flouted the Sierra Leone constitution by disbanding the constitutional army and replacing it with a private militia (the Kamajors) and a foreign troop to man the internal security of the country.
- 6. Your excellency, our people are being bombarded daily with heavy artillery guns acquired from Sand Lines, the popular mercenary group in Britain and Alpha Jet Bombers from Nigeria. They are dying in dozens yet the International Community remains quiet.
- 7. President Kabba had signed a peace accord with our RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh in Abidjan which he, the president, didn't implement that led to his overthrow by the military in May 25, 1997.


The International Community including the United Nations endorsed a military option against the AERC government that has caused and is still causing untold sufferings to the country.

Your excellency, we are aggrieved and totally opposed to what is going on in our country and would desire a negotiated settlement of the Sierra Leone crisis. Our leader Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh still remains to be detained against his will in Abuja, Nigeria. We are asking for his immediate release from detention as this is the only way we can achieve peace in this country.


We would be very grateful and thankful if you would use your very respective office to bring this present crisis to an end.

We thank you for your understanding and co-operation.

Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Korona
(AFRO; RUF)



Brig. Gen. Bockarie
(RUF)



S.Y. Rogers
Chairman, People's War Council
(RUF)

The AFRC, RUF Headquarters,
Kailahun District,
Sierra Leone,
West Africa.
12th May, 1998.

His Excellency Henri Konan Bedie,
President and head of state,
La Côte d'Ivoire,
Abidjan.

Your Excellency Sir,

In your presence and under your pioneership, the RUF and the Government of Tejan Kabba signed the Peace Accord titled "THE ABIDJAN PEACE ACCORD". The President went back to Freetown putting aside the accord. He was removed from power in a military coup of May 25th, 1997 and the military called the RUF from the bush for the sake of peace.

When we governed for the short period, the AFRC, RUF continued registering and candidly pronouncing its commitment to the Abidjan Peace Accord. Even when we have been ousted, we still stand committed to the Peace Accord and peace in our beloved country.

Being the guarantor and facilitator of the peace accord, we would be grateful if you could use your good office to enable a revisit to the said accord.

The RUF, AFRC leadership, the poor people, the under privileged, the exploited people of Sierra Leone see no peace in this country without the release of the RUF leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh from the prison in Nigeria.

We are shocked to learn that Tejan Kabba and his Minister of Justice are planning to get Corporal Foday Sankoh to face a war crime tribunal. Your Excellency, such a move will send a very dangerous signal and we ourselves cannot even predict its consequences.

All that the people in this country know is that Corporal Foday Sankoh was given a mandate by the civil population and the High Command of the RUF to negotiate a peaceful settlement to our internal crisis. He came to Abidjan under your protection. When he realized that President Kabba still wanted to pursue the military option, he took the chance to go to Nigeria to see General Abacha. We had said that he made a great mistake by not informing the Ivorian authorities but that must have been as a


result of the state of mind and frustration he was experiencing. He has been held against his will since the 8th March 1997. The civil society and the High Command of the AFRC, RUF see that the moral guarantors of the Abidjan Peace Accord have the responsibility to see to it that Corporal Foday Sankoh is released immediately.

We would hope that through your leadership, a meeting can be convened of the moral guarantors to find ways to resolve this major problem.


We thank you for your co-operation and understanding.

Yours faithfully,

Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma
(AFRC, RUF)



Bridg. Sam Bockarie
(RUF)



S.Y.B. Rogers
Chairman People's war Council
(RUF)

The AFRC, RUF Headquarters,
Kailahun District,
Sierra Leone,
West Africa.
12th May, 1998.

The President,
The Republic of South Africa,
Pretoria,
South Africa.

Dear President Mandela,

We are forced to write to you because of your high moral standing in the International Community to intercede in the on-going crisis in Sierra Leone. The crisis has reached a point where prejudices within the international community have the potential to totally destroy our beloved country, Sierra Leone. This prejudice is borne out of the fact that there is a thinking within the UN, the OAU, the Commonwealth, the British and US Governments that some sections of the Sierra Leone population must be exterminated before the civil conflict can be settled. Those of us who were forced by the misrule and wickedness of previous governments to take to arms are being called Terrorists, Bandits, undesirable of human existence.

Your excellency, you would recall that at one time in your struggles you and your colleagues who were fighting for the dignity of the people of South Africa were labelled as terrorists. It is rather sad that this prevailing minds set is at the core of the failure of the UN, OAU and the Commonwealth to resolve the Sierra Leone crisis without the use of force. We appeal to you to work closely with President Henri Konan Bedie of La Côte d'Ivoire to resolve the current crisis in Sierra Leone.


The Joint High Command of the erstwhile AFRC and the RUF including the civil population, particularly those in the country side believe that it is only the release of Corporal Foday Sankoh from the hands of General Abacha that would bring peace to Sierra Leone. Corporal Foday Sankoh is being held in detention in Abuja at the pleasure of President Abacha with whom he signed the ABIDJAN PEACE ACCORD. The people of Sierra Leone also believe that it is the implementation of the Abidjan Peace Accord that would resolve the Sierra Leone crisis. As President Bedie was the host of the Abidjan Peace Accord, he should be prevailed upon to convene a meeting of the Moral Guarantors of the Abidjan Peace Accord, namely the UN, the OAU, and the Commonwealth to review the current crisis in Sierra Leone including the implication of the detention of Corporal Foday Sankoh on the future of Sierra Leone.

As we write to you now, Nigerian troops and their Jet Bombers are bombarding towns and villages in the country side causing death and destruction. We find it sad that the Moral Guarantors have been silent about the Nigerian atrocities more so when we hear over the news the concern expressed by the international community whenever a rubber bullet is fired in Northern Ireland, Palestine or Isreal. At an appropriate time, we would be contacting your progress on this request for intervention.


We thank you for your co-operation and understanding.

Yours Faithfully,

Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Korona
(AFRC, RUF)



Brig. Sam Bockarie
(RUF)



S.Y.E. Rogers
Chairman People's War Council
(RUF)

35) Report

Report from Camp Lion Training Base Training Comandant Beudu to G-1 Commander at Beudu on Recruits

21 May 1998

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

CAMP LION TRAINING BASE - BUNUMBU

TO: THE G-1 COMMANDER - WAR OFFICE - BUEDU.

FROM: THE TRAINING COMMANDANT - BUNUMBU.

SUBJECT: TRY BASE MEN POWER STATISTIC

21st May 1998.

1. BASIC RECRUITS

Gallant Men -----	480
w.A.C.'s -----	70
S.B.U. -----	53
Total -----	<u>603</u>

2. INSTRUCTORS.

13 Instructors

S - 4 UNIT

3 S - 4

3. COMBAT MEDIC

7 Medics & 1 Security

4. CARPENTER.

1 Carpenter

5. SIGNAL UNIT.

2 Operators & 1 Security

6. BASE SECURITIES.

20 Base Securities

STAFF ON THE BASE

Total = 48 Staff

36) Letter from Administrative Office, Kono from Samuel Jabba, Lt. Col, RUF to G-1
Commander

14 August 2000


3112
Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFF) of Sierra Leone

From: The Administrative Office, RUFF-KONO

TO: One (1) Commander
Lt. Col. Korsia (Ngaiya)

SUBJECT: INVITATION

DATE: 14th August, 2000



REMARKS:

With the advise and consent of the High Command, you are cordially invited to an administrative forum scheduled for Wednesday, August 16, 2000 at 10 AM. The venue is at the Party Office (Old Yengema Road, Cotton tree).

Fail not to attend as matter of vital importance will be discussed.

Best Regards;

Signed.....



Samuel F. Jabba Lieutenant Colonel,
Administrative Office, RUFF/SL,
KONO.



G - One (1)
Commander
LT. Col. Korsia

To

THE G.S.O-1 R.U.F.P.S.L.

COL - M.M. KOSIA

37) Report

Report of the Sierra Leone People's Army to Brigadier Peter Vandi from the Joint Security Board of Investigation

5 April 1999

Thursday 18

Day (49-316)

0800 Mining Commander, Major Mohamed S Farara for record purposes after which he carried the diamond stones to Lt. M.S. Kennedy for safe keeping. There was no proper documentation and there was no living witness to prove, confirmed by

0830 Capt. Alpha Turay himself. Confirmed report proved that Capt. Alpha Turay used to hand over diamond stones to Lt. Col. M.S. Kennedy without witnesses and proper documentations. He was

0900 also advised in so many cases by the Dept. Mining Adviser - Lt. Saidu Bangura, the Mining Adjutant Lt. Bobor Nheimba and others that it was better for him to show the daily production of

0930 diamond stones to all Authorities and also carried the Gems to the O/all Mining Commander with some people to serve as witnesses, but Capt. Alpha Turay did not adhere to this advice.

1130 2. MAJOR MOHAMED S. KAMARA:

1200 Major Mohamed S. Farara, the Dept. O/all Mining Commander did see the eighty-two pieces of diamond stones and recorded it in his daily production record book on the 5th April, 1993, after

1300 which the Mining Operational Commander told him that he was carrying it to the O/all Mining Commander but he Major Mohamed did not go with the Mining Operational Commander to Lt. Col. M.S. Kennedy and he also failed to inquire from the Lt. Col. as to whether he received the diamond stones in question.

1400

1430

1500

1530 Investigations proved that Major Mohamed Kamara was very leth-argic or played a laise-faire attitude towards administration in the Mining Unit because of grudge for power. He saw the

1600 diamond stones but failed to inquire from Lt. Col. M.S. Kennedy to know whether Capt. Alpha Turay gave him the Gems or not, especially when it coincided with a state of gendemonium (Pine bomb

1630 issue). Despite the above, Major Mohamed was just seeing and recording daily production of diamond stones but never made

1700 effort to follow up to know whether the daily proceeds were received by Lt. Col. M.S. Kennedy or not. Furthermore, even when the Deputy Mining Adviser advised that Capt. Alpha Turay should not be allowed to carry the weighed diamond stones to

1730

1800

July 1993							August 1993							September 1993							October 1993							November 1993							December 1993						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S
5	6	7	8	9	10	11	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
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15 Monday

Day (46-319)

Washington's Birthday: USofA
0800

Buedu to the O/S but should stay so that prompt investiga-
tions into the missing eighty-two (82) pieces of diamond stones
would have started, Major Mohamed failed to follow this up to
the O/all Mining Commander, instead he commented that Lt. Col.
M.S. Kennedy had already approved of Capt. Alpha's going and
so there was nothing he could do. Major Mohamed M. Kamara
failed to perform his duties as Dept. O/all Mining Commander
and so in this light, he is partly held responsible for the
lapses in the Mining Operations that resulted to the missing of
these eighty-two (82) pieces of diamond stones on the 5th April,
1999.

0830

0900

0930

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1100

3. LIEUTENANT BOBOR B. MBAIMBA:

Lt. Bobor B. Mbaimba, Mining Adjutant admitted that he record-
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production record book but faithfully confessed that he did'
not set eyes on the Gems in question, he was only informed by
Capt. Alpha Murey that the 5th April, 1999, that day's product-
ion was eighty-two (82) pieces. When he was asked why, he
confessed that it was their normal procedure. The Adjutant
whose responsibility is to monitor all activities within the
Mining Unit, record them accordingly for proper accountability
failed to inquire from the O/all Mining Commander whether Capt.
Alpha gave him the eighty-two (82) pieces of diamond stones,
especially when he did not set eyes on the Gems.
Moreover, Lt. Mbaimba as Mining Adjutant never visited the
mining site to know what was going on. He always stayed in the
camp to give passes and also write official documents for O/all
Mining Commander, Lt. Phairae himself confirmed. It was later
found out that Lt. Phairae stayed in the camp mainly to received
and record daily production of diamond stones for onward transmi-
sion to the O/all Mining Commander for correct documentation
and proper accountability. In addition, this Adjutant has never
compiled and presented to the Higher Authorities Returns of
daily productions either weekly or monthly, and hence this improper
inaccurate and fictitious record keeping of daily production

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January 1993							February 1993							March 1993							April 1993							May 1993							June 1993													
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Tuesday 2

Buedu to the CDS but should stay so that prompt investiga- Day (61-304)
 tions into the missen eighty-two (82) pieces of diamond stones
 would have started, Major Mohamed failed to follow this upto
 the O/all Mining Commander, instead he commented that Lt. Col.
 M.S. Kennedy had already approved of Capt. Alpha's going and
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 found out that Lt. Mbaimba stayed in the camp mainly to received
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 and proper accountability. In addition, this Adjutant has never
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~~inaccurate and fictitious record keeping of daily production~~

July 1993							August 1993							September 1993							October 1993							November 1993							December 1993													
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Thursday 4
Day (63-302)

0800 Suedu to the CD but should stay so that prompt investigations into the missing eighty-two (82) pieces of diamond stones would have started, Major Mohamed failed to follow this unto

0830 the C/all Mining Commander, instead he commented that Lt. Col. M.A. Kennedy had already approved of Capt. Alpha's going and

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1000 these eighty-two (82) pieces of diamond stones on the 5th April, 1999.

1030

3. LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. MBAINBA:

1100 Lt. Booor E. Mbainba, Mining Adjutant admitted that he recorded the eighty-two (82) pieces of diamond stones in his daily

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1200 Capt. Alpha Turay that the 5th April, 1999, that day's production was eighty-two (82) pieces. When he was asked why, he

1300 confessed that it was their normal procedure. The Adjutant whose responsibility is to monitor all activities within the

1400 Mining Unit, record them accordingly for proper accountability failed to inquire from the C/all Mining Commander whether Capt.

1430 Alpha gave him the eighty-two (82) pieces of diamond stones, especially when he did not set eyes on the Gems.

1500

1530 Moreover, Lt. Mbainba as Mining Adjutant never visited the Mining site to know what was going on. He always stayed in the

1600 camp to give passes and also wrote official documents for C/all Mining Commander, Lt. Mbainba himself confirmed. It was later

1630 found out that Lt. Mbainba stayed in the camp mainly to receive and record daily production of diamond stones for onward transmission

1700 to the C/all Mining Commander for correct documentation and proper accountability. In addition, this Adjutant has never

1730 compiled and presented to the Higher Authorities Returns of daily productions either weekly or Monthly, and hence this improper

1800 inaccurate and fictitious record keeping of daily production

July 1993							August 1993							September 1993							October 1993							November 1993							December 1993						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S
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26	27	28	29	30	31	30	31																																		

22 Monday

Day (53-312)

Continuation of Lt. Colonel

Mining Commander, Major Mohamed S Kamara for record purposes after which he carried the diamond stones to Lt. M.S. Kennedy for safe keeping. There was no proper documentation and there was no living witness to prove, confirmed by Capt. Alpha Turay himself. Confirmed report proved that Capt. Alpha Turay used to hand over diamond stones to Lt. Col. M.S. Kennedy without witnesses and proper documentations. He was also advised in so many cases by the Dept. Mining Adviser - Lt. Saidu Bangura, the Mining Adjutant Lt. Bobor Mbaimba and others that it was better for him to show the daily production of diamond stones to all Authorities and also carried the Gems to the O/all Mining Commander with some people to serve as witnesses, but Capt. Alpha Turay did not adhere to this advice.

2. MAJOR MOHAMED S. KAMARA:

Major Mohamed S. Kamara, the Dept. O/all Mining Commander did see the eighty-two pieces of diamond stones and recorded it in his Daily production record book on the 5th April, 1999, after which the Mining Operational Commander told him that he was carrying it to the O/all Mining Commander but he Major Mohamed did not go with the Mining Operational Commander to Lt. Col. M.S. Kennedy and he also filed to inquire from the Lt. Col. as to whether he received the diamond stones in question.

Investigations proved that Major Mohamed Kamara was very lethargic or played a laise-faire attitude towards administration in the Mining Unit because of grudge for power. He saw the diamond stones but failed to inquire from Lt. Col. M.S. Kennedy to know whether Capt. Alpha Turay gave him the Gems or not, especially when it coincided with a state of pandemonium (Time Bomb issue). Despite the above, Major Mohamed was just seeing and recording daily production of diamond stones but never made effort to follow up to know whether the daily proceeds were received by Lt. Col. M.S. Kennedy or not. Furthermore, even when the Deputy Mining Adviser advised that Capt. Alpha Turay should not be allowed to carry the weighed diamond stones to

January 1993							February 1993							March 1993							April 1993							May 1993							June 1993						
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13.....

38) Letter

Letter from Major AS Kallon, Chairman, Joint Security Kono to Col. Sam Bockarie

6 May 1998

G - 1

THE SIERRA LEONE PEOPLE'S ARMY
OFFICE OF THE JOINT SECURITY BOARD
KONO DISTRICT

MAY 6, 1998.

To: The Brigadier, Col. Sam Bockarie
From: The Joint Security Chairman, Major A.S. Kallon
Subject: STATEMENT OBTAINED AT THE ABOVE NAMED OFFICE ON LT. RICHARD, SGT. BALLAH AND MR. DUMBUYA ON COMMERCIAL BANK BREAKING IN KOIDU - KONO SOME TIME IN MARCH, 1998.

Sir,

I have per used on all the three statements and the cross examinations made by the three suspects named above.

In my own opinion, the prima facie evidence obtained, clearly indicates and implicates the said men in question. Three points made me sceptical about the above named suspects which I adduce below:-

1. All three statements are identical in nature and structure.
2. All three suspects failed to quote the amount each received; two bundles is not a stipulated amount, hence the denominations remained concealed by the suspects.
3. The entire Board of investigation has not still got on the principal characters in the bank breaking drama as non of the Joint Security personnel were on the scene of the episode, of which in the absence, the Board cannot get a clue.

Moreover, as the business of the Joint Security Board is to investigate, evaluate and recommend, I think recommending that there is a case to be answered by these men (suspects) will suffice.

In accordance with the mandate given to me by you, I attached the various statements to the living bodies of the three suspects involved and despatched to your location in Kailahun for legal proceedings to be instituted.

Sir,

Furthermore, one of the suspects, Colonel Musa who was not investigated as he was on the frontline by then during the investigation process is now a deceased. The two other suspects, upon retrieving the amounts that was in their possession, later took to their heels and

and escaped and all efforts have been applied to apprehend them, but to no avail. Their names are:-

- 1. Capt. Steven and
- 2. Philip

The below are the listed names and diamonds arrested from the suspects:-

During the investigation into the alleged Commercial Bank breaking the following items were retrieved from the following suspects categorically as they appear:-

1. PHILIP'S ACCOUNT

COIN - Le 800,000.00
 152,000.00
 1,525,000.00

Le 2,477,000.00
 =====

LIBERIAN DOLLAR

\$505.00

ONE THOUSAND NOTES - Le 7,200,000.00
 FIVE THOUSAND NOTES - Le 453,000.00

TOTAL ACCOUNTS - Le 10,130,000.00
 =====

- 12 peices of diamond
- 3 coffee colours
- 9 white colours

PHILIP'S ACCOUNT THAT WAS GIVEN TO GABRIEL FOR SAFE KEEPING

GRAND TOTAL: - Le 10,130,000.00
 17,385,000.00

Le 12,515,000.00
 =====

= 2 -

2. S/Sgt. BALLAH'S ACCOUNT: Le 10,995,000.00
105,000.00

Le 11,100,000.00
=====

3. CAPTAIN STEVENS' ACCOUNT: Le 21,000,000.00

(With his girl friend)

4. LT. RICHIE HAY'S ACCOUNT: Le 7,000,000.00

5. MR. ABU DUMBUYA'S ACCOUNT: Le 17,380,000.00

6. COLONEL MUSA S. KAMARA'S ACCOUNT (Now deceased). Till now, no account has been given about his consignment, although this pannel has been informed that the total amount snatched on the Bank was divided according to seniority.

According to this source, Col. Musa S. Kamara should have in his possession Le 15,250,000.00 as his own share which he didn't submit till his death. (However, there was no confirmation on said money division).

The total of Le 67,000,000.00 was retrieved from the suspects on the 27th day of March, 1998 and handed over to Major Kennedy for the Battle Field Commander and the Brigadier General plus another Le 143,000,000.00 which the Battle Group Commander presented on the floor that he received from the accused suspects after the mission of the Bank breaking as a salute report.

Faithfully submitted.

Signed: Major A.S. Kallon,
Chairman, Joint Security - Kono.

39) Report

Report from the Revolutionary United Front Administrative Headquarters, Kono Branch

19 September 2000

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT PARTY OF SIERRA LEONE (RUF/SL).

ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD QUARTERS OFFICE - KONO BRANCH.

SUBJECT: FORUM MINUTE.
VENUE : LEBANON.
TIME : 1030hrs.

19/07/2000

A forum was called up on the above stated date by the general adjutant RUF/SL which comprised of all unit commanders and regional heads within the 2nd. Brigade - Kono. As usual the forum started with both Muslim and Christian prayers. The Christian prayer was conducted by Col. M.M. Kosia G.S.O.1, and Muslim prayer by one representative of the forum. Following that, was the reading of the last administrative forum that was held at the admin. office at No. 5 Suku Pamba street Koidu Town. All representatives who participated in that particular forum unanimously accepted the minute read by the Chief of Admin. Lt.Col. Edward Charlie. Just after that, Lt. Col. Jabba Special assistance to the Chairman RUF/SL magnificiently introduce the General Adjutant Col. Kposowa as the Chairman for this forum.

The Chairman in his opening speech, thanked all the unit commander that were present on the meeting for their relentless struggle up to this time. He further advised all unit commanders to double up their effort to promote the movement even though we are on self reliance struggle (that is, no account). The Chairman further explained the purpose of the meeting by saying that there are lapses in the administrative set-up within Kono District so, he has therefore been mandated by the Chairman RUF/SL to properly structure and centralise the Admin. in Kono Area. "Kono is a pronounce strong hold of the Revolutionary United Front Party of Sierra Leone, but authorities in Kono are not well organised in the field of promoting the Movement simply because of their lack of fund raising ability for the Movement", the C/Man added.

Col. Kposowa on the other hand, briefly out-lined the functions of the various units to enhance proper Administration. He further said that a meeting for unit commanders should be attended by unit commanders, not representatives, that is matter of report and case there should be no interruption to the securities concern, that the J/Security Chairman is not a commander for individual units but that there are commanders for the various, and the J/ security C/Man is the Commander and Chairman for the J/ security commanders from the various units.

"How are we to raise funds" the Chairman asked. "particularly in the following areas of work like the Mining unit, Drivers union, Marketing such bar runners, popo sellers etc." He suggested that a committee should be formed to carry out the fund raising activity for development. He also said that the committee will be able to raise funds to assist the J/Soldiers.

Col. Kposowa also said that Soldiers should respect other officers not only their commanders. He again expressed dissatisfaction over the attitude of some soldiers in their act of banditry and innocent killings. And even the interception of some officers in operation was condoned by him. In that he said all personal letters to the Chairman RUF should pass through the

Special assistance to the Chairman RUFF, Lt. Col. Jabba.

Col. Kposowa in his frantic mood recalled the rate of unnecessary killing that is becoming rampant in this region, and he advised the doers of this type of act to desist. The J/Security Chairman, Lt. Col. Edwin Bockarie in another mood talked about the non-compliance of some J/Security unit commanders, mostly the I.D.U. he said. The 2nd. Brigade Commander, Col. Lansana Conteh Elias The Big highlighted the need for all unit commanders to know their area of operation. he also lamented on the formation of the fund raising body for the development of this movement.

Col. M.M. Konia (G.S.C. 1) in his effort to appreciate the General Adjutant RUFF thanked other commanders for their interest in the struggle, and therefore advised all commanders to work very hard to promote the Movement. After all, turn was handed over to Lt. Col. Jabba by the General Adjutant for further advises. The special assistance in his effort to propagate the Admin. instructed the Chief of Administration - Kono Axis to centralise the offices which unanimously accepted by all the commanders that were on that meeting. Maj. Sylvester L. Kieh, 2nd. BDE. G-5 commander wanting to buttress the fund raising mood, openly said that he has formed up the committee needed to carry out the fund raising exercise to its limit. Maj. Sowa, one of the top members of the development committee outrightly said that Col. Peneto, the Q/A mining commander is causing problems in the mining field and also in the development committee set up by them. In response, the 2nd. Brigade Commander gave out a strict warning to the Kono Buisness Chairman, Officer Mohamed Kallon.

Lastly, there were so many views and opinions at the turning point of the meeting, but all were agreed upon and accepted by all. To the end, all unit commanders concensusly said that the office hours should be from 0930hrs. to 1700hrs every day with effect from the 20th. Sept, 2000.

The meeting ended in prayers as well.

40) Training Manual

Revolutionary United Front Party of Sierra Leone People's Army
Notes on the RUFS/I. Guerrilla Warfare For the Lion National Training Base

February, 1999 WAR Office

MAJOR - PATRICK MUSTAPHA KIBSO WA

2nd B Co 3rd B N A Coy

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE
PEOPLE'S ARMY

NOTES ON THE RUFSL GUERRILLA WARFARE

FOR THE

LION NATIONAL TRAINING BASE

PRODUCED BY:

part of home
negotiating team →

LT. COL. RASHID SANDI

ADJUTANT GENERAL - RUFSL

FEBRUARY, 1999

WAR OFFICE

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- 1 -

INTRODUCTION

On the 23rd March 1991, the Vanguard of the RUF/L using a military corridor through Liberia launched their first attack entering Sierra Leone from Boma ru in the Kailahun District.

Simultaneously, another flank was opened, travelling over the Mano River Bridge on the 3rd April 1991, into the Pujehun District. The International Community and the defunct APC Government of Sierra Leone quickly dubbed the RUF movement as an in-rading force. In spite of the poor, the deceived guerrilla operation employed initially the RUF Commanding against the disorganised Sierra Leone Military Force enabled the Vanguard to impact the RUF Ideology among the deprived poor masses.

RUF took up arms to struggle because, we saw it as the only means of bringing about a fundamental changes in Sierra Leone. All peaceful means of opposition to the inaptitudes of APC government functionaries, corrupt military officers and unscrupulous politicians have proved unavailing. We as a nation, had suffered state sponsored deprivation, fragrant Human Right Abuses, Social Injustices, Poverty, Mass Illiteracy, Unmitigated Miseries and an army of vice by defaults.

When the youths of Sierra Leone made a legitimate demand for the change of a system that kept them in sub-human conditions, the APC regime utilized the full force of the state security to frustrate the wishes of Sierra Leoneans. The plight of families, friends and ordinary people armed us and our own evidence of experience convinced us to take up arms to redress the aforementioned injustices.

Today RUF has become a force to reckon with throughout the four corners of Sierra Leone. Despite we are engaged in a fierce battle with a crime of opposing forces.

These opposition forces from Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea under the guise of Ecomog forces together with the British mercenaries (Sandlane International) will not force us to relent. The RUF Peoples' Army is determined to empower the ordinary people of Sierra Leone to reclaim the wealth of the country for their use and self development and the Restitution of Democracy and sanity to Sierra Leone.

As we begin the last stage of the guerilla warfare together with our brothers from the former Sierra Leone Army, it is incumbent upon all Commanders to invigourate the guerilla army in preparation for the transformation into a conventional army.

PART ONE

IDEOLOGY

WHAT IS MEANT BY IDEOLOGY?

The word Ideology can be defined as a motive reasons or aims and objectives behind a planned societal ventures or revolutions. It is the know-how in any organisation or operation. It involves basic points to study either in the form of conditions or laws geared towards the success of that organisation.

TYPES OF IDEOLOGY

A. POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: This is the way in which members of the society behaves. Their behaviours need to be very rational or positive. The leaders and commoners share equal rights/respects. The wealth of the society must be owned by every one. Members preside over their dispute/quarrel amongst themselves and decision to be taken by military rather than private lawyers, magistrates or judges hired with babulous sums.

The society is governed by body of laws known as constitution and this varies as per types of government. (1) Democracy (2) Socialism (3) Communism (4) Capitalism (5) Monarchy and (6) Appatheid.

(1) DEMOCRACY

Democracy means "Popular Rules". The people elect those who will represent them and their operation is in the interest of the masses.

(2) SOCIALISM

Unlike democracy, all properties are for the government. Nobody owns personal property. All properties are to be used in common eg. Russia, Libya etc.

(3) COMMUNISM

This is a government in which every power is in the hands of the working group. Secondly, lands, buildings etc., are owned by the public eg. China, Korea, etc.

(4) CAPITALISM

This is a government of small class of rich and wealthy people. The properties and power are owned by this small group of people rather than every one together.

(5) MONARCHY

Government in the hands of the family. The leadership deseent with the family by the head of KOREA as Queen, King, Duke etc.

(6) APPARTHEID

Seperation of powers between whites and blacks into which the whites take the head and therefore blacks have limitation of movements, eg. former South African government.

3134
MILITARY

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: Africa was the first continent to respond to stimulus of civilisation. Civilisation started in the North Coast countries of Africa, eg. Egypt and Ethiopia. They started discoveries and inventions designed to be used as messages to the next society.

Thus the country Sierra Leone was discovered by a Portuguese explorer called PEDRO-DA CENTRA in the year 1462. He gave the name Sierra Leone to the country meaning, LION MOUNTAIN. This was later interpreted as Sierra Leone in English. At that time the Europeans pretended to be friendly with the African inhabitants, especially chiefs in Africa so that the captives can be sold to them as slaves. The demand for black slaves was too high as a result of sugar cane plantation in Europe. West Indies was selected at that point in time for the plantation because of hot damp climate. But the inhabitants of the West Indies were not plenty for the manual labour.

Consequently, they focused their attention on Africa. They were paying chiefs for the slaves with clothes and other goods. It never stopped until 1770 when people in Europe started to see the witness in slavery.

In 1807, Britain stopped trading in slaves. In 1878, Sierra Leone source of river in Freetown was selected to be the best camp for their slaves to be harboured and colonisation started.

Europeans ruled Sierra Leone as governors and holding high post in the civil service department. On the 27th April 1961, Sierra Leone was proclaimed independent state by Sir Milton Margai and other builders of Sierra Leone.

However, Sierra Leone had to experience another intensive slavery when the country was declared a Republican State by worthless Siaka P Stevens who started draining the country's economy heavily. In 1985, he dictated to the Nation the crown of J.S. Momoh as president of Sierra Leone. Momoh enslaved Sierra Leone, ceasing their rights. He introduced Capitalism rather than democracy.

In the light of this, the RUF entered Sierra Leone as a redeemer on the 23rd March 1991, with arms because the corrupted A.P.C. escaped many coup de' tats. So the A.P.C. grew strong in Sierra Leone and it was only rooted out by invasion in the form of arm struggle.

Mr. G.M.T. Kaikai and others also tried during J.S. Momoh's regime, but they too failed. Mr. Kebbie, (former President of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress), and Mr. Emmanuel (former Secretary General of the Sierra Leone Teachers Union) and Mr. Pious Foray (the former Editor of Tablet Press) tried but never succeeded because Mr. Emmanuel Fatorma and Kebbie were bought over by the government in 1976-77. And A.P.C. introduced a one party in 1978. Other students leaders had introduced the Green Book into the University of Sierra Leone. In 1984, forty two (42) students from F.B.C. and thirty six (36) students from N.U.C. were suspended and some expelled because they bitterly protested against the inhuman and cruel rule of the A.P.C.

Joseph Saidu Momoh openly pronounced that education was a privilege and not a right. They cut off government scholarships and began offering grant-in-aids to students. They had totally succeeded in destabilizing the students' forces by sending the internal security unit (I.S.U.), or Special Security Division (S.S.D.).

This soul called SSD fired guns at students at any students strikes or demonstrations, killing two or more at any time. As a result of the fear of arms, students with-held their activities and submerged.

We are therefore fighting because the arms which they used to threatening us with have been freely given to us by the saviour of Sierra Leone - RUF/SL leader (Corporal Foday Sayoana Sankoh).

WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?

The R.U.F. is fighting for true democracy and self-reliance. No nation can be self-reliance without true democracy. The letters in democracy stand for certain words that have to be studied and put into use.

- 1. D - DISCIPLINE
- 2. E - EFFICIENCY/EFFORT
- 3. M - MANNERS
- 4. O - ORGANISATION
- 5. C - CIVILISATION
- 6. R - REALITY/RESPECT
- 7. A - AIMS
- 8. C - CULTURE
- 9. Y - YOUTHS

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- A. URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE:- This type of guerrilla warfare is mostly applied in cities. Here the use of heavy weapons are necessary. This is the area where motor platoon, artillery operates. Heavy weapons such as the BZT howitzer or surface to ground missile can be used in vehicles to bombard the enemy location. The artillery bombard while the infantry advance beneath the bombardment into the enemy zone to dislocate the enemies. These heavy bombardment paves easy way for combatant to capture a town or city.
- B. RURAL GUERRILLA WARFARE:- It is meant to fight in the jungles in the interior part of the country. Rural Guerrilla fighting is done with light weapons such as AK-47, G-3, LAR, RPG, Single barrel, LMG, GPMG and common motargun. These weapons can be easily used and manouver within the jungles.

A Guerrilla army is a small group of abled men launching a military activities to liberate the land from economical, social and political suppressions. As a result, the RUF fighters are now fighting Guerrilla Warfare to restore the social economical and political rights of every citizens of this land (Sierra Leone).

THE AIMS OF THE RUF MOVEMENT

- 1. Freedom of speech and association.
- 2. Free Better Education.
- 3. Better Medical and Health facilities of the people.
- 4. Good roads and better infrastructural development.
- 5. Respect for human right and dignity.
- 6. Equal justice before the law.
- 7. Speedy Economic Recovery.
- 8. To wipe out tribalism, sectionalism and sentiment.
- 9. Free society for Sierra Leoneans wherein our people can live freely without fear of molestation, intimidation or embarrassment.

PILLARS OF THE RUF MOVEMENT

- 1. Arms and Ammunition.
- 2. Medicines/Drugs.
- 3. Food.
- 4. Unity.
- 5. Discipline.
- 6. Love.
- 7. Justice.
- 8. Minerals.

Among the Non-Commission Officers, there are senior (NCO's) which ranges from the ranks of S/Sgt, S/Major and RSM while the junior (NCO's) ranges from Pet, L/Cpl, Cpl and Sgt. As a result, the private soldier should have due respect and obeys the L/Cpl, the Cpl should obey the Sgt, the Sgt obey the S/Sgt and the S/Sgt obey the RSM which serves as the link between the non-commission officers and the commission officers.

Unlike the RUF/SL (People's Army), which has some features of the British Army, have a rank of Brigadier General as the highest rank for now. Within the commission officers as well, there are junior and senior commission officers. The junior commission officers ranges from the ranks of 2nd Lt, Lt and Capt; while the senior commission officers ranges from the ranks of Major, Lt - Col, Col, Brig, Major - Gen, Lt - Gen and Field Marshall.

TYPES OF COMMISSION IN THE ARMY:

We also have three (3) basic ways of commission in the army:-

- a) COMBAT COMMISSION
- b) SPECIALIST COMMISSION
- c) SERVICE COMMISSION.

- a) Combat Commission: It is the most important commission in the army as it involves sending soldiers for Special Combat Training through cadet. At times you can also be commissioned on the field if you proved to be a strong combatant (Field Commission).
- b) Specialist Commission: They are mostly based on specialization. If a trained medical doctor joined the army, he or she has to be commissioned because of his or her technical skill.
- c) Service Commission: Mostly involves duration in the army. At times soldiers can be trained from the recruiting stage, go through the various ranks up to RSM with their long stay in the army backed with their experience, they can be commissioned locally (long service commission). In some cases, after spending four or five years in the army, they can be recommended for cadet, based on their outputs (short service commission).

Non-Commission Officers are not to be saluted in the army. We only need to brasse for them. As for commission officers, the need is there for them to be saluted as they form the senior sector or the army.

- 7) Study the characters of the various soldiers so that you will be able to administer them.
- 8) Do not beat the NCO's to death or disgrace them in front of civilians.
- 9) Do not force soldiers on battles most especially when the soldier is sick or weak on that day.
- 10) You should not be materialistic and weak minded.

PART (III) AMBUSH:

Ambush which can be defined as a hidden or deliberate human trap set up to conquer your enemy, is the most important ingredient of guerrilla tactics. This said tactics is applied in order to demobilize, produce shock and instantly destroy the enemy. Its objective is basically to get logistic arms, ammunitions, foodstuff and relevant materials for the utility of the guerrilla army.

Ambush is the oldest and the most effective instrument of the art of guerrilla warfare. It has three sub divisions:-

Preparatory (Defensive), Offensive (Opportunity), and Immediate ambushes.

A. PREPARATORY (DEFENSIVE) AMBUSH:

As the name implies, preparatory or defensive ambush is planned ahead of time. The materials needed the number of manpower and the site are carefully selected. Preparatory ambush is used mostly in time by the guerrilla army. It is used for defensive purposes especially in ensuring the security of the operational area.

Preparatory ambush is set on routes frequently used by the enemy. Selecting sites for preparatory ambush depends on the discretion of the ambush commander. But certain guide lines are used such as selecting site near bridges, curves, hills, rocky or gallopy areas. The topography of the site will be such that it will afford the guerrilla army an opportunity to hit the target.

B. OFFENSIVE (OPPORTUNITY) AMBUSH:

Offensive ambush is frequently set within the enemy's terrain. This ambush is set with precaution. The offensive nature of this ambush indicated by the deliberate encroachment on the territory of the enemy (more or less an opportunity ambush).

PART (IV) ARM (WEAPON):

Weapon could be defined as any material or instrument used to destroy the enemies and anything to defend life and properties:

AK 47 MECHANISM:

AK simply means AVOMAT KALASNIKOVE. The 47 refers to the venue of kalasnikove.

According to studies or research, this said weapon was discovered by a gentleman during the second world war in 1939 - 45. At the time of fighting, Russia where AVOMAT was born never had smaller weapons but only heavy weapons. At this point in time, the image of almighty God appeared to this gentleman and reveal all mechanisms of this weapon which was to be narrated to the people of Russia. From there this weapon was manufactured and the Russians too had the chance to make a successful alarm of the enemies.

The caliber range of this weapon is 7.62mm x 39 m. Its' travelling range is 1000m. Its' effective range is 400 m while the killing range is about 300 metres. The magazine contains 20-30 rounds.

PARTS OF THE AK 47:

- | | | | | | |
|----|--------------|-----|------------------|-----|------------------|
| a) | Sling | (f) | Gas react | (m) | Mitre |
| b) | Magazine | (g) | Barrel | (n) | Dust Cover |
| c) | Cleaning rod | (h) | Upper hand guard | (o) | Recoiling spring |
| d) | Firing pin | (i) | Lower hand guard | (p) | Fore sight blade |
| e) | Aiming sight | (j) | Piston rod | (q) | Safety Catch |
| k) | Trigger | (l) | Trigger guard. | | |

CLEANING:

In cleaning any arm there is always four types of namely -

1. daily cleaning
2. Cleaning before firing
3. Cleaning after firing
4. Cleaning for advance conditions.

GPMG - MECHANISM:

GPMG means general purpose machine gun. This weapon was design in Britain and Italy. The reason of calling it general purpose machine gun

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PARTS OF THE LMG:

- | | | | | | |
|----|---|------------------|-----|---|-------------|
| 1. | - | Fore sight | 8. | - | Top cover |
| 2. | - | Back sight | 9. | - | Trigger |
| 3. | - | Fore sight blade | 10. | - | Pistol grip |
| 4. | - | R - spool | 11. | - | Bolt |
| 5. | - | Hand guard | 12. | - | Bolt plates |
| 6. | - | Catch | 13. | - | Gas chamber |
| 7. | - | Sling swivel | 14. | - | Gas block. |

TYPES OF AMMO (FOUR TYPES):

1. - 7.62 x 39
2. - 7.62 x 40
3. - 7.62 . 41
4. - 7.62 x 45

All are mostly manufacture by Nato (North Atlantic treaty organisation).

REG:

Means Rocket propel grenades. This gun was design in Russia. It is divided into four parts namely the mechanism part, the shooting part, the barrel and the fire release part. In the back opening is the sytoms where the fire comes from out leaving the propell or rocket out of it.

1. THE BARREL PART:

The barrel part contains the fire sight and the whole body.

2. THE MECHANISM:

The mechanism part contains the trigger, the trigger guard, safe and the telescope part. On the mouth of barrel or muzzle, there is a cut on it which directs the rockets. The mechanism part also contains the bolt, eye sight, back sight and the pistol grip.

METHOD OF THROWING THE GRENADE:

There are four (4) methods of throwing a stick or wooden grenade:-

- 1. Standing position
- 2. Running position
- 3. Kneeling position
- 4. Lying position.

SAFETY RULES:

- 1) Hold the grenade firmly. The more you hold it firmly the better the throwing.
- 2) Whenever throwing, make sure you are behind cover.
- 3) For the grenade instruction, the thrower should be alignment with the soldier. The distance should be three (3) to four (4) metres and should be under cover before throwing.
- 4) Whenever you throw a grenade, you must be under cover for at least five (5) seconds. If the grenade does not explode you give yourself chance for about 30 seconds. The thrower should be a trained soldier at the same time will be able to send it at least 30 metres.
- 5) Before sending it, we must inspect it for rusty, cold or damp and lastly should not be used.

D. THE WALK - (TACTICAL MOVEMENT)

Hold the alert rifle ready in alert position and advance slowly. You have to be quiet on hard grounds. Put the edge or the sole of foot down first and apply maintenance of balance by keeping the knees slightly bent. The movement is normally used in a close terrain, when the enemies are far from you to avoid sound in your movement.

E. THE CRAWL

Side crawling is used with the G.P.M.G. lying on the left side. You hold the gun or carrying handle and rest the gun by the lower carrying handle and rest the gun on the left legs. Push forward using the right foot and the left elbow.

F. KNEEL CRAWL

The knee can be used by the G.P.M.G. when moving behind high covers. Hold the gun carrying handle upright in one hand close to the knee and rest the thumb upright in the knee to take some of the weight of the gun of the arm. Put the clenched fist of the other hand flat on the ground. To advance, move the clenched fist and forward legs together then bend the other legs together and forward legs together, then bend the other legs together and so on.

G. ZIG-ZAG CRAWLING

This type of movement is mostly used in desert to avoid been seen by enemy.

H. CAT CRAWLING

This type of crawling is used when you are close to the enemy and the gun carried by handling it on the chest with the two hands above it. When you get closer to your enemy it is placed above both hands.

I. NORMAL WALKING

You should be active in walking and observe any movement that takes place within your sight of hearing.

COVER AND CONCEALMENT

When defending or temporarily halted while making an attack you must first seek cover from fire and concealment from observation.

over head or the flank the rears the position. Cover also guides against the effect of friendly weapons supporting from the rear cover. This will let you enter and leave the position without exposing yourself to the enemies.

CONCEALMENT

If your position is detected, it can be hit by the enemy fire. If it is hit, you can be killed in it. Therefore, your position must be so well hidden that the enemy will have a hard time detecting it, even when it is within grenade range.

NATURAL UNDISTURBED CONCEALMENT

1. It is better than man-made concealment.
2. It is already prepared.
3. It can not attract enemy attention.
4. It need not be replaced.

Obeying the following rules will help in good concealment.

- a) Avoid sky lines.
- b) Make use of available shadows Remember that when some arms shadows are very conspicuous and that shadow obviously moves with sun.
- c) Choose a back ground to match the clothing and equipment been worn.
- d) Avoid isolated cover as the enemy likely to be observing it and is easy to bring fire than on thick type of cover.

CAMOUFLAGE

Camouflague can be defined as a process where in one can make himself difficult to recognised by disguising him or herself.

Basically, we have two (2) types of camouflagage:-

1. Day camouglage
2. Night camouglag.

A. DAY CAMOUFLAGE:

Is simply when one make himself difficult to recognise in the day by using things like leaves or camouglage clothes or dress yourself in full (CEFO).

B. NIGHT CAMOUFLAGE

Is simply done by avoiding the use of shining clothers or white materials. Soldiers should know how to camouglage and conceal themselves in battle or he or she will be an easy target for the enemy.

RAIDING

Raiding is a sudden attack of an area by troops or guerrillas. In guerrilla warfare, this type of operation is mostly done in the night by a squard or team of commandos to accomplish their mission.

REASON WHY WE RAID

- 1. We do raid to get rid of a personnel.
- 2. To get rid of equipments needed for smooth guerrilla operations.
- 3. To get rid of documents or past records.

Before taking this type of operation, a raiding team has to be sent in order to get necessary information about the enemy. Based on information received, the guerrilla can run successful mission within a short period of time.

Within the operation, noise should be completely avoided and the commander for this said operation should be a brave men to accomplish his mission under all possible means. Materials needed in this type of operation are assaulting riffles and explosive weapons like grenades.

COMBAT TACTICS

This simply means how to over power your enemy. In order to achieve your objective, you should observe the following habits - no smoking and eating.

COMBAT TACTICS FORMATION

We have five (5) major combat tactics formations, namely:

- a) Diamond formation - is used to cross an open terrims
- b) Line formation - It is used to conduct assault.
- c) Squard formation - It is used to cross a natural bridge, a narrow road and also to climb mountains.

- d) Squad Column Formation - This formation is used to walk along the side of a motor.
- e) Vee Formation - It is used to surround and capture living enemies and materials.

PATROL

Patrol is a detachment of a small force sent to perform military duties. Basically we have four (4) types of patrols in the guerrilla army:

1. RECONNAISSANCE OR RECREE PATROL

This patrol group only goes out to see about the activities of the enemies. They will be equipped with arms and ammunitions but only fight in order to defend themselves. Their mission is not to fight but to gain information from the enemies. Normally they are seven (7) in number.

2. FIGHTING OR COMBAT PATROL

This group knows the where about of the enemies. Therefore their task is to fight, raid and ambush the enemy. Their size are larger than the recree patrol team.

3. STANDING PATROL:

This type of patrol groups are there to patrol and give early warnings and dominate the THE MANS LAND location.

4. FAN OR NOMADIC PATROL:

This is the type of patrol the troops move in fan form by assembling in one place. This group composes of patrols, recons and combats, they therefore travel with all their weapons ready to fight.

PATROL EQUIPMENT - are as follows:

Baniculars, maps, whistles, communication, matches or lighter, arms and ammunition, drugs etc.

HOW TO GAIN INFORMATION FROM THE ENEMY

1. Through recree patrol
2. Through civilians
3. From past records or documents.
4. From prisoners of war (captured soldiers) P.O.W.

PART VI

MAP READING

WHAT IS A MAP?

A map is a plane or portion of the earth surface plotted on a piece of paper to describe a particular location on the earth surface. Maps may be divided into two classes:-

1. Those that are natural.
 2. Those that are man made features on the earth surface.
 3. Those that records man made & natural features.
- A. THE ATLAS MAP - These are small scale maps that shows whole countries and continent or even the world on sheet.
- B. TOWN PLANS - These are large scale maps to show street names and other details of particular towns. Some show relief contours and other means. They can be used by force on occasion regarding local maps.
- C. TOPOGRAPHICAL MAPS - These are maps showing in much details about the physical features of the ground, rivers, streams, hills, forests and other human or man-made features like roads, railways, villages, towns and buildings etc. These are basically concerned on military maps.

WHAT IS MAP READING?

Map reading is an extraction of information showing on the map to the ground knowing exactly what the map means. It is also the ability to read and give grade references, takes bearings and to measure distance on a map.

AIMS OF MAP READING

A map reader normally aims at the following points.

1. To be able to find his way about in the country and to recognised features on the ground and on the map.
2. To understand information given on the map so that the picture of the ground and its tactical and administrative possibilities can be achieved without seen the ground.
3. To assist in quick and accurate transmission of information and others involving movement and disposition.

IMPORTANCE OF MAP READING TO A SOLDIER

Map reading helps the soldier in war in two ways:- Movement and Navigation which includes time and distance.

- a. Selection of roads patrol, tactical manoeuvre including fanks movement.

CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS SINCE DECLARATION OF CEASEFIRE

24TH MAY, 1999, UP TO DATE

DATE:

DETAILS

4th June, 1999

RUF rebels infiltrated Kamajor positions at Gishum Konjo, Benduma, Kpetema, Sembahun and Weima. They claimed to be looking for food and probable deployment in those general areas.

20th June, 1999

RUF Commander - Col. AKIN TURAY of the 3rd Brigade, threatened Kamajors to leave Weima OPS area, on the false pretext that, they (RUF) occupied the above location before declaration of ceasefire.

28th June, 1999

Rebels abducted two women; Haja Sawaneh and Nurse Logan while processing palm oil. Haja Sawaneh was later released with the message that the rebels were coming to base at Ialahum and Sembahun already occupied by Kamajors

29th June, 1999

RUF rebels abducted two Kamajors in a Village called Kambama. They also abducted some women and took away personal effects including money. The women were later released but the Kamajors never surfaced.

1st July, 1999

Rebels came to Gumbu area, Garama Chiefdom and captured civilians, looted their property then with a message asking all civilians to leave Kokoru in the same Chiefdom.

11th July, 1999

So-called Acting 3rd Brigade Commander, Lt. Col Jawara asked the Kamajors in the Tongo general area to surrender their arms to them if they want to move there freely. The rebels also asked the civilians to move into Tongo to resume normal activities.

14th July, 1999

On 13th and 14th July, 1999, rebels occupying some Villages in Lower Bambara Chiefdom continue to put pressure on the Kamajors to surrender their arms. The rebels understanding of the Peace Accord is that Kamajors must disarm to them.

18th July, 1999

Rebels asked the Kamajors at Ialahum and Bumpah to surrender their guns to them. Foday Sankoh is made Chairman of Mining of mineral resources, therefore, they (RUF) wants to start mining in order to receive their Leader Foday Sankoh. As a result only rebels should carry arms.

18th July, 1999

Rebels from Kasingbi attacked Madina in Garama Mende Chiefdom and killed four(4) civilians, abducted 40 men and 20 women including children.

19th July, 1999

Rebels also attacked Joru along Garama and Kono Axis, they injured two Kamajors currently undergoing treatment at the Government Hospital.

19th July, 1999

Three rebels met people around a Village called Gelahun. They wounded one Brima Saffa on his right hand. Took money from the people and abducted them. The people were later released.

20th July,

In Fotehun, a man was also wounded by rebels. He is being treated at the Government Hospital.

41) Supreme Council Meeting

Minutes dated 16 August 1997 of meeting of AFRC held on 11 August 1997.

Ref: SG/Mtg/AFRC/97/4COPY No. 2 of 21
AFRC SECRETARIAT
STATE HOUSE

16th August 1997

See Distribution

MINUTES OF AN EMERGENCY COUNCIL MEETING
OF THE A.F.R.C. HELD AT STATE HOUSE ON
MONDAY 11TH AUGUST 1997.PRESENT

MAJOR J. P. KOROMA	-	CHAIRMAN
CAPTAIN S. A. J. MUSA	-	CHIEF SECRETARY OF STATE
STAFF SGT. ABU SANKOH	-	PLO I
STAFF SGT. TAMBA ALEX BRIMA	-	PLO II
IBRAHIM BAZZY KAMARA	-	PLO III
SQUADRON LEADER V. L. KING	-	MEMBER
COLONEL MIKE LAMIN	-	MEMBER
LT. COL. ISSA SESAY	-	MEMBER
MAJOR MORRIS KALLON	-	MEMBER
LT. ELDRED COLLINS	-	MEMBER
F. KALLAY	-	MEMBER
HASSAN BANGURA	-	MEMBER
GEORGE ADAMS	-	MEMBER
SULAIMAN K. TURAY	-	MEMBER
C. S. O. D. KABBIA	-	MEMBER
COLONEL A. K. SESAY	-	SECRETARY-GENERAL

INTRODUCTIONACTION

1. In his opening remarks, the Chairman emphasised the importance of Council Meetings and informed members that henceforth no member would be allowed entry into the hall after his arrival. For a start, all those absent for the meeting without a valid excuse are to be suspended from Council for a period of two (2) sittings.

AIM

2. The aim of the Meeting was to discuss the general financial position of the country.

(ITEM I: GENERAL FINANCIAL POSITION)

3. The Chairman intimated members that the general financial situation in the country is bad and that we have burst the bank telling by Five Hundred Million (Le 500,000,000). This has been so because our detractors are still at work asking people not to pay taxes and sabotaging revenue generating areas.

4. With calm determination, and relentless effort, we shall forge ahead to revamp the economy on the few areas we have at hand. He commended members for their patience and understanding over pay issue since no Council Member has had salary so far.

5. The Chairman went on to inform Members that he would not make major changes on the pay-scale of the previous government which he now ran down as follows:

- (a) Chairman = Le 1,500,000
- (b) Vice Chairman = Le 1,000,000
- (c) Secretary-General = Le 1,000,000
- (d) Secretary of State = Le 690,000
- Plus Allowance = Le 200,000
- (e) Under Secretary of State = Le 590,000
- Plus Allowance = Le 200,000

6. The Salary-scale of Council Members, he went on, will therefore fall between Le 690,000 and Le 1,000,000. He also spoke generally about the various Ministries and Institutions that have been paid so far.

7. The Chairman intimated Members that the only source, government can now raise funds from include the following:

- (a) Sale of Petroleum Products.
- (b) Imports and Customs Duties
- (c) Proceeds from sale of Diamonds

AFRC - SECRET

DECISIONS

8. It was decided that Council Members must put their men under control, and make prudent use of fuel.

ALL

9. Council Members must make sure that their men do not interfere with operations at the Ports.

ALL

ITEM II: APPOINTMENT OF BANK GOVERNOR

10. When the Bank Superintendent was initially approached to accept the appointment as Bank Governor, he suggested to be appointed as Superintendent. Based on his performance, it is considered to appoint him Governor, Bank of Sierra Leone.

DECISION

11. It was decided that he be appointed as the substantive holder of the position of Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone.

SECRETARY
GENERALITEM III. CHINESE AID

12. Following an earlier request the Chairman made to the Chinese Government, he has now been informed that the Chinese Government is willing to give in aid the sum of Two Million United States Dollars (US\$ 2,000,000) in the form of food, medicine and other relief items. An Ambassador Ku has now been sent to the Republic of Guinea to organise the signing of the Agreement for the aid.

DECISION

13. It was decided that the Government of Sierra Leone will put together a delegation fairly quickly to go and sign the Agreement.

ITEM IV. DISCIPLINE

14. The Chairman and Council Members were extremely concerned about the attitude and conduct of some Council Members. It was noted that as Members of the Highest Council of the Land, Members must conduct themselves with respect and honesty.

15. It is a shame, the Chairman went on, to hear of Honourable Members threatening to fight in the street. A case in point was the conflict between the PLO I and the Chief Security Officer to His

AFRC - SECRET

AFRC - SECRET

Excellency the Chairman. The two Honourable Members were allowed to explain themselves and the matter was resolved amicably.

16. The Chairman intimated Members that our detractors are planning to cause trouble for the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council before we are one hundred (100) days in office. He therefore encouraged Members to view themselves as a single unit and share information to avoid gossip.

DECISION

16. All Principal Liaison Officers must have effective control over the Honourable Members within Council.

PLO I
PLO II
PLO III

[Handwritten signature]
A. K. SESAY
Colonel
Secretary-General

Distribution

ALL MEMBERS

AFRC - SECRET

42) Speech

RUF speech to the nation (18 June 1997 – delivered on SLBS).

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT'S APOLOGY TO THE NATION
Delivered on SLBS, 18 June 1997

Fellow Countrymen,

For the past six years or so, we have been living in an environment of hatred and divisiveness. We looked at our brothers and killed them in cold blood, we removed our sisters from their hiding places to undo their femininity, we slaughtered our mothers and butchered our fathers. It was really a gruesome experience which has left a terrible landmark in our history. But the atrocities that occurred must not be taken in the context of a personal vendetta. They were the result of the rottenness of a system which could not be uprooted except by brutal means. We did not take to the bush because we wanted to be barbarians, not because we wanted to be inhuman, but because we wanted to state our humanity to a society so deep that had the RUF not emerged, we wonder if we would not have still been under the yoke of that wretched regime.

In the process of cleaning the system, however, we have wronged the great majority of our countrymen. We have sinned both in the sight of our Sierra Leonean brothers and sisters, for all the terror and the mayhem we unleashed on you in our bid to make Sierra Leone a country that all Sierra Leoneans would be proud of.

Today, we have rejoined you. We have come back as prodigal sons, brothers and sisters, to meet our families in our different homes, so that we all can sit in our houses in peace and tell tales to our young ones of how Sierra Leone was once cleansed of the mess that unpatriotic politicians brought to her in yonder years. Let the farmers take their tools and go to their farms in peace, let the young women go to the stream and swim in peace, let them sing to their loved ones under the moonshine in peace, let Sierra Leoneans walk in peace, let us talk in peace, let us travel in peace, and just let us live in peace. We have finally discovered the right atmosphere for a peaceful co-existence.

We must accommodate each other if we want to live in peace, and that is the miracle that has occurred in Sierra Leone through the coming of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). We have accepted to join forces with this government because it is the first to demonstrate a genuine feeling of brotherhood for us - it is the government that has seen us as Sierra Leoneans who came together to stand for a cause for the general good. We want to assure everybody that we are sincerely and genuinely committed to the maintenance and sustenance of this miraculously achieved long-awaited peace. We have not come to terrorize you, our brothers and sisters, we have come to embrace you in love and harmony.

Our members are not involved in the recent spate of armed attacks on residents of Freetown. No RUF member has so far been caught looting or behaving in any disciplinary manner. Perhaps what has delayed the wholesome practicality of this long-cherished peace is this threat of a Nigerian invasion. But the moment that chapter is closed, we are prepared to disarm and melt into the civilian populace and the regular army, because we are fully convinced that the foundation for lasting peace and true democracy has been laid.

We have all along been most willing to end this crisis peacefully, but the past

governments proved insincere and unfaithful to their words. The NPRC did not come with the desired reformation, and the SLPP made mockery of the Abidjan Peace Accord. Instead of integrating us into the society as promised, the SLPP only tried to bring divisiveness in our camp by selling our leader Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh to the Nigerians and staging a coup against him. This was a blatant disregard of the articles of the Peace Accord. Even when some of our members surrendered, they were still ostracized and treated as the dregs of society. And further still, even though we were abiding by the dictates of the cease-fire agreement, Hinga Norman directed the Kamajors to attack our bases. This clearly showed that the SLPP was not ready for PEACE, and so we prepared for the worst. But we must give bountiful thanks to the Almighty for the refreshing fact that instead of the worst, it is the best that has come through the concrete unbelievable peace that has been attained through the AFRC.

We have not therefore denounced attempts at bringing back Tejan Kabbah because we hate him, but it is because he is not willing to accept us as his fellow Sierra Leoneans. Ex-President Kabbah disappointed us gravely, and we can never trust him again. We were prepared for peace, but the SLPP was not. We are therefore appealing to the International Community, and all those that love Sierra Leone, to critically examine the Sierra Leonean problem before any unwarranted action is taken. For six years, we have lived in blood-bath, let us now have fresh baths in our streams, swimming pools and beaches.

We assure the International Community and all Sierra Leoneans of the RUF's total and unflinching commitment to lasting peace. All that we need now is for the United Nations to take the lead in assisting the AFRC in demobilising and re-integrating our combatants into the society for the ultimate achievement of true democracy through free and fair elections that will be conducted in the whole country in peace. At least we can today sleep in peace in the thought that Sierra Leone has finally achieved its nationhood by being bold enough to tell the whole world that we are capable of solving our own problems. The People's Army has come to stay.

43) Proclamation

AFRC Proclamation – PN no.3 of 1997 (28/5/97)

PUBLIC NOTICE

*Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary Vol. CXXVIII, No. 34
dated 28th May, 1997*

Public Notice No. 3 of 1997

Published 28th May, 1997

PROCLAMATION

ADMINISTRATION OF SIERRA LEONE
(ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL)
PROCLAMATION, 1997

Short title.

PROCLAMATION TO MAKE PROVISION FOR THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE BY THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; ITS ESTABLISHMENT AND CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER MATTERS CONNECTED THEREWITH.

WHEREAS it is a fundamental duty of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone to secure and maintain the safety of the State and public order;

AND WHEREAS the actions and utterances of the erstwhile Government, political parties and their leaders, have created conditions which can lead to tribal factions, bloodshed and tribal warfare;

AND WHEREAS it is necessary and expedient to avert immediately that trend of affairs and for provision to be made for the maintenance of law and order in Sierra Leone and for the proper administration by law, of the State of Sierra Leone;

NOW THEREFORE, We, the members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in cooperation with the people of Sierra Leone, in order to ensure the maintenance of law and order, domestic tranquility, the enjoyment of the blessings of liberty, unity and democracy to the people of Sierra Leone and all persons living therein, do hereby proclaim as follows:—

2
Constitution
of Armed
Forces
Revolutionary
Council.

1. (1) There is hereby established a Council to be known as the ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (hereinafter referred to as "the Council").

(2) The Council shall consist of —

- (a) a Chairman;
- (b) a Deputy Chairman; and
- (c) other members, not exceeding 27 in number.

(3) Subject to subparagraph (2), the Council may, by a majority vote at any meeting, appoint members or terminate the appointment of any member.

(4) There shall be a Secretary-General who shall be appointed by the Council and shall perform such functions as the Council may determine.

Suspension of
certain provi-
sions of the
Constitution.
Act No. 6 of
1997.

2. (1) All the provisions of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991, which came into operation on 1st October, 1991, which are inconsistent or in conflict with this Proclamation or any law made thereunder shall be deemed to have been suspended with effect from 25th May, 1997.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subparagraph (1) —

- (a) the Parliament elected under the said Constitution of Sierra Leone and in existence immediately before 25th May, 1997, is dissolved;
- (b) all political parties are dissolved and membership in political parties is prohibited with effect from 25th May, 1997.

3. (1) The Council shall have power for such purposes as it may think fit, and in the national interest, to make laws which shall be known as decrees.

Power of Council to make laws

(2) Any decree made by the Council may be amended, repealed, revoked or suspended by another decree made by the Council.

(3) Every decree made by the Council shall be deemed to be an Act as defined in section 3 of the Interpretation Act, 1971.

Act No 8 of 1971

(4) Any decree made by the Council shall be signed by the Chairman or, in the absence of the Chairman, by the Deputy Chairman of the Council.

(5) Subject to any decree made by the Council, all enactments in force in Sierra Leone immediately before 25th May, 1997, shall continue in force:

Provided that any enactment in force in Sierra Leone immediately before 25th May, 1997, which is inconsistent or in conflict with any provision of this Proclamation or any decree made thereunder shall be deemed to have been suspended as from 25th May, 1997.

4. Every decree made by the Council shall be published in the Gazette and shall come into operation on the date of such publication or on such other date as may be provided in or under the decree, or in any other enactment.

Publication and commencement of decrees.

5. Subject to any decree made by the Council, the public service of Sierra Leone as it existed immediately before 25th May, 1997, shall continue in existence, and any person holding or acting in any office in the public service immediately before that date, shall continue in office subject to any decree and other enactment in force after that date.

Public Service to continue.

6. Subject to any decree made by the Council, any reference to President, Vice-President, Minister or Cabinet in the Constitution of Sierra Leone which came into operation on 1st October, 1991, or in any enactment

Adaptation of references to President, Minister, etc. Act No. 6 of 1991.

4

continued in existence by virtue of this Proclamation shall, on and after 25th May, 1997, be construed as a reference to the Council or to such person or authority as the Council may by Order appoint.

Detention of persons.

7. (1) The Council may, where it considers it necessary in the interest of public safety or public order so to do, make an order against any person directing that he be detained.

(2) Subparagraph (1) shall be deemed to have come into operation on 25th May, 1997.

(3) Any order made under subparagraph (1) directing that any person be detained shall not be questioned in any court of law.

Power to make subsidiary legislation.

8. Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph 3, and subject to paragraph 6, any power vested in any person or authority, other than the Council, to make any law under any enactment shall continue to apply accordingly.

Power to amend or repeal Proclamation.

9. The Council shall have power to amend, repeal or suspend this Proclamation or any provision thereof.

Commencement.


10. This Proclamation shall be deemed to have come into operation on 25th May, 1997.

Made at Freetown this 28th day of May, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA,
For and on behalf of the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Sierra Leone.

44) Decree

AFRC (Establishment of Office of Principal Liaison Officer) Decree – Decree no. 3 of 1997.



1997

MINISTER OF DEFENCE
No. 3

Sierra Leone

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Establishment of Office of Principal Liaison Officer
Decree, 1997

Short title

Being a Decree to make provision for the establishment of
the Office of Principal Liaison Officer.

(10th July, 1997) Date of commencement.

3163

SCHEDULE

PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled
"Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council)
Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May
1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and
issues the following Decree:—

Commence-
ment.

1. This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on
the 10th day of July, 1997.

Establishment
of Office Prin-
cipal Liaison
Officer.

2. (1) There is hereby established the Office of
PRINCIPAL LIAISON OFFICER.

(2) The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may
appoint from amongst its members such number of Principal Liaison
Officers as the Council may think fit.

Functions of
Principal Liai-
son Officer.

3. A Principal Liaison Officer shall be responsible for
supervising, monitoring and co-ordinating the operations of any
Department of State or such other business of Government, as may
from time to time be assigned to him by the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council.

Allowances,
etc.

4. A Principal Liaison Officer shall be entitled to such
allowances and other incidents of office as may be prescribed by the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Oath of Office.

5. A Principal Liaison Officer shall take and subscribe the
Oath of Office as set out in the Schedule hereto.

In the name of God/Allah I swear (solemnly affirm) that I will
faithfully discharge the duties of the Office of Principal Liaison
Officer of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and that I will support, uphold and
maintain the provisions of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (Public Notice No. 3 of 1997) and
the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 1991 which
are consistent with the Proclamation

(So help me God/Allah)."

MADE AND ISSUED this 12th day of July, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

1918

45) Government Notices

Government Notices No 215 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997) of 3 September 1997 published in gazettes nos. 52 and 54 of 4 September 1997 & 18 September respectively.



The Sierra Leone Gazette

Published by Authority

VOL. CXXVIII

THURSDAY, 4TH SEPTEMBER, 1997

No. 52

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PUBLIC SERVICE NOTICES

FREETOWN, 4th September, 1997

Govt. Notice No. 208

Leave of Absence

ADMINISTRATION

Bangura, Mrs. H. M., 185 days, i.e., 3.11.96 to 31.5.97, inclusive.

Left the Sierra Leone Civil Service

MINISTRY OF WORKS

John, J. E., Senior Quantity Assistant, retired on pension, 30.6.96.

OBITUARY

Govt. Notice No. 209

M.P./F/68

The death is announced with regret of Sowa, P., Third Class Prison Officer, Prisons Department, which sad event took place on 27th May, 1997.

Govt. Notice No. 210

M.P./F/68

The death is announced with regret of Koroma, A. S., Chief Officer Class One, Prisons Department, which sad event took place on 5th June, 1997.

Govt. Notice No. 211

M.P./F/68

The death is announced with regret of Kargbo, A. M., Temporary Typewriter Mechanic, Government Printing Department, which sad event took place on 2nd June, 1997.

Govt. Notice No. 212

M.P./F/68

The death is announced with regret of Koroma, M., Works Service Employee, Provincial Secretary's Office Northern Province, Makeni, which sad event took place on 25th May, 1997.

Govt. Notice No. 213

M.P./F/68

The death is announced with regret of Davies, A., Third Class Prison Officer, Prisons Department, which sad event took place on 8th July, 1997.

Govt. Notice No. 214

M.P./F/68

The death is announced with regret of Beo, M., Nursing Aide, Ministry of Health and Sanitation, which sad event took place on 31st April, 1997.

DECLARATION OF VACANT POST

Govt. Notice No. 205

M.P./PF, 4617

Conteh, Brimah, Engineer, Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service/Television, having been absent from duty without leave or reasonable excuse since 1st July, 1995 is held to have vacated his post with effect from that date.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

Annual Subscription:—Inland—Le90,000.00, Overseas—Le300,000.00

To be purchased from the Government Bookshop, Wallace Johnson Street, Freetown.

Price:—Le1,000.00

G.P. 0315/97/1,200/9.97.

ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Govt. Notice No. 215

Govt. Notice No. 206

THE ADMINISTRATION OF SIERRA LEONE
(ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) PROCLAMATION, 1997

(P.N. No. 3 of 1997)

REVISED CHIEFDOM COUNCILLORS LIST —
KOYA CHIEFDOM, PORT LOKO DISTRICT 1996

P.N. No. 3 Pursuant to subparagraph (2) of paragraph 1 of 1997. of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997, the following persons constitute the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council with effect from the 25th day of May, 1997—

No.	Name	Town/Village	Post
1.	P. C. Bai Kompa Bomboli	Mastaka	P/Chief
2.	Pa Nenghana Falls	do.	C/Speaker I
3.	Alhaji Baharr Dumbuya	do.	C/Speaker II
4.	Pa Kapr Kompa	Monge	C/Chief
5.	Ya Beemilla Kamara	Rokon	do.
6.	Ya Beemilla Senkrah	Mawoma	do.
7.	Ya Bomposh Bomboli	Makarabay	do.
8.	Ya Bourwara Bomboli	Mastaka	do.
9.	Pa Roka Yek	Magbeni	do.
10.	Pa Roka Bomboli	Kourabai Norla	do.

MAHERA SECTION

No.	Name	Town/Village	Post
11.	Pa Alimamy Sesay	Makabie	Section Chief
12.	Momoh Sesay	do.	Headman
13.	Pa Santigie Conteh	do.	Councillor
14.	Morlat Sesay	do.	do.
15.	Morlat Kamara	do.	do.
16.	Hassan Kanu	Mahera	do.
17.	Hassan Sesay	do.	do.
18.	Pa Santigie Conteh	Malai	do.
19.	Foday Sesay	do.	do.
20.	Shaka Conteh	Ro-Nyella	do.
21.	Abu Koroma	Rokonteh	do.
22.	Amadu Kanu	do.	do.
23.	Amadu Senkrah	Maforay	do.
24.	Pa Santigie Seric	do.	do.
25.	Pa Santigie Sesay	Maschana	do.
26.	Amadu Kanu	do.	do.
27.	Pa Santigie Kamara	Magbanku	do.
28.	Pa Kapr Kamara	do.	do.
29.	Yamba Kanu	do.	Headman
30.	Chernor Sesay	do.	Councillor
31.	Shaku Kanu	Mafalla	do.
32.	Momoh Kanu	do.	do.
33.	Sampah Kamara	Mafinda	do.
34.	Alie Koroma	do.	do.
35.	Unisa Kargbo	Makabarie	do.
36.	Hassana Kargbo	Robias I	do.
37.	Mohamed Kanu	Rochairi	do.
38.	Ibrahim Koroma	Mapatheneh	do.
39.	Britina Conteh	Bathasmp/Ronorla	do.
40.	Alpha Conteh	Moyamba	do.

ROBARR SECTION

41.	Pa Bubu Kalorko	Mabora	Ag. Sec. Chief
42.	Sorie Turay	do.	Headman
43.	Pa Santigie Conteh	do.	Town Chief
44.	Amadu Kalorko	do.	Councillor
45.	Sillah Kalorko	do.	do.
46.	Britina Conteh	Rosarr	Headman
47.	Pa Santigie Bangura	do.	Town Chief
48.	Amidu Kargbo	Makeni Ferry	Headman
49.	Shaka Kanu	do.	Councillor
50.	Sullay Koroma	do.	do.

(1)	Major Johnny Paul Koroma	...	Chairman
(2)	Corporal Foday S. Senkrah	...	Deputy Chairman
(3)	Captain S. A. J. Musa	...	Member <i>deed</i>
(4)	Colonel A. K. Sesay	...	Member <i>deed</i>
(5)	Staff Sergeant Abu Senkrah	...	Member <i>deed</i>
(6)	Staff Sergeant Alex T. Brima	...	Member
(7)	Staff Sergeant Brima B. Kamara	...	Member <i>Bass</i>
(8)	Colonel Sam Bockarie	...	Member
(9)	Major Morris Kallon	...	Member
(10)	David G. Kallon	...	Member
(11)	Colonel Issa H. Sesay	...	Member
(12)	Colonel Gibril Massaquoi	...	Member
(13)	Colonel Michael Lamin	...	Member
(14)	Squadron Leader Victor L. King	...	Member
(15)	Major J. B. Cater-Tarawalle	...	Member
(16)	Captain Lawrence S. Womandia	...	Member
(17)	Lieutenant Eldred Collins	...	Member
(18)	Warrant Officer II Franklyn Conteh	...	Member
(19)	Warrant Officer II Samuel Kargbo	...	Member
(20)	Sergeant K. Bangura	...	Member
(21)	Sergeant S. B. Khanu	...	Member <i>SS?</i>
(22)	Sergeant George Adams	...	Member <i>crab</i>
(23)	Sergeant Sahr Gborie	...	Member <i>deed</i>
(24)	Sergeant Sulaiman Turay	...	Member
(25)	Sergeant K. Kallay	...	Member
(26)	Corporal Momoh Bangura	...	Member
(27)	Lance-Corporal Hector Bob-Lahai	...	Member
(28)	Lance-Corporal Ibrahim D. Sesay	...	Member
(29)	Staff Sergeant Moses Kabbia	...	Member <i>(Landa)</i>
(30)	Lance-Corporal Abdul M. Sesay	...	Member
(31)	Mohamed Saïdu Kamara	...	Member <i>Wishan</i>
(32)	Bai Hinga Kurraray-Bangura	...	Member
(33)	Abdulai Michael Munu	...	Member
(34)	Kandeh Sorie-Sebbe Bangura	...	Member

DATED this 3rd day of September, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

No.	Name	Town/Village	Post	No.	Name	Town/Village	Post
51.	Alie Kargbo	Moyamba	Headman	108.	Mohamed Turay	Makanrankay	Councillor
52.	Abu Sankoh	do.	Councillor	109.	Abu Conteh	do.	do.
53.	Karimu Conteh	Robis	Headman	110.	Fatu Thullah	do.	do.
54.	Abdulai Bangura	do.	Councillor	111.	Pa Santigie Koroma	Mamoa	do.
55.	Bundu Kanu	Makankry	Headman	112.	Foday Kamara	do.	Headman
56.	Momoh Sesay	Masumaila	do.	113.	Sorie Koroma	do.	Councillor
57.	Bassie Bangura	do.	Councillor	114.	Abu Koroma	do.	do.
58.	Sallieu Kamara	Magbele-lol	Headman	115.	Brima Kamara	do.	do.
59.	Bai Bangura	do.	Councillor	116.	Foday Yellow	do.	do.
60.	Baimba Kalorko	Rogbaneh	Headman	117.	Sullay Kamara	do.	do.
61.	Yaya Bangura	do.	Councillor	118.	Sidiqee Sesay	do.	do.
62.	Alimamy Conteh	Magboko/ Maronko	Headman	119.	Pa Santigie Sesay	Makali	Town Chief
63.	Mamudu Conteh	Rogbpro/Makalie	do.	120.	Sampha Kaloko	do.	Headman
64.	Alpha Kamara	Robis/Masikmah	do.	121.	Alimamy Kargbo	do.	Councillor
ROKEL SECTION							
65.	Pa Alimamy Sesay	Rogbai/Rotifunk	Section Chief	125.	Mohamed Koloko	Mamulai	Headman
66.	Abdulai Koroma	Rogbai	Headman	126.	Pa Santigie Kanu	do.	Councillor
67.	Pa Santigie Sesay	Ropot	Town Chief	127.	Abdulai Conteh	do.	do.
68.	Sorie Fornah	Rotifunk	Headman	128.	Usifu Kamara	do.	do.
69.	Pa Santigie Kabba	do.	Town Chief	129.	Allie Sesay	do.	do.
70.	Momodu Sillah	do.	Councillor	130.	Bassie Conteh	Mamusa	Headman
71.	Momodu Fallah	Ropollon	Headman	131.	Foday Tejan Kanu	do.	Councillor
72.	Pa Santigie Kamara	do.	Town Chief	132.	Usman Turay	Makankry	Headman
73.	Pa Nfa Sesay	do.	Councillor	133.	Amadu Kamara	do.	Councillor
74.	Samuel Koroma	Royell/Mende	Headman	134.	Alimamy Kamara	Match (1)	Headman
75.	Maligie Kamara	Rofenyea	do.	135.	Abu Falla	do.	Councillor
76.	Ansumana Turay	Masaffie	do.	136.	Mohamed Koroma	do.	do.
77.	Mohamed Conteh	do.	Councillor	137.	Abdulai Kanu	do.	do.
78.	Pa Santigie Kamara	Royanka/ Mashaka	Headman	138.	Foday Thollie	Match (2)	do.
79.	Pa Santigie Kanu	Rotkene/Makin	Town Chief	139.	Abdulai Falla	do.	do.
80.	Abdulraman Kamara	Rowareh Regboo	Headman	140.	Umaro Kabia	Robana	Headman
81.	Morich Fallah	Rotifunk	Councillor	141.	Sorie Turay	do.	Councillor
82.	Sullay Conteh	Makin	do.	142.	Unisa Kabia	do.	do.
83.	Mohamed Koroma	Royeleh	do.	143.	Brima Fornah	do.	do.
84.	Osman Yathch	Rofanyea	do.	144.	Amidu Koroma	Maktiani	do.
85.	Pa Santigie Kargbo	Ropat	Town Chief	145.	Assana Koroma	do.	Headman
MAWOMA SECTION							
86.	Pa Alimamy Kanu	Mawoma	Section Chief	146.	Pa Santigie Kamara	Mabtasch	do.
87.	Pa Santigie Kanu	do.	Councillor	147.	Pa Bai Kamara	do.	Councillor
88.	Lamina Sesay	do.	Headman	148.	Brima Kamara	do.	do.
89.	I. H. Brun Kanu	do.	Councillor	149.	Alhaji Brima Kamara	Mabarrow	do.
90.	Gbassay Kamara	do.	do.	150.	Mohamed Koroma	do.	Headman
91.	Sheka Kanu	do.	do.	151.	Ibrahim Koroma	do.	Councillor
92.	Abdulai Kamara	do.	do.	152.	Abu B. Koroma	do.	do.
93.	Bai Kanu I	do.	do.	153.	Bassie Koroma	Makantor	Headman
94.	Allie Kamara	do.	do.	154.	Abdulai Turay	do.	Councillor
95.	Lamina Kamara	do.	do.	155.	Mohamed Thollie	do.	do.
96.	Bai Kanu II	do.	do.	156.	Alimamy Thoronka	Bathibana	Headman
97.	Ibrahim Kanu	do.	do.	157.	Assana Koroma	do.	Councillor
98.	James M. Kanu	do.	do.	158.	Foday Koroma	do.	do.
99.	Alhaji Idrissa Turay	Makanrankay	do.	159.	Mohamed Turay	Mafulumu	Headman
100.	Foday Bear	do.	do.	160.	Amadu Conteh	Matopi	do.
101.	Pa Santigie Gbla	do.	do.	161.	Foday Kamara	Royanka	do.
102.	Sherifu Thulla	do.	do.	162.	Brima Koroma	do.	Councillor
103.	Amadu Kamara	do.	do.	163.	Amadu Koroma	Mabalay/M	Headman
104.	Ibrahim Kanu	do.	do.	164.	Shaka Kamara	Makolerr	do.
105.	Foday Folla	do.	do.	165.	Osman Turay	do.	Councillor
106.	Musa Gbla	do.	do.	166.	Amadu Kanu	do.	do.
107.	Sorie Bia	do.	do.	167.	Musa Kamara	do.	do.
				168.	Alpha Kargbo	Makabi	Headman
				169.	Brima Koroma	do.	Councillor
				170.	Abdulai Koroma	do.	do.
				171.	Abdulai Kanu	do.	do.

No.	Name	Town/Village	Post	No.	Name	Town/Village	Post
643.	Papa Kargbo	Masheak	Headman	707.	Bai Sesay	Mafentha	Headman
644.	Santigie Kamara	Makabbie	Councillor	708.	Alpha Osman Kamara	do.	Councillor
645.	Sinneh Sesay	Rokirima	Headman	709.	Alie Sesay	do.	do.
646.	Bassie Kargbo	do.	Councillor	710.	Moriak Kargbo	Ropath	Headman
647.	Sorie Kamara	Robis	Headman	711.	Sorie Turay	do.	do.
648.	Bai Kanu	Masoko	do.	712.	Santigie Bundu	do.	do.
649.	Alimamy Kanu	do.	Councillor	713.	Amadu Kamara	Pay-Bull	Headman
650.	Dibbeen Kargbo	Kissy	Headman	714.	Mohamed Kamara	Masumana	do.
651.	Amidu Koroma	do.	Councillor	715.	Brima Bangura	do.	Councillor
652.	Bai Fornah	do.	do.	716.	Brima Kargbo	do.	do.
653.	Sorie Koroma	do.	do.	717.	Amadu Kanu	do.	do.
654.	Brima Mansaray	Meyeiama Bana	Headman	718.	Alimamy Conteh	Magbonkneh	Headman
655.	Albert Tarawallie	Makoi	do.	719.	Foday Kamara	Makamborie	do.
656.	Hassana Tarawallie	do.	Councillor	720.	Abdulai Kanu	do.	Councillor
657.	Amidu Tarawallie	do.	do.	721.	Sinneh Fornah	Mabamboo	Headman
658.	Bassie Kamara	do.	do.	722.	Alhaji Foday Fornah	do.	Councillor
659.	Alie Banday	Petifu Hamburg	Headman	723.	Issa Kamara	Mayorma	Headman
660.	Dauda Conteh	do.	Councillor	724.	Sullay Kamara	do.	Councillor
661.	Saidu Kamara	Makunthel	do.	725.	Wusu Kamara	do.	do.
662.	Sullay Kamara	Rogbaneh	do.	726.	Hassan Kamara	do.	do.
663.	Alie Kamara	Madaka	do.	727.	Foday Bia	do.	do.
664.	Brima Kamara	Makarboh	do.	728.	Omaro Kanu	do.	do.
665.	Momoh Koroma	do.	do.	729.	Hassan Wanduni	do.	do.
666.	Sorie Fornah	Mamoriai	do.	730.	Sorie Sankoh	do.	do.
667.	Brima Sesay	Masogbol	Headman	731.	Mohamed Najib	Ro-worreh	Headman
668.	Amadu Conteh	Robaykoh	do.	732.	Brima Follah	Mabeku	do.
669.	Momodou Kanu	Masantigie	do.	733.	Abdulai Kargbo	do.	Councillor
670.	Mohamed Mansaray	Makossch	do.	734.	Mohamed Sesay	Mabain	Headman
671.	Ibrahim Kamara	Jabama	do.	735.	Santigie Bundu	do.	Councillor
672.	Idriss Kamara	Mabaina	do.	736.	Pa Santigie Kamara	do.	Town Chief
673.	Abdulai Kanu	Mabuttel/Kadi	Councillor	737.	Santigie Sesay	Makabbie	Headman
674.	Osman Kargbo	Matakay	do.	738.	Pa Santigie Bangura	do.	Town Chief
675.	Brima Kamara	Matimbasa	Headman	739.	Brima Kanu	do.	Headman
676.	Amadu Kabia	Kigbal	do.	740.	Abdulai Koroma	Royeiama	do.
677.	Amidu Kargbo	Mamanso	do.	741.	Brima Turay	Mafengbeh	do.
678.	Abdulai Sesay	Gbohbu	do.	742.	Abu Kargbo	Makoya	do.
679.	Saku Kargbo	Magbanah	do.	743.	Brima Kanu	Mabendu	do.
FOREDUGU SECTION				744.	Sorie Kamara	do.	Councillor
680.	Pa. Alimany Lahsi	Foreদিগু	Section Chief	745.	Mustapha Kargbo	do.	do.
681.	Foday Bundu	do.	Headman	746.	Brima Conteh	Mabintha	Headman
682.	Foday Kamara	do.	Councillor	747.	A. T. Falla (J.P.)	Makoya	Councillor
683.	Alpha Sesay	Ro-laya	Headman	CHIEFDOM COMMITTEE MEMBERS			
684.	Sillah Sesay	do.	Councillor	1.	P. C. Bai Kompa		
685.	Foday Bia	Mayon	Headman		Bomboii II	Masiaka	Chairman
686.	Amadu Bangura	do.	Councillor	2.	Pa Nengbana Falla	Speaker	Member
687.	Komboh Bundu	do.	do.	3.	Alhaji S. A. T. Koroma	Makossch	do.
688.	Bai Bundu	Mano	Headman	4.	Alhaji Amadu Kargbo	—	do.
689.	Mohamed A. Bundu	do.	do.	5.	Pa Sidiqie Kamara	Songo	do.
690.	Abu Senior	do.	Councillor	6.	Pa Adikali Conteh	Matennch	do.
691.	Saidu Kanu	Ro-gbomkatnday	Headman	7.	Pa Alimamy		
692.	Lamina Conteh	Bath-loi	do.		Ojukwu Sessy	Makabbie	do.
693.	Sineh Bangura	do.	Councillor	8.	Pa Alimamy Lahai		
694.	Alimamy Bundu	Makandeh	Headman		Bundu	Mabillah	do.
695.	Lamina Sesay	Makaray	do.	9.	Pa Sorie Kamara	Mabain	do.
696.	Thaimu Kamara	Kurankoh	do.	10.	Pa Sheka Dumbuya	Maoreh	do.
697.	Alhaji Amara	do.	Councillor	11.	Pa Bubu Kalokoh	Mamamah	do.
698.	Bassie Kamara	Kurankoh	do.	12.	Pa Modu Kamara	do.	do.
699.	Gbanabom-Falla	Maputha	Headman	13.	H. Y. Mansaray	Songo	do.
700.	Sorie Kanu	Masorie Baimba	do.	14.	Mr. A. B. M. Koroma	Makoloh	do.
701.	Pa Santigie Kanu	do.	Councillor	15.	Mr. I. H. Kanu	Masiaka	do.
702.	Musa Kanu	do.	do.	REVISED by me at Masiaka Koya Chiefdom on 10th January, 1990.			
703.	Amidu Bundu	Mabillah	Headman	M. S. JALLOH, for Senior District Officer.			
704.	Ansumana Bangura	do.	Councillor				
705.	Mohamed Bundu	do.	do.				
706.	Mohamed Kamara	do.	do.				



The Sierra Leone Gazette

Published by Authority

VOL. CXXVIII

THURSDAY, 18TH SEPTEMBER, 1997

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PUBLIC SERVICE NOTICES

FREETOWN, 18th September, 1997

Govt. Notice No. 219

New Appointment

MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SANITATION

Foray, Dr. Lynda Musu, Temporary Houseman, 12.3.97.
Kenneth, Sartic Mohamed, Temporary Houseman, 12.3.97.
Rogers, Dr. Iris Tenneh, Temporary Houseman, 12.3.97.

Leave of Absence

ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL'S

Weekes, Mrs. C. O., 298 days, 1.8.97.

AUDIT

Ceaser, Mrs. A. A., 108 days, 28.4.97.

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Sesay, Dr. M. A., 521 days, 8.10.95.

MINISTRY OF WORKS

Turay, K. M., 940 days, 23.10.96.

Left the Sierra Leone Civil Service

ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL'S

Bangura, I. M., Stock Verifier, retired on pension, 10.7.97.

CO-OPERATIVE

Kamara, I. K., Co-operative Superintendent, retired on pension, 15.8.97.
Kenneth, D. A. S., Co-operative Superintendent, retired on pension, 21.8.97.
Siaffa, E. M., Assistant Co-operative Superintendent, retired on pension, 28.7.97.

SIERRA LEONE BROADCASTING SERVICE/TELEVISION

Conteh, K., Senior Diesel Fitter, retired on pension, 31.7.97.
Koroma, A., Senior Driver, retired on pension, 11.6.97.

MINISTRY OF WORKS

Joaque, A., Third Grade Clerk, retired on pension, 17.6.97.

ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

Govt. Notice No. 215

THE ADMINISTRATION OF SIERRA LEONE (ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) PROCLAMATION, 1997

(P.N. No. 3 of 1997)

P.N. No. 3 of 1997. Pursuant to subparagraph (2) of paragraph 1 of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997, the following persons constitute the

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

Annual Subscription:—Inland—Le90,000.00, Overseas—Le300,000.00
To be purchased from the Government Bookshop, Wallace Johnson Street, Freetown. Price:—Le1,000.00 G.P. O 350 97 1,200 9,97.

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council with effect from the 25th day of May, 1997—

- (1) Major Johnny Paul Koroma ... *Chairman*
- (2) Corporal Foday S. Sankoh ... *Deputy Chairman*
- (3) Captain S. A. J. Musa ... *Member*
- (4) Colonel A. K. Sesay ... *Member*
- (5) Staff Sergeant Abu Sankoh ... *Member*
- (6) Staff Sergeant Alex T. Brima ... *Member*
- (7) Staff Sergeant Brima B. Kamara ... *Member*
- (8) Colonel Sam Bockarie ... *Member*
- (9) Major Morris Kallon ... *Member*
- (10) David G. Kallon ... *Member*
- (11) Colonel Issa H. Sesay ... *Member*
- (12) Colonel Gibril Massaquoi ... *Member*
- (13) Colonel Michael Lamin ... *Member*
- (14) Squadron Leader Victor L. King ... *Member*
- (15) Major J. B. Cater-Tarawallie ... *Member*
- (16) Captain Lawrence S. Womandia ... *Member*
- (17) Lieutenant Eldred Collins ... *Member*
- (18) Warrant Officer II Franklyn Conteh ... *Member*
- (19) Warrant Officer II Samuel Kargbo ... *Member*
- (20) Sergeant K. Bangura ... *Member*
- (21) Sergeant S. B. Khanu ... *Member*
- (22) Sergeant George Adams ... *Member*
- (23) Sergeant Sahr Gborie ... *Member*
- (24) Sergeant Sulaiman Turay ... *Member*
- (25) Sergeant K. Kallay ... *Member*
- (26) Corporal Momoh Bangura ... *Member*
- (27) Lance-Corporal Hector Bob-Lahai ... *Member*
- (28) Lance-Corporal Ibrahim D. Sesay ... *Member*
- (29) Staff Sergeant Moses Kabbia ... *Member*
- (30) Lance-Corporal Abdul M. Sesay ... *Member*
- (31) Mohamed Saidu Kamara ... *Member*
- (32) Bai Hinga Kurraray-Bangura ... *Member*
- (33) Abdulai Michael Munu ... *Member*
- (34) Kandeh Sorie-Sebba Bangura ... *Member*

DATED this 3rd day of September, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman.
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE

Govt. Notice No. 220 M.P./OP. 37 Vol V

PUBLIC HOLIDAYS ACT

Under the provision of Section 2 of the Public Holidays Act (cap. 58), the following days will be observed as Public Holidays throughout Sierra Leone:—

- FRIDAY, 29TH AUGUST, 1997
- FRIDAY, 5TH SEPTEMBER, 1997

S. L. MATTURI
for Secretary to the Chairman, AFRC.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Govt. Notice No. 221

**SUBSTANTIVE PROMOTION—OFFICER
ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE**

In accordance with Section V paragraph 121 (a) of the Army Orders of 1965, the undermentioned Commissioned officer of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone has been promoted with effect from 23rd August, 1997 with Seniority as Officer with effect from the date shown against his name:—

(a) *To Lieutenant*
Second Lieutenant F. T. K. Koroma (SL800)—AFRSL
7th August, 1996.

E. B. KAMARA,
for Director-General

COURT

Govt. Notice No. 217

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

It is hereby notified for the information of the General Public that the September, 1997 Criminal Session of the High Court in Freetown will commence on Tuesday the 16th day of September, 1997.

A. SHOWERS (Mrs.),
Master and Registrar.

MASTER'S OFFICE,
HIGH COURT,
FREETOWN.

**MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT**

Govt. Notice No. 218

**REVISED CHIEFDOM COUNCILLORS LIST —
MAFORKI CHIEFDOM, PORT LOKO DISTRICT**

No.	Name	Town/Village	Office
1.	P. C. A. Modu III, MBE, JP	Port Loko	P/Chief
2.	Saidu Kanu	do.	C/Speaker
3.	Pa Kekorr Kamara	do.	Cere/Chief
4.	Pa Kumrabai Dumbuya	do.	do.
5.	Pa Kapr Masim	do.	do.
6.	Ya Bomkapr Masim	do.	do.
7.	Pa Kapr Gbogboro	do.	do.
8.	Ya Bomporo	do.	do.
9.	Haja Bomwarrah Yansaneh	do.	do.
10.	Pa Alimamy Sesay	do.	do.
11.	Ya Alimamy Mansaray	do.	do.
12.	Ya Alimamy Bedor	do.	do.
13.	Ya Alimamy Mansaray	do.	do.
14.	Ya Alimamy Bateh	do.	do.
15.	Ya Alimamy Modu	do.	do.
16.	Ya Alimamy Sofarah	do.	do.

SANDA SECTION

17.	Pa Alimamy Dumbuya	Sanda Street	Sec. Chief
18.	Alhaji Morlai Sankoh	Davies Street	Councillor
19.	Alhaji Fadika	do.	do.
20.	B. S. Kamara	Sanda Street	do.
21.	Abu Kabia	do.	do.
22.	Alimamy Conteh	do.	do.
23.	Yaya Deen Kamara	do.	do.
24.	S. Mella Bangura	do.	do.
25.	Alpha Bangura	Adams Street	do.
26.	Abdul B. Kamara	do.	do.
27.	Alpha G. Dumbuya	Sanda Street	do.
28.	Alhaji Momodu Fallah	Famabrima St.	do.
29.	Abu Bakarr Bangura	do.	do.
30.	Abdul S. Bangura	Wharf Road	do.
31.	Abu S. K. Bangura	do.	do.
32.	Abu S. K. Bangura	do.	do.
33.	A. K. Molloh	Davies Street	do.
34.	Gbassay Kamara	do.	do.
35.	Abdul R. Wurie	do.	do.
36.	Joseph B. Kamara	do.	do.
37.	Alhaji Cole	do.	do.
38.	Julius S. Bangura	do.	do.
39.	Saidu M. Dumbuya	Aribo Street	Councillor
40.	Sullay K. Bangura	do.	do.

46) Decrees

Decrees 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of 1997.

DECREE

Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary Vol. CXXVIII, No. 41
dated 7th July, 1997

A.F.R.C. Decree
 No. 1



Sierra Leone

1997

The Bank of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Decree, 1997 Short title.

[16th June, 1997] Date of
 commencement.

PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree: —

1. This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the 16th day of June, 1997. Commence-
 ment.

3174

2 No. 1 *The Bank of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Decree* 1997

Section 2 of Act No. 6 of 1963 amended. 2. Section 2 of the Bank of Sierra Leone Act, 1963 is hereby amended by the insertion in the appropriate place of the following interpretation—

P.N. No. 3 of 1997. "Council" means the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council established by the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997".

Section 13 of Act No. 6 of 1963 amended. 3. Section 13 of the Bank of Sierra Leone Act is amended by the insertion immediately after subsection (1) of the following proviso—

"Provided that in the case of the temporary absence or incapacity of the Governor and Deputy Governor, the Council may appoint persons of recognised financial experience to carry out the functions of Governor and Deputy Governor respectively, until the resumption of duty or return of the substantive holders of the aforementioned positions."

MADE and ISSUED this 3rd day of July, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

DECREES

Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary Vol. CXXVIII, No. 43
dated 14th July, 1997

A.F.R.C. Decree
No. 2



Sierra Leone

1997

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(Establishment of Council of Secretaries) Decree,
1997

Short title.

[10th July, 1997] Date of commencement.

PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree:—

3175

Commence- 1. This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on
ment. the 10th day of July, 1997.

Establishment 2. There is hereby established a Council to be known as the
of Council of COUNCIL OF SECRETARIES which shall be directly and collectively
Secretaries. responsible to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Composition of 3. The Council of Secretaries shall consist of —
Council of Sec- (a) the Chief Secretary of State who shall be the head of
retaries. the Council of Secretaries, and
(b) other Secretaries of State that the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council may from time to time appoint.

Functions of 4. The Council of Secretaries shall —
the Council of (a) be responsible for the preparation and consideration
Secretaries. of policy papers or matters and shall advise the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and make
recommendations on all matters of good governance;
(b) execute the policies and directives of the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council.

Meetings of the 5. The Chief Secretary of State shall convene regular
Council of Sec- meetings of the Council of Secretaries over which he shall preside and
retaries. in his absence the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council shall appoint another person to preside from amongst members
of the Council of Secretaries.

Establishment 6. (1) There is hereby established the office of Chief Secretary
of office and of State.
functions of (2) The Chief Secretary of State shall be responsible for
Chief Secretary communicating the policy decisions and directives of the Armed
of State. Forces Revolutionary Council to the Council of Secretaries and
conveying the decisions of the Council of Secretaries to the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council.

(3) The Chief Secretary of State shall submit to the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council regular reports from the Secretaries of
State regarding the operations in their respective Departments of
State.

(4) The Chief Secretary of State shall be the co-ordinating
Secretary who shall receive and collate regular reports from the
Secretaries of State for submission to the Council regarding the work
of their Departments and the implementation of the policies of the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and may submit to the Council
proposals for legislative changes.

(5) The Chief Secretary of State shall effect the publicity
of and cause notice of the policies of the Council to be circularised or
communicated generally through the machinery of Government.

(6) Whenever the Office of the Chief Secretary of State
becomes vacant, or the person holding that Office dies, resigns, retires,
is absent from Sierra Leone or is removed from Office or is for any other
reason unable to perform the functions of his Office, the Chairman of
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council shall appoint another person
in his place from amongst members of the Council of Secretaries.

7. (1) A Secretary of State shall exercise Ministerial Functions of
responsibility for a Department of State or such other business of Secretary of
Government as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may from State.
time to time assign to him.

(2) A Secretary of State shall be entitled to such
remuneration, allowances, gratuities and other incidents of office as
may be prescribed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

8. The Chief Secretary of State and every other Secretary Oath of Office.
of State shall take and subscribe the oath of office as set out in the
Schedule hereto.

3176

Secretary to
the Council of
Secretaries.

9. (1) There shall be a Secretary to the Council of Secretaries whose office shall be a public office.

(2) The Secretary to the Council of Secretaries shall be appointed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in consultation with the Public Service Commission.

(3) The functions of the Secretary to the Council of Secretaries shall include—

- (a) having charge of the Secretariat of the Council of Secretaries;
- (b) responsibility for arranging the business for, and keeping the minutes of, the Council of Secretaries; and
- (c) any other functions that the Council of Secretaries may from time to time assign to him.

(4) The Secretary to the Council of Secretaries shall take and subscribe the oath of office as set out in the Schedule hereto.

Change of title
in Acts.

10. In every enactment continued in existence by virtue of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997, relating to the Ministries and Departments of Government, any reference to President, Vice-President, Minister or Cabinet shall be construed as a reference to the office or person with responsibility for the subject-matter to which the enactment relates, and any reference to "Ministry" shall be read as "Department".

SCHEDULE

Oath of the Chief Secretary of State, Secretaries of State and the Secretary to the Council of Secretaries.

I,
DO HEREBY (in the name of God/Allah swear) (solemnly affirm) that I will faithfully and truly discharge the duties of the Office of
of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and that I will support, uphold and maintain the provisions of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (Public Notice No. 3 of 1997) and the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 1991 which are not inconsistent with the Proclamation. (So help me God/Allah)."

MADE and ISSUED this 12th day of July, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

**A.F.R.C. Decree
No. 4**



Sierra Leone

1997

Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation (Amendment) Decree, 1997 Short title.

Being a Decree to increase the membership of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

[14th July, 1997.] Date of commencement.

PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree:—

3/M

DECREE

Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary Vol. CXXVIII, No. 49
dated 20th August, 1997

AFR.C Decree
No. 5



Sierra Leone

1997

The Imposition of Curfew Decree, 1997

Short title.

Being a Decree to make provision for the imposition of a Curfew.

[19th August, 1997] Date of commencement.

PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree:—

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PUBLIC NOTICE

*Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary Vol. CXXVIII, No. 49
dated 20th August, 1997*

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 4 OF 1997

Published, 20th August, 1997.

THE IMPOSITION OF CURFEW DECREE, 1997

(A.F.R.C. Decree No. 5 of 1997)

THE IMPOSITION OF CURFEW ORDER, 1997

Short title.

IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred upon it by Section 2 of the Imposition of Curfew Decree, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes the following order:—

1. This order shall be deemed to have come into operation on the 19th day of August, 1997 and shall apply to the Western Area of Sierra Leone.

Commence-
ment and
application.

2. As from the evening of the 19th day of August, 1997, no person shall be out of doors between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. the following day except under the authority of a written permit granted by the Inspector-General of Police or any officer deputed by him in that behalf.

Curfew from
19th August,
1997.

MADE this 20th day of August, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.
GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY No. 49 OF 20TH AUGUST, 1997.

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4
Attendance
by witnesses.

5. (1) The Commission shall have such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in the High Court of Justice or a Judge thereof at a trial in respect of —

- (a) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise; and
- (b) compelling the production of documents; and
- (c) the issue of a commission or request to examine witnesses abroad.

(2) Any person ordered to attend under subparagraph (1) shall attend at the time and place specified in the order and shall continue in attendance as directed by the Commission.

Secretary to
Commission.

6. The Commission shall have a Secretary who shall be Mr. Daniel Coomber, Permanent Secretary.

MADE this 5th day of May, 1997.

ALHAJI AHMAD TEJAN KABBAH,
President.

PUBLIC NOTICE NO. 12 OF 1997

Published 11th December, 1997

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, 1965
(No. 32 of 1965)

THE HIGH COURT (CRIMINAL SESSIONS) RULES, 1965
(P.N. 74 OF 1965)

THE HIGH COURT (APPOINTMENT OF CRIMINAL SESSIONS) ORDER, 1997 Short Title.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by paragraph 2 of Rule 2 of the High Court (Criminal Sessions) Rules 1965, the Honourable Chief Justice hereby makes the following Order:—

1. The following times and places are hereby appointed for the holding of Criminal Sessions of the High Court in places other than Freetown, Bo and Kenema for the year 1988.

Appointment of places for Criminal Sessions in places other than Freetown, Bo and Kenema.

<i>Times</i>	<i>Places</i>
6th January	Moyamba
6th January	Sefadu
13th January	Port Loko
3rd March	Makeni
7th April	Moyamba
7th April	Sefadu
14th April	Port Loko
12th May	Makeni
23rd June	Moyamba
23rd June	Sefadu
23rd June	Port Loko
15th September	Makeni
20th October	Moyamba
20th October	Sefadu
3rd November	Port Loko
1st December	Makeni

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Colonel (Rtd.) Alimamy Badara Koroma	Member
Ms Melvina Campbell	Member
Mr. Andrew J. A. Pratt	Member
Mr. Alfred Amara Sandy	Member
Prof. George Nathaniel Gage	Member
Mrs. Nancy V. Steele	Member
Mr. Roderick Oscar Abioseh Peacock	Member
Mr. Dennis Williams	Member
Mr. Lloyd Beserve	Member
Mr. Ansumana B. Pappa	Member

Revocation of P.N. No. 9 of 1997. 3. The Local Authorities (Committee of Management for the Freetown City Council) (No. 3) Order, 1997 is revoked.

MADE this 26th day of November, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Commence-
ment.

1. This Decree, except subsection (2) of Section 3, shall be deemed to have come into operation on the 19th day of August, 1997.

Power to
impose
curfew.

2. (1) The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may, in the interest of public order or public safety, by Order impose a curfew throughout Sierra Leone or in any part thereof as shall be specified in such Order.

(2) While such Order is in force, no person shall be out of doors between the hours specified in the Order except under the authority of a written permit granted by the Inspector-General of Police or any officer deputed by him in that behalf.

Offence and
penalty.

3. (1) Any person who contravenes any provision of an Order made pursuant to Section 2 commits an offence and may be detained by any member of the Armed Forces or the Police Force, who shall take that person immediately to the nearest police station.

(2) Any person convicted of an offence under subsection (1) shall be liable to a fine not exceeding thirty thousand leones or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

Operation of
Order.

4. Every Order made pursuant to Section 2 shall come into operation upon publication in the *Gazette* or upon publication in such other manner as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may deem necessary for bringing such Order to the notice of all persons.

Persons
deemed law-
fully detained.

5. Any person detained pursuant to this Decree before its date of publication in the *Gazette* shall be deemed to have been held in lawful custody during the period of such detention.

MADE and ISSUED this 20th day of August, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY NO. 49 OF 20TH AUGUST, 1997.

DECREE

Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXXVIII, No. 63
dated 20th November, 1997



Sierra Leone

A.F.R.C. Decree
No. 6

1997

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(Anti-Looting) Decree, 1997

Short title.

Being a Decree to provide for the establishment, functions, powers and duties of an Anti-Looting Squad, to make provision for the protection of persons against harassment and intimidation and for other related matters.

[20th November, 1997] Date of commencement.

PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree:—

Interpretation. 1. In this Decree unless the context otherwise requires—

P.N. No. 3 of 1997. "Council" means the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council established by the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997".

"Harass" means the coercing of one person by another with the object of forcing the former into doing a particular act and includes threatening the latter in a manner calculated to subject him or a member of his family or household to alarm, distress or humiliation.

"Intimidate" includes the use of words or action that puts or is intended to put another person in fear for his life, liberty or property, and also any words or action that prevent or is intended to prevent another person from exercising his rights or performing his duties under the law, or that compels another person into doing something that he is unwilling to do.

"Looting" includes the stealing of any property, whether public or private, movable or immovable, with or without the use or threat of the use of force.

"Commandeer" means to take arbitrary or forcible possession or control of any property whether, public or private, movable or immovable, without lawful authority.

2. There is hereby established a body to be known as The Anti-Looting Squad (hereinafter referred to as "The Squad"). Establishment of Squad.

3. The Squad shall consist of such officers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone Police Force and such other persons as the Council may from time to time appoint. Composition.

4. (1) Every member of the Squad shall, on appointment by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, take and subscribe to the Oath set out in the First Schedule to this Decree. Oath to be taken by members of Squad.

(2) Such Oath shall be taken and signed before the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

5. The Squad shall be responsible for—

- Functions and duties of Squad.
- (a) the detection and apprehension of any person who is engaged in or is actively preparing to engage in the looting of any property or the commandeering of any vehicle or other property;
 - (b) the apprehension of any person engaged in any act of intimidation or harassment of another person;
 - (c) the apprehension of any person occupying the premises of another person without lawful authority, whether such premises was occupied or unoccupied at the time of such unlawful occupation;
 - (d) the apprehension of any person reasonably suspected of being involved or implicated in the commission of any offence under this Decree; and

(e) the recovery of any property discovered by the Squad in the course of its operations, such property to be handed over to the Police for documented safekeeping.

Identification of members of Squad.

6. (1) For the purpose of identifying members of the Squad, each member shall be issued with, and shall carry with him, a warrant of authority issued by the Council in the form set out in the Second Schedule.

(2) The Council may at any time revoke or suspend any warrant of authority issued under subsection (1).

Powers of Squad.

7. (1) Any member of the Squad may, on the production of his warrant of authority, enter upon any premises whether public or private, stop any vehicle belonging to the State or any private person, in the process of searching for any looted property or commandeered vehicle or other property.

(2) Any member of the Squad may at the time of any such search question or arrest, without a warrant empowering him to do so, any person found in such premises or occupying any such vehicle or other property referred to in subsection (1), for the purpose of ascertaining whether an offence under this Decree has been committed.

Arrested persons to be brought before Court without delay.

8. Any person arrested by virtue of the provisions of this Decree shall be brought, within a reasonable time, before the Court having jurisdiction in his case, and no member of the Squad shall have the power to grant bail to an accused person.

Trial of persons arrested by Squad.

9. The Court before which a person arrested by any member of the Squad is charged with a criminal offence shall give priority to the trial of such person, unless in the opinion of the Court the interests of justice will not be served by so doing.

(1) A Court before which a case is tried shall be empowered to order the restoration of any property being the subject of such a trial to any person found by such a Court to be the rightful owner of such property.

Orders of Court.

(2) The Court may otherwise make such order for the disposition by sale or otherwise of such property:

Provided that no such sale or other disposition shall take place, unless the property shall have been in the custody of the Police for a period of one month and a description of the property shall have been published in two consecutive editions of the Sierra Leone Gazette.

(3) The Court may also order the immediate disposition by sale or otherwise of perishable goods or property which the Police find inconvenient, expensive or unreasonable to keep in custody.

11. Each member of the Squad shall as respect the exercise of his powers and duties under this Decree, be entitled to the same legal protection to which a police officer is entitled to under the Police Act, 1964.

Protection of members of Squad. Act No. 7 of 1964.

12. The funds of the Squad shall consist of such monies as may be appropriated to it by the Council.

Funds of Squad.

13. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Courts Act, 1965 or in any other enactment in force, the Magistrate Court shall have jurisdiction to try summarily any of the offences under subsection (4) of Section 15 and Section 17 of this Decree.

Jurisdiction. Act No. 31 of 1965.

14. (1) Where any person is charged with any of the offences under subsections (1), (2), (3) and (5) of Section 15, the Magistrate Court shall dispense with oral testimony of witnesses and shall rely on written statements, whether by the prosecution or defence.

Committal proceedings.

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(2) Subject to subsection (1), the Magistrate Court shall, on application by the prosecution that the contents of the written statements warrant committal to the High Court, commit the accused for trial before the High Court as of course, without consideration of the contents of such statements, except that such statements shall have been signed by the deponents.

(3) Any such trial in the High Court shall commence within 14 days of such committal.

Offences.

15. (1) Any person who shall engage in or actively prepare to be engaged in the looting of any property or the commandeering of any vehicle or other property without authority shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) Any person who receives any looted property or commandeered vehicle or other property knowing the same to have been looted or commandeered or obtained in any way whatsoever under circumstances which amount to a felony or misdemeanor shall be guilty of an offence.

(3) Any person who shall be found in possession or control of any looted property or commandeered vehicle or other property, and who shall not give an account satisfactory to the court of how he came into possession or control of the same, shall be guilty of an offence.

(4) Any person who shall intimidate or harass another person shall be guilty of an offence.

(5) Any person who shall, with or without force and without lawful authority, occupy the premises of another person shall be guilty of an offence.

Penalties.

16. (1) Any person who is found guilty of an offence under subsections (1), (2) and (5) of Section 15 shall be sentenced to death by a firing squad.

(2) Any person who is found guilty of an offence under subsection (3) of Section 15 shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

(3) Any person who is found guilty of an offence under subsection (4) of Section 15 shall be liable on summary conviction to a term of imprisonment of not less than two years and not more than seven years.

17. Any person who in any manner whatsoever obstructs any member of the Squad in the performance of his duties under this Decree, or fails to render reasonable assistance to any member of the Squad when called upon to do so, or resist or attempts to resist any arrest executed under this Decree, shall be guilty of an offence and on summary conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Le500,000.00 (five hundred thousand leones) or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

FIRST SCHEDULE (Section 4)

OATH TO BE TAKEN BY A MEMBER OF THE ANTI-LOOTING SQUAD

I, being appointed a member of the Anti-Looting Squad by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, do swear that I will faithfully, honestly and impartially, and to the best of my ability exercise and perform all the duties conferred upon me in accordance with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Anti-Looting) Decree, 1997.

SECOND SCHEDULE (Section 6)

WARRANT OF AUTHORITY

WHEREAS has been appointed a member of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Anti-Looting Squad.

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8 No. 6 *The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council* 1997
(Anti-Looting) Decree

NOW THIS WARRANT is to command you the aforesaid
..... and any Police
or Army personnel accompanying you as specified below to exercise and perform
the powers and duties conferred upon you by virtue of the provisions of the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (Anti-Looting) Decree, 1997.

DATED the day of , 199

Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

MADE and ISSUED this 17th day of November, 1997.


MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE.
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.
GAZETTE No. 63 OF 20TH NOVEMBER, 1997.

DECREE

Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXXVIII, No. 66
dated 11th December, 1997

A.F.R.C. Decree
No: 7



Sierra Leone

1997

The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991
(Amendment) Decree, 1997

Short title.

Being a Decree to amend the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991
and to provide for other related matters.

[11th December, 1997] Date of commencement.

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PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree:—

Repeal and re-
placement of
Section 156.

1. Section 156 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 is hereby repealed and replaced by the following new Section:—

"Establishment
of Police
Council.

156. (1) There is hereby established a body to be known as The Police Council which shall consist of—

- (i) the Chief Secretary of State;
- (ii) the Secretary of State, Department of Internal Affairs;
- (iii) the Inspector-General of Police;
- (iv) the Deputy Inspector-General of Police;
- (v) the Chairman of the Public Service Commission;
- (vi) a Member of the Sierra Leone Bar Association who shall be a legal practitioner of not less than ten (10) years standing as a practising Barrister, and shall be nominated by that body and appointed by the Chairman, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council;
- (vii) two other members appointed by the Chairman, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, subject to the approval of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

(2) Every member of the Police Council shall, before assuming the function of his office, take and subscribe the oath as set out in the Third Schedule to the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991.

(3) The Permanent Secretary of the Department responsible for matters relating to the Police shall be Secretary to the Council."

2. Section 167 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991 is hereby repealed and replaced by the following new Section:—

Repeal and
replacement of
Section 167.

"Establishment
of Defence
Council

167. (1) There is hereby established a body to be known as the Defence Council which shall consist of—

- (i) the Chairman, Armed forces Revolutionary Council, who shall be Chairman;
- (ii) the Chief Secretary of State;
- (iii) the Under Secretary of State for Defence;
- (iv) the Chief of Defence Staff;
- (v) the Commanders of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) and their Deputies;
- (vi) the Secretary of State, Internal Affairs;
- (vii) two other persons as the Chairman, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, shall from time to time appoint.

(2) Every member of the Defence Council shall, before assuming the function of his office, take and subscribe the oath as set out in the Third Schedule to the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991.

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(3) The Permanent Secretary of the Department of Defence shall be the Secretary to the Council."

MADE and ISSUED this 3rd day of December, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

PUBLIC NOTICE

*Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXXVIII, No. 16
dated 27th February, 1997*

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 1 OF 1997

Published 27th February, 1997

*THE PORTS ACT, 1964
(No. 56 of 1964)*

THE PORTS AUTHORITY (TARIFFS) REGULATIONS, 1997

Short title.

IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred upon it by sections 66 and 78 of the Ports Act, 1964, the Ports Authority with the approval of the Minister of Transport and Communications hereby makes the following Regulations—

[27th February, 1997] Date of commencement.

1. In these Regulations unless the context otherwise requires— Interpretation.

“berth” means a section of wharf, pier, jetty or quay or other fixed mooring facility at which a vessel can be moored. (In Freetown the berths on Queen Elizabeth II quay are given nominal numbers 1 to 6);

“commencement of time” means the period between 2400 hours on the day of receipt of export cargo and 2400 hours on the day of departure of the carrying vessel from the berth or port, in the case of imported cargo;

“free storage time” means the specified period of time during which cargo or cargo containers may remain on port property, subsequent to receipt by the port, free of any storage charges;

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47) Statement to Sierra Leone Police

Statement by Martin Moinama to Sierra Leone Police
17 March 1998

SIERRA LEONE POLICE FORCE

Name: Martin Moinama
Address: Gawama Village Kailahun District
Occupation: R.U.F. Signaller
Nationality: Sierra Leonean
Religion: Christian
Age: 34 Years

Statement commenced at 1345 hours on Monday 16th March 1998 at the Defence Headquarters building State Avenue Freetown. I have been asked if I wish to say anything and cautioned that I am not obliged to say anything unless I wish to do so but whatever I say will be taken down in writing and may be given in Evidence.

Signed:
P.W.S. Kargbo S/I.
17/3/98

Signed:
4107 Sheriff M.A.
17/3/98

Signed:
Martin Moinama
17/3/98

I am a Sierra Leonean born at a village called Gawama in the Malema Chiefdom Kailahun District. My birth was not registered but during my childhood days, my elder brother Bockarie Moinama with whom I grew up had always told me that I was born sometime in 1964. My late parents Mr. Moinama Swarray who died in 1970 and Mrs. Aminata Swarray who also died in 1996 were both natives of Gawama Village and were farmers. I have two elder brothers Bockarie Moinama and Momoh Moinama and an only sister, Miatta Moinama who are still leaving at Gawama. I attended the District Education Committee Primary School at Ngiehun on dates I cannot remember but I recall that I sat to the Selective Entrance Examination in

1977/78 school year. I entered the National Secondary School Kailahun in 1979 and I had my Secondary Education up to the Fifth form. I attempted the West African General Certificate of Education (G.C.E.) O'Level Exams in 1985. I did not however complete this exams because I was very sick and did not make it. My elder brother Moinama Bockarie then insisted that I must complete my Secondary Education and sent me to the Wesley Secondary School in Segbwema in 1986 and I finally took the 'O' Level Exams in 1987.

I gained a Division two pass in the Sciences i.e. Chemistry, Biology, Geograph, Economics, Mathematics and English Language. I left school about this time, and joined the New Apostolic Church Mission in Gawama Village as a Sunday School teacher. I was doing this job on voluntary bases until the rebel war broke out in 1991. I cannot remember the exact date, but sometime in the month of March 1991 I was in my home at Gawama Village when I got information that a group calling itself the Revolutionary United Front (R.U.F.) Fighters had entered Sierra Leone from Liberia through the boarders and that they were in Bomaru about seven miles from the village of Gawama. Following the invasion word went round my village and its environs that these fighters were indeed rebels and that their leader was one Corporal Foday Sankoh. The rebels were now approaching our end as the weeks went by and as they did so, Sporadic gunfire was heard in the nearby villages and news again went round that people were being killed by the invading rebels who were reportedly both Sierra Leonean and Liberian Nationals. As a result of this, the Civilian Population in this area were thrown in a complete Pandemonium and people were fleeing in the bushes for safety. During the month of May 1991. I was hiding with some Civilians in a forest nearby when a group of armed rebels entered the village of Gawama and surrounded this forest. In the process, I was later captured with many other youths of my village. After we were captured by a rebel Commando I later came to know as Morris Kallon, we were taken to a rebel base known as Kuiva about four miles off our village. In this village we found over one hundred captives who were already being trained as R.U.F. rebel fighters. I was then trained at this base for a period of about one month in the use of A.K. 47 rifle and general war tactics by Commando Morris Kallon. During this training a rebel Commando by the name of Benedict Fallah became interested in me and recruited me as his Personal Clerk. My assignment was to register all the trainees or captives, and to always call out their names from the register before they start training each day. I recall that during this period,

all Sierra Leonean rebels that were recruited in my presence were not supplied with guns at the end of their training even though they were actually trained on the use of the A.K. 47 rifle. The Sierra Leonean rebels were only given knives and cutlasses to fight with, unlike their Liberian colleagues who were fully armed with assault rifles. At this stage I want to make it quite clear that before Corporal Foday Sankoh and his R.U.F. Fighters actually invaded Sierra Leone in 1991, about three hundred Sierra Leoneans were trained in Liberia and these were known as Vanguarders whilst we who were captured here were known as junior Commandos. These set of Sierra Leonean rebels with high quality training were fully armed with assault rifles like their Liberian Counterparts. Examples of these were Colonel Mosquito, Col. Issa and others. There was also another set of Sierra Leoneans known as the "Special Force" in the R.U.F. when they initially entered Sierra Leone and these were trained in Libya. Examples of these were Foday Sankoh himself and Mohamed Tarawallie alias Zeno whose whereabouts I do not know but was last seen at Camp Zogoda in the Kambui hills Kenema district sometime in 1997 when the Kamajors invaded the said camp and killed many rebels. During this period I served as registration clerk at Kueva Camp, many Sierra Leonean youths both male and female were trained and recruited into the rebel force but I do not know the exact number. Sometime in 1992 between the months of June and July, commando Benedict Fallah recommended me for the post of Signaller in the Wireless Section of the R.U.F. The said Commando Fallah was then incharge of this section. Five (5) of us were trained at Pendembu town in the Kailahun district for a period of about one month, namely Sgt. Philip Sannoh, Ahmed Tarawallie, Ahmed Koroma a fellow known only as "T" Boy and myself. All the four other signallers apart from myself are presently in Corporal Foday Sankoh's remainant rebel force as far as I know. During this period also, I came to know Cpl. Foday Sankoh the rebel leader and we were infact personally trained by him on Wireless Signals. We studied voice procedure in code communication and Corporal Foday Sankoh told us during the training that this was his area of speciality when he served in the Sierra Leone Army. After our training in 1992, I was posted back to Kuiva Camp where I was now incharge of the radio communication set until sometime in 1993. During this period I received and sent messages to three other radio stations at Kailahun town, Mobai and one mobile radio station which was in the possession of Cpl. Foday Sankoh himself. These messages were simply routine exercise messages on R.U.F.

rebel movements. We used three types of radio communication sets namely YAESU, ICOM, KEENWOOD and we also used the Military type radio set known as THOMPSON on which I received my training. Sometime in 1993 the Government Forces attacked our bases and subsequently pushed us a long distance to Koindu and we did not have any strong hold again. As a result of this, Corporal Foday Sankoh advised that since we had been badly disorganised by the Government Forces, our only alternative now was to avoid the towns and villages and go into the bush, so we travelled for a period of about eleven days through bush paths to Nomafarma in the Kenema district. This place was captured by us after a serious battle with some ULIMO and Government Forces who were based there. After about two days at Nomofarma we advanced and formed the Camp Zogoda base at Kambou hills in the Kenema district in the month of January 1994. We were at Camp Zogoda in the Kamboui hills when I was promoted to the rank of a Sergeant by Corporal Foday Sankoh. At Camp Zogoda, I was still a signaller even after I was promoted to the rank of a Sergeant. Sometime in the month of April 1996 the Ivorian Foreign Minister Mr. Amara Essy came to Camp Zogoda by Helicopter and collected Cpl. Foday Sankoh and some of his bodyguards. Among the bodyguards Foday Sankoh took along to Abidjan was one Signaller commonly known as "Z" man and I was reliably informed that they were going to attend a Peace Conference between Foday Sankoh and the Government of Sierra Leone in Abidjan. Following this meeting in Abidjan there was a cease fire and three months later Cpl. Foday Sankoh returned Signaller "Z" man to base at Camp Zogoda and ordered that I must join him at Abidjan. I then went to Abidjan in the month of July 1996. During the journey to Abidjan five (5) of us went namely Lieutenant Morieba, Memunata Deen, Aminata Bangura, Sister Jane Konyah and myself all rebels of the R.U.F. We travelled by a fishing canoe towards Gegedu and later by road to Abidjan arriving in the month of July 1996. We found Cpl. Foday Sankoh at a place known as Cocody where we also stayed in the same house with him. While in Abidjan, Cpl. Foday Sankoh made arrangements for the five of us to be trained on the use of Computers and I was again trained on Computers. I had an office at Cocody where my Wireless Radio Set was installed with a Computer and each day after doing my job on the radio set, I use to go for Computer lessons at the Alia computer Institute which is owned by an American. We received tuition in English for six months and I was finally awarded a result and certificate along with my four colleagues

named above. We did not have much freedom at Cote D'Ivoire whilst we stayed at Cocody area and even the movements of Cpl. Foday Sankoh were restricted. After our training the women were merely engaged on domestic work whilst Lt. Moriba was bodyguard to Cpl. Foday Sankoh. I was also instructed to train Memunatu Deen and Aminata Bangura on radio communications. Presently both the two women I trained are in Abidjan whilst Lt. Moriba is with Col. Mosquito somewhere in Sierra Leone and Sister Jane Konyah had joined her husband in the United States of America. Sometime after we had completed our training on Computer Operations in Abidjan, Cpl. Foday Sankoh also used me to run errands for him, and in the process I came to know a gentleman by the name of Pa. Kallon who also stayed at Cocody in Abidjan. Towards the end of 1996, Cpl. Foday Sankoh took me to Burkina Faso when he went to visit the Head of State of that country and I was with him in that country for a period of ten days. During this visit I stayed at home whilst Cpl. Foday Sankoh visited the President of Burkina Faso according to what he told me. Whilst on this trip in Burkina Faso, Pa Kallon telephone Cpl. Foday Sankoh from Abidjan and I later learnt from Cpl. Foday Sankoh that he (Pa Kallon) had informed him that those whom we left behind in Abidjan were running out of food and needed some money. Following this telephone call, Cpl. Foday Sankoh gave me the sum of One hundred and sixty (160) C.F.A. Francs with instructions for me to go back to Abidjan and hand the money over to the women for food. On the night of my return to Abidjan a gentleman whom I came to know later as Stephen Bio but commonly called Steve Bio came to the house where we stayed with Cpl. Foday Sankoh. Jane Konyah told me that she had earlier received instructions by telephone from Cpl. Foday Sankoh that Mr. Steve Bio and his wife were to be accommodated in the house until he (Cpl. Sankoh) returned from Burkina Faso. Mr. Stephen Bio then introduced himself to us in the house by his popular name Steve Bio. He told us that he is a brother of the N.P.R.C. Former Head of State Brigadier Julius Maada Bio and that he is a very good friend of Cpl. Foday Sankoh. He went on to say that he had played an active role in assisting the N.P.R.C. Junta Government with the supply of arms and ammunition. Mr. Bio further assured us that himself and Corporal Foday Sankoh had presently consulted and agreed on similar terms of logistics support and that he was now going to provide sufficient arms and ammunition for the R.U.F. rebels fighters of Foday Sankoh to continue the war in Sierra Leone. After about two days, Cpl. Foday Sankoh returned to

Abidjan from Burkina Faso and told us in the presence of Mr. Steve Bio that indeed he (Steve Bio) was a very important man. He infact repeated almost all what Mr. Bio said about himself. From that moment we considered Mr. Bio as one of us and we had a lot of conversations. He was staying with his wife, a fair complexioned lady but I have now forgotten her name. During our conversations, Mr. Bio told us that he was infact a member of the R.U.F. and for this reason we seriously embraced him. As we became friends he became very open minded to us and explained that as a matter of fact he was involved in a Coup Plot against the Government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabba which backfired at the time of his escape in December 1996. He said that the Police in Sierra Leone had been looking out for him when he escaped from the country. According to him the Coup Plot was actually planned by him as he wanted to overthrow President Ahmad Tejan Kabba's Government and become President. He further disclosed that on the night the coup was to take place, arrangements were already been completed when a Corporal in the Sierra Leone Army whose name he did not tell us but that he was a member of the Coup Plotters, informed the authorities and their plan was foiled. He did not tell us as to whether any arrests had been made at the time of his escape, he simply narrated how he got out of the country. According to him, he owned three helicopters in Freetown and that he escaped from Sierra Leone through one of those helicopters. Mr. Bio did not go into too much details about the attempted Coup in Sierra Leone leading to his escape, however I recall very well that he mentioned the names of Two Military Officers who served in the N.P.R.C. Junta that were actively engaged on the attempted Coup Plot. Major Kwegor and Tom Nyuma. He said the two officers were out of the country but that even so they were strong members of the plot. Mr. Bio was with us in Abidjan for a period of about two to three months and I recall that during this period, he travelled to Russia once. According to what he told us, he went to make arrangements for the supply of arms and ammunition to the R.U.F. I cannot remember the date of his return from Russia but he came back precisely about three weeks later but he did not return immediately to Abidjān. He went to Nigeria and telephone Cpl. Foday Sankoh from there. After their telephone discussion, Cpl. Foday Sankoh later explained to us that Mr. Steve Bio had finalised arrangements in Russia about the supply of arms and ammunition to the R.U.F. but that the sum of Forty thousand United States dollars (\$40,000) was demanded by the manufacturers in Russia. He said that since this money was not readily

available, Mr. Steve Bio was therefore in Nigeria to persuade his own friend a man whose name was given as Mr. Prince to lend him this amount so that the arms and ammunition could be purchased. After this first telephone conversation, Mr. Steve Bio telephoned Cpl. Foday Sankoh a second time from Nigeria and according to what he (Sankoh) told us later, Bio convinced him that his friend Prince was also a best friend of Nigerian Head of State General Sani Abacha. Cpl. Sankoh further explained to us that this friend of Steve has now made arrangements on the request of Mr. Steve Bio for him (Sankoh) to go to Nigeria and meet General Sani Abacha who was willing to also give him arms, ammunition and even man power to beef up his fighters. Sometime later, Cpl. Foday Sankoh sent one of his bodyguards by the name of Ansumana Musa to Nigeria in order to verify the claims made by Steve Bio. When Ansumana arrived in Nigeria, Steve Bio convinced him to send back a very good report to Cpl. Foday Sankoh. Following this report, Cpl. Foday Sankoh sent Lt. Colonel Gibriel ahead one morning in the month of May 1996 and he asked me to go with him on the evening of that same day to Nigeria. Cpl. Foday Sankoh and I travelled by Air Cameroun and arrived at the Mohamed Murtalla Airport in Lagos at exactly 8.p.m. on that night. On arrival at the airport we found Mr. Steve Bio, Ansumana Musa and Lt. Colonel Gibriel waiting to receive us. They came to the Airport with two vehicles but there was no Government Official to represent General Sani Abacha. We went through the immigration process at the airport and joined Mr. Steve Bio and others in the waiting cars. We then moved a few yards towards a police station and the police stopped us and demanded to know our identities. We all showed our identities but the moment Cpl. Foday Sankoh disclosed his identity the Nigerian Officers gave Orders for us to come down and follow them to the Police Station. Foday Sankoh was then questioned and in reply he explained that he was in Nigeria as a Guest of the Nigerian Head of State. The police officers however were not convinced because according to them, if what Foday Sankoh was saying was the truth they should have been notified even before his flight landed in Lagos. We were then arrested and taken to the police headquarters where we were later thoroughly searched and Foday Sankoh was found with only four (4) live rounds of Pistol ammunition. Following this, the four of us were placed in Cells with the exception of Foday Sankoh. Thirty minutes later, through the intervention of the Nigerian Foreign Minister we were released and taken to Hotel known as Federal State Hotel at Victoria Island. We got everything we

needed in this hotel and we were there for a period of sixteen (16) days. However whilst we were in this hotel, one of the Protocol Officers in the hotel told Foday Sankoh that Nigerian Head of State knew nothing about his mission in Nigeria. The Protocol Officer further said that Foday Sankoh was to be sent under escort to Abuja on that same day. As a result of this, Foday Sankoh told us that he has been arrested and instructed me to return to Abidjan immediately. He took Lt. Col Gibriel and Ansumana Musa with him to Abuja whilst Steve Bio headed for Burkina Faso. I returned to Abidjan by Air Ethiopia and whilst I was still in Abidjan Cpl. Foday Sankoh communicated with me by telephone. On the day following my return to Abidjan, Foday Sankoh instructed me to go to Ouagadugoe in Burkina Faso where I received the sum of Six hundred and thirty C.F.A. Francs (630 C.F.A) from one General Ibrahim who also is a member of the R.U.F. He is a Gambian National and resident in Ouagadugou. I was there for a month before I returned with the money to Abidjan. The money was to be used for feeding. After sometime in Abidjan Foday Sankoh phoned us and gave instructions that we must all find our way back to Sierra Leone. Infact we lost communication and we had no money left for our feeding and nothing was known about Steve Bio's whereabouts. I returned to Sierra Leone in September 1997 but before doing so I had already heard that Major Johnny Paul Koroma had seized power from Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabba and the A.F.R.C. Junta was now in power. I was never paid a salary whilst I served Cpl. Foday Sankoh as a rebel in the R.U.F. throughout the period I was in this rebel movement. I came by road to Sierra Leone through Liberia and went straight to my village Gawama in the month of October 1997. I was not doing anything in Gawama on my return and I did not try to hide because the Junta had already announced that we should come out of the bush and join them. At the end of October 1997 I travelled to Samuel Town near the Benguema military barracks. I stayed with my brother John Trawallie and early in November 1997 Colonel Sam Bockarie alias Mosquito heard that I was in this place. I was at home in Samuel Town on the morning of 5th November 1997 when a small rebel boy whose name I dont know shot my right foot with an A.K. 47 rifle on the instruction of Col. Mosquito. His reason for giving that order according to this rebel boy was that those of us who went to Nigeria with Foday Sankoh had sold him to the Nigerians. Secondly Col. Sam Bockarie said that I was only enjoying in the R.U.F. and never held a gun. I cared for the wound on my foot and when it was nearly heald I went to

Maoma Village about three miles off Masiaka town as I was now afraid to be with the rebels. I now prefer to be on the side of the Government than to be a rebel, so I decided to surrender myself to Ecomog at the Texaco junction in Kissy on the 14th of March. This I did by asking the Guinean troops based at Masiaka to help me with means of transport to convey me to Freetown on the day I surrendered but in doing so, I only pretended to be a poor wounded man and I did not disclose my true identify to them. After I surrendered at Texaco Junction on the 14th, the Ecomog soldiers handed me over to the police at Kissy and I was later brought to the C.I.D. in Freetown where I made a statement. I still have the gun shot wound on my right foot and now need medical treatment. At this stage I want to pledge my Loyalty to the Government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabba and promise that if my life is spared I will play a vital role to counter further movements of the R.U.F. in the pursuit of real and lasting peace in this country. That is all. Statement made in Krio recorded in English read over and explained in Krio admitted to be true and correct and concluded at 1415 hours on Tuesday the 17th March 1998. Breaks from 1920 hours on 16th March 1998 to 1130 hours on 17th March, 1998.

Signed:
P.W.S. Kargbo D/S.I.
17/3/98

Signed:
4107 Cpl Sheriff M.A.
17/3/98

Signed:
Martin Moinama
17/3/98

48) Speech

Address by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Head of State and Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Freetown, 1 June 1997

**Address by Major Johnny Paul Koroma
Head of State and Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Freetown - 1 June 1997**

My fellow countrymen, friendly nations and members of the international community. The big question at this moment on the lips of everybody inside and outside the country is what prompted us to oust former President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his government from power.

Before dwelling on the main above-mentioned theme of my address, I want first and foremost on behalf of my colleagues avail myself of this opportunity to solemnly extend our sincere and heartfelt sympathy and expression of regret for the unfortunate incidents that occurred during the takeover operation in which some of our brothers and sisters, as well as foreign nationals, lost their lives and property.

In this regard, the AFRC, as you have been informed through the media, has taken appropriate measures to prevent the recurrence of such unfortunate incidents. My address this evening is not only directed to fellow Sierra Leoneans. It is also meant to enlighten concerned non-nationals and the international community about the welfare of our beloved country, on the main motive of our action.

I have already emphasized in my last two addresses that our action was not motivated by selfish [as heard] and greed for power. The main objective of the AFRC to seize power is to restore lasting peace and political stability in this country, which has been ravaged and continues to be shattered by a senseless war.

On this vital issue of restoring peace and political stability in our country, I would like on behalf of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the entire nation to pay a special and fitting tribute to the Ivorian head of state, His Excellency President Henri Konan Bedie, with special mention to his Foreign Minister Amara Essy, the government and people of La Cote d'Ivoire for the very important role they played in getting Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, the charismatic leader of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone around the negotiating table, that resulted to the signing of the Abuja peace accord last November. But for the relentless efforts of the authorities of this great African country, in the true state of African solidarity, we will not even have been thinking about...[pauses] talking about inviting the RUF leader to command his fighters to (?cease) hostilities and to join the revolution with the sole objective of bringing lasting peace to our beloved country.

The AFRC would also like to seize this opportunity to thank friendly sister countries in the subregion, namely the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of Guinea, and Ghana for their effective and invaluable role in averting irreparable destruction of our fatherland at the height of the rebel war. The AFRC would also like to behalf of the entire nation to thank the international community and NGO's [words indistinct] to the United Nations Organization, the Commonwealth, the OAU, the International Alliance, the International Community of the World Force for the very important roles they played toward the success of the Abidjan peace process.

Fellow countrymen, friendly nations, members of the international community, I would now like to dwell on the main theme of my address this evening. The main reason that prompted us to take the [word indistinct] and timely decision to overthrow the former regime and to extend an invitation to RUF Cpl. Foday Sankoh and the RUF to operate with us.

It is true the wind of democracy has blown and continues to blow around the world. Patriotic and national Sierra Leoneans, old and young, put in everything, sometimes at the expense of their lives, during the transition process to democratic rule with the objective of being in tune with progressive nations around the globe and restoring lasting peace and political stability in Sierra Leone. After five years of military governance, our country was returned to democratic rule with great pains, but due to lack of political ingenuity and sincere commitment on the part of former President Tejan Kabbah and some of his lieutenants, the hard-won democracy was being gradually jeopardized by the flagrant antidemocratic and unpatriotic practices of the late regime. The unanimous vote in favor of the new president by SLPP parliamentarians and the appointment of ruling party stalwarts to most of the key positions of the state's administrative machinery is a palpable truth of such tendencies.

In an exclusive interview granted to the West African magazine of March this year in Washington, OAU Secretary General Dr. Ahmed Salim Ahmed (sic.) rightly opined, and quote, "Progressive African leadership must now operate, above all, on the clear knowledge that the question of peace, security, and political stability of their respective continent is of primordial importance. Without peace, security, and political stability, it is not possible that any country will achieve the type of democratic and economic growth, the type of social development that we aspire to," quote. [as heard]

This is why my colleagues and I on the AFRC have decided to focus on the question of resolving our internal conflicts. The war that has shattered our once flourishing economy, with much more of [word indistinct] efforts and reality. [words indistinct] this priority of priorities--the return of lasting peace and political stability in our country--is achieved, we will then focus on the whole question of democratization and greater respect for human rights. Military issues, the question of economic and social development, the question of security and stability, and the issue of democratization and human rights are related. If we are to achieve the objective the AFRC will set for itself and address the new challenges that face our country [sentence as heard]. The AFRC will endeavor to address each of these goals and their [word indistinct] within the present context of the social and political situation prevailing in the country.

Our brother Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh is quick to understand this when he emphatically stated in his radio message to the nation from Abuja that a democracy without peace, security, and political stability is baseless. The remarkable economic growth and social development achieved by our sister and friendly Republic of La Cote d'Ivoire is due to the legendary peace, security, and political stability in that country. Foreign investors and economic operators will only pour in their money into countries that will guarantee their personal security and that of their investment.

Fellow countrymen, you will surely agree with me that the unseated president and some of his round pegs in square holes collaborators dragged their feet in implementing the priority clauses stipulated in the Abuja peace accord related to developments of mutual forces to carry out encampment and disarming of combatants. The Commission of the Consolidation of Peace, PCP, was never given the attention needed to carry out its functions.

Fellow countrymen, I will not dwell much on the negative [word indistinct], but let me touch on some of its saddest aspects. The death toll could be estimated at about 15,000 troops. Damaged property could easily amount to several billions of leones. The economy has been completely crippled. Thousands of families which once enjoyed the warmth of living together have been separated. Innocent citizens, mainly comprised of agricultural workers in rural areas, were mutilated and maimed, rendering them physically handicapped and useless throughout the rest of

their lives. The brain drain in the country during the war reached unprecedented proportions with its negative effects on the standard of education in our university and other institutions of higher learning. Children in their thousands have become homeless, orphans, and street-beggars. Persons traumatized by the atrocities of the war have become mentally unbalanced. Fellow countrymen, the negative spoils of the war cannot be fully exhausted in this address.

Nationalistic and patriotic Sierra Leoneans as well as well-meaning non-nationals and the international community will now understand why the AFRC deem it at this point in time to drive away the enemies of this nation and to call upon Cpl. Foday Sankoh and the RUF to join the revolution so as to bring about lasting peace and to arrest the unmerited and unwarranted sufferings of our people.

With the return of lasting peace and political stability in this country, Sierra Leoneans will regain their lost personality and integrity, but more especially our shattered economy [words indistinct] foreign investment. Our country will once more regain its rightly place among the progressive nations of the world.

My fellow countrymen, we are undergoing a very crucial stage in the history of our country. Our destiny and that of generations yet unborn is in our hands. Shakespeare rightly put, quote, "There is a tide in the affairs of men which, taken on the tide (sic.) leads on to fortune, omitted all their voyage is bound in shallow waters," unquote.

We should not leave the fate of this only country that we have to be determined by other people for their own personal aggrandizement. The Lord Almighty, our creator, loves this country. He has made it possible for us to know our enemies at the right time. The Biblical saying "God's time is the best" should be an eye opener for us. Prayers said in our numerous churches and mosques on Sundays and Fridays throughout the national territory for the return of lasting peace to our beloved country have not gone in vain. My fellow countrymen, our priority of priorities today is peace. Peace is an inseparable factor for human development. We have been longing for it for the past six years. Thanks to God, it is here. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and true patriots of this country are therefore solemnly appealing to all Sierra Leoneans, irrespective of their ethnic grouping, creed, social standing, and political affiliation, within and outside our national territory to join the God-inspired revolution for the ultimate salvation of our beloved fatherland.

I will end my address by declaring three days fasting and prayers throughout the country, from Sunday, 1 to Tuesday 3 June 1997. United We Stand, Divided We fall. I thank you very much.

49) Speech

Statement on the historic return to Freetown, Sierra Leone, of the Leaders of the Alliance of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, 3 October 1999.

STATEMENT ON THE HISTORIC RETURN TO FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE, OF
THE LEADERS OF THE ALLIANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT
OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

Freetown, Sunday, October 3, 1999

We herald the dawn of a new era. The war has ended. The era of peace, forgiveness and reconciliation has come.

We stand before you today to ask for forgiveness and a spirit of reconciliation across the country.

We offer hands of kindred understanding and love to all those who we have wronged. You, who we have wronged, you have every human right to feel bitter and unforgiving but we plead with you for forgiveness.

Those who have died; those who are grieving for the loss of their loved ones; those who have been disabled; those whose property have been destroyed; those traumatized - the children, the youth, the women and the old aged - we ask for their forgiveness.

We ask for forgiveness from the displaced and refugees.

We also ask for forgiveness and a spirit of reconciliation from the relatives and governments of all those foreign troops who lost their lives and suffered casualties in their tour of duty in Sierra Leone.

We ask for forgiveness and a spirit of reconciliation from members of the international community whose good will has been frustrated by this war. We ask of the same from non-governmental organisations, journalists and civil society groups both local and foreign.

We will like to repeat that the war has ended. To this effect, all prisoners of war are to be released. All roads are opened. To complement this, we call on the government to release all political prisoners and prisoners of war.

We are no longer in a state of war. We are in a state of peace and our presence here today is a testimony to our commitment to the full implementation of the Lome Peace Accord.

We have come to stay and to help consolidate the peace. We want all fears to be removed from our society starting from today. We are now in an era of peace. We are in an era of absolute respect for human rights.

All fears must be removed from our society. The state of emergency must be lifted immediately as we are no longer in a state of war. We have a responsibility now to remove all signals of mistrust, fear and war. The curfew must be lifted. All so-called collaborators are freed of their charges and we welcome them back into our society. Let know one be intimidated or live in fear in the new Sierra Leone we are about to create.

We are happy to announce to the nation today that the reason that brought together the Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council still remains. We came together to end the war. We shall remain together to consolidate the peace. Nothing will divide us as our union or alliance is with the blessing of the Almighty Allah/God and our glorious ancestors.

Our alliance is for peace! Our alliance is for peace! Our alliance is for peace.

With peace comes politics. The RUF/AFRC alliance will enter into politics. By this, therefore, the RUF/AFRC alliance is to be transformed from a military alliance to a political alliance in accordance with the Lome Peace Accord.

To further demonstrate our abiding commitment to peace, we the leadership and high command of the Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council are happy to announce today the transformation of the RUF/AFRC alliance into a political movement. We usher in a vibrant political movement for peace. The RUF/AFRC alliance is now the ALLIANCE FOR PEACE (AFP)!

Very soon we will announce the symbol and flag of the Alliance for Peace (AFP). Our chosen symbol will be that of peace, goodwill and respect for human rights. Our chosen flag will reflect the strength and pride of our Pan-African heritage. We shall strive for the empowerment of our people so that the root causes of the civil war shall be removed from our society forever. Our rallying call shall be "Power to the People". Our Alliance is for Peace and we are here to sustain the peace and contribute to the creation of a new Sierra Leone of equal opportunity, freedom and justice for all.

We have come home to stay! We have come home to build! We have come home to remove fear, intimidation and mistrust from our society.

We embrace you, our people, in the spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation.

Our dear nation has suffered enough but at long last peace is now at hand. All the fighting forces of this country will be mobilised to rebuild this country. We will transform ourselves into builders of homes, schools, hospitals, markets, roads, bridges, airfields and dams to provide electricity. We shall make farms, fish ponds and raise livestock. We will be the motivating force behind the regeneration of our mining industry. We will transform the motivation on the battlefield to the fields of construction and development. This is the challenge we have put before us. Our movement for peace is also a movement for reconstruction and development.

Fellow Sierra Leoneans, join us in expressing our profound gratitude to all those who have patiently assisted us on this our footpath to peace and democracy. We thank the Heads of State of the ECOWAS Authority, their governments and people for helping us to achieve peace at last. We thank the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the European Union and the Commonwealth for listening to the cries of Sierra Leoneans for peace and helping the nation to focus on the benefits of peace. We thank the NGO community, journalists and the civil society groups who constantly reminded the warring factions of their human rights obligations. To them and the international community who supported them we reaffirm our commitment to the observance of human rights. Let their collective voice continue to ring in our ears and remind us of our human rights obligations to the rest of society.

We hold our Alliance for Peace sacred and therefore our commitment to peace and our desire to see to the implementation of the Lome Peace Accord in full.

We are at home and there is no turning back. We have come to help build a new Sierra Leone. May the Almighty Allah/God and our glorious ancestors continue to guide and bless us all.

50) Speech

Personal Statement by Lt. JP Koroma on 1 October 1999

PERSONAL STATEMENT BY Lt. Col. J.P. Koroma on October 1st 1999.

Previous to May 1997, I did not collude with the RUF/SL nor did I ever collaborate with any coup plot. I want to hereby inform my brothers and sisters in the Diaspora that yesterday was the very first time that I ever met with the RUF leader.

On the 23rd March 1991, I was the very first officer who was sent from Daru Barracks to counter the RUF at Bomaru in Eastern Sierra Leone and until May 1997, God being my witness, I never had any contact with the RUF leadership. However, I had seen the devastation that the war had wrought on the country. In 1997, when I saw an opportunity to get peace for Sierra Leone through dialogue and power sharing, I worked hard to achieve this in spite of the enormous misunderstandings that were created.

Yesterday, after meeting with Chairman Foday Sankoh, I am very pleased that we are one step closer to the meeting between President Kabbah, Foday Sankoh and myself that I repeatedly called for in 1997 and 1998.

I am fully aware of the concerns by the International Community and my countrymen about the state of the Lomé Peace Accord. I want to assure all that the meeting between Chairman Sankoh and myself went well. I want to assure all that my men and I are fully committed to the Lomé Peace Accord albeit the necessary addendum(s) that would have to be attached in the near future. I am very sincere in seeing my country at peace and seeing that the socio-economic problems that caused the RUF to take up arms be addressed.

I am very thankful to President Charles Taylor for the role he has played in seeing that the first face to face meeting between Chairman Sankoh and myself went smoothly. My first meeting with Foday Sankoh was successful because of the diplomacy showed by President Charles Taylor. After the meeting at the Liberian Executive mansion, I held a second meeting with Foday Sankoh again last evening. This ended at 11pm. I had suspected that Chairman Sankoh's earlier statements referencing me had been made based on a lot of misinformation that he had received. Yesterday, after meeting with me, the RUF Leader publicly told President Taylor and others that he had been largely misinformed about my motives.

Again, I want to assure my brothers, sisters and the International Community that Chairman Sankoh and myself will work together to see the full implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord. There are however a few points that we wish the world to be made aware of:

1. The document released this week by the Sierra Leone Government, which promises to see to the grievances of the Sierra Leone Army, was signed not by our Commander-In-Chief, President Kabbah but by his deputy, Vice President Demby. We welcome the written promise by the government to see to the re-instatement and payment of salaries of my men but we question the rationale behind Demby's signature on the document as against President Kabbah's.
2. The exact role of the Civil Defence Force in the Peace process has to be seriously considered by all concerned. These fighters should not be made to feel that they have been used and are now being marginalised. The assurance from their leaders that all is well is in sharp contrast to the reality on the field. A package must be designed to rehabilitate and re-integrate the civil defence force fighters. In the current situation, any fighting force, however small can disrupt the Lomé Accord if they feel aggrieved.

3. All addendum(s) to the Lome Peace Accord including the current proposal signed by Vice President Demby must be signed by President Kabbah, Chairman Sankoh, myself and all the moral guarantors of the Lome Peace Accord before they can be considered as Addendum(s) to the Lomé Accord. They must also be speedily passed through parliament for legislative approval.

Finally but most importantly, I want to appeal to my countrymen to forgive my men for atrocities that they might have committed. I sympathise with the suffering of my brothers and sisters throughout Sierra Leone and I am again assuring them that I, Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma, am fully committed to making Sierra Leone a land of peace and subsequent development. I had been kept out of contact with my men for 18 months since February 1998; However, as from now, I will see to it that the suffering inflicted on the populace be brought to an end. Too many innocent people on all sides of the war spectrum have died. I want to encourage us all against the shedding of blood. Let us now look towards making our rich country a place we can all be proud of.

51) Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991

Sections 55, 156

CHAPTER V — THE EXECUTIVE

PART I — THE PRESIDENT

Office of President.

40. (1) There shall be a President of the Republic of Sierra Leone who shall be Head of State, the supreme executive authority of the Republic and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

(2) The President shall be the Fountain of Honour and Justice and the symbol of national unity and sovereignty.

(3) The President shall be the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of national independence and territorial integrity, and shall ensure respect for treaties and international agreements.

(4) Notwithstanding any provisions of this Constitution or any other law to the contrary, the President shall, without prejudice to any such law as may for the time being be adopted by Parliament, be responsible, in addition to the functions conferred upon him in the Constitution, for—

- a. all constitutional matters concerning legislation;
- b. relations with Foreign States;
- c. the reception of envoys accredited to Sierra Leone and the appointment of principal representatives of Sierra Leone abroad;
- d. the execution of treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of Sierra Leone;
- e. the exercise of the Prerogative of Mercy;
- f. the grant of Honours and Awards;
- g. the declaration of war; and
- h. such other matters as may be referred to the President by Parliament;

Provided that any Treaty, Agreement or Convention executed by or under the authority of the President which relates to any matter within the legislative competence of Parliament, or which in any way alters the law of Sierra Leone or imposes any charge on, or authorises any expenditure out of, the Consolidated Fund or any other fund of Sierra Leone, and any declaration of war made by the President shall be subject to ratification by Parliament—

- i. by an enactment of Parliament; or
- ii. by a resolution supported by the votes of not less than one-half of the Members of Parliament.

Qualifications for Office of President.

(41) No person shall be qualified for election as President unless he—

- a. is a citizen of Sierra Leone;
- b. is a member of a political party;
- c. has attained the age of forty years; and
- d. is otherwise qualified to be elected as a Member of Parliament.

Election of President.

42. (1) A Presidential candidate shall be nominated by a political party.

(2) The following provisions shall apply to an election to the office of President—

- a. all persons registered in Sierra Leone as voters for the purposes of election to Parliament shall be entitled to vote in the election;
- b. the poll shall be taken by a secret ballot on such day or days, at such time, and in such manner as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament;
- c. a candidate for an election to the office of President shall be deemed to have been duly elected to such office where he is the only candidate nominated for the election after the close of nomination;
- d. where in an election to the office of President a candidate nominated for the election dies, is incapacitated or disqualified, the party which nominated him shall within seven days of such death, incapacitation or disqualification, nominate another candidate;
- e. no person shall be elected as President of Sierra Leone unless at the Presidential election he has polled not less than fifty-five per cent of the valid votes in his favour; and
- f. in default of a candidate being duly elected under paragraph (e), the two candidates with the highest number or numbers of votes shall go forward to a second election which shall be held within fourteen days of the announcement of the result of the previous election, and the candidate polling the higher number of votes cast in his favour shall be declared President.

(3) A person elected to the office of President under this section shall assume that office on the day upon which he is declared elected by the Returning Officer, or upon the date that his predecessor's term of office expires, whichever is the latter.

Period during which Presidential election shall take place.

43. A Presidential election shall take place—

- a. where the office of President is to become vacant by effluxion of time and the President continues in office after the beginning of the period of four months ending with the date when his term of office would expire by effluxion of time, during the first three months of that period;
- b. in any other case, during the period of three months beginning with the date when the office of President becomes vacant;

Provided that—

- a. where any proceedings have been lawfully commenced or taken for the purposes of the election and assumption of office of a President, it shall not be recommended or retaken whether or not a President has thereby been duly elected, by reason only that a vacancy has occurred in the office of President otherwise than by effluxion of time; and the said proceedings shall, subject to the provision of this Constitution, be continued and committed in accordance with this Constitution and any other law for the time being in force relating thereto, with such modification as may be necessary; and
- b. where the office of President becomes vacant during a period when Parliament is dissolved, the Presidential election shall be held and completed before the election of Members of Parliament.

Parliament to make laws for election of President.

44. Parliament shall make laws for the purpose of regulating the election of President and other matters connected therewith.

Presidential

45. (1) The Chief Electoral Commissioner shall be the Returning Officer for the election of a

Returning
Officer. President.

(2) Any question which may arise as to whether—

- a. any provision of this Constitution or any law relating to the election of a President under sections 42 and 43 of this Constitution has been complied with; or
- b. any person has been validly elected as President under section 42 of this Constitution or any other law,

shall be referred to and determined by the Supreme Court.

Tenure of
office of
President, etc. 46. (1) No person shall hold office as President for more than two terms of five years each whether or not the terms are consecutive.

(2) Any person who is elected President while he is, or has been elected a Member of Parliament shall, on assuming office as President, cease to be an elected Member of Parliament and his seat shall be declared vacant.

(3). The President shall not, while he continues in office as President, hold any other office of profit or emolument in the service of Sierra Leone or occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for rendering services.

Second
Schedule.

(4) Upon his assumption of office, the President shall take and subscribe the oath for the due execution of his office as set out in the Second Schedule to this Constitution.

(5) The oath aforesaid shall be administered by the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone or the person for the time being appointed to exercise the functions of the Chief Justice.

President in
Parliament. 47. The President shall be entitled to address Parliament in person or to send a message to Parliament to be read by his Vice-President or a Minister on his behalf.

Incidents of
office, etc. 48. (1) The President shall receive such salary and allowances as may be prescribed by Parliament and such salary and allowances payable to the President are hereby charged on the Consolidated Fund.

(2) The salary and allowances of the President shall not be altered to his disadvantage during his tenure of office.

(3) The President shall be exempted from personal taxation.

(4) While any person holds or performs the functions of the office of President, no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against him in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him either in his official or private capacity.

(5) The President shall be entitled to such pension and retiring benefits as shall be prescribed by Parliament.

Vacancy in
office of
President. 49. (1) The office of President shall become vacant—

- a. on the expiration of any of the terms prescribed in subsection (1) of section 46 of this Constitution; or
- b. where the incumbent dies or resigns or retires from that office; or
- c. where the incumbent ceases to hold that office in pursuance of section 50 or 51 of this Constitution:

Provided that the President shall not resign or retire from this office even at the due expiration of his term of office while a general election of Members of Parliament is pending within the ensuing three months, or where a state of public emergency has been declared.

(2) If Sierra Leone is at war in which the national territory is physically involved, and the President considers that it is not practicable to hold elections, Parliament may by resolution extend the period of five years mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 46, but no such extension shall exceed a period of six months at any one time.

(3) Any resignation or retirement by a person from the office of President shall be in writing addressed to the Chief Justice and a copy thereof shall be sent to the Speaker and the Chief Electoral Commissioner.

(4) Whenever the President dies, resigns, retires or is removed from office as a result of paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (1), the Vice-President shall assume office as President for the unexpired term of the President with effect from the date of the death, resignation, retirement or removal of the President, as the case may be.

(5) The Vice-President shall, before assuming office as President in accordance with subsection (4), take and subscribe the oath for the due execution of his office as set out in the Second Schedule to this Constitution.

Mental or
physical
incapacity.

50. (1) Where the Cabinet has resolved that the question of the mental or physical capacity of the President to discharge the functions conferred on him by this Constitution ought to be investigated and has informed the Speaker accordingly, the Speaker shall, in consultation with the Head of the Medical Service of Sierra Leone, appoint a Board consisting of not less than five persons selected by him from among persons registered as medical practitioners under the laws of Sierra Leone.

(2) The Board appointed under subsection (1) shall enquire into the matter and make a report to the Speaker stating the opinion of the Board whether or not the President is, by reason of any infirmity of mind or body, incapable of discharging the functions conferred on the President by this Constitution.

- (3) Where the Cabinet has resolved that the question of the mental or physical capacity of the President to discharge the functions conferred on him by this Constitution ought to be investigated in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1), the President shall, as soon as another person assumes the office of President, cease to perform those functions and until the Board submits its report, those functions shall be exercised in accordance with subsection (1) of section 52 of this Constitution.

(4) Where the Board reports that the President is incapable of discharging the functions conferred on him by this Constitution by reason of infirmity of mind or body, the Speaker shall certify in writing accordingly, and thereupon, the President shall cease to hold office

and a vacancy shall be deemed to have occurred in the office of President and subsection (4) of section 49 of this Constitution shall apply.

(5) Upon receipt of the report of the Board referred to in subsection (4), the speaker shall—

- a. if Parliament is then sitting or has been summoned to meet, within five days communicate the report to Parliament;
- b. if Parliament is not then sitting (and notwithstanding that it may be prorogued), summon Parliament to meet within twenty-one days after the receipt by the Speaker of the report of the Board and communicate the report of the Board to Parliament.

(6) For the purposes of this section—

- a. the Cabinet may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership or the absence of any member;
- b. a Certificate by the Speaker that the President is by reason of mental or physical infirmity unable to discharge the functions of the office of President conferred on him by this Constitution shall, in respect of any period for which it is in force, be conclusive and shall not be entertained or enquired into in any court.

Misconduct by
President.

51. (1) If notice in writing is given to the Speaker signed by not less than one-half of all the Members of Parliament of a motion alleging that the President has committed any violation of the Constitution or any gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office and specifying the particulars of the allegations and proposing that a tribunal be appointed under this section to investigate those allegations, the Speaker shall—

- a. if Parliament is then sitting or has been summoned to meet within five days, cause the motion to be considered by Parliament within seven days of the receipt of the notice; or
- b. if Parliament is not then sitting (and notwithstanding that it may be prorogued), summon Parliament to meet within twenty-one days of the receipt of the notice, and cause the motion to be considered by Parliament.

(2) Where a motion under this section is proposed for consideration by Parliament, it shall meet in secret session and shall not debate the motion, but the Speaker or the person presiding in Parliament shall forthwith cause a vote to be taken on the motion and, if the motion is supported by the votes of not less than two thirds of all Members of Parliament, shall declare the motion to be passed.

(3). If a motion is declared to be passed under subsection (2)—

- a. the Speaker shall immediately notify the Chief Justice who shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman who shall be a Justice of the Supreme Court and not less than four others selected by the Chief Justice, at least two of whom shall hold or shall have held high judicial office;
- b. the Tribunal shall investigate the matter and shall within the period of three months from the date on which the motion was passed report to Parliament through the Speaker whether or not it finds the particulars of the allegation specified in the motion to have been sustained;
- c. the President shall have the right to appear and be represented before the Tribunal during its investigation of the allegations against him.

(4) If the Tribunal reports to Parliament that it finds that the particulars of any allegations against the President specified in the motion have not been substantiated, no further proceedings shall be taken under this Section in respect of that allegation.

(5) Where the Tribunal reports to Parliament that it finds that the particulars of any allegation specified in the motion have been substantiated, Parliament may, in secret session, on a motion supported by not less than two-thirds of all the Members of Parliament, resolve that the President has been guilty of such violation of the Constitution or, as the case may, such gross misconduct as is incompatible with his continuance in office as President; and where Parliament so resolves, the President shall thereupon cease to hold office and a vacancy shall then be deemed to have occurred in the office of President and subsection (4) of Section 49 of this Constitution shall apply accordingly.

Temporary filling of vacancy.

52. (1) Whenever the President is absent from Sierra Leone or is by reason of illness or any other cause unable to perform the functions conferred upon him by this Constitution, those functions shall be performed by the Vice-President.

(2) Upon assumption of office under subsection (1), the Vice-President shall not take and subscribe the oath of office of President.

PART II — EXECUTIVE POWERS

Exercise of executive authority in Sierra Leone.

53. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power in Sierra Leone shall vest in the President and may be exercised by him directly or through members of the Cabinet, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Deputy Ministers or public officers subordinate to him.

(2) In the exercise of his functions, the President may act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet except in cases where, by this Constitution or any other law, he is required to act with the approval of Parliament or in accordance with the advice of any person or authority other than the Cabinet:

Provided that the President shall always act in accordance with his deliberate judgement in signifying his approval for the purpose of an appointment to an office on his personal staff.

(3) Where by this Constitution or under any other law the President is required to act in accordance with the advice of any person or authority, the question whether he has in any case received or acted in accordance with such advice shall not be inquired into in any court.

(4) The reference in subsection (1) to the functions of the President shall be construed as reference to his powers and duties in the exercise of the executive authority of Sierra Leone and to any other powers and duties conferred or imposed on him as President by or under this Constitution or any other law.

(5) Nothing in this section shall prevent Parliament from conferring functions on persons or authorities other than the President.

Vice President

54. (1) There shall be a Vice-President of the Republic of Sierra Leone who shall be the Principal Assistant to the President in the discharge of his executive functions.

(2) A person—

- a. shall be designated a candidate for the office of Vice-President by a Presidential candidate before a Presidential election;
- b. shall not be qualified to be a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless he has the qualifications specified in section 41.

(3) A candidate shall be deemed to be duly elected as Vice-President if the candidate who designated him as candidate for election to the office of Vice-President has been duly elected as President in accordance with the provisions of section 42.

(4) The Vice-President shall, before entering upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe the oath of Vice-President as set out in the Third Schedule of this Constitution.

(5) Whenever the office of the Vice-President is vacant, or the Vice-President dies, resigns, retires or is removed from office, the President shall appoint a person qualified to be elected as a Member of Parliament to the office of Vice-President with effect from the date of such vacancy, death, resignation, retirement or removal.

(6) Whenever the President and Vice-President are both for any reason unable to perform the functions of the President, the Speaker of Parliament shall perform those functions until the President or Vice-President is able to perform those functions, and shall take and subscribe the oath of office as set out in the Second Schedule before commencing to perform those functions.

(7) Where the Speaker of Parliament assumes the office of President as a result of the death, resignation or removal from office of the President and Vice-President, there shall be a Presidential election within ninety days of that assumption of office.

(8) The provisions of sections 50 and 51 of this Constitution, relating to the removal from office of the President, shall apply to the removal from office of the Vice-President.

Vacancy in the office of Vice-President.

55. The office of the Vice-President shall become vacant—

- a. on the expiration of the term of office of the President; or
- b. if the Vice-President resigns or retires from office or dies; or
- c. if the Vice-President is removed from office in accordance with the provisions of section 50 or 51 of this Constitution; or
- d. upon the assumption by the Vice-President to the office of President under subsection (4) of section 49.

Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Government.

56. (1) There shall be, in addition to the office of Vice-President, such other offices of Ministers and Deputy Ministers as may be established by the President:

Provided that no Member of Parliament shall be appointed a Minister or Deputy Minister.

(2) A person shall not be appointed a Minister or Deputy Minister unless—

- a. he is qualified to be elected as a Member of Parliament; and
- b. he has not contested and lost as a candidate in the general election immediately preceding his nomination for appointment; and
- c. his nomination is approved by Parliament.

(3) A Minister or a Deputy Minister shall not, while he continues in office, hold any other office of profit or emolument whether by way of allowances or otherwise, whether private or public, and either directly or indirectly;

Provided that the Vice-President, the Ministers and the Deputy Ministers shall be entitled to such remuneration, allowances, gratuities, pensions, and other incidents of office as may be prescribed by Parliament.

(4) Subject to the provisions of section 53 of this Constitution, the Ministers and Deputy Ministers shall hold office at the President's discretion.

(5) Subject to the provisions of subsection (6), the Vice-President and the other Ministers under the direction of the President shall be responsible for such departments of State or other business of the Government as the President may assign to them.

(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (5), the President shall be responsible for such departments of State, including the Commissions established under this Constitution, as he may determine.

Oaths to be taken by Ministers, etc.

57. A Minister or a Deputy Minister shall not enter upon the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath for the due execution of his duties as set out in the Third Schedule.

Ministerial vacancies.

58. (1) The office of a Minister or a Deputy Minister shall become vacant—

- a. on the expiration of the term of office of the President; or
- b. if his appointment is revoked by the President; or
- c. if he resigns or retires from office or dies; or
- d. if he is elected as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of Parliament; or
- e. upon the assumption of any other person to the office of President.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (e) of subsection (1), Ministers and Deputy Ministers shall not vacate office as such by reason of the expiration of the term of office of the President or the assumption by the Speaker to the office of President pursuant to subsections (7) and (8) of section 54 and shall accordingly continue to perform the functions of their respective offices until the election of the new President and the Vice-President.

Establishment of Cabinet.

59. (1) There shall be a Cabinet whose functions shall be to advise the President in the government of Sierra Leone and which shall consist of the President, the Vice-President and such Ministers as the President may from time to time appoint.

(2) A person appointed as a Member of Cabinet shall vacate his seat in the Cabinet if he ceases to be a Minister or if the President so directs.

(3) The Cabinet shall determine the general policy of the Government.

(4) The President shall hold regular meetings of the Cabinet at which he shall preside, and in his absence the Vice-President shall preside.

Collective responsibility.

60. (1) The Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to Parliament for any advice given to the President by or under the general authority of the Cabinet and for all things done by or under the authority of any Minister in the execution of his office.

(2) The provisions of this section shall not apply in relation to—

- a. the appointment and removal from office of Ministers and Deputy Ministers, or the assignment of responsibility to any Minister; or
- b. the exercise of the prerogative of mercy; or
- c. the exercise by the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice or the Director of Public Prosecutions of the powers conferred upon them under section 66.

Constitution of offices.

61. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any Act of Parliament, the President may constitute offices for Sierra Leone, make appointments to any such office and terminate any such appointment.

Administration of Ministries.

62. Where any Minister has been charged with responsibility for any department of Government, he shall exercise general direction and control over that department and, subject to such direction and control, the department shall be under the supervision of a Permanent Secretary, whose office shall be a public office:

Provided that two or more Departments of Government may be placed under the supervision of one Permanent Secretary.

Prerogative of Mercy.

63. (1) The President may, acting in accordance with the advice of a Committee appointed by the Cabinet over which the Vice-President shall preside—

- a. grant any person convicted of any offence against the laws of Sierra Leone a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions;
- b. grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence;
- c. substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed on any person for such an offence;
- d. remit the whole or any part of any punishment imposed upon any person for such an offence or any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the Government on account of such an offence.

(2) Where any person has been sentenced to death by any Court for any offence, the Committee appointed under subsection (1) shall cause a written report of the case from the trial judge together with such other information, including a medical report on the prisoner, derived from the record of the case or elsewhere, as the Committee may require, to be submitted to it as soon as possible.

Establishment of office of Attorney-General and Minister of

64. (1) There shall be an Attorney-General and Minister of Justice who shall be the principal legal adviser to the Government and a Minister.

Justice.

(2) The Attorney-General and Minister of Justice shall be appointed by the President from among persons qualified to hold office as a Justice of the Supreme Court and shall have a seat in the Cabinet.

(3) All offences prosecuted in the name of the Republic of Sierra Leone shall be at the suit of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice or some other person authorised by him in accordance with any law governing the same.

(4) The Attorney-General and Minister of Justice shall have audience in all Courts in Sierra Leone except local courts.

Solicitor-
General

65. (1) There shall be a Solicitor-General, whose office shall be a public office.

(2) The Solicitor-General shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission and he shall, before assuming the functions of his office, take and subscribe to the oath as set out in the Third Schedule to this Constitution.

(3) A person shall not be qualified to hold or act in the office of Solicitor-General unless he is qualified for appointment as a Justice of the Court of Appeal.

(4) The Solicitor-General shall be the principal assistant to the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice.

(5) The Solicitor-General shall have audience in all courts in Sierra Leone except local courts.

(6) The Solicitor-General shall in all matters or any other law be subject to the general or special direction of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice.

(7) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person holding the office of Solicitor-General shall vacate his office when he attains the age of sixty-five years.

(8) If the office of Solicitor-General is vacant or the holder of that office is for any reason unable to perform the functions thereof, a person qualified for appointment to that office may be appointed to act therein, and any person so appointed shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (7) and subsections (9) to (12) inclusive, continue to act until a person has been appointed to and has assumed the functions of the office of Solicitor-General or until the person holding that office has resumed those functions.

(9) The Solicitor-General may be removed from office only for inability to discharge the functions of his office, (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause), or for misbehaviour and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(10) If the Judicial and Legal Service Commission represents to the President that the question of removing the Solicitor-General from office under subsection (9) ought to be investigated then—

a. the President, acting in consultation with the Judicial and Legal Service Commission,

shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and two other members, all of whom shall be persons who hold, have held or are qualified to hold office as a Justice of the Supreme Court; and

- b. the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof and the findings thereon, and recommend to the President whether the Solicitor-General ought to be removed from office under subsection (12).

(11) Where the question of removing the Solicitor-General from office has been referred to a tribunal under subsection (10), the President may suspend the Solicitor-General from performing the functions of his office, and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the President, and shall in any case cease to have effect if the tribunal recommends to the President that the Solicitor-General shall not be removed from office.

(12) The Solicitor-General shall be removed from office by the President if the question of his removal from office has been referred to a tribunal appointed under subsection (10) and the tribunal has recommended to the President that he ought to be removed from office of inability to discharge the functions of his office as stated in subsection (9) or for misbehaviour.

Director of
Public
Prosecutions

66. (1) There shall be a Director of Public Prosecutions whose office shall be a public office.

(2) The Director of Public Prosecutions shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission and subject to the approval of Parliament, and shall, before assuming the functions of his office, take and subscribe to the oath as set out in the Third Schedule to this Constitution.

(3) A person shall not be qualified to hold or act in the office of Director of Public Prosecutions unless he is qualified for appointment as a Justice of the Court of Appeal.

(4) Subject to subsection (3) of section 64, the Director of Public Prosecutions shall have power in any case in which he considers it desirable so to do—

- a. to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court in respect of any offence against the laws of Sierra Leone;
- b. to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings that may have been instituted by any other person or authority; and
- c. to discontinue at any stage before judgement is delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or any other person or authority.

(5) The powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions under subsection (4) may be exercised by him in person or through other persons acting under and in accordance with his general or special instructions.

(6) The Director of Public Prosecutions shall in all matters including his powers under this Constitution or any other law be subject to the general or special direction of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice.

(7) The powers conferred upon the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice by this section shall be vested in him to the exclusion of any other person or authority:

Provided that where any other person or authority has instituted criminal proceedings, nothing in this section shall prevent the withdrawal of those proceedings by or at the instance of that person or authority at any stage before the person against whom the proceedings have been instituted has been charged before the court.

(8) In the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by this section, the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.

(9) For the purposes of this section, any appeal from any determination in any criminal proceedings before any court, or any case stated or question of law reserved for the purposes of any such proceedings, to any other court shall be deemed to be part of those proceedings.

(10) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person holding the office of Director of Public Prosecutions shall vacate his office when he attains the age of sixty-five years.

(11) If the office of Director of Public Prosecutions is vacant or the holder of that office is for any reason unable to perform the functions thereof, a person qualified for appointment to that office may be appointed to act therein, and any person so appointed shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (10) and subsections (12) to (15) inclusive, continue to act until a person has been appointed to and has assumed the functions of the office of Director of Public Prosecutions or until the person holding that office has resumed those functions.

(12) The Director of Public Prosecutions may be removed from office only for inability to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for misbehaviour and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(13) If the Judicial and Legal Service Commission represents to the President that the question of removing the Director of Public Prosecutions from office under subsection (12) ought to be investigated then—

- a. the President, acting in consultation with the Judicial and Legal Service Commission, shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and two other members, all of whom shall be persons who hold, have held, or are qualified to hold office as a Justice of the Supreme Court; and
- b. the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof and the findings thereon to the President and recommend to the President whether the Director of Public Prosecutions ought to be removed from office under subsection (15).

(14) Where the question of removing the Director of Public Prosecutions from office has been referred to a tribunal under subsection (10), the President may suspend the Director of Public Prosecutions from performing the functions of his office, and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the President, and shall in any case cease to have effect if the tribunal recommends to the President that the Director of Public Prosecutions shall not be removed from office.

(15) The Director of Public Prosecutions shall be removed from office by the President if the question of his removal from office has been referred to a tribunal appointed under subsection (13) and the tribunal has recommended to the President that he ought to be

removed from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour.

Secretary to the President.

67. (1) There shall be a Secretary to the President who shall be appointed by the President at his sole discretion.

(2) The functions of the Secretary to the President shall include—

- a. acting as the principal adviser to the President on Public Service matters;
- b. the administration and management of the Office of the President, of which he shall also be Vote Controller;
- c. the performance of all other functions assigned to him from time to time by the President.

(3) The office of Secretary to the President and the offices of members of his staff shall be public offices.

(4) Before assuming the functions of his office, the Secretary to the President shall take and subscribe to the oath as set out in the Third Schedule to this Constitution.

Secretary to the Cabinet.

68. (1) There shall be a Secretary to the Cabinet who shall be the Head of the Civil Service and whose office shall be a public office.

(2) The Secretary to the Cabinet shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the Public Service Commission.

(3) The functions of the Secretary to the Cabinet shall include—

- a. having charge of the Cabinet Secretariat;
- b. responsibility for arranging the business for, and keeping the minutes of, the Cabinet, and for conveying the decisions of the Cabinet to the appropriate person or authority, in accordance with such instructions as may be given to him by the President;
- c. co-ordinating and supervising the work of all administrative heads of ministries and departments in the Public Service;
- d. such other functions as the President may from time to time determine.

(4) The Secretary to the Cabinet shall not assume the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed to the oath as set out in the Third Schedule to this Constitution.

Secretary to the Vice-President.

69. (1) There shall be a Secretary to the Vice-President whose office shall be a public office.

(2) The Secretary to the Vice-President shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the Public Service Commission and shall, before assuming the functions of his office, take and subscribe to the oath as set out in the Third Schedule to this Constitution.

Power of appointment vested in the president.

70. The President may appoint, in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution or any other law the following persons—

- a. the Chief Justice;
- b. any Justice of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, or Judge of the High Court;
- c. the Auditor-General;

- d. the sole Commissioner or the Chairman and other Members of any Commission established by this Constitution;
- e. the Chairman and other Members of the governing body of any corporation established by an Act of Parliament, a statutory instrument, or out of public funds, subject to the approval of Parliament.

71. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 152 of this Constitution and save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution or any other law, appoint—

- a. to any office to which section 141 (which relates to the offices within the jurisdiction of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission) applies;
- b. to any office to which sections 153 and 154, which relate to certain offices abroad and the offices of Permanent Secretaries respectively, apply;
- c. the Governor and the other members of the governing body of any State Bank, Banking or Financial Institutions.

Office of
Paramount
Chief.

72. (1) The institution of Chieftaincy as established by customary law and usage and its non-abolition by legislation is hereby guaranteed and preserved.

(2) Without derogating from the generality of the provisions of subsection (1), no provision of law in so far as it provides for the abolition of the office of Paramount Chief as existing by customary law and usage immediately before the entry into force of this Constitution, shall have effect unless it is included in an Act of Parliament and the provisions of Section 108 shall apply in relation to the Bill for such an Act as they apply in relation to the Bill for an Act of Parliament that alters any of the provisions of this Constitution that are referred to in subsection (3) of that section.

(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with, or in contravention of, the provisions of subsection (1) to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the determination, in accordance with appropriate customary law and usage, of the validity of the nomination, election, unseating or replacement of any Paramount Chief, or the question of restraining in any way the exercise of any rights, duties, privileges or functions conferred upon, or enjoyed by him, by virtue of his office or the installation or deposition of a person as a Paramount Chief.

(4) A Paramount Chief may be removed from office by the President for any gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office if after a public inquiry conducted under the Chairmanship of a Judge of the High Court or a Justice of Appeal or a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Commission of Inquiry makes an adverse finding against the Paramount Chief, and the President is of the opinion that it is in the public interest that the Paramount Chief should be removed.

(5) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and in furtherance of the provisions of this section, Parliament shall make laws for the qualifications, election, powers, functions, removal and other matters connected with the Chieftaincy.

CHAPTER X — THE PUBLIC SERVICE
PART I — THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Establishment
of Public
Service
Commission.

151. (1) There shall be a Public Service Commission which shall consist of a Chairman, not less than two and not more than four other members.

(2) The members of the Public Service Commission shall be appointed by the President, subject to the approval of Parliament.

(3) A person shall not be qualified to hold the office of a member of the Public Service Commission if he is a Member of Parliament, a Minister or a Deputy Minister, or if he holds or is acting in any public office.

(4) A person who has held office or who has acted as a member of the Public Service Commission shall not within a period of three years commencing with the date on which he last so held office or acted be eligible for appointment to any office, power to make appointments to which is vested by this Constitution in the Public Service Commission.

(5) The office of a member of the Public Service Commission, unless he sooner resigns or dies, shall become vacant—

- a. at the expiration of a period of five years from the date of his appointment or such shorter period not being less than three years as may be specified at the time of his appointment;
- b. if any circumstances arise that if he were not a member of the Commission would cause him to be disqualified for appointment as such;

Provided that a member of the Public Service Commission shall retire at that age of sixty-five years.

(6) A member of the Public Service Commission may be removed by the President for inability to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or from any other cause) or for misconduct.

(7) Whenever the office of a member of the Public Service Commission is vacant or a member is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office, the President may appoint a person who is qualified for appointment as a member of the Commission, and any person so appointed shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection (5), continue to act until his appointment is revoked by the President.

(8) A member of the Public Service Commission shall, before assuming the functions of his office, take and subscribe before the President the oath as set out in Third Schedule to this Constitution.

Appointments
etc. of public
officers.

152. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the power to appoint persons to hold or act in offices in the public service (including power to make appointments on promotion and to confirm appointments) and to dismiss and to exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices shall vest in the Public Service Commission.

(2) The President may, subject to such conditions as he may think fit, delegate any of his

functions relating to the making of appointments, including power to make appointments on promotion and to confirm appointments, by directions in writing to the Public Service Commission or to a committee thereof or to any member of the Commission or to any public officer.

(3) Before the Public Service Commission appoints to any public office any person holding or acting in any office, the power to make appointments to which is not vested in the Public Service Commission, it shall consult the person or authority in whom that power is vested.

(4) The Public Service Commission shall, upon request made to it by any person or authority having power to make an appointment to an office under this Constitution or in any other public institution, make recommendations to that person or authority for the appointment of any public officer or any other person to an office, the power to make appointment to which is vested by the Constitution or any other law in that person, authority or public institution.

(5) the power to transfer persons holding or acting in offices in the public service from one department of Government to another shall, where such transfer does not involve promotion, vest in the Public Service Commission.

(6) The provisions of this section shall not apply in relation to any of the following offices—

- a. the office of any Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeal or a Judge of the High Court;
- b. the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions;
- c. the office of Auditor-General;
- d. any office to which section 141 (which relates to offices within the jurisdiction of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission) applies;
- e. any office to which section 153 (which relates to the offices of Ambassadors and certain offices) applies;
- f. any office to which section 154 (which relates to the offices of the Permanent Secretaries and certain other offices) applies; and
- g. any office the remuneration of which is calculated on a daily rate;

Provided that the power of transfer vested in the Public Service Commission under subsection (5) may be exercised in the case of persons holding any of the offices specified in this subsection where such persons express their consent in writing to such transfer.

(7) No appointment shall be made under this section to any office on the personal staff of the President or the Vice-President, unless he signifies his personal approval of the appointment.

(8) The Public Service Commission shall not dismiss or indict any other punishment on a public officer on grounds of any act done or omitted to be done by that officer in the exercise of a judicial function conferred upon him, unless the Judicial and Legal Service Commission concurs therein.

(9) No member of the Public Service shall be—

- a. victimised or discriminated against directly or indirectly for having discharged his duties faithfully in accordance with this Constitution, or

- b. dismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank or otherwise punished without just cause.

(10) The Public Service Commission may, with the prior approval of the President, make regulations by constitutional instrument for the effective and efficient performance of its functions under this Constitution or any other law, and may, with such prior approval and subject to such conditions as it may think fit, delegate any of its powers under this section by directions in writing to any of its membership or to any public officer.

(11) Save as is otherwise provided in this Constitution, the Public Service Commission shall not be subject to the control or direction or any other person or authority in the performance of its functions under this Constitution or any other law.

Appointment of the principal representatives of Sierra Leone abroad.

153. (1) The power to appoint persons to hold or act in the office to which this section applies (including the power to transfer from one office to another and to confirm appointments) and to remove persons so appointed from any such office shall vest in the President.

The offices to which this section applies are the offices of Ambassadors, high Commissioners or other principal representatives of Sierra Leone abroad, the Commanders of the Armed Forces, and the Inspector-General of Police;

Provided that the appointment to these offices shall be subject to the approval of Parliament.

Appointment of Permanent Secretaries and certain other officers.

154. (1) The power to appoint persons to hold or act in any of the offices to which this section applies (including the power to make appointments on promotion and transfer from one office to another and to confirm appointments) and to remove persons so appointed from any such office shall vest in the President acting in consultation with the Public Service Commission.

(2) The offices to which this section applies are the offices of Secretary to the Cabinet, Secretary to the Vice-President, Financial Secretary, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Establishment Secretary, Development Secretary, Provincial Secretary and Permanent Secretary.

(3) Where any person holding an office mentioned in subsection (2) accepts another such office carrying higher remuneration, he shall, unless a contrary intention appears from the terms of his appointment, be deemed to have relinquished the office he was originally holding; where the second office does not carry higher remuneration, the question whether or not he shall be deemed to have relinquished the original office shall depend on the terms of his second appointment.

(4) Subject to the provisions of section 152 of this Constitution, where any person has been removed under subsection (1) from any office specified in subsection (2) he may notwithstanding such removal—

- a. remain in the Public Service;
- b. continue to receive a salary not less than the salary he received before such removal; and
- c. continue to be eligible for any benefit granted to him in respect of his service as a public officer, including benefits payable under any law providing for the grant of

pensions, gratuities or both;

unless by such removal he ceases to be a member of the Public Service.

PART II — THE POLICE FORCE

Functions of
Police Council.

(1) The Police Council shall advise the President on all major matters of policy relating to internal security, including the role of the Police Force, Police budgeting and finance, administration and any other matter as the President shall require.

(2) The Police Council may, with the prior approval of the President, make regulations for the performance of its functions under this Constitution or any other law, and for the effective and efficient administration of the Police Force.

(3) Regulations made pursuant to the provisions of subsection (2) shall include regulations in respect of

- a. the control and administration of the Police Force of Sierra Leone;
- b. the ranks of officers and men of each unit of the Police Force, the members in each such rank and the use of uniforms by such members;
- c. the conditions of service, including those relating to enrolment and to pay, pensions, gratuities and other allowances of officers and men of each unit and deductions therefrom;
- d. the authority and powers of command of officers and men of the Police Force; and
- e. the delegation to other persons of powers of commanding officers to discipline accused persons, and the conditions subject to which such delegation may be made.

PART III -- RESIGNATIONS, RE-APPOINTMENTS AND PROTECTION OF PENSION RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS HOLDING ESTABLISHED OFFICES

Resignations
and effect of
new
appointment of
a person
holding an
established
office.

159 (1) Any person who is appointed or elect to, or otherwise selected for, any office established by this Constitution, including the office of Vice-President, Member of the Cabinet, Minister or Deputy Minister, may resign from that office by writing under his hand addressed tot he person or authority by whom he was appointed, elected or selected;

Provided that in the case of the Speaker of the Deputy Speaker his resignation from office shall be addressed to Parliament and in the case of a Member of Parliament his resignation from Parliament shall be addressed to the Speaker.

(2) The resignation of any person from any such office as referred to in subsection (1) shall take effect, where no date is specified, when the writing signifying the resignation is received by the person or authority to whom it is addressed or by any person authorised by that person or authority to receive it.

Re-appoint-
ment, etc.

160. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, where any person has vacated any office established by this Constitution he may, if qualified, again be appointed, elected, or otherwise selected to hold that office.

(2) Where by this Constitution a power is conferred upon any person or authority to make any appointment to any public office, a person may be appointed to that office

notwithstanding that some other person may be holding that office, when that other person is on leave of absence pending relinquishment of the office; and where two or more persons are holding the same office by reason of an appointment made in pursuance of this subsection then for the purposes of any function conferred upon the holder of that office the person last appointed shall be deemed to be the sole holder of the office.

Protection of
pension rights.

161. (1) The law applicable to any benefits to which this section applies shall, in relation to any person who has been granted, or who is eligible for the grant of such benefits, be that in force on the relevant date or any later law that is not less favourable to that person.

(2) In this section "the relevant date" means—

- a. in relation to any benefits granted before the twenty-seventh day of April, 1961, the date of which those benefits were granted;
- b. in relation to any benefits granted on or after the twenty-seventh day of April, 1961, to or in respect of any person who was a public officer before that date, the twenty-sixth day of April, 1961; and
- c. in relation to any benefits granted or to be granted to or in respect of any person who becomes a public officer on or after the twenty-seventh day of April, 1961, the date on which he becomes a public officer.

(3) Where a person is entitled to exercise an option as to which of two or more laws shall apply in his case, the law specified by him in exercising the option shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be more favourable to him than the other law or laws.

(4) Any benefit to which this section applies (not being a benefit that is a charge upon some other public fund of Sierra Leone) shall be a charge upon the Consolidated Fund or upon such other Special Fund, whether contributory or non-contributory, as Parliament may prescribe.

(5) This section applies to any benefits payable under any law providing for the grant of pensions, gratuities or compensation to persons who are or have been public officers in respect of their service in the public service or to the widows, children, dependants or personal representatives of such persons in respect of such service.

(6) References to the law applicable to any benefits to which this section applies includes (without prejudice to their generality) references to any law relating to the time at which and the manner in which any person may retire in order to become eligible for those benefits.

- (7) Notwithstanding any law or custom to the contrary, it shall be lawful for Parliament to enact that a person shall not be entitled to a benefit under this section, unless he has
- contributed to a specified Fund created for the purpose.

PART IV — POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSIONS AND COUNCILS, AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Power of
Commissions
in relation to
the grant of
pensions.

162. (1) Where any benefits to which this section applies can be withheld, reduced in amount or suspended by any law, those benefits shall not be so withheld, reduced in amount or suspended—

- a. in the case of benefits which have been granted in respect of service in the public service to any person who at the time when he ceased to be a public officer was subject to the jurisdiction of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission or for which any person may be eligible in respect of such service, without the approval of that Commission; or
- b. in any other case, without the approval of the Public Service Commission or the appropriate Council, as the case may be.

(2) No benefits to which this section applies that have been granted to or in respect of any person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court, a Justice of Appeal or of the Supreme Court or for which any such person or his widow, children, dependants or personal representatives may be eligible, shall be withheld, reduced in amount or suspended on the ground that that person has been guilty of misconduct or misbehaviour unless that person has been removed from judicial office by reason of such misconduct or misbehaviour.

(3) This section applies to any benefits payable under any law providing for the grant of pensions, gratuities or compensation to persons who are or have been public officers in respect of their service in the public service or to the widows, children, dependants or personal representatives of such persons in respect of such service whether on a contributory or non-contributory basis.

Power and
procedure of
Commissions.

163. (1) Any Commission or Council established by this Constitution may, with the consent of the President and subject to the provisions of subsection (2), by regulation or otherwise regulate its own procedure and, confer or delegate powers or impose duties on any authority of the Government for the purpose of discharge of its functions.

(2) At any meeting of any Commission or Council established by this Constitution a quorum shall be constituted if three members are present; and if a quorum is present the Commission or Council shall not be disqualified for the transaction of business by reason of any vacancy among its members and any proceedings of the Commission or Council shall be valid notwithstanding that some person who was not entitled to do so took part therein.

Protection of
Commissions
from legal
proceedings.

164. The question whether—

- a. any Commission or Council established by this Constitution has validly performed any function vested in it by or under this Constitution;
- b. any member of such a Commission or Council or any other person has validly performed any functions delegated to such member or person in pursuance of the provisions of subsection (1) of section 163 or, as the case may be, subsection (10) of section 152; or
- c. any member of such a Commission or Council or any other person or authority has validly performed any other function in relation to the work of the Commission or Council or in relation to any such functions as is referred to in paragraph (b),

shall not be inquired into in any Court.

52) Order

Changes of Titles Order, 1997 – Public Notice 11 of 1997

PUBLIC NOTICES

Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXXVIII, No. 66
dated 11th December, 1997

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 11 OF 1997

Published 11th December, 1997

THE CHANGE OF TITLES ACT, 1984
(No. 6 of 1984)

THE CHANGE OF TITLES ORDER, 1997

Short title.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 2 and 3 of the Change of Titles Act, as adapted by sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3 of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes the following Order:—

1. This Order shall be deemed to have come into operation on the 28th day of May, 1997. Commencement.

2. The titles of Ministers, Public Officers and Ministries set out in the second column of the Schedule hereto shall be substituted for the corresponding titles set out in the first column thereof wherever such titles may appear in any enactment now in force in Sierra Leone. Change of titles.

SCHEDULE

<i>Old Title</i>	<i>New Title</i>
President	Chairman, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Vice-President	Deputy Chairman, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Minister	Secretary of State
Deputy Minister	Under Secretary of State
Attorney-General and Minister of Justice	Attorney-General and Secretary of State for Legal Affairs
Minister of Lands, Housing, Town and Country Planning	Secretary of State, Lands, Housing and the Environment

3230

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<i>Old Title</i>	<i>New Title</i>
Minister of Presidential Affairs and the Public Service ...	Secretary of State, Office of the Chairman
Minister of Information and Broadcasting	Commissioner of Information and Broadcasting
Minister of Tourism and Culture ...	Commissioner of Tourism and Culture
Secretary to the President ...	Secretary to the Chairman and Head of the Civil Service
Secretary to the Cabinet ...	Secretary to the Council of Secretaries
Ministry of Gender and Children Affairs	Department of Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and the Environment ...	Department of Agriculture and Forestry
Ministry of Marine Resources ...	Department of Fisheries and Marine Resources
Ministry of Lands, Housing, Town and Country Planning	Department of Lands, Housing and the Environment
Ministry of Labour, Social Welfare and Sports	Department of Employment and Industrial Relations Department of Youths, Sports and Social Mobilization
Ministry of Works, Energy and Power ...	Department of Works Department of Energy and Power
Ministry of Local Government and Community Development ...	Department of Internal Affairs

MADE AND ISSUED this 3rd day of December, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

53) United Nations Document

Statement by the President of the Security Council, 4 December 1996, S/PRST/1996/46, paragraph 2.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/PRST/1996/46
4 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 3720th meeting of the Security Council, held on 4 December 1996 in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Sierra Leone", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council warmly welcomes the Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front in Abidjan on 30 November 1996. The Agreement brings to an end a bitter conflict which has caused appalling suffering to the people of Sierra Leone. The Council pays tribute to the courage and determination of all those who have worked tirelessly towards this end. The Council hopes that the Agreement will provide encouragement to those working for peace in other parts of Africa.

"The Security Council commends in particular the role played by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire whose commitment and determination in the chairmanship of the negotiations between the parties have been crucial to this successful outcome. The Council also pays tribute to the support provided to the negotiations by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General in close coordination with the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, the Economic Community of West African States and other organizations and neighbouring countries.

"The Security Council continues to follow developments in Sierra Leone with close interest. The Peace Agreement is an essential first step towards national reconciliation and reconstruction. The Council will continue to support the development of peace and democracy in Sierra Leone. It notes in particular the need for a successful process of demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and stands ready to assist in this process. It stresses the importance of a coordinated international effort to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the country.

"The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in Sierra Leone and to keep the Council informed of further significant developments."

96-34924 (E) 041296

9634924

54) United Nations Document

Resolution 1132 (1997), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3822nd meeting on 8 October 1997.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/RES/1132 (1997)
8 October 1997

RESOLUTION 1132 (1997)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3822nd meeting,
on 8 October 1997

The Security Council,

Recalling the statements of its President of 27 May 1997 (S/PRST/1997/29), 11 July 1997 (S/PRST/1997/36) and 6 August 1997 (S/PRST/1997/42) condemning the military coup in Sierra Leone,

Taking note of the decision of the thirty-third summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held in Harare, Zimbabwe, from 2 to 4 June 1997 concerning the situation in Sierra Leone,

Taking note also of the Communique issued at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Sierra Leone, held in Conakry, Guinea on 26 June 1997 (S/1997/499), the Declaration of the ECOWAS Committee of Four Foreign Ministers on Sierra Leone (the ECOWAS Committee) of 30 July 1997 (S/1997/646), and the final Communique of the summit of ECOWAS held at Abuja on 28 and 29 August 1997 and the Decision on sanctions against the military junta in Sierra Leone issued at the summit (S/1997/695, Annexes I and II),

Taking note also of the Secretary-General's letter of 7 October 1997 (S/1997/776),

Expressing its full support and appreciation for the mediation efforts of the ECOWAS Committee,

Reaffirming its view that the Abidjan Agreement (S/1996/1034) continues to serve as a viable framework for peace, stability and reconciliation in Sierra Leone,

Deploring the fact that the military junta has not taken steps to allow the restoration of the democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order,

Gravely concerned at the continued violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone following the military coup of 25 May 1997, the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in that country, and the consequences for neighbouring countries,

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order;
2. Reiterates its call upon the junta to end all acts of violence and to cease all interference with the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Sierra Leone;
3. Expresses its strong support for the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone and encourages it to continue to work for the peaceful restoration of the constitutional order, including through the resumption of negotiations;
4. Encourages the Secretary-General, through his Special Envoy, in cooperation with the ECOWAS Committee, to assist the search for a peaceful resolution of the crisis and, to that end, to work for a resumption of discussions with all parties to the crisis;
5. Decides that all States shall prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of members of the military junta and adult members of their families, as designated in accordance with paragraph 10 (f) below, provided that the entry into or transit through a particular State of any such person may be authorized by the Committee established by paragraph 10 below for verified humanitarian purposes or purposes consistent with paragraph 1 above, and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse entry into its territory to its own nationals;
6. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territory;
7. Decides that the Committee established by paragraph 10 below may authorize, on a case-by-case basis under a no-objection procedure:
 - (a) applications by the democratically-elected Government of Sierra Leone for the importation into Sierra Leone of petroleum or petroleum products; and
 - (b) applications by any other government or by United Nations Agencies for the importation of petroleum or petroleum products into Sierra Leone

/...

for verified humanitarian purposes, or for the needs of the Military Observer Group of ECOWAS (ECOMOG),

subject to acceptable arrangements for effective monitoring of delivery;

8. Acting also under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes ECOWAS, cooperating with the democratically-elected Government of Sierra Leone, to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of this resolution relating to the supply of petroleum and petroleum products, and arms and related matériel of all types, including, where necessary and in conformity with applicable international standards, by halting inward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations, and calls upon all States to cooperate with ECOWAS in this regard;

9. Requests ECOWAS to report every 30 days to the Committee established under paragraph 10 below on all activities undertaken pursuant to paragraph 8 above;

10. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

- (a) to seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
- (b) to consider information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 above and to recommend appropriate measures in response thereto;
- (c) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 above, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;
- (d) to promulgate such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
- (e) to consider and decide expeditiously requests for the approval of imports of petroleum and petroleum products in accordance with paragraph 7 above;
- (f) to designate expeditiously members of the military junta and adult members of their families whose entry or transit is to be prevented in accordance with paragraph 5 above;
- (g) to examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraphs 9 above and 13 below;

/...

- (h) to establish liaison with the ECOWAS Committee on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
11. Calls upon all States and all international and regional organizations to act strictly in conformity with this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights granted or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or of any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the entry into force of the provisions set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
12. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee established by paragraph 10 above and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;
13. Requests States to report to the Secretary-General within 30 days of the date of adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken to give effect to the provisions set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
14. Requests all those concerned, including ECOWAS, the United Nations and other international humanitarian agencies, to establish appropriate arrangements for the provision of humanitarian assistance and to endeavour to ensure that such assistance responds to local needs and is safely delivered to, and used by, its intended recipients;
15. Urges all States, international organizations and financial institutions to assist States in the region to address the economic and social consequences of the influx of refugees from Sierra Leone;
16. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an initial report to the Council within 15 days of the adoption of this resolution on compliance with paragraph 1 above, and thereafter every 60 days after the date of adoption of this resolution on its implementation and on the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone;
17. Decides, if the measures set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 above have not been terminated in accordance with paragraph 19 below, to conduct, 180 days after the adoption of this resolution and on the basis of the most recent report of the Secretary-General, a thorough review of the application of these measures and of any steps taken by the military junta to comply with paragraph 1 above;
18. Urges all States to provide technical and logistical support to assist ECOWAS to carry out its responsibilities in the implementation of this resolution;
19. Expresses its intention to terminate the measures set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 above when the demand in paragraph 1 above has been complied with;
20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

55) United Nations Document

Security Council Resolution 1181 (13 July 1998), para. 1



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/RES/1181 (1998)
13 July 1998

RESOLUTION 1181 (1998)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3902nd meeting,
on 13 July 1998

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions and the statements of its President,

Welcoming the continued efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to restore peaceful and secure conditions in the country, to re-establish effective administration and the democratic process and to embark on the task of national reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation,

Recognizing the important contribution of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in support of these objectives,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1998 (S/1998/486 and Add.1),

Noting the objectives set by ECOWAS for its Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) as described in paragraph 17 of the report of Secretary-General,

Gravely concerned at the loss of life and immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone, including refugees and displaced persons, as a result of the continuing rebel attacks, and in particular at the plight of children affected by the conflict,

1. Condemns the continued resistance of remnants of the ousted junta and members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to the authority of the legitimate government and the violence they are perpetrating against the civilian population of Sierra Leone, and demands that they lay down their arms immediately;

2. Emphasizes the need to promote national reconciliation in Sierra Leone, encourages all parties in the country to work together towards this objective, and welcomes the assistance of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy in that regard;

3. Welcomes the proposal in the report of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1998 on the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL);

4. Notes that the Government of Sierra Leone has adopted a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan agreed with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations Development Programme and other donors;

5. Commends the positive role of ECOWAS and ECOMOG in their efforts to restore peace, security and stability throughout the country at the request of the Government of Sierra Leone, and notes the role of ECOMOG in assisting the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan adopted by the Government of Sierra Leone, including the provision of security and responsibility for arms collection and destruction;

6. Decides to establish UNOMSIL for an initial period of six months until 13 January 1999, and further decides that it shall include up to 70 military observers as well as a small medical unit, with the necessary equipment and civilian support staff, with the following mandate:

(a) To monitor the military and security situation in the country as a whole, as security conditions permit, and to provide the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with regular information thereon in particular with a view to determining when conditions are sufficiently secure to allow subsequent deployments of military observers beyond the first phase described in paragraph 7 below;

(b) To monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants concentrated in secure areas of the country, including monitoring of the role of ECOMOG in the provision of security and in the collection and destruction of arms in those secure areas;

(c) To assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law, including at disarmament and demobilization sites, where security conditions permit;

(d) To monitor the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of members of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), as security conditions permit;

7. Decides further that the elements of UNOMSIL referred to in paragraph 6 above shall be deployed as outlined in the Secretary-General's report, with approximately 40 military observers deployed in the first phase to ECOMOG-secured areas, and that subsequent deployments shall take place as soon as security conditions permit, and subject to progress on the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan and the availability of the necessary equipment and resources;

8. Decides further that UNOMSIL shall be led by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, who will be designated Special Representative for Sierra Leone, that UNOMSIL shall subsume the office of the Special Envoy and its civilian staff, and that the augmented civilian staff, as recommended by the

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Secretary-General in paragraphs 74 and 75 of his report, shall perform, inter alia, the following tasks:

(a) To advise, in coordination with other international efforts, the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies, to advise on the planning of the reform and restructuring of the Sierra Leone police force, and to monitor progress in that regard;

(b) To report on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Sierra Leone, and, in consultation with the relevant United Nations agencies, to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in its efforts to address the country's human rights needs;

9. Welcomes the commitment of ECOMOG to ensure the security of United Nations personnel, and in this regard welcomes also the intention of the Secretary-General to establish security arrangements for United Nations personnel with the Chairman of ECOWAS and to conclude a status of mission agreement with Government of Sierra Leone;

10. Decides that the elements of UNOMSIL referred to in paragraph 6 above shall be deployed when the Secretary-General informs the Council that security arrangements and the status of mission agreement have been concluded, and further decides to keep the deployment of UNOMSIL under review in the light of the prevailing security conditions;

11. Stresses the need for full cooperation and close coordination between UNOMSIL and ECOMOG in their respective operational activities;

12. Demands that all factions and forces in Sierra Leone strictly respect the status of UNOMSIL personnel, as well as organizations and agencies delivering humanitarian assistance throughout Sierra Leone, and that they respect human rights and abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law;

13. Expresses its serious concern at the reports of cross-border arms flows and support to the rebels in Sierra Leone, welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General, as indicated in his report, to pursue with all parties concerned steps to eliminate these activities, and in that regard reaffirms the obligation of all States to comply strictly with the terms of the embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to Sierra Leone imposed by resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998, and to bring all instances of violations of the arms embargo before the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997;

14. Welcomes the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to coordinate an effective national response to the needs of children affected by armed conflict, and the recommendation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict that Sierra Leone be made one of the pilot projects for a more concerted and effective response to the needs of children in the context of post-conflict peace-building;

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15. Further welcomes the decision of the Secretary-General to convene a high-level conference to mobilize assistance for peacekeeping activities, emergency and humanitarian needs and reconstruction and rehabilitation in Sierra Leone;

16. Reiterates its urgent appeal to States to make contributions to the Trust Fund which has been established to support peacekeeping and related activities in Sierra Leone, to provide technical and logistical support to assist ECOMOG to carry out its peacekeeping role, and to help facilitate other ECOWAS member States to provide additional troops to strengthen the deployment of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone;

17. Urges all States and international organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone, in response to the consolidated inter-agency appeal launched on 24 June 1998;

18. Encourages all States and international organizations to assist and participate in the longer term tasks of reconstruction and economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an initial report to the Council within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution and every 60 days thereafter on the deployment of UNOMSIL and on the progress of UNOMSIL in carrying out its mandate, and also to inform the Council on plans for the later phases of the deployment of UNOMSIL when security conditions permit these to be implemented;

20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

56) United Nations Document

Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/249 (18 March 1998), paragraph 6, 20.

5. I reaffirmed to the Committee of Five the desire of the United Nations for close cooperation between the United Nations and ECOWAS, and stated that ECOMOG needed to develop a concept of operations on the basis of which the United Nations could finalize its own deployment plan. ECOMOG should also compile a statement of its own logistical requirements in order to attract the necessary support from potential donors.

6. On the same day, responding to an attack by junta forces on their position at Lungi, ECOMOG launched a military attack on the junta, which culminated approximately one week later in the collapse of the junta and its expulsion by force from Freetown after heavy fighting. The fall of the city on 13 February, which was accompanied by widespread looting and some reprisal killings, led to the flight or capture of many soldiers and leaders of the junta. ECOWAS has assured me that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been allowed to visit prisoners detained by ECOMOG in Freetown. However, some of the former leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), including its Chairman, Johnny Paul Koroma, are believed to be still at large. Acting in concert with the local Kamajors and other traditional hunter militia (known as the Civil Defence Unit), ECOMOG has subsequently taken control of the towns of Bo, Kenema and Zimmi in the south of the country, and Lunsar, Makeni and Kabala in the north. ECOMOG has also reported the capture of Daru, which would mean that the remnants of the junta have now been dislodged from every major town except for Kailahun. Following scattered fighting in the latter part of February, the country now appears to be quiet. A number of foreign aid workers and missionaries taken hostage by armed elements in February were later released unharmed. However, press reports in mid-March indicated that Revolutionary United Front (RUF) members in Kono had murdered civilians and taken 200 hostages, reportedly including foreign nationals.

7. On 18 February, accompanied by the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mr. Lansana Kouyaté, Minister Ikimi visited Sierra Leone to assess the situation on the ground. They interviewed some former junta soldiers now detained by ECOMOG and visited the State House complex and the Parliament buildings. Many of the government buildings were found to have been looted and were in poor condition, and a number of unexploded bombs were scattered about. However, the ECOWAS team, which was enthusiastically greeted by crowds, found that in many respects life had returned to normal in the capital. As noted below, my Special Envoy also visited Freetown on the same day.

8. From 25 to 27 February 1998, the Committee of Five met in the margins of the meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa to review the situation in Sierra Leone. The Committee issued a communiqué, which was subsequently circulated as document S/1998/170.

9. On 4 March 1998, the members of the Committee of Five returned to New York and met again with members of the Security Council and with me. Chief Ikimi briefed me on his visit to Freetown on 18 February and his subsequent meeting with President Tejan Kabbah in Conakry. Following this meeting, it was announced that President Kabbah would return to his country on 10 March 1998.

10. ECOMOG has also prepared a detailed list of logistical requirements for its operations in Sierra Leone. During the visit to New York of the Committee of

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Five, Chief Ikimi requested the assistance of the United Nations and the international community in ensuring that these requirements could be met. That request was reaffirmed by the Chairman of ECOWAS, General Sani Abacha, in his statement at the ceremony held to mark the return of President Kabbah to Freetown on 10 March.

Action taken by the United Nations

11. On 18 February 1998, a few days after ECOMOG had established control over most of the city of Freetown, my Special Envoy, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, led a security and humanitarian assessment mission to the capital and to Lungi comprising United Nations and non-governmental organization officials. The mission determined the most immediate needs of the population. Mr. Okelo handed over a quantity of medicines donated by the World Health Organization (WHO) to local hospitals and began preparations for the re-establishment of a United Nations presence in Freetown. A few days later, the World Food Programme (WFP) delivered 857 metric tons of food to Freetown by ship.

12. Early in February, pursuant to a request by members of the Security Council for a technical assessment of the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone since the coup d'état of 25 May 1997, an inter-agency mission travelled to the subregion. Its report is contained in document S/1998/155. Further information on the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone can be found in section III of the present report.

13. Pursuant to the statement issued by the President of the Security Council on 26 February, I have initiated the necessary action to establish a Trust Fund for Sierra Leone. Contributions would help finance logistical assistance to ECOMOG, rehabilitation assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone and activities, including disarmament, demobilization and human rights.

14. On 7 March 1998, my Special Envoy reopened the United Nations office in Freetown, which had been closed shortly after the 25 May 1997 coup d'état and was temporarily relocated in Conakry, Guinea. The office is now being strengthened to comprise civilian political and humanitarian officers, a military adviser and, in due course, human rights and civilian police advisers and public information personnel. The function of the office is to liaise with the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS, ECOMOG and the United Nations and its agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations, and to act as the overall authority for all United Nations activities in the country. My proposals for deploying military liaison personnel as part of the United Nations presence on the ground can be found in section IV of the present report. My Special Envoy will also temporarily retain a small office in Conakry, but he expects to be fully established in Freetown by the end of March, thus paving the way for the return of all United Nations agencies to Sierra Leone.

Action taken by the Government of Sierra Leone

15. On 13 February 1998, President Kabbah called a meeting in Conakry of potential donors, including the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Nations, to discuss his Government's priorities; the nature of the assistance the international

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community could provide; and the urgent provision of humanitarian assistance. The President announced that he had created a task force to prepare the ground for the resumption of work by his Government, to assess damage to the infrastructure and to prepare for the resumption of education. President Kabbah identified the immediate priorities of his Government as the provision of humanitarian supplies and petroleum products, the reactivation of international aid programmes and the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. Three other areas that required special attention have been identified as the training and restructuring of the police force, the creation of job opportunities for young people and the construction of low-cost housing. President Kabbah also indicated that he intended to streamline his administration and appoint technical experts to cabinet positions.

16. Following the removal by ECOMOG of the military junta from power, President Kabbah issued a statement announcing his intention to submit proposals to Parliament concerning the rebuilding of his country. The President also spoke out against the reprisal killings, which, in some cases, had accompanied the seizure of control from the junta.

17. On 10 March 1998, accompanied by General Sani Abacha, Chairman of ECOWAS and Head of State of Nigeria, as well as the Heads of State of Guinea, Mali and Niger, President Lansana Conteh, President Alpha Oumar Konare and President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, and the Vice-President of Gambia, President Tejan Kabbah returned to Freetown to resume his office as Head of State of Sierra Leone. He was greeted by large and enthusiastic crowds. Mr. Ibrahim Fall, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, delivered on my behalf a message of congratulations to the President stating that his return represented the accomplishment of a major objective not only of the people of Sierra Leone, but also of ECOWAS, OAU, the United Nations and the entire international community. I expressed my deep regret at the violence, loss of life and property and immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone since the coup d'état and extended my condolences to the families of those who lost their lives in opposing it. Furthermore, I informed the President that the United Nations looked forward to working closely with him in helping his Government to reassert its authority and strengthen its capacity throughout the country.

18. In a statement made at the ceremony marking his return to Sierra Leone, President Kabbah declared his intention to embark on the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction of the country, to form a broad-based Government and to appoint a policy advisory committee. In his first meeting with my Special Envoy after his return, President Kabbah stressed the need for an early deployment of United Nations military personnel, the urgent provision of humanitarian assistance and the prompt establishment of the Trust Fund for Sierra Leone.

Military and security situation in Sierra Leone

19. Freetown is now fully under the control of ECOMOG and is increasingly secure. Some unexploded ordnance and landmines have been found, but these are not a threat to security. The peninsula on which the capital stands has also been secured. With the capture of almost every other major town in the country,

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and through its deployment further into the countryside in the north, south and east, ECOMOG has established itself successfully across most of the country.

20. Nevertheless, the fact that many of the senior junta leaders, including the former Chairman of the AFRC, Johnny Paul Koroma, have not thus far been apprehended, as well as the continuing violence inflicted on civilians during their retreat from ECOMOG forces by RUF and other armed elements, indicate that the security situation in Sierra Leone is still a source of concern. Though ECOMOG has begun to collect weapons in Freetown, a major disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercise will be needed to ensure security.

21. ECOMOG has also developed a concept of operations for its deployment throughout Sierra Leone that sets out the preliminary planning for the disarmament and demobilization of Sierra Leonean combatants. In summary, the tasks ECOMOG has set for itself include:

(a) Deployment throughout Sierra Leone;

(b) Manning of selected entry points by land, sea or air in order to ensure that no arms, ammunition or war matériel are brought into the country;

(c) Disarmament of ex-combatants at designated sites;

(d) Establishment of road blocks to check the movement of arms and ammunition and to assist in extending protection to refugees and internally displaced persons;

(e) Conducting patrols to create an atmosphere conducive to freedom of movement and the restoration of established authority;

(f) Providing security for key individuals, United Nations personnel, including military personnel, and non-governmental organizations.

22. The plan calls for the deployment of 15,000 troops in four sectors: western, northern, southern and eastern. The western sector, comprising Freetown and the airports of Lungi and Hastings, is further subdivided, and would support the deployment of seven battalions, an air force detachment and an artillery brigade. This appears to be an ample level of force for the protection of the capital and its airport.

23. In the northern sector, ECOMOG would deploy a brigade headquartered at Makeni, with battalions located at Port Loko, Magburaka and Kabala. In the south, ECOMOG will locate its brigade headquarters at Bo and deploy battalions at Moyamba, Pujehun and Kenema. Naval assets would also be required. The eastern sector is described as strategic in view of its mineral resources, the presence of heavy RUF and Kamajor concentration, and the border with Liberia. ECOMOG therefore considers that operations in the east could prove difficult and risky and demand a robust approach, alertness and deployment in strength. Battalions would be located at Yengema, Zimmi and Kailahun.

24. ECOMOG would also establish a disarmament committee which would be charged, inter alia, with selecting disarmament sites; setting standards and guidelines

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for disarmament; conducting the disarmament, coordination of resources and cooperation with other organizations; classifying and transporting recovered weapons and ammunition; disseminating information about the process and providing security for all participants. A ceasefire violations committee and a humanitarian services committee would also be created.

25. My Special Envoy and his staff are actively discussing with the Government and with ECOMOG the further elaboration and implementation of its concept of operations, which provides a suitable basis for the possible subsequent deployment of United Nations military personnel, subject to the authorization of the Security Council. I will revert to the Council with further recommendations on such deployment following a further assessment by my Special Envoy.

Other action taken pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997)

26. Since my previous report, a number of States have written to me, in compliance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1132 (1997), concerning the steps they have taken to give effect to the provisions contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution relating to the sanctions imposed by the Council on Sierra Leone. The latest list of those States can be found in a separate report to the Security Council contained in document S/1998/112.

27. In a letter dated 9 March 1998 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1998/215), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations conveyed a request from his Government for the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the lifting of the sanctions imposed on the importation of petroleum and petroleum products into the country in paragraph 6 of resolution 1132 (1997). On 16 March, the Council adopted resolution 1156 (1998) terminating, with immediate effect, the prohibitions on the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum and petroleum products referred to in resolution 1132 (1997).

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

28. A number of United Nations humanitarian assessment missions have now been undertaken to Freetown, Kambia, Bo, Kenema and Makeni. These missions determined that the current humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone remains serious. The primary health care system has been devastated by lack of supplies, looting and the exodus of medical personnel at all levels. Widespread neglect of water and sanitation facilities has increased the exposure of hundreds of thousands to disease. The normal distribution of food to vulnerable groups has been disrupted, affecting children in particular. Many children have also suffered exposure to acts of violence by being sent into battle as combatants. The public education system has collapsed; all schools have been closed since the coup d'état last May. The combination of fighting and looting has led to extensive damage to housing and infrastructure in the provincial towns. The number of internally displaced people has increased, and the welfare of some 14,000 Liberian refugees remains a matter of concern, as many fled from their camps during the recent fighting. The majority of Sierra Leoneans who took refuge in Conakry during the fighting in Freetown have returned. However, some 24,000 Sierra Leoneans have arrived in Liberia since mid-February and the

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influx continues, albeit at a reduced rate. A further influx of 3,000 refugees from the Kailahun area, still not under ECOMOG control, has been registered by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at its camp in Kissidougou, Guinea.

29. United Nations agencies prepared a consolidated inter-agency flash appeal, which was launched on 3 March 1998. Through this appeal, I am seeking financial contributions from Member States in the amount of \$11.2 million to meet priority humanitarian needs in Sierra Leone over the next three months. Priority needs include support to agriculture through the provision of seeds and tools, the re-establishment of basic health and education services, the resumption of food aid distributions and the provision of assistance and protection to the most vulnerable groups affected by the current conflict. The flash appeal complements the 90-day programme of the Government of Sierra Leone, which serves as a framework for action following the restoration of democratic civilian rule in the country.

30. The full deployment of ECOMOG and the restoration of the legitimate Government is expected to provide increased opportunities for the humanitarian community to accelerate its activities in response to the humanitarian crisis in Sierra Leone, and will also encourage the return to their homes of internally displaced persons. It is hoped that the international community will contribute generously to the humanitarian programme outlined in the flash appeal, in order to provide the crucial assistance needed to sustain lives and to promote stability in Sierra Leone.

31. Medium-term tasks, such as the assisted repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees and reintegration of ex-combatants, are not covered in the flash appeal. However, United Nations agencies are already re-establishing their offices in Freetown and are eager to restart their social and economic development programmes, important components of which must be the re-building of the capacity of the Government of Sierra Leone to deliver services, stimulate economic recovery and promote national reconciliation and reconstruction.

Commencement of the repatriation of refugees

32. At the request of President Kabbah, and with the help of a donation of \$120,000 from the Government of Japan, UNHCR has begun to prepare for the repatriation from Conakry of up to 5,000 Sierra Leonean refugees, including 200 civil servants who fled Freetown after the May coup d'état and who will be engaged in the administration of the country.

33. ECOMOG control of major towns in southern Sierra Leone is also likely to encourage the early repatriation by road of Sierra Leonean refugees from Liberia. It is further expected that the removal of the junta could lead to the repatriation of the 400,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in the West African subregion.

34. Of the total caseload of Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone, some 2,800 have thus far been re-registered with UNHCR, about half of them requesting repatriation. UNHCR has begun making arrangements for them to be repatriated by sea.

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United Nations Development Programme mission to Sierra Leone

35. A multi-unit mission to Sierra Leone dispatched by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has proposed four projects for immediate implementation following their approval by the Government. These are:

(a) A start-up project for the demobilization of various categories of combatants;

(b) Support for national institutions to enable a rapid return to normal functioning;

(c) Resettlement with emphasis on quick-impact micro-projects, reconciliation and youth development;

(d) Awareness-raising in order to help the country come to terms with the problems it faces and to promote national reconciliation and peace-building.

36. The mission is also assisting the Government to prepare a document for a donors' consultation proposed to be held in Brussels on 31 March 1998. UNDP plans to close its Coordination Office in Conakry by the end of March if the security situation continues to stabilize, and to return the staff of its Country Office to Freetown.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

37. The developments that have taken place in Sierra Leone since the submission of my last report should be seen as positive in the context of the wider situation in which they transpired. The removal of the junta by the action of ECOMOG has opened the way for the re-establishment not just of the legitimate Government, but also of civil order, the democratic process and the beginnings of economic and social development. The return of President Kabbah to Freetown on 10 March therefore presents the people of Sierra Leone and the international community with a challenge and an opportunity which must be grasped with a sense of urgency. We must not let slip the chance to restore Sierra Leone to the ranks of democratic nations and to help strengthen the stability of the subregion.

38. I commend the consistent diplomacy of ECOWAS and, in particular, its Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, and the contribution made by ECOMOG officers and men to the removal of the military junta. I call on ECOWAS and ECOMOG to continue their efforts to bring peace to Sierra Leone in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 1132 (1997) and of the Charter of the United Nations. Sierra Leoneans committed to the democratic system also played their part in maintaining a stubborn resistance to the illegal regime. These included not only the members of the Civil Defence Forces, but also countless unarmed civilians who persistently withheld their cooperation from the regime and denied it legitimacy. I salute the courage of the Sierra Leonean people and honour the memory of those who died opposing the junta.

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39. I also congratulate President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on his resumption of his responsibilities as Head of State of Sierra Leone following his return. The United Nations should give his Government every possible assistance in its efforts to promote national reconciliation among his people and to strengthen the authority and capacity of his Government.

40. As I stated in my message to the annual summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity at Harare, and in the special message which was delivered by my Special Envoy, Mr. Ibrahima Fall, on the occasion of President Kabbah's return, Africa can no longer tolerate or accept as faits accomplis coups d'état against elected Governments or the illegal seizure of power by military cliques.

Strengthening the office of the Special Envoy

41. In order to take full and prompt advantage of the changed situation, I wish to propose a comprehensive set of measures to assist the Government and people of Sierra Leone in both their immediate and longer-term needs. As a first step, I intend to strengthen the office of my Special Envoy in Freetown. In order to contribute to the restoration of respect for the rule of law, civil order and human rights in Sierra Leone, I have consulted with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights concerning the possible deployment of human rights observers. In the meantime, a human rights officer will be attached to the office of my Special Envoy at an early date.

42. I am also considering attaching to the office two civilian police officials to advise the Government on police training and procedures in a democratic society. An additional political officer and a military adviser would assist my Special Envoy in his consultations with ECOMOG on the development of planning for disarmament and demobilization, while a humanitarian officer would facilitate the coordination of activities of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations in Sierra Leone and advise my Special Envoy on all issues involving non-governmental organizations. The office will also require a public information programme to disseminate information among the population about its activities, in particular in connection with the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants and their reintegration into society.

Deployment of military liaison personnel

43. I also recommend the deployment to Sierra Leone of up to 10 United Nations military liaison officers, whose functions would be as follows:

(a) To liaise closely with ECOMOG and to report on the military situation in the country;

(b) To ascertain the state of and to assist in the finalization of planning by ECOMOG for future tasks such as the identification of the former combatant elements to be disarmed and the design of a disarmament plan.

44. Should the Security Council decide to authorize the deployment of these military liaison officers, as well as the military and civilian police advisers, as indicated in my third report (S/1998/103, para. 35), the costs relating

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thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to the special account to be established for Sierra Leone. The related cost estimates will be issued shortly as an addendum to the present report.

45. The military liaison team would complement the role of the military advisers who will, under the authority of my Special Envoy, continue to assist the Government of Sierra Leone to resolve issues related to the disarmament process. The military advisers will also be instrumental in assisting the Government of Sierra Leone in the development of planning for bilateral programmes to restructure and rebuild appropriate security forces for Sierra Leone in the future. In view of the importance of such retraining, I appeal to potential donors to show generosity in providing bilateral assistance.

46. The presence of United Nations military liaison officers, perhaps later supplemented by human rights observers, could also assist in the process of national reconciliation in Sierra Leone. Their close cooperation with ECOMOG in the countryside and their impartial reporting to my Special Envoy would reassure former combatants that they can surrender their weapons in safety.

Provision of humanitarian assistance


47. The provision of humanitarian assistance must also proceed expeditiously. The plight of Sierra Leoneans deprived of food, medical care and shelter by the recent fighting and the abuses of junta rule is acute, and it must be addressed as a matter of urgency with all the resources available to the aid agencies. While I remain deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation in many parts of the country, I am encouraged by news that humanitarian needs are beginning to be addressed. Food aid and emergency medical supplies have entered the country through the port of Freetown and have been delivered to some provinces by plane, helicopter and overland in a prompt and coordinated manner.

Contributions to the Trust Fund

48. I call on Member States to display generosity in contributing to the Trust Fund for Sierra Leone which, with the encouragement of the Security Council, I have established. My appreciation goes to the Government of the United Kingdom, which has already announced its readiness to contribute £2 million, and has been actively assisting in the provision of aid to Sierra Leoneans. I also urge all Member States to provide generous assistance to ECOMOG to enable it to meet its logistical requirements and to fulfil its mandate in Sierra Leone.

49. The events that have taken place in Sierra Leone over the past year carry a warning that similar crises may arise and challenge the international community to consider how it should respond to them. Democracy in Sierra Leone may have deep roots, but it is a fragile plant and must be nurtured. The international community must maintain its vigilance and support, not least in the prompt provision of emergency bilateral and multilateral aid. Assistance for the laudable efforts of ECOWAS and the logistical requirements of ECOMOG as it continues its deployment through the countryside will also be required. I trust that such support will be forthcoming.

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Map No. 3902 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS
January 1997

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

57) Joint Communique

Meeting between the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to
Sierra Leone and the Delegation of the Revolutionary United Front
Abidjan 19-21 February 1999

MEETING BETWEEN THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO SIERRA LEONE
AND THE DELEGATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
UNITED FRONT
ABIDJAN, 19-21 FEBRUARY 1999

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

1. The Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General to Sierra Leone, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, accompanied by the UNOMSIL Deputy Chief Military Observer, Col. David Chepkwony and Political Affairs Officer, Mr. Modem Lawson-Betum, and the Legal Representative of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Mr. Omrie Michael Golley, and the RUF Senior Military Adviser, Gen. Ibrahima Bah, met on 19-21 February 1999 at the HOTEL IVOIRE in Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire) to review the situation in Sierra Leone, including the holding of dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and the RUF pursuant to the offer made by President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah on 7 February 1999.
2. The Special Representative and the RUF Delegation also discussed the need for the observance of human rights and international humanitarian laws, and for addressing the serious humanitarian crisis in Sierra Leone, and taking practical steps to speed up the convening of the internal RUF consultations and dialogue between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone, including: i) The RUF commitment to peace; ii) The venue, format and duration of preliminary and subsequent substantive consultations; iii) The requirements for the declaration of a ceasefire; iv) The need to provide logistical assistance to RUF and to facilitate communication between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone and the ECOMOG High Command.
3. The Special Representative and the RUF Delegation stressed the need to make every effort to end the suffering of the people of Sierra Leone and to vigorously and relentlessly pursue dialogue to achieve genuine and lasting peace and stability in Sierra Leone. In this regard, the RUF Delegation welcomed the recent offer of dialogue by President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his renewed commitment to peace talks. The RUF Delegation also called on the United Nations to continue to provide the needed moral authority and support for the dialogue and the peace process.

I. COMMITMENT TO DIALOGUE AND THE PEACE PROCESS:

4. The RUF Delegation reiterated the firm commitment of its Movement to engage in a constructive and sincere dialogue with the Government of Sierra Leone, leading to sustainable peace and stability, in accordance with the aspirations of the Sierra Leonean people. In this connection, it stressed the crucial importance of creating a climate of sincerity, mutual respect and spirit of accommodation. It welcomed the GOSL's offer of dialogue on the understanding that: i) The legitimacy of the elected Government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was never questioned by

the RUF; ii) The RUF is not fighting against the innocent civilian population but against ECOMOG and CDF; iii) No preconditions should be set by either party, which would impede the start of dialogue.

5. The Special Representative conveyed the unswerving commitment of the Security Council and the UN Secretary General to support all efforts aimed at ensuring an early start of dialogue and setting a reasonable time frame for a peaceful resolution of the Sierra Leonean conflict.

II. VENUE, FORMAT AND CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN FODAY SANKOH AND MR. ...

6. The Special Representative and the RUF ... for a meeting between Foday Sankoh and RUF members in order for the Front ... the substantive dialogue with the Government. These internal consultations will give ... the opportunity to be fully briefed and to undergo medical check-up.

7. The Special representative and the RUF Delegation also stressed that the internal RUF consultations should be held in a secure place to allow for effective and extensive discussions during a reasonable time period, and that the issue of venue and format for the internal consultations should be addressed in a spirit of mutual accommodation. The Special Representative and the RUF Delegation further underlined that the issue of venue and format for the internal consultations should not delay the start of substantive dialogue.

8. The RUF Delegation said that while taking note of the proposals of venue made by the Government regarding the internal RUF consultations, it would make the following recommendations in order of preference, subject to final ratification: i) Ouagadougou (under the sponsorship of the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, President Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso); ii) Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire); iii) Lome (Togo as Chairman of ECOWAS). The Delegation expressed the hope that the necessary arrangements would be made to provide security, safe passage and transportation guarantees to enable Mr. Foday Sankoh and the RUF Delegation to travel to whatever venue would finally be agreed upon. It further expressed the wish that the United Nations would consider the possibility of assigning Military Observers to be involved in making the needed security arrangements.

9. The RUF Delegation stated that the RUF and the AFRC constituted a single unified structure.

10. The RUF Delegation also requested the United Nations to assist in: i) Facilitating the establishment of regular contacts between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone and the ECOMOG High Command; ii) Lifting the travel ban imposed by the Security Council on the

RUF/AFRC leaders to permit them to participate in the internal RUF consultations and the subsequent RUF/GOSL dialogue.

III. DECLARATION OF CEASEFIRE:

11. The RUF Delegation and the Special Representative recognized the importance of a ceasefire to facilitate dialogue. In this context, the RUF Delegation expressed the readiness of the RUF to consider a ceasefire with the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOMOG and the CDF at the beginning of the internal RUF consultations provided United Nations Military Observers were immediately deployed to monitor and verify strict compliance with the said ceasefire. However, it maintained that in the spirit of peace and reconciliation, Foday Sankoh should not be held in custody after the preliminary consultations as this would constitute a retrograde step in the dialogue process-

IV. RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:

12. The Special Representative stressed the importance of the observance of human rights in accordance with international standards, as called for by the Security Council and the UN Secretary General, and urged all parties to the conflict to publicly make this commitment. The RUF Delegation agreed to make this commitment publicly and stated that the RUF will take punitive measures against any of its members who would violate human rights. In this context, the RUF Delegation stated that it condemned and will continue to condemn all human rights violations and atrocities including amputations, mutilations, maiming, rape etc.... perpetrated against the civilian population.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION:

13. The RUF Delegation and the Special Representative stressed the need to make every effort to facilitate the unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance to the needy population in all parts of Sierra Leone. In this regard, the RUF Delegation stated that the RUF will strictly respect the neutrality of humanitarian organizations and their staff, and will take the necessary practical steps to facilitate their operations including the designation of Senior Humanitarian Liaison Officers to liaise with these organizations and to ensure free access to the needy population in all areas of the country, including those under RUF control. The Special Representative and the RUF Delegation stated that the humanitarian organizations should, in turn, observe the principle of neutrality in the conduct of their operations.

VI. FOLLOW-UP CONTACTS:

14. The Special Representative and the RUF Delegation agreed to maintain regular contacts as a follow up to the outstanding issues discussed in the present communique.

SIGNED FOR THE RUF:

SIGNED FOR THE UNITED NATIONS




Mr. Omrie Michael Golley
Legal Representative,
Revolutionary United Front




Mr. Francis G. Okelo
Special Representative of the Secretary
General to Sierra Leone

Gen. Ibrahima Bah
Senior Military Adviser,
Revolutionary United Front



WITNESSED BY
S.E.M. AMARA ESSY
FOREIGN MINISTER
REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D'IVOIRE



Done at Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), on 21 February 1999

58) United Nations Document

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 4-5 June 1997, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, para. 5.

[✉ Email this document](#)

Source: UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs

Date: 5 Jun 1997

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 04 - 05 Jun 1997

This report has been prepared by the office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Sierra Leone

SECURITY

1. According to local UN staff in Freetown several people were killed on 4 June from indiscriminate shooting by RUF patrolling the streets. The EU delegate reported that Nigerian citizens have been deliberately targeted. There have also been unconfirmed reports of amputations. Looting has continued and more cars have been taken from UN house and from residential premises. Civilians are nervous about the threat of Nigerian air strikes primarily on account of continuous announcements made by the AFRC over the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Services warning the population of the possibility of attacks and advising them to stay indoors. On a more positive note, the Nigerian soldiers being held as hostages have been released and have returned to their barracks at Jui. The Cape Sierra hotel remains untouched although UN vehicles parked outside are being looted.

2. The Sierra Leonean Ambassador to Guinea, who was taken hostage in Kailahun in March 1997 together with other members of the Commission for the Consolidation for Peace, was brought to Freetown by Sam Bockarie, the RUF commander who masterminded the operation. The Ambassador reported that the other hostages were still alive.

SERVICES

3. The population continues to suffer from continued shortages of basic amenities including food, fuel and cash. Food stores were, however, open from 1000-1800 hours on 5 June. Business have remained closed but the banks have indicated that they will open on 9 June. The National Power Authority continues to supply electricity throughout the city but it is only a matter of time before the diesel generators run out of fuel. Pipe-borne water continues to be supplied to the capital from the reservoir in Guma Valley but fuel shortages will have a negative impact on the capacity to purify the water supply. ICRC is in the process of despatching a water engineer to Freetown to make an assessment of the current situation.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

4. On 4 June a BBC round table discussion was held. During the course of the programme Desmond Luke, Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, stated that almost the entire civil society vehemently opposed the coup and wanted the democratically elected Government to be restored. President Kabbah, who is still in Guinea, made a statement over the BBC assuring the population that the democratically elected Government was still intact. He stated that his Government

was pushing for a diplomatic solution to the crisis but did not rule out the military option.

5. On 4 June Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) called ministers and deputy ministers of the SLPP Government and heads of political parties to a meeting to discuss ways of averting external military intervention. Six ministers attended the meeting and political parties present included the SLPP, APC and the UNPR. The RUF was represented by Sam Bockarie. One of the ministers in attendance reported that attempts by the AFRC to persuade those present to collaborate were rejected as it was unanimously stated that the AFRC should step down.

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Food

6. ICRC started to distribute food provided by World Vision to two hospitals in Freetown on 5 June. Beneficiaries at the Connaught hospital received a full ration and those at Netland nursing home received a supplementary ration. One of the ACF feeding centres in Freetown has also received food.

7. ICRC has reopened its office in Segbwema with a view to completing its distribution of seeds and tools into the chiefdoms in the vicinity of Daru and Segbwema before the rainy season commences in earnest. The vulnerable group feeding programme will start in Segbwema, Daru and Zimmi when ICRC receives the list of eligible beneficiaries from the US Food for Peace officer who is currently in Conakry.

8. More information on food stocks of humanitarian agencies in Sierra Leone has been gathered and it has emerged that agency warehouses have not been looted as extensively as previously thought. Current estimated food stocks are as follows:

WFP:	4,800 MTs
CRS*:	5,000 MTs
German Agro-Action:	800 MTs
World Vision:	4,410 MTs
CARE:	1,700 MTs
TOTAL:	16,710 MTs

* CRS has 5,000 MTs of bulgur remaining. The quantity of other CRS food commodities has not yet been determined.

9. As it is estimated that 3,000 MTs of food services 500,000 beneficiaries per month on a reduced (i.e., survival) ration, the food availability situation is not yet critical. However, the outlook could deteriorate very rapidly if the price of rice continues to soar as the temptation for the local population to loot aid food will become overwhelming. In this scenario shortages will occur, particularly with regard to vegetable oil and therapeutic and supplementary foodstuffs as over 80 percent of existing food stocks is in the form of cereals.

10. There are also many constraints in distribution food such as insufficient transport, fuel shortages, insecurity and a lack of management. The food agencies will meet on

9 June in Conakry in order to discuss these constraints and develop a joint strategy. In the meantime, WFP advocates that priority in any food distributions should be given to institutions, especially hospitals, in order to minimise the risk of further looting. It is believed that food shortages will be less severe outside Freetown but this situation will deteriorate with the onset of the rainy season and the traditional "hungry season" (July to October).

Health

11. In addition to distributing medical supplies to the Connaught hospital, the Netland nursing home and the hospital at Wilberforce barracks in Freetown, ICRC has reopened its clinic in Kenema as the Government hospital has closed down.

12. The ICRC and MSF surgical teams (see point 11, SitRep dated 2-3 June) arrived in Freetown during the afternoon of 5 June.

13. WHO has reported that its medical supplies including drugs, IV fluids and oral rehydration salts kept at the store at UN house and the Ministry of Health have been almost entirely looted. The stolen items are valued at approximately USD 180,000.

Humanitarian Response in Guinea

14. It is clear that the AFRC/RUF has been trying to discourage Freetown residents from leaving the Western area peninsula as many of those attempting to move north have been turned back by armed elements at Waterloo. If living conditions in Freetown continue to deteriorate, it is possible that a mass exodus could occur which the authorities would be unable to prevent. In this case, it is likely that the population would head towards Kambia province and Guinea.

15. On 5 June ECHO convened a meeting attended by UN Agencies and NGOs from both Sierra Leone and Guinea to formulate an appropriate contingency plan which could be used if the scenario depicted above were to occur. Preliminary estimates of resource availability in the areas of health, food, non-food items, water and sanitation and logistics have been made. Sectoral committees will meet next week to build on these preliminary estimates of resource availability. Issues relating to access need to be clarified. Efforts to determine the position of the Guinean Government to asylum seekers and aid agencies wishing to provide cross border humanitarian assistance into Sierra Leone are being made.

THIS REPORT IS AVAILABLE ON THE INTERNET THROUGH RELIEFWEB:
[HTTP://WWW.RELIEFWEB.INT](http://WWW.RELIEFWEB.INT)

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59) United Nations Document

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 17 July – 10 August 1999, Section 1,2,3,5.

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Date: 10 Aug 1999

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report: 17 Jul - 10 Aug 1999

1. Summary

This reporting period was dominated by gradual progress towards the implementation of the peace process and the expansion of humanitarian aid, followed by a number of worrying security incidents. The taking of hostages in Okra Hills, combined with other security incidents in RUF/AFRC held areas have temporarily but severely limited the scope of possible operations in areas which appear to be rapidly deteriorating. The hostage incident occurred even as aid agencies were on the verge of bringing relief to tens of thousands of civilians whose humanitarian conditions, assessed for the first time in months, had been classified as desperate. In particular, the nutrition situation in most up-country areas is deeply disturbing, and requires urgent action to avoid serious short and long-term damage to civilian livelihoods.

On the political front, some progress has been made towards the implementation of the Peace Accord. Humanitarian agencies believe that two priorities warrant the most attention: the immediate and effective commencement of the DDR programme, and support to the RUF/AFRC leadership to sensitize armed groups in all their areas of control, on the various provisions in the Peace Accord.

2. Political Developments

Parties make gradual progress on the Implementation of the Peace Accord

According to UN SRSG Ambassador Francis Okelo, the international community has generally welcomed the Peace Agreement with the exception of some reservations on the human rights aspect, in particular, the granting of blanket amnesty to members of the RUF/AFRC and other armed groups. Since the signing of the Agreement, both the Government and the RUF have taken significant steps to fulfil some of their obligations on schedule, although some specific deadlines have not been met.

GOSL

On the government side, Parliament unanimously ratified the Peace Agreement on 15 July and subsequently adopted legislation necessary for the implementation of the Agreement. This has paved the way for the transformation of the RUF/SL into a political party and for its senior members to hold public office. Furthermore, the GOSL has initiated the establishment of the Commission for the Strategic Management of Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) which is to be chaired by Cpl. Foday Sankoh. The Government also released military and political prisoners in line with the pardon and amnesty clause under Article IX of the agreement (84 were released in July).

In order to maintain the momentum in the peace process among members of the public, the GOSL is making efforts to coordinate various initiatives for a nation-wide sensitization

campaign on the Peace Accord. In this context, the Ministry of Information has developed a project proposal aimed at the dissemination of the Agreement at all levels of society.

The GOSL in collaboration with other partners has completed the first phase of the DDR programme with the discharge of 1,408 ex-SLA soldiers. The Lungi DDR centre has been reopened and is now receiving ex-soldiers who surrendered in advance of the start of DDR. Consultations are underway to define the relationship between ECOMOG and UNOMSIL with regard to the implementation of the DDR programme. The new ECOMOG Force Commander, Major General Gabriel Kpamber has on a number of occasions registered ECOMOG's preparedness to demonstrate its sincerity and commitment to the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement especially as it relates to its role in DDR. UNOMSIL Military Observers continue to maintain close relations with the rebel commanders on the ground, to explain the provisions for DDR in the Peace Agreement.

RUF/SL

An advance team of RUF/AFRC has been based in Freetown since the beginning of August. They participated in the first meeting of the Joint Implementation Committee (JIC) held in Freetown on 7 August. The meeting, which was attended by representatives of the GOSL, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Liberia, Libya, Togo, RUF/SL, USA, ECOWAS, OAU, the Commonwealth of Nations and the UN, reviewed and assessed the status of the implementation of the Peace Agreement. During the meeting, RUF representatives submitted nominations for the Cabinet and the various commissions and committees established under the Agreement, paving the way for the formation of the integrated government and the establishment of the various commissions and committees. Meanwhile, RUF leader Cpl. Foday Sankoh is yet to arrive to take up office in Freetown. The RUF members in Freetown are consulting with the GOSL and other concerned parties to finalize arrangements for his arrival.

Regarding commitments to guarantee unhindered humanitarian access, RUF/SL commanders have welcomed various humanitarian missions in some of their areas of control, and have shown willingness to cooperate with agencies in providing adequate security for the start of relief operations. However, the present arrangements are ad-hoc, as a global access mechanism, including all parties is yet to be established. The RUF has also released some prisoners of war and abductees, although large numbers reportedly remain captives at their various locations.

Resource Mobilization

UN calls for increased commitments

With the mounting political and humanitarian challenges in Sierra Leone, the UN has intensified efforts to advocate for greater international assistance to support the country's peace process, as well as an improved security environment for emergency interventions. In a recent Statement, the UN Secretary-General expressed his concern about the poor response of the international community to the humanitarian needs of victims of war and natural disasters in many parts of Africa. The Statement listed Sierra Leone as one of the countries whose serious humanitarian needs cannot be met due to inadequate resources. In this context, the Security Council in its

Resolution 874 on Sierra Leone urged donors to respond to the needs of UN agencies as presented in the revised consolidated interagency appeal for 1999. The 1999 Appeal requested \$28 million for humanitarian programmes in Sierra Leone, but by mid year, only 27 per cent had been received. (for Mid-term Review of SL 1999 Appeal, refer to www.reliefweb.int).

Specifically, the Security Council Resolution stresses the need for the international community and the GOSL to design and implement programmes to address the special needs of war victims, in particular those who have suffered maiming and mutilation. The Council further called upon all parties "to ensure the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in need in Sierra Leone, to guarantee the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and to strictly respect the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law." Members also authorized the provisional expansion of UNOMSIL to 210 Military Observers. They called on the RUF and all other armed groups to begin immediately disbanding and surrendering their arms in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement. In this context, the Council urged all states and international organizations to provide resources to help ensure the successful conduct of the DDR programme. Welcoming the adoption of the Human Rights Manifesto by the parties concerned, members stressed the need for international assistance to address the human rights issues in the country as a step towards accountability. The Council also supported the decision of the SG that the UN develops a Strategic Framework approach for Sierra Leone in consultation with national and international partners.

The SL International Contact Group pledges further support for peace process:

To further support the efforts of the parties in consolidating peace, the International Contact Group met in London on 28 July to see how the members could best address the resource requirements of the country. The meeting focused on DDR as a priority and members committed to providing adequate resources to effect the programme, in addition to some \$19.1 million already pledged by the British government and the World Bank. According to official sources, about \$40 million will be required to meet the needs of an estimated 40,000 combatants.

3. Security Update

Hostage incident resolved

Following the successful initiation of contacts with rebel commanders in their areas of control, and the commencement of work by NGOs and the UN, a number of security incidents forced a re-evaluation of the situation. The most significant security development during this review period was the abduction of 42 persons, including UN and ECOMOG personnel, Sierra Leone aid workers and journalists by ex-soldiers of the AFRC. The situation was resolved on 10 August after five days of negotiations involving the GOSL, RUF/AFRC, UNOMSIL, and hostage experts from the UK. The team, which was led by UNOMSIL, had gone to Okra Hills on 4 August to receive some 200 civilian abductees held at Magbeni village when the rebels took them hostage.

The last group of hostages was released on 10 August along with 200 civilians. The rebels admitted that their action was in violation of the Ceasefire Agreement, but said they did so to

secure the release of their leader, Johnny Paul Koroma, who they believed had been held prisoner by the RUF for the past seven months. Both the RUF and Johnny Paul Koroma himself denied the allegation. The rebels also said they had seized the hostages because they felt left out of the peace process and their food and medical needs were not being met. Four of the field commanders were assisted to travel to Monrovia to discuss their grievances with J.P. Koroma.

Monitoring the Ceasefire Agreement

With the exception of the hostage incident at Okra Hills, UN Military Observers have reported that the Ceasefire continues to be respected by the parties, who have refrained from engaging in direct conflict with each other. The observers have however reported many incidents involving elements of the RUF/AFRC who are foraging for food and in the process carrying out raids into villages. Consistent abuses of human rights are reported in these raids, many of which are currently taking place in Port Loko district. Also reported and confirmed by UNOMSIL observers are movements of RUF/AFRC personnel into the Western Area without their arms, posing a major concern for Freetown residents.

Of equal concern to humanitarian agencies has been a number of serious incidents in up-country areas. Incidents in Rokupr, Makeni and Okra Hills have resulted in threats against the lives of staff, the beating of national staff, the theft of personal items, and the looting of relief assets. This contrasts sharply with RUF-controlled areas in the East where visits have been incident-free. There have also been persisting reports of harassment by CDF forces in the southern and eastern provinces. Drivers plying the Freetown-Bo/Kenema highways are reportedly molested and harassed on the 76 checkpoints along the highway. According to some accounts, truck drivers and other transport owners are forced to spend two days to cover 150 miles to Bo. The combined effect of these incidents has interfered with the planned expansion of humanitarian programmes throughout the country. NGO and UN Humanitarian Agencies continue to work on a daily basis with all parties concerned in an attempt to find solutions and ensure a secure working environment.

Fighting in Liberia raises concerns in Sierra Leone

As the last group of hostages was being released on 10 August, Liberian rebels invaded Lofa County, taking hostage six international aid workers. According to reports, the rebels, who are fighting against President Charles Taylor, captured and occupied the town of Kolahun and surrounding villages, about 250 km northwest of Monrovia. The six European aid workers from MERLIN, MSF and IRC were later released unharmed, although substantial relief assets have been reported as looted in Lofa County. On the same day of the attack, RUF commander Sam Bockarie accused Guinean troops of attacking RUF positions in Kailahun District near the Guinean border. In a BBC interview, he threatened a resumption of hostilities if the attacks did not cease. The GOSL said it had carried out investigations but was unable to confirm the allegation, maintaining that neither its forces nor the Guinean government had any knowledge of the incident. News reports have since linked the alleged attack to the ongoing fighting in Lofa County.

The unfolding crisis in Liberia is being closely watched here in Sierra Leone. Although public opinion is divided on the issue, majority of the people perceive the eruption of fighting in that country as bearing ominous concerns for the Sierra Leone peace endeavours.

4. Human Rights

Noting that the Peace Accord does not provide for a specific body exclusively tasked with supervision of implementation of the human rights provisions, members of the Human Rights Committee decided to establish a tracking mechanism aimed at systematically monitoring implementation of the human rights provisions. This is to allow a clear assessment of the status of each of the key commitments and inform the parties concerned to take corrective measures where appropriate. Focal points have been selected to cover the different issues.

As part of its technical cooperation with the GOSL, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights sent three consultants in July and August to assist with the creation of the National Human Rights Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

5. Humanitarian Highlights

Status of implementation of agreement on unhindered humanitarian access (Article XXVII)

Following agreements to guarantee unhindered humanitarian access to all parts of Sierra Leone, the humanitarian community, in the last weeks of July, held a number of consultations with the RUF/AFRC High Command to finalize arrangements for assessing the situation of nearly half of the country under RUF/AFRC control. Despite initial delays, assessment missions commenced in the third week of July with the northern town of Makeni and the eastern town of Kailahun. Since then, more locations have been assessed and relief activities are slowly being expanded in newly accessed areas. However, large areas of the country have still not been assessed. Agencies are concerned that despite the Joint Statement on humanitarian access, access continues to be granted on an ad-hoc basis and the present arrangement does not as yet reflect a joint responsibility by both parties. The Implementation Committee established in Lome for this purpose is yet to convene.

Given the security problems described in section 3, further expansion of humanitarian work awaits the provision of a secure working environment. To establish mutually agreed structures for access throughout the country, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator met with the leaders of the RUF and with concerned officials of the GOSL to discuss the modalities for holding the first meeting of the Implementation Committee this month.

Among areas recently assessed by inter-agency humanitarian missions are towns and villages in the northern districts of Kambia, Tonkolili, Port Loko and Koinadugu, and the eastern district of Kailahun. In all the areas, agencies describe the humanitarian situation as grave. In particular, malnutrition rates of children and nursing mothers in the most affected locations have reached the highest levels ever recorded in the country since the start of the conflict. Small-scale relief activities have been established in each of these areas addressing the most urgent needs of health, nutrition and food assistance. Table I below represents the current status of accessibility due to

security conditions. It does not however imply that full-scale operations are being undertaken in all accessible areas as factors other than security also affect the degree of intervention in each location such as lack of capacity (resources and manpower), and impassable road conditions. Tables II and III reflect current and pending operational areas of agencies.

Table I

DISTRICT	Accessibility	Controlled by
Bo	Full	GOSL
Bombali	Partial	RUF/AFRC
Bonthe	Full	GOSL
Kambia	None	RUF/AFRC
Kailahun	Partial	RUF/AFRC
Kenema	Partial	GOSL/RUF/AFRC
Koinadugu	Partial (Kabala)	GOSL
Kono	None	RUF/AFRC
Moyamba	Full	GOSL
Port Loko	Partial	GOSL/RUF/AFRC
Pujehun	Full	GOSL
Tonkolili	Partial	RUF/AFRC
Western Area	Full	GOSL

6. Sectoral Interventions

Health and Nutrition

Ongoing support for health programmes

UNICEF, WHO and UNFPA have continued to support health partners in all operational areas, including technical support to the MOHS and supply of drugs and medical equipment to support health programmes and facilities. On 21 July, Health agencies supported EPI surveillance workshops in Bo and Kenema in preparation for the NID programmes, which will be held on 9 October, 6 November and 11 December 1999. UNICEF and WHO are assisting with logistics, training, as well as provision of cold chain equipment. Emergency health activities continue unhindered in main hospitals and IDP camps in accessible districts. MSF-B's emergency support to the Brookfield hospital in Freetown ended in July since the organization is not mandated to support private hospitals. (See Table IV for status of health intervention in IDP camps in the Western Area).

Combating measles outbreaks

Health agencies have intensified efforts to forestall measles outbreaks in various regions. Vaccination campaigns are ongoing at various locations including newly accessed areas in the east. During this review period, MSF-B with support from UNICEF organized a vaccination exercise in Daru and surroundings where measles outbreaks were recently confirmed. In Moyamba district, MRC is undertaking measles surveillance in Kamajei, Korri and Kowa chiefdoms. Meanwhile, MSF-B reported a measles outbreak in Jong chiefdom. Agencies in the area launched an intensive vaccination campaign with 94 per cent coverage of the target population. The patients are receiving treatment at various clinics in the area. During this month, AFRICARE, which began outreach medical services along the Wanjei river for the benefit of the Mano Sakrim and Kwame Bai Krim chiefdoms in the Pujehun and Bonthe districts also transferred some measles cases from there to the TFC in Bo.

Preventing cholera outbreaks

As the cholera season peaks in the next weeks, the MOHS, UNICEF and health NGOs have intensified efforts to prevent any outbreak of the disease in the country. The GOSL has allocated Le 10 million (US\$ 5,500) to the cholera preparedness programme. In the provinces, agencies have maintained cholera prevention campaigns including chlorination of some 4,167 wells and water sources in Bo, Bonthe, Port Loko and Kambia districts. The intervention is backed by health education programmes. Meanwhile, in the Western Area, the cholera task force reported a 50 per cent reduction in the incidence of bloody diarrhoea. According to their report, the numbers went down from 240 within the first half of June to 112 during the same period in July. The Task Force confirms that adequate supplies of cholera treatment drugs have been prepositioned in the country to strengthen medical response for any outbreak.

Addressing needs in newly accessed areas

With the gradual improvement of the security situation, a number of agencies have been able to respond to the desperate humanitarian conditions reported in Yele, Tonkolili district. (See SITREP 11 June to 18 May). To address the health needs of some 15,000 IDPs, MRC established a temporary clinic, which is being operated at a cost recovery basis, with about 800 patients seen each day. ACF on its part has conducted comprehensive nutritional surveys confirming earlier reports of serious malnutrition problems in the area. They have subsequently taken appropriate action to respond to the identified needs. Severely malnourished cases have been transferred to their TFC in Bo, while a supplementary feeding centre established during this review period, is catering for those classified as moderately malnourished, (about 200 by mid August). It is expected that this facility might be extended to Konta where the medical situation is also said to be deplorable. The current efforts in Yele are being complemented by CARE, which is providing regular food rations to the IDPs there.

In Port Loko district, agencies are expanding health, nutrition and food security activities. UNICEF is refurbishing the cold room in the district and will provide a generator to support routine EPI activities. At the same time, the Emergency Health Task Force is planning to expand primary health care activities throughout the district. Children's Aid Direct (CAD) is supporting five health clinics in Loko Masama chiefdom, in collaboration with the MOHS and UNICEF. A

dry ration programme for malnourished children is being carried out at the clinics with a caseload of 480 children registered by end of July.

With the resumption of health activities at the Kabala Government Hospital in Koinadugu district, UNICEF and MSF-B continue to provide drugs and medical supplies. Minor surgeries are now being performed at the hospital. The first attempt at the beginning of the month to access the town by road proved unsuccessful due to lack of security guarantees along the Makeni-Kabala route and general bad road conditions. At present, re-supplies for the health activities there are only possible by air.

In Makeni, MSF-H began rehabilitating the Out Patient Department of the Government hospital on 4 August. An MOHS doctor is now working at the hospital with support from MSF-H, which provided a two-week supply of drugs. However, re-supply has not been possible due to uncertain security conditions in the area.

In Kambia district, MSF-H is supporting six clinics. Though their field workers have not been able to gain access to Kambia town since rebel attacks began in February 1999, they have relocated to a village five km north of Kambia town, where they are providing limited health services to IDPs fleeing hostilities in the area. Supplies have so far been provided by boat from neighbouring Guinea. MSF-H plans to train health staff in the area, in anticipation for possible expansion of programmes should security conditions improve.

According to a recent report by the International Medical Corps (IMC), mortality rate on Tasso Island due to diarrhoea has dropped from 6.1 per cent in April 1999 to 0 per cent by end of July. To address the nutritional problem on the Island, IMC established a supplementary feeding centre to serve moderate cases, while the severely malnourished are taken to the ACF TFC in Freetown. IMC is maintaining bi-weekly monitoring visits to the Island.

Nutrition

As access to greater parts of the country reveals deteriorating nutritional conditions in many areas, relevant agencies are combining efforts to improve nutrition and household food security information systems. At a workshop organized by UNICEF on 12 August, participating agencies agreed on data collection tools for the Nutrition and Household Food Security Information System (NHFSIS). UNICEF will begin training enumerators in September. The System will be piloted in eight chiefdoms in Pujehun and Bo districts. UNICEF has contracted two staff members to assist with the programme.

As a result of increased and more effective screening exercises, ACF has reported a significant rise in the number of malnourished cases in its operational areas. In Freetown alone, 200 new cases have been registered. Most of these are referred by other NGOs. The organization has appealed for tents to help accommodate the patients. The TFC in Bo now caters for 320 cases, a 30 per cent increase in just one month. Supplementary feeding centres are being established in the newly accessed areas.

MERLIN also reports the continuing deterioration of nutritional status of displaced in the eastern region. In Kenema, 440 cases are presently registered at the TFC, while some 170 cases are admitted at the TFC in Blama. As a measure to address the needs, MERLIN has expanded its therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes by constructing three large structures that will accommodate 750 additional children.

INFORMATION ON HEALTH STATUS IN IDP CAMPS, WESTERN AREA

Table IV

Name of Displaced Camp	Area/ Location	Managing Agency /NGO	Camp Popn.	Age		Health Implementing Agency	Water Source	No & Toilet Type	Priority
				<5yrs	<1yr				
1. Mandella Displaced Camp	Ross Road	ARD	412	72	25	114	MSF/H (Mobile)	Pipe Borne	9 Pit Latrines Malaria ARI
2. Waterloo	Newsite	ADRA	30,000	8,000	12,000	10,000	ADRA	Pipe Borne	22 Pit Latrines Malaria ARI Diarrhea
3. Parade Grounds	Circular Road	CORD. SL	767	162	31	170	MERLIN Through Macauley Street Satellite Clinic	Water Bouzer	12 Pit Latrines Malaria ARI
4. National Workshop	Cline Town	CARE	10,000	3,000	1,200	4,500	MSF/H	Water Bouzer	36 Pit Latrines Malaria ARI
5. Trade Centre	Kissy	EFSL	1,365	-	-	-	MSF/H (Mobile)	Pipe Borne	3 VIP Toilets Malaria ARI
6. Bailoh Barrie	Bai Bureh Road	SLRCS	1,350	305	209	350	SLRCS	Water Bouzer	6 Pit Latrines Malaria Diarrhea
7. Approved School	Wellington	IIRO	10,089	1,716	404	2,220	Concern World Wide	Protected Well & Pipe Borne	25 VIP Latrines Malaria Diarrhea Chicken Pox
8. Grafton	Grafton	GOAL	1,453	535	-	-	MSF/F	Pipe Borne	VIP (8) Toilets Malaria ARI
9. Murray Town	Aberdeen Road	MSF/F	946 people 264 Amputees	146	-	-	MSF/F	Pipe Borne	VIP Toilets Malaria Diarrhea ARI
10.	Brookfields	CCSL	5,000	1,850	-	-	MSF/F	Pipe	VIP

National Stadium								Borne	Toilets Malaria Diarrhea ARI
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Child Protection

RUF/AFRC release child abductees

At least 100 children were among 200 people freed by AFRC rebels on 10 August. The abductees were released along with the last batch of hostages taken by the rebels on 4 August. Initial screening of the teenage girls revealed that eight of them were pregnant, while six others were nursing mothers. One girl had a five-day old baby. According to UNICEF, the children, who were mostly in tattered clothes appeared weak and haggard. The latest release brings to just over 250 the total number of abducted children officially released by the RUF/AFRC rebels since the signing of the Peace Agreement. The first set of 187 abductees was released on 16 July 1999 out of which 121 were children under 18 years of age. Ten of them were pregnant and breast-feeding girls between 14 and 18 years of age. Another group of 36 was handed over to UNICEF by ECOMOG on 6 August. By the time of writing, UNICEF and child protection partners had reunified about 75 per cent of the children with their families. Those remaining in interim care mostly come from the provinces and will be reunified as soon as access to their locations permit tracing activities.

Meeting future challenges

The Government has called for the immediate and unconditional release of the many children and other civilians still being held in captivity, in accordance with commitments under the Lome Peace Agreement. UNICEF registered nearly 4,000 children as missing by parents in the Western Area after the RUF rebels invaded Freetown in January. By end of July, 865 had been traced and reunified while 3,120 still remain missing. Child protection agencies emphasize that the scale of this tragedy is much larger than that indicated by the above figures, which only reflect the greater Freetown area. It is safe to assume that large abductions also occurred in the provinces.

To support activities for child soldiers and released abductees, UNICEF has signed new project agreements with COOPI, IRC, and KDDO for support in psychosocial, family tracing, integration and foster care for UACs and child soldiers in the Western Area and southern and eastern provinces. The UN Foundation, USAID, Japan, SWEDEN, Australia, New Zealand, and the German Committee for UNICEF are funding the programme.

Meanwhile, agencies have prepositioned supplies in the Western Area, Bo and Kenema in preparation for UACs and released children needing interim care. In Kenema, the Child Protection Committee identified two buildings at the RTI camp to house an estimated 2,000 children, including children associated with the fighting forces and the unaccompanied children. WVI is considering funding an emergency preparedness proposal to train social workers in their areas of operation.

Raising Awareness on Sexual Abuse

The Committee on Sexual Abuse continues to expand activities. A proposal has been finalized for community sensitization for sexually abused victims. The objectives are to raise the awareness among victims about the availability of medical and counseling services and to encourage them to take advantage of these services. Communities will also be sensitized to cultivate a positive attitude towards victims. Journalists, religious, community leaders and school counselors/PTAs will be targeted. The NGO, Marie Stopes and MSF-H are also assisting with programmes for sexually abused children.

Caring for Street Children

The NGO GOAL in collaboration with UNICEF is providing community-based assistance to street children in the Western Area, including health care/nutrition, shelter, psychosocial care, non-formal education, and reunification activities. There are currently 135 children on the programme. GOAL plans to assess the situation of Street/Separated children in other parts of Sierra Leone with a view to establishing programmes in these areas.

Food Aid

Recent assessments of newly accessed areas indicate persisting food insecurity. Although more food is now available in the market with the opening of the main highways from Freetown to the provinces, most families are still dependent on cassava. When available, the price of rice is high and much beyond the purchasing power of the civilian population. In most places, income-generating activities are yet to be revitalized. ACF predicts that people will likely face increased hardship when the cassava harvest runs out in September, as very few families took the risk of cultivating rice fields. With the lack of medical care, poor drinking water and the prevailing hungry season, the plight of these villagers can be considered grave. Food security agencies have recommended targeted food distributions in these areas, especially for the villages on the Masiaka-Makeni, and Songo-Masiaka highways.

In response to the situation, the National Technical Committee on Food Aid has proposed an expanded vulnerable group feeding (VGF) distribution in affected areas, to increase the availability of food in the towns, while adhering to the principle of targeted programmes. The expanded VGF will target all U5 children, pregnant and lactating women, and elderly and visibly disabled persons. Planned distributions in the Songo-Masiaka-Rogberi/ Lunsar-Makeni areas have however been delayed due to security incidents (see section 3).

A particular concern for food aid agencies has been the danger of distributing food to civilians in the absence of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. As agencies cannot directly assist armed groups, they have prevailed on other organizations to promptly address the issue as agencies plan to resume full-scale relief operations in affected locations. In this regard, a number of religious groups under the auspices of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) have started providing some food to the combatants in their locations. Agencies will plan distributions to civilians in close coordination with distributions to combatants. WFP has already registered over 4,000 civilians in 28 villages in the Masiaka area but will delay

distributions to coincide with the exercise in Lunsar and Makeni in order to avoid population movements towards Masiaka.

Meanwhile, agencies completed distributions to beneficiaries in accessible areas for the month of July. CRS and WFP served a verified caseload of about 40,000 beneficiaries in Kenema and Gofor, as well as Kandu Leppiama, Simbaru and Boajibu chiefdoms where nearly 13,000 beneficiaries were reached. The IDPs at the Blama site also received food rations, bringing the total number of beneficiaries served in the area to nearly 55,000. WFP also provided monthly rations to some 20,418 vulnerable groups in Bo and 47,290 in Freetown.

In Port Loko town and surrounding villages, WFP, in cooperation with ACF, CAD, CARITAS, and WVI provided monthly rations to nearly 8,000 vulnerable groups. According to the agencies, the security situation during the exercise was relatively calm as ECOMOG provided maximum cooperation in maintaining order at all the distribution sites. A group of persons supervised by CAD continued to monitor the use of the distributed food.

Agriculture

According to a recent report by FAO, Sierra Leone is among sixteen African countries facing "exceptional food emergencies." It is believed that the implementation of the peace agreement will significantly improve the situation. FAO is currently operating a fishery project to support displaced artisanal fishermen, fish processors and other groups involved in related fishing activities. The project provides fishermen with outboard engines, canoes, fishing gears and ice-making machines. Another project is being undertaken in Lungi, providing emergency agricultural inputs such as seeds, tools, building materials and fertilizers to rural women's groups to improve household food security and income-generating agricultural activities. The organization also plans to undertake a project targeting 8,000 destitute farm families with agricultural inputs. The project, which has a total budget of \$371,000, is expected to begin shortly.

ACTIONAID has entered an agreement with UNICEF to implement a household food security project that will enable 7,500 resettling households in the Western Area to access food throughout the year by promoting simple methods of household food requirement, home gardens and micro-credit schemes.

Concern Worldwide (CW) visited the northern town of Matatoka on 30 July where they met with their crop monitors and contact farmers. They plan to resume support to the agriculture sector. However, they do not believe it feasible to transport rice for agricultural purposes at this time, given the security situation and the absence of food in the town. Instead, they plan to distribute cassava, potato vines and vegetable seeds this month. Groundnut will be distributed in September.

Water and Sanitation

Activities in this sector continued in accessible areas. ACF and CCSL have worked out a solution to the deteriorating WATSAN situation at the National Stadium camp. CCSL has

supplied hygiene kits to the IDPs in the camp and the bush around the latrines has been cleared by the IDPs. ACF has also resolved the water problem at the new Grafton site, enabling the relocation of up to 1000 IDPs to the camp. CARE plans to begin project activities in Port Loko by this month.

Agencies have continued to meet WATSAN needs at the various IDP camps and in Bo town and surroundings. CARE has now cast 25 latrine slabs and placed them over the trenches of five seater latrines in the Lebanese camp. They are also involved in health education geared towards sensitizing camp inmates on how to prevent maggot infestation in the camp. OXFAM has completed the construction of wells at the cholera camp. They intend to design a rain water catchment to provide additional water in case of a cholera outbreak. The Sierra Leone Red Cross Society has chlorinated 20 traditional wells at the Bo number two section in Bo town. On its part, ACF is committed to providing latrines for 5,000 IDPs at the Keindeyella camp in Bo, after completion of booth construction. The Organization is also undertaking some WATSAN activities in Yele.

UNICEF has provided materials for construction of wells and latrines in schools and health centres for Bo and Kenema and for protection of wells, installation of hand-pumps on 21 wells and rehabilitation of some latrines in Bonthe district. In IDP camps in Freetown, they are trucking water on a daily basis to assist the displaced. At the same time, UNICEF is providing WATSAN materials to partners like ACF and OXFAM for the construction of washrooms and latrines in IDP camps. They also donated five motor bikes to assist the Water and Sanitation Division.

In the Moyamba area, CARE has completed the construction of three new wells and rehabilitated twelve wells. They continue to identify village communities for new well construction. Twenty such communities have been identified and selected in two chiefdoms.

WVI rehabilitated and installed 41 hand pumps in nine chiefdoms on Bonthe mainland. Some 105-pump attendants and 178 chlorinators have been trained there. Assessment shows that Bum and Kwame Bai Krim chiefdoms have no protected wells. WVI plans to provide them with two protected wells. They have also planned to provide demonstration latrines at six clinics. On the whole, WVI has nearly completed 63 wells in Bonthe district. Four new wells are being earmarked for Bom and Kwame Bai Krim chiefdoms respectively.

Shelter/Non-Food Assistance

After a series of negotiations with local authorities and NCRRR, agencies have finally secured land to construct an additional IDP camp in Bo. The location is Keindeyella village in the Tikonko chiefdom. Up to 300 booths can be constructed at the site. Agencies began clearing the land on 16 July and construction work has already started. ACF has indicated its interest to construct latrines, while OXFAM will rehabilitate wells and MSF-B will provide medical care. Other agencies have been requested to provide support after the construction of booths. Meanwhile, 24 booths have been completed and allocated at the Tikonko IDP camp. Some 1108 are under construction at the Splendid site.

At the Blama camp in Kenema district, some 500 of the 1200 booths planned for construction have been completed and occupied, while the Lebanese camp now has over 700 booths occupied. A total of 150 structures have been put up at the Nyandeyama camp. Non-food assistance is being provided by a number of agencies, including ICRC, which donated 165 rolls of plastic sheets to cover the rest of the booths at the Lebanese camp. NCRRR provided 50 mattresses and 40 bed-sheets for MERLIN's TFCs, and CARE distributed 3,000 blankets to 3,753 beneficiaries at the Blama camp. MSF-B also distributed non-food items to a total caseload of 10,537 at the camp.

In the Western Area, temporary shelter assistance continues at the officially recognised camps. At the new Grafton camp, GOAL has completed the construction of shelters to facilitate relocation of IDPs currently occupying unauthorized campsites. About 1,000 IDPs have already been relocated to the site, which has the capacity to accommodate 3,000 people. The Irish government has provided some funds for GOAL to cover the construction of shelters for additional 7,000 persons. This will come under phase two of the ongoing activity. The organization is presently waiting for plastic sheeting to be transported from Europe.

Education

UNICEF has completed and handed over eight temporary school buildings for displaced children in the Western Area to the Ministry of Youth, Education and Sports (MYES). The schools are expected to accommodate 4,800 children in two shifts. A consignment of teaching and learning materials and 3,200 copies of textbooks in the four core subjects – English, Mathematics, Science and Social Studies were also supplied to the schools. The textbooks will be used to establish a book bank in each school.

The MYES has established Regional Education Coordination Committees in the Eastern and southern provinces with technical inputs from UNICEF. These committees are charged with the task of developing and coordinating a plan to address the education needs of IDPs now emerging from rebel-controlled territories. The Committee will facilitate a quick assessment to determine the number of children of school-going age and identify existing facilities and basic requirements for effective resumption of school activities. UNICEF has also provided recreation and sports kits to serve some 130 schools in the southern province.

Despite these interventions, emergency education needs remain seriously under-funded. Requests for funding from agencies like UNICEF are often unmet. Education is a human right and it is vital that basic education support is provided to children during long emergencies like the one Sierra Leone.

Refugees

UNHCR meets on voluntary repatriation

UNHCR representatives from four countries met in Abidjan on 6 and 7 August 1999 to consolidate a plan for the voluntary repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees in neighbouring countries. The meeting was held to ensure that adequate preparations are in place to address

possible mass returns to Sierra Leone occasioned by the signing of the Peace Agreement. Although conditions have not yet been met for an organized repatriation in safety and dignity, the meeting identified a number of activities which could be carried out in the interim pending tangible progress in the peace process, as some spontaneous returns may occur. Among others, the activities include dissemination and sensitization of refugee communities on the Peace Agreement, facilitated repatriation to Freetown and Bo 30 days following the return of Cpl. Foday Sankoh to Freetown and the formation of a government of national unity. Should DDR be well advanced by February 2000, UNHCR would officially launch an organised voluntary repatriation, expected to last two years. In this context, the Organization plans to initiate the signing of tripartite agreements with relevant countries to assist mass voluntary repatriation. Furthermore, it intends to strengthen its presence in Sierra Leone, including the opening of new offices in major returnee areas.

For planning purposes, UNHCR estimates that half of the 500,000 refugees in neighbouring countries may return spontaneously. Some 30 per cent would be returned under a facilitated scheme which does not involve logistics, while the remaining 20 per cent would benefit from an organized repatriation exercise, including transportation.

*For summaries of recent humanitarian missions see attached document on Humanitarian Profiles

HUMANITARIAN PROFILES

1. Makeni Highlights

Background

The once thriving commercial centre was conspicuously deserted when an interagency assessment team arrived there on 22 July for the first time in seven months. Most shops seen were barred shut and only minimal street trading was evident. There were however no obvious signs of widespread destruction although significant looting had occurred.

The inter-agency mission including UN and NGOs secured a number of agreements from the People's Army (former AFRC) which committed to providing the enabling environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to respect the staff and properties of the humanitarian community in all territories under their control. To this end, the Army agreed to return all assets and properties of the humanitarian community to the respective owners immediately in order to facilitate their work. They also agreed to allow the participation of national staff members of international agencies in their areas provided their names and positions are forwarded to them prior to the visits. On substantive programming activities, the People's Army accepted the concept of facilitating the National Immunization Day in their areas. As part of a security measure to ensure global access mechanisms, UNHACU, on behalf of the Humanitarian Coordinator, maintains daily contacts with the RUF base in Buedu.

Based on the assurances of security and cooperation from the AFRC/RUF, subsequent multisectoral assessments were undertaken to ascertain child nutrition patterns, food and logistics situation and related human rights issues. After their assessment of the town and surrounding

villages, ACF and MSF described the humanitarian situation in Makeni as a major crisis, with over 30 percent malnutrition rates of the U5 children screened, compounded by lack of medical facilities and a chronic shortage of food commodities. Planned response to address the situation has been delayed by the deterioration of security in the area and along the routes to Makeni. However, national staff members of ACF and MSF who remain in the area are providing limited assistance in health and nutrition. At the beginning of the month ACF opened a supplementary feeding centre in Makeni town where 500 people were registered within two days of starting the operation. The organization plans to establish a day care centre during this week as a first step to addressing the needs of the severely malnourished. Expansion and continuation of relief operations in health, nutrition and food aid will largely depend on improvement of the security situation.

(Summary based on reports by ACF and MSF-H: 23 to 26 July)

Current Population

Current population of greater Makeni area is estimated at 25,000 compared to 63,000 prior to the attack in December 1999. Some 15,000 of the 25,000 are believed to be residing in Makeni town. According to demographic projections for SL, 18.6 per cent of the population are children U5.

IDP Camps

The two camps (Magbenteh and Makali) are still occupied by IDPs. Some 2,400 in Mabgenteh and 1,300 in Makali. There were over 12,000 IDPs in the two camps prior to the December attack. Current population includes both old and new cases.

Agriculture activities

Only about 25 per cent of farm families planted this year. Maximum two bushels of rice per family.

Feeding Patterns

Between January and February, people were living on rice, fruits, potatoes and cassava. From March to present, the main food sources are cassava, reptiles, larvae from composts, snails, frogs, rats and mushrooms. The situation really began to deteriorate in March 1999. Majority of the families can only afford one meal a day. More food is given to the working groups (youths) who provide for the family, followed by children, then women and lastly the aged. About 60 per cent of the food items are purchased from markets. If available, rice is sold for Le600/cup, compared to Le250 in Freetown.

Coping Mechanisms

Prior to December, people survived on menial jobs, petty trading, wood selling, car washing, hair plaiting, blacksmith, carpentry and masonry. At present, they depend on petty trading in wood, available food stuff and drugs, street begging, sale of household properties and personal

belongings, robberies and pick pocketing, prostitution and rat hunting. Trading activities are very minimal. The few traders come from Makeni, Kamakwie, Kabala, Fadugu and Lunsar. Movement is mostly on foot as vehicular transportation is either not available or too expensive.

Health Situation

The health situation is described as desperate. Severe shortages of food and medicine significantly increased health risks. Malaria, respiratory infections and nutrition-related illnesses are the most common. No outbreaks detected at present, but expected as more areas are accessed.

Present Situation:

Before the December attack, treatment was done at the government hospital, private clinics, quacks, and pharmacies and with herbalists. At present, services are only available at the RUF/AFRC hospital called the "Pentagon" (this was ACF's Supplementary Feeding Centre). The Pentagon has trained and untrained medical personnel, including MCH aides, SRNs, CHOs and medical volunteers. Two doctors are running the hospital. No surgeon at present. None of the hospital staff is paid. The hospital lacks drugs and medical equipment. Treatment is mostly for soldiers and their dependants.

The government hospital is completely looted, half-destroyed and non-functional.

SLRCS clinic - some consultation but no medical/drug supplies

Garden Clinic - private consultant but no drugs

No standing building at the Magenteh camp. Complete destruction. Primary health care activities for civilians as a start. They organization has made clear to combatants that they will only provide for civilians. At the Makele camp, one building but nothing in it.

Action Plan by MSF-H

MSF plans to send medical team to Makeni in the near future. The team will include a medical Coordinator, a medical logistician and logistical assistant and one nurse. Three of the four members will be international staff.

MSF will rebuild clinic and provide drugs, medical supplies and equipment. Work scheduled to start at beginning of August has been delayed. They also plan rehabilitation of the Makali camp clinic. Drugs will be provided.

They have enough in stock for current needs.

For the surrounding villages, MSF will begin operating mobile clinics on a regular basis, providing consultations and some treatment.

One priority area will be training as many health staff as possible to meet the challenges.

Education

Schools were opened on 24 July 1999, however only a few kids are enrolled in primary schools (about 10 per cent in town and 0 per cent in rural areas), and none in secondary schools. No school fees are levied and teachers are paid token amounts using tax revenues from traders.

WATSAN

Residents have access to drinking water mostly from rain. Wells are not chlorinated.

There is currently no access to electricity. People use their "appropriate technology" to get light in their homes.

Nutrition

Nutritional screening was conducted among U5s and adults in Makeni town and surrounding villages. Malnutrition was defined according to weight and height ratio.

Makeni Town:

Total U5 screened - 95; adults -- 36. Of the U5s, 17 were severely malnourished while 16 were moderate cases. Of the adults, 4 were severely malnourished and 5 were moderate. When malnutrition is detected among the adult population, it usually means that the situation is serious. No mortality assessment was conducted but according to local staff present in the area, several malnutrition-related deaths were reported over the past months.

Camp Population:

Magbenteh - Of the 97 U5s screened, 47 were severely malnourished and 8 were moderate cases; Out of 23 adults screened, 10 were severe cases and 2 moderate.

Makali - Out of 67 U5s 17 were severe cases and 10 moderate.

The ratio between severe and moderate cases is worrying, but the team believes that while most of the severe cases were screened, most of the moderate cases were absent at the time of screening. On the whole, taking into account the present camp population estimates, it is possible to say that about 20 per cent of the children U5 were screened in each camp. The situation in the camps among the adult population appeared worse than in town.

Surrounding villages:

All U5s present at the time were screened in Makama and Ropolo villages located in Bombali Sebori chiefdom and between Makeni and Magburaka. Some 100 U5s were screened in each village: Makama - 20 severe and 25 moderate; Ropolo - 11 severe and 23 moderate Masongbo - 19 severe and 12 moderate; Binkolo - 13 severe and 12 moderate. The situation in the villages compares with the camp situation. The situation in Makama village is particularly bad.

Conclusion:

In sum, among the 153 total severe cases seen, 103 bilateral oedema were observed. Important to note that it is always more difficult to treat kwashiorkor (oedema) than marasmus cases. The mortality rate among kwashiorkor cases is usually higher. The present global picture is the result of an extremely poor access to food over the past months. Generally speaking, the situation was found to be more difficult in surrounding villages of Makeni than in Makeni town itself, as the surroundings were repeatedly looted.

Recommendations/Action:

General food distributions urgently recommended in Makeni town and surrounding villages. In this regard, ACF emphasizes distributions in all chiefdoms and villages, not just the town, in order to avoid artificial population movements into the town.

A full ration at 2400 k/cals is recommended.

ACF intends to set up two therapeutic feeding centres and four supplementary feeding centres in Makeni town, camps, and surrounding villages by beginning of August. However, the organization notes that targeted supplementary and therapeutic nutritional feeding programmes aimed at addressing needs of malnourished populations are not effective if the general access to food remains limited and if such programmes are not complemented by regular and sufficient additional food input.

With regard to the frequency of the recommended food distributions, ACF recommends interviews with the local population in order to define the more appropriate alternatives and options for distribution. This will contribute to limiting incidents and to providing a comprehensive solution to the problem.

In the short term, medical facilities have to be set up in central locations, as well as rural and decentralized centres.

Medium term solutions should include agricultural assessments to determine the different kinds of inputs to be distributed to the population by September 1999.

Relevant players must also address the issue of food for combatants as soon as possible.

Intermediate food distributions for civilian populations residing in areas between Songo village and Makeni town (Masiaka, Rogberi, Lunsar areas), are also strongly recommended by ACF.

2. Inter-Agency teams assess villages, towns and chiefdoms in the East

Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom

During the reporting period, WFP, AFRICARE, MERLIN, SLRCS and HACU visited three towns in this chiefdom including Gbado, Levuma and Jenneh during July. In Levuma, about two acres of land have already been allocated to the IDPs for camp construction. An estimated

population of about 5,000 IDPs have erected 60 booths covered with palm fronds. A clinic operated by MERLIN at Levuma is providing antenatal, EPI and health education services. At Gbado, there is a MCH aid clinic. Diseases like malaria, diarrhoea, anaemia, related to malaria, constitute the most common cases. Mortality rate is low for U5s and above. The general nutritional status of the IDPs is reasonably good, with the exception of a few cases of malnutrition. In Gbado and Jenneh, the WATSAN situation is favourable, with 15 and 19 standpipes in both towns respectively, constructed by Water Aid and UNICEF. There are six toilets serving the host population and IDPs at Jenneh.

Simbaru Chiefdom

The assessment team couldn't get to Boajibu on the 15 of July due to a broken bridge at Babawahun. The team went on bikes the following day. There were two health centres, KDDO-supported clinic and a government health centre supported by MERLIN. ACF operates a mobile clinic and takes all referred cases to Blama and Bo. The host population at Boajibu refused the IDPs land for camp construction. They are presently in the catholic and Ahmadiyya schools while a few managed to stay with the host population.

Jawei Chiefdom -- Daru

MSF-F traveled by road to Daru to assess the spread of measles and to conduct a nutritional screening. They report an outbreak of measles in Daru, Malema and some of the villages surrounding Daru. They subsequently vaccinated target groups including children between six months and 15 years of age. A total of 4,567 children were immunised. A nutritional screening of 1,013 U5 children revealed 22 were severely malnourished while about 50 per cent were moderately malnourished.

Dama Chiefdom - Naiawama camp

On 23 July, the assessment team visited Niawama camp. IDPs were mainly from the Kailahun district, including Segbewema, Dia, Malema, Peje Bongre and other areas. They had completed 274 bamboo booths covered with grass. The camp had three shallow wells and no medical facilities. IDPs walk about 15 miles to Giema to attend clinic. There are about three TBAs without equipment. A total of 4,910 IDPs have been registered and the mortality rate was on the high side. The team counted 173 graves though most were thought to be old graves. The IDPs however claimed that the deaths occurred between June and July. Out of 179 U5 children nine were moderately malnourished and five were severe cases of kwashiorkor.

Konia Camp

The IDPs at this camp produced a register containing 4,933 names. Some 110 booths had been erected but not yet completed and occupied. The nearest health post supported by MERLIN was at Giema about 10 miles from the camp.

Gofor Camp

The IDPs here completed 275 booths to accommodate an estimated population of about 10,000 IDPS. There is a health centre operated by AFRICARE. The situation was not too grave since they received food supplies from CRS in June and July.

Recommendations/Action:

AFRICARE is to provide medical services to the Niawama camp, SLRC/ICRC will give two-week rations. Agencies were however concerned about distributing food at the Niawama camp which is close to Kailahun, where rebel groups remain armed. MERLIN recommends that vaccination and nutritional screening should be done regularly at this camp.

The IDPs at Kandu Leppiana and Simbaru chiefdoms have started receiving food from WFP. However, access to Boajibu remains difficult due to the broken bridge at Babawahun. IDPs were advised to go to the nearest accessible village for their supplies. There is an urgent need to negotiate the opening of the roads leading to Segbwema and Daru and the rest of the east to enable humanitarian relief agencies start accessing people living in bushes.

Kenema District

Mondema, Baama and Konta villages

The mission, undertaken during July, confirmed that the road from Bo to Grima junction in the Valunia chiefdom was relatively in good condition. There are 39 bridges between Grima junction and Baama village, 16 of which are in very bad condition and are made of palm trunks. These are located mainly between Mondema and Baama villages. Aid agencies have recommended that trucks be prevented from using the Mondema - Baama road until repairs are carried out.

At the Vengema village, the team learned that there were 1159 IDPs from Kono and Makeni staying in bush camps around the village. The IDPs were said to be surviving on bush yams and cassava. Rice and other commodities are acquired from Bo and Kenema. In Mondema village, the team observed a large concentration of people, mostly lactating mothers from bush camps. About 500 IDPs were said to be residing in the area, mainly from Kono and Masingbi. Almost all the houses in the town which is about 14 km from Masingbi, had been burned down by rebels.

The 18 km road from Mondema to Baama was still not open to vehicular traffic. Coping mechanisms were at the lowest here. Although some farming activities were evident, no agency had supplied seed rice and other farming inputs. A cup of rice when available is sold for Le 500. The team ascertained the lack of clean drinking water and poor toilet and medical facilities. The population depends on the river source for drinking water. They reported deaths from dysentery, diarrhoea, malaria and worm infections.

At Konta village, the section chief informed the team of the presence of 5,000 IDPs staying in the camp and 10,000 in the 17 surrounding villages. The team observed only one well and no toilet facilities in the town. Like in Mondema, the civilians told harrowing stories of suffering and deprivation. MERLIN offered some medical assistance on cost recovery basis. At the Konta displaced camp, the camp manager informed the team that 35 people, including nine children and

26 adults had died in April of hunger, malaria, dysentery and diarrhoea. Eight were said to have died in May and five in June. However, the death rate drastically reduced after the intervention of MERLIN. They reported that since the camp was established, they had received food from CRS twice (covering May and June). The living condition of the camp inmates remains deplorable. Children and adults alike are malnourished, as they live mainly on bush yam, cassava and other wild foods. The camp manager confirmed a caseload of 11,032 instead of the 1

5,000 stated by the section chief. The number of booths estimated by the team was about 200. Just over 5,000 IDPs reside in the camp while about 10,000 is reported to be in surrounding villages. There are no WATSAN facilities in the camp.

After the assessment, WFP led an inter-agency team to carry out a two-day registration and verification exercise from 16 to 18 July. According to their report, the following figures were derived: Mondema - 3,491, Konta - 5,449 bringing the total registered and verified to 8,940. The team did not encounter any security incidents during the trip. They learned that the area had been calm since the Ceasefire took effect on 24 May. They were informed that initiations were continuing by Kamajors, although one initiator claimed that they were in support of peace and would be ready to disarm.

3. Tasso Island - Port Loko District (input from IMC Report, July 1999)

Diarrhoea and dysentery accounted for 27 percent of all morbidity on Tasso Island. Among the 347 cases detected from January to April 1999, 23 resulted in death, a case fatality rate of 6.6 percent. The Island's community health post could not handle the outbreak as it lacked drugs and equipment and urgently needed rehabilitation. The problem was compounded by the large number of internally displaced persons whose presence more than tripled the island's population from 2,673 to approximately 7,718. This influx overwhelmed the island's capacity to provide for its residents.

In response to the situation, the International Medical Corps (IMC), in cooperation with MOHS, initiated an emergency health intervention project on the Island. By June, the Community Health Post had been rehabilitated. UNICEF and WHO supplied drugs while the MOHS provided health workers, enabling the CHP to effectively treat diarrhoeal diseases. As a result, there has not been a single fatality on Tasso Island from diarrhoeal disease or dysentery since the beginning of June.

Utilizing a boat procured from UNICEF and MOHS, IMC is undertaking bi-weekly visits to the Island to monitor the situation. These follow-up visits have revealed prevalence of high malnutrition cases among children. As of mid July, 536 of the under-five children screened were diagnosed as being malnourished. The severely malnourished (about 70%) were transported to ACF's TFC in Kissy, eastern Freetown. With the slow improvement of conditions on the Island, the number of severely malnourished cases is said to be on the decline. In order to prevent further deterioration of the situation, IMC established a supplementary feeding program for the moderately malnourished cases. High protein food, donated by Cap Anamur, along with supplementary food donated by WFP, is being used to feed pregnant women and breast feeding mothers at the health centre.

In addition to controlling the current outbreak of diarrhoeal diseases, IMC is putting in place long-term prevention measures. Work has already begun on the implementation of a health education campaign, and plans to train Blue Flag Volunteers are in the pipeline. The aim of this campaign, which is to be conducted in collaboration with WHO is to reduce the high rate of diarrhoeal disease on Tasso by raising community awareness about the importance of good sanitary practices. In order to improve sanitary conditions, IMC is finalizing a deal with a donor to get funds that will be used to build protected wells and V.I.P. latrines in all of the six villages on Tasso.

Continuing Challenges: While effective prevention measures have helped to reduce the number of cases of diarrhoeal diseases on the island, it must be noted that the incidence of bloody diarrhoea is still high. WHO and IMC are investigating the causes, and are planning appropriate intervention to address the situation. Another concern is the fact that the number of patients being seen at the Health Post has risen in recent weeks. In order to meet this rising demand for health services, funds for the construction of a new Health Centre are being sought.

NGO-Locations

Western Area	Kenema	Pujehun
ACF	ACF	ACF
ADRA	AFRICARE	AFRICARE
AMA	CARE	Bo-Pujehun RDP
CARE	CORD-SL	CARE
CCSL	CRS	CRS
CES	I. A. S.	I. A. S.
CHASL	ICRC	MSF-B
COOPI	MERLIN	OXFAM
CORD-SL	MSF-B	UNICEF
CRS	OXFAM	WVI
CWW	SLRCS	
GOAL	UNICEF	Bo
HANDICAP	WFP	ACF
I. A. S.		CRS
ICRC	Moyamba	I. A. S.
IMC	CARE	MRC
MCSL	SLRCS	MSF-B
MERLIN	TERRA TECH	OXFAM
WVI	UNICEF	SLRCS

MSF-B	WFP	UNICEF
MSF-F		WFP
MSF-H	Bonthe*	WVI
OXFAM	CARE	HANDICAP
SCF-UK	MSF-B	
SLRCS	SLRCS	Port Loko
UNICEF	UNICEF	ACF
WFP	WVI	ADRA
		CAD
		CRS IMC Kap
Bombali (activities in Makeni only)	Kailahun (activities in Daru & Kailahun Town)	Anamur
		OXFAM
		UNICEF
CARITAS	MSF-F	SLRCS
CWW CRS	ACF I. A. S.	WFP
MSF-H	WFP	
ACF		
WFP		
	Kambia (Some Health programmes by MSF-H)	Koinadugu (Activities in Kabala & surrounding villages)
Tonkolili (activities in Yele only)	WFP CARITAS WHO	CES CRS
	MSF-H	MSF-B
ACF CARE SLRCS	A. AID	
ICRC CWW WFP	UNICEF	
MRC IMC (Masiaka - Mile 91, in 2 eeks)		
CARITAS Makeni		


Interventions Data

District	Health/Nutrition Prog		WATSAN Prog.	Agric. Prog	Human Rights Prog
Bo	ACF, MRC, UNICEF, MSF-B, HANDICAP, IAS, WFP	WHO working primarily in an inter-governmental capacity with the MOHS, GOSL.	ACF, OXFAM, UNICEF, IAS, MSF-B	ACF, CRS, WFP, WVI, MCSL, MAFE, ADDO, OXFAM	FAO UNOMSIL, Human Rights, Human Rights Watch
Bombali	ACF, CARITAS, MSF-H			CWW, WFP	
Bonthe	SLRCS, UNICEF, WVI, MSF-B		UNICEF WVI	CARE, WVI, MCSL, MAFE	
Freetown & Peninsula	ACF, ADRA, ICRC, MERLIN, UNICEF, MSF-F, CHASL, COOPI, AMA, CWW, MCSL, MSF-H, MSF-B, HANDICAP, GOAL, KAP, IAS, IMC, WFP		ACF, ADRA, OXFAM, UNICEF, IAS, MSF-B	ACF, WFP, MAFE, NAFSL	
Kailahun	MSF-F, ACF, IAS		IAS	MCSL, WFP	
Kambia	CARITAS, MSF-H		ACF, UNICEF	WFP	
Kenema	AFRICARE, ICRC, MERLIN, SLRCS, UNICEF, ACF, MOHS, IAS, IRC, WFP		ACF, OXFAM, UNICEF, IAS	ACF, AFRICARE, CORD-SL, ICRC, WFP, MCSL, KDDO, MAFE, WFP	
Koindugu	CES, MSF-B, MOHS		CES, MSF-B	CES, CRS	
Kono	WVI			WVI	
Moyamba	SLRCS, UNICEF, TERRA TECH, MOHS		CARE	CARE, MAFE, WFP	
Port Loko	ADRA, CAD, IMC, UNICEF, MOHS, WFP		OXFAM, WFP	ADRA, CAD, CRS, WFP, CARITAS Makeni	
Pujehun	ACF, AFRICARE, UNICEF, BP-RDP, MOHS, IAS, MSF-B, CRS		ACF, OXFAM, UNICEF, CRS, BP-RDP, IAS, MSF-B	OXFAM, ACF, AFRICARE, WVI, CRS	
Tonkolili	ACF, MRC, CES, IMC	ACF	CWW		

In almost all the sectors National NGOS and CBOs serve as Implementing partners of UN Agencies and Int'l NGOs. Most Agencies have reported adequate capacity to meet needs in view of access throughout the country.

60) United Nations Document

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 03-09 October 1999, Section 1,2,3.



Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Date: 9 Oct 1999

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report: 03 - 09 Oct 1999

1. Political Developments

The return of Chairman Foday Sankoh and Major Johnny Paul Koroma continues to improve prospects for peace in the country. Since their arrival in Freetown on October 3rd the RUF/AFRC leaders have been visiting civil society groups, IDP camps, DDR campsites and others. They are expected to work closely with the GOSL in the formation of a Government of National Unity. They are also making plans to visit their various locations to further sensitize their men on the DDR programme. Addressing about 800 people including some ex-combatants at Lungi on October 8, Chairman Sankoh said he had moved from guerrilla warfare to political warfare. He urged the ex-combatants to ask the forgiveness of all Sierra Leoneans and to do something positive for the country.

The UN Security Council is currently meeting to discuss the peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone, and is likely to adopt a resolution before the end of the month.

In other developments, Britain has notified the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee that it will be exporting live ammunitions and military equipment to Sierra Leone for use by the new military. The shipment includes 4.5 million pounds promised by Britain to help re-train the Sierra Leone army. Some 5.5 million pounds has already been paid directly to ECOMOG.

On October 5, the Government, with the support of Britain's Department for International Development (DFID) held an anti-corruption workshop as part of the on-going effort to eradicate corruption in the public services. Participants included cabinet ministers, senior government officials and RUF/AFRC leaders Chairman Foday Sankoh and Major Johnny Paul Koroma. Presidential spokesman Septimus Kaikai reported that the workshop focused on three main areas: Prevention, Enforcement and Education. Mr. Kaikai also reported that an anti-corruption bill was before Parliament. When enacted, the Bill will provide the legal basis for establishing an anti-corruption commission.

2. SECURITY

The security situation has not significantly improved since in the last week. On October 4, it was reported that rebels on the Masiaka - Mile 91 highway, attacked a Sierra Leone Road Transport bus bound for Kenema. The bus was reportedly stopped at a checkpoint five miles to Masiaka on the Freetown highway. According to the report, all the commuters were ordered to disembark while the band of armed men stripped them of all they had, and abandoned the bus at a nearby bush-path. Human Rights Watch interviewed some of the passengers on the bus who confirmed that some of the girls had been raped. One pregnant woman reportedly aborted after suffering physical abuse by the captors. Such abuses are said to be on the increase in the northern region. The RUF/AFRC have blamed bandits for the incident.

These security incidents are hindering access to RUF/AFRC-controlled areas, particularly in the north. Concern Worldwide (CW) which has been attempting to re-start relief activities on the Magburuka - Matotoka axis, reports that it has been prevented from moving into the area by RUF/AFRC Commanders who are demanding that food be distributed in their district. According to CW, travel to Matotoka is not possible at the moment. Terrorism in villages around Magburuka and Matotoka is on the rise. Residents are forced to give food to the Paramount Chief who in turn gives to the armed combatants. Sometimes, the rebels go directly to the farmers for food, causing them to be doubly taxed. OSM officials in the area are reportedly afraid of the commanders, all of whom seem to be at the same level of command. UNOMSIL has been informed and is looking into the matter.

Makeni residents reportedly went into a panic when shooting broke out in parts of the town on 3rd October over a period of three hours. The Bishop of Makeni, Bishop Biguzzi (who was on a visit to the town) was prevented from leaving the town until the situation was brought under control. He reported that a meeting between the RUF and AFRC led to a resolution of the situation.

There are also persistent reports of armed groups attacking civilians (seizing properties, demanding

money and beating civilians) in villages in the Kambia district. The harassment has reportedly led civilians (some of them just returning from refugee camps in Guinea) to flee these villages and head back to the refugee camps or to settle in villages very close to the border with Guinea. The security situation in Port Loko district is also of concern. An aid agency working in the district reported some difficulty in the implementation of its programme due to the fragile security situation in the district. Groups of the AFRC are reported to be harassing civilians along the Port Loko - Lungi road and also at Loko Masama. Rape cases were also reported in this area.

In the Western Area, there are continuing reports of armed robbery attempts and the harassment of civilians by unidentified groups of young men suspected to be ex-combatants. According to UNOMSIL, there are reports of weapons being smuggled into the city.

The security situation in the southern region remains calm. However, elements of the CDF in the Bumpah area continue to pose threats to the security of the people in the town. According to aid workers, these individuals are harassing innocent civilians. They confirmed that CDF personnel shot a pregnant woman dead on suspicion that she was having an affair with another man. The matter is under Police investigation. The peace-building and reconciliation committee and NCRRR are also following up on the issue.

3. Humanitarian Highlights

Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Kailahun District

Following the inter-agency assessment mission to Kailahun District last week, WFP and other relevant agencies are beginning to take some practical steps to address some of the urgent needs. A detailed report of the mission is attached.

Health

The main health event during this period was the start of National Immunization Days (NIDs) on October 9, aimed at eradicating polio in Sierra Leone. Some 800,000 children under five are targeted for immunization countrywide. The whole of the southern region and parts of the northern and eastern regions were covered in this first phase. WHO, UNICEF and Rotary International, are the main supporters of the government in mounting the campaign. Their goal is to reach the entire country by the end of the third round. UNICEF and WHO reported that the first round got off to a good start as parents turned up in their numbers to immunize their children. In Freetown, President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah immunized the first child to kick-off the occasion. Over 5,000 children were reported to have been immunized by noon on the first day.

The programme was also undertaken in the RUF/AFRC-held northern towns of Makeni, Kabala, Kambia, Kono and Port Loko. Despite the overall success thus far, there have been a number of hitches. On 7 October, a scheduled helicopter flight to deliver vaccines to Makeni for the programme had to be cancelled, as there was no clear approval from the RUF/AFRC commanders for the helicopter to land. An assessment was made of the situation based on information from a number of sources (NGOS, UNOMSIL, ECOMOG) which led to the decision that at that time, it was not advisable to proceed to Makeni. The organizers managed to provide alternative means of transporting the supplies to the town. A serious security incident occurred during the exercise in the eastern town of Segbwema. Six MOHS staff members and NID volunteers have been missing since 9 October, and their abandoned vehicle has been found. Contacts have been made and negotiations are ongoing to secure their release.

It is hoped that by the end of the programme, at least 70% of the target group would have been covered. Community Health Organizations (CHOs), nurses and other health staff/volunteers have been fully trained for the programme. Intensive sensitization and awareness building programmes are being carried out throughout the country. The 2nd and 3rd phases will be undertaken on November 6th and December 11th.

Reported cholera cases in the Western Area have now increased to 927 cases with 9 cholera related deaths. There were however no new cases reported at the IDP camps. Efforts continue on all sides to combat the outbreak (See SITREP 23-30 September 1999). In Port Loko District, the District Medical Officer confirmed 40 cholera-related deaths during the month of September. Some 400 cases are currently being treated at the health center.

During the past week, a seven-year old died of measles at the METCHEM section of the National

Workshop Camp in Freetown. An outbreak of measles is also reported at the Approved school camp. Concern Worldwide is handling the situation at its camp clinic.

The MOHS has announced the start of the Cost Recovery Program as of October 1, 1999 in all areas, with the exception of Kono, Kailahun and the displaced camps. The outpatient Units in Magburaka, Kambia, Port Loko and Makeni are now operational. Malnutrition cases are the most prominent in these locations.

Food Aid

During the past week, WFP served 12,885 IDPs in all camps in Bo and 777 IDPs with host population at Mandu in the Bo North cluster. CRS also provided food for 4,273 beneficiaries in TFCs, SFCs and institutional programmes. At the Songo-Masiaka axis, WFP, ACF, ADRA carried out food distributions to 5,957 persons. These distributions will be followed by a distribution to 3,130 beneficiaries at villages between Masiaka - Makeni. Also, food pipeline agencies are soon to complete the third month of Food-For-Agriculture in their areas of operation.

As more areas of the country are accessed, the collective resources of food aid agencies will be insufficient to address increasing needs. There are reports of continuing food shortages in many areas in the north, including Fadugu and Kabala. The food situation in Makeni (in spite of the last distribution) is said to be getting bad. Some agencies have recommended a second distribution to avoid further deterioration.

CARE, WFP and CRS provided 3,946 mt of food aid to 276,190 IDPs and war-affected populations during the month of September. At the time of writing, WVI figures were not available.

Food Distribution - September 1999

Food Pipeline Agency	Population Served	Bulger	Oil	Lentils	CSB	Others	Total (mts)
CARE	60,531	558	48	221	-	-	827
CRS	87,873	619	63	255	57	-	994
WFP	106,013	637	48	325	83	745	1,838
WFP Partners	21,773						287
Grand Total	276,190	1,814	159	801	140	745	3,946

Nutrition

MERLIN reported an increase in the cases of malnutrition in Kenema town, IDP camps and in some chiefdoms within the district. They reported a total caseload of 411 and 176 severely malnourished cases in Kenema and Blama respectively. MERLIN is in the process of handing over its supplementary feeding caseload to GOAL. They are working closely with GOAL and CRS to address the nutritional problem in the area, through a joint distribution/ screening exercise planned for all under 5s in Kenema. This will be undertaken in a few weeks.

Agriculture

In an effort to strengthen the existing coordination mechanism in the agriculture sector, FAO, in collaboration with MAFE and the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR), has embarked on the production of a monthly newsletter called AGRISIL. The first edition has just been distributed to partners. The monthly newsletter will attempt to highlight agricultural relief and rehabilitation activities carried out by the government, UN Agencies, International Organizations and NGOs in Sierra Leone. It is expected that AGRISIL will serve as a medium of information exchange among agencies in the agriculture sector.

Celebrations for the *World Food Day* are underway. FAO, in collaboration with MAFE, other agencies and farmers associations in the Western Area, has lined up activities to mark the day on October 16. "Youth against Hunger" has been selected as the theme for this year's celebrations, to highlight the potential contribution of young men and women in achieving food security for all.

FAO has in principle, agreed to provide US\$6,000 to fund the needs assessment survey referred to in

SITREP 23-30 September. It is expected that the exercise will guide stakeholders in the agriculture sector to better plan for the year 2000.

Distribution for the last phase of the planting season is still in progress. FAO, MAFE and NGOs are currently distributing seed rice, vegetable seeds, tools, groundnut and sweet potatoes to 8000 Farm Families. MAFE recently concluded the distribution of 1.3 Mt of vegetable seeds to Farm Families in the entire country. It is expected that at the end of October 1999, agencies will make their input distribution reports available to the NGO Desk and HACU for collation and analysis.

Finally, a tools selection-clearing house has been established within the Ministry of Agriculture to help NGOs and other interested organizations to select the right tools for their beneficiaries.

IDP Update

There was no significant change in IDP figures during this period. Registration done at Lunsar town for VGF distribution revealed a total of 30,616 war-affected persons (not encamped).

Water and Sanitation

ACF has constructed 4 (4 x 4) latrine structures on Kendeyella site 1 camp in Bo. These are now in use by 750 IDPs. The following is being done on site 2 by ACF:- 12 x 4 squat blocks of latrine pits dug; 6 x 4 squat blocks of latrine foundations cast. Latrines are expected to serve up to 6,000 IDPs. The first phase of sensitization on hygiene promotion at site 1 has commenced. At Splendid and Kendeyella camps, ACF also completed general spraying of latrines and drainage at Splendid, Lebanese and Kendeyella camps. At Splendid, 7 latrine blocks have collapsed and have been closed. ACF is also engaged in dismantling old latrines at the former Tikonko road camp, and has completed the construction of 1 x 4 squat block latrine at Yele. Another 2 x 2 block of VIP latrines has been completed at Yele for the community health center. ACF intends to provide additional ones once space is available. CARE has completed one latrine at the Lebanese camp to complement the existing ones that are expected to serve 1,131 IDPs.

OXFAM has rehabilitated nine wells on Kendeyella site 2 with one awaiting hand pump from UNICEF. Four more wells are on standby and will be completed according to demand. In Koya rural, WSD and OXFAM are rehabilitating 100 wells constructed by Plan International.

At Kaffu Bullom chiefdom in Port Loko district, OXFAM has completed and fitted three new lined wells fitted with hand-pumps. Two more wells are under construction. Family latrine projects are underway in eight more villages in the chiefdom and 500 latrines are planned. Support is also being given to the Lungi Hospital cholera ward in the form of buckets, plastic drums, plastic sheeting's, gloves and chlorine. Temporary latrines are being constructed at the site to complement the poor sanitation systems. CARE International is also planning to resume its water and sanitation programs in three chiefdoms in Port Loko District.

In Kenema, OXFAM has repaired 6 latrine blocks and construction is underway for 12x5 latrine blocks. Four full latrine blocks have been shut down. At Nyawama camp, - installation of a gravity water system will provide water to 3,500 camp residents.

In the Western Area, Guma Valley has solved the water situation at Parade grounds camp, and UNICEF is supplementing shortfalls with daily trucking of water to the camp. OXFAM is in the process of building three new latrine blocks and two wash areas for IDPs at Approved School camp.

Child Protection

Some 90 people were released in Lunsar on October 2nd, of which 72 were children. On October 3rd, another 29 children were released. On October 6, RUF/AFRC commanders turned over 78 children to UNOMSIL and CARITAS - Makeni.

Refugees

UNHCR reported that the recent crisis in Lofa County has seen the movement of about 2,000 Liberian refugees and Sierra Leoneans back to the Kailahun area. They are proposing increased monitoring in this area by humanitarian agencies. Although the people did not appear in poor condition, their shelter situation is of concern.

3. Socio-economic

UNDP organized a press briefing on the National Human Development Report on 8 October 1999, in preparation for the launching of the Report on 11 October. The launching will be followed by a two-day workshop in Freetown.

4. DDR

The DDR camp for 2000 ex-combatants in Port Loko is now ready, but will have to be increased so as to accommodate their families, which makes it only 80% ready to use. The newly constructed water wells have been found to be salty so alternate water supply has to be looked into. SRSG Ambassador Francis Okelo led a mission to the demobilization camp in Port Loko at the end of the week, including the DFID program manager, political and human rights officers. Ambassador Okelo confirmed significant progress in preparation of the site and commended DFID and ECOMOG for a job well done. He said the demobilization phase of the DDR process should start soon and should ensure the full participation of Chairman Foday Sankoh and Major Johnny Paul Koroma. The new campsite is attracting a lot of commerce in the area and it is expected that up to Le16 million will go into the local economy daily.

During the week, officials from the DDR secretariat, on their visit to Bo, announced that Bo (Gerihun) has been designated as one of the DDR centers in the country. Pre-planning will commence in the near future. It is expected that more than 10,000 CDF personnel in the region will be disarmed and demobilized. Child combatants will form the core of the total number of CDF to be disarmed. Meanwhile, in certain areas in Bo and Pujehun districts, the CDF is expressing their desire to disarm, return to their homes and engage in meaningful projects, which will help rebuild their shattered lives. The DDR site at Kenema is ready and the operation is expected to start by mid October. The programme is also expected to begin in Daru at the same time. RUF Brigadier Mike Lamin has been in the area sensitizing the combatants. A total of 50 ex-combatants are now at the site in Lungi. In Makeni rebels have not allowed the inspection of DDR campsites.

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61) United Nations Document

First Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998 (S/1998/750) paras. 10, 12, 13, 14, 33, 36, 37, 38



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/1998/750
12 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

 FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 19 of its resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, the Security Council requested me to submit an initial report within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution and every 60 days thereafter on the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and its progress in carrying out its mandate, and also to inform the Council on plans for the later phases of the deployment of UNOMSIL when security conditions permit these to be implemented. The present report, which is submitted pursuant to that request, describes developments since my fifth report on the situation in Sierra Leone (S/1998/486) dated 9 June 1998.

2. The present report is also submitted in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1162 (1998) of 17 April 1998 and paragraph 8 of resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998.

II. SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

Activities of the Government of Sierra Leone

3. Since my last report, the Government of Sierra Leone has continued to strengthen its authority and improve its organization and functioning, including through the adoption, following a wide-ranging parliamentary debate, of a budget for the remainder of 1998. On 7 August, President Kabbah visited the provincial towns of Bo, Kenema and Makenie. Some 45 of the 52 paramount chiefs have returned to their districts in the south of the country.

4. Significant improvements have occurred in relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia. On 22 and 23 June, a Liberian delegation led by Senator Kekura Kpoto visited Freetown to deliver a special message from President Taylor to President Kabbah concerning ways to promote peace between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Mano River Union countries. The delegation also denied allegations that the Liberian Government was supporting the remnants of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and expressed concern that some Liberian dissidents were reported to be

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planning to use Sierra Leone as a base from which to attack Liberia. At the conclusion of the meeting, President Kabbah issued a statement reaffirming his commitment to subregional peace and security and calling for strict adherence to the existing non-aggression pact and good neighbourliness treaty contained in the Mano River Union Agreement.

5. On 1 July 1998, during my visit to Abuja, together with the President of Nigeria, General Abdulsalam Abubakar, I jointly convened a meeting between President Taylor and President Kabbah, the Heads of State of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The two Heads of State reached agreement at that meeting on a number of confidence-building measures to improve relations between their countries. The Presidents, inter alia, strongly condemned the continued rebel activities in Sierra Leone, as well as the horrendous atrocities committed there, and agreed to exchange official visits. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting was circulated as document S/1998/629.

6. On 20 July 1998, President Kabbah paid a one-day visit to Monrovia at the written invitation of President Taylor to attend the Liberian National Reconciliation Conference. The meeting of the two Presidents was held in the presence of the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Special Envoy of the President of the United States of America to Africa. In a joint communiqué issued after the meeting, President Taylor and President Kabbah again condemned all atrocities and violations of human rights committed by combatants in Sierra Leone against civilians, as well as the continued rebel activities in that country. They reaffirmed their commitment to non-aggression against the territorial integrity of each other's country and pledged to continue their cooperation towards peace and security in the subregion. Both leaders renewed their call to the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to deploy observer units on the Liberia/Sierra Leone border and agreed to coordinate border security activities. President Taylor accepted an invitation from President Kabbah to visit Sierra Leone at a date to be announced.

7. In a later development, the Government of Sierra Leone has denied any involvement in an alleged plot to overthrow the Government of Liberia, which has been widely reported in Monrovia.

8. On 25 July 1998, the Nigerian Government released the leader of RUF, Corporal Foday Sankoh, to Sierra Leonean custody in Freetown. The Government of Sierra Leone has now detained Corporal Sankoh and issued a public statement calling on his supporters, who are still fighting, to surrender to ECOMOG, to my Special Representative or to any religious organization by 8 August 1998. The Government statement called for an end to fighting and urged Sierra Leoneans to turn their attention and energies to the elimination of poverty, disease and illiteracy. In a television appearance with the Sierra Leonean Minister of Information, Corporal Sankoh appealed to the remnants of RUF to halt atrocities against the people of Sierra Leone and to surrender to United Nations observers or to the Military Observer Group of ECOWAS (ECOMOG). A subsequent Government statement issued on 3 August reiterated the 8 August deadline for the amnesty. There has been no significant response to the Government's call.

9. Following the visit to Sierra Leone of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara A. Otunnu, in May, the Government has

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accorded special attention, and has welcomed efforts by United Nations agencies, to promoting the welfare, rights and protection of children and to addressing challenges posed by the "youth crisis" and the high growth rate of the population. In July, Vice-President Albert Joe Demby publicized the 1998 edition of the UNICEF report, The Progress of Nations, while the Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning, Mr. James Jonah, delivered a radio address on World Population Day, in which he highlighted the Government's intention to rehabilitate and reconstruct all war-affected areas, increase the rate of economic growth faster than population growth and reduce poverty.

Activities of the Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States and the military and security situation in Sierra Leone

10. Since the end of June, the military and security situation in Sierra Leone has improved somewhat as reports of atrocities committed by elements of the former junta have markedly declined. Despite the onset of the rainy season, ECOMOG, has maintained its pressure on Kailahun district, the remaining stronghold of the former junta in the eastern part of the country. At the same time, ECOMOG positions in Koidu, also in eastern Sierra Leone, have repeatedly come under mortar attack during the last few weeks and the situation in the north-east remains volatile and unpredictable, as was shown by the rebels' capture and brief occupation of Kabala.

11. Security in Freetown has generally been good. However, on 19 July 1998, a gun battle lasting approximately one hour broke out in Freetown between ECOMOG and a band of 15 men described as robbers. The men were all captured the same day without bloodshed.

12. In the countryside, elements of the former junta are concentrated around Kailahun and Koidu in relatively large numbers, while smaller groups have been operating in northern and central Sierra Leone. Sometimes these groups have harassed ECOMOG units and the civilian population, perpetrating atrocities and destroying property, but on a much smaller scale than was the case in June. Attacks by ECOMOG, including air strikes, are thought to have inflicted significant casualties on the rebels and broken them up into smaller groups, curtailing their activities. Reported shortages of food and ammunition among the rebels have increased the risk that they could attack ECOMOG convoys and isolated settlements in order to resupply themselves. The southern part of the country and the area around Freetown in the west have been calm, except for the incident described above.

13. On 27 July 1998, apparently after seizing weapons and ammunition in an attack on ECOMOG units at Bendugu in north-eastern Sierra Leone, junta supporters attacked ECOMOG troops in the town of Kabala. The attack, which was preceded by a feigned offer to surrender, was well-coordinated and launched from three sides. The rebels succeeded in taking the town and temporarily driving out the ECOMOG defenders. At about the same time, the rebels attacked a civilian bus about 10 kilometres south of Kabala, killing seven passengers.

14. By 31 July, ECOMOG troops moved back in force into Kabala as rebel forces withdrew. The rebels caused extensive property damage, including the destruction of some 200 houses, plundered the town and extorted money from the

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civilian population, whom they threatened to use as human shields in the event of a counter-attack. No mutilations have been reported.

15. During the past few weeks, ECOMOG has inducted fresh troops into the Kenema sector in south-eastern Sierra Leone, with a view to reinforcing its presence near Kailahun. The deployment of an additional brigade, comprising three battalions, has enabled ECOMOG to mount more aggressive patrols, at times in conjunction with the Sierra Leonean Civil Defence Force. ECOMOG has also reinducted former Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSMLF) personnel, amounting to approximately three battalions, or 2,500 men, alongside its own troops to assist with the protection of supply lines and, in some cases, in combat duties. The provision of logistical assistance to ECOMOG, thanks to the bilateral contribution of the United States of America, has helped to improve operational capacity. ECOMOG has also been withdrawing exhausted troops with a view to rotating them. Nonetheless, ECOMOG, with an estimated 10,000 troops in theatre, is still overstretched and in need of significant additional logistical support, in order to contain the rebels and restore and maintain order in the eastern and northern parts of the country.

16. While the Civil Defence Force is nominally under the command and control of ECOMOG, reports continue to be received of unruly or criminal behaviour on the part of some members of the Force outside their own home districts. Strains that developed between ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Force in some places appear to have been successfully resolved or contained through the intervention of senior commanders. Some members of the Force have also been accused of human rights violations and criminal acts, including looting, confiscation of vehicles and civil disturbances, although allegations of summary killings and the torture of prisoners have dropped sharply since the end of May, apparently as a result of intervention by the Government and ECOMOG. The Civil Defence Force has made a commitment to end its practice of recruiting and initiating child soldiers, who comprise a high proportion of their ranks and who have been sent into combat.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Deployment of UNOMSIL

17. Pursuant to the creation of UNOMSIL by the Security Council by resolution 1181 (1998), I wrote to the President of the Council on 16 July 1998 to inform him of the countries that were contributing observers to the mission (see S/1998/673 and S/1998/674) and of the appointment of Brigadier-General Subhash C. Joshi (India) as Chief Military Observer. In accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 1181 (1998), I took advantage of the presence of President Kabbah at the special conference on Sierra Leone, held at Headquarters on 30 July 1998, to propose to him the terms of a status of mission agreement. As I informed the President of the Security Council in my letter of 3 August 1998 (S/1998/714), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone, Mr. Sama Banya, at once replied indicating his Government's acceptance. As I also mentioned in my 3 August letter, on the basis of the Government of Sierra Leone's programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, issued to participants at the special conference, I have

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written to the Chairman of ECOWAS proposing arrangements by which ECOMOG would be responsible for the security of United Nations personnel in Sierra Leone.

18. In accordance with resolution 1181 (1998), the eight military liaison personnel already deployed in Sierra Leone since May 1998 pursuant to resolution 1162 (1998) have now been redesignated United Nations military observers. The additional 32 officers who are in the process of being deployed, including those in the first phase, are from China, Egypt, India, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Zambia. As of 10 August 1998, a total of 26 officers have been deployed in Sierra Leone, with more to come over the next few days (see annex). The medical unit is expected to arrive in the country by 20 August.

19. As indicated in my report of 9 June and as outlined in the Government plan mentioned in paragraph 17 above, one of the priority tasks of the military observers, in accordance with the mandate set out in resolution 1181 (1998), is to monitor the demobilization of former combatants already disarmed by ECOMOG and concentrated in secure areas of the country, primarily at Lungi. In addition, in order to continue to monitor and report on the military and security situation, two observers are already deployed at Bo and two at Makeni, with the headquarters of ECOMOG brigades based there.

20. The Chief Military Observer and his staff will continue to be based at Freetown and an observer team will cover the area around the capital, including Hastings. The largest deployment outside Freetown will be at Lungi, with smaller teams deployed to the ECOMOG brigade headquarters at Bo, Kenema and Makeni, as the security situation permits and as the Government makes progress in the implementation of its disarmament and demobilization plan. Further deployments are planned in due course to cover locations in the north, south and centre of the country, co-deployed with ECOMOG units, including in Sumbuya, Sulima, Zimmi, Joru and Kabala. Eventually, as order is restored to the parts of the country where fighting has been taking place and subsequent phases of deployment take place, it is envisaged that United Nations observers would also be co-deployed with ECOMOG units at Kailahun and Koidu.

21. As I informed the Council in my report of 9 June (S/1998/486, paras. 78-79), I have pursued with President Taylor the possibility of an eventual co-deployment of United Nations military observers with ECOMOG troops at the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone. This proposal was reiterated in the communiqués following the meetings between President Taylor and President Kabbah at Abuja on 1 July 1998 and at Monrovia on 20 July 1998. My Special Representative will, at the appropriate time, dispatch a small team of observers from Freetown to examine the feasibility of such a deployment and I will revert to the Council accordingly.

22. In accordance with resolution 1162 (1998), a civilian police adviser, Deputy Commissioner Maritz du Toit (Namibia), was deployed in Sierra Leone in July. Following the adoption of resolution 1181 (1998), four more advisers will be deployed as soon as possible. Their role will be to assist in restoring the confidence of the Government and people of Sierra Leone in the police force, which incurred widespread public contempt for its role in supporting the junta,

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and to advise the Government on training and re-equipment needs. The United Nations civilian police will work closely with a team of police advisers deployed at the request of the Government from Commonwealth countries.

23. Since his arrival, Deputy Commissioner du Toit has established close relations with the Government and with his counterparts and has paid extensive visits to Sierra Leonean police stations within and outside the capital. He has also met with the Commonwealth police advisers to discuss cooperation between the Commonwealth and the United Nations in the conduct of their respective mandates.

Special Conference on Sierra Leone

24. As outlined in my report of 9 June 1998 (S/1998/486, para. 64), on 30 July 1998 I convened a high-level conference at Headquarters to mobilize assistance for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan, for the provision of logistical support to ECOMOG, for immediate humanitarian needs and for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Sierra Leone. The conference was preceded by an organizational meeting on 24 June.

25. President Kabbah, accompanied by the Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning, Mr. James Jonah, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sama Banya, made a statement before the Conference, setting forth his plans for national reconciliation and rehabilitation, including improvements in internal security and the Government's plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Sierra Leonean former combatants. Representatives of some 55 countries, including the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Gambia, Guinea and Liberia, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ghana, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and the Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration of the United States of America attended the Conference. Other participants included the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, as well as the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. United Nations specialized agencies and the relevant departments also sent representatives. The ECOMOG Force Commander, General Timothy Shelpidi, addressed the Conference on ECOMOG's needs.

26. Participants agreed on the need to establish an international contact group to mobilize and coordinate further support for Sierra Leone. I am presently reporting in greater detail on the conference, directly to the President of the Security Council, in a letter to be circulated as a document of the Council.

IV. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION

27. In a letter dated 11 August 1998 (S/1998/741), the Government of Sierra Leone conveyed to the President of the Security Council the programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants adopted by the Government of Sierra Leone. The programme describes in detail the institutional structures established by the Government to carry out its provisions, the financial management arrangements, the implementation schedule

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and the roles of UNOMSIL and ECOMOG in the reinsertion and reintegration of former combatants. The disarmament process will be carried out by ECOMOG, with the monitoring of UNOMSIL, in accordance with its mandate as set out in resolution 1181 (1998).

28. The essentials of the Government's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan were described in my report of 9 June (S/1998/486, paras. 53-62). The objective of the exercise is to consolidate the security of the State through the disarming, demobilization and reintegration into society of an estimated total of 33,000 former combatants (8,000 RSLMF and RUF and 25,000 CDF) in three phases between July 1998 and June 2001, at an estimated cost of \$33.6 million, of which \$17.3 million would be required for phase one. It is anticipated that the first phase would comprise the demobilization of the disarmed former RSLMF and RUF personnel now in detention and an estimated 5,000 CDF combatants. Particular emphasis will be devoted to the psychosocial reintegration of former child combatants from all sides.

29. The programme will be implemented under the guidance of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, under the chairmanship of President Kabbah and comprising representatives of the Government, ECOMOG, donors and my Special Representative on behalf of the United Nations community. The Committee will operate, in collaboration with other Government departments, donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), through an Executive secretariat responsible for overall programme planning and implementation, as well as the transparent and accountable administration of the programme and the monitoring and evaluation of its progress.

30. Following the formal adoption by the Government of the programme, the National Committee has commenced work and the members of the Executive secretariat, which will be assisted by a technical adviser, have been nominated. On 16 July 1998, a team representing the Committee, including the Ministers of the Interior and Information, the National Security Adviser and my Special Representative, visited the camp site at Lungi where more than 4,000 disarmed former members of RSLMF are currently detained by ECOMOG, awaiting demobilization and reintegration. The object of the visit was to explain the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process to the disarmed men and to the local community. Similar visits to other locations are planned for the future.

31. RSLMF has effectively been disbanded and is in a state of disgrace as a result of its participation in the illegal military coup of May 1997 and the subsequent junta rule. Though consideration is being given to reconstituting the Sierra Leone armed forces, it is considered unlikely that many of the ex-RSLMF personnel will be accepted for membership in it. The men detained at Lungi appeared to be well-treated, disciplined and receptive to the prospect of demobilization and rehabilitation. They were also aware of the intense hostility felt towards them by the general public and none have attempted to escape. Recently, some of the former RSLMF personnel have been reinducted into the ECOMOG force to assist in military operations.

32. One aspect of the reintegration process that has given cause for concern is the hostile attitude of the general public to former RSLMF personnel.

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Resentment at the atrocities inflicted by the junta and its supporters is so widespread as to pose a threat to the physical safety of anyone associated with the junta. As I have reported earlier, a number of revenge killings have been reported throughout the country since the recapture of Freetown in February. My Special Representative will assist the Government in carrying out a vigorous sensitization and education campaign to increase public acceptance of former army personnel undergoing reintegration, an effort that could also be supported by donor contributions.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

Abuses committed during and since the junta period

33. The human rights adviser working with my Special Representative for Sierra Leone has continued to compile accounts of atrocities committed both during and after the period of junta rule. Though some of these have yet to be rigorously examined, there is strong evidence of the systematic and widespread perpetration of multiple forms of human rights abuse against the civilian population, including rape. In recent weeks, elements of the former junta have continued to shell population centres such as Koidu and Daru and have used civilians as human shields in their military operations. There have been numerous instances of arbitrary execution, including of women and children, followed in some cases by mutilation of the bodies.

34. Though incidents of mutilation appear to have greatly declined since the end of June, it is feared that for each of the 600 or so persons attacked since March 1998 who survived and sought medical attention, at least 4 others are either dead or unaccounted for. The victims of these attacks are still making their way in small numbers to medical centres.

35. A survey of 9 of Sierra Leone's 150 chiefdoms indicates that some 700 civilian war-related deaths have occurred since February, including 200 in one village, Yifin, in late April. About 1,600 people have suffered war-related injuries in these chiefdoms since February, of whom 30 per cent are children. In Koidu, a reliable source has stated that 663 bodies were buried following the fighting in the area in mid-June. A significant percentage of the dead were women and children. At the same time, the killing of some 44 of the 144 paramount chiefs during that period indicates a deliberate attempt to target them.

36. The rebels are estimated to hold several thousand civilian captives, including women and children. They are used as porters, human shields and for forced sexual activity. Abductions continue to be reported in the north. It is believed that many RUF/AFRC fighters were themselves abducted as children and subjected to brutal initiation ceremonies.

37. Rebel forces tend to destroy property and homes in the villages they attack. Though no precise figures are available, there are indications of extensive damage to the housing stock in all areas that they have ravaged. The study of the 9 chiefdoms referred to above found that 1,619 homes had been destroyed. A survey of 3 other chiefdoms identified 600 destroyed houses and,

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on 12 July alone, in a village near Masingbi, some 40 houses were destroyed. As noted above, the rebels also destroyed property in Kabala at the end of July.

38. The rebel campaign of terror and their military activities have resulted in the displacement of at least 350,000 people since February. Some 250,000 of these are now in Guinea and Liberia and the remainder are internally displaced in Sierra Leone. The persistence of the rebellion not only prevents their return, but also causes grave humanitarian problems for a significant element of the displaced population, as described in more detail below.

Treason trials and the administration of justice

39. The State is prosecuting 58 persons in the regular courts on a range of charges including treason, murder and arson, and two further trials are scheduled to begin soon. All defendants, if found guilty, face the possibility of the death penalty. The trials are proceeding against a background of widespread public anger and a desire for quick justice.

40. The court martial of 38 soldiers has begun before a judicial panel comprising Sierra Leonean army officers and presided over by a Judge Advocate who is an ECOMOG officer. Early concerns regarding procedure were speedily rectified by the Government after they had been raised by UNOMSIL, which continues to monitor both the courts martial and the proceedings in the regular courts. UNOMSIL is also continuing to persuade the Government to establish a channel for judicial appeals from court martial findings.

41. The Government concedes that the judicial system in Sierra Leone is entirely inadequate. Outside Freetown, the courts are not functioning at all and the traditional court system has collapsed. Sustained support will be needed to restore the judicial system in keeping with Sierra Leone's distinguished legal traditions.

42. There are six functioning prisons in Sierra Leone, but prisoners are also held in an unverifiable number of other facilities, including military camps. Most detainees in civilian facilities are being held pursuant to the emergency powers legislation introduced by the Government shortly after its restoration in March 1998. Conditions in many facilities are overcrowded and unsanitary and the food and medical care are inadequate. About 2,000 prisoners are being held in Freetown.

43. Reliable reports are being regularly received of poor discipline within the Civil Defence Force. In various locations throughout the country they have been accused of harassing the local population and engaging in extortion. It has also been reported that the initiation of new members, including children between the ages of 15 and 17, occurred near Magburaka during the third week of July. ECOMOG has established a complaints procedure to investigate any allegations of harassment of the local population by ECOMOG troops.

44. UNOMSIL has commenced a human rights technical cooperation needs assessment and has already identified widespread requirements, many of which should be addressed as a matter of urgency. These include the need for human rights education for government officials, traditional leaders, police officers,

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teachers of civic education, lawyers, journalists and NGO personnel. It is also necessary to provide technical support to the Government and the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights to facilitate the application of human rights principles to State policy and practice. United Nations military observers will also receive training in aspects of international humanitarian law relevant to their duties.

VI. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

45. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone continues to give cause for concern, especially in the light of the poor response to the Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance to Sierra Leone. To date, only 5 per cent of the \$20.5 million requested has been received. Humanitarian organizations in Sierra Leone continue to face fundamental questions on the modalities for the delivery of relief assistance in an environment characterized by unpredictable hostilities and systematic human rights abuses. The effort to balance the rights of civilians in need of assistance with the requisite level of operational security has required the constant review and modification of the United Nations and NGO codes of conduct and protocols for humanitarian agencies operating in Sierra Leone, in order to reflect the current situation.

46. Despite the ongoing debate, humanitarian assistance continues to have a significant impact on the dire health and nutritional status of hundreds of thousands of war-affected Sierra Leoneans. The most significant humanitarian activities since my last report include efforts to address the serious humanitarian crisis at Masingbi in north central Sierra Leone, the influx of spontaneous returnees from Liberia and the repatriation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees. The United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit in Freetown now estimates that the number of internally displaced persons since the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998 has grown to more than 166,000. The recent clashes between rebel forces and ECOMOG around Kabala have provoked further displacements.

47. A rapid nutritional assessment carried out in Masingbi by the NGO, Action Contre la Faim, for children under the age of five revealed a global malnutrition rate of 39 per cent. Owing to insecurity in the Masingbi area during July, humanitarian organizations were forced to suspend operations and withdraw to Makeni. However, the United States NGO, CARE, succeeded in distributing assistance to more than 16,000 beneficiaries. Internally displaced persons continue to flow into Masingbi at a rate estimated at between 50 and 100 persons a day.

48. In collaboration with the Ministry of Health, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is supporting the health care delivery system in Masingbi as well as in western Kono district, where they are providing drugs and basic medical equipment. The latest data on morbidity from Masingbi and Kono district have shown that the measles outbreak that was prevalent in the area is now under control as a result of the vaccination campaign carried out by the Ministry of Health and UNICEF.

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49. Masingbi remains a critical focus for humanitarian intervention in terms of shelter for the current rainy season and coordination of other sectoral activities. The NGO, Concern Worldwide, has recently agreed to support shelter activities, while UNICEF and Action Contre la Faim will collaborate on water and sanitation matters. Food distributions by CARE and health activities by UNICEF, NGOs and the Government have had a significant impact in contributing to reducing the death rate in Masingbi and its environs from 899 deaths during June to 29 in July.

50. A joint Government, UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) mission to Pujehun district in southern Sierra Leone has confirmed that there has been an influx of returnees from Liberia, who are thought to be crossing the border at the rate of some 90 per day. The most urgent needs of the returnees are food, health and shelter, which are to some extent being met by WFP and by NGOs.

51. UNHCR has continued to repatriate Sierra Leonean refugees to Freetown. A total of some 7,500 Sierra Leoneans, mainly from Guinea and Gambia, have been assisted in returning home. Furthermore, it is planned to bring 3,000 Sierra Leoneans home by air from Guinea during the month of August. UNHCR has also repatriated some 440 Liberian refugees from Sierra Leone.

52. A United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit database has been established to detail the condition of more than 166,000 internally displaced persons, the number of people displaced since the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998. However, this figure represents only a portion of the total number of internally displaced persons in the country. UNHCR estimates that, during the same period, more than 250,000 Sierra Leoneans have sought refuge in neighbouring countries.

53. A mission to Kabala, undertaken only days before the 27 July attack, estimated that some 18,000 civilians were residing in the town, including a large number of internally displaced persons from Kono district. As a result of the hostilities, unconfirmed reports indicate that the majority of the civilians were displaced to villages to the north and north-west of Kabala. It has been reported that large numbers of civilians were abducted from Kabala, as has been the practice of the RUF in the past. Furthermore, all reports indicate that all relief goods, medical supplies and logistics for humanitarian efforts were looted or destroyed during the brief occupation. Now that the situation has calmed, the humanitarian community is assessing the damage and making efforts to meet the needs.

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

54. The decision by the Security Council to create UNOMSIL and to expand its functions has been warmly welcomed by the Government and people of Sierra Leone, and the early signing of the status of mission agreement between the Government and UNOMSIL has also been of great assistance in providing a firm basis for our activities there. The adoption by the Government of Sierra Leone of a comprehensive programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, containing clearly defined roles for ECOMOG and the United Nations, has set the tone for UNOMSIL's future efforts.

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55. The deployment of the first phase of UNOMSIL's 70 military observers and their equipment is also well under way. I am grateful to the troop-contributing countries for the dispatch with which they have acted in making these personnel available.

56. In my report of 9 June (para. 69), I identified three criteria which would govern subsequent deployments of military observers: the security situation, the progress of implementation of the Government's disarmament and demobilization plan and the availability of the necessary logistical equipment and resources. As I indicated then, I am keeping all three criteria under very close review and will keep the Council informed of all relevant developments while preparing for the next phase of the deployment. I am heartened by the progress made by ECOMOG in improving the security situation in the countryside, especially in eastern Sierra Leone, and renew my call to donors to contribute to ECOMOG's logistical requirements.

57. In this context, I am gratified by the success of the special conference on Sierra Leone, held at Headquarters on 30 July 1998, and look forward to working closely with the international contact group to be established to coordinate further support for Sierra Leone. In the meantime, I reiterate my call to donors to contribute to the Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance to Sierra Leone in order to assist Sierra Leoneans in meeting their most basic and urgent needs.

58. The sharp reduction in human rights violations perpetrated by elements of the former junta since the end of June is to be welcomed, but I remain deeply concerned about the plight of innocent civilians in the country, who may still be suffering from the depredations of the rebel forces or at risk from future attacks. In parallel with the efforts being made by ECOMOG to restore law and order throughout the countryside, I continue to believe that every effort should be made to end the threat posed by the rebels.

59. For this reason, I believe that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan adopted by the Government, and to be implemented with the assistance of ECOMOG and UNOMSIL, represents the best hope in the immediate future for consolidating the stability of the country and bolstering the authority of the Government throughout the territory of Sierra Leone. I therefore reiterate the plea I made on 30 July at the special conference for the donor community to lend every possible assistance to the Government in carrying out its plan. I welcome the commitment of the Government and the Civil Defence Force not to recruit children under the age of 18 as soldiers or to send them into combat, and urge them to implement their undertaking to demobilize any children currently under arms as soon as possible.

60. The development of technical capacity by the Government in the field of human rights deserves support. The results of a technical cooperation needs assessment performed by the office of my Special Representative reveal training needs. I encourage donors to assist the Government in meeting these needs.

61. Pursuant to resolution 1181 (1998), I will continue to keep the situation in Sierra Leone under close review and report to the Council on developments there and on the progress made by UNOMSIL.


62. I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, to the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier Subhash C. Joshi, and to the civilian and military personnel of UNOMSIL for the efforts they are continuing to make to deploy the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone in accordance with the mandate provided by the Security Council.

ANNEX

The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra LeoneContributions as at 10 August 1998

Country	Currently in position
China	3
Egypt	-
India	5
Kenya	2
Kyrgyzstan	-
New Zealand	2
Pakistan	5
Russia	5
United Kingdom	2
Zambia	<u>2</u>
	26*

* In addition to the Chief Military Observer, India.



Map No. 4065 UNITED NATIONS August 1998

Department of Public Information Cartographic Section

62) United Nations Document

Second Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 16 October 1998 (S/1998/960) para. 21.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/960
16 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 19 of its resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, the Security Council requested me to submit an initial report within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution and every 60 days thereafter on the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and its progress in carrying out its mandate, and also to inform the Council on plans for the later phases of the deployment of UNOMSIL when security conditions permit these to be implemented. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request and describes developments since my first progress report on UNOMSIL (S/1998/750), of 12 August 1998.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. The Government and Parliament of Sierra Leone have continued to take steps to extend their authority and to reform and strengthen national institutions, with a view to increasing efficiency and eliminating corruption and duplication, as well as enhancing security and stability.

3. On 2 September 1998, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah outlined plans for the creation of a new national security system, based on the reconstitution of national armed forces, the reform of the police force and the integration of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). Under this policy, the new armed forces would comprise a total of 5,000 troops under effective civilian management and constitutional control.

4. Another prominent issue is the handling of the trial of the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Corporal Foday Sankoh. After Corporal Sankoh had been brought back from Nigeria and placed in Government custody, RUF announced on 17 August 1998 a terror campaign against civilians, CDF and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) if the Government failed to release Corporal Sankoh within seven days, suggesting that peace negotiations could resume only thereafter. However, the Government has made it clear that Corporal Sankoh will stand trial and that there will be no resumption of negotiations or peace talks in view of the failure of RUF and the



junta in the past to comply with the provisions of the Abidjan and Conakry peace agreements.

5. Vice-President Albert Joe Demby and the Deputy Minister for Defence and CDF Coordinator, Chief Hinga Norman, have temporarily relocated their offices to Kenema in the eastern province in order to organize and direct the large-scale mobilization of the Civil Defence Forces for the operations aimed at clearing the remaining rebel-controlled areas. The Vice-President has reaffirmed the Government's determination to pursue the military option against the elements of the former junta. His statement has been reinforced by a call from Chief Norman to all CDF members to report for combat duty.

Relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia

6. In my report of 12 August, I mentioned the improvements that had occurred in the relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia. Since then, relations between the two countries, after a period of improvement following the meeting of President Kabbah and President Taylor in Abuja in July, have recently experienced complications arising in part from the continuing armed conflict in the east of Sierra Leone.

7. On 13 October 1998, President Kabbah informed me of alleged preparations by Liberia for the dispatch of fighters for an incursion into Sierra Leone. The allegations were vigorously denied by President Taylor. United Nations military observers also detected no evidence of an armed incursion from Liberia. On 16 October the two Presidents were reported to have spoken by telephone, and to have described the matter as "a misunderstanding that has been clarified". The two leaders were reported to have agreed to be in regular telephone contact in order to work towards strengthening relations. I welcome this constructive approach.

Follow-up to the Special Conference on Sierra Leone

8. Following the Special Conference on Sierra Leone held at United Nations Headquarters on 30 July 1998, the Government of Sierra Leone has established a 10-member working group charged with following up on the commitments and pledges made at the Special Conference. The Working Group met for the first time on 28 August 1998 and discussed possible steps for approaching donor countries and funding agencies that had agreed to support the reconstruction of Sierra Leone. As called for by the Special Conference, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has taken the initiative of convening an international contact group on Sierra Leone in London early in November. The Working Group will meet again beforehand, probably in late October, to assess the progress made.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION

Rebel activities

9. Since my last report, the security situation in Sierra Leone has experienced considerable fluctuations. A relatively quiet phase in July was

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followed by some volatility in late August and September, marked by a considerable increase in rebel attacks. These were accompanied by a resurgence of atrocities of the nature and scale last observed during the period from April to June, including the complete destruction of villages, and the torture, mutilation and execution of large numbers of civilians. These disturbing developments are reflected in more detail below.

10. The rebel build-up has been most significant in the north and brought the area of rebel activity closer to the centre of the country. Activity around the Koinadugu area has also intensified, as well as around Kambia and Kabala. The current concentration of rebels in the north-west indicates that they may be preparing for a major strike against Makeni or Port Loko. Such operations would sever ECOMOG's main supply route between Guinea, Freetown and Makeni and provide the rebels with a foothold close to the capital city. On 8 October, the rebels attacked Mange, between Port Loko and Kambia on the road between Lungi and the Guinean border, but were driven off. The situation in Freetown itself has remained safe and stable, and the whole of the southern province has remained free of rebel activity.

Civil Defence Forces/ECOMOG offensive into Kailahun district

11. On 1 October 1998 the Civil Defence Forces, with strong ECOMOG support, launched an offensive to capture one of the rebels' main strongholds in Kailahun district and thus disrupt their operations elsewhere in the country. The effects of the offensive are starting to be reflected in a reduction of the intensity of rebel activities in the north. Reports of the dispersal of the rebel stronghold at Koinadugu have also been received. Continued logistics support to ECOMOG is needed from the international community in order to ensure the effectiveness of those operations.

12. Several countries in the region have already pledged to contribute some of the additional 6,000 ECOMOG troops required to assist ECOMOG troops already in the country, whose number has been estimated at 10,000 to 12,000. The Governments of Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea, Mali and the Niger have indicated their readiness to provide contingents, stating that they could be deployed if the international community is prepared to bear the costs of transporting them to Sierra Leone. My Special Representative, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, has initiated discussions on this matter, and the Chief Military Observer of UNOMSIL has been meeting with contingent commanders from the countries involved concerning their deployment and related expenses for in-country maintenance and other needs.

Deployment of the Mission

13. At the end of August 1998, UNOMSIL completed the first phase of the deployment of its military component, consisting of 40 military observers, the Chief Military Observer and a medical team of 15 personnel. In addition to mission headquarters in Freetown, UNOMSIL has deployed military observers to five team sites, namely, the three provincial capitals Bo, Kenema and Makeni, the main demobilization site at Lungi, and Hastings airport (see map). The observers have been well received by the communities and have established good relations with the local authorities as well as with ECOMOG and CDF personnel.

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Though there have been occasional restrictions on their movement for security reasons, the observers have not so far experienced any disruption in their operations or threats to their personal safety.

14. Over and above their tasks of closely monitoring developments in the military situation, the military observers play an important role in the monitoring of international humanitarian law and promote humanitarian assistance through the investigation of incidents. They also provide security advice to humanitarian personnel and liaise between them and ECOMOG, CDF and the local authorities. They have been frequently called upon to intervene with ECOMOG and CDF on behalf of other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

15. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1181 (1998), I wrote on 3 August 1998 to General Abdulsalami A. Abubakar, Head of State of Nigeria, to propose that, in conformity with the disarmament and demobilization programme adopted by the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOMOG forces assume responsibility for the security of United Nations personnel in Sierra Leone. On 28 September 1998 General Abubakar replied, stating that ECOWAS was perfectly amenable to the proposals set out in my letter, which therefore constituted the terms of an agreement between our two organizations. General Abubakar confirmed in his letter that the ECOMOG mandate in Sierra Leone included the protection of all United Nations personnel and all staff of humanitarian and aid agencies.

IV. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

16. As described in my report of 12 August, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme targets an estimated total of 33,000 ex-combatants, most of whom are members of the Civil Defence Forces, and is scheduled to be completed in three phases by June 2001. The first phase covers the demobilization of former Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and RUF personnel who were captured and disarmed by ECOMOG and later encamped at Lungi. Their screening and registration commenced on 2 September. UNOMSIL deployed additional military observers to the Lungi team site to assist in several aspects of the registration, including the initial assessment of the candidates. While these activities go beyond the monitoring role of UNOMSIL, the additional effort was required to ascertain the identity and eligibility of the ex-combatants since UNOMSIL was not present during the initial disarmament by ECOMOG. The exercise was completed on 25 September with a total of 2,145 persons screened and registered. The full demobilization of those ex-combatants is scheduled to be completed in December 1998.

17. While the registration and screening process was implemented fairly smoothly, the pace of the programme lags behind the original goals since it is now being implemented against the background of a continued war effort. Since most of the ex-RSLMF soldiers, amounting to four battalions, who had been encamped at Lungi have been reinducted by ECOMOG, the number of individuals to be demobilized during the first phase of the programme has been considerably reduced. It is expected, however, that these soldiers, who are currently fighting alongside ECOMOG, will eventually undergo the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. In addition, though 5,000 members of

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the Civil Defence Forces were expected to be demobilized during the first phase, there is no indication to date that any CDF units have started the process, although in some areas registration exercises have been initiated.

18. As I mentioned in my last report, there is still concern about the hostile attitude of the general public towards former RSLMF personnel, which could potentially derail the reintegration process. Given the continued volatility of the overall security situation, it is important to ensure that former soldiers are not cast out of society because they may, as a group, turn into a destabilizing factor in the long run. A sensitization campaign under the auspices of the Ministry of Information, Communications, Tourism and Culture is now under way to increase public acceptance of ex-combatants. Successful reintegration will also depend on the benefits extended to those communities to which ex-combatants return in order to avoid the perception of a preferential treatment for the former soldiers.

19. A major challenge also remains concerning the start of the pre-discharge orientation programme which is to follow the screening and registration process. An initial programme of pre-discharge activities will be established at Lungi by the Executive Secretariat of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. These will include workshops for community sensitization, attitudinal education for ex-combatants, and general information on reinsertion and reintegration.

20. Regarding the future of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, the Executive Secretariat of the National Committee has already indicated its intention to open a disarmament and demobilization centre in the interior in preparation for the next phase of the programme. A team composed of National Committee staff, UNOMSIL and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), in collaboration with ECOMOG, is currently undertaking reconnaissance visits to identify suitable sites for the exercise.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights abuses

21. Since my last report there has been a resurgence of human rights abuses committed by the rebel forces. During the month of September, UNOMSIL received an escalating number of reports of mutilations, amputations, summary executions, abductions and house burnings. For instance, in just a single week, 20 villages were attacked and destroyed in four small chiefdoms in the north-west of the country. The attacks were preceded by the destruction of the principal local population centre, Kamalu, on 6 September. Forty people, including children, died in that attack. Photographic evidence suggests that a number of the dead had first been subjected to forms of extreme torture and sexual abuse; others appear to have been burned alive. It is reported that no less than 50 people were abducted. The rising incidence of mutilations and amputations is also illustrated by the admission to hospital of 14 amputees following just one attack on Kokuna on 27 September. From a number of locations UNOMSIL has received reliable reports of other forms of atrocities, including the detention

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of elderly or incapacitated men in huts which were then set on fire and the carving of slogans, such as 'AFRC', into the flesh of victims.

22. It remains difficult to estimate the exact number of rebel attacks and the casualties inflicted, not least because of the inaccessibility of many of the targeted locations and the high number of victims who never reach medical assistance. There is also very little reliable information regarding the plight of the captives of the rebels and of villagers living in areas under their control. However, interviews with former captives and escapees from those regions report such abuses as multiple rape of women, summary executions and slave labour. In the coming months, the four members of the UNOMSIL human rights unit, in cooperation with the military observers deployed in the provinces, will try in a systematic manner to compile and assess information regarding the human rights situation within the areas under rebel control.

23. There is also continued concern about the ongoing armed deployment of under-age boys and, in some locations, their continued initiation into the Civil Defence Forces. The renewed attention drawn to these matters by the Executive Director of UNICEF, Ms. Carol Bellamy, during a visit to Sierra Leone on 1 and 2 October, has greatly assisted efforts to end the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers by CDF units.

24. The discipline of many CDF units has improved significantly. Nevertheless, there are reports of interference by some CDF elements with the delivery of humanitarian supplies and acts of harassment against the civilian population. Reports of the prevalence of child prostitution in some heavily militarized areas of the countryside have, moreover, been substantiated. Together with UNICEF, the UNOMSIL human rights unit is seeking to assist the Government and ECOMOG in addressing this problem. Some reports have also suggested that certain ECOMOG personnel do not consistently ensure full respect for provisions of international humanitarian law, such as those regarding the protection of non-combatants in combat situations and the proper treatment of combatants during surrender or capture. UNOMSIL is encouraging the ECOMOG leadership to raise awareness among all troops to ensure full respect for all relevant aspects of international humanitarian law. The mission's human rights unit stands ready to assist ECOMOG with technical advice if needed.

Treason trials

25. The State is currently prosecuting, for treason and related charges, some 40 people in two civilian trials. A court martial was concluded on 12 October, and further trials are scheduled to commence in the coming weeks. A separate civilian trial of RUF leader Foday Sankoh commenced on 24 September 1998. Given the highly-charged atmosphere surrounding the trial, the Attorney-General has requested the assistance of the UNOMSIL human rights adviser on several occasions to ensure that Corporal Sankoh's rights are respected. However, the Government's failure so far to persuade a Sierra Leonean lawyer to represent Corporal Sankoh is a cause for concern. All the accused face the possible imposition of the death penalty. Already, 16 civilians and 34 of the defendants in the court martial have been sentenced to death. Under Sierra Leonean law, only the civilians have the right to appeal their sentences to the Sierra Leone Court of Appeal and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court. If the sentences are

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upheld throughout the appeals process, there is still the possibility of a pardon should the Head of State decide to exercise the prerogative of mercy under national law. A further avenue of consideration of the sentences is available by virtue of Sierra Leone's ratification of the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, whereby individuals may petition the United Nations Human Rights Committee.

26. So far, UNOMSIL and observers from the International Bar Association have found that the civilian group trials are being conducted in a manner which appears to comply with international procedural standards. It is also apparent that the Government is largely committed to conducting transparent and fair trials. It remains a matter of concern that those tried by court martial are deprived of their right to judicial review of the judgements and sentences. UNOMSIL is also concerned as to whether the manner in which a number of defendants were repatriated to Sierra Leone from neighbouring countries was in accordance with applicable international standards. The concerns of UNOMSIL continue to be conveyed to the Government in a timely and forthright manner. On 15 October 1998 the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights wrote to President Kabbah, asking him to intervene in the process to show mercy.

Training initiatives

27. The UNOMSIL human rights unit also plays an important role in improving coordination and exchange among the different public and private institutions involved in human rights work in Sierra Leone. Moreover, special attention is given to the provision of technical assistance to help the Government meet its reporting obligations under the international human rights treaties, commencing with those arising under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. UNOMSIL also seeks to facilitate national efforts to re-establish a functioning judicial system in provincial areas.

28. In line with the institution-building aspects of the UNOMSIL human rights mandate, the Mission has started several training initiatives in close collaboration with the Government and with national and international human rights non-governmental organizations and the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights. In September, UNOMSIL has successfully undertaken the training of the National Commission's human rights monitoring committees, and it has facilitated the first inter-non-governmental organization human rights training workshop. The Mission's human rights unit is also facilitating preparations for a major human rights monitoring and training programme to be implemented in November and provides a human rights module as part of the ongoing programme of retraining the police force.

29. These activities aim to strengthen local capacity to monitor, report on and promote human rights in the country, by both Government representatives and members of civil society. It is particularly important that training initiatives should be continued and consolidated.

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VI. CIVILIAN POLICE

30. In accordance with resolution 1181 (1998), UNOMSIL has to date deployed a total of three civilian police advisers, and two additional officers are under recruitment. In carrying out their mandate, the civilian police advisers work closely with the UNOMSIL human rights unit and the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force for Sierra Leone, which is advising and assisting the Government in police training.

31. In order to assess the current situation, the UNOMSIL advisers have undertaken visits to different police regional headquarters, divisional headquarters, departments, courts, police stations and posts, assisted in determining work methods, logistical and training needs, and identified a number of problem areas. In addition, they met with President Kabbah, the Chief Justice, various Members of Parliament, ambassadors, the commanders of ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces and various non-governmental organizations to discuss their activities in assisting the Sierra Leone police force. UNOMSIL has distributed to all concerned a report containing preliminary findings and recommendations.

32. The reform of the police force in Sierra Leone poses great challenges. As a result of the wanton destruction caused by the rebel war, many police stations in the country have been severely damaged or destroyed, and equipment vandalized. Parts of the country are without police presence, since many officers were killed or abandoned their posts during and after the conflict. Moreover, little or no training has been available for years, which has affected not only the skill level and capacity for policing but also the quality of leadership and strategic planning. Notwithstanding the rapid expansion of the force over the last few years, the police suffer from inadequate logistical support, lack of equipment, unattractive salaries and poor conditions of service. No vehicles or other means of transport are available to ensure the effective mobilization of officers to prevent and investigate crimes. This situation is exacerbated by the breakdown of the general law enforcement system. Outside Freetown, the courts are hardly operational except for the magistrates courts in Bo, Kenema and Makeni, and detention facilities are in poor condition.

33. The Government has outlined the principles and priorities which will guide the reform process, including specific steps based on the recommendations made by the UNOMSIL civilian police advisers and the Commonwealth Task Force. Moreover, a police mission statement has been announced, emphasizing the need to balance respect for human rights with law enforcement and to take account of local concerns through community consultation by the police force. Implementation of the reform process began in August, and a three-year draft plan, for the period 1999-2001, is currently under discussion. Strong emphasis is being placed on the development of police training initiatives, some of which are already being implemented.

34. While the progress made to date is impressive, resource constraints present serious obstacles to the effective and fast implementation of the reform. The Governments of Germany and the United Kingdom have already provided funds and equipment in support of these efforts, but further donor assistance will be required.

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VII. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Humanitarian crisis

35. A humanitarian crisis of serious proportions is developing in isolated areas of Sierra Leone, particularly the north-east. Since the incursion of former junta elements into Kabala at the end of July 1998, humanitarian agencies have been unable to assess needs there because of unpredictable security. The countryside between Kabala and Koidu, up to the border with Guinea, is also out of reach owing to insecurity and inadequate roads and airstrips. Similar conditions apply, inter alia, to the area east of Kambia in the north-west and in the Kailahun district.

36. Continuing insecurity has resulted in increased displacement of populations. During the reporting period, some 14,000 Sierra Leoneans were displaced from south Kenema district into Kenema Town. At the same time, the number of needy beneficiaries in Masingbi has swollen from 16,000 to more than 35,000. The United Nations Humanitarian Coordination Unit/Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that up to 250,000 persons have been displaced in the fighting that followed the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998, an increase of about 70,000 persons since my last report. It is feared that a considerable number of internally displaced persons remain unrecorded.

37. The number of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea is now 357,000, of which an estimated 217,700 have arrived since February 1998. Most of these fled to the Guéckédou area, but some 7,700 have recently arrived in Forécariah following a rebel attack on 28 September at Kukuna near the border with Guinea. There are also 90,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia, including 40,000 new arrivals. Another 10,000 Sierra Leoneans have taken refuge in other countries in the region, mainly in Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia and Senegal, for a total of 457,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in the subregion. So as to determine more accurately the number of refugees in Liberia, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will carry out a registration exercise in November 1998.

38. In response to the newly emerging internally displaced person situation in both the eastern and northern parts of the country, UNICEF, in collaboration with non-governmental organizations, is providing high-energy biscuits to counter malnutrition and providing support to malnourished children referred to therapeutic feeding centres and supplementary feeding programmes.

Activities of United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations

39. The World Food Programme (WFP) continues to provide humanitarian food assistance to vulnerable groups, farmers and institutions in accessible areas of the country. During August and September, WFP distributed over 4,641 tons of assorted food commodities, of which over 76 per cent benefited community farmers in their efforts to grow more food and become self-sufficient. Over 22 per cent of the quantity distributed during the reporting period went to support vulnerable groups escaping from the war as well as therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes. WFP targeted an estimated 62,000 vulnerable persons, over

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70,000 farmers, 12,600 nutritionally vulnerable persons and 6,823 refugees in food-for-work and training programmes in August and September 1998.

40. However, food assistance has encountered some constraints in supplies because of unacceptably high levels of losses from recent shipments, practically all in the port area. A meeting with the port authorities and security officers has led to proposals for improvements, and the situation is being monitored closely.

41. The intervention of the World Health Organization (WHO) proved crucial in the confirmation of vibrio cholera 0.1 as the causative agent responsible for the unusual increase in incidences of acute watery diarrhoea syndrome, which has caused a number of deaths. A total of 1,170 cases and 55 deaths were recorded from 19 July to 20 September 1998. The epidemic now appears to be on the decline, with the support of UNICEF and WHO, which have provided medical supplies to combat the outbreak. UNICEF is also coordinating cholera prevention through regular chlorination of wells and protection of water sources.

42. The maternal mortality rate is at a world record high of 1,800 per 100,000 live births and remains a primary concern. UNICEF is targeting 1.5 million children and women by revitalizing more peripheral health units to respond to the increasing demand for services.

43. Following an appeal by the Government of Sierra Leone for UNHCR to assist in the repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries, a UNHCR delegation visited Sierra Leone from 25 to 27 September. As a result, UNHCR is in the process of opening a new office in Kenema. Additional offices will be reopened in Bo, Segbwema and Zimmi once security permits. Moreover, UNHCR has started to facilitate the return of Sierra Leonean refugees. So far, a total of 11,000 refugees have been repatriated to Freetown where, at the request of the Government, priority has been given to the return of skilled professionals, civil servants and students, who could contribute to the ongoing reconstruction efforts. Finally, it should be noted that in August 10,000 refugees returned spontaneously from Liberia to Zimmi and Kenema and, in late September, according to reports yet to be confirmed, some 20,000 refugees returned from Liberia to Zimmi.

44. The World Health Organization commissioned a consultant in August to assess the magnitude of the problem of increased numbers of victims of amputation and has proposed rehabilitative measures to the Government.

45. To help better plan for relief and longer-term development intervention, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has begun discussions with the objective of helping the Government to undertake a national demographic and health survey.

VIII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

46. While a humanitarian emergency still prevails in the north and east of Sierra Leone, the southern and western parts have experienced a certain amount of stability and security. However, they must cope with the continuing influx

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of displaced populations and the challenges of reconstruction after the trauma and devastation brought on by the junta. The United Nations development system, under the leadership of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is therefore supporting peace-building efforts within the context of preventive development.

47. To this end, UNDP funds three large-scale programmes, including a programme for support to resettlement, reconstruction and rehabilitation through a preventive development approach. This \$4 million programme links emergency humanitarian assistance with the resumption of productive activities for longer-term development. Beneficiaries of the programme include internally displaced persons, returnee refugees, ex-combatants and host communities. UNDP is also funding a \$2.5 million programme aimed at raising public awareness of issues of national reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.

IX. FURTHER ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS

48. In my fifth report on the situation in Sierra Leone, of 9 June 1998 (S/1998/486, para. 69), I stated that additional deployments of United Nations military observers beyond the first phase would depend on the security situation within the country and the progress made by the Government in carrying out its disarmament and demobilization plan.

49. The security situation in Sierra Leone has not improved significantly since my last report and, in some parts of the country, may have deteriorated. In the last two months the northern province has seen a resurgence of rebel activity, including atrocities, with no sign of weakening in rebel resolve, numbers or organization.

50. Largely for this reason, the progress made by the Government in carrying out its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has been less than was hoped for. The intensification of fighting caused by the launching of the CDF/ECOMOG offensive and the consequent large-scale mobilization of both CDF and re-inducted RSLMF personnel do not at present provide the best conditions for the rapid progress of disarmament and demobilization.

51. On the other hand, should the CDF/ECOMOG offensive lead to large-scale surrenders among the former junta elements and their participation in the disarmament and demobilization programme, it may be necessary to deploy United Nations observers very rapidly.

52. I am therefore keeping the situation under careful review, and intend to deploy additional observers only after taking full account of the security situation. I am, however, prepared to deploy observers rapidly if the situation so permits.

53. Against the background of the continuing military conflict and its effects on security, the need for the Government to improve the functioning of the Sierra Leonean police force has become all the more acute. In view of the success already achieved in implementing its current mandate, I recommend that my Special Representative, assisted by the Mission's civilian police component,

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now proceed to seek donor funding for the reform and restructuring of the Sierra Leonean police force, while continuing to work closely with the Government in carrying out the three-year strategic plan referred to in paragraph 33 above.

X. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

54. The continuing conflict in Sierra Leone imposes immense suffering on the people of that country. I strongly condemn the summary executions, torture, mutilations, rapes, looting and other acts of barbarism carried out by former junta elements and call on them to lay down their arms and surrender. I am particularly outraged by the senseless acts of terror perpetrated against children, such as the amputation of limbs of boys and girls as young as six years of age, and support the efforts to bring to justice the authors of these especially abhorrent crimes.

55. The human rights abuses committed by the rebels also give rise to the humanitarian emergency in Sierra Leone, as they continue to cause the widespread dislocation of local populations. Though United Nations humanitarian personnel and non-governmental organizations have done much to aid the victims of attacks and displacement, more needs to be done as a matter of urgency, especially in regard to the provision of medical and surgical capacity, specific services for amputees and psychosocial treatment for the trauma suffered by the victims and their families. To this end, I reiterate my call to donors to contribute to the Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance to Sierra Leone in order to meet the basic needs of the people.

56. The continuing commitment of ECOMOG has been essential in assisting the Government of Sierra Leone to restore peace and security throughout the country, and the efforts being made to deploy additional troops from ECOWAS countries are welcome. In view of the importance of the present offensive into the east and the wresting of the initiative from the rebels, I appeal to the members of the Security Council and the international community to extend all possible technical and logistical support to achieving the successful conclusion of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

57. At the same time, I am encouraged by the focus of the Government on strengthening democratic control over the reconstituted armed forces. Equally commendable is the thoroughness applied to the restructuring of the police force and its reform in line with the standards of democratic societies. In this context, I should like to express my appreciation to the Governments of Germany and the United Kingdom for the support they have lent to the Government's efforts.

58. The long-term stability of the country will also depend vitally on the successful implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme adopted by the Government. I therefore reiterate the plea I made on 30 July at the Special Conference on Sierra Leone for the donor community to lend every possible assistance to the Government in carrying out its plan. I look forward to working closely with donors to ensure that the commitments made in this and other respects at the Special Conference will be honoured. I wish to commend the United Kingdom for the important role it has played by providing

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equipment and logistical support for the screening and registration exercise, and by continuing to provide food and emergency medical assistance to the ex-combatants as well as water to the larger community at Lungi.

59. The Government of Sierra Leone has made commendable efforts to ensure that the procedural aspects of the civilian group trials are in conformity with international human rights standards. However, I must express my concern that those sentenced to death in the recently concluded court martial have no right of legal appeal under Sierra Leonean law. Accordingly, in the light of the human rights issues which arise, I urge the Government, at a minimum, to consider a stay of execution of sentences pending review of the proceedings before relevant international monitoring bodies. I also encourage the Government to continue to take all reasonable steps to ensure that persons facing serious criminal charges are legally represented.

60. I should like to express my appreciation for the generous manner in which the International Bar Association has provided expert trial observers who have worked closely with UNOMSIL. I also encourage the international community to support human rights training programmes, to be carried out in close consultation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, for the benefit of those involved in law enforcement, as well as members of the legal profession and the judiciary.

61. The latest developments in the situation between Sierra Leone and Liberia are a cause for deep concern. I urge the Governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia to continue to exercise maximum restraint, pursue dialogue and implement the confidence-building measures aimed at improving relations between the two countries which they agreed upon in July 1998. In doing so, the two Governments would continue to show their commitment to subregional peace and security and their adherence to the Non-aggression Pact and Good Neighbourliness Treaty contained in the Mano River Union Declaration of 1973. In this context, should both parties agree, the deployment of ECOMOG troops at the border, subsequently accompanied by United Nations military observers, could help to stabilize the situation and restore mutual confidence.

62. Finally, I wish to thank all Member States which have contributed military observers for deployment with UNOMSIL for the speed with which the officers were dispatched. I hope that, under the right conditions and the necessary improvements in security, the second phase of deployment can be implemented with equal success.

63. Pursuant to resolution 1181 (1998), I will continue to keep the situation in Sierra Leone under close review and report to the Council on developments on the ground as well as the continued work of UNOMSIL. In particular, I will examine with great care any realistic proposal to end the armed conflict with minimal further loss of life to combatants and to innocent civilians, and to promote lasting peace and national reconciliation in Sierra Leone.

64. I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, to the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier Subhash C. Joshi, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNOMSIL for their work in accordance with the mandate provided by the Security Council.

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
AnnexUnited Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions
as at 1 September 1998

	Military observers	Others ^a	Total
China	3		3
Egypt	2		2
India	6	15	21
Kenya	4		4
Kyrgyzstan	1		1
New Zealand	2		2
Pakistan	5		5
Russian Federation	7		7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7		7
Zambia	4		4
Total	41 ^b	15	56

^a Medical team.

^b Including Chief Military Observer.

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Map No. 4065 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS October 1998

Department of Public Information Cartographic Section

63) United Nations Document

Third Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 16 December 1998 (S/1998/1176) para. 18.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/1176
16 December 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THIRD PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 19 of resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, the Security Council requested me to submit an initial report within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution and every 60 days thereafter on the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and its progress in carrying out its mandate, and also to inform the Council on plans for the later phases of the deployment of UNOMSIL when security conditions permit these to be implemented. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request and describes developments since my second progress report on UNOMSIL (S/1998/960) of 16 October 1998. The present report is also submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. Since my second progress report, the Government of Sierra Leone has continued its efforts to consolidate its position, to restore the stability of the country and to improve relations with its neighbours. The Government has launched initiatives to strengthen the civil service and to fight corruption. Sierra Leone is also increasingly active in the regional and international arena.

3. On 30 October 1998, the Government launched a nationwide consultative exercise, organized with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), aimed at enhancing the capacity of Government ministries, other national institutions and civil society to take charge of the development process. The consultations exercise is expected to conclude on 14 December with the adoption of a national consensus on major policy issues, including national reconciliation.

4. The Government has also pursued legal proceedings against both military and civilian supporters of the illegal coup of May 1997 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). On 19 October 1998, after a court martial had sentenced 34 officers found guilty of treason to death, 24 of them were executed by firing squad. The executions took place despite appeals from the United



Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and others, including myself, for a stay of execution and the grant of the right of appeal. On 23 October 1998, a jury at the High Court in Freetown found Corporal Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), guilty of treason and related offences and sentenced him to death by hanging. Corporal Sankoh, who had not been legally represented during his trial, has now selected legal advisers to undertake his appeal following efforts by the Government, with UNOMSIL assistance, to secure legal representation for him.

5. At their summit meeting in Abuja on 30 and 31 October 1998, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed to combine the strengthening of its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with efforts at dialogue to achieve lasting peace and national reconciliation in Sierra Leone. The Heads of State and Government also expressed gratitude to Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria for contributing troops to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, encouraged Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Mali and Niger to deploy the troops they had promised to contribute as soon as possible and appealed to the international community to provide the necessary logistical support. The arrival of these additional troops is still being awaited.

6. On 7 December 1998, the Chairman of the Security Council Sanctions Committee and Permanent Representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hans Dahlgren, arrived in Freetown for a four-day assessment mission. Ambassador Dahlgren met with President Kabbah; the ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Timothy Shelpidi; the ECOMOG Task Force Commander, Brigadier-General Abu Ahmadu and others from the United Nations and the international community. During his visit to the front-line areas, the local authorities conveyed to Ambassador Dahlgren their requests for United Nations assistance in controlling the border with Liberia through the establishment of a buffer zone, the deployment of United Nations military observers and assistance to ECOMOG in patrolling the frontier. Ambassador Dahlgren also visited Monrovia.

7. Following his visit to the Gambia on 9 December, President Kabbah reportedly accepted an offer from the President of the Gambia to mediate a peace agreement with the rebels.

Follow-up to the Special Conference on Sierra Leone

8. As called for by the Special Conference on Sierra Leone held at United Nations Headquarters on 30 July 1998, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland convened a meeting of the International Contact Group of donors to Sierra Leone in London on 5 November. The objectives of the meeting were to build up international support for Sierra Leone's efforts to restore peace, democracy and human rights; to encourage further assistance to ECOMOG and contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Sierra Leone; to try to match specific ECOMOG requirements to donor offers; and to encourage the Government of Sierra Leone to develop political dialogue and national reconciliation beyond the programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and to encourage participation in it.

9. The London meeting, which was opened by Mr. Tony Lloyd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, was attended on behalf of the Government

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of Sierra Leone by Mr. James Jonah, the Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Mr. Lansana Kouyate, and my Special Representative for Sierra Leone, Mr. Francis G. Okelo. The meeting expressed strong support for the dual-track approach (military and diplomatic) agreed upon at the ECOWAS summit on 31 October, by which efforts to strengthen ECOMOG would be accompanied by the opening of dialogue to achieve lasting peace and national reconciliation.

10. The meeting agreed on a series of next steps to be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS and ECOMOG and the international community. In particular, the Government would pursue the above-mentioned dual track approach for restoring peace and stability in Sierra Leone. Troop contributors would continue their efforts to augment ECOMOG, with the aim of completing the additional deployments by the end of 1998. For its part, the international community would press on with financing and other support to help ECOMOG remain in Sierra Leone and expand its operations, including through contributions to the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Efforts in Sierra Leone, as well as bilateral contributions.

11. It has provisionally been decided that the next meeting of the International Contact Group will be held in New York in January 1999. In Sierra Leone, a Government working group chaired by the Minister of Finance is continuing to follow up on the commitments and pledges made by donors. The membership of the working group also includes UNOMSIL and donor representatives.

Relations between Sierra Leone and its neighbours

12. On 12 November 1998, at the invitation of President Lansana Conte of Guinea, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and President Charles Taylor of Liberia participated in an extraordinary summit meeting of the Mano River Union in Conakry. The summit was also attended by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, the Presidential Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights in Africa, as well as my Special Representative for Sierra Leone and my Representative for Liberia, Mr. Felix Downes-Thomas.

13. In a communiqué issued after the meeting, the three Heads of State announced their decision to rejuvenate the Mano River Union. They further pledged to ensure the strict observance of the 1986 Non-Aggression and Security Cooperation Agreement between Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea that had been signed and ratified by the three member States. The three Heads of State agreed to work collectively to restore peace in Sierra Leone and maintain stability in the subregion.

14. After the summit, in a meeting with President Kabbah in Freetown, Reverend Jackson stressed the advantage of negotiations over confrontation and called for a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Sierra Leone. A Liberian delegation, led by the Minister of National Security, concluded a two-day visit to Sierra Leone on 9 December. The Liberian Government subsequently announced that President Kabbah had agreed with President Taylor's request for cooperation on joint border patrols.

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Activities of the Mission relating to the security situation

15. While reaffirming its commitment to end the ongoing rebel war as soon as possible, the Government has expressed its readiness to address any grievances the rebels might have on condition that they first stop fighting, lay down their arms and surrender to ECOMOG or UNOMSIL. There has also been discussion in Government circles of a possible offer to provide safe passage to five persons identified as leaders of the two factions comprising the rebel forces - Johnny Paul Koroma and S. A. J. Musa of the AFRC and Sam Bockarie, Dennis Mingo and Eldred Collins of the RUF - to leave the country for a non-neighbouring country of their choice.

16. In this context, UNOMSIL has cooperated closely with the Government and with ECOMOG in following up indications that S. A. J. Musa, along with several of his supporters, might be prepared to surrender to UNOMSIL. Despite suspicions that this reported offer might be a feint, UNOMSIL has made provisional preparations to accept the surrender of individuals or groups of rebels if this can be arranged under proper security conditions. UNOMSIL has also been in contact with S. A. J. Musa to try to secure the release of a Catholic priest, Father Mario Guerra, who was kidnapped near Makeni on 17 November 1998 by elements of the AFRC.

17. Since the establishment of UNOMSIL, my Special Representative has consulted the resident agencies, funds and programmes on a regular basis and has instituted weekly United Nations coordination meetings to address issues covered under the respective mandates of the organizations. Moreover, a joint security committee meets weekly to share and assess information about the situation on the ground. UNOMSIL has also actively pursued close contact with representatives of civil society, including good working relations with local non-governmental organizations and participation in civic events, such as symposia and workshops.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION

Rebel activities

18. On the basis of the information received by UNOMSIL on the strength, organization and activities of the rebels, there appear to be six rebel battalion-type formations comprising approximately 300 fighters each. Two of these are primarily AFRC and are based in the north. The other four, believed to be RUF with some AFRC elements, are deployed around Kailahun. It is believed that the AFRC units receive supplies of arms and ammunition from the Kailahun district.

19. In the north of the country, and especially in the north-west, rebel attacks against civilians have persisted and have recently intensified. In the first few days of December 1998, a large rebel force moving southwards and westwards launched coordinated and well-planned attacks on several locations near the road from Freetown to the Guinean border, including Mange, Lunsar and Masiaka, inflicting heavy casualties on civilians and property damage and causing thousands to flee and take refuge in the capital and surrounding

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districts. This rebel force is believed to be under the command of S. A. J. Musa.

20. There is much speculation concerning the motive behind these attacks, which have taken place at a time when Musa has publicly offered to surrender to UNOMSIL. These atrocities are taking place against the background of a rift which appears to have arisen between the AFRC remnants in the north and the RUF in the east. ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) have done much to disrupt the supply of arms and ammunition from Kailahun to the rebels in the north.

21. In the north-east, the rebel capacity to concentrate and coordinate their forces appears to have eroded since the time of their attack on Kabala in July. The rebel concentration in Koinadugu area was broken up by combined efforts of reconstituted battalions of former soldiers of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and ECOMOG, thus reducing the threat to Makeni and to the Koidu-Lunsar road. Repeated rebel attempts to gain control of the diamond-rich Koidu area have been unsuccessful. However, the situation remains unpredictable and the area is still in danger from rebel attacks.

22. In the south-east, rebel attacks during October and November 1998 seemed designed to surround and cut off Kenema both from Freetown and from the Liberian border by controlling the road that links Daru with Joru and Zimmi. UNOMSIL, in close collaboration with ECOMOG and CDF units based at Kenema, is standing by in case the rebels' failure to achieve their objective should lead some of them to open talks with the Government.

23. The south and south-west of the country, including Freetown, have remained calm, though tension in the capital rose during December following a rebel attack on the road linking Masiaka and Rogberi.

Civil Defence Forces/ECOMOG/RSLMF

24. In the north, ECOMOG has shown increased willingness to engage the rebels in the bush, while the CDF, which essentially originated in southern Sierra Leone, has begun to operate in the north. These developments, as well as the reinduction of former RSLMF soldiers into combat alongside ECOMOG, appear to have taken a toll on rebel strength in the north-east. As noted above, an important objective of the pro-Government forces has been to disrupt ammunition supply lines between the main rebel stronghold in the Kailahun district and rebel units in the north of the country. In the south-east, the CDF, with ECOMOG support, has now established fairly effective control of the area south of Kenema after stemming the rebel offensive along the Daru-Joru-Zimmi road.

25. The CDF in both the north and the east has, however, been hampered by serious shortages of ammunition, communications, food, transportation and medicines. In addition to logistical shortages, there have been occasional lapses in coordination between ECOMOG and the CDF. Air strikes launched by ECOMOG to disperse rebel preparations for an attack on Joru on 15 November reportedly caused casualties among a CDF concentration nearby, underlining the need for improved coordination between the two forces.

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26. Despite efforts to organize and fund the deployment of reinforcements, ECOMOG also remains overstretched in terms of manpower and requires urgent logistical support. Nevertheless, there are indications that ECOMOG has been concentrating its resources to support operations into Kailahun district, apparently in preparation for more intensive activity now that the rainy season has ended. The Government continues to be fully committed to concluding the war as soon as possible.

Deployment of the Mission

27. Since my second progress report, UNOMSIL's military deployment has remained unchanged, with 40 observers, in addition to the Chief Military Observer, General Subhash C. Joshi (India), and the medical team of 15 personnel (see annex). The observers based at Lungi, Hastings, Makeni, Bo and Kenema have continued to maintain close liaison with local government authorities, ECOMOG and the CDF, to gather information through contacts and regular patrols, and to keep my Special Representative fully informed of developments. The UNOMSIL observers also give advice on humanitarian law in the field, provide security advice to other United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and other humanitarian agencies and assist them in their liaison with ECOMOG and the CDF as necessary.

28. In view of S. A. J. Musa's reported offer to surrender and the prospect of ECOMOG's increased activity in the east, UNOMSIL, notwithstanding the continued volatility of the situation in the north, has prepared contingency plans to deploy teams in Kabala, Kambia, Koidu and Kailahun in order to be able to respond rapidly to any willingness on the part of the rebels to surrender. The presence of UNOMSIL observers in these tense areas, to encourage and facilitate humanitarian activities and to monitor the human rights situation, would also be important. Thus, additional observers may have to be deployed expeditiously when conditions permit, within the limits authorized by the Security Council in resolution 1181 (1998).

29. In addition to making regular visits to the military observers' team sites, some members of the medical team, over and above their normal duties, have also undertaken honorary teaching assignments in the local medical college and have offered advice to local hospitals and clinics, especially those treating amputees. These contacts and services are clearly appreciated by the general public.

Creation of a new Sierra Leonean army

30. The Government of Sierra Leone is continuing to develop its plans to rebuild the armed forces under civilian management and the overall democratic control of the Government. Since October 1998, two visits to Sierra Leone have been undertaken by a British joint security sector mission to assess the Government's plans for the creation and training of new armed forces and to produce an assessment of the prospects for assistance from the United Kingdom. The Government has also requested UNOMSIL's assistance in this process, while the Chief of Defence Staff, Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe, is currently engaged in a sensitization tour of the country to prepare for new recruitment.

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IV. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

31. The first phase of the Government's programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, as described in my last report, was to cover the demobilization of former RSLMF and RUF personnel who were captured and disarmed by ECOMOG and later encamped at Lungi. The total number of ex-combatants so far registered at Lungi is 2,973. Pre-discharge orientation activities have been held since October, but the actual reintegration process, including such programmes as vocational training, will commence as and when the funding contributed for these purposes has been made available.

32. Following the registration of 52 children at Makeni, another group of 33 child ex-combatants, mainly from the RUF, were registered at Lakka near Freetown on 21 November 1998. A further group of 94 children, mainly from the RUF, were registered at Bo on 3 December. There are also some 70 RUF and CDF child ex-combatants to be registered at Port Loko as soon as the security situation improves. Once the registration is completed, social services will take over the reintegration of the children into society. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is closely involved with this exercise to ensure the proper treatment of the children during demobilization and reintegration.

33. Following commitments made to my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara Otunnu, during his visit to Sierra Leone in May 1998, the Executive Committee of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration has agreed to ensure that the CDF do not initiate persons under the age of 18 and that they cooperate with the registration of children already within their ranks. They also agreed to request that ECOMOG release children in detention to UNICEF, UNOMSIL or the Ministry of Social Welfare.

34. A national sensitization programme on this subject has also been under way since early October with full radio and television coverage and a nationwide arts competition on the theme "Join Hands for Peace". The Lungi ex-combatants have embarked on community welfare work in the area, which has been well received by the local community. This, together with the programme of pre-discharge orientation, has gone a long way towards facilitating the acceptance of the ex-combatants in the Lungi area.

35. The National Committee, chaired by President Kabbah, is continuing its activities and its secretariat is functioning well. The Committee has now also identified two additional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites at Magburaka and Gerihun and preparations for their opening are under way. However, the pace of the programme continues to lag behind the original goals since the intensity of the war effort has not yet subsided. A further 830 ex-RSLMF soldiers are being prepared for re-induction into combat as a fifth battalion fighting alongside ECOMOG. As with the other four battalions re-inducted from among the ex-RSLMF personnel at Lungi, it is understood that most of these soldiers will undergo the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process once the war has been concluded. There has been no progress in the demobilization of CDF fighters in safe areas. Apart from the registration of CDF personnel in a few localities, there are no indications yet

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that the CDF are ready to begin the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, since they are still fighting.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

Conflict-related human rights abuses and violations

36. Widespread rebel attacks on civilian populations have characterized the period since my last report. Attacks and forms of abuse of civilians exhibited a characteristic modus operandi: amputation of limbs, mutilation, actual or attempted decapitation, rape, burning alive of men, women and children, destruction of homes, abduction and looting. In one typical incident, at the end of October, five farmers were burned alive by rebels in a house some ten miles from the town of Alikalia, in the north-east. In early November, the entire northern township of Bafodia was destroyed. At the end of November, the northern town of Yifin was again devastated in a rebel attack, during which up to 50 youths were abducted.

37. During September and October 1998, the incidence of hospital admissions for amputations and mutilations reached levels similar to those during May and June, with 71 admissions in just two hospitals in the west of the country and an unverifiable number in other regions. It is likely that the hospital admission figures are much lower than the actual levels of civilian fatality and injury. During November, although the overall number of atrocities reportedly fell, there was an escalating rate of reports of actual and attempted decapitation. Particularly since late October, rebel elements have indicated that attacks were motivated by a desire for revenge against the sentencing to death of Corporal Foday Sankoh.

38. Since my last report, there have been further complaints regarding the behaviour of certain CDF contingents. One incident, investigated and confirmed by UNOMSIL, involved the killing by the CDF of four captured alleged rebels at Romeni, near Port Loko. UNOMSIL has indicated to the Government of Sierra Leone its willingness to assist in the training of key CDF personnel regarding provisions of human rights and humanitarian law applicable to their activities. There have also been reports of inappropriate behaviour by certain elements of ECOMOG, including unlawful detention. My Special Representative has taken this matter up with the Force Commander of the Monitoring Group.

39. Since my last report, there have been frequent reports of children being sent into combat environments, notwithstanding indications of some ECOMOG commanders refusing to allow under-age CDF combatants to serve under them. However, on 25 November, the Government reiterated its commitment to non-recruitment and demobilization of combatants aged under 18.

Treason trials

40. In the absence of an appeals process under court martial proceedings, most of the 34 military personnel sentenced to death in the first court martial sought recourse through petitioning the United Nations Human Rights Committee pursuant to the provisions of the Optional Protocol to the International

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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Despite the Committee's formal request for a stay of execution pending its consideration of the petitions, 24 officers were executed by firing squad on 19 October 1998. On 4 November, the Human Rights Committee adopted a strongly worded decision and requested the submission of a report by Sierra Leone pursuant to the provisions of article 40 of the International Covenant. At the request of the Committee, I brought its decision to the attention of President Kabbah in a letter to him dated 16 November 1998. In the same letter, I appealed to President Kabbah to give every consideration, once the appeals process had been exhausted, to extending mercy to those who had been condemned to death.

41. Two separate group treason trials ended, on 21 October and 5 November 1998, respectively, with the sentencing to death of a further 26 civilians, with right of appeal. Among those given prison sentences was a former Head of State of Sierra Leone, Joseph Momoh. All of those convicted have appealed their sentences.

Technical cooperation

42. UNOMSIL continues, within the limits of its resources, to advise and assist the Government and civil society in matters relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This includes advising the Government on how to meet its reporting obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For instance, UNOMSIL has facilitated the donation to the Government of law books for use by the legal profession and has hosted a seminar on judicial reporting for the Sierra Leone media. The human rights component has also provided other forms of advice to the United Nations community in Sierra Leone.

43. Human rights technical assistance and training support continues to be extended to the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the Sierra Leone police force and civil society, including the community of non-governmental organizations, as well as UNOMSIL military observers. During November 1998, UNOMSIL facilitated the most ambitious human rights monitoring and reporting skills training programme ever implemented in Sierra Leone, with 70 participants from all parts of the country. The trainees will now replicate the training nationwide. Other training activities since my last report include facilitation of the project of human rights training for religious leaders, primarily implemented by the World Conference for Religion and Peace and partially funded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

44. In order to offer a broad range of human rights related services, UNOMSIL has sought funding under the 1999 consolidated humanitarian appeal for Sierra Leone for four human rights projects: to enhance monitoring capacity regarding rebel activities, to provide enhanced human rights training for the police and for the humanitarian community and to further strengthen the capacity of civil society to monitor human rights. Other project proposals, in course of completion in close consultation with the Government and other stakeholders, address the human rights training and resources needs of the judiciary, legal profession and prison personnel.

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45. On 24 November 1998, the Government of Sierra Leone reaffirmed its regulations on the manner in which the media may report on conflict-related issues. The regulations are based on the provisions of the state of emergency instituted in March 1998, elements of which may not be in compliance with applicable provisions of international human rights law. On 9 December, the Government arrested three journalists on charges related to these regulations. UNOMSIL is monitoring the situation.

VI. CIVILIAN POLICE

46. UNOMSIL has now deployed its full complement of five civilian police advisers and they are working closely with advisers deployed by the Commonwealth and with the Government of Sierra Leone and the police force in the reform and restructuring process.

47. Policing suffered a major setback during and immediately after the junta period. Many police officers had collaborated with the junta and others were killed or forced to flee, leaving much of the country without a police service. Following the reinstatement of the Government, the poor relationship between the police and public obliged the Government to undertake a comprehensive restructuring of the police force. Although policing activities have now returned to normal, many police stations are still not functional and will have to be rebuilt. Policing has not been reintroduced in certain areas of the country owing to rebel activity and/or the shortage of funds to reconstruct buildings. The CDF has established its own police force in some of the areas under its control, which operates independently of the Sierra Leonean police force.

48. The reintroduction of policing throughout the country also requires the retraining of police officers, a process hampered by a shortage of funds. The provision of minimal financial assistance would allow the introduction of limited training programmes. Towards this end, UNOMSIL civilian police have assisted in the development of a decentralized training programme, the production of training manuals and the conduct of refresher training.

49. After the introduction of the Government Policy Statement, the Police Mission Statement and the Strategic Development Plan (1998-2001), the civilian police advisers, in collaboration with the Commonwealth, have held detailed discussions with the Sierra Leonean police force on the restructuring process, the importance of respect for human rights, the role of the police in a democratic society and the disciplinary code of conduct. After consultations with all concerned, and with the financial support of the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, pilot projects have been introduced in certain police areas to improve communications and equipment and to introduce effective and efficient policing based on local needs and community involvement.

50. As part of the effort to improve the effectiveness of the Sierra Leonean police force, restructuring has begun in the departments of human resources management, personnel development, financial and logistical accountability, operations and crime management, with the aim of streamlining and restructuring

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the departments and ensuring that police officers are carefully selected, properly trained, directed by highly motivated officers and financially and logistically supported so as to be able to render acceptable service.

VII. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

51. Since my second progress report, humanitarian agencies have managed to maintain the delivery of relief assistance to populations fleeing insecurity in the north and east of the country. Most of the displaced are concentrated in a string of settlements between Makeni and Koidu in the centre of the country, in Kenema in the east and in Freetown. Fighting in the east has limited access to populations around Kenema, while hostilities in the north-west near the end of the reporting period have curtailed access there, as well as road access to Makeni. Growing insecurity along the arterial road network bodes ill for continued access and the delivery of assistance.

52. Displacement of civilian populations continued during the period under review. By mid-November, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit estimated that 308,695 persons had been displaced since February 1998, an increase of 58,000 internally displaced persons since my last report. The hostilities, which have continued since mid-November, have driven approximately 6,000 additional persons from their homes. As fighting continues into the dry season, the optimum period for military operations, the humanitarian community is concerned that access will continue to be constrained while displacement increases.

53. In an effort to further ensure the impartiality of relief operations and advocate for access, the Sierra Leonean humanitarian community came together at a workshop held from 19 to 23 November that resulted in a revised code of conduct for humanitarian agencies. The UNOMSIL human rights component also participated in the elaboration of the revised code, which is designed to reinforce a self-regulatory and coordinated approach for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to ensure that the parties to the conflict recognize and observe the impartiality and inviolability of humanitarian principles.

54. Despite the prevailing hostile environment and logistical constraints, the humanitarian community has been able to avert potential humanitarian disasters through the provision of a wide range of relief programmes to the most affected war victims in Masingbi, Kambia, Kenema and Freetown.

55. A good harvest is expected in most secure areas as a result of the distribution of agricultural support packages to vulnerable farmers. Discussions are taking place in all agencies with respect to their 1999 food aid programmes, which are expected to equal the 1998 levels.

56. The delay in the issuance of transport clearances to food aid agencies by ECOMOG continues to constrain the movement of humanitarian food aid to vulnerable groups. There has also been an increase in harassment, abuse and intimidation of aid workers at some security checkpoints. Instances of ECOMOG personnel commandeering aid vehicles, including a World Food Programme (WFP) truck at Masingbi, have been raised with ECOMOG by UNOMSIL. Interventions

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relating to a similar situation at the port in Freetown have led to significant improvements. Ms. Catherine Bertini, the Executive Director of WFP, will visit Sierra Leone from 10 to 12 December 1998 to assess food security issues in the country and the requirements for WFP assistance.

57. UNICEF undertook mass immunization campaigns in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Makeni, Kambia, Port Loko and Kabala, covering an estimated 1.1 million people, about 25 per cent of Sierra Leone's population. UNICEF and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) are supporting the Ministry of Health and Sanitation in trying to reduce the maternal mortality rate, which currently averages 1,800 per 100,000 live births. A UNFPA consultant is in the country to examine various aspects of UNFPA's planned activities and issues of coordination between the relevant United Nations agencies and the Ministry of Health.

58. A World Health Organization (WHO) consultant has been working with the Ministry of Health to address future outbreaks of cholera. WHO has also provided drugs and supplies intended to further strengthen the Ministry's preparedness to cope with public health challenges. As a result, the cholera outbreak referred to in paragraph 41 of my last report is now under control. No deaths have been recorded since mid-October.

59. On 14 November 1998, President Kabbah launched activities for the forthcoming National Immunization Days, which will target polio. WHO and UNICEF, along with other agencies, are providing financial and technical support to the polio eradication drive. The first round of immunizations will take place on 19 December and the second round on 2 February. WHO has also taken steps to deal with outbreaks of meningitis.

60. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has continued to facilitate the repatriation of students and professional civil servants to Sierra Leone. During October and November, UNHCR repatriated about 1,660 Sierra Leoneans from Guinea. In close consultation with the Government and others, UNHCR is continuing to develop a reintegration strategy for returnees and internally displaced persons.

61. United Nations agencies, in consultation with the Government, national and international non-governmental organizations and donors, have completed the 1999 consolidated inter-agency appeal for Sierra Leone in the amount of \$28 million. The 29 projects in the appeal range from immediate life-saving needs to longer-term projects aimed at creating a favourable environment for the promotion of peace and sustainable socio-economic development. The appeal was released in Geneva on 3 December by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and will be launched on 17 December 1998.

VIII. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

62. On 23 November 1998, the European Union signed an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to provide 111.5 million European currency units (\$124.88 million) to help rebuild its economy. The funds, to be disbursed over five years, are to support rehabilitation of infrastructure, the development of social and public sectors and good governance. The aid will include eight

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million European currency units (\$8.92 million) in risk capital, provided by the European Investment Bank, for projects in power supply, mining and private sector investment.

63. On 27 November, the Government presented the budget and statement of policies for the financial year 1999 to Parliament. The budget, which is being debated by Parliament, focuses on continuing the process of rehabilitating basic infrastructure and rebuilding dislocated institutions, as well as pursuing stabilization and economic reform policies.

64. The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund has approved the Government's request for assistance under the post-conflict emergency assistance policy for Sierra Leone in the amount of approximately \$15 million.

65. According to Government data, there are encouraging signs of a steady recovery in economic output. This is reflected in the 0.7 per cent growth rate in the gross domestic product in real terms, compared to negative 22 per cent for the same period last year. Increased activity in the manufacturing, services and construction sectors reflect the return of consumer and investor confidence. On the other hand, output in mining and agriculture continues to be depressed owing to persistent insecurity, especially in the east and north.

66. The generally weak economy has contributed to the continued pressure on the exchange rate. Gross external reserves have dwindled to 1.8 months of imports in 1998 compared to 5.7 months in the corresponding period for 1997. Consequently, the exchange rate, which had strengthened from 2,340 leones to the dollar in January 1998 to about 1,630 in March, depreciated to 1,850 leones in January 1998 to about 1,630 in March, depreciated to 1,850 leones in November. It is anticipated that increased donor support, particularly balance-of-payments assistance from the international financial institutions, the European Union and the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, will reduce the pressure on the exchange rate. The Government's economic management policies have helped contain inflation and restore confidence in the private sector, bringing about the present decline in the inflation rate to 12.5 per cent as at December 1998.

IX. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

67. The General Assembly, by its resolution 53/29 of 20 November 1998, appropriated an amount of \$22 million gross for the establishment and operation of the Observer Mission for the period of 13 July 1998 to 30 June 1999. This amount includes \$9.1 million gross for the period from 14 January to 30 June 1999, equivalent to some \$1.6 million gross per month, subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Observer Mission beyond 13 January 1999.

68. Should the Council decide to extend the mandate of the Observer Mission as recommended in paragraph 76 below, it is anticipated that the estimated additional requirements of some \$0.6 million gross arising during the 1998-1999 financial period in connection with the modest expansion of civilian staff of UNOMSIL recommended in paragraphs 78 and 79 below, would be met from resources already provided by the General Assembly.

69. As at 30 November 1998, the total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to \$1,642.2 million.

70. Pursuant to the Council's Presidential statement of 26 February 1998 (S/PRST/1998/5), on 26 March 1998 I established the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Efforts in Sierra Leone. As at 11 December 1998, voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund totalled \$1.79 million from the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (\$0.83 million) and Japan (\$0.96 million). In addition, the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has pledged to the Fund an amount of \$1 million.

X. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

71. Despite the progress made by the Government in consolidating its authority, I am disturbed at the continuing attacks inflicted by the rebels on civilians in the north and the atrocities and abductions that accompany such attacks. I condemn these serious violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law and call again on the RUF and the AFRC to desist from attacks against their unarmed compatriots and to lay down their arms and surrender.

72. The elaboration of a dual-track approach to the resolution of the conflict following the ECOWAS summit of 31 October 1998 and the London meeting of the International Contact Group of 5 November is a welcome development, and UNOMSIL will work with the Government to pursue this approach. ECOMOG, the CDF and the re-inducted Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces personnel have done much to defend the Government and people of Sierra Leone against rebel attacks and should continue to do so. At the same time, I call on the Government to explore ways to encourage the rebels to lay down their arms and surrender in order to avoid more bloodshed.

73. Clear evidence has emerged during the national consultative process described in paragraph 4 above to demonstrate that the people of Sierra Leone are willing to reconcile themselves with the rebels, on condition that they accept the authority of the Government, lay down their arms and surrender. UNOMSIL will continue to offer its services to the Government in facilitating such surrenders, provided this can be done under acceptable security conditions. UNOMSIL is also prepared to work with the Government concerning assurances that those who surrender will be humanely treated, in accordance with internationally accepted standards, and that any rebels who face criminal prosecution for their acts receive a fair trial.

74. I am particularly encouraged by the outcome of the extraordinary summit meeting of the Mano River Union on 12 November 1998, at which President Kabbah, President Taylor and President Conte agreed to continue to strengthen the Union and improve their mutual relations. The importance of this subregional approach to the strengthening of stability and security in all three countries cannot be overemphasized. I look forward to further steps by all three Governments to prevent the use of their territory by armed groups who would seek to undermine stability and would use their territory for the illegal transit of weapons and ammunition, especially where this is in violation of United Nations resolutions. I am prepared to assist, through my Special Representative in Sierra Leone and

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my Representative in Liberia, in developing and implementing a viable strategy for a subregional approach.

75. The onset of the dry season in Sierra Leone has opened the way for more effective action by ECOMOG, the CDF and the re-inducted personnel of the RSLMF. In order to maintain the pressure they have exerted to split the rebel forces, the military forces assisting the Government need to continue to receive adequate logistical support. In this context, I would like to express my appreciation to those Governments that have already made contributions to the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Efforts in Sierra Leone and to encourage others to make similar contributions or to consider providing the necessary assistance bilaterally to ECOMOG or to individual ECOWAS countries.

76. UNOMSIL has proved its value to the Government and people of Sierra Leone as they pursue their recovery from the illegal seizure of power by the military junta, in May 1997, and all its nefarious consequences. In particular, the deployment in the countryside of United Nations military observers has demonstrated to the Government and people of Sierra Leone the commitment of the broader international community to the restoration of order and peace in the country under the legitimate Government. UNOMSIL has also provided crucial support for humanitarian operations in the countryside. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone be extended for a further period of six months, until 13 July 1999.

77. The uncertain security situation in parts of the country and the delays to which the government's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme have consequently been subjected make it premature at this stage to proceed with further deployments of United Nations military observers, as authorized by resolution 1181 (1998). However, in view of the prospect that rebel fighters might begin surrendering as a result of the military operations directed against them in the east and the north, and the Government's willingness to accept their surrender under the conditions outlined above, UNOMSIL will continue to stand ready to deploy the additional observers rapidly as and when they may be required. I will keep the Security Council fully apprised of any developments in this regard and of any action I decide to take in response.

78. However, in order to address the growing demands on the ground and to be able to assist the Government and people of Sierra Leone in their efforts to normalize the situation, I am planning a modest expansion of the civilian staff of UNOMSIL. In particular, the enormity of the human rights abuses the rebels have perpetrated on the people of Sierra Leone and the large scope of human rights tasks to be performed have underlined the need for a strong human rights component. The deployment of five additional human rights officers in the provinces, in addition to the five now operating in the country, would do much to assist the Government to maintain and improve its commitment to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Sierra Leone. I also urge Member States to consider contributing bilaterally to UNOMSIL's human rights activities in Sierra Leone.

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79. UNOMSIL could also help the government develop more fully a dialogue with the rebels in keeping with the dual-track approach. To this end, I intend to deploy three additional public information officers to develop radio programmes and other information activities aimed at reaching out to rebels in the countryside to persuade them to surrender and generally to pursue the goal of national reconciliation. The additional public information staff could also help to explain the role of UNOMSIL and the international community. At the same time, the addition of another political officer in the Office of my Special Representative would assist him to coordinate these activities.

80. The restoration of stability in Sierra Leone will be a long and arduous process and will continue to require military support as well as various other forms of assistance. In particular, the Government needs assistance in its efforts to establish a new professional armed force under civilian control, as well as an effective and well-motivated police force. The commitment of all Sierra Leoneans to achieving peace through dialogue and national reconciliation will also be essential. The United Nations, through UNOMSIL, is ready to play its part in that process.

81. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Subhash C. Joshi, and all the military and civilian personnel of UNOMSIL. My thanks also go to the Government of Sierra Leone and to ECOMOG, as well as to Sierra Leonean civil society, for their continuing cooperation with the United Nations.

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
AnnexUnited Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone:
contributions as at 10 December 1998

	Military observers	Others ^a	Total
China	3		3
Egypt	2		2
India	6	15	21
Kenya	4		4
Kyrgyzstan	1		1
New Zealand	2		2
Pakistan	5		5
Russian Federation	7		7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7		7
Zambia	4		4
Total	41 ^b	15	56

^a Medical team.

^b Including Chief Military Observer.

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The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

HQ
UNMO

UNOMSIL
Deployment as of
December 1998

- ⊙ National capital
- ⊙ Provincial capital
- Town, village
- · — International boundary
- — — Provincial boundary

0 20 40 60 80 km
0 10 20 30 40 50 mi

64) United Nations Document

Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 4 June 1999 (S/1999/645) para. 7, 19, 20, 30, 31, 32.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/1999/645
4 June 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SIXTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 11 of resolution 1231 (1999) of 11 March 1999, the Security Council requested me to keep the Council closely informed on the situation in Sierra Leone and in this regard to submit a report, by 5 June 1999, with recommendations on the future deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and the implementation of its mandate. The present report is submitted in accordance with that request.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Dialogue process

2. Since my report of 4 March 1999 (S/1999/237), the peace process in Sierra Leone has made significant progress, culminating in the signing of a ceasefire agreement on 18 May 1999 (see S/1999/585, annex) and the start of dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) at Lomé on 25 May.

3. The signing of the ceasefire agreement and the inception of talks with RUF to a large extent reflect the outcome of a number of important initiatives undertaken by the Government of Sierra Leone. In early to mid-March, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah visited several key countries in the subregion, including Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo, to discuss the situation in Sierra Leone and possible ways forward with the support of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In a radio address to the nation on 14 March, President Kabbah expressed his appreciation for the assistance provided by those countries and reaffirmed his commitment to the dual-track approach, which involves strengthening ECOMOG while being prepared to talk to RUF and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

4. The Government's initiatives were accompanied by considerable diplomatic activity in the subregion on the part of a number of Governments and organizations in the subregion and elsewhere, including the current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo; the ECOMOG troop-contributing

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countries, namely Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Mali; the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and the United States Presidential Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, the Rev. Jesse Jackson; and my Special Representative for Sierra Leone, Francis G. Okelo.

5. The opening of talks between the Government and RUF at Lomé on 25 May followed internal consultations there between the RUF leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh, and a delegation of 14 RUF representatives from within Sierra Leone. At the Government's request, UNOMSIL transported Corporal Sankoh from Freetown to Lomé on 18 April. Subsequently, UNOMSIL also transported the 14 other RUF representatives from other parts of Sierra Leone to Lomé via Monrovia with the cooperation and support of the Government of Liberia and the assistance of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia. UNOMSIL has also provided some logistical support for the Government of Togo, which is hosting the talks, through the use of the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Activities in Sierra Leone.

6. Although Corporal Sankoh was still pursuing his appeal against his conviction and sentence to death for treason, the Government granted him judicial leave to pursue the dialogue process. On 29 May, the Government and the RUF delegation reached an understanding on the status of Corporal Sankoh. The Government undertook to take the appropriate legal steps to grant him an absolute and free pardon, and Corporal Sankoh said that his delegation would proceed with the dialogue.

7. The internal RUF talks lasted from 26 April to 10 May and resulted in a position paper reflecting the RUF/AFRC views and demands. The position paper calls, inter alia, for a blanket amnesty for all personnel of RUF and AFRC, which had organized the coup d'état in Sierra Leone in May 1997; and the establishment of a four-year transitional Government. The main functions of the transitional Government would include the drafting of a new constitution; the reform of the national security forces and civil service; the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all combatants; and the establishment of a national electoral commission. RUF expressed readiness to convert itself into a political party.

8. RUF stipulated that a neutral peace monitoring group should be deployed as part of the ceasefire arrangements following the signing of a peace agreement. Other demands include the departure of all foreign troops and mercenaries from Sierra Leone within 14 days of the signing of the agreement, and the termination of the Status of Forces Agreement between the Governments of Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

9. On 14 May, the Government of Sierra Leone issued a response to the RUF position paper, stressing the unconstitutional nature of the proposal for a transitional Government. At the same time, the Government emphasized that the proposal for an amnesty for all combatants would be examined with a view to achieving permanent peace, while taking into account gross human rights violations committed against the citizens of Sierra Leone. The government statement endorsed the importance of the transformation of RUF into a political party and pledged the Government's full support for that process.

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10. In order to help create conditions conducive to the success of the Government-RUF talks, my Special Representative proposed a cessation of hostilities for the duration of the dialogue process. This proposal was strongly supported by the Government of Togo and resulted in the signing, on 18 May, of an agreement between the Government and RUF to cease fire (S/1999/585, annex). According to the agreement, which came into effect on 24 May, both parties were to maintain their respective positions and refrain from hostile or aggressive acts. Other provisions included the guarantee of safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need; the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants; and the deployment, subject to the authorization of the Security Council, of United Nations military observers to observe compliance with the ceasefire agreement.

11. The peace talks have started off well, with the two parties expressing their firm commitment to the peace process and determination to work together to resolve the conflict. The dialogue process is being guided by a Facilitation Committee chaired by the Foreign Minister of Togo, with the participation of ECOWAS, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and my Special Representative. Within Sierra Leone, the dialogue process has benefited from the active involvement of the Parliament and civic groups. Among these, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, supported by the World Conference on Religion and Peace, has played a particularly active role. President Kabbah has proposed that the Council, whose role has been appreciated by both sides, should become one of the moral guarantors of a future peace agreement.

12. On 2 June, the Government and RUF decided to ask UNOMSIL to establish a committee to effect the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants in accordance with the 18 May ceasefire agreement. The committee, which is to be chaired by the UNOMSIL Chief Military Observer, comprises representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

Relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia

13. There have been continued allegations of arms shipments reaching the rebels in Sierra Leone either through or from Liberia. On 8 April, the ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Felix Mujakperuo, announced that ECOMOG had confirmed the involvement of the Governments of Liberia and Burkina Faso in the shipment and delivery of arms to the rebels on 14 and 15 March. The details of this incident and another alleged incident on 20 April were brought to the attention of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone. The Government of Liberia has denied the allegations.

14. Given the persistent tension between Sierra Leone and Liberia resulting from allegations of arms supplies to the rebels, the Security Council requested me, in resolution 1231 (1999), to consider, in coordination with the countries of the Mano River Union and other States members of ECOWAS, the practicality and effectiveness of the deployment of United Nations monitors, along with ECOMOG forces, at the Sierra Leone/Liberia border. Such a presence could improve the security climate and build confidence between the two countries. Accordingly, I wrote to both the Chairman and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS on 12 April,

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seeking their views on the possible deployment of ECOMOG troops and the subsequent deployment of United Nations personnel along the border.

15. In his reply, dated 26 April 1999, the Executive Secretary, Lansana Kouyaté, stated that the Chiefs of Staff of the countries contributing troops to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, who had discussed my letter at their meeting at Abuja, welcomed the proposal in principle. However, citing the difficult terrain along the border and the consequent need for adequate equipment, Mr. Kouyaté proposed that the United Nations should assist in providing the necessary logistical equipment, including helicopters, communications and ground transportation. He requested the United Nations to dispatch a technical team to discuss with ECOMOG the modalities and requirements of deployment. On 7 May, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Bernard Miyet, invited ECOWAS to indicate how many ECOMOG troops would be required, and the time needed for their deployment, and requested a detailed statement of ECOMOG's logistical requirements. This information can be provided to the Security Council as soon as it is received.

16. There have also been positive developments in the relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia. For example, there is increased contact among civic groups in both countries as demonstrated by the visits to Liberia of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone and the National Union of Sierra Leone Students. Moreover, a delegation of the Liberian Senate met with President Kabbah in Freetown in early April to offer the support of the Government and people of Liberia for the resolution of the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The delegation proposed that the three parliaments of the countries of the Mano River Union should work together, under the coordination of Mali, to help to end the conflict.

17. On 27 May, the first annual conference of the Mano River Parliamentary Union opened in Monrovia. Although no Sierra Leonean representative attended the conference, President Taylor stated in his address to the delegates of Liberia, Guinea and Mali that he would do his utmost to ensure peace and security in Guinea and Sierra Leone, since peace in Liberia could be assured only if its neighbours were also at peace.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION

18. The military and security situation in Sierra Leone has remained fluid and complex. Following his assumption of the command of ECOMOG in late March, the new Force Commander, Major-General Felix Mujakperuo, launched an offensive to provide a larger security cordon around Lungi and Freetown. As a result, ECOMOG succeeded in opening the roads connecting Freetown with Lungi, Port Loko and Kambia in the western and north-western parts of the country. Moreover, the clearance of a subsidiary road from Freetown to Bo via Moyamba opened up a land route for supplies to Bo and Kenema. ECOMOG also retains its positions at Kabala and Bumbuna. Since my previous report, ECOMOG's military capabilities have been further strengthened with a substantial increase in communications facilities and air assets.

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19. However, RUF/AFRC continue to dominate many areas of Sierra Leone, particularly in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. They also have considerable freedom of movement in parts of the Western Area and the Southern Province, where they retain the capability to interdict ECOMOG lines of communication and carry out raids. The Kono diamond mining area is also still under RUF/AFRC control. Two attacks on Kenema have recently been repulsed, although a large rebel group has advanced to around 15 miles north of the town. Continued reports of arms supply reaching RUF/AFRC indicate that their fighting capacity remains strong. In addition, they have significantly strengthened their anti-aircraft capabilities, an achievement attributed to the use of foreign expertise. The existence of pockets of forces behind the other party's lines, especially around the north-south Bo-Kabala axis, is expected to complicate the monitoring of the ceasefire.

20. Both before and after 24 May, when the ceasefire took effect, rebel activity in the north-west increased considerably, amid mutual accusations by the parties of violations. A rebel group, largely composed of troops of the former Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), has been detected in the area north of Occra Hills/south of Port Loko, and there is a large build-up of RUF/AFRC in the area north of Lunsar and Port Loko. This build-up poses a threat to Port Loko/Rogberi and possibly to Lungi, which ECOMOG has warned it will forcibly resist. Prior to the ceasefire, RUF/AFRC attacked some ECOMOG positions in the area of Port Loko, including Port Loko itself, and in the Occra Hills where both sides have suffered casualties. RUF/AFRC also undertook raids on undefended villages, committing atrocities at a scale not seen since their retreat from Freetown in January (see sect. V below). Freetown remains subject to a curfew, albeit at reduced hours, and ECOMOG continues to operate checkpoints to curb rebel infiltration.

Creation of a new Sierra Leone armed forces

21. As detailed in my second progress report on UNOMSIL of 16 October 1998 (S/1998/960), the Government's efforts to improve security involve the creation of a new armed forces of 5,000 troops, the restructuring of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and the reform of the Sierra Leone Police Force.

22. On 10 May, the first 562 troops completed three months of elementary training and, at the initiative of the Government of Nigeria, elementary cadet training has been provided for 81 future officers at the Nigerian Defence Academy. The efforts to create a new Sierra Leone army have received significant support from the Government of the United Kingdom, which is providing both training assistance and equipment.

Reconstitution of the Sierra Leone Police Force

23. Another aspect of these efforts concerns the rebuilding of the Sierra Leone Police Force, which suffered severely during the rebel invasion of Freetown, with some 200 officers being killed and many police stations destroyed. With donor assistance, the Government has made considerable progress in reconstituting a functioning police presence in the capital, but reversing the extent of the damage and the collapse of the police structure in most parts of the country will require substantial external assistance.

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24. As noted in my earlier reports, the support provided by the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force and the UNOMSIL civilian police advisers had contributed significantly to the Sierra Leone Police Force reform efforts. In April 1999, two Commonwealth police advisers visited Sierra Leone with a view to the eventual resumption of their activities. I will present to the Security Council at an appropriate time in the near future my plans for a resumption of activity in Sierra Leone by United Nations civilian police advisers to render tangible assistance in cooperation with bilateral donors.

IV. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION

25. Since my report of 4 March 1999 (S/1999/237), the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has been at a near standstill. A joint World Bank/British Department for International Development team found in March that some of the original programme assumptions and guiding principles were no longer applicable and that the programme would have to be re-adjusted to reflect the changed political environment and security situation. Based on their recommendations, the pilot phase of the programme, which was designed to accommodate existing ex-combatants as well as those who might surrender before the signing of a new peace agreement, has since resumed. However, any subsequent large-scale disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activity will require the implementation of a peace agreement and the stabilization of the security situation. This matter is still under consideration by the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

26. The approximately 1,300 ex-combatants, who had been originally part of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process at Lungi, continue to be housed under appalling conditions in Freetown. Despite a decision on 12 April by the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration to move them to Lungi, ECOMOG opposes their relocation because of continued insecurity in the area. As a result, plans are under way to improve their current living conditions. This matter is also under consideration by the National Committee.

27. Meanwhile, under the framework of its child protection network, UNICEF, in cooperation with ECOMOG and UNOMSIL, has been providing services to children released by RUF/AFRC as part of the overall peace negotiations. Child welfare agencies have also begun developing strategies and policies for child soldiers within the overall framework of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is reviewing its involvement in the reintegration phase of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Other specialized agencies of the United Nations system and humanitarian organizations have started conceptualizing and examining possible links to humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation programmes.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

28. The reporting period has been marked by a resurgence of rebel atrocities against civilians, most of them reported from the provincial towns of Masiaka

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and Port Loko. Based on eyewitness accounts, the human rights abuses by RUF/AFRC have included significant numbers of summary executions, mutilations, limb amputations, abductions and sexual abuse, as well as the large-scale destruction of property. Civilians in the affected areas are also suffering significant humanitarian deprivation.

29. Although there was a drop in the number of reported cases of gross human rights violations during March, escapees from rebel-held territories continued to provide disturbing accounts of abusive rebel behaviour against civilians, including physical and psychological torture and harassment. In Makeni and Koinadugu, escapees reported that RUF/AFRC had imposed punitive food taxes, restricted the movement of civilians and operated a harsh justice system. A UNOMSIL investigation team that visited Masiaka after the town's recapture by ECOMOG/CDF received testimonies of ill-treatment of civilians, some of whom were killed or mutilated after being accused of sympathizing with pro-government forces. Moreover, a large number of boys and male adolescents in the area had the letters "RUF" engraved across their chests with razor blades.

30. During a rebel attack on Port Loko on 7 May, over 20 civilians are believed to have been summarily executed by a group of RUF/AFRC at nearby Mangarma village. Survivors also reported summary executions in other areas around Port Loko, which were attributed in at least two villages to a well-orchestrated rebel strategy carried out at the orders of rebel commanders. In the Masiaka area, the UNOMSIL team observed a number of bodies and received credible reports that eight decapitated bodies and severed heads of civilians had been displayed on the roadside by retreating RUF/AFRC. In one incident in Masumana village between Masiaka and Mile 38, eye witnesses described the murder of several infants by RUF/AFRC.

31. RUF/AFRC forces have also continued their practice of limb amputations, and at least a dozen victims have suffered this form of torture over the past month alone. In Mangarma village, RUF/AFRC reportedly amputated the arms of two of their civilian captives and then instructed them to walk to Port Loko town to alert the Malian contingent of ECOMOG of the RUF/AFRC impending attack. One victim, a male teacher, was hospitalized in Freetown after RUF/AFRC cut off both his arms, as well as his ears and lips.

32. A large number of civilians are believed to have been abducted by RUF/AFRC over the past three months. The abductions have reportedly followed a consistent pattern where RUF/AFRC retreating from a town or village have forced men, women and children to go with them to serve as porters, potential recruits or sex slaves. Most of these abductees are still being held by RUF/AFRC. In Matteh village near Masiaka, the section chief estimated the number of abductees in the area to be in the thousands. Most of the people interviewed in the Port Loko and Masiaka areas said they had lost close family members through abduction. One man told UNOMSIL that 15 members of his immediate family had been abducted by RUF/AFRC.

33. My Special Representative in Sierra Leone has already expressed to RUF/AFRC the deep concerns of the United Nations over the reported abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law. Following the fact-finding visit by UNOMSIL human rights officers to Masiaka, the Special Representative

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shared the findings of the mission with Corporal Foday Sankoh, and presented the RUF delegates with an aide-mémoire on human rights issues. RUF has since pledged to set up an internal investigation to probe these allegations and has requested support from the international community.

34. After concerns had been raised by my Special Representative and others regarding human rights violations attributed to ECOMOG and CDF soldiers in the wake of the rebel incursion into Freetown in January (see S/1997/237), the ECOMOG High Command has taken concrete positive steps to address this issue. In April, the ECOMOG Force Commander initiated the formation of a Civil/Military Relations Committee which will, *inter alia*, investigate allegations of human rights violations against individual members of ECOMOG and CDF and recommend appropriate action to the higher authorities. Membership in the Committee includes representatives of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the Bar Association, the police, the media, civil society and the Government, with UNOMSIL participating in an observer capacity.

35. In spite of the goodwill exhibited by the ECOMOG High Command, there have been a few reports of ill-treatment of the civilian population by ECOMOG, CDF and Civil Defence Units (CDU). It is also reported that detainees from rebel-controlled areas face a high risk of intimidation and even execution as alleged rebel collaborators. For instance, information has been received of the execution of up to 30 escapees by CDF forces (Kapas) at Kagbantama, near the town of Gbinti in the Northern Province. In a separate report, a woman from Moyamba District in the south-west provided detailed information on an alleged attack on the town of Bradford by CDF forces (Kamajors) in which at least six civilians are believed to have lost their lives. In April, a reliable informant reported the severe beating and detention for two days of a man and a woman in central Freetown.

36. Various sources, including United Nations agencies, report that there is continued widespread recruitment of children by CDF in the Southern and Eastern Provinces, especially at Bo and Kenema. Agencies also report that a number of children who had been demobilized from CDF are known to have been subsequently re-recruited. This is an issue of great concern, especially considering the promise made last year by the Government of Sierra Leone to my Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict to demobilize and discontinue the practice of recruiting children under 18 years of age into the armed forces of Sierra Leone. My Special Representative in Freetown continues to monitor the situation closely and raises the relevant issues with the Government. Government officials in the Southern Province have reportedly acted to halt underage recruitment by CDF elements.

37. On 27 April, President Kabbah announced the establishment under statute of a new Human Rights Commission for Sierra Leone, replacing the human rights role of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights. The body will have some form of adjudicatory authority and considerable implementation powers. UNOMSIL has informed the Government of its support for this initiative and has promised to provide, in collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the necessary technical assistance.

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38. In the context of its technical cooperation activities, UNOMSIL also continues to provide full secretariat support to the Sierra Leone Human Rights Committee, comprising the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, national non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies. Membership also includes the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone and Human Rights Watch. The Committee remains a valuable forum for the exchange of information and for strategy development. In this context, UNOMSIL is assisting the non-governmental organization community to develop positions on the role to be played and issues of human rights within the peace process. Renewed efforts are being made to identify funding whereby the Committee can develop its own institutional identity.

39. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, has accepted the invitation of the Government of Sierra Leone to visit the country towards the end of June, accompanied by a panel of prominent human rights personalities. The purpose of the visit will be to support the peace process, to encourage future programmes for the promotion and protection of human rights in the country, and to draw attention to the plight of children, women and civilians bearing the brunt of the excesses in Sierra Leone. With the coordination of UNOMSIL, which is hosting the visit, a range of civil society actors in Sierra Leone are already exploring ways to maximize the impact of the visit of Mrs. Robinson with regard to both the short- and long-term human rights needs of the country.

VI. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

40. Since my previous report, an already desperate humanitarian situation has worsened. Rebel gains have increased the number of needy people while at the same time limiting aid workers' access to affected areas. At present, nearly half, or 2.6 million, of the Sierra Leonean population in the Northern and Eastern Provinces is effectively out of the reach of humanitarian agencies. Another 480,000 have become refugees. While the number of internally displaced persons in accessible areas remains relatively constant, at about 370,000, there are many more civilians countrywide who have been directly affected by the war in and around their own homes and villages. Many of these have been forced to live under rebel control and denied their right to sufficient food, shelter and health care. In addition, it is estimated that well over one million civilians countrywide still require some form of humanitarian assistance.

41. Even in government-controlled areas, despite some successes, obtaining access to civilians remains a challenge. For instance, it has been possible to access areas such as Pujehun, Bonthe and Bo districts in the Southern Province as well as parts of Kenema district in the Eastern Province. Additionally, owing to recent ECOMOG advances, agencies have assessed needs in a few towns in the north, such as Yele, by road from Bo. However, it remains impossible to move humanitarian goods to the east and south by road owing to RUF blockades of key junctions on the Freetown-Bo highway. While some aid can reach the provincial capitals of Bo and Kenema by air, the inability to transport food by road has led to a depletion of stocks in these areas. Additionally, the security situation in the immediate environs of Kenema remains unclear, and has prevented humanitarian intervention in many chiefdoms.

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42. Given these difficulties, urgent measures are now being taken in cooperation with the Government to explore other ways of transporting food aid. At present, food agencies have leased a ship to transfer food to Nitti port, where it can then be driven by road to Bo. If successful, this route will allow for the supply of food to war-affected people. The World Food Programme has also requested to send food along the Freetown-Bo highway, which was recently re-opened by commercial transporters, but had not received clearance from the Government at the time of the present report. In the meantime, the remaining limited amount of food in these areas has been prioritized for therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres as well as camps for internally displaced persons.

43. Meanwhile, in government-controlled areas, including Freetown and parts of the southern and eastern areas, the humanitarian community has mobilized to provide some form of support to about 370,000 individuals. At present, more than 120,000 registered internally displaced persons living in camps are receiving a comprehensive package of assistance, including food, shelter and health services. However, with more than 80 per cent of the buildings destroyed in some parts of Freetown, many thousands more are squatting in other areas or staying with relatives. A war-ravaged economy, characterized by low incomes and high costs for food and other basic items, has compounded their suffering.

44. To address chronic food insecurity, emergency seeds and tools have been distributed to farmers who lost their property to armed groups in Port Loko, Kenema and Bo districts as well as the Western Area. The United Nations continues to support the Government in its efforts to buy imported rice and to access food on a bilateral basis from donor Governments.

45. Basic support for clinics and hospitals has continued to come from UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the medical non-governmental organizations. Some 25 health centres and eight mobile clinics are now functioning in Freetown, with 25 operating in southern Bo, Pujehun and Bonthe districts. Large-scale expanded programme of immunization campaigns have successfully headed off a measles epidemic around Freetown, Kenema and Bonthe, with more than 65,000 children vaccinated in those areas.

46. As of mid-May, UNICEF had registered a total of 3,384 children who had been missing since January 1999 from the Freetown area. More than 500 of these have been traced and reunified with their families. However, abductions of large numbers of children persist. The Child Protection Network continues to trace such incidents and to provide programmes to help unaccompanied children, demobilized child soldiers and other children with special needs.

47. Finally, water trucking, well chlorination and waste management activities in most camps for internally displaced persons have reduced the level of waterborne diseases such as cholera and diarrhoea. Plastic sheeting, nails, wood and kitchen sets have been provided to some urban households and to displaced persons in camps in the west, east and south. The needs in this area, however are considerable and require continued intervention as well as resources.

48. While the humanitarian situation remains dire, the recent ceasefire and initiation of dialogue between the parties to the conflict has been welcomed by

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the humanitarian community as the best possible means for resolution of the long-standing crisis. The provision in the recent ceasefire agreement for safe and unhindered access for humanitarian organizations to all people in need is a significant step towards ensuring the countrywide delivery of assistance. However, turning the combatants' humanitarian commitment into a reality requires careful planning, good faith and confidence-building. As noted earlier in the present report, my Special Representative has provided the parties to the conflict with a proposal on humanitarian access, detailing, inter alia, the obligations of the parties under international humanitarian law to provide the enabling environment for humanitarian intervention. This proposal, prepared by the United Nations country team under the guidance of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, is seen as a first step towards building with the parties to the conflict a dialogue on access. In order to further the humanitarian imperative and to ensure the smooth delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance, it is necessary that:

(a) The issue of humanitarian access must be on an equal footing with, and not contingent upon, the military and political elements of the peace process. Moreover, as the combatants' observance of the right of civilians in need to humanitarian assistance is based upon international law, the concept is non-negotiable and can only be discussed in terms of mechanisms for access;

(b) Given the fragile state of the peace process and the steadily degrading humanitarian situation, it is imperative that the humanitarian community has immediate and independent access to the parties to the conflict, in order to establish working modalities for accessing all Sierra Leoneans in need.

VII. FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

49. UNOMSIL currently consists of 24 military observers, including two medical personnel, as well as 29 international and 24 national staff members. This includes 10 military observers recently deployed to assist in the expanded tasks of the Mission. The planned deployment of a further 16 observers during the month of June, together with the necessary support personnel, vehicles, communications and other essential equipment, will restore the mission's military capacity to the level it had attained last December. The security situation permitting, I would then proceed to deploy additional observers up to the limit of 70, with an additional 15 medical personnel, as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998. In view of the security considerations, the need to improve medical and casualty evacuation capacity and the enhanced monitoring and observation role being played by UNOMSIL, an additional helicopter will be required.

50. UNOMSIL's intensive preparations for the intra-RUF and RUF-Government talks have required my Special Representative and his immediate staff to travel to Monrovia and Lomé, in addition to consulting closely with the Government in Freetown. In view of the likelihood that the peace talks and related activity will require a high level of United Nations involvement, I intend to increase the civilian staff in the office of my Special Representative by two political

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officers. The human rights section also needs to be restored to its previous staffing level of five persons in view of the significant human rights monitoring and technical cooperation requirements in Sierra Leone. In this connection, there is a need for forensic experts, and I would ask donors to consider making available their services.

51. UNOMSIL's military component, thus restored to its former strength, will continue to monitor the ceasefire within the limits of its resources. It will also continue to establish, maintain and improve contacts with local RUF commanders with a view to establishing joint military commissions. The functions of these commissions will include identifying and locating forces on the ground; obtaining written assurances from rebel commanders of their commitment to the ceasefire and guarantees of security for United Nations personnel; and generally to build confidence, facilitate contacts and resolve disputes. Provision would also be made for deploying teams of five or six members to Lungi, Hastings, Port Loko and Bo, depending on the security situation. Observers outside Freetown would be co-deployed with ECOMOG to ensure their security.

52. I have given much thought to activities that might be carried out by an expanded UNOMSIL presence in the event of a peace agreement. To that end, I dispatched a military assessment and planning team to Sierra Leone at the end of May to develop a revised concept of operations for a possible enlargement of the Mission.

53. My detailed recommendations to the Council on the size, mandate and configuration of an eventual expanded UNOMSIL will depend on the provisions of any peace agreement that the Government and RUF may sign in Lomé, and on the considerations on the ground, notably security.

54. One important consideration in redefining UNOMSIL's tasks would be the future strength, activities and state of deployment of ECOMOG. While these are not yet known, I would anticipate that ECOMOG would remain in Sierra Leone as a stabilizing influence, with a well-defined mandate that would include ensuring the security of vital areas of the country.

55. At this point, however, I envisage the need for UNOMSIL itself to be prepared to ensure the security of United Nations personnel if it is to deploy effectively to assist in the implementation of an eventual peace agreement. To this end, bearing in mind the likely security situation and the confused and unpredictable nature of the conflict, there might well prove to be a need for the deployment of a sizeable number of infantry and additional observers, along with the necessary equipment and military logistical support. Subject to Council authorization, these troops would be deployed in phases to accomplish a range of possible tasks.

56. These can be more precisely defined only in the light of an eventual peace agreement, but are likely to include the following:

- (a) Monitoring and supervising the ceasefire;

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(b) Supervising, monitoring and assisting in the encampment, disarmament and demobilization of former combatants;

(c) Providing security to United Nations personnel, including military observers;

(d) Providing assistance to humanitarian efforts;

(e) Providing planning and logistical support for an eventual election.

57. I will revert to the Council with detailed proposals for a revised mandate and concept of operations for its consideration as soon as a peace agreement has been signed. However, in addition to the military requirements outlined above, I would also envisage a significant expansion of the civilian personnel, including those engaged in political, human rights and logistical support functions. Moreover, any enhanced role that UNOMSIL might play, whatever the final shape of the peace agreement, will benefit greatly from the acquisition of a nationwide broadcasting capacity. Experience has shown the clear advantages to a United Nations peacekeeping mission of access to its own radio facility. I would therefore appeal to donors to consider making such equipment available, and would envisage a modest increase in UNOMSIL's public information staff accordingly.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

58. As indicated in my previous report (S/1999/237), the General Assembly, by its resolution 53/29 of 20 November 1998, appropriated an amount of \$22 million for the establishment and operation of UNOMSIL for the period ending 30 June 1999. With regard to the subsequent 12-month period beginning on 1 July 1999, my budget submitted to the Assembly in February 1999 (A/53/454/Add.1) amounts to \$16.4 million and provides for the maintenance of the Mission at the strength authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1181 (1998). I intend to seek authorization from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to use the budgeted resources once the Council takes action on my recommendation contained in paragraph 71 below as to the extension of the Observer Mission's mandate.

59. Therefore, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOMSIL, the cost of restoring the Mission's military capacity to the level it had attained in December 1998 as well as its subsequent maintenance at the restored strength will be within the resources already provided by the General Assembly and my budgetary projections for the 1999/2000 financial period.

60. With regard to the estimated costs associated with the expansion of UNOMSIL, I shall submit my proposals to the General Assembly at a later date, when my detailed proposals for a revised mandate and concept of operations of the Mission will have been finalized and submitted to the Security Council for its consideration.

61. As at 31 May 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMSIL special account amounted to \$4.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions

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for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$1.6 billion. Contributions to the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Efforts amounted to \$2.8 million, with expenditures authorized in the amount of \$1.1 million.

IX. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

62. Despite the continued unpredictability of the conflict situation in Sierra Leone, I am encouraged by the significant progress that has been made in the pursuit of dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF. This is the first time in three years that a political settlement might be within reach to break the cycle of violence that has held the country in its grip since 1991. I welcome the Government's readiness to open talks with RUF, and call upon the latter to seize this opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to show flexibility in the interest of peace in Sierra Leone. In particular, as I stated publicly at the time, I welcome the signing on 18 May of the ceasefire agreement, which has helped to create an atmosphere conducive to the success of the peace talks. I reiterate my call to RUF/AFRC, CDF, the Government and ECOMOG to adhere strictly to its terms. I wish to express my appreciation to all the Governments concerned, in particular the Government of Togo and President Gnassingbe Eyadema, the current Chairman of ECOWAS, for hosting the talks, as well as the national and international organizations which have facilitated the dialogue process.

63. Nevertheless, the killings, mutilations and other human rights abuses perpetrated by rebel forces against the civilian population in Sierra Leone as well as the widespread destruction of property wreaked on a country which already ranks among the poorest in the world are deeply deplorable. Any armed opposition that expects to gain legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of the world must be prepared to renounce and atone for inflicting such suffering on non-combatants. I call upon the RUF leadership to prove its sincere commitment to peace and ensure the compliance of all its fighters with international human rights standards and humanitarian law, including the release of all abductees. In this context, I note the announcement made by the RUF leadership of its intention to investigate abuses committed by its troops and to invite international observers to take part in this process, and call upon them to demonstrate without delay their will and capacity to do so.

64. Concern about the extent of human rights violations in Sierra Leone has received increasing international attention. I welcome the intention of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, to visit Sierra Leone in late June to examine the situation on the ground and to obtain tangible commitments regarding the prevention of abuses and accountability of perpetrators. I am also gratified by the proposal by President Kabbah to establish a national Human Rights Commission in Sierra Leone as well as the creation of a truth and reconciliation mechanism as part of a peace agreement. These are important steps in acknowledging the pain of the victims and restoring national dignity and faith as part of efforts to achieve lasting peace, and these measures should receive all possible support from the donor community.

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65. In this context, I also wish to commend the initiative of the ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Felix Mujakperuo, in establishing a Civil-Military Relations Committee to investigate allegations of human rights violations by pro-Government forces. These investigations are being undertaken with the full participation of representatives of all sectors of Sierra Leonean society, with the United Nations in an international observer role.

66. In line with the dual-track approach, ECOMOG deserves praise for its continued efforts in support of the Government and people of Sierra Leone, as do the Governments of Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Mali for their steadfast commitment towards restoring security and stability in Sierra Leone, with the assistance of donor countries, including Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. I call upon the international community to continue supporting ECOMOG logistically and also to assist the process of the rebuilding of the Sierra Leone armed forces.

67. There is also an urgent need to resume the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the current ex-combatants and to prepare the groundwork for an expansion of such activities as part of a peace agreement. I hope that the Government of Sierra Leone will continue to provide the necessary impetus to the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and ensure its viability as an incentive for all rebel fighters willing to lay down their arms at this critical juncture in the peace process. It is also important for the Government to work closely with donors on the development of a revised disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan, with a well-defined operational plan and clear funding arrangements, to be put into effect in the context of a peace agreement.

68. There is an urgent need to consider how RUF/AFRC might be transformed into a legitimate political party in parallel with the process of reintegrating former combatants into society. I would also call for an end to all recruitment of children as soldiers, and would hope that any eventual peace agreement would embody commitments on the part of all parties to demobilize their child participants immediately. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes should consider giving priority to children under 18.

69. The persistent reports of arms supplies reaching the rebel forces are disturbing. Any support for RUF/AFRC by outside parties serves to perpetuate the conflict in Sierra Leone, whether it be motivated by economic interests or other strategic aims. I reiterate my call to all States to comply strictly with the embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 1171 (1998).

70. The dire humanitarian situation underscores the need to establish mechanisms to ensure unhindered humanitarian access to all parts of the country and to promote effective coordination and cooperation between humanitarian agencies, the Government and RUF. There is a critical need to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to people in need, which requires the protection of and respect for humanitarian relief workers, goods and properties. Negotiation for humanitarian access should be guided by the code of conduct for humanitarian agencies operating in Sierra Leone. While recognizing the considerable

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constraints of the present situation and from lessons learned negotiating humanitarian access in the Sierra Leone context, the humanitarian community is encouraged by the present political climate, and calls upon the international community for its continued support for humanitarian action. Specifically, the international community is urged to continue its support for dialogue with the aim of achieving unhindered humanitarian access to all areas of the country and, once granted, for their continued support of humanitarian assistance.

71. The recent political developments, including the signing of a ceasefire agreement and the start of the dialogue, have significant implications for the work of UNOMSIL. It is critical that the Mission, under the leadership of my Special Representative, should remain in a position to render effective assistance to the peace process in Sierra Leone. I therefore recommend the extension of UNOMSIL's mandate for a further period of six months, until 13 December 1999, along the lines described above. However, I would hope well within that time period to be in a position to revert to the Council with recommendations for an expanded mandate in implementation of a peace agreement.

72. I take this opportunity to express appreciation to my Special Representative, Francis G. Okelo, the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier General Subhash C. Joshi, and the staff and military observers of UNOMSIL for their tireless efforts and dedication to advance the peace process in Sierra Leone.

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
AnnexUnited Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone:
contributions as at 8 June 1999

	Military observers	Others ^a	Total
China	2		2
Egypt	2		2
India	2	2	4
Kenya	2		2
Kyrgyzstan	1		1
New Zealand	2		2
Pakistan	2		2
Russian Federation	3		3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4		4
Zambia	2		2
Total	22 ^b	2	24

^a Medical team.

^b Including the Chief Military Observer.

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65) United Nations Document

Human Rights Situation Report and Preliminary Technical Assistance Needs
Assessment, 19 July 1998

UNOMSIL

UNOMSIL
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION REPORT AND PRELIMINARY
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE NEEDS ASSESSEMENT¹
19 JULY 1998

REBEL ACTIONS

The rebels are responsible for systematic and widespread perpetration of multiple forms of human rights abuse against the civilian population.

i. Death, injury and mutilation

The rebels, in recent weeks, have repeatedly shelled population centres such as Koidu and Daru. They have also used captive civilians as "human shields". There have been numerous instances of arbitrary execution, including of women and children. Executions have been carried out by gunshot and various other means. There are, for instance, reliable reports of killings in recent months by disembowelment (of a young girl), burning (for instance, of babies tied down on lighted mattresses) and beheading. It is reported that, on a number of occasions, the bodies of victims have been subsequently dismembered and otherwise violated.

Mortality rates as a result of military attack, targeted executions or death resulting from mutilations are not known. There are, however, certain indicators which assist in formulating approximations. For instance:

- (a) Civilians who survive attacks and seek medical care indicate that for every person who survives and reaches safety, at least four others are either killed or unaccounted

¹ This report has been prepared in the context of very limited resources and constraints of time. It does not purport to be comprehensive. Nor has the Government had the opportunity to comment on its contents. Attached hereto, however, is a needs assessment of the judicial system which the Chief Justice has asked be given priority attention by the donor community.

for – over 600 people are reported to have sought medical care since March 1998 either in Sierra Leone or neighboring countries.

- (b) A survey in just nine Chiefdoms in the Northern Province (Sierra Leone has 150 Chiefdoms) indicated 700 civilian war-related deaths since February (including 200 in one village, Yifin, in late April)
- (c) A local source stated that 663 bodies were buried in the Koidu area following the fighting in the area in mid-June. A significant proportion of the bodies were of women and children.

The number of people subjected to mutilation can be estimated from the figures given at (a) above. These have occurred across an arc spanning from Koidu in the East, beyond Kabala in the North and to within 20 miles of Freetown in the West (with one isolated incident in the Freetown environs during June). The mutilations take the form of amputation of body parts, such as arms, ears, lips and legs, as well as the infliction of deep lacerations. They have generally been carried out in a systematic manner, often at the village chopping block and usually in the forced presence of family members of the victims. Some victims have been forced to express thanks to the perpetrators after the incidents. It is reported that female victims are frequently subjected to multiple rape.

During July the rate of mutilations has dropped considerably, though incidents continue to occur and victims of old attacks still trickle into medical centres.

Civilian injury rates from other forms of war related incident cannot be determined at this time. However, the figure just for the nine Chiefdom described above is reportedly 1,600 since February 1998, 30% of whom are children.

ii. Abduction

The rebels hold large numbers of civilian captives. These are used as porters, “human shields” and for forced sexual activity. They include men, women and children. It is difficult to estimate figures, though some suggest that there are some 10,000 captives

(most of whom are probably located in the Kailahun region). Though an unknown number of captives were released in the North East during June reports continue to be received of abductions in various locations in the Northern District.

It seems that a proportion of RUF/AFRC fighters were originally abducted, usually as children. For instance, in one Chiefdom in the Northeast, it is reported that all the rebel child combatants had been abducted (8 of them as recently as June). The initiation rites for new combatants reportedly include de-humanizing elements - information provided in this regard is withheld pending some form of verification.

iii. Destruction of homes

The rebel forces tend to destroy the property in villages which they attack. Though no definite figures are available, indications are of massive damage to the housing stock. For instance, the survey of nine chiefdoms, referred to above, reported the destruction of 1619 homes. 600 destroyed houses were counted in a survey of three other Chiefdoms. 60 houses in one village near Masingbi were destroyed on 12 July.

iv. Displacement

The rebel campaign of terror and military activities have resulted in the displacement of at least 350,000 people since February. Some 250,000 of these are now in Guinea and Liberia. The remainder are internally displaced in Sierra Leone. The continuation of the rebellion not only prevents return but also causes grave humanitarian problems for a significant element of the displaced population. For instance, within Sierra Leone, rebel actions, blocking or impeding movement of humanitarian assistance result in humanitarian emergencies. This was the case, for instance, in Masingbi, in early July, where lack of food, medicine and shelter materials, led to emergency level rates of mortality, malnutrition and illness (mainly measles). Refugees located just over the Guinea and Liberia borders are similarly affected by war-related blockage of access.

There are also allegations from the refugee camps in Guinea of actions by the authorities in contravention of the Refugee Convention, as well as of the presence of armed rebels.

THE PERIOD OF JUNTA RULE

Information continues to be received about human rights abuses perpetrated by forces loyal to the junta in the period before restoration of the Government. From all parts of the country there are reports of extra-judicial killings, rape, arbitrary detention, including for purposes of sexual abuse, torture of children (especially of child-combatants), forced labour, and the looting and destruction of residential and commercial premises and property. It will remain important to document these actions with a view to tackling issues of impunity and as an element in the process of promoting reconciliation and healing of society (see further below)

THE AFTERMATH OF JUNTA RULE

After the fall of the junta there were widespread acts of extra-judicial killings perpetrated against alleged junta collaborators. In just one town, Kenema, there are reports of at least 50 revenge killings. Some of those killed were children. Reports continue to be received, from locations such as Makeni, of arbitrary punishment imposed on alleged collaborators. There are ongoing reports of dismissals from employment or expulsion from schools and third level institutions after similar findings by superiors or ad-hoc investigation committees. The print media frequently purports to identify and condemn alleged collaborators. As a result of a continuing climate of fear it is reported that many alleged collaborators, including children, remain in hiding.

Sometimes the acts of intimidation directed against alleged collaborators contain elements of ethnic discrimination – this is, for instance the case regarding widespread vilification of the Lebanese community.

Issues of detention and deportation are discussed below.

HUMAN RIGHTS AWARENESS IN GOVERNMENT

The Government is sincerely committed to promotion of human rights in the context of consolidation of democracy. This is reflected by its ratification of a wide range of the international instruments and its unconditional welcome for the human rights activities of UNOMSIL. It has also been conscientious in making commitments on such matters as the demobilization of under-age combatants and the maintenance of high judicial standards in the treason trials. With the assistance of UNICEF, the Government has developed modalities to address issues of child rights.

The Government does, however, face difficulties in mainstreaming human rights perspectives in its policy and programme development and implementation. A lack of human rights technical expertise, economic limitations and the ongoing emergency are important constraints in this regard.

The State is not in compliance with its reporting obligations under international human rights instruments.

See further below.

THE TREASON TRIALS / COURTS-MARTIAL

The State is prosecuting 58 persons in the regular courts for charges, variously, of treason, murder and arson. Two further trials are scheduled to begin soon, as are courts-martial. All defendants, if found guilty, face the possibility of the death penalty. The trials occur in a context of widespread public anger and desire for quick justice.

The trials in the regular courts are being monitored by UNOMSIL. A number of procedural irregularities have been identified. However, UNOMSIL interventions have resulted in speedy rectification of the most egregious problems. Current concerns include

the speed with which the State is propelling the proceedings, the often biased media coverage and the manner in which one judge treats defense counsel. UNOMSIL has made representations on all of these matters in recent days.

The Government has indicated that there will be no right of appeal from findings of the courts-martial. UNOMSIL has indicated its regret and continues to seek a change in this position.

EMERGENCY POWERS

A State of Emergency was declared on 10 March 1998. It gives the President wide powers to order extra-judicial detention and deportation, limit freedom of expression and impose curfews. Certain of these powers would appear to be practically necessary while the rebel war continues. However, there are some causes for concern:

- i. The regulations do not comply with the requirements for notification to the UN Secretary-General contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- ii. Elements of the regulations are broader than is permitted by the International Covenant (for instance, the powers to curtail freedom of expression are excessive and the provisions on deportation lack sufficient safeguards; concerning application of these powers see below)
- iii. At least 1,500 civilians and police officers are being detained pursuant to the regulations, almost all in very poor conditions. The Government acknowledges that many of these people are no threat to society. However, a committee, tasked with the vetting of detainees for release, which was established in May, has yet to commence its activities. It is reported in this regard that the Government faces logistical problems such as lack of the necessary office equipment and meeting facilities.

- iv. Large numbers of military personnel and surrendered rebels are also being held at a number of locations. This is not in itself a cause for concern. However, an unknown number of the detainees are child combatants. There are, for instance, 13 children detained at Jui camp. It is a matter of concern that these children are not separated from adult detainees. Also, given Government undertakings in this regard, it is regrettable that they are not speedily demobilized and placed in the care of child protection agencies. UNOMSIL is considering an appropriate form of intervention.
- v. There have been a number of deportations, principally of members of the Lebanese community. These have not been preceded by any form of judicial or appeal process. It seems that they may also have been accompanied by the confiscation of assets.
- vi. The Government has issued stern warning to the media to comply with the limitations on freedom of expression. As noted above these regulations are excessive. In practice, however, the Government has exercised restraint in this matter.
- vii. In recent weeks numbers of children (perhaps over 50) have been arrested in Freetown for curfew violation. Most of the children are displaced, newly arrived in the city and not "street-wise". The arrest and criminalisation of these children introduces them to a criminal lifestyle and is also a cause of great distress. UNOMSIL and other bodies are currently seeking to have the matter addressed.

UNOMSIL will bring its views on the State of Emergency to the attention of the Government and will offer its assistance in addressing the main concerns. See further below.

RIGHTS OF THE CHILD

Serious impediments to enjoyment of child rights have been noted above, *in passim*.

One of the gravest problems is the high numbers of child soldiers engaged both with the Government and the rebel forces. Figures are not presently available for the numbers of child soldiers. However, observation of CDF suggests a high proportion of children in this 20,000 to 40,000 strong force. Of 4,000 Kamajor in one Chiefdom, 151 are under 15 years of age. Reports from various locations indicate that children are still sent in to combat on a regular basis.

The Government has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to cease recruitment of and speedily reintegrate child soldiers into society. Action has not yet been taken in this regard. In June there were reports from the Tonkolili district in the North that initiation of children was still occurring.

Years of instability, the ongoing conflict and economic constraints have severely undermined the educational system. Especially outside Freetown, schools face such problems as lack of equipment and materials, destruction or alternative use of school property and a lack of respect for the teaching profession. Teachers, all very poorly paid, are reportedly under-motivated. Many IDP children do not attend school. Large numbers of children also remain out of the school system because of the economic necessity to work. One related problem in rural areas is the failure of school timetables to take account of the rhythms of agricultural life, whereby families require that their children work in the fields during certain periods (such as to frighten away birds during the planting season). The dropout rate of girls from secondary school is high. This is partly because girls who are sexually active or become pregnant are not encouraged to continue their education.

There is a high incidence of female genital mutilation in Sierra Leone. Difficulties in addressing the issue include an unwillingness of society to confront the problem and its entrenched position in traditional culture.

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES

Until May 1998 there were widespread reports that the CDF paid no attention to such aspects of the laws of war as the rights of surrendered persons to be taken prisoner and not to be subjected to torture. Since then there has been a sharp drop in allegations of summary killing or of the torture of prisoners. This appears to be largely due to the insistence of Government and the intervention of ECOMOG. There are, however, persistent reports of CDF elements in the provinces committing criminal acts such as looting, confiscation of vehicles, assault and civil disturbance – all in a climate of impunity.

The persistent presence of children in the CDF is referred to above.

THE MEDIA

The print media is concentrated in Freetown and there is very limited distribution to other locations. The media, in any case, reach a very small readership because of high rates of illiteracy and the relatively high cost of newspapers. There are reportedly some 40 newspapers in print, though only some 15 of these are available on a regular basis. One is attached to the Government and the others take a varying range of independent positions. Occasionally the journalists take courageous outspoken positions. Frequently, however, material is of poor quality and is under-researched and inaccurate. Unprofessional reporting of the treason trials and news coverage, which promotes acts of revenge or discrimination, are noted above.

There is one Government controlled television station which, given under-resourcing and limited coverage, exerts very little influence.

In Sierra Leone radio is the most important mass medium. There are at least 4 stations in Freetown and one in Bo. Some of these take strongly independent position in support of democratic governance. Two of the channels re-transmit broadcasts of the BBC and Voice of America.

Government controls on the media pursuant to its Emergency Powers are discussed above. Suggestions for provision of technical assistance are made below.

FUNCTIONING OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The Government concedes that the judicial system is entirely inadequate. Across the country, except in Freetown, the courts are not functioning and the system of traditional courts has largely collapsed. In Freetown there is only very limited activity and most resources are deployed to the treason trials. The decline of the system has been underway for years, largely prompted by lack of resources and, allegedly, corruption. The rebel war and the period of junta rule were the final blows to the system. The lack of an effective judicial system has resulted in wide public contempt for the judiciary and the legal profession, interminable pre-trial detention (in some cases for years) in overcrowded and unsuitable facilities and severe impediments to commercial life. There has also been a widely reported tendency for the police, civil defense forces and others to take the law into their own hands and administer extra-judicial punishments to alleged offenders.

Notwithstanding the gravity of the situation, some positive aspects of the judicial system have survived. These include a strong legal tradition, based on the English system, a pool of competent lawyers and senior judges and a functioning law school. Massive support is, however, needed to reestablish an effective system. Firstly, there is need for financial and managerial support to reestablish the physical infrastructure. Only with that in place, or in tandem with its provision, does the implementation of training, including human rights training, make sense. See further below.

FUNCTIONING OF DETENTION FACILITIES

Currently, 6 prisons are functioning. Prisoners are also held in an unverifiable number of other facilities, including police detention blocks and military camps. Most current detainees in the non-military facilities are being held pursuant to the Emergency Powers. Exact numbers of detainees are not available for the entire country - Freetown holds some 2,000 in its two prisons and in one of its police detention facilities.

Conditions in all detention facilities are poor. Even in the context of general poverty of society, prisoners receive inadequate food and are housed in unsanitary conditions. Overcrowding is endemic. For instance, one 90 square metre facility is reported to house some 70 prisoners. There is only one juvenile detention facility in the country and at other detention centres adult and juvenile prisoners are not always separated.

An apparently well-trained team of officers runs the officially designated prisons and there are few reports of deliberate mis-treatment. However, at least at the main prison in Freetown, their overall control of the facility has been ceded to ECOMOG which frequently impedes family visits, provision of chaplaincy services, etc. The police at police detention facilities, though often performing in a conscientious manner, are not trained for their functions.

HUMAN RIGHTS NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ASSESSEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The Government has established the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights. This body is tasked with promotion of democratic and human rights values in society as well as the arbitration of individual human rights complaints against the authorities. The Commission is of potentially immense importance and is led by a well qualified and innovative Chairman. However, it currently lacks capacity to undertake effective outreach to all levels of society across the country. See further below.

There is a vigorous NGO community, located mainly in Freetown, but with increasingly effective outreach capacity to all parts of the country (except rebel occupied areas). Some of these groups are highly effective and benefit from strong leadership. The humanitarian assistance and developmental NGOs are grouped in a body termed, SLANGO. International developmental NGOs are similarly organized. NGOs with an interest in human rights issues are gathered in a Forum. A child rights monitoring network is in operation. UNOMSIL is currently facilitating development of a human rights information system, which draws in all the communities of NGOs.

The Christian and Muslim religions have a very strong presence throughout the country and, in a context of sincere and impressive ecumenism, have developed important networks for delivery of humanitarian assistance and promotion of human rights.

All of the NGOs and religious groups require support in order to develop capacity and effectiveness, including through provisions of training human rights monitoring and reporting. See below.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION PRELIMINARY NEEDS ASSESSEMENT

Provision of human rights technical assistance must take account of a number of factors:

- (a) The country remains in a State of Emergency and the rebel war has not yet ended. This need not impede delivery of assistance but requires to be factored into all programme development and implementation. It is no less necessary to ensure that a policy of delivery of assistance does not distract attention from the ongoing requirement to address the human rights emergency situation with a programme of, inter-alia, vigorous monitoring, reporting and appropriate intervention.
- (b) Prior to, or in tandem with, delivery of human rights technical assistance, the basic infrastructural needs must be addressed. For instance:
 - i. As noted above, the judicial system needs such basic things as buildings, furniture, office equipment, vehicles, training for clerks

and stenographers, etc. Without these, the delivery of human rights training and resources will be futile. Herewith, as an appendix to this report is a statement of needs which was furnished to us by the Master of the High Court of Sierra Leone. The Chief Justice has endorsed the document. It identifies immediate and compelling requirements.

- ii. Human rights training for the police can be effectively delivered only as part of a scheme for police reform, downsizing, professionalisation, equipping and comprehensive training in police skills
- iii. Delivery of human rights training in schools must be preceded or accompanied by an overhaul of the educational system and an addressing of the root causes of truancy, early drop out rates and poor standards of education delivery
- iv. Provision of advice regarding legislative reform requires to be accompanied by development of legal drafting skills, reform or support to the Parliamentary committee system and development of other parliamentary skills for both majority and opposition members

Taking the above remarks into account it is suggested that a programme of human rights technical cooperation might include the following elements:

1. Promotion of human rights sensitivity in Government policy, planning and programme development and implementation. This could, for instance, be achieved through placement of a human rights expert in the Office of the President or in the office of a cabinet rank minister with responsibility for human rights. The expert would be tasked with development of a human rights integration programme, servicing of the bodies that require to be established, and identification and supervision of delivery of all necessary training.

2. Provision of training and assistance to officials tasked with preparation of periodic reports under the International Human Rights Instruments, and to all relevant officials and law officers regarding application of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3. Provision of ethnical support for the review and amendment of the Emergency Powers regulations.
4. Technical support to the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, including as regards its outreach and project delivery capacity. Also, it would be valuable to either enhance its Ombudsperson role or else to devise a new national institution (perhaps a parliamentary body) to undertake the Ombudsperson function.
5. Development or support to a national programme on women's rights, including development of culturally sensitive strategies to tackle issues of female genital mutilation.
6. Provision of human rights training for police and prison officials – using a train the trainers methodology within the context of existing professional training academies in Sierra Leone.
7. Provision of human rights training to the Paramount Chiefs and other traditional leaders in the context of their governmental and judicial functions.
8. Provision of human rights training and materials for lawyers – using a train the trainers methodology within the context of existing professional training academies in Sierra Leone.
9. Support for a project which would chronicle the human rights situation during the period of junta rule. This exercise would undermine the mythologisation phenomenon, contribute to the process of healing and reconciliation and help address

problems of impunity. A full project proposal paper has been prepared and is currently circulating for comments.

10. Support and input to projects for promotion of human rights awareness in the population. There are already some projects in this sector – including those funded by UNDP, USAID (OTI) and, forthcoming, OHCHR.
11. Provision of human rights monitoring, reporting and intervention training to NGOs, using a train the trainer methodology.
12. Provision of training to the media on relevant issues of human rights as well as in journalistic professional standards

UNOMSIL looks forward to further developing these suggestions, in close consultation with the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Government, with a view to timely and sustainable response to Sierra Leone's compelling human rights needs.

66) United Nations Document

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 14 July 1997, UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

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Source: UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs

Date: 14 Jul 1997

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 08 - 14 Jul 1997

This report has been prepared by the office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea

SECURITY

1. On 9 July, the Peoples Army attacked Lungi Airport in a bid to break through ECOMOGs outer security perimeter and destroy the 98.1 FM radio station which has recently served as a mouthpiece for President Kabbah and which they believed to be in the area. (See point seven below). The attack was comprehensively repulsed by ECOMOG troops and reliable Freetown sources have reported that at least 350 Peoples Army soldiers were killed by a combination of Nigerian and Guinean forces. The RUF commander who led the attack, Sam Bockarie (known as Mosquito) was injured in the foot during the fighting and has been seen in hospital by reliable eyewitnesses.

2. During the weekend of 12-13 July, the Peoples Army suffered another significant setback during fighting with Nigerian forces involving heavy artillery in the Jui and Hastings area. Although precise numbers of casualties are unknown, two trucks laden with corpses were observed returning to Freetown on the afternoon of 13th July. While the Nigerians suffered some casualties, the Peoples Army clearly incurred far more severe losses. ICRC reported 26 newly-wounded civilians at Netland and Connaught hospitals on 14 July. AFRC claims that Nigerian troops that were using Guineans as human shields have been ridiculed by ECOMOG Force Commander, Victor Malu. An ECOMOG warplane was observed flying over Freetown at the start of the fighting, but it was not seen to have dropped any ordnance.

3. Nigerian troops are now in control of Hastings Airport and the area up to and including Allen town. Residents from these areas are relocating in large numbers to the hills and into central Freetown. The main road out of Freetown is effectively closed as few vehicles have been observed on this route since 13 July. In Freetown, the Peoples Army have been preparing heavy machine gun positions on the high ground in the Hill station area. Some of these guns are mounted on the back of pick-up trucks and are mobile.

4. There has been sporadic but intense fighting between the RUF and the kamajors during the past week in the Zimmi area and an estimated 1,500 civilians and 300 kamajors are believed to have been forced into Liberia. Control of the strategically-important Bo Waterside bridge on the Sierra Leone/Liberia border has fluctuated between the two sides. Although the RUF was believed to have taken the bridge earlier in the week, Chief Norman, Deputy Minister of Defense and de facto leader of the kamajors, reported that the kamajors were in control of the bridge on 14 July.

5. The Kenema-Kono highway, which was previously controlled by the kamajors, has

now been secured by the Peoples Army following AFRC/RUF re-enforcement of the area.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

6. The date of Major Koromas proposed meeting with the ECOWAS committee of four has been changed from 15 July to 17 July. The meeting is scheduled to take place in Abidjan and not in Conakry.

7. President Kabbah has made several broadcasts to Sierra Leone over the 98.1 FM radio station which have proved to be a considerable irritant to the AFRC. In his first broadcast on 8 July, Kabbah urged the AFRC to step down to spare the people of Sierra Leone further pain and suffering. He also ordered soldiers and RUF to report to the nearest ECOMOG base and declare their loyalty. This tactic has been partially successful as several AFRC soldiers have since surrendered to Nigerian forces at Lungi.

8. On 8 July, in an attempt to undermine the impact of Kabbah's broadcast which took place earlier in the day, the AFRC announced its 19 member Cabinet. The majority of the posts are filled by former representatives of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). For example, Captain SAJ Musa, Secretary of Mineral Resources and Chief Secretary; Victor Brandon, Secretary of Development and Economic Planning; Col. Dr. KIS Kamara, Secretary of Health and Sanitation; Major Kula Samba, Secretary of Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs.

9. The Finance Secretary, Joe Amara Bangali, was a former minister in the APC and the Foreign Secretary; Dr. Paolo Bangura, was a former Ambassador to the UN. The RUF are represented through the appointment of Foday Sankoh as Deputy Chairman and SB Rogers as Acting Secretary of Lands and Environment. Two portfolios, namely Trade, Industry and State Enterprises and Energy and Power, have not been filled but the posts have been reserved for representatives of the Peoples Army. 37 posts in the Supreme Council have also been created, but only 22 have been filled to date. The extent to which nominees were consulted prior to their appointment is debatable. In a radio broadcast on BBC's *Focus*, Mr. Saaba Tumor, who was appointed Director of Information and Broadcasting, denied all knowledge of his appointment.

10. In a statement issued on 11 July following its meeting with the Committee of the four ECOWAS Foreign Ministers, the UN Security Council reiterated its view that the attempt to overthrow President Kabbah's government was unacceptable and called for the immediate and unconditional restoration of constitutional order in Sierra Leone. The Security Council expressed deep concern over the negative humanitarian consequences of the continuing crisis in Sierra Leone as well as its threat to regional stability. The Security Council welcomed the mediation efforts initiated by ECOWAS and expressed its full support for these efforts as set out in the communique issued at the meeting of the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers in Conakry on 26 June. Finally, the Security Council stated that it would continue to follow the progress of efforts aimed at the peaceful resolution of the crisis and that it was ready to consider appropriate measures if constitutional order in Sierra Leone is not restored without delay.

11. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, on which nine different Commonwealth countries are represented, convened on 10-11 July to review developments in Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. In its discussions on Sierra Leone, the Group urged the international community to continue to deny recognition to the AFRC and decided that participation of Sierra Leone in the councils of the Commonwealth would be suspended pending the restoration of legitimate government.

12. On 10 July, the EU issued a statement welcoming ECOWAS efforts to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone. The EU particularly, welcomed the inclusion of the OAU on the ECOWAS committee of Four. With regard to its aid programme, it was stated that Pending the return of the legitimate government to Freetown . . . the EU maintains its view that development aid to Sierra Leone cannot be continued in the present circumstances.

HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS

13. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has endorsed the joint UN/NGO Strategy and protocols for Sierra Leone as well as the United Nations Strategy for Inter-Agency Emergency Humanitarian Response. See Sitrep dated 24-30 June for more details. The US-based NGO consortium, INTERACTION, has also expressed written support for these strategies.

14. There has been much speculation over the status of the embargo in Sierra Leone as envisaged in the ECOWAS communique. There is no doubt that there are four Nigerian warships off the coast of the Western Area as at 14 July. Although these vessels are not visible to Freetown residents, they have successfully prevented commercial ships from docking at Freetowns port. Rocketing insurance premiums have also been a significant deterrent to shipping companies. There have, however, been many reports of pirogues and other small vessels successfully circumventing the blockade.

15. Media reports of an influx of a million people into Bo town are hugely exaggerated. ACF and MSF, both of whom have a presence in Bo estimate that less than 10,000 people have moved into Bo since the coup.

FOOD AID

16. The increase of the price of rice in Freetown to 40,000 leones per bag from its previous cost of 25,000 leones per bag is a clear indication that rice shortages are becoming increasingly acute. Although retailers still have rice available in their stores, wholesalers have exhausted their stocks as no food vessels have arrived in Freetown since the coup. Attempts by the business community to import rice into Freetown at the request of the AFRC have been unsuccessful primarily due to the exorbitant cost of insurance. Food agencies have managed to transport limited quantities of commodities (approximately 500 MTs) to Makeni and Bo during the past week. There is still a capacity of approximately 1,400 MTs in warehouses in Port Loko and Kambia.

17. The food aid pipeline for humanitarian relief remains healthy. Providing there are

no unforeseen complications, there will be 10,000 MTs of food aid in Conakry available for programmes in Sierra Leone by the end of July. Another 5,000 MTs of food commodities are due to arrive in Conakry during August 1997. Distribution modalities will be determined by the Committees on Food Aid.

18. Existing targeted feeding programmes as outlined in previous sitreps continue. A one-off emergency distribution is being planned for approximately 8,000 displaced in Kabala in Koinedugu district in the Northern province of Sierra Leone. As the normal population of Kabala is estimated to be 10,000 people, this new influx is putting considerable strain on the coping mechanisms of the local population.

HEALTH

19. **Freetown.** There is a concern over the maintenance of the drug pipeline for the eight clinics currently being operated by ICRC, SLRC and MSF in Freetown. Staff from these agencies are investigating how long existing stocks will last. The caseload for the ICRC/MSF surgical programme has continued to decrease notwithstanding recent admissions due to the fighting in the vicinity of Hastings. ActionAid has agreed to make incentive payments to Blue Flag volunteers working on cholera prevention in Freetown.

20. **Bo.** An assessment of the MSF-supported hospital in Bo on 5 July revealed that the hospital building has not been damaged by recent fighting although the emergency department is still under rehabilitation. There is deemed to be sufficient local surgical capacity to treat casualties from possible future clashes. There were only 40 in-patients in the hospital as at 5 July this is attributable to insecurity and inaccessibility due to poor public transport to local areas.

21. **Kenema.** Merlin continues to support the Kenema government hospital in the Under Five clinics (the Pediatric Ward and the Lassa Fever Ward). Support is provided through the provision of therapeutic and supplementary foodstuffs and essential drugs and equipment. Merlin also plays a supervisory role as well as enhancing cholera preparedness. The programme is supervised by Merlins Medical Coordinator who is based in Monrovia. Although Merlins drug supplies were left intact, the pharmacy in Kenema hospital was completely looted. ICRC is seeing an average of 800 patients per week at the Nongowa clinic in Kenema. Drugs are provided by ICRC, Merlin and UNICEF.

CHILD PROTECTION

22. Although the family tracing and reunification network in Sierra Leone was temporarily disrupted by the coup and the departure of several key staff, efforts are being made to restart the reunification programme as the regional focus organisations, ADRA and Christian Brothers are still operational.

23. At the first Child Protection meeting in Conakry on 7 July, it was acknowledged that there were several impediments to successful implementation of child protection/demobilisation programmes in addition to security constraints namely: lack of reliable numbers of child soldiers as the only source of information was the former Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Unit under MNRRR; uncertainty over potential AFRC counterparts (e.g., the former programme manager

of the DDR Unit, Major Kula Samba, is now Secretary of Social Welfare, Children and General Affairs and the former Army Chief of Staff, Col. Max Kanga is now Director of the National Relief, Rehabilitation and Demobilisation Commissions); the degree to which any programme might apply to the kamajors; and the current capacity of NGOs to implement any programmes. UNICEF is exploring the possibility of a pilot demobilisation project for 50-100 children to test the publicly-stated commitment of the AFRC to demobilisation of child soldiers.

REFUGEES

24. Concern Worldwide, the Irish NGO which still has one expatriate in Freetown, has reported that a caseload of 7,700 Liberian refugees have been receiving WFP food on a regular basis since the coup. All Liberian refugees have moved out of Jui camp to Waterloo camp, Clay Factory Camp and Freetown. Concern Worldwide continues to run a medical and therapeutic feeding programmes in Segbwema.

25. 200 of the 489 Sierra Leonean refugees who have been living in Waterloo camp in Freetown since their repatriation prior to the coup have indicated that they would like to return to their areas of origin. The first group of 40 will return by bus to the Eastern province as soon as possible.

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
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67) United Nations Document

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 8 September 1997, UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

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Source: UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs

Date: 8 Sept 1997

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 02 - 08 Sep 1997

REG. NO. 97/0341

This report has been prepared by the office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea

SECURITY

1a). During the night of the 3 September Nigerian forces at Lungi shelled a Greek-Cypriot registered vessel with a cargo of rice, anchored off Destruction Bay near the Eastern coast of Freetown, in an attempt to enforce the embargo imposed by ECOWAS against the AFRC. On 4 September it transpired that civilian residences in 3 different areas bordering Destruction Bay had been hit. Estimates of numbers of casualties vary from 20-50 but it is confirmed that 13 corpses were subsequently laid by the AFRC outside UN House in the centre of Freetown. Doctors reported treating 17 wounded at Connaught hospital.

1b). On 4 September General Malu, ECOMOG commander in Monrovia, stated on BBCs Focus on Africa that there had been massive firing from the area of Fourah Bay College, which is situated on a hill overlooking Freetown, and Willberforce barracks at the time that the shelling near Destruction Bay took place. He added that there were no ECOMOG troops in these areas. Eyewitnesses also report having seen signs of fire from AFRC positions at Fourah Bay College. President Kabbah denied that Nigerian forces had been responsible for the deaths in a broadcast on 98.1 FM, the clandestine radio station located in the vicinity of Lungi. A statement issued by Nigerian Defence Headquarters in Lagos accused the AFRC of firing on civilians and ECOMOG positions on 4 September and stated that the AFRC had declared total war on ECOMOG forces at Lungi.

1c). An AFRC spokesman subsequently stated that The Nigerians shelled the coastal area of Freetown... just to kill our civilians. In a nationwide broadcast on 4 September Major Koroma, Chairman of the AFRC, accused President Kabbah of ordering the carnage which the Nigerian troops have embarked on. He also declared 5 September a public holiday to respect the dead. Graphic images of dismembered corpses were repeatedly shown on television following the incident. A crowd of several hundred people marched from Freetown towards Nigerian troop positions at Jui to protest against this incident.

2. On 7 September two Nigerian combat aircraft attempted to bomb the Greek-Cypriot registered vessel and two other vessels off loading rice at Freetown port. Two bombs were dropped from the aircraft, one of which detonated causing partial damage to one of the vessels, equipment and nearby vehicles. ECOMOG reported that the other bomb failed to detonate.

3. On 4 September an ECOMOG statement said that eleven ECOMOG soldiers were killed and three wounded in a landmine explosion near Lungi international airport. The statement blamed AFRC forces for laying the mine, and characterised the use of mines as an inhumane practice which posed more dangers to civilians than the ECOMOG troops.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

4. At consultations of the United Nations Security Council it was decided that any further action vis-a-vis the ECOWAS embargo should be postponed until the Security Council had the opportunity to discuss the issues in more detail with representatives from the ECOWAS Committee of Five Foreign Ministers. The Committee of Five will brief the UN Secretary-General on 11 September. The Nigerian Foreign Minister has already met Robert Mugabe, OAU Chairman, to explain the outcome of the ECOWAS summit.

HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS

5. Attempts are being made by the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Conakry to determine on behalf of the humanitarian community the procedure for obtaining exemptions for humanitarian items under the ECOWAS embargo (see point 4, sitrep dated 23 August-1 September). In a meeting with UN Agencies on 8 September President Kabbah said that sanctions-related enquiries should be addressed to General Malu, ECOMOG Force Commander in Liberia. Attempts are also being made to arrange a meeting with the appropriate Guinean authorities and the ECOWAS Secretariat.

6. During the week under review a European Union fact finding mission visited Conakry to evaluate the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone since the coup on 25 May and to assess the impact of the coup on the Republic of Guinea. The mission included representatives from France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Great Britain and ECHO (from Europe) and Italy, Great Britain and the EU delegation (from Guinea). The mission met representatives from UN Agencies from Sierra Leone and Guinea, the diplomatic community, NGOs and representatives from President Kabbah's Government. The mission was also briefed by the various sectoral committees and visited the refugee camps near Forecariah. The Swedish representative visited the refugee camps near Gueckedou.

7. In a statement issued following its meeting with the EU mission the Government of Sierra Leone in exile (GoSL) expressed appreciation for the EU's humanitarian support since the coup. The statement explained the GoSL's position on humanitarian assistance and sanctions as follows:

a) The GoSL recognised the humanitarian problems affecting the civilian population since the coup but did not believe that they had reached crisis proportions. Medical assistance to cover potential epidemics might be needed by there was no requirement for large-scale intervention.

b) The delivery of humanitarian aid should take into account the ECOWAS position as explained in the communique following the Abuja summit in August 1997.

c) The GoSL was concerned that an influx of aid agencies might create a false sense of normalcy which would give the AFRC undeserved credibility.

d) The GoSL felt that humanitarian assistance was bound to be misappropriated or looted by the AFRC Aid agencies should, therefore, adopt an ethical code of conduct on aid distribution. (Note: A Code of Conduct and Specific Operating Guidelines were drawn up and endorsed by humanitarian agencies in June 1997).

e) The GoSL does not intend sanctions to be used as a means of harming the civilian population.

8. The GoSL appealed for funding from the EU to support ECOMOG to enable it to fulfil its mandate and to organise conferences on Sierra Leone to solicit support from the international community. The first of these conferences would be held in Great Britain in October 1997.

FOOD AID

9. The most recent tally reveals a total of 6,300 MTs relief food available in Sierra Leone, less than previously thought. Consequently, food agencies are investigating the possibility of launching cross border operations through Guinea to address existing shortages. In Freetown ICRC reported that some 3,000 beneficiaries in 28 institutions were supplied in August with enough food until December 1997.

HEALTH

10. UNICEF has reported more outbreaks of measles in two different chiefdoms in Koinadugu district in the Northern province of Sierra Leone. 400 cases and 100 deaths have been recorded in Wara Ware Bafodea chiefdom and 200 cases and 60 deaths in Niene chiefdom.

11. ICRC recently conducted a rapid nutritional assessment of 400 children in Joru in the Southern part of Kenema district using Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measurements. The survey revealed severe acute malnutrition at 13 percent and global acute malnutrition at 30 percent. ICRC is currently conducting further assessments to determine the extent to which these results are representative. They do, however, suggest that the nutritional status of populations in other inaccessible, rural areas is likely to be poor.

FAMILY TRACING

12. A network of messages exchange is currently being run in Sierra Leone by the ICRC in cooperation with the Sierra Leone Red Cross (SLRC). The exchange of Red Cross messages has greatly increased in number over the last months. In August there was an average of 400 messages distributed or emitted each week between members of separated families between Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and other countries.

13. The Kenema District Diocesan Office (KDDO), the child protection focal NGO in Kenema, has reported that they are caring for 664 unaccompanied children in day-care centers, most of whom have been placed with foster families pending tracing and

reunification. Christian Brothers, the focal NOG for Bo, reported having reunified 632 unaccompanied children. Of the children still not reunified, 208 are in Group Homes, 720 in substitute families and 120 in supervised foster care.

CHILDREN PROTECTION

14. ADRA/CAW have completed their five day mission to the Northern province during which they established child protection committees in Port Loko, Kambia, Lunsar and Makeni to be chaired by the Catholic church. The mission documented the 48 children associated with the RUF living with their families in Port Loko and prepared a small community project to address their needs. The Planning Framework for Demobilisation of Child Combatants was reviewed with the Bishop of Makeni who has access to approximately 250 RUF children in the area. To date, ADRA has registered a total of 130 children associated with the RUF, 49 in Makeni and 81 in the Western Area.

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68) United Nations Document

Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution
1343 (S/2001/1015)

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
26 October 2001

Original: English

**Letter dated 26 October 2001 from the Chairman of the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
1343 (2001) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of the
Security Council**

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia, and in accordance with paragraph 19 of section B of resolution 1343 (2001), I have the honour to submit, as agreed upon at the 7th meeting of the Committee, held on 25 October 2001, the report of the Panel of Experts (see annex).

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if this letter, together with its annex, were to be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Kishore **Mahubani**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia

Annex**Letter dated 17 October 2001 from the Chairman of the Panel of Experts on Liberia addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia**

On behalf of the members of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, I have the honour to enclose the report of the Panel, in accordance with paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001).

(Signed) Martin Chungong **Ayafor**
Chairman
Panel of Experts on Liberia

(Signed) Atabou **Bodian**

(Signed) Johan **Peleman**

(Signed) Harjit Singh **Sandhu**

(Signed) Alex **Vines**

Enclosure

Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia

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Abbreviations

AFCAC	African Civil Aviation Commission
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)
ANA	Agence de la Navigation Aeriene (Guinee)
APIRG	Africa and Indian Ocean Planning and Implementation Regional Group
ASECNA	Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation in Africa and Madagascar
ATU	Anti-Terrorist Unit (Liberia)
CDF	Civil Defence Force
CMRRD	Commission for Management of Strategic Mineral Resources (Sierra Leone)
CSSP	Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project for Sierra Leone
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation Programme (Sierra Leone)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
Dwt	Dead weight tonne
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FIC	Flight Information Centre
FIR	Flight Information Region
FOB	Freight on Board
GODIMWUL	Gold and Diamond Miners and Workers Union (Liberia)
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
IWETS	International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System
LISCR	Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MROS	Money Laundering Reporting Office (Switzerland)

MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
NCDDR	National Centre for Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OTC	Oriental Timber Company (Liberia)
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
RTC	Royal Timber Corporation (Liberia)
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SITA	Société internationale de télécommunications aéronautiques
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNIC	United Nations Information Centre
UNOL	United Nations Office for Liberia
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive summary

1. In mid-April when the Panel embarked upon its mandate there were active hostilities in the three Mano River Union countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia). Six months on, there are significant signs of improvement in the region. Welcome regional diplomatic efforts are under way to further improve bilateral relations between the three members of the Mano River Union although there is still active conflict in Lofa County in Liberia and the possibility of Sierra Leone gravitating back into the conflict if RUF does not want to release its hold on some of the best diamond areas.

2. There has been a proliferation of the use of non-state actors in these conflicts in the Mano River Union. These groups obtain weapons from state supporters, from their trade in diamonds, alluvial gold, cocoa and coffee or from their military action. Their actions have had and can again destabilize the region. The junction of the borders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone has been the fault zone where these groups have thrived.

3. The Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) relationship with Liberia was described in detail in the Panel of Experts report on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195). In 2001 this relationship has continued, although a split is reported among RUF units that are willing to disarm in Sierra Leone and others that continue to fight in the war that has shifted to the Liberian and Guinean borders. Throughout 2001, RUF units have been fighting with Liberian units in Lofa County.

Transportation and weapons

Lifting of the sanctions on Liberian registered aircraft

4. Irregularities with respect to Liberian registered aircraft were directly related to violations of the arms embargo. This is why the Security Council decided to ground all Liberian registered aircraft until a new and proper registration process, in compliance with international civil aviation regulations, would be put in place. The Panel has closely monitored the progress made in this field and has worked consistently with the new Director of Civil Aviation in Liberia in order to find a way out of the disorderly situation the registry was in. Bits and pieces of documentation on the ownership of many aircraft were gradually found in Liberia and through communication with other civil aviation authorities. By the time the Panel last visited Liberia in the first week of October 2001, 117 planes had been identified on the basis of this information.

5. The problem of Liberian registered aircraft is not yet fully solved because some aircraft may still be operating abroad with an EL-prefix painted on the tail, despite the revocation by Liberia. But this is a matter that is beyond the control of the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority and should be dealt with on the level of the airports where these planes are seen and can be grounded.

Recommendation on Liberian registry

6. The Panel considers that the measures taken so far by the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority are adequate and that the Security Council may consider lifting the grounding order imposed by resolution 1343 (2001) and allow Liberia to reopen an aircraft register in coordination with International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO). Those individual aircraft that were effectively grounded and have provided ICAO and the Security Council Committee on Liberia with the documentation showing their registration in Liberia was done in accordance with international regulations, should be given permission to restart their operations.

7. The Liberian Civil Aviation Authority should keep the Security Council Committee on Liberia and the ICAO informed on the follow-up of the investigation and on the registration of every new aircraft on the new Liberian register.

Role of transportation in arms trafficking

8. In most of the arms trafficking cases the Panel investigated, the transport factor seemed once again a crucial element and in all of these cases the planes that were used, had in one way or another been subject to document fraud, forgery of flight plans and irregularities with respect to the registration of aircraft. The Panel found evidence of fraudulent registrations, not only in Liberia, but also in the Central African Republic and to a certain extent in Equatorial Guinea too. The registrations of the aircraft from Centrafrique Airlines in the Central African Republic are of particular importance because these planes were used for arms transportation in violation of the sanctions on Liberia.

Recommendations on illegal aircraft registrations

9. In view of the aircraft registration fraud committed in the Central African Republic, the Panel recommends that the Civil Aviation Authorities there:

- Transmit to Interpol the Court documents about Centrafrique Airlines;
- Publish these Court documents on the Government's web site;
- Coordinate urgently with Equatorial Guinea and the United Arab Emirates over the use by Centrafrique Airlines of forged documents.

10. To other States, the Panel recommends that the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea and other African States affected by this type of fraud coordinate with the African Civil Aviation Commission to put the issue of false registrations as an agenda item for its future meetings.

11. During its investigations the Panel found illegally registered aircraft an endemic problem. The Panel travelled to Montreal to discuss the problem with ICAO's Air Navigation Bureau Director. He informed the Panel that countries with an illegal registration problem could cancel or ground aircraft, and that ICAO advised in such circumstances new registration. The Panel felt that ICAO's response was inadequate to deal with this growing problem.

12. To ICAO, the Panel recommends that:

- ICAO proactively educates its members on the dangers of illegal registrations;
- ICAO's member States computerize their registration lists and centralize them on the ICAO web site so that users could check the situation and status of each aircraft;
- ICAO's Safety Oversight programme should place greater emphasis on aircraft registration.

13. To the United Nations Security Council, the Panel recommends that all the aircraft owned, operated or insured by San Air, Centrafican Airlines and West Africa Air Services should be grounded immediately. The grounding order could then be lifted gradually for each individual aircraft, provided all the records (ownership of the plane, operator, operating licence, insurance, airworthiness certificate, certificate of registration and the location of the aircraft) are inspected by both the Civil Aviation Authority in the country of registration and in the country where the aircraft has its maintenance base.

14. The companies concerned should inform the Council, through the Security Council Committee on Liberia, on the exact status and location of each aircraft. A list of those planes is found in annex 3 to the report.

Weapons

15. The Liberian Government's public commitments to comply with the embargo notwithstanding, a steady flow of new weapons continues to enter into the country. The Panel documents in this report five detailed case studies on sanctions violations.

16. Case study one describes how thousands of machine-guns found their way to Liberia in November 2000. The weapons were supposed to be sent back from Uganda to Slovakia but the Egyptian arms broker sold them to a company in Guinea that turned out to be a front for a Liberian smuggling network. The End-User Certificate for Guinea was forged and the plane used for the transport of the guns was chartered by Centrafican Airlines.

17. In case study two it is shown how Liberia set up a ghost airline West Africa Air Services to transport several arms cargoes. A first flight in July 2000 shipped spare parts for military helicopters from Kyrgyzstan to Liberia. A forged End-User Certificate for a company in Guinea was again used to buy the military equipment. Directly after that the plane shuttled between Monrovia and Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) to bring over 100 tons of ammunition to Liberia. This deal was organized and financed by Leonid Minin and a partner in Russia, Valery Cherny of the company Aviatrend. Minin was later found in possession of forged duplicates of an End-User Certificate that had been signed by General Robert Gueï, the former head of State of Côte d'Ivoire.

18. In a third case study the Panel describes Liberia's recent quest to obtain additional military helicopters. The Panel was informed that a military helicopter had been seized in the Slovak Republic in February 2001. The Slovak authorities wanted to ship the helicopter back to Kyrgyzstan after repairs had been done.

19. However, in Kyrgyzstan the authorities were not aware of any repair contract for helicopters in the Slovak Republic. According to the broker Kyrgyzstan had dealt with, the helicopters were to go to Guinea. According to the contract signed in Slovakia they were supposed to go back to Kyrgyzstan. Again a false End-User Certificate for Guinea showed up in this case. Had the helicopter not been stopped by customs, it would have gone to Liberia. A second consignment of helicopters was, right after the debacle in Slovakia, seized in Moldova. There two military helicopters were about to be exported to Guinea for repairs.

20. However, Guinea has no repair plant for helicopters and the companies, brokers and transport agents involved in this case were those that were involved in the previous case of sanctions-busting to Liberia. The contract with the Guinean

brokering company, Pecos was finally cancelled after the intervention of the authorities in Moldova and after a visit of the Panel to that country.

21. In another case study false End-User Certificates used by the company Pecos in Guinea is analysed. The individuals involved were operating in Central and Eastern Europe but had set up an off-the-shelf company, Pecos, in Guinea. End-User Certificates for this company were found in Kyrgyzstan, in Moldova, the Slovak Republic and Uganda. In all the cases, arms were bought for Liberia and the Panel verified that Guinea had never ordered any weapons through Pecos. Pecos was a follow-up to another company Joy Slovakia that had stopped operating after several law enforcement agencies had started investigating possible arms trafficking and money-laundering cases. The Panel found that the scheme set up with End-User certificates fabricated by the individuals involved with these companies, had been used to supply weapons to Liberia for years.

22. Finally, an analysis is made of the aviation network involved in these arms supplies to Liberia. The evidence on the involvement of Serguei Denissenko, Alexander Islamov, Pavel Popov and Sanjivan Ruprah is overwhelming. All these individuals are directly connected to Victor Bout and the operations of his aircraft. The Panel has investigated the corporate relationships between the companies San Air, Centrafrique Airlines, MoldTransavia and West Africa Air Services, all related to this network of arms dealers. In the course of the investigation different forms of fraud were found, including fraud with the registration of aircraft and with flight plans. The main company behind many of the arms shipments was San Air, in the United Arab Emirates. San Air is an agent for Centrafrique Airlines, the main company of Victor Bout, and the owner of many of the arms trafficking planes involved. San Air's bank accounts were used for many payments for arms deliveries to Liberia and the money trail is described in the section on government expenditures.

23. The Panel also documents in this report, how the Singapore-based mother company of the Oriental Timber Company, a company with significant timber operations in Liberia, arranged a US\$ 500,000 payment for an arms shipment in August 1999; how the Bureau of Maritime Affairs in Liberia assisted violations of the arms embargo and paid directly to Victor Bout's San Air bank accounts and how Sanjivan Ruprah, a diamond dealer and partner of Victor Bout had taken residence in Liberia, at the end of the arms pipeline.

Recommendations on weapons

24. The Panel recommends that:

- The arms embargo on Liberia be extended;
- All United Nations Member States abstain from supplying weapons to the Mano River Union countries;
- An arms embargo be imposed on the armed non-state actors in the three Mano River Union countries (namely the LURD and Ulimo-factions, the RUF and the Guinean armed dissident groups).

25. The Panel also recommends that, for reasons of transparency and confidence-building, the ECOWAS moratorium on small arms should be broadened to an information exchange mechanism for all weapons types procured by the ECOWAS

member States. The existing Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) could be further developed to improve the information exchange on current holdings and future arms procurement of West African States. The Panel recommends that this information exchange would be binding and that both supplier States and the receiving countries would be obliged to report each individual arms transaction to the newly established mechanism and include data on all the parties to the arms transactions, including the names and companies of the brokers and the transport agents.

Recommendation on End-User Certificates

26. The Panel recommends that each Member State that has ever procured or supplied arms on the basis of an End-User Certificate mentioning the companies Pecos, Joy Slovakia and/or Morse or the individuals Peter Jusko, Alexander Islamov, Jacob Berger, Andrei Izdebski or Serguei Schwabenland, conduct a thorough investigation on the actual delivery and end-use of the arms. The Panel recommends that the member States involved in any such transactions inform the other State party to these transactions and inform the Security Council Committees on Sierra Leone and Liberia on the findings of their investigation.

27. The Panel urgently recommends the establishment of a United Nations working group to develop the modalities for a standardized End-User Certificate that would include the name, address and telephone number of the signing authority for the Certificate, and name, address, telephone number and arms trading licence of the broker(s) involved.

Liberian Government use of revenue

28. The Panel examined the sources and management of government funds in an effort to establish the financing for sanctions-busting. The principal source of revenue for these activities between 1999 and 2001 was off-budget spending that was not part of regular government expenditures.

29. These expenditures occurred outside the budget process through the allocation of revenue at the source rather than through the central bank. According to IMF "certain timber concessions, government parastatals, and revenue collection agencies undertook expenditure on behalf of government, that was later recorded as "non-cash" revenue with an offsetting outlay on goods and services". This appears to be how sanctions-busting, namely for procurement of weapons and ammunition, was financed as this report will demonstrate below.

Recommendations on Liberian Government expenditure

30. The Panel recommends that the practice of allocating revenues at source for priority expenditure should be eliminated. All revenues should be consolidated in a central government account at the Central Bank of Liberia before being allocated to authorized agencies for approved expenditures.

Logging and wood processing

31. Between January and June 2001 round log production produced 679,253 cubic metres (valued at US\$ 46.2 million). These figures are a likely underestimate of real exports by 50 to 200 per cent because of tax evasion by companies and widespread corruption.

32. Logging has long been one of the prime sources of government revenue. Logging is still today a mainstay of export earnings for the Government. President Taylor has also taken a personal interest in the allocation of timber concessions. In January 2000 a new National Forestry Law declared that all forest resources are the property of the Government except for communal and privately owned forest resources that have been developed through artificial regeneration.

33. New concessions require final approval by the President of the Republic. During the 1999-2000 season, many authorized concessionaires continued logging but without assurances that they would be allowed to retain their concessions. This uncertainty encouraged rapid cutting and profiteering, without concern for sustainable forestry practices in order to maximize profits in anticipation of losing concessions.

34. Several Spanish and French enterprises lost their concessions to the United Logging Company, managed by Fawaz and President Taylor's son as chairman. President Taylor has also revoked concessions of the VH Timber Companies giving them to the United Logging Company and to the Mohammed Group. President Taylor is seeking to have the timber industry dominated by a few mega-concessions like the Oriental Timber Company.

35. A number of the timber companies complained to the Panel that making a profit currently in Liberia is difficult, except for the mega-concessions that are engaged in non-selective felling and processing massive volumes of round logs. Limited wood-processing capacity, log jams in France at saw mills because of large volumes of round logs and the difficulty in attracting new investors to Liberia were all blamed for these difficulties. They complain of excessive taxation and difficult operating conditions, making it impossible even to fell and sell timber up to their Forestry Development Agency 4 per cent quota. Presidential favour is an important ingredient in cutting operational costs. A number of logging firms obtained tax waivers for fuel purchases as a result of their close connections to the President.

36. According to FDA rules, 25 per cent of the volume of logs felled should be sawn in the country. This rule is not respected because of the volume of round logs exported by the Oriental Timber Company to China and because of the limited number of saw mills in Liberia.

37. Prior to the 1989-1996 war there were 18 saw mills, three veneering and plywood factories, six dry kilns and three wood-processing factories and domestic timber production surpassed log exports in timber volume. Today there are only 12 operational saw mills and these do not have the capacity to process the volume of logs felled.

38. The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently advises all countries to ban unprocessed log exportation beyond the end of 2000. Liberia urgently needs to phase out this trade and invest in wood-processing facilities. This would enhance the value of timber exported from Liberia, slow felling down and provide additional

employment. It would also make production and exporting easier to monitor. The Taylor government has announced a gradual prohibition on the export of round logs as a policy guideline since 1998, but no legislation on the issue has been enacted yet.

39. Some of the timber companies are directly involved in violations of the sanctions against Liberia. One prominent example of this was Exotic Tropical and Timber Enterprises (ETTE). The Panel has received a certain document, which indicates that a payment for a weapons delivery was made directly from the Singapore accounts of the company Borneo Jaya Pte Ltd, a mother company of OTC.

Recommendations on logging and wood processing

40. Timber production is an important source of revenue for the Government and a source of employment in Liberia. It is also a source of revenue for sanctions-busting. The Panel found it difficult to obtain real figures on the current volume of timber production and how much revenue is generated. Without a sound assessment of the timber-generated revenue base, the Panel could not assess how much revenue could have been used from this industry for assisting sanctions-busting. Therefore the Panel recommends that:

- The Government should reach agreement with the International Monetary Fund over the commissioning of an independent detailed report on revenue from the timber concessions for the January 2001-July 2002 period, including exemptions and tax offsets for government-related expenditures during this period;
- That the United Nations should impose a ban on all round log exports from Liberia from July 2002 and strongly encourage local operators to diversify into wood processing before that date.

Diamonds

41. The Panel examined Liberia's diamond industry because it is another crucial source of natural resource revenue for the Government. Liberia's own official diamond exports were said to be only 8,500 carats in 1999, valued at US\$ 900,000. Liberia's Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy estimates that this represents only 10 to 15 per cent of what is actually leaving the country.

42. Sanctions were imposed on the export of Liberian rough diamonds following the conclusions of the December 2000 report (S/2000/1195). This report illustrated how diamonds far in excess of the quality or quantity available in Liberia had been imported in provenance and origin. The larger illicit trade provided Liberia with a convenient cover for the export of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone although many of the so-called "Liberian" production emanated from other sources (most notably Russia), and was falsely declared "Liberian" for tax purposes.

43. With the entry into force of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) the Government of Liberia indicated that it would comply with the ban. The imposition of an embargo on the export of Liberian rough, coupled with progress in the peace process in Sierra Leone, has resulted in a marked decline of diamonds labelled as "Liberian" reaching international markets. There have been no imports from Liberia recorded in Antwerp since the imposition of the sanctions.

44. The embargo has created a different problem. Since it is impossible to sell Liberian rough officially, dealers and brokers are seeking to camouflage their Liberian diamonds as those from neighbouring countries markets. The Panel itself verified ongoing smuggling of Liberian rough to Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire.

45. The Panel also observed a steep increase in trade of diamonds mined by the RUF through Freetown. Many of these stones passed through Makeni from the Kono fields but lesser numbers reached dealers in Kenema and Bo before entering the official system. Approximately half of Sierra Leone's total production comes from the Kono/Koidu district. Following the imposition of a diamond embargo on Liberia, the closure of the border till September 2001 and the war in Lofa County, little diamond trade now passes through to Liberia from Sierra Leone. This shift in trade pattern is reflected also in the dramatic decline in so-called "Liberian" rough entering markets like Antwerp and a steep decline in the number of diamonds passing through Monrovia. The pressures on other revenue sources in Liberia for Executive Mansion extrabudgetary expenditure demonstrates once again the importance that diamonds had played over the last few years for President Taylor. Because of the loosening of President Taylor's grip on the Kono/Koidu diamond trade, the RUF axis has switched to increasing trade through Sierra Leone.

Recommendations on diamonds

46. The experiences of Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire discussed below show how difficult it actually is to separate out conflict diamonds from other alluvials. Better monitoring, increasing the cost of getting caught and the requirement to state the source of a stone (origin) rather than just the provenance could help this process. But as with the case of Sierra Leone, without steady progress in the internal peace process it is difficult to see how the distinction between government and RUF diamonds can be maintained effectively.

47. The diamond embargo on Liberia has contributed to the dramatic decline in the misuse of the Liberian label for diamond smuggling. The embargo has, however, reversed the problem in effect with encouraging an increase in the smuggling of Liberian rough out of the country and into neighbouring certification systems. If these certification schemes are to be credible, this situation needs to be dealt with urgently. Better policing of dealers can help, but ensuring that Liberia has its own credible certification scheme will ensure that less Liberian rough are deliberately mixed with rough of neighbouring countries.

48. The annual artisanal production of Liberia is low, approximately US\$ 1.5 million per year in total production. Any dramatic increase in exports could act as an early warning system for the Liberian label being once more used to launder non-Liberian diamonds. The Panel encourages the Liberian Government to put in place a credible and transparent certification scheme which is independently audited by an internationally recognized audit company. This scheme should be independently assessed as credible and effective in order to facilitate the consideration of a temporary suspension of the diamond ban by the Security Council. This would also alleviate the genuine hardship that artisanal miners, brokers and dealers are currently experiencing.

Other measures

49. Regular and accurate publication of official annual rough diamond import/export statistics is crucial. Currently only Belgium publishes a detailed list. A better international library of each diamond type, from each region and detailed records of run-of-mine alluvial samples in conflict zones would also be an important step forward in this region. It is also important that countries issue their own Certificates of Origin that are consistent with a fully integrated certification system. But in the end, the only guaranteed way to resolve the conflict diamond issue is to create conditions in a country that result in the label "conflict" being made redundant. Under such conditions, the principal challenge of the alluvial diamond trade in West Africa would be to curtail endemic smuggling for tax evasion purposes. Sierra Leone's attempt to redistribute diamond revenues back into the community is part of a solution.

The maritime and corporate registry

50. With 1,734 vessels registered under its flag, Liberia is the second largest maritime fleet in the world. The register has traditionally had a high proportion of tanker tonnage. In January 2001, Liberia accounted in tonnage for 35 per cent of all the world's oil tankers. The register is generally regarded as one of the quality open registries (called by some, flag of convenience). The registry also provides some 25 per cent of government revenue. In 2000, the Liberian registry and corporate fee programme generated some US\$ 25.72 million officially which netted according to the Bureau of Maritime Affairs some US\$ 18 million for the Government.

51. LISCR, the registry agent has ring-fenced the revenue it generates from the maritime and corporate registries. Their accounts are audited annually by Arthur Andersen LLP, an auditing firm of international repute, and these were open to inspection by the Panel. The collection of registry revenues and government taxes and fees, and any subsequent distribution of funds due to the Government, is accomplished in accordance with the agreement between LISCR and the Liberian Government.

52. Collections are initially deposited into one of several registry bank accounts, dependent upon the nature of the collection, and as specified in an agreement between LISCR and the Liberian Government. This is routine procedure. However, the Panel obtained bank transfer details for two LISCR transfers to San Air General Trading at Standard Chartered Bank, Sharjah, the United Arab Emirates, for US\$ 525,000 on 21 June 2000 and US\$ 400,000 on 7 July 2000. These two payments were for arms and transportation in violation of the sanctions. The sanctions-busting activities of San Air General Trading are documented in the Arms and Transportation Section below.

53. LISCR admitted to the Panel that it had made four payments to non-government accounts in 2000. The disbursements were made following four separate written requests instructing LISCR, from the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs. LISCR became increasingly uncomfortable at the growing regularity of requests for divergence from standard procedure in late 2000. Following a new request for disbursement on 17 August 2000, LISCR informed the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs that it would no longer honour such requests.

54. Having found resistance from LISCR, Liberia's Bureau of Maritime Affairs changed strategy, and directed four payments from their part of the maritime revenue directly to San Air via arms dealer Sanjivan Ruprah.

55. The Commissioner of Maritime Affairs and his Maritime Affairs Bureau are little more than a cash extraction operation and cover from which to fund and organize opaque off-budget expenditures including for sanctions-busting. For as long as there is an arms embargo on Liberia the funds from the registry will need to be protected from Bureau misuse.

Recommendations on the Liberian corporate and maritime registry

56. The Liberian corporate and maritime registries provide an important source of revenue to a poor country. The maritime registry is of international repute but it is vulnerable because of the use of the funds it generates for opaque off-budget expenditure including for sanctions-busting.

57. The Panel recognizes that the open registry business is very competitive, that any sanction on the registry would see client flight, and that these clients would be unlikely to return. The Panel would not wish to see an exodus to other open registries of ship owners currently with LISCR.

58. LISCR should not have made those four payments to non-government accounts in 2000. The payments were contrary to their agreement with the Liberian Government and showed a complete lack of due diligence. LISCR seems to have learned from its mistake and took action to stop this practice. In 2001 there has been no further pressure of this type from Monrovia and no evidence of further payments to non-governmental accounts.

59. The Panel recommends that:

- An escrow account should be set up by the Security Council Committee as the ultimate destination for all revenues generated from the shipping and corporate registry. The Panel believes that the Government of Liberia and IMF should reach an agreement to audit this account in order to determine all revenues generated by the shipping and corporate registry and to determine the use of the revenue in this account;
- The funds in this account should be designated for development purposes.

The travel ban

60. The travel ban has generally worked successfully. The Panel actively sought to monitor compliance with the travel ban. It verified 27 violations of the travel ban, the majority through Abidjan.

Recommendations on the travel ban

61. The travel ban has been the source of the greatest number of complaints received by the Panel. Individuals on the list requested to know on what grounds their names had been placed on the list and how to appeal. In each case the Panel referred them to the Security Council Committee as the appropriate body responsible for drawing up the list.

62. The Panel encourages the Security Council Committee to reply to individual requests about the ban promptly and expeditiously. The Panel also recommends that the Committee set up a Liberia travel ban web page where the Committee's criteria on how names have been put on the list is described. The web page should also provide information on how to apply for travel exemptions and have a section on who currently has an exemption to travel. This web site should be publicized as a resource for immigration and law enforcement agencies to keep track of who is on the travel ban list, and who has exemptions.

63. The Security Council Sanctions Branch in consultation with the Committee should also compile a photographic database of key individuals on the ban list to counter attempts by a number of individuals on the list to travel under a different name. These photographs could be put on the web site.

64. The Panel does not believe that the list should be set in stone. For humanitarian reasons a few names should be dropped; the Committee should also consider new names too.

To the Côte d'Ivoire Government

65. A loophole at Abidjan airport needs urgent attention. The Council should strongly encourage the Ivorian authorities to adopt a less passive attitude towards the implementation of the travel ban. A verifiable system should be set up at Abidjan airport to check that arriving passengers from Monrovia are not on the list or if they are, they have obtained a United Nations travel exemption.

Recommendations for the continued monitoring of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001)

66. The United Nations Secretariat should appoint a Liberian officer within the Sanctions Department of the Department of Political Affairs. This person should conduct ongoing monitoring of compliance of resolution 1343 (2001) from New York, develop databases of violation reports and write request letters and make telephone enquiries about such reports. This person should also act as an in-house researcher for the Security Council Committee, able to assist in monitoring compliance of the travel ban and requests for travel exemptions. A motivated United Nations Secretariat staff member, with administrative support from the assistants to the Committee, could fill this requirement efficiently and cost-effectively. The Angolan Monitoring Mechanism already has attached to it a political officer who has efficiently conducted a number of these tasks. Individual consultants could be hired for a short period of time to investigate a specific case of violation of the sanctions whenever the need arises, in order to keep pressure on Liberia.

67. There should be an ongoing assessment of Liberia's compliance to resolution 1343 (2001) on the ground, too. A way to achieve this in a targeted and cost-effective manner is to renew the mandate for this Panel of Experts for two short periods in 2002 for missions to visit West Africa with the Liberian officer appointed by the Secretariat. These missions should be:

- An assessment mission by the Panel to Liberia and neighbouring States for a period of four weeks starting in April 2002 to investigate and compile a short report on compliance. This report, an independent audit of compliance with

recommendations, would then be submitted through the Committee to the Council for consideration in May 2002;

- A second six-week mission to Liberia in September 2002 resulting in a final submission to the Committee in November 2002. This report would also be an independent assessment of total progress of the sanctions regime and the Government of Liberia's compliance over the year.

68. The advantages of this system are that it will over 2002 strengthen internal United Nations capacity to monitor Liberia and other States' compliance of resolution 1343 (2001). It also uses the expertise of the Panel in a targeted and cost-effective manner and ensures that the momentum created by the Panel's work in 2001 is not lost.

Introduction

A. General

69. Pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia, adopted on 7 March 2001, the Secretary-General appointed a Panel of Experts on 29 March 2001 (S/2001/268), with the mandate to:

- Investigate violations of the new tightened arms embargo, the ban on export of Liberian diamonds and the travel ban on senior officials of the Liberian Government;
- Collect information on the compliance by the Government of Liberia with the demands to expel all members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Liberia, cease all financial and military support to RUF, cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds, freeze funds or financial resources or assets controlled by RUF in Liberia and ground all Liberian-registered aircraft;
- Further investigate possible links between the exploitation of natural resources and other forms of economic activity in Liberia, and the fuelling of the conflict in Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries, in particular those areas highlighted by the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000);
- Collect information linked to the illegal activities of the individuals referred to in the report of Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000) concerning the situation in Sierra Leone;
- Collect information concerning any other alleged violations of resolution 1343 (2001).

70. The Panel took note of the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000) concerning the situation in Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195) of 19 December 2000 and the responses received from countries and individuals mentioned in the report. The corrective actions taken by such countries have been duly noted by the Panel.

71. The Panel recognized that the demands made to the Government of Liberia under paragraph 2 of resolution 1343 (2001) to immediately cease its support for

RUF in Sierra Leone and for other armed rebel groups in the region were intended to further the peace process in Sierra Leone.

72. The Panel took particular note of paragraph 4 of this resolution, which demands that all States in the region take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any action that might contribute to further destabilization of the situation on the borders between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

73. On 22 March 2001, the Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations transmitted the text of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General from Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia. This letter delineated the measures the Government of Liberia has taken in compliance with the resolution (S/2001/264). The Panel remained cognizant of the contents of the letter and all such subsequent correspondence from the Government of Liberia, made available to it by the Security Council Committee on Liberia and the Task Force of the Government of Liberia.

74. The Panel of Experts¹ consisted of Mr. Martin Chungong Ayafor, (Cameroon — Chairman), Mr. Atabou Bodian (Senegal — Expert from the International Civil Aviation Organization), Mr. Johan Peleman (Belgium — Arms and Transportation Expert), Mr. Harjit S. Sandhu (India — Expert from Interpol), and Mr. Alex Vines (United Kingdom — Diamond Expert) (S/2001/268, annex 1).

75. The Panel had its first organizational meeting at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 16 to 27 April 2001, and it was agreed with the Security Council Committee on Liberia that the Panel's report would be submitted on 15 October 2001. It was subsequently submitted on 17 October 2001.

76. The Panel committed itself to holding regular consultations with Panels of Experts/Monitoring Mechanisms and other Security Council Committees working on similar issues. The Panel also kept the Security Council Committee on Liberia informed of the progress of its work, as and when necessary, as per paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001).

77. The Panel received a great deal of logistical and moral support from the Security Council Committee on Liberia, the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations Resident Coordinators and UNDP officials in almost every country it visited. Many Governments helped with detailed information and advice, and many individuals provided helpful information.

B. A reminder to the background of the mandate

78. The Panel's mandate is described in section A above. The Panel was reminded of the background to its mandate, however, during its field visits in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. In Sierra Leone, thousands of civilians, many of them women and children, victims of unspeakable brutality, face a future without hands or feet. The Amputees Camp in Freetown is a cruel testimony to the havoc created by the forces that supplied arms to rebels. In addition to the amputees who have been condemned to a life without hands or feet, tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans, Guineans and Liberians have lost their lives, half a million have become refugees

¹ The Panel was assisted on the Timber Section of the report by Mr. Didier Boudineau (France).

and three or four times that number has been displaced in the subregion. The Panel visited the Amputees Camp in Freetown, refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in all the three bordering countries of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

79. As the Panel concluded its report, the situation on the borders between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea remained volatile and the best diamond-producing areas in Sierra Leone still remained in rebel hands. In several border areas of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, people lived without access to medical assistance, education or the means to a secure livelihood. The Panel remained cognizant, throughout its work, of its role and its responsibility in helping to end the suffering of the people of the subregion.

Methodology of investigation

80. **Questionnaires:** The Panel requested specific information from the relevant countries, through their Permanent Missions to the United Nations, regarding certain arms shipments and the movement of suspicious aircraft used for illegal transportation of arms and ammunition. The Panel also requested statistics dating back to 1987 on diamond exports from major producing countries, and imports to countries with significant trading, cutting and polishing industries. The reason for going back to 1987 was to determine what trends might have prevailed before the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In September 2001, the Panel sent reminder letters to all Governments, through their Permanent Missions to the United Nations, which had not yet provided the requested statistics. The Panel would like to record special appreciation for Cyprus, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Slovak Republic, United Arab Emirates and Uganda for their detailed replies and additional information that proved very useful for investigation.

81. **Interviews:** In each country, Panel members interviewed government authorities, and where relevant, diplomatic missions, civil society organizations, aid agencies, private sector firms and journalists. The Panel also contacted a number of key individuals whose names have been a subject of interest and controversy in recent months in connection with the crisis in the subregion (annex 2). Given the sensitive nature of the subjects investigated by the Panel, however, it should be noted that many individuals spoke under conditions of confidentiality. Several meetings held in various countries have therefore not been listed.

82. **Visits to countries:** The Panel travelled extensively to countries involved, or believed to be involved, in the trafficking of weapons and related materiel to Liberia in violation of Security Council embargoes and to countries involved in the diamond trade. The entire Panel visited Liberia twice, and some Panel members visited three times. The entire Panel also visited Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, the Gambia, Guinea, Moldova, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. Travel was undertaken by one or several of the Panel members to Austria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, France, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Niger, Norway, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Uganda, the United Kingdom, Washington, D.C. (USA).

83. **Field trips:** There had been a lot of mystique attached to several places in the subregion of Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel decided to visit all such areas. In Liberia, the entire Panel visited Gbatata training centre for

anti-terrorist unit (ATU) and the Buchanan Port where most of the activities of Oriental Timber Company (OTC) are concentrated. Three members of the Panel visited Lofa and Bong Counties. In Sierra Leone, two members of the Panel visited Bo, Kenema, Koidu, Yengema, Moyamba, Bauya, Waterloo and Daru. In Guinea, two members went all the way by road from Conakry to Kissidougou to Guéckédou to Macenta to Kuankan and Kola, to Nzérékoré and onwards to Côte d'Ivoire. In Côte d'Ivoire, two members visited Man, Biankouma, Guiglo, Danane, Niela and Guessessou.

84. During these field visits, the Panel spoke to various factions involved in the conflict in the subregion. The prominent ones being RUF, CDF, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The Panel also interviewed a large number of IDPs spread over all the four countries of the subregion. The Panel witnessed the disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) programme in Sierra Leone, spoke to combatants and picked up certain leads on the origin of arms and ammunition.

85. **Assistance from international and regional organizations:** The Panel received useful cooperation and assistance from several international organizations such as Interpol, ICAO, IMO, etc. and made proper use of their expertise.

86. **Police and judicial records:** The Panel was able to access police and judicial records of several under-investigation and under-trial cases linked to trafficking of arms and ammunition in the West African subregion. The Panel scrutinized interrogation statements of several former RUF cadres and the documents recovered from the premises of suspects.

Standards of verification

87. The Panel agreed at the outset of its work to use high evidentiary standards in its investigations. This required at least two credible and independent sources of information to substantiate a finding. Wherever possible, the Panel also agreed to put allegations to those concerned in order to allow them the right of reply. However, certain individuals whose role is highlighted in the report did not make themselves available to the Panel despite serious attempts by the Panel to give them a chance to explain their conduct.

88. During the investigation, where possible, the Panel shared the relevant information and cooperated with the States concerned for further thorough investigation at their level. Where appropriate, the Panel also brought the information collected during the course of investigation to the attention of authorities to allow them the right of reply as stated in paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001). A significant number of countries came forward with useful information on individuals behind certain shady companies and their financial transactions.

89. In the past, allegations against various parties to the conflict in the subregion have always been denied with the question, "Where is the evidence?". An example of this is the standard response to charges that weapons have been channelled to RUF through Liberia and that President Taylor continues to support RUF. In the report that follows, we have dealt in great detail with this particular allegation and several cases of arms shipments having reached Liberia in violation of Security Council arms embargoes.

90. **Following the paper trail and the chain of events:** To satisfy the oft-repeated rhetoric "Where is the evidence?", "If you have evidence, show it", the Panel has traced the entire sequence of events starting from the origin of weapons to the end-destination using documentary evidence and direct eyewitness accounts of the persons involved. The Panel has in its possession the following documents concerning the planes involved in illegal arms supply to Liberia:

- Copies of contracts signed by the contracting parties;
- Requests and permissions for overflight and landing;
- Flight plans;
- Cargo manifests;
- Airway bills;
- Documents showing owners or operating agency of the aircraft involved;
- Pilots logbooks;
- Payments made;
- Insurance documents for the cargo and the planes involved.

91. Analysing these documents, the Panel traced the entire flight route taken by the aircraft bringing weapons to Liberia. In addition to this, the Panel spoke to pilots and the other crew members who were on board the aircraft in question. Practically in all listed cases, the aircraft involved were physically located by the Panel and their photographs were taken. Some of the arms traffickers involved tried to hide but the Panel succeeded in locating them and confronting them with the details. In one such case, the Panel visited a prison and interviewed the suspect in the jail premises, after obtaining permission from the concerned judicial authorities.

92. In addition to its own detailed verification, the Panel also received corroborating information from international law enforcement agencies. The assistance of Interpol specialists was also taken as and when required. In all the cases delineated in the report that follows, the Panel did not rely solely on oral testimonies. Corroborative documentary and circumstantial evidence was always insisted on. The evidence, therefore, is incontrovertible and irrefutable.

Part I

Liberia and the region

Regional security in the Mano River Union

93. In mid-April when the Panel embarked upon its mandate, there were active hostilities in the three Mano River Union countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia). By mid-May according to United Nations figures, there were 2.3 million internally displaced people in Guinea along with 110,000 Sierra Leonean refugees and 81,000 Liberian refugees. In Sierra Leone, there were 400,000 internally displaced people and 6,000 Liberian refugees, and in Liberia there were 60,000 internally displaced people. There were also 120,000 Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire and 2,000 Sierra Leonean refugees.

94. Six months on, there are significant signs of improvement in the region. Welcome regional diplomatic efforts are under way to further improve bilateral relations between the three members of the Mano River Union, although there is still active conflict in Lofa County in Liberia and there is the risk of Sierra Leone gravitating back into the conflict if RUF does not want to release its hold on some of the best diamond-producing areas.

Sierra Leone

95. At the time the Panel first visited Sierra Leone in April 2001, fighting was under way in the Kambia area and the regionalization of the conflict was very visible. Guinea was engaged in military operations against RUF, with the tacit agreement of the Government of Sierra Leone. Persistent force was used by Guinea in action aimed at punishing RUF for its raids into Guinea from September 2000. Guinean troops entered deep in Sierra Leone in Northern Kambia District and created a "sanitized zone" on the north bank of the Great Scaries River to prevent further RUF activity.

96. The Government-sponsored militia Civil Defence Force also attacked RUF positions in the east of Sierra Leone during that month but eventually a ceasefire was restored. Guinea also stopped its raids against RUF in Kambia by May although there was Guinean shelling and helicopter raids against several RUF targets in July.

97. On 2 May, the major parties to the conflict reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process in Abuja. There followed talks in Freetown and on 18 May 2001, both sides entered the DDR programme in large-scale numbers. Since early July the security situation in Sierra Leone has remained stable, closely monitored by UNAMSIL.

98. In early September 2001, Sierra Leonean President Ahmed Kabbah and RUF leader Issa Sessay met in Koidu and shook hands, declaring the war over. The peace process, however, remains fragile in the run-up to multiparty elections in 2002 but outright hostilities appear to have ceased for the time being.

Liberia

99. Following Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) and the entry into force of sanctions on Liberia on 7 May 2001, President Taylor and his government increasingly signalled a desire to restore avenues of dialogue with their neighbours in the Mano River Union. The war in Lofa County continued to be a primary concern for the government and humanitarian agencies.

100. The first incident of armed conflict was in Voinjama on 21 April 1999. Rebels with semi-automatic rifles, a few mortars and shotguns attacked the town. They were a rag-tag group, some uniformed and some smoking marijuana. While looting the town, they claimed they were tired of the Sierra Leone war and wanted to overthrow the government of Charles Taylor. After the brief rebel attack the Liberian security forces entered Voinjama and also looted.

101. There was a further wave of insurgent attacks in Lofa County between July and October 2000, succeeding in widening their front to attacking the Douley region of Nimba County by late November 2000. The Liberian Government blamed Guinea and filed a formal diplomatic complaint to the then Organization of African Unity, ECOWAS, and the Guinean Government.

102. In mid-January 2001, the Government deployed more troops along the north-eastern border with Guinea. This move followed shortly after the defence heads of Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal met in Abuja, Nigeria to discuss the deployment of a force of 1,700 troops along Liberia's borders with Guinea and Sierra Leone. But the deployment of the ECOWAS force at the border confluence of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia in the Mano River region did not occur for two reasons: firstly, ECOWAS waited for a strong mandate from the United Nations for its contingents and, secondly, Status-of-Forces Agreements with Guinea and Liberia were never agreed upon.

103. Liberia's relations with Guinea deteriorated further in 2001, with the Government accusing the Guinean military of shelling the town of Foya in January and claiming two of its diplomats had been arrested and tortured in Conakry in September 2000. In February 2001, the rebels crossed again from Guinea and attacked villages in Lofa. The Government claimed that the villages of Boiwamei, Masizu and Turaszued, were razed to the ground during two days of fighting.

104. In April 2001, the Liberian Minister of Defence, Daniel Chea announced heavy fighting between government forces and rebels in upper Lofa county near the border with Guinea. The brunt of the fighting was near the towns of Foya and Kolahun. However, he denied claims by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), that they had seized control of large parts of Lofa County and the Government began mobilizing and retraining former fighters of the now defunct NPFL. By late April fighting had spread south into Salayea district, 80 km north of Gbarnga in Bong County. The battle for control of Zorzor in Lofa County was reported to be intense.

105. Liberia closed its borders with Sierra Leone and Guinea in mid-March and gave the ambassadors of Sierra Leone and Guinea three days to leave the country. The ambassadors were expelled for activities incompatible with their status and their embassies were informed that they needed to vacate their current premises. This Liberian action was at a time of increased regional tension because of the intense fighting in Lofa County and because one of the two diplomats had been well located to witness some sanctions-busting in progress.

106. In late July, continued fighting in Lofa forced a new wave of refugees to flee across the border to Côte d'Ivoire. The Lofa rebellion, part of a subregional dispute, had resulted in Liberia to accuse Guinea and Sierra Leone of harbouring dissidents. With an intensification of the conflict in April 2001, over 4,000 refugees fled to Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone in May and June. The United Nations reported that in a year the conflict has created more than 40,000 refugees.

107. By August, fighting continued between rebels and government troops, especially around the towns of Kolahun and Voinjama. Not all the fighting was by rebels. There were also incidents where different Liberian government armed groups fought each other for loot and control of resources. On 29 August 2001, the Liberian rebels attacked a lumber camp at Gbopolu in the west, showing that they could make attacks beyond upper Lofa County.

108. Between March and October 2001, independent observers were not allowed by the Liberian Government to visit Lofa County. This restriction was lifted in October, and the Panel visited Lofa in the first week of October. The situation there was visibly tense. In the area around Zorzor, the town that was completely destroyed

during an incursion by rebels from Guinea, the Panel observed many soldiers and armed young boys carrying new weapons and driving around in newly acquired Isuzu pick-up trucks. The pattern of destruction of the houses showed that the rebels from Guinea resort to hit-and-run tactics and do not occupy the territory.

Guinea

109. From September 2000, there were rebel incursions into Guinea supported by RUF. Guéckédou (a town with around 30,000 inhabitants) was badly damaged in late January when it was seized by rebels, who Guinean sources claimed belonged to Ulimo-K and RUF. The town was recaptured by the Guinean army in February. Ulimo-K had been a Guinean ally in its campaign against RUF but there had been some sort of dispute about recent Ulimo-K recruits in the Guinean military. There was more fighting along the border and a six-hour artillery battle in mid-March south of Guéckédou with rebels who had originated from Liberia.

110. The reduction in hostilities between RUF and the Sierra Leone Government by May 2001 has resulted in RUF abandoning its support for Guinean rebels, who were seeking to overthrow President Conté and his government. Following the major onslaught by the Guinean military in May, these rebels have realized they cannot fight alone and have become dormant.

Armed non-state actors in the Mano River Union

111. There has been a proliferation of the use of non-state actors in these conflicts in the Mano River Union. These groups obtain weapons from State supporters, from their trade in diamonds, alluvial gold, cocoa and coffee, or from their military action. Their actions have had and can again destabilize the region. The junction of the borders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone has been the fault zone where these groups have thrived. This Kailahun Salient is a very volatile area with notoriously difficult terrain, a highly permeable border and belligerents in close proximity to each other; it is an area that lends itself to the attacker — not the defender.

RUF and Liberia

112. RUF's relationship with Liberia was described in detail in the Panel of Experts report on Sierra Leone. In 2001 this relationship has continued, although a split is reported among RUF units that are willing to disarm in Sierra Leone and others that continue to fight in the war that has shifted to the Liberian and Guinean borders. Throughout this year RUF units have been fighting with Liberian units in Lofa County. In March, a RUF unit fought at Voinjama.

113. On 1 April 2001, General Sessay arrived in a camp at Vahun for discussions with Liberian commanders about additional RUF military assistance. The Liberian commanders came in a helicopter and Sessay arrived by vehicle and accompanied by General Dennis Mingo (alias Superman). Following the meeting, there was a public address to RUF fighters which was not well received; they grumbled about having to fight in a foreign war.

114. In mid-April, the Liberian Government refused to allow RUF to travel through Liberia to attend an ECOWAS meeting in Bamako, Mali. Liberia claimed it had severed its links with RUF. However, on 18 April the United Nations Security

Council published a list of RUF members residing in Liberia and asking the Government to expel them.

115. The RUF-Liberian relationship is important for President Taylor, but it is also strategic for RUF. The Kailahun region in Sierra Leone constitutes RUF's strategic lifeline into Liberia without which its source of resupply is seriously affected. Liberia offers sanctuary and a location to store weapons and keep armed units active and trained. An area of particular concern is the concession of the Liberian logging company SLC, along the border with Sierra Leone. The area comprises a road into Sierra Leone and an old military base of the Liberian Armed Forces, Camp Alfa. It is, since early 2001, controlled by the son of President Taylor and the Lebanese businessman Abbas Fawaz. Several sources indicated to the Panel that this is an area where weapons for RUF are stockpiled and where RUF can freely enter Liberian territory.

116. In June, President Taylor met with RUF representatives in Folima and offered them additional funding for their further assistance in the Lofa war. According to several RUF officials a number of them said they were tired of combat and were worried that the conflict might spill over into Sierra Leone and undermine the peace process. They also complained that the Guineans were providing better support to the Liberian dissidents than what they received from Taylor. This was followed by a second meeting of Guinean dissidents and RUF at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia. Taylor once more offered funds in return for their services to fight the Liberian dissidents in Lofa.

117. The Panel has interviewed many RUF members about their Liberian connections. Since August, RUF has moved weapons to Liberia via Kailahun, then caching them in the "Kuya area". Before disarmament in Kono district, RUF used to maintain its main ammunition dump in Kono. They have since also moved many of these arms and ammunition to Vahun in Liberia.

118. Eyewitnesses told the Panel of RUF combatants in Kono District and Kabala loading their infantry support weapons to Kailahun to avoid surrendering them for the DDR. The Panel has inspected the weapons handed in for destruction by RUF in Kono. They have been submitting .50 mm (12.7 mm) mortar and artillery bombs for the DDR process but not the guns to fire/launch them.

119. RUF units have on several occasions confronted Liberian government troops that have entered into Sierra Leone. Following fighting in July in Vahun between the Liberian army and dissidents, some AFL soldiers fled into Sierra Leone. RUF detained 17 private AFL soldiers overnight at Senga and then escorted them back to the border the next day.

120. In April, RUF had asked a group of AFL to disarm after they fled into Liberia following an earlier dissident attack on Vahun but the Liberians had refused on that occasion to leave their weapons because they outnumbered the RUF unit.

121. The recent killing of General Dennis Mingo (alias Superman) was in all probability because of an internal squabble about the distribution of money from Charles Taylor for RUF's assistance in clearing Lofa County of dissidents. Mingo was murdered just across the Sierra Leonean border in Liberia close to the United Logging Company compound on the road from Vahun to Monrovia. Superman had been on his way to attend a meeting at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia.

122. The RUF structure in Liberia is difficult to determine. The RUF have probably around 600 men, consisting of four companies and a support element in Liberia right now. They are being primarily used as a counter-insurgency force in the bush against the dissident activity in Lofa County. Their main base is Camp Najma, a camp where Liberian RUF are trained. The Commander at the camp is Liberian Special Security Service Kissi Captain Tamaba Malin. Recruitment is mainly from refugee camps where men are offered US\$ 300 as an incentive to join.

123. Liberian liaison officers continue to be stationed in Sierra Leone with RUF. Names the Panel heard were Colonel Shenkoleh, Colonel Lion, Colonel Monica, Colonel Base Mingo. The Panel also noted that in Yengema in Sierra Leone a number of Liberian RUF members had successfully entered the DDR process.

Where is "Mosquito"? (Sam Bockarie alias Moskita)

While Foday Sankoh was imprisoned in Nigeria, Sam Bockarie de facto headed the RUF in Sierra Leone. In October 1999, Dennis "Superman" Mingo, smarting over allegations that he had embezzled RUF diamonds from a 1997 diamond sale, fomented contention in the RUF ranks. He wrote to Foday Sankoh from Liberia, warning him that Sam Bockarie could not be trusted and that Sankoh's life was in danger. He also claimed that Bockarie and his men had squandered funds from diamond sales and that Bockarie bought a house in Liberia and France. Shortly thereafter, a military confrontation occurred between forces loyal to Foday Sankoh and those loyal to Sam Bockarie. Several combatants were killed. Sam Bockarie subsequently went into exile in Liberia and has remained close to President Charles Taylor ever since.

In late December 2000, a group of religious and civic groups, including 11 opposition political parties called in public on President Taylor to expel RUF from Liberia, including Sam "Moskita" Bockarie. On 8 January 2001 Bockarie reacted to this call by issuing a press statement in which he offered to return to Sierra Leone at once. He also invited representatives of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPM) to monitor his crossing the border into a RUF-held part of Sierra Leone. The CJPM replied that the Government of Liberia should be responsible for Bockarie's departure.

Liberia claimed that it expelled Sam Bockarie from its territory, but could not tell when and from where. The Foreign Minister of Liberia in his letter dated 28 June 2001 to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia, stated that the Government was not under obligation to show documentary evidence on the departure of Sam Bockarie.

The Panel has investigated the whereabouts of Bockarie. Multiple independent eyewitness accounts put Bockarie in Lofa County leading a number of military operations against Liberian dissidents in 2001. He was also seen in the Monrovia area at the Holiday Inn, at the ELWA Junction and at a refugee camp between January and April. In late April, Bockarie was again in Lofa, leading anti-Liberian dissident operations.

Increased international attention on the whereabouts of Sam Bockarie resulted in President Taylor arranging for Bockarie to lay low outside West Africa, reportedly in Zambia in May. In June, Bockarie moved to Ghana and has resided in three different locations in Accra, protected by General Abou, a former deputy commander of the ATU who has returned to Ghana following the change of government.

Bockarie is able to travel freely in Liberia and has, since June, visited Liberia a number of times, spending time at Timber Village, often accompanied by Special Security Commander Ben Yeaten.

Bockarie travelled to Libya in June for a brief trip. He also travelled to Burkina Faso in early September staying at a Presidential Compound at Ziniare (outside the capital). He left Burkina Faso on 26 September on a Chad-registered aircraft for Libya accompanied by General Ibrahim Bah (alias Balde) to try and enlist further support for RUF. He has since returned to Accra.

Through the mediation of President Taylor the differences between General Issa and Bockarie appear to have been settled. Bockarie freely travels to Liberia and has been provided a EX-SLA body guard, Salamy Kaba.

Bockarie has travelled under different names. The Panel was told he has used the name Sam Ben Johnson, Michel Samba and Michel Toure.

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)

124. A group of rebels attacked Liberia from Guinea in April 1999. It was difficult to initially establish who these dissidents were, but a number of former members of the ethnic Mandingo wing of ULIMO (called Ulimo-K after its civil war leader Alhaji GV Kromah) seemed to be among them.

125. More attacks occurred in late 1999 and since the beginning of the latest round of incursions in July 2000, attacks on Liberian territory have been claimed by a group called the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). The LURD is composed of former fighters from the civil war of 1989 to 1996, many of whom became refugees in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire after the end of the war.

126. LURD claims to have been formed in 2000 and not to be associated with any former warlord. Its supporters told the Panel that it is a resistance force dedicated to building democracy in Liberia through a political and military campaign.

127. The reality is more complex. LURD has enjoyed its main support from Guinea where it has a foothold in towns like Kissidougou, Macenta and Nzérékoré. Like the Sierra Leone Donzos were used against RUF, LURD was encouraged by Guinea to keep Charles Taylor tied up militarily in Lofa County. Guinea has supported LURD with cross-border artillery fire from time to time in 2001 and Guinean liaison officers have crossed into Lofa County to assess LURD's progress. Guinea has only given limited ammunition and weapons support to the Liberian rebels. One LURD official complained to the Panel that he had had to trade coffee, cocoa and diamonds to a Guinean commander to supply his men with shotgun cartridges (Guinea

produces these in Conakry). Other weapons have been captured in hit-and-run operations in Lofa.

128. The leadership of LURD is opaque. Conakry-based Sekou Kone is a Provisional Chairman of the Executive Committee — his prime role is to liaise with President Conte of Guinea. Self-styled Gen. Joe Wylie is a key military adviser, also based in Conakry. In September there were some changes; Prince Seo was appointed the new Chief of Staff. Seo was a Krahn fighter who fought with Roosevelt Johnson, one of the former warlords in Liberia. He recently joined LURD with some 100 Ulimo-K fighters loyal to him. Seo replaced Charles Dent, a former Ulimo-K chief-of-staff in August. This reshuffle has caused discontent among LURD fighters.

129. There also is a strong rift between the Krahn and Mandingo elements of LURD. The military wing wants Guinea to stop dealing with Sekou Kone, who is a Liberian Mandingo. There appear to be three ULIMO units, a group of some 230 fighters stationed in the forest region along the Guinea/Liberia border. A second group of several thousand in Sierra Leone (many may be Kamajors) and a third group of ex-Lofa Defence Force fighters based in the Lofa currently.

130. The rebels do seek supporters in refugee camps. In April, the Ivorian security forces arrested six suspected Liberian dissidents in Danane, who they said were trying to recruit refugees to join their operations in Guinea. The Panel also interviewed refugees who had declined such advances by dissident supporters. Indeed, a significant number of newly arrived refugees had fled Lofa County because of dissident activity. The rebels attacked villages, looted and sought to forcibly recruit their young men.

131. In October 2001, LURD appears factionalized and Guinean support declining. If the August agreement by the foreign ministers of the Mano River Union to take steps to round up armed groups waging a messy war in the junction of the borders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone is real, the activities of LURD may have peaked.

Guinean dissident groups

132. From September 2000 there were rebel incursions into Guinea supported by RUF. RUF ex-combatants told the Panel how some of them had been forced to board trucks at gunpoint by their leaders and escorted to Foya to fight in the offensive. Others were paid a US\$ 200 retainer and given the understanding that they could freely loot. Guéckédou was badly damaged in late January when it was seized by the rebels.

133. N'Faly Kaba, has called himself the leader of Guinean rebels based in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Kaba is a former adviser to Diarra Traoré (executed by President Conté after a purported coup in 1985). Kaba claimed to head an organization called the "Union des forces pour une Guinée nouvelle" (UGFN), and that they had been behind rebel attacks against Macenta, Ourekaba, Korecariah and Guéckédou since September 2000.

134. UFGN is the third group claiming responsibility for cross-border raids into Guinea. The "Rassemblement de forces démocratiques de Guinée" in December 2000 and the "Union de forces démocratique de Guinée" have also claimed responsibility.

Mano River Union dialogue

135. Following months of hostility between Liberia and Guinea, dialogue began with telephone contact between President Taylor and his Guinean counterpart, President Lansana Conté on peace in the subregion in early June.

136. There had been a number of phone calls between President Taylor and his Sierra Leone counterpart, President Kabbah, too. The release of two Sierra Leonean captives by Liberia and six Liberians by Sierra Leone in early June also helped in the confidence-building process among the three heads of State.

137. The Sierra Leone Foreign Minister visited Monrovia in July for a day on his way to the OAU summit in Zambia. The initial contacts helped prepare the foreign ministers of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia to hold a ground-breaking meeting in Monrovia on 14 and 15 August to discuss a summit between their presidents, aimed at ending the conflict in their border regions. At this meeting they decided to reactivate the Joint Security Committee Established by the 15th Protocol on Defence and Security in May 2000.

138. A meeting of the Joint Security Committee was held in Freetown on 22 and 23 August and on 8 to 10 September in Conakry. At the end of these meetings they agreed to "apprehend and turn over to their country of origin, individuals, armed groups and other para-military forces involved in the destabilization of member States". They also agreed to a series of other recommendations, including on the implementation and deployment of joint border security and confidence-building units along common borders.

139. Following the Joint Security Committee meeting in Conakry the Statutory Meeting of the Foreign Ministers met on 10 September. The Ministers accepted the Joint Security Committee's recommendations and proposed a further Joint Security Committee meeting to be convened in Monrovia from 25 to 28 September to work out and finalize the work plan and timetable for implementation of the recommendations.

140. The Joint Security Committee reconvened in Monrovia between 25 and 28 September to further work on implementation of the recommendations. A review meeting of the Foreign Ministers and Chairmen of the Joint Security Committees of each member State is to be convened in Freetown on 10 December 2001. A Summit of Heads of State of the Mano River Union will follow in early 2002.

Part II Transportation and weapons

A. Background to the grounding of Liberian registered aircraft

141. The report (S/2000/1195), in its section on arms and transportation, described how irregularities of Liberian registered aircraft contributed to violations of the arms embargo. The Security Council, in resolution 1343 (2001), therefore decided to ground all Liberian-registered aircraft.

142. In the case studies that follow this is again illustrated. In most of the arms trafficking cases the Panel investigated, the planes that were used had in one way or another been subject to document fraud, forgery of flight plans and other

irregularities. The Panel found evidence of fraudulent registration, not only in Liberia, but also in the Central African Republic and to a certain extent in Equatorial Guinea. Liberia, in a response to the Panel on Sierra Leone's request, had produced a registry consisting of 11 aircraft only. The Panel had knowledge of many more aircraft flying the Liberian flag and suspected that some of those had been used for violations of the arms embargo.

143. The problem turned out to be a complex one. Years of civil war and the difficult transitional process had created opportunities for aircraft owners and civil servants to exploit the registry, for instance to avoid costly safety inspections and requirements for old aircraft. This resulted in the Civil Aviation Authorities in Liberia having lost control and oversight of the planes flying on its registry. It also created a situation that enabled arms trafficking networks to camouflage their operations through fake registrations, document fraud and — as the case studies show — the setting up of a mystery airline, with the full knowledge of the Liberian authorities in order to avoid detection. The violations of the arms embargo and the problem with the registry were therefore directly linked.

Civil aviation in Liberia

144. The Liberian civil aviation authorities reacted to the publication of the report (S/2000/1195) by:

- Appointing a new Director of Civil Aviation and revoking, on 12 April 2001, the registration of 11 aircraft on the Liberian registry, which bear the prefix EL- and notifying all Directors of Civil Aviation of ICAO member States of the action;
- Informing the Directors of Civil Aviation of ICAO member States, on 13 April 2001, of this revocation and of the ban on flights by such aircraft and on the closure of the Liberian register;
- Asking the Directors of Civil Aviation, on 18 April 2001, to provide information on any Liberian aircraft grounded pursuant to the grounding order from Liberia.

145. Since the beginning of its mandate, the Panel has closely monitored the progress made in this field and has worked with the new Director of Civil Aviation in Liberia to find a way out of the disorderly situation the registry was in. Bits and pieces of documentation on the ownership of many aircraft were gradually found in Liberia and through communication with other civil aviation authorities. By the time the Panel last visited Liberia in the first week of October 2001, 117 planes had been identified on the basis of this information. These were aircraft that had been registered in Liberia since 1985 but a great number had obtained registration in the last five years (annex 12). The documentation showed that fraud had been committed under different ministers of transport. Sometimes, documents had just been forged or foreign businessmen had been given authorization to register planes in Liberia from offices abroad.

146. Identification and locating these aircraft is still ongoing and the newly appointed Director of Civil Aviation expressed his determination to the Panel to investigate the full extent of the problem of false registrations before proceeding to open a new registration list. The problem of Liberian registered aircraft is not yet fully solved because some aircraft may still be operating abroad with an EL-prefix

painted on the tail, despite the revocation by Liberia. This is beyond the control of the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority and should be dealt with by the airports where these planes are seen and can be grounded.

147. The Panel considers that the measures taken so far by the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority are adequate and that the Security Council may consider lifting the grounding order imposed by resolution 1343 (2001) and allow Liberia to reopen an aircraft register. Those individual aircraft that were effectively grounded and have provided ICAO and the Security Council Committee with the documentation showing their registration in Liberia done in accordance with international regulations, should be given permission to restart their operations. The Liberian Civil Aviation Authority should however keep the Security Council Committee and ICAO informed on the follow-up of the investigation and on the registration of every new aircraft on the new Liberian register.

148. A second measure taken by Liberia was a decision to take over operation of their own airspace, which had been controlled from Conakry (Guinea), where the Flight Information Centre (FIC) of the Flight Information Region (ROBERTS FIR) is located. This airspace will be controlled exclusively by Liberian nationals.

149. In its discussions with the Panel, the Liberian Government argued that increased national security concerns were the reason for this decision. As per Article 1 of the Chicago Convention regulating international civil aviation, every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, so Liberia has the right to manage flight movements in its own airspace.

150. At a meeting in Dakar, on 26 and 27 March 2001, under the auspices of ICAO, it was agreed that, prior to any takeover of responsibility for Liberian airspace by Monrovia, a number of measures would have to be taken. These measures would include providing a minimum of communications equipment necessary for the safety of air traffic and the signing of letters of agreement among all parties for the coordination and transfer of air traffic.

151. The Panel relied for its investigation on information from different Flight Information Regions in West Africa, to get a good picture of all non-scheduled aircraft that had landed in Liberia in 2000 and 2001. Liberia did not supply such a list. Although information on landings and departures of every aircraft is information that is kept at every airport in the world, the airport authority in Liberia had consistently claimed that such a list was only kept for a short while and then destroyed.

152. Liberia can, in agreement with its partners in the Roberts Flight Information Region and in accordance with ICAO regulations, start to manage its own airspace. The Panel wants to express its concern, however, that Liberia's plans to renationalize its airspace, as opposed to the global trend of ever more integrated and regional airspaces, and to man its control centre with Liberians only, seem to suggest a desire to keep certain flight movements and landings secret. The Panel does not think that the issue should be subject to any sanctions, but would advise the Liberian Government to reconsider its decision as a matter of goodwill.

B. Arming and disarming in the region: an overview

Liberian arms embargo

153. The United Nations Security Council imposed through resolution 788 (17 November 1992) a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia", citing the need to establish peace and stability. In March 2001, this embargo was replaced by a renewed and tightened weapons and military equipment embargo as part of a wider package of sanctions mandated by United Nations Security Council resolution 1343 (2001).

154. In 1999, Liberia conducted a weapons destruction programme. The exercise, which began on 25 July, involved the destruction of 19,000 small and heavy-calibre weapons and more than three million rounds of ammunition collected by the United Nations and ECOMOG during the disarmament exercise in 1996-1997. A symbolic arms-burning act took place in Monrovia but the real weapons destruction occurred at an abandoned iron ore mine northwest of the capital. About 40 per cent of these weapons were rusted or unusable but others were in good working order. The weapons and ammunition were of both small and large calibre, including 900 hand and smoke grenades (from China, Britain and the former Czechoslovakia), two 120 mm rockets, rocket launchers, thousands of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), recoilless weapons, and machine guns, old M-1 rifles, AK-47 assault rifles, PBK light machine guns and around 12 million rounds of small-calibre and 12,000 rounds of large-calibre ammunition.

155. Despite the Government's public effort to demonstrate its commitment to disarmament, it was consistently procuring new supplies of weapons for itself and assisting RUF to procure weapons via Liberia.

156. Following the first dissident incursions in April and August 1999 in Lofa County, the Government launched a campaign to get the arms embargo lifted, claiming that in the face of external attacks the country was unable to defend its citizens. The then Deputy Information Minister claimed that the rebels could only be crushed if the embargo was lifted, but added that Liberia "could easily bypass the ban, but we don't want to do that".

157. Public commitments to comply with the embargo notwithstanding, a steady flow of new weapons continued to enter into the country. The Panel documents in this report how the Singapore-based mother company of the Oriental Timber Company arranged a US\$ 500,000 payment for an arms shipment in August 1999; how the Bureau of Maritime Affairs assisted violations of the arms embargo in 1999 and 2000 and how Leonid Minin provided weapons in July 2000. In 2001 Liberia continues to try and violate the embargo.

158. Yet Liberia, in a letter dated 23 February 2001 from President Taylor to the United Nations Secretary-General, claimed that "As you are aware, Liberia destroyed all her arms and ammunition several years ago and currently remains disarmed. Accordingly, it would seem only fair, in the light of threats from Guinea, that this country be allowed to secure equipment for its legitimate defence needs". A second letter by Liberia in May asked the United Nations Security Council to temporarily lift the arms embargo so it could "import essential military supplies for the sole purpose of its self-defence".

159. Despite nine years of an embargo on arms and military equipment to Liberia, a steady supply of weapons have reached the country. Indeed, the Liberian authorities in their conversations with the Panel appeared not bothered about the embargo, and never complained about it. In contrast, they regularly complained about the United Nations travel ban on key individuals associated with the Government.

Security situation in neighbouring countries

Sierra Leone

160. The Government in Sierra Leone have had Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters since 1996 and the procurement of these or of spare parts and engines for these helicopters was always compromised by the involvement of controversial brokers and shadowy procedures. The Republic of Kazakhstan provided the Panel details of its export of two helicopters to Russia. The export licence was given against an end-user certificate for the helicopters, for their end-use in Russia. The helicopters were later detained by Russian customs, on their way to Freetown in Sierra Leone, without a valid export licence. The transaction was organized by Boris Fedoulov, a Russian national who is the owner of the commercial helicopter company Paramount Airlines in Freetown. The Panel interviewed Fedoulov in Moscow, where he confirmed the seizure of the helicopters. Fedoulov showed the Panel documentation on the case and explained that the helicopters had meanwhile been exported for use in Sierra Leone. In Kazakhstan, however, the authorities told the Panel that they believe that a crime has been committed under the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan by the procurer of the helicopters, Boris Fedoulov. In his testimony, Ya'ir Klein, who was arrested in Sierra Leone in January 1999 on suspicion of supplying and training the rebels of RUF, admitted the forgery of certain documents in his deal of supplying helicopter engines to the Government of Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone Government is currently also involved in court disputes with several other suppliers of helicopters and helicopter spare parts. In some cases these had been supplied during the rule of Valentine Strasser. The Panel does not suggest that these arms transactions were violations of the arms embargoes, but wishes to draw international attention to the lack of transparency and inadequate control systems in the procurement procedures for sophisticated weaponry and related materiel to Sierra Leone.

Disarmament in Sierra Leone

161. With the signing of the Abuja agreement on 2 May 2001 and the signing of a new agreement on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) between the warring parties in May 2001, cautious optimism is warranted. At the time of writing of this report, around 21,000 ex-combatants had been disarmed (the break-up being RUF — 7,000; CDF — 13,200 and AFRC — 260). It is still unclear what the total number of combatants in Sierra Leone was before the disarmament and demobilization process started. A majority of RUF and CDF are yet to join the DDR programme.

162. The ex-combatants have so far handed in around 8,200 weapons, 500 of which were group weapons such as mortars and heavy machine guns. The rest are various types of assault rifles, submachine guns and machine guns for individual use. The Panel was able to inspect many of the weapons in several of the DDR-weapons stores. Detailed lists are kept with the serial numbers and year of production of the

weapons and the date and location where they were handed over. This data is not sufficient to trace the suppliers of the weapons. A breakdown of the types of weapons handed in shows that approximately 60 per cent of the individual assault rifles are AK-47 and AK-58 Kalashnikov types, 10 per cent are FN-FALs and around 6 per cent are G3s. All these commonly used rifles are produced under licence in many different countries. They are some of the most widely used weapons in the history of conflict.

163. Hardly any of the weapons bear sequenced serial numbers that would suggest its origin from a specific producer or from a particular stockpile. Most of the weapons handed in under DDR are of very poor quality. The harsh weather conditions in West Africa, especially the high humidity and the jungle terrain, the type of warfare the different factions have been engaged in and the complete lack of discipline of the rebels, affect the condition of the weapons adversely. The Panel gave some old listing of weapons handed in to several United Nations Member States to check on possible matches in their database systems. No results have come out of this so far.

164. It is hard to estimate the number of combatants remaining in Sierra Leone. It would be even harder to estimate the number of weapons that are still in the hands of the different warring factions. The poor quality of the weapons handed in and observations in the field suggest that most of the ex-combatants have turned in weapons that were no longer of use to them and that the bulk of functional weaponry has been stockpiled elsewhere. Further success of the peace process in Sierra Leone and specifically the success of the disarmament programme will have a bearing on the availability of weapons in the hands of private groups and individuals in Sierra Leone and the wider subregion, a situation that may undermine the security situation in the countries concerned over a longer period of time.

165. At a subregional level, the ongoing war in Lofa County in Liberia, which is bordering Guinea and Sierra Leone, certainly has negative side-effects on the disarmament situation in Sierra Leone. The demand for weapons and ammunition in Lofa creates a market, both for the individual combatants who can bring their personal weapons and ammunition to the border and sell it and for RUF as a rebel movement. The hardcore RUF-fighters may, in coordination with their former sponsor President Taylor, stockpile weapons on Liberian territory or just hand over their weapons to the Liberian side before they can be disarmed in Sierra Leone. The Panel examined a sizeable number of RUF cadres who joined DDR. According to most of them, the better condition and heavy calibre weapons have been sent to Liberia and not handed in to DDR.

Guinea

166. A good mechanism is in place to deprive non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone of getting arms and ammunition and for monitoring the arms procurement by the Government of Sierra Leone under resolution 1171 of the United Nations Security Council. No such restrictions, however, exist for Guinea. The country is known to have purchased a significant amount of arms and ammunition in the past few years in order to cope with the incursions along its borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia. Such weapons have been supplied from Eastern Europe and from Western countries alike.

167. The Panel witnessed during its visits to the war zone on the Guinean side of the border with Libéria, the presence of great numbers of non-state armed groups in different towns and villages in the provinces bordering Libéria. Those armed men are called "volunteers" by the local administrators but it is clear that towns like Macenta, Guéckédou and Nzérékoré are harbouring hundreds of fighters of the LURD. Guinea has also acquired new heavy artillery transport and combat helicopters. The Panel members during their visit to the border towns saw that two new Mi-24s were based in that region. Guinea also has a small number of fighter aircraft. Two of those were recently displayed in the airspace above the capital.

168. The Guinean authorities told the Panel that many forged Guinean end-user certificates were circulating in Eastern Europe. During the course of its investigation, the Panel obtained several copies of orders and end-user certificates for small arms, missiles, helicopters and cargo aircraft, apparently all with the Guinean armed forces as the end-user. The Panel during its visit to Guinea in August 2001, showed these copies to the acting Chief of Staff of the Guinean armed forces and the officer in charge of procurement; they identified six different end-user certificates for Guinea as forgeries. All these had been used by a network of brokers to obtain weapons for export to Libéria as shown in the case studies covered in this report.

Côte d'Ivoire

169. Côte d'Ivoire is also affected by a volatile internal situation between the contenders of the last elections and the current government. The presence of General Gueï, who was leading a military junta in the country until the elections, has also created unease over the loyalties of some units of the armed forces. This element, and the fact that countries such as Guinea and Sierra Leone have acquired helicopter gunships, has incited the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to engage in negotiations about the procurement of helicopter gunships.

170. During discussion with the authorities in Côte d'Ivoire, the Panel learned that the Defence Ministry had been approached by a broker representing the company Pecos who was involved in some of the violations of the embargo on Libéria. This report describes the fraudulent activities of this company, Pecos Compagnie SA, in the case study on End-User Certificates. The Panel has also described how weapons that were imported legally in Côte d'Ivoire ended up in Libéria in July 2000. The transaction was financed and set up by Leonid Minin. After his arrest in Italy, copies of the End-User Certificate for these weapons, signed by General Gueï, were found in Minin's possession. Minin also had several forged copies of the End-User Certificate for Côte d'Ivoire.

171. As shown in the case study on helicopters, Libéria has tried to match the build-up of weapons systems, despite the arms embargo. The most recent cases in Libéria's persistent hunt for combat helicopters on the international black market are dated February and March of 2001. Thanks to the intervention of the arms export controlling authorities in Moldova and the Slovak Republic, the helicopters were intercepted before departure.

172. The Panel is concerned that the procurement of weapons in the Mano River Union, especially in view of the embargo against Libéria, should be better regulated. The easy availability of small arms and ammunition to volatile areas like the Mano River Union countries is a regional and internal security threat to the three Union

members. The use of unscrupulous arms dealers, even for the legal importation of arms by the non-embargoed neighbouring countries of Liberia itself encourages and provides opportunities for violations of the Liberia embargo.

173. In the case studies that follow, the Panel has painstakingly gone into details, followed various paper trails and put together pieces of the jigsaw puzzle to complete a picture of how Liberia has managed to get a regular supply of arms and ammunition despite an embargo on it since 1992.

C. Case studies

Case study: ER-75929 and the She-guns

174. When the Ugandan military discovered that a consignment of assault rifles did not correspond to the contract specifications, they demanded that the Egyptian arms broker send the delivery back to the manufacturer in the Slovak Republic. In October 2000 the broker agreed that a batch of one thousand of the rejected rifles would be dispatched back to Slovakia.

175. The broker, however, also found a new buyer for the weapons, Pecos company of Guinea. Initially the Ugandan authorities were unaware of this new arrangement. They assumed the broker was going to fly the weapons back to the sender and an Ilyushin-18 arrived in November 2000 in Entebbe, Uganda, to pick up the weapons and bring them back to the Slovak Republic. It flew to Monrovia instead.

176. This Ilyushin-18 arrived in Monrovia on 22 November 2000 carrying the cargo. The plane was registered in Moldova (ER-75929) but operated by the company Centrafrique Airlines of Bangui in the Central African Republic.

177. Three days later the same aircraft arrived back in Uganda to pick up a second consignment of 1,250 submachine guns. By that time the Ugandan authorities knew that the Egyptian broker was dealing with the Guinean company. An inspection of the plane showed that the pilot was trying to get official permission to fly to Guinea, but the routing on his flight plan suggested he intended to fly to Liberia. This resulted in the Ugandan authorities deciding to impound the cargo and contact the arms broker for additional information.

178. The arms broker, Sharif Al-Masri, responded on 26 November 2000 in a letter to the Ugandan authorities. The letter, a copy of which was obtained by the Panel, shows the letterhead of the brokering company Culworth Investments Corporation with an address in Monrovia, Liberia. In it, Mr. Sharif explains that the rejected arms had been sold to Pecos in Guinea and that the client had supplied him with an acceptable end-user certificate. The end-user Mr. Sharif sent to Uganda to corroborate was signed by the Director of Cabinet of the Guinean Ministry of Defence. It is dated 2 July 2000, almost five months previous to the planned delivery of the arms. Being not satisfied with the explanations of the arms broker and considering the risk of these weapons falling into the hands of rebels in West Africa, the Ugandan authorities decided to pay for the impounded weapons and keep them in the country. In early December 2000, the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone received information from the Ugandan authorities about the incident.

179. At the time of receiving that information, that Panel was in the process of submitting its final report. So no further investigation was possible by that Panel.

This Panel decided to investigate the matter further. In May 2001, the Panel visited the Republic of Moldova. The Ilyushin-18 that had been chartered to deliver the weapons was owned by the company Vichi, a private agent for the Moldovan Ministry of Defence. The Moldovan authorities were not aware of the Uganda incident but organized meetings for the Panel with the Civil Aviation Authority in Chisinau. In close cooperation with the Moldovan officials it was established that a suspicious incident had occurred in November. After receiving permission for a chartered flight to Ras-al-Khaimah in the United Arab Emirates on 4 November 2000 to pick up passengers, the Ilyushin had disappeared for almost three weeks. On 24 November 2000, the plane arrived back in Moldova without passengers from the United Arab Emirates. Computer records inspected by the Panel showed it had come from Liberia, via Uganda, instead.

180. During the discussion with the Ministry of Defence in Moldova, representatives of the company Vichi were summoned for cross-examination by the Panel. The deputy director of the company explained the plane had been chartered by a company MoldTransavia. MoldTransavia's own aircraft, a Tupolev-154 had a technical problem in the United Arab Emirates and had chartered the Ilyushin to pick up some passengers there and fly them back to Moldova. When the Ilyushin arrived in the United Arab Emirates, however, MoldTransavia's plane had been repaired and carried the passengers back.

181. The crew of the Ilyushin, while in the United Arab Emirates, were then contacted by a Russian, Serguei Denissenko, representing the company Centrafrican Airlines. A contract was signed for a cargo flight from the United Arab Emirates to Uganda and from there to Liberia. When the Ilyushin arrived in Uganda, seven tons of sealed boxes were loaded on board and the plane left for Monrovia, Liberia. The representative of Vichi was unable to tell the Panel what was in the sealed boxes. The contract that was signed with Centrafrican Airlines, the charter company of the aircraft, describes the cargo load as "Technical Equipment".

182. After the first delivery had been made in Liberia, the plane returned to Uganda to pick up a second consignment of sealed boxes. After arrival, the crew were taken to a hotel near the airport of Entebbe. There they learned that the charter company had problems and that the cargo could not be cleared. The plane then flew back to Chisinau in Moldova. As per the original contract, the charter firm mentioned on the flight documents was no longer Centrafrican Airlines but the original contractor for the cancelled passenger flight, MoldTransavia.

183. In Moldova the Panel was also able to interview the manager of the company MoldTransavia, Mr. Pavel Popov. Mr. Popov was invited for a meeting with the Panel in the offices of the Moldovan Aviation Administration but turned out to be very unhelpful. Mr. Popov seemed unable to even show the panel documentation on the ownership of his own passenger plane, the Tupolev-154 that was supposed to have had a technical problem in the United Arab Emirates. Mr. Popov only said he leased it from a company in Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates by the name of San Air but refused to reveal the name of the owner of the aircraft. Asked about his background in aviation, Mr. Popov explained that he had only started operating his own aircraft after working for years as an agent for AirCess, a company of Serguei Bout and Victor Bout.

184. After the meeting with Mr. Popov, the Directorate of Civil Aviation supplied the Panel with the documentation on Mr. Popov's plane. It showed the plane was


owned by Victor Bout and that Popov had signed a contract with Bout's company Transavia Travel Agency of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates to lease the aircraft.

185. The plane was indeed insured by a company San Air, also registered in the United Arab Emirates. The general manager of that company is one Serguei Denissenko, the same man that had chartered the Ilyushin-18 for the arms deliveries from Uganda to Liberia. The Panel was given a copy of the charter contract signed by representatives of the Moldovan company Vichi and the company in the United Arab Emirates, Centrafrian Airlines. Another document shows that Vichi was paid for this contract by the company San Air General Trading of Sharjah, suggesting San Air and Centrafrian Airlines are basically one and the same company.

186. The Panel was also able to establish some further details on the Liberian side of the illicit arms transaction. Documents obtained from Uganda include a handwritten statement that was made up to confirm the loading of 1,000 of the submachine guns aboard the Ilyushin-18 with registration number ER-75929. The document is signed by the Ugandan Inspector General of Military Equipments and countersigned by a Mr. Muko, representing the arms brokerage company of Sharif Al-Masri and by a Mr. Popov, on behalf of Peter Jusko. This means Mr. Popov was present when the weapons were loaded. Mr. Jusko is known to the Panel from a series of documents on illicit arms deals to Liberia. On these documents Mr. Jusko acts as a representative of the company Pecos in Guinea (see section on End-User Certificates). Arms broker Al-Masri had obtained an end-user for Guinea from this company.

187. As already described, the flights between Uganda and Liberia were arranged through a contract between the company Vichi and the company Centrafrian Airlines, signed on 9 November 2000. Another document the Panel obtained showed that one day before the signing of this contract, on 8 November, Centrafrian Airlines signed a contract with the company West Africa Air Services Inc. of Monrovia. This "Cargo Air Transportation Contract" referred to the same plane ER-75929 and the same routing. The document mentioned a cargo of 14.5 tons, the exact weight if the plane had flown the full amount of rifles to Liberia in two separate air transportations. The charter contract foresaw "the performance of several air transportations", suggesting that more weapons were expected. A copy of this contract was supplied to the Panel by the General Manager of San Air General Trading, Mr. Denissenko. The signature for West Africa Air Services was that of Sanjivan Ruprah (annex 8).

188. The plane flew twice between Uganda and Monrovia but the second consignment never left Uganda because the Ugandan authorities intervened. The crew members of Vichi described how a Portuguese-speaking man accompanied them on both the flights as a representative of the Liberians. The Panel obtained more information on him. Nicknamed "Beto", Carlos Alberto La Plaine held a Portuguese passport issued in Kinshasa that showed he was a diamond dealer. Sanjivan Ruprah admitted to the panel that "Beto" was one of his colleagues.



ER-75929 and She-Guns Case: Flow sheet diagram showing the legally imported She-guns (AK 47) landing illegally in Liberia

Case study: The case of the mystery plane, EL-ALY

189. In May 2000, the Kyrgyzstan Defence Ministry received an order for rotor blades and spare parts for military helicopters. The broker was a known arms dealer, Alexander Islamov. The order for the helicopter equipment was from Pecos, a company that claimed to be a procurement agency for the Guinean armed forces. The Panel investigated the sale of these rotor blades and spare parts because the Guinean Ministry of Defence confirmed to the Panel that they had not ordered them. Meanwhile the Panel received reliable information that the equipment had been diverted to Liberia. On investigation, the case turned out to be related to a mysterious plane the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone had found to be operating in Liberia.

Transportation of the helicopter spare parts

190. The Security Council report S/2000/1195 described how a phantom plane had been identified by air traffic controllers in West Africa. The plane was of interest to the Panel because it had landed on several occasions at Roberts International Airport in Liberia.

191. The aircraft was an Ilyushin-18, showing a Liberian registration EL-ALY. The Panel had asked Liberia to provide records of landings and departures from its airports but according to the Liberian authorities no such records were kept. In November 2000, Liberia provided the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone with a full

list of its aircraft registry. The Ilyushin with the Liberian registration was not among the 11 aircraft on the list.

192. But according to records on overflights and landings in several other African countries, a plane with this registration number operated for the West Africa Air Services company. West Africa Air Services operated the Ilyushin-18 from early July until October 2000.

193. According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), West Africa Air Services was not registered as an operating agency or an airline. The flights, according to documents obtained by the Panel, were operated with a call sign "WAS 123". This unique three-letter designator is a code that is used in aviation to communicate and identify specific flights or commercial operators in the air. The designator "WAS", however, belonged to an airline in Ontario, Canada.

194. A company with a slightly different name, *West African Air Service* existed in the Republic of Mali. The Panel obtained information and documentation from Mali on the registration and ownership of that company but it had never operated any flights beyond the borders of Mali. Besides, this company used "WAM", not "WAS" as its three-letter designator. During its investigation, the Panel on Liberia obtained additional documentation and conducted interviews with pilots and plane owners that revealed that the plane EL-ALY and the company West Africa Air Services did exist and that the plane was involved in weapons shipments on behalf of the Liberian Government.

195. The flight movements for West Africa Air Services as recorded by different Flight Information Regions in Africa and Europe are shown in the table below:

Table 1

Flight movements of aircraft of West Africa Air Services used for illegal shipments

(shown in bold letters is the shipment of helicopter spare parts from Bishkek to Monrovia and those in italics are the shipments of ammunition from Abidjan to Monrovia)

<i>Operating company</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Call sign</i>	<i>Itinerary</i>	<i>Registration</i>	<i>Type of aircraft</i>
West Africa Air Services	02/07/2000	EL-ALY	Monrovia/Abidjan	EL-ALY	Il 18
	02/07/2000	EL-ALY	Abidjan/Monrovia	EL-ALY	Il 18
	04/07/2000	COBRA02	Monrovia/Abidjan	EL-ALY	Il 18
West Africa Air Services	04/07/2000	COBRA02	Abidjan/Monrovia	EL-ALY	Il 18
	12/07/2000	WAAS 03	Monrovia/Chisinau	EL-ALY	Il 18
		WAS 123	Chisinau/Bishkek	EL-ALY	Il 18
	17/07/2000		Bishkek/Cairo	EL-ALY	Il 18
	18/07/2000	WAS0123	Cairo/Monrovia	EL-ALY	Il 18
	<i>18/07/2000</i>	<i>WAS0123</i>	<i>Monrovia/Abidjan</i>	<i>EL-ALY</i>	<i>Il 18</i>
	<i>19/07/2000</i>	<i>EL-ALY</i>	<i>Monrovia/Abidjan</i>	<i>EL-ALY</i>	<i>Il 18</i>
<i>19/07/2000</i>	<i>EL-ALY</i>	<i>Abidjan/Monrovia</i>	<i>EL-ALY</i>	<i>Il 18</i>	

S/2001/1015

	20/07/2000	EL-ALY	Monrovia/Abidjan	EL-ALY	II 18
	20/07/2000	EL-ALY	Abidjan/Monrovia	EL-ALY	II 18
	21/07/2000	EL-ALY	Monrovia/Abidjan	EL-ALY	II 18
	21/07/2000	EL-ALY	Abidjan/Monrovia	EL-ALY	II 18
	02/08/2000	EL-ALY	Monrovia/Abidjan	EL-ALY	II 18
	02/08/2000	EL-ALY	Abidjan/Monrovia	EL-ALY	II 18
	05/08/2000	EL-ALY	Monrovia/Abidjan	EL-ALY	II 18
Government of Liberia	05/08/2000	EL-ALY	Abidjan/Bamako	EL-ALY	II 18
	06/08/2000	EL-ALY	Bamako/Monrovia	EL-ALY	II 18
West Africa Air Services	04/09/2000	EL-ALY	Monrovia/Abidjan	EL-ALY	II 18
	04/09/2000	EL-ALY	Abidjan/Monrovia	EL-ALY	II 18
West Africa Air Services	07/09/2000	EL-ALY	Monrovia/Banjul	EL-ALY	II 18
VIP Flight	08/00/2000	EL-ALY	Banjul/Monrovia	EL-ALY	II 18
West Africa Air Services	11/09/2000	EL-ALY	Monrovia/Abidjan	EL-ALY	II 18
	11/09/2000	EL-ALY	Abidjan/Monrovia	EL-ALY	II 18
	15/09/2000	WAS 123	Monrovia/Chisinau	EL-ALY	II 18

196. One document obtained by the Panel is a copy of an overflight and landing request for flight WAS 123 with registration EL-ALY issued on 17 July 2000. The plane arrived in Liberia from Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) via Cairo and carried 7 tons of cargo described as "spare parts to equipment of aircraft".


197. The document also showed that the West Africa Air Services Ilyushin-18 was owned by a large airline company, Renan. The authorities in Moldova organized a meeting between the members of the Panel and several airline owners including Andrei Grosul, the general manager of the company Renan. The Panel obtained documents that provided more detail about West Africa Air Services. Furthermore, the Panel cooperated with the authorities in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and traffic controllers in Ghana, Guinea, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire to corroborate the plane's movements.

198. The documents obtained by the Panel included the leasing agreement between Renan and West Africa Air Services. This contract dated 6 June 2000 showed that West Africa Air Services was registered in Liberia, with an office at P.O. Box 5620 Monrovia, 1926 Liberia. The company was represented by Mr. LeRoy Urey, who also signed the contract (annex 7). Mr. LeRoy Urey is the Liberian Deputy Minister for Administration and Public Safety.

199. The contract with Renan stipulated that the aircraft would be registered with the State Administration of Civil Aviation of the Republic of Moldova and will carry the marking of Moldova. The Panel inspected this plane later in Moldova and its tail number was the Moldovan ER-ICJ. This was exactly the registration number referred to in the contract.

200. The contract also stated that: "In case there is a necessity to repaint the Operated Aircraft and to change the above mentioned marking it shall be done at the account of West Africa Air Services". Inspection of the plane in Moldova showed that the marking on the tail of the aircraft had been recently repainted.

201. The Panel interviewed the owner of Renan and the pilot who had operated the plane during the leasing contract in Liberia. The Ilyushin had flown to Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan on 15 July 2000. In Bishkek the helicopter spare parts and rotor blades were picked up. On 17 July the plane then flew to Cairo, with a cargo manifest and an official flight plan for a flight to Guinea. On 18 July 2000 the plane arrived in Monrovia, however, and the helicopter spare parts were offloaded.



EL-ALY — The Mystery Plane: Flow sheet diagram showing the helicopter spare parts going to Liberia

The arms dealers and brokers

202. The authorities in Kyrgyzstan were not aware that the cargo had been diverted to Liberia, not Guinea as the arms broker Alexander Islamov had claimed. Alexander Islamov had provided Kyrgyzstan with an end-user certificate for Guinea (see section on End-User Certificates).

203. On the Liberian end of the transaction, another contract was set up. The company West Africa Air Services not only organized the transport with the Ilyushin-18 but also signed a contract with the company San Air General Trading for the procurement of rotor blades for a Mi-2 helicopter. San Air is a company registered in the United Arab Emirates. The director of the company, Serguei Denissenko is a close associate of Victor Bout. The contract bearing number Mi-2/RB/2000 was signed on 27 April 2000. The company West Africa Air Services in

this case, is represented by Sanjivan Ruprah, who is also a close business associate of Bout.

204. Serguei Denissenko of San Air told the Panel that he had bought the rotor blades from Alexander Islamov, who is a regular supplier to San Air, and sold them to Sanjivan Ruprah of West Africa Air Services in Monrovia. He described Ruprah as a business partner of Victor Bout in Africa.

205. When the Panel requested information on the whereabouts of Sanjivan Ruprah in Liberia, the authorities claimed the man was unknown to them. LeRoy Urey, who had signed the leasing contract for West Africa Air Services, also denied knowing Ruprah. Ruprah, however, is known to have entered the European Union travelling with Liberian diplomatic passports, under different names. According to the passports, he was travelling on behalf of the Liberian Maritime Authority. The Commissioner for Maritime Affairs of Liberia, Benoni Urey, is a brother of LeRoy Urey. Benoni Urey also denied knowing Ruprah and knew nothing about the diplomatic passports. Mr. Ruprah is no longer in Liberia but had stayed for a long time in a house almost opposite to the one of Benoni Urey. When the Panel interviewed Mr. Ruprah he acknowledged this and confirmed that his house was that of the late Joe Tate, the former Inspector General of Police of Liberia who died in 2000 in a helicopter accident.

206. According to Denissenko no end-user certificate for the helicopter blades was needed because the Mi-2 is a non-armed transport helicopter. The end-user certificate that Alexander Islamov presented to the authorities in Kyrgyzstan to purchase the helicopter blades however clearly states that the blades were for Mi-24 helicopters (annex 6). The Mi-24 is a heavily armed helicopter gunship. The authorities in Kyrgyzstan told the Panel that Islamov had bought rotor blades for an Mi-24. Those rotor blades plus several tons of spare parts for helicopters were delivered to the Liberian end of the pipeline via San Air.

The case of Aviatrend

207. West Africa Air Services was set up for such smuggling operations only. The pilot of the plane told the Panel that he had been transporting some Liberian officials on the plane and the aircraft does have a number of passenger seats in front. However, the pilot also mentioned that the individual overseeing the operations of the plane knew more about ships than about aircraft and that his nickname was "Mr. Sanji". Sanjivan Ruprah signed West African Air Services documents and travelled on diplomatic passports issued by the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs. He is the same person the Panel on Sierra Leone identified as an arms dealer involved in the Liberian procurement process.

208. Asked about the trips from Monrovia to Abidjan and back during July and early August, the pilot claimed the plane had been "empty". The Panel, however, also interviewed Sanjivan Ruprah extensively. He said those trips from Abidjan to Monrovia were for transportation of ammunition.

209. The chronology of the West Africa Air Services flights Abidjan-Monrovia and back coincides with the arrival at Abidjan airport (Côte d'Ivoire) of an Antonov-124 on 15 July 2000.

210. In cooperation with the Ukrainian authorities the Panel obtained details on this flight. The Air Waybill showed that the Antonov-124 carried a cargo of 113 tons of

7.62 mm calibre cartridges. The plane left the Ukrainian airport of Gostomel on 14 July 2000 and arrived in Abidjan, after a fuel stop in Libya on 15 July 2000. In Abidjan, the cargo was unloaded by the military.

211. The End-User for the five million cartridges and for a long additional list of weapons was signed by General Robert Gueï who was the head of State of Côte d'Ivoire at the time of the delivery. A stamp on the document showed that the signature of General Gueï was authenticated by the ambassador of Côte d'Ivoire in Moscow on 2 June 2000 and on that basis the Ukrainian authorities issued an export permit and authorized the flight. An additional document was requested by the authorities in Ukraine, a guarantee that the arms would be used in compliance with the ECOWAS moratorium on small arms. Ukraine also sent a military officer with the plane to verify the actual delivery of the weapons to Côte d'Ivoire.

212. The plane used to transport the cargo was chartered from the Antonov Design Bureau. The broker for the five million cartridges and the charterer of the plane was the Moscow-based Aviatrend company, represented by Valery Cherny. Cherny was an associate of Leonid Efimovic Minin. Minin had been key to the transportation of 68 tons of small arms from Burkina Faso to Monrovia in March 1999. Minin's private jet had then shuttled several times between the airports of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso in Burkina Faso and Monrovia to carry the entire 68 tons.

213. Leonid Minin was arrested on 5 August 2000 in Monza, Italy. When the Italian investigators searched his hotel, a significant quantity of documents were found. Among these documents were faxes sent by Valery Cherny of Aviatrend to Minin and correspondence from the son of President Charles Taylor to Minin. Remarkably, several apparently original copies of the End-User Certificate from Côte d'Ivoire were also found in Minin's documentation. Bank transfers also show that Minin paid \$1 million to Aviatrend. One payment, of US\$ 850,000 to an Aviatrend account at the Alpha Bank in Nicosia, Cyprus, on 7 June 2000; a second payment of US\$ 150,000 to an Aviatrend account with the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York on 13 June 2000 through one of Minin's many offshore companies Sulico Holdings. The reference for both the payments was "Buying Technical Material/Wood Extractions Tools".

214. The Panel interviewed almost every player in this particular case. The Ambassador of Côte d'Ivoire to Moscow who had authenticated the signature of General Gueï on the End-User Certificate was interviewed. When he saw copies of the End-User Certificate, the Ambassador acknowledged that he had signed one of them but said that the other copies found in Minin's possession were forged. Minor details on the document showed that Minin was carrying fraudulent copies of the End-User Certificate and that the Ambassador's signature was different from the one on the original that the Panel obtained from the authorities in Ukraine (annex 4).

215. In Moscow the Panel interviewed Valery Cherny of Aviatrend. Cherny could not explain why there were multiple copies of the Côte d'Ivoire End-User Certificate. When asked why Minin had paid him US\$ 1 million when only five million cartridges had been sold (the approximate market price was US\$ 250,000) Cherny acknowledged that more arms were stockpiled and waiting for delivery to Côte d'Ivoire. After the 14 July shipment had left Ukraine and preparations were made for additional deliveries Minin "disappeared". Later Cherny heard that Minin

had been arrested in Italy. The weapons were waiting for delivery ever since, Cherny claimed.

216. The Panel also interviewed General Robert Gueï who, after the elections in Côte d'Ivoire, fled the capital to his home village in the west of the country. The General acknowledged that he had signed the End-User Certificate. He had signed only one document. He explained that when he took office, after a coup d'état in 1999, he wanted to replenish depleted Ivorian army stocks. As a first step he asked the Heads of State of other African countries, including Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco and Liberia to supply small quantities of ammunition and light weapons. The Liberian President, General Gueï said, supplied some arms and even sent an emissary to help the General out. This emissary was the Liberian Ambassador-at-large Mohamed Salamé, a resident of Abidjan, and owner of a timber business in Liberia. Salamé offered his services and asked General Gueï to sign the End-User Certificate. A split-up would then be made between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia for those weapons. The General acknowledged that some of the ammunition had remained in Côte d'Ivoire but most of it had been for Liberia.

217. The practical arrangements were made by Ambassador Salamé, according to the General. When the Panel contacted Ambassador Salamé, he flatly denied any knowledge of ammunition transactions. His business was exclusively timber, he said. However, when the Panel interviewed Leonid Minin in prison in Italy, he credited Mohamed Salamé for assisting the Côte d'Ivoire part of the Aviatrend arms deal. Minin said the deal had been organized by Mohamed Salamé on behalf of the Liberian President, in return for a beneficial deal for Minin's timber company Exotic Tropical and Timber Enterprises in Liberia. Leonid Minin also acknowledged that his arrest in August caused the cancellation of further deliveries of the weapons on the End-User Certificate. He had already made advance payments for those weapons. Leonid Minin also stated that the son of President Taylor, Charles "Chuckie" Taylor (Jr.) had tried to become part of some of these arms transactions, in order to collect commissions. Another business partner of Leonid Minin, a Finnish national with companies in Turkey and Switzerland, had dealt with Charles Taylor Jr. and documents found in Minin's possession show that this individual was sending documentation on different types of equipment to Minin. In some of these documents, "special packages for Junior" are mentioned. The Finnish individual, Erkki Tammivuori, acknowledged to the Panel that he had travelled a few times to Liberia with Leonid Minin and that he had been asked to broker non-lethal security equipment.

218. The Panel took particular interest in one letter sent to Minin by Mr. Tammivuori mentioning that arms could be delivered with or without End-User Certificate, and that a bidding procedure could be avoided if no end-user certificate was needed, thus making the arms cheaper. The letter is faxed to Minin in March 1999. It is printed on stationery of a company MET A.S. in Turkey, but sent from Tammivuori's address in Switzerland. The arms offered on the document are Konkurs missiles, configuration "Tandem Warhead for Reactive Armour". Sanjivan Ruprah, during his interview by the Panel showed on the computer screen of his cellular phone a list of weapons that had been delivered in May 2000 to Liberia, with the Ilyushin-76 bearing registration TL-ACU. The list contains several missile types, including Strela and Iгла missiles and launchers for Konkurs missiles. Mr. Ruprah explained that this equipment had so far not been used in the war, because no trainers had been sent to Liberia to operate the missile systems.

219. The son of President Taylor was also involved with the ammunition deal between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. Both Leonid Minin and Sanjivan Ruprah mentioned this. When the 113 tons of ammunition arrived in Côte d'Ivoire on board the Antonov-124 (registration UR82008), Minin was in Italy. The supplier of the weapons, Valery Cherny, was in the Ukraine at that time. The final delivery to Liberia was arranged between the military at Abidjan airport, Sanjivan Ruprah, Mohamed Salamé and Charles Taylor Jr. Minin said a special plane was organized from Monrovia to pick up the ammunition.

220. This is where the Ilyushin-18 of West Africa Air Services played an important role again. An Ilyushin-18 is a relatively small aircraft, as compared to the 113 tons that needed to be transported. This is why the plane had to fly eight times to bring the entire cargo over to Liberia, Mr. Ruprah told the panel. The operations started on the very day the Ilyushin had come back with the helicopter spare parts from Kyrgyzstan.

221. When Minin was arrested in Italy, the operation had to stop. Valery Cherny did not have the necessary contacts in Liberia, whereas Leonid Minin had been dealing with the Liberian presidency all along. President Taylor, as reported by the Panel on Sierra Leone, had reached an agreement with Minin to use his private jet to fly weapons from Niger and Burkina Faso. Minin also had important investments in the Liberian timber industry. Minin had documents in his possession when he was arrested, signed by the Minister of Justice in Liberia, showing that the Liberian Government still owed Exotic over \$2 million in prepaid taxes. Since Minin never exported any significant amounts of timber, this money could only be owed for other services rendered to the Government of Liberia.

222. The Ivorian End-User Certificate, with its multiple copies in possession of Minin and Valery Cherny, provides an indication of the amounts of weaponry that were still in the pipeline to be supplied to Liberia, had Minin not been arrested by the Italian authorities. The public prosecutor of the court of Monza in Italy, at the time of writing of the report, was still investigating the full extent of this sanctions-busting case.

223. The pilot of the Ilyushin-18 also told the Panel in Moldova that after those flights from Abidjan, there had been little work for him and the crew. Clearly, the weapons ordered through the Minin-Aviatrend pipeline were directly related to the operations of the mystery Ilyushin (EL-ALY) that had been leased by Sanjivan Ruprah and his Liberian partners, Benoni and LeRoy Urey. It explains why the leasing contract between Renan and West Africa Air Services was finally called off. In September, the plane made one last flight, to fly members of President Taylor's Anti-Terrorist Unit to Abidjan to assist General Robert Guei when his residence came under attack by a rioting army unit. The plane then flew back to Chisinau, Moldova, where the fake tail number was removed and replaced with its original Moldovan registration ER-ICJ.

Case study: Liberia's quest for helicopters

224. The Panel has discovered that Liberia has been trying hard to obtain military helicopters. Transport helicopters (Mi-8, Mi-17) and especially helicopter gunships (Mi-24 or Mi-35) have found their way from factories and stocks of Eastern European countries to African conflict zones. In Sierra Leone Mi-24s played a significant role in the operations of Executive Outcomes, by the South African

mercenaries in 1996. Guinea has in the past two years acquired several Mi-24 helicopters, several of which are stationed along the borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia. The Ministry of Defence in Côte d'Ivoire, in its discussions with the Panel, stated that the presence of these helicopters in neighbouring countries was a potential threat to Ivorian security and that the Government was going to procure similar helicopter gunships to match this build-up.

225. Liberia was not known to have any Mi-24s but the arms embargo imposed on Liberia has not prevented the country from importing several other military helicopters. The Panel on Sierra Leone mentioned the shipment of those in its report (S/2000/1195, para. 233) and identified the arms smuggling network of Victor Bout as the main supplier. During its visits to Liberia in July and October 2001, this Panel observed two Mi-17s, one with the markings of the Anti-Terrorist Unit, based at the airport of Spriggs Payne, close to the city of Monrovia; another one is grounded with technical problems in a hangar at Roberts International Airport since early 2001. Two Mi-2 helicopters were also supplied by Sanjivan Ruprah in October 1999 and spare parts for Mi-17 and for Mi-24 helicopters were obtained from Kyrgyzstan in July 2000. The Panel also spoke to Sanjivan Ruprah who, as a partner of Victor Bout based in Liberia, had been key to the procurement of the deliveries of the Mi-8 helicopters.

226. Helicopter pilots stayed in Hotel Africa, the hotel owned by one of the most influential businessmen in Liberia, Gus Kouwenhoven. The Panel visited Hotel Africa in July and found that the majestic hotel was almost completely empty. The pilots were the only regular clients. Gus Kouwenhoven lives in one of the villas that are part of the hotel complex. Mr. Kouwenhoven told the Panel in October 2001 that the pilots had left his hotel. One of these pilots, now returned to Eastern Europe, confirmed that he and his colleagues had left.

227. Liberia's quest for Mi-24 helicopter gunships appeared to have been unsuccessful so far. But there have been two recent attempts to obtain additional Mi-17s and even Mi-24s. The authorities of Moldova and Slovakia assisted the Panel in its investigation of these cases.

The first consignment

228. In March 2001, the Security Council Committee on Liberia received information from the Slovak authorities that their customs authorities had stopped a helicopter gunship from being transported to the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. They had been suspicious that the aircraft with the helicopter on board planned to go to another destination, in possible violation of United Nations sanctions.

229. An investigation into events leading up to this incident indicated that on 2 July 2000 the LOT helicopter repair plant at Trencin signed a contract with the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan for the repair and refurbishment of two Kyrgyz helicopter gunships. Contractual arrangements had been made between the Ministry of Defence and a Defence Attaché from the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to Moscow, Major General Urazmatov. The Defence Attaché had first enquired about the possibility to have two Mi-24 helicopter gunships repaired at the helicopter repair plant in Slovakia. A first helicopter had arrived in Slovakia in late June 2000, after approval of the Slovak Ministry of Defence. After the contract was signed, it had been refurbished and repaired and had been flown back to Kyrgyzstan a few weeks later. The second helicopter had arrived in October 2000 and an Ilyushin-76

was to pick it up again in February 2001. The transport in both cases had been arranged through charter contracts with the private airline company Centrafrique Airlines.

230. A detailed analysis of the case shows that the first helicopter had arrived in June on board an Ilyushin-76 and stayed at the repair plant for about one month. The same Ilyushin-76 (registration TL-ACU) had transported the helicopter back to Kyrgyzstan. However, by the time the second helicopter had been repaired in Slovakia, in February 2001, the authorities started to become suspicious and sought additional confirmation about the legitimacy of the deal from their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan because the second helicopter was ready to be flown back there.

231. Kyrgyzstan reported that the helicopters were not supposed to come back. In fact the Ministry of Defence in Kyrgyzstan was not even aware of any repair contract in Slovakia, correspondence between the customs departments of both countries shows. Instead, the helicopters had been sold by Kyrgyzstan to a broker, Alexander Islamov. The client for the helicopters was a Guinean company called Pecos. This information, received from Kyrgyzstan, led the authorities in the Slovak Republic to block the second helicopter and to inform the United Nations Security Council Committee about the case. The Panel found out later that it was the Military Attaché of Kyrgyzstan, Major General Urazmatov, who had set up the deal with the Slovak repair plant, without the knowledge of the Defence Ministry in Kyrgyzstan. The Major General was fired afterwards.

232. A few days after the grounding of the helicopter on 22 February 2001, a national from the Slovak Republic, a Peter Jusko presented himself as the representative of Pecos and claimed to be the new owner of the helicopter. Mr. Jusko was already known to the Slovak authorities as a director of an arms brokerage company called Joy Slovakia. Alexander Islamov, the broker who had dealt with the Ministry of Defence in Kyrgyzstan was also a director of that company. The military in the Slovak Republic had previously done business with Joy Slovakia and showed the Panel a copy of an end-user certificate of the company for the sale of small arms to Guinea in 1997. The Panel later verified in Guinea that the arms had never been ordered by the Defence Ministry there (see section on End-User Certificates). The End-User Certificate was a forgery.

233. Even before customs had grounded the second helicopter, the cargo plane that would come to pick up the helicopter had raised some suspicion with the Civil Aviation Authority in Bratislava. Requests for landing of the cargo aircraft had come from the company MoldTransavia, in Moldova, but the company wanted to perform flights with aircraft registered in the Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, with a billing address in the United Arab Emirates. The Slovak Civil Aviation Authority first contacted the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation in Moldova to establish if the company MoldTransavia was duly entitled to operate international non-scheduled flights, if MoldTransavia had a valid air operator certificate and if the airline was entitled to operate an Ilyushin-76 cargo aircraft. The Moldovan reply was that MoldTransavia had a valid operator certificate but was only authorized to operate a passenger aircraft, not the Ilyushin-76 it wanted to operate for the transport of the helicopter gunship.

234. Meanwhile, MoldTransavia tried to send copies of insurance documents to the Civil Aviation Authority in Slovakia to show that it was duly insured to operate two Ilyushin-76s. The insurance documents showed that since December 2000, one

Ilyushin-76 with registration number TL-ACU was insured for both the companies MoldTransavia and a company San Air. Another Ilyushin-76 with registration TN-AFS was insured for the Government of the Congo and again, the company San Air, but not for MoldTransavia. MoldTransavia had sent these certificates of insurance to Slovakia on 12 February 2001, but by that time the negative answer from the Aviation Authority in Moldova had arrived.

235. The Slovak Civil Aviation Authority refused to grant MoldTransavia permission to perform the flight for the transport of the helicopter. But then another series of requests arrived from the company Centrafrique Airlines. Centrafrique requested permission to land in Slovakia and to pick up the same helicopter. The plane it wanted to use was again the Ilyushin-76 with registration TL-ACU. This time, Centrafrique Airlines would be the operator.

236. By then, the Slovak Aviation Authority was already in possession of the insurance certificate it had obtained from MoldTransavia for this particular aircraft, the Ilyushin-76 with registration TL-ACU. The insurance document did not show that the company Centrafrique Airlines was entitled to operate the aircraft, so again, the aviation authorities wanted to check the air operator certificate of Centrafrique Airlines and the insurance certificate showing the company was authorized to fly the Ilyushin-76.

237. On 19 February 2001, Centrafrique sent an insurance certificate for the plane. This time it covered insurance for the owner San Air and two operators, MoldTransavia and Centrafrique Airlines. The plane, according to the certificate, was insured for all these companies since 4 December 2000.

238. Centrafrique Airlines also sent an Air Operator's Certificate issued in the Central African Republic and with a company address in the United Arab Emirates. On 20 February 2001, permission was finally granted for the Ilyushin-76 to land in the Slovak Republic, pick up the helicopter and fly it back to Kyrgyzstan. On 22 February, the aircraft arrived to collect the helicopter gunship but then the Slovak customs authorities intervened.

239. The Panel visited the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to get a better understanding of the contractual arrangements and of what had happened with the first helicopter that should have arrived back there, according to the contractual agreement the Slovak repair plant had with Kyrgyzstan. However, Kyrgyzstan did not have any knowledge of such a contract. The Ministry of Defence in Kyrgyzstan cooperated with the Panel and provided details on their involvement in the helicopter deal. The Ministry of Defence in Bishkek had been dealing with a representative of Pecos, Alexander Islamov. He had always presented himself as a regional representative of the company Pecos in Guinea, who procured weapons and related materiel on behalf of the Ministry of Defence of Guinea. As described in the case above, Islamov had bought spare parts for helicopters in Kyrgyzstan, too. Islamov is a co-director with Peter Jusko in a number of arms dealing companies that are known to have been set up for illegal arms transactions and sanctions-busting activities. In the case of the helicopters, Islamov presented the Defence Ministry in Kyrgyzstan with an end-user certificate for Guinea, dated 1 July 1999. This document, as the Panel later established during a visit to Guinea, was a forgery and the helicopters had not been ordered by Guinea.

240. When the Ilyushin-76, Victor Bout's plane, had arrived in Kyrgyzstan on 26 June 2000 to pick up the first helicopter gunship, it did take off and fly to the repair plant in Slovakia. There it departed again on 2 August 2000, to fly the helicopter back to Kyrgyzstan with a fuel stop in Chisinau (Moldova), according to the flight permission given in Slovakia, but it never went to Kyrgyzstan at that time. It only arrived in Kyrgyzstan on 22 August for a fuel stop, coming from Tbilisi (Georgia) and then it took off, according to the logs of the traffic controllers in Kyrgyzstan, to Conakry in Guinea. Records of the traffic controllers in West Africa, however, show that the plane did not fly to Guinea, but landed at Roberts International Airport in Liberia instead, on 23 August 2000. At the time of writing, the Panel was still waiting for a response from Georgia on the cargo on board the Ilyushin. Hardly two months earlier, as described in another case in this report, a plane had also flown from Kyrgyzstan to Monrovia, with 7 tons of spare parts for Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters. Again, the authorities in Kyrgyzstan had been led to believe that the final destination would be Guinea, not Liberia.

The second consignment

241. After the refusal of customs to allow the helicopter to depart from Slovakia, the Ilyushin-76 of Centrafrican Airlines went to pick up another helicopter consignment. On 10 March 2001, the cargo aircraft arrived at the military airfield of Marculesti in Moldova. Centrafrican Airlines had a contract with the local airline company MoldTransavia to pick up two Mi-8 helicopters. This was immediately after the debacle with the helicopter in Slovakia. The Panel obtained a copy of this charter contract, signed on 15 February 2001, provided to the Panel by Sergei Denissenko, the General Manager of San Air which is an agent for the flights of Centrafrican Airlines. The Panel also obtained copies of money transfers by San Air to the repair plant in the Slovak Republic.

242. In Moldova, the deception with flight plans went on. There, the helicopters were two Mi-8s, owned by the Moldovan Air Force. The Ministry of Defence of Moldova had signed a contract with Andrei Grosul, General Manager of the Moldovan company Renan, to have the helicopters repaired and then lease them to a third party. This was done through yet another company, the company Pecos in Guinea. A joint cargo insurance certificate obtained by the Panel shows that Renan and Pecos insured the transport of the two military helicopters Mi-8 from Chisinau (Moldova) to Conakry (Guinea).

243. During its visit to Moldova in June 2001, the Panel cooperated with the authorities to find out more about the case. The issue had already caused a dispute between the Defence Ministry and other government branches because normal arms export procedures had been bypassed and no authorization had been given for the export of the helicopters. The case shows an exceptional type of deception because the export of helicopters was done without an End-User Certificate. Copies of End-User Certificates would eventually turn up, but only after the helicopters had been stopped from departing.

244. One of the brokering companies, Renan, and the suppliers of the helicopters, the Defence Ministry of the Republic of Moldova, argued that in the case of a leasing contract, no end-user was needed. The helicopters were to be sent to Guinea for repairs and would then be leased to Guinea and later Namibia. Only after completion of the repairs in Guinea an exploitation contract for their use would be

signed and only then, the normal export procedures for military transactions would be followed. When the helicopters were ready to depart from the military airfield of Marculesti in Moldova to Guinea, the Moldovan security service intervened and stopped the cargo aircraft carrying the helicopters from departing. This was in March 2001. When the Panel visited Moldova, the helicopters were still being held. Shortly before the Panel arrived in Moldova, Renan cancelled its contract with Pecos in Guinea. The Panel obtained a copy of the agreement on the termination of the contract. That document, signed on 31 May 2001 in Chisinau, Moldova, clearly shows that Renan was not just sending the helicopters to Guinea for repairs. Pecos, in the document, is called the Lessee, Renan the Lessor. The document was signed one week before the Panel arrived in Moldova.

245. The Panel questioned the General Director, Andrei Grosui, of the company Renan at length. Renan had signed one contract with the Ministry of Defence in Moldova on the one hand and with Pecos Compagnie in Guinea on the other hand. Being short of money to maintain its helicopters, the Moldovan military were interested in this contract. Renan offered to pay for the repairs of the helicopters in Guinea, money that would be gained back afterwards when they would be leased to a third party for temporary use. Part of these profits would then be split between Renan and the Moldovan Air Force. The package deal also included contract work for pilots of the Moldovan air force, another aspect that was considered beneficial to the Moldovan Ministry of Defence.

246. The problem with this arrangement is that Guinea does not have any helicopter repair facilities. The Guinean authorities were also unaware of any contract being signed with either Renan, the Defence Ministry in Moldova or the Guinean company Pecos. All this was verified by the Panel.

247. In Moldova, the company Pecos was represented by an Israeli citizen, Jacob Berger. A document presented by Berger in Moldova to the Defence Ministry, shows that he had power of attorney to act on behalf of Pecos. Both Jacob Berger and Peter Jusko, as representatives of Pecos and of another company, Joy Slovakia (see section on end-user certificates), had procured weaponry from Moldova before. None of these weapons had ever been delivered to the destination stated on the documents they provided to the exporting countries. In the records of the Moldovan Defence Ministry, an end-user certificate was found for a case where Jusko and Berger had acted as brokers. The stated end-user on this document was Guinea, but as the Panel verified in Guinea, the weapons had never gone to Guinea. The Guinean authorities categorically stated that the country had never used Pecos as a broker for any of its arms procurement transactions. As the other cases in this report illustrate, Pecos is a company that has systematically been used by brokers to violate the arms embargo imposed on Liberia. If the helicopters had not been stopped in Moldova, they would certainly have ended up in Liberia, too.

248. Pecos is not the only indication for this. The company, Renan, had previously been in business with Liberia. It was Renan that signed the charter agreement for the mystery plane with registration number EL-ALY, that was used for several arms shipments to Liberia. At least one of those included helicopter spare parts and rotor blades for military helicopters, again with Pecos at the receiving end.

249. Another strong indication that the helicopters would have gone to Liberia is the transport plane that arrived in Moldova on 10 March 2001 to pick up the helicopters to ship them to West Africa. Victor Bout's Ilyushin had been used on

previous occasions to ship weapons to Liberia, as was shown in the report (S/2000/1195). The owner of MoldTransavia, the company that organized the operating and landing permits for the Ilyushin in Moldova, is Pavel Popov, an individual the Panel identified as a close business partner, or rather an employee, of Victor Bout. Popov can be considered the ground manager for Victor Bout's arms shipments from Central Europe. It is Popov who applies for flight permissions and issues the false flight plans. Popov was also a key player in the Ugandan case where AK-47s were diverted from their stated destination and flown to Liberia. It was Popov who signed the clearance document, on behalf of Peter Jusko of Pecos (see case of the She-guns).

250. The Moldovan authorities arranged for the Panel to meet with Pavel Popov, who confirmed that he worked for Victor Bout. Pavel Popov refused to give the Panel documentation on the owner of the plane. The Panel obtained the documents, however, from the Civil Aviation Authority in Moldova, where under normal international procedures, documents on the owners and insurers are kept. The documents show that Popov's company, MoldTransavia, operated its own passenger plane. The Certificate of Registration states that the owner of the aircraft was Transavia Travel Agency, in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. The leasing agreement between MoldTransavia and Transavia Travel Agency was signed in June 2000 by Pavel Popov and Victor Bout, respectively. An airworthiness certificate attached to the documentation shows the plane was registered in the Central African Republic before it had been registered by Pavel Popov in Moldova (see also section on Centrafrique Airlines). The latter certificate, the Panel found out while visiting the Central African Republic, was a forgery but it was used to change the name of the aircraft owner Centrafrique Airlines to Transavia Travel Agency. Other documents show that Victor Bout had bought the plane from his brother, Sergueï Bout. The payment of \$1 million was made from Transavia Travel Agency's account at the Standard Chartered Bank in Sharjah, an element that would later prove important to the Panel when bank transfers from Liberia to the companies of Victor Bout were analysed.

251. Shortly after the Panel had visited Moldova, the plane of Popov was excluded from the Moldovan aircraft register. This means MoldTransavia could no longer operate from Moldova. Information obtained from Bulgaria shows that Transavia Travel Agency, represented by Victor Bout, sold the plane on 21 May 2001, exactly two weeks before the Panel arrived in Moldova, to San Air General Trading FZE in Ajman, United Arab Emirates, represented by Serguei Denissenko. San Air's General Manager Serguei Denissenko also represents Victor Bout's airline Centrafrique Airlines.

252. On 11 June 2001, four days after the Panel had interviewed Pavel Popov, he leased his plane to Union Trans Service in Bulgaria, who in turn leased the aircraft to Balkan Bulgarian Airlines. The plane now carries the new registration LZ-LTV. Renan, after cancelling the leasing contract for the helicopter with Pecos in Guinea, signed a new agreement with a brokering company in Hungary. Under a new agreement signed on 25 June, two weeks after the Panel had left Moldova, the helicopters were now finally leased to Namibia. There is little doubt that the helicopters would be in Liberia, if the authorities in Moldova and Slovakia had not intervened in a timely fashion. There are strong indications that advance payments for the helicopters were made to Centrafrique Airlines, through the accounts of its

representing agency, San Air, in the United Arab Emirates (see section on Government Expenditures).

Case study: The Pecos End-User-Certificate Trail

253. Copies of Guinean end-user certificates used by Pecos were obtained by the Panel in Slovakia, in Moldova, in Kyrgyzstan and in Uganda. The Defence Minister of Côte d'Ivoire also mentioned Pecos as a company that had recently offered him its services to procure military helicopters for the Ivorian armed forces. An End-User Certificate mentioning Pecos and signed by the Defence Ministry of Namibia was also found. The latter, dated 28 March 2001, is a forgery. This was confirmed by the Namibian authorities. The Panel also verified that none of the weapons on the many different end-user certificates presented by Pecos of Guinea ever went to Guinea.

254. The structure of Pecos is simple. The company was established in Conakry, Guinea, in October 1997. The company's main focus was dealing in weapons. The statutory manager of the company is Mohamed Yansané, a Guinean citizen and agronomical engineer. He went to university in Czechoslovakia with Peter Jusko. Peter Jusko, a national from the Slovak Republic, came to see him in 1997 and asked him to set up a company in Guinea.

255. Jusko visited Yansané a few months after his arms dealing company, Joy Slovakia, in the Republic of Slovakia had become the focus in a criminal investigation by several European police services for suspected involvement in money laundering and arms trafficking.

256. Yansané's involvement was restricted to be, nominally, the manager of the Pecos company. When confronted by the Panel with all the end-user certificates bearing his signature, Mohamed Yansané did not recognize any of them. He recognized one document, dated February 2001, that was signed by him and stamped by a notary in Conakry, Guinea. The document gave full power of attorney to Peter Jusko to represent Pecos and was made up urgently to allow Jusko to get a combat helicopter released that was kept by customs authorities at the airport of Sliac in the Slovak Republic.

257. The notary's stamp and signature on the document was genuine, it was of Mr. Yansané's wife. Another document that provided similar representation to Jacob Berger, an Israeli citizen, was not recognized by Mr. Yansané. The Panel obtained this document in Moldova where the export of two helicopters was blocked by the authorities because of irregularities. The helicopters were, according to the documents, supposed to be sent to Guinea for repairs, and then to Namibia. Guinea has no helicopter repair facilities.

258. Mr. Yansané told the Panel that in 1997, around the time Pecos had been registered as a company, Peter Jusko had supplied medical equipment to Guinea for a military hospital. An official of the Ministry of Defence had signed for the delivery of that equipment. The stationery paper, the stamps and copies of that signature were then later used, Mr. Yansané explained, to produce forged end-user certificates. The Chief of Staff of the Guinean Armed Forces and the Procurement Officer of the Guinean army also said that none of the items on any of the Pecos end-user certificates the Panel presented to them had ever been ordered by Guinea.

259. Pecos was a front company for illicit arms imports into Africa from arms-exporting countries. Although the Panel's investigation was limited to a small number of specific arms transactions to Liberia, many of these end-user certificates showed up. Those documents show a wide range of arms, from helicopter gunships to transport aircraft, missiles, artillery pieces and massive quantities of small arms and ammunition. In combination with the false flight plans for the transport of the weapons, most of the exporting countries took Guinea for the real end-user. Had any of the exporting countries tried to actually verify that Guinea was the real end-user, Pecos might not have lasted until 31 May 2001, the date on the most recent document the Panel obtained.

260. An analysis of the chronology of events shows that Peter Jusko's plan was to set up a front company in Guinea, following the start of investigations by some Western and Central European police agencies into the activities of his other company, Joy Slovakia. In practically all the countries where the Panel discussed the issue of the Pecos end-user certificates, Peter Jusko or some of the other individuals involved with Pecos were also known as representatives of Joy Slovakia.

261. In 1998, new legislation was also enacted in the Slovak Republic making it a requirement for arms dealing companies to register and get a special permit. Since then, Joy Slovakia has become less active. The company changed its name into Morse s.r.o. in 1999, but that new company never had any registered commercial activities, an investigation by the Slovak authorities shows.

262. In some of the cases investigated, the date on the end-user certificates is much older than the actual delivery of the weapons. In the case of the helicopter spare parts and rotor blades from Kyrgyzstan that were shipped to Liberia in July 2000, an end-user dated 25 September 1998 was presented by Alexander Islamov to the Defence Ministry in Kyrgyzstan. Although end-user certificates have an indefinite validity, the signature on the documents is from an official in Guinea who left the Government years ago. None of the export controllers in the exporting countries seemed aware of that and only depended on the documents and the broker as a guarantee for the safe delivery of the arms.

263. Also, if arms-exporting countries would have reported all their arms sales to a centralized database such as the United Nations Conventional Arms Register, the magnitude of so-called "Guinean procurement of weapons" should have triggered the attention of several arms-exporting agencies.


264. The occurrence of individuals associated with Joy Slovakia and Pecos in the violation of the arms embargo on Liberia was systematic. Although these brokering companies may have been used for arms deals to other embargoed countries or non-state actors, individuals associated with the company played a very important role in arming Liberia and Sierra Leone. Peter Jusko, Alexander Islamov and Jacob Berger are three individuals whose names were mentioned during interviews with officials of arms-exporting agencies in several countries.

265. These names also appear on the documentation collected by the Panel. Since all the arms in these cases went to Liberia, all these individuals were involved in the use of forged end-user certificates and the illicit trafficking of weapons to a country under United Nations sanctions. The Panel asked the cooperation of the authorities and law enforcement agencies in several countries to locate or at least get a contact number for these individuals. Mohamed Yansané was found after a long search in

Kipé, Ratoma, a district of the capital of Guinea that was mentioned on some of the stamps on the end-user certificates. The Panel managed to find the notary who turned out to be the wife of Yansané and was able to question both of them.

266. The Panel also wanted to confront Peter Jusko, Alexander Islamov, and Jacob Berger with the evidence but only was able to locate Peter Jusko, who contacted the Panel himself in October 2001. Jusko claimed he knew nothing about the use of all these end-user certificates and blamed Alexander Islamov in Moscow, who was indeed his former associate, and the network of Victor Bout for the wrongdoing. He did not want to explain why then, he had taken the initiative to contact the Panel. When asked about the phone number or a contact address for Islamov, Jusko said Islamov changed phone numbers all the time and only contacted him. This was an often heard statement when the Panel tried to locate other arms dealers and brokers too.

267. When the Panel interviewed Sanjivan Ruprah, in September 2001, he explained that Jusko was one of the main suppliers of end-user certificates to his organization. Islamov is a supplier of many weapons and spare parts for the companies of Bout. Ruprah, who is both the owner of diamond mines in Liberia and an arms dealer, works in close cooperation with Victor Bout. Ruprah lived in Monrovia, Liberia, from 1999 until January 2001. He showed the Panel a recent arms wish list for Liberia with prices for different types of arms and ammunition. The price for the end-user certificate, as marked on the list, was US\$ 50,000. "24 hours required to obtain end-user" is marked on the document.



Pecos, the producer of forged End-User Certificates — Flow chart showing network of Pecos

Case study: The case of Centrafican Airlines

268. An Ilyushin-76 (registration TL-ACU) became a key focus of the Panel. In several of the cases analysed by the Panel, this plane was used for the transport of weapons in violation of the United Nations embargo. When not in operation, the plane is parked at Sharjah or Ras al-Khaimah, two airports in the United Arab Emirates. The Panel members saw the plane at the airport of Ras al-Khaimah during their visit to the United Arab Emirates. It is owned by Centrafican Airlines, an airline company with offices in the Sharjah Airport Freezone. In early 2001, the company offices moved to P.O. Box 2190 in Ajman, another emirate in the United Arab Emirates.

269. The company is owned by Victor Bout, but Bout himself is not involved in the day-to-day management. The commercial manager of the company is Serguei Denissenko, a Russian living in the United Arab Emirates who used to work as an employee for Victor Bout but now runs his own company San Air General Trading.

270. Mr. Denissenko claimed during interviews with the Panel that he no longer works for Victor Bout, but his company San Air shares a business address and phone numbers with Centrafican Airlines in the United Arab Emirates. Victor Bout's main operating agency, Transavia Travel Agency, also shared this address but that company has ceased operations in early 2001 according to Mr. Denissenko.

271. Centrafican Airlines is still operational with San Air General Trading acting as the commercial and operations agent. In March 2001, San Air and Centrafican Airlines moved to new offices in the Ajman Freezone. When calling the switchboard of these companies, it seems both companies are now part of an entity called the CET Aviation Enterprise. To make things more complicated, a company CET Aviation exists in Malabo, in Equatorial Guinea. That company is run by a Valerii Naido, also a former employee of Victor Bout, who now assists an agency to register planes in Equatorial Guinea. Serguei Bout has most of his aircraft registered there; some of the planes of Centrafican Airlines were in the process of being transferred to that register at the time the Panel was writing its report. In Rwanda, another associated company exists, with the name Central African Airways.

Centrafican Airlines

272. The Panel is in possession of documents showing it is Victor Bout who signs as the owner of Centrafican Airlines. Contracts for the sale of aircraft and bank documents are signed by him. As the name would suggest, the founding address of Centrafican Airlines is not in the United Arab Emirates but in Bangui, in the Central African Republic. The company was registered there by Victor Bout on 28 May 1998. The principal shareholders are a company SouthBound Ltd., P.O. Box 398, Suite 52 and 553 Monrovia House, 26 Main Street, Gibraltar, controlled by Victor Bout. Another company of Victor Bout under the name ATC Ltd. and a company WestBound Ltd., P.O. Box 399, 26 Main Street, Gibraltar, are also shareholders of the company. The latter, WestBound, is owned by a Belgian pilot, Ronal De Smet. De Smet has been a partner of Bout since 1995.

273. On 25 July 1998, upon special instructions from the Ministry of Transport, with a view to facilitating the registration of the company, Centrafican Airlines obtained an Air Operator Permit from the Civil Aviation Authority of the Central African Republic authorizing the company to operate flights domestically. Thus,

Centrafrique Airlines had no authorization to operate international or continental flights. Its fleet consisted of three aircraft, one Tupolev-154 and two smaller Antonov-24s, recorded in the registration book.

274. Those were the only planes that the company ever registered in the Central African Republic, but in early 2000, the Civil Aviation Authority there discovered a major case of fraud in its registry. A Director of Civil Aviation, in close collaboration with Victor Bout and his partners, but without the knowledge of the authorities in the Central African Republic, had produced many false permits for Centrafrique Airlines. About 20 planes and possibly more, many of them large freighter aircraft, operated in different parts of the world under the Central African Republic flag. None of these planes had been properly registered. The plane registered as TL-ACU is one of those illegally registered (annex 5). The plane was insured until mid-September by the company Willis, a well-known insurance broker in the United Kingdom. During the Panel's visit in the United Arab Emirates, Serguei Denissenko told the Panel that he has very good contacts at Willis and that his company San Air takes care of the insurance for Victor Bout's planes. The insurance documents for the Ilyushin illustrate how the plane operates for different companies, including Centrafrique Airlines, San Air and MoldTransavia, Moldova.

275. Centrafrique Airlines and San Air are clearly two agencies of the same company. MoldTransavia is another front company that operated only one passenger aircraft. The company, however, uses its three letter designator "MLT" for cargo flights of the Ilyushin of Centrafrique Airlines. Both the general manager of San Air and the general manager of MoldTransavia in Moldova are former employees of Victor Bout's company, Transavia Travel Agency, as they themselves acknowledged when the Panel interviewed them.

276. The Panel has obtained several copies of recent insurance certificates for the Ilyushin. These documents show that the name of San Air, MoldTransavia or Centrafrique are randomly interchangeable. Bank transfers also suggest that the accounts of San Air are used for payments made by Centrafrique and vice versa, again illustrating how Victor Bout and his partners just use different companies to disguise their activities. For instance, while the plane is registered with Centrafrique Airlines in Bangui, it is insured for flights by San Air of the United Arab Emirates. Landing and overflight requests are done by MoldTransavia from an office in Moldova and the flights are conducted under the three-letter designator CET, which is again Centrafrique Airlines. The billing address used for flights is that of Transavia Travel Agency or of San Air.

277. AirCess, the company of Victor Bout's brother, Serguei, also operates from offices in the United Arab Emirates, but the company's registered address is in Equatorial Guinea. Serguei Bout denied any links between him and his brother's companies. Only after the Panel confronted him with his own signature and a \$1 million payment from Victor Bout's account to that of his company AirCess, did Serguei Bout acknowledge that he does have an ongoing business relationship with his brother.

278. Mr. Denissenko also claimed to have severed all links with his former employer, Victor Bout. He presented himself as the general manager of San Air and claimed only vague links with Centrafrique Airlines. However, a bank document shows that Denissenko's company San Air paid US\$ 20,000 for a contract between a company in the Slovak Republic and Victor Bout's company, Centrafrique Airlines.

The Panel later found documents proving that many of the weapons that went to Liberia through Victor Bout's and Sanjivan Ruprah's network in 2000 and early 2001, were paid for to San Air's bank account No. 01-01-5712572-01 at Standard Chartered Bank in Sharjah.

279. Pavel Igorevich Popov, the General Manager of MoldTransavia told the Panel he had worked for years for Victor Bout as a broker, for the flights of Mr. Bout's companies. When the Panel asked him to produce documentation for some of those flights, Mr. Popov said he never kept any documents. He also had no business address during the days he worked as a broker for Bout. A cellular phone was sufficient. Mr. Popov also refused to clarify the ownership structure of his company, MoldTransavia. However, the Panel obtained documents from the Civil Aviation Authority in Moldova showing Mr. Popov's company is merely a front for Victor Bout's interests.

280. San Air is the owner of the MoldTransavia plane that Mr. Popov operated. The Panel also gathered documents in Moldova, the Slovak Republic and Uganda showing Mr. Popov was personally involved in arms deliveries to Liberia in November 2000 (see sections on Helicopter and machine gun sales to Liberia).

281. Some of the activities of this group of companies include legal passenger and cargo flights, but many of the planes operated by these companies and a wide range of associated companies are for deliveries of weapons or related equipment to war zones and countries under United Nations sanctions. Additionally, many of the planes operated by this group of companies have a track record of illegal registration and document fraud.

The Gambia New Millennium air incident

282. In January 2000, the President of the Central African Republic travelled to the Agenda 2000 summit of African heads of State in Libreville, Gabon. When the presidential delegation arrived in Libreville, they were congratulated for a beautiful aircraft standing at the airport. The plane, an Ilyushin -62, carried the registration number TL-ACL.

283. It also carried the flag of the Central African Republic and "Centrafrique Airlines" was written in bold letters on the plane. The authorities in Gabon thought it was a new acquisition of the Central African Republic's President. The President, however, had never heard of such a plane, and upon inspection it seemed another official delegation from Gambia had arrived in this particular aircraft. Because of the embarrassing situation, an investigation was carried out by the Ministry of Transport and the Prosecutor of the Central African Republic, in cooperation with ASECNA, the African air navigation and safety organization.

284. The investigation discovered two documents that had allowed the plane to operate, a "Temporary" Certificate of Registration and an Airworthiness Certificate. These documents were forged and had been issued and signed by Armand Fulbert Doungovo, the Director of Civil Aviation of the Central African Republic. On 24 January 2000, the investigating authorities ordered the immediate arrest of Mr. Doungovo, Mr. Bout and the local manager of Centrafrique Airlines, Mr. Bouroukine. The Director General of Civil Aviation was ordered to conduct a more thorough investigation, and on 14 February 2000 a Ministerial Decree put an end to all the activities of the company Centrafrique Airlines in the Central African

Republic. The Panel verified that the offices of Centrafican in Bangui were indeed closed and are now used by the company Sudan Airways. It remains unclear why the other shareholder of Centrafican, the Belgian pilot Ronal De Smet, who has been a long-time partner of Victor Bout, was not indicted in this case.

285. The Director General of Civil Aviation had earlier tried to obtain information from Director Doungovo on his relationship with Centrafican Airlines. A letter sent to Doungovo dated 22 June 1999, shows the Director General's suspicion was raised when he discovered that the Director was travelling abroad to negotiate traffic rights as a representative of the company, Centrafican Airlines. The incident in Gabon, however, had accelerated things.

Massive fraud

286. This investigation showed that Mr. Doungovo and Victor Bout had fabricated airworthiness certificates, air operator permits and certificates of registration for a great number of aircraft. Most of these had earlier been deregistered in the Kingdom of Swaziland, where Victor Bout and his partners had set up a similar scheme. Before that, Mr. Bout's planes had been registered in Liberia.

287. The Gambia New Millennium plane had been bought by a Gambian a few weeks before the Gabon incident. A copy of the sales agreement shows that the seller was Victor Bout, General Manager of Centrafican Airlines. The buyer was Gambia New Millennium Air, represented by Mr. Baba Jobe. The bank details show that the final beneficiary of the transaction was the holder of an account at the Standard Chartered Bank, Sharjah branch. This account with number 01-5624312-01 is of the Transavia Travel Agency, another company of Victor Bout.

288. The Panel was able to interview Mr. Baba Jobe in Banjul, Gambia, in September 2001. Meanwhile, the aircraft has changed registration and is now legally registered in Gambia. Mr. Jobe, who is a civil servant and close adviser of the Gambian President, denied knowing Victor Bout. He said he had never heard of that man and had dealt with a Mr. Hajazi, a Lebanese citizen who acted as a representative of Libya. The plane was considered a gift to the Gambian President and not to Baba Jobe, nor had the Gambian authorities been aware that the aircraft had been involved in a case of fraud in the Central African Republic. Some suspicion exists on the activities of Mr. Baba Jobe, first of all because the Panel does have a copy of the sales agreement showing both his and Bout's signatures. Also, among Mr. Jobe's acquaintances are Ibrahim Bah, one of the RUF rebels who is very active in the diamond business. Mr. Jobe acknowledged knowing Bah from the time he had been a student in Libya, where many of the RUF were trained before the wars in Liberia and later in Sierra Leone. Mr. Jobe stated that it had been years since he had spoken or seen Ibrahim Bah.

289. The Civil Aviation Authorities in the Central African Republic found many more incidents in connection with the fraudulently registered aircraft of Centrafican Airlines. In one case, the company had issued a false flight plan. After inspection, it was also found that all the documents authorizing the plane to operate were again false. Also, two helicopters belonging to the company had made emergency landings due to technical problems. Those helicopters, too, were operating on false documentation. These helicopters were, in 2001, operating in the rebel areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A flight log obtained from the Ugandan Civil Aviation Authority shows a landing in Uganda, in November, of a

Let-410 aircraft, with the Liberian registration EL-MLC. The operator was also Centrafrique Airlines. The Panel on Sierra Leone obtained the complete Liberian aircraft registry in November 2000. The helicopter is not among the aircraft on the list, again indicating a fraudulent use of a registration number.

Victor Bout escapes from justice

290. When the authorities in Bangui issued a warrant for the arrest of the Director of Civil Aviation, for the Russian manager of Centrafrique in Bangui and for Victor Bout, Bout was still in the country, but he managed to escape. On 16 June 2000, Doungovo, the director of Civil Aviation was convicted with a year of imprisonment for fraud and forgery. Victor Bout was also charged and convicted in absentia with two years in prison. The Court in Bangui also issued an international arrest warrant for him. But subsequently, on 28 June 2000, Bout was acquitted of the charges. The Panel did not get any information on the circumstances of this acquittal.

291. The Central African Republic's Civil Aviation Authority noted that despite the dissolution of the company Centrafrique Airlines in February 2000, the fraudulently registered aircraft were seen at many airports across Africa and elsewhere. After the investigation had started in Bangui, the offices of the Civil Aviation Authorities had been burgled. Official stamps and documents had disappeared. The Director General of Civil Aviation sent messages to all his colleagues in the African subregion, warning them about the status of Centrafrique Airlines and the planes of the company, but the Panel noticed, during its meetings with Civil Aviation Authorities in more than 30 countries, that few knew about the Central African Republic case. Annex 3 shows some 25 aircraft that were or still are operating illegally but the investigation in Bangui is ongoing and possibly more aircraft are yet to be located and identified.²

Equatorial Guinea

292. Equatorial Guinea has been an open registry for the aircraft industry for many years. Open registries, also known as aircraft registers of convenience, are used for commercial and tax reasons. In the arms business, those registers of convenience can be useful, because of the poor oversight of the aircraft and the operator by the country where the aircraft is registered. Most open registries of convenience are in small countries with a limited monitoring capacity and with very little aeronautical activity. The Panel discussed the issue of the open registry with the authorities in Equatorial Guinea. The Civil Aviation Authority is aware of the problem of fraud and abuse of its registry and has appointed a private company to regulate new aircraft registrations and identify irregularities in old registrations.

293. Many countries only register aircraft that use their territory as a regular base. Aircraft that are registered in countries of convenience are hardly ever seen in the country of registration because they keep their maintenance facilities and main operational offices elsewhere. This also creates certain airports of convenience, where many planes are based, flying foreign flags of convenience. The country of

² Since July 2000, after the decision of the court in Bangui, the Ilyushin-76 of Victor Bout, with registration TL-ACU has been seen in Chateauroux (France), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Sliac and Bratislava (Slovak Republic), Chisinau (Moldova), Tbilisi (Georgia), Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Brazzaville (Congo), Cairo (Egypt), Tripoli (Libya), Monrovia (Liberia) and at its maintenance base in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah.

registration is often totally unaware of the operations or whereabouts of these planes.

294. The brother of Victor Bout has his main company AirCess registered in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. Victor Bout's operating agencies, and those of his partners, still clearly prefer the airports of the United Arab Emirates. There, the General Civil Aviation Authority cooperated with the Panel's investigation and enabled the Panel to meet with Victor Bout's brother, Serguei Bout, and with the commercial manager of Centrafrique Airlines, Serguei Denissenko. Denissenko is also general manager of San Air.³

295. In January 2001, the authorities of the United Arab Emirates enacted new aviation legislation that would remove all foreign commercial air transport operators that operate planes registered in countries of convenience from the Air Operator Certificate of the United Arab Emirates. Aircraft that use the United Arab Emirates for commercial air transport operations have to be registered in that country. Exempt are only those aircraft that use the United Arab Emirates for a limited period, which will not exceed one year. These provisions entered into force on 1 January 2001, but the airlines were given a transitional period of one year. On 1 January 2002, aircraft operating agencies that are not registered in the United Arab Emirates will thus no longer be authorized to use that country for their operations. The measure would apply to most of the aircraft of Centrafrique Airlines, San Air and AirCess, the company of Victor Bout's brother.

296. Centrafrique Airlines today still has offices in the United Arab Emirates and so does San Air, which owns some of the aircraft operated by Centrafrique Airlines. The companies recently changed offices and moved from Sharjah to the other Emirate of Ajman in the United Arab Emirates. But Centrafrique Airlines no longer exists in the country where it was established and where it maintains its stated address, at P.O. Box 2760 in Bangui, Central African Republic. Centrafrique was in the process of reregistering some of its aircraft in Equatorial Guinea, during the course of the Panel's investigation. On 10 September 2001, San Air General Trading FZE obtained a new Certificate of Registration for the Ilyushin -76 (TL-ACU) in Equatorial Guinea. The plane now carries the registration number 3C-QRA.

297. The Panel compiled a list of aircraft (annex 3) that were all carrying a tail number or registration number indicating registration in the Central African Republic (type TL-XXX); only three were ever legally registered there. Also included in the table are those aircraft of companies of Victor Bout that have recently shifted their registration to Equatorial Guinea (type 3C-XXX). The table also includes all the aircraft that could be identified to have flown for West Africa Air Services (see the case of the mystery plane EL-ALY). The table also shows the strong links between San Air and Centrafrique Airlines.

³ Victor Bout was himself not in the United Arab Emirates when the Panel arrived there, despite an appointment made with a member of the Panel. After one phone call to a mobile phone of Victor Bout, he could no longer be reached. His partners in the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere refused to give the Panel a contact number, despite several attempts made between June and October 2001 to obtain a contact address or number for Victor Bout. The Panel later met with Sanjivan Ruprah who claimed to represent the interests of Victor Bout and that he had Bout's authorization to speak to the Panel.

D. Weapons by land and sea

298. During the Panel's investigations, there were persistent reports of ships to Harper, Greenville, Buchanan and Monrovia unloading weapons. The Panel investigated 105 shipping movements to Monrovia Freeport and Buchanan in 2000 and 2001 but was unable to obtain irrefutable evidence. The persistence of reports makes it plausible that weapons are delivered by sea and this should be a continued area of vigilance.

299. Likewise, there are a number of accounts of trucks carrying weapons from Côte d'Ivoire into Liberia in 2000 and 2001. These trucks either brought weapons from San Pedro or Abidjan or originated from Burkina Faso, according to eyewitness accounts. Refugees from Lofa County reported that two Burkinabe trucks loaded with weapons had been surprised in Voinjama by Liberian dissidents in April.

Recommendations on transportation and arms

300. The Panel considers that the measures taken so far by the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority are adequate and that the Security Council may consider lifting the grounding order imposed by resolution 1343 (2001) and allow Liberia to reopen an aircraft register in coordination with ICAO. Those individual aircraft that were effectively grounded and have provided ICAO and the Security Council Committee on Liberia with the documentation showing their registration in Liberia, was done in accordance with international regulations, should be given permission to restart their operations.

301. The Liberian Civil Aviation Authority should, however, keep the Security Council Committee on Liberia and the International Civil Aviation Organization informed on the follow-up of the investigation and on the registration of every new aircraft on the new Liberian register.

302. In view of the massive fraud with aircraft registrations committed in the Central African Republic, the Panel recommends that the Civil Aviation Authorities there:

- Transmit to Interpol the court documents about Centrafrique Airlines;
- Publish these court documents on the Governments web site;
- Coordinate urgently with Equatorial Guinea and the United Arab Emirates over the use by Centrafrique Airlines of forged documents.

303. The Panel further recommends that the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea and other African States affected by this type of fraud coordinate with the African Civil Aviation Commission to put the issue of false registrations as an agenda item for its future meetings. To ICAO, the Panel recommends that:

- It proactively educate its members on the dangers of illegal registrations;
- ICAO's member States computerize their registration lists and centralize them on the ICAO web site so that users could check the situation and status of each aircraft;
- ICAO's Safety Oversight programme should place greater emphasis on aircraft registration.

304. To the United Nations Security Council, the Panel recommends that:

- All the aircraft owned, operated or insured by San Air, Centrafrican Airlines and West Africa Air Services should be grounded immediately. The grounding order could then be lifted gradually for each individual aircraft, provided all the records (ownership of the plane, operator, operating licence, insurance, airworthiness certificate, certificate of registration and the location of the aircraft) are inspected by both the Civil Aviation Authority in the country of registration and in the country where the aircraft has its maintenance base;
- The companies concerned should inform the Council, through the Security Council Committee on Liberia, on the exact status and location of each aircraft. A list of those planes is found in annex 3 to the report.

Recommendations on arms

305. The Panel recommends that:

- The arms embargo on Liberia be extended;
- All United Nations Member States abstain from supplying weapons to the Mano River Union countries;
- An arms embargo be imposed on the armed non-state actors in the three Mano River Union countries (namely the LURD and Ulimo-factions, the RUF and the Guinean armed dissident groups).

306. The Panel also recommends that, for reasons of transparency and confidence-building, the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms should be broadened to an information exchange mechanism for all weapons types procured by the ECOWAS member States. The existing Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) could be further developed to improve the information exchange on current holdings and future arms procurement of West African States. The Panel recommends that this information exchange would be binding and that both supplier States and the receiving countries would be obliged to report each individual arms transaction to the newly established mechanism and include data on all the parties to the arms transactions, including the names and companies of the brokers and the transport agents.

Recommendation on end-user certificates

307. The Panel recommends that each Member State that has procured or supplied arms on the basis of an end-user certificate mentioning the companies Pecos, Joy Slovakia and/or Morse or the individuals Peter Jusko, Alexander Islamov, Jacob Berger, Andrei Izdebski or Serguei Schwabenland, conduct a thorough investigation on the actual delivery and end-use of the arms. The Panel recommends that the member States involved in any such transactions inform the other State, party to these transactions and inform the Security Council Committees on Sierra Leone and Liberia on the findings of their investigation.

308. The Panel urgently recommends the establishment of a United Nations working group to develop the modalities for a standardized end-user certificate that would include the name, address and telephone number of the signing authority for the Certificate, and name, address, telephone number and arms trading licence of the broker(s) involved.

Part III

Sources of revenue and government expenditure

Government expenditure

309. The Panel examined the sources and management of government funds in an effort to establish the financing behind sanctions-busting. The principal source of revenue for these activities between 1999 and 2001 was off-budget spending that was not part of regular government expenditures. This was also the preferred method to finance the war in Lofa.

310. According to President Taylor, US\$ 15 million was diverted from the US\$ 73 million budget for the 2000/01 fiscal year (July to June) to meet the costs of the war in Lofa in December 2000. This sum was deducted from the designated Spending for the Special Government Commitment (under the Executive Mansion control) and increased substantially in the last six months of 2000, relative to the first six months, from US\$ 9.1 million to US\$ 16.83 million or by 84.5 per cent. Most of this increased expenditure was for defence. This extrabudgetary spending significantly disrupted the Government's medium-term economic strategy.

311. The total revenue for the Government in 2000 was approximately US\$ 85.8 million. The principal budgetary allocation (chart 1) under the 2000-2001 budget was for General Administrative Services (41.0 per cent), followed by Government Special Commitment projects (34.0 per cent), and Social and Community Services (22.0 per cent). However, the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that there were extrabudgetary expenditures of approximately US\$ 73,000 in December 2000 for helicopter repairs and Christmas presents for the President's family and friends. The Ministry of Finance informed the Panel that the National Budget for the year 2001-2002 was approximately the same as the previous year.




Chart 1: Percentage distribution of the national budget, 2000-2001

312. Government spending in 2000 increased by approximately US\$ 24 million over 1999 from US\$ 66.50 million (1999) to US\$ 90.53 million (2000). However, expenditures exceeded revenues by 6.1 per cent (US\$ 5.23 million), according to the Central Bank.

313. The total expenditure for the first quarter of 2001 increased by 12.2 per cent over the same period in 2000. The prime reason for this increase was defence expenditures due to the war in Lofa County.

314. The International Monetary Fund expressed serious concerns about off-budget expenditures in its Staff Monitored Programme assessment from January to June 2000. The IMF recorded that extrabudgetary expenditures of US\$ 9.3 million during the first half of 2000 and that "expenditure by the Office of the President represented 28 per cent of total". Purchases of goods and services amounted to 21 per cent of total expenditure (25 per cent of current expenditure). While detailed data was not provided to the IMF, the authorities indicated that these expenditures were largely related to presidential and security priorities. These expenditures also included road rehabilitation for the timber concessions on behalf of government (US\$ 3 million in the first half of 2000).

315. These expenditures occurred outside the budget process through the allocation of revenue at the source rather than through the Central Bank. According to the IMF "certain timber concessions, government parastatals, and revenue collection agencies undertook expenditure on behalf of government, that was later recorded as 'non cash' revenue with an offsetting outlay on goods and services". This appears to be how sanctions-busting, namely for procurement of weapons and ammunition, was financed as this report will demonstrate below.

Depreciation of the Liberian dollar

316. This year, the Liberian dollar has been performing poorly against the United States dollar. According to statistics from the Central Bank, the average exchange rate in the first quarter of 2001 was L\$ 44.64:US\$ 1. By September, the rate had worsened, to around L\$ 52:US\$ 1. Since the Liberian dollar lost its fixed official parity with the US dollar in 1998, its quarterly average exchange value had never fallen above L\$ 44:US\$ 1 (only in September and October 1998 did the monthly average reach that rate).

317. According to the Central Bank, United Nations sanctions are exclusively blamed for eroding confidence in the Liberian dollar and contributing to the devaluation of the currency. Independent assessments by the Economist Intelligence Unit indicate that other factors may have contributed such as the "behaviour of local (mainly Lebanese) traders, who are reported to be hoarding US dollars and refusing to do business in the local currency, has probably led to the US dollarization of parts of the economy".

Recommendations on Liberian government expenditure

318. The Panel recommends that: The practice of allocating revenues at source for priority expenditure should be eliminated. All revenues should be consolidated in a central government account at the Central Bank of Liberia before being allocated to authorized agencies for approved expenditures.

Sources of revenue: the structure of Liberia's key industries

319. Liberia's agricultural sector (including forestry) comprises 72.7 per cent of estimated real GDP. Logging and rubber production are the main sources of foreign exchange for the Government. Mining contributed to about 2.0 per cent of GDP in 2001, even though the mining sector has not recovered since the civil war following the closure of the iron ore mining companies. There has also not been a sustained investment in gold and diamond mining, though there was some limited investment in 1998 and in 2000.

Table 2
Liberia: gross domestic product by sector
(in L\$m)

	1999	2000 ^a	2001 ^b
Agriculture	236.0	241.9	246.7
Forestry	76.7	79.0	81.4
Mining	8.6	8.7	8.9
Manufacturing	18.7	21.1	23.2
Services	72.2	85.2	95.4

Source: Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs.

^a Estimates.

^b Forecasts.

The main sources of revenue for government finance since 1999 are shown in table 3.

Table 3
Liberia: government finance
(US\$ million)

Year	1999		2000		2001	
	Total	Jan-June	July-Dec	Total	Jan-Feb	
Revenue	65.5	40.1	45.3	85.4	9.3	
Customs/excise	20.4	15.1	9.0	24.1	3.3	
Direct taxes	15	7.4	8.3	15.7	1.9	
Indirect taxes	7.1	3.5	4.0	7.5	1.7	
Forestry Development Agency	1.7	3.0	3.7	6.7	0.2	
Petroleum sales levy	6.1	4.3	2.8	7.1	1.1	
Maritime	15.2	4.8	13.2	18.0	0.5	
Grants	-	2.0	4.3	6.3	0.6	
Expenditure	66.5	43.9	46.6	90.5	11.0	
Deficit	1.0	3.8	1.3	5.1	1.7	
% of revenue	1.5	9.5	2.9	6.0	18.3	

Source: Central Bank; Ministry of Finance; Economist Intelligence Unit.

Rubber

320. The agricultural sector (including forestry), which represents 72.2 per cent of real GDP, continues to serve as the major source of growth in the economy. Logging and rubber production are the major foreign exchange earners for the Government. Rubber production grew in 1999 to 62,705 metric tons (valued at US\$ 33.3 million) from 48,916 metric tons (valued at US\$ 28.9 million) in 1998. In 2000, production rose to 102,412 metric tons valued at US\$ 53.2 million. During the first quarter of 2001, a total of 27,567 metric tons of rubber were produced compared to 16,617 metric tons produced during the first quarter of 2000. Rubber tends to be relatively well controlled by foreign investors, most notably Firestone and the Liberian Agricultural Company because of the structure of the plantations and the need for long-term collection/processing investment. Rubber is a less easy source for "at source" off-budget expenditures, although once the profits enter the government accounts there is no guarantee on how they are used.

Logging

321. The Liberian Timber Association estimates that the Liberian forest covers about 4.8 million hectares. This forest in 1978 was estimated to contain 81.3 million cubic metres of merchantable species which could permit felling of 3.2 million cubic metres annually on a twenty-five year felling cycle. Total round log production in 2000 rose to 934,066 cubic metres, representing an increase of 178.4 per cent over 1999 output. Round log exports during 2000 grew to 934,066 cubic metres with a value of US\$ 60.9 million. Between January and June 2001, round log production reached 679,253 cubic metres (valued at US\$ 46.2 million). These figures are likely to underestimate real exports by 50 to 200 per cent because of tax evasion by companies and widespread corruption.

322. Logging has long been one of the prime sources of government revenue. During the 1989-1996 civil war, timber provided Charles Taylor and his NPFL rebels their main independent source of revenue. Logging is still today the mainstay of export earnings for the Government.

Table 4

Volume, value production and export

	1999	2000	2001 (up to June)
Production volume	334,273 m ³	896,586 m ³	659,271 m ³
Export volume	188,944 m ³	626,657 m ³	494,478 m ³
FOB value (US\$)	21,099,959	68,137,065	50,541,617

Source: FDA.

323. In addition to the above, figures must be added for exports through San Pedro in Côte d'Ivoire. In 1999, these were 27,653 m³ in volume of logs of which 17,067 m³ was recorded as exported volume. These figures rose in 2000 to 60,805 m³, resulting in 49,218 m³ of exported volume. This represented 7.9 per cent of the volume directly exported from Liberia.

324. Because of the decline in price of the last couple of years of m³ FOB and taking account of the export of secondary species to China, the Panel estimated that the FOB exports should be around US\$ 75 million in 2001. The three main destinations in the first six months of 2000 were China (46.6 per cent), France (17.9 per cent) and Italy (9.3 per cent).

325. Timber production and exports are an important source of revenue for the Government, contributing officially about US\$ 6.7 million in official tax revenue in 2000, according to the National Bank of Liberia. The Forestry Development Agency has a higher figure of US\$ 13,203,514 in its semi-annual report for 2000. The Panel's own estimate, given on figures provided by the industry, is that Liberia's timber industry should today provide just under US\$ 25 million [based on 30 per cent of total value exported by Oriental Timber Corporation (secondary species) and 45 per cent for other exports] in taxation for the Government.

326. Taxes gained for forest activities are as follows:

- severance fees: US\$ 1.50/m³
- reforestation fee: US\$ 3.00/m³
- conservation fee: US\$ 1.50/m³ to US\$ 3.00m³ depending on species
- forest search fee: US\$ 0.50/m³
- export taxes: US\$ 0.40/m³ to 30.60m³ depending on species
- industrialization incentive: US\$ 1.44/m³ to 58.56/m³
- land rental fee: US\$ 0.50/acre whatever the volume is cut

327. The total amount of taxes paid by loggers is approximately 30 per cent to 45 per cent of the FOB value depending on the timber species, the size of concession and the volume cut. In order to make an estimate of total annual taxes paid to government (if these taxes are normally paid), a calculation of 30 per cent of the total value exported by OTC (secondary species) and 45 per cent for the other exports would yield this result:

• OTC FOB value export:	30% x 38,471,329 = US\$ 11,541,398
• Other Loggers:	45% x 29,665,735 = US\$ 13,349,580
Total	US\$ 24,890,978

328. This is only an estimate because some companies do not or cannot afford to pay the taxes. OTC, for example, has been given certain tax exemptions such as reforestation and for road building. Some other taxes also do not appear in government figures. For example, OTC pays the National Port Authority (NPA) US\$ 1 million a year for the use of Buchanan port: but this payment does not appear in the NPA's accounts. OTC should have paid approximately US\$ 12 million in taxes in 2000 but coincidentally it claimed to have a US\$ 12 million loss in 2000. The Central Bank of Liberia assessments of final tax figures derived from timber from paper work submitted by each logging company's production compared with the FDA (Forestry Development Agency) figures suggest a significant diversion of the timber revenue for extrabudgetary activities.

329. President Taylor has taken a personal interest in the allocation of timber concessions. In January 2000, a new National Forestry Law declared that all forest resources are the property of the Government except for communal and privately owned forest resources that have been developed through artificial regeneration. On 1 July 2000, the Liberian Government issued Executive Order No. 4 "restricting the Ministry of Finance to the collection of 50 per cent of all Land Rental Fees and 98 per cent of all Stumpage fees". The FDA was mandated to collect the balance. However, the FDA noted that they only collect a small portion of the funds that they are supposed to receive.

330. The Forestry Development Authority was also empowered to rescind many logging concessions and salvage permits unilaterally. New concessions require final approval by the President of the Republic. During the 1999-2000 season, many authorized concessionaires continued logging but without assurances that they would be allowed to retain their concessions. This uncertainty encouraged rapid cutting and profiteering, without concern for sustainable forestry practices in order to maximize profits in anticipation of losing concessions.

331. Several Spanish and French enterprises lost their concessions to the United Logging Company, managed by Mr. Fawaz and President Taylor's son as chairman. President Taylor has also revoked concessions of the VH Timber Companies giving them to the United Logging Company and to the Mohammed Group. President Taylor is seeking to have the timber industry dominated by a few mega-concessions. In early 1999, a Russian group sought a concession but the plans quickly collapsed. Shimmer International, a subsidiary of the Malaysian giant, Rimbunan Hijau, also declined to invest in a Lofa County mega-concession because of security concerns.

332. The President aspires to create two mega-concessions in addition to the one operated by the Oriental Timber Company (OTC). However, it has been difficult for him to find investors that are able to develop such large-scale concessions.

The main logging operations in Liberia

Oriental Timber Company (OTC)

333. The Chairman is Dutch national Gus Kouwenhoven, a close friend of Charles Taylor, who managed logging operations for him through rebel-controlled Buchanan in the early 1990s. In July 1999, OTC was granted a 1.24 million hectares concession in the south-east of the country, and then because of the poor quality of the species in the concession, a second one, further north in the primeval forest, taking the total concession to 1.6 million hectares. According to the FDA, this represents about 42 per cent of Liberia's total productive forests.

334. OTC is linked to the Hong Kong-based Global Star Holdings, which is part of the Djan Djajanti group of Indonesia, with offices in Singapore and Hong Kong and major investments in Indonesia and China. Djan Djajanti has taken responsibility for 70 per cent of the capital investment of the concession. Gus Kouwenhoven remains the chairman although he owns, according to documentation he showed the Panel, only 30 per cent of the capital and Joseph Wong Kii Tai, son of Djajanti's chairman, was made the manager. The Djajanti group has invested some US\$ 110 million in the project. President Taylor has publicly defended OTC calling it his "pepper bush", a Liberian phrase for something important and personal.

Royal Timber Company (RTC)

335. RTC is the second largest timber operation in Liberia, with three distinct concessions in the western part of the country, totalling 370,000 hectares. It is also run by Gus Kouwenhoven and exported 8654.122 m³ (FOB value US\$ 990,785.08) in the first six months of 2000.

Mohammed Group Companies

336. They exported 26,482 m³ in 2000, with concessions in Nimba and Grand Gedeh (the Salami Molowi Inc (SMI) and Bureaux Ivorian Ngorian (BIN)). This company is owned by Mohammed Salamé, a Liberian "ambassador-at-large", based in Côte d'Ivoire, who has been involved in assisting sanctions-busting arms transfers to Liberia. Much of BIN's production is exported through the port of San Pedro in Côte d'Ivoire.

Inland Group

337. The Inland Logging Company is managed by Maurice and Oscar Cooper, both long-term associates of President Taylor. Like Kouwenhoven, the company's roots go back to the 1990s when they extracted and exported timber for the NPFL rebels during the war. It has a 300,000 acre concession in the south-east of the country. Logs are being sold exclusively through a Swiss company to France and Turkey. The company reports that it exported 19,815 m³ of logs in 2000, but there are indications that this figure should be much higher, around 50,000 m³. The ILC also maintains a private militia in Sinoe County and manages the port of Greenville.

Forest Hill Company

338. This company has a 300,000 acre concession in Lofa County where it fells only Niangon, and sells it exclusively to France through Interwood. The company's Chairman is Victor Haikal, whose commercial operations have been badly impacted by the war in Lofa County.

VH Timber Companies

339. This group is owned by Victor Hanning and has a concession of 163,200 hectares in Lofa and Cape Mount Counties. He has also invested more than US\$ 800,000 in a sawmill in Monrovia, which currently produces in two shifts about 70 m³ of Niangon timber per day. He exported 10,000 m³ of round logs in 2000.

Liberia Wood Management Company

340. This company runs a concession about 100 km north of Monrovia. The company does logging and sawmilling and is owned by Rudolph J. Merab and Victor Hannig. The company exported around 13,000 m³ in 2000. Export volumes on cargo manifests for 2001 suggest a similar volume for this year. In late August, rebels attacked the concession base, badly destroying property and assets, including houses and a school for the workers. The attack was claimed by the rebels of LURD and a spokesman for LURD said they had targeted the company to discourage them from doing business with President Taylor.

Maryland Wood Processing Industry and United Logging Company

341. This is the second best exporter of timber in 2000. The company is owned by Mr. Fawaz, who owns also the United Logging Company. It has concessions in the north-east of the country in Grand Gedeh and River Gee. In 2000, these two companies exported 83,781 m³, 13.4 per cent of the total volume exported by Liberia.

342. A number of the timber companies complained to the Panel that making a profit currently in Liberia is difficult, except for the mega-concessions that are engaged in non-selective felling and processing massive volumes of round logs. Limited wood-processing capacity, logjams in France at sawmills because of large volumes of round logs and the difficulty in attracting new investors to Liberia, were all blamed for these difficulties. They complain of excessive taxation and difficult operating conditions, making it impossible even to fell and sell timber up to their FDA 4 per cent quota. Presidential favour is an important ingredient in cutting operational costs. OTC, RTC and the Inland Group are known to have obtained tax waivers for fuel purchases as a result of their close connections to the President.

Wood processing

343. According to FDA rules, 25 per cent of the volume of logs felled should be sawn in the country. This rule is not respected because of the volume of round logs exported by OTC to China and because of the limited number of sawmills in Liberia.

344. Prior to the 1989-1996 war, there were 18 sawmills, 3 veneering and plywood factories, 6 dry kilns and 3 wood-processing factories and domestic timber production surpassed log exports in timber volume. Today, there are only 12 operational sawmills and these do not have the capacity to process the volume of logs felled. The OTC plywood factory is scheduled to start production in late 2001 or early 2002. Sawn timber production is on the increase. In 1999, it increased to 22,746 cubic metres which represented 1,802.4 per cent rise over the 1998 output level. In 2000, it rose again to 224,824 cubic metres. However, in the first quarter of 2001, there has been a 25.8 per cent decline when compared with the previous quarter due to a clampdown by the FDA on pit-sawing and the impact on logging establishments in Lofa County.

345. The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently advises all countries to ban unprocessed log exportation beyond the end of 2000. Liberia urgently needs to phase out this trade and invest in wood-processing facilities. This would enhance the value of timber exported from Liberia, slow felling down and provide additional employment. It would also make production and exporting easier to monitor. The Taylor government has announced since 1998, a gradual prohibition on the export of round logs as a policy guideline but no legislation on the issue has been enacted yet.

The timber industry and violation of sanctions

346. Some of the timber companies have violated the sanctions against Liberia. One prominent example of this was Exotic Tropical and Timber Enterprises (ETTE), a company set up by Leonid Minin and his partners Vadim Semov and Fernando Robleda. The document (S/2000/1195) described how Minin's private jet was used to ship weapons from Niger and from Burkina Faso to Liberia in March 1999. Just

before his arrest, Minin was involved in setting up other arms deals for Liberia. Minin was arrested in Italy on 5 August 2000. He had in his possession a great number of documents showing his involvement in timber but also in the arms shipments to Liberia.

347. The Panel had access to this documentation. Among more than 1,500 documents seized from Minin, there were a number of maps showing that he was negotiating the possibilities for a mega-concession in the north-west of Liberia, comprising the Lofa war zone. The Panel was not interested in the details of Minin's failure in Liberia's timber business, where he finally had to sell his equipment and assets to a company of his partner of Forum Liberia, a Spanish-owned company. The case was only of interest to the Panel because of the link to violations of the arms embargo.

348. In the weeks before his arrest, Minin was planning the delivery of huge quantities of small arms and ammunition to Liberia, via Côte d'Ivoire. A first consignment was shipped to Côte d'Ivoire in July 2000 and then diverted to Liberia by means of an Ilyushin-18 that was leased by Liberian government officials in a deal with a Moldovan company and the arms dealer, Sanjivan Ruprah. Minin claimed, in an interview with the Panel, that Liberian ambassador-at-large Mohammed Salamé and his brother Yussuf were key to the Ivorian part of the operation. The Panel made several attempts to confront Ambassador Salamé in Abidjan with these allegations. He could finally be reached over telephone after the Panel had left Côte d'Ivoire and he denied his involvement. He said his only business was timber. However, General Gueï, who signed the end-user certificate for the weapons, Minin, who organized and financed it, and Sanjivan Ruprah, all confirmed that Mohammed Salamé had played a key role in the diversion of the weapons to Liberia. The case is described in detail in the section on violations of the arms embargo.

349. The Panel has received a bank document which indicates that a payment for weapons delivery was made directly from the Singapore accounts of the company, Borneo Jaya Pte Ltd, a mother company of OTC. This document shows transfer of US\$ 500,000 to the arms trafficking company San Air (one of the companies of Victor Bout) through Sanjivan Ruprah, paid by order of Dato Seri Bong Uray on 26 August 1999 using Chase Manhattan Bank N.Y.

Recommendations on logging and wood processing

350. The Government should reach agreement with the International Monetary Fund over the commissioning of an independent detailed report on revenue from the timber concessions for the January 2001-July 2002 period, including exemptions and tax offsets for government-related expenditures during this period; that the United Nations should impose a ban on all round log exports from Liberia from July 2002 and strongly encourage local operators to diversify into wood processing before that date.

Diamonds

351. The Panel examined Liberia's diamond industry because it is another crucial source of natural resource revenue for the Government. Liberia's own official diamond exports were said to be only 8,500 carats in 1999, valued at US\$ 900,000. Liberia's Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy estimates that this represents only 10

to 15 per cent of what is actually leaving the country. This is a far cry from the late 1970s when Liberia's production and export averaged at half a million carats with 70 per cent of gem quality. All of Liberia's production is currently artisanal alluvial although a Canadian company, the Mano River Resources, Inc. is engaged in kimberlite diamond exploration in Western Liberia.

352. In 2000, diamond production increased to 22,112 carats, representing a 162.1 per cent rise over 1999. In the first quarter of 2001, diamond output increased by 78.5 per cent to 3,885 carats when compared to the output of 2,177 carats for the corresponding quarter of 2000. However, there was a 27.5 decline in output compared with the last quarter of 2000, directly related to the introduction of the sanctions on the diamond trade. Since May 2001, after sanctions on Liberian diamonds were imposed, there has been no official export of diamonds from Liberia, and Central Bank statistics indicate no transactions at all.

353. Sanctions were imposed on the export of Liberian rough diamonds following the conclusions of the report (S/2000/1195). This report illustrated how diamonds far in the excess of the quality or quantity available in Liberia had been imported into Belgium. Invoices from "Liberian" firms — none on the list of licences provided by the Liberian Government — accompanied Belgian import licences. In 1999, official Liberian exports grew slightly to 8,500 carats, at an average value of US\$ 105 per carat. "Liberian" imports into Belgium declined to 1.75 million carats, but the stated value increased to US\$ 247 million, or US\$ 140 per carat.

354. Most of these diamonds were illicit diamonds from other countries, taking advantage of Liberia's involvement in the illicit diamond trade, its inability or unwillingness to monitor the use of its name internationally and the ability to use the corporate registry as camouflage. The larger illicit trade provided Liberia with a convenient cover for the export of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone although many of the so-called "Liberian" production emanated from other sources (most notably Russia), and was falsely declared "Liberian" for tax purposes.

355. With the entry into force of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001), the Government of Liberia indicated that it would comply with the ban. President Taylor wrote to the Secretary-General in a letter dated 22 March 2001, stating "A ban has been placed on the entry into Liberia of all uncertified rough diamonds from countries with certification regimes; a ban has also been placed on the export of all rough diamonds from Liberia for a period of 120 days, and pending the establishment of an internationally acceptable and transparent certification regime in Liberia." The three official diamond exporters in Monrovia were written to on 10 May by the Acting Minister of Mines emphasizing that "We further would like to inform you that during the period of this sanction, there will be absolutely no export of diamonds from Liberia until otherwise decided by the United Nations." The Government also placed Mineral Inspectors into the buying offices in Monrovia to monitor and keep record of daily diamond purchases on the internal market. These inspectors also ensured that the diamonds were only bought from legitimate diamond miners or brokers and were also tasked to certify that the Reporting Forms provided to the Dealers by the Ministry were filled in daily and correctly.




Chart 2: Diamond Export Statistics (June 1998-August 2000) showing actual Liberian diamond export versus diamond export reported by the Diamond High Council (HRD), Belgium.

356. There are currently three diamond dealers/exporters in Liberia in 2001:

- MARS Diamonds;
- The Empire Diamond Company;
- Diandorra Minerals.

In addition to these exporters, there are 12 recognized diamond brokers and 10 diamond broker agents. Liberia has 20 Diamond Mining Districts, 12 of them are all located in western Liberia, neighbouring Sierra Leone.⁴

357. The exporters reported to the Panel that these inspectors had frightened off their trade which was based on discretion. Many of their clients were fearful of entering their offices when inspectors might be nearby. The sanctions had also resulted in a cash flow crisis because they could not export diamonds, they could not get fresh cash injections to reinvest in ongoing mining. Diamond miners and brokers also complained to the Panel that they no longer got the support of rice and equipment from their sponsors, and the exporters. There is no doubt that the

⁴ 1. Gondorjah Mining District; 2. Kumbor Mining District; 3. Gbarma Mining District; 4. Weasua Mining District; 5. Camp Freeman District; 6. Bongoma Mining District; 7. Mecca Mining District; 8. Camp Alpha Mining District; 9. Boakai Camp Mining; 10. Camp Freeman Mining Agency; 11. Lower Cape Mount Mining Agency; 12. Smith Camp Mining Agency; 13. Tiapa Mining Agency; 14. Monsterrado Mining Agency; 15. Kolahun Mining Agency; 16. Monsterrado County; 17. Gibi/Kakata Mining District; 18. Sanniquellie Mining District; 19. Bahn Mining District; 20. Butuo Mining District.

artisanal trade in rough has been impacted by the embargo providing additional hardship to those who seek to make a living out of this sector. Some miners and brokers had tried to diversify into alluvial gold, but low world gold prices until after the events of 11 September in the United States made this unattractive. The artisanal trade is a significant employer in Liberia, some estimated 20,000 to 30,000 people in the rural areas are dependent on the trade.

358. The imposition of an embargo on the export of Liberian rough, coupled with progress in the peace process in Sierra Leone, has resulted in a marked decline of diamonds labelled as "Liberian" reaching international markets. There have been no imports from Liberia recorded in Antwerp since the imposition of the sanctions.

Table 5
Rough diamond imports from West African countries as recorded by HRD Belgium

	2000		2001 (till August)	
	1 000 ct	BEF million	1 000 ct	BEF million
Sierra Leone	82	560	121	665
Côte d'Ivoire	398	2 514	349	1 359
Guinea	796	6 514	567	4 344
Gambia	140	863	34	280
Liberia	413	2 904	8.7	61

Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, Belgium.

359. The embargo has created a different problem. Since it is impossible to sell Liberian rough officially, dealers and brokers are seeking to camouflage their Liberian diamonds as those from neighbouring countries markets. The Chairman of the Diamond Dealers of Liberia admitted to have had Liberian diamonds he had tried to sell in Freetown rejected by an evaluator. However, he admitted that smuggling of Liberian rough regularly occurred with stones that could be passed as Sierra Leonean or Ivorian being put in mixed parcels to avoid detection; those that were too distinctive were smuggled to other West African countries before being exported to Europe.

360. There is no doubt that despite the official efforts of the Liberian Government, smuggling with and without official knowledge continues from Liberia. Neighbouring countries are also more attractive for smuggling as they command better prices per carat and less harassment and diversion by officials of profits.

361. The Panel itself verified ongoing smuggling of Liberian rough to Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. In Bo, Sierra Leone, a dealer interviewed by the Panel specialized in buying Liberian rough. The dealer, a Sierra Leone national, had lived many years in Liberia and his Liberian brokers travelled from Liberia via Zimmi to Bo to trade with him. He claimed that the Sierra Leone Certificate of Origin scheme made it easier for him to launder Liberian rough, rather than having to go through complicated smuggling efforts through other West African countries. Since the Sierra Leone Army deployed in Zimmi in early September 2001 there had,

according to this dealer, been a significant decline in the rough he was receiving from Liberia.

362. Diamonds from Nimba County in Liberia are smuggled out via Danane to Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel was told of three dealers in Abidjan that had become specialists in laundering Liberian rough since the diamond embargo entered into force in May. Investigations by the Panel confirmed that two dealers operated through the Hotel Ivoire in Abidjan, using a Lebanese middleman who carried the parcels from Monrovia.

363. Liberian rough also appears to have been smuggled out of Lofa County to Guinea. Rebel LURD supporters admitted to the Panel that they had seized diamonds during their operations in Lofa County and had sold them to Guinean brokers in Conakry.

364. The issue of so-called "Gambian" diamonds continues to remain a matter of concern. Gambia, a non-diamond producing country, continues to figure as a source of diamonds in markets like Antwerp. Investigations by this Panel found dealers in Liberia and Sierra Leone travelling regularly to Banjul. Despite this trade, the Gambian authorities insisted that they have never had any record of an official diamond transaction through Gambia nor a smuggling incident on its territory.

365. In Liberia, uncorroborated stories refer to high-level go-betweens, senior government officials, and financial transactions made on behalf of President Taylor. Several individuals linked to the diamond trade complained that although the artisanal trade was suffering from the embargo, President Taylor and his senior officials sponsored ongoing diamond production and had special arrangements for the export of high value stones. One Lebanese businessman, who had for many years worked in the diamond trade in central Africa, claimed that he could not enter the diamond trade in Liberia because any high-quality operation was controlled by President Taylor. He has since entered into the timber business, which he claimed was less in the grip of the Executive Mansion.

366. Diamonds feature prominently as an interest of people associated with the Bureau of Maritime Affairs. This has been dealt in detail under "Maritime and Corporate Registry".

367. Sanjivan Ruprah's role in sanctions-busting to Liberia through the Bureau of Maritime Affairs was already described in the report (S/2000/1195). Ruprah is also involved in the diamond business and he told the Panel he had interests in a diamond mine in Liberia, the Liberian Diamond Mining Corporation. Carlos Alberto La Plaine, a Portuguese associate of Sanjivan Ruprah, assisted several sanctions-busting flights to Monrovia: on his immigration card in Uganda, where one of the arms trafficking planes was stopped, he gave his profession as "diamond dealer".

368. When Leonid Minin was arrested in Italy, he had in his possession a significant quantity of polished and rough diamonds valued at around US\$ 500,000. In the documents seized by Police from Minin at the time of his arrest, documents of a Mauritian diamond company called Black Stella Diamonds and letters showing Minin's attempts to set up a diamond-exporting chain from West Africa, through a polishing plant in Mauritius to Russia and China, were also found. Minin's office in Liberia also had diamond weighing equipment in it.

369. RUF ex-combatants talk of having brought diamonds to Liberia for President Taylor but admit this practice has declined. Several RUF officials said Ibrahim Bah, operating from Burkina Faso, has continued to obtain diamonds from senior RUF figures, including from General Sesay and these are then smuggled via Liberia or Côte d'Ivoire to Europe.

Diamonds and the RUF

370. The Panel also observed a steep increase in trade of diamonds mined by RUF through Freetown. Many of these stones passed through Makeni from the Kono fields but lesser numbers reached dealers in Kenema and Bo before entering the official system. Approximately half of Sierra Leone's total production comes from the Kono/Koidu district. The main interest of Freetown traders is Koidu, the capital of the Kono diamond fields. The city is ruined, but diamond digging continues apace, even undermining the foundations of the ruined buildings in the town. The traders bring in diesel, petrol, soap, rice, second-hand clothes and other consumer goods in return for diamonds, cassava and mangoes. RUF maintains a firm grip of all high-value stones and all diggers are taxed by the former rebels. The traders then sell the stones they have bought to licensed dealers in Sierra Leone or smuggle the stones to elsewhere in West Africa. A large number of these traders are from Mali or Gambia. There are indications that RUF collects millions of dollars a year, through taxation of the diamond trade and direct sales to smugglers of these diamonds, even though they often sell stones to smugglers at a discount.

371. In early July 2001, at the Third Tripartite Meeting of the Government, RUF and UNAMSIL, RUF and the state-backed civil militia Civil Defence Force (CDF) agreed to a moratorium of diamond mining in Kono under UNAMSIL supervision. But this ban immediately failed, ignored by all. When UNAMSIL attempted to implement the ban in Koidu, local residents protested, demanding to know how they should now make their living without diamond revenue and there has been no further attempt in Koidu to implement the agreement.

372. When police raided a premise of a Lebanese businessman suspected in illicit diamond trade in August 2000, they were surprised to find RUF spokesman Gibril Massaquoi present, with a bag containing at least US\$ 15,000. Papers confiscated at the house indicated that Bassem Mohamed, code named "Shark" by RUF had been organizing diamond deals. One paper showed he was organizing payment to Emmanuel Shallop/Mirib Shallop of Belgium for washing plants and batteries. Shallops, according to the documents, were to be paid through a bank in Geneva, Switzerland. In another incident, in July 2001, Massaquoi testified to police in a complaint about being defrauded that during a deal to obtain 69 vehicles for RUF he had provided an individual US\$ 110,000 in cash and 2,600 carats of gold. Both incidents indicate that RUF is not short of ready cash, its origin mostly from the diamond trade.

373. Following the imposition of a diamond embargo on Liberia, the closure of the border till September 2001 and the war in Lofa County, little diamond trade now passes through to Liberia from Sierra Leone. This shift in trade pattern is reflected also in the dramatic decline in so-called "Liberian" rough entering markets like Antwerp and a steep decline in the number of diamonds passing through Monrovia. The pressures on other revenue sources in Liberia for Executive Mansion extrabudgetary expenditure demonstrates once again the importance that diamonds

had played over the last few years for President Taylor. Because of the loosening of President Taylor's grip on the Kono/Koidu diamond trade, the RUF axis has switched to increasing trade through Sierra Leone.

Certificate of Origin schemes

Sierra Leone

374. The adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1306 (2000) on 5 July 2000, resulted in a ban on the import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone except those authorized with a Certificate of Origin from the Sierra Leonean Government.

375. Following a trilateral mission of the United Kingdom, the United States and Belgium in July 2000, the Certificate of Origin Monitoring System was set up for imports of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone under United Nations Security Council resolution 1306 (2000). The certification regime was approved by the Security Council on 6 October 2000 and became operational from 27 October 2000.

376. The Certificate of Origin regime consists of a specifically designed tamperproof printed Certificate of Origin, in combination with a set of rules that forms the export and import procedure. According to the Government "Under the system only diamonds that are legally mined are allowed to be exported. Legally mined means that they come only from areas under the control of the Government of Sierra Leone, and are the product of a chain of legally authorized transactions, from use of land, permission to mine, purchase by authorized dealers and agents, and export by licensed exporters". The Government of Sierra Leone has set up a Cabinet subcommittee to monitor all diamond exports, oversee the implementation of Security Council resolution 1306 (2000) and report to the Cabinet periodically.

377. The Government reports that the system is working reasonably well. The volume of exports and particularly the quality of stones entering the system has improved, providing important tax revenue to central government.

378. During its investigations in Sierra Leone, the Panel observed that although this system was working, there was no doubt that smuggled stones from Liberia were being laundered through the system. The GGDO evaluators were rejecting stones and a Liberian dealer admitted he had had stones rejected in Freetown, but other stones, especially from areas along the Liberian border, Lofa County and Weasua were entering the official system. The same is true of a much larger volume of diamonds originating from RUF-managed alluvial production. This is not necessarily the fault of the GGDO evaluators but rather a reflection of weak monitoring by a government agency in the diamond buying centres such as Bo and Kenema.

379. As long as all the diamond fields in Sierra Leone have not been brought under government control, these deficiencies will continue. Freetown can only investigate the origin of larger diamonds, not for every carat brought to the capital. Moreover, the Government rightly fears that when the controlling system is implemented too rigorously, buyers might prefer to go to countries in the region where the Certificate of Origin has not been introduced yet and where the old paperwork, the mere letterhead of a country is still considered sufficient for customs in the importing

markets for diamonds. The country address on the invoice from the sending country is then recorded as "country of provenance".

Table 6
Diamond export figures under the certification scheme

<i>Month</i>	<i>Total carats</i>	<i>Value (US\$)</i>
October 2000	28 450.60	4 470 424.41
November 2000	12 128.75	1 079 695.58
December 2000	9 702.16	938 014.60
January 2001	13 486.10	1 991 773.84
February 2001	15 384.67	1 909 276.29
March 2001	20 055.63	2 685 334.87
April 2001	14 440.58	1 821 237.48
May 2001	16 996.96	2 156 765.00
June 2001	15 652.29	2 154 917.36
July 2001	18 161.11	2 154 668.90
August 2001	16 509.67	2 280 402.42
September (till 10th)	6 397.27	827 898.47
Total	187 335.79	24 470 409.22

Source: Government Gold and Diamond Office, Bank of Sierra Leone, Freetown.

Diamond revenue in Sierra Leone to fund rural development

Taxation of the alluvial diamond trade is fraught with difficulties. Several years ago, donor-appointed consultants recommended that a 2.5 to 3 per cent taxation of the actual value of the diamonds would drive the trade underground. A recent World Bank study estimated that US\$ 138 million worth of diamonds was exported from Sierra Leone in 1999, of which only US\$ 1.2 million was legal. The Government currently levies a 3 per cent tax on the value of exports by dealers. The Government in August announced that one quarter of this revenue would be allocated to rural chiefdoms located in areas where alluvial mining occurs. These funds will then be earmarked to improve local schools, health clinics and community projects and will be divided according to the number of mining licences granted in each chiefdom. This could provide local authorities with an incentive to crack down on illegal mining. This is the first time that the Government has allocated diamond mining for community development schemes since mining began in 1956 under the alluvial diamond-mining scheme.

Guinea

380. Guinea has followed the lead of Sierra Leone. In June 2001, it introduced a Certificate of Origin scheme, which is controlled by the centralized "Bureau national d'expertise de diamants et autres gemmes" (BNE). The BNE diamond evaluation office in Conakry is housed in the "Banque centrale de la republique de Guinée" and a second office is in Kankan, the second exclusive diamond buying centre of the country. According to the Ministry of Mines, Geology and the Environment, the certificate system is working well. According to statistics from the BNE, Guinea exported in 2000 some 369,263 carats and up to July 2001, some 264,140 carats worth of diamonds. The value of the annual production going through the official system was around US\$ 40 million. The Certificate of Origin is certainly an improvement in the Guinean diamond business but smuggling is still a major problem. The Guinean Ministry of Mines underlined that only a few years ago, no diamonds at all were being exported through the official system. According to official estimates, around 65 per cent of all diamonds produced are still leaving Guinea illegally. Controlling authorities clearly face a lack of capacity in terms of equipment, training of customs agents and border controls in general, in an area where borders are very porous.

Liberia

381. The Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy has produced a draft certificate of origin and has sought assistance from the United Nations and the Diamond High Council for technical support to print. The draft certificate is based on the model encouraged by the Kimberly Process. The Ministry, in conjunction with the Central Bank of Liberia plans to open a centralized evaluation office in the bank, where diamonds for export would be evaluated, certified and put in sealed packages ready for export.

382. The Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy is well-versed on the progress of the Kimberly process and obtained a travel exemption from the Security Council Committee to attend the London meeting in September 2001 and subsequently held consultations with the Belgium Diamond High Council in Antwerp.

Côte d'Ivoire

383. Côte d'Ivoire has also participated at some of the Kimberly process meetings and has expressed an interest in having a regional certification scheme. Currently, Côte d'Ivoire has nine licensed export dealers of diamonds but the Panel found evidence of a number of other dealers who exported diamonds, including Liberian rough as Ivorian. In 2000, 320,207 carats were exported from Côte d'Ivoire. By September 2001, 290,407 carats had been exported.

The challenge of alluvial diamonds

384. The experiences of Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire show how difficult it actually is to separate out conflict diamonds from other alluvials. Better monitoring, increasing the cost of getting caught and the requirement to state the source of a stone (origin) rather than just the provenance (country) could help this process. A better definition of origin would help this monitoring. But as with the case of Sierra Leone, without steady progress in the internal peace process, it is

difficult to see how the distinction between government and RUF diamonds can be maintained effectively.

Recommendations on diamonds

385. The Panel encourages the Liberian Government to put in place a credible and transparent certification scheme which is independently audited by an internationally recognized audit company. This scheme should be independently assessed as credible and effective in order to facilitate the consideration of a suspension of the diamond ban by the Security Council. This would also alleviate the genuine hardship that artisanal miners, brokers and dealers are currently experiencing.

Other measures

386. Regular and accurate publication of official annual rough diamond import/export statistics is crucial. Currently, only Belgium publishes a detailed list. A better international library of each diamond type, from each region and detailed records of run-of-mine alluvial samples in conflict zones would also be an important step forward in this region. It is also important that countries issue their own certificates of origin that are consistent with a fully integrated certification system. But in the end, the only guaranteed way to resolve the conflict diamond issue is to create conditions in a country that result in the label "conflict" being made redundant. Under such conditions, the principal challenge of the alluvial diamond trade in West Africa would be to curtail endemic smuggling for tax evasion purposes. Sierra Leone's attempt to redistribute diamond revenues back into the community is part of a solution.

Liberian maritime and corporate registries

Origins of the registry

387. Liberia's maritime and corporate registry is of international repute. It has also been a steady source of revenue for the Liberian Government. From 1949 to 1999, the registry remitted around US\$ 700 million to the Government. During the 1990-1996 civil war and interim period, revenue from ship registry represented 90 per cent of total state budget. Previously, it had been 10-15 per cent. Today, the revenues account for about 50 per cent of the country's official budget, according to the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, although figures provided by the Ministry of Finance suggest it is closer to 25 per cent.

388. In 1948, the Monrovia-based International Trust Company was founded. A United States-based off-shore maritime registry opened and the first commercial ship was registered on 11 March 1949. This registry later became the International Registries Inc of Virginia (IRI) which administered the registry until 1999.

389. In the 1970s, the Liberian registry, coupled with a bank in Monrovia, operated by the International Trust Company of Liberia, grew to approximately 75 million tons. Liberia held the number one position for shipping tonnage registered under its flag until 1994.

390. In 1990, the IRI began dealings with the Marshall Islands registry. In 1991, the Marshall Islands had 28 ships of 4.2 million dwt on its registry; by 1997, the fleet was 168 ships dwt. The decision by IRI to adopt the Marshall Islands register in addition to maintaining the Liberian registry, marked a period of decline for Liberian registered tonnage.

391. In February 1997, Liberia filed a case alleging that IRI principals were diverting owners from the Liberian register to the Marshall Islands register and that Monrovia was unable to get hold of details of the registry finances. The Government sought an end to the IRI/Marshall Islands partnership and opening of its books. The newly appointed Liberian Commissioner for Maritime Affairs, Benoni Urey, alleged at the time that US\$ 60 million per year was generated by the registry, of which Liberia received US\$ 15-18 million. Financial statements from IRI show a remittance of US\$ 18,596,274.63 (82 per cent of profit) to the Government in 1998. The company kept a further 18 per cent for its own fees.

392. An IRI projection of funds to be generated by the corporate and maritime registry in 1999 estimated a total revenue of US\$ 27,465,000, out of which US\$ 5,100,000 went to IRI as fees and US\$ 8,370,000 in expenses for the Deputy Commissioner Fees and Expenses. According to the Central Bank of Liberia, the maritime registry provided the Government US\$ 15.2 million in 1999.

393. Commissioner Urey also announced in 1997 that the IRI's contract to run the registry until 2006 was not valid because it was not struck with a legitimate government but with one of the factions during the country's seven-year civil war, and thus not binding on the Taylor administration elected earlier in the year.

394. In June 1998, a Virginia Court dismissed efforts by IRI to prevent a challenge from the Liberian Government and in September, IRI filed a claim of libel against Liberia and alleged that the Marine Investigation and International Participation Fund (MIIP) had been abused since it had been handed over to Liberian control in 1998. This US\$ 7 to 8 million fund was used to pay IMO dues, casualty investigation, and expenses for the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs. IRI also insisted that it had presented audited accounts to Liberia since 1986.

395. As the legal battle wore on, growing increasingly bitter with time, Liberian flag owners began to voice serious concerns over the future stability of the register. Chevron pulled four tankers out of the registry as a direct result of the dispute.

396. Finally, in April 1999, both protagonists announced a truce and an out-of-court tripartite Settlement Agreement was finally reached in May. Monrovia agreed to drop its US\$ 60 million claim against IRI. On 7 May 1999, the Government of Liberia, IRI and its affiliates and the LISCR signed a settlement agreement, claiming to have resolved all their outstanding disputes. The agreement specified that LISCR would assume total management of the Liberian maritime registry and corporate programmes on 1 January 2000 and IRI would fulfil its contractual obligations to Liberia till then. IRI would continue to administer the Marshall Islands maritime and corporate programmes. The agreement was effective from 1 January 2000, although the company was required to operate during a transition period beginning 1 June 1999.

397. The truce was short-lived. In May 2001, IRI levelled charges against LISCR in a 25-page writ seeking US\$ 10 million in unspecified damages from it. IRI claimed that LISCR had not fulfilled its obligations under the May 1999 Settlement

Agreement under which LISCR agreed to make certain lump-sum payments, and subsequently periodic payments calculated as a percentage of revenues generated. LISCR filed its reply in June 2001, denying the alleged breaches of the Settlement Agreement and making detailed counterclaims.

398. Charles Taylor began to seek a replacement to IRI in 1996 while he was still only a member of a six-person Council of State established to run Liberia under the Abuja Accord. Taylor had failed to raise funds during the war from IRI and wished to replace them. He began with seeking the assistance of a close friend, United States attorney Lester Hyman, to seek a new company to run the registry. On 18 December 1998, an agreement was signed between the Government of Liberia and Lester Hyman for the creation of LISCR. This was further approved by an Act enacted by the Liberian Senate and House of Representatives on 18 March 1999.

399. Lester Hyman had fallen in and out of favour with Charles Taylor a number of times. Hyman assisted Taylor's cause during the lengthy Abuja peace negotiations. He also succeeded in getting the United States record on Taylor's escape from a Massachusetts jail expunged. Mr. Hyman and his law firm, Swidler Shereff Friedmann were registered under the United States Foreign Agent Registration Act on behalf of the Republic of Liberia. He also became a shareholder of LISCR and was the nominal chair of the LISCR Board until January 2001. Yo ram Cohen, the Chief Executive Officer of LISCR had worked for Hyman previously and had been recruited by him to manage LISCR.

The role of LISCR

400. The Government of Liberia appointed LISCR as its exclusive agent to manage the corporate and maritime registers with effect from 1 January 2000, although the company was required to operate during a transition period beginning 1 June 1999.

401. From January 2000, the LISCR Trust Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of LISCR, LLC, was given statutory authority to act as the sole registered agent for corporations registered in Liberia but not having a place of business there. The contract between LISCR and the Liberian Government is for 10 years with the provision for renewal. The contract is substantially similar to that in effect prior to the appointment of LISCR.

402. According to the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, the ship register is the political responsibility of the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs, appointed by the President. The corporate register is the political responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

403. LISCR is based in Vienna, Virginia, USA, where ship safety, inspection, compliance, manning, and accident-and-incident investigation are managed. LISCR has an office in New York, where traditionally Liberian ship registrations and ship mortgage recording take place. LISCR has a number of representative offices outside the United States.

404. LISCR is meant to retain approximately 66 per cent of the fee of income of the corporate register to cover operating costs and profit and the remainder is paid to the Treasury of the Government of Liberia. LISCR retains 20 per cent of tonnage fees and 80 per cent is paid to the Treasury. While 60 per cent of the total income generated by the registers is retained by LISCR, 5 per cent is paid over as dues to the International Maritime Organization and 35 per cent is paid to the Treasury.

405. Liberia is an active participant in the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations. Presently, the contributions of Liberia to IOM amount to 8.23 per cent of the income of that United Nations body and are paid directly by the management company from fees collected from the ship registries. Liberia has paid its full assessment up to and including the year 2000 and UK£ 819.34 of its 2001 assessment which is now due (it owes UK£ 1,494,271.66). LISCR is responsible for paying the dues and in 2000 transferred funds allocated for MIIPS funds to cover IMO dues.

Second largest maritime fleet in the world with high technical standards

406. By October 2001, Liberia's gross tonnes stood at 55.8 million. The net tonnes were 30.0 million. There were in 2001, 157 new registrations and 154 cancellations to date (22 of these were scrapped). With 1,734 vessels registered under its flag, Liberia is the second largest maritime fleet in the world. The register has traditionally had a high proportion of tanker tonnage. In January 2001, Liberia accounted in tonnage for 35 per cent of all the world's oil tankers. There are also significant numbers of bulk carriers and registered cruise ships. The average age of new registrations is 6.0 years and the average age of cancellations is 15.7.

407. The register is generally regarded as one of the quality open registries (called by some, flag of convenience) with the fleet having a relatively low average age and below average PSC detention rate. The casualty figures are also low. Liberia appears on all White Lists, including the IMO and all port state control authorities worldwide.

Accounting for the revenue at LISCR

408. Foreign shipping companies pay competitive fees for Liberian registration. Non-resident companies do not pay tax. The cost of registering a Liberian company was around US\$ 4,200. Following the transfer of management of the registry from IRI to LISCR, a price war among other registers opened up. And on 1 July 2000, LISCR introduced a new scale of fees and all initial registration fees were waived until the end of 2001. In 2000, the Liberian registry and corporate fee programme generated some US\$ 25.72 million officially which netted, according to the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, some US\$ 18 million for the Government.

409. LISCR has ring-fenced the revenue it generates from the maritime and corporate registries. Their accounts are audited annually by Arthur Andersen LLP, an auditing firm of international repute, and these audits were open to inspection by the Panel. The collection of Registry revenues and government taxes and fees, and any subsequent distribution of funds due to the Government, is accomplished in accordance with the agreement between LISCR and the Liberian Government.

410. Collections are initially deposited into one of several Registry bank accounts, dependent upon the nature of the collection, and as specified in the Agreement. All Registry bank accounts accepting collections are located at the Branch Banking & Trust Company (BB&T). All collections are deposited at a Branch account in Washington, D.C., with the exemption of those corporate receipts that are directed to BB&T's LockBox operation in North Carolina.

411. LISCR's accounting department records the collections and classifies them as Registry revenues (which are retained to cover operating costs), LISCR (registered agents and maritime fees), or Government funds (which consist of Tonnage Taxes and a percentage of MIIPS fees, and annual and specified fees charged to clients by acts of law). Weekly, amounts due to the Government are disbursed to an Embassy of Liberia, Maritime Finance Office account at Riggs Bank, Washington, D.C., which is then transferred through the Citibank system to an account at the Ecobank in Monrovia. The MIIP's funds go to a Bureau of Maritime Affairs account at Chevy Chase Bank, Maryland, USA. LISCR holds two joint LockBox Accounts with the Bureau of Maritime Affairs in the United States, one for the overheads of the maritime programme and a second one for receipts of the tonnage tax as there is a complex-sharing arrangement.

412. The above is routine procedure. However, the Panel obtained bank transfer details for two LISCR transfers to San Air General Trading Account No. 01-01-5712572-01 at Standard Chartered Bank, Sharjah, the United Arab Emirates for US\$ 525,000 on 21 June 2000 and US\$ 400,000 on 7 July 2000 (annex 10). These payments were made from LISCR's New York office account (No. 5162058071) at BB&T. These two payments were for arms and transportation in violation of Security Council resolutions. The sanctions-busting activities of San Air General Trading are documented in the Arms and Transportation Section.

413. LISCR admitted to the Panel that it had made four payments to non-governmental accounts in 2000. The disbursements were made following four separate written requests instructing LISCR, from the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs through his Deputy Commissioner of Financial Affairs (DCFA) to redirect a pending distribution of the Government's share of the Registry collection to a non-governmental account. In addition to the two payments to San Air General Trading in the United Arab Emirates, a payment was made to an undisclosed account at Ecobank in Monrovia and to Riggs Bank in Washington, D.C.

414. Each of the transfers were appropriately accounted for as a distribution to the Government of its share of taxes and was acknowledged by the Bureau of Maritime Affairs. These payments appear in the Arthur Andersen audit as US\$ 1,175,569 for "Fees to DCFA" and were taken out of the government share of the MIIPS funds. LISCR did not at the time conduct any due diligence on whom and for what these payments were for.

415. LISCR had become increasingly uncomfortable at the growing regularity of requests for divergence from standard procedure in late 2000. Following a new request for disbursement on 17 August 2000, LISCR informed the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs that it would no longer honour such requests.

416. Having found resistance from LISCR, Commissioner Urey then changed his strategy, writing to his Deputy Commissioner for Financial Affairs on 13 September to authorize one payment of US\$ 200,000 on 13 September 2000, one payment of US\$ 174,000 on 20 September 2000 and one payment of US\$ 174,000 on 27 September 2000. According to a copy of Urey's letter in the Panel's possession, these amounts were to be transferred to the Maritime Affairs Account at the Ecobank in Monrovia for onward transmission to the San Air General Trading Account in Sharjah, "via: the account of S. Ruprah" (annex 9).

417. These transfers from the Maritime Account correspond with the issuing of a US\$ 200,000 cheque (No. 0019119) from the BMA Ecobank account in Monrovia (Account 10610001812018). This cheque was written out to "Sanjivan Ruprah", dated "13 September 2000" and signed by Commissioner of Maritime Affairs Benoni Urey.

418. Ruprah transferred US\$ 179,980 to San Air account 00-01-5712572-01 in Sharjah on 16 September 2000. Ruprah also used an employee, Jacques Gakali, to make three subsequent payments from Monrovia to San Air. A final payment of US\$ 74,965 was made on 2 January 2001.

419. On 16 November, LISCR received a further request from the DCFA to distribute to a non-governmental account. LISCR refused, generating a series of demanding letters from DCFA over the next 10 days and political pressure from Monrovia to comply. LISCR eventually decided to distribute the funds in question to three recognized Government-controlled bank accounts and since December 2000 there has to date been no further Bureau of Maritime Affairs interference in LISCR's distribution of funds to the Government.

Accounting for the revenue in Monrovia

420. According to official documents of the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, the Government's portion of the funds collected directly by the LISCR programme are deposited directly into a government account that is operated exclusively by the Minister of Finance and not the Commissioner. The Bureau of Maritime Affairs is supposed to then be allocated 10 per cent of these funds to support its operational budget, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gets 6 per cent and 4 per cent to the Ministry of Information. The Commissioner for Maritime Affairs also spoke of a "LockBox" bank account shared jointly by LISCR and his Bureau in Monrovia.

421. Further investigation proved both these claims to be untrue. Funds are remitted directly to a tripartite account held at the Ecobank in Monrovia, which the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs and the Minister of Finance are signatories with a third determinational signatory controlled by the Executive Mansion. The Executive Mansion is able to call on these funds at will. The Ministry of Finance admitted that in 2001, due to increased defence expenditure, there had been significant diversion of the maritime funds for extrabudgetary use by the Executive Mansion. This partly would account both for the increased BMA deficit and the decline in accounted incoming maritime revenue by the Central Bank, although the gross shipping tonnage registered by LISCR continues to see growth.

422. According to the Central Bank of Liberia's Annual Report 2000, maritime revenue generated L\$ 609.03 million (US\$ 15.2 million) in 1999. It brought in L\$ 190.25 million (US\$ 4.8 million) by 30 June 2000, indicating a decline of L\$ 139.64 or 42.3 per cent when compared with the same period in 1999. In the second half of the year, according to the Central Bank, this was L\$ 527.46 (US\$ 13.2 million), a rise of 12.6 per cent (a total of US\$ 18 million). In January - February 2001, it generated L\$ 21.31 (US\$ 0.5 million); March - April, L\$ 23.73 (US\$ 0.51 million); May - June, L\$ 65.81 (US\$ 1.37 million) — a decline of L\$ 72 (US\$ 1.62 million) compared with the same period in 2000. The Ministry of Finance's figures for 2001 provide much higher remittances than those registered by the Central Bank of Liberia. This significant discrepancy between the figures

remitted and the figures registered by the Central Bank are mainly due to very high extrabudgetary demands on these funds by the Executive.

423. The IMF in September 2000, in its Concluding Statement, following an IMF staff visit to review the January-June 2000 Staff Monitored Programme (SMP) expressed its own concern about the shortfall in maritime revenue. It reported that "the continued decline in maritime inflows is troublesome and should be reviewed closely so that remedial measures can be taken if necessary. The transfer of maritime operations to a new agent on 1 January 2000 led to a delay in collection of corporate registration fees, explaining part of the decline". IMF's suspicion was correct. The remittance figures for August through October 2000 showed a dramatic decline compared with the same months in 1999: the reason for this decline was the authorized diversions by Benoni Urey to Sanjivan Ruprah for payment to San Air General Trading.

Table 7
Maritime revenue collected, 1998-2001
(in US\$)

Month	1998	1999	2000	2001
January	1 695 958.04	536 431.67	648 326.02	2 312 540.00
February	1 165 156.24	1 706 231.24	448 500.00	929 550.00
March	633 269.76	766 119.41	759 500.00	672 050.00
April	714 022.22	1 032 869.91	850 000.00	858 161.00
May	1 100 920.00	852 298.00	550 000.00	569 408.00
June	2 695 718.33	3 326 278.47	1 500 000.00	1 975 829.00
July	1 596 851.19	1 330 600.79	4 500 000.00	581 822.00
August	512 071.35	666 244.29	200 000.00	579 676.00
September	629 210.84	537 668.19	0	
October	516 106.78	417 864.32	200 000.00	
November	810 934.16	545 042.04	430 794.44	
December	5 270 979.50	3 481 025.29	11 905 672.54	
Total	17 341 199.39	15 225 674.54	17 942 793.00	8 479 036.20

Source: Revenue Accounts Division, Ministry of Finance, Monrovia.

The role of the Bureau of Maritime Affairs

424. The Bureau of Maritime Affairs originally functioned under the Ministry of Finance, but following the creation of the Ministry of Transport, it was transferred to that Ministry. On 20 June 1989, through an Act of Legislature, the Bureau was granted autonomous status. The Commissioner is officially the only senior official appointed by the President according to documentation provided by the Bureau. However, it is evident that the appointment of Ms. Agnes Taylor, an ex-wife to the President, as Permanent Representative to the International Maritime Organization and a Deputy Maritime Commissioner in London, was a political rather than professional appointment.

425. LISCR is the Agent for the Office of Deputy Commissioners of Maritime Affairs and as such has a close relationship with the Bureau of Maritime Affairs. Minister Plenipotentiary and Senior Deputy Commissioner John Morlu and Deputy Commissioner for Merchant Marine Personnel and radio and seamen ID, George Arku, share offices with LISCR at its headquarters in Virginia and are integrated in the official employee list. The New York office also hosts Deputy Commissioner Victor Douba and Assistant Commissioner Alfred Mensah. LISCR also shares space with the Liberian Permanent Mission to IMO in London.

426. In recent years, there appears to have been deficits in the Bureau of Maritime Affairs (BMA) operational budget. For example, in fiscal year 2001, the BMA expected a total income of US\$ 1,900,000 for its Monrovia operation against total expenditures of US\$ 2,025,880.63. In fiscal year 2000, LISCR provided an extra US\$ 2,125,372 in additional revenue to cover overexpenditure in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner.

427. Benoni Urey ordered the LISCR payments to San Air in June, July and September 2000. The Panel also has bank details showing that on 5 October 2000, the Bureau of Maritime Affairs in Monrovia transferred US\$ 149,980 from its Ecobank account in Monrovia to San Air in Dubai — further evidence that BMA funds from Monrovia were used to pay for sanctions-busting.

The case of Gerald Cooper

428. Gerald Cooper's case shows that the Bureau of Maritime Affairs has engaged in sanctions-busting before. Gerald Cooper was the Permanent Representative to IMO in London and a Deputy Commissioner of Maritime Affairs. On 5 February 1998, United States Customs seized a Hummer armoured vehicle with a hardened point to attach a weapon with a value of US\$ 146,260, in Savannah, Georgia. The vehicle was being exported to Liberia via Côte d'Ivoire without an export licence, thereby contrary to United States law and regulations and a contravention of the United Nations arms embargo on Liberia.

429. An investigation in the United States revealed the United Kingdom broker for this deal was to be the Liberian Purchasing Agency Europe (LIPAE) Inc. which operated from an address in London and the sole director was a Nigerian national named Liam Ge, who is also the director of the Liberian Purchasing Agency Europe Ltd. A United States broker called Mr. Aikhuele using a company named IMIOTA was also involved. Further investigations showed that payments were made from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the IMO Bank of Scotland Account and from LIPAE Ltd at Barclays Bank Plc to Aikhuele and Boomershine Pontiac of Smyrna, Georgia, who held the dealership for the Hummer vehicle. British police investigations provided documentation on Gerald Cooper's involvement in the transaction and there was further evidence that Cooper visited Atlanta in January 1998 for discussions with Mr. Aikhuele about the destination of the vehicle and the possibility of ordering three more vehicles with hardened points.

430. On 12 February 1999, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office requested the Government of Liberia to waive Cooper's diplomatic immunity so that he could be interviewed about these transactions. On 27 April 1999, the Liberian Embassy in London declined to waive the immunity and claimed that Cooper had acted in an "official capacity" on behalf of the Government of Liberia; that the

Embassy of Liberia had no specific knowledge of Article 3 (1) (c) of United Kingdom Order 1993 which enacted the United Nations arms embargo on Liberia.

431. On 8 July, Mr. Cooper was declared persona non grata with immediate effect. Mr. Cooper and all members of his family left the United Kingdom. He is now resident in the United States. According to interviews with and official correspondence from the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, Gerald Cooper is a "Senior Vice President of the Liberia International Ship and Corporate Registry". LISCR told the Panel in August that "Gerald is an independent contractor, he is not LISCR and LISCR is not he", and his name does not appear on their official employee list for 2001 or on their payroll, suggesting once again that what the Bureau of Maritime Affairs claims can be unreliable. LISCR had not investigated Cooper's past, prior to hiring him as a consultant, but admitted that they were "aware that he had to leave the United Kingdom under a cloud, but do not know exactly why".

The cases of Sanjivan Ruprah and Benoni Urey

432. In addition to Gerald Cooper's efforts to break the arms embargo in 1998 and 1999, the Panel found that Sanjivan Ruprah, a "Deputy Commissioner of Maritime Affairs", and a consultant to the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, had played an important role in violating the arms embargo.

433. Officially, Ruprah was known by several individuals in Liberia as a consultant to the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, and he is known to have travelled in the capacity of Deputy Commissioner of Maritime Affairs in several European countries using Liberian diplomatic passports. Remarkably, Ruprah used two different diplomatic passports, one issued in Liberia on 24 March 2000 under the name Sanjivan Ruprah, the other on 23 August 2000 under the name Samir Nasr.

434. The Liberian Commissioner of Maritime Affairs, Benoni Urey, denied knowing Mr. Ruprah. However, Sanjivan Ruprah stayed in Monrovia until January 2001, the time when the Sierra Leone report of the Panel of Experts became public, in Liberia. Ruprah told the Panel he had stayed in the house of the former Chief of Police. This was confirmed by several officials in Liberia. The house is in Old Congo Town By-pass in a quiet residential district in Monrovia. Mr. Urey was practically Mr. Ruprah's neighbour.

435. There is more evidence linking Ruprah to Benoni Urey. Ruprah was one of the Global Civil Aviation agents appointed by the Ministry of Transport in Liberia. These agents were entitled to issue certificates of registration for aircraft, a situation that caused the total corruption of the Liberian aviation registry. This Panel obtained more documents showing Ruprah carried official documentation in this respect. One of those, sent by Ruprah to show his appointment by the Ministry of Transport as an agent of the Liberia Civil Aviation Regulatory Authority to a business partner abroad, showed that it was faxed on 7 December 1999 from a fax machine in Monrovia that identified itself as the "Maritime Bureau", the office of the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs in Liberia, Mr. Urey. The address of the recipient is Sanjivan Ruprah, Liberia Civil Aviation Regulatory Authority, Old Congo Town By-pass, which is again the house almost opposite to that of Benoni Urey's. The Panel was also told that Ruprah was a prominent guest at the funeral of Benoni Urey's mother in 2000.

436. Mr. Ruprah is also a close business partner of Victor Bout. He himself acknowledged this in an interview by the Panel and the Panel has documents to prove this close relationship. In this capacity, Ruprah also set up the ghost airline West Africa Air Services, as is described in the section in this report on the violations of the arms embargo. The Panel obtained a copy of a contract agreement between West Africa Air Services and the airline company Renan in Moldova for the leasing of a cargo aircraft. The plane was used, as shown in this report, for weapons transport. This was also acknowledged by Mr. Ruprah and by the pilot of the aircraft. The contract shows that the leasing contract was signed, on behalf of West Africa Air Services, by Mr. LeRoy Urey. LeRoy Urey is the older brother of Mr. Benoni Urey.

437. The West Africa Air Services operation was run through San Air of the United Arab Emirates by Ruprah. As we have already seen, Urey insisted that LISCR make payments to their accounts in June and July 2000 and also authorized a direct BMA payment to San Air on 10 September 2000. These payments were for delivery of weapons including 1,000 submachine guns that were smuggled from Uganda to Liberia.

438. Commissioner Urey also authorized his Deputy Commissioner for Financial Affairs on 13 September to authorize three payments in September 2000 to the Maritime Affairs Account at the Ecobank in Monrovia for onward transmission to the San Air General Trading Account in Sharjah, "via: the account of S. Ruprah". These transfers from the Maritime Account correspond with a payment made by Sanjivan Ruprah for US\$ 179,980 to San Air's account on 16 September 2000 (annex 9).

Diamonds and maritime affairs

439. Commissioner Urey also maintains a number of other business interests including farming, cellular telephones and diamonds. He is a sponsor of a number of diamond mining concessions including at Smith Camp and at Cape Mount. The Panel saw many articles on conflict diamonds among the BMA's files in Monrovia and Urey admitted to love diamonds, although he denied breaking the diamond embargo. The association of diamonds with the maritime business is not new. Two separate retired United States Generals associated with the maritime agents have been involved in unofficial diamond transactions. While working for IRI, one of these retired Generals sponsored the activities of a diamond broker and was caught by the authorities at Roberts International Airport with undeclared rough diamonds in 1999.

Maritime officials on the travel ban

440. Agnes Reeves-Taylor, Gerald Cooper, Benoni Urey, the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs, Sanjivan Ruprah, a businessman and deputy commissioner of maritime affairs and Ms. Wessa Dennis, a Deputy Commissioner for Public Affairs at the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, are listed by the Security Council Committee as persons affected by resolution 1343 (2001) on Liberia and are on the United Nations travel ban list. Two of the named persons are known to have violated the ban by travelling without an exemption issued by the Security Council Committee. Sanjivan Ruprah, based since early 2001 in Brussels, has travelled regularly, including to Washington, D.C. and Abidjan. Benoni Urey, the Maritime Affairs

Commissioner travelled without an exemption from the Security Council Committee to Abidjan on Ghana Airways flight 533 on 29 August 2001.

The Liberian Corporate Registry

441. The Liberian Corporate Registry, managed by IRI and since 2000 by LISCR, has also been used for diamond transactions. The Panel of Experts in Relation to Sierra Leone documented how numerous non-resident corporations used the 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, postal address of the off-shore registry as a convenient label of origin for transactions for smuggled diamonds. This practice has declined following the United Nations imposition of a diamond embargo on Liberia but the Panel has found the address was still used for other types of illicit activity. In this report the case is described of over 1,000 submachine guns that were smuggled from Uganda to Liberia. The broker in this case was acting through the company Culworth Investment Corporation, with an address in 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia. Culworth joined the registry in 1992 and paid its annual bills until 1997. It became operational again in 2000 around the time of the West Africa Air Services operation. It seems to be an off-the-shelf company used at particular times to provide cover for sensitive business.

442. The 80 Broad Street postal address in Monrovia was used by the International Bank of Liberia Ltd (owned by IRI) up to April 2000 (it then moved to 62 Broad Street) when it was transferred to LISCR for the purpose of continuity in the operation of the off-shore registry. LISCR is the sole registered agent in Liberia for managing legal documents or other notices for the non-resident corporation wherever in the world that management may be.

443. The Liberian Corporate and Maritime Registries provide an important source of revenue to a poor country. The maritime registry is of international repute but it is vulnerable because of the use of the funds it generates for opaque off-budget expenditure including for sanctions-busting.

Recommendations on the Liberian Corporate and Maritime Registry

444. An escrow account should be set up by the Security Council Committee as the ultimate destination for all revenues generated from the shipping and corporate registry. The Panel believes that the Government of Liberia and IMF should reach an agreement to audit this account in order to determine all revenues generated by the shipping and corporate registry and to determine the use of the revenue in this account. The funds in this account should be designated for development purposes.

Part IV

The Travel Ban and States compliance to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001)

The Travel Ban

445. Paragraph 7 of resolution 1343 (2001) states:

“The Security Council ...

7. (a) *Decides also* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of senior members of the Government of Liberia and its armed forces and their spouses and any other individuals providing financial and military support to armed rebel groups in countries neighbouring Liberia, in particular the RUF in Sierra Leone, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 14 below, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse entry into its territory to its own nationals, and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede the transit of representatives of the Government of Liberia to United Nations Headquarters to conduct United Nations business or the participation of the Government of Liberia in the official meetings of the Mano River Union, ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity;

(b) *Decides* that the measures imposed by subparagraph (a) above shall not apply where the Committee established by paragraph 14 below determines that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation, or where the Committee concludes that exemption would otherwise promote Liberian compliance with the demands of the Council, or assist in the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the subregion;”

446. The Committee established by resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 14, issued the list of persons to be affected by this Travel Ban on 4 June 2001 (document SC/7068). The Travel Ban has, in the Panel's opinion, been the most effective sanction. Indeed, the Government had agreed with IMF as part of the January to June 2000 Staff Monitored Programme, to “Freeze all non-essential foreign travel” by the end of December 1999. The Fund concluded in its November 2000 report that this had only had “limited effectiveness”. The Ministry of Finance in Monrovia admitted that there had been a significant saving on government travel revenue due to the ban although they declined to provide the Panel their figures for travel in 2000 for comparison. However, the Panel did obtain official rates of the per diem allowances for government officials when abroad. They include the President (US\$ 600 per day); Vice President (US\$ 500 per day); Cabinet Ministers and Heads of ministerial agencies, accredited Ambassadors, Army Chief of Staff (US\$ 400); all Deputy Ministers, non-accredited Ambassadors, Heads of departmental agencies (US\$ 250 per day); and all Assistant Ministers, Deputy Head of departmental agencies (US\$ 200 per day).

447. The Travel Ban has been the source of the greatest number of complaints received by the Panel. Individuals on the list requested to know on what grounds their names had been placed on the list and how to appeal. In each case, the Panel referred them to the Security Council Committee as the appropriate body responsible for drawing up the list. The Panel does believe that the list should not be set in stone, and that for humanitarian reasons some names should be dropped. The

Panel also believes that the Committee should consider new names and should also properly publicize and set up an effective system to consider applications for travel exemptions for the duration of the Travel Ban.

448. The Panel actively sought to monitor compliance with the Travel Ban. The Panel examined all commercial flight manifests from Roberts International Airport although a request to Spriggs Payne for similar access to their manifest records were not forthcoming despite two meetings with the Director of Spriggs. Table 8 shows the names of individuals that the Panel believes violated the Ban. Some of these individuals such as George Haddad (he is a Lebanese passport holder) and Simon Rosenblum (holds Côte d'Ivoire residency) are able to travel to their homes. Mohammed Salamé has also travelled regularly from Abidjan to Monrovia and back.

Table 8

Persons affected by resolution 1343 (2001) who have travelled from Liberia in violation of the Ban between 7 June and 1 October 2001

<i>Date</i>	<i>Flight number</i>	<i>Name of person</i>	<i>Ports of embarkation/ disembarkation</i>	<i>Seat number</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1 October	Sabena SN 678	Taylor E./Mrs.	ROB-AMS	31-A	Kiia Tai Joseph Wong
		Carbah/F. M.	ROB-YUL	4-H	
		Wong/K. Mr.	ROB-BEY	5-G	
24 September	Sabena SN 678	Retfell/V. Ms.	ROB-TLV	7-H	
29 August	Ghana GH 571	Urey/B. Mr.	ROB-ABJ		
14 August	Ghana Airways GH 521	Ailen/C.	ROB-Accra		
11 August	Weasua 005	Salamé/M.	ROB-ABJ		
7 August	Weasua 005	Taylor/E.	ROB-ABJ		
6 August	Sabena SN 678	DeShield/C.	ROB-IAD	10-K	Waiver granted
5 August	Weasua 003	Gibson/M.	ROB-FNA		
		Minor/B. G.	ROB-FNA		
		Ward/A.	ROB-FNA		
5 August	Weasua 005	Dennis/J. Mr.	ROB-ABJ		
26 July	Ghana Airways GH-533	Basma/J.	ROB-ABJ		
24 July	Weasua 005	Gaye/A.	ROB-ABJ		
23 July	Weasua 005	Ward/A.	ROB-FNA		
22 July	Weasua 005	Kafel/M.	ROB-ABJ		
		Rosenblum/S.	ROB-ABJ		
16 July	Sabena SN 678	Haddad/G. Mr.	ROB-BEY	4-C	
2 July	Sabena SN 678	Gibson/M. Ms.	ROB-BOS	34-K	
27 June	Ghana Airways	Gaye/A.	ROB-Accra		
11 June	Sabena SN 678	Neal/J. M.	ROB-BRU	5-H	
7 June	Weasua 005	Salamé/M.	ROB-ABJ		

The case of Alphonso Gaye

449. On 27 June, the Director of the National Port Authority, Alphonso Gaye, arrived at Accra International Airport on a Ghana Airways flight from Monrovia. When attempting to enter Ghana carrying a Liberian diplomatic passport (D.00723-00) he was detained at the airport for 24 hours by the immigration authorities. Gaye claimed he was transiting Ghana to a conference in Togo. He was eventually released and returned to Monrovia. The Ghanaian authorities at Accra airport remain very vigilant over the travellers from Monrovia, especially those carrying Liberian diplomatic passports.

The case of Jamal Basma

450. Jamal Basma, a Lebanese informal adviser to President Taylor, travelled on a Liberian diplomatic passport to Abidjan on 26 July to have a number of meetings, including with TotalFinaElf with whom he has a long-standing business relationship. Late on 27 July, he was arrested by the "Direction de la surveillance du territoire" (DST) at the Hotel Sofitel in Abidjan and held for a number of days, and cross-examined on allegations that he was seeking to support Ivorian dissident groups. Eventually with assistance of TotalFinaElf, the intervention of the Liberian Government, and the assistance of the Ivorian Consul, Prosper Kotchi, Basma was finally released and escorted to the airport on 3 August. According to Ivorian officials, he was detained because of his violating the United Nations travel ban, but this would not explain why he had been permitted entrance into the country in the first place.

The case of Gus Kouwenhoven

451. Gus Kouwenhoven, the manager of Hotel Africa and RTC and partner in OTC is a Dutch passport holder, but also holds a number of other passports, including a Liberian diplomatic one. He has regularly travelled to and from Liberia, although his name appears on the Travel Ban list. He does not deny this travel to the Panel, admitting to important business in Congo, Brazzaville, where he is opening a hotel. His name does not appear on the airline manifests at Robertsfield International Airport, although he has been seen on international flights. This has led the Panel to conclude that he travels under a different name.

452. Kouwenhoven has visited Abidjan on a number of occasions since the Travel Ban has entered into force. The Panel has confirmed and obtained documentation that Kouwenhoven visited Abidjan on official government business in June. A printout of his hotel bill at the Hotel Sofitel showed that it had been booked by the Embassy of Liberia in Abidjan (annex 11). After staying there he moved to the Hotel Ivoire for an extra few days. Kouwenhoven also visited Abidjan in early August for a stop-over prior to travelling on to Brazzaville. He was met at the plane and escorted through the airport arrival procedures by the same Ivorian official who had helped Jamal Basma during his deportation to Liberia a few days before.

The Côte d'Ivoire loophole

453. Abidjan airport is the main loophole in better implementation of the Travel Ban. Panel members visited Abidjan five times during the Panel's investigation and found that the authorities had not informed their immigration and security people at the International Airport about the Travel Ban. The Panel itself had provided in

August the Ban Lists to airport and government officials. The authorities at the airport said they could only act upon the list if given instructions by central government. Despite the Panel's many requests, central government did not assist the Panel in its efforts to document and monitor violations of the ban in Abidjan. The Panel found that Côte d'Ivoire was deliberately uncooperative, despite the frequency of visits and requests for assistance.

454. The Ivorian authorities need to assist the United Nations in establishing a system at Abidjan airport to check that arriving passengers from Monrovia are not on the Travel Ban list or hold a United Nations travel exemption.

Wider implementation

455. The Panel is aware that many countries have tightened their vetting process of visa applications by Liberian nationals. Switzerland and the United Kingdom have reported rejections of visa applications by individuals on the list. One Ambassador reported he had been offered rough diamonds on behalf of an individual on the list to obtain a visa. Sierra Leone has refused Liberian delegations entry on two occasions when they tried to travel to Freetown without an official United Nations travel exemption. In the Philippines, Maxwell Poe has been attending a 23 July to 31 August summer programme at Trinity College, Quezon City, resulting in an exchange of correspondence between the college and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.

Recommendations on the Travel Ban

456. The Panel encourages the Security Council Committee to reply to individual requests about the ban promptly and expeditiously. The Panel also recommends that the Committee set up a Liberia Travel Ban web page where the Committee's criteria on how names have been put on the list is described. The web page should also provide information on how to apply for travel exemptions and have a section on who currently has an exemption to travel. This web site should be publicized as a resource for immigration and law enforcement agencies to keep track of who is on the Travel Ban list, and who has exemption.

457. The United Nations Secretariat's Sanctions Department, in consultation with the Committee, should also compile a photographic database of key individuals on the Ban list to counter attempts by a number of individuals on the list to travel under a different name. These photographs could be put on the web site.

458. The Panel does not believe that the list should be set in stone. For humanitarian reasons, a few names should be dropped; the Committee should also consider new names, too.

459. A loophole at Abidjan airport needs urgent attention. The Council should strongly encourage the Ivorian authorities to adopt a less passive attitude towards the implementation of the Travel Ban. A verifiable system should be set up at Abidjan airport to check that arriving passengers from Monrovia are not on the list or if they are, they have obtained a United Nations travel exemption.

Compliance with Security Council resolution 1343 (2001)

Liberia's compliance with resolution 1343 (2001)

460. The President of Liberia acknowledged receipt of resolution 1343 (2001) through a letter dated 22 March sent by the Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations. In this letter, the President claimed to have taken the following initiatives consistent with the demands of the Security Council:

(a) Expulsion of all members of RUF from the territory of Liberia, closing down of RUF contact office and banning of all RUF activities in Liberia;

(b) Closure of border between Sierra Leone and Liberia;

(c) Ban on the entry into Liberia of all uncertified rough diamonds from countries with certification regimes and ban on export of all rough diamonds from Liberia, pending establishment of an internationally acceptable and transparent certification regime in Liberia;

(d) Freezing of assets of RUF and its members;

(e) Order for grounding of all Liberian-registered aircraft and revocation of all these registrations.

461. In the sections above, the Panel has shown that on the issue of diamonds and Liberian-registered aircraft there has been some movement. On other issues there has been less progress. The RUF have not all been expelled from Liberia and Sam Bockarie, "Mosquito", although not a full-time resident of Liberia, currently continues to enjoy Presidential favour. The arms embargo also continues to be violated. The Travel Ban is generally respected by senior ministerial officials, who are seeking travel exemptions.

Notification by other States of compliance

462. The Panel found it difficult to comprehensively assess the compliance of other States in enforcing Security Council resolution 1343 (2001). Implementation and compliance are important and the Panel recommends that future resolutions contain a regular reporting requirement by States to the Security Council Committee on their compliance efforts.

Ideas for continued monitoring of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001)

463. The United Nations Secretariat should appoint a Liberia officer within the Sanctions Department of the Department of Political Affairs. This person should conduct ongoing monitoring of compliance of resolution 1343 (2001) from New York, develop databases of violation reports and dispatch letters of request and make telephone enquiries about such reports. This person should also act as an in-house researcher from the Security Council Committee, able to assist such as in monitoring compliance of the Travel Ban and requests for travel exemptions. A self-standing motivated United Nations Secretariat staff member, with administrative support from the assistants to the Committee could fill this requirement efficiently and cost-effectively. The Angolan Monitoring Mechanism already has attached to it a political officer who has efficiently conducted a number of these tasks.

464. There should be an ongoing assessment of Liberia's compliance with resolution 1343 (2001) on the ground, too. A way to achieve this in a targeted and cost-effective manner is to renew the mandate for this Panel of Experts for two short periods in 2002 to visit West Africa with the Liberia officer appointed by the Secretariat. These missions should be:

- An assessment mission by the Panel to Liberia and neighbouring States for a period of four weeks starting in April 2002, to investigate and compile a short report on compliance. This report, an independent audit of compliance with recommendations, would then be submitted through the Committee to the Council for consideration in May 2002;
- A second six-week mission to Liberia in September 2002, resulting in a final submission to the Committee in November 2002. This report would also be an independent assessment of total progress of the sanctions regime and the Government of Liberia's compliance over the year.

465. The advantages of this system are that it would, over the year, enhance Secretariat capacity to monitor compliance of resolution 1343 (2001). It also uses the expertise of the Panel in a targeted and cost-effective manner and ensures that the momentum created by the Panel's work in 2001 is not lost.

Annex 2**Meetings and consultations****Austria****Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies**

GPML (Global Programme against Money Laundering) in the office of
UNODCCP

UNDCP (United Nations Drug Control and Crime Prevention)

INCB (International Narcotics Control Board)

Belgium**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Task Force Kimberley Process)

Ministry of Economic Affairs

Diamond High Council (Hoge Raad voor Diamant)

Private sector

Paul La Roche, Liberia World Airlines, Ostend

Civil society

Christian Dietrich, IPIS

Media

Dirk Draulans, Knack

Walter De Bock, De Morgen

Burkina Faso**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Defence

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP

Cameroon**Government**

Ministry of External Relations

Ministry of Transport

Civil Aviation Authority

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

France

Liberia

Switzerland

UNDP
United Kingdom
United States

Canada

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

Cape Verde

Two members of the Panel participated in "the 13th Africa and Indian Ocean Planning and Implementation Regional Group Meeting on Civil Aviation". In the margins of the meeting, discussions were held with:

Director of Operations (DG ASECNA)
Chiefs of Air Navigation Services of Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Niger
Director of Air Navigation and Regulatory Services of Uganda
Director of Air Traffic Services of Ghana
Chief of Air Navigation Services of Central African Republic
Director of Civil Aviation and Chief of Air Navigation of Equatorial Guinea
Administrator and Technical Director of DRC

Central African Republic**Government**

Ministry of Mines
Ministry of Civil Aviation and Transportation
Ministry of Interior
Director General of Civil Aviation
Director of Cabinet of the Prime Minister

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

France
UNDP

Côte d'Ivoire**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Transport
Interpol Sub-Regional Bureau
Sub-Prefecture of Man
Secretary General of the Prefecture of Biankouma
Prefecture of Guiglo

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

ASECNA
Canada
Germany
Israel
Liberia
Netherlands
United Kingdom
UNDP
UNHCR
WFP

Civil society

Centre for Democratic Empowerment
Modern Africa

Private sector

Management of hotels Sofitel, Novotel, Ivoire, Tiama, Gulf

Others

General Robert Guei
Liberian Refugees camp Nicla
Yussuf Sanon, Weasua Airlines
Ambassador at large Mohamed Salame
Jean-Francois Guillotte, Air Continental
Dieudonne Essienne, Former Ambassador in Moscow for Côte d'Ivoire
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Unity Party of Liberia

Czech Republic

Ivan Feranec, CTK, Prague

Equatorial Guinea**Government**

Director General of Civil Aviation
Director General of Telecommunications

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP

France**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

Interpol Headquarters in Lyon

Private sector

ATIBT (Association Technique Internationale des Bois Tropicaux)
IFIA (Interafrican Forest Industries Association)

Others

Centre d'études africaines, L'Ecole des Hautes en Sciences Sociales
La Lettre du Continent

Gambia**Government**

Permanent Secretary and Chief of Defence Staff
Director General of Customs & Central Excise
Director General of Civil Aviation
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Baba Jobe, Office of the President

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP

Ghana**Government**

Civil Aviation Authority
Immigration Services

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP

Private sector

Ghana Airways

Guinea**Government**

Ministry of Mines, Geology and Environment
Director General of Civil Aviation
National Agency of Air Navigation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence (Defence Equipment Procurement Division) Central Bank
of Guinea
National Army
Prefecture of Gueckedou
Local Correspondent of "Agence Guinéenne de Presse" in Gueckedou
Prefect and Chairman of local Collectivities in Macenta
Governor of the Region of Nzerekore
Prefecture of Nzerekore
Commander of Nzérékoré Airport

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

Canada
 France
 Ukraine
 United Kingdom
 United States of America
 World Bank
 Office of Roberts Flight Information Region (FIR)
 UNDP
 UNHCR

Private sector

Société de Gestion de l'Aéroport de Conakry

Others

Liberian Refugees in camp Kouakan
 Liberian Refugees in camp Kola
 Mohamed Yansane, Pecos Compagnie SA
 Fatoumata Y. Yansane, Notary for Pecos Compagnie SA

Italy**Government**

Public Prosecutor Monza, Dr Walter Mapelli
 Consultants to the Prosecutor's office, Mr. Bruno Brugnani and Ms. Elizabetta Brugnani
 Massimo Alberizzi, Corriere della Sera, Milan

Others

Leonid Minin, ETTE (interviewed in Busto Arcizio Prison)

Kazakhstan**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Multilateral Cooperation Department
 International Security Section
 Non-tariff Regulation and Export Control Section
 Head Illegal Operations Section
 Chief Specialist in International Relations
 Civil Aviation Committee
 Division of Civil Aviation Activities Regulation
 Ministry of Defence
 National Security Committee
 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources

Kenya

International Air Transport Association (IATA)
 International Civil Aviation Organization (East & Southern Africa Regional
 Office)
 UNDP

Kyrgyzstan**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Ministry of Defence
 Minister of Transport & Communications
 Deputy Secretary of the Security Committee
 National Security Service
 Deputy Director of Air Transport and Air Space Use,
 Air Management Head of Department

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP

Private sector

National Aba Joldoru company

Liberia**Government**

Liberia's Task Force on UNSC resolution 1343 (2001)
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Ministry of Lands, Mines & Energy
 Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs
 Ministry of Transport
 Ministry of Revenue
 Ministry of Defence
 Ministry of Justice
 Ministry of Finance, Bureau of Customs & Excise
 Commissioner of Maritime Affairs
 Director of Civil Aviation
 Governor of Central Bank of Liberia
 Manager of Roberts International Airport
 National Port Authority of Liberia
 Gbatala Army Training Centre
 Ministry of Commerce and Industry
 Liberian National Police

Private sector

Association of Liberian Loggers
Diamond Brokers Association
Denco Shipping Lines, Inc.
Diamond dealers:

- Diandorra Minerals
- Empire Diamond Company
- MARS Diamond Company

Gold and Diamond Miners and Workers Union (GODIMWUL)
Forest Hill Corporation
Inland Logging
Hotel Africa
Liberia Timber Association
Oriental Timber Company (OTC)
Royal Timber Company (RTC)
Stevfor Inc.

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

Democratic Republic of Congo
Egypt
European Union
Guinea
India (Hon.)
Sierra Leone
UNDP
UNICEF
UNOL
United Kingdom (Hon.)
United States

Civil society

Catholic Justice & Peace Commission
Centre for Democratic Empowerment
GTZ (Germany)
Liberian Interfaith Council
Liberian National Bar Association
Médecine sans Frontières (MSF-France)
Oxfam (UK)
University of Liberia Press Club

Media

BBC
The Enquirer
The News
Press Union of Liberia
Kiss FM
Voice of America

Others

Prisoners of War held in Monrovia, belonging to CDF and LURD
IDPs from Lofa County
AFL and other armed militias in Lofa County
Ghassan Bassma, Africa Motors
Gus Kouwenhoven, O.T.C.
Simon Rosenblum, Getrac

Mali

State Protocol
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Civil Aviation Authority
UNDP

Moldova**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Ministry of Defence

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP

Private sector

Pavel Igorevich Popov, Moldtransavia Airlines
Andrei Grosul, Renan Air company
Siloci Iurie, Operations Manager CCM VICH

Others

Captain Garabet, Renan Airlines/West Africa Air Services

Namibia

Directorate of Civil Aviation

Netherlands

African Studies Centre, University of Leiden

Niger**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Transport
Civil Aviation Authority

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation en Afrique et à Madagascar
(ASECNA)
UNDP

Norway**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UN and Africa Departments)

Russian Federation**Government**

Ministry of Finance (Gokhran)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (International Organisations Department and
Africa Department)
Ministry of Transportation (External Affairs Department of the State Service of
Civil Aviation)

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

Côte d'Ivoire
Kyrgyzstan

Private sector

Valery Cherny, Avia Trend and Ecotrend company
Boris Fedoulov, Paramount Airlines

Senegal**Government**

Ministry of Interior
Direction de l'aviation civile

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

AFCAC (African Civil Aviation Commission)
ASECNA
ICAO (West and Central Africa Regional Bureau)

Sierra Leone**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Mineral Resources
Ministry of Trade
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Civil Defence Force
Customs and Excise

Port Authority
 National Security Adviser
 Sierra Leone Army
 Sierra Leone Police (Police Headquarters, CID, Special Branch and several other departments of Police)
 Sierra Leone Defence Headquarters

Private sector

Paramount Airlines
 Rex Diamonds
 Several diamond dealers in Bo and Kenema

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project for Sierra Leone (CCSSP)
 NCDDR
 UNDP
 United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General
 UNAMSIL

- officers and officials deployed in Daru, Kenema, Koidu, Yengema, Moyamba, Bouya,
- a wide range of officers and officials in Freetown

 United Kingdom
 United States
 Sierra Leone Ambassador to Liberia

Civil society

Campaign for Good Governance
 CRS (Catholic Relief Services)
 Chiefs and Elders from Kono District
 Human Rights Watch
 International Crisis Group
 International Human Rights Law Group
 International Medical Group

Media

BBC
 Independent
 PBS Frontline
 Radio UNAMSIL
 Reuters
 Wall Street Journal

Others

Chief Tony Chenyere, Diamond Airlinesm Freetown
 Gibril Massaquoi, spokesman for RUF
 Omrie Golley, Political & Peace Council, RUF/SL
 Paolo Palizzeri, owner of Cape Sierra Hotel Freetown

Roger Crooks, Mammy Yoko Hotel, Freetown
Ze'ev Morgenstern, Rex Diamonds

Slovak Republic

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials
Police Headquarters (several branches of Police)
Ministry of Economic Affairs
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Transport and Communications

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP

Spain

Fernando Robleda, ETTE

Switzerland

Government

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (United Nations & International
Organizations; Financial & Economic Affairs)
Federal Customs Administration (Berne)
Federal Department of Justice and Police
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
Money Laundering Reporting Office (MROS)

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
WHO

Private sector

JP Airline Fleets International
HSB Republic Bank (Suisse) S.A.
Company Met A.S. Laussane

Civil society

International Committee of Red Cross
Small Arms Survey

Media

Bruno Vanoni, Tagnes-Azeiger
Martin Stoll, Facts

Others

Erkki Tammivuori, Company Met A.S. (Laussane)

Turkey**Government**

General Directorate for Security
Ministry of Defence (National and Economic Affairs)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Africa and East Asia Affairs)
Under Secretariat of Foreign Trade

Private sector

Company Met A.S. Turkey

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP
Finland

Uganda**Government**

Commissioner of Customs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Director General of Civil Aviation
Ministry of Defence (Military Intelligence)

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP

Ukraine**Government**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Interior
Customs Department
Department of Civil Aviation
State Export Control
State Security Service
National Security Directorate
Border Control Authority
Ministry of Defence

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP

Others

Vadim Rabinovic

United Arab Emirates**Government**

Civil Aviation Authorities in Dubai, Sharjah and Ras al Khaema
Port Authorities at Saquer Port

Private sector

Damas Jewellery (President of Jewellery and Diamond Trade in U.A.E.)

Others

Sergei Bout, AirCess
Serguei Denissenko, San Air General Trading and Centrafrican Airlines

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**Government**

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Nations and Africa Departments)

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

IMO
UNIC

Private sector

De Beers
International Air Management
Standard Chartered Bank Limited
Willis Group Ltd. London

Civil society

Amnesty International
Global Witness
Human Rights Watch
International Alert
International Federation of Transport Workers
Oxfam (UK)

Media

Africa Analysis
Africa Confidential
BBC
Economist Intelligence Unit
Financial Times
Reuters
West Africa Magazine

United States of America**Government**

Department of State
Department of Defence

Private sector

IRI
LISCR
World Diamond Council
Rapaport Diamonds

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

IMF (International Monetary Fund)

Missions to the United Nations:

- Bangladesh
- Belgium
- Canada
- China
- France
- Gambia
- India
- Ireland
- Italy
- Jamaica
- Netherlands
- Russian Federation
- Sierra Leone
- Singapore
- Tunisia
- Ukraine
- United Kingdom
- United States

United Nations (DPA, DPKO, OCHA, UNDP)

Civil society

Amnesty International
Human Rights Watch

Media

The Perspective
PBS Frontline
Wall Street Journal

Others

Alhaji Koroma, ULIMO (K)
Peter Sprung, Attorney

Other locations /

Sanjivan Ruprah, West Africa Air Services/arms dealer
LURD representatives

Notes

- ¹ A number of individuals have played a key part in some of the events noted in this report. The Panel appreciates those who agreed to be interviewed.
- ² Given the sensitive nature of the subjects being investigated by the Panel, many individuals, however, spoke under conditions of confidentiality. Several interviewees have therefore not been listed.

69) United Nations Document

Statement by the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council
S/PRST/2000/24 (17 July 2000)

69) United Nations Document

Statement by the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council
S/PRST/2000/24 (17 July 2000)



Security Council

Distr.: General
17 July 2000

Original: English

Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the 4173rd meeting of the Security Council, held on 17 July 2000, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Sierra Leone", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council expresses its full support for the decision taken by the Secretary-General to mount a military operation by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to relieve its surrounded peacekeepers and military observers at Kailahun. It expresses its satisfaction at the successful outcome of the operation, with the minimum of casualties among United Nations personnel. The Security Council expresses its admiration for the professionalism, determination and robustness displayed by all the UNAMSIL forces involved in this difficult and dangerous operation, and for the leadership and skill of the Force Commander, General Jetley, under whose personal command it was carried out.

"The Security Council believes that the hostile stance taken by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) towards UNAMSIL personnel at Kailahun had become intolerable. It fully concurs with the Secretary-General's assessment in this regard. It is firmly of the view that, after over two months' denial of freedom of movement by the RUF; the exhaustion of intensive diplomatic and political efforts; and the recent decision by the RUF to impede the resupply to Kailahun, the Force Commander, under these circumstances, had no choice but to take resolute action to restore the security and freedom of movement of UNAMSIL personnel, as authorized under the mandate of UNAMSIL.

"The Security Council pays tribute to the forces of the Indian contingent of UNAMSIL, who took the lead in the execution of the operation. The Council expresses its profound condolences to the family of the Indian sergeant, Krishna Kumar, who gave his life in the cause of peace. It also expresses its sympathies to those who were wounded. The Security Council commends equally the critical role played by the Nigerian and Ghanaian contingents who provided essential flank and rear support, without which the operation would not have been possible; as well as the contribution of the force as a whole. The Council also expresses its appreciation to the United Kingdom for the valuable logistical support provided. The cooperation, coherence and sense of common purpose displayed by all concerned should be

considered an example of the very best in United Nations multilateral peacekeeping.

“The Council believes that there is now a firm foundation on which UNAMSIL can build as it continues to implement its mandate and work towards a lasting peaceful settlement to the conflict in Sierra Leone. While noting these positive developments, the Council recognizes that there is still much to be done, and expresses its full support to UNAMSIL in its efforts to implement its mandate.”

70) United Nations Document

Statement by the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council
S/PRST/2000/14 (4 May 2000)

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
4 May 2000

Original: English

Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the 4134th meeting of the Security Council, held on 4 May 2000 in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Sierra Leone", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council expresses its grave concern at the outbreak of violence in Sierra Leone in recent days. It condemns in the strongest terms the armed attacks perpetrated by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) against the forces of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and their continued detention of a large number of United Nations and other international personnel. The Council expresses its outrage at the killing of a number of United Nations peacekeepers of the Kenyan battalion and its deep concern for the UNAMSIL troops who have been wounded or remain unaccounted for.

"The Security Council demands that the RUF end its hostile actions, release immediately and unharmed all detained United Nations and other international personnel, cooperate in establishing the whereabouts of those unaccounted for, and comply fully with the terms of the Lomé Peace Agreement (S/1999/777).

"The Security Council considers Mr. Foday Sankoh, as leader of the RUF, to be responsible for these actions, which are unacceptable and in clear violation of their obligations under the Lomé Agreement. The Council condemns the fact that Mr. Sankoh has deliberately failed to fulfil his responsibility to cooperate with UNAMSIL in bringing these incidents to an end. The Council believes that he must be held accountable, together with the perpetrators, for their actions.

"The Security Council commends UNAMSIL forces and the Force Commander for the courage, resolve and sacrifice they have shown in attempting to bring this situation under control. It expresses its full support for their continued efforts to this end, and for the overall fulfilment of their mandate. It calls upon all States in a position to do so to assist the Mission in this regard. The Council also expresses its support for the regional and other international efforts under way to resolve the crisis, including by the Economic Community of West African States.

"The Security Council will continue to monitor the situation closely and consider further actions, as necessary."

71) United Nations Document

Security Council Resolution 1289 (7 February 2000) para 4.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/RES/1289 (2000)
7 February 2000

RESOLUTION 1289 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4099th meeting
on 7 February 2000

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998, 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, 1231 (1999) of 11 March 1999, 1260 (1999) of 20 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999 and 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999 and other relevant resolutions and the statement of its President of 15 May 1999 (S/PRST/1999/13),

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

Taking note of the letter to its President from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Sierra Leone of 17 January 2000 (S/2000/31),

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999 (S/1999/1003), 6 December 1999 (S/1999/1223) and 11 January 2000 (S/2000/13) and the letter of the Secretary-General to its President of 23 December 1999 (S/1999/1285),

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

1. Notes that the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as established by resolution 1270 (1999) is in the process of completion;

2. Welcomes the efforts made by the Government of Sierra Leone, the leadership of the Revolutionary United Front Party of Sierra Leone, the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States and UNAMSIL towards the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed in Lomé on 7 July 1999 (S/1999/777);

3. Reiterates its call upon the parties to fulfil all their commitments under the Peace Agreement to facilitate the restoration of peace, stability, national reconciliation and development in Sierra Leone, and stresses that the responsibility for the success of the peace process ultimately lies with the people and leaders of Sierra Leone;

4. Notes with concern that, despite the progress that has been made, the peace process thus far has been marred by the limited and sporadic participation in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, by the lack of progress on the release of abductees and child soldiers, and by continued hostage-taking and attacks on humanitarian personnel, and expresses its conviction that the expansion of UNAMSIL as provided for in paragraphs 9 to 12 below will create conditions under which all parties can work to ensure that the provisions of the Peace Agreement are implemented in full;

5. Notes also with concern the continuing human rights violations against the civilian population of Sierra Leone, and emphasizes that the amnesty extended under the Peace Agreement does not extend to such violations committed after the date of its signing;

6. Calls upon the parties and all others involved to take steps to ensure that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is fully implemented throughout the country, and in particular urges the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Civil Defence Forces, the former Sierra Leone Armed Forces/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and all other armed groups to participate fully in the programme and cooperate with all those responsible for its implementation;

7. Takes note of the decision of the Governments of Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana to withdraw their remaining ECOMOG contingents from Sierra Leone, as reported in the letter of the Secretary-General of 23 December 1999;

8. Expresses its appreciation to ECOMOG for its indispensable contribution towards the restoration of democracy and the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Sierra Leone, commends highly the forces and the Governments of its contributing States for their courage and sacrifice, and encourages all States to assist the contributing States further in meeting the costs they have incurred in making possible the deployment of ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone;

9. Decides that the military component of UNAMSIL shall be expanded to a maximum of 11,100 military personnel, including the 260 military observers already deployed, subject to periodic review in the light of conditions on the ground and the progress made in the peace process, in particular in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, and takes note of paragraph 33 of the report of the Secretary-General of 11 January 2000;

/...

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides further that the mandate of UNAMSIL shall be revised to include the following additional tasks, to be performed by UNAMSIL within its capabilities and areas of deployment and in the light of conditions on the ground:

(a) To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport;

(b) To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares;

(c) To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;

(d) To coordinate with and assist, in common areas of deployment, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities;

(e) To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction,

authorizes UNAMSIL to take the necessary action to fulfil the additional tasks set out above, and affirms that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone;

11. Decides further that the mandate of UNAMSIL, as revised, shall be extended for a period of six months from the date of adoption of this resolution;

12. Authorizes the increases in the civil affairs, civilian police, administrative and technical personnel of UNAMSIL proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 11 January 2000;

13. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General, as indicated in his report of 11 January 2000, to establish within UNAMSIL a landmine action office responsible for awareness training of UNAMSIL personnel and for the coordination of mine action activities of non-governmental organizations and humanitarian agencies operating in Sierra Leone;

14. Stresses the importance of a smooth transition between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL for the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement and the stability of Sierra Leone, and in that regard urges all those concerned to consult over the timing of troop movements and withdrawals;

15. Reiterates the importance of the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, notes that the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF have agreed in the Peace Agreement to provide

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guarantees in this regard, and calls upon all parties in Sierra Leone to respect fully the status of United Nations and associated personnel;

16. Reiterates its request to the Government of Sierra Leone to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the Secretary-General within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and recalls that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) should apply provisionally;

17. Reiterates also the continued need to promote peace and national reconciliation and to foster accountability and respect for human rights in Sierra Leone, and urges the Government of Sierra Leone, specialized agencies, other multilateral organizations, civil society and Member States to accelerate their efforts to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace as fully-functioning and effective institutions, as provided for under the Peace Agreement;

18. Emphasizes the importance of the exercise by the Government of Sierra Leone of full control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources for the benefit of the people of the country and in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 6, of the Peace Agreement, and to that end calls for the early and effective operation of the Commission of the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development;

19. Welcomes the contributions that have been made to the multi-donor trust fund established by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to finance the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and urges all States and international and other organizations which have not yet done so to contribute generously to the fund so that the process is adequately financed and the provisions of the Peace Agreement can be fully implemented;

20. Underlines the ultimate responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone for the provision of adequate security forces in the country, calls upon it, in that regard, to take urgent steps towards the establishment of professional and accountable national police and armed forces, and stresses the importance to this objective of generous support and assistance from the international community;

21. Reiterates the continued need for urgent and substantial assistance to the people of Sierra Leone, as well as for sustained and generous assistance for the longer terms tasks of peace-building, reconstruction, economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone, and urges all States and international and other organizations to provide such assistance as a priority;

22. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council every 45 days to provide, inter alia, assessments of security conditions on the ground so that troop levels and the tasks to be performed by UNAMSIL can be kept under review, as indicated in report of the Secretary-General of 11 January 2000;

23. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

72) United Nations Document

Security Council Resolution 1270 (22 October 1999) para 6.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/RES/1270 (1999)
22 October 1999

RESOLUTION 1270 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4054th meeting
on 22 October 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998, 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, 1231 (1999) of 11 March 1999 and 1260 (1999) of 20 August 1999 and other relevant resolutions and the statement of its President of 15 May 1999 (S/PRST/1999/13),

Recalling also the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September 1999 (S/1999/957) and its resolution 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999 (S/1999/1003),

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

1. Welcomes the important steps taken by the Government of Sierra Leone, the leadership of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF), the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) towards implementation of the Peace Agreement (S/1999/777) since its signing in Lomé on 7 July 1999, and recognizes the important role of the Joint Implementation Committee established by the Peace Agreement under the chairmanship of the President of Togo;

2. Calls upon the parties to fulfil all their commitments under the Peace Agreement to facilitate the restoration of peace, stability, national reconciliation and development in Sierra Leone;

3. Takes note of the preparations made for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including child soldiers, by the Government of Sierra Leone through the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, and urges all concerned to make every effort to ensure that all designated centres begin to function as soon as possible;

4. Calls upon the RUF, the Civil Defence Forces, former Sierra Leone Armed Forces/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and all other armed groups in Sierra Leone to begin immediately to disband and give up their arms in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement, and to participate fully in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;

5. Welcomes the return to Freetown of the leaders of the RUF and AFRC, and calls upon them to engage fully and responsibly in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to direct the participation of all rebel groups in the disarmament and demobilization process without delay;

6. Deplores the recent taking of hostages, including UNOMSIL and ECOMOG personnel, by rebel groups and calls upon those responsible to put an end to such practices immediately and to address their concerns about the terms of the Peace Agreement peacefully through dialogue with the parties concerned;

7. Reiterates its appreciation for the indispensable role which ECOMOG forces continue to play in the maintenance of security and stability in and the protection of the people of Sierra Leone, and approves the new mandate for ECOMOG (S/1999/1073, annex) adopted by ECOWAS on 25 August 1999;

8. Decides to establish the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with immediate effect for an initial period of six months and with the following mandate:

(a) To cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement;

(b) To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan;

(c) To that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres;

(d) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel;

(e) To monitor adherence to the ceasefire in accordance with the ceasefire agreement of 18 May 1999 (S/1999/585, annex) through the structures provided for therein;

(f) To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning;

(g) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;

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(h) To support the operations of United Nations civilian officials, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers;

(i) To provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone;

9. Decides also that the military component of UNAMSIL shall comprise a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, subject to periodic review in the light of conditions on the ground and the progress made in the peace process, in particular in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, and takes note of paragraph 43 of the report of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999;

10. Decides further that UNAMSIL will take over the substantive civilian and military components and functions of UNOMSIL as well as its assets, and to that end decides that the mandate of UNOMSIL shall terminate immediately on the establishment of UNAMSIL;

11. Commends the readiness of ECOMOG to continue to provide security for the areas where it is currently located, in particular around Freetown and Lungi, to provide protection for the Government of Sierra Leone, to conduct other operations in accordance with their mandate to ensure the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and to initiate and proceed with disarmament and demobilization in conjunction and full coordination with UNAMSIL;

12. Stresses the need for close cooperation and coordination between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in carrying out their respective tasks, and welcomes the intended establishment of joint operations centres at headquarters and, if necessary, also at subordinate levels in the field;

13. Reiterates the importance of the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, notes that the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF have agreed in the Peace Agreement to provide guarantees in this regard, and calls upon all parties in Sierra Leone to respect fully the status of United Nations and associated personnel;

14. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG;

15. Underlines the importance of including in UNAMSIL personnel with appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination;

16. Requests the Government of Sierra Leone to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the Secretary-General within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and recalls that pending the conclusion of such an agreement

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the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) should apply provisionally;

17. Stresses the urgent need to promote peace and national reconciliation and to foster accountability and respect for human rights in Sierra Leone, underlines in this context the key role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace established under the Peace Agreement, and urges the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure the prompt establishment and effective functioning of these bodies with the full participation of all parties and drawing on the relevant experience and support of Member States, specialized bodies, other multilateral organizations and civil society;

18. Emphasizes that the plight of children is among the most pressing challenges facing Sierra Leone, welcomes the continued commitment of the Government of Sierra Leone to work with the United Nations Children's Fund, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and other international agencies to give particular attention to the long-term rehabilitation of child combatants in Sierra Leone, and reiterates its encouragement of those involved to address the special needs of all children affected by the conflict;

19. Urges all parties concerned to ensure that refugees and internally displaced persons are protected and are enabled to return voluntarily and in safety to their homes, and encourages States and international organizations to provide urgent assistance to that end;

20. Stresses the urgent need for substantial additional resources to finance the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and calls upon all States, international and other organizations to contribute generously to the multidonor trust fund established by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for this purpose;

21. Stresses also the continued need for urgent and substantial humanitarian assistance to the people of Sierra Leone, as well as for sustained and generous assistance for the longer term tasks of peace-building, reconstruction, economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone, and urges all States and international and other organizations to provide such assistance as a priority;

22. Calls upon all parties to ensure safe and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in need in Sierra Leone, to guarantee the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and to respect strictly the relevant provisions of international humanitarian and human rights law;

23. Urges the Government of Sierra Leone to expedite the formation of professional and accountable national police and armed forces, including through their restructuring and training, without which it will not be possible to achieve long-term stability, national reconciliation and the reconstruction of the country, and underlines the importance of support and assistance from the international community in this regard;

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24. Welcomes the continued work by the United Nations on the development of the Strategic Framework for Sierra Leone aimed at enhancing effective collaboration and coordination within the United Nations system and between the United Nations and its national and international partners in Sierra Leone;

25. Notes the intention of the Secretary-General to keep the situation in Sierra Leone under close review and to revert to the Council with additional proposals if required;

26. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every 45 days to provide updates on the status of the peace process, on security conditions on the ground and on the continued level of deployment of ECOMOG personnel, so that troop levels and the tasks to be performed can be evaluated as outlined in paragraphs 49 and 50 of the report of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999;

27. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

73) United Nations Document

Security Council Resolution 1346 (30 March 2001)

**Security Council**

Distr.: General

30 March 2001

Resolution 1346 (2001)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4306th meeting, on
30 March 2001**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the situation in Sierra Leone,

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Expressing its continued concern at the fragile security situation in Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries, and in particular at the continued fighting on the border regions of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia and at the grave humanitarian consequences for the civilian, refugee and internally displaced populations in those areas,

Recognizing the importance of the progressive extension of State authority throughout the entire country, political dialogue and national reconciliation, the full implementation of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, the legitimate exploitation of the natural resources of Sierra Leone for the benefit of its people, full respect for the human rights of all and the rule of law, effective action on the issues of impunity and accountability, the voluntary and unhindered return of refugees and internally displaced persons, the holding by the Government of Sierra Leone of free, fair and transparent elections, and the formulation of a long-term plan for the peace process in order to achieve sustainable peace and security in Sierra Leone, and *stressing* that the United Nations should continue to support the fulfilment of these objectives,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 14 March 2001 (S/2001/228),

1. *Decides* that the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), established in its resolutions 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999 and 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000, shall be extended for a period of six months from the date of the adoption of this resolution;

2. *Further decides* to increase the military component of UNAMSIL to a strength of 17,500, including the 260 military observers already deployed, as recommended by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 99 and 100 of his report;



3. *Welcomes* the revised concept of operations for UNAMSIL as set out in paragraphs 57 to 67 of the report of the Secretary-General and the progress already made towards its implementation, and *encourages* the Secretary-General to proceed to its completion;

4. *Expresses* its appreciation to those Member States providing additional troops and support elements to UNAMSIL and those who have made commitments to do so, *encourages* the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to seek, if necessary, further properly trained and equipped forces to strengthen the military components of UNAMSIL in order to enable the mission to implement fully its revised concept of operations, and *requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Council upon receipt of firm commitments to that end;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Council at regular intervals on progress made by UNAMSIL in the implementation of key aspects of its concept of operations, and *further requests* him to provide an assessment in his next report on steps taken to improve the effectiveness of UNAMSIL;

6. *Expresses* its deep concern at the reports of human rights abuses committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and others, including other military groups, against the civilian population, in particular the harassment and forced recruitment of adults and children for fighting and forced labour, *demands* that these acts cease immediately, and *requests* the Secretary-General to ensure all human rights monitoring positions within UNAMSIL are filled in order to address the concerns raised in paragraphs 44 to 51 of the report of the Secretary-General;

7. *Expresses also* its deep concern that the Ceasefire Agreement signed in Abuja on 10 November 2000 (S/2000/1091) between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF has not been fully implemented, and *demands* that the RUF take immediate steps to fulfil its commitments under that Agreement to ensure full liberty for the United Nations to deploy its troops throughout the country, the free movement of persons and goods, unimpeded movement of humanitarian agencies, refugees and displaced persons and the immediate return of all seized weapons, ammunition and other equipment, and to recommence active participation in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;

8. *Requests*, in this respect, UNAMSIL to maintain its support, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, for returning refugees and displaced persons and to encourage the RUF to cooperate to this end in fulfilment of its commitments under the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Council his views on how to take forward the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons, including their return;

10. *Calls upon* all the parties to the Sierra Leone conflict to intensify their efforts towards the full and peaceful implementation of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement and the resumption of the peace process, taking into account the basis of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions, and *urges* Governments and regional leaders concerned to continue their full cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations to promote these efforts, and, in particular, to use their influence with the leaders of the RUF to obtain their cooperation towards achievement of the above-mentioned goals;

11. *Encourages* the efforts of ECOWAS towards a lasting and final settlement of the crisis in the Mano River Union region caused by the continued fighting in the border areas of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, and *underlines* the importance of the political support that the United Nations can provide to these efforts in order to stabilize the region;

12. *Takes note* of the responsibilities to be undertaken by UNAMSIL in support of the Government of Sierra Leone's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, notably the decision to provide an enhanced management role as referred to in paragraphs 76 to 79 of the report of the Secretary-General, *commends* the Government of Sierra Leone for the improvements it has already brought about in the programme, *encourages* it to take the necessary urgent decisions to allow finalization of the programme and dissemination of information on its benefits and conditions to proceed expeditiously, and *also encourages* international organizations and donor countries to support generously the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone in this regard;

13. *Emphasizes* that the development and extension of the administrative capacities of Sierra Leone are also essential to sustainable peace and development in the country, and therefore *urges* the Government of Sierra Leone to take the necessary practical steps to prepare for and bring about the restoration of civil authority and basic public services throughout its territory, including in the locations where UNAMSIL is expected to deploy in accordance with its concept of operations, and *encourages* States, other international organizations and non-governmental organizations to provide appropriate assistance in this regard;

14. *Encourages* the Government of Sierra Leone, together with the Secretary-General, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other relevant international actors, to expedite the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court envisaged by resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000, bearing in mind in particular the need to ensure the appropriate protection of children;

15. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's intention to keep the security, political, humanitarian and human rights situation in Sierra Leone under close review and to report to the Council, after due consultations with troop-contributing countries, with any additional recommendations, including, if necessary, for a further strengthening of the military component of UNAMSIL for the completion of the planned concept of operations to fulfil the overall objective of assisting the Government of Sierra Leone to re-establish its authority throughout the country, including the diamond-producing areas, and to create the necessary conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections in due course under the authority of the Government of Sierra Leone;

16. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

74) United Nations Document

Security Council Resolution 1313 (4 August 1999)



Security Council

Distr.: General
4 August 2000

Resolution 1313 (2000)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4184th meeting, on
4 August 2000**

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the situation in Sierra Leone,

Condemning in the strongest terms the armed attacks against and detention of the personnel of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and *commending* UNAMSIL and the Force Commander for the recent resolute action taken in response to the continuing threat towards the mission from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and other armed elements in Sierra Leone,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 19 May 2000 (S/2000/455) and 31 July 2000 (S/2000/751),

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNAMSIL until 8 September 2000;
2. *Considers* that the widespread and serious violations of the Lomé Peace Agreement (S/1999/777) by the RUF since early May 2000 constitute a breakdown of the prior generally permissive environment based on the Agreement and predicated on the cooperation of the parties, that until security conditions have been established allowing progress towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone there will continue to be a threat to UNAMSIL and the security of the state of Sierra Leone, and that in order to counter that threat, the structure, capability, resources and mandate of UNAMSIL require appropriate strengthening;
3. *Expresses* its intention, in this context, taking into account the views of the Government of Sierra Leone, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the troop-contributing countries, to strengthen the mandate of UNAMSIL as established in its resolutions 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999 and 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000 with the following priority tasks:
 - (a) To maintain the security of the Lungi and Freetown peninsulas, and their major approach routes;
 - (b) To deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force;

(c) To deploy progressively in a coherent operational structure and in sufficient numbers and density at key strategic locations and main population centres and, in coordination with the Government of Sierra Leone to assist, through its presence and within the framework of its mandate, the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend state authority, restore law and order and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under threat of imminent physical violence;

(d) To patrol actively on strategic lines of communication, specifically main access routes to the capital in order to dominate ground, ensure freedom of movement and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

(e) To assist in the promotion of the political process leading, *inter alia*, to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme where possible;

4. *Considers* that, in order to allow the restructuring of the force and provide the additional capability required for the achievement of the priority tasks set out in paragraph 3 above, the military component of UNAMSIL should be reinforced through accelerated troop rotations, as appropriate, and with, *inter alia*, further aviation and maritime assets, a strengthened force reserve, upgraded communications and specialist combat and logistic support assets;

5. *Recognizes* that the RUF offensive against UNAMSIL since May 2000 revealed serious inherent weaknesses in the mission's structure, command and control and resources, as referred to in paragraph 54 of the report of the Secretary-General of 31 July 2000, reflecting findings of the United Nations Assessment Mission which visited Sierra Leone from 31 May to 8 June 2000, *welcomes* the recommendations made and action already taken to address these deficiencies, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take further urgent steps to implement these recommendations to improve the performance and capacity of the mission;

6. *Stresses* that the successful achievement of the objectives of the mission, including the priority tasks set out in paragraph 3 above, will depend on the provision to UNAMSIL of fully equipped, complete units, with the required capabilities, effective command and control structure and capacity, a single chain of command, adequate resources and the commitment to implement the mandate of the mission in full as authorized by the Security Council;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after further consultations with troop contributing countries, to provide a further report to the Council as soon as possible on the proposals in paragraphs 2 to 6 above with recommendations for the restructuring and strengthening of UNAMSIL, and *expresses* its intention to take a decision on those recommendations expeditiously;

8. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

75) United Nations Document

Security Council Resolution 1306 (5 July 2000)

about Diamonds

United Nations

S/RES/1306 (2000)



Security Council

Distr.: General
5 July 2000

not helpful

Resolution 1306 (2000)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4168th meeting, on
5 July 2000**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the situation in Sierra Leone, and in particular its resolutions 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998 and 1299 (2000) of 19 May 2000,

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 19 May 2000 (S/2000/455), and in particular its paragraph 94,

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

A

Expressing its concern at the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, and at reports that such diamonds transit neighbouring countries, including the territory of Liberia,

Welcoming ongoing efforts by interested States, the International Diamond Manufacturers Association, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, the Diamond High Council, other representatives of the diamond industry and non-governmental experts to improve the transparency of the international diamond trade, and encouraging further action in this regard,

Emphasizing that the legitimate diamond trade is of great economic importance for many States, and can make a positive contribution to prosperity and stability and to the reconstruction of countries emerging from conflict, and *emphasizing further* that nothing in this resolution is intended to undermine the legitimate diamond trade or to diminish confidence in the integrity of the legitimate diamond industry,

Welcoming the decision taken by the member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at their Abuja summit on 28-29 May 2000 to undertake a regional inquiry into the illegal trade in diamonds,

Taking note of the letter of 29 June 2000 to its President from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations and of its enclosure (S/2000/641),

1. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory;

2. *Requests* the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure, as a matter of urgency, that an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in diamonds is in operation in Sierra Leone;

3. *Also requests* States, relevant international organizations and other bodies in a position to do so to offer assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to facilitate the full operation of an effective Certificate of Origin regime for Sierra Leone rough diamonds;

4. *Further requests* the Government of Sierra Leone to notify the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997) ("the Committee") of the details of such a Certificate of Origin regime when it is fully in operation;

5. *Decides* that rough diamonds controlled by the Government of Sierra Leone through the Certificate of Origin regime shall be exempt from the measures imposed in paragraph 1 above when the Committee has reported to the Council, taking into account expert advice obtained at the request of the Committee through the Secretary-General, that an effective regime is fully in operation;

6. *Decides* that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above are established for an initial period of 18 months, and *affirms* that, at the end of this period, it will review the situation in Sierra Leone, including the extent of the Government's authority over the diamond-producing areas, in order to decide whether to extend these measures for a further period and, if necessary, to modify them or adopt further measures;

7. *Further decides* that the Committee shall also undertake the following tasks:

(a) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

(b) To consider information brought to its attention concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

(c) To make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

(d) To promulgate such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

(e) To continue its cooperation with other relevant sanctions committees in particular that established pursuant to resolution 985 (1995) of 13 April 1995 concerning Liberia and that established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993 concerning the situation in Angola;

8. *Requests* all States to report to the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997), within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

9. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those through which rough diamonds from Sierra Leone are known to transit, and all relevant international and regional organizations to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of adoption of this resolution;

10. *Encourages* the International Diamond Manufacturers Association, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, the Diamond High Council and all other representatives of the diamond industry to work with the Government of Sierra Leone and the Committee to develop methods and working practices to facilitate the effective implementation of this resolution;

11. *Invites* States, international organizations, members of the diamond industry and other relevant entities in a position to do so to offer assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to contribute to the further development of a well-structured and well-regulated diamond industry that provides for the identification of the provenance of rough diamonds;

12. *Requests* the Committee to hold an exploratory hearing in New York no later than 31 July 2000 to assess the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict and the link between trade in Sierra Leone diamonds and trade in arms and related *materiel* in violation of resolution 1171 (1998), involving representatives of interested States and regional organizations, the diamond industry and other relevant experts, *requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary resources, and *further requests* the Committee to report on the hearing to the Council;

13. *Welcomes* the commitments made by certain members of the diamond industry not to trade in diamonds originating from conflict zones, including in Sierra Leone, *urges* all other companies and individuals involved in trading in rough diamonds to make similar declarations in respect of Sierra Leone diamonds, and *underlines* the importance of relevant financial institutions encouraging such companies to do so;

14. *Stresses* the need for the extension of government authority to the diamond-producing areas for a durable solution to the problem of illegal exploitation of diamonds in Sierra Leone;

15. *Decides* to conduct a first review on the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above no later than 15 September 2000, and further such reviews every six months after the date of adoption of the resolution, and to consider at those times what further measures may be necessary;

16. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and, as appropriate, other organizations and interested parties to report to the Committee information on possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

B

Stressing the need to ensure effective implementation of the measures concerning arms and related materiel imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998),

Stressing the obligation of all Member States, including those neighbouring Sierra Leone, to comply fully with the measures imposed by the Council,

Recalling the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa adopted in Abuja on 31 October 1998 (S/1998/1194, annex),

17. *Reminds* States of their obligation to implement fully the measures imposed by resolution 1171 (1998), and *calls upon* them, where they have not already done so, to enforce, strengthen or enact, as appropriate, legislation making it a criminal offence under domestic law for their nationals or other persons operating on their territory to act in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of that resolution, and to report to the Committee not later than 31 July 2000 on the implementation of those measures;

18. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and, as appropriate, other organizations and interested parties to report to the Committee information on possible violations of the measures imposed by the Council;

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, to establish a panel of experts, for an initial period of four months, consisting of no more than five members:

(a) To collect information on possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998) and the link between trade in diamonds and trade in arms and related materiel including through visits to Sierra Leone and other States as appropriate, and making contact with those they consider appropriate, including diplomatic missions;

(b) To consider the adequacy, for the purpose of detecting flights of aircraft suspected of carrying arms and related materiel across national borders in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998), of air traffic control systems in the region;

(c) To participate, if possible, in the hearing referred to in paragraph 12 above;

(d) To report to the Council through the Committee with observations and recommendations on strengthening the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998), and of those imposed by paragraph 1 above, no later than 31 October 2000;

and *further requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary resources;

20. *Expresses* its readiness, on the basis, *inter alia*, of the report produced pursuant to paragraph 19 (d) above, to consider appropriate action in relation to States that it determines to have violated the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998) and paragraph 1 above;

21. *Urges* all States to cooperate with the panel in the discharge of its mandate, and *underlines*, in this regard, the importance of the cooperation and technical expertise of the Secretariat and other parts of the United Nations system;

22. *Requests* the Committee to strengthen existing contacts with regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity, and relevant international organizations, including INTERPOL, with a view to identifying ways to improve effective implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998);

23. *Requests* the Committee to make information it considers relevant publicly available through appropriate media, including through the improved use of information technology;

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to publicize the provisions of this resolution and the obligations imposed by it;

25. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General
19 May 2000

Resolution 1299 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4145th meeting on
19 May 2000

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President on the situation in Sierra Leone,

Having considered the letter of the Secretary-General to its President of 17 May (S/2000/446), and *awaiting* his next report,

Convinced that the deterioration in security conditions on the ground necessitates the rapid reinforcement of the military component of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to provide the mission with additional resources to fulfil its mandate,

1. *Decides* that the military component of UNAMSIL shall be expanded to a maximum of 13,000 military personnel, including the 260 military observers already deployed;
2. *Expresses* its appreciation to all States who, in order to expedite the rapid reinforcement of UNAMSIL, have accelerated the deployment of their troops to UNAMSIL, made available additional personnel, and offered logistical, technical and other forms of military assistance, and *calls upon* all those in a position to do so to provide further support;
3. *Decides, acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that the restrictions set out in paragraph 2 of its resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998 do not apply to the sale or supply of arms and related *matériel* for the sole use in Sierra Leone of those Member States cooperating with UNAMSIL and the Government of Sierra Leone;
4. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

76) United Nations Document

Security Council Resolution 1299 (19 May 2000)

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/RES/1299
(2000)
19 May 2000**RESOLUTION 1299 (2000)****Adopted by the Security Council at its 4145th meeting,****on 19 May 2000**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President on the situation in Sierra Leone,

Having considered the letter of the Secretary-General to its President of 17 May (S/2000/446), and awaiting his next report,

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1. Decides that the military component of UNAMSIL shall be expanded to a maximum of 13,000 military personnel, including the 260 military observers already deployed;
2. Expresses its appreciation to all States who, in order to expedite the rapid reinforcement of UNAMSIL, have accelerated the deployment of their troops to UNAMSIL, made available additional personnel, and offered logistical, technical and other forms of military assistance, and calls upon all those in a position to do so to provide further support;
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4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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77) United Nations Document

Security Council Resolution 1220 (12 January 1999)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1220 (1999)
12 January 1999

RESOLUTION 1220 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3964th meeting,
on 12 January 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998 and the statement of its President of 7 January 1999 (S/1999/PRST/1),

Expressing its deep concern over the recent deterioration of the situation in Sierra Leone, and encouraging all efforts aimed at resolving the conflict and restoring lasting peace and stability,

Having considered the Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) (S/1998/1176) and his Special Report on UNOMSIL of 7 January 1999 (S/1999/20), and noting the recommendations contained therein,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMSIL until 13 March 1999;
2. Takes note of the intention of the Secretary-General, as set out in paragraph 37 of his Special Report, to reduce the number of military observers in UNOMSIL and to retain in Conakry a small number who would return to Sierra Leone when conditions permit together with the necessary civilian substantive and logistical support staff under the leadership of his Special Representative;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council closely informed on the situation in Sierra Leone and to submit a further report to the Council with recommendations on the future deployment of UNOMSIL and implementation of its mandate by 5 March 1999;
4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

78) United Nations Document

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 7-20 November 1999, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Section 2.



 Email this document

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Date: 20 Nov 1999

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 7 - 20 Nov 1999

SUMMARY

Continued violations of the cease-fire agreement and the slow implementation of the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme have continued to hinder humanitarian interventions. Security continues to be poor in most parts of the Northern Province, and real questions remain about the ability or willingness of the parties to the conflict to support the DDR process.

1. Political

Multi-Donor Mission to Sierra Leone

A Multi-Donor Mission visited Sierra Leone (November 8-11) led by the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Ms. Carolyn McAskie. The mission consisted of representatives from a number of key donor countries (Japan, USA, UK, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Canada and Ireland), the EU and United Nations officials from the FAO and WFP as well as a representative from IOM.

The objective of the mission was to demonstrate the commitment of the international donor community to support Sierra Leone's recovery from the civil war, and to focus on critical needs across all sectors. The mission met people across a wide variety of sectors including government officials, leaders of the AFRC and RUF, international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) local members of civil society and UN officials.

They visited the amputee camp at Aberdeen, and the St Michael's Children's Centre in Lakka. They also visited the Therapeutic Feeding Centre, Government Hospital and the Lebanese camp in Kenema. Ms. McAskie stated that the uncertain security situation on the ground made it difficult for humanitarian agencies to access areas where people were suffering. She urged all parties to speed up the DDR process that plays an important role in humanitarian intervention, and to respect the commitment to provide access to all parts of the country for humanitarian aid.

New Special Representative to replace Ambassador Francis Okelo

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Anan has appointed veteran Diplomat Oluyemi Adeniji as Special Representative to replace Ambassador Francis Okelo who is ending his two years position in Sierra Leone. Mr. Adeniji is considered an expert in disarmament and conflict resolution and has produced several publications in this regard.

UNAMSIL Peace-Keeping Contingent

Kenya has agreed to send 45 Officers and 779 servicemen and 6 service women as part of the 6,000 strong peace keeping-force (UNAMSIL). The United Nations has stated that it will begin deployment of troops to Sierra Leone on the week of 22 November.

Canadian Government donates money to Sierra Leone

Cause Canada announced that the Government of Canada has donated 100,000 Canadian dollars for permanent shelter support in the country. Cause Canada intends to use funds to construct 60 houses equipped with Kitchens, Latrines and water wells in the villages of Bevehun, Bandama and Waima along the Bo-Kenema Highway.

United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Mission

A two-week mission to Sierra Leone by two representatives from UNIDIR- Dr. Robin Poulton and Dr. Anofloe Ayissi (Specialist in African Security in the UNIDIR) to promote new ideas for Peace and Disarmament ended on 14 November.

The team visited with members of the government, UN Agencies, civil society groups and the press. Dr. Poulton said that if disarmament should continue at a fast pace then, there must be a visible sign that the people can appreciate. He suggested that a 100 weapons should be burnt as a "Smoke of Peace" as a means of building up the confidence of all Sierra Leoneans in the DDR programme. UNDP and the Council of Churches in Sierra Leone (CCSL) are launching the campaign against small arms nation wide.

Government Policy on Displaced Camps

The National Committee for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCRRR) gave a press release on 12 November on behalf of the Government discouraging IDP camps. The Commissioner encouraged all IDPs whose homes are in safe areas to return home and resettle in their homes. Plans are being put in place for the resettlement and reintegration of IDPs after disarmament of ex-combatants.

The NCRRR commended Freetown Cold Storage Company for employing four amputees, stating that this type of positive action is one of the best ways of helping amputees prosper in society. Other private business enterprises and institutions were urged to follow this step.

US Mission to Aid Sierra Leone

The US State Department is funding a mission to rehabilitate victims of war; Charles Ellmaker who left for Guekedou, Guinea on 13 November will head the mission. The mission grant of US\$766,000 is for a year and will focus on psychological help for tortured victims. Ellmaker stated that "if torturers no longer get the political benefit that they expected, then that as a weapon becomes useless."

The OCHA/HACU, UN Agencies and International NGO's also had a visit from Beth Stanford from the OFDA office in Washington and Janet Beik, the Regional Refugee Coordinator from the State Department office in Abidjan. They were here to discuss programs that the US government is funding.

Formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

On 8 November AFRC called for the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as provided by the Lomé Peace Accord. This commission will form a forum where Sierra Leoneans can tell their stories, express their grievances and identify those who tortured them. The Commission will form an essential part of the peace and reconciliation process, but Chairman Foday Sankoh of the RUF opposes the idea and calls for a blanket amnesty for all crimes.

Commonwealth Heads of State meeting in South Africa

The Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Durban, South Africa on 15 November called on all parties to the Lomé Peace Accord to fulfil their commitments to the DDR programme. The communiqué also commended ECOMOG force and expressed support for UNAMSIL.

2. SECURITY

The security situation has not improved since the last sitrep, when a number of incidents were reported that severely impacted on the ability of humanitarian agencies to carry out their activities. Insecurity has also affected the DDR programme in Lungi and Port Loko.

On 8 November riots broke out at the demobilisation camp in Lungi among rebel SLA soldiers. The soldiers were demanding information, an acceleration of the DDR process and payment of monies they claim are owed to them. The ex-SLA looted businesses and personal homes. While the United Nations Military Observers and Government staff were eventually able to restore calm at the camp, tensions remain. Also ex-combatants have threatened DDR staff at the Port Loko centres. This has helped to highlight the necessity of dramatically improving the consistency and quality of the sensitization effort and speeding up the process of providing the benefits to the ex-combatants.

As reported in the Human Rights section below, there continue to be almost daily attacks on civilians in Port Loko district. These primarily consist of raids for food, but abductions and rapes are also frequently reported. These attacks have been followed by an incident involving a vehicle belonging to Children's Aid Direct (CAD), an International NGO carrying out humanitarian operations in Port Loko district. The occupants of the vehicle, engaged normally in supplementary feeding activities, were

stripped, beaten and forced to march into the bush. While they were released the following day, this unacceptable incident has severely jeopardized operations in the area, and will be addressed at the highest levels. This is the first attack on an international aid agency, outside of a combat situation, for over a year.

Insecurity continues to grow in the Kabala area, where RUF armed elements continue to push ex-SLA soldiers from their bases in the North. Many of these soldiers are now in Kabala town, and have informally surrendered their weapons to loyal SLA. Others remain in the outskirts of the town, with their weapons, and have been responsible for some looting. A United Nations mission is planning to go to Kabala this week to highlight the issues there, and recommend on a future course of action.

The Yele-Matotoka road is currently blocked, following disagreements between the CDF and RUF.

A UNAMSIL mission in Segbwema was diverted to Buedu, at the request of Sam Bockarie. Initial reports indicated that the team had been detained, but UNAMSIL officials have since denied this.

Other areas of the country remain quiet, notably in Makeni/Magburaka, where the new command appears to have consolidated its control.

All persons abducted in October near Mange Bridge along the Masiaka highway have been released.

Information that several members of UNAMSIL were detained at Kailahun is false and should be disregarded.

3. HUMANITARIAN HIGHLIGHTS

A. Access

Access to the North has significantly reduced over the last few weeks, primarily due to the lack of secure environment in which to work, threats against agency staff, and the mentioned attack on CAD. Despite a number of pledges and commitments by RUF commanders, looted aid resources have not been returned. Travel and security in most of the northern province still remains a problem, which has limited the amount of humanitarian intervention in the area. With considerable and persistent effort a minimal supply of medical, nutrition and food has been able to reach this area in the past. At this time, conditions do not exist for a significant increase in activity in the Northern Province.

WFP and World Vision International have completed an assessment mission to Kailahun district and hope to start small-scale operation once logistical constraints have been addressed.

B. Sectoral Analysis

Agriculture

FAO delivers fishing equipment to fishing communities

An FAO project is assisting war-affected artisanal fisherman and women groups who are fish processors and marketers in the Western Area, Pujenhun, Bonthe, and Moyamba districts. Some 2000 families are benefiting from the ongoing distribution of project supplies which include fishing boats, outboard engines, fishing nets, kuralon hard cord, ropes, twines, hooks, life jackets, lead in plates, ice machine, insulated containers and fish smoking ovens.

The project also provides training in fish processing and marketing. On 12 November project inputs were delivered to beneficiaries in Tombo, in the Western area. Tombo is considered one of the most important fishing areas in Sierra Leone that suffered the devastation of the war. The distribution was completed on 17 November with distributions to Fogbo and Magmpoh few miles from Waterloo.

CAD agricultural team has provided an additional 1,000 vulnerable farm households in Masimera, Malal and Yoni chiefdoms in the Port Loko and Tonkolili districts with groundnut seeds, cassava, potato vines and farm tools.

International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and the Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS) have completed agricultural input distribution to 12,226 farm families in Lower Yoni, Kholifa Mabang and Gbonkelenken Chiefdoms in the North. They have also assisted 237 war victims in Mortaim and

Morgegba Villages near Grafton with seeds and tools, while Evangelical Fellowship of Sierra Leone (EFSL) is planning to assist with food for agriculture.

Child Protection

Spontaneous releases continue to occur, supported by ECOMOG, Human Rights community, UNAMSIL, and Child Protection Network and rebel groups. On 14 November 52 Child combatants were released at Laia Junction, as well as 6 abductees, 2 babes and 4 children. However, there remain 2,486 children registered as missing in the Western Area since January 1999.

At the St. Michael's Children's Centre Lakka west of Freetown there are 152 children (abductees and children associated with the fighting forces) being taken care of by Family Home Improvement (FHM) in collaboration with Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) and UNICEF, prior to fostering or reunification.

National Family Tracing and Reunification October 1999

	Western Area	Northern Province	Southern Province	Eastern Province	TOTAL
Missing CHN Documented	70	-	35	30	135
Missing CHN Reunified	245	-	-	-	245
Found CHN Documented	11	345	99	06	461
Found CHN Reunified	74	05	69	16	164

CHN....Children

Source: UNICEF- Sierra Leone

Western Area Family Tracing And Reunification Update January - October 1999

	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER
Missing CHN. Documented (Reg./UAC)	70	4,411
Missing CHN Reunified	245	1,925
Children Still Missing		2,486
Found CHN. Documented (Reg.)	11	584
Found Children Reunified	74	400
CHN. In Interim Centres and Foster Homes		184

Reg.:- Registered

UAC:- Unaccompanied Children

Source: UNICEF -Sierra Leone

Released Children/Abductees- January to October 1999

MONTH	Western Area Children Officially released		Northern Area Children Officially released		Total Number of Children released
	ECOMOG	AFRC/SLA	ECOMOG	AFRC/SLA	
January	-	-	-	-	-
February	40	-	-	-	40
March	55	51	-	-	106
April	05	-	-	-	05
May	01	-	-	-	01
June	02	-	-	-	02

July	10	129	-	-	139
August	04	165	-	52	221
September	03	-	-	76	79
October	19	29	-	217	268
November	-	51	-	-	51
TOTAL	139	425	-	345	912

Official Number of Demobilised child soldiers to date =160

Source: UNICEF -Sierra Leone

Food Aid

On 8 November a caseload of 2,647 Liberian refugees in the Eastern region received their November ratio of food (159bags of bulgur, 159 bags of maize meal and 107 pails of vegetable oil) from WFP.

Discussions in the Committee on Food Aid (CFA) have been focused on expanding access to areas that desperately need assistance. In particular, Makeni and its surrounding towns clearly need support, but security remains uncertain and insufficient to allow for action. However, in the meantime, more information will be sought on the situation in Kabala and Port Loko, and the possible implications for food aid.

Some progress has been reported on the funding for the WFP EMOP set up to acquire food for DDR participants: the Norwegian government has committed US\$250,000 in cash, the Swedish are considering an equal sum, and the US agency Food for Peace has committed up to US\$1million worth of pulses and oil.

Health and Nutrition

Second Round of National Immunization Days (NID)

The second round of the NID took place between 6-7 November. Vitamin A was given during this round, which plays an important role in the resistance of under five children. This round was considered successful; the teams were able to access most parts of the country including Kono. Oral Polio Vaccine coverage was 85% and 80% coverage of the Vitamin A supplement nationwide.

The causative agent for bloody diarrhea in the Southern Province has been identified in Shigella N. in the Southern Province. The agent is resistant to antibiotics; the MOHS has recommended the use of noladixic acid for serious cases.

Medicins Sans Frontiers Belgium (MSF-B) started operating a mobile clinic on 9 November between Kendeyella site2 and Splendid camp in Bo. This clinic is expected to serve 11,000 IDPs. This clinic will also cover Kendeyella site1 camp.

Lebanese Camp in Kenema continues to receive medical attention from the UNICEF sponsored clinics at the New Police barracks.

Planned Parenthood Association Sierra Leone (PPASL) conducted refresher courses for 75 Community Based Distribution (CBD) agents, 45 Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) and 15 Mother/Child Health (MCH) Aides in reproductive health, Family Planning and Income Generating skills.

Courses in Soap making and gari processing for 100 women of reproductive age were given. Bumpe, Boama and Jiama Bongor chiefdoms in the Southern Province were the target areas.

CAD continues to support 7 health clinics in Port Loko District with medical supplies, equipment, basic repairs, furniture and incentives for MOH staff. In the first week of November support was extended to an eighth clinic. They continue to implement a Supplementary-feeding Programme for malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women from 8 locations in Port Loko District. The severely malnourished cases are transferred to the Action Contra la Faim (ACF) feeding centre in Freetown. Approximately, 600 children and 500 pregnant women are currently being supported in the programme.

Refugees

UNHCR reports that the current number of Sierra Leonean refugees is 460,000 with 380,000 in Guinea and 80,000 in Liberia. Of these numbers 173,000 are originally from Kailahun, 28,000 from Kenema and 20,000 from Freetown. Repatriation as planned is unlikely to begin in significant numbers as planned for the beginning of 2000 due to insecurity. However, 3,000 ex-SLA soldiers are expected to return from Liberia in the near future. Fighting along the Makeni-Kabala axis has resulted in the movement of 1,000 civilian's north into Kabala.

Water and Sanitation

Oxfam has completed 3 showers and 3 laundry facilities at the Kendeyella site 2, and well construction at Tikonko is on going. The maintenance of existing hand pumps has been completed. Repairs on hand pumps and hygiene promotion is ongoing at Gondama in Bo. ACF is installing one submersible pump at their TFC. They have completed 12 blocks of latrines at the Kendeyella site 2. Construction to underway for 6 new latrine blocks and 2 VIP latrines for MSF-B who started running a clinic at the Kendeyella site 2.

Distribution of medicated soap and hygiene promotion at site 1 is ongoing. Construction of hygiene training hall at the site is in progress.

World Vision Sierra Leone (WVSL) has rehabilitated 63 wells in 6 chiefdoms in the Bonthe District, and has installed 40 pumps.

CARE is doing concrete work at various stages on 25 wells in the Moyamba district. Rehabilitation work on 10 existing wells is in progress. 90 latrine slabs have been cast and placed over pits while 79 latrine pits have been excavated and health lessons being taught in the Moyamba District.

OXFAM and ACF will be constructing 6 Latrines each at the Splendid camp after the demobilisation of booths.

C. IDP Updates

Due to the recent attacks in the Port Loko-Lungi-Lunsar axis the number of displaced people has soared with numbers between 8,000-10,000 in Port Loko town. When the security situation allows, the National Technical Committee (NTC), HACU and NCRRR are planning an assessment mission to the area to evaluate needs in food, shelter and water sanitation.

Actionaid has acquired a variety of non-food emergency items for Kambia district and will distribute them as soon as accessibility improves.

African Muslim Agency (AMA) distributed clothing to different areas:

- Jui refugee camp 55 bales
- National Workshop 25 bales
- Jui/Kossoh Town 10 bales
- AMA centre Kenema 31 bales
- Representatives of displaced Paramount Chiefs 10 bales

BO

400 booths constructed at Kendeyella site2 have been allocated to IDPs. OXFAM is doing work on the water facility at the camp whilst ACF is taking care of sanitation. Cause Canada has constructed over 700 skeletal booths on site 2 of Kendeyella camp.

KENEMA

OXFAM and MERLIN continue to provide humanitarian assistance in Watsan and Health respectively at Lebanese Camp.

OXFAM and AFRICARE continue to provide health and Watsan facilities for Nyandeyama camp. A 9-man management committee (3 each from Kono, Kailahun and Kenema Districts) has been elected

to address IDP concerns.

IRC provided 2 rolls of plastic sheets for roofing the school and a football to children.

The transit centre for abductees at Dauda in Kenema is now complete. 8 booths to house 150 prisoners of war/Abductees. Each shelter is estimated to hold 50 released abductees.

OXFAM has completed 2 toilet structures with 4 squat holes each and 2 laundries and shower sites at Dauda. 1 traditional well has been rehabilitated. The fencing of whole campsite started on 11 November. There are no prisoners/abductees at the site; Agricultural Production Extension and General Services (APEGS) a local NGO has offered to manage the camp.

FREETOWN

- Amputee Camp: There are presently 1,500 Amputees and family members at the site and 371 war victims. Representatives of the Multi-Donor Mission to Sierra Leone paid a visit to the camp on 9 November to assess their needs. Handicap International are running the prosthetists centre at the camp and have Dave Evans from the Vietnam Veterans Foundation training amputees and other people in the construction of prosthetic limbs for amputees. The camp manager pleaded on behalf of the amputees for donors to assist their return home and help in getting an education.
- National Stadium: GOAL has moved a total of 4,738 registered IDPs to Grafton. There remains 240 unregistered IDPs and 55 polio and leprosy victims at the stadium that need to be moved to some other location; the matter has been referred to NCRRR.
- Parade Grounds: The monthly food distribution by WFP has been completed; 26 cartoons of vegetable oil, 138 bags of bulgur and 58 bags of peas for 764 IDPs.
- Mandela Camp: Monthly food distribution by WFP has been completed for 434 IDPs.
- National Workshop: On 16 November UNICEF immunized children against measles. There are still illegal occupants at the camp, which is creating a problem for the legal occupants.
- Trade Centre: EFSL has disinfected all sheds and toilets against bed bugs. CHASL is planning a micro-credit program at the camp for single mothers and orphans.
- Approved School: The International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) is planning on phasing out camp management at Approved School by December 1999.
- Grafton: There are a total of 10,710 IDPs at Grafton who need to be verified. GOAL is having some problems in doing this and this is causing a delay for food distribution at the camp.
- Waterloo: ADRA hopes to complete the booths for IDPs staying at the make shift in Waterloo and have them moved out. ADRA is still under-going problems with abductees at the transit centre especially with food as is appealing to WFP to help out in this regard.

4. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTERGRATION (DDR)

Status Report: Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants

Location of demobilisation Centre	Assigned groups for centres	Fully operational	Ready for Use	No. of Ex-combatants Registered
Lungi	RUF CDF AFRC CHILD	Yes		0 0 63 7
Port Loko	RUF CDF AFRC CHILD	Yes	Yes	90 372 262 5
Hastings	RUF CDF AFRC CHILD	Yes	Yes	2 24 168 70
Kenema	RUF CDF AFRC CHILD	Yes	Yes	1 81 0 14

Daru	RUF	Yes	Yes	0
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Source: UNAMSIL - Sierra Leone

There are a total of 1,063 ex-combatants at the various centres around the country.

Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma has visited field commanders in the Okra hills and asked them to register for the DDR programme. He assured them that there were provisions for them to join the new army, however it was important that they give up their weapons by 15 December the end of the disarmament period. In this same light Chairman Sankoh sensitized his men in Makeni and Kailahun about the importance of the DDR programme. He urged his men to turn away from war and work towards peace.

The demobilisation site at Daru continues to remain empty contrary to some reports.

5. HUMAN RIGHTS

There have been repeated reports of human rights abuses of civilians by former rebel elements. There have been daily reports of attacks on villages, and associated rape, abduction, looting, and various forms of intimidation. These incidents are reported to be more prevalent in the Port Loko - Lungi axis. Also, civilians continued to be levied with taxes and general harassment in RUF controlled areas as well as in Bo and Northwest area by CDF elements.

Amnesty International called upon Commonwealth member states to help restore good governance, the rule of Law, and respect of human rights in Sierra Leone. In order to end human rights abuses effective implementation of the peace accord has to take place. This can only be effective with a strong commitment from the international community. They recommend support of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in investigating human rights abuses. Recommendations are also made that those helping to bring peace in the region be properly trained about international human rights and humanitarian law.

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
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79) United Nations Document

Sierra Leonean Humanitarian Situation Report 25 July – 07 August 2000, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Section A.

[✉ Email this document](#)

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Date: 7 Aug 2000

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 25 Jul - 07 Aug 2000

A. SECURITY

The security situation was relatively calm during the reporting period, characterized by the disarming of a number of West Side Boys (WSBs) and RUF fighters. The only clashes with the RUF occurred around Mange Bridge in the northwest, with the advance of SLA troops from Port Loko.

Northern Region

UNAMSIL troops occupy Masiaka and regularly patrol the roads. Since UNAMSIL's "Operation Thunderbolt", which aimed at clearing the WSBs out of the area, 130 of them have disarmed in Mile 38 and Port Loko. However, others who refused to disarm are continuing to man three checkpoints on the Mile 38/Masiaka road, and are harassing civilians. Four relief workers of the Christian Health Association of Sierra Leone (CHASL) are among the latest victims of abductions by the WSBs. They went missing on 21 July, and were only released on 31 July, unharmed, but their vehicle and its contents (food supplies etc) remain unaccounted for. Although the Masiaka-Mile 91 route has been reopened, caution is advised due to the continuing presence of elements of armed WSBs.

The security situation in Mile 91 remains relatively calm but fluid. UNAMSIL has assured residents that the situation there is under control. They however confirmed rebel activities in Mayibin village, across the Mabang River, where 24 houses were reportedly burnt down and a few civilians killed during a recent incident that took place at the beginning of the month. UNAMSIL expects to deploy one full Indian Battalion in Mile 91 before the end of the month.

The Bo-Mile 91 route is reported safe with a constant flow of vehicular traffic. Road access via the Mabang Bridge continues to be hindered by the poor state of repair and CDF harassment. Work is programmed to start on the bridge in the near future and UNAMSIL has promised troops to guard the bridge once work commences. The difficulty experienced on this route prompted the first use of a UNAMSIL escort by an NGO food convoy on 28 July, taking 500 mt of food to Mile 91 and Kenema. Humanitarian agencies remain concerned about the issue of access and security for aid workers and beneficiaries in the area, and are arranging a series of meetings with UNAMSIL and government authorities to address the matter.

There has been continuing violence in Port Loko between CDF and the SLA, with sporadic shooting after dark. Defense HQ has deployed a new Battalion Commander to rectify the situation.

Western Area

An increase in search and cordon operations by UNAMSIL and the Police within Freetown, and the movement of CDF out of the Brookfields Hotel, has seen positive results in reducing crime in the city.

Eastern Province

Daru continues to see the disarming of a small number of RUF fighters, but the agreement between the RUF and CDF, to allow commercial trucks to use the road from Kenema to Daru, seems to have fallen through, with the report of six vehicles captured by the RUF at Segbwema on Saturday 6 August. Save the Children Fund (SCF) reported that the vehicles (3 trucks and 3 taxis) were traveling from Kenema to Daru and Daru to Kenema respectively, when they were seized and taken to an unidentified RUF base. One of the vehicles is said to be a large commercial truck carrying rice and palm oil. With the exception of one passenger who escaped, the whereabouts of the people on the vehicles were still unknown at the time of writing.

Southern Province

The region was generally calm. However, aid agencies continue to express serious concerns about a number of security incidents involving Kamajors, which are hindering smooth delivery of humanitarian assistance in the region. The authorities are currently investigating a number of cases reportedly linked to the Kamajors, including the death of an MSF-B national officer; the looting of ACF/WFP food in Moyamba district and the commandeering of relief vehicles belonging to the Lutheran World Federation in Sorogbema, Pujehun district.

The recent decision of CDF authorities to organize a workshop in Freetown, with the participation of all its members, is viewed by the humanitarian community as a welcome and timely initiative. Humanitarian organizations urge the CDF to discuss as a matter of priority, strategies to end the continuing harassment and intimidation of aid workers and the civilian population at large by its members.

Military Expansion

UNAMSIL troop strength in the country now stands at 12,500, recently boosted by the arrival of a Russian aviation unit with four Helicopter Gun Ships. The SLAs have also expanded, with 1000 troops now undertaking continuation training after passing out of the Benguema Training Camp. A new group of recruits are now undergoing training.

B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

UN Security Council extends UNAMSIL mandate

On Friday, 4 August, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a British-sponsored resolution to extend UNAMSIL's mandate until 8 September 2000 and to strengthen its capacity. The original six-month mandate was due to expire on Monday 7 August. The resolution said UNAMSIL's military component "should be reinforced

through accelerated troop rotations, with further aviation and maritime assets, a strengthened force reserve, upgraded communications, and specialist combat and logistic support assets." According to the resolution, U.N. peacekeepers would help the Sierra Leone government to extend its authority over areas of the country under RUF control by deploying at key locations and main population centres. The Council also agreed that the peacekeeping force would "deter, and where necessary, decisively counter, the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions" or threat of imminent use of force.

The resolution calls on the U.N. force to maintain security around Freetown and at Lungi International Airport as a priority, to patrol main access routes to the capital, and to promote efforts to disarm and demobilise combatants. "Widespread and serious violations" by the RUF of the Lomé Peace Accord "constitute a breakdown of the prior generally permissive environment based on the agreement" and predicated on the cooperation of the warring parties, the resolution said. Until security conditions allow progress toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict, "there will continue to be a threat to UNAMSIL and the security of the state of Sierra Leone," it added.

An initial draft of the resolution called for UNAMSIL's strength to be increased from 13,000 to 16,500 troops, but given disagreement among Council Members on various issues, the resolution was amended to call on the Secretary-General to recommend measures to strengthen and restructure the Force. Meanwhile, the UNAMSIL Force Commander, Major General Vijay Jetley is due back in the country on Tuesday, 8 August after an official mission to New York to brief troop contributing countries and the UN Secretary-General on military developments and issues relating to the mandate of the peacekeeping force.

The Quest for an RUF Leader continues

UNAMSIL reported on Monday, 7 August, that efforts were underway to identify a new RUF leader to facilitate renewed dialogue between the RUF and the GOSL. The RUF is yet to finalize their decision on the matter. Meanwhile, the UN Special Representative for the Secretary-General (SRSG) Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji visited Monrovia on Wednesday, 2 August for consultations with President Charles Taylor on this and other matters relating to the Sierra Leone conflict. The SRSG is due to travel to Bamako, Mali, on Tuesday 8 August to hold discussions with the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Alpha Oumar Konare on the same issue.

C. DDR - Learning the Lessons

Deviation should not be tolerated in new DDR process - UN SRSG:

Disarmament should no longer be left to the discretion of the leadership of armed groups. Rather it should follow a generally agreed timetable and an agreed sequence. Any deviation should immediately be exposed as sabotage and as an indication of a hidden agenda, said the SRSG, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji at the opening session of the workshop. The SRSG, who chaired the occasion, stressed the need for political, military, humanitarian/development agencies, Donors as well as civil society movements, to work in full partnership in order to achieve the common goal.

Humanitarian Agencies will play their part - UN Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator

Speaking along the same lines, and in his capacity as UN Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator, Mr. Kingsley Amaning said humanitarian agencies saw the meeting as an opportunity to expand the ongoing collaboration with the NCDDR and its partners in the pursuit of the common goal - a successful DDR programme. In this regard, he said the Programme "should be anchored within a framework of a wider simultaneous and collective effort targeted at the resolution of conflict through: political arbitration; the enhancement of security; the provision of basic social safety nets and humanitarian assistance." While recognizing the role of political and military protagonists in providing a permissive environment, Mr. Amaning noted that, "without a well planned and efficient DDR and other humanitarian programmes to guide and encourage the peace process, an opportunity for real peace and stability can be easily lost." "For the UN humanitarian and operational agencies," he concluded, "this meeting is a timely invitation to us to join in biblical terms, the five wise maidens in putting oil in our lamps to keep them burning in readiness for the arrival of the bridegroom."

To do nothing is not an option for DDR - World Bank Director for Sierra Leone

"DDR is central and fundamental to Sierra Leone's transition from war to peace." "To do nothing, is not an option," declared Mr. Peter Harold, the new World Bank Director for Sierra Leone. Mr. Harold recognized the need to safeguard investments already made, while preparing for a full resumption of the Programme. Commenting on the controversial issue of the Transitional Safety Net Allowance (TSA) for ex-combatants, the Bank Director conceded that it was important to correct the erroneous image of a cash-for-guns policy, but underlined the continuing need for "cash", which he described as "cash-for-peace." "Without the early provision of development support, there will be no transition," Mr. Harold stressed, noting that the ultimate challenge was the Reintegration aspect of the programme. He observed that the Bank's contribution to reintegration was contingent on the support of humanitarian agencies, UNAMSIL, bilateral partners and civil society organizations.

GOSL still committed to the Lome Peace Accord

The Minister of Presidential Affairs declared that the GOSL was still committed to the Lome Accord, and that the government had gone one step further to outline the conditions for a resumption of peace talks with the RUF. He appealed to all stakeholders to fully support the DDR process and other instruments of peace.

Challenges for the future -- Dr Francis Kai-Kai, Executive Secretary of NCDDR

Dr Francis Kai-Kai, the Executive Secretary of NCDDR outlined a number of key challenges facing the DDR programme since May 2000, including: Status of the Lome Peace Agreement and its key structures; Status of political and military leadership of all fighting forces; Clarification of strategy to end the conflict and implications for DDR; Establishment of a security framework for DDR; Securing military compliance; and Clarifying the policy on encampment and specific incentives for D&D.

Summary of specific recommendations from discussion groups

Status of the DDR Programme

Before the resumption of hostilities in May, 24,285 combatants had been disarmed including 1,743 child combatants. Some 14,807 weapons and 255,719 ammunitions were collected. Since then, some of the disarmed soldiers have been re-armed and have returned to the war front. Only the Lungi and Daru camps are currently operational. On 7 August, the Executive Secretariat of NCDDR reported a total of 260 ex-combatants at the Lungi camp, including some of the newly disarmed Westside Boys. They are currently screening the ex-combatants for appropriate action. The Executive Secretary said NCDDR had embarked on a sensitization campaign to inform ex-combatants that they would not receive TSA payments while they were encamped -- rather, payments would be made in communities -- to ensure that the money is utilized for community-based reintegration programmes.

At the Daru camp, there are now 582 RUF and SLA ex-combatants. It is increasingly difficult for NCDDR to plan community-based reintegration activities for the ex-combatants there, as the town remains surrounded by a hostile environment, dominated by the RUF. The Commission however hopes to be able to move the SLAs from the area and to find ways of reintegrating the RUF.

In Port Loko, 299 ex-combatants are said to have returned to the DDR camp. These are mainly ex-RUF fighters who were being protected by UNAMSIL. Some of them are finding it difficult to return to their home areas due to insecurity and lack of acceptance by community members.

The NCDDR is currently sensitizing previously registered ex-combatants under the reintegration programme to re-register so they could be considered for assistance. They have appealed to agencies planning rehabilitation projects to include ex-combatants in their beneficiary caseloads.

Meanwhile, World Vision, in collaboration with NCDDR-eastern region, has started a three-week training programme for community volunteers to assist over 300 ex-combatants and affected youths from seven chiefdoms in the Kenema district. This programme, which is sponsored by the USAID/Office for Transitional Initiatives (OTI), is aimed at empowering the youths to become better-adjusted citizens. OTI is also supporting apprenticeship programmes to rehabilitate schools, wells and other community projects, in collaboration with UNICEF and other partners.

D. HUMANITARIAN HIGHLIGHTS

1. Eastern Province

Daru - Relief activities expand

Further to our report on the Daru displaced in the last SITREP (10-24 July), subsequent inter-agency missions have confirmed the presence of around 5,000 new IDPs who arrived in Daru from nearby chiefdoms in Kailahun district. Agencies are gradually expanding activities in the area, with UNICEF and OXFAM supporting

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Watsan activities, IMC and ICRC providing health services, and NRC addressing education needs with UNICEF support. SCF continues to assist separated children and other children associated with the fighting forces.

Although food prices are reported to be high, WFP maintains that the situation does not yet warrant emergency food aid intervention. The IDPs are said to be in good condition with no visible signs of malnutrition. Agencies are closely monitoring the situation for any significant changes. In this regard, IMC, WFP and MERLIN will conduct a quick nutritional survey in the affected areas on Saturday 12 August, which will help determine the appropriate level of intervention required at this stage.

On the health side, IMC continues to run two clinics - one in the main town and the other in Malema (see Sitrep 10-24 July). They have commenced routine EPI activities for U5s and women of childbearing age. On Tuesday, 8 August, MERLIN and IMC will organize a Lassa fever workshop in Daru town, as Daru is part of the Lassa belt and could be at greater risk of an outbreak due to recent population movements.

Kenema - overcrowding in camps due to new influxes

The humanitarian situation in Kenema remains under control despite the latest population influx resulting from UNAMSIL/GOSL military operations in the east last month. Existing camps are however overcrowded, straining current facilities and services. The regional inter-agency committee in Kenema estimates that more than 7,000 of the new IDPs have settled in IDP camps - (Blama - 747; Gofor - 2,000; Nyandeyama camp - 100; Lebanese camp - 1000; Konia - 2000 and Refugee returnees residing in different camps - 2000). CRS has agreed to provide a one-month VGF distribution to the new IDPs in camps after they have been verified. WFP will also distribute food to the new caseload at the Blama camp. In order to help relieve the overcrowding in the camps, agencies are mobilizing resources to construct a new camp either at the Gofor site or near the Blama camp.

Meanwhile, MERLIN has now completed a nutritional survey of IDPs in four of the camps. They are currently analyzing the results, which will be made available in our next report.

2. Northern Province

Mile 91 area - Inter-agency coordination intensifies

Efforts are underway by CARE and WFP to re-register and verify IDPs in Mile 91 for further clarification on the numbers currently in the area. OCHA is now chairing a weekly inter-agency meeting in the town to improve coordination of activities between sectors and among agencies. The meetings are held every Friday.

Shelter: The immediate priority is to relocate IDPs currently occupying school buildings in Mile 91 town, as schools are due to resume by mid September. CARITAS reports significant progress in the construction of the transit camp in the town, which will accommodate about 4,000 IDPs. They have completed the clearing of the site and have pre-positioned construction materials in the area. Construction is expected to begin during the week of 7 August. UNICEF has already started digging

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wells at the camp location.

Health: As a follow up to the recommendations of a joint rapid assessment mission, UNICEF has distributed a consignment of drugs, medical equipment and EPI supplies to the District Medical Officer of Tonkolili District for IDPs in the township. Meanwhile, at the U5 clinic, ICRC/SLRC immunised 1,356 children (DPT & BCG) and treated 670 children for malaria, Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI) and diarrhea. Some 405 expectant mothers were immunized against Tetanus. At the SLMB clinic supported by MSF-H, a dehydration and observation unit has been temporarily set up to treat severe bloody diarrhea cases until the isolation treatment centre for Shigella, currently under construction is completed. MSF-H has already trained medical personnel to attend to patients in the new centre. Meanwhile, the agency continues outreach programmes within the township and in surrounding villages.

Nutrition: ACF is treating 151 severely malnourished children at its Therapeutic Feeding Centre in Yonibana, while 654 moderate cases are benefiting from dry ration programmes at the Supplementary Feeding Centre in Mile 91 town.

Non-food Items: ICRC/SLRC have completed distribution of Non-Food-Items (NFI) to 2,642 families on the Roruks-Yobinana axis who had not benefited from earlier distributions.

WATSAN: Water and sanitation needs remain acute in the township. UNICEF is supporting the construction of 25 pit latrines as well as cleaning and chlorination of 572 traditional wells in the town. In Gbonkenlenken chieftdom, ACF has resumed well rehabilitation and will begin hygiene education for the population there in the immediate future.

Agriculture: In Gbonkenlenken chieftdom, Tonkolili district, CARE is following up an earlier VGF distribution to about 12,000 new IDPs, with FFAG assistance to 750 farm families in the villages there. Meanwhile, CARE together with other agencies has commenced a re-registration of new IDPs in Yele.

In Kholifa chieftdom, also in Tonkolili district, CARITAS distributed 500 kits of vegetable seeds and 1,500 bushels of rice seeds to 100 farming families in 14 communities.

Kabala - Poor road conditions hinder food assistance to new IDPs

During the reporting period, hundreds of new IDPs were reported in the Kabala area, coming from the Makeni and Kono axis. The food security situation there is of major concern as the Christian Relief Services (CRS) has now run out of food stocks there. Food aid agencies are having difficulties re-supplying the area due to poor road access. A cross-border operation via Guinea is being considered, but might prove impossible for movement of large trucks, as the roads are extremely bad at this time. The only viable option appears to be airlift operations. However, the Humanitarian Helicopters managed by WFP and MSF do not have the needed capacity to lift large volumes of food stocks at a time. Negotiations are ongoing with UNAMSIL on the possible use of their MI26 Helicopter, which has the capacity to lift up to 25mt of food stocks at a time. According to MSF-B, which is operational in the area, the IDPs

are presently coping with the host communities, but their conditions will most certainly deteriorate if a solution is not found in the next two weeks.

Bumbuna - humanitarian situation worrying

More than 7,000 newly displaced people are reported to have arrived in Bumbuna, (northeast of Makeni) in the last week. MSF-B undertook a one-day assessment mission to the town on Monday, 7 August and reported that the new IDPs were in desperate need of humanitarian assistance, particularly food aid. About 20 mt of food aid will be required to address the current needs. At present, food can only be transported to the area by air. Efforts are being made by various agencies to find ways of responding to the immediate needs of the IDPs.

The IDPs interviewed by MSF said they fled from Makeni and Magburaka to escape RUF forced recruitments and continuing attacks. Some of them also fled due to the helicopter gunship attack in Makeni in June, and had been hiding in bushes until their arrival in Bumbuna.

The American Ambassador, Amb. Joseph Melrose and the Catholic Bishop of Makeni, Bishop Biguzzi, visited the town on 4 August and donated some medical kits and BP5, which MSF said would help a great deal, as the bulk of the IDPs are children. Nearly 400 of the new arrivals are occupying a school building and an uncompleted hospital, while the rest are staying with host families. MSF conducted a quick nutritional screening of about 350 children during their visit. They are currently analyzing the results. Some of the children showed signs of malnutrition, particularly the new arrivals. MSF has opened a clinic in the town and plans to support MOHS health officials in the area to operate the facility. Some cases of diarrhea were identified, but no evidence of a major outbreak.

Port Loko - More IDPs reported

Within the Port Loko Township, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has registered a total of 25,200 IDPs, of which 5,499 arrived between 18 July and 1 August. Upon registration, the IDPs are reporting to the Police for further screening and security clearance. A significant number of the IDPs 10,831, have been absorbed into the local communities, while another 10,612 people have taken refuge in the camp. Due to the congestion in the camp, 3,241 of the IDPs have moved into the local primary school, while another 516 relocated to the Barracks. Meanwhile, WFP plans to undertake a re-registration and verification exercise in Port Loko town starting Tuesday, 8 August.

NRC began the construction of an additional 100 two-room booths at the camp on 31 July. Despite the continuing tense security situation, humanitarian activities are gradually being reactivated in Port Loko town, with OXFAM resuming WATSAN activities, which will help alleviate the suffering of many of the IDPs. The one-month VGF distribution by WFP in July has had a considerable impact on the food security status of the IDPs. However food shortages are reported in the camps due to continuing influxes. Non-food items have not been provided for new arrivals. IMC continues to maintain health programmes at the IDP clinic where they see an average of 120 patients per day. They identified about 40 malnourished children during the

period under review, mainly among the newly displaced.

NRC continues the Rapid Response Education classes. They will soon complete the construction of two additional temporary school structures for the students. A total of 970 children are enrolled in the programme. NRC is currently conducting a three-week teacher training for the teachers attached to the camp school.

Lungi Area/Tasso Island/Kakum Island - boosting coping mechanisms

IMC continues to support the outpatient clinic at the Lungi hospital, while providing medical screening services to children in the Interim Care Centre in Lungi. In Tasso Island, where at least 8,000 IDPs and residents are considered vulnerable, IMC is maintaining health services and supplementary feeding programmes. They are currently distributing plastic sheeting donated by ICRC to cover 97 booths in a makeshift camp constructed by IDPs on Kakum Island. As a follow-up to a one-month VGF distribution to 8,116 IDPs and residents in Tasso Island, WFP is now focusing on FFW & FFAg interventions aimed at reducing the population's dependency on VGF. In Lokomassama, which also hosts a large number of IDPs, CARITAS is supporting agricultural production. They distributed 500 bags of seed rice and 500 hoes to help boost the production capacity of the farming community there.

3. Western Area

IDP relocation ongoing

CARE, WFP, OCHA and NCRRR continue to facilitate the relocation of IDPs in National Workshop to the expanded sections of Waterloo and Grafton camps. As of the time of reporting, a total of 1,675 IDPs had been relocated. The relocation exercise will resume on Friday, 11 August. Plans are underway to further expand camp facilities to ease the overcrowding situation in IDP camps. Concern Worldwide and GOAL are currently working on the site expansion, while ACF is helping to upgrade and extend WATSAN facilities in the expanded sites. Meanwhile, MSF-H reports an increase in watery and bloody diarrhea in the camp clinics in Freetown.

Gambia donates money to IDPs

The Gambian President, President Yahya Jammeh, donated US\$10,000 to IDPs in the Western Area during a visit to Sierra Leone on 26 July. Discussions are ongoing with the IDPs on how best to allocate the funds. The Gambian leader also donated US\$10,000 to the amputees at the Murray Town camp in Aberdeen, Freetown.

Enhancing women's capacity

After an assessment of women's associations and war-affected youths, ICRC/SLRC together with the Ministry of Agriculture are planning to establish a community-based vegetable production programme, initially targeting 11,722 women and children in the Western Area and in Port Loko district. Meanwhile, UNICEF has distributed six sets of food processing equipment through AFRICARE & Action Aid for women's groups involved in food security activities in the Western Area and in

Bo.

4. Southern Province

Flood victims targeted in Bonthe District

WVI has completed a second distribution of 42.75mt of FFAg to 1,000 flood victims in the Kwame Bai Krim chiefdom, Bonthe district. Meanwhile, ACF has completed a food security assessment in five flood-affected chiefdoms in the Bonthe and Pujehun districts.

E. SECTORAL HIGHLIGHTS

Child Protection

The Minister of Social Welfare Gender & Children's Affairs (MSWGCA), in a press conference held on 27 July reported that the Sierra Leone government was working on modalities to ratify the two optional protocols approved by the UN General Assembly in May. The Minister also stated that the "Rights of the Child Act" has been drafted and is awaiting review. The Ministry is yet to organise a stakeholder's workshop to develop the mandate and structure for a Commission of War Affected Children in the country. UNICEF reports that the special rapporteur on "violence against women" will visit Sierra Leone by the end of the month.

During the past week, UNICEF and MYES along with other child protection agencies conducted a two-day mass tracing exercise in the Western Area, including cross-border tracing. Meanwhile, CRS has registered 28 separated children in Mile 91, while CARITAS is undertaking a registration and verification exercise for more than 400 separated children in Yele.

Below is a summary of family tracing and reunification activities in the South for the month of July.

	Separated children	Families traced	Reunifications effected	Follow-up visits made
Bo	7	15	11	11
Moyamba	3	2	2	-
Bonthe	3	-	-	-
Pujehun	7	-	1	13

Education

MYES in collaboration with UNICEF has conducted a 10-day training of trainer's workshop for the first batch of 20 trainers to implement the Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP). The ALP is meant to cater for over-age children wishing to complete primary schooling in half the normal time. UNICEF is also working with other partners to facilitate integration of amputee children and the children of amputees living in Murray town camp into neighbouring schools for the ensuing year.

Meanwhile, WFP has offered to extend its school feeding programme to UNICEF-supported formal schools and non-formal centres.

Food Aid

During the reporting period, WFP distributed a total of 445.879mt of assorted food-aid commodities to 39,447 beneficiaries countrywide.

Health

According to a health information bulletin recently published by the MOHS, health facilities operational in the Western Area and northern province have declined from 356 institutions in 1997, to 154 to date; (Western Area-76; northern province- 78). Meanwhile, UNICEF, WHO and UNFPA continue to undertake activities to strengthen the MOHS capacity to respond to health challenges in different regions.

UNICEF recently supplied 1,800 EPI manuals for the training of PHU staff in accessible districts. They also launched a community-based Anemia & Prevention Control Project in Bo, aimed at targeting 12,000 pregnant and breast-feeding women. They continue with chlorination, water trucking, and cesspit emptying activities in IDP camps and in accessible areas. In collaboration with local contractors, UNICEF is constructing wells in Moyamba, Port Loko, Tonkolili and Kenema districts to service schools, PHUs and vulnerable communities.

F. HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports continuing violations committed against civilians by armed groups. According to a report sent to OCHA on 6 August, "of particular concern is the plight of civilians attempting to flee RUF areas to escape attacks, forced recruitment, and GOSL gunship attacks." HRW said it has collected testimonies of civilians who were tortured by the RUF or killed for attempting to flee (Makeni, Lunsar, Kambia). Given the massive displacement of populations within RUF areas, the organization said it has reason to believe that the RUF is trying to terrorize the remaining civilian population in their areas of control to prevent them from leaving. "We've also documented many cases of civilians being severely maltreated by CDF members, particularly the Gbethis who routinely extort money from civilians and beat and torture those accused of being RUF combatants or collaborators," the report said.

Gunship Attacks: Furthermore, testimonies of victims and witnesses from Tongo Field recounted serious civilian casualties resulting from gunship attacks near the market place. "While other RUF targets were also hit, and while there were reported to be RUF combatants in and around the crowded market place, the attack resulted in 14 civilian deaths and at least a dozen wounded," said the HRW report. HRW said it was yet to confirm which gunship was responsible for these attacks.

Forced Recruitment: HRW has recorded witness accounts of a recent RUF recruitment drive in Makeni and in Yeliboya, near Kambia. "We have credible evidence to suggest a small number of children as young as 10 were recruited in Makeni between July 11 and 15." There are (unconfirmed) similar reports from

Kono.

Food Raids: The RUF continues to commit serious violations in raiding villages in Makeni, Lunsar, Kambia and Kabala for food. HRW said it has documented at least 15 murders and several rapes, which occurred during such raids (in June and July).

Westside Boys: HRW reported at least eight cases of abductions along the Freetown-Masiaka highway, including the four aid workers of the Christian Health Association of Sierra Leone (CHASL) who were abducted on 21 July and released a week later.

CDF: There are continuing reports of extortion and lawlessness within the areas of Moyamba, Kenema and Bo. HRW has also documented several cases of excessive use of brutality against suspected RUF rebels by the CDF.

For comments/questions/contributions please contact, Ahunna Eziakonwa, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA, Sierra Leone. Email: aeziaki@hotmail.com/Tel: 232-22-227759/23223-501302.

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80) United Nations Document

Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 19
May 2000 (S/2000/455)



Security Council

Distr.: General
19 May 2000

Original: English

Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

I. Introduction

1. By paragraph 22 of resolution 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000, the Security Council requested me to continue to report to the Council every 45 days to provide, *inter alia*, assessments of security conditions on the ground so that troop levels and the tasks to be performed by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) can be kept under review. The present report is submitted in accordance with that request and covers developments since my third report on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone issued on 7 March 2000 (S/2000/186). The present report also contains short-term recommendations for the stabilization of the current situation in Sierra Leone, including for an expansion of the capacity of UNAMSIL, beyond the level of 13,000 military personnel authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1299 (2000) of 19 May 2000.

II. Political developments

2. During the reporting period, the peace process suffered a very serious setback as the result of the recent unprovoked armed attacks on United Nations peacekeepers, the detention of several hundred United Nations personnel, and the destruction of disarmament and demobilization camps by fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Regrettably, those developments in May 2000, which are described in section VII of this report, overshadowed the limited progress achieved in the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement through a series of meetings of the parties and international stakeholders.

3. Prior to those events, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah convened on 9 March a special meeting of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration attended by the leader of RUF, Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/ex-Sierra Leone Army (AFRC/ex-SLA), Johnny Paul Koroma, the Deputy Defence Minister and Civil Defence Force Coordinator, Chief Hinga Norman, UNAMSIL and the Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). At that meeting, all faction leaders agreed to grant unhindered access to all parts of the country to UNAMSIL, the humanitarian community and the entire population; to relinquish the territory they occupied and allow the Government to have full control over every part of the country; and to allow disarmament to take place in selected areas in the Eastern and Northern Provinces where disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) facilities were already in place, and thereafter in the rest of the country as facilities were made available. As a result of these efforts, the number of checkpoints maintained by the factions was reduced, and UNAMSIL was able to deploy to the RUF stronghold of Kailahun on 16 March. However, RUF fighters continued to obstruct UNAMSIL deployment to Koidu in the Kono District and the number of RUF ex-combatants reporting for disarmament remained very low. In addition, some checkpoints manned by the factions remained in place and continued to hinder movement by the humanitarian community and the general population.

4. On 20 March, at Freetown, ECOWAS convened a verification meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Principal Parties to the Lomé Agreement to follow up on the decisions reached at the special meeting on



Sierra Leone held at Bamako on 1 March, which was covered in my third report. At the meeting in Freetown, the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, stated that he accepted that UNAMSIL was the "neutral peacekeeping force" provided for in the Lomé Peace Agreement (S/1999/777, annex). This was considered a positive development, since RUF had previously questioned the presence of UNAMSIL peacekeepers in Sierra Leone.

5. The meeting on 20 March of the principal parties also set up a committee, headed by my Special Representative, Oluyemi Adeniji, to carry out an investigation into the seizure in January of weapons and equipment from Kenyan and Guinean troops by RUF and from the Kenyan contingent by AFRC/ex-SLA. The investigation committee held its first meeting on 31 March, but RUF failed to attend on the pretext that it was not involved in the seizure of the Guinean weapons, despite evidence to the contrary. The three seized Guinean armoured personnel carriers have been recovered, but the other weapons and equipment have yet to be returned.

6. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations visited Sierra Leone from 19 to 21 March to assess the operations of UNAMSIL and to convey to the parties the strong commitment of the United Nations to assist them in implementing the Lomé Agreement. He held meetings with UNAMSIL senior staff, President Kabbah and other government officials, Mr. Koroma, Mr. Sankoh, United Nations agencies and representatives of civil society. The Under-Secretary-General also visited Port Loko and Makeni, where he inspected UNAMSIL troops, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps and centres for former child combatants. He also visited Bamako, where he met with the President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konaré, current Chairman of ECOWAS.

7. At the initiative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, a high-level donors conference on Sierra Leone was convened in London on 27 March, to affirm political support for the peace process and mobilize additional resources. The conference was co-chaired by the United Kingdom, the World Bank and the United Nations, which was represented by the Deputy Secretary-General. New pledges totalling some US\$ 70 million were made, to support the peace process, in particular the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well as humanitarian assistance. The conference reaffirmed the international community's continued and strong

support for the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement and sent a strong message to the factions to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement. In particular, the rebels were called upon to put an end to the continuing human rights abuses, to disarm their combatants immediately, to release women and children still detained, and to allow safe and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance to all areas of the country. The participants also discussed the issue of elections and undertook to help to organize free and fair elections in Sierra Leone, as provided for under the Lomé Peace Agreement, on the clear understanding that elections would not be possible without significant progress on disarmament. I commend the Government of the United Kingdom for taking this important initiative.

8. During the reporting period, some progress has also been made with regard to the functioning of the various institutions envisaged in the Lomé Agreement. However, this continued to be hampered by a lack of resources. The Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, chaired by Mr. Sankoh, did not produce a plan of action and there also appeared to be a lack of political consensus on its role vis-à-vis existing ministries. The Commission for the Consolidation of Peace led by Mr. Koroma, however, made a good beginning and organized several meetings of the parties and other stakeholders to promote reconciliation and discuss ways of moving the peace process forward. From 18 to 23 April, the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace convened a commanders peace conference at Bo to facilitate face-to-face meetings among the commanders of the factions and to build confidence and promote peace. The conference was well attended by all factions.

9. Mr. Sankoh appeared before the Parliament of Sierra Leone on 15 March to answer questions on issues impeding the peace process. All political parties represented in Parliament strongly criticized Mr. Sankoh for impeding the peace process. In his response, Mr. Sankoh asserted that he was committed to the peace process and attributed the current obstacles to progress, in particular the slow pace of disarmament, to the weakness of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; the lack of transportation facilities, inadequate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration facilities; and to unattractive incentives for the ex-

combatants. However, Mr. Sankoh claimed that he was ready to work with Parliament.

10. At various bilateral and multilateral meetings during the reporting period, Mr. Sankoh and other RUF leaders complained about certain aspects of the Lomé Agreement that had not been implemented. Specifically, they mentioned the fact that no RUF members had been appointed to positions in parastatal enterprises, the diplomatic service and any other public sector, under article IV of the Lomé Agreement. They also complained that too much attention was being focused on the disarmament provisions to the neglect of the political provisions of the Agreement. While there can be little doubt that the lack of cooperation on the part of RUF and Mr. Sankoh in particular was the main obstacle to the effective implementation of the Lomé Agreement, it is also true that the situation was not helped by the slow pace of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, as well as various political, administrative and other problems.

11. During the reporting period, there were unconfirmed reports of the formation of a new faction by a former RUF commander, Sam Bockarie, who was said to be engaged in the recruitment and training of rebels in Liberia. The Government of Liberia has denied these reports. On 22 March, the Government of Sierra Leone arrested 16 persons suspected of organizing a group of dissidents to invade Liberia. The arrests were carried out in the area of the Gola Forest, close to the Liberian border.

12. During consultations of the heads of State of the Mano River Union held at Bamako on 2 March, the President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was requested to become personally involved in resolving the obstacles confronting the Sierra Leone peace process. Pursuant to that decision, President Taylor extended an invitation to Mr. Sankoh to visit Monrovia on 12 March for consultations on the peace process. However, Mr. Sankoh insisted that he would not travel until the Security Council lifted the travel ban imposed on him by its resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998.

13. On 18 March, in a welcome development a ministerial meeting of the Mano River Union member States was held at Monrovia. The meeting was followed up by a meeting of the Ministers responsible for Security, Internal Affairs, Defence and Justice in Freetown on 17 April. At that meeting, agreement was reached to set up a Joint Security Committee of the

Mano River Union, which would include a technical committee to advise the Joint Security Committee and joint border security and confidence-building units. The recommendations were submitted for consideration by the Union at its summit meeting, which was held at Conakry on 8 May. At that meeting, which was also attended by President Konaré, the situation in Sierra Leone was also discussed (see para. 76 below).

III. Security situation before 1 May 2000

14. Prior to the serious attacks on United Nations peacekeepers, which erupted on 1 May 2000 and which are described in section VII below, the overall security situation had improved gradually as UNAMSIL troops stepped up their patrols and deployed to new locations in the provinces. However, in the areas still under the control of rebel groups, particularly the RUF and AFRC/ex-SLA strongholds, the security situation remained precarious and there were several serious incidents, some involving United Nations peacekeepers.

15. On 21 March, a serious violation of the ceasefire occurred in the Bafodia-Kabala area, where fighting erupted between elements of RUF and AFRC/ex-SLA. UNAMSIL deployed military observers and two platoons from the Kenyan battalion to the area to calm the situation. Intermittent fighting continued until 30 March when the AFRC/ex-SLA commander agreed to the UNAMSIL proposal to disarm. To avert tension, a total of 292 AFRC/ex-SLA combatants were disarmed on 30 March and transported to the Lungu disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camp together with their dependants. A further 139 were disarmed on 2 and 3 April and also transferred to that camp. Altogether, some 900 persons were moved. A company from the Kenyan battalion and a team of military observers were subsequently deployed at Kabala, but had to be moved back to Makeni to strengthen UNAMSIL positions there after the RUF attacks in early May. In another incident on 8 April, unidentified persons fired several rounds at Ghanaian UNAMSIL troops at Kenema. The troops returned fire and the attack ceased.

16. On 22 April, RUF staged a demonstration against the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme at Makeni, in which about 40 armed RUF

fighters participated. That group also set up a checkpoint close to the entrance of the reception centre of the Makeni disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camp. The RUF checkpoint was removed the same day under pressure from UNAMSIL. At that time, RUF fighters did not hinder the movement of UNAMSIL or personnel of the United Kingdom Department for International Development, which is providing the logistic support to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. However, RUF did harass local Sierra Leonean disarmament, demobilization and reintegration personnel and forced them to leave the camp.

17. Also on 22 April, a group of some 20 RUF fighters prevented UNAMSIL military observers from entering the premises of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration reception centre of Magburaka. They also alleged that UNAMSIL soldiers, who were providing security at that location, had taken some ammunition belonging to RUF. A small-scale scuffle ensued, after which UNAMSIL troops at the site decided to withdraw temporarily to avoid escalation. The Makeni/Magburaka area remained very tense and subsequently became the scene of the first attacks by RUF on UNAMSIL troops.

18. On 28 April, a scuffle between ECOMOG troops and ex-SLA members over a stolen vehicle led to several shots being fired, with one ex-SLA fighter killed and another seriously wounded. Several ex-SLA members immediately took to the streets to protest about this incident. The situation caused considerable tension in Freetown, but was brought under control by UNAMSIL. Mr. Koroma helped to restore calm. Mr. Sankoh, however, gave a press conference on 1 May during which he stated that UNAMSIL had shot the ex-combatants on 28 April in Freetown. This inciting statement led to an increase of tension between RUF and UNAMSIL throughout the country.

19. A serious incident occurred on 30 April, during which a soldier of the Nigerian contingent in UNAMSIL was shot and seriously wounded when he refused to surrender his weapon to a large group of armed men (presumably ex-SLA) in the Occra Hills area. His unit of five men was outnumbered and ultimately, forced to surrender their weapons. The injured soldier was evacuated to Nigeria. A protest about the incident has been made to Mr. Koroma.

20. Other ceasefire violations during the reporting period included serious abuses against civilians in the Port Loko and Occra Hills areas, the maintenance of illegal roadblocks by all factions, and other obstruction of peacekeeping operations, particularly by RUF elements. Tension in the Occra Hills area subsided somewhat after the Government announced that AFRC/ex-SLA combatants would be able to join the restructured army, if they met certain criteria. Another contributing factor to the decrease in tension was the payment by the Government of transitional safety allowances to ex-combatants who had disarmed under the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

21. The Joint Monitoring Commission continued to hold its weekly meetings under the chairmanship of UNAMSIL to address ceasefire violations. The Commission continued to press the factions to comply with article XIX of the Lomé Peace Agreement which requires them to disclose the number and location of their combatants. While the Civil Defence Forces and AFRC/ex-SLA have furnished this information, RUF provided only partial information on 25 April. United Nations military observers convened several meetings of the district-level ceasefire monitoring committees in areas where UNAMSIL is deployed.

22. During the period under review, UNAMSIL contingents destroyed unstable ammunition found in various areas, as well as that collected during the disarmament process, the latter in close coordination with the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Some damaged bridges in the Eastern Province have been replaced or repaired by UNAMSIL troops deployed in the area.

23. Since my last report, UNAMSIL troops have deployed to new areas, including the RUF stronghold of Kailahun, as well as to Zimmi, Joru, Kambia, Mange and Kabala (see the attached map). Although the deployment of UNAMSIL troops to Kono district was obstructed by RUF, military observers and a Kenyan platoon from Magburaka sent frequent patrols to Koidu. The deployment of UNAMSIL was subsequently adjusted in view of the RUF attacks. The strength of the military component of UNAMSIL as at 15 May had reached 9,251 military personnel, including 260 military observers (see annex).

24. In accordance with the understanding reached with the Government of Nigeria, two Nigerian

battalions and a tank company serving with ECOMOG were brought under United Nations command and deployed in Freetown for a 90-day period. On 2 May, the remaining ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone were repatriated after handing over their security functions to UNAMSIL peacekeepers, in particular in Freetown.

IV. Progress towards major objectives in the peace process

25. In my last report (S/2000/186), I outlined a number of important objectives or "steps ahead" to help define priorities and the responsibilities of all concerned and to provide the international community with benchmarks by which to measure progress. These main steps were endorsed by the Security Council at its 4111th meeting. This section describes the progress made during the reporting period towards these objectives.

Early disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants

26. The disarmament and demobilization process, which was making slow but steady progress, came to a virtual standstill after hostilities erupted early in May. As at 15 May, a total of 24,042 ex-combatants had been disarmed: 4,949 from RUF; 10,055 from AFRC/ex-SLA; and 9,038 from the Civil Defence Forces. The total figure of ex-combatants includes 1,701 child combatants who surrendered without weapons. The number and quality of weapons surrendered remain an issue of concern. To date, 10,840 weapons have been surrendered.

27. Following the attacks by RUF on UNAMSIL and its movements in the direction of Freetown, many ex-Sierra Leone Army and Civil Defence Forces combatants have taken up arms and are likely to remain armed at least for as long as RUF continues its attacks. While these actions on the part of the ex-SLA and the Civil Defence Forces would be understandable in the present context, it is clear that this development, together with the destruction of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration facilities by RUF, could seriously complicate the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, which remains a crucial element of the peace process in Sierra Leone. There is also concern about the fate of those combatants, especially children, who had voluntarily

joined the programme and would now be vulnerable to re-recruitment and possible punishment for desertion by RUF.

28. In view of the slow pace of disarmament, the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration held an emergency meeting on 7 April of all stakeholders in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, chaired by President Kabbah, and agreed on a fast-track approach to disarmament. This approach included the shortening of the period of encampment of disarmed combatants at the demobilization centres from the initial six to eight weeks to a period of three weeks, and the use of mobile disarmament teams. The process would take the same time for all the RUF, AFRC/ex-SLA and Civil Defence Forces combatants, and was expected to result in a quicker flow of ex-combatants through the programme.

29. At that meeting, the National Commission also decided that the disarmament of RUF combatants in the Kailahun District would start in the Eastern Province. As a result, on 10 April, representatives from UNAMSIL, ECOMOG, a group of Parliamentarians and the press accompanied Mr. Sankoh to a ceremonial start of this exercise in Segbwema. However, only 89 combatants, including 56 RUF, 28 ex-SLA and 5 Civil Defence Forces, reported for disarmament and were subsequently transported to the Daru demobilization centre.

30. On 17 April, the four disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps at Bo, Moyamba, Makeni and Magburaka became operational. Civil Defence Forces combatants have since then disarmed at Bo and Moyamba. RUF, however, did not participate in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process at Makeni and Magburaka and the overall number of RUF combatants disarmed remained well below expectations.

31. At the same time, many ex-SLA soldiers as well as combatants from other factions were reluctant to disarm for fear that they would not get the chance to join the new army if they left the demobilization centres. To allay this fear, the Government clarified that all former combatants would be eligible to join Sierra Leone's restructured army, provided that candidates met the criteria of the Military Reintegration Plan.

32. Delays in the payment of allowances for the combatants encamped at the disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration centres caused some disturbances in the camps as well as demonstrations in Freetown. UNAMSIL took steps to reinforce security at the camps and, in conjunction with the National Commission, to expedite the registration and documentation process for timely preparation of demobilization activities and payment of allowances.

33. The delays in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme led to additional costs and therefore increased the need for financial assistance from donor countries. Before May, there was an important shortfall in contributions to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which is administered by the World Bank, of \$19 million for the year 2000 disarmament, demobilization and reintegration budget. However, it is likely that a resumption in due course of the programme may require additional resources.

34. An additional concern arising in the context of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process was the lack of guidelines for the care and protection of so-called camp followers, or dependants of ex-combatants. UNAMSIL has initiated policy discussions and made recommendations on this issue, including the provision of adequate humanitarian assistance to this sector of the population, in cooperation with the Government and relevant humanitarian agencies.

Extension of State authority

35. During the period under review, the Government's Task Force for the restoration of civil authority throughout the country, which is chaired by Vice-President Joe Albert Demby, started discussions on plans and strategies for the return of Government officials and other public officials to the provinces, districts and chiefdoms.

36. In April, the Government of Sierra Leone decided to postpone the return of its officials to Makeni because of security concerns, as most parts of the Northern Province remain under RUF control. There was also a lack of basic amenities, including suitable residence and office accommodation.

National reconciliation and democratization

37. With a view to advancing democratization and national institution-building, UNAMSIL worked closely with the Attorney-General, the Minister of Justice and the High Commissioner for Human Rights

in preparing draft legislation for the establishment of the national Human Rights Commission as foreseen in the Lomé Peace Agreement.

38. The National Electoral Commission was sworn into office on 20 March and has commenced work. The Government was also exploring the possibility of conducting phased local elections for Paramount Chiefs, beginning with rebel-free areas.

39. Obviously, the process of national reconciliation has become even more difficult in the light of the recent attacks by RUF, which have seriously undermined the peace process and have further exacerbated the lack of trust between the signatories of the Lomé Agreement.

Rebuilding Sierra Leone's security forces

40. There has been some improvement in the functioning of the Sierra Leone police force, which receives assistance from the United Kingdom and UNAMSIL. However, the restructuring process is proceeding slowly and is hampered by the lack of funding as well as the outbreak of hostilities. Changes have been made in the management structure, crime prevention methods, and rank structure of the police force. A Complaints and Discipline Department has been established to look into corrupt practices, criminal activities, sexual abuse and violent crimes by the police. UNAMSIL has also continued to regularly provide human rights training to the Sierra Leone police forces. Personnel of the armed Special Security Division of the Sierra Leonean police have now been deployed to Moyamba, Kenema, Bo and Lungi.

41. Efforts were also made to implement the Military Reintegration Plan, which was agreed upon by all parties. The first phase of the plan would involve an assessment of Sierra Leone Army officers to ensure that they, after fast-track training, could be involved in the training of their own army. I wish to express my appreciation for the crucial assistance provided by the United Kingdom in this regard.

42. Regrettably, a key figure in the national security system, General Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, Chief of Defence Staff of the Sierra Leone Army, died on 18 April. The Government of Sierra Leone declared seven days of mourning.

V. Human rights

43. The human rights situation in some parts of the country, especially those areas not under the control of the Government, remained an issue of very serious concern. Abductions of civilians for specific tasks such as hard labour on palm oil plantations continued to be perpetrated by RUF and AFRC/ex-SLA elements from the Occra Hills area.

44. In the Northern Province, international non-governmental organizations seriously curtailed their humanitarian operations in RUF-held territories following the detention of some of their international and national aid workers by armed RUF combatants near Alikalia on 7 March. In Kabala, there were reports of the harassment of civilians and looting of villages by elements of the ex-SLA.

45. The large number of dependants of the AFRC/ex-SLA combatants who emerged from the bush at Kabala on 3 April (see para. 15 above) drew attention to the need to take special measures to protect dependants of ex-combatants, the majority of whom are women and children. The majority of "wives" of the combatants are in fact abductees and, if not interviewed separately from their "husbands", would most likely not feel free to express their wish to return to their original families.

46. The protection of internally displaced persons remains a source of concern, which needs to be urgently addressed in a coordinated manner. In the Port Loko area, internally displaced persons who move beyond the confines of relatively safe areas to meet their daily needs often become victims of abduction, rape and forced labour.

47. The deployment of United Nations human rights monitors to key locations in the country had to be curtailed as a result of the recent hostilities. However, their deployment will proceed as a matter of priority as soon as security conditions allow.

48. Recent reports of serious human rights abuses, summary executions and violations of international humanitarian law, committed during the recent fighting by RUF as well as by the Sierra Leone Army and AFRC/ex-SLA, are a cause of grave concern. I call on all parties and their leadership to refrain from such acts and restore respect for the rule of law.

Child protection

49. Preliminary reports suggest that child combatants have been used extensively during the current conflict. UNAMSIL human rights officers who undertook a mission to Masiaka on 15 May observed several armed child combatants, mostly boys, with the Civil Defence Forces, AFRC/ex-SLA and the Sierra Leone Army. About 25 per cent of the combatants were under 18 years and some freely admitted that their ages were between 7 and 14 years. Almost all of them were armed. Other reports indicate that RUF is using a similar proportion of child combatants in the front lines.

50. Prior to the events of May, a total of about 1,700 child combatants, out of an estimated 5,000, had entered the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. UNICEF estimates that, at the time of the current crisis, about 800 of the demobilized child soldiers had been reunified with their families or placed in foster care, or had run away, leaving about 900 in interim care centres. These children remain vulnerable to re-abduction as a result of the collapse of the programme. Further, there have been no more releases of children from their commanders since the start of the crisis. UNICEF and its implementing partners, with significant support from key donors, are working to ensure that adequate protections are in place for these children.

51. Obviously, the delay in the disarmament process and the renewed hostilities also impacted negatively on the release of abducted children and women. The Government of Sierra Leone has agreed to establish a National Commission for War-Affected Children to ensure that children's concerns are addressed at the highest political levels. This agreement was reached during the recent visit to Freetown, on 29 and 30 April, of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy. Mr. Otunnu and Mr. Axworthy also held separate meetings with President Kabbah, Mr. Koroma and Mr. Sankoh to stress the need for special measures to address the plight of the war-affected children of Sierra Leone and to assess progress in implementation of the Lomé Agreement.

VI. Humanitarian aspects

52. During the reporting period, humanitarian access gradually improved in some areas owing to the wider deployment of UNAMSIL and the subsequent improvement of security conditions. Rehabilitation and reintegration activities continued to operate without serious difficulties in the relatively stable Southern Province. However, during the attacks on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration centres in the first week of May, international humanitarian staff were surrounded and harassed by rebel elements in Makeni. All staff were able to leave the area, but several assets belonging to humanitarian organizations were looted. The drastic deterioration of the security situation in May forced the curtailing of humanitarian operations in this and other areas of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, reversing gains made in the past few months. Food, health, water, sanitation and child protection programmes continue in Freetown and accessible areas of the Southern and lower Eastern Provinces, such as Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Bonthe, despite limited staffing because of a drawdown in international humanitarian staff.

53. About 20,000 new internally displaced persons moved into Freetown following the fighting outside the peninsula. However, in view of improving security conditions, many of them are now returning to their homes in the Waterloo area, where they will receive assistance. Additionally, plans are under way to provide assistance to about 9,000 new internally displaced persons at Lungi. The World Food Programme, in collaboration with the Government, will also continue food distributions to about 59,000 internally displaced persons who were already in Freetown before the start of the current crisis. Further internal displacements have been reported in areas that cannot yet be reached, particularly around Masiaka and Port Loko. Meanwhile, the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees is providing assistance to more than 1,000 new refugees who have arrived in Guinea, which already hosts about 450,000 Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees.

54. Another area of concern is the apparently high rate of HIV/AIDS infection in Sierra Leone. Preliminary data suggest that the incidence of HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone is increasing exponentially, indicating that the country is in the early stages of a major HIV/AIDS outbreak. The Government and their

United Nations and non-governmental organization partners continue to support HIV testing, counselling and programmes for the control of sexually transmitted diseases, but much remains to be done in the areas of sexual education and health programmes. UNAMSIL has taken measures to sensitize its personnel to the risks of infection.

55. In order to cope with the current emergency, United Nations agencies have been forced to divert resources, such as food support for agricultural programmes, from activities designed to ensure the nation's long-term recovery. Further, the recent events have had a grave impact on the ability of humanitarian agencies to meet the needs of large segments of the population. Should these conditions persist, humanitarian priorities and needs will have to be re-evaluated and prioritized to reflect a new operating environment. To that end, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in cooperation with the agencies, is currently in the process of updating the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal to reflect the current situation. The Appeal, which requests \$71 million in humanitarian assistance, is at present only about 37 per cent funded. However, a more robust response is required to meet the urgent humanitarian and rehabilitation needs of the country.

VII. Attacks on and detention of United Nations personnel

Military developments

56. The present crisis commenced on 1 May, when RUF ex-combatants approached the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration reception centre at Makeni in a threatening manner and started firing in the air. It should be noted that the RUF commander in Makeni obstructed the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in that area ever since the camps there, which were constructed to meet the RUF demands for better facilities, had become operational on 17 April. Only 10 RUF ex-combatants voluntarily came forward to disarm. They were demobilized in the morning of 1 May at the Makeni reception centre. There have also been incidents at various locations of RUF forcibly preventing its fighters from disarming. At the same time, UNAMSIL was about to deploy its forces to the area of Koidu, which is the centre of diamond mining operations conducted by RUF. This

planned deployment may also have contributed to the decision of RUF to attack UNAMSIL in a possible test of its resolve.

57. On 1 May, the local RUF commander and some of his fighters approached the reception centre at Makeni, which was manned by UNAMSIL military observers, in an assertive manner and demanded that the United Nations hand over five of the disarmed ex-combatants with their weapons as well as the UNAMSIL military observer who had demobilized them. The likely motive of RUF was to punish those ex-combatants for joining the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. However, UNAMSIL prevented the RUF combatants from entering the UNAMSIL facilities and tried to discuss the situation with them. In the course of these discussions, the RUF combatants detained three UNAMSIL military observers as well as four UNAMSIL peacekeepers of the Kenyan battalion who were providing security at that location. The RUF combatants then proceeded to destroy part of the camp at Makeni and also started looting in the town. At Magburaka, a group of armed RUF ex-combatants surrounded the UNAMSIL team site, which was protected by a section of the Kenyan battalion.

58. In response to this incident, the Force Commander met the same day with President Kabbah to express his deep concern and discuss possible measures. The Force Commander also spoke with Mr. Sankoh by telephone to demand the immediate release of all UNAMSIL personnel. The RUF leader did not offer any help and accused UNAMSIL of trying to start a war by forcibly disarming RUF ex-combatants. President Kabbah then requested Mr. Lamin, the RUF-designated Minister for Trade and Industry, to try to convince Mr. Sankoh to give orders to defuse the situation. According to Mr. Lamin, this was agreed to by Mr. Sankoh, who, however, remained unavailable to UNAMSIL during the rest of that day.

59. On 2 May, which date coincided with the departure of the last ECOMOG troops from the country, the situation at Magburaka deteriorated sharply when RUF tried to disarm UNAMSIL troops. The United Nations troops resisted and an exchange of fire ensued which continued throughout the day. RUF used small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars. Three soldiers of the Kenyan battalion were injured as a result of the fighting. RUF also destroyed and looted the disarmament, demobilization and

reintegration facilities at Magburaka and Makeni. At Makeni, RUF attacked UNAMSIL troops, who returned fire. Two soldiers of the Kenyan battalion were wounded at that location. RUF also attacked and overran a 60-man strong unit of the Kenyan battalion located at the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camp in Makeni. On 3 May, fighting in Makeni and Magburaka stopped, with the exception of some sporadic firing. A large group of the Kenyan unit, which had not been heard from since the attack at the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camp, arrived at Mile 91 on 4 May after walking from Makeni, carrying three wounded. Smaller groups of this unit managed to join their company headquarters at Makeni.

60. The events at Makeni and Magburaka had immediate repercussions in other areas under RUF control where UNAMSIL had deployed its troops. On 2 May, a UNAMSIL helicopter and its crew and passengers were detained by RUF combatants at Kailahun. There were four crew members and two civilian staff members of UNAMSIL. In addition, RUF set up a roadblock to restrict UNAMSIL traffic in that area and detained 30 UNAMSIL military and civilian personnel and a helicopter. A 23-man unit of the Indian battalion, which was deployed from Daru to join the company deployed at Kailahun, was intercepted and detained by RUF at Kuiva, near Kailahun.

61. Also, late in the evening of 3 May, a company of the Nigerian contingent in Kambia came under fire from RUF. That company was then briefly detained by RUF and released on 4 May without their weapons and uniforms. A platoon of the Nigerian contingent at Mange also came under fire and was surrounded by RUF.

62. The Force Commander, Major General Vijay Kumar Jetley, took immediate measures to reinforce the UNAMSIL positions at Makeni and Magburaka. The company of the Kenyan battalion which had been deployed at Kabala moved to Makeni, while a 100-man unit of the Indian quick reaction company reinforced Magburaka. The Zambian battalion was then instructed to move from Lungi to Makeni, but was stopped at a strong roadblock erected by RUF, presumably ambushed and detained by a large group of RUF fighters. Some 400 United Nations troops, as well as elements of the Kenyan sector headquarters which accompanied them, are believed to have fallen into the hands of RUF, which reportedly moved 200 of them to

its stronghold in the Kono district. At that time, the Force Commander also began to redeploy United Nations troops to consolidate the UNAMSIL presence around Freetown as well as at Port Loko and Masiaka. The UNAMSIL units at the latter location were later forced to withdraw for lack of ammunition.

63. From 2 May onwards, there were several clashes between RUF and UNAMSIL troops, as well as elements of the Sierra Leone Army and the Civil Defence Forces at several locations in the northern and western parts of the country, including Makeni, Magburaka, Lunsar, Rogberi Junction, Port Loko, Mile 91, Masiaka, Songo, Mange and Kambia. At times, the Government-operated helicopter gunship engaged the rebel forces. During this period of fighting, UNAMSIL experienced serious difficulties in obtaining accurate information about the situation on the ground, which were exacerbated by a continuous stream of unconfirmed rumours and reports from the field. There were also unconfirmed reports about movements of RUF fighters from neighbouring countries into Sierra Leone. UNAMSIL was forced to conduct frequent aerial reconnaissance missions to gather information about the movements of hostile RUF elements.

64. On 9 May, the Indian quick reaction company and a Kenyan company, which had been surrounded at Magburaka, broke successfully through RUF lines and managed to reach United Nations positions at Mile 91. On the same day, the remaining troops of the Kenyan battalion broke out of Makeni and managed to reach areas controlled by the ex-SLA at Kabala and Bumbuna. Before their breakout, these units stood their ground and did not surrender in spite of continuing threats and attacks by RUF, which had encircled their positions. I wish to convey to the United Nations troops concerned my admiration for this display of military courage and determination.

65. It should also be noted that, although RUF elements at Kailahun have surrounded and detained United Nations peacekeepers, they have so far refrained from hostilities against UNAMSIL and have reportedly been under considerable pressure from the local population to release United Nations personnel.

66. On 14 May, 18 detainees were moved from Geima, where they were being held by RUF, to the compound of the Indian battalion at Kailahun. This group includes 11 military observers and seven members of the Indian battalion. Although their

location is surrounded by RUF, the former detainees are considered to be safe and under the protection of the Indian battalion, which did not yield to RUF. Negotiations continue with the RUF leadership to obtain their agreement to airlift the 11 military observers to Freetown.

67. On 15 May, 139 detainees, all members of the Zambian battalion, were moved to the Liberian border town of Foya, and 15 of them were transported onwards to Monrovia. Their release was the result of the commendable personal involvement of President Taylor of Liberia, whose efforts are to be commended by the international community. UNAMSIL is currently making arrangements to airlift the released detainees from Foya to Freetown with a stopover in Monrovia.

68. As at 15 May, the total number of UNAMSIL personnel presumed to be in the hands of RUF stands at 352, comprising 297 soldiers of the Zambian battalion, 29 soldiers of the Kenyan battalion, 23 soldiers of the Indian battalion and 3 military observers. They are believed to be held in Kuiva (near Kailahun) and in the Kono district. As a result of the fighting, a total of 25 UNAMSIL soldiers have been wounded. Fifteen United Nations soldiers remain missing, and it is feared that some of them may have lost their lives. RUF casualties are unknown, although reports indicate that RUF may have suffered a relatively high number of casualties.

69. At the time of preparation of this report, the situation in and around Freetown appeared to have stabilized, with no significant RUF movements reported towards the capital. The Government has mobilized forces which support it, including the Sierra Leone Army and Civil Defence Forces, to defend Freetown. A pivotal factor in restoring stability was the arrival of United Kingdom troops on 7 May and of a substantial British naval presence offshore a week later. The deployment of British troops at Lungi airport and in the western part of Freetown had as its objective the safe evacuation of nationals of the United Kingdom and others for whom it was responsible. Nevertheless, this presence boosted the confidence of the Sierra Leoneans, and enabled UNAMSIL to redeploy much-needed troops to areas east of Freetown. It is hoped that the United Kingdom will be able to maintain a military presence in the country until UNAMSIL has received the necessary reinforcements. An additional stabilizing factor was the arrival on 12 May of 300 well-trained and well-equipped troops from Jordan to

reinforce its contingent in UNAMSIL. The Government of India too made additional troops available for UNAMSIL, which will be airlifted soon. I applaud these countries for their immediate and resolute decisions to strengthen the international community's presence in Sierra Leone and their continued support since the beginning of the crisis.

70. As these events were unfolding, UNAMSIL received strong indications that Mr. Sankoh had given no instructions to his troops to stop the fighting or to seek the release of the detainees. On the contrary, Mr. Sankoh appeared initially to encourage his troops to take an assertive stand vis-à-vis the United Nations and later, when hostility against him increased in Freetown, called on his troops to march on Freetown.

71. On 9 May, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations arrived in Freetown as my special envoy to boost the morale of UNAMSIL and to consult with my Special Representative and the Force Commander on their assessment of the situation and to prepare recommendations for the United Nations response.

Diplomatic and political efforts

72. Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, I contacted leaders in the region and subregion to seek their assistance in bringing the situation to a rapid and peaceful resolution. I am grateful for the strong efforts made in this regard by African leaders, in particular the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, current chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, the President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, the Leader of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Colonel Muammar Al-Qadhafi, the President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konaré, the President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, and the President of Togo, Gnassingbe Eyadema. Representatives of several Governments have been in touch with Mr. Sankoh to secure the immediate release of the detainees and to find ways to salvage the peace process in Sierra Leone. I am grateful for their efforts and, in particular, to the heads of State of Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali and Nigeria, who sent their personal envoys to meet with Mr. Sankoh in the period from 3 to 7 May.

73. On 5 and 6 May, my Special Representative met in Freetown with Mr. Sankoh, who accused UNAMSIL troops of having precipitated the crisis by forcing RUF

combatants to disarm. The Special Representative responded that no UNAMSIL troops had ever attempted to disarm RUF combatants by force and that, in fact, RUF combatants had in subsequent days escalated events by attacking UNAMSIL; and demanded the immediate release of all detained UNAMSIL troops and their weapons and equipment. In the evening of 6 May, the Special Representative and the Libyan Special Envoy, Ali Treiki, met jointly with Mr. Sankoh. They pressed him to reduce the tension by ordering the immediate release of the detainees and to issue a statement that RUF would cease its attacks. Mr. Sankoh agreed to issue a statement to that effect, which was read out that evening on national television by the Special Representative. Mr. Adeniji and Mr. Treiki also spoke to President Kabbah and urged him to reduce tension and, in particular, to call on the organizers of the planned demonstration on 8 May to avoid approaching Mr. Sankoh's house.

74. However, on 8 May, an estimated crowd of 30,000 went to Mr. Sankoh's house to protest against the RUF attacks on UNAMSIL. When the crowd tried to approach the house, armed members of RUF fired into the crowd from Mr. Sankoh's residence and killed several people and injured dozens more. The UNAMSIL troops stationed at Mr. Sankoh's home were overwhelmed by the huge crowd. In the panic and confusion, Foday Sankoh disappeared with some of his body guards. Several members of RUF were shot and killed by armed elements within the crowd; the house was ransacked and looted. The whereabouts of Foday Sankoh remained unknown until 17 May, when he was apprehended as he returned to his residence by elements of AFRC/ex-SLA who turned him over to the custody of the Government.

75. In the same period, Mr. Koroma, the Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace and leader of AFRC/ex-SLA, made several public statements in which he urged his followers and other to take up arms and defend Freetown. Armed elements of the Sierra Leone Army, ex-SLA and the Civil Defence Forces started patrolling the town and arresting members of RUF, actions which contributed to an increase in tension in Freetown and beyond.

76. On 8 May, at the summit meeting of the Mano River Union held at Conakry, the Presidents of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone were joined by President Konaré of Mali as Chairman of ECOWAS and my Special Representative in Sierra Leone in a special

discussion on Sierra Leone. The summit condemned the attacks on and detention of United Nations personnel and mandated President Taylor to involve himself personally to ensure the release of the detainees and the resumption of the peace process.

77. On 9 May, a summit meeting of the ECOWAS Committee on Sierra Leone, consisting of Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo, met at Abuja. The meeting strongly condemned RUF and called for the immediate and unconditional release of the detainees. In this regard, the meeting approved the mandate given to President Taylor (see para. 76). The summit also warned the leadership of RUF that their amnesty under the Lomé Peace Agreement could be revoked and that they could be tried for war crimes if they continued to flout the Lomé Peace Agreement. Participants reaffirmed their total support for the peace process in Sierra Leone as set out in the Lomé Peace Agreement, which remains the most appropriate framework for the resolution of the conflict. They also expressed their determination to use all means at their disposal, including the military option, to foil any attempt to take over power through the use of force, and to defend democratic institutions in Sierra Leone. The ECOWAS Executive Secretary was directed to convene a meeting of Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff on 17 May at Abuja to consider, in the event of new involvement of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, the practical modalities of such involvement.

78. A meeting of the Joint Implementation Committee was held at Freetown on 13 May, chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali and attended by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia and representatives of Ghana, Guinea, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Sierra Leone, as well as of Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, OAU and UNAMSIL. Mr. Koroma also attended the meeting; RUF was not represented. The meeting agreed that a dual approach should be pursued to resolve the current crisis, namely, exerting strong diplomatic pressure on RUF and displaying military strength by enhancing the operational capabilities of UNAMSIL to enable it to perform its functions more efficiently.

79. As at 15 May, there have been few indications that the leaders of RUF are willing to change their course of action, although some individual members of RUF have conveyed their willingness to disarm. At the same time, RUF continued to detain hundreds of

UNAMSIL personnel and also to attack UNAMSIL and Sierra Leonean troops at various locations in the country. It would therefore be important to continue to bring strong pressure to bear on the RUF leadership.

VIII. Recommendations for immediate measures

80. I very much welcome the efforts made at the subregional, regional and international levels to express the international community's condemnation of the attacks perpetrated by RUF and to seek the immediate release of the peacekeepers detained by RUF, which remains the Organization's highest priority. At the same time, it would be important that political pressure be supported by a strong military posture, including on the part of the United Nations, to deter RUF from pursuing the military option.

81. To this end, UNAMSIL should be reinforced immediately to enhance its capability to defend its positions at Lungi airport, on the Freetown peninsula and at other strategic locations in the western and southern parts of the country. This immediate reinforcement, which is currently under way, would bring the military strength of UNAMSIL from its present strength of 9,250 to a level of up to 13,000, including 260 military observers. Once this key objective has been attained, UNAMSIL should be further expanded, which would enable it to gradually increase its presence, with sufficient military strength, and to stabilize the situation in Sierra Leone.

82. From the beginning of the crisis, the Secretariat has been working closely with those Member States that had agreed to contribute military units to UNAMSIL, in order to expedite the preparations for their deployment. With airlift support provided by the Governments of Canada, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation and the United States and with financial support provided by the Government of Germany, it is expected that up to 3,600 additional military personnel will arrive by the end of May or early June. It is also envisaged that the fourth Nigerian UNAMSIL battalion, which was due to be repatriated by the end of May, would be retained.

83. As I stressed in my previous reports on UNAMSIL, the troop strength authorized under Security Council resolution 1289 (2000) was predicated on the cooperation of the parties and a

generally permissive environment. Clearly, this crucial condition for any progress towards the Mission's key objective of assisting the parties in the implementation of the Lomé Agreement is now lacking. All efforts should therefore be aimed at the restoration of conditions conducive to a resumption of the peace process. The first priority in this regard is the consolidation of UNAMSIL units, both those currently on the ground and those scheduled to arrive shortly, at strong positions at Lungi airport, on the Freetown peninsula, and at other strategic locations on the main access roads to the capital. The main objective of this consolidation is to ensure the protection of the civilian population in Freetown and the security of Government institutions, as well as maintaining a sufficient strength in the areas under Government control to deter and, if necessary, repel further attacks by RUF.

84. Once these initial objectives have been attained, UNAMSIL will then seek to stabilize the situation in the country and assist the Government to restore law and order in the areas outside the control of RUF. To this end, UNAMSIL would be further strengthened and would begin to gradually deploy forward. It would do so in strength and with adequate equipment, in order to secure strategic locations in the western and southern parts of the country, including Port Loko, Rogberi Junction, Masiaka, Mile 91, Moyamba, Kenema and Daru. Such a deployment would make a significant contribution to the restoration of a measure of normalcy in the areas outside RUF control, the resumption of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and the extension of Government authority to the provinces. This deployment would also allow the Government of Sierra Leone and the international community to reassess the necessary steps that will be required to promote a durable peace in Sierra Leone.

85. In determining the military strength needed to reach these objectives, it should be borne in mind that RUF elements may continue to employ guerrilla tactics. As the recent history of Sierra Leone has shown, the topography of the country lends itself well to such a modus operandi, especially during the rainy season. To counter the threat posed by RUF and to attain the objectives described above, it would therefore be necessary to deploy with due care and preparation, in sufficient numbers and backed up by adequate military means to deter attacks and, if

necessary, respond decisively to any hostile action or intent.

86. However, after receiving the reinforcements currently under way, UNAMSIL would not have the necessary resources to fulfil its mandate in the present hostile environment in Sierra Leone and would need additional troops as well as the necessary force multipliers to do this. In this context, it is estimated that UNAMSIL would require, in addition to the immediate reinforcements described above, two infantry battalions (a mechanized battalion and one air transportable battalion for rapid reinforcement), a logistic battalion, a light artillery unit, additional air transportation assets and armed helicopters, and a maritime unit of six armed patrol boats, as well as the necessary medical, communications, intelligence and command personnel. The total military strength of an expanded UNAMSIL would be up to 16,500 military personnel, including 260 military observers.

87. It is envisaged that this force would comprise a total of 15 infantry battalions, which would tentatively be deployed to the following areas: the Freetown peninsula; Lungi airport and peninsula; Port Loko, Rogberi Junction and Lunsar; Masiaka, Moyamba and Mile 91; Bo, Kenema and Daru. UNAMSIL would also maintain a sizeable force reserve, which would provide it with the capacity to react rapidly to serious military threats throughout the country. It is understood that the deployment of troops and their modus operandi would need to be revised in the light of the situation on the ground and the time of arrival of the additional troops.

88. The envisaged expansion of the force up to a level of 16,500 military personnel would also require a commensurate increase in the civilian administrative and logistical support staff of the Mission. The financial implications of the envisaged increase in strength will be submitted to the Security Council in an addendum to the present report.

89. For the time being, I believe that the mandate entrusted to UNAMSIL under resolution 1289 (2000) provides the force with sufficient authority to conduct the necessary operations in support of the aims described above. In that resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized UNAMSIL, within its capabilities and areas of deployment and in the light of conditions on the ground, to take the necessary action to (a) provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in

particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport; (b) facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares; (c) provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme; (d) coordinate with and assist, in common areas of deployment, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities; (e) guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction. In that resolution, the Security Council also authorized UNAMSIL to take the necessary action, in the discharge of its mandate, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone. On the basis of that mandate, the present robust rules of engagement of UNAMSIL enable it to use force, including deadly force, in self-defence against any hostile act or intent. In the present circumstances, it is obvious that the use of force against all elements that continue to display a hostile intent towards the United Nations would be warranted and justified. At the same time, UNAMSIL would be ready to enter into discussion with all those who would be willing and ready to pursue a peaceful solution.

90. To ensure proper control and unity of command, I believe that all international forces in Sierra Leone, with the exception of those sent for a brief period for strictly national purposes, should be integrated into UNAMSIL. It is also of the utmost importance that the United Nations forces coordinate closely with the Sierra Leonean Army and other elements allied with the Government, in particular the Civil Defence Forces and AFRC/ex-SLA, to avoid any misunderstandings which could lead to incidents. To this end, it is envisaged that UNAMSIL will place military liaison officers with the military command of the groups and units involved. UNAMSIL would also ensure close coordination with the British force while it remains in Sierra Leone.

Public information

91. As was noted in my third report, it would be necessary for UNAMSIL to set up a countrywide

public information campaign. In that connection, the Department of Public Information conducted an assessment, from 13 to 20 March 2000, of public information needs. On the basis of the team's recommendations, efforts are currently under way to significantly increase the capacity of the UNAMSIL public information office as a matter of priority.

92. It is clear that UNAMSIL will face a significant challenge in disseminating information on the peace process in a country where the infrastructure has been damaged by years of warfare. In order to reach all parts of the country, UNAMSIL intends to set up its own radio station. The necessary equipment, donated to the United Nations in 1998 by the Government of Denmark, has been transferred to UNAMSIL. Radio UNAMSIL is expected to play a significant role in the Mission's efforts to inform the people of Sierra Leone, independent of any party or affiliation. The UNAMSIL public information office would also include units for liaison with the media, video and print production and community outreach.

IX. Observations

93. The overall situation in Sierra Leone remains tense and critical. The deliberate and unprovoked attacks by RUF fighters on United Nations peacekeepers and the detention of large numbers of United Nations personnel are unacceptable acts which have been unequivocally condemned by the international community. Given the suffering the country has endured during the past decade, it would be unforgivable to thwart the hopes of the Sierra Leonean people who had just begun to see some modest improvement in their situation. The international community should not allow any group, and in particular the RUF leadership, to deny to the people of Sierra Leone their legitimate aspirations to live in peace and rebuild their country.

94. Of immediate concern is the safe return of all those United Nations personnel currently being detained by RUF, an end to the hostile acts of the RUF fighters, and their full cooperation in retrieving the dead, wounded and missing. In this regard, I should like to acknowledge the efforts made by regional leaders, including President Taylor of Liberia, whose personal involvement led to the release of a significant number of detainees. However, I demand that the leadership of the RUF take urgent steps to ensure that

all remaining United Nations personnel in their hands be released immediately and unconditionally. I also call upon those with influence on RUF to continue to work towards this end. In addition, the Security Council may also wish to consider a strengthening of the sanctions regime, including measures which would prevent RUF commanders from reaping the benefits of their illegal exploitation of mineral resources, in particular diamonds.

95. While part of the responsibility for some of the recent events may lie with local commanders of RUF, it is clear that Mr. Sankoh has failed to take any action to prevent, curb or stop the actions of his troops. On the contrary, there is some evidence that he may well have encouraged, if not planned, some of these acts. The international community should hold Mr. Sankoh accountable for his actions and those of RUF, and for the safety and well-being of all those who have been detained.

96. At the same time, the international community should not lose sight of the overarching objective of helping the people and Government of Sierra Leone to establish a durable peace in their country and rekindling their hope. Their plight has become a crucial test of the solidarity of the international community, rising above race and geography, which is a basic guiding principle of this Organization. The United Nations has not abandoned and will not abandon Sierra Leone. It should continue to provide humanitarian aid and the required assistance in taking the many steps needed on the path to peace, national reconciliation and development.

97. In this regard, I believe that active political efforts to assist the people of Sierra Leone to change the course of events in their country must, in the present circumstances, be supplemented by credible military force. At the outset of the crisis, I called upon those Member States with the capacity to deploy well-trained and well-equipped troops to constitute a rapid reaction force to provide UNAMSIL with the necessary deterrent capacity. In this regard, I very much welcome the decision made by the United Kingdom to deploy a spearhead battalion and other assets which, although sent for national reasons, was instrumental in restoring calm in Freetown and helping UNAMSIL by ensuring the defence of Lungi airport.

98. I also deeply appreciate the commendable efforts made by troop contributors, other Member States, and

United Nations logistical personnel to accelerate the arrival of the troops which had already been committed to serve with UNAMSIL, as well as the arrival of additional units made available by Member States. This will enhance the capability of UNAMSIL to defend the Freetown peninsula, Lungi airport and other strategic locations on the main access roads to the capital.

99. However, in the present circumstances this will not be enough to create conditions which would be conducive to the establishment of a lasting peace. I therefore recommend an increase of the Force's strength up to a level of 16,500 military personnel, as outlined in paragraphs 80 to 90 above, for the purpose of stabilizing the situation in Sierra Leone under the present mandate of UNAMSIL. Once these additional forces have arrived in Sierra Leone and countered the threat posed by RUF to the peace process, it would be appropriate to consider additional steps which I will present to the Security Council after a thorough assessment of the political and military situation in Sierra Leone. Such steps may involve a strengthening of UNAMSIL, above the proposed strength of 16,500, which could be necessary to establish the security conditions throughout the country required for the successful implementation of aspects of the peace process, including disarmament and the holding of democratic elections.

100. At the 4139th meeting of the Security Council on 11 May 2000, many Member States advocated that UNAMSIL should be given a strong peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter. As I indicated in my statement at that meeting, I am not opposed to such a mandate in principle, as long as the United Nations is able to obtain, from Member States with ready capacity, the necessary resources to carry out the tasks that such a mandate implies. In addition, it would be essential for the international community to demonstrate the necessary will and resolve to sustain such a commitment to impose peace in Sierra Leone. If such conditions cannot be met, any effort to strengthen the mandate of UNAMSIL would unduly raise expectations, increase the risk of loss of life, and undermine the credibility of the Organization.

101. Some West African Governments have, in principle, offered to make troops available in an effort to restore peace in their region. I naturally welcome these offers. They have however indicated that their offers would be contingent on strong financial and logistical support from other Member States.

102. Looking ahead, it is clear that the Government of Sierra Leone, other parties to the Lomé Agreement and the international community will need to reflect on the future of the peace process. The recent events raise serious questions about the role of RUF and of Foday Sankoh in particular. ECOWAS, during its meeting of 9 May 2000, reaffirmed its support for the peace process in Sierra Leone as set out in the Lomé Peace Agreement, which remains the most appropriate framework for the resolution of the conflict. I too believe that the Lomé Agreement contains many elements which contribute to a durable peace, in particular the disarmament of all factions, national reconciliation, the holding of democratic elections, and the creation of an effective national army and police force. In this regard, I call upon the leaders of those factions fighting on the side of the Government to exercise restraint, to respect the rule of law, and to refrain from any acts of harassment or revenge against RUF members of sympathizers, which could complicate efforts at reconciliation and restoring confidence. At all times, there should be full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

103. The process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which is the cornerstone of the peace process, has come to a virtual standstill. Many of the ex-combatants belonging to AFRC/ex-SLA and the Civil Defence Forces have taken up arms again in defence of their country, which will seriously complicate their disarmament. Obviously, this aspect of the peace process requires a re-evaluation of its assumptions, organization and implementation mechanisms, which is to be undertaken in full coordination with national and international stakeholders.

104. Ultimately, a lasting resolution of the crisis can only be found through political means; it cannot be imposed by military force alone. Nor can a solution be the result of international involvement alone. The Government of Sierra Leone has a particular responsibility to actively design and implement the necessary steps towards peace in consultation with its regional and international partners. Of special importance in this regard would be the continuation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, together with the restructuring of Sierra Leone's armed forces. As I have stated in previous reports, the assistance of the international community to Sierra Leone cannot be open-ended and the

Government should do its utmost to ensure that it can maintain a stable democracy and guarantee the security of its territory and institutions.

105. Looking back on recent events, it is obvious that the United Nations will have to draw lessons from its experiences in Sierra Leone. The force, which had been designed, equipped and deployed as a peacekeeping force, was quickly forced into actual combat with one of the parties that had pledged to cooperate with it. In the course of these events, many problems emerged within the Mission, including with regard to command and control, cohesiveness of the force, the flow of information, equipment and preparedness of troops, and coordination between and within the various components in UNAMSIL. In this respect, the Secretariat is taking urgent steps to assess these problems and to address recognized equipment shortfalls, in close coordination with the troop-contributing countries. This is no reflection on the leadership of the Mission. My Special Representative has handled a very difficult situation effectively. I also wish to acknowledge the Force Commander's quick reaction, personal courage and military professionalism. Nor does this imply criticism of the troops on the ground, many of which displayed considerable courage and professionalism in defending themselves and their mandate. At the same time, I am deeply saddened by the casualties inflicted on UNAMSIL troops, who had come to assist a peace process, but were attacked and forced to engage in combat to defend themselves in a situation that resembles war. I pay tribute to those who have died or were injured while performing their duties to serve the cause of peace in Sierra Leone.

106. In our focus on Sierra Leone, it would be important not to lose sight of the regional dimensions of the peace process, in particular in respect of the neighbouring countries, Guinea and Liberia. In this regard, I very much welcome the efforts taken by the States Members of the Mano River Union to enhance their cooperation. I should also like to encourage further efforts by ECOWAS and regional leaders to bring their influence to bear on the parties to the Lomé Agreement, in particular the Revolutionary United Front, and convince them that a durable peace in Sierra Leone requires their full cooperation and respect for the provisions of the Lomé Agreement.

107. I should like to express my gratitude to all Member States contributing troops, military observers,

civilian police or other assistance to UNAMSIL for their unwavering support, resolve and commitment in the face of a very difficult situation. Their willingness to stay the course and to strengthen UNAMSIL, despite the adverse conditions on the ground, are an example to the international community. At no point during the crisis did the city and population of Freetown suffer casualties and destruction, which was not the case in January 1999. United Nations contingents have stood firm throughout in defence of the capital.

108. I should also like to express gratitude for the invaluable role played by ECOWAS and, in particular, by ECOMOG, which has now left the country after years of sacrifice and service to the people and Government of Sierra Leone. I pay tribute to the brave men and women in ECOMOG and their Governments for their defence of a democratically elected Government. Troops from ECOWAS continue, of course, to play an essential role as part of UNAMSIL.


109. I also take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to my Special Representative, Oluyemi Adeniji, the UNAMSIL Force Commander, Major General Vijay Kumar Jetley, and the military and civilian personnel of UNAMSIL, as well as of United Nations programmes and agencies, the World Bank and other institutions working in the country, for their perseverance, courage and dedication in their work to fashion a better future for the people of Sierra Leone.

Annex

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions as at 19 May 2000

	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff Officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>
Bangladesh	12			12
Bolivia	4			4
Canada	5			5
China	6			6
Croatia	10			10
Czech Republic	5			5
Denmark	2			2
Egypt	10			10
France	3			3
Gambia	26			26
Ghana	4	3	776	783
Guinea	12	3	776	791
India	14	18	1 644	1 676
Indonesia	10			10
Jordan	5		1 131	1 136
Kenya	11	13	858	882
Kyrgyzstan	2			2
Malaysia	10			10
Mali	8			8
Nepal	6			6
New Zealand	2			2
Nigeria	4	14	3 217	3 235
Norway	5			5
Pakistan	10			10
Russian Federation	15			15
Slovakia	2			2
Sweden	3			3
Thailand	5			5
United Kingdom	15	3		18
United Republic of Tanzania	12			12
Uruguay	11			11
Zambia	11	3	776	790
Total	260	57	9 178	9 495

Civilian police deployed (28): Bangladesh (2), Gambia (2), Ghana (3), India (1), Jordan (3), Kenya (1), Malaysia (3), Mali (2), Norway (2), Senegal (2), Namibia (1), Nepal (4), Zimbabwe (2).



81) United Nations Document

Thirteenth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 14 March 2002 (S/2002/267) para 2.



Security Council

Distr.: General
14 March 2002

Original: English

Thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 1370 (2001) of 18 September 2001, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for a period of six months, ending on 30 March 2002. In that resolution, the Security Council also requested me to report at regular intervals on progress made by UNAMSIL in the implementation of its mandate. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request and covers developments since my twelfth report on UNAMSIL, dated 13 December 2001 (S/2001/1195).

II. Political developments

Implementation of the Abuja Agreement

2. The peace process in Sierra Leone continued to make encouraging progress during the period under review. The disarmament of combatants of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) was completed on 11 January. As a follow-up, the Government of Sierra Leone launched a special programme to collect illegal weapons held by the civilian population and shotguns held mainly by the Civil Defence Forces, which had been excluded from the original disarmament programme. The resettlement of internally displaced persons commenced in all districts of the country, and more refugees were repatriated from Guinea and Liberia. With regard to the preparations for the elections, which are scheduled for 14 May 2002, the National Electoral Commission successfully conducted the voter registration process, and the Government lifted the state of emergency to allow free electoral

campaigning by the political parties. In the meantime, the Sierra Leone police and army deployed to more districts, while the Government took further steps to extend its authority to areas formerly controlled by RUF. Progress was also made in the preparations for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court. The process of reintegrating the disarmed combatants into civilian society, however, remained slow because of inadequate funding. The conflict in Liberia also escalated, raising fears about possible repercussions on the progress made in Sierra Leone.

3. In view of the lifting of the state of emergency, which had provided the legal basis for their detention, former RUF leader Foday Sankoh, 49 other RUF members and more than 30 AFRC/ex-SLA members known as the West Side Boys were brought before the Sierra Leonean courts on 4 and 11 March, and charged with murder and other criminal offences. The Attorney-General of Sierra Leone announced that these charges would not prejudice any case the Special Court for Sierra Leone might decide to bring against those individuals.

Regional aspects

4. The conflict in Liberia escalated during the reporting period, forcing large numbers of Sierra Leonean refugees to return and almost 10,000 Liberian refugees to flee into southern and eastern Sierra Leone. On two occasions, elements of the armed forces of Liberia, fleeing from the fighting, crossed the border into Sierra Leone. On both occasions, the Liberian soldiers voluntarily agreed to return to their country. There were persistent reports that the former RUF field commander, Sam Bockarie, remained active in the



region and that both the Government of Liberia and dissident forces fighting in Liberia might have recruited some disarmed Sierra Leonean combatants.

5. In a positive development, the heads of State of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone met at Rabat on 27 February. The heads of State condemned all dissident activities in the Mano River Union subregion and agreed to work collectively to curb the activities of armed groups operating there. They also agreed to maintain regular contacts among themselves and to convene a follow-up summit meeting at Rabat. Subsequently, the Foreign and Security Ministers of the three countries met at Freetown on 6 and 7 March to discuss ways of implementing the decisions taken by their leaders at Rabat. The Ministers recommended that a committee of legal experts from the three countries should meet at Freetown in March to develop a legal framework for dealing with dissident groups. They also mandated a technical committee to begin implementing the decision to deploy joint security units along their common borders.

6. On 10 February, my Special Representative, Oluyemi Adeniji, travelled to Abuja, where he briefed the Secretariat of the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) and the President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, on the completion of the disarmament process and the ongoing preparations for elections. During those meetings, he urged the ECOWAS countries to contribute towards the reintegration of the ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. In the discussions with the ECOWAS Secretariat, it was agreed that my Special Representative would submit the final report of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration to the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council at its next meeting.

III. Military and security situation

7. The overall security situation in Sierra Leone remained generally stable. There were, however, violent clashes between former CDF and RUF combatants over mining disputes in Kono district on 19 and 20 December. A total of 13 people were reportedly killed and 40 injured during those clashes. The violence resulted in large-scale displacement of the local population, some of whom were former displaced persons. UNAMSIL troops contained the incident, and

assisted in transporting the displaced people back to their villages.

8. During the reporting period, the Sierra Leone army further deployed to Kailahun and Kono districts, in order to secure the country's borders. It also continued to consolidate its deployment in the strategic areas of Makeni, Magburaka, Masingbi and Lunsar. The Government has announced that the army will be renamed the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, with effect from 1 April.

Deployment of the Mission

9. UNAMSIL troops continued to conduct high-profile patrols throughout the country in order to deter violence and to reassure the population. The Mission also stepped up air and land patrols along the Sierra Leone/Liberia border in view of the escalation of fighting in Liberia.

10. UNAMSIL is currently focusing on implementing phase one of its military concept of operations for 2002, the main objective of which is to ensure effective security for the forthcoming elections. To that end, the Mission has extended its deployment to 39 locations throughout the country to provide umbrella security. In phase two, which is expected to begin soon, UNAMSIL intends to deploy to more areas, on a temporary basis, with a view to covering as many locations as possible over the polling period. During phase three, which begins after the elections, UNAMSIL will focus on sustaining a secure environment for the crucial post-election period. Throughout, the security umbrella will be provided in close coordination with the Sierra Leone police and the Sierra Leone army. A protocol was recently agreed, designed to delineate security responsibilities clearly, with particular emphasis on the primacy of Sierra Leone police activities. In the meantime, planning is already under way for the subsequent phases, which will focus on a careful assessment of the post-election security situation and a gradual adjustment of the strength, composition and deployment of the military component of UNAMSIL, expected to begin later in 2002.

11. I regret to inform the Council that six peacekeepers from the Zambian contingent were killed in a tragic accident on 5 January, while handling ammunitions collected during the disarmament process in Kenema district. Twelve others were seriously injured. The loss was all the more poignant as it

occurred at the end of the disarmament process and was the only serious incident experienced in the course of handling vast quantities of unstable ammunition during the programme. The Mission is tightening procedures for handling ammunition and unexploded ordnance. I wish to pay tribute to all the United Nations peacekeepers who lost their lives in the service of peace in Sierra Leone during the period under review.

IV. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Disarmament and demobilization

12. The Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, which comprises the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF and UNAMSIL, met on 17 January and declared that the disarmament process had been completed. Subsequently, ceremonies to mark the end of the war, with the destruction of weapons, were held in Lungi and in the provincial capitals of Bo, Makeni and Kenema.

13. A total of 47,076 combatants (19,183 RUF, 27,695 CDF and 198 AFRC/ex-SLA) disarmed during the period between 18 May 2001, when the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme resumed, and 17 January 2002, when it was formally completed. During the same period, 15,840 assorted weapons and 2 million rounds of ammunition were collected. Prior to the resumption of the programme in May 2001, 11,824 weapons had been collected in the two disarmament phases, which were carried out from October to December 1998 and from November 1999 to May 2000. UNAMSIL has so far destroyed a total of 24,944 weapons, including 10,800 collected before May 2001. Some of the weapons were turned into tools under a project implemented jointly by UNAMSIL and GTZ, a German development organization. The United Kingdom troops in Sierra Leone assisted UNAMSIL in the destruction of unstable ammunition in Tongo, Kenema district.

14. The special programme for the voluntary collection of shotguns and illegal arms held by the civilian population was conducted by the Sierra Leone police with the assistance of UNAMSIL and is expected to be completed by mid-March. As at 7 March, the programme had collected 8,536 weapons, and 33,968 pieces of ammunition. The United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) is preparing to finance a follow-up project under the Small Arms Trust Fund aimed at providing long-term assistance in strengthening the institutional capacity of the Sierra Leone police to deal with illegal arms. As indicated in my last report, the Secretariat is preparing to send a mission to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the disarmament process in Sierra Leone. It should be recalled that a considerable number of the weapons and equipment seized by RUF from UNAMSIL and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) remain unaccounted for. The assessment mission will, among other things, look into this matter. I am grateful to the donor countries that have agreed to finance this important project.

Reintegration of ex-combatants

15. Funding for the Government-managed reintegration programme continues to experience a serious shortfall, now estimated at \$13.48 million for the year 2002. On a positive note, however, all disarmed combatants have received their initial reinsertion payment, which is intended to assist them in settling in their communities. To date, 17,951 ex-combatants have been absorbed in various short-term reintegration projects. These include 4,552 in agriculture, 5,331 in vocational training, 3,871 in formal education, 3,240 in apprenticeships in various trades, 589 in public works and 368 in child reintegration projects. In addition, some 1,723 ex-combatants (1,028 RUF, 632 CDF and 63 AFRC/ex-SLA) have so far been selected for reintegration into the Sierra Leone army. Besides inadequate funding, the absence of service providers in most areas in the east and north of the country has also slowed down the reintegration programme. UNAMSIL, UNDP and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) are implementing stopgap projects to occupy the ex-combatants in potentially volatile areas such as Kono and Kailahun districts.

V. Governance and stabilization

Extension of State authority

16. Upon the completion of the disarmament exercise, the Government took further steps to extend its authority throughout the country. Paramount chiefs and chieftdom officials returned to all districts, except Kailahun where disarmament was completed in mid-

January. The relocation of district officers from Freetown to areas formerly controlled by RUF in the northern and eastern provinces is also under way. During the reporting period, district officers returned to Kono, Koinadugu and Tonkolili districts. The high courts in Kenema and Bo, as well as the magistrates' courts in Port Loko, were reopened. The Sierra Leone police deployed to all districts, albeit in small numbers and, gradually, officials of line Ministries have also started returning.

17. However, the Government continued to face serious capacity constraints in its efforts to restore civil administration and public services throughout the country. In particular, the absence of qualified personnel, destroyed infrastructure, and the lack of office and communications equipment and transportation for the returning officials remained the major impediments to the efforts to accelerate the extension of the Government's authority. The immediate needs for the restoration of basic public services in the newly accessible districts were identified and presented to the donor mission that visited Sierra Leone early in February 2002. UNDP and other United Nations bodies, as well as DFID, continued to assist the Government to address some of the capacity constraints.

18. In the meantime, housing committees established in some districts played a key role in resolving disputes over properties illegally occupied by former RUF combatants. Efforts are under way to establish similar committees in other affected districts. UNAMSIL also facilitated meetings between former RUF cadres and paramount chiefs to resolve issues pertaining to property ownership, collection of market dues, illicit mining and the status of caretaker chiefs designated by RUF during the conflict.

19. The Government of Sierra Leone started implementing a new policy aimed at controlling artisan diamond mining. Under this policy, district mining committees, with the participation of local communities, are issuing mining licences. In addition, the Government has opened negotiations with concession holders to rehabilitate the industrial mining of underground kimberlite deposits. It is also studying options for the marketing and export of diamonds based on a study that was funded by DFID. The early adoption of a comprehensive and effective regime for diamond mining and marketing is of crucial importance to the economic viability and long-term stability of the

country. Without such a regime, there is considerable danger of uncontrolled exploitation and illicit trade in diamonds, which may again destabilize the country.

Recovery activities

20. The National Recovery Committee continued to conduct assessment missions, which are being used to set priorities and to mobilize resources for ongoing rehabilitation efforts. On the basis of those assessments, district recovery strategies, together with a national interim recovery strategy, were developed. This strategy addresses key aspects of the transition from relief to recovery. It focuses on immediate action, essentially targeted at the restoration of State authority and basic social services, with the objective of laying the foundation for effective social and economic development. It further provides the Government, donors and non-governmental organizations with a coordinated approach and a road map for recovery assistance.

21. Through the Trust Fund for Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL has financed the construction of a dormitory for police trainees, as well as two police stations in Koidu and the Western Area, with funds provided by the Government of Japan. Other police stations are being rehabilitated in Kambia, Kabala, Daru, Moyamba and Lunsar using DFID funds and, in Lunsar, through a contribution from the Government of Norway. To date, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom have made generous contributions to the Trust Fund. Other donors, such as DFID, the European Union and UNDP have made substantial contributions to the rehabilitation of roads and administrative infrastructure in the country.

VI. Elections

22. The period under review witnessed further progress in the preparations for the presidential and parliamentary elections, which are to be held on 14 May 2002. On 22 January, the parliament of Sierra Leone adopted legislation that formally established the National Electoral Commission. On 31 January, it adopted a revised electoral law by which it increased the number of parliamentary seats from 80 to 124, consisting of 112 elected seats and 12 allocated to paramount chiefs. The revised law also provided for the district block electoral system, which was

explained in paragraph 38 of my last report (S/2001/1195), and allocated 8 parliamentary seats to each of the 14 districts.

23. The voter registration exercise was conducted in a peaceful atmosphere from 24 January to 10 February. The National Electoral Commission extended the registration period by three days, but some stakeholders considered it necessary to further extend the registration period for as long as possible, in order to accommodate as many eligible voters as possible. The Commission encountered logistical, technical and administrative difficulties during the registration exercise, ranging from inadequate voter education to late disbursement of funds and the refusal of some registration officials to carry out their duties because of misunderstandings about remuneration.

24. The retrieval of the voter registration forms was completed on 20 February. The processing of the forms was slowed down by the high number of soiled forms, however, as well as frequent interruptions in power supply. Consequently, the exhibition of the provisional voters register had to be postponed by one week, to the period from 9 to 13 March. The National Electoral Commission announced that a provisional total of 2,276,518 potential voters were registered, which compares well with the 1996 registration figure of 1,566,000.

25. The exhibition of the provisional voters register will not only enable registered voters to verify their names, but will also provide an opportunity to address allegations that the registration of minors and multiple registrations of voters occurred during the voter registration process. Local civil society groups, as well as the Commonwealth Secretariat and the European Union, observed the registration process. The processing and issuing of identity cards for the registered potential voters is under way. The photography centres established for this purpose are deployed around the country and are scheduled to remain open until 30 March.

26. The National Electoral Commission announced that returning refugees can register in transit camps, beginning in mid-April, provided they have identity cards issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to confirm their status. A large number of refugees returning from Liberia have already dispersed to their villages of origin, however, making it difficult to register them in

the transit camps. The Commission therefore intends to organize mobile registration units to register the returnees. A mission consisting of the National Electoral Commission, UNHCR and UNAMSIL officials visited camps in Guinea from 2 to 7 February, to inform Sierra Leonean refugees about the situation in their country and the preparations for the elections.

27. With regard to internally displaced persons, those who return to their districts of origin prior to the elections will be allowed to request the transfer of their registration records to their respective districts. However, the National Electoral Commission has yet to announce details of voting arrangements for displaced persons who remain in camps until polling day.

28. Meanwhile, political parties in the country continued to prepare for the forthcoming elections. A total of 23 parties have registered. As indicated earlier, on 1 March President Kabbah announced the lifting of the state of emergency, thus opening the way for electoral campaigning by the political parties. RUF fulfilled the remaining requirement for registration as a political party by opening a regional office in the provincial capital of Kenema, but it still has to file an application for full registration. On 14 February, I received a letter from the RUF leader, Issa Sesay, in which he called for the lifting of the travel ban on RUF officials and requested the international community to provide assistance for his movement to transform itself into a political party. The former leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Johnny Paul Koroma, relinquished his position as chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, which was established under the Lomé Peace Agreement, and joined the Peace and Liberation Party.

29. At a meeting with the diplomatic corps in Freetown on 1 March, 11 opposition political parties renewed their criticism of the district block electoral system and called for a postponement of the elections until November 2002, as well as the formation of an interim government. Given the progress already made in the preparations for the elections, these calls are not expected to change the course of events. It is, however, important for the National Electoral Commission to maintain continuous dialogue with the political parties so as to build confidence in the electoral process.

Outstanding concerns and challenges

30. The voter registration exercise underlined the operational challenges that continue to face the National Electoral Commission, and which should be addressed in order to prevent difficulties that could hamper the conduct of critical activities on polling day. In particular, adequate planning of all aspects of the operation, effective communication between the Commission's headquarters and field offices, and timely disbursement of funds for the Commission by the Government, as well as effective voter education, adequate supply of materials and training of field staff, will be crucial to the successful conduct of the polling day activities. UNAMSIL and other partners are redoubling their efforts to assist the Commission to address shortcomings in these important areas.

31. Civil society groups and political parties continued to express concern at the lack of dialogue between them and the National Electoral Commission, which has held three meetings with political parties and civil society organizations during the reporting period. UNAMSIL and other external partners continued to encourage the Commission to hold more frequent consultations with all stakeholders. UNAMSIL has also emphasized to the National Electoral Commission the need for a more proactive public information strategy to promote better public understanding of the Commission's activities.

United Nations support for the elections

32. The electoral component of UNAMSIL is now established. During the reporting period, the Mission closely monitored the electoral process and provided advice to the National Electoral Commission on how to rectify shortcomings. UNAMSIL also provided logistical, security and public information support for the voter registration process in a coordinated manner. It opened regional electoral coordination offices in all three provinces of Sierra Leone, as well as the Western Area (Freetown). UNAMSIL helped the National Electoral Commission to transport voter registration materials and personnel to registration stations throughout the country, and subsequently to retrieve them.

33. As indicated earlier, UNAMSIL troops have made adjustments in their deployment in order to provide effective umbrella security for the electoral process. Delineation of security responsibilities between

UNAMSIL troops and the Sierra Leone police has been finalized, and appropriate liaison arrangements are in place to enable the police to call on UNAMSIL for assistance. Rehearsals are being conducted to test the joint security arrangements for polling day.

34. UNAMSIL civilian police advisers, together with the Mission's military component, continued to assist the Sierra Leone police to develop guiding principles on point security for the elections through the creation of police operational orders. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1389 (2002), the Mission deployed 30 additional civilian police advisers who will perform election-related tasks, which include advising and supporting the Sierra Leone police in carrying out their election-related duties and helping them to devise and implement an electoral training programme for their personnel. It may be necessary to retain these additional police advisers after the elections in order to reinforce key dimensions of UNAMSIL support to the Sierra Leone police.

35. UNAMSIL also provided public information technical support, as well as facilities, to the National Electoral Commission to facilitate dissemination of information on the voter registration process. At the same time, it assisted the Commission to design election logos and posters that were used during the voter registration exercise, and provided training on the electoral process for national public information staff. Similar support will be provided for the next phases of the electoral process. The Mission established an elections information unit to enhance the effectiveness of its public information support to the electoral process.

36. Radio UNAMSIL was used effectively to broadcast information on the voter registration process and the exhibition of the provisional voters register. Broadcasting 24 hours a day, the Radio integrated electoral information into all of its programming, including its daily current affairs programmes and news broadcasts in English and local languages. The station is now in the process of testing newly installed radio transmitters, which will soon extend its reach to the entire territory of Sierra Leone. Other aspects of the Mission's public information activities for the elections included the airing of simple civic education messages.

Support by other partners

37. The International Foundation for Election Systems continued to provide technical advisers to the National Electoral Commission and materials and equipment to support the electoral process. The National Democratic Institute, a United States-based non-governmental organization, and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which is funded by the United Kingdom, are implementing political party development projects in Freetown, which are intended to benefit all Sierra Leonean parties. Since my last report, the Governments of Canada and Germany have announced financial contributions to the UNDP Trust Fund for the Sierra Leone elections. The Trust Fund will also be used to facilitate the fielding of electoral observers from ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity, and to conduct training for domestic observers and representatives of political parties.

VII. Human rights

38. The completion of the disarmament of RUF, CDF and AFRC/ex-SLA has resulted in a general improvement in the human rights situation in Sierra Leone. Access to more areas in the east has, however, revealed more evidence of atrocities committed during the conflict. UNAMSIL investigated past human rights abuses and serious breaches of international humanitarian law in Kono and Kailahun districts. Several mass graves were identified in a village north of Koidu. The recent deployment of the Sierra Leone army to Kailahun also brought to light the existence of alleged "execution houses" in the district, where civilians were reportedly tortured and killed. It is important to preserve these sites and sources of evidence until proper forensic analysis can be undertaken. UNAMSIL also collected testimonies from persons who were mutilated during the conflict. The Mission is developing a database to map the conflict and will inform the local human rights community about its experience in that area.

39. Conditions in police cells and prisons have generally improved during the period under review. The slow pace of installation of court facilities and the inadequate performance of judicial officials in many districts has, however, severely impaired the overall functioning of the administration of justice and the due process of law. In order to continue to closely monitor the human rights situation in the country, UNAMSIL

opened a third regional human rights office in Port Loko.

Protection of women and children

40. Following the completion of the disarmament process, UNAMSIL human rights officers tracked cases involving former child combatants and abducted women in Kailahun district who have not been reintegrated into their former communities. They also investigated reports of former child combatants who are still being used for forced labour in diamond mining operations in Tongo Fields, Kenema district. While none of the abducted women expressed an unequivocal desire to leave their abductors, most of the abducted children working in the mines expressed the wish to be reunited with their families. A delegation from the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) visited Sierra Leone from 21 to 25 January to further examine the impact of the war on women.

41. Groups of abducted women in Kono, Bombali, Port Loko and Tonkolili districts who were abandoned by their captors have started to participate in community-based reintegration projects initiated by child protection agencies to reinforce the reunification of families and the reintegration of children. Following the disarmament process, there are increasing numbers of street children registered in Freetown and the provincial capitals of Bo, Kenema and Makeni. On 28 February, UNAMSIL launched the most comprehensive report to date on the incidence and effects of war-related sexual violence in Sierra Leone, based on research undertaken by Physicians for Human Rights, an organization based in the United States, with the support of the Mission.

42. UNAMSIL has in place an ongoing training programme, for all its contingents, on the rights of women and children. Under this programme, the Mission's human rights officers and the Child Protection Adviser provide training to the peacekeepers as part of their induction. In addition, the Training and Evaluation Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been pursuing a vigorous policy of improved training of troops on these issues. It has developed a gender awareness-training module for the military and civilian police components, which has been administered in four peacekeeping missions, including UNAMSIL.

43. As indicated in my ninth report to the Security Council (S/2001/228), allegations of sexual exploitation of minors and girls by United Nations personnel were reported to UNAMSIL early in 2001, and the Mission conducted an investigation, but no specific cases were brought to its attention. In January 2002, UNICEF and CARITAS-Makeni reported to my Special Representative several cases of alleged sexual exploitation of minors by peacekeepers in Kabala, Bo and Lungi. On 23 February, the UNAMSIL Child Protection Adviser and the Mission's Human Rights Section started monitoring the peacekeepers in Lungi. A joint investigation with UNICEF and CARITAS-Makeni will be conducted on the specific cases reported in Lungi, Kabala and Bo.

44. On 26 February, a joint assessment mission of UNHCR and Save the Children United Kingdom released a report alleging that United Nations and non-governmental organizations personnel were involved in the sexual exploitation of children and women in refugee camps in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. My Spokesman issued a statement on 27 February, reiterating the United Nations zero tolerance policy for such abuses. It is my intention to have this matter investigated in an expeditious and transparent manner by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, and I have instructed all United Nations agencies to take swift disciplinary measures against any of their staff members found to be involved in such unacceptable acts.

45. UNAMSIL has publicly invited those concerned to provide any information that could assist the Mission's investigation. Recently, the Mission's Deputy Force Commander visited all contingents in the field to impress upon the troops the importance of strict adherence to the highest standard of behaviour as stipulated in the code of conduct for peacekeepers. In addition, a meeting of contingent commanders was convened at Freetown, at which it was stressed that the commanders would be personally held responsible for the conduct of their troops. UNAMSIL has also decided to immediately create special child protection committees in each deployed unit to monitor the conduct of the Mission's personnel, and the Mission will establish coordinating mechanisms with the Regional Child Protection Committees set up by the Government, in order to gather information on alleged violations.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

46. On 3 January, my Special Representative presented to President Kabbah the names of the four proposed national commissioners on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, while the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has submitted nominations for three international commissioners. In the meantime, UNAMSIL, together with local and international non-governmental organizations, continued to conduct sensitization activities on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

47. A planning mission from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Sierra Leone from 13 to 17 January to discuss with the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and other partners practical issues relating to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Following the visit, an interim Executive Secretary of the Commission was appointed. The interim Secretariat is scheduled to begin work before the end of March 2002. On 21 February, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights launched an appeal to donors to contribute funds to the budget of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which amounts to almost \$10 million for the first 15 months.

Special Court

48. The background to the recent planning mission's visit to Sierra Leone was set out in my twelfth report (S/2001/1195, paras. 71-72). The report of the planning mission has been issued as document S/2002/246. During the visit to Sierra Leone a significant amount of time was devoted to discussing with the Government, non-governmental organizations and other bodies the availability locally of resources to support the creation and operation of the Special Court. In spite of the best efforts of those concerned it was obvious that the resources required would either be in short supply or, mostly, non-existent. Given the need for the Special Court to operate within a tightly drawn budget and, equally, the need to make early progress, it was inevitable that the potential offered by the presence of UNAMSIL would be considered.

49. The planning mission concluded, first, that UNAMSIL would be able to offer assistance in areas of crucial importance in logistical support, and in the fields of personnel administration, finance, communication, transport and procurement. In each of

those areas the administrative infrastructure of UNAMSIL is already well established and, subject to the understanding that assistance from UNAMSIL in these areas would be on a reimbursable basis, in some cases involving the funding of the provision of additional staff to supplement existing UNAMSIL resources, under UNAMSIL management, it would be at no cost to UNAMSIL. It would seem to make good sense to utilize a well-established infrastructure to support the operation of both the Mission and the Court, in respect of certain similar core functions, thereby making the most effective use of the funding provided by Member States.

50. In addition, UNAMSIL would be in a position to provide evidence to the Prosecutor gathered by its Human Rights Section and from other local sources and its rich experience in conducting a successful local campaign of sensitization in respect of both the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

VIII. Humanitarian aspects

Donor consultations

51. From 4 to 8 February, representatives of 12 donor countries and institutions visited Sierra Leone for consultations with the Government, United Nations agencies and international and national non-governmental organizations. The primary objective of the consultations was to review the humanitarian needs of the country as presented in the consolidated appeal process for 2002, and to mobilize resources for the resettlement and reintegration of displaced persons and refugees. In addition, the consultations sought to further sensitize donors to the need for sustained assistance for post-conflict recovery and the transition to sustainable development. The donors reiterated their commitment to sustaining their support to Sierra Leone beyond the elections.

Refugees and returnees

52. There are currently approximately 107,000 Sierra Leonean refugees being assisted by UNHCR in camps in the subregion, as well as an additional estimated 80,000 unregistered refugees living outside camps. Since September 2000, UNHCR has assisted the repatriation of 68,698 refugees, adding to tens of thousands who have returned spontaneously. A total of

17,846 displaced returnees have so far been assisted by UNHCR to resettle in their areas of origin.

53. As indicated earlier, the armed conflict in Liberia has resulted in new influxes of Liberian refugees and Sierra Leonean returnees since mid-December 2001. In December, there was an influx of 200 Liberian refugees and 3,000 Sierra Leonean returnees. As at 6 March, over 10,700 Liberians and more than 7,400 Sierra Leoneans had been registered by immigration authorities at the main crossing point in Jendema, southern Sierra Leone. In Buedu and Koindu in the east, there has been a further influx of approximately 1,600 Liberian refugees since the end of January 2002.

54. UNHCR and the Government of Sierra Leone are informing the Liberian refugees in border areas of Kailahun and Jendema about the security risks of remaining in border areas and about the Government's request that they move to camps in Bo district. UNAMSIL, at the request of UNHCR, has mounted an operation to transport the refugees and returnees from the border areas to Bo and Kenema districts. Currently, UNHCR is assisting 5,835 refugees who have moved to Jimi Bagbo refugee camp and to temporary settlements, which are being transformed into refugee camps. The recent influx adds to a previous refugee population of 7,000 who have been in Sierra Leone for the past decade.

55. UNHCR-facilitated repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees by ship from Guinea is in progress, at a rate of 500 repatriates per week. The number is expected to increase to 1,500 per week transported by road in mid-March, once the Kambia border post becomes operational. Facilitated repatriation from Liberia started on 13 February, and 1,741 refugees had been repatriated as at 26 February. Small numbers of Sierra Leoneans are also being repatriated from other asylum countries in the subregion.

Resettlement of internally displaced persons

56. As of January 2002, some 204,000 displaced persons were registered and being assisted by United Nations agencies. The resettlement of internally displaced persons is being conducted in phases. Under phase one, carried out in December 2001, 4,000 internally displaced persons and 13,000 returnees based in camps and host communities in Port Loko district were resettled to Kambia and Port Loko districts. The resettlement of displaced persons from the Western

Area (Freetown) and Tonkolili districts to Kambia, Port Loko and Bombali districts started in February 2002, under phase two.

57. With the completion of the disarmament process, the districts of Koinadugu, Tonkolili, Bombali and Kono and parts of Kailahun district were declared safe for resettlement. There are over 260,000 internally displaced persons and returnees that need to be assisted with food and non-food resettlement packages, as well as transportation during phase three of the resettlement in these areas. It is expected that this phase will be well under way prior to the commencement of the rainy season and the elections. The humanitarian community has approached UNAMSIL for assistance in transporting the displaced persons to their areas of origin. The World Food Programme has indicated that it expects to encounter a break in its food pipeline at the critical season in July if it does not receive immediate contributions to cover a shortfall of 25,000 tons.

HIV/AIDS

58. Since my last report, UNAMSIL has continued to provide information to its military and civilian personnel about the impact of HIV/AIDS, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1308 (2000). A selected number of peacekeepers participated in the Mission's train-the-trainers programme, which seeks to impart knowledge of HIV/AIDS issues to peacekeepers and create awareness through trained representatives.

IX. Economic developments

59. The reporting period witnessed the continuing recovery of Sierra Leone's economy. The improvement in the security situation, the increasing consumer and investor confidence, the drastic reduction in barriers to domestic mobility and trade, the stepped-up resettlement and rehabilitation activities, the increase in agricultural output, the expansion of donor-financed imports and the strong growth of domestic commerce have all contributed to the generally favourable economic trends. Fiscal and monetary policies contained inflation to 3.4 per cent in 2001, despite the healthy 30 per cent depreciation of the Leone (completely reversing its sustained appreciation of 2000). Exports are also gradually beginning to rebound. Recorded exports (\$6 million in 1999 and \$13 million in 2000) rose to \$26 million in 2001, 90 per

cent of which consisted of diamonds channelled through the certification process (\$24 million compared to \$10 million in 1999). Exports adjusted for trade partner data on diamond imports from Sierra Leone reached \$120 million in 2001 from \$61 million in 1999. However, large aid flows financed a 34 per cent increase in imports in 2001 and an expansion of the current account deficit to 29 per cent of GDP.

60. These favourable developments notwithstanding, the overall economic situation of Sierra Leone remains precarious. At the end of 2000, the net present value of the country's \$1.2 billion public and publicly guaranteed external debt was 133 per cent of GDP, and 757 per cent of exports. At the same time, the country reached the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative "decision point" in March 2002, which provides interim debt relief. This relief would be made permanent should Sierra Leone continue to perform well under its IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Programme over the next couple of years to satisfy the conditions for reaching the "completion point". With enhanced HIPC assistance, Sierra Leone's debt service to exports ratio would drop from 74 per cent in 2001 to 5 per cent by 2005. Debt service savings would amount to about \$37 million per annum during 2002-2005 (5 per cent of projected GDP annually).

X. Financial aspects

61. The General Assembly, by its resolution 56/251 of 24 December 2001, appropriated the amount of \$692 million gross for the maintenance of UNAMSIL for the financial period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002. I have also submitted a detailed budget amounting to \$669,476,400 gross for the maintenance of the Mission for the 2002-2003 financial period, which is currently before the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the General Assembly for oversight and legislative review and consideration.

62. Therefore, should the Security Council approve my recommendation set out in paragraph 70 below as to the extension of the mandate of UNAMSIL, the cost for the operation and maintenance of the Mission during the extension period will be limited to resources approved by the General Assembly.

63. As at 28 February 2002, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNAMSIL

amounted to \$365.4 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$2,001 million.

XI. Observations and recommendations

64. The completion of the disarmament process and the deployment of UNAMSIL throughout the country have created a relatively more secure environment, which provides an opportunity for Sierra Leone to hold free, fair and credible elections, and to concentrate on national reconciliation and recovery, and building sustainable institutions. After more than 10 years of a brutal civil war, this represents a unique chance, which Sierra Leoneans and their leaders cannot afford to miss. It is absolutely essential that the Government, the former armed groups, the political parties and civil society seize this opportunity and return their country to durable peace and stability.

65. The most urgent priority for Sierra Leone at this stage is to ensure that the forthcoming elections are conducted in a credible manner and in a reasonably secure and peaceful environment. I am encouraged by the progress made so far in the preparations for the elections, with the assistance of the international community. The peaceful atmosphere that characterized the conduct of the voter registration exercise bodes well for the next phases of the electoral process. The National Electoral Commission must, however, draw the necessary lessons from this exercise and rectify all shortcomings, particularly its organizational and management problems. The Commission must also coordinate closely with UNHCR and expedite arrangements for the registration of returning refugees.

66. The electoral campaign period, which will begin in the coming weeks, will be an equally critical phase. The people of Sierra Leone expect the political parties to conduct their electoral campaign activities in a responsible and mature manner, so as to preserve the prevailing stability. The international partners have made commendable efforts to ensure that all political parties get a fair chance to contest the elections. In particular, the National Democratic Institute and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy deserve praise for the role they are playing in promoting political party development. I also commend the Governments

of Sierra Leone and Nigeria for the assistance they have extended to RUF to enable it to transform itself into a political party. The National Electoral Commission must operate in a transparent and impartial manner, however, and should engage all the stakeholders, in particular the political parties and civil society groups, in more regular consultations, so as to sustain confidence in the electoral process.

67. The recent public statements by the leaders of RUF, expressing their commitment to transforming their movement into a political party and joining the mainstream of the democratic process, are a welcome development. They should be strongly encouraged to continue along this constructive path, and to actively participate in the party development projects of the National Democratic Institute and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which are intended to benefit all legitimate Sierra Leonean political parties. The sincerity of the commitment of the RUF party to the democratic process will, however, be measured by how it conducts itself before, during and after the elections.

68. Following the announcement of the election results, it will be necessary to closely monitor the reaction of all the parties and take stock of the evolving security environment, with a view to ensuring a peaceful transition to the newly elected government. In this connection, UNAMSIL is preparing for all possible contingencies, and is determined to assist in ensuring that stability is maintained in the post-election period.

69. As stated in my last report (S/2001/1195), the elections will not by themselves provide a lasting solution to the crisis in Sierra Leone. Without well-established State institutions throughout the country, and security agencies that are capable of defending the country from both internal and external threats, the stability so far achieved in Sierra Leone will remain vulnerable. In the period immediately following the elections, the efforts of the newly elected government and the international community must therefore focus on peace consolidation. Urgent attention will need to be paid to the unfinished aspects of the peace process, particularly the extension of State authority, the reintegration of ex-combatants and the restoration of the Government's control over diamond mining. Those efforts will need to be complemented by the reactivation of the judicial system, the strengthening of the law enforcement agencies, the restoration of basic

public services and recovery efforts throughout the country.

70. The international community has invested heavily in Sierra Leone, both politically and financially. It is therefore imperative that it safeguard the significant progress made and stay the course until its objectives are met. Despite the completion of the disarmament process, for now, the security situation in the country and in the Mano River Union subregion remains fundamentally fragile. It will be some time before Sierra Leone's security forces have the capacity to take full responsibility for the country's security. Without sustained stability, it will not be possible to accomplish the peace consolidation efforts described above. The continued engagement of UNAMSIL after the elections will therefore be indispensable. For this reason, I recommend that the mandate of the Mission be extended for another six months, until 30 September 2002.

71. Should the security situation in Sierra Leone continue to improve after the elections, adjustments will need to be made to the current strength, composition and deployment of UNAMSIL troops. As indicated earlier, the initial planning for those adjustments is already under way. It will be necessary, however, to watch how the post-election situation evolves and conduct a thorough assessment of developments in both Sierra Leone and the neighbouring countries, to ensure that any adjustment proposals are suited to the prevailing situation. Such an assessment, together with specific benchmarks related to the peace consolidation efforts, will be contained in my September report to the Security Council.

72. The process of national recovery has to begin early so that it contributes to the earliest consolidation of peace. Aspects of the recovery programme that are critical to the stabilization of the country, in particular the reintegration of displaced persons and returning refugees, employment creation, and the repair of vital infrastructure, should be accorded priority. United Nations agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions will have to be actively involved in these stabilization efforts. The United Nations country team has already begun developing a strategy for the transition from humanitarian assistance to supporting national recovery and peace-building in Sierra Leone.

73. National reconciliation and ensuring accountability for atrocities committed during the conflict will also constitute an important aspect of peace consolidation. The preparations for the

establishment of the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will no doubt gather momentum after the elections, and the strains associated with the efforts to address the atrocities of the past will need to be carefully managed. In this regard, I expect the Government, UNAMSIL and civil society to work closely together and step up activities aimed at informing the public about the functioning of the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

74. I remain very much concerned about the recent escalation of the conflict in Liberia. It will be extremely difficult to safeguard the security and stability achieved in Sierra Leone as long as conflict persists in a neighbouring State. I therefore welcome the Mano River Union summit meeting held at Rabat on 27 February. It is my hope that this event marks the beginning of sustained dialogue among the leaders of the Mano River Union subregion, which should address the sources of instability in the subregion and build confidence among the three countries. I wish to commend His Majesty King Mohammed VI for facilitating the summit meeting.

75. I am deeply disturbed by the recent reports of sexual exploitation of minors and women in the subregion. As stated above, I have asked the Office of Internal Oversight Services to conduct a thorough investigation. In addition to strengthening preventive and disciplinary measures by the concerned United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, it would also be important to address the underlying causes of the problem, including poverty and the breakdown of community values. With regard to the alleged misconduct on the part of peacekeepers, UNAMSIL has been instructed to conduct a vigorous and thorough investigation. At the same time, it is imperative for the troop-contributing countries to support the United Nations in implementing the preventive measures developed by the Mission.

76. In conclusion, I wish to commend the people and Government of Sierra Leone, my Special Representative, and all UNAMSIL military and civilian personnel for the remarkable progress achieved during the reporting period. I would also like, once again, to express my appreciation to ECOWAS, as well as to the United Nations agencies, the World Bank, many individual donor countries, and national and international non-governmental organizations for their unwavering support for the peace process in Sierra Leone.

Annex

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions as at 8 March 2002

Authorized strength: Military: 17,500 (up to 260 military observers)

Civilian police: current strength open; currently planning up to 90

	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Sector HQ staff</i>	<i>Total</i>
Bangladesh	12	18	4 174	65	4 269
Bolivia	6				6
Canada	5				5
China	6				6
Croatia	10				10
Czech Republic	5				5
Denmark	2				2
Egypt	10				10
France	1				1
Gambia	24				24
Germany			12		12
Ghana	6	10	847	58	921
Guinea	12	4	776		793
Indonesia	10				10
Jordan	10	1	119		130
Kenya	11	14	996	63	1 084
Kyrgyzstan	2				2
Malaysia	10				10
Mali	8				8
Nepal	10	5	800		815
New Zealand	2				2
Nigeria	10	15	3 236	64	3 325
Pakistan	10	17	4 203	50	4 280
Russian Federation	15	4	109		128
Slovakia	2				2
Sweden	3				3
Thailand	5				5
Ukraine	5	5	616		626
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	15	7			22
United Republic of Tanzania	12				12

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	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Sector HQ staff</i>	<i>Total</i>
Uruguay	11				11
Zambia	10	5	813	5	833
Total	260	105	16 701	305	17 371

Force Commander: Kenya; Deputy Force Commander: Nigeria; Chief Military Observer: Pakistan.

Civilian police: Bangladesh: 4; Canada: 4; Gambia: 4; Ghana: 8; India: 2; Jordan: 3; Kenya: 5; Malaysia: 3; Nepal: 5; Niger: 2; Nigeria: 3; Norway: 4; Senegal: 3; Sri Lanka: 2; United Republic of Tanzania: 1; Zambia: 8; Zimbabwe: 6; total: 73.

82) United Nations Document

Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 21 November 1995,
S/1995/975, paragraph 2.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/975
21 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
THE SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to a number of requests from members of the Security Council. It covers the period since my good offices were formally requested by the Government of Sierra Leone in November 1994.
2. The conflict in Sierra Leone began in March 1991, when the forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched attacks to overthrow the Government of the All People's Congress (APC) headed by former President Joseph S. Momoh. The conflict has so far caused the deaths of thousands of civilians, while many thousands more are internally displaced or are refugees in Guinea and Liberia.
3. On 29 April 1992, the Government of President Momoh was overthrown by a military coup and the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was established. Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser became the Chairman of NPRC and Head of State. After the coup, RUF made additional demands and continued its conflict with the new Government.
4. Towards the end of 1993, NPRC regained control of areas held by RUF in the southern and eastern parts of the country and subsequently announced a unilateral cease-fire in December 1993. Nevertheless, attacks on towns, villages and major highways escalated to unprecedented levels and spread throughout the country.
5. In a letter addressed to me on 24 November 1994, Chairman Strasser formally requested my good offices to bring the Government and RUF to negotiations, with the United Nations serving as an intermediary in that process. I dispatched a member of the Department of Political Affairs, Mr. Felix Masha, to Sierra Leone to explore the possibilities of dialogue between the Government and RUF. He held a series of discussions from 15 to 22 December 1994 with Government officials, prominent citizens, religious leaders, resident diplomats and representatives of all United Nations bodies and agencies in Sierra Leone. He was not able, however, to establish contact with RUF in order to assess its

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attitude towards negotiations. In a letter to me dated 23 December 1994, Chairman Strasser expressed his appreciation and full support for the mission and requested that I continue my efforts.

6. The findings of the exploratory mission convinced me of the need to establish a more permanent presence in Freetown. I therefore appointed Mr. Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia) as my Special Envoy for Sierra Leone and communicated this to the President of the Security Council on 7 February 1995 (S/1995/120).

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

7. During the last three years, while taking military measures against RUF, the Government has followed a two-track political approach: a negotiated settlement with RUF and democratization of the political process, including transition to an elected civilian Government within a fixed time-frame. These two political approaches are intended to reinforce each other.

A. The pursuit of negotiations

8. Prior to requesting my good offices, the Government had dispatched a delegation of prominent Sierra Leoneans to the border with Liberia to establish contact with RUF and pave the way for peace talks. The delegation met with the representatives of RUF on the Mano river bridge and held meetings with them on 24 November and 4 and 7 December 1994. Since then, there have been no follow-up meetings and each side has blamed the other for the non-resumption of talks. RUF accused the Government of sabotaging the process by issuing derogatory statements while the talks were being held. The Government alleged that the talks were discontinued because RUF took hostage three members of the Government delegation and continues to hold them.

9. My Special Envoy has spared no effort to establish contact with RUF. He has closely collaborated with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth Secretariat and other organizations supporting negotiations in Sierra Leone. Along with the OAU and Commonwealth delegations, he issued a tripartite statement in Freetown in February 1995, calling on RUF to meet with them. He has since kept in constant communication with officials of these two organizations.

10. In his attempts to establish contact with RUF leadership, my Special Envoy has sought and received assistance from official bodies, private individuals and non-governmental organizations in Sierra Leone and throughout the subregion. This has enabled him to communicate with Mr. Foday Sankoh, the leader of RUF, and some of its senior members. In May 1995, Mr. Sankoh invited my Special Envoy to visit him at his base but later changed his mind. In a similar vein, at the beginning of September 1995, he invited, through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Freetown, a number of prominent Sierra Leoneans to meet him. The Government agreed to allow those invited to proceed to the meeting. On 18 September, ICRC informed RUF of the Government's

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agreement and requested RUF to fix the date and venue. No response has yet been received.

11. My Special Envoy is still continuing his efforts through various channels to meet face-to-face with the RUF leader. In addition to these efforts, he has been assisting and encouraging the Government in its democratization process.

B. Democratization

12. On 26 November 1993, Chairman Strasser issued a declaration setting out a programme of transition to democratic constitutional rule. According to the schedule, registration of voters was to have been completed from March to June 1994 and presidential elections were to have taken place in November 1995. However, the continued conflict and limited State resources have delayed the implementation of the transition programme by one year.

13. On 27 April 1995, on the occasion of the thirty-fourth anniversary of independence, Chairman Strasser reaffirmed the commitment of NPRC to the transition programme, pledging that everything possible would be done to complete its implementation by January 1996, when a democratically elected President would be sworn in. Several important steps have followed that pronouncement.

14. The Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC), which was established by Decree No. 1, 1994, has intensified its activity under the chairmanship of Mr. James O. C. Jonah. Its sister organization, the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), established by Decree No. 15, 1994, promotes civic and voter education throughout the country.

15. At the request of the Government, the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division conducted a needs assessment mission from 22 November to 2 December 1994, in close collaboration with the National Electoral Commission, to identify the technical requirements for organizing the electoral process, including voter registration, polling, civic education, training of electoral officers, legal issues and the electoral timetable.

16. On 20 June 1995, the Government issued Decree No. 7, 1995, lifting the ban on political activities, which it had imposed when it came to power, and empowered INEC to register political parties. Fifteen political parties have so far been issued with final certificates of registration and have begun campaigning (see annex I).

17. In order to build broad-based support for the electoral process, a National Consultative Conference on Elections was held in Freetown from 15 to 17 August 1995 with the participation of all the political parties, representatives of the Government and 78 different organizations representing a wide spectrum of civil society. The Conference adopted a system of elections based on proportional representation, a code of conduct for political parties and rules to govern campaign financing. The Conference overwhelmingly agreed to hold elections by the end of February 1996. The date has since been set for

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26 February 1996. The vigorous debate and the consensus that emerged indicate wide support for the democratic process.

18. As a result of these decisions, INEC is ready to begin voter registration and to finalize preparations for the elections. However, there are serious financial constraints that endanger this process: the total budgetary requirement is US\$ 10,730,219, but only US\$ 1,125,005 in cash and kind has so far been raised from external sources (see annex II). Unless additional financial support is made available, the electoral timetable will not be met.

19. Postponement of the elections could result in escalating violence and halt altogether the process of democratization. There are some elements within Sierra Leone that seek to derail the electoral process, as was attested by the attempted coup of 2 October 1995.

20. Various efforts have been made to raise resources. At a briefing of donor countries on the electoral and political situation in Sierra Leone on 2 November 1995, the response was very positive. I am convening a donors' conference on electoral assistance to Sierra Leone in New York on 30 November and I urge Member States to respond generously.

21. I have instructed my Special Envoy to follow closely all aspects of the democratization process. I have also instructed him to encourage the Government and leaders of the political parties to safeguard the integrity of the process, ensuring that the elections are free and fair and that their outcome is not contested.

III. SECURITY SITUATION

22. When NPRC took power, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces numbered 3,000. A massive recruitment drive increased their total strength to around 14,000. After the December 1994 offensive by RUF, however, it became clear that the forces were inadequate to confront the challenges they faced. In addition, some soldiers have been implicated in illegal activities.

23. Given the links between the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, certain regional and other countries have taken the decision to provide military assistance to Sierra Leone. In addition, NPRC has been using non-Sierra Leonean advisers to improve the fighting skills of its troops, instil discipline and upgrade command and control.

24. The situation on the ground has not changed dramatically. Foreign and Sierra Leonean nationals, including seven nuns, were taken hostage in different parts of the country in early 1995 and subsequently released on 21 March 1995. In addition, RUF began moving closer to Freetown and captured several villages in Kono District, an area rich in diamonds and therefore of great economic importance.

25. Recently, morale and discipline within the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces appear to have improved. The diamond fields of Kono and a number of villages were retaken by Government forces in July and August 1995.

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The frequency of ambushes on the highways has decreased in the last few weeks and, if the present trend continues, the delivery of relief assistance to the countryside, as well as registration and voting, will be facilitated.

26. The majority of the combatants on both sides are young men with no employable skills other than soldiering. The Government has expressed its desire to demobilize part of its army. This is imperative, but it is also vital to reintegrate the demobilized soldiers into society as productive citizens. Sierra Leone lacks the resources to accomplish this task and the international community needs to assist the processes of demobilization and reintegration. While this programme will initially cover only members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces and those RUF combatants who are already in the hands of the Government, it must be designed to cover those still in the field as soon as a cease-fire and peace agreement are in place.

27. The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces held a seminar on 16 and 17 November 1995 with civilians and representatives of political parties to discuss the differences of perception and mutual suspicion between the military and the civilian population. It hopes that this seminar will create a harmonious environment in preparation for the forthcoming transition to civilian rule.

IV. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

The socio-economic costs of the war

28. Much of the fighting has taken place in the mineral-rich areas in the south and east and the agriculturally viable regions where cocoa, coffee and other cash crops are grown. As a result, production of gold and diamonds dropped from 43,000 tons in 1991 to 38,000 tons in 1994. This was reflected in a \$30 million decline in exports. Income from the production of cash crops has declined from \$21 million in 1990 to \$7.6 million in 1993, a fall of 64 per cent. At the same time, government expenditures have risen as a result of the war; it is estimated that some 75 per cent of total revenue is now spent on the war effort.

29. Infrastructure damage has been enormous, with academic institutions, government offices, banks, health centres, schools and hospitals in a state of severe disrepair. Roads, bridges and construction equipment have been destroyed, while the Government, the churches, NGOs and mining companies have closed or scaled down operations and laid off thousands of workers as part of the austerity measures.

30. The Government has been credited with stabilizing the economy. However, the formal economy accounts for only 25 to 30 per cent of the country's total economic activities. As economic opportunities in the formal sector decline, people have little choice but to participate more fully in the informal economy, including resorting to acts of banditry.

31. Much of the war is being fought in the rural areas, particularly in the south and east, affecting semi-subsistence farmers who make up the bulk of the rural population. Farms have been destroyed, food stores burnt, domestic

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animals stolen or killed and agricultural tools looted. Attacks have consistently taken place during the dry season, preventing farmers from harvesting their crops. As a result, 248,800 tons of cereals were imported in 1992, an 80 per cent increase over the previous year. Continued food shortages are likely to perpetuate the war.

V. HUMANITARIAN

32. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone remains critical. Nearly 2 million people have been internally displaced, the majority flocking to major towns, including Bo, Kenema and Makeni. This represents close to 50 per cent of the country's estimated population of 4,477,000. Only about 1.1 million persons from this group receive assistance with any degree of regularity, owing to security constraints. Highways linking Freetown to key population centres have been usable only sporadically for much of this year and the impact on civilian populations has been severe. In the eastern and south-eastern areas of the country, which have been totally inaccessible for more than eight months, it is feared that malnutrition will soon reach life-threatening levels. Beginning in September 1995, however, there has been a relative improvement in access, allowing humanitarian organizations to deliver relief without armed escorts. Areas in the eastern portion of the country, however, remain inaccessible.

33. The gap between the resources made available by the international community for humanitarian assistance and the unmet needs of the affected population continues to be great. In March 1995, I launched the United Nations inter-agency consolidated appeal for humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone, covering the period from March to December 1995 and requesting \$14.7 million for the emergency activities of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Only 41 per cent of the funds requested has been received. This pattern is particularly worrying with respect to the status of WFP food stocks and anticipated needs for the coming year. Resources are required as soon as possible to prevent an even more precarious food aid situation next year.

34. The emergency situation has prevented development organizations from carrying out any sustained activity outside the Freetown area. Programmes have now been reoriented to address the emergency. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs will establish a humanitarian assistance coordination unit in Freetown, staffed by three experienced officers, to support the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator.

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

35. While the situation in Sierra Leone is generally characterized by conflict, human suffering and economic decline, there are some positive emerging trends which, if assisted, would contribute to the re-establishment of peace and stability. The ongoing process of democratization, particularly the elections set for 26 February 1996, is a significant element in this development and worthy of the international community's support.

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36. The internal conflict that has raged for the last four years has damaged or destroyed much of the vital physical and social infrastructure of the country. In order to consolidate the democratic process and support the incoming elected civilian Government, I urge the international community to demonstrate its solidarity with the people of Sierra Leone, many of whom believe that the world has abandoned them. Some initial steps must be taken now to signal the international community's commitment to assist this democratization process.

37. Given the importance of the issue, I am instructing the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to field a team of experts to prepare, in collaboration with the Government, a coordinated and workable action plan for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants. The team will take into account the experiences gained by the United Nations in El Salvador and Mozambique, as well as the present effort in Liberia, to identify sources of funds so that implementation can begin expeditiously.

38. I have also instructed the Electoral Assistance Division to work closely with other United Nations agencies and programmes, in particular UNDP, to assist INEC in coordinating international observers during the elections and in strengthening national observer groups.

39. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone is a cause for concern because of the widening gap between the needs of the war-affected population and the resources available to humanitarian agencies. Unless the international community responds quickly to enhance the humanitarian agencies' capacity to deliver relief assistance in time and in sufficient quantity, the situation may become desperate. In this connection, I should like to commend all United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations operating in Sierra Leone for their response to the emergency situation by reorienting their various programmes.

40. Delivering relief assistance to the needy is not an easy task even at the best of times. It becomes almost impossible when humanitarian convoys are targeted. Members of the Security Council may consider admonishing those responsible for attacking relief convoys and urging them to refrain from such deplorable actions.

41. Despite all efforts to contact it, the RUF leadership has remained elusive and unresponsive to initiatives for a meeting or negotiations. While commending those Governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals that have been supporting the efforts of my Special Envoy, the time has come for the international community to urge RUF to take advantage of my good offices and to initiate a process of negotiation.

42. I intend to retain my Special Envoy in Sierra Leone for the time being. He will continue his efforts to establish a dialogue between RUF and the Government and to support the process of democratization. His efforts will be coordinated with OAU and the Commonwealth.

43. In conclusion, I should like to call upon Member States to provide the fullest possible material and financial support to INEC so that the elections

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can be held on schedule. Although there are legitimate security concerns, experience has shown in other places, such as Cambodia and South Africa, that the democratic process should not be held hostage to the intransigence of any particular group.

Annex IList of registered political parties in Sierra Leone

<u>Name of political party</u>	<u>Name of leader</u>
1. People's Progressive Party (PPP)	Edward Bundu-Kamara
2. National Unity Movement (NUM)	Desmond Luke
3. People's National Convention (PNC)	Ibrahim Ben Kargbo
4. United National People's Party (UNPP)	John Karafa-Smart
5. People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Thaimu Bangura
6. All People's Congress (APC)	S. A. T. Koroma
7. National Unity Party (NUP)	A. O. D. George
8. Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)	Rev. Paul Dumber
9. National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	Foday B. Mansaray
10. National People's Party (NPP)	Alimamy Yamba Komeh
11. National Republican Party (NRP)	Sahr Steven Mambu
12. Democratic Centre Party (DCP)	Abu A. Koroma
13. Coalition for Progress Party (CPP)	Ms. Jeredine Williams Sarho
14. National Alliance Democratic Party (NADP)	Mohamed Y. Sillah
15. Social Democratic Party (SDP)	Andrew Lungay

Annex II

Interim National Electoral Commission

Electoral assistance budget (November 1995-March 1996)

Funding status as at 24 October 1995

Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
Coordination	Chief technical adviser	108 000	108 000 a/		
	Legal adviser	60 000	60 000 b/		
	United Nations Volunteers	55 000			55 000
	Electoral coordinator	30 000			30 000
	Admin. support personnel	36 000	36 000 a/		
	Mission costs/duty travel	25 000	25 000 a/		
	Reports sundries	18 000	18 000 a/		
	Subtotal	332 000	247 000		85 000
Voter education	<u>International personnel</u>				
	Media coordinator	60 000	60 000 b/		
	Civic education consultant	120 000	120 000 c/		
	<u>National personnel</u>				
	Civic education consultants	12 000	10 000 a/		2 000
	Publicity supervisors	14 667			14 667
	Publicity officers	175 000			175 000
Publicity assistants	400 000			400 000	
Materials rental	Audiovisual productions	55 556	20 000 d/		35 556
	Theatre productions	100 000	63 000 e/		37 000
	Design/graphic materials	83 333			83 333
	Vehicle rental	100 000			100 000

Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
	Launch/other rental	5 556			5 556
	Mobile radio communications	300 000	50 000 a/		250 000
	Training	50 556			50 556
	Equipment materials	100 687			100 687
	Audiovisual communication vehicles	250 000	250 000 f/		
	Fuel and maintenance	106 500			106 500
	Subtotal	1 933 855	573 000		1 360 855
Voter registration	<u>International personnel</u>				
	Logistics coordinator	60 000	60 000 g/		
	Team leaders	40 000			40 000
	Database expert	17 555	17 555 a/		
	Registration coordinators	7 200	7 200 a/		
	Registrars	500 000			500 000
	Data editors	25 667			25 667
	Revision personnel	250 000			250 000
	Data entry personnel	20 000			20 000
	Logistics assistants	6 000			6 000
Training	Registration officials	100 000		63 000 h/	37 000
Rentals/others	Vehicles for registration	166 667			166 667
	Vehicles for revision	83 333			83 333
Materials	Registration	400 000		100 000 h/ 100 000 i/	300 000
	Computerization	220 250	8 500 e/ 211 750 h/		
	Subtotal	1 896 672	305 005	263 000	1 328 667

Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
Polling	<u>International and national personnel</u>				
	Nomination day	20 767			20 767
	Election day	900 638			900 638
	INEC supervisory personnel	100 000			100 000
	Trainees, monitors	533 333			533 333
	Training coordinator	7 200			7 200
	Training assistants	10 800			10 800
Training	Election officers training	250 000			250 000
Materials/rentals	Materials rentals	85 000			85 000
	Vehicle rentals	233 333			233 333
	Election day materials	851 067		0/	851 067
	Food/materials for brigades	109 667			109 667
	United Nations Secretariat equipment	69 220			69 220
	Helicopter lease	1 000 000			1 000 000
	Subtotal	4 171 025			4 171 025
Transportation	<u>Purchases</u>				
	Field vehicles (6)	240 000			240 000
	Light vehicles (14)	560 000			560 000
	Trucks (5)	266 667			266 667
	Minibuses (5)	400 000			400 000
	Motor bicycles/bicycles	150 000			150 000

Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
	Operation/maintenance	500 000			500 000
	Air transport fuel/operations	300 000			300 000
	Subtotal	2 416 667			2 416 667
	Grand total	10 750 219	1 125 005	263 000	9 362 214
Summary					
	Coordination	332 000	247 000		85 000
	Voter education	1 933 855	573 000		1 360 855
	Voter registration	1 896 672	305 005	263 000	1 328 667
	Polling	4 171 025			4 171 025
	Transportation	2 416 667			2 416 667
	Grand total	10 750 219	1 125 005	263 000	9 362 214

- a/ United Nations Development Programme.
- b/ Commonwealth.
- c/ European Union.
- d/ Greece.
- e/ United States of America.
- f/ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- g/ Canada.
- h/ Sierra Leone.
- i/ Sweden.

Annex III

Resource mobilization for the Sierra Leone emergency.


Agency	Requirements	Pledges	Shortfall	Percentage of needs covered
United Nations Children's Fund	2 799 000	1 100 000	1 699 000	39.3
World Health Organization	1 325 000	759 856	565 144	57.3
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	4 648 800	336 538	4 312 262	7.2
Department of Humanitarian Affairs	237 500	8 772	228 728	3.7
World Food Programme (non-food)	450 000	0	450 000	0
(food and ITSH) <u>a/</u>				
Vegetable oil	3 503 640	1 455 000	2 048 640	41.5
Corn-soya blend	686 280	592 800	93 480	86.4
ITSH <u>a/</u>	493 038	278 460	214 578	56.5
Subtotal	4 682 958	2 326 260	2 356 698	49.7
Total for consolidated appeal	14 143 258	4 531 426	9 611 832	32.0
United Nations Development Programme <u>b/</u>		4 104 000		
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations <u>b/</u>		356 000		
United Nations Population Fund <u>b/</u>		100 000		
Grand total	14 143 258	9 091 426	9 611 832	

a/ Internal transport, stores and handling.

b/ Not included in the March-December consolidated appeal.


83) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Human Rights Watch, "Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape" Vol. 11, No. 3
(A) June 1999 p1-4, 6-54.



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Vol. 11, No. 3 (A) - JUNE 1999



This two-year-old girl lost her right arm when her grandmother was shot and killed by Revolutionary United Front rebels. She was being carried on her grandmother's back and was injured by the same bullet that killed her grandmother. The four other men all had their hands amputated by rebels—two of them lost both of their hands.

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 Watch

Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, and Rape New Testimony from Sierra Leone

- I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- II. RECOMMENDATIONS
- III. BACKGROUND
- IV. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
 COMMITTED BY RUF
 REBELS
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 SIERRA LEONEAN
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- VI. CHILDREN AS VICTIMS
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I. SUMMARY

In the early hours of January 6, 1999, rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an offensive against the Sierra Leonean capital, Freetown, capturing it from government troops and the soldiers of the Nigerian-led peacekeeping force known as ECOMOG, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group. The battle for Freetown and the ensuing three week rebel occupation of the capital was characterized by the systematic and widespread perpetration of all classes of atrocities against the civilian population, of over one million inhabitants, and marked the most intensive and concentrated period of human rights violations in Sierra Leone's eight-year civil war.

As the rebels took control of street after street, they turned their weapons on the civilian population. By the end of January, both government and independent sources estimated that several thousands of civilians had been killed. The rebels dragged entire family units out of their homes and murdered them, hacked off the hands of children and adults, burned people alive in their houses, and rounded up hundreds of young women, took them to urban rebel bases, and sexually abused them. As the ECOMOG forces counterattacked and the RUF retreated through the capital, the rebels set fire to neighborhoods, leaving entire city blocks in ashes and over 51,000 people homeless.¹ And, while the RUF took with them almost no prisoners of war, they withdrew to the hills with thousands of abductees, mostly children and young women.

This latest rebel offensive brought to the capital the same class of atrocities witnessed in Sierra Leone's rural provinces over the last eight years and is the latest cycle of violence in an armed conflict that has claimed an estimated 50,000 lives and caused the displacement of more than one million Sierra Leoneans. Since launching the rebellion in 1991, the RUF has fought to overthrow successive governments it accuses of widespread corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement of the country's vast diamond and mineral resources. However, since its inception, the RUF has failed publicly and clearly to articulate an alternative political agenda and has consistently committed gross and large scale atrocities against civilians.

In December 1998, following the capture of the diamond rich Kono district and subsequently Makeni, Sierra Leone's fifth largest city, thousands of RUF fighters started moving towards the capital. By early January 1999, they had reached the peninsula on which Freetown is located and gathered less than twenty miles west of the capital city. On January 6, the rebels broke through the highly stretched and poorly manned ECOMOG defenses, ill-prepared for a rebel offensive in force, and proceeded to march through the eastern suburbs and straight into the city center. Their efforts to capture the westernmost part of the capital, containing the ECOMOG headquarters, Wilberforce Military Barracks, and the suburbs housing the country's wealthy elite, were frustrated as ECOMOG launched a major counteroffensive and started pushing them eastward from where they came.

While the rebels were only able to occupy the city center for less than one week, it took ECOMOG forces over three weeks to flush them from the three densely populated eastern suburbs of Kissy, Wellington, and Calaba Town. It was in these three suburbs, particularly towards the end of the occupation, that the vast majority of atrocities occurred.

The rebels made little distinction between civilian and military targets. They repeatedly stated that they believed civilians should be punished for what they perceived to be their support for the existing government. While there was some targeting of particular groups, the vast majority of atrocities were committed by rebels who chose their victims apparently at random. The arbitrary nature of these attacks served to create an atmosphere of complete terror.

While it is difficult to ascertain at what level the perpetration of human rights abuses was ordered by the RUF high command, many of the attacks seemed to be well organized, and some were clearly planned and premeditated. Victims and witnesses described widespread participation and very few accounts of individual combatants or commanders trying to halt the abuses. Operations to round up civilians for mutilation, rape, and execution are well documented, as is the existence of units specializing in the perpetration of particular forms of these atrocities.

The RUF's incursion into Freetown was built around the use of civilian human shields. As they began their march, the rebels used gunfire to create panic and produce a mass civilian exodus westward towards the city center. The rebels then mixed in with and marched behind the thousands of civilians making up the human shield. The tactic was effective for the rebels, but proved frustrating for the ECOMOG soldiers, who were unable to see and properly engage their opponents; and deadly for civilians who

¹Human Rights Watch interview, United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (HACU), Freetown, May 18, 1999.

were in the line of fire once the fighting began. Human shields were also used as defense against ECOMOG air power and during subsequent assaults on ECOMOG positions.

Upon gaining control of a neighborhood or suburb, the rebels went on systematic looting raids in which families were hit by wave after wave of rebels demanding money and valuables. Those who didn't have what the rebels demanded were frequently murdered. Civilians were also executed for resisting rape or abduction, trying to flee, trying to protect a friend or family member, or for refusing to follow instructions.

The largest number of killings took place within the context of attacks on civilians gathered in houses, compounds,³ and places of refuge such as churches and mosques. A study carried out in Freetown's biggest hospital found that some 80 percent of all war-wounded were survivors of mass killings and massacres. Human Rights Watch took testimonies from scores of witnesses to such atrocities—including a January 6 attack on a family in which all but one of their seven children were killed; a January 19 attack on the church of the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star in Wellington, in which twelve people were gunned down; a January 21 attack on a compound in Kissy in which seventeen people were murdered and later burned; and a January 22 attack on the Rogbalan Mosque in Kissy, in which sixty-six people were massacred.

There were also frequent accounts of people being burned alive in their houses, often after having been wounded. Children and the elderly were particularly vulnerable. Witnesses described rebels throwing civilians, sometimes children, into burning houses and shooting at those trying to escape. Family members trying to rescue their children or other relatives from a burning house were threatened with death and forced to abandon them to the fire.

The rebels carried out large numbers of mutilations, in particular amputation of hands, arms, legs, and other parts of the body—a horrific practice developed during offensives in the rural parts of Sierra Leone. In Freetown, several hundred people, mostly men, but also women and children, were killed and maimed in this way. Hospitals registered ninety-seven victims of hand and leg amputation, including twenty-six civilians both of whose hands were hacked off. Among those who had reached a hospital were a two-year-old toddler who had lost one arm, and at least twelve children under the age of eleven who had either lost a limb or suffered serious lacerations from these attacks.

Throughout the occupation, the rebels perpetrated organized and widespread sexual violence against girls and women. The rebels launched operations in which they rounded up girls and women, brought them to rebel command centers, and then subjected them to individual and gang-rape. The sexual abuse was frequently characterized by extreme brutality. Young girls under seventeen, and particularly virgins, were specifically targeted, and hundreds of them were later abducted by the rebels.

While most victims were seemingly chosen at random, the rebels directly targeted a few groups, namely Nigerian nationals, unarmed policemen, and journalists. At least sixty-three Nigerians, most of whom were traders or businessmen, were hunted down and murdered in particularly brutal ways. The rebels also killed at least eighty-five unarmed police officers, and several local and one international journalist. Witnesses described seeing rebels with lists containing the names of journalists who had criticized them in the past and of other pro-democracy and human rights activists. The Catholic archbishop, four Xavieran fathers, and six Sisters of Charity were abducted and held for over ten days. The rebels later killed four of the sisters and wounded one Xavieran father.

As the rebels withdrew, they took with them thousands of civilians, mostly young people and particularly young women. The abductions were often violent, and family members attempting to resist the abductions were often beaten or killed. Families who had more than one child abducted were not uncommon, and there are several cases of entire family units being taken. By June 1999, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs had registered 573 adults who had either been abducted or gone missing, and UNICEF had classed as abducted some 1,500 children registered as having gone missing during the offensive. In March 1999, rebels released fifty-one of the abductees; since then, hundreds more have managed to escape.

The rebels ignored medical neutrality and threatened hospital personnel. Freetown's largest hospital was turned into a temporary rebel base for hundreds of combatants. There, and in other hospitals, rebels tortured, robbed, and removed patients

³A collection of rooms or small dwellings, often behind one wall, which houses members of an extended family or several families and which share cooking, washing, and toilet facilities.

from their beds, and, in at least one case, dragged a patient out of the hospital to be killed. They ordered hospital personnel at gunpoint not to treat civilians and threatened them with death if rebel commanders died. Hospitals and clinics were looted, ambulances were destroyed, and several medical facilities were set on fire.

As the rebels withdrew from the capital they set entire city blocks and suburban streets on fire. Housing authorities registered the destruction of 5,788 homes and residential buildings within the greater Freetown area. Within the eastern suburb of Calaba Town, the authorities calculated some 80 percent of residential structures had been left in ashes, and within densely populated Kissy the estimate was over 65 percent. According to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Transport, extensive damage to at least eight of Freetown's factories, set ablaze by retreating rebels, has resulted in the loss of over 5,000 jobs. Embassies, government buildings, churches, mosques, and historical landmarks were also targeted, including Freetown's Big Market, built in 1802, and the Holy Trinity Church, built in 1877.

Witnesses and victims described the presence and participation of foreign mercenaries fighting with the RUF. Victims of arm amputations, killings, and massacres said some of their assailants were from Liberia and Burkina Faso. Others observed the presence of white mercenaries, believed to be from Ukraine, several of whom were seen giving orders and directing the battle during the ECOMOG assault on the temporary rebel headquarters at State House.

While the RUF committed the vast majority of atrocities and other violations of international humanitarian law during the battle for Freetown, those defending the capital also committed serious abuses, both during and after the rebel incursion. Members of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping force, and to a lesser extent members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) and Sierra Leonean Police routinely executed RUF prisoners and their suspected collaborators or sympathizers. Human Rights Watch has documented over 180 of these executions. Most were carried out by ECOMOG forces. While the victims were mostly young men, witnesses confirm the execution of some women, and children as young as eight.

Prisoners taken by ECOMOG, some of whom had surrendered and many of whom were wounded, were frequently executed on the spot. Suspected rebel collaborators and sympathizers were often killed with little or no effort to establish their guilt or innocence. Executions usually took place at checkpoints, or during small "mopping up" operations. Officers to the level of captain were present and sometimes participated in these executions.

ECOMOG troops also violated medical neutrality during a January 11 operation in which they stormed a hospital, proceeded to drag wounded rebels from their beds, and executed them on the hospital grounds. At least twenty-eight rebels, including two children and a few who had already surrendered, were executed.

In the aftermath of the offensive, civilian witnesses also complained of looting by members of the CDF during routine search missions and some excessive use of force by ECOMOG forces when passing through checkpoints.

During the rebel incursion, children were both the victims of serious abuses committed by all parties to the conflict and, in some cases, the perpetrators of these abuses. RUF rebels raped girls as young as eight, singled out children for mutilation, and murdered children alone and with other family members. RUF child combatants, armed with pistols, rifles, and machetes, were witnessed actively participating in killings and amputations. Some of these child combatants captured by ECOMOG forces were later executed or beaten by members of the local community. Some children abducted by the rebels and taken to the bush have already been observed to be undergoing military training.

The atrocities committed during the January RUF offensive follow a now painfully familiar pattern in Sierra Leone. Relatively protected from such abuses in the past, Freetown residents can now bear witness to the level of brutality and destruction which has threatened residents of the rural areas over the past eight years. In the capital city, the scale of these abuses—both in absolute numbers and in the percentage of the population affected—and the level of sheer brutality, was simply staggering.

In Sierra Leone, a war is being waged against the civilian population, and particularly horrific and inhumane methods are being used to fight it. Human Rights Watch calls on all parties to the war, but especially the RUF rebels, who have been guilty of the worst abuses, to respect international humanitarian law as laid down in the Geneva Conventions and its protocol. In particular, parties to the conflict must distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and desist from targeting civilians for attack. Although influencing the actions of the rebel forces in Sierra Leone is difficult, international pressure must be

maintained to convince them to cease indiscriminate killings, rape, mutilation, the abduction of civilians—especially children for use as soldiers, laborers, sexual slaves, or other purposes—and other violations of the laws of war.

In attempting to negotiate an end to the civil war, the international community and the Sierra Leonean government must insist on the need to bring the perpetrators of gross human rights abuses and war crimes to justice. RUF members suspected of having committed human rights abuses and former RUF collaborators must be given fair trials and punished according to national and international law. Allegations that members of the government's forces and Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces perpetrated abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law must be investigated and appropriate action must be taken.

The physical and psychological scars left by eight years of war in Sierra Leone are profound and far-reaching. In order to end the cycle of violence, there must be an analysis of the root causes of the conflict and a sincere effort on the part of the government and international community to address them. It is owed to the hundreds of thousands of people whose lives have already been torn apart by this war and essential for the future stability of both the country and the region.

Research for this report was conducted by Human Rights Watch during the months of April, May, and June 1999. Several hundred witnesses and victims were interviewed, within their homes and centers for the displaced, in hospitals and clinics, market places, churches, mosques, and places of work. Interviews were conducted with government and United Nations officials, journalists, human rights activists, social workers, and members of national and international nongovernmental organizations. The names of all witnesses and survivors, except where noted, have been changed in order to protect their identity and ensure their privacy.

The conduct of all combatants in the Sierra Leonean conflict is governed by international humanitarian law also known as the laws of war; the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two Protocols. A cardinal principle of humanitarian law is that civilian persons who are in the power of a party to the conflict are entitled to be treated humanely in all circumstances and to benefit from a series of fundamental guarantees without any discrimination. Under the laws of war the following acts in particular are prohibited under any pretext whatsoever:

- a) violence to the life, health, and physical or mental well-being of persons, particularly murder, torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental, corporal punishment, and mutilation;
- b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution, rape, and any form of indecent assault;
- c) the taking of hostages;
- d) collective punishments;
- e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.

Combatants have an obligation to distinguish at all times between the civilian population and combatants in order to spare the civilian population and property. Neither the civilian population as such nor civilian persons shall be the object of attack. Attacks shall be directed solely against military objectives, and the use of civilians as human shields is specifically banned.

Medical personnel, establishments, transports, and equipment are also covered by the protection afforded by the laws of war.

Members of the armed forces or rebel groups who are captured or placed hors de combat are entitled to respect for their lives and their moral and physical integrity. They must be protected and treated humanely without any adverse distinction. It is absolutely forbidden to kill or injure an enemy who surrenders or who is hors de combat.

All these fundamental guarantees without exception, have been grossly and systematically violated during the RUFs offensive against Freetown and ECOMOG's counterattack. The unthinkable atrocities described in this report constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

Human Rights Watch makes the following recommendations:

To the RUF:

Human Rights Watch condemns in the strongest terms the conduct of RUF forces described in this report. We call on RUF forces to:

- Immediately refrain from inflicting torture or murder of any kind, including extrajudicial executions and mutilations, by forces under its command.
- Immediately release all civilian abductees in custody; grant full and ongoing access to detention centers to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other humanitarian organizations; and publish lists of all prisoners and abductees, their ages, where they were captured, where they are being detained, and other relevant details.
- Immediately cease the recruitment and training of child soldiers under the age of eighteen and demobilize and release those already enlisted.
- Allow for unfettered access and safe passage for humanitarian agencies trying to reach needy populations under RUF control.
- Observe the cease-fire agreement entered into on May 18, 1999, desist from all acts in violation of international humanitarian law, and enter into negotiations for the resolution of the conflict in good faith.
- In accordance with the commitment made to U.N. special representative Okelo, set up an internal investigation to investigate violations of international humanitarian law by members of RUF and allied forces, as described in this and other reports on the conflict in Sierra Leone.
- Provide education for all RUF combatants and commanders on the rules of war and standards of international humanitarian law.
- Follow through with the commitment made on May 18, 1999 in Lomé, Togo, by Corporal Foday Sankoh, for the "immediate release of all prisoners of war and noncombatants."
- Follow through with the commitment made and signed on May 18, 1999 in Lomé, Togo by Corporal Foday Sankoh to "guarantee safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need, establish safe corridors for the provision of food and medical supplies to ECOMOG soldiers behind RUF lines, and to RUF combatants behind ECOMOG lines."
- Permit full, unhampered international investigation of grave and widespread humanitarian law and human rights abuses in areas under RUF control by nongovernmental organizations and accredited journalists.

To the Government of Sierra Leone:

We call on the government of Sierra Leone to:

- Thoroughly investigate and prosecute in full compliance with international law, individuals responsible for grave breaches of humanitarian law. Where combatants have committed abuses against civilians, they should be held accountable in a court of law.
- Desist from the recruitment of child soldiers, particularly within the Civil Defense Forces, and to follow through on its commitments made to the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general for children in armed conflict to stop the recruitment of children under eighteen and to create a joint task force to oversee the demobilization and reintegration of child combatants from all sides.
- Ensure that government soldiers and those forces allied with the government respect the human rights of civilians in areas of conflict.
- Ensure that all members of the new Sierra Leonean Army currently under formation receive formal education on the rules of war and standards of international humanitarian law.
- Promptly revise the criminal code to eliminate the death penalty and corporal punishment.
- Follow through with the commitment made and signed on May 18, 1999 in Lomé, Togo, by President Kabbah for the "immediate release of all prisoners of war and noncombatants," while ensuring that reliable reports that individuals in custody have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity are investigated, and prosecutions instituted, as described above, if there is evidence to do so.

- Follow through with the commitment made and signed on May 18, 1999 in Lomé, Togo by President Kabbah to "guarantee safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need, establish safe corridors for the provision of food and medical supplies to ECOMOG soldiers behind RUF lines, and to RUF soldiers behind ECOMOG lines."
- Follow through with the commitment announced by President Kabbah on April 27, 1999 to establish a new Human Rights Commission for Sierra Leone.
- Create task forces to:
 - develop a concrete plan for meeting the needs of abused women and deal specifically with violations inflicted on women during conflict, with the aim of improving the social, medical, and legal responses to women's needs.
 - deal with the effects of war on children: child victims, witnesses, and perpetrators. A key function of this task-force would be the development of a concrete plan for meeting the long-term needs of those who were adversely affected by the war. This task force should determine how best to reintegrate children into their communities, provide education and vocational training suitable for older children, and rehabilitate children who have been victims of atrocities, have witnessed atrocities (sometimes against their own parents), or have themselves taken part in atrocities.
 - address the special physical, psychological, and social needs of the thousands of victims of limb amputation and other mutilation.
- Initiate a widespread information and education campaign to inform communities of the special needs of all civilians who have been abducted or abused.
- Allow the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) unhindered and ongoing access to all detainees, including those who are currently being investigated but have not been charged with a crime.
- Permit full, unhampered international investigation of grave and widespread humanitarian law and human rights abuses in areas under government control by non-governmental organizations and accredited journalists.

To ECOMOG/ECOWAS:

Human Rights Watch urges ECOMOG and ECOWAS, as appropriate, to:

- Take steps to strengthen and make effective the Civil/Military Relations Committee formed to probe allegations of human rights abuses committed by some members of ECOMOG and the CDF.
- In particular, and in accordance with the commitment made to the U.N. secretary-general's special representative, Francis Okelo, and noted in the March 4, 1999, *Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone*, investigate allegations of abuses having been committed during the January offensive and take corrective action as necessary.
- Follow through with the commitment made and signed on May 18, 1999 in Lomé, Togo, for the "immediate release of all prisoners of war and noncombatants," while ensuring that reliable reports that individuals in custody have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity are investigated by the appropriate authorities, and prosecutions instituted if there is evidence to do so.
- Follow through with the commitment signed on May 18, 1999 in Lomé, Togo, to "Guarantee safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need, establish safe corridors for the provision of food and medical supplies to RUF soldiers behind ECOMOG lines."
- Ensure that all ECOMOG officers and soldiers receive proper training in the rules of war and international humanitarian law.

To the International Community:

Human Rights Watch urges the international community generally, including the U.N., its member states, and agencies,

- to:
- Dramatically increase the level of attention and resources devoted to the resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone and the establishment of respect for human rights and the rule of law, including by increasing the financial support given to UNOMSIL to enable an expansion of its human rights monitoring and peacekeeping activities.
 - Oppose a general amnesty that would apply to those who have committed gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law and insist on the need for the cycle of impunity to be broken if peace is to be restored to Sierra Leone.
 - Reinforce the flow of bilateral and multilateral aid to the government of Sierra Leone. This aid should focus on human rights and humanitarian needs, including restructuring of the army and police force, and initiatives focusing on such key areas as emergency relief, health, education, shelter, infrastructure, and the rule of law.
 - In particular, provide assistance for the reconstruction of the system for the administration of justice, and for other initiatives aimed at the establishment of accountability for crimes under national and international law.

- Provide moral, financial, and technical support to civil society organizations to assist them in playing an active role in the transition toward a democratic society and in monitoring, lobbying, and campaigning for improved human rights standards.
- Insist that the government of Sierra Leone follow up on its commitments to stop the recruitment of children under the age of eighteen and to create a joint task force to oversee the demobilization and reintegration of child combatants from all sides.
- Insist with all parties upon the access for accredited journalists and nongovernmental organizations to all areas of conflict.

III. BACKGROUND

The Sierra Leonean civil war began in March 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered Sierra Leone from Liberia, launching a rebellion to overthrow the one-party rule of the All Peoples Congress (APC). The RUF accused the APC, which had been in power since 1967, of rampant corruption, nepotism, and fiscal mismanagement. Despite the fact that Sierra Leone is extremely resource-rich, with large deposits of diamonds, gold, rutile, and bauxite, it is estimated to be one of the poorest countries in the world.

Under the leadership of Foday Sankoh, a corporal in the Sierra Leone Army who had been imprisoned in 1971 for his alleged involvement in an attempted coup against the APC, the RUF was originally made up of a mixture of middle class students with a populist platform, unemployed and alienated youths, and Liberian fighters from Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).³ The ideological component to the movement, however, was never clearly actualized, and the rebellion quickly developed into a campaign of violence whose principal aim appeared to be simply to gain access to the country's diamond and mineral wealth.

From 1991 until the present, the RUF has fought with great brutality to overthrow the successive governments of both military and elected-civilian regimes. Since the outbreak of the war, the country has been marked by instability. In 1992, APC President Joseph Momoh was overthrown in a military coup by Captain Valentine Strasser, whose National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) ruled until it was itself overthrown in 1996, by his deputy, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio.

Later in 1996, however, multi-party elections were held and won by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, head of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), who pledged to bring about an end to the war. After coming to the negotiating table in Abidjan, the RUF and Kabbah's government signed a peace agreement in November 1996, the Abidjan Accord, which called for a cease-fire, disarmament, demobilization, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The cease-fire, however, was broken in January 1997 when serious fighting broke out in southern Moyamba District.

In May 1997, fourteen months after assuming power, President Kabbah was himself overthrown in a coup led by army major Johnny Paul Koroma, heading the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), following his escape from prison, where he had been held following an earlier attempted coup in September 1996. Koroma cited the government's failure to implement the peace agreement as the reason for the coup. Upon taking over, the AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political parties, and announced rule by military decree. It also ushered in a period of political repression characterized by arbitrary arrests and detention.

The AFRC had widespread support within the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA), which had become disillusioned by President Kabbah's decision to cut back support for the military. The SLA accused Kabbah of putting greater confidence for the country's defense in and giving more economic resources to a network of civilian militias, known as the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), the largest and most powerful of which are the Kamajors.⁴ The Kabbah government had found the Kamajors very effective in fighting the RUF, and, unlike members of the army, they were not accused of collaboration with the RUF for the exploitation

³ Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone," in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *African Guerrillas* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), pp. 173-178.

⁴The Kamajors are traditional hunters from the Mende ethnic group in the southern and eastern regions of Sierra Leone who believe in supernatural and ancestral powers. The Mende is Sierra Leone's largest tribe comprising some 30 percent of the population.

of the country's diamond resources.⁵ Formalizing an alliance between the army and the rebels based on joint opposition to President Kabbah and the People's Party, the AFRC invited the RUF to join them in the new government.

After the coup, which was widely condemned, President Kabbah and his government fled into exile in neighboring Guinea and began to mobilize international condemnation for and a response to the coup makers. In June 1997, Nigerian troops, claiming to act under a defense pact with the Sierra Leonean government, moved to reinforce colleagues from the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) already based at the Freetown airport to defend it from RUF rebels, where they remained based throughout the AFRC regime. In August, following the AFRC's announcement of a four-year program for elections and return to civilian rule, which represented a breakdown in negotiations, ECOWAS states put in place an almost total embargo against Sierra Leone. In October, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution imposing mandatory sanctions on Sierra Leone, including an embargo on arms and oil imports.⁶

After negotiations in Guinea under the auspices of ECOWAS, the Kabbah government-in-exile and the AFRC/RUF signed an agreement on October 23, 1997 providing for the return to power of President Kabbah by April 1998. However, the AFRC/RUF undermined the implementation of the accord by stockpiling weapons and attacking ECOMOG positions. In February 1998, ECOMOG forces working together with Kamajor militia launched an operation which drove the AFRC/RUF forces from Freetown. In March 1998, President Kabbah was reinstated as president and over the next several months ECOMOG forces were able to establish control over roughly two-thirds of the country including all regional capitals.

However, once expelled from the capital, the rebels tried to consolidate their own positions in other parts of the country and through a series of offensives toward the end of 1998, managed to gain control of the diamond-rich Kono district and several other strategic towns and areas.⁷ The Kabbah government, which had negligible forces of its own, relied on ECOMOG to stay in power, yet declined to enter into any negotiations to bring the civil war to an end. By the end of 1998, the rebels had gained the upper hand militarily and were in control of over half of the country, including all those areas housing the country's major economic assets. From this position, the RUF launched the January 1999 attack on Freetown.

The war in Sierra Leone has seen considerable involvement of both foreign governments and mercenary forces which have usually provided support in exchange for lucrative contracts and mining concessions. The assistance of Charles Taylor's NPFL and later Liberian government to the RUF is well documented, and has included training, personnel and considerable logistical support. The 1992-1996 military regime (Captain Strasser's National Provisional Ruling Council: NPRC) contracted the South African-based private security firm Executive Outcomes in 1995 to protect the major diamond mining areas. Executive Outcomes remained involved in Sierra Leone until President Kabbah terminated their contract in 1996 as a condition of the 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord. The involvement of Ukrainian arms and ammunition suppliers began under the NPRC and intensified under Brigadier Maada Bio's government. During the January 1999 RUF offensive, armed white men were observed fighting alongside and giving orders to RUF forces. In April 1999, the ECOMOG force commander Felix Mujakperuo publicly accused the presidents of Liberia and Burkina Faso of supplying arms to the RUF by using Ukrainian registered aircraft and crews.⁸ The Sierra Leonean government has also contracted the services of several foreign soldiers and pilots, most of whom fly, man, and maintain the attack and transport helicopters currently being used by ECOMOG forces.

Since the January occupation of Freetown, there have been the first signs for several years of a possible negotiated resolution to the conflict in Sierra Leone. During March 1999, President Kabbah visited several key countries in the subregion, including Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo to discuss the situation in Sierra Leone and possible ways forward. In a radio address to the nation on March 14, President Kabbah expressed his appreciation for the assistance provided by those countries and

⁵Since the NPRC regime, Sierra Leonean Army soldiers and officers had been accused of colluding with the rebels to exploit the country's diamond reserves. The army was accused of exchanging weapons for diamonds from the RUF, giving them military information, and withdrawing from bases so as to allow rebels to take over diamond rich areas. Such allegations led to a loss of faith in the country's military and the subsequent creation of civil defense forces, like the Kamajors.

⁶See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Transition or Travesty? Nigeria's Endless Process of Return to Civilian Rule," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, vol. 9 no.6 (A), October 1997 for a discussion of the Nigerian intervention in Sierra Leone.

⁷See Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, vol.10, no.5 (A).

⁸ECOMOG Press Statement, issued Freetown, April 8, 1999.

reaffirmed his commitment to the "dual-track" approach developed by ECOWAS, which involves strengthening ECOMOG while preparing to talk to the RUF. At the same time, there was considerable diplomatic activity among a number of parties interested in the resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone, including the current chairman of ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo; the ECOMOG troop-contributing countries, namely Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali; the governments of the U.K. and the USA (the USA being represented by the United States presidential special envoy for the promotion of democracy in Africa, the Rev. Jesse Jackson); and the U.N. secretary-general's special representative for Sierra Leone, Francis G. Okelo.

On May 18, 1999, the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF signed a cease-fire agreement, which came into effect on May 24, 1999. Under the agreement, both parties were to maintain their respective positions and refrain from hostile or aggressive acts. Other provisions included the guarantee of safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need; the immediate release of prisoners of war and noncombatants; and the deployment, subject to the authorization of the Security Council, of United Nations military observers to observe compliance with the cease-fire agreement. Talks between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF opened in Lomé on May 25, 1999, guided by a facilitation committee chaired by the foreign minister of Togo, with the participation of ECOWAS, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the U.N. secretary-general's special representative.

On June 2, 1999, the government and the RUF decided to ask UNOMSIL to establish a committee to effect the immediate release of prisoners of war and noncombatants in accordance with the May 18 cease-fire agreement. The committee, which is to be chaired by the UNOMSIL chief military observer, comprises representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), other United Nations agencies, and nongovernmental organizations.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY RUF REBELS

Systematic Targeting of Civilians

The rebel occupation of Freetown was characterized by the systematic and widespread perpetration of all classes of gross human rights abuses against the civilian population. Civilians were gunned down within their houses, rounded up and massacred on the streets, thrown from the upper floors of buildings, used as human shields, and burned alive in cars and houses. They had their limbs hacked off with machetes, eyes gouged out with knives, hands smashed with hammers, and bodies burned with boiling water. Women and girls were systematically sexually abused, and children and young people abducted by the hundreds.

The rebels made little distinction between civilian and military targets. They repeatedly stated that they believed civilians should be punished for what they perceived to be their support for the existing government. Thus, the rebels waged war against the civilian population through the perpetration of human rights abuses. While there was some targeting of particular groups, such as Nigerians, police officers, journalists, and church workers, the vast majority of atrocities were committed by rebels who chose their victims apparently at random.

The arbitrary nature of these attacks served to create an atmosphere of complete terror. Some victims were attacked for resisting rape or abduction, trying to flee, trying to protect a friend or family member, or refusing to follow instructions to dance or make music on the streets, but most described being chosen for execution or mutilation at random, often without being asked a single question.

It is difficult to ascertain the level of seniority within the RUF at which the perpetration of human rights abuses was ordered, though the widespread participation in abuses suggests that they must have been authorized at a high level within the RUF's command structures. Victims and witnesses frequently overheard commanders on the ground give orders to perpetrate atrocities, and there are very few accounts of individual combatants or commanders trying to halt the abuses. When witnesses reported that individual combatants did object and try to halt the abuses, those objecting were often met with death threats from their fellow rebels.

The atrocities were often planned and premeditated. Victims and witnesses describe well-organized operations to round up civilians who were later executed, attacked with machetes, or raped. On several occasions rebels gave advance warning that atrocities were to be committed later.

Witnesses describe the existence of distinct units known for committing particular crimes, like the "Burn House Unit," "Cut Hands Commando," and "Blood Shed Squad." Some of these squads had a trademark way of killing such as the "Kill Man No Blood" unit, whose method was to beat people to death without shedding blood, or the "Born Naked Squad," who stripped their victims before killing them. The closer ECOMOG forces got to rebel positions, the more these squads were mobilized and sent on operation.

Upon gaining control of a neighborhood or suburb, the rebels went on systematic looting raids, in which families were hit by wave after wave of rebels demanding money and valuables. Those who didn't have what the rebels demanded were often murdered. While rape and abduction were widespread throughout the offensive, the pace of the executions, amputations and burning of property picked up dramatically as the rebels were forced to withdraw. The abuses committed in the last several days of rebel occupation of any given neighborhood were of staggering proportion.

It is difficult to establish how many civilians were killed during the rebel incursion. The Senior Government Pathologist registered the burial of 7,335 corpses of people who were killed as a result of the January 6 rebel incursion. These include 4,245 which were either left in the city morgue or picked up off the street during the offensive and buried in mass graves, and 3,090 which were later exhumed and reburied after having been hastily disposed of during the fighting and rebel occupation.⁹ While the number of combatants from both sides, either killed in battle or after capture or incapacitation by wounds, was thought to be high, human rights activists believe at least half of the dead were civilians. One local human rights group has already documented 2,215 civilian killings.¹⁰

⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Dr. Arthur C. Williams, Freetown, April 20, 1999.

¹⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Moses Sahr Lamine, Network Movement for Justice and Development, May 31, 1999.

Freetown's three main hospitals reported treating 827 wounded, although hospital staff note that for the first several weeks of the offensive, precise records were not kept.¹¹ In all three hospitals, the majority of war related injuries resulted from gunshot wounds, followed by lacerations by machete, knife, or axe. One study done in Freetown's biggest hospital found that some 80 percent of all wounded were the victims of multiple killings or massacres.¹²

The largest concentration of dead and wounded came from the three densely populated eastern suburbs of Kissy, Wellington, and Calaba Town. During the weeks of rebel occupation all three suburbs were cut off from the capital's main medical facilities, which are all located within the ECOMOG controlled west. Unable to cross the front lines, most wounded civilians sought medical attention from local nurses and small clinics. However, loathe to identify themselves for fear of abduction, medical personnel had frequently gone into hiding or fled the area. There was also a dearth of medicine and supplies to treat the wounded, as clinics and pharmacies were frequently targeted for looting by the rebels. It was not uncommon for wounded civilians to go for several days before receiving medical treatment or seeing a doctor.

On June 14, 1999, Human Rights Watch spoke with Omraie Golley, official spokesperson and legal representative for the RUF. He denied that his troops had committed any atrocities against the civilian population during the January offensive. He said that while they have received allegations, "I have yet to find firm evidence that points to individual soldiers or commanders responsible for committing any atrocities against the civilian population. We've heard a lot of stories, we've heard a lot of terrible things. These kinds of allegations are easy to make but difficult to prove. But, if any of our soldiers or commanders have been guilty of such atrocities they will be brought to book." Golley also stated that the RUF has not initiated any formal investigations or disciplinary proceedings against any individual soldier or commander.

When asked about the mutilation and amputation of limbs, he said, "in July 1997 firm instructions were issued about the use of machetes. They were banned as an implement of war and it was made clear to all our soldiers and commanders that any found guilty of these atrocities would be severely dealt with. The RUF has been fighting a war to protect people, not to destroy them. If any civilians were mutilated during the January offensive, they were not mutilated by the RUF. There were many other groups involved in the conflict during the time of occupation and all of them—the Civilian Defense Forces, The Kamajors, ECOMOG, and vigilante groups—should be investigated." About the use of human shields and reports of rape, he said, "we unreservedly deny the use of human shields. This is clearly against our war policy and our commanders are well aware of this. Rape is clearly against the RUF penal code and in the past men found guilty of this have been severely dealt with."

In response to the allegations of atrocities committed in the last eight years of war, Golley said that in March 1999 the RUF asked the government of Sierra Leone to provide them with detailed allegations of such atrocities and set up "an independent commission made up of three RUF military personnel and three civilians to investigate various allegations of atrocities." Golley clarified, however, that, "the fact that we've set up a commission is not an admission of guilt, because as far as we're concerned we are not guilty of having committed atrocities against the people; rather it is in response to these persistent allegations."¹³

Massacres, Individual Murders, and Fire-Related Deaths

Human Rights Watch took testimonies from scores of survivors and witnesses to individual murders, group killings, and massacres. These killings began on the first day of the offensive and continued through the day the rebels abandoned the easternmost suburbs.

James Kajue and his family

In the early morning hours of January 6, as they were attempting to flee their home in the eastern suburb of Wellington, James Kajue and his family were stopped by advancing rebels and marched to a nearby side street. After being asked for money, a rebel opened fire on them, wounding both James and his wife Victoria and killing six of their children and their only grandson. One daughter, Frida, survived. James recounted what happened:

¹¹Freetown's three main hospitals are Connaught Hospital, Brookfields Community Hospital, and Netland Hospital.

¹²Human Rights Watch interview, Martha Carey, Médecins Sans Frontières, May 27, 1999. Study was done in Connaught Hospital on February 14, 1999.

¹³Human Rights Watch phone interview, Omraie Golley, RUF spokesperson, Lomé, Togo, June 14, 1999.

We went to bed on the night of January 5 and left the children watching videos. Around midnight I woke up and heard gunshots coming very close. I didn't hear any shelling from ECOMOG so I figured the rebels were on their way. I called a few friends who live further east and when they didn't answer I said, "Victoria, let's get out of here." So we put all the kids in the station wagon and left.

As we drove down the main highway there were thousands of people on the roads and when we'd gone a few more miles the cars were stopped. At that moment someone lit a flare illuminating the area and when I looked back I saw that mixed in with the civilians were hundreds of rebel soldiers. It was then I realized the rebels were among us.

There was a lot of gunfire so I told everyone to stay in the car and crouch down. I thought it was safer. Scores of rebels passed by without seeing us but then an eight-year-old rebel with an RPG¹⁴ and who was small enough to see through the window noticed us and alerted the others.

One of them ordered us out of the car and said, "you people have been deceived by ECOMOG, why are you fleeing towards them, we're your brothers." Victoria tried to calm him and told him we just wanted to go to someplace safe. He then walked us up a side street a few hundred yards away and told us to sit down. He wanted money so Victoria reached into her bag and gave him some. He said it was too little and as we were about to offer him more I noticed three or four more rebels moving up the road.

As they approached I heard them shouting, "SLA on the move...you thought we'd gone but we've come back." As one of them was approaching, I heard him say "why are you wasting time with these civilians...they've been supporting Tejan Kabbah and ECOMOG. We must teach them a lesson. I think we should just fire [kill] them."

And as soon as he said this, he swung around the AK-47, cocked it and opened fire on my family. It wasn't even one minute from the time he walked up to the time he opened up on us. And then I heard one of them saying, "why did you have to do it" but the one who did it, who by that time was walking around to check if we were all dead, pulled Frida, who was alive, by the hair and said, "see, they're not all dead." And then he got to me and said, "I'll just pick up Pa's watch." I was hit on the hand which was resting on my chest so there was a lot of blood. I pretended to be dead so he just ripped off my watch and walked off with the others.

And then the roll call — I couldn't do it. Victoria had to do it. Patrick, CiCi, Mary all died instantly. Ester was dying. At that moment only Frida replied. She was wounded but not gravely. There was a lot of gunfire so I got up and said, "I'm going for shelter...can anyone who can walk just please, please follow me."

Victoria took my two year-old grandson who was crying and fatally wounded. We later dragged David who'd been hit in the spine and couldn't walk. And I could hear James calling, "I'm stuck against this wall and can't move." By now rebels were passing and we couldn't go to him. Later we thought that he must've been hit in the spine and to him it must've felt like he was pinned against a wall. He only called a few times more and then fell silent.

Little Hassan died a few hours later; he was hit three times. And David, the last time I spoke to him I said, "can you promise me, promise me you'll survive this thing" and he said, "Dad I promise you" but he couldn't. He died later that day.

He [the rebel] came from nowhere. I didn't have time. I would've stood up and offered myself in place of the kids. They didn't ask us any questions. If they were to accuse anyone it should've been me. I would have given myself. I had some money. I would've offered it to them but the one who killed us didn't come for money — he came to destroy our lives. He just opened up on my family without saying anything.¹⁵

Several attacks and massacres were perpetrated against civilians seeking refuge within churches, mosques, and hospitals. These included the January 18 attack on the Kissy Mental Hospital in which some sixteen men were executed and six women

¹⁴A hand held Rocket Propelled Grenade, usually fired while resting on the shoulder.

¹⁵Human Rights Watch interview with James Kajue, Freetown, May 18, 1999. Real names used.

attacked with machetes, the January 19 attack on the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Church in Wellington in which twelve people, including at least three children, were taken out and executed, and the January 22 massacre within the Rogbalan Mosque in Kissy in which sixty-six people were gunned down.

Ibrahim

According to numerous survivors interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the massacre within the Rogbalan Mosque was an organized, premeditated operation involving two groups of rebels and lasting approximately forty-five minutes. Several survivors described how, a few days prior, rebels had given warning that a massacre was going to be committed. Ibrahim, forty-eight, described what he saw as he was hiding and how he later counted the dead:

The mosque was packed full of both Muslims and Christians. The rebels had been coming in and out of the mosque; abducting young girls and harassing us, but things were getting so bad outside we thought it was still safer than in our houses. That day at around 10:00 a.m. I was inside the mosque when I saw at least four rebels burst into the courtyard. One of them had a gun, one had a pistol and two others, including a ten-year-old, had knives and machetes. They were all wearing black pants and black T-shirts.

A sixteen-year-old boy sitting on the steps tried to warn the others that the rebels were coming so when they entered the courtyard, the first thing they did was tell the boy to open his mouth and then the one with the AK put his gun into his mouth and shot him through the head.

Once inside, the one with the pistol started asking everyone for money. In the meantime, two of the other rebels, including the ten year old, moved to block the doors. Then, as the pistol man was walking around pointing his gun and robbing people, a few of the others started arguing over whether to burn us alive in the mosque or shoot us. One of the rebels then walked around the mosque sprinkling petrol on people and I heard one of them say, "you bastard civilians; you don't like us and we don't like you." Finally, one of the others raised his machete and screamed, "Our mission is to kill you and cut your hands." People then started screaming and begging and the one with the rifle just started firing.

The mosque was very crowded. It was very confusing and people were running and trying to escape but the ten-year-old was standing by one of the doors and I saw him stab people as they tried to run past him. Sometimes the executioner would aim directly at one person and other times he'd just fire randomly. Then he walked back to the women's section and opened up on the people gathered there. Then he positioned himself in the passage leading out of the mosque and started picking people off as they tried to escape. It was here he killed a lot of people. His was the only way out, so as people made a run for it, he would shoot them.

Some fifteen or so minutes into the thing, another group of rebels arrived to reinforce. They surrounded the place and several of them came around and hit the little Islamic school we have in the back. I think many of the children who died in the massacre were back there. Then at some point a whistle blew and the rebels rushed around searching for things to steal from the dead. And then left.

Somehow a lot of people including myself managed to escape. I was hiding under a mattress in the courtyard and all I could think about was my daughter who was inside when the firing started. I prayed she was able to escape. After I was sure the rebels had gone, I crept out and started looking for her. That's how I came to know how many were killed. I went through the mosque, the women's section, the school, the courtyard, and the street looking for my daughter. I thank god I didn't find her among the dead. But I counted sixty-six bodies including seven little children.¹⁶

Adama

During the fighting and rebel occupation, civilians tended to concentrate in the larger or more fortified houses of their neighbors, friends, and family. Such concentrations of people often fell victim to brutal rebel attacks in which large numbers of civilians would be killed. Sometimes the men would be targeted and other times no one would be spared. The houses were frequently set on fire with the wounded civilians still inside.

¹⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 1, 1999.

Adama, sixteen, was hiding in a closet with her two small cousins on January 21, while rebels walked room to room killing seventeen men, women, and children including several relatives. The house was later set on fire with one blind man and at least three of the wounded still inside. She recounted:

At around 7:30 a.m. when we were just sitting down to breakfast, two rebels came into the compound and told everyone to get inside the house. They started screaming obscenities and then one of them said, "we're going to kill all of you" so we all ran upstairs.

I hid with my two little cousins but I could see everything. As they were coming up the stairs I heard them shoot two men who'd sought refuge in our house. Then they came into our apartment and my sister's husband Mani started to plead saying, "please, I beg you, if it's money you want I'll give it to you" but they said, "we don't want money, we said we've come to kill you." Then they shot him in the chest. Then they turned on Mani's brother Tejan who was holding his nine-month-old baby. They shot him and he fell with the baby in his arms. Then they fired a friend of Tejan's. They said nothing, nothing, asked them nothing. The same rebel dressed in blue jeans and a white T-shirt and with dreadlocks was doing all the killing.

When they'd finished in the parlor they went to the bedroom which I could still see from where I was. My sister Fatmata was on the bed with my three year old cousin Sia. They shot my sister two times, and then shot little Sia. Then I heard my twelve-year-old cousin Sahr scream, "mama, have you left me," and then they shot him. Then they shot a ten-year-old neighbor boy on the foot, then our friend Mr. Koroma and a fifteen-year-old neighbor named Aminata.

Then they went to the next room. I couldn't see what happened but I heard three gunshots and later saw the bodies of three of our neighbors. There was a blind man who lived in that apartment with his seven-year-old boy. The blind man was the only one they didn't shoot and as they left the room I heard them say, "now, you be sure and take care good care of all these people."

When they were in the third room, my little eight-year-old cousin crept out from behind the wardrobe and went to her father. She was crying and she stood in front of him and bowed down. He was dead and her uncle Tejan who was still alive said, "he's left us now...quick, you go hide." But, then she went to her mom and did the same thing. I think she was saying good-bye to them. Then I called her back to me.

By this time we could smell smoke coming from downstairs. I guess the other rebels had set fire to the downstairs. The one who did the killing then sprayed petrol throughout our apartment and lit it on fire. Then I heard them go outside.

By now there was a lot of smoke so I grabbed my cousins, went down the stairs and tried to leave but the rebels saw us. They told me to give them my cousins but I refused so two of them pointed their guns at me and said, "so it's there you're going to die — get back into that house and burn." They then closed the door from outside and leaned on it so I couldn't escape.

I waited for several more minutes until I just couldn't stand it anymore and then tried the door again and this time managed to escape. By now the fire was really blazing. We could hear the screams of people upstairs and from the outside we could see the seven-year-old son of the blind man from the window, but his father was crying and he didn't want to leave him. We convinced him to jump by saying we'd rescue his father in a few minutes. We knew it wouldn't be possible but otherwise the boy wouldn't have come. The blind man and the others were burned alive. They kept crying but there was just nothing we could do.

The second rebel told the bad one at least twice to stop the killing but the bad one said he'd kill him as well if he said anything else. I just don't know why he behaved that way. In a quiet moment I feel it too much.¹⁷

Abdul

¹⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 15, 1999.

Abdul, twenty-eight, and his brother had sought refuge from the fighting in a large house in the business district of Freetown. He described how the rebels targeted only the men, leaving nine dead.

We'd been up fleeing all night and were so tired so we sought refuge with about fifty people within a fenced compound which we thought would be safe. At around 7:00 a.m. a group of seven rebels dressed in full military uniform stormed in. One of them said, "we're SLA soldiers. We've been gone for nine months but today we've come back."

Then they started pointing their guns at us and screaming for us to give them money. A few minutes later the one who seemed like he was their commander said, "let's don't waste time, spray them all," at which point another rebel started shooting us one by one. The gunman was only two yards away from us. They shot my seventeen-year-old brother Isa and two of my friends. We begged them to spare us, we begged them to stop.

He shot us deliberately, one after the other and only picking out the men. They said we didn't support them and after shooting us said, "now you see we're back if you people want us or not." I was so afraid to even look at them. It happened so fast; they were only there for five minutes.

Our brothers have done such a bad thing to us. What did we ever do to them? We know nothing of their rebel ways. That day I just looked around me and started to cry.¹⁸

Agnes

Victims and witnesses describe the rebels purposefully attempting to terrorize the civilian population by forcing them to watch atrocities being committed. They would then admonish them to "behave" or meet a similar fate. Civilians acting out of line by trying to escape or protect a family member were often killed in front of their family.

Agnes, twenty-five, together with her family and neighbors, was lined up and forced to watch the brutal execution of three neighbors on January 9. She recounted:

They [the rebels] ordered us out of our houses and then assigned a small rebel unit of six or eight to guard over each group of twenty or so civilians. It was very organized. They lined my family up with about twenty of my neighbors in a single file line on the street. They kept us standing for over one hour while they insulted us and others ransacked our houses. They got drunk on the alcohol we had left over from the Christmas holidays.

Then, a few rebels called the first three civilians standing in the line; from the left. They were two men and one woman. They moved them about fifteen feet away and just opened up on them. They must have fired at least twenty shots into them. One of the rebels then turned to us and said, "you've seen the example — now if any of you dare move we'll do the same to you." And then we had to stand perfectly still for another one and one-half hours while our neighbors were lying dead on the street.¹⁹

Memunatu

Before commencing an attack on a compound, the rebels would frequently assemble everyone together and then select the ones they wanted to abduct. Most often those chosen for abduction were young girls, and boys of fighting age. Abductees were led away either before the attack began or after having to witness family members be killed.

Memunatu, twenty-one, was one of eight young women abducted from their compound on January 23, immediately after the execution of seven family members. She recounted:

I looked up and saw four rebels coming into the compound. Only one had a gun and the others were armed with axes and machetes. We were over forty in the compound and those that weren't able to escape were gathered together and told to sit down right outside the verandah. A few of us started singing, "we want peace" but one of the rebels said, "you shut your mouths. You're all hypocrites."

¹⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 10, 1999.

¹⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 19, 1999.

They [the rebels] then picked out eight of us young girls and one seventeen-year-old neighbor boy. They ordered us to get up and stand to one side. And then the one they called "CO Blood" started the killing. He used a single barrel shotgun. He shot Alusine first, and then Hannah and Saphiatu who was nine months pregnant. Then they ran out of ammunition and set upon the rest with machetes and axes. They hit them on the neck and head. As we stood off in the corner we were begging them to stop but they kept insisting they'd leave no one alive.

And then they forced us to go. We left our families bleeding and never knew who lived and who died. I was with them [the rebels] for eight days and when I finally escaped I found out that eight of my family and friends had been killed. In fact it was seven but because Saphiatu's baby was ready to be born, we count it as eight.²⁰

Hasanatu

Hasanatu, eighteen, and several female members of her family were attacked by the rebels as they were attempting to flee the eastern suburb of Wellington on January 23. She described how six family members were abducted before the remainder were lined up and shot. She said:

The night before they'd burned our house so we decided the men should hide in the swamp and the women and children should try to hide in an abandoned house. So we left the men and the twelve of us took off down the road, but just as we were leaving our compound we were confronted by two rebels who asked us where we were going.

We told him we were looking for a safer place. They ordered us to sit down and after looking us over picked out five young women and one ten-year-old boy. They were all my cousins. Then they pushed them and ordered them to go to the bush.

The rest of us begged for our lives and then two of them started arguing over whether to kill us or not. I guess they decided because a few minutes later they ordered an old woman, a neighbor of ours, to stand up and as she did, they shot her. Then they told the rest of us to stand up and proceeded to shoot every one of us including my cousins Ramatu [four] and Jenneh [ten].

When they shot me in the shoulder I pretended I was dead. From the blood it looked like they'd got me in the heart. A few minutes later I heard the other rebels returning with all my cousins who'd been abducted who burst into tears when they saw all of us lying there. Then they [the rebels] said sarcastically "are you related to any of these because if you are we've just finished them off."²¹

Burning Alive

There were frequent accounts of the particularly sadistic practice of burning people alive. Children and the elderly seemed to be particularly vulnerable. There were a few documented cases of children being thrown into burning fires and many accounts of elderly people being left behind in a burning house as their children and grandchildren were forced to flee in haste. The pleas by other family members to retrieve their children or elderly parents were most often met with threats of death.

One witness described an incident in which a thirteen-year-old boy who was "accused" of having washed the clothes and shined the boots of ECOMOG soldiers at a checkpoint was later recognized by one of the rebels and thrown into a burning fire in the business district. Another incident involved a businessman who was forced at gunpoint into his Mercedes Benz and burned alive.

Maria

Maria, a fifty-three year old retired nurse, suffered third degree burns and a fractured femur after jumping from the second story of the house in which her daughter and mother were burned alive. She recounted:

²⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

²¹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

In the early evening a group of about twenty rebels came near the house. As usual I sent my seventeen-year-old son to hide out back, and my five-year-old adopted daughter Titi upstairs to be with my elderly mother while I dealt with them. They [the rebels] asked for water so I got several gallons and gave them all as much as they wanted.

I remember climbing the stairs and thanking God that this large group had left without doing anything to us. But just a few minutes later, another group came. The commander introduced himself as "Captain Blood" and started demanding that I hand over my daughters. I explained that I only have three sons but he accused me of lying.

As I tried to convince him, he grabbed my kerosene lamp and proceeded to douse the sofa and set it alight. I begged him not to burn my house but he continued and pushed me towards the stairs, continuing to sprinkle kerosene as we went. The other two rebels guarded the entrances so no one could escape.

Then he pushed me into my mother's room where she was lying in bed with Titi curled up, crying beside her. No sooner had he entered the room than he began pouring kerosene over the bed and said to my mother, "mommy, it's enough for you, now it's time for you to die." He then tossed a match on the bed which went up in flames and pushed me out the door and into the next room. I heard them screaming but I couldn't do anything.

He then doused the bed in that room, threw in a match and quickly left the room. As I tried to follow him he pushed me violently and I crashed onto the burning bed and cut my head on the bedboard. I got up with my leg burning and tried to leave but "Captain Blood" was leaning against the door and shouting, "it's time for you to die, you're going to die there."

I fell down on the floor with flames beginning to engulf the room and felt my chest tightening. I was bleeding from my head, my chest was filling up with smoke, my leg burning and I thought, "Titi is dead, my mother is dead. God, do you want me to die here? Is it here I'm going to meet my maker?" And, I just said no. I said no. I got up; burning my hand as I opened that door I rushed to the balcony where I saw a neighbor watching. I jumped from the second story of my house and felt my leg crack as I landed. I was dragged into the bushes where I waited with my other neighbors for the rebels to pass.²²

Ibrahim

Ibrahim, fifty-five, described how two of his nieces were burned alive as their father begged to remove them before the rebels set their house on fire:

At around midnight, I was woken up by the sound of screaming and shouting near my cousins house. I saw four rebels standing outside his house. They screamed for him to open the door and then fired one shot after which everyone scattered, running out the back door into the bush. The rebels then started pouring kerosene on the house but in the meantime my cousin ran back and started screaming frantically, "my two children are still inside; my four-and six-year-olds are sleeping. I want to take my children!" to which the rebel replied, "If you dare enter I will kill you." By this time the house had taken fire. My cousin insisted again but the rebel became more aggressive, like he was going to shoot him so he had to run away.

When he ran into the bush the first time his arms were full with his other children. He didn't mean to leave them. None of us ever thought the rebels would do something like that.²³

The Use of Games to Maximize Terror

Atrocities were sometimes perpetrated within the context of games, in which the element of terror was maximized through the use of deception or teasing. Victims were sometimes given a choice as to how they wanted to be killed—"gunshot, machete, or burned alive,"—or were forced to listen to the rebels arguing over what atrocity to commit against them. Utilizing an old tactic

²²Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 16, 1999.

²³Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 15, 1999.

they'd employed in past offensives, the rebels dressed up in ECOMOG uniforms, trying to illicit a favorable reaction, and would then "catch" the civilians who would later be "punished."

After setting a house on fire, the rebels were witnessed positioning themselves near the entrances and then shooting at civilians as they tried to escape. Similarly, after killing civilians, the rebels were witnessed laying ambushes around the corpses, waiting for their relatives to retrieve them. There were numerous accounts of rebels who promised not to kill, rape or abduct an individual if the family would raise a given sum of money, but, upon receipt of the money, would commit the atrocity anyway.

Agnes

Agnes, twenty, witnessed the killing of at least twenty people on January 15 after rebels dressed as ECOMOG soldiers and, imitating a Nigerian accent, trapped a group of civilians who had come out on the street to celebrate what they thought was the arrival of ECOMOG forces. She recounted:

I was sitting in my house when I saw a group of about ten ECOMOG, or what I thought were ECOMOG, soldiers coming down the street. They were accompanied by a few women who were singing and dancing and saying, "ECOMOG has liberated us! It's over! Come out of your houses!" And then speaking with an accent like an Oga man [Nigerian] the soldiers said, "where are the RUF rebels, where are the SLA soldiers? We've come to liberate you from those people."

As they moved down the street they collected more and more civilians who said, "tanke, tanke [thank you], we're so tired of these people. We're happy you've come. You don't know how we've suffered," and so on. The women accompanying the rebels clapped their hands and got the rest of them dancing and when they'd [the rebels] collected about thirty or so people, just started to laugh. And, a few moments later said, "oh, we see, so it's ECOMOG you want. We've really caught you now."

The civilians started begging for forgiveness but the rebels, who had them surrounded by now, ordered them to lie on the ground and shot them one by one in the head and chest. There were men, women, and even a few children killed. I saw the rebels change the clips on their pistols until all of them were dead. I was watching this all from my window. Even if it had been ECOMOG, I wasn't in the mood to celebrate anything.²⁴

Francis

Francis, thirty-six, was inside the unfinished Bashariah Mosque with scores of other civilians when a small boy waved a white flag at a patrol of what he thought were ECOMOG soldiers. The mosque was soon after attacked by rebel gunfire and rocket propelled grenades. He explained:

A friend of ours who'd escaped from the rebels told us that they had ECOMOG uniforms. So that day in the mosque when we saw a patrol of soldiers in ECOMOG uniforms we didn't welcome them; we kept silent. But there was a boy who hadn't been warned and before we could stop him he was waving a white cloth out the window.

They [the rebels] started shooting immediately and just a few minutes later we heard the first crash of what I think was an RPG [rocket propelled grenade]. The first one killed a boy named Mohamed. Then a minute later as we were trying to get down the stairs, the second one hit right near us, this time killing two children. Another boy died later.²⁵

Kaima

As Kaima, forty, was lying on the grounds of the Kissy Mental Hospital after having been hacked on the legs by the rebels, she watched as they shot at civilians trying to retrieve their dead and dying who'd been gunned down some hours earlier. She explained:

²⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 28, 1999.

²⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 19, 1999.

We saw hundreds of them [the rebels] coming down from the hill behind Mental [the mental hospital]. We tried to run but they caught about twenty-five of us. They separated the men from the women and then right there on the grounds, lined up the men and shot them. I was attacked by machetes later on and as I lay there wounded throughout the night I counted them; there were sixteen and they shot them all. I don't know if all of them died.

Then over the next several hours, their wives and families who had run into the bushes came back and tried to see about their people. I guess they wanted to take their bodies and maybe even save the few that might have still been alive. But when the rebels saw the women, they took up position and shot at them as they crept out to get their people. It was hard to see if any of them [the relatives] were wounded but after the first few times none of them came back to fetch their men.²⁶

Alusine

Alusine, thirty-nine, a civil servant, described the hours of terror he spent with his family as they were rounded up with other civilians, divided up to be held in rooms which they were told would each have different hours for execution. He explained:

At around 7:30 p.m., a group of seven of them [rebels] rounded us up from our houses and walked us down to a big house on Kissy Bypass Road. We were about 200 and when we arrived, the commander divided us into groups of about sixty and then explained how he planned to kill us all. He said the first group was the 9:00 room, the second group, that was ours, the 10:00 room and the last group the 11:00 room. At 9:00 p.m. sharp he was going to kill all of those in the first room, 10:00 p.m. he was going to kill us and so on. Then they led us into the rooms.

So sure enough at just 9:00 p.m. we heard them open the door of the room right next to us, the 9:00 p.m. room, and started shooting. I couldn't see but I heard people running and screaming "don't! It's the end of my life! They've killed my wife! They've taken my girl!" and like that. The shooting went on for about ten minutes.

Within our room we started crying. Muslims and Christians; we were all praying together and I started thinking of my children, my mother, how I hadn't yet helped my parents, how I hadn't really enjoyed my education.

At 10:00 p.m. sharp they came to our door but we'd locked it from the inside. They threatened to burn us alive so we decided to open the door thinking that at least some of us might be able to escape. When they opened the door the heat that hit them was so intense they said, "what kind of hell is that" and then ordered us out on the street for execution.

As we were taken outside, another commander happened to pass by and when he saw what was happening ordered there to be no more killing. The commander apologized, saying they were RUF rag-tag boys. The next morning we buried four bodies from the "9:00 o'clock room" and we heard many, many were taken away wounded.²⁷

Alpha

Alpha, thirty-five, described how from his hiding place he saw a group of rebels gather up twenty-four civilians, put them in a room, set it ablaze and then position themselves so as to be able to shoot them as they ran out:

As the killing was happening upstairs, the rebels gathered twenty-four of our neighbors who'd sought refuge in our house and put them under gunpoint in the back room. When the one called "Dave" came downstairs after having killed everyone, he asked for a lantern and said, "I'm not going to waste my bullets on these people — let me set this place alright." In fact, they'd already set the upstairs and part of the downstairs on fire.

Then he sprayed kerosene on the civilians, closed the door and as he was leaning on it told them that those who paid 1,000 leones [U.S.50 cents] each to the rebel waiting at the window, would be set free. The civilians then started handing out the 1,000 leones to a few rebels waiting there. One girl came to the window and begged, saying she didn't have any money and the rebel collecting the money shot her in the face.

²⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 20, 1999.

²⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 13, 1999.

Then, as the fire was really blazing, the rebels, announced they were leaving but instead positioned themselves around the back door with their guns pointed at the only exit and waited. However, the fire was too intense and those trapped inside were no longer able to move through the hall to get to the back door. By that time the people were really screaming and choking for air at the window. After about ten minutes the rebels finally left, thinking the people would burn to death, and my friend and I rushed to find an axe and break through the bars of the window and let everyone out.²⁸

Targeting of Particular Groups

Nigerians, policemen, and journalists were those most directly targeted by the rebels during the January offensive. Foreign missionaries, members of the government and civil servants, human rights activists, successful business people, Lebanese and Indian nationals, and those vocal in their opposition to the AFRC junta during its nine month rule were also targeted, but to a lesser extent. A few witnesses saw rebels with lists of such people. Others were targeted by individual combatants settling old personal and political vendettas.

While there were many prominent members of society killed by the rebels, it is difficult to say to what extent they were targeted because of their position or simply because they were caught up in the wave of violence. There does not appear to be any ethnic element involved in the choice of victims.

Nigerians

Nigerian nationals, most of whom are traders and business people in Sierra Leone, and some of whom are long time Sierra Leone residents, suffered considerably during the January offensive. The Nigerian High Commission registered the deaths of sixty-three Nigerian nationals and evacuated two victims of arm amputation. Nearly all of the victims were men. Their houses and business were burned and the Nigerian High Commission was looted and set on fire.²⁹

Nigeria has shown significant support for the government of Sierra Leone both militarily and politically. Nigerian troops make up the bulk of the 14,000 strong ECOMOG force, and Nigerian general Maxwell Khobe was last year seconded to the Sierra Leone army as chief of defense staff.

Nigerians were hunted down in their hiding places and murdered in particularly brutal and sadistic ways. Their attackers frequently accused them of actively spying for and supporting ECOMOG, and of supporting President Tejan Kabbah's government. Sierra Leonean civilians who were married to, associated with, or happened to be in the same place as a Nigerian national who came under attack, were also frequently targeted.

Abdul

Abdul, forty-six, witnessed the double amputation of limbs of two Nigerian businessmen and one Cameroonian, on January 21 in Kissy. One of the Nigerians and the Cameroonian were later killed. He recounted:

A big group of rebels rounded up about fifty of us and brought us to Leadenhall Street where they separated us and made us form two lines; men on one side, women and children on the other. Then they went around inspecting each one of us. Among us were two Nigerians; Mr. Ben and Mr. Ben's brother, and one man from Cameroon.

One of the rebels quickly noticed Mr. Ben's wedding ring; he was married to a woman named Zainab who was standing in the women's line. The rebel told Mr. Ben he had a really nice ring and asked him his name but Mr. Ben didn't answer him. I think he was afraid to talk for fear they'd find out he was a Nigerian. The commander asked the rest of us if he was a deaf-mute but none of us said anything.

He then started threatening us and said, "We know there're Nigerians among you.... Tell us who they are or you all die. We don't want them in our country and we will kill them all." Some of them [the rebels] sprinkled petrol on us and threatened to set us on fire.

²⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 1, 1999.

²⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Alhaji M.C. Abubakar, Nigerian High Commissioner, Freetown, April 4, 1999.

Finally Ben told the commander that he was married to a Sierra Leonean and his wife Zainab stood up and said, "He is my husband but he is a businessman. I can show you the papers to prove it." The rebel responded that he didn't want to see any papers and as they pulled Mr. Ben out of the line, several of the rebels started arguing over whether to kill him, amputate his hands or set him on fire.

When they'd decided to cut off his hands Mr. Ben started pleading saying he was a businessman, and shouted, "I beg you don't cut my hand, Oh Jesus, Jesus." Then the axe man said, "If Jesus himself comes here I'll amputate his hand as well." Then they ordered him at gunpoint to put his right hand face up on a table and they hacked it off with an axe. And then his left hand. The rebel then put his hands in Ben's blood and walked over to his wife, who was sobbing, and smeared it on her face. He told her if she continued crying he'd kill her.

As this was happening Ben's brother started yelling, "God what have you done to my brother." So they pulled him out and cut off his two hands as well. Then they pulled out the third one who started screaming that he wasn't a Nigerian, but was from Cameroon, but they cut off his hands as well. Then they sprinkled more petrol on Ben's brother, I think he even had tribal markings, and set him on fire. His hands were hanging off his arms and he was on fire screaming "please don't kill me." They let him burn for five minutes before a commander let some us put the fire out with dust.

Several of the rebels were dancing around the three of them saying, "now you go tell ECOMOG about your problem." A few days later in the hospital I saw Zainab and Ben's brother. That's how I found out Mr. Ben had been killed.³⁰

Hawa

Hawa, forty-three, a nurse in Good Shepherd Hospital in Wellington, described how on January 18 a Nigerian businessman who had several days earlier been admitted with a gunshot wound was dragged out of his hospital bed and killed by a group of rebels.

On January 8, a thirty-five-year-old Nigerian businessman named Joseph was brought to me by passers-by who'd found him in Wellington. He'd been shot three times by the rebels. I admitted him and put him upstairs because I thought it would be safer.

On January 18 I heard a large commotion and then a group of fifteen rebels stormed my hospital, put a gun to my head and demanded I show them "the ECOMOG lieutenant colonel you have hidden here." I told them I had no such person but in the meantime another ten of them, who'd run upstairs, found Joseph and proceeded to drag him down the stairs and out the door. As they passed me I heard him saying, "Jesus have mercy upon your servant, Jesus have mercy upon your servant."

When they had him outside another ten rebels dragged him half a block up, surrounded him, beat him and proceeded to cut off both his arms, both his legs, his ears, cut his throat and then shoot him several times. They never asked Joseph to identify himself. It was so brutal the way they killed him. They danced around his body and those who weren't doing the killing were cheering. They continued to threaten me for having "harbored a Nigerian" and a day later I had to close my hospital and flee.³¹

Gbassay

Gbassay, fourteen, described the January 19 killing of twelve people, including two Nigerians, who had sought refuge within the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Church in Wellington. Among the dead were a well-known journalist Paul Mansaray, his wife, and their three children.

My auntie, uncle, and I went to the church that night as we'd been doing every night since the trouble began. We thought it was safer than sleeping at home. Shortly after arriving, five rebels with a lot of guns entered and said, "we

³⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 8, 1999.

³¹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

know you people are hiding ECOMOG soldiers in here." I could see a few other people outside the door and we later thought they were probably collaborators who'd told the rebels about the two Nigerians.

They started harassing us and asking for money so one of us said, "we just pray for you people, that you succeed in your mission." Many of the others were just pleading to be left alone. The rebels noticed that the Nigerians weren't talking and so eventually discovered their nationality.

They then ordered us all outside the church but in the confusion and panic twelve of us got away. From where I was I could see them being walked at gunpoint with all the rebels pointing their guns at them and shouting, "captured live, captured live."

Around this time a second group of rebels arrived and asked the others who the civilians were to which they answered, "These people are harboring Nigerians." The two groups started arguing over whether to just kill the Nigerians or to kill everyone. Then a few rebels ordered all twelve of them to lie face down on the ground and they started firing. The journalist tried to run with two of his children but they gunned them all down a few feet away.³³

Police Officers

According to officials at the Sierra Leone Police Headquarters, eighty-five police officers, including two women, were killed during the January 6 rebel incursion.³³ Many officers were killed while on duty and within the police stations, which came under heavy attack by the rebels. Sierra Leonean police, except the Special Security Division (SSD) are traditionally unarmed, and since the February 1998 ECOMOG intervention to oust the AFRC Junta, even the SSD have not been allowed to carry weapons.³⁴

Police officers interviewed believed they were targeted because they were seen by the ex-Sierra Leonean army members of the RUF as being traitors for not having fled with them when driven out of Freetown by ECOMOG forces in February 1998 and for their role in investigating and preparing the cases against the twenty-four AFRC junta members accused of treason and later executed in October 1998.

Police officers described being hunted by rebel forces and having their family members harassed and sometimes killed. Because of the past relationship under the AFRC junta, they were well known and recognized by the ex-SLA members of the rebel army.

Abu

Abu, fifty, described how he was wounded in an attempt to execute him, specifically because he was a police officer:

On Wednesday morning I found out that Mr. D. of the SSD had been killed by the rebels as they advanced through Calaba Town. His wife described how the rebels knocked on his door as they passed and started screaming "he's an SSD man" and then stabbed him to death with knives. I started getting really worried.

We fled to another house but in the meantime a commander calling himself Major S. took over my house, found out where I'd fled to and sent four other rebels to bring me to him. When I arrived the major told me he'd found police ID papers and announced that he'd made a vow to himself to kill any policeman or woman he encounters because, "the police betrayed us and joined ECOMOG." He said, "I don't mercy police officers." Then he ordered the other rebel boys to tie and beat me. Several of them gave me a severe beating in the face and abdomen and tied me with a wire. Major S. just sat there watching the whole thing and I noticed he was wearing a watch that had been given to me as a gift and that I only saved for special occasions.

³³Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 6, 1999.

³⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Julius J. Momoh, Staff Officer of Sierra Leone Police, Freetown, May 18, 1999.

³⁵SSD officers were ordered to surrender their weapons by ECOMOG during the February 1998 intervention which ousted the AFRC/RUF from the capital and subsequently reinstated democratically elected President Tejan Kabbah. Since then, SSD officers were only allowed to carry weapons when called to go to the war front on military operations.

Then he put me in the corner of my house. He threw me on the ground so I was sitting, tied on the ground about a yard from Major S. and he said, "you think we should remain in the bush don't you, but the bush is made for animals." It was between 5:45 and 5:50 p.m.

I started to beg and told him "but life is so very precious. Please, please don't kill me. I've been in the force for over thirty-four years and I'm not meant to die like this. When peace comes wouldn't you too want a government job?"

Then Major S. pointed a pistol at me and said, "I've killed 213 people and you're going to make number 214." And then he shot me in the face. I fell down and put my tied hands in front of my face but he shot me again.

I didn't know if I was in the world again until God woke me up late that night and I saw myself in a gutter. I had blood all over me and I felt my face to be huge. I dragged myself for some meters and hid until I was out of the road because there were still rebels around. When I felt it was safe I got myself to an ECOMOG checkpoint. As they were taking me to the hospital I saw so many corpses along that road. There must have been two hundred.³⁵

Journalists

According to local journalists, seven Sierra Leonean and one United States citizen reporter were killed by rebel forces during the January 6 rebel offensive. There were also three journalists abducted, one of whom has since been released. One journalist had one of his eyes gouged out with a knife and many journalists suffered significant personal property damage and loss. The building housing two newspapers, the *Concord Times* and the *Standard Times*, was looted and later burned. Many journalists who went into hiding were later told that groups of rebels had come to their residences asking for them and demanding their capture.

While the atrocities committed against a few journalists resulted from arbitrary acts of violence, there is clear evidence to suggest that journalists were indeed sought after and targeted. Members of the independent press in Sierra Leonean have traditionally been vocal opponents of past military regimes, and have often worked in a climate of repression. The nine month rule of the AFRC/RUF Junta was no exception. Many pro-democracy newspapers continued to publish and were highly critical of the Junta, thus becoming deeply unpopular with them.

When the RUF returned to Freetown in January, they had the names of and sought after many of the individual journalists and publishers who had in the past written unfavorably of them. The relatives of Phillip Neville, the managing editor of the pro-democracy *Standard Times* described how rebels came to his home in Kissy with a list of opponents, which included the names of Phillip and several other journalists. According to the relatives, the rebels showed them the list and said, "we've come to teach him a lesson. He's been writing negative things about us. We remember."³⁶

Mustapha Sesay

Mustapha Sesay, twenty-nine, was captured as he was fleeing the fighting in the Eastern suburb of Calaba town. After a brief "trial" he was "accused" of being a journalist and sentenced to death. He was able to escape but in the process had his right eye gouged out. He recounted:

On January 21 I saw a huge group of what looked like 5,000 civilians moving down the hills. We thought they were fleeing the rebels so my cousin and I, who had heard they [the rebels] had started chopping hands, thought we'd better flee with them.

As we were running, I was all of a sudden fished out from this group. I felt someone seize me from behind and when I looked around I saw there were two men in rag-tag dress. I never thought they were rebels and one of them said they were taking me to ECOMOG. I asked them what I'd done and then started roughing me up and stole my watch and wallet. Then they said, "We know you're a journalist working for one of those pro-democracy newspapers. You're

³⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 23, 1999.

³⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

the people passing information to ECOMOG about our movements." It was then I realized I'd been captured by the rebels.

Then they grabbed me and walked me several blocks to their hide-out where I saw two other rebels. They were all armed with knives and machetes. I didn't see any guns.

One of the rebels, who I assumed to be the commander, then stood up and the two who'd brought me gave him my ID card. He studied it for a minute while I stood before him and then announced, "Mustapha Sesay. Journalist. Death Sentence." Then he reached into his shirt and pulled out a machete. A few moments later as the two who'd brought me held me tightly by my shorts, and their leader was in front, I felt something hit my eye and I realized I'd been hit. They had daggers and I thought maybe that was what hit my eye.

They hit me four or five times on the head with a machete. I started fading. I was bleeding seriously and was very weak. I struggled with them for five minutes and finally fell on the ground and surrendered myself to death. But when I reached the ground I decided I had to escape. I struggled with them as they continued to strike me but eventually struggled my way out of their grip and ran for thirty meters. As I ran I could hear the commander saying, "you've allowed the bastard to escape — we'll shoot you if you don't stop running," but I didn't care. I preferred them killing me with a bullet to being hacked to death.³⁷

Clergy Members

On January 12, Catholic Archbishop Joseph Henry Ganda, four Xavierian Fathers and six Sisters of Charity were abducted from their parish homes by RUF rebels. All but the Catholic archbishop were foreign nationals. For over ten days they were kept under the control of the RUF military police and moved from place to place. They were interrogated and a few of them, including Archbishop Ganda, suffered some form of physical abuse. As the rebels fled Kissy on January 20, Archbishop Ganda and three of the Xavierian fathers were able to escape. On January 22 while in the process of withdrawing from Freetown and fleeing into the surrounding hills, four Sisters of Charity were executed and one Italian father was shot. Since 1991, many members of the Catholic clergy, almost always foreign nationals, have been abducted or come under attack by RUF rebels.

While abducted, the church men and women, and thirteen Indian nationals working for the Shankerdas and Sons plastics factory who were abducted at around the same time, were being guarded by the RUF military police. Witnesses to the execution of the nuns and shooting of the priest described elements of the RUF arguing over whether the killing should take place. They felt the rebels' intention was to take them into the bush as hostages, and that the order to protect them had been overridden by a renegade soldier or unit.

Beatrice

Beatrice, twenty, was abducted with her sister on January 21 and forced by the rebels to retreat to the hills with thousands of other abductees. On January 22 she witnessed the gunning down of seven foreigners, three Sisters of Charity, one Xavierian Priest, and three Indian factory workers. She described the killing, which took place in Allen Town:

There were thousands of us from Kissy, Wellington, and Calaba Town who'd been taken away with them [the rebels]. Among us were seven foreigners; mostly Indians but also an African Sister of Charity they said was from Kenya and a white Priest. You could tell who were the sisters because they wore that white robe with blue trim. It was in the morning and they had us all seated on a street in Allen Town. There were hundreds of rebels all around the area.

Many of the children were crying for their parents and the young women were crying and a few of them told us to "shut up" and that they were taking us into the bush. The rebels were drinking, laughing, and playing music. The foreigners were off to one side and we were seated about ten feet away.

³⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

There was this rebel, and he had it out for the nuns. He said his name was Colonel Foday Bah and for the last day we'd heard him threatening to kill the nuns. Another rebel named Tina Musa, she was SAJ Musa's wife,³⁸ kept insisting that they be left alone and they argued about it. So that morning she had to go on a mission and no sooner had she climbed the hill behind Allen town, than Foday Bay started in again on the nuns.

At around 10:00 a.m. he got out his pistol and started threatening, but seriously now. The nuns started crying and praying and we did as well, so he announced, "I am Colonel Foday Bah. I'm an SLA man. We came for peace but you people don't want it. You're the ones selling out our country." In the process he was hitting the nuns and others with a stick. Another rebel told him to leave them, but Foday threatened to kill him as well.

When it became clear he was serious, the nuns started praying. And then he walked over to the black nun, and shot her with his pistol in the head. Then he shot a white man. And, then even as the others were begging and begging he shot a yellow [Asian] nun and then another yellow [Asian] one, and then the others. When he was finished he went over, removed their slippers and gave them to a few of the abductees.

When Tina came back down the hill and saw the nuns had been killed she was furious and upset. She even cried for them.³⁹

The Use of Civilians as Human Shields

According to interviews with witnesses, victims, and military personnel, the RUF's incursion plan into Freetown was built around the use of a massive human shield. In the early morning hours of January 6, thousands of rebels massed near the suburb of Calaba Town some eight miles east of Freetown and began to march westward, firing rapidly into the air. This served to frighten the civilian population of the densely populated east, provoking a mass exodus of people who fled in panic towards central Freetown. The rebels, many of whom were in civilian dress, then mixed in with the crowd. Other civilians were forced at gunpoint to join in with the crowd, which was by then massive. The majority of the rebel fighters, however, remained safely behind.

Civilians described being totally confused as to what was happening and surprised to find the rebels mixed in among them. As the mass of humanity approached the first ECOMOG position, and the civilian-dressed rebels pulled out their guns, witnesses described the horror they felt as they realized they were being used as a human shield.

This surprise proved both frustrating for the ECOMOG soldiers manning their positions and deadly for the civilians being used as a human shield. ECOMOG commanders and soldiers interviewed expressed their frustration at not being able to "effectively engage the enemy" and respond militarily because of the heavy civilian presence. According to witnesses, many people within the human shield, particularly those near the front, died in the crossfire once rebel soldiers, who'd mixed in with the human shield, and ECOMOG soldiers manning their positions began an exchange of fire. The tactic however, proved largely effective for the rebels. As the ECOMOG soldiers were forced to withdraw, both because they were overpowered and because they could not respond effectively, thousands of RUF rebels marched into Freetown and took up positions in and around the city center.

The use of civilians to advance towards military targets was not limited to the rebel entry into Freetown. It was also used in defense against ECOMOG air power. As the rebels advanced through downtown Freetown on January 7, civilians were forced out of their homes and forbidden to take cover as an ECOMOG jet flew over and later bombed the area. According to witnesses at the scene, some thirty civilians were killed in this attack.

Towards the end of the offensive, the rebels used thousands of abductees as human shields as they made a failed assault on the hills and peaks above Freetown and as they made their withdrawal from the capital. Again, escaped abductees describe scores of civilians, mostly young women, being killed by the ECOMOG mortar and artillery bombardment that ensued.

³⁸"SAJ" Solomon Musa, was an ex-SLA officer and under NPRC government was vice-chairman and secretary of state. In 1997 he was appointed secretary of state with the AFRC/RUF Junta. He was killed in December 1998, allegedly by an accidental explosion.

³⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 2, 1999.

Corporal S.

Corporal S., an ECOMOG soldier who was stationed at a checkpoint near the entrance to the city, described seeing a mass of civilians moving towards them and the confusion that followed as fighting broke out with rebels they were not able to see:

I was stationed at [X] position with another twenty-five soldiers and about twenty Kamajors. We were on the alert because we'd been told the rebels were on their way coming from Allen Town. We lined up, weapons ready, on the street at about 1:15 a.m.. We heard a lot of noise; people shouting, civilians, children, the sound of people walking and saw what I estimated to be more than 2,000 civilians carrying things on their heads and backs. Suddenly we saw an armed man in the crowd and said, "who goes there." He refused to say anything and someone fired a shot and then the whole thing started. There was so much confusion, everyone was running helter skelter, boxes were flying, people were screaming and running everywhere, and people were falling and trying to run for safety. In the end I think many civilians were killed.

The rebels later withdrew but regrouped and came back at us ten or fifteen minutes later. And the civilians kept coming. They were so many and we just didn't know who was among them. It was too difficult. It wasn't possible to hold that position.⁴⁰

Inna

Inna, fifteen, was one of several hundred civilians rounded up from their homes on January 7, and forced by the rebels to walk through the street as an ECOMOG jet flew overhead. The group was later bombed and heavy civilian casualties ensued. She recounted:

They ordered me and my friend Ami at gunpoint to join a group of people they'd gathered from our street. A few blocks later we were met by a group of about 150 civilians who were being forced from their houses. They threatened anyone who refused to come with them.

We continued walking for another thirty minutes and they [the rebels] kept picking up people along the way. It was when we got to Regent Road that we first heard the Alpha pass over.⁴¹ Between 1:50 and 2:00 p.m. it flew over us four times. Each time it passed the rebels would run and find safety wherever they could crying, "Jet cover, jet cover!" and running into phone booths, towards the sidewalks, into the cathedral. A few of them fired at the plane. We knew it was a bomber but we just didn't think it would do anything to us because we were civilians. But, anyway the rebels had their guns on us the whole time; there were at least five of them around me. By this time there were about two or three hundred of us, mostly women and children.

And then the jet flew over again, there were a few explosions and I was knocked completely off my feet. I think three bombs dropped but I'm not sure. Most of the rebels were running away and there was dust everywhere. People were crying and screaming and there was blood everywhere. I was desperate to find Ami but I couldn't. The rebels started screaming, "you see what ECOMOG is doing; you see how they target civilians." I saw one child who'd been cut in two and so many people, maybe ten, had their limbs hanging off. I counted ten bodies but I'm sure there were more. I looked and looked for Ami and finally recognized her by her curly hair. Her belly had been split open and I think at that moment she was dying. I finally got away and rushed straight to her mom to tell her what'd happened.⁴²

Victor

Victor, forty-five, was hiding in an upper floor of a downtown building as he witnessed the same bombing. He described seeing the rebels pointing their guns at civilians to stop them from taking cover. He said:

The rebels were mixing in with the civilians in the front of the crowd but there was a much heavier concentration of them at the back. I was hiding, listening to my radio on the third floor of my building and at 1:30 p.m. I heard a state

⁴⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 17, 1999.

⁴¹Alpha jet, used by Nigerian Air Force members of ECOMOG Nigerian contingent.

⁴²Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 29, 1999.

announcement on 98.1 radio warning all civilians to go inside their houses because the ECOMOG jets would be searching for rebels.

So at around 1:45 p.m. I heard the jets start to pass over. By this time the crowd was making its way down Wilberforce Street. Each time the jet passed by, the rebels moved to the side of the street to search for cover. But when the civilians tried to run as well, I saw the rebels pointing their guns towards the civilians to keep them in the middle of the street.

And then it fell. I hit the floor, glass was breaking, people were screaming. And when the dust cleared about three minutes later I was able to see the carnage. They brought carts to take away the dead and wounded, and I counted about thirty bodies in the street. People were even cut in two.⁴³

Saramba

Saramba, twenty, was one of hundreds of abductees who were used as a human shield in late January during one of the rebels' final attempts to attack ECOMOG positions. She described how civilians were killed as they came under heavy ECOMOG mortar and artillery bombardment near Bathurst Hill.

I was taken with my fifteen-year-old sister on January 20. My people cried but there was nothing they could do. They [the rebels] made us carry boxes and things they'd looted. As they were withdrawing through Calaba Town they were pulling lots of people from their houses.

On the morning of January 25, the commanders ordered the other rebels to take us up the hills behind Calaba town and start moving towards Bathurst Hill. There were hundreds of us. We later heard them talk of how they were going to attack Wilberforce Barracks. But, as we were climbing the hill, at around 2:00 p.m., the bombardment started. It was terrifying. There was a whistling sound and then huge explosions. It went on for three hours and I saw about thirty people, civilians like me, dead or badly hurt. The pieces of the bombs cut you. I saw one beautiful fair-skinned girl who'd been cut up so badly and died right there.

The rebels seemed to know when they were coming and knew how to take cover. They just weren't getting hit as much as we were. But of course there were a lot more of us.⁴⁴

Christiana

Another abductee, Christiana, twenty-one, described being part of an abducted group during a rebel assault on Leicester Peak. She described seeing about one hundred corpses of people who were killed in the bombardment:

At around 10:00 p.m. on either January 28 or 29, they [the rebels] told all the abductees to start moving. There were thousands of us, mostly young women. As we walked it became clear they were headed for Leicester Peak and from there Wilberforce and it was obvious what they were using us for.

They made some of us carry water and ammunition on our heads and we walked for hours and hours. They kept getting lost and didn't seem to know where they were going.

When we arrived at Leicester Peak on around January 29, the ECOMOG gunship started shelling. I was so frightened. The bombs were coming from everywhere. They shelled us by air and from Wilberforce Barracks. It went on for hours and there was a terrible confusion. I ran and tried to take cover and people keep falling around me. People were dropping their boxes and diving for cover. There were so many dead; more than one hundred. I kept stepping on them as I was running and it seemed like most of them were the abductees. The rebels were in a panic and there was very little return fire. I ran and ran and because the rebels were fleeing, I was able to escape. That's how I was finally able to make it back to my family.⁴⁵

⁴³Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 29, 1999.

⁴⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 2, 1999.

⁴⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

The Use of Drugs by the RUF and Forced Drugging of Civilians

Most victims and witnesses describe widespread usage by the rebels of drugs, marijuana, and alcohol and believe most of the atrocities were committed while under the influence of these substances. Witnesses describe rebels self-administering drugs by cutting small incisions around their temples, cheeks, and other places on their faces in which a brown or white powder was inserted and then covered with "plasters" or adhesive tape. The rebels spoke of this drug as being "cocaine." Others observed rebels cutting the undersides of their arms with a razor blade and injecting themselves, and of taking small blue pills.

Abductees who managed to escape reported having been forcibly injected with drugs, or being given food and drink laced with drugs. One father whose sixteen-year-old girl was abducted by the rebels saw her a few days later being led away with "those plasters" on her face and describing her behavior as "drugged and out of it." One abductee asked a nine-year-old rebel about the drugs they were using and was told, "it's a medicine they give us which makes us to have no respect for anybody; whatever we think to do, we just do it." Another rebel added, "it gives us power and makes us fear nobody," and yet another said, "It makes us feel so tall and you people [civilians] look so small."

Lynette

Lynette, sixteen, was abducted on January 21 and held by the rebels for several days during which time she was given drugs in her food, and witnessed other abductees being lined up and injected with drugs. She recounted:

From the first day they drugged us. They showed me some powder and said it was cocaine and was called brown-brown. I saw them put it in the food and after eating I felt dizzy. I felt crazy.

One day I saw a group of rebels bring out about twenty boys — all abductees — between fifteen and twenty years old. They had them lined up under gunpoint and one by one called them forward to be injected in their arms with a needle. The boys begged them not to use needles but the rebels said it would give them power.

About twenty minutes later the boys started screaming like they were crazy and some of them even passed out. Two of the rebels instructed the boys to scream, "I want kill, I want kill" and gave a few of them kerosene to take with them on one of their "burn house" raids.⁴⁶

Joseph

Joseph described how he was abducted and brought to State House where he and several other civilians were held at gunpoint and injected with a brown substance:

They had me in a room in State House where they put a gun to my head and forced me to take that thing. They said, "You take this so you won't feel afraid." It was a liquid and after some minutes I felt like I was flying and my head ached. It took me two weeks to get over that thing; my head felt heavy and confused."⁴⁷

Abdul

Abdul, twenty, another abductee held at State House, described large groups of rebels being called forward to receive pills and the distribution of drugs by rebel commanders and, on a few occasions, white mercenaries. He said:

There were hundreds of rebels in State House because it was their base. They were always drinking, smoking jamba [marijuana], sneezing a white powder, and some of them took these bright blue tablets.

I was held there for three days and at least once a day one of the commanders would call people together saying, "it's time for your medicine" and give out those pills. I even saw two of the Ukrainians [white mercenaries] walking around distributing what I thought was probably cocaine from a small sugar box.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 10, 1999.

⁴⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 12, 1999.

⁴⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 12, 1999.

Mutilation and Amputation

The practice of mutilation and, in particular, amputation of hands, arms, legs and other parts of the body was also widespread during the January RUF offensive. The rebels used axes, machetes, and knives to kill and maim hundreds of people, mostly men but also women and children.

During the month of January, Freetown's three main hospitals—Connaught, Brookfield, and Netland Hospital—treated ninety-seven victims of amputations resulting from attacks with axes and machetes. The majority of amputations were of the hands and arms, including twenty-six double amputations. One hospital treated over forty cases of "attempted amputations," serious lacerations to the arms and legs, where medical staff were able to save the extremity or extremities.⁴⁹ In these cases medical personnel note that the damage to the nerves, tendons, muscles, and bones frequently leads to some degree of decreased functioning.⁵⁰ Wounds from lacerations to the head, neck, and other areas were also numerous.

What will never be known is the number of victims who died before being able to receive medical attention. Many people reported seeing corpses on the streets of Freetown with both hands dangling or missing. Public health workers and mortuary attendants responsible for the collection of corpses and burial within mass graves, also observed many bodies with missing limbs and lacerations.⁵¹ The main hospitals, which were located in western Freetown and under ECOMOG control, were inaccessible to the majority of victims in the east where the vast majority of amputations took place. Unable to cross front lines, victims frequently reported going two to three days before receiving medical attention:

Lansana

Lansana, twenty-four, was one of three brothers each to have one of their hands hacked off as they were attempting to flee towards an ECOMOG position on January 18. He described how one brother died near the site of the amputation:

The closer ECOMOG moved to our area, the more they [the rebels] started committing atrocities. At 9:00 a.m. me and my brothers Amara, seventeen, and Brima, twenty, decided to flee. We packed up a few things and then took off. About a quarter mile from our house, we rounded a bend and ran straight into a group of about fifty rebels. They argued about whether or not to kill us and then one of them said "let's send them to ECOMOG," which is their way of saying our arms should be cut.

They told us to lie down in the road, face down—they had their guns to our heads. The first to be cut was Brima; they cut his left hand with an axe. Then my left hand was hacked off and then Amara's right hand. They didn't ask us any questions or accuse of us anything. There was a lot of gunfire all around. The battle for the place was really on. We were all bleeding so much. Brima tried to get up a few times, but he stumbled and fell. The last time he only made it a few yards and then collapsed. He couldn't move, he fell down right there. I think he lost too much blood or just couldn't take the shock. It was so tense; the bullets were flying and me and Amara had no other choice. We had to leave our brother right there on the street.

After we got out of the hospital we went back to the place where it happened. The people there told us Brima had been buried later that day in a common grave, right near where he fell.⁵²

Alpha

Alpha, a victim of a machete wound to the head, described seeing two victims of limb amputations die on January 22 during the battle for the eastern suburb of Calaba Town:

As I ran towards the ECOMOG position, blood was gushing from my head. The rebels had whacked me three times with a machete. The ECOMOGs had their guns on me but when they saw I was bleeding, I heard them say, "this man

⁴⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Médecins Sans Frontières, Freetown, May 6, 1999. The cases of unsuccessful amputations were treated by MSF medical staff at Connaught Hospital.

⁵⁰Human Rights Watch interviews, MSF, Freetown, May 6, 1999.

⁵¹Human Rights Watch interview, Morgue Attendants Connaught Hospital, Freetown, May 5, 1999.

⁵²Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 12, 1999.

isn't a rebel; he's one of your brothers. Come and help him." They brought me to the back of a house and lay me down next to three other badly wounded civilians; a woman with a gunshot and two men with their hands cut off.

One man forced me to drink water and then I passed out. When I woke up some hours later I saw that all three of the civilians had died. I wanted to leave that place and go home. I didn't want to die there.⁵³

Civilians were often mutilated in pairs or groups of up to eight, during small rebel operations in which victims were rounded up, made to form a line and their limbs amputated one after the other. Other amputations were done as punishment for having resisted the abduction of a family member or for fleeing from a rebel patrol. In other cases the rebels choose their victims randomly, frequently without asking a single question.

Ramatu

Ramatu, fifteen, and five other neighbors rounded up by the rebels, had their hands or arms amputated near the Kissy Mental Home where dozens of amputations were witnessed. She described how they hacked off her left arm:

Ten rebels broke into our house and started demanding money. Then they ordered us outside and grouped us together with about thirty other people from the area. They held us at gunpoint in a circle, and started pointing, "you, you, you," and telling us to follow them. They didn't ask us any questions. I don't know why they chose me, or the others. We were three men and three women. A few of them were young like me.

They then marched us at gunpoint to the hill near Kissy Mental. They didn't say why they were taking us but we knew. When we arrived they ordered us to lay face down and started cutting us. They dragged us, they had us get down on our knees and put our arms on a concrete slab. They had others standing over us and holding us from behind. One rebel did all the cutting. A few had both hands cut off; others just one. And then they walked away. I couldn't even bury my arm. And now I don't think I'll ever find someone to marry me.⁵⁴

Osman

Osman, forty-two, and a neighbor had both of their hands amputated in Kissy on January 25 when they were caught hiding in the banana trees behind their house. He recounted:

At around midnight, they [the rebels] started firing at our house and ordered us to come outside. I fled into the bush with my wife and four children. We found our neighbor and his family there and remained hiding throughout the night. Early the next morning we saw another group of rebels passing by but the neighbor's baby started to cry and gave away our position. We started running but they were too fast.

They ordered me and the other man forward. They cursed and insulted us and without asking any questions pushed my friend to the ground and cut off both his hands with an axe. When they called me forward I begged them and offered them all my money. But, they did it anyway.

The rebel who cut my hands had a white T-shirt with "Captain 2 Hands" written in what looked like blood. My four-year-old son was screaming, "Don't cut my papa's hand."⁵⁵

The rebels would often single out one or two family members for amputation before massacring an entire compound, or amputate limbs of the survivors. Sometimes the men would be killed and the women attacked with machetes. The, by then mutilated, survivors were then instructed to take a verbal message to ECOMOG or members of the government.

Mani

Mani, forty-eight, watched as a commander ordered the execution of seven civilians and then singled him out for amputation on January 21. He said:

⁵³Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 6, 1999.

⁵⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 19, 1999.

⁵⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 11, 1999.

A group of thirteen rebels came to my house, poured kerosene on the furniture and then set it ablaze. I stumbled out of my house and started running up the street but was immediately caught by a group of ten rebels. They ordered me to join a group of seven other people from my neighborhood.

The commander, who introduced himself as a Liberian, then ordered everyone but me to stand to one side and said, "I'm going to kill you all, so say good-bye to the world." He kept them there begging for three minutes and then at 7:03 p.m.—I looked at my watch—ordered another rebel to open fire on them.

Then, the same Liberian said, "I'm ordered and paid by Sam Bockerie not to spare anyone and that is why I have killed. You saw it with your own eyes. But now I am ordering your hand to be cut." He ordered me to lay face down in the road and called forward a rebel with an axe who then hacked off my hand. It was hanging off limp and bleeding and when I saw it I started to cry. The rebels just walked away.⁵⁶

Amadu

After massacring his neighbors in Kissy on January 20, Amadu, forty, described how the rebels hacked off his arms:

I was hiding in my house with my wife and family, when at around 9:30 p.m. we started hearing shouts and screams. Several minutes later we heard our neighbors begging, "don't kill me, I beg," and then I heard gunfire. I peeked out but one of them [rebels] saw me and screamed for me to come out. I ran back into my house but after a few minutes they doused it with kerosene and set it on fire. When the heat was too much we fled out the back but they caught me and marched me to my neighbor's compound.

It was then I saw over what had happened to my neighbors; I saw at least twenty of them lying on the ground and I screamed, "you've killed my people there." One of them called for the man with the axe to come and hack off my arms and they did it right there in that compound. When they were done they said, "you go to Pa Kabbah and ask him for a new set of arms."⁵⁷

Kaima

Kaima, forty, was captured with a group of civilians seeking refuge in the Kissy Mental Home. The rebels separated them—gunning down the men and attacking the women with machetes. She received severe lacerations on both legs and, unable to walk, spent over three days without any medical attention. Due to the severity of the injury and degree of infection, both legs had to be amputated above the knee. She recounted:

They ordered us out of the building at gunpoint. There was a lot of confusion and we took off running. They caught about twenty-five of us and put the men on one side of the grounds and the women on the other. As they fired the men [shot them] I again took off running with my infant son on my back. But, I fell in a ditch and as I struggled to get up they had me surrounded. There were five of them and they started hacking at my legs. I guess they attacked my legs because I tried to run.

As they were striking me with machetes, my baby was lying on the ground next to me. One of my attackers then raised his machete to strike my baby but I blocked the blow with my right hand and screamed, "it's enough now—you have cut my legs and now you want to kill my baby—it is enough." They then set upon the five other women with machetes; cutting the hand off one, the fingers off another and striking the head of yet another.⁵⁸

The majority of amputations were done shortly before the rebels were forced to retreat from neighborhoods under their control. Victims and witnesses describe the rebels often mobilizing special "cut hand" squads which were then sent on operation. The leaders of some of these infamous squads introduced themselves to their victims as "Captain 2 Hands," "Betty Cut Hands," "OC Cut Hands," and "Adama Cut Hands." After being captured, the victims were sometimes made to wait until the "cut hands" unit arrived. Several of the commanders and members of these units were adolescents or women.

⁵⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 19, 1999.

⁵⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 11, 1999.

⁵⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 20, 1999.

Tejan

Tejan, a forty-three year old driver, described the brutal way in which a fifteen-year-old combatant from one of these units named "Commander Cut Hands" hacked off his two hands in Kissy on January 20:

After they set fire to my house they caught me trying to escape out the back door. They then brought me to the compound next door where I saw they'd captured two of my neighbors. They started arguing over whether to kill me or cut my hands. Then the one who seemed to be in charge gave the order to amputate both my hands and called forward a fifteen-year-old boy they called "Commander Cut Hands."

I refused to lie down. They beat me and it took several of them to hold me. They tripped me and when I fell to the ground three of them had to sit on my legs and back and another few had to hold my arms. Then they took out that axe. I was crying and after they'd hacked off both of my hands I screamed, "just kill me, kill me."

They also cut off the hands of my two neighbors. I feared they might attack me because I was a driver for the SLPP [Sierra Leone People's Party], the President's party, but they never found that out. They knew nothing about me.⁵⁹

Allieu

The particularly macabre practice of filling up bags with amputated hands and fingers was witnessed by several people interviewed by Human Rights Watch. Another witness hiding within a house in Calaba Town on January 24 witnessed a commander calling himself "Dr. Blood" summon five rebels and order them to begin a "cut hands" operation. He then said, "I want a bag of hands from Kissy, one from Wellington, and one from Calaba Town."⁶⁰

Allieu, fifty, a civil servant with the customs department, described seeing a bloody rice bag full of hands during the brutal amputation of both of his arms in Kissy on January 21:

They surrounded my family and one of them said, "Since Pa Kabbah won't give us peace, we have come to cut your hands." I begged them not to harm my wife and children so they fired their guns in the air and told them to run away. They then marched me up the hill to the grounds of St. Patrick's Catholic Church where I saw over one hundred rebels. They ordered me to put my left arm on a tree trunk and then they swung the axe from behind and hacked it off. They kept talking about President Kabbah and as they ordered me to put my other hand. I screamed, "but I don't know anything about politics" and one of them answered, "but you voted for Kabbah." Then he hacked off my remaining hand.

Blood was spurting out of my arms. I was weak and kept falling as I tried to get up. They started laughing at me and I shouted, "just kill me, kill me, look at how you've left me." They spit on me and started pounding me and then several of them took a hammer, held me down and started knocking out my teeth. I left four of them [teeth] in the dirt. They danced around me and said, "we've really got you now, here you will die."

As I lay there bleeding in the church courtyard I saw them amputate the hands of two other men. And, then a rebel walked by with a white rice bag, with blood dripping out the bottom, and said - pointing to the hands lying on the ground—"put those things in here."⁶¹

Children and in some cases even toddlers were not immune from attack. In one case, children were even singled out. The youngest known amputation victim from January 1999 was a boy aged just one year and eight months. One small clinic in Kissy during January 1999 treated twenty-one children from three to fifteen years old for laceration wounds, mutilation, and amputation. Five of these children were from three to five years old.⁶²

⁵⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 11, 1999.

⁶⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 23, 1999.

⁶¹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 19, 1999.

⁶²Human Rights Watch interview, Nurse Ibrahim Conteh, Kissy Summertime Clinic, May 6, 1999. The clinic also treated seven children between six to ten years old, and nine children between eleven to fifteen years old for injuries related to lacerations with axes, knives, and machetes.

Lucia

Lucia, ten, described how on January 13 she and two of her friends were chosen out of a large group, taken away, and had both of their arms amputated:

At around 4:00 in the afternoon I was sitting under the big mango tree in front of my house with all of my family and neighbors when we saw a group of four rebels coming down the road. We got up and ran inside. When they arrived they ordered us all outside. They had a container of petrol and asked for matches. We thought they were going to burn our house but instead they started pointing at several of us; me, my cousin Miata who is twelve, and my friend Finda who is fifteen.

They marched us up the hill where we were joined by another rebel and two more adult men. And, then they started hacking off our arms. When it was my turn they pushed me to the ground and told me to put my right hand on a big stone. One rebel held me down, one put his foot on my arm while the one they called "Blood" hacked it off with a big axe. Then they did the same thing with my left hand. They hit each hand one time each.

We couldn't run; they had their guns on us the whole time. It was so fast; the whole thing only took about ten minutes. They then walked us back down the hill and back to our compound. When my mother saw me, with my hands dangling from my arms and blood spurting everywhere she screamed and burst out crying. When they were cutting me, I heard one of them say, "now you will know the rebels; now you will know the bitterness of the war."⁶³

Rape and Sexual Assault

Throughout the January offensive RUF forces perpetrated systematic, organized, and widespread sexual violence against girls and women including individual and gang-rape, sexual assault with objects such as sticks and firewood, and sexual slavery. These sexual crimes were most often characterized by extraordinary brutality and frequently preceded or followed by violent acts against other family members.

Human Rights Watch took testimonies from over fifty girls and women who were sexually abused by the rebels during the January incursion. And, while it is impossible to determine the precise number of victims, doctors and counselors report having treated several hundred girls and women for the physical and psychological effects of sexual abuse perpetrated by the rebels during this time. One Sierra Leonean human rights group registered 255 cases of rape, but believes this number to be a serious underestimation given cultural factors which lead to underreporting.⁶⁴ A doctor working within a camp for those displaced by the January fighting said he treated at least twenty-five women for vaginal bleeding resulting from rape, most of whom were girls between the ages of twelve and fifteen, and scores of other rape victims.⁶⁵

While some of the victims interviewed were raped within their homes, most report having been rounded together up with other girls at gunpoint and taken to houses and buildings which, during the occupation, served as rebel bases and command centers. The girls and women were rounded up from their homes, as they were fleeing, and from centers of refuge such as mosques, churches, and camps for displaced people. Once with the rebels in these bases, nearly all victims described witnessing the sexual abuse of other girls and young women also being held there. Following the abuse, some victims were allowed to go home, but ordered to report back to the rebel base the following day or be murdered.

Once captive the victims were frequently "shared" and "divided" among the combatants who would rape them on a daily basis for anywhere from one day to several weeks. Of the victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch, over half reported being raped by more than one combatant. The victims often reported being kept locked up in a room with many other girls and taken out only to cook, do laundry, and fetch water. The rebels frequently told the victims they would be taken to the bush and made into a "rebel wife" and indeed young girls and women made up the majority of the hundreds of civilians witnessed to have been later abducted as the rebels retreated out of Freetown.

⁶³Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 6, 1999.

⁶⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Moses Sahr Lamine, Network Movement for Justice and Development, Freetown, May 31, 1999.

⁶⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Dr. Kagbo Lebour, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

It is difficult to know what percentage of girls and women abducted by the rebels are sexually abused while being held behind rebel lines. However, several girls who've managed to escape say the percentage is very high. Those who remain within the rebel ranks most often become attached to one rebel who then refers to her as his "rebel wife." Many become pregnant, have children and remain with the rebels for years. Several girls and women abducted during January described pairing up and attaching themselves to one rebel so as to avoid gang-rape, be given a degree of protection, and be subjected to less hardship.⁶⁶

The organized way in which victims frequently described being rounded up and taken, and the number of rebels participating in these abductions, suggests an element of premeditation and planning on the part of the RUF command. Victims frequently described being taken by rebel patrols of from two to seven combatants who clearly stated their intent to sexually abuse them. That some of these patrols were being led by rebels referring to themselves as "commanders," that victims often described being sexually abused by or in the presence of men referred to as "commanders," and that some victims were told they had been selected specifically to be given to a "commander," suggests some of the sexual abuse was indeed perpetrated under the direction of and with the consent of members of the RUF hierarchy. Human Rights Watch was able to document only one instance of a rebel commander stopping a rape, which occurred within a hospital when a combatant attempted to rape a female nurse.⁶⁷

Marie

Marie, sixteen, was fleeing the fighting in central Freetown with three other girls on January 7 when she ran into a patrol of five heavily armed rebels. She and her companions were then abducted and taken to a "rebel house" where they were gang-raped for three days. She said:

The rebels put us in a room and told us to wait. A few minutes later they took out my friend and then four of them came back in the room. They were all big men, at least twenty-five or thirty. They told me to undress. I refused and told them I was a virgin, that it was not right in the eyes of God to rape a virgin and that it would effect me for the rest of my life. One of them slapped me hard on the face while the others hit me with their guns. One said, "shut up. We don't care if you're a virgin. We've already done so many, why should you be an exception." Then another one said, "if she refuses let's just bring her out naked and put her under a firing squad." I started crying and crying; I was so frightened.

Then while a few of them started ripping my clothes off, another one went behind me and bit me leaving a huge wound on my back. I was then pushed down to the ground. I was still crying so the one who'd slapped me took a rag and tied my mouth. I could hardly breath. Then the first one forced open my legs and raped me. The four of them spent two hours with me and each raped me at least twice. I was so ashamed. I was bleeding so much and when they finally undid my mouth I begged them to leave me but they told me to "shut up" and that they would use me until they were satisfied. I spent three days in that house.⁶⁸

Saramba

Rebels rounded up seven girls from their street in the evening of January 13 and brought them to a command center in Kissy. All of the girls reported being raped. One of them, Saramba, thirteen, described what happened:

We were hiding under the bed when they came but they eventually found us. They ordered me, my sister Sarah and friend Sia to follow them to a truck. A few minutes later we picked up four more girls being held by another group of rebels. They took us to a big house a few miles away.

When we arrived we saw over one hundred rebels gathered there and as we were led into the house they started cheering and I heard a few of them say "well done, you've brought us more women. When we were in the bush it was only ECOMOG enjoying you. Now it is our turn."⁶⁹

Beatrice

⁶⁶Human Rights Watch interviews, Freetown, May 4, May 8, and May 22, 1999.

⁶⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

⁶⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 18, 1999.

⁶⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 15, 1999.

Beatrice, twenty-five, went out briefly on January 21 to look for a few cups of rice from a little store half a block from her house in Wellington. On the way back she and another woman were confronted by a group of ten rebels who sexually assaulted them with burning firewood. She recounted:

They asked us for money but we said we didn't have any so they ordered us to take off our clothes, putting a gun to our throats to make sure we did. We begged them to leave us but they ordered us to lie down on the dirt ground, face up, and open our legs. At least four of them had their guns to our throats and stomachs to make sure we obeyed. The rest of them surrounded us and then a big rebel went to the kitchen of a near-by house and took a piece of burning firewood from the fire. He then squatted down and with his two hands forced it in and out of my vagina one or two times. Then he returned to the fire and got another piece and then a third. I felt as if I was being stabbed inside and nearly fainted from the pain. Then they did the same thing to the woman laying next to me.

While doing this to both of us I heard them say, "This is the way we're going to fuck you. You hypocrites; as soon as you see ECOMOG you start pointing fingers at us." And then they left and I dragged myself home, blood flowing from my vagina.⁷⁰

Sophie

Sophie, twenty-four, was in her house in Kissy when on January 21, a group of three rebels burst in demanding money and killed her husband. She was then abducted and gang-raped. She said:

They kept asking for money and my husband kept begging them for forgiveness for not having any. We are poor and the other groups of rebels had already taken all we had. They started waving their guns and then the one named "Abdul" killed him. Right in front of my children. I burst into tears and tried to run to my husband but they pulled me back and put a gun to me saying that if I didn't go with them they'd kill me as well. He was bleeding, my children were crying and then they forced me at gunpoint to walk out that door and follow them.

We walked all the way to the Sierra Leone Brewery in Wellington which seemed like an HQ for them. By this time we were three women and ten rebels. When we arrived they put us in a dirty room and then used the three of us at the same time for the entire night. They were so rough; they slapped me and tore my clothes. Four of them used me—it was twelve times altogether—it went on the entire night. And that Abdul, the same rebel who killed my man and stole everything from my family, raped me all night long.⁷¹

Sahr

Sahr, twenty, was rounded up on January 8 with some ninety other civilians from Central Freetown and taken at gunpoint by a group of eighteen rebels to State House which was at that time functioning as the RUF command center for the operation to take Freetown. He described seeing scores of young women raped:

As we approached State House I saw hundreds of other civilians, most of them women, being kept under guard on the lawn and as we entered I saw even more inside. There were rebels armed with machine guns and RPGs everywhere. They then divided us into smaller groups and put us into different rooms and offices. There were twenty people in my cell, fifteen of which were young women.

Every night most of the women in my cell were brought out by armed rebels at around 10:00 p.m. and brought back again at around 3:00 a.m. When they returned they were crying and many of them were bleeding down below. They told me they'd been raped, some of them by two or three men. I had a good view from my window and every night could see at least fifteen girls being raped on the grounds, under trees and on the walkways of State House.⁷²

⁷⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999. Human Rights Watch also interviewed clinic workers who had treated both women for serious injuries, including removing splinters from their vaginas.

⁷¹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 1, 1999.

⁷²Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 12, 1999.

Particularly vulnerable were young women between fourteen and eighteen who were sought after and targeted for being virgins. The rebels often entered houses and compounds asking specifically for "virgin girls" and would reject all women who had children, were over a certain age, or who they believed to have already had sex. There are documented cases of girls as young as eight being sexually abused.

Samretta

Samretta, fifteen, was inside a mosque with hundreds of other people seeking refuge when, on January 20, two rebels entered and abducted four young girls, including Samretta and her eighteen year old sister, who has yet to be released. She explained:

It was at night and dark in the mosque. My mother tried to hide me under her skirt but they walked around with a flashlight shining their lights on everyone. They said, "we've come for your young girls; for your virgins. Even if they tie their heads like grandmothers we'll find them." They said that if our parents didn't give us up they would kill everyone.

They shone their light on my mother and asked her what she was hiding. That's how they found me and my sister Fatmata. They took four of us that night. They held me for two days in a house in Calaba town where one of them raped me four times. He said my mother had taken good care of me. I escaped two days later when an ECOMOG jet flew over, but my sister was taken with them to the bush.⁷³

Fatmata

Fatmata, thirty-eight, witnessed young girls being given an examination to determine if they were virgins or not. She recounted:

There was a lot of gunfire and I was trying to escape with my family when we were stopped by a rebel checkpoint. Inside the compound of the house next to where we were being searched, I saw five young girls between thirteen and sixteen, lying completely naked on the ground with one or two rebels holding each one by the arms, another two holding the legs apart and a female commander named Rose putting her fingers inside the vagina of each one to determine if she was a virgin or not.

The girls were crying and struggling and I saw a few of the rebels slap them and rough them up. After finishing with each girl, Commander Rose would announce to the others whether she was or was not a virgin. She was very crude and after checking one small girl said, "this one is a sweet popo [papaya]; she'll do well for the commander." After the girls had been checked, they put the virgins to one side and the nonvirgins to the other. As the rebels let us pass through I heard them saying to each other "we don't want this lot, let them go, they're too old."⁷⁴

Zainab

After being abducted with six other girls in Wellington on January 13, Zainab, twenty, described how those the rebels deemed to be virgins and nonvirgins were separated. The women designated virgins were then "given" to the younger fighters. She explained:

When we arrived they lined us up and the commander, "Ibrahim," asked each of us if we were or were not a virgin. There were four nonvirgins and three virgins, including myself. He then told a group of five older rebels to take the nonvirgins and told the three younger ones to take us into a bedroom next to the parlor.

A few minutes later Ibrahim entered that room and ordered us at gunpoint to take off our shirts and then began to fondle and pinch our breasts and examine our feet. I don't know what he expected to tell from our feet. The other two rebels just stood and watched. After ten minutes he announced that we were indeed virgins and then proceeded to

⁷³Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 12, 1999.

⁷⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 24, 1999.

assign each of us to a rebel. I resisted and Ibrahim slapped me, put a gun to my throat and said, "if you don't allow that man to satisfy himself I'll kill you."⁷⁵

Hawa

Girls as young as eight were raped. Hawa, twenty-two, described seeing a twelve-year-old bleed to death after being gang-raped by six men:

I was abducted from my home with several other neighbor women on January 8 and made to carry looted goods all the way to Waterloo. I spent over a month with the rebels and during that time was raped countless times. In our rebel camp there were scores of other abductees from Freetown including a young girl named Mariatu. She was just beginning to get breasts and I estimated her to be no more than twelve.

One afternoon in later January as we were both being raped in the bush, I saw six men use her; one after the other. She was screaming and crying in pain and I could see she was bleeding. After the second or third man she went silent and I thought she had passed out. After they'd finished with both of us I brought her water and said, "Mariatu, you must drink" but she wouldn't wake up. I think she was dying. There was too much blood. After a few hours they came, picked up her little body and carried it into the bush. I never saw her again.⁷⁶

Rapes committed in the home were often in the presence of family members and neighbors who were forced at gunpoint to watch. Family members frequently reported attempting to pay for their daughters not to be raped or having to choose between having their daughters taken or the entire family executed.

Osman

Osman, thirty-eight, and several other fathers were forced at gunpoint to watch the rape of their daughters on January 8. He recounted:

At round 4:00 p.m. five juntas [RUF rebels] stormed into my house where my family and neighbors were gathered. They picked out my fifteen-year-old Aminata and four other young women and then locked us [the parents] into another room. They told us they wanted all our money or they would kill our daughters. As we were collecting what little money we had, I heard the girls start to scream. I peeked through the crack in the door and could see them slapping my daughter and pushing her onto the bed.

A few minutes later one of them opened the door and asked, "Who are the fathers of these girls?" As we walked out of the room I could see a rebel named "Blood" raping my daughter and "Sneak" using her friend Marie. They lined us up in front of the bed and said, "Don't you want to see what we're doing with your daughters?" There was a rebel with a gun pointed at us the entire time and two more by the door. Aminata was crying so "Blood" covered her mouth with her shirt. When those two finished, two more took their place. We begged them but the "Blood" said, "Shut up or we'll burn this house and kill every one of you." I was shaking. I was scared. I was angry but what could I do? After twenty minutes "Blood" ordered the girls to get dressed and then abducted them all plus my eight-year-old daughter.⁷⁷

The rapes were usually accompanied by other physical abuse and death threats to the victim and often her family. Numerous witnesses and victims described seeing girls who had resisted rape being executed. Medical staff from one hospital reported treating two women who received gunshots to their vaginas. Both women, an eighteen-year-old and a twenty-five-year-old woman who was five months pregnant, died of their injuries.⁷⁸

Sahr

⁷⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 15, 1999.

⁷⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 27, 1999.

⁷⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

⁷⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, Connaught Hospital Nurse, May 20, 1999.

Sahr, twenty, the man who was abducted and kept in a cell with fifteen young women in State House, described how two of his friends were executed after resisting sexual assault:

On January 9, around midnight a group of rebels came to our cell and ordered two girls from my neighborhood, Hana, fifteen, and Majah, twenty, to come out. They had been raped the night before, Hana by one rebel and Majah by four.

They started screaming but were eventually dragged out by three rebels. Some minutes later I heard them both yelling and arguing with the rebels and refusing to lie down. The rebels were screaming obscenities and I heard the sound of struggle and slapping. A few minutes later I heard several shots. Hana and Maja didn't return that night and I cried for those girls because I knew the rebels had shot them. When I was able to escape two days later I saw the corpses of both girls lying on the State House lawn.⁷⁹

Joy

On January 7, Joy, seventeen, witnessed five girls who attempted to escape a rebel base in which they had all been raped, being killed. She said:

I was captured in the morning with five other girls about my age and taken to a house full of rebels in Kissy. They took me into a room, pointed a pistol at my head, and told me if I didn't submit to them I would be shot. They were all high on drugs and drinking beer. Five of them used me that day.

At around 6:00 p.m. the one who'd captured me took me out on the verandah and there I found the five others who were crying and I could see at least two of them were bleeding. They said it had happened to them as well but we couldn't really talk because there was a rebel with a gun next to us. Some minutes later our guard left to get something and the girls got up and ran but the rebels saw them and opened up on them. There was gunfire all around and I crouched in the corner crying. I was so afraid they would kill me as well. I ran to the rebel who had captured me, told him I'd not run away and begged him to protect me. They fell just a few meters from the house. I saw their bodies. I don't know why they ran that day.⁸⁰

The health repercussions of the sexual abuse are many. Most victims under twenty reported considerable bleeding during and after the rape, something gynecologists treating them attribute in part to complications produced by the practice of female genital cutting which is widespread in Sierra Leone.⁸¹ One gynecologist reported treating every victim aged between eight to twelve for some degree of vaginal tearing.⁸² According to medical personnel and testimonies taken by Human Rights Watch, at least fourteen girls and young women, including one thirteen-year-old, became pregnant from the sexual assault. Health practitioners treating the victims also report a high percentage of them diagnosed with sexually transmitted diseases and infections. Yet another medical implication involves the spread of HIV-AIDS. One twenty-two-year-old woman who was abducted in early January and gang-raped and sodomized repeatedly over a period of two months, was during her captivity already suffering from full blown AIDS, and has since died of AIDS-related illness.⁸³

Victims of sexual abuse frequently reported female rebels having taken part in rounding up operations and often singling out girls and women for their commanders. Once in captivity, girls frequently reported appealing to female rebels for help. However their pleas were ignored and often met with threats of violence. One sixteen-year-old victim described how a female

⁷⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 12, 1999.

⁸⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 21, 1999.

⁸¹Human Rights Watch interview, Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, Freetown, May 24, 1999. Some 80 percent of females in Sierra Leone undergo female genital cutting. In Sierra Leone, the type of female genital cutting performed is excision; removal of the clitoris and labia minora, and when the wound heals there is a tightening of the vaginal tissue and resulting scar tissue which frequently leads to painful intercourse and possible bleeding.

⁸²Human Rights Watch interview, Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, Freetown, May 25, 1999.

⁸³Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 27, 1999. Human Rights Watch interview, Social Worker, Freetown, June 2, 1999.

commander entered the room in which she was being raped and said, "why are you hollering. These are my boys and you will not refuse them."⁸⁴

Human Rights Watch took testimony from one sixteen-year-old girl who described sexual abuse by a female rebel, who forced her and another sixteen-year-old girl to undress, and then tied them up and proceeded to insert her fingers into their vaginas.⁸⁵

The motive of the attackers, according to what they told the victims, was both to be rewarded for having endured hardship in the bush and to punish their victims for supporting the current government or having sexually accommodated ECOMOG soldiers. The abuses are consistent with a long-standing pattern of RUF use of rape as one of many weapons to intimidate, terrorize, and ultimately control the civilian population.

The rebels sought not only to control and degrade their victims but also to undermine and degrade the authority of the family and community. The victims described feeling terror, humiliation, and shame, and their parents, husbands, and community elders described feeling powerless at their inability to protect them.

Josephine

Josephine, sixteen, described the terror she felt when she was brought in to witness the rape in progress of the friend with whom she had been abducted and brought to a command post:

They kept me in a room but I could hear Susan crying and crying. Five minutes later one of them ordered me to go into the room where I saw she was being held down by one rebel and raped by another. This rebel then told me, "look at this—this is what we're going to do to you—once we're finished with that one it will be your turn." I could only weep.⁸⁶

Fabian

Fabian, twenty-one, and eight other women were brought into a room on January 21 and forced to strip naked in front of eleven rebels after a picture of President Tejan Kabbah was found in the parlor. She described how they were terrorized and humiliated for over two hours:

As soon as the commander summoned us to the room he said, "so you are Kabbah's children; the ones calling in the jets to bomb us." He then ordered us to strip naked and stand in a line in front of him with our legs spread two feet apart. I begged him to leave me as I had my three-month-old infant in my arms but he tore the baby from my arms and threw him against a wall. The other rebels formed a circle around us and got out their pistols and machetes. He then ordered another rebel to sprinkle kerosene on us and threatened to burn us. That rebel then gathered up our clothes and set them on fire in the corner of the room. The one with the machete circled around us, threatening to cut off our hands.

The commander then took out a flashlight and inspected our private parts—slowly, one after the other—making crude comments about how ugly, dirty, and disgusting we were. They fondled and pinched our breasts and ordered us to turn around and bend down, laughing and insulting us the whole time. And the whole time my baby was crying in the corner.

Every time I think about that day I cry bitterly. I cry for how my baby was treated. I cry when I think of how they treated my sisters. I cry for my husband who was later abducted. And I keep asking myself, what did we ever do to them?⁸⁷

Kadi

⁸⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 23, 1999.

⁸⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 18, 1999.

⁸⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 18, 1999.

⁸⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 20, 1999.

Kadi, forty-two, described the horror she felt at having to listen to her sixteen-year-old daughter Binti being raped on January 11.

Three of them came to our house at midnight and ordered us to line up outside. They demanded money and one of them put a knife to Binti's throat. Just then the rebels' attention was diverted by a civilian they saw running around the corner and I ordered my family to scatter. There was shooting and confusion and in the end all but Binti were able to escape.

I ran with my one-year-old grandson on my back and hid in an abandoned house. Some minutes later I started hearing the screams and sobs of my Binti. It went on for over an hour and I knew what was happening. She was only 200 yards away but I couldn't do anything. Towards the end I even got up to go to her but I forced myself back to my hiding place until the early morning hours when I found her weeping in an abandoned shop.⁸⁸

Jenneh

Jenneh, fourteen, was beaten, raped, and left near unconscious in the street. Several months after the incident, her right eye was still swollen and teeth marks on her back were visible. She recounted:

When my mother saw him coming towards our house she yelled at me to get inside and hide. From under the bed I could hear him threatening to kill us both so I came outside. As he dragged me away my mother ran after us, pleading with him to release me but he turned around, pointed his gun at her and said he'd open up if she took one more step.

He tore the clothes from my body. He bit me. He punched me in the face. He knocked my kneecaps with his gun and forced himself upon me. I knew nothing about this thing. I'm only fourteen. After the first time he forced me, sobbing, to say "thank you," and by the fourth time I could barely move.

When he was finished he picked me up, putting his fingers inside my vagina and threw me in a gutter. Then he walked off. I was almost unconscious and couldn't remember everything, but that much I remember; he threw me in a gutter. The next morning my little sister found me there. She cried when she saw me and ran to get my mother.⁸⁹

These crimes, and other forms of sexual violence, are explicitly condemned under international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions prohibit rape in both international and internal conflicts.⁹⁰ Likewise, rape, when committed on a mass scale, constitutes a crime against humanity. The Convention of the Child further protects children from "all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse."⁹¹

Abduction

As the rebels withdrew from Freetown they took with them thousands of civilians; mostly young people, and particularly young women. Abduction has become the principal method the rebels use to augment their ranks, to provide a pool of rebel fighters a work force, and "wives" or sexual partners for male combatants.

While it is difficult to ascertain the number of civilians abducted in January, both residents who witnessed the rebel exodus from the capital, and abductees who've since managed to escape, confirm the number to be over one thousand and the greatest percentage to be young women. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs has registered 573 adults who have either been abducted or gone missing since the January 6 incursion.⁹² Of the 3,700 children UNICEF registered as missing as of June, 1997, 40 percent, or approximately 1,500 have been classed as victims of abductions. Of those abducted, 680 or 46

⁸⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 14, 1999.

⁸⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 21, 1999.

⁹⁰Rape in internal armed conflict is prohibited under Article 3, subparagraphs (a) and (c), common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and by Article 2(e) of Protocol II. For international armed conflict, this is established in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949 (Fourth Geneva Convention), Arts. 27 and 147, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

⁹¹Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 34.

⁹²Human Rights Watch interview, Mrs. Jackson-Smith, Freetown, May 31, 1999.

percent were from fifteen to seventeen years old, and 260, or 18 percent, were children under eleven.⁹³ The figures for both the adults and children show the majority of abductees to be female.

As in past offensives, the process of abduction was usually violent and traumatic. Those attempting to resist the abduction of a family member were often beaten, maimed, or killed. They were also often forced to make painful choices between allowing a loved one to be taken or having one or several family members killed. Families who had more than one child abducted were not uncommon, and there are several cases of entire family units being taken. Rebels frequently went to houses and compounds and selected all the young men or women of a certain age. Reports of several residents from a single compound being abducted were not uncommon.

The rebels began abducting people shortly after the offensive began, using them to carry looted goods back to their bases further east. However, the numbers increased dramatically towards the end of the RUF's occupation of Freetown. Residents of Calaba Town, near the easternmost end of Freetown, described rebels going from house to house, hurriedly pulling several people from each house as they fled into the hills. As has already been discussed, abductees were also used as porters and human shields in some of the final battles of the offensive.

Young men and boys abducted during January were witnessed by escaped abductees to be undergoing military training just weeks after their capture. Most were made to carry heavy loads and subjected to forced labor and sometimes physical abuse. One escaped abductee described seeing abductees being trained in February, 1999 by Caucasian soldiers.⁹⁴

Eldred

Eldred, forty, another abductee who was captured on January 22 and spent two months with the rebels, described seeing abductees taken during the January offensive being divided up by age and trained by rebel soldiers. He recounted:

They [the rebels] gathered the abductees together and had them march up and down in the bush; left, right, left, right and so on and then divided them up into groups. They had the small boys from six to ten years old, then those from twelve to fifteen and finally those from fifteen to eighteen. For the older boys, the training was compulsory for all of them. I saw them doing physical exercises, teaching them how to dismantle and clean all kinds of guns, explaining them how many cartridges are in a clip, and all that.

But they didn't trust the new recruits to hold onto the guns for long. They really watched them at first; afraid they would turn the weapons on them and escape. They [the rebels] said if the peace talks failed, they'd come back to Freetown with a vengeance. And that this time they'd go to the west where all the rich people live. They said it'd be called "Operation Westside."⁹⁵

Lansana

Lansana, forty-two, described how on January 20 the rebels abducted two of his three daughters as they swept through their neighborhood. The eleven-year-old has since been released but was raped during her captivity. He recounted:

They usually came at night, when it was easier to hide our three daughters, Jennah, sixteen, Mansa, fourteen, and Sally, eleven, but that day they came in the afternoon. First they fired their guns into our house and then they crashed in and forced us to line up outside. The girls were huddled around my wife.

ECOMOG had started bombarding the hills and they seemed frantic; in a hurry. They went to my wife and told her to give up the girls. One man put a gun to her throat and a few more started pulling the girls. Mansa was able to run but they pulled Jennah and Sally from my wife who was crying and pleading to leave them. The girls were screaming and the rebels just said, "you move, move, move."

⁹³Human Rights Watch interview, Roisin De Burca UNICEF, Freetown, June 7, 1999.

⁹⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 27, 1999.

⁹⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 6, 1999.

As they walked away, dragging the girls, my wife followed them up the street, but they told her they'd kill her and one said, "If I look around one more time and see you following me, you're all dead." She broke down when she came back to the house.

And at 8:00 p.m. another group came back. This time I was holding Mansa and I screamed at them "you can beat me, you can kill me but I'm not giving this girl to you." A few of them started hitting me and forced her from me. But, Mansa was really determined; as they took her out the door she somehow squirmed out of their grip and ran to the banana patch.⁹⁶

Josiah

Josiah, forty-one, was shot at as he begged for his sixteen year-old daughter not to be abducted on January 21. He recounted:

Seven of them came asking for money but we didn't have anything left; there was nothing left to loot. We were all in the parlor and they had their guns on us, when one of them looked at my first-born Aminata and said, "if you don't have any money then, we'll take your daughter." I started shouting and said, "no, no, don't take my daughter, I beg you. If I had money I'd give you. I'd give you anything." Then the same rebel turned towards me, raised his gun and shot at me.

He missed and then Aminata, who was crying by this time said, "pa, let me go with them, so that they don't kill you, let me go with them." As they pulled her away I cried bitterly, I cried and the one who shot me said, "why are you crying, You can always get another child." They walked out and that was the last time I saw my daughter.⁹⁷

Miata

Miata, fourteen, was abducted on January 9 but escaped several weeks later as the rebels withdrew to the hills. She was sexually abused by the rebel who abducted her. She described how she was taken after her grandfather couldn't raise the sum of money the rebels demanded:

A rebel came to the house and said he was going to burn it. Then he started searching for hidden Kamajor fighters and lifted all the cushions on the sofa. He struck a match and tried to set the parlor on fire and then went from room to room using abusive language against my grandpa and my mother and President Tejan Kabbah's mother and then he entered the room where me and my cousins were hiding.

So he looked for the smallest one, that was me, and told my grandpa that if he didn't give him 30,000 leones (U.S.\$15) he was taking me to the bush. My mom and grandpa started pleading because they didn't have that money. So he took me away. But before he did he went to the back and took two chickens and told me to hold them. He said if he saw my people following us he would damage them. And then he pulled out a big sword and I started crying. He said if I cried he would kill me with it.⁹⁸

Augustine

Augustine, thirty-nine, was abducted on January 23 with his wife and seven-year-old son. He spent several weeks with the rebels before managing to escape during an ECOMOG bombardment. His wife and child are still missing. He said:

We were hiding in an abandoned house but the rebels caught us...The column was massive and went on for miles; there were thousand of rebels and captives fleeing into the hills. When they saw us they pulled us into the mass and one of them gave me a heavy pipe, one of those used to fire a mortar bomb, and told me if I dropped it he would shoot me.

They ordered my wife and son to walk with the women's group, and I was put in the "G4 group," responsible for taking arms, ammunition, and such. That thing was really heavy. There were many other captives; young men and

⁹⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 1, 1999.

⁹⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 8, 1999.

⁹⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 27, 1999.

even children in my group as well. Along the way I saw four dead people who the rebels said were killed for dropping their loads. They don't go along any trails; they go straight through the bush. We reached Waterloo two days later and for another day the people were still coming; women, pregnant women, children being carried by abductees.

It was when we came under heavy bombardment a few weeks later that I was able to escape and make it back to Freetown. I try not to think about Sahr; he is my only son. As long as we were in the bush we slept together and he'd tell me he missed his sisters and wanted to go home. But when I had the opportunity to escape, I just had to and now I haven't heard or seen him for over two months.⁹⁹

Treatment of Prisoners

There are several accounts of RUF forces executing captured ECOMOG soldiers and members of the Civil Defense Forces, mainly Kamajors; some after they had clearly attempted to surrender. Some of the prisoners were killed on the spot, and some were executed after having been humiliated and tortured. A few were taken as prisoners and remain under rebel control.

Mariatu

Mariatu, forty-six, described the January 6 execution of three ECOMOG prisoners captured hiding within a storeroom in the "Clay Factory" displaced camp. She recounted:

There was a contingent of ECOMOG soldiers living next to our camp within the Safecon Factory. They were all Nigerians and had their girlfriends in the camp so we got to know them quite well.

On the morning of the attack they tried, but the rebels were too many and when they knew they were being overpowered, they stripped off their uniforms and went into hiding. Many of them fled down to the waterside, hoping to get a boat, some of them ran up the hills and some stripped off their uniforms and went into hiding.

At around 2:00 am or so, about a hundred rebels stormed the camp, and asked us where they [ECOMOG soldiers] were hiding. They hit and slapped us, and took a few of us around as hostages as they searched every corner of the camp. A few hours later they finally found three of them hiding among the bags in the storeroom. They all had tribal markings so it was obvious. They were Sgt. Hassan Orgg, RSM Haruna, and Staff Sergeant Amedu.

When the rebels caught them the Nigerians put up their hands and said, "We want to surrender, take us, we want to surrender!" but the commander said, "Oh fuck off, when our brothers came to you people to surrender you killed them, so now that's what we're going to do to you."

They opened fire on Sgt. Orgg and the Staff Sergeant Amedu right there near the store. But RSM Haruna, who they knew was operating the AA machine gun, they really treated him badly; they tied his hands, beat him horribly, put a pistol in his mouth and shot him through the head. Then they dragged his body out to the middle of the highway and ran over his head with a hi-lux.

The rebels had by this time found the ECOMOG uniforms in the store and put them on. Then a girlfriend of one of the ECOMOG soldiers started pointing out where the others, including her own boyfriend, were hiding and then pointed out the houses of all the girlfriends of the other Nigerians. I guess she was working as a rebel spy because after her ECOMOG boyfriend was killed down by the water, she went into town with the rebels.¹⁰⁰

Aaron

Aaron, forty-eight, witnessed the killing of one ECOMOG soldier, and the brutalization and torture of another on January 6 in central Freetown. He recounted:

On January 9, I saw an ECOMOG prisoner, bloody, stripped naked and with a rope around his waist and his private parts, being led up Pademba Road by a group of rebels. They were pushing him and ordering civilians to touch his

⁹⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 7, 1999.

¹⁰⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 11, 1999.

privates. When they reached a rebel checkpoint, they brought out another ECOMOG soldier who was also naked and looked like he'd been horribly beaten up. Then they lay both of them on the ground and some of the rebels started kicking and beating them. Then, a few of them took a machete and started cutting off the head of the second soldier. It took them about ten minutes and when they were finished, they started dancing around and brought it around to show the other soldier. I felt sick.

By this time there was a lot of gunfire and it seemed like the rebels were going really mad. They pushed the other prisoner down and grabbed a long stick and started shoving it up his backside; sodomizing him. They kept doing it for about thirty minutes. The soldier was screaming and crying and eventually just passed out. And then they shot him and just left him in the gutter. He was very bloody and everyone thought he was dead. But, several hours later he regained consciousness and called people to come and help him.¹⁰¹

Violations of Medical Neutrality

There are many accounts of RUF forces storming and occupying both public and private hospitals in which they threatened hospital staff, looted and destroyed hospital property, and in a few cases mutilated and executed patients.

Sierra Leone's biggest public hospital, Connaught Hospital, suffered most from these violations. Doctors, nurses, and patients describe how the hospital was stormed by RUF fighters on January 6, and turned into a rebel base. They described how the hospital filled up with hundreds of rebel fighters who then used the premises for cooking, washing, and cleaning their weapons. The hospital was looted and both ambulances destroyed. Patients were removed from their hospital beds and were then replaced with wounded rebels. Patients' possessions were looted and as wounded civilians entered the hospital they were robbed by rebel fighters.

While most medical personnel ran away, the few doctors and nurses who remained on duty were threatened with death if rebel commanders died, and forced to work long hours under unsanitary conditions. When they tried to rest they were sought after and brought back to work under gunpoint. When wounded civilians entered the hospital, doctors were ordered at gunpoint not to treat them. Most of these patients died.

Nurses describe how on January 6, in the Curney Barnes Memorial Hospital, rebels violently shook the leg of a patient whose fractured leg had just been operated on, whilst accusing him of being an ECOMOG soldier. Five nursing staff were kept at gunpoint while they looted shoes, radios, jewelry, and money from the patients, stole medicines and instruments from the hospital and set the outpatient ward on fire. The hospital closed down the next day.¹⁰²

In Good Shepherd Hospital in Kissy, after removing and executing one Nigerian patient from the hospital on January 18, rebels forced all ambulatory patients, staff members, and other civilians to a nearby wall and then shot some fifteen of them. At least one nurse and a few relatives of the patients were wounded and several others died. Later the same day a fourteen-year-old rebel walked around the wards threatening patients with a hand-grenade. The hospital closed down the following day after rebels threatened to burn it and kill all staff.¹⁰³

In the Summertime Clinic in Kissy, nurses described patients belongings and medicines being looted by the rebels on several occasions. One nurse said, "over the course of a week, we lost seven patients, simply for lack of medicine. They needed antibiotics but the rebels had stolen what we needed to help keep our patients alive."¹⁰⁴

In the Kissy Mental Home, rebel forces killed five patients and attacked several others, including one man whose legs they attempted to amputate with a machete. They also looted and burned part of the hospital.¹⁰⁵

Paul

¹⁰¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 17, 1999.

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch interview, nurse, Curney Barnes Hospital, Freetown, May 10, 1999.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch interview, nurse, Good Shephard Hospital, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

¹⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, nurse, Summertime Clinic, Freetown, May 6, 1999.

¹⁰⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, nurse, Kissy Mental Hospital, May 6, 1999.

Paul, a doctor at Connaught Hospital, described how the rebels threatened to kill him if their wounded commanders died of their injuries or if he treated the civilian wounded:

On January 6 we received the first wounded rebel at around 5:30 a.m.; several rebels brought him in. They told me at gunpoint he was a very important commander and, "if he dies, you too will die because this man is far more important than you are."

By 6:30 I'd received three more rebels with gunshot wounds. By this time there was heavy gunfire all around. Again they threatened me saying they'd kill me if any of them died; that they didn't care how I did it.

Over the next few days the hospital was turned into a command center. The rebels were bringing in bags of rice and cooking, drinking beer, and smoking pot, doing their laundry, coming and going. I saw them telling patients to vacate their beds on wards three, five, and seven, replacing them with their own wounded. They looted from the patients and even stole from the wounded civilians and their families as they entered the hospital.

In the morning hours I also received about ten wounded civilians; all gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen. The rebels threatened me, again at gunpoint, not to give medicine to or treat any civilians. And I lost them one after the other—they all died.

By 16:00 I was exhausted. I'd been working non-stop; the conditions were terrible and unsanitary, there was blood everywhere, I had no gloves, it was filthy.

By 20:00 we received the heaviest casualties; three wood carts loaded with over sixty wounded, all of them civilians. Of these I can tell you only fifteen survived. Most of the wounded were head and abdomen injuries but the operating theater wasn't working, no nurse, no medicines. All we could do was stop the bleeding. By the next day there were over 200 corpses in the morgue.¹⁰⁶

V. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY ECOMOG, SIERRA LEONEAN DEFENSE FORCES, AND POLICE

Summary Executions

Human Rights Watch has taken the testimonies of witnesses to over 180 summary executions of rebel prisoners and their suspected collaborators, mostly by ECOMOG forces but also by members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), and the Special Security Division (SSD) of the Sierra Leonean Police (who when on combat operations are under ECOMOG command). While the victims were overwhelmingly young men, witnesses confirm the execution of some women, and children as young as eight.

It is difficult to ascertain the level at which the ECOMOG, CDF and SLA high command were aware of or sanctioned these killings. As they were often carried out in highly public places and in front of very large groups of people, it is highly unlikely that knowledge of the executions did not reach the highest levels of command. According to witnesses and survivors, the executions were done with the consent and sometimes participation of ECOMOG officers to the level of captain.

ECOMOG soldiers deployed in Sierra Leone have operated under extremely difficult conditions, and many have been traumatized by what they have seen of rebel atrocities. As one ECOMOG soldier participating in an operation in which executions took place said, "we have a proper code of conduct. We know about the Geneva Conventions and have taken prisoners in the past, but this time was different. The things these people do. This time my unit took very few prisoners."¹⁰⁷ Another soldier added, "In many ways we felt we were doing it for the people. Sometimes we wonder if these rebels are human. After everything they've done, it was best to eliminate them."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶Human Rights Watch interview, doctor, Connaught Hospital, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

¹⁰⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 19, 1999.

¹⁰⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 30, 1999.

Most Nigerian soldiers, the largest component of ECOMOG, have been deployed in Sierra Leone for at least one year without respite, or visits home. Some soldiers, particularly those that were deployed in Sierra Leone after previously serving in the ECOMOG forces in Liberia, have not been back to Nigeria for over two years. What with the difficulty in communicating through phone or mail, many soldiers complain of losing touch with their families. The soldiers are supposed to be paid a special U.S.\$150 per month allowance in addition to their wages while they are on active duty in ECOMOG, but until recently there have often been delays of up to three months in receiving this money. Commanders cite these difficulties as contributing to problems with low morale among their troops.

These difficulties do not excuse abuses by ECOMOG, and serve rather to reinforce the need for ECOMOG's senior command to improve discipline and morale among their soldiers. Moreover, under international law, abuses by one side in a conflict, however appalling, can never excuse retaliatory abuses by opposing forces.

Prisoners, some of whom had surrendered and many of whom were wounded, were frequently executed on the spot. Suspected rebel collaborators or sympathizers were often killed with little or no effort to establish their guilt or innocence. Some of the victims were rounded up during small "mopping up operations," and many were executed at ECOMOG checkpoints after being found with weapons, determined to have improper identification, or denounced by the local population.

Scores of executions by ECOMOG and to a lesser extent CDF and SSD forces took place on the Aberdeen Bridge in western Freetown, which during the rebel incursion was under the command of an ECOMOG captain who during this time earned the name of "Captain Evil Spirit" among the local population.¹⁰⁹ Human Rights Watch took testimonies from witnesses who saw at least ninety-eight executions on this bridge from January 7 through January 29. According to these witnesses, small groups of young men were brought to the entrance to the bridge in trucks and cars, and arrived usually stripped down to their underwear and often with their hands tied. They were then marched onto the bridge where they were executed and thrown into the bay. While ECOMOG soldiers, and sometimes "Captain Evil Spirit," did most of the killing, CDF-Kamajors also took part. Members of the SSD were often present and have been seen throwing the bodies into the water.

One witness, who saw scores of executions on the bridge, was told by a soldier that most of the victims had been captured during military operations and at checkpoints in other parts of the capital, and were then handed over by ECOMOG soldiers, CDF-Kamajors, or civil defense unit members to the captain for execution. Another witness said many of those executed formed part of an informal organization of the sons of former SLA soldiers, many of whom lived within either the Murray Town Barracks or Wilberforce Barracks.¹¹⁰ Witnesses said most of the executions on the bridge were done by the same ten soldiers who fell directly under "Captain Evil Spirit's" command.

Several witnesses described the ECOMOG execution of over fifty rebels in and around Connaught Hospital on January 11, in violation of the laws of war protecting those no longer capable of fighting. Wounded rebels were dragged from their beds and executed within the hospital grounds, or shot directly in their beds or as they tried to flee on crutches and in wheelchairs. Others were executed in the morgue where they were caught trying to hide among the corpses.

Another incident involved the January 19 killing of seven civilians who had sought refuge within the Jami Ul-Masjid Mosque. Witnesses also saw executions taking place on the wharves around Susan's Bay, in the National Stadium, and near Ferry Junction. Witnesses saw several people, particularly women, executed after trying to smuggle pistols and cartridges in their hair or hidden underneath children strapped to their backs. There were also reports of freshly severed heads being displayed near a CDF-Kamajor base in the Brookfields neighborhood.

The high degree of rebel infiltration into the capital in the months prior to the January 6 incursion heightened the sense of suspicion among the local population. When ECOMOG regained control of the city, anyone unknown to a given neighborhood became suspect. As Freetown residents went out in search of food, to check on relatives, to bury friends, and the like, they were

¹⁰⁹The name of this ECOMOG captain was provided to Human Rights Watch but has been withheld.

¹¹⁰Many of the SLA soldiers had taken part in the 1997 AFRC/RUF coup, and fled to the bush when ECOMOG expelled them from the capital. Their families, many of whom continued to live within the military barracks in the capital, were often accused of collaboration with ECOMOG.

obliged to pass through numerous ECOMOG checkpoints. It was at these checkpoints that young men who were unknown to the local residents were often denounced as rebel collaborators and subsequently executed.

Some victims and witnesses describe going through a brief "trial," either on the street or at a checkpoint during which an alibi was checked out and someone able to verify the suspect's identity was sent for. The "judgment" was then pronounced by an ECOMOG officer, and the execution then carried out by ECOMOG soldiers, or members of the CDF or SSD. Others were given no time to explain themselves and simply executed on the spot. The local population exploited the tense situation to settle personal vendettas against individuals and families by denouncing debtors, love rivals, or those with whom they'd had an argument.

The executions often took place within the context of joint operations usually involving ECOMOG and CDF-Kamajor forces. After ECOMOG identified suspected rebels or collaborators, they were frequently handed over to and executed by the CDF-Kamajors. Also, members of local, unarmed, civil defense units (CDUs), who during the offensive and its aftermath helped to man checkpoints around the city, frequently played a part in identifying rebels and their collaborators.

Dwight

Dwight, twenty-five, lived underneath the Aberdeen Bridge and described witnessing scores of executions, mostly of young men, by ECOMOG soldiers. He recounted:

From where I lived you could see everything. The first time I ever saw a public execution was on January 7, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. I saw Captain Evil Spirit and his boys [soldiers] marching seven young men in their underwear down to the bridge and then as they got closer I recognized several of them to be people from the neighborhood. I saw my friend Ismael and several more. Some of them were the sons of former SLA soldiers and had been living in Murray Town Barracks. Evil did the firing and then the SSD men threw the bodies over the bridge.

On January 8, around 10:00 am, I saw them killing fifteen prisoners. Captain Evil was there and killed some of them this time as well. On January 9 I saw them kill two people and on January 10 I saw them kill a man who had a bullet in his foot. I heard later he was accused of being a rebel and had been brought to Captain Evil by one of the CDU people manning checkpoints in town.¹¹¹ On January 11, we buried sixteen corpses which we fished out of the water underneath the bridge.

On January 14 at around 3:00 p.m. the ECOMOG soldiers brought a big group of prisoners; they were eighteen in number. I saw them [the prisoners] get down from a truck and walk them down to the bridge where the same ten soldiers executed them and threw them over. We were later told they were rebels who'd been captured in the east [of Freetown].

Every day they [the soldiers] killed people—two, three, four a day. We feared that man, Evil. He never gave anybody a chance to explain... some people even called him "Captain No Explain." There was a man from our neighborhood who was caught by him. I was told the other ECOMOGs tried to convince Evil that he was a boy from the neighborhood but he wouldn't listen and killed him anyway. The boy was an only child and his mother went crazy. A few times we saw her go to Evil's house and ask to see him. She started screaming, "You, I want you to kill me too... you've killed my only son. You show me where you've buried my boy."¹¹²

Hassan

Hassan, twenty-nine, who also lived underneath Aberdeen Bridge, witnessed both ECOMOG soldiers and CDF-Kamajor militias killing suspected rebels. He recounted:

¹¹¹The civil defense units are unarmed units made up of local civilians. The CDUs were set up following the ECOMOG intervention of February 1998 which ousted the AFRC/RUF junta and restored elected President Tejan Kabbah to power.

¹¹²Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 7, 1999.

The first time I saw the executions was on January 7 at around 3:00 p.m. I saw eight people being brought down from the guardroom [a checkpoint near the bridge] with their hands tied behind them. They were marched down by two ECOMOGs, Captain Evil Spirit, and another one. But it was Evil who did the firing.

Over the next several weeks I saw them kill at least forty people. And there were a lot more done at night that I couldn't see. It was always the same thing: you'd hear people screaming and begging "no don't kill me, I beg," and then in less than five minutes you'd hear shots and then the splash as they threw them into the bay. And then we'd see their bodies floating in the water the next morning. I buried at least nineteen bodies between January 8 to 22.

I also saw about eight Kamajors execute people on three different days. The first time they killed two people, the second time five people, and the third time ten people. A few ECOMOGs were with them but it was the Kamajors who were in charge of the executions.¹¹³

Tamba

Tamba, forty-five, described witnessing the execution of at least fifty rebels, some wounded, when ECOMOG soldiers stormed Connaught Hospital on January 11. The rebels, who had been occupying the hospital since they entered the city on January 6, were largely caught by surprise. Tamba described how the rebels tried frantically to escape, how hospital personnel were made to identify their rebel patients, and how all those they identified were later executed:

There was a lot of gunfire, and as the rumors about ECOMOG started flying the rebels in the hospital started panicking. Both the wounded ones and the others who'd been hiding in the hospital stripped off their fatigues and tried to get away.

A group of about twenty started demanding gauze and tape and then wrapped their arms and feet to try to make it look like they were wounded. Then they slipped out the back entrance to the hospital. After walking a block up Liverpool Street they ran straight into a group of advancing ECOMOG troops who opened up on them; right on the spot. At about the same time I saw a rebel "wife" searching frantically for a wheelchair to move her wounded rebel boyfriend; they got it as well, not far from the first group.

Then, as this was going on, another group of about fifteen—they were hiding near the stairwell under ward ten—started putting white cotton into their noses, and then slipped through the back door and went into the morgue to hide among the corpses. A few minutes later, I think it was around 11:30 a.m., the ECOMOG soldiers rushed into the hospital from several directions. They had their guns out and were pointing and asking all of us to identify ourselves. Someone alerted them about the group that had gone into the morgue and three of them rushed in and started shooting and screaming, "so you're dead— well now you're going to be dead twice."

By this time the ECOMOGs had identified who the hospital staff were and told them they had information there were rebels hiding among the patients and they told them [the hospital workers] to identify which were rebels and which were real patients. So three ECOMOGs, and a few CDUs [civil defense unit members], went from ward to ward, telling the hospital workers to identify the rebels.

Most of the patients weren't killed in their beds; they had the CDUs pull the patients from their beds and drag them to the entrance to the outpatient ward. That's where they killed them. They dragged out one rebel from ward one, four from ward three, four from ward five, and four from the OPD [outpatient department]. And then they shot all thirteen of them.

All of the ECOMOG soldiers took part in the killing. They even killed a small rebel who looked to be about eight and another one who was about thirteen. A few of them tried to surrender. I heard one rebel scream, "I beg you, don't shoot me wait, I'll talk." but they killed them anyway. They even killed some behind the wards and in front of the entrance to the hospital.

¹¹³Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

Anyway, there were a lot of dead rebels that day. I watched as they kept bringing all the bodies into the morgue. I must have counted at least sixty. Even some of the patients were telling the ECOMOGs where the rebels were hiding.¹¹⁴

Moses

Moses, thirty-two, saw a husband and wife pulled out of a line at a checkpoint and executed, after a civilian accused them of being rebels. He recounted:

On January 25, I was waiting in line at a checkpoint near the Congo Cross Bridge with about 200 other people. I was about forty yards back when all of a sudden this woman coming from the other direction starts pointing her finger at another woman, who I later recognized as a friend of mine named Ami, and started screaming, "She's a rebel, I know her, I saw her armed, she's a rebel."

The ECOMOG soldiers then pulled Ami out of the line, who by this time was denying the accusation. But the accuser continued screaming very convincingly that she'd seen Ami armed in Kissy earlier in the month. And then at about this time Ami's husband walked from the back of the line and tried to defend his wife saying it was all a misunderstanding. But the ECOMOG soldiers just pushed both of them to one side and started slapping them. They asked them a few questions, but that woman was accusing them the whole time.

Then about ten minutes after the accusation was made, the ECOMOG officer, he had three stripes [a sergeant rank], gave the command that Ami and her husband should be executed. When they heard this, they started crying and begging, but the soldiers pulled them away from the line, pulled their clothes off, took them to the side of the bridge and shot them. The one who'd ordered it didn't kill them. He just watched. And then he ordered them buried right there.

We heard later from Ami's father who was also in the line, that the accuser had been an old girlfriend of one of Ami's past boyfriends and that they'd never liked each other. Ami's father complained to the ECOMOG people, but by then it was too late.¹¹⁵

Bintu

Bintu, twenty-nine, was nearly executed on January 22 after being unable to verify her identity. She recounted:

I was walking home with my four children when I was stopped and searched at the checkpoint near the Aberdeen Bridge. They asked me where I was coming from and I told them the truth, that I'd been living with a friend of my husband's named Isaac. So, they sent a soldier to check out my story and he came back a few minutes later with Isaac who denied that he knew me. I think he was so traumatized by everything and was just afraid.

The soldiers at the checkpoint then took me to see "Captain Evil Spirit." The soldiers handed him my ID, explained the case and asked Isaac if he knew me, to which he replied, "no" and then Evil said, "well, take this lady for execution." The "trial" lasted three minutes and that was it.

I started screaming, my children started screaming, I begged for my life saying there was no one to take care of my children, I told them it was a mistake, that it wasn't fair and then one of the ECOMOG soldiers hit me on the head with his gun and I started bleeding. And then they started leading me down to the bridge.

A few minutes later one of the ECOMOGs suddenly ran down after us shouting, "leave her, one of her children confirmed the story, don't shoot her." Then the other soldier walked me back up and as I was gathering up my things, another soldier tied up Isaac and shoved him in the back of a pickup. As I was fleeing we heard shots and they saw his body floating in the bay the next day.

¹¹⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 6, 1999.

¹¹⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

Whenever I see Isaac's family I don't know what to say. It wasn't my fault. I don't know why he denied he knew me. I think about it every day and feel broken inside.¹¹⁶

Abu

Abu, eleven, witnessed his mother being executed by an armed SSD policeman after a neighbor with whom they had a business dispute accused her of being a rebel. He recounted:

A few days before it happened my mom had a terrible argument with a guy named Francis over some goods that had gone missing. He accused my mom and our friend Foday of having taken the goods.

At noon on the day it happened, an SSD man and an ECOMOG soldier came and arrested Foday and my mom, and accusing all of us, even me, of being a rebel. Francis was there the whole time, accusing us as well. The SSD man started threatening us and saying "today your life is over, even you small boy; small boys like you even kill our officers."

The community chief tried to help us but an hour later the SSD man and an ECOMOG man took Foday away to the wharf and I saw from a distance I saw the SSD man shot him. The chief finally convinced them to release my mom but as we were walking back I saw Francis and the SSD man talking secretly and then the SSD man said he wanted my mom to walk towards the wharf. My mom got scared and started to run away from them and the SSD man just shot her. Three times he shot her.

That man came back here a few weeks ago and I started yelling at him and said "you, you're the one who killed my mother." He slapped me and told me to "shut up." He's training to be in the new Sierra Leonean army now, so we haven't seen him.¹¹⁷

Helen

Helen, nineteen, witnessed the killing of her friend by a CDF-Kamajor on January 24. She said:

Early in the morning six of us, including my friend Fatmata, went in search of firewood. The situation was still very tense. About thirty minutes later we were stopped by a checkpoint manned by two Sierra Leonean soldiers and two Kamajors.

They started accusing us of being rebels and ordered us at gunpoint to lie face down on the ground. They started insulting us and gave us a real beating. They hardly asked us any questions and just had it in their mind that we were rebels.

Then the Sierra Leonean soldier told Ali, the one man in our group, that they were going to kill him, and fired a shot near his legs. We started begging and telling them we were innocent and then Fati just jumped up and ran to hide in a house about twenty yards away.

One of the Kamajors followed her to the house and ordered her to come out. He threatened to kill her and I guess the lady inside convinced Fati to come out. But as soon as she did the Kamajor just opened up on her. As I was lying on the ground I watched as he just fired and fired and fired. He shot her more than ten times.¹¹⁸

Daniel

Daniel, forty-one, witnessed the killing of seven civilians inside the Jami Ul-Masjid mosque, after an ECOMOG officer ordered their execution. He explained :

¹¹⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

¹¹⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 14, 1999.

¹¹⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 19, 1999.

On Monday January 18, ECOMOG came to liberate the area. They told the eighty or so civilians inside to leave which all but about ten of us did. It was still very tense. The advancing troops had left eight ECOMOG soldiers in the mosque and they deployed up the tower and around the grounds.

At 6:15 a.m. the next morning, one of the soldiers deployed downstairs went upstairs and as he did there was the sound of a shot. Everyone ran to see what happened and found him lying slumped on the stairs. The stairs were very narrow and blocked with peoples' bags, and the other soldiers surmised that his gun had accidentally gone off as he was climbing up. The other soldiers pulled him down and got on the radio to inform their superiors what'd happened.

Shortly before 9:00 a.m., a lieutenant and captain entered; I could tell by the marks on their uniform. They asked for an explanation and both the soldiers and a few of the civilians told them and showed them the cartridge which they'd found under the stairs. The officers went to inspect the site to see if anyone could've shot him but since the place is in a stairwell surrounded by thick walls, the lieutenant concluded "it must've been the gun that went off," and everybody agreed. Then they left.

And then, not eight minutes later, another officer accompanied by at least eighty soldiers came in and deployed everywhere. By this time all the civilians, there were nine of them, were sitting near where Muslims wash their feet. So the officer in charge—I couldn't see what rank he was because he was wearing green overalls, but he was about forty, had a walkie-talkie and was obviously the man in charge—asked angrily who the soldiers deployed there were.

Several of the new soldiers started accusing the civilians of having killed the soldier and the soldiers who were deployed there started saying, "no, it was an accident." Then the big man ordered that the original lot be disarmed and said, "why are you protecting these people and hiding their act," and as they were being disarmed turned to the civilians and said "we're going to kill all of these people." He then ordered the first one to stand and told a soldier to shoot him. They he told everyone else to lie down which they did. I could hear them praying to Mohammed, to Jesus. They didn't ask for an explanation and blocked the entrance so no one could run and then they shot every one of them. It wasn't five minutes from the time that officer came into the mosque until he ordered them to die. He stormed out taking the disarmed soldiers with him. It was so unfair. I don't know what was wrong with that man.

A few minutes later a few ECOMOG soldiers from the first group came back. They were really upset. I heard them say, "why did he do this—we didn't come to Sierra Leone to kill innocent people."¹¹⁹

ECOMOG military officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they took between 200 and 300 RUF rebels as prisoners of war during the January 1999 offensive, and that throughout the offensive they strictly followed the procedures established in the Geneva Conventions and acted in accordance with international humanitarian law on the taking of prisoners and other military conduct of war.¹²⁰

According to Lt. Col. Chris Olukolade, the chief military information officer of ECOMOG, no soldiers or officers have been formally investigated or court martialed as a result of their conduct during the January offensive. He said, "within ECOMOG there is an internal mechanism set up for the investigation of violations of international humanitarian law, and although we've heard of individual complaints, none have been sufficient enough to activate this mechanism."¹²¹

Colonel Buhari Musa, the commander of the Freetown garrison under whose jurisdiction most of Freetown, including the Aberdeen Bridge, falls, said there have been a few lower level investigations of executions following complaints by members of the public, but that the allegations were proven to be baseless and subsequently dropped. He said, "I heard about the allegations of executions and I took it up. There have been a few investigations into accusations of summary executions having been committed by soldiers under my command, which have been conducted at the brigade level, but we didn't find anything

¹¹⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 20, 1999.

¹²⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Colonel Buhari Musa, commander Freetown garrison, Freetown, June 11, 1999.

¹²¹Human Rights Watch phone interview, Lt. Colonel Chris Olukolade, Freetown, June 11, 1999.

substantial. There have been no formal inquiries or disciplinary actions taken against any soldier or officers under my command as a result of the what took place during the January rebel offensive."¹²²

Following a United Nations report in February 1999 which expressed concern about summary executions, the ECOMOG high command indicated to the U.N. secretary-general's special representative in Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo, "their intention to investigate these allegations and to take corrective action as necessary."¹²³ In April, the ECOMOG force commander Felix Mujakperuo established a Civil/Military Relations Committee to investigate allegations of human rights violations against individual members of ECOMOG and CDF and recommend appropriate action to the high authorities.¹²⁴ However, the start date for complaints to be investigated is April 1, thus none of the executions committed in January and February will be eligible for investigation under this committee.

Looting and Brutality

Witnesses, particularly from the eastern suburbs of Kissy, Wellington, and Calaba Town observed CDF-Kamajor fighters looting property from the homes of civilians who had fled to get away from the fighting. Thousands of civilians had fled from the eastern areas to take shelter in the homes of relatives and in camps of displaced people, leaving entire neighborhoods largely unoccupied. Witnesses described the CDF-Kamajors going into these areas ostensibly to search and secure them, but then leaving with bundles of clothes, electrical items, radios, and other items. Once civilians reoccupied their homes, the looting decreased significantly.

ECOMOG, CDF-Kamajors, and SSD police in charge of manning the many checkpoints in Freetown were accused of using extreme brutality against the civilian population. Witnesses described people being slapped, pushed, humiliated, and forced to do painful physical exercises as "punishment" for such insignificant "offenses" such as not waiting one's turn in line, not answering questions in sufficient detail, or riding a bike through a checkpoint.

There were reports of mistreatment by ECOMOG soldiers of members of some international nongovernmental organizations, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who were accused of being rebel collaborators. Members of ECOMOG confiscated property, including vehicles and radios, and several ICRC expatriate staff were deported after being detained and interrogated.

Detention

Social workers for local humanitarian organizations have documented the mistreatment of suspected child rebels while in the custody of both ECOMOG and CDF-Kamajors. One international NGO received reports of "several" children being beaten while in ECOMOG's Wilberforce Barracks during the months of January and February. A local NGO documented the physical abuse of over thirty street children suspected of being rebel collaborators, both during capture by ECOMOG and Sierra Leonean Police and while in detention in Wilberforce Barracks.

Local social workers also expressed concern about the periodic detention of children and adults by the Kamajor Civil Defense Forces. The Kamajors don't have an official barracks or military headquarters, and have adopted a local hotel as their base, the Bookfields Hotel in central Freetown. It is within this hotel that several witnesses reported to Human Rights Watch seeing detainees held by the Kamajors. As the detentions are not officially acknowledged, they are not subject to governmental regulations and monitoring. They are also illegal.

Execution of a Journalist

There is a highly reliable report of the killing by ECOMOG forces of a journalist named Abdul Jumah Jalloh, who at the time worked for an independent newspaper, the *African Champion*. According to an investigation carried out by the Sierra Leonean Union of Journalists, Mr. Jalloh was publicly accused of being an RUF rebel by a member of a civil defense unit, who then alerted a patrol of ECOMOG soldiers. Mr. Jalloh identified himself as a journalist and produced his press identification card,

¹²²Human Rights Watch interview, Colonel Buhari Musa, commander Freetown garrison, Freetown, June 11, 1999.

¹²³*Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone* (New York: United Nations, March 4, 1999), U.N. document S/1999/237, p.7.

¹²⁴The membership in the committee includes representatives of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the Bar Association, the police, the media, civil society and the governments. UNOMSIL participates in an observer capacity.

but was later taken to a checkpoint near State House and subsequently executed. His death, which occurred in the last week of January, was denounced by his editor, Mohamed Koroma, who was with him at the time of his detention, and who has since left the country. Human Rights Watch has been unable to find a direct witness to this killing.

Failure to Minimize Civilian Casualties

Joseph

Civilians making up part of a human shield often described feeling surprised when ECOMOG either opened fire on them or bombed them from the air. Joseph, a thirty-five-year-old man, who on January 7 was forced by the RUF rebels to walk down Wilberforce Street as part of a human shield, described his confusion when they were later bombed by an ECOMOG jet:

I was one of several hundred civilians; we'd all been ordered out of our houses at gunpoint and forced to join in a march. They made us put white bands around our heads and told us to shout "we want peace, we want peace" as we walked down the street. The rebels really wanted to infiltrate the west of the city and I later thought their plan had been to use the big "peace march" to break into the west.

When the jets passed over of course we saw them, of course we heard them, but we just never, never thought they would drop those bombs. There were so many of us and even though they were flying fast, they passed at least three times and it must've been obvious we were civilians. When the rebels ran for cover I thought it was because they didn't want ECOMOG to see them. I just didn't think it was because they were going to bomb us.¹²⁵

Brig.-Gen. Maxwell Khobe, a Nigerian seconded to be the Sierra Leonean chief of defense staff, stated to journalists on February 2, 1999 that rebels had managed to enter Freetown in January only because they had used civilians as human shields. He said, "from hindsight, I believe it would have been better to kill all those that have come, even if they were civilians, in order save the majority. That was not done, and that was what was responsible for the entire thing that took place in Freetown." He said that in the future ECOMOG commanders have issued new "shoot the shields" orders and that, "if they try it again, we'll kill everything from the opposite direction."¹²⁶

Colonel Buhari Musa, commander of the Freetown garrison described the difficulty his soldiers faced when fighting an "unorthodox force" who often don't wear uniforms or have any special markings to distinguish them from the civilian population. He said "it's difficult for us to say what are the criteria for identification; both males and females, young and old are combatants. It is difficult and unfortunate. But sometimes you just have to fight and in such situations you will see that some lives are lost. It is unfortunate for whoever is the victim. But we tell our soldiers that everybody, even they have a right to their lives."¹²⁷

International humanitarian law forbids the use of human shields, but also requires that combatants minimize civilian casualties at all times, even if the civilian population is being used as a shield. Attacks on legitimate military targets are limited by the principle of proportionality as set out in Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, article 51. The attacker must choose a means of attack that avoids or minimizes damage to civilians, and in particular should refrain from launching an attack if the expected civilian casualties would outweigh the importance of the military target to the attackers.

VI. CHILDREN AS VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

During the January rebel incursion children were the victims of serious abuses committed by all parties to the conflict. They were not spared from any class of abuse and were, in some cases, purposefully targeted because of their age.

¹²⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 28, 1999.

¹²⁶Nigerian newspaper report posted to "Sierra Leone Web," February 3, 1999. Available at <www.sierraleone.org>.

¹²⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 11, 1999.

Some of the atrocities committed by the RUF rebels were unthinkable. Infants and children were thrown into burning houses, the hands of toddlers as young as two were severed with machetes, girls as young as eight were sexually abused, and hundreds of children of all ages were traumatically separated from their communities and forced to walk into the hills with strangers whom they had seen kill their family members.

In some cases children, many of them originally abductees, participated in the perpetration of these abuses. Child combatants armed with pistols, rifles, and machetes actively participated in killings and massacres, severed the arms of other children, and beat and humiliated men old enough to be their grandfathers. Often under the influence of drugs, they were known and feared for their impetuosity, lack of control, and brutality.

In some cases, ECOMOG and government forces summarily executed rebel child combatants and suspected collaborators they had captured; other children suffered physical abuse while in detention. Some child soldiers were beaten to death after being caught by members of local communities.

As children abducted by the rebels in January have been released or managed to escape, they have described the process of psychological and physical formation used to turn victim into perpetrator. They described a life of physical hardship, forced labor, substance abuse, and military training. In Freetown, parents speak of their frustration and guilt at their inability to protect their children.

For those hundreds of children who witnessed family members murdered in front of them, were forced to watch as a mother or sister was raped, or had to leave a wounded relative behind in a burning house, the events of January 1999 have no doubt produced deep psychological scars they will live with for the rest of their lives.

Two civilians, Adama and Zainab, expressed the ambivalence civilians have about the role of child combatants. On the one hand they are feared and misunderstood, and on the other, pitied as victims themselves.

Adama

Adama, a forty-two year old secretary, described the horror and fear adults felt at seeing children carry out terrible atrocities:

We feared them. They were cruel and hard hearted; even more than the adults. They don't know what is sympathy; what is good and bad. If you beg an older one you may convince him to spare you, but the younger ones, they don't know what is sympathy, what is mercy. Those who have been rebels for so long have never learned it.

Once, a rebel, a small boy in full combats, he couldn't have been more than twelve, called everyone out of the house across the street. The papa of the family, Pa Kamara, said, "please my son, leave my family," but the boy said, "listen, we can do anything we want in Freetown. We don't have mothers, we don't have fathers. We can do anything we wanna do." And that is how Pa Kamara died; the rebel boy shot him, in front of his wife, his children, his grandchildren. They are wicked, those boy soldiers. They spare no human life.¹²⁸

Zainab

Zainab, a twenty-four old market vendor, on the other hand, found that she could pity a child exhausted by combat:

Late one evening, a ten-year-old with a pistol came, alone, into our house. He told my husband his commander was hungry and wanted one of our chickens. While my husband was catching the hen, that boy sat down to wait. He was thin and exhausted. I brought him a biscuit and water. He said he was tired and weak and as he left with the chicken turned to me and said, "thank you, mam."

Later my neighbors criticized me for giving him that biscuit. I said I didn't care if he was a rebel or not. He's still somebody's child. Maybe he was abducted. God knows what they've done to him. I wanted to hide that boy and take him with us as we fled and just knew he would've come with us if he'd had the chance. I could see he wasn't happy.¹²⁹

¹²⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 20, 1999.

¹²⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 14, 1999.

VII. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Since the beginning of the conflict in 1991, the plight of civilians in Sierra Leone has had to compete with the other refugee-related emergencies on the African continent and elsewhere for the attention of the international community. Insofar as Sierra Leone has attracted international interest, attention has focused on the humanitarian needs of the displaced—or on the protection of mining concerns in Sierra Leone's diamond fields. As one human rights worker observed in 1998, "half the battle [has been] keeping Sierra Leone on the world's radar screen."¹³⁰ The January 1999 RUF occupation of Freetown brought more condemnation from the international community, but little more action. Only Sierra Leone's West African neighbors, in particular Nigeria, have put substantial resources into an attempt to keep the peace and restore respect for human rights and the rule of law.¹³¹ It is to be hoped that the visit of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson to Sierra Leone in June 1999 will contribute to a reversal of this neglect.

ECOWAS, ECOMOG, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

In accordance with bilateral security accords, Nigerian and Guinean forces from ECOMOG have been stationed in Sierra Leone since 1995 to help the NPRC and, later, the Kabbah government fight the RUF rebels. After the May 25, 1997 military coup of the AFRC, and its establishment of a coalition government with RUF rebels, hundreds of additional Nigerian soldiers assigned to ECOMOG in Liberia moved to Sierra Leone to defend the Freetown airport from attack. The Nigerian troops attempted to take Freetown itself, but were forced to withdraw. On June 26, 1997, ministers of foreign affairs from ECOWAS countries, supported by the OAU, demanded the reinstatement of the elected government of President Tejan Kabbah and formed a ministerial committee to monitor the situation in Sierra Leone. When negotiations with the new rulers in Sierra Leone collapsed, ECOWAS imposed an almost total embargo on Sierra Leone, enforced by the Nigerian navy, which was later reinforced by an October 1997 U.N. Security Council global arms and oil embargo and restrictions on international travel by families of the rebel leaders.¹³²

With the failure of diplomatic efforts for the restoration of peace and the reinstatement of the Kabbah government, ECOMOG's mandate was changed from sanction enforcement to actual military intervention to oust the rebel government. In February 1998, ECOMOG drove the AFRC/RUF forces away from the capital city of Freetown and reinstated President Kabbah, though it could not reestablish government control over the whole country; thus allowing the RUF resurgence and attack on Freetown in January 1999. ECOMOG now maintains security in and around Freetown, and has been able to expand its control to some other areas, although the rebels maintain their grip on much of the country.

Presently the ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone is led by Nigerian Major-General Felix Mujakperuo (who assumed command in March 1999) and is composed of approximately 14,000 troops, predominantly Nigerian, with Ghanaian, Malian, and Guinean support. The cost of maintaining the troops is being borne mostly by Nigeria (which is allegedly spending approximately U.S.\$1 million daily) and the other states that have contributed troops.¹³³

In addition to its peacekeeping role, ECOMOG's mandate also includes the implementation of a program for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (the DDR program), and training the new Sierra Leone army. Although ECOMOG has stated that the new army will be ethnically and regionally balanced,¹³⁴ there is also a need to underscore the importance for UNOMSIL to provide assistance and closely monitor the disarmament, demobilization, and training processes to assure that the new army is founded upon principles of respect for international humanitarian law.

¹³⁰Human Rights Watch interview, relief organization representative, Freetown, June 24, 1998.

¹³¹Nigerian support, through ECOMOG, for President Tejan Kabbah was perhaps motivated partly by domestic politics and by the desire of former military ruler Gen. Sani Abacha to gain credit on the international stage in the face of condemnation of his own dictatorial regime. Nevertheless, and although the ECOMOG intervention has been neither as effective nor as respectful for human rights on its own account as Sierra Leoneans would wish, it is undoubtedly true that the situation for many Sierra Leoneans has been significantly ameliorated by the presence of the ECOMOG forces.

¹³²See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Transition or Travesty," pp.38-41, for a discussion of the Nigerian role in the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone.

¹³³InterPress Service, May 31, 1999.

¹³⁴Press conference led by Brig. Gen. Maxwell Khobe, Wilberforce military base, June 25, 1998, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

On the humanitarian front, ECOWAS and the OAU have been consistent in their condemnation of the atrocities of the rebels. For example, in December 1998, the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee on Sierra Leone issued a communiqué deploring the torture, mutilations, amputations, and mass killings of innocent civilians. In March 1999, Salim Ahmed Salim, the secretary-general of the OAU, delivered a report to a session of the Council of Ministers, in which he condemned the January offensive on Freetown by the rebels. The OAU also reaffirmed its absolute support for the efforts of ECOWAS and ECOMOG.

ECOWAS has played an important role in facilitating peace negotiations between the RUF leaders and representatives of the government of President Kabbah, which are taking place in Togo, whose president is the current chair of ECOWAS.

The United Nations

The United Nations' initial reaction to the 1997 military coup by the Armed Forces Ruling Council was to condemn it and to place sanctions against the government formed by the rebels. The United Nations Security Council commended ECOWAS on its efforts to restore the ousted government of President Tejan Kabbah and urged member states to assist ECOMOG with financial and logistical support. It also condemned the atrocities perpetrated by the rebels, in particular against women and children.¹³⁵ The Security Council also made the determination that the crisis in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and that it would remain actively seized of the matter.

In July 1998, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved a resolution to establish the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), increasing the United Nations' military observer presence already in the country from approximately ten to seventy officers, along with civilian support and medical staff. UNOMSIL's mandate includes responsibility for monitoring and helping ECOMOG with the implementation of a program for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (the DDR program); reporting on the security situation; monitoring respect for international humanitarian law, including at disarmament and demobilization sites; and advising the government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment, and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies.¹³⁶

As RUF forces approached Freetown in late December 1998, the U.N. and other international agencies and foreign governments began withdrawing their staff from the country. On January 6, as the rebels entered the city, UNOMSIL completed its evacuation.¹³⁷ The relocation to Conakry, the capital of neighboring Guinea, was followed by a substantial reduction in the number of staff, in particular military and civilian police. On March 3, the decision was made to allow the return of a limited number of staff to Freetown.¹³⁸

On June 4, 1999, the U.N. secretary-general released his sixth report on UNOMSIL. The report noted a resurgence in rebel atrocities against civilians in recent months; the secretary-general's fifth report, issued in March, described similar atrocities committed during the rebel invasion and occupation of Freetown in January. Both reports also noted serious allegations that members of ECOMOG and the CDF had carried out summary executions of suspected rebels. The secretary-general described the worsening of an already desperate humanitarian situation across much of the country, noting that 2.6 million Sierra Leoneans, nearly half the population, were out of reach of humanitarian agencies, and that even where there was access, humanitarian efforts were still unable to reach all those in need.

The secretary-general also noted that ECOMOG had confirmed the involvement of the governments of Liberia and Burkina Faso in the shipment and delivery of arms to the forces of the RUF. Accordingly, the secretary-general had proposed the deployment of ECOMOG troops and U.N. personnel along the Sierra Leone border. Welcoming the proposal in principle, the

¹³⁵United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, October 8, 1997, U.N. document S/RES/1132 (1997).

¹³⁶United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181, July 13, 1998, U.N. document S/RES/1181 (1998) (sponsored by the U.K.).

¹³⁷*Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone* (New York: United Nations, January 7, 1999), U.N. document S/1999/20, section II.

¹³⁸*Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone* (New York: United Nations, March 4, 1999), U.N. document S/1999/237, paragraph 6.

executive secretary of ECOWAS had responded that U.N. logistical support would be necessary, including helicopters, communications, and ground transportation.

As of June 4, 1999, UNOMSIL consisted of twenty-four military observers, including two medical personnel, as well as twenty-nine international and twenty-four national staff members. The secretary-general's sixth report stated that it was planned to deploy additional observers up to the maximum of seventy set by U.N. Security Council resolution 1181 of July 13, 1998, to increase the civilian staff by two political officers, and to restore the human rights section to its previous staffing level of five persons. The secretary-general drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that, depending on the progress of the peace talks, it might well be necessary to deploy "a sizeable number of infantry and other observers, along with the necessary equipment and military logistical support," if the U.N. were to deploy effectively to assist in the implementation of an eventual peace agreement.¹³⁹ The secretary-general also "envisage[d] a significant expansion of the civilian personnel, including those engaged in political, human rights and logistical support functions."¹⁴⁰ On June 11, 1999, the Security Council extended the mission of UNOMSIL for a further six months, until December 13, 1999.¹⁴¹

The Sierra Leone Contact Group

In July 1998, a Sierra Leone Contact Group was established, following a special conference on Sierra Leone held at U.N. headquarters in New York. The first meeting of the Contact Group, chaired by the United Kingdom, took place on November 5, 1998, with objectives "to build up support for Sierra Leone's efforts to restore peace, democracy and human rights; to encourage further assistance to ECOMOG and contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Sierra Leone; to try to match specific ECOMOG requirements to donor offers; and to encourage the Government of Sierra Leone to develop political dialogue and national reconciliation beyond the programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and to encourage participation in it."¹⁴² The meeting expressed strong support for a "dual track" approach endorsed by the ECOWAS summit held in October, "by which efforts to strengthen ECOMOG would be accompanied by the opening of dialogue to achieve lasting peace and national reconciliation."¹⁴³

On April 4, 1999, the Contact Group held its second meeting, attended by representatives of twenty-two countries, the U.N., ECOWAS, ECOMOG, the European Commission, the Commonwealth, the World Bank and IMF, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and once again reaffirmed support for the "dual track" approach and for the 1996 Abidjan Accord as a framework for a negotiated settlement. The group condemned atrocities committed by the rebels, called on all sides to investigate abuses, and expressed concern at support coming to the RUF through Liberia and Burkina Faso.¹⁴⁴

The United Kingdom, European Union, and United States

The United Kingdom has provided more assistance to the ECOMOG and Sierra Leonean government forces than any other government from outside the region, and has also been the largest national donor to Sierra Leone of reconstruction aid and humanitarian assistance, committing more than £30 million in total to Sierra Leone since the restoration of President Kabbah in March 1998.¹⁴⁵ The assistance the U.K. has provided has included training and equipment for a new Sierra Leonean army.

The U.K.'s record on Sierra Leone has been tarnished by the government's handling of contacts between the government of President Kabbah and a U.K.-based private security company, Sandline International, during 1997 and 1998, which included

¹³⁹*Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone* (New York: United Nations, June 4, 1999), U.N. document S/1999/645, paragraph 55.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, paragraph 57.

¹⁴¹United Nations Security Council Resolution 1245, June 11, 1999, U.N. document [S/RES/1245(1999)].

¹⁴²*Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone* (New York: United Nations, December 16, 1998), U.N. document S/1998/1176, paragraph 8.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, paragraph 9.

¹⁴⁴Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Sierra Leone Contact Group Meeting: Chairman's Concluding Statement* (London, April 19, 1999).

¹⁴⁵Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Statement on Sierra Leone* (Private Notice Question Answered by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Robin Cook, House of Commons, London January 1, 1999), and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Cook Welcomes Nigerian Support for Peace in Sierra Leone* (Edited transcript of Press Conference by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, Nigerian Head of State General Abubakar and President Kabbah of Sierra Leone, Abuja, Nigeria, March 9, 1999).

the supply of a shipment of arms to Sierra Leone in late February 1998 in breach of the U.N. arms embargo (which applied to government as well as rebel forces). In February 1999, the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs issued a report, itself based on an investigation ordered by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and carried out by Sir Thomas Legg Q.C. Both the Legg report and the Foreign Affairs Committee were highly critical of both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the foreign secretary, though they concluded that the violation of the embargo was due to incompetence and mismanagement rather than intent.

According to the U.S., its policy towards the crisis in Sierra Leone is designed to achieve four goals: increase international support for ECOMOG; help ECOWAS leaders coordinate a negotiated settlement; curtail external support for the rebel forces; and provide humanitarian relief. To that end, the U.S. provided U.S.\$3.9 million in equipment and logistical support to ECOMOG, and contributed over U.S.\$55 million in humanitarian assistance in 1998. In 1999 it committed U.S.\$5 million for logistical support and medical supplies and planned to seek approval for a further U.S.\$5.8 million from Congress.¹⁴⁶ In May 1999, the U.S. government promised to double its commitments to assist ECOMOG and the Sierra Leonean Government.¹⁴⁷ The U.S. has also condemned external support for the rebels from Liberia. However, in a letter dated February 4, 1999 sent by seven members of the U.S. Congress to President Clinton, the members expressed dismay by the limited U.S. support for the efforts of ECOMOG.¹⁴⁸

Through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the E.U. has been an important donor of non-food humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone, having contributed over 20 million ECUs (over U.S.\$22 million) by 1998, mostly to support the activities of international humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In November 1998, the E.U. made a grant of 860,000 ECU to the OAU partly to support any post-conflict reconstruction that it undertakes in Sierra Leone. In April 1999, the E.U. approved Euro 5 million to cover emergency aid for displaced persons in Sierra Leone (and Guinea). The E.U. states that it has given Sierra Leone more than 111 million ECUs (U.S. \$140 million) in emergency aid and for reconstruction of infrastructure and rehabilitation of victims of the war.¹⁴⁹

The Commonwealth

The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), formed in November 1995 at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Auckland, New Zealand, has consistently followed the situation in Sierra Leone, condemning the 1997 military coup and suspending the right of the junta to participate in Commonwealth debates until the restoration of President Kabbah. CMAG has also denounced atrocities committed against civilians by the rebels. Since the restoration of President Kabbah, the Commonwealth has assisted with the reorganization and training of the Sierra Leone police force, together with UNOMSIL civilian police advisers.

¹⁴⁶U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan E. Rice speech to the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives, March 23, 1999.

¹⁴⁷The U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs, Ambassador Thomas Pickering, made this pledge to the Nigerian President on May 5, 1999.

¹⁴⁸The letter was signed by Alcee L. Hastings, Cynthia McKinney, Eva M Clayton, Amo Houghton, Vernon Ehlers, Albert Wynn, and Tom Lantos.

¹⁴⁹DG VIII Press Releases. Confirmed by Ms. Hals (DGVIII) on May 19, 1999.

VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was written and researched by Corinne Dufka, Sierra Leone researcher. Chinedu Ezetah of Davis Polk Wardwell contributed to the writing of the international legal aspects of the report. The report was edited by Bronwen Manby, legal counsel to the Africa Division; Peter Takirambudde, executive director of the Africa Division; Mike McClintock, deputy program director; Wilder Taylor, general counsel; and LaShawn Jefferson and Regan Ralph of the Women's Rights Division. Production assistance was provided by Zachary Freeman, associate for the Africa division; Patrick Minges, publications director; and Fitzroy Hopkins, mail manager.

Research for this report was conducted by Human Rights Watch during the months of April, May, and June 1999. Several hundred witnesses and victims were interviewed, within their homes and centers for the displaced, in hospitals and clinics, market places, churches, mosques, and places of work. Interviews were conducted with government and United Nations officials, journalists, human rights activists, social workers, and members of national and international nongovernmental organizations. The names of all witnesses and survivors, except where noted, have been changed in order to protect their identity and ensure their privacy.

We would also like to thank several people and organizations in Sierra Leone for their assistance given to Human Rights Watch: Helen Bash Taki from the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone (CCSL), Francis Kai-Kai from the Pioneers for Development and Sanitation (PIDESU), Beatrice Parkinson from the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), Isaac Lapia from Amnesty International, Muctarr Jalloh from Murray Town Camp, The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR), Network Movement for Justice and Development, Médecins Sans Frontières, UNOMSIL, particularly the members of the Human Rights Section, UNICEF, Handicap International, the staff at Connaught Hospital, the members of the Sierra Leone Human Rights Committee, and lastly, and especially to so many people who were willing to relive their pain to tell their story.

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The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Michele Alexander, development director; Reed Brody, advocacy director; Carroll Bogert, communications director; Cynthia Brown, program director; Barbara Guglielmo, finance and administration director; Jeri Laber, special advisor; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director; Patrick Minges, publications director; Susan Osnos, associate director; Jeimera Rone, counsel; Wilder Taylor, general counsel; and Joanna Weschler, United Nations representative. Jonathan Fanton is the chair of the board. Robert L. Bernstein is the founding chair.

Its Africa division was established in 1988 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights in sub-Saharan Africa. Peter Takirambudde is the executive director; Janet Fleischman is the Washington director; Suliman Ali Baldo is the senior researcher; Alex Vines is the research associate; Bronwen Manby and Binaifer Nowrojee are counsels; Zachary Freeman is the administrative associate; Alison DesForges is a consultant; and Peter Bouckaert is the Orville Schell Fellow. William Carmichael is the chair of the advisory committee.

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The fourteen-year-old boy on the right was shot four times by Revolutionary United Front rebels and is now paralyzed from the waist down. The rebels gathered up everyone in his house and opened fire on them. Three of his family members were killed and several others wounded. He is now living in a camp for the displaced. The man on the left lost his leg to a gunshot wound.

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
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84) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror, Atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone," Vol. 10, No. 3 (A) July 1998 p 4, 15-23.



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Vol. 10, No. 3 (A) – July 1998

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SIERRA LEONE

SOWING TERROR

Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
CDFs	Civilian Defense Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
LRRRC	Liberian Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Committee
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
YOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone

I. SUMMARY

Since losing political power in February 1998, members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) have been engaging in a war of terror against civilians in Sierra Leone. With no recognizable political platform, the AFRC/RUF rebel alliance is committing widespread and egregious atrocities against unarmed civilians in an attempt to regain power. As the violence in Sierra Leone continues, grave abuses continue to take place. Human Rights Watch interviewed civilian men, women, and children who had been intentionally mutilated or shot as recently as June 12, 1998 in eastern Sierra Leone.

Many thousands of Sierra Leonean civilians have been raped; deliberately mutilated, often by amputation; or killed outright in a campaign by the AFRC/RUF between February and June 1998 alone. Men, women and children, probably numbering in the thousands, have been abducted by the AFRC/RUF for use as combatants, forced laborers, or sexual slaves. Women have been actively targeted through sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. Children have been targets of killings and violence and are forcibly recruited as soldiers. In addition to various forms of physical abuse, innumerable Sierra Leoneans suffer from psychological trauma due to intentionally cruel methods of inflicting harm against these individuals and their communities.

These atrocities committed against civilians are the latest cycle of violence in the armed conflict that has devastated Sierra Leone for seven years. The fighting has caused the displacement of more than a million Sierra Leoneans. Most have become internally displaced, while hundreds of thousands have fled the country as refugees, predominantly to neighboring Guinea and Liberia.

The AFRC—led by a group of military officers—took power forcibly on May 25, 1997. During the nine months it was in power, the AFRC joined forces with the armed rebel group, the RUF, to form a regime characterized by serious human rights violations and a complete breakdown of the rule of law. In February 1998, a Nigerian-led peacekeeping force, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), forced the AFRC/RUF out of power and reinstated former President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who had been elected president in March 1996 in the first multi-party elections for almost three decades in Sierra Leone. Since the reinstatement of Kabbah, the AFRC has joined forces with the RUF to wage a war against ECOMOG and the Kabbah government.

Since independence in 1961, Sierra Leone has endured a series of military regimes and rebellions in struggles over economic and political power. However, the latest round of violence is unique in the scale and grotesque nature of the attacks on civilians. Much of rural Sierra Leone is inaccessible due to the ongoing war, and information is available for the most part only through health facilities where victims seek care in Sierra Leone and through the testimonies of witnesses and survivors in neighboring Guinea and Liberia. Of the hundreds of testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch, many described situations in which the interviewee was the sole survivor among many victims. The cases reported in this document represent only a small fraction of the actual number of victims. The true number may never be known.

Human Rights Watch compiled information regarding the experiences of more than 500 survivors of atrocities committed in Sierra Leone between February and June of 1998. The vast majority of these abuses were perpetrated by members of the AFRC/RUF. Of this number, over 425 survivors of gunshot wounds, amputations and other mutilations, or rape were registered in Connaught, Magburaka, and Makeni hospitals in Sierra Leone. Approximately eighty-two survivors of the same types of abuse were identified in Guinea at Conakry, Faranah, Kissidougou, and Gueckedou hospitals during roughly the same period. In the Liberian refugee camps, Human Rights Watch interviewed victims of the conflict and former AFRC/RUF combatants living alongside one another.

Forces fighting on behalf of President Kabbah have also committed human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), civilian militias who support the Kabbah

government, have committed numerous abuses including indiscriminate killings and torture. These killings are on a smaller scale than those carried out by the AFRC/RUF and are of a different nature: the CDFs were created in order to assure local security, and they generally limit their abuses to those they claim are AFRC/RUF combatants and to a lesser extent, those perceived as their supporters. The largest and most powerful of the CDFs, the Kamajors, have been responsible for the majority of abuses committed by those fighting on behalf of the Kabbah government since February 1998. In addition to killings and torture, Kamajors have also been responsible for obstructing humanitarian assistance and demanding money or other payment at roadblocks. There are many child soldiers among the Kamajors, and despite promises by the government to demobilize all combatants under the age of eighteen, recent reports indicate that the CDFs continue to recruit children.

According to international humanitarian groups, the shelling by ECOMOG during its assault on Freetown in early February 1998 took a high toll on civilians. ECOMOG forces have also obstructed humanitarian assistance by commandeering vehicles from aid agencies. Information from ECOMOG regarding the security situation in Sierra Leone has often been unduly positive, leading to the repatriation of refugees to unsafe areas. ECOMOG has been widely praised for ousting the AFRC/RUF and conducting itself with greater discipline than was the case in Liberia. However, international observers in Sierra Leone have expressed concerns that some members of ECOMOG may seek to prolong its mission in order to exploit the conflict for economic incentives, as was the case involving some ECOMOG contingents in Liberia.

The atrocities that drive civilians into flight are only the first chapter of hardship for many Sierra Leoneans affected by the crisis. Approximately one-quarter million Sierra Leoneans have fled to refugee camps in neighboring Guinea and Liberia to escape the abuses and fighting. The location of the camps in border areas presents problems of security for and access to the camps, which in turn have impaired assistance and protection for refugees. Security conditions in many of the camps are precarious, and humanitarian assistance has been hampered by difficult access to the camps, a lack of resources at the disposition of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and aid agencies, and in some instances, poor coordination of relief efforts.

Protecting refugees in this context remains a challenge for UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies. In the Guinean camps, many unaccompanied women, children, and other war victims suffer from inadequate protection. Delays in the distribution of identity cards for refugees have led to restricted movement for refugees, as well as extortion and arbitrary arrest by Guinean authorities. Despite repeated requests from UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Guinean authorities have denied access to detained asylum seekers they are holding as suspected combatants.

In the Liberian camps, the presence of former combatants among the refugee population has hampered humanitarian assistance and protection. The proximity of the camps to the fighting in Sierra Leone and the permeable nature of the Sierra Leonean-Liberian border present a clear security risk for refugees and for the delivery of aid to the Vahun camp, located eight to twelve kilometers from the border. Former combatants in the camps stated that the AFRC/RUF are taking advantage of the porous border situation to resupply and to recruit combatants. Assistance and protection has been further compromised by difficult access to the camps, the onset of the rainy season and poor road conditions, a lack of resources for UNHCR and aid groups, and an insufficiently rapid and well-coordinated effort to relocate refugees and separate combatants. The generally weak assistance and protection provided to the Vahun camp has increased tension and the risk of insecurity in the camp and its environs. By June 1998, most refugees in Vahun had received only one fourteen-day ration since their arrival in February and March.

Sierra Leone has been largely ignored by much of the international community, with the exception of those attempting to exploit its rich diamond and mineral deposits. This mix of exploitation and indifference, combined with a history of weak respect for the rule of law and democratic institutions, has repeatedly permitted military leaders to hold power and divert revenue from the mines for their own benefit. In attempts during recent years to gain

political and economic control, both government and rebel groups have sought to tip the balance of power by employing private security firms or mercenaries, often in exchange for lucrative contracts and mining concessions.

A major challenge to the new Kabbah government will be to promote respect for the rule of law and the establishment of institutions of justice in the midst of the present public outcry for revenge and threats against those who defend the human rights of the accused. While demanding accountability for crimes committed by all sides, the Kabbah government must assure due process for the accused, especially the fifty-nine civilians currently being prosecuted for collaboration with the AFRC/RUF. These trials constitute the first major test of the justice system under Kabbah. The government has made repeated gestures in favor of human rights, such as its pledge to provide amnesty for child soldiers and to demobilize all child soldiers; it must now follow through on these commitments. In conjunction with ECOMOG, the government must also assure that the CDFs respect international humanitarian law, are demobilized as soon as possible or integrated into the new army, and are held accountable for their abuses.

In order to end the cycles of violence in Sierra Leone, perpetrators of human rights violations must be held accountable for their actions. AFRC/RUF members suspected of having committed human rights abuses and former AFRC/RUF collaborators must be given fair trials and punished according to national and international law.

Although influencing the actions of the AFRC/RUF has proven to be difficult, international pressure must be maintained to convince them to immediately cease indiscriminate killings, rape, and mutilation of civilians, the abduction of civilians, especially children, for use as soldiers, laborers, sexual slaves or other purposes, and other violations of the laws of war.

The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union have condemned violations by the AFRC/RUF, undertaken high-level assessment missions, and provided humanitarian aid. Despite the blatant disregard of the AFRC/RUF for international humanitarian and human rights law, the U.S., U.K. and E.U. should continue to denounce the atrocities and seek means to stop them. This should include cutting the supply lines of the AFRC/RUF and stating unequivocally that no group or individual associated with these abuses will receive any international support. The international community should call upon the government of Liberian President Charles Taylor to immediately allow ECOMOG in Liberia to monitor the border area with Sierra Leone. This operation should be reinforced by simultaneous monitoring on the Sierra Leonean side of the border by ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). President Taylor should also be called upon to prevent the use of Liberian territory for any support to the AFRC/RUF.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should assure that human rights concerns are integrated into ECOMOG's mandate, as well as into its own initiatives to promote peace and stability in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG should desist from obstructing humanitarian aid and take measures to minimize the impact of their military initiatives on civilian populations and structures. ECOMOG should work closely with UNOMSIL, UNHCR, and humanitarian agencies to assure that accurate and neutral information regarding security is provided to the public, especially to refugees, displaced populations, and aid workers.

The international community also has a crucial role to play in order to promote human rights, the rule of law, and stability in Sierra Leone. United Nations agencies are well placed to implement programs and policies to meet these ends in Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL should closely monitor ECOMOG's respect for international humanitarian law and assure that ECOMOG's mandate to train the new Sierra Leonean army results in an ethnically and geographically balanced force, and includes adequate training in the laws of war. UNOMSIL should reinforce and integrate human rights into its existing mandate, primarily through further support for its human rights office. This office should be given the resources necessary at U.N. headquarters as well as in the field to monitor and report publicly on the human rights situation throughout the country. Additionally, the office must have the capacity to provide technical assistance and training to the Sierra Leonean government and local human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Finally, UNOMSIL must carefully monitor the Disarmament, Demobilization, and

Reintegration (DDR) program for combatants, developed by the World Bank and the Sierra Leonean government. UNOMSIL should provide oversight to ensure that ECOMOG, responsible for the implementation of the DDR program, treats captured or surrendered combatants, especially the large number of child soldiers, in a humane fashion, and works closely with other agencies to facilitate the reintegration of children and other former combatants into civilian communities.

As resources permit, UNHCR should assure that refugees be moved in a timely and humane fashion from insecure camps near the border areas in both Liberia and Guinea. UNHCR should increase its protection of the most vulnerable refugees, in particular the significant number of unaccompanied minors, unaccompanied women, and victims of atrocities. In Guinea, UNHCR should insist upon access to asylum seekers in detention, the screening and registration process at border areas, and, in a manner compatible with security concerns, access to the refugee camps. In Liberia, former AFRC/RUF combatants should be separated from civilian refugees and registered into programs for their reintegration into civil society or prosecuted where appropriate.

In order to put an end to the cycles of violence and atrocities against civilians, the international community will have to focus and sustain its attention on the root causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. With the democratically elected Kabbah government reinstalled, the international community should seize the occasion to make the respect for human rights an integral part of its presence and programs in Sierra Leone. International interventions should support the government's efforts to establish institutions of justice and the rule of law, as well as promote a vibrant civil society with full respect for human rights. If human rights issues are not tackled head-on, the international community and Sierra Leonean people will continue to bear the high cost of further conflict and providing relief for victims.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

To All Parties Involved in the Present Conflict in Sierra Leone:

- Despite the apparent intransigence of the AFRC/RUF and its leaders' willful disregard for international humanitarian and human rights law, Human Rights Watch continues to call on all parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone to immediately cease from committing human rights abuses, including killings, rape, and mutilation of civilians. Combatants should respect the laws of war, particularly those norms related to the protection of noncombatants and civilian infrastructure.
- All parties should desist from the recruitment, forced or otherwise, of child soldiers. The AFRC/RUF in particular should cease abductions of civilians for use as soldiers, laborers, or other reasons. The AFRC/RUF should halt gender-based violence and the abduction of women and girls as sexual slaves.

To the Sierra Leonean Government:

- Perpetrators of atrocities against civilians should be held accountable for their actions. This should be achieved through arrest, prosecution, and, where appropriate, punishment according to international humanitarian and human rights law.
- In order to establish principles of accountability and the rule of law, respect for due process should be enforced by an independent judiciary. This will be extremely important in the ongoing trials of fifty-nine civilians accused of collaborating with the AFRC/RUF regime, as well as for upcoming court martial trials and the future treatment of war criminals. International observers should immediately be brought in to monitor the ongoing trials. In order to strengthen the neutrality and independence of the judiciary, the government should consider incorporating international judges into its judicial system, in particular for cases regarding war crimes.

- The government should immediately ensure that the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program underway incorporates human rights concerns. Particular attention should be paid to (1) the humane treatment of captured and surrendered combatants; (2) psychological and social preparation for the reintegration of combatants into communities; and (3) training in human rights and humanitarian law for those combatants wishing to enlist in the new Sierra Leonean army. Demobilized combatants suspected of having committed war crimes or human rights abuses should be screened by the government in compliance with international standards, and investigated and prosecuted where appropriate.
- The government should follow through on its commitments made to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, including to stop the recruitment of children under the age of eighteen and to create a Joint Task Force to oversee the demobilization and reintegration of child combatants from all sides.

To the Liberian Government:

- The government of Liberia should respect the international arms embargo against the AFRC/RUF and assure that Liberia is not used as a point of supply or transit for combatants, arms, ammunition, food or other supplies to support the AFRC/RUF. To this end, President Charles Taylor should facilitate border monitoring by ECOMOG. The government should investigate, arrest, and hold accountable anyone on Liberian territory engaged in arms trafficking or other support to the AFRC/RUF.
- The Liberian government, through the Liberian Repatriation, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation Committee (LRRRC) and its security forces, should cooperate with UNHCR in the development and implementation of a program to screen and separate combatants from civilian refugees. This program should be in accordance with international refugee law and UNHCR's guidelines on the application of the exclusion clauses to the 1951 Refugee Convention and to the 1967 Protocol.
- Individuals suspected of having committed a war crime, crime against humanity, or any other crime which would exclude them from protection under international refugee law, should be investigated, and where warranted, prosecuted for the violations they are accused of in accordance with international standards of due process.

To the Guinean Government:

- The Guinean government should facilitate the maximum possible access for humanitarian organizations to refugee camps in the Guéckedou area.
- The Guinean government should maintain its generous asylum policy for refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, while taking actions to ensure local Guinean border authorities immediately cease to demand money or seize property from Sierra Leoneans who seek to enter Guinea.
- The Guinean government should give UNHCR full and unimpeded access to border entry points and allow UNHCR to monitor access to asylum procedures; conduct prima facie refugee status determination screening; and participate in pre-screening to identify refugees who may be suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or other such crimes which would exclude them from international refugee protection. The latter should be done with a view to investigate and prosecute where appropriate in accordance with international standards.

- Individuals suspected of having committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, or any other crime which would exclude them from protection under international refugee law, should be held accountable for the violations they have committed in accordance with international standards of due process.
- The Guinean government should allow UNHCR full and unimpeded access to places of detention for refugees and asylum seekers.
- The Guinean government should continue to work closely with UNHCR to register all refugees and issue them identification cards. Police and military should immediately cease the arbitrary arrest, extortion, and harassment of refugees who do not have identification cards.
- The government should maintain the arms embargo against the AFRC/RUF and assure that Guinea is not used as a supply or transit point for arms, ammunition, food or other supplies to these forces. Authorities should arrest and hold accountable any Guinean military personnel or civilians found to have violated the arms embargo to the AFRC/RUF in Sierra Leone or those involved in trade with AFRC/RUF forces.

To the United Nations:

United Nations Security Council

The United Nations should integrate human rights into its programs and further expand the capacity of the human rights office of UNOMSIL. This should include adequate resources and additional staff to monitor and report publicly on the human rights situation throughout the country, implement technical assistance programs with the government of Sierra Leone, and provide support and training to Sierra Leonean human rights groups.

- UNOMSIL should carry out its mandate of assuring that ECOMOG respect international humanitarian law during the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program. It should further monitor ECOMOG's respect for international humanitarian and human rights law during all of its activities, especially military operations.
- The U.N. Security Council should call upon Liberia to not allow their territory to be used in support of the AFRC/RUF activity in Sierra Leone. It should urge the Liberian government to take all measures necessary to assure that present and former Liberian military or rebels are not supporting AFRC/RUF in Sierra Leone. Such measures should include the deployment of ECOMOG and U.N. military observers in the border area.
- Similarly, the Security Council should call upon all governments to respect the international arms embargo against the AFRC/RUF and, in particular, assure that Liberia is not used as a point of supply or transit for arms, ammunition, food or other supplies to or from the AFRC/RUF.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

- Refugee camps most at risk should be relocated to secure, accessible areas a safe distance from the borders of Guinea and Liberia, as soon as the availability of resources permits this. Where not already developed, plans for relocation should be designed and implemented as soon as possible.
- UNHCR should maintain a permanent presence at border entry points to Guinea and Liberia in order to monitor access to asylum determination procedures for those fleeing Sierra Leone; conduct basic screening to determine group-based prima facie refugee status; and conduct pre-screening of those suspected of having committed a war crime, a crime against humanity, or any other such crime which would exclude them from international refugee protection.

- UNHCR should seek access in writing and in practice to all detention centers in Guinea and Liberia where asylum seekers and refugees are held, including those where refugees suspected of being former combatants are held. UNHCR should monitor conditions of detention and ensure, to the extent possible, that its own guidelines on detention of asylum seekers are applied.
- UNHCR should seek a presence at screening interviews to identify refugees who are suspected of committing crimes that would deem them undeserving of international refugee protection. UNHCR should monitor screening for exclusion and ensure necessary safeguards. UNHCR should advise the governments of Guinea and Liberia on fair and just criteria and procedures for the application of the exclusion clauses, according to international refugee law and its own guidelines.
- In collaboration with the governments of Guinea and Liberia, UNHCR should ensure that an efficient and effective registration program for Sierra Leonean refugees is in place in both countries. Registered refugees should be provided with identity cards.
- UNHCR should provide refugees in Liberia and Guinea with accurate, neutral, and objective information about security conditions in Sierra Leone, to enable refugees to make informed choices about repatriation.
- UNHCR should rapidly implement an evaluation of the psychological and medical needs of the large numbers of refugee victims of psychological and physical trauma. In particular, UNHCR should respect and implement its own guidelines regarding assistance and protection for women who are victims of rape, sexual violence, or survivors of trauma. UNHCR and other relief agencies should have qualified personnel to implement these guidelines and programs and promote a general awareness and sensitivity to these issues among refugees and local authorities.
- Special considerations in programming should be made to protect the large numbers of vulnerable refugees among the new Sierra Leonean caseload, including unaccompanied children, unaccompanied women, single parents, victims of atrocities, the elderly and the infirm. Funding should be provided for the implementation of education programs for reconciliation, conflict resolution and human rights education in refugee camps, especially for youth.

To ECOWAS and ECOMOG:

- While its record in Sierra Leone has improved from past performances, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should closely monitor ECOMOG's respect for international humanitarian and human rights law in all aspects of its mandate, especially while conducting military operations, as well as during its retraining of the new army and its implementation of the DDR program. In accordance with international humanitarian law, ECOMOG should take measures to reduce the toll of its military operations on civilians and civilian structures.
- ECOMOG should produce accurate, neutral and objective information about security conditions in Sierra Leone to enable refugees to make informed choices about repatriation.

To the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and other Members of the International Community:

- In order to end cycles of violence in Sierra Leone, the international community should maintain a strong focus on Sierra Leone and assure that respect for human rights and the rule of law are foundations of the newly reinstated government.

- The arms embargo against the AFRC/RUF should be strictly enforced. States, arms dealers, private security firms or others found in violation of the embargo should be held accountable. The international community should state unequivocally that no group or individual associated with abuses committed by the AFRC/RUF will receive any international support.
- Members of the international community should respond to UNHCR's \$7.3 million emergency appeal for assistance to Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea and Liberia. Funds are needed for food, shelter and sanitation, medical, educational, psychological and social services, the relocation of camps, transportation and logistical support.
- Donors should also respond to bilateral requests for assistance in addressing Guinea's environmental and infrastructure damage resulting from the refugee flow. International donors should provide funds in response to OCHA's request for \$11.2 million to meet humanitarian needs in Sierra Leone. Without these funds, the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies will not have the human or financial resources to provide basic assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons, and other Sierra Leoneans affected by the crisis.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CIVILIANS

Human Rights Abuses Committed by Members of the AFRC/RUF

A War of Terror against Civilians

Human Rights Watch took testimony from dozens of survivors and witnesses of gross violations of human rights committed by the AFRC/RUF,¹ involving the physical mutilation, torture and murder of Sierra Leonean civilians. They included: amputations by machete² of one or both hands, arms, feet, legs, ears and buttocks and one or more fingers; lacerations to the head, neck, arms, legs, feet and torso; the gouging out of one or both eyes; rape; gunshot wounds to the head, torso and limbs; burns from explosives and other devices; injections with acid; and

¹The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was formed in 1991 and entered eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia. Originally, the RUF was a mix of members of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), NPFL-trained Sierra Leoneans and others. Since its inception, the RUF has failed to publicly and clearly articulate a political agenda other than ousting successive governments and has committed atrocities from the beginning. Abdul Koroma in "Sierra Leone: The Agony of a Nation," (Andromeda Publications, 1996) reports that during one of their first attacks in 1991 in eastern Kailahun district, the RUF decapitated civilian leaders and placed their heads on sticks. Over the next seven years, the RUF attempted to gain power through guerrilla warfare and attacks against civilians. RUF leader Foday Sankoh is a former colonel in the Sierra Leonean military. He was imprisoned in 1971 for his alleged involvement in a coup attempt, released seven years later and dishonorably dismissed from the army. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed by a group of military officers who took power in a coup on May 25, 1997 ousting President Kabbah. Its chairman, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, had been in detention in Freetown awaiting trial for alleged involvement in a prior attempted coup in September 1996. The AFRC invited RUF forces to join them in the new government. The AFRC cited the government's failure to implement a peace agreement with the RUF and the practice of ethnic favoritism as reasons for assuming power. They also called for the release of Foday Sankoh, who had been detained in Nigeria on March 2, 1997, charged with possession of arms and ammunition. Upon taking power, the AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political parties, public meetings, and demonstrations and announced rule by military decree. Many judges, attorneys and police were among those who fled the country, causing a total collapse of the judiciary. The AFRC established the People's Revolutionary Courts, whose staff had little or no legal training. The government arbitrarily arrested and detained its suspected opponents and critics. In indiscriminate attacks on villages, AFRC/RUF forces amputated, raped, killed and abducted civilians to use as laborers and fighters.

²Also referred to as "cutlasses" by the survivors.

beatings. Human Rights Watch also received unconfirmed reports of sexual mutilation such as the cutting off of breasts and genitalia, among other atrocities.

This is a war being waged through attacks on the civilian population. AFRC/RUF soldiers typically capture civilians, round them up from their hiding places in the forest or in villages and commit atrocities against them in an effort to instill terror. The AFRC/RUF appears to use this campaign of fear as a means of exerting political and military control. They often summarily execute civilians, accusing them of being Kabbah or Kamajor³ supporters, or Kamajor relatives. The soldiers further terrorize their victims by forcing them to participate in their own mutilation, asking them to make choices about which finger, hand or arm, for example, to have amputated. They also use mutilation and other forms of physical abuse as punishment for refusing to follow their instructions.

The AFRC/RUF uses the civilians it abuses to "send messages" to its opponents. Victims of amputations or other mutilations are frequently told that they should take their amputated limb and a verbal or written message to ECOMOG or the Kabbah government. The messages are typically demands that ECOMOG should "leave the country to Sierra Leoneans" or that Kabbah should replace the limbs of amputees. The AFRC/RUF also state that they will keep fighting until Kabbah is gone and their leaders are restored to power. They call for the release of RUF leader Foday Sankoh, imprisoned in Nigeria. According to testimony from other victims and witnesses, many victims die from complications related to their wounds before their messages of horror can be heard.

Since February 1998, attacks on civilians have occurred in almost all regions of the country but with a particularly high concentration in the Koidu diamond-mining area in the east, where the AFRC/RUF maintain a strong presence. The vast majority of victims are males between the ages of sixteen and forty-five, but women, children, and the elderly are not spared. For example, testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch included male and female amputees over the age of sixty, as well as from a three-year-old boy with a gunshot wound. Attacks on villages or civilians hiding in the forest are seemingly carried out without regard for ethnic or religious affiliation. Perpetrators and victims come from diverse ethnic and religious groups, and ethnicity is seldom invoked as a motivating factor in killings or abuse.

Men of voting and fighting age are particularly targeted in order to discourage them from giving political or military support to President Kabbah or the Kamajors. When the RUF committed atrocities prior to elections in 1996, they told victims that their hands were being amputated so that they could not vote. Women and girls are also frequently subject to rape and other forms of gender-based violence, including sexual slavery. Pregnant women and nursing mothers are also targets of the AFRC/RUF.

The AFRC/RUF led at least two loosely organized campaigns of terror, "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Pay Yourself." These campaigns, both of which originated in the Koidu area in February 1998 and then spread throughout the country, were designed to loot, destroy, or kill anything in the path of the combatants. Operation Pay Yourself included AFRC/RUF roadblocks where civilians were forced to place their belongings into two piles, one for civilians to keep, to "pay themselves," and one to be handed over to the soldiers. One witness who fled Koidu described what happens at the road blocks:

³"Kamajors," meaning traditional hunter in Mende, are among the Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs) which fight on behalf of Kabbah's government. CDFs evolved as local protection responses to insecurity and violence throughout Sierra Leone. The Kamajors are the largest and most powerful of these groups, and most Kamajors are from the Mende ethnic group. They dress in traditional clothing, often wearing charms and mirrors. Other ethnic groups, including the Temne, Mandingo and Kuranko have also formed CDFs known as "traditional hunters" in their respective languages. The Kamajors became an important fighting force under the previous government of Captain Valentine E.M. Strasser, helping to combat the RUF, but also committing human rights violations. The Kamajors were armed by and grew in number under the first Kabbah government, allegedly fueling resentment among the Sierra Leonean military and leading to the subsequent AFRC coup.

Ten of them [AFRC/RUF soldiers] in a van with weapons—RPGs, AK47s—stopped us and told us to put down our bags. They searched us from shirt to pants. They told us to make two piles and put all the best of what we had—money, rice—into one pile, and the rest in another. They took all the best and gave us the one that wasn't good. That's "Operation Pay Yourself!"⁴

These operations were apparently designed to force the local populations to provide them with economic support and to assert their position as political and military players in Sierra Leone.

Although the attackers claim to be seeking out supporters of President Kabbah or the Kamajors, which have fought on behalf of Kabbah, there is often no distinction being made by AFRC/RUF forces. A small minority of victims are, in fact, Kabbah supporters or Kamajors; most are subsistence farmers, miners or small merchants with no history of political activity. One witness to atrocities near Koidu said, "They don't ask you if you're a Kabbah supporter; they just kill randomly... they just kill anyone. But if they know you are a Kabbah supporter, they will kill you faster."⁵

Actual supporters of President Kabbah and those who served under his first administration, in particular civilian administrators, paramount chiefs, traditional section chiefs, Catholic priests, other religious figures and other community leaders, are actively sought out by AFRC/RUF for intimidation, extortion, or abuse. Several traditional chiefs and Catholic priests interviewed by Human Rights Watch explained that the AFRC/RUF perceives them as supporters of the democratically elected government of President Kabbah. Many traditional chiefs, often with ethnic ties to Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), fled after learning that the AFRC/RUF was looking for them. One Catholic priest who was captured by the AFRC/RUF and later escaped stated that his captors planned to execute him. They told him, "Look here's one Kamajor to take care of. You priests are supporting the SLPP government and the Kamajors. Stand here because we are going to kill you."⁶ The AFRC/RUF takes whatever money and property these individuals have and brutalizes them to show the population how they will treat their opponents.

International Law Governing the Crisis

The hostilities in Sierra Leone constitute an internal armed conflict under the laws of war, also known as humanitarian law. Sierra Leone is a party to the Geneva Conventions and both optional protocols. Common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions sets out fundamental rules applicable to internal armed conflicts that are not subject to suspension under any circumstances, and that are widely accepted as constituting customary international law. Virtually a convention within a convention, Common Article 3 provides in relevant part:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including those placed *hors de combat* by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Fandouyema II Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 12, 1998.

⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Koundou Lengo Beágo Refugee Camp, Republic of Guinea, June 6, 1998.

⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 9, 1998.

- (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
- (b) taking of hostages;
- (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
- (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

The 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions is also directed at internal armed conflicts, and elaborates these fundamental guarantees of humane conduct and protection of civilians. In particular, Article 4 of this protocol provides in relevant part:

- (1) All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take direct part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honor and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.
- (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and whatsoever:
 - (a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
 - (b) collective punishments;
 - (c) taking of hostages;
 - (d) acts of terrorism;
 - (e) outrages on personal dignity, in particular humiliating or degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
 - (f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
 - (g) pillage;
 - (h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.

The principle of protection of civilians is at the core of both provisions, and indeed, is fundamental to all humanitarian law. For the purposes of the conflict in Sierra Leone, a civilian is anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an organized armed group of a party to the conflict. Included as protected persons are also members of government or insurgent forces who are wounded, sick, unarmed or in captivity. Both Common Article 3 and Protocol II bind all parties to the internal armed conflict, including the insurgent party.⁷

The government of Sierra Leone is also bound by the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the state is a party. That treaty, at Article 4(1), provides that states parties may take measures derogating from certain rights "in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed". On March 10, 1998, President Kabbah declared a state of emergency which was communicated to the office of the Secretary-General to the United Nations. Even for rights the derogation of which is permitted, however, any derogation may be only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" and must not "involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin." Some of the rights that may not be derogated even during a state of emergency include the right to life

⁷ The commitment of a state to these provisions applies also to private individuals in that state's territory who are thereby bound by the same rights and obligations. International Committee of the Red Cross, *Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 1977* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987) p. 1344-45. The government's application of these provisions does not confer on the insurgents any international recognition on the insurgent party. Nor do Common Article 3 and Protocol II provide any special status for insurgents in internal armed conflict such as the combatants privilege to kill or capture enemy troops, or prisoner-of-war status when captured. *Ibid.* at 1344.

(Article 6), the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7), the ban on slavery in all its forms (Article 8) and freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18).

Killings, Mutilations, Sexual Abuse, and Enslavement by the AFRC/RUF

As mentioned above, it is impossible to determine the precise number of victims of these types of abuse due to a lack of access to much of Sierra Leone and the fact that most deaths occurred without record. Human Rights Watch collected testimonies from hundreds of Sierra Leoneans who survived or witnessed these types of atrocities.⁸ A few of the countless examples follow:

Ike C. was a reporter for the *Herald Guardian* newspaper in Koidu town, Kono. He is thirty-two years old and fled the AFRC/RUF's attack on Koidu on February 21 but was captured, held by the AFRC/RUF, and threatened with death. He ultimately escaped. Among other atrocities he witnessed, he described the following:

I saw them kill two people right before my face at Tomboudou, in front of the residence of the Paramount Chief of Tomboudou.⁹ One man they arrested at a village called Nemessedu. They brought him to Tomboudou along with his wife. He was killed before his wife. They tied him up and shot at him in his chest three times. Then they took his wife as their own.

The second executed was a youth. He was tall, and before killing him, they told him, "You're too tall." So, they chopped off his foot, and he fell to the ground. Later, they shot him three times in the chest, too, and he died. After that, they agreed to set Tomboudou on fire as a part of Operation Non-Living Thing.¹⁰

Helen C. was a fish seller in Koidu. She claims that she lost her two children in chaos related to an attack by the AFRC/RUF near Koidu in May 1998. Later that month, she was caught by the AFRC/RUF in Tumbodu, Kono district, where she saw them kill approximately fifty people. The AFRC/RUF caught her and cut off her hand and forearm.

They captured me and said lie on the floor. I was reluctant; they cut me on the neck with a machete. I was cut by a small boy. Then they put my hand on a stone and cut me. They told me to go to Kabbah and tell him what happened.

They left me there. They said they would go to the bush and kill anyone they found there. I walked eleven days to Forekonia [the border with Guinea]. I left my belongings with my hand. I had to bury my own hand.¹¹

Franklin M., a farmer from Sinekoro town, Kabolah district, was returning from his fields around May 21, 1998 when he saw members of the AFRC/RUF coming toward him.

⁸The names of all the refugees interviewed have been changed in order to protect their safety and privacy.

⁹Ike C. provided this information for purposes of describing the location of the killings only, not to imply involvement of the Paramount Chief in the killings of these two individuals.

¹⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Boodou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 23, 1998. Survivors referred to this military offensive both as "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Non-Living Thing."

¹¹Human Rights Watch interview, Faranah Hospital, Guinea, June 3, 1998.

I saw people with cutlasses and guns. So I started to run; they caught me and cut off both of my hands. Then they left me. Some of them wore uniforms, some were in plainclothes. They said I was a supporter of Tejan Kabbah.¹²

Human Rights Watch interviewed Franklin M. in Faranah Hospital, Guinea where he sought refuge and health care. He further described his dilemma as a refugee and victim of a double arm amputation.

My family is here. How can I hope to feed my family? My mother is here. My wife is here. My children are here. I have no hands.¹³

Timothy C., a history teacher from Koidu, was one of two survivors of a group of ten civilians captured near his home by the AFRC/RUF on June 10, 1998. The other eight were killed with machetes. He was cut so deeply on his forearms that it is likely that both will have to be amputated.¹⁴

In March 1998, Catherine M., an administrator from Segbwema, was shot in the back by the AFRC/RUF as they fled from ECOMOG. Her husband and son were shot dead in front of her. She was stripped and forced to flee with the AFRC/RUF. She witnessed the killing of many children and a nursing mother as she fled.¹⁵

Atrocities Against Children

Children are the frequent targets of brutal, indiscriminate acts of violence by the AFRC/RUF.¹⁶ Children are murdered, mutilated, tortured, beaten, raped, enslaved for sexual purposes, forced to work, and forced to become soldiers by the AFRC/RUF.

In addition to violating the instruments of international humanitarian law cited above, these crimes violate the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which makes explicit children's right to life and freedom from sexual abuse, abduction and forced recruitment, among other rights.¹⁷

Examples of these types of violations were frequent. Sam R., a farmer in the Koidu area, saw six of his children and his wife attacked in front of his house on June 12. He recalled,

They accused me of being a Kamajor. When they want to kill you, they accuse you of anything. There is no reason. I am a farmer. I don't vote. I have no money. They burnt my house.¹⁸

At about 4:00 a.m., I heard bombs and gunshots outside my house. The rebels came and banged on the door. They said they would kill us all outside. My wife took five of the children outside. I stayed inside with one. My wife threw herself on top of two of the children to protect them.

¹²Human Rights Watch interview, Faranah Hospital, Guinea, June 4, 1998.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Connaught Hospital, June 24, 1998.

¹⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Kolahun refugee camp, Lofa county, Liberia, June 12, 1998.

¹⁶Children are considered persons below the age of eighteen, as defined in Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, September 2, 1990.

¹⁷All states are party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child except for the United States of America and Somalia.

¹⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Faranah Hospital, Guinea, June 3, 1998.

They shot my wife, killed two of the children, shot my seven-year-old through the stomach, and cut another one on the buttocks. Two got away.¹⁹

Human Rights Watch received documentation on dozens of similar cases. According to medical records, out of 265 war wounded patients admitted to Connaught hospital from April 1 through June 20, approximately one-quarter were children. According to reports from humanitarian agencies, 111 children died between February 15 and 24, 1998 during AFRC/RUF attacks in the Bo area.²⁰

Gender-based Violence

Women and girls are the primary targets of widespread rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence.²¹ Although the exact number of those raped will never be known, testimonies from survivors confirm that sexual violence has been widespread, against thousands of women and girls. Furthermore, no comprehensive medical statistics have been compiled on rape-related injuries or on pregnancies as a result of rape. Those who have witnessed, or endured and survived these and other atrocities are suffering enormous psychological trauma.

Women and girls are brutally raped and gang-raped at gunpoint and knife point by AFRC/RUF soldiers or raped with objects, such as sticks. Often, the rapes occur in front of family members and others, and in some cases relatives are forced to rape their sisters, mothers or daughters. Women and girls are frequently abducted individually or collectively and kept as so-called "wives" for members of the AFRC/RUF. Some suffer rape or gang rape multiple times as they escape one AFRC/RUF group, only to be caught by another. Rape is also used as an immediate punishment for refusing to follow instructions or in retaliation for the acts of others held in captivity.

These crimes, and other forms of sexual violence, are explicitly and implicitly condemned under international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions prohibit rape in both international and internal conflicts.²² Likewise, rape, when committed on a mass scale against a civilian population, constitutes a crime against humanity. The Convention on the Rights of the Child further protects children from "all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse."²³

The crimes of sexual violence committed by the AFRC/RUF against women and girls are often accompanied by other forms of violence. Murder or mutilation frequently follows these rapes. Many are forced to work as porters for the AFRC/RUF and witness their children being abducted, abused, or killed. Some women and young girls are abducted to care for the many young children captured by the AFRC/RUF.

Pregnant women are not spared from attacks by the AFRC/RUF. In light of the gruesome nature of the atrocities committed against them, these women seem to be targeted because of their status as pregnant women.

¹⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Connaught Hospital, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 24, 1996.

²⁰Internal survey conducted in Bo, Sierra Leone, by humanitarian organizations, March 19-21, 1998.

²¹Human Rights Watch also received an account of boys having been sexually abused alongside women and girls; while sexual abuse of males has occurred, it has not occurred to the extent of the abuse of women and girls.

²²Rape in internal armed conflict is prohibited under Article 3, subparagraphs (a) and (c), common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and by Article 2(e) of Protocol II. For international armed conflict, this is established in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949 [Fourth Geneva Convention], Arts. 27 and 147. 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

²³Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 34.

Witnesses report having seen the mutilated bodies of pregnant women whose fetuses had been cut out of their wombs or who died of gunshot wounds to the abdomen. Some pregnant women are also forced into labor due to the extreme physical hardship of having to flee their homes, and at times die in flight due to complications in childbirth.

The AFRC/RUF's rape and enslavement of women and girls for sex is not only a vicious expression of power over the individual, but also a means of expressing dominance over the community. Throughout the world, sexual violence is routinely directed against women and girls during situations of armed conflict as a weapon to terrorize a community and to achieve a political end. The humiliation, terror and pain inflicted by the rapist is meant to harm not only the individual victim but also to strip the humanity from the larger group of which she is a part. The rape of one person can be translated into an assault upon the community through the emphasis placed in every culture on women's sexual virtue; the shame of the rape humiliates the family and all those associated with the survivor.

The following are some of the testimonies of Sierra Leonean women who survived or witnessed sexual violence, and of some of the service providers and others who witnessed the abuse or assisted them once they reached refugee camps in Guinea and hospitals in Sierra Leone.²⁴

Ruth B. is a thirty-six-year-old farmer from Gandorhun, in Kono District. She fled her village when it was attacked by the AFRC/RUF, but was captured, beaten, raped, and forced to work. She ultimately escaped and made her way to Guinea. When Ruth described her one-month ordeal in captivity, she was visibly traumatized, in poor health and still bore scars on her back and legs. The back of her ankles had been sliced just below the Achilles tendon to prevent her from escaping:

They took three of my children and killed my husband. The rest of us ran away. But we were captured by the junta,²⁵ and they took the women away to carry their loads. I was with them one month. They held us in a house. One day while we were there and they were away, another group came from Gongo and asked us what our mission was. We told them we were from Gandorhun, and they beat us. They beat us severely. They stomped on my stomach, and the next day, I was bleeding from my vagina as if I had had an operation. Now, I have a serious backache.

Later the two groups came together, and the second group told the first group that we were family members of the Kamajors. They used me for sex, and they cut my heels with their bayonets so I wouldn't run or walk off. But I escaped into the bush even though I was wounded...

I didn't know who captured me. They were older and younger—adults and children. Some had uniforms and machetes, and some wore ordinary clothes, like jeans, and had guns. There were lots of nicknames: one of them was called "Blood." They said they didn't like Kabbah and said, "If

²⁴The majority of women Human Rights Watch interviewed fled villages in the diamond-rich Kono district of Sierra Leone and became refugees across the border in the Guéckedou area of Guinea, which is now home to over 200,000 Sierra Leonean refugees. The names of all the rape survivors interviewed have been changed in order to protect their safety and privacy.

²⁵Witnesses often referred to their attackers as "rebels" or "juntas," common terminology for the RUF and the AFRC respectively. Human Rights Watch interviews revealed that attackers were in most cases a mix of plainclothes "rebels" and uniformed AFRC/RUF soldiers. They also sometimes disguised themselves as Kamajor or ECOMOG forces. For these reasons and a lack of a reliable method of distinguishing former government soldiers from rebels in Sierra Leone, this report refers to them collectively as AFRC/RUF.

he's there, we will continue to fight." They were both Liberian and Sierra Leonean. I could tell from their language.²⁶

Finda T. is a forty-five-year-old woman from Koidu town, Kono who fled with her family when the AFRC/RUF attacked at the end of February. She told Human Rights Watch how her family had been killed and how she had been raped by rebel soldiers:

The rebels caught us in the bush after my family and I had fled one Saturday in February. They killed my brother immediately, and they took my two children. One of them raped me. He used me as his wife, and another one beat me with a gun. They made me and others carry their loads. They told us to take their bags of rice back to Koidu town. They seriously used us. In Koidu, they took our clothes and freed us. I lived in the bush for two months using leaves to cover myself. Eventually, I found some people who showed me the way to Guinea. A child gave me her clothes, and I have only one dress now.²⁷

In April, medical staff in Connaught Hospital, Freetown reported that they were witnessing an alarming number of patients suffering mutilations. A number of the female patients they interviewed were raped and had foreign objects inserted in their vaginas. They had been attacked by AFRC/RUF between April 15-25 in villages between Njaiama Sewafe and Koidu. The patients said the AFRC/RUF rounded up civilians in groups or lines, put them to a cutting block and commenced limb amputations with a cutlass. Doctors reported:

In some villages, after the people were rounded up, they were stripped naked and ordered to "use their women;" men were ordered to "use" their sister. When men refused to do so, their arm was amputated, and the women were raped by the attackers.²⁸

Alice M. is a forty-one-year-old former police officer from Jabwema Fiama, Kono, Sierra Leone, who is now a refugee in Guinea. On March 10, 1998, she and her family fled their home into the forest two days after the AFRC/RUF began to attack and loot her town. The AFRC/RUF captured her with her husband in the forest, but didn't catch her children. They let her husband go, but seeing her police identification, they kept her. She remembered:

Commander Steven Gbenya and Sergeant Moussa captured me. They had also captured other police officers, whom they killed. The commander said he wasn't going to kill me, and instead, he raped me all night. I cried and cried and prayed. I don't know why, but early in the morning, about 6:00 a.m., he let me go. I think he felt sorry for me. He and Moussa escorted me out without telling anyone else and took me to a place in the bush. They deliberately raped many women. To save your life, you have to agree, or they will kill you. They are beastly.²⁹

²⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Mangay Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 15, 1998. Many refugees interviewed described their captors as having spoken with Liberian accents. They were not able to say whether or not they were Liberian fighters or Sierra Leonean fighters from the Kailahun region of Sierra Leone, closest to Liberia, who would have spoken with the same accent. Nonetheless, many believed them to be Liberians.

²⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Sowadou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 14, 1998.

²⁸"Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone," Médecins Sans Frontières, May 1998, p. 4.

²⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 14, 1998.

Abductions

The abduction of civilians by the AFRC/RUF is commonplace. People of all ages are abducted, but witnesses point to young men, women, and girls and boys as preferred targets. The soldiers capture individuals and groups to labor for them and in general perform tasks necessary for their subsistence and advancement.³⁰ Women and girls are taken as "wives," or sexual slaves, to cook and perform other domestic tasks. Young men and boys are also abducted for forced recruitment as soldiers. It is unclear whether or not they have designated large-scale holding centers, although at least one witness testified to this effect.

Human Rights Watch received reports that the AFRC/RUF abducts these groups for use as human shields against attacking ECOMOG forces, in the belief that ECOMOG would hesitate to target civilians, particularly women and children, or that in the event of an attack, the "shield" would be hit first.

As described below, many witnesses are under the impression that abductions number in the thousands. The AFRC/RUF captures many civilians apparently with the intention of holding them permanently to reinforce their numbers and ensure their future existence. Others abducted are executed or ultimately allowed to go free after having suffered a number of abuses.

Forced Labor

Many who had been captured by the AFRC/RUF and either escaped or were released testified to Human Rights Watch that they were forced to "carry loads" and perform other tasks for them. The civilians were collected or called upon individually to transport items that the fighters looted from town to town and from one point to another within villages. They prepared food for the soldiers and performed any task required of them to contribute to meeting the daily needs of the soldiers.

Mary F., a nine-year-old girl who fled Koidu town, Kono, was captured by AFRC/RUF soldiers and forced to work. She was freed by the soldiers but was separated from her parents and is now an unaccompanied minor in a refugee camp in Guinea. Upon finishing her story, her steady, serious mood changed, and she burst into tears.

A group of about eleven junta soldiers captured me, my parents and others. They killed one person in our group in front of us. The group split, and I lost my parents. They took us back to Koidu and released us but arrested us again and used us to carry their loads. We were adults and children. They didn't tell us anything about why they were making us do this. Eventually they let us go...³¹

Sia T., who is eighteen and the mother of one, fled the fighting in Koidu town and hid in the forest for three months before making her way to Guinea. She witnessed the murder, rape and abduction of civilians and was herself captured and forced to work for the AFRC/RUF. Some of her captors were children. She remembered:

We were hiding in the bush, not too far from where some of the junta stayed. They knew where people were. They would go into the bush and get some of them, take them to town, make them work and let them go. Then they'd go back and get more. They made me pound rice. We were afraid. They said they weren't going to do anything, but we were working at gunpoint. They were

³⁰Other civilians were forced to labor for the AFRC/RUF, but weren't abducted per se. Survivors testified that often the soldiers would know where their hide-outs were in the forest and would regularly call upon them to perform tasks or subject them to other forms of abuse, under threat of additional physical harm. Although these civilians were not held inside AFRC/RUF installations, it was difficult for them to flee.

³¹Human Rights Watch interview, Boodou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 23, 1998.

as young as the boys here. [She gestures at three young boys, approximately five to seven years old, sitting nearby the interview setting]. The small ones had guns, too. They even fought between themselves over whose girls were whose.³²

Sexual Slavery

Human Rights Watch documented repeated accounts of women and girls being abducted by the AFRC/RUF in large numbers for sexual and other purposes. The AFRC/RUF holds these women and girls indefinitely and requires them to perform a variety of tasks, such as preparing food. Women and girls may also have been abducted to care for the many young children captured by the AFRC/RUF. Some who have escaped report that the soldiers divide them up amongst themselves and refer to them as their "wives." They have sex with them at will and at times brutalize them with other forms of physical violence. The AFRC/RUF move these women and girls with them from one location to another. Targeting women and girls in these ways serves the AFRC/RUF practically, in terms of meeting their own daily needs, and strategically, as they coopt their labor and destroy local family and economic structures.

Grace M. is from Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District. She is twenty-one years old. When the AFRC/RUF attacked Koidu in February and launched "Operation Pay Yourself," Grace fled to Kombayendeh (thirty-two miles from Koidu) to find rice. She stayed there for a while but was forced to flee again, first to Bovoma and finally into the forest. AFRC/RUF soldiers captured her along with seventeen other women and kept them as so-called "wives." She ultimately escaped and made her way to Guinea. She believes the other women who did not escape are probably still with the AFRC/RUF, perhaps in Kailahun. She said:

It was on a Monday mid-day, that the junta stormed where we hid. They arrested eighteen of us, and we were taken to Koidu town again. We spent sixteen days with them in the township. While in Koidu town, I saw dead bodies littered all over the place. I also saw some of the soldiers' captives, regardless of age, carrying looted items from the surrounding villages; they took them to Kailahun. We were eighteen in number, all females. It was this same day that the soldiers shared us amongst themselves as wives. Each of us got a man as a husband. It was indeed horrible as one soldier that I was assigned to sexually abused me. He had sex with me any time he wished—at night, mid-day and anywhere. I can still remember his name, Alie, Mende tribe.³³

Ike C., the newspaper reporter from Koidu town, fled the AFRC/RUF's attack on Koidu and was caught. He was able to escape, however, and among many atrocities he witnessed, he said this about sexual violence:

There was rampant raping. I saw a fifteen-year-old girl raped right before me. They left her, but they captured others, and among them was a seven-year-old girl. I also saw many girls held in vehicles, ready to be transported. They force them to carry loads, use them as "wives" and encourage them, saying, "I will give you everything, stay with me." But they have no alternative but to stay.³⁴

Forced Recruitment

³²Human Rights Watch interview, Fandouyema II Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 12, 1998.

³³Center for Rural Adult Education (CREA) interview, conducted the week of June 15, 1998, Kissidougou, Republic of Guinea. Also, Human Rights Watch interview, Kissidougou, Republic of Guinea, June 17, 1998.

³⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Boodou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 23, 1998.

The AFRC/RUF is using and forcibly recruiting children and young men to engage in armed attacks against Sierra Leone civilians, Civilian Defense Forces, and ECOMOG soldiers.³⁵ Many witnesses told Human Rights Watch that they had seen AFRC/RUF soldiers abducting and holding young men and boys to use as child soldiers and that child soldiers had been among their AFRC/RUF attackers.

The forced recruitment of boys as child soldiers by the AFRC/RUF in Sierra Leone is not new. As armed conflict in Sierra Leone has intensified in recent years, the social fabric of the country has unraveled, and children have increasingly seen their rights erode. Many children have lost or been separated from their parents in the fighting, do not have enough to eat and do not have schools and other basic structures in place to meet their needs. They are particularly vulnerable to forced recruitment and have clearly been targeted by the AFRC/RUF as it seeks to reinforce its ranks.³⁶

Young boys are targeted in part because their captors consider them to be less afraid to fight; they likely do not have children or wives to consider in risking their lives. They are readily manipulated because they are vulnerable and without protection. Child soldiers are often placed at the front line and forced to commit atrocities against their own communities. This establishes a sense of culpability in them, as well as traumatization, and makes it less possible for them to be accepted back into society or to be psychologically prepared to return.

Little is known about the condition of the young men and children abducted since February by the AFRC/RUF for use as soldiers; few have escaped to tell the story. Over the past few years, however, child recruits were typically provided with food, mind-altering drugs and firearms and were forced to fight and commit atrocities alongside the AFRC/RUF soldiers. The demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of these children will ultimately present an enormous challenge to all those involved in healing the wounds of war and building a future for Sierra Leone.

Alice M. is a forty-one-year-old former police officer in Jabwema Fiama, Kono. While she was held captive by two members of the AFRC/RUF, she was confined to a room with a ten-year-old boy. She said:

Commander Steven Gbenya and Sgt. Moussa were also holding a ten-year-old boy in the room I was held in. They didn't release him. The house we were in was full of rebels. The room next to mine was the Liberian commando room.³⁷ The commander said that they no longer planned to kill children below fifteen, pregnant women, or old men and women. They said they were going

³⁵Although prevailing international law sets fifteen as the minimum age for military recruitment and participation in armed conflict, Human Rights Watch shares a growing consensus among independent, nongovernmental sources which believe that this age is too low and must be raised to eighteen. Not only does the Convention on the Rights of the Child define a child as any human being under the age of eighteen, unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier, but eighteen is the voting age in the vast majority of countries. Establishing eighteen as the minimum age for participation in hostilities would be consistent with existing international norms and offer greater protection for children in situations of particularly grave risk. In Sierra Leone, Human Rights Watch also noted the problem of birth registration; individuals often did not know their own age or the age of their children. The lack of records makes it easier for those who forcibly recruit children to do so by claiming the recruits were older than they actually were.

³⁶The Child Protection Committee, a United Nations-Nongovernmental Organization group established to address child protection issues in Sierra Leone, estimated the number of children in armed groups in Sierra Leone in September 1997 at approximately 3,000. (Inter-agency strategy paper for Child Protection Activities in Sierra Leone, Child Protection Committee, Camp Conakry, September 1997.) The actual number is not known, but has increased significantly since the renewal of fighting in February.

³⁷The interviewee claimed that there were Liberian fighters among the AFRC/RUF.

to train-up those children because they knew they were going to die themselves. They encouraged the boy not to be afraid. They cooked for us, but I couldn't eat. The boy didn't say much, but he was hungry, and he ate.³⁸

Ike C., the reporter for the *Herald Guardian* in Koidu town who was captured by the AFRC/RUF, also testified to the role of child soldiers. Some of his captors were under ten years old and wielded guns. He said:

I was captured by Gittaboi, who said he'd execute me because I am a press man. There were little kids, boys, around seven, nine, twelve years old who were among the soldiers. They had guns and felt they had power.... I saw girls held in vehicles ready to be transported. The last group of kids I saw were held at the Branch Energy mining group office in Koidu town. They had 1,500-2,000 of them there. I saw them. In Koidu, the junta forces shouted for kids and gathered them. A soldier told me they are holding those kids as a shield in the event of an ECOMOG attack. They also use them as soldiers, for labor, and for sexual purposes.³⁹

Other Violations of International Humanitarian Law

In addition to the abuses described above, members of the AFRC/RUF flagrantly violated other provisions of international humanitarian law. The AFRC/RUF regularly showed a gross disrespect for principles granting protection to hospitals, places of worship, and other non-military structures providing public services.⁴⁰

The private property of civilians was frequently looted and their homes intentionally burned.⁴¹ Witnesses spoke regularly of theft and mass destruction by the AFRC/RUF as they retreated from ECOMOG forces. Members of the AFRC/RUF completely stripped civilians of their belongings on a regular basis. Many of those fleeing Sierra Leone arrived in refugee camps with little more than their clothing; and several witnesses explained how they had been left naked by the AFRC/RUF and spent days in flight without clothing.

In February 1998, in Lunsar town of Porto Loko district, as a part of their "Operation Pay Yourself," members of the AFRC/RUF raided the Magbesemi hospital. Medicines and equipment were taken, patients were forced to flee, and some medical personnel reportedly abducted by the AFRC/RUF. One patient being treated for a gunshot wound described their actions:

The AFRC/RUF soldiers came to Magbesemi Hospital, fleeing the ECOMOG advance. They took the doctors away. There were many rebels—in several trucks with arms and heavy weapons. They took all the drugs. We were about twenty-five patients. They said, "this is Operation Pay Yourself."⁴²

³⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 14, 1998.

³⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Boodou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 23, 1998.

⁴⁰Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, Article 52, and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8 June 1977, Articles 9, 10, 11, and 16.

⁴¹Protocol II, Article 4 (2) (g).

⁴²Human Rights Watch interview, Faranah Hospital, Faranah, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 3, 1998.

Abuses Committed by Members of Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs)

Human Rights Watch documented numerous abuses, including killings and torture, by members of the Civilian Defense Forces, frequently referred to in local dialects as "traditional hunters." Civilian Defense Forces were developed primarily in the early 1990s as local protection responses to insecurity and violence throughout Sierra Leone. The largest and most powerful of these groups, the Kamajors, were responsible for the majority of the most serious abuses committed by those fighting on behalf of the Kabbah government since February 1998. In recent months, Kamajors have also been responsible for obstructing humanitarian assistance and demanding money or compensation at roadblocks.

Humanitarian and United Nations organizations complain that Kamajors frequently obstruct the delivery of aid to IDPs and civilian groups in need. Humanitarian agency vehicles were frequently commandeered by Kamajors, and aid workers were occasionally detained by Kamajors, two as recently as June 1998.⁴³ Groups providing assistance to the interior of Sierra Leone reported in June that the Kamajors had become increasingly demanding at checkpoints, often insisting that they be compensated for having "liberated" the country from the AFRC/RUF.

Killings and Mutilation

The scale and nature of abuses committed by Kamajors and other members of CDFs differ significantly from atrocities carried out by the AFRC/RUF, but the abuses are often no less horrific. Many witnesses of abuses committed by Kamajors spoke of the grotesque nature of killings, at times including disembowelment followed by consumption of vital organs, such as the heart. Acts such as these were intended to transfer the strength of the enemy to those involved in the consumption. Killings by Kamajors usually targeted people they believed to be members of the AFRC/RUF and their civilian supporters.

A Sierra Leonean Catholic priest described how the Kamajors reacted to the presence of the AFRC/RUF in Koidu in early February, just following ECOMOG's takeover of Freetown:

On February 7th, they [the AFRC/RUF] started "Operation Pay Yourself." On Friday the 13th, I went back to the mission. The youths had called the Kamajors who started arriving on the 11th, 12th, a day or two after "Operation Pay Yourself" had ended. They came from Sewafe, Punduru, Gondama... When they found AFRC, they would kill them immediately. The Kamajors and youths started burning [AFRC/RUF] soldiers and collaborators. On about February 11th, they [Kamajors] called a meeting at the town counsel. They said it was to restore law and order—they said if anyone knows where they are, they should tell us. They decapitated one surrendered soldier and I saw them eat his raw liver and heart.⁴⁴

Another witness from Koidu remembered:

After the first night of "Operation Pay Yourself," the youths and the Lebanese businessmen called the Kamajors. The Kamajors came, and if they and the youths caught soldiers, they burned them alive with tires and petrol.⁴⁵

⁴³Human Rights Watch interview with humanitarian agency whose staff had been detained by Kamajors to "make a point," Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 23, 1998.

⁴⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 9, 1998.

⁴⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Fandouyema II Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 12, 1998.

Several foreign residents of Sierra Leone that had worked with or observed Kamajors in the field concurred that this "take no prisoners" policy was widespread. One foreign trainer of the Kamajors claimed that the fighters were as "malicious as the AFRC/RUF"⁴⁶ but committed fewer abuses due to their supervision, even though this was limited. The Kamajors have been led by Capt. Samuel Hinga Norman, deputy defense minister, who in recent months repeatedly stated that all CDFs were now under the control of ECOMOG.⁴⁷ With their knowledge of the local terrain, Kamajors are frequently relied upon by ECOMOG as combatants and guides in unfamiliar rural areas.

Recruitment of Child Soldiers

CDFs, especially the Kamajors, have contributed to one of the most urgent human rights problems involving children in Sierra Leone: the recruitment of child soldiers. Children have been recruited by the CDFs for many of the same reasons that the AFRC/RUF abduct them into their ranks: children are often easily indoctrinated, fearless, have little sense of what is morally right or wrong, and, according to Kamajor leaders, are more likely to be "unadulterated."⁴⁸ While no one knows the number of children fighting among the CDF forces, one field commander estimated that their forces in the eastern Kailahun district alone numbered 3,000.⁴⁹

The situation for child combatants provoked a mission to Sierra Leone from Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu. Otunnu urged that, "the international community make Sierra Leone a pilot project for a more concerted and effective response to the needs of children effected by war."⁵⁰ During his visit, Otunnu obtained commitments from the government to assure that the CDFs would cease recruitment of children under the age of eighteen, begin demobilization of child soldiers, provide special protection to child combatants, and create a Joint Task Force comprising representatives from the government, ECOMOG, U.N. agencies, and relevant NGOs. On June 25, in an interview with Human Rights Watch, the Deputy Minister of Defense, Hinga Norman, also declared that the government was committed to demobilizing CDF child combatants.⁵¹ In mid-July, however, aid agencies and press reports concurred that the CDFs were still recruiting children in northern Sierra Leone.⁵²

National and international human rights and humanitarian workers in Sierra Leone expressed their concern to Human Rights Watch that Civilian Defense Forces, such as the Kamajors and loosely organized bands of youths, represent a serious and growing human rights issue in Sierra Leone today. Like the AFRC/RUF, these groups are able to act largely with impunity. This trend, when considered in the context of past practices of armed groups in Sierra Leone, underscores the need to develop a comprehensive program to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate all combatants into the new national army or Sierra Leonean society.

Many former combatants, mostly from the AFRC/RUF, are presently being retrained by ECOMOG and integrated into the new national army. This training should be carried out by qualified ECOMOG personnel and

⁴⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 23, 1998.

⁴⁷Human Rights Watch interview with deputy defense minister, June 25, 1998.

⁴⁸According to Kamajor rules of conduct, combatants must refrain from drugs, sex, looting, and other illicit acts in order to maintain their magical powers, including being bulletproof, on the battlefield.

⁴⁹Lansana Fofana, "Militia Admits Recruiting Child Soldiers," IPS, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 29, 1998.

⁵⁰Press release, "Mr. Olara A. Otunnu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict urges the international community make Sierra Leone a pilot project for a more concerted and effective response to the needs of children effected by war," New York, New York, June 2, 1998.

⁵¹Human Rights Watch interview with Deputy Minister of Defense, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 25, 1998.

⁵²Ibid. and phone conversations with aid agencies in Sierra Leone, July 27, 1998.

monitored by UNOMSIL observers. Diplomats and aid workers in Sierra Leone have noted the lack of support for the approximately 3,000 ex-combatants in an encampment in dire conditions in the Lungi area outside of Freetown. Former combatants wishing to be reintegrated into the new national army will need appropriate support in order to complete their retraining. Those who are screened out as possible war criminals should be investigated and prosecuted where appropriate according to international standards. Those who wish to return to civilian life will require appropriate assistance to reintegrate into communities, including programs to encourage a return to farms, schools, or micro-economic activities. The reintegration aspects of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program must emphasize a respect for the laws of war and human rights. As combatants from rebel groups, CDFs and government forces have comprised the principal perpetrators of human rights abuses in Sierra Leone, the success of this program could play a crucial role in preventing future human rights abuses.

IV. SIERRA LEONEAN REFUGEES

The atrocities and violence described above are unfortunately only the first chapter of hardship for many Sierra Leoneans. Approximately one-quarter million Sierra Leoneans have fled to neighboring Guinea and Liberia in order to escape the abuses and fighting. The continuing conflict in Sierra Leone prevents them from leaving the refugee camps in these countries.

The Situation of Sierra Leonean Refugees in the Republic of Guinea

Since February 1998, the refugee situation in the Republic of Guinea has reached a state of emergency. As the AFRC/RUF attacked and committed atrocities in villages and towns in Sierra Leone's Kono and Kailahun districts, civilians fled by the thousands and crossed the border into Guinea. UNHCR puts the total number of new arrivals since May 1997 at over 200,000.⁵³ The new Sierra Leonean refugees have joined thousands who had fled fighting at earlier points in Sierra Leone's seven-year internal armed conflict.

Refugees poured out of Sierra Leone, sometimes at the rate of 3,000 per day, primarily into Faranah, Guéckedou, Kissidougou, and Macenta prefectures, in the forest area of eastern Guinea known as Guinée Forestière. The largest number of this population are settled in approximately 124 camps, or local settlements,⁵⁴ in Guéckedou, where refugees now outnumber Guinea nationals.⁵⁵

⁵³According to UNHCR, there are approximately 255,000 new Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea and Liberia, over 185,000 of whom arrived in Guinea since August 1997. They joined 121,000 Sierra Leoneans already in Guinea as of June 1997. An additional 128,000 Liberian refugees are also in Guinea.

⁵⁴Many of the refugees spontaneously settled in Guinea in areas abandoned by refugees from previous years and in new areas. Other refugee sites were planned by UNHCR, creating more traditional camp settings for larger numbers of people. Regardless of size, shape or history of formation, in the field the settlements are referred to by UNHCR, aid agencies, Guinean authorities and refugees alike as "camps." For the purposes of this report, the term camps will therefore be used to describe all refugee settlements. All of the camps are named after the local villages they are attached to, or are near to. In many cases, the camps are much larger than their namesakes. None of the camps are enclosed or are guarded by the Guinean military, although the border region of Guéckedou has been increasingly militarized with the increase in conflict across the border. Many military checkpoints have been established along the roads in the area. If security issues arise within the camp, they are currently dealt with by refugee camp committee authorities, who may consult with UNHCR and may refer issues to the Guinean police.

⁵⁵Sierra Leonean refugees and members of the local Guinean population do mix. Although the refugees' movement is restricted, trading does occur and the refugees sell their labor, food obtained from UNHCR, wood, kerosene and other items to nationals. They also trade their rations for a variety of other items, such as salt or rice. This interaction is made easier by similarities in the tribal languages and heritage of the groups, and many share family relationships.

Assistance

The refugees arrive in terrible shape after days, weeks, and sometimes months hiding and walking in the forest with little to eat, little to wear, and no health care. They suffer great trauma and urgently need food, shelter, clothing, and medical attention. From the outset, the crisis placed immense pressure on the Guinean civil and health authorities,⁵⁶ along with UNHCR and its implementing partners,⁵⁷ who struggled to respond.

Although UNHCR and its implementing partners in Guéckedou reported to Human Rights Watch that the situation has improved somewhat, the humanitarian response to the refugee emergency was slow and disorganized.⁵⁸ Humanitarian organizations working with UNHCR to address the crisis cite a lack of resources, particularly trucks for food distribution, and a general lack of emergency preparedness as the main factors contributing to the poor initial response.⁵⁹ Prolonged exposure to the elements during flight in Sierra Leone and in Guinea, the continuing uneven distribution of food, the lack of medical attention, and insufficient shelter have led to severe health problems, especially in the under-five population, including malnutrition, malaria, acute respiratory afflictions, and diarrhea. Infant mortality is high.

The situation became worse on June 14, 1998 when fighting intensified on the Sierra Leone side of the border with Guéckedou. Ostensibly for security reasons, the government of Guinea on June 15 blocked access to roads leading to approximately fifty refugee camps, housing over 150,000 newly arrived refugees. The lack of access made it impossible to provide adequate services to the refugees and infringed upon UNHCR's ability to provide protection over four weeks. The Guinean government's refusal to provide even limited access on a regular basis risked a humanitarian disaster and the possibility of increased insecurity and unrest among the refugee and local populations—a situation no one would have been prepared to adequately address. The World Food Program was finally permitted to deliver a week's worth of rations on July 14, feeding approximately 130,000 refugees.

The closing of access to refugee encampments and consequent blockage of humanitarian supplies can result in a severe violation of the rights to adequate food, clothing and housing, and to medical care. Guinea is a party to

⁵⁶Health services for refugees are provided through Guinea's health authority—Le Département Publique de la Santé (DPS). Refugees can report to often overcrowded and sometimes distant health posts where they can receive treatment for minor ailments and/or referrals to hospitals. At the time of Human Rights Watch's visit, hospitals were overflowing and lacked adequate medical supplies, including medicines, and had limited surgical capacity.

⁵⁷UNHCR contracts local and international nongovernmental organizations to provide food, shelter, water, health, educational, counseling, and other services to refugees. UNHCR also works with Guinean authorities, particularly in the areas of refugee security and protection and health.

⁵⁸The principal problems that refugees reported to Human Rights Watch include lack of food, medical care, shelter and the provision of non-food items. The distribution of corn meal as the main food item for refugees poses a problem for many. The staple food in Sierra Leone is rice, and refugees have difficulty preparing and digesting the corn meal. Intermittent and delayed deliveries of food have left many hungry and struggling to find sustenance. Longer-term assistance challenges include the need for adequate programs to address the psychological and social needs of survivors of trauma and sexual violence. Culturally appropriate counseling and other activities, particularly for single women, single mothers, and children should be a priority. Women alone also face ongoing self-sufficiency problems, and programs for these women with real income-generating potential are needed.

⁵⁹At the time of Human Rights Watch's visit, the arrival of a UNHCR Emergency Response team to Guéckedou in late April, along with weekly interagency coordination meetings and additional support from the international community, had gone a long way to improving the situation.

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR) which guarantees these rights in articles 11 and 12.⁶⁰

Refugee Protection

Location of the Camps

The most immediately striking refugee protection concern in Guéckedou is the proximity of the refugee camps to the Sierra Leone border. Many of the camps, in particular those that were cut off from humanitarian assistance in June and July, are located in the area of Guéckedou which forms a peninsula-like territory stretching into eastern Sierra Leone. They are extremely close to the border with Sierra Leone; some are as little as three kilometers away.⁶¹ A river running along the border forms a natural barrier between Guinea and Sierra Leone, providing minimal protection to refugees who are in gunshot range of the AFRC/RUF soldiers, located just on the other side. Pressure on the border is growing as ECOMOG forces continue to attack AFRC/RUF-held territory in Kono and Kailahun districts, squeezing AFRC/RUF soldiers further north. In addition, the roads leading to many of the camps are extremely treacherous, even for four-wheel-drive vehicles. Once Guinea's June-November rainy season begins, the roads often become impassable.

Although all of the Guinean military and civil authorities Human Rights Watch spoke with rejected the possibility of a cross-border attack by the AFRC/RUF, the risk is clear. AFRC/RUF soldiers are located dangerously close to the border and, on several occasions in mid-June, gunfire was exchanged across the border in the Nongoa village area, resulting in casualties among the Guinean military and small numbers of civilians.⁶² Refugees from a camp in Nongoa fled the fighting.

Access to Asylum, Screening and Registration

Although Sierra Leonean refugees are granted group-based prima facie refugee status in Guinea,⁶³ and in many respects, Guinea stands out as a generous host nation, obtaining asylum is not without obstacles. Refugees

⁶⁰Although the covenant stipulates that developing countries "with due regard to human rights and their national economy" may determine to what extent they guarantee these rights to non-nationals, the Refugee Convention requires that refugees be accorded treatment in these areas not less favorable than that accorded to nationals. (Refugee Convention, Article 23 relating to public relief and assistance. Guinea is also a party to this treaty.). Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which all states are deemed to accept and adhere by virtue of their membership in the United Nations, explicitly guarantees the right to food, clothing, housing and medical care to "everyone" (Article 25).

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which is charged with interpreting these economic, social and cultural rights under the ICESCR, has stated in General Comment 3 that a state party which allows any significant number of individuals to be deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, or of basic shelter and housing is "prima facie failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant." Although states parties are required to guarantee only the "progressive" realization of these rights, "[i]f the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its *raison d'être*." The state must use "all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations." Such resources would also include proffered humanitarian assistance.

⁶¹Article II (6) of the OAU Convention states that "For reasons of security, countries shall as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin." This has generally been understood to mean a minimum of fifty kilometers from the border.

⁶²Human Rights Watch interviewed a ten-year-old refugee victim of a bullet wound and observed several wounded Guinean soldiers at Guéckedou Hospital, all casualties from this exchange of fire.

⁶³Lists of new arrivals are compiled by Guinean officials at the sub-prefecture and prefecture levels and given to UNHCR, which then goes out to the field, identifies, and registers the refugees.

consistently testified to Human Rights Watch that they receive a mixed welcome when they reached the Guinea border. There are no reports of forced return—*refoulement*—by the Guinean military patrolling the border, but the refugees are routinely subjected to summary searches, and border authorities extort fees and property from them prior to entry into Guinea.⁶⁴ Sixty-year-old Fea R. from Kuyoh, Kono, and her husband entered Guinea at Bakador after one month in the forest in Sierra Leone. She remembered: “We met Guinean military at the border, and they were making people pay. The soldiers took the palm oil we were traveling with.”⁶⁵

Refugees, however, also frequently expressed their appreciation for the assistance the Guinean military provided to the most vulnerable arrivals, particularly survivors of gross human rights violations, such as amputations. The soldiers transported refugees in dire need of medical assistance to hospitals in military vehicles or to places of temporary shelter.

UNHCR does not maintain a presence at border crossings, and UNHCR protection officers have rarely monitored the treatment of refugees as they seek to enter Guinea. In part, this is due to the fact that Guinean authorities have in many areas recently barred access to the border, citing security concerns. To ensure the protection of refugees seeking to enter Guinea, UNHCR should work with the government of Guinea to establish a presence at border crossing points to monitor access to asylum.

Detention and Exclusion

Human Rights Watch has received reports that possibly hundreds of suspected AFRC/RUF soldiers trying to enter Guinea have been detained by Guinean military authorities. Unlike the situation in Liberia described below, infiltration of the camps by AFRC/RUF members is not known to have happened to a large extent. Suspected AFRC/RUF members have reportedly turned up in refugee camps in small numbers and have been identified by the refugees and handed over to the Guinean authorities. For example, refugees in Fangamadou told Human Rights Watch that six suspected AFRC/RUF soldiers had been turned over to Guinean authorities, who reportedly detained them and later transferred them to jails in Conakry.

UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have both been denied access to detainees to determine whether or not they actually have bona fide asylum claims and whether they are being treated as candidates for exclusion.⁶⁶ The government of Guinea has provided no information about the detainees or the procedures and criteria used to screen, detain, and seemingly exclude these persons from protection in Guinea. The Guinean government should give UNHCR unlimited full access to entry points and places of detention of refugees and asylum seekers, including potential exclusion candidates, in order to determine their status and provide assistance and protection where appropriate.

⁶⁴ “Guinean border authorities behaved similarly with Liberian refugees returning to Liberia in 1997.”

⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Fandouyema II Refugee Camp, Republic of Guinea, June 12, 1998.

⁶⁶ UNHCR and governments are obliged under international refugee law to deny the benefits of refugee status to persons who would otherwise qualify as refugees if they have committed certain human rights violations. These provisions are commonly referred to as “exclusion clauses.” Article 1(F) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that the Convention “shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering” that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Article 1(5) of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa contains identical language and excludes from refugee status any person who “has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Organization of African Unity.”

These concerns underline the need for UNHCR to maintain a presence at entry points into Guinea, where protection officers can monitor access to asylum for new arrivals, conduct basic screening to determine group-based, prima facie refugee status and pre-screen those who may be potential exclusion candidates.⁶⁷ UNHCR should also advise the Guinean government on criteria and procedures for exclusion.

Freedom of Movement

The Guinean government has thus far failed to issue refugee identification cards to the refugees, which has created a number of problems. Without an identification card, the refugees' freedom of movement is constrained, and they risk arrest should they be stopped by Guinean military or police authorities at various checkpoints along the road. Refugees are frequently stopped, threatened with arrest, and pressured to pay what little they have in money or goods for failure to present an identification card.

William S., a refugee from Sierra Leone in Nyeadou Refugee Camp, said:

I was arrested two days ago by a police officer while I was walking along the road for not having an identification card. I had the piece of paper saying I'm a refugee from Sierra Leone, my *auto-collant* and my fixing token,⁶⁸ but he said I need an ID card. He said if I didn't pay him he was going to take me to the jail. He said if I pay FG5,000, I can get a small receipt and go by. I produced FG1,000 to get released and came straight back to the camp fast. And he didn't give me any receipt.⁶⁹

A form of identification which the Guinean authorities do recognize is available for a hefty fee (FG5,000, approximately U.S.\$5.00) from the Sierra Leonean Refugee Coordinating Committee. But the price is too high for most. UNHCR is reportedly in continued negotiations with the Guinean government regarding issuance of these cards. The slow process may be an indication of the government's desire to keep the refugee population as separate from the local population as possible.

Security

There have been few reports of crimes being committed in the refugee camps. The only incidents reported to Human Rights Watch involved refugees stealing property, such as tarpaulins, from the houses of "vulnerable"⁷⁰ refugees during the night. "Vulnerable" populations are still in the process of being identified and situated within

⁶⁷Screening for exclusion should take place after screening for refugee claims, as a person may have a valid fear of persecution but not be deserving of international protection for the reasons described. Efforts should be made, however, to ensure as much as possible that combatants and war criminals are not mixed in with the rest of the refugee population, as is currently the case in refugee camps in Liberia. Those excluded are still entitled to protection under international human rights law. For example, the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides protection against *refoulement* to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be subjected to torture.

⁶⁸The *auto-collant* is a temporary card issued to new Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea to facilitate distribution of supplies, including food. Refugees later receive a temporary card and a "fixing token," which is also used to identify refugees for distribution. The temporary card is meant ultimately to be replaced with a refugee identification card, but none have been issued. Refugees also receive a copy of their UNHCR registration form, issued by UNHCR, which identifies all of the members of their family.

⁶⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Nyeadou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 20, 1998.

⁷⁰Certain members of the refugee population have special needs, are deemed "vulnerable" by UNHCR, and receive targeted assistance. "Vulnerable" populations include such groups as unaccompanied minors; single female heads of household; victims of torture; sexually abused; chronically ill; handicapped; mentally disturbed; blind; and others.

the camps. The location and security of these populations in the camps are ongoing concerns, as is assistance to this community.

There have also been no reports of abductions by any party taking place in the camps. Sexual attacks on women in the camps, if occurring, have not been reported. However, women alone, or with children, have been subjected to another form of sexual abuse. Human Rights Watch received reports that fellow male refugees often tell women that they will assist them in the camp only in exchange for sex.⁷¹ Volunteer social workers who work with UNHCR to identify, counsel and assist "vulnerable" refugees in Nyeadou Refugee camp said:

There are more women than men here. Women have children to take care of and no husbands. There is little money and no one to help with the family. Many women tell us that men tell them, "I'll help you if you sleep with me." This is practiced widely in all the camps. Many women agree because they are in need. It is against their real will, but they don't want to starve.⁷²

A number of refugees have been arrested for crimes committed in Guinean villages and cities. Lists of these individuals, their crimes, terms of imprisonment and location have been compiled and made available to UNHCR. UNHCR protection officers have been allowed to visit these refugees, and provide them with one meal per day.

Situation for Sierra Leonean Refugees in Liberia

From February through April 1998, approximately 42,000 Sierra Leoneans fled fighting in the eastern part of the country for Liberia, joining an existing Sierra Leonean refugee population of about 11,000.⁷³ Sierra Leonean civilians have fled on repeated occasions to western Liberia since 1991. Armed rebel groups from both Liberia and Sierra Leone have also moved back and forth across the border on numerous occasions, in order to find refuge, get supplies, such as food, and seek new recruits.⁷⁴ The refugees face serious security and assistance problems in two main camps in Liberia.

Separation of Ex-combatants from Civilian Refugees

The situation for Sierra Leoneans who fled to Liberia is different in several regards from the conditions in the refugee camps in Guinea. Aside from the smaller numbers of refugees in Liberia, the most striking contrast is the presence of former combatants among the refugee populations in the two main camps in Liberia, located at Vahun and Kolahun in northwestern Liberia. According to witnesses at the border, a large number of AFRC/RUF soldiers, perhaps over 2,000, arrived in Vahun from Sierra Leone during the months of February and March 1998. The fighters reportedly entered without weapons. At least one large group was allegedly escorted from the border at Vahun to the interior of Liberia by members of the Liberian military; some may even be Liberian nationals. Others were integrated into the general refugee or local populations. Refugees and aid workers both report that the combatants have gradually slipped away as time passed; by June 1998, a large number had either moved elsewhere in Liberia, or had returned to Sierra Leone. A significant number, probably at least several hundred, remain in the Kolahun and Vahun camps at the time of this writing.

⁷¹Human Rights Watch also received unconfirmed reports of women and girls entering into prostitution in Guinean cities and villages in order to survive.

⁷²Human Rights Watch interview, Nyeadou Refugee Camp, Republic of Guinea, June 20, 1998.

⁷³These statistics were provided by UNHCR field staff in Liberia. Other estimates varied.

⁷⁴The border between Sierra Leone and Liberia, like many in the region, is poorly controlled and subject to much traffic, both legal commerce and illegal crossings. Members of the Mende ethnic group live on both sides of the border, resulting in additional cross-border ties and regular movement between families.

Human Rights Watch interviewed Liberians, Sierra Leoneans, and foreign agency staff who, on multiple occasions, had witnessed interaction between Liberian military and members of the AFRC/RUF in the Vahun and Kolahun areas. Witnesses concurred that, in general, the interaction appeared to have been friendly, including encounters with one of the key RUF commanders, Sam Bouckarie, also known as "Mosquito."⁷⁵

Human Rights Watch also spoke with former combatants in the Vahun camp who stated that members of the AFRC/RUF had come from Sierra Leone into the camps on numerous occasions to encourage them to return to the fighting in Sierra Leone. In addition to recruitment, members of the AFRC/RUF cross the border at unofficial crossing points to sell looted goods from Sierra Leone and to purchase supplies, such as food and clothing.⁷⁶ The AFRC/RUF conduct their business in broad daylight but in civilian clothing. On June 13, Human Rights Watch observed one group of young men transporting goods on the Vahun-Kolahun road that, according to Liberians from the area, were members of the AFRC/RUF on their way back to Sierra Leone. This type of traffic is apparently frequent, according to refugees and Liberians.

Assistance and Protection in Vahun

The presence of former combatants among the refugee population has hampered humanitarian assistance for refugees, as well as their protection. In February 1998, UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP), and other humanitarian organizations became aware of former combatants among the refugee population in Vahun. In view of the proximity of the Vahun camp to AFRC/RUF-controlled territory in Sierra Leone, members of the international aid community attempted to develop a plan to assist refugees as well as transfer them to a safe and accessible area in Kolahun. Much debate ensued among the international humanitarian community regarding how to avoid the danger of creating a "Goma-like" situation.⁷⁷

The proximity of the camp to AFRC/RUF fighters in Sierra Leone and the permeable nature of the border presents a clear security risk for refugees in the Vahun camp. The remote location and vulnerability of the Vahun camp has made it a target in the past: in 1993, armed rebel groups operating in the border area attacked the camp, looted UNHCR facilities, and forced the evacuation of aid workers.

Refugees in the Vahun camp also suffer from abuses by the Liberian military. Upon arrival at the Liberian border, refugees are regularly stripped of their belongings by authorities and subject to beatings if they resist. Refugees claim that Liberian military frequent the camps and openly steal from them, at times in the presence of international aid workers.⁷⁸ Refugees face the constant risk of theft, rape, or other abuse especially when traveling to fields that they till, nearby markets, or other destinations outside the camps. Refugees and medical workers in Vahun also claim that rape, often by Liberian military, is a serious problem for refugees.

Some members of international agencies and nongovernmental organizations have expressed strong criticism at the disjointed and very slow response to the present precarious situation in Vahun. By June 1998, refugees in Vahun had received only one fourteen-day ration from UNHCR since their arrival (most refugees had arrived in

⁷⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Vahun, Liberia, June 14, 1998.

⁷⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Vahun, Liberia, June 14, 1998.

⁷⁷The reference is to Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Zaire, near the border town Goma. The international community was widely criticized for allowing camps in this area to be set up too close to the border with Rwanda and for not taking steps to separate out armed elements and those responsible for the genocide from civilian refugees. This allowed for aid to benefit combatants and war criminals, and exacerbated insecurity in the region.

⁷⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Vahun, Liberia, June 13, 1998.

February and March), and no concrete plan to separate combatants from civilian refugees had been put into place by the Liberian authorities or UNHCR. Refugees also complained that mixed signals from UNHCR had left them confused as to whether they should stay in Vahun or relocate to Kolahun. Human Rights Watch repeatedly heard reports from refugees who said they had been told by UNHCR to build their shelters in Vahun in order to receive tarpaulins and other assistance, only to be told later that they need to move to Kolahun in order to receive assistance.

According to medical aid workers, by June 1998 the lack of humanitarian assistance to the Vahun camp had led to a serious decline in the nutritional health of the refugees. The shortage of assistance created enormous tension in the refugee camps. Refugees and aid workers noted that as pressure on the refugee and local populations increased, theft was rising and it was likely that many of the former combatants would return to Sierra Leone to rejoin the fighting, or else resort to banditry in Liberia. Refugees also claimed that they would at times risk crossing back into AFRC/RUF territory across the border in Sierra Leone to search for food. At least one refugee single mother of three had disappeared while seeking palm oil in Sierra Leone; the caretaker of her children claimed that the woman had been abducted by AFRC/RUF while in Sierra Leone.⁷⁹

Assistance and protection has further been compromised by the onset of the rainy season and poor road conditions,⁸⁰ as well as a lack of resources for UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies. UNHCR was able to maintain only one field officer at the Vahun camp, home to some 42,000 refugees in June 1998.

Kolahun Camp

Protection, security, and humanitarian conditions in the Kolahun camp, some fifty kilometers from the border, are far better than in the Vahun camp. Some refugees have been hesitant to move to the Kolahun camp, however, due to cultural and family ties with the local Mende population in Vahun. These ties create better opportunities for crop cultivation and small business ventures for those who stay in Vahun. Refugees also explained that they do not want to relocate to Kolahun, first, because of the forbidding prospect of establishing new shelters and fields (already established in Vahun) during the rainy season; second, many are unable to make the three-day journey due to age, illness, or nutritional status; and third, they are receiving unclear messages regarding where and when aid will be delivered. By mid-June 1998, some 10,000 refugees had relocated to Kolahun; while approximately 32,000 remained in Vahun, waiting for clearer signals from UNHCR as to future assistance.⁸¹

V. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Overshadowed by conflict in Liberia and events elsewhere on the continent, Sierra Leone has largely escaped the attention of the international community. Over the past seven years, aside from the involvement of diamond mining firms, international interest has focused on the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of the internal conflict and, to a lesser extent, finding political or military solutions to end the violence. Until recently, human rights concerns have largely taken a back seat to emergency relief, support for military interventions, or efforts to negotiate peace between the various warring parties.

⁷⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Vahun, Liberia, June 14, 1998.

⁸⁰Deteriorating road conditions due to heavy rain are likely to cut off road access to the Vahun and Kolahun camps and also to camps in Guinea.

⁸¹According to statistics from UNHCR field office, Vahun, Liberia, June 13, 1998.

The recent surge in atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone has raised a limited level of awareness from the international community regarding the human rights implications of the crisis. In general, the plight of civilians in Sierra Leone has had to compete with other refugee-related emergencies for the attention of international players. This competition, often with crises in Europe, combined with a general lack of funds for UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies, has resulted in insufficient responses to the political, humanitarian, and human rights situation in Sierra Leone. In the words of one human rights worker, "half the battle is keeping Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia on the world's radar screen."⁸²

In June 1998, a team of three experts from the World Bank visited Sierra Leone to discuss and refine a program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) with the Sierra Leonean government. The World Bank, UNDP, and other donors have agreed to fund this program, to be carried out by ECOMOG. The United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) will have the critical role of monitoring and assisting with the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants and assuring the respect for international humanitarian law during this process.⁸³ The success of this program and the humane treatment of former combatants from all sides will be crucial to bring about an end to the conflict in Sierra Leone.⁸⁴

A major challenge to the international community is developing policies and providing assistance that protect human rights and promote peace and stability in the long run. Some past and present policies of governments and international organizations, as discussed below, have targeted only short-term political, economic, or military objectives, while ignoring fundamental human rights concerns. As the reinstated Kabbah government rebuilds national institutions of justice, and ECOMOG creates a new national army, the international community is presented with a unique opportunity to promote human rights in Sierra Leone.

The United Nations

In response to political, military, humanitarian, and human rights developments since February 1998, the U.N. presence in Sierra Leone is undergoing significant expansion. In early July, following a report on Sierra Leone from U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved a measure to establish the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL),⁸⁵ subsuming and expanding the office of the U.N. Special Envoy to Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL's role will increase the present U.N. military observer presence from approximately ten to seventy officers along with support and medical staff. Its mandate will include monitoring and helping ECOMOG with the DDR program for combatants; reporting on the security situation; and "monitoring respect for international humanitarian law at disarmament and demobilization sites."⁸⁶

The secretary-general's June report also calls for adding three human rights officers to support the existing human rights advisor in the Office of the Special Envoy. These officers "would have a monitoring role and the task of addressing the country's long-term human rights institution building needs."⁸⁷ A July 13 U.N. Security Council

⁸²Human Rights Watch interview, relief organization representative, Freetown, June 24, 1998.

⁸³Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998.

⁸⁴Lawyers and international observers in Freetown have called into question the respect for due process in the ongoing trials of fifty-nine civilians being tried on various charges related to collaboration with the AFRC/RUF. Whether or not these fifty-nine are given a fair trial may send a strong message to AFRC/RUF members considering laying down their arms and enrolling in an eventual DDR program.

⁸⁵United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998), S/RES/1181 (1998), 13 July 1998.

⁸⁶Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, June 9, 1998.

⁸⁷Ibid

Resolution further states that UNOMSIL should advise the "Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies."⁸⁸ The Security Council also reiterated the secretary-general's report in calling for UNOMSIL to "report on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Sierra Leone, and in consultation with the relevant U.N. agencies, to assist the government of Sierra Leone in its efforts to address the country's human rights needs."

In addition to these statements, United Nations officials have paid significant attention to the human rights situation in Sierra Leone in recent months, largely due to the scale and horrific nature of atrocities committed against civilians. Several agencies have sent high-level delegations to the region, while five senior U.N. officials issued an unprecedented joint statement calling for an end to the atrocities and impunity, and underscoring the need for an International Criminal Court to hold perpetrators accountable for the atrocities.⁸⁹

The current crisis in Sierra Leone is a brutal reminder to the delegations now meeting in Rome of the urgent need for an effective international criminal court to provide justice for the appalling violations of human rights in that country and elsewhere. Since April this year, rebel forces in the east, north and, more recently, the west of Sierra Leone have engaged in a terror campaign involving the systematic laceration, mutilation or severing of limbs of non-combatants, including children and the elderly.

In addition to the office of the special envoy, other U.N. agencies in Sierra Leone have engaged in a number of initiatives in recent months designed to protect rights and promote reconciliation and peace. In conjunction with the U.N. special envoy for Sierra Leone and the U.N. special representative for children in armed conflict, UNICEF has pushed for the creation of a joint task force for the demobilization of child combatants and other measures to protect the rights of children. Among other U.N. initiatives in human rights and civic education, UNDP approved a \$2.5 million support program in June to the Sierra Leonean National Commission on Democracy and Human Rights to promote reconciliation, forgiveness, and civic education.⁹⁰

It will be critical that these programs put into practice the principles that they preach. ECOMOG's poor human rights record in the past raises questions about its appropriateness as trainer of the new Sierra Leonean army, unless it is closely monitored and assisted by qualified UNOMSIL personnel. The National Commission on Human Rights and Democracy has also been widely criticized for being corrupt and inefficient. Donors must ensure that implementing organizations or government ministries have the technical expertise, capacity, and will to implement these and other programs that promote or protect human rights. Monitoring and coordination among the various implementing U.N. agencies, government ministries, and NGOs will be critical to making good use of funds dedicated to rights issues.

As required by its mandate, UNOMSIL should insist that ECOMOG respect the rights of demobilized combatants and that high standards are maintained throughout the training of the new Sierra Leonean army in international humanitarian law. Linked with this responsibility, UNOMSIL should work closely with ECOMOG to

⁸⁸United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998), S/RES/1181 (1998), 13 July 1998.

⁸⁹Sergio Vieira de Mello, the under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, Olara Otunnu, the special representative of the secretary-general for children in armed conflict, and Soren Jensen Peterson, the assistant high commissioner for refugees, have all recently visited the region. Mr. Vieira de Mello and Mr. Otunnu were joined by Carol Bellamy, executive director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Mary Robinson, United Nations high commissioner for human rights, and Sadako Ogata, United Nations high commissioner for refugees, in making the joint declaration on June 18, 1998.

⁹⁰"UNDP approves USD 2.5 million Awareness Plan." *For di People*, Freetown newspaper, June 24, 1998.

monitor arms flows and recruitment in support of AFRC/RUF. Human Rights Watch received numerous allegations that the AFRC/RUF was continuing to receive arms from outside the country, via land and air. In order to monitor and deter military support to the AFRC/RUF, a strong presence of UNOMSIL will be necessary to monitor arms trafficking, in particular along the porous border with Liberia. The monitoring of the Liberian border should be performed in conjunction with ECOMOG forces in Liberia.

The Organization of African Unity, ECOWAS, and ECOMOG

ECOWAS and ECOMOG have played key roles in recent political negotiations and military interventions respectively in Sierra Leone. As part of bilateral security accords, Nigerian forces and Guinean forces have been in Sierra Leone since 1995 to help the NPRC and, later, the Kabbah government to fight the RUF. The Nigerian and Guinean forces were in Sierra Leone at the time of the May 25, 1997 coup, and later reinforced ECOMOG's efforts to oust the AFRC/RUF.

Following the 1997 coup, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called on ECOWAS to restore constitutional order to Sierra Leone. When their negotiations with the AFRC/RUF failed to achieve progress, ECOWAS imposed an economic embargo, which was later reinforced by an October 1997 U.N. Security Council global arms and oil embargo⁹¹ and restrictions on international travel by AFRC/RUF members and their families.⁹² ECOMOG enforced these sanctions with the permission of ECOWAS and the Security Council. With the failure of diplomatic efforts and the escalation of tension, ECOMOG's mandate was upgraded from sanction enforcement to actual military intervention to oust the AFRC/RUF. The ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone is led by Nigerian Commander Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe and composed of approximately 9,000 troops, predominately Nigerian with several Guinean support battalions. As of June 23, Gambia, Ghana⁹³ and Niger⁹⁴ had all promised to send troops to reinforce ECOMOG. In late July, ECOMOG announced that it was finishing the transfer of its headquarters from Monrovia to Freetown and that an additional 3,500 troops would soon arrive.⁹⁵

While residents of Freetown and Sierra Leonean refugees consistently stated that ECOMOG's role in ousting the AFRC/RUF and enabling a return to civilian rule was welcome, international humanitarian groups complained that shelling by ECOMOG led to a high number of civilian casualties. One humanitarian organization in Freetown at that time stated that even after ECOMOG had been provided with maps of high-density population zones and medical structures, shelling continued in these areas for several days, resulting in over 600 war-wounded hospital admissions during a nine-day period in early February.⁹⁶

Despite these serious allegations, ECOMOG has been praised by the Sierra Leonean press and international community, largely due to its military success in Sierra Leone and significant improvements in its conduct since its intervention in Liberia. United Nations military observers and aid workers attributed the improvements in ECOMOG's human rights record to improved supervision, more regular payment of salaries, and a sensitivity to past

⁹¹Petroleum for humanitarian purposes was permitted.

⁹²U.S. Agency for International Development Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Situation Report #1, January 28, 1998.

⁹³Integrated Regional Information Network, Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN-West Africa Update 169, March 19, 1998.

⁹⁴"More ECOMOG Troops Due," page 1, *Daily Mail*, Freetown newspaper, June 23, 1998.

⁹⁵Integrated Regional Information Network, Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN-West Africa Weekly Roundup, July 24, 1998.

⁹⁶Human Rights Watch interview, New York, July 15, 1998.

criticisms.⁹⁷ ECOMOG has also evacuated dozens of war victims via helicopter and road, saving many civilian lives. However, ECOMOG and Kamajor commandeering of humanitarian vehicles has been, in the words of the director of one aid organization, "blatant and prevalent."⁹⁸ In response to this problem, which has significantly obstructed the delivery of humanitarian aid, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (HACU) organized a seminar for ECOMOG and Kamajors in the Bo district in May.⁹⁹ In May and June 1998, ECOMOG and the Ministry of Defense repeatedly declared in public that the Kamajors were entirely under the control of ECOMOG.¹⁰⁰ While the obstruction of aid decreased after this and subsequent seminars and the arrival of logistical support and trucks donated by the United States in May, at least one humanitarian group stated that ECOMOG had yet to return one aid vehicle by late June 1998.

ECOMOG holds the key responsibilities of disarming and demobilizing combatants as well as forming and training the new Sierra Leonean army. ECOMOG commander Maxwell Khobe has stated that the new army will be ethnically and regionally balanced.¹⁰¹ ECOMOG's past human rights record in Liberia and problems in the present, however, underscore the need for UNOMSIL to provide assistance and closely monitor the disarmament, demobilization, and training processes to assure that the new army is founded upon principles of respect for international humanitarian law.¹⁰²

Misinformation regarding the security situation in Sierra Leone has created serious risks for both Sierra Leonean refugees and civilians within the country. ECOMOG, along with Sierra Leonean government and some U.N. officials, has downplayed the capacity of the AFRC/RUF and portrayed the security conditions in Sierra Leone as safe and returning to normal in many districts. This information has contrasted sharply with reports from aid organizations with a field presence as well as from other U.N. officials. During a humanitarian assessment mission to Koidu on June 10, aid workers were told by an ECOMOG commander on the scene that the area had been entirely secured by ECOMOG and that security was "no problem."¹⁰³ Several hours later, after the mission left Koidu, AFRC/RUF forces began the first of several sustained attacks over four days on the town, temporarily pushing ECOMOG out of strategic positions.¹⁰⁴

Information regarding the security situation in Sierra Leone reaches refugees generally through international radio and new arrivals to the camps. Refugees reported that misinformation regarding security conditions in Sierra

⁹⁷ECOMOG succeeded in Liberia in stopping the bloodshed and ethnic violence on several occasions, and human rights benefits clearly flowed from the intervention. However, ECOMOG did not integrate human rights into its activities, which has been a serious shortcoming. ECOMOG allied itself with other warring factions, which clearly undermined its credibility. It was responsible for extensive looting, harassment and detention of civilians. There were also serious concerns about the civilian toll and violations of medical neutrality by ECOMOG air strikes in Liberia.

⁹⁸Human Rights Watch interviews with aid organizations, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 22-25, 1998.

⁹⁹Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, June 9, 1998.

¹⁰⁰Human Rights Watch interview with Sierra Leone Deputy Minister of Defense, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 25, 1998.

¹⁰¹Press conference led by Brig. Gen. Maxwell Khobe, Wilburforce military base, June 25, 1998, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

¹⁰²See Human Rights Watch, "Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace."

¹⁰³Human Rights Watch interview with aid organization that participated in the mission, Freetown, June 23, 1998.

¹⁰⁴Human Rights Watch interviews with several members of the assessment mission, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 23, 24, and 25, 1998.

Leone had on several occasions led to voluntary repatriation to zones perceived as safe. Human Rights Watch interviewed refugees in Guinea who claimed that dozens of refugees had been killed while attempting to return to the Koidu area in April.¹⁰⁵ Their decision to repatriate was made following declarations on international radio claiming that area was under the control of ECOMOG. In order to protect refugees, civilians in Sierra Leone, and humanitarian workers, both ECOMOG and UNOMSIL should ensure that accurate information regarding security conditions is provided to the public, especially to refugees, internally displaced persons, and aid workers.

The United Kingdom, European Union and United States

Since May 1998, the United Kingdom, European Union (E.U.), and United States have issued several strong statements denouncing the human rights violations committed by the AFRC/RUF in Sierra Leone. On May 21, 1998, the U.S. Department of State and European Union issued a joint statement which expressed their grave concern over the atrocities.

The European Union and the United States strongly condemn these horrific actions and urge all parties to call an immediate end to the senseless slaughter, mutilation, and torture of the civilian population and show full respect for human rights.¹⁰⁶

In June, the U.S. and E.U. sent a joint high-level assessment mission to the region led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Julia Taft which resulted in financial pledges for humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia. These calls for an end to atrocities against civilians and financial commitments for humanitarian assistance should be combined with long-term support from the U.S. and the E.U. that promotes human rights and the rule of law.

In addition to its support of elections in 1996, the E.U. has had a significant and growing presence in Sierra Leone and neighboring countries affected by the refugee flows. Through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the E.U. has been the most important donor of non-food humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone, contributing over 20 million European Equivalency Units (ECU) (over U.S. \$22 million), since 1993, mostly to support the activities of international humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). ECHO has also provided aid in response to the refugee crisis in Guinea and Liberia, while the European Commission has been a long-term supporter of development activities and infrastructure projects in Sierra Leone. ECHO is now considering a 6 million ECU (U.S. \$ 6.6 million) global aid package for assistance in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

Both the U.S. and U.K. have played significant roles in recent political and military developments in Sierra Leone. The U.S. is the single largest donor in response to the Sierra Leonean crisis, having contributed \$53 million in food, humanitarian and other aid in fiscal year 1998, including support for ECOMOG. The British have led fund-raising efforts at the European Union for the 1996 elections, ECOMOG, and other assistance. Both the U.S. and the U.K. have provided support for the Nigeria-led ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone.¹⁰⁷ In May, the U.S. State

¹⁰⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Koundou Lengo Bengo Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 5, 1998.

¹⁰⁶U.S. Department of State, "Sierra Leone: Rebel Atrocities Against Civilians," May 21, 1998.

¹⁰⁷In a further effort to support ECOMOG and retake power, the Kabbah government engaged Sandline, a private security firm. Sandline claims that it imported between twenty-eight and thirty-eight tons of small arms and ammunition to ECOMOG with the consent of the British government. The arms were impounded by ECOMOG forces and never used. However, a scandal ensued because the shipment could constitute a violation of a U.N. or a U.K. arms embargo against Sierra Leone. U.N. legal analysts subsequently determined that the U.N. embargo had not been broken. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook ordered an investigation into whether anyone in the Foreign Office had knowledge of or gave consent to such a shipment. The investigation is ongoing.

Department announced \$3.9 million for logistical support to ECOMOG through Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE).¹⁰⁸ PAE is a U.S.-based military logistics firm contracted to provide transportation, communication, and other support to ECOMOG. The U.K. has contributed £2 million (U.S. \$ 3.3 million) to a U.N. trust fund for peacekeeping activities in Sierra Leone, some of which may be used to support ECOMOG.

This support for ECOMOG should be accompanied by close monitoring of its conduct and complemented by additional efforts to protect human rights. The U.S. and U.K. should closely monitor the performance of ECOMOG in international humanitarian law observance and in its disarmament, demobilization, and training efforts. In particular, the U.S. and U.K. should insist on high-quality training in international humanitarian law for the new Sierra Leonean army and on the humane treatment of demobilized combatants from all sides. The U.K. has sent an evaluation team to Sierra Leone to consider a police training program to Sierra Leone. The success of these types of initiatives in contributing to building institutions that protect human rights will depend largely on their careful design and monitoring of their implementation.

Both the U.S. and the U.K. have encouraged negotiated solutions to end the violence, most recently during talks at Abidjan in November 1996 and at Conakry in October 1997. Since the scale of atrocities has increased, the U.K. has been cautious about promoting negotiations with the AFRC/RUF. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, U.K. High Commissioner Peter Penfold stated that the U.K. was not pushing in "public or in private" for negotiations with the AFRC/RUF. The U.S. has taken a more open stand, stating that it:

did not preclude any possible option that might lead to peace. ECOWAS, with the support of the international community, must explore every political avenue and determine the best way to proceed."¹⁰⁹

The U.S. elaborated that the RUF and former junta leadership must first, however, "unambiguously and honestly renounce" atrocities against civilians before talks could begin.

The U.S. has been a key supporter of humanitarian organizations, including the UNHCR, and has recently promised an additional \$19.5 million to support international humanitarian organizations working in response to the Sierra Leonean crisis and for the repatriation of Liberian refugees. Additional funds have been allocated to supporting civic education, and, to a lesser extent, the initiatives of local human rights groups. Through its Office of Transition Initiatives, the U.S. is providing \$900,000 in programs for war-affected children, the reintegration of former combatants, and to promote reconciliation. The U.S. should continue to expand its funding for well-coordinated training and support programs for civil society, in particular for local organizations promoting human rights and the rule of law.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report, based on findings from a mission to Sierra Leone in June 1998, was written by Scott Campbell and Jane Lowicki, consultants to the Africa division of Human Rights Watch. The report was edited by Peter Takirambudde, executive director of the Africa division, Regan Ralph, executive director of the Women's Rights division, Lois Whitman, executive director of the Children's Rights division, Dinah PoKempner, deputy general counsel, Michael McClintock, deputy program director, Reed Brody, advocacy director, Rachael Reilly, refugee policy director, Janet Fleischman, Washington director of the Africa division, and Binaifer Nowrojee, counsel to the

¹⁰⁸Human Rights Watch telephone interview with U.S. Department of State official, May 25, 1998.

¹⁰⁹Hearing on Sierra Leone before the House Subcommittee on Africa, June 8, 1998, Statement of Johnnie Carson, principal deputy assistant secretary for African affairs.

Africa division. Production assistance was provided by Ariana Pearlroth, associate for the Africa division, Patrick Minges, publications director, and Fitzroy Hepkins, mail manager.

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85) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Amnesty International, "Sierra Leone 1998 – a year of atrocities against civilians".
(Excerpt, pp 1, table of content (p2), 14-28)

Amnesty International

SIERRA LEONE

1998 - a year of atrocities against civilians

Introduction

During 1998 the scale of atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone has reached unprecedented levels. Several thousand unarmed civilians, including many women and children, have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed and mutilated by forces of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the armed opposition Revolutionary Front (RUF) since February 1998. These atrocities are continuing.

The AFRC, which seized power in a military coup in May 1997 and which was joined by the RUF, was deposed in February 1998 by West African forces deployed in Sierra Leone. The government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, which had been elected in 1996, returned to Freetown in March 1998. Although security has since returned to the capital, Freetown, and much of the south of the country, the scale of human rights abuses committed by AFRC and RUF forces in the north and east of the country has escalated and taken on grotesque forms. From April 1998 reports emerged of civilians suffering mutilations such as crude amputations of their feet, hands, arms, lips or ears. Women and girls have been systematically raped. Hundreds of civilians, in particular children and young men and women, have been abducted by rebel forces. The violence has resulted in hundreds of thousands of Sierra Leoneans fleeing to neighbouring Guinea and Liberia or becoming internally displaced within Sierra Leone. AFRC and RUF forces must respect international humanitarian law and immediately end the gross human rights abuses which they are perpetrating against unarmed civilians.

The international community, including the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Commonwealth and the European Union (EU), has devoted considerable attention and effort to resolving the political crisis in Sierra Leone and to restoring the government of President Kabbah. It has since repeatedly condemned the atrocities being committed by AFRC and RUF forces. The international community has committed itself to bringing peace and security to Sierra Leone and also to assisting in its reconstruction and rehabilitation. This commitment must include initiatives to help end the gross human rights abuses being perpetrated by AFRC and RUF forces, to prevent further abuses and also to lay solid foundations for the respect and protection of human rights in the future.

The challenges facing Sierra Leone in confronting the widespread and gross human rights abuses which have continued and worsened since May 1997 are difficult and daunting. Sierra Leone's social and economic infrastructure needs to be rebuilt. Its institutions, such as the legal and judicial systems and the army and police, need to be restructured and reinforced in order to ensure protection of human rights. Civil society, including the human rights community, has a crucial role to play. The government of Sierra Leone has to respond to these challenges in a way that ensures that the fundamental human rights of all those in Sierra Leone are protected.

West African forces and a civilian militia who are fighting rebel forces must also respect international humanitarian and human rights law. Forces of the civilian militia have been responsible for extrajudicial executions, torture and ill-treatment, although on a far lesser scale than rebel forces. West African forces have in some cases illegally detained civilians and tortured and ill-treated captured combatants. Concerns have also been expressed about the protection of non-combatants during military operations.

Accountability for the gross human rights abuses which have occurred in Sierra Leone must be established. National reconciliation within Sierra Leone will not be possible if there is impunity for those who have perpetrated human rights abuses. All those charged in connection with the military coup in May 1997 and the period of AFRC rule must be granted trials which conform to international standards of fairness. Recourse to the death penalty will not contribute to the process of reconciliation.

The international community should continue to assist Sierra Leone to respond effectively to the challenges which it faces in ensuring the long-term protection and respect of human rights in Sierra Leone.

The political context

On 25 May 1997 the government of President Kabbah was overthrown in a military coup and the military formed the AFRC, headed by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. President Kabbah had come to power in March 1996 following parliamentary and presidential elections, ending four years of military rule. The AFRC claimed that they had overthrown the government because it had failed to consolidate peace in Sierra Leone following a peace agreement concluded in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, in November 1996 between the government and the RUF to end the internal armed conflict which began in 1991. It also claimed that the government was undemocratic and that it had promoted tribalism by appointing people mainly from the Mende ethnic group from the south and the east to prominent government positions. A major grievance was the perceived lack of resources accorded by the government to the Sierra Leone armed forces and a favouring of a civilian militia composed of traditional hunters of the Mende ethnic group, known as *kamajors*, which supported the government in the conflict against the RUF. These accusations were strongly denied by President Kabbah, members of his government and their supporters. The AFRC also called for the release and return of the RUF's leader, Foday Sankoh, in detention in Nigeria.

Foday Sankoh remained held, effectively under house arrest, in Abuja, Nigeria. He had been detained by Nigerian authorities on arrival in Nigeria in March 1997, apparently for possession of arms and ammunition. From Nigeria, Foday Sankoh announced his support for the military coup. The AFRC was subsequently joined by RUF forces who arrived in large numbers in Freetown. Foday Sankoh was named as Vice-Chairman of the AFRC and prominent members of the RUF were appointed to the AFRC's ruling council.

The overthrow of President Kabbah was condemned by the international community which demanded the return of constitutional order to Sierra Leone. Negotiations by the

international community with the AFRC faltered, a global economic embargo was imposed and military intervention to restore the government of President Kabbah was seriously considered by countries in the region if dialogue and sanctions failed. Following the military coup the OAU gave a mandate to ECOWAS to take necessary action to restore legality and constitutionality to Sierra Leone and subsequently provided strong support for ECOWAS's initiatives to bring peace, security and stability to Sierra Leone. The UN Security Council also expressed its full support for the efforts of ECOWAS to resolve the political crisis in Sierra Leone.

On 23 October 1997 the AFRC signed an agreement in Conakry, in neighbouring Guinea, with representatives of five other West African governments to return power to President Kabbah by 22 April 1998. Implementation of this agreement, however, which included cessation of hostilities, disarmament and demobilization, encountered serious set-backs. Fighting between AFRC and RUF forces on the one hand and the *kamajors* on the other intensified.

In early February 1998, following attacks on its bases outside Freetown, West African forces deployed in Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) [1], launched an offensive on Freetown. Chaos and violence ensued the following week during which there were many civilian casualties. Civilians were killed by AFRC and RUF forces who also looted and destroyed their homes. Reports described soldiers and RUF forces, also joined by Liberian fighters, going from house to house of those they suspected of opposing them and deliberately and arbitrarily killing them. Others died as a result of shelling both by ECOMOG and also AFRC and RUF forces. While fighting continued in Freetown, civilians in Southern and Eastern Provinces were facing an equally desperate situation as they were caught in fighting between the *kamajors* and AFRC and RUF forces. Thousands of people, including women and children, fled into neighbouring Liberia to escape. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone, already critical, deteriorated still further with the increase in hostilities.

Although after the ECOMOG intervention and the return of President Kabbah's government comparative calm and the rule of law returned to Freetown and Southern Province, armed confrontation has continued throughout the following months in Northern and Eastern Provinces as ECOMOG forces have fought to defeat remaining rebel forces. Appalling atrocities have been committed against civilians as conflict has continued. Major Johnny Paul Koroma and other prominent members of the AFRC and the RUF, including Sam Bockarie, known as Mosquito, remained with rebel forces in the north and east of the country.

The government of Sierra Leone has adopted a comprehensive program for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants which contains clearly defined roles for ECOMOG and the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which was established by the UN Security Council in July 1998. The program is aimed at some 33,000 former combatants of the disbanded national army, the RUF and the civilian militia, known as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The government has expressed a particular commitment to demobilizing some 2,500 child soldiers who have fought in the

internal armed conflict. Funding was expected from international financial institutions, several UN agencies and important donor nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom. As violence has escalated and offensives by ECOMOG and CDF against rebel forces have continued, however, effective implementation of this program has been prevented.

On 25 July 1998 Foday Sankoh was released by the Nigerian government into the custody of the Sierra Leonean authorities. He appeared in a television interview calling on his fighters to end atrocities against civilians and to surrender to either ECOMOG or UNOMSIL. The government subsequently reiterated a deadline of 8 August 1998 for an amnesty for rebel forces but there was no significant response. Members of the RUF were subsequently reported as claiming that Foday Sankoh had made these statements under duress and continued to demand his release. The RUF threatened to continue their campaign of violence against civilians if he remained in detention. The government announced its intention to prosecute Foday Sankoh for crimes, including gross human rights abuses, committed during Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict. He was brought to trial on 24 September 1998 and convicted and sentenced to death the following month. This prompted further attacks by rebel forces against unarmed civilians in retaliation.

Also in September 1998 rebel forces called on the government to begin negotiations for peace through the UN, the OAU and the Commonwealth Secretariat, the moral guarantors of the peace agreement signed in Abidjan. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG)[2] on 9 October 1998 called on rebel forces to make an immediate statement accepting the following terms: the recognition of the legitimacy and authority of the government; an unconditional and indefinite cessation of all hostilities; and a willingness to enter into talks to bring about an immediate end to the conflict. At the same time CMAG expressed its grave concern about the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone, in particular the continuing atrocities by rebel forces, which it condemned unreservedly. The government also responded to the call by rebel forces for negotiations by saying that they should lay down their arms and surrender to UNOMSIL military observers.

President Kabbah repeated calls for rebel forces to surrender on 19 October 1998 and renewed an offer of amnesty for those surrendering. It appeared that the amnesty implied that those surrendering who had not been responsible for crimes would be included in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process whereas those who were accused of criminal offences would be prosecuted with due process of the law. There was, however, no significant increase in the number of those surrendering.

The West Africa sub-region

Liberia was widely reported to be providing combatants, arms and ammunition to AFRC and RUF forces in Sierra Leone. Liberian fighters were present in Freetown at the time of the ECOMOG intervention and survivors of the gross human rights abuses which followed stated that the armed groups which had attacked them had included Liberians.

In the Vahun and Kolahun areas of Lofa County in northwestern Liberia, where tens of thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees had fled escalating fighting in eastern Sierra Leone, cooperation between rebel forces and the Liberian military was reported to be witnessed regularly. The RUF second-in-command, Sam Bockarie, was reported to have been in direct contact with Liberian military forces and to have regularly crossed the border into Liberia.

On 12 May 1998 a statement by the United States Department of State referred to *"distressing rumours that RUF and AFRC forces were being assisted in their campaign of terror by other governments. Although we cannot confirm these rumours, it should be clear that any government or other party which is found to be helping the rebels to prolong the tragedy in Sierra Leone will face the strongest condemnation of the United States and the international community."*

On 20 May 1998 the President of the UN Security Council condemned as gross violations of international humanitarian law the atrocities carried out against the civilian population, particularly women and children, by the deposed AFRC and RUF, including widespread rape, mutilation and killings, and called for an immediate end to continuing violence against civilians. The Security Council also expressed grave concern about reports of military support being provided to the AFRC and RUF by other countries and called on all states to observe strictly the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, which had imposed an arms embargo on Sierra Leone, and to avoid any action which might further destabilize the situation in Sierra Leone. Security Council Resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998 lifted the arms embargo on the government of Sierra Leone. The same resolution prohibited the sale and supply of arms and related *matériel* to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone. The Security Council subsequently praised the efforts of the UN Secretary-General to stop the flow of arms across the border from Liberia to rebels forces in Kailahun District, Eastern Province. All states were urged to comply strictly with the terms of the UN embargo on sales of arms to rebel forces still fighting in the interior of the country.

In his Fifth Report on the Situation in Sierra Leone to the UN Security Council of 9 June 1998, the UN Secretary-General stated that the deployment of ECOMOG troops at the border with Liberia could help dispel allegations of the influx of arms or the provision of armed assistance to the AFRC and RUF by foreign forces. While welcoming a commitment by the government of Liberia not to allow its territory to be used to destabilize any neighbouring country, the Secretary-General expressed the view that verification of this would improve the security climate throughout the sub-region and improve mutual confidence among countries in the sub-region.

On 22 and 23 June 1998 a Liberian delegation visited Freetown to deliver a message from President Charles Taylor to President Kabbah on ways to promote peace between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the three Mano River Union countries. The delegation denied allegations that the Liberian government was supporting AFRC and RUF forces. President Kabbah and President Taylor met in Abuja on 1 July 1998 at a meeting convened by the UN Secretary-General. Agreement was reached on a number of

confidence-building measures. A further meeting between President Kabbah and President Taylor took place in Monrovia, Liberia, on 20 July 1998. In a communiqué signed at the conclusion of the meeting both leaders condemned atrocities and human rights abuses committed by combatants in Sierra Leone against civilians, as well as continued rebel activities in Sierra Leone. They reaffirmed their commitment to non-aggression against the territorial integrity of each other's country and pledged to continue cooperation towards peace and security in the sub-region. Both leaders renewed a call to the UN and ECOWAS to deploy observer units on the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone and agreed to coordinate border security activities.

At a UN special conference on Sierra Leone in New York in July 1998 the meetings between President Kabbah and President Taylor were welcomed and the two leaders were urged to continue to work towards improving relations between their two countries and regional security. The importance of stopping entry of illegal supplies of weapons into Sierra Leone and ending the direct or indirect support of neighbouring countries to rebel forces was stressed.

Relations between the two countries appeared to deteriorate, however, in October 1998 when the government of Sierra Leone was reported to have complained to the international community, including the UN Secretary-General, about the presence of Liberian combatants among rebel forces in Sierra Leone and about preparations for an incursion of Liberian fighters into Sierra Leone. These allegations were vigorously denied by President Taylor. UNOMSIL military observers at that time detected no evidence of an armed incursion from Liberia.

The UN Secretary-General in his Second Progress Report on UNOMSIL on 16 October 1998 expressed deep concern about developments in the situation between Sierra Leone and Liberia and urged both governments to exercise maximum restraint, pursue dialogue and implement the confidence-building measures agreed in July 1998. He also proposed that, should both countries agree, the deployment of ECOMOG forces at the border, subsequently accompanied by UNOMSIL military observers, could help stabilize the situation and restore mutual confidence.

During a visit by Reverend Jesse Jackson, special envoy of United States President Bill Clinton, to West Africa in November 1998 he held meetings in Conakry with President Kabbah, President Taylor and President Lansana Conté of Guinea. The three heads of state on 12 November 1998 stated their commitment to non-aggression and cooperation on security issues within the Mano River Union and also to promoting peace in Sierra Leone and maintaining stability within the sub-region.

In view of the appalling level of violence against civilians which has characterized the conflict in Sierra Leone, including the widespread and gross human rights abuses being perpetrated by AFRC and RUF and their stated intention to attack unarmed civilians, Amnesty International believes that military transfers, including arms, ammunition and combatants, to rebel forces will contribute to abuses of international human rights and humanitarian principles governing the conduct of war.

Recommendations

- all governments should take all possible measures to end immediately military transfers, including arms, ammunition and combatants, to AFRC and RUF forces;
- in addition, the governments of Liberia and Guinea, which border Sierra Leone, should take all possible measures to prevent military supplies, whether they originate in their country or not, destined for AFRC and RUF forces, from entering Sierra Leone across their borders;
- effective monitoring of the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia by ECOMOG forces and UNOMSIL military observers could assist in preventing military transfers to AFRC and RUF forces;
- governments in the sub-region should use whatever influence they may have on AFRC and RUF forces to bring about an end to the atrocities they continue to perpetrate against civilians.

International response to the human rights crisis

Following the military coup in May 1997 the international community made strenuous efforts to resolve the political crisis in Sierra Leone. Since the reinstatement of President Kabbah's government in March 1998, serious attention continues to be paid to consolidating the government's position, ending the conflict in the north and east of the country, which is still claiming hundreds of civilian victims, and to assisting rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. The continuing gross human rights abuses committed by AFRC and RUF forces have been universally condemned, including by the UN, the OAU, the EU and the Commonwealth.

United Nations

On 17 April 1998 the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a UN liaison unit in Sierra Leone. Resolution 1162 (1998) provided for up to 10 UN military liaison and security advisory personnel in Freetown with a mandate for up to three months. The group was to coordinate closely with ECOMOG to report on the military situation in Sierra Leone and to assist in disarming former combatants. The resolution also welcomed efforts of President Kabbah and his government to restore peaceful and secure conditions, to re-establish an effective administration and democratic process and to embark on reconstruction. The resolution noted the need to promote national reconciliation and encouraged all parties to work towards that objective. All countries and international organizations were urged to provide urgent humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone and were encouraged to help with its reconstruction and economic and social recovery. A human rights officer was also appointed to assist the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo (who was subsequently appointed as Special

Representative).

In the UN Secretary-General's Fifth Report on Sierra Leone, the deteriorating human rights situation was emphasized, and it was recommended that the number of UN human rights officers in Freetown be increased.

The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

On 13 July 1998 the UN Security Council established a new peace-keeping operation, UNOMSIL, which expanded the office of the Secretary General's Special Envoy, to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, as security conditions permitted, for an initial six-month period until 13 January 1999. UNOMSIL would consist of 70 military observers and would be accompanied by a small medical unit and civilian support staff. The civilian staff would advise the government and local police, report on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Sierra Leone, and assist the government in its efforts to address the country's human rights needs. UNOMSIL was to be led by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Sierra Leone. Initially, 40 military observers were to be deployed from July 1998 in Freetown, Hastings and Lungi. Depending on the security situation, a second phase of deployment would take place.

In approving Resolution 1181 (1998), which established UNOMSIL, the Security Council also condemned the continued resistance by remnants of the AFRC and RUF to the legitimate government and demanded that they lay down their arms immediately. It expressed its grave concern "*at the loss of life and immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone, including refugees and displaced persons, as a result of continuing rebel attacks*".

Resolution 1181 (1998), in addition to establishing a military and civilian police peace-keeping mission, also mandated the monitoring of human rights and the provision of assistance to the government of Sierra Leone in addressing its human rights obligations [3]. The resolution also gave UNOMSIL military observers a mandate to monitor respect of international humanitarian law during the demobilization process.

By October 1998 the human rights component of UNOMSIL had been increased to seven staff: four international human rights officers, one national human rights officer and two support staff. Subsequent progress reports by the UN Secretary-General on UNOMSIL to the Security Council referred extensively and in detail to continuing human rights abuses in Sierra Leone. The prominence given to the human rights crisis in Sierra Leone in these reports is welcomed and should continue.

In his First Progress Report on 12 August 1998, the Secretary-General reported that "*there is strong evidence of the systematic and widespread perpetration of multiple forms of human rights abuse against the civilian population, including rape. In recent weeks, elements of the former junta have continued to shell population centres such as Koidu and Daru and have used civilians as human shields in their military operations. There*

have been numerous instances of arbitrary execution, including of women and children, followed in some cases by mutilation of the bodies."

In his Second Progress Report on 16 October 1998, the Secretary-General stated that *"the continuing conflict in Sierra Leone imposes immense suffering on the people of that country. I strongly condemn the summary executions, torture, mutilation, rapes, looting and other acts of barbarism carried out by former junta elements and call on them to lay down their arms and surrender. I am particularly outraged by the senseless acts of terror perpetrated against children, such as the amputation of limbs of boys and girls as young as six years of age, and support the efforts to bring to justice the authors of these especially abhorrent crimes."*

The UN Secretary-General concluded his Second Progress Report by stating that he would *"examine with great care any realistic proposal to end the armed conflict with minimal loss of life to combatants and to innocent civilians, and to promote lasting peace and national reconciliation in Sierra Leone"*.

Major initiatives have been undertaken by UNOMSIL human rights officers. Continued monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses have been reflected in the UN Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council. A preliminary human rights needs assessment has been developed. Human rights officers have also closely observed trials before the High Court and court martial in Freetown of those charged with treason in connection with the military coup in May 1997 and have intervened with the government in relation to these trials when appropriate. Guidance on human rights reporting to UNOMSIL military observers has been provided and human rights training programs for police officers, prison officials, the legal profession and the media have been developed and implemented. A human rights monitoring network including local non-governmental human rights organizations throughout the country and international non-governmental organizations has also been developed. Training for the network in human rights monitoring and reporting has been planned by UNOMSIL human rights officers, in cooperation with the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and a coalition of local groups, the National Forum for Human Rights. Increased cooperation between local human rights groups has been encouraged and it is anticipated that the human rights training program will involve relevant sectors of civil society from all parts of the country.

The role of UNOMSIL human rights officers in human rights monitoring and reporting should be continued for as long as necessary, including until it is clear that the government is implementing international human rights guarantees effectively. In September 1998 UNOMSIL human rights officers also began to provide human rights technical assistance to the government, including assistance in meeting its reporting requirements under international human rights treaties to which it is a party, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child [4].

The human rights component plays a dominant role within UNOMSIL and is an essential part of the military mandate of the peace-keeping operation. Sierra Leone continues to

face a human rights emergency and monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses therefore remain essential. Strategies to develop continued and enhanced support for the UNOMSIL human rights component should be developed by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The UN special conference on Sierra Leone

The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, convened a special conference in New York on 30 July 1998 to galvanize the international community's response to the political, humanitarian and human rights situation in Sierra Leone. The purpose of the meeting was to focus international attention on the situation in Sierra Leone and the government's initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict, restoring secure conditions and effective administration throughout the country. The conference brought together representatives of the government of Sierra Leone, intergovernmental organizations, including the UN, the OAU, ECOWAS, the EU and the Commonwealth. The special conference on Sierra Leone specifically sought assistance from the international community for UNOMSIL and for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, including child soldiers.

At the time of the UN special conference Amnesty International recommended that the international community's commitment to bring peace and security to Sierra Leone and to assist in its reconstruction and rehabilitation include initiatives which would help to stop the gross human rights abuses being perpetrated by AFRC and RUF forces, prevent further abuses and also lay solid foundations for the respect and protection of human rights in the future[5].

The UN special conference strongly condemned the continued resistance of AFRC and RUF forces, and in particular their perpetration of appalling atrocities, and they were called on to lay down their arms and surrender. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Sierra Leone urged the international community to match their pledges of support to Sierra Leone with concrete action to consolidate its democratic gains. The conference agreed to establish an international contact group to mobilize and coordinate further support for Sierra Leone. The contact group was convened by the government of the United Kingdom in London on 5 November 1998[6]. Those participating included representatives of the government of Sierra Leone, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Sierra Leone and Lansana Kouyaté, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. In his opening address to the meeting, Tony Lloyd, United Kingdom Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, said that: *"Atrocities are still being carried out by remaining rebel forces. Sierra Leone needs peace, reconciliation and lasting restoration of democracy and human rights ... we hope to boost the efforts of the international community to meet these needs."*

Recommendations

- **the human rights component of UNOMSIL should continue to be supported and strengthened; adequate resources, including additional staff, should be**

provided to effectively monitor and report on human rights abuses throughout the country, implement technical assistance programs with the Sierra Leone government and provide support and training to Sierra Leonean human rights groups;

- the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should play a major role in reinforcing and providing support to the human rights component of UNOMSIL;
- the human rights component of UNOMSIL should include experts in the area of violence against women, including rape and sexual abuse;
- UNOMSIL human rights officers should continue to submit reports of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law to the UN Secretary-General and to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; comprehensive reports on the human right situation in Sierra Leone should be made public and submitted to the UN Security Council;
- the human rights component of UNOMSIL should have sufficient resources to effectively contribute towards long-term measures for human rights protection and its human rights monitoring and reporting roles should be continued for as long as necessary;
- visits to Sierra Leone by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the UN Special Rapporteur on torture should take place in order to investigate and report on the gross human rights abuses which continue to be perpetrated;
- the international contact group on Sierra Leone should place human rights at the centre of its efforts to coordinate the international community's response to the situation in Sierra Leone and ensure that adequate resources are provided to initiatives aimed at the protection and respect of human rights.

OAU and ECOWAS

Immediately after the military coup in May 1997, the OAU Secretary General, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, condemned it as "*unacceptable to the continent*". The Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution unequivocally condemned the military coup and called for the immediate restoration of constitutional order [7]. It appealed to the leaders of ECOWAS states to pursue efforts aimed at assisting the people of Sierra Leone in the restoration of constitutional order and to the international community to support those efforts.

The 33rd OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe, in early June 1997 gave a mandate to ECOWAS to take necessary action to

restore legality and constitutionality to Sierra Leone. The specific measures to be taken were to be decided by ECOWAS. The OAU Secretary General reiterated the OAU's strong support for ECOWAS's initiatives to bring peace, security and stability to Sierra Leone at the ECOWAS summit in Abuja at the end of August 1997.

It was under this mandate from the OAU that ECOWAS forces were deployed in Sierra Leone to monitor a cease-fire, to enforce the sanctions and embargo imposed by the UN Security Council and to secure peace in Sierra Leone. Military intervention by ECOMOG remained an option if dialogue between the AFRC and representatives of other ECOWAS countries and sanctions failed.

ECOWAS and ECOMOG have played a dominant role in political developments in Sierra Leone since the military coup, culminating in the removal of the AFRC and the reinstatement of President Kabbah's government in February 1998. ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone have been widely praised by the international community. At the ECOWAS summit in Abuja in late October 1998 ECOWAS heads of state and government endorsed the extension of ECOMOG's mandate in Sierra Leone and agreed that it should be strengthened, adding that efforts to achieve a lasting solution to the conflict should continue.

Between 10,000 and 12,000 ECOMOG forces were reported to have been deployed in Sierra Leone by October 1998. ECOMOG, which is composed largely of Nigerian forces, also comprises Guinean and Ghanaian troops and further contingents from Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Mali and Niger were envisaged. ECOMOG headquarters were to be transferred from Monrovia to Freetown. In April 1998 President Kabbah appointed the ECOMOG commander in Sierra Leone, Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe, as head of internal security in Sierra Leone. He was subsequently appointed in July 1998 as Chief of Defence Staff of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF). The national Sierra Leone army had effectively ceased to exist but was to be re-established.

The ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone is generally considered by the international community and within Sierra Leone to be disciplined and its intervention in February 1998 was welcomed by the majority of Sierra Leoneans. During the following months, as atrocities in the north and east of the country escalated, ECOMOG forces evacuated to safety and medical facilities some of the hundreds of victims of amputations and other injuries, saving many lives.

In the following months, however, reports began to be received of human rights violations committed by ECOMOG forces, including illegal detention of civilians, and torture and ill-treatment of civilian detainees and captured combatants. Concerns have also been expressed that the safety of the civilian population might be endangered during ECOMOG operations, especially air strikes, against rebel forces, particularly in Kailahun District, a rebel stronghold. Measures to minimise the risk to civilians during combat must be undertaken during all military operations by ECOMOG forces. The OAU and ECOWAS have a responsibility to ensure that ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone conform to international humanitarian and human rights law at all times.

As atrocities against unarmed civilians by rebel forces have continued, the need for concerted action by the international community remains. The OAU Central Organ should continue to play a role both in attempts to resolve the conflict in Sierra Leone and also to respond to post-conflict needs, in particular assistance for creating and reinforcing institutions aimed at long-term protection of human rights in Sierra Leone.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission), meeting in Banjul, Gambia, on 22 October 1998 agreed to send its Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, arbitrary or summary executions, Dr Mohamed Hatem Ben-Salem, to Sierra Leone in November 1998.

Recommendations

- in view of the continuing gross human rights abuses in Sierra Leone, the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution should consider requesting that the UN Security Council increase the resources of the human rights component of UNOMSIL in order to investigate and document these abuses;
- in addition to its Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, arbitrary or summary executions, the African Commission should also consider a visit to Sierra Leone by its Special Rapporteur on women in order to investigate and report the gross human rights abuses which continue to be committed in Sierra Leone, including against girls and women;
- the OAU Central Organ should send a delegation to Sierra Leone to assess the country's post-conflict needs including the establishment of effective structures for the future protection and respect of human rights;
- ECOWAS should ensure full compliance of its forces in Sierra Leone to international humanitarian and human rights law; there should be a mechanism to monitor human rights violations and take measures to prevent further violations.

Human rights violations during the period of AFRC rule

The period from 25 May 1997 until 12 February 1998 was marked by a total disregard for the rule of law and demands from the international community to respect international humanitarian and human rights law. The rule of law completely collapsed and violence engulfed the country.

Hundreds of people who were associated with the government of President Kabbah or his political party, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), or who were perceived to be opposed to the AFRC were detained without charge or trial, torture and ill-treatment were systematic, and many of those perceived to be political opponents of the AFRC were

extrajudicially executed.

On 20 October 1997 Amnesty International published a report which documented the human rights violations systematically committed by the AFRC and the RUF after the military coup [8]. The victims included those associated with the government of President Kabbah, journalists, students and human rights activists. Between October 1997 and February 1998 arrests, torture and killings continued relentlessly. The full toll of those detained, tortured, ill-treated and killed while the AFRC and RUF held power only emerged after they were forced from power.

During the period of AFRC rule, while it was possible to obtain limited information about human rights violations in Freetown, few details of what was happening in the Provinces were accessible. When an Amnesty International delegation travelled to Sierra Leone in May 1998, the extent of the suffering of civilians became evident. Killings, rape and looting were systematic in all parts of the country. Hundreds of people had been deliberately and arbitrarily killed, thousands lost their possessions, homes and livelihoods. Rape of girls and women was systematic throughout the country.

Amnesty International repeatedly called on the AFRC to end the systematic human rights violations which occurred after May 1997 and to adhere to its obligations under international human rights law, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter)[9]. It called for urgent measures to end arbitrary arrest and detention of those perceived to be opposed to the AFRC and to end torture, ill-treatment and extrajudicial executions.

It is important that there continue to be full and independent investigations into the human rights violations committed during the period of AFRC rule and that the truth of what occurred during those months is established and documented in order to bring those responsible to justice. There should be no impunity for the grave human rights violations committed throughout the period of AFRC rule. Investigation and accountability for these human rights violations will also contribute towards the process of national reconciliation within Sierra Leone.

Arbitrary arrest and detention

Hundreds of political detainees were held incommunicado without charge or trial. It was difficult to assess with any accuracy the number of those detained because of continuous arrests and releases, the failure of the authorities to provide information about detainees and lack of access to places of detention. Detainees were held at the Central Prison, Pademba Road, the police Criminal Investigation Department (CID) headquarters and Cockerill military headquarters in Freetown as well as other military camps, such as that known as the SS camp at the village of Regent in the hills above Freetown.

Throughout the period of AFRC rule journalists were particular targets of arrest, detention and torture. During October and November 1997 the crack-down on the press

intensified; at least 20 journalists were detained and many were tortured and ill-treated. They included Jon Z. Foray, editor of the *New Storm* newspaper, who was arrested by soldiers on 11 October 1997. He was taken first to Cockerill military headquarters where he was handed over to the military police and then held in a freight container. Also held in the container was Prince Akpu, a Nigerian journalist who had established a newspaper called *Alpha jet*, and who was arrested around the same time and accused of subversive activities. (Nigerian ECOMOG forces had used military aircraft called Alpha jets in their operations.) Two days later the two journalists were collected by a senior AFRC member, apparently to be taken to CID headquarters. They were, however, blindfolded and taken to the SS camp. Jon Z. Foray was beaten and stabbed with bayonets by soldiers and sustained a serious injury to his spine. He and Prince Akpu were released on 22 October 1997. With the help of friends, Jon Z. Foray managed to leave Sierra Leone for Ghana where he was admitted to hospital and received two months of medical treatment.

Arrests of journalists continued into November 1997: Dorothy Awoonor Gordon, acting editor of the *Concord Times*, Ibrahim Karim-Sei, editor of the *Standard Times*, and Pius Foray, editor of *The Democrat*, were among those detained and subsequently released without charge.

Sylvanus Kanyako, a journalist working for the *Herald Guardian*, and David Kamara, the newspaper's proprietor, were arrested on 10 January 1998, the day after an article suggested that a prominent member of the AFRC, Sergeant Abu "Zagalo" Sankoh, should be arrested in connection with the looting of the Iranian Embassy in Freetown on 31 December 1997. Sylvanus Kanyako was arrested by soldiers after being identified by an AFRC supporter. He and David Kamara were detained for three weeks. Both men were tortured. Sylvanus Kanyako was tied tightly with his arms behind his back, beaten all over his body and burned with a cigarette. At one point he lost consciousness. He sustained serious injuries to his arms and hands. He was then taken to CID cells where he remained, without any medical treatment, until he managed to escape on 30 January 1998.

On 30 January 1998 Michael Lawson, a university student at Fourah Bay College in Freetown, was arrested. He was apparently accused of passing information to a radio station broadcasting in support of the government of President Kabbah. The radio station, 98.1 FM, had been broadcasting clandestinely since July 1997. Many people suspected of providing information to the radio station, or knowing from where broadcasts were transmitted, had previously been arrested and detained. He was reported to be held at CID headquarters until his release in February 1998 after the intervention by ECOMOG.

Torture and extrajudicial executions

Ill-treatment, torture and extrajudicial executions were systematic throughout the period of AFRC rule. Soldiers and RUF members operated with impunity and created a climate of fear both in Freetown and throughout the country.

On 14 January 1998 a trader, Sama Turay, was shot dead by soldiers on Wilkinson Road

in Freetown after an argument. Local residents were forced to hand the body over to soldiers. Residents of the area staged a demonstration along Wilkinson Road the following day in protest against the killing. This demonstration coincided with a visit to Freetown of a delegation headed by the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, at that time based in Conakry, for discussions with the AFRC on the implementation of the peace agreement signed in Conakry in October 1997.

The demonstration on 15 January 1998 was brutally suppressed; soldiers indiscriminately beat civilians and raided homes in the area around Wilkinson Road. They went from house to house accusing civilians of deliberately discrediting the AFRC during the visit of the delegation. One of the victims was a 25-year-old trader. When soldiers arrived at his stall he was hit in the face with butt of an AK 47 gun and was also badly beaten on his back. He recognized the soldiers who beat him and described them as relatives of Major Johnny Paul Koroma.

Another of the victims was an 18-year-old girl, also living in the Wilkinson Road area, who had joined the demonstration. Three days later six soldiers came to her home. She was raped by all six soldiers who then cut her hair and shaved her head with a broken bottle.

In Kenema, Eastern Province, terror reigned throughout the period of AFRC rule. The town was effectively under the control of the RUF and, in particular, Sam Bockarie. As in Freetown and other parts of the country, rape of girls and women was systematic and at least a hundred civilians were reported to have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed in Kenema. Every house in the town was looted. The homes of those perceived to have been supporters of the SLPP were destroyed.

On 13 and 14 January 1998 several prominent members of the community in Kenema were arrested by members of the RUF under the supervision of Sam Bockarie. They included B.S. Massaquoi, the chairman of the town council, Dr P.B. Momoh, a medical doctor, Paramount Chief Moinama Karmor, a traditional leader, and Ibrahim Kpaka, a businessman. They were arrested at a time of fierce fighting between the *kamajors* and AFRC and RUF forces around Kenema and were accused of supporting the *kamajors*. They were held at the AFRC Secretariat building in Kenema, which had been the local SLPP headquarters, and some were later moved to the police station and army brigade headquarters. They were stripped and repeatedly beaten with sticks, electric cable and strips of tyres and were threatened with death. Their arms were tied tightly behind them. One of those detained sustained a serious head wound and injury to his eye after being beaten on his head with a gun. At least one of these detained died as a result of beatings.

Some of those arrested were released on 26 January 1998 and escaped to safety. B.S. Massaquoi, however, was among those who remained held at army brigade headquarters. He was killed by members of the RUF on 8 February 1998 as news arrived of ECOMOG's offensive on Freetown and as *kamajors* entered Kenema. Dozens of other people were also reported to have been killed. The mutilated body of B.S. Massaquoi and 35 other people were reported to have been found in mass grave near Kenema on 23

March 1998.

The use of the death penalty by the AFRC

The AFRC resorted to the use of the death penalty in an apparent attempt to be seen to be taking action to impose law and order but in doing so violated international human rights standards. On 25 October 1997 10 soldiers were executed after being convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a military court. A further 17 people were reported to have been executed on 2 November 1997, apparently after conviction by a military court although some reports suggested that summary executions took place without any form of legal proceedings. Another eight people were publicly executed in Koidu on 2 December 1997. According to reports, they had been convicted of armed robbery by a military court, from which there was no right of appeal.

On 28 November 1997 a new decree was promulgated which was retroactive to the time of the military coup and which extended the scope of the death penalty by making death sentences statutory for the offences of looting and commandeering vehicles.

International standards prohibit the retroactive use of the death penalty. The ICCPR states that the death sentence may be imposed only "in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime" and also that a heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. The Safeguards Guaranteeing the Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty state that: "Capital punishment may be imposed only for a crime for which the death penalty is prescribed by law at the time of its commission...".

In addition, the ICCPR states that: "In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes...". The Safeguards Guaranteeing the Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1994, also state that "... capital punishment may be imposed only for the most serious crimes ... with lethal or other extremely grave circumstances." The UN Human Rights Committee, a body of 18 experts established under the ICCPR, stated in 1996 that: "Extension of the scope of the application of the death penalty raises questions as to the compatibility with Article 6 of the Covenant", which guarantees the right to life. The UN Commission on Human Rights, in a resolution adopted in April 1997, called on all states which have not yet abolished the death penalty "progressively to restrict the number of offences for which the death penalty may be imposed".

Amnesty International urged the AFRC to repeal this legislation and to ensure that all death sentences were commuted and that no further executions took place.

Recommendations

- **investigations into the human rights violations committed during the period of AFRC rule should continue to be undertaken in order to bring those**

responsible to justice and to provide compensation to the victims of human rights violations;

- assistance for documenting the human rights violations which occurred during this period should be provided by the international community.

Human rights abuses by AFRC and RUF forces since February 1998

Since their removal from power the AFRC and RUF have wreaked a campaign of terror against unarmed civilians and human rights abuses have reached unprecedented levels. Several thousand civilians have been brutally killed or mutilated. Hundreds of others have been abducted from their villages and forced to join their attackers. Members of the AFRC and the RUF again inflicted on unarmed civilians the atrocities which they had endured throughout Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict but now on a much greater scale [10].

The abuses perpetrated by rebel forces of the AFRC and RUF constitute the most egregious violations of international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 which apply to international conflicts - wars between nations - also contain provisions which apply to internal armed conflicts. Article 3, common to all four Conventions, extends to "armed conflict not of an international character" fundamental rules for the protection of non-combatants which each party to the conflict is "bound to apply, as a minimum". Under the terms of common Article 3, people who take no active part or who have ceased to take an active part in hostilities must be treated humanely in all circumstances. Common Article 3 specifically prohibits: violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; the taking of hostages; and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment. This prohibition applies not only to government forces but to all parties to internal armed conflicts including armed political groups.

Article 4 of the Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the protection of victims of internal armed conflicts prohibits violence to life, health and physical well-being, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment, of all those not taking a direct part in hostilities or who have ceased to take part in hostilities. [11]

In the days immediately after their removal from power by ECOMOG, AFRC and RUF forces indiscriminately killed unarmed civilians, looted and burned houses, both in Freetown and other towns. As the rebel forces were pursued eastwards by ECOMOG forces through towns such as Bo in Southern Province, Kenema and Koidu in Eastern Province and Makeni in Northern Province during February, March and April 1998, they were responsible for widespread killings, torture and ill-treatment, including rape and other forms of sexual assault, and abduction. Villages and towns were burnt to the ground, destroying thousands of homes. Koidu, a major town in the diamond-rich Kono District, was almost totally destroyed by AFRC and RUF forces and villages between Njaiama-Sewafe and Koidu were repeatedly attacked.

Several foreign nationals were captured by RUF forces in mid-February 1998. They included Spanish, Italian and Austrian religious brothers working at St Joseph's Hospital in Lunsar, Port Loko District, Northern Province, who were abducted on 14 February 1998. Eldred Collins, a prominent RUF member, was reported to have demanded the release of Foday Sankoh, at that time still detained in Nigeria, in exchange for the release of the hostages. They were, however, released on 27 February 1998. Two staff of the humanitarian organization *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF), a Canadian and a French national, were also abducted around 14 February 1998 at Rogberi while driving between Port Loko and Lunsar. They were also released after two weeks.

Those perceived to be opposed to the AFRC and the RUF were particularly targeted by rebel forces. They included Catholic priests. As almost all other sectors of Sierra Leonean society, the Catholic Church in Sierra Leone had condemned the military coup. Catholic priests were specifically sought by AFRC and RUF forces after February 1998 and some narrowly escaped death. Their homes were looted and destroyed. Traditional leaders, known as Paramount Chiefs, were also singled out; 44 Paramount Chiefs were reported to have been killed in the months following February 1998.

"Operation no living thing"

An even more grotesque pattern of killing, rape and mutilation became evident in April 1998 and the number of victims increased dramatically. Rebel forces called their campaign of terror against civilians

"Operation no living thing". As fighting continued between ECOMOG and rebel forces around Koidu attacks on civilians in villages in the area persisted and then spread west and north. Later in April and into May 1998 Alikalia, Yifin and other villages in Koinadugu District, Northern Province, were attacked. Unarmed civilians who were taking no active part in the conflict were killed, their homes burned and their villages destroyed.

Although the exact number of those killed is unknown, it is likely to be several thousand. Most survivors of attacks described hundreds of bodies lying in the bush where they had fled and of several members of their families and communities being killed. More than 200 people were killed during an attack on one village, Yifin, in Koinadugu District, in late April 1998. More than 650 bodies, many of them women and children, were reported to have been buried following fighting in the area around Koidu in mid-June 1998.

With these attacks came reports of mutilations. The arms, hands, legs, ears and lips of victims were deliberately cut off. By early May 1998 some 120 victims of severe mutilations had been admitted to Connaught Hospital in the centre of Freetown; about 60 were admitted on one day alone, 26 April 1998. Four had both arms cut off, another 23 had one arm cut off, and others had deep lacerations on their lower arms, severed tendons or broken bones in their arms after being attacked with machetes. Some had a complete hand, several fingers or ears missing. They were all civilians: farmers, housewives, traders, miners, school students. These numbers swelled in the weeks and months which

followed as more victims arrived at Connaught Hospital and other hospitals in the north of the country, including in Makeni and Magburaka. Some of these hospitals lacked the equipment needed to perform war surgery. Connaught Hospital in the centre of Freetown, which had the necessary facilities, struggled to cope with the influx of patients. Between 6 April 1998 and 27 July 1998 an MSF surgical team treated almost 300 patients with amputations, severe mutilations or gunshot wounds at the hospital. The majority of the cases treated were lacerations to the head or neck or amputations of arms, hands, fingers, ears or lips. About a fifth of these victims were children, one aged 18 months. This number represented, however, only a fraction of the number of such victims, many of whom never reached medical help. Between 25 May 1998 and 12 June 1998 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates evacuated 23 people from the north of the country with gunshot wounds, deep lacerations and amputated limbs requiring urgent reconstructive surgery. A helicopter was used to reach areas inaccessible by road because of insecurity and fear of attack by armed groups. Evacuation of wounded civilians continued throughout the following months. According to humanitarian agencies in Freetown, only about one in four victims of mutilations by rebel forces survived their injuries. In June 1998 the ICRC rehabilitated Netland Hospital in Freetown for the surgical treatment of victims of amputations. By the end of September 1998, some 400 victims of amputations were reported to have undergone surgery at Netland Hospital. By October 1998 estimates of the number of victims of mutilations since February 1998 were put as high as 4,000.

Among the thousands of refugees arriving from Eastern and Northern Provinces into Guinea to escape attacks were civilians with similar mutilations. Between April and June 1998 some one hundred refugees were reported to have arrived in Guinea with serious injuries; half of them had suffered deliberate mutilation. By September 1998 a regional representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that more than 400 refugees in a camp at Kissidougou in Guinea had hands, limbs or ears cut off or were suffering other injuries.

Many of the survivors provided accounts of the violence inflicted upon them. Groups of armed men arrived in their villages, claiming to be ECOMOG, that they had come to liberate the villagers and that they were safe. Forced out of their homes, they realised that they were not ECOMOG troops. Civilians were rounded up, in groups or in lines, and then taken individually to a pounding block in the village where their hands, arms or legs were cut with a machete. In some villages, after the civilians were rounded up, they were stripped naked. Men were then ordered to rape members of their own family. If they refused, their arms were cut off and the women were raped by rebel forces, often in front of their husbands. As well as rape, women and girls also suffered other forms of sexual assault such as having foreign objects inserted into their vaginas. Victims of these atrocities also reported women and children being rounded up, locked into houses which were then set alight.

The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sergio Vieira de Mello, following a visit to Sierra Leone, said on 15 June 1998 that the brutal treatment of civilians by AFRC and RUF forces was unlike anything he had seen in 29 years of

humanitarian work. Describing the pattern of amputations, lacerations and maiming of civilians, including of children, he said that "*hands are cut off and ears and noses are amputated ... there are no words to condemn this sort of practice ...*".

Villagers from Kondeya, Kono District, fled into the bush when they heard that rebel forces were approaching their village in early April 1998. On 9 April 1998 a group of about 50 rebel forces found them and captured about 120. One of the men was strangled. A baby who was crying was pulled from its mother's back and thrown into a river. They were forced to return to the village where all the houses were burned. Twenty-seven of the captured villagers were then attacked with machetes; some were decapitated, others had their throats cut or their eyes gouged out.

Survivors were often taunted by rebel forces to go to ECOMOG and tell them that the AFRC and RUF were there or to go to President Kabbah to ask for a new limb. One was given a letter and told to deliver it to President Kabbah. Victims who had one or both ears cut off were told that without their ears they could no longer listen to the government or ECOMOG.

In some cases it took victims days or weeks to reach medical assistance. One man who had both arms cut off in April 1998 walked for several weeks from village to village until he was able to find a vehicle to take him to Freetown. Many more, unable to reach a medical centre in time, died as a result of their injuries. Some spent weeks in the bush either attempting to walk to safety or waiting until it was safe to return to their homes. The fate of several thousand people who fled into the bush during attacks on villages remains unknown. Many of those wounded have died in the bush.

An Amnesty International delegation which visited Sierra Leone in May 1998 met some of the victims of these atrocities at Connaught Hospital. One, a farmer aged 40 from the village of Badala, in Koinadugu District, had both hands cut off when the village was attacked on 3 May 1998. Hearing reports of advancing attacks, including those on Yifin and Alikalia, he had previously sent his family to safety in Kabala. At the time of the attack he was preparing food in his compound. Up to 400 men, armed with machetes, AK 47 guns and rocket propelled grenades entered the village. They caught him and asked him where ECOMOG was. When he said that he did not know, he was hit on the head with an AK 47. He was then forced to lie down and both arms were cut off. He was also beaten on his legs. He begged to be killed. The men who attacked him wrote three letters and put them in the pockets of his trousers. He was then told to go to tell President Kabbah that they were coming to Freetown, adding "*No AFRC, no peace*". He lay injured for three days in Badala and arrived at Connaught Hospital four days later. He had no news of his wife and three children. Other villagers, of all ages, from Badala were also mutilated and killed; they included a woman who was raped and then cut with machetes.

Another of the victims, a 15-year-old schoolboy from Koidu who had arrived at Connaught Hospital on 10 May 1998, had suffered severe lacerations to his right ankle in an attempted amputation. He and his family - his parents and six brothers and sisters - had been hiding in the bush for more than two months after being driven from Koidu

after it was attacked by rebel forces. They had no food throughout that time other than bananas. On 1 May 1998 the family had heard reports that ECOMOG had arrived in Koidu and they went to enter the eastern part of the town. They and those with them were attacked by rebel forces who accused them of supporting President Kabbah. Almost 50 people were killed. The young boy stayed for four days in a house without food or treatment for his severely injured leg. He was taken first to Makeni by ECOMOG forces and then brought to Connaught Hospital. He did not know what had happened to his family.

Three young women survived an attack on the village of Boima in Bombali District, Northern Province, on 7 May 1998; one had a deep cut to her arm, the other two had been beaten all over their bodies. One of the women had witnessed the killing of several members of her family, including her children. Twelve people, including three of her children, died when their house was set alight. Another child, a girl aged three, was pulled from her back and cut with machetes.

There were many atrocities in villages around Karina, between Makeni and Fadugu, in Northern Province, which were attacked on 7 May 1998. All those who were unable to run away were killed; others had limbs amputated.

In an incident which occurred on 7 May 1998 in Northern Province, a woman survivor recounted that one of her sisters had been killed by having her throat cut and two others were covered in kerosene and burned. Other victims, including children, were wrapped in a foam mattress which was then set alight.

The village of Tumbodu, north of Koidu, was attacked repeatedly during April and May 1998. During one of these attacks, on 11 May 1998, a woman aged in her twenties who was hiding in the bush outside the town was caught and asked for rice, which she did not have. She was forced to carry a heavy load; when she faltered she was beaten. When she reached Tumbodu she was forced to place her legs on a stone which were then cut in an attempted amputation. She suffered deep laceration to both legs and also to her arms. She arrived in Connaught Hospital on 15 May 1998. Her 10-year-old son was abducted by the rebels.

Massenbendu, a village close to Tumbodu, was also attacked on 11 May 1998. One of the victims, a farmer, was in his house when the door was broken down by rebel forces who demanded money; he said that he had none. Rebel forces told him that they were going to kill him because he supported President Kabbah. He sustained deep lacerations to his neck, head and arms. He was taken first to an ECOMOG base at Masingbi and was then transferred to Freetown. Three members of his family - two men and a small boy - were abducted.

Human rights abuses by rebel forces since July 1998

Atrocities declined significantly during July and August 1998 as the rainy season advanced. Despite this decreased level of atrocities concerns remained that rebel forces

could mount future attacks against unarmed civilians. In his First Progress Report on UNOMSIL, the UN Secretary-General said that he remained "*deeply concerned about the plight of innocent civilians in the country, who may still be suffering the depredations of the rebel forces or at risk from future attacks.*"

Incidents of killing and mutilations continued to be reported. On 27 July 1998 rebel forces, after feigning surrender, attacked Kabala, was held by ECOMOG. Rebel forces threatened to use civilians as human shields. No mutilations were reported but a large number of civilians, including children and young people, were reported to have been abducted. Rebel forces held Kabala for about four days before it was retaken by ECOMOG. Some 200 houses had been destroyed, property was looted and money extorted from civilians. All relief goods, medical supplies and logistics for humanitarian efforts had been looted or destroyed. At about the same time, rebel forces attacked a bus carrying civilians about 10 kilometres south of Kabala, killing seven people. Three young boys were also reported to have been abducted.

During attacks on villages in the area of Gbinti, Port Loko District, in early August 1998 victims of killings and mutilations included three women and a two-year-old child who were subsequently admitted to hospital with gunshot wounds, either to the backs of their bodies or their head. Three men were also admitted to hospital with deep lacerations apparently inflicted in attempted amputations.

In late August and during September 1998 an escalation of attacks was reported in Northern Province. Reports began to be received of victims having the initials "AFRC" carved into their foreheads and backs. Around 24 August 1998 there were attacks on villages, including Thawuya and Masunthu, in Kambia District. Several civilians were subsequently admitted to the Government Hospital in the town of Kambia with amputated limbs or severe lacerations. Three had both hands and ears amputated; others had deep wounds to their arms, shoulders and faces. One of the victims was a three-month-old baby with lacerations to the nape of its neck. On 6 September 1998 the town of Kamalu, near Kamakwie, in Bombali District, was attacked by rebel forces. At least 40 civilians, including children, were reported to have been killed in the attack; others were seriously injured with machete wounds. Some of those killed had been first been subjected to torture and sexual abuse; others had been burned alive. A Paramount Chief, Samura Bangura, was reported to have been abducted from Kamalu, together with some 50 others. On 11 September 1998 Fadugu, Koinadugu District, was attacked. According to reports, during that attack eight civilians, including a Paramount Chief, Alimamy Fanna Thoronka II, were burned alive.

Three villages in Kambia District, Yebaya, Kathatinah and Kakula, were reported to have been attacked by around one hundred rebel forces on 12 September 1998, resulting in the deaths of at least 16 civilians. According to witnesses of the attack on Yebaya, at least nine people were killed either by being shot or attacked with machetes. In late September 1998 and early October 1998 more than 50 people were reported to have been killed in attacks in Kambia District, near the border with Guinea, including on the village of Kukuna, and at least 25 civilians were reported to have been mutilated, including by

amputations, by rebel forces.

On 8 October 1998 the town of Mange in Port Loko District, some 150 kilometres from Freetown and on the main road to Guinea, was attacked by more than 200 rebel forces in an attempt to gain control of a strategic bridge. Some 25 civilians were reported to have been killed in the attack but the toll was expected to be higher since rebel forces were reported to have set fire to more than 40 homes, in some cases with civilians inside. Most of the town's 15,000 inhabitants fled and many of the wounded arrived at the hospital in the town of Port Loko for treatment. ECOMOG forces maintained control of the bridge after three days of fighting.

There were further attacks by rebel forces on villages in Bombali District during September 1998. Among the victims were two men, Pa Bai Munu and Morlai Munu, from the village of Mabunduka, between Pendembu and Mateboi, some 40 kilometres from Makeni. Pa Bai Munu, a farmer aged over 70, had fled his village for Makeni following an earlier attack during which two other members of his family, including Sorie Kabbie Munu, were abducted by rebel forces. The village was burned. Other members of the same family, Pa Amadu Munu and Pa Santigie Munu, had been killed by having their throats cut during an attack on Mateboi in May 1998. Pa Bai Munu later returned to a village, Four Road Loko, close to his home at Mabunduka. He, Morlai Munu and about 20 other people were killed when Four Road Loko was attacked on 16 September 1998. According to reports, Pa Bai Munu was tied by the neck and dragged for about 10 kilometres before he was hacked to death and his body mutilated. At least six members of the family had been killed or abducted.

Attacks on villages around Kabala, including Benikoro and Badala, resumed and intensified during September 1998. The town of Kabala itself, earlier attacked and held briefly by rebel forces in late July 1998, was again attacked on 18 September 1998. Some 20 civilians were reported to have been killed and houses burned. Among the victims who were evacuated to Freetown by the ICRC were three children, two of whom were suffering from extensive burns. One of them had hidden with his family in a hut which was set alight by rebel forces; he was the only survivor.

On 24 October 1998, apparently in retaliation at the death sentence imposed on Foday Sankoh the previous day, the village of Alikalia was attacked by some 300 rebel forces. Reports of the attack referred to civilians, including women and children, being shot, decapitated or having their arms amputated. Civilian survivors of the attack on Alikalia were admitted to Connaught Hospital with gunshot wounds and multiple lacerations.

Attacks by rebel forces also escalated in Kenema District from August 1998. Among the villages affected were Mendেকেlema, Neama and Sandaru, which was completely destroyed, less than 30 kilometres from the town of Kenema. One of the victims of the attack on Mendেকেlema in late August 1998 had both hands amputated. Survivors of attacks consistently described mutilation, rape, torture, killing and the burning of houses. Entire local communities were displaced from the area, many fleeing to the towns of Kenema, Segbwema and Daru.

Recommendations

- the international community must continue to condemn in the strongest possible terms the grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed by forces of the AFRC and RUF;
- leaders of AFRC and RUF forces must take immediate measures to end human rights abuses committed by their combatants, including deliberate and arbitrary killing of non-combatants, torture, mutilation and rape, and must publicly state their commitment to respecting international humanitarian law;
- those in command of AFRC and RUF forces should exert effective control over those under their command in order to prevent torture and killing of non-combatants; those suspected of committing human rights abuses should be removed from any position of authority or duties which bring them into contact with prisoners or others at risk of abuse;
- AFRC and RUF forces must respect human rights and the basic principles of international humanitarian law and abide by minimum standards of humane behaviour at all times.

Children at the centre of the violence

Children have not escaped the violence and brutality of the conflict in Sierra Leone; they have often been the principal victims of gross human rights abuses, including the atrocities in Eastern and Northern Provinces which occurred in the months following the removal of the AFRC and RUF from power in February 1998. They have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated and maimed, abducted and forcibly recruited by rebel forces. Among the thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees in neighbouring countries or internally displaced within Sierra Leone after February 1998 were hundreds of unaccompanied children, separated from their families as a result of the violence.

Several thousand children, including babies and very young children, have been separated from their families as a result of seven years of internal armed conflict. Most of those abducted in the earlier years of the war were from Southern and Eastern Provinces. The most common reason for the separation of children from their families was abduction by rebel forces. Others became separated from their parents as a result of attacks on their towns and villages when their parents were killed, abducted or became missing.

Many families have rejected children who had been forcibly recruited into rebel forces and have refused to take them back into their homes. Even in cases where parents are willing to take back their children, the level of resentment and bitterness within their communities sometimes prevents them from doing so.

Significant and coordinated efforts are being undertaken by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) together with a coalition of non-governmental organizations to reunite these children with their families and to help their reintegration into their families and communities, often in the most difficult of circumstances.

The work of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations in providing help and protection to children traumatized by the conflict, including former child combatants, should be supported and reinforced by the international community.

Abduction of children

Large numbers of civilians, in particular children and young men and women, have been abducted by the RUF throughout the years of the internal armed conflict. They have been forcibly recruited to fight or forced to undertake other tasks such as carrying loads, including looted property and food, and cooking. Women and girls have been forced to become the sexual partners of rebel forces. While in the early years of the conflict representatives of the RUF claimed publicly that some of those abducted had joined rebel forces willingly, in most cases captured civilians have been held under duress, threatened with killing or ill-treatment, and have had little option but to cooperate.

Capture and abduction of civilians, including many children, has continued throughout the months since the AFRC and RUF were deposed and has occurred increasingly in Northern Province. In those areas of the country which remained under the control of rebel forces thousands of civilians, including women and children, effectively remained captive, many of them in Kailahun District, a stronghold of the RUF since the beginning of the internal armed conflict. Some estimates put this number as high as 10,000. They were used to carry goods, as human shields or for sexual slavery.

Testimonies of victims of the attacks by rebel forces which occurred in Northern Province from April 1998 invariably referred to the abduction of large numbers of people, including children. When the town of Kabala was attacked by a large group of rebel forces in July 1998, a large number of children were abducted. Njalia Nimikoro, a village some 10 kilometres southwest of Koidu, was reported to have been attacked around 18 August 1998. Nine civilians, including a 10-year-old child were admitted to hospital with gunshot wounds, and a woman and her five children were reported to have been abducted by rebel forces. A few days earlier, on 15 August 1998, rebels in the area around Koidu were reported to have released around 250 captured civilians. Dozens of civilians were reported to have been abducted, however, when three villages in Kambia District were attacked in September 1998.

The abuse of children by rebel forces

Many of those abducted have been trained and forced to fight. When RUF forces joined the AFRC in Freetown following the military coup in May 1997 many of its fighters, some as young as 11 or 12 years and many in their teens, who had previously been abducted arrived in Freetown. Many had spent several years in RUF camps in the bush

and had fought in the conflict. In some cases their names had been changed by the RUF. Fear played a significant role in forcing these children to remain with the RUF. Those who attempted to escape were beaten or killed. Former RUF child combatants have recounted summary killing, torture and ill-treatment. These children also relied on the RUF for their means of survival, including food and shelter. As well as being forced to fight, they were used as porters to carry goods and looted property. The use of drugs such as amphetamines was reported to be widespread. Sex was used in a systematic way by the RUF to enslave girls, often very young, and young women. While some later expressed a wish to remain with their partners, most remained under duress. Many had become pregnant and had children, making eventual reintegration into their own communities even more difficult.

The histories of many of the children abducted by the RUF since 1991 emerged when they arrived in Freetown. An 11-year-old boy caught and abducted during an ambush by the RUF near Bo several years earlier had been forced to take drugs and fight. Another boy had been captured in Kailahun District in 1992 when he was six years old and separated from his mother, sister and brother. Six years later he did not know where his family were or whether they were still alive. Another boy had been abducted during an attack in Kenema District in 1992, in which both his parents had been killed, when he was 10 or 11 years old. He had been with the RUF for six years and had been trained to use a gun and fight. A girl, aged 14 at the time of her abduction in 1995, was forced to become the sexual partner of a member of the RUF. She was forced to cook and taught how to use a gun.

Victims and perpetrators of human rights abuses

When the AFRC and RUF were forced by ECOMOG from Freetown in mid-February 1998 many of these children, some of whom had been responsible for killings and torture, were identified as members of the RUF and risked revenge attacks by civilians, placing their safety and lives in jeopardy. Almost 3,000 children associated with the RUF, fearing reprisals from civilians, were reported to have fled from Freetown in a matter of days. There were reports of such children being beaten by civilians before being handed over to ECOMOG troops and one child who had been living on the streets of Freetown was reported to have been burned alive in an apparent revenge attack. ECOMOG troops were also reported to have ill-treated some of these children when they were handed over into their custody.

Recruitment of children by Civil Defence Forces

Large numbers of children have also been recruited into the ranks of the CDF which support President Kabbah and are fighting with ECOMOG against rebel forces. Although the CDF has made a commitment to end initiation of children into the traditional hunters' societies which form the CDF, there were reports that new members, including children between the ages of 15 and 17, were recruited near Magburaka in Tonkolili District, Northern Province, in July 1998. Initiation of children into the CDF was also reported to be continuing in Southern and Eastern Provinces, for example at Daru and Segbwema,

during the following months and children, some as young as seven years, were still seen carrying arms and guarding CDF checkpoints. In early October 1998 Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence, during a visit to Sierra Leone by the Executive Director of UNICEF, Carol Bellamy, was reported as stating his commitment to disarming and demobilizing children recruited by the *kamajors*, adding, however, that the conflict in Sierra Leone was not yet over.

Efforts by the international community to meet the needs of children

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, visited Sierra Leone in both March and May 1998. During his visit in May 1998, when he travelled to the east of the country, it became clear that one of the most pressing challenges facing Sierra Leone was the "*crisis of the young*": the plight of children affected directly or indirectly by the conflict. He identified five areas requiring urgent action by the international community: demobilization and reintegration of child combatants; resettlement of internally displaced people; tracing the families of unaccompanied children; rehabilitation and support of victims without limbs; and provision and rehabilitation of medical and educational services.

At a meeting with the UN Special Representative during his visit in May 1998, the government agreed not to recruit children under the age of 18 years into a reconstituted national army. The CDF also agreed to stop initiation and recruitment of children under the age of 18 and to begin the process of demobilization of child combatants within their ranks [12]. Both ECOMOG and the CDF agreed to provide special protection to AFRC and RUF child combatants in their custody as a result of surrender, capture or escape. On 5 November 1998 Olara Otunnu again appealed to both the CDF and rebel forces to end the recruitment of child soldiers.

Olara Otunnu called on the international community to respond in a more vigorous and concerted way to the needs of children affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone and urged it to make the rehabilitation of children in Sierra Leone a pilot project for post-conflict reconstruction. Meeting the specific needs of children, young people and women affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone were particularly important in plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction.

In a press conference following his address to the UN General Assembly in October 1998, Olara Otunnu made specific references to the plight of children in Sierra Leone and called for the international community to provide both political commitment and resources. He recommended to the key actors responsible for post-conflict reconstruction programs, such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), that the needs of women and children who had been victims of conflict should be at the centre of such programs.

On 29 June 1998 the UN Security Council strongly condemned the targeting of children in war, in particular their abduction, sexual abuse and recruitment as soldiers, and said that it would pay serious attention to the situation of children affected by armed conflicts.

In his address to the UN special conference, the UN Secretary-General acknowledged the terrible suffering of children in Sierra Leone: "*To an appalling degree, it was children who were, and still are, the victims of war, either as conscripted fighters or as casualties of indiscriminate attacks.*" The Secretary-General welcomed the government of Sierra Leone's decision to offer an amnesty for child soldiers from all combatant groups and efforts to develop a national program to meet the needs of children who had been particularly adversely affected by seven years of conflict.

At the UN special conference the Executive Director of UNICEF referred to the importance of demobilizing and reintegrating into society an estimated 4,000 children still attached to fighting forces which would require an intensive and long-term commitment of resources from the international community. Some 2,500 of these children were being forced to fight with rebel forces; the others had been recruited by the CDF. The safety of all children who had been captured needed to be ensured and ways found to release them and include them in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program.

During her visit to Sierra Leone in early October 1998, the Executive Director of UNICEF again urged that all child combatants be disarmed and demobilized: "*the fact that the conflict is (still going) on should not justify recruitment of children*". During discussions with government officials, she sought assurances that the government would abide by its commitments to demobilize child combatants, not to recruit new child combatants and to provide an amnesty for those children who had been fighting with rebel forces. She urged that the process be speeded up. She also called for the release of all child prisoners of war, the number of which is unknown.

The demobilization of soldiers and their reintegration into society - socially, psychologically, politically and economically - is critical to post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. Support for such programs, particularly those for children, is vital. UNICEF and UNOMSIL, with the National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy and ECOMOG, are undertaking a program of registration and interviewing of former RUF child combatants in order to include them into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The children, once registered, are released from ECOMOG custody into the care of UNICEF. In October 1998 some 60 children, aged from eight to 18, were reported to have been registered in Makeni and another 120 in Bo; registration in Port Loko was due to commence in November 1998.

Recommendations

- AFRC and RUF forces must end the gross human rights abuses being perpetrated against children, including killing, mutilation, rape and other forms of sexual abuse, abduction and forcible recruitment as combatants;
- AFRC and RUF forces should release all children currently held as captives or child soldiers;

- immediate measures to end the recruitment of children under the age of 18 by the CDF should be taken and the government should be assisted and supported in the registration of child combatants among the CDF in order to ascertain their exact number and location and to incorporate them into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program;
- the Sierra Leone government and the international community should fully support and assist relevant UN agencies and non-governmental organizations to identify and address the social, psychological and material needs of children, particularly former child combatants, affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone;
- the international community should fully support the proposal of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict for Sierra Leone to be made a pilot project for a more effective response in the context of post-conflict peace building; this pilot project should coordinate, reinforce, and provide adequate resources for initiatives aimed at the protection of children in Sierra Leone.

Human rights violations by ECOMOG forces

At the time of its offensive on Freetown which began on 5 February 1998, shelling by ECOMOG forces was reported to have caused a high number of civilian casualties. Shelling continued in densely populated areas of Freetown throughout the week of the offensive, including in areas where medical facilities, such as Connaught Hospital, were situated. More than 600 people with war-related injuries were reported to have been admitted to hospital during that period. The high number of civilian casualties suggested that ECOMOG may have taken inadequate measures to protect civilians during the offensive on Freetown.

Shelling by AFRC and RUF forces was, however, also intensive during that period and some civilians claimed that residential areas in Freetown were being deliberately shelled by AFRC and RUF forces, particularly by those positioned at Fourah Bay College on a hill overlooking Freetown.

Thousands of civilians in rebel-controlled areas, in particular Kailahun District, remain at risk of being caught in hostilities between ECOMOG, fighting with the CDF, and rebel forces. There are fears that the safety of the civilian population might be endangered, especially during air strikes which are reported to be taking place. Measures to minimise the risk to civilians during combat, in conformity with international humanitarian law, must be undertaken during military operations, including aerial bombardments of rebel forces' bases located near or within areas where there are high concentrations of civilians.

In his Second Progress Report on UNOMSIL the UN Secretary-General referred to reports which suggested that "*certain ECOMOG personnel do not consistently ensure full respect for provisions of international humanitarian law, such as those regarding the*

protection of non-combatants in combat situations and the proper treatment of combatants during surrender or capture. UNOMSIL is encouraging the ECOMOG leadership to raise awareness among all troops to ensure full respect for all relevant aspects of international humanitarian law".

In the days after it took control of Freetown, several thousand soldiers surrendered to or were captured by ECOMOG forces. In subsequent weeks and months, ECOMOG supervised thousands of military detainees, in particular at Benguema, a military training camp some 25 kilometres from Freetown, but also at military bases at Lungi, Bo, Kenema and Makeni. According to the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa, all military detainees held by ECOMOG remained under the authority of the Sierra Leone government; the role of ECOMOG was to screen those detained, assess whether they were a security risk and whether they could be deployed as part of the ECOMOG force or the eventual reconstituted national army.

It was claimed that AFRC and RUF combatants captured by the CDF were handed over to the police or ECOMOG forces after February 1998. It appeared, however, that CDF forces summarily killed some captured combatants and reports also suggested that ECOMOG forces handed over captured AFRC and RUF forces to the CDF who subsequently killed them.

A significant number of civilians are being detained by ECOMOG forces under the category of "safe custody" in prisons and other places of detention throughout the country. An unspecified number of people are held under ECOMOG "safe custody" at Pademba Road prison. At the Central Prison in Kenema more than 30 people, some apparently accused of collaboration with rebel forces, were reported to be held under ECOMOG "safe custody" in October 1998 without any referral of their cases to the civilian authorities. There is apparently no legal basis for their detention; it is unclear whether they are held under the provisions of the Public Emergency Regulations which came into effect in March 1998. In October 1998 there were reports that a suspected member of rebel forces had been taken into custody by ECOMOG in Makeni despite substantial evidence that he was innocent.

There have also been reports that those taken into custody by ECOMOG forces have been ill-treated by being beaten and tied tightly. Among the victims in Freetown were children who had been among RUF forces and who were detained shortly after the ECOMOG intervention. During September 1998 there were reports, although few in number, of torture and ill-treatment of both civilian detainees and captured combatants. A number of former RUF child combatants who were registered as part of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program claimed that they had been ill-treated while in the custody of ECOMOG.

There have also been reports of acts of violence and intimidation by ECOMOG forces against civilians in Freetown and other parts of the country. On 5 October 1998 at a checkpoint at Magbenteh, about three kilometres from Makeni, a driver was reported to have been beaten and stabbed with a bayonet by a member of ECOMOG during an

argument about a search of his vehicle and request for his documents. Sexual assault of women at ECOMOG checkpoints has also been reported in the area around Makeni.

There were several reports of harassment of humanitarian convoys by both ECOMOG and CDF forces in the area of Masingbi and Njaiama-Sewafe during October 1998. For example, the driver of vehicle belonging to a non-governmental organization was reported to have been physically assaulted by ECOMOG forces near Masingbi who also stole property from the vehicle. UNOMSIL military observers have frequently been requested to intervene with ECOMOG and the CDF on behalf of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations.

ECOMOG commanders have expressed a determination to address problems of ill-discipline and were reported to have established a complaints procedure to investigate any allegations of harassment of civilians by ECOMOG forces.

Recommendations

- all military personnel participating in the ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone must adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law at all times;
- all troops participating in ECOMOG should be fully trained in these standards and understand their obligation to adhere to them;
- in accordance with international humanitarian law, civilians should not be targeted during military operations by ECOMOG forces; ECOMOG forces must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and take all necessary measures to protect civilians from the dangers arising from military operations;
- the cases of civilian detainees reported to be held "in safe custody" by ECOMOG forces should be reviewed by a civilian judicial authority in order to establish the legal basis for their detention and to determine whether they should be charged or released;
- specific mechanisms for monitoring, investigating and reporting any violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by ECOMOG forces should be established;
- UNOMSIL military observers should be provided with adequate resources to monitor the respect by ECOMOG forces of international humanitarian and human rights law during both military operations and during disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs for former combatants;
- any allegations of human rights violations by ECOMOG forces, such as extrajudicial execution, torture and ill-treatment, should be promptly and

independently investigated and those responsible brought to justice, in accordance with international standards.

Human rights violations by Civil Defence Forces

The CDF have also failed to respect international human rights and humanitarian law and have been responsible for torture, ill-treatment and extrajudicial executions, although not on the scale of abuses committed by AFRC and RUF forces.

The CDF are composed of traditional hunters and include *kamajors* from the south and east of the country, and *kapras*, *donsos*, *tamaboros* from the north. The National Coordinator of the CDF is the Deputy Minister of Defence. Although attempts have been made to register all members of the CDF throughout the country, this has been made difficult because of the lack of a formal structure and control over some of the CDF, continuing recruitment and fighting.

The CDF have killed, tortured and ill-treated both captured AFRC and RUF combatants and also civilians suspected of supporting or collaborating with the AFRC and RUF. In September 1997 four people, including a woman, who were suspected of being soldiers or AFRC supporters were reported to have been summarily executed by being decapitated when the vehicle in which they were travelling from Bo to Makeni was stopped by *kamajors*. In January 1998 *kamajors* were reported to have summarily killed civilians suspected of supporting the AFRC and RUF in two villages near the town of Rotifunk, Southern Province, some 90 kilometres from Freetown.

In February 1998, in the days following the removal of the AFRC and RUF, there were many cases of torture, ill-treatment and extrajudicial executions by the *kamajors*, including in the towns of Bo, Kenema and Koidu. They were often mutilated and many were killed by being burned alive; some had tyres placed around their heads which were then set alight. At least 50 people accused of having supported the AFRC and RUF were extrajudicially executed in Kenema. Black marks on the dirt roads where people had been burned alive were still visible months later. When *kamajors* entered Koidu on 11 and 12 February 1998 they captured and killed AFRC soldiers. Some were decapitated, others were doused with petrol or had tyres placed around them and were burned alive. Such killings also took place in Freetown in the days immediately following the removal of the AFRC and RUF. At least six people were killed by civilians in revenge attacks. They included Mohamed Bangura, also known as Saccoma, who was burned alive, Sheik Mustapha, who was beaten to death, and Musa Kabia.

Several independent sources referred to isolated incidents of extrajudicial execution together with ritual cannibalism by members of the CDF. Ritual cannibalism is not, however, accepted behaviour or policy among the CDF and is rejected as abhorrent by most CDF. It appears to be carried out only by a small number of *kamajors*, in particular in the region around Kenema, who subscribe to animist beliefs. One such incident was reported to have occurred on 27 March 1998 when a boy aged 17 from Kenema was detained by *kamajors* and accused of collaborating with the AFRC and RUF. He was

taken to the market place and forced to buy vegetables and other ingredients. He was then reported to have been killed in a cannibalistic ritual. His partially burned body, with the heart removed, was later seen by witnesses. Other incidents of ritual cannibalism were reported to have taken place during April and May 1998 at Panguma, north of Kenema. These incidents must be investigated by the authorities and those responsible brought to justice. Longer-term measures, including increasing awareness and understanding of the cultural basis for this practice, are also needed in order to eradicate ritual cannibalism.

On 28 April 1998 President Kabbah announced that the CDF had been placed under the command of ECOMOG. The following day a *kamajor* leader in Bo was reported to have criticized the growing lawlessness of the *kamajors* and called for the registration of all CDF, who were apparently roaming the streets of Bo. Although nominally under the command and control of ECOMOG, the behaviour of the CDF continued to be undisciplined in the following months, particularly in areas other than their own villages, towns and districts. Reports of extrajudicial executions and torture of prisoners decreased significantly, however, from June 1998, apparently as a result of intervention by the government and ECOMOG, and the discipline of many CDF units improved significantly.

Some incidents of extrajudicial execution, torture and ill-treatment, however, continue to be reported. On 26 October 1998 four captured rebels were reported to have been extrajudicially executed in the village of Romeni, north of Port Loko. At least another 10 were reported to have been killed after being captured during the attack on Alikalia in October 1998.

In late August 1998 a young woman from the area around Kenema who had previously handled goods looted from the World Food Programme (WFP) by rebel forces was reported to have been interrogated by a group of about 20 CDF in the town of Kenema. When she made remarks considered offensive by the CDF, she was stripped and beaten. She was then taken to an unknown destination. Reports were also received in September 1998 of illegal arrest and detention of civilians by the CDF although it is unclear whether this practice is continuing.

Criminal acts, such as looting, confiscation of vehicles and civil disturbance, by the CDF have continued. Civilians have been harassed and money and goods extorted in exchange for permission to pass through checkpoints along major roads. The CDF have imposed their authority through fear and intimidation with the result that many people are afraid to make formal complaints to the authorities about their conduct. During September 1998 there were persistent reports of interference with the delivery of humanitarian supplies.

Little or no action is known to have been taken by the authorities against members of the CDF who have been responsible for illegal arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment and extrajudicial executions of those suspected of having collaborated with the AFRC which have occurred since February 1998. The CDF appear to act with impunity. There is an urgent need to investigate human rights violations committed by the CDF and bring those responsible to justice.

Recommendations

- strict chain of command must be enforced over members of the CDF in order to prevent extrajudicial executions, torture and ill-treatment, illegal arrest and detention;
- all reports of extrajudicial executions, torture and ill-treatment, illegal arrest and detention by the CDF should be promptly and independently investigated in order to bring those responsible to justice.

Refugees and internally displaced people - still at risk

In July 1998 at the UN special conference on Sierra Leone, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, stated that the refugee crisis in Sierra Leone had been the worst in Africa so far during 1998. On 10 November 1998 she again referred to the plight of Sierra Leonean refugees and internally displaced people when she called on the UN Security Council to respond more effectively to refugee crises in Africa.

As fighting has intensified in the east and north of the country since the intervention by ECOMOG in February 1998, at least 550,000 Sierra Leoneans are estimated to have fled areas affected by conflict. They include hundreds of unaccompanied children. According to UNHCR, since the beginning of 1998, some 210,000 Sierra Leoneans have sought refuge in Guinea and another 57,000 in Liberia. It is also estimated that more than 300,000 have become internally displaced within Sierra Leone during 1998.

The continuing violence perpetrated by rebel forces has not only prevented the return of refugees and internally displaced people to their homes but has also caused a serious humanitarian situation which threatens lives. Both refugees and internally displaced people remain vulnerable to attacks by rebel forces and face acute hardship, disease and malnutrition. The violence and insecurity in areas affected by the conflict has often prevented adequate assistance reaching them.

Refugees in Guinea and Liberia

When fighting between ECOMOG and rebel forces intensified in Kailahun District in April 1998, some 1,000 civilians were reported to be fleeing to Liberia daily. Thousands of refugees also fled into Guinea; 6,000 new refugees arrived during the first week of June 1998. Many, including children, died as a result of malnutrition, diarrhoea and malaria.

The majority of Sierra Leonean refugees were in areas where access was extremely difficult. In both Guinea and Liberia, poor road conditions and the onset of the rainy season, combined with concerns about security by both the Liberian and Guinean authorities, aggravated still further problems of access by humanitarian agencies to refugees in camps near the border, threatening food deliveries and basic medical care,

including vaccinations.

Between 15 June 1998 and 10 July 1998 humanitarian agencies were denied access by the Guinean authorities to camps close to the border in the Guéckédou region where more than 150,000 refugees had recently arrived. The Guinean authorities cited insecurity and difficulties in guaranteeing the safety of humanitarian agencies in the area. UNHCR and its partners did not have access to these refugees for more than three weeks. Many of the refugees in this area were already in poor physical condition when they had arrived. In early September 1998 heavy rains disrupted the delivery of relief assistance to some 180,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in camps in the Guéckédou region of Guinea.

In Guinea most camps were near the border with Sierra Leone, leaving refugees close to areas of the fighting and vulnerable to attacks. On 3 July 1998 the refugee camp at Forokonia in Guinea was attacked during an incursion by rebel forces from Sierra Leone. Six refugees were killed and the camp was looted and almost entirely burned.

In early September 1998 UNHCR reported that rebel forces were continuing to brutalize Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea. Rebel forces had attacked a refugee camp at Tomandu inside Guinea on 1 September 1998, killing at least 10 people - seven women refugees and several Guineans - as they forced other refugees to carry stolen goods back across the border into Sierra Leone. UNHCR sent representatives to the village which had been attacked. They found Sierra Leonean refugees who had previously been abducted by rebel forces, including a girl who said that she had been repeatedly raped and a boy who had the letters RUF carved into his chest and forehead. Witnesses said that rebel forces had raided local food stores killing everyone nearby. Three women refugees were reported to have been shot and seriously wounded when they refused to continue across a bridge into Sierra Leone. UNHCR subsequently moved thousands of refugees from Tomandu to camps further inside Guinea.

Conclusion 22 of the UNHCR Executive Committee states that: "The location of asylum-seekers should be determined by their safety and well-being as well as by the security needs of the receiving State. Asylum-seekers should, as far as possible, be located at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin". In addition, Conclusion 48: "Condemns all violations of the rights and safety of refugees and asylum-seekers and in particular military or armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements".

On 8 September 1998 the WFP appealed for assistance for more than 200,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in the Guéckédou region, most of whom had fled continuing rebel attacks in Kono and Kailahun Districts. According to the WFP, some 80 per cent of civilians from these areas were either dead or unaccounted for. Several thousand others were believed to be held captive by rebel forces. Refugees were arriving destitute, suffering from exhaustion, malnutrition and disease.

There was a further large influx of Sierra Leonean refugees into the Forécariah region of Guinea in late September 1998. According to UNHCR, more than 3,000 people crossed the border on 29 September 1998 after rebel forces had killed civilians and burned homes

in Kukuna. Concern was expressed that refugee camps in the Forécariah region, close to the border, were vulnerable to incursions by rebel forces from Sierra Leone. Another 2,000 were reported to have also fled their homes and become internally displaced.

Most Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia, the majority unaccompanied women and children, were based at camps at Vahun and Kolahun in Lofa Country in northwestern Liberia. An unknown number of others were scattered along the border without access to humanitarian assistance. Bad roads and rains hampered access by humanitarian organizations to refugee camps.

The large concentrations of Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia, in particular at camps in Vahun and Kolahun, contained significant numbers of both active and former combatants. They included rebel forces who regularly crossed the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. Others were former Sierra Leonean soldiers who feared returning to Sierra Leone because of possible reprisals by the CDF. Also among Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia were former combatants of the RUF who had voluntarily ceased combat. Conclusion 77 of the UNHCR Executive Committee "calls on States of refuge to take all necessary measures to ensure that the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements is maintained".

In addition to the severe physical hardship encountered by refugees and internally displaced people, there was also concern that refugees returning to Sierra Leone who might be considered to be associated with rebel forces could be at risk of revenge attacks on their return and might become victims of arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment or extrajudicial execution.

Internally displaced people

Some 20,000 internally displaced people sought safety from the increasing attacks in Northern and Eastern Provinces from April 1998 at Masingbi, between Koidu and Makeni, swelling the town's normal population of 7,000. During June and early July 1998 up to 300 people arrived daily at Masingbi, decreasing to between 50 and 100 a day during August 1998. The humanitarian situation of internally displaced people at Masingbi remained critical during the following months and there was a high mortality rate as a result of disease and malnutrition. Children under five years were the worst affected. Fears for the safety of displaced people at Masingbi heightened after ECOMOG forces repelled an attack by rebel forces on Masingbi in late October 1998.

With the onset of the rainy season from May, when endemic diseases such as cholera resurface, many civilians caught in areas under the control of rebel forces, forced from their homes and seeking refuge in the bush and with no access to medical assistance were reported to be suffering from vomiting and diarrhoea.

As attacks by rebel forces in both Northern and Eastern Provinces resumed during September and October 1998 entire local communities in Kambia, Koinadugu, Bombali and Kenema Districts were displaced. Attacks by rebel forces on villages in Kenema

District in late September 1998 were reported to have resulted in as many as 10,000 people fleeing their homes, half of whom sought refuge in the town of Kenema.

Recommendations

- all violations of the rights and safety of refugees and, in particular, military or armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements should be condemned; all efforts should be made to protect the safety of refugees in camps and settlements, including location to secure areas and, whenever possible, at a reasonable distance from the border with Sierra Leone;
- effective measures should be taken to preserve the civilian and humanitarian nature of refugee camps and settlements;
- every effort should be made to ensure the safety of internally displaced people; internally displaced people's camps should be provided adequate protection from human rights abuses;
- all efforts should be made to ensure that there is adequate access to refugees and internally displaced people in order to monitor their safety and provide humanitarian assistance;
- refugee repatriation programs should include effective monitoring and protection for as long as necessary; international refugee law and protection standards must be adhered to at all times, including the principles of *non-refoulement*, the right to seek asylum and repatriation only on a voluntary basis with international supervision.

Accountability for human rights abuses

The government of President Kabbah, since it was reinstated in March 1998, has taken measures to establish accountability for human rights abuses and to bring those responsible to justice. This is essential for achieving justice and moving towards national reconciliation. Such a process, however, must be undertaken in accordance with international standards and must not itself violate human rights. Trials of those accused of human rights abuses must conform to international standards for a fair trial and there should be no recourse to the death penalty.

Impunity contributes to continuing human rights abuses. It is only when those responsible for human rights abuses are brought to justice for their crimes that a clear message is sent that these abuses will not be tolerated or allowed to go unpunished.

The scale of the atrocities committed by the AFRC and the RUF, both before and after they held power, demand that those responsible be brought to justice. This is not incompatible with peace and reconciliation. Peace and security will not be achieved in Sierra Leone until there is an end to impunity. True reconciliation cannot be achieved if

the right of victims and their families to truth, justice and redress are ignored.

On 17 June 1998, shortly after a conference on the creation of an international criminal court opened in Rome, Italy, a joint statement by the heads of five UN agencies said that the atrocities being committed in Sierra Leone were a brutal reminder of the urgent need for an international criminal court to try those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The statement by UNICEF, UNHCR, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs urged those participating at the conference in Rome to study carefully the situation in Sierra Leone and to ensure that the statute they adopted would be able to combat impunity, provide justice and contribute to a lasting peace in the country.

The statement added that, despite the willingness of the Sierra Leone government, it was unlikely that the judicial system would have sufficient resources to bring those responsible for human rights abuses to justice, which would raise "*the prospect of yet another round of mindless violence going unpunished*".

The delegation of Sierra Leone to the conference in Rome repeatedly cited its country as evidence of the need for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. Amnesty International believes that the international community must assist in establishing accountability for the atrocities in Sierra Leone. This assistance should include both political commitment and practical assistance towards the re-establishment of a functioning and effective justice system and the investigation and documentation of past human rights abuses.

At the UN special conference on Sierra Leone, the UN Secretary-General also stressed the need for national reconciliation and for Sierra Leoneans to put the past behind them and put the future first. The process of reconciliation did not, however, preclude accountability for human rights abuses: "*Those responsible for the atrocities and other gross violations of human rights will in time be brought to justice*". The need to pursue policies promoting national reconciliation had to be combined with ensuring that those responsible for crimes and atrocities against civilians were brought to justice. All those accused had to be given fair trials with full respect for due process of the law.

Recommendations

- those responsible for the gross human rights abuses which have occurred in Sierra Leone since May 1997 must be held accountable for their crimes, in accordance with international standards;
- the international community should assist Sierra Leone in establishing accountability for the atrocities in Sierra Leone and bringing those responsible to justice, in accordance with international standards.

Detentions and trials after February 1998

After ECOMOG forced the AFRC from power in February 1998, some 2,000 people were arrested and detained. A significant number were former combatants who were considered to be prisoners of war. Others were associated or perceived to be associated with the AFRC and RUF. Many of those detained were suspected of criminal offences which included gross human rights abuses such as torture and deliberate and arbitrary killing of civilians. Some of those detained had given themselves up to police and ECOMOG forces as a means of protection from civilians who attacked, and in some cases killed, those closely associated with the AFRC and RUF.

On 10 March 1998, President Kabbah proclaimed a state of emergency, under Section 29 of the Constitution of 1991, which includes provisions for indefinite detention without charge or trial. The Proclamation of Emergency was ratified by parliament on 26 March 1998. The Public Emergency Regulations, 1998, state that:

"2. The President may, if in his opinion it is necessary, for the purpose of maintaining and securing peace, order and good government in Sierra Leone, make an Order-

(a) directing that any person be detained or continues to be detained and so long as such an Order is in force in respect of any person, that person shall be liable to be detained in such place and under such circumstances as the President may from time to time determine and shall, while so detained, be deemed to be in legal custody".

Although Article 4 of the ICCPR allows the Sierra Leone government to derogate from its obligations under the treaty, it requires that derogation has to be to the "extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". Certain rights, including the right to life in Article 6 and the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 7, cannot be derogated from. The UN Human Rights Committee which monitors compliance with the ICCPR has stated that "measures taken under Article 4 are of an exceptional and temporary nature and may only last as long as the life of the nation concerned is threatened and that, in times of emergency, the protection of human rights becomes all the more important, particularly those rights from which no derogations can be made".

Hundreds of people alleged to have collaborated with the AFRC and RUF have been held without charge under the Public Emergency Regulations. The scope of these regulations raises concern that people could be held indefinitely without charge or trial, in violation of international human rights standards, in particular the ICCPR.

Throughout the months following the return of the government of President Kabbah arrests of those suspected of collaborating with the AFRC have continued, although the scale of arrests has gradually decreased and some of the detainees have been released without charge. It has been difficult to determine at any one time exactly how many detainees are held without charge. At the end of September 1998, however, several hundred people, including some 130 children, were believed to be held without charge in

detention in Pademba Road prison and other places of detention in and around Freetown. In some cases detentions appeared to be entirely arbitrary, for example, in cases where people were denounced as collaborators for reasons of personal revenge or settling of scores. In September 1998, 18 women were reported to have been arrested in Freetown after being denounced for having fraternized with members of the AFRC.

Significant numbers of civilians are also being held illegally by ECOMOG forces in "safe custody" without any process of review of their detention by a civilian judicial authority.

Among those released without charge from Pademba Road prison after several months in detention were more than 20 senior police officers, who were reported to have been released on 20 August 1998. More than 270 Sierra Leonean soldiers who had been part of the ECOMOG contingent in Liberia at the time of the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown, repatriated in March 1998 and detained in Pademba Road prison were also released from custody for retraining on 31 August 1998.

Fifty-nine civilians were charged with treason and other offences in April 1998 and were brought to trial before the High Court early the following month. Trials before a court martial of 37 soldiers began in July 1998. Foday Sankoh was brought before a magistrates' court on 4 September 1998 and charged with treason and other related offences; his trial before the High Court began later that month. It was also expected that further trials of both civilians and soldiers would begin in November 1998. The Court of Appeal ruled in 1975 that the death penalty for the offence of treason was discretionary.

The cases of some of the hundreds of other detainees who remained held without charge or trial were to be reviewed by an independent committee of investigation.

The committee of investigation

In late May 1998 the government established an independent committee of investigation to review the cases of the several hundred people arrested for alleged collaboration with the AFRC who remained detained without charge. The purpose of the committee is to review the cases of those detained in order to expedite release or prosecution. The terms of reference of the committee was to advise the government on action to be taken in the cases of: those alleged to have collaborated with the AFRC; civil servants who had resumed work under the AFRC at their own request or on the invitation of the AFRC; and managers and employees of public sector services who allowed the use of funds by the AFRC or others who facilitated payment of public funds.

The committee of investigation is headed by Nasiru Tejan-Cole, a former Director of Public Prosecution, and includes seven other prominent members of the community. It began its work on 17 July 1998 but its hearings were not held in public. Human rights officers from UNOMSIL were, however, allowed to attend. Detainees appeared before the committee in person and were not represented by lawyers. They were invited to comment on statements that they had made to the police after their arrest and were also able to call witnesses. The committee then made recommendations to the government on

whether to prosecute or release them.

Amnesty International welcomed the establishment of the committee of investigation by the government as a positive initiative. While its progress in reviewing cases has been slower than anticipated, the committee is reported to have conducted its work professionally and competently.

By late September 1998 the cases of some 120 detainees had been considered by the committee. More than 70 had been released unconditionally and another 17 were released either on bail or pending further investigations. In other cases the committee concluded that there was evidence of criminal offences. The committee of investigation is continuing its work and has repeated its calls for witnesses of suspected collaboration to provide evidence and cooperate with the committee.

Recommendations

- **the cases of those who remain detained without charge or trial should be reviewed by the committee of investigation with a minimum of delay with a view to either charging or releasing them.**

Trials before the High Court

Among the 59 civilians charged in April 1998 with treason and some also with other offences, including murder and arson, were those who had participated in the AFRC by accepting government posts. The defendants also included a number of former politicians including former President Joseph Saidu Momoh. One of the defendants, Abdul B. Sankoh, died as a result of ill-health on 21 June 1998. Trials in three groups began in early May 1998 before the High Court in Freetown.

The government stated its commitment to ensuring fair trials for those charged, whereas the public mood was one of anger and a desire for swift justice. The trials were open to the media and public and were monitored by UNOMSIL human rights officers, assisted from July until October 1998 by representatives of the International Bar Association. Independent observers concluded that there had been a genuine attempt by the government to conduct fair and transparent trials before the High Court and that the trials appeared to comply to international procedural standards.

On 25 August 1998, 16 defendants in one of the trials were convicted and sentenced to death; the two remaining defendants were acquitted. Among those sentenced to death were Victor Foh, a member of parliament of the All People's Congress (APC) party, Allieu Badara Kamara, AFRC Under-Secretary of State for Information, Christian Kargbo, former Governor of the Central Bank, Hilton Fyle, a journalist and broadcaster, who had formerly worked for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, Ibrahim Ben Kargbo, a journalist and editor of the *New Citizen* newspaper, Gipu Felix-George, Director General of the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS), and two other SLBS broadcasters, Dennis Ayodele Smith and Olivia Mensah. Olivia Mensah,

who was pregnant at the time of her arrest and who gave birth in July 1998, was also convicted of murder.

A second trial concluded on 19 October 1998; 16 defendants were convicted and three acquitted. On 21 October 1998, 11 of those convicted were sentenced to death and the five others were sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Those sentenced to death included Claude Victor Campbell, a former Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Ahmed Charrid Dumbuya, former head of the National Power Authority, Brigadier (rtd.) Leslie Modibo Lymon, AFRC Secretary of State for the Interior, and Nancy Steele, a former APC politician.

The third trial concluded on 4 November 1998. Fifteen of the defendants were convicted of treason and were sentenced to death the following day. They included several people who had held ministerial positions during the period of AFRC rule, including Victor Brandon, Secretary of State for Development, Dr Bailah Leigh, Secretary of State for Health, Dr Matilda King, Under-Secretary of State for Health, and Ajibola Manley-Spaine, Attorney General and Minister of Justice. Former President Momoh was found not guilty of treason but was convicted of two counts of conspiracy and sentenced to two five-year terms of imprisonment to be served concurrently. Five other defendants were acquitted.

All those convicted by the High Court have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal and, if unsuccessful, to the Supreme Court. If conviction and sentence are confirmed on appeal, those sentenced to death may seek the exercise of the prerogative of mercy, under Section 63 of the Constitution of 1991. The prerogative of mercy is exercised by a special committee chaired by the President. All those convicted and sentenced to death have appealed against their conviction and sentence; a date for hearings before the Court of Appeal had not been set by early November 1998.

Following interventions by the international community calling for commutation of the death sentences passed in August 1998, the government responded that the judicial process was continuing, that those sentenced had the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, that it remained committed to due process of the law and that the President would consider exercising clemency in any cases where a death sentence was confirmed at the completion of the judicial appeal procedure.

The trial of Foday Sankoh began on 24 September 1998 and he appeared before the High Court on several occasions during October 1998, pleading not guilty to charges of treason and other offences related to the military coup of May 1997. Sierra Leonean lawyers feared reprisals if they agreed to represent Foday Sankoh and genuine efforts by the government to provide legal representation for him proved unsuccessful. He therefore conducted his own defence.

Under Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, a defendant should be allowed to defend himself through a legal representative of his own choosing and that, if he does not have legal assistance, such assistance should be assigned to him. Article 7 of the African Charter, as

interpreted by the African Commission, also includes the right to be defended by a lawyer of the defendant's choice. Safeguard 5 of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, states that: "Capital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court after legal process which gives all possible safeguards to ensure fair trial, at least to those contained in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the right of anyone suspected of or charged with a crime for which capital punishment may be imposed to adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings." The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions reiterated in December 1996, that: "All defendants facing the imposition of capital punishment must benefit from the services of a competent defence counsel at every stage of the proceedings."

On 23 October 1998 Foday Sankoh was convicted on seven of the nine counts against him and sentenced to death. He appealed against his conviction and sentence and requested representation by a defence lawyer for the appeal procedure. The government sought assistance in providing a lawyer for Foday Sankoh from the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

Recommendations

- all trials should continue to be open to international observers and to conform to international standards for a fair trial;
- all those tried for offences which carry a mandatory or discretionary death sentence should be ensured all appropriate safeguards as guaranteed by international standards, including adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings and the right to appeal against conviction and sentence to a higher jurisdiction.

Trials before court martial

The trial of 37 soldiers charged with mutiny, failure to suppress a mutiny, treason and conspiracy began on 23 July 1998. The defendants included senior members of the AFRC such as Colonel Abdul Karim Sesay, AFRC Secretary General, Sergeant Abu "Zagalo" Sankoh and Corporal Tamba Gborie who had announced the military coup on 25 May 1997 on state radio. The judicial panel comprised Sierra Leonean army officers and was presided by a Judge Advocate who was a Nigerian ECOMOG officer.

As with the trials before the High Court, the court martial was open to independent observers. In addition to monitors from UNOMSIL and the International Bar Association, an Amnesty International representative observed the early proceedings of the trial before the court martial in late July and early August 1998.

Trials before court martial in Sierra Leone allow no right of appeal against conviction and sentence to a higher jurisdiction. The right of appeal from a decision of a court martial was abolished by statute in 1971. This lack of judicial appeal violates international

standards for a fair trial. Amnesty International repeatedly urged the government to allow a judicial appeal from the court martial.

Article 14(5) of the ICCPR states that: "Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law." Under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, ratified by Sierra Leone in 1996, where rights guaranteed by the ICCPR, including the right to fair trial, have been violated, recourse may be sought from the UN Human Rights Committee.

The Human Rights Committee has concluded that imposition of a death sentence after a trial which violates the provisions of the ICCPR, including Article 14, constitutes a violation of the right to life which is guaranteed by Article 6 of the treaty.

In addition, Safeguard 6 of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty states that: "Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction, and steps should be taken to ensure that such appeals shall become mandatory." [13]

The African Charter also guarantees, under Article 7, the right to fair trial. The African Commission has made several decisions which interpret Article 7 of the African Charter to include a right of appeal to a higher jurisdiction. In April 1998 the African Commission, before the execution of 23 people in Rwanda, issued a statement saying that the executions of people who had been denied a fair trial violated Article 4 of the African Charter which prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of the right to life.

As with those sentenced to death by a civilian court, the presidential committee for the prerogative of mercy may meet after judgment has been made to confirm or reduce sentences by the court martial.

In the final stages of the trial, the judicial panel of the court martial refused to accept legal arguments, which had previously been accepted by the prosecution in the case of civilians being tried for treason before the High Court, that the death penalty was discretionary, rather than mandatory, for the offence of treason. It therefore refused to accept evidence in mitigation.

On 12 October 1998 34 of the defendants before the court martial were convicted of treason, murder and collaborating with the enemy and sentenced to death. They included Colonel Abdul Karim Sesay, Sergeant Abu "Zagalo" Sankoh, Corporal Tamba Gborie, Brigadier Hassan Karim Conteh, a former Chief of Defence Staff, Colonel Samuel Francis Koroma, also former Chief of Defence Staff, Squadron Leader Victor L. King, and a woman, Major Kula Samba, who had been AFRC Secretary of State for Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs. The three other defendants were acquitted.

Complaints of violations of the ICCPR were submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee on behalf of 18 of those sentenced to death by the court martial. Despite these submissions and appeals for stays of execution and clemency by the international

community, including the UN Secretary-General and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 of those sentenced to death, including those named above, were executed on 19 October 1998. The other 10 had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment by the committee for the prerogative of mercy.

The executions were carried out by a firing squad using automatic weapons and took place in public on the outskirts of Freetown. The executions were reported to have been observed by a large number of people, although not specifically invited, who included the news media. Photographs of the executions were subsequently published. Amnesty International considers that the death penalty in all circumstances is a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. The manner in which these executions were carried out, however, was particularly cruel, inhuman and degrading. The graphic publicity subsequently appearing in the news media in Sierra Leone both emphasized and aggravated the brutalizing effect that the executions have on society within Sierra Leone.

These executions violated Sierra Leone's commitments under international human rights law and were condemned by the international community, including the UN and the EU, as well as Amnesty International and other human rights organizations. The UN Secretary-General said on 22 October 1998 that he regretted that the executions had taken place despite his appeal to the government to consider, at the very least, a stay of execution pending review of the proceedings before relevant international monitoring bodies. He added that he hoped that the government would ensure due process of the law in subsequent trials. The UN Human Rights Committee requested the government to explain why it had disregarded the Committee's request for a stay of execution and carried out the executions.

It was reported in late October 1998 that a further 16 soldiers would be tried on treason charges before the court martial; if convicted, they too faced death sentences without the right to appeal to a higher jurisdiction.

Recommendations

- **trials before court martial must conform to international standards for a fair trial, including the right of appeal against conviction and sentence to a higher jurisdiction;**
- **in addition, those tried before court martial for offences which carry a mandatory or discretionary death sentence should be ensured all appropriate safeguards.**

The death penalty - a violation of human rights

All those convicted of treason and other offences relating to the military coup of May 1997 face a possible death sentence. By early November 1998, 42 civilians and Foday Sankoh had been sentenced to death and 24 of 34 soldiers sentenced to death by court martial had been executed.

The anger and bitterness of the people of Sierra Leone against those tried for crimes committed during the period of AFRC rule and the desire for retribution and swift justice was demonstrated by the series of revenge killings which took place in Freetown and other parts of the country after the removal of the AFRC and RUF. Public opinion in Sierra Leone demands that strong action is taken by the government against those responsible for crimes committed during that period, which included gross human rights abuses such as killings and torture. The atmosphere surrounding the trials has been highly charged and support for the death penalty in Sierra Leone is inevitably widespread.

Amnesty International acknowledges the government's responsibility to bring to justice those responsible for such crimes, in accordance with international standards. Amnesty International is opposed to impunity and always encourages governments to investigate human rights abuses and to bring the perpetrators to justice. It is precisely because Amnesty International is concerned that those guilty of human rights abuses should not escape justice that it urges the government to ensure that all trials are conducted fairly.

Amnesty International is, however, unconditionally opposed to the death penalty on the grounds that it is a violation of the fundamental right to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR. There is particular concern when those sentenced to death and executed do not receive fair trials.

The scale of human rights abuses committed in Sierra Leone has been horrendous. An argument used in favour of the death penalty is that it is justified retribution for particularly atrocious crimes. The use of the death penalty, however, perpetuates a cycle of violence, bitterness and revenge, instead of bringing reconciliation and respect for human rights. The death penalty is an official form of violence which has a brutalizing effect on society. Violent retribution is not justice but vengeance disguised as justice. A government and people committed to end human rights abuses must rise above vengeance and promote and protect human rights, in particular the right to life.

A difficult and daunting task faces Sierra Leone in achieving reconciliation within its society after the atrocities committed by the AFRC and RUF. Amnesty International, however, does not believe that the use of the death penalty will contribute in any way to the process of reconciliation. On the contrary, it considers that the public executions of 24 soldiers in October 1998 after an unfair trial are incompatible with initiatives aimed at reconciliation within Sierra Leone.

There has been significant progress towards ending the use of the death penalty both in Africa and throughout the world; 19 states in Africa and a majority of states worldwide have abolished the death penalty in law or in practice. The government of Sierra Leone should move in the direction of this trend, rather than against it.

Recommendations

- the government of Sierra Leone should take steps towards the abolition of the death penalty in law
- pending abolition, all death sentences should be commuted and no executions should take place;
- the government and non-governmental organizations should initiate and promote open debate on the death penalty among the Sierra Leonean population in order to raise awareness of the human rights issues involved.

Harsh prison conditions

Conditions in prisons, police stations and other places of detention in Freetown and throughout the country fall far short of international standards for the treatment of prisoners and in some cases amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The severity of conditions in Sierra Leone's prisons appears to be attributable to material shortages in a country which faces acute economic problems. Conditions have been further exacerbated by the destruction and damage of prison facilities at the time of the military coup in May 1997.

All places of detention hold numbers of detainees well beyond the capacity for which they were designed. Following the detention of some 2,000 people in the weeks following the removal of the AFRC and RUF from power, conditions in Pademba Road prison and police cells in Freetown became severely overcrowded. In October 1998 some 1,200 detainees were reported to be held at Pademba Road prison, more than three times the capacity for which it was constructed. Most of these detainees were held under the Public Emergency Regulations. Detainees were also held in military camps, including ECOMOG bases at Wilberforce and Lungi barracks.

In August 1998 a local human rights organization, Prison Watch Sierra Leone, reviewed conditions both at Pademba Road prison and the Kingtom Remand Home for children in Freetown. It concluded that generally the diet of prisoners was deficient. With the exception of separate facilities provided for women prisoners, sanitation was poor at Pademba Road prison. Prisoners depended on family and relatives for the provision of clothing. Prison Watch Sierra Leone drew particular attention to the neglect of 24 children held at that time at the Kingtom Remand Home, the youngest of whom was 11 years old. Few received visits from members of their families and most appeared to be children who had lost contact with their families as a result of the conflict.

Conditions are particularly harsh at CID headquarters and also at the Central Police Station in the centre of Freetown. Large number of detainees, accused of criminal offences or of crimes committed during the period of AFRC rule, are reported to have been held for lengthy periods at CID headquarters in small, dark cells with inadequate ventilation and sanitary facilities. Cells at the Central Police Station, which is situated next to the sea, are reported to be extremely damp and subject to flooding. Often detainees have no bedding and have to sleep on the floor. Food and medical care are

inadequate. Detainees held in police stations rely on food being provided by relatives and friends.

Conditions in prisons outside the capital are also extremely poor. Food and sanitary provisions are particularly deficient. There is no effective system for providing food to prisoners and those without support from relatives are at particular risk of deprivation. Often there is no space for exercise within the prison. In prisons outside Freetown, for example in Kenema, female prisoners are not segregated from males and minors are held with adult prisoners.

As a result of severe overcrowding, inadequate hygiene and medical care diseases, including malaria, diarrhoea and skin complaints, are rife in Pademba Road prison and other places of detention. Some prisoners and detainees were reported to have died as a result of ill-health. While Pademba Road prison has medical facilities within the prison and a prison doctor, most prisons outside Freetown have no such provision.

Following the detention of hundreds of people alleged to have collaborated with the AFRC and RUF visits were severely restricted and denied altogether on several occasions. The authorities justified these restrictions on security grounds.

Shortly after the removal of the AFRC and RUF a delegation of the ICRC, accompanied by a doctor and a nurse, were authorized to visit all places of detention in areas under the control of ECOMOG, including Pademba Road prison, and visits have since continued.

The government is reported to be reviewing the prison system in Sierra Leone in order to undertake major reforms. Financial assistance from the international community will, however, be necessary to implement improvements to conditions in prisons and other places of detention. Following visits to several places of detention in late October 1998 UNOMSIL human rights officers prepared an analysis of the problems faced by the prison system in order to provide a more coordinated response to the needs of prisons and other places of detention.

Recommendations

- urgent and effective measures should be taken to ensure that all places of detention in Sierra Leone conform to international standards for the treatment of prisoners, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners;
- the health of all detainees and prisoners should be ensured while in custody; adequate medical facilities and treatment, food, washing and sanitary facilities should be provided, and prisoners should have daily exercise in the fresh air;
- the international community should assist the Sierra Leone government in ensuring acceptable conditions of detention.

Long-term measures for the protection and respect of human rights

Establishing accountability for human rights abuses is essential to prevent human rights violations in the future. Also needed are strong and effective institutions within Sierra Leone to ensure that fundamental human rights are respected and protected. This includes the legal and judicial systems, the army and the police, as well as an independent national human rights commission. Civil society, including human rights groups, are also integral to promoting human rights and creating an environment in which human rights are respected.

Despite the exceptionally difficult circumstances that all sectors of civil society, including the human rights community, in Sierra Leone have recently endured, human rights groups have emerged as a committed and active force. Their potential should be acknowledged and their activities supported. A National Forum for Human Rights, which is a coalition of 18 organizations working in diverse areas, has been established.

It is essential that basic institutional reforms are guided by strict adherence to international standards relating to the independence of the judiciary, human rights in the administration of justice and codes of conduct for law enforcement officials. All sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including the human rights community, should be involved in these reforms and should receive education and training on human rights standards and complaints procedures.

The international community, including the UN and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, should work closely together to promote post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation in Sierra Leone which is based on good governance and respect for human rights. International financial institutions should use their influence - official and unofficial - to ensure that the restoration of good and effective governance includes the re-establishment of mechanisms and systems to promote the rule of law and the protection of human rights. This should include assistance towards the establishment of permanent, independent and effective national institutions for the long-term protection of human rights and the rule of law, including an independent judiciary and fair criminal justice system.

Reform of the legal and judicial system

The long-term protection of human rights in Sierra Leone depends fundamentally on an effective legal system which is enforced by an independent, impartial and accessible judiciary with adequate resources. The Sierra Leone government, following its return to power, admitted that the judicial system was entirely inadequate. Courts outside Freetown are not functioning, other than magistrates courts in Bo, Kenema and Makeni, and the traditional court system has collapsed.

There should be a thorough review of existing legal institutions in order to make them more effective in the protection of human rights. These initiatives should be accompanied by a determined government policy to hold those responsible for human rights violations

fully accountable.

UNOMSIL, UNDP, other UN agencies and international financial institutions should contribute towards the reconstruction of an effective judiciary and legal system in Sierra Leone. Some initiatives have already been undertaken. UNOMSIL has provided law books to the legal profession and has distributed legal technical documents to lawyers representing defendants in the treason trials. It has also conducted seminars for lawyers to discuss aspects of trial practice and procedure.

Restructuring the armed forces

The Sierra Leone national army, the RSLMF, was effectively disbanded following its participation in the military coup and the period of rule by the AFRC. Programs for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have commenced but at a slower pace than anticipated.

In May 1998 the government announced plans for the establishment of a new national army. Recruitment and training was entrusted to ECOMOG. During a meeting with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict in May 1998, the government agreed not to recruit children under the age of 18 years. The government and ECOMOG have also agreed to receive assistance from UN agencies in providing training materials on humanitarian and human rights standards concerning the protection of civilians, particularly women and children.

In early September 1998 President Kabbah announced the government's strategy for the re-establishment of a professional and disciplined Sierra Leonean national army which would comprise 5,000 soldiers, including some of those who had remained loyal to President Kabbah's government after the military coup and who had surrendered to ECOMOG forces after February 1998. Some of these soldiers have already been deployed alongside ECOMOG and CDF forces in those parts of the country still affected by conflict. The international community, including the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, are providing assistance in training and equipping the new national army. Restructuring, training and equipping the national army should include provisions for the protection of human rights contained in international humanitarian and human rights law.

Human rights training for the police force

Restructuring and training of the police force should also include training in human rights. In August 1998 the government announced its intention to create a police force which would be able to assist Sierra Leone in returning to peace and prosperity and which would eventually remove the need for the deployment of military and paramilitary forces, including the CDF, in towns and villages.

UNOMSIL civilian police advisers should continue to monitor, supervise and train national police and security forces and verify their adherence to international human rights and criminal justice standards. A UN civilian police adviser was deployed in Sierra

Leone in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1162 (1998) in July 1998; Resolution 1181 (1988) provided for the deployment of a further four police advisers. Their role is to assist in restoring the confidence of the government and the people of Sierra Leone in the police force and to advise the government on training and re-equipment needs. UNOMSIL civilian police advisers are working closely with a team of police advisers from Commonwealth countries, the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force, deployed at the request of the government, as well as with UNOMSIL human rights officers.

In his Second Progress Report on UNOMSIL, the UN Secretary-General acknowledged that reform of the police force in Sierra Leone poses great challenges. Parts of the country are without a police presence, since many police officers have been killed or have abandoned their posts as a result of the conflict. Little or no training has been available for several years and the police suffer from inadequate logistical support, lack of equipment and poor conditions of service. Respect for human rights has been emphasized and police training initiatives have begun.

UNOMSIL human rights officers have conducted a series of human rights training workshops for police officers, including at the Sierra Leone police training college and in Bo and Kenema, as part of continuing efforts by UNOMSIL and the Commonwealth to restructure and train the Sierra Leonean police force.

The National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy

Long-term respect for human rights requires national human rights institutions to redress human rights violations. Rarely do they receive the necessary funding. If empowered with political support and resources national human rights institutions are the most sustainable mechanisms for the protection human rights. National institutions, which include government bodies as well as those of civil society such as human rights groups, the media, trade unions and professional organizations, are an important element of post-conflict reconstruction.

A National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy has been established in Sierra Leone and with the return President Kabbah's government has begun to resume its activities. The National Commission has a crucial role to play within Sierra Leone in building a culture based on the universality, interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights for all people. It should be supported and strengthened and its independence and impartiality guaranteed [14].

An effective national human rights commission, with the power to investigate human rights violations and to institute legal proceedings where appropriate, can play a central role in protecting human rights. It is crucial, however, that the National Commission is supported by the government in bringing those responsible for human rights violations to justice.

An effective national human rights commission is an important mechanism for

strengthening human rights protection and bringing about institutional reform. It should not, however, replace or detract from the importance of safeguards provided by an effective legal system.

On 18 September 1998 the National Commission established four committees, composed of prominent civilians, to monitor and report on areas of concern for the protection and respect of human rights. These included the conduct of the police, prison conditions and the situation of women and children. On 10 October 1998 UNOMSIL human rights officers conducted a human rights training session for the committee monitoring women and children which was also attended by members of the National Commission.

The National Commission should continue to work closely with local human rights groups in order to develop a strong and effective human rights movement in Sierra Leone which includes all sectors of civil society.

Recommendations

- the international community, including international financial institutions, should continue to contribute to institutional reform in Sierra Leone, including strengthening the independence of the judiciary and reforming the military and civilian police force;
- the National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy should have the necessary powers, resources, professional competence and guarantees of independence and impartiality to carry out prompt and effective investigations into human rights violations; its findings should be made public and it should include recommendations for bringing those responsible for human rights violations to justice and for providing compensation to the victims;
- the National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy should also make recommendations for institutional reform and other preventive measures, such as human rights education aimed at all sectors of society, including military, police and judicial officials.

(1) ECOMOG had been deployed under the authority of ECOWAS in neighbouring Liberia since 1990. Immediately after the military coup in May 1997, Nigerian forces already present in Sierra Leone under the provisions of a defence agreement between Sierra Leone and Nigeria were significantly reinforced by ECOMOG forces, who were predominantly Nigerian. ECOWAS is an intergovernmental organization of 16 states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo) with its headquarters in Nigeria. Established in 1975, the aim of ECOWAS is to promote cooperation and development and to improve relations among member states.

(2) CMAG is composed of Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Ghana, Malaysia, New

Zealand, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

(3) For further information on implementing human rights in international peace-keeping operations, refer to *Peace-keeping and human rights* (AI Index: IOR 40/01/94), published by Amnesty International in January 1994.

(4) Sierra Leone ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990.

(5) For further information about Amnesty International's recommendations to the UN special conference on Sierra Leone, refer to *Sierra Leone: The United Nations special conference on Sierra Leone: the protection of human rights must be a priority for the international community* (AI Index: AFR 51/14/98), published by Amnesty International on 24 July 1998.

(6) The contact group included representatives from China, Egypt, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States and the EU.

(7) Countries which are part of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are also part of the Bureau of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. The Bureau consists of 16 ambassadors and is elected annually. It plays a crucial role in decision-making and planning at the OAU. For further information about the OAU and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, refer to *Organization of African Unity: Making Human Rights a Reality for Africans* (AI Index: IOR 63/01/98), published by Amnesty International in August 1998.

(8) For further information, refer to *Sierra Leone: A disastrous set-back for human rights* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/97), published by Amnesty International on 20 October 1997.

(9) Sierra Leone ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1996 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1984.

(10) For further information about human rights abuses committed in the internal armed conflict in Sierra Leone, refer to *Sierra Leone: Human rights abuses in a war against civilians* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/95), published by Amnesty International on 13 September 1995, and also *Sierra Leone: Towards a future founded on human rights* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/96), published by Amnesty International on 25 September 1996.

(11) Sierra Leone acceded to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II) in 1986.

(12) For further information on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, refer to *"Old enough to kill but too young to vote"* (AI Index: IOR 51/01/98), published by Amnesty International in January 1998.

(13) For further information on international standards relating to the use of the death penalty, refer to *International standards on the death penalty* (AI Index: ACT 50/06/97), published by Amnesty International in August 1997.

(14) For further guidelines on the mandate, composition and functioning of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, refer to *Proposed Standards for National Human Rights Commissions* (AI Index: IOR 40/01/93), published by Amnesty International in January 1993, and the handbook on *National Human Rights Institutions*, published in 1995 by the UN Centre for Human Rights (now the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights).

86) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Human Rights Watch, "We'll kill you if you cry, Sexual violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict" Vol. 15 No. 1 (A), January 2003

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Vol. 15, No. 1 (A) – January 2003



A woman receives psychological and medical treatment in a clinic to assist rape victims in Freetown. In January 1999, she was gang-raped by seven rebels in her village in northern Sierra Leone. After raping her, the rebels tied her down and placed burning charcoal on her body. (c) 1999 Corinne Dufka/Human Rights Watch

I was captured together with my husband, my three young children and other civilians as we were fleeing from the RUF when they entered Jaiweii. Two rebels asked to have sex with me but when I refused, they beat me with the butt of their guns. My legs were bruised and I lost my three front teeth. Then the two rebels raped me in front of my children and other civilians. Many other women were raped in public places. I also heard of a woman from Kalu village near Jaiweii being raped only one week after having given birth. The RUF stayed in Jaiweii village for four months and I was raped by three other wicked rebels throughout this period.

-Testimony to Human Rights Watch

“WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY” SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT

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SIERRA LEONE

“WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY”

Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	All People's Congress
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CCP	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CCSSP	Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
CDF	Civil Defense Forces
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CMRRD	Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development
C. O.	Commanding Officer
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
DFID	Department for International Development, United Kingdom
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
E.U.	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IMATT	International Military Advisory and Training Team
IRC	International Rescue Committee
FAWE	Forum for African Women Educationalists
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFR	Operation Focus Relief
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PHR	Physicians for Human Rights
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SBU	Small Boys Unit
SCSL	Special Court for Sierra Leone
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
USAID	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
VRF	Vasico-rectal Fistula
VVF	Vasico-vaginal Fistula
WHO	World Health Organization

DEFINITION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, RAPE AND SEXUAL SLAVERY

In this report:

Sexual violence is an overarching term used to describe “[a]ny violence, physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means or by targeting sexuality.”¹ Sexual violence includes rape and attempted rape, and such acts as forcing a person to strip naked in public, forcing two victims to perform sexual acts on one another or harm one another in a sexual manner, mutilating a person’s genitals or a woman’s breasts, and sexual slavery.

Rape as defined in the appeals chamber judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the 2002 *Foca* case is “[t]he sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) [of] the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator, where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The *mens rea* is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”² The appeals chamber rejected the “resistance” requirement argued by the appellants as it is justified neither in law or fact, and stated that the use of force in itself is not a necessary element of rape. The coercive circumstances present in the *Foca* rapes, which were committed in circumstances similar to the crimes of sexual violence perpetrated in Sierra Leone, made the victims’ consent to the sexual acts impossible. The use or threat of force often removes any requirement that a victim show resistance and most jurisdictions have discarded the idea that a rape victim must resist under all circumstances as impractical, if not absurd. This definition also underscores that rape is an attack on the physical integrity of a woman and not an attack against her honor or that of her family or community.

Rape was defined in the judgment of the *Akayesu* case at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as “[t]he physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive” and is not limited to the insertion of a penis into a victim’s vagina or anus or the insertion of a penis in the mouth of the victim.³ This definition, however, has been criticized for being too broad and has not been included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Sexual slavery, defined by the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1953 Protocol amending the same convention, refers to “[t]he status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual violence.”⁴ The Statute of the ICC includes the trafficking of women and children in its definition of enslavement.⁵

¹ United Nations, *Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict*, Final Report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur (New York: United Nations, 1998), E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1998/13, pp. 7-8.

² *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Foca case)*, Appeals Chamber Judgement, June 12, 2002, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, paras. 127-133.

³ *Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu*, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998, para. 688.

⁴ United Nations, *Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict*, p. 9. Sierra Leone ratified the Slavery Convention on March 13, 1962.

⁵ Article 7 (1) (g) lists enslavement as a crime against humanity with the definition given in Article 7 (2) (c). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, Article 7, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). The Rome Statute entered into force on April 11, 2002 and the ICC has the authority to prosecute the most serious international crimes from July 1, 2002.

I. SUMMARY

Throughout the armed conflict in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2001, thousands of women and girls of all ages, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes were subjected to widespread and systematic sexual violence, including individual and gang rape, and rape with objects such as weapons, firewood, umbrellas, and pestles. Rape was perpetrated by both sides, but mostly by the rebel forces. These crimes of sexual violence were generally characterized by extraordinary brutality and frequently preceded or followed by other egregious human rights abuses against the victim, her family, and her community. Although the rebels raped indiscriminately irrespective of age, they targeted young women and girls whom they thought were virgins. Many of these younger victims did not survive these crimes of sexual violence. Adult women were also raped so violently that they sometimes bled to death or suffered from tearing in the genital area, causing long-term incontinence and severe infections. Many victims who were pregnant at the time of rape miscarried as a result of the sexual violence they were subjected to, and numerous women had their babies torn out of their uterus as rebels placed bets on the sex of the unborn child.

Thousands of women and girls were abducted by the rebels and subjected to sexual slavery, forced to become the sex slaves of their rebel "husbands." Abducted women and girls who were assigned "husbands" remained vulnerable to sexual violence by other rebels. Many survivors were kept with the rebel forces for long periods and gave birth to children fathered by rebels. Some abducted women and girls were forcibly conscripted into the fighting forces and given military training, but even within the rebel forces, women still held much lower status and both conscripted and volunteer female combatants were assigned "husbands." For civilian abductees, aside from sexual violence their brutal life with the rebels included being made to perform forced labor, such as cooking, washing, carrying ammunition and looted items, as well as farm work. Combatants within the rebel forces had considerable latitude to do what they wanted to abducted civilians, who were often severely punished for offenses as minor as spilling water on a commander's shoes. Escape for these women and girls was often extremely difficult: In many instances, the women and girls, intimidated by their captors and the circumstances, felt powerless to escape their life of sexual slavery, and were advised by other female captives to tolerate the abuses, "as it was war." The rebels sometimes made escape more difficult by deliberately carving the name of their faction onto the chests of abducted women and girls. If these marked women and girls were caught by pro-government forces, they would be suspected of being rebels, and often killed. Even though many women did manage to escape, some escaped from one rebel faction or unit only to be captured by another. An unknown number of women and girls still remain with their rebel "husbands," although the war was declared over on January 18, 2002.

The main perpetrators of sexual violence, including sexual slavery, were the rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the AFRC. Human Rights Watch has documented over three hundred cases of sexual violence by the rebels; countless more have never been documented. From the launch of their rebellion from Liberia in March 1991, which triggered the war, the RUF perpetrated widespread and systematic sexual violence. Its ideology of salvaging Sierra Leone from the corrupt All People's Congress (APC) regime quickly degenerated into a campaign of violence whose principal aim was to gain access to the country's abundant diamond mines. The AFRC, which consisted of disaffected soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who in May 1997 overthrew the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, were also responsible for subjecting thousands of women and girls to sexual violence, including sexual slavery. After the signing of the peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, in July 1999, sexual violence, including sexual slavery, continued unabated in RUF-controlled areas and was also perpetrated by the West Side Boys, who operated outside of the capital, Freetown. The human rights situation worsened after the May 2000 crisis when fighting broke out again, until relative peace was re-established, with U.N. and British assistance, by mid-2001. The prevalence of sexual violence peaked during active military operations and when the rebels were on patrol. Even in times of relative peace, however, sexual violence continued to be committed against the thousands of women and girls who were abducted and subjected to sexual slavery by the rebels. No region of Sierra Leone was spared.

Human Rights Watch has documented only a limited number of cases of sexual violence by pro-government forces, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the militia known as Civil Defense Forces (CDF), the latter consisting

of groups of traditional hunters and young men who were called upon by the government to defend their native areas. Human Rights Watch has not documented any cases of sexual violence by the SLA prior to 1997. This may in part be due to the fact that survivors would have often found it difficult to distinguish between rebel and government soldiers, as the latter frequently colluded with and disguised themselves as RUF forces. Sexual violence was committed relatively infrequently by the CDF, whose internal rules forbid them from having sexual intercourse before going to battle and who believe their power and potency as warriors depends upon sexual abstinence. Some of this internal discipline, however, was lost as CDF moved away from their native areas and traditional chiefs and were given more responsibility in national security. Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of rape by the largest and most powerful CDF group, the Kamajors, who operate predominantly in the south and east.

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of sexual violence by peacekeepers with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), including the rape of a twelve-year-old girl in Bo by a soldier of the Guinean contingent and the gang rape of a woman by two Ukrainian soldiers near Kenema. There appears to be reluctance on the part of UNAMSIL to investigate and take disciplinary measures against the perpetrators. Reports of rape by peacekeepers with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the majority of whom were Nigerian, deployed at an earlier stage in the war, were rare. Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women, including the solicitation of child prostitutes, whilst deployed in Sierra Leone.

Rape in wartime is an act of violence that targets sexuality. Moreover, conflict-related sexual violence serves a military and political strategy. The humiliation, pain, and fear inflicted by the perpetrators serve to dominate and degrade not only the individual victim but also her community. Combatants who rape in war often explicitly link their acts of sexual violence to this broader social degradation. The armed conflict in Sierra Leone was no exception. The rebels sought to dominate women and their communities by deliberately undermining cultural values and community relationships, destroying the ties that hold society together. Child combatants raped women who were old enough to be their grandmothers, rebels raped pregnant and breastfeeding mothers, and fathers were forced to watch their daughters being raped.

To date there has been no accountability for the thousands of crimes of sexual violence or other appalling human rights abuses committed during the war in Sierra Leone. The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement included a blanket amnesty under Sierra Leonean law for offenses committed by all sides, as the price for the RUF/AFRC agreeing to lay down arms. The United Nations (U.N.) stated that it did not recognize the Lomé amnesty insofar as it purported to apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Two important transitional justice mechanisms, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) have been established with U.N. assistance and are tasked with investigating the human rights abuses, including sexual violence and sexual slavery, committed by all parties during the war. Both bodies were operational by the third quarter of 2002. The SCSL, a hybrid national and international court, is mandated by the U.N. Security Council to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law" committed in the Sierra Leonean conflict since November 30, 1996. As the SCSL is likely to try only a very limited number of persons, due to funding constraints, a clear and comprehensive prosecutorial strategy is essential, with a strong affirmation that gender-related crimes will be thoroughly and competently investigated and rigorously prosecuted as crimes against humanity or war crimes. The TRC, provided for under the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement partially to offset the controversial amnesty it also included, has the mandate to establish an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law from the outset of the war in 1991, promote reconciliation, and make recommendations aimed at preventing a repetition of the violations committed. The final report on the findings of the TRC should highlight the crimes of sexual violence committed throughout the entire country during the armed conflict and make recommendations to strengthen the promotion and protection of women's human rights.

Sexual violence has remained Sierra Leone's silent war crime. Until recently, little attention has been paid either nationally or internationally to this less visible human rights abuse, although sexual violence was committed on a much larger scale than the highly visible amputations for which Sierra Leone became notorious. The underreporting is a reflection of the low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone as well as the internal shame that survivors suffer and their fear of rejection by family and communities. Women and girls in Sierra Leone are subjected to structural discrimination by practice, custom and law. They face discrimination in terms of education and employment, in the political arena, and in other walks of life. Both customary law, which governs the majority of the population, and general law, which was inherited from the United Kingdom and is primarily applied in Freetown, discriminate against women and girls in terms of family law, as well as property and inheritance rights. In addition, the provisions pertaining to rape under general and customary law offer inadequate protection. The misinterpretation of the complicated provisions of general law by the police and courts means, for example, that those who are alleged to have sexually assaulted a minor are generally charged with "unlawful carnal knowledge of a child," for which the sentence is lighter, rather than rape. Under customary law, the perpetrator is generally required to pay a substantial fine to the victim's family as well as to the chiefs. The victim may also be forced to marry the perpetrator.

The concept of sexual violence as a crime in itself is a very recent one in Sierra Leone's patriarchal society. Only rape of a virgin is seen as a serious crime. Rape of a married woman or a non-virgin is often not considered a crime at all: as in many countries, there is often a belief that the woman must have consented to the act, or she is seen as a seductress. The virtual destruction of Sierra Leone's already corrupt and inefficient court system and police force during the war, moreover, created a climate of impunity that persists, allowing perpetrators of sexual violence (as well as other crimes) to escape justice.

The lack of attention to conflict-related sexual violence means that few assistance programs have been established for women and girls who were subjected to sexual violence, including sexual slavery. Survivors not only live with the severe physical and mental health consequences of the abuses suffered, but also fear ongoing non-conflict-related sexual violence, largely perpetrated with impunity. International donors and nongovernmental organizations should work together with the government of Sierra Leone to establish programs (health care, education, adult literacy, skills training, trauma counseling, and income-generating schemes) that will help to rehabilitate the survivors of sexual violence. To combat impunity and work toward changing societal attitudes toward sexual violence, the government of Sierra Leone should, with the technical and financial support of the international community, revise its discriminatory laws to ensure that they meet international standards. The constitution also needs to be reviewed and the provision exempting personal and customary law from the prohibition against discrimination removed. In addition, the government should take steps to improve the response of the legal system to ongoing sexual and domestic violence, including strategies for effective prosecution and protection. A nationwide public awareness campaign also needs to be undertaken to educate the general population on women's human rights.

Women have a crucial role to play at this critical phase in Sierra Leone's history, but they will only be able to contribute fully in a civic culture in which women and girls are respected as equal partners and gender-based abuses are not tolerated.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Sierra Leone

- Take all necessary measures to ensure that former rebels release all women and girls abducted during the armed conflict who continue to be held. Provide these women and girls with the necessary social and economic options to enable them to leave these often abusive relationships.
- Prioritize the nationwide establishment of reproductive health clinics for women and girls that can provide testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, along with other services.
- Revoke or revise existing laws (general, customary and Islamic) that discriminate on the basis of gender and ensure that they meet international human rights standards. Take the necessary steps to amend the constitution to remove the provision exempting personal law and customary law from the prohibition on gender-based discrimination. Provide training on these new laws for the judiciary, police, prosecutors, and staff of local courts.
- Establish an inter-ministerial task force with representatives from nongovernmental organizations to deal with the conflict-related sexual violence and related current problems facing women, with the aim of improving the social, medical and legal responses to women's and girls' needs.
- Take steps to improve the response of the legal system to ongoing sexual and domestic violence, including strategies for effective prosecution and protection, such as recruiting and training more female police officers, allowing nongovernment doctors to examine victims and providing legal aid to victims.
- Mainstream gender within the government and government policies. Launch a nationwide public awareness campaign on sexual and domestic violence against women to dispel the prevailing societal attitudes to sexual and domestic violence against women.
- Provide training on human rights and international humanitarian law, with a focus on women's human rights issues and gender-based crimes, to members of the security forces.
- Repeal the provision in the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement Act that grants amnesty to all warring parties, so that individuals who committed acts of sexual violence (and other crimes) during the war may be prosecuted in the domestic courts.
- Cooperate fully with the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
- Establish an independent national human rights commission as provided under the Lomé Peace Agreement that will contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights beyond the lifespan of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

To Members of the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

- Provide military personnel participating in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone (and elsewhere) with training in human rights and international humanitarian law, including a focus on women's human rights issues, and gender-based crimes. Ensure that peacekeepers understand the U.N. Code of Conduct for peacekeepers, which provides that peacekeepers should not commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children. Prosecute any nationals that have been repatriated from Sierra Leone for crimes of sexual violence in line with the zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation by anyone employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL.

- Issue a statement, jointly, if possible, declaring your willingness to support the Special Court for Sierra Leone and to surrender any alleged war criminals to it. Commit to extraditing to Sierra Leone individuals indicted by the Special Court, take the legal steps that may be necessary to ensure that this can happen (for example, by amending extradition laws), and otherwise cooperate with the Special Court, for example, by locating witnesses or providing information.

To Members of the International Community

- Prioritize the funding of reproductive health clinics for women and girls that can provide testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, along with other services.
- Greatly increase funding for legal reform programs, including training, to ensure that both the laws and domestic courts meet international standards, as well as for programs that will establish better medical, legal and social support services for survivors of sexual violence.
- Monitor all aspects of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to ensure that cases involving sexual violence and sexual slavery are fully prosecuted and that survivors and witnesses of sexual violence receive necessary protection and support throughout the judicial process and post-trial period. Cooperate with the court and take the necessary steps for the extradition or surrender of persons indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
- Fund the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and monitor it to ensure that conflict-related sexual violence and sexual slavery are fully investigated and properly documented by the TRC in a gender sensitive manner.
- Prosecute military personnel, who have been repatriated from Sierra Leone in line with the zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation by anyone employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL.

To the Special Court for Sierra Leone

- Conduct thorough investigations into incidents of sexual violence against women and girls including sexual slavery during the war for possible prosecution under the court's mandate. Ensure that gender-integrated teams investigating these acts have competence in investigating rape and conducting interviews with rape victims, who should only be interviewed by experienced female investigators.
- Ensure the gender crimes investigators conduct compulsory gender sensitization training for all staff, and provide more in-depth training for staff members dealing most directly with survivors of sexual violence. Ensure the gender crimes investigators have access to all cases under investigation, even the ones not previously identified as gender cases, to provide guidance and expertise.
- Recruit a staff member with expertise in juvenile justice who can provide training on juvenile justice issues and interviewing skills for staff dealing most directly with young children.
- Establish a strong Victims and Witnesses Unit with protection and support for prosecution and defense witnesses. Protect and support the victims and witnesses not only during the investigation and trial phase but extend this to post-trial protection, where appropriate.
- Provide judges, prosecutors and defense counsel with strict guidance to prevent them from unnecessarily re-victimizing witnesses on the stand or releasing their identity publicly in violation of protective measures.

To the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

- Recruit an experienced gender advisor with expertise in sexual violence, and ensure staff of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is gender balanced at all levels.

- Recruit a staff member experienced in dealing with child victims and perpetrators who can provide training on how to interview young children.
- Investigate and document fully gender-based abuses committed throughout the country. Ensure survivors of sexual violence are heard in a manner that ensures their dignity and safety, and avoids any re-traumatization. Guarantee the confidentiality of these hearings when confidentiality is requested.
- Highlight gender-specific abuses in the final report on the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as well as recommendations on legal reform to ensure that the domestic laws and courts meet international standards; on human rights training for the judiciary and law enforcement officers; and on the assistance needs of survivors.
- Promote public awareness of gender-based crimes through the media umbrella organizations, NGOs and mobile community outreach teams as well as the creation of an information and resource center.

To the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

- Investigate fully any allegations of sexual violence by UNAMSIL personnel, which will serve to enforce the policy of zero tolerance for any such acts perpetrated by anyone employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL. Establish a mechanism with the Sierra Leone Police whereby cases of sexual exploitation by persons employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL are immediately reported to the relevant UNAMSIL staff member, including the provost marshal and gender specialist in the human rights section. Establish a mechanism to follow up on cases that have resulted in military personnel who commit such crimes being repatriated to their country of origin to ensure that states properly prosecute the offender. Civilian staff that have perpetuated sexual violence should be fired and their misconduct properly recorded in their personnel file so that they are not rehired in another U.N. mission.
- Provide in-depth gender sensitization training to military and civilian staff and ensure the human rights unit systematically monitors and reports on issues of gender-based violence. Ensure that peacekeepers understand the U.N. Code of Conduct for peacekeepers, which provides that peacekeepers should not commit any act that could result in the physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children.
- Collaborate with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations to revise the U.N. Code of Conduct and the Military Observer Handbook, ensuring that the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation by persons employed or affiliated with U.N. missions and the consequences of such acts are clearly stated in these guidelines. Compile similar guidelines for civilian staff.
- Provide capacity building with a focus on women's human rights issues to national women's groups and human rights organizations across the country under the guidance of the gender specialist in UNAMSIL human rights units.

III. METHODOLOGY

Over three hundred women and girls were interviewed by Human Rights Watch as part of ongoing research and for this report. For a variety of reasons, including the lack of an ideological aspect and the limited ethnic dimension to the civil war in Sierra Leone and the all-pervasiveness of abuse, victims of human rights abuses, including survivors of sexual violence, generally feel free to talk very openly about their experiences.⁶

Great care was taken with the victims to ensure that recounting their experience did not further traumatize them. While we sought as much information as possible from each interview, the well-being of the interviewee was always paramount and some interviews were cut short as a result. The interviews were conducted in private settings in the presence of a female interpreter. The interviews with survivors were mostly conducted in Krio, the *lingua franca* of Sierra Leone, or in one of the other languages spoken by the different ethnic groups and interpreted into English. In most interviews only females were present and in the few cases where a man was present, it was with the permission of the interviewee. In order to guarantee the confidentiality of all information, interviewees are not identified by name.

In addition to the survivors, government officials, law enforcement officers, lawyers, key figures from the rebel forces, health personnel, religious leaders, and representatives of local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the areas of human rights, women's rights, and health, as well as U.N. officials were interviewed.

IV. BACKGROUND

The Civil War

Sierra Leone is a coastal West African country that shares borders with Guinea and Liberia. It has a population of close to five and a half million (July 2001 estimate) composed of sixteen ethnic groups.⁷ These are the Fullah, Gola, Koranko, Kissi, Kono, Krim, Krio, Limba, Loko, Mandingo, Mende, Sherbro, Susu, Temne, Vai and Yalunka. The Mende, in the south, and the Temne, in the north, are the largest ethnic groups (around 30 percent each). The Krio, who are descendants of freed slaves, were settled in the area of Freetown (now the capital) in the late eighteenth century and make up 10 percent of the total population. The educated Krio minority generally still occupies a higher social and economic position and has traditionally been resented by the other groups. Sierra Leone was a British colony, and English is Sierra Leone's official language. Krio, largely based on English vocabulary but with its own grammar, is the first language of the Krios as well as Sierra Leone's *lingua franca*. Though there are no reliable figures, Sierra Leone is a predominantly Muslim country (around 60 percent) with the remainder of the population practicing indigenous religions (10 percent) and Christianity (30 percent).⁸

In 1961, Sierra Leone gained its independence from the United Kingdom. For most of the next three decades, Sierra Leone was governed by the All People's Congress (APC), dominated by the northern Temne and Limba ethnic groups, which came into power in 1967.⁹ The corruption, nepotism and fiscal mismanagement under the one-party rule of the APC led to the decay of all state institutions and the impoverishment of Sierra Leone's population, notwithstanding the country's large deposits of diamonds, gold, rutile, and bauxite. Frustration with government corruption and mismanagement led to the formation of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 1984. The RUF claimed to be a political movement with the aim of salvaging the country and overthrowing the APC. Its invasion of Sierra Leone from Liberia on March 23, 1991 triggered the civil war that was to last ten years.

⁶ Women and girls who have been raped can be presented and/or perceived either as victims or survivors and there is an ongoing debate as to which is the more appropriate term. In this report, both terms are used interchangeably without significant distinction.

⁷ See <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sl.html>.

⁸ See <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/iris/irf/2001/5730.htm>.

⁹ See generally, J.A.D. Alie, *A New History of Sierra Leone* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

At its inception, the RUF consisted of a mixture of middle class students with a populist platform, unemployed and alienated youths, and Liberian fighters from Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), who had helped Charles Taylor in his quest to become the president of Liberia. A lesser-known covert sponsor of the RUF was the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), with its ethnic base among the Mendes from the south, which also sought the overthrow of the APC.¹⁰ The RUF was led by Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal who had been imprisoned in 1971 for his alleged involvement in an attempted coup against the APC. Sankoh had also reportedly received training in Libya with Taylor.¹¹ The RUF initially consisted of two small groups of only 150 combatants in total. As the RUF captured border towns and villages in Kailahun and Pujehun districts, they used tactics similar to those used to terrorize civilians during the Liberian civil war: seizing and summarily executing chiefs, village elders, traders, government agents and suspected SLA collaborators.¹² The violence and looting or "jah-jah," especially by the Liberian mercenaries within the RUF, was sanctioned by Sankoh who justified them as reward for the mercenaries' support.¹³ The RUF's ideology of salvation quickly degenerated into a campaign of violence whose principal aim was to gain access to the country's diamond and other mineral wealth. From the very beginning, the RUF's campaign of terror included sexual violence and sexual slavery, committed on a widespread and systematic basis.

In April 1992, APC President Joseph Momoh was overthrown in a military coup by twenty-six-year-old army captain Valentine Strasser, who formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Strasser vowed to end corruption and create opportunities for all Sierra Leoneans. The new regime, however, was as corrupt as the old. The RUF continued to gain strength and was joined by numerous soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who were disgruntled with their poor conditions. These soldier-rebels or "sobels" discarded their uniforms at night to loot but wore government uniforms and continued to work for the government during the day. The "sobels," who included officers, also provided weapons, ammunition, and intelligence to RUF forces.

Starting in January 1991, Momoh and later Strasser embarked on a recruitment drive that swelled the army's ranks to approximately twelve thousand, aiming to dislodge the RUF including by offering its youthful constituency a lucrative alternative. Many of the new soldiers were unemployed drifters, petty criminals, and street children as young as twelve. Given the inability of the undisciplined and ill-trained SLA to drive out the RUF, in March 1995, Strasser invited Executive Outcomes (E.O.), a South African private security company, to fight the RUF and guard the mining areas, in return for concessions over their production. The RUF was by that time approaching Freetown and controlled most of the diamond mining areas. By December 1995, E.O. had retaken a number of key diamond areas and began to collaborate with the pro-government militia known as the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), of which the Kamajors are the largest and most powerful.

The CDF movement began with the establishment of the Eastern Region Defence Committee in 1993-4 and was greatly expanded in 1996 when regent chief Hinga Norman was appointed deputy minister of defense in Kabbah's government and head of the CDF, with the government providing the CDF with training, weapons and food.¹⁴ The CDF movement consists of groups of traditional hunters and young men who were used by the government to defend their native areas. The Kamajors operate mainly in the south and east, the Tamaboros in the far north, the Gbettis in the north and the Donzos in the far east. Civilians who joined the CDF underwent initiation ceremonies, which were said to bestow magical powers, making them immortal and invincible.¹⁵ Units of fighters were initially deployed only in their own chiefdoms to ensure their loyalty and discipline and make the

¹⁰ Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (London: The International African Institute in association with James Currey and Heinemann, 1996), p. 7. When the RUF first invaded from Liberia, villagers in Kailahun were ordered to cut palm fronds—the symbol of the SLPP—"in support" of the rebels.

¹¹ Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone," in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *African Guerrillas* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), pp. 173-178.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 178.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 185. By 1999, the CDF had grown into a movement of an estimated fifteen thousand fighters who had to be disarmed and demobilized.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* This is a throwback to the venerated esoteric Mende cult of invincible traditional hunters who were given power through initiation ceremonies. These powers enabled the hunters, *inter alia*, to turn into an animal in order to catch their prey.

best use of their superior bush knowledge. The CDF, in contrast to the SLA and the RUF, had the support of the local civilians and were very effective, overrunning main RUF camps in late 1996 with the support of E.O. and the army.

In January 1996, Strasser was overthrown by his deputy, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. Bio initiated peace negotiations with the RUF, which had begun to suffer a number of defeats, as well as a program to return Sierra Leone to civilian rule. In March 1996, elections were held, and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP, who pledged to bring about an end to the war, became president of Sierra Leone.

In November 1996, the RUF and Kabbah's government signed the Abidjan Peace Accord, which provided for a ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization, an amnesty to the RUF, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The ceasefire was broken in January 1997, however, when serious fighting broke out in southern Moyamba district. In January 1997, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria on an arms charge and imprisoned by the Nigerian government.

In May 1997, fourteen months after assuming power, President Kabbah was overthrown in a coup led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who formed a new government called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Koroma had escaped from prison, where he had been held following an earlier attempted coup in September 1996. The AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political parties, and announced rule by military decree. Days of looting by soldiers followed the coup, which also ushered in a period of political repression characterized by arbitrary arrests and detention. An attempt by Nigerian and Guinean troops (who had been in Sierra Leone since 1995 as part of bilateral security accords to give support to the NPRC), supported by South African mercenaries, to oust Koroma failed.¹⁶

The AFRC consisted primarily of disgruntled ex-SLA soldiers who had become disillusioned by President Kabbah's decision to cut back support for the military. Koroma also cited the government's failure to implement the peace agreement as the reason for the coup. The SLA accused Kabbah of having put greater confidence for the country's defense in and giving more economic resources to the CDF than to the army. Formalizing an alliance between the army and the rebels based on joint opposition to President Kabbah and the SLPP, the AFRC invited the RUF to join its government in June 1997.

From exile in Guinea, President Kabbah mobilized international condemnation for and a response to the coup makers. In response to a plea from Kabbah, hundreds of Nigerian troops based in Liberia as part of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) moved to Freetown, reinforcing ECOMOG colleagues already based at the Freetown airport to defend it from attacks by the RUF. Nigerian vessels stationed off Freetown shelled the city, reportedly killing at least fifty people. Nigerian forces were, however, eventually forced to withdraw from around the capital. In August 1997, following the AFRC's announcement of a four-year program for elections and return to civilian rule, which represented a breakdown in negotiations initiated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ECOWAS established a strict economic embargo against Sierra Leone. In October 1997, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution also imposing mandatory sanctions on Sierra Leone, including an embargo on arms and oil imports, which ECOMOG forces were mandated to enforce.

After negotiations in Guinea under the auspices of ECOWAS, the Kabbah government-in-exile and the RUF/AFRC signed an agreement on October 23, 1997, providing for the return to power of President Kabbah by April 1998. The RUF/AFRC, however, undermined the implementation of the accord by stockpiling weapons and attacking the positions of ECOMOG forces. In February 1998, ECOMOG forces together with Kamajor militia launched an operation that drove the RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown. In March 1998, President Kabbah was

¹⁶ See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (A), June 1999, p. 8 for a discussion of the role of foreign mercenaries in the armed conflict. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Transition or Travesty? Nigeria's Endless Process of Return to Civilian Rule," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, vol. 9, no. 6, October 1997, for a discussion of the Nigerian intervention in Sierra Leone.

reinstated. Over the succeeding months ECOMOG forces were able to establish control over roughly two-thirds of the country, including all regional capitals: as of mid-1998, the ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone was composed of approximately 12,500 troops, predominantly Nigerian with support battalions from Guinea, Gambia, Ghana and Niger.¹⁷ Sankoh was transferred to Sierra Leone from Nigeria and incarcerated in July 1998. In October 1998, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone tried and sentenced Sankoh to death for his role in the 1997 coup.

Once expelled from Freetown, the AFRC/RUF rebels tried to consolidate their own positions in other parts of the country. The Kabbah government, which had negligible forces of its own, had to rely on ECOMOG to stay in power. Through a series of offensives, the RUF/AFRC managed to gain control of the diamond-rich Kono district and several other strategic towns and areas. By late 1998, the rebels had gained the upper hand militarily and were in control of over half of the country, including all the mineral-rich areas. From this position, the RUF/AFRC launched a major offensive on Freetown in January 1999.

The battle for Freetown and ensuing three-week rebel occupation of the capital were characterized by the systematic and widespread perpetration of a wide range of abuses against the civilian population, and marked the most intensive and concentrated period of human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations in Sierra Leone's ten-year civil war. At least five thousand civilians were killed and one hundred civilians had limbs amputated, including twenty-six double arm amputations. Thousands of women and girls, including girls as young as eight, were raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence. In addition, the rebels used civilians as human shields, both while advancing towards ECOMOG positions and as a defense against ECOMOG air power. They also burnt whole neighborhoods, often with the residents in their houses.

Government and the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces also committed serious human rights abuses, though on a lesser scale, including over 180 summary executions of rebels and their suspected collaborators. Prisoners taken by ECOMOG, some of who had surrendered and many of whom were wounded, were executed on the spot often with little or no effort to establish their guilt or innocence. Officers to the level of captain were present and participated in the executions. ECOWAS officials have yet to initiate a formal investigation into these killings.

As the RUF/AFRC were driven out of Freetown in February 1999, they abducted thousands of civilians, who were used to carry looted goods and ammunition, forcibly conscripted into fighting or used for forced labor. Thousands of girls and women were used as sex slaves by the rebels and forced to "marry" rebel husbands. As they moved eastward, the rebels continued to commit egregious human rights abuses, including killings and amputations, particularly in the villages around the towns of Masiaka, Lunsar, and Port Loko.¹⁸

In the months following the January invasion, and as a result of intense international pressure, Kabbah's government and RUF rebels signed a ceasefire agreement on May 18, 1999,¹⁹ followed by a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, on July 7, 1999.²⁰ Sankoh was released from prison by the Sierra Leonean government to participate in the peace negotiations. The accord, brokered by the U.N., the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and ECOWAS, committed the RUF/AFRC to lay down its arms in exchange for representation in a new government. Sankoh was given the chairmanship of the board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) and the status of vice-president.²¹ Johnny Paul Koroma was made the chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP), provided for under Article 6 of the peace agreement.²²

¹⁷ See Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (A), July 1998.

¹⁸ See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape," for a comprehensive report on the January 1999 invasion.

¹⁹ See the annex to U.N. Security Council report, S/1999/585, May 18, 1999.

²⁰ Lomé Peace Agreement at <http://sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>.

²¹ Article 5 (2) of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

²² The RUF delegation to the peace talks in Lomé included members of the AFRC who were also appointed as ministers as part of the agreement to share power.

The peace agreement also included a general amnesty for all crimes committed by all parties during the civil war until the signing of the peace agreement.²³ At the last minute, the U.N. secretary-general's special representative attending the talks, added a hand-written caveat that the U.N. held the understanding that the amnesty and pardon provided for in Article 9 did not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. In addition, the peace agreement mandated the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a national human rights commission.

The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), initially established in July 1998 to monitor the military and security conditions, was transformed into a much larger peacekeeping mission.²⁴ In October 1999, months later than had been planned, UNOMSIL, which at its maximum deployment included 192 military observers as well as a small human rights unit of four persons, was transformed into the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL was mandated to maintain the peace and monitor the ceasefire and had a maximum authorized strength of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers.²⁵ The human rights unit was authorized to expand to a total of fourteen human rights officers. Two further Security Council resolutions followed, increasing the authorized troop strength to 11,100²⁶ and then 13,000.²⁷

The peace process was marred by cease-fire violations, missed deadlines and infighting within rebel ranks. The RUF/AFRC failed to comply with several commitments, including the release of all civilian abductees. There was a relative decrease in human rights abuses following the peace agreement, although the RUF/AFRC continued to terrorize the civilian population in the north and east, which largely remained under its control. Sexual violence, in particular against the thousands of abducted women and girls, continued. In addition, a splinter group of the AFRC known as the West Side Boys established numerous bases in the Occra Hills near Freetown, from where they staged looting raids. The West Side Boys abducted hundreds of civilians, including girls and women, whom they raped and kept as sex slaves. In August 1999, they took hostage for one week forty-two members of a U.N.-led delegation composed of ECOMOG soldiers, religious leaders, aid workers, and journalists, who had gone to the Occra Hills to have abducted children released to them.

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program progressed slowly, with only 25,000 out of a total 45,000 combatants demobilized by May 2000.²⁸ There was also considerable delay in the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces, with only 8,700 peacekeepers deployed by the same month. The peace process then broke down completely, when, in early May, the RUF captured over five hundred UNAMSIL peacekeepers and military observers deployed in the north and the east, holding them for several weeks.²⁹ The conflict erupted again throughout the country and many of the combatants, including child combatants, who had been disarmed and demobilized, were re-conscripted. The human rights situation deteriorated sharply with numerous reports of RUF abuses, including murder, widespread rape, abduction, forced labor, and looting. During a demonstration in Freetown to protest the collapse of the peace process and hostage taking of the peacekeepers, twenty-two civilians were killed outside the house of the RUF leader, Sankoh. On May 17, 2000, several days

²³ Lomé Peace Agreement. Under Article 9 (1) of this agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone was required to grant Sankoh absolute and free pardon. Article 9 (3) refers to the amnesty granted to all combatants of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF for any crimes they may have committed in pursuit of their objectives (See below, p. 61, for a discussion on the amnesty).

²⁴ U.N. Security Council resolution 1181, S/RES/1181 (1998), July 13, 1998.

²⁵ U.N. Security Council resolution 1270, S/RES/1270 (1999), October 22, 1999.

²⁶ U.N. Security Council resolution 1289, S/RES/1289 (2000), February 7, 2000.

²⁷ U.N. Security Council resolution 1299, S/RES/1299 (2000), May 19, 2000.

²⁸ U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation report, May 29, 2001. See <http://www.relief.int/w/Rwb.nsf/s/4A58557840970841C1256A5C0050441B>.

²⁹ The hostages in the north were released on May 28, 2000. The hostages in the east, however, were not released until June 29, 2000. Two hundred and thirty-three peacekeepers and military observers who had been encircled by the RUF were finally freed by the U.N. military operation "Khukri" on July 15, 2000.

after the demonstration, Sankoh was arrested by the government and held in custody, together with over 125 members of the RUF, without charge, using powers under a state of emergency declared in 1998.

There was also a disturbing intensification of abuses by pro-government forces. The Sierra Leonean government caused numerous civilian casualties through helicopter gunship attacks during May and June 2000 against the RUF strongholds of Makeni, Magburaka, and Kambia. Abuses by both the government forces and the RUF caused the displacement of some 330,000 civilians from behind rebel lines. Civilians leaving RUF territory were often captured and accused of being rebel sympathizers³⁰ by the CDF. Whereas previously sexual violence against women had been very uncommon among the CDF, numerous cases of sexual violence were reported, including gang rape by Kamajor militiamen and commanders.

When, in May 2000, it seemed as though the fighting would threaten Freetown again, several hundred British soldiers were rapidly deployed to Sierra Leone—in the first instance to evacuate foreign nationals who wished to leave, but also to secure the airport, allow reinforcement of the U.N. contingent, and assist in the reorganization of the pro-government forces as an effective fighting force. At their maximum, there were more than 1,200 British soldiers in Sierra Leone, though they began to withdraw within two months of the first deployment. UNAMSIL was rapidly brought up to strength: by June 5, 2000 there were 11,350 U.N. troops in the country.

At the behest of Johnny Paul Koroma, the West Side Boys in May 2000 briefly fought on the government side to prevent the RUF from entering Freetown. However, they continued to commit human rights abuses, and in August 2000 abducted eleven British soldiers of the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) and one SLA officer. In September 2000, the West Side Boys bases were destroyed during an operation by British paratroopers to free the captured soldiers. Numerous West Side Boys, including their leader, were arrested and incarcerated.

From September 2000 through April 2001, RUF rebels and Liberian government forces acting together attacked refugee camps and villages accommodating several hundred thousand Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees just across the border with Guinea. Following the attacks, Guinean security forces and the local population retaliated against the refugees, frequently looting, raping, and unlawfully detaining them. Guinean forces also responded to these RUF raids by killing and wounding dozens of Sierra Leoneans in indiscriminate helicopter and artillery attacks in the rebel-held areas in the north of Sierra Leone. Guinean troops conducted several ground attacks during which several civilians were gunned down and girls and women were raped.

In November 2000, the government and RUF signed a cease-fire, which committed both parties to restarting the disarmament process, the reestablishment of government authority in former rebel-held areas, and the release of all child combatants and abductees. On March 30, 2001, the U.N. Security Council authorized the further expansion of UNAMSIL to 17,500 military personnel, including 260 military observers. These forces, contributed by Bangladesh, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Zambia, were deployed into RUF strongholds, including the diamond-rich Kono district.³⁰ The DDR program recommenced in May 2001, and by the end of 2001 over three thousand child soldiers, abductees, and separated children had been released by the RUF and the CDF.

During this period, serious human rights abuses continued to be committed, though on a reduced scale. Fighting between the RUF and the CDF broke out in the east of the country in June through August 2001, leaving tens of civilians dead. RUF forces committed scores of serious abuses including rape, murder, and abduction. The victims of these abuses included Sierra Leoneans returning from refugee camps in Guinea; Guinean civilians who were attacked during the cross-border raids by the RUF from September 2000 through April 2001; and Liberians fleeing renewed fighting in Lofa county of Liberia from April 2001. While the RUF released or demobilized more than 1,500 male child combatants, they were reluctant to release Sierra Leonean and Guinean female abductees, most of whom are believed to have been sexually abused.

³⁰ U.N. Security Council resolution 1346, S/RES/1346 (2001), March 30, 2001.

The human rights situation continued to improve in 2002, with the disarmament and demobilization phases declared completed. By January 2002, 47,710 combatants had been disarmed and demobilized. On January 18, 2002, the armed conflict was officially declared to be over in a public ceremony attended by many dignitaries. In addition, the state of emergency was lifted for the first time in four years on February 28, 2002. Following the end of the state of emergency, the government charged Sankoh, and the other RUF and West Side Boys members held in custody since May 2000, with a number of crimes, including murder and related charges. The resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees from Guinea and Liberia was ongoing as of the writing of this report. By July 2002, approximately 250,000 refugees and IDPs had been resettled. The RUF transformed itself into a political party and nominated presidential and parliamentary candidates for elections held on May 14, 2002.

In the elections, President Kabbah's SLPP was re-elected for a second term and faced the challenge of rebuilding the country and its economy. After a decade of war, Sierra Leone ranks last out of 162 countries in terms of life expectancy at birth; adult literacy; combined enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education; and GDP per capita.³¹ Fifty-seven percent of Sierra Leone's population struggles to survive on only U.S. \$1 per day.³² Unemployment is rampant and the current economy is driven by the presence of UNAMSIL and other international organizations. Investors who could create desperately needed jobs remain cautious given the rampant corruption that permeates all levels of Sierra Leonean society and their concerns about regional security.

Women and Girls under Sierra Leonean Law

The Sierra Leonean Legal system

Three systems of law—general, customary, and Islamic—co-exist in Sierra Leone.

General Law

General law consists of the statutory law (codified) and common law (based on case law) mainly inherited from the United Kingdom, the former colonial power. General law is administered through the formal court system, which follows the usual Commonwealth structure, under which the High Court hears more important cases, and magistrates courts the less important ones, both civil and criminal. There is an appeal system, first to the Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court, which is the ultimate court of appeal and also hears cases relevant to the interpretation of the constitution. The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court are located in Freetown. A High Court and magistrates courts are constituted in Freetown. The High Court was re-established in Kenema and Bo in 2002 and there are magistrates courts in Bo, Kenema and Port Loko.³³ The court system in the provinces, which had a limited infrastructure before the war broke out in 1991, was virtually destroyed during the war—the High Court has not held hearings outside Freetown for six years—and was only gradually being rehabilitated from 2002. Access to the judiciary for rural Sierra Leoneans is further limited by their lack of funds for lawyers, or even transport money.

Only a small number of women, primarily those who reside in the Western Area (where Freetown is located) and women with sufficient funds, have access to the formal court system. As many general law provisions have not been updated since colonial days, the protection that general law affords women is often only marginally better than that provided under customary or Islamic law.

Customary Law

Customary law is defined by the 1991 constitution as "the rules of law by which customs are applicable to particular communities in Sierra Leone."³⁴ Although there are sixteen ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, a general treatment of customary law is justified, as there are many fundamental similarities between the customary laws of

³¹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 141-144.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

³³ An itinerant judge covers the High Court in both Bo and Kenema.

³⁴ The Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter XII - The Laws of Sierra Leone, Section 170 (3). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-xii.html>.

these ethnic groups.³⁵ Customary law has not been written down or codified and is only applied by the local courts.³⁶ These courts operate in the provinces and not in the Western Area, which is historically where the Krio and the British colonizers settled. A chairman presides over the local courts with the assistance of chiefdom councilors who are knowledgeable in customary law. The chairmen in theory should be independent from the paramount chiefs who used to preside over the local courts before reforms were introduced both prior to and after independence.³⁷ Customary law officers who are trained lawyers are supposed to review decisions of local courts and provide training to the personnel of local courts. The government Law Officers' Department, however, remains chronically understaffed, and few of the customary law officers' posts are filled.

As the majority of Sierra Leoneans live in the provinces, customary law governs at least 65 percent of the population in relation to issues not reserved by statute to the magistrates courts or High Court. In practice, issues that should be dealt with in the magistrates courts and High Court are also dealt with under customary law. In addition to problems accessing the formal court system, rural Sierra Leoneans, in particular, have historically always preferred to administer justice amongst themselves to ensure that good community relations are maintained in villages where the other residents are invariably relatives by marriage or descent, rather than turning to outsiders.

Although customary law is not applied in the formal court system, it is recognized and there is some interaction between the two systems. There is the right of appeal from the local courts to the District Appeal Court, where a magistrate sits with two assessors who are chiefdom councilors from the given area of the local court and are knowledgeable about the customary law in their respective areas.³⁸ The assessors advise the magistrate on questions of customary law, with the decision remaining with the magistrate. Likewise, a decision of the District Appeal Court can be appealed to the High Court, with the High Court judge being advised by assessors with expertise in customary law.³⁹

Islamic Law

Islamic law has been recognized by statute in Sierra Leone in relation to marriage, divorce, and inheritance among Muslims.⁴⁰ Otherwise, Islamic law, if applicable at all, is considered part of customary law. In this report, Islamic law is therefore treated as part of customary law except when referring to the specific areas dealt with by the Mohammedan Marriage Act, and cases involving Islamic law are heard by the local courts. Criminal *sharia* law is not applicable in Sierra Leone.

Constitutional Status of Women

In theory, Sierra Leonean women are granted equal rights to men under the 1991 constitution, which provides as one of the "fundamental principles of state policy" that the state "... [s]hall discourage discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, sex, religion,..."⁴¹ The equal rights of women are again underscored in the human rights chapter of the constitution.⁴² Under Section 27 of the constitution, however,

³⁵ H. M. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law* (Freetown: Atlantic Printers Ltd., 1983), p. 6.

³⁶ See 1963 Local Courts Act.

³⁷ Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest*, p. 46.

³⁸ Section 29 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act and Section 76 of the 1965 Courts Act.

³⁹ Section 31 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act.

⁴⁰ The Mohammedan Marriage Act (Cap. 96 of the revised laws of Sierra Leone, 1960) deals with marriage, divorce, and intestate succession. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 20. Intestate successions occur when the deceased did not leave a will.

⁴¹ The Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter II – Fundamental Principles of State Policy, Section 6 (2). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-ii.html>. Under Section 8 (2) (a), "... [e]very citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations, and opportunities before the law..." and specific safeguards of equality before the law in terms of health care, employment and education are provided under Section 8 (3) (d); Section 8 (3) (a), (c), (e) and Section 9 (1) (a), (b) and (2) respectively.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Chapter III - The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, Section 15. See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-iii.html>. Section 15 provides that "every person in Sierra Leone is entitled to the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, has the right, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public Human Rights Watch

discrimination is permitted, *inter alia*, under laws dealing with “adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other interests of personal law,” which have direct bearing on the rights of women, as well as under customary law.⁴³ This important contradiction in the constitution—similar to that in many African constitutions—has contributed to the low status of women in Sierra Leone, as it legitimizes the application of discriminatory customary law. No protection from discriminatory customary law can be sought under the constitution on the basis of sex. Customary and Islamic laws also continue to be widely applied, notwithstanding the fact that legislation provides that general law should prevail over customary law when customary law is “repugnant to statute or natural justice, equity, and good conscience.”⁴⁴

Marriage

The rights of married women remain limited, particularly for those married under customary and Islamic laws, which govern most marriages. Women married under the general law have comparatively more rights.⁴⁵

A married woman’s position under customary law is comparable to that of a minor: a woman is generally represented by her husband who has the right to prosecute and defend actions on his spouse’s behalf.⁴⁶ Sierra Leonean women can gain status through marriage as well as through their role as mothers: a woman’s status within society and the polygynous household increases with the number of children she bears. Sierra Leone has one of the highest birth rates in the world, with the average number of children born to each woman estimated at 6.5.⁴⁷ Most households are polygynous, apart from the monogamous Christians (approximately 30 percent of the population); under customary law, a husband can marry as many wives as he wishes. Muslims (60 percent of the population) can marry up to four wives.

Under customary law, a girl is considered of marriageable age once her breasts have developed, her menses have started and she has been initiated, which could mean as young as twelve. Marriages are usually arranged, and the consent of the bride-to-be is not considered essential in most ethnic groups, but the consent of the girl’s/woman’s family is required.⁴⁸ The fact that a girl is considered “ready” for marriage at such a young age and her consent is not sought has contributed to the common practice of early forced marriages. Men wishing to marry do not need to seek consent from their own parents. The statutory age of marriage under general law is twenty-one years.

interest, to each and all of the following—(a) life, liberty, security of person, the enjoyment of property, and the protection of law; (b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association; (c) respect for private and family life, and (d) protection from deprivation of property without compensation.”

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Section 27. Subsection 27 (1) provides that “Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5), and (7), no law shall make provision which is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.” Under Subsection 4, however, the protection provided under Subsection 1 does not apply “... (d) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other interests of personal law, or (e) for the application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe or customary law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the case of other persons.” Discrimination is also permitted against persons who are not citizens of Sierra Leone or naturalized Sierra Leoneans. According to Dr. Tucker, former Chairperson of President’s Kabbah’s Advisory Committee, the original intent of Section 27 was “to preserve certain areas of segregation which are embedded in traditional practices and are generally acceptable to both sexes, such as the segregation between male and female secret societies. What was taken up in the constitution was more extensive than what was intended.” Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Tucker (Consultant on the Law Development Program funded by the U.K.’s Department for International Development (DFID)), Freetown, April 25, 2002.

⁴⁴ Section 2 of the 1963 Local Courts Act and Section 76 of the 1965 Courts Act.

⁴⁵ Marriages under the general law are governed, *inter alia*, by the Christian Marriage Act, (Cap. 95), the Civil Marriage Act (Cap. 97), and the Matrimonial Causes Act (Cap. 102).

⁴⁶ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 98. Under customary law, a Sierra Leonean woman is always under the guardianship of a male relative.

⁴⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 157. This figure is based on births recorded for 1995-2000.

⁴⁸ Consent is a very relative term, as girls generally will find it very difficult to disobey their parents’ wishes, which can result in severe punishment, including ostracism from the immediate and extended family.

Under Islamic law, a male or female dependant can be given in marriage against his or her will, and the legal guardian of an adult woman has the right to object to her choice of husband if the prospective husband is not of equal birth.⁴⁹ Under customary law, a dowry is usually paid to the wife's family. Under Islamic law, the dowry is paid to the bride, although the contract is concluded with the legal guardian of the bride-to-be.⁵⁰

Under customary law, a wife can only refuse to have sexual intercourse with her husband if she is physically ill, menstruating or suckling a young child. She can also refuse intercourse during the daytime, in the bush or during Ramadan.

Under customary law, a wife's decision-making powers are limited since she is obliged to always obey her husband. This lack of decision-making power means that women in families where the breadwinner is the man find it very difficult to influence decisions on how the (generally) little income that the family makes is disbursed. Under customary law, a married woman must ask her husband for permission to work outside the house or visit her family. In families where the woman has been given permission to work outside the house and is the breadwinner, it seems that the added responsibility has not necessarily come with increased decision-making power.

A wife, especially in rural communities, is expected to cultivate food for herself and her children, whilst the husband's responsibility is limited to providing accommodation and clothing.⁵¹ A wife residing in an urban area is generally given a lump sum of money by her husband to start a small business, usually petty trading. If the business fails, the wife must refund the capital to her husband. Given the heavy work burden on women, however, there is little opportunity for women to seek remunerated work outside the house.

Divorce and Death of Husband

Under customary law, both parties can bring divorce proceedings either extrajudicially or judicially before a local court, but in practice women are generally not as free to do so as men.⁵² Only the husband has the right to divorce through unilateral repudiation.⁵³ A wife married under customary or Islamic law may, however, seek dissolution of marriage on grounds of impotence of the husband, for example.⁵⁴

Under customary law, the dowry is refundable upon divorce. Dowries paid to poor families are sometimes set purposely excessively high to ensure that the wife's family will not sanction a divorce given their inability to repay the dowry, again highlighting how little control women married under customary law have over their lives.⁵⁵ Under general law, a husband is expected to pay alimony for his wife and children on divorce, which both parties may initiate.⁵⁶

When a husband dies, the widow is expected under customary law to undergo a mourning period and rituals.⁵⁷ It is only after these rituals that widows are considered purified and can remarry. Some ethnic groups

⁴⁹ Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 161-2.

⁵⁰ Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 161.

⁵¹ Full maintenance of his wife is only the responsibility of the husband during the rainy season (approximately between the months of May and November) or when his wife is sick or nursing a baby. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, pp. 106-7.

⁵² Judicial divorces are rare as they are more expensive. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-149.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 143-4.

⁵⁴ Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 165.

⁵⁵ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 79. Strict tribal Muslims do not require that the dowry be repaid on divorce.

⁵⁶ Christian Marriage Act, Cap. 95 of the revised Law of Sierra Leone, 1960, s. 7 (2), s. 15 (1) (b), and s. 5 respectively.

⁵⁷ A widow must mourn for forty days. Her head is shaved or, in some chiefdoms, disheveled and her body is washed with the same water used to wash her husband's corpse. In some chiefdoms her body is smeared with mud to indicate her mourning. After either one week or forty days for strict Muslims, widows are taken to a stream to be ceremonially washed.

still insist that if the widow remarries, she does so within her deceased husband's family, otherwise all marriage payments are refundable.⁵⁸

As Sierra Leone is a patrilineal society and the husband has custodial rights over children, children are handed over to the husband's family head upon his death.⁵⁹ Under Islamic law, the mother has the right to care for a boy child until the age of nine and a girl child until she comes of age.⁶⁰

Under customary matrimonial property law, a wife is generally only able to keep her own possessions and her self-acquired property in the event of divorce or death. A wife is generally not entitled to keep property acquired through the joint efforts of husband and wife and has no rights over the matrimonial home.⁶¹ Nor can a wife inherit under Islamic law: either the eldest son or brother or the official male administrator of the deceased inherits.⁶² Under general law, a wife is also only entitled to one third of her deceased husband's property, if he has not made a will.

This denial of inheritance rights of women is a major problem given the large number of war widows who are now able to return to their villages of origin, but have no access to land.

Domestic Violence

Societal attitudes to domestic violence are another indicator of the status of women and girls in society; physical violence against women and children is common in Sierra Leone. Indeed, under customary law, a husband has the right to "reasonably chastise his wife by physical force."⁶³ If the husband is persistently cruel and frequently beats his wife to the point of wounding her or causing her great pain, the wife can divorce her husband, but under customary law a single act of physical and brutal force is permitted. A population-based assessment of war-related sexual violence in Sierra Leone carried out by Physicians for Human Rights among 991 female-headed households in camps for displaced people found that, although 80 percent of women surveyed expressed that there should be legal protections for the rights of women, more than 60 percent of the women believed that a husband had the right to beat his wife.⁶⁴

Rape as a Crime under General Law

The laws governing rape in Sierra Leone are very confusing even for persons working in the criminal justice system, such as members of the judiciary and police force. They are also archaic and date back to the British 1861 Offences Against the Person Act. Under this Act, rape is defined as "the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent by force, fear or fraud."⁶⁵ Penetration (however slight) is required to constitute the crime of rape.⁶⁶ In addition, although a child is defined as a person under the age of sixteen,⁶⁷ Sierra Leonean law makes the extremely unhelpful distinction between unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of thirteen and

⁵⁸ The Mende, Krim, Sherbro, Vai, Karonko and Yalunka adhere to this custom, whereas the Temne, Susu, Limba, Loko, Kissi and Kono allow a widow to select her own husband and do not require a refund of the marriage payments if she marries outside her deceased husband's family. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 138.

⁵⁹ If the couple was married under general law, the custody of the children is often determined by the courts, which generally grant the mother custody of the children.

⁶⁰ Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 167. In practice, the mother and children will stay with whomever has the money to provide for them.

⁶¹ As customary marriages are generally polygynous, a divorce with one of the wives would result in the dissolution of the whole household if she were to ask for a refund for her contribution to building the house. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, pp. 113-120.

⁶² Mohammedan Marriage Act, Cap. 96 of the revised laws of Sierra Leone, 1960, s. 9.

⁶³ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, p. 152.

⁶⁴ Physicians for Human Rights, *War-related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone: A Population-based Assessment* (Boston: Physicians for Human Rights, 2002), p. 55 (hereafter referred to as PHR report).

⁶⁵ Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c 100), s. 63. Unlawful carnal knowledge refers to sexual intercourse between unmarried persons. The law does not actually forbid or make sexual intercourse between unmarried persons a punishable crime, but it only recognizes the right to sexual intercourse for married couples.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act (1926), Cap. 31 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone 1960, s. 2.

unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl between thirteen and fourteen years of age. The law is unclear about unlawful carnal knowledge committed against persons aged between fourteen and sixteen, although the few cases involving this age group that have gone to trial have reportedly been prosecuted as rape.⁶⁸

Nor is the age of consent explicitly stated, although it is presumably by necessary implication sixteen years old. Marital rape does not exist under Sierra Leonean statutory law, and most Sierra Leoneans firmly believe that it is the duty of a wife to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to.⁶⁹

Unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of thirteen, whether with or without her consent, is a felony and carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment.⁷⁰ Unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl between the ages of thirteen and fourteen, whether with or without her consent, is, however, only considered a misdemeanor and carries a maximum sentence of two years.⁷¹ The language "with or without her consent" refers only to cases of unlawful carnal knowledge that do not constitute rape; for example, an eighteen-year-old man who has sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl with her consent.

The police and judiciary seem to have misconstrued the meaning of the law. When an offence of rape against a girl under the age of fourteen is reported, the police and judiciary turn to either Section 6 or 7—depending on the age of the victim—of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act and determine that the girl did not consent. Based on her age, they then charge unlawful carnal knowledge and not rape. This misinterpretation therefore leads to a lesser charge for the rape of a child than for the rape of an adult.⁷²

Rape of a person over the age of sixteen is considered a felony and carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.⁷³ Indecent assault—sexual assault without penetration—on or attempts to have carnal knowledge of girls under the age of fourteen years carry the same maximum sentence as unlawful carnal knowledge of girls between the age of thirteen and fourteen i.e. only two years of imprisonment.⁷⁴ No person can be convicted of unlawful carnal knowledge, indecent assault or attempted unlawful carnal knowledge "upon the evidence of one witness, unless such witness be corroborated in some material particular by evidence implicating the accused."⁷⁵

The law pertaining to the abduction of girls for immoral purposes applies to any unmarried girls under the age of sixteen.⁷⁶ Abduction of girls for immoral purposes is a misdemeanor, carrying a maximum sentence of two years of imprisonment.

In addition to the legal confusion that exists in general law concerning rape, attempts by women to obtain the prosecution of rapists are frustrated by the collapsed state of the judiciary and the lack of effective law enforcement, which has contributed to the ongoing climate of impunity for offenders.

⁶⁸ Human Rights Watch interviews with Abdul Tejan-Cole (human rights lawyer and acting coordinator for the national nongovernmental organization Campaign for Good Governance), Freetown, February–May, 2002.

⁶⁹ As the right to have intercourse between a husband and wife is recognized, a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife unless he has been legally separated from his wife. See also PHR report, p. 55.

⁷⁰ Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, s. 6.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, s. 7. If a man were legally married to a girl under fourteen years of age, sexual intercourse with her would not be an offence.

⁷² Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

⁷³ Offences against the Person Act, s. 48.

⁷⁴ Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, s. 9. Section 9 stipulates that "whosoever commits an indecent assault or attempts to have carnal knowledge shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall on conviction before the Supreme Court be liable for imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any period not exceeding two years." Consent is no defense to a charge of indecent assault of a child under fourteen years.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 14.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 12. There are also problems with the term "unmarried" because abduction of persons should obviously be prohibited irrespective of their marital status.

Prosecution of Sexual Violence under Customary Law

The manner in which rape is dealt with under customary law is indicative of the societal values towards sexual violence and the low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone. Although all serious criminal cases should automatically be tried under general law, rape cases continue to be prosecuted under customary law in the local courts.⁷⁷

Under customary law, when a case is brought to the local court, the perpetrator is generally required to pay a substantial fine to the victim's family as well as to the chiefs. "Virgin money" is payable to the victim's family if the victim was a virgin. In some communities, in particular Muslim communities, the victim is forced to marry the offender, as a girl who is not a virgin is considered less eligible for marriage. Traditionally, in some ethnic groups, both the victim and the perpetrator will be made to undergo a purification ceremony. For the victim, the purification ceremony is supposed to restore her virginity and for the perpetrator to cleanse the guilt. Any man who invades the husband's exclusive sexual rights over a wife compensates the husband, and not the wife, for "woman damage."⁷⁸

In addition to applying discriminatory laws, the local court system is problematic as women of some ethnic groups do not have direct access to the local courts, but must be represented by a male guardian.⁷⁹ The situation is further exacerbated as the chairmen and chiefdom councilors of the local courts are generally all male, which makes it difficult for women to bring cases of sexual violence as the women are often embarrassed and their cases are generally dealt with insensitively by the male court staff. The local courts are also prone to interference by the chiefs as well as the concerned parties, especially in cases dealing with sexual violence.

Many people in rural areas prefer to settle the case between the families and do not go to court. In cases settled between the two families, money or goods are given to compensate the victim's family. Paradoxically, the giving of gifts or money to a rape victim may even elevate her status within her family.

Some families turn to the local chiefs who can arbitrate between the two families but have no right to impose any fines. In practice, however, the local chiefs have been known to impose fines.

Discrimination against Women and Girls in Practice

In addition to being subjected to discriminatory laws, all women and girls face structural discrimination in Sierra Leone's patriarchal society, which accords automatic respect to its older male members. As a result of the low status accorded to them by law and by custom, women in Sierra Leone face substantial discrimination in practice.

Education

Systemic discrimination against women starts in childhood, when many parents prefer to spend their scarce resources on the education of their sons rather than their daughters. According to the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Gender-Related Development Index, females account for only 21 percent of the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, compared with 32 percent males.⁸⁰ This gender disparity illustrates not only that fewer girls attend school but also that their education is discontinued at an earlier age than boys. This is reflected in the literacy rate of persons over fifteen years: only 20 percent of females are literate compared to 40 percent of males.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Under Section 13 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act, the local courts have no jurisdiction in seduction actions, which includes any act intended to lead the wife astray. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, footnote 34, p. 121.

⁷⁸ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 5.

⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Manane Ferme (Lecturer, Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, U.K.), Freetown, April 19, 2002.

⁸⁰ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 213.

⁸¹ Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone: A Household Survey Report (MICS-2)* (Freetown: 2000), p. 30. The literate population includes those who are able to read "easily" or "with difficulty." Only 30 percent of the total population over fifteen years is literate.

The high illiteracy rate among women can in part be explained by the higher demand for female labor in the family. Girls are required to work in the house at an early age given that their mothers have to take care of the household and the children and do farm work. Another contributing factor to women's illiteracy is the harmful traditional practice of early forced marriage, which is very common in the provinces (see below).

The Workplace

Sierra Leone has ratified numerous international labor conventions.⁸² Some discriminatory practices, such as restricting the right to maternity leave to married women, which was the norm in the formal sector in the 1970s, have been prohibited by law. Extremely poor working conditions, however, persist in Sierra Leone for the majority of workers. In addition, women working for male bosses continue to be subjected to sexual harassment. According to the president of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, the trade union federation, much work remains to be done to ensure the full and even application of the labor laws, especially in the provinces.⁸³

Sierra Leone's rural population is primarily engaged in subsistence farming, with women constituting 80 percent of the labor that produces 70 percent of the nation's food.⁸⁴ This agricultural labor is generally not remunerated by cash wages and women have unequal access to land or technology. In Sierra Leone, the different ethnic groups continue to operate under communal and family land holding systems. Women can use the land for subsistence farming but the control and management of the land and any property on it is vested in the male head of the family. With the post-war resettlement process underway, war widows returning to their villages of origin often lack the legal means or community support to reclaim their families' properties. As women have little or no property to offer as collateral, their access to credit is limited. Women therefore tend to rely on traditional sources of credit such as rotating savings, which only provide small loans.⁸⁵

Due to the limited number of educated women, which is partly the result of the high demand for girls to perform household tasks at a young age, the preference of sending boys to school, and early forced marriages, few women are represented in the better remunerated professional or managerial jobs. Sierra Leone's crushing poverty and high unemployment have also meant that positions that in the West are perceived as women's jobs are often held by men in Sierra Leone, leaving even fewer openings for women. In the formal employment sector, women therefore constitute only 40 percent of the clerical staff and a mere 8 percent of the administrative and managerial cadre.⁸⁶ In the informal sector outside agriculture, where the cash returns are low, women are mainly involved in petty trading, soap making and tie-dyeing. Given the lack of opportunities for remunerated work, women tend to be heavily dependent on their husbands.

The breakdown of community values as the result of the war, combined with cultural practices, also serves to make girls and women vulnerable to abuse and sexual exploitation, which has historically been rampant in Sierra

⁸² Multilateral Convention (no. 29) concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 28, 1947); Multilateral Convention (no. 105) concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force January 17, 1959); Multilateral Convention (no. 100) concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force May 23, 1953); Multilateral Convention (no. 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960). Sierra Leone has not signed Convention 47 (40 hour week), Multilateral Convention (No. 95) concerning the Protection of Wages, July 1, 1949 (entered into force September 24, 1952), Multilateral Convention (No. 102) concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security, June 28, 1952, 210 U.N.T.S. 131 (entered into force April 27, 1955) or Multilateral Convention (No. 182) concerning the Worst Forms of Child Labor, although a social security system for both the public and private sector was recently established.

⁸³ Human Rights Watch interview with Uriah O. H. Davies, president of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, Freetown, April 14, 2002.

⁸⁴ Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, *National Policy on the Advancement of Women* (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone, 2000), p. 7.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15. Rotating schemes are schemes whereby groups of women pool their resources and each member of the group has access to the funds on a rotating basis.

⁸⁶ Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, *National Policy on Gender Mainstreaming* (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone), p. 3.

Leone.⁸⁷ Many women and girls have been driven to prostitution as a result of the increased poverty caused by the conflict and their lack of other opportunities and skills.

In the Political Arena

Discrimination against women is evident in the political arena. Women were not granted the right to vote or stand for election for any political office until after independence in 1961. Given their economic dependence on men, it is also much more difficult for women to raise the necessary campaign funds. In the Northern Province, women continue to be excluded from contesting and voting for the elections for traditional leadership positions (although there are reportedly several female chieftainship councilors).⁸⁸ Out of the 149 paramount chiefs in the country, only three are female, all based in the south.

Under the new block voting system which was introduced for the 2002 elections, 112 parliamentary seats are elected by popular vote. An additional twelve parliamentary seats are reserved for paramount chiefs who are elected in separate elections by chieftainship councilors. There are presently only eighteen female parliamentarians, including two female paramount chiefs. This does represent an increase over the previous government, which had a total of eight women parliamentarians, including two female paramount chiefs. At government level, there are only three female ministers and three female deputy ministers, which is a marginal increase from President Kabbah's previous Cabinet.⁸⁹

Harmful Traditional Practices and Their Impact on Women's and Girls' Health

Early forced marriages

The health of many women and girls in Sierra Leone is compromised by early forced marriage.⁹⁰ Early forced marriages are very common in the provinces, where men often sponsor a girl from birth (paying for school fees, clothes, etc.) and marry her after she has been initiated (see below for an explanation of the initiation process).

Early forced marriage is one of the factors contributing to Sierra Leone's high maternal mortality rate, since young girls have several children before their bodies are fully mature. At 1,800 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, Sierra Leone's maternal mortality rate is one of the highest in the world. This mortality rate translates to approximately 4,000 maternal deaths per year based on a total population of five million.⁹¹

Girls who are forced to marry early not only miss out on education, but also on skills training opportunities and are therefore highly dependent on their husbands.

⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with a highly respected international observer who has worked in Sierra Leone for two decades, Freetown, February 27, 2002.

⁸⁸ Only persons paying tax can contest and participate in elections for paramount chiefs who are elected from ruling houses. The paramount chieftainship system was introduced by the British Colonial Administration to administer the various chiefdoms in the Protectorate (i.e. the whole of Sierra Leone excluding the Western Area). Although there is reportedly no law against women paying taxes, women in the Northern Province have historically not done so probably due to lack of opportunities to find remunerated work. The tax is a negligible amount that women are willing to pay to ensure their eligibility for these elections. Human Rights Watch interview with Joseph Hall and Honerin Muyoyatta from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Freetown, March 22 and 23, 2002.

⁸⁹ The three ministerial posts are Minister for Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Minister for Trade and Industry, and Minister of Health and Sanitation. The three female deputy ministers are in the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Works, Housing and Technical Maintenance. The new government was sworn in on July 12, 2002.

⁹⁰ Early forced marriages are marriages whereby the consent of either party is not sought or more commonly whereby the consent of the girl is not sought and whereby one or both spouses is/are under the age of consent (which under international law should not be less than fifteen years of age). This harmful traditional practice contravenes article 16(3) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which states that the betrothal and marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, article 16(1) and (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and article 23(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which says that "[n]o marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses."

⁹¹ Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, p. 63.

Female Genital Cutting

Sierra Leonean girls as well as boys are traditionally initiated into secret societies at adolescence. The secret societies that perform the initiation rites take the adolescents into a sacred place in the bush where they are circumcised and taught about traditional practices. The male and female societies are segregated and males are not supposed to know what happens in female secret societies or vice versa.

Traditionally, initiation for girls entailed spending an extended period (up to two years) in the bush with girls of the same age, being taught various cultural skills (dancing, singing, drama, arts and craft, how to use local herbs, how to respect elders, etc.) and being a good wife (cooking, cleaning, child welfare, hygiene, fishing, etc.) by older women. Girls who undergo initiation through the secret societies are treated with deference after having completed the ritual and are feted by their communities.⁹² Today, the duration of the initiation ceremony has been greatly reduced, minimizing the skills transfer aspect, and thus focusing on the cutting itself. Because it was not always possible to hold the ceremonies during the war, initiation rites are now often practiced on adults, girl mothers, and pregnant girls—whereas traditionally it was seen as a rite of passage into adulthood for adolescent girls, who had to be virgins. In recent years, girls and/or adult women who do not wish to be initiated have been abducted and circumcised by force by female members of the community.

Ninety percent of Sierra Leonean women have undergone female genital cutting, which can have major health repercussions, including pain, injury to adjacent tissue of the urethra, hemorrhage, shock, acute urine retention, and infection.⁹³ Longer-term health effects include recurrent urinary tract infections, pelvic infections, infertility, keloid-scar, and problems during childbirth.⁹⁴ The high prevalence of conflict-related sexual violence, which causes trauma to the genital area, can only have served to aggravate these health repercussions and both have in turn contributed to the increased spread of sexually transmitted diseases, including Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS).

This harmful traditional practice, which is contrary to provisions of several international human rights instruments, continues to be practiced due to the significant societal pressure exerted by adults as well as peers.⁹⁵ Girls who have not been initiated are seen as less eligible for marriage and many future husbands sponsor the initiation of their bride-to-be.

Societal Attitudes to Sexual Violence against Women and Girls

The low status of women and girls is highlighted by the prevalent societal attitudes towards sexual violence. The notion of sexual violence as a crime is a very recent concept in Sierra Leone. It is still widely believed that only rape of a virgin is rape, which in Krio is called "to virginate." Rape of a non-virgin, on the other hand, is not considered rape, and there is often a belief that the woman must have consented to the act or is a seductress. Marital rape is not recognized under either customary or general law in Sierra Leone.

⁹² Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Mariane Ferme, (lecturer, Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, U.K.), Freetown, April 19, 2002.

⁹³ Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, *The Circumcision of Women: A Strategy for Eradication* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1992), p. 19. The type of female genital cutting performed in Sierra Leone is clitoridectomy (removal of the prepuce of the clitoris) and excision (removal of the prepuce, the clitoris and all or part of the labia minora). The extreme form of infibulation is not practiced in Sierra Leone.

⁹⁴ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Report on the First Donors Meeting For FGM/FGC Elimination* (Washington D.C.: USAID, 2001), p. 12.

⁹⁵ Female genital cutting violates the right to be free from violence (Article 1 of the CEDAW) and the right to bodily integrity (Article 6 of the CRC). Under Article 5 (a) of the CEDAW, states are called upon "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." Article 24 (1) and (3) of the CRC also requires states to abolish traditional practices that are harmful to the health of children. General Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW Committee also links traditional attitudes which subordinate women and violent practices, including female genital cutting, that "... justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or control of women."

Given the lack of statistics about rape cases before the war, it is impossible to establish the historical prevalence of sexual violence, but several doctors reported to Human Rights Watch that, before the war, they only treated a limited number of young girls who generally had been raped by older men.⁹⁶ According to the doctors interviewed, many cases of rape before the war occurred within the extended family and were considered family matters. They were rarely discussed or reported, in order to ensure that the victim's chances of marriage and obtaining a good dowry were not destroyed. Rape was also apparently unlikely to occur within a village community, where everyone knew each other and the shame attached to the offender would be too great. Rape outside the extended family was more likely to be committed in environments where there were mixed ethnic groups, such as in mining areas or larger towns. The cultural definition of rape and lack of reporting, however, may have led to the understanding that rape rarely occurred before the war. Sexual exploitation, however, has always been rampant in Sierra Leone, where economic options for women are limited and which has traditionally condoned a high level of promiscuity, despite the high value placed on virginity. With the increased poverty caused by the war, sex has become even more of a commodity.⁹⁷

The societal attitudes to rape and the low status of women have meant that no cases of conflict-related sexual violence and few cases of non-conflict-related sexual violence are prosecuted.⁹⁸ (See also below at p. 61 for a discussion on the amnesty included in the Lomé Peace Agreement.)

V. SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Prevalence of Sexual Violence during the War

Throughout the ten-year civil war, thousands of Sierra Leonean women and girls were subjected to widespread and systematic sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. A survey of 991 female heads of households in communities of displaced persons carried out by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) in 2002 found that approximately one of every eight household members (13 percent) had been subjected to one or more incidents of conflict-related sexual violence; among the actual respondents to the survey, the prevalence rate of conflict-related sexual violence was 9 percent (94 out of 991).⁹⁹ Based on this prevalence rate, as many as 50,000 to 64,000 internally displaced women may have been subjected to sexual violence as a result of the war.¹⁰⁰ Adding extrapolated data for other types of victim, PHR calculated that as many as 215,000 to 257,000 Sierra

⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, Freetown, February 25, 2002; Dr. Noah Conteh, Freetown, March 1, 2002 and Dr. Bernard Fraser, Freetown, March 3, 2002. The latter two doctors practiced in the provinces as well as in Freetown.

⁹⁷ Sex can be bought for as little as U.S. \$0.50. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Save the Children U.K., *Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone* (Geneva/London: UNHCR/SC-UK: 2002). Human Rights Watch has some concerns about this report as the report does not provide an adequate review of the context, including the status of women and girls within the given countries. Given the low status of women and girls in these countries, the sexual exploitation is much wider than reported: the power dynamic means that men of all walks of life, such as teachers, pastors, police, businessmen as well as aid workers or peacekeepers, exploit girls and women. It would also appear that the short-term solutions proposed do not adequately address the underlying structural issues, such as poverty, lack of education or alternative means of income generation for many women.

⁹⁸ It was not possible to obtain reliable statistics as reporting and recording of cases by the police and judiciary are not consistent.

⁹⁹ PHR report, p. 2. The PHR report captures some of the different types of sexual violence that women were subjected to. Of the ninety-four internally displaced women reporting their own experience of sexual violence to PHR, interviewees reported among other things: rape (89 percent); being forced to undress/stripped of clothing (37 percent); gang rape (33 percent); abduction (33 percent); molestation (14 percent) and insertion of foreign objects into genital opening or anus (4 percent). It should be noted that the definition of rape used by the PHR report differs from that used throughout this report. The definition used in this report, as mentioned above, is that used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in the *Foca* case.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3. As PHR points out this figure might be an underestimate due to deliberate non-disclosure of sexual violence and the lack of privacy in some of the interviews, despite efforts made to ensure privacy.

Leonean women and girls may have been subjected to sexual violence in the conflict period.¹⁰¹ Although these figures are necessarily no more than estimates, they do give an indication of the widespread nature of sexual violence during the war.

Human Rights Watch has primarily documented sexual violence committed during the latter stages of the war when the organization had a full-time presence in the country, beginning April 1999. This does not mean that sexual violence was at its worse during this period. Since that time, Human Rights Watch extensively documented crimes of sexual violence during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown as well as ongoing human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch has also received numerous reports of sexual violence dating from earlier in the war.

Perpetrators

Survivors of sexual violence mostly reported being raped by rebel forces, but were at times not able to identify which rebel faction the perpetrators belonged to or whether—especially given the frequent collaboration between soldiers and rebels—the perpetrators were indeed rebels or rather soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). In addition, survivors explained that they often deliberately did not want to look at their rapists out of fear and because they did not want to make eye contact. For example, D.T., a twenty-five-year-old woman raped by four rebels, including one child combatant, said that she would not be able to recognize any of the perpetrators, as she was too afraid to look at them (see below at p. 36).¹⁰² A. B., a thirty-year-old who was raped by two rebels, also said that:

When you are with these people [rebels], you do not ask questions. I did not even look into their faces. Many of them rubbed black chalk on their face and when you looked at them would say, "What are you staring at?"¹⁰³

Rebel Forces

The RUF committed crimes of sexual violence—often of extreme brutality—from the very beginning of the war when they invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia in March 1991. RUF rebels committed crimes of sexual violence in the course of their military operations, during which thousands of women and girls were abducted and forced to "marry" rebel "husbands." These abducted women and girls were repeatedly raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence throughout the duration of their captivity, which in many cases lasted years. During captivity, these women and girls were also made to carry out forced labor, including carrying heavy loads, cooking, cleaning, etc. Many women and girls have given birth to children fathered by rebels. Especially during the early years of the war, the RUF were assisted by Liberian forces, who also committed rape and other sexual violence.

The AFRC committed crimes of sexual violence from May 1997, using the same tactics as the RUF. Sexual violence by the RUF and the AFRC continued to be committed after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on July 7, 1999, and they were joined in this by the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the AFRC formed after the signing of the Agreement. An unknown number of abducted girls and women still remain under the control of their rebel "husbands" who did not want or feel able to relinquish the "families" they had founded in the bush; in many cases the abductees' own families would not have welcomed them back.

Sexual violence peaked during the rebels' military operations, which occurred countrywide as the rebels sought to capture more territory. After capturing a town or a village, the combatants rewarded themselves by looting and by raping women and girls, many of whom they later abducted. Crimes of sexual violence committed during and following military operations, such as "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Pay Yourself"

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. PHR's calculation is not inclusive of all categories of victim: to the IDP women reporting conflict-related sexual violence, PHR added non-conflict-related sexual violence among non-displaced women, assuming a prevalence rate of 9 percent.

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch interview, Foriah, March 6, 2002.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000.

that took place in 1998, have been documented by Human Rights Watch.¹⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch has also extensively documented the January 1999 invasion of Freetown by the RUF/AFRC, during which sexual violence was systematically committed against women and girls on a massive scale. The sexual violence committed during January 1999 serves as an illustration of the widespread nature of sexual violence committed by the rebel forces. Among the perpetrators were child combatants, and many of the victims were also children. Members of the Small Boys Units (SBUs) within the rebel forces were known to be particularly cruel and committed egregious human rights abuses.

Although there are no exact figures for the number of women and girls subjected to sexual violence during the January 1999 invasion, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Sierra Leone chapter of the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE Sierra Leone), a nongovernmental organization that has been treating survivors of sexual violence since 1999, provided medical treatment and counseling to 1,862 female survivors of sexual violence who had been raped and/or abducted during the invasion. According to MSF, 55 percent of these survivors reported having been gang raped and 200 had become pregnant.¹⁰⁵

As the RUF/AFRC rebels controlled most of the countryside apart from pockets of government-controlled areas in the south and some key towns, including Bumbuna and Freetown, at different times throughout the war, women and girls living in these rebel-held areas were also subjected to sexual violence when the rebels went on patrol or simply sought to assert their domination over the population. Women and girls in government-controlled areas also lived in fear of rebel hit-and-run attacks, during which many women and girls were subjected to sexual violence and abducted. Women and girls residing in Freetown were "spared" until the January 1999 invasion by the RUF/AFRC.

Pro-Government Forces

Human Rights Watch has not documented any cases of sexual violence by the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) prior to the time of the 1997 AFRC coup. According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, of seventy-five women and girls who reported having been raped and identified the rapists' affiliation, only three said they were raped by SLA soldiers.¹⁰⁶ This may in part be due to the fact that survivors would have often found it difficult to distinguish between the rebel factions and the SLA. With the "sobel" phenomenon, the SLA soldiers would disguise themselves as rebels (the rebels were also known to disguise themselves as members of the SLA or the ECOMOG peacekeeping force).

Human Rights Watch has documented only a few cases of sexual violence committed by the pro-government Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The CDF movement consists of groups of traditional hunters and young men organized into militia. They were initially only deployed by the government in their own chiefdoms, in order to ensure their loyalty and discipline and make the best use of their superior bush knowledge.¹⁰⁷ The government provided training, weapons and food to the units. The relatively small number of identified cases of sexual violence perpetrated by the CDF may be related to the CDF's internal rules that stipulate that warriors cannot have sexual intercourse before going to battle, as they would lose some of their protective powers that are bestowed on them during their initiation ceremonies. These powers are meant to make the fighters invincible and immortal. During the initiation ceremonies, the fighters are also instructed not to harm civilians, and required to take an oath to that effect. Thus, it is likely that the pro-government forces did not actually commit sexual violence on a widespread and systematic basis; however, the low number of identified cases may also be partially due to Human Rights Watch's human resource constraints, faced with the overwhelming number of abuses committed by the rebel forces. Research on the CDF was mainly conducted in the south where the Kamajors, the

¹⁰⁴ See Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone," *A Human Rights Watch Report*, July 1998.

¹⁰⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with MSF, Freetown, March, 2000.

¹⁰⁶ PHR report, p. 48. and Table 5 on p. 52. See also Binta Mansaray, "The Invisible Human Rights Abuses in Sierra Leone: Conflict-related Rape, Sexual Slavery and Other Forms of Sexual Violence," June 2001. On file with UNAMSIL human rights section.

¹⁰⁷ The Kamajors operate predominately in the south and east, the Tamaboros in the far north, the Gbetts in the north and the Donzos in the far east. See also "Background" section.

largest and most powerful group of the CDF, are based. In recent years, as the Kamajors have been moved away from their villages of origin and the influence of their traditional chiefs, they have become increasingly undisciplined and cases of rape by Kamajors have become more common.

Peacekeeping Forces

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of sexual violence by UNAMSIL peacekeepers, including the rape of a twelve-year-old girl in Bo by a soldier of the Guinean peacekeeping contingent in March 2001 and the gang rape of a woman by two Ukrainian peacekeepers in April 2002 near Kenema (see below). There appears to be reluctance on the part of UNAMSIL to investigate and take disciplinary measures against the perpetrators. Reports of rape by ECOMOG peacekeepers, the majority of whom were Nigerian, were rare.

Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women and solicited child prostitutes.

Sexual Violence Committed by the Rebel Forces

"Virgination"—Targeting Young Girls

The rebel forces subjected women and girls of all ages, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes to individual and gang rape. Although the rebel forces raped indiscriminately irrespective of age, the rebels favored girls and young women whom they believed to be virgins. This was evident not only by their actions, but was also explicitly stated by them as they chose their victims. As in many countries, Sierra Leonean society places a high value on virginity. Girls who have been "virginated" and are therefore no longer virgins, are considered less eligible for marriage. M.B., a fifteen-year-old girl from Freetown, described how RUF/AFRC rebels deliberately sought out virgins for violation during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown:

We were hiding in the mosque when two rebels dressed in civilian [clothing] entered. It was dark but they shone their flashlights looking for girls and said, "We are coming for young girls ... for virgins, even if they tie their heads like old grandmothers, we will find them." They also said that if the people did not hand over the young girls, they would open fire on all of us.¹⁰⁸

Some victims explained that female rebels physically checked girls to see whether they were virgins.¹⁰⁹ M.W., a thirty-eight-year old nurse who was captured by the RUF/AFRC during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown and forced to treat wounded rebels and civilians, said that the youngest rape victim she treated was "a little nine-year-old from Calaba Town [an area of Freetown]. Her perineum was bleeding and had been badly torn. Every day we gave her sit baths and she eventually recovered."¹¹⁰ The consequences of sexual violence for virgins can be particularly severe as these testimonies highlight, although mature women also reported experiencing similar consequences.¹¹¹

R.T. was about sixteen when she was brutally raped vaginally and anally by ten RUF rebels in the forest near Koidu in Kono district in January 1997. R.T. developed vasico-vaginal fistula (VVF) and vasico-rectal fistula (VRF) from her brutal gang rape:

I was hiding in the bush with my parents and two older women when the RUF found our hiding place. I was the only young woman and the RUF accused me of having an SLA husband. I was still a virgin. I had only just started my periods and recently gone through secret society. There were ten rebels, including four child soldiers, armed with two RPGs [rocket propelled grenades] and AK-47s. The rebels did not use their real names and wore ski masks so only their eyes were

¹⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 1, 1999.

¹⁰⁹ It should be noted that virginity can not be medically proven.

¹¹⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 21, 1999. The victim probably suffered from vasico-rectal fistula (a tear or opening in the tissue between the rectum and the vagina, usually resembling an open blood vessel), which would have left her incontinent.

¹¹¹ International humanitarian law prohibits all rape and other acts of sexual violence, of course irrespective of whether the victim was a virgin or not.

visible. The rebels said that they wanted to take me away. My mother pleaded with them, saying that I was her only child and to leave me with her. The rebels said that "If we do not take your daughter, we will either rape or kill her." The rebels ordered my parents and the two other women to move away. Then they told me to undress. I was raped by the ten rebels, one after the other. They lined up, waiting for their turn and watched while I was being raped vaginally and in my anus. One of the child combatants was about twelve years. The three other child soldiers were about fifteen. The rebels threatened to kill me if I cried.

My parents, who could hear what was happening, cried but could do nothing to protect me. I was bleeding a lot from my vagina and anus and was in so much pain. My mother washed me in warm water and salt but I bled for three days. I can no longer control my bladder or bowels as I was torn below. We stayed in the bush until ECOMOG took over Koidu. When we came out of the bush, even adults would run away from me and refused to eat with me because I smelled so badly. I had an operation in 2000 but it did not work. Before I got a catheter in 2001, I had no friends, as I smelled too bad. I am still in pain and have a problem with vaginal discharge. I also have nightmares and feel discouraged.¹¹²

This extreme sexual violence is illustrated also by the following testimony by F.B., who describes the resultant deaths of eight young girls in one Liberian refugee camp alone (no doubt many others died from similar treatment during the war). F.B.'s testimony also illustrates the RUF's connection to Liberia and the role of Liberian mercenaries in the RUF movement. F.B. was a ten-year-old girl living in Mano village in Kailahun district near the Liberian border when the RUF accused civilians in her village of helping the SLA. Her family decided to flee to Liberia in November 1991, but was fired upon by the rebels as they fled. At least fifteen civilians were killed, including her father and several women with babies on their backs:

Only six of my family survived; my mother, one brother, two sisters, one uncle, and me. After hiding and fleeing through the bush for three days, Mohammed, my uncle, found someone with a boat to help us cross over to Liberia. We crossed into Vahun where there was a sort of refugee camp. We were there for two weeks and terrible things happened. We thought we had escaped from the rebels but we found many of them there. They controlled the camp. Even though food was being air dropped, the rebels took it all. They took everything we had, our money, salt, and all our food. The rebels were mixed Sierra Leoneans and Liberians.

About a week after arriving, the rebels came into our house in the evening and took my fifteen-year-old sister away. My mother stayed up the whole night. The next day my uncle went from hut to hut looking for her. He called her name and heard her groaning inside a hut. He picked her up and carried her home. When my mom saw her she burst out crying. I was only ten and didn't know anything about man business. My sister was crying all the time and couldn't walk. She cried, "Oh mother, I'm going to die." My mother just held her and told her it would be O.K. My uncle exchanged five gallons of palm oil so we could get some salt, which my mother later mixed with water and had my sister sit in. She was bleeding a lot. She told me they had tied her mouth and raped her many times, but I didn't know what rape was.

After that my uncle shaved my head, gave me trousers and made me look like a boy. When I was walking around a camp I saw a few girls aged under twelve years old, lying on the ground with their legs spread open and blood coming out between their legs. Some had their dresses pulled up and others had cloth stuffed in their mouths. During the two weeks I was in Vahun I saw eight girls like this. Sometimes their family would come and wrap them in white so I knew they had

¹¹² Human Rights Watch interview, IDP camp called "Lebanese Camp," March 2, 2002. Women and girls with obstetric fistulae suffer from a constant wetness that results in genital ulcerations, frequent infections and a terrible odor. These fistulae generally require surgery although occasionally they spontaneously heal.

died. Other times no one picked them up and they stayed there for days until someone buried them. There were so many girls who had lost their parents and were there alone, so no one would come for them.

I saw the rebels catching young and even older women. Once they caught an old woman. She said, "No, leave me. I'm too old for this business." But they made fun of her saying, "Oh look, we have caught a young *Bundu* [initiate into secret society] girl here." Other times I heard women screaming in the middle of the night. Everyday people were dying—from hunger, illness, and this rape. After that I had dreams about a dead person coming to hurt me.

The only reason we stayed that long was because people were still moving across the border and we figured things were even worse in Sierra Leone. Besides, the rebels stopped us from going back home, and we did not know anyone in Liberia so we would have died of hunger.¹¹³

M.M. was only eleven when she was abducted, together with her aunt and her aunt's four children, when Koidu was attacked during the dry season¹¹⁴ in 1994. M.M. had not yet experienced her first period or been initiated into secret society:

I was raped by seven child combatants, who were aged between fifteen and sixteen years old, on the way to Kailahun. I was raped in my vagina and anally. Other rebels and also civilians saw me being raped but the civilians were too afraid to protect me. My aunt put native herbs on my genital area but I bled for five days. The RUF had medicine but would not give it to us civilians. My aunt carried me on her back, as I could not walk because of the pain. It took us five days to reach Kailahun. A rebel commander wanted my aunt to be his wife but she refused so he killed her. In Kailahun, I was not raped again. Since my rape, I have only experienced irregular periods and my belly is always swollen like I am pregnant.¹¹⁵

M.F. was abducted from Koinadugu town in Koinadugu district in September 1998 when the RUF/AFRC attacked the town. She was only thirteen at the time and was brutally raped both vaginally and anally by five RUF rebels. During the same attack, the RUF killed over thirty older women:

I was only thirteen and a virgin. They forced me to go down on my hands and knees with my bottom in the air and raped me both vaginally and anally. Five rebels raped me on that first day. My clothes were bloodied and it hurt to urinate and defecate afterwards. The rebels who raped me promised to take me to Freetown and give me money and dresses. They gave me nothing after they used me. I was given to one of them, Mohammed, as his wife. We stayed in Koinadugu town for four days. I was with my parents but could not tell them about the rapes although my mother heard me being raped.

The RUF said they came to kill civilians who were ungrateful and talked bad about the RUF. The RUF cut my grandmother with a knife and beat her with a pestle. She died. The RUF told the older women to go to the mosque to attend a ceremony. More than thirty women, some of whom had children, went to the mosque. The RUF set fire to the mosque. Another old woman was rolled into a mat and the mat was set on fire.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000. *Bundu* is one of the secret societies that initiate girls and perform female genital cutting.

¹¹⁴ The dry season in Sierra Leone is approximately between November and May.

¹¹⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Lebanese Camp, March 2, 2002.

¹¹⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabaia, March 7, 2002.

Rape Victims Subjected to Multiple Human Rights Abuses

Rapes were often preceded by or followed by other human rights abuses against the victim, her family members and/or her community. Hardly any family was unscathed by abuse during the war. The PHR report highlighted that 94 percent of the 991 female-headed households surveyed had experienced at least one serious human rights abuse during the ten-year period.¹¹⁷ M.P., who was twenty-four years old when the RUF attacked Jaiweii village in Kailahun district in May 1991, testified:

I was captured together with my husband, my three young children and other civilians as we were fleeing from the RUF when they entered Jaiweii. Two rebels asked to have sex with me but when I refused, they beat me with the butt of their guns. My legs were bruised and I lost my three front teeth. Then the two rebels raped me in front of my children and other civilians. Many other women were raped in public places. I also heard of a woman from Kalu village near Jaiweii being raped only one week after having given birth. The RUF stayed in Jaiweii village for four months and I was raped by three other wicked rebels throughout this period.

The rebels, who spoke Liberian English, said they were fighting for the SLPP to be in power. When the RUF first entered Jaiweii, they accused my husband of giving information to the SLA, so they tied his hands behind his back and beat him mercilessly. They kept him tied up and continued to beat him. After six days, he died and they threatened to kill me if I cried. The RUF also shot three other men whom they accused of giving information to the SLA. My three children all died because they became sick and there was no medicine. The older one who was five years died one week before the two younger ones who died on the same day. They were only three and seventeen months old.¹¹⁸

M.P. added that the RUF had said that they could do whatever they want with women whom they "owned." A.J., a fourteen-year-old student, was abducted by the RUF from Pujehun and was held by them from February to May 1994. She was first tortured, caged, and then brutally raped:

On February 3, 1994 at around 8:00 p.m., the RUF attacked Pujehun. There was lots of firing because the SLA was deployed here. As we were fleeing, we ran straight into a group of over one hundred RUF. They were dressed in civilian clothes and nearly all had guns. Among those rebels was one named Maliki, who was actually from Pujehun. RUF Commander Bai Bureh started to select several people from our group. As he was doing the selecting, Maliki told him to choose me because if they let me go, I would go back to Pujehun and tell the SLA that he was there. They chose eight of us, four young men and four young women, including three of my cousins. They told the rest of the civilians to go back into the bush and said that if they found them the next day they would be killed. We were taken to their camp.

Two weeks later, the four young men managed to escape. When the rebels found out, they blamed us for what happened. They said the boys were really SLA soldiers that were there to get information on the RUF. I was then tortured by a Liberian RUF commander named C.O. Rackin. He said I was "bright and bold" and must have known how they escaped. He interrogated me, asking me if the boys were SLA's. During the interrogation he cut me in twenty-one places with a knife including a deep cut on my left breast. He drew a small, small circle in the dirt and told me to step inside and walk around in it. Any part of my body left outside he stabbed with a knife.

Then a commander called Momoh Rogers, who was the battalion commander, ordered that my cousin and I be put in a wooden cage smaller than one square meter. He said that if our brothers

¹¹⁷ PHR gave the following examples of serious human rights abuses: beating, bodily injury, amputation, torture, killing, forced labor, captured for less than one day, sexual assault without rape, rape, abduction, burned dwelling, looting. PHR report, pp. 45-47.

¹¹⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Lebanese IDP Camp, March 2, 2002.

who had gone to tell the SLA came to attack, it would be very easy for them to kill us. The cage was what the village people used to store their husk rice in and it had almost no ventilation. We were only let out to defecate. They told me I had to pee on myself in the box. They poured water into the cracks but it was never enough and was dirty. Sometimes they dropped cassava and boiled bananas into the cage, feeding us like we were animals. The stab wounds I had got infected and I got sores all over my body. They were painful and smelled very badly.

After about two weeks in the cage, one of Patrick's bodyguards took me to C.O. Patrick's house. When I saw him, I told him about the sores on my feet and breasts. I told him I was in pain and asked for treatment. C.O. Patrick told me to shut up and ordered me to go into the house. He turned to his bodyguard and said that if I refused, I was to be taken behind the house and executed. When we got inside, Patrick told me to lie down on the floor. Then he forced himself upon me. I was a virgin. He was violent and rough. Then he told me to turn over and give him my behind. But I told him I could not lie down because my breast was so swollen. So he brought a chair and told me to stand up and lean onto the chair. Then he stood behind me and tried to shove his penis into my vagina. The first time he did this I fell over onto my chest, which was so painful. I started bleeding from my chest wound. Then he told me to get up and said if I did not hold the chair firmly he was going to kill me. He took a long time doing that thing to me. I was crying from the pain of my breast and because it was painful, being the first time. He told me to shut up. As he was sexing me he accused my brothers of being spies and said he was going to kill me and that he was only waiting for the others to come from the frontline to do it.

C.O. Patrick asked if I had done sex before and I told him "No, I am a school-going girl." Then he said, "Well, tonight you are going to have sex, because you are going to be killed and you should do it before you die." I was terrified. I started crying. All I could think of was my death and all that guy could do was do that thing to me. After he was satisfied, I was taken back to the cage.¹¹⁹

A.M. was eighteen when she fled Freetown with her two children, two sisters, and brother after the 1997 AFRC coup. Not only was she first forced to watch the execution of three male civilians by Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers in Fadugu, Koinadugu district, but also the rebel execution of her brother and sister. The RUF tried to get her to eat her brother's liver and heart. Her sister's head was also placed on her legs:

After the rebels were driven out of Kabala by ECOMOG, the rebels spread to different towns, including Mongo, Badela, and Dankawali. One day I went with my brother to wash in the stream, as I was afraid to go by myself. We heard shots, which my brother thought must have come from ECOMOG soldiers. I was afraid. We met three rebels with guns who accused my brother of being a SLA soldier. "Superman" was the commander. They beat my brother with their gun butts and took off his clothes. "Superman" forced my brother to go down on his hands and knees and made me sit beside him. They cut his neck from the back and then took an axe and cut his back. They removed his heart and liver and put them on my hands. The heart had more shape and the liver was flat. They tried to force me to eat them but I refused to. Another rebel, Colonel Titus, a mercenary who spoke Liberian English, arrived and told the others not to force me to eat my brother's heart and liver. He said he would show me how they will deal with me. He said they should abduct me. They took me back into the village of Dankawali where we met my grandmother on her veranda. She was tied up and she said that another rebel commander, Hakim, had carried my two children and small sister away in the first group.

The rebels had abducted another group of twenty-five persons and held them by the cotton tree. My big sister was under the cotton tree. I told her that the rebels killed our brother. Colonel Titus slapped my sister and told her not to cry. They killed my sister and two other women and placed

¹¹⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Pujehun, February 12, 2002.

their cut off heads on my legs. The rebels also locked some villagers in the houses and set all houses on fire.¹²⁰

H.K., a sixteen-year-old student, was abducted from Freetown during the January 1999 invasion. She was taken to Makeni where she was "virginated" and forced to be the wife of Colonel "Jaja," a twenty-two-year-old half-Liberian who threatened to kill her entire family if she escaped. H.K. was brutally tortured after Colonel "Jaja" accused her of stealing his money, which was in fact taken at gunpoint from her by "Superman," a notorious rebel commander and his bodyguard called "Yellowman." She described what happened afterwards:

Then the rebels took me into a stream and tied me to a tree in the water. They told people to beat me. I was in water up to my head. "Jaja" said the boys should cut down the tree and let me drown. I was there for several days, maybe up to a week or so. Once a water snake swam by and ate my foot in the water. When I was tied there, Jaja cut my neck and put cocaine into my body. He also gave me marijuana cigarettes to smoke. Finally he untied me and put me in an old container where I stayed for several days. While in the guardroom Jaja and Alhaji "Cold Boots" came several times to give me drugs.¹²¹

The rebels often used psychological torture against civilians by, for example, making them clap or sing in praise while watching family and friends being killed, raped or mutilated. They further exerted their domination over civilians by not allowing them to show any emotion, and threatening to kill anyone who did. In 1997, when K.M. was abducted by the RUF from Kabala in Koinadugu district, her brother was shot in front of her. The RUF accused him of planning to escape. She was not allowed to show any emotion and was forced to throw his body in the river. In 1999, K.M.'s husband was killed in front of her by RUF Captain Solvelar in Yomandu in Tonkolili district, when a child combatant accused her husband of not doing his job properly. As Captain Solvelar shot K.M.'s husband, he warned her not to cry otherwise she would be killed. Later in the same year, K.M.'s baby was killed in front of her in Kambia district by a rebel captain who wanted to rape her:

Captain "Danger" pulled my baby from my back and before I could do anything, he sliced my child in two. I was told not to cry as otherwise I would be killed as well.¹²²

Rape with Objects and Other Sexual Torture, including Sexual Mutilation

The rebels frequently used objects, including weapons, burning wood, and hot oil, to rape or otherwise torture (including sexually torture) women and girls, sometimes resulting in their death. In 1994, J.M., an elderly man from Giehun village in Kailahun district, witnessed the killing of nine civilians accused of plotting to set Foday Sankoh up for a government ambush. One of those civilians, a woman named Janneh, was alleged to have been one of Sankoh's "wives." J.M. described how rebels brought her into the village square, forced her to lie down and then poured boiling palm oil into her vagina and ears:

The RUF rounded up about seventy of us civilians, including Abi and Janneh, and accused us of making a plot to arrest Sankoh. The commander said we were to be killed but that first he would do an investigation. First he called upon Abi who accused Janneh of calling people in Freetown to arrange something against Sankoh. So Janneh was the first to be killed. The rebels grabbed her, stripped her and threw her down in front of the whole village. Several of them pulled her legs apart and held her tightly. They poured a pan of boiling palm oil into her vagina and then into her ears. This terrified us. She started shaking all over and was bleeding from the nostrils and mouth. While on the ground they struck her with a gun and danced around her saying, "When you were loving with the old man [Sankoh], you didn't show us any respect, but now your time for punishment has come." She died about an hour later. The rebels said they were sent by Sankoh who was living in Kailahun about seven miles. Nothing small or big happened without his

¹²⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 9, 2002.

¹²¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 12, 1999.

¹²² Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7 and 9, 2002.

knowledge. After killing Janneh they poured hot oil in the mouths, eyes and noses of three other villagers, and then shot five others. I guess Janneh must have known all of Sankoh's secrets.¹²³

M.F., the thirteen-year-old who was raped by five rebels (see above, p. 30), witnessed how her stepmother's mother was beaten by the RUF with a long pestle in Momoria village in Koinadugu district in 1998. The rebels then shoved the pestle into her anus. M.F. said that her stepmother's mother was still alive when they left her with the pestle in her anus, which was bleeding.¹²⁴ One woman also reportedly had pepper put in her vagina as the RUF suspected her of being the wife of a SLA soldier. Rebels inserted burning firewood into the vagina of twenty-five-year-old F.T. and another woman during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown:

On 21 January 1999, I went to a neighbor's house to buy rice, as I had not eaten for over two days. The rebels had been in the area and as I bought two cups from my neighbor, we heard the rebels coming again. My neighbor told me to leave quickly so that he could lock up his house. When I left with another woman and a man, we met a group of ten rebels who surrounded us. They were dressed in full combat [uniform] and asked us where we were going in Krio.

The rebels asked us what we could give them, so the man took out all his money and gave it to them. He was then allowed to go. As the other woman and I did not have any money, they told us to take off our clothes at gunpoint. We begged them not to harm us. The rebels then told us to lie on the dirt ground and open our legs. They put their guns to our throats and stomachs to make sure that we followed their order. Once we were on the ground all the rebels surrounded us, and a tall rebel well over six feet went to the kitchen of Parliament House and took a piece of burning firewood from the fire. He then squatted down and with his two hands inserted it into my vagina. Then he returned to the fire and got another piece and then a third. I felt like I was being stabbed inside.

He did the same to the other woman. While they did this to us, I heard them say "This is the way we are going to fuck you. We are not able to do to you half of the things we do to people in the provinces. You bastard civilians, you hypocrites; as soon as you see ECOMOG, you start to point fingers at us."

They left shortly afterwards and I managed to drag myself to a nearby house with blood gushing from my vagina. I went to a clinic where the doctor removed bits of firewood from my vagina. I feel so unhappy and fear my husband will find another wife to satisfy his sexual desire. The treatment is very slow and I do not have money for treatment. There are sores inside me. I can not sleep at night or walk more than one hundred yards.¹²⁵

H.K., the sixteen-year-old Freetown student forced to be the wife of Colonel "Jaja," had an umbrella shoved up her vagina as part of the torture that followed her being accused by "Jaja" of stealing his money:

When Jaja came home, I told him what happened and instead of believing me, he blamed me and accused me of having stolen the money. He dragged me out of the house into the street and started beating me. He caused a great scene. He stripped me, tied me up and hit me again and again with a stick. He also beat with the butt of his gun. Then he took an umbrella and pushed it up inside me two times—he shoved it up into my privates—hard. Many people were standing around watching and even some of the other rebels told him to leave me. He went crazy. He started shooting up in the air. I lay there for a few days, naked and bleeding. I was three months pregnant but after this I aborted. I bled for over a month. Once a boy named Junior came by and put his hand inside my vagina. He brought out his hand, which was all bloody and said, "Look at

¹²³ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, November 11, 1999.

¹²⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7, 2002.

¹²⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

your blood, you're sick." All the civilians seeing this felt sorry for me, but of course they couldn't say anything.

Rebel forces were known for mutilating pregnant mothers to find out the sex of the unborn child. According to witnesses, they would bet large sums of money, and the rebel who had rightly guessed the sex of the unborn child after the woman's belly had been cut open would keep the money. Some women were cut open alive, but sometimes the women were killed before the rebels cut their abdomens open. K.M. who was abducted during the 1997 attack on Kabala, witnessed the killing and sexual mutilation of a pregnant woman near Kono in Kono district (see above):

They captured a Koranko woman who was pregnant. Two RUF, Captain "Danger" and C.O. "Cut Hand" argued about the sex of the child. They bet 100,000 leones [approximately U.S.\$50] on the sex of the child. Then they shot the woman dead and opened her belly. The RUF held up the baby with the placenta, which they shook in the air. The baby cried and then died. I wanted to run away but my husband said that the civilians would think that I was a rebel and that they would kill me.¹²⁶

Fifteen-year-old F.K. was raped by the RUF in Lunsar in Port Loko district in May 2000 and witnessed the sexual mutilation of a pregnant woman as well as the killing of her three male relatives, and six amputations:

I was raped when the RUF attacked Lunsar in May 2000 by four rebels including one man called "Put Fire," who had made me his rebel wife from 1997 to 2000. One of the other rebels was called "Kill Man No Blood." While I was being raped, the rebels found my three male relatives who were hiding under their beds. They stabbed them with their bayonets and then shot them. They raped me in my bedroom and then brought me into the living room. Three men and three women were also brought into the room. They were put in line and then the rebels gave them the choice between their life or their money. The rebels strip searched each one and then killed them on the spot. The group was forced to watch as each was killed.

One of the women was six months pregnant and slightly disabled. She was last in the row. When it was her turn, she was stabbed in the neck and fell down. The rebels started to discuss whether she was carrying a boy or a girl. They bet on the sex of the baby so they decided to check it. Kill Man No Blood split open her belly. It was a boy. One of the other rebels took the baby out and showed everyone that it was a boy. The baby was still alive when he threw it on the ground next to the woman but died shortly after. As the rebels took me away, I saw six men who had just been amputated. Some had an arm cut off below the elbow, others above the elbow. They were screaming, "Please kill us, don't leave us this way."¹²⁷

Sexual Violence with the Added Element of Violating Cultural Norms

The rebel forces have used sexual violence as a weapon to terrorize, humiliate and punish, and to force the civilian population into submission. The rebels sought complete domination by doing whatever they wanted with women, including sexual acts that, by having the additional element of assailing cultural norms, violated not only the victim but also her family or the wider society. The rebels have forced civilians to commit incest, one of the biggest taboos in any society. One survivor witnessed the RUF trying to force a brother to rape his sister in Sambanya village in Koinadugu district. When the brother refused to do so, the rebels shot him.¹²⁸ Fathers were forced to rape their daughters. Fathers were forced to dance naked in front of their daughters and vice versa. In Sierra Leone, postmenopausal and breastfeeding women are presumed not to be sexually active, but rebels violated this cultural norm by raping old women and breastfeeding mothers. Child combatants also raped women who could have been their mothers or in some instances even their grandmothers. Many rapes were committed in

¹²⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, March 7 and 9, 2002.

¹²⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 25, 2000.

¹²⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 9, 2002.

full view of other rebels and civilians. Victims were also raped in mosques, churches, and sacred places of initiation.

During the January 1999, invasion of Freetown, A.C. was forced to watch the rape of his daughter by RUF/AFRC rebels:

The rebel in charge was a thirty-year-old ex-SLA known as "Amos." I knew him from before. He had plasters on his face. The others were called "Junior" and "Blood," who did most of the talking. They gathered five young girls together, including my fifteen-year-old daughter, and put them in the back room. They asked us for five million leones [approximately U.S. \$2,500] otherwise they threatened our girls would be killed. We managed to collect 350,000 leones [approximately U.S. \$175], which we gave to them.

Then they brought out the girls. They pushed my daughter and a seventeen-year-old on the bed in the parlor and started tearing off their clothes. I peeked through a crack in the door and could see them fighting with my daughter. They put clothes in her mouth so she would not scream. The rebels punched, slapped her and knocked her head with the butt of their rifle. Then one of them opened the door and asked who the fathers of the girls were. One of them took us and lined us up right in front of the bed and said, "Don't you want to see what we do to your daughters?" We begged them to leave them alone but they said, "If you continue to talk, we will burn this house and kill everyone of you." A rebel had his gun pointed at us the whole time and there were two more at the door. Amos raped my daughter and Blood raped another girl. Then the rebel with the gun and the one guarding took their turns. My daughter was crying but they covered her mouth and told her to shut up. Blood then told the girls to get dressed and they took them away.¹²⁹

S.G., a fifty-year-old widow, was raped by a teenage rebel called Commander "Don't Blame God" and subsequently had both arms amputated in Mattru village in Bo district prior to the 1996 elections:

I pleaded but Commander Don't Blame God said he was going to kill me if I didn't lie down. I told him it had been such a long, long time since I had sex. During the rape I was pleading with him saying, "Don't kill me, please don't kill me." He was so rough with me. Then he took me up a big dune above Mattru village. As we were walking, he said he was going to kill me. I pleaded with him and he then said, "I've changed my mind, I'm going to give you a letter." Once we got there I saw many more rebels, about twenty. I was stripped naked down to my underwear. It was humiliating. Then they asked me to sit down and wait. Commander Don't Blame God said: "I have a letter for you but wait for the cutlass man to come." Then the one with the machete came and told me to put out my left arm. It took them three chops with the cutlass to cut off my arm. After this I begged them not to cut my other arm but they struggled with me and a rebel held it down and cut it off. The cutlass man said, "We belong to Foday Sankoh's group." Then one of them took my left arm and put it under my vagina and kicked me twice in the vagina ... very, very hard.¹³⁰

D.T. was gang raped by a child combatant and three other RUF rebels in the rainy season in 2000 near Foriah village in Koinadugu district:

I was hiding in the bush from the rebels with about fifteen other villagers when the rebels found us. The rebels separated me from the others because my nine-month-old son was crying. A child combatant ordered me at gunpoint to put my son down. He then raped me. I do not know how young he was but he had not yet been circumcised. He was maybe as young as twelve. Then three other rebel men raped me. When I was being raped, I made no movement as they might think that

¹²⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

¹³⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

I was trying to resist. I was bleeding after being raped by four males. After being raped, the rebels forced me to carry a heavy load and walk to Kania town. I escaped the same day and returned to the farm. I explained to my husband that I had been raped but he was happy to accept me back.¹³¹

R.F., a thirty-three-year-old farmer, explained how she felt after she was gang raped by West Side Boys, including four child combatants, at Petifu village in Port Loko district in November 1999:

Four children between ten and twelve years used me. They were so small I could barely feel them inside me. The small ones tried to imitate the older ones and one of them kept saying, "I'm trying it, I'm trying it." It was the war that brought that humiliation. I kept comparing them to my own children; my first-born son is ten. I forgave them because they are children. It was not of their own making. They must have been drugged.¹³²

In December 1994, thirty-year-old A.B. was abducted with six other women from Yonibani in Tonkolili district by the RUF when they launched a surprise attack with the collusion of the SLA. The RUF made the women carry looted items to their camp, where A.B. stayed for a week before escaping. She herself was repeatedly raped by two rebels, including one Liberian, and witnessed the rape of an old woman with gray hair:

At least four of the women I had been abducted with were raped. Before they raped me, the rebels went for an old woman with white hair. When she realized what they wanted, she took off her headscarf to show her white hair and said, "I'm old, I have stopped having sex." At first the commander said the rebels should not touch her because she was old. But the other rebels got annoyed and started insulting the commander saying, "Fine, you can fuck any woman you want, anytime you want, but now that we have one we want, you say no." The commander finally said that they could go ahead so all five rebels, including a small boy of fifteen years raped her. One was on his knees with his trousers down while the others stood around watching.

When I saw that I felt sick. When I saw a young boy and that old woman, I realized they could do anything and that they were going to do the same thing to me. But I guess I was lucky as only two did it to me.¹³³

S.J., a wealthy forty-five-year-old woman, was raped by RUF rebels, including a child combatant, and then burnt in late January 1999 in Manjoro village in Bombali district:

Thirty rebels attacked our village. The rebels said that we, the civilians don't want peace. I saw them kill three people and were it not for God, I would have been the fourth. Then they burned thirteen houses and looted all our things. I ran with my four children to the house in the bush where we tend to the cows. We slept there with the cows for a few days but then seven rebels surprised us there. The commander of this group was called C.O. Caca Scatter. He was a Mende. Others were speaking Mandingo and Temne.

They started stealing what few possessions I had and then C.O. Caca Scatter said that I should be raped. When I heard that order I pleaded, "Please, don't do that one to me." But they said they would do whatever they wanted. Four raped me and the last one to rape me was a fifteen-year-old. I could have given birth to him, he was so young. He put a knife to my throat and said he was going to kill me but the C.O. said I shouldn't be killed.

Then they tied my hands behind me and C.O. Caca Scatter burnt me. He scooped up hot charcoal from the fire we had been cooking with and tried to burn my face with it. I struggled and turned

¹³¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Foriah, March 6, 2002. The rainy season starts in May and ends in October.

¹³² Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko, November 27, 1999.

¹³³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000.

my face so he burned my chest instead. He did this four times on my front and seven times on my back. Each time they picked up the charcoal and held it on my body until it burned deep into my skin. They left me with my skin burning but I could not roll on the ground for fear it would catch fire and burn me even more. When they started to burn me I pleaded for them to kill me. I started screaming and my children came around to try and save me. They took two of my children, gave them looted property to carry and took them away. That is the last I have heard of them.¹³⁴

T.B., a fifty-year-old woman was abducted from Freetown during the January 1999 invasion and made to walk to Magburaka in Bombali district. There, a RUF/AFRC rebel raped her until she developed an abscess in her vagina:

In Magburaka, I was first raped by three rebels. While doing it they called me a bastard child and that civilians wanted to burn them all alive. After that I was taken as a wife by a commander called "Bird Bod" who was in his thirties. He raped me every day. They were always on drugs. He said he didn't have a wife so I cooked and washed for him. He roughed and beat me and used to put his fingers violently up inside me. He would get an erection while he was doing this and would sometimes rape me afterwards. I think this is how I started to get boils—I had five or six of them. It started to create an ulcer. Over the two months I was with them it got worse and worse. It was terribly painful but Commander Bird still raped me and put his fingers up me even though I had this problem. I don't know why the RUF would treat an old woman like me in such a way.

The abscess got very swollen and started to hang down between my thighs. I could barely walk. It started to smell very bad and it was then that the commander finally drove me away. I walked for two to three weeks through the bush going from village to village until I got to Masiaka. In every village I went, the women felt for me and would give me food and make a bath of herbs and salt for me to soak in. Then when I felt strong enough, I would walk to the next village. When I reached Freetown, I received medical treatment. My husband has accepted me back and feels sorry for me.¹³⁵

Breastfeeding mothers were also not spared by the rebel factions even though in Sierra Leonean culture, women are not supposed to have sexual intercourse until their children have been weaned and can walk, which can take up to three years.¹³⁶ Sierra Leoneans believe that doing so will weaken the breast milk and the ability of the child to fend off infection. Women whose infants died from malnutrition after they—the mothers—had been raped frequently attributed the death of their child to the fact that they had been raped. It is also a specific crime for a man to commit adultery with another man's wife while she is breastfeeding. Traditionally, the guilty spouses are thought to be under a curse and will suffer misfortune.¹³⁷ A.B., who was raped by two rebels and witnessed the rape of an old woman, tried at first to dissuade the first rebel from raping her by telling him that she was a breastfeeding mother with full breasts, but the rebel said he did not care.¹³⁸ M.C. was breastfeeding her two-week-old baby when she was brutally gang raped by RUF/AFRC rebels in early January 1999 near Mabang in Tonkolili district; she breastfed her baby while being raped. She suffered a prolapsed uterus¹³⁹ as a consequence of the rape:

At the time of the January 1999 offensive, my husband who is a policeman was based in Mile 91. I became very worried about him and decided to travel to find him. I left Bo on January 8. I had just given birth to a baby girl two weeks before so was still feeling very weak but I desperately wanted to find my man.

¹³⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

¹³⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, July 8, 1999.

¹³⁶ Mariane C. Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2001), p. 131.

¹³⁷ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Law*, pp. 127-8 and 131.

¹³⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

¹³⁹ A prolapsed uterus is a condition in which the uterus drops from its normal position. In severe cases, such as those that may be associated with injury from sexual violence, the cervix and uterus may protrude beyond the vaginal opening.

I arrived late in the evening. Then all of a sudden we heard firing. There was confusion and armed rebels captured me. They took me to their bush camp in a place called Mabang. They started sexing me two days later. I tried to fight and told them to leave me, but several times they put a pistol into my vagina. I gave myself up to God and asked that he save me. The first day, about ten sexed me. After the first day there were fewer men, between three and six a day. Every day they came and stood in line waiting to rape me. All together there were over thirty different men. They were aged between seventeen and twenty-five years old. The younger ones were rough and most of them seemed to be on drugs. I think these were RUF people. Most of them seemed to be Mendes. I saw many young girls in their camp. I guess the lucky ones only had one rebel. But I'm from Bo and wouldn't allow myself to be together with one of them. I told them I wasn't a Kamajor and that my husband was a policeman and they said, "Oh policemen are our enemies ... we've killed them all. Forget about your husband."

Sometimes they tied my legs to my arms with my legs spread and raped me one after the other. They said since I was from Bo and I was a Kamajor's wife that they were going to rape me to death. [Sometimes] I held my baby Hawanatu in my arms while they were raping me. When she cried they said they wanted to shoot her so I gave her the breast.

They raped me for two or three weeks and then in early February, my vagina came out [i.e. she suffered a prolapsed uterus]. It was so, so painful. I can't tell you how much it hurt. When this happened, I thought I was going to die. In order to get it to go back in I had to lie down and push it back in. To urinate, I had to lie down. They provoked me and made fun of me. They said now my Kamajor husband will not be able to have sex with me. A wife of one of the commanders told a villager to help me escape which they did. He took me to a nice woman in another village away from the rebel area and after explaining my problem, she helped me so much. She gave me herbs and tried to cure me and my baby who by that time was vomiting and very sick. It's only God that helped keep my little Hawanatu alive. He decided that this little child is mine to keep. Later, when I was stronger, I made it to Freetown and had an operation for my prolapsed uterus. I feel much better now.¹⁴⁰

Rebels also raped pregnant women. In polygynous marriages, pregnant women generally stop having sexual intercourse with their husbands once their pregnancy has been confirmed, to protect the fetus. R.F, the thirty-three-year-old farmer gang raped by West Side Boys at Petifu, Port Loko, in November 1999 (see above, p. 39), was six months pregnant at the time. As the result of the gang rape she delivered prematurely, causing the baby's death:

I went with Isatu, her husband and my five-year-old son to harvest rice in Isatu's village, Petifu. We traveled by boat and at night to avoid the rebels. When we were resting having worked all the next day, we heard the rebels. They were all over the village and told us to give them our rice and palm oil. Several of them started hitting me on the head with their guns. Three were wearing uniform, the others wore civilian clothes. They spoke all different languages.

One of them tied a rope around my waist like a goat and pushed me out of the door screaming, "Show me where your people are." My little boy was left sleeping on the bed. Seven of the rebels then led me about a mile out of the village, screaming at me to tell them where we had hidden the rice and palm oil. I told them I was a stranger there but they did not believe me. They took me into a small farmhouse where they all used me. This went on for a few hours until the cloth I was lying on was soaked. I could barely walk. Then they ordered me to get up and dragged me like a sheep back to the village.

¹⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 5, 1999

Once back in the village, they put me in a house and more of them started raping me. I was used by at least twenty rebels. I think the whole unit raped me throughout the night. The only one who did not use me was the commander. He kept coming in and saying, "Have you had your turn?" He was the one they kept calling "Commander."

When one of the Temne speaking rebels was raping me I said, "Please brother, talk to these people and ask them to leave me." But he said he could not do anything. Another rebel pulled out a knife when he was on top of me and said if I said anything he would kill me. I told them I was pregnant and said, "Can't you see? I have a six month belly." But they said, "We do not care. We see your belly but so what." Two of them told me to stoop down, but I couldn't and they just pushed me down and used me. After many had used me one of them said, "Oh, there is no more sweetness there," so they turned me over and did it to me from behind. Three of them did it to me like that, and now when I go to the toilet it is so painful; I am still bleeding and it feels like my insides are coming out. One rebel had sex with me several times. He said he was punishing me for not having shown him where the rice and palm oil was hidden. I yelled for the commander and complained, saying, "He wants to kill me, tell him to leave me!" but he said, "We have killed others that are better than you." I did not complain after that. They kept saying they were about to stop fighting—that they really want peace and that after peace comes, they won't do these things any more.

In the early hours of the morning, they finally left. They wanted me to carry their looted items but I could not walk. They took other people whom they used to carry the looted goods. At one point I tried to get up but could not, I slipped and fell down to earth. By this time I had started bleeding. I felt my baby trembling in my belly. A few hours later the water broke and then I started to have contractions. I have five children and had never even had a miscarriage. I had about three hours of labor before giving birth. The little thing shook for a minute or so and then it died. It was so beautiful; it had fine hair and the face was so pretty. I wrapped it with a cloth. I could not bear to look whether it was a boy or a girl. I was gushing out blood and shortly after I delivered the placenta. I felt dizzy. I was barely able to walk.

Later when I had a little more strength I covered my baby and threw it in a pit latrine. I felt so bad for throwing it away like that but I did not have the strength to bury it properly. After thinking everything over, I am only angry at this war and thankful that I still have my life and that the life of my child [her five-year-old] was spared. It's only God that saved him. He was lying on the bed the whole time.¹⁴¹

Forced Pregnancies

Many women and girls became pregnant as the result of the rape(s) they were subjected to. Although some women were reportedly able to abort without the knowledge of the rebels using traditional herbal treatments, the majority had no choice but to carry the child to full term. M.W., the abducted nurse already quoted above (see p. 28), said that many girls who had been raped had miscarriages that might have been self-induced with herbs. I.S., a twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted by the AFRC during the January 1999 invasion, tried to abort, but was unsuccessful:

When I got pregnant I didn't tell my rebel husband for months. I asked a woman who knows about medicine to give me herbs to abort the baby, but it never worked and after my belly started to swell, he found out. He warned me that if I tried to flush the baby out, he'd kill me. He said he wanted the baby and that he hoped it would be a boy.¹⁴²

M.W., the abducted nurse, also mentioned that medical personnel were instructed by a rebel doctor, Dr.

¹⁴¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko, November 27, 1999.

¹⁴² Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

Lahai, not to perform abortions, give birth control, or advise that traditional herbal treatments be taken, as the rebels felt that too many people had died and they needed to increase the population.¹⁴³ Many women did have miscarriages because of the brutal rapes and trauma they were subjected to by the rebels, as well as the difficult conditions in the bush.

Forced Abortion by West Side Boys

Human Rights Watch has documented one case of forced abortion by the West Side Boys, the splinter group of the AFRC that took power in the 1997 coup. Twenty-year-old M.K. was abducted from Magbele village in Port Loko district in July 2000, when she was four months pregnant. She was raped by four West Side Boys and was made the wife of a rebel who forced her to abort:

I was abducted with two other civilians, including my brother-in-law, by the West Side Boys. They were all wearing uniforms; some uniforms were new, and others wore old ones. We were taken to their base in Magbele Junction where there were many other abductees. At nighttime one of the rebels called Umaro Kamara came to me and said he wanted to have sex with me. He spoke nicely with me and said that he wanted to take me to Makeni and make me his wife. He raped me that day. The rebels saw that I was pregnant and said to Umaro, "We are not going to work along with any pregnant woman, we should kill her." Umaro said that he wanted to take me as his wife and that I should be given an injection instead. Umaro called me and tried to convince me to get rid of the baby. He said, "They will kill you if you do not agree so you better have the injection." I was taken to the doctor who gave me an injection and some pills. Two days later I started bleeding. I felt weak and had pain all over my body. Then I lost the baby.

When Umaro was on patrol, three other rebels raped me. When we moved out to go to another base, I saw the body of my brother-in-law. After one day I started bleeding again so Umaro took me to the doctor who gave me another injection. When we reached Lunsar, Umaro wanted to make me his wife. Even while I was bleeding, Umaro used me. He told me to wash myself before raping me.¹⁴⁴

Rape by Female Combatant

Human Rights Watch has documented a case of a female rebel manually raping female abductees. The virginity checks performed by female rebels on abductees prior to their "virgination" by male rebels, noted above, also constitute rape given that penetration occurred without the consent of the victim. More of such abuses may have been committed but not reported due to shame, as expressed in the testimony below. The rebels captured sixteen-year-old F.P. on January 7, 1999 when—as she was fleeing the fighting in central Freetown with two other girls—she ran into a patrol of five heavily armed rebels, including one female rebel. They knew the female rebel from before as Aminata; she had lived in their neighborhood before the 1997 AFRC coup. She had joined the rebels at that time and had not been seen since the AFRC was driven out of Freetown in February 1998. F.P. remembered having had an argument with her several years ago. The rebels called her "C.O. Sally." F.P. was taken with her sister and another girl whom she did not know to a rebel base. Her friend was raped by five men, which she was made to watch. F.P. was also "virginated" by male rebels and sexually molested by "C.O. Sally," along with another girl, also called Sally:

C.O. Sally came into the room where we were kept and said, "Why are you hollering? These are my boys, why are you refusing them?" Since we knew C.O. Sally, we asked her to help us get away, so finally on January 10 she took us at gunpoint to another house. She made us cook and wash for her. Once she told us to go into a room and take off our clothes. She had an RPG [rocket propelled grenade] on the ground as well as a gun. We took off our clothes and then she took two long sticks and tied our hands to them straight out from our shoulders. She stood us in front of her and asked if we remembered her to which I answered, "No." Then she said that she remembered

¹⁴³ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 21, 1999.

¹⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko IDP camp, July 13, 2000.

me and that we had fought last time we had met each other. She made me put one leg up on a drum and then she fingered me with two fingers. I was so embarrassed and ashamed. I asked her why she was doing this but she screamed at me to shut up. She did not touch herself or say anything, but kept on fingering me. Then she called Sally and did the same thing to her. When she was finished, she left us standing there with our arms tied. A little later she fingered us again. It did not seem sexual to me and I do not know why she did it. An hour later a young rebel came and said he thought he was hearing gunshots from ECOMOG. C.O. Sally ordered the boy to untie us as "I have punished these people already."¹⁴⁵

Rape and Other Sexual Violence against Boys and Men by Male and Female Rebels

According to FAWE Sierra Leone, boys and men were also raped by male rebels. FAWE Sierra Leone treated fourteen boys aged between nine and fifteen years old who had been raped, but suspects that there are more cases. Due to the stigma attached to homosexuality in Sierra Leone, male victims of rape feared they would be perceived as homosexuals and therefore few boys were willing to report it. Human Rights Watch has not documented any of these crimes of sexual violence, which were apparently committed on a much smaller scale than sexual violence committed against women and girls. FAWE Sierra Leone did not want Human Rights Watch to interview the boys they had treated as they feared that interviewing them would re-traumatize them.¹⁴⁶

Human Rights Watch documented two cases in which female rebels forced men to have sexual intercourse at gunpoint. One case involved a female rebel forcing a male civilian to have sex during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, and the second involved a RUF female training commander and male conscripts in Kono. Cases of these crimes of sexual violence were also reported by FAWE Sierra Leone. It is impossible to determine the prevalence of this type of sexual violence, but—given the general level of violence within the rebel forces and the power that female combatants had over civilians—Human Rights Watch believes that such incidents did happen more often than has been reported, albeit again on a much reduced scale compared to male combatants raping female civilians.

Abduction, Sexual Slavery, Forced Labor, and Conscription

Abduction

The rebel forces used abduction as their primary method for recruitment. During an attack on a town or village, rebels typically rounded up civilians as they tried to flee or were found hiding. Men were abducted to carry the looted items as well as being forcibly conscripted. The abducted children were also given military training and forcibly conscripted.

In thousands of cases, women and girls were abducted after being subjected to sexual violence. The rebels often killed family members who tried to protect their women and girls. Abducted women and girls described being "given" to a combatant who then took them as their "wives" (see also "Sexual slavery" section, below).¹⁴⁷ Abduction of civilians continued for the duration of the armed conflict. In the early years of the conflict, the RUF went on hit-and-run raids, returning to their base camps with looted items and abducted civilians. As the RUF took over more territory, an increasing number of civilians were abducted. As their ranks increased with more men and boys being forcibly conscripted, so did their abduction of women and girls. The AFRC and West Side Boys used the same tactics. Some women had the extreme misfortune of escaping from one rebel faction, or unit, only to be abducted by another. One such victim, thirteen-year-old M.F. (see above, p. 34), who was first

¹⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 18, 1999.

¹⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Christiana Thorpe (founding Chairperson of FAWE Sierra Leone Chapter), Freetown, March 22, 2002.

¹⁴⁷ The PHR report found that 9 percent of women reporting having themselves experienced sexual violence had been forced to "marry" their rebel "husband." PHR report, p. 2. These types of marriage are similar to marriages by capture, which were common at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. In tribal wars, the conquerors would kill the male inhabitants of the vanquished village and capture the women who subsequently became the wives of the conquerors. The "marriage" was validated by the captor's public declaration of his intention to cohabit with his captive. Such a wife was regarded as a slave and her children could not inherit from their father. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 29.

abducted from Koinadugu by the RUF/AFRC and gang raped, was driven out of Makeni in October 1999 when it came under attack by the RUF. She was subsequently abducted by the West Side Boys and raped by two child combatants.¹⁴⁸

Sexual Slavery and Forced Labor

Women and girls were primarily abducted to be the sex slaves of the rebels and to perform slave labor. The survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights found that 33 percent of the interviewees reporting war-related sexual violence had been abducted and 15 percent had been subjected to sexual slavery. Consistent with fairly common practice among the Sierra Leonean male population at large, many rebels had polygynous "marriages," including with abducted women whom they had forced to "marry" them. Rebels also changed "wives" frequently when they tired of them or when their "wives" were too ill to perform their tasks (a consequence of the brutality that they were often subjected to). Victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported attaching themselves to one rebel to avoid gang rape and be given a degree of protection. The more highly ranked the commander, the more protection a woman had. Women and girls, however, remained vulnerable to sexual violence by other rebels. M.F., the thirteen-year-old who was gang raped by the RUF/AFRC in Koinadugu was raped by two other commanders when her "husband" Mohammed was out on patrol.

Women who were "married" to high-ranking rebels benefited not only from "protection" but also were able to exert power over others. The women and girls often benefited from the looted items that their rebel "husbands" gave them, and took part themselves in looting raids to steal clothes, shoes, and jewelry. Not all were abductees: some women and girls voluntarily joined the rebel forces and sought to benefit from their relationship with the rebels, i.e. from the looted goods or escaping from their parents (some girls would use a relationship with a rebel boyfriend to gain freedom from parental control, by threatening to involve the boyfriend in their dispute over parental restrictions). Such women consenting to marry a rebel were probably still vulnerable to sexual violence from other rebels.

Numerous victims described being subjected to abuse or forced to work by commanders' wives. FAWE Sierra Leone also reported that female combatants "married" to rebels killed new abductees if their "husbands" showed a preference for them. A.J., the fourteen-year-old student who was abducted in Pujehun and tortured by the RUF from February to May 1994 (see above, p. 31) is an example of how some "wives" were treated by other female abductees or combatants:

I was put under the control of Commander Patrick, a Liberian. He was married to a woman called Neneh who was very jealous of me. Once, after the commanders had gone to the war front, Neneh told one of our guards to open up the cage where I was being held and take me out. She said, "My husband is interested in you. If you accept him to have sex with you, I'll kill you, so be forewarned." Neneh and Patrick have one child. She told me she'd joined the rebels voluntarily. She said, "You are just a captive. Do you think I was abducted? I was not abducted. I joined voluntarily. So you have no right to fall in love with my husband."¹⁴⁹

A few victims also described how some of these women, usually the wives of commanders, used their power to try and protect, and at times facilitate the escape, of other abductees. For example, M.C., who was brutally raped by rebels in early 1999 in Mabang and suffered a prolapsed uterus (see above, p. 38) was helped to escape by a commander's wife who felt sorry for her.¹⁵⁰

Abducted women were made to carry out forced labor during their captivity, including cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, and carrying heavy loads of ammunition and looted items. In many instances, women—intimidated by their captors and the situation they were in—felt powerless to escape their lives of sexual slavery, and were advised by other female captives to tolerate the abuses, "as it was war." The rebels often deliberately

¹⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, 7 March 2002.

¹⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Pujehun, February 12, 2000.

¹⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 5, 1999.

marked abducted civilians with the letters "RUF" or "AFRC" carved mainly onto their chests. This made escape more difficult because, were they to be caught by government forces, they would likely be suspected of being rebels and killed. Some women used traditional herbal remedies to remove their markings, and international organizations have also performed surgery on these victims to remove the scars.

Relationships between Rebels and Abductees

The relationships that developed between the abductees and rebels were very complex and varied. Most relationships were obviously very volatile, as described by I.S., the twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted by the AFRC in the January 1999 invasion (see above, p. 40). She stayed with the AFRC/West Side Boys until August 1999 when she was able to escape:

We stayed there for months and they were always going on attacks in the Port Loko area. Occasionally C.O. Blood was nice to me and I had to kiss him and play love with him. But I could never tell him what was really in my heart; that I missed my family and wanted to escape. Other days he would beat me for nothing. He did the same thing to his other "wife." Neither of us could complain.¹⁵¹

H.K. was assigned as the wife of "Jaja" and was so badly treated by him that even the other rebels sometimes tried to prevail on him to be less violent:

Jaja was already "married" to another abductee, and when she saw what he had done to me, she escaped. He always beat both of us. He used to sex me twice every night. He made me take his penis in my mouth. I tried to refuse him but he always threatened to kill me. He was actually an SLA soldier but had joined the RUF. His C.O. was Colonel Stagger, who used to criticize him for how he treated us. Colonel Stagger used to say, "Look, when we take these kids, we should take care of them and now you beat her for nothing." Jaja used to say it was not Stagger's business. Stagger's own abductees were treated pretty well. He never beat them.¹⁵²

Some women fled at the first opportunity. Other women, especially those who had children with the rebels, found it difficult to leave these abusive relationships. Many women and girls experienced their first sexual relationship with their rebel "husband" and may have developed aspects of the "Stockholm Syndrome," whereby the hostage identifies with the hostage-taker. They adjusted to the level of violence with the rebels, which over time became "normal," in order to survive.¹⁵³ Others feared that their "husband" might seek revenge if they escaped and returned to their family. The rebels instilled fear in their "wives" by telling them that their families would not accept them back. The abductees also feared to some extent that they would be blamed for what happened to them. For some women who had lost their families, the rebels became a surrogate family. As many rebels had themselves lost their families or could not return to their villages of origin, given that they had in some cases committed human rights abuses in their communities, they did not want to relinquish their surrogate families or their slave labor.

As the women and girls were never registered in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program and there was insufficient documentation of this large category of victims throughout the armed conflict, it is unclear how many girls and women were abducted. It is now impossible to establish how many remain under the control of their rebel "husband" or have returned to their village of origin.

The ones who have remained involuntarily will only re-examine their situation when alternatives become available. Women who wish to sever links with ex-combatants have few alternative economic or social options. They are a very vulnerable group that has little or no means of support. They are often not able to return to their

¹⁵¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

¹⁵² Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 12, 1999.

¹⁵³ A group of female ex-combatants and abducted women, for example, defined to Human Rights Watch domestic violence as "wounding or losing consciousness."

villages out of fear, lack of funds and social stigma, especially if they have given birth to children fathered by rebels. The women are therefore often forced to remain in situations in which they are vulnerable to continuing abuse. Numerous victims end up being commercial sex workers, selling their body for as little as U.S.50¢. Exploited girls and women can end up abandoned with several children to raise by themselves by the time they are in their early twenties.

Rebel Control over Abductees

Life with the rebels was very tough. Civilian abductees, in particular, were treated ruthlessly. The RUF established a military police system and courthouses to administer a form of justice to those who contravened RUF rules of behavior. Some of the RUF rules were written, but the rules, trial and punishment were to a large extent arbitrary, dependent on the particular commander. Interviewees reported that severe punishment was meted out for small incidents such as spilling water on a commander's shoes (one week in a cell with daily beatings) or not lodging complaints through the official channels (imprisonment in a dungeon). "Courthouses" were established to try both combatants and the civilians.¹⁵⁴ A rebel was expected to provide for his "wives" and children during their captivity even if he had taken on another "wife" or "wives." If a rebel reneged on his responsibility, then he could be put in a cell and beaten to death. Civilian women who were tried by the court were raped and beaten if they did not have a commander to stand up for them. According to K.M., who was abducted by the RUF from Kabala, Koinadugu, the three male rebels who presided over the courthouse in Burkina, a training camp in Kailahun, would arrange amongst themselves who could rape the women. She also said that one woman was raped to death by six rebels.¹⁵⁵

Forced Conscription: Female Combatants

Women and girls were also forcibly conscripted into the rebel fighting forces. The RUF established military training camps for women. During active fighting, female combatants were sent into battle after the men and the Small Boys Units (SBUs). There were only very few high-ranking female commanders in the rebel forces and a much smaller number of female combatants than adult men or boys. Female combatants had more power than female civilians: combatants, including female combatants, who had received military training, had substantial power to do whatever they wanted to civilians. Within the rebel forces, however, women still held much lower status: female combatants were assigned "husbands."

Forcibly conscripted female combatants were in many ways as vulnerable as civilian abductees, and may have decided to stay with their rebel "husbands" for the same reasons as their civilian counterparts i.e. shame, lack of alternative options, and economic dependence on their "husbands."

RUF Officers' Responsibility for Sexual Violence

In addition to their individual criminal responsibility, rebel commanders can bear direct command responsibility for crimes of sexual violence and sexual slavery, for ordering the rape and abduction of women and girls (see below, p. 60, for a discussion of the principle of command responsibility in international law). C.O. Caca Scatter, for example, ordered the gang rape of S.J., the wealthy forty-five-year-old woman (see above, p. 37). A.J., the fourteen-year-old student, was tortured, caged and brutally raped by C.O. Patrick (see above, p. 43). S.G., the fifty-year-old widow was raped and had both arms amputated by Commander "Don't Blame God" (see above, p. 36).¹⁵⁶ Indeed, the organized way in which victims frequently describe being rounded up and taken, as well as the number of rebels involved in these abductions and the number of victims abducted, suggests an element of premeditation and planning on the part of the RUF, AFRC and West Side Boys command. Victims also frequently described being specifically selected to be given to a commander or being sexually abused in the presence of commanders, which again suggest that sexual violence was committed under the direction of and with the consent of members of the rebels' hierarchy. I.S., the twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted and

¹⁵⁴ Abdullah and Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone," p. 189.

¹⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabaia, March 7 and 9, 2002.

¹⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999. Under Article 6 (1), persons are held individually responsible for the planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the statute.

gang raped by the West Side Boys from January to August 1999 explained how Commander "Blood" had initiated the "wife" selection process:

One of the commanders said he was going to amputate all of us too. But another commander, C.O. Blood, said, "Don't kill them, let's chose them as wives." Then we were divided up. The one who seemed to be in charge, C.O. Blood, chose me. When he looked at me I was frightened. His pupils were huge—he was high on drugs. He took me to a house and told me to lie down on the ground. He said if I did not allow him to have sex, he would kill me. He took out a knife and said he would not even waste his ammunition on me. He would just chop me to pieces. I knew he meant what he said. He forced my clothes off and used me twice. He was rough and after the second time I begged him to leave me, but he said he did not care. My insides hurt so much. Then he used me from behind. Other women were being raped in the same room. They [the West Side Boys] did not care.¹⁵⁷

According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, thirty-four of the ninety-four survivors directly reporting sexual violence believed that their attackers' commander was aware of the attack.¹⁵⁸ While it is difficult to generalize from this figure, it does tend to confirm the findings of Human Rights Watch that sexual violence and slavery, which were committed on a widespread and systematic nature, were part of the rebel forces' military strategy to dominate, humiliate and punish the civilian population.

The RUF has made occasional efforts to declare rape a crime within certain areas under their control and disciplined ordinary soldiers accused of raping. The disciplinary measures included summary trials followed by execution. These efforts failed to prevent sexual violence in practice. One commander, for example, prevented at least temporarily the rape of an eight-year-old girl who was abducted by a ten-year-old child combatant by ordering the child combatant to only use the young girl "for cleaning and cooking for now."¹⁵⁹ A.B. witnessed the gang rape of an old woman, which the commander had originally tried to stop but then allowed to happen (see above, p. 37).

Senior male and female figures in the RUF interviewed by Human Rights Watch mainly denied that sexual violence had happened, explaining that the women joined the RUF movement voluntarily and fell in love with their rebel "husbands."¹⁶⁰ A key figure in the AFRC admitted that he had heard of cases of sexual violence and blamed it on the breakdown of law and order.¹⁶¹ He also said that none of his men had expressed any remorse for the human rights abuses they committed. In the vast majority of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, those who committed rape were not disciplined or punished in any way

Sexual Violence Committed by the CDF

As already noted, there are relatively few reported cases of rape committed by the CDF. The CDF were reasonably disciplined during the war, although their discipline deteriorated when they were deployed in chiefdoms outside their own native areas. Sexual intercourse is believed to act against the protection bestowed on the fighters during their initiation ceremonies. However, Human Rights Watch has documented several crimes of sexual violence by the Kamajors, the CDF based in the Southern Province.

In March 1998, a forty-five-year-old Temne man, M.B., witnessed the rape of a young Temne woman called Jeneba by the Kamajors in Kenema town. The Kamajors also mutilated and killed Jeneba. M.B. explained that during the ECOMOG intervention to restore the democratically elected government in 1998, Kamajors accused members of the Temne and Limba ethnic groups of being RUF/AFRC supporters and persecuted them. According to M.B., the Kamajors identified Temnes and Limbas as such by their last names and publicly beheaded or

¹⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

¹⁵⁸ PHR report, p. 54.

¹⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 16, 1999.

¹⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch interviews, Freetown and Makëni, April 1999 to May 2002.

¹⁶¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 26, 2002.

stabbed to death numerous alleged rebels. The Kamajors also ate some of their victims, believing that this would bestow additional powers to them. The accused had no means to defend themselves, as ECOMOG initially backed the Kamajors and did not realize until later that the killings were carried out along tribal lines. After receiving death threats, M.B. sought refuge in the house of a chief who was Temne and the father of Jeneba. A group of about eight Kamajors came to the house, looking for Jeneba, and accused her of having a sexual relationship with an AFRC fighter:

I saw Jeneba being raped by one Kamajor, while the others were standing around watching. Then the Kamajors threatened to kill us if we did not stop looking at them, so we went into other houses to hide. From there we could not see what was going on but heard Jeneba screaming at the top of her voice, and when the Kamajors had gone we came outside and found Jeneba dead. She was naked and her hands and feet had been mutilated by a machete.¹⁶²

On February 17, 1999, J.K., a thirty-one-year-old woman was raped by two Kamajors in a small village in Bonthe district. A group of Kamajors entered J.K.'s house looking for her brother, who had not been home for the past three years:

One of the Kamajors called Kinie said that they had been told that my brother was in the village and was planning to attack them. I assured them no one knew where he was. During this argument, the other civilians in village became afraid and fled into the bush. As soon as the Kamajors forced their way into my bedroom, I followed them to check up on what they were doing. Kinie and another Kamajor whose name I did not know pushed me to the ground, tearing off my clothes. I screamed for help but no one came to my rescue. Even my father who was in the house was unable to help me. They both raped me while the others stood around laughing. When they left the village, they looted some goats and chickens. There was no one to report the incident to and I had no money to pay for a hospital visit. I decided to leave everything to the Almighty God.¹⁶³

In another incident, at least three female civilians were raped, including by a Kamajor commander. In July 2000, M.S. and twenty-five other passengers were taken off a bus at Bauya in Moyamba district, beaten, and accused of being RUF rebels. All their possessions were taken off the bus and inspected by the Kamajors but they did not find any incriminating goods. Their possessions were stolen by the CDF. In the evening, M.S. was locked in the guardroom at the CDF office with nine other women and her young child:

Twenty CDF came to the guardroom and told us, the women that we could choose between [being] raped or killed. I was raped by a young CDF on the ground of the guardroom. I told him that I was a suckling mother but he did not care. My baby was in the room when he raped me. He made me stoop like an animal. He said, "I am a government man so no one will ask me anything about this." My breast milk has gone bad now. I could hear another woman who initially refused to be raped being beaten with the torch. She was raped by two CDF called Mohammed and Ahmed.¹⁶⁴

In the same incident, an older high-ranking CDF commander raped a thirty-five-year-old trader, R.K.:

Mr. S. raped me all night. He raped me five times. I cried as I was not used to doing that even with my husband. He was rough and did it from behind like an animal in a bad way. He accused me of being a RUF commander's wife. I told him my husband is a Gbeti [part of the CDF].¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Human Rights Watch interview, Kenema, August 12, 2002.

¹⁶³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bonthe district, July 8, 2002.

¹⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.

¹⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.

Human Rights Watch also interviewed B.R., a Kamajor fighter who reported witnessing the rape of two civilians that took place in 1997 and 1998. He also witnessed the killing of a captured RUF female combatant, who died after being raped with a stick. B.R. explained that the rape that took place in 1997 happened when a patrol of six Kamajors, including B.R., met a group of female civilians in the bush:

Some of the women started talking bad things about the Kamajors and said that we were taking food off people. Then one Kamajors went for this woman. I saw him raping her. He had stripped her naked and she was screaming. I did not want to see it or be a witness but I had to rush there. At one point I thought he was killing her.¹⁶⁶

The incident was reported to the high priest, one of the main Kamajor initiators who decided that the offender had to be punished. B.R. explained that the punishment was called "walking the highway," which entailed the offender being made to walk slowly through fifty Kamajors lined up on two sides, with the Kamajors flogging him with canes. B.R. said that the victim would have reported the rape to the Kamajor high priest, but that he and the others on patrol decided to report it first, otherwise it would have made them equally guilty of the crime. The rape committed in 1998 involved a young Kamajor raping a twenty-year-old woman. B.R. explained that the offender was given a trial, during which he admitted to having committed the crime. He was subsequently locked up in prison (probably a local prison).

In another instance, B.R. explained how a twenty-five-year-old female RUF combatant captured in Tongo in Kono district was brutally killed by the insertion of a long stick in her vagina after the Kamajors had cut off her ears and nose and gouged her eyes out with a machete. The Kamajor commander allegedly wanted to teach the woman a lesson and said that: "This stick is your husband and is screwing you. Are you enjoying it? Just say your last prayers, as you are going to die bit by bit."¹⁶⁷

Sexual Violence Committed by International Peacekeeping Forces

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of rape by the international peacekeeping forces. Human Rights Watch was informed of a rape committed by a Guinean peacekeeper, Sgt. Ballah, by two reliable sources, including the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), who had interviewed the twelve-year-old victim. The victim was raped on March 26, 2001 when she asked for Sgt. Ballah's assistance in securing a ride to Freetown at the checkpoint that he was manning. The rape was perpetrated in Bo, the area of deployment of the Guinean peacekeeping contingent. Sgt. Ballah was charged to court on the same day. Unfortunately, the SLP dropped the case and the offender was sent back to Guinea. Human Rights Watch was not able to locate the victim.

In February 2001, a Nigerian peacekeeper reportedly raped a sixteen-year-old girl in Freetown. When Human Rights Watch investigated the case, the SLP claimed they had not been able to trace the perpetrator for questioning. UNAMSIL claimed that the Nigerian contingent and UNAMSIL Civilian Police Section had investigated the matter and that the plaintiff had subsequently dropped the charge.

Human Rights Watch interviewed a witness to an alleged rape by two Ukrainian peacekeepers that took place on April 3, 2002 in the village of Joru in Kenema district. K.S., a fifty-five-year-old female farmer testified that she as well as others in her village had witnessed the gang rape:

Late at night I came out of my house to ease myself [urinate]. Maybe I had been woken up by a big white truck that had stopped about fifty meters away from my house. I hid and watched what was happening; there were people inside. I noticed two white men and one black lady inside the truck. Clearly there was a struggle going on. I could hear her yelling at them to "leave me alone" in what sounded like a Liberian accent, but I can not be sure. The door was open and one of them was on top of her. The lady was really struggling. I saw that one of them was holding her down while the other was raping her. I was able to see because in the process the men had opened the

¹⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, July 31, 2000.

¹⁶⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, July 31, 2000. The CDF generally killed any RUF that they had captured.

door to the car and the light had come on. I am sure they were raping her and she was fighting with them to stop it. I stayed and watched this go on for several minutes. I later learned a few more people were also watching what was going on. In fact we talked about it the next morning.

Then, perhaps afraid of being watched, the two whites moved their truck further down the road ... past my house, further down the road going out of town. Maybe they thought that because there were no houses around, we would not see what they were up to. They stayed another thirty or so minutes in this second location. I saw both of them have their turn on her, but I did not see any guns. After they were finished, I saw one of them drag her out of the cabin and put her in the back of the big truck. I can not remember if one of them got in the back with her but I think so. Then they drove off.

The next morning when I went out to go to the mosque, we found one of her black shoes that she must have kicked off while struggling with those men. The shoe was near the first place they had stopped. We took it to the police but they never came to ask us any questions. We are all a bit frightened of those UNAMSIL people now. We tell our girls never to get in a truck with them or the same thing might happen to them.¹⁶⁸

Neither the SLP in Joru or UNAMSIL in Kenema conducted a proper investigation into this alleged gang rape, both claiming that the absence of the victim prevented them from conducting their investigation. The UNAMSIL human rights section was not aware of this alleged gang rape until Human Rights Watch informed them, and to date has also not conducted a thorough investigation.

On June 22, 2002, a fourteen-year-old boy was allegedly raped by a Bangladeshi peacekeeper near the Jui transit camp for Sierra Leonean returnees located outside of Freetown in the Western Area. The rape occurred when the victim and his friends were fishing with several Bangladeshi peacekeepers near the camp. The offender was reported to have taken the boy away from the others in the group before raping him. The victim's friends reported that the boy looked disheveled after rejoining the group and immediately told them what had happened. The offender gave the victim the equivalent of U.S \$0.25 to silence him. The boy reported the rape to the SLP on June 24 and a medical exam carried out on the same day confirmed penetration had taken place.

The SLP were involved in the case for ten days, until the UNAMSIL provost marshal took it over. The provost marshal concluded that there was no conclusive evidence to link the crime to the perpetrator. After reviewing the case, the UNAMSIL force commander concluded that while the evidence was inconclusive, the circumstantial evidence was strong enough to conclude that the peacekeeper had violated military discipline, and as such issued an order of repatriation. It is not clear to Human Rights Watch whether this violation will be recorded on the offender's file. According to a reliable source, the investigation by the police and UNAMSIL was conducted in an insensitive manner and members of the Bangladeshi contingent spoke with the victim while the UNAMSIL investigation was ongoing, even though they should not have had access to him. Nor did UNAMSIL follow up with the victim or his family to apologize, provide compensation, and explain the outcome of the investigation.¹⁶⁹

UNAMSIL investigations into allegations of sexual violence by peacekeepers indicate a lack of appreciation for the seriousness of the problem of sexual violence. Human Rights Watch urges UNAMSIL to fully investigate any allegations of sexual violence committed by UNAMSIL military or civilian personnel. The human rights section should systematically monitor and report on sexual violence, including cases involving UNAMSIL personnel. UNAMSIL should establish a mechanism with the SLP whereby allegations of sexual violence by persons employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL reported to the police are immediately reported to the relevant UNAMSIL staff members, including the provost marshal and the gender specialist in the human rights section. UNAMSIL should reciprocate by reporting cases known to it to the SLP. UNAMSIL should ensure that states

¹⁶⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Joru, May 28, 2002. Other villagers did not want to be interviewed.

¹⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 15, 2002

report within the prescribed six months on follow up to cases involving military personnel that have resulted in the alleged perpetrator being repatriated to his country of origin, in order to ensure that states prosecute the accused. This will serve to actually enforce a stated "zero tolerance" for sexual exploitation by UNAMSIL staff and persons affiliated with UNAMSIL, which to date has had no teeth and therefore no impact on changing behavior. Civilian staff who commit sexual violence should be fired and their misconduct properly recorded in their personnel file to ensure that they are not rehired in another U.N. mission.

The UNAMSIL human rights section should also provide in-depth gender sensitization training to military and civilian staff. The training should ensure that the peacekeepers understand the code of conduct and the consequences if they do not adhere to it. The U.N. Code of Conduct for peacekeepers and the Military Observer Handbook need to be revised to ensure that the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation by persons employed or affiliated with U.N. missions and the consequences of such acts are clearly stated in these guidelines. Similar guidelines for civilian staff need to be widely disseminated to all U.N. missions.

Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women and solicited child prostitutes.

VI. EFFECTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Health

Sexual violence often continues to impact the physical and mental well-being of survivors long after the abuses were committed. In addition to the reluctance of some survivors to seek medical treatment, the lack of health facilities, especially in the provinces, as well as the survivors' lack of money for transport, medical treatment and drugs has meant that the health status of survivors is poor.¹⁷⁰ Survivors also were often only able to seek medical treatment months after the abuse had happened, for example when they managed to escape rebel captors and make their way to a health center.

The probability of transmission of HIV and certain other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) is greatly increased in violent sex and any sex where a woman or girl is injured. Doctors and other health personnel interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported a high prevalence of STDs amongst victims, as the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, like other armed conflicts, served as a vector for sexually transmitted diseases.¹⁷¹

A World Health Organization (WHO) report found an alarmingly high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS amongst Sierra Leone Army soldiers. According to the report, the SLA tested 176 soldiers and eighty-two civilians working for the army who had prolonged diarrhea, tuberculosis, weight loss or pneumonia, and found a HIV-positive rate of 41.9 percent (or 108 persons). Among the group tested were eighty female soldiers of whom thirty tested positive (37.5 percent). As many SLA soldiers defected to the rebel factions, it is likely that victims of sexual violence by them have been infected with the virus.¹⁷² A U.N. report on the impact of conflict on children states that rates of sexually transmitted diseases among soldiers are two to five times higher than those of civilian populations, and that during armed conflict the rate of infection can be up to fifty times higher.¹⁷³ Commercial sexual exploitation of women by soldiers, including peacekeepers, also contributes to the spread of

¹⁷⁰ PHR report, p. 45.

¹⁷¹ Human Rights Watch interviews with Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, Freetown, February 25, 2002; Dr. Noah Conteh, Freetown, March 1, 2002 and Dr. Bernard Fraser, Freetown, March 3, 2002.

¹⁷² World Health Organization, *HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone: The Future at Stake—The Strategic and Organizational Context and Recommendations for Action* (Freetown, 2000), p. 3.

¹⁷³ See United Nations Security Council resolution 1308 on the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security: HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations, July 17, 2000; and Graca Machel, "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: A critical review of progress made and obstacles encountered in increasing protection for war-affected children," report prepared for and presented at the International Conference on War-Affected Children, September 2000, Winnipeg, Canada, p. 12, at <http://www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/machel-e.asp>.

STDs, including HIV/AIDS.¹⁷⁴ In 1997, tests showed that 70.6 percent of commercial sex workers in Freetown were HIV positive compared to 26.7 percent in 1995.¹⁷⁵

The 2002 report by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) on the global AIDS epidemic estimated that by the end of 2001 there were 170,000 persons aged between fifteen and forty-nine living with HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone. UNAIDS estimates that more than 50 percent of this figure (90,000) are women and girls.¹⁷⁶ More accurate figures on HIV/AIDS prevalence in Sierra Leone, as opposed to estimates, should be known when the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) publish their report based on a nationwide HIV/AIDS prevalence survey conducted in May 2002.¹⁷⁷ The government of Sierra Leone should ensure that future information campaigns on HIV/AIDS are designed both to impart basic information and to help reduce stigma, especially in light of the large number of survivors of sexual violence who may have been infected with HIV.

Other health problems are vasico-vaginal and vasico-rectal fistulas (VVF's and VRF's), as a result of the rape(s) especially of young girls but also of mature women; complications when giving birth; prolapsed uterus; trauma; and unwanted pregnancies. Health professionals have noted high rates of pregnancies amongst young girls with likely resultant illness, injury, and even death, due to pregnancy-related complications. These girls are likely to experience future complications including uterine problems and scarring, reducing their ability to have a normal sex life or to conceive or carry a child to full term in the future. The health of children born to abducted girls is also likely to suffer as the girls often have no one to teach them motherhood skills, contributing to high rates of infant mortality. The health risks are further exacerbated by various factors that impede safe sex, including lack of information about HIV/AIDS, as well as cultural practices and beliefs that undermine the use of reproductive health services and contraception.¹⁷⁸ The lack of attention paid until recently to conflict-related sexual violence has meant that the health needs of women and girls have not received as much attention or funding as required to adequately address the scale of the problem. In general the Sierra Leonean health services lack trained and motivated personnel, medical equipment and supplies, drugs, and blood for transfusion. The reproductive health infrastructure, which was poor before 1991, virtually collapsed during the war.¹⁷⁹ There are only six specialist obstetricians and gynecologists in Sierra Leone.¹⁸⁰ Treatment for sexually transmitted diseases is limited to the main towns and outreach by mobile clinics in some chiefdoms.

Mental health services for survivors of sexual violence are inadequate and as of 2002 there was only one qualified psychiatrist in the country. FAWE Sierra Leone, which has substantial expertise in treating survivors of

¹⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, UNAMSIL medical personnel, Freetown, April 30, 2002.

¹⁷⁵ Ministry of Health and Sanitation, *National AIDS/STD Control Programme Annual Report for 1998* (Freetown, Ministry of Health and Sanitation, 1998), p. 3.

¹⁷⁶ UNAIDS, *Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002* at <http://www.unaids.org/>, p. 190. This figure is based on a total population of 4,587,000.

¹⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Joaquim Saweka (WHO Sierra Leone Representative), Freetown, May 3, 2002. The preliminary results of the CDC showed a prevalence rate of 4.9 percent.

¹⁷⁸ Only 297 of 4,923 women (or 6 percent) surveyed by the government in 2000 reported that they used contraceptives. This low prevalence of contraception use is due to lack of access to family planning services within the communities, inadequate health facilities, especially in the provinces, lack of disposable income to pay for these services, and the low education of women. Only 3 percent of women with no education used contraception compared to 8 percent of women with primary education and 14 percent of women with secondary or higher education. Another worrying factor is the unwillingness of partners to use condoms, which does not bode well given the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other STDs. See Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, pp. 55-58.

¹⁷⁹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 198.

¹⁸⁰ WHO and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, *Assessment of District Hospitals in Sierra Leone for the Delivery of Safe Motherhood and Reproductive Health Services* (Freetown: 2002), p. 10. The Assessment also found that physicians attended only 3 percent of births whereas traditional birth attendants assisted in 38 percent of births nationally. Ibid. pp. 56-57. Only 10 percent of 4,923 women surveyed by the government in 2000 reported that they received antenatal care from a physician. See Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, p. 10.

sexual violence, believes that counseling on a massive scale is needed to ensure that the women and girls can face the future.¹⁸¹

Stigmatization and Shame of Survivors

The rebels frequently committed crimes of sexual violence in public places. A.M., a twenty-year-old male, reported that when he was held in captivity in State House in Freetown from January 8, 1999 for three days, he saw from his cell window RUF/AFRC combatants raping about twenty to twenty-five girls each night on the grounds.¹⁸² Given that rape has been committed on such a systematic and widespread scale and was witnessed by many people, it seems that rape survivors, particularly in urban centers, are generally not stigmatized by society. Survivors interviewed have expressed fear of rejection by their families and communities, but in practice it seems that their fears are unfounded. Most survivors are accepted back into their communities, with their families simply overjoyed to find that they are still alive.

Nevertheless, some women, like R.K. who was raped by the CDF (see above, p. 48), have been rejected by their husbands:

I told my husband what happened. He cried and rejected me. He said he will find another wife. My family has begged him to accept me as it was not my fault. He does not love me anymore. I am annoyed because I was the senior wife and now he does not treat me well.¹⁸³

Girls and women who voluntarily joined the rebel forces are less likely to be welcomed back.

The survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights gives an indication of survival strategies employed by women who had been raped: of the ninety-four interviewees reporting having themselves experienced sexual violence, sixty-one (or 65 percent) told someone about their case(s) of sexual violence. The majority of these survivors (fifty women and girls or 53 percent) reported their experience to a health care provider in a hospital, health care center or to a traditional healer, albeit on average five months after the incident(s) occurred. Among those not reporting these incidents and who stated a reason (twenty-eight out of thirty-three), the reasons given were feelings of shame or social stigma (eighteen women and girls or 64 percent), fear of being stigmatized or rejected (eight women and girls or 28 percent) and not having trust in anyone (six women and girls or 21 percent). Eighteen women and girls (19 percent) reported that discussions with family members helped them to try to forget about the incident(s). Other survivors reported that what helped most was to try and forget about the incident (46 percent), support of family (35 percent), a health care provider (33 percent) and traditional medicine (32 percent).¹⁸⁴

Human Rights Watch also found that many survivors feel intense personal shame that the rebels have defiled them, and therefore often do not report the crime or seek medical attention. S.G., the fifty-year-old widow who had both arms amputated after being raped (see above p. 36), described the shame and anger she felt after her ordeal:

I didn't even tell my people about the rape. It's such a shameful act. Not just because of the rebel's age, but also because never in my life have I had sex with someone besides my husband. I was a good woman. Can you imagine how I felt when this young boy raped me, kicked me and then told me to get out of his sight after doing this to me? And without my arms, how can I as a woman even clean myself, let alone take care of my affairs. We're farmers and how am I to farm now? Both the rape and amputation are awful ... but later when thinking about what happened, I was even angrier about the rape than the amputation because for him to have done that to me was

¹⁸¹ Human Rights Watch interview with Christiana Thorpe (founding chairperson of FAWE Sierra Leone Chapter), Freetown, March 22, 2002.

¹⁸² Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 12, 1999.

¹⁸³ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.

¹⁸⁴ PHR report, p. 51 and Table 6 on p. 54. Women could select more than one of the choices given.

like killing me inside because of the shame. Sex is something you should enjoy together with your man. But to do it like that, to handle me like that, to torture me like that and then kick me and leave me like that ... it's too much. But I guess I was somehow lucky. There could have been ten people doing that to me.¹⁸⁵

P.S. twenty-five, who was abducted and gang raped by the West Side Boys in January 2000, explained why she had not reported her rapes:

I didn't want to tell anyone what happened. I was ashamed because it is bad enough being done like this, but having a rebel do it is even worse. I felt so bad because I wanted to save myself for someone special. I went to secret society and they instructed us not to be involved in sex until we were ready to marry. And now I'm afraid because of AIDS. When I think of them I feel so angry.¹⁸⁶

VII. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Introduction¹⁸⁷

Women and girls have, since time immemorial, been subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, including rape and sexual slavery, during armed conflict. Mass rape of women and girls was documented during the Second World War as well as in more recent conflicts in such diverse countries as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁸⁸ Sexual violence has traditionally been considered as the inevitable by-product of armed conflict and has been mischaracterized by military and political leaders as a private crime or the unfortunate behavior of renegade soldiers. The use of rape as a weapon of war, however, means that rape is not a private or incidental crime. Rape as a weapon of war serves a strategic function and acts as an integral tool for achieving military objectives.

Conflict-related rape is an act of violence that targets sexuality, but it is also a military and political tool. It functions to subjugate and humiliate both the women and men within the targeted community. Furthermore, rape is generally not committed in isolation and victims are often subjected to multiple human rights abuses, which serve to further traumatize the survivor. In conflicts in which civilians are the principal targets, sexual violence has become an even more deliberate and insidious weapon of war. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, rape and other grave abuses committed by Serb forces were with the intent to drive the non-Serb population from their homes and communities.

¹⁸⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

¹⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, February 8, 2000.

¹⁸⁷ Some of the information in this section was published previously in Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, *The Global Report on Women's Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); and Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph, "Rape in War: Challenging The Tradition of Impunity," *SAIS Review* (Washington D.C.: John Hopkins University Press, Winter-Spring 1994).

¹⁸⁸ See for example Human Rights Watch, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina: U.N. Cease-Fire Won't Help Banja Luka* Volume 6, Issue 8, June 1994, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/bosnia2/>; Human Rights Watch, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, No. 13, October 1995, <http://www.hrw.org/summaries/s.bosnia9510.html>; Human Rights Watch, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, A Closed, Dark Place: Past and Present Human Rights Abuses in Foca*, Vol. 10, No. 6 (D), July 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/foca/>; Human Rights Watch/Africa, Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, *Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme*, Human Rights Watch, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, September 1996, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm>; Human Rights Watch, *The War Within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo*, June 2002, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/>; Human Rights Watch, *Democratic Republic of Congo, War Crimes in Kisangani: The Response of Rwandan-backed Rebels to the May 2002 Mutiny*, Vol. 14, No 6 (A), August 2002, <http://hrw.org/reports/2002/drc2/>; United Nations, *Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45, E/CN.4/1995/42* (United Nations, 1994), p. 64.

The ten-year internal armed conflict in Sierra Leone has been characterized by egregious human rights abuses against the civilian population, including the use of sexual violence to achieve military aims.¹⁸⁹ From the testimonies in this report, it is clear that the rebels waged a war through attacking civilians. Sexual violence was therefore used as part of the rebels' military and political strategy, with victims often being used to bring messages to their enemies, including President Kabbah, ECOMOG, the SLA or the CDF. RUF rebels told an older woman whom they first raped and then subjected to amputation that: "There should be peace before the elections. Now you can go and vote. You have got to take a letter to Bo and those hands are the letters."¹⁹⁰ The testimonies also reveal how the rebels sought complete domination over girls and women by doing whatever they wanted to, including breaking numerous cultural taboos, such as raping lactating mothers or elderly women.

Despite being commonplace during armed conflict, rape "remains the least condemned war crime," according to the U.N. special rapporteur on violence against women.¹⁹¹ It is only in recent years that it has been exposed and condemned alongside other human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations. Sexual violence remains insufficiently reported, condemned, and prosecuted as war crimes or crimes against humanity. This differential treatment of sexual violence highlights the international community's willingness to tolerate sexual violence against women notwithstanding its obligations under international law.

International law has prohibited rape and other forms of sexual violence against women during armed conflict for over a century.¹⁹² Perpetrators can be held accountable for rape and other forms of sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and as acts of genocide.¹⁹³ International human rights law, which remains applicable in times of armed conflict, also prohibits sexual violence and sexual slavery.

International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war, sets out protections for civilians, prisoners of war and other non-combatants during international and internal armed conflicts.¹⁹⁴ The four Geneva Conventions¹⁹⁵ and their two Additional Protocols¹⁹⁶ implicitly and explicitly condemn rape and other forms of

¹⁸⁹ United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/49, Addendum, Mission to Sierra Leone, E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.2* (United Nations, 2002).

¹⁹⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

¹⁹¹ United Nations, *Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women*, E/CN.4/1995/42, p. 64.

¹⁹² Some examples of how the law prohibiting war-related rape developed include the Italian lawyer Lucas de Penna advocating in the thirteenth century for the punishment of wartime rape just as severely as rape committed in peacetime, and Hugo Grotius stating in the sixteenth century that sexual violence committed in wartime was a punishable crime. Articles 44 and 47 of the 1863 Lieber Code, which served as the basis for subsequent war codes, also lists rape by a belligerent as a war crime punishable by death. See the Lieber Code of 1863, Correspondence, Orders, Reports, and Returns of the Union Authorities, From January 1 to December 31, 1863.--#7, O.R.--Series III--Volume III [S# 124], General Orders No. 100., War Dept., *Adj. General's Office, Washington*, April 24, 1863. Article 4 of the Hague Convention (1907) provides a general prohibition of torture and abuses against combatants and non-combatants. Article 46 of the same convention prescribes that "[f]amily honour and rights...must be respected," which can be interpreted to cover rape. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annexed Regulations (Hague Convention IV) of October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (entered into force January 26, 1910). Kelly D. Askin and Doreen M. Koenig (eds.), *Women and International Human Rights Law* (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999), Volume 1, p. 50. See also Kelly D. Askin, *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 18-36.

¹⁹³ Although genocide did not occur in Sierra Leone, rape and other forms of sexual violence can be defined as constituent elements of genocide. Genocide is defined under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as "acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group." Genocide has attained *jus cogens* status (a norm that preempts other norms) and is prohibited both in its own right and as a crime against humanity.

¹⁹⁴ See the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions. Other sources of international humanitarian law are the 1907 Hague Convention and Regulations, decisions of international tribunals and customary law.

¹⁹⁵ Sierra Leone became a party to the four Geneva Conventions on June 10, 1965.

sexual violence as serious violations of humanitarian law in both international and internal conflicts. In international armed conflicts, such crimes are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and are considered war crimes. Violations involving direct attacks on civilians during internal armed conflicts are increasingly recognized as war crimes.

Under international humanitarian law, the civil war in Sierra Leone was an internal armed conflict.¹⁹⁷ Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions applies to all parties in an internal armed conflict, including armed opposition groups. Through its prohibition of "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment," Common Article 3 implicitly condemns sexual violence.

The Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in international armed conflicts provides a basis for defining the protections provided under Common Article 3. Article 27 on the treatment of protected persons states that "women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."¹⁹⁸ Article 147 specifies that "torture or inhuman treatment" and "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health" are grave breaches of the conventions.¹⁹⁹ According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), rape and other forms of sexual violence are considered to be grave breaches and even a single act of sexual violence can constitute a war crime.²⁰⁰

Article 4 of Protocol II, which governs internal armed conflicts and applied to the conflict in Sierra Leone, expressly forbids "violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment, such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment" and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape and enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault" as well as "slavery and the slave trade in all their forms."²⁰¹ According to the ICRC Commentary, this provision "reaffirms and supplements Common Article 3 ... [because] it became clear that it was necessary to strengthen ... the protection of women ... who may also be the victims of rape, enforced prostitution or indecent assault."²⁰²

As the above language highlights, crimes of sexual violence under international humanitarian law have been mischaracterized as attacks against the honor of women or an outrage on personal dignity—as opposed to attacks on physical integrity. This mischaracterization diminishes the serious nature of the crime and contributes to the widespread misperception of rape as an attack on honor that is an "incidental" or "lesser" crime relative to crimes such as torture or enslavement.²⁰³ Whilst it is true that rape is an assault on human dignity, rape should primarily be viewed as a violent assault on bodily integrity as well as one that dishonors the perpetrator and not the victim.

Sexual Violence as a Crime against Humanity

Acts of sexual violence committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians in Sierra Leone can be classified as crimes against humanity and prosecuted as such. There is no single international treaty that provides an authoritative definition of crimes against humanity, but such crimes are generally considered to

¹⁹⁶ Sierra Leone ratified the Additional Protocols on October 21, 1986.

¹⁹⁷ The fighting in 1997-98 between West African ECOWAS forces and the RUF/AFRC government may have met the criteria for an international armed conflict.

¹⁹⁸ Geneva Convention IV, Article 27 (2). Article 76 of Protocol I extends this protection of protected persons to all women. Protocol I, Article 76.

¹⁹⁹ Geneva Convention IV, Article 147.

²⁰⁰ Theodor Meron, "Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law," *American Journal of International Law* (Washington D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1993), vol. 87, p. 426, citing the International Committee of the Red Cross, Aide Mémoire, December 3, 1992.

²⁰¹ Protocol II, Article 4 (2) (a), (e) and (f).

²⁰² Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, Bruno Zimmerman (eds.), *ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949* (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 1375, para. 4539.

²⁰³ See Catherine N. Niarchos, "Women, War and Rape: Challenges facing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia." *Human Rights Quarterly* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995), vol. 17, pp. 672, 674.

be serious and inhumane acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, during peacetime or war, and that result from the persecution of a specific group.²⁰⁴

The charter establishing the Nuremberg tribunal after the Second World War did not specify rape under crimes against humanity or list gender as one of the grounds of persecution; the inclusion of rape could however be derived from the charter's general prohibition against "other inhumane acts."²⁰⁵ Resolving this ambiguity, rape (as well as torture) was included in the specific list of crimes constituting crimes against humanity in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)²⁰⁶ and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).²⁰⁷

The statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) expands on this by including gender as one of the grounds of persecution, as well as adding rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.²⁰⁸ This definition of gender-based crimes against humanity, which appropriately makes no reference to the outdated notion of "crimes against honor," has been taken up in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see below for a discussion of the Special Court).

Under the evolving case law on crimes against humanity, formal proof of policy, plan or design is no longer an essential element for the prosecution of crimes against humanity. Both the ICTY and the ICTR have found that the existence of a plan or policy is sufficient: the policy need not be formalized and may be deduced from the way in which the acts occur.²⁰⁹ The failure to take action to address widespread or systematic attacks against the civilian population can also be considered sufficient to determine the requisite element of policy, plan or design. Both state and non-state actors can be held accountable for crimes against humanity.

An individual case of serious sexual violence can be prosecuted as a crime against humanity if the prosecution can make the link between the single violation and other violations of basic human rights or international humanitarian law that have been committed as a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.²¹⁰ Each enumerated type of act, such as murder, torture, or rape, does not need to be committed on a

²⁰⁴ See, e.g. "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808," 32 I.L.M. at 1159 (1993), para. 48.

²⁰⁵ The Nuremberg Charter, as amended by the Berlin Protocol, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547 (1945), E.A.S. NO. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284. Under article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, crimes against humanity included, but were not limited to the following atrocities: "[m]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds."

²⁰⁶ Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTY (adopted 25/5/93) at <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute-con.htm>.

²⁰⁷ Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTR (adopted 8/11/94) at <http://www.ictt.org>.

²⁰⁸ Article 7 of the Statute of the ICC enumerates crimes against humanity as "any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, Article 7, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). Sierra Leone signed and ratified the Rome Statute on October 17, 1998 and September 15, 2000 respectively.

²⁰⁹ *Kunarac* Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 432.

²¹⁰ "It is sufficient to show that the act took place in the context of an accumulation of acts of violence which, individually, may vary greatly in nature and gravity." *Kunarac* Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 419.

widespread or systematic basis—it is the attack that must be widespread or systematic.²¹¹

Human Rights Law

Sierra Leone is party to international human rights instruments that provide safeguards for women and girls at all times, including during armed conflict. These include protection from rape as torture and other mistreatment; slavery and forced prostitution; and discrimination based on sex. Armed opposition groups, particularly those in control of territory, have increasingly been under an obligation to respect international human rights standards.²¹²

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)²¹³ prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by officials or persons acting in an official capacity. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides for the right to freedom from torture, sexual exploitation and abuse as well as liberty and security of person.²¹⁴ The 1991 constitution of Sierra Leone also prohibits “any form of torture or any punishment or other treatment which is inhuman or degrading.”²¹⁵

The United Nations special rapporteur on torture has recognized that rape can constitute torture: “[R]ape is a traumatic form of torture for the victim.”²¹⁶ The ICTY in the *Furundžija* case noted that “[i]n certain circumstances ... rape can amount to torture and has been found by international judicial bodies to constitute a violation of the norm prohibiting torture.”²¹⁷ The ICTR in the *Akayesu* case stated that “Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when it is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”²¹⁸

Sexual violence generally violates women’s rights to be free from discrimination based on sex as provided for under the ICCPR.²¹⁹ Under Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),²²⁰ the definition of discrimination is considered to include “gender-based violence precisely because gender-based violence has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the enjoyment by women of human rights” on a basis of equality with men.²²¹ The CEDAW Committee enumerated a wide range of obligations for states related to ending sexual violence, including ensuring appropriate treatment for victims in the justice system, counseling and support services, and medical and psychological assistance to victims.²²² In a 1993

²¹¹ *Prosecutor v. Kupreškic*, Judgement, IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000 (*Kupreškic* Trial Chamber Judgement), para. 550.

²¹² Nigel S. Rodley, “Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?” in P. Mahoney and K. Mahoney (eds.) *Human Rights in the 21st Century: A Global Challenge* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp. 297-318, and International Council on Human Rights Policy, “Hard Cases: Bringing Human Rights Violators to Justice Abroad—A Guide to Universal Jurisdiction,” (Geneva: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 1999), p. 6.

²¹³ Sierra Leone ratified the CAT on March 1, 2001.

²¹⁴ Sierra Leone ratified the CRC on June 18, 1990. Article 34 protects the child from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. Article 37 provides for the freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as liberty and security of person.

²¹⁵ Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter III – The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, s. 20(1).

²¹⁶ United Nations, *Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1992/32, E/CN.4/1995/34*, Paragraph 19, January 12, 1995.

²¹⁷ *Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija*, Judgement, IT-95-17/1-T, December 10, 1998, para. 171.

²¹⁸ *Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu*, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998 (the *Akayesu* Trial Chamber Judgement), para. 687.

²¹⁹ See ICCPR, Articles 2 (1) and 26.

²²⁰ Sierra Leone ratified this treaty on November 11, 1988.

²²¹ Women, Law and Development International, *Gender Violence: The Hidden War Crimes* (Washington D.C.: Women, Law and Development International, 1998), p. 37.

²²² Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, “Violence Against Women,” General Recommendation no. 19 (eleventh session, 1992). U.N. Document CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15.

resolution, the U.N. General Assembly declared that prohibiting gender discrimination includes eliminating gender-based violence and that states "should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women."²²³

The CRC also provides for freedom from discrimination on the basis of gender (Article 2), and the right to enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (Article 24). Under Article 39, states shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social integration of a child victim of any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. The CRC also calls upon states to provide special protection and assistance to a child "temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment."²²⁴ A child's right to "such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor" is also guaranteed by the ICCPR.²²⁵

Under both the ICCPR and CEDAW, slavery and forced prostitution in times of armed conflict constitute a basic violation of the right to liberty and security of person.²²⁶ Furthermore, slavery, which is a *jus cogens* norm from which no derogation is permitted, is prohibited under Article 8 of the ICCPR, which also prohibits forced labor, and by the 1926 Slavery Convention.²²⁷ The right to freedom from slavery is also provided under the constitution of Sierra Leone.²²⁸

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, to which Sierra Leone is a party, guarantees the "[e]limination of every discrimination against women ... and protection of the rights of the woman and the child"²²⁹ as well as the right to integrity of one's person, and the right to be free of "... [a]ll forms of exploitation and degradation ..., particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment."²³⁰

Gender Jurisprudence for Crimes of Sexual Violence

Despite the widespread practice of sexual violence during the Second World War, rape did not figure prominently in the prosecutions brought by the two major tribunals established after the war. Rape was not prosecuted at any of the Nuremberg trials notwithstanding the evidence of sexual violence presented. Rape charges were brought in a few cases before the International Military Tribunal in the Far East (the Tokyo Tribunal),²³¹ and several accused were convicted of crimes including sexual violence. The Tokyo tribunal was responsible for bringing international attention to atrocities, including sexual violence, committed during the

²²³ United Nations General Assembly, "Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women," A/RES/48/104, December 20, 1993 (issued on February 23, 1994). See Article 4, in particular.

²²⁴ Article 20 (1) of the CRC.

²²⁵ Although the masculine pronoun is used, the ICCPR is applicable without any discrimination to sex as stated in Article 24 (1).

²²⁶ Article 9 of the ICCPR provides for the freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, whilst Article 23 prohibits forced marriage. Under Article 6 of CEDAW, states are required to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.

²²⁷ Slavery Convention, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 212, p. 17., July 7, 1955.

²²⁸ Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter III – The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, s. 19 (1).

²²⁹ Article 3 of the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, Organization of African Unity Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 1982. Sierra Leone signed and ratified this treaty on August 27, 1981 and September 21, 1993 respectively.

²³⁰ Articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

²³¹ The Indictment for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) included rape within the crimes charged generally. IMTFE Indictment, p. 31, reproduced in the IMTFE Docs., vol. 20, Annex A-6; See also Appendix D, attached to the Indictment, which provides more detail on the charges. The Indictment stated that the accused were responsible for "mass murder, rape, pillage, brigandage, torture, and other barbaric cruelties upon the helpless civilian population of the overrun countries." Appendix D alleged responsibility for "inhumane treatment" and "mistreatment" when "civilian internees were murdered, beaten, tortured, and otherwise ill-treated, and female prisoners were raped by members of the Japanese forces" and "female nurses were raped, murdered and ill-treated," and "large numbers of the inhabitants" were also murdered, tortured, raped, and otherwise mistreated.

"Rape of Nanking." The Tokyo tribunal failed, however, to prosecute members of the Japanese government and military for the 200,000 "comfort women" forced into sexual slavery during the war.²³²

Widespread reports of sexual violence in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were instrumental in the U.N. Security Council decisions authorizing the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR. As noted, the statutes of both the ICTY and ICTR make explicit mention of rape as a crime against humanity.²³³ The ICTY also has implicit jurisdiction to prosecute crimes of sexual violence as grave breaches of international humanitarian law, as violations of the laws and customs of war and genocide.²³⁴ The ICTR is explicitly empowered to prosecute rape as a serious violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and can prosecute crimes of sexual violence when they constitute torture or genocide.²³⁵

Both tribunals have played a critical role in setting precedents in the prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence, including articulating definitions and elements of many gender-related crimes.²³⁶ As noted at this report's opening (see "Definition of Sexual Violence, Rape and Sexual Slavery," p. 2), both the ICTR (in the 1998 *Akayesu* judgment) and the ICTY (in the 2002 *Foca* judgment) defined rape, of which there is no commonly accepted definition in international law, albeit the definition from the *Akayesu* judgment has been criticized as too broad. The *Akayesu* judgment also provided a legal definition of sexual violence: any act of a sexual nature, including rape, committed on a person under coercive circumstances, but which need not include a physical invasion of the body or even contact.²³⁷ The ICTY has found that sexual violence not only constitutes crimes against humanity, war crimes and grave breaches, but can also constitute torture, enslavement, serious bodily injury and other relevant acts as long as the elements constituting these crimes are present in the act of sexual violence.

In general, however, both tribunals have had an inconsistent record on investigating and prosecuting crimes of sexual violence. The ICTR continues to lack a comprehensive approach to the inclusion of sexual violence charges and has failed to include these charges or seek amendments in the original indictments where the Office of the Prosecutor has witness testimony or evidence of sexual violence.²³⁸

²³² See the Appendix entitled "An Analysis of the Legal Liability of the Government of Japan for "Comfort Women Stations" Established During the Second World War" to the United Nations, *Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict*, pp. 38-55.

²³³ Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTY (adopted 25/5/93) at <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute-con.htm>. Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTR (adopted 8/11/94) at <http://www.ictor.org>.

²³⁴ Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute of the ICTY respectively.

²³⁵ Articles 4, Article 3 (f) and Article 2 respectively of the ICTR Statute.

²³⁶ *Akayesu* Trial Chamber Judgment; *Prosecutor v. Tadic*; *Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al.*, IT-96-21-A, November 16, 1998; *Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija* Judgment, December 10, 1998; *Prosecutor v. Blaskic*, IT-95-14, Judgment, March 3, 2000; *Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al.*, Judgment, IT-98-30-T, November 2, 2001. *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic* (Foca case), Appeals Chamber Judgment, June 12, 2002, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1.

²³⁷ *Akayesu* Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 688. The ICTR stated: "The Tribunal defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact. The incident described by Witness KK in which the Accused ordered the Interahamwe [Hutu militia] to undress a student and force her to do gymnastics naked in the public courtyard of the bureau communal, in front of a crowd, constitutes sexual violence. The Tribunal notes in this context that coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal."

²³⁸ See Human Rights Watch press release "Bosnia: Landmark Verdicts for Rape, Torture, and Sexual Enslavement," February 22, 2001, at <http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/02/serbia0222.hun>. These facts were reconfirmed from a reliable source from the ICTR, Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, November 8, 2002.

Command Responsibility²³⁹

The culpability of superior officers for atrocities that their subordinates commit is commonly known as command responsibility. Although the concept originated in military law, it now also embraces the responsibility of civil authorities for the abuses committed by persons under their direct authority.²⁴⁰

Commanders of armed rebel groups, such as in Sierra Leone, are subject to command responsibility. While Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II on internal armed conflicts do not explicitly mention command responsibility, the application of Protocol II depends on there being organized armed groups "under responsible command."²⁴¹ Command responsibility is now part of customary international law, that is, a universally recognized precept of international criminal law. It is also an explicit feature of many treaties, including the statutes of the ICC, the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see below, p. 63).

There are two forms of command responsibility. The first is direct responsibility for orders that are unlawful. When an official authorizes or orders rapes, massacres, or other grave abuses, that individual is criminally responsible for these acts, whether the superior who initiated or conveyed the order also carries out the atrocity or has subordinates perform it. The other form of command responsibility is an imputed responsibility for the crimes of subordinates where those crimes are not based on direct orders. In this case, responsibility is determined on the basis of whether the superior knew or should have known of the abuses committed by subordinates.

Knowledge of the abuses may be actual, either by the army officer or rebel commander witnessing the crimes or being informed of them shortly thereafter. It may also be constructive, where the abuses were so numerous or notorious that a reasonable person could come to no other conclusion than that the superior must have known of their commission or of the existence of an understood and acknowledged routine for their commission. Another basis of constructive notice is that the officer should have known of the offenses, but displayed such serious personal dereliction as to constitute willful and wanton disregard of the possible consequences, which is an extreme form of negligence. The failure of the commander to take appropriate measures to control the subordinates under his or her command and prevent atrocities, and the failure to punish offenders, are further elements in showing command responsibility.

An individual found to have command responsibility for the crime committed by a subordinate is deemed culpable to the same degree as the subordinate. A commander will therefore be found guilty of murder if he or she stood by while the subordinate committed murder.

With regard to the crime of rape, some courts have been reluctant to impute command responsibility for what is seen as random and a private crime.²⁴² However, the requirements of command responsibility do not vary according to the particular crime; the commander is no more permitted to stand by while rape is committed than to stand by while murder is. If a superior had reason to know that subordinates under his or her command committed rape (such as news reports, or widespread commission of this abuse), and failed to use all feasible means under his or her command to prevent and punish this abuse, he or she may also be found guilty of rape.

²³⁹ The legal analysis in this section was previously published in Human Rights Watch, *Milosevic and the Chain of Command in Kosovo*, July 7, 2001, <http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/07/chain-of-command.htm>.

²⁴⁰ Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice* (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1999), p. 206-7.

²⁴¹ Article 1 (1), Protocol II.

²⁴² See generally Patricia Viseur Sellers and Kaoru Okuižumi, "Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View: Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults," *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems* Volume 7, Number 1 (Spring 1997), p. 45.

VIII. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS FOR SIERRA LEONE

Two transitional justice mechanisms are currently underway to address the cycle of impunity in Sierra Leone: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Both bodies became operational in the third quarter of 2002.

The Lomé Amnesty

The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 7, 1999, controversially provided for amnesty for combatants in the civil war. Under Article 9 (1), Sankoh was granted an absolute and free pardon (he had been convicted and sentenced to death for his involvement in the 1997 coup); and under Article 9 (3) the government was required to ensure that "no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organizations, since March 1991, up to the time of signing of the present Agreement..."²⁴³ At the last minute, the U.N. secretary-general's special representative attending the talks added a hand-written caveat that the U.N. held the understanding that the amnesty and pardon provided for in Article 9 did not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Under international law, states have an *erga omnes* obligation—in other words a duty owed to the whole international community—to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide and torture even if this means that amnesty laws are in effect annulled. This means that Sierra Leone therefore has an obligation under international law to prosecute those who committed crimes against humanity and torture, irrespective of the Lomé Amnesty and the setting up of the SCSL. Other states also have an obligation to prosecute these crimes based on the principle of universal jurisdiction (see below at p. 66 for a discussion on this principle). Crimes committed in the post-Lomé period fall outside the amnesty and can be prosecuted under domestic law.

The granting of an amnesty may also be challenged under the Sierra Leonean constitution and international law, as being against the fundamental legal principle of the state's duty to provide an effective remedy against official violation of guaranteed rights. The U.N. Human Rights Commission has ruled that "States may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy, including compensation and such rehabilitation as may be possible."²⁴⁴ A duty to revoke the amnesty retroactively may even arise under international law. Several Sierra Leonean lawyers have discussed the issue of the amnesty's constitutionality and whether to challenge it in court.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement provides for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was conceived by nongovernmental organizations attending the peace talks as a counterbalance to the amnesty granted to all parties. Under the peace agreement, the TRC was to be established to "address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, [and] get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation..."²⁴⁵

The commission should have been established within ninety days after the signing of the peace agreement, but the Sierra Leonean Parliament did not pass the Truth and Reconciliation Act establishing the TRC until February 2000. Its establishment was further delayed due to the renewed outbreak of fighting in May 2000, and lack of political will of both the government and the international community. As the selection process for the commissioners took longer than planned, the government also decided to delay the commencement of the TRC until after the May 2002 elections to ensure that the TRC would not be politicized by the elections. The activities of the TRC may well be further hampered by funding shortfalls. Only U.S. \$1.5 million had been pledged as of June 2002, partially because the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) did not

²⁴³ Article 9 of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement.

²⁴⁴ Robertson, *Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*, p. 260.

²⁴⁵ Article 26 (1) of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement.

launch the funding appeal until January 25, 2002. Its total planned budget was reduced from almost U.S. \$10 million to U.S. \$6,276,440 in August 2002 and has remained unchanged since then.²⁴⁶

On May 13, 2002, President Kabbah announced the seven commissioners. The four Sierra Leoneans are: Rt. Rev. Dr. Joseph C. Humper; Justice Laura A. E. Marcus-Jones; Prof. John A. Kamara; and Mr. Sylvanus Torio. The three international commissioners are: Madam Ajaaratai Satang Jow (Gambia); Ms. Yasmin L. Sooka (South Africa); and Professor William Schabas (Canada). The commission had a three-month preparatory phase, which started in July 2002, and must wrap up its activities and submit a report within twelve months of the start of hearings, which as of this writing have not yet begun.²⁴⁷ An interim executive secretariat headed by the Sierra Leonean lawyer Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff and staffed with eight other members was established to support the work of the commissioners. The budget will be used to establish the secretariat of the commission in Freetown, which will support the seven commissioners and the office of the executive secretary. In addition, it is likely that six operational units will be established to provide support to the commissioners and the executive secretary.²⁴⁸ The establishment of regional offices is also provided for under the Act and should encourage Sierra Leonean participation and ownership of the process. These offices are expected to begin functioning in early 2003.²⁴⁹

The TRC's mandate is "to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the armed conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity; to respond to the needs of the victims; to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered."²⁵⁰ The commission is called upon to give special attention to the subject of sexual abuse and may also implement "special procedures to address the needs of such particular victims as children or those who have suffered sexual abuse ..."²⁵¹ Any committees formed by the commission to assist it in the performance of its functions should also take into account gender representation.²⁵²

Both the UNAMSIL human rights unit and NGOs have conducted sensitization activities, mainly in the key urban centers, to ensure Sierra Leonean awareness of the process, but at the time of writing, there was still considerable confusion about the role of the TRC, especially in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).

Human Rights Watch believes that the work of the TRC would be greatly enhanced were the staff of the TRC to be gender-balanced with women represented at all levels and to include persons with expertise in sexual and gender-based violence. The gender adviser, expected to take up the post in January 2003, should provide gender sensitization training and ensure that the work of the TRC, including investigations and hearings, are carried out in a sensitive manner. Human Rights Watch recommends that the TRC explore the relationship between the widespread and systematic nature of conflict-related sexual violence and the low status of and discrimination against women. The final report on the findings of the TRC should highlight gender-specific abuses committed throughout the country during the armed conflict. The TRC should also make recommendations on improvements to the law and judicial system toward eliminating the discriminatory nature of customary and general law, and on legal reform and human rights training for government authorities, including members of the criminal justice system. The report should highlight the need for increased assistance (shelter, medical care, education, skills training, mental health programs, etc.) for women, as well as for strengthening existing women's groups through capacity building.

²⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with TRC staff, November 14, 2002.

²⁴⁷ The TRC can extend its operations for another six months provided that good cause is shown. TRC Act 2000, Section 5 (1). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html>.

²⁴⁸ The six operational units will probably be: Administration and Programming; Public Information and Education; Legal; Investigation; Research; Reconciliation and Protection.

²⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with TRC staff, November 14, 2002.

²⁵⁰ TRC Act 2000, Section 6 (1). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html>.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Section 6 (2) (b) and 7 (4) respectively.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, Section 10 (2).

Special Court for Sierra Leone

Following the hostage taking of over 500 U.N. peacekeepers and the renewed outbreak of fighting between the RUF and government forces in May 2000, the government of Sierra Leone requested that the U.N. assist in establishing a court "to try and bring to credible justice those members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and their accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of U.N. peacekeepers as hostages."²⁵³ The government expressly mentioned that the RUF, in renegeing on their obligations under the Lomé Peace Agreement, continued to subject many women and children to human rights abuses, including sexual slavery. On August 14, 2000, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1315 requesting the secretary-general to negotiate with the Sierra Leonean government an agreement for the establishment of a special court.

Due to delays in funding contributions and agreement on key substantive matters, the agreement between the government and the U.N. to establish the Special Court for Sierra Leone was not signed until January 16, 2002.²⁵⁴ The total budget for the SCSL is U.S. \$56.8 million. The first year of the court has been fully funded and pledges have been received for the second year.²⁵⁵ The secretary-general appointed the prosecutor and registrar on April 19, 2002, and it is hoped that the first trials will commence in the second quarter of 2003.²⁵⁶ Given budgetary constraints, it is likely that only a limited number of persons will be tried, perhaps as few as twenty.

The SCSL differs in notable ways from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Firstly, it is based on an agreement between the government and the U.N. and was not established by a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. This means that the Special Court does not have the power to require international cooperation.²⁵⁷ Secondly, the SCSL is a hybrid court relying on both international and domestic laws. The professional and support staff of the court will be a mix of Sierra Leonean and foreign nationals.

Article 1 of the SCSL provides that the court has the competence to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996."²⁵⁸

Other crimes that the court has the jurisdiction to prosecute are provided under Article 2 to Article 6. Under Article 2, which defines the crimes against humanity that the SCSL has the power to prosecute, the following crimes of sexual violence are specified: "rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence."²⁵⁹ Rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault can also be prosecuted as violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II as stated under Article 3 of the statute. Under Article 4, specific serious violations of international humanitarian law are enumerated, including intentionally attacking civilians and the recruitment of children under fifteen years old into

²⁵³ Letter dated June 12, 2000 and addressed by the president of Sierra Leone to the U.N. secretary-general. Letter and annexed Suggested Framework for the Special Court.

²⁵⁴ Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf>.

²⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Robin Vincent (registrar of the SCSL), U.K., July 4, 2002.

²⁵⁶ S/2002/246, Letter dated March 6, 2002 from the secretary-general addressed to the president of the Security Council. David Crane, a prosecutor for the U.S. Department of Defence, was appointed as prosecutor and Robin Vincent of the U.K. was appointed as the registrar.

²⁵⁷ See also letter from Human Rights Watch to members of the Security Council and other interested states dated September 27, 2001. Under Chapter VII, which is entitled "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," the Security Council can decide to take non-military and/or military action against states that threaten international peace and security. Decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII—which should be read in conjunction with Article 24, which confers primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council, and Article 25, under which U.N. member states agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council—are binding on member states.

²⁵⁸ Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/documents-specialcourt.html>.

²⁵⁹ The other crimes against humanity are: murder; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds; and other inhuman acts.

the armed forces. With the unanimous adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in May 2000,²⁶⁰ however, the minimum age for any conscription or forced recruitment has been raised to eighteen.²⁶¹ Under Article 5, gender-based crimes can also be prosecuted under domestic law provisions. However, as these provisions do not meet international standards in terms of definition of crimes and punishment, they should not be applied.²⁶²

In accordance with the U.N.'s statement that it did not recognize the Lomé amnesty as it purported to apply to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, Article 10 of the court's statute states:

An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.²⁶³

This means that those bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity (Article 2); violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II (Article 3); and other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Article 4) can be prosecuted for their crimes.

The issue of command responsibility is of crucial import to the SCSL given that its mandate is to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders, who in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone."²⁶⁴ The court therefore will only prosecute the so-called "big fish" and not the "small fry" or those persons who in many instances actually committed the violations. Article 6 of the statute of the SCSL provides that:

3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Special Court determines that justice so requires.²⁶⁵

The failure by rebel commanders and army officers to punish combatants involved in abuses, despite documentation of and international attention to crimes of sexual violence perpetrated by rebels and pro-government forces, indicates that such persons of authority knowingly tolerated and even condoned these abuses. Commanders may also bear individual criminal responsibility for crimes of sexual violence in addition to command responsibility, as the testimonies in this report highlight.

It is highly regrettable that the court's temporal jurisdiction does not extend to the beginning of the conflict (March 23, 1991). Instead November 30, 1996, the date of the Abidjan Peace Accord, was chosen as it was felt that including the whole war would impose too great a burden on the court. The U.N. also felt that this date corresponded to a new phase in the conflict without necessarily having any political connotations, and that this

²⁶⁰ General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, adopted May 25, 2000.

²⁶¹ Sierra Leone signed and ratified the Optional Protocol of the CRC on September 8, 2000 and on August 24, 2001 respectively. The Optional Protocol entered into force on February 12, 2002.

²⁶² Article 5 refers to the sections (6, 7 and 12) of the 1926 Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act that relate to abuses committed against girls under the age of fourteen. See above, "Rape as a crime under general law," et seq., for a discussion of these provisions.

²⁶³ Article 10 of the statute of the SCSL.

²⁶⁴ Article 1 of the statute of the SCSL.

²⁶⁵ Article 6 (3) and (4) of the statute of the SCSL.

temporal jurisdiction encompassed the most serious crimes committed by persons of all political and military groups and in all geographical areas of the country.²⁶⁶ The temporal jurisdiction is, however, open-ended as the war was still ongoing at the time of the discussions on the court's establishment. The U.N. states that the lifespan of the court will be determined by "a subsequent agreement between the parties upon completion of its judicial activities, an indication of the capacity acquired by the local courts to assume the prosecution of remaining cases, or the unavailability of funds."²⁶⁷

In terms of prosecuting crimes of sexual violence, the statute specifies that "given the nature of the crimes committed and the particular sensitivities of girls, young women and children victims of rape, sexual assault, abduction and slavery of all kinds, due consideration should be given in the appointment of staff to the employment of prosecutors and investigators experienced in gender-related crimes and juvenile justice."²⁶⁸ Likewise, Article 16 (4) specifies that personnel of the Victims and Witnesses Unit should include experts in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence and violence against children.

As the TRC and Special Court will be functioning simultaneously, the interaction between the two bodies, whose subject matter as well as personal and temporal jurisdiction intersect, must urgently be clarified. This is crucial in terms of sharing of information, especially confidential information, but also for the sensitization efforts underway. Enabling legislation enacted in March 2002 contains a provision, criticized by many nongovernmental organizations, that establishes the primacy of the SCSL, apparently including over the TRC.²⁶⁹

Given that the SCSL will only try a limited number of alleged perpetrators, it needs to establish a clear and comprehensive prosecutorial strategy from the onset. Within the court's mandate, the prosecutor should ensure that gender-related crimes are thoroughly and sensitively investigated and rigorously prosecuted as crimes against humanity or war crimes. The two gender crimes investigators should conduct compulsory gender sensitization training for all staff, and provide more in-depth training for staff members dealing most directly with survivors of sexual violence. The gender crimes investigators should also have access to all cases under investigation, even the ones not previously identified as gender cases, to provide guidance and expertise.

Principle of Universal Jurisdiction

Given the limited number of persons that the Special Court can prosecute due to funding constraints, it is important to note that the principle of universal jurisdiction applies to war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery,²⁷⁰ and torture.²⁷¹ A resolution passed by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in April 1999, specifically reminded all factions and forces in Sierra Leone of this principle, stating that "in any armed conflict including an armed conflict of a non-international character, the taking of hostages, willful killing and torture or inhuman treatment of persons taking no active part in the hostilities constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law, and that all countries are under the obligation to search for such persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches and to bring such persons, regardless of their

²⁶⁶ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone*, S/2000/915, October 4, 2000, para. 25-28. Other dates considered were May 25, 1997, and January 6, 1999, but the U.N. considered that these would be perceived as offering only selective justice.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 28.

²⁶⁸ Article 15 (4) of the statute of the SCSL. A Woman's Task Force for the Special Court and TRC was established with the support of the International Human Rights Law Group to advocate that gender-based crimes be properly investigated by both bodies and—in terms of the Special Court—prosecuted. The Women's Task Force has also advocated for the appointment of staff who are experienced in and sensitive to cases of sexual violence, as well as for gender balance i.e. women should be well represented in positions of authority as well as in positions of support (statement takers, investigators, counselors and interpreters, etc.).

²⁶⁹ Special Court Agreement 2002 (ratification) Act 2002 (March 7, 2002). Article 21 (2) of the Act provides that: "Notwithstanding any other law, every natural person, corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra Leone law shall comply with any direction specified in an order of the Special Court."

²⁷⁰ Slavery can be prosecuted as a war crime and a crime against humanity, but also on an independent basis against both state and non-state actors during wartime and peace given its status as a peremptory norm of customary law.

²⁷¹ Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Articles 8, 9, 17, 19 and 20, *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth Session*, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, para. 50 (United Nations, 1996).

nationality, before their own courts.²⁷²

The special rapporteur for violence against women also stressed the principle of universal jurisdiction in her report on her mission to Sierra Leone:

Thus, crimes of gender based violence must be investigated and documented for possible criminal prosecution in the domestic courts of other States which may have jurisdiction ...²⁷³

IX. THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

National Response

Climate of Impunity

Human Rights Watch is not aware of any prosecutions in the Sierra Leonean courts of any cases of conflict-related sexual violence or other human rights abuses. The lack of both categories of prosecutions is due to a number of factors. Firstly, many survivors simply want to try to forget about the sexual violence and other human rights abuses they have been subjected to and just get on with their lives in post-conflict Sierra Leone, which for many is a daily struggle. Secondly, some women and girls fear reprisals. According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, thirteen (or 25 percent) of the fifty-one respondents indicating that their perpetrator should not be punished, expressed this fear.²⁷⁴ Thirdly, women and girls are often ashamed of what happened to them and are therefore reluctant to present themselves in court. Fourthly, women and girls have little faith in the criminal justice system or the customary law system, which were never equipped to deal with crimes of such widespread and systematic nature. If a survivor of sexual violence does decide to prosecute, she is likely to be retraumatized by the whole experience given the very poor track record of the Sierra Leonean criminal justice system. Fifthly, many women and girls lack the financial means to access the court system. As women are generally economically dependent on men, many women who have initiated prosecution of non-conflict-related sexual violence, have dropped their cases once they realize that their husband may be sentenced to prison (dependency means that a previously abducted woman or girl who is still with her rebel "husband" is even more unlikely to bring any charges against him). Sixthly, victims are often not even aware of their rights, given high illiteracy rates, prevalent societal attitudes towards sexual violence, and women's low status in Sierra Leonean society. Many rural women and girls, in particular, see little value in the formal court system as there is often no financial or material benefit from bringing a case. Attitudes towards sexual violence, and the subordinate status of women and girls, mean that there is considerable societal pressure for women not to bring cases before the courts that could bring shame to the extended family, such as sexual violence cases.

The climate of impunity means that violence against women and girls remains a serious problem in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Rape continues to be committed by former rebels, members of the CDF and by civilians who are used to doing what they want with women by force and with impunity. A lawyer who practices in the Eastern Province reported to Human Rights Watch that of the rape victims he was currently representing at least 50 percent had been raped by civilians and the remainder by former combatants.²⁷⁵ Girls continue to suffer the greatest number of sexual assaults: a lawyer who practices in the Freetown area reported to Human Rights Watch that of the at least fifty rape victims she represented at the time of writing, 98 percent are under fourteen years old.²⁷⁶ Although there are no reliable statistics on the incidence of sexual or domestic violence, the police doctor in Connaught Hospital in Freetown, which is the largest government-run hospital in the country, sees about thirty victims of recent rape and sexual assault per month.²⁷⁷ For the reasons enumerated above, this figure is likely to

²⁷² UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/1, April 6, 1999.

²⁷³ United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women* E/CN.4/2002/83/Add. 2, 2002, para. 78.

²⁷⁴ PHR report, pp. 53-55 and Table 7 at p. 56. Women could select more than one option.

²⁷⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with Abdulai Bangurah (lawyer), Freetown, March 15, 2002.

²⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Claire Fatu Hanciles (lawyer), Freetown, August 9, 2002.

²⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

be the tip of the iceberg. Physicians for Human Rights found that 39 percent of respondents expressed concern ("quite a bit" or "extremely worried") about future sexual violence by family members, friends or civilian strangers. Ninety-one women (or 9 percent of all respondents) had experienced sexual abuse, occurring at an average age of fifteen, from family, friends or civilians during their lifetime.²⁷⁸

Despite all these problems, seventeen out of a total of ninety-four respondents (or 18 percent) reporting sexual violence to Physicians for Human Rights supported punishment for "all those involved," thirty women (or 32 percent) supported punishment for the perpetrators, and seventeen women (or 18 percent) supported punishment for the commanders. Thirty-three women believed that punishment of perpetrators would prevent sexual violence from happening to others.²⁷⁹

Corrupt and Ineffective Judiciary

Lack of faith in the system, as the few women who have decided to prosecute non-conflict-related rape have experienced, is fully justified. The judiciary—which, prior to the conflict, barely existed in the provinces, and in Freetown was only accessible to those who had sufficient funds—completely collapsed during the war. Many lawyers fled the conflict, and much of the infrastructure, including the law courts in Freetown, was destroyed. The low salaries of personnel working in the judiciary have meant that magistrates, lawyers, and judges are easy targets for bribery and/or intimidation. In addition to these problems, women who seek justice for crimes of sexual violence have to contend with more gender-specific problems. The judiciary is dominated by men and some of its older members, in particular, do not think rape is a serious crime and that the victims are generally to blame. The legal processes are very cumbersome and open to corruption, factors which favor the perpetrator. At the magistrates court level, it is up to the magistrate to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to submit a case to the High Court and whether to grant bail. As the court system is so overburdened this phase can take weeks or months, and it is not unusual for victims to have to appear over ten times before the case is handed on to the High Court. Magistrates have also been known to grant bail even if the offender and victim live in the same compound, which means that the victim is at risk at least of intimidation and even physical violence.²⁸⁰ Many cases die in the magistrates courts, as victims run out of money, patience, and/or time. Cases at this stage are also frequently dismissed, if, for example, the witnesses do not show in court (after three no shows, the case can be dismissed): witnesses often decide against appearing in court for reasons including intimidation, ignorance of the law, lack of transportation money, and the slow pace at which court cases proceed, or because they simply do not care. The requirement for corroborating evidence is often an obstacle to prosecution and violates international norms.

If the magistrate decides that there is sufficient evidence, the case is handed up to the High Court. Cases in the High Court can also take months especially as there are also continuous indefinite adjournments to contend with. There have been no High Court sittings in the provinces for the past six years, and cases in the provinces have therefore been on indefinite hold. One offender who sexually assaulted two young girls spent five years in pre-trial detention before being sentenced to two years for indecent assault—the five years already served in pre-trial detention were ignored by the court, thus putting the offender in detention for a total of seven years rather than two.²⁸¹

Need for Law Reform

Both general and customary law offer little protection for women and girls (see above, "Women and Girls Under Sierra Leonean Law"). The misinterpretation of the general law provisions pertaining to rape by members of the criminal justice system means that girls are offered even less protection than adults. There is an urgent need for the laws to be revised: the discriminatory provisions in both general and customary law should be removed and brought into line with international standards of human rights, including in relation to the protection of women and girls from violence. The law relating to rape, in particular, should be simplified as well as

²⁷⁸ PHR report, p. 49.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

²⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with John Bosco Alieu (lawyer), Freetown, February 26, 2002.

²⁸¹ Human Rights Watch interview with Abdulai Bangurah (lawyer), Freetown, March 15, 2002.

strengthened. Specific legislation on domestic violence, which currently does not exist, should be introduced as women seeking legal redress for domestic violence generally face even more difficulty in convincing the police and members of the judiciary that their rights have been violated.²⁸² The constitution should also be amended to remove the exemption for customary law and personal law from the prohibition on discrimination. Ending discrimination under customary law in practice will require a major public education exercise, but, as a start, staff of local courts, especially those presiding over them, should be trained in relation to issues of discrimination and the rights of women under the (revised) constitution and international human rights law. The judiciary and the police force need to be trained on the new laws to ensure that they are properly applied.

The Sierra Leone Police

Prior to the civil war, the Sierra Leone Police had been used by politicians for their own purposes and had not received any substantive training for decades. The attitude of the police force to sexual and domestic violence remains insensitive. Police officers, for example, often do not take reports of rape seriously and chastise women who report domestic violence. There are many problems with police investigations of rape cases. Firstly, the police lack basic investigation skills. Secondly, victims must be examined by state-employed doctors, including police doctors, as only a state-employed doctor can present medical evidence in court. Both the police and other state-employed doctors often charge money for these examinations even though they should be free of charge. Thirdly, both the doctors and the police may be intimidated and/or bribed to drop the cases, or police may demand money from plaintiffs before interviewing witnesses and arranging their transport to court. A nationwide system of Family Support Units (FSUs) is in the process of being established with the support of the British-funded Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) to deal with cases of sexual and domestic violence.²⁸³ To date, however, only a small number of police officers (approximately sixteen) have received some training and much work remains to be done before the FSUs can deal with victims of sexual and domestic violence in an appropriate manner.

The International Response

In addition to funding UNAMSIL, the international donor community pours approximately U.S. \$70 million a year into Sierra Leone for humanitarian assistance. Within the overall humanitarian assistance program to Sierra Leone, only a small percentage of funding is targeted to gender-related programs, notwithstanding the large number of girls and women who have been affected by gender-specific abuses. This funding has also come very late: there were no services specifically for survivors of sexual violence before 1999. After the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, the international community finally took note of the scale of sexual and gender-based abuses and started funding small-scale programs in accessible areas. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program consistently overlooked the assistance as well as protection needs of abducted women and girls (see below).

Donor funding has contributed to education, adult literacy, health care, trauma counseling, and skills training programs as well as credit and income-generating schemes for a limited number of survivors of sexual violence. These programs need to be expanded into all parts of Sierra Leone, so that more survivors can benefit from these programs. Long-term sexual and gender-based violence programs that aim to educate communities about sexual and domestic violence as well as provide women with health care and some legal aid on a limited scale have been established in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the east and south. These programs have been quite successful in changing the attitudes towards sexual and domestic violence of the IDP communities these programs serviced. They have also empowered rural women to stand up for their rights.

²⁸² Charges of physical assault can be made under the 1861 Offenses Against the Person Act under sections 18 (wounding with intent to maim; causing grievous bodily harm with intent; shooting with intent to maim), 20 (unlawful wounding) and 47 (assault, battery, actual bodily harm).

²⁸³ Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

To date, funding for the judiciary has focused on the rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the judiciary, but as the peace in Sierra Leone takes hold, donors, including the British government and the World Bank, are considering funding desperately needed judicial reform programs.

The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program

The extent to which sexual violence, including sexual slavery, has been ignored throughout the war and in the post-conflict phase is most evident by the lack of attention paid to the thousands of abducted women and girls and their children. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process has completely overlooked the protection needs of these women and children. The lack of clear policy and procedural guidelines on these abductees has meant that the responsibility for these women and girls fell between governmental institutions and implementing agencies, resulting in an *ad hoc*, inappropriate and inadequate humanitarian response. Little to no funding was allocated to the protection needs of abducted women and children and only a small number of programs that provide education, skills training and counseling were established for them. This important human rights issue was raised on numerous occasions at different levels with the relevant government institutions, donor governments and the World Bank by UNAMSIL and nongovernmental organizations as well as by World Bank consultants in confidential reports, but did not succeed in bringing about any concrete policy decisions.

The needs of abducted girls and women should, however, be considered an inextricable part of the DDR process and a priority issue that should have been addressed during meetings between the U.N. and government officials or rebel leaders prior to the commencement of disarmament. The abducted girls and women should have been registered and interviewed at the same time that their "husbands" entered the DDR program, with the interviews conducted separately from the "husbands." Information on alternative options could have been disseminated at the DDR camps through social workers and orientation sessions. Alternatively, if it had been possible to gain access to the abducted women and children in rebel-held areas before or during the DDR process then contact should have been established to determine total numbers and inform them of the reintegration support and alternative options available to them. Female social workers in the DDR camps could also have counseled the abductees to help them understand the implications of their decisions, and that the decision is theirs. Basic reproductive health services, including testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, should also be provided at DDR camps.

Donors and the government of Sierra Leone must redress their neglect of survivors' protection needs by drastically increasing funding for women's programs and providing women with desperately needed assistance in terms of health, education, trauma counseling, adult literacy and skills training to promote their rehabilitation into society. In addition, donors should fund legal reform and training programs for the judiciary and police, which will contribute to increase the protection of women's human rights. Donors should also learn from their failure in Sierra Leone and ensure that DDR programs in other countries where large numbers of women and girls have been abducted by the fighting forces, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, do integrate the protection needs of these abducted women and girls.²⁸⁴

United Kingdom

The U.K. has played a key role in restoring peace to Sierra Leone. During the May 2000 crisis, British troops deployed to Sierra Leone, and a standby force was deployed offshore ready to provide additional support to UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Army, if required. Since the May 2000 crisis, it has provided technical assistance to most government departments and military training to the new SLA, and has publicly committed itself to remain closely involved in Sierra Leone.

The U.K. is the biggest donor in Sierra Leone, and in 2002 contributed £100 million (approximately U.S. \$145 million) of which about £50 million (approximately U.S. \$73 million) was disbursed through its development agency, the Department for International Development (DFID). DFID-funded programs aim at

²⁸⁴ Human Rights Watch, *The War within the War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).

strengthening the protection and promotion of women's human rights. Since September 2001, the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), which is funded by DFID and staffed only by British nationals, has been working to establish a nationwide system of Family Support Units (FSUs) to deal with cases of sexual and domestic violence. Under this system, only female police officers are supposed to interview female victims, while both male and female police officers are responsible for interviewing suspects and witnesses. More officers need to be trained in addition to the sixteen who have received training. As the force has few women, more females need to be recruited so only female police officers interview victims of sexual and domestic violence. The police officers in the FSUs lack strong leadership and require more training and close supervision to ensure that victims are dealt with in a professional and sensitive manner.

DFID also funds a program to promote the participation of women in politics, especially in Parliament, as well as university research into conflict-related sexual violence committed in January 1999.²⁸⁵ DFID has provided £2.5 million (about U.S. \$3.5 million) for a three year Law Development Program which aims at rehabilitating the physical infrastructure of the court system, as well as providing training to administrative staff to ensure proper record-keeping of cases. The Law Development Program is under review to determine its future strategy, in particular with relation to legal reform, including customary law. DFID is currently considering funding a three-year program that will establish sexual and physical assault referral centers across the country.

The U.K. has contributed a total of over U.S. \$500,000 to the operations of the TRC and its Interim Secretariat. The U.K. has also pledged U.S. \$9,110,000 over three years to the Special Court.

United States

In 1999, the U.S. put considerable pressure on the warring parties to seek a negotiated settlement. However, following the breakdown of the peace process in 2000, U.S. policy revolved around ending external support for the RUF, supporting British military actions and transitional justice mechanisms as well as providing humanitarian aid. From 2000 to 2002, the United States contributed a total of U.S. \$170 million to Sierra Leone, which was primarily disbursed on food-for-peace programs, the resettlement of displaced persons, and reintegration of former combatants. The U.S. has funded several women's programs, notably in the field of health, including the provision of obstetric surgery and HIV/AIDS education, a sexual and gender-based violence program, a program aimed at promoting women in politics, and micro-finance schemes for women. The Senate's Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) expand services to rape victims and fund a public education program on women's rights. The U.S., which is a strong supporter of the Special Court, has contributed U.S. \$5 million to this body, and pledged an additional \$10 million. The U.S. has contributed \$500,000 to the TRC.

After the May 2000 crisis, the U.S. initiated a program called Operation Focus Relief (OFR) to train and equip seven battalions of West African troops for peacekeeping with UNAMSIL. In July 2002, the U.S. pledged to help ECOWAS set up military bases for the rapid deployment of troops in conflict areas. The first steps in this assistance program include the installation of a U.S. \$5.3 million early-warning satellite communications system, which will link the ECOWAS secretariat with observation centers in four ECOWAS countries.

European Union

The E.U. did not play a key role in responding to the armed conflict and to date has not been a major donor. Since May 2000, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has disbursed approximately €30 million (roughly the same in U.S. dollars) in Sierra Leone. Few ECHO-funded programs have directly targeted women. ECHO has funded child protection programs, which have assisted child-mothers who became pregnant as the result of conflict-related sexual violence.

²⁸⁵ A survey of 226 victims, conducted by the University of Sierra Leone Gender Research and Documentation Centre in collaboration with the Sierra Leone Association of University Women (SLAUW), Médecins Sans Frontières, UNICEF and FAWE Sierra Leone.

As the situation in Sierra Leone stabilizes, the E.U. will increase its funding to Sierra Leone through the European Development Fund (EDF), which from 2000 to 2002 disbursed €38 million on activities that supported the return to democracy, rehabilitation of infrastructure and resettlement. From 2002 to 2007, a total of €144 million will be made available for disbursement through the EDF on activities that focus on the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, good governance and institutional capacity building. An additional €76 million can be spent on activities outside of these two focal areas.

In 2002, the European Commission funded a two-year program that supports the reintegration of rape victims and other war-affected persons through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Human rights-related programs funded through the EIDHR, which has €6 million for disbursement over the next three years (2002-5), should include women's rights issues, which the EIDHR seeks to mainstream in all its programs.²⁸⁶

In addition to the U.K., other member states of the E.U. have bilaterally contributed to Sierra Leone. The Netherlands, in particular, has since 1999 funded sexual and gender-based violence programs. The Dutch government has also been a strong supporter of the Special Court and has contributed U.S. \$11.4 million, which is approximately 20 percent of the total budget. A donation for the TRC is being prepared at the time of writing, but has not yet been formalized. A small budget for human rights programs was made available for 2002.

United Nations

Security Council, Secretary-General, and UNAMSIL

Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the members of the Security Council have devoted much attention to the conflict in Sierra Leone. Kofi Annan visited the country in July 1999 and December 2000. The Security Council has frequently denounced the egregious human rights abuses committed during the conflict, in particular by the rebel factions, and has stressed the importance of protecting women in armed conflict.²⁸⁷

Following the failure of the U.N. peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Rwanda, there was substantial pressure on the U.N. to ensure that the UNAMSIL peacekeeping mission would succeed when it was established in October 1999.²⁸⁸ After the slow initial deployment of peacekeepers, which led to the May 2000 crisis, the U.N. committed itself to deploy 17,500 peacekeepers in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL is the world's largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission, costing the international community over U.S. \$700 million annually.²⁸⁹ As of March 31, 2002, there were 17,455 peacekeepers, 259 military observers, 87 civilian police officers as well as 322 international and 552 local civilian staff in Sierra Leone. The mission is now being hailed as a great success, although Human Rights Watch has criticized UNAMSIL on numerous occasions for failing to fulfill its mandate to protect the civilian population.²⁹⁰ In a June 19 report to the Security Council on UNAMSIL, the secretary-general stated that the government security apparatus was not yet capable of protecting Sierra Leone from both internal and external threats and warned that the international community must protect the major investments that had made possible the progress achieved so far.²⁹¹ On September 24, the Security Council extended UNAMSIL's mandate for a further six months, but envisaged a reduction of 4,500 troops in the peacekeeping mission within eight months. The resolution was based on the recommendation of a further report on UNAMSIL which laid out benchmarks to govern the withdrawal of the U.N. from Sierra Leone, including the ability of the police and army

²⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with EIDHR representatives Andrew Kelly and Irene Corcillo and the Economic Adviser to the E.U., René Mally, Freetown, April 10, 2002.

²⁸⁷ In resolution 1370, the Security Council expressed "... its continued deep concern at the reports of human rights abuses and attacks by the RUF and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) ... against the civilian population, in particular the widespread violation of the human rights of women and children, including sexual violence, [and] demands that these acts cease immediately..." U.N. Security Council resolution 1370, S/RES/1370 (2001), September 18, 2001, para. 4.

²⁸⁸ U.N. Security Council resolution 1270, S/RES/1270 (1999), October 22, 1999.

²⁸⁹ U.N. Security Council resolution 1346, S/RES/1346 (2001), March 30, 2001.

²⁹⁰ See Human Rights Watch letter addressed to Secretary-General Kofi Annan at <http://www.org/press/2001/11/annanltr.htm>.

²⁹¹ *Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2002/679, June 19, 2002.

to maintain security, the successful re-integration of ex-combatants, and the situation in the broader sub-region. The resolution also encouraged the government of Sierra Leone to "pay special attention to the needs of women and children affected by the war," and welcomed "the steps taken by UNAMSIL to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation of women and children," and encouraged the mission to continue to enforce a policy of "zero tolerance" for such acts. The Security Council also called on states to bring to justice their own nationals responsible for such crimes in Sierra Leone.²⁹²

UNAMSIL was initially authorized to field fourteen human rights officers, but for the first two years of UNAMSIL's existence, the human rights unit remained understaffed, which meant that human rights abuses were not effectively monitored. At various times during the lifespan of UNAMSIL, the gender specialist post was not filled. When UNAMSIL's mandate was expanded to 17,500, the human rights unit was authorized to recruit six additional human rights officers and most positions are currently filled. The Physicians for Human Rights report on conflict-related sexual violence was produced in collaboration with the UNAMSIL human rights section and has contributed to focusing the attention of the international community on the issue of sexual violence.

In October 2000, the Security Council held an Open Session on Women and Armed Conflict and adopted a resolution calling for documenting the impact of armed conflict on women and the role of women in peace-building.²⁹³ Since then the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has undertaken a major study on the impact of armed conflict on women in more than ten countries around the world, including Sierra Leone. In January 2002, a three-woman UNIFEM team visited Sierra Leone in connection with this study.²⁹⁴ UNIFEM also recently appointed a gender and AIDS adviser in Sierra Leone, who is tasked with strengthening the gender division of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs and local women's groups as well as mainstreaming gender in the TRC and Special Court for Sierra Leone. She will also research the relationship between gender, conflict and HIV/AIDS with the aim to increase protection against HIV infection.²⁹⁵

In November 2001, a team from the Training and Evaluation Service of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) conducted a two-week training on gender in peacekeeping. The program involved over 1,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers and civilian personnel from both Freetown and the provinces. Local human rights activists and women's organizations were invited in order to contribute a domestic perspective on gender issues.

UNAMSIL has funded several women's programs for survivors of sexual violence through various trust funds. These trust funds are normally established for quick impact programs whilst the rehabilitation and reintegration of women who have been abducted and subjected to sexual violence and sexual slavery should be seen as long-term projects.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

The then U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited Sierra Leone in June 1999, while the Lomé peace negotiations were taking place. The purpose of the mission was "to support the peace process, to encourage future programmes for the promotion and protection of human rights in the country, and to draw attention to the plight of children, women and civilians bearing the brunt of the excesses in Sierra Leone."²⁹⁶ OHCHR has provided technical assistance for the establishment of the TRC, but was very slow to issue the funding appeal for the TRC. OHCHR has also assisted in the drafting of the statute for the national human rights commission provided under the Lomé Peace Agreement, but the establishment of this body has not progressed beyond that point.

²⁹² *Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2002/987, September 5, 2002; U.N. Security Council resolution 1436, S/RES/1436 (2002), September 24, 2002, paragraphs 14 and 15.

²⁹³ U.N. Security Council resolution 1325, S/RES/1325 (2000), October 31, 2000.

²⁹⁴ See the summary of the assessment's findings at http://www.unifem.org/gov_pax_assessment.pdf.html.

²⁹⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with Jebbeh Forster (Gender and AIDS advisor to UNIFEM Sierra Leone), Freetown, March 11 and April 15, 2002.

²⁹⁶ United Nations, *Sixth Report of the U.N. secretary-general on the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)*, S/1999/645, June 4, 1999, para. 39

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has condemned the human rights situation in Sierra Leone on numerous occasions.²⁹⁷ In August 2001, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the commission's special rapporteur on violence against women, visited Sierra Leone to highlight the gender-specific abuses that thousands of women and girls have been subjected to. She highlighted that "systematic and widespread rape and other sexual violence has been a hallmark of the conflict in Sierra Leone" and noted that "the failure to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence has contributed to an environment of impunity that perpetuates violence against women in Sierra Leone, including rape and domestic violence."²⁹⁸ She therefore stressed the need for accountability for these abuses.

World Bank

The World Bank established a multi-donor trust fund for the DDR program, which is now focused on the reintegration of ex-combatants. As discussed above, the protection needs of abducted women and girls were ignored by the DDR program even though World Bank consultants had raised this issue in their confidential reports. In 2002, the World Bank agreed in principle to allocate U.S. \$140 million to support reconstruction and development efforts in Sierra Leone and U.S. \$15 million to go towards HIV/AIDS prevention projects there.

X. CONCLUSION

The decade-long war in Sierra Leone has been characterized by egregious human rights abuses committed primarily by the rebel forces against the civilian population. Throughout the conflict, thousands of women and girls were raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence of unimaginable brutality, including sexual slavery. The low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone by law, custom and practice remains a contributing factor to their vulnerability and may have contributed to the widespread and systematic sexual violence. In addition to the combatants' motivation to achieve their strategic military objectives through terrorizing the civilian population, the fact that sexual violence during the Sierra Leone conflict predominantly involved *men* raping *women* reveals that conflict-related rape, like most rape, reflects this dynamic of gender inequality and subordination. This assertion by men of their power over women is deeply imbedded in societal attitudes in Sierra Leone. The international community and the government therefore need to think of creative ways to change these deeply embedded attitudes.

The lack of attention paid until recently, both nationally and internationally, to the widespread and systematic acts of sexual violence, sexual slavery and their consequences means that there are few assistance programs for survivors. The international community and the government of Sierra Leone should drastically increase funding to ensure that desperately needed health care, education, adult literacy, skills training, trauma counseling, and income-generating schemes are provided. Nor have there been any prosecutions. Rape therefore continues with impunity and it is little wonder that women and girls in post-conflict Sierra Leone remain vulnerable to non-conflict-related violence, and are reluctant to seek legal redress in the domestic courts or even report the incident given the country's inefficient and corrupt criminal justice system. Although, the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should help to address this climate of impunity, the domestic legal system must urgently be revised to ensure that crimes of sexual violence are prosecuted in a sensitive manner. The international community therefore needs to fund legal reform and training

²⁹⁷ The Commission on Human Rights deplored "... the ongoing atrocities committed by the rebels, including murders, rape, abductions ... calls for an end to all such acts." U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/24, April 18, 2000, para. 4. The Commission also expressed its grave concern "...at the targeting and abuse of women and girls that have been committed in Sierra Leone by the Revolutionary United Front and others, including other armed groups, in particular murder, sexual violence, rape, including systematic rape, sexual slavery and forced marriages..." U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/20, April 20, 2001, para. 2(b).

²⁹⁸ United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/49, Addendum, Mission to Sierra Leone, E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.2* (United Nations, 2002), p. 2.

programs for the criminal justice system as a whole, which has a key role in promoting and protecting the rights of Sierra Leonean women and girls.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was written by Louise Taylor, a consultant to Human Rights Watch, on the basis of interviews conducted in Sierra Leone from February to June 2002. It is also based on testimonies collected by Corinne Dufka, Human Rights Watch Africa Division researcher based in Sierra Leone, from 1999 to June 2002, and by Ellen Vermeulen, consultant, from February 2000 to April 2001.

The report was edited by Bronwen Manby, deputy director of the Africa Division; James Ross, senior legal adviser; and Ian Gorvin, consultant to the program office. It was also reviewed by Corinne Dufka; Widney Brown, advocacy director in the Women's Rights Division; Zama Coursen-Neff, researcher in the Children's Rights Division; Joanne Csete, director of the program on HIV/AIDS and human rights; and Joanne Weschler, U.N. representative. The final edits were inputted by Max Marcus, consultant. Production and coordination assistance was provided by Jeff Scott, associate in the Africa Division; Patrick Minges, Publications director; and Fitzroy Hepkins, mail manager.

We would like to thank all the organizations and individuals interviewed for this report for their invaluable assistance and insights. We particularly thank the survivors who agreed to recount their experiences. The courage and dignity of these women and girls never ceases to amaze and inspire.

Human Rights Watch recognizes with appreciation funding for work on Sierra Leone from the Oak Foundation, Stichting Doen, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

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
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Page omitted in error.

87) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

United States Department of State, "Human Rights Practices for 1998 Report", Sierra Leone Country Report, February 1999, p. 1.



The State Department web site below is a permanent electro information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see y material released since President George W. Bush took offic This site is not updated so external links may no longer func us with any questions about finding information.

NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be c endorsement of the views contained therein.



U.S. Department of State

Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 26, 1999.

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with a directly elected president and a unicameral legislature; however, this democratically elected Government did not control the whole country effectively at any time during the year. In March the Government, led by President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who had been elected in 1996, was returned to power after 9 months in exile. The President's party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, has had a majority in the Parliament since 1996. The Government's return followed the February ouster of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which had overthrown the Kabbah Government in 1997 and assumed power. The RUF had conducted an insurgency against successive governments; the AFRC originated in a 1997 coup by elements of the Government's armed forces. The AFRC and RUF junta forces were defeated and driven out of Freetown by forces of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), led by the armed forces of Nigeria. In February and March there was fierce fighting throughout the country as ECOMOG and members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) continued to fight remnants of the AFRC and RUF, particularly in the larger cities outside the capital. However, government and ECOMOG forces failed to gain control of the whole country, and the civil conflict continued throughout the year. In December AFRC AND RUF rebels infiltrated Freetown and, at year's end, controlled areas close to the capital. The officially independent judiciary functioned only in part of the country and only during part of the year, but demonstrated substantial independence in practice when it did function.

Among the Government's security forces, the police officially had primary responsibility for internal order. However, due to the continuing insurgency, the newly constituted army, the CDF and ECOMOG

shared de facto responsibility with the police in security matters. Government forces, particularly poorly trained CDF units that included child soldiers, committed numerous serious human rights abuses, and ECOMOG forces also committed some abuses.

Sierra Leone is an extremely poor country, with a market-based economy and a per capita income of less than \$100 per year. It is estimated that only one-fifth of adults are literate. Although it is rich in natural resources and minerals (particularly diamonds, gold, rutile, and bauxite), and has large areas of fertile land suitable for farming, the junta period and the continuing insurgency have brought normal extraction and agricultural production almost to a standstill. There is little manufacturing, and there are few exports; approximately 70 per cent of the Government's budget comes from external assistance. Years of corruption and mismanagement have resulted in a crumbling infrastructure; many schools, hospitals, government buildings, roads, and bridges have been damaged or destroyed in the fighting and through neglect.

The Government's human rights record was characterized by serious problems. Some members of the security forces, including the Civil Defense Forces, committed extrajudicial killings, and tortured and beat suspected rebels and rebel collaborators. Prison and jail conditions remained harsh and sometimes life-threatening. Government forces sometimes interfered with humanitarian relief efforts. The Government arrested and detained persons under emergency decrees approved by Parliament that authorized indefinite detention without trial. Pretrial detention often was prolonged. The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press, and harassed, arrested and detained journalists for their coverage of security-related issues. Government forces limited movement within the country due to the civil conflict. Violence and discrimination against women, and prostitution remained problems. CDF units inducted child soldiers and female genital mutilation continued to be a widespread practice. Discrimination against ethnic minorities persisted. There was some forced labor in rural areas. Child labor persists. ECOMOG forces operating in support of the Government occasionally beat and detained noncombatants. In the period directly following the removal of the junta from power, there was a significant number of vigilante-style extrajudicial killings by citizens; upon being restored to power, the Government, with ECOMOG support, acted forcefully to end these killings.

Throughout the year, AFRC and RUF rebels committed numerous egregious abuses, including brutal killings, severe mutilations, and deliberate dismemberments, in a widespread campaign of terror against the civilian population known as "Operation No Living Thing." While still in power in January and February, junta forces continued their previous pattern of abuse, which included assaults and other acts of intimidation against political opponents, nongovernmental and other civic and humanitarian organizations, and citizens. During the fighting for Freetown in February, their retreat to the interior in March, and their advance on the capital in December, junta forces were responsible for killings, kidnappings, mutilation, rape, and destruction of property. One particularly vicious practice was cutting off the ears, noses, hands, arms, and legs of noncombatants who were unwilling to cooperate with or provide for the insurgents. The victims ranged from small children to elderly women; in some cases, one limb was cut off, in others two limbs, typically two hands or arms. Rebel forces also detained, decapitated, burned alive, and inflicted bullet and machete wounds on civilians; many died from their wounds before they could obtain any form of treatment. The rebel forces abducted missionaries and aid workers, ambushed humanitarian relief convoys and raided refugee sites. The junta forces continued the long-standing practice of abducting villagers and using them as forced laborers, as sex slaves, and as human shields during skirmishes with Government and ECOMOG forces. Boys were forced to become child soldiers. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic against women. Rebel atrocities prompted the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. As many as half a million persons fled to neighboring countries to escape the civil conflict, and remain outside the country on their own or in refugee camps, primarily in Guinea and Liberia.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were persistent reports that some elements of the CDF refused to take prisoners and, after torture or other acts of physical abuse and interrogation, often killed captured insurgents and AFRC and RUF sympathizers. In November a senior CDF spokesman confirmed that the CDF had executed seven individuals who had been searching illegally for diamonds in the Tongo fields in the eastern part of the country, an area long contested by both the CDF's Kamajoh militia and the RUF.

In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the rebel junta in February, there were dozens of reports of torture and vigilante-style executions in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, and other cities. Some of these abuses were committed by citizens in reprisal against junta members and their alleged supporters. Victims were stabbed, beaten, and in some cases burned to death; there is no evidence that any of those responsible for the deaths were ever formally charged or prosecuted. AFRC and RUF forces also committed such abuses as they were driven out of their strongholds.

Many of the hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians killed by AFRC AND RUF insurgent forces in the conflict were executed deliberately for political motives. In March RUF leader Sam Bockarie summarily executed 10 prominent residents of Kenema, including former cabinet minister Bockari S. Massaquoi and paramount chief Momoh Tarawlie, for opposing the rebels. Also in March, RUF forces executed 32 youths in Koidu for supporting Kamajoh CDF forces that previously had taken the town. In September rebel forces shot 50 individuals execution-style in Kamalu, and on October 4, RUF forces shot and killed contract employees of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who were traveling in clearly-marked trucks, in an ambush near Joru. On December 15, rebel forces killed a number of noncombatants in the village of Masiaka on the approach to Freetown.

Government security forces retaking areas discovered mass graves of those killed by rebel forces in Bo (over 100 bodies) and on Bonthe island (more than 550 bodies); the latter had been considered a Kamajoh CDF stronghold, and the killings apparently were reprisals against islanders for supporting the Kamajohs.

There were also several reports of indiscriminate, mass killings as villagers tried to escape from contested towns; for example, 50 persons reportedly were killed while fleeing fighting in Kabala in March, 22 in Malima, and 80 in Ngolahun. In May U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunno described the continuing conflict as the "deliberate targeting of civilians," and described that strategy as "part of the objective of conflict fare, not just indiscipline on the part of fighters."

b. Disappearance

AFRC and RUF forces continued the RUF's long-standing practice of kidnapping youngsters and women and compelling them to work for the troops and, at times, act as "shields" in battles with government and ECOMOG forces. Women were also forced to act as sexual slaves. A conference sponsored by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) noted that the RUF had captured children as young as 4 and 5 years of age. Seven girls between the ages of 7 and 15 were abducted in March from the Ben Hirsh childcare center in Kenema. During the rebels' retreat, the insurgents kidnapped five medical missionaries and two French medical aid workers in the Lunsar area and held them captive for 2

weeks. In November RUF forces kidnapped an Italian priest, father Mario Guerra, from his mission in Kamalu in the Northern District; he still was held at year's end.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Constitution prohibits torture; however, some of the security forces, in particular the CDF, routinely tortured suspected insurgents upon capture to gather information.

AFRC and RUF forces continued to use rape as a terror tactic against women. In February during their retreat from Freetown, rebel forces raped female patients at the Lunsar Eye Hospital. In March rebel forces gang-raped several teenage girls in Koidu after retaking the town from Kamajoh control. In May several women who had fled to Guinea reported that they were sexually assaulted by junta forces before they were able to escape. ECOMOG forces operating in support of the government occasionally beat and detained noncombatants. Rebel forces also were responsible for many cases of deliberate mutilation, including the chopping off of hands, arms, ears and legs; attempted decapitations; and severe cuts with machetes. The victims have ranged from babies

10 months old to elderly men and women. Humanitarian organizations estimated that at least 2,000 individuals had one or both limbs amputated, and that for every one of these wounded who eventually succeeded in securing medical aid, at least three or four died en route from their wounds, shock, and the hazards of the journey. Some victims who secured treatment in Freetown indicated that at times the junta members forced civilians to take part in macabre lotteries, in which the victim picked a piece of paper which indicated the sentence--from the loss of one limb to scalping or death. In other cases, rebel forces cut off the arms of men who refused to rape relatives.

The rebel campaign, known as "Operation No Living Thing," drove thousands of persons from their homes into the countryside, where many have died from untreated wounds, disease, and starvation. Over 250,000 citizens crossed the borders of Guinea and Liberia to escape the conflict; many thousands of others were displaced internally, and fled their homes to hide in wooded areas, or to towns where there are security forces and some degree of protection from rebel forces. In November Amnesty International published a report that detailed rebel abuses and atrocities during the first 10 months of the year.

Prison conditions and those in police lockup facilities generally are harsh; at best they are Spartan, and at worst life threatening. The Pademba Road maximum security prison, which was designed for 325 prisoners, housed almost three times that number at year's end. Diet and medical care were inadequate; only a handful of toilets was available for use by the prison population. Although male and female quarters were separate, adults and juveniles were incarcerated together. Convicted felons, those in the middle of the judicial process, and those who had not yet been charged formally also were incarcerated together. Other prison facilities were equally rudimentary; the holding cells in police offices are even further from compliance with international standards.

The Government allowed the ICRC, U.N. human rights officials, and other observers to visit the prisons, assess conditions, and see inmates.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile

The Public Emergency Regulations enacted by the Parliament in March at President Kabbah's request provide for indefinite detention without trial. In the immediate aftermath of its restoration, the Government arrested and detained without specific charges persons suspected of collaborations in crimes committed by the desposed junta. Although the Constitution and law provide for a speedy trial,

in practice the lack of judicial officers and facilities often produced long delays in the judicial process. Due to the civil conflict, the judicial system did not function in some parts of the country at any time during the year, and functioned in other parts of the country only during part of the year. Many prisoners were held for months on suspicion of criminal activity before their cases were examined or formal charges were instituted.

ECOMOG forces at times detained noncombatants (see Section 1.c.) In January and February, while still in control of the capital, the rebel junta continued its practice of detaining individuals suspected of supporting the Government in exile and criticizing junta policies. The junta arrested three journalists from The Herald Guardian and detained them for several weeks in apparent retaliation for publishing a statement urging children to remain home rather than go to school because of the security situation. Several other persons were released after shorter detentions.

The Government does not use forced exile.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and the Government respects this provision in practice.

Although there are often lengthy delays between arrest, detention, the imposition of charges, and judicial proceedings, trials are usually free and fair. Traditional justice systems continued to supplement the central government judiciary extensively in cases involving family law, inheritance, and land tenure, especially in rural areas.

After the overthrow of the rebel junta, the Government detained several hundred individuals on suspicion of treason and other charges stemming from their involvement with the junta. Some eventually were released; some remained in detention at year's end; and at least 103 persons were tried in four civilian trials and one court-martial proceeding. The trials and court-martial were open to the public, and were extensively monitored by U.N. personnel, foreign diplomats, and human rights observers from both within and without the country. Observers generally agreed that these high profile proceedings were conducted in an open and fair manner, and that the defendants had adequate opportunities both for counsel and to make their cases. The verdicts ranged from acquittals on all charges to guilty; the sentences given ranged from 5-years imprisonment to execution. However, some observers from international human rights organizations questioned the appropriateness of the treason prosecutions or death sentences in the cases of five journalists and one 75-year-old woman. Twenty-four former army officers convicted on treason charges subsequently were executed.

There were no reports of political prisoners.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The Constitution and law prohibit such practices, and government authorities generally respected these prohibitions.

Throughout the year, there were numerous instances in which rebel forces invaded, looted, and destroyed private property and terrorized civilians. Homes and businesses associated with former government members and supporters of the elected Government were particular targets, but many homes of ordinary citizens were also looted, burned, or destroyed.

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

During the year, there were reports that government security forces or ECOMOG forces hindered the safe passage of relief supplies on two occasions by commandeering vehicles that belonged to relief organizations. The CDF continued to accept, train, and induct children into its ranks.

AFRC and RUF rebel forces routinely committed numerous serious abuses, and sought to coerce, intimidate, and terrorize those who either refused to cooperate with them or supported the Government. They massacred groups of persons fleeing fighting; maimed and cut off the limbs and ears of noncombatants; kidnapped children and women to work for them, and men to carry equipment; raped women as a means of punishment and to inspire fear and cooperation; forced individuals to commit atrocities under penalty of their own mutilation or death; commandeered relief supplies; and vandalized religious institutions, hospitals, and schools.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted these rights during the year. The Government has attempted to regulate the press through registration, and attempts to control the publication of information on security-related topics.

There are over 50 newspapers published in Freetown alone, covering a wide spectrum of interests. Their number fluctuated weekly; many contained sensational, undocumented stories and repeated items carried by other newspapers. Newspapers openly and commonly criticized the Government and its officials, as well as the rebel forces.

Due to low levels of literacy and the relatively high cost of newspapers and television, radio remained the most important medium of public information. There were several government and private radio and television stations; both featured domestic news coverage and political commentary. The government-controlled Sierratel communications company provided Internet access in Freetown, although the condition of its land lines often made Internet reception problematic.

The Junta arrested three journalists and detained them for several weeks (see Section 1.d.).

The Government generally respected academic freedom. All institutions of higher learning were wholly or partly closed during the year; most had been looted, burned, or used as quarters by rebels.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected this right in practice. The Government was not known to deny requests to use public areas for meetings or demonstrations, many of which took place throughout the year. The Constitution provides for freedom of association and the government respected this right in practice. There were numerous civic, philanthropic and social organizations, and the registration system was routine and apparently nonpolitical. There were more than a dozen opposition parties, and there were no known restrictions on their formation or organization.

c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice. However, numerous ECOMOG and government roadblocks throughout the country due to the security situation hindered free movement. Citizens were required to get a police clearance within the 72 hours before international travel, but such clearances were issued nonrestrictively; the Government did not attempt to limit citizens' departure or return for political or discriminatory reasons. There were reports of attempts by troops manning roadblocks to extort food or money from travelers.

At year's end, more than one million citizens, more than one-quarter of the population, either were displaced internally or had fled the country to escape the continuing insurgency. More than 500,000 persons were in refugee camps in Guinea and Liberia; others had fled to The Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire, and other destinations in Africa, and still others were in countries outside Africa. Although thousands returned from abroad after the restoration of the Kabbah Government, most remained outside the country because of continuing security concerns.

There is no formal process for granting political asylum. The Government cooperated with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations on repatriation matters, and continued to provide first asylum to over 5,000 Liberians who had fled to Sierra Leone because of conflict in their home country in earlier years of the decade. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared persecution.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their government, and the 1996 elections won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his Sierra Leone People's Party were the first free and fair multiparty elections held in the country in 30 years. In March the democratically elected Kabbah Government, which had assumed power in 1996 and which was deposed by the combined AFRC and RUF forces in May 1997, was restored to power. Several political parties were represented in the unicameral legislature. Local government was controlled by locally elected councils and a traditional chieftancy system. Preparations for local elections were in progress at year's end.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were generally cooperative and responsive to their views. Representatives of various local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), foreign diplomats, the ICRC, and U.N. human rights officers were able to monitor freely and fully the major treason trials, and visit prisons and custodial facilities.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status

The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women and provides for protection against discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity, except for the long-time prohibition against citizenship for persons with a non-African father. This provision effectively blocks citizenship for much of the sizable Lebanese community, and for other persons with non-African fathers.

Women

Violence against women, especially wife beating, is common. Police are unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in cases involving severe injury or death. Domestic violence is not recognized as a societal problem. However, rape is recognized as a societal problem punishable by up to 14 years imprisonment. There is a significant amount of prostitution: Many women, especially those displaced from their homes and with few resources, resort to it to secure income for themselves and their children. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.).

The Constitution provides for equal rights for women, but in practice women face both legal and societal discrimination. In particular, their rights and status under traditional law vary significantly depending on the ethnic group to which they belong. The Temne and Limba tribes of the north afford greater rights to women to inherit property than does the Mende tribe, which gives preference to male heirs and unmarried daughters. However, in the Temne tribe, women cannot become paramount chiefs. In the south, the Mende tribe has a number of female paramount chiefs. Women are nevertheless very active in civic organizations and NGO's, and were instrumental in pressuring the previous government to allow free and fair multiparty elections in 1996.

Women do not have equal access to education, economic opportunities, health facilities, or social freedoms. In rural areas, women perform much of the subsistence farming, and have little opportunity for formal education. The average educational level for women is markedly below that of men; only 6 percent are literate. At the university level, men predominate.

Children

Although the Government is committed to improving children's education and welfare, it lacks the means to provide basic education and health services for them. Schools, clinics, and hospitals throughout the country have been looted and destroyed during the 8-year RUF insurgency, and most have not been replaced. Although in November, the Government began a program to pay the fees for 3 years of schooling for all children, lack of schools and teachers still place even this much education out of the hands of many. Schools are financed largely by formal and informal fees that many families cannot afford.

The recruitment for military service by the CDF and the kidnaping and forced conscription of children into rebel forces were a serious problem; an estimated 5,000 youthful soldiers served alongside adults during the civil conflict. While the CDF forces accept children as volunteers, most children who join the insurgent ranks do so under duress: For years rebels have kidnapped young boys and girls to serve them and augment their forces. In some cases they have forced these children to commit atrocities involving family members. There are now several programs to deal with former child combatants, including those who have escaped from rebel forces. However, even children who escape and wish to leave the ranks sometimes are rejected by their families and communities for their perceived involvement in rebel activities.

Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, is widely practiced among all levels of society, although with varying frequency. The form practiced is excision. Some estimates of the percentage of women and girls who undergo the practice range as high as 80 to 90 percent. While UNICEF estimates the percentage of females who have undergone this procedure to be as high as 90 percent, local groups believe this figure is overstated. There is no law prohibiting FGM. There are a number of NGO's that are working to inform the public about the harmful health effects of FGM and to eradicate it; however, an active mass campaign by secret societies countered the

well-publicized international efforts against FGM.

Occasional instances of ritual murders of boys and girls, as well as adults, associated with illegal secret societies, have been reported in the past. There were no reported cases this year.

People with Disabilities

Questions of public facility access and discrimination against the disabled have not become public policy issues. No laws mandate accessibility to buildings or provide for other assistance for the disabled. Although a few private agencies and organizations attempted to train the disabled in useful work, there was no government policy or program directed particularly at the disabled. There does not appear to be outright discrimination against the disabled in housing or education. Given the high rate of general unemployment, however, work opportunities for the disabled appear to be few.

Some of the many individuals who were maimed in the fighting, or had their limbs amputated by rebel forces, are receiving some special assistance from various local and international humanitarian organizations. Such programs involve reconstructive surgery, prostheses, and vocational training to help them acquire new work skills.

National/Ethnic/Racial Minorities

The country's population is ethnically diverse, and consists of members of at least 13 ethnic groups. These groups generally all speak distinct primary languages and are concentrated regionally outside urban areas. However, all ethnic groups use Krio as a second language, there was little ethnic segregation in urban areas, and interethnic marriage is common. The two largest ethnic groups are the Temne in the northern part of the country and the Mende in the southern part; each of these groups is estimated to make up about 30 percent of the population.

Ethnic loyalty remained an important factor in government, the military, and business. Complaints of corruption within ethnic groups and ethnic discrimination in government appointments, contracts, military commissions, and promotions were common. There did not appear to be a strong correspondence between ethnic or regional and political cleavages. Ethnic differences also did not appear to contribute appreciably to the RUF rebellion, the 1997 coup, or the civil conflict during the year. There was no identifiable ethnic or regional base of voluntary popular support for the rebels, who controlled territory by terror and coercion rather than by popular consent.

Residents of non-African descent face institutionalized political restrictions. The Constitution restricts citizenship to persons of patrilineal Negro-African descent. This constitutional restriction effectively denies citizenship to many long-term residents, notably the Lebanese community.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The Constitution provides for the right of association and, in practice, under the restored Government, workers had the right to join independent trade unions of their choice. About 60 percent of the workers in urban areas, including government workers, are unionized, but there has been little success in organizing agricultural and mine workers. All labor unions by custom join the Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLLC), but such membership is voluntary.

The Trade Union Act provides that any five persons may form a trade union by applying to the Registrar of Trade Unions, who has statutory powers under the act to approve the creation of trade unions. The Registrar may reject applications for several reasons, including an insufficient number of members, proposed representation in an industry already serviced by an existing union, or incomplete documentation. If the Registrar rejects an application, his decision may be appealed in the ordinary courts, but applicants seldom take such action.

There is a right to strike, although the Government can require 21 days' notice. Union members may be fired for participating in even a lawful strike. There were no reported strikes during the year.

Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate internationally. The SLLC is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act provides the legal framework for collective bargaining. Collective bargaining must take place in trade group negotiating councils, each of which has an equal number of employer and worker representatives. Most enterprises are covered by collective bargaining agreements on wages and working conditions. The SLLC provides assistance to unions in preparations for negotiations; in case of a deadlock the Government may intervene.

No law prohibits retribution against strikers. An employee fired for union activities may file a complaint with a labor tribunal and seek reinstatement. Complaints of discrimination against trade unions are made to a tribunal. Individual trade unions investigate alleged violations of work conditions to try to ensure that employers take the necessary steps to correct abuses.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that by children. However, under the Chiefdom's Council Act, compulsory labor may be imposed by individual chiefs, who may require members of their villages to contribute to the improvement of common areas. This practice exists only in rural areas. There is no penalty for noncompliance. The last Saturday in each month is declared a National Cleanup Day; in Freetown traffic is proscribed before 10:00 a.m. so that everyone may clean their immediate area. There have been reports of security forces publicly humiliating citizens to ensure compliance; however, social and community values and pressures largely unrelated to the State were chiefly responsible for widespread compliance. There were no legal or formal governmental consequences of noncompliance.

The AFRC and particularly RUF rebels forcibly impressed young boys and girls into their ranks and forced them into involuntary servitude, and to perform as sexual slaves. Many later become fighters with the rebel forces

(see Section 5).

d. Status of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The minimum age for employment is officially 18 years, but in practice there is no enforcement of this law because there is no government entity charged with the task. Children routinely assist in family

businesses and work as petty vendors. In rural areas, children work seasonally on family subsistence farms.

Because the adult unemployment rate remains high, few children are involved in the industrial sector. Children have been hired by foreign employers to work as domestics overseas at extremely low wages and in poor conditions. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is responsible for reviewing overseas work applications to see that no one under the age of 14 is employed for this purpose.

School attendance through primary school is required by law. However, there is a shortage of schools and teachers, due both to inadequate government funding of public education, and to widespread destruction of educational facilities by rebel forces. Consequently, a large number of children receive little or no formal education. Many consequently enter the workforce with few skills and with limited, if any, literacy. The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that by children; however, there was some compulsory labor possibly including labor by children in rural areas (see Section 6.c.).

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is no minimum wage. Purchasing power continues to decline through inflation. Most workers support an extended family, often including relatives who have been displaced by the insurgency in the countryside, and it is common both to pool incomes and to supplement wages with subsistence farming.

The Government's suggested work standard is 38 hours per week, but most workweeks for those who are employed exceed that figure. Although the Government sets health and safety standards, it lacks the funding to enforce them properly.

Trade unions provide the only protection for workers who file complaints about working conditions. Initially, a union makes a formal complaint about a hazardous working condition. If this complaint is rejected, the union may issue a 21-day strike notice. If workers remove themselves from dangerous work situations without making a formal complaint, they risk being fired.

[end of document]



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88) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Amnesty International, "Sierra Leone: Childhood – a casualty of conflict", AI Index: AFR 51/69/00, 31 August 2000, p. 1.

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SIERRA LEONE

Childhood - a casualty of conflict

31 August 2000

SUMMARY

AI INDEX: AFR 51/69/00

DISTR: SC/CC/CO

More than 5,000 children under the age of 18, both boys and girls and some as young as five, have fought as combatants in Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict. Children have been specifically singled out for recruitment by both the armed opposition and forces fighting in support of the government. Most of the children fighting with rebel forces have been abducted from their homes and families and forced to fight. Victims themselves, they have also been perpetrators of human rights abuses, sometimes against members of their own families and communities. Many have been forced to kill and mutilate under the influence of drugs, alcohol or simply because of fear. Former child combatants often say that they do not know why Sierra Leoneans are killing Sierra Leoneans.

A further 5,000 children, again both boys and girls, have been associated with rebel forces although not directly deployed in combat; they have been used to carry goods, cook or collect firewood, and girls have been raped and forced into sexual slavery. Some girls are forced to "serve" many male combatants. These figures are estimates; the real figures may be much higher.

On 7 July 1999 in Lomé, Togo, the government of Sierra Leone and the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed a peace agreement which was to end Sierra Leone's eight-year conflict. The difficult task of disarming and demobilizing very large numbers of child combatants and helping them to return to a normal life with their families and communities began.

While some progress was being made towards securing the release, disarmament and demobilization of child combatants following the signing of the peace agreement, further efforts have since been curtailed. The political and security situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated in early May 2000 with the capture of some 500 United Nations (UN) peace-keeping troops by rebel forces and a resumption of hostilities. The recruitment and use of children as combatants

by both rebel forces and government-allied forces, among the most distressing features of the internal armed conflict, are continuing.

In this report Amnesty International describes the violation of the most fundamental rights of the children of Sierra Leone. Much of the information included comes from the children themselves who were interviewed by Amnesty International representatives during visits to Sierra Leone in March, June and July 2000.

The scale of the problem of child combatants in Sierra Leone is well known and has been recognized, including by the UN, the government of Sierra Leone and non-governmental organizations, both national and international. There is a wealth of international and regional standards, resolutions and statements on the protection of children in situations of armed conflict. What is now urgent is to give substance to the repeated commitments to end the recruitment and use of children as combatants.

Amnesty International is making a series of recommendations to the government of Sierra Leone, the leaders of RUF forces and the international community aimed at finally ending the use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone. These include:

- the highest priority should be given to resuming the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child combatants and prompt and effective measures should be taken to ensure that no child under the age of 18 is recruited for military service, including by raising the minimum age for military recruitment to 18;
- all children held by RUF forces should be released immediately and RUF forces should immediately cease forcible or voluntary recruitment and use of children under the age of 18;
- in all efforts by the international community to resolve the political and security crisis in Sierra Leone, the needs of children affected by the internal armed conflict, including child combatants, should be given the highest priority and concrete steps should be taken to implement commitments made to end the recruitment and use of child combatants in Sierra Leone;
- those responsible for grave breaches of international human rights law and humanitarian law, including the abduction and forcible recruitment of children, should be brought to justice.

KEYWORDS: CHILD SOLDIERS1 / RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS1 / JUVENILES / ARMED CONFLICT / MILITARY / NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES / WITNESS TESTIMONIES / REHABILITATION / MSP / HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS / INVESTIGATION OF ABUSES / PEACE-KEEPING / UNICEF / PHOTOGRAPHS

This report summarizes a 40-page document (15,129 words), *Sierra Leone: Childhood - a casualty of conflict* (AI Index: AFR 51/69/00), issued by Amnesty International on 31 August 2000. Anyone wishing further details or to take action on this issue should consult the full document. An extensive range of our materials on this and other subjects is available at <http://www.amnesty.org> and Amnesty International news releases can be received by email: <http://www.amnesty.org/news/emailnws.htm>

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
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SIERRA LEONE

Childhood - a casualty of conflict



Drawing by a former child combatant at the interim care centre at Lungi ©Amnesty International



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AI Index: AFR 51/69/00
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SIERRA LEONE



INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY. ————

ROAD ————

RAILWAY..... ————

AIRFIELD..... ————

PORT..... ————

SWAMP..... ————

FREETOWN

0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

0 10 20 30 40 50 Kilometres

SIERRA LEONE

Childhood - a casualty of conflict

Introduction

More than 5,000 children under the age of 18, both boys and girls and some as young as five, have fought as combatants in Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict. Children have been specifically singled out for recruitment by both the armed opposition and forces fighting in support of the government. Most of the children fighting with rebel forces have been abducted from their homes and families and forced to fight. Many were separated from their families at a very young age. Victims themselves, they have also been perpetrators of human rights abuses, sometimes against members of their own families and communities. Many have been forced to kill and mutilate under the influence of drugs, alcohol or simply because of fear. Former child combatants often say that they do not know why Sierra Leoneans are killing Sierra Leoneans.

A further 5,000 children, again both boys and girls, have been associated with rebel forces although not directly deployed in combat; they have been used to carry goods, cook or collect firewood, and girls have been raped and forced into sexual slavery. Some girls are forced to "serve" many male combatants.¹

These are the figures provided by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) but they are estimates; the real figures may be much higher. The Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, after a visit to Sierra Leone, said on 9 September 1999 that '*more than 10,000 children have been serving as child soldiers in various fighting groups*'.

On 7 July 1999 in Lomé, Togo, the government of Sierra Leone and the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed a peace agreement which was to end Sierra Leone's eight-year conflict. The difficult task of disarming and demobilizing very large numbers of child combatants and helping them to return to a normal life with their families and communities began.

While some progress was being made towards securing the release, disarmament and demobilization of child combatants following the signing of the peace agreement, further efforts have since been curtailed. The political and security situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated in early May 2000 with the capture of some 500 UN peace-keeping troops by rebel forces and a resumption of hostilities. The recruitment and use of children

¹For further information about the abduction, rape and other forms of sexual violence committed against girls and women, see *Sierra Leone: Rape and other forms of sexual violence against girls and women* (AI Index: AFR 51/35/00), published by Amnesty International on 29 June 2000.

as combatants by both rebel forces and government-allied forces are continuing. This is among the most distressing features of a conflict which has also been characterized by systematic and widespread deliberate and arbitrary killing, amputation of limbs and mutilation, rape and other forms of sexual violence.²

In this report Amnesty International describes the violation of the most fundamental rights of the children of Sierra Leone. Much of the information included comes from the children themselves who were interviewed by Amnesty International representatives during visits to Sierra Leone in March, June and July 2000.

The scale of the problem of child combatants in Sierra Leone is well known and has been recognized, including by the UN Secretary-General, his Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, UNICEF, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the government of Sierra Leone and non-governmental organizations, both national and international. There is a wealth of international and regional standards, resolutions and statements on the protection of children in situations of armed conflict. What is now urgent is to give substance to the repeated commitments to end the recruitment and use of children as combatants, by whatever side.

Amnesty International is making a series of recommendations to the government of Sierra Leone, the leaders of RUF forces and the international community aimed at finally ending the use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone. These include:

- the highest priority should be given to resuming the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child combatants, and prompt and effective measures should be taken to ensure that no child under the age of 18 is recruited for military service, including by passing legislation raising the minimum age for military recruitment to 18;
- all children held by RUF forces, either used as combatants or in any way associated with fighting forces, should be released immediately and RUF forces should immediately cease forcible or voluntary recruitment and use of children under the age of 18;

² For further information about human rights committed during the conflict, see previous reports published by Amnesty International, in particular: *Sierra Leone: Recommendations to the international contact group on Sierra Leone*, New York, 19 April 1999 (AI Index: AFR 51/05/99), 19 April 1999; *Sierra Leone: 1998 - a year of atrocities against civilians* (AI Index: AFR 51/22/98), November 1998; *Sierra Leone: A disastrous set-back for human rights* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/97), 20 October 1997; *Sierra Leone: Towards a future founded on human rights* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/96), 25 September 1996; and *Sierra Leone: Human rights abuses in a war against civilians* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/95), 13 September 1995.

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- in all efforts by the international community to resolve the political and security crisis in Sierra Leone, the needs of children affected by the internal armed conflict, including child combatants, should be given the highest priority and concrete steps should be taken to implement commitments made to end the recruitment and use of child combatants in Sierra Leone;
 - those responsible for grave breaches of international human rights law and humanitarian law, including the abduction and forcible recruitment of children, should be brought to justice.

The use of child combatants in the internal armed conflict

Children have fought with the various forces involved in Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict which began in 1991. These forces include the RUF, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Sierra Leone Army and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The AFRC came to power following the military coup on 25 May 1997 which overthrew the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah elected in 1996. The AFRC joined forces with the RUF after coming to power and remained its ally after the AFRC was forced from power in February 1998 by forces deployed in Sierra Leone by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), known as ECOMOG. With the signing of the peace agreement in July 1999, the AFRC allied itself to the government of President Kabbah but some of its forces continued to engage in hostilities against government-allied forces. Rebel forces who remain in control of parts of the north and east of the country continue to forcibly recruit and use child soldiers. Previously disarmed and demobilized members of the AFRC and those members of the Sierra Leone Army who had remained loyal to the government, including children under the age of 18, have again been recruited and rearmed to fight on behalf of the government since May 2000. Large numbers of children have also been recruited and used in combat by the CDF, the civilian militia based on societies of traditional hunters, such as the *kamajors*, which support the government of President Kabbah.

The involvement of children in conflict has devastating effects on their physical and mental integrity. There have been higher casualty rates among children because of their inexperience, fearlessness and lack of training. Children are considered as particularly useful because their size and agility means that they may be sent on particularly hazardous assignments. Frequently ill-treated or even killed by the commanders, they have no protectors. Adult combatants who commit human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, involve children in those crimes. In addition to the obvious risks

of death or serious injury in combat, children suffer disproportionately from the general rigours of military life, especially in the bush, and are particularly vulnerable to disease and malnutrition. As for the severe psychological consequences of active participation in hostilities, with children witnessing and at times also committing atrocities, the full extent of the impact on child combatants as well as society as a whole may only become apparent over a long period.

Former child combatants tell their stories

Those children who have been released or have escaped and who have been disarmed and demobilized provide horrifying accounts of how the conflict has affected them. The names of the children whose testimonies are included have been changed in order to protect their identities. Most were interviewed by Amnesty International representatives during June and July 2000.


Child combatants live in constant fear of being beaten and killed. Many former child combatants describe being threatened, intimidated and severely beaten; others recount the killing of their friends and companions. Former child combatants describe the killings and mutilations of civilians which they carried out while fighting. If they refused, they risked being beaten or killed. Peter, a 12-year-old former child combatant, said: "*When I was killing, I felt like it wasn't me doing these things. I had to because the rebels threatened to kill me.*"

Former child combatants fighting with RUF

Ibrahim is now aged 16 and living at a centre for former child combatants at an internally displaced people's camp at Waterloo, 20 kilometres east of Freetown. He was captured by the RUF in 1992 in Kono District, Eastern Province, and from there was transferred to the rebel stronghold of Kailahun District, also in Eastern Province. He was taught how to use weapons, how to advance and attack the enemy and how to ambush. He described how before attacks, each combatant, including child combatants, was given cocaine and marijuana: "*After sniffing cocaine, I was not afraid of anything. I became bloody.*"

Ibrahim told Amnesty International on 19 June 2000 that when the RUF forces with whom he fought heard that RUF leader Foday Sankoh was going to be tried in 1998: "*We were ordered to kill any civilian that we came across. Any fighter or children suspected of being reluctant to do the killings were severely beaten. We were asked to advance and to do everything possible to terrorize the civilians. It was during this period that people's hands and limbs were cut off, in Kono, Masingbi, Matatoka, Magbwaka and Makeni.*"

During that time, one of the children asked the commander the reasons for the killings. He said that the civilians were supporting President Kabbah's government. Sheriff Kabia, who was 17 and known as 'Crazy Jungle', was killed because he asked this question." Sheriff Kabia was reported to have been killed in November 1998. Ibrahim also described the death of Mamadu Kamara, aged 14, who was killed because he refused to cut off the hand of someone from his own village.



Drawing by a former child combatant at the interim care centre at Lungi
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Abdul, now aged 17, was abducted by the RUF in 1997 during an ambush in Kenema District, Eastern Province. He told Amnesty International on 21 July 2000 that he was taken to an RUF training camp, known as Camp Lion, near Pendembu in Kailahun District where he was trained by both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians. He was taught to use a variety of weapons, including AK47 and AK58 rifles, which he said came from Liberia. *"After the Lomé peace accord, we thought that was the end of the whole war. We were waiting to disarm; there was no fighting. Instead we all went to Tongo Field to mine. Most rebels did that."* Abdul was then ordered to go to Lunsar, Port Loko District: *"We didn't even reach the front line when we met some wounded colleagues. I wanted to surrender but I was afraid."* When he gave himself up to Sierra Leone Army forces, his arms were tied tightly behind his back; rope marks on both arms were still visible. He was first taken to Masiaka, some 50 kilometres east of Freetown, where he was hit on the head with a pistol by a soldier and then transferred to Cockerill military headquarters in Freetown. *"They threatened to kill me. For the first week I was treated badly but then I was given food and water and no one treated me badly. For the first two weeks I was not allowed out of the cell."* He remained there for more than three weeks before being transferred to an interim care centre in Freetown. *"I want to go back to school but here in Freetown, not in the provinces. I am scared that I'll get taken back to the front line."*

David, now aged 14, from Bumbuna, Tonkolili District, Northern Province, was abducted in 1996 by the RUF when they attacked Bumbuna. He is now at a centre established to care for former child combatants, known as an interim care centre, run by an international non-governmental organization, in Freetown. When interviewed by Amnesty International on 12 July 2000, he said that after his abduction he was taken first to Kabala, Koinadugu District, Northern Province, and then to Bunumbu in Kailahun District, an RUF stronghold. There he, together with another 40 children, was trained to fight at Camp Lion. *"I had to go through the training and learn to fight, otherwise the RUF people would beat me or kill me."* Among those killed by the RUF during the training was a boy, aged about 11, with whom David had become friends. He was beaten to death because he refused to continue training. He had complained of being tired - the training was difficult and he was exhausted. He was beaten in front of more than 30 other children and his body was thrown into the bush. Another child, aged 14, was also beaten and killed.

David described how, even under the influence of marijuana and alcohol, he was still afraid to fight, but he did not tell anyone for fear of being killed. David remained with rebel forces for three years until surrendering to forces of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) at Makeni, Bombali District, Northern Province, after the peace agreement was signed in July 1999. Now at the interim care centre, he said: *"I want to become a doctor now and go back to school to learn how to cure people."*

Many former child combatants with rebel forces have described how they were forced to drink alcohol and take drugs and the effect that it had on them. Among the drugs used were marijuana, amphetamines, commonly referred to as "blue boats", and cocaine. When child combatants refused to take drugs they were beaten and, in some cases, killed.

Komba, now aged 15, was captured by the RUF in 1997 in Binkolo, Bombali, District. Now at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo, he told Amnesty International on 20 June 2000 that he was among rebel forces who attacked Freetown in January 1999: *"My legs were cut with blades and cocaine was rubbed in the wounds. Afterwards, I felt like a big person. I saw the other people like chickens and rats. I wanted to kill them."*

When interviewed by Amnesty International on 20 June 2000, Gibril, aged 11, said: *"Before battles, I was given white powder which was mixed with rice. It made me brave, it made me think that I could do anything."*

Fifteen child combatants, including at least two girls, were among some 2,500 Sierra Leonean refugees who fled into Gueckédou in Guinea during the first two weeks of August 2000 to escape intensified fighting and bombing by government forces of rebel-held areas in Eastern Province. All but one had been abducted by rebel forces and forced to fight for periods of up to seven years. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), all the children said that they had been heavily drugged with cocaine and they acknowledged that they had been extremely brutal. They were separated from other refugees because they feared that victims of the atrocities which they had committed would recognize them.

Former child combatants fighting with the AFRC

After being removed from power in February 1998 by ECOMOG forces acting in support of President Kabbah, the AFRC, together with the RUF, wreaked a campaign of terror against civilians, particularly in Northern Province. From April 1998 reports emerged of widespread killings, amputations and abductions in villages in Northern Province.

When interviewed on 19 June 2000 by Amnesty International, Sayo, now aged 14, said that he was abducted by AFRC forces in 1998 in Makali, Tonkolili District. He was trained in different places, including Koinadugu District. He described how his skin was cut in different places, including near his eyes, and cocaine put in the wounds. *"When I go to the battle fields, I smoke enough. That's why I become unafraid of everything. When you refuse to take drugs, it's called technical sabotage and you are killed."* After the peace agreement was signed in July 1999 Sayo was freed and taken to a centre for former child

combatants run by a non-governmental organization, CARITAS-Makeni, in Kabala. He is now at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo.

Hassan, now aged 15, from Makeni, told Amnesty International on 21 July 2000 at a centre for former child combatants in Freetown that he was abducted with four of his cousins by the AFRC in 1998 when he was aged 13. He was trained in a camp near Kabala where he was given an AK 47 rifle. He claimed that there were several hundred other young boys in the camp. The training lasted three months. He had to learn how to dismantle a weapon, how to use a rocket propelled grenade (RPG), how to attack, how to undertake guard duty and how to parade. He also said that he had to parade for AFRC leaders, including Johnny Paul Koroma, now head of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, established under the July 1999 peace agreement, and Brigadier, now Colonel, Gabriel Mani, who was appointed in July 2000 as Director of Army Training.

Hassan spent over a year with the AFRC in Kono District, Eastern Province. Following the signing of the peace agreement in July 1999 he remained with the AFRC in the Occra Hills, some 40 kilometres east of Freetown, the stronghold of a faction of the AFRC known as the "West Side Boys" who had not disarmed after the peace agreement. In late June 2000 Hassan travelled to Freetown to purchase drinks for the "West Side Boys". He was not armed and he travelled in a public transport vehicle. At a checkpoint he was recognized as a West Side Boy by members of the Sierra Leone Army and the *kamajors* and ordered to get out of the vehicle. His shoes and trousers were removed but, initially, he was not otherwise ill-treated. He was taken to Benguema military training camp, 20 kilometres east of Freetown, and the following day to Cockerill military headquarters in Freetown. He was interrogated about a recent attack on the town of Masiaka. One soldier, however, beat him severely on his back; three weeks later, in July 2000, deep scars were still visible. The beating was stopped by a more senior officer.

Hassan said: *"At first, I loved being in the bush. I could get money and other things, including vehicles, for free. But then I got tired. Now I want to go home."*

When interviewed on 24 July 2000 John, now aged 15, from Mokanji, Moyamba District, Southern Province, did not remember when he had been abducted by the AFRC and did not know what had happened to his family. He was threatened that he would be killed if he did not go with the AFRC and was taken to Makeni where he was trained how to use weapons and how to fight the CDF and ECOMOG. John said that he was told not to kill civilians and that civilians were killed in the cross-fire. He was also instructed not to loot property but said that many AFRC members did engage in looting. *"I was not happy living in the bush but I had no way to escape. I asked to leave and was told 'go if you can' but I then saw children being killed - many of them - when they tried to escape to go home."*

I was afraid of fighting but I was given 'blue boats'. After that I felt like I could do anything. I never refused to take drugs."

John recalled that children were punished if they refused to obey orders: *"I was punished after I was asked to be part of an advance team to attack Koinadugu. I was not feeling well; I was feeling sick and had a stomach ache. I said that I could not go and fight. The commander ordered other small boys to beat me. After I was beaten a doctor who had been captured helped me."*

Isatu, a girl now aged 17, was abducted by AFRC forces from Fadugu, Koinadugu District, in 1998. She told Amnesty International on 24 July 2000 at a centre for former child combatants: *"I did not want to go; I was forced to go. They killed a lot of women who refused to go with them."* She was forced to become the sexual partner of the combatant who captured her and is now the mother of their three-month-old baby: *"When they capture young girls, you belong to the soldier who captured you. I was 'married' to him."*

Isatu was trained in a base near Kabala to use weapons, including a bayonet, gun and knife, and fought in the area around Fadugu and Makeni. She admitted that she had cut off the hands of children and adults, and set fire to houses with civilians locked inside. *"There is a law of the AFRC that forces you to kill; if you refuse to, you yourself are killed."*

Former child combatants fighting with the CDF

Child combatants recruited by the CDF have also recounted their experiences. The parents of 12-year-old Brima, now at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo, gave permission to the CDF to use him as a child combatant in 1998. He continued to live at his home but was active with the CDF in areas around Masiaka, Port Loko and Yele. He was trained to fight by CDF "initiators", those who admit members into the societies of traditional hunters. Brima told Amnesty International on 20 June 2000 that when children disobeyed orders they were beaten unless their parents paid a fine. Brima recalled: *"I was beaten because I became separated from a CDF patrol."*

Brima recounted that when a rebel is caught, his arms are tied up behind his back. The captive is then interrogated and stabbed to death. *"I saw four executions."*

Mohamed, also aged 12, from Port Loko, Port Loko District, Northern Province, was recruited by the CDF in 1998. His parents were not informed about the recruitment but they did nothing to prevent it because of the status attached to membership of the society of traditional hunters, such as the *kamajors*, described by Mohamed as *"the supremacy of the society"*. In addition to carrying water and machetes for the CDF, he escorted captured

rebels to the Sierra Leone Army. He also described to Amnesty International on 20 June 2000 how the CDF executed rebels they had captured or those suspected of being rebels: *"I saw three captured rebels being killed; their heads were cut off. The children had to bring the heads to the SLA [Sierra Leone Army] headquarters to show that the CDF were effective."*

Rehabilitating child combatants

Until the resumption of hostilities in May 2000 UNAMSIL, including its human rights section, played an important role in negotiating the release of children held by rebel forces and providing logistical support and military escorts to ensure their safe transfer to interim care centres. It worked with a number of non-governmental organizations, both national and international, who have been active in trying to secure the release of children and to provide the assistance they need. In March 2000 UNICEF and non-governmental organizations were supporting more than 700 children in interim care centres; about 80 per cent of these were demobilized child combatants.

Following the July 1999 peace agreement and before the resumption of hostilities in May 2000, specific procedures had been adopted for child combatants. When children presented themselves to a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration reception centre - sometimes simply a table in the middle of the road - those who were not combatants were handed over to child protection agencies and taken to an interim care centre. If, after questioning, it was established that they were combatants, they were transferred to the children's sections of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps. For those who had fought with the RUF, the AFRC or the former Sierra Leone Army this program lasted for five weeks; for those with the CDF a shorter program was provided because normally the children had not been separated from their families and communities.

At interim care centres former child combatants are provided with medical treatment, food and clothing, psycho-social rehabilitation, education and recreation. Some of the older children, especially those who had spent months or years with rebel forces, have bullet wounds or other injuries. Malnutrition, respiratory and skin infections and other ailments are common, as are sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Some still suffer the effects of narcotic drugs.

When Amnesty International met former child combatants at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo on 25 March 2000, a boy aged 14 who had been abducted by AFRC forces in 1998 said: *"I want to go to school and learn so that I can forget the old*

times." Another former child combatant interviewed at Waterloo on 19 June 2000 said: "We want to go back to school; we don't want to go back to the bush."



Former child soldiers in the interim care centre at Waterloo, east of Freetown, 25 March 2000
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The psychological effects of the conflict on children have often been severe: many have killed, mutilated or raped or have witnessed such atrocities. During the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999 - when at least 2,000 civilians were killed, more than 500 people had limbs severed, and rape of girls and women was systematic - it was estimated that some 10 per cent of rebel combatants were children. Often under the influence of drugs, many of them committed atrocities. During the first few weeks after they are disarmed and demobilized, former child combatants are reported to be often aggressive and violent, to show other behavioural problems, to suffer nightmares, alienation, outbursts of anger and an inability to interact socially.

In a report published in January 2000, the international humanitarian organization *Médecins sans Frontières* (MSF-Holland) said that: "The psychological impact of actually witnessing horrific events imposes a serious psychological stress. Deliberately or not, witnessing at least once events such as torture, execution, (attempted) amputations, people being burnt in their houses and public rape often results in traumatic stress or even post-traumatic stress disorder."³

³Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone, Médecins Sans Frontières (Holland), 11 January 2000.

At an interim care centre in Lungi, former child combatants have been encouraged to make drawings of their experiences as child combatants. Many have depicted horrific scenes of the mutilation, rape and killing in which they have been involved.



Drawing by a former child combatant at the interim care centre at Lungi
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After considering Sierra Leone's initial report under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in January 2000, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern that the government had insufficient capacity to provide psycho-social

assistance to the many children who have suffered forms of psychological trauma. The Committee urged the government to make every effort to strengthen available psycho-social assistance and to recruit more mental health workers, recommending in addition that the government seek international assistance in this area.

After undergoing the demobilization and rehabilitation process, efforts are made to reunite former child combatants with their families. Child protection agencies have developed programs for family tracing and reunification, often with success. In some cases, however, former child combatants, especially the younger ones, do not know their real names and have lost all knowledge of what a family is. One boy now aged 16, who was abducted by the RUF in 1992, said: "*The commander told me when I was captured: 'Your father is gone. Now I am your father'.*" Another, aged 15, who was abducted in 1997 said: "*After you are captured you cannot think about your family; that is out. Sometimes, when I was by myself, I would think about them. But when you are captured you have to change or you are a dead man.*"

Many former child combatants have been transferred to the province from which they originally came, if this has been possible, in order to increase the possibility of tracing their families. In other cases, however, their parents have been killed or displaced. Where their families cannot be traced, the children are placed temporarily with foster families. Significant efforts have been made to sensitize communities to the plight of former child combatants and to promote reconciliation. In some cases, however, former child combatants have been rejected by their families and communities because of the atrocities committed by rebel forces during the conflict. One 16-year-old former child combatant said: "*I don't want to go back to my village because I burnt all the houses there. I don't know what the people would do, but they'd harm me. I don't think I'll ever be accepted in my village.*"

Girls who have been abducted and forcibly recruited often face specific problems. When an Amnesty International delegation visited Sierra Leone in March 2000, it identified that the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants appeared often not to provide any real opportunity to those girls and women who had been abducted by rebel forces and forced to become their sexual partners to free themselves from former combatants when they reported for disarmament and demobilization. The Fourth Report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMSIL of 19 May 2000 recognized "*the need to protect dependants of ex-combatants, the majority of whom are women and children*" and that "*the majority of 'wives' of the combatants are in fact abductees and, if not interviewed*

separately from their 'husbands', would most likely not feel free to express their wish to return to their original families".⁴

Effective provision needs to be made for those girls and women, many of whom are pregnant or have young children, to leave former combatants, if they wish. This would require: firstly, the opportunity to indicate privately to UN personnel their desire to leave the men who abducted and sexually abused them; secondly, support to enable them to receive all necessary medical and psycho-social care; and thirdly, support either to return to their families where this is possible or to re-establish their lives together with their children.

In Resolution 1314 (2000) on children and armed conflict of 11 August 2000 the UN Security Council underlined "*the importance of giving consideration to the special needs and particular vulnerabilities of girls affected by armed conflict, including, inter alia, those heading households, orphaned, sexually exploited and used as combatants*" and urged "*that their human rights, protection and welfare be incorporated in the development of policies and programmes, including those for prevention, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration*".



Former child combatants attending a human rights education session led by a human rights officer for CARITAS-Makeni at the interim care centre at Lungi, July 2000

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⁴Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/455.

May 2000 - children again forced into conflict

"A whole generation of children has already been emotionally traumatized and physically scarred. They'd been told that peace had finally arrived. Now what are we supposed to tell them?" - Johanna van Gerpen, UNICEF representative in Sierra Leone, 10 May 2000.

After the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the RUF in July 1999, several hundred children were released by rebel forces; by the end of 1999 some 800 children, many of them combatants, had been handed over to UNICEF and other child protection agencies. During the first months of 2000 there was a significant increase in the release of children, most of them combatants, by AFRC forces from the Occra Hills to the east of Freetown and from Kabala, Northern Province. By the end of April 2000, some 1,700 child combatants, of an estimated total of 5,000, had been absorbed into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program. According to estimates by UNICEF, about 800 of them had been reunited with their families or placed in foster care, or had run away, leaving 900 in interim care centres. Several thousand children, however, remained in the hands of rebel forces, particularly in Northern Province.

When the political and security situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated seriously at the beginning of May 2000, fears of an imminent attack on Freetown by rebel forces intensified and hostilities between RUF forces and forces of the Sierra Leone Army, the CDF and UNAMSIL troops were reported close to the capital and in Port Loko District.

Moves to secure the release of children still held by rebel forces halted. Former child combatants in interim care centres in areas where rebel forces were active again became vulnerable to being abducted and forcibly recruited by rebel forces. UNICEF and the child protection agencies with which it works have tried to ensure adequate protection for these children.

In his Fourth Report on UNAMSIL to the UN Security Council on 19 May 2000, the UN Secretary-General cited preliminary reports which suggested that child combatants were being used extensively as hostilities resumed. UNAMSIL human rights officers who visited Masiaka on 15 May 2000 observed several child combatants, mostly boys, with the CDF, the AFRC and former Sierra Leone Army and the reconstituted Sierra Leone Army. Some 25 per cent of the combatants observed were under 18 and some freely admitted that they were between 7 and 14. Almost all of them were armed. Other reports indicated that RUF forces were using a similar proportion of child combatants at the front line. In his subsequent report to the UN Security Council on 31 July 2000, the Secretary-General reported that both the RUF and forces fighting for the government continued to use children

in combat.⁵ He expressed deep concern about continuing human rights abuses, including the forced recruitment of children, and urged "*all fighting forces to immediately release all child combatants among their forces and to cease the recruitment of children as combatants*".

Continuing recruitment of children by the RUF

Since May 2000 RUF forces have continued to abduct and forcibly recruit children as combatants, some of whom had previously been demobilized. While some of the children recruited by both rebel and government-allied forces since May 2000 were forcibly recruited, usually after being abducted, others were reported to have volunteered to join the RUF. It appears, however, that in many cases these children had little option but to do so. Reports from Kambia District, Northern Province, during May 2000 described RUF forces going from village to village demanding a quota of men and boys, most of whom were forced to join under duress. Local traditional rulers, known as Paramount Chiefs, were ordered to provide a certain number of recruits and families were forced to hand over children, including those aged under 18. For example, in Madina Junction, Kambia District, 300 men and boys were demanded. Similar reports have been received from the towns of Kambia and Kamakwie. This practice explained the comparatively high number of young men and boys, without their families, who fled across the border into Forécariah region, Guinea, during May 2000. Reports of forcible recruitment were also received from Mange in Port Loko District.

In Makeni, when the RUF first confronted UNAMSIL troops in early May 2000, children were pressed by RUF forces by threats and intimidation into joining them. RUF commanders positioned vehicles at the entrance of an interim care centre, run by CARITAS-Makeni, and repeatedly coaxed the older boys to rejoin them, through enticement and implicit threat. Some of the children were told by RUF forces that their families had been traced and that the RUF would help them return to their homes. It was also reported that the RUF had threatened to kill all those in the interim care centre if the children did not rejoin the RUF. Staff at the centre believed that up to 30 boys aged from 14 to 17 rejoined the RUF; other estimates put the number of those who rejoined the RUF at 40 or as many as 50. It appeared that shortage of food at the centre, which had been looted by rebel forces, was also a factor influencing the children's return to rebel forces. The centre had been looted on 2 May 2000 by rebel forces; some of the older boys in the interim care centre had tried to prevent the looting and one of the adult carers, a woman, had been beaten. The rebels came the following day and again looted the centre.

⁵Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/751.



Lungi interim care centre for former child combatants run by CARITAS-Makeni, July 2000

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For fear of further attack, on 23 May 2000, 83 children from the centre - 73 boys and nine girls, most aged between 6 and 12 years - and 27 adult carers fled the centre for Freetown. On their arduous three-day trek their remaining possessions, including food and money, were stolen by RUF combatants. When they arrived in Petifu, Tonkolili District, some of the group, both children and adults, were beaten by members of the CDF. The children finally arrived safely in Freetown on 26 May 2000 and were taken to the interim care centre at Lungi.

One former child combatant, Francis, now aged 16 who had been abducted in 1998, described to Amnesty International on 15 July 2000 at the interim care centre in Lungi how RUF forces had tried to lure children back into their ranks from an interim care centre in Lunsar, Port Loko District: *"by then the rebels had moved from Makeni to Lunsar. They came to our camp and asked some children to join them again and we refused. We have rights to live and play. They encouraged us to join them. We told the manager of the centre to move us. At that time there were no vehicles; even the NGO's vehicle was not around. We walked along the road to Rogberi Junction where we met the rebels. They told us to return to our camp. We knew that they were killing people around. After that they said, please, come and join us or we are going to kill you people. After that we fled in the bush."*

On 31 May 2000 RUF forces were reported to have killed two boys and a young man at the village of Maforay, near Port Loko, after they refused to join them. On 15 June 2000, a farmer from a village near Magbile, Port Loko District, between Masiaka and Rogberi Junction, described to Amnesty International the killing of his sons by RUF forces on 11 June 2000: "My four sons, aged 11, 21, 23 and 25, were building a new hut when the rebels asked them to join them. They refused and the rebels shot and killed them." His three eldest sons were all farmers, married with children; his youngest son worked on his father's farm.

Continuing recruitment of children by government-allied forces

Government-allied forces have also continued to recruit children and use them in combat. Some of the child combatants who had been disarmed and demobilized after the peace agreement were again recruited to fight against the RUF. Government-allied forces comprise a loose alliance of the Sierra Leone Army, the AFRC and the CDF. Although in theory these various forces are under the command of the Chief of Defence Staff, in practice it appears that chain-of-command control is diffuse and often unclear and that, in the confused and unstable situation which prevails, it is unlikely that senior military personnel of the Sierra Leone Army exert effective control over all forces fighting on behalf of the government.

When an Amnesty International delegation met the Deputy Minister of Defence, Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, who is also the National Coordinator of the CDF, in Freetown on 25 May 2000, he denied that the CDF recruited children or "initiated" them into the societies of traditional hunters. He said that the children with CDF forces had been rescued or captured from rebel forces and that they were handed over to child protection agencies. Chief Hinga Norman has publicly announced that child combatants will be demobilized from government and government-allied forces. In mid-July 2000 he held a meeting in Bo, Southern Province, with CDF leaders and "initiators". He instructed that no further children were to be "initiated" into the CDF. It is not clear, however, to what extent this instruction is being heeded. While it may reduce the number of children newly admitted into the CDF, it does not resolve the problem of those already with CDF forces.

A senior member of the CDF in Kenema, Eastern Province, told Amnesty International on 27 July 2000 that, although he personally opposed the use of children, he acknowledged that it was normal practice within the CDF. He was in the presence of two boys who appeared to be under 18 and who were both armed. He claimed that, before the peace agreement, there were some 600 children in the CDF forces around Kenema but that they were all subsequently demobilized and that there was no further recruitment of children.

On 12 June 2000 in Masiaka, an area where hostilities were continuing, much publicity was given to the apparent demobilization of 135 child combatants with government-allied forces, in particular the CDF. It subsequently transpired, however, that only 13 of these children were serving as combatants, nine with the CDF and four with the AFRC. It appeared that children and their families were attracted by the potential assistance and facilities provided to former child combatants, including food and education, as well as the opportunity to remove the children to safety from an area close to the front line. The children who were not former child combatants, and who had been separated from their families, were subsequently returned to their homes.

According to some reports, recruitment of children by the CDF is continuing in Bo and Moyamba Districts in Southern Province. It is often difficult, however, to distinguish between "initiation" into the societies of traditional hunters and recruitment to fight. Child protection agencies report that recruitment of children, including those who had previously been demobilized, is continuing. According to reports which remain unconfirmed, villages in Southern Province are expected to provide a certain number of children to the CDF. In some areas the CDF appear to be no longer using children so openly to guard checkpoints along major roads in Southern Province; children, some of them armed, have been seen close to checkpoints but hidden in the bush. In late May 2000 two children with the CDF aged about 14 or 15 were observed in Moyamba close to a checkpoint. In other areas, however, an increase in the number of children guarding checkpoints has been observed.

Arming the children

Military assistance to rebel forces

Rebel forces in Sierra Leone have received and continue to receive significant military assistance, including arms and ammunition, despite a UN embargo on the provision of such assistance. UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997 imposed an arms embargo on Sierra Leone following the military coup of 25 May 1997 which brought the AFRC to power. After the government of President Kabbah was restored to power in March 1998, UN Security Council Resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998 lifted the arms embargo on the government of Sierra Leone but prohibited the sale and supply of arms and related *matériel* to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone.

In view of the appalling level of human rights abuses against civilians perpetrated by rebel forces, military assistance to rebel forces can be assumed to have contributed, and to continue to contribute, to continuing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Among these violations are the recruitment and use of child combatants.

Arms and ammunition reaching rebel forces inevitably fall into the hands of the children abducted and forcibly recruited by rebel forces. Traffic in small arms and light weapons clearly facilitates and encourages the use of child combatants. Amnesty International is calling for the cessation of all military assistance to rebel forces in Sierra Leone, including the provision of arms, ammunition, combatants and training.

The government of Liberia has been consistently cited as violating the embargo on military assistance to rebel forces in Sierra Leone. Following a visit to Sierra Leone and Liberia in December 1998 the Chairman of the UN Security Council sanctions committee on Sierra Leone said that arms and ammunition were crossing into Sierra Leone from neighbouring countries, including Liberia, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1171 (1998).⁶ At the time of the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999, the governments of both the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) unambiguously accused the government of Liberia of supporting rebel forces. Burkina Faso has also been reported to have acted as a transit route for military assistance to rebel forces in Sierra Leone. Some of this assistance has originated from countries in the former Soviet bloc and has been facilitated by the activities of international arms brokers and shipping agents, some of them based in Europe.

In April 1999 the commander of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone accused Liberia and Burkina Faso of transferring arms to rebel forces. He asserted that a Ukrainian-registered cargo plane had delivered arms and ammunition to Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, for on-shipment to RUF forces through Liberia.⁷ A Gibraltar-based company was reported to have organized the arms shipment to Burkina Faso, using a UK-based air company.

These accusations against Liberia and Burkina Faso have continued and intensified, especially as the international community has focused increasing attention on the role of the illicit trade in diamonds from rebel-held areas of Sierra Leone in financing the provision of military assistance to rebel forces.⁸

⁶S/1998/1236, Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone, 31 December 1998.

⁷For further information, see *Neglected Arms Embargo on Sierra Leone Rebels*, published by Human Rights Watch on 15 May 2000.

⁸For further information on Amnesty International's position on military assistance to rebel forces and the trade in diamonds, see *Sierra Leone: Cutting the link between diamonds and human rights abuses "forever"* (AI Index: AFR 51/56/00) 14 July 2000, *Sierra Leone: Amnesty International calls for fast and effective action on diamonds* (AI Index: AFR 51/54/00), 30 June 2000, and *Sierra Leone: Cutting the link between diamonds and guns* (AI Index: AFR 51/27/00), 31 May 2000.

On 5 July 2000 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1306 (2000) which imposed an embargo on all diamond exports from Sierra Leone for 18 months until the government of Sierra Leone can establish a proper certification system for diamonds and regain full access to those areas of the country - notably in Eastern Province and in particular Kono District and Tongo Field - where RUF forces remain in control. Liberia was specifically referred to as a transit route for diamonds from rebel-held areas; the Security Council expressed its concern "*at the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, and at reports that such diamonds transit neighbouring countries, including the territory of Liberia*". The resolution decided that "*all States shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory*".

The international diamond industry has meanwhile responded to growing international pressure. The International Diamond Manufacturers' Association and the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, meeting in Antwerp, Belgium, from 17 to 19 July 2000, agreed that they will not trade in diamonds from rebel-held areas of Sierra Leone. The industry has sought further legal action from governments, such as import control and certification systems.

In line with the provisions of Resolution 1306 (2000), on 31 July and 1 August 2000 the UN Security Council sanctions committee on Sierra Leone held a public meeting, which included representatives of the international diamond trade, governments and non-governmental organizations, to debate the role of the illicit trade in diamonds from rebel-held areas in procuring military assistance for rebel forces.

Further allegations were levelled against Liberia and Burkina Faso, notably by representatives of the UK and USA governments. Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock of the UK said that: "*a variety of reliable sources show that President [Charles] Taylor [of Liberia] is orchestrating the activities of the RUF. He is giving direct military support, encouraging attacks against UNAMSIL and Sierra Leone government forces, providing strategic direction, influencing decisions on leadership and on command and control. Moreover, he is using the RUF to retain control of Sierra Leone's diamonds reserves.*" Ambassador Richard Holbrooke of the USA said that: "*there was reason to believe that RUF leaders and the President of Liberia have taken increasingly large commissions for each of themselves, and particularly for Liberian President Taylor for his services as a facilitator of diamond sales and related arms transfers*" and added that the government of Burkina Faso was also involved providing arms to the RUF.

The governments of both Liberia and Burkina Faso vigorously denied these allegations and called on the international community to conduct independent investigations in their countries in order to substantiate these claims.

The UN Security Council sanctions committee on Sierra Leone established a panel of five experts to continue to investigate the link between the diamond trade and the conflict in Sierra Leone, including the alleged implication of the governments of Liberia and Burkina Faso. The panel of experts is expected to report on its findings by the end of October 2000.

In Resolution 1314 (2000) on children and armed conflict, the UN Security Council expressed its grave concern at: *"the linkages between the illicit trade in natural resources and armed conflict, as well as the linkages between illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons and armed conflict, which can prolong armed conflict and intensify its impact on children, and, in this regard, expresses its intention to consider taking appropriate steps, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."*

Military assistance to government forces

Since May 2000 combatants below the age of 18 have continued to be recruited by the Sierra Leone Army and other government-allied forces, including the AFRC and the CDF.

While recognizing the responsibility of the Sierra Leone government to maintain security and protect its population and territory, Amnesty International opposes the provision of assistance to armed forces where it can be reasonably assumed to contribute to the recruitment of children under the age of 18 by the armed forces or other armed groups and their participation in hostilities. Effective mechanisms need to be put in place to monitor the distribution and use of arms and ammunition provided by other countries to the Sierra Leone Army and other forces fighting on behalf of the Sierra Leone government in order to ensure that they do not reach combatants under the age of 18. Continuing military assistance to government forces should be conditional on guarantees being provided that such assistance does not facilitate the recruitment and use of child combatants, or contribute to other human rights violations. If evidence is found that military assistance from other countries facilitates the recruitment and use of child combatants, the international community has a responsibility to ensure that such assistance is suspended.

The UK government has provided substantial assistance to the government of Sierra Leone for training and equipping the new Sierra Leone Army. As a condition for proceeding with training and equipping the Sierra Leone Army, the UK government sought and obtained assurances from President Kabbah in March 1999 that children under the age

of 18 would not be used by the Sierra Leone Army or the CDF and that equipment supplied would be used in accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law.

The UK leads what will become a 90-strong military training team composed of military personnel from several other countries. Some 200 UK military personnel are providing a two-month training for recruits for the new Sierra Leone Army; a first contingent of 1,000 recruits completed their training in July 2000 and a further contingent of 1,000 is now being trained. All have been over 18. In addition, the UK continues to provide arms and ammunition to the Sierra Leone Army.

On 23 May 2000 the UK Ministry of Defence announced that it would be transferring 10,000 self-loading rifles to the Sierra Leone Army to assist in military operations against the RUF. UK government officials stressed at the time that the program to train and equip the Sierra Leone Army would be carried out under strict supervision. It sought to allay fears that arms supplied by the UK government would fall into the hands of children. These fears were fuelled by a photograph published by a UK newspaper of a 14-year-old boy, alleged to be fighting with government-allied forces, with a weapon previously supplied by the UK government. A spokesperson for the UK government said on 24 May 2000 that: "*We have instructed the [(UK) High Commissioner in Sierra Leone to remind the President of his undertaking last year that UK-supplied weapons would be used only by regular soldiers and in accordance with international law.*" During a visit to Sierra Leone in early June 2000 UK Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, obtained clear and public commitments from the leaders of government-allied force that they would not use child soldiers and that any remaining in their ranks would be disarmed and demobilized.

Further assurances were provided by the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey Hoon, following an announcement that further military assistance, including ammunition, was to be transferred to the Sierra Leone Army. He was reported to have said on 12 July 2000 that: "*the ammunition is being provided subject to further reassurances that it will be used only by regular soldiers, in accordance with humanitarian law and human rights standards, and not by child soldiers.*"

A violation of children's rights and a war crime

The recruitment and use of children under the age of 15 as combatants is prohibited by both international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Invariably, the use of children as combatants violates the rights enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, ratified by Sierra Leone on 18 June 1990, for example by depriving them of a family environment, education and basic health care.

On 13 January 2000 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child considered Sierra Leone's initial report on its implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and adopted its concluding observations on 28 January 2000.⁹ The Committee expressed "its deep consternation at the very high numbers of children who have been forcibly recruited into armed forces, including children at least as young as five years old, and who have been forced to commit atrocities against other people, including other children and members of their community". The Committee added that it was "deeply saddened by direct effects of the armed conflict on all child victims, including child combatants, and is concerned with the tragic loss of life and severe psychological trauma inflicted upon them".

Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that:

For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.

Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that:

1. *States Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child.*
2. *States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 15 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.*
3. *States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of 18 years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.*
4. *In accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an armed conflict.*

⁹Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Sierra Leone, CRC/C/15/Add.116.

Amnesty International believes that voluntary or compulsory recruitment and participation in hostilities, whether on the part of governments or armed opposition groups, ultimately jeopardize the mental and physical integrity of anyone below the age of 18. For this reason, Amnesty International actively opposes the voluntary or compulsory recruitment, as well as participation in hostilities, of children below 18 by governments or armed opposition groups.

In line with the general age of majority set in the Convention of the Rights of the Child, Amnesty International and five other international non-governmental organizations have been calling for the age of military recruitment - be it voluntary or compulsory - as well as deployment in hostilities to be raised to 18.¹⁰

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict states:	
Article 1	<i>States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.</i>
Article 2	<i>States Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces.</i>
Article 4(1)	<i>Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.</i>
(2)	<i>States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices.</i>
(3)	<i>The application of the present article under this Protocol shall not affect the legal status of any party to an armed conflict.</i>

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 May 2000 and is now open for signature and ratification. The Optional Protocol raises the age for participation in hostilities, for both the armed forces and armed groups, from 15 to

¹⁰Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Federation *Terre des Hommes*, the International Save the Children Alliance, the Jesuit Refugee Service and the Quaker UN Office (Geneva) launched the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers in June 1998. For further information, see *Stop Using Child Soldiers!*, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, second edition published by Rädde Barnen on behalf of the International Save the Children Alliance in November 1998.

18. Eight countries have so far signed the Optional Protocol; only one, Canada, has ratified it. UN Security Council 1314 (2000) on children and armed conflict urged member states to ratify the Optional Protocol.

The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which entered into force on 29 November 1999, is the only regional instrument which specifically prohibits the recruitment and use as combatants of children under 18 in both international and internal armed conflicts. Article 22 (2) requires States Parties to "*take all necessary measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular from recruiting any child*". Sierra Leone has signed but not yet ratified the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.

International humanitarian law - the laws of war - also prohibits the recruitment of children under 15 into the armed forces of governments and armed opposition groups as well as their participation in hostilities.¹¹

Article 4 (3)(c) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions states that:

Children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.

Francis, now aged 16 and at the interim care centre in Lungi, was abducted by rebel forces in 1998. He told Amnesty International on 15 July 2000: "*As far as the Geneva Conventions are concerned, we should not fight. They have violated our rights. Even the government troops, they some time ago made a mistake of killing the children because the rebels use children.*"

Many of the children who have been abducted and forcibly recruited have also been victims of deliberate and arbitrary killing, beatings and other forms of torture or ill-treatment. Girls have been raped and forced into sexual slavery. These abuses constitute the most serious violations of international humanitarian law. Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions, extends to "*armed conflict not of an international character*" (internal armed conflict) fundamental rules for the protection of those taking no active part in hostilities which each party to the conflict is "*bound to apply, as a minimum*". Under the terms of common Article 3, people who take no active part or who have ceased to take an active part in hostilities must be treated humanely in all circumstances. Common Article

¹¹Sierra Leone acceded to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on 10 June 1965. On 21 October 1986 it acceded to both Additional Protocol I of 8 June 1977 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, and Additional Protocol II of 8 June 1977 relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.

3 specifically prohibits: “*violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.*” This prohibition is binding not only on government forces but on all parties to internal armed conflicts, including armed political groups.



Former child combatants playing volleyball at the interim care centre at Lungi, July 2000
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Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of internal armed conflicts, which develops and supplements common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, requires all parties to the conflict to treat humanely every person affected by the conflict. Article 4 of Additional Protocol II prohibits: “*violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment*” of all those not taking a direct part in hostilities or who have ceased to take part in hostilities.

In Resolution 1314 (2000) on children and armed conflict the UN Security Council urged: “*all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of children in armed conflict, in particular the Geneva Conventions*”

of 1949 and the obligations applicable to them under the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in-mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court."

Bringing to justice those who recruit and deploy children as combatants

Although the recruitment of children is unlawful in many countries, prosecution is rare. The majority of the world's nations finalized in July 1998 the Statute of a permanent International Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction to prosecute those charged with war crimes, genocide, aggression and crimes against humanity. Included in the list of war crimes is "*conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities*" and, in the case of an internal armed conflict, "*conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities*". The International Criminal Court will be formally established once 60 states have ratified the Statute, thereby giving the court jurisdiction over these provisions. Sierra Leone signed the Statute on 17 October 1998 and intends to ratify it shortly.

On 12 February 1999, Carol Bellamy, Executive Director of UNICEF, stated at a UN Security Council Open Briefing on the Protection of Civilians that: "*over 300,000 children, girls as well as boys, have participated as combatants in the 30 most recent conflicts. Many are recruited - others are abducted. Some join simply to survive. And many of these children, some less than 10 years old, have witnessed or taken part in acts of unspeakable violence, often against their own families or communities... Children's recruitment as members of the armed forces, their rape and slaughter, and the targeting of their schools and hospitals are recognized by the International Criminal Court statute for what they are: heinous atrocities.*"

The UN Security Council, in Resolution 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999 on children and armed conflict, called on all parties concerned to comply strictly with their obligations under international law, in particular the Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and stressed "*the responsibility of all States to bring an end to impunity and their obligation to prosecute those responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*".

This was reiterated by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1314 (2000) in which it emphasized the responsibility of all States: "*to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and, in this regard, stresses the need to exclude these, where feasible, from amnesty provisions and relevant legislation.*" In a statement issued on 11 August 2000 when the resolution was

adopted, UNICEF said that it: "*underlines the urgent need for an end to impunity for those who commit crimes against children.*"

Although the use of child combatants under 15 violates both international human rights and humanitarian law, no one in Sierra Leone has yet been brought to justice for these crimes. The peace agreement signed in July 1999 provided an amnesty for all activities undertaken in pursuit of the conflict, including human rights abuses, even when amounting to crimes against humanity or war crimes. The UN at the time added a disclaimer to the agreement that the amnesty would not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. Although the amnesty did not apply to crimes committed after 7 July 1999, human rights abuses against civilians, including deliberate and arbitrary killings, mutilation, rape, abduction and forcible recruitment continued to be committed with impunity.

By June 2000, with the lack of implementation of key provisions of the peace agreement, the resumption of hostilities and the arrest of the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, and other leading members of the RUF, initiatives by the authorities began to address the issue of impunity. On 12 June 2000 the government wrote a letter to the UN Secretary-General requesting assistance from the UN in establishing a special court to try Foday Sankoh and other senior members of the RUF for "*crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of UN peace-keepers as hostages*".

On 14 August 2000 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1315 (2000) on the creation of an independent special court. Amnesty International has urged that the special court try all those alleged to be responsible for crimes under international law, including crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as certain grave crimes under national law, throughout the period since the conflict began in 1991. This would include the forcible recruitment and deployment of children under 15. Although forces of the RUF have been responsible for systematic and widespread abuses throughout the conflict, those of the AFRC, the Sierra Leone Army and the CDF have also been responsible for gross human rights abuses, including violations of international humanitarian law. Those allegedly responsible for these crimes, whether they be members of the RUF, the AFRC, the Sierra Leone Army and regardless of their current political position or allegiance, must be brought to justice.¹²

¹²For further information on Amnesty International's recommendations for ending impunity in Sierra Leone, see *Sierra Leone: The United Nations Security Council should strengthen the independent special court to prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses* (AI Index: AFR 51/66/00), 4 August 2000, and *Sierra Leone: Ending impunity - an opportunity not to be missed* (AI Index: AFR 51/60/00), 26 July

Child combatants themselves will not be brought to trial before the International Criminal Court, as the Statute bars it from exercising jurisdiction over any person who was under 18 at the time that the crime was committed. Child combatants in Sierra Leone have been responsible for gross human rights abuses; many of the worst atrocities have been carried out by children who were abducted and subjected to horrifying acts of violence. In a situation where crimes have been committed by children terrorized and brutalized into submission, complex questions about their criminal responsibility are raised.

While recognizing the need for justice and accountability, former child combatants must be treated in accordance with the principles of juvenile justice, which place the best interest of the child as a priority, recognize the special factors and needs of childhood, and place an emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegration rather than punishment. In conformity with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child must be in accordance with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time. Any child who is detained should be held separately from adults.

The Sierra Leone government's responsibility to end the use of child soldiers

The government of Sierra Leone has made repeated commitments to demobilize all combatants under the age of 18, to raise the legal age of military recruitment to 18 and to fulfil its obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Considering Sierra Leone's initial report in January 2000, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed its deep concern about the massive participation of children associated with fighting forces in Sierra Leone, either as combatants or in other roles. The Committee also noted that there is no minimum age defined by national legislation for voluntary recruitment, when the consent of a specified adult party is given. The Committee welcomed the government's intention to pass legislation raising the minimum age of recruitment to 18 and urged the government to move quickly towards passing this legislation and to ensure that the new legislation was enforced.

On 24 May 2000, following reports that children were either fighting with government-allied forces or were being allowed to remain in front-line positions, the government issued a statement reiterating its position on the recruitment of child soldiers (see appendix A).


2000.

The government stated that this practice was “*totally against government policy which stipulates that 18 years is the minimum age for bearing arms in Sierra Leone*”. The statement continued: “*The Acting Chief of Defence Staff has been instructed to ensure that all those below the age of 18 currently involved in fighting on the side of the government should be immediately withdrawn, demobilized and handed over to competent institutions for rehabilitation. Henceforth, any commander who allows a child below 18 years to carry arms within his area of operations or allows children to remain in areas of active conflict will face severe disciplinary action.*” It is not clear, however, what measures have been taken to implement these commitments.

On the same day Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the AFRC, issued statements on behalf of the AFRC and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace which he heads. In these statements Johnny Paul Koroma “*warned all warring factions to desist from recruiting child soldiers*” and stated his strong opposition to the recruitment of child soldiers by both government-allied forces and rebel forces.

On 22 March 2000 CARITAS-Makeni launched a campaign to end the use of child combatants. Secondary school children marched through the centre of Freetown and speakers representing the government, UN agencies and non-governmental organizations called publicly for an end to the use of child combatants.

A Declaration of Commitment to the Release of Child Combatants and Child Abductees by the Various Factions was drafted as part of the campaign and signed by Chief Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence and National Coordinator of the CDF, Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the AFRC and Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, and Colonel Tom Carew, acting Chief of Defence Staff. RUF leader Foday Sankoh declined to sign the



Poster for CARITAS-Makeni's campaign against the use of child soldiers © Amnesty International

declaration (see appendix B). The declaration made the following commitments:

- Article 1* *The parties hereto shall forthwith facilitate the disarmament of all child combatants, that is to say, children under the age of 18 years and bearing arms and shall take immediate steps to prevent the use of child combatants in any manner whatsoever.*
- Article 2* *The parties hereto shall in tandem with the actions contemplated in Article 1 above, release, free and cause to be released, all children and other persons abducted both during the conflict and after the signing of the Lomé peace accord.*
- Article 3* *The parties shall in utmost good faith facilitate the return and/or handing over of child combatants and abductees to UNAMSIL, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps and other humanitarian agencies by 15 May 2000 (the International Day of the Family), to enable them to receive care and attention and ultimately to be reunited with their families and relatives.*
- Article 4* *The parties in this regard undertake to cooperate with UNAMSIL, all agencies concerned with the welfare of children and the war affected and shall assiduously work towards the attainment of goals enumerated in the Declaration.*



Demonstration by schoolchildren to launch CARITAS-Makeni's campaign against the use of child soldiers in Freetown. 22 March 2000 © Amnesty International

Following the signing of the peace agreement in July 1999 Foday Sankoh became the Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, and assumed the protocol rank of Vice-President. Other RUF members also became part of the government by being appointed to ministerial and deputy ministerial positions. The RUF therefore became obliged not only to implement the provisions of the peace agreement which it had signed, but also to implement the government's commitments under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Article XXI of the peace agreement stated specifically that all prisoners of war and non-combatants should be released immediately and unconditionally by both parties. This would include the thousands of civilians, including children, who had been abducted by rebel forces. Article XXX of the peace agreement stated that the government of Sierra Leone should give particular attention to the issue of child combatants and should mobilize resources, both within Sierra Leone and from the international community, to address the special needs of former child combatants in the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Foday Sankoh frequently denied that the RUF had abducted children. In a meeting with Amnesty International representatives on 25 March 2000 he said that the RUF had not abducted any children but had "rescued" them and was not holding any children captive. He was arrested on 17 May 2000, after more than 20 civilians were shot and killed by his forces during a demonstration outside his house in Freetown on 12 May 2000, and remains in detention. Other prominent members of the RUF are also detained. They are expected to be charged with a number of offences, including crimes amounting to violations of international humanitarian law.

In late April 2000, just before the resumption of hostilities, the government of Sierra Leone agreed to establish a National Commission for War-Affected Children in order to ensure that children's concerns are addressed at the highest political levels. This agreement was reached during a visit to Freetown on 29 and 30 April 2000 of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, and the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy.

Moves by the international community to end the use of child soldiers

The plight of children in Sierra Leone has been highlighted repeatedly by the international community and commitments have been made to assist the children whose lives have been blighted by nine years of conflict. In the Eighth Report of the UN Secretary-General on the

UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (then known as UNOMSIL) of 23 September 1999, the Secretary-General stated that "*the plight of children is among the most pressing challenges currently facing Sierra Leone*".¹³

On 25 August 1999 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1261 (1999) on children and armed conflict. The Security Council urged States and all relevant parts of the UN: "*to intensify their efforts to ensure an end to the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law through political and other efforts, including promotion of the availability of alternatives for children to their participation in armed conflict*"; and also "*to facilitate the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of children used as soldiers in violation of international law*."

At a debate on children and armed conflict at the UN Security Council on 26 July 2000, Carol Bellamy, Executive Director of UNICEF, said that many of the values, principles and concrete commitments enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child remained unfulfilled, as did those of Resolution 1261 (1999). The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, said that the use of child combatants must be curbed by mobilizing political pressure, addressing the economic, social and political factors leading to the use of child combatants and increasing capacity on the ground for receiving and rehabilitating child combatants.¹⁴ Commenting on UN Security Council 1314 (2000) on children and armed conflict which was passed on 11 August 2000, UNICEF said that: "*The council has reminded the world that it is both immoral and illegal to make children the victims and protagonists of war... It has helped to maintain awareness of the unacceptability of turning children into soldiers, of forcing millions of children and women to flee their homes, and of subjecting children to forced labour, sexual abuse and the pressure to commit atrocities.*"

Olara Otunnu has visited Sierra Leone on several occasions, most recently in April 2000, and has made recommendations for a special program for assisting children affected by the conflict. Following a visit in late August and early September 1999, he formulated a 15-point agenda for action for children affected by the conflict, which included recommendations in respect of: ending the recruitment and use of child combatants; access to and release of abducted children; demobilization of child combatants; and the establishment of a National Commission for Children in Sierra Leone.

¹³Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/1003.

¹⁴SC/6985, Security Council holds debate on children and armed conflict, 26 July 2000.

UNAMSIL, whose current full strength is 13,000, but which is expected to be increased to 16,500 peace-keeping troops, was deployed to assist with the implementation of the peace agreement, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. UN Security Council Resolution 1313 (2000) of 4 August 2000 extended UNAMSIL's mandate until 8 September 2000 and requested the UN Secretary-General to make recommendations for the restructuring and strengthening of UNAMSIL.

The process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was first hampered by the failure of large numbers of combatants to disarm and demobilize and then halted by the resumption of hostilities in May 2000. The human rights section of UNAMSIL is providing training in human rights, including children's rights, and international humanitarian law for peace-keeping troops. Since the peace-keeping force comprises troops from several countries with different training and experience, it is essential to ensure that adequate time and resources are devoted to comprehensive human rights training, including in children's rights. A child protection adviser was appointed to UNAMSIL in February 2000 and the UNAMSIL human rights section includes human rights officers with specific responsibilities for children's rights.

Resolution 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999 on children and armed conflict specifically requested the UN Secretary-General to ensure that: "*personnel involved in United Nations peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building activities have appropriate training on the protection, rights and welfare of children.*" It urged States and relevant international and regional organizations to ensure that appropriate training was included in their program for personnel involved in similar activities.

At the end of the African Conference on the use of Children as Soldiers, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 19-22 April 1999, participants adopted a declaration against the use of children as combatants. The Declaration calls on all African states to end the recruitment of all children under 18 into the armed forces. The Declaration also condemned the use of children by armed opposition groups and called upon these groups to end the recruitment of children and to demobilize or release into safety children already being used as combatants.

On 27 and 28 April 2000 a West African ministerial conference on war-affected children was held in Accra, Ghana, sponsored and co-hosted by the governments of Ghana and Canada. It brought together ECOWAS foreign ministers, as well as civil society organizations, donor governments, UN representatives, including Olara Otunnu, and children affected by conflict in the region. The primary objective of the event was to mobilize concrete action for child protection in a region whose children have been acutely affected by armed conflict. The conference focused on practical ways to implement and

support international instruments of child protection, such as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

At the end of the conference the delegates adopted and signed a West African Declaration on War-Affected Children which is expected to lead to commitments to: implementation of existing international, regional and local norms; ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court; incorporation of child rights and civilian protection into military training; and implementation of early warning/response systems to prevent armed conflict. At the conclusion of the conference, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs said: "*The protection of children affected by war and the promotion of their well-being is a moral, political, social and economic imperative.*" The outcome of the conference will be discussed and developed at an International Conference on War-Affected Children to take place in Winnipeg, Canada, in September 2000.



Drawing by a former child combatant at the interim care centre at Lungi © Amnesty International

While some countries have made commitments towards providing assistance to children affected by the conflict and others have made significant contributions towards the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the attention of the international community should continue to focus on the needs of former child combatants, both on securing their disarmament and demobilization and also providing the assistance they need to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into their families and communities. All these initiatives will require sustained commitment and resources from the international community.

Amnesty International's recommendations

Amnesty International is urging that the Sierra Leone government, the leaders of the RUF and the international community implement swiftly and effectively the following recommendations in order to end the recruitment and use of child combatants in Sierra Leone and to meet the particular needs of former child combatants.

Recommendations to the Sierra Leone government, including the Chief of Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister of Defence and the leader of the AFRC:

- the highest priority should be given to the immediate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child combatants;
- prompt and effective measures should be taken by the government to ensure that no child under the age of 18 is recruited for military service, including by passing legislation raising the minimum age for military recruitment to 18;
- the Chief of Defence Staff should ensure that there is effective chain of command over all forces fighting on behalf of the government to ensure the immediate demobilization and disarmament of child combatants currently serving in these forces and to ensure that no child under the age of 18 is recruited or used in the future;
- the leader of the AFRC should give immediate effect to his condemnation of the recruitment and use as combatants of children under the age of 18 by instructing AFRC forces to release all children, both those used as child combatants or in any way associated with AFRC forces;
- the Deputy Minister of Defence and National Coordinator of the CDF should immediately and unequivocally denounce the recruitment and use of children under the age of 18 by the CDF and instruct all CDF leaders to immediately demobilize and disarm all child combatants serving with the CDF and to cease any further recruitment;
- the government of Sierra Leone should take steps to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, including by identifying priorities relating to child combatants and defining strategies to implement those priorities;

- the government should ratify without delay the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and the Statute of the International Criminal Court;
- the government should take effective measures to end impunity and prosecute those responsible for crimes under international law including violations of international humanitarian law, such as the abduction and forcible recruitment of children under the age of 15.

Recommendations to the leaders of the RUF:

- leaders of the RUF should immediately and publicly condemn and prohibit the recruitment and use of child combatants and RUF forces should immediately cease forcible or voluntary recruitment and use of children under the age of 18;
- RUF forces should be instructed to release immediately all children either used as combatants or in any way associated with fighting forces;
- leaders of the RUF should make a public commitment to observing international humanitarian law, in particular Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions of 1949;
- RUF forces should be instructed to end deliberate and arbitrary killings, rape, sexual abuse and other forms of torture or ill-treatment of all captured civilians, including children;
- RUF forces should also allow immediate, full and unhindered access by child protection agencies and UNAMSIL personnel supervising the disarmament and demobilization program to children who continue to be held;
- RUF forces should allow immediate, full and unhindered access by humanitarian agencies, both national and international, to all civilians, including children, who continue to be held, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Recommendations to the international community:

- the international community should repeat its condemnation of the continuing recruitment and use of children as combatants in Sierra Leone which constitute a crime under international law and a violation of both international human rights and international humanitarian law;
- the highest priority should be given to implementing commitments made to end the use and recruitment of child combatants, including by taking concrete measures to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000;
- in all efforts to resolve the political and security crisis in Sierra Leone, including any reconsideration or renegotiation of the peace agreement signed in Lomé, Togo, on 7 July 1999, the needs of children affected by the internal armed conflict, including child combatants, should be given the highest priority;
- all governments should take all possible measures to end military transfers, including arms, ammunition, combatants and training, to rebel forces in Sierra Leone and enact legislation to prevent the trade in diamonds from rebel-held areas of Sierra Leone from facilitating the provision of military assistance to rebel forces;
- those governments which are providing military assistance, including training, arms and ammunition, to the Sierra Leone Army and other forces fighting on behalf of the government should first ensure that stringent safeguards are in place to ensure that this assistance does not facilitate or encourage violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including the recruitment and use of child combatants; these safeguards should also include effective mechanisms to ensure that arms do not reach combatants under the age of 18; if evidence is found that such assistance facilitates the recruitment and use of child combatants, such assistance should be suspended;
- the international community should provide full and sustained support and assistance to relevant UN agencies and non-governmental organizations, both national and international, in order to strengthen initiatives for child protection, prevent further recruitment and use as combatants of children under the age of 18 and assist the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former child combatants, including by addressing their social, psychological and material needs;

- the child protection adviser and human rights section of UNAMSIL must be given full political support and adequate resources in order to undertake their work in relation to child protection;
- the UN should ensure that all troops participating in the UNAMSIL peace-keeping force are fully trained in international human rights and humanitarian law, including children's rights, and that they have training in addressing the specific needs of child combatants;
- the international community should ensure that those responsible for grave breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law, including the abduction and forcible recruitment of children, should be brought to justice; this should include provision of the necessary expertise and practical assistance for the independent special court to be established under UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000.

89) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, "Child Soldiers: Global Report",
Sections: Child soldiers, An Overview; Sierra Leone, May 2001.

WHAT'S NEW ▪ ABOUT CHILD SOLDIERS ▪ ABOUT THE CSC ▪ APPEALS ▪ CHILD SOLDIER NEWS ▪ CSC EVENTS ▪
CSC PUBLICATIONS: ▪ DONATIONS ▪ OPTIONAL PROTOCOL ▪ OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW ▪ PRESS RELEASES ▪ USEFUL LINK / RESOURCES ▪
WHAT YOU CAN DO ▪ SEARCH ▪

SIERRA LEONE

SIERRA LEONE

REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

POPULATION: 4,717,000 total 2,370,000 under-18s

GOVERNMENT ARMED FORCES: 3,000-4,000 active, strength unknown paramilitary (Civil Defense Forces)

COMPULSORY RECRUITMENT AGE: no conscription

VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT AGE: previously any age with consent; unknown if recent government commitments to an age limit of 18 has resulted in legislative change

VOTING AGE (GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS): 21

CHILD SOLDIERS: indicated - 5,000-10,000 in government and opposition armed groups

CRC-OP-CAC: signed on 8 September 2000

OTHER TREATIES RATIFIED: CRC; ICC; GC/API+II

Some 5000 child combatants serve among government and opposition forces, and a further 5,000 are estimated to have been recruited for labour among armed groups.[1] Armed groups typically rely on forced recruitment through abduction and drug use, and are responsible for particularly cruel and degrading treatment of children in their camps, often including the sexual slavery of girls. The Lomè peace agreement of July 1999 included important provisions on the demobilisation of child soldiers, however the resumption of fighting in May 2000 significantly slowed progress. To date slightly more than 1,800 children are reported to have entered disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Underage recruitment, including the re-enlistment of some of those previously demobilised, has continued among all forces.

CONTEXT

Since 1991 Sierra Leone has been in the grips of internal armed conflict between government forces and international peacekeepers, and armed groups including the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Thousands of men, women and children have been killed, raped, wounded or systematically mutilated. The Lomè peace agreement of July 1999 included important provisions on the demobilisation of child soldiers. Just over 24,000 combatants, including 1,700 children,

were disarmed before the peace process collapsed in May 2000.[2] Renewed insecurity resulted in further abuses against civilians and massive displacement. A 30 day ceasefire signed in November 2000 held throughout the early months of 2001, however the RUF did not disarm and violence towards civilians, including returning refugees, continued. The RUF still controls large sections of the diamond-rich north and east of Sierra Leone.

Fighting in Sierra Leone has also affected neighbouring Guinea, where some 340,000 Sierra Leonean refugees reside. Since September 2000 rebel fighters have launched a series of cross-border attacks prompting military counter-attacks by Guinean forces.[3] The deployment of an ECOWAS border monitoring force, agreed upon in January 2001, has been delayed for months pending a status of forces agreement between Guinea and Liberia and approval by the UN Security Council.[4]

Liberia is also involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone, having actively supported the RUF since its inception in 1991 through arms and diamond trafficking. Liberia announced its intention to sever ties with the RUF following UN Security Council action in March 2001. [5]

GOVERNMENT

National Recruitment Legislation

The Sierra Leone government has made repeated commitments to raise the legal age of military recruitment to 18, demobilise all underage combatants, and fulfil its obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

There is no conscription in Sierra Leone.[6] In February 2000 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child issued concluding observations on Sierra Leone's initial report, expressing concern over the continued failure to define minimum voluntary recruitment age in national legislation. Rather, Section 16(2) of the Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces Act 1961 states that volunteers under "the apparent age of 17_ years" may not be enlisted without the consent of parents or legal guardians. However the Committee welcomed the government's intention to pass legislation raising minimum recruitment age to 18, urging the government to move quickly in this direction and to ensure enforcement.[7]

On 24 May 2000, following reports of children fighting with government-allied forces or remaining in front-line positions, the government issued the statement that "government policy ... stipulates that 18 years is the minimum age for bearing arms in Sierra Leone". The government further reported that the Acting Chief of Defence Staff was "instructed to ensure that all those below the age of 18 currently involved in fighting on the side of the government should be immediately withdrawn, demobilised and handed over to competent institutions for rehabilitation. Henceforth, any commander who allows a child below 18-years to carry arms within his area of operations or allows children to remain in areas of active conflict will face severe disciplinary action." [8] At the International Conference on War-Affected Children in Winnipeg in September 2000 the government stated its commitment to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child regarding "voluntary recruitment into any fighting force before age 18". [9] However, it is unclear whether this commitment has resulted in appropriate legislative change.

Child Recruitment and Deployment

Government-allied forces comprise a loose alliance of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), including more recently former AFRC members retrained by British forces. Chain-of-command control for these forces is in practice weak. This is particularly true of the largest and most powerful membership of the CDF, the Kamajors, which are well known for recruiting children.

It is not clear how far measures to prevent underage recruitment and demobilise child soldiers have been implemented by the various government-allied forces. There is evidence that these forces continued to recruit and use children in combat in 2000 and currently, including some previously disarmed and demobilised child combatants.

New Sierra Leone Army (SLA)

After the Lomé Peace Accord the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) began restructuring its units and training with the aid of foreign forces; UK military personnel are currently training the new SLA. By January 2001 some 6,500 persons, all age 18 or over, had completed training (not all of these soldiers are yet on active duty). Members of the new SLA are also being trained in child protection by UNICEF in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence, child protection agencies and the Ministry of Social Welfare.

Civil Defense Forces (CDF)

Since the war began civilians began forming self-defence militias comprised of various groups of traditional hunters, in particular the kamajors. The government came to rely on these militias, which officially became known as the Civil Defence Forces. The CDF has been accused of serious human rights violations including extrajudicial killings and execution of suspected rebels and collaborators, arbitrary arrest and detention, and induction of child soldiers.[10] However in May 2000 the Deputy Minister of Defence and National Co-ordinator of the CDF, Samuel Hinga Norman, denied the CDF recruited children or "initiated" them into militias comprising the CDF. He claimed children among CDF forces had been rescued or captured from armed groups and transferred to child protection agencies. In mid-July 2000 he further instructed CDF leaders and "initiators" not to recruit children.

While these instructions may reduce the number of children newly admitted into the CDF, it does not resolve the problem of those already in CDF forces. A senior member of the CDF in Kenema, Eastern Province, informed Amnesty International in 2000 that, although he personally opposed the use of children, it was normal practice within the CDF.

"I was beaten because I became separated from a CDF patrol."

Brima, a 12-year-old who became a soldier with the CDF at age 10, explained that when children disobeyed orders they were beaten unless their parents paid a fine.[11]

CDF recruitment of children – including some previously demobilised – is reportedly continuing in Bo, Kemema and Moyamba Districts in Southern Province. According to some reports, villages in Southern Province are expected to provide a certain number of children to the CDF. In some areas there appears to be an attempt to conceal the use of

children to guard checkpoints along major roads in Southern Province; aid workers repeatedly report seeing children, some of them openly armed, others concealing arms or hiding themselves in the bush.[12] In other areas an increase in the number of children guarding checkpoints has been observed. In May 2000 a UN assessment mission observed children between 7 and 14 years old comprising 25 to 30 per cent of the SLA/CDF in the town of Masiaka. Militia members claimed the children had volunteered as fighting spread through the villages.[13] The low rate of child demobilisation after May 2000 (see below) suggests that many underage recruits may remain among these government forces.

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)

The AFRC was comprised primarily of former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) officers who organised a coup in 1997 and joined forces with the RUF. The AFRC forcibly recruited children and used them to fight against government forces before the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord. The AFRC was also known to abduct young girls for use as sex slaves. After the Lomé Accord the AFRC, led by Johnny Paul Koroma, re-joined the government as a political party. Some of its members re-joined the new SLA being trained by British forces.[14] Hundreds of other AFRC members, however, refused to join the government, instead occupying areas outlying the capital or joining an opposition group known as the West Side Boys which are known to include under-18s (see below). On 24 May 2000 Koroma issued a statement voicing his opposition to the recruitment of children and warned "all warring factions to desist from recruiting child soldiers".[15]

"I did not want to go; I was forced to go. They killed a lot of women who refused to go with them... when they capture young girls, you belong to the soldier who captured you."
Isatu was abducted by the AFRC at the age of 15.[16]

"When I go to the battle fields, I smoke enough. That's why I become unafraid of everything. When you refuse to take drugs, it's called technical sabotage and you are killed."
Sayo (age 14, ex-AFRC soldier) described how his skin was cut and cocaine rubbed in the wounds.[17]

OPPOSITION

Currently the opposition group posing the greatest challenge to government forces is the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Opposition groups also include the West Side Boys and, before the Lomé Accord, the AFRC (see above).

Child Recruitment and Deployment

Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

In May 2000 a RUF spokesman SWB Rogers was quoted as saying: "The RUF doesn't believe in using children as soldiers. When they are five or six, they are far too young to fight. We only use the older boys, from ten or eleven upwards." [18] The RUF is well known for its abduction and forcible recruitment of children, both boys and girls, for use as soldiers,

sexual slaves and forced labour. In 2000 reports also emerged of armed groups forcing children to work in diamond fields under their control since the signing of the Lomé Accord in 1999.[19]

The RUF commonly abducts children during attacks. After the January 1999 Freetown attack, in which an estimated 10 per cent of armed forces were children, more than 4,800 children were reported missing.[20] Of these about 60 per cent were girls, who are typically forced into sexual slavery.[21]

Since May 2000 RUF forces have continued to abduct and forcibly recruit children as combatants, often using drugs to induce their compliance and fighting ferocity. Others were reported to have volunteered to join the RUF, however it appears that in many cases these children had little option but to do so. From May through August 2000 reports from Kambia and Makeni Districts, Northern Province, described RUF forces going from village to village demanding a quota of men and boys, most of whom were forced to join under duress. Local traditional rulers, known as Paramount Chiefs, were ordered to provide a certain number of recruits and families were forced to hand over children, including those aged under 18. The RUF has also reportedly killed children who refused to join their forces and frequently extorted money from families of conscripted youths.

Recruits also include hundreds of those who were previously demobilised after the July 1999 peace agreement. Some 200 demobilised children were abducted on their way from Kabala to Freetown in January 2000.[22] In May re-recruitment increased with RUF commanders targeting interim care centres; at the Makeni rehabilitation centre for example, a group of 72 former child soldiers were forced to rejoin.[23] Some of the children were told by RUF forces that their families had been traced and that the RUF would help them return to their homes. It was also reported that the RUF threatened to kill everyone at the centre if the children did comply.[24]

Recent interviews of children staying at transit centres set up in Bo and Kenema as part of the demobilisation programme in 2000 confirmed reports of sexual violence and abuse of children, both boys and girls, by RUF personnel. Three adolescent boys interviewed by an aid worker reported they had been abducted around age 14 and 15 and were sexually abused by female members of the RUF. They also reported being sexually abused by male RUF members, apparently as a form of punishment. Other forms of abuse included being forced to aid and abet the rape of girls. Rape of girls by RUF members was frequently cited.[25]

"By then the rebels had moved from Makeni to Lunsar. They came to our camp and asked some children to join them again and we refused. We have rights to live and play. They encouraged us to join them. We told the manager of the centre to move us. At that time there were no vehicles; even the NGO's vehicle was not around. We walked along the road to Rogberi Junction where we met the rebels. They told us to return to our camp. We knew that they were killing people around. After that they said, please, come and join us or we are going to kill you people. After that we fled in the bush."

– Former child soldier describes how the RUF tried to lure children back into their ranks.
[26]

"I had to go through the training and learn to fight, otherwise the RUF people would beat me or kill me."

David, abducted by the RUF at the age of 10. [27]

West Side Boys

The West Side Boys are an ex-AFRC splinter group aligned with the RUF. Like the RUF they have committed serious human rights abuses including killing, abduction, deliberate mutilation, rape and the forced recruitment of children as soldiers.[28] In September 2000 British troops conducted raids on the West Side Boys, during which scores of child soldiers were seen fleeing into the jungle, likely to have rejoined armed groups.[29]

RELATED ISSUES

In Sierra Leone it is often difficult to distinguish between recruitment into armed conflict versus the initiation process young boys undergo to mark entry as an adult into societies of traditional hunters. For example, some parents may not try to prevent the recruitment of their children by the CDF due to the traditional status associated with membership in groups such as the kamajors, which are an important element of the CDF.

DEVELOPMENTS

International Standards

The government of Sierra Leone signed the CRC-OP-CAC on 8 September 2000 but does not uphold the "straight-18" position.

Appeals

The problem of child soldiers in Sierra Leone has attracted significant international and national attention. In January 2000 hundreds of people marched in Freetown to protest the recruitment of children and to demand such children be reunited with their families.[30] Some 40 child protection agencies and NGOs working with government have been constituted into a child protection committee coordinated by UNICEF,[31] and the government of Sierra Leone committed itself to establishing a National Commission for War-Affected Children. In October 2000 the UN Security Council urged the government of Sierra Leone to establish the promised Commission.[32] The Coalition vigorously lobbied for the establishment of a special court in Sierra Leone to try those responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers (see below).

Demobilisation

In 1999 little demobilisation appeared to be taking place. Following the Lomè peace agreement the RUF admitted that 30% of its forces were under 18 but that official demobilisation had not begun. Later that year a mere 111 children were said to have been

demobilised. The CDF reported equally small numbers with approximately 100 children demobilising in October 1999.[33]

In January 2000 the pace picked up considerably and by May the UN reported that approximately 1,700 of an estimated 5,000 underage recruits had entered disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.[34] But renewal of hostilities that month derailed the process, and by November 2000 the total number of demobilised child soldiers had only risen to slightly over 1,800.[35] About 138 of these children, between the ages of 8 and 16, were handed over by the CDF in June 2000.[36] The UN Security Council reported in October 2000 that "a significant portion of the rank and file RUF would be willing to disarm but were not allowed to do so by their commanders, who often used brutal methods, including execution, to prevent fighters, including children, from leaving." [37]

Some of the demobilisation since 1999 has come about through self-disarmament, which established programmes were not always equipped to address. But in 2000 efforts were being made to establish reporting and outreach mechanisms that would facilitate the inclusion of such former combatants in disarmament and reintegration programmes.[38] A National Commission of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration is expected to be established in 2001.[39]

A particular challenge for reintegration programmes concerns child rape victims forced to live among the RUF. The taboo nature of the subject, the social ostracisation that often follows abuse, and the lack of appropriate government services all present significant obstacles to dealing with such victims of armed conflict. In March 2001 UNAMSIL announced the launch of a skills training project for about 390 young girls who had been abducted by armed groups as a step toward addressing the needs of such children.[40]

Special Court

In August 2000 the UN Security Council set in train the establishment of a special court to try war crimes in Sierra Leone, recommending that this court prosecute those with greatest responsibility for crimes. The Security Council agreed that all recruitment and use of child soldiers be considered a war crime under the Special Court in accordance with statute of the International Criminal Court.[41] Following considerable debate about whether 15 – 18-year-olds should also be eligible for trial, as initially proposed by the UN Secretary General, the Security Council later reiterated that the Special Court should target only those most responsible for war crimes, and recommended that juveniles appear before a separate Truth and Reconciliation Commission.[42]

[1] AI, "Sierra Leone Childhood – a casualty in conflict", 31/08/00.

[2] UN Security Council, Fourth report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/455, 19/05/00.

[3] HRW, "Guinean Forces Kill, Wound Civilians in Sierra Leone", HRW, New York.

[4] UN IRIN, "ECOMOG capable of defending border, ECOWAS head says", 24 January 2001.

[5] UNWIRE, "Liberia: Council imposes sanctions, calls for end to RUF support", 8 March 2001. Between \$25 and \$125 million in diamonds are smuggled out of Sierra Leone through

Liberia each year.

[6] Report of the secretary-general submitted pursuant to commission resolution 1998/77, "Civil and political rights, including the question of: conscientious objection to military service", UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/55, 17/12/99.

[7] Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Sierra Leone. CRC/C/15/Add.116 24 February 2000.

[8] AI, "Sierra Leone: Childhood – a casualty of conflict", 31/0800, at: <http://www.amnesty.ca/library/afr5106900-4.htm>

[9] Statement by the Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Shirley Gbujama, at the International Conference on War-Affected Children, Winnipeg, Canada September 2000.

[10] US Department of State, Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999 and 2000. Washington D.C., 2000 and 2001.

[11] AI, "War children tell their story", Amnesty Magazine November/December 2000, pp.7.

[12] Information provided to the Coalition by aid workers, April 2001.

[13] IRIN, "Sierra Leone: Re-recruitment of child soldiers", 23 May 2000.

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[15] AI, "Sierra Leone: Childhood – a casualty of conflict", 31/0800, at: <http://www.amnesty.ca/library/afr5106900-4.htm>

[16] AI, "War children tell their story", Amnesty Magazine November/December 2000, pp.7.

[17] AI Press Release, "Sierra Leone: action needed to end use of child combatants", (AFR 51/075/2000), 31 August 2000.

[18] Africa Confidential, 26 May 2000. See Radda Barnen Children and War Newsletter, July 2000.

[19] US Department of State, Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2000. Washington D.C., 2001.

[20] UNICEF, Child soldier projects: Assistance to Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone, at <http://ginie1.sched.pitt.edu/ginie-crisis-links/childsoldiers/sierraleone2.html#Demobilisation>

[21] AI, "Sierra Leone: rape and other forms of sexual violence against girls and women", AFR 51/035/2000, 29 June 2000.

[22] Reuters, "Rebels said to kidnap 200 children in Sierra Leone", 21 January 2000.

[23] Reuters, "UNICEF says children rejoined Sierra Leone rebels", 30 May 2000.

[24] IRIN, "Sierra Leone: re-recruitment of child soldiers", 23 May 2000.

[25] Coalition interview of a reliable source that requests confidentiality, Geneva 22 February 2001.

[26] AI, "War children tell their story", Amnesty Magazine November/December 2000, pp.6.

[27] Ibid.

[28] US Department of State, op. cit.

[29] BBC World news, "Sierra Leone: Child soldiers scatter into jungle after hostage release", 14 September 2000.

- [30] IRIN, "Sierra Leone: march against recruitment of child soldiers", 22 March 2000.
- [31] Statement by the Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Shirley Gbujama, at the International Conference on War-Affected Children, Winnipeg, Canada September 2000.
- [32] Report of the UN Security Council mission to Sierra Leone, S/2000/992, 16 October 2000.
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- [34] Fourth report of Secretary General on UN Mission in Sierra Leone, 19 May 2000, S/2000/455.
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- [36] IRIN, "Sierra Leone: Kamajors hand over ex-child fighters", 13 June 2000.
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- [38] IRIN, "Sierra Leone: reintegration of child combatants", 14, July 2000.]
- [39] Report of the Special Representative of the secretary-general for Children and Armed Conflict to the UN General Assembly, Protection of children affected by armed conflict, A/55/442, 3 October 2000.
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- [41] UN Security Council issued a Resolution, S/RES/1315(2000), adopted 14 August 2000. At: <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1315e.pdf>
- [42] UN News, "Security Council Says Sierra Leone War Crimes Court Should Target Top Leaders Only" 28 December 2000. At: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sierra/court/001228.htm>

WHAT'S NEW ▪ ABOUT CHILD SOLDIERS ▪ ABOUT THE CSC ▪ APPEALS ▪ CHILD SOLDIER NEWS ▪ CSC EVENTS ▪
CSC PUBLICATIONS ▪ DONATIONS ▪ OPTIONAL PROTOCOL ▪ OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW ▪ PRESS RELEASES ▪ USEFUL LINK / RESOURCES ▪
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90) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

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U.S. Department of State
Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997
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SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone is controlled by a military junta. On May 25, dissident junior officers of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) violently seized power from the 14-month-old democratically elected Government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The United Nations Security Council condemned the overthrow of the government and called upon the military junta to restore the elected Government unconditionally. Major Johnny Paul Koroma, awaiting trial on charges stemming from a September 1996 coup attempt, was freed from prison and named Chairman of the new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC immediately suspended the Constitution, banned political parties and all public demonstrations and meetings, and announced that all legislation would be made by military decree. Koroma invited the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to join the AFRC in exercising control over the country. The RUF quickly took control of the military junta, although Koroma remains nominal Chairman of the AFRC. Rule is arbitrary; maintenance of law and order has collapsed. The judiciary, like other civil institutions, has effectively ceased to function.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) designated the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) to bring about the restoration of the constitutional government. After ECOWAS negotiations with a joint AFRC/RUF delegation failed to make progress toward the restoration of the elected Government, ECOWAS imposed regional sanctions and an embargo against the military junta. On October 8, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions prohibiting the importation of weapons, military materiel, and petroleum as well as international travel by members of the military junta. Dozens of civilians were killed in clashes between AFRC/RUF forces and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as ECOMOG attempted to enforce the sanctions. On October 23, AFRC/RUF and ECOWAS delegations signed a peace plan calling for the restoration to power of President Kabbah on April 22, 1998. Both President Kabbah and AFRC Chairman Koroma publicly endorsed the Conakry Plan. However, the junta did not cooperate in attempts to refine the details of the peace plan and by year's end had taken no steps to implement it.

Before May 25, the RSLMF was responsible for external and, together with the police, internal security, primarily against RUF attacks. The RSLMF was supported by Nigerian and Guinean military contingents and by personnel working under a training and logistics contract with Executive Outcomes, a private South African mercenary firm. In compliance with the November 1996 Abidjan Peace Agreement, President Kabbah terminated the contract with Executive Outcomes at the end of January. For 20 months, Executive Outcomes had played the critical role in government efforts to protect major towns and

diamond mining areas from RUF attacks. Groups of traditional hunters (including the Mende Kamajohs, Temne Kapras, and Koranko Tamaboros) organized as civil defense militias, with government support defended their chiefdoms from RUF attacks and RSLMF looting. Neither the RSLMF nor the civil defense militia were fully under government control. After May 25, the RUF joined with RSLMF troops loyal to the AFRC junta and renamed itself the People's Army of Sierra Leone. RSLMF forces loyal to the AFRC appear to function separately from RUF troops. They also fought occasional battles against each other. In June the AFRC formed joint military and police antilooting squads and gave them authority to shoot looters on sight.

Before the coup on May 25, government security forces and the RUF committed numerous human rights abuses. After May 25, the scale of violence and human rights abuses committed against civilians by the AFRC and RUF greatly increased. In addition members of the Civil Defense Force allegedly committed serious human rights abuses.

Sierra Leone is an extremely poor country. Before the civil war began in 1992, more than 70 percent of the 4.5 million citizens were involved in some aspect of agriculture, mainly subsistence farming. Although the country has substantial mineral resources, including diamonds, gold, rutile, and bauxite, official receipts from legal exports have been small in recent years. For decades the majority of diamond and gold production has been smuggled abroad. The economic infrastructure has nearly collapsed due to corruption, neglect, and war-related disruptions. The 6-year RUF insurgency dislocated more than 40 percent of the country's population, placing additional burdens on Sierra Leone's fragile economy. According to the United Nations, the average life expectancy is now only 34 years. One child out of four dies before the age of 5. The economic embargo imposed on the military junta by ECOWAS caused the customs duties to dry up, depriving the AFRC of 85 percent of its expected revenue flow.

Sierra Leone's human rights record worsened significantly and is now extremely poor. Before the May 25 coup, government military forces committed serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, beatings, arbitrary arrest and detention, and illegal searches. Under the elected Government as well as under the military regime, there were reports that police abused suspects during arrest and interrogation. Prison conditions remained life threatening. Prior to May 25, lengthy delays in trials, prolonged pretrial detentions, and violations of due process were problems. Government harassment of the press was also a problem. Discrimination against ethnic minorities persisted, and violence against women remained widespread, as was violence against children, including female genital mutilation (FGM) and the use of child soldiers.

Prior to the coup, RUF forces continued to attack villages and ambush travelers, killing, torturing, raping, and mutilating civilians. The RUF abducted children and forced them to commit atrocities, including the torture and murder of their relatives. The RUF raped and sexually abused young girls and women during attacks.

After May 25, AFRC and RUF forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses including deliberate extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians, torture, mutilation, rape, beatings, arbitrary arrest and detention, and illegal searches. The military junta routinely jailed antiregime civic leaders and students without judicial process; junta forces killed some detainees; amputated the arms of others; and raped women as punishment for their

opposition to the regime. After the coup, the court system ceased to function. The AFRC announced that it would replace the judiciary with People's Revolutionary Courts manned by ordinary citizens. There is no evidence that these or any other courts are functioning. The military junta harassed, beat, detained, and arrested journalists.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Before and after the coup, government military forces and the RUF committed political and extrajudicial killings. Soldiers and RUF troops engaged in looting, robbery, and extortion frequently killed civilians. The situation became much worse on May 25 when coup leaders freed hundreds of prisoners from Pademba Road prison and gave them military uniforms and weapons. Freed prisoners, AFRC troops, and RUF forces engaged in looting, rape, and murder. Foreign countries evacuated several thousand foreign citizens and tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans fled Freetown. Up to 100 civilians were killed in the violence surrounding the coup. Hundreds more have been murdered subsequently in both random violence and political killings. In mid-June, AFRC officials created antilooting squads including the Western Area Security Patrol and gave them authority to shoot looters on sight. Antilooting Decree Number Six published on November 28, but effective retroactively to May 28, made looting punishable by firing squad. AFRC and RUF officials summarily executed at least 120 soldiers and civilians accused of looting and other crimes. Eight senior members of the AFRC who looted the Iranian Embassy on New Year's Eve were demoted or lightly fined.

Throughout the last half of the year, there was fierce fighting between AFRC/RUF forces and Kamajohs in several areas in the Southern and Eastern Provinces. AFRC/RUF forces routinely summarily executed captured Kamajohs. AFRC/RUF forces routinely shot and tortured civilians and looted their property while searching for Kamajohs. While the Kamajohs usually turned AFRC/RUF prisoners over to ECOMOG, a few AFRC/RUF prisoners were executed while in Kamajoh custody.

At least one person was killed and another injured in Bo on May 27 when AFRC soldiers shot at a crowd of about 5,000 persons demonstrating against the coup. The demonstration started when large quantities of looted goods were discovered in the army's possession.

At least 80 people, including 30 civilians, were killed during fighting in Kenema between RSLMF troops and Kamajohs during the first weekend in May. Fighting started when soldiers shot at a truck of Kamajohs, killing three, as they drove past the army base at Kpetema. At least 22 people, including at least 6 civilians, were killed in fighting that started that weekend between RSLMF troops and Kapras at Camp Charlie near Matotoka.

On May 29, at Masingbi in the Eastern Province, AFRC soldiers ambushed a group of Kamajohs, killing 20 of them. RUF forces firing automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and mortars repeatedly attacked the town of Moyamba at the end of June. During 1 attack they killed more than 10 people, including women and children.

In June the Western Area Security Patrol and antilooting squads in other parts of the country executed at least two dozen people including four soldiers who tried to rape four nuns and loot their residence on June 11. Their bodies were dumped into the sea. In other cases, armed robbers were hacked to pieces or decapitated. A teenage boy caught breaking into a house in Freetown on June 25 was hacked to death; his arms and head were chopped off and one testicle placed in his mouth by the antilooting squad.

On June 26, AFRC/RUF troops searching for Kamajohs killed at least 25 people in Bo District. Soldiers took Albert Sandy Demby, paramount chief of Baoma Chiefdom and father of Vice President Albert J.E. Demby, from his home in Gerihun, Bo District, and shot him in the stomach, killing him. The soldiers then attacked and burned the villages of Sembehun and Telu Bongor, the home of Deputy Defense Minister Samuel Hinga Norman.

During an attack on the town of Moyamba at the end of June, RUF troops tortured student leader Sheku Kabbah in public before killing him; they gouged out his eyes and cut off his ears before cutting his throat.

On July 8, a young woman was summarily executed by uniformed soldiers in Freetown for publicly supporting President Kabbah. Junta military officers executed three soldiers in July in Kenema for looting.

On August 12, AFRC troops executed a soldier in Freetown after he shot and killed a mechanic who asked the soldier to pay for five gallons of gasoline that the soldier had taken from the gas station. An angry crowd chased the soldier to a police station. Other soldiers rushed in and dragged him out, stripped off his uniform, and shot him at least five times.

On August 18, at least 11 people were killed when AFRC forces attacked students attempting a "march for democracy" in protest against the AFRC. One student from Njala University was chopped into pieces by the military forces. Many students remain missing and the number killed may be higher. Many students also were arrested arbitrarily and tortured (see Section 1.c.).

In August AFRC soldiers beat and cut the throat of paramount chief Dessima from the Dame chiefdom near Kenema. His deputy was abducted and presumed killed. In late August, seven men were arrested and taken to Cockerill Military Headquarters after arriving at a Freetown wharf from Lungi across the river. Six were shot after being accused of involvement with FM 98.1 radio station; one later was released.

On September 1, members of the Kamajoh and Kapra militias beheaded four people who they suspected of being soldiers or AFRC sympathizers. The four were traveling from Bo to Makeni in a commercial vehicle that stopped at a CDF checkpoint at Gumahun, 25 miles from Bo. After the vehicle was searched, the driver was identified as a retired soldier and arrested. Two other men in military T-shirts also were arrested, along with the girlfriend of one of the men. All four were summarily executed. The other passengers in the vehicle were allowed to continue their journey to Makeni.

Ten soldiers were executed by firing squad on October 25. Military police head Captain John Harleston said that all 10 had pleaded guilty to murder charges during a 1-day trial. Other sources said that two of those executed had been accused of beating the girlfriend of a military officer. Harleston said that the executions were meant to send a signal to undisciplined soldiers and to reassure the civilian population.

Nine passengers on a bus traveling between Kenema and Bo were killed on November 2 in a clash between AFRC soldiers and members of the Kamajoh militia. Sierra Leone Road Transport Company officials said the fighting began when soldiers on the bus ignored an order to disembark at a Kamajoh roadblock.

On December 3, eight armed robbers were executed by firing squad in a soccer field in Koidu town in the eastern Kono District. A junta spokesman said that the eight had appeared before a 1-day military tribunal. One of the eight persons executed, Jonathan Moore, had been serving a 25-year sentence when he was released from prison during the coup.

b. Disappearance

Thousands of civilians disappeared following the May 25 junta takeover. In many cases, it is unclear whether the individuals were killed, captured by AFRC/RUF forces, or whether they successfully fled the country. Some individuals subsequently reappeared in refugee camps or in other parts of the country. The whereabouts of hundreds of people detained by junta officials since the coup remain unknown. In most cases, family members are too frightened of the junta to inquire about the location of their missing relatives.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the now suspended Constitution prohibits torture, there were numerous reports that government security forces at times used torture. For example in January, a soldier on trial for treason for the September 1996 plot to overthrow the government alleged that he had been forced to sign a confession under torture. Joseph Yajah, a former security officer at State House, testified in court that he was tortured at CID headquarters where deputy head Samuel Soumassa urged him to change his statement. Yajah said he was tied to a chair in the squad office, stripped naked, had ice water poured on him, and was subjected to electric shocks. He said police officers stuffed a cap in his mouth when he screamed. Yajah also testified that a subinspector put out a cigarette on his head and ordered other men to scratch his back with wire. The police denied the allegations.

In the week of the military takeover, the level of violence by military and RUF forces caused the exodus of hundreds of thousands of civilians from Freetown, the capital, and other population centers. Soldiers and released prisoners engaged in wholesale looting of private homes, businesses, diplomatic residences, international organizations, and warehouses of humanitarian assistance organizations. In particular local and foreign officials and businessman were targeted for looting and beatings. Their female family members were targeted for rape. Similar acts of abuse and violence continued through the end of the year. Both AFRC and RUF forces used torture on numerous occasions. Since 1991 the RUF waged an armed rebellion marked by violent attacks against civilians. After

the RUF joined the AFRC junta in Freetown, RUF Spokesman Eldred Collins admitted responsibility for the atrocities committed in the country's interior. He asserted that the RUF "burned, looted, maimed, and killed," not because it wanted to, but because "that was the only way we could have uprooted a rotten system."

A leader of the AFRC beat student leader Ansu Bockarie and cut him with a razor blade in early June.

On August 18, AFRC and RUF soldiers killed at least 11 students during a student "march for democracy" against the junta in Freetown. A large number of students and other protesters suffered severe injuries when AFRC and RUF forces breaking up the march attacked them with machetes and bayonets. Four had their arms chopped off. Approximately 20 female students were arrested and taken directly to the residences of AFRC/RUF leaders who sexually assaulted them. Some are still detained. One female student remains missing.

President of the Civil Liberties Congress Soulainman Banja Tejan-Sie was arrested on August 18 and beaten with military helmets and gun butts. His arms were tied with rope, and he was put in the truck of a car belonging to an AFRC leader. After several hours in the car, he was taken to Cockerill Military Headquarters where he was interrogated and beaten. He was later transferred to Pademba Road prison's death row and was denied washing and sanitary facilities. He was denied food for the first 3 days that he was detained. The AFRC released Tejan-Sie on August 28, but kept him under close surveillance until he fled the country in early October.

In the Eastern Province near Tongo, AFRC officials harassed, intimidated, and tortured miners to find the location of diamonds. In August a miner was roped over a fire in the Kono area by a junta official to make him disclose where he had hidden a recently found diamond. The miner surrendered the diamond and his tribe had to pay AFRC officials a large ransom sum for his release.

RUF soldiers tortured and killed numerous persons (see Section 1.a.). On October 2, three soldiers and one member of the RUF attacked Olu Jones at his house. He was tied, beaten, and stabbed in both ears with a bayonet. In the early morning, the soldiers took him to Cockerill Military Headquarters.

Refugees fleeing Sierra Leone reported torture and abuse of civilians by AFRC soldiers and the RUF, particularly in the Mende areas in the south and east where the AFRC and RUF were fighting the Kamajohs. AFRC/RUF soldiers burned villages suspected of supporting the Kamajohs. Civilians were beaten and tortured. Women and girls were raped, sexually tortured, and forced into sexual slavery.

Both the AFRC and the RUF use rape as an instrument of control and punishment. The military junta has not taken steps to control violence by soldiers against women and often encourages it.

Prison conditions remain life threatening. The quality of food and medical care was poor. In mid-May, Pademba Road prison held 60 percent more inmates than its capacity. The majority of those were on remand awaiting trial. When the AFRC seized power on May

25, it broke open the Pademba Road prison and freed all inmates. By the end of the year, Pademba Road prison was again seriously overcrowded with persons detained by the AFRC. Many detainees are held in metal shipping containers at Cockerill military headquarters.

The AFRC junta occasionally granted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Prison Watch limited access to prisoners, many of whom were officials in the previous government, journalists, or student protesters. In August Prison Watch reported that most detainees in Pademba Road prison were brutalized and beaten during arrest and interrogation, and none had been formally charged or had access to legal counsel.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The AFRC junta suspended the Constitution and gave itself far-reaching powers of detention. Any person can be arrested "in the interest of public safety." There are no safeguards against arbitrary arrest or indefinite detention without charge or trial. Members of the elected Government and people associated with it, members of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), journalists, students, and human rights activists have been arbitrarily arrested and detained without charge in what the junta calls "military safe custody." Police and military officials arrest without warrant and detain indefinitely any person they suspected of posing a threat to military rule. With the collapse of the rule of law, all civilians are at risk of arbitrary arrest and detention.

Several hundred detainees are being held at Pademba Road prison, Cockerill military headquarters, Criminal Investigation Department (CID) headquarters, and police stations or military installations throughout the country. While some detainees have been released after a short time, others have been held for weeks or months. Many have been beaten or tortured (see Section 1.c.). Most detainees who are released go into hiding or flee from the country.

In the days immediately following the coup, several members of President Kabbah's cabinet and other senior government and military officers were detained at Cockerill military headquarters. Soldiers conducted house-to-house searches for others. Most of these detainees were released after a few days. On June 16, at least eight senior military officers and seven civilians associated with the SLPP were arrested and accused of conspiring to overthrow the AFRC. None was charged with a crime; however, they were not allowed visitors. Most were released within several weeks.

Hundreds of people have been detained and beaten by junta troops searching for the transmitter of a clandestine, prodemocracy radio station that began broadcasting in July.

More than 120 people were arrested on August 18 and 19 as the National Union of Sierra Leone Students (NUSS) attempted to hold a "march for democracy" in protest against the AFRC. Eighty-six students were taken to Pademba Road prison where they were held for 12 days before release. Another 35 students were taken to Cockerill military headquarters. Others were taken to CID headquarters and about 20 women were taken directly to the residences of junta leaders. In October the junta admitted that it was still holding 37 students; many more, including some women, remained missing.

On September 16, People's Army troops attacked the town of Bonthe, on Sherbro Island, searching for a Kamajoh training center. The soldiers arrested 60 civilians suspected of sympathizing with the Kamajohs and took them to Moyamba for questioning. It is not clear what happened to them afterwards.

On October 13, the junta arrested eight people, including the elected Government's Deputy Minister of Marine Resources Mamoud Sesay, newspaper editor Prince Akpu, and Temne tribal chief Alhaji King Naimbana for "involvement in subversive activities." At the time the junta admitted to holding another 33 detainees it described as "prodemocracy activists."

On November 26, the AFRC arrested Chief A.B. Tomboyeke in Baoma Chiefdom, Bo District while searching for Kamajohs.

Prior to the coup, on March 29 RUF forces abducted several of its own members at Nongowa in Kailahun District in the Eastern Province. Two of those abducted, Fayia Musa and Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh, had been appointed as RUF representatives to the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace established by the Abidjan Peace Accord, which was signed by the Government and the RUF in November 1996. In April they were reported to be on trial in an RUF people's court for plotting to overthrow RUF leader Foday Sankoh. The captives' condition was uncertain at year's end.

The junta refused to allow several prominent businessmen, government officials, and journalists to leave the country. Because of the violence surrounding the coup and the RUF's reputation for brutality, hundreds of thousands of Sierra Leoneans fled the country fearing for their lives. Many more left later after being targeted by the junta. President Kabbah and members of his government are among those now in exile in Guinea.

The junta does not practice forced exile; however, thousands have fled for their own safety.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The suspended Constitution included provisions for an independent judiciary. Virtually all magistrates have fled the country; several were beaten, and some were raped by prisoners released from prison during the coup. The court system has not functioned since May 25. The AFRC announced that it would replace the judiciary with People's Revolutionary Courts manned by ordinary citizens, but there is no evidence that these or any other courts are functioning.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The AFRC monitored actions by citizens to prevent them from acting in a manner it deemed prejudicial to its continuation in power and to control association or communication with other persons. The junta erected roadblocks to control movement and conducted surveillance of the homes of people it perceives as opponents. Telephones and mail are monitored by the military junta. There were numerous occasions of abusive treatment of citizens by soldiers and police throughout the country, including forced entry into homes, robberies, and assaults. Many of these abuses were sanctioned by or

committed by high-ranking members of the junta. Joint military and police Antilooting Squads frequently executed soldiers caught looting homes.

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

The RUF fighting against three successive governments resulted in an estimated 20,000 deaths since 1991. More than one-third of Sierra Leone's 4.5 million citizens are displaced internally or are living as refugees in neighboring countries because of insecurity and violence stemming from the civil war and the AFRC/RUF takeover. After taking power, junta forces seized food aid destined for displaced persons and refugees, and looted the headquarters and warehouses of international aid organizations, making humanitarian relief difficult. The AFRC also planted land mines around ECOMOG installations and at other strategic sites in an attempt to hinder their efforts to restore the constitutional government.

There were many serious violations of humanitarian law throughout the country before as well as after the military takeover. Military and RUF forces committed summary executions of prisoners and killings, torture, rape, and mutilation of civilians. Traditional hunter societies (including the Mende Kamajohs, Temne Kapras, and Koranko Tamaboros) organized as civil defense militias and sought to protect their chiefdoms from both RUF attacks and military looters. At times they executed military or RUF forces that they had captured. Hundreds of civilians were killed in fighting between military and RUF troops and the civil defense forces.

Despite the Abidjan Peace Agreement signed in November 1996, and a cease-fire in effect, RUF rebels and elements of the government security forces continued to attack villages and ambush vehicles. RUF forces continued to abduct villagers and force them into involuntary servitude, making them serve as porters, sexual slaves, human shields, and fighters, among other abuses. Civilians were murdered, maimed, tortured, and raped in these attacks. In some cases, perpetrators could not be identified; however, it is generally believed that RUF forces, military personnel, and ordinary thieves, committed attacks on civilians. Even in the instances where perpetrators could be identified, the Government took no action against them.

In early May, the RUF resumed targeting international organizations. On May 7 several miles from Makeni, RUF gunmen attacked two United Nations vehicles with machine gun fire. The driver of one vehicle was killed and another U.N. employee was injured. The next day two more humanitarian aid workers were injured when the RUF attacked two World Food Program vehicles on the Makeni-Lunsar road.

Beginning on May 9, forces generally believed to belong to the RUF began a campaign of attacks against villages in the Northern province. Armed groups in both military uniforms and civilian clothes attacked at least 10 villages with sticks, machetes, guns, and rocket propelled grenades. The attacks caused 8,000 people to seek refuge in the Northern province capital of Makeni and thousands more to flee to Guinea. In the attack on Kalangba village, more than a dozen people were killed and 87 houses burned. In Gbandembu village, the clinic and 124 of 130 houses were burned. Scores of people whose hands and feet had been cut off by rebel forces sought medical attention in Makeni. Many people were also abducted in these attacks. On May 14, these forces, including

many young boys, captured the northern town of Kamakwie, leaving dozens of corpses lying in the streets. They destroyed the hospital, dispensary, and pharmacy, and burned more than 60 houses. In separate attacks in mid-May, the RUF killed more than 100 people in the eastern towns of Kalihun and Bomaru.

On the morning of June 2, after the junta broke off negotiations with the international community, a Nigerian warship shelled AFRC/RUF military installations in the western end of Freetown for several hours. In response 150 RUF soldiers attacked and then set fire to the Mammy Yoko Hotel where some 600 foreigners were awaiting evacuation and where ECOMOG forces and Nigerian negotiators had set up their headquarters. At least one person at the hotel died in the attack and six were injured, including five Nigerian soldiers guarding the hotel. Later that day RUF troops also attacked the Bintumani hotel. At least 62 civilians were killed and more injured by the RUF-fired rocket-propelled grenades and Nigerian shells that fell into residential areas.

In late June, virtually the entire population of Magburaka fled 60 miles to Makeni after RUF troops entered the town and began harassing civilians.

On September 16, AFRC and RUF troops searching for a Kamajoh training center attacked the town of Bonthe on Sherbro Island, looting and destroying much of the town. At least 34 Kamajohs were killed. Sixty civilians were arrested and taken away for questioning. ??

In fighting during October, AFRC and RUF supporters looted and burned homes of President Kabbah's family and supporters of the elected Government, including the homes of Chairman of the Commission for Consolidation of the Peace Desmond Luke, Minister of Works Emmanuel O. Grant, and Deputy Minister in the Vice President's Office Theresa Koroma. At least seven villages in Baoma chiefdom, Bo District were abandoned in late October after AFRC/RUF troops burned the houses and stole the rice crop.

On November 26, AFRC soldiers burned 13 houses in the villages of Pelewahun Ngiyeibu and Gerihun in Bo district while searching for Kamajohs.

On December 3, Kamajohs seized a Sierra Leone Red Cross truck delivering relief food to Moyamba. They reportedly manhandled the Red Cross staff and told them that in the future, they should receive all relief supplies for distribution.

On December 9 and 10, AFRC and RUF forces launched attacks on Kamajoh strongholds in of Joru and Gorahun villages in Kenema District and Sonoshun, Fairo and Dia villages in Pujehun District. The villages were attacked by an AFRC helicopter gunship, artillery, and rocket propelled grenades. AFRC and RUF troops looted the villages, set fire to houses and rice farms, and raped several women. Similar AFRC/RUF attacks on Kamajoh strongholds throughout the eastern and southeastern parts of the country continued through the end of the year with significant fighting along the border with Liberia.

ECOMOG artillery and rocket attacks killed numerous civilians. In June a Nigerian warship shelled AFRC/RUF installations in Freetown for several hours. At least 150 civilians were killed and more were wounded during fighting that started on July 12 between AFRC/RUF and ECOMOG forces at the ECOMOG bases at Lungi Airport,

Hastings Airfield, Jui, and Kossoh near Freetown. Junta forces attacked the ECOMOG bases and nearby towns seeking a new clandestine radio station that had recently broadcast a speech by President Kabbah.

About 15 civilians were killed in fighting that began when AFRC and RUF forces attacked the ECOMOG base at Lungi Airport on August 13. Most of the civilians were killed when ECOMOG troops tried to shell the attacking AFRC/RUF troops. A senior AFRC official said the junta would continue to harass ECOMOG troops until they left the airport.

Twenty-one civilians were killed and many more wounded during heavy fighting that broke out on September 4 when ECOMOG troops at Lungi Airport launched artillery and air attacks against two container ships docking at Queen Elizabeth Quay in violation of the ECOWAS embargo. There were reports that some of the ECOMOG shells fell in residential areas. Most of the civilian casualties were at Marbela Market. It is not clear whether the market was hit by an ECOMOG shell or by anti-aircraft rounds fired from AFRC positions at Fourah Bay College on Mount Aureol.

On September 5, ECOMOG Force Commander Major General Victor Malu issued a "final warning" that ECOMOG would attack any ships violating the ECOWAS embargo. The next day a Nigerian Alpha jet dropped bombs into the water near a Ukrainian cargo ship Seaway as it unloaded in violation of the embargo. Three paramilitary policemen and a port official were seriously injured. The following day, another Nigerian aircraft dropped two bombs on the ship. No injuries were reported in the second attack. General Malu claimed that, in addition to rice, the ship had been discharging arms and ammunition for the junta. In the following days, AFRC officials reportedly smuggled much of the rice into Guinea and sold it for their personal gain.

Hundreds of people died in 2 weeks of heavy fighting that started on October 8 between AFRC/RUF troops and ECOMOG forces. Hostilities began when an AFRC helicopter gunship fired at an ECOMOG helicopter ferrying supplies between ECOMOG bases. In retaliation a Nigerian Alpha jet fired rockets at, and dropped bombs on, the AFRC helicopter after it had returned to its base at Cockerill Military Headquarters. The AFRC reported that four soldiers and two civilians were killed in the attack on Cockerill. AFRC and RUF troops then attacked ECOMOG positions at Lungi Airport, Kossoh Town, and Jui. Dozens of civilians were killed by artillery fired by both sides. The fighting spread as AFRC/RUF troops attacked Nigerian ECOMOG contingents at Bo and Kenema. AFRC military trucks patrolled Freetown, arresting soldiers who had gone AWOL and refused to fight against ECOMOG troops, and forcibly impressed others into service. On October 16, at least 14 civilians were killed in the eastern outskirts of Freetown by ECOMOG artillery fired from Lungi Airport at AFRC/RUF troops attacking ECOMOG forces at Jui and Kossoh Town. Eight civilians were killed and 20 injured the same day when a bomb dropped by a Nigerian Alpha jet exploded in a market at Kissy. The Alpha jets also targeted junta radio and television transmitters. The AFRC placed anti-aircraft guns in residential areas. Shells fired by these guns frequently fell in residential areas.

On December 11, AFRC forces at Daru barracks in Kailahun District fired on a Nigerian Alpha jet. The jet dropped two bombs that killed several people in the nearby village of Benduma.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The suspended Constitution provided for freedom of speech and of the press. In practice, however, prior to May 25 the Kabbah Government detained some journalists without charge and charged some with sedition, libel, and contempt of Parliament for their coverage of alleged government corruption, the civil war, and human rights issues. The elected Kabbah Government's frequent use of criminal libel and sedition charges encouraged self-censorship. Imposition of heavy fines financially crippled some members of the private press. Forty-six newspapers circulated while the elected Government was in power. On May 14, Parliament passed the Media Practitioner Act, designed to drastically curtail the numbers of journalists and newspapers. The law required all journalists to have an academic degree in journalism and to register with the authorities every year; editors are required to have 10 years professional experience. About 80 percent of the country's journalists could not meet these criteria; if enforced, the law would prevent them from working as journalists.

Shortly after the coup, the AFRC harshly criticized the Media Practitioner Act and asserted that press freedom would be unrestricted. However, journalists, like other critics of the junta, quickly became targets for harassment and intimidation. Dozens of journalists fled the country in fear of the military junta. In September following publication of a story in the Standard Times that revealed discord among members of the AFRC Supreme Council, the junta announced that newspapers were required to obtain permission before publishing. At year's end, only about six newspapers remained, all operating at the discretion of the AFRC Minister of Information. Under the elected Government five radio stations operated in Freetown and one in the provincial city of Bo. After May 25, the only regularly operating broadcast media were government radio and television stations tightly controlled by the military junta and the clandestine station FM 98.1 operated by the elected Government in exile. The AFRC/RUF junta took severe measures attempting to close FM 98.1, including torturing people who might know its location and electronically jamming its broadcasts. Many of the journalists who remained in Sierra Leone after May 25 were harassed, detained, arrested, and beaten by the military junta for reporting perceived to be critical of the AFRC or the RUF.

Under the elected Government, Punch newspaper correspondent Pat Kawa was arrested on January 24 on defamation charges after reporting allegations of financial improprieties by government officials. The case was dismissed in court on March 3. Footprints magazine publisher Harry Evans was arrested on March 6 and held without charge for a week after publishing an article alleging that the Minister of Presidential Affairs had imported 50 automobiles without paying customs taxes. Footprints editor Mohammed Karim and staff writer Njai Kanthba also were arrested and held for 3 days on spurious charges of drug possession. Three journalists from Expo Times newspaper were arrested without charge on March 19 following publication of an article entitled "Abacha's Wild West Gangsterism," about the detention of RUF leader Foday Sankoh by the Nigerian government. They later were charged with spying and possession of a secret military document and were released on bail after 2 weeks.

On May 27, AFRC military personnel looted the Concord Times newspaper offices. Fearing for their safety, the newspaper's staff went into hiding. On June 4, two armed men searching for a Kabbah Government minister broke into the home of Standard Times newspaper managing editor Phillip Neville. When he denied sheltering the official, Neville was beaten. On June 9, Sky FM talk show host Ojukutu Macaulay went into hiding after a group of AFRC soldiers threatened to kill him for speaking against the military takeover. Following a June 11 story in For Di People newspaper about travel to Libya by an AFRC delegation, the junta warned journalists to seek clarification from AFRC headquarters before publishing sensitive security information. For Di People subsequently closed after receiving verbal threats from AFRC officials. In mid-June British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) stringer Sylvester Rogers went into hiding after learning that AFRC soldiers were trying to locate him. On October 2, AFRC Spokesman Allieu Kamara admitted that security personnel had taken Rogers into "safe restriction" after Rogers had attempted to leave the country without a police permit.

On July 8, The Point newspaper managing editor Budu Hayes was arrested at his home and detained at AFRC military headquarters until the following day. The soldiers who arrested Hayes alleged that he was harboring people fighting against the revolution. Also on July 8, The Democrat newspaper reporter Saloman Conteh and freelance correspondent Jeff Bowlay Williams were arrested at Democrat offices by 20 soldiers and interrogated at AFRC military headquarters. They then were transferred to Pademba Road prison and held 11 days without charge. The Democrat stopped publication when they were arrested. Business Vision reporter Martins I. Martins was arrested on July 19 and detained at AFRC military headquarters for 2 days on suspicion that he had communicated with President Kabbah. When he returned to his home, he discovered that it had been looted. On July 26, AFRC soldiers arrested Unity Now editors Dominick Lamine and Sahr Mbayoh and confiscated the newspaper's computers. AFRC officials claimed that the newspaper had subversive materials. The two editors were had incommunicado and released several days later. AFRC soldiers continued to search for the newspaper's editor-in-chief Frank Kposowa, who went into hiding to avoid arrest. On July 26, Kenema-based BBC stringer Suliman Momodu also went into hiding after learning that he was being sought by AFRC soldiers. On July 28, AFRC soldiers arrested New Tablet production manager Suliman Janger and seized 900 copies of the newspaper. Soldiers also arrested five newspaper vendors. New Tablet editor Gibril Foday Musa went into hiding to avoid arrest. On July 30, AFRC soldiers seized 1,500 copies of the Standard Times at the newspapers offices. The soldiers were searching for managing editor Philip Neville who had gone into hiding after receiving threatening phone calls for articles critical of the AFRC.

On August 18, AFRC soldiers arrested Voice of America correspondent Kelvin Lewis, Sky FM talk show host Ojukutu Macaulay, and their driver as they were on their way to cover a student demonstration against the junta. Soldiers beat them with machetes and gun butts and threatened to kill them. They were detained overnight in a metal shipping container at AFRC Cockerill military headquarters but released the next day. On September 1, BBC stringer Prince Brimah was ordered detained by AFRC Secretary of State for the Southern province, Major Augustine Kamara, who reportedly was displeased by his report about the execution of four persons at a CDF roadblock on the road between Bo and Makeni (see Section 1.g.). Kamara ordered Brimah taken to a police station where he was detained for 4 hours in a cell full of feces and then released. On the morning of

September 20, several people who had gathered at the Mende Central Mosque in Freetown were beaten by security forces seeking information about the FM 98.1 radio station.

In early October, Concord Times acting editor Foday Fofana and the acting secretary of the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) Fallah Ensa-Ndemah went into hiding after receiving information that they were to be arrested on subversion charges stemming from the SLAJ's denunciation of the AFRC junta and its control of the press. Freelance journalist Donald Davis was arrested on October 8 and detained in Pademba Road prison. Freelance journalist Abdul Salam Timbo was arrested on subversion charges on October 10 and is being held incommunicado. On October 10, a truckload of soldiers arrested Punch newspaper Editor David Tambaryoh at his residence. He was held for 3 days on subversion charges stemming from his alleged contact with legitimate Sierra Leone government officials. Armed men searching for Tambaryoh's personal property looted his sister-in-law's home and twice raped her and her daughter. After his release, Tambaryoh went into hiding. Umaru Fofana, a freelance correspondent for The Vision newspaper and the BBC was shot in the leg and physically abused on October 11 by junta forces who claimed that he was reporting for FM 98.1. He was released later that day. Democrat newspaper acting editor John Foray and freelance journalist Abdul Kpowsa were beaten by junta forces and detained without charge on October 11. AFRC soldiers arrested For Di People editor Paul Kamara on October 16 and took him to Pademba Road prison. The soldiers smashed and looted the office, and confiscated the newspaper's computers and Kamara's car. The soldiers gave no reason for Kamara's arrest.

On November 13, the AFRC temporarily suspended the Standard Times and detained several of its reporters after it printed a story suggesting that the AFRC/RUF junta was involved in a plot with Liberian President Charles Taylor to overthrow the Government of Guinea. The suspension was lifted a week later after the newspaper retracted the story. On November 21, the AFRC temporarily suspended The Democrat after it reported a burglary at the British High Commissioner's offices and home by seven uniformed men. It also subsequently retracted this story.

On November 22, police arrested Standard Times editor Ibrahim Karim Sei, The Democrat editor Pious Foray, and Concord Times acting editor Dorothy Awonoor-Gordon, and four other journalists. A police spokesman said that all three newspapers had carried "dubious articles" that threatened to undermine the security of the State. The seven journalists were detained for a week without charges. The Concord Times also had published an article disclosing the delivery of lubricating oil to the Freetown power plant, in violation of U.N. Security Council sanctions.

On December 16, journalist Vandi Kallon was detained and brutally beaten by AFRC officials who accused him of passing information to radio station FM 98.1 and ECOMOG. There was no information on his circumstances at year's end.

The elected Government respected academic freedom. All schools and universities were closed after May 25 as both teachers and students stayed away in protest against the AFRC's seizure of power.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The suspended Constitution provided for freedom of assembly; however, at times the elected Government limited this right. The elected Government permitted many street demonstrations.

In February, however, police and armed forces personnel killed two persons and injured 20 others in breaking up a riot by several hundred youths against the postal service. The police fired tear gas and started shooting after rioters hurled stones at them. One of the dead men was shot in the chest as he emerged from an Ash Wednesday mass at Sacred Heart Cathedral near the post office where the riot was taking place. President Kabbah criticized the police for using excessive force in dispersing the rioters.

On March 11, police fired tear gas to disperse hundreds of students at the Parade Grounds soccer field in Freetown. The National Union of Sierra Leone Students (NUSS) had called the meeting to plan protests against the Government's decision to give retirement benefits to former President Major-General Joseph Momoh. The police refused to issue a permit for the meeting, claiming that security could not be ensured, and suggesting that the students meet instead on college campuses.

On March 14, police attacked 2,000 students attempting to meet in an open park. Before NUSS Secretary-General Abdulai Bayraytay was to address the crowd, 50 riot policemen disrupted the meeting to arrest him and other student leaders. When students attempted to prevent the leaders' arrests, the police attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas and batons, injuring at least 15 persons. Several more students were detained by the police. A government statement said that police had been ordered "to take appropriate but reasonable action to prevent a student group meeting anywhere throughout Sierra Leone." It said that the students could hold meetings on any of the college campuses, but not elsewhere.

After May 25, the military junta restricted freedom of assembly and banned public demonstrations and meetings. At least one person was killed and another injured in Bo on May 27 when AFRC soldiers shot at a crowd of about 5,000 people demonstrating against the coup. The demonstration started when large quantities of looted goods were discovered in the army's possession. Nearly all the shops in Bo and an Action Contre La Faim warehouse were looted 2 days earlier when the junta released all the inmates at the Bo prison.

The military junta violently broke up a student march in Freetown on August 18. Using assault weapons and machetes, AFRC/RUF soldiers killed at least 11 students and maimed many others with machetes and bayonets. Soldiers shooting rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons set up roadblocks and searched the streets, making arrests wherever a group had gathered. AFRC/RUF forces chased students into Connaught hospital and assaulted patients as they searched for students. Students and citizens harboring students were severely beaten when found and detained in the Pademba Road prison.

Also on August 18, combined operation by AFRC and RUF troops and State Security Division police armed with automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-aircraft guns broke up a student demonstration in the Southern province capital of Bo. After

marching for a short distance, the students were confronted by the security forces, who dispersed them with tear gas.

The suspended Constitution provided for the right to form political, economic, social, and professional organizations, and the elected Government respected this provision in practice.

The AFRC junta restricted freedom of association and outlawed political parties and activities.

c. Freedom of Religion

The suspended Constitution provided for freedom of religion. The Kabbah Government respected this right in practice. Most religious institutions have continued to operate under the junta. However, due to security concerns, most foreign missionaries left the country. On August 17, AFRC security forces detained Secretary General of the Council of Churches in Sierra Leone (CCSL) Alimamy Kokomah at his church and ordered him to cancel an interreligious worship service scheduled for Freetown's national stadium. Security officers turned back people who attempted to reach the stadium that evening. The AFRC also denied a CCSL request that it be allowed to host some form of worship service at its headquarters, alleging the possibility of infiltration.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The military junta tightly controls travel within the country. Most politicians, government officials, and businessmen left the country immediately after the coup. Many prominent persons were given safe haven through international evacuation efforts following the coup. Numerous checkpoints manned by AFRC/RUF soldiers make travel difficult. The junta refused to allow several prominent businessman, government officials, and journalists to leave the country. The junta severely restricts internal travel and emigration.

Approximately 1.4 million of Sierra Leone's 4.5 million citizens are displaced within the country. An estimated 238,000 Sierra Leoneans are refugees in Guinea and Liberia, including as many as 40,000 who fled to Guinea and 25,000 to Liberia following the coup. Several thousand more have sought refuge in The Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. Many middle class Sierra Leoneans fled to Europe, Great Britain, and the United States.

Prior to the coup, the Government cooperated with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. Several hundred thousand refugees and displaced persons returned to their homes in the months following the November 1996 signing of the Abidjan Accord. Many of these returnees were forced to flee their homes again after the May 25 coup. Sierra Leone had provided asylum to 17,000 Liberians; several thousand of these refugees fled following the coup, but 5,500 Liberian refugees remained in the Freetown area, awaiting safe passage to Liberia. After the evacuation of United Nations personnel in early June, they were assisted by the ICRC.

There is no formal process for granting political asylum.

Prior to the coup, there were no reports of forced return of persons to a country in which they feared persecution.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Citizens do not have the right to change their government. On May 25, a military junta seized power from the civilian government which was chosen in free and fair elections. The AFRC suspended the Constitution, banned political parties, and announced that all legislation would be made by military decree. The military junta routinely threatened, harassed, imprisoned, tortured, and killed citizens who sought to challenge the military's seizure of power. The junta has not negotiated in good faith with the Committee of Five (C-5) foreign ministers appointed by ECOWAS to bring about the return of the Kabbah Government and the restoration of constitutional order. Parliament has not functioned since the military takeover. Many civil servants refuse to report to work until constitutional order is restored.

There is 1 woman in the 34 member AFRC Supreme Council and 1 woman in the 20 member Cabinet.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Under the elected Government, several local human rights organizations operated including a local chapter of Amnesty International, the Civil Liberties Congress, Prison Watch, the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, and the Society for Advancement of Civil Rights. Most members of these groups fled to Conakry, Guinea, from where they report on violations of human rights in Sierra Leone. Those who have stayed in Sierra Leone have to restrict their activities severely for their own safety.

On August 17, soldiers seeking Civil Liberties Congress President Soulainman Banja Tejan-Sie arrested and beat three people closely associated with him. He was arrested the next day and taken to Cockerill military headquarters where he was tortured. He was then forced at gunpoint to appear on national television and to call upon students to cancel the "march for democracy" planned for that day. He was detained without charge at Pademba Road prison for 11 days and then placed under close surveillance until he fled the country in October. The junta allowed ICRC and Prison Watch to visit the Pademba Road prison at least through October.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status

The suspended Constitution prohibited discrimination against women and provided for protection on the basis of race and ethnicity, except for the prohibition against citizenship for persons with a non-African father. This provision effectively blocks citizenship and political participation of those of Lebanese descent, and other persons with non-African

fathers.

Women

Violence against women, especially wife beating, is common. Police are unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in cases of severe injury or death. Sierra Leone does not recognize domestic violence against women as a societal problem, and neither the elected Government nor the AFRC junta gave it high-level attention. Rape is a recognized societal problem and is punishable by up to 14 years' imprisonment. The elected Government enforced this law; however, the AFRC and the RUF use rape for both control and punishment.

The suspended Constitution provided for equal rights for women, but in practice women face both legal and societal discrimination. Their rights and status under traditional law vary significantly, depending upon the ethnic group to which they belong. The Temne and Limba tribes of the north afford greater rights to women to inherit property than does the Mende tribe, which gives preference to male heirs and unmarried daughters. However, in the Temne tribe, women cannot become paramount chiefs. In the south, the Mende tribe has a number of female paramount chiefs.

Women do not have equal access to education, economic opportunities, health facilities, or social freedoms. In rural areas, women perform much of the subsistence farming, all of the child rearing, and have little opportunity for education. The average educational level for women is markedly below that of men; only 6 percent are literate. At the university level, men predominate. Due to the military takeover, efforts by local NGO's to educate women on their civil rights and civic responsibilities have been suspended.

Children

Infant and child mortality is very high. In 1995 one child in four died before the age of 5 and one-third of children under the age of 5 were underweight.

As many as a few thousand RUF fighters are child soldiers who are as young as 8 years of age. They often are smaller physically than the rifles they carry. Abducted by the RUF from their villages, brutalized, and used to transport supplies, the children eventually become fighters. The armed forces also took boys off the streets of Freetown to expand its forces. The armed forces provided little or no training to the boys. This undisciplined and unsupervised group committed many atrocities. After the coup, parents began to ask the traditional hunter societies to initiate their young male children to protect them from abduction and forcible recruitment by the RUF. Human rights groups believe that a large number of the children abducted into the various armed forces, or otherwise traumatized by the war as civilians, experience serious psychological problems.

In late February, RSLMF soldiers and Kamajohs cooperating in a government operation rescued several hundred war orphans, most from 9 to 15 years of age, living in the forests in Kailahun and Kenema districts. Most of the children fled to the forests after RUF rebels attacked and destroyed their villages 4 years earlier.

Occasional instances of ritual murders of boys and girls, as well as adults, associated with

illegal secret societies, have been reported in the past. There were no reported cases during the year. Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, is widely practiced on young women and girls, especially in traditional ethnic groups and among the less-educated. While UNICEF estimates the percentage of females who have undergone this procedure may be as high as 90 percent, local groups believe this figure is overstated.

In January the women's Bondo society initiated approximately 600 young women in the Grafton displaced persons camp near Freetown in a ceremony that included FGM. About 100 girls required medical treatment for complications including bleeding and serious infections caused by the multiple use of unclean knives or glass used in the procedure. An active press campaign by secret societies countered the well-publicized international effort against FGM. The 28-year-old woman abducted in 1996 by a secret society and subjected to FGM eventually found a lawyer to take her case, but now there are no functioning courts. On July 2, AFRC Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma told the executive council of the Bondo Society that he supports FGM and other traditional practices and that after the coup they could now perform these rites without hindrance.

People with Disabilities

Questions of public facility access and discrimination against the disabled have not become public policy issues. No laws mandate accessibility to buildings or provide for other assistance for the disabled. While there does not appear to be outright discrimination against the disabled in housing or education, with the high rate of unemployment, few disabled persons work in offices or factories.

Many citizens suffered debilitating injuries during the war. Many had limbs cut off by RUF fighters. A few NGO's have provided prostheses, but the vast majority of victims remain without assistance of any kind.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Ethnic loyalty remains an important factor in government, the military, and business. Complaints of corruption within ethnic groups and ethnic discrimination in government appointments, contracts, military commissions, and promotions are common. Residents of non-African descent face institutionalized political restrictions. The Constitution restricts citizenship to persons of patrilineal Negro-African descent. This constitutional restriction effectively denies citizenship to many long-time residents, notably the Lebanese community. The Lebanese community was targeted for looting by military and RUF forces during the AFRC takeover. Nigerian citizens were also targeted by the junta for harassment, arrest, and detention because of the dominant role played by Nigerian troops in the ECOMOG forces enforcing the U.N. and ECOWAS sanctions. RUF members killed two Nigerian citizens on September 9 in apparent retaliation for ECOMOG attacks against ships violating the ECOWAS embargo. In early September, at least 20 Nigerian citizens were accused of spying for ECOMOG, arrested, and held at Cockerill military headquarters. Another six Nigerians were arrested in mid-September as they traveled from Freetown to the interior of the country. The reason for their arrest is unknown.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

Under the elected Government, the now suspended Constitution provided for the right of association. All workers, including civil servants, had the right to join trade unions of their choice. Unions were independent of the government. All labor unions had by custom joined the Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLLC), but membership was voluntary. There was no legal prohibition against SLLC leadership holding political office, and leaders have held both elected and appointed government positions.

The Trade Union Act provides that any five persons may form a trade union by applying to the Registrar of Trade Unions, who has statutory powers under the act to approve the creation of trade unions. The Registrar may reject applications for several reasons, including an insufficient number of members, proposed representation in an industry already serviced by an existing union, or incomplete documentation. If the Registrar rejects an application, his decision may be appealed in the ordinary courts, but applicants seldom take such action. Approximately 60 percent of workers in urban areas, including government employees, are unionized, but unions have had little success in organizing workers in the agricultural and mining sectors.

Under the elected Government, unions had the right to strike without exception, but the Government could require 21 days' notice. Although union members may be fired for participating in even a lawful strike, no such incidents were reported. Unions were free to form federations and confederations and to affiliate internationally. The SLLC is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the elected Government placed no restrictions on international travel or contacts of trade unionists.

Following the coup most businesses shut down and school teachers and many other public servants refused to return to work until the elected Government was restored. Leaders of the SLLC defied a junta demand that SLLC order all its members back to work. At year's end, most businesses and government offices and all schools remained closed as employees continued to refuse to return to work, despite warnings by the AFRC that those who did not return to work would be fired.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The legal framework for collective bargaining is the Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act. Collective bargaining must take place in trade group negotiating councils, each of which has an equal number of employer and worker representatives. Most enterprises are covered by collective bargaining agreements on wages and working conditions. The SLLC provides assistance to unions in preparation for negotiations. In case of a deadlock, the Government may intervene. It has not, however, used decrees to prevent strikes.

No law prohibits retribution against strikers. Should an employee be fired for union activities, the individual may file a complaint with a labor tribunal and seek reinstatement. Complaints of discrimination against unions are made to an arbitration tribunal. Individual trade unions investigate alleged violations of work conditions to try to ensure that employers take the necessary steps to correct abuses.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The suspended Constitution prohibited forced and bonded labor, including that by children. However, under the Chiefdom's Council Act, compulsory labor may be imposed by individual chiefs, requiring members of their villages to contribute to the improvement of common areas. This practice exists only in rural areas. There is no penalty for noncompliance.

The elected Government did not require compulsory labor. However, an old decree requires that homeowners, businessmen, and vendors clean and maintain their premises. Failure to comply is punishable by fine or imprisonment. The last Saturday of each month is declared a National Cleaning Day. There have been reports of security forces publicly humiliating citizens to ensure compliance.

The AFRC forcibly impressed teenage boys into military service. The RUF frequently abducted villagers, including children, during its attacks and forced the abductees into involuntary servitude as laborers for the RUF. Many of the children eventually became fighters for the RUF. This continued even after the RUF joined the AFRC junta.

d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment

The minimum age for employment is officially 18 years, but in practice there is no enforcement because there is no government entity specifically charged with this task. Children routinely assist in family businesses, especially those of vendors and petty traders. In rural areas, children work seasonally on family subsistence farms.

Because the adult unemployment rate is high (an estimated 70 percent in some areas), few children are involved in the industrial sector. There have been reports that young children have been hired by foreign employers to work as domestics overseas at extremely low wages and in poor conditions. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is responsible for reviewing overseas work applications to see that no one under the age of 14 is employed for this purpose and to enforce certain wage standards.

The suspended Constitution prohibited forced and bonded labor, including that by children; however, there was some compulsory labor in rural areas (see Section 6.c.). The AFRC forcibly impressed teenage boys into military service.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is no minimum wage. Purchasing power declined drastically as incomes dropped and inflation rose to 40 percent. Most workers have to pool incomes with their extended families and engage in subsistence food production to maintain a minimum standard of living. The Government's suggested standard workweek is 38 hours, but most workweeks for the few people who have jobs exceed 38 hours. The Government sets health and safety standards, but the standards are outmoded and often not enforced. The Health and Safety Division of the Department of Labor has inspection and enforcement responsibility, but

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the lack of funding and transportation limit its effectiveness.

Health and safety regulations are included in collective bargaining agreements, but there is no evidence of systematic enforcement of those health and safety standards. Trade unions provide the only protection for workers who file complaints about working conditions. Initially, a union makes a formal complaint about a hazardous work condition. If this is rejected, the union may issue a 21-day strike notice. If workers remove themselves from dangerous work situations without making a formal complaint, they risk being fired.

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
91) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Amnesty International 1998 Annual Report on Sierra Leone (the Republic of), p.1.

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AI REPORT 1998:
SIERRA LEONE

(This report covers the period January-December 1997)

Hundreds of suspected opponents of a military coup were arbitrarily detained. They included supporters of the ousted government, journalists, students and human rights activists. Most, if not all, were prisoners of conscience. Many were tortured or ill-treated. Dozens of extrajudicial executions of political opponents were reported. Thirty-five people sentenced to death by military courts were executed. Armed opposition groups were responsible for deliberate and arbitrary killings and torture.

On 25 May President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's government, in power since elections in 1996, was overthrown in a military coup. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) which took power was subsequently joined by the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (RUF) which had fought government forces for five years until a peace agreement in November 1996. The AFRC cited the failure to implement this agreement as one of the reasons for seizing power. The Constitution was suspended, political parties banned and demonstrations prohibited. The AFRC assumed extensive powers of detention, without safeguards against arbitrary arrest or indefinite detention without charge or trial.

The AFRC was headed by Lieutenant- Colonel (formerly Major) Johnny Paul Koroma who, with hundreds of other prisoners, was freed from the Central Prison, Pademba Road, in Freetown, on the day of the coup. He had been among nine soldiers charged in December 1996 with conspiring to overthrow the government, but not yet tried (see *Amnesty International Report 1997*).

Almost all sectors of society opposed the coup which was also strongly condemned by the international community _ including the UN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth and the European Union. West African (predominantly Nigerian) troops present in Sierra Leone clashed repeatedly with AFRC and

RUF forces. There was also fighting between a civilian militia of *kamajors* (traditional hunters) loyal to President Tejan Kabbah and AFRC and RUF forces. Nigerian forces used shelling to enforce an embargo on oil and arms imposed by the international community. Fighting and shelling resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties.

In October representatives of the AFRC and five other West African countries agreed on President Tejan Kabbah's return to power by April 1998. However, implementation of this agreement, which included cessation of hostilities, disarmament and demobilization, encountered serious set-backs. Fighting between soldiers and *kamajors* intensified in December and disarmament had not begun by the end of the year.

The reintegration within Sierra Leone agreed in November 1996 of hundreds of thousands of returning refugees and internally displaced people _ nearly half the population _ was thwarted by violence and insecurity following the coup. Thousands of civilians throughout the country were again forced to flee their homes. Many fled to other West African countries, where some encountered rejection at the frontier (see **Gambia** and **Liberia** entries), while others became internally displaced. Following the coup, many people associated with the ousted government or suspected of opposing the AFRC were arbitrarily detained. An accurate assessment of their number was impossible but it appeared to be several hundred.

Immediately after the coup, several members of the ousted government and senior military officers were detained briefly at Cockerill military headquarters in Freetown. In June at least 15 senior military officers and civilians, including Dr Sama Banya, a prominent political figure, and Abu Aiah Koroma, former Minister for Parliamentary and Political Affairs, were arrested and accused of conspiring to overthrow the AFRC. Most were released in the following weeks, but Dr Sama Banya and five others remained in detention until late July and under house arrest until October.

A radio station began broadcasting in July, transmitting messages supporting the ousted government. Many people suspected of either knowing the location of the transmitter or of passing information to the radio station were arrested.

In October Mohamed B. Sesay, a former government minister, was among several people arrested and accused of subversive activities. He was held at police Criminal Investigation Department (CID) headquarters in Freetown before being released uncharged.

Those speaking out against human rights violations were arbitrarily detained. Some fled Sierra Leone and threats against those who remained severely restricted their activities. The president of a human rights organization, the Civil Liberties Congress, Sulaiman Banja Tejan-Sie, was arrested in August and forced at gunpoint to appear on television to call on students not to proceed with planned demonstrations. He was severely beaten, had his arms tied tightly and was locked in the boot of a car for several hours. He was again beaten at Cockerill military headquarters before being transferred to Pademba Road prison where he was denied food and washing facilities for several days. He was released without charge after 11

days.

In October soldiers and RUF members attempted to arrest the Secretary General of the Sierra Leonean Section of Amnesty International. Isaac Lappia, apparently suspected of opposing the AFRC and passing information outside Sierra Leone, escaped arrest; however, family members and others at his house were beaten and briefly detained.

Many students were vocal in their opposition to the AFRC. More than 120 people, mostly students, were arrested in August after attempting to stage a march for democracy. Most of those arrested were released after 12 days; others, however, were believed to have been held until October. Some students, including Juliet Jones, remained missing; it was unclear whether they had been arrested or had gone into hiding.

The AFRC's stated commitment to press freedom on coming to power was short-lived. In July the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists condemned unprecedented harassment and intimidation of journalists. That month four members of staff of *The Democrat* newspaper, and three others at its premises, were arrested by soldiers searching for the clandestine radio transmitter. Although four were released a few days later, Jeff Bowley Williams, Salomon Conteh and Fatmata Kamara were held for 12 days. Two journalists on their way to cover the students' demonstration in August were arrested with their driver and taken to Cockerill military headquarters. Kelvin Lewis, a correspondent for *Radio France Internationale* and *Voice of America*, and Winston Ojukutu Macaulay, a *British Broadcasting Corporation* (BBC) correspondent previously arrested in June, sustained serious injuries from beatings by soldiers who also threatened to kill them. Both journalists and their driver were released the following day. During October and November the crack-down on the press intensified; at least 20 journalists, including Jon Z. Foray, editor of *New Storm*, and Jonathan Leigh, editor of the *Independent Observer*, were detained without charge for up to two weeks.

Before the coup, in March, three journalists of the *Expo Times* newspaper were arrested on charges of spying, following an article criticizing the detention of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in Nigeria (see below). Released on bail, their trial was scheduled for May but the coup intervened and in July the charges against them were effectively dropped.

At least 15 people, both soldiers and civilians, were arrested in November, accused of conspiring to overthrow the AFRC and abort the return to civilian rule agreed the previous month. They included Stephen Bio, a businessman and close relation of the former Head of State who ceded power to President Tejan Kabbah, and Gibril Massaquoi, a prominent RUF member. None had been tried by the end of the year.

Following the coup, torture and ill-treatment by both soldiers and RUF members were widespread. In June Ansu Bockarie, a student leader, was reportedly beaten and cut with a razor blade by a prominent AFRC member. Students arrested in August were beaten, cut with machetes or stabbed with bayonets. Some women

students were reported to have been sexually assaulted while held at the residences of AFRC members.

Many journalists detained during the year were tortured or ill-treated. In October Umaru Fofanah, a freelance journalist suspected of providing information to the clandestine radio station, was reportedly tortured and shot in the leg by soldiers.

Some of those arrested in Freetown were held in conditions amounting to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. For example, Sam Goba, arrested in September because of his close association with President Tejan Kabbah, was held with others in a freight container at Cockerill military headquarters for several months. His health seriously deteriorated as a result and his fate was unclear at the end of the year.

There were also reports of torture and ill-treatment by soldiers and RUF members in areas of the country affected by fighting with *kamajors*, in particular around Kenema in the east and Zimmi in the south. Villagers accused of supporting the *kamajors* were beaten and had their arms tied tightly behind their backs, causing serious injuries; women and girls were raped and forced into sexual slavery.

Many civilians died in the violence following the coup, some of whom were deliberately killed for political reasons by soldiers and RUF members. Soldiers searching for *kamajors* in Southern Province in June were reported to have killed about 25 people in the villages of Telu Bongor and Sembehun, as well as Albert Sandy Demby, father of the ousted Vice-President and a traditional leader, who was shot dead at his home in Gerihun. Also in June more than 10 people, including women and children, were reported to have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed when armed men, believed to be RUF members, attacked the town of Moyamba; a student, Sheku Kabbah, was reported to have had his eyes gouged out, ears cut off and throat slit. Many civilians were deliberately killed during fighting around Zimmi, Southern Province, in June. In December about 100 villagers were reportedly shot dead by soldiers posing as *kamajors* in the east of the country.

At least six students were shot dead in August by security forces. They included Morie Momoh, shot when soldiers entered his hostel room. In late August, six men suspected of involvement with the clandestine radio station were reportedly shot dead at Cockerill military headquarters.

Following the coup, several people were summarily executed by soldiers in Freetown following repeated AFRC warnings that suspected looters would be shot on sight.

In October, November and early December, 35 people, mostly soldiers but including some civilians, were executed by firing-squad following conviction for murder and other offences by military courts. Reports suggested, however, that in some cases no trial had taken place. In late November the AFRC passed retroactive legislation providing for the death penalty for looting or commandeering vehicles.

Despite the November 1996 agreement providing for immediate cessation of hostilities, unarmed civilians continued to be tortured and killed by RUF forces in the months before the coup, particularly in Tonkolili District, Northern Province. In January dozens of civilians were reported to have been killed and young girls raped in RUF attacks on several villages. According to reports, when soldiers moved into forest areas in Kailahun District, an RUF stronghold in Eastern Province, in February, they found more than 100 young children separated from their families, including three girls whose hands had been deliberately cut off and another child with an ear cut off. Similar atrocities by the RUF were reported during attacks on villages, including Kalangba and Pendembu, north of Makeni, in May before the coup; dozens of civilians were killed and others mutilated by having their arms or feet cut off.

In late March RUF members abducted at least five of their own members, a Sierra Leonean diplomat and members of the Guinean security forces in Kailahun District shortly after an announcement by prominent RUF members that Foday Sankoh had been removed as leader because he had obstructed the peace process. Foday Sankoh had been detained on arrival in Lagos, Nigeria, in early March, apparently for possession of arms and ammunition; he remained under house arrest in Nigeria at the end of the year. Two of those abducted, Fayia Musa and Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh, were RUF representatives on the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace established by the peace agreement. Although the diplomat was freed shortly after the coup, five RUF members remained held at the end of the year.

There were also reports that *kamajors* fighting AFRC and RUF forces deliberately killed, tortured and ill-treated civilians. In September four people, including a woman, who were suspected of being soldiers or AFRC supporters, were reportedly summarily executed by being beheaded when the vehicle in which they were travelling from Bo to Makeni was stopped by *kamajors*.

In February Amnesty International received a response from the Minister of Justice to its request for clarification of the death in custody of a soldier among those arrested with Major Johnny Paul Koroma (see *Amnesty International Report 1997*). The reply included a post-mortem report, rejected allegations of ill-treatment during interrogation and stated that he had died after attempting to escape by jumping from a window. In March Amnesty International called for the humane treatment and release of RUF members held hostage. Following the coup Amnesty International repeatedly called for an end to arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment, and extrajudicial executions, and in October published a report documenting these violations, *Sierra Leone: A disastrous set-back for human rights*. It called on the international community to give priority to the protection of human rights in efforts to resolve the political crisis in Sierra Leone. Amnesty International strongly condemned executions in October, November and December, called for the repeal of retroactive legislation extending the scope of the death penalty and urged that no further executions take place.

Annual Report UPDATE:

From January to June 1998

The arbitrary detention, torture and killing which characterized the period of rule by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), joined by the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (RUF), after it came to power in May 1997 continued unabated into 1998.

Several prominent members of the community in Kenema, in Eastern Province -- including the chairman of the town council, B.S. Massaquoi -- accused of supporting a civil defence force loyal to ousted President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah were arrested in January and tortured; B.S. Massaquoi was killed by members of the RUF on 8 February.

Later that week the AFRC and RUF were removed from power by the West African force, known as ECOMOG, deployed in Sierra Leone. As the AFRC and RUF retreated from Freetown they killed, raped and mutilated hundreds of civilians. Horrific abuses were carried out in the east and the north of the country.

In Yifin, in Northern Province, at least two hundred unarmed civilians were killed when the village was attacked in late April. The number of those killed continues to rise as violence has spread throughout Northern Province.

Several hundred victims -- school children, housewives, farmers, traders -- are being treated in hospitals in Freetown, Makeni and Magburaka for crude amputations or attempted amputations, bullet and machete wounds. Many have had their arms, feet or ears cut off. Victims have reported women and children being rounded up, locked into a house which was then set alight. Women have been raped and suffered other forms of sexual assault. Men who refused to rape members of their own family were reported to have had their arms hacked off.

It has taken some of the victims days, if not weeks, to reach medical assistance. Many others -- possibly hundreds -- have fled into the bush. Some 250,000 Sierra Leonean refugees have arrived in neighbouring Guinea and Liberia since April 1998 -- many with amputated limbs, severe lacerations and suffering from disease, starvation and exhaustion after weeks in the bush.

An Amnesty International delegation which visited Sierra Leone in May met victims of these atrocities.

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92) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

International Rescue Committee, "Situation Report on Human Rights Violations in and around Makeni town, in the Bombali District, Northern Province, Sierra Leone, West Africa," (December 1998 – July 1999)

IRC

3971

SITUATION REPORT

ON

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

IN AND AROUND MAKENI TOWN,

IN THE BOMBALI DISTRICT,

NORTHERN PROVINCE,

SIERRA LEONE,

WEST AFRICA.

IRC

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is intended to provide an insight into the variety and severity of inhuman treatment suffered by individuals and groups in the target area (Makeni Town and its environs) during its occupation by joint forces of the renegade faction of the Sierra Leone Army that named itself as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (A.F.R.C.) after ousting the legitimate Government in a coup on Wednesday May 25th, 1997; the Revolutionary United Front (R.U.F.) rebel group, the Liberian Mercenary Force, the Special Task Force (S.T.F.) in collaboration with mercenaries from Burkina Faso (West Africa) and Ukraine(Asia)

Of greater concern is the high level of children and women's right violations. The most appalling but common spectacle was the long line of "Povuls" (RUF coinage for civilian/slaves) plodding with heavy loads on their heads from as far as fifty miles away without food, only to return to be recaptured enroute to recommence the vicious circle - an ordeal some unlucky captives repeated several times without mercy. This forced many women and children to associate with the armed groups.

This report is essentially a result of clandestine site visits, subtle interview with victims and none victims on one hand; and members of the rebel forces on the other, together with personal experiences. The Executive Director on an official visit to Makeni in December, 1998 was arrested and detained (on a tip-off that he was a Journalist and a Government spy) for one month during which period he was also tortured; and he witnessed the torturing and killing of other detainees. The Programme Officer was assaulted on two occasions while other Kwayor Personnel suffered various rights violations.

The work was chiefly constrained by the dreadful and risky conditions under which it was done; though logistical and economic problems also left their marks.

The sample cases (as the title implies) are by no means exhaustive; the magnitude and scope of this human tragedy will ever remain a fertile field of research for human rights defenders.

~~This report covers the period December, 1998 to July, 1999.~~ The investigating team was forced out of the area by unbearable economic constraints, complete dearth of basic logistical needs and incessant threats to the lives of members.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background Information

Makeni is the headquarter town of the Northern Province of Sierra Leone, West Africa.

It is a cosmopolitan area with an estimated population of Forty Thousand people. A greater proportion of persons residing in the town are indigenous Sierra Leoneans, essentially belonging to the Northern tribes: Lokos, Limbas, Temnes, Fullahs, Madingos etc; although other Sierra Leonean citizens and foreigners also live there.

Security in Makeni began eroding by the second week of December, 1998, when reports about the fall of Kono District in the East was received.

As a result residents, especially those who had previously tasted the bitterness of rebel atrocities lost no time to flee. But Makeni actually crumbled on the morning of Wednesday December 23rd, 1998, when Bishop Bighouzzi left the town. The Catholic Bishop's presence around had always been a source of confidence since the Sierra Leone rebel crisis commenced in 1991. Thus his singular departure signaled the inevitable fall of the town; especially when rumours were rife that some members of the invading forces were already in hiding in the homes of local collaborators. Consequently by the time the actual event occurred, Makeni was virtually empty.

From then and for almost two weeks, the incessant thundering of bombardments and pattering of artillery fire became the lone voice of the desolate town and its environs.

By the second week of January, 1999, some of the invaders were stepping beyond Makeni to outskirts communities to loot and harass. Following this the armed adventurers added to their activities the propagation of false propaganda to convince hiding civilians that the town was safe for their return home.

Some civilians in hiding who yielded to this on the first instance later became agents to assure others still in fear that no danger awaited in the town.

But the latter returnees were to discover to their dismay that they had been merely illuded into a snare. All roads leading to and out of the town were mounted with check-points manned by officials who hardly let any one out.

1.2 Terms of Reference

The Northern Regional Office was mandated by the Programme Coordinating Secretariat (Head Office) to investigate and record cases of Human Rights abuses in and around Makeni during the occupation of the area by AFRC/RUF Forces.

The main goal of the report is to provide an insight into the level of crime committed and or perpetrated against humanity during the period under review and in the target area. The duties of the Northern Regional Office in this regard were as follows:

- Visit all sites of violations (if possible)
- Interview victims of specific violations
- Interview alleged offenders
- Interview alleged perpetrators
- Discuss and or cross-check findings with other individuals and or groups with similar interest.
- Record all cases verified.

1.3. Methodology

In pursuance of its stipulated terms of reference a number of steps were taken to achieve the prescribed goal.

Sites of alleged violations were visited and victims and non-victims interviewed. Also AFRC/RUF personnel were interviewed on specific allegations. It must be however noted that such interviews were not formal. The issues involved were introduced in conversations and casual discussions. Other civilians were also encouraged to inform team members about violations for further verification.

Cases cross checked with groups and individuals sharing similar interest were recorded.

1.4. Constraints and Limitations

The major constraint of this report was the unwillingness of people with facts to reveal same for fear of reprisals. This explains why certain items in the sample cases (names, addresses, dates etc) remain unavailable.

In addition, the Northern Regional Office also faced serious handicaps. The office was not only vandalised but every item of office equipment and furniture was carted away.

Members of the investigating team like most civilians in the target area were left with only their bare skins as property. This economic and social deprivation seriously eroded the ability of the assigned personnel to maximally perform.

The team could not reach certain areas of alleged violations chiefly because of security - which also limited the scope of the report.

CHAPTER 2

VIOLATIONS

2.1 Extra-Judicial Killing

This was rampant from December, 1998 to February, 1999. The main victims were youths accused of rape, robbery and harassment. A considerable number of persons killed in this manner were members of the armed group, especially AFRC Soldiers although some Civilians and RUF Rebel victims suffered in like manner. In certain cases the innocence of the victims were proven after their deaths.

2.2 Torture

People accused of various crimes were tortured before investigations. Thus even after such investigations and they were proved innocent, most suspects would have received punishment in excess of the crimes allegedly committed. Some victims did not survive the ordeals.

2.3 Unlawful Arrest and Detention

The arrest and detention of civilians was carried out by every combatant unhindered. Civilian collaborators used personal vendetta to incite such arrests and detentions in some cases. These were very indiscriminate and occurred on a daily basis.

2.4 Abduction:

The abduction of youths, children and women especially within Makeni by the AFRC/RUF was a common sight during the first three months of occupation.

For instance, on Thursday, 21st January 1999 Two Thousand abducted youths were assembled at the former I.D.A. Compound at Agriculture road for final briefing by one Colonel Augustine Gbow before conveyance to various training camps.

Also on the 9th March, 1999 more than three thousand abducted youths rounded up the previous day by one colonel Mende Rambo and his team were also assembled at the premises of the Seventh Day Adventist Mission Primary School for dispatch to training camps.

Also girls and boys were raided from their houses to carry out domestic work for combatants. This plague became the source of agony for both parents and children in the township.

Although abductions were no longer common after the said period random cases outside Makeni continued to be reported and verified.

2.5 Sexual Abuse:

This human rights violation claimed victims from both males and females. A group of sex-starved female RUF combatants at No. 1, Watson Lane constantly raided young men and were forced to go to bed with them; although the victims were sometimes rewarded with financial and other offers.

Their male counterparts on the other hand used brute force to sexually abuse the victims.

There is an infamous case of an RUF combatant who, meeting with a young woman on the way, arrested her and forced the victim to bed in a house belonging to none of the two parties. While he went away, the victim collapsed in tears over her wounded pride before the watching eyes of the stupefied public.

There are also cases of child combatants with two or more wives; all abducted.

2.6 Forced Labour

This violation was as indiscriminate as it was frequent. Combatants seized anybody at any time not only to do domestic work at home, but the able bodied were frequently forced to accompany armed looting teams to steal and serve as human portage for items forcefully seized from their owners. Civilians used for this purpose did not only go without pay, but were equally punished in some cases.

For instance One Hundred and fifty (150) youths from various villages in the Biriwa Chiefdom were rounded up and forced to destroy the Magbonso bridge on the Kamabai-Kabala highway.

Most often, these marauding groups met with resistance, resulting in deaths; including of those forced to join the gangs.

2.7 Conscription:

The Epicurean life-style of combatants, particularly the senior Officers easily revealed their cowardly nature. Youths were therefore constantly rounded up for conscription, especially at the threat of battle at the warfront. It therefore goes without saying that these conscripts were used as human shields.

Equally, the excessive abuse of drugs by youngsters at the time and the economic deprivations suffered by many homes enticed especially girls and young men to the rebel force

2.8 Extortion:

This violation was committed through the arrest and detention of under-age children in the first instance. A fee of Five Thousand Leones(Le5,000/-) was the standard charge per head for freedom. Also people were forced to provide fees for unhindered

movement. Although travelling passes were officially supposed to be free, certain issuing military authorities asked for money.

Moreover, military personnel at checkpoints asked especially frightened villagers for money even if they had official passes.

In addition, the AFRC/RUF High command also requested per household contributions for such expenditure items as welcome reception for Corporal Foday Sankoh, UNOMSIL, Sacrificial items for peace and registration for relief food. These amounts ranged from Five Hundred Leone (Le500/-) per household to One cow per Chiefdom.

Finally, village communities were forced to provide the feeding and other domestic needs of military personnel posted to their areas.

2.9 Dispossession:

As far as properties were concerned, every item belong to members of the forces. Thus it was not uncommon for armed men to enter a house (even in the day time) and cart away whatever they wanted. In some cases the owners were forced to carry the loads.

Even properties buried in the ground were no exception. For instance (on a tip-off) a gang opened a grave for hidden items at the SUPER KAYS Night Club Compound, at 2, field road, the disappointed group went away, leaving the corpse uncovered.

In principle and according to the joint forces "a rebel lives on the terrain" - meaning that everything belongs to them.

In addition items such as rice, nut oil, money, drugs were declared as "Government Property", possessions of which by civilians was a crime. People in the outskirts of Makeni suffered from this most.

2.10 Assault and Insult:

The incidence of assault and insult ranked amongst the most frequent violations. And if anything, it was this that reduced residents of the target area to slaves in their own places.

People forced to carry loads were insulted and assaulted if they did not walk at the desired pace of their armed masters.

Sometimes innocent people were subjected to this indignity out of mere instinct. For instance one Captain Joseph Pandawa walked into the bedroom of Miss Maseray Sesay at No. 4 Agriculture road and hit her with a stick, after hauling insults at her person and parents.

The use of obscene language in public was a common attribute of the average combatant.

2.11 Violence-Related Injury:

This came about as a result of several circumstances. Detainees were often wounded in the process of torture. Also drugged/drunken combatant wounded civilians who resisted their violent advances.

In the villages people who could not show the hiding places of food stuff were wounded as one means of forcing them to comply. Several rape victims were also wounded to subdue same. Cases of wounding which characterised the advent of the rebel forces showed a gradual decline with time.

2.12 Forceful Eviction:

The forceful eviction of people from their homes chiefly affected the more socially and economical superior members of the Makeni community. The combatants mainly targeted the best house in town. Thus Lebanese, Missionaries and other Foreigners became the bulk of the victims

However, people in the lower social stratum were also affected.

2.13 Freedom Of Movement:

Because of the many checkpoints that beset the town and its environs many people chose to stay at home to avoid any trouble with the men manning those checkpoints. During the early period of occupation most people went indoors by 6 p.m. and never came out before 7 a.m.

As food and other human needs became scarce in town many combatants spread outside. Their cruelty forced village dwellers to abandon their homes, while some town residents never ventured out.

This problem became so acute that Reverend Usman J Forna of the Wesleyan Church of Sierra Leone and Secretary General of the Inter-Religious Council, Northern Region, had cause to bravely complain about "numerous checkpoints preventing worshippers going to churches and mosques".

The said checkpoint personnels often 'off-loaded' personal effects of passers-by, thus restricting the movement of petty traders; consequently making more acute the shortage of food and other essential commodities.

2.14 Freedom of Speech

In this case it was inconceivable for anyone to make utterance displeasing to the military establishment. People merely accused of making negative remarks were subjected to cruel treatments even before investigations.

There is the case of a Teacher, Mr. Andrew Kanu of the Saint Francis Secondary School who was arrested and harassed for opining that schools could not resume in the town because the necessary furniture and other materials were not only destroyed but also some were taken away by renegade soldiers and RUF combatants.

In Makeni and its environs therefore many people spoke and laughed against their wishes and consciences, especially at public meetings or at the sight of men at arms.

2.15 Freedom Of Assembly

All forms of meetings were banned when the combatants occupied Makeni. Even people converging to listen to radio news were harassed.

Although worship services were not officially prohibited the awkward daily experiences of the average man on the street prevented some followers from mixing with others who may be possible spies; especially when certain religious leaders chose to side with the junta and rebel groups.

The fears of such persons are not unfounded, considering the case of one Pa Yamba Forna of No. 77 Old Magburaka Road. He was arrested and detained for one month on the false accusation that he conducted secret meetings against the occupying forces. He was released later when his innocence was confirmed.

2.16 Harassment

This violation occurred in all its possible forms without any limitation. It neither discriminated nor observed any time limit. It descended on the Makeni community like endemic plague.

CHAPTER 3

CHILD AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

From the foregoing it is clear that children and women have been victims of every violation suffered by the target population in and around Makeni during the specified period.

However, this explanation is not enough for one to appreciate the extent to which the two vulnerable groups fell prey to this social quagmire.

The fundamental truth is that because of their inexperience and physical weakness children have often been easy prey; they have often been trapped where adults escaped.

It is also worthy to note that because of their age (and all other things being equal) they are bound to live longer and hence, unavoidably bear the prolonged disadvantages of whatever violations become their lot: loss of pride, self-esteem, impairment, lack of education/profession and general social degradation etc.

The future of women in this regard cannot be different. One thing that is clearly revealed is that the indignity to which females have been subjected is bound to print a permanent stain on their persons.

Used as sexual incentives and sex objects even the married ones were snatched from their legal husbands to serve as maids to combatants who, under normal circumstances would be condemned as inferior for matrimonial partnership.

In addition to being subdued to this status, assault and insults together with other forms of indignity become a permanent characteristic of their lives. Hardly did one pass by a house hosting a rebel family without witnessing incidents of fighting, hauling of insults etc.

Similarly underage girls were forced into premature marriage with no future. They are abandoned as soon as their so-called superior new 'catches' were won. Most bush wives of combatants were forced out upon arrival in Makeni town, in preference for their town-dwelling counterparts; only for the latter to also suffer same fate afterwards. The vicious circle remained unending with the attendant increasing number of disowned spouses left on the street to face economic strangulation and other ills.

This partly explains the upsurge of prostitution in Makeni with the advent of members of the AFRC and the RUF, and the proliferation of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs)

Thus it is plausible to assert that all articles and protocols guaranteeing the basic human rights of people (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Convention on The Right of the Child etc) and particularly those of women and children were violated in one form or the other.

Consequently the highlighted plights of the two groups points a brighter light on the image of the totality of violations suffered by the entire community.

This is so because the victimisation of children and women has always had an unavoidable direct and indirect impact on the rest of the community. Parents have often been trapped in the process of searching for lost children in addition to their perpetual anguish.

In the same manner husbands have often been spiritually battered on account of dear wives forcefully snatched away from them. Some have lost their lives in attempt to retrieve their spouses.

It is from this perspective that one can possibly appreciate the wider implications of the violations of the right of children and women. This in turn also indicates a new and more realistic vista through which can be determined the level of attention and amount of resources required to rehabilitate the victims and measures to be adopted to prevent a future reoccurrence.

It also succinctly tells how much needs to be done to save the women and children of Sierra Leone from the claws of violations tomorrow. This is very crucial, now that it has been proved that the violation of the rights of women and children has positive correlation on the violation of the rights of the rest of the community.

CHAPTER 4
SAMPLE CASES

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
1	Unidentified 29, Mess Road, Makeni	<u>EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLING</u> 23/12/98		Adult			The victim was shot dead by AFRC/RUF forces for being an ECOMOG collaborator. She was suspected of being in love with an ECOMOG Officer.
2	Ballah Janneh 42 Mabanta Road, Makeni	23/12/98	Rice Mill Operator	"	"		The victim was shot in the leg, leading to his death.
3	John Conteh Mayanka Lane Makeni	27/12/98	Diamond Miner	"	"		The victim was shot dead for refusing to surrender his car to AFRC/RUF combatants.
4	Unidentified C/O John Adams Campbell Street Makeni	3/1/99	Unemployed	Youth	"	"	The victim was shot dead for allegedly stealing Palmoil.
5	Anthony Tarawalie	4/1/99	"	"	"		The victim was beaten to death for enlisting in the Civil Defence Force.
6	Fullah Boy	12/1/99	"	"	"		The victim was shot dead for alleged harrassment.
7	Abdulai	12/1/99	"	"	"		Same as above.
8	Unidentified	12/1/99	"	"	"		Same as above.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
9	Three Youths	13/1/99	Not Available	Youth	"		The victims were tortured and later shot to death at the Military Police Office at Azzolini Highway.
10	Gibril Bangura Campbell Street Makeni	15/1/99	Unemployed	Youth	Male		The victim was shot dead for allegedly stealing.
11	Three Youths	16/1/99	"	"	"		The victims were shot dead for allegedly raping. People could not identify them for fear of reprisals. KWAYOR personnel saw the corpses.
12	Alias Obomi Turn-Table Old Magburaka Road Makeni	19/1/99	"	"	"		The victim was shot dead for allegedly stealing.
13	Unidentified	19/1/99	Tailor	"	"		The victim was shot dead by RUF Combatants because he failed to halt when the latter ordered him to do so. He could only be identified as a tailor.
14	Alusine	19/1/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		An alleged rape victim was reported to have pointed him as one of her abusers. His innocence was proved after he was shot dead at the Makeni Market Square.
15	Ahmed	19/1/99	"	"	"		Same as above.
16	Unidentified Magbonso Village	1/2/99	RUF Combatant	"	"		The victim was shot dead for allegedly raping one Yariba Conteh.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
17	Fatmata Makama Village	2/2/99	Unemployed	Youth		"	The victim was shot dead for rejecting the love proposal of an RUF combatant.
18	Brima Sesay Katombo Village Biriwa Chiefdom	2/2/99	Farmer	Adult	"		The victim was shot to death by combatants in vengeance for the death of a combatant who was earlier killed for attempting to seize properties from the villagers.
19	Tunkuh Mansaray Katombo Village Biriwa Chiefdom	2/2/99	"	Adult	"		Same as above (18)
20	Kendeka Mansaray Kalombo Village Biriwa Chiefdom	"	"	"	"		Same as above (18)
21	Mr Bona and 7 others	5/2/99	Civil Servant	"	"		The eight victims were arrested, detained and shot to death for various allegations ranging from fraud, harassment to rape. The cases were not properly investigated. Two of the eight were under forceful conscription.
22	John Sesay	5/2/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		The victim was arrested for forceful conscription. When he refused, he was beaten until two of his ribs fractured which led to his death on 5-2-99.
23	Mani Kabba 6 Lunsar Road Makeni	3/3/99	"	Child		"	The victim was shot dead by an RUF Colonel (Banya) who later pleaded with the bereaved family with the claim that it was an unintentional act.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
24	John C/o Yansama 19 Conteh Street Makeni	3/3/99	"	Adult	Male		The victim was shot dead by armed combatants when the deceased asked for the repayment of his debt.
25	Paul Turay Makama Road Makeni	17/4/99	"	"	"		The victim was shot dead by armed combatants because military wearings were found at his place of residence.
26	Saidu Conteh 8A Back of Ropolon Lane, Makeni	17/4/99	Watchman Makama Institute	"	"		The victim was killed by an armed man because the victim could not offer the sum of Fifteen Thousand Leones (Le15,000.00) which the latter requested.
27	Brima Kamara Alias Nico	25/5/99	Head of Civil Defence	"	"		The victim was shot by the AFRC/RUF highcommand for his role in the Civil Defence Force.
28	Sheriff Koroma 14 Yaide Street Makeni	31/5/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		The victim was accused of witchcraft, butchered to death, and pieces of his body displayed to the public at Yaide Street.
29	Sahr M. Sandi 6A Agriculture Raod Makeni	<u>TORTURE</u> 21/1/99	Development Worker and Journalist	Adult	"		The victim was arrested detained for one month and tortured on allegation of possessing a communication machine. He was released when the allegation proved false.
30	Ali Kargbo Masingbi	26/1/99	Unemployed	Child	"		Arrested, detained and tortured for serving as carrier to a combatant who forcefully abducted him.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
31	Mr Sidi Bangura 3A Mabanta Road Makeni Alias Nico	5/2/99	Development Worker (CARE)	Youth	"		The victim was arrested detained and tortured for allegedly possessing a communication set. He was released when proved innocent.
33	Sahr T. Gbeinda Sylvanus Street Makeni	6/2/99	Wireless Operator (CARE)	"	"		Same as above (30)
34	Alpha C/O P.C. Kassanga II Upper Banana Street Makeni	1/3/99	Driver	Adult	"		The victim was tied and assaulted to force him to point the location of a vehicle
35	John Fofanah Water Works Area Makeni	11/2/99	Employee of SIERRATEL Mmakeni	"	"		The victim was arrested detained and assaulted for possessing wireless communication machine which allegation was later proved false - leading to his release.
36	Sahr Yongai Makeni	17/4/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		The victim was tattooed with razor blade on his back with the inscriptions: "SLA/RUF" by rebel personnel
37	Joseph S. Tholley Makeni Teacher's College, Makeni	17/4/99	Lecturer Makeni Teachers College	Adult	"		Same as above (36)
38	Mrs Mmabinty Sankoh Tendatta Village	17/5/99	Housewife/ Farmer	"		"	The victim was tied and assaulted for planting rice which her assailants condemned as waste of food. She had to point the location of rice belonging to a neighbour in the same Tendatta Village to ensure the release of her mother.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
39	Pa Kassun Katombo Village	30/6/99	Farmer	"	"		The victim was arrested, and beaten on account of the Katombo incident in case No (18)
40	Mammy Piti Katombo Village	30/6/99	Housewife	"		"	Same as case No. 39
41	Mr Kanu Batmorie Magburaka	29/6/99	Head Teacher R.C.Primary Sch Magburaka	"	"		The victim was arrested, detained and tied and assaulted to force him to show the location of a wireless set.
42	Henry Magburaka	29/6/99	Catechist	Youth	"		Same as above (41).
43	Pa Yamba Forna 77, Old Magburaka Road, Makeni	<u>UNLAWFUL ARREST AND DETENSION</u> 21/1/99	Farmer	Adult	"		The victim was arrested, detained for allegedly holding clandestine SLPP meetings at home. He was later released because the allegation was false.
44	Christiana Forna (Nee Baby) 77 Old Magburaka Road	21/1/99	MCH Aid	"		"	The victim was arrested and detained for one month when she enquired about the arrest of her father Pa Yamba Forna above in case No (43)
45	Yei Hawa Sandi	22/1/99	Unemployed	Five months		"	This baby victim was detained with her mother. While in detention RUF Colonel Alpha vowed to force the mother to shoot her baby before he (Colonel Alpha) shoots the mother dead.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
46	Mrs. Mayonette Porter (Nee Aminata Clement) 28 Masuba Road Makeni	2/2/99	Housewife	Adult		Female	The victim was arrested, put in car boot and driven to the Makeni Police Prison she was detained for one month. She was accused of forging documents relating to a consignment of assorted chemical fertilizers. But the victim claimed that the issue had to do with her rejection of a love proposal from one RUF Colonel Titus Tarawallie.
47	Mr. Sam Sesay 3, Lower Mathanko Street, Makeni	5/2/99	Development Worker (ICRC)	Adult	Male		The victim was arrested, detained and tortured on allegation of possessing a wireless communication machine.
48	Abdulai Kuyateh 3A Lower Mathonka Street, Makeni	5/2/99	Journalist	Youth	"		The victim was arrested and detained for expressing his opinion that he did not believe that Mr. Sesay in (47) had the machine in question.
49	Moses Nabay 44, Old Mabantha Road, Makeni	6/2/99	Development Worker (CARE)	Adult	"		The victim was arrested and detained on allegation of possessing a wireless communication machine; which allegation was later proved false.
50	Mr. Timbo 44, Old Mabantha Road, Makeni	6/2/99	Development Worker (CARE)	Youth	"		The victim was arrested and detained for accompanying Mr. Nabay in (49) above to the Prison Yard.
51	Fonty Sesay 1, Hospital Road Makeni	7/2/99	Development Worker (C.R.S.)	Adult	Male		The victim was arrested and detained on allegation of possessing a wireless communication machine; an allegation which was later proved false.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
52	Komba A. Mondeh 11, Ropollon Raod Makeni	23/5/99	Teacher	Adult	"		The victim was arrested and assaulted and detained on allegation of being a Journalist.
53	Andrew Kanu Makeni	26/6/99	Teacher St. Francis Sec. School Makeni	"	"		The victim was arrested and harrassed for pointing out that schools in Makeni could not resume because the necessary teaching and learning materials had been looted by individuals, especially soldiers; an act interpreted by the AFRC/RUF High Command as anti-revolutionary.
54	89 Youths (unidentified),	<u>ABDUCTION</u> 7/2/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		The victims were abducted from their homes to be conscripted into the RUF by force. They spent their first two days in detention without food. A price of Le5,000.00 was put on the heads of those who expressed unwillingness to be trained.
55	Mr. Apha Kamara 34, Mabalha Road Makeni	<u>ARMED ROBBERY</u> 13/5/99	Businessman	Adult	"		Armed men broke into the victim's home at night, put him under gun point, tortured him and stole money and other belongings from him.
56	Saidu Koroma 145, Makeni Road Binkolo	<u>ASSAULT</u> 16/5/99	Student	Child	"		The victim was assaulted and wounded on the head when he asked why his grandmother planting materials were being taken away by armed men.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
57	Mr. Sahr M. Sandi 6, Agriculture Road	21/5/99	Journalist and Development Worker	Adult	Male		The victim was hit with the butt of gun by an armed man who alleged that the victim did not greet him.
58	Sahr Morsay 6, Teko Road	10/1/99	Teacher and Lay Preacher	Adult	"		The victim was slapped in the face by one RUF Combatant for attending divine church service.
59	Alimamy Sankoh (Alias Depor) 4 Frances Conteh Street, Makeni	10/5/99	Student	Youth	"		The victim was shot in the leg by one RUF Combatant for not obeying his order to stop playing chess.
60	Solomon H. Butcher Water Works Compound	24/5/99	Dispenser	Adult	"		The victim was dragged out of a public meeting, assaulted, arrested, wounded on the head and hands, and later detained for 24 hours, for being a member of the ousted Sierra Leone Peoples Party.
61	Maseray Sesay 4 Agriculture Road	25/5/99 Violence related injury	Unemployed	Youth		Female	The victim was assaulted in the face by a disloyal soldier, Captain Joseph Pandawa.
62	Rev. Usman J. Fornah Wesleyan Church Compound Rognaeh Road, Makeni	<u>FORCED LABOUR</u> 31/12/98	Clergy	Adult	"		The victim was forced to push a vehicle looted from the compound of the Wesleyan Mission in Makeni, by armed men.
63	Salifu Kamara Makeni	3/1/99	Unemployed	17 Yrs.	"		The victim was seized from his home and forced to serve as a Cook and later trained as a combatant.
64	Abdul Kamara 14, Mabureh Street Makeni	24/12/98	Student Makama Agric. Institute	Adult	"		The victim was seized by Colonel Tamba Yamba to serve as a Cook. He was later forced to join armed looting gangs.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
65	150 Youths (unidentified) Biriwa Chiefdom	Between 21/1/99 and April, 1999	Farmers	Youths	"		The victims were forcefully mobilised from various villages in the said chiefdom to destroy the Magbonso Bridge at Magbonso Village, Biriwa Chiefdom. Villages in the same community were forced to provide food-for-work for the venture.
66	Salo Marah 35 Wallace Johnson Street, Makeni	<u>EXTORTION</u> 9/3/99	Unemployed	Youth	"		The victim was one of more than 3000 youths arrested and detained for conscription. He was released after paying Le5,000.00 for his head.
67	Saran Dabor, 77, Old Magburaka Road, Makeni	9/5/99	Housewife	Youth		Female	The victim was beaten by armed men who put their hands in her private parts to steal the sum of Le60,000.00
68	Tamba E. Kemoh 13, Ropollon Road Makeni	<u>DISPOSSESSION</u> 20/1/99	Teacher	Adult	"		The victim was insulted and his two bundles of wood forcefully taken away from him; his only source of income and livelihood for the day.
69	Rev. Usman J. Fornah Wesleyan Church Rogbane Road Makeni	20/3/99	Clergyman	"	"		He was harrassed by an armed combatant who also took away his sunglasses.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
70	Mrs. Isatu Sesay (nee Isatu Kanu) 1, Savage Square Makeni	21/6/99	Housewife	Adult		Female	The victim together with other traders were forced out of a vehicle hired by them and full of their wares. After traveling from Gbomsamba to Makeni, the victims were forced to flee from the vehicle under gun-point. Isatu and others lost more than two million Leones (Le2,000,000.00)
71	Mabinty Koroma Makeni	<u>VIOLENCE RELATED INJURY</u> 25/1/99	Unemployed	Youth		Female	The victim was arrested, detained and shot in the foot by RUF Captain Green Snake for carrying arms forced into her hand by other combatants.
72	Alimamy Sankoh (Alias Depor) 4 Fracess Conteh Street, Makeni	10/5/99	Student St. Francis Sec. School	"	"		The victim was shot in the leg by one RUF Combatant for not obeying his order to stop playing chess.
73	Maseray Sesay 4 Agriculture Road Makeni	25/5/99	Unemployed	"		"	The victim was hit and wounded in the face by a disloyal soldier Captain Josje Pandawa.
74	Solomon H. Butcher Water Works Compound, Makeni	24/5/99	Dispenser	Adult	"		The victim was dragged out of a public meeting, arrested, strapped naked, wounded on the head and hands and later detained for twenty hours during which period he was also assaulted.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
75	Saidu Koroma 145 Makeni Road Binkolo	16/5/99	Student St. Francis Sec. School	Youth	"		The victim was assaulted and wounded on the head when he asked why his grandmother's planting materials were being taken away by armed combatants.
76	Tamba Samba Makeni Technical College, Makeni	1/6/99	Student Makeni Teachers College	Youth	Male		The victim was wounded and assaulted before his X-Bass Tape Recorder and other belongings were seized from him.
77	Hawa Janneh 14 Yaide Street Makeni	31/5/99	Midwife	Youth		"	The victim is one of eight persons accused of witchcraft, arrested, detained and tortured by the AFRC/RUF establishment in Makeni.
78	Major Frances 14, Yaide Street Makeni	"	Soldier	Youth		"	Same as above No. (78)
79	Mariatu Kamara 14, Yaide Street Makeni	"	RUF Combatant	Youth		Female	Same as above No. (78)
80	Posseh Sesay 14, Yaide Street Makeni	31/5/99	Unemployed	Youth		"	Same as above No. (78)
81	Ramatu Bockarie 14, Yaide Street Makeni	"	Housewife	"		"	Same as above No. (78)
82	Adama Fofanah 37, Sahid Kamara Street, Makeni	"	Unemployed	"		"	Same as above No. (78)

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
83	Hawa Newland Makeni	"	"	"		"	Same as above No. (78)
84	Zainab Koroma Makeni	"	"	"		"	Same as above No. (78)
85	Abdulai Sillah 14 Lady's Mile Makeni	13/1/99	"	Adult	Male		The victim reported being wounded by Kamajors Militia Personnel at Masingbi.
86	Pa Yamba Forna 77 Magburaka Road Makeni	<u>HARRASSMENT</u> 13/1/99	Farmer	"	"		The victim's home was broken into at night by armed men who put him under gun-point and forced him to surrender his money and other belongings; after assaulting same.
87	Mr. Andrew Forna 77 Magburaka Road Makeni	"	Teacher	"	"		Same as above No. (87)
88	Mrs. Adesatu Forna 77 Magburaka Road Makeni	"	Teacher	"		Female	Same as above No. (87)
89	Dauda S. Kamara 18 Makama Road Makeni	15/1/99	Unemployed	Youth			Same as above No. (83)
90	Alimamy S. Marah 35 Wallace Johnson Street, Makeni	19/1/99	Development Worker (KWAYOR)	"	Male		The victim was requested by RUF Combatants for money. When he could not surrender, his sandals were removed from his feet and damaged.

NO.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM	VIOLATION AND DATE	OCCUPATION OF VICTIM	AGE	SEX		BRIEF HISTORY
					Male	Female	
91	Sahr M. Sandi 6, Agriculture Road Makeni	21/5/99	Journalist and Development Worker	Adult	"		The victim was hit with the butt of a gun by RUF Major Francis, who alleged that the victim did not greet him.
92	Sahr Morsay 6, Teko Road Makeni	10/1/99	Teacher and Lay Preacher	"	"		The victim was slapped in the face for attending divine church service.
93	Mr. Franklin Syvanus Sylvanus Street Makeni	30/5/99		"	"		The victim was harrassed until he had to abandone his home.
94	Mrs. Franklin Sylvanus Sylvanus Street Makeni	"	Housewife	"		"	Same as above No. (95)
95	Adama Kallon, Kamabai	30/6/99	"	Youth		"	The victim was assaulted by a combatant Thoronka for shouting in his (the combatant's) compound; which the latter interpreted as OVERLOOKING - a local RUF coinage for disregard.

93) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Medecins San Frontieres, "Mutilation of civilians in Sierra Leone," 23 May 1999

MSF-1 3998

The following is the full text of a report prepared by Medecin Sans Frontiers

MUTILATIONS OF CIVILIANS IN SIERRA LEONE

One month of surgical activities in Connaught Hospital, Freetown, Sierra Leone

26th April to 23rd May 1999

A REPORT BY MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES

1. Synopsis

Since 26th April 1999, the surgical team from the international medical aid agency Medecins Sans Frontieres working in Connaught Hospital in Freetown has witnessed a new rise in the number of mutilated patients: in 4 weeks, 56 recently war-wounded patients have been admitted of which 10 had at least one hand deliberately amputated. Of these 56 patients, 24 were children under the age of 15

This report details one month of hospital activities, from 26th April to 23rd May 1999. It describes the wounds inflicted on those admitted, and briefly recounts the stories of 17 of these patients. It also contains excerpts from the diaries of MSF expatriate volunteers.

These victims of these mutilations are essentially civilians, originally from the country's interior, and particularly from the regions of Port Loko and Masiaka, where these most recent series of attacks have been taking place.

These testimony accounts only concern the people who survived their mutilations and managed to reach the Connaught Hospital. It is feared that the total number of mutilated persons is far higher than the number of those admitted to the hospital. Indeed, the number of admissions is directly related to the possibility of the wounded to move freely. The team regularly receives new patients suffering from terrible wounds, including people who have gone for weeks without treatment. Given the nature of these injuries, one can imagine that many of those wounded are unable to reach the hospital and are left to die along the road. In fact, many of the patients from whom testimony was taken, mention others who were wounded and of whom nothing further has been heard.

The fact remains that much of Sierra Leone is currently inaccessible to humanitarian aid agencies. It is in these parts of Sierra Leone that the needs of the population are undoubtedly the greatest. Under constant threat by armed groups, these people are in desperate need of humanitarian assistance, and most importantly, protection.

2. Background

In February 1997, after 6 years of bitter civil war, an elected government took power in Sierra Leone. However in May of the same year a military coup d'etat overthrew the government. The regional peace-keeping force ECOMOG was expelled from the capital Freetown, and the leaders of the military coup convinced the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) rebels to join their cause. This alliance was able to maintain power until February 1998, when the ECOMOG forces retook the capital and various other parts of the country. During these events, two MSF volunteers were captured and held hostage by an armed group for two weeks before being released.

In March 1998, armed groups began a campaign of terror in regions they had taken control of in the east and north of the country. This consisted of destroying villages, pillaging harvests, mutilating and executing civilians. Tens of thousands of Sierra Leonean civilians attempted to flee the violence and moved to safer regions and neighboring countries. At the end of 1998, after an active campaign, the 'rebels' succeeded in re-entering the capital, where heavy fighting ensued against the government forces. Since then, the 'rebels' have been forced out of the peninsula around the capital, but still currently control the area around many roads and towns. This period of status quo has been accompanied by a new campaign of terror including mutilations, kidnappings and the destruction of property.

Human rights violations:

Mutilations and other forms of torture are not a new phenomenon in Sierra Leone. Between 1992 and 1999 an untold number of civilians were assassinated or mutilated over the course of attacks undertaken by different armed groups.

In Freetown alone it is estimated that in January/February 1999, approximately 6,000 people died. The terrible wounds suffered by the patients of Connaught hospital also serve as indications of the level of brutality.

* In May 1998 MSF issued a report regarding atrocities against civilians. At that time, the Connaught Hospital received 115 patients, most of whom were severely mutilated.

3. MSF'S Activities

Following the renewal of fighting in Freetown, the MSF team had to leave the capital on 26th December 1998. On the 31st of January, 4 volunteers were able to re-enter the war-torn city and restart the surgical program in Connaught Hospital. In 12 days, 85 wounded patients were treated, of which 29 were amputees.

At that time, the revival of clashes around the Freetown peninsula resulted in the renewed admission of mutilated people to the hospital. Since February, the MSF surgical team working alongside hospital personnel has carried out 713 operations.

MSF's surgical activities have been primarily focused on war related injuries. However, MSF has also been working on medical and sanitary care in a camp for 747 displaced war-wounded and amputated people which houses many ex-surgical patients from Connaught Hospital, and families.

MSF began its work in Connaught, Freetown's main hospital, during the military coup d'etat of May 1997. Urgent surgical programs were established during crisis periods: from February to March 1998, 960 operations were conducted, and in May 1998, the team had to face a new surgical emergency.

MSF pursues other support programs to health structures within Freetown, as well as in Bo and Pujehun.

22 MSF volunteers are working in Sierra Leone.

4. One month of activity in Connaught Hospital

Since the 26th April 1999, 271 patients have been operated on at the hospital, 172 of whom have suffered war-related wounds (new cases and follow-up cases).

Among them, 56 patients were recently war-wounded.

Of these

- 24 were children under 15 years old, including one 4 year-old child who died due to machette wound to the head
- 10 had suffered amputation by machette (8 having both hands amputated, 2 having 1 hand amputated)

The others were suffering from gunshot wounds, cutlass wounds, lacerations, fractures.

I. Patients' Accounts

Testimony was taken from 17 patients who arrived at the Connaught Hospital from 2nd May to 15th May. Most of these patients had suffered severe mutilations. Their names are not given for security reasons

- Interview #01

Sex: F Age: approx. 8 yrs Date of Admission: 2/5/99

Date of incident: May 1

Wound: Deep laceration to the right cheek. Fracture of the occipital bone.

Description of incident: (Interviewed the mother as the child is mute from birth. The mother ran into the bush at the time of the attack and so was not a witness. The father was a witness but was not present during the interview. He returned to their village to tell the people that his daughter was alive).

Armed men attacked their village in vehicles around 5 a.m. shooting in the air. They looted everything from the place and there was some burning. They started just chopping at the people as they ran past them. This girl was first struck on the side by a machette which did no real damage. The second cut was on the face.

The father carried the girl for 9 miles through the bush to safety. Her cheek bone was completely broken from the machette blow.

- Interview #02

Sex: F Age: 17 yrs Date of Admission: 3/5/99

Date of incident: April 17th (approx.)

Wound: Laceration on the right lower leg

Description of incident: (she is still in shock)

She and her family and other villagers had been hiding in the bush since before December. On 17th

April, armed men entered the village in the morning, and called all the people together for a meeting. When they gathered together, they heard ECOMOG was on its way to attack. There was panic and people started running. The armed men started chopping at people and also ran after some. She was hit in the leg when she was running.

Her brother and sister were taken by the armed group. She saw 5 dead, and (many wounded in the bush).

• Interview #03

Sex: F Age: Adult Date of Admission: 3/5/99

Date of incident: April 17, 1999

Wound: Fingers of the right hand cut

Description of incident:

She and her family and village had been hiding in the bush for over 6 months. Armed men came in the afternoon and began shooting wildly. There were many who came to attack. Everyone started to panic and run. She was caught and they chopped her hand. They told her to go and ask Kabbah (The president of Sierra Leone) to give her new hands.

They pulled her 3 and half year old child off her back. A young boy started to kick and beat it and threatened to kill the child. They started to yell at her and told her to take her child and go away. She saw one dead and many others who had been cut.

• Interview #04

Sex: M Age: Adult (20-30) Date of Admission: 3/5/99

Date of incident: May 2 (?)

Wound: Double amputation of hands, lips and surrounding tissue cut off.

Description of incident:

patient unable to speak and was unaccompanied

• Interview #05

Sex: F Age: Adult* Date of Admission: 3/5/99

with 10 month baby girl

Date of incident: April 17 (approx)

Wound: Lacerations to the middle of the fingers on the right hand.

Description of incident

On Saturday at around 2 p.m., armed men entered their village. She only saw one with a gun. All the people ran into the bush when they saw them coming. The men burned all the houses and followed the

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villagers into the bush. She and her baby were caught. They held her down and chopped at her hand, and told her to ask Pa Kabbah to give her new hands. They then took the child from her back and started beating the baby. They then ran into the bush.

- Interview #06

Sex: F Age: Adult Date of Admission: 3/5/99

Date of Incident: April 16th

Wound: Internal injury of the left arm from beating

Description of incident:

Armed men entered in the early morning without shooting. They started looting and burning the village. The people started running to the bush as soon as they heard the looting start. Some were followed by the perpetrators. She and her 13-year-old son were caught. She was badly beaten but not cut with a machette. They took her son and he started screaming and crying. She told him to be quiet and go with them or they would kill him. Then the men told her that because she "gave" her son she would not be cut.

They had been in the bush before for about 5 months living off of palm kernels (nuts) and cassava root.

- Interview #07

Sex: F Age: Middle age Date of Admission: 3/5/99

Date of incident: Unknown

Wound: Lacerations on the head, shoulder and back

Description of incident:

Unable to interview the patient as she died just after arrival. Others said that her whole family was killed in front of her, and she died of a broken heart.

- Interview #08

Sex: M Age: Adult Date of Admission: 6/5/99

Date of incident: April 30 (?)

Wound: Deep laceration on the neck (attempted decapitation)

Description of incident:

After the village of Mile 4 was attacked, groups of armed men attacked Songo. It was around 11 p.m. The man was with his wife and 3 children. They were in bed. The armed group entered town and burst into peoples' homes. When they heard their door being broken down, they jumped out of bed. When the man left his room he saw a man near the door so he ran out the back. The one inside started shooting. As he ran out of the house there was another man with a machette waiting for him. He hit him on the side of the neck with the machette.

He did not see his family anywhere, and he does not know what happened to the rest of the village. He ran to the bush and spent 1 week alone just outside of town

• Interview #09

Sex: M Age: Adult Date of Admission: 6/5/99

Date of incident: 4th May (approximately)

Wound: 2 gun shots; one on each leg

Description of incident:

The man lived in his home village with 2 wives, four children, his brother, his sisters-in-law and his brother's child. Armed groups would sometimes pass through the village. The people of his village would run into the bush each time they passed. The population was not harrassed, but these groups would take some food.

The day before Christmas, armed men entered the town shooting and he and his family ran to the bush. They spent 5 months there. He prepared a farm and was getting ready to plant. He thinks that the armed groups heard his rooster and they came early in the morning when it was still dark.

Someone gave the alarm when they saw these men coming and they all ran to the bush again. He was trying to gather the little food together that he still had when his attackers came and shot him twice. His brother heard him crying and came to help him. He was shot and killed. Those remaining villagers came out of the bush after the attack and buried his brother.

• Interview #10

Sex: F Age: 8 yrs. Date of Admission: 6/5/99

Date of incident: 2 weeks ago (around 24th April)

Wound: Amputation of right hand

Description of incident:

One month ago, retreating armed groups from Freetown attacked their village of Mafunta. They entered the village and told the inhabitants to leave. Anyone that was difficult was killed or had their hands chopped off. All their food was looted, and the village burned. Three children were taken, all boys aged 9, 7 and 6 years-old. 2 people were killed in this attack.

The girl ran, with 24 other villagers to the village of Mamoni. Around the 24th April, armed men entered the town in the morning and started yelling at people. They had guns but no ammunition. They captured four people; this girl, her uncle and 2 men were killed on the spot. The girl and the man each had a hand amputated. The child and her uncle were told to go ask Kabbah for new hands.

The mother went back after the attack and took the child to the bush. Three days later they were caught by armed men again who stole their food. They moved to another village called Beng for 3 days, and then came to Masiaka on the 3rd of May.

• Interview #11

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Sex: F Age: Adult Date of Admission: 6/5/99

Date of incident: About 3 weeks ago (no idea of day or time)

Wound: Deep lacerations on right hand

Description of incident:

Armed men came to her village and told the inhabitants that they had to come with them to another location to do manual work for them (gathering and preparing food, etc.). They were told if they did this work they would not be hurt. There were more than 30 people all together.

After they finished the work they prepared to go back to their village. They started on the bush path and they were ambushed by the "rebels". Some of the people were caught. They amputated some peoples' hands, others were killed. She saw 5 amputees.

After they were chopped, the armed men ran after them yelling that they should go to Kabbah to get new hands. They returned to their village and spent 3 weeks in the bush. They were attacked again and they ran deeper into the bush.

• Interview #12

Sex: F Age: Adult Date of Admission: 6/5/99

Date of incident: Around April 22

Wound: Cutlass wound to the left leg

Description of incident:

Armed men told them to leave their village (about 6 months ago), but no one was hurt at that time. They stole food and property and left. The people from the village went to the bush.

In the bush camp there were about 50 adults when they were attacked. It was early evening and only the children were asleep. Armed men entered the camp. There was a lot of confusion and the people ran into the bush, leaving the sleeping children behind. She left 6 children behind. The youngest is only 6 years-old. The armed men were chopping at people when they were running away. That is how her leg was injured.

After the attack left, they returned to the camp to check situation. All the children were gone. They were able to remember at least 40 children that had disappeared.

They stayed in the bush until the 6th of May.

• Interview #13

Sex: M Age: Adult Date of Admission: 6/5/99

Date of incident: 3 weeks previously

Wounds: Right forearm damaged from heavy beating

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Description of Incident

He left his home village of masampa about 1 month ago after an attack on the village. The attack took place at night - there were many 'rebels', but they were not using their guns. They started yelling at people to bring out food and property. They ran around and entered houses, and finally burned the village. His mother was killed and he saw 2 injured.

He ran into the bush in a group of about 20 people. They were followed and the armed men took about 5 of the 20 people (women, children and men). He continued in the bush and stayed in a place called Malamina. They were again attacked at night. People started to run and the <rebels> started chopping them. Some were killed and he saw 2 others "chopped" but he did not see them after that.

He was caught and thrown on the ground with 3 other people. They were beaten with sticks. Finally they managed to escape and ran into the bush for 3 weeks.

- Interview #14

Sex: M Age: 26 yrs Date of Admission: 6/5/99

Date of incident: about 2 weeks previously

Wound: Attempted amputation of both ears and RUF carved in his chest and back.

Description of incident:

About 5 - 6 months ago, 'rebels' entered his village of Ropat when everyone was asleep. They had only knives (cutlasses). They called all the people to the center of town. He could not move from his bed because he was sick.

They took food and clothes. They also took some people with them to the main road - women, children and men. They were abducted. No-one in the village was killed.

They were attacked a 2nd time, this time during the day. This man was lying under the mango tree as he was still not well. He suddenly saw all the people runnignaway. He was the only one left. He saw them coming at him with a big knife. They asked him to go into the bush and fight with them. He said it was not possible because he was sick. They then tied his hands. They beat him and carved RUF in his back and his chest. Then they tried to cut off his ears.

He was somehow untied before they left. He ran into the bush and found his family there. They lived in the bush for 2 weeks.

- Interview #15

Sex: M Age: Adult Date of Admission: 6/5/99

Date of incident: about 3 weeks ago (same attack as the interview #10)

Wound: Amputation of the right hand

Description of Incident:

They left Mafunta about 5 months ago when they were first attacked. He could remember a number of times that they were attacked since the (rebels) were pushed out of Freetown.

The first time, armed groups came at 6 a.m. The village ran away and no-one was killed. Everything was looted and burned. They went into the bush.

In their bush camp they were attacked again. The armed men took 4 people, 3 men and 1 girl (including him and his niece the 8 -yr old above). One man was beaten to death, I was killed. The armed men started to scream at the people to bring out the rice that they had hidden. They had no food hidden and so he and his niece had their hands chopped off. They then were told to ask Kabbah for new hands, and to tell Kabbah that (we did our job).

They went back into the bush for about 2 weeks. They were attacked again.

• Interview #16

Sex M Age Adult Date of Admission 15/5/99

Date of Incident May 13

Wound Attempted amputation of the left hand

Description of Incident.

The village was attacked in the morning hours. Armed men entered the town shooting in the air. They went from house to house and demanded whatever they had. They took food and clothes. He and his wife and 2 youngest children prepared to leave, and managed to escape. They ran to a small village in the swamp. They saw that the armed men were following them. He wanted to run but they could not with the children.

The perpetrators gathered him and his family along with others to one place and instructed them to carry the looted property. There were many people. They spent one week with them in the bush.

The 'rebels' then decided they were leaving. They said they would kill his two sons and his wife. They started to take people from the group one by one and put a log on the ground. The people were decapitated, and then the next person was called. He was 10 people killed and then he was called. He begged them to kill him first before the rest off his family. They said they would not kill him, but instead chopped his hand, and then chased him away into the bush.

He ran to the bush alone. After 2 days he returned to the village and then he saw his wife and children dead.

• Interview #17

Sex M Age Adult Date of Admission 9/5/99

Date of incident May 7

Wound Gun shot to the neck

Description of incident

People came running into the village saying that 'rebels' were coming. They all ran into the bush. Early the next day they went to check the village. Things were quiet. His wife arrived just coming from another village saying that she saw a car full of soldiers - but did not know who it was. They ran into

the swamps in fear of attacks. They heard gunshots and then a grenade exploding, so they kept running. They slept one night in the bush, and then moved to the next village.

The following day they heard shorts and big explosions close by, so they ran even further. They stayed there for 2 months. Then they heard that the nearby town had reinforcements and so went there for safety.

They stayed in the town for another 2 months. One night sitting outside his house, he hear people talking of an attack on a nearby village., Then an armoured vehicle began firing. It was too late in the night to see what was happening and so he went under the bed with his daughter of 10 years.

Armed men entered his house and started looting food, and he heard them saying that anyone left should be shot. Then he heard them say they needed to check the rooms of the house. They entered his room and pointed a torch on his face. They called him out and told him to leave the child.

They started beating him and asking whom he was fighting for? He said he was a civilian and not fighting for anyone. They accused him of lying and ordered him to sit on the ground. His arms were not working properly due to the beating.

3 men came up to him, one quite young. One pointed a gun at him and shot him in the neck. He fell and waited. The men continued to loot the house. On their way out they stepped on his feet to see if he was alive.

When they left he sat up and saw houses on fire so he ran to the bush. He met some neighbours in the bush. They stayed for 4 days in the bush before making his way to Freetown.

5. MSF TEAM'S ACCOUNTS

The following extracts are taken from the diaries written by MSF expatriate staff working in Sierra Leone.

May 6th, 1999

'We visited Songo, Mabang, Mile 38 and Masiaka. We picked up 9 patients; 3 from Masiaka; one pregnant women and 2 amputees. In Mile 38, there looked to be around 500 - 700 people in very bad condition: full of skin infections, malnutrition, freaked out and frightened.'

May 8th, 1999

'Today we received one man from Port Loko, attacked on Wednesday, carried on a door to Pele and then on a canoe' to Freetown. We also received two out of the bush from near Waterloo, after 12 days in the bush. And one woman yesterday evening, suffering from attempted decapitation.'

May 10th, 1999

We received the first 15 from Port Loko (mostly amputees). 7 double amputees, 2 attempted amputees, the youngest is just 4 years - old.'

The week of the 16th of May, 1999

Over the week, we have seen wounded continue to arrive from villages around Mile 38. They report a lot of killing and chopping. We are seeing people arriving just butchered (not just the hands). One man

The first time, armed groups came at 6 a.m. The village ran away and no-one was killed. Everything was looted and burned. They went into the bush.

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They went back into the bush for about 2 weeks. They were attacked again.

• Interview #16

Sex: M Age: Adult Date of Admission: 15/5/99

Date of Incident: May 13

Wound: Attempted amputation of the left hand

Description of Incident:

The village was attacked in the morning hours. Armed men entered the town shooting in the air. They went from house to house and demanded whatever they had. They took food and clothes. He and his wife and 2 youngest children prepared to leave, and managed to escape. They ran to a small village in the swamp. They saw that the armed men were following them. He wanted to run but they could not with the children.

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The 'rebels' then decided they were leaving. They said they would kill his two sons and his wife. They started to take people from the group one by one and put a log on the ground. The people were decapitated, and then the next person was called. He was 10 people killed and then he was called. He begged them to kill him first before the rest off his family. They said they would not kill him, but instead chopped his hand, and then chased him away into the bush.

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the swamps in fear of attacks. They heard gunshots and then a grenade exploding, so they kept running. They slept one night in the bush, and then moved to the next village.

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Over the week, we have seen wounded continue to arrive from villages around Mile 38. They report a lot of killing and chopping. We are seeing people arriving just butchered (not just the hands). One man

had 6 fractures, including most of his shoulder hacked off by a machete. One family lost everyone. The last child in the family died just after arriving. Her head was completely chopped open with a machete.

Many arrived with nothing; all their clothes soaked in blood and puss and no shoes or anything to sleep on, nothing to eat or drink from.

7. MSF'S conclusions and concerns

It is feared that the number of mutilated persons is far higher than the number of those admitted to the hospital. Indeed, the number of wounded admitted to the hospital is directly linked to their possibility to move freely. The team regularly receives new patients suffering from terrible wounds, including people who have gone for weeks without treatment. Given the nature of these injuries, one can imagine that many of those wounded are unable to reach the hospital and are left to die along the road. In fact, many of the patients from whom testimony was taken, mention others who were wounded and of whom nothing further has been heard.

The fact remains that much of Sierra Leone is currently inaccessible to humanitarian aid agencies. It is these parts of Sierra Leone that the needs of the population are undoubtedly in greater. Under constant threat by armed groups, these people are in desperate need of humanitarian assistance, and most importantly, protection.

94) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Amnesty International, "Rape and other forms of sexual violence against girls and women," AFR 51/53/00, 29 June 2000

SIERRA LEONE

Rape and other forms of sexual violence against girls and women

Mariatu (*not her real name*), now aged 16 years, was abducted from the village of Mamamah, some 40 kilometres from Freetown, as rebel forces retreated from the capital in January 1999. Both her parents were killed by rebel forces when they attacked the village. Mariatu was repeatedly gang-raped by a number of rebels. If she attempted to resist rape she was denied food and beaten. She was forced to accompany rebel forces first to Lunsar and then to Makeni, in Northern Province, and was eventually forced to become the “wife” of one of the rebels. Many other girls were held in the same situation. When she became pregnant, she was taken back to her family and abandoned. In May 2000, shortly after her release, her village was again attacked by rebel forces and she was forced to flee with her grandmother. She walked to Waterloo and then to an internally displaced people’s camp to the east of Freetown. She is now six months’ pregnant.

Rape and other forms of sexual violence during the internal armed conflict

Abduction, rape and sexual slavery of girls and women have been among the most abhorrent and distressing features of the nine-year internal armed conflict in Sierra Leone.¹ Rape and other forms of sexual violence committed by government officials or by armed opposition groups are acts of torture. Sexual slavery refers to situations where girls and women are forced into “marriage”, domestic servitude or other forced labour that ultimately involves forced sexual activity, including rape by their captors.

Rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence against girls and women by rebel forces have been systematic and widespread. Sexual violence has been directed at women of all ages, often including very young girls. Almost all the thousands of girls and women who have been abducted by rebel forces have been raped and forced into sexual

¹For further information, see previous documents published by Amnesty International, in particular, *Sierra Leone: Civilians face real and immediate threat to their fundamental human rights* (AI Index: AFR 51/06/00), 10 May 2000, *Sierra Leone: Escalating human rights abuses against civilians* (AFR 51/13/99), 30 November 1999, *Sierra Leone: Recommendations to the international contact group on Sierra Leone, New York, 19 April 1999* (AI Index: 51/05/99), 19 April 1999, and *Sierra Leone: 1998 - a year of atrocities against civilians* (AI Index: AFR 51/22/98), November 1998.

slavery. Studies by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have shown that 75 per cent of abducted girls and young women have been sexually abused; other estimates put the figure at 90 per cent. In some cases girls and women have been forced to become the sexual partner or "wife" of a single combatant. In other cases they have been abused by several combatants.

Beyond the brutality and trauma of rape itself, which often causes life-long psychological damage to the victim, sexual assault can result in serious physical injury, forced pregnancy, disease and even death. All victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence suffer psychological trauma and almost all have required medical treatment for physical injuries inflicted during their ordeal. Many of the girls and women abducted and raped by rebel forces have become pregnant and have given birth.

Often victims of rape have suffered further brutality, including by having objects inserted into their vagina. A 14-year-old girl was stabbed in the vagina with a knife because she had refused to have sex with the rebel combatant who abducted her. Another woman had small pieces of burning firewood put into her vagina. One 16-year-old girl was so badly injured after repeated rape that, following her escape, she required a hysterectomy. Beatings have been common and most victims who have subsequently been released have bruising. Most have contracted sexually transmitted diseases and a high number are suspected of having contracted HIV/AIDS. Deaths of victims of rape as a result of AIDS have been reported. Those who have spent months or years in the bush after being captured by rebel forces also suffer from tuberculosis, malnutrition, malaria, skin and intestinal infections and respiratory diseases.

The terror wreaked by rebel forces on civilians has also included men being forced to rape members of their own family under threat of being mutilated by having their hands or arms cut off. Girls and women have been raped in front of their husbands and other members of their families.

After rebel forces, the majority of them members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) but also including members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), attacked the capital, Freetown, on 6 January 1999 many residents reported the rape of groups of girls and women, including in public places such as Kroo Town Road in the centre of Freetown and Kissy to the east. A high incidence of rape was also reported at the Clay Factory internally displaced people's camp in Freetown. A policeman in Kingtom witnessed the rape of his three daughters before they were abducted by rebel forces. An 11-year-old girl abducted from Freetown in January 1999 was among 40 civilian captives freed in August 1999 in the Occra Hills region, 60 kilometres east of Freetown. She described being dragged from her home and then joined by scores of other girls as rebel forces went from house to house. Girls who were not selected to be the "wife" of a rebel commander were repeatedly raped by countless other rebel combatants.

Girls and women were rounded up in different areas of the city and forced to report nightly to rebel combatants. On 8 January 1999 in the Cline Town area in the east of Freetown a rebel commander ordered that all girls who were virgins report for a physical examination by a woman colleague. Those confirmed to be virgins, mostly aged between 12 and 15 years, were ordered to report each night to the rebel commander and other combatants who raped or otherwise sexually assaulted them. Some of the girls were subsequently abducted when rebel forces were forced to retreat from Freetown. As in the case of rape, forcibly subjecting girls and women to so-called "virginity tests" amounts to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and is specifically prohibited by international humanitarian law.

More than 4,000 children were reported missing after the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999. Although Article XXI of the peace agreement signed by the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF on 7 July 1999 in Lomé, Togo, provided for the release of all captured civilians, some 2,000 children who were believed to have been abducted remained missing at the beginning of the year; 60 per cent of them were girls. UNICEF, the human rights section of the United Nations (UN) peace-keeping operation in Sierra Leone and child protection agencies which are trying to secure the release of civilians held by rebel forces have found it particularly difficult to obtain the release of girls and young women.

Girls and women abducted by rebel forces have been raped as a matter of course: many were threatened that they would be killed if they tried to resist rape. One rape victim quoted the combatant who abducted her as saying: "You don't understand. This is the reason we go and capture you people. If you don't sleep with me today, I'll kill you."

The human rights crisis continues

Following the signing in July 1999 of the peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, the scale of human rights abuses against civilians, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, declined significantly. From October 1999, however, the previous pattern of human rights abuses again emerged. Rebel forces who had yet to disarm and demobilize continued to abduct, rape and sexually abuse large numbers of girls and women. On 1 February 2000 the human rights section of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which had visited Port Loko and Kabala in Northern Province, reported that harassment and abduction of civilians, rape and other forms of sexual violence, looting of villages and burning of houses were occurring almost daily in the area around Port Loko. In both Port Loko and Kabala, most girls and women who had been abducted by rebel forces and who had subsequently arrived in internally displaced people's camps had suffered rape and other forms of sexual violence. These abuses were perpetrated by rebel forces of the RUF, the AFRC and former soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army. According to health care workers, pregnancies resulting from rape were so frequent that they "could not be counted". They also reported that

girls and women often feel forced to marry their abductors or to live as their “wives” because they fear the social stigma attached to rape and resulting pregnancies.

At the beginning of May 2000, Sierra Leone was thrown into further crisis after rebel forces captured some 500 UNAMSIL peace-keeping troops. Hostilities between rebel forces and government forces, including the Sierra Leone Army, Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and the AFRC, now allied to the government, resumed. Renewed insecurity and fighting have further aggravated the incidence of rape.

In the area around Masiaka in mid-May 2000 rebel forces raped and abducted girls and women. Among the victims was a woman aged in her twenties, with a five-month old baby, who was abducted after rebel forces took control of Masiaka. At the time of her abduction, she was stripped and raped by seven combatants. Taken to a rebel camp, she was repeatedly raped by several rebel combatants and was forced to carry supplies, cook and cut wood.

Many cases of rape - including gang-rape and rape of very young girls - have also been reported from Makeni, which remains under the control of rebel forces, and other towns, such as Lunsar, where government-allied forces have regained control but which has subsequently been retaken by rebel forces. Among those reported to have been raped in Makeni was a 14-year-old schoolgirl who was raped by rebel combatants in front her parents at their home in Makeni on 1 May 2000. The following day, 2 May 2000, two women were reported to have been raped as their home in Makeni was looted. In the village of Mayaki in Kambia District, rebel forces were reported to have raped several women on 24 May 2000 when they attacked the village and killed livestock. Girls and women in those areas of the country still controlled by rebel forces continue to face the threat of rape and abduction.

During June 2000 an Amnesty International delegation in Sierra Leone met a number of women who had been raped in Northern Province during the preceding weeks.

“It was the last Friday in May when we were trying to escape. My sister was running with her baby when the RUF caught us. The baby was placed elsewhere. Then the RUF raped my sister. My husband wanted to take the baby but he was caught and mercilessly beaten, and he collapsed. I managed to take the baby. My husband was later killed. My sister died later the same day.”

A woman aged 19 years from Magburaka, close to Makeni, who was attacked on 26 May 2000.

“We fled to a village called Makoth; we hid ourselves in the bush together with our children. We were later surrounded by the RUF who grabbed my husband and tied his hands behind his back. They asked him to choose who will die; the choice was between me and him. He asked them to spare my life. They then tied him to a tree and they tried to cut his throat; this was difficult to do with their

knife, so they shot him. I'm still breast-feeding but five RUF rebels raped me. I'm still bleeding."

A woman aged 29 years who fled Makeni on 30 May 2000.

"The RUF rebels dressed in UNAMSIL uniforms entered our house. I was very happy that we had been liberated, not knowing that they were rebels. They asked me to have intercourse with them; when I refused they hit me on my sides with their guns. My children managed to escape. Three of them raped me; the fourth one ordered them to stop what they were doing. After the rape, they looted my house. I escaped naked looking for a hiding place."

A woman aged 45 years who was attacked by RUF forces at her home in Lunsar.

Preventing rape and other forms of sexual violence

All combatants in Sierra Leone, both rebel and government-allied forces, must be explicitly instructed by those who exercise chain-of-command control to respect international humanitarian law and to end rape and other forms of sexual violence immediately. All reports of rape and other forms of sexual violence must be investigated and those suspected of committing these offences prosecuted. Any combatant suspected of committing rape or other forms of sexual violence must be immediately removed from active service and from situations where such abuses might recur.

The UNAMSIL peace-keeping force has a mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment. UNAMSIL must, however, have a clearer mandate to protect the human rights of all civilians at all times, including girls and women at risk of abduction, rape and other forms of sexual violence by rebel forces, by taking a more determined and active approach to protecting civilians. This would include extending, as far as is possible, the area of deployment of UNAMSIL troops, particularly in those areas of Northern Province where abuses against civilians are continuing, and making every effort to defend civilians from attacks by rebel forces.

Bringing those responsible for human rights abuses to justice

It is now generally accepted that, under customary international law, rape committed by government officials or armed opposition groups during armed conflict - whether international or non-international - constitutes torture. Rape and other forms of sexual violence by combatants in the conduct of both types of armed conflict are now recognized as war crimes, most recently in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which Sierra Leone signed on 17 October 1998 and intends to ratify shortly. When rape is committed on a systematic basis or a large scale, or, as confirmed in the Rome Statute, when it is committed

as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, it is a crime against humanity. As such, it is subject to universal jurisdiction.

As well as violating international humanitarian law, notably common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, rape is a crime under Sierra Leone national legislation: the 1960 Protection of Girls and Women Act and also the 1960 Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act.

Abuses of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict are contrary to the fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. All abuses of this kind, including rape and sexual slavery, require a particularly effective response. In Sierra Leone the systematic way in which rape and other forms of sexual violence have been used, and committed so extensively with impunity, indicates a deliberate strategy to use rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls as a weapon of war and to instil terror.

The impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of human rights abuses throughout the internal armed conflict was further entrenched by the peace agreement signed in July 1999 which provided a blanket amnesty for all acts undertaken in pursuit of the conflict. This therefore included the gross human rights abuses which have characterized the conflict, including systematic sexual violence against girls and women.² Amnesty International believes that the amnesty in the peace agreement violates fundamental human rights principles by providing impunity to the perpetrators of gross human rights abuses and provides no deterrent against further abuses.

The UN added a disclaimer to the peace agreement that it did not recognize the amnesty as applying to crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. There can be no amnesty for serious breaches of international humanitarian law and for human rights abuses which may amount to crimes against humanity. The duty to prosecute or extradite people responsible for crimes against humanity and grave violations of human rights, such as extrajudicial execution, forced disappearance, torture and violence against women, means that national amnesties and pardons which prevent the emergence of the truth and accountability for such violations are inconsistent with the duty to bring to justice those responsible for such violations and the rights of victims to justice.

Furthermore, human rights abuses committed since the signing of the peace agreement are not covered by the amnesty. Those rebel combatants who are responsible for continuing

²For further information, see previous documents published by Amnesty International, including *Sierra Leone: Real and credible justice is needed* (AI Index: AFR 51/45/00), 22 June 2000, *Sierra Leone: Human rights violators must be brought to justice* (AI Index: AFR 51/11/00), 17 May 2000, *Sierra Leone: the Security Council should clarify the United Nations' position on impunity* (AI Index: AFR 51/10/99), 4 August 1999, *Sierra Leone: a peace agreement but no justice* (AI Index: AFR 51/07/99), 9 July 1999.

abuses, including abduction and rape of girls and women, must be identified and brought to justice.

Assistance for the victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence

The psycho-social consequences of the systematic campaign of rape and other forms of sexual violence in Sierra Leone are great and need to be addressed urgently. A non-governmental humanitarian organization, *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF), working in Sierra Leone identified in January 2000 that the psycho-social and mental health consequences of conflict on civilians are all too often neglected.³

Following the incursion by rebel forces into Freetown in January 1999, a non-governmental organization, the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) - Sierra Leone Chapter, with support from other national and international agencies, developed a program to help victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence by providing medical care and counselling. Between March 1999 and February 2000, more than 2,000 girls and women who had been abducted, mostly from Freetown and the Western Area, were treated; more than 1,900 had been raped. Most had sexually transmitted diseases and many were pregnant; 80 per cent of those pregnant were aged between 14 and 18 years. FAWE has also opened a centre for women and girls who have had babies as a result of rape and provides training in skills such as tailoring, tie-dying and soap-making to enable them to make a living. In March 2000 there were more than 100 girls and women with babies and small children at the centre in Freetown.

Much more, however, needs to be done to assist the victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence. Outside Freetown, little or no help is available.

Following the signing of the peace agreement, a process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was to begin. It suffered serious delays, however, and only half of an estimated 45,000 combatants had been disarmed and demobilized by April 2000. When an Amnesty International delegation visited Sierra Leone in March 2000, it identified that the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants appeared often not to provide any real opportunity to those girls and women who had been abducted by rebel forces and forced to become their sexual partners to free themselves from former combatants when they reported for disarmament and demobilization. The Fourth Report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMSIL⁴ of 19 May 2000 recognized "the need to protect dependants of ex-combatants, the majority of whom are women and children" and that "the majority of "wives" of the combatants are in fact abductees and, if not interviewed separately

³*Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone*, Médecins Sans Frontières (Holland), 11 January 2000.

⁴S/2000/455

from their “husbands”, would most likely not feel free to express their wish to return to their original families”.

The current crisis in Sierra Leone has disrupted the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. When it resumes, effective provision needs to be made for those girls and women, many of whom are pregnant or have young children, to leave former combatants, if they wish. This would require: firstly, the opportunity to indicate privately to UN personnel their desire to leave the men who abducted and sexually abused them; secondly, support to enable them to receive all necessary medical and psycho-social care; and thirdly, support either to return to their families where this is possible or to re-establish their lives together with their children.

Urgent and sustained assistance from the international community is needed to address the needs of girls and women who have been victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence. In April 2000 the United States Ambassador to Sierra Leone, Joseph H. Melrose Jr., said that: “Child and women abductees and victims of gender violence are far too numerous, and we do not yet even have a clear picture as to how many there really are. What is clear is that these victims and their injuries, both physical and psychological, must not be ignored. If these injuries do not heal, they will have implications for future generations of Sierra Leoneans and the success of the peace process”.

Amnesty International’s recommendations

Recommendations to leaders of the RUF:

- take all measures to protect girls and women from rape and other forms of sexual violence, including by instructing all RUF combatants to respect international humanitarian law and to end rape and other forms of sexual violence immediately;
- state publicly that rape in the conduct of armed conflict constitutes a war crime and may constitute a crime against humanity under defined circumstances;
- immediately remove any combatant suspected of committing rape or other forms of sexual violence from situations where such abuses might recur;
- order the immediate release of all girls, women and other captured civilians who remain held and ensure that no further abductions are carried out.

Recommendations to the Sierra Leone government and leaders of the Sierra Leone Army, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Civil Defence Forces (CDF):

- instruct all combatants fighting with government-allied forces not to commit rape and other forms of sexual violence;
- reaffirm that rape in the conduct of armed conflict constitutes a war crime and may constitute a crime against humanity under defined circumstances;

- state publicly that anyone who commits such a crime will be brought to justice;
- investigate all reports of rape and other forms of sexual violence by those combatants under their control and prosecute those alleged to have committed these offences;
- immediately remove from active service anyone suspected of committing rape or other forms of sexual violence.

Recommendations to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL):

- ensure that UN peace-keepers fulfil their mandate to protect civilians from physical violence, including girls and women at risk of abduction, rape and other forms of sexual violence, by encouraging a more active and determined approach to protecting civilians and by providing all necessary training and logistical support;
- ensure that all troops deployed by UNAMSIL are fully trained in international human rights and humanitarian law and that expertise in violence against women, including gender-based crimes, is provided within UNAMSIL;
- ensure that cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence continue to be monitored and recorded by the UNAMSIL human rights section with a view to the investigation and prosecution of those alleged to be responsible;
- during the demobilization and disarmament process, provide the necessary conditions to enable those girls and women forced to become the sexual partners of rebel forces to leave demobilized combatants, if they wish to do so.

Recommendations to the international community:

- continue to publicly condemn rape and other forms of sexual violence and apply sustained pressure on those in control of combatants to end these abuses;
- ensure the provision of sustained and adequate assistance to the victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence, including by supporting those organizations which are providing medical and psycho-social care and programs to rehabilitate the victims and assist them in returning to their families and communities;
- ensure that all reports of rape and other forms of sexual violence are fully investigated by the appropriate authorities in order to identify those responsible and bring them to justice; this should include providing assistance to the government of Sierra Leone in restructuring and training the police force and establishing a competent, impartial and independent judiciary with the necessary resources to function effectively and fairly, and ensuring that appropriate training is provided to prosecutors, judges and other officials in handling cases involving rape and other forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;
- ensure that all training provided to the new Sierra Leone Army and the police force includes training in international human rights and humanitarian law and that those dealing with women who are victims of violence, including sexual violence, have expertise in violence against women, including gender-based crimes;

- in the event of a review of the peace agreement concluded in Lomé in July 1999, ensure that the specific needs of victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence during the internal armed conflict and their right to redress are fully taken into account.

95) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Human Rights Watch: "World Report 1999: Sierra Leone, Human Rights Developments."



Sierra Leone

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Human Rights Developments

In early February, troops of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) ousted the government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Freetown. This ended their nine-month rule, characterized by widespread human rights abuses and a complete breakdown of the rule of law. For the past seven years a vicious civil war has engulfed Sierra Leone, characterized by atrocities against civilians, often committed by the RUF, a rebel group formed in 1991 with support from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).

Upon taking power on May 25, 1997, the AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political parties and public meetings, and announced rule by military decree. The AFRC, created by a group of senior military officers, soon joined forces with the RUF. During their joint rule, many judges, lawyers, and police fled the country, causing a total collapse of the judicial system. The AFRC/RUF government arbitrarily arrested and detained its suspected opponents and critics, including students, journalists and human rights advocates, causing thousands to seek asylum.

On March 10, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG reinstated President Tejan Kabbah, first elected in March of 1996, who subsequently declared a state of emergency. After losing political power, the AFRC/RUF alliance engaged in a war of terror against civilians, committing widespread and egregious atrocities in an attempt to regain power. Between February and June 1998 alone, its members raped, deliberately mutilated, or killed outright thousands of Sierra Leonean civilians. The AFRC/RUF abducted men, women and children, probably numbering in the thousands, for use as combatants, forced laborers, or sexual slaves. Women were actively targeted through sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. In addition to various forms of physical abuse, innumerable civilians suffered psychological trauma from the rebels' choice of tactics and extreme cruelty—like the severing of limbs—to compound the horror of their attacks.

Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), civilian militias who supported the Kabbah government, also committed numerous abuses, including indiscriminate killings and torture, but on a significantly smaller scale than those carried out by the AFRC/RUF. The CDFs were created in order to provide local security and targeted for abuse those they claimed

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were AFRC/RUF combatants or their supporters. The largest and most powerful of the CDFs, the Kamajors, were responsible for the majority of abuses committed by those fighting on behalf of the Kabbah government. In addition to killings and torture, Kamajors also obstructed humanitarian assistance and extorted money or other payment at roadblocks.

Children were victims of gross violations of human rights committed by both sides to the conflict. The AFRC/RUF abducted an unknown number of children—probably in the thousands—for use as laborers, fighters, and in the case of girls, sexual prisoners. Many girls were forced to work for the AFRC/RUF combatants until they reached sexual maturity, when they would be assigned to a fighter as a “wife.” There were also many child soldiers among the Kamajors, and despite promises by the government to demobilize all combatants under the age of eighteen, the CDFs continued to recruit children at least until July.

The United Nations estimated that over 416,000 Sierra Leoneans fled the fighting as refugees to neighboring Guinea and Liberia or to internally displaced camps. Conditions for both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees were often severe due to a lack of access to camps and poor security conditions. In particular, the close proximity of the camps in Guinea and Liberia to the Sierra Leonean border and the presence of former combatants among the refugee population in Liberia jeopardized humanitarian assistance and protection. Many refugees and IDPs suffered from a host of problems including high levels of malnutrition and disease, as well as occasional attacks from the RUF/AFRC.

The government made repeated gestures in support of human rights, such as its pledge to provide amnesty for child soldiers and intermittent appeals to combatants to lay down their arms in exchange for amnesty. In a climate of public hatred for individuals associated with the AFRC/RUF, the Kabbah government initiated legal proceedings against fifty-eight civilians in regular courts and thirty-eight former soldiers before a military court on a range of charges including treason and murder. In hearings in August and October, the High Court of Sierra Leone sentenced to death twenty-seven civilians convicted of treason, including five journalists and a seventy-five-year-old woman. International observers questioned the appropriateness of the treason charges for the journalists, and criticized the lack of a right to appeal sentencing by the military court. On October 19, the government of Sierra Leone executed by firing squad twenty-four of the soldiers who had been sentenced to death one week earlier. The trials constituted the first major test under the Kabbah government of a justice system which lacked basic infrastructure and support. Many of the over 2,000 prisoners in Sierra Leone were held under the 1998 Public Emergency Regulations, introduced by President Kabbah on March 16 and ratified by parliament, which provided for indefinite detention without trial. Prisons were often overcrowded, unsanitary, and lacking in health care and the regular provision of food.

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Section 13 of the Public Emergency Regulations declared that “disturbing reports” by the media were punishable offences. On June 24, Minister of Information and Cultural Affairs Dr. Julius Spencer stated that any information regarding the security situation must be approved by ECOMOG before publication. Journalists complained further that taxes had been unjustly imposed upon newspapers in an attempt to limit their ability to publish.

96) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

International Medical Corps – Press Release on Sierra Leone Program

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Sierra Leone



Photo by Jenny Chu

Growth Monitoring at an IMC Clinic in Sierra Leone

After nine years of vicious civil war between the government and rebel forces, peace appears to have taken hold in Sierra Leone, a small nation on the West African coast. The war's legacy nonetheless continues to haunt Sierra Leone's 4.5 million residents, nearly half of whom were displaced from their homes by ongoing violence. Countless thousands, including children, remain wounded and brutally maimed by machete-wielding soldiers.

IMC, which entered Sierra Leone in 1999, continues to provide medical care to thousands of civilians in the Daru and Freetown areas. In addition, IMC supports numerous local health care facilities with necessary supplies and staff training programs. In the Port Loko and Lungi government hospitals, for example, IMC conducted training in expanded programs of immunization, emergency nursing, health education, and surgical services. Each IMC supported facility provides primary health care and education on the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, hygiene, sanitation, and nutrition offered by IMC-trained health workers.

As the war-time phase of its work winds down, IMC is now refocusing its efforts to meet the needs of repatriated Sierra Leoneans, many of whom have had little or no access to health care while displaced from their homes. In the Kailahun and Kambia districts, IMC currently supports emergency health services for 320,000 returnees and refugees, which includes hospital referrals, ambulance services, and medical screenings, and also provides primary health care services, which include vaccinations, growth monitoring, health education, antenatal care, and

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treatment for common infectious diseases. IMC also supports four supplementary feeding centers for malnourished children and pregnant and lactating mothers. IMC works in partnership with UNHCR to provide medical escorts and screening for returning refugees, and is currently providing support on the Sierra Leone-Liberia border for returning Sierra Leoneans.

Sierra Leone's nine years of violence left few untouched, including hundreds of young children and women who were brutally assaulted, kidnapped and/or sexually enslaved during the conflict. In 2001, IMC launched a unique surgical program to heal the scars of war inflicted on children who had been abducted by rebel armies, forced into conscription as child soldiers, and physically branded with the rebel factions' insignias cut or burned into the children's chests, arms and foreheads. IMC plastic surgeons removed these horrific scars from 82 children and transformed and corrected various physical abnormalities on 33 others. IMC followed up the surgeries with counseling and other activities designed to help the children reclaim some semblance of healing and normalcy in their lives. In so doing, IMC provided new hope and a new beginning to children whose childhoods had been stolen from them in the cruelest possible ways.

IMC surgeons also provided much-needed surgical assistance to scores of women who suffered unimaginable horrors after having had their insides literally torn apart as a result of torture, rape, and/or sexual slavery. Since Sierra Leone suffers from a severe lack of surgeons trained in such anatomical repair procedures, IMC sent a national doctor and nurse to an intensive training course at the renowned Evangel Fistula Centre in Nigeria. Following this training in the fall of 2001, 321 patients have been screened in Sierra Leone, and 86 operations have been performed.

In this and many other ways, IMC is working to heal the scars of war for the people of Sierra Leone who have suffered unthinkable hardships along the long, difficult road to peace.

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IMC Plastic Surgeons Remove The Scars of War in Sierra Leone

September, 2001—While a tentative peace accord appears to be taking hold, for hundreds of children and child soldiers in Sierra Leone, the 10-year civil war has left scars that can only be healed with the help of IMC's plastic surgery program.

Over the course of what was considered to be one of the bloodiest civil wars in recent times, hundreds of children between the ages of 9-17 were kidnapped, drugged, abused and forced to harm their fellow countrymen. By branding them with hot poker or carving their initials in their chests, arms or foreheads with broken glass, the R.U.F. created an army of outcasts who can't go home to face the families and communities they were often forced to murder.

"Without plastic surgery, these child victims might never be able to return to their communities and reintegrate into society," said IMC President and CEO, Nancy Aossef. "We cannot let them continue to suffer."

The torment of the scars is so great that some children have tried to burn them off with caustic soda, which only makes them worse.

"In the eyes of their family members, these kids symbolize the atrocities committed by the rebels. Their families fear being associated with them," said Rabih Torbay, IMC's West Africa regional director. "The brands are like shackles that isolate the children and serve as constant reminders of the brutality of war."

IMC's medical teams will perform one to two skin grafts as needed on each patient, working side-by-side with Sierra Leonean doctors and operating theater nurses to train them in pre and post operative care, anesthesiology and plastic surgery techniques.

Funded with a USAID grant from the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, administered by UNICEF, the program will initially help more than 120 children, with

More on IMC's program
in Sierra Leone



IMC doctors performing
to remove scars on a

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hundreds more expected to come forward. COOPI, a UNICEF-supported child protection agency will provide counseling to children before and after the surgery in an attempt to help them cope with their trauma and rejoin their families.

During the 10-year civil war rebels terrorized thousands of civilians by amputating limbs, raping women and girls, and destroying villages. IMC's skin graft program will help heal both the physical and psychological scars suffered by the child soldiers.

Since 1999, IMC has provided emergency medical care and primary health care to tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans displaced by fighting. Some of the most intense fighting has taken place in Daru and Port Loko, where IMC-supported clinics are staffed by health care workers trained by IMC.

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97) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

International Crisis Group, "Time for a New Military and Political Strategy," 11 April 2001

SIERRA LEONE
TIME FOR A NEW MILITARY
AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

11 April 2001

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SIERRA LEONE



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SIERRA LEONE

TIME FOR A NEW MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sierra Leone is a human tragedy of massive proportions that is rapidly becoming a security nightmare for all West Africa. Two-thirds of Sierra Leone's population are thought to have been displaced during the ten-year civil war. Another 600,000 have become refugees in neighbouring countries. The war is spilling over into Guinea, where heavy fighting since September 2000 threatens the collapse of the government and has already produced a massive, new refugee problem. In effect, Sierra Leone is now at the heart of a series of conflicts that risk forming an arc of violence from southern Senegal to the Ivory Coast.

ICG believes the international community needs to take a radically different approach to that in which it has engaged so far. There should be no further negotiations with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) other than for its complete disarmament and demobilisation. The RUF has blatantly used negotiations for the purpose of rearming. It has consistently shown bad faith in the string of agreements it has signed in Abidjan, Conakry, Lomé and Abuja. The RUF has no meaningful political constituency. Its main backer is Charles Taylor, the president of Liberia, who uses it as a proxy army to pursue his drive for regional hegemony: not for nothing is Taylor known widely as the Milosevic of West Africa. And, of course, the RUF has committed heinous atrocities qualifying as war crimes.

This report reaches the conclusion, stark, but we believe unavoidable -- that the international community must help Sierra Leone take decisive military action against the RUF. There are two vital conditions.

First, it is urgent to harmonise the divergent approaches of the UK government, which is arming, retraining and re-equipping the Sierra Leone army (SLA) for a serious campaign, and the UN military mission (UNAMSIL), which is still trying to implement the compromise provisions of the Lomé agreement. The international community cannot run two or more strategies in Sierra Leone simultaneously. Working against each other with conflicting mandates will only fuel the conflict and invite warring factions to exploit differences. Achieving a common approach will require much diplomacy, especially with West African nations that are hesitant about a muscular policy in which a former colonial power takes a prominent role.

Those in the RUF who refuse to demobilise should be defeated militarily. The military option could be spearheaded by UK trained and led Sierra Leone armed forces, with UNAMSIL securing the areas regained. The UK should provide military and intelligence backup to guarantee the safety of UN forces. The Civil Defence Force (CDF) could provide additional security for local villages and settlements.

Secondly, military action must be co-ordinated with a coherent political strategy accepted by all the key international actors and the Sierra Leone government. This will involve some form of UN-endorsed commitment to an international effort that may need to last five years or more, in order to help Sierra Leone re-establish good governance and reconstruct its shattered society. Without such a political effort, even military victory over the RUF would be pointless since the resulting power-vacuum would soon be filled by more violence from government and pro-government forces, new rebels and predatory neighbours.

The specific recommendations that follow will be difficult to implement. If the international community does not make a substantial commitment to help Sierra Leone resolve both its military and political problems now, however, it is all too easy to foresee the contagion of violence spreading out of control in West Africa much as has happened in Central Africa.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the UN Security Council

1. Abandon the Lomé Agreement and make no further deals with the RUF.
2. Call for immediate surrender of the RUF and, against those who refuse, support the threat and eventual use of military force by the Sierra Leone army, supported by the UK.
3. Give UNAMSIL a tougher mandate to occupy and protect areas liberated by the SLA and harmonise its objectives with the UK and with West African heads of state.
4. Impose targeted sanctions on Charles Taylor's regime in Liberia -- involving visa restrictions, freezing of bank accounts and the like -- in order to persuade it to end its support for the RUF.
5. Provide adequate financing so that the Special Court established under UN Security Council Resolution 1315 of August 2000 can begin to investigate and prosecute those responsible for war crimes and a Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission can start operations.
6. Support Demobilisation and Reintegration Programs for RUF and government militia (CDF) combatants.
7. Commit to a continuing international role in Sierra Leone, which may need to last five or more years, to assist the Sierra Leone government constitute a more reliable army, re-establish good governance, and restore its shattered society.

Freetown/Brussels/London, 11 April 2001



SIERRA LEONE

TIME FOR A NEW MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

I. INTRODUCTION

Sierra Leone has become a tragedy of massive proportions. Moreover, the civil war in that country has now spilled into neighbouring Guinea, where heavy fighting since September 2000 threatens to produce the collapse of another West African government. In effect, Sierra Leone is at the heart of a series of conflicts that risk spreading an arc of conflict from southern Senegal to the Ivory Coast.

Radical action is urgently needed if the further spread of war is to be avoided. The experience since the first international intervention in neighbouring Liberia in 1990 has demonstrated that neither the United Nations nor regional groupings can achieve this unaided, not least because conflicts in this part of Africa make a unanimous approach by the local countries impossible. The presence of an 800-strong British military force in Sierra Leone is an important new factor. However, if lasting peace is to be established in Sierra Leone and destabilisation of the region halted, it is essential that the British role and other forms of international intervention be harmonised. The International Crisis Group believes that further efforts to achieve a workable negotiated agreement between the parties to the Sierra Leone war would be fruitless. Rather, what is needed is broad international consensus on the military measures required to save the country from further agony and prevent violence from extending further throughout the region, and support for a complementary political strategy to rebuild the devastated country's institutions.

The modern republic of Sierra Leone grew out of an eighteenth-century settlement on the West African coast for black people from Britain, some of them former slaves. Starting with the colony of Freetown, British rule eventually extended into the hinterland. The country remained under British rule until independence in 1961. From the beginning, Sierra Leone's political parties vied for dominance at any cost. In 1967, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), that had led the country since independence, was narrowly defeated by the All People's Congress (APC) led by former trade union leader Siaka Stevens. The latter was prevented from taking power immediately by a military coup, but in 1968 Stevens became head of state. His APC party quickly consolidated power, and in 1978 it formally established a one-party state. Its notoriously corrupt government made extensive use of patronage and eventually undermined all the principal institutions including parliament, police, and civil service, resulting in chaos.

The past twenty years have seen a succession of bad governments, both military and civilian, all in one way or other dependent upon or involved in the trade in diamonds, which are Sierra Leone's most valuable resource. In the last decade the diamond trade has helped destroy Sierra Leone. Financial, military and diplomatic crime have characterised the country, as Lebanese, Israeli, Russian and other traders have competed for gems, and various military forces have fought for control of the diamond fields.¹

Diamonds have also fuelled the terrible civil war in which a nihilistic movement known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by a former corporal, Foday Sankoh, has battled against every government that seized or otherwise obtained power in Freetown since 1991. Sankoh, widely thought to be a psychopath, has repeatedly committed atrocities against civilians. He has been supported in his ambitions by the equally brutal and unscrupulous Charles Taylor, now president of Liberia. Taylor won power in Liberia through war and now seeks to dominate the Mano River basin, which includes Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

Throughout the 1990s, Sierra Leone has had only one period of relative peace, in 1995-1996. South African mercenaries from an organisation known as Executive Outcomes were hired by the NPRC in April 1995. With a force of less than 200, they drove the RUF away from Freetown, secured the diamond fields and many other areas, and enabled a peaceful democratic election to be held in 1996. This was won by Tejan Ahmed Kabbah, a former UN official. Unwisely, Kabbah thought that Foday Sankoh could be persuaded to reasonable compromise. In one of several peace agreements ultimately broken by the RUF, Kabbah agreed that Executive Outcomes should leave. As a result, he was overthrown by a military coup and exiled in May 1997.

Nigerian forces, deployed under the banner of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), eventually restored Kabbah but they were unable to defeat the RUF, which invaded Freetown again in January 1999, killing, mutilating and abducting thousands of people. It was this awful event – coinciding with the Kosovo crisis – that finally compelled the broader international community to act. At that stage, the refugees in and from Sierra Leone were double those of Kosovo. Around 600,000 persons have fled the country - mainly to Guinea - and two-thirds of Sierra Leone's population of almost five million are thought to have been internally displaced.

The question was what to do. Nigeria, now under the democratic rule of Olusegun Obasanjo, wished to withdraw, and no other country wanted to take its place. Consequently, President Kabbah was pressured by the U.S., the UK and his neighbours to make another peace agreement with Sankoh, in Lomé in July 1999. Under this, Sankoh was, astonishingly, given the status of vice president and put in charge of the strategic minerals, including diamonds. The RUF were amnestied for their crimes. A UN mission (UNAMSIL) was dispatched to implement the accord.

¹ See Appendix 1: Detailed Background to the Political Crisis.

The Lomé agreement collapsed in May 2000. The RUF was chiefly to blame, sabotaging the peace process by capturing 500 UN peacekeepers and their equipment. The peacekeepers were eventually released through the intervention of Liberia's Taylor, and Sankoh was arrested. He faces the prospect of trial by the special tribunal established under UN Security Council Resolution 1315 of August 2000 for war crimes committed after the signature of the Lomé agreement, if international funding for that tribunal and political will can be found. Nevertheless, the RUF still controls 50 per cent of the country, including the diamond areas. From those areas it continues to make incursions across the border into Guinea, which is growing ever more unstable.

The collapse of the peace process has left the United Nations and its member states floundering for a response. Neither the amnesty offered to all combatants by the Lomé accord nor the deployment of what is already the UN's largest current peacekeeping force has been sufficient to keep the peace process on track. A decade after the end of the Civil War, Sierra Leone provides a sobering reminder of how little progress has been made on forging appropriate international responses to conflict. A further international failure in Sierra Leone will have catastrophic consequences for West Africa and grave implications for future international peacekeeping.

Throughout the last decade, international initiatives in Sierra Leone have been marred by divergent and competing agendas. Too often, mediators have staked their credibility on negotiated settlements in which rival warring groups are treated as potential political players, even allies in a coalition government. The notion of bringing rebel groups into government, which has been successful in some countries and some situations, however, has proved utterly misguided in Sierra Leone. The Lomé accord, the most recent agreement to disintegrate, was a vain exercise motivated largely by international expediency. It attempted to elevate those responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians into statesmen even though they lacked a coherent political agenda and almost any political base.

The collapse of Lomé means that the international community and the Sierra Leone government must rethink their approaches. There are key questions that need to be resolved before it will be possible to embark on a new strategy based on more than short-term expediency: what issues underlie the war? who are the key players, including in the international community? what assumptions are behind the failed peace initiatives? what new approaches are viable? The situation is so desperate and so unusual that new approaches are certainly necessary.

The answers do not lie in futile pursuit of yet another negotiated settlement with forces that have shown no interest in adhering to accords. The RUF plays a long game and uses peace agreements as stepping stones towards its ultimate goal of power. Its strategy is at the expense of democracy and the country's citizens. For the commanders of the RUF and its chief puppeteer, President Taylor, peace offers little reward; war presents greater opportunities to extend their influence.

ICG believes that there is no other real option than to take military action against the RUF. We do so, however, with the vital proviso that this must be associated with a coherent political strategy agreed among the key international actors and with the Sierra Leone government. The type of political strategy sketched here is

an unusual one. It will require significant international commitment to Sierra Leone for five years or more. In the particular case of Sierra Leone, the decision already made to establish an international tribunal to try Foday Sankon and others accused of war crimes is a significant marker of the willingness of national and international forces to work together.

The necessity for a coercive military response has been recognised by the UK, which has been supporting the Sierra Leone government's need to reform and strengthen its armed forces to defeat the RUF on the battlefield since last summer. The UK and the U.S. have also supported a complete embargo against diamonds from Liberia in order to cut the RUF's revenue. The prospect of such a military policy, which conflicts with the UN's propensity towards impartiality, being applied without broader international agreement causes deep consternation in West Africa for understandable reasons. It must acquire the commitment of key regional and other international players if it is to succeed. Most importantly, a military policy will not succeed in isolation but must be coupled with a political strategy that addresses the conflict's underlying causes and has broad support inside Sierra Leone and within the region. Without international consensus around these linked objectives, real peace is unlikely, and the people of Sierra Leone, who have been victims for so long, will continue to suffer.

In short, Sierra Leone needs radical solutions involving the serious use of force complemented by extended international political commitment. The use of military force should always be a last resort, but ICG believes the crisis is so grave that this option must now be seriously pursued.

II. ROOT CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

Amidst the turbulence of Sierra Leone's conflict, the underlying causes are frequently overlooked. These include corrupt and unaccountable government, ethnicity that has been manipulated for political ends, and alienated youth. Peace cannot be sustained without addressing all these factors.

A. Bad Government

Sierra Leone's problems are rooted in its history. Since independence in 1961, Sierra Leone has never experienced truly democratic, accountable government.² Independence was preceded by lengthy colonial rule which, although including a strain of authentic democratic tradition, was characterised by patronage and authoritarian government, especially in rural areas.

The habits of trust and accountability between people and rulers are often absent. There is little general awareness of the duties and responsibilities of government as these are accepted internationally. Politicians have for decades squandered the country's resources, which include good land and rich mineral deposits. Diamonds provide easily transportable and lucrative returns for people who enjoy good connections with or within the government. A medley of politicians, businessmen, soldiers and civil servants have formed networks of patronage or commerce,

² See Appendix 1: Detailed Background to the Political Crisis.

spread as far as the Middle East, the U.S. and Europe, that have undermined state institutions. Unsurprisingly, within a few years of the RUF's appearance, the rebel group's primary focus had become the occupation and control of diamond areas as a source of funds for weapons. The link between diamonds and corruption, conflict and weapons is a central feature of Sierra Leone's war.

Sierra Leone desperately needs to establish a government that is both legitimate and accountable. The events of the last five years have shown that free elections alone are no guarantee. President Kabbah's SLPP government was democratically elected but is now widely regarded as corrupt. It is highly dependent on armed support from forces over which it has no control. President Kabbah has spent much of his life outside the country, is often perceived as detached from the population, and does not demonstrate the requisite level of influence over all members of his government. He has also shown poor judgement. Following his return to office in February 1998, for example, he unwisely oversaw a policy that led to the execution of people associated with the military junta and convicted of treason. This and other policies heightened animosity towards his administration and undoubtedly contributed to the intensity of the horrific revenge killings and abuses during the January 1999 RUF attack on Freetown.

Elections in 2001? There is widespread support among Sierra Leone citizens for new elections this year. Although they would be insufficient in themselves, they could be a vital element in creating a new legitimate government and underpinning reforms. New elections were due in March 2001 but were postponed by the government due to insecurity in parts of the country. They are unlikely to be held soon as around 50 per cent of Sierra Leone's territory is controlled by the RUF and two-thirds of its population is displaced.

The constitution provides conditions under which elections can be postponed: if Sierra Leone is fighting a war affecting the national territory; if the president concludes that under such circumstances it is not practicable to hold an election and proposes postponement to the parliament; and if the parliament so decides. If these conditions are met, the president's tenure may be extended for a maximum of six months at any one time. The number of extensions is unlimited.

There are other practical problems. The 1996 elections cost around U.S.\$10 million. Unless similar funding is forthcoming from donors, there is little possibility of organising new elections. Voter registers will need to be revised, constituency boundaries delineated, and hundreds of thousands of refugees repatriated. This will not be cheap.

B. Unaccountable Military

President Kabbah's most immediate problem is control of the armed forces. Under President Siaka Stevens, the armed forces remained small, around 3,000, sufficient to quell minor uprisings but not to pose a threat to the government. President Stevens did, however, establish an Internal Security Unit, from which the Special

³ For a full account, see *Report Of The Panel Of Experts Appointed Pursuant To UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19 in Relation To Sierra Leone* (December 2000).

Security Division (SSD) was created in 1972. This notorious, 500-strong unit was effectively a private army for his APC party.

In 1991-92, to counteract emergence of the RUF, the security forces were expanded to around 13,000. (The exact figure has never been determined because of the large number of 'ghost' soldiers, who drew salary and rations.) Recruitment attracted street boys and unemployed youth. Coupled with poor leadership, training and equipment, the rapid expansion led to disillusionment among front-line soldiers and the emergence of what became known in Sierra Leone as 'sobels' – 'soldiers by day, rebels by night'.⁴ During 1994 and 1995, violence against civilians was often blamed on combatants believed to be part of the security forces. Difficulty in identifying the attackers fostered a belief that both sides – army and rebels – were equally to blame.

The 'sobel' phenomenon and collapse into gang-like tactics had several causes. Soldiers were unprepared to risk their lives to serve corrupt masters in Freetown, particularly as their salaries and rations were frequently missing. That led to collusion with the RUF to avoid battle. There was evidence of large-scale transfers of arms and ammunition from the army to the RUF. Also, soldiers discovered the lucrative returns that could be made by mining diamonds or simply looting civilian property.

Substantial commonality of interest gave the army and the RUF further incentive to cooperate. During 1995, terror tactics – which included amputation and carving messages into the chests and backs of victims – were often designed to deter the population from the democratisation process that was gathering momentum. Both the RUF and the armed forces recognised that elections were against their interests. The armed forces – which held power throughout the NPRC military administration headed by Valentine Strasser – stood to lose their ruling position. For the RUF, elections threatened further exclusion at home and internationally since a democratic government would gain international recognition and credibility. It has been alleged that the practice of cutting off the hands of civilians at random dates from this period and was originally an attempt to deter voting: the official election slogan was 'The future is in your hands'. Such terror tactics, however, failed to deter. The parliamentary and presidential elections held in February 1996 had widespread support. People saw the elections as a chance to express dissatisfaction with both the military government and the RUF and bring about permanent change.

While the initial success of the elections was astonishing, the Kaabah government failed to inspire extensive loyalty. It favoured a Mende militia in the form of the *Kamajors* (later the central element in the Civil Defence Force, CDF). Latent discontent within the army intensified, resulting in the coup of May 1997. The immediate spark was a government proposal to slash spending on the military and use the savings for the CDF, turning it into a private army for the ruling SLPP or factions within it. Johnny Paul Koroma, the head of the AFRC, justified his coup by noting that:

⁴ ICG interviews with residents of Bo and Kenema, November 1995.

'the SLPP tribal hunter militia, the Kamajors, received logistics and supplies far beyond their immediate needs. This was enough indication of the preference for the private army over our Armed Forces, foreshadowing the ultimate replacement of the Constitutional Defence Force by Mr Kabbah's hunters.'⁵

The AFRC junta, which took power in May 1997, may have had some desire to end the war by inviting the RUF to join it in power, but it also sought to protect army privileges. At a more basic level, the administration reflected the battlefield collusion between the two sides. However, the army underestimated the strength of the RUF and quickly found itself a hostage of the rebel movement.

When a Nigerian military assault in February 1998 pushed AFRC and RUF forces out of Freetown, their common front ended. What was left of the alliance wreaked terror against civilians, particularly in the Northern Province.⁶ Some former military filtered back into Freetown while others joined the RUF and yet others continued nominally as the AFRC or joined splinter groups such as the West Side Boys who set up base in the Okra Hills outside Freetown. In August 2000, this faction kidnapped eleven British soldiers, ultimately leading to its elimination during a rescue by British special forces.

With its entry into Freetown in February 1998, the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG contingent effectively became Sierra Leone's military. President Kabbah was reinstated, and Nigerian Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe, who had led the assault on Freetown, was seconded to be the country's defence chief. General Khobe was in theory answerable simultaneously to the Nigerian and Sierra Leone governments.

The New Sierra Leone Army. Sierra Leone has a long history of private armies formed by particular parties or factions, degenerating into banditry, and official security forces being abused for private interest. The British decision to revive the Sierra Leone army as the core of a new military thus carries significant risks.

In September 1999, the SLA consisted of around 6,300 troops of which 2,000 were new recruits, the others the rump of the AFRC with little loyalty to the elected government and with a lamentable human rights record.⁷ The military is highly politicised. Maintaining an ethnic balance will be essential if it is to be impartial. The military is also riddled with corruption. Sierra Leone has a long history of coups, and for nearly a decade the army has taken power on a whim. Inculcating values of professionalism, discipline and service to the state and eliminating corruption will require long-term training.

Finally, the success of security sector reform requires not only the remodelling and retraining of soldiers into an accountable force, but also a guarantee that they will be adequately paid and equipped. Sierra Leone's resources are limited and the government has no revenue base adequate to finance an efficient army in the

⁵ In letter from Johnny Paul Koroma to ECOWAS, August 1997. Available at www.sierra-leone.org/koroma0897.html.

⁶ Amnesty International. *Sierra Leone: Childhood – a Casualty of Conflict* (Amnesty International, AFR 31/69/00, London, 31 August 2000), p.7.

⁷ Comfort Ero, *Sierra Leone's Security Complex* (Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, 2000), p.41.

short or medium term. Donors have traditionally been reticent to fund the security sector, although since last May the UK has increased bilateral defence assistance to Sierra Leone.

The Civil Defence Force. Apart from the considerable difficulty in organising the SLA into a responsible force, there remain other security forces of dubious nature within the government camp. Most notable is the Civil Defence Force. The CDF began as an initiative to protect civilians from the ravages of both RUF and SLA but its current strength and composition may exacerbate rather than improve the internal security situation.

Currently, the CDF consists of some six different groupings, representing the main ethnic groups in Sierra Leone. The most powerful, however, are the *Kamajors*. These were originally a guild of hunters among the Mende people in the southeast of the country. They defended their villages and hunted game with home made shotguns. As RUF and army looting intensified, traditional chiefs, many supporting the SLPP, which is regarded as a Mende-dominated party, recruited young men to be initiated into the *Kamajor* movement to defend their communities. The success of the *Kamajors*, supposedly equipped with extraordinary spiritual powers, stimulated similar defence forces, also purportedly traditional in nature, in other parts of Sierra Leone. These were loosely organised under the CDF umbrella.

On balance the CDF has been highly successful at protecting some communities, particularly when supported by good logistics and elite troops such as the South African military company Executive Outcomes. The CDF alone, however, is generally unable to resist a concerted RUF attack. Over time, the CDF has evolved into a force which itself contains the seed of destabilisation. The mistrust and hostility that has existed between CDF and army for six years has not evaporated with creation of the 'new' SLA. Towns like Lunsar have been lost to the RUF reportedly because of fighting between the coalition of forces that support the government. Some CDF commanders admit they now exist to guard against the SLA as much as against the RUF. CDF fighters are bitter that they receive fewer rations and weapons than the SLA. They argue the CDF stayed loyal to the democratic government and fought the RUF in the bush while the SLA colluded with the rebels. That loyalty, they argue, should be rewarded.

To a large degree, the CDF's future depends on the ambitions of Chief Hinga Norman, the Deputy Defence Minister, who is the nominal leader of all CDF and exercises real control over some *Kamajor* forces. Norman, formerly a professional army officer, was imprisoned in the late 1960s for planning a military coup on behalf of the SLPP, the party which is today in power. There is sometimes speculation that he may attempt a coup again, although this appears unlikely. However, Chief Norman may be a candidate in the next presidential election, in which case his influence among the CDF will be of real political value, especially if the CDF were to be seen as instrumental in the war against the RUF. There are also splits emerging in the CDF. Chief Norman is said to be losing control of the *Kamajors* in the regions of Kenema and Pujenun and Moyamba district to another leader, Eddie Massally.

There is a risk of wider ethnic instability if the SLPP, whose core support is among the Mende, were to lose forthcoming elections. The Mende component of the CDF – the *Kamajors* – are seen by many as guarantors of Mende power. Controlling the CDF – and giving it an effective role, such as local territorial force as is being mooted – is a major challenge facing the Sierra Leone government and its British military advisers.

C. Ethnic Politics and Exclusion

Ethnic balance, most particularly in the reorganised armed forces, will play a large part in rekindling people's confidence in institutions of government. Ethnic relations have been a persistent undercurrent in Sierra Leone's modern history, although there is not a history of enmity comparable to that in the Balkans or Rwanda, nor has widespread violence been conducted on a plainly ethnic basis.

The first seven years of Sierra Leone's independence were dominated by the SLPP, which attracted support predominantly from the Mende people in the south. Under the All People's Congress (APC) led by Siaka Stevens, power shifted to northern groups, principally the Limba and Temne. Stevens' dictatorship ensured that this dominance, reinforced by ethnic favouritism in the security forces, continued until the transfer of power to Joseph Momoh in 1985.

When the SLPP in 1996 won office for the first time in nearly 30 years, it was widely perceived as the return to power of a Mende constituency. But Kabbah tried to heal ethnic divisions by bringing representatives of other parties into his government. The dominance of northerners in the army remained a legacy from Stevens' time. Hence, the military coup of May 1997 also reflected some shift in the ethnic complexion of power.

Yet ethnicity is not necessarily all-pervasive. Ethnic factors appear to have played little role in the formation of the RUF or in its later manoeuvres. RUF combatants come from all parts of the country, many of them recruited by force. In its first months, the RUF attempted to rally support not on grounds of ethnic favouritism but in protest against social and political exclusion, a result of corrupt central power of whatever form.

D. Militarisation of Youth

'Central to an understanding of the war in Sierra Leone is the role of alienated youth ... for whom combat appears a viable survival alternative in a country with high levels of urban unemployment'.⁸

Sierra Leone's future will depend on ensuring that youth do not join military factions. That in turn largely depends on having an economy able to absorb an expanding young work force. This is a challenge that is not unique to Sierra Leone. Throughout Africa, poorly educated, unemployed youth are the excluded and disenfranchised outcasts created by corrupt governments. In Sierra Leone,

⁸ Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, 'The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone', in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *African Guerrillas* (James Currey, Fountain Publishers and Indiana University Press, Oxford, Kampala & Bloomington, 1998), p.172.

frustrated urban and rural youth formed a veritable reserve army. The RUF's simplistic messages offered the possibility of reversing the social hierarchy through violence. Quick wealth was also an attractive incentive.

Although many joined the RUF for these reasons, young people with an identical profile in 1992 joined the army to fight the RUF. It is perhaps unsurprising that ill-equipped, poorly-trained, ill-paid army recruits colluded with the rebels. The more structured CDF, by contrast, recruited a greater concentration of rural youth through the patronage networks of chiefs. More recently, recruitment into the CDF has been less discriminate.

For the young, therefore, ethnic differences have been less important than finding a remedy to feelings of dispossession and alienation or, more positively, achieving a sense of purpose. Policies that do not address these fundamental issues are unlikely to provide long-term remedies for Sierra Leone's problems.

III. THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE PEACE

While the underlying causes of Sierra Leone's war can be traced to different roots, the resolution of the conflict has been hampered by a number of issues. First, the RUF has shown little sign of wanting peace. The international community has confused the signing of agreements with achieving peace. Lomé and earlier negotiations need to be understood as interludes within a wider strategy of war through which the RUF bought time to seize power. A new peace agreement that relies on the RUF being a cohesive force willing to adhere to a document is pointless. Finally, the response of the international community has been uncoordinated and has shown lack of resolve. Its competing interests have hampered the search for a consistent strategy.

A. The Futility of Negotiations and the Failed Peace Accords

Early Attempts at Negotiation (1992 -1996). Few chances for negotiation were taken during the early years of the war. When the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) military junta came to power in 1992, the RUF sought a negotiated settlement but the NPRC scorned the offer as it was confident of military victory. Its counteroffer to the RUF was tantamount to a demand for unconditional surrender and was rejected by Sankoh.⁹ Instead, the RUF consolidated its weak position and realigned its rhetoric.¹⁰ As the military situation began to turn during 1994 and early 1995, the RUF's desire to negotiate lessened further.

The NPRC and RUF re-established communication toward the end of 1995 when the NPRC offered a coalition government of national unity. But Sankoh, still confident he could win militarily if foreign forces left (specifically the Executive Outcomes mercenaries), refused to compromise. According to senior diplomatic

⁹ Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (James Currey and Heinemann, London and Portsmouth NH, 1996), pp.10-11.

¹⁰ For further information on the NPRC, see appendix 1.

sources, he demanded the presidency, but the NPRC was willing to concede only the vice-presidency.¹¹

Faced with Sankoh's unwillingness to compromise, the NPRC stepped up its military attacks through Executive Outcomes. EO deployed a helicopter gunship and tactics that included concentrated mortar fire and ground attacks by approximately 120 soldiers. It rolled the RUF back in a number of battles, taking the Kono diamond fields in late 1995 and enabling a number of diamond companies, including Branch Energy, a firm with close links to EO, to resume mining. During the later battles, it conducted combined operations with the *Kamajors* and occasionally with the Sierra Leone armed forces, though these were often hampered by intelligence leaks.

In January 1996, following a campaign that destroyed a key RUF base in the Kangari Hills, the RUF dropped its demands, agreed to a ceasefire, and began unconditional negotiations for the first time. It was this that created the period of relative stability that enabled the elections in February 1996 to proceed.

The Abidjan Accord (1996). The election of a civilian government undermined any legitimacy the RUF might have claimed and relegated it to an insurgent threat. But the army was also threatened by civilian government as it lost political and economic privileges. When Sankoh, after weeks of talks in the Ivory Coast, reneged on his promise to sign a peace accord, President Kabbah authorised EO and the *Kamajors*, supported by the SLA, to assault RUF positions. A few days after they destroyed the RUF headquarters southeast of Kenema in November 1996, Sankoh agreed to sign the Abidjan peace accord. A senior diplomat in Freetown noted that, 'always military pressure was needed to be put on before negotiations could succeed'¹².

Unsurprisingly, Sankoh insisted that the Abidjan agreement include EO's departure. Unwisely, Kabbah agreed. In its place a UN peacekeeping force was to be established but never arrived. Donors were not willing to meet the U.S.\$ 47 million bill for 700 soldiers, and Sankoh continued to dispute the agreement, maintaining that the UN presence should be less than 100. Nevertheless, EO was finally asked to leave by President Kabbah, who believed the RUF was sincere about peace. Three months later, without any external force to defend his government, he was deposed in another military coup led by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

The Conakry Accord (1997). The AFRC was not recognised by any foreign government or by the Sierra Leone people. After extensive bloodshed and destruction, the Conakry Accord was signed in October 1997 by a delegation sent by the AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma. It was intended to restore the Kabbah government. But it clearly became a ploy to buy time in the face of international pressure and a domestic boycott by government employees, who refused to work under the AFRC regime and shut down key government functions. Under cover of the accord, the AFRC stockpiled weapons and attacked remaining ECOMOG positions at the country's international airport at Lungi.

¹¹ Confidential interview, 24 April 1997.

¹² ICG Confidential Interview, 24 April 1997.

The Lomé Accord (1999). A Nigerian/ECOMOG offensive retook Freetown in February 1998, forced the AFRC out of the city and reinstalled President Kabbah. In January 1999, however, the RUF rampaged through Freetown, killing and maiming until Nigerian troops drove them out. Seven months later, the Lomé Accord was brokered by the UN under the auspices of Francis Okello, special representative of the UN Secretary General, as well as by the UK, the U.S. and regional states. Lomé was an act of expedience. ECOWAS states – particularly Nigeria – wanted to withdraw. Nigeria claimed it was spending U.S.\$ 1 million a day and had been actively fighting for over two years. Other than from the UK, there was little Western assistance for the Nigerian operations, and there was scant prospect of any replacement force or backing from Western states. Lomé was the child of stalemate. For the UN, striving for continued relevance as a peace-brokering body after being sidelined in Kosovo by NATO, the stakes were high. In October 1999, the Security Council authorised the establishment of UNAMSIL.

The international desperation to reach an agreement and 'create' peace enabled the RUF to negotiate very favourable terms. Donor countries, for their part, invested more heavily in the Lomé process than in past agreements and made important concessions to push the accord through. The U.S. hoped that the agreement would usher Sierra Leone off the international agenda at minimum cost. President Clinton's special envoy to Africa, Jesse Jackson, helped persuade Sankoh. At a critical point, Sankoh received a call from Clinton. Sankoh was reportedly jubilant. 'What rebel leader gets called by the president of the United States?' he asked. 'I only got that call because I fought in the bush for so many years'.¹²

Under Lomé the RUF was brought into the government, gaining four cabinet positions, heading a number of public sector directorships, and filling some ambassadorial posts. Most controversially, there was a blanket amnesty for all crimes committed during the war, however terrible. At the last moment however, the UN dissociated itself from the amnesty for crimes against humanity. In November 1999, a UN spokesperson stated that the amnesty would not cover 'the most flagrant' human rights abuses, and there would be a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In February 2000, the Sierra Leone parliament approved legislation to create such a commission. However, it has not begun to function.

Lomé also achieved one of the RUF's central goals – exit of the Nigerians. Today Sankoh was rewarded with the status of vice president and chairmanship of the Strategic Mineral Resources Commission, effectively giving him access to the country's diamond resources. Diamonds have been the main source of revenue for the RUF in its nine years' bush war. When Sankoh was imprisoned in May 2000, documents were discovered in his house that allegedly prove he continued to export diamonds illegally while in government.

Given the extent of concessions to the RUF, President Kabbah, was reluctant to sign. He buckled under international (particularly U.S.) pressure.

¹² Steve Coli, 'The Other War', *Washington Post Magazine*, 9 January 2000, p. 26.

The Abuja Agreement (2000). Within days of the last ECOMOG troops' departure in May 2000, the RUF took 500 members of UNAMSIL hostage and seized their vehicles and weaponry. Charles Taylor, increasingly recognised as the real power behind the RUF, came under strong international pressure to secure the eventual release of these hostages. He claimed this result proved his desire to broker a peace; it also showed his power over the RUF. Subsequently, Sankoh was arrested in Freetown, and a powerful UK force was dispatched to Lungi airport to provide security for the capital after the UN debacle. This intervention was crucial in again changing the military balance inside Sierra Leone.

In August, the Security Council approved the creation of a Special Court for war crimes. In November a cease-fire was agreed in Abuja between the RUF and the government, which was followed by a break in fighting. However, the RUF continues to commit atrocities against the civilian population and to block UN deployment. Furthermore, the fighting has spread to Guinea, where the RUF is backing rebels.

B. The RUF - No Credibility or Legitimacy

For the most part the RUF has agreed to negotiations when it faces military disadvantage and has then broken the resulting agreements after rearming. Negotiated peace settlements with the RUF, unless they provide for its complete demobilisation and disarmament, are, therefore, extremely suspect.

Moreover, the RUF lacks any independent political legitimacy. It is effectively controlled by Liberia's President Taylor, who uses it to advance his regional ambitions. The RUF has become an army of Taylor's convenience, so negotiations with the RUF's leadership ignore the real power behind its operations. These factors, discussed in more detail below, point to the need for a coercive military strategy that also provides opportunities for RUF combatants to demobilise voluntarily.

A Proxy for Charles Taylor's Political Ambitions. Taylor was elected Liberia's president in 1997 after a campaign of terror. He runs Liberia as his own personal fiefdom. He has a personal stake in every major business and personally directs all financial and security services. For Taylor, there is limited advantage at best in ending the Sierra Leone war. Disorder enables the RUF to control the diamond fields and gives Taylor access through northern Sierra Leone to attack Guinea. Both the RUF and his own elite forces have been trained by Fred Rindel, formerly with the South African special forces. Associated with Rindel are several South Africans, formerly of Executive Outcomes, who have effectively changed sides. Rindel is believed to have markedly improved the RUF's military capabilities. A state of war also provides a pretext for Taylor to quell domestic opposition.

President Taylor is not just interested in money and diamonds. Resources are simply a means to his political goals. As one senior Liberian commentator put it, 'he's in Sierra Leone not for the money but for his political agenda.'¹⁴ Although the

¹⁴ ICG interview, 3 November 2000.

Sierra Leone diamond revenues are a key source of funds, the Liberian president has never been short of money. While head of the NPFL, in control of 90 per cent of the country, he was estimated by the former U.S. ambassador to Liberia, William Twaedell, to be earning U.S.\$ 75 million a year from taxes on the passage of diamonds, timber, rubber and iron ore through his territory.¹⁵

Taylor is determined to attain power throughout the region. Since the mid-1980s he has relied heavily on personal links with Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Libya. He attended the Libyan training camps that 'became the 'Harvard and Yale of a generation of African revolutionaries'¹⁶ where he first met Foday Sankoh. Now unchallenged in his control of Liberia, he has a grander design to control the Mano River countries. However, his desire to destabilise Sierra Leone and Guinea also reflects personal grudges. He was angered that West African ECOMOG forces occupied Monrovia in 1990 and foiled his initial attempt to seize power.

An uncompromising report by the UN in December 2000 identified President Taylor as the principal culprit behind the Sierra Leone war and linked him with diamond smuggling and arms trading. It noted that he 'is actively involved in fuelling the violence in Sierra Leone, and many businessmen close to his inner circle operate on an international scale, sourcing their weaponry mainly in eastern Europe'. It added:

'In short, Liberia is breaking [UN] Security Council embargoes regarding weapons imports into its own territory and into Sierra Leone. It is being actively assisted by Burkina Faso. It is tacitly assisted by all the countries allowing weapons to pass through or over their territory without question, and by those countries that provide a base for the aircraft used in such operations.'¹⁷

An Unpopular Movement. The RUF has no discernible popular following. The 1996 elections were essentially a protest vote against the RUF and the Sierra Leone government of the day. While there was some initial sympathy for the RUF's aims – opposition to corruption in government – that has long since evaporated.

From its beginning the RUF relied on terror and brutality, summarily executing leaders believed to support the government, including chiefs, government officials and village elders. It has carried out widespread and indiscriminate campaigns of terror, mutilating thousands of people, often at random. It has received little support from the more settled rural communities, the population of which has often preferred to flee the 'freedom fighters'. Consequently, there has been 'little scope for the transformation of political dissent in these areas into revolutionary fervour'.¹⁸

An Ideological Vacuum. The simplistic ideology the RUF once enunciated is no longer a real influence on its actions. It has been replaced by a triangle of profit,

¹⁵ Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: the Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War*, (C. Hurst and New York University Press, London and New York, 1999), p.90.

¹⁶ Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy*, *ibid.*, p.72.

¹⁷ Report of the UN panel on illicit diamond and arms dealings in Sierra Leone, December 2000.

¹⁸ Abdullah and Muana, 'The Revolutionary United Front', p.179.

power and brutality. The overwhelming view in Sierra Leone is that the RUF is criminal.

The main RUF propaganda tract, 'Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone', quotes copiously from foreign revolutionary documents and essentially calls for a return to multi-party democracy, a fair sharing of resources, reform of education and an end to Lebanese domination¹⁹. This bears no relation to RUF practice. The RUF has not focused on building a political base in the countryside among the peasantry that might have been its natural following but has sought only to terrorise. Sankoh is a militaristic despot and, like Charles Taylor, is intent on taking power by whatever means. He executed his two main internal rivals, Rashid Mansaray and Abu Kanu in 1992, apparently for objecting to his tactics, and thereby eliminated any threat to his command.

The RUF concentrates upon making money, obtaining power, punishing those who are perceived as opponents, and perpetuating the privileges of gangland authority. Since Sankoh's imprisonment, it has continued to mine diamonds but the proceeds have gone to other senior leaders and Taylor. Miners work most commonly on a 'split pile' arrangement whereby they keep diamonds from one pile, and the other is taken by the RUF. Most reports indicate that any larger stones are taken by the RUF with the largest going to Liberia²⁰.

Forcible Recruitment of Young Fighters. Many, perhaps most, RUF fighters were forcibly recruited. Many are child soldiers who were kidnapped from their homes and fed on a diet of drugs. Former child combatants report using marijuana or *djamba* (often spiced with gunpowder to make it stronger), homemade alcohol, and various tablets. Cocaine and heroin are also taken, but less frequently.²¹ Children say they took drugs because it made them 'fearless'. They 'no longer saw people as people but as animals, and they could do anything they had to do, the implication being that drug taking made it possible to commit atrocities such as killing family members and cutting off peoples' limbs'.²²

There are many accounts of children forced to commit atrocities against their home villages. This transforms them into pariahs in their own communities and makes it impossible for them to return. Others are tattooed with RUF symbols so they cannot go home even if they had the chance to escape. Former combatants also relate that they would be beaten if they returned from raiding expeditions against civilians with nothing, and several tell of seeing friends shot by commanders if they did not follow orders.²³

War Crimes and Terror as a Means of Control. The RUF has committed heinous atrocities that qualify as war crimes. Indeed, the main tactic used to control territory is intimidation through violence. A RUF hallmark is amputation. Since the mid-1990s hundreds of people have had hands hacked off. The most

¹⁹ The economic influence of the Lebanese communities in West Africa is often seen as imperialistic by local populations.

²⁰ Report Of The Panel Of Experts Appointed Pursuant To UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000).

²¹ Sue Loughtin, 'A preliminary assessment of past and current drug use among former child ex-combatants in Sierra Leone', Report for UNICEF, August 2000, p.4.

²² Ibid., p.6.

²³ Ibid.

dramatic orgy of violence occurred in January 1999 when the RUF, supported by disgruntled members of the former army, infiltrated Freetown, attacked Nigerian troops from ECOMOG, killed several thousand civilians and amputated limbs of over 800 people.²⁴ More than anything, it was these well-documented atrocities that forced Western governments to take notice of Sierra Leone.

Internal Divisions within the RUF. There appear to be splits within the RUF. These are not new. In April 1997 one group of senior RUF members denounced Sankoh's leadership because he did not support the Abidjan Accord. They were taken prisoner and tortured. Some never reappeared. It is unclear whether the RUF now operates cohesively as a single unit. Junior members were sent to sign the November 2000 cease-fire, for example. It is uncertain exactly who has authority to represent the movement and ensure that it adheres to a peace agreement.

With Sankoh's imprisonment, the RUF appears to have come more directly under President Taylor's control. Issa Sesay has been announced as 'interim leader', although it is not clear on whose authority. The 'interim' nature of the appointment is presumably meant to indicate that Sankoh remains in theory the overall leader despite his imprisonment. Sesay's appointment appears not to have total support but is most likely backed by President Taylor. Some leaders, such as Dennis 'Superman' Mingo, have opposed Sesay's more moderate line, while there are reports that Sam 'Mosquito' Bockarie may be trying to exert more influence after disagreeing with Sankoh and taking refuge in Liberia. But Bockarie's position is uncertain since it was reported in January 2001 that Taylor had expelled him from Liberia, probably to distance himself from visible connections with the RUF.

Further confusion has fuelled uncertainty about who speaks for the RUF. On 22 November 2000 media reports quoted RUF spokesperson Gibril Massaquoi as alleging that the RUF was divided over the cease-fire signed earlier in the month, and the majority of combatants no longer took orders from Sesay. This was later denied. The RUF appears broadly divided into two commands. The eastern command has two main brigades, one centred around Kono and Tongo diamond areas to secure those resources and the communication routes to Liberia. The northern command, with four brigades, is located in the Magburaka, Makeni area. The division poses difficulties for obtaining full RUF acquiescence to any peace agreement.

C. Conflicting Agendas and Military Deadlock

Intransigence and a lack of legitimacy and integrity have been the hallmarks of the RUF but the RUF has also capitalised on the absence of international resolve and the multiplicity of international agendas. The result has been a series of weak accommodations engineered by the international community that have perpetuated rather than resolved the war.

The UK intervention to retrain the SLA with a view to conducting a more coercive strategy is a break with the past. It contains risks given SLA unreliability but it

²⁴ 'Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone', *Africa Rights Watch*, Vol. 11, No. 3(A), June 1999.

recognises that there is little chance of permanent peace through negotiations. The UK stance has been met with scepticism and a degree of resentment in Africa. The UN has tended to favour another series of negotiations, in large part because UNAMSIL is incapable of robust action.

1. The African Response

Nigeria. A small Nigerian unit has been in Sierra Leone since the mid-1990s. Nigerian troops have served under both ECOMOG and the UN. The initial Nigerian role was to assist Sierra Leone during the Liberian war when it was clear Charles Taylor was helping the RUF. A large ECOMOG force held parts of Liberia and was frequently in conflict with Taylor's NPFL faction. Conversely, one militia recruited from Liberian refugees (ULIMO) was helping the Sierra Leone army against the RUF.

In Sierra Leone, the ECOMOG force was usually small and restricted to guarding key installations. When confronted with the AFRC/RUF forces during the coup in May 1997, the Nigerians were forced into an embarrassing retreat to the international airport. Their failure was exacerbated by the fact that Nigeria had also signed a defence agreement with the Kabbah government in March 1997 which promised to provide presidential protection, training for the Sierra Leone military and strategic support for the regime.

That blow to Nigerian pride, added to impatience at the intransigence of the AFRC/RUF junta, was a key reason for the Nigerian assault that took Freetown and restored Kabbah to power in February 1998. Intervention also suited General Sani Abacha's military government. Nigeria needed – and still needs – to be seen as a powerful player and a positive force for regional stability. For Abacha the intervention was an opportunity to divert the increasing international pressure on Nigeria to improve its human rights situation and hold elections. The West was obliged to recognise Nigeria's involvement in Sierra Leone because no other state was willing to fulfil this role.

More than any other nation, Nigeria has committed itself militarily to the resolution of Sierra Leone's war. Without its involvement it is likely the RUF would have consolidated its power. But it also locked Nigeria into a long-term fight against the RUF, which retreated into the hinterland. On assuming office in early 1999, the newly elected Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, stated that one of his main foreign policy priorities was to reduce the cost of Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone. Prior to the Lomé agreement, there was a clear feeling among Nigerian politicians that it was time the UN pulled its weight in Africa by sending more peacekeepers or at least paying for ECOMOG.

Today Nigeria's continued presence risks degenerating into collaboration with its supposed enemies. Something similar happened earlier in Sierra Leone and in Liberia where international peacekeepers often collaborated with various armed factions. During the Liberian war, timber and minerals were transported across the frontlines between rival forces, earning ECOMOG the synonym of 'Every Car Or Moving Object Gone'. In September 2000, some

Nigerian soldiers were accused by the Indian UN Force Commander, General Jetley, of collaborating with the RUF to mine and trade diamonds. This is an accusation with which most independent observers in Sierra Leone concur. The economic ambitions of senior Nigerian officers are worrying, especially since, as part of UNAMSIL, Nigerian troops are likely to reoccupy the diamond mining areas

Positioning Nigerian forces in the diamond areas could prolong an intractable conflict. Added to the U.S.\$ 1,000 per month that Nigeria receives for each soldier it contributes to UNAMSIL (under ECOMOG all costs were borne by West African states and so overwhelmingly by Nigeria), the fear is that some commanders have little incentive to seek an end to the conflict.

When a UN Security Council mission visited Liberia in October 2000, President Taylor stated he would prefer Nigerian forces to be based in the diamond fields and to guard the Liberian border. This contrasts to statements during the Lomé negotiation when he insisted that ECOMOG withdraw. His change is clearly linked to what he judges would give him best advantage. Within days of ECOMOG's departure in April 2000, the RUF took UN peacekeepers hostage. Now with the threat of the UK-trained force on the horizon, Taylor is courting Nigeria and attempting to drive a wedge between Nigeria and the UK so as to maintain his stronghold. On 21 November 2000, for example, he called for withdrawal of UK forces if they were not brought into UNAMSIL. Clearly, Taylor believes he can do business with the Nigerians.

Liberia and Guinea. West African conflicts are too frequently compartmentalised into state specific insurgencies, ignoring regional implications. Sierra Leone's war was perceived as a local conflict until its regional ramifications recently became only too obvious. Clearly, the RUF has support from Liberia and, indirectly, Burkina Faso. There has been significant fighting along the Sierra Leone-Guinea border between RUF and Guinean troops and also between Liberian and Guinean security forces along the Guinea-Liberia border around the Guinean town of Guéckédou where there are approximately 200,000, mainly Sierra Leone, refugees.

Liberia and Guinea have accused each other of territorial violations and harbouring dissidents. Liberia has charged that more than four attacks on its territory in two years were carried out with the acquiescence of Guinea, which it alleges trained and armed Liberian insurgents.

Guinea claims the Liberian government supports incursions into its territory from Sierra Leone and Liberia. Guinea has carried out several bombing raids of Sierra Leone territory, claiming they were in pursuit of dissidents who were attacking Guinean towns and villages. Fighting in Guinea's forest region has created a humanitarian crisis involving over 300,000 Sierra Leone and Liberian refugees, who have fled the wars in their countries. The conflict has seriously affected the ability of aid agencies to reach desperate refugees. The UNHCR describes the crisis as its biggest humanitarian emergency.

Charles Taylor is widely regarded as supporting RUF attacks against Guinea. There are fears that these attacks could provoke more widespread conflict and instability within Guinea, a country of over seven million considered close to collapse from internal strife and the misgovernment of President Lansana Conte's regime.

In addition to Taylor, another name consistently linked with the incursions into Guinea is that of Mohammed Touré, son of Guinea's first post-colonial leader, Ahmed Sékou Touré. Mohammed Touré is believed to be close to Taylor and working alongside the RUF to exploit its control of territory adjacent to Guinea's long border with Sierra Leone. Ethnicity also plays a leading role in this instability since there are mixed populations along the border.

Many of the same factors in Sierra Leone and Liberia's wars are present in Guinea. Poverty and corruption have resulted in high levels of youth unemployment. Unsurprisingly, students and disgruntled young people are at the vanguard of protests and most likely to take up arms. Unfortunately, Guinea's mineral wealth, including one third of the world's bauxite reserves²⁵, significant iron ore and gold and an estimated 300 million carats in diamond reserves, could prove to be a source of instability.

2. The United Nations

Military Role. ICG believes that there is a need for military coercion against the RUF but UN forces can not do this. Increasing their numbers in the expectation that more will prove better could lead to further UN humiliation.

The UN's mandate permits peacekeepers only to protect themselves when threatened and to protect civilians in 'imminent threat of physical violence' in areas of UNAMSIL deployment. Thus, in practice, the issue of where and when to use force to protect civilians is open to inconsistent interpretation and is ultimately at the discretion of the field commander. UNAMSIL's evacuation of Kenyan peacekeepers from Kabala when the town came under RUF attack in early June 2000 demonstrated the lack of clarity and vulnerability inherent in the current 'Chapter Six and a Half' mandate. Many argue that UNAMSIL needs more extensive powers so as to be better prepared if attacked or deployed in dangerous areas. Under a stronger Chapter VII mandate, it would be more easily held accountable for any failures.²⁶

However, even a more robust mandate will not change the reality that the UN force is ill-suited to wage war in Sierra Leone. It cannot be expected to launch offensives. To protect civilians effectively, UNAMSIL requires not only a robust mandate, and the political will to hold UN field commanders and their units accountable, but also serious military capability.

²⁵ Guinea's production represents 11 percent of the world's production.

²⁶ See U.S. Committee for Refugees http://www.refugees.org/news/fact_sheets/faq_sierraleone.htm

Regrettably, much of the current UNAMSIL force is inadequate, and its soldiers are not willing to put their lives at risk in a conflict in which they have no direct interest. The standard of many of the African forces that form the bulk of UNAMSIL is woeful. Poorly briefed, ill-equipped and unable to operate cohesively, they are unprepared to cope with the tactics of the armed groups. Peacekeepers in May 2000 put up little resistance to RUF attempts to disarm them in Makeni. Rather than disarming combatants, they contributed a significant array of weaponry and equipment to the arsenal of the RUF. An informal poll of the rules of engagement by various contingents revealed that they would return fire if under attack but that they considered themselves under no obligation to go to the rescue of another country's soldiers in UNAMSIL.

The U.S. supports a more forceful UNAMSIL approach and advocates that the force be strengthened. It favours a redrafting of the UN mandate to allow UNAMSIL to impose peace and has threatened to withhold funding if that does not happen. The U.S. has started training five Nigerian, one Ghanaian and one Senegalese battalion to join UNAMSIL and enforce a more aggressive mandate.²⁷ But there is little guarantee that this diverse force could retake much territory. Experience suggests that the successful use of force requires a single cohesive military unit.

Furthermore, adopting a more robust Chapter VII approach would deter potential troop-contributing countries. They question why their soldiers should fight a war to which Western governments are unprepared to commit troops. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was unusually frank during the hostage crisis of May 2000: 'We would have liked to see some of the governments with capacity, with good armies and well-trained soldiers, participate but they are not running forward to contribute to this force'.²⁸

For developing countries, the opportunity to earn hard currency has become a compelling reason for contributing peacekeepers. UN peacekeeping forces in Africa – especially in unresolved internal conflicts – are rapidly turning into a third world army paid by the West. Whereas five years ago, Western governments formed the backbone of UN deployments, today they shun such involvement. Lakhdar Brahimi, the Algerian diplomat who led a UN panel on the reform of peacekeeping, recently lamented 'you can't have a situation where some people contribute the blood and some contribute the money'.²⁹

India's withdrawal of its 3,000 soldiers and Jordan of its 1,800 at the end of 2000 is linked in part to their reluctance to provide peacekeeping forces to areas where Western troops refuse to go. But there was also considerable hostility between Nigeria and India over Gen. Jetley's remarks concerning Nigerian diamond interests. The two most senior Nigerian officials implicated in the report - Mr Annan's special representative in Freetown, Ambassador

²⁷ The U.S. partnership with Western African armies to support UN operations in Sierra Leone is called "Operation Focus relief".

²⁸ UN press release SC/6857, 11 May 2000.

²⁹ Colum Lynch, 'U.S. and Europe Shift UN Peacekeeping Burden to Poor Nations' Troops', *Guardian Weekly*, 14 December 2000, p.29.

Oluyemi Adeniji, and Gen Jetley's immediate subordinate, Brigadier-General Monammed Garba - both denounced Gen. Jetley's memorandum.

After that incident, future co-operation between these two major contributors, each with three battalions, was untenable. General Victor Maiu, the Nigerian chief of staff, demanded Gen. Jetley's immediate removal. 'We are not going to serve under that man in whatever circumstances. If he is not removed, he will not get our co-operation, and we are the largest contingent in the force,' he said.³⁰

Although two Bangladeshi battalions and further troops from Zambia and Ghana will partly fill the gap, the departure of the Indians is a major blow to UNAMSIL's viability; the Indian forces were its best troops.

International Tribunal. 'The Lomé peace agreement entrenched the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of human rights abuses throughout Sierra Leone's eight-year conflict. By including an amnesty for all activities undertaken in pursuit of the conflict, the peace agreement granted impunity for some of the worst human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity and war crimes.'³¹

The Security Council has resolved (Resolution 1315 of 14 August 2000) to create an international tribunal to prosecute those who have committed crimes against humanity. The tribunal or special court will try 'persons who bear greatest responsibility' for 'crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law, committed within the territory of Sierra Leone'. Unlike the Tribunals of Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia, the court is to be a mixed effort between the international and Sierra Leone justice systems.³² Although the Lomé accord of July 1999 included a comprehensive amnesty, it would be possible to prosecute people who have committed crimes since that date, including Foday Sankon. Moreover, it is sometimes argued that RUF failure to respect Lomé terms has rendered the amnesty null and void, thus enabling prosecution also of earlier crimes.

The tribunal is needed. Those who have committed abuses must be brought to trial. That will go some way to ending impunity for perpetrators on all sides of human rights abuses. But there has been little material support for its establishment. In January 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan cautioned the Security Council against moving ahead without proper funding. He noted that the court might encounter financial problems unless provided three years of operational funds before its inception.

³⁰ Chris McGreal and Ewen MacAskill, 'UN to Bolster Peacekeeping Force by 7,000. Decision to Send Extra Troops Could Solve Dilemma about Leadership', special report: Sierra Leone, *The Guardian* (London), 13 September 2000.

³¹ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Ending Impunity - an Opportunity Not to be Missed* (Amnesty International, AFR 31/60/00, 6 July 2000), p. 2.

³² See letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council dated 12 January 2001, S/2001/40.

There is also need for legal improvements within Sierra Leone. Administration of justice, both civil and criminal, is barely functional. Judicial institutions lack the necessary personnel with the appropriate training in international criminal law, financial support, equipment and the necessary legal tools to conduct trials of those accused of crimes under both national and international law³³. Furthermore, Sierra Leone law does not currently extend to crimes under international law, including crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The Lomé Accord also mandated a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a national human rights commission but little progress has been made toward establishing either. The TRC was to be established 90 days after the signing and to submit its report twelve months later. However, the government stated that it did not want the TRC to begin until disarmament and demobilisation of combatants were complete. Recently, UNAMSIL has assisted the government to draft legislation to establish a human rights commission, but funding is lacking. A workshop by the UNAMSIL human rights office in November 2000 also laid out some issues for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

3. The UK Role

The UK has maintained an interest in Sierra Leone since independence. It contributed the bulk of the funding to the February 1996 election. The so-called Sandline Affair (known also as the 'Arms to Africa Affair') and the publicity surrounding atrocities in Sierra Leone intensified British interest. In March 1998 it was reported that the British private security company Sandline (an associate of Executive Outcomes) had violated an arms embargo on Sierra Leone. Sandline had purchased weapons and provided a small number of personnel and a helicopter in support of the February 1998 Nigerian assault on Freetown to reinstate President Kabbah. Sandline, dubbed 'mercenaries' in the British press, claimed that the UK government had known of its intention to assist Kabbah. While the Labour government condemned the affair as an affront to ethical foreign policy, it appeared to many that the company was supporting the restoration of democracy against a barbarous AFRC/RUF junta and could, therefore, be seen as being on the 'right' side in Sierra Leone's war.

Sandline's intervention raised a more fundamental issue. In the absence of other international assistance, President Kabbah had little choice other than to arrange a commercial deal to obtain the funds to pay Sandline for its support and to request the help of Nigeria, which then was under the dictatorial rule of Sani Abacha. The international media coverage of atrocities when the RUF entered Freetown in January 1999 fuelled further pressure on the UK to assist in resolution of the Sierra Leone conflict. These events resulted in a marked increase of UK funds to restructure the Sierra Leone armed forces in 1999.

³³ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Ending Impunity*, p.3.

As noted earlier, the UK's policy to train and equip SLA troops to inflict a military defeat on the RUF is high-risk. A military offensive against the RUF may be essential given the failure of Sierra Leone's elected government to stabilise the country and end the war but if pursued in the absence of an appropriate political strategy it could prove disastrous. Even if a reorganised SLA, supported by British troops, could decisively defeat the RUF, the consequence might be further regional destabilisation since RUF forces could regroup in Liberia and renew their offensive in Guinea. Moreover, SLA forces, unless regularly paid and effectively commanded, might well begin to live off the land as so many troops in Sierra Leone have done in the past. Finally, a British withdrawal after a comprehensive military victory over the RUF would tip the balance of military power and risk restarting the war, as happened after the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes in 1997. All the problems which helped create the war in the first place remain present, aggravated by the events of the past ten years.

It is obvious, despite Whitehall denials, that British involvement in logistics and training will need to continue for a long time. Habits of ill discipline and corruption are endemic in the Sierra Leone armed forces, and many of the same soldiers are being recycled. Familiar problems – especially 'lost' wages and rations – are re-emerging as soldiers are placed under Sierra Leone command following their UK training. To reorient the SLA, it needs to know it is being effectively led. For that to happen, British officers must be placed in the chain of command, probably as deep as the rank of major. That step, while believed essential by British officers on the ground, is politically risky for a Blair government already accused of 'mission creep' by its political opponents. It would also create unprecedented dependence by an African country on a former colonial power.

The necessity for outside commitment to Sierra Leone goes further than the military sphere. In effect, a military option alone is doomed to failure in the sense that it cannot by itself stabilise Sierra Leone and could cause serious military repercussions throughout West Africa, further destabilising a troubled region. A military option, while necessary, can only achieve stability if it is part of a medium-term political strategy.

4. Harmonising Objectives

There is mounting unease in West Africa at the British approach to arm, retrain and re-equip the Sierra Leone army with the objective of defeating the RUF. The show of British strength in November 2000, including deployment of warships, attack helicopters and marines, may have been comforting for Sierra Leone citizens, but it was condemned by the acting UN commander, a Nigerian, who considered it overtly aggressive and declared it might undermine any peace agreement.

The Nigerian position – which has great resonance in UNAMSIL – is that international and Sierra Leone government forces should push into the interior, persuading, not compelling, the RUF to stand aside. Multinational forces, given their composition and mandate, actually have few other options. UNAMSIL continues to hold one-on-one conversations with the RUF,

entreats its leaders to keep the Lomé accord, which in reality has already failed.

The UK mission is distinct from that of the UN, and there are risks of serious disagreement. The new appointments of Force Commander Major-General Daniel Opande (Kenya), Deputy Force Commander Major-General Martin Agwai (Nigeria) and a British Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Alastair Duncan, may help bridge some of the gaps. But the question remains how mediation aimed at forging a consensus favoured by UNAMSIL can mesh with the more aggressive stance taken by the Sierra Leone government and its UK backers.

Nevertheless, the two international forces need each other. UNAMSIL relies on the guarantee of forceful UK intervention. Without it, UNAMSIL risks once again being humiliated by the RUF as in May 2000. At the same time, the UK plan presumably requires UNAMSIL to occupy areas that the SLA takes, especially given the nature of Sierra Leone troops. That strategy, however – appearing to take sides against the RUF – does not coincide with the UN approach.

The UN also worries that, should the SLA be defeated by the RUF, its soldiers will retreat into UNAMSIL bases, effectively placing them on the front line and compromising their 'impartiality'.

The international community cannot run two or more strategies in Sierra Leone simultaneously. Working against each other with conflicting mandates will only fuel the conflict and invite warring factions to exploit differences. The former Yugoslavia and Somalia provide clear examples that strategic coherence is fundamental to success.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

There are no simple solutions to the Sierra Leone war. The task is to make the best policy from the possibilities and players available. The international community must not repeat its mistakes by believing that a quick-fix negotiation will resolve the conflict. This time around, Sierra Leone deserves reassurance that the international community will fulfil its commitment to restore and uphold peace for as long as needed. That first aspect -- to restore peace -- involves a militarily robust response.

The Lomé peace agreement is dead and should be abandoned. It was broken by the RUF in the first months after its signature. The most recent blatant demonstration of bad faith came in December 2000 with the long-awaited hand-over of weapons and equipment taken from UNAMSIL in May 2000. A total of eleven armoured vehicles were returned on 11 December 2000 but they had been stripped of all mounted weapons and equipment. No other weapons or ammunition were turned in, despite commitments to do so. Furthermore, the RUF banned UNAMSIL from entering areas it controlled until certain 'non-negotiable' conditions were met, including the release of Foday Sankoh.

Since bringing the RUF into negotiations has not aided peace, the UN should call for the RUF's immediate 'surrender'. The RUF is not a cohesive movement. It lacks ideology or popular support. It is an armed gang, ultimately controlled by President Charles Taylor.

RUF combatants wanting to demobilise should be helped to do so quickly and in safety, with well planned and designed re-integration programs to entice them out of the bush. Delays in providing re-integration programs will result in many youths being recycled as further recruits for President Taylor and his security forces.

Those in the RUF who refuse to demobilise should be defeated militarily. The military option could be spearheaded by UK trained and led Sierra Leone armed forces with UNAMSIL securing the areas regained. The UK should provide military and intelligence backup to guarantee the safety of UN forces. The CDF could provide additional security for local villages and settlements.

Such a military strategy, while essential, clearly requires a shift in international perceptions and agreements.

A forward military strategy requires rapid harmonising of international positions. It is unlikely to succeed while the UN-West Africa alliance pulls in a different strategic direction from the UK-Sierra Leone government alliance. The international community must quickly find a united way forward or it will witness another intervention disaster in Africa.

It is essential that the UN Security Council upgrade the UNAMSIL mandate. This will require a concerted effort by permanent Security Council members including the U.S., UK and France. The UK is already committed to such a course. The U.S. also supports redrafting the UN mandate. Its role as a funder of the operation and its training function with various West African armies give the U.S. considerable influence. France is understood to be considering a British request to take a more positive approach to military interventions in West Africa. An incentive for France to do this could come from its relations with Ivory Coast, the government of which is threatened by a further spread of violence in the region and has closed its territory to arms transfers from Burkina Faso to Liberia.

It is also vital that other West African governments identify themselves with such an approach. This is perhaps the hardest diplomatic task. It would effectively legitimise a position already taken by the UK that has never been the subject of any international mandate. It would require resolution of deep differences between West African governments.

The most important actor in this respect is Nigeria. A guarantee of further international funding for African troops in UNAMSIL would have to be part of a comprehensive diplomatic agreement that would also include an enhanced mandate for UNAMSIL and agreement by ECOWAS on an aggressive stance towards the RUF. Importantly, Ivory Coast might now be expected to support such a position given its vulnerability. France might also be prevailed upon to intercede with its regional allies and is already considering British requests for support for joint border operations between Sierra Leone and Guinea. This would be welcome if agreed by key regional actors, especially Nigeria and Ivory Coast. Other African

governments should be asked for support. Little can be hoped for from the Organisation of African Unity, which is too large and disparate, but some gesture of support for robust international action might be obtained from South Africa, which has good relations with both Britain and the U.S. Although South Africa is not militarily involved in West Africa, its influence and its rhetorical commitment to the notion of an African renaissance make its position important.

If Charles Taylor is not stopped from fuelling the Sierra Leone conflict, he is likely to encourage formation of a new rebel group should the RUF be defeated. This tactic was often seen during the earlier war in Liberia. The conflict must be examined in its regional context and Sierra Leone's neighbours need to be made accountable for their role in it. The use of targeted sanctions – visa restrictions, freezing bank accounts and the like – against key members of President Taylor's power structures and their families would be extremely effective. To keep Taylor's threat at bay these sanctions could be extended to Taylor's business partners in the region and in the United States. A key element would include logging activities, which enrich Taylor's immediate circle and are frequently associated with arms shipments. ECOWAS is already considering such sanctions against Liberia.

Funding is needed to start the Special Court, which has already been formally established. While the pitfalls of the Rwandan tribunal need to be heeded, the instigators of violence such as Foday Sankoh and key members of the RUF hierarchy should stand trial. This is essential to stop the cycle of impunity.

Parallel support is needed to re-establish basic judicial functions within Sierra Leone and to bring into play a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in a form appropriate to the Sierra Leone situation. The latter would seek to produce a degree of healing between those who have committed crimes at a lower level, and their victims.

The underlying causes of Sierra Leone's war are frequently forgotten in the face of the immediate conflict. These include corrupt and unaccountable government, manipulated ethnicity and alienated youth. Peace cannot be sustained without addressing these factors.

Demobilisation and reintegration campaigns that collapsed in May 2000 should be rejuvenated to provide an incentive for soldiers to give up their weapons. Even before May 2000, only a minority of those who demobilised were RUF.

The CDF needs to be brought under more accountable control, possibly as part of local territorial units. Currently, it is an extra-state force, answerable to Chief Hinga Norman, who runs it as his own military. The CDF's future needs to be resolved quickly and decisively. While it has been effective in keeping the RUF at bay, it is a wild card in the peace process and risks deteriorating into a new RUF. The UK and Sierra Leone governments have developed an apparently sound concept to formalise the CDF's existence and bring it under state control. It envisages the CDF serving as a smaller territorial force that could be mobilised in response to local security threats. Its weaponry could conceivably be stored in one central arsenal.

Improving governance in Sierra Leone is the most difficult problem of all but it is essential if there is to be a lasting peace. The civil war is rooted in four decades of bad government and a longer colonial history of indirect rule. Elections in 1996 produced a government which was democratically chosen but soon demonstrated itself incapable of governing well or installing peace. It failed to address many of the fundamental problems that have underpinned the war. New elections are needed. They should be run by the UN, as in Cambodia and elsewhere.

However, there is no reason to believe that a government elected in the immediate future would do any better unless rooted in a clear partnership with the international community. This means the Security Council making a clear commitment to a continuing role for the international community in Sierra Leone for a long enough period, probably five years or more, to complete essential contributions not only to rebuilding Sierra Leone's army but also to re-establishing the judicial system and other elements of good governance, including a national system of education.

The whole strategy proposed, with both its military and civilian support dimensions, would need to be the subject of negotiation with key political actors in the country, and discussed and, as far as possible, endorsed by key regional actors, especially Nigeria. It would surely be supported by the overwhelming majority of the Sierra Leone population.

Regarding the international half of this partnership, the single most eligible actor to play a leading role is the UK government, which is the only potential peacemaker that has shown the will and ability to intervene decisively. Its authority, however, would need to be confirmed in some form and complemented by the UN, with respect to both military and political strategy. It needs to be emphasised again that a purely military strategy, without a real political commitment by the international community, would likely only further destabilise the region, as many West Africans fear, regardless of the fate of the RUF.

These are unusual and radical recommendations. They will be difficult to implement. However, if the international community were to leave Sierra Leone quickly, even in the event of the military defeat of the RUF, violence would likely resume at once as the consequent power-vacuum attracted intervention from Liberia and Burkina Faso. The results would almost certainly include a collapse of government in Guinea and spread of the zone of conflict throughout much of West Africa in a manner comparable to what has happened in Central Africa. In other words, without an unusually intense and protracted international commitment in Sierra Leone, the prospects are terrible.

Freetown/London/Brussels, 11 April 2001

APPENDIX A

Appendix A: Political Background to the Crisis

The modern republic of Sierra Leone grew out of an eighteenth-century settlement on the West African coast for African and Caribbean Slaves and free citizens from Britain, some of them former slaves. Starting with the colony of Freetown, British rule eventually extended into the hinterland. The country area remained under British rule until it gained independence in 1961. From the beginning Sierra Leone's political parties vied for dominance at any cost. In 1967, the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), that had led the country since independence, was narrowly defeated by the All People's Congress (APC) led by former trade union leader, Siaka Stevens. The latter was prevented from taking power immediately by a military coup but in 1968 Stevens became head of state. His APC party quickly consolidated power and in 1978 formally established a one-party state. This notoriously corrupt government made extensive use of patronage.

In 1985, the 80-year old Stevens handed over power to his hand-picked successor, General Joseph Momoh. Momoh cracked down on prominent Lebanese businessmen who controlled the Sierra Leone diamond trade and had become politically powerful under APC rule. These businessmen used their wealth to finance the civil war then raging in Lebanon itself and their influence with the government to encourage diplomacy helpful to one or another Lebanese faction. However, President Momoh became increasingly dependent in his own turn on Israeli traders and diplomatic and security networks and on Russian criminals with interests in the diamond trade. Such webs of international influence, in which criminal, financial, military and diplomatic interests are inextricably linked, have characterised Sierra Leone ever since.

Sierra Leone's war began in March 1991 when a small armed contingent known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), accompanied by Liberian fighters and Burkinabe soldiers, entered south-eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia. Foday Sankoh and other leading figures in the RUF had been involved with Charles Taylor and other insurgents from various West African countries in training camps in Libya and Burkina Faso in the 1980s. They said they intended to overthrow the APC government of President Momoh and claimed their larger goal was a radical, pan-African revolution.

The RUF was heavily dependent on Taylor, then the leader of a military faction in the civil war that had begun in neighbouring Liberia in 1989. Taylor and Sankoh sometimes claimed that their alliance was based on pan-African revolutionary solidarity. Taylor was also motivated by a desire to punish the Sierra Leone government for its participation in the West African intervention force in Liberia, known as the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and led by Nigeria. That intervention in 1990 had prevented Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) faction from taking control of Liberia. As time went by, Sierra Leone and Liberian forces became increasingly embroiled in one another's affairs, and Taylor supported the RUF to prevent Sierra Leone from being used by his Liberian opponents as well as to acquire diamonds and other plunder.

On 29 April 1992, President Momoh was overthrown in a military coup by young officers disillusioned with his government. Many of these officers had battlefield experience of the burgeoning two-country war. The coup was overwhelmingly popular among Sierra Leone citizens, many of whom regarded the old administration as incorrigibly corrupt. But the new National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) administration, consisting of eighteen military officers and four civilians, headed by Captain Valentine Strasser, soon adopted a style reminiscent of its predecessors. It also suffered a series of defeats

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against the RUF. Despite military government and the expansion of the Sierra Leone army from 3,000 to over 13,000, the RUF advanced within a few kilometres of Freetown. Moreover, it became increasingly apparent that the government army often avoided fighting the RUF. Army and rebel commanders even reached informal understandings not to confront one another. Both sides lived off the countryside, plundering and abusing unarmed civilians. In desperation the government hired a private military company, Executive Outcomes, mainly comprised of former South African soldiers. This more disciplined and experienced force, which was supported by local armed militias, reversed the tide of war and pushed the RUF from most strategic areas.

The subsequent lull in fighting afforded sufficient stability – coupled with international and local pressure for democracy – for elections to be held in February 1996. These were conducted reasonably well and were won by the SLPP party led by Ahmed Tajan Kabbah, a former international civil servant with the United Nations.

The new government continued the policy of encouraging some local communities to recruit their own armed militias, officially called the Civil Defence Force but often known as *Kamajors*. It signed a peace settlement with RUF leader Foday Sankoh in Abidjan in November 1996, as part of which Kabbah was obliged to terminate Executive Outcomes' contract at the beginning of 1997. This proved a mistake that crucially changed the balance of military force and upset whatever basis had existed for political accord.

Three months later, President Kabbah was overthrown in a coup led by his own army, which had grown dissatisfied with the new government's curtailment of its privileges and its increasing use of the Civil Defence Force as, in effect, a private army. Kabbah and his government were forced into exile in Conakry. The new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) invited the RUF to join a coalition government.

A bizarre alliance of former foes, the AFRC/RUF administration was characterised by the total absence of the rule of law. There was widespread violence, rape and looting. The military regime was shunned by the international community. Many Sierra Leone civil servants boycotted their government jobs. Under international and domestic pressure, the AFRC/RUF agreed in Conakry in October 1997 to return power to the democratically elected Kabbah government. But almost immediately the AFRC/RUF administration showed increasing reluctance to adhere to its pledges.

Nigerian forces, present under an older defence agreement, continued to hold the international airport at Lungi even after the May 1997 overthrow of Kabbah. In February 1998 these troops, now technically part of ECOMOG, attacked Freetown, ousting the AFRC government. Most RUF fighters returned to the interior and resumed guerrilla war. Many Sierra Leone soldiers who had served the AFRC junta also fled to the interior and lived off the land, making common cause with the RUF. Pitted against them were 10-12,000 mainly Nigerian troops, under the banner of ECOMOG. These worked closely with the armed civilian militias, especially the *Kamajors*.

Horrific atrocities against civilians in rural areas were reported throughout 1998. In many cases these seem to have been perpetrated by the RUF and former soldiers seeking to impose their will in the countryside, but there were also reports of atrocities by the *Kamajors*. In effect, Sierra Leone was prey to a variety of armed groups, some having little coherence and no formal status. Its government, although internationally regarded as legitimate by virtue of its electoral mandate, was actually dependent on Nigerian troops and local militias. Several local forces recruited Liberians who had come to Sierra Leone either as refugees or as military adventurers. Some of these retained

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links to Liberian military factions. There were many reports of collusion between groups officially opposed to one another, especially in diamond-marketing.

In July 1998, the UN established UNOMSIL, a 40-strong observer force.³⁴ But in January 1999, AFRC and the RUF infiltrated and nearly seized control of Freetown. Appalling atrocities were inflicted on civilians including rape, the random amputation of limbs from men, women and children, and kidnapping. Three thousand people are believed to have been murdered or abducted and many hundreds mutilated before ECOMOG again consolidated and pushed the RUF out of the capital.

ECOMOG, overwhelmingly Nigerian, was incapable of inflicting a lasting military defeat on the RUF, which continued to be supplied from Liberia by President Taylor. Nigeria wanted to withdraw, especially once Olusegun Obasanjo was elected as head of a civilian government in 1999. With few other states showing interest in sending troops and under international pressure to take even cosmetic action, another peace agreement was signed between the government and the RUF in Lomé just six months after the January 1999 atrocities.

Under Lomé the RUF gained positions in the government, and Foday Sankoh was given the status of vice president and made responsible for diamond marketing. To replace departing ECOMOG forces the UN Security Council also agreed to establish a 6,000-strong peacekeeping force, recently raised to 17,500. The new UN force, known as UNAMSIL, was empowered under Chapter VI of the UN Charter to ensure the security of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under immediate threat of violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Sierra Leone government and ECOMOG. Half of the 6,000 troops were expected to be provided by ECOWAS countries.³⁵

But within days of the last ECOMOG troops' departure in May 2000, the RUF took hostage 500 members of UNAMSIL and seized their vehicles and weaponry. Charles Taylor, increasingly recognised as the real power behind the RUF, came under strong international pressure to secure the eventual release of these hostages. He claimed this result proved his desire to broker a peace; it also showed his power over the RUF. Subsequently, Sankoh was arrested in Freetown, and a powerful UK force was dispatched to Lungi airport to provide security for the capital after the UN debacle. This intervention was crucial in again changing the military balance inside Sierra Leone.

By December 2000, a vague west-east front line divided the warring factions. Since then there has been little fighting inside Sierra Leone itself. To the north of this front line, the RUF remains dominant except for isolated army deployments around Kabala and Bumbuna. In the south, especially around Freetown, some 13,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers, predominantly African and dominated by three Nigerian battalions, are stationed in camps. Between them, and operating completely independently, is the Civil Defence Force (CDF), an exceedingly loose militia group of up to 40,000 fighters nominally under the control of the Deputy Minister of Defence, Hinga Norman. The training and strength of the militia is highly variable though many have modern automatic weapons.

³⁴This was renamed UNAMSIL in October 1999, initially with some 6,000 troops.

³⁵John L. Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* (International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, Lynne Rienner publishers, Boulder and London, 2001), p.127.

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The new Sierra Leone army, which will ultimately number 8,500, is becoming a more powerful force. Under the direction of several hundred UK soldiers, 3,000 have now completed basic training. A British rapid reaction force has been stationed offshore, presumably ready to intervene should the RUF become a major threat once again. A key concern to many observers, however, is that among the troops deployed in support of the government are many who could carry out future abuses. The new, retrained Sierra Leone army appears to contain individuals who were themselves responsible for human rights abuses in previous years. If they are not well led, there may be more abuses. The CDF has also been responsible for many abuses; some of its fighters are reported to have served previously with other militias in Sierra Leone or in Liberia.

APPENDIX B

Appendix B: Acronyms

- AFRC: Armed Forces Ruling Council. A military junta established after a coup in 1997, which was driven from power by Nigerian forces operating under the umbrella of ECOMOG in February 1998. Troops loyal to the AFRC retreated to the countryside and continued to operate as armed opponents of the restored democratic government.
- APC: All People's Congress. A political party formed by the late Siaka Stevens, which held power until a military coup in 1992.
- CDF: Civil Defence Force. Officially a government-aligned militia force of about 40,000, the name is given to a number of local militias, most notably the *Kamajors*, which are in fact largely independent of government control.
- ECOMOG: ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group. Originally organised in 1990 to intervene in Liberia, it has evolved into an umbrella for various regional interventions in which Nigeria has played a leading role.
- ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States. A regional economic grouping which has become a key diplomatic forum for organising regional military interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia and elsewhere.
- EO: Executive Outcomes. A South African security company run by former members of the South African Special Forces. Employed by the Sierra Leone government in 1995-6, it decisively altered the military balance. Its contract was terminated under the terms of the Abidjan peace agreement in early 1997. EO has subsequently been dissolved, but some of its associates have recently worked for President Taylor of Liberia and have aided the RUF.
- NPRC: National Provisional Ruling Council. A military junta established after a coup in 1992 chaired by Valentine Strasser. It ceded power to an elected government in 1996.
- RUF/SL: Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone. A revolutionary group formed by Sierra Leone citizens in Libya in the late 1980s and led by Foday Sankoh. It began its armed campaign in March 1991. It is particularly known for its use of terror tactics such as amputation and mutilation.
- SLA: Sierra Leone Army. The armed force of the Sierra Leone government.
- SLPP: Sierra Leone People's Party. A political party which held power immediately after independence and again since 1996. Regarded as having a power-base particularly among the Mende people, one of the country's largest ethnic groups.
- ULIMO: United Liberation Movement for Democracy. A militia established in 1991 by Liberians opposed to Charles Taylor, at that time Liberia's main rebel leader. ULIMO was employed as an auxiliary force inside Sierra Leone, fighting against the RUF, before pushing its way into Liberia. It subsequently split into rival factions, some supported both by the Nigerian faction in ECOMOG and the government of Guinea. ULIMO has used Guinean territory to launch attacks on President Taylor's Liberia and appears to have played a role in recent fighting inside Guinea.
- UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, established by UN Security Council Resolution 1270 of October 1999.

Appendix C: Chronology²⁶

- 1961 Sierra Leone is declared independent on 27 April. Its first prime minister is the leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party.
- 1967 All People's Congress party leader Siaka Stevens wins elections. He is prevented by a coup from taking office.
- 1968 Non-commissioned officers stage Sierra Leone's third coup in thirteen months. Siaka Stevens assumes power.
- 1978 The APC adopts a one-party constitution.
- 1985 Military force commander Major-General Joseph Momoh succeeds Stevens as president.
- 1990 Momoh supports return to multiparty constitution. Elections scheduled for 1992.
- 1991 March 23. Around 100 fighters, including Sierra Leone citizens, Liberians loyal to Charles Taylor, and some Burkinabe mercenaries, attack Sierra Leone in the name of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal once detained for his part in a coup attempt.
- 1992 April 29. Junior officers carry out a coup and establish the National Provisional Ruling Council with Captain Valentine Strasser as chairman.
- 1994 September. Sierra Leone and Nigeria sign a mutual defence agreement.
- 1995 February. An RUF advance on Freetown is stopped by pro-government forces including some 2,000 Nigerian soldiers.
- 1995 March. Strasser signs a contract with the South African security company Executive Outcomes.
- 1996 January 16. Brigadier-General Julius Maada Bio replaces Strasser as NPRC Chairman in an internal coup.
- 1996 February 26-27. Presidential and legislative elections are held with the participation of thirteen political parties. No presidential candidate receives the required 55 per cent vote.
- 1996 March 15. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP wins a runoff.
- 1996 March 29. Kabbah is sworn in as president.
- 1996 November 30. Kabbah and Sankoh sign the Abidjan Peace Agreement.

²⁶ Adapted from Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*, pp.113-34.

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- 1997 January 31. Executive Outcomes officially leaves Sierra Leone under the terms of Abidjan.
- 1997 May 25. A military coup installs the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, chaired by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. President Kabbah flees to Guinea.
- 1997 June 1. Major Koroma invites the RUF to join the ruling junta.
- 1997 October 8. UN Security Council Resolution 1132 establishes an embargo on selected items. ECOWAS is empowered to enforce the embargo.
- 1997 October 23. In negotiations in Conakry between the junta and ECOWAS, the AFRC/RUF agree to restore President Kabbah within six months.
- 1998 January 15. Nigerian troops operating with ECOMOG attack Freetown.
- 1998 February 15. The AFRC/RUF leave Freetown, which is taken by Nigerian troops.
- 1998 March 10. President Kabbah returns to Freetown and is reinstated as president.
- 1998 July 13. UN Security Council 1181 establishes the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone.
- 1999 January 6. AFRC/RUF forces re-enter Freetown by force. They inflict major destruction and widespread atrocities.
- 1999 May 25. Negotiations begin on a new peace agreement.
- 1999 July 7. The Lomé peace agreement is signed by President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh. The UN Security Council welcomes the agreement.
- 1999 October 22. UN Security Council Resolution 1270 establishes the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, now known as UNAMSIL.
- 2000 February 7. The Security Council adopts Resolution 1289 which expands UNAMSIL from 6,000 to 11,100 military personnel and revises its mandate to include additional tasks, like providing security at key locations and ensuring the free flow of people and goods on specified routes.
- 2000 May 6. After several incidents indicating its non-compliance with the peace process, the RUF takes 500 UN peacekeepers hostage.
- 2000 May 8. RUF fighters in Freetown fire on a demonstration, killing seventeen people.
- 2000 May 9. ECOWAS appoints Charles Taylor to ensure that the RUF complies with the terms of the Lomé peace agreement and frees the estimated 500 UN peacekeepers hostages.
- 2000 May 17. Foday Sankoh is captured by a crowd in Freetown, turned over to government authorities, and imprisoned.

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- 2000 May 19. UN Security Council resolution expands UNAMSIL to 13,000.
- 2000 May 29. An ECOWAS summit approves a proposal to send 3,000 West African troops to Sierra Leone.
- 2000 June 10. A team of British military trainers arrives in Freetown.
- 2000 July 5. The UN Security Council imposes an eighteen-month trade ban on uncertified diamonds from Sierra Leone in a bid to stop their sale from funding the RUF rebellion (Resolution 1306).
- 2000 August 1. The UN Security Council Sanctions Committee announces the composition of a panel to look into possible violations of sanctions and the link between trade in diamonds and arms.
- 2000 August 4. The UN Security Council extends UNAMSIL's mandate and agrees to a reinforcement of its military component (Resolution 1313).
- 2000 August 14. The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1315 that recommends the setting up of a Special Court, which would have jurisdiction over suspected perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations and would operate under both Sierra Leonean and international law.
- 2000 August 28. Kofi Annan recommends that UNAMSIL be increased to 20,500 troops, which would cost \$305 million more, bringing the UNAMSIL annual budget to \$780 million.
- 2000 September 20. India announces its intention to withdraw troops from UNAMSIL, soon followed by Jordan.
- 2000 November 10. Sierra Leone's government and the RUF agree to a cease-fire and to resume the peace process. They also agree that the UN Mission will be allowed to deploy freely in rebel held areas in order to supervise the cease-fire.
- 2000 December 20. The UN panel investigating illicit arms and diamond dealings with anti-government forces in Sierra Leone recommends a complete embargo on all diamonds from Liberia.
- 2001 January 1. The British announce that their troops will remain in Sierra Leone "until the RUF has been defeated by war or diplomacy".
- 2001 January 17. Kofi Annan cautions the Security Council that the Special Court has not yet received adequate funding from UN member states.
- 2001 January 30. Presidential and parliamentary elections are postponed because of the continuing insecurity in parts of the country.
- 2001 March 30. UN Security Council Resolution 1346 authorises the extension of UNAMSIL by six months and increases its military strength to 17,500.

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98) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Amnesty International, "The United Nations special conference on Sierra Leone: the protection of human rights must be a priority for the international community", AI Index: AFR 51/14/98, 24 July 1998.

SIERRA LEONE

The United Nations special conference on Sierra Leone: the protection of human rights must be a priority for the international community

On 30 July 1998 the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, will convene a special conference in New York to galvanize the international community's response to the political, humanitarian and human rights situation in Sierra Leone.

The meeting will bring together representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, intergovernmental organizations, including the UN, the Organization of African Unity, the Economic Community of West African States - which played a key role in restoring the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in March 1998 - the European Union and the Commonwealth, as well as humanitarian organizations.

Continuing atrocities

The international community's commitment to bring peace and security to Sierra Leone and to assist in its reconstruction and rehabilitation must include initiatives which will help to stop the gross human rights abuses being perpetrated by the joint forces of the ousted Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF), prevent further abuses and also lay solid foundations for the respect and protection of human rights in the future.

AFRC and RUF forces in the east and north of Sierra Leone are deliberately and arbitrarily killing and torturing unarmed civilians. A deliberate and systematic campaign of killing, rape and mutilation - called by the AFRC and RUF "*Operation no living thing*" - has emerged since April 1998.

Although the exact number of those killed in recent months is unknown, it is likely to be several thousand, many of them women and children. More than 200 people were killed during an attack on one village alone - Yifin, in Koinadugu District in Northern Province - in late April 1998. Many hundreds of men, women and children of all ages have suffered mutilation and crude amputations of their arms, legs, lips or ears, lacerations and gunshot wounds. Women and girls have been raped or suffered other forms of sexual assault. Survivors of attacks who manage to reach safety and medical assistance recount that many others from their villages were killed or fled into the bush, their fate unknown.

The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Sergio Vieira de Mello, following a visit to Sierra Leone in June 1998, said that the brutal treatment of civilians by the AFRC and RUF was unlike anything he had seen in 29 years of humanitarian work: "*there are no words to condemn this sort of practice...*".

An Amnesty International delegation which visited Sierra Leone in May 1998 met some of the victims of these atrocities at Connaught Hospital in Freetown. One, a farmer aged 40 from the village of Badala, in Koinadugu District, had both hands cut off when the village was attacked on 3 May 1998. He had arrived at Connaught Hospital four days later. Another, a 15-year-old schoolboy from Koidu, in Kono District, Eastern Province, who had arrived at the hospital on 10 May 1998, had suffered severe lacerations to his right ankle in an attempted amputation. Almost 50 people with him had been killed when they were attacked on 1 May 1998.

Three young women survived an attack on the village of Boima in Bombali District, Northern Province, on 7 May 1998; one had a deep cut to her arm, the other two had been beaten all over their bodies. One of the women had witnessed the killing of several members of her family, including her children. Twelve people, including three of her children, died when their house was set alight. Another child, a girl aged three, was pulled from her back and cut with machetes.

Such gross and large-scale human rights abuses demand an immediate and forceful response from the international community. The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), the peace-keeping operation established by the UN Security Council on 13 July 1998 to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, must be given the necessary resources and political support to effectively monitor violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and to make its findings public. In approving resolution 1181 (1998) the Security Council expressed its grave concern about "*the loss of life and immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone ... as a result of continuing rebel attacks*". Effective monitoring and reporting should be an important part of the international community's response.

Monitoring and reporting human rights abuses

Measures taken by the UN so far to address the human rights situation in Sierra Leone, including UNOMSIL civilian staff to monitor and report on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, should be supported and reinforced. The inclusion of reporting on human rights in the Fifth Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Sierra Leone of 9 June 1998 is welcomed and should be developed further in future reports.

The extent of the atrocities in Sierra Leone requires an increased number of civilian staff with human rights expertise within UNOMSIL to report on human rights violations to the UN Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It is important that there are adequate resources for UNOMSIL human rights monitors to be deployed in those areas of the country, in particular Eastern and Northern Provinces, where human rights abuses are being perpetrated. Adequate protection must be provided in areas where their security might be at risk.

The special conference will specifically seek assistance from the international community for UNOMSIL and for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Military observers deployed in Sierra Leone should also report, through explicit channels, to the UN Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights any violations of international humanitarian and human rights law which they may witness or receive reliable information about.

Children caught in the violence

Children have been particular victims of the violence and brutality in Sierra Leone. As well as being deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated and maimed, thousands of children have been and continue to be abducted by AFRC and RUF forces and forced to fight. Girls and women have been systematically raped and forced into sexual slavery.

Among the more than 350,000 Sierra Leoneans who have either become refugees in neighbouring countries or internally displaced since February 1998 are hundreds of unaccompanied children separated from their families as a result of the violence. Children are the most vulnerable to the acute hardship, disease and malnutrition faced by Sierra Leonean refugees and displaced people. During May and June 1998, 750 people, including children, were reported to have died of disease and malnutrition at

Masingbi, in Tonkolili District, Northern Province, where some 15,000 displaced people have sought safety.

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, following a visit to Sierra Leone in May 1998, challenged the international community to respond in a more vigorous and concerted way to the needs of children affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone. In June 1998 the UN Security Council, condemning the abduction, sexual abuse and recruitment and use in hostilities of children, said that it would pay serious attention to the situation of children affected by armed conflict. The needs of children in Sierra Leone are critical. Amnesty International welcomes the work of the Special Representative and endorses his call for Sierra Leone to be made one of the pilot projects for a more effective response in the context of post-conflict peace-building.

Effective institutions for the protection of human rights

Amnesty International urges the participants at the special conference on Sierra Leone, including the UN and international financial institutions, to work closely together to promote post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation which is based on good governance and respect for human rights. The police and army need to be restructured and trained, including in human rights; the legal and judicial systems need to be reformed and strengthened. The international community should assist in creating effective institutions for the protection and respect for human rights, including an independent national commission for human rights.

Ending impunity

Impunity contributes to continuing patterns of human rights abuses. Peace and security in Sierra Leone will not be achieved until there is an end to impunity. It is only when those responsible for human rights abuses are brought to justice for their crimes that a clear message is sent that gross human rights abuses will not be tolerated or allowed to go unpunished.


Amnesty International strongly endorses the joint statement in June 1998, shortly after the conference on the creation of a permanent international criminal court opened in Rome, by the heads of five UN agencies - UNICEF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs - that the atrocities being committed in Sierra Leone are a brutal reminder of the urgent need for an international criminal court to bring to trial those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The delegation of Sierra Leone to the diplomatic conference in Rome repeatedly cited the experience of its country as evidence of the need for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. The international community must assist in establishing accountability for the atrocities in Sierra Leone in order to combat impunity and to bring justice, and also to contribute to lasting peace in Sierra Leone.

99) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Amnesty International Annual Report 1999, "AI Report 1999: Sierra Leone".

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SIERRA LEONE

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (afrc) continued to detain prisoners of conscience without charge or trial and was responsible for torture and extrajudicial executions. After their removal from power in February, the afrc and the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (ruf) killed and mutilated thousands of unarmed civilians. A civilian militia supporting the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the Civil Defence Forces (cdf), was also responsible for extrajudicial executions and torture, although on a significantly smaller scale. Hundreds of people alleged to have collaborated with the afrc and ruf were detained without charge by the reinstated government. Thirty-four soldiers were sentenced to death by a court martial which did not meet international standards for fair trial; 24 were executed. Forty-two civilians and the leader of the ruf were also sentenced to death.

The elected government of President Kabbah was reinstated after the afrc was forced from power in February by West African forces deployed in Sierra Leone – the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ecomog). The afrc had seized power in a military coup in May 1997 and was joined by the ruf (see *Amnesty International Report 1998*).

During the ecomog offensive on Freetown, the capital, in February, afrc and ruf forces deliberately and arbitrarily killed many civilians. Several hundred others were injured or killed as a result of shelling by both sides, which in some cases appeared to be indiscriminate.

Following their removal from power and throughout the rest of the year, afrc and ruf forces embarked on a systematic campaign of killing, rape, mutilation, abduction and destruction in the east and north of the country. By December rebel forces had advanced towards Freetown and an attack on Freetown appeared imminent. The government of Liberia was widely reported to be providing combatants, arms and ammunition to rebel forces.

In late April President Kabbah announced that the cdf, composed of traditional hunters such as the *kamajors*, had been placed under

the command of ecomog.

On 10 March President Kabbah proclaimed a state of emergency, subsequently ratified by parliament, which included provisions for indefinite detention without charge or trial. Some 2,000 soldiers and civilians suspected of collaboration with the afrc and ruf were detained following the ecomog intervention. Many were suspected of human rights abuses.

In May the government established an independent committee of investigation to review the cases of several hundred detainees and recommend whether they should be charged or released.

Implementation of a comprehensive plan for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, including an estimated 5,000 child soldiers, from the ruf, cdf and national army, was limited because of continuing conflict.

The un and other intergovernmental organizations repeatedly condemned as gross breaches of international humanitarian law the atrocities committed against civilians by rebel forces. The Special Representative of the un Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, following a visit to Sierra Leone in May, called for a more vigorous and concerted response by the international community to the needs of children affected by the conflict.

In July the un Security Council established a peace-keeping operation, the un Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (unomsil). unomsil human rights officers consistently investigated and reported human rights abuses, monitored treason trials and undertook several other important initiatives which contributed to the protection of human rights.

On 30 July the un Secretary-General convened a special conference in New York, usa, attended by representatives of the government of Sierra Leone, intergovernmental organizations including the un, the Organization of African Unity, ecowas, the European Union and the Commonwealth, and humanitarian organizations. The conference agreed to establish an international contact group to coordinate support for efforts to restore peace, stability, democracy and human rights in Sierra Leone. It first met in November.

While in power, the afrc and ruf committed widespread human rights violations, including detention without charge or trial, torture and extrajudicial executions. Among prisoners of conscience detained by the afrc were Sylvanus Kanyako, a journalist on the *Herald Guardian*, and David Kamara, its proprietor, who were arrested in January, held without charge for three weeks, and tortured.

In mid-January in Kenema, Eastern Province, the ruf detained several community leaders accused of supporting the *kamajors*. They were repeatedly beaten and one died as a result. Some were released, but several others remained held, including B.S. Massaquoi, Chairman of the town council. He was killed by ruf forces in February, and his mutilated body was reported to have been found with 35 others in a mass grave near Kenema the following month.

After they were removed from power, afrc and ruf forces killed thousands of unarmed civilians, including many women and

children, in the east and north of the country. The exact number of those killed remained unknown. The town of Koidu, in Kono District, Eastern Province, was virtually destroyed by rebel forces in April, and more than 550 bodies were reported to have been found there. More than 200 unarmed civilians were killed during an attack on Yifin, a village in Koinadugu District, Northern Province, in late April.

As many as 4,000 men, women and children suffered mutilation, crude amputations of their hands, arms, legs, lips or ears; others suffered lacerations and gunshot wounds. Survivors of attacks recounted that many others from their villages had been killed or had fled into the bush where many died of their injuries. They reported that villagers had been rounded up and locked in houses which were then set alight. Women and girls were systematically raped or subjected to other forms of sexual assault. Men who refused to rape members of their own families had their limbs amputated as punishment. Children were ripped from their mothers' backs and killed with machetes. Among the victims who were evacuated to Freetown was a 15-year-old schoolboy from Koidu who had severe lacerations to his right ankle after an attempted amputation; about 50 people with him were killed when they were attacked on 1 May.

Reports of atrocities declined significantly during July, but from August onwards, atrocities by rebel forces in Northern and Eastern Provinces escalated. In early September, for example, at least 40 civilians, including children, were reported to have been killed in Kamalu, Bombali District, Northern Province. Some of those killed had first been tortured and sexually assaulted and others were burned alive. Some 50 civilians were reported to have been abducted in Kamalu.

Hundreds of civilians, in particular children and young men and women, were abducted during attacks by rebel forces. They were forced to fight and used as forced labour; women and girls were forced into sexual slavery. All those abducted were at risk of ill-treatment and deliberate and arbitrary killing. As many as 10,000 civilians in rebel-controlled areas, in particular in Kailahun District, Eastern Province, were effectively held captive.

An estimated 570,000 civilians fled to neighbouring countries to escape the violence or became internally displaced. Many remained at risk of killing, mutilation and abduction. In September rebel forces attacked a refugee camp at Tomandu in Guinea, killing at least seven women refugees and three Guineans and forcing others to carry looted goods across the border. In November, 20 refugees in Tomandu who crossed the border in search of food had their hands cut off by rebel forces. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees subsequently moved thousands of refugees from Tomandu to camps further inside Guinea.

In mid-February several foreign humanitarian aid workers were captured and held hostage for two weeks by ruf forces who demanded the release of their leader, Foday Sankoh, who had been detained in Nigeria since March 1997. An Italian priest abducted in Kamalu by rebel forces in November remained held hostage at the end of the year.

The cdf were responsible for extrajudicial executions and torture and ill-treatment of captured combatants and real or suspected supporters of the afrc and ruf. afrc soldiers were summarily executed by kamajors in Koidu in February; some were

decapitated, others were doused with petrol or had tyres placed around them and were burned alive. At least 50 people were extrajudicially executed in Kanema in February. Human rights violations by the cdf decreased significantly after June, apparently following intervention by the government and ecomog.

There were some reports that ecomog forces were responsible for illegal detention of civilians and torture and ill-treatment of combatants during surrender or capture. Reports also suggested that ecomog forces handed over some captured rebels to the cdf who then summarily executed them. unomsil also expressed concern that ecomog forces did not consistently respect international humanitarian law in relation to the protection of non-combatants in areas affected by conflict.

Hundreds of people alleged to have collaborated with the afrc and ruf were held without charge under legislation allowing indefinite detention without charge or trial. By December about 100 detainees had been released unconditionally and others were released either on bail or pending further investigation after their cases were reviewed by the independent committee of investigation; in other cases the committee concluded that there was evidence of criminal offences.

In April, 59 civilian prisoners, one of whom later died in detention, were charged with treason and some also with murder and arson. Three separate trials began the following month before the High Court in Freetown. Sixteen defendants were convicted and sentenced to death in August, 11 in October and 15 in November. Seven were sentenced to terms of imprisonment and the others were acquitted. Appeals against conviction and sentence had not been heard by the end of the year. Another 22 civilians were charged with treason in December.

ruf leader Foday Sankoh was returned to Sierra Leone from Nigeria in July and in September brought to trial for treason and other offences. Efforts by the government to obtain legal representation for Foday Sankoh were unsuccessful because lawyers feared reprisals. In October he was convicted and sentenced to death. His appeal against conviction and sentence, during which he was to be represented by lawyers from abroad, had not commenced by the end of the year.

A court martial of 37 soldiers, including prominent afrc members, charged with treason and other offences began in late July. In October, 34 were convicted and sentenced to death; the others were acquitted. Despite a 1975 Appeal Court ruling that the death penalty for treason was discretionary, the court martial refused to accept arguments that the death penalty was not mandatory for these offences. The court martial allowed no right of appeal to a higher jurisdiction, contrary to international standards for fair trial. The convicted soldiers appealed to a special committee for the prerogative of mercy, chaired by the President. Despite calls for clemency by the international community and submissions on behalf of 18 of those convicted to the un Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 24 were publicly executed a week later. The others had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment.

In December, two journalists, Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay and Sylvester Rogers, both *British Broadcasting Corporation* correspondents, were arrested. Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay was charged with publication of false news for allegedly publishing false

information about hostilities and failing to check his stories with ecomog, and released on bail. A third journalist was also sought.

Prisoners and detainees were held in conditions which in some cases amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Following large-scale detentions after February, the Central Prison, Pademba Road, in Freetown was severely overcrowded. Conditions were particularly harsh in prisons outside the capital and at the headquarters of the police Criminal Investigation Department and the Central Police Station in Freetown.

Before the afrc and ruf were removed from power, Amnesty International repeatedly appealed for the release of prisoners of conscience and an end to detention without charge or trial, torture and ill-treatment, and extrajudicial executions.

In late February Amnesty International requested that those detained for alleged collaboration with the afrc and ruf be charged and brought to trial in accordance with international standards with a minimum of delay and that those not to be charged be released. The Minister of Justice and Attorney General responded that detainees included prisoners of war and those who had surrendered for their own safety and that criminal investigations were proceeding.

In early May Amnesty International publicized escalating atrocities by rebel forces. It called for an end to human rights abuses against civilians and for the urgent establishment of an independent human rights presence in the country.

An Amnesty International delegation visited Sierra Leone in May and met government officials and members of the military, the legal profession and non-governmental organizations, as well as victims of human rights abuses.

Amnesty International addressed a report to the un special conference in July _ *The United Nations special conference on Sierra Leone: The protection of human rights must be a priority for the international community*. The report called for an end to impunity as a prerequisite for lasting peace and recommended: that unomsil be given the necessary resources to monitor violations of international humanitarian and human rights law; that particular attention be given to the needs of children affected by the conflict; and that assistance be provided to create effective institutions for the protection and respect of human rights.

An Amnesty International representative observed the early stages of the court martial of afrc members in late July. Amnesty International repeatedly urged the government to allow a judicial appeal procedure from the court martial.


Amnesty International appealed to President Kabbah to commute all death sentences and in October condemned the execution of the 24 soldiers.

In November Amnesty International published *Sierra Leone: 1998 _ a year of atrocities against civilians*, which documented in particular the gross human rights abuses committed by rebel forces and made specific recommendations to the government, rebel forces and the international community for ending human rights abuses and ensuring the protection of human rights in the future.

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100) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

The Heart of the Matter (Partnership Africa Canada)

THE HEART OF THE MATTER
SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS & HUMAN SECURITY
(COMPLETE REPORT)

Ian Smillie
Lansana Gberie
Ralph Hazleton

Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) is a coalition of Canadian and African organizations that work in partnership to promote sustainable human development policies that benefit African and Canadian societies.

The *Insights* series seeks to deepen understanding of current issues affecting African development. The series is edited by Bernard Taylor.

The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security (Complete Report)

Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, Ralph Hazleton

ISBN 0-9686270-4-8

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ACRONYMS

AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council
APC	All Peoples Congress
CAST	Consolidated African Selection Trust
CSO	Central Selling Organization
EO	Executive Outcomes
GGDO	Government Gold and Diamond Office
HRD	Hoge Raad voor Diamant (Diamond High Council)
NDMC	National Diamond Mining Company
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PMMC	Precious Metals Mining Company
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SLST	Sierra Leone Selection Trust
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USGS	United States Geological Survey
VAT	Value Added Tax

"Oh, the diamonds, diamonds, diamonds," Yusef wearily complained. "I tell you, Major Scobie, that I make more money in one year from my smallest store than I would in three years from diamonds. You cannot understand how many bribes are necessary."

- Graham Greene, *The Heart of the Matter*, 1948

The diamond, a symbol of purity, makes a market that functions both above and below ground, in which the licit and the illicit mingle freely and comfortably, the line between them almost imperceptible, usually irrelevant. Diamonds bring out the worst in men---and women.

- David Koskoff, *The Diamond World*, 1981

Loot, not better government, has motivated the psychotically brutal guerrillas of Sierra Leone. They trade the diamonds they control for arms through neighbouring Liberia, under sponsorship of President Charles Taylor, their longtime patron.

- *New York Times*, Editorial, August 8, 1999.

FOREWORD

The processes of mining, trading and selling diamonds are myriad and byzantine; only those intimately involved in the industry truly comprehend its vagaries.

Sierra Leone has one of the richest mother lodes of diamonds in the world. Over the years, the ramifications of diamond extraction in Sierra Leone have intrigued the international community, spawning numerous articles and books, from Graham Greene's *The Heart of the Matter*, to Robert Kaplan's *The Ends of the Earth*.

But more recently, Sierra Leone has intruded on the world's attention for other reasons. The recurring conflicts and brutality; the uprooting of fully half of its people, the mutilation and murder of its children have shocked even the most hardened observers. And many are asking:

How can peace and stability be restored in Sierra Leone? Is there a connection between the illicit diamond trade and the mayhem that has disfigured Sierra Leone in recent years? What can the international community do to assuage the trauma of conflict in Sierra Leone? These are the questions this study seeks to address.

Too often in the past the powers of the North have felt compelled to help resolve tensions in countries with which they felt some compatibility, while ignoring similar struggles in countries of the South. One has only to contrast the attention accorded the conflict in Bosnia with what was given Rwanda; or of Kosovo with Sierra Leone. The eight million refugees and internally displaced persons throughout Africa are symptomatic of this lack of concern. Root causes of conflict in Africa are ignored. The authors of this report are to be commended for their investigation. In reading their report, I can only conclude that greed and corruption - local, regional and global in scope - have encompassed Sierra Leone's diamond industry, and are the root cause of a conflict too long ignored.

Hon. Flora MacDonald, C.C.
Ottawa, January 2000

PREFACE

This study grew from a discussion in 1998 among members of an informal group in Ottawa called the 'Sierra Leone Working Group' (SLWG). Meeting under the auspices of the Canadian and African NGO coalition, Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), the SLWG has helped to raise Canadian awareness about the conflict in Sierra Leone, it has raised funds for peacebuilding and emergency relief in Sierra Leone, and it has encouraged senior Canadian government officials to take a greater interest in the broader political and economic aspects of the conflict. The group concluded in 1998 that diamonds were central to the conflict, and that a highly criminalized war economy had developed a momentum of its own. The group believed that regardless of what might be done to bring about a peaceful settlement, no peace agreement would be sustainable until the problems related to mining and selling diamonds had been addressed, both inside Sierra Leone and internationally.

The Sierra Leone Working Group requested financial support for this study from a variety of organizations with interests in Sierra Leone specifically, or with an interest in the broader issues surrounding extractive industries and war. Supporters include the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, the Canadian Auto Workers' Social Justice Fund, Canadian Feed the Children, the Centre canadien d'étude et de coopération internationale, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, CUSO, Inter Pares and the Steelworkers Humanity Fund. Five additional institutional donors in Canada and Britain wished to remain anonymous. The study was also generously supported by the Peacebuilding Division of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the International Development Research Centre. To all of them we are very grateful. Although much of the funding was Canadian, the study's subject matter is international. The only point of particular reference to Canada is the distinctive role of Canadian stock exchanges and certain 'Canadian' mining companies that are active in Sierra Leone.

The study was conducted between February and December 1999. Core team members were Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie and Ralph Hazleton. Members of the core team traveled extensively in Europe, North America and West Africa. Belgian research was conducted with the valuable assistance of Johan Peleman of the International Peace Information Service in Antwerp, and assistance was provided in Sierra Leone by Mohamed Swaray.

Many individuals, organizations, companies and government officials - in Sierra Leone, Britain, Belgium, Canada and the United States - assisted in the preparation of this study and were generous with their time and their knowledge. Special thanks is due to the Government of Sierra Leone, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Global Witness, the Diamond High Council, and several companies in the diamond industry, including De Beers and AmCan Minerals. Individuals who assisted in many ways include Bonnie Campbell, Terry Copp, Caspar Fithen, Frances Fortune, Howard Goldenpaul, Kingsley Lington, Hon. Flora MacDonald, Doug Paget of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, David Pratt, Nicola Reindorp, David Tam-Baryoh, long-time Sierra Leone-watcher William Reno, Jim Rupert, Dr. Julius Spencer, Minister of Information, Sierra Leone, and Thomas Turay. Special thanks to Helen Moore. Without the continuing assistance of Bernard Taylor and PAC, the study would not have been possible. Many officials, journalists, miners, traders, dealers, couriers and smugglers - especially in Sierra Leone and Belgium - spoke to the Project Team on the condition of anonymity. The reasons for this will become apparent in the text, however efforts were made to corroborate any information used in the report from 'off-the-record' sources. To them as well, a vote of thanks is very much in order.

A list of those who were consulted 'on the record' is included in an appendix. It is important to note, however, that the entire report, its recommendations and any errors or omissions are those of the authors alone.

CORRIGENDUM

This report was issued in January 2000. In the following six months there were many changes in Sierra Leone and the diamond industry at large. We stand by the facts contained in the report as at the time of publication, with minor exceptions. On pages 2 and 26 the report states that De Beers maintains a diamond buying office in Conakry and a diamond trading company in Liberia. These continue to be mentioned in De Beers reports, but the company has informed us that these offices have been closed for some time. On page 3, we referred to “De Beers’ Sierra Leone Selection Trust”. SLST was, as explained on page 38, a subsidiary of the consolidated African Selection Trust.

IS, LG, RH

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study is about how diamonds - small pieces of carbon with no great intrinsic value - have been the cause of widespread death, destruction and misery for almost a decade in the small West African country of Sierra Leone. Through the 1990s, Sierra Leone's rebel war became a tragedy of major humanitarian, political and historic proportions, but the story goes back further - almost 60 years, to the discovery of the diamonds. The diamonds are, to use the title of Graham Greene's classic 1948 novel about the Sierra Leone, *The Heart of the Matter*.

A weak post-independence democracy was subverted in the 1960s and 1970s by corruption and despotism. Economic decline and military rule followed. The rebellion that began in 1991 was characterized by banditry and horrific brutality, wreaked primarily on civilians. Between 1991 and 1999, the war claimed over 75,000 lives, caused half a million Sierra Leoneans to become refugees, and displaced half of the country's 4.5 million people.

There is a view that Sierra Leone's war is a crisis of modernity, caused by the failed patrimonial systems of successive post-colonial governments. Sierra Leonean writers have rejected this analysis on several grounds. While there is no doubt about widespread public disenchantment with the failing state, with corruption and with a lack of opportunity, similar problems elsewhere have not led to years of brutality by forces devoid of ideology, political support and ethnic identity. Only the *economic* opportunity presented by a breakdown in law and order could sustain violence at the levels that have plagued Sierra Leone since 1991.

This study constitutes a strong critique of prevailing orthodox explanations of conflict, which tend towards state-centric and non-economic explanations. Traditional economics, in fact, as well as traditional political science and military history are of little assistance in explaining Sierra Leone's conflict. The point of the war may not actually have been to win it, but to engage in profitable crime under the cover of warfare. Diamonds, in fact, have fueled Sierra Leone's conflict, destabilizing the country for the better part of three decades, stealing its patrimony and robbing an entire generation of children, putting the country dead last on the UNDP Human Development Index.

Over the years, the informal diamond mining sector, long dominated by what might be called 'disorganized crime', became increasingly influenced by *organized* crime and by the transcontinental smuggling not just of diamonds, but of guns and drugs, and by vast sums of money in search of a laundry. Violence became central to the advancement of those with vested interests. As the mutation of the war in Sierra Leone continued through the 1990s, so did the number and type of predators, each seeking to gain from one side of the conflict or another.

The Diamond Industry and De Beers

In 1998 the diamond industry produced an estimated 115 million carats of rough diamonds with a market value of US \$6.7 billion. At the end of the diamond chain, this was converted into 67.1 million pieces of jewelry worth close to US \$50 billion.

The De Beers group of companies mines or partners in mining the majority of the world's diamonds. De Beers purchases by far the majority of all diamonds produced, and more or less sets the price of rough diamonds on the global market. Manipulation of both the supply and demand for rough diamonds on world markets is managed through its Central Selling Organization (CSO), headquartered in London.

The CSO sources diamonds from De Beers mines as well as from the 'outside market' - diamonds produced by non-De Beers firms. Diamonds purchased by the CSO are in turn sold at ten annual 'sights' (sales) to 160 'sightholders'. Sightholders are designated by De Beers and are presented with mixed 'parcels' of diamonds. The parcels are packages of combined rough gem quality and industrial diamonds, and may include stones from a combination of countries. Parcels are priced by De Beers and are bought by sightholders - ironically enough, sight unseen. Sightholders then take the diamonds to other cities where they are resorted and repackaged for onward sale, or for cutting and polishing.

Until the 1980s, De Beers was directly involved in Sierra Leone, had concessions to mine diamonds offshore, and maintained an office in Freetown. Since then, however, the relationship has been indirect. De Beers maintains a diamond trading company in Liberia and a buying office in Conakry, Guinea. Both countries produce very few diamonds themselves, and Liberia is widely understood to be a 'transit' country for smuggled diamonds. Many 'Liberian' diamonds are of Sierra Leonean origin, and others reportedly originate as far away as Russia and Angola. De Beers says that it does not purchase Sierra Leonean diamonds. Through its companies in West Africa, however, and in its attempts to mop up supplies everywhere in the world, it is virtually inconceivable that the company is not - in one way or another - purchasing diamonds that have been smuggled out of Sierra Leone.

Belgium and the Diamond High Council

Antwerp is the world centre for rough diamonds. More than half of the CSO sightholders reside in Antwerp. Antwerp is also the principal 'outside market' serving as a funnel for more than half of all the diamonds produced in the world. The formal trading of diamonds in Belgium is structured around the *Hoge Raad voor Diamant* (HRD) - the Diamond High Council. The HRD is a non-profit umbrella organization officially acknowledged as the voice of the entire Belgian diamond industry. The mission of the HRD is to maintain and strengthen the position of Antwerp as the world centre for diamonds.

Smuggling in the Belgian context refers to diamonds which enter Belgium without being declared to customs officials, and which are not licensed for import by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the HRD Diamond Office. Neither the Government of Belgium nor the HRD have estimates of the quantity or source of smuggled diamonds. In addition, there are few active policies aimed at controlling diamond smuggling.

A factor which eases large-scale diamond smuggling and inhibits the tracking of diamond movements is the manner in which the HRD documents diamond purchases. The HRD records the origin of a diamond as the country from which the diamond was last exported. Therefore diamonds produced in Sierra Leone, say, may be officially imported and registered as originating in Liberia, Guinea (Conakry), Israel or the UK, depending on their journey from one trading centre to another.

A major problem with the Belgian environment, as it pertains to Sierra Leone or any other diamond producing country, is the lack of interest and information on the true source of the diamonds entering the country. A comparison of West African diamond export figures with Belgian imports is revealing. For example:

- while the Government of Sierra Leone recorded exports of only 8,500 carats in 1998, the HRD records imports of 770,000 carats;
- annual Liberian diamond mining capacity is between 100,000 and 150,000 carats, but the HRD records Liberian imports into Belgium of over 31 *million* carats between 1994 and 1998 - an average of over six million carats a year;
- Ivory Coast, where the small diamond industry was closed in the mid 1980s, apparently exported an average of more than 1.5 million carats to Belgium between 1995 and 1997.

Of further interest where transparency and accountability are concerned, is the question of who actually monitors imports and exports on behalf of the Belgian government. Oddly, this role is carried out largely by the HRD itself, the representative and lobbying institution for the Belgian diamond industry. In recent years there have been a number of judicial inquiries which have shown that the overall system violates almost any definition of neutrality, and is an invitation to corruption. Cases of fraud in the Antwerp diamond and banking trade are legendary and Antwerp has become one of the primary world centres for Russian organized crime. Several recent cases of fraud, banking collapse and the involvement of organized crime in the Belgian diamond industry are documented in the report.

The Sierra Leone Diamonds

The first Sierra Leonean diamond was found in 1930, and significant production commenced in 1935. By 1937 Sierra Leone was mining one million carats annually, reaching a peak of 2 million carats in 1960. From 1930 to 1998, approximately 55 million carats were mined (officially) in Sierra Leone. At an average price in 1996 dollars of US \$270 per carat, the total value is close to US \$15 billion.

In 1935, the colonial authorities concluded an agreement with De Beers' Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), giving the company exclusive mining and prospecting rights over the entire country for 99 years. By 1956, however, there were an estimated 75,000 illicit miners in Kono District - the heart of the diamond area - leading to smuggling on a vast scale, and causing a general breakdown of law and order. The buyers and smugglers at that time were mainly Madingo and Lebanese traders. With the tightening of security between Kono and Freetown in the early 1950s, Lebanese smugglers began moving their goods to Liberia, Antwerp, and then Israeli-based diamond merchants soon noticed the booming diamond trade in Monrovia, and many established offices there. De Beers itself set up a buying office in Monrovia in 1954 to keep as much of the trade under its control as possible.

In 1955, the colonial authorities scrapped SLST's nation-wide monopoly, confining its operations to Yengema and Tongo Field, an area of about 450 square miles. In 1956, they introduced the Alluvial Mining Scheme, under which both mining and buying licenses were granted to

indigenous miners. Many of these licenses came to be held by Lebanese traders who had begun to settle in Sierra Leone at the turn of the century.

Siaka Stevens came to power seven years after independence in 1968. A populist, he quickly turned diamonds and the presence of SLST into a political issue, tacitly encouraging illicit mining, and becoming involved himself in criminal or near-criminal activities. In 1971, Stevens created the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) which effectively nationalised SLST. All important

[map]

decisions were now made by the prime minister and his right hand man, a Lebanese businessman named Jamil Mohammed. From a high of over two million carats in 1970, legitimate diamond exports dropped to 595,000 carats in 1980 and then to only 48,000 in 1988. In 1984, SLST sold its remaining shares to the Precious Metals Mining Company (PMMC), a company controlled by Jamil. Stevens retired in 1985, handing over power to Joseph Momoh, who placed even greater responsibility in the hands of Jamil.

From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, aspects of Lebanon's civil war were played out in miniature in Sierra Leone. Various Lebanese militia sought financial assistance from their compatriots in Sierra Leone, and the country's diamonds became an important informal tax base for one faction or the other. This was of great interest to Israel, in part because the leader of the important Amal faction, Nabih Berri, had been born in Sierra Leone and was a boyhood friend of Jamil. Following a failed (and probably phoney) 1987 coup attempt in Sierra Leone, Jamil went into

exile, opening the way for a number of Israeli 'investors' with close connections to Russian and American crime families, and with ties to the Antwerp diamond trade.

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) war began in 1991 and soon after, Momoh was replaced by a military government - the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Despite the change in government, however, RUF attacks continued. From the outset of the war, Liberia acted as banker, trainer and mentor to the RUF, although the Liberian connection was hardly new. With a negligible diamond potential of its own, Liberia's dealings in stolen Sierra Leone diamonds have been a major concern to successive Sierra Leone governments since the great diamond rush of the 1950s.

What was different and more sinister after 1991 was the active involvement of *official* Liberian interests in Sierra Leone's brutal war - for the purpose of pillage rather than politics. By the end of the 1990s, Liberia had become a major centre for massive diamond-related criminal activity, with connections to guns, drugs and money laundering throughout Africa and considerably further afield. In return for weapons, it provided the RUF with an outlet for diamonds, and has done the same for other diamond producing countries, fuelling war and providing a safe haven for organized crime of all sorts.

The 'Juniors' and Private Security Firms

Joseph Momoh's search for new investors in the early 1990s was carried forward by the NPRC military government. With De Beers out of the picture, and with the disappointing and short-lived Israeli experience behind it, the government now began to receive overtures from small mining firms, known in the business as 'juniors'. The report deals primarily with the three juniors most involved in Sierra Leone during the 1990s, some with interests that extended far beyond the mining of diamonds.

All three trade on Canadian stock exchanges, no doubt because of Canada's well-deserved reputation as a source of easy venture capital for small mining and exploration companies. The first, Rex Diamond - with de facto headquarters in Antwerp - has an integrated mining, sorting, cutting and marketing operation, holding Sierra Leonean concessions in Zimmi and Tongo Field. Although Rex claims friends among both government and the RUF, this is denied by the RUF, perhaps understandably. In 1998, Sierra Leone lost its only combat helicopter - a serious problem because the Soviet-built gunship had been the government's most effective weapon against the RUF. Zeev Morgenstern, Rex's Managing Director, and Serge Muller, the company's President, came to the government's aid by making an arrangement to supply engines, parts and ammunition worth US \$3.8 million. The deal went sour as a result of defective parts supplied from Russia. According to the *Washington Post*, Morgenstern and Muller have both said, '...the arms deals were unrelated to Rex's mining activities'.

The second firm is Toronto-based AmCan Minerals, which holds various exploration licenses in Sierra Leone. Because of the security situation, AmCan has so far done little diamond mining, although it recently acquired a South African-owned firm, ArmSec International (SL) with connections to both the diamond and the security industries. AmCan's Sierra Leone lawyer is Chairman of the Government Gold and Diamond Office, the body responsible for overseeing the monitoring, valuation and taxation of the diamond industry.

The third 'Canadian' firm is DiamondWorks, an outgrowth of Carson Gold and Vengold, companies promoted by Robert and Eric Friedland. In 1995, DiamondWorks acquired Branch Energy Ltd., a private company registered on the Isle of Man. DiamondWorks and Branch Energy have become the subject of widespread interest because of their apparent but much-denied connections with two major international security firms, Executive Outcomes and Sandline. In 1995, The Government of Sierra Leone, backed onto the Freetown peninsula by the RUF and facing certain defeat, engaged the services of Executive Outcomes (EO) to help in its defense. With 200 imported soldiers, air support, and sophisticated communications equipment, EO pushed the RUF back from Freetown within a week, and within another month had cleared the major diamond areas of Kono as well. Shortly after EO took control of the diamond areas, Branch Energy - which had introduced EO to the GOSL - secured a 25 year lease on Sierra Leonean diamond concessions.

In 1997, DiamondWorks' Sierra Leone country manager was seconded - as a 'private citizen' - to Sandline, in connection with a controversial arms shipment intended for the briefly exiled government of Tejan Kabbah.

The juniors arrived in Sierra Leone when the formal instruments of the state had all but disappeared, notably law, order, probity and justice. They also arrived in the midst of a war which had at its epicentre the same thing that brought them to the country - diamonds. Lawlessness, however, was not new. The government of Sierra Leone had - from the 1950s - given up pretending that it could police the diamond areas. From the days of the SLST Diamond Protection Force, it had encouraged and even required foreign investors to make their own security arrangements. This goes a long way to explaining why the juniors appear to have such an intimate relationship with private security firms.

There is a distinction to be made, however, between the need to hire a private security firm in order to police a mining operation, and the provision of troops and weapons in support of a faction in a civil war. It can be said that the involvement of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone was in a good cause. The company successfully protected the government against a brutal and illegitimate rebel force. EO was certainly cheered in the streets of Freetown for its efforts. It can also be said that the provision of weapons to the democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbah - a UN arms embargo notwithstanding - made sense and was in support of a good cause.

The problem is not the individual episodes, but the bigger picture which they help to form - of a world in which beleaguered and legitimate governments find little formal international protection against internal predators, and are forced into Faustian bargains in order to survive.

Conclusions

In the absence of a governmental capacity for self-protection, and in the absence of effective mechanisms for international protection, private security firms and mercenaries may well be the way of the future. Closely connected to mining interests, the phenomenon, however, is more than just a convenient way to let the international community 'off the hook'. It begins to look like a protection racket, with the payment for assistance made in future mineral concessions - 'concessions for protection'.

It is unclear whether junior mining companies have the capacity to undertake serious mining ventures in Sierra Leone. Only time and peace will tell. On the latter point, however, a peace

agreement is only one step in a long process that will be required to provide real security in the diamond areas. An important next step will be the demobilization of fighters and a return to the rule of law under government authority. Before government authority can be established, however, there may be a lengthy interregnum required for UN peacekeeping forces.

The report concludes with a discussion on the identification of rough diamonds, an issue of great interest to law enforcement agencies. Long thought to be impossible, new diamond 'fingerprinting' technology is being developed in consultation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The RCMP stresses that it has yet to clearly identify the limitations and capabilities of the system through actual use. The potential difficulties in applying the technology are reduced, however, by the fact that the bulk of the rough diamond trade is centralized in only two organizations and two locations, the HRD in Antwerp and De Beers' Central Selling Organization in London.

The report ends with a series of recommendations directed to the United Nations, The European Union, the Governments of Sierra Leone and Belgium, the Diamond High Council and others. It also argues that a consumer campaign may be required in order to draw attention to the urgency of the matter and to gain broad public support for change.

1. INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

1.1_ Background to the WarBackground to the War

Through the 1990s, the war in Sierra Leone became a tragedy of major humanitarian, political and historical proportions. Sierra Leone is Africa's first modern state, founded by black Nova Scotians over 200 years ago and home to sub Saharan Africa's first university. A weak post-independence democracy was subverted in the 1960s and 1970s by corruption and despotism. Economic decline and military rule followed. A rebellion which began in 1991 was characterized by banditry and horrific brutality, wreaked primarily on civilians. Attempts to improve governance in the 1990s, and in particular since 1996, have been inadequate. International support which might have made a difference at key moments, especially since 1996, has also been inadequate. Between 1991 and 1999, the war took over 75,000 lives, caused half a million Sierra Leoneans to become refugees, and has displaced half of the country's 4.5 million people. A peace accord between the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was signed in July 1999, and in October 1999, a 6000-member United Nations Peacekeeping Force was approved by the Security Council as a complement to the West African Peacekeeping Force (ECOMOG) that had supported the government through the latter half of the 1990s. (For details, see Box 1)

1.2 Why the Issue is Important: Murder, Terror, Theft1.2 Why the Issue is Important: Murder, Terror, Theft

The issues arising from Sierra Leone's lengthy and brutal conflict have ramifications that extend well beyond the country's borders. Inside Sierra Leone, diamonds have fueled a conflict that has destabilized the country for the better part of a decade. Seventy five thousand people - most of them civilians - have lost their lives. Rebel butchery has left thousands of women, men and children without hands and feet, disfigured physically and psychologically for life. At different times during the crisis, as many as half of Sierra Leone's population - more than the entire population of Kosovo - became displaced or were refugees. Schools, hospitals, government services and normal commerce ground to a halt in all but the largest urban centres. Mineral resources which should have been available for development were used to finance the war, robbing the potential beneficiaries and an entire generation of children, putting Sierra Leone very last on the UNDP Human Development Index.

The issue is also important because the economic fuel for this enormous human tragedy is almost exclusively derived from diamonds, small bits of carbon that have no intrinsic value in themselves, and no value whatsoever to the average Sierra Leonean beyond their attraction to outsiders. It is ironic that enormous profits have been made from diamonds throughout the conflict, but the only effect on the citizens of the country where they are mined has been terror, murder, dismemberment and poverty. At the far end of the diamond chain, in the retail jewelry stores of Europe, North America and Japan, diamonds are purchased as emblems of wealth, or as symbols of love and affection, to commemorate weddings and anniversaries. Many of these diamonds that make their way through London, Antwerp, Tel Aviv, New York and elsewhere are of Sierra Leonean origin and most of them over the past decade have been stolen. The chain between the teen-aged boy

who mines a diamond and the individual who wears a diamond ring is complex, but it is traceable. Many governments, reputable companies and international agencies participate one way or another in, and benefit enormously from, the theft.

Sierra Leoneans are not alone in seeing their country, their lives and their families destroyed for diamonds; the Angolan situation is equally horrific, and there are similar diamond-related tragedies in Liberia and Congo. It is estimated that various African rebel groups supply as much as 20 per cent of the world's diamonds to the global market.¹ This report will examine how the theft of Sierra Leone's diamonds occurs, who the thieves are, and what the theft means to ordinary people. It will offer recommendations and ideas that may help to change the situation for the better.

1.3 A Crisis of Modernity? 1.3 A Crisis of Modernity?

There is a view that Sierra Leone's war is a crisis of modernity, caused by the failed patrimonial system of successive post-colonial governments. This argument makes the case that three decades of bad government blighted the hopes of most young people for a meaningful life, and that RUF terror techniques - conditioned in part by repeated viewing of *Rambo* and other 'lone warrior' videos - are compensation for a lack of opportunity. Some writers cite the RUF's Libyan connections, and talk of a highly educated 'excluded intellectual' leadership. This sort of argument posits a clear RUF political agenda within an understandable - even reasonable - anthropological and environmental context.²

Sierra Leonean writers have rejected this type of analysis on several grounds. While it is true that the RUF is made up of disaffected young men, a very high proportion of them were already alienated and dangerous before the RUF opportunity for rape, drugs and pillage arose. Only a fraction of Sierra Leone's young people joined the RUF of their own volition. The main RUF recruits have been drawn from the ranks of illicit diamond miners and from the same Freetown slums where President Siaka Stevens (1968-1985) recruited his brutal Internal Security Unit and where President Joseph Momoh (1985-1991) found the material to double the size of his army. Others were children who were kidnaped, drugged, and forced to commit atrocities. The 'radical intellectual' roots of the RUF were extinguished in murderous internal purges during the RUF's first year of operation. And its brutal attacks on civilians stand in sharp contradiction to its ostensible aim of creating a 'revolutionary egalitarian system'.³

While there is no doubt about widespread public disenchantment with the failing state, corruption and lack of opportunity in Sierra Leone in the late 1980s and early 1990s, similar problems elsewhere have not led to years of brutality by forces devoid of ideology, political support and ethnic identity. Only the economic opportunity presented by a breakdown in law and order could sustain violence at the levels that plagued Sierra Leone after 1991.

Box 1: KEY EVENTS IN SIERRA LEONE'S HISTORY

- 1787:** 377 black and white colonists from Britain land in Sierra Leone; most die within two years
- 1792:** 1200 'free Negroes' sail from Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone where they establish the settlement of 'Freetown'.
- 1799:** A Royal Charter gives legal status to the colony.
- 1808:** Establishment of a Crown Colony (Sierra Leone thus becomes the first modern state in sub-Saharan Africa).
- 1827:** Establishment of Fourah Bay College, the first university in sub-Saharan Africa.
- 1896:** Establishment of a Protectorate over territories of the interior.
- 1961:** Independence
- 1964:** First Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai, dies; power goes to his brother, Albert Margai.
- 1967:** General elections are marred by widespread violence, in part because of Margai's plan to establish a one-party state. Army takes power as 'National Reformation Council'.
- 1968:** Non-commissioned officers seize power and invite Siaka Stevens, apparent winner of the 1967 election, to take power. Elections reconfirm him in office.
- 1970s:** Stevens consolidates power through violence, corruption and intimidation, creating an Internal Security Unit with Cuban assistance. 1977 elections are rigged and marred by violence, after which Stevens declares a one-party state.
- 1985:** The economy in ruins, Stevens - now 80 - hands over to former army chief, Joseph Momoh.
- 1990:** Momoh relaxes press restrictions; moves to reintroduce multi-party democracy; UNDP *Human Development Report* places Sierra Leone last out of 160 countries; Charles Taylor begins his war in Liberia; 80,000 Liberian refugees flee to Sierra Leone; ECOMOG is established with Freetown as the rear base.
- 1991:** Former army corporal Foday Sankoh leads Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacks on Sierra Leone border towns from Liberia; attacks continue, marked by brutality against civilians; children are kidnapped and inducted into RUF; Momoh doubles the army, recruiting 'hooligans, drug addicts and thieves' and children.
- 1992:** April: A mutiny by unpaid soldiers becomes a coup; Momoh flees; National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) assumes power under Capt. Valentine Strasser (age 27); brutal war continues; RUF attacks target civilians. Their hallmark is crude amputations - feet, hands, lips, ears, noses - with special attention to women and children. 120,000 refugees flee to Guinea; widespread internal dislocation.
- 1993:** Kamajor (traditional hunters) militia begins fighting against RUF along with Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and ECOMOG; rebel atrocities continue.
- 1994:** RUF overruns diamond areas, bauxite and titanium mines; economy essentially bankrupt; Freetown threatened. By now an estimated 50,000 have been killed and about half the country's 4.5 million people have been displaced.
- 1995:** February: NPRC employs Gurkha Security Guards for combat duty, but following setbacks they withdraw; May: Executive Outcomes contracted by NPRC; by June, the RUF is beaten back from Freetown and diamond areas liberated; rebel activity subsides.

1996: May: Soida Estate case, 600 victims in Mamba and Bizer places, strains the Accra talks. Foday Sankoh (AFRC) and Kabbah flee. Major John J. RUF Koolanaje is reported to be the business chairman and invites RUF to join the new Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (AFSL). RUF attacks are characterized by systematic brutality. Sankoh and Kabbah are urged to leave a full formal banking and commerce throughout the country.

1998 February: ECOMOG launches offensive on Freetown, driving the AFRC/RUF out. President Kabbah returns. Sierra Leone armed forces disbanded. Towns and villages throughout the country experience continued attacks and extreme brutality from AFRC/RUF forces. July: Security Council creates UN peace-keeping operation, UNOMSIL, and sends 40 military observers and later human rights observers. October: An estimated 10,000 - 12,000 ECOMOG troops continue to battle AFRC/RUF. An estimated 800-1200 Nigerian soldiers have been killed, and the cost is estimated at \$1 million per day. October: Trials of soldiers and civilians result in death sentences for many, including Foday Sankoh. Attacks continue; RSLMF regroup.

1999 January: AFRC/RUF elements attack and enter Freetown resulting in two weeks of arson, terror, murder and dismemberment. Cabinet ministers, journalists and civil servants are tortured and killed. Parts of the city are razed, over 6000 civilians are killed before ECOMOG pushes them back. 2000 children are reported missing. February: Nigerian presidential candidates agree that Nigeria should get out of Sierra Leone soon after Nigeria's return to civilian rule on May 29. The UN Security Council discusses Sierra Leone. July: GOSL concludes a negotiated peace agreement with the RUF, giving Foday Sankoh and several other RUF and AFRC leaders cabinet positions. All RUF and AFRC leaders are given amnesty. August: Phased Nigerian Troop withdrawal begins. October: UN Security Council approves a 6000-member Peacekeeping Force for Sierra Leone with authority to use 'deadly force' if required. December: Kenyan and Indian contingents of the new UNAMSIL peacekeeping force begin to arrive in Sierra Leone.

1.4 The Political Economy of War 1.4 The Political Economy of War

Claueswitz said that war is 'the pursuit of politics by other means'. David Keen has amended this, saying that 'war is the pursuit of economics by other means'.⁴ He is critical of journalists like Robert Kaplan who depict wars like Sierra Leone's as little more than chaotic madness and the result of 'ancient economic hatreds'.⁵ He suggests that 'traditional economics (with a focus on peaceful markets) and traditional political science (with a focus on elections and voting), as well as traditional military history (with a focus on bureaucratic war) are simply too rigid and narrowly defined.' The point of some wars, he argues, is not for one side or the other to win them, but to 'engage in profitable crime under the cover of warfare'. War, then, becomes not so much a breakdown of society as a complex, shifting and re-ordering of society. Neither government nor rebels may be in full command of their followers, and both inevitably require the financial support of outsiders. Often these outsiders are 'investors' likely to seek an economic return for their support.

External intervention in complex emergencies has focused to a large extent on emergency assistance at one end, and on calls for negotiation, often brokered by neighbouring (or even distant) countries at the other. In between can be found multifarious efforts at reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation, often far removed from the principal combatants, and far removed from the elements that made war an attractive proposition for them in the first place. And often far removed from those who invest in supporting one side or the other in a conflict. Such situations mock the Carnegie Commission report, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, which recommends that private companies 'put pressure on governments to seek an early resolution of emerging conflict'. Private companies, or at least certain types of private company, may well benefit from *increased* destabilization, finding new opportunities for short-term profit and longer-term gain, picking up the

pieces abandoned by earlier investors who have fled, or who shelter away from the front, behind the facade of arm's length but interlocking relationships.

1.5 Private Power, Commerce and State Institutions

It is odd, given the voluminous critical discourse on aid agencies, development assistance, humanitarianism and war, that very little study has been devoted to the role of the private sector in modern complex emergencies and their aftermath. This is especially surprising, given the now widespread prescription of the private sector as an appropriate and workable solution for most economic and development ailments. Aid has been implicated in causing economic and political collapse and in delaying its recovery. NGOs are frequently assailed for opportunism, individualism, amateurism and lack of transparency. The UN, Northern governments and their politicians are regularly held up to scorn for inaction and tight-fistedness. But the private sector is rarely discussed in the context of complex emergencies, except as something that must be 'jump-started' in the reconstruction phase of waning emergencies.⁶

The OECD *Development Assistance Committee Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* has considerably more to say about NGOs than it does about the private sector, devoting only one or two lines to the subject under the general rubric of the need for a stable macroeconomic environment in post-conflict situations. The Carnegie Commission report devotes two pages to the subject, suggesting primarily that businesses may be well placed to detect the early warning signs of conflict, and could pressure governments to seek an early resolution.

During a conflict, normal commerce is likely to be disrupted or destroyed, although new opportunities, not to mention opportunism, inevitably arise. The arms trade, for example, is likely to grow and thrive. Much of the private sector, however - although operational and in plain sight - remains largely invisible, or is deemed irrelevant by those reporting on conflict.

'Investors' in natural resources such as tropical hardwoods, or mineral resources such as gold or diamonds can play an important role during an emergency, in providing or denying foreign exchange, jobs, political support. Prior to the downfall of Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, for example, America Mineral Fields, a Vancouver-listed penny stock company with headquarters in Hope, Arkansas, signed a \$1 billion deal with rebel leader Laurent Kabila for mineral rights to high grade copper and cobalt tailings near Kolwezi. The company's CEO, Jean-Raymond Boulle, put his own plane and other assets at Kabila's disposal during his final struggle to topple Mobutu.⁷

There is another, more controversial but nonetheless available role for the private sector - the use of private security firms whose services range from equipment and training through to the use of direct force. Private security firms are not a new phenomenon, but in recent years they have begun to provide a more up-scale corporate service to governments whose problems are beyond the abilities of their own armed forces, and beyond the interest of the international community. Executive Outcomes and Sandline have been the most prominent of these companies in recent years, the former providing effective support at critical moments to the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone, the latter becoming embroiled in controversies as far apart as London and Papua New Guinea.* The intimate

* Sandline director Tim Spicer prefers 'private military armies' to the term 'mercenaries'.

connection between private security firms and the Sierra Leone diamond industry will be examined in detail in this report.

Their involvement is hardly surprising. Commercial enterprises operating in an environment with severe security problems can do one of three things: they can hope for the best; they can leave; or they can do something about it. After 20 years of war in Angola, a decade in Bougainville and five years in Sierra Leone, it is not surprising that beleaguered governments, failed by the UN and international diplomacy, would turn to options offered by the private sector. Although few officials in the international community openly endorse enterprises like Executive Outcomes and Sandline, the privatization of defence is not without appeal in the face of ineffective and inefficient public institutions. Certainly, Executive Outcomes was enthusiastically cheered by Sierra Leoneans in 1997 for beating the RUF back from the gates of Freetown.

1.6 Conclusion

It is not, however, quite that simple. William Reno argues that 'internal warfare and the rise of so-called warlords and other armed factions, develops out of a particular Cold War era relationship between private power, commerce and state institutions in weak states.'⁸ He uses the term 'shadow state' to explain the relationship between corruption and politics, and the growth of personal rule that can develop behind the facade of state sovereignty. Reno's shadow state ruler manages by fiat through a patronage network, manipulating factions and tensions, and weakening any formal institution - army, police, universities, central bank, the civil service - that might pose a challenge. This is Sierra Leone with all t's crossed under Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh. Inevitably, in the gray area of disintegration between shadow state and collapsed state, challenges do arise, often from sociopathic entrepreneurs willing to employ whatever level of violence is required to serve their objectives.

The willingness by factions and entrepreneurs to use violence is encouraged by the inability of the collapsing state to mount an effective defence. State employment of external security firms can become part of the scenario, but these are likely to be linked to other commercial interests, never entirely trustworthy and often mutating into a kind of protection racket. In the case of Sierra Leone, the connection between diamond mining firms and private security forces (described in greater detail below) is indivisible. As state kleptocracy and disintegration progressed, the peculiar nature of the diamond industry allowed large name-brand companies to withdraw from the front lines, leaving the field to 'juniors' - companies more willing to take risks with their capital and their reputation, and sometimes more willing to engage in unethical behaviour. The same has been true in Angola, Liberia and Congo. Marketing channels, long dominated in the informal diamond mining sector by what might be called 'disorganized crime', are increasingly influenced by *organized* crime and by the transcontinental smuggling not just of diamonds, but of guns and drugs, and by vast sums of money in search of a laundry. Violence in such cases is central to the advancement of those with vested interests. As Reno puts it, the organization of violence - 'who becomes a partner in the direct exercise of power and who gets managed into becoming a business' - are issues of critical concern for those interested in ending violence and building sustainable peace.⁹ Political settlement alone does not necessarily mean that the deeper causes of conflict have been solved. It may be little more

than a temporary realignment of political and economic interests, especially if key actors have a vested interest in the continuation of conflict.

It is worth noting at the outset of this study, therefore, that commercial interests of all kinds, licit and illicit, can be as potent a determinant of outcomes, if not more so, than the work of international aid agencies. Milton Friedman once wrote that 'There is one and only one responsibility of business - to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits, so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception and fraud'.¹⁰ The problem in emergency situations is that the 'rules of the game' may well be ignored. In the absence of enforceable laws, rules and conventions, context and temptation inevitably lead to commercial distortions and entanglements that are not in the best interests of the population at large.

Until the attraction of diamonds to criminals and international predators is defused, there is unlikely to be lasting peace in Sierra Leone, or the resources required to sustain it. This paper will argue that peace in Sierra Leone will remain unsustainable until the economic gains to be derived from criminality and violence are squarely addressed. Some remedies to the economic problem are within the purview and capacity of the government of Sierra Leone. Many, however, are not. Concerted international attention to the economics of the Sierra Leone conflict will be required if the fragile peace of 1999 is to survive for any length of time.

Keen suggests that 'as with the mutation of viruses... war is turned against civilians in the pursuit of profits, [and] these civilians may be forced to resort to violence in order to survive. The impoverishment of particular geographical and ethnic groups may also precipitate the "spreading" of war to new areas as predatory groups seek new assets to appropriate'.¹¹ As the mutation of the war in Sierra Leone continued through the 1990s, so did the number and type of predators, each seeking to gain from one side of the conflict or another. This study will examine the role of Lebanese diamond dealers and traders, and connections between Sierra Leone's diamonds, the Lebanese civil war and Israel. It will review the economic benefits to neighbouring states (and neighbouring warlords) of diamond smuggling - Liberia in particular. It will examine the role and responsibilities of the Belgian government and the Diamond High Council, which represents the Belgian diamond industry. And it will describe the involvement of key international diamond mining and selling companies, from De Beers at the top, to penny stock promoters at the bottom. The study will also deal with less savoury elements of the diamond trade: organized crime, the international weapons trade and mercenaries.

2. WORLD DIAMOND RESERVES AND PRODUCTION WORLD DIAMOND RESERVES AND PRODUCTION

2.1 Introduction 2.1 Introduction

The diamond business is a massive enterprise. In 1998, the industry produced an estimated 115 million carats of rough diamonds with a market value of US \$6.7 billion. At the end of the diamond chain, at the level of the consumer, this was converted into 67.1 million pieces of jewelry worth close to US \$50 billion.

Diamonds are derived from two main sources. Primary deposits are those which occur in basic volcanic rock, known as kimberlite. Secondary deposits are those which occur in alluvial deposits of weathered kimberlite. Although kimberlite is found worldwide, little is diamondiferous. If it is large enough and sufficiently diamondiferous to be mineable, the term diamond or kimberlite 'pipe' is used (although technically, the term 'kimberlite pipe' is used whether the pipe is diamondiferous or not).

The mining of kimberlite pipes is an expensive and capital-intensive operation, involving tunneling underground for hundreds of feet in order to extract diamonds. Where there are large and productive kimberlite pipes, one will usually find large companies with extensive investment funding. Although there are many kimberlite pipes in the world, a large proportion of diamonds are still recovered from alluvial deposits. Alluvial diamond fields are created by the disintegration of volcanic rock (kimberlite) over a long period of time. The product of the disintegration, including diamonds, can be carried away by river systems and deposited over widely scattered areas, including the sea-bed. Alluvial mining involves the separating of rough diamonds from earth and gravel. This can be done by a single person working with a sieve and shovel, or by large dredges which can remove tons of earth and gravel quickly.

Gemstones, including diamonds, are weighed in carats. One carat is 0.20 grams. Individual stones vary in average size from 0.01 ct. (about 1 mm in size) to more than 0.7 ct. Prices vary according to quality - weight, shape, clarity, colour. A 1 ct. gem-quality rough stone could be worth as little as US \$12, or as much as US \$2000. A cut diamond of this size would be worth many times more than this once it reaches the retail market.

Prior to the discovery of diamonds in South Africa in 1867, there were only two significant places in the world where diamonds were known to exist. Significant mining of diamonds in India dates from antiquity, and Brazilian diamonds were discovered in 1725.¹² Since 1867 about 20 additional producing countries have been identified. These diamond producing countries and production estimates can be found in Table 1.

The impact on global production of the growing number of sources has been enormous, with world production levels rising from about 300,000 carats in 1870, to 3 million carats in 1920, to 42 million carats in 1970, to the present production of 115 million carats.

In recent years, Botswana and Russia have been competing for the position of leading world diamond producer (by value). In 1998, Botswana produced approximately US\$ 1.6 billion worth of rough diamonds while Russia produced US \$1.3 billion. South Africa is ranked 3rd in the world. In the same year Sierra Leone's official production equaled US \$1.05 million.¹³ Jwaneng, a low-cost pit mine in Botswana remains the world's richest diamond operation, producing 12.5 million carats annually, worth more than US \$1 billion. In terms of pure volume Australia's output greatly surpasses all other countries by producing 40 million carats a year. However Australian diamonds are of lower quality and are smaller in size, and most are sold in Indian markets at relatively lower prices.

Table 1: Rough Diamonds: Estimated World Production by Type and Country
(thousands of carats)

COUNTRY	1995	1996	1997	1998
Gemstones	Gemstones			

Angola	2600	2,220	1,110	2,400
Australia	18,300	18,897	18,100	18,400
Botswana	11,500	12,400	15,100	13,500
Brazil	676	200	300	300
Canada	Nil	Nil	Nil	278
CAR	400	350	400	330
China	230	230	230	230
DRC	4,000	3,600	3,300	13,000
Cote d'Ivoire	53	202	207	207
Ghana	126	142	664	640
Guinea	274	165	165	165
Liberia	60	60	60	60
Namibia	1,382	1,400	1,420	1,600
Russia	10,500	10,500	10,500	10,500
Sierra Leone	113	162	64	50
South Africa	5,070	4,280	4,380	4,100
Venezuela	125	99	158	100
Zimbabwe	114	300	321	40
Other	119	165	121	126
Total	55,700	55,400	56,600	66,000
Industrial	Industrial			
Angola	300	250	124	364
Australia	22,400	23,096	22,100	22,500
Botswana	5,300	5,000	5,000	5,000
Brazil	600	600	600	600
CAR	130	120	100	200
China	900	900	900	900
DRC	13,000	17,000	18,900	2,000
Cote d'Ivoire	22	100	100	100
Ghana	505	573	166	160
Guinea	91	40	40	40
Liberia	90	90	90	90
Russia	10,500	10,500	10,500	10,500
Sierra Leone	101	108	40	30
South Africa	5,880	5,670	5,790	6,200
Venezuela	66	73	90	150
Zimbabwe	90	137	100	30
Other	101	120	105	106
Total	60,100	64,400	64,700	48,900
GRAND TOTAL	116,000	120,000	121,000	115,000

Source: 1998 Annual Report, United States Geological Survey, 'Mineral Industry Surveys - Gemstones', p. EE 17

2.2 An Important Note on Statistics 2.2 An Important Note on Statistics

Table 1 is based on the United States Geological Survey (USGS), which is generally regarded as an authoritative source of information on diamond production statistics. Its statistics, however, are based mainly on production figures supplied by governments. In countries where there is significant theft or smuggling, government statistics are likely to represent as little as 60 per cent of actual production. For example it is estimated that theft in South Africa represents about seven per cent of total production. In Russia it may be as high as 40 per cent. Government officials in Sierra Leone estimate that in recent years as much as 85 per cent of the country's diamond production has been

stolen and is not, therefore, included in the USGS figures. In other words, the USGS figures for Sierra Leone are very low.

This is borne out by historical data. Until the advent of organized and government-supported crime in the 1970s, Sierra Leone traditionally exported several hundred thousand carats a year (See also Section 4, below). In 1998, the USGS figure for Sierra Leone was 80,000 carats. (The Government of Sierra Leone, in fact, recorded exports of only 8,500 carats.) If it is true that 85 per cent of the diamonds are smuggled out of the country, this would suggest an annual production total of at least 530,000 carats, a figure more in keeping with earlier trends. A figure like this, while only an estimate, is borne out by statistics on Liberia, where no government figures have been available for years. The USGS estimates annual Liberian production at 150,000 carats, a very generous amount according to most technical reports. The Belgian Diamond High Council alone, however, records 1998 imports from Liberia of 2.6 million carats and a total of over 28 million carats in the three preceding years.

The discrepancy in statistics is not a matter of clerical error. Rather it points to - in Liberia's case - a very great contradiction between known reserves and actual exports. The diamonds that are exported from Liberia originate elsewhere, a high proportion of them in Sierra Leone. The report will return to this very important point in detail in Sections 3.3 and 4.6 below.

2.3 The Future Production of Diamonds

2.3 The Future Production of Diamonds

Most existing diamond mines have a reasonably long life expectancy. Overall, approximately two-thirds of total world production is derived from just eight mines, located in Australia, Botswana, Russia and South Africa. Most of these have a remaining mine life of at least 30 years and some up to 100 years. It is estimated that the Botswana sources will produce for another 25 to 100 years, the Namibia sources for a minimum of 18 years and presently-mined sources in South Africa will be productive for another 10 to 30 years. There are some mines in Angola and Russia that are predicted to have a shorter productive life, some as short as five years, however others have a projected longevity of up to 40 years.¹⁴

The greatest potential for future diamond finds is in areas where past exploration has been hampered by inhospitable location and climate, as in Siberia and northern Canada, and in offshore locations which have been constrained by limits of technology. It is estimated that there are diamond reserves of 1.5 billion carats off the coasts of South Africa and Namibia, and De Beers has in recent years developed new technologies to harvest them. There are also estimated to be large diamond reserves off the northwest coast of Australia, in the Arctic Ocean, off the coast of the Russian Federation and off the north coast of Canada and the west coast of Africa. In Angola geologists have identified more than 300 new kimberlite pipes. The greatest future source of diamonds is likely to be beneath the ice cap in Antarctica, probably the last great terrestrial source of diamonds. For now, however, the technology and international agreements do not permit mining in the area.

One of the world's most productive diamond finds has taken place in the Northwest Territories of Canada. The Ekati Diamond Mine, Canada's first, started production and produced 278,000 carats in 1998. When Ekati is at full capacity it is expected to have an annual production of four million carats, it will account for four per cent of global diamond production by weight, and six per cent by value. By 2002, Canada's second mine, Diavik, located just south of the Ekati lease, will

come on stream. The Diavik site consists of four kimberlite pipes of high-quality gem diamonds. Diavik feasibility studies envisage production of six to eight million carats a year for about 15 years, with a total production value for the life of the mine in the order of US \$6 billion.

In Russia there is major exploration and mining throughout Siberia by Russian companies, De Beers, Archangel Diamond Corporation of Canada and the regional Geological Survey company, Arkgeo. In Guinea and Sierra Leone there appear to be substantial kimberlite pipes. In the case of Sierra Leone, the pipes have not been developed because of conflict in the country, and in Guinea, development is just commencing.

2.4 Sierra Leone and West African Diamonds

The diamond reserves and production levels of Sierra Leone are impossible to estimate accurately. Reserve estimates vary widely. At one end are the implausibly high numbers used by junior mining companies to create shareholder interest and confidence. At the other are comments like one from De Beers suggesting that the alluvial fields are worked out and the kimberlite pipes are '... only as large as two tennis courts and even those are being mined at their roots'.¹⁵ Somewhere between are estimates provided by professional groups such as the USGS, Natural Resources Canada and independent geologists.¹⁶

The other, and perhaps more important difficulty in generating accurate data for Sierra Leone, and West Africa generally, occurs as a consequence of inter-country smuggling. However, given these qualifications, certain things can be said.

In Sierra Leone the first diamond was found by members of the Sierra Leone Geological Department in Kono District in 1930 and significant production commenced in 1935. By 1937 Sierra Leone was mining one million carats annually, reaching a peak of two million carats in 1960. At that point Sierra Leone was producing one-third of the world's diamonds and diamonds largely supported the Sierra Leone government through taxes on diamond profits. Between 1952 and 1962 taxes paid to the Sierra Leone government averaged between 30 per cent and 60 per cent of profits and the profits were significant.¹⁷

From 1930 to 1998 approximately 55 million carats were mined (officially) in Sierra Leone. At an average price in 1996 dollars of US \$270 per carat, the total value is close to US \$15 billion. The first two kimberlite pipes were discovered in 1948 near Koidu on what is presently known as the Yengema Lease and in 1954 additional pipes were found in what has become known as the Tongo Lease. According to the noted geologist A.J.A. Janse, the once-rich Yengema and Tongo alluvial fields (not to be confused with kimberlite potential) are now largely depleted.¹⁸ The war, the export statistics from Liberia, and the interest in Sierra Leone of several aggressive junior mining firms suggest that this comment may be premature.

The report will return to the question of Sierra Leone diamonds in greater detail in Section 4.

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION OF THE INDUSTRY

3.1 A Preliminary Roadmap 3.1 A Preliminary Roadmap

The international diamond trade is unique in the world of business. It is secretive, iconoclastic, exploitative, and in the words of an Antwerp banker, 'still pretty medieval'. The term 'medieval' is apt. An industry which each year sells 67.1 million pieces of diamond jewelry, worth US \$49.4 billion, is largely controlled by a single company that sets the price and the market supply of 70 to 80 per cent of the world's entire rough diamond output.

This section of the report provides a brief overview of the major commercial and corporate interests involved in the diamond business: 'De Beers', Belgium and the Diamond High Council.

De Beers

'De Beers' and 'Oppenheimer' are names synonymous with the development and ownership of the mineral industries of South Africa since the middle of the 19th century. Two companies emerged from the South African diamond rush of the 1870s and 1880s - the Kimberley Central Mining Company and the De Beers Mining Company, named after the De Beers brothers, owners of the land where the rush began. In 1888 the two companies merged to form De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited. Over 100 years later, the company still has its registered office in Stockdale Street, Kimberly, South Africa.

In the late 1920s, the diamond industry was in a catastrophic state with too many diamonds and too few buyers. Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, appointed Chairman of the Board of De Beers in 1929, reorganized the diamond industry, essentially by offering to buy all the diamonds on offer throughout the world, in order to support a stable price. The Oppenheimer family has maintained its relationship with De Beers for 70 years. Harry Oppenheimer, who succeeded his father, turned 91 in 1999. He was succeeded as Chairman by his son, Nicky.

De Beers is likely the only private company in existence that has operated as a 19th century mercantilist firm, passed unscathed through the heyday of Western anti-trust and combines legislation, and without significant organizational change managed to fit into the late 20th century global model before globalization 'happened', and before monopolies re-emerged as a semi-acceptable form of business practice.¹⁹

The Anglo American Corporation was formed in 1917, with Ernest Oppenheimer as chairman and managing director, in order to gain access to capital markets in the United States. For many years, cross directorships and shareholdings meant that De Beers and Anglo American essentially controlled one another. In 1998, however, Anglo American re-structured, and was operationally separated from De Beers. The purpose of the separation, according to De Beers, was to 'assemble all the diamond skills and expertise which have long been De Beers' special strength in one independent, dedicated and integrated company, led by a highly focused management team, free to devote its full attention to its core role – the discovery, mining and marketing of diamonds.'²⁰ With the re-structuring, De Beers held 40 per cent of Anglo American PLC, which was newly listed on stock exchanges in London in 1998. The Chairman of Anglo American Corporation of South

Africa Limited (AAC), J. Ogilvie Thompson, remained Deputy Chairman of the De Beers Board of Directors.²¹

What is commonly referred to as 'De Beers' is organizationally two major companies. De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited (DBCM) is incorporated and has its headquarters in Kimberly, South Africa. De Beers Centenary AG (DECAG) is incorporated in, and operates from Lucerne, Switzerland.

De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited manages most activities in South Africa, including its mining operations, its marine company which mines offshore diamonds, its interests in the Central Selling Organization (see below) and companies which produce synthetic diamonds. As well, it controls all its investments in the Anglo American Corporation, holds a 10.9 per cent interest in the Swiss-based De Beers Centenary AG as well as other investments. De Beers Centenary AG manages all diamond operations in Botswana and Namibia, all diamond trading companies (including the Central Selling Organization) and a myriad of other investments.

De Beers mines or partners in mining the majority of the world's diamonds, it purchases by far the majority of all diamonds produced, and more or less sets the global price of rough diamonds on international markets. Probably its major role, and a role in which it has been extremely successful, is to maintain stable prices by manipulation of both the supply and demand for rough diamonds on world markets. This is done through its Central Selling Organization (CSO).

The CSO headquarters are in London, but it has buying offices around the world. The CSO sources diamonds from its own mines and it purchases from the 'outside market'. The outside market consists of diamonds produced by non-De Beers firms that are not contractually bound to sell to the CSO. The diamonds purchased by the CSO are in turn sold at 10 annual 'sights' (sales) to 160 'sightholders'. Sightholders are designated by De Beers and are presented with mixed 'parcels' of diamonds. The parcels are packages of combined rough gem quality and industrial diamonds, and may include stones from a combination of countries. Parcels are priced by De Beers and are bought by sightholders, sight unseen. Sightholders then take the diamonds to other cities where they are resorted and repackaged for onward sale, or for cutting and polishing.

Belgium and the Diamond High Council

If De Beers is the dominant name in the diamond business, its extended family resides in Antwerp, Belgium. Antwerp is undeniably the world centre for rough diamonds. More than half of the CSO sightholders reside in Antwerp. Antwerp is also the principal 'outside market' serving as a funnel for more than half of all the diamonds produced in the world. In Antwerp, transactions are settled in cash, even when they involve prices of six and seven figures. Diamond dealers often do not issue receipts; million-dollar deals are sealed on a handshake and entrance into the industry is almost impossible, except through family ties.

The formal trading of diamonds in Belgium is structured around the *Hoge Raad voor Diamant* (HRD), commonly known in the trade as the Diamond High Council or simply the HRD. The HRD is a non-profit organization established in 1973. It is the umbrella organization officially acknowledged as the representative and spokesperson for the overall Belgian diamond industry. The HRD maintains only one office outside of Belgium, in Toronto. The HRD groups four Belgian Diamond bourses (exchanges), the Federation of Belgian Diamond Bourses, professional diamond

associations and two trade unions. The stated mission of the HRD is to maintain and to strengthen the position of Antwerp as the world centre for diamonds. The HRD achieves this by carrying out the following functions:

- it supports and defends the interests of the Belgian diamond trade and industry, both at home and abroad;
- it develops state-of-the-art techniques for grading and processing diamonds;
- it handles import and export formalities;
- it provides proof of authenticity for polished diamonds;
- it supervises and trains specialized employees.

The most important branches of the HRD are its Institute of Gemology, a Certificates Department, the Industry Department and Diamond Office.

By far the most important function of the HRD is to supervise the importation, valuation and export of diamonds and it does so at an annual turnover rate of approximately 500 million carats of industrial, gem and polished diamonds, valued at roughly US\$ 20 billion.

For the purposes of this report, the most important branch of the HRD is the Diamond Office. The Diamond Office is responsible for the HRD's trade and evaluation aspects, and it also plays a unique role as the diamond customs agent of the Government of Belgium. The structure of the Belgian industry is discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3, below.

3.2 De Beers – A Diamond is Forever 3.2 De Beers – A Diamond is Forever

Managing Supply and Demand

De Beers dominates the diamond industry unequivocally. De Beers produces 50 per cent of the world's gem diamonds (by value), from its own mines in South Africa and in partnership with the governments of Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania. In addition, it purchases diamonds from 'outside markets' and in turn markets them through its CSO. The total of De Beers own mining output plus diamonds purchased from the 'outside market' results in De Beers selling each year, on average, 70 to 80 per cent of the world's diamond output.

De Beers acknowledges its monopolistic appearance,²² but argues that its approach benefits everyone from the miner on the ground to the consumer who purchases diamond jewelry. 'Control' is necessary in the industry. Harry Oppenheimer explains:

'Whether this measure of control amounts to a monopoly I would not know, but if it does, it is certainly a monopoly of a most unusual kind. There is no one concerned with diamonds, whether as producer, dealer, cutter, jeweler or customer, who does not benefit from it. It protects not only the shareholders of diamond companies, but also the miners they employ and the communities that are dependent on their operations.'²³

The current De Beers corporate position is similar:

‘Price fluctuations accepted as normal in the case of most raw materials would undermine confidence in the value of a luxury product like diamonds. De Beers’ policy is to maintain price stability by tailoring supplies to the cutting centres to meet prevailing demand while continuing to buy from producing nations and on the open market’.²⁴

De Beers’ 1998 Annual Report refers to the company’s principles and interests, provisions which are aimed at maintaining its monopolistic position. Two of the core principles are:

- our striving for stability in the world-wide diamond industry for the benefit of all our stakeholders and our core partners;
- our consequent determination to remain the largest diamond producer in value terms and – in all respects – the leading diamond company in the world.²⁵

De Beers maintains stability and its position in the international market through various mechanisms. The CSO directly dictates the price of diamonds for all sightholders, and indirectly influences price by periodically withholding or releasing diamonds on the market. In addition, De Beers’ strategy includes efforts to own outright or to partner with ‘juniors’, in order to control the major diamond fields in the world.

The two major branches of De Beers, De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited (DCM) and De Beers Centenary AG, have extensive economic power and market reach. The following lists, while not by any means complete, provide insight into De Beers diversity and market reach. As of December 31, 1998, De Beers held 100 per cent ownership in the following subsidiary companies:

- eleven separate finance and investment companies incorporated in Luxembourg, Switzerland, the Isle of Man, Belgium, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Namibia and Netherlands;
- eight separate diamond trading companies incorporated in Switzerland, Bermuda, Botswana, Liberia, Namibia, Panama, Tanzania and the United Kingdom;
- three separate diamond manufacturing and processing companies (synthetic diamonds) incorporated in the Isle of Man, Ireland and Sweden;
- three separate manufacturing companies incorporated in Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom;
- four separate administrative companies incorporated in Bermuda, Canada and Ireland;
- one air charter company incorporated in the United Kingdom.

Additional listed investments, which are not formally subsidiaries of De Beers, include:

- a 26 per cent share in Minorco SA;
- Zambia Copper Investments Limited;
- AngloGold Limited.

Together these three investments have a market value of US \$834 million. Unlisted investments of the De Beers group include:

- Sibeka Soci t  d'Entreprise et d'Investissements S.A (Belgium);
- Erongo Mining and Exploration Company (Pty.) Limited;
- Anglo Middle Eastern Holdings Limited;
- Antwerpse Diamantbank N.V. (Antwerp Diamond Bank);
- a 50 per cent share in Debswana Diamond Company Limited (Botswana Government Diamond Company);
- a 50 per cent share in Namdeb Diamond Corporation (Namibia Government Diamond Company).

Together, these six unlisted investments are valued by the De Beers Board of Directors at slightly over US \$2.1 billion.

De Beers dominates the supply side in Botswana, South Africa, Angola and Namibia. As well, Task Holdings, an investment company controlled by the Oppenheimer family, controls 41 per cent of Archangel Diamond Corporation of Canada, which mines rich kimberlites in Russia and holds close to 50 per cent of the Russian mining company of Severalmaz. The discovery of rich diamond fields in the Canadian Northwest Territories persuaded De Beers to establish an office in Vancouver, Canada, and to partner with the Canadian Mountain Province Mining Company in order to exploit Canadian fields.

The rules of the game for De Beers partnerships are tough, as a De Beers official states: 'We want the sales from any mine to go through the CSO; we want to manage the operation and we want to have more than 50 per cent of the shareholding'.²⁶ Regarding De Beers's partnerships with the junior companies, one analyst says,

'The lion may lie down with the lamb, but the lamb is not going to get much sleep.'²⁷

Box 2. Playing Rough in the Diamond Business

David Gadd-Claxton does not mince his words when he speaks of De Beers: 'I highly respect them, and I hate them like f---ing poison.' Gadd-Claxton is mine manager for Canada's Southern Era Resources in South Africa and an ex-De Beers's employee.

When Southern Era's Chris Jennings discovered the M1 pipe in Marsfontein, the company thought it had hit the motherlode. But a group of South Africans claimed to be heirs to the property, saying they had never renounced the mineral rights. A court battle, followed, which at first Southern Era thought it could win.

Southern Era's chances dimmed, however, when De Beers stepped in and bought out the heirs, and Southern Era found itself dealing with the most powerful adversary in the diamond business. After a six-month fight Southern Era caved in and on June 1998 they agreed to give away a majority of the find to bring the dispute to an end, retaining 40 per cent of the mining rights. Part of the deal to end the dispute also gave De Beers the exclusive right to market all production.

In the end Gadd-Claxton is wistful, 'we'd do a joint venture with De Beers again,' he agrees, adding: 'We'd be wiser. We'd negotiate better.'

Toronto *Globe and Mail*, July 31, 1999

De Beers Central Selling Organization (CSO)

The CSO originated as a result of the virtual collapse of the diamond market during the depression of the 1930s. In 1934 Sir Ernest Oppenheimer created the CSO to establish what De Beers refers to as a system of single-channel marketing. The system and the strategy is to support artificially high market prices - what De Beers calls 'price stability' - by tailoring supplies to the cutting centres to meet prevailing demand, while continuing to buy from all diamond producers and on the open market. The enduring success of this strategy rests on two main factors:

- contractual quota arrangements in which the main producers who sell through the CSO withhold temporarily from sale diamonds which are not in demand;
- De Beers' extensive financial resources which enable the CSO itself to hold a 'buffer' stock of diamonds until demand improves.

Most of the world's rough gem diamonds are sent to the London CSO where they are sorted into over 14,000 separate categories based on shape, quality, colour and size. In addition to London, the CSO operates sorting and valuing operations in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Switzerland. Once sorted, the diamonds are blended into selling combinations - 'parcels' - that are prepared for sale to the company's clients, the 'sightholders'. The parcels vary, including gem diamonds, 'melee' (mix) and 'boart'. Boart is intended for industrial use. 'Mix' are smaller stones, but they may have a high value as some dealers may be interested in a specific quality or stones of a certain colour.

De Beers sells to only 160 sightholders in the world. Diamond parcels are put together solely by De Beers; the price of parcels is set by De Beers; the 'sightholders' are chosen by De Beers; and the parcel price is non-negotiable. It is a rigorous business, and De Beers expels sightholders who refuse to purchase at the set price.

All sightholders are leading diamond cutters and polishers, or dealers chosen by De Beers. Ten 'sights' (sales) are held each year. The sights take place in London, Lucerne and Johannesburg. Sightholders apply for parcels in advance, and their individual requirements are matched as closely as possible from the available supply of diamonds.

In addition to defining buyers and setting prices at the microeconomic level, De Beers strongly affects the

Box 3. How Prices are Maintained

Next to the United States, the Asia-Pacific region is the largest retail market for cut and polished diamonds and diamond jewelry. However, with the disintegration of Asian economies in 1997, retail diamond sales fell by 18 per cent in a single year. De Beers responded by significantly reducing diamond sales through its CSO in the latter part of 1997 and throughout 1998, stockpiling diamonds in order to maintain the price levels of previous years. As a result, sales by the CSO during 1998 were US\$3,345 million – a drop of 28 per cent on the previous year. De Beers then convinced other 'core sellers' which were contracted to the CSO to share the burden by agreeing to stockpile 26 per cent of their production, despite the short-term effect on revenue. Overall, De Beers was successful in reducing stocks of rough and polished diamonds by a value of US \$1 billion and, in De Beers's terms, 'leaving the stock-to-sales ratios in the cutting centres at much healthier levels'. What this means for the consumer is artificially determined higher retail prices.

Source: De Beers Annual Report, 1998

macroeconomic market price by manipulating the world supply of rough diamonds. It also influences markets through an extensive advertising strategy. Even though De Beers does not sell finished diamonds or diamond jewelry, the company has an annual advertising budget of US \$200 million.

With an increasing number of operational diamond companies and potentially productive diamond mines throughout the world, De Beers has consistently formed new partnerships in order to maintain its control over the market and expand the range of CSO purchasing. For example:

- in December 1998 De Beers finalized a new sales contract with Almazny Rossi Sakha (Alrosa), the Russian conglomerate which is second only to De Beers in the production of diamonds. Alrosa produces 98 per cent of the total output of Russian rough diamonds and accounts for 28 per cent of CSO sales. Under the terms of the agreement, Alrosa will sell a minimum of US \$550 million worth of diamonds a year through the CSO, out of a planned production of US \$1.5 billion;
- in March 1999, De Beers signed a three-year deal with Broken Hill Properties (BHP) to purchase 35 per cent of the production from the Ekati mine in Canada's Northwest Territories. The Ekati mine is expected to be one of the most productive mines of the 21st century, representing about six per cent of the world's diamond supply by value.

For De Beers, such agreements mean that fewer diamonds are likely to reach markets that are not dominated by the CSO. There are, nevertheless, occasional industry revolts:

- In 1997 De Beers faced an unprecedented revolt as gem dealers and jewelry manufacturers protested the crushing effects of a strong US dollar and the disintegration of Asia-Pacific economies. The industry's main body accused De Beers of pricing stones in a way that could force them out of business. The World Federation of Diamond Bourses declared that: 'Pricing and marketing policies of De Beers resulted in unacceptably low profitability, which threatens the viability of diamantaires (diamond dealers) worldwide.'²⁸
- In 1997 Argyle, Australia's largest diamond producer, stopped selling to the CSO after De Beers re-balanced prices away from smaller diamonds towards more expensive stones. Australia produces lower value gems and currently sells the majority through markets in India where there are approximately 180,000 diamond cutters;
- In July 1999, the U.S. jeweler, Tiffany & Company, signed a contract with Aber Resources Ltd. Aber, a Canadian 'junior', had 40 per cent of the Northwest Territories Diavik property, and Rio Tinto PLC had 60 per cent. The deal with Tiffany will see a 'substantial portion' of Aber's production sold directly to New York. This direct marketing relationship between a mining company and a retailer is unprecedented and is designed to get around De Beers and the CSO.²⁹

De Beers and Sierra Leone

The present connection between De Beers and Sierra Leone is indirect. Until the 1980s, De Beers was directly involved in Sierra Leone, had approved concessions to mine diamonds offshore, and maintained an office in Freetown. The historical connection is discussed in greater detail in Section

4.1, below. As late as 1994, however, De Beers still held concessions and rights for offshore mining in Sierra Leone.³⁰ And in 1997, the company had tentative plans to re-open a small purchasing office in Freetown. Because of hostilities in Sierra Leone, however, these plans were shelved.

De Beers questions the economic viability of pursuing diamonds in Sierra Leone. There have been recent (1999) overtures from the Government of Sierra Leone for De Beers to return, but at the time of writing, the company had apparently not reached a final decision, '...as the pricing structure of diamonds is such that it would not be cost efficient.'³¹ De Beers also questions whether kimberlite resources in Sierra Leone are as rich as others believe.

There are several other ways in which De Beers is involved with Sierra Leone diamonds, however. De Beers maintains a diamond trading company in Liberia (Polestar Limited) and a buying office in Conakry, Guinea.³² Both countries produce very few diamonds themselves, and Liberia is widely understood to be a 'transit' country for smuggled diamonds. Many of these diamonds are of Sierra Leonean origin, and others are reportedly of Russian and Angolan origin (See Section 4.6).

De Beers says that it does not purchase Sierra Leonean diamonds. Through its companies in several West African countries, however, and in its attempts to mop up supplies everywhere, it is virtually inconceivable that De Beers is not purchasing diamonds that have been smuggled out of Sierra Leone. In the past, De Beers staff have taken the position that diamonds cannot be identified by source: '...if you are sitting in Tel Aviv or Moscow or New York, whatever the potential for positive identification, you have not a clue where they come from. Just to be clear, if he (the diamond seller) says they are Scottish diamonds, you take his word for it... They could be diamonds from the moon.'³³ In correspondence with the United Nations Sanctions Committee on Angola, De Beers has recently taken a more nuanced position (see Section 7, below).

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The Belgian Connection

*Antwerp: A Diamond's Best Friend*³⁴

There are several historical reasons for Belgium's preeminence in the diamond industry, not least of them Belgium's colonial history and the role that Belgian mining companies have played in the Congo. At the beginning of the 20th Century, Amsterdam was the centre of the world diamond trade, but revisions in Dutch taxation laws between the two world wars made it less hospitable, and the majority of the traders gradually migrated to Antwerp. Antwerp already had a tradition for diamond craftsmanship, dating back to the 16th century. In 1930 the Antwerpsche Diamantkring - today the only rough diamond exchange in the world - already had 1,300 members. After World War II, Belgian authorities helped to rebuild the diamond industry, introducing strong incentives to revitalize the trade, and significantly loosening legislation and tax laws. As a result, Antwerp has thrived.

Today Antwerp annually processes more than half the world's consumption of rough, polished and industrial diamonds. It has the world's largest community of dealers, and more than half of all De Beers's sightholders live in Antwerp. The Antwerp diamond district consists of one square kilometer, encompassing three small streets, but this area alone has 1,500 registered diamond traders, wholesalers and retailers. Within the district there are also four diamond bourses where much of the diamond trading is carried out, and four banks that specialize in financing the diamond trade.

The diamond trade contributes significantly to the Belgian economy, and more significantly to the regional economy of Flanders, as illustrated in Table 2.

Table 2. The Diamond Trade and its Economic Impact in Belgium, 1998

World Production (Rough/Industrial)	115 million carats
Market Value	US \$6.7 billion
Total Belgium diamond trade (imports plus exports)	525 million carats
Trade value through Belgium (imports plus exports)	US \$20.06 billion
% of CSO sales to Antwerp sightholders	44%
World sales outside CSO	US \$3 billion
Antwerp purchases of non-CSO diamonds	77%
Diamond contribution to Belgian GNP	1.5%
Diamonds as per cent of Belgian exports	7%
Diamonds as per cent of Flanders exports	12%
Taxes paid to Govt. of Belgium by diamond industry	US \$8 million

Diamond-related employment (Belgium)	27,000
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Sources: Rombouts, Luc 'Antwerp Facets' (Diamond High Council, Antwerp, April 1999); Diamond High Council Press Conference (Antwerp, March 1999); Diamond High Council, 1998 *Annual Report*, Antwerp 1999.

Role of the Diamond High Council (HRD)

Role of the Diamond High Council (HRD)

The formal organization of the Belgian diamond industry is structured around the *Hoge Raad voor Diamant* (HRD), or the Diamond High Council. In its 1998 Mission Statement, the HRD explains that its overall mission is to maintain and to strengthen the position of Antwerp as the world centre for diamonds. Two of the primary functions of the HRD are germane to a better understanding of the diamond trade:

- to support and defend the interests of the Belgian diamond trade and industry, both home and abroad;
- to handle import and export formalities for the Government of Belgium.³⁵

Belgian Import and Export of Diamonds

Table 3 provides a statistical summary of the diamond trade through the HRD. Table 3 also shows the significance of the Belgian re-export trade in diamonds (both gem and industrial) and polished diamonds. Most notable, is the fact that while Belgium imported nearly 256 million carats of diamonds in 1998, it only exported 7.6 million carats of polished diamonds in the same year, and the import and export of rough diamonds (by volume) was roughly equal. Belgium does not have an extensive cutting and polishing industry. Its main business is the re-routing of diamonds. Belgium's most significant market for the export of rough diamonds is India, where over 180,000 diamond cutters are employed. In 1997 and 1998 Belgium re-exported 121 million carats and 149 million carats respectively to India. The re-export business is so significant that in 1998 the HRD exported more rough diamonds than it imported (133 million carats imported and 166 million carats exported).³⁶

Table 3. Statistical Survey - Belgian Imports and Exports of Diamonds

	1997		1998	
	(Millions of carats)	(millions of US\$)	(millions of carats)	(millions of US\$)
IMPORTS				
Polished Diamonds	6.5	4184.8	7.5	4247.4
Rough Diamonds	143.4	6774	133.7	5420.2
Industrial Diamonds	103	147.1	121.8	138.9
Total	252.9	11106	263	9806.5

EXPORTS				
Polished Diamonds	7	5144.1	7.7	5026.5
Rough Diamonds	145.1	6273	166.1	5127.7
Industrial Diamonds	91.7	114.4	88.5	101.6
Total	243.9	11531.4	262.3	10255.9
Total Imports and Exports	496.7	22637.4	525.4	20062.4

Source: Diamond High Council, *1998 Annual Report*, Antwerp, 1999, p. 9.

Diamonds arriving in Belgium are channelled into a formal and legal structure built around the HRD's Diamond Office and supported by Belgian legislation. However, there are other markets that operate externally to the HRD and Belgian legislation. The various Antwerp markets can perhaps be referred to as the 'white', 'grey' and 'black' markets.

The White Market

The White Market

The 'white' market refers to the legal and formal purchase and sale of diamonds. It is basically a wholesale and importing and exporting market. Legally, diamonds can only be marketed, imported and exported by companies and dealers registered with the HRD Diamond Office, and only Belgian and Luxembourg-registered companies can become registered members of the HRD. A special arrangement exists between Luxembourg and Belgium, resulting from the establishment of the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) in 1921. Licensing documents for the import and export of diamonds are valid for both Belgian and Luxembourg customs authorities. Luxembourg follows Belgian customs regulations, and application forms for imports and exports are valid in both countries. The overall majority of companies and dealers are, however, registered in Antwerp and only a few large jewelers in Luxembourg import diamonds via Antwerp.

The largest single source of high quality gem diamonds are the Antwerp-based De Beers sightholders. In 1998, they purchased 28 million carats, valued at US \$1.5 billion. Although a larger quantity of Australian diamonds was purchased, they are of a lesser quality and therefore have significantly lower value. Table 4 shows the imports, import sources and value of all rough diamonds processed by the HRD in 1997 and 1998.

Table 4. Antwerp Imports of Rough Diamonds

	1998 Jan-Dec		1997 Jan-Dec	
	Millions of Carats	US\$ Millions	Millions of Carats	US\$ Millions
UK (non-CSO)	11.3	732	10.4	711
CSO	28.2	1,465	36.8	2,159
Congo (DRC)	20.9	613	15.8	553
Israel	3.5	487	3.4	532

Angola	1.6	349	1	273
Australia	44.1	280	40.2	267
Liberia	2.6	269	5.8	330
Central. Afr. Rep.	0.8	165	579	108
South Africa	0.6	155	367	122
USA	1.1	132	845	113
Guinea	0.6	116	533	109
Gambia	0.4	103	660	132
Sierra Leone	0.8	66	803	115
Switzerland	1.2	56	3.7	94

Source (Diamond High Council , Antwerp 1999) p. 11.

In addition to CSO purchases, diamonds come to Antwerp from major producers who have either no agreement or a partial marketing agreement with the CSO. An approximate estimate from this source is US \$600 million annually (1998). This figure is likely to increase in coming years due to a rise in production from newly discovered mines.³⁷ Major producers may sell their diamond output directly through their own marketing offices in Belgium. Most major producers, such as Argyle (Australia), ENDIAMA (Angola), Ashton (Canada), Broken Hills Properties (Australia) and Rio Tinto (USA) have their own sales offices or representing agents and brokers who are members of one of the diamond exchanges. A few producers such as ENDIAMA, Trans Hex (Canada) and Rex Diamond Mining Corporation (Canada) also have their *de facto* headquarters in Antwerp.

The Grey Market

The Grey Market

The 'grey' or 'independent' or 'parallel' market in Antwerp consists of brokers, jewelers and retailers who are not directly linked to the HRD, are not members of the diamond exchanges and are not registered as importers or exporters of diamonds. It is a parallel market because diamonds are sold or bartered from one dealer to another, or from a manufacturer directly to the jewelry shop, often without invoices or paperwork. This market is 'grey' because it operates beyond the purview of the HRD. Producers such as Namco (Namibia), DiamondWorks (Canada), Southern Era (Canada) and MIBA (Government of DRC) sell most of their diamonds through independent dealers in Antwerp and some may supply directly to Belgian manufacturers, cutters and jewelers. The market operates outside the confines and therefore the monitoring of the HRD. The HRD takes the position that the quantity of diamonds exchanged in this 'grey' market is very small, but there are no statistics to verify the HRD position.³⁸

In 1998, the grey market came to the attention of a Belgian Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Organized Crime. The Commission's report contains an extensive chapter on the diamond industry and suggests that the grey market is far less marginal than the diamond industry and the HRD would suggest.³⁹

The Commission Report estimated that 4,000 to 5,000 commercial diamond dealers and brokers are active in the grey market, apart from the 3,500 registered members of the four diamond exchanges in Antwerp. Membership in a diamond exchange is voluntary and provides the benefit and privileges that are inherent to being 'inside' the industry. The advantage of remaining 'outside' the industry is the lack of industry-led regulation or monitoring.

While operating on the 'outside' is not illegal, the Parliamentary Commission Report took the position that the grey or parallel market is extremely vulnerable to infiltration and use by organized criminal groups.⁴⁰ The Commission Report listed 30 cases related to the Antwerp diamond industry that were under judicial investigation at the time of its report. The cases involved fraud, forgery, tax evasion, fake bankruptcy, laundering, contraband and theft. Ten of the listed cases were categorized under the heading 'organized crime' and the 20 remaining cases were classified as 'organizational crime'.⁴¹ The distinction appears to be that 'organizational crime' consists of criminal acts committed by criminal members of an otherwise legitimate business.

The Illicit Trade – The Black Market

The Illicit Trade – The Black Market

The distinction made here between the white, grey and black markets are, to a large extent, artificial – boundaries and a separation of sourcing and trading in diamonds cannot be drawn this easily. Because of the high level of secrecy inherent in the Antwerp diamond trade, and the fact that there are few paper trails outside the HRD, it is difficult to fully determine the extent of the illicit trade.

Smuggling in the Belgian context refers to diamonds which enter Belgium without being declared to customs officials, and which are not licensed for import by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the HRD Diamond Office. Neither the Government of Belgium nor the HRD have estimates of the quantity or source of smuggled diamonds. In addition, there are few active policies aimed at controlling diamond smuggling, apart from standard declaration and checking procedures of the customs department and the HRD. (Belgium, however, is perhaps the only country to have - at least on paper - a monitoring system of imports and exports. In the Netherlands, for example, the procedures are even more cursory.)

It is known that most of the rough diamonds smuggled into Belgium are from Africa, and are likely to have been produced by artisanal diggers. These diamonds are sold from dealer to dealer, outside the purview of the HRD or the diamond exchanges. A number of smaller hotels in and around the area of Antwerp's Central Station are known trading places for illicit diamonds.⁴² In some cases, if the seller has enough, diamonds may be presented directly to a manufacturer. The manufacturer will undertake the cutting and polishing process, and the diamonds will subsequently be sold on the open market or to one of the many jewelry shops in the diamond district, or abroad.

On a small scale, African couriers bring in rough diamonds, without declaring them to customs or the HRD, and selling them directly to Antwerp-based dealers. An African diamond courier describes the process:

Smuggling is not risky and I have been doing it nearly my whole life. One just needs to have special contacts at home. My contacts will guarantee free passage at the airport at home and once you're on the plane the job is done. I am never checked for diamonds when I enter Belgium. To sell my diamonds I just go to one of the diamantaires in the Pelikaanstraat and

present myself at the counter with my batch of stones. The diamantaires are always friendly and take me to a room in the back and serve me something to drink. They even offer to arrange for a place for me to stay in Antwerp.⁴³

The next step in the laundering process is not particularly expensive or risky for the diamantaire. As one writer puts it, 'A diamond becomes legal as soon as it is presented at a diamantaire's counter'.⁴⁴ A registered dealer and member of one of the diamond exchanges can simply mix illegally obtained diamonds with a parcel of already declared diamonds. This allows the diamantaire to both avoid taxes and launder the illicit diamonds.

The Real Source of Antwerp Diamonds

The Real Source of Antwerp Diamonds

One of the factors which eases larger scale diamond smuggling and inhibits the tracking of diamond movements is the manner in which the HRD documents the industry. The HRD records the origin of a diamond as the country from which the diamond was last exported. Certificates of origin are not in use, except in a cursory manner for Angola. Therefore, diamonds produced in Sierra Leone, say, may be officially imported and registered as originating in Liberia, Guinea, Israel or the UK, depending on their journey from one trading centre to another.

The real issue of the Belgian environment, as it pertains to Sierra Leone or any other diamond producing country, is the lack of interest and therefore the lack of information on the true source of the diamonds entering the country. The Belgian diamond industry - and apparently the Belgian government - are basically not interested in the source of diamonds or how they get to Belgium. They are concerned only that imported diamonds pass through a dealer who is registered with the HRD, or through the HRD itself.

Official data from both the HRD and the Government of Belgium mask this issue, but at the same time serve a useful service in pointing out the significance of the problem. The two following tables illustrate the problem:

Table 5. Diamond Production in West African Countries for Selected Years
(000 carats)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Sierra Leone	78	243	347	158	255	213	270	104	8.5
Liberia	100	100	150	150	100	150	150	150	150
Guinea	127	97	153	167	381	365	205	205	205
Ghana	650	700	656	591	740	632	715	830	800
Ivory Coast	12	15	15	15	84	75	302	307	307

Sources: Data for Liberia, Guinea, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire for the years 1994-1998 from: Ronald F. Balazik, 'Gemstones', *1998 Annual Review* (United States Geological Survey, August 1999) p. EE 17. Remaining data for the same countries is from various mineral industry reports from 1990 to 1994 published by the United States Geological Survey. Sierra Leone data is from: Government of Sierra Leone, Government Gold and Diamond Office, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 1999.

Table 6. Antwerp Imports of West African Diamonds
Selected Years (000 carats)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Sierra Leone	331	534	831	344	526	455	566	803	770
Liberia	5,523	658	1,909	5,006	3,268	10,677	12,320	5,803	2,558
Guinea	287	374	526	1021	875	780	439	533	596
Ghana	597	675	689	526	498	643	608	531	n.a.
Ivory Coast	825	946	868	683	605	1614	2214	885	n.a.

Sources: Diamond High Council, *1998 Annual Report*, Antwerp 1999, p. 1, and additional information supplied directly by HRD.

Comparison of the two tables shows that the production figures for Ghana and the HRD import statistics from Ghana are similar, as might be expected. For all the other West African countries, there are startling discrepancies. For example:

- while the Government of Sierra Leone recorded exports of only 8,500 carats in 1998, the HRD records imports of 770,000 carats;
- while the estimates of Liberian diamond mining output are between 100,000 and 150,000 carats in Table 5 (and there are no estimates anywhere of a capacity exceeding 200,000 carats per annum⁴⁵), the HRD records Liberian imports into Belgium of over 31 million carats between 1994 and 1998 - an average of over six million carats a year;⁴⁶
- Ivory Coast, where the small diamond industry was essentially closed in the mid 1980s, exported an average of more than 1.5 million carats between 1995 and 1997.

Among other things, these figures suggest either massive international fraud, or massive bureaucratic incompetence⁴⁷

Where Sierra Leone is concerned, the discrepancy between what the HRD says is imported from Sierra Leone and what Sierra Leone officially produces and exports may be an indication of what is illicitly mined and exported to Belgium. But this is only a *minimum* figure, as the data does not include diamonds which travel from Sierra Leone to India, Israel, Lebanon, New York and the De Beers CSO, and then to Belgium.

Belgian Import and Tax Legislation and Policy

One of the main factors making Belgium, and particularly Antwerp, the world centre for diamonds is the laxity of tax and trade legislation. Antwerp attracts a large quantity of diamonds sold on the 'outside market', i.e. outside De Beers CSO. For the purposes of this study, this outside market is very important and it helps to explain the problems in the Belgian environment.

The import of diamonds to Belgium is free, in the sense that there are no tax or import duties applied at entry. However, all diamonds must be declared to customs upon entry or exit from the country, and importers must (theoretically) pay a value added tax of 21 per cent on the customs value. The customs value, however, is simply the value expressed on the supplier's invoice. Belgium has a unique system of VAT exemption and most dealers can benefit from this provision in the law.

A dealer is not required to pay the VAT at the time of import, but can settle it through the HRD Diamond Office at a later date. The Diamond Office will advance the amount to Belgian customs and invoice the dealer at the end of each month. Most dealers travelling abroad carry bank guarantees covering the VAT in the countries they pass through, without actually paying it.⁴⁸ When rough diamonds are exported for sale, the import VAT is recovered by the dealer, who is then tax-free.

There has been increasing concern that the Belgian diamond industry pays very little tax. In 1998 an industry with a turnover of US \$20.6 billion paid only US \$8 million in taxes. This has led to a new 'fiscal plan', worked out between the HRD and the Belgian Direct Tax Authority, that will ostensibly result in a tax contribution by the diamond industry of 'a fair share of taxes'⁴⁹. The new fiscal plan became effective on January 1, 1999, taxing the gross turnover margin of diamond companies. It is expected to significantly raise the amount of taxes paid by the industry.

Of greater interest where transparency and accountability are concerned, is the question of who actually monitors imports and exports on behalf of the government. Oddly, this role - the role of customs agent - is carried out by the HRD itself, the representative and lobbying institution for the Belgian diamond industry.

Upon entry into Belgium, sealed diamond parcels are sent by customs to the HRD Diamond Office, which acts as the internal clearance and customs bureau on behalf of the Government of Belgium. At the HRD Diamond Office, all diamonds entering or leaving the country are individually checked by ten diamond experts who are employees of the HRD, acting on behalf of the Licensing Department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Importers and exporters must provide invoices describing the exact weight and price of the diamond parcels and documents showing their company registration in Belgium or Luxembourg. Diamond Office experts are not civil servants. They are experts employed by the Diamond Office, sworn in by the Belgian Minister of Economic Affairs.⁵⁰ The only outside check on this process is that there are always a number of customs officers and representatives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs present at the Diamond Office to monitor the procedure.

The Diamond Office therefore plays a dual role: it provides a lobbying service on behalf of its clients in the diamond industry, *and* it acts as their watchdogs on behalf of government. To the outside observer, this looks like a major conflict of interest.

Difficulties with the process are legendary:

- diamonds imported from other countries of the European Union, need not be declared at the Belgian border, but need only to be checked by the HRD Diamond Office. Different valuing and controlling applications by EU members leads to additional problems. The Netherlands, for instance, applies a different weighing system, enabling importers to declare a certain amount of low quality rough diamonds and then alter it, before exporting, with high quality gems of the same weight. The diamonds may then be invoiced at a lower price than the real value;⁵¹
- in most cases the penalty for the fraud involved in inconsistencies between invoice and real value is minimal. The diamantaire risks a fine but will normally receive questionable diamond parcels back when a corrected invoice is received from the seller.

The historical reason given for having the HRD Diamond Office act as an agent for the government is that only the diamond industry has the expertise required to perform the government's task. However, in recent years there have been a number of judicial inquiries which have shown that the system violates almost any definition of neutrality, and is an invitation to corruption.

Cases of fraud in the Antwerp diamond and banking trade are legendary. In April 1999, for example, an expert of the HRD Diamond Office was arrested in connection with a million dollar import-export fraud involving the expert, a number of diamond exporting companies and a specialized diamond transport company. The expert overvalued diamond parcels, enabling a number of diamond companies to use a fraudulent invoicing system and then to launder illegally obtained diamonds with the 'licensed' documents.⁵² Another case exposed two experts of the Diamond Office when customs officials double-checked a parcel inspected and sealed by the HRD Diamond Office, on its way to an unknown customer. The transaction was registered for a value of US\$ 5 million, but the parcel contained only brick dust.⁵³ Fraudulent transactions like these allow diamond dealers to use legitimate documents for other purposes, such as unchecked diamond exports, VAT fraud or the laundering of illegally imported diamonds.

The Diamond Bourse
The Diamond Bourse

Box 4. Diamonds and Drugs:

Of the twenty-one diamond exchanges (bourses) in the world, four are in Antwerp, including the only rough diamond bourse. The bourses are transaction centres where traders meet individually to present their diamonds and negotiate sales. The bourses are highly secured exchange buildings in the heavily guarded diamond district of Antwerp. Access to a bourse is allowed only to fee-paying members, and membership is restricted to individual dealers or companies registered in Belgium or Luxembourg. Candidate members have to be recommended to the Board of Directors and need support from a number of existing members. Non-members are only allowed to enter the transaction room of the bourse in the presence of accompanying members, and only then if they have approval from the Board of Directors.

A deal at a bourse is struck without formalities or paperwork. However, there exists a set of strict rules applied by the bourse. The buyer inspects a parcel of diamonds on offer and negotiates the price per carat with the seller. When a broker negotiates a transaction, the price stands for only one day - until the closure of the bourse. In the meantime, the parcel - a small envelope - is sealed and the negotiated price is written on it. When, or if the seller wants to renegotiate the broker's price, or when the buyer fails to pay within the one-day deadline, the parcel ('cachet') can be reopened, but only in the presence of a Transaction Room Committee of the bourse.⁵⁴

Despite the extraordinary amounts of money changing hands and the potentially high risks involved, diamond dealers and their financiers rarely settle differences in legal courts. The exchange system has its own internal procedures and sanctions system based on hundreds of years of tradition.

Diamonds and Drugs: the Collapse of the Max Fischer Bank

In January 1997, the Max Fischer Bank, in the heart of the Antwerp diamond district, declared bankruptcy. A few months after the bankruptcy the Antwerp prosecutor opened an investigation, and in June 1997, three members of the bank staff were arrested and taken into custody.

The bankruptcy and subsequent judicial investigations created a near panic in the Antwerp diamond business. After the arrests, several diamond dealers' offices and the HRD Diamond Office were searched.

Investigations into the bankruptcy inadvertently led to the activities of Fouad Abbas. Abbas had been a crown witness in a Dutch narcotics investigation, and was accused of being the key supplier of marijuana to European and Canadian markets in a case that involved thousands of tons of drugs. Abbas confessed his own role under a witness-protection programme in the Netherlands, but Belgium nevertheless demanded his extradition, after he had moved to London. The Max Fischer Bank in Antwerp had been used to launder an estimated US \$25 million of the proceeds of Abbas' criminal business. Abbas was not unknown to the Antwerp diamond business. He ran his operations through a diamond company by the name of TTS Diamonds and reportedly had mining interests in West Africa. Some of Mr. Abbas' partners, it was later revealed, were also active in arms trafficking. Iraq and UNITA in Angola were allegedly the recipients of the Abbas arms.

Systematic tax evasion and Belgium's policy of fiscal and administrative leniency for the diamond business were the combination that enabled Abbas to thrive for many years.

Source: Confidential interviews with Dutch television journalists who had documents related to Abbas companies. Also Chris de Stoop, *Ik ben Makelaar in Hasj*, Amsterdam, De Bezige Bij, 1998

The obvious advantage for the diamond industry is the maintenance of complete confidentiality, a minimum amount of monitoring and paperwork, and exclusive control of the diamond market.

Diamond Banking

Diamond Banking

Like the rest of the diamond business in Antwerp, banking arrangements are opaque, and the small number of players have an immense amount of economic power. There is likely to be less transparency than in other banks in the world as these financial institutions have their own fiduciaries in Switzerland or Luxembourg, where banker's discretion is guaranteed by law. Ninety per cent of all diamond transactions in Antwerp are handled by two banks - the ABN Amro Bank and the Antwerpse Diamantbank. De Beers holds 12.8 per cent ownership in the Antwerpse Diamantbank through the Henfin Holding Company.

Traditionally, most trading or marketing companies in Antwerp have maintained a very low level of capitalization. It is not exceptional to find a diamond company with a capitalization of only US \$30,000, but with an annual turnover of several million dollars. Consequently, short-term and rapid financing is critical to the business. Diamond traders depend on short-term financing in the millions of dollars for single transactions, enabling them to bridge the period between the time of their own purchases and payment by their clients.

The lack of transparency and questionable business practices of some of the diamond banks, and spectacular scandals like the Max Fischer Bank collapse, have led to increasing debate in Belgium on the nature of the diamond business and its relationship with organized crime.

The Underbelly of the Belgian Diamond Industry

The Underbelly of the Belgian Diamond Industry

Because of governmental and HRD laxity, Antwerp has, in recent years, become one of the key cities of the world for Russian organized crime.⁵⁵ One of the most spectacular public cases involved the embezzlement of US \$180 million in gold and diamonds from the Russian State reserves.

Andrei Kozlenok and his company, Golden ADA, were at the centre of a transcontinental scandal, causing embarrassment to authorities in the USA and more so in Russia. Kozlenok's company was provided with gems from the Russian State Precious Metal Reserve, with the approval of high officials in Russian government circles. Instead of using the diamonds intended - as collateral for a commercial loan in the US - Kozlenok sold US \$70 million worth of diamonds in Antwerp, with forged documents claiming the diamonds had originated in the DRC (Zaire). Kozlenok also had a company registered in Belgium, beyond the reach of both Russian and American authorities. For three years, Russia battled in California courts in order to bring Kozlenok to trial and recover the gems. In 1998, Russia authorities finally succeeded in extraditing Kozlenok from Greece.⁵⁶

Kozlenok's name appeared again in a seemingly unrelated fraudulent incident. The fraud involved a million-dollar trade in fake invoices. Antwerp businessmen and local politicians (members of the Antwerp City Council) were among the accused. Several individuals were convicted on a number of charges, but the full nature of the fraudulent mechanism remains hidden. Some of the investigators and financial experts analyzing the case have suggested that large amounts of diamond profits or credits were at the heart of the fraud.⁵⁷

Conclusion

Conclusion

Antwerp is the most important 'final' marketing site for the bulk of the world's diamonds, including those of Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, the political, fiscal and law enforcement environments makes Antwerp a diamond smuggler's dream. Even in the most overt cases of questionable behaviour, little is done. Government officials informed the Project Team that while the Customs Department in Antwerp does report, on average, ten cases of fraud annually to the Ministry of Economic Affairs Diamond Monitoring Department, the majority of these cases are judged to be 'administrative errors' on transport documents and invoices. In most cases, the supplier or the recipient in Antwerp is simply contacted to produce corrected documents.⁵⁸ Such 'findings' obscure the magnitude and seriousness of institutionalized smuggling, diverting attention from a major international problem to small-time criminals.

The lack of official concern may stem from the overall economic importance of the diamond industry to the Belgian economy. The result, however - a lack of the legislative controls that are accepted as normal and necessary in other business environments and in other countries - is devastating for diamond producing countries like Sierra Leone. Contributing factors include:

- a serious apparent conflict of interest between the HRD's responsibility to it membership and its responsibilities to government for critical elements of supervision over that same membership;
- encouragement - through government and private sector lack of interest in the source of imported diamonds - of what appears to be either massive fraud or massive bureaucratic incompetence in diamond import statistics;
- encouragement of a secretive environment which permits corruption at high levels (such as the Max Fischer Bank collapse, cases of fraud within the HRD, and opportunities for organized crime).

4. THE SIERRA LEONE DIAMONDS

4.1 Origins

Sierra Leone diamonds were discovered in Kono District in 1930, when a small geological survey team led by N. R. Junner and his assistant, J. D. Pollet, picked up a crystal by the Gboraba stream. The team had been examining stream-bed gravels for heavy minerals; instead the crystal turned out to be a diamond. The next day, the team found another diamond at the same site. Their discovery was extraordinary. The Sierra Leone colony, Britain's first in West Africa, had been suffering from economic stagnation and depression for nearly a century because of its dire lack of resources. But their discovery, which was duly reported to the colonial authorities, elicited little interest until Junner brought it to the attention of the De Beers-controlled Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST), based in the Gold Coast (now Ghana). A prospecting party from CAST arrived in the country in March 1931; that same month, the first hint of the widespread nature of diamond occurrences in Sierra Leone was received when Pollet found two more diamonds in the gravel of Kenja stream, near Pava, about 50 miles south of the original discovery.

Given the chaotic nature of Sierra Leone's diamond industry in the 1990s, it is easy to forget that all the country's diamond fields, estimated to cover an area of some 7,700 square miles in 1968, was officially under corporate control for over two decades. In 1935, the colonial authorities concluded an agreement with the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a subsidiary of CAST, which gave the company exclusive mining and prospecting rights over the entire country for 99 years. In return, SLST was to pay income tax at the rate of 27 per cent (later increased to 45 per cent) on its profits, in addition to a small 'special development' fund, mainly for the Kono region.⁵⁹ This was not difficult to arrange, as Kono District had never been a commercially active region and Kono chiefs, who owned the land communally, appeared unconcerned and unable to grasp the dramatic impact that diamond mining would inevitably have.

Corporate control was relatively easy to establish as far as dealing with the local authorities was concerned; and in the four years after mining intensified (1948-1952), SLST paid over £3 million in taxes to government.⁶⁰ The threat to De Beers' control came not from local authorities, but from far more insidious and uncontrollable forces, forces so powerful that they eventually forced an end to the company's monopoly in 1956. By the early 1950s, a huge influx of illicit miners - attracted, no doubt, by internal SLST theft - had nearly overrun the company's holdings. By 1956, there were an estimated 75,000 illicit miners in Kono District, leading to smuggling on a vast scale, and causing a general breakdown of law and order.

The buyers and smugglers of illicitly mined diamonds at that time were mainly Madingo traders from neighbouring West African states, and Lebanese traders. The Lebanese had first arrived in Sierra Leone at the close of the 19th century. With the rise of the diamond industry, they soon emerged as major players on the illicit side because of their ability to raise significant capital, and because of their outside contacts. Initially, the smuggling route was from Freetown to Beirut and then to European markets. But with the tightening of security between Kono and Freetown in the early 1950s, Lebanese smugglers began moving their goods across the Mano river to Liberia. Antwerp, and then Israeli-based diamond merchants soon noticed the booming diamond trade in Monrovia,

and many established offices there, rather than in Freetown where the De Beers' monopoly made it illegal to do so. De Beers itself was forced to set up a buying office in Monrovia in 1954 to keep as much of the trade under its control as possible. The impact of smuggling on the Kono mining areas was immensely destabilizing. According to Koskoff,

Large combines of diggers emerged, now with more elaborate equipment, with financing from buyers in Monrovia or from local Lebanese. The illegal industry was taken over by toughs. Itinerant buyers were occasionally murdered by hard-pressed diggers. According to one source, by 1954 forty murders had already occurred in the diamond areas, including one case of a digger who had been disembowelled in search of a stone that he had been seen to swallow.⁶¹

This was the 'Great Diamond Rush'. John Cartwright has provided an insight into its socio-political and economic impacts on the country as a whole. At the time of the Rush, the total number of persons calculated by the Labour Department to be in wage employment was between 75,000 and 80,000. This meant that within a period of just three years 'as many men (75,000) left [their homes]...to search for diamonds as had left it over a half century to seek wage employment.'⁶² This had a radical impact on the process of social mobilization. By 1955, the Director of Agriculture attributed a marked drop in rice production to the Rush, many of the young men having abandoned the rice fields for the more interesting and promising diamond mines. By the end of the 1950s, Sierra Leone - once a net exporter of rice - became a net importer.

The influx of these uncontrollable young men soon had the district verging on 'anarchy, with armed bands of as many as 400 to 500 men raiding SLST...areas, and on occasion doing battle with the police.'⁶³ A detachment of the Sierra Leone Police Force had been stationed in Kono in 1952, the first such posting outside of Freetown. But it was severely ill-prepared to deal with this unexpected problem. The force launched military-like campaigns with names like 'Operation Parasite' or 'Operation Stranger Drive,' targeting every unregistered non-Kono in the District, in an effort to curb the massive influx of illicit miners. Most of these efforts were dismal failures. It was estimated that in the first half of the 1950s, more than half of Sierra Leone's diamonds were being sold in Monrovia as 'Liberian' diamonds, the country having created fictive 'mines' in the jungles to account for this enormous production.⁶⁴

The situation was highly problematic for De Beers, representing a crisis comparable only to the Second World War which forced the closure of its premiere mines in South Africa. De Beers resorted to the employment of private security.

4.2 The Beginning of Privatised Violence 4.2 The Beginning of Privatised Violence

Most recent writing on private security firms and the 'Dogs of War' views them as a product of post-Cold War collapse among African states.⁶⁵ In Sierra Leone, however, private security is not a new phenomenon. More particularly, it initially had nothing to do with state collapse or the highly destructive rebel warfare that later marked the country. The first use of private security in Sierra Leone was in the 1950s, and was directly sanctioned by the head of De Beers, Sir Ernest Oppenheimer. Alarmed by the widespread theft in SLST's mining areas and the consequent massive

smuggling operation, in 1953 Oppenheimer contracted a retired British counter-intelligence agent, Sir Percy Sillitoe, to organise an intelligence operation aimed at getting at the root of the smuggling. The operation later blossomed into the full-scale deployment of a private security force aimed at halting both the pilfering and smuggling. Sillitoe confirmed that smuggled Sierra Leone diamonds were travelling through Monrovia, where European and Israeli firms had established offices and were funding African smugglers. The diamonds moved then to Belgium and to the Soviet Union, which then badly needed industrial diamonds to retool its factories.⁶⁶ Sillitoe's army was known as the Diamond Protection Force (DPF), and it was led by white soldiers of fortune from Rhodesia and South Africa. An account of how the force operated is provided by Michael Harbottle, a former British army officer who took over command of the force after Sillitoe. Although they did not have firearms, the DPF used sophisticated technology, including light plane (and later helicopter) patrols, radio communications, floodlighting and booby traps. They even mined border crossings in an attempt to bring down illicit miners and smugglers. Illicit miners - known as 'san san boys' - and smugglers captured by the mercenaries were likely to be imprisoned (one could earn a year's hard labour for the mere possession of mining implements) but there were occasions when miners were shot to death.⁶⁷

In 1956, Sillitoe hired a Liberian-based Lebanese adventurer, Fred Kamil, who later wrote about his adventures. Kamil had independently started a low-intensity warfare against smugglers after one cheated him when he was a businessman in Liberia. Kamil recruited a gang of armed toughs from the streets of Monrovia. The group launched a small-scale guerrilla war along the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border, ambushing diamond smugglers, overpowering them and stealing their goods. Sillitoe offered the outlawed Kamil an attractive deal: his undercover agents would supply the Lebanese with information about the exact movements of the smugglers; in return, Kamil would turn the diamonds over to De Beers and receive one-third of their value in cash. Kamil agreed, since this obviously meant Sierra Leone police protection. The risk became too high for the smugglers, and the colonial authorities in Freetown added a carrot: export taxes on diamonds were lowered, and De Beers increased the buying price. For a time, smuggling seemed to have been contained.⁶⁸

But illicit mining continued. The colonial government, under more and more pressure from nationalist politicians (this was the period of decolonization), decided to act more radically to put the situation under control and to satisfy calls for legitimate indigenous participation in the booming diamond industry.

4.3 The End of Corporate Control and the Emergence of the 'Shadow State'

By the 1950s, diamond mining, once confined to Kono District and Tongo Field in Kenema District, had spread to much of the Eastern Province and Bo District. Digging followed the route of the Sewa, a wide river flowing from Kono through Kenema to Bo District, and covered an area of 19,000 km², about one-quarter of the entire country. SLST operations were based in the most productive areas, mainly in Kono and Tongo Field. These areas were the hardest hit by the destabilising effects of illicit mining, but other parts of the country were affected. In Bo, a district which, unlike Kono, was relatively developed and urbanised, the issue of SLST control created divisive political controversy.

In 1955, the colonial authorities concluded an agreement with SLST which scrapped its monopoly and confined its operations to Yengema (in Kono district) and Tongo Field, an area of about 450 square miles, in return for £1.6 million in compensation. In 1956, the authorities introduced the Alluvial Mining Scheme, whereby both mining and buying licenses were granted to indigenous miners. All mining areas were declared to be government property and the government appointed an inspector of mines who, after consulting local authorities, would issue one-year mining licenses to any Sierra Leonean (or a firm controlled by Sierra Leoneans) for a fee of £9. Each license area was to employ a maximum of 20 people. License holders had also to pay a fee of 4 shillings a week (slightly higher than that paid for the license itself) to local authorities (the chiefs) known as 'surface rent'. They might also be called upon to pay compensation for crops destroyed in the course of digging. Dealer licenses were to be issued at £25, but unlike the mining licenses, they were not restricted to Sierra Leoneans. Many of these licenses came to be held by Lebanese. The first mining licenses under the scheme were issued in Lubu chiefdom, Bo District, on 6 February 1956. Within a single month, 1,500 licenses had been issued.

For a time, the Alluvial Mining Scheme seemed to be a success. The diamond rush was put under control, mining areas were stabilized and De Beers' Diamond Corporation Sierra Leone (DCSL) opened buying offices in Bo and Kenema, in addition to the one they had in Freetown. Although legal sales of diamonds may have increased significantly, most of the licensed dealers - mainly Lebanese - continued to export illegally. Still, as one writer put it at the time, the scheme created an economic boom for the country as a whole: 'Markets were built and communications improved. Shopkeepers and craftsmen did good business. New houses and cars symbolized the new wealth earned in the diamond industry.'⁶⁹

The Alluvial Diamond Scheme stabilized the diamond industry somewhat for about a decade. Sierra Leone gained its independence in 1961, but the party which took power, Milton Margai's Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), a gradualist and conservative political movement, had ruled in partnership with the British since 1952, and governed in much the same way as the British. By 1968, over 30 million carats of diamonds had been produced in Sierra Leone; the gems had generated about US \$200 million for the country's economy, and provided about 70 per cent of the country's foreign exchange reserves. Nevertheless, it has been estimated that as much as half of the country's diamonds were still smuggled out, largely by Lebanese.⁷⁰ The challenge to this uneasy stability - and indeed to Sierra Leone's formal bureaucratic state - came from a political movement which ousted the SLPP at the close of the 1960s: the All Peoples Congress (APC), founded by Siaka Stevens, a former police constable and trade unionist.

Stevens broke away from the SLPP and founded the APC shortly after Sierra Leone's independence, claiming that the Margai-led party was overly conservative and elitist, and that it was still British-controlled. As Minister of Mines with oversight of the diamond industry during much of the turbulent 1950s, Stevens had been firmly on the side of corporate control of the important diamond resources. But now in opposition, he campaigned on a populist platform calling for a greater share of SLST's holdings for the 'common people.' His new party claimed to stand for a welfare state based on a socialist model in which all citizens, regardless of class, colour or creed, shall have equal opportunity and where there shall be no exploitation of man by man, tribe by tribe, or class by class. Stevens recognized early, in large part due to his trade union background and his intimate knowledge of miners, the potential support base among the huge army of illicit tributors and

miners in the diamond regions. His party appealed to this group and promised greater protection for them, as mining of this nature - however illicit in the eyes of the authorities - represented 'the little man's only hope for wealth'.

Stevens' populist rhetoric clearly emboldened illicit miners and transformed their criminality into an ideological battle. With defence of their illicit activities by a major politician, miners began to regard SLST as a predator, and a hated foreign predator at that. Soon after Stevens became prime minister in 1968, illicit mining, once largely subdued, again became a serious menace for SLST, with outright hijackings of their gravel trucks by armed illicit miners, some of whom even dug up highways and airfields in the rapacious hunt for diamonds. SLST increased its defence force to 1,200 men, but to no avail.

The situation became so intolerable that by 1970, SLST abandoned all prospecting efforts, because anything it discovered was soon likely to be stolen. This played into Stevens' hands: the Prime Minister was eager to gain direct control over SLST's rich holdings, and he exploited SLST's frustrations to achieve his ambition. In addition, from his earliest years in office, he was linked to criminal or near-criminal elements. On November 3, 1969, SLST's monthly haul of diamonds, valued in Sierra Leone at US \$3.4 million, was stolen at gunpoint as it was about to be flown out of the country at Hastings airport. The theft was professionally executed and the thieves were never caught. Attempts to prosecute a few suspects ran into serious difficulties: potential witnesses were spirited out of the country by the police, the judiciary was curiously disinterested, and the case was eventually dropped. It was rumoured in Freetown that Stevens and a Sierra Leonean-born Lebanese businessman Jamil Said Mohamed (well-known simply as Jamil) had masterminded the theft. Jamil's chief rival, another Lebanese named Hanneh Shamel, was expelled from the country for alleged links to the thieves; the stolen diamonds were allegedly sold in Europe for US \$10 million and Jamil emerged as a major player in Sierra Leone's diamond industry.⁷¹

In 1971, Stevens announced the formation of the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) which effectively nationalized SLST. The new company took over 51 per cent of SLST's shares and SLST retained 49 per cent. The NDMC was to be run by a board of directors composed of 11 members, six nominees of the government and five of SLST, but in fact all important decisions were made by the Prime Minister. To ensure that he had a reliable front man in the new arrangement, Stevens arranged for Jamil - who in 1959 had been sentenced to six months in jail for unlawful possession of diamonds - to take over 12 per cent of the government's shares. SLST's diamond shipments dramatically declined soon after. With Stevens' active participation, Jamil's men were stealing and smuggling as much as they declared.⁷² From a high of over two million carats in 1970, legitimate diamond exports dropped to 595,000 in 1980 and fell to only 48,000 carats in 1988.

During this period, De Beers attempted to manage the growing informal market by using its Monrovia purchasing office to purchase smuggled Sierra Leonean diamonds in dollars,⁷³ a practice which probably continued over the years. Stevens' underground economy, however, the 'Shadow State', was by now firmly in place. In 1984, SLST sold its remaining shares to the Precious Metals Mining Company (PMMC), a company controlled by Jamil, and in 1986, PMMC terminated its management of the NDMC on grounds that it was no longer viable. The timing was significant: Stevens retired in 1985, handing over power to Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh.

4.4 The Failure of 'Reform' 4.4 The Failure of 'Reform'

Momoh came to power promising to wage war on 'profiteers, hoarders and smugglers,' precisely the types of forces upon which Stevens' 'shadow state' rested. Shortly after taking office, the new president set up the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO) to replace the PMMC. The GGDO was to 'examine, sort, value, parcel, market and export gold diamonds', but its real function - in large part because the government was severely cash-strapped - was mainly the valuing of diamonds and gold for export, so that taxes and duties could be levied. The GGDO was to receive one per cent of the value of each diamond submitted, and the government two per cent. A firm of international consultants, Diamond Counsellor International, was contracted by the government to fly to Freetown at least five times a year to audit and 'advise' the GGDO.

With the collapse of the NDMC, formal sector diamond mining became less and less important, and wage-earning virtually ceased. Where once wage-earning miners at least had been members of the United Mineworkers Union, the actual mining - even where legal - was now managed on a tributor basis, with payment based on a percentage of whatever was found. While formal sector mineworkers in rutile, gold and other minerals were members of, and represented by the Union - even through much of the 1990s - there was not a single diamond miner in the union at the end of 1999 (see also Section 6, below).

Momoh's 'New Order' began to show early signs of cracking, however. For one thing, his government was dominated by leftovers of Stevens' discredited regime. The GGDO's first chairman, for example, Joe Amara Bangalie (who doubled as minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development), was a long-time Stevens' minister, with a reputation for extravagant corruption. Not surprisingly, Bangalie soon brought Jamil back as key player in the GGDO. In January 1986, Bangalie announced that the new GGDO had accepted a loan of 100 million leones (about US \$25 million) from Jamil to help run it. The diamond office was now to rely on the 'professional competence' of the Lebanese mogul for its operation.⁷⁴

4.5 Lebanon, Israel and the Arrival of International Organized Crime

Up to the early 1970s, the informal diamond industry was dominated by two Lebanese communities - Maronite Christians and Shi'ite Muslims. Once Stevens had begun to sideline De Beers, however, the Lebanese became increasingly involved on the formal side, or what was left of it. From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, aspects of Lebanon's civil war were played out in Sierra Leone. Because all Lebanese militia needed financial assistance, Sierra Leone's diamonds came into play as a kind of donor base or informal tax on behalf of one faction or the other. This was of great interest to Israel, not least because part of the Sierra Leonean Shi'ite community actively supported the Amal faction, which on the one hand fought against Israel's greatest enemy, Hezbollah, and on the other was Syria's main ally against Israel. It could not have been lost on Israel that the leader of Amal, Nabih Berri, had been born in Sierra Leone and was a boyhood friend of Jamil, the most influential man in the country's diamond business.

It was largely through Berri that Iran became interested in Sierra Leone, building a large cultural centre in Freetown and making the country its main base in West Africa, to the further discomfort of Israel, which had been trying unsuccessfully to restore ties with Sierra Leone, broken

during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. In a dramatic move, Jamil persuaded Momoh to invite the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat for a state visit to Freetown in 1986. In Freetown, Arafat offered several million dollars to Momoh in exchange for a training base for his PLO fighters, an offer which Momoh, alarmed by aides to the danger, turned down.⁷⁵ It was the beginning of the end of Jamil's power in Sierra Leone. Lobbyists for Israel began actively to prod Momoh towards stronger ties with Israel and to end Lebanese dominance. In 1987, President Momoh announced that he had foiled a coup plot involving Jamil, his own Vice-President Francis Minah (a close associate of Jamil) and a few lower ranking soldiers and police. Minah was tried for treason and hanged. Jamil, who was out of the country at the time, remained in self-exile for the duration of Momoh's tempestuous regime.

The foiled 'coup' allowed Momoh to create his own partnerships, and Israel, long anxious to get the Lebanese away from Sierra Leone's diamond wealth, came in handy. One of the first to arrive was the Russian-born Shaptai Kalmanovitch and his Israeli-based enterprise, the LIAT construction and Finance Company.⁷⁶ LIAT's assets did not amount to much. Most of its contracts were with government, including a low-cost housing scheme in Freetown which never got started. Kalmanovitch's main interest was diamonds, and perhaps drugs. Among other things, Kalmanovitch set up a diamond buying office in Freetown. At first, the partnership appeared to be beneficial for the diamond industry, and exports increased by 280 per cent in late 1987. Illegal production and exports however, did not decrease accordingly, and it was discovered that Kalmanovitch was using Sierra Leone to circumvent the weapons, diamonds and gold embargoes on South Africa. Kalmanovitch was also thought to have connections to the Israeli intelligence apparatus and to have played an advisory role in Israeli politics.⁷⁷

While in Sierra Leone, Kalmanovitch brought in other money launderers, drug traffickers and arms dealers, all scrambling to gain access to diamonds. In 1986, Marat Balagula, considered the 'Godfather' of Russian mafia in Brooklyn, N.Y., found a safe haven in Sierra Leone and was known to be operating with Kalmanovitch. Balagula was considered one of the initiators of the Antwerp operations of the Russian Mafia. He and Kalmanovitch became involved briefly in the importation to Sierra Leone of gasoline, in a deal reportedly backed by a fugitive American businessman, Marc Rich, and guaranteed by the Luccheses, an old-time American crime family.⁷⁸

Two others, Boris Nayfeld and Rachmiel 'Mike' Brandwain, both active in the Antwerp underground, met with Kalmanovitch and Balagula in Freetown in 1987. Brandwain at that time ran a small electronics store near the diamond district of Antwerp and was involved in tax-free export transactions with Eastern Europe. Before his trip to Sierra Leone, he had been released on bail for a gold smuggling deal between Luxembourg and London. He was also involved in M&S International, an intercontinental brokering and wholesale business allegedly involved in laundering and trafficking activities, including heroin trafficking and diamond smuggling. M&S maintained its headquarters in Belgium until the mid-1980s. Investigations of Brandwain's operations are still continuing.⁷⁹ Brandwain's part in the story ended when he was shot to death in a parking lot in the centre of Antwerp, near the diamond district where he kept his headquarters.

Shortly after the Sierra Leone meeting, Kalmanovitch was arrested in London in 1987 on an American warrant. He stood trial in a case involving forged cheques and was released on bail six months later. Kalmanovitch was reportedly expelled later from the South African 'homeland' of Bophutatswana and arrested in Israel, where he stood trial as a spy for the Soviet Union. He was released in 1993 and is currently thought to be living in the Baltic region.

The fourth person at the Sierra Leone meeting, Boris Nayfeld, was released in 1998 from an American prison where he spent four years for his involvement in heroin trafficking between Thailand and New York. Prior to his arrest, Nayfeld had been living in Antwerp.⁸⁰ Balagula remains imprisoned in the U.S. for credit card fraud and for the evasion of US \$85 million in taxes on the sale of almost a billion gallons of fuel sold between 1983 and 1988.⁸¹

A more credible and better organized Israeli company appeared in Sierra Leone soon after Kalmanovitch's arrest. The N.R. SCIPA Group, owned by Nir Guaz (known as 'The Skipper'), set up diamond buying offices in Freetown and Kenema, offering vastly improved prices for diamonds and in the process further marginalizing the capricious Lebanese dealers. SCIPA continued a LIAT enterprise, importing rice and machinery and selling it at low prices. A loan from SCIPA also helped Momoh settle some of the country's outstanding arrears with international donors. The IMF was so impressed with Momoh's apparent reforms, including further efforts to cut Lebanese interests out of the diamond business, that it offered half a billion dollars in assistance to the country in 1990. The relationship with SCIPA was a rocky one, however, with the company allegedly financing both legal and illegal diamond exports.⁸² Despite considerable mining activity, the company exported only US \$6 million worth of diamonds in 1989, reportedly far below SCIPA's actual performance and considered to be something less than two per cent of national production.⁸³

By 1991, The Skipper was gone, and Momoh was desperately seeking new foreign firms to generate revenues in a climate of massive corruption and economic free-fall. Joint ventures proliferated, most of them leading nowhere. The RUF war began that year, with rebels attempting to cut Momoh off from the Kono diamond fields. In April 1992, he was overthrown in a military coup.

Led by a 27-year old army Captain, Valentine Strasser, The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) came to power on a promise to end corruption. As Reno puts it, however, the real news in Strasser's ascension to power lay not in his commitment to reform.

Instead, he and his associates concentrated on conquering what they believed their control of State House entitled them to. As the inherited technocrats from the old regime issued promises to the IMF, Strasser's troops were already mining diamonds in Kono in exchange for weapons from Belgium and Romania... Unlike Momoh and his associates, these coup leaders had been raised in Freetown's slums... As before, [however], the leader [engaged] in private dealings to achieve [his] control. In Strasser's case, this allegedly involved the private export of 435 carats of diamonds to Sweden in 1993.⁸⁴

4.6 The Liberian Connection

Liberia's dealings in stolen Sierra Leone diamonds have been a major concern to successive Sierra Leone governments since the great diamond rush of the 1950s triggered massive smuggling of the country's gems through Monrovia. Monrovia's attraction to smugglers include its porous borders, the US dollar - which was legal tender in Liberia - and the relatively higher, untaxed prices offered by dealers who established offices there in order to buy smuggled Sierra Leone diamonds. In the 1950s, it was estimated that 20 per cent of all stones reaching the world's diamond markets were smuggled from Sierra Leone.⁸⁵ Liberia itself has relatively negligible diamond potential, and by 1985 prospectors and diamond experts had all but given up on future investments. Where diamonds were

concerned, Liberia had become little more than a fencing nation, creating fictive mines as cover for the immense laundering of diamonds smuggled from other nations, mainly Sierra Leone.

What is different and more sinister today is the active involvement of official Liberian interests in Sierra Leone's brutal war - for the purpose of pillage rather than politics. Initially, Charles Taylor backed the RUF in an effort to destabilize the Momoh regime, which had allowed ECOMOG to use Freetown as a staging base for its peacekeeping efforts in Liberia. Since launching his military campaign to seize power in 1989, however, Taylor has operated a rapacious and sometimes criminal national enterprise, looting Liberia's forest resources (mainly timber and rubber) with the active involvement of foreign companies and criminal elements considerably more dangerous than those engaged by Joseph Momoh. Diamonds have played an active role both in financing Taylor's own expansionist enterprise, and in bringing Sierra Leone to its knees.

In 1988, before Liberia erupted, the country exported US \$8.4 million worth of diamonds, including a great many smuggled Sierra Leonean diamonds. In 1995, when Liberia lay in ruins and economic activity was almost non-existent, it exported US \$500 million worth of diamonds, according to HRD statistics. This is more or less supported by IMF trade returns which show estimates of Belgian imports from Liberia at US \$309 million in 1994 and \$371 million in 1995.⁸⁶ A large proportion of these are rumoured to have originated in UNITA-held Angolan territory (Taylor has maintained close links with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi), and certainly a very high proportion originated in Sierra Leone.⁸⁷ There is also rumoured to have been Russian dumping of industrial diamonds in the Monrovia market during the period.

In February 1999, the London *Times* reported that the UN and 'western intelligence agencies' were investigating the probability that an international criminal consortium of diamond dealers and cocaine traffickers were behind the attempt by Taylor to seize Sierra Leone's diamond fields through their RUF proxy. The paper named Col. Fred Rindle, a South African 'neo-Nazi' and a former spokesperson for the far-right South African *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (AWB), and Nico Shefer, an Ecuadorian who was once in business with Colombian drug baron, Pablo Escobar, the Colombian cocaine lord. These two, the paper said, were the main figures in the consortium behind the RUF, reinforcing the rebels with 300 Ukrainian mercenaries and hundreds of soldiers from Burkina Faso. Quoting an intelligence source, the paper said 'The interests of Taylor and his crew are clearly not political. They are after Sierra Leone's diamonds. They want to establish a puppet regime and then run the country as a criminal exercise.'⁸⁸

British newspaper accounts in January 1999 reported that late the previous year the RUF had contracted two British companies operating 'ageing' Boeing aircraft to transport AK 47 rifles and 60 mm. portable mortars to rebel-held territory in eastern Sierra Leone. The 40-ton consignment of arms, from Bratislava in Slovakia, was undoubtedly acquired with diamond resources. The arms were crucial in the RUF's successful and highly destructive attack on Freetown, in January 1999.⁸⁹ Earlier reports spoke of helicopter flights from Liberia around the northern town of Makeni, then under rebel control. The helicopters reportedly ferried tons of light arms and ammunition to the rebels.⁹⁰ A Ukrainian 'businessman' based in Liberia, Leonid Minin, was reported to trade in timber, arms and diamonds.⁹¹ He reportedly used a far less expensive method of getting arms to the RUF. Minin, who also owned a trucking firm, had arms driven from Liberia into Kailahun, the RUF's main base, using the derelict railway line as a track and the thick forest as cover.⁹² Of greater concern are more recent reports that parts of Sierra Leone, such as the extremely fertile Kailahun District

bordering Liberia - under RUF control - had become sites for opium poppies and coca plants, and that the crops are going over the border to Liberia for processing and export.⁹³

In January 1999, the West African ECOMOG force apprehended an Israeli named Yair Klein attempting to sell helicopter spare parts to the Freetown authorities just after the devastating attack by the RUF on the capital. Klein is a former Israeli military officer. He was (at the time of writing this report) facing trial in a Freetown court, accused of spying for the rebels, and supplying them with arms through Liberian networks directly linked to the Liberian President. Klein had been involved in the training of Taylor's elite fighters and before that, through his company, Spearhead Inc., he worked in Colombia. He is still wanted by Colombian authorities for providing 'instruction and training in terrorist activities' to paramilitary and vigilante groups in Colombia's Magdalena valley region between 1987 and 1989, according to the warrant issued by Colombian judicial authorities for his arrest in February 1994. The trainees later joined the Medellin drug cartel.⁹⁴ Freetown authorities say that Klein provided them with information about the RUF's drug and arms trade, implicating the Liberian president. Curiously, the same informant claimed that Israel has been quietly putting pressure on the authorities to have Klein, a former senior member of the Israeli reserve force, released.⁹⁵

Taylor's support for the RUF rebel war has been extensively discussed by the media, scholars and politicians.⁹⁶ Less well discussed is the possibility that Taylor may now be supporting a 'rebel peace' for the same reasons that he supported the war. Taylor may have noticed that with the escalation of the conflict, much of his potential income was being spent to keep the fractious RUF together, to pay Liberia-based South African trainers, and to buy more arms and ammunition. This may be why he pressured the RUF to sign the July 1999 peace accord in Lomé.⁹⁷ There, the RUF successfully insisted - on pain of restarting its terror campaign - that its leader, Foday Sankoh, be placed in charge of the exploitation and sale of Sierra Leone's diamonds in exchange for 'peace'. The appointment of Sankoh as chairman of a quickly-forged 'Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development' (CMRRD), to control the exploitation and management of diamonds merely recognized what was already a matter of fact: the RUF was controlling all the major diamond mining areas, including Kono district and Tongo Field.

That the RUF would be so fixated on the country's diamonds is hardly surprising, even discounting the extraordinary accessibility of the gems: the group itself is dominated by many former illicit diamond miners. The RUF's main battle commander, 'General' Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Maskita), was reportedly a san san boy (illicit diamond miner) in Kono before becoming a professional disco dancer and hair-dresser in Liberia, and later in the Ivory Coast. He was recruited in Abidjan, the Ivorian capital, first by Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and then by the RUF. He now reportedly owns substantial property in Monrovia, including a house and a night club, and is said to have direct access to Taylor's Executive Mansion whenever he visits.⁹⁸

In conclusion, there is little doubt that Liberia has become a major centre for massive diamond-related criminal activity, with connections to smuggling and theft throughout Africa and considerably further afield. In return for weapons, it has provided the RUF with an outlet for diamonds, and has done the same for other diamond producing countries, fuelling war and providing a safe haven for organized crime.

5. THE 'JUNIORS' THE 'JUNIORS'

Despite the business success and the overwhelming influence of the De Beers, and Antwerp cartels, there remains an element of anarchy in the industry. The anarchic element is provided by the 'juniors', small prospecting and mining companies which work on the edge of the industry, discovering diamond fields, generating funds on international stock markets, sometimes mining diamonds but more often than not eventually selling out to larger companies if they are successful.

Joseph Momoh's search for new investors in the early 1990s was carried forward by the new NPRC military government. With De Beers out of the picture and unwilling to return, and with the Israeli experience behind them, the government now began to receive overtures from junior mining firms. This report deals primarily with three 'juniors' with the greatest interest in Sierra Leone during the 1990s, interests that have at times extended far beyond the mining of diamonds.

5.1 The Canadian Connection 5.1 The Canadian Connection

It is not a coincidence that so many of the world's mining companies are incorporated in Canada and listed on Canadian stock exchanges. A combination of Canadian tax provisions, the method of operation of the Canadian exchanges and Canada's own resource history have encouraged many junior exploration and mining companies to operate from Canada. For a very long time Canada has been the premier country of the world for the venture capital it supplies to small mining companies.

Part of this is explained by Canadian history. Canada has largely developed from extractive industries and has an abundance and variety of mineral resources. Consequently, Canada has high levels of expertise in mining, a large number of exceptional mining geologists and perhaps more important, an abundance of skilled penny stock promoters - 'the bottom feeders of the mining business.'⁹⁵ The country also has a population of investors with a penchant for penny stocks. It is in this environment that Canadian stock exchanges - particularly the Vancouver and Calgary exchanges (recently merged as the Canadian Venture Exchange) - became 'mining exchanges' or 'wildcat exchanges'. Mining is a risky, tough business, and the probability of striking it rich is slim. Only one in 10,000 exploration companies will find and bring a mine into production. Because of the high risk of failure and the low level of capitalization by most mining companies, Canadian stock exchanges have traditionally been easier to access, with lax disclosure requirements and lower capitalization requirements than exchanges in many other countries.

This explains why so many non Canadian firms, including some that have been involved in Sierra Leone, are traded on Canadian stock exchanges and have their nominal headquarters in Canada. A more detailed discussion of this phenomenon is contained in Annex 1.

5.2 Rex Diamond Mining Corporation 5.2 Rex Diamond Mining Corporation

Rex was established under the Business Corporations Act of Ontario (Canada) on September 14, 1995 through the amalgamation of Kimberlex Resources Ltd. and Speer Darrow Management Inc. Rex is formally a Canadian company registered on the Toronto Stock Exchange and its registered headquarters is in Toronto, Canada. The Toronto office is a facade, as the Project Team discovered after months of phone calls and then a visit to the premises. There it was discovered that the 'office'

was little more than an answering machine and that the real headquarters are in Antwerp where its President and CEO resides, and where management decisions are made.⁹⁶

Other than raising Canadian funds on the Toronto Stock Exchange, (TSE), the strongest connection Rex has to Canada is the presence of three Canadians on the Rex Board of Directors, including the Hon. Robert P. Kaplan P.C., Q.C., former Solicitor General of Canada.⁹⁷

Rex is headed by Serge Muller, the President, CEO and largest single stockholder. Muller has been engaged in the diamond business since joining his family company, S. Muller and Sons Diamonds NV, 20 years ago. Muller is a member of the Diamond Bourse in Antwerp and represented family company sightholders of De Beers from 1982-1994, during which time he was responsible for rough diamond purchases. He has also been involved in the diamond business in South Africa for more than 15 years, initially as a purchaser of rough diamonds and operating cutting plants, and then in connection with the acquisition and development of the Bellsbank and Rex mines, now properties of Rex in South Africa. Muller has had a long history and involvement with Sierra Leone, originally providing financing to the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) secured by their diamond production. In 1989 the Government of Sierra Leone entrusted the NDMC itself to Muller and Sons, but official diamond exports plummeted from 141,800 carats in 1987/88 to 4,800 carats in 1988/89. In May 1992, the new military government announced that all output from the NDMC would be sold at public tender.⁹⁸

Rex has extensive holdings and participates in virtually all aspects of diamonds, from exploration through to selling its own uniquely branded diamonds on the Internet. It is a vertically-integrated company with extensive diamond exploration in Mauritania, diamond concessions in Sierra Leone, two diamond producing mines in South Africa and diamond cutting, polishing and marketing enterprises in Antwerp. The company also owns a diamond sorting and marketing operation in Antwerp. All Rex activities are operated as subsidiaries of their Corporate Head Office in Toronto. Rex subsidiaries include the following:

Table 7. Subsidiaries of Rex Diamond Mining Corporation

Name	Jurisdiction of Incorporation	Ownership %
Rex Mining Company NV	Belgium	100%
Rex Diamond Company NV	Belgium	100%
Rex Diamonds (Barbados), Inc	Barbados	100%
Bellsbank Consolidated Diamond Mine (Pty.) Ltd.	South Africa	100%
Rex Mining Corporation Ltd.	South Africa	100%
Loxton Exploration (Pty.) Ltd.	South Africa	100%
Rex Diamond Corporation (Pty.) Ltd.	South Africa	100%
Rex Exploration (Pty.) Ltd.	South Africa	50%

Source: *Annual Information Form for the Year ended March 31, 1999* (SEDAR: System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval, www.sedar.com/homepage.htm) August 18, 1999.⁹⁹

Of the Rex holdings, the most important for the purpose of this analysis is Rex Mining NV. Rex Mining NV is incorporated under the laws of Belgium and is centred in Belgium. Rex Mining NV was incorporated on November 29, 1990 under the name of Coast to Coast Trading NV, and changed its name to Rex Mining Company NV effective November 3, 1993. Rex Mining NV is licensed to

trade in diamonds in Belgium, and holds the mining leases in Sierra Leone. Rex Mining NV also operates a diamond sorting, cutting and marketing operation in Antwerp. The concessions held in Sierra Leone are commonly referred to as the Tongo Field and Zimmi (see Annex 2 for more details).

The Tongo Field property consists of approximately 65 square kilometres and is located in Kenema District. The present lease expires on February 28, 2019. The Rex property has been previously mined for alluvial diamonds, but Rex reports that it has discovered four kimberlite dike zones on the property. The Zimmi Property consists of approximately 54 square kilometres and is located in Pujehun District. The lease on this property expires on February 28, 2019. The Zimmi property is also an alluvial property, which was developed for mining during the mid-1980s. The property was abandoned before commencement of full-scale mining because of civil unrest. Rex company geological reports, based upon sampling programmes carried out on the property, indicate that the property contains deposits of large stones of high quality. Rex believes that the Zimmi property has the potential to produce alluvial diamonds at surface and that high-grade paleo channels, and other geophysical features indicate the possibility of kimberlite dikes.

Rex says that it maintains close contact with high level personnel within both the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. Still, there remains some dispute at the end of 1999 over whether Rex still holds or will hold in the future their Zimmi and Tongo Fields concessions. Rex argues that their leases have been paid and they are in possession of a letter from the Director of Mines of the Government of Sierra Leone ensuring their leases still hold. Serge Muller had the following to say on this issue:

For the third time in a year reassurances were given by both Government and RUF officials as to the strong and lasting friendship of Rex in Sierra Leone. Further to the Lomé Agreement (13 July 1999) the Parliament of Sierra Leone passed a Law on 23 July 1999 to clarify the mandate of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources. Clause 10 (4) clarifies the issue of the review of the mining concessions as follows: The Commission shall declare void any concession or mining lease in gold and diamond in existence immediately before 21 July 1999 if such concession or mining lease is found to have been obtained by fraud or tainted with illegality or as being contrary to public policy or the general public interest. We have again received confirmation from all parties, Government and RUF that the Rex leases are in good standing.¹⁰⁰

In his Chairman's Letter in the Rex *1998 Annual Report*, Muller reiterates that 'the Ministry of Mineral Resources formally reconfirmed both titles to Rex's major assets in Sierra Leone, the Tongo Fields and Zimmi on August 18th of this year (1999).'¹⁰¹ This letter, however, predates Lomé.

Ben Holemans, Rex's Chief Financial Officer and Secretary and member of Rex Board of Directors, also attempts to boost stockholder confidence, saying that, 'Serge has been active in Sierra Leone for more than 10 years and has close friends in all political factions of both Government and the RUF. Throughout the difficult times Serge has maintained open channels with the government and with the RUF while not interfering in the local politics.'¹⁰²

Despite Muller's claim and Holemans' confidence, the RUF begs to differ. Foday Sankoh, it seems, watches the Internet, and personally requested the Sierra Leone National, Independent, Neutral Journalist Association (NINJA) to carry his rebuttal:

No one from the RUF has ever spoken to any Rex Diamond official to reassure them of any such information as they issued yesterday. It is important that every single mining lease ever granted in Sierra Leone be thoroughly examined by professionals. The RUF is not yet in a position to know if the Rex Leases are tainted with illegality until the RUF gets a professional analysis of these Leases. No member of the RUF has ever been given a copy of any such lease so we may certainly not have reassured Rex Diamond Mining Company.¹⁰³

There is perhaps some reason for Sankoh's ambivalence about Rex. In 1998, Sierra Leone lost its only combat helicopter - a serious problem as the Soviet-built gunship had been the government's most effective weapon against the RUF. Zeev Morgenstern, Rex's Managing Director, and Muller came to the government's aid by making an arrangement to supply the government with engines, parts and ammunition worth a value of US \$3.8 million. The deal went sour as a result of defective parts supplied from Russia. Reporting in October 1999 on the activities of the two Rex executives, the *Washington Post* stated that during interviews Morgenstern and Muller both said, '...the arms deals were unrelated to Rex's mining activities'.¹⁰⁴

5.3 AmCan Minerals Limited.3 AmCan Minerals Limited

AmCan Minerals Limited is incorporated in Canada, listed on the Canadian Venture Exchange, and maintains its headquarters in Toronto. AmCan was founded in 1989, and its present principals acquired the company in 1993. Since 1993 AmCan has acquired diamond and gold concessions in Sierra Leone and Angola. In an undated AmCan document entitled, 'The AmCan Diamond and Gold Project - Sierra Leone', the company optimistically predicted that it would annually mine and sell 114,000 carats of diamonds at a value of US \$200 per carat, for an annual revenue of US\$ 22.8 million. After all costs were deducted, AmCan predicted an annual post-tax profit of Cdn.\$7.48 million, a level that would continue into the future.

Based on their positive evaluation of the Sierra Leone diamond potential, the company placed four million new shares on the market at 25 cents apiece in order to raise \$1 million for its Sierra Leone operations. While AmCan's pronouncements had the desired affect - raising badly needed funds from the public - it did not result in the mining of diamonds. AmCan commenced preliminary operations on their high terrace diamond deposits and anticipated that full production levels would commence in the fall of 1996. However, with the conflict in Sierra Leone, all production activity ceased, and in mid-1997 AmCan withdrew its staff and moved to protect its equipment and its property.

Between 1995 and 1999, AmCan generated total income of Cdn.\$446,999 and had losses every year during the period, finally ending up with a 1999 accumulated deficit of more than Cdn.\$7 million. Over five years its total proceeds from diamond sales were approximately Cdn.\$171,000. The annual losses per share of between one and five cents is significant when one considers that AmCan stock was selling for only six cents a share in October 1999. The Sierra Leone and Canadian governments cannot be optimistic about collecting taxes from AmCan. The company presently has a loss carry-forward of over Cdn.\$3.4 million to write off against future company income.¹⁰⁵

For several years, AmCan attempted to operate exclusively in Sierra Leone, however during 1999 it obtained five diamond concessions in Angola. In Sierra Leone, AmCan has an explorations license for diamonds in Kono District's alluvial fields as well as one kimberlite pipe with its

surrounding dikes. Two of the blocks held by AmCan are immediately northeast and contiguous with the Koidu kimberlite project that is controlled by Vancouver-headquartered DiamondWorks (see below). Through its subsidiaries, AmCan also holds concessions on 12 river lots on the Sewa River and three 144-acre lots on the Old River Terraces immediately southwest of the Koidu Kimberlite Project. AmCan presently holds an exploration license in Kono District, rights to areas surrounding a kimberlite pipe covering a distance of 27 miles, the widest point of which is eight metres. AmCan also holds a 90% interest in a 50 square kilometre gold property on the Pampana River in Tonkalili District. (See Annex 2 for more details on AmCan concession rights)

AmCan gained the Sierra Leone properties by acquiring already existing companies and by forming of one new company:

- In 1994 AmCan formed AmCan Minerals (SL), in which it holds 90% interest. AmCan (SL) Limited holds interests in 17 parcels of properties and 22 properties;
- In 1996 AmCan moved to acquire the privately held ArmSec International (SL), which brought with it diamond-bearing properties in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and a large quantity of specialized mining equipment. Along with the 100 per cent purchase of ArmSec International (SL), AmCan appointed its owner and CEO, Michau Huisamen to its Board of Directors and to the position of Managing Director of AmCan. AmCan states that 'Huisamen has an extensive background in the diamond mining and security industry in South and West Africa.'¹⁰⁶

With the purchase of ArmSec International (SL) and the appointment of the owner to its Board of Directors, AmCan adds to its knowledge of security issues. One of AmCan's long-serving Board members is Edwin D. Sanford, who also holds the position of Vice President for Africa Operations. Sanford is a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the Canadian Armed Forces and is responsible for the operation of the Sierra Leone diamond properties. AmCan states that Sanford, throughout his 35 year international military career was '...specialized in security at every level including the most top secret areas as an advisor to both the Canadian Armed Forces and the Government of Canada.'¹⁰⁷

Until its purchase by AmCan, ArmSec International (SL) was a subsidiary of the South Africa-based ArmSec International, which Michau Huisamen owned. AmCan Toronto informed the Project Team that ArmSec International (SL) is purely a mining company and has nothing to do with arms or security. Asked if Huisamen, their newly appointed Board Member, still owned or had interests in the parent company of ArmSec International, AmCan Toronto said that it did not know. AmCan also said that it did not know what kind of business ArmSec International was involved in.¹⁰⁸

AmCan has strong connections on the ground in Sierra Leone. David Quee is AmCan's lawyer and personal representative in Freetown. Quee also is Chairman of the Sierra Leone Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO). The GGDO is the government office responsible for monitoring the diamond industry, valuing Sierra Leone diamonds and levying the government tax on diamonds. Quee is also a senior member of the political party in power (SLPP) and was President Kabbah's First Interior Minister. When interviewed by the project team in Freetown, Quee said he did not believe that his appointments with both AmCan and the GGDO constituted a conflict of

interest.¹⁰⁹ Like all the diamond companies attempting to operate in Sierra Leone, AmCan believes that its existing concessions remain valid and are fully paid for.

5.4 DiamondWorks and Branch Energy .4 DiamondWorks and Branch Energy

'All rising to a great place is by a winding stair' - Sir Francis Bacon

The quotation from Francis Bacon - which opens DiamondWorks' 1998 Annual Report - aptly describes the short history of the company. It has indeed been a 'winding stair' but it is yet to be determined whether the 'great place' will be discovered. On the way up the winding stair the company has been touched by international intrigue, and much of its activity has been shrouded in mystery. It has had its Angolan mines closed and staff killed by bandits, and it has been shut out of Sierra Leone because of military conflict. Correctly or incorrectly, DiamondWorks and its subsidiary, Branch Energy Ltd., have been linked with at least two international mercenary/security groups, two attempted coups, and many of the most important international mercenary and mining personalities of recent years.

DiamondWorks is incorporated in Canada and listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange with 'headquarters' in Vancouver. But like many other 'Canadian' junior mining firms whose real centre is elsewhere, DiamondWorks' management is centred in London, and its operational headquarters are in Johannesburg.¹¹⁰

Early Days – The Inception of DiamondWorks

The DiamondWorks story begins with the Carson Gold Corporation. In the early 1990s Carson became one of the most active worldwide junior explorers. One of Carson's first ventures was to place a Yukon placer property into production. Little gold was actually mined, and Carson subsequently re-emerged as 50 per cent owner of a commercial fruit and ornamental nursery enterprise. Carson's most important supporter at the time was Robert Friedland, a flamboyant penny stock gold mine promoter.

In early 1993 the company arranged a large private placement of shares, the bulk of which were purchased by Vengold Inc., a company owned by Friedland. Vengold thus became a major shareholder of Carson, and Robert Friedland's brother, Eric, assumed the position of Chairman and CEO. The arrival of the Friedlands brought Carson into the spotlight and the value of the company's shares quadrupled. The Friedlands started expanding. They purchased gold properties in Venezuela, gold and copper properties in the Philippines and then made a bid for properties in China. In the spring of 1995, Carson surprised the market with two major deals. In the first, Carson announced its intention to acquire China Diamond Corporation, offering 25 million shares of Carson stock for the company. That was followed by a move to acquire Branch Energy Ltd., a private company registered on the Isle of Man. Friedland offered 33 million Carson shares for the Branch Energy purchase.

The China deal ultimately fell through, but the acquisition of Branch Energy Ltd. proceeded and Carson was now in the diamond business, as Branch Energy Ltd. held significant interests in a number of diamond properties in Angola and Sierra Leone. Important organizational changes took place throughout 1996 and in October of that year, Carson Gold became DiamondWorks, complete

with its new fully-owned subsidiary, Branch Energy Ltd. Eric Friedland became the first President and CEO. By this time, the Company had written off most of its Venezuela and Philippine projects and sold its interest in China. From this period on, DiamondWorks was exclusively a diamond explorer.¹¹¹

Branch Energy Ltd. is registered and incorporated in the Isle of Man, where public disclosure rules make basic information difficult to obtain. DiamondWorks documents and publications contain little information on its subsidiary. The only public and accessible information on Branch Energy Ltd. is that it holds interests in a number of African diamond concessions, principally in Angola and Sierra Leone, that it was first established in 1994, and that its present Director is Bruce Walsham, who is also President and CEO of DiamondWorks. Branch Energy's contact numbers, office address and mailing address are in Johannesburg, South Africa. Branch Energy Ltd. itself owns two subsidiaries. One is Branch Minerals and the other Branch Energy (Uganda). Michael Grunberg, a Director of DiamondWorks is listed as the contact person for Branch Minerals and Branch Energy (Uganda). Company documentation stresses that these two companies are not subsidiaries of Branch Energy's parent company, DiamondWorks.¹¹²

Complications in Sierra Leone

DiamondWorks and Branch Energy have become the subject of much speculation and interest because of their apparent but much-denied connections with two major international security firms, Executive Outcomes and Sandline. In 1995, The Government of Sierra Leone, backed onto the Freetown peninsula by the RUF and facing certain defeat, engaged the services of Executive Outcomes (EO) to help in its defence. With 200 imported soldiers, air support, and sophisticated communications equipment, EO pushed the RUF back from Freetown within a week, and within another month had cleared the major diamond areas of Kono as well.

DiamondWorks has been criticized for its non-mining activities in Sierra Leone. The company has responded by posting a section on its web site entitled, 'Setting The Record Straight'. The company periodically issues a 'Statement & Media Advisory', meant to correct comments by researchers and the media. The efforts do not usually help, focusing more on 'what is not the case' than what is. A few examples:¹¹³

- At no time has Branch Energy Ltd. bought, or otherwise obtained, mining concessions in Sierra Leone, Angola, or elsewhere from Executive Outcome or any of its related companies;
- There is no relationship, corporate or otherwise, between DiamondWorks and Executive Outcomes or Sandline International. Furthermore, there is no relationship, corporate or otherwise, between Branch Energy Ltd. and Executive Outcomes or Sandline International. Executive Outcomes does not have an interest in Branch Energy Ltd.'s diamond concessions in Sierra Leone, or elsewhere;

Box 5. Crooks

Neither DiamondWorks nor Branch Energy Ltd. has ever contracted with Executive Outcomes;

Tony Buckingham introduced the services of Executive Outcomes to the Governments of Angola and Sierra Leone, but neither he nor any companies he is associated with, including Branch Energy Ltd., paid for, or otherwise sponsored, the provision of these activities.

Which events are cause, and which are effect is unclear, as are various corporate links and connections. Regardless of the DiamondWorks denials, a few events and relationships are, however, verifiable:¹¹⁴

There is a strong connection between Tony Buckingham and Eben Barlow, who at the time operated Executive Outcomes. As Barlow expressed it, 'We are very good friends. I've known Buckingham since 1993, and we share similar interests, we share similar views on many, many things, and we get along very well. So we're very good friends.' After the Executive Outcomes operation in Sierra Leone, Barlow became a shareholder in DiamondWorks;*

During the 1990s, Roger Crooks was known as a 'kingmaker' with a large amount of economic and political influence. An American millionaire and long-time Sierra Leone resident, he was also manager of the Mammy Yoko Hotel, and part-owner along with Texan Oscar Wyatt, founder of Coastal Corporation. Wyatt had built Coastal into a \$12 billion energy company, with interests in natural gas, coal, oil refineries, making international business arrangements with heads of government including Muammar Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein. When the Mammy Yoko came under deadly RUF attack in 1998, Crooks phoned Wyatt, strings were pulled, and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit was dispatched from the USS *Kearsarge* to rescue trapped civilians.

There was more to Roger Crooks, however, than the hotel business. Quoting confidential police documents, the London *Sunday Times* revealed that Crooks had been involved in an attempt to sell 2,000 kgs of C4 explosives, Browning machine guns, mines and rocket launchers to contacts in Northern Ireland via Sierra Leone. Crooks also, according to the Times, owned extensive diamond and mining interests in Sierra Leone. It was Crooks who apparently leased the military helicopter used by Sandline to help Nigerian troops during the fight for Freetown.

According to Scotland Yard, 'Roger said that we would not have problem getting the arms from Sierra Leone as he had all the right contacts, in fact he even had a diplomatic passport for that country (Sierra Leone)'. Crooks was issued a Sierra Leone diplomatic passport in 1991 on the authorization of then President Joseph Momoh. The reason was to 'enable the holder (Mr. Crooks) to travel to the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Government of Sierra Leone'. The diplomatic passport was revoked in 1998, two days after the *Sunday Times* article appeared.

References: David Leppard and Marie Colvin, 'Diplomat Linked to Gunrunner', *The Sunday Times*, May 24, 1998; Christopher Palmeri, 'Deconstructing Oscar', *Forbes Magazine*, Oct. 19, 1998; Will Scully, *Once a Pilgrim*, Headline, London, 1998; Press Release, Office of the President of Sierra Leone, 26 May, 1998

* Buckingham and EO had collaborated on an earlier operation in Angola, and there would be future controversial connections between them and Sandline in Papua New Guinea in 1998. Although DiamondWorks has denied that Barlow was ever a shareholder, Barlow told the CBC program *Fifth Estate*,

- One month after Executive Outcomes took control of the diamond area of Sierra Branch Energy secured a 25 year lease on diamond concessions in Sierra Leone. At the time, Tony Buckingham was a principal of Branch Energy Ltd.;
- Michael Grunberg, then a Director of Branch Energy, Ltd. and now a Director of DiamondWorks, travelled to Canada to seek international financing to develop the Sierra Leone diamond mines. 'We started discussions with the Friedlands, and we developed a relationship, which resulted in the integration of our diamond assets in Angola and Sierra Leone into one of their companies';
- Grunberg and Buckingham joined Branch Energy Ltd. and Carson Gold together, renaming the latter 'DiamondWorks'. Both Grunberg and Buckingham were then appointed as members of DiamondWorks' Board, with Buckingham the single largest stockholder, controlling approximately one-third of the total shares;
- Lifeguard, a security company established by Executive Outcomes and staffed by Executive Outcomes soldiers, continued to provide security for DiamondWorks properties after EO pulled out of Sierra Leone;
- Executive Outcomes owned Ibis Air and used it to transport its mercenaries. Tony Buckingham at one point agreed to be CEO of Ibis Air, but later turned down the job. Ibis Air operated out of the same office as the Buckingham companies. One of Buckingham's partners, Simon Mann, served for a time as Chairman of Ibis Air and owned 50,000 shares in DiamondWorks;
- Tony Buckingham introduced Executive Outcomes to the Government of Sierra Leone, helped in negotiating the EO contract and acted as intermediary between the President of Sierra Leone and Executive Outcomes;
- Reginald Glover, a senior Sierra Leone Cabinet Minister, states that he was ordered to turn over diamond concessions to Buckingham and his company, 'I, as Minister of Mines, was never consulted. In fact, I was directed that these mercenaries – Executive Outcomes – are coming in to help the government fight the war against the rebels and, as such, the mines more or less to be mortgaged for peace.'

aired Feb. 4, 1997, that he was.

In November 1997 Peter Penfold, Britain's High Commissioner to Sierra Leone met in Guinea with Rupert Bowen who was the DiamondWorks country manager in Sierra Leone. Their discussion about the security of Sierra Leone took place during the AFRC interregnum, during which the democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbah was also in exile in Conakry. Bowen allegedly discussed a plan for the British security firm, Sandline International to ship arms to Sierra Leone. Bowen, an ex-British Army officer, was then seconded from DiamondWorks to Sandline for their Sierra Leone operation, with the blessing of the CEO of DiamondWorks. Walsham stated: 'I was very happy for Rupert in his capacity of having all the contacts, all the background in West Africa to undertake that at Sandline's request'.

Box 6. Rakesh Saxena and Financial Wizardry,

At the time of writing, Rakesh Saxena remained under house arrest in Vancouver, three years after being arrested by the RCMP. He awaited a Canadian decision on extradition to Thailand where he was accused of defrauding the Bangkok Bank of Commerce of C\$88 million. When he was arrested, he had a suitcase stuffed with Swiss francs. At one point he was bailed out of jail, but he was re-arrested when the court found he had violated bail by attempting to obtain a false Yugoslav passport. Apart from the Thailand fraud he was involved in 18 other civil suits in Canada at the time this report was written. On July 9, 1999 two companies on the Vancouver Stock Exchange, Global Explorations Corporation and Quadrant Financial Corporation, were delisted. The reason: their connection to Rakesh Saxena, who had a controlling interest in both companies. Saxena purchased the shares while he was under-house arrest in June 1999.

Saxena got Global Explorations into the diamond business by bringing them extensive diamond concessions which he acquired through a deal with the President of Sierra Leone when the country was under siege by rebels. Saxena was representing Blackstone Capital Corporation, registered in Belize. As part of the deal, Saxena was allegedly granted by the Government of Sierra Leone, 'the right for the Grantee's (Saxena's) internal security force to bear and use arms and an agreement regarding rules of engagement for such internal security force to be made with the Solicitor-General and Inspector General of Police.' In return for these favours Saxena was to provide the Government of Sierra Leone US\$10 million.

Sources: Financial Post, July 23, 1999, Toronto Globe and Mail July 17, 1999, Ottawa Citizen, Oct. 23, 1999; undated Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Sierra Leone and Blackstone Capital Corporation.

Buckingham never denied his involvement in the Sandline arms deal, but the CEO of DiamondWorks stated that Buckingham was doing it as a 'private citizen' and not as a Director of the company;

Rakesh Saxena (see Box 6) appears to have been the middleman in the Sandline arms deal, handling the funds for Sandline. However, when Saxena was jailed in Canada, the flow of funds stopped. Grunberg flew to Canada and met with Saxena in jail. With no apparent hope of finding the rest of the funds, Grunberg contacted retired Canadian Brigadier General Ian Douglas in Ontario for help. Grunberg made it clear to Douglas that he was in Canada to try and get funds for a counter-coup attempt in Sierra Leone. Douglas has been quoted as saying,

'I was flabbergasted at the time. I said, you're here to do what?' Douglas told Grunberg there was nothing he could do to get Saxena out of jail, and informed officials at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs about the meeting;

Grunberg had the following to say regarding the Sandline arms deal. 'It is important that I again clarify on behalf of Sandline that the consignment of small arms, which had been ordered by President Kabbah against an End User Certificate personally signed by him, was delivered to Sierra Leone with the co-operation of ECOMOG. In fact, the Nigerian commanders of ECOMOG helped Sandline organize the necessary flight plan clearances and en-route refueling stops for the shipment. On arrival the consignment was delivered as planned to ECOMOG for safekeeping and subsequent issue. Furthermore, two official UK government inquiries (the Legg Report and the Foreign Affairs Committee Report) have confirmed that Sandline had a degree of approval from the British High Commissioner and was entitled to believe that it had the approval of Her Majesty's Government to deliver the consignment. In addition, the UN's own legal adviser issued an opinion stating that the delivery was not a breach of sanctions.'

Bruce Walsham, CEO of DiamondWorks, shares the same office with Sandline, and two of his Board members were involved in the Sandline deal, but he insists that at no time did he know about the activity (see Box 7).

By mid-1998 DiamondWorks was in serious financial difficulty. Their difficulties intensified and reached a peak at the end of 1999. In anticipation of mining in Sierra Leone, DiamondWorks had raised Cdn. \$17 million on Canadian markets. This was spent on an acquisition programme, the development of plant and earth moving fleet, and a bulk-sampling programme. Many of these expenditures were destined for its Koidu property in Sierra Leone. In May 1997, the company had just commenced bulk sampling at its Koidu property when the AFRC coup occurred. DiamondWorks was forced to shut down and evacuate the country a short time later, with heavy losses. The company estimated that in 1997, during the period of suspended operations, maintenance and security costs amounted to US \$3.2 million, and in 1998 the costs were \$2.5 million.¹¹⁵

During 1997 and early 1998 DiamondWorks had also commenced diamond production at their Angolan properties. In November 1998, however, the company was forced to suspend activities at its Yetwene and Luo properties because of an armed attack on the Yetwene camp. During the attack eight mining staff were killed, including the mine manager, and eight staff were abducted.

The company's 1998 Annual Report stated the financial situation:

As at November 30, 1998 DiamondWorks had cash and cash equivalents of approximately US\$0.9 million, a working capital deficiency of approximately US\$11.3 million and long term debt of US \$5.0 million.

Box 7. Interview with DiamondWorks'

The Company presently does not have sufficient financial resources to maintain current operations or to undertake all of its currently planned exploration and development programs and capital equipment purchases during the forthcoming year. In addition, the Company is dependent on obtaining new financing for the future development of its properties and for acquisition and development costs of new project opportunities. There is no assurance that such financing will be available when required by or under terms favorable to the Company¹¹⁶.

In addition, by the end of 1998 DiamondWorks had an accumulated deficit of US \$72 million, and by September 1998, the value of their shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange fell to 72¢ a share, down from a 52 week high of Cdn.\$2.15. A year later, shares were selling at 21¢ a share. Collapse, however, was averted. A restructuring of the company and new infusions of cash from South Africa, along with the departure of Tony Buckingham and other controversial figures from high-profile positions, appeared to give the company a new lease on life. By mid December 1999, however, with the stock trading at under 4¢ a share, there was a further restructuring, which included the departures of Bruce Walsham and Michael Grunberg. News reports suggested that DiamondWorks was close to the bottom of its winding stair.

Like Rex and AmCan, DiamondWorks mined very few diamonds in Sierra Leone. In addition to its financial travails, its political future at the end of 1999 was also uncertain. It cannot be lost upon Foday Sankoh that DiamondWorks was intimately involved in more than one major effort to crush the RUF rebellion.

Bruce Walsham

Victor Malarek: I guess what I have a problem with, when I look back at all of the activities of Tony Buckingham, all the people he spoke to, when I look at Michael Grunberg flying to Vancouver, meeting with the main bag man, Saxena – you know these men, it's a small Board, and they don't tell you anything?

Bruce Walsham: Well, they never told DiamondWorks that in any detail at all. They said that there were moves afoot to re-establish Kabbah.

Victor Malarek: Boy, if somebody said to me, There are moves afoot to re-establish Kabbah, I'd say, What are they? What are they? Let me in.

Bruce Walsham: Well, sure, I mean, you would do that naturally. But the fact.....

Victor Malarek: Did you?

Bruce Walsham: No, I didn't

Victor Malarek: Was that a way of saying, do what you've got to do, guys, but don't tell me because we don't want to know.

Bruce Walsham: Well, to a degree. I mean, the fact is that our job was to keep production going, keep maintenance of our position. It's a commercial world.

Victor Malarek: So, it's all a coincidence. DiamondWorks and Sandline share an office, two of your Board members work with Sandline, and your Country Manager is seconded to Sandline.

Bruce Walsham: Yeah, I think it's a coincidence. It is a coincidence because we happen to have interests in Sierra Leone.

Victor Malarek: I've got to say it's a hell of a coincidence.

Source: Transcript of CBC *Fifth Estate* TV program, Nov. 3, 1998, pp. 12-13.

5.5 Conclusions: Mining the Stock Market, and Concessions for Protection

The nationalization of SLST/De Beers by the government of Siaka Stevens³ was followed by the parallel slide of both the country and the diamond industry into deep corruption and anarchy. Stung by organized crime, and having played most of the Lebanese and Israeli cards, the post-Momoh NPRC military government - despite its own predations - needed new international mining assistance and expertise. The only place left to turn was to the 'juniors'. A revised and more attractive investment framework sweetened the pot, and they came.

Despite the prominence of Rex, AmCan and DiamondWorks in Sierra Leone, none have yet mined many diamonds - war being the major constraint. All, however, have successfully and extensively mined the Canadian stock market, and more than one has become engaged in business transactions that extend well beyond both diamonds and the stock market.

The juniors arrived in Sierra Leone when the formal instruments of the state had all but disappeared, notably law, order, probity and justice. They also arrived in the midst of a brutal rebel war which had at its epicentre the same thing that brought them to the country - diamonds. Lawlessness, however, was not new. The government of Sierra Leone had - from the 1950s - given up pretending that it could police the diamond areas. From the days of the SLST Diamond Protection Force, it had encouraged and even required foreign investors to make their own security arrangements. This goes a long way to explaining why junior companies in Sierra Leone appear to have such an intimate relationship with private security firms.

There is a distinction to be made, however, between the need to hire a private security firm in order to police a diamond operation (or a shopping mall for that matter), and the provision of troops and weapons in support of a faction in a civil war. It can be said that regardless of their purpose, the involvement of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone was in a good cause. EO successfully protected a government (albeit a military government that had taken power in a coup) against a brutal and illegitimate rebel force. EO was certainly cheered in the streets of Freetown for its efforts. It can also be said that the provision, or the attempted provision of weapons to the democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbah - a UN arms embargo notwithstanding - made sense and was in support of a good cause.

The problem is not so much the individual episodes, but the bigger picture which they help to form - of a world in which beleaguered governments find little formal international protection against internal predators, and are forced into Faustian bargains in order to survive. Despite much ingenuous intellectual disapprobation, private security firms thrive. As Guy Arnold puts it,

The emergence into the public eye of mercenary organizations or companies - Executive Outcomes of South Africa or the British organization Sandline, for example - suggests both a new public acceptance of the role that mercenaries are expected to play and an increasingly brash certainty on the part of the mercenary community that its services are needed and that its members will continue to be lucratively employed round the world.¹¹⁷

In the absence of a governmental capacity for self-protection, and in the absence of effective mechanisms for international protection, private security firms and mercenaries - despite the

international uproar around EO and Sandline - may well have a profitable future. Closely connected to mining interests (as in Sierra Leone, Angola, Papua New Guinea, DRC and elsewhere), the phenomenon, however, is more than just a convenient way to let the international community 'off the hook'. It begins to look like a protection racket, with the payment for assistance made in future mineral concessions: 'concessions for protection', as Arnold puts it.

It is by no means clear yet whether junior mining companies have the capacity to undertake serious mining ventures in Sierra Leone. Only time and peace will tell. On the security issue, however, a peace agreement is only one step in a long process to provide real security in the diamond areas. An important next step will be the demobilization of fighters and a return to the rule of law under government authority. Before this can be achieved, however, there may be a lengthy interregnum required for UN peacekeeping forces.

While it may be legitimate to expect mining companies to provide *security* at their sites, it is not reasonable to expect them to do more. Nor should they offer to do so. In the long run, the overall security of the country, including the diamond areas, must be provided by the Government of Sierra Leone. International support in making this possible is an urgent priority.

6. LOCAL PLAYERS

Although the scene on the ground in Sierra Leone has changed in many ways over the past decade, some aspects have not. In many parts of the country there are minor players for whom the diamond business is a matter of subsistence and survival. They are found mainly in the diamond mining areas, and particularly in the more stable Bo and Kenema Districts. Mostly they are small-time indigenous Sierra Leonean dealers (a few licensed), age-old *Maraka* (travellers from Guinea, Senegal, Gambia, Mali and some from as far as Angola), traders (many registering as ECOWAS citizens) and small-time Lebanese dealers.

The 1994 Mines and Minerals Act restricted miners' and agents' licenses to Sierra Leonean nationals, and banned non-nationals from travelling to actual mining areas (they were restricted to towns like Bo and Kenema or the capital Freetown). However, many of these non indigenes, both Lebanese and ECOWAS citizens, have acquired Sierra Leonean passports, and can therefore own mining licenses and travel freely. An additional problem for locals is that the banks, continuing a discredited colonial practice, still decline loans to indigenous players, claiming that the Lebanese, with their already significant assets, are more credit-worthy. Also, both Lebanese and many ECOWAS citizens have extensive overseas contacts, as well as established smuggling routes. (The *Marakas* or *Djullahs*, as they are called, already had extensive trading routes through many West African states even before the diamond rush.) These are advantages that smaller Sierra Leonean players do not have.

Interviews conducted by the Project Team in Bo among these three groups brought out in bold relief some of the problems and differences, but there were areas where all agreed. The most important had to do with the many bribes and 'dashes' they are required to pay to Ministry of Mineral Resources officials in order to acquire licenses. In their perception, the GGDO is corrupt, and is in any case not playing a useful role. The GGDO's main offices, once housed at the Bank of Sierra Leone, were burnt down by rebels in January 1999, and at the time of writing, this important institution was being operated in a run-down area of Freetown from an office that doubled as a private law firm.

All of this provides little incentive for legal exporting. In any case, there is currently no legal exporter in Bo, and the Freetown-based Lebanese exporter who flies in occasionally deals mostly with other Lebanese. Sierra Leonean and *Maraka* traders - who distrust the Bo-based Lebanese intensely - have to either travel with their diamonds to Freetown, or smuggle them out of the country. Given local perceptions of corruption in official channels and the need to pay bribes, the smuggling option makes sense in several ways: the economic return is higher and faster; payment in Liberia is in US dollars; and there is no paper trail. Needless to say, the risk of being caught is very low.

The war may have contributed to these problems. The war has caused a massive influx from rural areas, and Bo has grown from a pre-war population of just over 35,000 to nearly 400,000. Former diamond mining villagers living in Bo now have a better awareness about 'money affairs', as one of them, Patrick Sannoh, puts it. This means that profit margins for legitimate dealers may now be considerably lower than before, and it may be that they too will start looking elsewhere to sell their diamonds, away from the eyes of the GGDO.

It is important to note that unlike the operations of SLST (and later the NDMC), diamond mining today is largely informal and unsystematic. There is no valuation of deposits, and although successive government acts have emphasized the need for miners to refill pits dug in the course of mining, this is rarely done. This poses serious environmental problems, so much so that some local authorities - particularly those in Pujehun District (where prospectors claim there are extremely rich deposits of diamonds) - have been reluctant to allow serious mining activities to take place in their jurisdictions. All land (which in Sierra Leone cannot be sold, only leased) is controlled by chiefs and prominent families, and these have always had a stake in mining. Prospective miners must pay 'surface rent' to them before they are granted the leases and, in the period before the breakdown of law and order, they had to pay compensation to the landowners for crops they destroyed or for desecrating sacred places in the course of their mining.

At this level, mining is still based on a 'tributor/supporter' system rather than wage labour.¹¹⁸ The miners, known as tributors, are recruited by a license holder who provides them with food and equips them with the simple tools needed for alluvial mining (picks, shovels, hand-made sieves and in some cases small drainage machines). In return, miners sell their finds to the license holder at prices that are vastly lower than what pertains on the 'open market'. Most miners, in fact, are also farmers or artisans; they simply change functions according to the season. Although their work is very important - indeed it is central to the rural economy and to the dynamics of the smuggling regime - successive governments have tended to neglect or take them for granted. A recent attempt to 'secure and monitor the legitimate exploitation of Sierra Leone's gold and diamonds' - the Commission for Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development' which resulted from the July 1999 Lomé accord - says nothing about the miners or, for that matter, the local authorities. Both are crucial factors to the success of any legitimate exploitation effort - for the reasons stated above, and for another reason which is a peculiar product of the war: the Kamajors.

Many Kamajors - a civil defense militia based on traditional hunting societies - are also miners. In Project Team interviews in Bo with a number of them, it was revealed that many had joined the civil defense group (like the diamond mining industry, an almost exclusively male affair) as a kind of survivalist strategy in order to gain 'corporate' security, as they continue their mining activities. The greatest danger has been the depredations of RUF rebels, who made diamond mining areas their chief target. According to Deputy Defense Minister Hinga Norman, who is also the Grand Patron of the Kamajors, over 80 per cent of the young men in Bo district have been 'initiated' into the movement. Not surprisingly, the Kamajors have made 'regulating' the mining regime in their areas a priority security issue. Informants in Bo told the Project Team that the Kamajors have been issuing mining 'permits' of their own, regardless of government licenses, and that non-natives of the district are discriminated against in the process.¹¹⁹ The Kamajors (a largely Mende group) believe that the war is the work of northerners (Temnes and Limbas) who aim to destroy the resource-rich Mende-dominated southern and eastern parts of Sierra Leone. They point to the fact that both the leader of the RUF (Foday Sankoh, a Temne) and the AFRC (Johnny Paul Koroma, a Limba) are from the north. Some northerners claimed in interviews that they have been routinely harassed, and that there are areas where they virtually cannot mine. The Kamajors in turn deny this, and claim that where there have been cases of harassment, they were merely trying to control the movement of 'unknown persons' who may well be rebels. Most were emphatic that a Foday Sankoh-controlled

Commission would not be allowed to administer the diamond mining areas in the south without a fight.

7. OTHER ISSUES

7.1 Diamond Identification

There has been a long-standing problem in identifying cut or rough diamonds by their geographic origin. If diamonds could be reliably identified by source, this could become an effective tool in curbing the excesses of the illicit trade. For example, there is absolutely no doubt - as documented elsewhere in this report - that Liberia has become an entrepot for millions of carats of diamonds smuggled from a variety of countries - Sierra Leone, Angola, Russia and elsewhere. A reliable diamond identification technology would demonstrate not only that the bulk of Liberia's exports are not of Liberian origin, it could identify the real source, information of great interest to law enforcement agencies.

The issue of source identification is not new. Van der Laan reports a 1952 incident: a Gambian in transit from Sierra Leone to Beirut was arrested at Banjul (then Bathurst) airport for the unlawful possession of 1,319 diamonds. The diamonds were confiscated in favour of the Sierra Leone Government, based on an analysis by J. Pollett, a geologist who informed the judge that, 'the stones were all characteristic of diamonds mined in Sierra Leone'.¹²⁰

Using the 'characteristics' technique, it is generally accepted that polished diamonds cannot be identified by source, so the identification issue applies only to rough stones. Once they are mixed, however, even this form of identification becomes difficult.

In January 1999 De Beers wrote to the United Nations Angola Sanctions Committee saying: 'It is difficult to be confident of the origin of a diamond once it has left the place where it has been extracted. When a rough diamond has been polished, then the difficulty of identification becomes an impossibility.' De Beers advice to the United Nations was that the international smuggling should be regulated by limiting the trade to recognized firms and by tightening border controls around Angola.¹²¹ De Beers has also produced a document on the 'sources of rough diamond production and their individual characteristics' which states that:

- experts from De Beers and elsewhere can be reasonably sure of the origin of diamonds from a primary source or a broad alluvial area if they see a parcel of original 'run-of-mine' goods or a decent sized parcel (say several hundred carats) of specific types of rough gem diamonds;
- in the case of alluvial diamonds, the situation is complicated by the fact that some diamondiferous rivers cross national borders. For example, diamonds that have their origins in Angola have been transported by ancient alluvial flood plains or river courses into what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo, so the same types of diamonds can be found on both sides of the border;
- there are cases where an expert could be reasonably sure of the geographical origins of quite small parcels of diamonds, even individual diamonds, for example with some kinds of Russian crystals, some of the characteristic Australian goods, or the 'frosted' gems from Angola/Congo; however, in general it will be much more difficult to tell the origin of rough

gem diamonds when they are not run-of-mine, when there are only individual stones or small parcels available, or when diamonds from different sources have been mixed together;

it is generally accepted that a single rough diamond cannot be identified with certainty, as having come from a particular source, certainly not to the level of evidence required for a court of law. There are occasional exceptions, i.e. some large and famous polished and rough stones with a known history.

when a rough diamond has been polished, identification becomes impossible. During the polishing process, diamonds lose the natural features by which they could be identified.¹²²

A recent technological breakthrough, however, may provide a partial solution to the diamond identification problem. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) are actively pursuing the development of diamond 'fingerprinting' at their Central Forensic Laboratory in Ottawa. The RCMP believes that its technology is ideally suited to rough diamonds, but that the potential also exists for the identification and fingerprinting of polished diamonds.

Diamonds are typically thought of as pure carbon. However, even the best quality diamonds will have trace amounts of over 50 different impurities. Research indicates that by using diamond fingerprinting technology to compare the relative amounts of these impurities, the origin of diamonds can be determined. Laser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LAICPMS) is used to analyze the trace impurity elements. The laser vaporizes a very small amount of material from the surface of the stone, leaving little or no visible damage. The mass spectrometer is then used to identify the impurity elements. Relative quantities of each element are determined and then compared to standards held in a data base.¹²³

According to the RCMP, the technology is developed and workable. However, in order for the fingerprinting process to be practically applied, a reliable data base must be created. This means that diamond samples from different mines and different countries must be 'fingerprinted'. Once that is accomplished, any rough diamonds on the market could be tested and matched against specific mine and country characteristics existing in the data base.

The RCMP stresses that it has yet to clearly identify the limitations and capabilities of the system through actual use.¹²⁴ Certainly the development of fingerprinting technology is one thing; the acceptance and universal application of the methodology is another. The potential difficulties in applying the technology are reduced, however, by the fact that the bulk of the rough diamond trade is centralized in only two organizations and two locations, the HRD in Antwerp, and the De Beers' CSO in London.

7.2 Certificates of Origin

UN Security Council Resolution 1173 (1998) of June 12, 1998 states that 'all States shall take the necessary measures...to prohibit the direct or indirect import from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the [Government of Angola]. More recently, US Congressman Tony Hall introduced a bill to provide for the disclosure of source of gem-quality diamonds and gem-quality diamond products imported into, and sold in the

United States. If the bill is passed, it will require such diamonds and diamond products 'to be accompanied by a certificate stating the English name... of the country in which the diamonds were mined.'¹²⁵ Violations would attract a fine of up to US\$5000, and attempts to defraud would be subject to more serious penalties.

The UN Security Council focuses on the supply side, while Congressman Hall focuses on the demand side, observing that Americans buy 65 per cent of the gem-quality diamonds sold worldwide, 'making us a force the market must reckon with. Insisting that our consumers are informed of the original source of diamonds sold to them will send a wake-up call to the diamond industry. It will encourage countries and businesses in Africa to use their influence to end the wars that wreak so much havoc on that continent before those wars give diamonds a bad name.'¹²⁶

These initiatives are highly commendable, and are supported by the authors of this report. They are not without problems, however. Legally mined and exported diamonds from one country are mixed with those of others almost immediately upon arrival at the CSO or in Antwerp. With the best will and the best regulatory system in the world, tagging and tracking each gem-quality diamond - of which there are dozens, if not hundreds of millions each year - would be a task of enormous proportions. Tracking *illegally* mined diamonds that are mixed in countries such as Liberia would be a more daunting task still. Liberia could well provide official certificates of domestic origin which, under current circumstances, would be absolutely worthless. This report has demonstrated that the manipulation of statistics on countries of origin is rampant throughout the industry, extending the problem far beyond problem countries like Liberia.

This report takes a more pointed short-term approach to the issue of origin, recommending that the large volumes of diamonds said to originate in countries that have small or non-existent industries should be banned outright on world markets. We make this recommendation with special reference to Liberia and Ivory Coast, but it could be extended to the non-diamondiferous countries bordering Angola that have also done well from diamond exports. Over the longer term, the concept could be elaborated further, limiting exports from any country to an approximation of its annual mining potential, a figure that could be derived from new geological surveys. Ultimately, in order to be useful, certificates of origin would have to be approved by an international verification body with full access to information about a country's mineral resources, its mining capacity and the probity of its diamond industry as a whole.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

The places you can sell uncut diamonds are pretty limited. It should not be beyond our wit to devise an international regime in cooperation with the diamond trade that cuts off the flow of diamonds from those who use them to buy arms and fuel conflicts.

- Robin Cook, British Foreign Minister

In writing this report, The Project Team understood that any recommendations for solutions to Sierra Leone's terrible and complex problems had to be pragmatic enough for them to have at least a reasonable chance of success. In other words, they should be realistic. Some of what follows is optimistic, but where Sierra Leone diamonds are concerned, business as usual is *not* realistic.

No single recommendation on its own will solve the problems of Sierra Leone's diamond industry, and most of the recommendations that follow are part of a comprehensive set of changes that need to be addressed together. In fact taken together, the recommendations have major policy implications not only for governments and international organizations, but for civil society organizations in Sierra Leone and abroad, for private sector firms and for individual consumers.

In addition to national and international dimensions, there are important regional dimensions to the diamond trade and the conflict in Sierra Leone. There will be no lasting results to peacekeeping, peace-building and reconstruction unless all three dimensions are addressed.

The recommendations fall under seven broad headings. The first and second sets have to do with the environment in Sierra Leone. The third and fourth sets deal with De Beers and with the diamond environment in Belgium. The fifth set has to do with neighboring states, particularly Liberia. One recommendation deals with the concept of a consumer campaign - possibly a necessary precursor to change elsewhere.

The general thrust of the recommendations aims at improved human and economic security, a sustainable peace, and at changing the economics of the diamond trade. If smuggling can be made more difficult, and if legal mining, investing and trading can be made more attractive, the potential for change can be turned into reality.

1 Framework for the Recommendations

1.1_ A Permanent Independent International Diamond Standards Commission should be created under United Nations auspices in order to establish and monitor codes of conduct on governmental and corporate responsibility in the global diamond industry. It should draw members from intergovernmental institutions such as the Commonwealth and the OAU, from the diamond industry, from international law enforcement agencies and from international civil society organizations

1.2_ In addition to the diamond-specific recommendations in this report, the development of sustainable peace in Sierra Leone will require major investment by the government of Sierra Leone and by donors in long-term basic human development and the creation of democratic institutions. Diamond-specific initiatives must be integrated into wider programmes aimed at

building fundamental human security and democracy, involving parliamentarians, journalists, teachers and a broad cross-section of civil society.

2 Recommendations for Action in Sierra Leone

- 2.1 Establishment of the rule of law and human security throughout the country is of primary and urgent importance for a return to peace, and for appropriate exploitation of the country's mineral resources. In the short- and medium-term, donor agencies, friendly governments, the UN Peacekeeping Force and ECOMOG must facilitate the disarmament and demobilization of extra-governmental forces. Force must be used in a timely fashion to halt a resurgence of conflict.
- 2.2 Special long-term UN security forces must be deployed in all major diamond areas.
- 2.3 Attention should also be given by the UN Peacekeeping force to blocking or destabilizing major smuggling routes from Sierra Leone into neighbouring countries.
- 2.4 Donors should actively support current British government efforts to rebuild Sierra Leone's army and police force. A professional diamond unit should be created with the ability to anticipate and counteract criminal activities. This reform should place human rights law and international humanitarian law at the centre of its efforts to create a credible non-partisan army.
- 2.5 The Government of Sierra Leone must ensure full transparency, high standards and rigorous probity in the implementation of its diamond purchasing, valuation and oversight activities. Corruption and conflicts of interest must be dealt with quickly and decisively. There is an important role to be played in this effort by Sierra Leonean civil society. Assistance in reviewing current systems and developing an enforceable code of conduct should be sought from appropriate donor agencies.
- 2.6 Systems must be developed in Sierra Leone for the payment of fair prices to legitimate small miners. The banking system must be able to provide adequate and timely funding to finance such purchases. Schemes which actively promote participation in small-scale artisanal mining by Sierra Leoneans, and which actively discourage the participation of non-citizens should be given top priority.
- 2.7 Effective and honest monitoring and inspection systems must be established throughout the mining and trading system. External assistance should be sought in developing these. Competent UN inspectors should be posted at different points in the system.
- 2.8 In creating incentives for foreign investment in larger-scale mining operations, the Government of Sierra Leone should raise its standards for investors, insisting on a minimum per annum exploration budget and/or minimum levels of market capitalization and/or assets.

Full corporate transparency must also be provided. Assistance in developing such standards should be sought from international securities commissions.

- 2.9 While it is reasonable to expect mining firms to provide security within their immediate areas of operation, under no circumstances should they be provided with concessions in return for larger security or military operations, or in return for the supply of weapons.

3 De Beers

De Beers is part of the problem. In its efforts to control as much of the international diamond market as possible, it is no doubt purchasing diamonds from a wide variety of dubious sources, either wittingly or unwittingly. The breadth of its control, however, is also its major strength, and is part of the solution to the problem. If De Beers were to take a greater interest in countries like Sierra Leone, and if it were to stop purchasing large amounts of diamonds from countries with a negligible production base, much could be done to end the current high levels of theft and smuggling.

- 3.1 As a matter of urgency, more rigorous oversight on the issue of origin must be instituted by the CSO.
- 3.2 Strong efforts should be made by the Government of Sierra Leone, international bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank, and concerned governments, to persuade De Beers to return to Sierra Leone. At a minimum, De Beers should be persuaded to open a purchasing office in Freetown and should be given every incentive to do so.
- 3.3 Strong efforts should be made by the same international community to persuade De Beers to halt the purchase of all diamonds originating in Liberia and Ivory Coast until clear international guidelines have been developed for proving that any diamonds sold in these countries are genuinely of local origin. De Beers and all other foreign firms should be encouraged to close their purchasing offices in these two countries.

4 Belgium

The structure of the Belgian diamond industry may have served useful purposes when the industry was smaller. Today, however, it looks irresponsible, secretive and seriously under-regulated. It has a demonstrated attraction for new forms of organized crime, and is complicit in fueling African wars. The following recommendations are made to the Diamond High Council and the Government of Belgium, but they are also made to the European Union, and to other governments and institutions in Europe and Belgium with the potential to influence the outcome of events.

- 4.1 The Government of Belgium must take full and direct responsibility for oversight of the Belgian diamond industry. This includes taking direct responsibility for customs, valuation and statistical procedures.

- 4.2 The conflict of interest posed by the government's current customs-related arrangements with the HRD should be terminated.
- 4.3 A high-level commission of enquiry should be instituted into the Belgian diamond industry as a whole, with particular reference to its lack of transparency and questionable paper work, and its possible infiltration by organized criminal elements. Such an enquiry, while of primary interest to Belgian authorities, has implications that extend far beyond Belgium. The Belgian Government should invite representatives of international bodies and/or other governments to participate in the enquiry.
- 4.4 The HRD and/or the Government of Belgium should immediately prohibit the processing of all diamonds that are said to be of Liberian and Ivory Coast origin.
- 4.5 As a matter of urgency, more rigorous oversight on the issue of origin must be instituted by the HRD and the Government of Belgium.
- 4.6 The Government of Belgium and the HRD should, as a matter of urgency, investigate the diamond 'fingerprinting' technology being developed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The sooner this technology is in widespread use, the easier questions of identification will become.

Note: There is concern in Belgium that tougher controls would drive the diamond industry away to countries such as Israel, where oversight may be equally lax. This is not a good enough reason to ignore the Belgian problem, but it *is* a reason for rigorous international investigation of other diamond trading centres (see Recommendation 8).

5 Liberia and Ivory Coast

Liberia has become a major criminal entrepot for diamonds, guns, money laundering, terror and other forms of organized crime. The astoundingly high levels of its diamond exports bear no relationship to its own limited resource base. By accepting Liberian exports as legitimate, the international diamond industry actively colludes in crimes committed or permitted by the Liberian government.

- 5.1 The United Nations Security Council should place a full embargo on the purchase of any diamonds originating in, or said to originate in Liberia until a full and objective international review can be carried out of the country's legitimate resource base, and until exports fall into line with that resource base.
- 5.2 The United Nations Security Council should place a full embargo on the purchase of any diamonds said to originate in Ivory Coast until a full review can be carried out of the country's legitimate resource base, and until exports fall into line with that resource base. Consideration should be given to imposing the same restrictions on Guinean diamonds.

6 Canada

As 'home' to a high proportion of the world's junior mining companies, Canada has a particular responsibility to ensure good corporate citizenship abroad. New standards and codes of conduct have been implemented by some companies and provincial securities commissions in recent years, but these are directed largely at matters of financial transparency, professional competence and issues dealing with capitalization. Some deal with environmental issues. They do not, however, deal with issues of corporate behavior in war zones or with issues such as contravention of the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.¹²⁷

- 6.1 All Canadian securities commissions should initiate discussion among their members about issues relating to corporate conduct in war zones, with special reference to direct or arm's length trade in weapons and materiel, involvement with individuals and companies recruited abroad to engage in hostilities in a third country, or the arrangement of mining concessions in return for protection of any sort. Guidelines dealing with such issues should be created or added to existing codes.¹²⁸
- 6.2 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police should be encouraged and supported in its development of diamond 'fingerprinting'. Efforts should be made to develop systems for adopting the technology as a matter of course in diamond producing countries and in major trading centres around the world, including the CSO and Antwerp.

7 A Consumer Campaign

Like diamonds, the Atlantic slave trade essentially served non-African markets. And like the diamond trade, the impact of slavery was devastating for many West African countries: it spawned predatory bandit groups acting like the RUF, UNITA and the NPFL, and mercenary regimes based entirely on violence and slave raiding. These regimes and bandit groups were sustained and motivated by the slave trade - by the arms and other resources they received for selling captive human beings to Europeans. With the end of the Atlantic slave trade, however, they collapsed or were swept aside in short order. The abolition of the slave trade was significantly influenced by a consumer campaign in Britain, aimed at the products of slave labour - mainly sugar from the Caribbean. The political and commercial damage to the slave trade of such campaigns was as much responsible for abolition as the humanitarian imperative.

At the bottom of the UNDP Human Development Index and wracked by almost a decade of war, Sierra Leone could not possibly be in worse condition today than if it never had any diamonds. Diamonds have, in fact, been a curse, not a blessing. This does not have to be the case, but concerted action on all the recommendations above will be necessary just to *start* making a difference. The recommendations will not be easy to implement, nor will they be cost-free. The easiest thing for the major actors - De Beers, the HRD, the Governments of Belgium and Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council - will be to do as little as possible.

One way of drawing greater attention to the urgency of the matter and of gaining broader support for change, would be a consumer campaign, One has already been started in Europe* and it would not be difficult to expand it. Imagine:

- Diamonds are *not* a girl's best friend - witness the brutalized little girl (pictured on the cover of this report) with no hands;
- 'The millennium gift she'll never forget' - ditto;
- For some people, diamonds are more 'forever' than for others - witness 75,000 violent deaths in Sierra Leone;
- Diamonds are a guerilla's best friend - witness Sierra Leone's coups, rampaging criminals, etc etc

Sixty million individual pieces of diamond jewelry are sold every year, indicating a sizeable target audience.

The Project Team understands that an effective consumer campaign could inflict damage on an industry which is important to developing economies and to poor people working in the diamond industries of other countries such as Namibia, South Africa, India and Botswana. Those considering the possibility of initiating or joining a campaign, therefore, would have to consider how many lives in countries like Sierra Leone, Angola and the Congo these jobs are worth. Speaking in November 1999, Nicky Oppenheimer said,

Damage to the diamond market will not on its own deprive the warlords of their treasuries, but it will kill prosperity and encourage poverty in other well regulated African countries and in the cutting centres of India and around the world... Indeed, damage the market and you undermine orderly mining regimes and ensure instead that there will be more Angolas, more Congos, more Sierra Leones. It could ensure that there will be no more Botswanas, South Africas or Namibias.¹²⁹

Diamond analyst Martin Rapaport, while critical of the UN, Global Witness and what he sees as hypocritical politicians and bureaucrats, fears a consumer campaign, but understands that it could hurt. 'The bottom line,' he says, 'is that the diamond industry does not need or want conflict with government or NGOs. It is in our economic interest to cooperate and find reasonable and responsible ways to deal with war diamonds.' He says that 'from a humanitarian and moral perspective, our industry must do everything it reasonably can to ensure that diamond money is not used to fuel conflict... As an industry we must take responsibility for our actions and develop trade-wide practices that we believe are correct and moral.'¹³⁰ Nelson Mandela has said the same thing: 'We would be concerned that an international campaign... does not damage this vital industry. Rather than boycotts

* By the NGO, Global Witness - URL: www.oneworld.org/globalwitness

being instituted, it is preferable that through our own initiatives the industry takes a progressive stance on human rights issues.¹³¹

The word 'boycott' is increasingly being used within the diamond industry. This report does not use the word. The point of a *campaign* would be to create greater interest among the public, public institutions and within the diamond industry in doing exactly what Mr. Mandela suggests. In fact an informal campaign appears to be well under way, and this report takes its place as part of it. Where people's lives are concerned - as they are in Sierra Leone - time is of the essence. In the absence of clear and meaningful movement, the point of a campaign would be to help the industry 'take responsibility for its actions' - not damaging it, but improving it.

8 Further Study

This report has not dealt with the problems of Angolan or Congolese diamonds and their relationship to other countries in the region. Angola's problems - which are similar to those of Sierra Leone - were under consideration by a United Nations panel of experts when this report was being finalized. Recommendations emerging from that panel will no doubt need to be considered in relation to what has been recommended here.

This report has also not addressed the diamond trade in other parts of the world, most notably in Russia, Ukraine, New York, Israel and India. Further solutions to some of the problems identified here might follow additional research into these and other trading, cutting and polishing centres.

ANNEX 1

A NOTE ON CANADIAN JUNIOR MINING COMPANIES¹³²

It is not a coincidence that so many junior mining companies incorporate themselves in Canada and are listed on Canadian stock exchanges. A combination of Canadian tax provisions, the operation of the Canadian stock exchanges and Canada's own resource history has made Canada the premier country for mining company venture capital.

Part of this is explained by history. With an abundance and variety of mineral resources, much of Canada's development has been based on extractive industries. Consequently, Canada has high levels of expertise in mining, a large number of exceptional mining geologists, and an abundance of skilled penny stock promoters, sometimes called 'the bottom feeders of the mining business.'¹³³ The country also has a population with a penchant for penny stocks. Mining is a risky business and the probability of striking it rich is slim. Only one in 10,000 exploration companies will find and bring a mine into production. Because of the high risk, and the low level of capitalization by most mining companies, Canadian Stock Exchanges have traditionally been easier to access because of less restrictive disclosure requirements and lower capitalization requirements than exchanges in many other countries. The Vancouver and Calgary exchanges (merged in November 1999 as part of a new Canadian Venture Exchange) were long known as mining exchanges, and sometimes as 'wildcat' exchanges.

This helps to explain why so many non-Canadian junior mining firms are 'officially' located in Canada, with listings on Canadian exchanges. During 1996, the amount raised to finance the domestic and foreign projects of Canadian mining companies - C \$7 billion (almost US\$5 billion) - was an all-time record. Of this, C \$5.5 billion was in the form of equity and C \$1.3 billion was in the form of debt. The amount of equity financing for mining during 1996 accounted for about one quarter of all Canadian-dollar equity issues raised in Canada. In the case of debt, however, mining accounted for less than five per cent. In 1996, more Canadian-dollar and foreign-currency equity financing was raised for the mining industry than for any other industry. In fact, the Canadian financial services sector appears to have raised more equity capital for the mineral industry than was raised in Australia, the United States and South Africa combined.¹³⁴

In 1996, more than 39 billion shares of all types of companies were traded on Canadian exchanges, with a value of C\$369 billion. At the end of 1996, there were about 1400 mining companies listed on Canadian stock exchanges. More than 800 companies were listed on the Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE), about 300 on the Toronto Stock Exchange and the remainder were listed on the Alberta Stock Exchange (ASE) and the Montreal Exchange (ME). Mining companies accounted for more than half of the companies listed on the VSE. In addition to the four stock exchanges, Canada also had a negotiated dealer market, the Canadian Dealing Network, that provided a market for the shares of unlisted mining companies. There were more than 150 mining companies trading on the Canadian Dealing Network (also merged mainly with the Canadian Venture Exchange in November and December, 1999).¹³⁵

Another characteristic of Canadian markets over the past decade has been the increasing number of foreign-based mining companies listed on Canadian exchanges. During 1996 at least eight mining companies with headquarters located outside of Canada were listed on the TSE alone. The increase in foreign listings is attributable, in part, to the large pool of capital available in Canada, to the liquidity made available to investors by Canadian stock exchanges, and to the visibility given to mining companies by Canadian mining analysts.

Over the years, there have been various Canadian mining scandals. In virtually all of Canada's mining scams, the final 'blame' has been laid on stock promoters and the 'flexibility' of the stock exchanges. The Bre-X scandal was perhaps the worst: a phoney gold mine in Indonesia was capitalized to the tune of C\$6 billion before its sudden and well-deserved crash in 1997. The fallout from Bre-X was significant. The remarkable bull market that propelled penny stocks into the big leagues ended. In 1997, 30 per cent of Canada's biggest stock market losers were junior mining companies. The TSE's gold and precious metals subindex, which lists the sector's 'best' performers, dropped almost 40 per cent in the same year, the worst showing among all fourteen of the TSE's subgroups. By contrast, the TSE's financial services subindex, which includes the nation's largest major banks and brokerages, was up nearly 52 per cent.¹³⁶ For the juniors, the 'market dried up.'¹³⁷

In addition to the past attractiveness of Canadian exchanges, there are a number of tax regulations that facilitate Canadian investment abroad, some of which apply specifically to the mining industry:

- Canadian tax law allows the deductibility of interest incurred by borrowing, whether in Canada or offshore, for investment in foreign subsidiaries, while intercorporate dividends are exempt from Canadian income tax.;
- Profits generated by subsidiaries operating in a country with which Canada has a tax treaty can be repatriated free of Canadian income tax;
- Canadian companies that invest directly in foreign mining projects and incur exploration and development expenses can deduct, under certain conditions, deduct up to 100 per cent of these expenses.
- Canadian tax regulations allow the pooling of exploration and development expenses, rather than requiring property-by-property or country-by-country accounting. As a result, proceeds from the sale of foreign resource properties can be sheltered against Canadian tax by the total amount of unclaimed foreign exploration and development expenses.

A positive outcome of Bre-X scandal was a tightening up of Canadian exchanges, with changes that could make life more difficult for unethical junior mining companies. The merger of the Calgary and Vancouver exchanges brings the industry under tighter scrutiny than before. The TSE is drafting new regulations which are part of the restructuring. Proposed changes include the following:

- Resource companies trading on the TSE will be expected to boost minimum exploration or development budgets by \$100,000, to \$350,000, and record sales of at least \$3 million, up from \$1 million;
- Companies will be bound by stricter disclosure requirements, as recommended in 1999 by a Mining Standards Task Force;
- Companies also must now have a minimum market capitalization of \$3 million, with publicly floated shares valued at at least \$2 million. They must also be in control of assets worth a minimum of \$3 million, up from \$2 million, and have revenues of at least \$3 million, up from \$1 million;

Companies that do not conform to the new requirements will be given 120 days to do so, and the market will be given 30 days notice of pending suspensions.¹³⁸

ANNEX 2

DIAMOND PROPERTIES HELD IN SIERRA LEONE BY INTERNATIONAL MINING COMPANIES
(Mid 1999)

AMCAN MINERALS LIMITED

River Lots: The company has 12 river lots on the Sewa River (alluvial).

Old River Terraces: AmCan has three 144-acre lots in this main alluvial diamond fairway. The lots are numbered 106, 107 and 108 and are immediately southwest of the Koidu Kimberlite project.

Hard Rock Kimberlite Dykes: AmCan holds an exploration license (No. Expl. 4 1998) for blocks 51 and 51A, along with kimberlite pipe No. 3 and all surrounding dykes. Blocks 51 and 51A are immediately northeast and contiguous with the Koidu Kimberlite Project, which is controlled by DiamondWorks. The total land area covers an area of approximately 20.7 square kilometres and is in Kono District. The surrounding dykes cover a distance of 27 miles in length, the widest of which is eight metres. The license was granted by the Ministry of Mineral Resources of Sierra Leone in 1996.

AmCan, through its subsidiary Sierra Gold Limited also holds a 90 per cent interest in a 30 sq. mile gold property on the Pampana River in the Tonkalili District of central Sierra Leone. The property is situated in the middle of the Sula Mountain Archean Greenstone Belt. In 1998, the exploration license for the property was renewed by the Government of Sierra Leone for a period of three years.

REX DIAMOND MINING CORPORATION
REX DIAMOND MINING CORPORATION

The Ministry of Mineral Resources of Sierra Leone reconfirmed title of Rex's diamond concessions on August 18, 1999. Rex titles are in Tongo Field and Zimmi Fields.

Tongo Field: The Tongo Field property comprises approximately 65 square kilometers, located in Kenema District and was originally granted to REX by the Government of Sierra Leone on 15 March 1994. The mining rights are held by Rex NV pursuant to lease ML 10/94, and expires on February 28, 2019. The Rex property has been previously mined for alluvial diamonds. Four Kimberlite dyke zones have been discovered on the property.

Zimmi: The Zimmi Property consists of approximately 54 square kilometers located in Pujehun District. The property is held pursuant to lease ML 9/94, which expires February 28, 2019. The Zimmi property is an alluvial diamond property, which was developed for mining during the mid-1980s. The property was abandoned before commencement of full-scale mining because of civil unrest. Company geological reports based upon sampling programs carried out on the property indicate that the property contains deposits of large stones of high quality. Rex believes that the

Zimmi property has the potential to produce alluvial diamonds at surface and that high-grade paleo channels and other geophysical features indicate the possibility of kimberlite.

DIAMONDWORKS LTD.

Koidu Property: DiamondWorks has a 25-year renewable mining lease which grants the company the exclusive right to carry out exploration and mining activities in respect of diamonds, gold and associated minerals in an area of approximately four square kilometres in the Kono District known as the Koidu Property.

Area 7 Property: DiamondWorks has a 3-year prospecting license that covers an area of approximately 93 hectares in the Kono District known as Area 7.

Matemu Property: DiamondWorks has a 3-year prospecting license for kimberlite diamonds covering an area of approximately 68 square kilometres in southeastern Sierra Leone. DiamondWorks is required by the Government of Sierra Leone to spend US\$ 340,000 on exploration on the property during the first two years of the license.

Sources: Company Annual Reports and submissions to the Ontario Securities Commissions (www.sedar.com)

ANNEX 3

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

SIERRA LEONE

Government

- Desmond Luke, Chief Justice
- Dr. Sama Banya, Sierra Leone Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (interviewed in Canada)
- Mohamed Swaray Deen, Minister of Mineral Resources
- Julius Spencer, Minister of Information, Broadcasting and Culture
- Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence
- David Quee, Chairman, Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO)
- Osman Kamara, Deputy Mineral Resources Director
- A. Yumkella, Deputy Minister of Mines
- Femi Kamara, Mines Engineer
- Andrew Keilli, Senior Mines Engineer
- Arnold Mason, Geologist, Mineral Resources Ministry
- Lamin Massaquoi, Senior Geologist, Mineral Resources Ministry

Other

- Alfred Akibo-Betts, businessman, former Minister of Fisheries and former Mayor of Freetown
- Amadu Amara, Chief Clerk, Kamajor 19th battalion, Bo
- Simon Arthy, Regional Coordinator for the EC Resettlement Program (ECSLP), Bo
- Mohammed Hassan Barrie, President, United Mineworkers Union
- Steven Crossman, Deputy High Commissioner for Great Britain
- Pios Foray, editor, *Democrat*
- Francis Fortune, Conciliation Resources, Bo
- Martin Kallon, senior Kamajor intelligence officer, Bo
- John Kanagbo, diamond dealer, Bo
- Francis Kpullum, diamond dealer, Bo
- Kingsley Lington, editor, *Concord Times*
- Rodney Michaels, diamond dealer, Bo
- Phillip Neville, editor, *Standard Times*
- Patrick Sannoh, ex-miner, Bo

And many other persons, mainly illicit miners and dealers who asked not to be named.

CANADA**CANADA****Government****Government**

- David Angel, First Secretary, Political Affairs, Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN
- D.J. Ballantyne, Central Forensic Laboratory, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ottawa
- Sgt. Ray Halwas, NCO in Charge, "G" Division Diamond Project, Yellowknife, NT
- T.S.E. Jones, Eastern and Southern Africa Division (GAA), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
- Gerry Olson, Office of the Privy Council, Ottawa
- Douglas Paget, Chief of Special Projects, Mineral Resources/Natural Resources and Environment Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development

Private Sector**Private Sector**

- J.S. Austin, President and CEO, Aston Mining of Canada Inc., Vancouver B.C.
- Terry Buckham, Diamond High Council (HRD), Toronto, Ontario
- George F.H. Burne, President & CEO, De Beers Canada Corporation, Vancouver
- Tom Beardmore-Gray, Senior Vice-President, De Beers Canada Corporation, Vancouver
- Alan McCaffrey, Vice-President for Public Relations, AMCAN Minerals, Ltd., Toronto
- Peter Meredith, Chief Financial Officer, DiamondWorks Ltd., Vancouver
- E.J. Oosterhuis, Investor Relations, CEF, Toronto
- Adolf Petancic, Investor Relations, Dentonia Resources Ltd., Vancouver, B.C.
- Bill Trenaman, Vice-President, DiamondWorks, Ltd., Vancouver, B.C.

Other**Other**

- John Leigh, High Commissioner of Sierra Leone to Canada and Ambassador to the United States
- Prof. Bonnie Campbell, Université du Québec à Montréal
- Gen. Ian Douglas (Ret.), Independent Consultant, Kanata, Ontario
- Howard Goldenpaul, Producer, CBC *Fifth Estate* television program, Toronto
- Joan Kuyek, National Coordinator, MiningWatch Canada, Ottawa
- Professor A.A. Levinson, Department of Geology and Geophysics, University of Calgary

UNITED KINGDOM**UNITED KINGDOM**

- T.W.H. Capon, Executive Director of Central Selling Organization and Member Board of Directors, De Beers
- Kaspar Fithen, Oxford Analytica, Oxford
- Charmian Gooch, Director, Global Witness, London

- David Lord, Conciliation Resources, London
- Alex Yearsley, Global Witness, London

BELGIUM

BELGIUM

- Frieda Coosemans, Head of Diamonds Department, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Government of Belgium

A number of interviews took place with individuals who preferred to remain anonymous. They included officials in:

- The Ministry of Justice
- The Senate Commission on Organized Crime
- The Belgian Administration for Development Aid

Others

- Belgian Investigative Journalists
- Diamond Dealers and Traders
- Diamond Couriers and Smugglers
- Officials of the Diamond High Council (HRD) (Diamond Office and the Gemological Institute)

UNITED STATES

UNITED STATES

- E.J. Hogendoorn, Human Rights Watch, Washington, D.C.
- Professor Herb Howe, Georgetown University, Washington, DC
- Danny Kennedy, Project Underground, California
- Prof. William Reno, Northwestern University, Michigan
- Jim Rupert, *Washington Post*, Washington, DC
- Rachel Stohl, Center for Defence Information, Washington D.C.

GHANA

GHANA

- Yao Graham, Third World Network (Africa Secretariat), Accra, Ghana
- David Tam-Baryoh, West African Media Watch, former editor of *Punch* (Freetown)

NOTES

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2. See, for example, Paul Richards, 'Rambo and war in Africa', *Crosslines*, April-May 1995; and Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*, International African Institute & James Currey, Oxford, 1996
3. See, for example, Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front'; Yusuf Bangura, 'Understanding the Political and Cultural Dynamics of the Sierra Leone War: A Critique of Paul Richards' *Fighting for the Rainforest*'; and I. Abdullah *et al.*, 'Lumpen Youth Culture and Political Violence: Sierra Leoneans Debate the RUF and the Civil War' in *Africa Development*, Vol. XXII, Nos. 3/4, 1997
4. Keen David, 'War as a Source of Losses and Gains', Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, July 1995
5. See Robert Kaplan's 'The Coming Anarchy', *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994 and *The Ends of the Earth*, Random House, New York, 1996
6. 'Jump-starting the economy' is almost as common an expression as 'strengthening civil society'. The *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* observe that 'The need to preserve peace and stability, rehabilitate essential infrastructure, reform public institutions, jump-start the economy, and create employment opportunities places heavy demands on budgetary resources' (1997, 53). The World Bank's first priority in an integrated package of reconstruction assistance is to 'jump-start the economy through investment in key productive sectors' (*Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 1997, iii).
7. McNish, Jacquie, *The Big Score: Robert Friedland, Inco and the Voisey's Bay Hustle*, Doubleday Canada, Toronto, 1998, pg. 330.
8. Reno, William, 'Commercial Agendas in Civil Wars', mimeo, undated (ca. 1999). See also Christopher Clapham (ed.) *African Guerillas*, James Currey, Oxford, 1998; and Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*, International African Institute and James Currey, Oxford, 1999
9. *ibid*
10. Friedman, Milton, 'Social Purpose of Business is to Increase its Profits', *New York Times Magazine*, Sept. 13, 1970.
11. Keen, *op cit*
12. Levinson, A., Gurney, J., Kirkley, M., 'Diamond Sources and production: Past, Present and Future', *Gems and Gemology*, Vol. 28, No. 4, Winter, 1992, p. 236
13. There are major difficulties in the comparability of diamond statistics, which will be discussed later in this report. However, at this point, an example is useful. For 1998 two separate sources give the diamond output of Sierra Leone as 500,000 carats (Terraconsult Consulting) and 104,000 carats (United States Geological Survey, Department of the Interior).
14. James Picton, 'African Diamond Production in the 21st Century'. Paper presented at the Gemological Institute of America International Gemological Symposium, (June 21-24 1999, San Diego, California). Also see; James Petra, 'Standard Equities' Analyses of World Diamond Production (1997)', in Luc Rombouts, 'The Mining and Exploration Scene', *Mining Journal* Vol. 331 No. 8505 (London November 6, 1998) p. 5. Also useful is Alfred Levinson, John Gurney, Melissa Kirkley, 'Diamond Sources and Production: Past, Present, and Future' in *Gems & Gemology* Vol. 28 No. 4, Winter 1992) pp. 234-252.
15. Interview with De Beers Canada, Vancouver on July 21, 1999

16. Most general statistics about diamond resources in this report are taken from the United States Geological Survey. USGS data is used because of its breadth and comparability even though, as noted elsewhere in this report and according to personal conversations with A.A. Levinson, a Canadian geologist, USGS data, especially for West African countries, 'are likely to be very, very wrong' (personal communication).
17. Van der Laan, H.L., *The Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study Covering the Years 1952-1961* (London, Oxford University Press 1965) P. 60.
18. Much of this section relies on an article by A.J.A. Janse, 'A History of Diamond Sources in Africa', *Gems & Gemology* (Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 1996) pp. 2-30.
19. There are some costs of being labeled a monopoly. For example, De Beers cannot operate offices in the United States as its market structure would violate American anti-trust legislation. However, this is a small cost as De Beers has American companies that effectively represent their interests. Canadian combines legislation is more flexible. De Beers has an office in Vancouver, British Columbia.
20. De Beers, *A Diamond is Forever-1998 Annual Report*, p. 5.
21. For two detailed but quite different histories of the De Beers-Anglo American conglomerate see David Pallister, Sarah Stewart and Ian Lepper, *South Africa Inc.: The Oppenheimer Empire*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1987; and Duncan Innes, *Anglo America and the Rise of Modern South Africa*, Heinemann, London, 1984
22. Economic purists may not agree with the idea that De Beers is 'monopolistic'. In the economic sense of market structures, pure monopoly refers to a market structure characterized by one seller and many buyers. De Beers also does not fit the definition of 'oligopoly' - a structure characterized by few sellers and many buyers. The market structure that De Beers has created is unique, and does not fit traditional economic categories. A firm that produces 50 per cent of world output, and controls the sale of 70-80 per cent of world output to a specially chosen group of 160 people, at prices it alone determines, exerts a massive amount of power over the market place and certainly has monopolistic characteristics.
23. Oppenheimer, Harry, 'De Beers and the Diamond Industry', January 1998, p. 31.
24. De Beers, 'De Beers and the Diamond Industry', January 1998, p. 14
25. De Beers, *1998 Annual Report*, p. 3.
26. Brenden Ryan quoting De Beers geology manager Roy Edwards in: 'Attracting Mining Minnows: Getting Into Bed with De Beers... who Gets the Best Night's Rest?' (<http://www.edata.co.za/debeers/fm6.html>) p.3
27. Ryan, *op cit*, p. 3.
28. Atkinson, Dan, 'De Beers Faces World Revolt', in *Electronic Mail & Guardian*, Johannesburg, South Africa, September 30, 1997, p.1 (www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97sep2/30sep-diamonds)
29. Kennedy, Peter, 'Tiffany Snags Aber Stake' in the *Globe and Mail*, July 20 1999.
30. It is unclear whether De Beers still holds offshore concessions in Sierra Leone.
31. T.W.H. Capon, Member of De Beers Board of Directors and an Executive Director of the Central Selling Organization, Interview, London, July 16, 1999.
32. De Beers, *1998 Annual Report*, p. 103
33. A De Beers's official quoted in *A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angola Conflict*, Global Witness, London, 1999, p. 6.
34. Title of Public Relations Brochure published by the Diamond High Council (Hoge Raad Voor Diamant Vzw), 1999.
35. Diamond High Council, *1998 Annual Report*, Antwerp 1999, p. 5
36. *ibid.* p. 11
37. Luc Rombouts, 'Antwerp the World's Marketplace for Diamond Producers' in *Antwerp Facets* (Diamond

High Council, April 1999) #31, pp. 10-11.

38. Conversation with Diamond High Council spokesperson, September 2, 1999.
39. Sénat de Belgique, Session de 1998-1999, 8 Décembre 1998. Commission Parlementaire chargée d'enquêter sur la Criminalité Organisée en Belgique. Rapport Final fait par MM. Coverliers et Desmedt. (Chapter IV of the Report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Crime includes 30 pages on the Diamond Industry.)
40. *ibid.* pp. 249-252
41. *ibid.* pp. 249-252
42. Interview with Antwerp police official.
43. Confidential interview with African diamond courier. Antwerp, September 24, 1999.
44. The quotation is from a novel by a Belgian novelist, Jef Geeraerts: *Diamant* (Meulenhoff/Manteau, Amsterdam/Antwerpen) 1981.
45. The project team was informed by a Canadian geologist specializing in the collection and analysis of diamond statistics that even the 200,000 carats listed as being produced in Liberia was a gross exaggeration. Personal communications with A.A. Levinson, University of Calgary.
46. Repeated written requests from the Project Team to the HRD in Toronto and Antwerp for information on the discrepancy between Liberian export figures and Belgian import figures remained unanswered.
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50. Arrêté ministériel réglant les modalités de l'épreuve d'aptitude des experts chargés de constater le poids, la valeur et la qualification des diamants à l'importation et à l'exportation. *Moniteur Belge*, (The Belgian Government Gazette), 23 March 1990.
51. Confidential interview with a Belgian agent working on behalf of the Ministry of Justice and investigating crime and terrorist connections in Antwerp.
52. Van Baelen, J., 'Expert Diamond Office leerde frauderen in Twee Maanden Tijd in *Gazet van Antwerpen*, 22 April 1999
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56. On the Kozlenok case see the following. Mark Whitehouse, 'Anatomy of a Diamond Scam' in *The Moscow Times*, March 17, 1998. Also, David Kaplan, and Christian Caryl, 'The Looting of Russia' in *US News*, August 3, 1998. This report can be found on the following Internet web site: www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/980803/3g0ld.htm. On this site is included a copy of the California Federal Judge's order on the case. See also Jeffrey Robinson, *The Merger: How Organized crime is Taking over the World*, Simon and Schuster UK, London, 1999, pp. 100-102
57. Timmerman, George and de Witte, Rene, *Fraude en Corruptie in Antwerpen*, Hadewych, 1996, p. 160.
58. **Interview on procedures for import and export with Mrs. Frieda Coosemans, Head of the Diamonds Department of the Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs, Administration of Licenses and Contingents. Antwerp, September 7 1999.**
59. *Diamond Agreement and Licence (Ratification) Act*, Government Printing, Freetown, 1934
60. Van der Laan, *op cit*, p. 2.
61. Koskoff, David, *The Diamond World*, Harper Collins, New York, 1981, p. 74
62. Cartwright, John, *Politics in Sierra Leone 1947-67*, University Press, Toronto, 1970, p. 69
63. *ibid*
64. Koskoff, *op cit*, pp. 87-93
65. See, for example, Mason & Cilliers, *Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatization of Security in Wartorn African States*, Institute for Security Studies, Johannesburg, 1999; William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1997; Guy Arnold, *Mercenaries*, Macmillan, London, 1999.
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67. Harbottle, Michael, *The Knaves of Diamonds*, Seeley Services & Co., London, 1976
68. See Fred Kamil, *The Diamond Underworld*, Allen Lane, London, 1979
69. Van der Laan, *op cit*, p. 19
70. See Koskoff, *op cit*, pp. 87-93; also Casper Fithen, 'Diamonds and War in Sierra Leone: Cultural Strategies for Commercial Adaptation to Endemic Low Intensity Conflict,' (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, University of London, 1999).
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78. Robinson, *op cit*, p. 115
79. Allain Lallemand, *De Organizatsiya: De Russische Maffia van Antwerpen tot Brooklyn*. (Berchem/Antwerpen, EPO 1996) P. 308). Originally published under the title: *L'organizatsiya: La mafia russe a l'assaut du monde* (Paris, Editions Calmann-Lévy, October 1996).
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81. Robinson, *op cit*, p. 116

82. Reno (1995), *op cit*, p. 163

83. *ibid.*, p. 165

84. *ibid.*, pp. 175-6

85. H.R. Van der Laan, *op cit*

86. Atkinson, Philippa, 'The War Economy in Liberia; A Political Analysis', Relief and Rehabilitation Network (RRN), May 1997

87. A good proportion of the diamonds were of gem quality (common in Angola and Sierra Leone); only three per cent of Liberia's diamonds are of gem quality.

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89. *Sunday Times*, 23 January 1999.

90. See the Sierra Leone Web, Url: <http://www.SierraLeone.org> archives for October and November 1999.

91. Rupert, *op cit*

92. Kamajor informants, Bo and Freetown; also senior western diplomatic source, Freetown, July 1999

93. *Africa Confidential*, 28 May 1999.

94. See Arnold, *op cit*, pp. 97-9; also Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, *The Arms Fixers*, Prio, Oslo, 1999; also, Rupert, 'Diamond Hunters Fuel Africa's Brutal Wars', *Washington Post*, Oct. 11, 1999

95. Freetown interview with a senior judiciary figure.

96. See, for example, 'Liberia's Hand Seen in Sierra Leone's War', *Washington Post*, 10 January 1999.

97. See *Africa Confidential*, August 1999; also Monrovia informants, July 1999.

98. t'Sas, Vincent, 'Sierra Leone's rebel fighter Bockarie thrives on war', Reuters, Abidjan, Jan. 15, 1999

95. Francis, Diane, *BRE-X: The Inside Story*, Seal Books: McClelland-Bantam Inc., Toronto, 1997

96. Visit to (locked) Rex Diamond office in Toronto and accidental meeting with E.J. Oosterhuis, Investor Relations, Toronto.

97. Rex Diamond Mining Corporation *Press Release*, June 3, 1999

(www.Rexmining.be/press%2099_06_03). Other Canadian board members are Joseph Conway, President and CEO of Repadre Capital Corporation and Martin Furman, Assistant Vice-President of National Trust Company, Inc.

98. Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile, 'Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia - 1993/94', *Economist Intelligence Unit Limited*, London 1994, p. 44.

99. SEDAR or the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval is used to electronically file securities related information with the Canadian Securities Administrators. The network was developed by the Canadian Depository for Securities, through its subsidiary CDS Inc. The purpose of this initiative is to make public securities filings easily accessible to all.

100. Serge Muller response to a question on the Rex Internet chat line

(www.Rexmining.be/rdmc/company/Q_and_A/qea_content.htm) August 4, 1999.

101. 'Chairman's Letter', 1998 *Annual Report*, Rex Diamond Mining Corporation, 1999.

102. Ben Holemans on Rex Question and Answer web site. (www.Rexmining.be/rdmc/Company/Q_and_A/qea_content.htm) June 28, 1999.

103. E-mail from RUF to NINJAS (<http://206.253.196.7/-wsapi/investor/reply-10846986>) August 6, 1999

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107. 1996 *Annual Report* (AmCan Minerals Limited) p.11.

108. Phone interview with E. Allan McCaffrey, Vice President, Public Relations of AmCan Minerals Limited. October 14, 1999.

109. Interview with David Quee, Government of Sierra Leone Gold and Diamond Office, August, 1999.

110. Interview with senior DiamondWorks personnel, Vancouver, July 21, 1999

111. Much of the information on Carson Gold and its transformation into DiamondWorks comes from: Will Purcell, 'A Rocky Past, A Hopeful Future'

(www.siliconinvestor.com/stocktalk/msg.gsp?msgid=10955815) August 14, 1999.

112. This information comes from a one-page summary found on: <http://mbendi.co.za/orgs/cbh2.htm>.

113. The examples are taken from, 'Statement & Media Advisory', DiamondWorks,

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117. Arnold, *op cit*, p. 47

118. For more on the system, see Alfred Zack-Williams, *Tributors, Supporters and Merchant Capital: Mining and Underdevelopment in Sierra Leone*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1994

119. For example a company with South African connections, Igoli Mining, has recently begun operations in the Pujehun area. Security is being provided by Kamajors, with weapons reportedly purchased from ECOMOG.

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123. Project Team discussions and communications with: D.J. Ballantyne, Chemistry Section – Central Forensic Laboratory (RCMP) and Sgt. Ray Halwas, NCO in Charge, 'G' Division Diamond Project (RCMP)

124. Communication from Sgt. Ray Halwas, NCO in Charge, 'G' Division Diamond Project (RCMP) October 20, 1999.

125. 'Consumer Access to a Responsible Accounting of Trade Act of 2000 (Introduced in the House)', 106th Congress, House of Representatives, Nov. 1, 1999

126. 'Floor Statement of U.S. Rep. Tony P. Hall', US House of Representatives, Nov. 1, 1999

127. This Convention was passed by the United Nations General Assembly after ten years of debate and negotiation in 1989. It was to enter into force one month after it had been ratified by 22 states. By the end of

1997, it had been ratified by only seven.

128. This is a complex issue, made more difficult by the fact that as many as one third of 'Canadian' mining companies are based outside Canada. One way of looking at it has to do with shareholder protection. Mining firms are expected to apply due diligence to technical matters in the interest of their shareholders. Lack of diligence in political, military and ethical matters overseas can place shareholder investment at risk. The Alliance of Manufacturers and Exporters Canada makes a reasonable start at such issues with its 'Good Corporate Conduct Abroad'. The issue, however, is not codes, but how to give them teeth.

129. Oppenheimer, Nicky, 'Diamonds Working for Africa', Speech to the Commonwealth Business Forum, Johannesburg, Nov. 11, 1999

130. Rapaport, Martin, 'Blood Money', Nov. 11, 1999, Diamond Net, URL: www.diamonds.net/news

131. *IRIN Newsbriefs*, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 17 November, 1999

132. This section draws on the research of Bonnie Campbell. In particular see, Bonnie Campbell, 'Canadian Mining Interests and Human Rights in Africa in the Context of Globalization', Occasional Papers, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Montreal, January 1999.

133. Francis, *op cit*

134. Campbell, *op cit*, p. 11.


135. *ibid*

136. Hutchinson, Brian, *Fools Gold: The Making of a Global Market Fraud*, Alfred A. Knopf Canada, Toronto, 1998, p. 250

137. Interview with Peter Meredith, Chief Financial Officer of DiamondWorks, Vancouver, July 21, 1999.

138. 'TSE Introduces Stricter Listing Requirements', *Northern Miner*, Vol. 85, #33, October 11-17 1999, p.5.

101) Report of Non-Governmental Organization
War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone



**War-Related
Sexual Violence
in Sierra Leone**

4193

War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone

A Report by Physicians for Human Rights

With the Support of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone's decade-long conflict has been one of the deadliest in recent history and has been marked by an extraordinary level of brutal human rights abuses, including abductions, beatings, killings, sexual assault of women and men, being "captured" for less than 24 hours, torture, forced labor, gunshot wounds, serious injuries and amputations. An alarming 94% of 991 households of internally displaced persons randomly surveyed by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) reported among its members at least one of these serious abuses during the past ten years of conflict. The majority of abuses occurred between 1997 and 1999 and, when known, were attributed primarily to the forces of the rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

The PHR/UNAMSIL study is one of the first to scientifically document the extent of sexual violence as a result of war. Approximately one of every eight household members (13%) reported one or more war-related sexual assaults among its members, and these assaults were perpetrated primarily by members of the RUF. In addition, 23% of women interviewed reported being pregnant at the time of the attack. A striking 53% of respondents reporting "face to face" contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence. One third of the women who reported sexual assault reported being gang raped.

In fact, the prevalence of war-related sexual assaults (8-9%) in only a ten year period was equivalent to the lifetime prevalence of non war-related sexual assault (also 9%) among the study participants. PHR estimates that approximately 50,000 to 64,000 Sierra Leonean internally displaced women may have suffered war-related sexual assaults.

Today, in the context of war, rape and other forms of sexual assault are considered war crimes and can be prosecuted as such. A Special Court has been proposed to prosecute those "most responsible" for violations of human rights in Sierra Leone's conflict. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission is being set up to foster accountability and reconciliation. All who have expressed an interest in testifying or providing information to the Special Court or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should have an opportunity to do so.

... They undressed five of us, laid us down, used us in front of my family and took us away with them. They wouldn't release us, they kept us with them in the bush... When I escaped, I couldn't walk... I was bleeding from my vagina... Since I got back I have been so sick... I never used to get sick like this... I would like to go back to school, but I can't concentrate anymore, I can't do anything...

Isata, a 15-year-old girl

PHYSICIANS
for
HUMAN
RIGHTS 

War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone

A Population-Based Assessment

A Report by Physicians for Human Rights

With the Support of the United Nations Assistance Mission
in Sierra Leone

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Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 1-879707-37-3

Cover and report Design: Glenn Ruga/Visual Communications

Cover Photo: Kristina Hare Lyons

Physicians for Human Rights

Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) promotes health by protecting human rights. We believe that human rights are essential preconditions for the health and well-being of all people. Using medical and scientific methods, we investigate and expose violations of human rights worldwide and we work to stop them. We support institutions that hold perpetrators of human rights abuses, including health professionals, accountable for their actions. We educate health professionals and medical, public health and nursing students and organize them to become active in supporting a movement for human rights and creating a culture of human rights in the medical and scientific professions.

Since 1986, PHR members have worked to stop torture, disappearances, and political killings by governments and opposition groups; to improve health and sanitary conditions in prisons and detention centers; to investigate the physical and psychological consequences of violations of humanitarian law in internal and international conflicts; to defend medical neutrality and the right of civilians and combatants to receive medical care during times of war; to protect health professionals who are victims of violations of human rights; and to prevent medical complicity in torture and other abuses.

As one of the original steering committee members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, PHR shared the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. PHR currently serves as coordinator of the US Campaign to Ban Landmines.

The President is Robert Lawrence, M.D.; Vice President is Holly Atkinson, M.D.; the Executive Director is Leonard S. Rubenstein, J.D.; Deputy Director is Susannah Sirkin; Advocacy Director is Holly Burkhalter; Senior Program Associate is Doug Ford; Director of Communications is Barbara Ayotte; Director of Finance & Administration is Lori Maida; Director of Development is Dena Getzie; Director of Campaigns is Gina Cummings; William Haglund, Ph.D., is Director of the International Forensic Program; Senior Medical Consultant is Vincent Iacopino, M.D., Ph.D.; and the Fireman Health and Human Rights Fellow is Lynn L. Amowitz, M.D., M.S.P.H., M.Sc.

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UNAMSIL

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established by Security Council Resolution 1270 on October 22, 1999 with the broad based mandate of cooperating with the Government of Sierra Leone and other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement and assisting in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the parties in conflict. On February 7, 2000, May 19, 2000 and March 30, 2001 the mandate and size of UNAMSIL were expanded. Its current troop strength exceeds 17,000, making it the United Nations' largest peacekeeping mission.

In pursuit of its mandate, UNAMSIL combines military and civilian personnel. The Human Rights Section is part of the civilian component of the mission and has a threefold approach to its activities. The first is to monitor the compliance by government and all parties to the conflict of human rights and international humanitarian law. Secondly, the Human Rights Section provides technical assistance in building the capacity of national institutions that can promote respect for the rule of law through a sustainable culture of human rights. Thirdly, the Section undertakes and supports human rights and peace awareness programs conducted in national languages as a means of building popular confidence in, and understanding of, the human rights principles and their role in peace-building efforts.

The UNAMSIL Human Rights Section conducts specialist work with national institutions, the internally displaced and children. It also focuses on the rule of law and gender issues. The Human Rights Section currently has 16 international staff members and 4 national staff members deployed in its three offices in Freetown, Kenema and Makeni.

UNAMSIL

Mammy Yoko, Aberdeen

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Foreword

The subject of violence against women in Sierra Leone has until recently been overlooked. I welcome this report by Physicians for Human Rights, with the support of UNAMSIL, which helps to redefine the role that sexual violence played in the conflict. The findings and data are a clear indication of the kinds of depravity that war can bring. I visited Sierra Leone on official mission in August 2001 to study the issue of violence against women committed during the conflict and to identify key measures and initiatives needed to ensure the rights of women in the aftermath of the conflict. In my work as Special Rapporteur on violence against women I have seen that it is often the need to understand clearly the specific nature of gender-based crimes, through research and collection of data, that is required to mobilize civil society, governments and the international community against such abuses. This report comprehensively documents the widespread nature of sexual violence in Sierra Leone during the conflict and is a valuable tool for those who have been fighting for women's human rights to be put on the agenda as a matter of priority.

Furthermore by documenting the wartime experiences of women in Sierra Leone this report will provide a valuable contribution in making the post-conflict needs of women and girls more apparent. Its findings should be taken into consideration in the formulation of repatriation and resettlement plans, as well as demobilization, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction programmes.

I often see many situations involving gender-based violence—similar to the cases so carefully documented in this report—for which perpetrators go unpunished. Internationally there has been progress, at least in the area of legal sanction. Perpetrators of violence against women during wartime are being brought before the courts of justice. Their trial and punishment is a vindication of many years of effort by many groups and individuals who have been trying throughout the years to end the impunity of those who commit the most horrendous acts of brutality. In this regard, I welcome the Foca judgment by The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which sets out in detail, the international law and standards with regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against women and girls. The Tribunal found that these actions constituted rape as a crime against humanity, torture as a war crime and enslavement as a crime against humanity. Their strong judgment is welcome and lays to rest all arguments that rape and sexual slavery during wartime does not constitute international customary law that is in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. The Foca judgement sets a context by which the wealth of information contained in this report should be analyzed.

The International Criminal Court, which was finalized in 1998, is also a major victory for those who have fought to make international justice an important part of modern international law. The Rome Statute makes explicit that rape and gender violence are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community by specifically defining them as constituent acts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. According to the Statute, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence also constitutes a Grave Breach of the Geneva Convention. Similarly, the Statute defines crimes against humanity to include torture, as well as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population. The Statute also provides that persecution on the basis of gender may constitute a crime against humanity.

As a result of this Statute and the decisions of the international tribunals in the Hague and in Arusha, the world is slightly more just for women who have been the victims of sexual violence during wartime. It is my hope that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court in Sierra Leone will follow this example and ensure that cases involving violence against women are prosecuted and the perpetrators brought to justice.

Rarely do human rights organizations undertake and publish such substantial and detailed studies of sexual violence in conflict. It is in this light that this report will help the international community to understand the grave situation in Sierra Leone and the needs of all the conflicts' survivors. I encourage its wide dissemination, as this important and timely report will be of interest to all those who seek to understand or intervene in the rebuilding of Sierra Leone.

Radhika Coomaraswamy

United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its cause and consequences

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Acknowledgements

This report was written by Chen Reis, J.D., M.P.H., a consultant to Physicians for Human Rights (PHR); Lynn L. Amowitz, M.D., M.S.P.H., M.Sc., Fireman Health and Human Rights Fellow, Physicians for Human Rights, and Instructor in Medicine, Division of General Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital and Harvard Medical School; Kristina Hare Lyons, M.A.L.D., Program Associate for Physicians for Human Rights; and Vincent Iacopino, M.D., Ph.D., Senior Medical Consultant to Physicians for Human Rights. Holly Burkhalter, Advocacy Director for PHR contributed to the Executive Summary and Background sections of the report. Michele Heisler, M.D., Robert Wood Johnson Clinical Scholar, University of Michigan Health System, contributed to the chapter on qualitative comments and testimonies of women and girls. Kelly Askin, J.D., Fellow, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, contributed to the chapter on Application of Relevant International Law.

Ahunna Eziakonwas, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, contributed to the recommendations. We are grateful to John Gay for his assistance with the presentation of statistical analysis.

The report is based on two research investigations. The first research trip was undertaken by PHR in March 2000 by Adyinka M. Akinsulure-Smith, Ph.D. and Deborah Dyson-Stockhoff P.A., M.P.S., from the Bellevue-NYU Program for Survivors of Torture, and Ms. Lyons. The second phase of research was undertaken by PHR together with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) between January and February 2001. Ms. Lyons, Ms. Reis, Binta Mansaray, M.A., a consultant to UNAMSIL; Beth Vann, M.S.W., a consultant to PHR; Dr. Akinsulure-Smith; and Louise Taylor, M.B.A., LL.M., UNAMSIL Human Rights Officer, composed the PHR/UNAMSIL team.

PHR especially thanks Maarit Kohonen, former Gender Specialist, UNAMSIL Human Rights Section; Mara Bustelo, Gender Coordinator, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; Rodolfo Mattarollo, Chief of Human Rights Section, UNAMSIL; Patrice Vahard, Human Rights Section, UNAMSIL; Chris Mburu, former Acting Chief of UNAMSIL Human Rights Section, and Michael O'Flaherty, former UNAMSIL Human rights Section staff member, who helped initiate this project. We also are grateful to Memunatu Pratt for her assistance.

The report was reviewed by Ms. Kohonen; Christina Saunders, Assistant to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Violence Against Women; Corinne Dufka, Researcher in Sierra Leone for Human Rights Watch; Ronald Waldman, M.D., M.P.H., Director, Program on Forced Migration and Health, Center for Population and Family Health, the Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia

University, New York, NY; Leonard Rubenstein, J.D., PHR's Executive Director; Susannah Sirkin, PHR's Deputy Director; Barbara Ayotte, PHR's Director of Communications; and Ms. Burkhalter. The authors are indebted to these people for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. Ms. Ayotte and Michelle Sachs, PHR's Internet and Publications Coordinator, edited and prepared this document for production. Christina Deck, an intern at PHR, also assisted with report production.

The authors are grateful to UNAMSIL and the UN agencies in Sierra Leone that provided information and support. The authors are also grateful to the organizations that provided referral services without which this study could not have been done including GOAL, the International Rescue Committee, Médecins sans Frontières-Holland, Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), Concern, Merlin, International Medical Corps (IMC) and Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and to those which otherwise facilitated access to, and collection of information used in this study.

We thank those individuals and organizations working in Sierra Leone who shared their time and insights with our research team including: former United States Ambassador Joseph Melrose, Rabih Torbay of IMC, William Aldis of the World Health Organization (WHO), Glenis Taylor of UNICEF, the Campaign for Good Governance, Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), and The Council of Churches of Sierra Leone (CCSL). PHR is especially grateful to the women of Sierra Leone who participated in this study after years of suffering.

PHR and UNAMSIL thank the team of dedicated researchers: Agnes Conteh, Isatu Fofana, Margaret Ganda, Fatmata Kabba, Joyce Kamara, Adama Koroma, Abigail Lebbie, Doris Lebbie, Erica Luke, Bondu Mani, Salley Mansaray, Laurel Mendenkia, Mary Quashie, Fatmata Salisu, Sia Sandy, Fatmata Sesay, Mariatu Songo-Kanu, Aminata Thorlie, Safiatu Turay, Mary Vandi, and Rose Vincent whose commitment to the project and perseverance under very difficult circumstances made this report possible. The authors also thank Muctar Jalloh.

This report is dedicated to Abigail Lebbie, who passed away in May, 2001. Abigail was a dedicated member of a team of Sierra Leonean field researchers. We wish to express our heartfelt condolence to her family and friends. May her soul rest in peace.

Glossary

- ADRA: Adventist Development and Relief Agency
- AFRC: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (rebel force)
- CDF: Civil Defense Forces (pro-government force)
- CRS: Catholic Relief Services
- DDR: Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
- ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group, a military intervention force with troops donated by ECOWAS members
- ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
- FAWE: Forum for African Women Educationalists
- ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
- IDP: Internally Displaced Person
- IMC: International Medical Corps
- IRC: International Rescue Committee
- Krio: lingua franca of Sierra Leone
- MSF: Médecins sans Frontières
- NCRRR: National Commission for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation
- NGO: Non-governmental organization
- OTI: Office of Transitional Initiatives
- PHR: Physicians for Human Rights
- PHU: Peripheral Health Units
- RUF: Revolutionary United Front (rebel force)
- SLA: Sierra Leonean Army
- TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission
- UN: United Nations
- UNAMSIL: United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
- UNDP: United Nations Development Program
- UNDPKO: United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNOCHA: United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

US: United States

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

WFP: World Food Program

WHO: World Health Organization

SIERRA LEONE



I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose of Study

Sierra Leone's decade-long conflict has been marked by an extraordinary level of brutal human rights abuses, including summary killings, sexual violence against women and girls, abductions, amputations, and the use of child soldiers. The combined effects of prolonged conflict, pervasive human rights abuses, and massive forced migration¹ in one of the poorest countries in the world have devastated the health and well-being of the Sierra Leonean people. The daunting process of rebuilding and reconciliation in the aftermath of such destruction requires the establishment of an accurate account of the nature and extent of abuses that have been committed. For this reason Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), with the support and participation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), conducted a population-based assessment of the prevalence and impact of sexual violence and other human rights abuses among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sierra Leone.

Findings

The findings of this study, the most comprehensive population-based assessment to date of war-related sexual violence and other human rights abuses in Sierra Leone, indicate that combatants have committed widespread human rights abuses and international crimes against IDPs in Sierra Leone including: abductions, beatings, killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, capturing for less than 24 hours, torture, forced labor, gunshot wounds, serious injuries, and amputations. Such quantitative findings contribute considerable insight into the nature and extent of human rights abuses among IDPs in Sierra Leone, i.e., the frequency of specific human rights abuses, the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the impact of these experiences and the most urgent needs identified by the victims. Furthermore, a rigorous approach to sampling enables the findings to be generalized to the larger IDP population. In order to gain insight into individual experiences of human rights abuses of Sierra Leonean women and their families, the PHR study included qualitative assessments of abuses as well.

¹ Approximately 400,000 people have fled Sierra Leone into neighboring Guinea and Liberia as refugees. At the time of this study, there were 334,061 registered and approximately 500,000 to 1 million unregistered internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sierra Leone.

A striking 94% of 991 households randomly surveyed reported among its members at least one of these serious abuses during the past ten years of conflict. The majority of abuses reported by participants in the PHR study occurred between 1997 and 1999 and, when known, were attributed primarily to forces from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The study's primary focus on abuses of women and girls stems from the historical neglect of these sexual crimes committed against women from previous reports of human rights abuses in Sierra Leone.

The PHR study indicates that war-related sexual violence experiences perpetrated by armed combatants (primarily RUF) are, indeed, widespread among IDPs in Sierra Leone. Approximately one of every eight household members (13%) reported one or more incidents of war-related sexual violence. Nine percent (94/991) of respondents reported war-related sexual violence.^{2,3} A striking 53% of respondents reporting "face to face" contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence, compared to less than 6% for any other combatant group.⁴ One third of the women who reported sexual violence reported being gang raped.

Participants reporting sexual violence related the following: rape (89%), being forced to undress/stripped of clothing (37%), gang rape (33%), abduction (33%), molestation (14%), sexual slavery (15%), forced marriage (9%), and insertion of foreign objects into the genital opening or anus (4%). In addition, 22 (23%) of the women who experienced sexual violence reported being pregnant at the time of the attack with an average gestation of three months. The majority of the incidents of sexual violence reported by participants (68%) occurred between 1997 and 1999.


This prevalence rate of war-related sexual violence (8%-9%) during only a ten-year period is equivalent to the lifetime prevalence of non war-

² It is likely that the prevalence of war-related sexual violence in the study was underestimated because of willful non-disclosure of sexual violence and the lack of privacy in some of the interviews, despite efforts to ensure privacy. According to Koss (Koss M.P., "Detecting the scope of rape: a review of prevalence research methods," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 1993(8);198-222) reasons for willful non-disclosure often include fear of retribution by an assailant, being stigmatized and rejected, being blamed for the attack, and/or the psychological consequences of disclosure.

³ In addition, the average age of participants reporting war-related sexual violence was more than twice the average age of non war-related sexual violence reported in the study. Although interviewers were careful to explain that there would be no material or other gain by participating in the survey, the number of abuses reported in the study may have been overestimated or underestimated if IDPs judged that it was in their material, political or psychological interest to exaggerate or conceal claims of abuse.

⁴ Other perpetrators reported included Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), West Side Boys, unspecified "rebels", and Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) and ex-SLA. The UN peacekeepers and Civil Defense Forces (CDF) militia forces were not identified as perpetrators among respondents reporting sexual violence.

FIGURE 1:
Extrapolation of Human Rights Abuses Among All IDPs in Sierra Leone



* Extrapolations are based on frequencies reported by 9,166 household members (Table 2); sexual assault is among female respondents only. For 95% confidence intervals, please see page 45, footnote 165.

related sexual violence (9%) among the study participants.

By extrapolating the number of war-related sexual violence incidents reported by participants in the PHR sample to the total female IDP population in Sierra Leone, PHR estimates that approximately 50,000 to 64,000 Sierra Leonean IDP women may have suffered such human rights abuses. If non-war-related sexual violence among non-IDP females is added to the IDP totals (assuming a 9% prevalence rate), as many as

215,000-257,000 women and girls in Sierra Leone currently may have been affected by sexual violence.⁵

Today, in the context of war, rape and other forms of sexual violence are considered war crimes⁶ and can be prosecuted as such.⁷ They also constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic⁸ attack against the civilian population.⁹ This population-based assessment demonstrates that war-related sexual violence and other human rights abuses were indeed perpetrated as a widespread attack against the civilian population, and therefore constitute both war crimes and crimes against humanity.¹⁰ A Special Court has been proposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1315 to prosecute those “bearing the greatest responsibility” for violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra Leone’s conflict.¹¹ A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is being created to provide an impartial historical record of the war and to foster reconciliation.¹²

Methods of Investigation

Quantitative

PHR sampled 1,048 households in three IDP camps (near Freetown, Port Loko, and Kenema) and one community with a large number of IDPs,

⁵ To generate population estimates of sexual violence among the IDP and non-IDP females in Sierra Leone, PHR assumed a total IDP population of 1.0-1.3 million (55% female) and a non-IDP population of 2.7-3.0 million (50% female). UNOCHA database. Sierra Leone: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Updated February, 2001; Norwegian Refugee Council, Sierra Leone Section, “Population profile and figures”. Available at: www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/1c963eb504904cde41256782007493b8/fdc6d215bab90118c12569dd002b1aec?OpenDocument; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Available at: [unhcr.ch/un & ref/numbers/numb2000.pdf](http://unhcr.ch/un%20ref/numbers/numb2000.pdf)

⁶ Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1 “FOCA” Available at: www.un.org/ICTY/judgement.htm

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ See Chapter V for a discussion.

⁹ Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 5, Crimes against Humanity. Available at www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm#5.

¹⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), adopted 7/17/98. Available at: untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm; Askin K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*, M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1997. Askin K. “Women and International Humanitarian Law,” in Askin K.D, Koenig D.M., Editors, *Women and International Human Rights Law*, Transnational, 1999. Vol. I. Also see: United Nations, Draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S/2000/915. Available at www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf.

¹¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 (Adopted August 14, 2000). Available at: www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1315e.pdf

¹² For more information see www.sierra-leone.org/trc.html

Mile 91 Township. The camps/locales included in this study represented 91% of the registered IDP population in Sierra Leone. All study participants were selected using systematic random sampling or a combination of systematic random sampling and cluster sampling.¹³ A total of 991 female heads of household participated in the study (response rate = 95%). The 991 household representatives reported on the experiences of 9,166 household members, which included themselves and those who lived with them prior to their displacement. The PHR survey contained 49 questions pertaining to demographics, physical and mental health perception, experiences of human rights abuses among household members and experiences of sexual violence. It also inquired about assistance needs, opinions regarding punishment and justice for perpetrators, and attitudes on women's human rights and roles in society.

Qualitative

In order to gain additional insight into individual experiences of human rights abuses of Sierra Leonean women and their families, the PHR study included qualitative assessments of abuses as well. Two primary approaches were used to elicit qualitative information. Seven open-ended questions were included in the questionnaire itself, and longer semi-structured interviews were conducted with survivors of human rights abuses, some who were not survey participants.

Individual case testimonies provided considerable insight into the brutality of the human rights abuses reported, including sexual violence, in the PHR survey. Katmara B, a 13-year-old girl, reported being abducted, beaten, raped and forced to become a rebel's "wife." She was released during the latter stages of her pregnancy and now has a baby girl. The story of what happened to her and her family during the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999 captures the anarchy of those days which left the people of Sierra Leone's capital city terrified:

...So, on our way to be killed, we were taken to a house with about 200 people held in it. My older cousin was sent to go and select 25 men and 25 women to have their hands chopped off. Then she was told to cut off the first man's hand. She refused to do it saying that she was afraid, I was then told to do it. I said I'd never done such a thing before and that I was also afraid. We were told to sit on the side and watch. So we sat. They chopped off two men's hands. My cousin couldn't watch and bowed her head down to avoid the sight. Because she did that, they shot her in the foot. They bandaged her foot and then forced her to walk. We left the two men whose hands had been cut off behind. We were then taken to a mosque in Kissy. They killed everyone in there...They were

¹³ See Patton M.Q., *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, Sage Publications, 1990; 169-283.

snatching babies and infants from their mother's arms and tossing them in the air. The babies would free fall to their deaths. At other times they would also chop them from the back of their heads to kill them, you know, like you do when you slaughter chickens... One girl with us tried to escape. They made her take off her slippers and give them to me and then killed her... one time we came across two pregnant women. They tied the women down with their legs eagle-spread and took a sharpened stick and jabbed them inside their wombs until the babies came out on the stick.

Several women who had not suffered sexual violence spoke of the range of abuses they and their families had experienced and the multiple losses they faced. A young woman, Marie K., described her and her family's experience:

...They killed many of us, many people... about 100, we were in an unfinished house when they came and kicked at the doors and demanded to know who was in there. They yelled that if we didn't come out they would kill us or burn the house down. Someone near the door opened it. The rest of us were hiding in a room, huddled together. They came in and began to hit us with their weapons yelling "get out, if you don't come out we will kill you." Those who refused to come out, they lit the house up and burned it with them inside the house...

Some of the women who reported experiencing sexual violence provided the PHR/UNAMSIL team with information that suggests that the incidents of sexual violence were politically motivated. One woman told PHR that her attackers told her "to come and report or tell [president] Tejan Kabbah that they will continue to do such things." Another told PHR that her attacker asked her "whom are you going to vote for?"

Sexual Violence

Given the prevalence of sexual violence reported in the PHR study, it is not surprising that the vast majority (91%) of respondents reported being "quite a bit" or "extremely" worried about sexual violence to themselves or family members by combatants. They were much less worried about sexual violence by family members, friends, or civilian strangers despite 9% of respondents reporting sexual abuse by family members, friends, or civilian strangers in their lifetime.

In February 2001, PHR interviewed a fifteen-year-old girl, Bola N. Rebels had abducted her four times since 1999. At the time of the interview she was two months pregnant and living at an IDP camp in Port Loko. She described her first abduction to the interviewer:

When they first attacked the village, we fled to the bushes. When they removed us from our village we were frightened... They held us, they cut

some hands. They killed some. They forced us to be tied. We were taken to the bush where the sexual act was forced on us...Nine men raped me...My mother was taken away, my things, belongings, taken. I slept three days in the bush after they had raped me. I was unconscious, not myself...After they had raped me to their satisfaction; they left me in the bush. I was beaten, bruises on my body, part of my body. Some around were amputated. I was not well.

Isata, a 15-year-old girl, was abducted and gang raped by rebels. She described her experiences and their continuing effects on her health:

...I don't have any children. I was a virgin before. They ruined me. The story is long, much too long. I was at home when they came and kidnapped me...They demanded money. My family has no money. They demanded Le 200,000.00 (\$83.00)...they said to my parents, come and see how we use your children. They undressed five of us, laid us down, used us in front of my family and took us away with them. They wouldn't release us, they kept us with them in the bush...When I escaped, I couldn't walk – the pain. I was bleeding from my vagina. That night, God gave me strength to walk...I can't remember how long I was held...I don't like to talk because of the memories. When I made it back, my mother couldn't believe it. Since I got back I have been so sick...I never used to get sick like this...I would like to go back to school, but I can't concentrate anymore, I can't do anything...

Characteristics of Assistance Needs among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Sixty-five percent of respondents said that they had reported the incident(s) of sexual violence to another person. The most common reasons for not reporting these incidents were feelings of shame or social stigma, fear of being stigmatized/rejected, and not having trust in anyone. Only 53% of women reported seeking help after the attack, although 80% of these women reported that they informed a health care provider of the specifics of the attack. Women reported that what helped most after the attack was trying to forget about the incident, support of family, a medical provider, and country medicine/traditional healer.

A number of testimonies collected by PHR in March 2000 were from survivors of rape who reported becoming pregnant by their attackers. Many of these young women are particularly vulnerable as they must not only recover from the trauma of their ordeals while often facing stigma from their communities, but at the same time learn to care for and support a baby with few resources.

The majority of women who responded to the two questions about their biggest worries about the future in general and about their health referred to the financial and personal insecurity they faced as a result of the war. Women expressed fear that the war would not end and that they would experience future attacks and abuse. They spoke of their lack of livelihoods, homes, and husbands to provide for them. A number of women expressed fear about how they would provide for themselves or for their children, including offspring from their rapes:

Presently my husband is no more. Who will take care of me in the future? They have looted my properties and I do not have anything for now.

I am homeless, bankrupt, and where can I get help to take care of my unborn child?

In their responses about overall worries about the future, some respondents linked their fears about their vulnerability as “violated” women without a male partner or family with concern about their health:

There will be no better future for me because I am broken. No man will marry me or take me seriously. I don't want to become sick, to get what they call AIDS. People will begin to say a lot about me if they know what happened to me.

The concern about having contracted a sexually transmitted disease or AIDS was a prominent concern expressed by several participants in response to the question about specific health worries. Women described experiencing diffuse abdominal and pelvic pains and expressed worry that these represented sexually transmitted diseases. Yet, they were afraid of the stigma associated with seeking help for rape-related health problems:

I don't want to have AIDS. I am afraid to go to the hospital. I don't want people to know if it is true that I have AIDS. I don't know whether I have AIDS or not.

Beliefs about Justice among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Of the respondents who indicated whether their perpetrator should be punished, 42% thought their perpetrators should be punished. The most common reasons cited for not punishing a perpetrator were, “in the spirit of reconciliation”, fear of reprisal, no confidence in the system for such punishments, or they wanted to forget about the incident.

Thirty-six percent of all respondents reporting sexual violence believed their attacker's commander was aware of the attack. Only 35% of women

believed that punishment of perpetrators would prevent sexual violence from happening to others. Twenty-two of the 94 women reporting sexual violence to PHR (23%) were willing to give their names to the proposed Special Court and/or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Given the prevalence of war related sexual violence as reported to the PHR/UNAM-SIL team, the team believes that there may be thousands of female IDPs in Sierra Leone who have experienced sexual violence and who may be willing to provide testimony to the Special Court or the TRC.

Mary J., 16 years old at the time of the interview, explained her reasoning for why she would not seek punishment for her persecutors:

... If they catch them and try to do to them what they did to me, it won't even come near the hell I've been through. So they should just leave them. If they try to punish them, the punishment that I have gotten is more than theirs. I wanted to die during that time. If the emergency operation had not been performed, I would have died... If I ask for punishment for them, it will never amount to what I went through, so the best thing is just to leave them so that we can have peace in Sierra Leone.

Madina K., a young woman, described her reactions to her experience and expressed a desire for the punishment of only one of those involved in her attack:

... They'd wanted to burn the house down with me in it... I was beaten, raped, forced to go with them. They told me to do bad things, they threatened me with death and beat me. Two men raped me. The first one would go and call other men to come and join in. Others intervened and saved me... I don't want revenge. I don't even remember who they were. The only one I want punished is the one who kidnapped me. I want him to be punished for his wickedness...

Attitudes on Women's Human Rights and Women's Roles in Society

Despite 80% of women expressing that there should be legal protection for the rights of women, more than half of women reported that their husbands had the right to beat them and that it was a wife's duty to have sex with her husband even if she did not want to. The apparent disparity between such beliefs and international principles of human rights suggests a need for public discourse and education on local, regional and international levels.

Recommendations

To the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)¹⁴

- The RUF should immediately release all remaining abductees and child soldiers under its control.
- The RUF command must explicitly prohibit violence against civilians including women and must hold RUF members who commit abuses accountable in a manner that is in keeping with international standards. The RUF should cooperate fully and not interfere with investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed during the conflict.
- The RUF must cooperate fully with demobilization of soldiers, accelerate efforts to collect and relinquish weapons, and allow UN forces full access to the country.

To the Government of Sierra Leone

- The Government of Sierra Leone, with the assistance of the international community, should ensure:
 - that military commanders are held accountable for violations committed by their subordinates,
 - that violations by members of the armed forces and militias will be promptly and fully investigated and those responsible brought to justice,
 - that all members of its armed forces and civilian militias be trained in humanitarian law,
 - that instruction in the rights of civilians – and in particular women’s rights – be an integral part of this training.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should strengthen the capacity of its police force and judicial system adequately to address cases of sexual violence including rape. Efforts should include the recruitment of female police officers, training in appropriate means of obtaining evidence, development of procedures that protect the rights and privacy of victims, protection for victims and witnesses, development of forensic capacity, and social services. Police training must include training in women’s rights.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should work with professional organizations and international experts to establish gender-based violence

¹⁴ These recommendations are specifically addressed to the RUF as the main armed opposition group and the primary perpetrator of human rights abuses documented in this report. These recommendations, however, should be implemented by all parties to the conflict.

reporting procedures that are effective, sensitive, and that protect victims. Strict and consistent policies of confidentiality should be developed for all groups working with survivors of sexual violence so that the privacy of those who report or testify is fully protected.

- The National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration must emphasize the protection of women's rights as an integral part of the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) effort for ex-combatants, including child soldiers.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should engage in large scale public education, in collaboration with women's groups to educate women, men and youth on issues relating to sexual violence and to women's rights. This includes the promulgation of information through radio.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should ensure that human rights education including women's rights, be made an integral part of training of health, legal, education, and law enforcement professionals.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should work to increase the number of female clinicians/ health care workers and to increase the number of health care workers trained in women's health. The Government of Sierra Leone should support medical and educational institutions to increase the number of women professionals, including the establishment of dedicated scholarship programs to encourage women to enter these professions.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should work to address the needs of survivors of gender-based violence, including provision of health services, referral and transport assistance; counseling; and education or job/skills training. These services must be extended throughout the country. The physical, emotional and economic well-being of children born as a result of rapes should also be protected – and efforts made to encourage community acceptance of both rape survivors and their children as they reintegrate into society.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should ensure that efforts are made to coordinate the various actors providing treatment to those who have suffered sexual violence, and efforts to protect women and girls in the future in order to improve services and use scarce resources more effectively.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should work with civil society to educate Sierra Leoneans about HIV/AIDS. They should integrate HIV/AIDS prevention messages into formal education curricula and public education and social marketing campaigns. Approaches must be developed for the majority of the population that is illiterate. They should integrate education about HIV/AIDS prevention into the DDR process.

- The Government of Sierra Leone must formulate and begin to execute a national strategy to address HIV/AIDS to facilitate treatment and prevention, and to encourage donor funding to support those efforts.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should assure confidentiality of HIV test results and seek international assistance to conduct a national HIV prevalence survey. Epidemiological data should be disaggregated by gender and other factors for more targeted interventions.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should develop and implement sex education, including sexual violence education, curricula in schools and public campaigns for those not in school.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should institute legal reform to eliminate discriminatory practices in inheritance that contribute to the lack of security and severely limit the choices of women.

To the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Health

- The Ministry of Health should ensure that medical services are sufficiently organized to collect and safeguard evidence that could be useful in holding alleged rapists accountable and establish systems of record keeping throughout the country for epidemiological, human rights and other purposes, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice.
- The Ministry of Health should train health care workers in the diagnosis and management of sexually transmitted diseases, and ensure that appropriate medications, such as broad-spectrum antibiotics are available to combat resistant strains.

To the United States Government and other Bilateral Donors

General Funding

- The US Government and other donors should accelerate provision of funds to meet the needs of victims of sexual violence, including rape, in Sierra Leone. In particular, the needs of the displaced and those newly returning to their communities in under-served areas should be prioritized. Assistance should be given to locally run programs such as FAWE that address the needs of survivors of sexual violence such as shelter, mental and physical health, and job skills training so that they can serve a larger number of people.
- The US Government should fully meet its obligation to fund UNAMSIL.
- The US and other Governments should fully fund the 2002 Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Sierra Leone, with particular attention to those programs focusing on the needs of women and girls.

- The US Government and other donors should fund the World Bank trust fund for the DDR effort so that the reintegration portion of the plan can be carried out and former combatants who are not imprisoned can be reintegrated in such a way that they will be less likely to commit human rights abuses in the future, including sexual violence, or to re-arm.

Humanitarian/Medical Assistance

- The US Government and other donors should fund HIV/AIDS education, prevention and treatment programs - specifically those that target high-risk populations and provide HIV test kits and anti-retroviral drugs at a low cost.
- The US Government and other donors should support improved medical facilities, equipment, medical supplies, and training, including health center and health post training and human rights and universal precautions training. Programs for community-based social service providers should be supported.
- The US Government and other donors should provide appropriate diagnostic, therapeutic and prevention measures to combat sexually transmitted diseases – and support more widespread and comprehensive reproductive health services including the provision of adequate supplies of male and female condoms.
- The US Government and other donors should provide extensive reconstruction assistance now that IDPs and returnees are returning to their home communities. Particular attention must be paid to the shelter needs of single women and widows.

Justice and Law Enforcement

- The US Government and other donors must adequately fund both the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
- The US Government and other donors should support the establishment and strengthening of national institutions and mechanisms in Sierra Leone in order to improve the capacity of the judiciary, police, armed forces and other relevant government institutions to respond adequately to the problem of sexual violence in the country.

Humanitarian Assistance Programs for Women

- The international community should establish a coordinating body for treatment protection and data collection related to sexual violence.

- The US Government and other donors should fund Sierra Leonean civil society organizations promoting women's rights, health and education.
- The US Government and other donors should support effective and culturally appropriate psychosocial programs for those who suffered sexual violence and other human rights abuses.

Women's Human Rights

- The US Government should ensure that women are included in all aspects of planning for peace, demobilization, reintegration and rebuilding and support local organizations working to promote women's full participation and rights

To the United Nations

- The UN should continue to deploy peacekeepers in all areas of Sierra Leone and actively protect civilians, including women and girls, from sexual violence
- The UN should work with the Government of Sierra Leone to incorporate education about sexual violence into all aspects of demobilization and re-training of professionals including those in the military and police, health and legal professions and educators.
- The UN should ensure that rape and other forms of gender-based violence are prioritized as crimes by the Special Court and that perpetrators from all sides are held accountable.
- The UN should ensure that safeguards are in place to protect those who come forward to testify – especially women. The UN should educate and inform people throughout Sierra Leone about the Special Court and TRC, and ensure that all those who want to provide information or testify have an opportunity to do so.
- The UN should work with the Government of Sierra Leone to train all Special Court and TRC staff who will be working with victims. Learning from experiences with other international tribunals, the UN should establish sensitive procedures that protect victims and do not further traumatize survivors of gender-based violence and other abuses. This should include the provision of counseling before and after testifying in the first language of the victim and the protection of the victim or witness upon return to her/his community.
- The UN, with the Government of Sierra Leone, should ensure that women are represented at every level of the Court and TRC.

II. BACKGROUND

Population and Geography

Sierra Leone, named by the Portuguese for the resemblance of its peninsula mountains to a crouching lion,¹⁵ borders Liberia to the southeast, the Republic of Guinea to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the West. It is about 71,700 sq. km in size¹⁶ and has a population of approximately 5 million.¹⁷ The year consists of two main seasons; the wet season lasts from May to October and the climate during the rest of the year is dry.¹⁸

The largest of the indigenous ethnic groups in Sierra Leone are the Mende, Temne (each about 30%), and Limba (under 10 %).¹⁹ Most of the population is Muslim, though there is a significant Christian population and followers of indigenous religions. English is the country's official language, however, the population primarily uses Krio, Mende and Temne.²⁰

Historical Overview

Sierra Leone gained independence from England in 1961. From that time it was ruled by a series of governments most of which were plagued by corruption. Its first Prime Minister, Milton Margai, ruled until his death in 1964. At that time his brother Albert Margai became the Prime Minister. Albert Margai's rule was marked by authoritarian efforts to consolidate power and remove opposition.²¹

Albert Margai and his Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) were challenged during the 1967 elections by Siaka Stevens and his All People's Congress (APC) Party. On March 21, the Governor General of Sierra Leone declared Stevens winner of the contested elections.²² Before Stevens could

¹⁵ Alie, J.A.D., *A New History of Sierra Leone*, St. Martin's Press, 1990; p 4.

¹⁶ Central Statistics Office, "Sierra Leone in Figures" (1997) Available at: www.sierra-leone.org/cso.html#Natural Resources

¹⁷ UNICEF, "Statistical Data: Sierra Leone," available at: www.unicef.org/statis/Country_1Page154.html

¹⁸ Conteh-Morgan, E & Dixon-Fyle, M., *Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century: History, Politics, and Society*, Peter Lang, 1999; p.11.

¹⁹ Africaville.com, "Sierra Leone Profile," available at www.africaville.com/seraleon1.html

²⁰ Kaplan, I, Dobert, M, McLaughlin, J.L., Marvin, B. J., & Whitaker, D P. *Area Handbook for Sierra Leone*, 1976; p. vii.

²¹ Conteh-Morgan p. 77

take office, however, a series of military coups and counter coups established a military government named the National Reformation Council (NRC) headed by Brigadier Andrew Juxon-Smith.²³ Another coup in 1968 brought Stevens back from exile and restored a civilian government.

For the next 17 years, Stevens ruled Sierra Leone. In 1968, Stevens established a one-party state.²⁴ Under his rule, the economy declined due to alleged mismanagement and corruption. By the start of the 1980s, Sierra Leone was increasingly dependent on international assistance – specifically International Monetary Fund loans.²⁵ Virtual insolvency, high inflation, shortages of power and food, mounting deficits, declining exports, corruption, and high unemployment particularly among youth became increasingly severe problems.²⁶ In 1985, Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh, then head of the military, took over leadership of the APC and the presidency of the country in a peaceful hand-over. Although Momoh promised economic reform and an end to corruption,²⁷ his seven years in power were marked by increased deprivation and economic collapse. In 1987 a coup attempt against Momoh took place – believed to have been sparked in part by Momoh’s anti-corruption efforts.²⁸ Although it failed, the coup marked a return to the status quo and the start of Momoh’s downfall.²⁹

In 1990, Momoh instituted reforms including the drafting of a new constitution. Before multiparty elections could be held, however, an April 1992 military coup headed by young officers overthrew Momoh’s government. The young coup leaders, many in their twenties, formed a new ruling body, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) headed by Captain Valentine Strasser.

During this time, the ongoing conflict in neighboring Liberia played a part in the development of a new threat to stability in Sierra Leone.³⁰ In March 1991, a group calling itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began a rebellion against the Freetown Government. The small band of insurgents consisted primarily of disaffected youth from the criminal cultures spawned in the urban ghettos of Freetown and the mining regions,

²² Ibid p. 80

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid p. 81

²⁵ Conteh-Morgan p.87

²⁶ Pratt, D. “Sierra Leone: Danger and Opportunity in a Regional Conflict: Report to Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honorable John Manley, P.C., M.P.” July 27, 2001;p.37 available at: www.davidpratt.ca/sleone_e.htm

²⁷ Conteh-Morgan p.122

²⁸ Ibid p. 125

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid p. 127

though a number of university students who had been radicalized by conditions in Sierra Leone and inspired by the revolutionary teachings expressed in Muammar al-Qaddafi's Green Book³¹ also participated. They were led by Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal and photographer who had received military training in Libyan camps.³² From their base in a part of Liberia controlled by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the RUF attacked the southeastern region of the country. The NPFL's support for the RUF may have been in response to Sierra Leone's participation in ECOMOG, the West African Regional Peacekeeping Force, which was using Freetown as a staging ground for operations against Taylor in Liberia.³³ Marked by their brutality against civilians and the abduction and forced conscription of children, the RUF raids caused rapid flight by much of the population in the region. In a matter of weeks after the first incursions, the RUF controlled much of Kailahun District in the East³⁴. This period was marked by confusion and brutality as rebels committed attacks while dressed in army uniforms and as disaffected members of the armed forces carried out attacks against civilians, which they blamed on rebels. These soldiers by day, rebels by night became known as "Sobels."³⁵ By late 1992, local militias known as the Civil Defense Force (CDF) or Kamajor (Mende for hunter) sprang up to defend areas against the RUF and the "sobels." Within a year and a half of the first attacks in Sierra Leone, international agencies estimated that at least 400,000 people were displaced within Sierra Leone. Sierra Leonean refugees in neighboring Guinea and Liberia numbered in the hundreds of thousands by the summer of 1992.³⁶

In 1995, with the RUF not far from Freetown, Strasser turned to the South African mercenary (security) firm Executive Outcomes for assistance in pushing the RUF back from their positions.³⁷ Executive Outcomes succeeded in forcing the retreat of the RUF from the Freetown area but were not able to uproot the RUF from their headquarters in Kailahun.³⁸

By 1996, civil society and the donor community placed great public pressure upon the government to hold democratic elections and return the country to civilian rule. Women's groups were especially instrumental in

³¹ Pratt, *Sierra Leone: Danger and Opportunity*. p.38. The Green Book is Qaddafi's two volume treatise on Islamic socialism published between 1976-1980. See www.encyclopedia.com/articles/10672.html

³² Ibid p.38

³³ Ibid p.38

³⁴ Ibid p.38.

³⁵ Conteh-Morgan p.135

³⁶ Conteh-Morgan pp.128-9

³⁷ Hirsch, J. L., *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*, (International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series), Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001; p.38

³⁸ Ibid p.39

this campaign.³⁹ In spite of a coup in January in which Strasser was overthrown by his deputy Julius Bio,⁴⁰ popular pressure intensified and democratic elections were held as scheduled in February and March, 1996.⁴¹

In the weeks leading up to the elections, RUF attacks on civilians in areas under RUF control became more violent. The RUF hacked off the limbs and other body parts of men, women and children. The RUF particularly employed the amputation of hands or arms as a method of attempting to discourage others from voting in the elections.⁴² Despite this, the voter turnout was large and the winner of these elections was Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, a former United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) official.⁴³

At the time of the elections, peace talks began between the RUF and the short-lived Bio Government. The Abidjan talks continued after Kabbah took power as did attacks by the RUF and counter attacks by Kamajors and Executive Outcomes.⁴⁴ The Abidjan peace agreement was signed by the RUF and the Government in November of 1996. Shortly thereafter Executive Outcomes was dismissed from the country as required by the agreement.⁴⁵

In May 1997, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) overthrew Kabbah and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) regime under Major Johnny Paul Koroma.⁴⁶ The AFRC invited the RUF to join in ruling the country. This period was marked by lawlessness, rampant destruction and looting of property, and specific targeting of Kabbah allies.⁴⁷ An estimated 200,000 Sierra Leoneans fled the country in the weeks following the coup. Many of these ended up in refugee camps on the Guinea-Sierra Leone border.⁴⁸ In October 1997, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1132 which imposed sanctions on the AFRC junta and prohibited the importation of military equipment and petroleum into Sierra Leone. The resolution also placed travel restrictions on AFRC officials and their families.⁴⁹

³⁹ Ibid p.40

⁴⁰ Ibid p.42

⁴¹ See www.Sierra-Leone.org/govt8.html

⁴² Hirsch, John L., *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* p.45

⁴³ Ibid p.57

⁴⁴ Pratt p.40

⁴⁵ Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Article 12; Available at: www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html

⁴⁶ Pratt, p.40

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Hirsch, J. L., *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* (International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series), Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001; pp.59-60

In February 1998, following months of increased CDF and ECOMOG activity against the AFRC/RUF, ECOMOG forces removed the AFRC/ RUF from Freetown in fierce fighting. Many civilians were injured and killed in battles throughout the city. Kabbah was restored to power and returned to Freetown in March from exile in Guinea. The RUF continued to brutally attack civilians and, together with elements of the SLA, to fight the Freetown government, a policy dubbed by the RUF, "Operation No Living Thing."⁵⁰ By the end of December the rebels were again near Freetown and foreigners began to leave the capital.⁵¹ On January 6, 1999, the RUF and AFRC forces entered the Eastern part of Freetown and unleashed an unprecedented wave of terror upon the population – killing, amputating and raping civilians and setting fire to buildings and vehicles. They were eventually pushed back by ECOMOG. During the invasion and their subsequent withdrawal following the ECOMOG intervention, the rebels committed egregious human rights abuses against the civilian population, killing at least 5,000 civilians, including members of the government and journalists who were singled out, and abducting an estimated 3,000 children.⁵²

The Role of Diamonds in the Conflict

Sierra Leone's rich diamond resources have largely been fueling the brutal war. Diamonds, primarily alluvial deposits, discovered in 1930, are found in about a third of the country's territory – mostly in the east and south-east.⁵³ For more than half a century, diamonds have been the leading source of foreign exchange, accounting for between 80% and 90% of export earnings in recent years.⁵⁴ Official exports, however, for 1999 as reported by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) totaled only \$1.5 million, though diamond exports for the first half of 2000 were valued at \$3.45 million.⁵⁵

The Lome Peace Agreement

The attack on Freetown accelerated local and international desire for peace. A cease-fire was brokered by May of 1999 which set the stage for peace negotiations held in Lome, Togo which led to the signing of the

⁴⁹ www.un.org/Docs/scres/1997/9726713E.htm

⁵⁰ Pratt, p.41

⁵¹ Hirsch, p.71

⁵² Pratt, p.41

⁵³ Pratt, p.36

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Cook, N., *Diamonds and Conflict: Policy Proposals and Background*, Congressional Research Service, November, 2000; p.22.

Lome Peace Agreement in July 1999. The resulting controversial power-sharing agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF granted amnesty to all combatants and was widely condemned by human rights organizations.⁵⁶ The UN ultimately added a hand-written caveat to the agreement that stipulated that the amnesty did not apply to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.⁵⁷ The UN subsequently established a UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) in Sierra Leone with 6,000 troops in October 1999. At the time of this writing, UNAMSIL has grown to be the world's largest peacekeeping force with 16,000 troops.⁵⁸

Despite the signing of the accord and the deployment of UN troops, the AFRC/RUF continued its campaign of terror – abducting, raping, killing, mutilating and destroying the property of civilians in areas under and some outside AFRC/RUF control.⁵⁹ In April and May 2000, more than 500 UN personnel were attacked and held hostage by the RUF. Though several peacekeepers were killed by the RUF, the rest were released in June, following the intervention of Charles Taylor, the announcement of a British government plan for military assistance to the Sierra Leone Government, and the arrest of Foday Sankoh after some protesters were killed by his security guards outside his home in Freetown. Sankoh remains in government custody and is awaiting trial.⁶⁰

In August 2000, upon the request of President Kabbah, the UN Security Council voted to establish a Special Court for Sierra Leone to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of humanitarian law committed after the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement on November 30, 1996.⁶¹ Other members of the warring parties will be expected to participate in the planned Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).⁶²

From September 2000 to March 2001 the RUF engaged in cross-border attacks into Guinea, causing widespread panic and considerable civilian casualties. The Guinean government retaliated, often indiscriminately attacking villages in Sierra Leone. The fighting caused panic among the

⁵⁶ Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 7 July 1999; Available at www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html.

⁵⁷ Pratt p. 42. Conversation with Corinne Dufka, Sierra Leone Researcher, Human Rights Watch.

⁵⁸ Pratt, p.10

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone*, July 1999, Vol. II. No. 31 (A). Available at: www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/; Human Rights Watch, *Fresh Reports of RUF Terror Tactics*, May 26, 2000; Amnesty International, Sierra Leone. *Rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls*, June 29, 2000; p. 2.

⁶⁰ Pratt p.42.

⁶¹ Pratt, p. 28.

⁶² See Chapter V.

400,000 refugees largely living in camps near the border, prompting tens of thousands to flee back into Sierra Leone. While fighting continued in Guinea in 2001, the RUF had largely been observing a cease-fire since November 2000 and in May 2001 an agreement to cease hostilities was signed between the RUF and CDF. Though isolated acts of violence against civilians by both sides have been documented as recently as July 2001, at the time of this writing, UN troops were deployed in much of the country and the disarmament of RUF and CDF fighters had resumed. On September 17, 2001, UNAMSIL peacekeepers deployed to the diamond rich region of Tongo, opening the area to humanitarian assistance.⁶³ The following day, the UN Security Council extended UNAMSIL's mandate until March 31, 2002.⁶⁴

In 2000, the UN Security Council enacted sanctions against the conflict diamond trade, barring the import of Sierra Leonean diamonds into UN member states for 18 months, except those certified by a newly established Government of Sierra Leone system.⁶⁵ The US, UK, Belgium and Israel assisted the Government of Sierra Leone in developing a new and more effective diamond trade policy with the aim that diamonds can once again promote prosperity rather than violence in the country.

Of even greater importance in terms of immediate impact on the ground is that on May 7, 2001, the UN Security Council voted to enact sanctions against Liberia, which included both a ban on travel by government officials and on the importation of diamonds from Liberia. Until these sanctions were enacted Liberia had been exporting many more times its annual mining capacity in what is believed to have been stones of Sierra Leonean, Angolan and Congolese origin. Both Liberia and Burkina Faso were implicated in transferring arms and ammunition through their territories and trading diamonds from rebel-held areas, according to a report by a UN Panel of Experts published in December 2000.⁶⁶ As part of the continuing diplomatic pressure particularly on Liberia for its role in the Sierra Leone conflict, approximately \$50 million in aid from the European Union was suspended.

Through the work of several non-profit organizations, namely Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness, the role of diamonds in supporting conflict and the complicity of national leaders such as Liberia's Charles Taylor have been revealed to the world, forcing a multi-sectoral response.

⁶³ USAID, BHR, OFDA, *Humanitarian Situation Report #1* (FY 2002), October 3, 2001.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ A diamond certification system was established in Sierra Leone in October, 2000 and the UN Security Council removed sanctions on government certified diamonds. (AI 9/7/01)

⁶⁶ Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 9, in relation to Sierra Leone. Available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/1195.pdf

Industry leaders, importing and exporting countries, NGOs and UN agencies are now working together to create a global system of controls⁶⁷ which would require the registration, identification and monitoring of international shipments in order to shut illicit diamonds out of the market place and cut off revenues to insurgents.⁶⁸ In late 2001, The Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds,⁶⁹ an umbrella organization of groups concerned about the issue, co-chaired by PHR, worked closely with the US Congress to pass legislation in the House of Representatives that imposes trade sanctions against diamond-exporting countries that have not put in place comprehensive controls to eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds. The legislation, called the Clean Diamonds Trade Act, is supported by the World Diamond Council.⁷⁰ The United States represents approximately 65% of the retail market for gem quality diamonds.

While recent developments in Sierra Leone offer hope that combatants may finally lay down their arms, lasting peace will not be achieved until UNAMSIL and the Government of Sierra Leone have taken full control of the highly contested diamond areas of Tongo Field and Kono from the RUF and the CDF.⁷¹

Presidential elections are scheduled for May 14, 2002, and are expected to take place if the cease-fire continues to hold and rebels and the CDF are fully disarmed.

Demobilization Effort

One critical aspect of the transition from war to peace is demobilization of combatants. A Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) program was begun with the assistance of the international community in 1998. Prior to the virtual halt of the DDR effort following the RUF attack

⁶⁷ This effort to develop an international certification system, known as the Kimberley Process, was initiated because of the recognition by the international community of the link between diamonds and human rights abuses, particularly the case of Sierra Leone and the RUF. (Amnesty International, "Sierra Leone Diamonds: International Certification System Essential to Help End Killings, Abductions and Torture of Civilians." 9/17/2001)

⁶⁸ As noted by Nicholas Cook in the November 2000 CRS Report to Congress, *Diamonds and Conflict: Policy Proposals and Background*, (see note 67) "diamonds are a highly fungible, concentrated form of wealth, and the legitimate global diamond industry is historically insular and self-regulating."

⁶⁹ www.endconflictdiamonds.org

⁷⁰ The Clean Diamonds Trade Act prohibits the import of diamonds into the United States unless the exporting country is implementing a system of controls on the export or import of rough diamonds that meets specified requirements, consistent with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 adopted on December 1, 2000, or a future forth both civil and criminal penalties for violations of the requirements of this Act.

⁷¹ Progress in this regard includes the deployment of UNAMSIL forces in the diamond areas as well as an agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone, the UN and the RUF to ban mining in Eastern Kono district. (AI 9/7/01)

on peacekeepers and defacto withdrawal from the Lome agreement in May, 2000, nearly 25,000 ex-combatants of an estimated 45,000 had disarmed and entered the demobilization process.⁷² While it is likely that many previously demobilized combatants rearmed after the May 2000 incident, more than 30,000 fighters have handed over their weapons and 3,000 more children have been turned over to the UN since the most recent cessation of hostilities in May 2001.⁷³ The current climate suggests peace may be within reach, however, the sustainability of peace largely depends on the effectiveness of the demobilization effort.

DDR, managed by the government of Sierra Leone and supported by a World Bank trust fund, was designed not only to remove weapons from the hands of former combatants, but to provide a bridge to civilian life, a process which was intended to include medical, psycho-social, educational and financial support to jump-start a new society after years of armed conflict.⁷⁴ With a surge in disarmaments since the May 2001 cease-fire and concern about the security implications of keeping large numbers of former fighters in close quarters with little to occupy them, the revised approach seeks to encamp fighters for only two weeks.⁷⁵

Physicians for Human Rights is concerned about releasing former fighters before they have received human rights training, including education about sexual violence, as well as other reintegration support. Thousands of ex-combatants are now returning to the very communities where they may have committed violent acts. Furthermore, the World Bank Trust Fund, which has been supporting DDR does not have sufficient funds for the reintegration portion of the process.⁷⁶ The successful reintegration of former combatants is vital to the long-term security of the country as well as the immediate security of the communities and families to which they will be returning.

Status of Women in Sierra Leone

The basic human rights enshrined in many international and regional instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights are found in the 1991 Sierra Leone

⁷² UNOCHA, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, May 29, 2001. available at: www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/s/4A58557840970841C1256A5C0050441B

⁷³ Pratt, p.21; Also conversation with Corinne Dufka, Human Rights Watch

⁷⁴ PHR interview with Florian Fichtl of the World Bank, Freetown, March 2001.

⁷⁵ PHR telephone interview with Richard Bennett of UNAMSIL, August, 2001.

⁷⁶ UNOCHA, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, May 29, 2001. Available at: www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/s/4A58557840970841C1256A5C0050441B

⁷⁷ The Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991) Chapter III — The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual. Available at: www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-iii.html

Constitution, Chapter 3, Sections 15-30, which provides for the equal rights of women.⁷⁷ Sierra Leone also ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1988.⁷⁸ Though the constitution states that no law should discriminate against any person because of his/her gender, in practice women face structural discrimination under all three types of law which coexist in Sierra Leone – English, Islamic, and Customary Law.⁷⁹ The effects of discriminatory inheritance practices are particularly devastating to women and children, especially during armed conflict which has produced many war widows. It should be noted that Sierra Leone's criminal justice system remains largely dysfunctional due to a lack of financial and human resources.

While high levels of war-related sexual violence have been documented by the PHR study and by other organizations documenting human rights abuses, evidence also suggests that domestic violence against women and children is common, though it is not generally recognized as a societal problem.⁸⁰ Nearly 67% of urban women interviewed for a survey on AIDS knowledge, practices and behaviors revealed that they had been beaten by an intimate male partner, and over 50% reported being forced to have sexual intercourse.⁸¹ In almost 90% of these cases, a boyfriend or husband was identified as the perpetrator.⁸² The police are generally unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in cases resulting in severe injury or death.⁸³ And though rape is a crime under Sierra Leonean law,⁸⁴ historically, the response of the Sierra Leone Police and judiciary to reports of

⁷⁸ Ratified: November 11, 1988. Sierra Leone's initial and second and third periodic reports were due December 11, 1989, 1993 and 1997 respectively.

⁷⁹ According to Abdul Tejan-Cole of the Sierra Leone Bar Association, under English Law, the husband inherits all his wife's property if she dies, whereas the wife only inherits one-third of her husband's property if he dies, the remainder going to the children. Under Islamic Law, the wife inherits the estate of her deceased husband, but is not permitted to administer it – that responsibility falling to the husband's eldest brother. Under Customary Law, the wife is part of the property inherited by the eldest brother. By law women receive little or no child support after divorce or for children born out of wedlock. In Freetown, however, women can inherit property; upcountry they can not.

⁸⁰ PHR interview with Zainab Bangura and Christiana Solomon of the Campaign for Good Governance, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

⁸¹ Coker, A.L. & Richeter, D.L., "Violence Against Women in Sierra Leone: Frequency and Correlates of Intimate Partner Violence and Forced Sexual Intercourse," *African Journal of Reproductive Health*, 1998; 2(1).

⁸² *Ibid* p.61.

⁸³ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2001; p. 8.

⁸⁴ Thompson, B., *The Criminal Law of Sierra Leone*, University Press of America, 1999; pp.68-72.

⁸⁵ PHR Interview with Zainab Bangura, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, March 2000.

rape has been minimal.⁸⁵ In fact, the first successful prosecution of a rape case in Sierra Leone did not occur until 1999.⁸⁶ Rape cases are not made a priority and are generally not handled professionally due to improper/insufficient training, lack of means, and structural discrimination against women resulting in a lack of understanding that rape is a serious crime. In response to this problem, the Commonwealth Police have recently established a number of centers called Family Support Units to educate police on sexual and domestic violence, receive rape victims, ensure proper forensic testing has been done assist in processing their cases and to reach out to the community.

Human Rights Abuses During the War

All armed groups involved in the war have committed a range of serious human rights abuses against the civilian population, other groups, and members of their own groups including: extra judicial killing or summary execution, sexual violence including rape, abduction, amputation, destruction of property, disappearance, torture, violations of humanitarian law and forced labor. The crimes committed by rebel forces have been of a particularly heinous nature. In addition to the practice of amputation of limbs and other body parts of men, women and even infants, there are reports of pregnant women disemboweled, and women and children raped and made to witness torture and murder of relatives and neighbors. More recently, since the November 2000 cease-fire between the government and the RUF, rebel abuses have apparently been on the decline.⁸⁷

Despite this, several serious incidents involving multiple civilian deaths including women and children were reported by Human Rights Watch as recently as July 2001.⁸⁸ Based on interviews with victims and witnesses, Human Rights Watch reported that attacks by the CDF militias in June and July against then RUF-controlled towns resulted in the killing of least twenty-four civilians, and the wounding of another nineteen.

Rebel Abuses

In recent years RUF rebels, the ex-SLA/AFRC and an ex-SLA splinter group called the West Side Boys have reportedly committed widespread abuses, including killings, abductions, deliberate mutilations, and rape. Rebel forces also abducted civilians, missionaries, aid workers from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and UN personnel; ambushed humanitarian relief convoys; raided refugee sites; and extorted and stole

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2001; pp. 2-11.

⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Sierra Leone: Most Serious Attacks in Months; UN Peacekeepers Needed to Protect Civilians*, July 24, 2001.

food. The RUF forces continued their long-standing practice of abducting civilians (including women and children) and using them as forced laborers, child soldiers, and sexual slaves.

Since the Lome agreement was signed, there are reports that the RUF have committed numerous abuses including rape, the execution of civilians and peace keepers, and execution of their own, allegedly for committing rapes.⁸⁹ Mostly rebel atrocities but also government allied jet and helicopter gun ships prompted the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of civilians over the past several years.⁹⁰

The extent of the rebel's signature mutilations reportedly declined in 2000 and 2001. Thousands of individuals, including children as young as 2 months, had their limbs severed during the conflict, and many more died as result of their wounds. It has been estimated that for every one amputee that survived, three perished from shock, infection and loss of blood because they were not able to obtain medical care.⁹¹

Abduction has been one of the methods of recruitment used by the RUF.⁹² The UN estimates the number of men, women and children abducted by rebel forces from 1991-1999 to be approximately 20,000.⁹³ The RUF has also abducted aid workers, and has taken UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage on several occasions.

Throughout the war rebel forces have invaded, looted and burned private and public property. These destructive actions have played an instrumental role in the terror campaign against civilians – often resulting in the evacuation of whole towns and villages on the first signs that rebels were approaching. The rebels have also looted belongings, crops, animals, medicines and cash for their own use.

Child Soldiers

It has been estimated that at any time during the conflict at least 5,000 children fought alongside adults, the majority with the RUF, which created “Small Boy Units” and “Small Girl Units” and sent them into combat.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Interview with Corinne Dufka of Human Rights Watch in Freetown, January 2001. Human Rights Watch, *Sexual Violence Within the Sierra Leone Conflict*, Human Rights Watch, February 26, 2001

⁹⁰ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*, pp. 1-2.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 4

⁹² Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers *Sierra Leone: Child Soldiers Global Report 2001*, 2001. Available at: www.child-soldiers.org/report2001/countries/sierra_leone.html

⁹³ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*; p 3.

⁹⁴ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 2001; p. 9.

Children were frequently plied with a range of narcotics and forced to commit atrocities, even against their families and communities. Many children who were abducted had “RUF” permanently engraved on their skin with a knife or bayonet, often in places where it is difficult to cover up the markings.⁹⁵

Sierra Leone ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, which prohibits the recruitment of children under fifteen as combatants, and more recently has made repeated commitments to demobilize those under eighteen.⁹⁶ Sierra Leone has also ratified the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflicts.⁹⁷ In May 2000, however, approximately 25% of combatants fighting with government forces near Masiaka were observed to be under eighteen, and some as young as seven.⁹⁸

Abuses by Government Forces and Their Allies

Evidence suggests and the PHR survey confirms that rebel forces committed the vast majority of abuses against civilians. However, government forces committed serious violations as well. There were reports that government and ECOMOG forces operating in support of the government committed extra judicial killings and summarily executed suspected rebels and their collaborators, particularly in the wake of the rebel occupation of Freetown.⁹⁹ There appear to have been fewer reports of human rights violations involving the SLA since the latter half of 2000, most likely due to training and reorganization.¹⁰⁰

Abuses by the Civil Defense Forces (CDF)

The Government affiliated Civil Defense Forces also committed human rights abuses according to reports. While the number of abuses perpe-

⁹⁵ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*, p. 4; Even once healed, the markings are a daily reminder of their trauma and may lead to stigmatization and/or retribution. The Council of Churches of Sierra Leone, a local human rights organization told PHR about one boy interviewed by the organization who was captured by ECOMOG with five of his child-soldier colleagues in February/March 1999. The boy escaped, but not before witnessing the immediate execution of his friends by ECOMOG reportedly because they had “RUF” engraved on their skin.

⁹⁶ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Action Needed to End Use of Child Combatants*, 2001

⁹⁷ Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts. Available at: www.unhcr.ch/html/menu2/6/protocolchild.htm

⁹⁸ Amnesty International, *Report 2001, Sierra Leone*, p. 5. ; www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/index.html

⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone*, 1999. US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*; p 2.

¹⁰⁰ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*, p. 4.

trated by other groups appeared to have decreased in the later part of 2000 and early in 2001, violations by CDF seemed to have risen during the same period,¹⁰¹ including reports of rape by CDF, which in past years had not been reported to have engaged in rape.¹⁰² In June and July 2001 pro-government militias reportedly attacked RUF-controlled towns killing at least 24 civilians, most of whom were women and children.¹⁰³ There are reports that the CDF also continued to recruit child soldiers in spite of promises to halt the practice. Like the other groups, the CDF have manned unofficial roadblocks and routinely extorted money from travelers. The CDF have also arrested and detained suspects illegally.¹⁰⁴

The Humanitarian Situation

The complex humanitarian emergency, a product of the war, exacerbated the already grim quality of life experienced by most of the population in Sierra Leone. In 2001 Sierra Leone was the least developed country in the world according to the United Nations Human Development Index.¹⁰⁵ A Sierra Leonean's average life expectancy of 38.3 years is the lowest in the world, and the under-five mortality rate is the highest in the world; nearly one third of children in Sierra Leone die before their fifth birthday.¹⁰⁶ Sixty-eight percent of adults are illiterate, 36% do not have access to health care, 34% do not have access to clean water, and the average per capita annual income is \$448.¹⁰⁷ Twelve percent of children aged 0-14 have one or both parents dead.¹⁰⁸ For the majority of people in the country, life is consumed by the challenge of survival, which is threatened not only by violence but by disease, malnutrition,¹⁰⁹ and the limited availability of basic services. Sierra Leoneans live not only with the consequences of extreme poverty, but with the profound insecurity that exists in a society

¹⁰¹ Human Rights Watch, *Recent Abuses Documented by Human Rights Watch*, November 30, 2000.

¹⁰² US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*; p 4.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch, *Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict*, February 26, 2001.

¹⁰⁴ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*; p 4.

¹⁰⁵ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001* available at www.undp.org/hdr2001/back.pdf

¹⁰⁶ UNICEF, *State of the World's Children, UNICEF 2000*.

¹⁰⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*. Figures are for 1999.

¹⁰⁸ The Government of Sierra Leone, *Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the End of the Decade*, November, 2000; p. 13.

¹⁰⁹ Twenty-seven percent of children under five are underweight or too thin for their age, according to the Government of Sierra Leone *Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the End of the Decade*, November, 2000.

where the infrastructure and rule of law have virtually collapsed and there seems to be little hope for the future in terms of work and education opportunities. The humanitarian assistance community has an enormous task providing aid to the displaced and other war-affected peoples and beginning to rebuild the country, particularly in the areas of housing, health care, and education.

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Mass displacement has been a defining characteristic of the crisis in Sierra Leone. At the height of the hostilities, more than 3,000 communities¹¹⁰ were destroyed resulting in the flight from their homes of nearly half the country's population. Many have experienced displacement more than once. At the time of writing it is estimated that more than one million, approximately a quarter of the population, are either displaced internally or have fled to neighboring countries to escape the conflict.¹¹¹ An estimated 75,000 refugees had been repatriated by UNHCR to Sierra Leone and had returned independently by ship and foot since the beginning of 2001 as a result of the declining security situation in Liberia and Guinea. As many as 500,000, however, remained in camps in Guinea, as well as in the Gambia, Ghana and the Côte D'Ivoire.¹¹² As the numbers of returnees grow, particularly in Freetown where IDP camps are already over capacity, the government of Sierra Leone and relief agencies are making efforts to relocate them to host communities in areas deemed secure.

The official caseload of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is over 400,000 at the time of this writing.¹¹³ An estimated 170,000 people reside in eighteen official IDP camps, and thousands more are living with host communities primarily in the Port Loko and Tonkolili districts. The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) estimates that an additional one million Sierra Leoneans are internally displaced and absorbed into host communities where they are not receiving any humanitarian relief.¹¹⁴ At least 55% of the refugee and displaced populations are estimated to be women and girls.¹¹⁵

Most of the camps in Sierra Leone were constructed as temporary measures to address the immediate shelter needs of the displaced population.

¹¹⁰ United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone, 2000, p. 117.

¹¹¹ Global IDP Database, Sierra Leone Profile Summary. Available at: www.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/Sierra+LeoneProfile+Summary

¹¹² USAID, BHR, OFDA, *Humanitarian Situation Report #1* (FY 2002), October 3, 2001.

¹¹³ Pratt. p.23

¹¹⁴ Global IDP Database www.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/Sierra+LeoneProfile+Summary

¹¹⁵ UNOCHA Database - Sierra Leone: UN Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs. Updated February, 2001

They have, however, since been used as long-term housing and issues of space, sanitation, durability and management exist. The breakdown of the peace process in May 2000 not only prevented the resettlement of most IDPs, but led to additional internal displacements of people fleeing fighting, which overwhelmed already inadequate facilities.

The camps are generally crowded and unsanitary and most IDPs interviewed by PHR desperately want to return home. The return of the displaced to their home communities, many of which have been occupied by rebels for years, may, however, pose an even greater challenge to the government of Sierra Leone and humanitarian relief agencies. Sierra Leone's fragile and limited infrastructure may be unable to absorb an influx of refugees from unstable areas in Liberia and Guinea. This difficulty may be exacerbated by the voluntary resettlement of IDPs as the peace process moves forward and areas of the country are secured. The National Committee for Relief, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (NCRRR) which is providing those who return home with seeds, tools and other essential household items, had reached only 77 of 149 chiefdoms before the end of the planting season in May, 2001.¹¹⁶ So whether the displaced return home or remain in camps, the need for food aid will remain high. Massive reconstruction of shelter and education and health facilities must also be a top priority.¹¹⁷

Extension of state authority into the provinces – crucial in order to undertake and sustain programs in key sectors – has been hampered by the military, political and economic situation. Government capacity to deliver basic services continues to be limited and civil administration in areas under RUF control was virtually obliterated. Health and development indicators point to particularly dire conditions in the North.¹¹⁸ The current needs for displaced populations, the host communities and resettlement far exceed the existing capacity at all levels.¹¹⁹

Health Care Delivery

The health sector, which was already weak prior to the war, has been further compromised during ten years of conflict. It is ill equipped to serve a large number of returning IDPs and refugees. Hospitals and health clinics were systematically looted and destroyed over the past 10 years. Though some district hospitals are now open including Kenema, Port Loko, Lungi and Kabala, they are not operating at full capacity and the percentage of

¹¹⁶ Pratt p.23

¹¹⁷ Mid-Year review of the 2001 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone

¹¹⁸ The Government of Sierra Leone, *Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the End of the Decade*, November, 2000; p.51.

¹¹⁹ Mid-Year review of the 2001 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone.

functioning peripheral health units (PHU) that provide primary care is very low.¹²⁰ Other factors contributing to reduced health standards are a decrease in number of health-care providers due to death and displacement, limited access to drugs and equipment, and referral services which are inaccessible and/or unaffordable to local populations.¹²¹ Efforts to address public health issues are also hampered by a dearth of reliable statistics.

Maternal and Child Care

The continuing political and military turmoil has had a particularly devastating impact on those most vulnerable to poverty and disease – women and children. Sierra Leone's maternal mortality rate is the highest in the world. It has been estimated that one in seven women will die from complications related to childbirth.¹²² The inability of women to access health services is largely due to their unavailability, but also a problem of access and affordability. Much of the population today is so poor that they cannot pay even small fees that are now required.¹²³ In spite of the obstacles, it has been reported that 85% of women in Sierra Leone receive some form of prenatal care, and antenatal care from a health care provider with specialized skills.¹²⁴ A recent government survey found that 42% of births were attended by a doctor, nurse or midwife, though only 22% of births in the North received specialized assistance.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ For example, Connaught Hospital in Freetown, the country's largest hospital had no laundry and food service and was in desperate need of medical equipment, qualified staff, plumbing and telephones when PHR visited in March, 2000. Princess Christian Medical Hospital (PCMH), a maternity hospital in the eastern part of Freetown suffers from years of neglect in the form of puddles, peeling paint and a lack of general daily medical consumables. A survey conducted in 2000 revealed that only 237 PHUs, out of a total of 730 pre-war facilities were operating. Each functioning facility is technically servicing 25,000 people, far higher than the recommended standards for effective primary health care delivery. UNICEF is supporting the PHUs, while WHO is working to improve the district hospitals which act as referral centers – and they are working together to meet the emergency

¹²¹ For example, the ICRC clinic at the Clay Factory IDP camp sees patient and may prescribe drugs, however many cannot afford to have their prescriptions filled or they are referred to Connaught Hospital for surgery, but they cannot afford it, so the problem goes untreated. Many people have no idea where to go for treatment.

¹²² Rada Petrovic, "Most Natural Thing in the World," in *Birth Matters*, Marie Stopes International p. 8.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ The Government of Sierra Leone, *Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the End of the Decade* (Central Statistics office, Ministry of Development and Economic Planning), November 2000; p. 13.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

Mental Health Care

The Kissy mental hospital in Freetown, the only hospital providing mental health care in the country, is managed by the only Sierra Leonean psychiatrist in the country. Due to limited resources and other constraints the hospital has been more a refuge for the mentally ill who have nowhere else to go for mental health services. Though they should be more widely available and better coordinated and regulated, anecdotal evidence suggests existing psychosocial services provided almost exclusively by NGOs are proving to be very valuable in some IDP camps in larger towns such as Freetown and Kenema. Recently, the World Health Organization (WHO) has begun to assist the government of Sierra Leone in coordinating their mental health response to the crisis.

HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS will likely be one of the greatest challenges facing the country in the post-war period. As suggested by a recent Sierra Leone government report,¹²⁶ there is a lack of information and knowledge about HIV/AIDS among women in Sierra Leone. For example, overall, only 54% of women aged 15-49 had heard of AIDS. Of these, 21% correctly stated three main ways of avoiding HIV infection; 9% knew where to get an HIV test and 2% had been tested. Given the dearth of testing facilities and health services in the areas we surveyed, the PHR/UNAMSIL team felt it would be unethical to raise concern about HIV/AIDS in our population-based survey activities. However, women reporting sexual violence were asked several open-ended questions including one¹²⁷ geared towards health concerns. Several women used this opportunity to raise concerns about AIDS (see Chapter IV).

The exact prevalence rate of HIV infection in Sierra Leone is not known. Although UNAIDS lists the adult prevalence rate as 2.99%, the estimates of those actually living with AIDS vary greatly.¹²⁸ UNAIDS's 2000 report¹²⁹ states that "scant information on HIV prevalence is available for Sierra Leone."¹³⁰ A recent analysis conducted on behalf of the WHO attributed the lack of information to "the fact that no statistically

¹²⁶ Government of Sierra Leone, *Survey report on the Status of Women and Children* November 2000

¹²⁷ See Appendix A.

¹²⁸ www.unaids.org/epidemic_update/report/Final_Table_Eng_Xcel.xls

¹²⁹ www.unaids.org/hivaidsinfo/statistics/june00/fact_sheets/pdfs/sierraleo.pdf

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.3

¹³¹ World Health Organization, *HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone: The Future at Stake*, December 2000

¹³² www.unaids.org/hivaidsinfo/statistics/june00/fact_sheets/pdfs/sierraleo.pdf p.3

valid national epidemiological survey has been undertaken in Sierra Leone due to the prolonged civil conflict.”¹³¹

Smaller studies conducted at antenatal clinics and among high risk groups such as the armed forces cited by UNAIDS¹³² and in the recent WHO analysis¹³³ suggest that the prevalence rate is probably higher than the official UNAIDS figure. This likelihood is supported by several aspects of the situation in Sierra Leone, including those documented by PHR.

One key factor that suggests that HIV prevalence is higher than reported by UNAIDS is the long-term conflict and the corresponding population displacement and human rights abuses. Data from Rwanda indicate that “wars and armed conflicts generate fertile conditions for the spread of HIV.”¹³⁴ These conditions include conflict related rape which was reported as a factor in increasing the HIV prevalence in Rwanda,¹³⁵ and which PHR documents to have affected 9% of internally displaced women in Sierra Leone. The nature of the rapes documented in this report also suggests that these are likely to contribute to the spread of HIV; about a third of those reporting sexual violence reported experiencing gang rape and the mean number of attackers reported for those experiencing sexual violence was 3.2. Abduction, reported by a third of women reporting sexual violence, is also likely to contribute to the spread of HIV when associated with repeated rapes over a period of time of a month or longer. Thirty-nine percent of respondents reported that the sexual violence lasted for more than one week. HIV prevalence among combatants is an important factor in determining HIV rates. This is especially true for rates of infection among the RUF, since 53% of participants in the PHR survey who reported face-to-face contact with RUF also reported sexual violence.

Other factors that are likely to contribute to the prevalence of HIV in Sierra Leone relate to devastated health and education infrastructures of the country and include: the lack of materials necessary for prevention and treatment, the lack of availability of testing and counseling, and the absence of a coordinated comprehensive government policy to address HIV/AIDS including the absence of a policy on confidentiality of test results. According to a recent analysis of government response to HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone, the country’s “National AIDS Control Programme remains weak and largely ineffective...there is no national policy or strategic plan to deal with the epidemic in any comprehensive way.”¹³⁶

¹³³ World Health Organization HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone

¹³⁴ UNAIDS, *AIDS epidemic Update: December 1998* p.12 www.unaids.org/publications/documents/epidemiology/surveillance/wad1998/wadrp98e.doc

¹³⁵ Ibid p.12

¹³⁶ WHO, *HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone*

¹³⁷ Ibid p.17

The issue appears to be one of lack of capacity and management as well as of financial resources.¹³⁷

Whatever the reason for the lack of effective government response, the pattern of HIV infection in other countries demonstrates that once the adult rate of infection passes 5%, the infection spreads exponentially – sometimes as swiftly as 50% per year.¹³⁸ If, as limited data suggest, the prevalence rates in Sierra Leone are significantly above that level, the country could potentially reach South Africa's prevalence rate of over 20% within 10 years if an effective HIV/AIDS control program is not established.¹³⁹

Education

Although the Government of Sierra Leone is committed to improving children's education and welfare generally, and girls and boys are legally required to attend primary school, the government lacks the financial and practical capacity to provide basic education and other services for children, particularly in areas that have been under rebel control.¹⁴⁰ An estimated 70% of schools were destroyed during the fighting and rampant looting has left most facilities still standing without teaching materials and furniture.¹⁴¹ Additionally, school fees and/or the cost of uniforms and books are prohibitive for many.¹⁴² As a result, a large percentage of children are currently receiving no formal education, or have missed many years of school.¹⁴³ Furthermore, reentry into the educational system is proving to be a challenge for those whose schooling was disrupted by displacement or who suffered psychological trauma. Many children feel they are too old to return to the level where they left off and feel pressure to

¹³⁸ Ibid p. 11 citing a World Bank document.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ According to a Government of Sierra Leone Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the End of the Decade, released in November 2000, 42% of primary school age children are attending school, though attendance levels in the North and East are markedly lower at 28% and 35% respectively.

¹⁴¹ Global IDP Database, "Sierra Leone: Widespread Destruction of Schools in 1997 and 1999," www.db.idpproject.org

¹⁴² Global IDP Database, "Sierra Leone: Combination of Factors Discourage Displaced Children from Attending School (2000)," www.db.idpproject.org

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Global IDP Database, "Sierra Leone: Combination of Factors Discourage Displaced Children from Attending School (2000)," www.db.idpproject.org; Interview with Glenis Taylor of UNICEF; UNICEF recognizes the vital role of education in normalizing the lives of psychologically traumatized children and is particularly focused on ensuring that girls return to school. UNICEF has proposed working to improve access to formal primary education, but also to advocate for the development of specialized programs for displaced populations and for over-age children to complete primary education in accelerated learning programs, which would also include psychological counseling and peace building.

earn income to help rebuild the lives of their families. Others now must take on the responsibility of breadwinner due to the death of parents or pregnancy resulting from rape.¹⁴⁴

The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs has primary responsibility for children's issues within the government and has been working actively with UNICEF and civil society to provide services and normalize conditions for children as a way to address the trauma so many of them have suffered.

Impact of War on Women

The impact of war on civilians has increased substantially in the past century. In World War I, approximately 5% of casualties were civilians, whereas in the 1990s it is estimated that 80% of war casualties were civilians, many of whom are women and children. Women and children also constitute the majority of the world's displaced and refugee populations.¹⁴⁵ This dramatic increase in the impact of conflict on civilians is likely due to the changing nature of conflict itself. Most conflicts today occur within a state's borders and are often characterized by deliberate and systematic violence against civilians and civilian institutions. Of 101 armed conflicts around the world between 1989 and 1996, 95 were internal disputes characterized by the use of light weapons and small decentralized fighting groups. These conflicts have devastating consequences for civilians.

Although rape is thought to be a common aspect of military conflict throughout history and in all regions of the world, rape, until recently, remained the "least condemned war crime,"¹⁴⁶ not because of inadequate legal provisions, but because of the international community's willingness in the past to tolerate sexual abuse of women and girls.¹⁴⁷ There had been little or no research on the scale of sexual violence, the factors that provoke it, or how to mitigate the problem.¹⁴⁸ Perhaps even less is known about how women recover after the trauma of rape in war and about the impact of rape on their communities.¹⁴⁹ Documenting sexual violence, already difficult during peacetime, is even more challenging during conflict when lack of ordinary support systems, general instability and collat-

¹⁴⁵ Worldwide Refugee Information, US Committee for Refugees, www.refugees.org/articles/women_refugees.htm

¹⁴⁶ Commission on Human Rights, *Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences*. United Nations, 1994; p.64.

¹⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, 1996.

¹⁴⁸ Swiss S., Giller J.E., "Rape as a Crime of War: A Medical Perspective," *JAMA*. 1993; 270:612-615

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.2

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*

eral trauma further discourage disclosure. Despite this, persistent efforts to do so are increasingly forcing the issue into the light.¹⁵⁰

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Rape, forced prostitution, sexual slavery and forced impregnation are all criminal means and methods of warfare that have attracted more attention in the recent years because of the widespread reporting of such acts in recent conflicts."¹⁵¹ The wars in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia focused attention on the use of rape as a deliberate strategy to undermine community bonds and weaken resistance to aggression.¹⁵² In fact, the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and the devastating effects it typically has on communities reflects a profound and disturbing perspective on the dignity and worth of women and girls—that a woman's dignity and worth can be reduced to her sexual purity and serve as a measure of family and community honor.¹⁵³ The recent convictions handed down by the ad-hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia on rape as a war crime and crime against humanity¹⁵⁴ send a strong message that impunity around sexual violence can no longer be taken for granted. While rape is receiving increased attention, an emphasis on this particular abuse should not lead to a disregarding of other violations. Instead, sexual violence should be understood in the context of a range of abuses and hardships faced by women during conflict situations.

Health care professionals have a unique role to play in the investigation and documentation of sexual violence in war and in the treatment of survivors. Collecting and presenting sound evidence will help hold perpetrators accountable, restore the rule of law, and limit future violations. Furthermore, increasing medical and social knowledge about sexual violence in war will facilitate the development of strategies that allow the recovery of survivors of sexual violence and their communities. A better understanding of the determining factors and characteristics of sexual violence in war may contribute to the development of measures to better protect potential victims and deter perpetrators in the future.¹⁵⁵ Documentation is also important for the development of international jurisprudence and strengthening the interpretation and implementation of existing international legal standards.

¹⁵¹ ICRC, "Fact Sheet: The Impact of Armed Conflict on Women," March 6, 2001.

¹⁵² Swiss and Giller.

¹⁵³ Frank, M., Bauer, H.M., Fincanci, Korur S., Arican, N., & Iacopino, V., "Virginity Examinations in Turkey: The Role of Forensic Physicians in Controlling Female Sexuality," *JAMA*, 282(5), 1999; pp.485-490.

¹⁵⁴ See especially Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998; Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Judgement, IT-95-17/1-T, December 10, 1998; Prosecutor v. Zejnib Delalic et al., Judgement, IT-96-21-T, November 16, 1998; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgement, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, February 22, 2001.

¹⁵⁵ Swiss & Giller.

III. THE PREVALENCE OF WAR-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AMONG IDPs¹⁵⁶

Methods

Subjects

Subjects of the PHR survey consisted of female heads of household who could most accurately provide information about the experiences of the entire household over the past 10 years. An assertive attempt was made to ensure that each respondent was interviewed privately due to the sensitive nature of questions asked. Of the 1,048 households sampled, 991 female heads of household participated in the study (response rate = 95%). Seven women were not eligible; 41 were not available at the time of sampling, and 8 women were either opposed to the survey, refused to participate, or requested the interview be stopped.

Sampling

At the time of the study, registered IDPs were living in a total of 21 camps or locales in seven districts and the Western Area of Sierra Leone. To obtain a representative sample of IDPs, the PHR/UNAMSIL team selected camps and/or locales on the basis of IDP arrival time and the place of residence before displacement. Since the proportion of "recent arrivals" (after the May 2000 crisis) was known for each camp/locale, the PHR/UNAMSIL team was able to select camps/locales that reflected the known proportion of two-thirds recent arrivals in all IDP camps/locales. A total of four sample locations from three different districts and the Western Area of Sierra Leone were included in the study. The camps/locales included those that best represented the IDPs' home district and/or region of the country. The four districts from which camps/locales were sampled

¹⁵⁶ This chapter is excerpted from Amowitz, L et al, "Letter from Sierra Leone: Prevalence of War-Related Sexual Violence and other Human Rights Abuses Among Internally Displaced Persons in Sierra Leone," *Journal of the American Medical Association* (Forthcoming January 23, 2002 issue).

represented 91% of the registered IDP population in Sierra Leone. Camps/locales located in four other districts were excluded on the basis of inaccessibility due to safety concerns or an inadequate number of IDPs for sampling (less than 5,000). 4244

Assuming a prevalence rate of sexual violence (based on a previous estimate by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) of 14% of Freetown residents witnessing rape in 1999)¹⁵⁷ to be between 10% and 20%, the PHR/UNAMSIL team determined the following sample sizes would be needed. For a 20% prevalence (18-22% margins), sample size would range from 653 at 80% confidence to 1,071 at 90% confidence. For a prevalence of 10% (9-11% margins), sample size would range from 1,457 at 80% confidence to 2,377 at 90% confidence. The PHR/UNAMSIL team therefore planned to include approximately 1,000 households in the study due to safety and logistical constraints during the time period of the survey. Households were selected in each camp/locale in proportion to the distribution of IDPs in that location. A total of 1,048 households were selected from the three camps and one town, Mile 91 Township.

All study participants were selected using systematic random sampling or a combination of systematic random sampling and cluster sampling.¹⁵⁸ In sampling IDPs, the PHR/UNAMSIL team first mapped all domiciles within the camp, cluster, or town, then conducted a systematic random sample of the entire camp, cluster, or town. A sampling interval (n) was calculated by dividing the number of households in the camp, cluster, or town by the number of interviews to be conducted in the camp, cluster, or town. A starting household was determined by random number generation and each nth household was interviewed until the entire camp, cluster, or town had been surveyed. One camp required cluster sampling due to size and difficulty in mapping. The camp was organized into eight administrative units. Two clusters (administrative units) were selected at random from seven of the units. One unit was excluded from sampling because it consisted of only very recent arrivals, unlike the other seven units.

Survey Questionnaire¹⁵⁹

The PHR survey contained 49 questions pertaining to demographics, physical and mental health perception, experiences of war-related human rights abuses among household members, experiences of war-related sex-

¹⁵⁷ de Jong, K., Mulham, M., van der Kam, S., *Assessing trauma in Sierra Leone: Psychological Questionnaire: Freetown Survey Outcomes*, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins sans Frontières, January 11, 2000. Available at: www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2000/sierraleone_01-2000.shtml.

¹⁵⁸ Patton MQ. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications; 1990:169-283

¹⁵⁹ See Appendix A.

ual violence, including assistance needs, opinions regarding punishment and justice for perpetrators, and attitudes on women's human rights and roles in society. The survey also assessed the lifetime prevalence of non war-related sexual violence.

Physical and mental health perception, fears of sexual violence in communities either by combatants or non-combatants, and family relationship changes after the incident of sexual violence were assessed using Likert-type scales (e.g., excellent, good, fair, poor). Human rights opinions and views on women's roles in society were asked of all female heads of the households. Opinions were assessed by a response of "agree" or "disagree" with statements concerning human rights and women's roles in society.

Regarding experiences of human rights abuses, respondents were asked whether they or their household members had been beaten, shot, killed, tortured, seriously injured, sexually violated, raped, abducted, suffered amputations or been subjected to forced labor by combatants during the past 10 years (e.g., since the war started). Respondents also were asked whether their homes were burned and/or property was looted. For each abuse, participants were asked the gender of the abused, type of abuse, who they thought committed the violation, and consequence of the abuse. Finally, all participants were asked about non war-related sexual violence experiences in their lifetime committed by non-combatants such as family members, friends, or civilian strangers, including age at time of attack, type of sexual violence and identity of the perpetrators.

Regarding war-related sexual violence experiences during the past 10 years of war, respondents were asked when the incident occurred, where it took place, the sexual abuse type, the identity of the perpetrator, the number of attackers, the duration of the attack, and the consequences of the sexual violence. In addition, these women were asked their opinions regarding the punishment of perpetrators, and whether they were interested in giving their names to the proposed Special Court or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

The questionnaire was written in English, the official language of Sierra Leone, translated into Krio, the lingua franca of Sierra Leone, and back-translated into English. The questions on sexual violence and sexuality were written by Sierra Leonean women who conduct research in this area and who provide treatment services to survivors of sexual violence in Sierra Leone. Researchers learned to administer the survey in Krio in which they all were fluent and collaborated on a translation from Krio into the two other main languages in Sierra Leone (Mende and Temne). These translations were checked for accuracy by members of the PHR/UNAMSIL team. Seven regional human rights and sexual violence experts reviewed the questionnaire for content validity. The survey was pilot tested among twelve IDP women in Freetown and suggestions were incorporated for clarity and cultural appropriateness of questions.

Interviewer Training

The survey interviews were conducted by 21 Sierra Leonean women trained and supervised by the PHR/UNAMSIL field team. The five-member team had extensive experience in research, psychological counseling with survivors of sexual violence and torture, sexual violence aid programs for Sierra Leonean refugees and IDPs, and human rights issues. Researcher training consisted of eight to nine days of classroom teaching and role-play followed by several days of field observation and continuous supervision. (See Appendix B for details of training process.)

Interviews

All interviews were conducted over a four-week period in the calendar year 2001. Interviews with participants lasted approximately 25-60 minutes and were conducted in the most private setting possible. All questionnaires were reviewed for completeness and for correctness of recording after the interview by the researchers themselves, and then reviewed by the field supervisors at the end of each day.

Human Subjects Protections

This research was reviewed and approved by an independent group of individuals with expertise in clinical medicine, public health, bioethics, and international human rights research. In addition, permission for the study was granted by UN officials, camp administrators and local community leaders in each area surveyed and there were no limitations on movement or to surveying. The research was conducted in accord with the Declaration of Helsinki, as revised in 2000.¹⁶⁰ Every effort was made to ensure the protection and confidentiality of and to reduce any potential adverse consequence to the human subject participants. All data were kept anonymous. Verbal informed consent was obtained from all participants and parental consent was obtained for all participants under the age of eighteen. Participants did not receive any material compensation. To reduce the risk of possible retraumatization among respondents, researcher training included extensive sensitization to this issue by a psychologist and social worker who specialize in sexual violence and those who reported sexual violence were referred to any existing services.

Statistical Analysis

The data were analyzed using STATA statistical software.¹⁶¹ For 2x2 cross tabulations containing cells with expected frequencies of less than five,

¹⁶⁰ World Medical Association, *Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects* [5th rev], Edinburgh, Scotland: World Medical Association; 2000.

¹⁶¹ *STATA 5.0 (Intercooled) for Windows*, STATA Corporation, College Station TX.

statistical significance was determined using Fisher's exact test; Yates' corrected chi square was used for all others. For cross tabulations with greater than two rows, statistical significance was determined using Pearson chi square. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used for statistical comparison of means and the Kruskal-Wallis test was used for comparison of medians. For all statistical determinations, significance levels were established at $p < 0.05$.

Definitions

A perpetrator was defined as any person who directly inflicts violence or abuse.¹⁶² Torture was defined according to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.¹⁶³ Sexual violence included rape¹⁶⁴ and other forms of sexual violence such as molestation, sexual slavery, being forced to undress or being stripped of clothing, forced marriage, and insertion of foreign objects into the genital opening or anus. Gang rape was defined as rape by two or more individuals. Depression was self-reported as "depression." Symptoms of "depression" included "very sad," "excessive worry," sleeping difficulties, "unhappy," "change in appetite," and "feels bad."

Mental Health Counseling was defined as "having someone to talk to about your problems who will listen and give emotional support." A household was defined as "those people sleeping and eating under the same roof before first displacement." Female head of household was considered "the woman who knows the most about the persons in the household." War-related prevalence of sexual violence included experiences of sexual violence committed by combatants during the past 10 years of war. Life-time prevalence of non war-related sexual violence included experiences of sexual violence committed by family members, friends, or civilians at any time in a woman's lifetime. These two prevalence rates did not overlap since the perpetrator categories were mutually exclusive.

Findings

The findings of the PHR study represent the most comprehensive population-based assessment to date of war-related sexual violence and other human rights abuses in Sierra Leone. Such quantitative findings contribute

¹⁶² Saltzman, L.E., Fanslow, J.L., McJahon, P.M., Shelley, G.A., *Intimate Partner Violence Surveillance: Uniform Definitions and Recommended Data Elements*, Center for Disease Control and Prevention National Center for Injury Prevention and Control: Atlanta, 1999:11. Available at: www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/intimate.htm

¹⁶³ Article 3, Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1948, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (*entered into force* October 21, 1950).

¹⁶⁴ International Planned Parenthood Association Western Regional Hemisphere, *Definitions: What is Gender-Based Violence?* Available at: www.ippfwhr.org/whatwedo/definitions.pdf.

TABLE 1:
Demographic Characteristics and Health Perceptions among Respondents

Respondent Characteristics	Respondents* n=991
Age (years), mean \pm SE (range)	34 \pm 0.48 (14-80)
Marital Status	
Married; living with husband	622 (63)
Widowed due to war	134 (13)
Widowed/divorced/separated	113 (11)
Separated due to war	101 (10)
Never married	21 (2)
Wife Status, n=965	
First wife	430 (45)
> First wife	535 (55)
Tribe, n=989	
Temne	703 (71)
Mende	150 (15)
Kono	39 (4)
Limba	28 (3)
Krio	4 (0.4)
Other	65 (7)
Religion, n=989	
Muslim	814 (82)
Christian	172 (17)
Other	3 (0.3)
Years Since Displacement, n=766	
1-3 years	216 (28)
4-6 years	225 (29)
7-10 years	311 (41)
> 10 years	14 (2)
Number of Times Fled Fighting, mean \pm SE (range)	4 \pm 0.07 (1-15)
Months in Camp/Town, mean \pm SE (range)	18 \pm 0.53 (.25-120)
Years of Formal Education, mean \pm SE (range)	1.9 \pm 0.11 (0-16)
Most Commonly Reported Occupations †	
Farmer	500 (50)
Trader	383 (39)
Business	76 (8)
Student	17 (2)
Professional	25 (2)
Homemaker	11 (1)

Perception of General Health in the Last Two Years	
Very good	19 (2)
Good	83 (8)
Fair	629 (63)
Poor	260 (26)
"State of Mind" † Since Displacement, n=988	
Very good	8 (0.8)
Good	48 (5)
Fair	638 (64)
Poor	294 (30)
Suicidal Ideation Since the War	
	280 (28)
Suicide Attempts Since the War	
	34 (3)
Assistance That Would Help "State of Mind" ‡	
Humanitarian assistance	960 (97)
Medical assistance	956 (96)
Income generation projects	937 (94)
Religious counseling/support	879 (89)
Skills training	832 (84)
Mental health counseling	714 (72)
Traditional ceremonies	452 (48)
Education	393 (41)
Country medicine/traditional healer	321 (34)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise

† May list more than one

‡ "State of mind" defined as current thoughts and feelings

considerable insight into the nature and extent of human rights abuses among IDPs in Sierra Leone, i.e. the frequency of specific human rights abuses, the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the impact of these experiences and the most urgent needs identified by the victims. Furthermore, a rigorous approach to sampling enables the findings to be generalized to the larger IDP population.

Characteristics of Respondents

Of the 1,048 households sampled, 991 female heads of household participated in the study (response rate = 95%). Seven women were not eligible; 41 were not available at the time of sampling, and eight either were opposed to the survey, refused to participate, or requested the interview be stopped.

Demographics of the respondents are presented in Table 1. The mean age was 34± 0.48 years (range 14-80 years). The majority of the women sampled were poorly educated, Muslim, married, women of either the

TABLE 2:
Reported Human Rights Abuses among Household Members

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Characteristics	Household Members Reporting Abuse n= 3759*
Household Members, #, mean \pm SE (range)	
Total	9166, 9.37 \pm 0.11 (2-30)
Women	5001, 5.18 \pm 0.07 (1-17)
Men	3983, 4.17 \pm 0.07 (0-17)
Current Age, mean \pm SE (range)	24.8 \pm 0.33 (1-95)
Human Rights Abuses Among All Household Members, n=9166 †	1157 (13)
Abduction	841 (9)
Beating	618 (7)
Killing	414 (4)
Reported sexual assaults among household members	402 (4)
Sexual assault among respondents, n=991	94 (9)
Sexual assault among household females, n=5001	396 (8)
Sexual assault among household males, n=3983	6 (0.1)
Torture	151 (2)
Forced labor	114 (1)
Gunshot wound	128 (1)
Bodily injury (stabbed, burned, cut)	85 (0.9)
Amputation of limb or digits	21 (0.2)
Destruction of Property	1836 (20)
Alleged Perpetrator †	
<i>Rebel forces</i>	
RUF, Revolutionary United Front	1490 (40)
"Rebels", unspecified	590 (16)
AFRC, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council	74 (2)
West Side Boys	82 (2)
Ex-SLA	17 (.4)
<i>Government forces</i>	
SLA, Sierra Leonean Army	39 (1)
CDF, Civil Defense Forces	14 (.4)
<i>Peacekeeping troops</i>	
ECOMOG, Economic Community of West African States	5 (.1)
UN, United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone	1 (.02)
<i>Other</i>	
Don't know	1290 (34)
"Mixed group"	162 (4)

Consequences of Abuse †	
Self reported "depression" or symptoms of depression ‡	837(22)
No consequence	455 (12)
Killed/died after attack	420 (11)
Bodily injury	321 (8)
Stigmatized and rejected	27 (1)
Consequence of Sexual Assault, n=396	
Self-reported "sexually transmitted disease"	79 (20)
Self-reported pregnancy following rape	36 (9)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise

† May list more than one

‡ Symptoms of depression included "sleeping difficulties," "excessive worry," "unhappy," "change in appetite," "crying all the time," "cannot stop crying," "feeling bad," and "feeling sad."

Temne or Mende tribes who most commonly reported their occupation as farmers, petty traders and business women. Nearly one quarter of women were either separated or widowed due to war, had been displaced more than four times since 1990 and had, on average, lived in the IDP camps or Mile 91 Township for eighteen months. Fifty-seven percent of women reported that they had been displaced between one and six years ago, and 41% of women had been displaced between six and ten years ago.

The majority of women perceived their general health (89%) and mental health (94%) as "fair" or "poor" (Table 1). Approximately one third of women (280, 28%) reported suicidal ideation (thoughts or feelings), and 3% (34) had attempted suicide. Women reported types of aid that would help their states of mind the most, including humanitarian assistance (960, 97%), medical assistance (956, 96%), income generation projects (937, 94%), religious counseling and support (879, 89%), skills training (832, 84%), and mental health counseling (714, 72%).

Human Rights Abuses Reported among Household Members ¹⁶⁵

The 991 household representatives reported on the experiences of 9,166 household members, which included themselves and those who lived with

¹⁶⁵ The following 95% confidence intervals (CI) are calculated among household members (N=9166) for all human rights abuses (12.6 ± 0.635), abduction (9.0 ± 0.564), beatings (6.7 ± 0.494), killings (4.5 ± 0.415), sexual assaults among household members (4.4 ± 0.399), captured for less than 24 hours (3.4 ± .307), torture (1.6 ± 0.255), forced labor (1.2 ± 0.221), gunshot wounds (1.4 ± 0.239), bodily injuries (0.9 ± 0.192) and amputations of limbs or digits (0.2 ± 0.097); sexual assault among respondents where N=991 (9.0 ± 1.74), sexual assault among household females where N=5001 (7.9 ± 0.717), sexual assault among household males where N=3983 (0.15 ± 0.120). The 95% confidence intervals reported here can be used to calculate the confidence interval for the estimates of abuses of the total IDP population (see Figure 1) using (95% CI X N value).

TABLE 3:
Reported Abuses of Household Members (n=1157), by Offender

Reported Abuse*	RUF	"Rebels"	AFRC	West Side Boys	Ex-SLA	SLA	CDF	ECOMOG	UN
All Abuses, n=2266	1312 (58)	645 (28)	125 (5)	69 (3)	58 (2)	42 (2)	11 (.5)	3 (.1)	1 (.04)
Abduction, n=666	398 (60)	161 (24)	46 (7)	26 (4)	19 (3)	12 (2)	3 (.04)	1 (.1)	-
Beating, n=511	260 (51)	188 (37)	21 (4)	15 (3)	14 (3)	11 (2)	2 (.04)	0	-
Killing, n=335	218 (65)	90 (27)	10 (3)	1 (.3)	7 (2)	5 (2)	2 (.06)	1 (.3)	1 (.3)
Sexual Assault									
Females, n=353	186 (53)	103 (29)	23 (6)	17 (5)	11 (3)	12 (3)	0	1 (.3)	-
Males, n=3	2 (67)	1 (33)	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Torture, n=135	81 (60)	37 (27)	9 (7)	0	3 (2)	2 (1)	3 (2)	0	-
Forced Labor, n=86	48 (56)	22 (26)	9 (10)	6 (7)	1 (1)	0	0	0	-
Gunshot Wound, n=108	75 (69)	29 (27)	2 (2)	1 (1)	0	0	1 (1)	0	-
Bodily Injury, n=49	35 (71)	12 (25)	0	1 (2)	1 (2)	0	0	0	-
Amputations, n=20	9 (50)	2 (11)	5 (28)	2 (11)	2 (11)	0	0	0	-

*The 2266 abuses represent abuses (1 or more) listed by the 1157 household members who could identify the perpetrator. This data excludes those who could not list the perpetrator.

them prior to their displacement (mean household size 9.4 ± 0.11) (Table 2). Of the 9,166 household members, 5,001 (55%) were females and 3,983 (44%) were males.¹⁶⁶ Overall, there was a total of 1157 household members with specific forms of war-related human rights abuses reported among the 9,166 household members. These included abductions (841, 9.3%), beatings (618, 6.7%), killings (414, 4%), and sexual violence against women (396, 8%) and men (6, 0.1%). Three hundred and sixteen (3%) were "captured" for less than 24 hours, 151 (2%) were tortured, 114 (1%) were forced into labor, 128 (1%) reported gunshot wounds, 85 (0.9%) had serious injuries, and 21 (0.2%) reported amputations. Burning of homes and/or looting of property also was commonly reported among household members (1,836, 20%).

Regarding sexual violence, 9% (94) of the 991 respondents reported one or more war-related sexual violence experiences. Study participants also reported war-related sexual violence among 396 (8%) female and 6 (.1%) male household members. The prevalence of war-related sexual violence among female household members may be as high as 11% (554/5001) if 158 women are included who did not report sexual violence per se, but did report abduction with the likely consequences of sexual violence, and who became pregnant, or experienced vaginal bleeding, pain, swelling, uterine pain, vaginal discharge, or sexually transmitted diseases.

For all abuses reported, the RUF was identified most often (1,490, 40%) as the perpetrator (Table 2). Table 3 and Figure 3 represent the 1,157 household members who reported abuses and could name the perpetrator. These household members had 2,266 incidents of abuse since each victim could have one or more abuses listed; however, this does not take into account those who did not know their perpetrators. In this analysis, the RUF was reported as the perpetrator 58% of the time. The most commonly reported consequences of all abuses reported among household members included "depression" or having symptoms of depression 837 (22%), 420 being killed (12%), 455 reported "no consequence" (11%), and 320 had bodily injury (8%). Respondents reported that 36 (9%) female household members became pregnant as a consequence of the attack. Respondents reported that the majority of the abuses among household members occurred in the last three years with most of these occurring between 1997 and 1999 (Figure 2).


Characteristics among Respondents Reporting War-related Sexual Violence

Table 4 presents the characteristics of respondents reporting war-related sexual violence. Nine percent (94 of 991) of the respondents reported a

¹⁶⁶ There were a total of 9,166 household members but the gender was not indicated for 182 persons. Since some of these individuals may have experienced sexual assault but were not included in the analysis, it is likely to have led to an underestimate of sexual violence.

FIGURE 2:

Occurance of Sexual Assaults Among Respondents and Other Human Rights Abuses Among Household Members



personal account of sexual violence (Table 4). The mean number of attackers was 3.2. Sixty-eight percent of the incidents reportedly occurred in the last three years, with more than half (54%) in their home villages, and 22% while fleeing. More than half (60%) of the abuses lasted for one week or less. The majority of the incidents of sexual violence (63, 67%) occurred between 1997 and 1999. In addition, 22 (23%) of women reported being pregnant at the time of the attack with an average gestation of three months. Fifty-three percent of respondents and 47% of female household members who were sexually assaulted reported “face to face” contact specifically with RUF forces, compared with less than 6% for any other combatant group.


Overall, 79 (84%) of 94 respondents reported the identity of one or more of their perpetrators (Table 5). Of these, the RUF was the perpetrator 60% of the time (Figure 5). Other perpetrators reported included AFRC, West Side Boys unspecified “rebels”, and both SLA and ex-SLA. The UN peacekeepers and CDF militia forces were not identified as perpetrators among respondents reporting sexual violence.

Rape was reported by 84 of the 94 women reporting sexual violence and 31 reported being gang raped. Also, approximately one third of the 94 women reported abduction, being stripped of clothing and being forced to undress. Nine women reported forced marriage to combatants, and six women reported pregnancy as a consequence of the attack. Forty-four percent of women felt the incident of sexual violence had “quite a bit” or an “extreme” effect on relationships with family and friends. The

most commonly reported consequences of the attack included bodily injury/physical disability, sexually transmitted disease, and “reproductive complications” including miscarriages.¹⁶⁷

The majority (91%) of respondents reported being “quite a bit” (161, 16%) or “extremely” (740, 75%) worried about sexual violence to themselves or family members by combatants (Figure 4). Concern about sexual violence by family members, friends, or civilian strangers was lower (39% “quite a bit” or “extremely” worried). In addition, 91 (9%) of respondents reported sexual abuse (occurring at age 15 ± 1.2 years) by family members, friends, or civilian strangers during their lifetime.

FIGURE 3:
Proportion of Reported Human Rights Abuses by Offender



¹⁶⁷ Female Genital Cutting is reportedly widely practiced in Sierra Leone. Women who are raped and who have undergone female genital cutting are likely to be at increased risk for genital trauma and related complications.

TABLE 4:
Characteristics Among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Characteristics	Respondents Reporting Sexual Assaults* n=94
Reporting Sexual Assault, n=991	94 (9)
# of Attackers, mean \pm SE (range)	3.2 \pm 0.39 (1-25)
Timing of Abuse, n=92	
Within last 3 years	63 (68)
> 3 years ago	23 (25)
Unsure	6 (6)
Where Abuse Occurred, n=91	
Home village/town	49 (54)
While fleeing	20 (22)
While abducted	18 (20)
Non home village	2 (2)
IDP camp/town	1 (1)
Other	1 (1)
How Long Abuse Lasted, n=91	
Less than one week	55 (60)
One week to 1 month	16 (18)
1-6 months	10 (11)
More than 6 months	10 (11)
# Women Pregnant at Time of Assault	22 (23)
Months Pregnant During Assault, mean \pm SE (range)	3.1 \pm 0.47 (1-7)
Abuse †	
Rape	84 (89)
Being forced to undress/stripped of clothing	35 (37)
Abduction	31 (33)
Gang rape	31 (33)
Molestation	13 (14)
Sexual slavery	14 (15)
Forced marriage	9 (9)
Insertion of foreign object	4 (4)
Consequences of the Abuse †	
Bodily injury/physical disability	48 (51)
Self reported "sexually transmitted disease"	32 (34)
Self reported "reproductive complications/miscarriage"	19 (20)
Stigmatized/rejected by family and/or community	14 (15)
Fear of STD/AIDS	9 (9)
Self reported "pregnancy" after the assault	6 (6)
Other	19 (20)


Effect on relationships with family and friends, n=89

Not at all	29 (32)
A little	18 (20)
Quite a bit	15 (17)
Extremely	27 (30)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise

† May list more than one

FIGURE 4:
Proportion of Participants Reporting Fear of Sexual Assault



Characteristics of Assistance Needs among Respondents Reporting War-related Sexual Violence

Of the 94 respondents reporting war-related sexual violence, 61 reported the incident(s) to another person (Table 6). Of those who did not report the attack, the most common reasons were “feelings of shame or social stigma” (18, 64%), fear of being stigmatized/rejected (8, 28%) and not having trust in anyone (6, 21%). Fifty women reported seeking help after the attack and 40 of these women reported that they informed a health care provider of the specifics of the attack. On average, these women sought help five months after the attack(s) occurred. Hospitals (25, 50%), traditional healers (20, 40%) and health centers (19, 38%) were the most common places where women sought help after the attacks.

TABLE 5:
Reported Sexual Violence of Respondents (n=79) by Offender

Reported Assaults	RUF	“Rebels”	AFRC	West Side Boys	Ex-SLA	SLA	CDF	ECOMOG	UN
All Assaults, 213	129 (61)	21 (10)	18 (8)	19 (9)	12 (6)	10 (5)	0	4 (2)	-
Rape, n=75	48 (64)	10 (13)	5 (7)	4 (5)	4 (5)	3 (4)	0	1 (1)	-
Abduction, n=34	21 (62)	2 (6)	4 (12)	3 (9)	1 (3)	3 (9)	0	0	-
Stripped of clothing, n=39	22 (56)	3 (8)	4 (10)	4 (10)	3 (8)	2 (5)	0	1 (3)	-
Gang Rape, n=30	16 (53)	3 (10)	3 (10)	4 (13)	3 (10)	0	0	1 (3)	-
Molestation, n=14	8 (57)	3 (21)	0	1 (7)	1 (7)	0	0	1 (7)	-
Sexual Slavery, n=12	7 (58)	0	1 (8)	3 (25)	0	1 (8)	0	0	-
Forced marriage, n=9	7 (78)	0	1 (11)	0	0	1 (11)	0	0	-

Women reported what helped most after the attack was trying to forget about the incident (43, 46%), support of family (33, 35%), a health care provider (31, 33%), and country medicine/traditional healer (30, 32%). Figure 6 shows what respondents felt were the most needed assistance that would help their state of mind and ability to cope with the sexual assault experience.

Beliefs about Justice among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Of 88 respondents, 37 (42%) thought those who had committed sexual violence against them should be punished (Table 7). Of the 51 respondents who indicated that their perpetrator should not be punished, the most common reason given was "in the spirit of reconciliation" (35, 68%), followed by fear of reprisal (13, 25%), no confidence in the system for such punishments

FIGURE 5:
Proportion of Sexual Assault Abuses by Offender




TABLE 6:
Characteristics of Assistance Needs Among Respondents
Reporting Sexual Violence


Characteristic	Respondents Reporting Sexual Assault* n=94
Told Anyone About the Incident	61 (65)
Reasons for Not Telling Anyone About Incident, n=28 †	
Feelings of shame or social stigma	18 (64)
Fear of being stigmatized/rejected	8 (28)
Do not trust anyone	6 (21)
Fear of rejection by my husband/family	5 (18)
No one asked	2 (7)
Fear of physical retaliation by perpetrator	1 (3)
Other	6 (21)
Sought Help After Sexual Assault	50 (53)
Sought Help After Sexual Assault # days, mean ± SE (range)	161 ± 50 (1-1460),
Where Help Was Sought After the Sexual Assault, n=50 †	
Hospital	25 (50)
Country medicine/traditional healer	20 (40)
Health center	19 (38)
NGO	3 (6)
Informed Health Care Provider of Specifics of Sexual Assault, n=50	40 (80)
What Has Helped the Most After Assault †	
Trying to forget about it	43 (46)
Support of family	33 (35)
A health care provider	31 (33)
Country medicine/traditional healer	30 (32)
Discussions with family members	18 (19)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise

† May list more than one

(8, 16%), or they wanted to forget about the incident (4, 8%). Of the 94 respondents reporting sexual violence, punishment was supported by 17 (18%) for "all those involved," 30 (32%) for the perpetrators of the attack(s), and 17 (18%) for the commanders. Thirty-four of the respondents reporting sexual violence believed their attacker's commander was aware of the attack. Thirty-three women believed that punishment of perpetrators would prevent sexual violence from happening to others. Twenty-two of the 94 women reporting sexual violence to PHR were willing to give their names to the proposed Special Court and/or the Truth and Reconciliation

FIGURE 6:
Assistance That Would Help State of Mind and Ability to Cope
with Your Experience



Commission. Given the prevalence of war related sexual violence as reported to PHR, PHR believes that there may be thousands of female IDPs in Sierra Leone who have experienced sexual violence and who may be willing to provide testimony to the Special Court or the TRC.

Attitudes of Women's Human Rights and Roles in Society

More than 90% of women agreed that women and girls should have the same access to education as men and boys (Table 8). More than 80% of women agreed that women should be able to express themselves freely, that there should be legal protection for the rights of women, and that women and girls need more education about their reproductive health. However, more than 80% of women also indicated that a good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees. More than 70% of women felt that family problems should only be discussed within the family, that women have the right to control the number and spacing of their children, and that more should be done to protect women and girls from having sex when they do not want to. More than 60% of women expressed the view that a man has the right to beat his wife if she disobeys, and that it is a wife's duty/obligation to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to. The same proportion of women (more than 60%) indicated women and girls need more education about their right to refuse sex.

TABLE 7:
Beliefs about Justice among Respondents Reporting Sexual Assault

Belief	Respondents Reporting Sexual Assault* n=94
Who Should Be Punished for Sexual Assaults †	
Perpetrators	30 (32)
Commanders	17 (18)
All involved in attacks	17 (18)
Believe Perpetrator Should Be Punished, n=88	
Yes	37 (42)
No	51 (58)
Reasons Why Perpetrators Should Not Be Punished, n=51 †	
In the spirit of reconciliation	35 (69)
Fear of reprisal/revenge	13 (25)
No confidence in a system for such punishments	8 (16)
Respondent just wants to forget about incident	4 (8)
Other	13 (25)
Believe Perpetrators Commander Was Aware of Assault	34 (36)
Believe Punishment of Perpetrators Will Prevent This From Happening to Others	33 (35)
Willing to Give Name to Truth and Reconciliation Commission or the Special Court	22 (23)

* Values are number (percent) † May list more than one

Comments on Survey Findings

The findings of this study indicate that combatants (primarily, members of rebel forces) have committed widespread human rights abuses against civilians in Sierra Leone, including: abductions, beatings, killings, sexual violence against women and men, being “captured” for less than 24 hours, torture, forced labor, gunshot wounds, serious injuries, and amputations. These abuses were experienced on an individual level by a substantial number of participants and their household members. The respondents in this study reported at least one of these abuses had occurred during the past ten years of conflict among 94% of households surveyed (Figure 7). Recent PHR surveys in Chechnya¹⁶⁸ and Kosovo¹⁶⁹ found abuse rates of 19% and 31% respectively among participant households. The burning of homes and/or looting of property was also

¹⁶⁸ Physicians for Human Rights, *Endless Brutality: War Crimes in Chechnya*, PHR, 2001.

¹⁶⁹ Physicians for Human Rights, *War Crimes in Kosovo: A Population Based Assessment of Human Rights Violations Against Kosovar Albanians*, PHR, 1999.

TABLE 8:
Majority Opinions Among Primary Respondents on Women's Rights and Gender Roles in Society

Shared by more than 90% of women

- Women and girls should have the same access to education as men and boys
-

Shared by more than 80% of women

- Women should be able to express themselves freely
 - There should be legal protections for the rights of women
 - Women and girls need more education about their reproductive health
 - A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees
-

Shared by more than 70% of women

- Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family
 - Women and girls need more education about their rights to refuse sex
 - More should be done to protect women and girls from having sex when they don't want to
-

Shared by more than 60% of women

- A man has the right to beat his wife if she disobeys
 - It is a wife's duty/obligation to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to
 - Women have the right to control the number and spacing of their children
-


commonly reported among household members. The majority of these abuses experienced by interviewees occurred between 1997 and 1999. Forty percent of these abuses were attributed to RUF forces; however, of those who could identify a perpetrator, 58% of abuses were reported to be due to the RUF. Fifty-three percent of respondents and 47% of all female household members reporting "face to face" contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence. Sexual violence was reported by less than 6% of respondents reporting "face to face" contact with any other combatant group.

Sexual violence in war has increasingly been recognized as a means of demoralizing individuals, families and communities¹⁷⁰ and is used as a weapon to disable an enemy by dissolving bonds between family and society.¹⁷¹ Today, in the context of war, rape and other forms of sexual violence have been recognized as instruments of genocide, crimes against humanity,

¹⁷⁰ Swiss, S., Giller, J.E., "Rape as a Crime of War: A Medical Perspective," *JAMA*, 1993;270:612-615; Human Rights Watch, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch: 1996; Herman, J.L., *Trauma and Recovery*, New York, NY: Harper Collins: 1992.

¹⁷¹ Goldfeld, A.E., Mollica, R.F., Pesavento, B.H. & Farone, S.V., "The Physical and Psychological Sequelae of Torture," *JAMA*. 1988;259:2725-2729.

FIGURE 7:
Proportion of Households Reporting Human Rights Abuse



means of torture, and crimes of war¹⁷² and can be prosecuted as such.¹⁷³ They also constitute crimes against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”¹⁷⁴

To generate population estimates of sexual violence among the IDP and non-IDP females in Sierra Leone, the PHR/UNAMSIL team assumed a total IDP population of 1.0-1.3 million (55% female)¹⁷⁵ and a non-IDP population of 2.7-3.0 million (50% female).¹⁷⁶ By extrapolating the number of incidents of war-related sexual violence reported by participants in

¹⁷² Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1 “FOCA.” Available at: www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/index.htm; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 7/17/98). Available at: untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm; Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*, The Hague, M. Nijhoff Publishers, Distributed by Kluwer Law International, 1997; Askin, K., “Women and International Humanitarian Law,” in Askin, K.D. & Koenig, D.M. editors, *Women and International Human Rights Law*, Ardsley, NY: Transnational. 1999. Vol. I.

¹⁷³ Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic; Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*; Askin K. “Women and International Humanitarian Law”

the sample to the total female IDP population, PHR estimates that approximately 50,000 to 64,000 Sierra Leonean IDP women may have suffered such human rights abuses. The prevalence of sexual violence among IDP women and girls, including war-related or non-war-related, in this study was 17%, or an estimated 94,000-122,000 individuals. If non-war-related sexual violence among non-IDP females is added to the IDP totals (assuming a 9% prevalence rate), as many as 215,000-257,000 women and girls in Sierra Leone currently may have been affected by sexual violence.

This study indicates that war-related rape and other forms of sexual violence were committed on a widespread basis among IDPs in Sierra Leone. In fact, the prevalence of war-related sexual violence (8%-9%) was equivalent to the lifetime prevalence of non war-related sexual violence (9%) among the study participants, increasing Sierra Leone's total prevalence rates to 17%.¹⁷⁷ The lifetime prevalence of rape in the United States is 9%, though the average life span of an American is more than twice that of a Sierra Leonean.¹⁷⁸

Rates of sexual violence vary based on research methodology and populations surveyed. Studies of sexual violence in Sierra Leone that include non-probability samples¹⁷⁹ or select populations such as clinic patients¹⁸⁰ generally report higher prevalence rates of sexual violence but cannot be generalized to broader populations. The prevalence of war-related sexual violence in this study was less than that reported in Liberia (15%),¹⁸¹ but

¹⁷⁴ Rome Statute; Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*; Askin, K., "Women and International Humanitarian Law"; United Nations, Draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S/2000/915.

¹⁷⁵ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), UNOCHA Database: IDP Census (data collected February 2001), UNOCHA, February, 2001.

¹⁷⁶ Norwegian Refugee Council, Sierra Leone Section: Population profile and figures, Available at: www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/1c963eb504904cde41256782007493b8/fdc6d215bab90118c12569dd002b1aec?OpenDocument; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, available at: unhcr.ch/un_ref/numbers/numb2000.pdf.

¹⁷⁷ One percent of participants had experienced both war-related and non-war-related sexual violence.

¹⁷⁸ Crime Victim Research and Treatment Center, *Rape in America*, Charleston, SC: Medical University of South Carolina: 1992.

¹⁷⁹ Coker, A.L., & Richter, D.L., "Violence against Women in Sierra Leone: Frequency and Correlates of Intimate Partner Violence and Forced Sexual Intercourse," *African Journal of Reproductive Health*, 1998; 2(1):61-72.; Giller, J.E., Bracken, P.J., Kabaganda, S., "Uganda: War, Women, and Rape," *Lancet*, 1991;337:604.

¹⁸⁰ Shanks, L., Ford, N., Schull, M. & de Jong, K., "Responding to Rape," *Lancet*, 2001;357:9252; Human Rights Watch, "Women's Rights Project" in: *Human Rights Watch World Report 1998*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch: 1998.

exceeded that found in other population-based assessments of refugees and displaced persons (0-0.1%),¹⁸² including a prior study conducted in Freetown, Sierra Leone (2%).¹⁸³

Physical injuries and self-reported "depression" were among the most common consequences reported following sexual violence. The adverse physical and psychological consequences of sexual violence are described in other studies.¹⁸⁴ The prevalence of sexual violence, including war-related or non-war-related, suggests a serious health burden for individual and community members that cannot be addressed adequately by services that currently exist in Sierra Leone. The assistance needs most commonly identified by women reporting sexual violence included humanitarian assistance, including food and shelter, medical care, income generating projects, and women's support groups. These needs were not significantly different ($p < 0.05$) from Sierra Leonean women who did not experience sexual violence but did experience other human rights abuses.

The majority of participants reporting sexual violence indicated the belief that their perpetrators should not be punished and, among these women, the most common reasons cited were "in the spirit of reconciliation" and "fear of reprisal/vengeance." This highlights the need to protect survivors of war-related sexual violence including those that come forward to testify. Twenty-three percent of these women indicated an interest in giving their names for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court that are expected to be established in 2002. This may be explained by feelings of shame, and/or fear of being stigmatized or rejected also reported in the study, as well as a desire to put the incident(s) behind them. Such concerns are not unfounded in societies where women are financially dependent on their husbands or extended family and are subjected to structural social inequality on many levels.¹⁸⁵ Being cast out of a community or family can have dire consequences not only for the woman but her children as well.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ Swiss, S., Jennings, P., Aryee, G., et. al. "Violence against Women during the Liberian Civil Conflict," *JAMA*, 1998; 279:625-629.

¹⁸² PHR, "A Population-based Assessment of Human Rights Abuses against Ethnic Albanian Refugees from Kosovo," *American Journal of Public Health*, 2001;91(12); Physicians for Human Rights, *Endless Brutality: War Crimes in Chechnya*, Physicians for Human Rights, May 2001:1-143; Physicians for Human Rights, *Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan: A Population-Based Study*, Physicians for Human Rights, May, 2001.

¹⁸³ de Jong, K., Mulham, M. & van der Kam, S., *Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone: Psychological Questionnaire: Freetown Survey Outcomes*, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins sans Frontières, January 11, 2000. Available at: www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2000/sierraleone_01-2000.shtml

¹⁸⁴ Resnick, H.S., Acierno, R., Kilpatrick, D.G., "Health Impact of Interpersonal Violence, 2: Medical and Mental Health Outcomes," *Behavioral Medicine*, 1997;23:65-78; Schafran, L.H., "Topics for Our Times: Rape is a Major Public Health Issue," *American Journal of Public Health*, 1996;86(1):15-17.

Despite 80% of women expressing that there should be legal protection for the rights of women, more than half of women reported that their husbands had the right to beat them and that it was a wife's duty to have sex with her husband even if she did not want to. The apparent disparity between such beliefs and international principles of human rights suggests a need for public discourse and education on local, regional and international levels.

Limitations

It is likely that the prevalence of war-related sexual violence in the study was underestimated because of willful non-disclosure of sexual violence and the lack of privacy in some of the interviews, despite efforts to ensure privacy. Reasons for willful non-disclosure often include fear of retribution by an assailant, of being stigmatized and rejected, blamed for the attack, and/or the psychological consequences of disclosure.¹⁸⁷ In addition, the average age of participants (female heads of households) reporting war-related sexual violence (34 ± 0.48 years) was more than twice the average age of females experiencing non war-related sexual violence reported in the study (15 ± 1.2 years). Although interviewers were careful to explain there would be no material or other gain by participating in the survey, the number of abuses reported in the study may have been over or underestimated if IDPs judged that it was in their material, political or psychological interest to exaggerate or conceal claims of abuse.

¹⁸⁵ Ulin, P., "African Women and AIDS: Negotiating Behavioral Change," *Soc Sci Med.* 1992;34(1):63-74; Bruyn, M., "Women and AIDS in Developing Countries," *Soc Sci Med.* 1992;34(3):249-262.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ Koss, M.P., "Detecting the Scope of Rape: A Review of Prevalence Research Methods," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 1993;8:198-222.

IV. QUALITATIVE COMMENTS AND TESTIMONIES OF SIERRA LEONEAN WOMEN AND GIRLS

In order to gain insight into individual experiences of human rights abuses of Sierra Leonean women and their families, the PHR study included qualitative assessments of abuses as well.¹⁸⁸

Two primary approaches were used to elicit qualitative information. Seven open-ended questions were included in the questionnaire itself, and longer semi-structured interviews were conducted with survivors of human rights abuses that were not survey participants. Throughout this chapter, wherever possible, the exact words of the women and girls interviewed have been used in order to give expression to their individual experiences. All participants were informed of the purpose of the interview and of how the data would be collected and used. In the interest of confidentiality, their names have been changed and identifying information removed.

Case Examples from In-Depth Interviews

Case testimony of survivors of war-related human rights abuses was collected during two separate investigations to Sierra Leone. A PHR delegation visited Sierra Leone in March, 2000 to assess the medical consequences of human rights abuses committed during the war, including sexual violence. During that trip, members of the team with specialized training in sexual violence interviewed more than two dozen survivors of abuses. To mitigate the risk of re-traumatization, most of the testimony gathered during the 2000 investigation was taken from individuals who were already participating in programs for rape survivors. The interviews were semi-structured and covered a range of topics including basic biographical information, the circumstances of violations, details about perpetrators, medical and psychological consequences of the abuses, what types of services had been available and helpful to them, and what their concerns were for the future. The interviews took place at NGO offices,

¹⁸⁸ Quantitative and qualitative modes of inquiries each may have value independent of the other when the research questions address meaningful human rights issues and the studies are designed and interpreted within relevant historical and political context. Using both quantitative and qualitative modes of inquiry also may be complementary serve as one line of inquiry may serve to corroborate, or challenge, another.

UNICEF's headquarters in Freetown, health clinics, IDP camps, and programs for women who had become pregnant as a result of rape.

Testimony was also collected at the time the survey was conducted in February, 2001. Researchers administering the questionnaire were asked to identify women who had experienced human rights abuses who were willing to describe their experiences in more detail. These women then recorded their stories on audio and videotape in a private room in the health clinic on the outskirts of the camp. Most interviews were conducted in the first language of the victim and translated simultaneously by the researcher who first interviewed the woman or a translator, or they were translated at a later date from a tape recording.

A number of testimonies taken by PHR in March 2000 were from survivors of rape who had become pregnant by their attackers. These young women are particularly vulnerable as they must not only recover from the trauma of their ordeals while often facing stigma from their communities, but at the same time must learn to care for and support a baby with few resources. As part of a larger effort to assist rape victims in Freetown after the January 1999 incursion by rebel forces, a local NGO, the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), established a program providing medical, psychological and educational support to these women and their children. A number of the young women participating in the program acknowledged to PHR the importance of the program in helping them to cope with what had happened to them.

Cases of Sexual Violence

Bola N.

In February 2001, Physicians for Human Rights interviewed a fifteen year-old girl, Bola N. Rebels had abducted her four times since 1999. At the time of the interview she told PHR she was two months pregnant and living at an IDP camp in Port Loko. She described her first abduction to the interviewer:

When they first attacked the village, we fled to the bushes. When they removed us from our village we were frightened ... they held us, they cut some hands, they killed some, they forced us to be tied, we were taken to the bush where the sexual act was forced on us. ... Nine men raped me. ... My mother was taken away, my things, belongings, taken. I slept three days in the bush after they had raped me. I was unconscious, not myself. ... After they had raped me to their satisfaction, they left me in the bush. I was beaten, bruises on my body, part of my body. Some around were amputated. I was not well.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁹ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

As she described her multiple abductions, she wrapped her arms around herself and lowered her tone to almost a whisper:

My first captivity was when the nine men raped me. Then I was left in the bush. Second time I was held a little over a month, taken to base. There are many, many combatants there. There are also many other young women held there, too. I was not assigned to just one man, as long as you are good looking, you have intercourse with all of them. In the third captivity they remembered me. They knew me. They use abusive language. I escape during the night. The fourth time was last year: they did an ambush [on an outing of women from the IDP camp]. They came for us, raped us, they asked us to go back to the village to prepare food for them, so we had to escape. We were afraid to go to the village. So we escaped.¹⁹⁰

Over the course of her multiple abductions and gang rapes, she had two miscarriages. She had been engaged to one man at the time of the first gang rape, but he left her when he heard of the event:

I was just engaged to someone. So when I went to the bush, I was pregnant. Because of the nine men who raped me, I had to abort. So my husband had to resign from continuing the engagement. The husband I have now is a new person.¹⁹¹

She said that this new husband did not know what had happened to her in the bush. She told PHR that she had not gone to a doctor for prenatal care because she did not want anyone to know she was pregnant, although she stated that she would go to the doctor once the pregnancy was visible. She had not gone to the hospital for the miscarriages because they asked for 1,000 Leones (approximately 30 cents) simply to register. The cost for medical care had further prevented her from seeking help for the multiple health problems she had experienced since the abductions.

She stated that she was not able to sleep through the night. Every night she wakes up and cries. Her family had been killed. Her first fiancé had left her. She was afraid to tell anyone about the violence she had experienced. When asked if she had told anyone of these events before PHR interviewed her, she acknowledged that she had told her friend who had taken her to the hospital after the first attack, but no one else. No one in her family knew what had happened to her.

Sampa K.

Another woman, Sampa K., had 11 children under her care when the rebels attacked. She told PHR that they abducted her for two years, sepa-

¹⁹⁰ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

¹⁹¹ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

rating her from all but one of the children. Some were killed, others were scattered. Sampa described the initial attack:

*I woke up in the morning about two o' clock and cleaned my house. ... As soon as I lifted a load I was trying to carry, my daughters said, "Mama! The rebels are coming!" I dropped everything. I am ready to flee to the bush with the baby on the back. Then there are so many, I cannot escape. They hit me, they took the baby from my back and threw the baby, the baby is too tired. Then he started to do the act on me - there are many of them.*¹⁹²

During her subsequent servitude to the rebels, she tried in vain to save her infant child:

*I was now crying with my baby, the baby was crying, I tried to let the baby suck the breast milk. And it was not completely five days, [when] I lost the baby. The baby was having trouble. Everyday I had to sleep with the boys. Every day I sleep with the boys and I cannot refuse - guns all over, they threaten me with guns. Guns all over. And then one says give the breast to the child. And every time I gave the breast to the child, he refused me. And so for three days I did not feed the child.*¹⁹³

She traveled for two years, living as the "wife" of one particular rebel. He kept her compliant by feeding her drugs:

*Every day this man would give me some tablets to take, some are green, some are blue, some are red. I was using the tablets so that I wouldn't get any problem with the man. The man used to tell me to take this tablet it is good for you.*¹⁹⁴

Throughout the interview, Sampa kept a blank look on her face, giving the facts of her abduction and sexual enslavement in a straightforward manner. It was not until she was asked what might help her that her demeanor shifted. In response to this question, she described a nightmare she had recently had, in which she was again chased by the rebels. They brandished knives that filled her with fear. They chased her, intending to kill her once they caught her, up to a bridge. The dream ended with her standing on the edge of the bridge, prepared to jump to her death rather than be caught again.

Aminata K.

Twenty-year-old Aminata K. wanted to tell her story, but did not want to be recorded. She was eight months pregnant at the time of the interview. Aminata was captured by the a breakaway faction of the AFRC, the West

¹⁹² PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

¹⁹³ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

¹⁹⁴ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

Side Boys, in Mafore village in the Port Loko area in 1999 and held for almost two years. According to Aminata K., they killed one young man, left some old women and took Aminata, along with one young boy and two other women, to their base. She said she was forced to leave behind her eight-month-old baby. She told PHR that she was held at the base for a year and a month and forced to marry a young member of the West Side Boys called James. Initially she was closely watched and then was forced to go with others to villages to loot, a practice the rebels refer to as “jaja”. She saw them burn many houses. The leader was referred to as ‘Pape’ or ‘Sammy’. She said that she escaped by telling the rebels that she was going to wash her clothes and then ran away to her home village where she found her family seeking food. Aminata told PHR that she is pregnant as a result of being raped and now reports feeling depressed and hopeless. Before she was abducted, she was married and had three children. One of her children died, but two are living. Her parents took care of the baby. Since returning from her captivity, her husband left her and they have divorced. She said that after she returned he kept saying, “this is not my child – you are pregnant with child – this is not my child,” and after a few months he left her. She wanted to abort using herbs, but her family asked her not to as it might kill her and offered to help raise the new child. She said she is worried, however, because she has no husband or means and is completely dependent. They are currently living in the IDP camp, but they go back to their village from time to time to see if they can rebuild their house – but she does not see much hope for the future.¹⁹⁵

Kadiatu S.

Kadiatu S. was 16 years old at the time of the PHR interview. She was abducted when she was fourteen years old. She had no formal education, but worked for her mother, a businesswoman in Kono. “The rebels attacked the town and we ran. I was separated from my parents and for nine days I walked in the bush with five other girls to the next town. We were grabbed by rebels. They used me and threatened to kill me with a gun.” A commander stopped them from killing her and took her back to the base. ECOMOG attacked the base. An ECOMOG soldier took her for his wife. She traveled with ECOMOG and stayed in Kailahun for approximately one year. She hitched a ride from a car full of rebels. “If you are a willing rebel wife you can get a ride in the rebel cars into town to shop.” She told them she was going to visit family in Makeni. They assumed she was a rebel and would return. Kadiatu managed to find her way to Freetown, where she contacted her aunt. She was taken to her uncle, a doctor, and diagnosed six months pregnant. She was devastated. Kadiatu states that she does not cry, though she is

¹⁹⁵ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

very sad and angry about the pregnancy. Her mother came to Freetown to collect her.¹⁹⁶

Hawa

Seventeen year-old Hawa told PHR that she delivered a stillborn baby girl in the bush after carrying her unwanted child for eight months.

*The rebels burned my father's house and my mother jumped out the window. The rebels shot her in the chest and killed her. My father is too depressed to work. He lives in the house and is making the repairs. The rebels took me to the bush and kept me for six months. I was made a real wife.*¹⁹⁷

She showed the interviewer the scars on her right thigh – “RUF.” She said they had traveled a route from Freetown to Collage, then to Occra Hills and to Makeni. She reported that the rebels starved her for 2-3 days, drugged her with cocaine and infected her with a sexually transmitted disease. She told PHR that ECOMOG came into the bush and rescued her and delivered her to Waterloo camp.

Katmara B.

Katmara B., a 13-year-old girl told PHR she was abducted, beaten, raped and forced to become a rebel's “wife.” She said she was released during the latter stages of her pregnancy and now has a baby girl. The story of what happened to her and her family during the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999 captures the anarchy of those days which left the capital city and its people profoundly fearful:

...that night, houses were being burned down in our neighborhood, so we ran to the local mosque for sanctuary. There were so many people hiding in there. We tried to run away. They began to shoot and killed some people in the mosque. They forced us to sit down on the side and went into the mosque and killed about 15 people in there. I saw them do it. Then they called us to come and look at the bodies. My cousin's father and my aunt were shot. An uncle's hand was hacked off. My mother was inside the mosque, when she saw me, she called out to me, one of them heard her and said “If you call her, we'll kill you.” So she didn't call me again. Then they took us outside and told us to change our clothes and gave us combat clothes to wear. We were told that we had to do anything they told us to do. We were told that when they addressed us, we were to respond with “Yes sir”. At that point we were given guns and cutlasses, and told that we were to go and cut hands off. On our way to wherever they were taking us, we met up another group

¹⁹⁶ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

¹⁹⁷ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

called "Born Naked". The people in this group roamed the streets naked, the way they were born, and when they met people, they killed them. When the members of "Born Naked" saw us, they told the others that they should kill us since they had been warned not to take any more hostages.

So, on our way to be killed, we were taken to a house with about 200 people held in it. My older cousin was sent to go and select 25 men and 25 women to have their hands chopped off. Then she was told to cut off the first man's hand. She refused to do it saying that she was afraid, I was then told to do it. I said I'd never done such a thing before and that I was also afraid. We were told to sit on the side and watch. So we sat. They chopped off two men's hands. My cousin couldn't watch and bowed her head down to avoid the sight. Because she did that, they shot her in the foot. They bandaged her foot and then forced her to walk. We left the two men whose hands had been cut off behind. We were then taken to a mosque in Kissy. They killed everyone in there...They were snatching babies and infants from their mother's arms and tossing them in the air. The babies would free fall to their deaths. At other times they would also chop them from the back of their heads to kill them, you know, like you do when you slaughter chickens...One girl with us tried to escape. They made her take off her slippers and give them to me and then killed her...one time we came across two pregnant women. They tied the women down with their legs eagle-spread and took a sharpened stick and jabbed them inside their wombs until the babies came out on the sticks...¹⁹⁸

Isata

Isata, a 15-year-old Mandingo girl, was abducted and gang raped by rebels. She described her experiences and their continuing effects on her health:

...I don't have any children. I was a virgin before. They ruined me. The story is long, much too long. I was at home when they came and kidnaped me...They demanded money. My family has no money. They demanded Le 200,000.00 (\$83.00)...they said to my parents, come and see how we use your children. They undressed five of us, laid us down, used us in front of my family and took us away with them. They wouldn't release us, they kept us with them in the bush.....When I escaped, I couldn't walk - the pain. I was bleeding from my vagina. That night, God gave me strength to walk...I can't remember how long I was held...I don't like to talk because of the memories. When I made it back,

¹⁹⁸ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

*my mother couldn't believe it. Since I got back I have been so sick...I never used to get sick like this...I would like to go back to school, but I can't concentrate anymore, I can't do anything...*¹⁹⁹

Binta K.

Binta K., an 18-year-old girl, told PHR she was abducted, beaten, raped and forced to become a rebel's "wife." She was released during the latter stages of her pregnancy and at the time of the interview had a two-month old baby girl. She recounted to PHR:

*...As the rebels were pulling out of Freetown, they came to our house and captured us. They even killed some of the other girls in our house. I was hiding with some girls when they found us. We were told that if we didn't come with them, they'd kill us. While I was begging them not to take me, a little boy, about ten years old who was with them piped up "If she doesn't want to come, pass her over to me and I'll chop her hands." I agreed to go. I was raped and held there in the bush. I wanted to run away, to escape, but there was no way. If you were caught trying to escape, you were killed or put in a box...*²⁰⁰

Later in that same interview, she expressed her sorrow that many of her family members blame her for not having tried harder to escape. She and her baby were living with a girlfriend at the time of the interview.

Zainab K.

Zainab K. told PHR she was abducted when she was seventeen during the January 1999 incursion into Freetown. She recounted her story in English in measured, unemotional language. She had attended school through second form (12-14 years).

Zainab was taken from her home in Wellington by RUF and ex-SLA combatants and then taken to Calaba Town with two neighbors the same age. She said that she was raped by two older men who were very brutal. She was a virgin. They beat her and carved "RUF" on her chest with a knife. She said that she remained in Calaba Town for three days and then walked 20 miles to Waterloo carrying cartons of water. She had to forage for food and ate Cassava plants by the roadside. She stayed in Waterloo for one week and then walked for three days to Masiaka. There, she recounted, the CDF attacked. About 100 girls escaped, leaving 50 with the rebels. From then on, she said, soldiers guarded them and told them they would shoot them if they tried to escape.

They then walked for two weeks to Makeni. She told PHR that she knew she was pregnant because she had morning sickness. She stayed with

¹⁹⁹ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

²⁰⁰ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone




Chen Reis

The PHR/UNAMSIL team randomly sampled 1,048 households in three internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps (near Freetown, Port Loko, and Kenema) and one community with a large number of IDPs—Mile 91 Township. The camps/locales represented 91% of the registered IDP population.



Beth Vann

A total of 991 female heads of households participated in the PHR study (response rate = 95%). Nine percent of respondents reported war-related sexual violence. A striking 53% of respondents reporting “face to face” contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence. One third of the women who reported sexual assault reported being gang raped.




Kristina Hare Lyons

A striking 94% of 991 households interviewed by PHR/UNAMSIL reported among its members at least one of the following serious abuses during the past ten years of conflict: abductions, beatings, killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, capturing for less than 24 hours, torture, forced labor, gunshot wounds, serious injuries, and amputations. These children were among the many Sierra Leonean children that had their limbs amputated by rebel forces.




Beth Vann

The majority of the women interviewed by PHR/UNAMSIL perceived their general health (89%) and mental health (94%) as “fair” or “poor”.




PHR program associate Kristina Hare Lyons (left) interviews a Sierra Leonean woman in March 2000.




Chen Reis

PHR consultants Beth Vann (left) and Yinka Akinsulure-Smith led training sessions for local Sierra Leonean researchers who later conducted the survey.



Cheri Reis

PHR/UNAMSIL survey researchers prepare to conduct interviews at an IDP camp.



Kristina Mare Lyons

The Forum for African Women's Educationalists (FAWE) is a pan-African NGO that has been successful in promoting education for girls. FAWE expanded their mandate to respond to the needs of rape victims after the January 1999 incursion by rebels into Freetown and became the primary organization providing medical and counseling services to rape survivors.




Kristina Hare Lyons

The US government and other donors should ensure that women are included in all aspects of planning for peace, demobilization, reintegration and rebuilding and support local organizations working to promote women's full participation and rights.




Krisina Hare Lyons

Sierra Leone's rich diamond resources have largely been fueling the brutal war. Diamonds, discovered in Sierra Leone in 1930, are found in about a third of the country's territory—mostly in the east and southeast. Governments, activists and representatives of the diamonds industry are working to regulate the import and export of the gems.



Cheri Reis

In 2001, Sierra Leone was the least developed country in the world, according to the United Nations Human Development Index. Sierra Leoneans average life expectancy of 38.3 years is the lowest in the world and the under five mortality rate is the highest in the world. Nearly one third of children in Sierra Leone die before their fifth birthday. Twelve percent of children under 14 years of age, such as the orphans pictured here, have one or both parents dead.



Kirstina Hare Lyons

Destroyed buildings in Freetown, such as the one pictured, are still occupied. Sierra Leone's infrastructure has been devastated by the war. Thirty-six percent of Sierra Leoneans do not have access to health care. Thirty-four percent do not have access to clean water. The average per capita income is \$448. More than 3,000 communities were destroyed resulting in flight from homes of nearly half the country's population.

one man, Mohammed, who was ex-SLA. She said that she begged him to release her but he said she should stay until she had the baby, so she could leave the child with the rebels. She told PHR that if she refused to have sex he would beat her – though he stopped beating her when she was four months pregnant. No other men touched her after that. Mohammed's boss took care of her and gave her food. From Makeni she was brought to a base in Occra Hills.

One day when she was about six months pregnant she said that she was sent to do laundry by the stream. She left the clothes and took a bush path with another girl. They came to an area where soldiers had surrendered and found transportation back to Freetown. She said that she found her mother who was pleased to see her, but her aunt said her mother should not take her in. She said that her mother, however, insisted and her father has also been supportive. She was scared to go home, but since she went to FAWE and got counseling she feels much better. She came to FAWE two weeks after arriving back in Freetown. A neighbor in Wellington had told her and her mother about the program and brought her to the office. At first she could not sleep and would always wake up at night, but now after the FAWE counseling sessions she is able to relax.

Her baby, Fatmata, was four months old at the time of the interview. Zainab had no problems with the delivery and likes being a mother. She knew she wanted to keep the baby when she was pregnant. She said she is scared Mohammed will come for the baby. Though she does not think he should be punished, she never wants to see him again and wants to try to forget about him. She also has anxieties about what will happen when the program ends. At the time of the interview she was not interested in getting married in the future, but in gaining skills so she can support her child.²⁰¹

Other Human Rights Abuses

The PHR study revealed the severity of human rights abuses in addition to sexual violence experienced by IDPs at the hands of combatants. Ninety-four percent of households interviewed by the PHR/UNAMSIL team were affected by one or more serious physical abuses. The trauma experiences by those who suffered sexual violence must, therefore, be understood in the context of trauma suffered from a range of abuses committed against the individual, her family and community. In addition to the reported levels of trauma and physical abuse experienced, many of those PHR interviewed spoke of loss. This loss went beyond the loss of basic human needs such as housing, food and medical care. It concerned safety, trust, control, self-esteem, and intimacy. Participants interviewed expressed shock, anger, horror, sadness, and a sense of countless additional losses – loss of property, society, family, loved ones, health and a sense of well being. In a society

²⁰¹ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

where the extended family plays an integral function, this primary means of support was irrevocably damaged. Several women who had not suffered sexual violence spoke of the range of abuses they and their families had experienced and the multiple losses they faced. A young woman, Marie K., described to PHR her and her family's experience:

*...They killed many of us, many people...about 100, we were in an unfinished house when they came and kicked at the doors and demanded to know who was in there. They yelled that if we didn't come out they would kill us or burn the house down. Someone near the door opened it. The rest of us were hiding in a room, huddled together. They came in and began to hit us with their weapons yelling "get out, if you don't come out we will kill you." Those who refused to come out, they lit the house up and burned it with them inside the house...*²⁰²

Aminata B.

Aminata B., a 21 year-old Limba woman who was 12 years old when the war started, told of the destruction of her family's farm by rebels

*...I grew up with my parents in the Kenema area – Bahamaconta. When the war came, we had to run away, everything we had was burned down or taken away. My father was killed and we couldn't even bury him, we had to just leave him behind...we don't know whether he was ever buried. My mother, sisters and I fled to Makeni. When we lived in Bahamaconta I used to go to school, but when we fled to Makeni, my mother could no longer afford to send my sisters and me to school. We tried to sell water (put in small plastic bags for drinking purposes) to make money to survive...*²⁰³

Musu

Musu was abducted when she was 12 years old and at the time she was interviewed by PHR in March 2000 she had twin nine-month-old boys. She told PHR her story:

I had gotten up and bathed and was getting ready to go to school when the rebels came. I heard shooting and hid under my bed. They searched my house. They shouted, they'd launch an attack on the house and set it on fire if we didn't go with them. I was so frightened I felt I had to use the toilet – the rebels told me I could relieve myself right there in front of them. They took me out of my house and threatened to kill me if I resisted. I saw a neighbor and warned her to run. She was seated and had already surrendered. I surrendered also. We were forced to walk in

²⁰² PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

²⁰³ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

the bush for one week and three days. My feet swelled with pain until my toenails came off. We traveled from Kambia to Malal Hill in Makeni. We stayed one week then we trained as commandos for one month and three days, after which we were attacked by government troops. They (rebels) moved out in the middle of the night and traveled on foot to Rotifunk where we all stayed for one year and six months. In 1997, I was with the rebels when they attacked Freetown, but I returned with the rebels because I saw no family there. I never killed anyone. I [lied to them and] told them I had surgery on my eyes and could not see to shoot. They believed me because my eyes were always swollen and red [from crying] because of the things I saw. When the rebels returned to Freetown in 1999 I was pregnant. I convinced a lady to allow me to stay with her. I told her no harm would come to her. I stayed in her house until one day I ran into my aunt on the street. I told her my story and she invited me to come stay with her.²⁰⁴

Women's Attitudes about Punishment of Perpetrators

A striking finding from both the in-depth interviews and survey was how many women did not want their perpetrator to be punished. The survey revealed that only 42% of those who responded to this question thought their perpetrators should be punished. Because of the destruction of the war, many Sierra Leoneans do not have experience with a functioning judiciary – this may have been a factor in some women's responses. Some of the women indicated to PHR that what they had experienced was so horrific that they did not believe justice to be possible, others feared retaliation by their perpetrators. Most did not seek justice or revenge, but rather peace and reconciliation, a theme that was echoed in the long form testimonies.

Mary J., 16 years old at the time of the interview, explained her reasoning for not wanting to seek punishment for her persecutors:

...My parents died during the war – they were killed by rebels. I was there and saw it. They captured me and took me with them to the bush. I was a virgin. Two men used me, they ruined me. I escaped when we came near Freetown...so many problems since. I became ill, stomach aches...Finally I was taken to the hospital. I wanted to die. In the hospital, they told me they had to do emergency surgery, my people did not have any money...If they catch them and try to do to them what they did to me, it won't even come near the hell I've been through. So they should just leave them. If they try to punish them, the punishment that I have gotten is more than theirs. I wanted to die during that time. If the emergency operation had not been performed, I would have died...If I

²⁰⁴ PHR Interview March 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

*ask for punishment for them, it will never amount to what I went through, so the best thing is just to leave them so that we can have peace in Sierra Leone.*²⁰⁵

A desire for a return to peace was also expressed by Fatmata, a 21 year-old woman with two children:

*I was dragged out of the house, but when they saw me, they said that they wanted a virgin, even then I was told to undress...a gun was put to my head, I was kidnapped and constantly threatened with rape...I just want peace in the country, I want things to go back to the way they were in the old days...*²⁰⁶

Madina K., a young woman, was one of the women who expressed a desire to bring one of those involved in her attack to justice:

*...They'd wanted to burn the house down with me in it...I was beaten, raped, forced to go with them. They told me to do bad things, they threatened me with death and beat me. Two men raped me. The first one would go and call other men to come and join in. Others intervened and saved me...I don't want revenge. I don't even remember who they were. The only one I want punished is the one who kidnapped me. I want him to be punished for his wickedness...*²⁰⁷

Some victims revealed that their attackers made explicit threats. A 30 year-old woman from the north was raped and beaten by two RUF members in 1997. Her husband was also beaten and their home burned and looted. She told PHR, "They [the attackers] were saying to me after they raped me if I will say it to anyone, they will come and kill me."

In spite of the risks, women did offer to give their names to the Special Court or the TRC. One victim who agreed to testify said enthusiastically: "I am ready to go anywhere in the world to explain myself."

The PHR survey administered in 2001 concluded with a series of six open-ended questions for those respondents who reported war-related sexual violence to provide more details about their experiences and additional information about their health, their future, and other concerns. All participants were also encouraged to provide additional comments at the end of the interview. The experiences and concerns women described in their answers to these questions are briefly described here.

Identity and Affiliation of Attackers

Participants were asked to provide identifying information about their attackers and their affiliation:

²⁰⁵ PHR interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

²⁰⁶ PHR interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

²⁰⁷ PHR interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

Do you know anything that could identify your attackers? Did they call each other by name? How do you know which military group your attackers were with?

Many respondents were able to provide first names of their attackers – both real names and *noms de guerre* such as Blood, Pepper, Nasty, Bullet, Cut Hand, Poison, God Father, Rebel Baby, Dry Gin, Rambo and Commando Around the World. While one woman was gang-raped by eight members of the RUF, she only named one perpetrator: “His name is Body Naked and if I see him now I will identify him.” Several women offered the full names of their attackers as well as descriptions of them.

The affiliation of perpetrators was understood primarily through verbal communication, “They call their leader’s name, Foday Sankoh and their commander Superman;” “They call themselves West Side Boys and they took me to their base and I was with them until I escaped.” A twenty-five year-old woman from Port Loko who was captured by the AFRC in 1998 and whose husband was tortured said that the perpetrators referred to themselves as “our junta the AFRC.” Two women specifically identified members of the Sierra Leone Army, though it is possible that they were part of the military that turned on the government: “They said they were the Sierra Leone Military Group.”

Dress also played a role in linking individuals to a group in the minds of those who were attacked. One woman told PHR, “They were running after us and they were calling Superman, Colonel Issa, and everybody knows that these people were RUF, because they were always at the bush and wore T-shirts with “RUF” printed on them. I was given one to wear by Gold Teeth.” A 16-year-old from Port Loko who was gang raped by five attackers and held for months was able to identify her attackers “because they were wearing Tupac [Shakur] T-shirts, so I know they were rebels.” The RUF were identified numerous times as wearing red scarves tied around their heads. “They identify each other by names. One called himself Abdullah, another Mohammed and the last Sorie. They all had red cloths on the forehead. The Ex-SLA wore their uniforms and identified themselves as Ex-SLA,” recounted a woman who had been abducted and gang raped. Another woman who had a similar experience in which she was jointly attacked by RUF and Ex-SLA claimed: “They had red cloth on their forehead and call their leaders name, which is Poppeh,²⁰⁸ meaning Foday Sankoh.” Another woman told PHR, “They had red headbands and green uniforms on and said they were fighting for Foday Sankoh (and) that they were going to fight until Tejan Kabbah goes away.”

Of the 93 survivors of sexual violence interviewed in the PHR survey

²⁰⁸ The name of Poppeh, apparently a nickname for Foday Sankoh, was mentioned by many women in the questionnaire. While it was spelled differently by the various researchers, it is reasonable to assume that they are all referring to the same name.

who were able to identify the affiliation of their perpetrator(s) in the PHR survey, the RUF was named 63 times, four of which were in complicity with ex-SLA soldiers. The West Side Boys were named 14 times, the AFRC eight times, Liberians two times, and the Sierra Leone military twice, though it is unclear whether their loyalty was with the government at the time of the attacks. Most attackers identified themselves verbally as well as by their dress, but also, in the incidents perpetrated by RUF fighters, by declaring their loyalty to their leader. Several victims concluded the affiliation of their perpetrators because they were “based near by.”

While no direct evidence of command responsibility was provided to PHR, several women pointed a finger at rebel leadership. A 30 year-old woman from the North who was abducted, raped and beaten by RUF stated, “I just know that the leader of the fighters is the fault because if he stopped them, they would never do it – because he supported it – that’s why.”

Many participants were clear about the affiliation of their attackers. It must, however, be understood that many of the rebel factions collaborating and loyalties shifted at various times of the war. As such, in some cases, it may be difficult to determine perpetrator affiliation with certainty.

Relationship between Victim and Perpetrator

The complexity of the relationship between victim and perpetrator that has on occasion developed in the bush must be noted. It has been reported that some women and girls who were abducted chose to remain with their captors. There are a number of possible explanations. The PHR survey revealed that some who became pregnant as a result of rape consider themselves married to their captors and believe they have no choice but to remain with their “husbands.” Other possible factors contributing to the reported phenomena of abductees voluntarily remaining with their captors include: identification with the abductor, drug addiction, the more desirable food options reportedly available in the bush, fear that they will be rejected by their families and communities if they go home, and the fact that many abductees, particularly those who were abducted as young girls are now accustomed to their new way of life and surrogate families.²⁰⁹

For example, one 16 year-old girl from the Port Loko area with no schooling was raped and abducted by a member of the RUF. She thinks commanders were aware of the attacks and she “can identify her attacker because she knows his name and he forced her to marry him.” While she expressed fear of contracting a disease and of future sexual violence by combatants, she does not think her perpetrator should be punished now because he is her legal husband and they have a child together.

²⁰⁹ PHR conversations Corinne Dufka of Human Rights Watch, January, 2001 and with NGO representatives who were providing services to returned abductees, March 2000.

A 16-year-old from the Eastern area was abducted by the RUF in 1999 with her sister and forced to marry her captor. She also claims the commander was aware of the attack. She does not think her attacker should be punished because of fear of reprisals and in the spirit of reconciliation:

In the bush he was called Lt. Papay, ... He said they were Mosquito's group. That he was pure rebel and would marry me and carry me into the bush and live with me there because they are bad people and want to destroy me and even the country.

What Perpetrators Said During the Attacks

More than half of the women who reported sexual violence answered the question, "What did [your attackers] say to you, or to each other?" About a fourth of these reported that their attackers explicitly claimed to be targeting supporters of Pa (Tejan) Kabba. Of these, many women were directly told to go tell Pa Kabba about what had happened to them: One woman told PHR "They told me to go complain to Tejan Kabbah after they have burnt my clothes and house, then raped me." Another reported that "they told me if I refuse to lie down they will kill me and after they finished they told me to go and report to Pa Kabba." This was almost identical to what was reported to PHR by another woman: "They told me they are going to kill me if I refuse to follow them and they told me to lie down. They also used all sort of obscene language at me and they told me to go and tell Tejan Kabba." These remarks suggest that the attacks were politically motivated.

Other women reported comments made by their attackers that suggest political motivation. According to one participant, "they asked me, 'whom are you going to vote for?'" Another told PHR "they said they are coming with their boss Foday Sankoh to take over from Pa Kabbah, and that we should support them." A 22 year-old woman who was abducted by the RUF with her husband's other wife quoted her attackers; "We will never release you until we marry you... Because Foday Sankoh is not president, that's why we are doing this to women." Another told PHR "they said they were fighting because the government was corrupt." A 19 year-old woman was raped along with all seven other female members of her household. "They were saying we are not ready for disarmament until they release Foday Sankoh from prison to come to us."

Many also reported to PHR that they were threatened with violence or death by their attackers if they did not cooperate, as evidenced by some of the statements above. A woman from Port Loko whose husband was beaten, whose sons were abducted and are still missing, and who was raped along with her daughter and her husband's other wife reported the

rebels saying to her “that if I don’t allow them to rape me they were going to kill me, so I allowed them.”

Why Did Respondents Think Combatants Attacked Women?

In response to the question posed by the PHR/UNAMSIL team, “Why do you think combatants did these things – sexually abusing women and girls – during this war?” the majority of women did not reply or stated that they did not know. Many of those who answered gave the question over to God, saying only God knew why the assailants did those things. Among those who ventured an opinion, most maintained that the combatants targeted women because women are weak, they cannot fight back, or run away. Some women stated simply that the men wanted sex. A smaller, but significant, group of respondents indicated that the men committed acts of sexual violence because they did not respect women or their mothers. Other women cited the sense of omnipotence felt by their attackers. As one woman explained, “They are rebels. They could do anything.” Another said, “because they wanted young women and they have money and guns.”

Several responses suggested the actions of the perpetrators were strategic: “They use women as human shields in their campaign against the government and whenever they have planned attacks women lead in order to be spies.” “They know what they did it for – they hold the gun and their motive was to see women and rape them.”

Women’s Concerns about the Future and about Their Health

The majority of women who responded to the two questions about their biggest worries about the future in general and about their health referred to the financial and personal insecurity they faced as a result of the war. Women expressed fear that the war would not end and that they would experience future attacks and abuse. They spoke of their lack of livelihoods, homes, and husbands to provide for them. As one woman told PHR “Presently my husband is no more. Who will take care of me in the future? They have looted my properties and I do not have anything for now.” A number of women expressed fear about how they would provide for themselves or for their children, including offspring from the rapes they experienced. One woman told PHR, “I am homeless, bankrupt, and where can I get help to take care of my unborn child?”

In their responses about overall worries about the future, some respondents linked their fears about their vulnerability as “violated” women without a male partner or family with concern about their health:

There will be no better future for me because I am broken. No man will marry me or take me seriously. I don’t want to become sick, to get what they call AIDS. People will begin to say a lot about me if they know what happened to me.

The concern about having contracted a sexually transmitted disease or AIDS was a prominent concern expressed by several participants in response to the question about specific health worries. Women described experiencing diffuse abdominal and pelvic pains and expressed worry that these represented sexually transmitted diseases. Yet, they were afraid of the stigma associated with seeking help for rape-related health problems:

I don't want to have AIDS. I am afraid to go to the hospital. I don't want people to know if it is true that I have AIDS. I don't know whether I have AIDS or not.

Other women expressed a desire for medical treatment, but spoke of their lack of access to medical assistance at the IDP camps. Many of the respondents, both those who had directly suffered sexual trauma and those who had not, spoke in general terms of being physically and mentally sick, but with little hope of receiving necessary medical care.

In addition to the series of open-ended questions asked by PHR of those who survived sexual violence, all participants were given the opportunity to provide additional comments at the end of the interview.

Many respondents expressed a strong desire for an end to the war so they can return home and resume their previous routine including work, food and housing: "I want the government to help with all possible means to put an end to this war. I am fed up being displaced. I want to go back. I want perfect peace so that our children can go back to school and we would no longer have fear."

Many, however, did not know the state of their homes, which they feared or knew had been burned or looted: "When the rebels attacked us at night, I left naked and ran into the bush. They burned and looted everything in our house." In the camps many women have little to do but gather firewood to occupy their time, which some sell to earn money. Some complained of food shortages and lack of access to medicines: "I worry about my daughter because she never discloses anything about her experience when she was abducted. I want the government to help me with money so that I will be able to take her to the hospital for medical check up since she refuses to talk to me. I need clothes for my children and also for myself." Another expressed her desperation:

Since four years back they abducted my son – until now I don't know if he's dead or alive. I want to see him. The condition we are living in is deplorable. We are praying and asking for rapid deployment – we want to return. There is nothing to live on unless the mere bulgur. My sides are paining me from laying on the ground – we have no place to sleep.

A number of women who had lost their husbands in the war stressed the need for education and skills training for women and assistance in sup-

porting their children: “Now that they have killed my two children and also my husband is dead, how am I going to maintain the other children as we need assistance?”

Now I have lost my husband so I do not have a husband. I have no money. I am also an old woman. All that I had was left to the mercy of the rebels because I had to run when they were behind us. As you can see, my feet are swollen, I cannot walk – I cannot do anything. The first thing is that I do not have money – If I had money I would start doing something. All I can say now is that I wish the war would end.

Women requested loans for business purposes, as well as a need for assistance with school fees so they could send their children back to school: “We are praying that this war ends. We will also like to see rehabilitation take place in our community. We want our homes rebuilt, but most of all education for our children. We know that once they are educated, they in return will help build our nation.” Several women not only recognized the importance of education for the long-term success of the country, but specifically noted education for girls:

We want education in our land. The saying goes that when you educate a woman, you educate a nation. We want our girl children to go to school, learn skills – and even we parents, if need be. We want loan schemes because some of us were traders, but today the rebels have suffered us.

Many of the additional comments could be categorized to reveal the most common concerns among IDP women who did not report sexual violence. The prevailing response was a desire for the war to end (168/424): “My heart’s desire now is to see that the war ends so that we can go back home. Those who took the guns on us, we want God to take the guns from them so that we can go to our homes in peace.” A quarter (108/424) said that they wanted to return home: “Only begin the perpetrators to come out of the bush and lay down their weapons for us to go home – we’re homesick.” Education for children was also mentioned (30/424) – and education/skills for the participant by (10/424). A thirty-four year-old woman with five young children who had been displaced since January 1999 and is separated from her husband said that she “needs help from any NGO to set up women’s groups for the promotion of women’s activities to become self-reliant.”

Fifty-eight women expressed a need for clothing, food or other household items including pots for cooking, utensils and bedding. Twenty requested financial assistance and 15 medical assistance. Fifteen requested assistance with building and repair.

Of those who reported sexual violence, 79 provided additional comments. The comments they provided were related to the preceding ques-

tions which focused on details about their perpetrator and their concerns about their health and their future. The most common comments among this group also had to do with a desire for an end to the war and for going home. Other concerns cited in descending order of frequency were: health/medical, schooling/training, clothing, shelter, cooking tools, financial support/loans, child care, food, family tracing, justice, and fear of future attacks. "Help me with school fees as I want to be a lawyer in the future. My mother is poor and do not have money. Protect women also."

Many of these women also asked for assistance to simply begin rebuilding their lives, in some cases their pleas reflect an acute helplessness and desperation more evident among those who reported sexual violence. Many have lost their husbands, their homes, their children, their possessions and in some cases their ability to work due to disability and disease. "I am going to let the human rights people help me for medication. I am slowly dying – please help." "Let the government and other NGOs decide on any help for us." "We have suffered greatly during this war – even something to eat and wear we do not have, so please help us." "Provide enough medicines because only panadol (paracetamol²¹⁰) is available. Rebuild our homes, send doctors who are very well with their jobs." "Please UNAMSIL, help us. We are tired of this war. We want to return back. Please UN come help us with this war – help us return to our homes."

Even those who felt less defeated pleaded for help: "I am thanking all those who ask you people to come and interview us about our experiences in the war in Jesus name. I greet them all. I pray God will touch the heart of the human rights people to think of our plight and bring immediate help for us." •

²¹⁰ Also known as acetaminophen or Tylenol.

V. APPLICATION OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW

The acts of sexual violence, killings, and torture documented in this report that were perpetrated against civilians in Sierra Leone are crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined by international legal standards.²¹¹

Traditionally, rape and other forms of sexual violence were regarded as legitimate spoils of war, and sexual access to the vanquished women viewed as an incentive to capture a town. During the Middle Ages, wartime rape was increasingly prohibited, though rarely punished. Sexual violence was generally viewed as an unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of war. Although evidence of rape, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery, forced abortion, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, sexual mutilation, and sexual humiliation was entered into the official transcripts of the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials held after World War II, attempts to prosecute the crimes were very limited.²¹²

As recent events in such conflicts as those in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have demonstrated, sexual violence is increasingly used as a powerful weapon of war, a means to cause serious bodily and mental harm to not only women, but to all members of the opposing group. Rape and other forms of sexual violence, including reproductive crimes, are now regarded as means of inflicting terror and destruction upon the civilian population and the armed forces protecting them.²¹³ Partly as a result of reports of women being detained and systematically raped in the Balkan conflict and during the Rwanda genocide, the international community has recognized these acts as serious crimes which merit prosecution and punishment. This acknowledgement has led to the inclusion of gender-based crimes in not only the Statute of the International Criminal Court, but also the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia²¹⁴ and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.²¹⁵ Several judgments rendered by these tribunals have recognized various forms of

²¹¹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 7/17/98). See www.untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm

²¹² See Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals* (1997).

²¹³ See discussion in Askin, K.D., "Women and International Humanitarian Law," in Askin, K. & Koenig, D., eds. *Women and International Human Rights Law*, vol. I, 1999.

²¹⁴ Statute of The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (adopted 5/25/93) www.un.org/icty

sexual violence as instruments of genocide, means of torture, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, regardless of the nature of the conflict as international or internal.²¹⁶ Sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery, is specifically included in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Humanitarian law

The legal instruments that constitute what is referred to as international humanitarian law, or laws of war, set out protections that apply in times of conflict. These overlap and supplement the protections offered by human rights law.

In the case of an internal conflict, such as the one in Sierra Leone, the protections that exist are less complete. Nonetheless, rape, extrajudicial killing, and torture are clearly prohibited under any circumstance. The origin of these standards is codified in Article 3 common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which afford protections to civilians, prisoners of war, and others rendered *hors de combat* in internal armed conflicts.²¹⁷ The 1977 Additional Protocol I which regulates international armed conflicts and Additional Protocol II, which regulates non-international armed conflict, expand on these protections.²¹⁸ Sierra Leone is a party to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions²¹⁹ and both Additional Protocols.²²⁰

Common Article 3 which applies to all parties in internal conflicts such as Sierra Leone's, prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment." Additional Protocol I that regulates international armed conflict specifies that "Women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent

²¹⁵ Statute of The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (adopted 11/8/94). See www.ictt.org

²¹⁶ See especially Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998; Prosecutor v. Anto Furund`ija, Judgement, IT-95-17/1-T, December 10, 1998; Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al., Judgement, IT-96-21-T, November 16, 1998; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgement, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, February 22, 2001.

²¹⁷ See e.g., Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS (1950) 287-417.

²¹⁸ 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS (1979) 609-99 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].

²¹⁹ Succession: June 10, 1965

²²⁰ Ratified: October 21, 1986

assault.”²²¹ Additional Protocol II which applies in certain internal armed conflicts expands upon and explicitly forbids “violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation”²²² and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”²²³ The jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR has reinforced the principle that serious violations of these provisions constitute war crimes. As such, the acts of rape, killing and torture documented in this report, which were committed with a nexus to the armed conflict, are war crimes and international crimes prosecutable regardless of the presence of an armed conflict if committed in the context of crimes against humanity or genocide.

Human Rights Law

Sierra Leone has signed or ratified several international human rights treaties that prohibit the abuses committed against civilians documented in this report. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),²²⁴ the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),²²⁵ and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).²²⁶ These treaties protect the right to life, and the right to be free from torture and arbitrary detention. Sierra Leone is also a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).²²⁷

International human rights law distinguishes certain rights as non-derogable. These must be respected in all circumstances including times of conflict. The right to life is one such right and is set out in the ICCPR²²⁸ and, in the case of children, the CRC.²²⁹ Another non-derogable right identified in the ICCPR is the right to be free from torture.²³⁰ This right is set out in more detail in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Sexual violence including rape is

²²¹ Additional Protocol 1, Article 76 (1)

²²² Additional Protocol II, Article 4(2)(a).

²²³ Ibid, article 4(2)(e).

²²⁴ Acceded: August 23, 1996.

²²⁵ Signed: March 18, 1985; ratified by parliament March 1, 2001

²²⁶ Signed: February 13, 1990; ratified: June 18, 1990

²²⁷ Signed: September 22, 1988; Ratified: November 11, 1988. Sierra Leone's initial and second and third periodic reports were due December 11, 1989, 1993 and 1997 respectively

²²⁸ ICCPR, Article 6(1)

²²⁹ CRC, Article 6(1)

²³⁰ ICCPR, Article 7

also recognized as a form of torture in reports by the Special Rapporteur on Torture, and in cases before the European Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

The Slavery Convention defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”²³¹ As recognized in the Kunarac Case, indicia of slavery may include “sex; prostitution; and human trafficking” as well as “control of sexuality.”²³² The case stood for the proposition that enslaving women and girls and subjecting them to rape constituted sexual slavery. Also, article 8 of the ICCPR states that “No one shall be held in servitude”²³³ and prohibits forced labor.²³⁴

Non-State Actors

Regarding international humanitarian law, the provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions apply to all parties to a conflict, this includes armed opposition forces such as the RUF and the AFRC. As such, these non-state actors may be held accountable for their violations of international humanitarian law.²³⁵

The Kunarac Case in the ICTY recently emphasized that under international humanitarian law, the “presence of a state official or of any other authority-wielding person in the torture process is not necessary for the offense to be regarded as torture.”²³⁶ Thus, whereas human rights law might require state action or sanction of torture, international humanitarian law and international criminal law does not. This is consistent with the Statute for the International Criminal Court, which also deleted the state-actor requirement.²³⁷ All persons, regardless of whether acting in an official capacity or not, can and should be held individually criminally liable for international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. The perpetrators of the crimes documented in the PHR survey can and should be prosecuted for their crimes.

The PHR study documented that 6% of abuses were committed by government forces. However, most abuses for which the affiliation of perpetrators was identified were committed by the RUF or unspecified rebels

²³¹ Slavery Convention Article 1(1) www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/28.shtml

²³² Kunarac et al, paras. 542-43.

²³³ ICCPR, Article 8(2)

²³⁴ ICCPR Article 8(3)

²³⁵ E/CN.4/2001/73 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences Violence against women perpetrated and/or condoned by the State during times of armed conflict (1997-2000)

²³⁶ Kunarac et al., para. 496.

²³⁷ Rome Statute untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm

(86%). As an armed opposition group, the RUF is not a party to the human rights instruments above, however the characteristics of the RUF and the nature, pattern, and seriousness of the abuses are such that the RUF may be held to the standards contained therein.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone

Background

At the request of the Government of Sierra Leone, the United Nations proposed establishing an international court for prosecution of those responsible for the commission of atrocities during the war. UN Security Council Resolution 1315, adopted on August 14, 2000, requested negotiations for creation of a court to prosecute “crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law,”²³⁸ and to try those “persons who bear the greatest responsibility”²³⁹ for these crimes.

Following negotiations, it was determined that the court for Sierra Leone would differ from the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in several ways.

The Sierra Leonean Court would be based on a treaty or agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone. As such, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, it cannot assert primacy over national courts of other states nor can it order accused individuals located in another state to surrender.

Staff for the Special Court, including the judges and prosecutors, will be composed of both Sierra Leoneans and people from other countries.²⁴⁰ The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction will include acts in violation of international humanitarian law as well as certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law.²⁴¹

The Special Court will try cases of events occurring since November 30, 1996.²⁴² Although the conflict started in 1991, it was believed that extending the temporal jurisdiction to that time would impose too much of a burden on the court.

Security Council Resolution 1315 refers to voluntary contributions of funds, services and equipment,²⁴³ implying that the Security Council intended this to be the primary method of meeting the Special Court’s

²³⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1315, adopted on August 14, 2000 Available at www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1315e.pdf.

²³⁹ Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 1 Available at: www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid* Arts 2 & 3

²⁴¹ Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Article 1 Available at www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf.

²⁴² This is the date of the signing of the Abidjan accords, the first peace agreement between the RUF and the Sierra Leonean Government.

²⁴³ UN Security Council Resolution 1315 8(c)

costs.²⁴⁴ The UN Secretariat's Office of Legal Affairs has estimated that the Special Court's budget for the first three years will be about \$57 million of which some \$16.8 million will be required for the first year of operation.²⁴⁵ As of the end of November 2001, the UN had received contributions for \$14.8 million for the Court's first year. It had only received pledges for some \$20.4 million for the next two years. Initial steps toward the establishment of the court have taken place despite lack of funding.²⁴⁶

Gender-Based Crimes in the Special Court

The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone explicitly includes gender-based violence in its definition of several categories of crimes that the Court has the power to prosecute.

The Statute, in its listing of Crimes against Humanity, includes "rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence"²⁴⁷ as prosecutable crimes when "committed...as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population."²⁴⁸

The Court also expressly includes "rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault"²⁴⁹ as violations of humanitarian law as enshrined in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.²⁵⁰ As mentioned above, the court has the power to try certain offenses under Sierra Leonean law. Some of these may be used to prosecute gender-based violence against girls under the age of fourteen.²⁵¹

The term "systematic" requires a qualitative judgment by adjudicators as to active and passive complicity and the extent to which these crimes were committed. It is important to consider the high rate of sexual violence documented by the PHR survey. The frequency of sexual violence and other human rights abuses, especially those committed by the RUF, suggests that commanders are likely to have been aware of the crimes perpetrated by the forces under their command.

²⁴⁴ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Renewed Commitment Needed to End Impunity*, 24/09/2001 Available at [www.web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/AFR510072001ENGLISH/\\$File/AFR5100701.pdf](http://www.web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/AFR510072001ENGLISH/$File/AFR5100701.pdf) p.7

²⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.9

²⁴⁶ UN Daily Briefing, "Annan Authorizes Planning Mission for Sierra Leone Court", January 3, 2002, <http://www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites.htm>.

²⁴⁷ Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Art 2 (g) Available at www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf

²⁴⁸ *Ibid*, Article 2 chapeau

²⁴⁹ *Ibid*, Article 3 (e)

²⁵⁰ *Ibid*, Article 3 chapeau

²⁵¹ *Ibid*, Article 5

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Lome Peace Agreement of July 7, 1999, provides for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to “address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story [and] get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation”²⁵² by addressing human rights violations committed from the start of the conflict.

Enacted in 2000, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act²⁵³ provides more detail about the TRC, which will look at cases occurring prior to the signing of the Lome Agreement. As part of its mandate to “work to restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation,”²⁵⁴ the TRC will pay “special attention to the subject of sexual abuses.”²⁵⁵ Some education efforts about the TRC have begun²⁵⁶ and preliminary steps towards selection of Commissioners and preparation of a budget have been taken.²⁵⁷ The TRC, however, is not expected to begin operations until after the elections in 2002. Most importantly, the nature of the relationship between the TRC and the Special Court has not yet been resolved.²⁵⁸

It will be particularly important for both the Court and the Commission to consult with and hire persons with expertise in and sensitivity to gender-related crimes, including sexual violence and to ensure the protection of women that come forward to testify.

²⁵² Peace Agreement Between The Government Of Sierra Leone And The Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone Art. XXVI <http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>

²⁵³ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000. Available at www.sierra-leone.org/trcacat2000.html

²⁵⁴ TRC Act Part III 6 (2)(b)

²⁵⁵ TRC Act Part III 6 (2)(b)

²⁵⁶ <http://www.sierra-leone.org/trc.html>

²⁵⁷ Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone p.7 www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/857e.pdf

²⁵⁸ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Renewed Commitment Needed to End Impunity*, 24/09/2001; pp. 13-14 [www.web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/AFR510072001ENGLISH/\\$File/AFR5100701.pdf](http://www.web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/AFR510072001ENGLISH/$File/AFR5100701.pdf)

VI. RESPONSES TO THE SIERRA LEONE COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY

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Humanitarian Assistance

Numerous non-governmental and international organizations are working in Sierra Leone to address the complex humanitarian emergency that has emerged from the ongoing conflict. These groups are doing their best to provide a range of basic services under extremely difficult conditions. There are, however, significant gaps in services due to funding, coordination and security problems. The task is made all the more challenging by the frequent movement of populations including the periodic surges of returnees from neighboring countries. United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) is the lead coordinating body for humanitarian relief in Sierra Leone with Sierra Leone's National Committee for Relief Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (NCRRR).

After the peace process deteriorated in May 2000 most relief agencies were forced to evacuate the country and humanitarian assistance temporarily ceased. Relief activities resumed, however, in the second half of 2000 as agencies regained access to affected areas. The cease-fire agreements between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone as well as the recent opening of roads has allowed much improved access to areas of the country previously beyond the reach of aid agencies.²⁵⁹

Numerous agencies are working to build shelter; feed and provide healthcare for the displaced; reintegrate adult and child soldiers; reunite families; care for orphans; mitigate the ill effects of the civil war, particularly for children, women and the injured; provide food security; educate the population and rebuild the infrastructure of the country.²⁶⁰ Meeting the food needs of the displaced, one of the greatest challenges to the relief community, has been managed by four implementing agencies: Care, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), World Vision and the UN World Food Program (WFP). The provisions of shelter, education and healthcare have also been priorities.

Basic health services are offered in clinics set up temporarily in some IDP and demobilization camps by organizations such as International

²⁵⁹ Sierra Leone-Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY2001), April 20, 2001 p 1.

²⁶⁰ For a more detailed list of organizations working in Sierra Leone specifically on the issue of sexual violence, see Appendix C.

Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), the International Medical Corps (IMC), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), though like the PHUs they suffer from a shortage of trained staff, equipment and medications.²⁶¹ Some of those who were maimed in the fighting or who had their limbs amputated by rebel forces have received more comprehensive assistance from various NGOs including Handicap International (HI), MSF, and Christian Children's Fund (CCF). Such programs involve reconstructive surgery, prostheses, physical therapy, counseling and vocational training.

Despite several rebel incursions, the capital, Freetown, has been one of the most secure areas in the country and provided a base for the various aid organizations working in Sierra Leone. This concentration of services has led to problems of coordination in the Western area, as well as inadequate services in the provinces, although both issues are beginning to be addressed as the security situation continues to stabilize.²⁶² UNOCHA and UNHCR are making significant progress in developing maps on who is doing what and where in the humanitarian arena. The maps of individual international non-governmental organizations are now available, in electronic form, at the Humanitarian Information Center in Freetown.

NCRRR is providing emergency recovery funding and technical support in over one-third of the country, which is accessible in the following sectors: agriculture, capacity building, community infrastructure, education and health facilities rehabilitation water and sanitation, and roads.

Relief agencies, with the support of international donors, are also responding to the needs of half a million refugees in Guinea by setting up camps and providing food, medical care and education.²⁶³

International Community Response to the Crisis in Sierra Leone

Though a number of international and non-governmental organizations have had operations on the ground providing humanitarian and development assistance for decades, the international community has been particularly active in promoting peace in Sierra Leone since the signing of the Lome Accord in 1999. Efforts to end the crisis have included strengthening the UN peacekeeping mission, taking concerted action to curb the trade in diamonds used to procure arms, supporting the demobilization effort, and resolving to establish a Special Court for Sierra Leone in an effort to end impunity.

The United Kingdom (UK) has played a particularly prominent role in the marked improvements in the security situation over the past year. The

²⁶¹ During a March 2000 investigation, PHR observed that many clinics had no gloves, antibiotics or antibiotic cream.

²⁶² USAID, BHR, OFDA, Humanitarian Situation Report #1, October 3, 2001.

²⁶³ USAID, BHR, OFDA, Situation Report #1, October 3, 2001.

UK sent a team of Special Forces in response to the May 2000 crisis. Since then, the British have maintained a high-profile military presence and are actively screening new recruits and training the new Sierra Leonean army. While the United States has declined to send American soldiers to Sierra Leone, in an effort to build regional peacekeeping capacity the US has trained battalions of peacekeepers in Nigeria, Senegal²⁶⁴ and Ghana who could serve under the West African Regional Peace Keeping Force (ECOMOG) and/or or the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) in the future, and has provided logistical and technical support to UNAMSIL and ECOMOG.

The US and the UK have also assumed a leadership role within the UN structure to address conflict diamonds as well as the involvement of Charles Taylor and Liberia in the conflict.

While many developed countries have been active diplomatically and through humanitarian efforts, only developing countries including: Nigeria, India, Kenya, Jordan, Zambia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ghana, Guinea, and Nepal have contributed troops to the peacekeeping force.

Multilateral and Bilateral Support

While the international community is actively engaged in ending the conflict and is funding UNAMSIL in the amount of millions of dollars per day, Sierra Leone has historically received inadequate humanitarian and development assistance.²⁶⁵ Of over \$64 million requested by UN agencies for humanitarian assistance for Sierra Leone in 2000, only 65% was funded through contributions – and a portion through carry-over funds for the previous year. The increased appeal (CAP) of \$74 million in 2001 was also underfunded by 35%, or approximately \$26 million.²⁶⁶ Most donors channeled assistance to Sierra Leone through either the United Nations agencies or international NGOs, rather than through bilateral assistance given the weak state of the government. The primary donors involved in Sierra Leone are the European Union, The African Development Bank, The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank. The World Bank's activities have focused on agriculture, education, infrastructure and health. In addition to advising the government on economic reform, the Bank has provided funds of over \$650 million to various initiatives since 1995²⁶⁷ and manages the

²⁶⁴ Fisher-Thompson, J, US Aid West African Force in Sierra Leone on Track www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/440FC9976409CA70C1256A1D003CB447

²⁶⁵ Pratt p. 24

²⁶⁶ 2001 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for Humanitarian Assistance Summary of Revised Requirements and Contributions by Affected Country/Region. November 6, 2001.

²⁶⁷ World Bank web site www.worldbank.org, Countries: Sierra Leone

trust fund for the DDR process.²⁶⁸ Among the largest government donors of assistance to Sierra Leone are the US, UK, Norway, Germany, Sweden, Canada, Japan, France, Denmark and the Netherlands. The European Commission has earmarked 15.5 million Euros in 2001 to meet the needs of refugees, IDPs and host communities in Sierra Leone and Guinea. In both countries funds are channeled through partner organizations including *Premiere Urgence*, *Action Contre La Faim*, *Enfants Refugies du Monde*, *Oxfam*, *International Medical Corps (IMC)* and the *International Federation of the Red Cross* which are providing food, water and health care to the targeted population, assistance for IDPs, assistance for humanitarian agencies working on the ground, and special support for children, amputees and war-affected women.²⁶⁹

While the international community has provided increased humanitarian aid, particularly in 2001 in response to the refugee crisis in Guinea, many urgent humanitarian and development needs remain unmet due to the sheer scale and complexity of the crisis. Furthermore, Sierra Leone has historically received less development assistance in real terms and per capita than other nations in the region. In fact, official development assistance figures reveal that aid to Sierra Leone declined from \$133.4 million (\$30.6 per capita) in 1992 to \$106.3 (\$21.9 per capita) million in 1998.²⁷⁰ Though countries including the US may have hesitated to invest in a country wracked by political instability and corruption, now that the security situation is improving, it is vital that Sierra Leone receive strategic capital infusions in order to consolidate the delicate peace.

The current level of international involvement coupled with the relatively conciliatory position of the RUF offers the most optimistic outlook for peace in years. With active support for development and good governance by the international community, Sierra Leone with all its potential could become a model for the positive involvement of the international community. In the absence of adequate funding, it is likely that conflict in the country could reoccur as well as a broadening of the conflict in the region with serious humanitarian and security implications.

In addition to short-term engagement to enforce peace and longer-term development and nation building efforts to foster a climate less conducive to conflict, there is a particular need for greater assistance for women and girls who, even before the war, were disadvantaged due to discriminatory laws and cultural practices. Women and girls who have lost their fathers, sons and husbands due to the war are now heading households with severely limited resources while trying to recover from displacement and

²⁶⁸ World Bank, "Fact Sheet: Sierra Leone Disarmament Program and Donor Conference" Washington DC June 5 2001 Available at www.worldbank.org/afr/sl_pr_factsheet.pdf.

²⁶⁹ IRIN-WA, "ECHO Director Visits Guinea, Sierra Leone," May 16, 2001.

²⁷⁰ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2000*.

human rights abuses. Funding is urgently required for medical treatment, housing and skills training for survivors of sexual violence and for improved education, law enforcement, and judicial processes in order to better protect the population from sexual violence in the future.

United States Assistance

The US Government has provided more than \$300 million in humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone since the war began ten years ago from a number of departments within the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US Department of State. These include: the Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP), the Africa Bureau (USAID/AFR), and the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (State/PRM). The total USAID humanitarian assistance in FY 2000 was nearly \$40 million.²⁷¹ The total US Government humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone for FY 2001 was over \$75 million. That figure includes approximately \$20 million in support for humanitarian assistance programs²⁷² in agriculture, health, IDP resettlement, nutrition, shelter, water/sanitation, and education and training for ex-combatants, as well as electoral/political processes support and support for the reconciliation process, including human rights; \$37.3 million in food assistance,²⁷³ and nearly \$10 million for programs to assist returning refugees.²⁷⁴

The US also provided substantial support for Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea. In addition to \$60 million provided in response to UNHCR's Global Appeal for Africa for 2001, which was not earmarked, as well as \$33 million earmarked for West Africa, over \$22 million was allocated in 2001 (more than twice last year's figure) to address the refugee crisis in Guinea largely through international non-governmental organizations.²⁷⁵ Programs in Guinea and Sierra Leone addressing war-affected women that received funding from PRM in 2001 include the Center for Victims of Torture (approximately \$1.5 million) for psycho-social assistance to traumatized refugees in Guinea and Sierra Leone, the IRC (approximately \$250,000 for programs addressing sexual and gender-based violence, and IMC (\$725,000) for gynecological surgeries.²⁷⁶

²⁷¹ USAID Pledges \$2 million to Sierra Leone to Aid War-Affected, USAID Press Release June 27, 2000.

²⁷² Organizations receiving US funds include: Action Contre La Faim, Africare, CARE, CRS, Merlin, International Medical Corps, UNICEF, World Vision, and WFP.

²⁷³ Food assistance is distributed between WFP, CRS, CARE, and World Vision

²⁷⁴ Sierra Leone-Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY2002), October 3, 2001. P.12

²⁷⁵ From a phone conversation with Mary Lange of PRM/State, October 26, 2001. Organizations receiving PRM funds in Guinea and Sierra Leone include: UNHCR, IOM, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, OCHA, FAO, ICRC, Center for Victims of Torture, WHO, The Red Cross, Action Contre La Faim, American Refugee Committee, IMC, Save the Children, IRC

²⁷⁶ From a phone conversation with Mary Lange of PRM/State, October 26, 2001

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), is focusing its activities on supporting reconciliation and reintegration activities. OTI began working in Sierra Leone in January, 1997 and will exit in March, 2002 after handing off activities to other donors. In FY 1999, OTI supported the Sierra Leonean peace process with 232 small grants to civil society groups working in the areas of human rights, peacebuilding and youth activism for community development. This assistance for civil society's peace-building initiatives is particularly related to reconciliation and reintegration of war-torn communities in the provinces, and civic education to prepare for upcoming elections has been ongoing since FY 2000 and 2001. Also in 1999, OTI sent representatives to the Lome Peace talks. In 2000, at the request of the Sierra Leonean government, OTI provided specific technical assistance to establish the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP).²⁷⁷

OTI has also been supporting a nationwide, non-formal education initiative intended to reach 40,000 ex-combatant and civilian young adults. This two-year program, which began in January, 2000 combines reintegration orientation and counseling, life-skills training, vocational counseling, agriculture skills and development, civic education, and functional literacy training. The Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YRTEP) program focuses simultaneously on reintegration of ex-combatants and war-torn communities, and remedial education for youth who were unable to attend school due to the war. As of August 2001, 36,180 male and female war-affected youth and ex-combatants are participating in the program in over 1750 sites throughout the country. Approximately 18% of those enrolled were officially discharged combatants.²⁷⁸ The initiative addressed sexual violence only in one question as part of a 20-minute segment on responsible sexuality, which includes a discussion question related to sexual violence.²⁷⁹ This year the program has been expanded to include a second track of adult non-formal education, aimed at private and public sector leaders nationwide. So far, 180 civil servants, traditional and religious leaders, civil society leaders and leaders of professional groups, youth groups and women's groups are participating in the program.²⁸⁰ OTI has also funded efforts by the Sierra Leone Ministry

²⁷⁷ Documents provided to PHR by OTI summarizing their activities in Sierra Leone

²⁷⁸ Ibid

²⁷⁹ Email correspondence with Patrick Wingate, OTI/USAID to PHR, October 29, 2001.

²⁸⁰ OTI's international implementing partners in Sierra Leone are World Vision, Management Systems International (MSI), Common Ground Productions, and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES).

of Gender and Children's Affairs to create public awareness and build consensus on the role of women as peacemakers and agents of reform.

The OTI FY 2001 budget for Sierra Leone of \$3,804,081²⁸¹ is divided between five principal efforts:²⁸²

- Assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone for development of a new diamond policy and operations to address the conflict diamond problem;
- A continuation of the Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program;
- A continuation of funding for a small grant program for civil society's peace building initiative with an added focus on the reintegration of war-affected women and girls and the development of community leadership;²⁸³
- Communication support through NCDDR for demobilization, reconciliation, and reintegration, and to media and distance learning support for OTI's non-formal education program; and
- Co-funding with the UK (DFID and other USAID offices) to provide election assistance for national parliamentary, local and paramount chief elections scheduled to be held in 2001.

The US also pays 27% of the cost of the peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone. Though it is an assessed contribution, and therefore mandatory, several holds have been placed on the transfer of funds in the past year. Most of the funds were ultimately released, however, the problem of arrears adversely impacted the force and may have hampered the ability of the UN to get firm commitments of troops from member nations.²⁸⁴

The United Nations

The UN is deeply invested in Sierra Leone with the largest peacekeeping force in the world and most agencies operational on the ground including: UNHCR, OCHA, WFP, WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF, and UNDP. UNAMSIL is working to ensure that a human rights perspective is mainstreamed throughout the system and boasts the first permanent child rights protec-

²⁸¹ Sierra Leone-Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY 2001) April 20, 2001, p.2.

²⁸² In FY 2000, OTI provided \$3,284,000, and in FY 2001 is expected to contribute \$3,770,000.

²⁸³ OTI provided funding for programming for girls and women war victims to FAWE through World Vision, according to PHR correspondence 6/12/01 with Stephen Grant, USAID Sierra Leone Desk Officer.

²⁸⁴ According to the UN contributions office, as of August, 2001, the US had paid \$44 million for all peacekeeping operations in 2001 and owed \$1.8 billion, of which \$800 million was arrears.

tion officer connected to a UN peacekeeping operation. The UN's recognition of the particular circumstances faced by women in the Sierra Leonean war is reflected in more recent programs that have been carefully designed to ensure that the needs of women are addressed. At least 15 projects presented for funding in the Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for 2001 focus on the special needs of women.²⁸⁵ In addition, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, visited Sierra Leone in August 2001.

²⁸⁵ UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone 2001

VII. THE FUTURE FOR WOMEN IN SIERRA LEONE

Women, already disadvantaged and vulnerable prior to the outbreak of fighting in Sierra Leone,²⁸⁶ have suffered in egregious ways, as documented in the PHR survey. Many women have lost the protection of husbands, fathers and sons – the PHR survey revealed that 23% of IDP women were widowed or separated due to the war. Not only are women targets of violence simply because of their gender, but the low social status of women interferes with their ability to obtain treatment and ensure protection from future attacks, particularly in the climate of social breakdown that has existed in the country for much of the past 10 years.

Thousands of former combatants who have spent years murdering and raping are returning to their communities without punishment or accountability for their crimes to live among women and children who are likely traumatized. The greatest concern consistently expressed by survivors of sexual violence in interviews with PHR was an extreme fear that the fighters would return to abuse them again. Education for spouses, family members and communities is also important to mitigate social rejection.

The RUF and other factions have been reluctant to release abducted women and children in spite of their obligation to do so under the Lome Peace Accord.²⁸⁷ Girls and young women who escaped from the rebels or who were released, suffer a variety of consequences such as: sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS; trauma with symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (the symptoms of PTSD are: recurrent and intrusive memories of a distressing event (intrusive memories in the form of visual or auditory flashbacks), persistent avoidance of things that remind one of that event and hyperarousal, i.e., hypervigilance, inability to sleep or stay asleep, inability to concentrate, and anxiety; stigmatization and alienation by their communities and families; unwanted pregnancies and unsafe and illegal abortions; scarring and serious gynecological problems, such as prolapsed uterus and bladder perforations.²⁸⁸ Some are pregnant or are now single mothers of so-called “bush babies.”²⁸⁹ Some women who were raped, now suffer from vesico-vaginal

²⁸⁶ Conciliation Resources, “Gender and Conflict in Sierra Leone,” 1997 Available at www.c-r.org/occ_papers/briefing5.htm

²⁸⁷ Peace Agreement Between The Government Of Sierra Leone And The Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone, Article XXI Available at: www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html

fistulas (VVF). This condition can leave them incontinent and often renders them social outcasts.²⁹⁰ UNICEF reported that one 16-year-old who was gang raped and suffered VVF would not leave the hot, dark hut of her refugee camp for fear of being teased and humiliated.²⁹¹

Many of those who became pregnant as a result of rapes are now faced with the task of raising their babies as single mothers. Many have few parenting skills, and are limited in their ability to support themselves and their children. In some cases, families reject either their daughters or their babies, leaving these young women and their children in extremely vulnerable positions.²⁹² Some live in fear that the fathers, members of rebel groups, will come back from the bush to claim their babies.²⁹³

The consequences of human rights abuses including sexual violence are not merely physical. Previous studies by PHR and others²⁹⁴ suggest that a high level of psychological trauma is associated with displacement and exposure to human rights abuses. A Sierra Leonean psychologist who participated in both investigations reported that most of those she interviewed exhibited acute signs of distress in all four of the following spheres: physical, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral. Survivors of abuses spoke to her of numerous physical symptoms – aches, pains, trembling, startle responses to sudden sounds or movement, anxiety attacks, upset stomachs, elevated blood pressure and excessive fatigue. Additionally, there were cognitive symptoms related to difficulties in decision mak-

²⁸⁸ Summary report from March 2000 investigation into the medical consequences of human rights abuses committed during the war in Sierra Leone (available at www.phrusa.org/campaigns/sierra_leone/sierra_tripreport.html) and also World Health Organization, *Reproductive Health during Conflict and Displacement: a guide for programme managers*. Department of Reproductive Health and Research World Health Organization, 2000.

²⁸⁹ PHR Summary report from March 2000 investigation.

²⁹⁰ PHR interview with Rabih Torbay of International Medical Corps, Freetown, March 2000 and January 2001.

²⁹¹ PHR interview with Glennis Taylor of UNICEF, Freetown, January, 2001; These women and girls, who are unable to begin to recover from their trauma, could be helped with specialized surgery; there is, however, currently no one in the country with the necessary expertise. A number of organizations including, Marie Stopes, MSF, and IMC have been trying to secure funding to bring a gynecological surgeon to the country. IMC has recently applied for a \$300,000 grant from USAID for a range of services for survivors of sexual violence including vaginal fistula repair

²⁹² Observations of counselors at FAWE and COOPI who had been working with girls who had become pregnant as a result of rape as told to PHR, March. 2000.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ PHR, *The Taliban's War on Women: a Health and Human Rights Crisis in Afghanistan*, 1998; PHR, *Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan A Population-Based Assessment (2001)*; MSF-Holland, "Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone :Psychosocial Questionnaire: Freetown Survey Outcomes," 2000. Available at: www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2000/sierraleone_01-2000.shtml

ing, poor concentration, memory loss, flashbacks, and confusion. On an emotional level, many reported symptoms related to depression, anger, anxiety, fear and resentment. Finally, all reported behavioral changes – withdrawal from friends and family, changes in normal behavior patterns, inability to function the way they did before the war. These symptoms of distress were particularly remarkable in those women and girls who reported experiencing sexual violence.²⁹⁵ These clinical observations are consistent with the PHR survey findings.

Responses to Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone

Support services for rape survivors in Sierra Leone were, until fairly recently, virtually non-existent.²⁹⁶ In response to conflict related sexual violence, a number of local and international non-governmental organizations have developed services to aid survivors including: medical care, psychological counseling, housing and skills training for young mothers, family mediation to encourage parents to accept returned abductees, and public education efforts. These organizations are, however, only able to assist a fraction of victims. They lack the capacity to address the needs of the many who have not yet been released able to escape from the rebels and arrive in Freetown where until recently virtually all²⁹⁷ of the programs were based. Even if access to populations in the rebel-held east and north continues to improve, there is limited infrastructure in place to respond to the needs of a population which may have experienced particularly high levels of sexual trauma.

UNICEF has been a leader in coordinating services for girls who have suffered sexual violence. UNICEF reports that two specialized programs that provided for girls who were raped and have subsequently borne children, have been enormously helpful.²⁹⁸ Despite the successes of UNICEF, FAWE, COOPI, MSF, IMC and others, there are no government or UN-led multi-sectoral efforts in place to prevent or respond to sexual violence in Sierra Leone.

²⁹⁵ Observations made by psychologist Dr. Yinka Akinsulure-Smith, who interviewed survivors of abuses on behalf of PHR in March, 2000.

²⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict*, February 26, 2001.

²⁹⁷ The IRC has a program servicing Kenema and Bo.

²⁹⁸ PHR interviews with Glennis Taylor of UNICEF, Freetown, March, 2000 and January, 2001.

VIII. APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A:

Sexual Violence Survey Instrument

Sierra Leonean Women's Health Survey
(PRIMARY PARTICIPANTS ONLY)

6 Feb 01

1A.	CASE ID _____ (1-2,000) ID
1B.	Household member interviewed: <u> A </u> HMC
2.	Date of interview _____ - _____ - 2001 DATE (month) (date)
3.	Researcher code _____ ICD
4.	Language code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) TCD
5.	Location code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20) LCD
6A.	Participation Outcome: [Circle ONE] OUTC 1 2 3 4a 4b 4c 4d 5a 5b 5c 5d Eligible/Survey Complete = 1 Not Eligible = 2 Not Available = 3 Refusal= 4a=No Time; 4b=Fear Reprisal; 4c=Oppose Study; 4d=No explanation; 4e=Other Unable to Complete= 5a=interrupted; 5b=Emotional; 5c=Safety; 5d= Lack of privacy; 5e=Request to stop; 5E=Other Unable to conduct interview due to language =6
6B.	Was participant referred to another organization(s)? [Circle ONE] Yes.....1 (GO TO Q6C) REFR No.....0
6C.	If yes, which organizations? (list) _____ WORG

Read ONLY text that is in *italics*
For a response of "don't know" code DK. If no response to a question, code NR

- 1) *Hello, my name is _____ I am working with the UN and Physicians for Human Rights, an American NGO. I would like to speak to the woman who knows the most about the persons in the household. [once you have identified the woman continue with introduction]*
- 2) *Our purpose: We are gathering information from displaced women, which we hope will help to better promote and protect the health and human rights of women.*
- 3) *We are only here to ask questions. We are not here to provide humanitarian assistance.*
- 4) *Confidentiality We will not report the information in a way that will reveal your identity.*
- 5) *We would like to speak to you and perhaps other women in the household. We want to ask you questions about your experiences during the war.*
- 6) *We are conducting this survey in many households in Sierra Leone and have chosen your home randomly from this camp.*
- 7) *It is important that we have some privacy for our conversation because some of the questions may be sensitive*
- 8) *If you do not understand a question, please ask me to explain it to you. You are free to stop at any time during the interview. If a question makes you uncomfortable, we will skip the question and go to the next question. Do you have any questions before we begin?*

7. What is your tribe? [circle ONE] ETH
 Krio1
 Temne 2
 Mende3
 Limba4
 Kono.....5
 Other [SPECIFY] _____ 6

9. I want you to tell me-- are you married?
 [READ ALL CHOICES; Circle ONE] MAR
 Married and living with husband now....1
 Never Married2 (GO TO Q 12)
 Separated due to the war.....4
 Divorced/separated not because of war.....3
 Did your husband die because of the war?...5
 Did your husband die NOT because of the war?6

11. [IF SHE IS OR WAS EVER MARRIED] Are you/were you the only wife?
 Only wife.....1
 Which wife are/were you?
 First.....2 WIFN
 Second.....3
 Third.....4
 Fourth.....5
 Other.....6 [specify] _____

12. What is your religion? [Circle ONE] RELG
 Muslim.....1
 Christian.....2
 Other [SPECIFY] _____3

13. What level did you complete in school? _____ level [number years of school] _____
 EDU

14. What was your job before you fled your home? _____ WRK

15. Where were you born [be sure to use correct spelling]

- A. Province _____ LVPR
- B. District _____ LVDS
- C. Chiefdom _____ LVCH
- D. Town or Village _____ LVVL
- E. If not born in Sierra Leone, which country? _____ LVCT

16. When were you first displaced? _____ year; _____ month MLV

17. Where did you live at the time before you were first displaced?

- A. Province _____ BDPR
 B. District _____ BDDS
 C. Chiefdom _____ BDCH
 D. Town or village _____ BDCT

18. How many times have you fled the fighting? (number of times) _____ FLED

19. How long have you lived in this camp? number _____ weeks/months/years [circle one] NHME

20. I will give you four choices to answer this next question about your health. The question is: In the last 2 years, how has your general health been? And the four choices are: [CIRCLE ONE] GH

- In the last two years, my health has been Very good1.....E good-o. I noh get wan problem.
 OR -In the last two years, my health has been Good2.....E fine.
 OR -In the last two years, my health has been Fair3.....I dey manage.
 OR -In the last two years, my health has been Poor4.....E bad off. E noh good at all.*

Which one of those things I just read is most correct for you? [read choices again if needed]

22. For this question, again I will read you some choices so you can answer the choice that is most correct for you: How would you describe your state of mind since your displacement? [Circle ONE] PSY

- Is your state of mind since displacement Very good1.....E good-o. I noh get wan problem.
 Is your state of mind since displacement Good2.....E fine.
 Is your state of mind since displacement Fair3.....I dey manage.
 Is your state of mind since displacement Poor4.....E bad off. E noh good at all.*

24. Since the war, have you ever had thoughts that you were better off dead? DED

YES.....1
 NO.....0

25. Since the war, have you ever tried to hurt yourself or end your life? SU1

YES.....1
 NO.....0

26. I am going to read you a list of things – For each one, I want you to tell me if that thing would help your state of mind?

[READ ALL CHOICES; circle all that apply]

	YES	NO	
26A Women's support groups	1	0	GWSG
26B Country medicine/ traditional healer	1	0	GTRD
26C Traditional ceremonies	1	0	GTCR
26D Religious counseling/support	1	0	GRCS
26E Mental health counseling	1	0	GMHC
26F Medical assistance	1	0	GMAS
26G Income generating projects	1	0	GIGP
26H Skills training	1	0	GSKT
26I Education	1	0	GEDU
26J Humanitarian assistance/ food & shelter	1	0	GHUM
26K Anything else? (Other) [SPECIFY] _____			GOTR

Sierra Leonean Women's Health Survey
(PRIMARY PARTICIPANTS ONLY)

Feb 01

4323

1A. CASE ID _____ (1-2,000) ID

1B. Household member interviewed: A HMC

2. Date of interview _____ - _____ - 2001 DATE
(month) (date)

3. Researcher code _____ LCD

4. Language code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) TCD

5. Location code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20) LCD

6A. Participation Outcome: [Circle ONE] OUTC 1 2 3 4a 4b 4c 4d 5a 5b 5c 5d
 Eligible/Survey Complete = 1
 Not Eligible = 2
 Not Available = 3
 Refusal= 4a=No Time; 4b=Fear Reprisal; 4c=Oppose Study; 4d=No explanation; 4e=Other
 Unable to Complete= 5a=Interrupted; 5b=Emotional; 5c=Safety; 5d= Lack of privacy; 5e=Request to stop; 5E=Other
 Unable to conduct interview due to language =6

6B. Was participant referred to another organization(s)? [Circle ONE] Yes.....1 (GO TO Q6C) REFR
 No.....0

6C. If yes, which organizations? (list) WORG

Read ONLY text that is in *italics*
For a response of 'don't know' code DK. If no response to a question, code NR

1) Hello, my name is _____ I am working with the UN and Physicians for Human Rights, an American NGO. I would like to speak to the woman who knows the most about the persons in the household. [once you have identified the woman continue with introduction]

2) Our purpose: We are gathering information from displaced women, which we hope will help to better promote and protect the health and human rights of women.

3) We are only here to ask questions. We are not here to provide humanitarian assistance.

4) Confidentiality We will not report the information in a way that will reveal your identity.

5) We would like to speak to you and perhaps other women in the household. We want to ask you questions about your experiences during the war.

6) We are conducting this survey in many households in Sierra Leone and have chosen your home randomly from this camp.

7) It is important that we have some privacy for our conversation because some of the questions may be sensitive

8) If you do not understand a question, please ask me to explain it to you. You are free to stop at any time during the interview. If a question makes you uncomfortable, we will skip the question and go to the next question. Do you have any questions before we begin?

4324

44. As a result of the incident, did you seek help for your health? [Circle ONE] SHLP
YES.....1 (GO TO Q45)
NO.....0 (GO TO Q50, NEXT PAGE)

45. Where did you seek help for your health?
[READ CHOICES; circle all that apply]

- 45A Hospital SHHO
- 45B Health center SHHC
- 45C Country medicine / Traditional healer SHCM
- 45D NGOs SHNG
- 45E Other [SPECIFY] _____ SHOT

46. How long after the incident(s) did you seek this help? TTSHA
days _____ months _____ years _____

47. Did you tell the health care provider what happened to you? [Circle ONE] THCP
YES.....1
NO.....0

50. What has helped you through all this you have suffered?
[DO NOT READ CHOICES; Circle all that apply]

- 50A Discussion with other survivors of sexual violence HLDS
- 50B. Discussions with friends HLDF
- 50C Religion HLRL
- 50D Discussions with family members HLFA
- 50E Assistance from NGO workers HLNG
- 50F A medical care provider HLMC
- 50G Not telling anyone about the incident HLNT
- 50H Support of family HLSF
- 50I Country medicine/ traditional healer HLCM
- 50J Traditional ceremonies HLTR
- 50K Work/job/employment HLWK
- 50L Taking care of household HLHW
- 50M Trying to forget about it HLFH
- 50N Other [SPECIFY] _____ HLOT

51. I am going to read a list – please tell me which things on this list you think would help you with your state of mind and help you cope better with your experience?

[READ ALL CHOICES; circle all that apply] COPE

	YES	NO	
51A Women's support groups	1	0	SWSG
51B Country medicine/ traditional healer	1	0	STRD
51C Traditional ceremonies	1	0	STCR
51D Religious counseling/support	1	0	SRCS
51E Mental health counseling	1	0	SMHL
51F Medical assistance	1	0	SMAS
51G Income generating projects	1	0	SIGP
51H Skills training	1	0	SSKT
51I Education	1	0	SEDU
51J Humanitarian assistance/ food & shelter	1	0	SHUM
51K Other [SPECIFY] _____			SOTR

53. Do you think your attacker's commander was aware of his attack on you? [Circle ONE] CMDR

YES.....1

NO.....0

54. Should your attacker(s) be punished for what they did to you? [Circle ONE] PUN

YES.....1 (GO TO Q56)

NO.....0 (GO TO Q55)

55. Why do you say you don't want your attacker to be punished?

[DO NOT READ CHOICES; Circle all that apply]

- 55A Fear of reprisal/revenge NPIR
- 55B Fear of rejection/ stigmatization NPSJ
- 55C Respondent doesn't want to be reminded of the incident; wants to forget NPNR
- 55D In the spirit of reconciliation NPRC
- 55E No confidence in a system for such punishments NPNC
- 55F Other [SPECIFY] _____ NPOT

GO TO Q58

56. Do you think punishment of perpetrators might prevent this from happening to others? [Circle ONE]

PREV

YES.....1

NO.....0

57. Of all those people who did these things to you, which ones should be punished?

[DO NOT READ CHOICES; Circle all that apply]

- 57A Perpetrators PUPR
- 57B Commanders PUCM
- 57C All involved in the attacks PUAL
- 57D No One PUNO
- 57 E Other [SPECIFY] _____ PNOT

Now I want to know if there is anything more you can tell me about what happened.

4326

*58A. Do you know of anything that could identify your attacker, such as:
Did they call each other by name?*

58B. How did you know which military group your attackers were with?

58C. What did he/they say to you, or to each other?

59. Why do you think combatants did these things – sexually abusing women and girls -- during this war?

60. What are your biggest worries about your future after what you have suffered?

61. What are your biggest worries about your health?

30. Do you believe that perpetrators of human rights abuses should be punished? BELP

YES.....1
NO.....0

33. Now, please tell me – at any time in your lifetime, have you ever had any of these things happen to you:

sexual violence such as molestation, being forced to undress or stripped of clothing, forced intercourse or other sexual acts committed by FAMILY MEMBERS, FRIENDS, OR CIVILIAN STRANGERS?

Age at assault	Types of sexual assault	Perpetrator
DAGE	SXAS 1=Molestation 2=Being forced to undress/Stripped of clothing 3=Attempted rape/attempted intercourse 4=Rape/ intercourse 5=Other sexual acts [SPECIFY] 99 = NO ABUSE	PERP 1=Boyfriend 2=Husband 3=Father 4=Son (4a, 4b..) 5= Brother (5a, 5b..) 6= Uncle(6a, 6b..) 7 = Other Relative (7a, 7b) [SPECIFY] 8= Other Non-relative known to individual (8a, 8b..) [SPECIFY] 9= Stranger

34A. About this sexual violence committed by COMBATANTS - How much you are afraid that it could happen to you or your family? Like before, I will give you four choices for your answer.

4328

[READ ALL CHOICES; Circle ONE] COMF

- Are you worried about this Not at all.....1.....E noh day worry me at all.
- Are you worried about this A little.....2.....E day worry me small, lili bit, no moh.
- Are you worried about this Quite a bit.....3.....E day worry me plenty..
- Are you worried about this Extremely.....4.....E day worry me pass mark. Bad bad wan.

34B. And now this sexual violence committed by FAMILY MEMBERS, FRIENDS, OR CIVILIAN STRANGERS - How much are you afraid of this for yourself and your family?

[READ ALL CHOICES; Circle ONE] DOMF

- Are you worried about this Not at all.....1.....E noh day worry me at all.
- Are you worried about this A little.....2.....E day worry me small, lili bit, no moh.
- Are you worried about this Quite a bit.....3.....E day worry me plenty..
- Are you worried about this Extremely.....4.....E day worry me pass mark. Bad bad wan.

35 I am going to read some statements, one at a time. For each one, please say if you agree or disagree

	Agree	Disagree
35A Women and girls should have the same access to education as men and boys. ...EDAC....1	1	0
35B Women should be able to express themselves freely.EXPR.....1	1	0
35C Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family.....PROB....1	1	0
35D A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees.....OBEY....1	1	0
35E It's a wife's duty/obligation to have sex with her husband even if she doesn't want to OSEX..1	1	0
35F A man has the right to beat his wife if she disobeys him.....BEAT....1	1	0
35G Women and girls need more education about their rights to refuse sex.....EDRS.....1	1	0
35H More should be done to protect women and girls from having sex when they don't want to.....PRRS.....1	1	0
35I Women and girls need more education about their reproductive health.....RHLT.....1	1	0
35J Women should have the right to control the number and spacing of their children...BSPC...1	1	0
35K There should be legal protections for the rights of women.LPRW.....1	1	0

REVIEW Page 5, Question 28:

Did she report human rights abuses for any other female member of the house over age 13?

IF YES, go to Question 62 (page 14). IF NO, go to Page 15.

62. You told me that other female household members suffered some kind of war-related abuse. When you and I finish, can you introduce me to them so I can ask if they will let me interview them?

YES1 [GO TO NEXT PAGE] PRMI
NO0

63. Tell me why you cannot introduce me to them?

Family member reported in Q28 FNI	Why unable to be introduced FNIW
(use same codes from Q28, page 5)	[DO NOT READ CHOICES; Circle all that apply] 1=Not available 2=She doesn't want to talk, 3=Not permitted by others to talk, 4=Too young (< 13 years old) 5=Dead 6=Missing 7=Other [specify]

TAKE A MOMENT TO REVIEW THIS FORM: Be sure all questions are answered and any refusal/inability to answer a question is noted on this survey

For Participants who report NO human rights violations: GO TO PAGE 16.

For Participants who report Human Rights violations by combatants that they themselves have suffered:

Everything that you have told me so far will be kept confidential which means that your identity will not be revealed .

There are now plans for a Special Court to punish people like your attacker(s) for their crimes and to get justice for the victims and for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I am going to tell you more about these plans:

There are plans to create a Special Court with the support of the UN. This Special Court will bring to justice those people most responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as mass killing, wide-spread mutilation, sexual violence against girls and women, sexual slavery, abduction of children and adults and forced conscription.

The Lomé Peace Agreement provides for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission "to break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story and to get a clear picture of the past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation". The Truth and Reconciliation Commission will only be established once there is sustainable peace. Since the outbreak of fighting in May 2000 its establishment has been on hold though some preparations towards its establishment are taking place.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court will be looking for persons who have suffered human rights abuses during the war. If you are willing to be contacted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission or Special Court staff, I will take your name.

1A Do you want us to give your name to the special court? We understand if you prefer to remain anonymous.

Yes.....1 [check SP on PAGE 17] SP
No.....0

1B Do you want us to give your name to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?

Yes.....1 [check TR on PAGE 17] TRC
No.....0

If respondent answered YES to 1A and / or 1B , GO TO PAGE 17 – Question 2.

Sierra Leonean Women's Health Survey
(PRIMARY PARTICIPANTS ONLY)

6 Feb 01

1A. CASE ID _____ (1-2,000) ID

1B. Household member interviewed: A HMC

2. Date of interview _____ - _____ - 2001 DATE
(month) (date)

3. Researcher code _____ ICD

4. Language code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) TCD

5. Location code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20) LCD

6A. Participation Outcome: [Circle ONE] OUTC 1 2 3 4a 4b 4c 4d 5a 5b 5c 5d
 Eligible/Survey Complete = 1
 Not Eligible = 2
 Not Available = 3
 Refusal= 4a=No Time; 4b=Fear Reprisal; 4c=Oppose Study; 4d=No explanation; 4e=Other
 Unable to Complete= 5a=Interrupted; 5b=Emotional; 5c=Safety; 5d= Lack of privacy; 5e=Request to stop; 5E=Other
 Unable to conduct interview due to language =6

6B. Was participant referred to another organization(s)? [Circle ONE] Yes.....1 (GO TO Q6C) REFR
 No.....0

6C. If yes, which organizations? (list) WORG

Read ONLY text that is in *italics*

For a response of 'don't know' code DK. If no response to a question, code NR.

- 1) *Hello, my name is _____ I am working with the UN and Physicians for Human Rights, an American NGO. I would like to speak to the woman who knows the most about the persons in the household. [once you have identified the woman continue with introduction]*
- 2) *Our purpose: We are gathering information from displaced women, which we hope will help to better promote and protect the health and human rights of women.*
- 3) *We are only here to ask questions. We are not here to provide humanitarian assistance.*
- 4) *Confidentiality We will not report the information in a way that will reveal your identity.*
- 5) *We would like to speak to you and perhaps other women in the household. We want to ask you questions about your experiences during the war.*
- 6) *We are conducting this survey in many households in Sierra Leone and have chosen your home randomly from this camp.*
- 7) *It is important that we have some privacy for our conversation because some of the questions may be sensitive*
- 8) *If you do not understand a question, please ask me to explain it to you. You are free to stop at any time during the interview. If a question makes you uncomfortable, we will skip the question and go to the next question. Do you have any questions before we begin?*

SP _____ TR _____

2. Surname _____

First name _____

Middle Name _____

Current address _____

3. I know that you will not be living in this camp forever. Where do you plan to go when you leave the camp:

A. Province _____

B. District _____

C. Chiefdom _____

C. Town or Village _____

4. Is there someone else whose name and residence information you can give us who will know how to contact you after you leave this place?

Name _____

Address _____

Relationship to participant _____

APPENDIX B:**Summary of PHR/UNAMSIL Researcher Training and Supervision***Overview*

The field surveys were conducted by a staff of 21 Sierra Leonean women primarily from the Temne, Mende, and Kono ethnic groups. These researchers were selected based on education, experience or knowledge about sexual violence, and language skills. All researchers were fluent in English, Krio, and at least one other language. All had completed high school level education, several had attended university classes, and a few had university level degrees. All of the researchers were affected by the war, most of them were displaced at least once, and approximately half had lived as refugees in Guinea for a period of time. None of the researchers had prior experience with quantitative surveys such as this one.

There were five Field supervisors for the project who provided extensive training and supervision of the researchers, among other duties. Each supervisor brought a specialized set of skills and experience to the team. In combination, this knowledge and experience made a complementary and highly skilled team of supervisors for the project:

Binta Mansaray, Sierra Leonean, specialized training and experience in qualitative research on sexual violence through in depth individual interviews with Sierra Leonean women

Adeyinka Akinsulure-Smith, PhD Psychology, Sierra Leonean, specialized training and experience in psychological counseling with survivors of sexual violence and other forms of torture

Chen Reis, JD, MPH, specialized training and experience in quantitative research and human rights issues

Beth Vann, MSW, specialized training and experience in West Africa humanitarian aid field work, national staff training, and sexual violence aid programs with Sierra Leonean refugees/IDPs

Louise Taylor, MBA, LLM, UNAMSIL liason, human rights officer

Researcher training consisted of eight to nine days classroom teaching and experiential role play followed by at least one day of field observation. At the end of the 7th day, trainees were tested on skill and ability. After testing, trainees were divided into two groups. Group I proceeded to

the field to begin supervisory observation and conducting the survey. Group II stayed in the classroom for an additional day of intensive training and observation before joining Group I.

Training was conducted at UNAMSIL headquarters in Freetown.

Training commenced with 24 trainees. Three of the trainees were unsuccessful when tested, and supervisors determined through observation that they were unable to accurately conduct the survey. By the end of the 10th training day, there were 21 researchers trained, observed by supervisors, and sufficiently prepared to conduct the survey in the field.

There was at least one supervisor, and usually two, at each field site. Supervisors managed the sampling by making assignments for areas or zones, and also provided supervision, guidance, and support for the researchers.

Throughout each day, the supervisor remained in a designated central location to provide any support or assistance needed. In the morning, researchers were given assignments, survey forms, and supplies. Around mid-day, each researcher checked in to review her completed surveys, hand them in, and gather a fresh supply of forms and another assigned area if needed. This was repeated at the end of the day. Researchers were encouraged to return to the supervisor at any time for questions, problems, and to discuss particularly severe situations they encountered. For each field site, supervisors had information about services available for referrals, such as health care, counseling, etc. When the affected research participant agreed, supervisors made referrals for follow up by local or international organizations best able to provide assistance.

Training

Training was interactive; researchers provided input on the questionnaire and interview procedures and observed and participated in role play. A training schedule was developed in advance and revised frequently to meet the needs of the trainees. The survey was printed in English, but researchers learned to administer it in Krio.

During Days 3 – 6, revisions were made to the survey instrument for easier translation from English to Krio. Sentences and questions were reformed to better follow the pattern of Krio speech. These changes enhanced researchers' ability to both understand the intended meaning of the questions and to translate them into any language they would be using.

Day 1 Training

Introductions

- Intro to Physicians for Human Rights, UNAMSIL Human Rights Section
 - Purposes and Overview of the project
 - Confidentiality and Conduct Agreement (discussion, signatures)
 - Training plan, field work plan and logistics
-

This was the researchers' first exposure to quantitative research. At first, it was difficult for them to understand their role as data collectors and not "counselors". The Confidentiality Agreement proved to be an extremely useful tool for conveying the nature and purposes of the project. The Agreement included detailed descriptions of expectations for researcher conduct, professional integrity and dignity, confidentiality, information sharing, impartiality, and accuracy in transmission of information from the research participant. Item by item discussion of the standards and expectations, in Krio, clarified many questions from the researchers. After this discussion, they were much better able to discuss the project and asked questions more relevant to the work at hand.

Day 2 Training

Sexual Violence:

- Definitions and types of sexual violence, myths and facts
- Causes and contributing factors
- After-effects and consequences – health, emotional, legal psychological after-effects – cognitive, behavioral, and emotional
- Exploration of our own personal values, biases, attitudes – how to keep these out of the interview process
- Emotional responses of research assistants to secondary trauma

Human Rights and Lome Peace Agreement

- Overview of international human rights documents
 - Special Court for Sierra Leone War Crimes
 - Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
-

The purpose on this day was to ensure that all researchers would be working with the same definitions and concepts for the topics on the

agenda. For many, this was the first candid description of the various forms of sexual violence, and there were many questions.

Detailed descriptions of the variety of cognitive and behavioral after-effects was necessary for researchers to understand the types of behaviors they might see that could help them identify problems needing referral, and choose strategies for interviewing.

Discussion of the special court and TRC was part of the survey, and it was important that all researchers thoroughly understand so that they could explain it to research participants as needed.

Day 3 Training

Interview skills

- Developing trust
- Body language
- Techniques for eliciting narrative accounts of individual experiences
- Privacy
- Confidentiality

Survey instrument

- Reading, explanation item by item
-

Included a practical and detailed discussion of various strategies and words (in Krio) to encourage participants to disclose private and potentially embarrassing information.

Day 4 Training

Survey instrument

- Translation to Krio, item by item
 - Discussion, question and answer
 - Practice role plays in groups of 3
-

After going through the survey in Krio, supervisors determined it was time to suspend the full classroom didactic methods and begin experiential learning. Researchers were divided into groups of three. They were given three role play scenarios for practice interviews. One person played the researcher, one the participant, and one an observer. After each interview, they were to listen to feedback and switch roles until each person had practiced at least once as researcher.

Supervisors circulated among groups observing, giving feedback, and gathering information about common areas of confusion or misunderstanding. From time to time, supervisors called the group together to discuss and clarify issues.

Day 5-7 Training

Continue Practice

- Role plays in groups of 3, feedback, switch roles
- Discussion with entire group for common issues and problems
- Instrument revisions and instruction

End of Day 7

- Test
-

During these three days, supervisors became familiar with each researcher's strengths and weaknesses. At the end of Day 7, a test was administered to all researchers: the two Krio speaking supervisors conducted a mock interview while the researchers observed as a group, each completing her own survey instrument form.

In the evening, supervisors reviewed and made corrections and notes on the forms using the "Interviewer's" completed form as the guide. Based on these reviews and supervisory observations made during the practice role plays, the trainees were divided into two groups for the next day's session. Group I excelled in their tests and were observed to be well skilled in interviewing. Group II made errors on their tests and were observed to have some problems in conducting interviews.

Day 8 Training

Review tests with individual researchers

Group I:

- Observe individually in role plays, review documentation
- Translation to Temne and Mende; practice

Group II: Focus training on weaknesses

- Techniques for systematic random sampling and the use of sample site maps
 - Identification, assistance, referral for serious problems and severe cases
-

Supervisors distributed tests to researchers and discussed individually each error and area of concern. Researchers were given the responsibility to focus on their own weaknesses during the day's role-plays and discussions. Only three of the trainees performed poorly on the test and had also been observed making interview errors that demonstrated they did not understand the purposes of the survey. These three individuals were excluded from the project, leaving 21 researchers.

Supervisors observed each researcher in Group I conducting a role play interview to verify that her skills were adequate. Group I was then divided into Temne and Mende sub-groups to go through the questionnaire and develop consensus on translation into those languages.

At the end of the day, mapping and methods to be used for systematic random sampling were explained. The role of the supervisor in the field was also discussed, emphasizing the need for researchers to identify and bring forward for supervisory assistance information about any situations they encountered that were problematic.

Day 9 Training

Group I to field site to begin survey and individual observation by supervisors

Group II in classroom for continued practice and individualized training and observation

At the field site, each researcher was observed at least once conducting a complete interview from introduction through closing statements. Supervisors gave immediate feedback, and observed additional interviews if there were problem areas.

In the classroom, Group II (12 people) received individualized assistance. By the end of the day, it was determined they were ready for field observation.

Day 10 Training

Groups I and II at field site conducting surveys

Continue individual observation with supervisors

Group I teaching Temne / Mende translation to Group II

Individual supervisory observation continued until all researchers had been observed and deemed adequately knowledgeable and skilled.

Supervision

By the end of Day 10, supervisors were thoroughly aware of each researcher's strengths and weaknesses in conducting the survey and documentation on the instrument. For the duration of the fieldwork, supervisors continued to provide guidance, review, and advice as needed for each individual researcher. A supervisor reviewed each completed survey, giving immediate feedback for any errors or items left blank. Survey skills most closely monitored were:

- ✓ Appropriate and accurate introduction and explanation of purpose of survey
- ✓ Complete and accurate questioning and corresponding documentation
- ✓ Ability to elicit information about private, shameful, and traumatic events in a warm and respectful manner
- ✓ Correct and simple explanation of the Special Court and TRC
- ✓ Appropriate requests to interview other household members
- ✓ Complete and accurate closing statement
- ✓ Ability to accomplish all of this in a rapid fashion while maintaining warmth and respect. Primary interviews were expected to take no more than one hour, with secondary interviews maximum 40 minutes.
- ✓ Accurate counting and selection of households in accordance with sampling method in each field site
- ✓ Ability to find and maintain privacy for interviews in very crowded settings

Summary of Existing Treatment and Protection Services for War-Affected Women in Sierra Leone²⁹⁹

Prior to the rebel incursion into Freetown in January, 1999, there were no services in the country specifically addressing the problem of sexual violence.³⁰⁰ The alarming number of women and girls who were sexually abused during the invasion precipitated a response from several organizations including UNICEF, the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), and MSF-Holland. A task force was established which created a network of medical practitioners and counseling centers to treat the thousands of reported cases, MSF-H set up a training program for counselors, and COOPI and FAWE opened comprehensive programs to assist women and girls who had become pregnant as a result of rebel rapes.

In response to a growing recognition of the widespread and particularly brutal nature of the crimes committed against women and girls, many new programs are now servicing survivors and beginning to address some of these problems. It is challenging, however, to provide services in Sierra Leone given the continuing insecurity, ever-changing population shifts, lack of awareness and recognition of the scope of the problem, and chronic funding shortfalls. With scarce resources and constant emergency situations, both the government of Sierra Leone and the UN agencies face a number of difficulties in providing coordination, continuity and leadership for the myriad of humanitarian and development needs in the country. Therefore, services addressing the various aspects of sexual/gender violence are fragmented and coordination is a continuing problem. In spite of these challenges, there are a plethora of international NGOs and UN agencies operating in Freetown, many of which are working in highly successful cooperative arrangements. With the improving security situation, some groups are beginning to expand their services to the provinces and are seeking funding to do so.

There was general agreement among all organizations interviewed by PHR that there is a need for development of both prevention and response services to include all relevant sectors, and also for improved coordination among providers and sectors. There was general acknowledgement that some

²⁹⁹ The information about individual organizations was compiled primarily from PHR interviews conducted with representatives of the organizations in March, 2000 and January, 2001, as well as from written information published by the organizations themselves. Additional information was provided by Glenis Taylor of UNICEF, the UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Sierra Leone, 2001 and other sources which are cited in the footnotes.

³⁰⁰ Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict, *Human Rights Watch*, February 26, 2001.

of these problems could be alleviated if one agency took the lead, perhaps expanding the UNICEF model to include all survivors of sexual violence.

International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations Providing Treatment and Protection Services:

Most organizations working on sexual violence are providing treatment, though several have been documenting abuses and some are beginning to work more strategically to improve protection and the status of women through education and institutional capacity building. UNICEF, Campaign for Good Governance and a handful of others are addressing the problem from a number of angles.

Treatment Services

UNICEF chairs a sexual violence committee in Freetown comprised of international, local and government agencies working on the needs of girls. The committee meets regularly and its members include: COOPI, MSF-Holland, Marie Stopes, CARITAS, GOAL, FAWE, Planned Parenthood Association of Sierra Leone (PPASL), The Ministry of Social Welfare, and the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone with their Child Rights Monitoring Network. The Committee currently acts as a referral system for girls who were abducted and raped. Girls are brought by their parents, families, UNAMSIL representatives, and some simply show up at UNICEF headquarters in Freetown. Though those actively seeking assistance have dwindled in the West, there are many who require services outside of Freetown where programs are not as coordinated. Those groups working in cooperation with the Committee on Sexual Violence in the provinces include: Christian Brothers, War-Affected Girls Association (WAGA), PPSL, CARITAS-Makeni, the IRC in Kenema and FAWE, now with a new branch in the South. Committees on sexual violence were recently formed in the Southern and Eastern provinces.

While UNICEF's efforts are focused on those under 18, the needs of women are also being addressed through their education efforts, which are aimed at the population as a whole. UNICEF is providing training on sexual violence for lawyers and police, as well as in schools, which includes information on rape, its effects, and what to do if raped. They have found that more women and girls are coming forward, but that the judicial process is slow and frustrating. These efforts will continue next year with the aim of reaching all schools in the country and an emphasis on prevention, if funding is available.³⁰¹

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is providing comprehensive maternal-child health services, sexual violence services and operating an interim care center for former child soldiers in Kenema District. IRC was

³⁰¹ Email correspondence with Glenis Taylor of UNICEF, November 18 and 19, 2001.

the first international NGO to focus on sexual violence beginning in November 1999 in Kenema. Kenema was chosen because it was identified as the best place to filter displaced people from rebel areas of Kono and Kailahun. IRC has been providing sexual violence services under the umbrella of a safe motherhood program, which addresses basic reproductive health. The IRC team trains core groups of local women who then reach out to others in their chiefdoms. They are focusing particularly on Lebanese and Blama camps near Kenema, and are expanding their outreach to other camps in the area. For example, in Blama camp there are 21 chiefdoms represented from districts in the South and in the East, and one woman has been selected to represent each group. They use reproductive health and maternal/child health as an entry point, deliver reproductive health kits (which include condoms, family planning, STD/HIV prevention information), and introduce the subject of sexual violence. Basic training on sexual terms and definitions of sexual violence is provided. Sexual violence is not the initial focus because women are generally unaccustomed to talking about sexual violence and women's rights.

The IRC staff has generally found physical needs to be more urgent than psycho-social needs. IRC staff reported to PHR that they are attempting to introduce the program in each community/village and have found that women are responding very positively to their sensitization efforts around the notion of women's rights as human rights. According to IRC staff, the women they are working with generally express excitement when they learn that their husbands do not have the right to beat them.³⁰² In 2000, IRC conducted a survey in several of the camps in Kenema to learn more about sexual violence in the community. Results were not available at the time of writing.

The Forum for African Women's Educationalists (FAWE) is a pan-African NGO which has been successful in promoting education for girls. FAWE expanded their mandate to respond to the needs of rape victims after the January 1999 incursion by rebels into Freetown and, because there was a vacuum, became the primary organization providing medical and counseling services to rape survivors. Their ultimate goal, in service of their mandate, is to get these girls back to school and as of March 2000 they had been 100% effective in negotiating with parents of girls who had babies as a result of rapes, to keep them in school.

FAWE began their rape victims program in March 1999 with a sensitization effort over radio and TV and by going to secondary schools and communities to let people know that FAWE was offering medical and counseling services. They did this outreach both to make the community aware of the new services being offered, but also as part of an effort to remove some of the stigma around talking about rape. Within one year

³⁰² PHR interview with IRC field staff, Kenema 2000.

FAWE served over 2,000 women and girls in the Western Area alone. All participants saw a doctor at least once. All participants in the program began with individual counseling two times per week and then transitioned into group counseling. Once girls returned to school, they were monitored by the guidance counselors at their schools who have been briefed by FAWE on their circumstances. FAWE planned to end the program in Freetown because they had largely addressed the need and because they had run out of funds. Once the full-time program concludes in Freetown, FAWE arranged for those participants who still need counseling to see MSF counselors and organized some doctors to take referrals.

FAWE has also been working to sensitize the community at large to accept girls who have become pregnant as a result of rape. Many of these girls have been gang raped and do not know who the father is. There is often a stage of rejection of these babies both by the mother and their communities. FAWE created two training centers in the eastern area of Freetown, which provide comprehensive services to young women/girls and their babies including: skills training, education, parenting skills and medical care for their children. They do not provide human rights training specifically, but do sensitize the adolescents about what is inappropriate treatment. The program was designed very much in response to the needs identified during counseling sessions with their patients. Those young women participating in the program who were interviewed by the PHR team reported feeling much better since being enrolled in the program (though they were anxious about what they would do when the program concluded) and expressed a keen interest in learning marketable skills so they could care for their children. In 2000, FAWE expanded its programs to Kenema in the eastern area, where sexual violence has been particularly widespread, and immediately enrolled 700 victims.

FAWE has also produced a series of radio programs to educate the public against rape. The discussion/phone-in programs were aired every 2 weeks in 1999, with the hope that they would be aired bi-weekly once funding is available.

COOPI (Cooperazione Internazionale), an Italian NGO specializing in international relief and development projects, has been working in Sierra Leone since 1967. In 1998, COOPI expanded its development mandate to help children released by the rebels and operates several interim care centers, that provide family tracing services, medical care, counseling and skills training. One of its centers, the Conforti Welcome Home is similar to FAWE's program for girls who became pregnant as a result of rape, except that it also provides housing. Conforti Welcome Home was set up as a temporary facility for pregnant girls and child mothers who could not go home for reasons ranging from their area of origin being inaccessible for fear of rejection by their families. Those enrolled in the program

expressed a desire for skills training before returning to their families so they have something to offer and are not dependent. COOPI is providing them with such training, as well as general education and literacy, and is working actively to sensitize communities and families to be more accepting and supportive of these young mothers and their babies. COOPI operates the **Holy Mary Clinic** in the eastern part of Freetown where the women and girls at Conforti Welcome Home receive a full range of reproductive health services including deliveries.³⁰³

COOPI also has established psycho-social teams, which make 'house calls' in IDP camps and host communities in and around Freetown. They have also created self-help groups in a number of IDP camps in the Western area. COOPI takes referrals from both camp clinics and the community.³⁰⁴ They are committed to a community-oriented approach to psycho-social care, to developing local capacity and building on indigenous coping mechanisms. Most of the counselors are from the Sierra Leonean community and were teachers or nurses. The organization provides basic training on trauma and then encourages the counselors to adapt the information to their own culture. They have found that their patients are most responsive when they are engaged in a task, and so the self-help groups are organized around activities like needle work. According to one aid worker interviewed by PHR, approximately 40% of the women they see have been sexually abused. COOPI is committed to offering options so survivors of trauma can find the treatment and support that works for them.³⁰⁵

Marie Stopes Society (MSSSL), an international NGO headquartered in the UK, is a reproductive health agency. Many sexual violence survivors are seen among the 7,000 women treated each month in the three MSSSL outpatient clinics in west-, central- and east Freetown. MSSSL offers a range of reproductive health services including a maternity center, ante- and post-natal care, and treatment and diagnosis for STDs. While they were forced to close their clinics in Port Loko and Segbwema in the east, they are expecting to open new centers in the provinces, perhaps in Bo and Makeni. The organization accepts referrals for abandoned children and rape survivors in need of delivery services through the Child Protection

³⁰³ PHR visited the Welcome Home in March, 2000 and spoke extensively to COOPI staff there.

³⁰⁴ Information on COOPI's psycho-social programs is based on a PHR interviews with Patrick Campbell of COOPI and local COOPI counselors in Freetown in March, 2000.

³⁰⁵ While Coopi started off doing individual counseling, they have often found working in groups to be more culturally appropriate, and therefore effective. COOPI counselors report that children respond best in a group of three or four – though, even under ideal circumstances, it can take 4-5 sessions for them to realize there are no negative consequences in telling the truth and to open up. COOPI mental health providers told PHR that integrating rebel wives has been even more challenging than integrating child soldiers.

Committee on Sexual Violence, which MSSSL fully subsidizes. The director, Pamela Greene, and Dr. Yvonne Harding are actively seeking comprehensive health care services and improved inter-agency referral systems and coordination. According to Dr. Harding, there is a lack of surgical care for the small number of sexual violence survivors who need it, but the psychological scars are more common and sometimes require long-term intervention. Like other members of the Sexual Violence Committee, Marie Stopes does not test patients for HIV partly because of concerns over the lack of an official national policy on confidentiality of test results. Though MSSSL's concerns are valid, hundreds of pregnant women are passing the disease on to their babies or to their partners when transmission could be prevented with medication. MSSSL's funding from DFID is coming to an end in 2001, and at the time of their interview with PHR, the organization was pursuing new grants.

Doctors Without Borders/Médecins sans Frontières-Holland (MSF-H), an international medical relief organization, has been providing a range of health care and psycho-social services in Sierra Leone since 1994. While the French and Belgian branches also have programs in Sierra Leone, MSF-Holland has been more focused on war-affected women and mental health. In January, MSF-H released a report documenting high levels of trauma among the population and has since advocated for governments and donor agencies to provide greater resources for treatment of post-traumatic stress among the general population. MSF-H also identified the need for specialized surgery for VVF and VRF cases. These surgeries were provided for a brief period after the 1999 Freetown invasion, but the specialist was in-country only for a short time. CCSL referred girls who suffered physical consequences from sexual violence to MSF for surgery at **Connaught Hospital**. MSF has also been providing referral services for FAWE and other members of the sexual violence committee, and has supplied all medications required for participants in the program. At National Workshop IDP camp in the Western Area, MSF-H provided counseling to the displaced population. In addition to Freetown, MSF also had programs in Makeni and Kambia.

International Medical Corps (IMC) is focusing on providing health care to ex-combatants, dependents of fighters, displaced and the community at large. Reproductive health services are offered at IMC clinics, including treatment of STDs. All patients receive information about safe sex and condoms. In April 1999, IMC launched a pilot program with Rural Aid, a local NGO, focused on basic health education including HIV prevention counseling.

Since only medical screenings (no treatments) are available at DDR camps, all referrals of former combatants and their dependents are sent to IMC clinics. IMC health workers have also identified a need for special-

ized VVF and VRF surgeries among their patients. While the organization has secured surgical space at **Lungi Hospital**, there is a need for an expert surgeon, some additional equipment, and referral/ transport assistance for patients from Freetown.³⁰⁶ IMC received a grant from the US government to hire surgeons to treat victims of VVF and to train Sierra Leonean surgeons in the procedure.

Planned Parenthood Association of Sierra Leone (PPASL), is a member of International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), and has been promoting maternal and family welfare in Sierra Leone for over 40 years. At its clinics in the major urban areas of the country, PPASL has been offering a range of reproductive health services at reduced rates, including treatment of STDs, laboratory tests, and maternal and child care. PPASL takes referrals from the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone for patients who require medical care due to sexual violence.

Because of its links to IPPF, PPASL is able to tap into the resources of the larger organization to address the AIDS epidemic including educational materials about HIV, general best-practices on reproductive health and a supplies of low-cost condoms. PPASL relies particularly on community members and leaders to act as peer counselors and to educate the population at large. The organization has reached out to the most vulnerable groups with education programs including IDPs, the military, and youths through the school system. PPASL reported to the researchers of the recent WHO/Associates for Global Change study on HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone that they had virtually no contact with the National AIDS Control Program.

Due to the war, Planned Parenthood has experienced shortages in both staff and supplies, including medications. Health care providers at PPSAL in Kenema reported to PHR a dramatic jump in syphilis and gonorrhea among their clients, which was not a significant problem before the conflict. They also noted that most of their patients do not reveal that they have been victims of sexual violence. It is possible that the hesitancy of survivors to report is exacerbated by the predominance of male clinicians observed by the PHR team during a March 2000 investigation.

Leonet, an NGO funded by Americans concerned about Sierra Leone, works with street/unwanted children, many of whom are sexual violence/abduction survivors. Leonet has been assisting a number of young girl abductees who have been rejected by their families due to resulting pregnancies. UN agencies, government ministries, and NGOs refer the "most hopeless" cases to Leonet. The organization is also operating a day care and skills training centers in Kissy, the eastern part of Freetown, which was hardest hit by the January incursion of 1999, and was operat-

³⁰⁶ At time of writing, IMC was in the process of obtaining a list of VVF patients awaiting surgery from a physician at Princess Christian Medical Hospital (PCMH) in Freetown.

ing in Port Loko. The building was given to them by the community and is open to other single mothers, but the program is at a standstill because of lack of funding. Leonet uses Marie Stopes for referrals.

Cause Canada, an international relief and development organization, has been active in Sierra Leone since 1989. Their activities include refugee assistance, primary health care, vocational and post war reconciliation, and reintegration of women and girls affected by war. The program for war-affected women and girls consists of counseling, medical treatment, vocational training and community reintegration.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provides a range of services, focusing its activities in the last year on emergency aid and protection of war-affected civilians. ICRC's surgical team has performed hundreds of surgeries on destitute patients with war-related injuries, established and upgraded medical and surgical facilities, assisted thousands in reconnecting families that had been separated due to the war, and raised the coping abilities of vulnerable and displaced women by teaching them skills to increase their self-sufficiency. ICRC is also providing training to the new Sierra Leonean army and UNAMSIL troops on humanitarian law.³⁰⁷ They are also supporting a community theater program to educate the population about HIV transmission.

Other Groups Working Directly and Indirectly with War-Affected Women and Girls

- CARITAS: a UNICEF Child Protection partner and operates interim care centers in Lunsar and Makeni
- The Ministry of Social Welfare and ICRC collaboration to link children with relatives through the National Family Tracing Network
- A joint effort by UNDP/UNIFEM to create a holistic program for women and girl refugees to support reintegration
- A UNDP project providing medical, social and legal support, as well as micro-credit
- UNAMSIL's Civil Affairs Division has been helping the Government of Sierra Leone restore its authority in rebel-held areas and identifying

³⁰⁷ ICRC, Update on ICRC activities in West Africa: Sierra Leone-Guinea-Liberia. December 15, 2000. <http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/5cacdf48ca698b641256242003b3295/62e58fc7be68051cc12569b6004a9e5c?OpenDocument>

³⁰⁸ In July, 2001, UNAMSIL distributed \$45,000 from their trust fund to support the activities of three community-based organizations working with survivors of sexual violence.

urgent humanitarian needs in these regions. The division also raises funds to support locally-based programs to assist sexually abused women and girls and ex-combatants.³⁰⁸

Documentation, Education and Protection Services

Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) is a Sierra Leonean NGO based in Freetown that works “to facilitate the full participation of all Sierra Leoneans in the political, social and economic processes of development in Sierra Leone.” CGG has been at the forefront of fighting for gender equality and is interested both in improving women’s lives by enhancing their status as a group and as individuals, and in improving national government and civil society by involving women at all levels. CGG played a critical role in the success of the 1996 democratic election when the group mobilized market women who took to the streets to insist the election take place. As part of their efforts in both gender equality and human rights, CGG has been addressing sexual violence and human rights on a number of fronts including:

- Establishing a group in 1999 called SOS-Women in Freetown focused on violence against women and children. The group seeks to provide support for victims, promote accountability, and to educate women about their rights. Among their goals is to break the silence around sex and encourage victims and others to speak out;
- Investigating reports of mistreatment of women;
- Playing an active role in the first successfully tried rape case in Sierra Leonean history.³⁰⁹ CGG has also been active in efforts to change trial procedures, which required victims, including child victims, to testify in front of their rapists;
- Conducting public education presentations about sexual violence on the radio, including the use of short-wave radio to broadcast outside of Freetown since February 2000;³¹⁰
- Establishing a database of women in decision-making positions in government with the intention to advocate for more women in positions of power;
- Monitoring the full range of human rights abuses committed by combatants for the TRC and Special Court;

³⁰⁹ A 65-year-old man was sentenced with 10 years imprisonment for raping a 13 year-old girl. (CGG, 3/2000)

³¹⁰ The content of their broadcasts comes mostly from materials sent to them by the US Embassy in Freetown. (CGG, 3/2000)

- Providing legal advice and representation to human rights victims;
- Providing human rights education to schools, groups and communities in an effort to elevate the expectations the public has of their government.

Council of Churches of Sierra Leone (CCSL), a local NGO based in Freetown, created the Child Violations Monitoring Network (CRIVMON) in 1998 with technical and financial support from UNICEF. It works through a country-wide network of child and human rights organizations, as well as individual lawyers to document abuses committed against children. CCSL found sexual violence to be one of the most prevalent violations, with a sharp increase in the number of abuses occurring after the January 1999 rebel incursion into Freetown.³¹¹ It was Helen Bash-Taqi, then CRIVMON Co-ordinator, who informed the Child Protection Committee of the high number of rape cases in the communities. In response, UNICEF invited interested partners to meet and discuss how to facilitate physical and psychological rehabilitation for girls who had been abused by combatants. This led to the formation of the Sexual Violence committee. CCSL has submitted statistical documentation and narrative reports to UNICEF, which they hope will be used for accountability purposes in the TRC and Special Court processes and to bring the attention of the government to the problem, which thus far, has done little to either protect women and girls or prosecute their perpetrators. CCSL has a referral arrangement with Planned Parenthood of Sierra Leone but also makes medical referrals to other partners.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) closely monitors and documents a range of human rights abuses in Sierra Leone, including sexual violence. HRW produces frequent reports and press releases as part of an effort to advocate for accountability, stronger protection for civilians at risk and improved human rights training of former combatants. In February, 2001 HRW released a short report specifically on sexual violence during the conflict.³¹²

Amnesty International has also been producing regular reports and releases documenting rights abuses, including rape³¹³, and advocating

³¹¹ PHR interview with Helen Bash-Taqi of CCSL in Freetown, March, 2000. Generally, their research has revealed that most younger children were used as domestic servants, though cases of girls as young as 10 being used for sex have been documented. They also have cases of two boys (15 and 16) who were forced to have sex with their female commander and young boys who were forced to commit rapes.

³¹² Human Rights Watch, *Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict*, February 26, 2001.

³¹³ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Rape and other Forms of Sexual Abuse Must be Stopped*, May 30, 2000.

³¹⁴ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone. Rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls*, June 29, 2000.

within the Sierra Leonean government and the international community for protection, justice, and concerted action against the diamond and arms trades which are fueling the war. Amnesty also produced a report specifically documenting war-related sexual violence in Sierra Leone.³¹⁴

Women's Forum is a Freetown-based nation-wide network of women's groups established in February 1994 in response to the need among women for sharing ideas, building effective alliances and taking collective action on issues of common concern and interest to the overall advancement of the status of women and the promotion of children's rights. The Women's Forum played a crucial role in ensuring that the first democratic elections since independence from British rule took place in 1996. They are in a position to promote the need for legal reform and put pressure on political parties to address women's rights in the upcoming general elections.³¹⁵ The Women's Forum was identified at a forum chaired by UNHCR in 2001 as a potential partner to house a data-base on sexual violence and disseminate information on the issue.³¹⁶ With adequate financial support, the Women's Forum could also address the ongoing problems of coordination on the issue.

Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) is a Sierra Leonean NGO, active in Freetown, Kenema, Bo and the Kono district, with a strong foundation and solid experience in civil society, public advocacy, and rural development. NMJD is well suited to provide public advocacy to change the laws governing treatment of women/children, and to promote community development to establish community-based prevention and response systems in both rural and urban areas.³¹⁷

GOAL is an Irish NGO working with street children and commercial sex-workers in Freetown. In a survey conducted in 2000, they found that nearly half of the girls interviewed were between the ages of 13-17, many were formerly with the rebels, and 98% were addicted to drugs. The sex trade is an ongoing problem that has been aggravated by the war and sexual violence continues to be a daily problem in the lives of these girls – perpetrated by customers, boyfriends and military personnel. GOAL has established a drop-in center for these girls where they offer counseling, non-formal education and medical care. GOAL also advocates for the

³¹⁵ Witness, *Witness action in Women and Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*, December 2001 www.witness.org

³¹⁶ One of the problems raised at a workshop organized by UNHCR in Geneva in March, 2001, was the non-availability of adequate information and data about the extent of sexual violence in Sierra Leone which makes it difficult to provide targeted support for survivors. It is hoped that the findings of the PHR/UNAMSIL survey will help address this problem.

³¹⁷ NMJD received technical and training assistance from a representative of John Snow International in September, 2000 and has also received a small grant to expand their programs from the Washington D.C. based, Reproductive Health of Refugees Consortium.

rights of these girls with the police. Although family reunification has been particularly challenging because there is such a stigma attached to prostitution, GOAL is attempting to mediate with families to allow the girls to go home.

HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care

Society for Women and AIDS in Africa is a regional organization which focuses on the gender dimension of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and works to improve women's access to information, to challenge the cultural and legal constraints of patriarchal societies, and to encourage women's financial independence and self-esteem. The Sierra Leone branch, SWAASL, was set up ten years ago and has played a central role in organizing stakeholders to address the epidemic strategically and cooperatively. Major present and future activities which arose from a conference on best practices convened by SWAASL in 1998 include: establishing an AIDS/STD Resource Center, conducting research on the prevalence and impact of the disease, and orchestrating awareness campaigns targeted at war-affected women, commercial sex workers and other vulnerable groups.

Shepherd's Hospice – Sierra Leone's only hospice has no in-patient capacity, but at the time of this writing had 25 volunteer counselors throughout the greater Freetown area. The hospice has received modest funding from Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and WHO, and is expected to receive additional funds to rehabilitate their building and expand their services. Because of the stigma surrounding HIV and the frequent reports of those discovered to have the disease being thrown out of their homes and shunned by their families, it is essential to establish in-patient services.³¹⁸ There is currently nowhere else in the country to refer those who are ill for care and counseling.

National AIDS Control Office, a body within the Sierra Leonean government, is trying to revive AIDS-related activities nationwide. This office is intended to facilitate coordination and planning between government, NGOs, and international organizations working on the issue, but lacks the necessary capacity.³¹⁹ Among their activities, NACC has conducted prevalence testing among pregnant women as recently as 1997 and organized efforts to inform parliament of the need for a more active government role in preventing and treating HIV/AIDS.

³¹⁸ World Health Organization and Associates for Global Change, *HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone: The Future at Stake, The Strategic and Organizational Context and Recommendations for Action*, December 20, 2000.

³¹⁹ According to a presentation made by a representative of the National AIDS Control Office attended by PHR in March 2000, testing of pregnant women at clinics revealed the following growth in HIV prevalence rates: 2% in 1992, 2.7% in 1993, 3.4% in 1994, 4.5% in 1995, 5.5% in 1996, and 7% in 1997.

APPENDIX D

Referrals

The PHR/UNAMSIL team took every precaution to minimize the risk of re-traumatization for interview subjects, including careful design of the survey instrument, sensitivity training of the research team, and by the central involvement of two consultants, one a psychologist and one a social worker, who had extensive experience counseling survivors of sexual violence. In spite of the team's best efforts, it was recognized that the women and girls interviewed were taking some emotional and practical risk in sharing their stories, as well as giving up some of their time. While PHR decided against giving the participants any material compensation or token, and made it clear at the outset that the team was not offering any humanitarian services, it felt the least it could do was educate them about and connect them to existing services in the area. First, PHR established contact with those organizations providing medical and psychosocial support in the camps where the team intended to survey and explained the nature of the study. All the groups we contacted including: IMC, IRC, MSF-H, ADRA, GOAL, Concern, and Merlin, were happy to provide referral services to the women and girls we interviewed. In most cases, the researchers simply told the participant about the services offered in her camp, however special arrangements were made for "high risk cases." Researchers were trained to identify particularly severe cases requiring intervention and to request permission from the individual to pass her name along to the appropriate health care provider. Great care was taken to ensure that any names taken were separated from the completed questionnaires to ensure strict confidentiality. The PHR/UNAMSIL team is grateful to those organizations and individuals who so generously cooperated with this effort.

The researchers also provided a brief explanation of both the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in an effort to begin to educate the population and to ensure that the participants had an adequate understanding to determine whether they wanted PHR to give their names to these bodies. Any names that were given to pass on to the TRC or Special Court were separated from the questionnaires, so that no information about the participant's history would accompany her name. These names and contact information are in the possession of the UNAMSIL Human Rights Section until they can be passed on to the appropriate bodies.

102) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Médécins Sans Frontières, "Mutilation of civilians on the increase in Sierra Leone", 5
May 1998

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> Press Room > Press Releases Before 1999


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Mutilation of Civilians on the Increase in Sierra Leone

May 5, 1998 — Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) surgical teams at Connaught Hospital in Freetown, Sierra Leone, report that the number of patients suffering from severe mutilations has increased significantly over the past few weeks. The victims, mostly civilians, originate from the northeastern region of Kono, where insecurity is still rife.



Since April 6, the surgical team has treated 128 injured patients. MSF Head of Mission Monique Nagelkerke worries there could be many more victims in the countryside, unable to reach the hospital. "We fear that this may be just the tip of the iceberg," she says.

Many of the victims have had one or more limbs traumatically amputated; several have also had their ears removed. Some of them walked for weeks through the bush to get to the hospital.

According to the patients, the civilian population of Kono is terrorised by various armed groups, who have been carrying out executions, mutilations, rapes and kidnappings. Attacks are reported to be very systematic, with groups of people rounded up and killed, wounded, or raped, one by one. Many patients report seeing other civilians, some seriously wounded, fleeing into the bush. They remain unaccounted for.


Out of an estimated total population of half a million, about 25,000 people from Kono managed to migrate to villages in the west of the region, and another 70,000 fled across the border to Guinea. Those who remain in the province have no form of protection or care. International agencies are unable to access the area.

An MSF surgical team has been working in Connaught Hospital since May 1997. The organization also supports four other clinics in Freetown and hospitals and clinics in Bo, Pujehun, and Makeni. A nutritional program is carried out in Kambia in the north of Sierra Leone.

MSF is the world's largest independent emergency medical relief organization, providing aid to victims of armed conflict, natural and man-made disasters, and epidemic diseases, and to populations who lack of access to health care. Nearly 2,500 volunteers from 45 countries currently work with MSF, providing medical aid in more than 80 countries.

103) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Médécins Sans Frontières, MSF 1998 Report, "Atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone", 1 May 1998.



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MSF 1998 Report: Atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone

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From 6th April 1998, the surgical teams of the international medical aid agency Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) at Connaught Hospital, Freetown, started recording an alarming increase in the number of patients suffering from severe mutilations. This report provides further details of the injuries inflicted on the people admitted to hospital, as well as a summary of in-depth interviews with over 70 survivors conducted by MSF medical staff. The victims, mostly civilians, originate from the north-eastern region of Kono, where insecurity is still rife.

The history of Sierra Leone and the recent outbreaks of fighting need little introduction. The first democratically elected president Ahmad Kabbah was ousted in a coup in May 1997 led by Johnny Paul Koromah, commander of the Sierra Leone military junta, with the support of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The RUF/AFRC remained in power until February 1998, when, after failed talks in Conakry, the West African troops of ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group) forced the coup leaders and their followers out of Freetown and into the isolated areas upcountry.

While the capital Freetown, major towns and villages are now held by Ecomog and relatively safe for civilians, large areas in the countryside around these locations remain under the control of the former Junta. Fighting is currently under way in the north, west and east of the country.

Between 6th April and 4th May 1998, the Connaught Hospital in Freetown received 115 patients, most of whom are severely mutilated. Connaught Hospital, which receives MSF support, is Sierra Leone's only hospital with an orthopaedic surgeon.

2. ATROCITIES AND MUTILATIONS

Mutilations and other forms of torture and retribution are not a new phenomenon in Sierra Leone. Between 1992 and 1996, many civilians (including non-nationals) were mutilated and murdered during attacks against villages and towns conducted by various armed groups. Expatriates were also taken hostage or killed. The horrific injuries now being treated at Connaught hospital are of a similar nature.

As of 6th April, 1998 Connaught Hospital started receiving small or large groups, depending on the availability of transport.

The following overview gives the number of patients admitted with arm amputations.

Date	No of patients	Double arm amputation	Single arm amputation
06/04	10	-	-
14/04	24	1	6
18/04	17	1	4
24/04	2	1	-
26/04	58	-	13
02/05	4	1	-
Total	115	4	23

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Out of these 115 patients, 70 were interviewed (56 male, 14 female).

Their mutilations and wounds are as follows :

- 4 men with both arms amputated, age ranging between 16 and 40.
- 14 men with one arm amputated, age ranging between 23 and 50.
- 5 men had, in addition to having their arm(s) amputated, a part of, or one or both ears cut off.
- 1 woman with one arm amputated as a result of a gunshot wound.
- 1 patient with an amputated foot, 1 patient with an amputated leg, both as the result of gunshot wounds.
- 23 patients with deep lacerations on lower arms, severed tendons, broken ulna and radius, as result of cutlass attacks.
- 7 patients with either a complete hand or several fingers missing as result of cutlass attacks.
- 20 patients with gunshot wounds.
- 1 patient with shrapnel wounds as result of Ecomog bombing.
- 2 women who were raped and had foreign objects inserted in their vagina.

Only one interviewee could be identified as a combattant (in this case a Kamajor fighter). All others were civilians, with occupations ranging from housewives, trader, farmer to diamond digger and miner.

* While writing the report, this afternoon 4 May 1998, 13 more patients were admitted in Connaught Hospital. Of these 13 people, three men had both their arms hacked off, six had one arm or nearly one arm hacked off. One of the victims is a 60-year-old woman with one arm hacked off.

The interviews were carried out by MSF staff over a period of four days. All patients were informed that all information would be dealt with in a confidential manner, and that no names would be recorded. None of the patients approached refused to be interviewed. The full story of when, where and how the attack occurred was recorded. The summary is as follows.

3. ATTACKS AS TOLD BY VICTIMS

After having talked to the 70 patients, it became clear that between 15 and 25 April the villages between Njalama Sewafe and Koidu, East Sierra Leone were attacked by groups of armed men. Some villages seem

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to have been attacked more than once. Patients told about attacks on their villages both during the day and at night, and also about attacks that occurred on the road, while people were moving between villages or their farms.

More recently, on 2nd May, patients started to arrive from the area around Yifin and Alikalia, north-east of Koidu. All patients reported that after the attacks, people scattered into the bush in all directions. In most cases the current whereabouts of these people is unknown. It is also reported that, while moving away from their attacked villages, patients witnessed many "damaged" (wounded) and dead people on the roads. It might well be possible that the 115 patients admitted to the hospital form only a small percentage of the total wounded and mutilated people from these areas.

In general, most patients told about attacks that started with groups of men arriving in their villages, calling out that they were ECOMOG, and that they were there to free the villagers. Many villagers mentioned that they were woken up by a knock on their door, with the order to open the door, that they were ECOMOG and that they were safe. Upon leaving their houses, the villagers then realised that these men did not belong to ECOMOG. Some of the attackers were wearing green fatigues. Villagers were then rounded up, in groups or in lines.

They were then, one by one, in front of the other villagers, taken to the pounding block, asked by their attackers which arm they used to work with, after which the right or left arm would be put on the pounding block and amputated with a cutlass. Sometimes a pre-cut would be made with bayonet, to show where the amputation was to happen. People realising what was happening like one teacher, said that he used his left arm, even though he was right handed. His left arm was amputated.

Several patient reported that the attackers took the amputated arms with them. One patient said that they did not take his arm, but that he was able to keep his cut-off arm.

In some villages, after the people were rounded up, they were stripped naked and ordered to "use their women"; men were ordered to "use" their sister. When men refused to do so, their arms were amputated, and the women were raped by the attackers.

After the attack, many patients mentioned that the armed men would tell them to go now, and report

themselves to ECOMOG and tell ECOMOG, "That we, the attackers do not want them here, and to tell ECOMOG that the attackers were here, and that they would come to ECOMOG soon".

Patients were also told that they should go to President Kabbah, and ask him for a new arm. One patient was given a letter by the attackers, with the order to give it to President Kabbah.

Some patients, who did not leave their village after the attack, and when encountering the attackers again, were ordered to leave ; "Why are you still here , we told you to go to ECOMOG !". Other men, who had one or two ears cut off, reported that the attackers told them, that without their ears, they should no longer listen to ECOMOG and the government and that they should listen better to the attackers.

Other patients reported that they hid under their beds but that the attackers pulled them out from underneath the bed, or shot under the beds in the room, as they were aware that people were hiding there. One patient reported that she was in a room with a group of other people, and that the attackers shot and killed four people, and the patient hid underneath the 4 dead bodies with her baby until the attackers had left.

Several patients reported that groups of people had been rounded up, locked into a house and then the house was set on fire. It was reported that this had happened to women and children.

In one family that was interviewed, the older brother had both arms amputated, his wife had one arm amputated, the younger nephew of 16 had both arms amputated, and another relative had both arms badly cut (tendons cut and ulna and radius broken due to cutlass attack). One man of 50 had walked for 4 weeks, from village to village, with both arms amputated, until he reached a place where he found a commercial vehicle that took him and 2 others to Freetown. These examples are just a few of the stories as recorded by the MSF staff. Each patient had a similar gruesome story to tell.

4. CONCLUSION

After interviewed 70 patients at Connaught hospital and taking into account credible reports from other parts of the country, MSF strongly believes that the actual number of casualties may be much higher than the number of patients reaching the hospital. All patients interviewed mentioned other people, wounded

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and mutilated who ran into the bush during the attacks, and who remain unaccounted for.

MSF is concerned that a significant proportion of the civilian population of rural Sierra Leone is vulnerable to more attacks of this sort and that no protection is currently available for them. MSF calls upon the international community to look urgently for ways to provide protection and assistance for these civilians.

104) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Human Rights Watch: "World Report 1999: Sierra Leone, Human Rights Developments". (Excerpt, p1)



Sierra Leone

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Human Rights Developments

In early February, troops of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) ousted the government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Freetown. This ended their nine-month rule, characterized by widespread human rights abuses and a complete breakdown of the rule of law. For the past seven years a vicious civil war has engulfed Sierra Leone, characterized by atrocities against civilians, often committed by the RUF, a rebel group formed in 1991 with support from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).

Upon taking power on May 25, 1997, the AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political parties and public meetings, and announced rule by military decree. The AFRC, created by a group of senior military officers, soon joined forces with the RUF. During their joint rule, many judges, lawyers, and police fled the country, causing a total collapse of the judicial system. The AFRC/RUF government arbitrarily arrested and detained its suspected opponents and critics, including students, journalists and human rights advocates, causing thousands to seek asylum.

On March 10, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG reinstated President Tejan Kabbah, first elected in March of 1996, who subsequently declared a state of emergency. After losing political power, the AFRC/RUF alliance engaged in a war of terror against civilians, committing widespread and egregious atrocities in an attempt to regain power. Between February and June 1998 alone, its members raped, deliberately mutilated, or killed outright thousands of Sierra Leonean civilians. The AFRC/RUF abducted men, women and children, probably numbering in the thousands, for use as combatants, forced laborers, or sexual slaves. Women were actively targeted through sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. In addition to various forms of physical abuse, innumerable civilians suffered psychological trauma from the rebels' choice of tactics and extreme cruelty—like the severing of limbs—to compound the horror of their attacks.

Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), civilian militias who supported the Kabbah government, also committed numerous abuses, including indiscriminate killings and torture, but on a significantly smaller scale than those carried out by the AFRC/RUF. The CDFs were created in order to provide local security and targeted for abuse those they claimed

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CAMPAIGNS

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were AFRC/RUF combatants or their supporters. The largest and most powerful of the CDFs, the Kamajors, were responsible for the majority of abuses committed by those fighting on behalf of the Kabbah government. In addition to killings and torture, Kamajors also obstructed humanitarian assistance and extorted money or other payment at roadblocks.

Children were victims of gross violations of human rights committed by both sides to the conflict. The AFRC/RUF abducted an unknown number of children—probably in the thousands—for use as laborers, fighters, and in the case of girls, sexual prisoners. Many girls were forced to work for the AFRC/RUF combatants until they reached sexual maturity, when they would be assigned to a fighter as a “wife.” There were also many child soldiers among the Kamajors, and despite promises by the government to demobilize all combatants under the age of eighteen, the CDFs continued to recruit children at least until July.

The United Nations estimated that over 416,000 Sierra Leoneans fled the fighting as refugees to neighboring Guinea and Liberia or to internally displaced camps. Conditions for both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees were often severe due to a lack of access to camps and poor security conditions. In particular, the close proximity of the camps in Guinea and Liberia to the Sierra Leonean border and the presence of former combatants among the refugee population in Liberia jeopardized humanitarian assistance and protection. Many refugees and IDPs suffered from a host of problems including high levels of malnutrition and disease, as well as occasional attacks from the RUF/AFRC.

The government made repeated gestures in support of human rights, such as its pledge to provide amnesty for child soldiers and intermittent appeals to combatants to lay down their arms in exchange for amnesty. In a climate of public hatred for individuals associated with the AFRC/RUF, the Kabbah government initiated legal proceedings against fifty-eight civilians in regular courts and thirty-eight former soldiers before a military court on a range of charges including treason and murder. In hearings in August and October, the High Court of Sierra Leone sentenced to death twenty-seven civilians convicted of treason, including five journalists and a seventy-five-year-old woman. International observers questioned the appropriateness of the treason charges for the journalists, and criticized the lack of a right to appeal sentencing by the military court. On October 19, the government of Sierra Leone executed by firing squad twenty-four of the soldiers who had been sentenced to death one week earlier. The trials constituted the first major test under the Kabbah government of a justice system which lacked basic infrastructure and support. Many of the over 2,000 prisoners in Sierra Leone were held under the 1998 Public Emergency Regulations, introduced by President Kabbah on March 16 and ratified by parliament, which provided for indefinite detention without trial. Prisons were often overcrowded, unsanitary, and lacking in health care and the regular provision of food.

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Section 13 of the Public Emergency Regulations declared that "disturbing reports" by the media were punishable offences. On June 24, Minister of Information and Cultural Affairs Dr. Julius Spencer stated that any information regarding the security situation must be approved by ECOMOG before publication. Journalists complained further that taxes had been unjustly imposed upon newspapers in an attempt to limit their ability to publish.

105) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Amnesty International "Annual Report 2000, Sierra Leone".

SIERRA LEONE

REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE
 Head of state and government: Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
 Capital: Freetown
 Population: 4.4 million
 Official language: English
 Death penalty: retentionist

The political and human rights crisis deepened as rebel forces attacked Freetown in January 1999. Thousands of unarmed civilians were deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated, raped or abducted. Although conclusion of a peace agreement in July provided opportunities to end human rights abuses, the political and security situation remained precarious and human rights abuses against civilians continued. The peace agreement included a general amnesty which provided impunity for human rights abuses, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed during the conflict.

Background
 Rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) attacked Freetown on 6 January and committed large-scale atrocities against civilians. Extensive destruction of property made as many as 200,000 people homeless. Although rebel forces were forced to retreat by forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), fighting continued in other parts of the country and some towns, including Makeni in Northern Province, remained under rebel control. Liberia was widely accused of providing military support to rebel forces, in violation of a UN Security Council resolution.

A cease-fire was agreed in May, and a peace agreement — signed in Lome, Togo, in July — provided for an immediate cessation of hostilities and disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. RUF and AFRC members were appointed to ministerial positions in a government of national unity in October and the RUF became a political party. RUF leader Foday Sankoh, with the status of vice-president, chaired a commission to manage mineral resources and post-conflict reconstruction, and Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the AFRC, a commission to oversee implementation of the peace process.

Implementation of key provisions of the peace agreement, including disarmament and demobilization, release of captured civilians and unhindered humanitarian access, was, however, limited. Full deployment of a UN peace-keeping force to monitor the cease-fire and assist with disarmament and demobilization was delayed. By the end of 1999 only some 3,500 of an estimated 45,000 combatants had been disarmed and demobilized. Despite the

appointment of their leaders to official positions, political rivalry between AFRC and RUF forces resulted in heavy fighting, in particular in Makeni and Lunsar in October. Rifts also emerged between Foday Sankoh and other rebel leaders who had yet to disarm, and doubts remained about the commitment of the RUF to the peace process. Parts of the north and east of the country, including strategic diamond-mining areas, remained inaccessible.

Abuses by rebel forces
 RUF and AFRC forces committed gross human rights abuses on a large scale. AI repeatedly called for an end to abuses and to transfers of arms, ammunition and combatants to rebel forces.

Despite improvement after the signing of the peace agreement, there was a marked increase in attacks on civilians from October in areas west of the Occra Hills and in Northern Province, in particular around Makeni, Lunsar, Port Loko, Kamboia and Kabala, and a pattern of deliberate intimidation and terrorizing of civilians re-emerged. From November such attacks, often during raids for food, money and other goods, occurred almost daily in Northern Province.

Deliberate and arbitrary killings
 Although it was impossible to ascertain the exact number of deaths during the rebel incursion into Freetown, an estimated 5,000 people, at least 2,000 of them civilians, were killed. Medical authorities subsequently put the figure at over 6,000. Although most killings were arbitrary, some individuals and groups — including government officials, journalists, lawyers, human rights activists, prison officials and police officers — were deliberately targeted. For example, more than 200 police officers and eight journalists were reported to have been killed.

After being forced from Freetown, rebel forces continued to commit atrocities. In Masiaka, east of Freetown, civilians accused of sympathizing with government forces were killed or mutilated. In one incident in a village between Masiaka and Mile 18, several babies and young children were reported to have been killed. Deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians continued after the peace agreement, particularly in Northern Province.

Torture, including mutilation and rape
 As rebel forces retreated from Freetown, they mutilated civilians by cutting off limbs, most frequently hands and arms. In February reports indicated that some 300 victims of mutilation who required surgery were being treated in Freetown hospitals. Among the youngest recorded victims was a six-year-old girl whose left arm had been severed. It was probable that many other victims failed to reach medical help and died from their injuries.

Amputations and others forms of torture continued to be reported after rebel forces retreated from Freetown, although on a lesser scale. In May boys and young men in the area around Masiaka were seen with the letters RUF carved across their chests. In an attack

on a village near Port Loko in October there were cases of attempted amputation of limbs, and burns inflicted by molten plastic.

Rape and other forms of sexual abuse of women and girls were systematic and widespread. During the rebel incursion into Freetown, women and girls were rounded up and gang-raped, often in public. More than 90 per cent of women and girls abducted and held captive were believed to have been raped; many were forced to submit to rape or be killed. Many girls subsequently released were pregnant, had given birth or had contracted sexually transmitted diseases. Rape of women and girls caught up in the fighting between AFRC and RUF forces in Makeni and Lunsar in October was common.

Abduction of civilians

Rebel forces abducted several thousand civilians, including children, from Freetown in January. Some of those abducted were subsequently killed. Some were selected for training as fighters, others used as porters to carry looted goods. Abducted women and girls were forced into sexual slavery and retained to cook and undertake other tasks. Up to 4,000 children were reported missing from Freetown, most of them abducted.

A small number of prominent Sierra Leoneans, including the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Freetown, and foreign nationals, including priests and nuns, were also abducted. At least eight were killed and two others seriously injured. Others, including the archbishop, either escaped or were released.

Although the peace agreement provided for the release of captured civilians, only some 1,000 adults and children, a comparatively small number, had been freed by December. Many of those released suffered from malnutrition and disease. The release of girls and young women was particularly difficult to secure. Some 2,400 children, most of them girls, abducted from Freetown remained missing.

As attacks against civilians increased from October, the number of civilians being abducted exceeded those released.

Hostage-taking

AFRC forces captured more than 30 UN military and civilian personnel who had gone to the Occra Hills in August with an ECOMOG escort to supervise the release of abducted civilians. Their captors claimed that Johnny Paul Koroma was held under duress by RUF forces and that the peace agreement disadvantaged AFRC forces. All were released after six days.

In December RUF forces captured two foreign nationals working for an international humanitarian organization, Medecins sans frontieres (MSF-France), in Kailahun District, Eastern Province, and held them hostage for 10 days in protest against disarmament and demobilization being supervised by UN peace-keeping forces and ECOMOG troops.

ECOMOG and Civil Defence Forces

ECOMOG forces were commended by the international community for their role in Sierra Leone. They and the

civilian militia supporting President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), however, also committed human rights violations.

During the rebel incursion into Freetown, large numbers of captured or suspected rebels were extrajudicially executed by ECOMOG and the CDF, often without any real attempt to establish guilt or innocence. Children, including an eight-year-old boy caught in possession of a gun, were among the victims. Ill-treatment, including beatings, whippings and public humiliation, was common at ECOMOG and CDF checkpoints.

At least 10 Sierra Leonean staff of humanitarian organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross were detained by ECOMOG forces in January; most were beaten. Although accused of cooperating with rebel forces, these allegations were unfounded.

Indiscriminate aerial bombardments on densely populated areas of Freetown during the rebel incursion resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties.

AI called for strict compliance by ECOMOG forces with international human rights and humanitarian law. In April the ECOWAS Executive Secretary called for an investigation into extrajudicial executions by ECOMOG forces but none took place. A committee subsequently established to monitor relations between ECOMOG forces and the civilian population failed to function effectively.

Reports of harassment and ill-treatment by ECOMOG forces continued in the months which followed. Detainees held by ECOMOG forces and the CDF were ill-treated, including by being beaten and having arms and hands tied extremely tightly. Civilians and humanitarian convoys travelling along major roads were frequently harassed.

Child combatants

Several thousand children under the age of 18 fought with rebel and CDF forces. An estimated 10 per cent of rebel forces who attacked Freetown were children, many of them previously abducted and frequently under the influence of drugs. Some were responsible for killings and mutilations.

Before the peace agreement, widespread recruitment of children by the CDF in Southern and Eastern Provinces continued. The peace agreement specified that particular attention be given to the issue of child combatants and the government made repeated commitments to end recruitment of children. Although the CDF subsequently demobilized some child combatants, it admitted in November that some 300 children aged between 15 and 18 were in its forces in the Kooala region and that there had been no effort to demobilize them.

In September the UN estimated that 3,400 child combatants were awaiting disarmament and demobilization; the real number, however, was likely to be much higher. Child combatants, including those who had been abducted, were still engaged in combat; in October a number of boys were among those injured in

fighting between rebel forces.

AI called for priority to be given to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers and for adequate resources for agencies, including UNICEF, specifically helping them.

Refugees and internally displaced people
More than a million people were internally displaced and half a million were refugees, most of them in Guinea. Often still at risk of human rights abuses, they also suffered acute hardship including shortage of food and basic health care. In some areas up to 30 per cent of internally displaced people were reported to be children, many unaccompanied.

Delays in disarmament and demobilization, continuing insecurity and lack of access to parts of the country limited the return of internally displaced people and refugees.

Intergovernmental organizations
Human rights abuses and violations of the peace agreement by rebel forces were repeatedly condemned by the international community which took major initiatives to establish peace and security. An international contact group bringing together intergovernmental organizations and key governments met in April and July. AI called on the international community, including the UN and the World Bank, for protection and respect of human rights to be at the centre of efforts to resolve the political crisis and during post-conflict reconstruction.

A Human Rights Manifesto for Sierra Leone was adopted during a visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in June. It included commitments to promote children's rights and to raising the age of military recruitment to 18 years. It also pledged UN support for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a National Human Rights Commission, both subsequently included in the peace agreement.

In September, after visiting Sierra Leone, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict proposed specific measures to meet the needs of children affected by the conflict.

In October the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an international peace-keeping force of 6,000 troops as part of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The force, to include a substantial number of troops from ECOWAS countries, was to be deployed for an initial period of six months to help implement the peace agreement, in particular monitoring the cease-fire and the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. The full complement of troops, however, had not been deployed by the end of 1999. A reduced ECOMOG force was to remain to maintain security and help implement the peace agreement with UNAMSIL. Subsequent plans to withdraw ECOMOG troops, however, prompted a recommendation by the UN Secretary-General in late December for a substantial

increase in UNAMSIL troops. The UN peace-keeping force was mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment.

Following the peace agreement, the UN Security Council agreed to expand the human rights section of UNAMSIL, including by appointing advisers on child protection. The human rights section monitored and reported abuses and promoted respect and protection of human rights. It was actively involved in securing the release of prisoners and captured civilians and in assisting in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the National Human Rights Commission. It also provided human rights training for police and UN military observers and support for Sierra Leonean human rights groups. AI called for the human rights section to receive full political support and adequate resources.

In November the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights decided to send a delegation to Sierra Leone in early 2000.

Impunity

The peace agreement provided for a general amnesty for all acts undertaken in pursuit of the conflict. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sierra Leone, signing the peace agreement as a moral guarantor, added a disclaimer that the UN did not recognize the amnesty as applying to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. It remained unclear, however, how impunity for such abuses would be addressed. While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission provided by the peace agreement could examine human rights abuses committed during the conflict, it could not alone establish full accountability because of the amnesty.

Shortly after the peace agreement was signed, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an international investigation into human rights abuses during the conflict and the UN Secretary-General acknowledged that the amnesty was difficult to reconcile with the goal of ending impunity. He suggested to the UN Security Council that it consider measures to ensure accountability for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including the establishment of an international commission of inquiry. While noting the views of the Secretary-General, the Security Council neither explicitly supported nor endorsed such a commission, judging that insistence on accountability for human rights abuses at that stage would undermine the peace process.

In a letter to the Security Council in July, AI urged that it recommend an effective international mechanism for investigating human rights abuses and for bringing those responsible to justice. Although the High Commissioner's Office established a study on the possible relationship between the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and an international

commission of inquiry, no recommendations were known to have been made by the end of the year.

AI country reports

- Sierra Leone: Escalating human rights crisis requires urgent action (AI Index: AFR 51/001/99)
- Sierra Leone: UN human rights presence reduced as abuses worsen (AI Index: AFR 51/003/99)
- Sierra Leone: Recommendations to the international contact group on Sierra Leone, New York, 19 April 1999 (AI Index: AFR 51/005/99)
- Sierra Leone: Mary Robinson's visit to Freetown - placing human rights centre stage (AI Index: AFR 51/006/99)
- Sierra Leone: A peace agreement but no justice (AI Index: AFR 51/007/99)
- Sierra Leone: The Security Council should clarify the United Nations' position on impunity (AI Index: AFR 51/010/99)
- Sierra Leone: Amnesty International's recommendations to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Durban, South Africa, 12-15 November 1999 (AI Index: AFR 51/011/99)
- Sierra Leone: Escalating human rights abuses against civilians (AI Index: AFR 51/013/99)

106) Report of Non-Governmental Organization

Women Waging Peace and The Policy Commission, "From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone", Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson, January 2004.

From Combat to Community:
Women and Girls of Sierra Leone

By Dyan Mazurana and Christopher Carlson

With Contributions by
Sanam Naraghi Anderlini

Series Editor
Sanam Naraghi Anderlini

January 2004

WOMEN WAGING PEACE is a program of Hunt Alternatives Fund that advocates for the full participation of women in formal and informal peace processes around the world.

THE POLICY COMMISSION is conducting a series of case studies to document women's contributions to peace processes across conflict areas worldwide.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although many individuals contributed expertise and insight to this report, the analysis and findings reflect the perspective of the authors alone.

We wish to acknowledge and extend our thanks to our colleagues in Sierra Leone: Shellac Davies, Maurice Ellis, Michel Kamara, Philip Kamara, Bintu Mansaray, Donald Robertshaw, and Keith Wright. We would also like to thank Dorene Martinez, who conducted follow-up research in 2003.

The following individuals allowed us to interview them, shared their insights, read, and commented on drafts of this paper, and/or provided support to the project: Ester A'Kanu, Memunaru Bangora, Amy Bangura, Roisin de Barca, Florian Fichtl, Cynthia Kallay, Fatta Kamara, Ramatu Sama Kamara, Samuel Kamara, Daniel Sahead Karoma, Kees Kingma, Stephanie Kuttner, Olayinka Laggarrh, Alfred Lansana, Jean Lieby, Jane Mansbridge, Francis Murray, Amie Passay, Antonio Piccoli, Caleb Rossiter, Victoria Salinas, Foday Sawee, Ibrahim Sesay, M. Sylvester, Glenis Taylor, Richard Thoronka, Samuel Turner, Catherine Wiesner, and Ibrahim Yoffendeh. There were many others who shared their perspectives but preferred to remain anonymous.

Finally, the following individuals at Women Waging Peace and Hunt Alternatives Fund made possible the publication of this report: Sanam Anderlini, Joelle Balfé, Mari Barrera, Camille Pampell Conaway, Cheryl Foley, Carla Koppell, Elizabeth Powley, Jessica Ratey, Jan Smith, and Roxane Wilber. And special thanks are owed to the chair of Women Waging Peace, Swanee Hunt.

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PROJECT BACKGROUND

Wars and internal conflicts do not end simply with the signing of peace agreements. To avoid a resurgence of violence, it is necessary to develop and support measures for strengthening the governance, security, justice, and socioeconomic capacities of a state. This is a complex task in any society, but daunting in post-conflict situations. While the international community can provide assistance and valuable resources, the local population, which has no "exit strategy," has the greatest commitment to building sustainable peace. It is therefore essential to draw on the assets, experiences, and dedication at the local level and among all sectors of society. One sector often overlooked and underestimated is women. In most post-conflict societies women are more than 50 percent of the population and are actively engaged in peace building while addressing the basic survival needs of their families and communities. Yet they are often portrayed as passive victims, and little regard is given to their actual and potential roles in fostering security.

In October 2000, for the first time in its history, the United Nations Security Council acknowledged that women have a key role in promoting international stability by passing Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. It called on all parties to ensure women's participation in peace processes, from the prevention of conflict to negotiations and post-war reconstruction. The Women Waging Peace Policy Commission was established to examine peace processes with a particular focus on the contributions of women. Drawing on qualitative field-based research and quantitative survey data, "From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone" assesses how consideration of gender issues can improve disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes and documents the contributions of women in official and civil society-based reintegration programs.

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Key Findings

1. Throughout the conflict, women led civil society peace efforts. In 2002, as the country faced the breakdown of the 1999 Lomé accords, women were pivotal in galvanizing mass demonstrations that led to the end of the war.
2. Contrary to official reports, women played a military role in the pro-government Civil Defense Forces and in the rebel movement.
3. Female ex-combatants from all forces were significantly underrepresented in official disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs.
4. Women are playing a significant but unacknowledged role in the reintegration of former fighters, filling many gaps in official programs.

Recommendations

1. When **planning DDR**, international actors, including the UN, multilateral organizations, donor governments, and national governments, must:
 - ensure the participation of women during all stages of negotiation;
 - assume that women are part of the fighting forces and be aware that, where children are present, 10 to 33 percent may be girls;
 - recognize the initial estimated number of fighters provided by military forces may be low, and thus be prepared to increase resources to ensure effective programs; and
 - extend the definition of *combatant* to include those who were part of a "regular armed force in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks and messengers...and girls recruited for sexual purposes..."—in accordance with existing norms followed by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and outlined in the UN Secretary-General's study, *Women, Peace and Security* (2002).
2. During **disarmament and demobilization**, implementing organizations should:
 - accept females even when unaccompanied by men; and
 - develop parallel systems for the demobilization of women and girls by:
 - offering women the choice to enter care centers with their children or to remain with their male colleagues and counterparts; and
 - ensuring there are facilities to separately house girls and boys without parents.
3. In **reintegration**, donors should ensure that:
 - local organizations and communities working with former combatants are direct beneficiaries of resources from official reintegration and rehabilitation programs;
 - income-generation and job-creation programs are created to provide employment for ex-combatants and members of communities into which they are returning; and
 - DDR programs support mothers, particularly single mothers, emerging from the fighting forces—including providing basic care for them and their children (through foster care programs or centers) to facilitate their participation in education and skills training that can help them avoid petty crime or the sex trade.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sierra Leone ended its national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program in December 2003. Since the program began in 1998, 72,500 former combatants have been demobilized, including 4,751 women (6.5 percent) and 6,787 children (9.4 percent), of whom 506 are girls.¹ From the outset, there was some recognition that women and child soldiers made up a significant portion of the forces.² In theory, the DDR process was designed to include them. But while the program was effective in reaching out to male combatants, ultimately women and children were underserved. Despite this shortcoming, the plan has been hailed as a success and a model upon which other DDR processes could be based.

These DDR programs have also failed to support civilian populations faced with the reality of reintegrating former fighters. Instead, in communities across Sierra Leone, women as individuals and in groups have taken on the responsibility of assisting former combatants as they return to civilian life. But they receive little or no support from the national and international programs established to ensure successful reintegration.

Women and the War

In March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), led by former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) corporal Foday Sankoh, invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. Violence against women and children, and general terror in rural and urban centers quickly became cornerstones of the RUF movement and were encouraged by its leadership. But as the war escalated, women and girls reported atrocities committed by forces on both sides. Preyed upon by the RUF and SLA, local civilians in many areas transformed traditional hunting societies, such as the Kamajors, into pro-government militias known as Civil Defense Forces (CDF). These militias gained prominence with the armed activities of the Kamajors in the eastern and southern provinces and the rise of the Gbechis in the north, among others. Throughout the war years, the government endorsed the CDF, providing them with resources, including weapons.

Soldiers and "Wives," Cooks and Spies

Women and girls were present in large numbers in pro-government and rebel forces and were involved in a variety of activities. In the survey of 50 female ex-

combatants (ranging in age from 10 to 35)³ conducted for this study, almost all stated "abduction" as their means of entry; one third stated that they had fighting experience; nearly half indicated that they received weapons training; one fifth described themselves as spies; and more than half indicated that in addition to performing other duties, they were forced to be captive "wives." On average, they were 12 years old when they entered the forces.

Despite denials by government officials, girls and young women played an integral role in the CDF. They were spies, commanders, and frontline fighters; some were herbalists, meant to supply fighters with magic potions for invulnerability. Others were cooks, medics, and spiritual leaders. They witnessed brutal rituals and suffered significant sexual abuse.

Women and girls also made up a large part of rebel RUF forces. Many served as captive "wives" of commanders and were responsible for distributing weapons, food, and loot confiscated from village raids. They commanded fighting forces known as small boys units and small girls units; many were also involved in the mutilation and murder of civilians. In camps, commanders' "wives" sometimes used their control over food and loot to prevent young boys and men from abusing girls.

In sum, the experience of women and girls in the fighting forces was complex. They were captives and dependents, but they were also involved in the planning and execution of the war.

Disarmament and Demobilization 1998-2000

The Sierra Leone government and international partners, including the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group and the United Nations, conducted disarmament and demobilization in three phases between 1998 and 2000. Reintegration programs continued through 2003. At the start of the program, the estimated number of combatants was 45,000, of which 12 percent was presumed to be women.⁴ At its completion, over 72,000 had been demobilized, indicating that the preliminary estimates of force size were inaccurate. As 84 percent of the demobilized were adult men, the program was effective in reaching out to this segment of the population. Since just 6.5 percent of the demobilized were women, however, it seems likely that thousands

more fighters, particularly women and girls, were not reached by the official process.⁴

Qualifications for Entry

Adults (18 years and older) were eligible for entry into the program by presenting a weapon at any of the official reception centers across the country. They were asked questions and required to disassemble and reassemble a gun, usually an AK-47, as a prerequisite for participation. In Phases I and II, wives and dependents were not eligible for entry.

In Phase III, a group could bring in a weapon. Late in the program, as men complained about their inability to sustain their families, "wives" were permitted to apply for microcredit. For a woman to access the loans, however, she had to be present with a man who was willing to identify her as his wife. No woman could claim benefits alone, regardless of the number of children in her care. For many abductees forced into "marriage," there was no means of escaping their captors. But some senior DDR officials did not consider this important. "Even if they were raped and abducted," said one unnamed official in a 2002 interview, "70 percent... want to be with their husbands." Officially, those under 18 were not required to present a weapon to enter DDR. However, there was widespread inconsistency among the UN, government officials, and NGO staff on whether children were required to turn in weapons. The majority of girl fighters interviewed for this study, including those who passed through the DDR process, stated that the weapons test was repeatedly administered to children.

Women and Girls in the Margins

Nearly 7,000 children participated in official demobilization programs,⁵ but estimates suggest that there were as many as 48,216 children in the forces. Thus, there is significant disparity between the number of children, particularly girls, presumed to be in the forces and the numbers that entered the DDR programs (see table).

Table 1: Estimated Number for Total Forces, Child Soldiers, and Girl Soldiers

Force	Total	Child Soldiers	Girls Soldiers
RUF	45,000	22,500	7,500
AERC	10,000	5,000	1,567
SLA	14,000	7,500	1,167
CDF	63,865	17,216	1,722
Total	137,865	48,216	12,056

In the survey referenced earlier, half of the women and girls had not gone through official disarmament and demobilization. Their experiences highlight a number of gaps in the process:

1. Forty-six percent cited not having a weapon as a barrier for entry into the program. Many women in the CDF were ordered to hand in their weapons prior to demobilization, then were left behind as their male colleagues were transported to assembly centers. Others indicated that their guns were taken away by their commanders and handed to male fighters. Many who were not "primarily" fighters had used weapons from a communal source but did not possess guns themselves.
2. Twenty-one percent feared reprisals from opposing forces at the centers and so avoided the process.
3. Others reported feeling unsafe among the men and thus stayed away from the sites.
4. Many had no knowledge of the program or felt there was nothing to gain by participating.
5. Little was done to reach out to women and girls in the CDF, as it was incorrectly assumed that these were male-only units.

According to local reports since the conclusion of the disarmament and demobilization components of the official program, some female ex-combatants have turned to prostitution and petty crime for survival.

With no hope of receiving assistance from the children's fathers, their own families, or the state, some are turning to violence. In 2002, social workers observed that young women, particularly those with children, were instigating riots in urban centers. Some young women fighters have reportedly crossed borders to join armed groups across the region.

**Rising to the Challenge:
Women's Campaign for Peace**

From the early days of the war, women in rural and urban centers mobilized to protest the atrocities and call for peace. In May 2000, with the RUF flouting the 1999 Lomé accords, a group of elderly women came together, demanding a meeting with Sankoh. On arriving at the RUF compound, they were mistreated and insulted. Frustrated, the women tried a different tactic. They collectively hitched up their skirts, bent over, and bared themselves to Sankoh and his coterie. In Sierra Leone, such an action by women is the worst curse that can be brought upon anyone.

The news had a galvanizing effect on Sierra Leoneans. They had an obligation to uphold the women's honor and support the curse. But the women's actions also gave people the courage to stand up to the RUF. Coinciding with the arrival of the new UN mission and British Special Forces, the women's protest and subsequent public demonstrations, were pivotal in the struggle for peace, culminating in Sankoh's arrest.

**Caring for Ex-Combatants:
Women's Contributions to Reintegration**

Across Sierra Leone, women as individuals and in groups have been critical to reintegrating former combatants, particularly those excluded from official programs. Some women whose children were killed have opened their homes to former child soldiers. Others have set aside their own suffering and offered help, believing that, "If left abandoned, the child ex-combatants would have nothing positive to do... and would prove a threat to a fragile peace."⁶

In the study survey, 55 percent of respondents indicated that women in the community played a significant role in helping them reintegrate. This was higher than responses for assistance given to them by traditional leaders (20 percent) or international aid workers (32 percent). They said community women provided guidance, shared meager resources, and, perhaps most important, helped facilitate their skills training and

education by providing childcare, clothes, and food. Women's organizations have also provided models for many of the female ex-combatants; over 65 percent of respondents said that they would like to join such organizations, which they see as offering practical assistance.

Nationally, the Forum for African Women Educationalists and the Progressive Women's Association are the main organizations active in reintegration programs. Among local organizations, Caritas-Makeni, affiliated with the Catholic Church and operating in central Sierra Leone, has developed a foster care program for young mothers, enabling them to attend school while their children are tended. Caritas-Makeni also offers counseling and programs on health and alternative income generation for those who have entered the sex trade.

Among international actors, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) offer strong models for working with local groups and reaching former combatants excluded from the national programs. UNICEF has an innovative program of providing resources to schools that accept former child combatants. In addition, UNICEF, with the support of USAID, runs training centers that offer mothers childcare and food. A number of their programs combine vocational training with basic literacy and numeric skills. Non-traditional trades such as welding, carpentry, and house building are among those taught to women. Forty-nine percent of survey participants said such training, as well as education, are critical in facilitating their adjustment to civilian life.

Conclusion

Sierra Leone's DDR process failed women and girls. As many were classified as "dependents" only, their real experiences were not acknowledged, and they were precluded from receiving the benefits provided to "combatants." The assumption that women and girls were victims only, with no role in either the execution of war or the building of peace, is proving detrimental to their future, with potentially negative consequences for the country's recovery and the region's security.

First, despite their horrific experiences in the war, women and girls have shown tremendous agency and initiative. Even during their captivity, those in the

forces regained some control of their own lives by developing skills to ensure their survival and strategies to protect others. Yet when the DDR program was implemented, there was virtually no recognition of the multiple roles women played or the skills they had gained. Many have ambitions for education and independence. They feel tremendous responsibility for their offspring and aspire to give them a better future. By being treated as passive victims, they are again stripped of their sense of self-worth and dignity. Second, women's exclusion from official programs will have significant social consequences, including poverty, crime, prostitution, and an increase in HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the exclusion of single mothers means the exclusion of their children—and thus another generation of unskilled, marginalized youth.

Third, in the same way that disaffected male youths and ex-fighters might lead rebellions, form militias, or join other guerilla groups, so can women and girls. As the 2002 riots and female militia activities indicate, some have already taken up violence. Without support, these young mothers have little to lose from resorting to armed activity as a means of survival.

Finally, local community efforts, informal networks, and organizations—primarily led by women—provide critical support for former combatants. Women's commitment to rehabilitating and coexisting with former fighters is a matter of basic survival for themselves and others. Unlike the international community, they have no exit strategy. If they fail, violence returns to their doorsteps. At the same time, local groups are under immense pressure. They have meager resources, their work is rarely acknowledged in official processes, and they receive only limited assistance from the international community. Supporting the work of these women is a cost-effective and essential ingredient for ensuring sustainable reintegration.

Drawing on qualitative field-based research and quantitative survey data, this study assesses how a gender perspective can improve formal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs and documents women's contributions to official and civil society-based initiatives.

Endnotes

¹ Bradley, Sean, Massimo Fusato, and Philippe Maughan. "Sierra Leone: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)." Ed. P.C. Mohan. *Findings Africa Region 31*. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002, 1, 22 October 2003 <<http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/infobeng/infob81.pdf>>; Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children. *Precious Resources: Adolescents in the Reconstruction of Sierra Leone*. New York: Women's Commission, 2002, 46; Sierra Leone. National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Statistical data provided to the authors. Freetown: NCDDR, 2002.

² Estimates indicate that up to 50 percent of fighters in rebel forces were children and some 10-30 percent of force members were women.

³ Malan, Mark, et al. *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003, 25.

⁴ Sierra Leone, NCDDR; Women's Commission 46.

⁵ Women's Commission 46.

⁶ Shellac, Davies. personal interview, August 2002.

INTRODUCTION

In December 2003, Sierra Leone ended its official disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program. From the time of its initiation in 1998, 72,500 former combatants passed through the program, including 4,751 women (6.5 percent) and 6,787 children (9.4 percent), of whom 506 were girls.¹ From the outset there was recognition of the large presence of child soldiers (up to 50 percent of fighters in rebel forces were believed to be under 18) and women (estimates ranged between 10 and 30 percent) among the various forces, so the program was in principle, designed to include them. At completion, however, while the program was noted for its effective outreach to male combatants, women and children were underserved. Despite this significant shortcoming, the program has been hailed as a success by the UN, the World Bank, and others, and a model upon which other DDR processes could be based.²

The DDR program also failed to provide support to civilian populations faced with the reality of reintegrating former fighters. Instead, women as individuals and in groups took on the responsibility of assisting these fighters, particularly the children and youth among them, as they returned to civilian life. The majority of these community-based efforts, however, received little or no aid or recognition from the national and international programs established to guarantee not just successful demobilization, but ultimately effective reintegration and rehabilitation.

This report revisits the Sierra Leone conflict and peace process from the perspective of women. Drawing on field-based interviews and data, it outlines the diverse roles played by women and girls in the war and highlights the importance of women's activism for peace. This study presents key findings of the experiences of women and girls in the DDR program, focusing on obstacles to access, entry, and full participation. It documents women's individual

and collective contributions to the reintegration of fighters, concluding with an analysis of the importance of a gender perspective to DDR efforts and practical recommendations to support the development of such programs.

Outlined here are the rationale for this study, assumptions of the research, an explanation of methodology, and the working definitions that frame this report.

Rationale

Limited research has been conducted to assess DDR programs' ability to respond to the experiences of women and girls within fighting forces, in Sierra Leone or elsewhere.³ Still less is known about how programs that do or do not address gender considerations may contribute to or hinder peaceful transitions. Drawing on the Sierra Leone conflict (1991-2000) this report uses quantitative and qualitative methods and gender analysis to document and examine women and girl ex-combatants' roles and experiences within the forces and official DDR processes.⁴

In addition to a lack of information on the experiences of women and girls in official DDR programs, knowledge is scarce regarding the contributions that women make to official and community-based DDR processes. As conflicts increasingly involve civilian populations, women are more and more often called upon to "unofficially" assist in demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants, especially child soldiers. In Sierra Leone, children constituted half of some of the fighting forces; up to one third of these were girls.⁵ This study, therefore, also documents women's previously unrecognized actions to strengthen official and community-based DDR, assist ex-combatants, and contribute to peace building within Sierra Leone and the region.

¹Results presented in this study draw in part on data collected under a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, "Girls in Militaries, Paramilitaries, Militias, and Armed Opposition Forces" (Montreal: Rights and Democracy, 2003). Principle investigators for the CIDA grant were Dyan Mazurana and Susan McKay, Professor of Women's Studies, University of Wyoming, USA; the full results are presented in the forthcoming book, *Where Are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War* (Montreal: Rights and Democracy).

Assumptions

This study rests on the assumption that effective DDR processes are critical for achieving sustainable peace. Further, it presupposes that it is insufficient to prioritize the disarmament and demobilization elements alone at the expense of the reintegration component. Finally, it acknowledges that the burden of reintegration and longer-term rehabilitation is largely placed on the families and communities into which former combatants return; too often official national and international DDR programs overlook this key component.

The study does not assume that women are more peaceful than men by nature. Indeed it shows that women play many roles during times of war, ranging from frontline combatants to community peacemakers. They should therefore be recognized as active agents rather than passive victims in peace processes, including DDR. To exclude their voices and experiences and to ignore their contributions ultimately undermines peace.

Methodology

Throughout August and September 2002 in Sierra Leone, over 60 in-depth interviews were conducted with community leaders, social workers, NGO staff, psychologists, traditional and religious leaders, as well as with government officials, representatives of international organizations and women and girls formerly in the fighting forces.

Secondary quantitative data on the fighting forces and their participation in DDR programs with particular emphasis on children and girls was gathered from the Sierra Leone National Center for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) and the Child Protection Unit of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Sierra Leone.

Finally, a survey using quota sampling was used to gather quantitative data.⁹ The Sierra Leone survey was a quota sample of girls and young women formerly associated with the fighting forces during the 1991-2002 war. Sub-categories of the study population included captive "wives" of commanders and girls involved in pro-government Civil Defense Forces (CDF). Study sites were selected with the assistance of UNICEF in Sierra Leone and international and local NGOs working with child ex-combatants or war-affected communities in Sierra Leone.¹⁰ The

sampling took place in different regions of the country and included the Western Area (the area including and surrounding the capital Freetown) and two of three provinces, the North and the East. Throughout August and September 2002, surveys were conducted in a variety of locations including remote villages, "suburbs" of urban centers, urban centers, and interim care and training centers for war-affected youth.

The survey contained 99 questions pertaining to basic demographic data, entry into the force, roles and experiences within the force, experiences of physical abuses within the respective forces and in community reintegration, experiences of time spent in the army barracks, official disarmament and demobilization, direct community entrance, reintegration, skills training, assistance needs, and current status. Fourteen open-ended questions were included in the survey itself; issues ranged from questions regarding why a girl joined an armed force if she reported joining, skills learned in fighting forces that could assist the respondent now, to difficulties and assistance during reintegration.

A full description of the research methodology can be found in Appendix 1.

Definitions

Peace Processes

Just as scholars have identified the "lifecycle" of conflict,¹¹ current thinking in the field identifies a lifecycle of peace. The establishment of peace is not a single event, but rather a process characterized by progress and setbacks, successes and failures. Observers of peace processes, including those who live in societies with protracted conflict, are all too familiar with premature celebration of ceasefires and peace accords that are later violated. Even if a settlement holds, the transition to a state of peace is a long-term operation. It requires extensive logistical and financial measures to create or reestablish the physical, social, and political infrastructure necessary for the country to transition towards a culture of peace.

Perhaps the most realistic approach to understanding the peace process is to acknowledge that, though negotiations are "the best-known stage in a process of peace," as Anderlini et al. write in *Journeys Through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons*,

[They] represent but one moment. Though essential, they nevertheless do not exhaust all the possibilities of actions or initiatives that such a process may require. For negotiations to take place, prenegotiations are necessary, be they formal or informal. For a political settlement to succeed, implementation of the provisions of an accord in the postnegotiation period is vital. In other words, it could be said that peace processes have three broad phases: preparation, transformation, and consolidation.⁹

It is important to note that these three phases are seldom distinct; they blend into one another in a continuum from ceasefire toward the consolidation of peace. Timelines often blur, for example, when the reintegration phase of DDR ends and the longer-term process of reconstruction begins.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

International policymakers consider DDR one of the most important steps in any peace process. The World Bank has defined a successful DDR program as "the key to an effective transition from war to peace."⁹ Although each of the three elements of DDR has distinctly different goals and requires independent planning, the phases do overlap and are dependent upon each other.¹⁰

The UN defines disarmament as "...the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone."¹¹ Former combatants are gathered in pre-determined assembly areas, where weapons are confiscated, safely stored, and eventually destroyed. Individuals then receive support in the form of food aid, shelter, clothing, medical attention, basic education, and orientation programs. In addition, censuses are often conducted, and ex-combatants are issued discharge documentation.¹²

Demobilization is both the formal disbanding of military formations and the release of combatants from a "mobilized" state.¹³ Discharge of ex-combatants often occurs over a period of time, during which they are usually transported to their home districts or given small transportation grants and the process of initial reinsertion begins.¹⁴

Nicole Ball of the University of Maryland breaks down reintegration into two phases—initial reinsertion and long-term reintegration.¹⁵ Reinsertion refers

to the short-term arrival period of an ex-combatant into his/her former home or into a new community. Support during this phase may include basic household goods, land, food supplements, and housing materials. Reintegration takes a long-term approach, to assist the community and the ex-combatant in the difficult transition to civilian life. Assistance during reintegration usually includes job placement services, skills training, credit schemes, scholarships, and rehabilitation programs.

The international community at times refers to a second "R" in DDR, which represents "rehabilitation." This concept encompasses difficult issues, such as the need to address the psychological and emotional aspects of returning home and problems that arise in relation to the wider community. Nearly all DDR programs address rehabilitation in some form, but the most often-used acronym for the process is DDR.

Security sector reform—such as dismantling and restructuring the military and constructing a new civilian police force—is often included in discussions surrounding disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. For the purposes of this paper, DDR will only include the processes defined above and will not address issues pertaining to security sector reform.

Gender

The term "gender" refers to the socially constructed—as opposed to biologically determined—identities of men and women. Gender is not the same as "sex," and gender differences are not the same as sex differences. For instance, the ability of women to bear children is a sex, or biologically determined, difference from men; that women, in many societies, are responsible for food preparation and household chores is a gender, or socially constructed, difference.

Gender roles are assigned to men and women early in socialization. They cut across public and private spheres; are specific to a given culture at a given time; are affected by other forms of differentiation such as race, ethnicity, and class; and can change in different socio-political and economic contexts within a society. World Bank literature notes that in any given society, gender shapes the definitions of acceptable responsibilities and functions for men and women in terms of "social and economic activities, access to resources, and decision making authority."¹⁶

This report is careful not to conflate the terms "gender" and "women." It examines how gender considerations are a necessary component of DDR planning and implementation, and how women in Sierra Leone enhanced the DDR process, primarily through their numerous ad-hoc and local reintegration and rehabilitation programs.

PART 1: THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE

Pre-Colonization to Independence

Prior to colonization no ethnic tribe dominated the geographic area that is now Sierra Leone. The largest ethnic groups, the Mende and Temne, have long been divided into chiefdoms in the south and the north respectively. A country rich with natural resources—umber, ivory, palm oil, and valuable mineral deposits including gold, bauxite, and diamonds—Sierra Leone fell into British control in the early 1800s. During its movement to abolish slavery, Great Britain allowed thousands of freed slaves to find refuge in the West African territory, effectively reshaping the demographic composition of Sierra Leone. Other ethnic groups including the Kono, Limba, Kissi, and Krio migrated into the new British territory.

Democratic reforms following World War II established an assembly for the territory led primarily by Paramount Chiefs. Fearing marginalization, the Krio elite, along with other chiefs, created the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), led by Sir Milton Margai, a Mende. The creation of the Temne-dominated All People's Congress (APC) followed in 1957, splitting the assembly's composition and dividing it ethnically between the Mende (SLPP) of the south and the Temne (APC) of the north. Margai was elected Prime Minister after successful constitutional talks in London in 1960. A year later, Sierra Leone became independent, women gained the right to vote, and a parliamentary system within the British Commonwealth was established. The years after independence gave way to protracted political clashes between the two parties until 1967, when the APC won in a democratic election.¹⁷

Cold War to Civil War

Adopting a policy of non-alignment during the Cold War, the Sierra Leone government upheld the colonial practice of emphasizing the export of raw materials over industrial production. Independent mining made up the bulk (80 percent) of economic export from Sierra Leone. Continuing a tradition of maintaining power through asset control and patron systems, by the early 1970s, the APC, with Siaka Stevens as president, controlled 52 percent of the national diamond industry. In 1978, facing increased opposition from professionals and trade unionists, Stevens consolidated his power. He destroyed many of the political institutions established in the British parliamentary system, rendering them ineffective. Tightening its grip, the

APC leadership cut off access to natural resources to those outside its sphere.¹⁸

One result of these actions was increased frustration and unrest among youth and students unable to support themselves and their families. The political ideals expressed by jobless university students, graduates, and dropouts supplanted the unorganized political frustrations among the uneducated youth, who were sometimes used as thugs by the political leadership. Buoyed by public support, the youth promoted the idea of pan-Africanism, drawing parallels between the colonial past and the post-colonial present. The APC tried to attract distinguished "radicals" among the youth class as potential candidates for the party, but none accepted.¹⁹

The economy faltered throughout the 1980s, due in part to lost revenues from diamond smuggling. Yet those within the patron system, including politicians, powerful chiefs, and traders, prospered while the average citizen's standard of living continued to decline.²⁰ Government expenditures on health and housing dropped and state-sponsored scholarships decreased. Looking for allies to overcome the West's containment of Muammar Qaddafi's regime, Libya eagerly nurtured the political discord among young Sierra Leoneans.²¹ One of those who traveled to Libya was Foday Sankoh, formerly a corporal in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). It was in a Libyan military training camp that Sankoh met Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). In 1987, the two agreed to support each other's efforts to overthrow their respective governments. Financiers and recruits were found in the main diamond mines of Sierra Leone, located in the Eastern and Southern Provinces, in some cases more easily accessed from Liberia than from the Sierra Leone capital of Freetown.²²

In August 1985, the APC named Joseph Saidu Momoh as successor to Stevens after several years of economic decline, increased political opposition, and Stevens' increasingly autocratic approach. Corruption, the collapse of the economy, and heavy cuts in social programs, partly due to International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs, had severely weakened the country.²³ Momoh attempted to re-establish a multi-party government with elections scheduled for 1991. However, armed

rebel forces led by Foday Sankoh, calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and backed by Liberia, launched their first attack into Sierra Leone just prior to the elections, thwarting the president's efforts to stabilize the economy. Initially, RUF forces consisted of three groups: those trained in Libya with fighting experience in Liberia, young men from Liberia and Sierra Leone who had little or no work, and seasoned NPFL fighters from Taylor's army.²⁴

Violent Conflict and the Rise of the Civil Defense Forces

In March 1991, RUF rebels invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia and occupied the eastern regions of the country, securing lucrative diamond reserves. In exchange for weapons, drugs, and supplies, Sierra Leonean diamonds were smuggled into Liberia for sale on the international market, generating millions of dollars annually. Controlling the diamond mines also allowed Sankoh to recruit, forcibly and voluntarily, young miners and locally unemployed men and boys into his fighting forces. By the mid to late 1990s, global exposure of these "blood diamonds" led to an international outcry against their export and sale and initiated numerous UN investigations and resolutions.²⁵

Within the first 18 months of RUF attacks, over 400,000 people were internally displaced while hundreds of thousands became refugees. The war quickly came to involve not only Liberia, but also Guinea and Côte D'Ivoire. It destroyed hundreds of hospitals and schools and tens of thousands of homes. Because of a lack of health care, failing schools, and the widespread destruction of infrastructure support systems, the population grew increasingly vulnerable. The Sierra Leone countryside became militarized as a result of the presence of international forces, widespread proliferation of small arms, and a general suspicion towards one's neighbor, especially in areas protected by local militias.²⁶

Women and girls reported atrocities committed by all fighting forces during the war.²⁷ Early in the conflict the RUF perpetrated widespread violence across southern and eastern Sierra Leone. Violence against women and children and general terror in rural and urban centers quickly became cornerstones of the movement and were encouraged by RUF leadership.²⁸

As government revenues fell from the loss of mineral sales, so too did the salaries and the resolve of the SLA. Soldiers committed gross human rights violations, including rape, mutilations, looting, property destruction, and murder. They forced women and girls to exchange sex for "protection" and used them as prostitutes.²⁹ With the rebellion spreading virtually unchecked in the south and east, rebels preyed on civilians for food, supplies, and labor.³⁰

Subjected to violence by both the RUF and the SLA, local militias known as Civil Defense Forces (CDF) emerged.³¹ CDF gained prominence with the rise of the Kamajors, the largest traditional hunting society, in the eastern and southern provinces. Other hunting groups were the Tamaboro, Donso, Kapra and later, the Gbethis in the north. With the exception of the Gbethis, these groups existed prior to the war, relying on perceived magical powers and customary hunting weapons such as spears. Combining skill and valor, these groups at times thwarted RUF offensives.³²

As the war progressed and the RUF gained ground, the government supplied the CDF with weapons and financial and logistical support. Although under the supervision of Samuel Hinga Norman, who was the deputy defense minister, chairman of the CDF, and a Kamajor, the CDF did not feature prominently in the president's overall war strategy. This was a result of the army's unease at what it perceived as competition from other fighting forces and possibly due to fear of the CDF gaining political leverage over the president's hold on authority.³³

In 1995, the government hired Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African "mercenary" force composed of 2,000 former South African Defense Force combat veterans. The intervention of EO along with the CDF propped-up the failing Sierra Leonean government. EO's rapid deployment and well-trained soldiers attacked RUF forces and regained control of resource-rich areas. Its military victories allowed local traders to re-establish trade networks and, more importantly, enabled a corporate web of allied mining partners to fence off valuable mining zones, squeezing everyday miners into smaller low-paying illicit operations.³⁴ With the assistance of local landowners or policemen, these traders kept wages low, forced slave-like labor, and traded diamonds on the informal market.³⁵ Those who did not cooperate were removed from political positions and trading zones.³⁶

Women and Girls in Fighting Forces

The presence of women and girls within the former rebel RUF and AFRC fighting forces was known early on in the war.³⁷ Much less is known about their presence or roles in the SLA or the CDF. Drawing on field-based data and secondary sources, this study concludes that the estimated number of girls and young women in fighting forces was higher than previously reported (see Table 1).³⁸ This increase is partly due to their presence as fully initiated members of the CDF.³⁹

Table 1: Estimated Number for Total Forces, Child Soldiers, and Girl Soldiers

Force	Total	Child Soldiers	Girl Soldiers
RUF	45,000	22,500	7,500
AFRC	10,000	5,000	1,667
SLA	14,000	3,500	1,167
CDF	68,865	17,216	4,722
Total	137,865	48,216	12,056

Of the study population, nearly all stated "abduction" and "forced recruitment" as their means of entry into the various forces. Ten-year-old Maria B.⁴⁰ was outside her home playing with friends under the moonlight when the RUF attacked.⁴¹ All of them tried to escape, but she was captured. She was told to carry looted items for the rebels and was given a five-gallon container of palm oil; anytime she tried to rest she was beaten.

Agnes V.⁴² was nine years old and on vacation with her family when rebels attacked the village. After looting the village, the rebels rounded up around 50 people, locked them in a building, and began to set it on fire. A junior commander pleaded with the senior commander to release the young girl. She was then selected by the junior commander to be his captive "wife." The people remaining in the building were burned. Agnes was forced to be the captive "wife" of the commander for the next nine years. During the commanders' absences from the camp, she was in charge of the military compound, including organizing raids and fighting units.

Mariama M.⁴³ was seven years old when she was captured and spent 10 years with the AFRC/RUF as a fighter. She received basic military and weapons training with machine guns and two-grip pistols. She was trained with approximately 50 other girls and 100 boys.

Once recruited, women and girls had numerous roles, including that of frontline fighters. In fact, nearly half (44 percent) of the study population received basic military and weapons training from their commanders or captor "husbands." However, nearly all women and girls performed additional roles:

- 72 percent as cooks;
- 68 percent as porters;
- 62 percent as assistants for the sick and wounded;
- 60 percent as "wives;"
- 44 percent as food producers;
- 40 percent as messengers between rebel camps;
- 22 percent as spies;
- 18 percent as communications technicians; and
- 14 percent as workers in diamond mines for their commanders or captor husbands.

Notably, all of the study population who reported their primary role as "fighter" also reported that they were forced to be captive "wives." According to Kama F.,⁴⁴ who at age 15 was an RUF frontline fighter, it was better to be a fighter and the "wife" of a common soldier because you could protect yourself with your own weapon, you had access to food and loot, and your chances of escaping were greater, unlike captive "wives" of commanders who were closely guarded with little chance of escape.

Women and Girls as Full Members of the CDF

Official claims that the pro-government CDF were composed only of males are inaccurate.⁴⁵ Women and girls were fully initiated members of the CDF.⁴⁶ This study focuses on the two largest CDF: the Kamajors and Gbethis. Although the Kamajors were originally a male-only traditional hunting society, in response to the increased pressure from the RUF it became a

self-defense force and enlisted women and girls beginning in the early 1990s and continued this practice throughout the war. The Gbethis, never a traditional male society, were created as one of the CDF in the mid 1990s in response to increased rebel attacks. They enlisted and initiated women and girls where they acted as integrated members of the CDF and were included in all ceremonies, amulets, and scarification. They served as commanders, frontline fighters, initiators, spiritual leaders, medics, herbalists, spies, and cooks.⁴⁷

Ramatu T.⁴⁸ was a fighter with the Kamajors and fought alongside other girls and women Kamajors in Kenema and Bo Districts. Describing her initiation she says,

They use native herbs, which you drink and they bathe you in. These herbs make it so you don't feel like returning to your family. The initiator placed charms around my neck so that bullets are deflected, and a special charm to protect against knives and pangas; they will just bounce off my body. After this they gave me my special dress and herbs and charms. I was instructed not to bathe for several days because it would reduce the magic. Later, they rubbed the blood of a human being on my skin, and I found that I was not afraid of anything. I had a strong and fearless heart.

Some women and girls joined the Kamajors and Gbethis at the request of their husbands who were already initiated in the militias. Mamuna K.⁴⁹ was married to a Gbethi man who asked her to join for her own protection. Mamuna, who was pregnant, sent her remaining children into Freetown for their safety and joined the Gbethis the same year. Importantly, Mamuna was an herbalist and her role within the Gbethis was to prepare the baths and drinks for those undergoing initiation. Within the group she was regarded as crucial to maintaining the magical powers of the fighting force, as she collected and prepared herbs for the fighters' food and drink.

Others were abducted and conscripted by the Kamajors and Gbethis. At times, women and girls worked with their male counterparts to capture civilian adolescents and children whom they forcibly initiated and trained as fighters.⁵⁰ Some "joined" or became "wives" to male CDF fighters as a matter of survival. Mariatu R.⁵¹ agreed to become a "wife" of a

fighter and join the Gbethis when an RUF attack on her village left her and her elderly parents as the only survivors. Upon joining, Mariatu was able to bring her parents and herself within the ring of protection offered by the Gbethis.

Many adolescents and children "joined" the Kamajors and Gbethis with the approval of their parents. This was especially the case when the Paramount Chief of the area endorsed a particular unit of the CDF; it then became mandatory that all families contribute a member to the CDF.⁵² Dissension was rare. For example, in Kenema Township, Kenema District, where the Kamajors were especially active during the war, the burned homes are not the result of rebel activities. Instead, they belong to families who did not contribute a family member to the Kamajors, and thus were suspected rebel sympathizers. According to one informant, "There is not a house in Kenema [Township] left that did not contribute someone to the Kamajors."⁵³

Women and girls in the Kamajors and Gbethis observed widespread human rights violations by members of the CDF, including cannibalism, human sacrifice, and sexual abuse. For example, Ramatu T.⁵⁴ reported that a common practice among her Kamajor force was for adult Kamajor males to enter a village and capture an adult civilian. They would then cut the person's throat, turn them upside down, and "squeeze them from toe to head" to drain their blood into a bucket. All members of the fighting party, including the women and girls, would then drink the blood so they would not be afraid during the attack. Perhaps in part because of their participation in such violent acts, as well as their involvement in activities such as warfare, that went against traditionally acceptable roles for females, all young women and girls formerly with the CDF in the study population reported stigmatization, threats, and abuse upon returning to the communities they had fought to protect.

"Wives" of RUF Commanders in Camps and Command Structure

The RUF was loosely configured, and camp and command structure varied throughout the country. In general, a commander held "houses" or compounds in which his or her recruits and captives served. While there were a number of female RUF commanders, the majority were males.⁵⁵

Captive "wives" of commanders exerted substantial power within the RUF compounds. These "wives" were predominately girls. When the commander was away, they were in charge of the compound. They kept in communication with the commander and would select and send troops, spies, and support when needed. These girls and young women decided on a daily basis who in the compound would fight, provide reconnaissance, and raid villages for food and loot. Some counseled their captor husbands on war strategies, troop movement, and upcoming attacks.⁵⁶

Saramba M.⁵⁷ spent five years with the RUF as a commander's "wife." During that time she distributed weapons to boy and girl fighters prior to village raids and attacks on enemy forces. She also chose boys and girls for spy missions to infiltrate camps of the SLA, CDF, and Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and to report on force locations and size. At times, such spying led to the deaths of these children and sexual abuse by male soldiers, particularly in the case of girls who were told to become intimate with the men in these forces to gather information.⁵⁸

In the absence of the commander, when food and loot were delivered to the camps, it was brought to his captive "wife." She would then decide how these goods were to be apportioned among those in the compound.⁵⁹ Lynette S.⁶⁰ distributed food and loot to groups of boy fighters within her RUF compound to try to persuade them not to harass or sexually abuse the young children in the camp. She expressed deep sympathy for the young children and had a number of strategies she would employ to try and influence her commander "husband" to also look out for the well being of the children.

Bodyguards accompanied the commanders' captive "wives," both to provide protection in case of attack on the compound and to prevent their escape. Between four to six children might serve as bodyguards; 25 to 50 percent were girls.⁶¹ Ester C.,⁶² a commander's "wife," was guarded by six boys and three girls; the youngest boy was six. They were armed with AK-47s and two-grip pistols. Nearly all bodyguards and the commander's captive "wife" or "wives" carried guns and other weapons.⁶³

In some cases, as documented in Kono District, commanders' captive "wives" were replaced by new or

more favored girls. Subsequently, the rejected "wives" were sent by their commander husbands to the front lines to fight.⁶⁴ Ramatu S. and Inna T.⁶⁵ described RUF camps in the south with strictly enforced separations between civilians and soldiers. RUF commanders believed that a separation of camps would prevent civilians from witnessing atrocities committed by soldiers or learning about force size and strength should they escape and inform government factions. Consistent with this strategy, "wives" of commanders or soldiers who were rejected were forbidden from returning to the civilian camps and were instead sent to the front lines.

Commanders' "wives" were in charge of Small Boys Units (SBU) and Small Girls Units (SGU).⁶⁶ The SBU were made up of boys aged 6-15 used primarily for scouting to prepare attacks and food raids, but were dispatched to execute some of the most violent killings and mutilations.⁶⁷ The SGU were made up of similarly aged girls and were used primarily for raiding villages and spying, although they too were sent to fight and commit atrocities.⁶⁸ In some cases, commanders' "wives" used loot to mitigate abuse by the SBU or to reward them for not abusing the girls within the compound. In other cases, they could order punishment of the SBU or SGU for "disrupting life in the compound."⁶⁹

Fighters, male and female, had their own "families" within the compound, which consisted of children they had captured and who were under their protection and care. Girl fighters could and did serve as heads of these "families."⁷⁰ Food and loot were distributed on the basis of these "families." Much has been said about girls trying to attach themselves to boys or men within the compounds to avoid gang raping.⁷¹ While this appears to be accurate, this study also found that older children and adolescents who were not attached to a "family" were not given food and had to survive as scavengers. Thus, attachment of girls to boys or men was also means to secure food as well as (some) protection against sexual assault.⁷²

The presence, roles, and experiences of women and girls within the fighting forces in Sierra Leone has a number of important implications for the design of those processes that seek to build human and national security and peace in the post-conflict period. It is evident that despite their trauma, women and girls showed tremendous agency. They developed a number

of skills and strategies that enabled them to survive and regain some control over their lives during their time with the fighting forces.

From the standpoint of DDR programs, however, the need for strict categorization of individuals as "combatants" or "non-combatants," and the reluctance on the part of the international community and local governments to acknowledge that women and girls are integral to the fighting often devalues the multiple roles they play in conflict. This is not only detrimental to disarmament and demobilization, it also harms the women and girls. By being treated as passive victims or "dependents," they are again stripped of control of their lives and their sense of dignity. Moreover, by not acknowledging the skills and resources that they have attained, DDR processes risk losing tremendous social capital that could be utilized for post-conflict reconstruction.

The Role of Women in the Peace Process

Throughout the war, rural and urban women from all classes and ethnic groups mobilized to form active organizations, conduct marches, and lead rallies for peace and justice. Many women's organizations participated in peace processes during and after the war, including the Mano River Women's Peace Network, Women's Movement for Peace, Forum of African Women Educationalists (FAWE), Sierra Leone Women's Forum, Network of Women Ministers and Parliamentarians, and the Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace. They educated civilians on electoral proceedings, recruited and trained observers, and pressured the military to respect the results of elections.⁷³ Their efforts were critical in shaping informal and formal peace processes, and in bringing about an eventual end to the conflict.⁷⁴

The first attempt at a ceasefire came in January 1996, after a bloodless coup that overthrew the brief military dictatorship of Valerian Strasser. Brigadier General Maada Bio opened negotiations to cease hostilities with the RUF. Women's groups, led by Women Organized for a Morally Enlightened Nation (WOMEN), pressured Bio's military government, the National Provisional Ruling Council to hold demo-

cratic elections. WOMEN was the first non-partisan women's group in Sierra Leone that promote women's representation and concerns in the period before elections.⁷⁵ It incorporated many smaller women's groups under one umbrella organization. Yet, when elections were held, only five women were on a list of 68 candidates representing the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP).⁷⁶ Although given the opportunity, the RUF did not submit candidates of its own. The SLPP won the elections, led by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.

Kabbah's first attempt at brokering a peace plan was the 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord. Drafted between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government, the accord called for a cessation of violence and the transformation of the RUF into a political party, with a power-sharing incentive to entice the RUF to lay down its arms. Although women suffered greatly from the war and were active in civil movements for peace, none were present at the Abidjan negotiations.⁷⁷

At the signing of the Abidjan peace accord, some girl captives were released from RUF control as a goodwill gesture. However, mutual distrust in implementing the provisions of the accord, and RUF reluctance to lay down arms without the unconditional departure of EO ultimately led to its failure. Other contributing factors included the government's belief that military victory remained possible and the RUF's fear of judicial reprisals.⁷⁸

The government's failure to consistently pay or supply its soldiers, its increasing dependency on and financial support of the CDF, and the high price tag of EO led to the splintering of the SLA. Some soldiers joined the RUF or became part of the new rebel Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which aligned itself with the RUF. In 1997, the AFRC overthrew President Kabbah's regime. Former Army Major Johnny P. Koroma headed the AFRC in Freetown. Shortly thereafter, the RUF was invited to join the regime. Support for the AFRC came from professionals, civil servants, politicians, and other members of the socio-economic elite who felt alienated from the Kabbah government.⁷⁹

⁷³While much is written on the SBU, this study presents some of the first data on the presence and roles of the SCU. We interviewed girls who headed the SCU, girl members of the SCU, commander's wives who were in charge of the SGL, and boys within the SBU who confirmed the presence of the SCU.

Growing concern in the region regarding a joint AFRC/RUF government in Freetown brought about the intervention of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) to restore the Kabbah regime. ECOWAS determined to act militarily to prevent further chaos, economic ruin, and violence. In March 1997, with the approval of the UN, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG, the military wing of ECOWAS, attacked Freetown, forced the AFRC/RUF regime out and restored Kabbah to power. Key policy objectives of the Kabbah government were to de-legitimize the AFRC/RUF, uphold the rule of law, create a competent and trustworthy national army, and defeat the rebellion.³⁰ Kabbah's restored government continued to rely on ECOMOG for protection, as well as the support of the CDF.

ECOMOG's presence, however, contributed to violence against civilians. Violation of women and girls' human rights by ECOMOG soldiers was widespread. Girls desperate for income would prostitute themselves or become "girlfriends" of ECOMOG troops for protection. ECOMOG soldiers coerced others into spying on enemy camps. Girls were made especially vulnerable during RUF attacks on ECOMOG forces, and it was common for suspected "girlfriends" of ECOMOG soldiers to be targeted by the RUF for torture and murder. At the same time, girls from RUF and AFRC camps would be sent into ECOMOG areas to befriend soldiers, establish sexual relations with them, and collect intelligence.³¹

In January 1999, a joint AFRC/RUF attack on Freetown resulted in the deaths of over 5,000 civilians. Thousands more were mutilated and raped, and over 5,000 were abducted, mostly women and girls. Recognizing the improbability of a military victory over the AFRC/RUF, the government sought a peace plan and eventually agreed to the 1999 Lomé accord. The Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), as a founding member of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, played a leading role in the negotiations that led to the signing of the 1999 Lomé peace accord, officially ending the war (though fighting and unrest continued into 2002). It called for RUF inclusion in a power-sharing government and granted blanket amnesty to gross violators of human rights.³² In addition to pardoning RUF leader Sankoh, it placed him at the head of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources.³³

Two women were involved in the Lomé process, one a member of the government delegation and the other a representative of the RUF. Although they were not chief negotiators, the final document reflected at least some gender-specific issues as a result of women's participation. For example, Article 23 calls for special attention to victimized women and girls in formulating and implementing rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development programs. The formation of commissions to promote good governance was also called for in the peace accord. Yet within the key entities including the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, and the Council of Religious Leaders, there were no women represented at the time of writing.³⁴

In October 1999, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) deployed troops to support the implementation of the Lomé peace accord and bolster the government in the DDR process. However, because there were vast areas still under RUF control, UNAMSIL forces were unable to fully restore peace. In particular, fighting in the diamond-rich eastern province persisted. Small RUF raids and offensives against UN troops yielded large numbers of UN weapons and armored vehicles. RUF attacks peaked on May 3, 2000, when 500 UN peacekeepers were taken hostage. Less than a week later, British Special Forces arrived in Freetown, expelled the RUF from the city, and restored a sense of security. Subsequently, British forces trained and armed Sierra Leonean troops and drove the remaining RUF soldiers from their territory, allowing UN peacekeepers to return.³⁵

Women Tipping the Balance Toward Peace

The Lomé accord collapsed when the RUF broke the ceasefire following UNAMSIL's assumption of control of the diamond-rich areas of eastern Sierra Leone. Recruits from Liberia continued to enter the country, facilitating RUF control over the resource-rich region. When Sankoh's intentions of continuing the war despite Lomé surfaced, women assembled in the streets demanding "Not again! Enough is enough!"³⁶ Their slogan was a response to both the inadequate representation of women after the 1996 elections and Sankoh's tactics, which the women understood to be a means for him to re-arm for war. The women on

the streets called for an end to male domination and male-biased decisions within parliament. They were particularly critical of the decision to appoint Sankoh as a minister and repeatedly called attention to the fact that he was refortifying for war.³⁷

Women's activism reached a high point in 2000 when they ultimately played a catalytic role in bringing an end to the conflict. A group of elderly women, representing churches and mosques, requested a meeting with Sankoh, who was living in Freetown. The women came as an interfaith group with an agenda of peace at any cost. Upon arrival they were abused by Sankoh, his guards, and advisors, who refused to listen and mistreated them. The assembled older women stood outside the house of Sankoh, hitched up their skirts, bent over, and bared themselves. In Sierra Leone, such an action by women of this age and standing constitutes the worst curse, sign of shaming, and insult that can be brought upon anyone.

When word of what had happened reached the streets, people were shocked. But they were also mobilized, both because they now had courage to stand up to Sankoh and the RUF, and because they had an obligation to enforce the curse of these respected, senior, religious women. Previously, people had lived in fear of retaliation and violence by the RUF as Sankoh sent death squads to any part of the capital where people spoke out. Yet when such a curse is given, it is the family and society's obligation to back the curse. Men in particular were mobilized to defend the power and honor of the women. May 8, 2000, was set as the date for mass peace protests and demonstrations.

The families of the women, religious organizations, labor and trade unions, and adolescents and school children committed to join the peace protests. Since it appeared that many people would not be going to work or school, the government declared it an unofficial holiday. The mass demonstrations on May 8, 2000 marked the turning point in the conflict.³⁸ This time the women marched to Sankoh's house with parliamentarians and civil society leaders. Sankoh's guards opened fire, killing a number of the protesters. On May 13, British troops captured and arrested Sankoh, charging him with the murder of unarmed protesters. With the incarceration of Sankoh, the RUF began to splinter, creating a vacuum in which General Issa Sessay became the new RUF leader and eventually the head of the RUFF, a newly formed political party.

The war was officially declared over in January 2002, when hostilities between the CDF and RUF soldiers in eastern Sierra Leone ceased.³⁹

When the war ended there were approximately 400,000 internally displaced people and up to 500,000 refugees in Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, and Côte D'Ivoire. At least 55 percent of the refugees were women.⁴⁰ Women's organizations continue to address these ongoing issues. For example, recognizing the regional dimensions of the conflict, the Mano River Union Women's Network for Peace visits women refugees in Guinea and Liberia encouraging them to become a part of the peace process, addressing problems such as sexual assaults in camps and food shortages, and, with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), reuniting women with family members and returning them to their homes in Sierra Leone.⁴¹

PART 2: THE ROLE AND EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND GIRLS IN DDR

DDR Design and Implementation

DDR was initiated by the government of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) in the aftermath of the 1996 Abidjan accords. A National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (NCRRR) was established with a department that had responsibility for disarming the varying factions.⁹² In 1998 the department was restructured as the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (NCDDR), after which the program began. Its goals were threefold:⁹³

- 1) collect, register, and destroy all conventional weapons and munitions turned in by combatants;
- 2) demobilize the *initially* estimated 45,000 combatants from the SLA, RUF, AFRC, and the CDF, 12 percent of whom were thought to be women;⁹⁴ and
- 3) support ex-combatants through demobilization to prepare them for reintegration.

DDR was conducted in three phases, the first beginning in 1998. Phase I was conducted by the NCDDR, chaired by President Kabbah, and ECOMOG, which was mandated to assist in disarmament, weapons collection, and demobilization. In 1999 with the Lomé accords in place, Phase II was initiated, running until April 2000; DDR was conducted by NCDDR and the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which was mandated to assist in disarmament and monitoring of demobilization. UNOMSIL was replaced in October 1999 by a significantly larger peacekeeping mission to support the DDR effort. Phase III, which ran from May 2001 to January 2002, was conducted by NCDDR and the new United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).⁹⁵

Reception centers were established for disarmament and demobilization throughout the country. From September 1998 through May 2001, during Phases I and II, a series of questions and performance of disassembly and reassembly of a gun, usually an AK-47, were used to assess combatants and their DDR eligibility status (combatants 18 years or older). It was believed that the ability to assemble and disassemble a weapon was a good litmus test to determine whether an individual had participated in the conflict as an

armed combatant—the requirement for participation in the DDR program. During this time, women accounted for six percent and girls for 0.6 percent of participants. In Phase III (May 13 2001 through January 2002) group disarmament was allowed, meaning a group could bring in weapons together. This helped marginally to increase women's participation to seven percent and girls to 0.7 percent.⁹⁶

Combatants voluntarily presented themselves at the reception centers to disarm and surrender all weapons and ammunition, and to be assessed for eligibility in the program. While officially those under 18 years of age were not required to present a weapon to enter DDR, this study found widespread discrepancy among UN and NCDDR officials and staff of NGOs working within the DDR process as to whether or not children had to turn over a weapon.⁹⁷ According to nearly all interviewees who passed through DDR, despite official policy the weapons test was repeatedly administered to children to determine their admission into programs.

Qualifying adults (18 years of age and above) were sent to a demobilization center where they received pre-discharge orientation, their benefits packages, a small amount of resettlement and transportation money, and were discharged. Children (17 years of age and below) were to be sent to Interim Care Centers (ICCs) and could select to enter skills training or an educational program of their choice.⁹⁸

Late in the program it was decided that "wives" of (male) ex-combatants could apply for micro-credit to help maintain their families, as the men complained about their inability to sustain families. However for a female applicant to access the loans, she had to be present with a "husband," who was willing to identify her as his wife. No woman could claim benefits alone, regardless of the number of children she cared for. If women had been permitted to apply alone, it could have enabled them to abdicate their "relationships." But this was not considered by senior DDR officials, one of whom said that "even if they were raped and abducted, 70 percent of the women and girls wanted to be with their 'husbands'."⁹⁹

Obstacles to the Participation of Women and Girls in Formal DDR

The DDR program in Sierra Leone is widely seen as a success and considered to have been sensitive to the needs of female and child combatants. During a visit to Sierra Leone by UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunbo, a UN statement was released noting that "since the Sierra Leonean conflict ended in January 2002... [a]n ambitious programme for the demobilization and reintegration of 7,000 child ex-combatants has [reunited] 97 percent of them with their families and communities."¹⁰⁰

In March of 2002, in an interview with IRINnews, when asked about female ex-combatants, Dr. Francis Kai-Kai, Executive Secretary of the NCDDR stated "we had about eight percent of them... In the designed program we made every provision for the female ex-combatant."¹⁰¹ However, this study finds this claim difficult to substantiate when compared to actual experiences of women and girl ex-combatants through interviews and NCDDR data (see Table 2).¹⁰²

As previously illustrated in Table 1, the estimated number of all forces was 137,865 of whom 12,056 were assumed to be girls.⁹ Yet as Table 3, and data drawn from UNICEF and NCDDR indicate, there is substantial disparity between the numbers of girls within the forces and those entering DDR programs, thus calling into question the design, implementation, and success of these programs.¹⁰³

In the Disarmament and Demobilization Phases

Despite official policy, the possession of an AK-47 (even with a group) and knowledge of its assembly and disassembly was repeatedly used by disarmament administrators to determine entry into the program, even for those under 18. This proved to be a particular problem for women and girls who did not always have a weapon in their possession. There was a perception among them that a weapon was required for everyone seeking entry into the DDR program, and, indeed, among those in this study's sample, all who entered into DDR (half the study population) were asked to turn in a weapon and perform the weapons test. This

Table 2: NCDDR Gender-Disaggregated Data on Entry into DDR

Force	Girls Number	Percent	Boys Number	Percent	Women Number	Percent	Men Number	Percent
RUF	436	1.8%	5,220	23.3%	3,929	16.1%	16,735	66.8%
AFRC	41	5%	375	4.2%	530	6.0%	7,934	39.3%
SCA	22	No Data	445	No Data	No Data	No Data	No Data	No Data
CDP	7	0.001%	1,396	5.3%	296	0.3%	34,890	93.8%
Total	506	No Data	6,436	No Data	No Data	No Data	No Data	No Data

⁹It is not possible to make these comparisons about women, as there are no reliable estimates on the number of women within the various fighting forces. Data are available on children within the fighting forces because of the work of child protection agencies. Therefore, for this aspect of the study, findings relate only to young women and girls.

perceived requirement kept some who would have qualified from attempting to enter the program. Of the study group that did not go through DDR, 46 percent cited not having a weapon as the basis for their lack of participation. There were several reasons girl ex-combatants found themselves without weapons at this critical time. Although they had been in the fighting forces, many in the CDF were ordered

to leave the assembly center after only three days, "There were too many people crowded in, too many men with nothing to do. The security was bad."

Second, female ex-combatants, particularly women and girls from the CDF, reported fearing RUF former fighters housed at the centers. Christiana R.¹⁰⁵ left an adult center due to the sleeping accommodations.

Table 3: Girls in Fighting Forces and Formal DDR

Force	Estimated Number of Girls in Force	Number of Girls in DDR	Percentage of Girls in DDR	Percentage of Total Force in DDR
RUF	7,500	476	6%	54%
AFRC	1,667	41	2%	39%
SEA	1,167	22	2%	No data
CDF	1,772	7	0.4%	54%
Total	12,056	506	N/A	N/A

Sources: Names withheld. Personal interviews, August 2002; Names withheld. Personal interviews, September 2002. Sesay, *Statistical Data from the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Statistical Data from the United Nations Children's Fund*.

to hand in their weapons prior to demobilization and were then left behind as the men were transported to the assembly centers. Other girls indicated that their guns were taken away by their commanders and handed to male fighters. Additionally, many who were not "primarily" fighters had used weapons from a communal source but did not possess a gun themselves.

In further discussion, interviewees revealed six key concerns that affected their attitudes towards DDR and the reasons they chose not to join or remain in programs. First, some girls and young women indicated they did not know about DDR or felt there was nothing to gain by going to the centers. Twenty-one percent of the sample that did not go through DDR reportedly feared reprisals at the centers and thus avoided the entire process. Other respondents perceived the facilities to be dangerous with large numbers of men and inadequate protection. According to Agnes E.¹⁰⁴ who left a disarmament and demobiliza-

tion site after only three days, "There were too many people crowded in, too many men with nothing to do. The security was bad." With regard to children in particular, young women and girls explained that interviews conducted by DDR and ICC staff in the presence of other children and youth did not protect their affiliation with regard to fighting force. CDF girls reported immediate threats to their lives when RUF youth became aware of their affiliation, and they left the ICCs shortly thereafter. For example, Bintu O.¹⁰⁶ was interviewed in a room where other adolescents stood around looking in. As soon as it was known that she was a Kamajor, the former RUF children began to threaten her, and she left the center that evening.

Third, there was the widely perpetuated myth that women and girls were not involved in the CDF. This denial was propagated by influential figures such as then Deputy Minister of Defense and National Coordinator of the CDF Samuel Hinga Norman, who was himself a Kamajor.¹⁰⁷ For some women and

girls, official denial was considered a direct attempt to prevent them from entering DDR programs and collecting benefits. At the end of the war, Norman was promoted to Minister of Internal Security, which caused a number of this study's informants to insist that they remain anonymous when discussing issues of women and girls within the CDF. Recently, however, the Prosecutor for the Sierra Leone Special Court ordered the arrest of Norman and he is currently awaiting charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including for the use of child soldiers within the CDF.¹⁰⁸

Fourth, there was a mistaken belief that children in the CDF were not separated from their families and communities. As a result, many were not classified by UNICEF and international NGOs as "separated children" and therefore could not receive other forms of aid. This is significant, as a number of UN, government, and NGO programs and benefits were designated for "separated children," including child combatants. It was not uncommon for NGOs to report that they did not work with children in the CDF "since they were never separated," and particularly with girls, since there was the assumption that the CDF did not include female members.¹⁰⁹ However, among the women and girls interviewed for this study, some with the Kamajors and Gbethis, had spent significant time away from their families and communities, including traveling the length of the country to fight with other CDF.¹¹⁰

Fifth, over-classification of girls and young women abducted by the RUF, AFRC, and SLA as "camp followers," "sex-slaves," and "wives" by some within the international community and the Sierra Leone government prevented the establishment of DDR programs to address their actual lived experiences. According to DDR officials, "wives," including those abducted, were to be explicitly excluded from formal entrance into DDR.¹¹¹ The focus of DDR was on the main fighting forces, and "minority" groups would not be taken into consideration.¹¹² However, since women and girls frequently played multiple roles, narrow classification of them as "wives" resulted in programmatic errors. Of the study population, 60 percent reported having served as a "wife," yet only eight percent reported this as their primary role.

Additionally, in the case of the CDF in particular, there was the erroneous belief that male CDF fight-

ers could not have sexual or casual contact with a girl or woman; it was largely considered impossible for female members of the CDF to exist in the category of CDF "wife" or "sex slave." This myth gained international legitimacy in October 1998 when a boy Kamajor refused to shake the hand of UNICEF head Carol Bellamy "because he was not allowed to touch a woman."¹¹³ This story was widely circulated and repeated in contexts that helped strengthen the belief that women and girls were not included in the CDF.¹¹⁴ However, among Sierra Leoneans, it was understood that interactions with members of the opposite sex, including sexual relations, were permitted for both male and female members of the Kamajors and Gbethis. It was common, especially among those Kamajors and Gbethis who were married to each other or lived together.¹¹⁵ The only caveat was that sexual contact nullified the perceived magical powers of a fighter's charms, and thus after such contact, fighters had to reapply the charms to regain these supposed powers.

Finally, it is important to note that cultural notions of childhood in Sierra Leone affected the way in which young women and girls engaged with the DDR program. In many rural and urban areas, childhood and adulthood are defined not by chronological age but by actions undertaken by the person, such as a boy harvesting and making palm wine or a girl having a baby.¹¹⁶ When girls who had borne children arrived to disarm, some entered the programs as women since this is how they were now "culturally" defined. Indeed, it was reported to the researchers by those in charge of DDR programs and officials who screened participants that it was not uncommon for girls under 18 with children to enter DDR as women.¹¹⁷ Thus they did not benefit from the programs that were established for child combatants, and were largely left unsupported since the DDR program did not have adequate mechanisms to address the needs of women in the forces.

For those who did enter the DDR process (i.e. half of the study sample) many noted the paucity of supplies, particularly in terms of their physical needs as women. At the ICCs where child combatants and "separated children" were taken and demobilization centers where adults were taken, 43 percent reported not receiving adequate clothing; 54 percent did not receive proper sanitation materials, including soap, shampoo, and feminine hygiene products; and 23 percent did not

have access to medical care when requested. Women respondents also reported very poor conditions at adult demobilization centers.

In terms of the length of their stay at demobilization centers, the young women and girls surveyed had experiences that contradicted official claims. For example, while UN data indicate that nearly all children remained in the centers for at least six months, among those surveyed for this study, only 20 percent had remained for that length of time.¹¹⁸

Finally, only 44 percent of the sample reported receiving the benefits they were promised in demobilization. In particular, lack of financial payment was noted as a leading cause of rising tension among child ex-combatants and resulted in rioting, strikes, and attacks against NGO staff and property in 2002.¹¹⁹

In the Reintegration Phase

As in many war-torn countries, the reintegration of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone is complex and sensitive. For the young women and girls, in particular, there is a range of issues that create concern. In response to an open-ended question, 50 percent of the study population named material deprivation, including lack of food, clothing, and housing, as the greatest challenge for their reintegration. Others noted separation from family, rejection, and abuse by family or community, fear of a return to war, and the inability to attend school as major concerns.

When asked what factors helped to mitigate these issues, responses included the end of the war, support from their community or family, and support from NGOs. However, the most critical and often identified need was for education—a core component of most DDR programs for children. Seventy-five percent of the study population indicated a desire to attend school and gain literacy skills. Forty-nine percent stated that skills training would be essential to their successful reintegration.

Sierra Leone ranks among the lowest countries in the world in female literacy and education. Purposeful destruction of schools by the fighting forces further devastated the education system. Well-meaning social workers associated with implementing DDR programs at times discouraged or prevented older ex-combatant girls and girl mothers from entering school, instead urging them to attend skills trainings.¹²⁰ They

argued that since so many of these young women now had children and few had husbands to assist with income, they would need to develop skills rather than continued education to support themselves. At the same time, a number of women and girl mothers were unable to attend skills trainings because of a lack of adequate care for their children (this is related to stigmatism and rejection by families who may welcome a girl back, but not her child or children).¹²¹ There is also a misperception that the older girls and young women considered themselves too old to attend school. Thus, while education was an option for those who went through official DDR, many of the young women and older girls were discouraged to pursue that option. Notably, this argument was not put forward to adolescent boys or men. NGO records themselves reveal unbalanced ratios of boys and girls enrolled in education programs.¹²²

Expanding the Safety Net:

Women's Contributions to Reintegration

The reintegration of children and youth from fighting forces is a significant factor in any peace process. Yet few resources and limited time are given to the "R" in DDR. While significant research is being done on the need to support long-term reintegration and rehabilitation processes, in most cases, the burden of caring for ex-combatants still falls to individuals and communities. Women in Sierra Leone, though under-resourced and unheralded, have filled in these programmatic gaps and done much to reintegrate former combatants, particularly women and child soldiers. Working alone, as leaders and members of NGOs, and through the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs, women have taken in and cared for child soldiers, provided women and child former fighters with critical services and training, and thereby worked to normalize and bring stability to their communities and their nation.

Shellac Davies, a leading peacemaker in Sierra Leone, has observed the trauma inflicted on child soldiers and the mixed responses they receive in their home communities. At the end of the war, the attachment between commanders and the child rebels disintegrated, but children often felt that they couldn't go home. "The children were in a dilemma," says Davies. "Mothers who survived the manslaughter but were witnesses to the evil acts committed by their children virtually disowned them. 'A child who committed such an atrocity could not have been born from my womb,'

many mothers were known to have said."¹²² However, Davies has documented the work of some women and mothers to reintegrate the very children who committed the atrocities. It was these women who "realized that the children involved in the war were both victims and perpetrators." She goes on to describe how the children's violence was the result of their own victimization at the hands of commanders:

Urged by their commanders, within the rebel movement, they were known to have committed most of the atrocities experienced during the war. Those children under the influence of drugs obeyed commands to kill their parents, burn down houses, and amputate the limbs of their siblings and other members of the community.¹²⁴

In the Bo District (south central Sierra Leone), a group of women decided to take back those children and youth from the fighting forces between the ages of 6 and 25. "The women claimed that such a move was their own contribution to upholding the peace," says Davies adding, "It should be noted that some of those women had lost their own children and relatives as a result of the war."¹²⁵

Women in Makeni (Bambali District, north central Sierra Leone) also organized themselves to care for children coming out of the fighting forces. Women in this region, known as the rebel stronghold, experienced the realities of the rebel war in particularly brutal ways. They were forced to become "wives" of the commanders, rape was a weapon of war used against them, and they were forced into various functions including acting as human shields for rebels during attacks. "The women there knew those children who committed atrocities in Makeni and its environs," says Davies. "Some of those young boys and youths were urged to rape women who could pass as their mothers, aunts, or elder sisters."¹²⁶

Despite these experiences, in their pursuit of peace the women were willing to play a pivotal role in the re-integration of these child ex-combatants. Davies notes: "If the peace so far achieved is to prove meaningful and sustainable then society has to take up its responsibility of caring for its children."¹²⁷ As individuals and through collective action, women in communities are leading efforts to reintegrate women and girl ex-combatants. "The women argued that if those children were left uncared for now that peace has been

achieved they would easily revert to their old ways," says Davies. "They argued that left abandoned, these child ex-combatants would have nothing positive to do and or think, and will prove a threat to the fragile peace now in existence."¹²⁸

Fifty-five percent of the study population indicated that women in the community had played a significant role in their reintegration. This is noteworthy as it was higher than their responses for being assisted by traditional healers (14 percent), traditional leaders (20 percent), international aid workers (32 percent), health workers (51 percent), and on par with religious leaders and social workers, many of whom are women.¹²⁹ Interviewees noted that women in the community provided them with helpful guidance, shared meager resources, and, perhaps most importantly, helped to facilitate skills training and education by providing childcare, clothes, or food. The basic assistance given in the form of childcare was critical in enabling many ex-combatants to enter skills training programs.

At the Community Level

As staff of NGOs working to reintegrate combatants, women contributed to building peace throughout the country at the grassroots level. For example, Esther A.,¹³⁰ a reintegration and HIV/AIDS program officer with a local NGO that works with child ex-combatants and war-affected children, was captured by the RUF along with three of her siblings. She watched as her siblings, all university graduates, were killed. She narrowly escaped.

After all that has happened to me, I still want to work with these children. Really the past is not easy, you cannot force people to tell their stories. I share my story with the children. I share my losses. They see this reality that they, the RUF, were the ones who took my beloved people, and yet I am here helping them. You can forgive, but you can never forget.¹³¹

Esther's colleague, Ramatu S.,¹³² was trained as a teacher before joining an NGO as a psychosocial supervisor for child combatants. In addition to her full workdays with children and adolescents and caring for her own two children, Ramatu has taken five girl mothers with their children and two foster children, all former members of fighting forces, into her home so they have a place to live and recover.¹³³

With regard to women's collective action, the Luawa Skills Training Center (LSTC) in Kailahun, the Women's Progressive Movement (WPM) in Freetown, and Caritas-Makeni have been innovative in their efforts in the Makeni area. Founded by six women, LSTC now has 120 members. It serves as a reintegration program and assists women abductees, ex-combatants, and victims in their efforts at independent living. The organization offers tailoring and garment-dyeing classes. Once women learn the skills and sell their products, they are required to give some of their earnings back to the organization.

WPM was founded in 1998. Its mission is to find abducted children, provide financial and medical assistance, and help women become independent. When the parents of abducted children cannot be found or their relatives shun them, members of WPM adopt them. Today, nearly every member has taken on at least one child and in many cases, several.

Affiliated with the Catholic Church, locally based NGO Caritas-Makeni operates in central Sierra Leone with a staff comprised mostly of nuns and female social workers. In a country with a 60 percent Muslim population this organization has been effective in reaching beyond Catholic communities. In their programs in the Districts of Port Loko, Tonkolili, and Bombali, it has instituted programs that allow for girl mothers to bring their children to skills training or to care for them while their mothers attend school. They provide a room and mat for the child to sleep on and food for the mother and child during the day. This contributes to higher retention rates in the programs and helps prevent their involvement in illicit activities such as prostitution, which is on the rise.¹⁵⁴ Caritas-Makeni also offers a program on alternative income generation for those who have entered the sex trade and reproductive health and safe sex education.

At the National Level

Women in international and national NGOs are also working with young women and girls to incorporate them into their skills training programs.¹⁵⁵ National women's organizations such as the Progressive Women's Association (PROWA) and the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) are among the groups running skills training centers, which include education for basic literacy. With branches across Africa, FAWE established its Sierra Leone chapter in 1995 during the war. It is now a national

women's organization with branches throughout the country. It offers a range of training programs to girl and women ex-combatants including tailoring, carpentry, tie dyeing, and masonry. FAWE has rebuilt schools and community centers that were destroyed and in some areas, has constructed and opened schools for girls. Some of its programs cater to girl mothers and other vulnerable girl populations with the aim of increasing literacy and education.¹⁵⁶ FAWE is the only organization to accept pregnant girls into the classroom.¹⁵⁷

In March 1999 FAWE began the Rape Victims Program. Their projects include radio programming, visits with school children, counseling, and referrals to team doctors. Female survivors who became pregnant were given pre- and post-natal care by the organization. FAWE has partnered with over 30 ministerial and government agencies, UN agencies, international and local NGOs to carry out their work.¹⁵⁸

PROWA is operating in the Kono District, an area that has been heavily impacted by the war and where, at the time of publication, few international NGOs were active. PROWA was one of the few organizations in the area to offer skills training to female ex-combatants. Additionally, it is one of the few organizations that encourages and allows pregnant girls to participate in their programs. Since Kono was the last area to disarm and an RUF stronghold, many girls who recently came out of the bush are in Kono and in need of assistance, thus increasing the importance of the efforts of this women's group.

The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has focused its support for women in Sierra Leone at various levels, working with other UN agencies, with national ministries, and with community-level official and non-government organizations to ensure gender-sensitive policies. In particular, UNIFEM has worked to ensure that special attention is given in the Truth and Reconciliation process to crimes against women, and that the needs and concerns of female survivors are addressed. In addition, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs, due in part to the advocacy efforts and technical support of UNIFEM, recently received government approval and funding for a gender directorate. The ministry works with UN agencies and international and local NGOs to provide accelerated education and skills training for ex-combatant children.¹⁵⁹

UNICEF, in partnership with the Sierra Leone government, and local and international NGOs, has developed model programs for encouraging the schooling and reintegration of former child combatants. To summarize, communities that receive ex-combatant children (who benefited from DDR and elect to attend school) into the education system are "rewarded" by receiving books, supplies, and sports equipment. Schools and communities receive materials based on the number of ex-combatants they accept. Thus, ex-combatants are not perceived as "benefiting" from violent behavior in the fighting forces; instead all children in the school benefit by having their peers return. At the same time, accelerated schooling is offered for older child ex-combatants who have missed school years due to the war.¹⁴⁰ In partnership with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), UNICEF has developed targeted programs for young mothers, combining childcare and food with vocational training and basic literacy skills. There is also a focus on training women in non-traditional skills such as welding, carpentry, and the construction of houses.

These initiatives, led by individuals, communities, NGOs, and national mechanisms, and in some cases, supported by international aid, are relatively small and inexpensive compared to official DDR efforts. Yet their impact is notable: Over 65 percent of the study population said that women have reached out to help them and that they would be interested in joining a women's organization to assist others.

CONCLUSION: THE CENTRALITY OF GENDER PERSPECTIVES TO DDR

The presence, roles, and experiences of women and girls within the fighting forces in Sierra Leone are more complex than previously reported. This inaccurate assessment resulted in operational and programmatic errors on the part of the UN, multilateral organizations, international NGOs, donor governments, and the government of Sierra Leone. In short, the inadequate attention to women and girls, coupled with a lack of gender sensitivity regarding their particular circumstances and needs, had a detrimental impact on the DDR process as a whole. Bias in design and implementation of DDR programs resulted in the near exclusion of women and girls from DDR programs and benefits, with those within the SLA and the CDF particularly marginalized.

Disarmament and demobilization camps and procedures were constructed to attract large numbers of male fighters and did not give adequate attention to ensuring that the human rights of women and girls were protected and preserved. The efforts of child protection agencies operating in Sierra Leone are among the best to date. Still, due to biases within the DDR program, alternative approaches must be sought to address the needs and rights of the many excluded women and girls that potentially fall under the umbrella of war-affected children and youth.

A range of factors including inadequate funding resulted in limitations to reintegration and longer-term rehabilitation elements of the program. Yet the successful reintegration of ex-combatants is an essential component of national and human security, necessary to build sustainable peace.¹⁴¹ Some international programs have recognized the need to address reintegration from the ex-combatants' and the community's perspectives. In addition, there is growing understanding that financial assistance alone is not sufficient for effective reintegration, that the needs and aspirations of ex-combatants and their families must be addressed, and that local support systems, psychosocial services, and other referral centers should be established to assist all ex-combatants in their efforts to return to a peaceful and productive lifestyle.¹⁴²

But while these efforts are developing, it is critical to ensure that women and girls are fully integrated, and that there is greater understanding of the roles they played in the war.

By being over-classified as "dependents," the real experiences of women and girls were not acknowledged and they were precluded from receiving benefits provided to other combatants. This assumption—that women and girls were victims only, with no significant role in either the execution of war or the building of peace—is detrimental for their future and could adversely affect the country's recovery.

First, as observed during 2002, the exclusion of child and female combatants from official DDR processes can lead to increased levels of insecurity.¹⁴³ For in the same way that disaffected male youths and ex-fighters might lead rebellions and form militias, so can women and girls. In 2002, riots increased, particularly among former child and adolescent combatants, and ICCs were attacked.¹⁴⁴ Social workers reported that adolescent women and girls were sometimes the leaders of these protests. Without support or care from their former "partners" or "husbands," their own families, the community, or the state, many of the young women—particularly those with children born as a result of their captivity—resorted to civil unrest as a means of accessing basic goods for the survival of their children. For these young women and girls, the stakes are, in effect, greater than for some of the men and boys.¹⁴⁵

Second, the exclusion of women and girls from official programs and assistance has significant social consequences including poverty, crime, and prostitution. Inevitably it also leads to an increase in HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the exclusion of single mothers means the exclusion of their children. Thus the emergence of another generation of disaffected marginalized youth is possible.

Third, despite the horrors they endured, the women and girls showed tremendous agency and initiative during their times in the forces. Within the confines of their environment they regained some control of their own lives by developing skills to ensure their survival and strategies to protect others. Yet when the DDR program was implemented, there was virtually no recognition of the multiple roles they played or skills they gained. Many have ambitions for education and independence. They feel tremendous responsibility for their offspring and aspire to give them better lives. But when they are treated as passive victims rather than as former combatants who played a sig-

nificant role in the conflict, they are again stripped of opportunities and a sense of self-dignity. International human rights laws oblige national, and particularly international, actors to ensure that women are treated equal to men.

Finally, women have held leadership roles throughout Sierra Leone's history. During the war, despite the widespread violence, women were fundamental to the reorganization of civil society, mass mobilization for peace, and the eventual cessation of the war. Women's organizations such as the YWCA played central roles in the processes that led to the signing of the Lomé peace accord.

The YWCA of Sierra Leone openly encourages women to "unite and initiate programs for self sufficiency and take up leadership roles in our communities and country as a whole."¹⁴⁶ National organizations such as FAWE and PROWA are rebuilding schools and educating children including ex-combatants. Local community members and informal networks and groups support some of those who did not pass through DDR programs or receive benefits. Women, individually and collectively, are playing important roles in assisting in the material, social, and cultural reintegration of former fighters.

Women's commitment to rehabilitating ex-combatants is a matter of basic survival. Unlike the international community, they have no "exit strategy." If the peace fails, violence returns to their doorsteps. But such groups are under tremendous pressure. They have meager resources. Their work is often undocumented and unacknowledged in official processes, and they receive limited support from the international community and donor governments. In a region that continues to be plagued with instability, recognizing the key role that women and women's organizations play and providing adequate resources to support them, is a cost-effective and essential ingredient for ensuring sustainable reintegration and ultimately, peace.

ENDNOTES

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APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY

Data Collection: Interviews

Mazurana and Carlson designed the study and served as the primary researchers. They conducted fieldwork in Sierra Leone in August and September 2002. A structured survey with 50 women and girls formerly in the fighting forces was used for gathering data. Mazurana and Carlson also interviewed over 60 community, traditional, and religious leaders, parents of abducted girls and boys, and social and health workers who interact with the girls. The researchers interviewed the female ex-combatants in cooperation with NGO staff, social workers, and/or psychologists. Study participants were familiar with those serving as interpreters. In advance of the interviews, researchers explained the study to their translators and discussed the kinds of questions they might ask study participants. Most other interviews, such as with NGO staff and UN officials, occurred in English.

Prior to beginning interviews, the researchers and/or translator described the study to participants, including the study sponsorship, the purpose of the study, and why the individual was asked to participate. The researchers then explained the procedure of the interview, including that interview data and their identities would remain anonymous; participants were told that they could refrain from answering any question if they were uncomfortable, and they could end the interview at any time with no fear of penalty to themselves. No inducements were offered to the respondents prior to interviews that might have influenced their willingness to participate.

Mazurana designed the survey, consulting with a biometrician about issues of sample size and the precision with which she could estimate percentages. She then obtained reviews from two practitioners before finalizing the design. A survey using quota sampling was used to gather quantitative data.

Quota sampling was chosen because it was not possible for the researchers to do random sampling under the research conditions in Sierra Leone, due to challenges including locating mobile populations, concerns regarding anonymity, poor communication and transportation conditions, as well as security risks throughout the country. While quota samples are biased, they can do a good job of reflecting the population parameters of interest. The researcher then documents the bias.

Data Management and Analysis

All surveys were recorded on the survey form with additional details offered on any of the questions recorded in field notes. Mazurana managed all field notes and surveys, identifying the main categorical components within each, including age at entry into force, force name, entry routes, roles, training with the force, experiences of human rights violations within force, exit routes, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Mazurana then compared categorical data first by force and then comparatively among the forces. When possible, both force and country findings were compared to previously published data, including historical facts, to assist in checks for accuracy. For analyses of surveys, working in Microsoft Excel®, Mazurana designed the database, Carlson entered the data, and Mazurana quality checked the data. Mazurana then used histograms and descriptive statistics for initial analysis.

Precision of Estimates

For Mazurana and Carlson's study population in Sierra Leone (N=50) the precision of estimates is + 0.14 for 10,000 females within the fighting forces (95 percent confidence interval for a single population proportion) and + 0.2 for a population of 529 girls who went through disarmament and for a population of 506 girls that went through official demobilization conducted via ICCs.¹⁴⁷

Bias

Although every effort was made to ensure that the study population reflected an accurate quota sample, the broader group of women and girls from which the study population was chosen was itself biased in several ways. First, the group from which the study population was chosen consisted only of women and girls who came or were taken to NGOs for assistance. In some cases, the girls had not come forward but were identified for NGOs by community leaders as having served in the fighting forces. Although girls who had not participated in

official programs for child combatants (such as DDR or ICCs) were surveyed, the study population was in some way known to the NGOs they worked with. Thus, women and girls and that NGO staff did not know, or could not locate, were not included. For example, on some occasions, NGO workers were unable to locate girls they were responsible for; some had left the area, and/or had gone "unnoticed" for over six months.

Second, since the girls could be located, it can be assumed that they were having positive experiences in the various NGO programs. Third, the study population is positively biased towards female ex-combatants from the former rebel RUF, and negatively biased towards those within the SLA and the various CDF. This is because girls within the RUF were privileged with entry into programs. As this finding came to light, more focused attention was given to the girls and women who had been associated with the CDF.

At the time of interview, the mean and median age of the girls and young women was 18, with a range from 10 to 35 years of age. The study population came from a variety of ethnic groups, Temne (42 percent), Mende (23 percent), Kono (13 percent), Fula (10 percent), Limba (8 percent), Kru (2 percent), and Soso (2 percent). The majority (94 percent) came from Sierra Leone, the rest came from Guinea (4 percent) and Liberia (2 percent). At the time of their entrance into the force their mean age was 13 and the median was 12, with a range of 2 to 32 years of age. Ninety-four percent reported abduction as their means of entry into a fighting force, while the remaining six percent reportedly "joined." Eighty-four percent of the study population entered a fighting force under 18 years of age, with 12 years of age both the mean and median age of entry into the force. The mean length of time in captivity was over three years and the median was three years, with some girls held for up to 10 years. The mean years of schooling was over two years and the median was zero, with a range from no schooling to nine years of school. Ninety percent had only received primary schooling, with 58 percent only completing primary one (first grade). Thirty percent of the study population was married or served as a common-law wife, 24 percent had one child, and 8 percent had two or more children. Thirty percent had become pregnant during their time in the fighting force. The largest percentage of girls (58 percent) named the northern province as their home province, followed by the east (28 percent) and south provinces (12 percent) and the western area (zero percent). Twenty-four percent of the study population was outside of their original home province at the time of interview.

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF ACRONYMS

All People's Congress	APC
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council	AFRC
Civil Defense Forces	CDF
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration	DDR
Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group	ECOMOG
Executive Outcomes	EO
Forum of African Women Educationalists	FAWE
Interim Care Centers	ICCs
International Monetary Fund	IMF
National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	NCDDR
National Patriotic Front of Liberia	NPFL
Nongovernmental organizations	NGOs
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR
Progressive Women's Association	PROWA
Revolutionary United Front	RUF
Sierra Leone People's Party	SLPP
Sierra Leone Army	SLA
Small Boys Unit	SBU
Small Girls Unit	SGU
Truth and Reconciliation Commission	TRC
United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL
United Nations Children's Fund	UNICEF
United Nations Development Fund for Women	UNIFEM
United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL
Women Organized for a Morally Enlightened Nation	WOMEN
Young Women's Christian Association	YWCA

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About Women Waging Peace

Women Waging Peace, a program of Hunt Alternatives Fund, advocates for the full participation of women in formal and informal peace processes around the world. Over 250 members of the "Waging" network, all demonstrated leaders with varied backgrounds, perspectives, and skills, bring a vast array of expertise to the peace-making process. They have met with over 1000 senior policy shapers to collaborate on fresh, workable solutions to long-standing conflicts.

About The Policy Commission

The Policy Commission is conducting a series of case studies to document women's contributions to peace processes across conflict areas worldwide. The studies focus on women's activities in conflict prevention, pre-negotiation and negotiation, and post-conflict reconstruction—including governance, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and transitional justice and reconciliation. This body of work is pragmatic and operational, offering suggestions, guidelines, and models to encourage policymakers to include women and gender perspectives in their program designs.

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
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
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No Peace Without Justice
Sierra Leone Conflict Mapping Program

Draft Copy for Review

9 March 2004



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No Peace Without Justice wishes to acknowledge the financial assistance of the **European Community** and the **Open Society Initiative - West Africa** to its programmes. The views expressed herein are those of No Peace Without Justice and therefore in no way reflect the official positions of the European Commission or OSI-WA.

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Printed in Sierra Leone by *NABsTech*, 18 Siaka Stevens Street, Freetown.

Cover Photo: Youth on peninsular road near Freetown. Pascal Turlan, 2002.

Cover Design & Publication Layout: Thomas Longley.

Maps: Basemap from Sierra Leone Information Systems (SLIS), Development Assistance Coordination Office, Freetown, Sierra Leone

Photo Overleaf: Youths in Segbwema, Kailahun District. Catherine Gambette, 2003.

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NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE

FORWARD

The purpose of this report is to examine information gathered in Sierra Leone by No Peace Without Justice's Conflict Mapping Program and analyse it through the lens of international humanitarian law, particularly those crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Special Court.

Accountability exists in many forms and at many levels; this report focuses on accountability for the violation of the laws of war in the belief that it is only by holding responsible those who violate those laws can there be deterrence for future would-be perpetrators. Too often, there are those who argue for the preservation of general amnesties and other guarantees of immunity in the name of "stability" or "moving on"; yet too often, history shows that the only way to achieve real stability and to move forward is to account for what has happened in the past.

Accountability for violations of international humanitarian law for conflicts such as that experienced by Sierra Leone requires more than one avenue; even the formal institutions established for this purpose – the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court – can only do so much. This report hopes to contribute to the accountability process, to the strengthening of the rule of law and to sustainable peace by adding to the historical record of what happened during the long years of the conflict.

The Conflict Mapping Program deliberately took a wide approach: chronologically, it covers the whole period of the conflict and substantively, it covers all violations of humanitarian law, irrespective of whether they are subject to the jurisdiction of Sierra Leone courts or of the Special Court. Thus, it hopes to demonstrate two main things. First, that what happened to the people of Sierra Leone were crimes, whether they are prosecuted or not. Second, to demonstrate that all such crimes are worthy of an account, from the harassment of one person in a remote village, obliged to give all he owns to an invading force, to the systematic killing of hundreds or thousands of people.

The world characterised the conflict in Sierra Leone in two words: diamonds and amputations. For certain, those two factors construct a persuasive framework by painting acts of great horror and ruthlessness against a background of solid greed. However, the conflict was about much more than that, as the facts gathered and analysed for this report show. There is another story of a decade of cruelty and petty humiliations, systematic brutality, murder, theft and exploitation: a million or more tales of human suffering, sadness and loss. The conflict in Sierra Leone was characterised by extreme levels of violence against a civilian population from all sides, even from those supposed to be their protectors. The violence focused on the domination of a country and her resources, particularly her people: the most valuable resource of all.

If the rule of law is to be upheld, the perpetrators of these acts, which are astonishing not only in their brutality but also in their repeating pattern across more than a decade, must be held to account. Such perpetrators rely upon people not watching closely and not speaking out, in keeping quiet and living with fear in their hearts and minds; they rely on the language of "forgive and forget". It is hoped that this report goes some small way towards removing the shield of impunity for the planners and perpetrators of such predatory enterprises and that in its reading, the plight not only of the hundreds or thousands killed but also the one person who lost everything will remain in our memory.



NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE

*Through the years we have worked in Sierra Leone, we have made many close and valuable friends. This report is dedicated to two friends who are no longer with us, to **Idrissa Kendor**, one of NPWJ's Conflict Mapping Recorders, and to **Mr S.A. Sankoh**, former Treasurer of the Special Court Working Group, whose enthusiasm and dogged determination are sorely missed.*

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
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Preface: An overview of NPWJ activities in Sierra Leone

1. No Peace Without Justice

No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ) is an international non-profit organisation working for the establishment of an effective international criminal justice system and in support of accountability mechanisms for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, with a view to strengthening democracy and the rule of law worldwide.

Since its creation in 1994, NPWJ has been engaged in activities to promote public awareness on the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as to pressure Parliaments, Governments and other decision-making bodies with the aim of accelerating the entry into force of the first permanent international jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

NPWJ's international activities have involved a series of inter-governmental regional conferences in Europe, Africa, Asia, North America and Latin America to foster the prompt creation of the ICC. At an academic level, NPWJ has organised a series of seminars and workshops to create a "Task Force" to enable the participation of developing and less developed countries in the process towards the establishment of the Court. On the eve of the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference, NPWJ launched a project of concrete technical cooperation called the "Judicial Assistance Program" (JAP) to assist small delegations to participate in ICC-related negotiations. To date, some 15 countries have benefited from this program, profiting from the competence and expertise of more than 40 jurists, lawyers, law professors and researchers.

In August 1998, NPWJ launched an ad hoc campaign to support the activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concerning the crimes perpetrated in Kosovo. This was followed in 1999 by an extensive Humanitarian Law Documentation Project, conducted under the auspices of the International Crisis Group, which gathered statements from witnesses of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during the Kosovo conflict, primarily for use by the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY. In addition, the "analysis" part of the project produced a report generalising the findings and helping to reconstruct chains of command.¹ A third purpose was to build local capacity to continue this work and promote human rights after the project ended in December 1999.

In June 2000, NPWJ also launched a Judicial Assistance Program related to internationalised courts, including the Serious Crimes Panel established by the United Nations in East Timor after the obtainment of independence and the then-proposed Special Court for Sierra Leone. Following the entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002, NPWJ has continued its international activities to universalise the jurisdiction of the ICC aimed at enlarging the membership of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute and continues to assist developing countries to participate in

¹ See "Reality Demands" on the ICG website for the report from this project: www.crisisweb.org



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ICC-related meetings. NPWJ has also expanded its scope of action to other issues such as the fight against Female Genital Mutilation and the direct promotion of the enforcement of democracy.

NPWJ projects are carried out in collaboration with a variety of international and regional entities, such as the United Nations and the European Union, as well as groups of Non-Governmental Organisations, such as the International Coalition of NGOs for the ICC and others. NPWJ publishes a quarterly newsletter and operates a website at www.npwj.org.

2. No Peace Without Justice in Sierra Leone

NPWJ's involvement in Sierra Leone began with the secondment of experts in international criminal law to the Government of Sierra Leone in June 1998 on the occasion of the Rome Diplomatic Conference that adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Since 2000, NPWJ-seconded experts have been working in Freetown and New York, within the Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations and the Office of the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice, to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Since 2001, NPWJ has also been engaged in a wide-ranging field-based Outreach and public information campaign on the Special Court, in cooperation with Sierra Leonean grassroots organisations and civil society groups. In 2002, after the Special Court came into existence, NPWJ's Sierra Leone project considerably expanded both its scope of activity (and its expenditure) to include a Conflict Mapping program and a Legal Profession program designed specifically for the Sierra Leonean Legal Profession.

NPWJ's most recent Sierra Leone program, which ran from July 2002 to October 2003, included four principal components:

1. The Judicial Assistance Program ("JAP" Program), namely the secondment of expert personnel to the Government of Sierra Leone in Freetown and New York to assist with dealing with requests of assistance and other requests by the Special Court and to build the capacity of the relevant Government Departments to deal with these requests, as well as to provide advice on issues relating to international law in general;
2. The Outreach Program, namely cooperation with local grassroots organisations to carry out public information and education on the Special Court and on accountability mechanisms in general, in order to facilitate a sense of ownership of these mechanisms and increase reliance on the rule of law and the mechanisms of democracy; this included the organisation of "Training the Trainers" workshops throughout the country, seminars, the production of outreach materials in different media, community events including street theatre and creating a robust network of non-governmental organisations centred on issues of accountability;
3. The Legal Profession Program, namely the promotion of the role of the Special Court within the legal profession in Sierra Leone and the role of the Sierra Leonean legal profession within the Special Court, in order to enhance the relevance of the Special Court in the lives of legal professionals and the potential of the Special Court for leaving a legacy of respect for the law and knowledge of international human rights standards; this included training seminars, public lectures and the production of reports and informational materials;



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4. The Conflict Mapping Program, namely the reconstruction of the chain of events during the ten-year war through the scrupulous selection and debriefing of key individuals throughout the country whose profession, role in their community or in the forces involved in the conflict, placed them in a position to follow events as they unfolded.

Each program, while distinct in their specific aims, was conducted so as to reinforce the other programs and thereby increase the contribution of each program to the project's overall aim of strengthening the ability of Sierra Leone society to address violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The most striking example of this was the close cooperation between the Outreach and Conflict Mapping programs. While the Outreach Program trained villages and towns on the Special Court, through "Training the Trainers" sessions and community events, these same communities continued to participate in accountability efforts by providing the Conflict Mapping program with their own views on and experiences of the conflict, by being consulted on the events and by directly taking part in the gathering of information. In addition, the project as a whole operated so as to maximise the participation of Sierra Leoneans in decision-making processes, both in relation to project policy as well as the design, implementation and follow-up for activities. This was premised on the belief that for Sierra Leone's accountability mechanisms to make a meaningful impact and achieve their goals, there must be "ownership" of the processes by Sierra Leoneans. It is also underpinned by the notion that, as a matter of policy, Sierra Leoneans are best placed to know what activities and approaches would be the most effective to reach the people of Sierra Leone.

2.(a). Judicial Assistance Program

Since 2000, NPWJ-seconded experts have been working in Freetown and New York, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice, to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in its negotiations for the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. This component of the project addresses the consequences of the conflict in Sierra Leone by increasing governmental awareness of and commitment to accountability mechanisms, which is vital for the successful operations of these mechanisms. Increasing the awareness of the Government and Parliamentarians of the benefits of international human rights and humanitarian law increases the likelihood of legislation passing through Parliament, which in turn strengthens the rule of law by providing legal mechanisms by which to seek redress for its violation.

In July 2000, responding to the request of Sierra Leone to provide specialised assistance, NPWJ seconded a legal expert to the Sierra Leone Mission to the UN in New York to continue assisting the Sierra Leone Ambassador to the UN, which had begun during the negotiations for the establishment of the ICC in 1998. In August 2000, a further two legal experts were seconded to the Office of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice in Freetown, Sierra Leone. This ensured that the Government, with the advice of NPWJ-seconded personnel, was able to form a co-ordinated response, both in Freetown and in New York, and to convey that response in the best possible way at the best possible time. By maintaining this close contact, NPWJ-seconded legal experts have kept the often delicate negotiations balanced and have ensured that the concerns of Sierra Leone were not lost in the debate.



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The work of NPWJ-seconded legal experts has centred around advising the Sierra Leone Government on critical issues arising in relation to the Special Court and issues of international criminal justice in general, including representing the Government during meetings and negotiations. This, together with detailed legal and policy analyses and recommendations on a range of issues raised directly and indirectly by the ongoing negotiations, has enabled Sierra Leone to formulate policies and address all the relevant issues in a timely manner.

In addition, NPWJ-seconded legal experts have been assisting the Attorney-General and the Sierra Leone Mission with various other tasks relating to international human rights and humanitarian law. For example, in New York, NPWJ-seconded legal experts have been participating in the VI (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly, while in Freetown, the Government has often taken advantage of the presence of NPWJ-seconded international law experts to provide information and analyses on matters within their areas of expertise, such as the requirements of implementing legislation for the International Criminal Court.

2.(b) Outreach Program

During the team's stay in Freetown in 2000, NPWJ identified a need for public sensitisation and education, given that what was being reported concerning the Special Court in the local media was often wildly inaccurate. The NPWJ Sierra Leone Mission was therefore expanded in 2001 to include an Outreach Program, designed to facilitate public information and sensitisation on the Special Court. The Outreach Program increased awareness of the mandate and operations of the Special Court, including promoting knowledge about human rights and humanitarian law issues to the public at large. The Outreach Program worked through the medium of local organisations, in particular the Special Court Working Group, by building the capacity of such local organisations to formulate and disseminate information coherently and in simple terms. Part of this process includes working with local organisations to formulate the issues in language and ways easily understandable by the general public. This fosters the role of civil society in promoting accountability within Sierra Leonean society and creates a stronger civil society by supplementing them with potent means to raise the issues publicly, both in general and in terms of prompting the Government to ensure international standards are promoted.

The Outreach Program commenced with "The Freetown Conference on Accountability Mechanisms for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Sierra Leone", held in the Lagoonda Complex on 20 to 22 February 2001 and attended by over 100 mainly Sierra Leonean participants. The conference provided a vehicle for the exploration of mechanisms designed to provide accountability for atrocities committed in Sierra Leone during the course of the conflict. It focussed on the two mechanisms then envisaged for Sierra Leone (the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission) and the interaction between those institutions as well as exploring how traditional or customary justice could be incorporated into or operate alongside those mechanisms. Two key recommendations were adopted at the plenary session of the Conference, both based on participants' perceived need for ownership of accountability mechanisms by the people of Sierra Leone: holding training workshops on the Special Court and establishing a coalition of interested Sierra Leonean NGOs to conduct the bulk of public sensitisation and information



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sharing about the Special Court. This concrete set of recommendations formed the basis for much of NPWJ's subsequent outreach work.

The "Training the Trainers" seminars presented a detailed overview of the provisions of the (then) draft Statute and Agreement for the Special Court. To place the Special Court in context, the seminars began with a brief introduction to the purposes and principles of international humanitarian and criminal law and discussed practical issues surrounding the Special Court. A number of identical workshops were held over a period of days, limiting the number of participants within each session to ensure the maximum opportunity for discussion. This model was employed over a number of months to facilitate holding seminars both in Freetown, the capital city, and in the provinces. The series of seminars thus held in 2001 attracted a total of over 600 participants from a diverse range of human rights, civil society and other organisations, including the RUF and the CDF. Training sessions were also held at the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) camp in Lunsar and "extra-ordinary" sessions were held for specialised groups, such as the legal profession and human rights monitors.

An additional motive for the training seminars conducted in March 2001 was to identify those members of Sierra Leone civil society who were interested in establishing a "Special Court Working Group", a coalition of Sierra Leone civil society organisations who were interested in the issues and who could play a crucial role in outreach and sensitisation, including ensuring that information being disseminated about the Special Court by various groups within Sierra Leone would be uniform and consistent. NPWJ organised a number of meetings of the Special Court Working Group (SCWG); over the course of 2001, the number of participants in working group meetings grew to a total of 39 members representing as many organisations. The SCWG, which met every two weeks in plenary and more often in smaller specialised groups, discussed the types of messages concerning the Special Court that would need to be directed to specific groups within Sierra Leone, together with the modalities through which the sensitisation program would be implemented. The SCWG adopted its constitution on 30 June 2001 and held elections for the national executive in July 2001, from which time the Special Court Working Group Sierra Leone (SCWG-SL) was established as an independent entity.²

During 2002-2003, the NPWJ Outreach Program gathered momentum and expanded in terms of the range of activities undertaken, its geographical reach and its implementing partners, which at the end of 2003 included the Special Court for Sierra Leone itself. NPWJ continued to work with the SCWG, including facilitating the establishment of 12 District Working Groups and the holding of elections for the national executive in August 2003, as required by the constitution. NPWJ also cooperated with the SCWG to hold "top-up training" for existing and new SCWG members, to ensure people were kept well informed about ongoing developments in relation to the Special Court. Among the targeted training held in 2002-3, NPWJ held a seminar for performing artists, which saw the creation of "The Right Players", a group of Sierra Leonean dramatists who write and perform skits, short plays and songs on themes related to the Special Court. Building on this and the targeted

² The Special Court Working Group subsequently changed its name to the Coalition for Justice and Accountability. Given that during the time period covered by this preface they were still known as the SCWG, that is the name this preface will use.



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training held for market women, NPWJ organised a series of Market Tours for the Right Players, in which the Right Players staged short plays about the Special Court in 16 markets across the Freetown area, with NPWJ staff on hand to answer questions from the audience.

Together with the Peace and Conflict Studies Department of Fourah Bay College at the University of Sierra Leone, NPWJ organised a series of public lectures, which commenced with the first public engagement of the newly-elected President of the Special Court, Judge Geoffrey Robertson. These lectures were video-taped and broadcast on SLBS, Sierra Leone's national television station. In addition to television, NPWJ continued to facilitate the SCWG's "Special Court Hour", held every Saturday on Radio UNAMSIL since 2001, and helped to establish and support similar radio shows in five locations across the country. Again in conjunction with the SCWG, NPWJ held a series of training sessions for the newly-established District Working Groups in 13 locations in the provinces. These sessions were attended by over 520 participants, ranging from NGO and civil society activists to the Sierra Leone Police and Sierra Leone Army, traditional leaders and the local Law Officers' Departments. These were followed by two major conferences in the provinces for the District Working Groups, based on the model adopted for the Freetown Conference in 2001, which resulted in concrete plans of action for the District Working Groups for the coming months. During August 2003, NPWJ and the Special Court for Sierra Leone built on these seminars and conferences by conducting a major series of training seminars across the country targeting specific groups such as the military, children, women and others.

The Outreach Program continued to develop and distribute materials on the Special Court, including production of the "Special Court Times", a newspaper-sized broadsheet on issues related to the Special Court, and its accompanying "Pocket Edition", which contained "Frequently Asked Questions" about the Special Court. In addition, NPWJ produced a number of small informational pamphlets, reproduced the constitutive and supporting legal documents of the Court³ and assisted the Special Court to put together a booklet covering all aspects of the Special Court, illustrated by local artists. NPWJ also produced a series of informational materials on the International Criminal Court, to accompany two seminars hosted by NPWJ, one for civil society in conjunction with the Coalition for an International Criminal Court and other foreign and local NGOs, including the National Forum for Human Rights, and one at the request of Sierra Leone Parliamentarians.

2.(c) Legal Profession Program

In 2002, after the Special Court came into existence, NPWJ's Sierra Leone project expanded to include a Legal Profession Program, aimed specifically at the Sierra Leonean Legal Profession and working primarily in partnership with the Sierra Leone Bar Association. The Legal Profession Program promoted knowledge of human rights and humanitarian law norms within the legal profession in Sierra Leone. A robust legal profession with knowledge about human rights will lead to a profession capable of defending human rights through various means, including legal means. This in turn strengthens the rule of law by enabling the Sierra Leone legal profession to ensure they have the knowledge required to work effectively with and within Sierra Leone's accountability mechanisms.

³ Namely the Agreement establishing the Special Court, the Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Rules of Detention and the indictments.



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The activities undertaken within the Legal Profession Program included training seminars, roundtable discussions and the drafting of explanatory and critical documents. The program also encouraged the Special Court to involve itself in the legal community so that the Court may make a sustainable contribution to the rule of law in Sierra Leone. To that end, NPWJ together with the Sierra Leone Bar Association and the Special Court held a half-day seminar on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court in December 2002. During this seminar, selected members of the Bar Association made submissions to the newly sworn in Judges on different aspects of the Rules, in particular with reference to the laws of Sierra Leone. In addition, NPWJ brought an international law expert to Sierra Leone to consult with the Special Court and others on potential models for defence before the Special Court. Both activities resulted in reports that were made available to, among others, the Judges of the Special Court during their first plenary meeting to consult on the Rules in early 2003.

The Legal Profession Program also worked closely with the Outreach Program on the public lecture series, including selecting an international law expert to provide specialised training for the members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court.⁴ In July 2003, NPWJ in partnership with the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales held a week-long “IHL Training Seminar” for members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association and other interested legal practitioners. This training resulted in a set of lecture notes, which was widely distributed in Sierra Leone and abroad. In addition, many of the trainers participated in another NPWJ activity, the Lawyers’ Guide to the Special Court, which is a guide to the substantive and procedural law relating to the Special Court.⁵

A major component of the Legal Profession Program was providing access to relevant library resources through the establishment of the NPWJ International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Library in Freetown. This library was a continuation of the “Book Donation” program launched in 2000, whereby foreign universities, individuals and others donated legal books and materials to NPWJ’s international law reading room and resource centre in Sierra Leone. NPWJ was fortunate to receive a large donation from the Colombia University Human Rights Law Program, which was shipped to Sierra Leone in 2002 and formed the backbone of the library, which also included donations from Penguin Publishers, the Canadian Law Book Company, Geoffrey Robertson QC (as he then was), Caroline Morgan and others. The library was officially opened at the beginning of 2003 by Desmond de Silva, QC, the Deputy Prosecutor of the Special Court. NPWJ hired a qualified librarian to manage the collection, which included a digital library compiled by NPWJ, and to oversee the library itself, which also contained internet stations and photocopying facilities. The majority of users consisted of human rights activists and university and school students, who used the library for research on human rights, humanitarian law and related matters. Following the conclusion of the NPWJ Sierra Leone project in 2003, NPWJ embarked on a partnership with the Campaign for Good Governance, who are now housing the library at their Freetown headquarter office and ensuring continued public access to the collection.

⁴ Staff of the Special Court also attended these training seminars.

⁵ The Lawyers’ Guide is available from www.specialcourt.org.



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2.(d) Conflict Mapping Program

In 2002, NPWJ launched the Conflict Mapping Program, which reconstructs the chain of events during a conflict through gathering information in the field and analysing the decision-making processes to ascertain the role of those who bear the greatest responsibility for policies of systematic and massive violations of the laws of war. This analysis is based on testimonial and other data overlaid with order of battle and command structures of the various forces as they evolved over time and space. This chronological and geographical mapping of the conflict, including reconstructing the order of battle and chain of command, serves to prevent denial of those events. An analysis of events according to international law establishes prima facie accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. In so doing, it both serves to strengthen the rule of law and to promote and defend human rights by publicising the price for violating them. In addition, establishing the chain of command within the armed forces operating in Sierra Leone and assembling these disparate pieces of information to create the bigger picture of the decade-long conflict in Sierra Leone enables the crucial first phase of establishing who bears direct and command responsibility for crimes committed during the conflict. This will enable the people of Sierra Leone to establish who should be held accountable for those crimes, thereby avoiding the trap of blaming a group or segment of society and promoting peaceful conciliation.

Beginning in 2002, the Outreach Program increased its geographic spread. This opened up new channels, networks and possibilities for collaboration and consequently increased the diversity and size of NPWJ's network of partner organisations and individuals. In addition, the Outreach Program deepened NPWJ's pre-existing relationships with many key sectors of society. These factors made it possible to conceive of a field based nation-wide Conflict Mapping Program in two main ways. NPWJ's extensive and trusted network of partners would be essential in devising and implementing any system of collecting information. Following this, NPWJ's network of partners embedded in communities throughout the country would also be essential in maximising the possible impact of the program: in encouraging people to participate in the program; in promoting the underlying rationales of accountability; and then in disseminating the results.

Meaningful long-term conciliation and reintegration can only take place if the accountability process belongs to each and every community – and if each community is able to participate in it. Rehabilitation and reintegration is not simply a matter of locating next of kin and assisting in individual reintegration; it is about enabling society and each community to move forward and to accept individuals back into their fold. The outreach and information gathering processes have contributed towards establishing confidence in the accountability mechanisms, by providing victims and witnesses with the opportunity to recount their stories and the stories of others in such a way as to help them understand their personal and their communities' experiences in the context of the conflict.

In the implementation of the Conflict Mapping Program, NPWJ worked closely with local partner organisations, with whom an excellent relationship had been built over the previous two years. The Conflict Mapping Program has therefore involved as much of the country as possible in conducting sensitisation and documentation in this manner so as to encourage a sense of ownership of the processes by the people of Sierra Leone.

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The results of this work, which are found in this report, together with the work of organisations in Sierra Leone undertaking human rights reporting, are hoped to support the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court. It must however be emphasised that the process in itself is as important as the final document, because the direct involvement of Sierra Leoneans (both as interviewer and interviewee) in this program has allowed them to be at the heart of the accountability work being carried out in the country.



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Chapter One: Methodology

The purpose of the Conflict Mapping Program, as outlined in the preface, is two-fold: to gather reliable information so as to put together an accurate picture of what happened in Sierra Leone and to make the process meaningful for Sierra Leoneans. Initially, on the basis of NPWJ's experience in other situations, it was determined that there were four main ways in which a report such as this one could be produced, namely:

1. Individuals recounting their own experiences;
2. Individuals giving an overview of what happened in their area, through their own experience and what they have learnt from others;
3. Groups recounting their experiences in a shared environment; and
4. Open source materials.

The question facing the program during the conceptual phase was which method to select in order to maximise both the quality of the information gathered and the impact of information-gathering on Sierra Leoneans, given the resources and constraints. The main constraints were limited financial resources; a limited amount of time; the size of the country and lack of ease of movement, including the condition of the roads; and the fact that Sierra Leone experiences torrential rains for six months of the year, making many roads completely impassable.

In addition, each method listed above has its own pros and cons. For example, while the first method involves Sierra Leoneans to the greatest degree, every single person in the country would have to be given an opportunity to tell their story in order to gather enough information to be able to put together an accurate picture of what happened across the country. This would be difficult if not impossible to achieve at the national level for a ten-year conflict with limited resources and limited time. On the other hand, while the last method can also give a very comprehensive picture of what happened across the country, it would have limited to no impact on or involvement of the people of Sierra Leone.

Given these factors, it was considered that the most appropriate method for NPWJ to conduct a Conflict Mapping Program that focused on the whole of the country rather than a limited geographical area was to use information gathered from people in Sierra Leone with a good general overview of the conflict in their area ("key persons"),⁶ supplemented with open source materials. In order to maximise community participation, enhance the quality of the information and overcome potential cultural and linguistic barriers, it was considered that the best people to take records from people with an overview were Sierra Leoneans from the same geographical area as the key persons ("Conflict Mapping Recorders" or "CMRs"). In addition, it was considered that in order to enhance community "ownership" of the accountability mechanisms, the Conflict Mapping and Outreach Programs should as much as possible be conducted together. Marrying the sensitisation and the documentation processes ensures that the perception of the communities reached is not that of

⁶ Key persons provided information to NPWJ on the basis of confidentiality, subject to certain exceptions for which the consent of the key person was obtained prior to taking the record, including use of the information in the compilation of this report.



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being “told” about the accountability process as something that happens elsewhere and is relevant to others, but rather of truly taking part in it.

While this method was the most appropriate in the circumstances, it comes with its own potential drawbacks, which had to be addressed during the conceptual phase so as to minimise their possible impact during implementation. There are seven major areas of concern of such importance that failure to recognise and address them would have compromised the value of both the process and outcomes of the program, described here as “critical areas”. These are addressed comprehensively in the following sections, but are worth discussing briefly here.

The first critical area is the quality of the CMRs and their ability to draw out relevant information from the key person so as to compile a record that could be used during the analysis phase. This was addressed through a rigorous two-fold selection process. In the first instance, NPWJ outlined the program to partner NGOs in the regions, often members of the SCWG, who would nominate persons they considered suitable to be CMRs. Following that initial nomination, NPWJ held a training session for the potential CMRs, including a practical exercise in record-taking, and selected CMRs on the basis of the results of that training. In addition, CMRs were trained in recognising their own potential biases and how to overcome them and, at the very least, to identify those biases for the analysts.

The second critical area concerns the quality and usability of the records, which is distinct from the quality of the person taking the record, although the two often correlate. This was overcome by rigorous training in how to take a record and what information might be relevant, which included practical exercises in taking a record before interviewing the first key person. In addition, once the first record had been taken, NPWJ personnel reviewed the record with the CMR, to point out potential problems and provide advice on how to take a more comprehensive record.⁷

The third critical area is the type of the key persons interviewed by the CMRs in terms of the kind of information they might provide. In order to overcome this concern, CMRs were provided with rigorous guidelines and criteria for ideal candidates for key persons. Once CMRs had made their initial selection of the key persons they wished to interview, NPWJ personnel went through the list with them and discussed their choices, suggesting alternatives where the initial choices were inappropriate.

The fourth critical area is the accuracy of the information provided by the key persons. This was addressed by providing CMRs with guidelines and training in interviewing and how to take a record, including the importance of accuracy and not “making up” information to fill in gaps, as well as recognising potential bias in key persons.

The fifth critical area concerns the accuracy of the information itself. Given that the conflict ranged over the course of a decade and many key persons were either relatively young when events happened or were relatively elderly at the time they gave their record, not to mention the potential

⁷ In most cases, CMRs were required to go back to the first key person to fill in information that was lacking in the record, which would generally improve the comprehensiveness of the remaining records that were taken.



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effects of post traumatic stress disorder, even with the best intentions on the part of both the CMRs and the key persons there is always the possibility that people are mistaken. This was addressed by reviewing the first factual analysis with well respected local human rights activists who were not involved in the Conflict Mapping Program and who themselves had a good general overview of what happened in a particular District. In addition, it was addressed by providing the factual analysis to other local and foreign experts and by cross-checking the information with open source materials.

The sixth critical area was geographical coverage. In its original conception, the Conflict Mapping Program was to have one CMR per chiefdom, in order to have saturation coverage across the whole country. However, time, financial and logistical restraints meant that this was not possible, as there are 149 chiefdoms across the country, plus the rural Western Area, not all of which are accessible at all times of the year. In order to avoid making arbitrary decisions about which chiefdoms to cut and with a view to minimising the damage to the report as a whole, NPWJ therefore discussed this issue with the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), the leading human rights NGO in Sierra Leone with human rights monitors in every District, and the SCWG. NPWJ sought their advice on which chiefdoms could be covered by a CMR from a neighbouring chiefdom (termed “linked”) and which chiefdoms were not the scene of a great deal of activity during the conflict and could be cut altogether. In addition, NPWJ discussed with CGG the chiefdoms about which they would be able to provide information, on the basis of their regular human rights reporting work as well as a special human rights violations reporting project they undertook during 2001.

The final critical area related to processing the raw information generated by the project – in short, information management. Failure to secure, store and accurately break down the records into a practical format for analysis would undermine efforts to build an accurate reconstruction of the events described in them. In November 2002, NPWJ together with Sensible Data srl, an Italian IT company specialising in emergency situations, began developing a customised database that would allow the narratives in the records to be broken down into incidents, storing simple information about the incident alongside data about the exact location and date of its occurrence. As soon the first completed records began to be collected in mid May, they entered a process of digitisation. In late June, once all the records were collected, records were broken down into incidents by a team of specially trained database analysts. A thorough system of cross-checking was implemented throughout to maintain the accuracy of information from record through to database.

1. Selecting and training Conflict Mapping Recorders

The gathering of information in the field in Sierra Leone was conducted by national human rights workers or “Conflict Mapping Recorders”, trained and supervised by NPWJ personnel, in communities and villages throughout the country.

1.(a) Selection of CMRs

While the selection of the CMRs in the communities was one of the most important parts of the program, it also presented one of the greatest challenges from a quality control perspective. In this process, NPWJ was very heavily reliant on the judgment and expertise of its collaborating organisations and their representatives, with whom a relationship of trust had been built over the previous two years.

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As a system of quality control, NPWJ tried to ensure the collaborating organisations selected their best people to nominate as CMRs, by discussing with the organisations the purpose of the program and providing the following checklist for indicators that people could make good CMRs:

- They should have a good level of knowledge about the conflict in their chiefdoms.
- They should have a good level of written and spoken English.
- They should be able to overcome their bias as much as possible.
- They should show willingness and have time for the program, since much of its success lies in the quality of their records.

Following the initial selection stage by local partners, NPWJ held a training workshop at which the final selection was made (see below), based on how the CMR responded to the training and their performance in the practical exercise of taking a record. By the end of April 2003, the selection stage was complete and NPWJ had hired a total of 136 CMRs to cover 146 chiefdoms.⁸ Twenty-two CMRs were hired to cover the Western Area, which is a densely populated area to which many IDPs fled during the war. In each District, NPWJ appointed a focal point, who was the main contact person for that District and who assisted with logistical and other arrangements, including bringing the final records to Freetown for review purposes. These CMRs and the focal points represented a broad cross section of civil society and included human rights activists, teachers and others.

1.(b) Training of CMRs

NPWJ conducted training workshops in various locations in the Western Area and in the 12 headquarter towns throughout the country. In order to provide greater participation and information sharing, as well as due to time and logistical constraints, CMRs travelled from their chiefdoms to the headquarter town rather than NPWJ personnel travelling to each chiefdom. In addition, this allowed the focal point to meet every CMR selected and identify possible logistical obstacles. The training was divided into three distinct components: the introductory workshop, the training workshop and the review process.

The first visit, called an “introductory workshop”, was dedicated to meeting with community leaders and collaborative organisations to introduce the program. This session was the final part of the “Training the Trainers” seminar held by the NPWJ Outreach Program and the Special Court Working Group. This placed the Conflict Mapping Program in the context of the Special Court, accountability mechanisms and the difficulties faced in reconstructing accurately the events of the conflict in Sierra Leone. The introductory workshops laid the groundwork for the quality of the CMRs selected, following the considerations outlined above, as well as the relevance of the key persons identified. One of the main aims of this session was to engage the participants, so that over the following days they could identify potential CMRs for the training workshop and compile a list

⁸ CMRs were paid a small stipend to cover transport and incidental costs incurred during their time spent taking records. It should be noted, however, that CMRs were not paid according to the number of records they took but were paid a sum that had been set in advance. It was felt that paying according to the number of records taken could harm the quality of the records, as there was the possibility, however remote, that some people may take more records, which could be of reduced quality, in order to increase their remuneration.



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of potential key persons for reviewing at the end of that training workshop. This stage was completed for the whole country by mid April 2003.

The second visit was the “training workshop”, a one-day session composed of sensitisation on the Special Court to ensure that CMRs would be well versed in crimes under international law, in particular those within the jurisdiction of the Court, to enable them to take all the relevant details from their key persons. This sensitisation was followed by a workshop on the Conflict Mapping Program itself, concluding with the selection of Conflict Mapping Recorders to take records from key persons. The training focused on explaining the Conflict Mapping Program, how conflict mapping differs from human rights reporting, how to take a record, what type of information to focus on and discussed the fact that these interviews would be taxing and draining on both the CMRs and the key persons. The session culminated in practical exercises in record taking. In addition, this stage included training in the crucial first step of selecting appropriate key persons who have a good general overview of the conflict in their area. On the basis of performance during this training session, including perceived understanding of the process and principles and the quality of the practice record, NPWJ selected a limited number of individuals to work as CMRs. This stage was completed for the whole country in the first week of May 2003.

The third stage consisted of reviewing the first records collected by the CMRs for content and organisation before the final two records were taken from key persons selected by the conflict mapping recorders in consultation with NPWJ. This stage was essential to provide top up training (if necessary), to address problems the CMRs may have encountered, to ensure the quality of the records taken and to ensure that CMRs never felt abandoned. The fact that this process took place after the collection of each CMR’s first record and before the collection of subsequent records enabled NPWJ to undertake a thorough system of quality control on an ongoing basis. This stage was completed for the whole country in June 2003. Thus each location was visited at least three times by NPWJ according to a schedule worked out in advance with local partners, especially the SCWG, and the NPWJ Outreach Program.

The structure of the training was developed by NPWJ in consultation with local partners during October and November 2002 and was reviewed on an ongoing basis to incorporate lessons learnt during the training process. The first round of training commenced in December 2002 in Freetown, followed by further meetings and the training of conflict mapping recorders in the rural Western Area, near Freetown. Although this ran the risk of appearing there was a “Freetown bias”,⁹ NPWJ selected the Western Area as the first point of entry to enable NPWJ to perfect the conflict mapping training before taking it into the provinces, as logistically it is more difficult to perfect such processes in the provinces. Lessons learned from the training in the Western Area were incorporated into the planning process for the provincial training and in late March 2003, following preparatory work undertaken in consultation with the SCWG and the Outreach program, conflict mapping training began in the provinces.

⁹ A common criticism by Sierra Leoneans of foreign NGOs and others in Sierra Leone is that they focus too much on the capital, Freetown, and do not focus enough on the provincial and rural areas in Sierra Leone.



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Partly in consideration of the time frame and the impending rainy season, which starts in May and during which many roads become impassable, NPWJ hired a Sierra Leonean team comprised of the best CMRs from the Western Area to undertake the training workshops and the collection of the first records in some parts of the country. This enabled there to be two conflict mapping training teams working simultaneously in different locations around the country, allowing full coverage of the whole country by the conclusion of the time frame for the gathering of records.

2. Key persons

The Conflict Mapping Program was primarily based on the scrupulous selection and debriefing of selected individuals ("key persons") whose profession, role in their community or in the forces involved in the conflict placed them in a position to follow events as they unfolded.

To facilitate proper identification and selection of key persons, CMRs were provided with the following guidelines for characteristics of people who would likely be best suited to being a key person:

1. The widest possible overview of the conflict in their area.
2. They were present in their chiefdom for much of the conflict.
3. Reliability.
4. Trustworthiness.
5. They have a good reputation in their community.
6. They would usually be regarded in their community as a person that others can confide in.
7. Honesty.
8. They are able to pass on their knowledge to the Conflict Mapping Recorders accurately and fully.
9. They are as free from bias as possible or at least are able to recognise their own bias.
10. They will usually be recognised as local community leaders in some respect.

In addition, CMRs were provided with the following list of people who may make good key persons:

1. Teachers.
2. Doctors.
3. Lawyers.
4. Counsellors/Social workers.
5. Youth Leaders.
6. Women's Movement Leaders.
7. Senior Police from the local area.
8. Local Magistrates.
9. Chiefs.
10. Section Leaders.
11. Local Commanders from the different fighting factions.
12. Any person in the local community who has been able to gain an overview of the conflict through a number of other persons talking to them or through holding some respected and trusted position in their community.



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To facilitate and monitor the quality of the records and the key persons selected for interviews, the CMRs were asked to provide a report prior to conducting an interview, in order to maintain the focus of the process and the standard of the key persons selected. These reports covered the following matters:

1. Why that key person was selected from their list of potential key persons.
2. How the selected key person meets the criteria, for example how and why that key person has an overview of the conflict in that area.
3. The nature of the information provided by that key person.
4. The key person's knowledge of the conflict.

Each CMR was to select three key persons in their chiefdom from whom to take a record, based on the time necessary to take a record and the time frame within which the record-taking phase had to be completed. Nevertheless, the main emphasis was on quality and not quantity when identifying key persons to be interviewed. It was therefore the case that fewer key persons were selected for interviewing in some chiefdoms where the scale of the conflict was minimal or where there was a smaller population.

Following these criteria, the Conflict Mapping Program gathered records from 401 key persons across the country, who ranged in age between 19 and 82. Of these, 6.7% were former members of one of the fighting factions; 6.7% were women; and 10.7% had been captured by one or more of the fighting factions and used either as forced labour or were recruited into a fighting faction.¹⁰ The most common occupation of key persons was a farmer, most of whom had occupied some position of authority during the conflict (such as Town or Section Chief) and many of whom were members of a fighting faction, most commonly the Civil Defence Forces. Other occupations included Paramount Chiefs, Town Chiefs and other chiefdom authorities, teachers, fishermen, housewives, retired military personnel and civil servants.

3. Database

The information gathered by CMRs from key persons comprised over 400 records, each containing an average of 30 pages, with a total of approximately 5,500 separate incidents, that is, instances of an alleged violation of international humanitarian law or key strategic or other information contained in a record. Given the amount and breadth of information, it had to be collated and stored in such a way as to enable easy search and retrieval in order for it to be used by analysts.

NPWJ therefore entered this information into a database designed specifically for the purposes of analysis according to order of battle and chain of command information. Prior to the completion of the design and programming of the database,¹¹ typists entered the records in their entirety into digital format. The resulting files underwent rigorous proofreading to ensure they were exactly the same as

¹⁰ These people are not included in the 6.7% who were former members of a fighting faction, which refers only to those people who joined willingly, according to the information they provided to the CMR.

¹¹ The database was designed and developed by Sensible Data s.r.l. Sensible Data is an IT company that specialises in information technology, data processing and secure communications for emergency and humanitarian operations: www.sensible.it.



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the record provided by each CMR. These documents then formed the basis of the data entry process and were used extensively during the analysis phase.

For data entry purposes, each record was broken into incidents, which consist of discrete parts of information, usually chronological, containing examples of serious violations of international humanitarian law or other relevant information. Each incident was classified according to what crimes were allegedly committed, who allegedly committed them, what weapons they allegedly used and other pertinent information. To ensure accuracy and consistency in the classification of incidents, NPWJ personnel provided training to data entry operators in the basics of international humanitarian law as well as a manual outlining how different factual scenarios should be classified. To ensure accuracy of the database as a whole and to enhance its effectiveness for analysis purposes, each entry went through a thorough process of checking and cross-checking, to ensure that it was consistent, complete and correct.¹²

4. The analysis

4.(a) District level analysis

At the conclusion of the data entry stage, NPWJ's analysts began piecing together what happened during the 10 years of war in Sierra Leone, using three tools: the database; detailed maps, mostly at District level; and the typed records. The result of this stage, which involved collating and cross-checking vast amounts of information, was a rough outline of what happened in each District during the conflict, highlighting troop movements, chains of command and events, including acts likely to constitute violations of international humanitarian law.

Following this stage, the rough drafts for each District were reviewed in Freetown with field monitors from the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) responsible for that District. CGG's field monitors are very experienced human rights activists with an in-depth knowledge about what happened during the conflict in the District for which they are responsible. NPWJ specifically did not hire any CGG field monitors as Conflict Mapping Recorders, so that their experience could be better utilised once the first analyses were done, to ensure that there were no major errors or inconsistencies in the District-level analyses, thus providing a crucial first level of cross-checking.

In addition, over a six month period, NPWJ debriefed a former high-level member of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who provided a great deal of information on the inner workings of the RUF and an overview of the conflict since it began in 1991. The hours spent working with this key person yielded a statement of over 100 pages, plus various documents and maps describing the structure, procedures and geographical locations of the RUF, which were of immense benefit during the analysis phases. A senior Kamajor was also debriefed for the same purposes, although not as extensively.

¹² In compiling the database and the data entry process, NPWJ hired personnel who had worked on the ICG Humanitarian Law Documentation Project so as to enable this phase to benefit from lessons learnt during that project.



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The process as a whole enabled analysts to piece together the conflict as it happened across time and space and, in particular, to draw out patterns of conduct that may constitute crimes against humanity, namely those crimes committed in a widespread or systematic manner.

4.(b) The first draft factual analysis

Once these stages were complete, experienced analysts began the long process of putting all the information together, which consisted of three stages. First, a “first review” was conducted of the rough drafts, checking for internal sense and consistency. Second, each rough draft went through a more thorough review, addressing potential problems in the analysis, often going back to the original records and maps to clarify issues. Finally, the rough drafts for each District were put together and cross-referenced, which enabled the compilation of the general overview of the conflict. This first stage was based purely on the information gathered in the field and, as such, did not incorporate any information from open sources or other materials.

4.(c) The second draft factual analysis

The first draft factual analysis formed the backbone of the work that followed, namely the incorporation of information from open sources and other materials, going back to the records when necessary to iron out inconsistencies and to fill in details. Further, at this time, cross-checking, filling in details and checking dates and other information was undertaken when there was conflicting, contradictory or inadequate data. To facilitate this process, NPWJ incorporated a range of diverse information into a fully searchable open source database, with 8,500 entries comprised of news reports,¹³ UNAMSIL press briefings,¹⁴ situation reports from NGOs and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations press briefings and documents, press releases from other relevant bodies, such as mining companies, and other relevant information. Other open source materials were also used, including reports from major human rights organisations, particularly Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

The primary purpose for open source and other material was to provide background material, cross-check the information gathered from key persons and to fill in gaps where any existed. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the main source of information for the facts as analysed in this report was Sierra Leoneans themselves, through the records of key persons gathered by Conflict Mapping Recorders throughout the country. Wherever open sources provided information used in the report, that is noted in a footnote to the relevant portion of the text.

The result of this was the second draft factual analysis, which incorporated all verified information from the first draft, with the addition of open sources and other material that had not been gathered directly by NPWJ in the field, but which was useful for confirming or correcting the data. This second draft factual analysis was then sent to a selected number of “resource persons”, namely Sierra Leoneans and foreigners with expertise in the conflict in Sierra Leone who had agreed to

¹³ The main sources used were BBC and AFP wire reports and reports from the Xinhua News Agency.

¹⁴ Often, the records did not contain as detailed information about events that occurred from late 2000, partly because the decade-long conflict was beginning to come to an end. As such, UNAMSIL press briefings – which were regular and very detailed about UNAMSIL deployment in particular – were used to bring structure to the recollections of key persons, where necessary.



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review the information contained in the draft report and help clear up any lingering inconsistencies or unclear information.

4.(d) The legal analysis

While the factual analysis was being perfected with the assistance of resource persons, NPWJ put together a legal analysis of the events that happened during the conflict. This involved researching, presenting and discussing the relevant principles of international humanitarian and criminal law, which were then applied to the information contained in the factual analysis, so as to ascertain what crimes under international law and Sierra Leonean law were committed during the conflict.

The draft of the legal analysis was sent to NPWJ's network of international law experts, many of whom have had experience working on similar projects, such as the Humanitarian Law Documentation Project in Kosovo, or practicing before international courts or tribunals. These people are to the legal sections what the CGG field monitors and the factual resource persons are to the factual sections.

5. Notes on the report

One difficulty in a country with limited resources is the availability of detailed, comprehensive and up-to-date maps. In Sierra Leone, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has begun producing detailed maps, which were vital for the analysis of the information gathered during the Conflict Mapping Program. Difficulties were nevertheless encountered because a number of villages mentioned in the records – which span back to 1991 – were completely destroyed during the conflict and, as such, no longer exist. Wherever possible, this report tries to identify the location of such villages based on the information contained in the reports.

Due to the fact that OCHA maps were used in the analysis phase and specially-constructed maps were provided by OCHA as visual aids for the report itself, this report adopts the spelling of place names used on the OCHA maps. If that was not available, this report uses the spelling used in the records. Throughout, the report tries to be as specific as possible about the location of a particular place, adopting the formula of naming first the town or village, then the chiefdom and District, where it is different from the District under analysis. For example, if Peyema is being discussed as part of the factual analysis for Bo District, it will read: "Peyema (Lower Bambara Chiefdom)"; however, if it is being discussed as part of the factual analysis for Pejuhun District, it will read "Peyema (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Bo District)". In addition to avoid any possible confusion, the word "Town" was used to distinguish a town from a District, for example, "Pejuhun Town", although "Town" is not an official part of the place name.

Finally, while it may appear counter-intuitive in a report on a conflict in which many victims and perpetrators were named in the media, this report does not "name names" of either victims or perpetrators. While the case for not naming victims is clear, it was decided also not to name perpetrators, even where they might be considered to be "notorious". This decision was taken because the allegations made are often extremely serious and would require further investigation before public disclosure could be considered. It must be borne in mind that the information analysed in this report has not been tested to the level required for sustaining a conviction, for

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example through cross-examination in court, nor have the alleged perpetrators had the opportunity to tell their side of the story or answer the allegations made in this report. Therefore, although some names are well known and the decision not to include them may seem artificial, it was decided that the best approach would be to omit entirely any references to names.

6. Partners

NPWJ would have been unable to complete the Conflict Mapping Program without the support and assistance of a number of partners. First and foremost, the Special Court Working Group, both in Freetown and across the country, was invaluable at every stage of the process from the initial design of the training seminars, to planning the up country trips, to providing us with CMR candidates. They also assisted us in undertaking training on the Special Court, together with the Outreach Program, during the first phases of training of the CMRs.

Another crucial partner was the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), who provided assistance both as a member of the SCWG and independently. In particular, the CGG field monitors provided vital assistance by going through the preliminary District-level analyses for their District to verify the accuracy of the information and fill in any gaps. CGG field monitors are particularly well placed to undertake this task, as they are based in the District and have been gathering information on human rights abuses for CGG, one of Sierra Leone's leading and most reputable organisations.

A proper understanding of the movement of forces and how events interplayed would not have been possible without the use of maps provided by OCHA. The illustrative maps contained in the report were produced with the generous assistance of OCHA personnel, who put together District-level maps that contain as many of the places mentioned in the report whose location could be identified.

Special recognition should go to the European Commission, who financed the bulk of our 2002 and 2003 activities in Sierra Leone, including the Conflict Mapping Program.

Finally, the Special Court for Sierra Leone provided much needed co-financing during the analysis stage of the Conflict Mapping Program. It must be emphasised, however, that this assistance was limited to financial assistance only and in no way implies endorsement by the Special Court of any of the material or conclusions, factual or legal, contained in this report.

Indeed, the content and conclusions drawn in this report are the sole responsibility of No Peace Without Justice and cannot be attributed to any of our partners.

The present report does not and cannot mention or even truly reflect the varied range of tasks carried out by all NPWJ personnel in the Conflict Mapping Program or other programs in the project. Nor can it acknowledge fully or exhaustively the wide range of assistance and support given to us by our partners, friends and people we met throughout the country. Rather, the purpose of this report is to provide as comprehensive as possible a picture of what happened during the

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decade-long conflict in Sierra Leone, analysed over time and space according to chains of command and order of battle information. With this picture, we hope to demonstrate that what happened to the people of Sierra Leone over the course of more than 10 years was a crime – the result of deliberate policies to commit systematic and massive violations of the laws of war – and by so doing to give a voice to the countless victims of these crimes, to play our part in ensuring they will not be forgotten.



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Chapter Two: A General Overview of the conflict in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002

Sierra Leone is located on the south-west coast of Africa; bordered on the north and north-east by Guinea, on the east and south-east by Liberia and on the west coast by the Atlantic Ocean. Sierra Leone's compact shape and coastal situation mean that her international borders are only 555 miles in total, sharing 397 miles with Guinea and 158 miles with Liberia. Sierra Leone's territory covers 27,699 square miles (71,740 km²), housing a pre-conflict population estimated at 4.3 million. The 13 ethnic groups in Sierra Leone had strong administrative structures in the provinces prior to British colonisation in the late 18th or early 19th century, which were utilised by the British when they expanded control from Freetown across the rest of the country. This is echoed in today's legal and administrative systems, which are comprised of both traditional structures and traditional or customary law as well as a Westminster style Parliament and the application of British common law.

Sierra Leone is endowed with mineral resources, namely diamond, gold, bauxite, rutile and iron ore. Although only 6.7% of the land is arable, it also produces cash crops, in particular, coffee, cocoa, ginger and rice. Of the 800 km of waterways running through the country, 600 km is navigable the year round. Very few of the major highways running through the country are paved and there are no common carrier railroads, rendering travel through the country difficult during the rainy season, which runs from May to October. Indeed, rainfall along the coast can reach 495 cm (195 inches) per year, making Sierra Leone one of the wettest countries in West Africa. Prior to the rainy season, from December to February, the dry haramattan winds carry sand from the Sahara, depositing large amounts of sand throughout the country and bringing corresponding dust storms.

The early years of independence, which Sierra Leone attained in 1961, are marked by a number of military coups until 1968, after which the one-party State was established in the late 1970s. Once prosperous Sierra Leone would experience a steady decline throughout the 1980s, widely regarded to be the result of rampant corruption, which would set the stage for the conflict that erupted in the 1990s.

On 23 March 1991, combined forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) entered Kailahun District from Liberia through the town of Bomaru in Upper Bambara Chiefdom. On 27 March 1991, another group of RUF/NPFL entered Kailahun District from Liberia through the town of Koindu in the north of the District. By mid April, these two fronts would join in the centre of the District, having by then occupied the majority of it. On 28 March 1991, a third RUF/NPFL group crossed the Mano River forming the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone, in the south-east part of the country. They immediately occupied Zimmi, the southern-most town on the road network in Pujehun District.

As at 23 March 1991, units of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) were stationed in the towns of Koribondo (Bo District), Daru (Kailahun District), Gandorhun (Kono District) and Kenema Town (Kenema District). RUF/NPFL forces would move towards these locations to confront directly the SLA in an aggressive inland-moving campaign that was accompanied by systematic attacks against the civilian population.



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In April 1991, the RUF unit that had entered Bomaru was engaged with the SLA at Daru Barracks in the south of the District. This was an important SLA position on the northern bank of the Moa River, as it controlled further inland access by road. Occupying Daru Barracks would be a continuing objective of RUF/NPFL forces throughout 1991 and 1992. Again in April, the RUF/NPFL unit that entered through Koindu town immediately attacked SLA forces stationed some 20 km south in the town of Buedu, forcing them to retreat to Kailahun Town.

When the RUF/NPFL forces entered a town or village, civilian residents were gathered together in the centre of town, at the Court Barrie, where the RUF/NPFL forces introduced themselves as "freedom fighters" seeking to redeem the people of Sierra Leone from the corrupt All People's Congress (APC) Government. NPFL members were immediately identified as Liberian through their foreign accent and use of Liberian dialects. Enlisting, conscripting and training of both adults and children started immediately, particularly in Kailahun, where numerous training camps were established; the ranks of the RUF swelled quickly.

Reacting to such events, the Government of Sierra Leone requested and received support from the Governments of Nigeria and Guinea, who sent forces to provide security for strategic locations in and around Freetown. The Government of the United States would also provide indirect logistical and training assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone throughout 1991.

The RUF/NPFL unit entering Pujehun District from Liberia spread out across the District in a 45 mile arc from the town of Zimmi. They attacked through Pujehun Town, northwards into the southern chiefdoms of Bo District and north-east toward Koribondo Town, where the SLA was garrisoned. RUF/NPFL forces would attack the SLA in villages on the route to Koribondo until August 1991. The advance of RUF/NPFL forces in April allowed them access to land running south-west into Bonthe District, where RUF/NPFL occupied a number of small towns in the extreme south and east of the District, eventually trying but failing to occupy the District headquarter town of Bonthe, on Sherbro Island. Around this time, SLA forces were deployed in Bonthe Town and by the end of the year had opened new bases in the south-east of the District. RUF/NPFL forces moved into the southern chiefdoms of Kenema District using the main road linking Zimmi to the south of the District. Combined Guinean and SLA forces checked their advance through Kenema District into Kenema Town, where the main SLA brigade was located.

As they advanced, RUF/NPFL forces uniformly abducted civilians, simply killing them, or forcing them to carry looted property and perform domestic tasks. Almost without exception, sexual violence against women accompanied the arrival of RUF/NPFL forces in a locality. The burning of civilian residences and targeting of government and traditional authorities, in addition to the violence against civilians, caused massive panic and an exodus of civilians northwards inland. Rudimentary administrative structures – pass systems, checkpoints and appointment of their own personnel as town and chiefdom authorities – were put in place by the RUF/NPFL as they advanced. This would continue throughout the following years.

In June 1991, RUF/NPFL forces moved further north into Kono District along the main road to the District headquarter town of Koidu, staging a number of attacks on SLA positions in the south



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of Kono District. Throughout August and September, SLA forces from Koribondo would react offensively, forcing RUF/NPFL forces to retreat back through Pujehun District along the routes by which they had entered. In recapturing Pujehun and pushing the RUF/NPFL southwards, the SLA collaborated with forces of the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), a Liberian movement engaged in warfare with the NPFL in Liberian territory.

To consolidate their own advance and successes against RUF/NPFL forces, SLA forces in Kono District began supporting the establishment of civilian vigilante groups, armed with bladed weapons and short-barrel shotguns. Throughout Pujehun District, SLA forces executed civilians suspected of collaborating with RUF/NPFL forces in even the most menial of ways.

By December 1991, RUF/NPFL forces had consolidated positions in Kailahun District and were compressed into small pockets of activity away from main towns in Pujehun District.

In April 1992, junior officers from the SLA Tiger Unit led by 25 year-old Captain Strasser moved from the war front to Freetown to complain about poor conditions. They successfully staged a coup, ousted the APC Government and established a military government known as the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Following the coup, SLA forces looted many civilian shops and residences in the Western Area, which was accompanied by the infliction of violence upon civilians.

In early 1992, the SLA, now under the command of the NPRC, continued to unseat RUF/NPFL forces throughout Pujehun District. Moving southwards from Koribondo (Bo District), SLA and ULIMO forces retook the network of roads crossing the Sewa River and moved towards Pujehun Town. With the assistance of the SLA, a civil militia group comprised of local hunters called the "Donsos" gained in strength in Kono District, participating as auxiliary forces to the SLA and ULIMO. The Donsos, together with other local hunting societies across the country – the largest of which were the Kamajors – would later join forces under the umbrella of the Civil Defence Forces.

RUF/NPFL forces attempted again to enter Kenema District, having failed in 1991. Entering Kenema from points in the east of the District, RUF/NPFL were resisted by ULIMO and freshly deployed SLA forces. SLA secured these positions until late 1993.

RUF/NPFL forces continued to attack Kono District, uniformly attacking the civilian population as they advanced until their expulsion from the District in early 1993. In mid 1992, in response to this increasing northwards movement of RUF/NPFL forces, the NPRC Government initiated, supported and strengthened the process of mobilising a civil militia group in Koinadugu District, in the extreme north-east of Sierra Leone. Comprised of local hunters, the "Tamaboros" – as they became known – were deployed to Kono District to engage RUF/NPFL forces. In late October 1992, RUF/NPFL forces occupied Koidu Town and were able to attack further inland in the northern chiefdoms of Kono District. Combined SLA, ULIMO and civil militia forces pushed them out of Koidu Town and Kono District in early 1993.

By May 1992 in Pujehun District, combined SLA and ULIMO forces had pushed RUF/NPFL forces back across the Moa River, leading by the end of the year to their retreat back into Liberia



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across the Mano River. Pockets of RUF/NPFL activity continued to pressure the SLA in the southern chiefdoms of Pujehun District and in the extreme south-east of Bonthe District.

The SLA intensified attacks on “collaborators” from October 1992 to February 1993. To the SLA, there appeared to be little distinction between civilians who cooperated enthusiastically with the RUF/NPFL and those who found themselves with little choice or simply failed to escape when the RUF/NPFL entered an area. The criteria used to determine who was and was not a “collaborator” were largely arbitrary. The SLA forced civilians to mine diamonds, provide food and carry out other forms of manual labour. In Pujehun Town, the SLA started providing basic military training, weapons and ammunition to civilians.

In Kailahun District, RUF/NPFL forces continued to attack Daru and other SLA positions in the west of the District. At the end of 1992, the RUF/NPFL grip on the northern chiefdoms of Kailahun District was unchallenged. Within these areas, a special unit of NPFL forces known only as “TAP 20” executed terror operations against the civilian population, including the widespread killing and cannibalism of civilians. Later, in 1993, “TAP 40” and “TAP Final” would continue this operation.

In the early months of 1993, SLA forces established positions in advance of Daru and started to engage RUF/NPFL forces stationed in the northern chiefdoms of Kailahun District, where RUF/NPFL forces had first entered Sierra Leone. The SLA built on this eastward progression by successfully preventing the RUF/NPFL from moving northwards into Kono District. By mid-1993, the SLA had rolled back and confined RUF/NPFL forces to the far eastern part of Kailahun District.

RUF/NPFL activity in Pujehun District resumed in December 1992 to January 1993 when the RUF/NPFL moved a large force into the District, crossing the Moa River, entering Pujehun Town and Potoru, a strategic town giving access to Kenema District. Their push into Pujehun District, while brief, was accompanied by a brutal attack against the civilian population; the RUF/NPFL forces routinely killed, raped and abducted people and burnt down large numbers of civilian residences. However, their control of these two towns and the surrounding areas was quickly overturned by SLA and ULIMO forces. RUF/NPFL forces were then confined to the bordering chiefdoms with Liberia and in the swampland south of Pujehun District. RUF/NPFL forces also made intermittent attacks on locations in the south-east of Bonthe District, following the course of the Wanjei River.

In December 1993, the then Head of State announced a unilateral ceasefire, RUF/NPFL forces having been repelled almost entirely back to Liberia. Taking advantage of this ceasefire, in the last days of December 1993, RUF forces moved across the border from Liberia into Kenema District, occupying its seven southern chiefdoms by March 1994 and inflicting violence on the civilian population. By this point, NPFL had withdrawn from Sierra Leone to fight ULIMO forces in Liberia. “Camp Zogoda”, established in March 1994 to the north of the Moa River in the south-west of Kenema District, became the RUF’s main base until 1996. From Camp Zogoda, RUF forces were able to stage ambushes on the main Bo-Kenema highway, a major arterial route.



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In early 1994, the number of forces under arms in the SLA swelled to around 12,000 owing to a recruitment drive by the NPRC Government. RUF forces in Pujehun District fully repelled the SLA eastwards towards Koribondo, allowing their forces to push northwards into Bo District. SLA forces stationed in Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island used boats to patrol the coastal waters off Sherbro Island, engaging on the water RUF forces entering the mouth of the Sewa River. The RUF had control over the boundary between Bonthe and Pujehun Districts, setting up a number of town and village level administrations and continuing to inflict similar violence on the civilian population as had begun earlier in Kenema District.

Although in April 1994, RUF forces made incursions into Kono District, they were from the beginning of 1994 unable to undermine significantly the hold over the District exercised by the Donsos and SLA forces in the northern chiefdoms and the Civil Defence Units, mainly composed of local hunters known as the Kamajors, in the south. This prevented RUF forces moving directly through to Koinadugu District, to the immediate north of Kono District. However, an alternative route was found.

Thus the RUF expanded their operations in a westerly direction from the three Districts bordering Liberia, continuing to inflict serious violence against the civilian population as part of an attack that had begun in Kenema District in 1993 and would last until the end of 1994. Thousands of civilians in Pujehun District were asked by SLA forces to go to an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in Gondama (Bo District), placed under the protection of foreign forces. RUF forces established a base in the north of Kenema District in February 1994, thus preceding their advance through Kenema District from the south and guaranteeing control over the entire District, bar Kenema Town, by April 1994. From this northern base, RUF forces staged ambushes on the main Koidu-Makeni highway in Tonkolili District, making it impassable for civilian and military traffic alike. In April, RUF forces attacked the towns of Masingbi and Makali, both along the Koidu-Makeni highway, very close to the northern tip of Kenema District. SLA forces sent from Makeni were repelled from Makali by the RUF. RUF forces would move progressively further along this road, attacking Matotoka in July. Getting ever closer to Magburaka Town, by October the RUF were able to loop round through Tonkolili District into the southern chiefdoms of Koinadugu District. A string of attacks on the Magburaka-Alikalia highway by an RUF expeditionary force culminated in a heavy attack on Kabala Town on 7 November 1994. This force would leave Kabala the next day and return to Tonkolili District in the following week, leaving in its path a trail of destruction and hundreds of civilian deaths.

The RUF grip on Pujehun and Kenema Districts presented opportunities for the RUF to further infiltrate Bo and Bonthe Districts. In early 1994, RUF forces executed countless "hit and run" attacks on villages in the eastern chiefdoms of Bo District along the entire boundary with Kenema District. Initially, these were "food-finding missions", mostly staged from Camp Zogoda. Between June and December, however, these missions became more substantial, with RUF forces attacking but not occupying towns just across the District boundary. In November, RUF forces attacked an IDP camp in Gerihun, but were repelled by SLA forces. On 24 December, RUF forces attacked the IDP camp at Gondama, killing hundreds of civilians displaced from the fighting in the preceding



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years. On 25 December, Kenema Town was attacked but left unoccupied. Towns in the centre of Bo District, including the District headquarter town of Bo on 27 December, were attacked by the RUF; none of these towns were occupied. RUF forces re-entered Bonthe District, occupying the eastern chiefdoms, using the natural features of the District to expand their control in areas in the three chiefdoms on the east and south.

Responding to RUF advances into Bo and Tonkolili Districts, groups of civilians were formed into civil militia, variously labelled "Civil Defence Units" or "Territorial Defence Forces". In Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom (Bo District), these units were gathered, trained and armed under the auspices of the Resident Government Minister for Bo District. In Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom alone, 2,800 civil militia were under arms by June 1994.

Initially, these units were deployed alongside SLA forces, used to operate checkpoints, identify RUF "collaborators" and carry out patrols within chiefdoms. Despite this cooperation, tensions between the SLA and civil militia groups had been simmering since 1993 throughout the country. This was due to widespread civilian mistrust of the SLA, owing to their involvement in the same enterprises of killing civilians, raping women, looting private property and exploiting mineral resources. For example, in the Tongo Field area of Lower Bambara Chiefdom, the SLA engaged in diamond mining in Tongo Town itself and forced civilians to work at the mining sites. In nearby Peyema, also in Lower Bambara, the RUF did the same. These practices were aggravated further by numerous attacks on civilian settlements and ambushes on civilian traffic carried out by unknown assailants suspected to be members of the SLA. Two such attacks occurred in Moyamba District in 1994. Civilians branded such SLA members "So-bels", or "Soldier-Rebels".

By late December 1994, RUF forces had entered the western chiefdoms of Tonkolili District, having had access to the eastern chiefdoms since April. Earlier in 1994, it is highly likely that RUF forces began establishing a foothold in the Kangari Hills in the south of the District, which they would use as a launching point for attacks on the surrounding villages. Since June, SLA forces had been stationed in Mile 91, which is located on a key junction; to the west lies Masiaka, the gateway to Freetown. Leading north-east from Mile 91, the highway goes to Magburaka. Leading south-east, the highway runs through to Bo, Kenema and Kailahun. On 22 December, the SLA were forced out of Mile 91 by the RUF, although they regrouped outside of the town and regained control the following day. Many locations in the chiefdoms around Mile 91 were attacked as the RUF forces established a new Brigade base in the Kaitkant Hills, spanning the borders of Tonkolili with Port Loko and Bombali Districts. The location of the Kaitkant Hills between the two main highways leading into the Western Area allowed the RUF to begin a new phase of their campaign, opening up for the first time since 1991 the possibility of attacking Freetown. By the end of 1994, rumours of imminent RUF attacks on Moyamba District, so far unaffected by the RUF, were widespread. Since 1992, SLA forces had been deployed in the District, although they had also been harassing civilians, including stealing property, which intensified from December 1994 to early 1995.

As the RUF expanded the territory over which it had control throughout 1994, violence against the civilian population continued unabated. The proliferation of "hit and run" missions into Bo District, across Kenema District and in Tonkolili District resulted in the widespread burning and looting of



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civilian residences, accompanied by a high number of civilian deaths. Sexual violence against women was perpetrated by RUF forces during raids. Beating, molestation and abduction of both men and women for use as porters to carry stolen property or for conscription into the fighting force continued. The RUF assaults on Bo, Kenema and Kabala resulted in the denigration and destruction of public infrastructure such as government offices, hospitals, schools and Police barracks.

As 1995 began, RUF forces controlled the southern Districts of Kailahun, Pujehun and Kenema. Deployments of SLA within the occupied Districts occasionally offered short-term effective resistance to RUF attacks, but had little long-term strategic influence. Camp Zogoda continued to be the RUF's main base in the south and it was common practice for abducted civilians and looted property from the whole occupied area to be sent to the camp. The RUF expanded their operations in Bo District, opening a new base, "Camp Bokurr", in the north-east. The Bo-Freetown highway, at least until Mile 91, and the entire Bo-Kenema highway were under RUF control. The IDP camp in Gerihun was attacked again, this time successfully. RUF forces killed over 100 civilians. Even before 1995 ended, the RUF controlled all of Bo District and would attack the civilian population there until April 1996, systematically killing civilians, burning houses and committing similar acts of violence against civilians.

The strong grip on Pujehun and Bo Districts and on the south-east part of Bonthe District allowed a rapid and large-scale expansion of RUF forces into the whole of Moyamba and Bonthe Districts. Entering the eastern part of Moyamba District in January 1995 from Bo District, RUF forces proceeded southwards and took control of the bauxite mining area of Mokañji before moving south-west to upper Bonthe District, the location of the economically important Sierra Leone Rutil Mining Company. By February 1995, RUF forces controlled all the northern chiefdoms of the District, using the developed road network in this area. These attacks on the south of Moyamba District and the north of Bonthe District paralysed an economic area vital to the Government of Sierra Leone. From the north of Bonthe District, RUF forces rapidly spilled over into the southern chiefdoms of the District. Despite this, they failed to gain control of Sherbro Island and Bonthe Town. This movement in Bonthe District was carried out during the same period of a concerted action accompanied by attacks against civilians in Moyamba District.

Throughout January and February 1995, RUF forces attacked villages and towns in the chiefdoms of Tonkolili District in which the Kaitkant Hills are located. In early January, the RUF extended military operations into Port Loko District, attacking two key towns on the Freetown-Makeni highway. On 1 January 1995, RUF forces advanced north-west from their Kaitkant Hills base and from positions near Mataboi in Bombali District, towards the town of Foredugu in Port Loko District. The RUF force, which numbered 500, overcame the SLA forces stationed in the town, forcing their retreat. RUF forces attacked other villages in the Foredugu area. From Foredugu, RUF forces attacked Lunsar, but were beaten back by SLA forces stationed in the town. Lunsar would fall to the RUF later in the year.

At the end of January 1995, RUF forces moved north from Port Loko District and attacked Kambia, the headquarter town of Kambia District. RUF forces did not attempt to occupy Kambia



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Town and the attack was staged primarily to demonstrate their ability to strike in areas previously thought to be secure.

In early March 1995, RUF forces moved north into Kono District from Kailahun District and the Tongo Field area in Kenema District, taking advantage of SLA groups abandoning a comprehensive defensive position in favour of illicit mining operations. Throughout March, April and May, RUF forces occupied many towns in the western, diamond-rich area of Kono District, including Koidu Town, which was accompanied by violent acts against the civilian population.

The pattern of RUF activity in Moyamba District in March-April 1995, part of an overall attack from December 1994 to April 1995 across several Districts, clearly shows that their immediate objective was to attack Freetown. The RUF did not initially intend to settle in Moyamba District, rather use it as a transit into the Western Area and the capital. RUF forces attacked Moyamba Junction, in the north of the District, to paralyse any SLA response to a simultaneous attack on Moyamba Town. The group that attacked Moyamba Town would then follow the Moyamba-Freetown road, attacking the major roads and settlements on its way, before being slowed down by SLA forces in the north-west of the District. In March, RUF forces settled in Moyamba District, progressively reaching all the chiefdoms and establishing a strong base in the north, known as "Camp Fol Fol". As the RUF consolidated their hold over Districts in the south and encamped in Moyamba District, SLA forces increased security activities throughout the Western Area, adopting defensive deployments at locations along the road running around the Freetown Peninsula and on the main inland highway.

Also in early March 1995, RUF forces deployed from their Kaitkant Hills base and attacked Mile 91, partly in response to reports of an advance by SLA forces towards RUF positions. In late March, SLA forces coordinated by members of a private military company called the Gurkha Security Group attacked RUF forces at Kaitkant Hills using intensive bombardment from a helicopter gunship and a Guinean Airforce fighter jet. Evacuating the base, RUF forces consolidated at the recently established Camp Fol Fol (Moyamba District). From this location, RUF forces raided the surrounding chiefdoms in Moyamba District between March to May 1995.

In early April, RUF forces moved into the Western Area in a bid to attack Freetown. RUF forces attacked settlements in Koya Rural District in a triangular area delimited by Songo to the east, Waterloo to the west and Fogbo Jetty to the south. RUF forces met resistance from SLA forces. Many civilians were killed and many civilian houses were burnt down by RUF forces. By late April, the RUF had pushed its front lines into Waterloo, where they attacked SLA and Guinean positions in the town. Replacing the Gurkha Security Group, the Government of Sierra Leone contracted another private military company called Executive Outcomes at the beginning of May 1995.

Executive Outcomes started training activities at the Benguema Training Centre near Freetown and formed a "Special Task Force" using a large number of demobilised Liberian militia from ULIMO. The Special Task Force attacked the RUF, pursuing them out of the Western Area. Following this, civilians and SLA forces in the Western Area attacked and killed persons suspected to be "rebel collaborators".

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In mid-May, the RUF established a camp at Ro-Source in the west of Bombali District and commenced attacking nearby towns. RUF activity in northern Port Loko District, near Camp Ro-Source, recommenced, following a lull during the RUF push into the Western Area.

Moving to the north-east, Executive Outcomes, together with the SLA and civil militia, attacked RUF positions in Kono District from land and air. They successfully recaptured Koidu Town from the RUF by June. By the end of 1995, Executive Outcomes had control over the western chiefdoms of Kono District, where the mining areas are to be found. This did not, however, prevent RUF forces from launching "food-finding missions" into the eastern chiefdoms of Kono District and the southern chiefdoms of Koinadugu District.

In June 1995, the RUF commenced a second wave of attacks in Port Loko District, advancing beyond the Foredugu area towards Port Loko Town, attacking on two fronts. The first advance came from the south, possibly again from Kaitkant Hills or from Camp Fol Fol. The second advance was from the north, through Gbinti Town from Camp Ro-Source in Bombali District. Both advances converged upon Port Loko Town on 8 June 1995. RUF forces attacked and entered Port Loko, but did not capture the town from the SLA forces stationed there. Following this attack, RUF forces took up temporary positions in the chiefdoms to the north and east of Port Loko Town. By mid June, a contingent of Guinean soldiers deployed into Port Loko, commencing heavy artillery bombardments on the RUF's positions. This forced an RUF retreat towards Camp Fol Fol (Moyamba District) and Camp Ro-Source (Bombali District). Following their stalled advance on Freetown and the failure to take Port Loko Town, RUF activity concentrated on the strategic town of Masiaka and other towns in the surrounding area across June 1995.

In October 1995, the Special Task Force, comprised of Executive Outcomes, SLA and ULIMO members, deployed to Bonthe District and started dislodging the RUF forces from their positions, notably in the primary mainland town of Matru Jong. Joined later by Kamajors, the Special Task Force progressively dislodged the RUF from their positions throughout Bonthe District. In late 1995, RUF forces, defeated in certain areas of the District, gathered thousands of civilians at Bauya Junction, killing hundreds of them. A few years later, over 1,000 human skulls would be discovered in that area. RUF activity in Port Loko District continued unabated, with the attack and brief occupation of Lunsar in December.

In 1996, Executive Outcomes controlled the diamond mining areas of Kono District, also taking control of other strategic sites. In collaboration with the Kamajor Society, Executive Outcomes took control of the Sierra Rutile mining operation in mainland Bonthe District and were contracted by the Sierra Ore and Metal Company (Sieromco) in Moyamba District. Alongside the SLA, Executive Outcomes were hired by the owners of the hydroelectric plant at Bumbuna (Tonkolili District) to provide security.

In January 1996, the NPRC Deputy Chairman overthrew the NPRC Chairman, thereby seizing power. In the weeks preceding the Presidential and Parliamentary elections planned for 26 February 1996, RUF forces in a number of locations across Sierra Leone threatened civilians, posing the



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question about whether they wanted peace before elections, or vice versa; the implication being that “elections before peace” would lead to reprisals against the civilian population. A national consultative conference held in Freetown in February gauged the national mood and decided that elections should go ahead. This decision was not without dissenters other than the RUF, including sections of the SLA and a number of Paramount Chiefs.

In late January and across February, RUF forces attacked Madina, Kukuna and Rokupr in Kambia District and Kamakwie in Bombali District, resulting in huge damage to civilian residences and some particularly brutal killings of civilians. RUF forces staged attacks on villages in Moyamba District, killing, raping and mutilating civilians. Just before Election Day, the NPRC commenced peace talks with the RUF in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. On Election Day itself, RUF forces attacked the towns of Kenema and Magburaka, the elections nevertheless proceeding in the wake of killing, rape and looting.

Following the February elections which resulted in the formation of a government by the candidate of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), Guinean armed forces were deployed at two locations in the north-west of Sierra Leone. Nigerian forces set up checkpoints in the Western Area and the Nigerian 28th Battalion arrived in Port Loko District. An entire SLA battalion deployed from Freetown to the far east of Kono District. Guinean forces were also deployed in small numbers in southern Koinadugu District and established a base in Kambia District.

Around this period, the various civil militia groups that had formed throughout Sierra Leone were united under a central coordination system known as the Civil Defence Force (CDF) and the Kamajor leader was appointed to the position of Deputy Defence Minister by the newly elected President. The Kamajor Society was the largest component of the CDF, which also included the Gbethis, the Kapras the Donsos and others.

The process of initiating Kamajors already underway in Bonthe District since 1995 spread in 1996 to Bo District. The Kamajor High Priest and Chief Initiator was moved from Bonthe District to Bo District to initiate young men into the Kamajor Society. By late 1995, Kamajor Societies were formed in some of the southern chiefdoms of Bo District. By mid-1996, the initiation process had spread throughout Kenema, Bo and Pujehun Districts and into parts of Moyamba, Kailahun and Tonkolili Districts.

In the early stage of this process, recruitment for the Kamajor Society was carried out exclusively through the traditional authorities, who nominated men from their chiefdoms for initiation. However, as the war escalated and the territory over which the Kamajors gained control increased, new initiates did not require this nomination by traditional authorities.

The most striking feature of 1996 is the exponential increase in strength of the Kamajor Society throughout the Southern and Eastern Provinces. By early 1996, a Kamajor Society had formed in every chiefdom of Bo District. Initiates in Bo District were first sent to locations in Bo Town and Jama Bongor Chiefdom where they were initiated and given basic military training. In the first half of 1996, initiates from Kenema were sent either to Kenema Town or a location in Bo District for



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training. In the southern Kenema chiefdoms, Kamajors were initially gathered into two battle groups, one of which was known as the Upper Wanjei Defence Committee. Alongside Nigerian, Guinean and SLA forces and other Kamajor groups from chiefdoms in Bo and Pujehun Districts, the Upper Wanjei Defence Committee successfully destroyed the RUF stronghold of Camp Zogoda. In the north of Kenema District, Kamajor units successfully confronted and eliminated RUF camps, including "Camp Joe Bush", undermining completely the hold over Kenema District that was enjoyed by the RUF throughout 1995. In late 1996, Kamajors attacked another main RUF base known as "Camp Booloko", just north of Bo District. Also in late 1996, Kamajor units in Moyamba District attacked the RUF at Camp Fol Fol, removing one of the RUF's main staging points for attacking Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts. On other occasions, Kamajors from different chiefdoms regrouped in order to engage the RUF more efficiently. Kamajors from Bonthe District were also active in Moyamba District, assisting those chiefdom authorities that did not have a Kamajor Society.

In Tonkolili District, other components of the CDF were formed. Civil militia movements known as the Gbethis and the Kapras were formed in the south and north of the District respectively. The Gbethis were active in the area surrounding the Kaitkant Hills, a former RUF stronghold. In June 1996, Gbethis worked alongside SLA forces stationed in Mile 91, before being driven out of town by SLA forces after a skirmish concerning the division of contributions offered by civilians under their control. The Gbethi leadership demanded that the civilian population provide support for their positions, punishing with physical violence those "RUF collaborators" who did not cooperate willingly. The Gbethis set up checkpoints and patrolled villages at night, looking for "strangers" and fining civilians who failed to give notice of their arrival. Similar practices were carried out by members of the CDF throughout the territory they occupied.

On 30 November 1996, the Government of Sierra Leone negotiated a peace agreement with the RUF leadership in Côte d'Ivoire. One of the key provisions of the Abidjan Peace Accord, as it became known, was the removal of all foreign forces and Executive Outcomes from the country; Executive Outcomes would leave the country by early 1997.

At the beginning of 1997, SLA and CDF forces continued to confront the RUF. "Camp Libya" in Pujehun District, one of the RUF's longest held positions, fell to a combined SLA and CDF attack in the first months of 1997. Until May, Kamajors also engaged the RUF, sacking the RUF's main defence headquarters in the Kangari Hills. RUF activity in Bombali District continued from Camp Ro-Source with a number of food-finding raids into Port Loko. In mid May, RUF forces captured the northern town of Kamakwie, meeting no resistance and capturing an ammunition dump from the SLA forces stationed there.

The tensions between the CDF and SLA that were ignited in 1996 burned on into 1997, with numerous armed confrontations between the two forces throughout the country. For example, in Tonkolili District, SLA forces ambushed a Kamajor night patrol and attacked Gbethis defending Yonibana. Kamajors in Pujehun District forcibly dismantled SLA checkpoints. These tensions led the SLA to abandon some chiefdoms. Already in the middle of 1996, civilians from Moyamba District had asked the governmental authorities in Freetown to withdraw the SLA forces from the



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District. SLA forces moved out shortly after and left the security of the District to the Kamajors who, by the end of the year, had control of the south of the District, while RUF forces were still active in the north of the District. The CDF, however, was partially weakened in Kono District with the disbanding of the Donsos in February 1997 as a sign of good faith in the wake of the Abidjan Peace Accord.

Civilian populations fared badly throughout areas controlled by both CDF and SLA forces. Throughout Moyamba and Bonthe Districts, civilians suspected of being “RUF collaborators” or who were considered to be insufficiently supportive or respectful of the CDF, were subjected to gruesome punishments. In the areas they controlled, Kamajors put in place rudimentary administrative structures, preventing regular local authorities from exercising any power and took actions affecting various aspects of civilian life. These practices continued throughout the following years. The SLA also continued their illicit mining and looting activities, often using civilians to carry the loads.

On 25 May 1997, junior elements of the SLA overthrew the elected government of President Kabbah. This coup d'état resulted in the formation of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by an SLA officer awaiting trial in Pademba Road Prison in Freetown, charged with treason for a planned coup attempt. Immediately following the advent of the AFRC, its leadership called for the RUF to join them and share power, an offer the RUF leadership promptly accepted. Immediately following the coup, AFRC forces looted extensively throughout Freetown and the Peninsula area. A large RUF force moved into the Western Area, initially concentrating around Waterloo and Hastings, stealing from and harassing civilians.

Following the coup, former-SLA deployments gave the AFRC a strong foothold throughout the country, particularly in the major towns of Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Koidu, Pujehun and Bonthe. The AFRC did not inherit territory the SLA did not control, such as CDF strongholds. Nevertheless, AFRC positions were reinforced and strengthened when RUF forces allied with them, moving from the bush towards towns where the AFRC was deployed. The RUF also established new positions throughout the north. RUF forces moved into Port Loko District, living amongst the civilian population. In Bombali District, they occupied a number of strategic locations. They also established a large base in Kambia District. At this time, the RUF/AFRC staged a sharp and brutal attack against the civilian population, including massive killings, abductions, rapes and other acts of severe violence; staged simultaneously across the whole country, every District would be affected to different degrees.

The RUF/AFRC immediately found itself in a tense standoff with Nigerian forces stationed in Freetown. Nigerian forces were reinforced by sea and air in the days following the coup. At the beginning of June, Nigerian forces attempted to unseat the RUF/AFRC but the operation was called off the day it had begun, when RUF/AFRC forces overpowered and briefly held hostage around 300 Nigerian soldiers. Nigerian forces took control of Freetown International Airport in the following days, although civilians were killed during exchanges of mortar fire between Nigerian and RUF/AFRC forces throughout the year.



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Throughout 1997, the RUF/AFRC appeared to have two closely related priorities. The first was to destroy the base of support for the CDF movement. The second was to consolidate their hold over the country and find ways of supporting their regime. Accordingly, the RUF/AFRC began suppressing political dissent, civil society and student activism in Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces in Freetown arrested many journalists, activists and demonstrators. Some were tortured and killed, others detained in freight containers and other places.

In June, the CDF rejected a call by the leadership of RUF/AFRC to demobilise and surrender their arms and register at Police Stations. Instead, the CDF retreated to strongholds where there was no previous SLA – now RUF/AFRC – deployment and commenced attacking combined AFRC and RUF positions. CDF forces in Bonthe District did not, however, go underground, as RUF/AFRC forces were concentrated in Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island and not on the mainland.

On the boundary between Kenema and Kailahun Districts, RUF/AFRC forces established a base known as “SS Camp” and used this to attack surrounding villages and towns in the hunt for “CDF collaborators”. Throughout the areas in which they were deployed, RUF/AFRC forces attacked civilian settlements and hunted through the bush for civilians, stealing any property they found. In general, screening systems were put in place, especially at checkpoints, where RUF/AFRC forces were searching civilians thoroughly for any evidence that they were supporters of the CDF. Such brutal tactics swelled the numbers of civilians willing to give active support and be initiated into the Kamajor Society.

In some places, more sophisticated methods of extracting support from civilians were put into place by the RUF/AFRC, including local tax administrations and systems allowing the regime to communicate demands to civilians less violently. Nevertheless, the number of “food-finding missions” ballooned, including such plainly-titled looting sprees as “Operation From your Hand to My Hand, from Your Pocket to my Pocket”. In Tonkolili District, RUF/AFRC forces concentrated their actions in the chiefdoms around Mile 91 and in the area around Magburaka, where they were strongly engaged by the CDF from the south and west of the District.

In Moyamba District, a CDF stronghold, the RUF/AFRC commenced an aggressive campaign, culminating in the attack on and week-long occupation of Moyamba Town in July 1997. RUF/AFRC forces perpetrated large scale violence against civilians in retaliation for the earlier rejection by civilians of SLA protection. Until CDF forces repelled the RUF/AFRC from Moyamba Junction, the Mile 91-Bo highway fell under RUF/AFRC control, evidenced by intense attacks on towns and their civilian inhabitants along the route. The mainland of Bonthe District remained under CDF control, but they were forced to move from Bonthe Town after the RUF/AFRC deployment in the town. Throughout 1997, RUF/AFRC forces occupied the diamond-rich areas of Kono District, continuing the established practice of forcing civilians to work in the mines.

In August 1997, ECOWAS imposed a trade and arms embargo on Sierra Leone and extended the mandate of their Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to cover sanctions enforcement in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG artillery and Alfa Jets began shelling vessels approaching Freetown’s Kissy Terminal; stray ECOMOG shells resulted in the deaths of civilians in Freetown’s densely populated



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east end. Eventually, ECOMOG and the RUF/AFRC negotiated a ceasefire in late October. This, however, did not hold firm and there were many breaches of the letter and spirit of the ceasefire agreement.

Starting in September 1997, having regrouped in villages and strongholds, CDF forces successfully launched attacks on RUF/AFRC positions. These actions would yield greater results in early 1998 with the inland advance of ECOMOG forces. In late December 1997, CDF forces intensified pressure on provincial RUF/AFRC positions by preventing civilian and military traffic from moving towards Freetown and vice versa. The consequences of "Operation Black December" – namely the deprivation of food and other supplies - were sharply felt in the towns of Bo, Kenema and Pujehun. From then until March 1998, the CDF would engage in a systematic attack against the civilian population, including massive killing of "RUF collaborators", the widespread use of small cages in which they imprisoned people and similar acts of brutality.

Between 6 and 12 February 1998, following renewed RUF/AFRC attacks on ECOMOG positions, ECOMOG forces invaded Freetown and gained control of the Western Area, forcing RUF/AFRC forces to retreat inland. From the Western Area, RUF/AFRC forces retreated along the main highway to Masiaka, where they split into three groups. The first headed directly towards Magburaka through Mile 91. The second group moved to Makeni (Bombali District) through Lunsar. These two groups would meet after 14 February and move to Kono District, occupying main towns along the route. The third group regrouped at a pre-existing RUF/AFRC base in Port Loko District and moved northwards into Kambia District. RUF/AFRC forces counter-attacked ECOMOG and CDF positions on the roads to Port Loko Town. All these groups left in their wake a trail of destruction, including the loss of civilian life and property.

The RUF/AFRC forces reaching Makeni and Magburaka moved into Kono District along two routes. One group moved along the main highway though southern Tonkolili District, enduring ambushes from CDF forces positioned along the route. The second group moved into Koinadugu District, both by the main highway through Foredugu and along a secondary road though Bumbuna, before moving south into Kono District.

By 21 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces had reasserted control over Koidu Town and its immediate environs. A large RUF/AFRC base known as "Superman Camp" was established in the east of Kono District and served as a training base through 1998 and 1999. Shortly after, RUF/AFRC forces scattered throughout the District and parts of the southern chiefdoms of Koinadugu District.

At the beginning of March, ECOMOG forces deployed from Port Loko and moved into towns throughout the Northern Province, following the retreating RUF/AFRC forces and reaching Lunsar, Magburaka, Masingbi and Makeni. By mid March, they had entered Kabala, Foredugu and Alikalia (Koinadugu District). In addition, by mid March, ECOMOG had also occupied the towns of Kamakwie (Bombali District), Falaba and Mongo Bendugu (Koinadugu District), which are the key access routes to the Guinean border for the entire Northern Province. ECOMOG forces also



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deployed from Guinea to Kambia Town. Throughout their deployment, ECOMOG forces were assisted by CDF members in patrolling these areas.

From the southern entry point, ECOMOG moved directly north and in early February entered Kenema Town, which had been deserted by RUF/AFRC forces a few days earlier. Since December 1997, CDF forces had undermined RUF/AFRC control over Kenema District. Shortly after entering Kenema Town, ECOMOG and CDF forces overran SS Camp. By March 1998, the RUF/AFRC had retreated from Kenema District entirely, although in April they made a few minor incursions from Kailahun District.

As ECOMOG forces coming from Kenema Town retook Bo Town from the RUF/AFRC in early March, CDF forces dislodged the RUF/AFRC from Pujehun District. RUF/AFRC forces withdrew from Sherbro Island in the days following the ECOMOG intervention, leaving the District entirely under the control of the CDF (Kamajors). From Bo Town, ECOMOG deployed in Mile 91, where they engaged in patrolling the area, assisted by the CDF. By March 1998, the entire Southern Province was free of the presence of RUF/AFRC forces and would remain so throughout the year, although RUF/AFRC forces retreating from Freetown who went through the Northern Province towards Makeni and ultimately Koidu Town made a few rapid incursions into the north of Moyamba District. Nevertheless, the level of violence inflicted upon civilians and those alleged to have collaborated with the RUF/AFRC heightened in 1998 since CDF forces, primarily Kamajors, were unchallenged throughout this Province and in most of Kenema District. The CDF progressively exercised greater control over civilian life, replacing both State and traditional structures with their own invasive and largely arbitrary system of administration.

By April, ECOMOG units attacked and occupied Koidu Town and other major towns on the main highway, forcing the RUF/AFRC further into Kono District. ECOMOG forces based in Kenema Town, together with SLA and CDF forces, reinforced the Moa Barracks at Daru and other positions in the south of Kailahun District. Between March and May, RUF/AFRC forces attacked these positions as ECOMOG Jets attacked the RUF/AFRC headquarters in Buedu, in the far east of Kailahun District.

Following their ejection from Freetown and the commencement of ECOMOG provincial operations, RUF/AFRC forces launched "Operation Pay Yourself". In all the areas passed through or occupied while retreating from the Western Area, RUF/AFRC forces stole civilian property. Between mid February and mid March, towns and villages throughout the entire Northern Province and, to a limited extent, the north of Moyamba District were attacked. RUF/AFRC forces took anything that could be of use, from livestock and other food items, domestic items such as mattresses and cooking pots and motor vehicles, trucks and motorcycles. Although looting had been standard practice throughout the previous RUF campaigns and "food-finding missions" had been commonplace since 1992, the scale and intensity of "Operation Pay Yourself" was unprecedented in Sierra Leone.

A heightened level of violence against civilians accompanied "Operation Pay Yourself". Shortly after the reinstatement of the exiled Sierra Leonean President on 10 March 1998, RUF/AFRC forces



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launched “Operation No Living Thing”. During a period running from February to June, in locations across Sierra Leone, but primarily in Kono District, hundreds of civilians were killed, or had limbs amputated and hundreds of women were raped. This operation marked a specific period of military activity during which the scale and intensity of violence against civilians in Sierra Leone was elevated to new and unprecedented levels. Thousands of civilians in Kono District were abducted and brought into the mining areas in the western part of the District to work, many of them dying as a result of the squalid living conditions.

From April to early December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces in Kambia, Koinadugu and Bombali Districts expanded the territory over which they had control and consolidated their positions in some areas in Tonkolili District. A striking feature of this period in 1998 was how ineffective CDF forces and other civil militia groups in Bombali and Koinadugu Districts were compared to their high concentration and success in the Southern and Eastern Provinces and, to a lesser extent, in the south and west of Moyamba District. In those areas where ECOMOG cooperated with what groups did exist and CDF forces deployed alongside them, their forces often had success in holding rural outposts, gaining good intelligence and extending their influence throughout smaller settlements in the surrounding bush. There are episodes, however, indicating that ECOMOG was reluctant to leave main fortified positions, or support others in so doing, thereby handing RUF/AFRC forces immeasurable advantages.

In Koinadugu District, RUF/AFRC forces gradually expanded their activity around the two main roads arcing in towards Kabala from the south of the District, while at the same time moving fluidly through bush areas bypassing ECOMOG positions and continuing their operations without needing recourse to main roads and tracks. A strong ECOMOG and SLA presence in Kabala guaranteed that the RUF/AFRC never captured Kabala for more than five days in late July 1998, despite many attacks during the course of 1998. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC placed all other major towns in the District under constant pressure, offering RUF/AFRC forces easy access to the area surrounding Kabala Town and influence over the arterial roads leading to it. ECOMOG forces were prevented from moving south, pre-empting any attempt to reinforce or counter-attack from Kabala.

In Bombali District, the RUF/AFRC adopted a similar strategy. They expanded their territorial hold and continued the occupation of towns to east of Makeni Town, thereby controlling the major east-west axis roads through the District. Throughout November, RUF/AFRC advanced closer to Makeni Town. Additionally, they secured control over a main latitudinal road, which gave the RUF/AFRC free access to the eastern boundary of Port Loko District.

In Port Loko District, RUF/AFRC forces intensified activity to the north of Port Loko Town between May and November 1998, with the formation of large looting squads and the gradual encroachment on Port Loko Town. ECOMOG forces based in the town were reinforced by CDF from numerous locations. CDF forces proved effective in Port Loko District, creating with ECOMOG a defensive arc around the north of Port Loko Town that prevented RUF/AFRC forces infiltrating southwards from Kambia District. During this period, RUF/AFRC forces attacked many villages in the south of the District. As for Tonkolili District, CDF continued engaging the RUF/AFRC forces concentrated in the north-west of the District. A massive IDP camp hosting



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thousands of civilians fleeing fighting in Kono District was opened in Masingbi in the west of the District.

In mid April, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 10-strong team of military and security observers to Sierra Leone, who arrived in May 1998. The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), comprising around 70 military observers and accompanying logistic support, was established on 13 July 1998.

In October 1998, a splinter group of the RUF/AFRC comprised primarily of ex-SLA members commenced operations in the Okra Hills area in the south of Port Loko District. The “West Side Boys”, as they later became known, staged “hit and run” attacks on a large number of villages in the area that would continue until April 1999, with a lull in January and February when the West Side Boys were in Freetown. During this period, the West Side Boys systematically killed civilians, stole property and burnt houses. In addition, they ambushed civilian and military traffic on the main highway to Masiaka, often making the road impassable.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked ECOMOG forces in Masiaka (Port Loko District), and Kamalo, in the north of Bombali District in November 1998. These preparations would put the logs beneath the stones of a large-scale RUF/AFRC action in December. Kono Town was overrun by RUF/AFRC forces on 20 December 1998, beginning a chain of attacks across the Northern Province that culminated in the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999. These would be accompanied by massive violence systematically inflicted on the civilian population in all areas in which the RUF/AFRC had a presence. While retreating south from Koidu, ECOMOG left with thousands of civilians, hundreds of whom were abducted by the RUF/AFRC during ambushes on convoys.

On 21 December, RUF/AFRC forces from Port Loko District attacked Songo and Mile 38 and moved into Waterloo – the gateway to Freetown – by 22 December. This foothold was reinforced over the following days, as RUF/AFRC forces began moving from Kono District on 21 December. RUF/AFRC forces advanced from Koidu towards Magburaka and Makeni, taking control of both towns by 24 December. The attack from Magburaka was coordinated with attacks on Makeni from RUF/AFRC positions immediately north-east of the town. ECOMOG was forced to retreat north to Kamakwie, which by 28 December would also be in RUF/AFRC hands.

RUF/AFRC forces continued the westwards movement from Makeni directly to Port Loko Town, where they were supplemented by RUF/AFRC forces already in Port Loko District and prepared for the assault. From 28 December 1998 until 3 January 1999, they launched a sustained attack from three directions on ECOMOG forces stationed in Port Loko Town. Meanwhile, on 30 December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces in Kailahun District moved from their headquarters in Buedu and successfully forced SLA and ECOMOG units out of the town of Segbwema. This move was undertaken to pre-empt any possible counter-attack on Freetown from SLA and ECOMOG forces based at the Moa Barracks in Daru. In mid January, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Mile 91, blocking the highway leading to Freetown and pre-empting any ECOMOG counter-attack.



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After staging a number of preliminary attacks on towns west of Waterloo in the Western Area, RUF/AFRC forces advanced on Freetown. On 6 January, RUF/AFRC entered the eastern end of Freetown and advanced into the centre. On the first day, RUF/AFRC forces released 700 inmates from Pademba Road Prison. During their advance in the capital, hundreds of civilians were killed, mutilated or raped in the eastern end of Freetown. At night, in the Freetown suburbs held by the RUF/AFRC, civilians were forced to gather in the streets and sing songs about peace in support of the RUF/AFRC. Others were burned alive in their homes. Behind ECOMOG lines, civilians were gathered in the National Stadium and screened; a number were lined up against the walls and shot dead by ECOMOG forces. The westward movement of RUF/AFRC forces into Freetown was halted by ECOMOG at the Congo Cross Road Bridge on Freetown's Main Motor Road, held by ECOMOG, SLA and CDF forces. By 9 January, unable to advance further into the Freetown urban area and under constant attack from ECOMOG Alpha Jets, the RUF/AFRC were forced to retreat gradually from Freetown back towards Waterloo.

In the following days, ECOMOG forces pushed the RUF/AFRC out of the Greater Freetown Area. During the retreat, RUF/AFRC destroyed much of the State infrastructure in the centre of town, killed and mutilated civilians and burnt down many houses. RUF/AFRC forces held firm in Waterloo until late February and remained in control of Masiaka and Mile 91. The towns of Lunsar and Magburaka, however, remained under firm RUF/AFRC control for much longer.

Following the assault on Freetown, the RUF/AFRC clearly concentrated their actions on mining activities, strengthening their positions in the Northern Province and planning actions to take place on Guinean territory. At this time, the RUF/AFRC commenced a large defensive operation, at the heart of which was their continuing occupation of Makeni and Kono District. The RUF/AFRC defensive headquarters was also moved to Makeni at that time. Between February and July 1999, RUF/AFRC forces consolidated their positions as of December 1998 and expanded their control over Kambia District. The RUF/AFRC's strength throughout the Northern Province guaranteed a strong hand during the peace negotiations that started in the aftermath of the Freetown invasion.

Across the Northern Province and Kono District, RUF/AFRC forces devised methods of rationalising the use of civilians by making them participate in their own administration. Throughout Koinadugu, Bombali and Kambia Districts, RUF/AFRC commanders selected individuals to form committees of "G-5" civil-military intermediaries, communicating RUF/AFRC demands for food and human resources to local communities. The G-5 committees administered the collection of house and trade taxes, food and other financial contributions from the civilian population to the RUF/AFRC. In western Tonkolili District, civilians were required to register with the RUF/AFRC military police. Unregistered civilians were deemed "CDF collaborators" and were flogged, fined or killed. However, G-5 committees proved to be inadequate in providing enough subsistence resources for the combined RUF/AFRC forces, and "food-finding missions" again proliferated through the Northern Province. In a cynical irony, the same commanders that supported the G-5 system by ordering their subordinates to cease looting and theft also ordered the commission of food-finding missions, again increasing the levels of violence inflicted on civilians. Facing shortages, RUF/AFRC forces raided trade fairs in Guinean towns just over the border from Kambia District, prompting the Guinean armed forces to bombard suspected RUF/AFRC positions in the District.



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In late January 1999, SLA forces deployed in Bumbuna, a town in the north of Tonkolili District. This brought a limited amount of relief to the civilian population who quickly converged on the town. The area surrounding Bumbuna remained under RUF/AFRC control, although Kamajors from the south of the District continually attacked this concentration of RUF/AFRC forces. This fighting led to the substantial destruction of much of the central chiefdoms of Tonkolili District.

CDF forces strengthened their deployment in Port Loko District, where they established a recruitment and training centre, and the south of Tonkolili District. CDF forces directed excesses of violence at civilians as a means of encouraging the creation of more Gbethi Societies in the District, as people frequently joined in order to avoid harassment by the CDF. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Port Loko Town in May 1999. In April 1999, CDF, SLA and ECOMOG forces retook control of Mile 91, which rapidly saw the influx of thousands of civilians from the areas around Makeni and Magburaka.

In the north of Kenema District, the RUF/AFRC retook control of Tongo Field, the most important diamond mining area in the District. CDF forces continually attacked RUF positions in Tongo Field, but did not disrupt mining operations. South-east of Tongo Field, RUF/AFRC forces maintained a hold over Segbwema (Kailahun District), denying the CDF, ECOMOG and the SLA the opportunity of moving north into Kono District from Moa Barracks. The RUF/AFRC diamond mining office was established in Koakuima, to the immediate south of Koidu. All diamonds mined by RUF/AFRC operations were trafficked through Koakuima onto their final destinations. Throughout 1999, hundreds of civilians from Kono District who had not fled into neighbouring Guinea were abducted to work in the mining areas of the District. RUF/AFRC forces continued to inflict physical violence on civilians, although on a lower scale than in 1998. Throughout RUF/AFRC-occupied areas of Sierra Leone, civilians were forcibly transported into Kono District to work in the mines.

In Koinadugu District, RUF/AFRC intensified gold mining operations in Diang Chiefdom, at the same time putting pressure on the SLA Brigade stationed at the strategic hydroelectric plant in nearby Bumbuna (Tonkolili District). RUF/AFRC forces had unimpeded access along all main roads in Koinadugu District, surrounding Kabala Town completely. RUF/AFRC brigade headquarters were established in Kayima, in Kono District and in Gberifeh (Koinadugu District) splitting between them responsibility for administering the expansive Neini Chiefdom.

The RUF/AFRC divided Bombali District into two, establishing headquarters in Makeni for the south and Kamakwie for the north. The intermediate territory remained under complete RUF/AFRC control. The RUF/AFRC began conscripting large numbers of able-bodied men in Bombali and Tonkolili Districts, in part due to CDF attacks on Magburaka Town. The RUF/AFRC increased their control over the northern chiefdoms of Bombali District, crossing the Little Scarcies River and establishing stronger supply lines by land through to Kambia Town, which was occupied completely in February 1999. The RUF/AFRC's increasing hold over Kambia District was sealed with the establishment of additional RUF/AFRC bases and a brigade headquarter in the District. The RUF/AFRC also occupied many of the wharf towns on the Great Scarcies River, thereby



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controlling a valuable economic and strategic asset. ECOMOG forces created checkpoints on main roads leading to Kambia Town, but this did little to prevent the RUF/AFRC moving freely throughout the District.

Throughout 1999, the West Side Boys raided villages located on each side of the Rokel Creek in Koya and Maforki Chiefdoms (Port Loko District). Initially operating from a base in the densely forested Okra Hills inside Koya Chiefdom, the West Side Boys opened a new base on the other bank of the Rokel Creek in Maforki Chiefdom.

Except for brief “food-finding missions” carried out by RUF/AFRC units into parts of northern Moyamba District, the CDF hold over Moyamba, Bonthe, Pujehun, Bo and most of Kenema Districts, bar the mining area in the north, remained unchallenged.

Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (Lomé Peace Agreement). Shortly after the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, the main RUF/AFRC training centre at Camp Superman (Kono District) was supplanted by a new one in Gbendembu Town, north of Makeni. This was primarily to train conscripts for missions into Guinea.

After a few months, however, hostilities resumed in Bombali District, with the RUF/AFRC attacking civilians. Internal divisions within the RUF/AFRC created following the retreat from Freetown heightened, resulting in violent confrontations between the senior commanders of the combined movement as the disarmament process grew nearer. To a certain extent, the RUF and the remnants of the AFRC started controlling different parts of the country. In Kailahun District, disagreements over disarmament between the RUF leader and the most senior RUF officer resulted in the flight of the latter to Liberia.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) commenced deployment in late November 1999 and by 10 January, 4,500 UNAMSIL troops were present in Sierra Leone. The UNAMSIL force was initially deployed alongside ECOMOG forces and was gradually reinforced as the United Nations Security Council expanded the size of the mission.

Despite the official launching of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program by the Sierra Leonean President in Freetown on 4 November 1999 and a nationwide sensitisation tour conducted by the leaders of the RUF, the AFRC and the CDF, hostilities rapidly resumed. The CDF in Kono District engaged the RUF/AFRC forces in the north and east of the country but failed to impact upon the strongly embedded RUF/AFRC forces, who retained their positions in the north of Tonkolili District and in the areas bordering Bombali and Port Loko Districts.

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In early May 2000 and following the withdrawal of the last Nigerian ECOMOG contingent, RUF forces launched a number of attacks against UNAMSIL peacekeepers in Kambia, Port Loko, Tonkolili, Bombali and Kailahun Districts, leading to the taking of around 500 UN peacekeepers as hostages. Following the capture of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers, RUF forces first advanced southwest along the main highway towards Masiaka and Songo, unsuccessfully attempting to occupy the towns. As these events unfolded, the bodyguards of the RUF leader fired on a crowd of thousands of civilians gathered around his home in Freetown, killing around 20 people. The RUF leader was later captured in Freetown and detained by the Government of Sierra Leone. RUF/AFRC forces then attacked Port Loko Town, but were repelled by UNAMSIL and SLA forces. UK armed forces arrived in Freetown to provide security for the Freetown area and, in the following months, to retrain the SLA. By the middle of July, the RUF/AFRC had released all the UNAMSIL peacekeepers it had previously captured. The SLA also staged a number of counter-attacks, attempting to retake Lunsar and using a helicopter gunship to bombard RUF/AFRC positions in and around the major towns of Makeni, Magburaka and Rokupr and other locations in the Northern Province, resulting in civilian casualties.

On 30 August, 11 UK Royal Marines were taken hostage by the West Side Boys in the Okra Hills area. Following a breakdown in negotiations, UK paratroops rescued the hostages in September 2000, practically destroying this volatile splinter group in the process.

Starting in July, the hostilities had become sporadic and in August 2000, RUF/AFRC forces surrendered to UN peacekeepers in Kabala. The disarmament process continued, although the RUF/AFRC were still engaged in mining activities, mainly in the centre of Koidu Town.

In May 2000, RUF forces in Kono District started engaging Guinean forces in the Guinean area known as "The Parrot's Beak", using the hundreds of civilians they had abducted and trained during the previous months. In early September 2000, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Guinean towns of Pamelap and Madina Oula and carried out similar actions in the Parrot's Beak area from Kailahun District. Throughout September and October, Guinean forces also adopted a "hot pursuit" policy, in which RUF bases inside Sierra Leone along the Guinean-Sierra Leonean border were directly attacked in addition to the pursuit of RUF/AFRC forces from inside Guinea. This was manifested through intensified artillery and helicopter gunship bombardment of towns just south of the border in Sierra Leone, resulting in many civilian casualties and in the large-scale displacement of the population, mainly Sierra Leoneans who had found refuge in Guinea. Guinean armed forces also moved their security checks three miles inside the territory of Sierra Leone in Bombali District and erected some checkpoints in Kailahun District. RUF/AFRC forces nevertheless continued to attack Pamelap and Guinean infantry and airborne operations against RUF/AFRC positions in Kambia District continued into 2001.

Representatives of the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone met in Abuja, Nigeria, to negotiate the reactivation of the ceasefire and peace agreement signed in Lomé in July 1999. The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 November 2000. In December 2000, RUF forces went to Guinea to bring back Sierra Leonean refugees as a proof of their commitment to the peace process. By January 2001, thousands of Sierra Leoneans were thus brought back to the east of Kono District,



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where they were relocated by the RUF to different towns across RUF territory. Harassment, however, continued and many civilians were sent to Koidu to work in the mines.

In the first three months of 2001, RUF/AFRC forces entered into negotiations with UNAMSIL. This resulted in the opening of a number of key stretches of road leading into Kambia and Bombali Districts and the eventual deployment of UNAMSIL peacekeepers throughout those areas.

In March and April 2001, Donsos and Kamajors who had sought refuge in Guinea were armed by Guinean authorities and launched successful attacks on RUF forces in the east of Kono District, thereby opening three flanks in Kono and Kailahun Districts. They were, however, prevented from entering Koidu Town when the RUF requested the intervention of UNAMSIL to remind the CDF of the terms of the successive ceasefire agreements.

The November 2000 ceasefire was renewed in Abuja on 4 May 2001 and it was agreed that an accelerated disarmament should be carried out on a District-based level. To this end, disarmament was to take place successively and simultaneously in two Districts. The DDR program started in Kambia and Port Loko Districts, where in May 2001, reception centres were opened. In Port Loko District, the DDR process was accompanied by sporadic looting of civilian settlements by demobilised members of all factions. The stealing of corrugated zinc roofing material from houses was commonplace. Nevertheless, disarmament continued across the country throughout 2001; the last two Districts to be disarmed were Kailahun and Kenema. Mining activities would continue in Kono District until the last days of the disarmament.

Following disarmament and demobilisation of members of all the different fighting factions, the Sierra Leonean President declared that the war was over and held a symbolic "Arms Burning Ceremony" at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom, Port Loko District) on 18 January 2002.



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
Chapter Three: Overview of Armed Forces Involved in the Sierra Leone Conflict

1. Fighting factions

a. The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF)

The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) is commonly known and referred to as the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). When RUF/NPFL forces commenced military operations in the south and east of Sierra Leone in March 1991, the SLA was under-staffed, under-equipped and often poorly trained. The SLA had three battalions deployed in the Eastern and Southern Provinces.

Until 2002, when the Government of Sierra Leone embarked on significant military reforms, the senior hierarchy of the SLA was as follows:



Army Branch forces below Army Chief of Staff were and are divided into brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and sections, with a conventional officer and non-commissioned officer ranking hierarchy. In addition to barracks in provincial Sierra Leone, the SLA has a number of major installations in the Western Area, including the Defence Headquarters at Cockerill and the Armed Forces Training Centre near Waterloo.

From the beginning of the war in 1991, the SLA did not engage RUF forces unaccompanied. In addition to ad-hoc civilian security initiatives and local militias, including those evolved from traditional hunting societies throughout Sierra Leone, the SLA fought alongside foreign forces primarily from other West African countries at different times throughout the conflict. This foreign involvement was also expressed through the provision of logistics, resources, military training and guidance to the SLA. As the war progressed, the SLA collaborated with a Liberian fighting force engaged in the Liberian conflict called ULIMO and a selection of international private military companies, including the Gurkha Security Guards and Executive Outcomes. In 1992, a contingent of the SLA made up part of the ECOMOG peacekeeping forces in Liberia.



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On two occasions during the 11-year conflict, in 1992 and in 1997, members of the SLA overthrew the Government of Sierra Leone, establishing military regimes in its place. The two juntas were very different in nature. On 29 April 1992, junior officers of the SLA came to Freetown to complain about the desperate situation on the war front. They successfully staged a coup, ousting the then President and the All People's Congress (APC) establishment. They created the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), swearing in 25 year-old Captain Strasser as Head of State. Shortly after the coup, SLA members looted civilian property in major centres, particularly in Freetown and the Western Area. In December 1992, SLA members suspected of having planned a coup were convicted of treason and executed, resulting in international condemnation of the NPRC. The NPRC engaged in an extensive recruitment drive, more than doubling the number of infantry available to the SLA by 1994. New recruits received only summary military training before being sent to the front lines and were unable to contain the RUF advance across the country, despite initial successes in 1993.

The swelling of the SLA ranks was accompanied by some breakdowns in discipline, compounding many of the problems already caused by the dramatic subversion of the traditional military hierarchy by junior officers. SLA attacks against civilians, including theft and summary executions of suspected RUF "collaborators" and the SLA's inability to protect civilians from RUF attacks led to a profound deterioration in civil-military relations. Many called the SLA "So-bels", or "Soldier-Rebels", noting that in some cases there was little to distinguish the two. The NPRC regime came to an end with the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in February and March 1996, during which the leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) was elected President of Sierra Leone.

Just over a year later, on 25 May 1997, SLA officers staged a military coup, ousting the Sierra Leonean President and establishing a military regime called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The elected Government moved into Guinea. Unlike the NPRC, the AFRC chose not to fight the RUF; rather, the AFRC Chairman — Johnny Paul Koroma — called upon the RUF leadership to join the AFRC regime, which they promptly did. The majority of the SLA aligned with the AFRC, but some "loyal SLA" retained an allegiance to the elected Government. As the coup was driven by non-commissioned officers, most of the senior SLA officers who did not want to take part in the new regime went into hiding, chased by AFRC members. This military regime was ousted from power in February 1998 by an ECOMOG military intervention.

The situation of the SLA became a priority for the Sierra Leonean President after his reinstatement on 10 March 1998. During a presidential address delivered on 22 May 1998, President Kabbah revealed he had appointed the former ECOMOG Task Force Commander as Chief of Defence Staff to "use his wide experience in helping [Sierra Leone] to develop guidelines for putting together a new army."¹⁵ Two months later, the disbanding of the "unpatriotic Army" was announced.¹⁶ The

¹⁵ Presidential address delivered on the occasion of the State Opening of the Second Session of the First Parliament of the Second Republic of Sierra Leone, 22 May 1998: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/kabbah052298.html>.

¹⁶ Statement of the Sierra Leonean President at the Special United Nations Conference on Sierra Leone held at the United Nations, New York, 30 July 1998.



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framework of the new army, composed of 5,000 members was announced to Sierra Leoneans in early September.¹⁷ Newly trained SLA members began fighting alongside ECOMOG forces. Earlier in the year, former SLA members were hastily retrained by ECOMOG forces and absorbed into the ECOMOG force structure to help fight the retreating RUF/AFRC forces in the Provinces.¹⁸

In the middle of 2000 and at the request of the Sierra Leonean Government, the United Kingdom started providing assistance in the “national restructuring exercise” of the SLA by providing advice and training.¹⁹ UK forces carried out a series of six-week basic training courses for around eight battalions of the SLA.²⁰ The 180-strong team began arriving in Freetown on 10 June 2000,²¹ dovetailing with the withdrawal of the Royal Marines after 15 June 2000.²² On 24 July, nearly 1,000 SLA members graduated from the UK-run training course,²³ the first group of a total of around 8,000 who would eventually be trained this way. SLA forces again began to participate in combat actions against the RUF/AFRC in mid 2000.

Following the initial rounds of UK short-term training programs, a UK-led long-term International Military and Training Team (IMATT) was established to push a wider process of military reform. In 2002, the SLA was renamed Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) and the separate army, navy, and air force command structures were restructured.²⁴

b. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) commenced attacks inside Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991, at which time little information about the RUF was available to the public. The RUF finds its origins in a movement to overthrow the regime of the All People’s Congress (APC). In an internal RUF document written in the early stage of the conflict and entitled “Reasons Why We Took Up Arms to Fight”, it is stated that, “We are fighting against corruption, because the past and present government seized political, economic and social justice in this country”.²⁵ In 1991, the RUF was composed of around 230 members. These included former Fourah Bay College students, political opponents of the APC, former members of the SLA and other public figures that considered themselves victims of the APC regime. The majority were trained in Liberia at Camp Namma,

¹⁷ See point 10 of the Broadcast to the Nation on Peace and Security by the Sierra Leonean President.

¹⁸ The ECOMOG 128th Infantry Battalion was created to remedy the ECOMOG personnel shortage in their “mopping up operations” in the province and was mainly composed of former SLA members: Brig. Gen. R. A. Adeshina: *The Reversed Victory: Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc., pp. 66-7.

¹⁹ Address by the Sierra Leone President at the Pass Off Ceremony for the First 1000 Military Personnel, under the UK Short-term Training Program, Benguema Training Centre, 22 July 2000.

²⁰ The UK Military handed over to the UK-led International Military and Advisory Training Team (IMATT) in September 2001.

²¹ BBC Online News, 10 June 2000 (19:28 GMT 20:28 UK).

²² IRIN West Africa, 14 June 2000.

²³ IRIN West Africa, 24 July 2000.

²⁴ IRIN West Africa, 22 January 2002. See also the speech of the Sierra Leone President at the Opening of the New Defence Ministry Building, Tower Hill, Freetown, 21 January 2002.

²⁵ See also the RUF’s manifesto, *The Footpaths to Democracy, Towards a new Sierra Leone*. For a full text of this manifesto, see <http://www.sierra-leone.org/documents.html#RUF>.



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
although eight of the original members – referred to as “vanguards” – were trained in warfare and the “ideology”²⁶ in Libya. RUF numbers swelled rapidly following their entry into Sierra Leone.

At first, many civilians joined the RUF voluntarily, seeing it as a solution to corruption and poverty. Nevertheless, the RUF commenced abducting and conscripting civilians shortly after, a practice that continued throughout the conflict. The RUF conscripted thousands of Sierra Leoneans of all ages and of both sexes to be trained as fighters at large training bases. These were opened from time to time depending on the state of the RUF advance, on the number of new conscripts and recruits and on the logistic support available. While one senior RUF officer was responsible for the opening of bases and the provision of training, this did not stop other, smaller training bases from being opened under localised commands. When the RUF needed “manpower” for planned actions, RUF members known as “Safari Teams” were sent to the villages to bring back civilians in accordance with pre-agreed figures. Children under the age of 15 were abducted, conscripted and trained to operate as Small Boy Units (SBU) and Small Girl Units (SGU). Adults were organised into platoons and trained. Instructors in the training bases were responsible for providing training on drill, military tactics, weapons and ideology, among other things.

The NPFL clearly supported and even controlled, to an extent, RUF operations in Sierra Leone. NPFL members fought alongside RUF forces and the NPFL provided logistical support to the RUF as a whole. When they first entered Sierra Leone and during the early stage of the conflict, NPFL members, who not only outnumbered the RUF but also held most of the commanding positions, dominated the RUF forces. Although the NPFL withdrew from Sierra Leone in 1993, links with the NPFL and its leader were never severed completely.

Following the SLA coup in May 1997, the AFRC invited the RUF to join the regime. RUF forces joined with and strengthened AFRC positions throughout areas of Sierra Leone that the SLA had previously controlled. RUF members held ministerial positions in the Council of the AFRC and the movement re-branded itself the “Peoples’ Army”.

From the beginning of the movement, the RUF, whose leader was a retired signals corporal from the SLA, adopted a military-style internal organisation and disciplinary system, with clearly identified positions and tasks allocated to its members:



²⁶

Battle Group Commander (BGC)

 Battle Front Line Commander or Inspector

Draft Conflict Mapping Report

9 March 2004



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The BFC moved between front lines depending on to the battles in preparation and ongoing military activity, while the BGC remained in the rear at headquarters. The BGC's primary function was to take care of logistics, under the orders of the BFC. The Battle Front Line Commander moved between the front lines according to logistical needs. RUF forces were divided into brigades,²⁷ battalions, companies, platoons and sections. A section was composed of 8 to 10 combatants and five sections made a platoon. A platoon was composed of 30 or more combatants and five platoons made a company. A company was composed of 100 or more combatants and five companies, plus an administrative one, made a battalion. A battalion comprised around 1,000 combatants; three battalions made one brigade.

Representatives from specific supporting units were attached at battalion level. The G-5 Unit was responsible for coordinating relations between combatants and civilians, including the collection of taxation and food contributions from civilians. G-5 was also responsible for disseminating political ideology. The Army Agricultural Unit was to take care of all farming and food production in the battalion. The S-4 Unit was responsible for the storage and distribution of food and was battalion quartermaster. The Intelligence Office Unit was responsible for monitoring all operations within the battalion and for sending intelligence reports to headquarters. The Combat Medic Unit was responsible for all medical affairs and the health for everybody in the battalion. The G-4 Unit took care of all arms and ammunitions. Armoury was a sub-unit and was responsible for the maintenance of all arms. The Logistics and Motor Pool was responsible for the maintenance of all mechanical and vehicular equipment in the battalion. The Signal Unit was responsible for internal and external communications. The Military Police (MP) Unit was responsible for disciplinary actions and, therefore, for the maintenance and enforcement of law and order. Military Police (MP) also escorted prisoners and were attached to brigades, battalions and companies. The Internal Defence Unit was responsible for all necessary investigations in the battalion and also served as a link between the G-5 and other operational units.

When they entered Sierra Leone in 1991, the RUF established a headquarters in Pendembu (Kailahun District), where they remained until 1993 when SLA forces retook the town. From 1994 until they joined the AFRC in Freetown, the RUF leader was not settled in one place but was generally mobile.²⁸ When the RUF joined with the AFRC in Freetown, the high command established headquarters in Freetown in the Defence Headquarter at Cockerill. Following the retreat from Freetown in February 1998, a War Office was opened in Buedu (Kailahun District, on the border with Liberia). This was the administrative headquarter, the permanent radio base and the

²⁷ Growing rapidly after the first attack in March 1991, the RUF had one and a half brigade. Following the retreat from Freetown in 1998, the RUF had three brigades, one in Kailahun District, one in Kono District and one in Bombali District.

²⁸ During this period, it is not completely clear whether the RUF retained a headquarters as such and if it existed, where it was located.



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base for one of the most senior RUF officers. Important meetings involving the senior RUF command took place in Buedu until disarmament in 2001. The RUF defensive headquarter was moved as RUF forces captured towns, but remained in Makeni (Bombali District) from 1999. As the RUF's positions stabilised following the general retreat from Freetown in 1999, the territory under their control was subdivided further and a number of brigade headquarters were established.

The appointments of the most senior officers within the movement were approved personally by the RUF leader. Some appointments were approved by the Liberian President, in particular when the RUF leader was in custody in Nigeria in 1997 and then Sierra Leone in 1998. When the RUF leader was again arrested after the 8 May 2000 events,²⁹ the then Battle Field Commander was made Interim Leader and would take instructions directly from the Liberian President.

The RUF set up a disciplinary system to deal with offences committed by its members. When an RUF member committed an offence, he or she was sent to the Military Police (MP), which would obtain a statement and issue a report. When the offence reached a certain level of severity, the MP had to refer the matter to the General Staff Officer Class One (GSO1),³⁰ who in turned would convene a Board of Investigation. The report of the Board of Investigation would then be sent to the RUF leader or the most senior RUF officer,³¹ who would be responsible for taking appropriate measures, including recommending that a court martial be conducted. For minor offences, local commanders were vested with certain powers to conduct investigations and administer punishment in line with the gravity of the offences committed. Most of the time, commanders settled cases at the front line without going through the proper channels. The senior officers in charge of the RUF were allegedly aware of this conduct, but did not intervene to deter it. During the 11-year conflict, very few courts martial were conducted.³²

c. National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL)

The National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) emerged in the neighbouring country of Liberia in 1989. The NPFL's aim was to oust the Liberian President, who had been in power since 1980 and whose regime was accused of being corrupt and excessively tribalistic. Backed up by foreign

²⁹ On 8 May 2000, a crowd gathered outside the Freetown residence of the RUF leader to protest the resumption of hostilities in Sierra Leone and the taking hostage of UN peacekeepers by RUF forces. RUF bodyguards fired on the crowd, killing around 20. The RUF leader was detained by the Sierra Leone Police on 17 May and was subsequently held in custody.

³⁰ As an example of the structuring of the RUF, the functions given to the GSO1 were as follows: to maintain an ongoing roadmap or prepare a yearly forecast of events concerning general training, including bush camps, recreational sports, ceremonial parades and the planning and implementation of training courses; maintenance of a list of all courses to be undertaken by RUF members throughout the year; to maintain a manifest of the seniority of officers and senior NCO's in the RUF for promotions; appointments and reversions; to request course bids based on existing vacancies for various courses stating educational qualifications required; to be in charge of general discipline; and to post officers.

³¹ Depending on the period, it was sent to the RUF leader, to the Battle Field Commander, or to the officer who later became the Interim Leader.

³² For example, a Board of Investigation was seized of a case involving a senior RUF officer who allegedly diverted some Guinean currency and failed to give it to the movement. The Board investigated some of the most senior RUF officers.



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countries, the NPFL movement rapidly expanded its actions across the country towards Monrovia, the capital. In August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent to Monrovia a peacekeeping force known as the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG established a rear base near Freetown's International Airport in Lungi. In September 1990, the President was arrested, tortured, killed and his body paraded through Monrovia by an NPFL splinter group called the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). An Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was formed in November 1990. Despite a reconciliation accord signed in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, between the President of the IGNU and the NPFL leader in October 1991, fighting continued in Liberia. In March 1991, the NPFL assisted the RUF in launching its "revolution"³³ in Sierra Leone. NPFL members started fighting alongside the small RUF force. The strength and involvement of NPFL forces in Sierra Leone would decline over the subsequent years owing to the emergence of the United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), a counter-revolutionary force comprised of supporters of the late President. The NPFL's physical withdrawal from Sierra Leone did not, however, lead to the withdrawal of the NPFL's active support for the RUF.

In March 1994, pursuant to the Cotonou Agreement signed in July 1993 between the NPFL, ULIMO and the Interim Government of National Unity, a tripartite Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG), headed by a five-seat Council of State replaced the IGNU. The three signatories each obtained one seat in the Council of State. Hostilities continued in Liberia and a splinter group of the NPFL, the NPFL-Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC) emerged and formed a coalition with the ULIMO-J. Following a new peace agreement signed in Abuja, Nigeria in August 1995, a new six seat Council of State was established, and the coalition obtained a seat in the Council.³⁴ Pursuant to a peace accord signed between the same fighting factions in August 1996 – referred to as Abuja II – disarmament started and in February 1997, the various groups were disbanded. In July 1997, Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held in Liberia; the NPFL leader was elected President of Liberia, his National Patriotic Party also winning a majority of seats in the National Assembly.

d. United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)

The United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), mainly composed of former members of the Liberian Armed Forces (AFL) and other refugees who had found refuge in Sierra Leone and who were supporters of the late Liberian President, emerged in 1991 as an opposing force to the NPFL. In September 1991, ULIMO forces attacked NPFL forces in the west of Liberia, using Sierra Leonean territory as a staging point. ULIMO rapidly started fighting alongside the SLA to push the combined RUF/NPFL assault back into Liberia.

Over the subsequent years, the existence of this fighting force would be punctuated by rivalries between two personalities, leading to various splits and reunifications. In May 1992, the ULIMO Chairman was removed and the movement was split between two potential leaders, one of whom was accused of using ULIMO to wage a holy war while the other was accused of financial

³³ This is how the RUF referred to its actions in Sierra Leone. The RUF would further consider itself a government, referring to property stolen from civilians by RUF members as "government property".

³⁴ For a full text of these peace agreements, see http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/pa_liberia.html.



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impropriety and hijacking the movement for political ends. Nevertheless, between August and December 1992, ULIMO reunified and resumed fighting with the NPFL. Following this, two branches of ULIMO clearly appeared: a Freetown-based branch, fighting alongside the SLA in Sierra Leone, and a branch based solely in Liberia.

A reunification congress between the two branches in October 1993 and a selection of joint communiqués issued in early 1994, some at the initiative of the Sierra Leonean NPRC Chairman, did not prevent the two branches from fighting. One of the main points of disagreement was the participation of the ULIMO Liberian branch in the Cotonou peace process for Liberia in July 1993.³⁵ In June 1994, the violence committed against civilians by ULIMO fighting alongside the SLA led a delegation of Sierra Leonean Chiefs to call for the withdrawal of ULIMO from Sierra Leone and also resulted into the disarmament of some members of the Freetown-based branch by the SLA.³⁶

In 1994, the two branches were clearly identified by two different acronyms: ULIMO-J (Freetown) and ULIMO-K (Liberia); the letters “J” and “K” referred to the names of the respective branch leaders. From the end of 1994 until 1996, ULIMO forces as such were not active within Sierra Leonean territory. In May 1995, demobilised ULIMO-J members based in Freetown were remobilised by Executive Outcomes, a private military company hired by the Government of Sierra Leone. The Special Task Force, as the ULIMO-J/Executive Outcomes force became known, assisted the SLA in driving back the RUF from the Western Area. The Special Task Force continued to operate under the umbrella of the SLA and Executive Outcomes in Bonthe District and briefly in Bo Town in late 1995 and 1996.

The ULIMO-J branch was formally included in the peace process in Liberia in August 1995. By signing the Abuja Agreement,³⁷ the parties agreed to form a six-seat Council of State to exercise executive power in Liberia. The leader of the ULIMO-K branch represented ULIMO in the Council of State while the NPFL-CRC/ULIMO-J coalition received one seat and the ULIMO-J wing gained ministerial positions.³⁸ However, factional fighting resumed and ULIMO-K and the NPFL collaborated to capture the leader of the ULIMO-J, who they accused of murder. This fighting culminated in the widespread destruction in Monrovia, the capital, in April 1996.

Peace negotiations resumed and resulted in the signing of a supplement to the Abuja Accord, referred to as Abuja II, which would be the first step towards the end of the conflict in Liberia. This provided for the representation of both ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J in the Council of State. ULIMO was officially disbanded in early 1997, pursuant to the Abuja II Agreement. Nevertheless, ULIMO resurfaced in Sierra Leone in 1997 and 1998 when some former members joined the Kamajors and others fought alongside the RUF/AFRC.

³⁵ This accord was signed by the NPFL, ULIMO and the Interim Government of National Unity in Cotonou, Benin; the ULIMO leader of the Liberian Branch appeared in the agreement as the leader of the ULIMO. No mention of different branches was made.

³⁶ Those disarmed ULIMO members were encamped at Waterloo refuge camp in the Western Area.

³⁷ This supplemented the previous Akosombo, Cotonou and Accra Agreements.

³⁸ For a full text of the Agreement, see http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/pa_liberia.html.



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e. **Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).**

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a coup d'état and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC released over 700 inmates from Pademba Road Prison, including their leader, an SLA officer who had been charged with a coup attempt in 1996. The AFRC immediately suspended the Constitution of Sierra Leone and the elected President escaped to the Republic of Guinea by helicopter. In an address to the nation, the AFRC leader advanced as a justification for the coup the polarisation of the country "into regional and tribal factions",³⁹ and the lack of control of the President over the situation". Amidst international condemnation of the explosion of violence and looting that accompanied the coup, the AFRC leader was sworn in as Head of State on 17 June 1997.

Immediately after the coup, the AFRC invited the RUF to share power. On 28 May, the RUF leader – at that time in custody in Nigeria for a firearms offence – broadcast a statement over SLBS Radio, encouraging RUF solidarity with the AFRC. Part of his statement is worth quoting: "You will always get instructions from me through [the AFRC leader]. They are our brothers. Let no one fool you. You have to work with them to put the situation under control, especially in the Western Area. As you [sic] the field commander, instruct your other Commander ... to stand by for any reinforcement needed by [the AFRC leader] for any eventualities. We have to defend our sovereignty. You are to act on these orders immediately."⁴⁰ On 30 May, the RUF declared their support for the AFRC on SLBS television and radio and on 1 June, the AFRC declared the RUF leader to be the Deputy Head of State of Sierra Leone. The RUF/AFRC Cabinet hierarchy was as follows: Chairman and Head of State, Vice Chairman and Deputy Head of State, Chief Secretary of State, Secretaries of State and Public Liaison Officers. In June 1997, the RUF/AFRC created a 17-member supervisory team to prevent the apparatus of civilian government from grinding to a halt following lengthy strikes by public sector workers.⁴¹

Immediately after the coup and throughout 1997, the RUF/AFRC found itself in an escalating military standoff with Nigerian forces stationed in Freetown and Lungi. ECOWAS established a Committee mandated to negotiate with the RUF/AFRC regime. On 29 August 1997, at its 20th Annual Summit, ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone, effective throughout all ECOWAS member States.⁴² The ECOWAS embargo included military hardware, supplies and spare parts, petroleum and petrol-derived products; an export ban was also imposed. A travel ban was imposed on AFRC members and their families, in addition to a freeze on their assets. Moreover, ECOWAS formally expanded the mandate of ECOMOG to include the use of force to impose sanctions

³⁹ The President of Sierra Leone had appointed the leader of the Kamajors, a pro-government local militia, as the Deputy Defence Minister in 1996.

⁴⁰ BBC Media Monitoring, 30 May 1997 transcribing SLBS, 28 May 1997.

⁴¹ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 24 - 30 June 1997.

⁴² Decision on sanctions against the junta in Sierra Leone, Twentieth Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 28-29 August 1997.



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against Sierra Leone.⁴³ Effectively, this gave legal backing to a complete navel blockade of the Port of Freetown and the prohibition of air-freight traffic. On 8 October, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1132 (1997), imposing a range of global arms, oil and travel sanctions on Sierra Leone.⁴⁴ During peace talks in Conakry, Guinea, on 22 and 23 October 1997, the ECOWAS Committee of Five⁴⁵ and representatives of the RUF/AFRC agreed to an immediate ceasefire and a six-month peace plan guaranteeing a return to civilian government by 22 April 1998.

Following RUF/AFRC attacks on ECOMOG positions and other breaches of the Conakry Peace Plan, ECOMOG intervened militarily. Starting on 6 February 1998, ECOMOG drove the RUF/AFRC regime from power and its forces from the Western Area. Ousted from Freetown, the RUF/AFRC alliance survived but the balance of power between the allies was inverted. The situation of the AFRC members was varied: most fled from Freetown into the Provinces with their leader, others surrendered to ECOMOG forces and many of the senior officers were charged with treason, convicted and executed in 1998.⁴⁶

Following the RUF/AFRC invasion of Freetown in January 1999, most of the AFRC forces withdrew to Makeni (Bombali District) and the rift between RUF and AFRC forces deepened. The AFRC leader did not take part in the peace negotiations in Lomé, Togo that concluded with the signing of a Peace Agreement between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone.⁴⁷

While provisions in the Lomé Peace Agreement granted the RUF leader status equivalent to Vice President, the AFRC leader was appointed as Chairman of a governmental body called the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace. Following serious infighting between RUF and AFRC forces in the Northern Province in October 1999, the rift between the two groups further deepened. Both forces controlled different areas of the country. Nevertheless, the alliance between the leadership of the two forces was still valid. The two leaders issued joint statements and continued to

⁴³ *Ibid.* "Article 7. The sub-regional forces shall employ all necessary means to impose the implementation of this decision. They shall monitor closely the coastal areas, land borders and airspace of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and shall inspect, guard and seize any ship, vehicle or aircraft violating the embargo imposed by this decision."

⁴⁴ On 29 August 1997, ECOWAS had issued a recommendation on the application of sanctions against the AFRC regime: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 23 August - 1 September 1997.

⁴⁵ Initially, ECOWAS established the Committee of Four. In August 1997, a fifth nation, Liberia, was added to the Committee of Four, which became known as the Committee of Five.

⁴⁶ ECOMOG forces, SSD and even civilians arrested many alleged members and collaborators of the AFRC regime and brought them to Pademba Road Prison, Freetown, where – despite only having the capacity for 400 – the number of inmates rose to between 3,000 and 5,000. Following the reinstatement to power of the President, civilians and military personnel were tried on treason grounds and on 19 October, 24 ex-members of the SLA who had joined the SLA were executed by firing squad.

⁴⁷ AFRC members alleged that their former leader was detained by the RUF second-in-command in Kailahun District: BBC Online News, 7 August 1999.



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appear together publicly.⁴⁸ The AFRC leader visited RUF/AFRC strongholds in an attempt to engage AFRC commanders in the disarmament program.⁴⁹

When RUF forces disarmed and held hostage of UNAMSIL peacekeepers in early May 2000, the AFRC leader called on his forces to support the Government and halt the RUF advance on Freetown. In May and June 2000, AFRC forces fought the RUF alongside the SLA in Masiaka and Lunsar. The AFRC leader's declaration marked a public shift in relations between the AFRC and the RUF, compounding the division of operational areas that happened in late 1999. AFRC forces were remained active on the ground in only two principal locations.

f. The West Side Boys

Between October 1998 and the end of 2000, the West Side Boys, a splinter group from the RUF/AFRC alliance, concentrated its actions in the Okra Hills (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District). While it is not possible to say the West Side Boys did not fall under the command of the RUF/AFRC, their actions followed a clear pattern that was different from the RUF/AFRC and later RUF actions in Port Loko District. Although the group considered the AFRC leader to be their figurehead – the absence of the AFRC leader in Lomé and their belief that their interests had been inadequately represented⁵⁰ was the origin of the West Side Boys taking UNOMSIL, ECOMOG and NGO officials hostage in 1999 – the AFRC leader publicly dissociated himself from the group and officially disbanded the AFRC in mid-August 2000. The West Side Boys, primarily ex-SLA who aligned with the RUF/AFRC, achieved international notoriety by kidnapping 11 UK Royal Marines in late August and provoking a decisive military response from the UK that would all but destroy the West Side Boys.

g. Civil Defence Force (CDF)

As RUF/NPFL forces expanded activities the Southern and Eastern Provinces, numerous civilian initiatives emerged between 1991 and 1993 to assist the SLA. Across the Districts, NPRC and SLA authorities, traditional structures and popular personalities⁵¹ supported the foundation of civilian security schemes. This led to the creation of a number of vigilante groups sometimes known as Civil Defence Units (CDU), whose main role was to operate checkpoints. The traditional authorities selected civilians, usually experienced hunters and well-known community people, to join these CDUs. This quality control system guaranteed that Paramount Chiefs could exercise a degree of actual and moral authority over the CDUs. In addition, the mobilisation of tribal-based hunting societies was actively encouraged and supported by the NPRC authorities. Various State agencies were involved in administering the general mobilisation of various hunting societies, which included

⁴⁸ The RUF leader announced that the RUF/AFRC alliance was transformed into a political organisation called the Alliance for Peace. UN OCHA, 30 September 1999. In early November, the two leaders issued a joint statement guaranteeing the safety of humanitarian staff and resources even in times of insecurity. IRIN West Africa, 4 November 1999.

⁴⁹ IRIN West Africa, 18 November 1999 and 6 December 1999.

⁵⁰ They also believed that their leader was held hostage by a senior RUF commander in Kailahun District: IRIN West Africa, 12 August 1999.

⁵¹ In Kenema and Kailahun Districts, for example, a renowned local personality who was a former professor played the role of a catalyst in the regrouping of the Kamajors group.



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the “Donsos” in Kono District, the “Tamaboros” in Koinadugu District and the “Kamajors” in the Eastern and Southern Provinces. Affiliates of the Kamajor Society were the largest in number of these societies.

These local militia used their intimate knowledge of their immediate localities to assist the SLA in fighting the RUF/NPFL. Both the civil militia and CDUs were given bladed weapons and rustic single-barrel shotguns and deployed alongside the SLA during combat against RUF forces. As the conflict expanded westwards across the country, similar initiatives emerged in Moyamba and Tonkolili Districts. Traditional hunters known as “Kapas” and “Gbethis” regrouped in the Northern Province.

The organisation of local militias entered a new phase in 1995, when initiation of civilians into the Kamajor Society began in Bonthe District (Southern Province). Hidden behind a veil of secrecy, Kamajor initiation ceremonies revolve around an assortment of mystical beliefs and charms performed by a High Priest Initiator.⁵² The purpose of the ceremony was to render initiates fit to serve at the war front, through the granting of special powers such as the ability to be “bulletproof” and being able to smell enemies. Initiators of the Gbethi Society called this process “washing”. Once initiated, Kamajors had to adhere to the rules of the Kamajor Society, which governed the conduct of the members. Infractions of the rules were believed to deprive Kamajors of the powers they had been granted at the time of initiation. In the early stages of this process, hunters and youths were nominated for initiation by chieftdom authorities. Once initiated, Kamajors were sent back to the chieftdom from which they originated.

The number of initiates and the rate of initiation into the Kamajor Society increased rapidly throughout 1995 and 1996. Kamajor deployment alongside SLA forces steadily expanded into the other Districts of the Southern Province and into the Eastern Province. By 1996, almost every chieftdom in the Southern and Eastern Provinces had their own Kamajor Society. The initiation of men into the Kamajor Society brought with it the structuring of this local militia at a chieftdom level. Other organised pro-government militias – Gbethis, Kapas and Donsos – were active in the Northern Province and in Kono District.


The Civil Defence Force (CDF) emerged in late 1995 or early 1996 as a union of the various local militias active across the country. Members of the Kamajors were the main force within the CDF and presented strong resistance to RUF attacks throughout the Southern Province and, to a lesser extent, in the Eastern Province. The role and efficiency of the CDF in fighting the RUF received formal recognition from the newly-elected President in early 1996, who appointed the then leader of the Kamajor Society as Deputy Defence Minister. This strong symbolic support was backed up with practical support when the Government of Sierra Leone provided the CDF with staple food items and gave them responsibility for providing security throughout the country. Although originally aligned with and to some extent subordinate to the SLA, the CDF progressively distanced itself from SLA forces, objecting to their action and behaviour. Rivalry and tension between the two groups erupted, frequently resulting in armed clashes.

⁵² The first Chief Initiator was an herbalist believed to have magical powers.



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On the national level, the internal organisation of the CDF was as follows:⁵³



Below battalion level, the CDF adopted a regular structure similar that of the SLA, dividing battalions into companies, platoons and sections of varying numbers. The CDF also put in place administrative structures at the chiefdom level. For example, in Dasse Chiefdom (Moyamba District), the Chiefdom Ground Commander was assisted by a Deputy Chiefdom Ground Commander, below whom was Section Commanders and then Patrol Commanders. The CDF also

⁵³ The then Deputy Defence Minister was made National Coordinator in the aftermath of the military coup in May 1997. Accordingly, although the coordination of the local militias within the CDF took place in 1995 or in early 1996, the schematised internal structure applies only for the period starting in June 1997.



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appointed civilians as Welfare Officers to liaise between civilians and CDF forces. Chiefdom commands often merged to form battalions comprising over 500 armed personnel.⁵⁴

Following the military coup in May 1997, the AFRC leader officially disbanded the CDF and asked its members to surrender and disarm to the Sierra Leone Police. The CDF command rejected this order and CDF members remained armed, initially keeping a low profile before regrouping to fight the RUF/AFRC. The scale of their military actions increased and progressively more initiates joined the various components of the CDF, in particular the Kamajors. With the increase in the rate of Kamajor initiations came a number of problems. The CDF started to lose control over the selection of initiates and there was some loss of discipline among the newly-initiated. The role of the traditional authorities in selecting initiates was, opening the door for the initiation of children below the age of 15. Increasingly, but notably in 1998, a dichotomy between new members and “old Kamajors” came to the fore.⁵⁵

Following the restoration of the elected Government, the President of Sierra Leone placed the CDF under the control of ECOMOG.⁵⁶ CDF forces were deployed in Freetown; both Kamajors and members of a group called the Organised Brotherhood of Hunting Societies (OBHS) were deployed at checkpoints throughout the Western Area and deployed alongside ECOMOG. CDF forces would be active in defending Freetown in January 1999. In September 1998, the President decided to formalise their position, stating that a Civil Defence Force with a CDF Administrator would be appointed to liaise with the SLA in every District. The District CDF would report directly to the Paramount Chiefs, thus restoring much of the authority that had been eroded during the development of the CDF.⁵⁷ However, the CDF continued to impose a progressively more insidious system of administration throughout the territory it occupied, invading many aspects of civilian life.

2. Private military companies

a. Gurkha Security Guards Limited

In January 1995, the NPRC Government entered in a three-month renewable⁵⁸ contract with the Gurkha Security Guards Limited (GSG), a British company based in the Channel Islands. Nepalese Gurkhas have long been trained and incorporated into the UK armed forces pursuant to a tripartite agreement between the governments of Nepal, India and Britain. The British Government made significant cuts to the number of Gurkhas serving in the armed forces, resulting in their increased availability to private security and military firms. GSG’s contract was to train and advise the SLA in jungle warfare tactics and provide security for the SLA base at Camp Charlie, near Mile 91. GSG

⁵⁴ For example, in Bonthe District, Dema, Sittia and Bendu Cha Chiefdoms merged to form a battalion, while the CDF battalions were formed through pairing the chiefdoms of Kwamebai Krim and Nongoba Bullom, Jong and Imperi, Kpanda Kemo and Bum, and Sogbini and Yawbeke. In Bo District, nine battalions were formed to cover 15 chiefdoms.

⁵⁵ In April 1998, for example, the High Priest and Chief Initiator called for registration of the Kamajors “because of growing lawlessness among them”: AFP, 29 April 1998.

⁵⁶ CDF fought alongside ECOMOG forces for the restoration to power of the Sierra Leonean President.

⁵⁷ Broadcast to the Nation on Peace and Security by the Sierra Leone President, 2 September 1998.

⁵⁸ AFP, 23 March 1995.



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was not contracted to engage in direct military actions against the RUF. In February 1995, RUF forces killed two senior GSG advisers and the aide-de-camp of the NPRC Chairman during a road ambush near the Kaitkant Hills in Tonkolili District.⁵⁹ The NPRC Government let GSG's contract lapse in April 1995.

b. Executive Outcomes

In late April or early May 1995, the NPRC contracted Executive Outcomes, a South African private military company, to train SLA forces.⁶⁰ At the time Executive Outcomes was contracted, RUF forces had pushed through Moyamba District into the Western Area and were engaging SLA and Guinean forces in and around Waterloo, not far from metropolitan Freetown. Near Freetown, Executive Outcomes created a "Special Task Force" of around 600 re-mobilised Liberian militia from the ULIMO-J movement. The Special Task Force assisted the SLA and organised civil militia in forcing the RUF to withdraw from the Western Area. Executive Outcomes rapidly expanded operations into the Provinces, securing the diamond-rich areas of Kono District. The Special Task Force also engaged RUF forces in Bonthe District later in the year. In March 1996, the newly-elected President of Sierra Leone retained the services of Executive Outcomes.

Executive Outcomes were also hired by mining and hydroelectric companies in Kono, Moyamba and Tonkolili Districts to provide security at their sites. Their departure from Sierra Leonean territory would be one of the main terms insisted on by the RUF during the peace negotiations that led to the signing of Abidjan Peace Agreement on 30 November 1996 between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone. Article 12 of the Peace Agreement provided that, "The Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn five weeks after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG). As from the date of the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group, the Executive Outcomes shall be confined to barracks under the supervision of the Joint Monitoring Group and the Neutral Monitoring Group."⁶¹ In early 1997, Executive Outcomes left Sierra Leone.

c. Sandline International

Sandline International is a British private military company⁶² linked both to Executive Outcomes and to an array of companies with commercial mining interests in Sierra Leone. On 23 December 1997, Sandline International entered into a contract with the exiled Government of Sierra Leone to assist the Government in removing the RUF/AFRC regime through the "provision of technical knowhow, military logistics and equipment" to a value of around 10 million US dollars. This included the provision of 2,500 assault rifles, 180 rocket launchers, 50 machine guns and quantities of ammunition and spare magazines.⁶³ A number of finance problems reduced the money available

⁵⁹ For background information, see Cillers, J. and Mason, P. (eds.), *Peace, Profit and Plunder: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies*, 1999, pp. 129-33: <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Books/PeaceProfitPlunder/Chap7.pdf> [Link alive: 7 January 2004].

⁶⁰ Associated Press Worldstream, 11 May 1995.

⁶¹ For the full text of the Agreement, see <http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html>.

⁶² For the company profile of Sandline International, see <http://www.sandline.com/site/>.

⁶³ Sir Thomas Legg, KCB QC and Sir Robin Ibbs, KBE; *Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation, 27 July 1998* (the "Legg Report"), paras. 4.15-4.18. Full text and annexes of the report are available from the Official Documents section of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth website: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/complete.zip> [Link last visited: 28 February 2004].



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to around 1.35 million US dollars. Sandline International flew 35 tonnes of weapons costing 700,000 US dollars to Freetown International Airport at Lungi.⁶⁴ Landing on 23 February 1998, the shipment arrived well after ECOMOG forces had driven the RUF/AFRC from the Western Area. The arms shipment was placed in storage by ECOMOG, who passed on a small number of weapons to the CDF commander for use by the Kamajors.⁶⁵ Sandline International was also responsible for establishing an operations base at Lungi for use by the returning Government of Sierra Leone.

In late March 1998, a few weeks after the Sierra Leone President's reinstatement to power, UK Customs and Excise investigated Sandline International's arms shipment as a possible breach of UK law implementing the arms and oil embargo imposed on 8 October 1997 by the UN Security Council.⁶⁶ Ultimately, Customs and Excise decided that it was not in the public interest to prosecute Sandline International.

The details of the investigation and allegations made in the media, led to a political row in the UK concerning the possible involvement of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials and ministers in the breaking of UN sanctions. On 18 May, the UK Government announced an independent inquiry into what had become known as "the Sandline affair", to be led by Sir Thomas Legg. The report of the Legg Inquiry led to a series of administrative and policy changes concerning internal Government communications, particularly in the FCO, and the clear elucidation of future Government policies concerning both economic sanctions and private military companies. Following the submission of the findings of the Legg Inquiry, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee also conducted its own investigation into the handling of the Sandline Affair by the FCO.⁶⁷

3. Peacekeeping forces

a. Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Observer Group (ECOMOG)

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional organisation comprising 15 member States, including Sierra Leone. It was created in 1975 and its founding Treaty was re-affirmed by all member States in July 1993. The ECOWAS Treaty allows ECOWAS to "establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate",⁶⁸ although it does not have a standing military component.

Since 1990, the forward operating base of the ECOMOG mission in Liberia had been located in Lungi, near the Freetown International Airport. The military mandate of ECOMOG, however, did not encompass Sierra Leone until 29 August 1997, when the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government authorised ECOMOG to "employ all necessary means" to enforce a comprehensive

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, para. 4.24.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, para. 7.9.

⁶⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997), 8 October 1997.

⁶⁷ The Second Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons:

<http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaaff/116/11602.htm>.

⁶⁸ Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, article 58(2)(f). Available online at www.sec.ecowas.int.



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trade embargo on Sierra Leone.⁶⁹ In addition to the ECOMOG forces already deployed in Sierra Leone in support of operations in Liberia, additional forces from ECOWAS member States were also deployed alongside the SLA in Sierra Leone pursuant to a series of defence pacts and agreements between those States and Sierra Leone. In early 1993, for example, Nigerian forces were deployed in Kono District while Guinean forces were active in Kailahun District. However, according to the Abidjan Peace Accord signed on 30 November between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, all foreign forces were to leave the county.⁷⁰

The evolution of ECOMOG's direct military involvement in Sierra Leone began with the AFRC coup on 25 May 1997. Nigerian forces reinforced the ECOMOG deployment at Lungi and the Nigerian force headquarters at Kossoh Town, near Freetown. On 2 June 1997, Nigerian forces – not acting under ECOMOG, the mandate of which did not cover Sierra Leone – attempted and failed to unseat the combined RUF/AFRC forces.

The military situation between the RUF/AFRC and Nigerian forces remained tense throughout 1997. Following the failure of diplomatic negotiations carried out by the ECOWAS Committee of Five, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government imposed a trade, arms and petroleum products embargo on Sierra Leone on 27 August 1997. As noted, this decision also expanded ECOMOG's mandate to include monitoring and supervising ceasefire violations and enforcing the sanctions and the embargo instituted by the authority of the Heads of State and Government against the RUF/AFRC regime.⁷¹

Although Nigerian forces had established a de facto naval blockade of the Port of Freetown since the coup, the ECOMOG mandate allowed them to intensify enforcement operations. The UN Security Council supported the ECOWAS action and applied its own sanctions regime to Sierra Leone, authorising ECOWAS to ensure its strict implementation.⁷²

The continuous shelling of strategic locations in Freetown, the effects of the embargo and the RUF/AFRC's inability to dislodge ECOMOG from Kossoh and Jui prompted them to continue the negotiations started early in the year. ECOWAS mediators, led by the then Nigerian Foreign Minister, hammered out a peace plan. This led to a ceasefire on 21 October 1997, followed on 23 October by the signing of the ECOWAS six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone (23 October 1997-22 April 1998).⁷³ The central provisions of this agreement were the maintenance of a ceasefire and the return of the elected Government by 22 April 1998.

⁶⁹ ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Decision on Sanctions Against the Junta in Sierra Leone, 29 August 1997, article 7: "The sub-regional forces shall employ all necessary means to impose the implementation of this decision. They shall monitor closely the coastal areas, land borders and airspace of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and shall inspect, guard and seize any ship, vehicle or aircraft violating the embargo imposed by this decision."

⁷⁰ Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Abidjan, 30 November 1996, article 12.

⁷¹ ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Decision on Sanctions Against the Junta in Sierra Leone, 29 August 1997.

⁷² UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997), 8 October 1997.

⁷³ ECOWAS Six-month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone (23 October 1997-22 April 1998). Available online at: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_09231997.html [Link last visited 28 February 2004].



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On numerous occasions during the remainder of 1997, RUF/AFRC, CDF and ECOMOG forces violated the spirit and the letter of the Conakry Peace Plan. During the seventh meeting of the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, held in Abuja on 19 December 1997, “the Ministers deplored the incessant and unprovoked attacks on ECOMOG peace-keepers. They reaffirmed ECOMOG’s right of self defence”.⁷⁴ In early January, ECOMOG had begun planning a military intervention to remove the RUF/AFRC from Freetown. On 6 February 1998, as the impasse in implementing the Conakry Peace Plan appeared to deepen, ECOWAS reaffirmed the three options available for the resolution of the conflict, namely: the pursuit of dialogue; the imposition of a sanctions regime; and the possible use of force.⁷⁵ On the same day, ECOMOG forces in Freetown commenced a military intervention that led to their capture of Freetown and the Western Area by 12 February.

Following the success of their Freetown intervention, ECOMOG forces commenced provincial operations in March. The ECOMOG force was divided into three brigades. The 24th Infantry Brigade would execute operations in the Northern Province and parts of the Eastern Province. The 26th and 15th Infantry Brigades would take responsibility for operations in the Southern Province and the remainder of the Eastern Province. After April, four “loyal” SLA battalions were put under the command of the ECOMOG 24th Infantry Brigade.

ECOMOG’s mandate in Sierra Leone was expanded following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF on 7 July 1999. ECOMOG forces became a key component and actor in the peace process.

To reflect the provisions of the Lomé Agreement, ECOWAS redefined the mandate of ECOMOG on 25 August 1999. Although the Government of Nigeria had announced the drawdown of its contribution to ECOMOG, their withdrawal was delayed to ensure that there was no security vacuum during the deployment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).⁷⁶ At this time, ECOMOG’s additional responsibilities included monitoring the ceasefire, providing security for and disarming ex-combatants at DDR sites and guarding any arms and ammunition retrieved during the disarmament process. ECOMOG gradually scaled down its operations and UNAMSIL deployed in the areas previously under the control of ECOMOG. Out of the six Nigerian battalions deployed in Sierra Leone, four were absorbed by UNAMSIL and the remaining two had left Sierra Leone by 2 May 2000.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Final communiqué, point 14.

⁷⁵ ECOWAS eighth meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, New York, 5-6 February 1998. Full text available at: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/ecowas020698.html> [Link last visited: 28 February 2004].

⁷⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 5 - 16 January 2000 and IRIN West Africa, 31 January 2000. On 23 December, the Governments of Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana informed the Secretary-General of their intention to withdraw their remaining ECOMOG contingents from Sierra Leone.

⁷⁷ IRIN West Africa, 2 May 2000.



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b. United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

On 22 October 1999, in the aftermath of the Lomé Peace Agreement and following the extension of the ECOMOG mandate, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1270 (1999) establishing the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Initially, the authorised force strength of UNAMSIL strength was 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers⁷⁸ to “cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement”. This included establishing a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone and assisting the Government of Sierra Leone in implementing the DDR plan.

UNAMSIL had been preceded in 1998 by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL),⁷⁹ composed of military observers and aiming at “monitor[ing] the military and security situation in Sierra Leone” and the “disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants”, at “assist[ing] in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law” and at “monitor[ing] the voluntary disarmament and demobilisation of members of the Civil Defence Force”.⁸⁰ The presence of UNOMSIL within Sierra Leonean territory and the number of its personnel would vary over the subsequent months, as its terms of deployment were amended taking into account the security situation in Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL personnel were highly dependant on ECOMOG forces for their security.

In establishing UNAMSIL, the UN Security Council decided that UNAMSIL was to “take over the substantive civilian and military components and functions and to that end” decided “that the mandate of UNOMSIL shall terminate immediately on the establishment of UNAMSIL”.⁸¹ Furthermore, despite the ECOWAS statement of impending withdrawal from Sierra Leone, the United Nations included the role and functions of ECOMOG in the resolution, stating the “need for close cooperation and coordination between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL”, “commend[ing] the readiness of ECOMOG to continue to provide security for the areas where it is currently located”

⁷⁸ For a full text of the resolution, see <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99>.

⁷⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998), 13 July 1998.

⁸⁰ UNOMSIL was initially established for a six-month period between 13 July 1998 and 13 January 1999. Its authorised deployment contained up to 70 military observers. As hostilities between ECOMOG and the RUF/AFRC resumed in January 1999, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNOMSIL until 13 March 1999 in UN Resolution 1220 (1999), 12 January 1999, paragraph 2 of which authorises the Secretary General “to reduce the number of military observers in UNOMSIL and to retain in Conakry a small number who would return to Sierra Leone when conditions permit together with necessary civilian substantive and logistical support staff under the leadership of his Special Representative”. UNOMSIL’s mandate was extended to 13 June by Resolution 1231 (1999) of 11 March 1999. At this time, however, there were only eight military observers and they were not deployed inside Sierra Leone. Resolution 1245 (1999) of 11 June 1999 expanded the mandate of UNOMSIL until 13 December. On 20 August 1999, Resolution 1260 (1999) authorised the expansion of the mission to include 210 military observers to monitor the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement and to assist with the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program. The full texts of all the above-mentioned resolutions are available online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99> and <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98>. Additional sources of information on UNOMSIL can be found at <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/Unomsil.htm>.

⁸¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999), 22 October 1999, para. 10.



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and noting the need “to conduct other operations in accordance with their mandate to ensure the implementation of the Peace Agreement”.

UNAMSIL force numbers would increase over the subsequent months as ECOMOG forces left Sierra Leone. In May 2000, hostilities resumed and UNAMSIL forces were targeted directly by RUF/AFRC forces. The capture of nearly 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers by RUF/AFRC forces, a series of military events including the intervention of the UK Armed Forces and expanded combat operations by the SLA identified a clear need not only for an increase in UNAMSIL’s force strength, but a reform of its structure. In late 2000, the UN Security Council increased the number of authorised personnel in UNAMSIL to 13,000⁸² and ultimately to 17,500.

The first of these expansions would be decided on 7 February 2000, with the Security Council approving the extension of the military component of the UNAMSIL to 11,100 military personnel, deciding the revision of UNAMSIL’s mandate and approving its extension for a period of six months.⁸³ UNAMSIL’s force strength was increased to a ceiling of 17,500⁸⁴ by 30 September 1999. While the mandate of UNAMSIL was renewed in September 2003,⁸⁵ recent UN Security Council Resolutions have authorised the gradual drawdown of UNAMSIL, paving the way for a possible withdrawal by December 2004.⁸⁶

⁸² UN Security Council Resolution 1299 (2000), 19 May 2000.

⁸³ UN Security Council Resolution 1289 (2000), 7 February 2000.

⁸⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1346 (2001), 30 March 2001.

⁸⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1508 (2003), 19 September 2003.

⁸⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1492 (2003), 18 July 2003.



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Chapter Four: Legal Analysis

1. Introduction

NPWJ's Outreach and Conflict Mapping Programs focused on the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone so that the people of Sierra Leone might understand more about how the Court could assist in the accountability process, by gaining an understanding of the types of crimes on which the Court would be able to adjudicate. This section is, in many ways, intended to be an extension of that program, therefore this analysis focuses on the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and related matters, including the principle of individual criminal responsibility. As such, it is not intended to be an academic analysis of all aspects of the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. Rather, it is aimed at filling out the factual analysis contained in this report by outlining the crimes and their elements in more detail than was possible during the training seminars and demonstrating how this law might apply to the facts uncovered from the information gathered during the Conflict Mapping program.

This section will first give an overview of what is international humanitarian law (IHL), including its sources and key provisions. It will go on to examine whether or not there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone and, if so, its duration and its nature. The section will go on to discuss the legal aspects of each category of crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction, in the order in which the crimes are listed within the Statute of the Special Court. The discussion of each category of crimes will conclude with an identification of what crimes were committed during the conflict, by applying the law as discussed to the facts as described in the factual analysis. The section will conclude with a discussion of the personal and temporal jurisdiction of the Court, namely the people over whom the Court has jurisdiction and when the acts had to be allegedly committed in order to be considered by the Court, finishing with a brief discussion of the principles of individual criminal responsibility, both direct and command responsibility.

It should be noted that in some circumstances the same set of facts can be characterised as a crime against humanity, a war crime and a crime under Sierra Leone law. For example, the rape of a 10 year-old can be the crime against humanity of rape, where committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; the war crime of rape, when committed during an armed conflict; and a crime under Sierra Leone law, namely a violation of section 6 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1926. In such a situation, this report considers that the legal basis for each of those crimes has been made out and reflects this in the list of crimes committed, although an accused may be charged with only one of those crimes. Conversely, there are some crimes that do not have counterparts and, as such, some facts only fit into one category of crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction. These include the crime against humanity of enslavement, the war crime of pillage, the serious violation of international humanitarian law of the conscription of children and the crime under Sierra Leone law of the burning of public buildings.

For reasons of clarity and manageability, the crimes are also identified according to the fighting faction identified as being responsible. However, it must be emphasised that responsibility for these crimes cannot be extended to every member of the fighting faction: the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law are premised on the basis of individual criminal responsibility, both direct and command responsibility. As such, liability will only fall on the people who devised and

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implemented the policies to commit such crimes, i.e. the leaders and planners, the commanders responsible for the individuals who committed the crimes and each individual who committed that crime.

As mentioned, the facts as described in this report are the result of the collection of information from key persons throughout Sierra Leone; that is, persons who by virtue of their profession or their position in society were in a position to have an overview of the conflict in particular in their area. This information has been used to compile the factual analysis section of this report, on which the following legal analysis is based. Every care has been taken to establish the veracity of the information gathered in Sierra Leone, including cross-checking and, to an extent, supplementing this information with open source and other materials.⁸⁷ Details that could not be verified or information on events coming from only one source were generally not included in the final report. However, it must be borne in mind that this information has not been tested to the level required for sustaining a conviction, for example through cross-examination in court, nor have the alleged perpetrators had the opportunity to tell their side of the story or answer the allegations made in this report. Therefore, although every care has been taken to ensure the correctness of the facts contained in this report, these limitations must be borne in mind when considering the following analysis.

2. Applicable law

2.a Introduction to international humanitarian law (IHL)

International humanitarian law, also known as “the laws of war”, is the area of international law that regulates conduct during an armed conflict. In the modern era, the development of the rules of IHL began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in an attempt to mitigate some of the consequences of the conflicts prevalent at the time. In essence, they attempted to regulate wars to prevent unnecessary suffering being inflicted upon combatants and civilians. Their development attempted to set specific rules concerning what were and were not legitimate targets in conflict and refined the distinction between combatants and civilians. The protection of persons not taking an active part in hostilities became a basic principle of IHL.

Traditionally, there have been two branches of international humanitarian law: the “Hague law”, concerned with means and methods of warfare, and the “Geneva law”, concerned with the more humanitarian issues, including the protection of civilians; this distinction is largely illusory, as there is a wide degree of overlap between the two.⁸⁸ The prohibition on intentionally directing attacks against civilians, which is applicable irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict, is one of the cornerstones of international humanitarian law. This prohibition derives from one of the key tenets of international humanitarian law, that a distinction be made between legitimate and illegitimate

⁸⁷ For a full description of this process, see section A on the methodology of the Conflict Mapping program.

⁸⁸ See McCoubrey, H., *International Humanitarian Law: The Regulation of Armed Conflicts*, 1990, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Great Britain, pp. 1-2. Indeed, the Hague Law of 1907 and its annexed Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which have the status of customary international law, were to a large degree complemented and supplemented in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I: Roberts, A. and Guelff, R., *Documents on the Laws of War* (3rd edn.), 2000, Oxford University Press, Great Britain, p. 68.



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military targets. Accordingly, some targets will always be illegitimate, such as undefended towns and objects employed solely for the provision of humanitarian assistance, while some targets will always be legitimate, such as military installations. Additionally, some methods of attack, such as carpet bombing, and some weapons, such as indiscriminate weapons, may not be employed. A key feature underpinning international humanitarian law is the principle of proportionality, according to which the military advantage expected to be gained in any attack must be balanced against the likely incidental or collateral damage to non-military persons and objects. Therefore, in all cases where either the target, methods, or weapons are not prohibited, the military commander must apply the principle of proportionality to weigh whether or not a particular target can be attacked in a particular way using particular weapons.

Currently, the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and the two Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977,⁸⁹ form the heart of international humanitarian treaty law and are its most frequently cited sources.⁹⁰ The 1949 Geneva Conventions, much but not all of which are now considered to be customary international law, were aimed at both codifying customary international humanitarian law as it had emerged following World War II and at developing law to address the experiences of World War II.⁹¹ These four Conventions concern the treatment of:

- (I) sick and wounded combatants on land;
- (II) sick and wounded combatants at sea;
- (III) prisoners of war (POWs); and
- (IV) civilians.

The Geneva Conventions marked the first inclusion in a humanitarian law treaty of a set of war crimes explicitly attracting individual criminal responsibility – the “grave breaches” of the conventions.⁹² Each of the four Conventions contains its own list of grave breaches, expanded by Additional Protocol I of 1977. Grave breaches are crimes considered so serious that all States Parties are required to prosecute persons accused of such offences, or to hand them over to other States Parties willing to conduct such prosecutions. However, the grave breaches provisions only apply in international armed conflicts as opposed to non-international armed conflicts⁹³ and then only to acts against persons protected by each of the Geneva Conventions (“protected persons”), namely sick and wounded combatants on land and sea, POWs and civilians who find themselves in the hands of a State of which they are not nationals. The primary responsibility for enforcement of these grave breaches provisions, and indeed of international humanitarian law in general, rests with States themselves.

⁸⁹ Sierra Leone succeeded to the Geneva Conventions on 10 June 1965 and acceded to the Additional Protocols on 21 October 1986.

⁹⁰ McCoubrey, *supra*, n. 2, p. 15. Note also the Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 1925, which has the status of customary international law (Roberts and Guelff, *supra*, n. 2, p. 157) and is reflected in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8(2)(b)(xviii).

⁹¹ Roberts and Guelff, *supra*, n. 2, pp. 195-6.

⁹² See, for example, the Fourth Geneva Convention, articles 146-7.

⁹³ See below for a discussion of this distinction.



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International humanitarian law has two main sources: treaty law and customary international law; it can also be found in general principles of law and in judicial decisions and the writings of eminent jurists,⁹⁴ as subsidiary means that are of particular importance in this field. Treaty law refers to the obligations binding on a State because they are a party to a treaty containing those obligations. Customary international law, on the other hand, refers to those obligations that are binding on States irrespective of whether they are contained in a treaty or not. The existence of customary international law is determined by reference to State practice and *opinio juris*.⁹⁵ State practice is the actions undertaken by States and *opinio juris* means that States undertake such actions because they believe they are under a legal obligation to do so.⁹⁶ State practice in the absence of *opinio juris*, no matter how uniform or consistent, will therefore not amount to customary international law; one example is the cancellation of diplomats' parking tickets, which is a standard practice but does not give rise to legal consequences if it is not followed. Official statements and declarations can provide evidence of *opinio juris* and can even amount to State practice in some circumstances, depending on their context. Generally, customary international law is binding on all States. However, it is not binding on a persistent objector, namely a State that has consistently made its objections manifest during the emergence of a new rule,⁹⁷ except if it amounts to *jus cogens*, which is a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is permissible and, as such, is binding on all States.⁹⁸ It should be borne in mind that customary international law is a continually evolving process and what was customary international law 20 years ago will not necessarily be customary international law today.

While international humanitarian law regulates the conduct of war, not all of its provisions attract individual criminal responsibility. For example, the violation of the provision stating the prisoners of war shall be permitted to use tobacco⁹⁹ is not considered to be a crime. However, there are a wide number of provisions, based both in treaty and customary law, that do attract individual criminal responsibility, so that people who violate the obligations in those provisions can be held accountable in a court of law. These provisions are considered to form part of a discrete area of law called international criminal law.¹⁰⁰ Many of these provisions will be discussed in the following sections on the crimes over which the Special Court has jurisdiction. The classic modern examples of the enforcement of international humanitarian law are found in two military tribunals established after World War II: the Nuremberg Tribunal, established to try the 22 major Nazi war criminals and

⁹⁴ Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38(1)(c)-(d).

⁹⁵ *North Sea Continental Shelf Case* [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 44.

⁹⁶ See the Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38(1)(b), listing one of the sources of international law as "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law".

⁹⁷ Stein, T. L., "The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law" (1985) 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 457, p. 458.

⁹⁸ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, article 53; norms amounting to *jus cogens* can only be replaced by norms of a similar character. The prohibition on genocide is generally considered to be *jus cogens*: see, for example, Bassiouni, M. C., 'International Crimes: *Jus Cogens* and *Obligatio Erga Omnes*' (1996) 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63, p. 68.

⁹⁹ Third Geneva Convention 1949, article 26.

¹⁰⁰ These provisions form part of International Criminal Law, which is also considered to include a range of other offences such as drug trafficking, piracy and fraud: see, for example, Bassiouni, M. C., *International Criminal Law* (2nd edn), 1999, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY.



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the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, established to try major war criminals in the Pacific. The Nuremberg Charter, which gave the Tribunal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace,¹⁰¹ is often cited as the basis for the development of international criminal law in the latter half of the twentieth century. In fact, “[t]he 1949 Geneva Conventions were prepared in the wake of the Nuremberg trials and were heavily influenced by them”.¹⁰²

2.b The International Criminal Court (ICC), including the Elements of Crimes

The preliminary and traditional problem with international humanitarian law is its lack of enforceability. Despite the advances made after World War II by the International Military Tribunals and several notable cases tried in domestic courts, including Eichmann, Barbie and Trouvier, it is only with the advent of the ad hoc tribunals and subsequent developments through the 1990s and beyond that this historic lack of enforceability is being addressed.¹⁰³

In the early 1990s, the international community took steps to enforce international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, through the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) in 1993 and 1994 respectively. These Tribunals were established by Security Council Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁰⁴ Crimes within their jurisdictions include genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war. The decisions of these tribunals, which are based on customary international law as identified by the judges, represent the first major post-Nuremberg decisions on crimes under international humanitarian law. While the decisions of these international tribunals are not binding on other courts, whether domestic and international, this growing body of jurisprudence is at the very least highly persuasive and was referred to extensively by the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court (ICC) when the time came to elaborate the Elements of Crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.

Indeed, the main step forward in the codification of international criminal law since Nuremberg and Tokyo is the creation of the International Criminal Court. In many ways, the ICC can be seen as a logical next step of the process begun at Nuremberg and traced through the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, albeit a step that would be blocked for 50 years by the Cold War, among other things. The main difference between the ICC and the tribunals that preceded it is that the Statute of

¹⁰¹ Nuremberg Charter, article 6; note that conspiracy to commit any of these acts was also within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

¹⁰² *The Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995.

¹⁰³ For further reading, see McCormack, T. and Simpson, G., *The Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches*, 1997, Kluwer Law International, Boston.

¹⁰⁴ ICTY: Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), 25 May 1993; ICTR: Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 8 November 1994. The Security Council is mandated under Chapter VII with determining the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, pursuant to article 39(1) of the UN Charter. Having made that determination, the Security Council may then make recommendations or decisions regarding measures to be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. Any such decisions are binding on all member States (article 25) and are superior to all other international obligations (article 103).



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the ICC was negotiated by all member States of the United Nations, thereby representing for the first time a truly universal attempt to codify those laws and customs of war that attract individual criminal responsibility.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998, after weeks of intensive negotiations and debate, and entered into force on 1 July 2002. Following the Diplomatic Conference, the Preparatory Commission comprised of representatives of States¹⁰⁵ with significant input from international organisations and non-governmental organisations, debated the particulars of the supporting documents for the Rome Statute, in particular the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.¹⁰⁶ During the negotiations, the often long debates centred around what was and what was not customary international law, with delegates accepting the former and rejecting the latter. As such, the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, found in articles 6 to 8, are the best possible indication of customary international law at the time of the adoption of the Rome Statute, as are their Elements of Crimes, which were approved at the June 2000 session of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court and subsequently adopted during the first meeting of the Assembly of States Parties in September 2002.¹⁰⁷

2.c Note on procedural law

Along with substantive provisions on international criminal law, the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC have also contributed to the development of a set of procedural rules for international courts and tribunals. Thus each of the international criminal tribunals and the ICC has its own “Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, which represent a cross-fertilisation between major legal systems.¹⁰⁸ The rules have a large impact on the evidence that is accepted at trial and, as such, forms the basis for judgments. As such, these rules have contributed to the development of the procedural and substantive elements of this area of law. While the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court fall outside the ambit of this report, interested readers are directed towards NPWJ’s *Lawyer’s Guide to the Special Court*, which goes into these Rules in detail.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ The Republic of Sierra Leone was one of the most active participants in these discussions and made numerous statements, both in formal and informal negotiations, as to what constituted customary international law in respect of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.

¹⁰⁶ Both the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as adopted, are found in UN Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3.

¹⁰⁷ See Politi, M. and Nesi, G. (eds.), *The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity*, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, UK, 2001, p 25 and Lee, RS (ed), *The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence*, Transnational Publishers Inc, USA, 2001, pp. 5, 8 and, generally, Chapter 6, “Reflections on the Elements of Crimes”. While there is some debate as to whether the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes entirely reflect customary international law, they are used in this report as the most authoritative statement of customary international law to date, due to their manner of negotiation and adoption.

¹⁰⁸ The Rules were made in different ways: for the ad hoc tribunals and the Special Court, they are made by the Judges themselves, whereas for the ICC, they were the product of lengthy negotiations between States, which took place at the same time as the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes.

¹⁰⁹ NPWJ’s *Lawyers’ Guide to the Special Court* is available from www.specialcourt.org.



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3. Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background and establishment

In June 2000, the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone requested the assistance of the United Nations to establish a court to try people who committed crimes in Sierra Leone during the conflict. On 14 August 2000, the UN Security Council passed a Resolution requesting the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to allow the Special Court to be established.¹¹⁰ It also asked the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council on a number of points raised in the resolution, including: from what date the Special Court should have jurisdiction, where an alternative seat for the Special Court outside Sierra Leone might be located, how appeals should be made and how much assistance will be required from the international community in terms of finance and personnel.

Negotiations between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations began in September 2000 in New York, continuing later that month in Freetown. The Secretary-General reported back to the Security Council on 4 October 2000. This was followed by an exchange of letters on some of the more contentious areas in the Sierra Leone-United Nations negotiations between the Security Council and the Secretary-General in December 2000 and January 2001, which detailed some changes the Security Council believed should be made to the draft Statute and Agreement. These changes were agreed to by Sierra Leone and the Agreement for the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, to which the Statute is annexed, was signed in a ceremony in Freetown on 16 January 2002 by then Attorney-General and Minister of Justice and the then UN Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs. This Agreement forms the legal basis for the Special Court and in addition to the substantive functioning of the Court includes matters such as privileges and immunities of officials, staff and the premises of the Special Court, which was supplemented by a Headquarters Agreement signed on 21 October 2003 by the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice and the Registrar of the Special Court.

In early 2002, the Prosecutor, Registrar and Judges of the Special Court were named by the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone, each of whom was responsible for appointing a number of officials. The Special Court began its operations in late July 2002, when the Registrar, the Prosecutor and some initial staff arrived in Freetown. The first set of indictments was approved on 7 March 2003, arrests were made on 10 March 2003 and initial appearances began on 15 March 2003 at temporary facilities in Bonthe, a small town in southern Sierra Leone. A number of indictments were approved in the following months and all detainees were moved to the Special Court's detention facilities in New England, Freetown, once construction on the site of the Special Court was complete. Since that time a number of pre-trial motions have been heard by the Judges of the Special Court, including applications for provisional release¹¹¹ and jurisdictional matters, heard by a panel of Judges of the Appeals Chamber sitting for the first time in October 2003.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000), 14 August 2000.

¹¹¹ All of the applications for provisional release have, at the time of writing, been denied.

¹¹² It should be noted that the courtroom for the Special Court was, at the time of writing, still under construction and pre-trial hearings were being held at a temporary courtroom on the New England site.



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4. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Court

In his letter of 12 June 2000, the President of Sierra Leone suggested that the Special Court have as its applicable law a blend of international and domestic Sierra Leone law.¹¹³ Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) therefore recommended that the Special Court was to have jurisdiction over crimes under international law and selected crimes under Sierra Leonean law. Pursuant to the Statute of the Special Court, the crimes under international law fall under the broad categories of crimes against humanity; violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II; and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, including crimes against peacekeepers and the use of child soldiers.¹¹⁴ These are crimes under international humanitarian law that were considered to have had the status of customary international law at the time the alleged crimes were committed.¹¹⁵ Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II and the “other serious violations of international humanitarian law” both require the existence of an armed conflict as a condition of applicability, therefore this will be discussed separately at the beginning of this section. The crimes under Sierra Leonean law cover offences relating to the abuse of girls and wanton destruction of property, taken from Sierra Leone legislation dating from 1926 and 1861 respectively; these are the only crimes under Sierra Leone law over which the Special Court has jurisdiction.¹¹⁶

This selection of subject matter jurisdiction was done to pre-empt any challenge to the Court’s legality on the basis of the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*,¹¹⁷ since the acts these provisions are purporting to address had been criminalised at the time those acts were allegedly committed.¹¹⁸ It should be emphasised that the Statute of the Special Court does not create the crimes to which it refers: rather, articles 2 to 5 of the Statute simply provide that the Special Court has jurisdiction over pre-existing crimes. Therefore, an examination of the applicability and content of the norms referred to within the Statute – whether as a result of customary international law or voluntary adoption of norms by Sierra Leone – is necessary to determine the elements of the crimes.

¹¹³ UN Doc. S/2000/786, ‘Framework for the Special Court’, para. 3.

¹¹⁴ Crimes against humanity (article 2); violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (article 3); and other serious violations of international humanitarian law (article 4).

¹¹⁵ See, for example, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone*, UN Doc. S/2000/915, para. 12.

¹¹⁶ This may leave a gap in accountability for violations committed during the conflict, leaving aside the question of the Lomé Amnesty for now. For example, if a person is tried for murder as a crime against humanity before the Special Court and the contextual elements are not proven, that person must be acquitted. The Special Court has no jurisdiction to find that person guilty of murder under Sierra Leone law. However, the *non bis in idem* principle then bars any trial of that person in domestic courts for murder based on the same facts. See the Statute, article 9(1): “No person shall be tried before a national court of Sierra Leone for acts for which he or she has already been tried by the Special Court.”

¹¹⁷ According to this principle, nobody may be found guilty of a criminal offence for acts that were not criminalised, whether under national or international law, at the time of their commission: see the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, article 15(1).

¹¹⁸ One of the indictees has filed a motion challenging the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the recruitment of children, submitting that this was not a crime under customary international law at the time of the alleged commission of the alleged acts. Oral arguments were heard in November 2003 and, at the time of writing, the Judges of the Appeals Chamber have not yet decided the matter.



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Thus the elements elaborated below are drawn primarily from the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which are the best current indication of customary international law, and the decisions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. While their decisions are not binding *per se* on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, they are persuasive. According to the Statute, the Appeals Chamber “shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda”;¹¹⁹ furthermore, it is also in the interests of certainty of the law and consistency of the application of its provisions that the Special Court for Sierra Leone follow these decisions.

4.a The existence and nature of an armed conflict: the law

International humanitarian law applies during times of armed conflict, whether international or non-international in nature. The exception to this is crimes against humanity, namely certain acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, and genocide, namely certain acts committed against a national, racial, ethnic or religious group with the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part, as such.¹²⁰ According to customary international law, the prohibitions against these acts apply during times of war and times of peace.¹²¹ In all other cases, however, in order to apply these norms, it must first be determined whether an armed conflict existed, before going on to consider whether the conflict was international or non-international in nature.

The ICTY considered the definition of an armed conflict early in its history and stated the following:

“[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring states or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.”¹²²

International humanitarian law draws a distinction between international armed conflicts, i.e. those between two or more States, and non-international armed conflicts, i.e. those between a State and a non-State organised armed group or between such groups. The majority of provisions in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol I apply only to international armed conflicts.

¹¹⁹ Statute of the Special Court, article 20(3).

¹²⁰ See the Genocide Convention 1949.

¹²¹ The ICTY Statute limits the jurisdiction of that Tribunal to crimes against humanity committed in the context of an armed conflict (see article 5) but the Statute of the Special Court contains no such limitation, so this aspect of ICTY jurisprudence will not be discussed in the present report.

¹²² *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995 (*Tadic* Jurisdiction Decision), para.70.



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Nonetheless, article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II lay down a set of basic minimum rules and basic protections applicable in any armed conflict.¹²³

Whether an armed conflict is international or non-international in nature depends on the parties to the conflict. In essence, a conflict will be “international” when it is conducted between two or more States and will be “non-international” when it is conducted between a State and another armed force not qualified as a State or between such forces.¹²⁴ The character of a conflict can change during its course from being non-international in nature to being international in nature.¹²⁵ In the *Tadic* decision, the ICTY Appeals Chamber specifically addressed the question of when a conflict that is *prima facie* internal in nature may be regarded as involving forces acting on behalf of a foreign power, thereby rendering the conflict international in nature.¹²⁶ The Appeals Chamber identified three specific tests concerning the necessary degree of control by a foreign power to determine whether this had occurred, namely overall control of an armed group or individuals; specific instructions to an armed group or individuals; and actual behaviour of an armed group or individuals, irrespective of any specific instructions.

The Statute of the Special Court only gives the Court jurisdiction over crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. Particularly given the three-part test identified by the Appeals Chamber, it is debatable whether the drafters of the Statute for the Special Court should have limited the jurisdiction of the Special Court only to crimes committed within an non-international armed conflict. A more sensible approach would have been to leave that determination to the Special Court itself, so it could have applied the test of whether the conflict was rendered international in nature on the basis of evidence presented to it.

4.b The existence and nature of an armed conflict: the facts

It seems almost counter-intuitive to be asking the question of whether an armed conflict existed in Sierra Leone. The facts as adduced in this report, including the descriptions of fighting between various forces at different times, as well as the numerous public reports from the media, human rights organisations and others seem to negate the need for even raising the issue. Nevertheless, it is important to examine this question, in particular to determine when the conflict began, which determines when international humanitarian law begins to apply, and also to determine the nature of

¹²³ *Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic*, Case No. IT-98-34, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 March 2003, para. 228.

¹²⁴ *Prosecutor v Kayishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-1, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 170.

¹²⁵ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 84. In addition, there can be both non-international and international armed conflicts taking place side by side. Note, however, that the ICTY Appeals Chamber discussed the issue of the applicable law in such a situation. Addressing the argument that the existence of two types of conflicts meant the application of two different legal regimes in the same place at the same time, the Appeals Chamber stated that such an interpretation would “authorize the International Tribunal to prosecute and punish certain conduct in an international armed conflict, while turning a blind eye to the very same conduct in an internal armed conflict” (para. 78). This led the Appeals Chamber to consider that “to the extent possible, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Tribunal should extend to both internal and international armed conflicts” (*Ibid.*).

¹²⁶ See *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, point IV.B.3.



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the conflict, in order to determine what provisions of international humanitarian law are applicable.¹²⁷

4.b.i Existence of an armed conflict

As noted, an armed conflict is deemed to have begun whenever there is “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”¹²⁸ Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) forces coming from Liberia first entered Sierra Leone through Kailahun District on 23 March 1991, at which time they engaged the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) in battle. From the very beginning, the RUF was organised according to a military structure, including identifiable chains of command, rules of engagement and disciplinary structures. From that time, RUF/NPFL forces would spread throughout the country, engaging the SLA in battle and establishing their own bases, including for recruiting and training.

As the conflict progressed, different fighting factions became involved, including loosely organised groups of local hunters and “vigilantes”; the more organised and structured Civil Defence Forces; the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), who took over power during a coup in May 1997; Nigerian and Guinean forces, both independently at the invitation of the Sierra Leone Government and as part of ECOMOG; Executive Outcomes, the South African private military company who entered Sierra Leone under contract with the Sierra Leone Government; and the United Nations military peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL). Some of these armed forces and groups would, at different points, also begin fighting each other, notably the Civil Defence Forces and the SLA, both before and after the establishment of the AFRC during the coup of May 1997.

Thus to greater and lesser degrees from 1991 there was protracted armed violence between both governmental authorities and organised armed groups¹²⁹ on the one hand and between such groups¹³⁰ within the territory of Sierra Leone on the other hand. It is therefore clear that an armed conflict began in Sierra Leone in March 1991, thereby triggering the application of international humanitarian law.

The question of when the armed conflict ended turns on when a general conclusion of peace was reached or when a peaceful settlement was achieved.¹³¹ At various times throughout the conflict, attempts were made to reach a peaceful settlement between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone. A number of ceasefires were declared and peace agreements were negotiated and signed, notably in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, on 30 November 1996 and in Lomé, Togo, on 7 July 1999.¹³²

¹²⁷ It should of course be remembered that for crimes against humanity, customary international law does not require the existence of an armed conflict; rather, it requires a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and that prohibited acts be committed as part of that attack.

¹²⁸ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995, para.70

¹²⁹ For example, RUF/NPFL v SLA; RUF v SLA; RUF v CDF; RUF/AFRC v CDF; RUF v SLA/ULIMO; RUF v ECOMOG; SLA v CDF.

¹³⁰ For example, RUF/NPFL v local hunters/vigilantes.

¹³¹ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995, para.70

¹³² The ECOWAS Six-month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone, signed in Conakry, Guinea, on 23 October 1997, should also be noted in this context.



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None of the agreements would last for any appreciable length of time, instead taking on the appearance of temporary lulls in the fighting, during which each of the armed forces and groups would regroup, sometimes retrain and on all occasions prepare for further fighting.

By the end of 2001, disarmament was well under way in all Districts across the country, leading the President of Sierra Leone to declare an official end to the war during a symbolic weapons-burning ceremony on 18 January 2002. Such a declaration does not necessarily mean that an armed conflict has concluded, as this falls to be determined by whether there is a general conclusion of peace or a peaceful settlement. Nevertheless, those conditions had clearly been met by that time, therefore this report is taking 18 January 2002 as the date on which the armed conflict ended.

4.b.ii Nature of the armed conflict

The fact that there was a non-international armed conflict – that is, between government authorities and organised armed groups – is clear. The more complex question is whether the armed conflict was international in nature at any point and, if so, when and for how long.

Because the Special Court only has jurisdiction over those crimes specifically included in the Statute, the answer to this question does not have a practical effect on the work of the Court. Nevertheless, it is useful from the perspective of contextualising the conflict in Sierra Leone and, furthermore, as an indication of whether international or internationalised courts should have jurisdiction over all crimes under international humanitarian law and then determine on the basis of evidence presented to them whether a conflict was international or non-international in nature.

The test of whether an armed conflict is an international armed conflict is based on the presence of forces that are under the control of a foreign power. This falls to be determined by who was controlling the different fighting factions at any given time, for which the ICTY has identified a test consisting of three parts, namely:

1. Overall control of an armed group or individuals;
2. Specific instructions to an armed group or individuals; and
3. Actual behaviour of an armed group or individuals, irrespective of any specific instructions.¹³³

Factual information gathered in Sierra Leone reveals very clearly that the RUF was operating under direct orders from Charles Taylor, the leader of the NPFL¹³⁴ to greater and lesser degrees throughout the entire conflict, particularly during the early years of the conflict. Indeed, NPFL forces had entered Sierra Leone together with the RUF in 1991 under the direct orders of their leader. Throughout the conflict, logistics and weapons were supplied from Liberia – first through the NPFL and subsequently through the Liberian President, who was the former NPFL leader – in exchange for property taken by RUF/NPFL forces and later by RUF forces from civilians and other commodities, in particular diamonds mined throughout the country.

¹³³ See *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, point IV.B.3.

¹³⁴ This section does not consider the position of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) or other foreign forces engaged in Sierra Leone, which is also beyond the scope of this report.



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Therefore, given that the test of control is satisfied, the conflict in Sierra Leone was international in nature during those periods when Charles Taylor was an official of the State of Liberia. For those periods when he was not an official of the State of Liberia, even during times when the NPFL controlled up to 90% of the territory, there is at least a question about the nature of the conflict, although the answer to this question is beyond the scope of this report. However, as noted, the fact that the conflict was international in nature for at least some periods of time does not alter the crimes over which the Special Court has jurisdiction and it is those crimes that this report will focus on in the following sections.

4.b.iii Conclusion

The facts clearly demonstrate that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone from 23 March 1991 until the most definitive statement of peace, namely in 18 January 2002. In addition, albeit with less clarity, the facts also demonstrate that at times, this armed conflict was international in character, at the very least from 1997 until sometime in 2001. Given this, international humanitarian law began to apply in Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991 and continued to apply across the whole territory until 18 January 2002.

4.c Crimes Against Humanity (Article 2): The law

Article 2 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone reads as follows:

“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population:

- (a) Murder;
- (b) Extermination;
- (c) Enslavement;
- (d) Deportation;
- (e) Imprisonment;
- (f) Torture;
- (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence;
- (h) Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds;
- (i) Other inhumane acts.”

Aside from the Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, there is no other document defining crimes against humanity and their legal elements. There are eleven international texts defining the crimes and they all differ slightly. Although the term originated in the preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,¹³⁵ which codified then existing customary law relating to armed conflict, the crimes were first defined in article 6(c) of

¹³⁵ The preamble states that until a more complete code on the laws of war is established, “the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result ... from the laws of humanity”.



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the Nuremberg Charter following the end of World War II. The category of crimes has been included in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR and, in 1998, in the Rome Statute of the ICC.

The UN Secretary-General's report on the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone states that "The list of crimes against humanity follows the enumeration included in the Statutes of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, which were patterned on article 6 of the Nürnberg Charter."¹³⁶ Considerations on this by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and ICTR clearly state that these crimes had the status of customary international law as at the time of the establishment of those Tribunals, i.e. in 1993 and 1994 respectively.¹³⁷

4.c.i Contextual elements of crimes against humanity

There are two sets of elements for crimes against humanity; one of which may be described as the "contextual" elements; the other of which may be described as the elements of the acts enumerated in article 2 of the Special Court Statute. The contextual elements – spelt out in the chapeau to article 2 – must be met in all cases for an act to constitute a crime against humanity. These elements are:

1. There is an attack against a civilian population;
2. The attack is widespread or systematic;
3. The act in question was committed as part of that attack; and
4. The accused knew of the broader context in which his or her act is committed.

1. An attack against a civilian population

The "attack against a civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts enumerated in article 2.¹³⁸ Thus the "attack" does not refer to an armed conflict as such, or even to an armed attack or a military attack, but instead refers to one of the acts enumerated in article 2. As such, the attack does not need to be a physical attack but can consist of other forms of inhumane mistreatment of a civilian population.¹³⁹

Customary international law does not require that the attack itself be committed on discriminatory grounds.¹⁴⁰ The case law of the ICTR can be distinguished on this point, as the jurisdiction of the ICTR over crimes against humanity is limited solely to cases where the attack was carried out on discriminatory grounds.¹⁴¹ The Statute of the Special Court does not contain such a limitation, therefore, in keeping with customary international law, there is no requirement that the attack itself be committed on prohibited discriminatory grounds.

¹³⁶ *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone*, UN Doc. S/2000/915, para. 14.

¹³⁷ See, for example, the *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995 and *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 1 June 2001.

¹³⁸ See the preamble to the ICC Elements of Crimes.

¹³⁹ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 327.

¹⁴⁰ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 283, 292 and 305. See also *Prosecutor v Blaskić*, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 3 March 2000, paras 244, 260.

¹⁴¹ ICTR Statute, article 3. See also *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 464, footnote excluded.



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A “civilian population” refers to a population that is predominantly civilian in nature, i.e. that the people comprising the population do not take a direct part in the hostilities or no longer take a direct part in hostilities, including those who are placed *hors de combat*, namely those who are not fighting because they are wounded or otherwise incapacitated.¹⁴² The presence of non-civilians within the population will not deprive that population of its civilian character.¹⁴³ In addition, the specific situation of a victim at the time of the commission of a crime is the critical point at which to determine the person’s standing as a civilian rather than his or her general status.¹⁴⁴ The definition of “civilian” and “civilian population” is of critical importance in international humanitarian law, which prohibits targeting civilians, a civilian population and civilian objects, such as schools and hospitals. To constitute a crime against humanity, the civilian population must be the primary object of the attack, although it is not required that the entire population of a territory is victimised.¹⁴⁵

2. The attack is widespread or systematic

To fulfil the contextual elements for a crime against humanity, an attack must be *either* widespread *or* systematic, but does not have to be both.¹⁴⁶ ‘Widespread’ means that the attack takes place on a large scale and is perpetrated against a number of victims, whereas ‘systematic’ refers to an organised pattern of conduct.¹⁴⁷

Early jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals considered whether ‘systematic’ required the existence of a pre-conceived policy or plan, either of a State or some other organised group.¹⁴⁸ The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has concluded that while a widespread or systematic attack can be evidence of a pre-existing policy or plan, and in practical terms such a policy or plan would in all likelihood be necessary for an attack to be carried out in a widespread or systematic manner, such a policy or plan is not in itself a necessary element:

“There was nothing in the Statute or in customary international law at the time of the alleged acts which required proof of the existence of a plan or policy to commit these crimes ... proof that the attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was widespread or systematic, are legal elements of the crime. But to prove these elements, it is not necessary to show that they were the result of the existence of a policy or plan. It may be useful in establishing that the attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was widespread or systematic (especially the latter) to show that there was in fact a policy or plan, but it may be possible to prove these things by reference to other matters. Thus, the existence of a policy or plan may be evidentially relevant, but it is not a legal element of the crime.”¹⁴⁹

¹⁴² See, for example, common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols.

¹⁴³ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 638.

¹⁴⁴ *Prosecutor v Blaskić*, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 214.

¹⁴⁵ *Prosecutor v Bagilishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-1, ICTR Trial Chamber, 7 June 2001, para. 80.

¹⁴⁶ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 580. See also the Rome Statute, article 7.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ *Prosecutor v Kumaratunga*, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para. 98. In reaching this conclusion, the ICTY Appeals Chamber reviewed a wide range of precedents, including article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter; Nuremberg Judgement, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military



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3. The act was committed as “part of” the attack

An act must have been committed or intended to be committed as part of the attack against a civilian population to qualify as a crime against humanity. There must therefore be a nexus between the act and the attack,¹⁵⁰ namely that the act was related to the attack.¹⁵¹ As such, this excludes random or isolated acts – those not forming “part of” the attack – from the definition of crimes against humanity.

While the attack itself will generally involve a large number of acts, as evidenced by the definitions of ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’, a single act may constitute a crime against humanity if it is perpetrated as part of a larger attack. This has been made clear by the ICTY Trial Chamber, which stated that:

“Crimes against humanity are to be distinguished from war crimes against individuals. In particular, they must be widespread or demonstrate a systematic character. However, as long as there is a link with the widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime against humanity. As such, an individual committing a crime against a single victim or a limited number of victims might be recognised as guilty of a crime against humanity if his acts were part of the specific context identified above.”¹⁵²

4. The accused knew of the broader context in which his or her act was committed

As with most crimes, there is a mental element to crimes against humanity that must be satisfied in order for an accused to be found guilty of that crime. This element is twofold, namely that the accused acted with knowledge of the broader context of the attack and the accused knew that his or her act formed part of the attack on the civilian population.¹⁵³

Simple knowledge on the part of the accused is sufficient to satisfy this requirement; it is not necessary to show that the accused shared the purpose or goal behind the attack against the civilian population.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, the motive with which the accused commits the act is irrelevant. There is no requirement that an act must not have been carried out for purely personal reasons; the only requirement is that the act is related to the attack and the accused knows it is so related.¹⁵⁵

Tribunal, Nüremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1945, in particular, pp. 84, 254, 304 (*Streicher*) and 318-19 (*von Schirach*); Article II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No 10; *In re Ahlbrecht*, ILR 16/1949, 396; *Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia and Anor* (1991) 172 CLR 501; Case FC 91/026; *Attorney-General v Adolph Eichmann*, District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61; *Mugesera et al. v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration*, IMM-5946-98, 10 May 2001, Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division; *In re Trajkovic*, District Court of Gjilan (Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), P Nr 68/2000, 6 March 2001 plus various reports of the UN Secretary-General and the International Law Commission.

¹⁵⁰ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 251; *Prosecutor v Kordić*, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 33.

¹⁵¹ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 271.

¹⁵² *Prosecutor v Mrksić, Radi and Šljivančanin*, Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61, 3 April 1996, IT-95-13-R61, para. 30.

¹⁵³ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 656 and *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 331.

¹⁵⁴ *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 332.

¹⁵⁵ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 271, 272.



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This is made clear in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which states that: “The perpetrator *knew that the conduct was part of* or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.”¹⁵⁶ This is elaborated in the chapeau to the elements of crimes against humanity, which states that:

“[This element] should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization. In the case of an emerging widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, the intent clause of the last element indicates that this mental element is satisfied if the perpetrator intended to further such an attack.”¹⁵⁷

4.c.ii Elements of enumerated acts constituting crimes against humanity

Once the contextual elements are met, the elements of the acts that constitute crimes against humanity also have to be established. There are nine types of acts that can constitute a crime against humanity, as outlined in paragraphs (a) to (i) of article 2 of the Statute of the Special Court. Although not all of these acts have been considered by the ICTY or ICTR, they have all been elaborated in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC.

a) Crime against humanity of murder

The elements for the crime against humanity of murder are:¹⁵⁸

1. The perpetrator unlawfully killed or caused the death of one or more persons.
2. The perpetrator acted:
 - (a) With the intent to cause someone’s death; or
 - (b) With the intent to cause grievous bodily harm and with the knowledge that that bodily harm was likely to cause death and was reckless as to whether death would actually occur.¹⁵⁹
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

Customary international law does not require the element of premeditation for the crime against humanity of murder and, as such, all the different types of murder known to common law would satisfy this requirement.¹⁶⁰ This is mirrored in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which refer

¹⁵⁶ See, for example, the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(a), para. 3, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, p. 116 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁷ Chapeau of the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, p. 116.

¹⁵⁸ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(a) and below, note 68.

¹⁵⁹ See also the Rome Statute of the ICC, article 30 (2) for a description of the required *mens rea*.

¹⁶⁰ *Prosecutor v Kayishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-I, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 138. See also *Prosecutor v Kordic*, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 235 and *Prosecutor v Jelusic*, Case No. IT-95-10, ICTY Trial Chamber, 14 December 1999, para. 51. The decisions of the ICTR can be



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simply to “killing”, with a footnote indicating that this is interchangeable with the phrase “caused the death of”.¹⁶¹

b) Crime against humanity of extermination

The elements of the crime against humanity of extermination are:¹⁶²

1. The perpetrator unlawfully killed or caused the death of one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.
2. The conduct constituted, or took place as part of, a mass killing of members of a civilian population.
3. The perpetrator acted:
 - (a) With the intent to cause someone’s death; or
 - (b) With the intent to cause grievous bodily harm and with the knowledge that that bodily harm was likely to cause death and was reckless as to whether death would actually occur.
4. The accused acted with the knowledge that his or her act was part of a vast murderous enterprise in which a large number of individuals were systematically marked for killing or were killed.
5. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

Extermination contains an element of mass destruction, requiring that the act of extermination be “collective in nature rather than directed towards singled out individuals.”¹⁶³ This mass destruction can include direct killing of individuals but can also include causing the conditions of life calculated to bring about such destruction, for example by detaining individuals and withholding food or by introducing a deadly virus into a population and withholding vital medical supplies.¹⁶⁴ Generally, a numerically significant proportion of the population must be destroyed to constitute the crime against humanity of extermination.¹⁶⁵

distinguished on this point, as they have found that pursuant to the ICTR Statute, this crime requires an element of premeditation, due to the elements of the crime of *assassinat* under French law: see *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 588 and *Prosecutor v Kayishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-I, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, paras. 138-9 for discussions on this issue.

¹⁶¹ Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(a), para. 1.

¹⁶² See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(b), *Prosecutor v Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 229 (for the fourth element) and below, notes 72-6.

¹⁶³ *Prosecutor v Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment of 29 November 2002, para. 227.

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, *Kayishema* Judgment, para. 146.

¹⁶⁵ *Prosecutor v Krstic*, Case No. IT-98-33, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 503, *Prosecutor v Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 227. See, however, *Prosecutor v Stakic*, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 640, where the Trial



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The ICTY recently considered the crime against humanity of extermination in *Vasiljevic*, in particular the required level of participation of the accused. The Trial Chamber concluded that in order to be guilty of the crime against humanity of extermination, an accused person has to be responsible for a “large number of deaths”,¹⁶⁶ even if the accused’s involvement was remote or indirect. Further, the accused must have known of the “vast scheme of collective murder and have been willing to take part therein”.¹⁶⁷

c) Crime against humanity of enslavement

The elements of the crime against humanity of enslavement are:¹⁶⁸

1. The accused exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

The ICTY has held that the crime against humanity of enslavement has the same elements as the war crime of slavery and violates both treaty and custom based international humanitarian law.¹⁶⁹ Indeed, the prohibition against slavery is an “inalienable, non-derogable and fundamental right, one of the core rules of general customary and conventional international law”.¹⁷⁰

The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that “the traditional concept of slavery, as defined in the 1926 Slavery Convention and often referred to as “chattel slavery”, has evolved to encompass various contemporary forms of slavery which are also based on the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership.”¹⁷¹ Thus the indicia of slavery include the following: “control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour”.¹⁷² This is mirrored

Chamber considered this must be considered on a case-by-case basis and that no specific minimum number of victims is required.

¹⁶⁶ *Prosecutor v Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 227.

¹⁶⁷ *Prosecutor v Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 228; see also *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003. But see *Prosecutor v Stakic*, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 640, which specifically rejected the requirement of a “vast scheme of collective murder”.

¹⁶⁸ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(c) and below, notes 78 to 83.

¹⁶⁹ *Prosecutor v Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, paras. 352, 353.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, para. 353.

¹⁷¹ *Prosecutor v Kمارac et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 117.

¹⁷² *Ibid*, para. 119.



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in the footnote to the Elements of Crimes of the crime of humanity of slavery, which reads as follows:

“It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.”¹⁷³

Given that the definition of slavery is exercising “any or all” of the powers attaching to “ownership” over a person,¹⁷⁴ the exaction of forced labour from a person held captive would be sufficient to establish the commission of this crime, provided the other elements are also established. It should further be noted that the lack of consent is not an element of the crime, although “consent may be relevant from an evidential point of view as going to the question whether the Prosecutor has established the element of the crime relating to the exercise by the accused of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership.”¹⁷⁵

d) Crime against humanity of deportation

The elements of deportation as a crime against humanity are:¹⁷⁶

1. The accused deported, without grounds permitted under international law, one or more persons to another State, by expulsion or other coercive acts.
2. Such person or persons were lawfully present in the area from which they were so deported or transferred.
3. The accused was aware of the factual circumstances that established the lawfulness of such presence.¹⁷⁷
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

Deportation is to be distinguished from forcible transfer, with the former referring to the displacement of people across national borders and the latter simply referring to the forced movement of people, which can occur within the confines of national borders.¹⁷⁸ The ICTY has made it clear that “forced displacement” – charged in the *Krnjelac* case as persecution – is a stand-

¹⁷³ Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(c), footnote.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 120.

¹⁷⁶ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(d) and below, notes 86-7.

¹⁷⁷ This element is intended to clarify that the perpetrator does not need to be aware that the presence is lawful, just the facts that go to make up that lawfulness; in other words, the perpetrator does not need to make a legal determination that the victim is lawfully present in the area.

¹⁷⁸ *Prosecutor v. Krnjelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 474.



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alone crime and is not a lesser, included offence of deportation.¹⁷⁹ This is mirrored in the Rome Statute of the ICC, which refers to the crime against humanity of “deportation or forced transfer of population”.¹⁸⁰

e) Crime against humanity of imprisonment

The elements of imprisonment as a crime against humanity are:¹⁸¹

1. The accused imprisoned one or more persons or otherwise severely deprived one or more persons of their liberty.
2. The gravity of the conduct was such that it was in violation of fundamental rules of international law.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of the conduct.¹⁸²
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

The crime against humanity of imprisonment, which incorporates deprivation of liberty, has only been considered in two cases at the international criminal tribunals.¹⁸³ The ICTY has held that the elements of this crime are not limited by the elements of the similar crime of unlawful confinement, which is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, but that any form of arbitrary physical deprivation of liberty might constitute imprisonment.¹⁸⁴ This is mirrored in the Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in which the elements of this crime differ from those for the crime of unlawful confinement.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁹ The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has recently stated that “acts of forcible displacement underlying the crime of persecution ... are not limited to displacements across national borders”, without making a definitive pronouncement on the crime in general: *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 17 September 2003, para. 218. The recent Trial Chamber decision in *Stakic* held that the crime encompasses “forced population displacements both across internationally recognised borders and *de facto* borders, such as constantly changing frontlines, which are not internationally recognised *Prosecutor v Stakic*, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 679. While this may be indicative of evolving customary international law, the distinction between the crime of deportation and the crime of forced displacement is retained for the purposes of this report.

¹⁸⁰ Rome Statute of the ICC, article 7(1)(d).

¹⁸¹ See the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(e) and notes 91-6.

¹⁸² This element is intended to clarify that the perpetrator does not need to be aware that the conduct is in violation of fundamental rules of international law, just the facts that go to make up that violation; in other words, the perpetrator does not need to make a legal determination that his or her conduct violates international law.

¹⁸³ The first of these cases, *Kordic*, considered that this crime was identical in its elements to the crime of unlawful confinement as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, whereas the second case, *Krnojelac*, considered that imprisonment as a crime against humanity should not be limited by the elements of unlawful confinement as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.

¹⁸⁴ *Prosecutor v Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 112.

¹⁸⁵ See the Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(c) (imprisonment) and article 8(2)(a)(vii)-2 (unlawful confinement).



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One of the elements of the crime against humanity of imprisonment is that the deprivation of liberty is imposed arbitrarily, namely that no legal basis can be invoked to justify the deprivation of liberty.¹⁸⁶ Therefore, a determination has to be made regarding the legality of imprisonment as well as the procedural safeguards pertaining to the subsequent imprisonment of the person or group of persons in question,¹⁸⁷ including the fact that the deprivation may be initially justified but may become arbitrary “if the deprivation is being administered under serious disregard of fundamental procedural rights of the person deprived of his or her liberty as provided for under international law.”¹⁸⁸ This is mirrored in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which refers to the gravity of the conduct being in violation of fundamental rules of international law.¹⁸⁹

f) Crime against humanity of torture

The elements of the crime against humanity of torture are:¹⁹⁰

1. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator.
3. Such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

The essential element of the crime against humanity of torture is “the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental”.¹⁹¹ Torture can therefore be distinguished from ill treatment or other inhumane acts by the level of intensity of the pain or suffering inflicted; the standard adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, for example, is “very serious and cruel suffering”.¹⁹² The ICTY Appeals Chamber has also addressed this question, stating that, “In assessing the seriousness of any mistreatment, the Trial Chamber must first consider the objective severity of the harm inflicted. Subjective criteria, such as the physical or mental effect of the treatment upon the particular victim and, in some cases, factors such as the victim’s age, sex, or state of health will also be relevant in assessing the gravity of the harm.”¹⁹³ The ICTY Appeals Chamber

¹⁸⁶ *Prosecutor v Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 115 (footnote deleted).

¹⁸⁷ *Prosecutor v Kordic*, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 302-3.

¹⁸⁸ *Prosecutor v Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, footnote 347.

¹⁸⁹ Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(e), para. 2.

¹⁹⁰ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(f) and below, notes 99-113.

¹⁹¹ *Prosecutor v Kunarac et al.*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 142.

¹⁹² *Republic of Ireland v UK* (Series A, No 25), European Court of Human Rights, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, 18 January 1978.

¹⁹³ *Prosecutor v Kvočka et al.*, Case No. IT-98-30/1, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 November 2001, paras. 142-3.



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has further stated that rape, as an act necessarily implying pain and suffering, can amount to torture provided the other elements are established.¹⁹⁴

The Convention Against Torture, which requires States to criminalise torture as a self-standing offence, contains the element that the torture be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”.¹⁹⁵ However, both the ICTY Appeals Chamber¹⁹⁶ and the Elements of Crimes for the ICC¹⁹⁷ recognise that this element is applicable only to torture pursuant to the Convention and that customary international law does not impose such a limitation in the context of crimes against humanity.

Where the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence and the Elements of Crimes of the ICC diverge is on the question of whether a purpose is required as an element of this crime. Both the ICTY¹⁹⁸ and the ICTR¹⁹⁹ have held that one of four purposes is required for conduct to rise to the level of torture, namely that the conduct was committed for the purposes of 1) obtaining information or a confession from the victim or a third party; 2) punishing the victim or a third party; 3) intimidating or coercing the victim or a third party; or 4) for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, although the conduct need not have been committed solely for one of the prohibited purposes.²⁰⁰

The Elements of Crimes of the ICC, however, specifically states that “[i]t is understood no specific purpose need be proved for this crime”.²⁰¹ This was considered by the vast majority of delegations at the Preparatory Commission to reflect customary international law, in part because the Rome Statute – which includes only those crimes already established under customary international law – does not contain any reference to a purpose element.²⁰² This can be distinguished from the elements of the war crime of torture, which does contain the purpose requirement²⁰³ so as to distinguish it from inhuman treatment,²⁰⁴ which is included within the offence of torture.²⁰⁵ Nevertheless, for the purposes of crimes against humanity, the international community has affirmed that torture does not require that the conduct in question be carried out for any particular purpose.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁴ *Prosecutor v Kumarac et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, paras. 149-51.

¹⁹⁵ The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984, article 1(1). The Convention against Torture entered into force on 26 June 1987.

¹⁹⁶ *Prosecutor v Kumarac et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, paras. 142, 144-8.

¹⁹⁷ Elements of Crimes, Article 7(1)(f), p 119.

¹⁹⁸ *Prosecutor v Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 185.

¹⁹⁹ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 594.

²⁰⁰ *Prosecutor v Kumarac et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 155. These purposes are also included in the Convention Against Torture, article 1(1).

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, footnote.

²⁰² Lee, pp. 5 and 90-2. The Preparatory Committee also referred to the European Court of Human Rights, in particular the separate opinion of Fitzmaurice J in *Ireland v UK*, who stated that a certain purpose is not a necessary requirement and that the distinguishing feature of torture is its severity: Series A, o.25 (1976), pp. 129 ff.

²⁰³ Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(a)(ii)-1, para. 2.

²⁰⁴ Lee, p. 91.

²⁰⁵ The Rome Statute of the ICC, article 8(2)(a)(ii), prohibits “torture or inhuman treatment”.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p 92.



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g.i) Crime against humanity of rape

The elements of the crime against humanity of rape are:²⁰⁷

1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight:
 - (a) of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ; or
 - (b) of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

Much of the jurisprudence of the ICTR about this crime has focused on the discussion of whether rape should be defined as a contextual framework, or whether the elements of the crime should be explicitly defined. The general trend at the ICTR has been to adopt a contextual framework, according to which rape is defined as “the physical invasion of a sexual nature committed under circumstances that are coercive”.²⁰⁸

However, the ICTY Appeals Chamber, considering this matter in the context of common elements in national legislation and the trend for States to broaden the definition of rape, which has as its core element forced physical penetration, has followed the approach of defining the elements of the crime. Thus, the Appeals Chamber held that rape means the non-consensual penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of the victim by the perpetrator’s penis or another object used by the perpetrator, or of the victim’s mouth by the perpetrator’s penis.²⁰⁹ Consent must be given freely and voluntarily, which must be assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.²¹⁰

The question of consent is further addressed in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court, which set out the following guiding principles:

- “(i) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine consent;

²⁰⁷ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(g)-1 and below, notes 115-9.

²⁰⁸ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 598.

²⁰⁹ *Prosecutor v Kimeru et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, paras. 127-8.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, para. 120.



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- (ii) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent;
- (iii) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence;
- (iv) Credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim or witness cannot be inferred by reason of [the] sexual nature of the prior or subsequent conduct of a victim or witness.²¹¹

It is submitted that explicitly stating the elements of the crime, rather than adopting a loose conceptual framework, is the more appropriate approach, as it gives more certainty to the law in respect of this crime. Indeed, this is the approach adopted in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which also incorporates aspects of the contextual approach and, as such, better reflects customary international law.

g.ii) Crime against humanity of sexual slavery

The elements of the crime against humanity of sexual slavery are:²¹²

1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.
2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

While the crime of sexual slavery is not addressed in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, it is nevertheless comprehensively addressed in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC. While not explicitly stated in the elements, the framers understood that “deprivation of liberty” in this context may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.²¹³

g.iii) Crime against humanity of enforced prostitution

The elements of the crime against humanity of enforced prostitution are:²¹⁴

²¹¹ Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court, rule 96. Unlike the ICTR, however, evidence of consent does not first have to be raised before a Judge in Chambers: cf. ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 96. For further reading, see the Lawyers’ Guide, available from www.specialcourt.org.

²¹² See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(g)-2.

²¹³ *Ibid*, footnote 18.

²¹⁴ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(g)-3.



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1. The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person's or persons' incapacity to give genuine consent.
2. The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts of a sexual nature.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

g.iv) Crime against humanity of forced pregnancy

The elements of the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy are:²¹⁵

1. The perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law.
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

g.v) Crime against humanity of other forms of sexual violence

The elements of the crime against humanity of other forms of sexual violence are:²¹⁶

1. The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature.
2. The act was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person's or persons' incapacity to give genuine consent.
3. Such conduct was of a gravity comparable to the other offences in article 2(g) of the Statute of the Special Court.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of the conduct.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(g)-4.

²¹⁶ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(g)-6 and below, note 126.

²¹⁷ This element is intended to clarify that the perpetrator does not need to be aware that the conduct is in violation of fundamental rules of international law, just the facts that go to make up that violation; in other words, the perpetrator does not need to make a legal determination that his or her conduct violates international law.



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5. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

The crime of other forms of sexual violence has been addressed in the ICTR, which has held that sexual violence is any act of a sexual nature that is committed on a person under circumstances that are coercive.²¹⁸ In addition, the crime of other forms of sexual violence is comprehensively addressed in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC.

h) Crime against humanity of persecution

The elements of the crime against humanity of persecution are:²¹⁹

1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or more persons of fundamental rights.
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, or religious grounds.
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

The crime of persecution is premised on the discriminatory intent of the perpetrator. Thus both acts enumerated in article 2 of the Special Court Statute as well as other acts can constitute persecution when they are carried out against a particular group on prohibited discriminatory grounds, namely on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds. Indeed, the ICTY has characterised persecution as follows: "Persecution is grounded in discrimination. It is based on the notion that people who share ethnic, racial or religious bonds different to those of the dominant group are to be treated as inferior to the latter. In the crime of persecution, this discriminatory intent is aggressively achieved by grossly and systematically trampling upon the fundamental human rights of the victim group."²²⁰

The material element of persecution as a crime against humanity, in addition to the requirement that the acts be carried out on discriminatory grounds, is that there is a gross or blatant denial of a fundamental right laid down in customary international law or conventional law, reaching the same level of gravity as other enumerated acts.²²¹ The acts that constitute persecution need not themselves be physical acts and must be evaluated in context by looking at their overall cumulative

²¹⁸ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 688; sexual violence can also fall within the scope of "other inhumane acts" (para. 688).

²¹⁹ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(h) and below, notes 128-40.

²²⁰ *Prosecutor v Kupreskic*, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 751.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, para. 621. See also the Elements of Crimes of the ICC for the crime against humanity of persecution.



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effects,²²² rather than the effect of one specific act. Indeed, it is a requirement that the *effect* of the acts be discriminatory; discriminatory intent is not itself sufficient to warrant characterising an act as persecution, the act must also have discriminatory consequences.²²³

The question of which grounds are prohibited is not a closed issue and customary international law has developed to the extent where, in addition to those grounds listed in article 2(h) of the Special Court Statute, the following grounds are also prohibited: cultural, gender and other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international law.²²⁴ The restriction of the grounds in the Statute of the Special Court can therefore be seen as a jurisdictional limitation only, similar to the requirement of a nexus with an armed conflict in the ICTY Statute²²⁵ and the requirement that the attack itself be committed on discriminatory grounds in the ICTR Statute.²²⁶

Early jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR considered the question of whether discriminatory intent was required for *all* crimes against humanity,²²⁷ not just for persecution. The Trial Chambers initially adopted the position that not only did the attack have to be carried out on discriminatory grounds²²⁸ but that each of the enumerated acts also had to be committed with discriminatory intent to constitute a crime against humanity. However, the Appeals Chamber of both the ICTY²²⁹ and the ICTR²³⁰ overturned this position, holding that the perpetrator did not have to have discriminatory intent each time an act constituting a crime against humanity was committed, in part because this would render the crime of persecution redundant.

i) Crime against humanity of other inhumane acts

The elements of the crime against humanity of inhumane acts are:²³¹

1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act.
2. Such act was of a character, i.e. in terms of gravity and nature, similar to any other act referred to in article 2.

²²² *Prosecutor v Kupreskic*, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 622 and *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 349.

²²³ *Prosecutor v Krijeljic*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 432. See also *Prosecutor v Stakic*, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 733.

²²⁴ See the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(h).

²²⁵ ICTY Statute, article 5; see also *Prosecutor v Kupreskic*, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 545.

²²⁶ ICTR Statute, article 3; see also *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 580.

²²⁷ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 May 1997 and *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998.

²²⁸ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 578.

²²⁹ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 305.

²³⁰ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 464.

²³¹ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(i) and below, notes 143-4.



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3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the character of the act.²³²
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

This is a “catch-all” provision that covers all other acts of similar gravity that are not enumerated in article 2. The International Law Commission has noted the impossibility of listing all the various acts that may fall within this category of crimes against humanity, stating that it includes “acts of similar gravity that are intended to cause and in fact actually cause injury to a human being in terms of physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity”.²³³ This has been followed in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR and in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which provides greater guidance as to what may constitute an inhumane act.

There must be some nexus between the act and the suffering of the victim, which does not necessarily require physical injury to the victim as such. Mental injury consequent on witnessing acts committed against other people may constitute an inhumane act where the perpetrator intended to inflict suffering on the victim or knew such suffering was likely to occur and was reckless as to whether that suffering would result.²³⁴

4.d Crimes Against Humanity (Article 2): The facts

The accusation of having committed a crime against humanity is a very serious one; indeed, it could be said that it is the most serious crime over which the Special Court has jurisdiction. In order for an act to be considered a crime against humanity, there is no need that it occur in the context of or be associated with an armed conflict of any type. Rather, what needs to be demonstrated is that the prohibited act was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and that the accused knew of the broader context in which his or her act is committed.

An analysis of the individual events that occurred across the whole of Sierra Leone shows very clearly that the same patterns were employed time and again throughout the country and throughout the conflict. In order for satisfy the contextual elements for crimes against humanity, there must be a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.²³⁵ An attack against the civilian population is different from an armed attack or a military attack; in fact, as noted, the existence of an

²³² This element is intended to clarify that the perpetrator does not need make a legal determination that his or her conduct constitutes a crime against humanity.

²³³ ILC Commentary on article 18 to the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. See also *Prosecutor v Kupreskic*, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 566, for a discussion of what might constitute an inhumane act falling within this category.

²³⁴ *Prosecutor v Kayishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-1, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 153. This is reflected in article 30 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, dealing with the *mens rea* of the perpetrator.

²³⁵ In the following analysis, only those acts committed by the fighting forces concerned that were committed in relation to such an attack and with the knowledge of the broader context of the attack have been characterised as crimes against humanity.



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armed conflict is not an element of crimes against humanity. Rather, an attack consists of prohibited acts being committed against a civilian population on a widespread or systematic basis.

For the purposes of this report, the conflict has been analysed according to patterns of conduct and patterns of attack over time and over geographical space, based on a strict application of the law to the facts. The attacks have therefore been identified based on whether similar conduct was occurring at the same time in different locations, at different times in the same location, or against a large number of victims at different times in different locations; such attacks satisfy either the widespread or systematic requirement, or both. In identifying such attacks, this report errs on the side of caution: there are a number of other potential attacks that took place during the conflict in Sierra Leone that have not been included in this discussion because the facts as analysed in this report do not necessarily yield the level of certainty about the widespread or systematic nature of the attack required to sustain a criminal conviction.

The information gathered for this report reveals that there were two general attacks against the civilian population: one by the RUF and one by the CDF. A series of more specific attacks was also committed by each faction within the context of those broader attacks. In the case of the other fighting factions, it was not possible to identify general attacks against a civilian population stretching over a period of years. The West Side Boys committed an attack against the civilian population during the period spanning late 1998 to early 1999. In the case of the SLA, there were clearly a number of specific attacks committed against the civilian population between 1991 and 1996. However, for ECOMOG, it was not possible to identify any attack committed against the civilian population on a widespread or systematic basis, although there are numerous incidents of specific acts being committed against civilians, which are examined in the section on war crimes.

The selection of the specific attacks for analysis has been undertaken on the basis of the proportion of attacks committed by each faction. An examination of the conflict as a whole reveals the commission of 33 discrete widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population:²³⁶ 21 committed by the RUF and their allies; eight committed by the SLA; three committed by the CDF and one committed by the West Side Boys. Accordingly, the legal analysis below reflects the fact that more crimes were committed by the RUF without absolving the members of any other fighting faction of responsibility for the crimes that they committed. Similarly, the description of specific crimes in the various categories of crimes against humanity are not exhaustive of *all* the crimes committed during a particular attack, but are highlighted as representative examples of the types of crimes that were committed.²³⁷

4.d.i Crimes Against Humanity Committed by members of the RUF, the RUF/NPFL and the RUF/AFRC

The RUF, joined by the NPFL between 1991 and 1993 and the AFRC from 1997 onwards, committed a general attack against the civilian population lasting from 1991 until 2000. This attack

²³⁶ As noted, these attacks were selected on the basis of a strict application of the law to the facts as analysed in this report. Nevertheless, based on the information gathered, any additional attacks that may have taken place are unlikely to alter significantly the proportion of attacks committed by each faction.

²³⁷ All of the specific examples listed in these sections are detailed in the factual analysis.



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was both widespread, in that it took place on a large scale and with a multiplicity of victims, *and* systematic, in that it constituted an organised pattern of conduct. That there was a policy to attack the civilian population is clearly demonstrated by the targeting of civilians in virtually every month in every District in which the RUF or their allies had a presence, particularly during military advances and retreats, but also when military manoeuvres were not being undertaken. Those instances in which there was relative calm usually represent periods during which the RUF was regrouping and rearming or periods during which the population had fled. During the period spanning from 1991 to 2000, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional and reckless killings of thousands of civilians;
- (b) **Extermination**, for several mass killing events, namely the gathering of hundreds of civilians at different times in different locations to be shot or hacked to death;
- (c) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of thousands of civilians and their use as porters, cooks, food-gatherers, domestic work, construction work and for similar purposes;²³⁸
- (d) **Rape**, for the rape of hundreds of women and girls, including girls aged below 14, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of hundreds of women and girls as “wives”, for sexual violence, including numerous incidents of sexual abuse and sexual assault, including forcing people to have sex with members of their own families;
- (e) **Imprisonment**, for the arrest and detention of hundreds of civilians, who were held for weeks without charge;
- (f) **Torture**, for the infliction of pain and suffering on people under RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC custody and control, including severe beatings and floggings, dripping melted plastic or rubber into people’s eyes and onto people’s bodies and a range of other equally grave acts;
- (g) **Other inhumane acts**, for the variety of severe acts of violence committed against civilians throughout the attack, including mutilation, amputation, beatings, floggings and a range of other similar acts as well as for the effect on the population of cannibalism, drinking blood, displaying internal organs and severed heads at checkpoints, parading severed heads around villages and forcing civilians to sing and dance at gunpoint in celebration of the actions of the RUF/NPFL, the RUF and the RUF/AFRC.

Within that general attack, there were a series of specific attacks committed against the civilian population. Of the 21 identified attacks committed against the civilian population,²³⁹ six will be

²³⁸ The crime of enslavement requires that the perpetrator exercise any or all of the powers of ownership over the abducted person. As such, this report does not characterise as enslavement the thousands of incidences where civilians were abducted but the purpose is not revealed; in addition, it does not characterise as enslavement the thousands of incidences where civilians were abducted and forced to carry loads for a short period of time before being released.

²³⁹ Those attacks that are not discussed in detail in this report are: the RUF/NPFL attack in Kailahun, Kenema and Pujehun Districts from January to June 1992; the RUF/NPFL attack from May 1992 to early 1993, primarily the movement from Kailahun to Kono District; the RUF/NPFL attack in Pujehun District from December 1992 to the end of January 1993; the RUF attack across several Districts from December 1993 to September 1994; the RUF attack on Bo from January 1995 to April 1996; the RUF attack from May to June 1995 in Port Loko, Bombali and Koinadugu Districts following the failure to take Freetown; the RUF attack in Kono District from April to



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discussed below as being representative of the types of actions carried out by the RUF/NPFL, the RUF and the RUF/AFRC throughout the conflict. It should, however, be emphasised that the selection of these attacks is in no way intended to reflect any judgment about the relative importance of the attacks not selected for further exploration.

a) The RUF/NPFL attack from March to July 1991

In March 1991, the RUF/NPFL entered Sierra Leone from Liberia, arriving first in Kailahun and Pujehun Districts and spreading across Bonthe, Bo, Kenema and Kono Districts before being gradually pushed back in early August. During that time, the pattern of conduct employed by the RUF/NPFL reveals a clear policy to direct attacks against the civilian population, as evidenced by the abduction, killing, sexual assault, massive burning of houses and countless other actions inflicted on civilians. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/NPFL committed the following crimes against humanity:

- a) **Murder**, for the numerous intentional and reckless killings of civilians, including the killing of 100 people in Pujehun District in July 1991 and the killing of 62 people in Kailahun District in June 1991;
- b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of hundreds of civilians and their use as porters, guides, food-gatherers and similar purposes, including the abduction of 800 civilians to work in farms in Kailahun District in July 1991;
- c) **Imprisonment**, for the detention of children who refused to be conscripted in Kailahun District in May 1991;
- d) **Torture**, for the numerous beatings administered to people under the control of the RUF, for the dripping of rubber or plastic into people's eyes in Bonthe District in May 1991 and for tying a man up under the sun for one week in Bo District in May 1991;
- e) **Rape**, for the rape and sexual assault of dozens of women, including the rape of a 10-year-old girl in Kailahun District in May 1991, and for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as "wives";
- f) **Other inhumane acts**, for ordering people to dance while women were being raped in Pujehun District in June 1991 and for the effect on the population of frequent acts of cannibalism.

b) The "TAP" operation: April 1992 to May 1993

From April 1992 to May 1993, successive groups of NPFL forces committed an ongoing attack against the civilian population, which was striking in terms of the similarity of the conduct

September 1995; the RUF attack in Moyamba District from August 1995; the RUF attack in the northern Districts in the lead up to elections from January to February 1996; the RUF/AFRC attack from May to December 1997 in Freetown, during which journalists and civil society were particularly targeted; the RUF/AFRC attack from July to January 1998 in District Headquarter towns in Bonthe, Kailahun, Kenema, Tonkolili, Bo and Pujehun Districts; the RUF/AFRC attack from February to November 1998, during which there named policies to commit certain acts, including "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Pay Yourself"; the RUF/AFRC attack in the Northern Province from February 1999 to February 2000; the RUF/AFRC attack in Kono District for the purposes of mining from 1999 to March 2001; and the RUF/AFRC attack on the Northern Province from May to November 2000.



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employed, including cannibalism, and the brutality inflicted on civilian men, women and children in the areas of Kailahun District over which the RUF/NPFL forces exercised control. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the NPFL committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional killing of scores of people, including people who tried to escape, people who were abducted for use as porters and people selected for their large size in Penguia Chiefdom in May 1992;
- (b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of dozens of people for use as porters;
- (c) **Torture**, for the infliction of severe pain and suffering on people under RUF control, including the severe cutting of people's flesh and dripping melted plastic or rubber into people's eyes in Luawa Chiefdom;
- (d) **Rape**, for the rape of dozens of women, including young girls, and often by multiple assailants, including the rape of women by multiple assailants in Penguia Chiefdom in May 1992 and the rape of a woman in Kissi Teng Chiefdom in February 1993;
- (e) **Other inhumane acts**, for cooking people alive, pounding a baby in a mortar and for the effect on the population of frequent acts of cannibalism, including the people who had been selected for their large size in Penguia Chiefdom in May 1992.

c) RUF attack between December 1994 and May 1995

From the end of 1994, the RUF had consolidated its control over Kailahun, Pujehun and Kenema Districts. From there, they expanded across Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba and Port Loko Districts in a clear push towards Freetown, which culminated in April 1995 in attacks on settlements in the Western Area. Throughout this westward expansion and their subsequent retreat on being repelled from the Western Area, the RUF engaged in an attack on the civilian population in towns through which they passed. This attack was both widespread, in that it affected a large area of the country and a large number of victims, and systematic, in terms of the remarkable similarity among the acts carried out across these Districts. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional and reckless killing of thousands of people, including the killing of dozens of civilians at an IDP camp in Bo District in 1994;
- (b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of hundreds of people for use as porters, food-gatherers and cooks;
- (c) **Rape**, for the rape of scores of women and girls, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as "wives" and for sexual violence, including forcing people to have sex with their own family members;
- (d) **Torture**, for beatings and other acts inflicting pain and suffering on people under RUF control, including dripping melted plastic in people's eyes,
- (e) **Other inhumane acts**, including amputation of limbs, branding people with hot irons and carving words on their bodies with razor blades.

d) RUF attack on Bonthe District: 1995

Throughout 1995, the RUF were progressively taking firm control of Bonthe District; their arrival in towns across the District was accompanied by severe brutality against civilians and the deposing and



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replacement of traditional authorities. The attack was carried out in a systematic manner, in that it was clearly conducted according to an organised plan. From January to November, not a month passed without significant violations being committed against the civilian population. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including the killing of 300 people in Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom) in February;
- (b) **Extermination**, for rounding up thousands of civilians from many different places and killing hundreds of them in Bauya Junction (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom) in October;
- (c) **Enslavement**, for abducting civilians and forcing them to work, including as food-gatherers, cooks and porters;
- (d) **Rape**, for the rape of scores of women and girls, including the rape of young girls in front of their parents, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as “wives” and for sexual violence, including forcing people to have sex with their own family members;
- (e) **Other inhumane acts**, for the amputation of limbs, for the effect on the population of leaving mutilated corpses on the road, for severe beatings and for pouring petrol over a man and setting him on fire.

e) RUF/AFRC Attack in May and June 1997

On 25 May 1997, the AFRC staged a military coup, and were joined in power soon after by the RUF, thereby establishing a presence in areas previously held by the SLA. Between the end of May and the middle of June, the RUF/AFRC staged a sharp and brutal attack against the civilian population across the country that would affect every District to greater and lesser degrees. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including reprisal killings against civilians for failing to be “sufficiently supportive”, the killing of civilians deemed to be “enemy collaborators” and civilians who refused to work;
- (b) **Enslavement**, for the use of civilians as food-gatherers, cooks and porters;
- (c) **Imprisonment**, for the arbitrary arrest and detention without charge of dozens of journalists, lawyers and civil society activists;
- (d) **Torture**, for the infliction of severe pain and suffering on people detained by the RUF/AFRC, including severe beatings;
- (e) **Rape**, for the rape and sexual abuse of dozens of women, including young girls, and the padlocking of women’s genital areas in Pujehun District;
- (f) **Other inhumane acts**, for the mutilation of several civilians, the amputation of one or more of their limbs, the effect on the population of displaying people’s intestines at checkpoints and forcing people under gunpoint to dance and sing in support of the RUF/AFRC.

f) RUF/AFRC Attack from December 1998 to January 1999

From December 1998, the RUF/AFRC orchestrated a campaign to retake Freetown, moving from various Districts, particularly in the north, towards the Western Area. As they advanced, as well as during their retreat, the RUF/AFRC implemented a systematic attack against the civilian population



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that reached its peak during the invasion and brief occupation of parts of Freetown. This attack was striking particularly in terms of the sheer number of acts committed against the population and the destruction wrought in such a short period of time. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including alleged “enemy collaborators” and the killing of 27 people in a market place in Bombali District in January 1999;
- (b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of hundreds of civilians for their use as porters and cooks;
- (c) **Torture**, for the regular and severe beatings administered to people under the control of the RUF/AFRC, including one man who was beaten for 24 hours and then buried alive in Bombali District in January 1999;
- (d) **Rape**, for the rape of dozens of women and girls;
- (e) **Other inhumane treatment**, for forcing people at gunpoint to dance and sing in support of the RUF/AFRC in Freetown’s East End in January 1999, for the mutilation of dozens of civilians, including carving words onto their bodies, and the amputation of one or more of their limbs.

4.d.ii Crimes Against Humanity Committed by members of the West Side Boys

The West Side Boys committed an attack against the civilian population in Port Loko District lasting from October 1998 to April 1999 across Koya and Maforki Chiefdoms.²⁴⁰ This attack was both widespread, in that it took place on a large scale and with a multiplicity of victims, *and* systematic, in that it was an organised pattern of conduct. The facts clearly demonstrate that there was a policy to commit such an attack, with civilians being targeted for a variety of reasons. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the West Side Boys committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the killing of dozens of civilians, including the killing of two civilians by hanging and the public execution of 20 civilians and the burning of 73 civilians in a house in April 1999;
- (b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of civilians for their use as porters;²⁴¹
- (c) **Rape**, for the rape of dozens of women and girls and for sexual violence, including forcing people to have sex with their own family members
- (d) **Other inhumane acts**, for the mutilation of several civilians, including carving words onto their bodies.

²⁴⁰ There was a lull in this attack in January and February 1999, during which time the West Side Boys were participating in the attack on Freetown. Nevertheless, the actions before and after that time form part of the same attack against the civilian population.

²⁴¹ The crime of enslavement requires that the perpetrator exercise any or all of the powers of ownership over the abducted person. As such, this report does not characterise as enslavement the incidences where civilians were abducted but the purpose is not revealed; in addition, it does not characterise as enslavement the incidences where civilians were abducted and forced to carry loads for a short period of time before being released.



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4.d.iii Crimes Against Humanity Committed by members of the SLA

While there was no general attack spanning a number of years, the SLA committed a number of specific widespread or systematic attacks at different periods between 1991 and 1996 that reveal a policy to commit an attack against a civilian population, generally for the purposes of reprisals, abducting civilians for the purposes of mining or other work and to obtain property. Of the eight identified attacks committed against the civilian population, two will be discussed below as being representative of the types of actions carried out by the SLA.²⁴² It should, however, be emphasised that the selection of these attacks is in no way intended to reflect any judgment about the relative importance of the attacks not selected for further exploration.

a) SLA attack from January to April 1992

As the SLA started gaining successes over RUF/NPFL forces across Pujehun and Kailahun Districts, they progressively and rapidly launched attacks on civilians. Beginning by targeting civilians they arbitrarily labelled as RUF/NPFL “collaborators”, often in the areas they had retaken from the hands of RUF/NPFL forces, the SLA soon expanded these activities to encompass the entire civilian population in those areas. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the SLA committed the following crimes against humanity:

- a) **Murder** for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including the killing of alleged “collaborators” at Makibi Bridge in Pujehun Town and the tying up of alleged collaborators and throwing them off the Yonni Bridge (Kpaka Chiefdom, Pujehun District) in early 1992;
- b) **Enslavement**, for the use of civilians under SLA control for work, including breaking down houses and uprooting cocoa and coffee plantations in Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom, Kailahun District) and as food-gatherers in Pujehun District in early 1992;
- c) **Deportation**, for the use of radical measures such as setting fire to houses as part of a clear action to evict civilians from an area in Pujehun District in early 1992;
- d) **Rape**, for the rape of several women, including the rape of a woman in Makpele Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in early 1992, and for other acts of sexual violence;
- e) **Other inhumane acts**, for the amputation of ears and hands, the plucking out of eyeballs and for putting civilians in a bag that was then set on fire in Kpanga Krim Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in early 1992.

b) SLA attack in Kenema District from March to July 1994

Between March and July 1994, while RUF forces were continuing expanding their operations in the District, SLA forces together with members of ULIMO-J conducted an attack against the civilian population in the area remaining under their control. The widespread or systematic nature of the attack is evidenced by the numerous acts of violence committed against civilians across different

²⁴² Those attacks that are not discussed in detail in this report are: the SLA attack in Bonthe District from June to July 1992; the SLA Attack from October 1992 to February 1993, particularly in Kono District; the SLA attack from March to June 1994; the SLA attack in Moyamba District from December 1994 to February 1995; the SLA attack in Kenema District from March to June 1994; and the attack carried out by the Special Task Force in October 1995 in Bonthe District.



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chiefdoms. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the SLA committed the following crimes against humanity:

- a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of dozens of civilians, including those alleged to be RUF “collaborators” and those they accused of not respecting their “orders”, including the killing of 12 young people from Damawuro and the killing of a man in Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom) in March;
- b) **Imprisonment**, for detaining an alleged RUF “collaborator” in a cell in Blama in March and for detaining civilians in a guardroom for some days in Blama;
- c) **Enslavement**, for the forceful use of civilians to work at mining sites in the Tongo Field area;
- d) **Rape**, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as “wives” and for sexual violence committed against several women and girls.

4.d.iv Crimes Against Humanity Committed by members of the CDF

The CDF committed a general attack against the civilian population lasting from January 1996 until October 1999. This attack was both widespread, in that it took place on a large scale and with a multiplicity of victims, *and* systematic, in that it was an organised pattern of conduct. The facts clearly demonstrate that there was a policy to commit such an attack, with civilians being targeted for a variety of reasons; reprisals against civilians for having cooperated with the RUF were systematic and particularly brutal throughout this period. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the CDF committed the following crimes against humanity:

- a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including civilians arbitrarily labelled as “RUF collaborators”;
- b) **Enslavement**, for the use of civilians under their control to harvest food for the CDF in Tonkolili District in October 1999;
- c) **Imprisonment**, for the detention without charge of people in cells and cages, particularly at checkpoints;
- d) **Torture**, for the use of “FM ropes”,²⁴³ beatings, dripping melted plastic on people and other acts inflicting pain and suffering on people under the control of the CDF;
- e) **Rape**, for sexual slavery, namely forcing women to become “wives”, and for sexual violence committed against women;
- f) **Other inhumane acts**, for the effect on the civilian population of acts of cannibalism and displaying internal organs at checkpoints.

Within that general attack, there were a series of specific attacks committed against the civilian population. Of the three identified attacks committed against the civilian population, one will be

²⁴³ “FM rope” stands for “Frequency Modulation”. A victim would be tied up with a length of nylon, which would be progressively tightened. The more the nylon tightened, the more pain and suffering it would cause and the more the victim would “talk”, hence the analogy with a radio tuner.



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discussed below as being representative of the types of actions carried out by the CDF.²⁴⁴ It should, however, be emphasised that the selection of these attacks is in no way intended to reflect any judgment about the relative importance of the attacks not selected for further exploration.

CDF Attack from November 1997 to May 1998

During this period, the CDF engaged RUF/AFRC forces throughout the Southern Province, repelling them from most of the areas previously under their control. The CDF actions in those areas demonstrate a clear pattern of violent activities directed against civilians, in particular against suspected RUF/AFRC “collaborators”, leading to the infliction of severe physical violence and the draconian regulation of every aspect of civilian life. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the CDF committed the following crimes against humanity:

- a) **Murder**, for the intentional and reckless killing of dozens of civilians, including the killing of alleged RUF/AFRC “collaborators” in Bonthe Town in February 1998;
- b) **Imprisonment**, for the detention of civilians in cells or specially designed cages, including the detention in a cell for two days of civilians in Bonthe Town in February 1998, the detention of civilians in a cage at Baiama Junction (Bo District) in February 1998 and in Kwellu (Moyamba District) in December 1997;
- c) **Torture**, for the infliction of severe physical and mental violence, notably by the use of cages and FM ropes across the Southern Province, including tying up suspected collaborators with an FM rope, beating them and locking them up in Blama (Kenema District) in February 1998;
- d) **Rape**, for the use of three women as sex slaves in Makpele Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in January 1998;
- e) **Other inhumane acts**, for the effect on the population of frequent acts of cannibalism, including the decapitation of a civilian and the drinking of his blood in Nomo Chiefdom (Kenema District) in December 1997.

4.e Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Article 3): The law

Article 3 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone reads as follows:

“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed or ordered the commission of serious violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include:

- (a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
- (b) Collective punishments;
- (c) Taking of hostages;

²⁴⁴ Those attacks that are not discussed in detail in this report are: the CDF Attack from January 1996 to September 1996 in Bonthe District, which included attacks on Moyamba District from April to August 1996; and the CDF attack from December 1998 to May 1999 in Tonkolili, Moyamba and Port Loko Districts.



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- (d) Acts of terrorism;
- (e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
- (f) Pillage;
- (g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples;
- (h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.”

The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 were, as noted, concerned mainly with international armed conflicts, that is, conflicts involving two or more States. The Geneva Conventions were expanded on in 1977 with the adoption of the two Additional Protocols, the first of which was also concerned with international armed conflicts. However, article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, which has been described as a “treaty in miniature”, contains the minimum set of protections applicable in any armed conflict.²⁴⁵ Additional Protocol II expands on common article 3 to specify in more detail the protections that apply during a non-international armed conflict.

In order for these norms to become applicable, they must have been in force at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, whether through customary international law or because the State in question had ratified these instruments and, as such, was bound by these provisions. In respect of the first possibility,²⁴⁶ it is clear that common article 3 has the status of customary international law;²⁴⁷ indeed, most States have criminalised the acts listed in common article 3 within their domestic penal codes. Additional Protocol II as a whole is generally not regarded as having the status of customary international law, but article 4(2) relating to fundamental guarantees both reaffirms and supplements common article 3 and, as such, has the status of customary international law.²⁴⁸

Nevertheless, in order not to offend the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*,²⁴⁹ it is not sufficient simply to show that these instruments had the status of customary international law at the time the alleged crimes were committed. It must also be established that the violation of those norms attracted individual criminal responsibility: the ICTY Appeals Chamber has found that customary

²⁴⁵ It should be noted that while common article 3 refers to its applicability in non-international armed conflicts, it is now recognised that customary international law dictates that these protections are applicable in *any* armed conflict, not just those that are non-international in nature.

²⁴⁶ Note that Sierra Leone succeeded to the Geneva Conventions on 10 June 1965 and acceded to the Additional Protocols on 21 October 1986, therefore these instruments were, in any case, in force in the territory of Sierra Leone at all relevant times.

²⁴⁷ See for example *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999 and *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 608.

²⁴⁸ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 608-10.

²⁴⁹ According to this principle, nobody may be found guilty of a criminal offence for acts that were not criminalised, whether under national or international law, at the time of their commission: see the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, article 15(1).



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international law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common article 3, as supplemented by other general rules and principles, in particular Additional Protocol II.²⁵⁰

4.e.i Contextual elements of violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II

Once it is established that these instruments were in force, there are two sets of elements that need to be met, one of which can be described as “contextual” elements, the other of which are the elements of the acts enumerated in article 3 of the Statute of the Special Court. The contextual elements are as follows:

1. The applicability of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II must be established.
2. The personal jurisdiction (relating to victims and perpetrators) and the geographical jurisdiction must be met.
3. There must be a nexus between the act constituting the crime and the armed conflict.
4. The act constituting the crime must be a serious violation.

1. Applicability of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II

Both common article 3 and Additional Protocol II contain conditions of applicability that must be considered in order to determine whether or not they apply at a particular location or during a particular time. As noted, the inclusion of these crimes within the Statute of the Special Court is not in itself sufficient to conclude that these instruments apply to the situation in Sierra Leone, nor is it sufficient to establish that the instruments were in force at the time in question.

Common article 3 applies during any armed conflict,²⁵¹ thereby ruling out its application during internal disturbances and tensions. Whether an armed conflict exists or not²⁵² must be determined on an evaluation of the intensity and organisation of the parties to the conflict; indeed, the *Tadic* decision refers to “protracted armed violence”.²⁵³

The situations to which Additional Protocol II will apply are more limited than those to which common article 3 will apply.²⁵⁴ It is worth noting that while Additional Protocol II develops and supplements common article 3, the more restrictive conditions of its applicability are not automatically extended to common article 3, which continues to apply during any armed conflict. In order for Additional Protocol II to apply, the following elements must be satisfied:

- (a) An armed conflict is occurring between the armed forces of a State and dissident armed forces or other organised groups.

²⁵⁰ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 134. The Appeals Chamber reached this conclusion following consideration of the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal, elements of international practice showing that States intend to criminalise serious breaches of customary rules and principles applicable during a non-international armed conflict as well as national legislation aimed at implementing the Geneva Conventions.

²⁵¹ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 137.

²⁵² See above for a discussion on what constitutes an armed conflict.

²⁵³ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995 (*Tadic* Jurisdiction Decision), para. 70.

²⁵⁴ In this respect it should be noted that if the requirements for Additional Protocol II are met, then the lower threshold conditions for common article 3 are also automatically met.



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- (b) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups were under responsible command.
- (c) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups exercised control over territory such that they were able to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.
- (d) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups are able to implement Additional Protocol II.

(a) An armed conflict is occurring between the armed forces of a State and dissident armed forces or other organised groups

The jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals refers to the fact that “armed forces”, namely those fighting on behalf of the State, covers all armed forces described in national legislation.²⁵⁵ It is unclear whether this would cover armed forces fighting on behalf of the State that are not so described in national legislation but are established as a result of some other procedure. In the absence of a decision on this matter, it is submitted that a test similar to that in *Tadic* related to forces under the control of a foreign power could be adopted to determine whether armed forces are fighting on behalf of the State on whose territory the conflict is being fought.²⁵⁶ The test could therefore be: overall control of an armed group or individuals by the State; specific instructions to an armed group or individuals by the State; and actual behaviour of an armed group or individuals, irrespective of any specific instructions.²⁵⁷

(b) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups were under responsible command

This requirement refers to the degree of organisation of the groups, namely that they were able to carry out military operations and that they were able to impose discipline in the name of the *de facto* authority,²⁵⁸ although it does not imply that there needs to be a hierarchical system identical to that employed by the armed forces of a State.

(c) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups exercised control over territory such that they were able to carry out sustained and concerted military operations

While the previous requirement refers to the command *ability* of the groups, this requirement considers whether the military operations actually carried out were continuous and planned. This requires that the groups in fact dominate part of the territory that is no longer under government control.²⁵⁹

(d) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups are able to implement Additional Protocol II

This refers to the degree of organisation of the dissident armed forces or other organised group, such that they can carry out obligations under Additional Protocol II, which includes matters such as

²⁵⁵ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 625; *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 256.

²⁵⁶ This question could be relevant, for example, if there are protracted periods of fighting between dissident armed forces and armed forces not described in national legislation that are in fact fighting on behalf of the State, without the involvement of the armed forces of a State.

²⁵⁷ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, point IV.B.3.

²⁵⁸ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 626.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*



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searching for sick, shipwrecked or wounded personnel and providing them with medical care and attention.²⁶⁰

2. Personal and geographical jurisdiction

i) Personal jurisdiction: Perpetrators

Anybody who commits a violation of common article 3 or Additional Protocol II can be held accountable; there is no category of persons to whom these provisions cannot apply. The early jurisprudence of the ICTR focused on whether there were certain criteria that needed to be satisfied in order for an accused to fall within the *ratione personae* for perpetrators. Thus the Trial Chamber in *Akayesu*, while recognising that this should not be interpreted restrictively and that civilians could be held liable for violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II, applied a “public official” test to determine whether a person could be held liable. According to this test, if a person was not a combatant, they could be held liable only if they were public officials or agents or exercised some public authority such that they were mandated and expected to support or fulfil the war effort.²⁶¹ However, this was overturned by the Appeals Chamber, who held that this test was not supported either by the language of the Statute nor customary international law. Considering that the core of common article 3 is the protection of victims, which implies effective punishment of perpetrators,²⁶² the Appeals Chamber held that common article 3 and Additional Protocol II are applicable to everyone.²⁶³ As such, the existence of a special link or relationship between the accused and the armed forces of a State is not a pre-condition for the applicability of these instruments.²⁶⁴

ii) Personal jurisdiction: victims

Common article 3 and Additional Protocol II are concerned primarily with the protection of civilians, namely people who do not bear arms. Thus common article 3 refers to persons who are taking no active part in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those who are placed *hors de combat*, namely those who are no longer fighting due to injury or some other similar incapacity, whereas Additional Protocol II refers to those persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities or who have ceased to take a direct part in hostilities.

To take a “direct part” in hostilities means to undertake acts of war that, by their nature or purpose, are likely to cause actual harm to personnel or equipment of the enemy armed forces.²⁶⁵ Should a civilian undertake such acts, they would lose their right to protection as civilians and could thereby fall within the class of combatants, thus becoming legitimate military targets.

The central question in this respect is, therefore, whether the alleged victim was taking a direct part in hostilities at the time of the alleged offence. If they were not, then they fall within that class of

²⁶⁰ Additional Protocol II, part III.

²⁶¹ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 630-4.

²⁶² In this consideration, the Appeals Chamber cited the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the *Celebici* case, para. 143, which stated that the quintessence of international humanitarian law is the respect for a few essential rules of humanity that are valid everywhere, under all circumstances, and which exist above and outside war.

²⁶³ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 443.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 444.

²⁶⁵ *Prosecutor v Rutaganda*, Case No. ICTR-96-3, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 6 December 1999, para. 100.



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persons protected by common article 3 and Additional Protocol II. As such, it must be determined on a case-by-case basis whether a victim has the status of a civilian and, as such, whether the provisions of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II apply.

iii) Geographical jurisdiction

The geographical jurisdiction refers to the geographical territory within which common article 3 and Additional Protocol II apply. As noted, international humanitarian law applies across the territory affected by the conflict from the moment hostilities commence until there is general conclusion of peace or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, a peaceful settlement is reached.²⁶⁶ Customary international law, as reflected in the jurisprudence of the Tribunals, makes it clear that the application of the law is not confined to the narrow geographical scope of the actual theatre of combat operations. Rather, international humanitarian law applies throughout the territory affected by the conflict whether or not actual combat is taking place in parts of the territory under the control of a party to the conflict.²⁶⁷

In addition, international humanitarian law also has a temporal scope, namely from the commencement of hostilities until the conclusion of peace or the reaching of a peaceful settlement. Customary international law, as reflected in the jurisprudence of the Tribunals, also requires that the temporal factor not be given a restrictive interpretation. As such, there only needs to be some kind of nexus between the act and the conflict, but not that the act itself occurs during the midst of battle.²⁶⁸

3. Nexus between the crime and the conflict

There must be some kind of link between the crime and the armed conflict, whether it be “closely related”;²⁶⁹ “in conjunction with”;²⁷⁰ or – more reflective of customary law – “in the context of or associated with”.²⁷¹ This requirement stems from the fact that international humanitarian law, concerned as it is with law during an armed conflict, does not protect persons against crimes unrelated to the conflict,²⁷² which should be dealt with by other means.

The ICTY Appeals Chamber has addressed this issue in *Kumarac*, holding that an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit the crime, his or her decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed. Hence, establishing that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed conflict would be sufficient to conclude that the acts were closely related to the armed conflict. In determining whether or not an act is sufficiently related to the armed conflict, the

²⁶⁶ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995, para.70.

²⁶⁷ *Prosecutor v Kumarac et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 57.

²⁶⁸ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995, para.70 and *Prosecutor v Kayishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-I, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 183.

²⁶⁹ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 573.

²⁷⁰ *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 369.

²⁷¹ See generally the ICC Elements of Crimes, contextual elements for article 8(2)(e).

²⁷² *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, paras. 368-9.



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Appeals Chamber suggested a number of factors that may assist in making that factual determination: the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non-combatant; the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and the fact that the crime was committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrator's official duties.²⁷³

4. The violation must be serious

The chapeau of article 3 of the Statute of the Special Court gives the Special Court jurisdiction over "serious violations" of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II. Broadly speaking, the requirement that it be 'serious' refers to "the breach of a rule protecting important values involving grave consequences for the victim".²⁷⁴ The jurisprudence of the Tribunals makes it clear that violations of the fundamental guarantees related to the protection of victims during an armed conflict are, by their very nature, considered to be serious.²⁷⁵

4.e.ii Elements of enumerated acts constituting violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II

For the most part, the elements of the crimes constituting violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II mirror the elements required for crimes against humanity. This has been explicitly stated, for example, for murder,²⁷⁶ torture²⁷⁷ and rape²⁷⁸ and it is reasonable to predict that the same approach would be adopted for other crimes. There are, however, some crimes within common article 3 and Additional Protocol II that have no direct counterpart within crimes against humanity, which are discussed briefly below.

a) Mutilation

The elements of the war crime of mutilation are:²⁷⁹

1. The perpetrator subjected one or more persons to mutilation, in particular by permanently disfiguring the person or persons, or by permanently disabling or removing an organ or appendage.
2. The conduct was neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person or persons concerned nor carried out in such person's or persons' interests.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.

²⁷³ *Prosecutor v Kunarac*, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para. 58.
²⁷⁴ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 616.
²⁷⁵ *Prosecutor v Rutaganda*, Case No. ICTR-96-3, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 6 December 1999, para. 106.
²⁷⁶ *Ibid*, para. 107.
²⁷⁷ *Prosecutor v Kunarac*, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 465. It should be noted that the purpose element will apply in relation to torture as a war crime: see above for a discussion of the elements of the crime against humanity of torture.
²⁷⁸ *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 285.
²⁷⁹ See *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 285 and the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(e)(xi)-1.



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4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

b) Cruel Treatment

The elements of the war crime of cruel treatment are:²⁸⁰

1. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons.
2. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

c) Taking of hostages

The elements of the war crime of taking hostages are:²⁸¹

1. The perpetrator seized, detained or otherwise held hostage one or more persons.
2. The perpetrator threatened to kill, injure or continue to detain such person or persons.
3. The perpetrator intended to compel a State, an international organisation, a natural or legal person or a group of persons to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for the safety or the release of such person or persons.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

d) Outrages on personal dignity, including degrading and humiliating treatment

The elements of the war crime of outrages on personal dignity are:²⁸²

1. The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of one or more persons.
2. The severity of the humiliation, degradation or other violation was of such degree as to be generally recognised as an outrage upon personal dignity.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

²⁸⁰ See the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(c)(iii).

²⁸¹ See the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(c)(i)-3. See also *Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic*, Case No. IT-98-34, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 March 2003, para. 246.

²⁸² See the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(c)(ii). See also *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 285.



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The Elements of Crimes of the ICC explicitly states that “persons” can include dead people, going on to say: “It is understood that the victim need not personally be aware of the existence of the humiliation or degradation or other violation. This element takes into account relevant aspects of the cultural background of the victim.”²⁸³

The ICTR has interpreted “humiliating and degrading” treatment as treatment designed to subvert the self regard of the victims.²⁸⁴ The ICTY held that rape could amount to an outrage on personal dignity and therefore could be covered by this provision.²⁸⁵ In *Aleksovski*, the ICTY held that the use of detainees as human shields or trench diggers, beatings and the constant fear of being robbed or beaten could constitute outrages upon personal dignity.²⁸⁶

e) Indecent assault

The elements of the war crime of indecent assault are:²⁸⁷

1. The accused inflicted pain or injury on the victim or victims.
2. The act inflicting pain or injury was sexual in nature and was committed by coercion, force, threat or intimidation.
3. The act was non-consensual.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

f) Pillage

The elements of the war crime of pillage are:²⁸⁸

1. The perpetrator appropriated certain property.
2. The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use.
3. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

²⁸³ ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(c)(ii), footnote.

²⁸⁴ *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 285.

²⁸⁵ *The Prosecutor v Furundžija*, Case No. IT-95-17/1, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 10 December 1998, paras. 172-3.

²⁸⁶ *Prosecutor v Aleksovski*, Case No. IT-95-14/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 24 March 2000, para. 36.

²⁸⁷ *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 285.

²⁸⁸ See ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(e)(v). See also *Prosecutor v Jelisić*, Case No. IT-95-10, ICTY Trial Chamber, 14 December 1999, paras. 48-9.



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The crime of pillage encompasses isolated acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for private gain as well as organised forms of the seizure of property, for example as part of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory. However, as indicated by the use of the term “private or personal use”, appropriations justified by military necessity cannot constitute the crime of pillaging.²⁸⁹

4.f Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Article 3): The facts

Certain conditions must be met before common article 3 and Additional Protocol II will apply. For common article 3, the condition is the existence of an armed conflict. As stated, there was an armed conflict occurring on the territory of Sierra Leone from March 1991 until 18 January 2002. As such, common article 3 applied throughout that time across the whole territory. For Additional Protocol II, the conditions centre around the degree of organisation of the armed forces against whom the State’s armed forces are fighting. While it is not intended to go into this issue for each of the fighting factions, the analysis of the non-State fighting factions involved in the conflict of Sierra Leone clearly reveals that these conditions are met, in that at any given point during the conflict, dissident or other armed groups were organised, were under responsible command, exercised control over the territory such that they were able to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and were able to implement Additional Protocol II.

Given that, the provisions of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II applied throughout the territory of Sierra Leone throughout the conflict, whether or not actual combat was taking place. Therefore, although there were lulls in the fighting at different times in different places throughout Sierra Leone, IHL continued to apply in those places as well as those areas where fighting was occurring until the end of the conflict as a whole.

Aside from these, there are other contextual elements that need to be established in order for an act to constitute a violation of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II, namely that the victims are civilians, the violation is serious and that there is a nexus between the act and the armed conflict. These contextual elements were taken into account in describing the crimes listed below;²⁹⁰ for example, murder of a civilian has been included whereas murder of a combatant during a battle has not been included. Similarly, acts that could otherwise amount to a violation of the law but were not committed “in the context of or associated with” the armed conflict have not been included.

In every military action there is the requirement of proportionality, such that a military commander must weigh the military advantage to be gained as against civilian casualties. There is also the requirement that a distinction be made between legitimate and non-legitimate targets, which is highlighted by the prohibition on indiscriminate firing. In Sierra Leone, there were many instances of significant civilian deaths that resulted from what appeared to be predominantly military actions and it is not possible to determine to the requisite degree of certainty whether the military attack was

²⁸⁹ ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(e)(v), footnote.

²⁹⁰ It should be noted that due to the meaning in international law of the term “terrorism” and the types of acts to which this term is generally applied, such as hijacking planes, this category of crimes has not been considered in this report.



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proportional or what was the intended target. In those cases where it is possible to make that determination, this report characterises such deaths as murders.

4.fi Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II by members of the RUF, the RUF/NPFL and the RUF/AFRC

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, the following war crimes were committed:²⁹¹

(a) **Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular—**

- (i) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of tens of thousands of civilians for a variety of reasons, including for allegedly “collaborating” with forces aligned against the RUF movement, for supporting the elected Government and for failing to show sufficient support for the RUF movement, which was often determined on an arbitrary basis, and by a variety of means, including decapitations, disembowelling pregnant women and throwing babies into the bush or into burning houses, and by using a variety of weapons, including shooting people, hacking people to death with bladed weapons and by locking people in houses that were then set on fire;
- (ii) **Torture**, for the infliction of severe pain and suffering on people under the custody or control of the RUF and their allies for the purposes of inflicting punishment or obtaining information, including by the means outlined below;
- (iii) **Mutilation**, for the hundreds of mutilations, amputation of limbs, the carving of words into people’s skin with razor blades and other similar acts;
- (iv) **Corporal punishment**, for the beating and flogging of tens of thousands of civilians;

as well as for several other acts that inflicted violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, including the frequent instances of the infliction of severe pain and suffering by means such as the dripping of melted plastic into people’s eyes and onto their bodies, setting people on fire, forcing people to lie on the ground and stare at the sun, cutting off people’s genital organs and a variety of other similar acts;

- (b) **Collective punishments**, for the arbitrary infliction of various degrees of punishment as reprisal actions for real or imagined wrongs on groups of civilians, such as the retaliatory killing of 100 people and the burning of 200 houses in Kailahun District in March 1992;
- (c) **Taking of hostages**, for the abduction of civilians, their continued detention under threat of death or personal injury and thereby using the detainees as a bargaining tool to achieve various aims with third parties;
- (d) **Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular—**
 - (i) **humiliating and degrading treatment**, for the severe humiliation, degradation and violation of the dignity of tens of thousands of civilians, including by forcing traditional authorities and elders to sit on the floor,²⁹² by forcing adults to “frog jump” or “pump”, for shaving the heads of female abductees, by decapitating,

²⁹¹ For those crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that are not listed here, there is no evidence that members of the RUF, RUF/NPFL; RUF/AFRC committed those crimes.

²⁹² Note that this element takes into account the cultural background of the victim, such that the infliction of these acts on elders, adults and women in the Sierra Leone context amounts to a violation of their dignity.



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mutilating and displaying corpses, severed body parts and internal organs in public places, by frequent acts of cannibalism, including the drinking of blood,²⁹³ by forcing men to watch the rape of their wives, by forcing parents to watch the rape of their children, by gambling on the sex of a baby who has yet to be born and settling the bet by disemboweling the mother, for the use of detainees as human shields in a few cases and by keeping the civilian population in constant fear of being robbed, beaten, abducted, having their children abducted and having their houses burnt down and for a variety of other similar acts;

- (ii) **rape**, for the rape, often by multiple assailants, of hundreds²⁹⁴ of women and young girls, including girls as young as 10 and including the rape of women and girls who had been abducted as “wives”;
- (iii) **any form of indecent assault**, for sexual violence committed against thousands of civilians, including children, and for forcing people to have sex with members of their own families;
- (e) **Pillage**, for the stealing of personal property including food, domestic animals, cooking utensils, money and valuable items from hundreds of thousands of civilians in villages and towns and at checkpoints, for the stealing of personal property from civilian residences and for the stealing of property from other buildings, including companies, organisations, churches and others, none of which was justified by military necessity;
- (f) **The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without due process**, for the capture and execution of hundreds of civilians on varied grounds, in particular on the accusation of being a member, collaborator or relative of one of the other fighting forces, and for the infliction of often severe punishment for real or imagined wrongs, such as stealing or adultery, without any form of trial;
- (g) **Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts**, for the daily threats meted out to civilians wherever the RUF, RUF/NPFL or RUF/AFRC had a presence to kill them, steal their property, beat them and commit a variety of other brutal actions against them.

4.f.ii Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II by members of the West Side Boys

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the West Side Boys committed the following war crimes:

- (a) **Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular—**
 - (i) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians;
 - (ii) **Torture**, for the infliction of pain and suffering on people under the control of the West Side Boys, including beatings;
 - (iii) **Mutilation**, for various acts of mutilating civilians, including the carving of words into people’s skin with razor blades;

²⁹³ Note that in the context of this crime, “persons” can also include dead people and that the victim does not necessarily need to be aware of the humiliation, degradation or other violation of dignity.

²⁹⁴ It is likely that thousands of women and girls were raped as descriptions of “sexual assault”, the “breaking of marital homes” and similar references likely refer to rape. However, this report has taken a cautious approach and only characterised an act as “rape” when the facts as described specifically meet the elements of the crime.



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- (iv) **Corporal punishment**, for the frequent instances of beating and flogging civilians;
- (b) **Collective punishments**, for reprisal killings and other punishments inflicted in retaliation for military defeats suffered by the West Side Boys;
- (c) **Taking of hostages**, for the capture of 40 UNOMSIL, ECOMOG and civil society workers, under the threat of continued detention, in August 1999 for the purpose of securing the release of the AFRC leader from RUF custody and for the capture of United Kingdom military personnel in August 2000, under threat of continued detention, for the purpose of seeking their integration into the SLA, the release of detained members of the West Side Boys and a review of the Lomé Peace Agreement;
- (d) **Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular—**
 - (i) **rape**, for the rape of scores of women;
 - (ii) **any form of indecent assault**, for sexual violence committed against hundreds of civilians, including children, and for forcing people to have sex with members of their own families;
- (e) **Pillage**, for the stealing of property from thousands of civilians, including at checkpoints and from civilian residences, none of which was justified by military necessity.

4.f.iii Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II by members of the SLA

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the SLA committed the following war crimes:²⁹⁵

- (a) **Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular—**
 - (i) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians for a variety of reasons, mainly for “collaborating” with the enemy, which was often determined on an arbitrary basis;
 - (ii) **Torture**, for the infliction of serious pain and suffering on people under the custody or control of the SLA for the purposes of inflicting punishment or obtaining information;
 - (iii) **Corporal punishment**, for the beating and flogging of hundreds of civilians, including traditional and local authorities;
- (b) **Collective punishments**, for the targeting of towns and villages suspected of being supportive of the RUF and the consequent infliction of punishment on them, including the burning of property and the bombing of a prison;
- (c) **Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular—**
 - (i) **humiliating and degrading treatment**, for the severe humiliation, degradation and violation of the dignity of hundreds of civilians, including by forcing adults to “frog jump” or “pump”, by forcing men to watch the rape of their wives and by keeping civilians in constant fear of being robbed or beaten by the armed forces that were supposed to be providing them with protection;
 - (ii) **rape**,²⁹⁶ for the rape of scores of women and girls;

²⁹⁵ For those crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that are not listed here, there is no evidence that members of the SLA committed those crimes.



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- (d) **Pillage**, for the stealing of property including food from thousands of civilians, including at checkpoints and from civilian residences, none of which was justified by military necessity;
- (e) **The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without due process**, for the capture and execution of hundreds of civilians accused of being “collaborators” often on an arbitrary basis, including having come from an RUF-held area, without any form of trial.

4.f.iv Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II by members of the CDF

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the CDF committed the following war crimes:

- (a) **Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular—**
 - (i) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, mainly people suspected of being members, relatives or collaborators of the RUF and their allies;
 - (ii) **Torture**, for the infliction of pain and suffering on people under the control of the CDF, including the common use of FM ropes, detaining people in cages made of sharp sticks, pouring hot ashes on people and other similar acts;
 - (iii) **Mutilation**, for various acts of mutilating civilians, including the cutting off and chewing of a woman’s ear in Moyamba District;
 - (iv) **Corporal punishment**, for the frequent instances of beating and flogging civilians, including traditional and local authorities;
- (a) **Collective punishments**, for the targeting of towns and villages suspected of being supportive of the RUF and their allies and the consequent infliction of punishment on them, including the burning of property and the execution of inhabitants;
- (h) **Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular—**
 - (i) **humiliating and degrading treatment**, including forcing adults to “frog jump” or “pump”, the decapitation and mutilation of corpses, targeting the traditional and local authorities and keeping the civilian population in constant fear of being physically violated;
 - (ii) **rape**, for the rape of scores of women;
- (b) **Pillage**, for the stealing of property from thousands of civilians, in particular at checkpoints, none of which was justified by military necessity;
- (c) **The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without due process**, for the capture and execution of suspected RUF members and collaborators without any form of trial;
- (d) **Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts**, including threatening to kill people and use their bodies as roadblocks in Port Loko District in March 1999.

4.f.v Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II by members of ECOMOG

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of ECOMOG committed the following war crimes:

²⁹⁶ There was no evidence that enforced prostitution was committed by the SLA during the conflict, although there was ample evidence of sexual slavery.



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- (a) **Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular—**
- (i) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including the killing of 100 alleged RUF supporters in Kailahun District in May 1998 and killings that occurred as a result of the artillery and aerial bombardment of market places and other heavily populated civilian areas;²⁹⁷
 - (ii) **Corporal punishment**, for the frequent instances of beating and flogging civilians;
- (b) **Pillage**, for the stealing of property from thousands of civilians, often at checkpoints, none of which was justified by military necessity.

4.g Other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Article 4): The law

Article 4 of the Statute of the Special Court reads as follows:

“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

- (a) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
- (b) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
- (c) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.”

These provisions give the Special Court jurisdiction over additional crimes under international humanitarian law that have achieved the status of customary international law, including the imposition of individual criminal responsibility for their violation. They are also all included in the Rome Statute of the ICC both for conflicts of an international nature²⁹⁸ and for conflicts that are not international in nature.²⁹⁹ As these crimes were not included in the Statutes of the ICTY or ICTR, there is no jurisprudence directly on these provisions and the only authoritative pronouncement on the elements of the crimes comes from the Elements of Crimes of the ICC and in the writings of eminent jurists.

a) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population

The elements of the crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population are:³⁰⁰

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.

²⁹⁷ While this report characterises these deaths as murder, more information is needed as to whether civilians were the target during these attacks and/or whether these deaths were proportionate to the military advantage gained.

²⁹⁸ See Rome Statute of the ICC, article 8(2)(b).

²⁹⁹ See Rome Statute of the ICC, article 8(2)(e).

³⁰⁰ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 8(2)(e)(i).



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3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

The crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population confirms the fundamental and long-standing distinction between combatants and civilians³⁰¹ and the prohibition on intentionally directing attacks against the latter.

b) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel and objects of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions

The elements of the crime of intentionally directing attacks against personnel and objects of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions are:³⁰²

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The perpetrator intended such personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles so involved to be the object of the attack.
4. Such personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles were entitled to that protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protection.
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
7. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

The crime of intentionally directing attacks against personnel and objects of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions also recognises the fundamental distinction between civilians and combatants.³⁰³ This provision is explicitly directed towards such missions in recognition of the need to extend special protection to them in light of their nature and purpose.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ See earlier, section X.

³⁰² See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 8(2)(e)(iii).

³⁰³ This is an evolving area of international law and is currently under extensive discussion in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly: see <http://www.un.org/law/UNsafetyconvention/index.html>, last visited on 28 February 2004.

³⁰⁴ See *Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of the Special Court*, UN Doc. S/2000/955, para. 16.



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These missions will only be entitled to such protection so long as they retain their civilian character, that is, provided that they do not take a direct part in hostilities, which has been defined as undertaking acts of war that, by their nature or purpose, are likely to cause actual harm to personnel or equipment of the enemy armed forces.³⁰⁵ These provisions expressly do not apply to “United Nations operations authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies”.³⁰⁶

c) The recruitment and use of child soldiers

The elements of the war crime of the recruitment and use of child soldiers are:³⁰⁷

1. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into an armed force or group³⁰⁸ or used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities.
2. Such person or persons were under the age of 15 years.
3. The perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or persons were under the age of 15 years.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15, or using them to participate actively in hostilities, is a war crime under all conditions, whether the child is recruited into national armed forces or armed groups, whether the conflict is international or non-international and whether the child is coerced or has volunteered. This crime was first included in Additional Protocol II, article 4(3)(c) and subsequently in other instruments, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, article 38(3) and the Rome Statute for the ICC, article 8(2)(e)(vii).³⁰⁹ An examination of State practice and *opinio juris* in this area, which is beyond the scope of the current report, demonstrates that the act of conscription, enlistment and use of child soldiers is a crime under customary international law.³¹⁰

³⁰⁵ *Prosecutor v Rutaganda*, Case No. ICTR-96-3, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 6 December 1999, para. 100.

³⁰⁶ *Report of the Secretary General on the Scope of Legal Protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel*, UN Doc. A/55/637, endnote 1.

³⁰⁷ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 8(2)(e)(vii) and below, notes 199-200.

³⁰⁸ With respect to armed conflicts that are international in nature, this element prohibits the conscription or enlistment of children into the national armed forces: see the Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(xxvi).

³⁰⁹ The entry into force in 2002 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict raises the minimum age for compulsory recruitment and participation in hostilities to 18. This signifies the gradual emergence of a new standard, albeit one that has not yet reached the status of customary international law.

³¹⁰ See NPWJ and UNICEF, *International Criminal Justice and Children*, 2002, available from www.npwj.org, and the Amicus Brief submitted by UNICEF and others, including NPWJ, to the Special Court for Sierra Leone in *The Prosecutor v Norman*, SCSL-03-08-PT-129, filed on 21 January 2004, both of which go into this issue in great detail.



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4.h Other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Article 4): The facts

As noted, there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone that began in March 1991 and continued until January 2002. As such, IHL – including the crimes listed in article 4 of the Statute of the Special Court – applied across the whole territory of Sierra Leone for that time period both in those places where actual combat was not taking place as well as those areas where fighting was occurring.

In respect of the crime of intentionally directing attacks against peacekeeping personnel, it should be recalled that the Rome Statute of the ICC reflects customary international law in limiting the crime to intentional attacks against personnel and objects “as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict”. The critical question is, therefore, whether UNAMSIL military peacekeepers had civilian status or whether they were combatants. UNAMSIL was established by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,³¹¹ authorising the use of force in certain circumstances, which gives rise to the *prima facie* conclusion that they were combatants, rather than civilians.³¹² It is therefore submitted that UNAMSIL peacekeepers did not have civilian status, at least not to the level of certainty required to sustain a criminal conviction. As such, this report considers that the elements of this crime are not made out in relation to various actions against UNAMSIL peacekeepers.

4.h.i Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

- (a) **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities**, for the general and specific attacks committed against the civilian population as outlined above and the attacks against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities as outlined above;
- (b) **Intentionally directing attacks against humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles**, for the attacks committed against humanitarian personnel and objects, specifically the abduction of personnel of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and World Health Organisation (WHO) and the stealing of property from the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at the IDP camp in Bo and Pujehun Districts;
- (c) **Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities**, for the abduction of tens of thousands of

³¹¹ Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999), 22 October 1999.

³¹² See Shraga, D, ‘Current Developments: UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage’ (2000) 94(2) *American Journal of International Law* 406; see in particular page 409, in which Ms Shraga states that “The [Secretary-General’s] instructions apply to members of UN forces when they are actively engaged in situations of armed conflict as combatants ... They accordingly take effect in enforcement actions when the use of force is authorized in *pursuance of a Chapter VII mandate*, and in peacekeeping operations *when it is permitted in self-defence*’ (emphasis added).



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children³¹³ under the age of 15 years, some being as young as 10 at the time of their abduction, conscripting them into the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC forces and using them to participate actively in hostilities and in the commission of crimes under international humanitarian law as members of the regular forces and as members of “Small Boy Units” and “Small Girl Units”.

4.h.ii Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by members of the West Side Boys

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the West Side Boys committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

- (a) **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities**, for the specific attack against the civilian population as outlined above and for attacks against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities as outlined above;
- (b) **Intentionally directing attacks against humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles**, for the abduction of 40 UNOMSIL and civil society workers in August 1999.³¹⁴

4.h.iii Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by members of the SLA

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, the following war crimes were committed

- (a) **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities**, for the specific attacks against the civilian population as outlined above and for attacks against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities as outlined above;
- (b) **Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities**, for using children under the age of 15 to carry arms and ammunition to the warfront in Pujehun District in January 1992.

4.h.iv Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by members of the CDF

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the CDF committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

- (a) **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities**, for the general and specific attacks

³¹³ The first instance of recruitment of children by the RUF/NPFL was recorded in March 1991; children would continue to be abducted and used as soldiers throughout the conflict by the RUF and their allies until at least June 2000, which is the last recorded instance of this practice.

³¹⁴ The members of the United Kingdom armed forces captured in August 2000 were clearly combatants and, as such, the elements of this crime in relation to that incident are not satisfied.



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against a civilian population as outlined above and for attacks against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities as outlined above;

(b) **Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities**, for the initiation of boys aged under 15 in Kenema in May 1997, the use of children aged as young as 13 in hostilities in Kenema in 1999, the initiation of children aged below 15 in Pujehun District in late 1997, the use of children aged under 15 as spies and soldiers in Pujehun District in February 1998 and the conscription of children and their use as soldiers in Kailahun in May 1998.

4.h.v Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by members of ECOMOG

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the war crimes that were committed, members of ECOMOG committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

(a) **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities**, for attacks against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities as outlined above.

4.i Crimes under Sierra Leonean law (Article 5): the law

Article 5 of the Statute of the Special Court reads as follows:

“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who have committed the following crimes under Sierra Leonean law:

- (a) Offences relating to the abuse of girls under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926 (Cap. 31):
 - (i) Abusing a girl under 13 years of age, contrary to section 6;
 - (ii) Abusing a girl between 13 and 14 years of age, contrary to section 7;
 - (iii) Abduction of a girl for immoral purposes, contrary to section 12.
- (b) Offences relating to the wanton destruction of property under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861:
 - (i) Setting fire to dwelling - houses, any person being therein, contrary to section 2;
 - (ii) Setting fire to public buildings, contrary to sections 5 and 6;
 - (iii) Setting fire to other buildings, contrary to section 6.”

Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) explicitly refers to Sierra Leonean law as being among the provisions over which the Special Court should have jurisdiction. The provisions were selected to cover specific situations that were “considered to be either unregulated or inadequately regulated



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under international law.³¹⁵ The elements of these crimes are governed by Sierra Leone Statute and case law³¹⁶ and, as such, do not require any connection with an armed conflict.

a) Abuse of girls

The provisions of the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926* listed in the Statute of the Special Court are designed to protect girls under the age of 16 from sexual abuse and exploitation. They vary in terms of the ages of the children they protect, from under 13 in the case of section 6, through between 13 and 14 in the case of section 7, to under 16 in the case of section 12. The different crimes are considered to have different levels of seriousness and entail different penalties under Sierra Leone law, from 15 years in the case of section 6, which is a felony, to 2 years in the case of sections 7 and 12, which are misdemeanours.

The elements for the crimes under sections 6 and 7 are that the accused “unlawfully and carnally” knew and abused a girl within the stated ages. The elements for section 12 are that the accused took or caused to be taken an unmarried girl under the age of 16 out of the possession of and against the will of her father or mother or any other person having lawful charge of her.

There are two possible defences to the crimes under these provisions. First, ‘belief of age’ is a defence to the charge: thus if the accused can prove that he had reasonable cause to believe the victim was of or over the required age, this will be a complete defence.³¹⁷ In addition, in keeping with the common law applicable in Sierra Leone related to these types of crimes,³¹⁸ if the accused can show that the victim was his wife, particularly under the customary law of Sierra Leone, this will also be a defence.³¹⁹ However, consent of the girl is no defence to the crime, as lack of consent is not an element of the crime.

b) Wanton destruction of property

These provisions only cover setting fire to specific buildings, namely dwelling houses, public buildings and “other” buildings, which include any type of building not explicitly mentioned elsewhere in the *Malicious Damage Act, 1867*.³²⁰ It should, however, be emphasised that setting fire to a house will only fall within the jurisdiction of the Special Court should a person actually be inside, due to the elements of section 2 of the *Malicious Damage Act, 1867*.³²¹ Furthermore, the Statute of the Special Court does not incorporate the other provisions of the *Malicious Damage Act, 1867*, thereby

³¹⁵ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court*, UN Doc. S/2000/955, para. 19.

³¹⁶ In this regard, it should be noted that regular case reporting in Sierra Leone ceased in 1973 for a number of reasons, mainly to do with lack of resources, and it was only in 2002-3 that the first steps started being taken towards its reintroduction.

³¹⁷ *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926*, proviso section 15(3).

³¹⁸ Many common law countries have abolished immunity for spousal rape, considering it to be a breach of human rights, in particular those relating to the dignity of the person and discrimination on the basis of sex; arguably, Sierra Leone law also constitutes a breach of the rights of the child.

³¹⁹ Thompson, B., *The Criminal Law of Sierra Leone*, 1999, University Press of America, USA, p. 70.

³²⁰ These are: a church, chapel or other place of divine worship (section 1); a house (with no person inside), outhouse, manufactory, farm building or similar building (section 3) and railway stations (section 4).

³²¹ Apparently, the person inside the house may be the accused person: *R v Pardoe* (1894) 15 Digest 1027, 11-547.



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excluding setting fire to buildings other than those listed above and excluding other types of damage to all buildings.

An essential element of this crime is that there was actual burning, no matter how slight, of some part of the building or property in respect of which the charge is laid.³²² Each of the crimes listed in article 5(b) constitute a felony under Sierra Leone law, with penalties ranging from 14 years (section 6), through 16 years (section 5) to life imprisonment (section 2).

The mental element is that the act must be committed “unlawfully and maliciously” in order to constitute an offence. In this instance, “malice” does not mean malevolence or ill will, but refers instead to the intention of the accused. The mental element is therefore that the accused either intended to do the act, without just cause or excuse,³²³ or was reckless and foresaw or ought to have foreseen the result, even if that result was not necessarily intended.³²⁴

4.j Crimes under Sierra Leonean law (Article 5): the facts

Sierra Leone law applied throughout the territory of Sierra Leone throughout the time period covered by the conflict, without the need to prove any contextual elements such as those applicable to crimes against humanity (a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population) or violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II and other serious violations of international humanitarian law (the existence of an armed conflict). It should, however, be noted that an amnesty applies in relation to crimes committed before 7 July 1999,³²⁵ so that those crimes cannot be prosecuted in the national courts of Sierra Leone or before the Special Court. Nevertheless, this report characterises acts as crimes where the elements of the crimes are met, irrespective of whether they can be prosecuted or not.

One of the signature acts committed during the conflict in Sierra Leone was the widespread burning of residential houses. While this is a crime under Sierra Leone law,³²⁶ it is not a crime over which the Special Court has jurisdiction: the Special Court is limited to those circumstances in which a person is inside the house at the time it is burnt. Similarly, while wanton destruction of property is a crime under international law, it is not a crime over which the Special Court has jurisdiction. Therefore, while there is evidence of the burning of hundreds of thousands of houses – effectively destroying the lives of hundreds of thousands of people – this in itself is not a crime that can be prosecuted before the Special Court.

³²² *R v Stallion* (1833) 15 Digest 1026, 11-541 (no flame visible); *R v Parker* (1839) 15 Digest 1027, 11-542 (charring); and *R v Russell* (1842) 15 Digest 1027, 11-543 (scorching).

³²³ *Bromage v Prosser* (1825) 4B & C 247, 255 per Bayley J.

³²⁴ *R v Pemberton* (1874) LR 2CCR 119, 122 per Blackburn J.

³²⁵ See below for a discussion of the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court, including the issue of the Lomé Amnesty.

³²⁶ *Malicious Damage Act, 1861*, section 3.



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4.i.ii Crimes under Sierra Leone law committed by members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes under Sierra Leone law:

(a) **Offences relating to the abuse of girls under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926**, for the rape of scores of girls aged under 13 years, with some aged as young as 10, the rape of girls aged between 13 and 14 years and the abduction of girls aged under 16 years for their use as “wives”;³²⁷

(b) **Offences relating to the wanton destruction of property under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861**, for the burning of people in residential premises, including locking people inside houses before setting fire to them, and for the burning of public buildings, including schools, courthouses and other buildings;

4.i.iii Crimes under Sierra Leone law committed by members of the West Side Boys

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the West Side Boys committed the following crimes under Sierra Leone law:

(a) **Offences relating to the wanton destruction of property under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861**, for the burning of people in residential premises, in particular the locking of 73 people in a house prior to it being set on fire in April 1999.

5. Temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court (Article 1(1))

The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone states that its temporal jurisdiction runs from 30 November 1996 to a future date as yet undetermined.³²⁸ This date was selected on the basis of three considerations during the negotiations:

- (a) the temporal jurisdiction should be reasonably limited in time so that the Prosecutor is not overburdened and the Court overloaded;
- (b) the beginning date should correspond to an event or a new phase in the conflict without necessarily having any political connotations; and
- (c) it should encompass the most serious crimes committed by persons of all political and military groups and in all geographical areas of the country.

Three different dates were discussed in this context:

- (a) 30 November 1996 (i.e., the date of the failed Abidjan Peace Accords);
- (b) 25 May 1997 (i.e., when the AFRC launched its coup d'état against the government of Sierra Leone); and
- (c) 6 January 1999 (i.e., when the AFRC and RUF launched their attack on Freetown).

³²⁷ This report proceeds on the basis that the fact that members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC labelled these girls as their “wives” does not establish there was a marital relationship sufficient to mount a defence to this charge.

³²⁸ Statute of the Special Court, article 1(1).



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The date of 25 May 1997 was rejected as having too many political overtones, while 6 January 1999 was rejected as giving the impression of favouring Freetown over the provinces. The date of 30 November 1996 was therefore considered the most appropriate, as it represented the first time the fighting factions had attempted to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Additionally, it was considered to encompass the most serious crimes committed in the provinces, thereby ensuring the Court would not be too 'Freetown-centred'. Sierra Leone and the United Nations therefore agreed that this would be a suitable starting date for the Court. It has to be queried whether these reasons provide sufficient justification for setting a start date for the Court that is halfway through the conflict, a compromise criticized by Sierra Leoneans from all along the social, political and professional spectrum.³²⁹ The perception in Sierra Leone is that the Statute unjustly favours Freetown over the provinces, as the November 1996 date corresponds to the time when the capital first became a target of attack. For the provinces, the conflict has generally been one long, continuous experience from the beginning of the 1990's, whereas Freetown witnessed intermittent, although extreme, episodes of violence only from the mid-1990's onwards.

Following consultations with civil society groups and others, the Government of Sierra Leone sought to alter the date so as to give the Court temporal jurisdiction over the whole of the conflict in Sierra Leone, i.e. commencing in 1991. This was sought both to provide greater recognition to the situation in the provinces throughout the war, as well as to be more faithful to the tenets of IHL, which applies from the commencement of a conflict rather than at an arbitrarily-set date midway through the conflict.³³⁰ However, the general feeling within the United Nations was that this issue should not be reopened, lest 'delicate' balances achieved during the negotiations be upset, thereby requiring the re-opening of other aspects of the Statute or Agreement. In addition, the United Nations considered that an extension of the Court's temporal jurisdiction would increase the burden on the Prosecutor and the Court to an unacceptable level. The United Nations also maintained that the Prosecutor would in any event also be relying on evidence relating to events before 1996 (provided it is relevant to cases before the Court), therefore crimes committed prior to 1996 would not necessarily be excluded from consideration by the Court.³³¹ In order to avoid further delay, the Government therefore withdrew its request, while still maintaining the legitimacy of the reasons behind making it.³³²

Another factor to be considered when examining the Special Court's temporal jurisdiction is the amnesty granted under the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999. The UN Secretary-General denied that this would act as any bar to the determination of the start-date of the Special Court's jurisdiction, reasoning that the "United Nations has consistently maintained the position that

³²⁹ Freetown newspapers, for example, have consistently attacked this issue on numerous occasions. In addition, it was criticised in every one of the 26 Special Court Training Seminars conducted by NPWJ, which were held in Freetown, Bo, Kenema and Mile 91 in 2001, when negotiations on the creation of the Special Court were still ongoing. These seminars attracted a total of over 600 participants, including civil society and human rights organisations, lawyers, Paramount Chiefs, police, teachers, combatants and ex-combatants: not a single voice was raised in support of retaining the start-date at 1996.

³³⁰ 11th Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 September 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/857.

³³¹ Letter from the Office of Legal Affairs to the Government of Sierra Leone (19 October 2001).

³³² Letter from the Government of Sierra Leone to the Office of Legal Affairs (29 November 2001).



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amnesty cannot be granted in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”³³³ In addition, he reiterated the disclaimer issued by his Special Representative for Sierra Leone at the time of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement to the effect that “the amnesty provisions contained in article XI of the Agreement (‘absolute and free pardon’) shall not apply to international crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”³³⁴ However, the Statute acknowledges that amnesties will be valid in respect of the included provisions of Sierra Leone law.³³⁵ This makes for a situation in which the Special Court will be able to hear violations of international humanitarian law committed since 30 November 1996 but only hear violations of the Sierra Leone provisions committed from the date of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, namely 7 July 1999, in effect creating a dual start-date for the Special Court’s temporal jurisdiction.

As noted, international humanitarian law begins to apply from the moment hostilities commence until such time as there is a conclusion of peace or a peaceful settlement is reached. Thus international humanitarian law applied across the territory of Sierra Leone from 1991, the date that hostilities first commenced. As such, this report looks at the time period of the whole of the conflict, from 1991 until 2002, when considering what violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law were committed in Sierra Leone during the conflict.

6. Personal jurisdiction of the Special Court (Article 1(1))

Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) states that the Special Court should have jurisdiction over those who bear the “greatest responsibility” for crimes committed within Sierra Leone. This was understood to be a limitation on the number of accused who would be tried, according to their command authority and the gravity and scale of crimes committed. The UN Secretary-General’s report recommended this be altered to “those most responsible” in order to widen the potential pool of defendants before the Special Court.³³⁶ However, the Security Council refused to accept this change, preferring instead to remain consistent with the wording of Resolution 1315 (2000).³³⁷ Therefore, the Statute retains the wording of “those who bear the greatest responsibility”. It should be emphasised that article 1 contains no other limitations on personal jurisdiction, in particular it does not limit jurisdiction based on nationality, political affiliation or official position.

Article 1 also specifically refers to the ability of the Special Court to try peacekeepers who otherwise satisfy the requirements of the personal jurisdiction. Article 1 basically replicates what is found in most Status of Forces Agreements, namely those agreements between troop-contributing and troop-receiving States. According to these types of agreements, the primary responsibility for prosecuting peacekeepers for crimes committed on the territory of the recipient State remains with the sending

³³³ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court*, UN Doc. S/2000/955, para. 22.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 23.

³³⁵ Article 10 of the Statute provides: “An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.” The omission of Article 5, which inscribes the provisions of Sierra Leone law, indicates that amnesties granted in respect of these crimes will be a bar to prosecution.

³³⁶ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court*, UN Doc. S/2000/955, paras. 29-31.

³³⁷ Letter from the Security Council to the Secretary-General, 22 December 2000.



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State. Article 1 contains an exception to this principle, whereby it may be possible to try peacekeepers before the Special Court if the sending State is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute peacekeepers for crimes committed in Sierra Leone. The Special Court may hear such cases upon receiving authorisation from the Security Council,³³⁸ which may act on the proposal of any State.³³⁹

The aspect of the Special Court that has, perhaps, provoked the most public debate is its position vis-à-vis accused below the ages of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes. Pursuant to article 7 of the Statute, the Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over persons under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the crime but persons between the ages of 15 and 18 at the time of alleged commission of the crime may be brought before the Special Court,³⁴⁰ although the Prosecutor is directed to have resort to alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms, where appropriate. If convicted, juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to imprisonment, instead the Special Court may order a variety of correctional care. Nevertheless, the personal jurisdiction limitation of bearing the “greatest responsibility” always made it unlikely that children aged below 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the crime would be prosecuted before the Special Court; more recently, the Prosecutor of the Special Court has stated publicly that no child will be prosecuted before the Special Court.³⁴¹

7. Individual criminal responsibility (Article 6)

7.a Direct criminal responsibility

Following well-established principles of customary international law, article 6 of the Statute states that any person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 shall be individually responsible for the crime. The accused does not necessarily have to be a member of the armed forces in order to attract liability; civilians, for example, can also be held criminally responsible for violations of the laws of war.³⁴² Criminal responsibility for the crimes contained in article 5, namely those under Sierra Leonean law, falls to be determined by the relevant laws of Sierra Leone.

The fact that the accused was acting under the orders of a Government or superior does not relieve the individual of his or her criminal responsibility, although – according to general principles of law as well as the Statute – it may be taken into account in mitigation of sentence. According to these principles of liability, if a commander orders that certain acts be committed, he or she would bear

³³⁸ Although many Status of Forces Agreements require the consent of the sending State before trials are launched against their forces, there does not appear to be such a limitation in the Statute of the Special Court, presumably due to the involvement of the Security Council.

³³⁹ As at the time of writing, no peacekeepers have been publicly indicted by the Prosecutor of the Special Court.

³⁴⁰ The position represents a break with the Statute for the ICC, which provides that the “Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime”: article 26.

³⁴¹ Press release of the Special Court, “Special Court Prosecutor Says He Will Not Prosecute Children”, 2 November 2002.

³⁴² See above, discussion on violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II.



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direct responsibility for those acts, as the Statute specifically refers to ‘ordering’ that the act be committed as a basis for liability.

7.b Command responsibility

The laws of war also impose what is known as “command responsibility”, referring to the principle by which a superior will be responsible for the acts of subordinates under his or her control.³⁴³ This concept, which is longstanding in military hierarchies,³⁴⁴ has also become a well-established principle in customary international law, particularly following its development at the Nuremberg, Tokyo and post-Nuremberg Trials.

Command responsibility is concerned with being in a position of command, namely that the commander is in a certain relationship towards his or her subordinates, rather than actually giving commands. Thus the commander will be responsible for any acts of his or her subordinate, irrespective of whether the commander actually issued an order to commit such acts. If a command is actually given, as noted, the commander will bear direct responsibility for acts carried out pursuant to that command. The theory of command responsibility as been described by the ICTY as follows:

“The distinct legal character of the two types of superior responsibility must be noted. While the criminal liability of a superior for positive acts follows from general principles of accomplice liability ... the criminal responsibility of superiors for failing to take measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of their subordinates is best understood when seen against the principle that criminal responsibility for omissions is incurred only where there exists a legal obligation to act. As is most clearly evidenced in the case of military commanders ... international law imposes an affirmative duty on superiors to prevent persons under their control from committing violations of international humanitarian law, and it is ultimately this duty that provides the basis for, and defines the contours of, the imputed criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute.”³⁴⁵

This type of responsibility is applicable in two situations: first, where the superior knew or ought to have known the acts were about to be committed or were being committed and did nothing to stop their commission. Second, where the superior knew that such acts had been committed and failed to punish those responsible for their commission. The ICTY Trial Chamber has described the relevant elements for the imposition of command responsibility in the following way: (i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; (ii) that the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and (iii) that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator.³⁴⁶ As with direct responsibility, command responsibility is not limited to military personnel but extends

³⁴³ See, in general, Bantekas, I., ‘The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility’ (1999) 93(3) *American Journal of International Law* 573.

³⁴⁴ See, for example, Charles VII’s Ordinance “Ordonnances des Rois de France de la Troisième Race”, cited in Meron, T., *Henry’s Laws and Shakespeare’s Wars*, 1993, Cambridge University Press, p.149, fn.40.

³⁴⁵ *Prosecutor v Delalić et al*, Case No. IT-96-21-T, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 16 November 1998, para. 334.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid*, para. 346; the first two of these grounds was appealed and the Appeals Chamber upheld the decision of the Trial Chamber in this respect.



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also to civilian commanders. It is also worth emphasising that the principle of command responsibility does not limit or extinguish the individual criminal responsibility of the subordinates for the acts they have committed.

Command responsibility applies during any armed conflict, both international and non-international in nature. The ICTY Appeals Chamber addressed this issue recently, stating that, “the fact that it was in the course of an internal armed conflict that a war crime was about to be committed or was committed is not relevant to the responsibility of the commander; that only goes to the characteristics of the particular crime and not to the responsibility of the commander. The basis of the commander’s responsibility lies in his obligations as commander of troops making up an organised military force under his command, and not in the particular theatre in which the act was committed by a member of that military force.”³⁴⁷

³⁴⁷ *Prosecutor v Hadzihasanovic, Alagic and Kubura*, Case No. IT-01-47, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003, para. 20.

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Chapter Five: Factual Analysis

Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004

DRAFT FOR REVIEW ONLY: NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION



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C. Northern Province

a. Bombali District

1. Introduction

Bombali District is in the centre-north of Sierra Leone. The town of Makeni is both the district headquarters of Bombalia, and the administrative centre of the Northern Province. The northern boundary of Bombali District is formed by the Republic of Guinea. Koinadugu District is found to the east and north east of Bombali District, and Tonkalili District is located to the south and south east. Kambia and Port Loko Districts border Bombali District to the west.

There are 13 chiefdoms in Bombali District:

Chiefdom	Headquarter Town
Biriwa	Kamabai
Bombali Seborra	Makeni
Gbanti Kamaranka	Kamaranka
Gbendembu Ndowahun	Kalangba
Libeisaygahun	Batkanu
Magbajamba Ndowahun	Hunduwa
Makati Gbanti	Masongbon
Paki Masabong	Mapaki
Safroko Limba	Binkolo
Sanda Loko	Kamalo
Sanda Tendaren	Mataboi
Sella Limba	Kamakwie
Tambakha	Fintonia

A main highway runs from the Western Area through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni (Bombali Seborra). At Makeni, the highway splits. The southern fork runs to Magburaka, the headquarter town of Tonkalili District. The northern fork runs through the towns of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) and Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom) to Kabala, the headquarter town of Koinadugu District. Makeni and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) are linked by a poor quality secondary road that runs north-south through the towns of Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) and Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). Running north from Kamakwie, the road continues to a ferry point over the Little Scarcies River into Tambakha Chiefdom. A route running north through Tambakha Chiefdom leads directly to the international border with Guinea and the Guinean town of Madina Oula. From Kamakwie, a road runs west over the Little Scarcies River into Kambia District, and the town of Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District) and Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District). A route runs east from the main Makeni-Kabala highway nearby Karina, through Gbendembu, Mataboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom) to Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom). From Batkanu, the road continues west into the northern chiefdoms of Port Loko District, ending at Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District).



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The Little Scarcies River runs latitudinally through the north of Bombali District, forming the boundary between Sella Limba and Tambakha Chiefdoms. It also forms the boundary between Bombali and Kambia Districts before running into Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District).

Bombali District was not directly affected by the conflict until early 1994. Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces attacked a number of locations in Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom on the boundary with Port Loko District. During the RUF attacks, which lasted for around two weeks, civilians were targeted, killed and raped. Many homes were burned down. SLA forces stationed Makeni were involved in countering RUF incursions in Tonkolili District to the south. During 1994, civilian unrest and mistrust of the SLA boiled over into a demonstration in Makeni Town (Bombali Seboria Chiefdom), which was brutally suppressed by SLA forces. RUF activity in early 1995 was concentrated on attacking the Western Area, through major assaults on town like Port Loko (Maforiki Chiefdom, Port Loko) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). RUF forces briefly extended their activity into Kambia District in early 1995. In May 1995, RUF established a base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), a village on land between two rivers that is inaccessible by land except by an impractical detour. From Ro-Source, RUF forces attacked nearby villages raping women, abducting civilians to carry stolen items, and burning down houses. Later in the year, RUF forces established a base at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). The RUF forward operating bases in 1995 were in the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and later at Camp Fol-Fol in the South of Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District.

Before the Parliamentary and Presidential elections scheduled for 26 February 1996, RUF forces attacked villages on Batkanu-Gbendembu road, killing civilians and looting property. A civilian was burnt alive in his vehicle by RUF forces. RUF forces also attacked Kamakwie Town (Sella Limba Chiefdom), in the north of Bombali District, opening their attack with indiscriminate fire from with RPG. RUF forces killed and cut open the stomach of a farmer, and shot a deaf and mute man before withdrawing to their camp at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). The elections in Bombali District passed without any widespread violence, and the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed in late 1996. The ceasefire held until early May 1997, when RUF forces again attacked Kamakwie, meeting no resistance from the SLA. Here they seized the contents of an SLA ammunition dump. The RUF again withdraw to their camp at Masonkorie.

On 25 May 1997, element of the SLA overthrew the elected government and formed a military regime called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Shortly after the coup, the RUF and AFRC joined. RUF forces took up positions in Bombali District at Karina and Kamabai (both in Biriwa Chiefdom), taking control of the prosperous agricultural area. In Karina, RUF forces shot dead ten civilians attending a Muslim feast, and abducted a large number of others to be trained to fight for the RUF/AFRC or used as sex slaves by RUF/AFRC members. Other settlements around Karina were attacked. In late 1997, Guinean long-range artillery fire from Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District) forced the RUF/AFRC to temporarily abandon the Ro-Source base. They established a new base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District). Relations between Nigerian forces stationed within Sierra Leone and the RUF/AFRC deteriorated rapidly across 1997 as Nigerian forces, given an ECOMOG mandate in late 1997, used force to police a trade and arms



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embargo. In late December, ECOMOG jets bombed RUF/AFRC positions outside of Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom), claiming that the RUF/AFRC was constructing a runway to allow arms supplies to enter the country.

In early February, ECOMOG forces attacked Freetown, dislodging the combined RUF/AFRC forces and forcing their retreat into provincial Sierra Leone. On 14 February, heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces retreating from the Western Area began concentrating in Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom), commencing a 17 day spree of looting and violence known as "Operation Pay Yourself". RUF/AFRC forces performed house to house searches, stealing valuable items and food from civilians. In early March, ECOMOG commenced provincial operations and moved from Port Loko (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni, establishing a base at Makeni's Teko Barracks. CDF forces deployed in the town, and a hunt for "collaborators" began. ECOMOG also occupied the northern towns of Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

Following ECOMOG's arrival in Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces dispersed throughout Bombali District, staging hit-and-run attacks on settlement on the Makeni-Kamalo axis, and attacking towns in the northern Tambakha Chiefdom. In the chiefdom headquarter of Fintonia (Tambakha Chiefdom), RUF forces executed 11 civilians and burned down large numbers of houses. Civilians from the town were abducted to assist RUF/AFRC forces in navigating the dense jungle terrain. In late April, RUF/AFRC forces amputated the arms from over ten civilians in Komoyah (Tambakha Chiefdom). They erected a rudimentary checkpoint, a rope across the road and tied the amputated arms along the length of the rope, leaving the amputees for dead nearby. Mid-year, towns on the Batkanu-Karina axis, and throughout the north of Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom came under attack from RUF/AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces strengthened their positions in Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom) and commenced frequent food-finding missions or "Jar Jar" throughout the west of the Chiefdom. By August, RUF/AFRC forces were again active in Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom). ECOMOG artillery shelled the base from Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom) for seven days continuously, leaving the base littered with the corpses of RUF/AFRC forces.

At the end of October 1998, RUF/AFRC forces concentrated around Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) in preparation for an attack of the town. Villages to the east of Kamalo were raided by RUF/AFRC squads. This forced many civilians to seek safety behind ECOMOG lines in Kamalo. During these preliminary attacks, RUF/AFRC forces cut a man in half from head to groin. Despite reinforcing in advance of the RUF/AFRC attack, ECOMOG withdrew north from Kamalo to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), taking casualties. From Kamalo, RUF/AFRC forces moved south attacking Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). During both attacks, large number of houses were burnt down, and civilians killed. ECOMOG forces, and SLA and CDF forces that had been infused into ECOMOG took up positions at Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), Kamaranka and Kamakwie on the northern axis running from Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom). The CDF began initiating local youths around Gbendembu, "washing" them spiritually to render them bullet-proof.



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In early December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked SLA and ECOMOG forces in Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), killing over 20 SLA soldiers and amputating the limbs of six civilians. In the closing weeks of late December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces cleared ECOMOG forces from within a corridor from Koidu (CHIEFDOM, Kono District) through Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkalili District) and Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District, Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). RUF/AFRC forces assaulted Freetown between 6 and 20 January. In late December, RUF/AFRC forces in Bombali District were closing in on Makeni, attacking towns to the north including Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom), Karina and Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC had also broken out of Kono District, and were moving on Makeni along the highway through Tonkalili. On 24 December, RUF/AFRC force assaulted Makeni from three directions, forcing ECOMOG to retreat to Kamakwie, which fell to the RUF/AFRC in the days following. A huge RUF/AFRC force moved through Makeni towards Port Loko District, and onwards to the Western Area.

Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom) now became the RUF/AFRC stronghold until April 2001. The town was at the heart of the RUF/AFRC's defensive operation following their failure to hold onto territory in the Western Area. The RUF/AFRC occupied Kambia District and the key entry points into the district. Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) was also under RUF/AFRC control, as was the town of Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). The RUF/AFRC controlled all the northern border routes in Guinea. Bombali District was divided into two commands, seated at Makeni and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

Throughout RUF/AFRC controlled territory, local RUF/AFRC began establishing joint civilian and military cooperation committees known as G5 committees. Without fail, the establishment of the G5 committee was accompanied by promises that RUF/AFRC commanders would prevent their forces from inflicting violence upon civilians. The G5 committees administered the collection of periodic - sometimes daily - contributions of money and food from the civilian population to the RUF/AFRC. ECOMOG's move to secure the highways between the Western Area, Port Loko and Mile 91 removed vital trade routes that could supply RUF/AFRC with basic goods and supplies. The G5 system appeared not to provide adequate resources to feed or pay RUF/AFRC members. The few instances of extremely brutal punishment metered out by RUF/AFRC commanding officers to their subordinates - on RUF/AFRC member was beaten with a cane infused with razor blades, another was stoned to death - did not to restrain RUF/AFRC forces from carrying out "food finding missions", stealing civilian property and food. To supplement the resources gained through G5 Committees and "food finding missions" the RUF/AFRC began selling stolen property in Guinean trade fairs just over the border from Tambahka Chiefdom. Often, the same commanders that promised discipline and the rule of law ordered these missions.

On 7 July 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed the Lomé Peace Agreement, consolidating a ceasefire that had been in force since May 1999. The RUF/AFRC continued to consolidate within Bombali District, setting up a training camp at Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom). Intense raids, both day and night were conducted around the training camp, intensifying the terror of the civilian population. The training camp at Gbendembu was also used to



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train recruits and conscriptees for missions inside Guinea territory. In late 1999, infighting between the the leadership of RUF and the AFRC in Makeni led to a division of operational areas, although the depth of the split between the two group is not clear. UNAMSIL commenced deployment in late 1999 to bolster the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

In January 2000, the 450 peacekeepers tried to deploy in Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom) but were delayed a few days en route at an RUF/AFRC checkpoint because they did not have the correct papers. In February, diamonds were discovered in Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom, leading to a concentration of RUF/AFRC forces in the chiefdom. In May, the RUF/AFRC surrounded and attacked UNAMSIL peacekeepers in Makeni, killing an unknown number and attacking them with sniper fire as they fled to Kabala. RUF/AFRC forces also disarmed over 200 Zambian UNAMSIL peacekeepers and took them to Makeni, and then to Kailahun. The RUF/AFRC captured a significant haul of armoured vehicle, weapons, uniforms and communications apparatus from UNAMSIL. Simultaneously, the RUF/AFRC again pushed towards the Western Area, attacking towns in Port Loko District and on the main highway through Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District). By mid-May, the RUF/AFRC advance had stalled. Between May and July, Sierra Leone Government helicopter gunships commenced attacking RUF/AFRC positions in and around Makeni, resulting an frequent civilian deaths and destruction of property when RUF/AFRC forces engaged with Anti-Aircraft guns. Similar attacks occurred in Kambia, Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts. The RUF/AFRC often deserted their positions as the gunship appeared.

In September 2000, RUF/AFRC forces in Tambakha Chiefdom staged attacks on attacked border towns just inside Guinean territory. Guinean armed forces adopted a "Hot Pursuit" policy, bombarding RUF/AFRC positions inside Sierra Leone and moving their border security forces three miles within Sierra Leonean territory. Civilian movement was restricted, and as the RUF/AFRC reprisals against civilians for suspected collaboration with Guinean force intensified.

Negotiations between UNAMSIL and the RUF/AFRC continued in line with the Aduja Ceasefire Agreement and its review process. In the first few months of 2001, the RUF/AFRC had opened the Lunsar-Makeni highway and returned to UNAMSIL much of weaponry and hardware it had confiscated in 2000. Long range UNAMSIL and MILOBs patrols commenced and by April Nigerian UNAMSIL had deployed into Makeni. The disarmament process in Bombali began in late September, accompanied by the arrival of Sierra Leone Police to Makeni (Bombali Seborá)

2. Factual Analysis

a) Events between 1992 and 1994

Following RUF attacks in Kono District on 22 October 1992, residents of the village of Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) who had moved to Kono District to mine diamonds, returned to their village on foot, a distance of over 100km. Many residents of Kambia Mapulen (Gbati Kamaranka Chiefdom) packed up their belongings and fled to larger towns such as Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom), Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District) and Freetown (Western Area). On 21 January 1994, the NPRC Resident Minister for the Northern Province arrived in Kambia



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Mapulen for a meeting with the chiefdom elders, during which he promised to provide security for civilians.

The RUF entered Bombali District in February 1994. RUF forces attacked the villages of Rogboreh, Makalan and Mateboi (all Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom), to the northwest of Makeni town, and bordering Port Loko District. The troops were armed with AK-47s, RPGs, and hand grenades and wore military-style uniforms. Thirty people were abducted from Rogboreh and a number of women were raped. Following the attack on Rogboreh, RUF forces chanted slogans about the leader of the RUF. Rogboreh was occupied for 2 weeks, during which no houses were burned. An RUF Commander was identified as killing three people in Makalan, taking their property. In Mateboi, RUF forces burned down an unknown number of homes.

On 3 April 1994, 200 SLA soldiers in Makali (Konike Barina Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) were also under the command of the Resident Minister for the Northern Province. On 11 April, SLA forces deployed from Makeni (Bombali Seboria Chiefdom) and recaptured the town of Makali from RUF forces.

In Makeni (Bombali Seboria Chiefdom), on 18 April 1994, there was a public demonstration by civilians in response to a strongly-held belief that those SLA forces had been responsible for earlier attacks on the villages of Masanga and Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and on Magburaka town (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). SLA forces fired on civilian demonstrators, killing at least two people.

In the late morning of 1 November 1994, a large RUF force attacked the town of Bungbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), southwest of Makeni (Bombali Seboria Chiefdom). One hundred and ninety-three houses were burned during the attack. Civilians displaced from Bungbuna moved westwards to Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom). On 2 November 1994, SLA forces moved from Teko Army Barracks in Makeni and repelled the RUF forces from Bungbuna. Over the following week, these forces eastwards towards the town of Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom, Koinadugu District).

b) Events in 1995 and 1996

RUF activity in 1995 was concentrated on attacking the Western Area, through major assaults on town like Port Loko (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). Although the RUF established two camps in Bombali District – at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom) and Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) – the RUF forward operating bases in 1995 were in the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara, Tonkolili) and later at Camp Fol-Fol in the south of Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili. The bases in Bombali would take on a greater significance in 1996, as the RUF suffered a series of military defeats and failed to move into Freetown or hold territory in the Western Area.

Between 1 and 5 January 1995, RUF forces attacked the town of Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom, Port Loko District) from the direction of Makeni (Bombali Seboria Chiefdom) and Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom).



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In May 1995, RUF forces entered the Bombali District from Kambia or Port Loko, neighbouring districts to the west. Between 14 and 18 May 1995, RUF moved eastwards from Romeni (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) towards Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District) crossing into Bombali District and establishing a base on an island between two river at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom)³⁴⁸. RUF forces operated from Ro-Source until at least September 1997. RUF forces again attacked the village of Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), southeast of Ro-Source along the primary route between Batkanu and Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) in May 1995. RUF forces raped five women and burnt down 10 homes. Civilians were abducted and forced to carry stolen property to an unknown destination. In the same year, RUF forces also established a base at Masonkorie, a village in Sanda Loko Chiefdom, 15km east of the town of Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

Sometime in February 1996, before the Presidential and Parliamentary elections on 26 February, RUF troops left their camp in the Kangari Hills, (Malal Mara Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) crossed the Makeni–Freetown highway and headed in the direction of Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom, Bombali District). From this point, RUF forces took an alternative route towards the town of Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), avoiding the main Batkanu–Gbendembu road, and attacked Makundu village (Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom). At least four civilian men were killed during the attack. Subsequently, 200 RUF forces moved in the direction of Gbendembu, attacking the town early in the morning on 22 or 23 February 2003 having camped the previous night in dense forest to the west of the town.

It is likely that RUF forces were active around the Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) area from 1 February, since they had control over Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District). On or around 23 February 1996, civilians in Kamakwie learned of the RUF attack on Gbendembu (Gbendembu-Ndowahun Chiefdom) prior to the subsequent attack on their town. Attacking Gbendembu, RUF forces were armed with AK47s, G3s, RPGs and hand grenades. Properties were looted and the doors of homes were destroyed. Civilian traffic travelling northwards from Gbendembu towards Kamakwie was targeted by RUF forces. The driver and passenger of a passing car were shot and wounded, and their car looted. RUF forces burned the car with the dying occupants trapped inside.

Between 23 and 26 February 1996, an RUF of between 150 and 200 personnel attacked Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) to the north of Makeni, north east of their base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), and 15 Km west of the RUF base at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). The attack came from the south of the town, through the village of Kathumpeh (Sella Limba Chiefdom). The main north-south road through Kamakwie passes through Gbendembu. The attack commenced in the morning, when a member of the RUF entered the town on a motorbike and began firing indiscriminately, possibly with an RPG. In addition to the burning down of 67 houses, RUF forces also burned offices of several international NGOs operating in the town. At least two people were

³⁴⁸ Given the attacks in the north eastern chiefdoms of Port Loko in early January 1995, and accounts in the records detailing attacks on locations in these chiefdoms as coming from the direction of Mateboi (Sanda Tenderen, Bombali), it is likely that the RUF had a presence around Ro-Source well before June 1995.

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abducted during this attack and taken to an RUF base at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko chiefdom). In the same period, in the village of Kagberi (Sella Limba Chiefdom), about 4 km west of Kamakwie, RUF forces captured and killed a farmer. They cut open his stomach and for an unspecified reason placed some "gari"³⁴⁹ inside it. Although no location was specified, it is likely that these same RUF forces also shot a deaf and mute man in Kagberi for not responding to their orders

RUF forces withdrew from Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) to their camp at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom), 15km east of Kamakwie. Abductees held at Masonkorie camp had their movement severely restricted and there are reports that female abductees were raped. Following the attacks on Kamakwie, the RUF unit stationed at Masonkorie redeployed to Kambia District.

Between 26 February 1996 and May 1997 no incidents are recorded within Bombali District. On 30 November 1996 the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed between leadership of the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone. Beginning early May 1997, Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) began to experience steady RUF activity. Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) was attacked during this month.

On 10 May 1997, the SLA deployed heavily armed units at a number of unknown locations in Bombali District.³⁵⁰ In the evening of 12 May 1997, SLA forces in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) came under attack from RUF forces. RUF forces met little to no resistance and displayed considerable knowledge of the SLA deployment within the town, including the exact location of an SLA ammunition dump. RUF forces killed over ten people during the attack. RUF forces captured an officer of the Sierra Leone Police, who was dressed in civilian clothes. Amongst his possessions they discovered a handgun, with which they subsequently killed him. RUF forces raped an elderly woman before killing her with a blow to the head from the butt of a handgun. RUF forces seized an SLA ammunition dump located within the town during the 12 May attack, although there is no indication of the quantity of ammunition taken. RUF forces selected the most prestigious residences in sections I and II of Kamakwie and burned them down. At 14:00 on 13 May 1997, RUF forces again returned to their base at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). By 20 May, government sources claimed Kamakwie was secure and free from RUF activity.³⁵¹ Sometime during May or June of 1997, likely following the 12 May assault on Kamakwie, RUF forces raped and killed a women in the village of Kaforad (Sanda Loko Chiefdom), about three miles from Kamakwie.

On 25 May 1997, elements of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces overthrew the elected government. This coup d'etat resulted in the formation of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by an SLA officer released from prison by the coupists. Shortly after the coup, the RUF and AFRC joined. AFRC forces, comprising primarily SLA elements remained stationed in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom). There are no reports of any atrocities committed by the ARFC in Kamakwie after this time. There are reports that troops clearly identified as belonging to the RUF had free access to Kamakwie.

³⁴⁹ Dried, cracked cassava root.
³⁵⁰ AFP, 10 May 1997
³⁵¹ Detail from AFP 20 May 1997



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Following the AFRC coup, the towns of Karina and Kamabai (both Biriwa Chiefdom) were occupied by RUF/AFRC forces. Both towns are located along the main east of the Batkanu – Gbendembu highway, on a key junction joining the north-south highway from Makeni to Kabala. Like Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and Mataboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), control of these towns serves to restrict movement north out of Makeni, the district headquarter town, cutting it off from Kabala (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). Karina is situated on top of a hill simplifying greatly the rearing of herd animals. In May 1997, it had a very high degree of agricultural productivity, including a large cattle stock, making it a valuable location for the RUF to control.

In the early hours of 27 May 1997, the town of Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom) was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces carrying guns and other weapons. Soldiers surrounded the central mosque and killed 10 civilians celebrating the Muslim feast of “Jonbedeh”, including the Section Chief. Of those escaping this attack on the mosque, an unknown number were injured. The majority of residents of the town heard gunfire and fled into the surrounding bush. RUF/AFRC forces raped an unknown number of women, and abducted 30 young civilian men and women. During the attack, numerous houses were burned down including those belonging to the town chief and the section chief. RUF/AFRC forces stole property. On the same day, RUF/AFRC forces moved west towards the village of Mandaha towards Gbendembu town (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), taking with them the 30 abductees. Some of the abductees were given military training and forced to join the RUF/AFRC, and some were forced into sexual slavery. The next day, the residents of Karina returned to the town and buried ten corpses in a mass grave. Given that Karina was on a regular patrol route from the RUF/AFRC camp at Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom), the burial was performed quickly, as residents feared the return of RUF/AFRC forces.

Also on 27 May 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Malongbo (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), nearby Karina. A father and son were killed when RUF/AFRC forces set their house on fire. An old man was killed when RUF/AFRC forces set fire to his grass house. RUF/AFRC forces amputated the hand of a civilian man, before shooting him dead in response to his complaints that he was now useless to his community.

From May 1997 to October 1997, Guinean forces were stationed at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District). During August and September 1997, the RUF/AFRC base at Ro-Source came under pressure from long-range rockets fired by Guinean forces at Madina. RUF/AFRC forces moved from their camp at Ro-Source (Ro-source) and established a new camp at Bainkoro (between Dibia and Sanda Magbolonthon Chiefdoms, Port Loko).

On 16 December, ECOMOG jets bombed RUF/AFRC positions outside of Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom), claiming that the RUF/AFRC was constructing a runway to allow arms supplies to enter the country more freely in violation of ECOWAS and UN sanctions.³⁵²

c) Events in 1998

³⁵² AFP, 16 December 1997.



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Between 6 and 14 February 1998, ECOMOG forces attacked Freetown, dislodging the combined RUF/AFRC forces and forcing their retreat into provincial Sierra Leone. This general retreat moved northwards, along the Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) –Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) - Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) axis.³⁵³ After 14 February, RUF/AFRC forces were stationed in Lunsar, to the west along the highway from Makeni Town (Bombali Seborá). RUF/AFRC forces also attacked key locations in Kambia District, including the economic centres of Kambia Town and Rokupr (both Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District).

On 13 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered the village of Masongbo (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom), 3 km west of Makeni along the main Freetown-Makeni highway. They were identified as RUF/AFRC because of their half military, half civilian attire. One member of the RUF/AFRC fired a single round between the legs of a civilian man in order to extort money from him; another civilian was robbed. On 14 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces regrouped in Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom) following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown. On the same day, ECOMOG Alpha Jets attacked Teko Barracks in Makeni. In addition, ECOMOG targeted the Makeni Police barracks, believing them to be the RUF/AFRC brigade headquarters. At least five civilians were killed during this attack.

RUF/AFRC commenced “Operation Pay Yourself”, which lasted 17 days in Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom), from 14 February 1998 until 3 March 1998. “Operation Pay Yourself” was executed in response to the failure of the AFRC to resist attacks on Freetown by ECOMOG forces between 8 and 14 February 1998.³⁵⁴ A similar operation was launched between the same dates in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District). RUF forces were reported as entering Makeni from the Magburaka (Kholifa Rhowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) highway with Toyota Hi-Lux and Mazda pick-up trucks. They were armed with AK-47s and G3s. At night, RUF/AFRC forces fired upon the exterior of houses before entering and performing searches. During these searches, mattresses, watches, foodstuffs, and personal and saleable items were taken. RUF/AFRC forces retreated from Makeni in the wake of ECOMOG forces

In the early evening of 1 March 1998, troops from the ECOMOG 24th Infantry Brigade entered Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) from Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District). They engaged RUF/AFRC snipers en route at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and exchanged fire with RUF/AFRC forces for about an hour as they entered Lunsar. Apart from that, ECOMOG met no further resistance from RUF/AFRC forces in Lunsar.³⁵⁵

On 2 March 1998, ECOMOG forces moved from Lunsar and arrived at the village of Magbema, 2km west of Makeni (both Bombali Seborá Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces retreated northwards from Makeni in the direction of Kamaboi (Biriwa Chiefdom), to the east of Makeni, which had been under RUF control since May 1997. Some forces moved further towards Kabala Town (Wara Wara

³⁵³ See factual analysis for Western Area and Port Loko District in 1998 for further information.

³⁵⁴ Clarification is required from the records about the date, as the starting date of “Operation Pay Yourself” is reported at different times across different Districts, the earliest being in the Western Area in 1997.

³⁵⁵ R.A. Adeshina, pp.36-38.



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Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District), settling in the town of Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). On 2 or 3 March 1998, ECOMOG arrived in Makeni and established a base at Teko Barracks, taking control of Makeni. At some point after ECOMOG entered the town, forces from the CDF 9th Battalion were deployed to assist in patrolling the Makeni area.³⁵⁶ An ECOMOG major stated that any civilian who is caught and found to have been an RUF/AFRC collaborator “will be treated as if they are not human” and commenced house to house searches, screening civilians and searching for possible RUF/AFRC infiltrators.

Around midday on 22 March 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Kambia Mapulen (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). They were driven to Kambia Mapulen through the town of Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) on the main northern road to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), in a big truck with a civilian driver. Some of the RUF/AFRC forces were dressed in full military attire and others were dressed in civilian clothes. All were well armed with G3 and AK-47 rifles, and support weapons including RPGs. The RUF Commander first called a village meeting and informed the assembled civilians that they were being “liberated from their struggle”. As the meeting progressed, RUF/AFRC forces surrounded the village. In the afternoon, the RUF/AFRC forces began firing on civilians, who fled the village. One girl did not escape the attack, was captured and raped by five members of the RUF/AFRC. The RUF/AFRC forces left the village along the same road they entered in the direction of Kamaranka. Villagers returned to find their valuables and livestock looted by the RUF/AFRC forces.

At this point, ECOMOG forces had taken control of Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom). ECOMOG met little resistance and easily took control of Kamakwie. During this time, RUF/AFRC forces were based at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District) at the other end of a highway leading directly to Kamakwie. In April and May 1998, ECOMOG informed representatives of the village of Laya (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) that they had insufficient logistical capacity to patrol the road between Kamalo and Laya.

In April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered the northern Tambakha Chiefdom, passed through the Northern Jungle from Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom (Koinadugu District) on their way to the chiefdom headquarter town of Fintonia. Duguta (Tambakha Chiefdom), a village along their route, was the first town to be attacked in the chiefdom. Reports indicate that the RUF/AFRC did not fire a shot as they entered, although RUF/AFRC forces aged between 13 and 16 years were given orders to shoot should anyone try and escape. Fifty residents were held under armed guard for the duration of the attack. Twenty-five homes were burned down and 30 people were abducted and forced to carry stolen property, including livestock and poultry. Nobody was killed, although threats were made to abductees by RUF/AFRC forces that anyone caught resting would be killed.

In the early hours of one Wednesday in April 1998, over 100 RUF/AFRC forces eventually arrived at and attacked Fintonia (Tambakha Chiefdom). They were armed with AK-47 rifles, RPGs and bladed weapons. The town was surrounded within 30 minutes of their arrival. Over 20 people were caught trying to escape the town. They were rounded up and placed into groups. During the

³⁵⁶ All Africa News, 11 December 1998 taken from Concord Times
Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004



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RUF/AFRC attack, eleven people were killed, sixty-eight houses were looted and burned. At least 17 civilians were abducted to carry stolen property. Those abducted were ordered by RUF/AFRC forces to assist them in avoiding “Government positions”, because of their familiarity with the terrain.

On the same day the same RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Kottoh (Tambakha Chiefdom) in the Outanma Kilimi National Park, three miles west of Fintonia. At this village, they amputated the hand of an old civilian man, who died from loss of blood whilst heading south to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) to seek medical attention. Following this assault, the same RUF/AFRC forces proceeded towards Komoyah (Tambakha Chiefdom), which is about sixteen miles south west of Fintonia. RUF/AFRC forces killed 10 civilian men one after the other in this attack and amputated the arms of a further 11 civilian men. An unknown number of houses were also looted by RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG forces visiting Komoyah following the attack reported that RUF/AFRC forces had erected a checkpoint, a rope across the road. They had tied the amputated arms along the length of the rope and left the amputees dying nearby. ECOMOG forces took the amputees to their base at Kamakwie, where they received medical attention. From here, RUF/AFRC forces continued westwards to Sarakuda (Tambakha Chiefdom) where they killed an old woman.

Overnight between 10 and 11 May 1998, RUF/AFRC force attacked Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), a town on the road to Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District) that sits upon the Batkanu–Gbendembu route. During the attack, the Chiefdom Speaker and another prominent elder were killed. Seven other civilians were also killed. Many of the brick houses in the town had been burnt down, and much of the property stolen by RUF/AFRC forces.

In late June 1998, Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) once again came under attack by RUF/AFRC forces. The town was surrounded before the RUF/AFRC forces announced their presence with a single signature shot. Further sporadic firing by RUF/AFRC forces caused many of the residents to flee the town. An hour after RUF/AFRC forces first entered the village, a large group of RUF/AFRC forces in full combat fatigues passed through the village in a westerly direction, heading towards Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom). Following these military forces were between 1000 and 1500 people in civilian dress carrying looted property. In Mayainku village (Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom), on the road to Batkanu, RUF/AFRC forces abducted a man, who was later found dead, his body containing many bullet holes. In Mamaya (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), also on the road to Batkanu from Gbendembu, RUF/AFRC forces raped a 10-year old girl, who later died of blood loss.

In July 1998, villagers in Gbendembu heard from displaced persons that the village of Loihindi (both Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), east of Gbendembu on the route to Kabala, had been attacked by RUF/AFRC forces. During the attack, RUF/AFRC forces had mutilated a young boy and an old man.

In July 1998, the village of Masiba (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces from the direction of Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces went from house to house searching for civilians. Those captured were first tied up as the search continued,



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and were then taken to the village of Kortulay (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and forced to take the rice of the Section Chief. The captives then transported the rice in the direction of Biriwa Chiefdom. Two days after the initial attack, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masiba again, to recapture a number of abducted civilians who had escaped and returned to Masiba. The second RUF/AFRC attack on Masiba came from the village of Hundowa, to the north. A trader was shot dead in the centre of town. RUF/AFRC forces broke into all the houses in Masiba, looting what could be carried. At least 10 houses were burnt down. The escapees were recaptured by RUF/AFRC forces. Following this attack, the RUF/AFRC forces immediately moved to the nearby village of Wanworowah (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), where they captured 20 civilians. The men were hung beneath trees and set on fire. The women were cut with blades on their chests and backs.

On 17 July 1998, in Laminaya (Sanda Loko Chiefdom), 28 civilians were killed by RUF/AFRC forces. A man was handcuffed and then burned to death, and RUF/AFRC forces mutilated a woman's genitals. Laminaya was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces again in the afternoon of 5 September 1998.

On 23 July RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Matoko in the north of Biriwa chiefdom, about 20 miles from the village of Laya (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). RUF forces opened the attack at 2200 with an RPG, and went house-to-house searching for civilians. Many fled into the surrounding bush. Over 20 of those that were captured were tied in pairs and shot dead by RUF/AFRC forces. The attack ceased at 0200 on 24 July 1998.

On 29 July, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Kalangba (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) south of Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) on the North-South Kamakwie-Makeni highway. There are no further details about this attack.

Since late May 1997, RUF/AFRC forces had occupied the town of Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom). From this location, RUF/AFRC forces were able to establish a strong presence in the area, bolstered by forces driven from Makeni in early March 1998 by ECOMOG forces. RUF/AFRC activity in the neighbouring town Karina and its environs was mainly limited to "food finding missions" or "Jar-Jar". The July 1998 attacks on Masiba (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom) described above are good examples of "food finding missions": civilians were captured and instructed to lead RUF/AFRC forces to sources of salt, livestock, crops and vegetables. The same civilians were then force by RUF/ARFC forces to transport the stolen food to RUF bases.

On 2 August, ECOMOG began planning an operation to remove RUF/AFRC forces from their camp as Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), deploying an artillery battery at Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), and sending a Nigerian infantry platoon to Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom). Across seven days in mid-August ECOMOG artillery and air support bombarded Ro-Source continually. On or around 22 August, a group of civilians volunteered to head to Ro-Source and provide information to ECOMOG. They reported that the village was deserted, and that there



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were many corpses littering the area.³⁵⁷ RUF/AFRC activity nevertheless continued in and around Ro-Source into 1999.

On 1 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked the town of Kalangba, south of Gbendembu (both Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom). On 5 September RUF/AFRC forces attacked the town of Laminaya to the east of Kamalo town (both Sella Limba Chiefdom). Many civilians had moved to Kamalo following these attacks, seeking protection from the ECOMOG forces stationed in the town.

Around midnight on 8 September 1998 RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Maharibo (Sando Loko Chiefdom), immediately to the east of Kamalo (Sella Limba Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces were armed with AK-47s, RPGs, machetes, grenades, and G3s, and dispensed heavy machine gun fire throughout the town. The shooting stopped at 0300. RUF/AFRC forces gathered the villagers into the centre of the town, and requested information about the security arrangements in Kamalo, which had been held by ECOMOG forces since early March 1998. Following the attack, RUF forces departed westwards for Bankabie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), a village immediately south of Kamalo and joined with other RUF/AFRC units. RUF/AFRC units that participated in this attack re-established Camp Ro-Source (Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom), which had previously been abandoned in September 1997.

About fifteen miles south of Kamalo (Sella Limba Chiefdom), on 8 October, two groups of RUF/AFRC forces joined at a camp outside Masomba (Sella Limba Chiefdom), where some 500 RUF/AFRC forces were already deployed. RUF/AFRC forces abducted a man rumoured to have mystical powers, and forced him to perform religious rites for the unit. These including creating talisman to guarantee RUF forces would not suffer injuries, in addition to offerings of kola-nuts, sacrifices of goats and sheep for military success. The RUF/AFRC were certain that that another group of RUF/AFRC forces would arrive at the camp on 20 October. Once that unit arrived, all RUF/AFRC forces stationed at the camp would prepare for an attack on Kamalo. In the northern part of Magbaiamba Ndowahun Chiefdom, RUF forces attacked the village of Gbendebu on 27 October. RUF forces captured one civilian and divided him into two sections by splitting his body in two from head to groin. On 31 October, the group of RUF/AFRC forces who had been expected entered the RUF camp outside Masomba (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

By the end of October 1998, around 500 "loyal" SLA troops had been deployed to Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), south of where the RUF/AFRC were concentrating for the attack on Kamalo. The CDF deployed at Kalangba frequently patrolled Gbendembu. Parents were encouraged by the CDF commander to send their children to be initiated into the CDF, or "washed", so they could become bulletproof. A number of people died when trainers shot them at during the final stages of initiation.

As RUF forces prepared to attack Kamalo (Sella Limba Chiefdom) from the south, ECOMOG reinforced their positions in the town on 13 November 1998 with troops from Kamakwie. On 14

³⁵⁷ Account from R.A. Adeshina, p. 115-116



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November, RUF forces attacked Kamalo. During this assault, RUF/AFRC forces killed an unknown number of ECOMOG forces, who were buried by civilians two days later, on 16 November. In addition, 80 homes were burnt and an unknown number of civilians were killed. Five RUF/AFRC wounded were returned to the camp outside Masomba (Sella Limba Chiefdom). ECOMOG and SLA forces were driven out of Kamalo and retreated north to the town of Kamakwie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom), still at this stage held by ECOMOG.

On 21 November RUF/AFRC forces headed south from Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) along the main highway and on 21 November they attacked Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces abducted seven men and two women, burnt down homes, and took property. The village clinic was also destroyed. They then established a base there that was still in operation in December 1998. On 22 November, ECOMOG deployed to Kamaranka, but did not engage forces at a nearby RUF/AFRC camp identified by two youths who had escaped from the camp the night before. ECOMOG troops remained in Kamaranka. It is reported in general terms that ECOMOG forces treated civilians accused to being "rebel collaborators" with extreme brutality. On 23 November 1998 in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), ECOMOG forces tied-up and beat to death a well known and popular businessman accused of being a "rebel collaborator" by a woman in the town.

CDF forces established a checkpoint Ferrah Loko village, on the main Makeni-Kamakwie highway south of Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). On 27 November 1998, CDF forces detained two civilians at the checkpoint and accused them of being "rebel collaborators". The civilians were led to a nearby river and shot dead with AK-47s. On 28 November, at the same checkpoint, CDF confiscated a quantity of prescription drugs to be used in the treatment of an outbreak of cholera in Kamaranka from a pharmacist travelling from Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom) to Kamaranka.

In December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked many villages in Sella Limba Chiefdom, around the headquarter town of Kamakwie. Six miles from Kamakwie, at the crossing point over the Mongo River at Kabbah Ferry, RUF/AFRC forces burnt several houses and looted property in their attack on the village. Then, seven miles from Kamakwie, the town of Kamaportho (Sella Limba Chiefdom) was also attacked. RUF/AFRC forces killed an unknown number of civilians, burnt homes and looted properties.

Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) was attacked on 9 December by RUF/AFRC forces again entering the town from the west along the Batkanu-Gbendembu Highway. ECOMOG and SLA forces stationed in the town were driven out by RUF/AFRC forces. During the engagement, RUF/AFRC forces lined up eleven civilians and shot them one after the other. RUF/AFRC forces set fire to two machine guns located in the vacated ECOMOG position. ECOMOG and "loyal" SLA forces regrouped to the south of Gbendembu and launched a counter attack. During the attack RUF/AFRC forces killed 23 SLA forces and amputated the limbs of six civilians. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC forces were successfully dislodged from Gbendembu. Residents buried the dead civilians in mass grave near the Wesleyan Church. The 25 dead SLA soldiers were taken to Makeni (Bombali Sembora). Civilians buried an unknown number of RUF/AFRC dead in the bush surrounding Gbendembu.



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On Monday 20 December, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Binkolo town (the headquarter town of Safroko Limba Chiefdom), near Makeni (Bombali Seborā Chiefdom) on the main road to Kabala (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). On 21 December, RUF forces took property, including food items, and burnt down 133 homes. Five people were shot dead in the attack. RUF/AFRC forces established and manned checkpoints in Binkolo between 30 December 1998 and 4 January 1999.

On 23 December, RUF/AFRC forces took control of Magburaka Town (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). Later that day RUF/AFRC forces commenced a major assault on Makeni from three directions. The nearby towns of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom), Karina and Kamabai (both Biriwara Chiefdom) to the northeast were already under RUF/AFRC control. Gbendembu (Gbendembu. Ndowahun Chiefdom) and Kamolo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) to the northwest were both under pressure from RUF/AFRC forces. From the south, RUF/AFRC forces entered Bombali district through Magburaka town (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and continued towards Makeni, whilst another RUF/AFRC force launched their attack on the town from the north. RUF/AFRC forces also moved from Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), attacking Makeni from the west.

On 24 December at 1200 RUF/AFRC forces succeeding in dislodging ECOMOG forces from the Teko Barracks in Makeni. ECOMOG forces retreated north to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom). Teko Barracks was home to the brigade headquarters of the ECOMOG 24th Infantry Brigade. ECOMOG forces ran short of ammunition and were overpowered by the attacking RUF/AFRC force. During the attack, RUF/AFRC forces inflicted heavy casualties on ECOMOG, and managed to capture the ECOMOG brigade intelligence officer and much of the brigade documentation.³⁵⁸ By 26 December, ECOMOG had withdrawn from Makeni.

In late December, RUF/AFRC forces Fintonia (Tambakah Chiefdom) was attacked. Many people were abducted some of whom were made to carry looted goods. Eleven civilians were killed and at least one woman was sexually assaulted and forced to be a sex slave for RUF/AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces abducted over 40 people, 11 were killed. 68 houses were burned down. Civilians were forced to carry looted items for the RUF/AFRC forces.

On 24 December 1998, SLA forces retreating from Makeni towards Koinadugu District arrived in the village of Bombali Bana (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom), 3km west of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom), to the north of Makeni. Bombali Bana was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces after 24 December 1998. In this attack, 25 houses were burned down. Throughout the night of 25-26 December report hearing the movement of convoys of vehicles moved towards Makeni through Binkolo on the Kabala-Makeni highway. Between 30 December 1998 and 1 January 1999, convoys of civilians carrying sacks of rice on their heads, and livestock over their shoulders, were being escorted by armed RUF/AFRC forces through Binkolo towards Makeni.

³⁵⁸ Detail only. R.A. Adeshina, p.133



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After 26 December, ECOMOG forces retreated from the town of Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) through the village of Konba towards Kambia District, and eventually to Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District). On 30 December, RUF/AFRC forces entered the town immediately, without engaging ECOMOG. RUF/AFRC forces quickly set up an administration, and started recruiting young men and women from throughout Sella Limba Chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces also crossed into Kamakwie from Tambakha Chiefdom, stealing much of the kerosene and food waiting to be ferried across the Little Scarcies River to Kamakwie. Soon after arriving in Kamakwie, RUF/AFRC forces sought to extend their authority over the Mongo River north towards the border with Guinea. Also on 30 December, RUF/AFRC forces advanced into Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and engaged ECOMOG positions.

d) Events in 1999

Through December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces cleared ECOMOG forces from within a corridor from Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) through Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkalili District) and Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District, Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). RUF/AFRC forces assaulted Freetown between 6 and 20 January. Following an intense battle for the control of metropolitan Freetown, ECOMOG forces pushed RUF/AFRC forces back to Waterloo, where they remained in force until at least 25 February 1999.

At the beginning of 1999 the RUF/AFRC focused on several initiatives to consolidate their gains of late December 1998, and corral ECOMOG in Port Loko District. Initially, RUF/AFRC forces retained control over the arterial routes from Western Area running through Port Loko District towards Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom). Additionally, RUF/AFRC forces took control of the key junction town of Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). In the first months of 1999, however, ECOMOG forces pushed along the main highway from the Western Area into Port Loko District, retaking Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) from RUF/AFRC forces by late April, and creating a relatively secure route between Masiaka and Port Loko Town through Rogberray (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District). Maforki and BKM Chiefdoms, and those behind Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom)³⁵⁹ remained primarily under ECOMOG control. In April, ECOMOG also moved from Masiaka and retook control of Mile 91.

The RUF/AFRC consolidated in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Makeni (Bombali Sembora), and took control of all the key towns in Kambia District.³⁶⁰ From this point through to disarmament in 2001 and 2002, Makeni was the RUF/AFRC headquarter for the southern part of Bombali District. An additional headquarter was also established in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) to oversee the expansive northern region of the district and the Mongo River crossing at Kabba Ferry. In Port Loko District, the RUF/AFRC lines started at Mange, which was the first line of defence for their positions in wharf towns on the Great Scarcies River, including Rokupr and Kambia Town (both Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District). Makeni was connected to Kambia Town by a lengthy route looping north and then west through Kamakwie and Madina

³⁵⁹ Kaffu Bullom and Lokomassama Chiefdoms.

³⁶⁰ See factual analysis for Kambia District in 1999 for further information.



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(Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District). This gave RUF/AFRC forces access to the major international border crossings with Guinea. At their base in Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District), RUF/AFRC forces controlled access to the main routes Sanda Magbolontor and Dibia Chiefdoms (both in Port Loko District) into Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom (Bombali District). To the south, RUF/AFRC forces occupied Magburaka Town and positions on the main highway to Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District), which was also under RUF/AFRC control. Makeni was the heart of this RUF/AFRC defensive operation.

At the beginning of 1999, RUF/AFRC forces controlled Kamabai, a main town in the Biriwa Chiefdom, to the north east of Makeni. There are frequent mentions of RUF/AFRC forces forcing residents to vacate to provide lodgings for RUF/AFRC forces. There was also massive theft of private property and food during The RUF/AFRC encampment. RUF/AFRC forces were armed with rifles, grenades, cutlasses, bayonets, and RPGs and forced civilians to join them.

In January, numerous RUF/AFRC bases were established along the Makeni– Guinea and Makeni-Freetown highways. One RUF/AFRC base was established in Mabaibunda (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom) and another was established a base at Matakoko. A camp was set up in Makoth (Makari Gbanti chiefdom). Kamalo (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) was occupied in late December 1998 and checkpoints were established in the following weeks. South of Kamalo, RUF/AFRC forces established two checkpoints in Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom).

By 10 January the RUF/AFRC had all of Sanda Loko Chiefdom under its control, in addition to the north-south road linking Makeni (Bombali Sembora Chiefdom) with Kamakwie. The RUF/AFRC command in Kamalo established a G5 committee, and announced to the town residents that it would punish any of its personnel caught inflicting violence on civilians.

In early January, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Mateboi (Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom), capturing four civilians and burning down houses that remained from their attack in May 1998. CDF forces attacked RUF/AFRC forces in Ro-Source at some point in January or February 1999 but were unsuccessful. Over 50 CDF personnel were killed by RUF/AFRC forces and buried by civilians in a mass grave at Ro-Source. RUF/AFRC forces attacked Mateboi later in January, gathering 27 civilians in the town market and shooting them dead. A woman was injured with a cutlass, but did not die and was taken to Makeni for medical treatment. Throughout Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, RUF/AFRC force used civilians to assist with “Food Finding Missions”. The RUF/AFRC set up a civilian G5 committee in Mateboi to assist with the collection of contributions of 30 cups of rice and 5 litres of palm oil from every civilian in the town. Shortly after this system began, those civilians remaining began leaving for bush camps to avoid making contributions to the RUF/AFRC.

In January, a group of around 20 RUF/AFRC members set up camp in Masiba (Ghendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and informed the town residents that they were here to protect them from raids by other RUF/AFRC groups. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC forces in the town beat civilians regularly. One man was beaten for 24 hours continually, and then taken by the RUF/AFRC town commander to the nearby bush. The RUF/AFRC commander executed the civilian with two gunshots in the back of his head. He was not fully dead when the RUF/AFRC commander ordered



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other civilians to bury him. Another young boy was beaten severely by RUF/AFRC members, who also used a bladed weapon to inscribe "RUF" on his chest. Between January and August, two other civilians were treated the same way by RUF/AFRC forces in Masiba. In August, RUF/AFRC forces tied up a civilian in Masiba and attacked him with a cutlass.

Also in January, RUF/AFRC forces set up a base and checkpoints at main entrances of the town of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom). By then, Bombali Bana village (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) was already experiencing regular RUF/AFRC food finding missions. RUF/AFRC forces attacked the town on 26 January because of suspicions that there were CDF and Kamajor supporters among the populace. During the RUF/AFRC attack, two civilians were shot dead and another tortured to death before being transported on a wheelbarrow to the nearby village of Panlap (Bombali Sembora Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces also burned down 25 houses.

ECOMOG's success in March and April in pushing the RUF/AFRC off the main highways in Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District) and Yoni Chiefdom (Tonkolili District) had the effect of cutting off a major route for goods and supplies for the RUF/AFRC operations in the north. The RUF/AFRC sought to establish other sources of revenue and supply, trading and stealing from markets in Guinean border towns. At this time in the northern chiefdom of Tambakha, RUF/AFRC forces were beginning to move towards the Guinean border. RUF/AFRC forces attacked the chiefdom headquarter town of Fintonia, on the northerly Kamakwie–Madina Oula³⁶¹ (Guinea) route on 11 January. RUF/AFRC forces were also based seen in border villages such as Sanya and Symbecki (both Tambakha Chiefdom), where they regularly sold items stolen during attacks to intermediaries who would sell them at the weekly market in the Guinean border towns of Madina Oula, Sekusoria and Lakantha. In Kambia District, RUF/AFRC forces used the Great Scaries River to access trade fairs in towns just over the Guinean border.³⁶² The Guinean authorities tightened border security checks on traders. In relation to the Guinean operations, RUF forces in Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom) attempted to conscript civilians.

By March 1999, RUF/AFRC forces had effective control over the surrounding area of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) and proceeded to take food from its inhabitants. In Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom, food-finding missions were conducted in Kamaranka and Kambia Mapalun in April. At a meeting that occurred sometime between before peace negotiations commenced, a G5 committee of RUF/AFRC forces and civilians met to discuss food contributions to the RUF/AFRC war effort. An order was passed requiring civilians to contribute food to RUF/AFRC forces on a daily basis. The RUF commander officially ordered the beginning of food-finding missions around Binkolo in middle to late 1999.

Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May in the Togolese capital, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (Lomé Peace

³⁶¹ In late January 1999, UNHCR established a refugee camp in Madina Oula, although Sierra Leonean refugees had been seeking safety there since 1997. AFP, 28 January 1999.

³⁶² See the factual analysis for Kambia District for 1999 for further information.



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Agreement). On the same day the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, RUF/AFRC forces in Thama Village (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) tied up, beat and executed four young boys. Residents of the village buried their corpses in a mass grave in Thama.

After the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, the RUF/AFRC established a large training camp in Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), on the Guinea-Makeni road. The Gbendembu camp replaced a camp located previously located in Kailahun District. It was set up both to bolster the RUF/AFRC ground force in Sierra Leone, and to train forces for attacks on towns in Guinea. Many civilians in Gbendembu were forced to work in the training camp preparing food for trainees. Conditions in the camp were harsh, and food was scarce. To ensure they did not escape, trainees were monitored continually by RUF/AFRC security forces. RUF/AFRC "Food Finding Missions" became commonplace in villages surrounding Gbendembu, and a specific group of RUF/AFRC "Night Combatants" carried out frequent looting raids in the area overnight. This contributed to a sense of heightened terror amongst civilians in and around the town.

In August 1999, "Operation Pay Yourself" began in Magbema. This was an ongoing RUF/AFRC slogan targeting towns and villages with a looting spree, the stolen property from which served as pay for the forces. This operation lasted for 72 hours. If any civilians refused to provide RUF/AFRC forces with food or with whatever goods they sought, they were either beaten or killed. Also in August, RUF/AFRC established "G5" civilian-military liaison committees throughout Safroko Limba Chiefdom. Like in other places, the G5 committee was tasked with administering the collection of daily contributions of foodstuff from the civilian population to the RUF/AFRC. Shortly after its establishment, RUF/AFRC forces were ordered to search the bush surrounding settlement to collect food for themselves.

In the southern headquarter tension was beginning to exhibit itself between RUF and AFRC commanders and ranks in Makeni (Bombali Sembora). In August, a senior RUF commander was captured and detained in Port Loko District by an AFRC splinter called the West Side Boys.³⁶³ The West Side Boys, based in the Okra Hill Area of lower Maforki Chiefdom and Koya Chiefdom in Port Loko District eventually released the senior RUF commander, who commandeered a number of vehicles in Lunsar (Port Loko District) and Magbema and returned to Makeni. In August 1999, in Makeni's Independence Square, one of the RUF commanders shot an AFRC commander at point blank range, killing him immediately. RUF and AFRC members fought for control of Makeni. Following this battle, the AFRC forces left Makeni and moved into Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) led by a different commander³⁶⁴. During their withdrawal from Makeni, AFRC forces abducted civilians en route to Lunsar to carry wounded AFRC personnel.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to replace the previous observer mission and assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.³⁶⁵ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

³⁶³ See factual analysis for Port Loko District for further information.

³⁶⁴ This information will require further clarification, since it is also mentioned in the factual analysis for Tonkolili District.

³⁶⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999)



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(UNAMSIL) commenced deployment with the arrival of advance teams on 29 and 30 November;³⁶⁶ 4,500 UNAMSIL troops were present in Sierra Leone by 10 January 2000.³⁶⁷

e) Events in 2000

On 5 January, a contingent of 450 Kenyan UNAMSIL peacekeepers and military observers (MILOBS) tried to enter Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom) but was denied entry by RUF/AFRC forces on the grounds that they had not been authorised by the RUF/AFRC high command to deploy in the town. By 6 January, companies of Kenyan UNAMSIL peacekeepers had set up camp in Makeni. In January 2000, RUF/AFRC forces in Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) stoned a civilian to death after accusing him of killing an RUF/AFRC member. The civilian's body was left unburied and dragged along the road to the nearby village of Mongoreh (Safroko Limba).

In February or March 2000, diamonds were found in Kambia Makuhun (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) by residents of the village. A member of RUF/AFRC senior command oversaw the mining operation, in which abducted civilians were forced to work as miners. Those accused of stealing were given 200 lashes. Within the month, RUF/AFRC forces moved from Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) and Makeni to reinforce Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom), a village at the intersection of a route that leads to Kambia Makuhun and the Gbundema–Kamakwie highway. On 24 February, the RUF/AFRC commander in Kamakwie captured the Paramount Chief of Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom and released him after two weeks when each household in the chiefdom had contributed 5,000 Leones to the RUF/AFRC. Other RUF/AFRC forces entered Kamaranka, and held a town meeting to announce that they planned to use AK-47 machineguns to chase a chicken belonging to a local lady. A young boy was shot in the leg during the chase. Later in the year in Kamaranka, three RUF/AFRC members raped a woman in the Kamaranka Police Station.

On 2 or 3 May, the Kenyan contingent of UNAMSIL stationed in Makeni came under attack from RUF/AFRC positions in the town. A number of British UN Military Observers were also deployed with the Kenyans. An RUF brigadier entered the Kenyan base, assaulted a Bangladeshi Major and with a group of other RUF forces abducted an unknown number of Kenyan peacekeepers. One Kenyan peacekeeper was shot dead at point blank range by an RUF/AFRC member. As the RUF brigadier tried to take a Kenyan officer, gunfire broke out between the two groups.³⁶⁸ RUF/AFRC forces in Makeni celebrated the attack on the peacekeepers. On 5 May 2000, 208 members of UNAMSIL's Zambian contingent were disarmed and captured en route to Makeni by RUF/AFRC forces based in Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom, Port Loko District). RUF forces returned to Foredugu and Makeni with vehicles, communication sets, weapons and uniforms confiscated from the peacekeepers. The RUF/AFRC high command in Makeni encircled the Zambians partly to delay their advance so other RUF/AFRC forces could prevent a UNAMSIL helicopter from reaching the Kenyan contingent in Makeni. The Zambian captives were taken from Makeni to Kailahun District.³⁶⁹ Kenyan UNAMSIL broke out of Makeni on or around 11 May, and headed to UN outposts in Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and to Kabala (Wara Wara

³⁶⁶ BBC, 29 November 1999

³⁶⁷ IRIN West Africa, 11 January 1999

³⁶⁸ BBC Online News, 11 May 2000 (13:14 GMT 14:14 UK).

³⁶⁹ See the factually analysis for Kailahun District in 2000 for further information.



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Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District), which was held by the “loyal” SLA. Kenyan UNAMSIL soldiers were attacked by RUF/AFRC snipers in Panlap, a village on the highway to Kabala. On or around 12 May, UK forces airlifted four UN MILOBs from Magburaka following their escape from Makeni.³⁷⁰

The RUF/AFRC had captured around 500 UNAMSIL peacekeeper since the beginning of May, prompting a crisis for the peacekeeping mission. On 8 May, the UK military commenced “Operation Palliser”, deploying to Sierra Leone the *HMS Ocean* and other vessels with around 800 soldiers from the Parachute Regiment.³⁷¹ UK forces secured the Freetown area and commenced re-training the SLA in June.³⁷² Between 8 and 14 May, RUF/AFRC forces unsuccessfully tried to occupy Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) in a bid to move into the Western Area. Other towns in Port Loko District, including Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) also came under attack from RUF/AFRC forces.³⁷³ By 28 May, following the series of events outlined below, UNAMSIL announced that virtually all the peacekeepers had been released by the RUF. In June RUF/AFRC and SLA forces fought for control of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), a key town in the RUF/AFRC’s defensive arc around Makeni. RUF/AFRC secured the town by 21 June.

Between May and July 2000, helicopter gunships began flying over the Makeni and towns along the main highway nearby Makeni, such as Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) and Masungbo (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom). In early May, a gunship attacked Binkolo, destroying two civilian residences. On seeing the gunship RUF/AFRC forces would run from their positions and seek cover in the surrounding bush. On 9 May, the gunship attacked RUF/AFRC positions on the Masungbo-Makeni highway. On 29 May, a helicopter gunship dropped leaflets³⁷⁴ over Makeni. RUF/AFRC forces in Makeni Lorry Park attacked the helicopter. Five civilians were killed in the engagement, although it is not possible to say which side was responsible. The explosions could be heard in Binkolo, some 10 km from Makeni. On 7 July, a gunship flew over Binkolo, hovered and then left. On 29 July, the gunship returned to Makeni, and attacked RUF/AFRC positions killing at least one civilian and damaging three houses. Similar attacks by gunship were made in Kambia District, becoming more intense after 26 May 2000. Gunship attacks are also noted around this time in Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District).

Between August and October, RUF/AFRC commanders requested youths in Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) and Bombali Bana (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) to be trained at the RUF/AFRC camp in Gbendembu. By this time, nearly two battalions of RUF/AFRC combatants had been trained at Gbendembu and deployed on missions in Guinea.

³⁷⁰ BBC Online News, 12 May 2000 (15:37 GMT 16:37 UK).

³⁷¹ On 24 May, soldiers from the 42 Commando Royal Marines replaced the paratroopers.

³⁷² See the factual analysis for the Western Area in 2000 for further information.

³⁷³ See the factual analysis for Port Loko District in 2000 for further information.

³⁷⁴ Leaflets dropped from Government of Sierra Leone helicopter gunships in Kambia stated that their next sortie would not be with leaflets, but Gatling machine guns, 57mm rockets, 23mm guns and 30mm grenades.



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In the morning of 3 September 2000, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Guinean town of Madina Oula. The RUF/AFRC had been concentrating forces in Fintonia (Tambakha Chiefdom) in the weeks before the attack, and conscription with Tambakha Chiefdom had greatly increased. RUF/AFRC forces attacked Guinean forces there but were forced to withdraw after three days when Guinean forces were reinforced. On their return to Fintonia on or around 7 September, RUF/AFRC forces held a town meeting and accused the civilian residents of providing information to the Guinean forces. As punishment, RUF/AFRC force burned down 15 houses in the town. Shortly after the attack on Madina Oula (Guinea), RUF/AFRC forces moved from Kambia District and attacked the Guinean border town of Pamelap.³⁷⁵

In response to RUF/AFRC encroachments, Guinea forces adopted a “Hot Pursuit” policy, in which RUF bases inside Sierra Leone along the Guinean–Sierra Leonean border were attacked in addition to the pursuit of RUF/AFRC forces inside Guinea. Guinean armed forces also moved their security checks three miles inside the territory of Sierra Leone. The RUF/AFRC unit based in Sanya (Tambakha Chiefdom) came under pressure from the new Guinean security policy and moved their base to a location nearby Sekusoria (Tambakha Chiefdom), a town on the border with Guinea. In early October, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Sekusoria but Guinean forces learned of these plans in advance and reinforcements arrived in the town in advance of the attack. In the weeks following the attack on Madina Oula, Guinean Forces attacked Tukukuray. The villages of Sanya and Somathai were attacked as well by Guinean forces and vigilantes. On 10 October, RUF/AFRC forces from Kambia District again attacked the Guinean town of Pamelap.

In late September, RUF/AFRC forces raided Thama (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) and went house-to-house looking for valuable items. Seventeen civilians were abducted and forced to carry the stolen items to Makeni, a journey of over 40 miles.

f) Events in 2001

On 3 January, the RUF high command met with the UNAMSIL force commander in Magburaka.³⁷⁶ In January, the RUF/AFRC agreed with UNAMSIL to open the stretch of highway connecting Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni Town. On 31 January and 13 February, the UNAMSIL Core Contact Group met with the RUF/AFRC command in Makeni Town. At the latter meeting the RUF/AFRC returned 56 weapons, some communications equipment, and nine vehicles seized from UNAMSIL since deployment.³⁷⁷ On 16 February, a Bangladeshi UNAMSIL unit conducted a long-range patrol to Makeni from Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), passing through 16 RUF/AFRC checkpoint en route. The patrol met with the RUF brigadier in Makeni.³⁷⁸ Patrols continued throughout February, also moving from Ro-Gberray (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni. On 14 March, around 240 Nigerian UNAMSIL soldier commenced deployment to Lunsar,³⁷⁹ increasing to 776 by 23 March

³⁷⁵ See the factual analysis for Kambia District in 2000 for further information.

³⁷⁶ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 3 January 2001

³⁷⁷ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 13 February 2001

³⁷⁸ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 16 February 2001

³⁷⁹ UNAMSIL Press Release, 14 March 2001 and IRINWA, 16 March 2001



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2001.³⁸⁰ On 17 April, Nigerian UNAMSIL soldiers moved from Lunsar and commenced deployment to Makeni.³⁸¹ On 25 May, RUF/AFRC forces released 591 child combatants to UNAMSIL in Makeni.³⁸²

On 24 September, disarmament commenced in Bombali District. UNAMSIL established reception centres in Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom), Makeni (Bombali Seboru Chiefdom)³⁸³ and in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) in late October.³⁸⁴ On 15 November, 150 Sierra Leone Police deployed to Makeni.³⁸⁵

3. Conclusion

** TO BE DRAFTED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE**

b. Kambia District

1. Introduction

Kambia District is located in the north-west of Sierra Leone. The Republic of Guinea runs along the entire northern boundary of Kambia District, with the Atlantic Ocean lying to the west. Port Loko District is to the south of Kambia District and Bombali District is found to the east.

There are seven chiefdoms in Kambia District:

Chiefdom	Headquarter Town
Bramaia	Kukuna
Gbinleh Dixon	Tawaya
Samu	Kychom
Magbema	Kambia (District Headquarter)
Mambolo	Mambolo
Masungbala	Kawulia
Tonko Lima	Madina

The bulk of Kambia District is situated between the Little Scarcies River and The Great Scarcies River. The Great Scarcies River³⁸⁶ initially forms the border between Sierra Leone and the Republic of Guinea before running south through Kambia District into the Atlantic Ocean near Kassiré (Samu Chiefdom). Gbinleh Dixon and Samu Chiefdoms are located on the north bank of the Great Scarcies River, forming the boundaries with Magbema, Mambolo and Bramaia Chiefdoms. Traders from Guinea and Sierra Leone transport goods to Freetown along the Great Scarcies River, passing

³⁸⁰ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 23 March 2001
³⁸¹ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 17 April 2001.
³⁸² UNASMIL Press Briefing, 29 May 2001.
³⁸³ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 25 September 2001.
³⁸⁴ OCHA, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 16 Oct - 05 Nov 2001
³⁸⁵ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 16 November 2001.
³⁸⁶ Called the Kolente River in Guinea.



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through the wharf towns of Rosinor (Samu Chiefdom), Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom) and Kassirie (Samu Chiefdom). The Great Scarcies also passes nearby the district headquarter town of Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom).

There are four key land routes in Kambia District. The first runs north from Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) through Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom), where it continues north across the Great Scarcies River to the Guinean border at Pamelap (Gbinleh Dixon Chiefdom). From there, the highway leads to Conakry, the capital city of Guinea. This route passes over a long road bridge at Mange, which was held by the RUF/AFRC for most of the period spanning August 1997 to March 2001. The second important route runs from Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District) into Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom) and then directly to Kambia Town. This route can also be used to by-pass the road bridge at Mange and rejoin the Mange-Kambia highway at Sendugu Junction, just south of Kambia Town. The third route runs from Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District). This route allows movement between the large town of Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom, Bombali District) and locations in Kambia District. The final key land route also runs from Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) through Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) northwards to the Guinean border.

Between 1991 and 1995, Kambia District was not directly affected by the conflict. At the end of January 1995, the RUF extended their operations northwards into Kambia District from Port Loko District. The RUF did not attempt to hold any territory in Kambia District in 1995, but attacked the district headquarter town of Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom), killing 20 people. The force was heavily armed, carrying AK-47 machine guns, RPGs, small arms and grenades, as well as an array of bladed weapons; there would be little change in this configuration throughout the conflict. RUF forces abducted a large number of children and other civilians and also kidnapped seven Italian nuns to draw international attention to the RUF movement. The attack on Kambia Town was viewed as a demonstration of the ability of the RUF to strike throughout Sierra Leone. The inadequate response and poor discipline of the SLA led to a sharp deterioration in civil-military relations in Kambia District.

RUF forces returned to Kambia District in February 1996, concentrating on securing land and river routes between northern Bombali District and Kambia District. Shortly before the Parliamentary and Presidential elections on 26 February 1996, RUF forces staged a number of attacks on towns in the District, killing civilians and stealing civilian property. RUF forces attacked two key points on the road linking Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). The town of Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom), just north of Madina on the road to Guinea, was also attacked. In addition, they attacked a wharf town and crossing on the Little Scarcies River near Kabbah Ferry (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District), enabling seaward river access to Sanda Magbolontor and BKM Chiefdoms in Port Loko District and Mambolo and Magbema Chiefdoms in Kambia District. RUF/AFRC forces also attacked Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), a large wharf town and economic centre on the Great Scarcies River. From May until November, Guinean forces moved into Sierra Leone and established a base at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). In cooperation with local guides, Guinean forces patrolled the roads around the border



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with Guinea to prevent RUF infiltration. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF leadership signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996. The resulting ceasefire held firm in Kambia District until May 1997.

In May 1997 the RUF resumed hostilities, moving from Bombali District to attack Madina (Bramaia Chiefdom), stealing property from the town's Catholic Mission. On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a successful coup and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); soon after, the AFRC leadership joined with the RUF. The RUF/AFRC immediately established a brigade headquarter for Kambia District in the village of Yibaya (Tonka Limba Chiefdom). As the year progressed, the RUF/AFRC moved into Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom) and established a training camp at Kamba (Magbema Chiefdom). At this time, there was an escalation in the mistreatment of civilians. During attacks on villages, murder, rape and abduction were commonplace. Many civilians were forced to carry stolen property. News of high profile and brutal killings spread through the District, prompting many civilians to cooperate with the RUF/AFRC and take on roles as porters or administrators in order to protect themselves from the consequences of non-cooperation.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Kambia and Rokupr (both Magbema Chiefdom). During the attacks, they looted extensively, as well as killing and abducting civilians. The RUF/AFRC brigade headquarters remained in Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) and a series of intense raids were staged on nearby towns and villages across September and October 1998. A number of civilians were killed and mutilated in barbaric ways by RUF/AFRC forces; others had one or more limbs amputated by RUF/AFRC members. Guinean forces strengthened their deployment on the border with Sierra Leone and commenced artillery bombardment of suspected RUF/AFRC bases. RUF/AFRC forces occupied another point on the Great Scarcies River and, in addition to taxing road and river traders, began imposing a high weekly tax on the houses in RUF/AFRC occupied areas. The Great Scarcies River took on increasing logistical importance to the RUF/AFRC; since CDF and ECOMOG forces fortified Port Loko District, control of points of the river allowed RUF/AFRC forces to generate significant revenue by taxing traders. In addition, it allowed supplies to be transported to other RUF/AFRC bases inland. At this time, a series of hard punishments were administered by the RUF/AFRC command to RUF/AFRC members that were caught committing violent acts against civilians. However, the effectiveness of these disciplinary measures is overshadowed by a pattern of escalating violence towards against the civilian population. Cruel and high profile punishment of civilians and RUF/AFRC members created an atmosphere of terror that was reinforced by the hunt for "rebel collaborators" in the aftermath of successful Guinean attacks on various villages.

In February and March 1999, after the RUF/AFRC had failed in its bid to capture Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces occupied towns across Kambia District, including Kambia Town and Rokupr (both Magbema Chiefdom). Guinean forces in Kambia Town retreated to positions outside the town and engaged RUF/AFRC forces throughout March for full control over the town. Guinean artillery inflicted huge damage on civilian residences in the town. The wharf town of Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom) and Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) were also both occupied. Uncharacteristically, RUF/AFRC forces entered Rokupr and Mambolo without firing a shot,



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wearing white strips of cloth tied around their heads. While civilians welcomed their arrival, the peace did not last long, as RUF/AFRC forces began taxing the civilian population and abducting young men to join their movement. The RUF/AFRC now had full control over all the main wharfs on the Great Scarcies River and began appointing civilian chairpersons and secretaries to administer an extensive system of collecting house taxation and food “contributions” from the civilian population. The consolidation of control over Kambia District was part of a general RUF/AFRC strategy to secure Makeni and encircle Port Loko Town. Bases in Port Loko District at Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom) complimented the RUF/AFRC hold over the Mange Bridge, rendering the main northern route to Makeni and inland unusable. In mid 1999, the RUF/AFRC extended activity to Kassirie (Samu Chiefdom) and began moving into Guinea by night to rob traders. Guinean forces started the artillery bombardment of upstream traffic on the Great Scarcies River, resulting in many unidentified corpses floating past the downstream wharfs. Guinean forces also started using long-range patrols and helicopter gunships to secure the border area.

In 2000, the RUF/AFRC moved their brigade headquarters to Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom). In April, UNAMSIL commenced long-range patrols into Kambia District. RUF/AFRC forces disarmed a company of Nigerian UNAMSIL peacekeepers in May 2000, releasing them after a few days. Guinean forces intensified their bombardment of towns where RUF/AFRC forces were stationed, resulting in many civilian deaths. RUF/AFRC forces took up positions on the Guinean border and late in the year attacked towns inside Guinean territory. The Guinean bombardment continued into 2001. In the first months of 2001, the RUF/AFRC opened up the highway between the towns of Port Loko and Kambia, allowing UNAMSIL to patrol parts of the District. In May, RUF/AFRC forces commenced disarmament in Kambia District at UNAMSIL-run centres in Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) and Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom). The SLA also returned to the District in May and by August 2001, disarmament was complete across the District.

2. Factual Analysis

a) Events in 1995

From the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), RUF forces pushed into Port Loko District during the first three weeks of January 1995, focussing on the road network linking the towns of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), Foreduku and Kamasundo (both Buya Romende Chiefdom, Port Loko District). RUF forces then moved into Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District), which borders Kambia District, where they attacked villages on the main road through the chiefdom and also attacked Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District) before moving into Kambia District. Despite the deployment of SLA forces in the District headquarter town of Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom), RUF forces entered Kambia District on 23 January 1995, advancing towards Barmoi³⁸⁷ (Masungbala Chiefdom), 10 miles from Kambia Town near the border with Port Loko District.

At dawn on 25 January 1995, RUF forces attacked Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom). The attack came from the direction of Kolenten Secondary School and lasted for around four hours. The RUF forces did not face any resistance from SLA forces stationed in the town and killed about 20 civilians

³⁸⁷ Also spelt Gbamoye.



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and a policeman. Around 300 civilians were rounded-up at the Long Communication Pole part of town and screened by RUF forces. Since they were unable to control 300 people, the majority were released, with 70 civilians remaining in RUF custody. Three young boys who escaped abduction were caught by RUF forces in Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District) and publicly tortured to death. During the attack, RUF forces entered the hospital compound and abducted around 50 schoolchildren³⁸⁸ and seven expatriate nuns from the Rome-based order of the Xaverian Missionary Society of Mary, who were operating a dispensary. RUF forces paraded the nuns and around 100 other civilian residents around the town for three hours before moving south to an unknown destination, possibly Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District).³⁸⁹

Around five hours after the attack, two truckloads of SLA forces arrived in Kambia Town. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that over 24,000 civilians had fled into Guinea immediately after the 25 January RUF attack on Kambia Town.³⁹⁰ In the wake of the attack, both local youths and the SLA stole civilian property.

On 31 January 1995, the RUF leader requested the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to act as an intermediary between the RUF and the NPRC concerning the release of the seven nuns.³⁹¹ On 13 February, the RUF leader made a number of demands on the Italian Ambassador to Sierra Leone for the release of the nuns, namely the provision of medicine, a satellite phone and a generator.³⁹² RUF forces finally released the nuns onto the Lunsar-Makeni highway on 21 March 1995, their demands remaining unmet.³⁹³

Kambia District was quiet for the remainder of 1995, although rumours about new RUF attacks persisted throughout the District. The RUF moved into the Western Area by April 1995 and attacked Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) in June 1995.

b) Events in 1996

January and February 1996 were extremely tense politically, with ongoing disagreements between the NPRC, the SLA and the RUF concerning the elections scheduled for 26 February. In mid-January, the NPRC leader was overthrown by his deputy and fled to Guinea. Throughout this time, the RUF concentrated on securing land and river routes between northern Bombali District and Kambia District. First, RUF forces attacked two key points on the road linking Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) and the headquarter town of Medina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). Second, RUF forces attacked key wharfs on the Little Scarcies River near Kabbah Ferry (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District),³⁹⁴ allowing seaward river access to Sanda Magbolontor and BKM Chiefdoms in Port Loko District and Mambolo and Magbema Chiefdoms in Kambia District.

³⁸⁸ AFP, 27 February 1995 reports that parents of around 50 children abducted by the RUF on 25 January 1995 appealed to international agencies for assistance in securing their release.

³⁸⁹ All details of kidnap from AFP, 26 January 1995.

³⁹⁰ Facts on File World News Digest, 23 February 1996 quoting UNHCR 31 January 1996.

³⁹¹ AFP, 31 January 1995.

³⁹² AFP, 13 February 1995.

³⁹³ Xinhua, 21 March 1995 and AFP, 22 March 1995.

³⁹⁴ See factual analysis Bombali District in 1996 for further information.



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RUF/AFRC forces also attacked Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), a large wharf town and economic centre on the Great Scarcies River.

On 31 January 1996, staff of the Catholic Mission in Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) intercepted a radio message that RUF forces were planning to attack Madina the following day at 08.00. The Paramount Chief was contacted immediately and a town meeting was held at the Court Barrie in Madina. On 1 February 1996, RUF forces entered Kambia District using the route from Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) that runs up the centre of the District. The RUF forces attacked Madina Town between 06.00 and 08.00, meeting no resistance. Seventeen houses were burnt down, one man was killed and two other men were forced to carry items the RUF forces stole during the assault on the township. After the attack, the RUF forces returned to the Kamakwie area, possibly to their camp at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom, Bombali District) for a meeting with another RUF group that in the meantime had attacked Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom).

In the morning of 20 February 1996 an RUF force numbering around 300 targeted Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), using Makatic Section as entry point to the town. Rokupr, which is divided into the town proper and the large, economically important Rice Research Station, is less than 13 miles due south of the District headquarter town of Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom). As with the attack on Kambia, SLA forces were inadequately equipped and numbered too few to resist the RUF offensive. During the attack, RUF forces killed a popular Islamic cleric who had identified one of the RUF members. An unknown number of people were abducted but released the same day. RUF members looted around 250 houses, burnt down eight houses and stole rice; the Rice Research Station was also severely looted.

On 23 February 1996, peace talks between the RUF and the NPRC leadership commenced in Abidjan, the commercial and administrative centre of Cote d'Ivoire. Between 23 and 26 February 1996, RUF forces attacked Kamakwie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom, Bombali District), at the eastern end of the road axis from Madina and Kukuna. On 25 February, RUF forces attacked Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom). During the attack, the RUF forces burnt down between 30 and 50 houses and looted extensively. The brother of a prominent politician was shot dead by RUF forces and an old woman and a baby were burnt to death in one of the houses. From Kukuna, RUF forces went to Makindota (Tonko Limba Chiefdom), moving to their base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District) on 28 February 1996.

Three months later, in May 1996, Guinean forces set up a base in Madina (Magbema Chiefdom), where they stayed for about six months, working together with a locally mobilised civil defence,³⁹⁵ as RUF forces began moving towards the northern part of the District along the Guinean border. During this period, Guinean forces patrolled all around the Madina - Kukuna route.

The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF leadership signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996. This provided for the immediate and total cessation of hostilities.³⁹⁶

³⁹⁵ The affiliation of these civil defence people, if any, is unknown.

³⁹⁶ See factual analysis for the Western Area in 1996 for further information.



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c) Events in 1997

A small RUF force again attacked Madina on 18 May 1997. Using a red Toyota Hi-Lux stolen in the prior attack on Madina, they took medicine, clothes, generators and furniture from the Catholic Mission. The stolen property was taken to the main road leading to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) and then to the Ro-Source base (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District). RUF forces attacked Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) on the same day.

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a successful coup and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); soon after, the AFRC leadership joined with the RUF. Shortly after the coup, RUF forces based in Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District) moved on to Tonko Limba Chiefdom to establish a base in Yibaya,³⁹⁷ a village in the centre of the chiefdom less than 10 miles from the international border with the Republic of Guinea. The RUF established another base south of Yibaya at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District). Yibaya was the first seat of the joint RUF/AFRC command in Kambia District. There were few attacks on civilians in the area surrounding Yibaya, primarily for fear for provoking Guinean forces to return to Madina. Yibaya would be the launch point for attacks on the main towns in Kambia District.

Shortly before the signing of the Conakry Peace Plan on 23 October 1997, around 500 RUF/AFRC members under the command of a senior member of the RUF/AFRC leadership carried out "Operation Stay in Madina" (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). A young man was appointed by the RUF/AFRC as Town Chief, and was put in control of revenue-generating activities. This led to a general escalation of ill-treatment of the civilian population by the RUF/AFRC forces in the villages surrounding Madina. RUF/AFRC forces stole civilian property, beat civilians, raped women and forced young and strong men to carry stolen items. The RUF/AFRC forces established a "Combat Camp" in Kamba (Masungbala Chiefdom), where many important commanders came to deploy their forces all over Kambia District. RUF/AFRC forces also established a checkpoint four miles south of Madina at Nuemeya Mabande village to screen road traffic through the "Mene Curve" route from Port Loko to Kambia.

In Kamba, an unknown number of members of the Dina Ba Yeh Sor³⁹⁸ religious group were accused by the RUF/AFRC commander of stealing 15 gallons of palm oil from the nearby village of Banka Makunloh (Masungbala Chiefdom). They were stripped, tied up and beaten unconscious³⁹⁹ by four members of an RUF Small Boy Unit. The captives were then swung "like a hammock" and thrown away. News of this incident quickly spread through Masungbala and Tonka Limba Chiefdoms, prompting many civilians to cooperate with the RUF/AFRC, taking on roles such as load carriers and public relations officers for fear of the consequences of non-cooperation.

d) Events in 1998

Between 6 and 12 February 1998, ECOMOG forces entered Freetown and removed the RUF/AFRC forces from the bulk of the Western Area. In March 1998, ECOMOG commenced provincial operations: in brief, within four days of commencement, ECOMOG forces had taken

³⁹⁷ Also spelt Yibaia.

³⁹⁸ Little is known about this group.

³⁹⁹ The RUF/AFRC commander specified that the accused should be beaten until they were in "free engine".



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control of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), Makeni (Bombali Seboria Chiefdom, Bombali District), Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and locations in Koinadugu District. ECOMOG then moved into Kono District, taking full control of Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) in early April 1998, by which time they had also moved as far east as Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District).

RUF forces moved from their base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Kambia District, advancing into Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom) on 12 February 1998. In Barmoi, RUF/AFRC forces burnt down eight houses, abducted 50 civilians and forced them to carry stolen property. Another RUF/AFRC commander was left in charge in Barmoi and the former commander moved on to attack Kambia Town on 14 February 1998. In Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom), the RUF/AFRC forces killed eight men, stole a large amount of property and burnt down a large number of houses. On 19 February 1998, the same force simultaneously assaulted Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) and Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District), overcoming ECOMOG forces deployed in Mange and pushing them back into BKM Chiefdom.⁴⁰⁰

Guinean ECOMOG forces deployed from the Republic of Guinea to Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) at some point in late February or early March 1998.⁴⁰¹ On 23 February, youths in Kambia Town captured and burnt alive two RUF members in retaliation for an attack on Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom), where RUF/AFRC forces had disrupted the town market. Another two captives were handed over to the Guinean forces.⁴⁰²

At this time, RUF/AFRC forces were already based in Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom). On 8 April 1998, an important conference occurred between many commanders in Madina. It was during this meeting that the AFRC High Command planned the operation "Stay in Kambia", but the plan was later executed on 11 February 1999. Following the conference, the RUF/AFRC field commander gathered the town residents together and asked them for support. He also stated that civilians should report to him any incidences of violence committed by RUF/AFRC members; any RUF/AFRC members caught carrying out such activities would be shot on sight. On 15 April, the RUF/AFRC commander executed two RUF/AFRC child combatants who had reportedly raped a woman in the village of Gboray Laya (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). The two corpses were buried in a single grave behind the Madina town market. After this event, RUF/AFRC forces tied up a Sierra Leone police officer, placed him in the boot of a car and left it in the sun; he was later released.

Residents of Banka Makunloh (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) who had crossed into Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District) requested⁴⁰³ the Gbethi Society to provide them with security. On 24 August 1998, Gbethis (CDF) from Port Loko District attacked RUF/AFRC forces stationed at Katherie⁴⁰⁴ (Tonka Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District), killing an RUF/AFRC captain. RUF/AFRC forces retaliated by capturing and decapitating 15 residents of Katherie, subsequently placing their

⁴⁰⁰ See factual analysis for Port Loko District in 1998 for further information.

⁴⁰¹ AFP, 16 March 1998.

⁴⁰² AFP, 23 February 1998.

⁴⁰³ It is reported that the Gbethis accepted money for this service.

⁴⁰⁴ Also known as Malikia Katherie.



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c) Events in 1997

A small RUF force again attacked Madina on 18 May 1997. Using a red Toyota Hi-Lux stolen in the prior attack on Madina, they took medicine, clothes, generators and furniture from the Catholic Mission. The stolen property was taken to the main road leading to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) and then to the Ro-Source base (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District). RUF forces attacked Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) on the same day.

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a successful coup and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); soon after, the AFRC leadership joined with the RUF. Shortly after the coup, RUF forces based in Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District) moved on to Tonko Limba Chiefdom to establish a base in Yibaya,³⁹⁷ a village in the centre of the chiefdom less than 10 miles from the international border with the Republic of Guinea. The RUF established another base south of Yibaya at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District). Yibaya was the first seat of the joint RUF/AFRC command in Kambia District. There were few attacks on civilians in the area surrounding Yibaya, primarily for fear for provoking Guinean forces to return to Madina. Yibaya would be the launch point for attacks on the main towns in Kambia District.

Shortly before the signing of the Conakry Peace Plan on 23 October 1997, around 500 RUF/AFRC members under the command of a senior member of the RUF/AFRC leadership carried out "Operation Stay in Madina" (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). A young man was appointed by the RUF/AFRC as Town Chief, and was put in control of revenue-generating activities. This led to a general escalation of ill-treatment of the civilian population by the RUF/AFRC forces in the villages surrounding Madina. RUF/AFRC forces stole civilian property, beat civilians, raped women and forced young and strong men to carry stolen items. The RUF/AFRC forces established a "Combat Camp" in Kamba (Masungbala Chiefdom), where many important commanders came to deploy their forces all over Kambia District. RUF/AFRC forces also established a checkpoint four miles south of Madina at Nuemeya Mabande village to screen road traffic through the "Mene Curve" route from Port Loko to Kambia.

In Kamba, an unknown number of members of the Dina Ba Yeh Sor³⁹⁸ religious group were accused by the RUF/AFRC commander of stealing 15 gallons of palm oil from the nearby village of Banka Makunloh (Masungbala Chiefdom). They were stripped, tied up and beaten unconscious³⁹⁹ by four members of an RUF Small Boy Unit. The captives were then swung "like a hammock" and thrown away. News of this incident quickly spread through Masungbala and Tonka Limba Chiefdoms, prompting many civilians to cooperate with the RUF/AFRC, taking on roles such as load carriers and public relations officers for fear of the consequences of non-cooperation.

d) Events in 1998

Between 6 and 12 February 1998, ECOMOG forces entered Freetown and removed the RUF/AFRC forces from the bulk of the Western Area. In March 1998, ECOMOG commenced provincial operations: in brief, within four days of commencement, ECOMOG forces had taken

³⁹⁷ Also spelt Yibaia.

³⁹⁸ Little is known about this group.

³⁹⁹ The RUF/AFRC commander specified that the accused should be beaten until they were in "free engine".



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control of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom, Bombali District), Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and locations in Koinadugu District. ECOMOG then moved into Kono District, taking full control of Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) in early April 1998, by which time they had also moved as far east as Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District).

RUF forces moved from their base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Kambia District, advancing into Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom) on 12 February 1998. In Barmoi, RUF/AFRC forces burnt down eight houses, abducted 50 civilians and forced them to carry stolen property. Another RUF/AFRC commander was left in charge in Barmoi and the former commander moved on to attack Kambia Town on 14 February 1998. In Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom), the RUF/AFRC forces killed eight men, stole a large amount of property and burnt down a large number of houses. On 19 February 1998, the same force simultaneously assaulted Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) and Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District), overcoming ECOMOG forces deployed in Mange and pushing them back into BKM Chiefdom.⁴⁰⁰

Guinean ECOMOG forces deployed from the Republic of Guinea to Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) at some point in late February or early March 1998.⁴⁰¹ On 23 February, youths in Kambia Town captured and burnt alive two RUF members in retaliation for an attack on Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom), where RUF/AFRC forces had disrupted the town market. Another two captives were handed over to the Guinean forces.⁴⁰²

At this time, RUF/AFRC forces were already based in Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom). On 8 April 1998, an important conference occurred between many commanders in Madina. It was during this meeting that the AFRC High Command planned the operation "Stay in Kambia", but the plan was later executed on 11 February 1999. Following the conference, the RUF/AFRC field commander gathered the town residents together and asked them for support. He also stated that civilians should report to him any incidences of violence committed by RUF/AFRC members; any RUF/AFRC members caught carrying out such activities would be shot on sight. On 15 April, the RUF/AFRC commander executed two RUF/AFRC child combatants who had reportedly raped a woman in the village of Gboray Laya (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). The two corpses were buried in a single grave behind the Madina town market. After this event, RUF/AFRC forces tied up a Sierra Leone police officer, placed him in the boot of a car and left it in the sun; he was later released.

Residents of Banka Makunloh (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) who had crossed into Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District) requested⁴⁰³ the Gbethi Society to provide them with security. On 24 August 1998, Gbethis (CDF) from Port Loko District attacked RUF/AFRC forces stationed at Katherie⁴⁰⁴ (Tonka Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District), killing an RUF/AFRC captain. RUF/AFRC forces retaliated by capturing and decapitating 15 residents of Katherie, subsequently placing their

⁴⁰⁰ See factual analysis for Port Loko District in 1998 for further information.

⁴⁰¹ AFP, 16 March 1998.

⁴⁰² AFP, 23 February 1998.

⁴⁰³ It is reported that the Gbethis accepted money for this service.

⁴⁰⁴ Also known as Malikia Katherie.



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severed heads on poles at the town entrance points. During the attack, three civilians had their hands and ears amputated by RUF/AFRC forces. Others, including a three year-old baby, were wounded when RUF/AFRC members attacked them with bladed weapons.

From 12 September to early October 1998, the RUF/AFRC command based in Madina focused activity on Tonko Limba Chiefdom, attacking the villages of Yibaya, Kathantinah, Kakula, Kamabala, Kasengeta, Kabasa, Kamasasa, Katimbo and Kakonteh. During the attacks on Yibaya, Kathantinah and Kakula, RUF/AFRC forces killed 16 civilians. These three villages were occupied by Guinean ECOMOG forces on or around 16 September 1998.⁴¹⁵

In Kamabala (Tonka Limba Chiefdom) RUF/AFRC forces, who had earlier infiltrated the town disguised as IDPs, mistreated and killed eight people. RUF/AFRC forces impaled the son of a prominent elder on a sharpened pole, and bayoneted another woman in the right leg for refusing to pay them money. RUF/AFRC forces burnt down all the grass houses in the village before heading into the bush to collect money from village residents who had fled the attack. In Kakonteh (Tonka Limba Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces cut a finger off a young mother and injured her with blows to the head from a cutlass when she stopped them from decapitating her baby.⁴¹⁶ An unknown number of others were killed during the attack and all the houses but one were burnt. In Kangawala (Tonka Limba Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces abducted, raped and then released a number of women. In Katimbo (Tonka Limba Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces injured a man with blows to the head from a machete and amputated a hand each from two other civilians. In early October 1998, a land dispute broke out between the villages of Yibaya and Kakula (both Tonka Limba Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces stationed in Yibaya assisted residents to occupy the disputed land, meeting resistance from the people of Kakula; in the resulting battle, 16 people were killed.

On 28 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces staged a surprise attack on Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom). Guinean ECOMOG forces stationed in Kukuna engaged the RUF/AFRC forces and, receiving reinforcements, repelled the RUF/AFRC from the town. RUF/AFRC forces killed 13 civilians, around seven of whom died from blood loss following the amputation of one or more limbs.⁴¹⁷ RUF/AFRC forces abducted 10 civilians, and burnt down around 60 houses. Much of the public infrastructure, including the Court Barrie and health facilities, were also destroyed during the battle. Following the attack, it is reported in general terms that Guinean ECOMOG began hunting for RUF/AFRC collaborators.

In the light of this attack, in the final months of 1998, Guinean forces decided to launch artillery attacks on RUF/AFRC positions in Sella Limba Chiefdom (Bombali District). After 22 October, Guinean ECOMOG deployed 3,000 troops along the border with Sierra Leone, and a further 1,000 into Kambia District, including Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom).⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁵ AFP, 16 September 1998.

⁴¹⁶ The woman and her child were both taken to the government hospital in Kambia.

⁴¹⁷ Amputation detail only. All Africa News, 30 September 1998.

⁴¹⁸ BBC, 25 October 1998.



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From October onwards, RUF/AFRC forces moved toward the south-west of the District, occupying Rosinor (Samu Chiefdom), a small town situated along the banks of the Great Scarcies River. Rosinor is also a key trading and transit point from where produce is taken to Guinea for sale. RUF/AFRC forces entered the town along the river from the direction of Rokupr. They first fired into the air to frighten the town residents and then stole property from the wharf area of Rosinor. RUF/AFRC forces frequently made such raids, forcing civilians to hide their belongings in the bush surrounding the town. In December, RUF/AFRC forces requested the traditional authorities of Rosinor to find them accommodation in the town and eventually occupied two large houses. RUF/AFRC forces taxed each resident of Rosinor two cups of rice and Le 2,000.⁴⁰⁹ Those defaulting were locked up in a cell, or had essential household items like cooking utensils and pots taken away until they paid. RUF/AFRC forces established two checkpoints in Rosinor, one at the wharf and another at Yomkeleya (Samu Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC members below 15 years of age patrolled the wharf area and taxed alighting boats a sum of between Le 10,000 and Le 20,000 depending on their destination. RUF/AFRC forces stole bags of rice and other property from traders passing through the Rosinor stretch of the river while those at the Yomkeleya checkpoint collected money from vehicles entering the town. More junior RUF/AFRC members took each day's stolen property for collection at the house of the RUF/AFRC commanding officers. The RUF/AFRC command in Rosinor established a guardhouse where RUF/AFRC members caught committing serious crimes⁴¹⁰ would be beaten and imprisoned for a few days without rations.

At the end of 1998, a substantial number of the RUF/AFRC forces deployed in Kambia District headed to Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to support the attack on Makeni and then the assault on Freetown. The Madina brigade was moved to Makeni, leaving behind a skeleton force in Madina.

e) Events in 1999

RUF/AFRC forces invaded Freetown between 6 and 20 January. In preparation for the 6 January invasion of Greater Freetown, RUF/AFRC force staged preliminary attacks in late December on towns in Port Loko District and the Western Area, including Port Loko Town, Ro-Gberray (both Maforki Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), Masiaka, Songo (both Koya Chiefdom), Newton (Koya RD, Western Area) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). Also in late December, the towns of Makeni (Bombali Seborra, Bombali District) and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) were occupied by the RUF/AFRC. ECOMOG forces pushed the RUF/AFRC back from Freetown to Waterloo, where they remained in force until at least 25 February 1999. RUF/AFRC forces retained control over the arterial routes from the Western Area running through Port Loko District throughout this time. During January, Kambia District remained a key destination for IDPs and humanitarian organisations continued to ship relief supplies to Kambia

⁴⁰⁹ As a very rough guide, one million leones is approximately equivalent to 500 USD. This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone's position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2,000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4,000 SLL) per day: see UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.

⁴¹⁰ It is not specified what constituted a serious crime.



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Town (Magbema Chiefdom). Throughout February, the RUF/AFRC occupied all the key towns in Kambia District and imposed an extensive system of house, traffic and trade taxation in those areas.

On 5 February, an RUF/AFRC member at Rosinor (Samu Chiefdom) beat and tortured a well-known riverboat captain by making knife cuts on his back and dripping rum onto the wounds.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) on 11 February 1999, engaging Guinean ECOMOG forces at a checkpoint along the route. The RUF/AFRC established a base in Kambia Town, where they remained until late May 2001. Many of the town's residents and those of nearby villages towards Guinea, passing through Gbinleh Dixon Chiefdom towards the Pamelap border crossing. On entering Kambia Town, RUF/AFRC forces targeted prominent SLPP supporters and organisers in the town; they also burnt down many houses and stole property. Guinean ECOMOG forces established checkpoints near Kambia Town and at the bridge over the Great Scarcies River, intermittently firing artillery at RUF/AFRC positions in the town. The primary result of these bombardments was the destruction of civilian residences and other property.

RUF/AFRC forces informed those remaining in Kambia Town that they would not inflict havoc on the civilians in the town, as they may have heard from others. This reassured people, who began resettling in the towns and villages in the area. However, the RUF/AFRC forces soon started harassing people, asking them constantly for food and restricting their movement. To move from one point to another, people had to buy a "passport" from the RUF/AFRC forces, which initially cost Le 500 and later rose to Le 1,000. The rate of killing was not as high as the previous years and people were now mainly killed when they refused or were unable to give food or money. For example, in Kambia Town, a fisherman who came back from the sea without fish was killed by a member of the RUF/AFRC forces.

RUF/AFRC forces also attacked Mambolo Town (Mambolo Chiefdom), on the south bank of the Great Scarcies River, on 11 and 12 February. RUF/AFRC forces killed three civilians and raped one woman in front of her husband. They also looted shops and abducted civilians to carry the stolen property as they left the town towards Kamba, a village near Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom). Around this time, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Seed Multiplication Project near Mambolo, destroying much of the machinery and stealing around 5,000 bushels of rice, which they transported to Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) and sold to traders.

Also on 11 February, RUF/AFRC forces entered Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) searching for food items and valuable property. This mission was code-named "Operation Feed Yourself" and had not been designed to include the killing of civilians or the destruction of property. Two days later, RUF/AFRC forces returned to Kukuna from the direction of Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces shot dead two civilians with mental health problems and raped a number of young women. A large amount of property was stolen. As a result of these actions, civilians fled from Kukuna to Guinea. While maintaining Madina as their Brigade headquarter, at some point after 13 February the RUF/AFRC deployed a force of between 20 and 50 in number to Kukuna.⁴¹¹

⁴¹¹ The command of the detachment in Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) rotated a number of times between 1999 and 2001.



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RUF/AFRC forces entered Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) on 25 February 1999 from the direction of Royanka and Kambia Town. Their entrance was unusual in that RUF/AFRC forces had tied pieces of white cloth around their heads and claimed to be seeking peace. Between Ahmaddiua Muslim Secondary School and the wharf area of Rokupr, the town residents organised a procession to welcome the RUF/AFRC forces. The RUF/AFRC commander addressed a crowd in the Wongbo Hall, promising that any of his forces caught inflicting violence on civilians would be punished. By the beginning of March, however, the RUF/AFRC had commenced conscripting youths of the town into the RUF/AFRC and taking them to a training camp they had established at the nearby village of Kamba (Magbema Chiefdom).⁴¹² Residents of villages near Kamba were ordered to register with the RUF/AFRC command at Kamba, which meant that the village had to present at least Le 200,000 and a large amount of food and livestock to the RUF/AFRC command. With the exception of Rokupr Town,⁴¹³ RUF/AFRC forces imposed a monthly tax of Le 1,000 per house in all villages in Magbema Chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces publicly molested or confiscated the property of those who failed to pay the house tax.

At the beginning of March 1999, RUF/AFRC forces returned to Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom), and established a base in the town. As they had done in Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) on 25 February, RUF/AFRC forces entered the town peacefully, singing and dancing and claiming to want peace. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC members stripped those civilians that joined the dance of quality clothing and jewellery. RUF/AFRC forces quickly occupied a number of houses in the town and established checkpoints at the Mambolo Wharf and on the Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Mateite (Mambolo Chiefdom) Highway. To assist them with the administration of the town, the RUF/AFRC command also appointed numerous chairpersons and secretaries from among the town's residents. While in Mambolo, the RUF/AFRC stole civilian building materials and started rebuilding the Mambolo Jetty, constructing a number of roundabouts on which they painted the faces of the RUF/AFRC leadership.

Guinean ECOMOG forces counter-attacked RUF/AFRC forces in Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) between 12 and 18 March, seizing parts of the town.⁴¹⁴ The attacks were in response to reports that RUF/AFRC forces had taken control of a customs point on the border at Gbalamya (Gbinleh Dixon Chiefdom) and had advanced on the town of Pamelap, just across the border from Kambia Town.⁴¹⁵

Beginning in March, many RUF/AFRC came to Rosinor (Samu Chiefdom) from Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom), Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom, Bombali District) and other towns on the Great Scarcies River. They travelled northwards upriver, crossing the Guinean border and heading by night to the town of Dagagbay, the site of an important trade fair, where they robbed Guinean traders, killing those that tried to resist. At least until June, RUF/AFRC forces continued to come to Rosinor. The Guinean Government decided to strengthen its deployment of forces in towns like

⁴¹² Kamba is about 8 miles north east of Rokupr, across the Mange-Kambia highway.

⁴¹³ The reason for this exception is unknown.

⁴¹⁴ AFP, 18 March 1999.

⁴¹⁵ African News Service, 12 March 1999.



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Bubuya, Koya and Funkdeh just within Sierra Leonean territory. Despite regular patrols and engagement with RUF/AFRC units at Rosinor, Guinean forces did not prevent RUF/AFRC forces from harassing civilians and stealing property. Indeed, the Guinean forces often turned back civilian river traders, suspecting them to be RUF/AFRC members. In general terms, whenever Guinean forces detected an RUF/AFRC unit travelling up river into Guinea, artillery fire would be brought to bear on the Great Scarcies River between Rosinor and Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom); many unidentified corpses were subsequently found floating in the river

On 16 May 1999, RUF/AFRC forces entered Kassirie (Samu Chiefdom) by motorboat from Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom). Kassirie is located at the mouth of the Great Scarcies River and, like other towns further upriver including Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom), Rokupr, Kambia (both Magbema Chiefdom) and Rosinor (Samu Chiefdom), is an important transit and trade route between Sierra Leone and Guinea. To frighten residents, RUF/AFRC forces fired in the air with AK-47s while going house-to-house kicking down doors and stealing property. A motorbike belonging to the local police post was also taken. The stolen property was loaded onto the motorbikes and taken to the RUF/AFRC base at Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces also attacked on Mapotolon (Samu Chiefdom), about 10 miles from Kassirie, where they captured two men.

In mid-May 1999, RUF/AFRC forces returning from missions in Port Loko District⁴¹⁶ captured six men from Rokamba (Masungbala Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC brigade commander later personally executed the six captives at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom).

Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May in the Togolese capital, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (Lomé Peace Agreement).

The second RUF/AFRC attack on Kassirie (Samu Chiefdom) occurred during the ceasefire period, in the evening of 11 June 1999. RUF/AFRC forces stole civilian property during the attack. Senior members of the RUF/AFRC command addressed the residents of Kassirie, informing them that they would punish any RUF/AFRC member who killed or stole. Shortly after this, the RUF/AFRC command in Kassirie appointed a civilian Chairperson to act as an intermediary, administering the collection of a monthly contribution to the RUF/AFRC from the civilian population. In early July, a helicopter gunship bombarded Kassirie, killing two civilians. On 16 July 1999, Guinean ECOMOG forces acting on information passed to them by residents of the town successfully ambushed RUF/AFRC forces entering Kassirie. ECOMOG forces killed at least three members of the RUF/AFRC and captured a number of others. RUF/AFRC forces retaliated in the following days and burnt down over 100 houses in Kassirie.

Following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the RUF/AFRC began requiring the inhabitants of villages throughout Tonka Limba Chiefdom to pay money and feed the RUF/AFRC

⁴¹⁶ The RUF/AFRC Madina Brigade was involved in planning attacks in Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District) at this time.



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forces. On market day in Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom), which occurs every Friday, RUF/AFRC forces levied Le 500 and three cups of rice or oil from each house; those who defaulted were ill-treated. For example, at Kasuroh village, just north of Madina, RUF/AFRC forces broke the leg of an old man who refused to let them take his livestock. In Mapotolon (Samu Chiefdom), local youths responded to this ill-treatment by killing a number of RUF/AFRC members in the village. The RUF/AFRC forces in Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) launched a heavy attack on Mapotolon in retaliation, surrounding the village and burning down every residence.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to replace the previous observer mission and assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.⁴¹⁷ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) commenced deployment with the arrival of advance teams on 29 and 30 November;⁴¹⁸ 4,500 UNAMSIL were troops were present in Sierra Leone by 10 January 2000.⁴¹⁹

f) Events in 2000

In late April, UNAMSIL commenced long-range patrols in Kambia District, particularly around the border areas. UNAMSIL plans to continue deployments into Kambia District were interrupted when the RUF/AFRC disarmed and detained around 300 UNAMSIL peacekeepers in different locations across Sierra Leone. In early May 2000, RUF/AFRC forces disarmed a 100 strong Nigerian UNAMSIL contingent near Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom). They were released in Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) a few days later.

The RUF/AFRC moved the Kambia Brigade headquarters to Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) at some point in early 2000. On 26 May 2000, a Sierra Leone Government helicopter gunship bombarded Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), killing three people and wounding two others. Shortly before this, around late March or early April 2000, the same gunship had dropped leaflets telling the RUF to surrender and disarm to UNAMSIL, warning that the next time it would be bombs,⁴²⁰ not leaflets. This practice was also carried out in Bombali and Tonkolili Districts. RUF/AFRC forces would shoot at civilians attempting to take one of the leaflets. After 26 May 2000, the helicopter gunship came regularly, which resulted in civilian deaths in Rokupr, Kambia Town (both Magbema Chiefdom) and Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). This continued until June 2000, when the Guinean forces bombarded Rokupr on numerous occasions, killing up to 17 civilians.

In June 2000, RUF/AFRC forces harassed civilians in Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom). On 15 June, a member of the RUF/AFRC started beating any civilians who would not hand over their bicycles to him. Three days later, a man who had defaulted on a daily payment to the RUF/AFRC was beaten 300 times with an axe handle by RUF/AFRC members. He passed out and was then detained in a large box before being released.

⁴¹⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999).

⁴¹⁸ BBC Online News, 29 November 1999.

⁴¹⁹ IRIN West Africa, 11 January 1999.

⁴²⁰ The leaflets refer specifically to Gatling machine guns, 57mm rockets, 23mm guns and 30mm grenades, accompanied by a picture of a Mi-24 "Hind" helicopter gunship.



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Guinean forces started reinforcing the border areas and continued to bombard RUF/AFRC positions in Kambia District. The RUF/AFRC also established a "Combat Camp" at Gbalamuya (Gbinleh Dixon) using forces redeployed from Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom), Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom, Bombali District). On 6 or 8 September 2000, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Pamelap on the border in Guinea, stealing property and forcing people to carry the items back to Kambia Town and Madina. Two well-known Italian Xavarian missionary priests were also abducted at Pamelap and taken to Madina, where they were allowed by the RUF/AFRC command to continue their work. They were released at Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom, Bombali District), although the RUF/AFRC Kambia Brigade command was not informed, leading to a house-to-house search of Madina and surrounding villages, and a wave of arrests of RUF/AFRC officers. Those arrested were taken to Kamakwie, where they were severely beaten with canes with razor blades embedded in them.

The RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Pamelap on 10 October 2000.⁴²¹ Guinean forces reacted to the RUF/AFRC military activities in the Guinean towns of Pamelap, Moola and Tassin by bombarding all the towns along the Great Scarcies River from Pamelap and Madina Woula, Kassirie, Rosinor (both Samu Chiefdom), Rokupr, Kambia (both Magbema Chiefdom), Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) and some locations in Gbinleh Dixon Chiefdom. Sustained periods of bombardment of these locations continued throughout October, as did RUF/AFRC attacks within Guinean territory. During those attacks, RUF/AFRC forces killed or abducted many civilians and burnt down many houses. The entire Kambia District remained firmly under RUF/AFRC control.

In November 2000, many civilians fled Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) to nearby villages, fearing the consequences of being unable to continue paying money to the RUF/AFRC forces, who became concerned as there were progressively fewer civilians to provide them with food. RUF/AFRC forces sent a civilian chairperson to order people to return to Rokupr, otherwise RUF/AFRC forces would start amputating their limbs, as a result of which many people travelled to Freetown by boat.

Throughout 2000, Gbethis (CDF) were based in BKM Chiefdom (Port Loko District), on the south bank of the Little Scarcies River. Intermittently, they came into Kambia District and engaged RUF/AFRC positions. Their presence was thus a threat for the RUF/AFRC forces, who on one occasion learnt that the Gbethis had crossed the river. They therefore went to Mapolon (Masungbala Chiefdom) to confront the Gbethis and a battle took place, during which over 100 people, including civilians, RUF forces and Gbethis were killed.

g) Events in 2001

Guinean infantry and airborne operations against RUF/AFRC positions in Kambia District continued into 2001. The RUF command in Kambia District commenced regular "contact group" meetings with representatives of UNAMSIL. On 3 January, the RUF leader met with UNAMSIL force commander and invited UNAMSIL to deploy to Kambia District.⁴²² On 12 January 2001, the RUF opened the road between Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Kambia Town

⁴²¹ BBC Online News, 10 October 2000 (17:51 GMT 18:51 UK).

⁴²² UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 5 January 2001.



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(Magbema Chiefdom)⁴²³. The road bridge over the Little Scarcies River would not be open until 22 March 2001 since it had been damaged significantly.⁴²⁴ On 25 February, the first formal UNAMSIL-RUF Contact Group meeting was held in Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District). In early March, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees commenced negotiations with the RUF command and the Government of Guinea to create a demilitarised “humanitarian corridor” running from Forecariah through Pamelap and then Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) to Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District).⁴²⁵ This would go some way to enable the secure passage of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Guinea to Sierra Leone.

On 22 March, the UNAMSIL force commander visited Rokupr and Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) following the reopening of the bridge at Mange.⁴²⁶ As a result of this, UNAMSIL had expanded its patrols to cover Mange, Kambia and Rokupr by 30 March.⁴²⁷ In April, UNAMSIL gained access to Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom). At the ECOWAS-sponsored six monthly ceasefire review meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 2 May, the RUF leadership agreed to withdraw from Kambia District by 30 May.⁴²⁸ Disarmament plans for Kambia and Port Loko Districts were also agreed upon in Abuja. Following this, UNAMSIL gained access to the towns of Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom) and Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom).

On 18 May, UNAMSIL opened a disarmament centre at Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom).⁴²⁹ A disarmament centre was also opened at the Court Barrie in Madina (Bramaia Chiefdom). On the same day, a Guinean helicopter gunship briefly bombarded Rokupr. The following day, the President of Sierra Leone and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone travelled to Conakry to discuss the bombardment with the Guinean authorities, who said that their attack was “unfortunate” and was a consequence of a “communication gap”.⁴³⁰ On 29 and 30 May, the 11th Battalion of the SLA and 30 SSD members deployed to Kambia Town.⁴³¹ On 10 August 2001, a committee comprising representatives of the RUF, UNAMSIL and the Government of Sierra Leone declared disarmament complete in Kambia District.⁴³²

3. Conclusion

**** TO BE DRAFTED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE****

⁴²³ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 12 January 2001.

⁴²⁴ UNAMSIL Press Release, 22 March 2001.

⁴²⁵ UN Security Council Press Release SC/7029, 8 March 2001.

⁴²⁶ UNAMSIL Press Release, 22 March 2001.

⁴²⁷ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 3 April 2001.

⁴²⁸ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 4 May 2001.

⁴²⁹ UNAMSIL Press Release, 19 May 2001.

⁴³⁰ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 22 May 2001.

⁴³¹ BBC Online News, 30 May 2001 (05:37 GMT 06:37 UK) and UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 1 June 2001.

⁴³² UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 14 August 2001.



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c. Koinadugu District

1. **Introduction**

Koinadugu District is located in the northwest of Sierra Leone. It shares a border with Guinea to the north and east, with Kono and Tonkolili Districts to the south and with Bombali District to the west. The town of Kabala is the Headquarter Town of Koinadugu District. There are eleven Chiefdoms in Koinadugu District:

Chiefdom	Headquarter Town
Dembelia Sinkunia	Sinkunia
Diang	Kondembaia
Follosaba Dembelia	Musaia
Mambolo (Kasunko)	Fadugu
Mongo	Mongo Bendugu
Neini	Yiffin
Neya	Krubola
Sengbe	Yogomaia
Sulima	Falaba
Wara Wara Bafodia	Bafodia
Wara Wara Yagala	Gbawuria

[geographical overview and summary of factual analysis to be drafted pending incorporation of comments from resource persons]

2. **Factual Analysis**

a) Events in 1992

On 29 April 1992, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), led by Valentine Strasser and elements of the SLA, overthrew the government of the All Party Congress.

In the first half of 1992, Fadugu town (Mambolo) experienced an influx of civilians from Makeni town (Makari Gbanti, Bombali) and Kono District. On 2 May 1992 a local civilian militia was formed in Fadugu town (Mambolo). For this militia, local blacksmiths manufactured single-barrel shotguns known as "Chaka Bulla." Others were armed with sticks through which nails were driven, metal bars, axes and cutlasses. Reports indicate that the Government of Sierra Leone was setting up and recruiting for a civilian militia called the "Donsos," the headquarter of which was Koidu town (Gbense, Kono District). An unknown number of civilian militia from Mambolo chiefdom joined the Donsos.

In mid 1992 the SLA started reinforcing their positions in the eastern Chiefdoms of Neya and Mongo in the towns of Kumba Wullen Balia and Tumonia.⁴³³ In July 1992, in Mongo Bendugu (Mongo), the Paramount Chief of Mongo met with a 12-man SLA unit and informed them that there was no problem with security in the entire chiefdom.

⁴³³ This town could be Tomania, Sengbe Chiefdom.



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Between July and October 1992, SLA senior staff members visited all 11 chiefdoms in Koinadugu, urging local leaders to gather local hunters into a civilian defence movement. Paramount Chiefs recall receiving letters from the NPRC government echoing this request. At about the same time civilian militia started to be formed in various chiefdoms and were gathered to be trained by the SLA in the tactics of guerrilla warfare and ambushes in the headquarter town of Kabala, Wara Wara Yagala chiefdom. They were named the Tamaboros. They were to be used to fight alongside the SLA and SSD. The Tamaboros were operating under the political leadership of the then NPRC Minister of Defence, Mr. Komba Kambo. The field commander of the Tamaboros was Pa. Khanko Modi Samura, of Ghaya town in Sulima chiefdom. Local commanders were selected from the five tribes of Koinadugu, namely the Yalunka, Kuranko, Limba, Fullah and Madingo. In August 1992, 450 "Tamaboros" were deployed to confront RUF forces in Kono and Kailahun districts in the months following. It is likely that the bulk of deployment to Kono followed the RUF attacks on Koidu (Kono District) from 22-23 October 1992 onwards.

Recruitment to the Tamaboros continued through November and December 1992. In late November 1992, a member of the Sierra Leone Police entered the town of Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) with a message for the Section Chief from the Neini Paramount Chief ordering him to gather all hunters in the section and send them to Yiffin town within 7 days. Later, on 23 December 1992, 43 hunters left the town of Firiwa (Neini Chiefdom) for the town of Yiffin, further south in the Neini Chiefdom.

In September 1992, SLA forces were sent the headquarter town of every chiefdom in Koinadugu District. In September, at the SLA base in Yarawadu (or Yarawadugu, Neya Chiefdom), SLA troops detained a Guinean man suspected of being a member of the RUF. The hands and feet of the man were bound together behind his back, and he was suspended on a lateral stick, his head facing towards the ground. Within 24 hours the man had died. SLA forces ordered villagers of Yarawadu to bury the body, and blocked all roads out of the town until this was done.

For two weeks in November 1992, townspeople of Yiffin (Neini Chiefdom) saw large and continuous convoys of civilians travelling through the town. There were few vehicles. Those in the convoy said they were moving from Kono because of RUF attacks.

Across 1992 SLA forces were stationed on the border of Neya chiefdom with the Kono Chiefdoms of Toli, Lei and Sandor. There were SLA bases in the villages of Yarawadu and Durukoro to the extreme south-east, and in Kurubonla (Neya), Mansofinia (or Mansofenia, in Neya Chiefdom) on the main motorable road crossing the north of the chiefdom. The SLA soldiers were little paid or even unpaid for months, so there were some incidents of looting.

b) Events in 1993

In early 1993 there was a meeting in Yiffin (Neini), between NPRC officials and the Chiefs to form a militia to help the NPRC government to fight the RUF. Following this, in 1993 the Tamaboros started to be deployed. Their effectiveness became a threat at government level where they were perceived as a potential alternative source of power and therefore the then Minister of Defence Paul Nyuma prompted their dissolution.



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In 1993 Tamaboros, moved to combat RUF forces in Kono District. The first battle took place in Sewafe River, in Kono District.

In June 1993, a group of SLA entered the village of Kumba Wullen Balia (Neya), abducted three people and took them to Tagbadu where they had to catch some animals to be slaughtered for food. The SLA forces left, releasing the people they had abducted.

On 15 September 1993 at a meeting in the community centre in Kabala town (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom) the Tamaboros were officially disbanded. Tamboros were given a half a sack of rice and some kerosene. The Paramount Chiefs were given a wall clock and a radio each.

c) Events in 1994

In March 1994 civilians fleeing Kono District started to arrive in the southern chiefdom of Neya, in the towns of Mansofinia and Kurubonla.

Following an attack on Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) on 1 November 1994, RUF forces moved eastwards along the main road through Bendugu (Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) towards Diang chiefdom and the town of Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom). This first group would attack Kabala by 7 November. A second RUF group would leave Mansofinia on 8 November and arrive in Alikalia by 11 November.

Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) was attacked by RUF forces moving from Bendugu (Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) between 1 and 5 November 1994. Two SLA soldiers organised local hunters, who were ordered by the Section Chief to gather their weapons, to move towards Bendugu (Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and ambush the advancing RUF forces. Two miles from Alikalia, this group engaged a large number of RUF forces, but were repelled by superior firepower and dispersed into the surrounding bush. RUF forces attacked Alikalia shortly after, burning 68 houses. Two members of the RUF forces were killed in the attack.

On 5 November 1994, a meeting was held in the southern town of Mansofinia (Neya Chiefdom) between RUF commanders during which an attack on Kabala Town was planned. This group would move north towards Kabala on 8 November.

Also on Saturday 5 November 1994 convoys of civilians moving from Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) passed through the town of Kondembaia (Diang Chiefdom) moving towards Kabala. Residents were informed that RUF were advancing on the town. SLA forces stationed in Kondembaia used long-range weapons to check the RUF advance, forcing a retreat to the town of Badala town on the Seli river, some 6 miles from Kondembaia. RUF forces had entered Badala earlier in the day, and had informed residents that they were safe, before commencing their attack. SLA forces moved towards Badala and blocked the bridge of over the Seli River, both halting the northward movement of RUF forces and preventing civilians from moving towards Kondembaia. Two hundred people were killed when RUF forces burned down the house they were in. The number of civilian deaths was high



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because it was the Saturday market day (called "Lumor" locally). SLA troops were ultimately dislodged from the bridge.

Early on 6 November 1994 RUF forces departed Badala, and moved across the Seli river northwards towards Kabala, bypassing the town of Kondembaia, to where the SLA had retreated. They attacked a number of villages within a 10km area to the immediate south of Kabala. Surkurela (Dieng Chiefdom) and Kamadugu Sokurela (Neini Chiefdom) were attacked. RUF forces arrived in Fasowaya (or Fasawaia, Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom) early on 7 November and cooked a large amount of food. RUF forces were in three groups around the Fasowaya area. The first group was on a patch of farmland called Maworona, the second on the farm of Madam Fatmata Roko, and the third at a location called Centre Bolt's Garden.

In the afternoon of 7 November 1994, RUF forces moved from their Fasowaya encampment and attacked Kabala. Shortly before the attack, residents of Kabala recall hearing an announcement over the radio informing them that the SLA were about to test their AK47 rifles, and therefore nobody should worry. There was limited resistance from the small SLA contingent stationed in the town. Reports indicate that Guinean and Nigerian troops were also present. They would be reinforced on 11 November by SLA forces retreating from Kono District. During the attack, RUF forces killed a prominent former Tamaboro leader, beating him severely with metal bars before cutting his throat. At least four other civilians were killed by RUF forces. In addition to burning over 100 residences, RUF forces looted and destroyed public buildings, including the Police Barracks, the District Office, the District Council Hall and the hospital. Twenty civilians were abducted to carry stolen property. RUF forces also destroyed the businesses of many civilians thought to have been Tamaboros. Fleeing the battle much of the Kabala people fled the town of Kabala heading northeast towards Fadugu and Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) and also towards the town of Tomania (Mongo Chiefdom).

Following the attack, RUF forces left Kabala in the morning of 8 November 1994, moving directly southwards through the villages of Yisimaia (Sengbe Chiefdom), Fasowaya (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom) and Kamadugu Sokurela (Neini Chiefdom). In Fasowaya, 18 civilians were abducted to carry looted property. They continued southwards off the main motorable road, moving through Singbini (Neini Chiefdom) before veering westwards towards the town of Foria (Diang Chiefdom). A further 18 civilians were abducted in Singbina. Reports indicate that this RUF group, active in Diang chiefdom prior to the 7 November attack on Kabala, abducted over 3000 civilians.

By 10 November 1994, the RUF forces responsible for the attack on Kabala on 7 November reached Dondoya (Diang Chiefdom). Instead of taking the main motorable road from Foria (which continued south towards Alikalia and Yiffin) RUF forces headed to Darakuru (Diang). Darakuru is one of the main gold mining areas in Sierra Leone. RUF forces camped in Darakuru until 13 November 1994, during which time they received 300 ounces of gold from the residents of the village in return for not attacking Darakuru. This group of RUF moved into Tonkolili District.

RUF forces departed Mansofinia (Neya Chiefdom) on 8 November, moving to Yiffin on 9 November 1994. Before entering Alikalia on 9 November, RUF forces overpowered armed significant resistance from local militia. Eleven civilians and four local militia were killed by RUF



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forces during this attack. Reports suggest that this second RUF group may have joined the RUF forces moving southwards towards Darakuru following the 7 November attack on Kabala.

d) Events in 1995

Throughout 1995, RUF and SLA activity was concentrated in the Neya chiefdom, to the extreme southeast of Koinadugu District. Across 1995, the RUF would push their line of operation westwards towards Freetown, staging large attacks on Moyamba Port Loko, Mile 91, Songo and Waterloo attacking Waterloo town in mid 1995. The RUF's presence in Koinadugu in 1995 was primarily a spillover from the war in Kono, where food supplies were running short.

"Food finding" missions were launched by both RUF and SLA forces around the towns of Mansofenia and Kurobonla, both on the main motorable road through Neya chiefdom. During RUF "Food finding" missions, there were incidents of rape and other violence against civilians, but nowhere near the intensity of the attacks in Neya, Neini and Diang chiefdoms in late 1994. In August 1995, a 50 civilian militia were mobilised in the south of Diang chiefdom.⁴³⁴

On 16 February 1995, RUF forces arrived in Mansofenia (also Mansofenia, Neya) and requested to be fed and lodged by the villagers, who obliged. On 17 February, they abducted five villagers and moved to the village of Kamaya (Neya Chiefdom), arriving at towards midnight. Following a search of the village, RUF forces opened fire, rounding up the population of the village and performed a search of every residence. Early in the morning of 18 February, RUF forces had found and taken 15 five gallon tanks of palm oil, four bags of husk rice, two bags of husk groundnut, two bags of salt and one full bag of beans. On 19 February, villagers from Kamaya were ordered by the town chief to carry the stolen food items back to Mansofenia through Henekuma village (Neini Chiefdom). In Henekuma, more food items were stolen from villagers and two men were abducted to carry them. On 20 February, the convoy returned to Mansofenia.

On 22 February 1995, RUF forces based in Mansofenia divided into two groups and also divided the property that had been taken the previous days. The first unit moved to nearby Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom). The second unit headed south towards Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District).

As a consequence of these incidents, the SLA were redeployed in the Southeastern chiefdom of Neya in the towns of Gberawalia and Kumba Wullen Balia. A number of incidents of looting by SLA forces are reporting between February and March 1995.

In February 1995, SLA forces entered the village of Nelikoro (also Nerekolo III, Neya chiefdom). Twenty civilian men were arrested and questioned about the location of livestock nearby the village. A farmer was tied up and forced to watch as his wife was raped by 5 members of the SLA. SLA forces then took some livestock and abducted an unknown number of Nelikoro residents to transport the livestock to Gberewaya (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District).

⁴³⁴ There is one report of an attack on Kabala, taken from a key person from another District, which is not corroborated by any record taken in Kabala town or in Koinadugu District, therefore it does not appear to be reliable.



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In March 1995, SLA forces entered Kumba Wullen Balia. They abducted at least 5 civilians and took them to nearby Yirandu (Neya Chiefdom) where they were forced to kill and butcher a cow, and carry another cow suspended upside-down by its legs on a stick over their shoulders. Marching towards Mansofenia (Neya Chiefdom), SLA forces captured a further 5 civilians to assist with carrying the cow. On their arrival in Mansofenia (Neya Chiefdom), the civilians were locked in a building without food or water until the following day.

RUF forces came from Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom) to Mansofinia in May 1995 before moving to Seredu (Neya Chiefdom). In Seredu, they entered the town firing in the air, and arrested 10 women and 8 men. Many villagers fled into the surrounding bush. All 10 women were raped and then forced to fetch water and cook for the RUF forces. The men were forced to fetch firewood and palm wine. RUF forces also took palm oil, rice and poultry from farms in the surrounding area. After five days, they returned to Yiraia, abducting 25 villagers from Seredu to carry property stolen in the previous days

In August 1995, reports reached the villages of Foria, Yanqulia, Soria and Kumunkaia (Diang Chiefdom) of renewed RUF activity in Yiffin town (Neini Chiefdom) and Neya chiefdom. All four villages are on the same road, running north to Kabala from Kono. Fifty hunters were mobilised, with only five single barrel guns between them.

Food finding missions by RUF units along the Mansofenia – Kurubonla road (Neya Chiefdom) continued into November and December 1995. RUF forces entered the town of Mansofinia on 13 October 1995 and took food items. The next day they also entered the villages of Kurubonla and Worokoro (Neya Chiefdom), searching for livestock. In December RUF forces again entered Mansofinia (Neya Chiefdom) and Daboroma, near Kurobonla. In Mansofinia they abducted 20 men and forced them to carry the loads to Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District) and also to Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom).

e) Events in 1996

In general, there RUF forces carried out raids in Neya Chiefdom and attacks on Foria and Aliakalia in Diang chiefdom. There were frequent patrols from the town of Kurubonla into Mongo and Neya Chiefdoms. Food finding raids were carried out from Kaiyai (Sandor Chiefdom). The RUF forces had total freedom of movement throughout Neya chiefdom. RUF activity concentrated entirely in the southern chiefdoms, the most intense attack being on Foraya (Diang Chiefdom).

No incidences were recorded in first half of 1996. The first record of resumed RUF activities was a meeting in Kurubonla (Neya Chiefdom). On 13 June 1996, RUF forces commanded by three different commanders met in Kurubonla (Neya Chiefdom). A decision was made to split into two groups: one to go north to Bendugu (Mongo Chiefdom) and the other to head south to Mansadu, Kono District. Both groups claimed to be looking for a senior SLA officer. On 15 June 1996, the northern group headed towards Bengdugu (Mongo Chiefdom), staying in the village of Kamaron (Mongo Chiefdom), returning to Kurubonla (Neya Chiefdom) on 18 June. On 19 June, they departed Kurubonla for Koidu. During this mission, there were no reports of any violent incidents. The



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Chiefs of both Kamaron (Mongo Chiefdom) and Kuribonla (Neya Chiefdom) cooperated with the RUF forces, ordering villagers to provide food when requested by the RUF.

On 15 August 1996, RUF forces attacked Foraya (Diang Chiefdom) from Nyamulnya, (Diang Chiefdom) at the south end of the town.⁴³⁵ Foraya is on the main northern road to Kabala, between the towns of Alikalia and Kondembaia, both attacked heavily by RUF forces in 1994 prior to their attack on Kabala on 7 November. With five shotguns, civil militia mobilised in August 1995 managed to repel the RUF assault and capture three members of the RUF, who were taken to ECOMOG forces present in Alikalia. ECOMOG forces gave three AK47 rifles in exchange for the RUF prisoners. The fate of the prisoners is unknown.

The RUF forces moved from Kurabonla along the main towards Masadu (Mongo Chiefdom) on 15 September. In the evening they attacked the villages of Madine, Kumba Wullen Balia and Masandu. In Madine, two houses were burnt down, one man was shot dead, 10 men arrested and property was taken.

On 5 November 1996, RUF forces attacked Alikalia (Neini) RUF forces looted property, burnt houses and killed 13 civilians. RUF forces also raped an unknown number of women.

On 26 November, armed RUF forces arrived in Kurubonla from Kaiamy (Sandor Chiefdom) from Kono and stayed overnight in the village. The town chief provided them with food. On 27 November 1996, they moved south eastwards through the villages of Marilia (Neya Chiefdom) and Toria (Neya Chiefdom). In Toria, the village was surrounded and all the houses searched. Food items were taken and 25 villagers were abducted to carry the load back to Kurobonla, where the Chief offered the commander one cow for the safe return of the Toria abductees.⁴³⁶ From Kurobonla, the RUF unit moved to Mansofenia, where the 25 abductees from Toria were released. The Unit continued towards Kayia (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District).

In December 1996,⁴³⁷ RUF forces attacked Mansofinia where they arrested 20 young men and forced them to carry loads of property to Kaiyima, in Kono district.

On 12 December 1996, RUF forces attacked Foraya (Diang Chiefdom) from the village of Kulanko (Neini Chiefdom) using heavy machine guns, mortars and RPGs. ECOMOG forces, SLA and local militia engaged the RUF, but were repelled and retreated from the town northwards towards Badala, a crossing point over the Seli river. RUF forces killed one SLA soldier and captured one Nigerian ECOMOG soldier, about whom there is no further information.

f) Events in 1997⁴³⁸

⁴³⁵ It is possible that this incident took place at a hill called Gbakan, but this is not marked on the maps and requires further clarification.

⁴³⁶ It is not clear from the record whether this offer was accepted.

⁴³⁷ More clarification is required from the records on the date, specifically when during December this happened.

⁴³⁸ The records contain contradictory information on what happened in Koinadugu District in 1997. This whole section therefore requires further clarification, including verification through open source research.



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In April 1997, RUF forces established a base in Serekolia (Mongo Chiefdom). Then they moved on to attack Dolar⁴³⁹ and moved south to Kurubonla (Neya chiefdom). The ECOMOG forces occupied Kabala and moved on to Koinadugu, Sengbe chiefdom, searching for RUF forces.

In May 1997, RUF forces left Sengbe chiefdom towards a bordering chiefdom, apparently escaping from the advance of ECOMOG troops. Chasing the RUF forces the ECOMOG troops attacked Gberefeh (Sengbe Chiefdom) and Dolar⁴⁴⁰ to unseat the RUF/AFRC bases. During this month, CDF captured some members of the RUF and took them to the ECOMOG base in Mongo chiefdom.⁴⁴¹ The RUF/AFRC forces counterattacked in Serekolia and Gberefeh where they engaged in a battle against the Tamaboros.

There were RUF/AFRC bases in Sereya (Mongo Chiefdom), whose presence caused people to flee to Guinea.⁴⁴²

In meantime, in the south eastern chiefdom of Neya, RUF forces attacked a number of towns, including Kurubonla, Porpon and Henekum, and set bases in Yiraia, Bendu, Kulia, Kumba Wullen Balia, Nerekoro, Mansofinia, Yarawalu and Konkowaboro. In these places they continued looting, killing and abducting people to carry their loads.⁴⁴³

In June 1997, senior RUF/AFRC commanders were based in Koinadugu town (Sengbe Chiefdom), where their men captured 80 young men, they raped women and girls in the bush and they killed 98 people. Then they moved on to Dankawali.⁴⁴⁴

In June RUF/AFRC forces coming from Mongo and Neya Chiefdoms, went to Freetown, passing through the towns of Kurubonla and Mansofinia. In Mansofinia RUF/AFRC formed the G 5, mixed units of RUF forces and civilians who were charged with various administrative functions, and stayed in the district.⁴⁴⁵

In July 1997, RUF/AFRC forces occupied the eastern part of the District in Neya, Mongo and Sengbe chiefdoms, attacked many towns and villages and they planned the attack on Kabala town, at the time a stronghold of ECOMOG and CDF. The battle took place on 27 July 1997.⁴⁴⁶

On 17 September 1997, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Kabala. The RUF forces did not meet any resistance from SLA and many people were killed. The next day the SLA, who had apparently

⁴³⁹ The location of this town is not clear, although it is likely to be either Mongo or Sengbe Chiefdom.

⁴⁴⁰ The location of this town is not clear, although it is likely to be either Mongo or Sengbe Chiefdom.

⁴⁴¹ More information is required from the records about the location of the ECOMOG base in this chiefdom.

⁴⁴² More information is required from the records on this matter.

⁴⁴³ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁴⁴ This requires more detail, in particular whether all of these incidents took place on one day or over the month of June.

⁴⁴⁵ More information is required from the records here about the "G5" system.

⁴⁴⁶ More detail is required from the records about this battle and these incidents.



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delayed fighting the RUF forces for strategic reasons, started firing on their position killing many RUF forces and their commander, who was subsequently buried in one of the main mass graves.

On 19 September 1997, an RUF commando group left Mansofinia and headed to Kulero. On the way, they attacked Sumaworia and Sondordu (both in Neya Chiefdom). In Sumaworia, they abducted everyone in the town, including men, women and children. The women were then taken into empty houses and raped, while their husbands were forced to watch. Similar incidents took place in Sondordu. During that month a group, coming from Kumba Wullen Balia, attacked Kilimendu and Mansadu.

The RUF/AFRC forces operated in Neya chiefdom until the end of September 1997 in the towns of Kurubonla, Sangabania, Kamaron and Bumbunkoro, where they abducted everybody and forced men and women to work for them. During the night, women were raped all over the town.⁺⁴⁷

In October one AFRC group attacked the towns of Koromandor and Kumba Wullen Balia. During the same month in Sengbe chiefdom a fight took place between two senior RUF/AFRC commanders, as a result of which one left the chiefdom. In November 1997, the RUF forces went from Makeni to Fadugu, Mangolo chiefdom, while in the first half of December another group of RUF forces attacked Kondodalema, Sangbania and Kurubonla in Neya Chiefdom.

RUF forces attacked Mansonia (Neya Chiefdom) on 26 December 1996, where they held a meeting and asked the people for food. On this occasion, they beat people and raped women. After four days they left the town forcing men and women to carry the loot to Kurubonla, where five vehicles came to collect them and left to Safaru in Kono district.⁺⁴⁸

In December 1997, AFRC, RUF and G5 were based in Sengbe chiefdom where they took property, abducted and beat people. The people were forced to cook, wash their cloths and build guard-posts. They were also sent in search of food. Many people would be flogged, especially when the RUF forces had casualties in a battle. RUF forces destroyed roads and bridges.⁺⁴⁹

g) Events in 1998

Intense RUF/AFRC activity and food finding missions staged from the two towns of Mansofenia and Kurobonla on the main motor road though Neya chiefdom continued. Following ECOMOG intervention, "Operation Pay Yourself", during which RUF forces stole property in many different locations at the same time, was reported across Neini, Diang, Sebeneh chiefdoms.

In early January, a 20-man RUF/AFRC unit entered the village of Kumba Wullen Baia. In nearby Bola Mamburia, RUF forces temporarily detained 15 people and took property from their premises. A man and his son were shot dead for refusing to carry loads of property. The unit left Kumba Wullen Baia for the RUF base at Mansofenia.

⁺⁴⁷ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁺⁴⁸ More detail is required from the records about this attack.

⁺⁴⁹ More detail is required from the records about this attack.



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At some point before 5 January 1998, a 50-man RUF/AFRC unit entered Kuronbonla (Neya Chiefdom), describing their mission to the town Chief, as a "routine patrol". On 5 January, they left Kuronbonla heading southeast towards Yarawadugu (Neya Chiefdom), a border town with both the Republic of Guinea and Toli chiefdom (Kono District). On their arrival in Yarawadugu, RUF/AFRC forces sealed off the roads, fired shots in the air and went house-to-house removing the occupants and taking them into the streets. The Section Chief offered the RUF/AFRC forces some livestock to feed them for the duration of their stay.

Around midday on 12 January, RUF forces used a machete to cut off four fingers from the right hand of the Section Chief. An unknown number of civilians in the town were whipped and beaten by RUF forces, who looted extensively. Twenty-six men and 15 women, all civilians, were forced to carry the looted property. RUF forces burned down four houses before departing Yarawadugu.

Between 12 and 13 January 1998, this RUF unit returned to Kurubonla from Yarawadugu passing through the villages of Tilikoro, Fasombnuya, Sandia, Tenkeya, Toroya and Marliya. In Tilikoro, two men were caught and their property taken away. In Fasonbnuya, three men were caught, and property including radios, cassette tapes and a gun was taken. Five houses were also burned down. Many houses in other towns were also burnt down, including 10 in Sandia, two in Tenkeya, 10 in Toraya and 6 in Marliya. On 13 January, the unit arrived in Kurubonla, whereupon the people who had been abducted to carry stolen property on the patrol were released. A truck from the RUF base at Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom) was provided to carry the 50 man unit back to Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District).

On 15 January 1998, RUF forces burned a total of 11 houses in the villages of Dunamara, Fandala and Henekuma (all Neya Chiefdom) en route from Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District) to Mansofenia (Neya Chiefdom). In Mansofenia, RUF forces began to burn houses. Villagers report begin surprised, having been informed earlier by one of the RUF commanders that Mansofenia was an RUF base. That RUF commander shot dead another RUF commander with a pistol.⁴⁵⁰

In February 1998, the combined forces of the ARFC and the RUF were driven out of Freetown by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention force.

After 14 February 1998, a 1000-man RUF/AFRC unit known as "Junta One" arrived in Fadugu (Mambolo HQ town) and proceeded to attack many surrounding villages as part of "Operation Pay Yourself". Attacks were made upon Kagbasia, Kafogo, Kassasie, Thankorosidia, Madina, Kasandakoro, Kakayo and Kamanda.⁴⁵¹

On 15 February 1998, ECOMOG forces entered Fadugu town forcing ARFC/RUF forces to retreat towards Kabala. Fadugu town became the focus point for surrenders by RUF/AFRC forces present in the surrounding villages, as a result of which ECOMOG set up a screening process.⁴⁵² At least

⁴⁵⁰ More detail is required from the records on this.

⁴⁵¹ More detail is required from the records on these attacks.

⁴⁵² More detail is required from the records on the screening process.



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two killings of surrendered RUF/AFRC forces by ECOMOG soldiers are recorded. ECOMOG cooperated with the CDF to set up a town defence plan that included civilians.

CDF forces had made the main route between Magburaka and Koidu impassable to retreating RUF/AFRC forces, so the main route used was through Bumbuna (Kalansogoia, Tonkolili) and Bendugu (Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili) into Neini chiefdom. After 14 February 1998, a large convoy of RUF/AFRC vehicles moved through the towns of Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) and Yiffin (Neini Chiefdom) through towards Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District). In both Alikalia and Yiffin, until early March 1998, there are reports of continual harassment of civilians and their property being taken by RUF/AFRC forces as part of "Operation Pay Yourself".

Throughout March and April 1998 in Sebeh chiefdom, the number of RUF/AFRC forces present grew. There are also reports of continual looting of civilian property and expropriation of dwellings to house RUF/AFRC forces and their families. Civilians in Kalkoia (Sengbeh Chiefdom) report seeing small ECOMOG patrols shortly after the arrival of the main ECOMOG 2nd Battalion reached Kabala in early March. Shortly after ECOMOG arrived in Kabala, RUF/AFRC forces occupied the town of Serekolia (Mongo Chiefdom).

After 13 March 1998, ECOMOG forces commanded by entered the town of Alikalia from the north. A company of ECOMOG forces remained in Alikalia, whilst a platoon was dispatched to Yiffin town (Neini Chiefdom), in pursuit of RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG met little resistance on entering Yiffin. In both Yiffin and Alikalia, ECOMOG forces and Section Chiefs accepted the surrender of unknown numbers of RUF/AFRC forces, who were issued with documents identifying them and then sent to Kabala or Makeni for further questioning by ECOMOG.

Immediately after entering both Yiffin and Alikalia, ECOMOG met with the Section Chiefs and requested that hunters be gathered together to assist ECOMOG troops. In Alikalia, 50 hunters were rapidly assembled and registered at the ECOMOG base. ECOMOG firstly provided training to those who registered in how to use an AK-47 rifle, and secondly ordered those trained to search the bush around Alikalia town for RUF/AFRC forces.

By 14 March 1998, ECOMOG troops had deployed to the northern town of Sinkunia (Dembelia Sinkunia Chiefdom) to the North of Kabala. Civilians in nearby Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) report arresting and tying up a local ARFC leader and handing him over to ECOMOG forces in Sinkunia. After 14 March 1998, ECOMOG forces arrived in Falaba town.

On 26 March 1998, an RUF/AFRC unit attacked the town of Kosaba in the Republic of Guinea, bordering Mondo chiefdom. The previous day this unit abducted 40 civilian men in Kamaron and Kiridu (both in Mongo Chiefdom) to guide them through to Kosaba. Two civilians were killed during the attack. RUF/AFRC forces took items like foam mattresses, guns, radios and foodstuffs from Kosaba. The abductees were forced to carry the looted property back to the RUF/AFRC base in Mansofenia.



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On 28 March 1998, ECOMOG forces stationed in Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) received reports of an RUF/AFRC buildup to the south of the town. A young boy reported that RUF/AFRC forces had captured his friend and killed him as a ritual sacrifice. An ECOMOG armoured car fired from Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) in the direction of Alia (Alieya Chiefdom) village. In the early hours of the morning on 29 March, RUF/AFRC forces responded and attacked Falaba town with heavy machine guns and RPGs, killing 18 civilians, looting and burning down over 50 houses. ECOMOG withdrew to their pre-existing position in Sinkunia. Falaba was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces again on 3 April, thereby securing RUF/AFRC control of Falaba until the arrival of Guinean troops in late May 1998. The Guinean contingent remained until late November 1998.

On 30 March 1998, ECOMOG in Alkalia received reports from civilians of a large concentration of ARFC/RUF forces around Worombaia in the southern tip of Neini chiefdom, bordering with Tonkolili District. ECOMOG forces based in the town and 40 local hunters were dispatched by ECOMOG from Alikalia. Failing to locate RUF/AFRC forces, they returned to Alikalia in early April 1998.

In early April 1998, a contingent of Guinean ECOMOG troops attacked Serekolia town (Mongu), entering from the direction of Kabala. Residents report seeing 13 trucks, an unknown number of ground troops and a helicopter gunship. RUF/AFRC forces retreated from Serekolia towards Kurobonla. ECOMOG moved through Serekolia, and established a base in the nearby town of Mongu Bendugu (Mongu). There are also reports that shortly after moving from Serekolia, RUF/AFRC forces established a base in the town of Seria (Mongu Chiefdom), close to Mongu Bendugu, and on the main road southwards to the other RUF/ARFC bases in Neyya chiefdom.⁴⁵³

On 11 April 1998, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces arrived in the village of Mansofenia (Neyya Chiefdom). They had more than 20 Honda motorcycles and a large and a varied amount of weaponry including RPGs, LMGs, AK-47s, shotguns, mortars, grenades and bladed weapons. The town was sealed off by RUF/AFRC forces. On 13 April, a large meeting of civilians and all military forces was convened. The RUF/AFRC forces were divided into five groups, to be based at Mansofenia, Yiriaia, Kurobonla (Neyya Chiefdom), Mansodugu (Mongu Chiefdom) and Alikalia (Diang Chiefdom). On 20 April, some of the RUF/AFRC forces moved towards Kurobonla, and a much smaller group moved to Mandodugu. The Alikalia and Mansofenia groups remained in Mansofenia.

Late morning on 27 April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Yiffin from the easterly directions of Krutor and Konombaia village (both in Nieni Chiefdom).⁴⁵⁴ ECOMOG forces were ambushed with an RPG whilst setting up defences and retreated from Yiffin. The ECOMOG commander informed the Section Chief that the town should be evacuated because they were unable to defend against the RUF/AFRC attack. Many civilians fled the town into the nearby bush. RUF troops had red material tied around their heads and AFRC had white pieces tied around their heads. The house of the Town Chief was destroyed with an RPG. The chief was shot in the mouth but escaped to Alikalia. A number of the RUF/AFRC forces wore uniforms similar to that of ECOMOG and informed

⁴⁵³ More information is required from the records on this base and whether it in fact existed.

⁴⁵⁴ It is likely this groups moved from Mansofenia but further clarification is required from the records on this.



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civilians that they should head to the centre of town where they would be protected. RUF/AFRC forces gathered between 200 and 300 people in a barn, firing into the building before setting it on fire. Later that afternoon, RUF/AFRC forces left Yiffin in the direction of Alikalia. On 28 April 1998, returning civilians buried over 200 dead civilians in a mass grave in Yiffin. Two ECOMOG forces were also killed in the attack, after which Yiffin was left undefended.

Around midday on 28 April 1998, RUF/AFRC troops attacked Alikalia. ECOMOG forces and hunters (specifically, two hunters and one ECOMOG soldier) were at that time dug into trenches, having been warned of the attack by civilians escaping the RUF/AFRC attack on Yiffin on 27 April. They exchanged fire for about four hours, before repelling the RUF/AFRC attack. On 29 April 1998, the ECOMOG platoon arrived in Alikalia from Yiffin.

In early May, RUF/AFRC forces stationed in Mansofenia established a form of cooperation with civilians. Under the threat of their property being taken, civilians were ordered to provide a certain amount of livestock, palm oil, salt, groundnuts and other food items to support RUF/AFRC forces. Men from the village were to provide firewood and women were to deliver water and cook for RUF/AFRC forces.

In early May 1998, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces (possibly moving from Kurobonla to the south) attacked and occupied the town of Gberefeh (either Mongo or Segbeneh Chiefdom), at the beginning of a motorable road leading to Serekoilia town (Mongo Chiefdom). Local hunters engaged them, but ran short of ammunition and were driven into the bush. During the attack, RUF/AFRC forces set fire to a 10-wheel truck full of agricultural machinery and burnt down all the houses in the villages. Only the town mosque was left untouched. Two trucks of ECOMOG forces from the Guinean ECOMOG base in Mongo Bendugu were sent towards Gberefeh to engage the RUF/AFRC forces, but returned to Mongo Bendugu without having dislodged the RUF/AFRC forces from Gberefeh.

In the following days, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the villages of Dambafayi and Farama. In Farama, RUF/AFRC forces burned down all the houses, and killed a prominent town chief. There are reports that RUF/AFRC then stationed themselves in Serekolia town.

On 5 May 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered the town of Tomania (Mongo Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC commanders met with the local chief and elders, informing them that they intended to attack the town of Dankawali (Sengbe Chiefdom). Between 8 and 10 May 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Dankawali. Three Nigerian ECOMOG forces and eight civilians were killed during the attack. Civilians fleeing the attack moved eastwards to Tomania.

On 6 May 1998, the town of Badala, a crossing point over the Seli river, was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces from the direction of Dalakuru. RUF/AFRC forces amputated both hands of one man and disfigured the lips, nose, eyes and forehead of another.

On 9 May 1998, Kondembaia town was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces. Both hands of two men were amputated and seven girls were raped by RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG forces retreated to



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Fadugu town (Mabolo Chiefdom), to the north. Kondembaia was attacked again on 22 May from the direction of Diang Sokurela. Eleven people were killed in the attack and an unknown number of people had both hands amputated.

On 10 May, RUF/AFRC forces attacked ECOMOG forces stationed in Alikalia from the direction of Kulankor and Firawa in the north of Neini chiefdom. ECOMOG forces engaged the RUF/AFRC attack, which ceased after about 2 hours. Local militia were ordered by an ECOMOG commander to remove all undergrowth within a 300 metre perimeter around Alikalia. More trenches were dug, and for three weeks local militia and ECOMOG forces were placed on 24 hour-guard around the town.

By the early morning of 22 May 1998, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces attacking from the RUF base at Koinadugu village (Sengbe Chiefdom) had captured the town of Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom). The 40-man ECOMOG unit was briefly driven from town. One CDF member was shot dead and his body cut up by RUF forces. Eleven civilians were killed in the attack and an unknown number of houses were burned down. On the same day, by 1000, ECOMOG reinforcements from Kabala arrived, but were ambushed in Kafogo village, nearby Fadugu. On 23 May, ECOMOG, SSD and CDF forces attacked Fadugu with the assistance of air support. RUF/AFRC forces retreated towards Kabala. ECOMOG forces immediately performed a house-to-house search of Fadugu, during which civilian property was taken.

On 2 June 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered Yiffin (Neini Chiefdom), under heavy rainfall. Using cutlasses, they tore the corrugated zinc roofing from an unknown number of houses, claiming they were "repairing" the properties. RUF/AFRC forces remained in Yiffin until the next day, singing songs and harassing civilians throughout the night.

On 3 June 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kondembaiai (Diang). In this attack, RUF/AFRC forces cut off the limbs of an unknown number of children between the ages of three and five. The RUF/AFRC forces searched every house in town, with the exception of the mosque and the Roman Catholic church.

On 6 June 1998, RUF/AFRC forces coming from the direction of Yiffin and Kulankor (both in Diang Chiefdom) attacked Alikalia town. ECOMOG and local militia repelled the RUF/AFRC attack by midday on 7 June 1998. RUF/AFRC forces killed three civilian men in the bush nearby Alikalia and one woman was shot in the stomach while attempting to escape. On 9 June 1998, ECOMOG commanders in Alikali ordered a unit of 40 local militia to travel to Firawa (Diang Chiefdom), to establish the whereabouts of the RUF/AFRC forces that attacked Alikalia. On the road to Firawa, this unit stopped at Kulanakor and learned from residents that the RUF/AFRC forces had moved to Gbefereh (Senebeh Chiefdom) in search of livestock. On their return to Alikalia, on 10 June, ECOMOG ordered the local militia to return to the trenches, where they stayed until 17 June before being allowed to freely move around the town.

On 30 June and 10 July 1998, soldiers of the SLA 1st Battalion moved through Alikalia towards Yiffin, dislodging the RUF/AFRC forces, on way to engage RUF at Kayima (Kono District). ECOMOG in Alikalia were informed by the commander that SLA forces would remain in Yiffin as

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an advance defence for Alikalia. One company of SLA forces remained in Yiffin, whilst the remainder advanced to attack RUF/AFRC positions in Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District).

At the end of June 1998, Alikalia, Yiffin and Kabala were out of the control of the RUF/AFRC. On 24 June, the CDF was officially formed in Diang chiefdom.

In early July 1998, RUF/AFRC forces established combat bases in the villages of Koinadugu and Yamadugu (both in Sengbe Chiefdom).

Before 26 July 1998, reports reached the town of Firawa (Neini Chiefdom), immediately south of Koinadugu and Yamadugu (Sebeneh Chiefdom), that RUF/AFRC forces were gathered in the village of Banda Karafaia (Neini Chiefdom). On 26 July 1998, CDF forces laid an ambush for RUF/AFRC forces on the road into Firawa. After 2 hours, CDF retreated into the town, informing residents that they should hide in the bush. RUF/AFRC forces entered the empty town, burning down 20 houses and killing one civilian. They remained in Firawa until 28 July, until they moved westwards towards the town of Foria (Diang Chiefdom)

In the evening of 27 or 28 July 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked and occupied Kabala town from the direction of Makeni. They were armed with AA guns, RPGs, mortars and other weapons and arrived in about 30 vehicles including Toyota land cruisers, Land Rovers and Mercedes Benz cars. While RUF/AFRC forces looted private property, there are no reports of violent incidents or burning of houses. Nigerian and Guinean ECOMOG troops stationed in Kabala secured their defensive positions and remained in town until they were reinforced. The occupation lasted until the evening of either 1 or 2 August, when RUF/AFRC forces were driven from Kabala by ECOMOG forces and the SLA 2nd Battalion.⁴⁵⁵

Retreating from Kabala, RUF/AFRC forces settled in towns and villages on the arterial road leading eastwards from Kabala through Sebeneh chiefdom. These included Yamadugu, Koinadugu and Kalkoia (Sebeneh Chiefdom). Another unit moved further south, arriving in the town of Gberefeh (Sebeneh Chiefdom).

In the early hours of 11 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Fadugu (Mangolo Chiefdom) in an operation called "Operation Die." They were armed with RPGs, AK-58s and AK-47 machine guns. RUF/AFRC forces came through the Madingotown area of Fadugu, avoiding the ECOMOG checkpoint on the road from Kafogo and Kabala. ECOMOG forces engaged the RUF/AFRC forces but were unable to repel the attack. The Paramount Chief of Mambolo was shot dead at his home by RUF forces, who afterwards set fire to his corpse. Sixty-eight houses were burned down and eight civilians were killed, two of them being set on fire. The RUF/AFRC forces moved from the town later in the day on 12 September. The attack was primarily to loot ECOMOG ammunition dumps in the town.

⁴⁵⁵ Clarification is required from the records about the exact dates these incidents took place.



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On 18 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Karia (Diang Chiefdom) from the direction of Darakaru, in gold-rich area of Diang chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces burned 36 houses and abducted 10 civilians. One hundred SLA soldiers were deployed to Karia at the request of the chiefdom elders.

On 23 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces left Kuronbonla (Neya Chiefdom) for the town of Kamaron (Mongo Chiefdom), arriving in the early evening. Twenty-five men and 15 women were detained by RUF forces in a church in the town. RUF/AFRC forces entered every house in the town and took property, including food items, livestock and domestic goods. The stolen property was loaded onto trucks and driven to Kuronbonla. Fifteen houses were burnt when the RUF/AFRC forces left Kamaron the next day.

On 8 October 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) from Firawa (Neini Chiefdom) in the north. Although CDF and ECOMOG resisted the attack, RUF/AFRC burned down over 20 houses along their retreat route. CDF and ECOMOG forces pursued the RUF/AFRC unit over 2 miles out of Alikalia towards Firawa.

On 16 October 1998, RUF/AFRC forces moved from Kuronbonla (Neya Chiefdom) and destroyed the bridges over the Bafin and Bagbe rivers along the main road through Mongo chiefdom. This was to prevent ECOMOG forces stationed in Mongo Bendugu (Mongo Chiefdom) from entering the Neya chiefdom, and putting pressure on the RUF/AFRC bases in Kuronbonla and Mansofenia. At the Bagbe crossing point, they destroyed the concrete on both ends of one of the main support rails, causing the wooden slats that made up the bridges to fall into the river. The bridges were rendered impassable to vehicles.

On 28 October 1998, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces from Kurobonla attacked the ECOMOG base at Mongo Bendugu. Since they had earlier destroyed both bridges over the main road, the attack was carried out on foot. Two RUF/AFRC forces were sent into Mongo Bendugu to surrender to ECOMOG, distracting their attention away from the main attack, which came along the southern road from Seria. RUF/AFRC forces killed over 20 civilians and three ECOMOG soldiers. ECOMOG retreated from the town to an unknown location, leaving behind arms and ammunition. RUF/AFRC forces took possession of this weaponry, in addition to looting livestock and domestic goods from civilian residences. An unknown number of civilians were captured and forced to carry the stolen property over 30 miles to Kurobonla.⁴⁵⁶

Between 1 and 7 November 1998, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Alikalia. They were repelled by combined ECOMOG and CDF forces who, having received warning from a local farmer, engaged the RUF/AFRC attack a mile out of Alikalia. On 2 November 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kamarantak (Diang Chiefdom). SLA forces based in the village repelled the attack.

⁴⁵⁶ There are reports at this time of in-fighting within the RUF, which requires further information.



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On 11 November 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered the town of Musaia (Follosaba Dembelia Chiefdom) and occupied the town for the day. An unknown number of civilians were beaten with iron bars, sticks and belts. An unknown number of civilians were tied up and left in the sun.

Early on 28 November, SLA forces retreated from Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District) through Yiffin, to Alikalia. Their commander reported to the ECOMOG commander that his unit had been ordered to move to Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) to defend the hydroelectric plant from attack.

On 8 December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Alikalia, meeting resistance from ECOMOG and local CDF. The engagement continued throughout the night. Around midday on 9 December 1998, the ECOMOG Commander ordered ECOMOG to retreat, because they had expended all their ammunition, so they retreated towards Makeni. The ECOMOG Commander further informed the CDF that this was a "brigade attack", so CDF forces retreated into the surrounding bush. RUF/AFRC forces burned down over 200 houses and discovered a large amount of ammunition buried beneath the former ECOMOG headquarters.

Following the RUF/AFRC capture of Alikalia, Neini chiefdom was divided into two operational regions by RUF/AFRC. The towns of Alikalia and Firawa came under the control of the RUF/AFRC Brigade Headquarters at Gberefeh (Mongo to Sebeneh Chiefdoms). The towns of Banda Karafaia, Yiffin, Sumbaria and Drutor came under the control of the Brigade Headquarters at Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District). Committees of civilian intermediaries were appointed in all these towns, their role being to ensure the provision of foodstuff, manpower and other material needs of RUF/AFRC forces. These intermediaries were known collectively as "G-5" and were expected to cooperate fully with both resident RUF/AFRC units and new units entering and leaving town. In Yiffin (Neini Chiefdom), for example, the G5 were ordered to provide to the RUF/AFRC Kayima Brigade the sum of 800 cups of rice each month, in addition to 20 cups each day for the Commander. In Alikalia, G5 were to provide 900 cups of rice and 600 cups of beans to RUF/AFRC Brigade Headquarters at Gberefeh.

The capture of all the major towns in Diang, Neini and Neya chiefdoms refocused RUF/AFRC strategy away from bush fighting and raiding, towards occupation and consolidation of control. Patrols were sent into the bush to encourage civilians to return to the towns.

h) Events in 1999

The RUF commander in Yiffin held a meeting informing the population that the RUF/AFRC had taken over the government and that President Kabbah had fled to Guinea. In February 1999, he ordered "G5" to gather the people from the bushes and these civilians were forced to work in a government farm for them. During this month of time civilians were subject to violence, tortures and forced labour, women were taken from them and raped, all huts burnt down. Another unit of RUF/AFRC was active in the Mambolo chiefdom and attacked towns and villages among which



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Madina, Dugbongbon, Kakarima and Fadugu. Around 10 January RUF/AFRC forces raided Kabala and went back to Fadugu.⁴⁵⁷

On 12 January a group of RUF/AFRC forces reinforced Kumba Wullen Balia (Neya Chiefdom) from Kono District. The leaders of those forces were saying that they wanted to join the fighters at Makeni to launch an attack on Guinea, but ECOMOG and SLA were based in Kabala, blocking the most convenient route Guinea.

Around 15 and 20 January 1999, a very large RUF/AFRC force comprised of different units led by different commanders on their way to Freetown stopped in Fadugu, Mambolo chiefdom causing the population to retreat to the surrounding bush.⁴⁵⁸

On 28 January in Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom) there was a battle between SLA forces and ECOMOG against RUF/AFRC forces.⁴⁵⁹

In February 1999, AFRC forces attacked Tomania (Sengbe Chiefdom) and then they skirted northwards on the main road avoiding Kabala, via Serekolia (Mongo Chiefdom), Gbenikoro (Sengbe Chiefdom), Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom), towards Makeni town. During this expedition, they were ambushed by CDF forces. In Tomania, they captured all the women and took them to a flat rock behind the town where they were sexually abused. They also abducted men and women to carry their looted foodstuff to Serekolia.⁴⁶⁰

Another RUF/AFRC unit was active in Wara Wara Bafodia chiefdom, where attacks were made on Magbgbe, Bafodia and Kakonsio. In Bafodia town, the RUF commanders gathered the population and divided it into three groups. One group remained in Bafodia, the second was deported to another village, possibly Katawuyia, and the third to Kakoyia. After five days the RUF forces left for Kamawie.⁴⁶¹

From 15 to 20 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces passing through Fadugu (Mambolo) on the way to Freetown, arrested civilians, captured them and killed some of them. Seventy houses were burnt down and women, both young and old, were sexual abused.⁴⁶²

On 16 February 1998, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces attacked Bafodia (Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom), where they spent the day. During the attack, the RUF/AFRC forces amputated the limbs of four civilians, including children under five years of age, and they raped five women. Two of the amputees died. They also took property and abducted five people to carry the loads.

⁴⁵⁷ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.
⁴⁵⁸ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.
⁴⁵⁹ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.
⁴⁶⁰ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.
⁴⁶¹ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.
⁴⁶² More detail is required on these incidents.



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Between March and April 1999, a battle went on in Gbenekoro and Fogo, (Diang Chiefdom) between RUF forces and CDF forces. Towards mid-April, in Bafodia (Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces entered the town and introduced themselves as “SLA loyal forces” to the residents. After extorting money from them for three days, some of the RUF/AFRC forces left Katawuyia (Diang Chiefdom).⁴⁶³

In Mambolo chiefdom, on 16 March 1999, RUF/AFRC forces were present in the villages of Kamandai and Kamajmbo.⁴⁶⁴

On 28 April 1999, a high-command meeting was held in Firawa (Neini Chiefdom) to organise the RUF convention. A number of important commanders were present at the meeting, during which time property was taken from people in the town, who were also forced to undertake tasks for the RUF.⁴⁶⁵

At the beginning of May in Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom), the RUF commander was replaced, after which the forces executed a looting operation known as “JAJA”.⁴⁶⁶ The joined RUF/AFRC forces made preparations for an attack on Kabala. They attacked the town from different direction in Mambolo Chiefdom from the southwest and from the northwest through Yagala, but were repelled by SLA forces.

On 18 July 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces attacked the gold-rich mining area of Binkokoh (Diang Chiefdom). In Foraya, the RUF forces killed 3 people, looted the whole village, demanded gold and abducted some young boys and girls to carry the stolen property.⁴⁶⁷ On 3 August, the RUF/AFRC forces moved from Binkokoh to attack Barakan and Dalakuru (Diang Chiefdom), which are also gold-mining areas. While in Dalakuru, the RUF/AFRC forces raped a woman.

In September 1999 the CDF attacked the RUF/AFRC position in Dondoya (Diang Chiefdom). In the southern Neya chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the towns of Dalawullay-feh, Bendu III and Yarawadu.

On 3 September RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kafogo and Fadugu, (Mambolo), where they, given their great number, overwhelmed the ECOMOG, CDF, SSD and SLA checkpoints and entered Fadugu carrying sophisticated weapons like RPG, AK47, AK58, G3 and AA guns. In Fadugu, the RUF forces burnt 80 houses, took all the property they could find, abducted some girls and boys to use them as forced labour and killed some people.

On 17 September 1999 in Diang chiefdom there were several attacks by RUF/AFRC forces, based in Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom). The RUF forces attacked Kombonkalia and Nyawuljenja (both in

⁴⁶³ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶⁴ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶⁵ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶⁶ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶⁷ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.



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Diang Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC forces were resisted by an organised group of youth⁴⁶⁸ in Nyawulenai (Diang chiefdom), therefore the town was totally burnt down while Kombonkalia (Diang Chiefdom) was spared because did not put up any resistance. The same day the CDF, based in Faraya, attacked RUF/AFRC positions in Dondonya (Diang Chiefdom).

In October 1999, CDF-Kamajors coming from Kono district attacked Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom), an important RUF/AFRC base. The CDF took property and burnt down the town, but the RUF commander was not captured. Consequently, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the nearby town of Henekuma (Diang Chiefdom), where 27 civilians were killed, property was taken and the town was described as being completely destroyed.

On 16 and 19 October 1999, RUF/AFRC forces planned an attack on Kabala. They entered Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom) and looted all the surrounding villages in Mambolo chiefdom. Following this, they moved on to Kabala, but failed to occupy the town. The group was reorganized in Fadugu and moved towards Freetown. In the following days many locations in the chiefdom were looted by RUF/AFRC forces.⁴⁶⁹

In November 1999, in Bafodia (Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces engaged SLA forces. The RUF/AFRC forces were driven from the town and SLA forces subsequently left for Kabala. On 3 November 1999, one senior AFRC commander, coming through Folosaba Dembeia Chiefdom via Musaiia compound, attacked Kamasigie and then continued towards Kamakwie. In Neini chiefdom people were abducted and taken to mines in the Kono district.⁴⁷⁰

In December 1999 news arrived that an important RUF commander had been captured in Koidu town, Kono district. On 22 December, Kenyans troops from UNAMSIL (KENBATT) in transit from Makeni to Kabala were attacked by RUF forces in Fadugu, but nevertheless managed to reach Kabala.

i) Events in 2000⁴⁷¹

During 2000, the RUF/AFRC forces attempted to take control Kabala many times, but SLA and ECOMOG forces stationed in the town managed to hold it under their control. At the beginning of 2000, the SLA forces were also based in Makakura (Mambolo Chiefdom).

Deportation of civilians by RUF forces to the mining areas continued. For example, in January, RUF forces gathered the citizens of Kurubonla and Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom) to find people to be taken to work in Kono mines. Following this, they sent some civilians they had located to Kono district.

In February the UNAMSIL KENBATT coming from Makeni to Kabala were attacked by RUF/AFRC in Fadugu. The Kenyan troops were again able to reach Kabala.

⁴⁶⁸ More information is required from the records on this group, including who they were organised by and how old they were.

⁴⁶⁹ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁷⁰ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁷¹ In general, more detail is required from the records on events that occurred in 2000.



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On 16 February 2000, the RUF forces withdrew from Alikalia moving around the northern circuit road, avoiding Kabala, to Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) and then Senkunia (Mongo Chiefdom). In Falaba and Senkunia, RUF forces conducted food-finding missions, during which property was taken and civilians were abducted. In Firawa (Diang Chiefdom) RUF forces gathered 400 civilians to carrying items the RUF forces had stolen to Kono district.

On 10 March 2000, knowing that RUF/AFRC forces would be holding a meeting in Kurubonla (Neya Chiefdom), a Guinean helicopter gunship attacked the town. On 24 March, medical personnel from an unknown organisation visited Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) to carry out a program of immunisation but the RUF/AFRC Commander refused them entry and seized their vaccination kits. In April 2000, RUF forces moved to Ganya and Sinkunia (Mongo) from Alikalia, the headquarter town of RUF/AFRC.

In May 2000, RUF forces were redeployed throughout Mongo chiefdom. They passed through Gbenikoro (Diang Chiefdom), Korifaia (Neini Chiefdom) and Morofindu before establishing bases in Gbenikoro, Gberefeh (Senebeh or Mongo Chiefdom) and Serekoro (Mongo Chiefdom). In Yalunka, there was an engagement between RUF and CDF forces. Also in Feraya (Neini Chiefdom) RUF forces gathered civilians together for a meeting, following which many people fled to Serekolia (Mongo Chiefdom).

In June 2000, CDF attacked Kanikoro (Diang Chiefdom), where they took civilian property.

Also in June 2000, RUF forces attacked several towns in Neya chiefdom, including Porpon, where they killed 25 people and burnt down 70 houses, taking property such as rice, corn, groundnut, guns, which were later transported to Yiraia. The RUF forces then attacked Tenkeya, killing four people, burning 15 houses and taking property. This unit also attacked Maraliya, killing two people, burning down 12 houses and taking all the property in the town. They then attacked Yarandor, Kekowafeh, Bondofeh, Bunbania and Terero II, in all of which houses were burnt down and all the property was taken away. Many villages in Sandoh chiefdom were burnt down like Farandala, Dunamaro, Waldu, Kayima and Teleya.⁴⁷²

In July CDF-Kamajors attacked the RIUF/AFRC base at Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom) and Sumbaraya. The RUF commander managed to escape capture, but the Kamajors killed his mother, sister and nephew. The body of the RUF commander's mother was left hung on a stick above the road entering in the town. The town was completely burnt down, all fruit-trees were cut down and also the old zinc from the houses were punctured with nails to prevent their use as roofing. All the stolen property gathered from other villages were taken away by the Kamajors.⁴⁷³

⁴⁷² It is possible that these events took place in 1998. Further clarification is required from the records on when these events took place.

⁴⁷³ Clarification is required from the records on who took the property initially, the RUF or the CDF, and what happened to it after the CDF took it away.



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In Firawa (Nieni Chiefdom) RUF/AFRC forces captured about 400 young civilian men to be taken to Kono district for mining.

In August 2000, RUF/AFRC forces left Alikalia to surrender either to UNAMSIL or to ECOMOG troops in Kabala.⁴⁷⁴ On 14 August a group of RUF/AFRC forces from Kono and Kailahum district passed through Alikalia on their way to attack Kabala. The town of Kabala was attacked on 17 August 2000, where they fought a battle against the SLA and CDF based in the town.

During this month, RUF forces regularly tried to attack Kabala, but were repelled by SLA forces. After the attack on Kabala, at the end of the month, RUF forces stormed Wara Wara Bafodia chiefdom attacking towns and villages such as Kapongo, Kassaye and Gbentu.

On 26 September 2000 Sinkunia (Dembelia Sinkuria Chiefdom) and Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) were attacked by CDF, who beat people and took most of people's belongings.⁴⁷⁵ In retaliation for these attacks, on 3 October 2000, RUF forces mobilized their troops and launched an attack on Falaba and Sinkunia and took over the towns and burnt them down and left, abducting 50 civilians including women and children.

In October 2000, RUF/AFRC forces entered Fadugu town (Mambolo Chiefdom), where a fight without casualties took place. Two days later, another group reached them.

On 12 October, an unknown group of civilians with guns entered Musaia, (Follosaba Dembelia). They held a meeting with villagers who appreciated their intention to fight against government soldiers. At night, they started to fight and a battle took place. One house was burnt, people abducted and torture, and women and children were raped and property was taken.⁴⁷⁶

In November 2000, the RUF/AFRC forces were based in Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom). They launched several attacks on towns such as Kalkoia, Koinodug, Dankwalie and Falaba. In the same month, RUF forces moved from Badala and Alikalia to Falaba and Firawa. During December 2000, there was a fight among some of the AFRC and RUF forces. The group of RUF forces moved from Alikalia (Diang) to Yiffin, (Neini). In December in Firawa, operations geared for the ceasefire commenced.

j) Events in 2001⁴⁷⁷

During 2001, military activities started to decrease. Probably without a specific plan to seize power, the RUF forces tried to hold a fairly strong grip on the provinces to achieve a good bargaining power in eventual peace negotiations. The RUF groups went around in the district looting livestock

⁴⁷⁴ More information is required from the records about the surrender, including how it came about and to whom they surrendered.
⁴⁷⁵ It is not clear from the records whether the people being beaten were RUF or civilians. Clarification is required from the records on this.
⁴⁷⁶ More detail is required from the records on this incident, in particular on who the "civilians with guns" were (or were likely to be) and who did the raping, beating and burning.
⁴⁷⁷ In general, more detail is required from the records on events that occurred in 2001.



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and foodstuffs. In 2001, the disarmament process commenced under the supervision of UNAMSIL forces and despite a few sporadic incidents of fighting, mostly between the CDF and the RUF, fighting ceased.

Early in January 2001, RUF forces retreated from Alikalia moved to Kono district. However, they returned on 10 January 2001 from Kono to Firawa (Nieni Chiefdom) via Falaba (Serulia Chiefdom) and Gbindi. On their way they engaged in a battle against CDF. On 14 January, UNAMSIL troops visited the town of Alikalia and gathered the RUF leaders, taking them to Kabala for disarmament. On 26 March 2001, CDF-Kamajors arrived in Alikalia. On 4 July 2001 a group arrived in Alikalia, declared themselves RUF fighters and requested food from the civilians. The next morning they left to Gberefeh (Senebeh, or Mongo Chiefdom). This group, together with another based in Gberefeh attacked CDF positions in Sereya (Mongo Chiefdom). In Sereya they found a list of people registered with the Kamajors and they killed, wounded or amputated them all. Then they moved back to Gberefeh, where a MP loyal to Foday Sankoh ordered them to disarm. Guns were packed and taken to Alikalia. There, the RUF forces faced a serious attack from the Kamajors and were defeated, all properties taken away from them. They, then, left and went to Kabala where they pleaded to be reintegrated into civil society. On 16 August 2001 UNAMSIL troops arrived in Alikalia to overview the disarmament.

In February 2001, the RUF/AFRC forces based in Gberefeh (Senebeh or Mongo Chiefdom) organized a farewell party, packed all the property they had taken throughout the conflict and left to Alikalia to be finally demobilized and reintegrated into society. The trip took five days and when they arrived in Alikalia, CDF-Kamajors and UN troops entered the town forcing the RUF forces to disarm. This episode caused them to flee the town leaving behind all that they had looted from civilians since the beginning of the war in 1991.

In March 2001, RUF/AFRC forces came from Kono district to Nieni chiefdom in search of food and they looted every house, then the RUF forces conveyed the looted properties to Kayima (Kono District). A similar incident took place in May 2001 in Firawa (Neni Chiefdom), with RUF forces coming from Sinkunia (Dembelia Sinkuria Chiefdom).

RUF/AFRC forces returned to Sinkunia on 15 June 2001, while another group, on the same day, went to Alikalia and held a meeting with G5 and the village chiefs announcing the end of the war and the beginning of disarmament and asking for people's political support to the RUF, soon to be transformed into a political party.

On 24 August 2001 RUF/AFRC went from Falaba, Sulima chiefdom to Kabala to submit to disarmament. This was the last group of RUF/AFRC forces to disarm in the District.

In November, CDF from the whole district went to Alikalia for disarmament. In December 2001, Kamajors led by Mohamed Mansaray fought a battle against RUF forces, shortly after UNAMSIL troops arrived, prompting disarmament.

This was the final episode of the decade long war in Koinadugu District.



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3. Conclusion

[to be drafted pending incorporation of comments from resource persons]

d. Port Loko District

1. Introduction

Port Loko District is located in the north-west of Sierra Leone. It is bordered by the Western Area, Moyamba District and Tonkolili District to the south, Bombali District to the east and Kambia District to the north. To the west lies the Atlantic Ocean.

There are 11 chiefdoms in Port Loko District:

Chiefdom	Headquarter Town
Bureh Kasseh Makonte (BKM)	Mange
Buya Romende	Foredugu
Dibia	Gbinti
Loko Massama	Petifu
Kaffu Bullom	Mahera
Koya	Songo
Maforiki	Port Loko
Marampa	Lunsar
Masimera	Masimera
Sanda Magbolontor	Sendugu
Tinkatupa Makama Safroko (TMS)	Malekuray

A high quality, asphalted highway runs from the Western Area to Songo and Mile 38, passing through the densely forested Okra Hills area to Masiaka (all Koya Chiefdom). At Masiaka, the highway splits into two and the quality of the road declines sharply into intermittent stretches of soil track, unsealed road and broken asphalt. Seen from another perspective, all main routes from inland Sierra Leone converge on Masiaka, making it difficult to overstate the town's strategic significance. The road continuing east from Masiaka leads through Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) to Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and on to both Kabala and Kono Districts. The major routes to the Eastern and Southern Provinces converge on the Masiaka–Mile 91 length of road. The northern fork runs across the Rokel Creek to Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforiki Chiefdom), from where both the District headquarter town of Port Loko (Maforiki Chiefdom) and Lunsar Town (Marampa Chiefdom) can be reached.

The Masiaka–Ro-Gberray–Port Loko axis continues north through BKM Chiefdom across the long road bridge over the Little Scaries River at Mange, continuing into Kambia District and the Republic of Guinea. This is the only major road crossing over the Little Scaries River and handles the majority of road traffic between Conakry and Freetown, making it a considerable strategic and economic asset to whoever controls it. Moving west from Port Loko Town, the highway continues directly to Lungi, the coastal location of Freetown International Airport. Although there is an airstrip at

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Hastings (Waterloo RD, Western Area), Freetown International Airport is the principal airport in Sierra Leone. From Freetown to Lungi is approximately four hours by road; across the Freetown Estuary, the helicopter ride is less than 10 minutes. The Masiaka–Ro-Gberray–Lunsar axis continues through Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) towards Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District), the political and administrative centre of the Northern Province.

A secondary road network connects the chiefdom headquarter towns of Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom), Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom) and Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom). It is joined in Dibia and Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdoms by roads leading into Sanda Tendaren and Libeisaygahun Chiefdoms (both Bombali District), which bypass Makeni and re-join the arterial route to Kabala (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District).

Port Loko District was not affected directly by the conflict before 1995. In January 1995, RUF activity was focused in the four eastern chiefdoms of Port Loko District, bordering Bombali and Tonkolili Districts. RUF activity in early January concentrated on pressuring the two towns of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom), both on the arterial route between Freetown and Makeni. SLA forces were driven from Foredugu and Lunsar was under pressure for the whole of 1995. RUF activity in these areas followed from the extension of RUF forces into the western chiefdoms of Tonkolili District in late 1994. This was marked by a large attack on Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) in late December 1994 and RUF dominance of Malal Mara Chiefdom (Tonkolili District), in which the RUF established a brigade headquarters in the Kaitkant Hills. From here, RUF forces staged attacks on towns in both the north, moving into Kambia District, and the south of Port Loko District, facilitating their movement into the Western Area by May 1995. In June, RUF forces staged a large-scale assault on the District headquarter of Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). RUF forces also attacked Mile 38 and Masiaka (both Koya Chiefdom) in June, in addition to staging ambushes on the main roads. The triangle formed by Lunsar, Port Loko and Masiaka has been the crucible of the conflict in Port Loko District.

Following this, RUF activity in the District diminished significantly, with only a few ambushes and small attacks reported from July through to the end of the year. RUF attacks routinely included killings, torture and the abduction of large numbers of civilians to use as forced labour. Additionally, RUF forces routinely stole civilian property and burned civilian residences to the ground. In 1996, RUF forces continued to attack Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and staged ambushes on the highway north of the town. Generally, however, 1996 was a quiet year in Port Loko District. Elections were held in February, marking the end of four years of military rule and a peace agreement was struck between the elected government and the RUF in Abidjan in November 1996. At least until May 1997, the ceasefire provided for in the Abidjan Peace Accord appears to have been generally observed in Port Loko District. In May 1997, the AFRC – who were soon joined by the RUF – overthrew the elected government and found itself in a tense standoff with Nigerian forces stationed in country. Following armed confrontations with the AFRC that resulted in large numbers of civilian deaths, Nigerian forces took over the international airport at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom), occupying Lungi and surrounding villages. Combined RUF/AFRC forces launched an operation to steal large amounts of civilian property in Masimera Chiefdom, calling it “From your hand to my hand; from your pocket to my pocket.” RUF forces also attacked CDF positions at Mange and



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Barmoi Junction (BKM Chiefdom) and established a camp at Bainkoro, near the Little Scaries River between Sanda Magbolontor and Dibia Chiefdoms. The Little Scaries River, bisecting Sanda Magbolontor and BKM Chiefdoms, took on increasing significance at this time; running inland, it passes through the north of Bombali District.

ECOMOG was formally deployed in Sierra Leone in August 1997 and began training civil militia groups in Port Loko District in cooperation with traditional authorities. ECOMOG deployed in Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) and assisted the CDF in securing BKM Chiefdom. CDF forces deployed along the northern route to Mange and the route from Port Loko, through Kagbantama, to Barmoi Junction. The CDF also deployed along the south bank of the Little Scaries River in BKM Chiefdom, creating a defensive arc around the north of Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom).

In February 1998, ECOMOG intervened militarily against the RUF/AFRC, driving them out of Freetown. As a result, RUF/AFRC forces commenced "Operation Pay Yourself" in Port Loko District, stealing extensively from civilian settlements along their line of retreat through Mile 38, Masiaka (both Koya Chiefdom) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) towards Makeni. RUF/AFRC forces also attacked towns in the northern chiefdoms of Port Loko District. In March 1998, ECOMOG commenced provincial operations, moving from Port Loko Town, taking control of Masiaka and forcing the RUF/AFRC out of Lunsar, where they had killed civilians and destroyed much of the infrastructure. RUF/AFRC forces scattered throughout the eastern chiefdoms of Port Loko District, raiding villages for food. In April, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masimera Chiefdom and commenced the amputation of limbs from civilians amid attacks of astounding ferocity. In September, the RUF/AFRC again began surrounding Port Loko Town, staging attacks in BKM, TMS and Maforki Chiefdoms. Assisted by the CDF, ECOMOG held onto the stretch of road between Port Loko and Mange (BKM Chiefdom).

In December 1998, RUF/AFRC intensified attacks on ECOMOG and pushed south into Koya Chiefdom, again attacking Masiaka and Songo. A large RUF/AFRC force attacked Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) between 28 December 1998 and 3 January 1999. By the time Port Loko was attacked, the RUF/AFRC had broken out of Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) and Kailahun Districts and had taken every major town from ECOMOG en route to Freetown along the northern axis roads. The RUF/AFRC push towards the Western Area was along the main highway through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), Masiaka and Songo to Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). For the first three months of 1999, the Masiaka area was occupied by RUF/AFRC forces and was under constant attack from the CDF. In March, Gbethis hunted down suspected "collaborators", torturing and summarily executing significant numbers of the people they caught. Those villages that did not actively support the Gbethis were targeted and looted, their inhabitants subjected to torture or simply killed. Lunsar remained under the control of the RUF/AFRC.

Peace negotiations between the RUF and the elected government resulted in the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. Subsequently, there were tensions between the RUF and the AFRC, resulting in clashes between the two, but not a complete severing of their alliance.



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In early January 2000, UNAMSIL moved into positions throughout Port Loko District. A single Nigerian battalion was based at Freetown International Airport at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) and a second covered Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom), Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), securing both the towns and the main highways. RUF/AFRC forces attacked many villages throughout the eastern and northern chiefdoms of Port Loko District, stealing food and property. In May 2000, the RUF/AFRC provoked a crisis by holding hostage over 200 UNAMSIL personnel at Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom). They also provoked the UK to send paratroops to Freetown and commence training the SLA. The SLA secured Masiaka in April 2000, but the RUF repeatedly attacked Port Loko Town from many different approaches. The RUF/AFRC also remained in control of Lunsar, despite SLA attempts to recover the town in June 2000. Attacks on civilian settlements across Port Loko District continued, although UNAMSIL maintained a "horseshoe" of security between Songo, Masiaka, Ro-Gberray (Maforki Chiefdom) and Port Loko Town.

An RUF/AFRC splinter group formed in October 1998 in the Okra Hills, an area spanning the lower part of Maforki Chiefdom, crossing southwards over the Rokel Creek into Koya Chiefdom towards the township of Magbeni and onto the stretch of highway between Mile 38 and Masiaka (all Koya Chiefdom). The West Side Boys, as they later became known, were formed primarily of ex-SLA forces that had aligned with the AFRC coup. They conducted an intense series of "hit and run" missions on settlements in this area, routinely killing and raping civilians and stealing civilian property and food. They abducted hundreds of civilians, inscribing "West Side Boys" on their bodies and executing them in retaliation for battlefield losses. On the highways within the Okra Hills area, they ambushed civilian and military traffic. At various points, the West Side Boys changed sides, allying with the RUF/AFRC during the 1999 Freetown invasion and then with the SLA in defending Masiaka from the RUF/AFRC in May 2000. The West Side Boys earned international notoriety for taking foreigners hostage, a tactic that resulted in their complete defeat by UK paratroops in September 2000.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1995

RUF activity in Port Loko District in 1995 began in early January in Buya Romende Chiefdom. Between 1 and 5 January 1995, RUF forces moved from their base in the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom, Tonkolili District on the boundary with Marampa Chiefdom to the south of Buya Romende Chiefdom) and attacked the villages of Mabettor and Royana, where they burnt down an unknown number of houses.

RUF forces numbering around 500 attacked the headquarter town of Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) early in the morning of 2 January 1995. Foredugu is located on the main highway leading east to Makeni and south-west to Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom). Residents fled into the nearby bush on hearing heavy machine gun fire. SLA forces stationed in Foredugu were unable to repel the RUF attack. The surrounding villages of Robis Junction, Romende, Makinkiba, Handalai, Paiteful Junction and Gbomru (all Buya Romende Chiefdom) were also attacked. During these attacks RUF forces burnt down eight houses in Mabettor, five in Royana and 42 in Foredugu. RUF forces also



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killed nine people, mostly with guns, amputated a man's hand with an axe and abducted an unknown number of people.

From then until 5 January 1995, RUF forces moved north from Foredugu and attacked Rogberen Gberen, a settlement in the far north of Buya Romende Chiefdom. Hundreds of civilians were killed during this attack. The RUF forces established a camp at Rogberen Gberen and used abducted civilians to dig trenches. From Rogberen Gberen, RUF forces staged an attack on Mabureh village (Buya Romende Chiefdom), where they decapitated the Section Chief and a prominent businessmen. Before returning to their camp, RUF forces burnt down at least 50 houses and stole a lot of civilian property.

On 15 January 1995, around 45 RUF members moved towards the headquarter town of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, in the north-west on the boundary with Masimera Chiefdom). They came from the south of the chiefdom through the villages of Rokatic and Robom Limba. Before reaching Lunsar, they were repelled by SLA forces stationed in the town.⁴⁷⁸ The RUF exerted continuous pressure on Lunsar, staging numerous attacks on unknown dates between January and July 1995. On 16 February, the NPRC announced that it had commenced heavy bombardment of a medium-sized "rebel base" in the Lunsar area.⁴⁷⁹

The RUF delivered a letter⁴⁸⁰ to the residents of Kantia (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) towards the end of January 1995, announcing their intention to use the road passing through Kantia as a route to attack Kambia, the District headquarter town of Kambia District. The people of the town resolved to attack the RUF forces if they pursued this course of action. Consequently, male members of the Gbangbani traditional society formed a local militia and established a checkpoint on the roads entering the village. A day after delivering the letter, RUF forces attacked Kantia. A local man confronted the RUF as they tried to pass the checkpoint; the RUF members tortured and killed him with his own cutlass. On entering the village, RUF forces sought out the Local Court Chairman at his home and beat him to death with pestles⁴⁸¹ and sticks. The RUF forces remained in Kantia for at least a day before moving south to Kanokie village (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom), arriving there in the late evening. At Kanokie, the RUF forces divided and entered the village in two groups, taking palm wine from civilians and shooting dead a 12-year-old boy who was carrying a cutlass. The RUF commanding officer issued an order to the villagers stressing that anyone caught fleeing the village would also be shot. The RUF forces stayed overnight in Kanokie, leaving for Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District) before dawn the following morning. RUF forces looped southwest from Kanokie arriving in Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom, Kambia District) on 23 January 1995, before moving north to attack Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District) on 25 January 1995.

⁴⁷⁸ This detail is reported by the key person as occurring on 1 January 1994, but cross-checking during analysis makes it clear that this refers to an RUF attack on Lunsar on or around 15 January 1995.

⁴⁷⁹ Xinhua, 16 February 1995.

⁴⁸⁰ There are many reports of the RUF leaving letters on the road for villagers to find.

⁴⁸¹ Club-shaped implements used for fine-pounding wheat and other granular foods in mortars.



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Around 21 January 1995, RUF forces coming from Bombali District passed through Dibia Chiefdom on the way to Safroko Section in the north of TMS Chiefdom. From Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom), RUF forces moved through Rogbakai* (six miles south-east of Maron), Rotombo, Maron and Roctolan along the road north towards the headquarter town of Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom). At this time, around 20 members of the SLA were stationed in Gbinti. In Gbinti, between 21 and 23 January 1995, RUF forces killed a number of people, burnt down at least 70 houses with petrol bombs, stole property and abducted civilians, including around 23 school children. After about four hours in Gbinti, during which there was fighting between the SLA and RUF forces, the RUF forces left with the people they had abducted and moved south to Roctolan (TMS Chiefdom).

RUF forces again attacked Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) between 3 and 5 March 1995, killing 12 SLA members in an ambush on the outskirts of the town.⁴⁸² In response to this attack, the Government of Sierra Leone closed sections of the Makeni–Freetown highway to traffic as SLA forces combed the bush for RUF forces.⁴⁸³

Through intense activity in Ribbi, Bumpe and Kaiyanga Chiefdoms (Moyamba District)⁴⁸⁴ immediately south of Port Loko District, the RUF were able to attack the town of Songo (Koya Chiefdom) by 7 April 1995. Songo is located on the boundary between Port Loko District and the Western Area, just south of the main asphalt highway leading to Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) and the ring road around the Freetown peninsular into Freetown itself.

In the morning of 7 April 1995, about 100 RUF members, some in full military fatigues and others in casual dress, launched an attack with artillery and heavy machine gun fire on Songo. The attack came from the west end of the town, near the Roman Catholic Primary School, and was met with no resistance from SLA forces. Despite a build-up of SLA troops in Songo (Koya Chiefdom) in early April, those SLA forces previously stationed in Songo had withdrawn to nearby Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom) before the RUF assault of 7 April.⁴⁸⁵ News that the SLA had captured RUF members in Mabang (Ribbi Chiefdom, Moyamba District) and Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom) had caused the majority of Songo's residents to flee the town, moving west into Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) and south into Ribbi Chiefdom (Moyamba District). Despite this, during their attack on Songo, RUF forces killed 20 people, including an unknown number of women and children. The Songo Police station was also looted and destroyed. On 8 April 1995, SLA forces counter-attacked, pushing RUF

⁴⁸² AP, 6 March 1995.

⁴⁸³ Xinhua, 7 March 1995.

⁴⁸⁴ On 15 March 1995, RUF forces attacked Bradford (Ribbi Chiefdom, Moyamba District). On 17 March, RUF forces took control of Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom, Moyamba District) and Moyamba (Kaiyamba Chiefdom, Moyamba District). On 18 March, RUF forces clashed with SLA forces for control of the strategic Mabang Bridge over the Ribbi River. On 20 March, SLA forces counter-attacked the RUF at Bradford, but this did not halt the RUF westward movement and their crossing the Ribbi River to access Songo (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District).

⁴⁸⁵ SLA forces had concentrated in Mile 38 following a successful ouster of the RUF from the town on 28 March 1995.



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forces out of Songo and retaking control of the town. While this RUF group was displaced from Songo, attacks in the agricultural area around Newton (Koya RD, Western Area) intensified.⁴⁸⁶

On 10 May 1995, the RUF forces again attacked Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom) from Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom. During this attack, the RUF forces burnt houses and killed civilians, in particular members of the youth movement, as a result of which the youth movement was destroyed. Between 14 and 18 May, RUF forces established a base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District), bordering Sanda Magbolontor and Dibia Chiefdoms in Port Loko District.

From the beginning of June 1995, there were rumours of an imminent attack on Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). Consequently, many inhabitants left the town, moving to nearby villages and to Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom), the coastal location of Sierra Leone's international airport. On 7 June 1995, some RUF forces crossed the Lunsar-Makeni highway towards Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom), which is approximately 15 km from Port Loko. In Port Loko Town, members of the Civic Development Unit, an organisation primarily formed to clean roads and collect rubbish, started working with the SLA to increase security in the town. An SLA commanding officer responsible for Port Loko called a town meeting in the Court Barrie, where he reassured the population that the town was well protected.

Nevertheless, in the evening of 8 June 1995, the RUF attacked the Port Loko along two lines of advance. The first RUF group arrived from the north-east, moving through Burreh Section (BKM Chiefdom), attacking Port Loko Town in the early evening. The second group, numbering 150, arrived some hours later from the east having travelled the Malekuray road through TMS Chiefdom. Their advance along this route, which begins at Kamasundu Junction, makes it likely that this RUF group had a camp at Rogberen-Gberen or Kamasundu (both Buya Romende Chiefdom), from where attacks on the areas on the North-South axis between Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom) and Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) had been commonplace since January 1995.

The RUF group moving through TMS Chiefdom attacked a number of villages. In Robenkia (TMS Chiefdom), RUF forces shot dead a young civilian man wearing combat fatigue-style trousers and poured acid on another young man who was caught trying to escape. On 8 June, 30 SLA members in two 4x4 vehicles arrived in Malekuray village (TMS Chiefdom). The SLA commanding officer met with community leaders, requesting that they provide him with early warning when the RUF arrived in the town. During the meeting, residents overheard information passed to the SLA commanding officer by radio informing him that the RUF had already bypassed the town and had arrived in Robat (TMS Chiefdom), to the west of Malekuray. The SLA moved from Malekuray and engaged the RUF near Robat, as a result of which three SLA members were killed and the remaining group were forced to retreat into the bush. The RUF forces then moved west from Robat over the road bridge to Romaka, through the villages of Ropolon, Rotombo, Tawa, Rolal I and II and then into Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) by the late evening.

⁴⁸⁶ See Western Area analysis for 1995.

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During their attack on Port Loko Town, RUF forces killed an unknown number of people, burnt down around 30 houses and abducted up to 200 people, predominantly children. RUF forces ceased their attack in the early hours of 9 May, retreating in two directions when the SLA was reinforced.

One group of RUF retreated to Kamalo (BKM Chiefdom), on the boundary with Maforki Chiefdom, where they established a temporary base, killing a number of people and burning down some houses. Two days later, on 11 June 1995, SLA forces held a meeting in Port Loko with the Town Chief and some senior military officers who had come from Freetown. On 14 June 1995, Guinean forces deployed under the Mano River Union arrived in Port Loko Town. Using heavy artillery, they shelled the RUF base at Kamalo, forcing their withdrawal north towards Romeni (BKM Chiefdom), where the RUF forces put around 16 people abducted in Port Loko Town into a house and set fire to it. The following day, they made a ritual sacrifice and left Romeni northward along the main road. Three days later, on 18 June 1995, the RUF forces attacked Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom). After burning houses and stealing property in Gbinti, RUF forces moved to their base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District).

Another group of RUF forces retreated from Port Loko Town towards Rokatimpi (TMS Chiefdom) on 9 June, avoiding the main highways as they moved south towards Moyamba District. On 10 June, they went to Rosent (TMS Chiefdom), close to the boundary with Maforki Chiefdom. They stayed in Rosent for around 12 days, raiding the surrounding villages. From 16 to 20 June, Guinean forces based in Port Loko Town also fired long-range weapons towards Rosent. At the end of this period of heavy bombing, RUF forces moved in two groups from Rosent, dispersing throughout Tinkatupu Section (TMS Chiefdom) to avoid artillery barrages. One group fanned out through Romaka and the other group fanned out around Masangan and Worreh (all TMS Chiefdom). The two groups rejoined in Robat, near Rosent (but closer to the boundary with Maforki Chiefdom), where they abducted an unknown number of men and women. They then moved to Maranka, where they abducted more people before moving to Malekuray by 20 June. Here, RUF forces carried out a house-to-house search, destroying what private property they could find, defecating in houses and ruining food items like rice and palm oil. On the night of 20 June, RUF forces danced and fired into the air before leaving on 21 June, abducting at least six people. They moved south through Marforay and Mafira, resting close to Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) before attacking and driving the SLA forces out of the town. On the same day, RUF forces crossed the Rokel River south of Lunsar and continued to Masimera (Marampa Chiefdom). The RUF continued south into Yoni Chiefdom (Tonkolili District), before moving to Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom, Moyamba District) by 23 June.

RUF activity near the junction town of Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) continued as their forces retreated from Port Loko. On 16 June 1995, the RUF forces again attacked Masiaka and were repelled by the SLA forces stationed there. This pattern was repeated on 18 June 1995 and again at other times during 1995.

Between 10 and 16 June 1995, RUF forces coming from the north-eastern part of Masiaka went to Mansumana, where they attacked the town and surrounding villages, including Masherry-Potho, which is nine miles from Mile 38 (all Koya Chiefdom). At this time, the RUF forces were searching

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for food. In the following days, there were more RUF attacks on Mile 38, after which they were driven out of the area by SLA forces coming from the western part of Mile 38 along the Freetown Highway.

RUF forces attacked both Masiaka and Mile 38 (both Koya Chiefdom) on 18 June, but were repelled by SLA forces. Fifteen civilians were killed in Mile 38. On 20 June, RUF forces ambushed SLA forces near Mile 38. On 22 June, RUF forces cut off the main highway near Mile 38 at two points by setting fire to large trailers and setting up a defensive position around their skeletons. On or around 28 June 1995, SLA forces again attacked Mile 38 with support from a Sierra Leone Armed Forces Alpha Jet, which bombarded the town. During this attack, a large number of civilians and members of the SLA were killed, houses burnt down and vehicles destroyed.

At this time, ambushes and fighting along this road were common, as a result of which the SLA forces mounted checkpoints along the road. In July 1995, the SLA set up a checkpoint at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), controlling traffic moving north along the arterial road from Masiaka and Mile 38 towards Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and other inland northern towns such as Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Kabala (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). Harassment of civilians by SLA and other government security personnel intensified at this checkpoint following the RUF assault on Port Loko Town. On 9 September 1995, RUF forces ambushed SLA forces on the highway at Karrfay (Buya Romende Chiefdom) killing two; one of whom was buried in Foredugu and the other was left on the highway. RUF forces took the property that was in the SLA truck and forced civilians to carry it for them. On 11 September 1995, seven Guinean soldiers travelling to Makeni in a military vehicle were killed in an RUF ambush on the east-west road between Foredugu and Madina (Buya Romende Chiefdom).⁴⁸⁷ RUF forces took the weapons and ammunition from the military vehicle before setting fire to it.⁴⁸⁸

Towards the end of 1995, the RUF launched numerous attacks on Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), but were again repelled by the SLA forces based there. At this time, there were no fatalities in Lunsar, but RUF forces killed people in surrounding villages in Marampa and Buya Romende Chiefdoms, including Pan House, Marampa, Rogbele and Foredugu. In December 1995, the RUF forces were successful in dislodging the SLA forces. The RUF forces entered Lunsar and killed four people, raped an unknown number of women, abducted 10 people and burnt down 55 houses, although they did not occupy Lunsar at this time and left soon afterwards.

b) Events in 1996

During 1996, Sanda Magbolontor and Dibia Chiefdoms were free from RUF activity. Although the RUF maintained a base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District), bordering both chiefdoms, from there they concentrated on attacking towns in Bombali District;⁴⁸⁹ the RUF forces were also focusing on attacking towns in Kambia District in the run up to the 26 February elections. Koya Chiefdom, bordering the Western Area, was also free from RUF activity. Throughout the

⁴⁸⁷ AP, 15 September 1995.

⁴⁸⁸ Xinhua 15 September 1995.

⁴⁸⁹ See the analysis for Bombali District, 1996.



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year, unspecified civil militia were deployed in Kasseh Section (BKM Chiefdom), which to a large extent prevented RUF infiltration throughout BKM Chiefdom.

In January 1996, an RUF force entered the north of TMS Chiefdom from Libeisyagahun Chiefdom (Bombali District). These forces passed through a number of towns, where they captured up to 300 civilians, in particular from Futa and Madina in the centre of the chiefdom. The RUF forces then moved to a hill called Fantima Hill, on the boundary with Buya Romende Chiefdom close to Makola Valley, in a forest called Kagberen-Gberem. TMS Chiefdom would remain mostly quiet from then until February 1998.

On 5 February 1996, RUF forces stole and destroyed two vehicles near Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom). They moved east from the direction of Robis (Buya Romende Chiefdom) along the Makeni Highway. Consequently, civilians mobilised themselves into a civil militia armed with cutlasses and launched an attack on the RUF forces but were repelled when the RUF forces open fire with machine guns. In March 1996, Guinean or Nigerian forces stationed in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) arrived in Foredugu, where civil militia joined them. It should be noted that throughout the year, the RUF forces continued to launch attacks on Lunsar.

On 26 February 1996, Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held in Sierra Leone. There are no reports of harassment of civilians prior to the election in Port Loko District. During March and April, RUF forces based in Masimera (Marampa Chiefdom) went south to Rokatic, where they took property and abducted some people; this would continue intermittently until the end of 1997.

NPRC-initiated peace talks commenced with the RUF in February, resulting in a ceasefire in May 1996. On 30 November 1996, the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed between the leadership of the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone, providing for the immediate and total cessation of hostilities. In November and December 1996, the Nigerian forces were deployed in Port Loko Town.

c) Events in 1997

During 1997, RUF/AFRC attacks appear to have taken place mainly on ECOMOG and Government positions, although very few incidents are reported. It is likely that RUF/AFRC forces were scattered all over the eastern chiefdoms of Port Loko District and were engaged solely in food-finding missions. At least until May 1997, the ceasefire provided for in the Abidjan Peace Accord appears to have been generally observed in Port Loko District.

However, there were exceptions. In April 1997, Kanokie (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) was raided by RUF forces, who spent a few hours in the town and stole various food items and livestock. Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom) was attacked on 20 May 1997 and 22 RUF members were seized by the SLA.⁴⁹⁰ Residents of Gbinti began to participate more actively in civil defence initiatives as a result of this attack. In May 1997, prior to the coup, RUF forces attacked Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) from the Kantia-Sendugu road. In Sendugu, the RUF forces initiated a house-to-house

⁴⁹⁰ AFP, 20 May 1997.

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search. At this time, at least one person was killed and several people were abducted, including the Chief Imam and a well-known teacher.

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a coup d'etat and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC released an SLA officer from Pademba Road Prison, installing him as their leader and as Head of State in June. This prompted an intense standoff between the Nigerian forces stationed in Sierra Leone and the AFRC, which requested the RUF to join with it.

In the evening of 26 May, a large number of jubilant RUF forces entered Mile 38 and the nearby villages of Massherri-Potho and Masankara (all Koya Chiefdom), on the main highway towards the Western Area. They surrounded the village at the main junction and forced all the residents onto the streets to sing songs. This lasted throughout the night. In Rosint Buya (Buya Romende Chiefdom), after the coup of 25 May, RUF/AFRC forces lived alongside civilians. They stole property and forced civilians to carry their property and carry out domestic work like fetching water and pounding rice. People refusing to carry their load were beaten and one man from Rosint Buya was shot dead. It is also reported in general terms that children were conscripted into the ranks of the RUF/AFRC and girls were used for sexual purposes.

Freetown's position as a key logistic point for ECOMOG in Liberia meant that Nigerian forces had maintained a near continuous presence at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) since 1990. In the days following the coup, Nigerian forces concentrated in the Western Area as their main base at Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD, Western Area) was reinforced. On 3 June, RUF/AFRC forces captured a number of Nigerian forces at Lungi after their abortive attempt to take full control of Freetown International Airport. Between 5 and 9 June, Nigerian forces regained full control of Freetown International Airport during an operation supported by heavy artillery from the Nigerian 231st Field Artillery Regiment. Nigerian and RUF/AFRC forces intermittently traded machine gun and mortar fire across 10 and 11 June,⁴⁹¹ which left at least 5 people dead.

The standoff continued throughout 1997. On 9 July, there was a resurgence of heavy mortar fire between Nigerian and RUF/AFRC forces.⁴⁹² The Nigerians sought to push RUF/AFRC forces back from the Lungi area and RUF/AFRC forces sought to prevent the pro-government FM 98.1 Radio Democracy broadcasting from inside the Nigerian perimeter. News reports show that 10 members of the Nigerian forces and 60 civilians were killed during this action.⁴⁹³ RUF/AFRC forces substantially looted villages around the International Airport during their assault on Nigerian positions in the airport. Significant exchanges of fire in the airport area occurred on 29 July; 10, 13, 14 and 23 August; 22 September; and 9 October. On or around 4 September, around 11 members of the Nigerian forces were killed when their vehicle ran over a landmine on the road near between Lungi and Port Loko Town. On 22 November at Tagrin (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom), Nigerian forces released 28 RUF/AFRC prisoners of war captured at various points since 2 June.

⁴⁹¹ Xinhua, 11 June 1997.

⁴⁹² AFP, 9 July 1997.

⁴⁹³ AFP, 13 July 1997.



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After the coup, RUF/AFRC forces scattered throughout Masimera Chiefdom introduced a system of theft they called, "From your hand to my hand; from your pocket to my pocket", which encouraged the recruitment of more civilians into the CDF. Following this, CDF and ECOMOG were deployed together in Mange (BKM Chiefdom) and ECOMOG forces were also deployed near Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), from where roads lead to Koya and Masimera Chiefdoms. However, "loyal SLA soldiers"⁴⁹⁴ fighting alongside ECOMOG were not trusted and, accordingly, were given only light weapons. During this period, RUF/AFRC forces were engaged mainly in food-finding missions, during which villages were looted.

RUF/AFRC forces coming from Kambia District attacked Barmoi Junction and Mange (BKM Chiefdom) after September 1997. Little resistance was offered by the Gbethis deployed at Mange, where RUF/AFRC forces burnt down 18 houses and stole property.

At the same time, Guinean troops deployed at the crossing-point over the Little Scaries River at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District) put severe pressure on the RUF/AFRC forces based in Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District). After July 1997, RUF/AFRC forces moved from Ro-Source to a new base in Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom), on the Mabile River between the chiefdoms of Sanda Magbolontor and Dibia (Port Loko District), just north of Gbinti. RUF/AFRC forces used canoes to cross the river and stage food-finding raids on nearby villages. Pressure was mounted on the RUF/AFRC base at Bainkoro by both ECOMOG and CDF; deployed over the river from Bainkoro, these forces were able to use artillery on the RUF/AFRC base. The RUF/AFRC retreated from Bainkoro in September 1997, reportedly moving north towards Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom, Kambia District).

From 27 August, Nigerian forces stationed in Sierra Leone were formally deployed as ECOMOG under the authority of ECOWAS. In August, ECOMOG forces were deployed in Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) and began encouraging the enlisting of youths into the CDF from that time. Chiefdom authorities were requested to send men to Port Loko Town for initiation. In BKM Chiefdom, for example, ECOMOG trained 250 men from Makonte Section, merging this force with other men trained in Bureh and Kasseh Sections. The CDF command in BKM Chiefdom was based in Mange.

d) Events in 1998

After the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown on 12 February 1998, the intensity of the war escalated in Port Loko District.⁴⁹⁵ Atrocities were committed throughout the District, especially during the first months of the year. Throughout 1998, RUF/AFRC forces deployed and took positions in all the chiefdoms and main towns of the District surrounding Maforki Chiefdom. Starting in September 1998, the movement of troops in BKM, TMS, Masimera and Marampa Chiefdoms and the abduction of many civilians for recruitment demonstrate that RUF/AFRC

⁴⁹⁴ Meaning SLA not affiliated with the RUF/AFRC.

⁴⁹⁵ This section and the following sections on 1999-2001 do not include any incidents involving the West Side Boys, which have been dealt with in a separate section at the end of this chapter. This has been done for reasons of clarity and simplicity, since the West Side Boys operated in a limited area according to a pattern that was clearly identifiable and repeated throughout 1998-2001.



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forces were preparing an attack on Port Loko Town and were also probably already en route to Freetown. The chain of events accelerated in September 1998 and at the end of the year, Port Loko Town fell to the persistent RUF/AFRC attacks.

After the coup and throughout 1997 and 1998, RUF/AFRC forces were present in Masimera and Marampa Chiefdoms; it is reported that none of the 373 villages of Masimera Chiefdom were left without those forces entering or attacking them during this period. When RUF/AFRC forces attacked or entered a town or village, they burnt, stole, raped, killed and captured a number of people, forcing some to carry their loads. After the merger of the RUF forces with the AFRC forces, important bases were operated in the south of Tonkolili District (Yoni, Malal Mara and Kholifa Mabang Chiefdoms), at the south-east boundary of Port Loko District.

After ECOMOG commenced operations to remove the RUF/AFRC from Freetown on 6 February 1998, many RUF/AFRC forces regrouped in Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom) at the border with Dibia and Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdoms. From there, some deployed through Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District). On 12 February 1998, an RUF/AFRC unit called Brigade Advance left Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom) for Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom, Kambia District), where they burnt down eight houses and abducted 50 civilians, who were forced to carry stolen property. On 14 February, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District), where they killed eight civilians, took property and burnt down an unknown number of houses. On 19 February, RUF/AFRC forces launched simultaneous attacks from Kambia Town on the towns of Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District) and Mange (BKM Chiefdom). CDF and ECOMOG forces based in Mange were overpowered by the RUF/AFRC forces and retreated to their headquarters in Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). Six people were killed, 62 houses were burnt down and an unspecified number of people were abducted by the RUF/AFRC during the attack on Mange (BKM Chiefdom). The same day, RUF/AFRC forces returned to their base at Bainkoro. A Guinean ECOMOG contingent equipped with armoured tanks and accompanied by members of the CDF left Port Loko Town and moved on Bainkoro, but was repelled by RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG established a temporary base in Kabatha (Maforki Chiefdom), a key junction approximately five miles from Port Loko Town.

On 21 February, RUF forces left Bainkoro for Kasseh Section (both BKM Chiefdom). They attacked the villages of Rokon and Robath Kantakathe, where they encountered resistance from the Gbethis. RUF/AFRC forces were driven from the town and pursued by the Gbethis from Kasseh Section (BKM) to a village called Magbankitha in Malekuray Section (TMS Chiefdom). The CDF Commander in Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) called for air support from Nigerian ECOMOG, who bombarded RUF/AFRC positions, forcing them to retreat to an unknown location.

During the same period, in early 1998, RUF/AFRC forces were retreating from Freetown along the Freetown–Masiaka Highway through Koya Chiefdom. The general retreat north moved towards Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District), where RUF/AFRC troops began arriving on or around 14 February. That day or the next, RUF/AFRC



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forces⁴⁹⁶ attacked Masherry-Potho and Mile 38 (both Koya Chiefdom). In both locations, RUF/AFRC forces conducted house-to-house searches, forcing civilians to carry the stolen property. They chased civilians into the bush, flogged those they caught and killed those who refused to give information about the location of their possessions. In Masherry-Potho, around 25 civilians were killed during the RUF/AFRC attack; at least three civilians were also mutilated. RUF/AFRC forces amputated the left hand of a man abducted from Masherry-Potho to carry stolen property when it became obvious he was unable to carry the load. RUF/AFRC forces dug deep trenches across the Freetown–Masiaka Highway, presumably to hold up ECOMOG movement out of the Western Area. Following this, they retreated north towards Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), burning all the houses along their route. Many civilians were abducted and forced to carry stolen property. A man from Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom) had both hands amputated by RUF/AFRC forces when he attempted to escape. He was left at the village of Ro-Lal (Koya Chiefdom) and instructed to inform President Kabbah that the RUF/AFRC would return to Freetown.

RUF/AFRC forces were seen in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and the surrounding villages between 14 February and 1 March 1998. ECOMOG military intelligence received reports that the RUF/AFRC were taking up strong defensive positions in Lunsar.⁴⁹⁷ During this time, RUF/AFRC forces launched “Operation Pay Yourself,” which in essence was a widespread looting spree. RUF/AFRC forces established checkpoints in the Delco Compound, Mabesseneh and Tainratha areas of Lunsar and stripped passers-by of all valuable and tradable items. On 15 February, RUF/AFRC forces kidnapped three missionaries and two foreign aid workers from the Mableseneh Hospital in Lunsar.⁴⁹⁸ They were taken to Camp Charlie, near Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), before being released in Masiaka on 27 February. RUF/AFRC forces stole civilian property, burned down many residences in Lunsar and killed and decapitated an unknown number of civilians, forcing other civilians to bury the corpses. The Catholic Mission, Murialdo Vocational Institute, the Sierra Leone Primary School, the Sierra Leone Muslim Brotherhood Primary School and other institutions in Lunsar were severely vandalised.

In the early evening of 1 March 1998, troops from the ECOMOG 24th Infantry Brigade entered Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) from Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). They engaged RUF/AFRC snipers en route at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom) and exchanged fire with RUF/AFRC forces for about an hour as they entered Lunsar. Apart from that, ECOMOG met no resistance from RUF/AFRC forces in Lunsar.⁴⁹⁹ From Lunsar, ECOMOG forces staged an attack on Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District), taking hold of the town on 3 March 1998. Two days earlier, on 1 March, around 400 RUF/AFRC members surrendered to Guinean ECOMOG at Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom).⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁶ Some of these forces were dressed in full combat fatigues, while others wore camouflage t-shirts with red handkerchiefs tied around their heads.
⁴⁹⁷ R.A. Adeshina, pp.36-8.
⁴⁹⁸ AFP, 15 February 1998.
⁴⁹⁹ R.A. Adeshina, pp.36-38.
⁵⁰⁰ AFP, 1 March 1998



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In March 1998, RUF/AFRC activities resumed in TMS Chiefdom, although the three sections were concerned at different times: Tinkatupa and Saproko Sections as early as April and May and Makama Section in December. Tinkatupa Section is sandwiched between Saproko Section to the north and Makama Section to the south. In early March, Gbethis (CDF) deployed at Masangban, Rogbanneh, Romamboi and Robaka, all in Tinkatupa Section. Shortly after their arrival, Gbethi members started harassing civilians for contributions of money and food. It is also reported in general terms that during this period, Gbethis raped women and flogged men.

After Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) had come under the control of ECOMOG from around 1 March, RUF/AFRC forces were dispersed throughout Buya Romende Chiefdom. They settled in numerous locations including Buya, Ro-Sint Buya, Foredugu, Gbonsama and Massenebe (all Buya Romende Chiefdom). At this time, RUF/AFRC activity in the chiefdom focussed on Jar-Jar operations, which involved the formation of squads dedicated to the widespread robbery of civilian property, both for subsistence and enrichment. Squads of around 150 RUF/AFRC members roved around villages in the chiefdom on a daily basis taking food and valuables, flogging people and forcing civilians to carry stolen property to RUF/AFRC camps.

Between 17 and 19 April, around 300 RUF/AFRC forces moved from a camp called "Kenema"⁵⁰¹ in Libeisayahun Chiefdom (Bombali District) to TMS Chiefdom. They established a base at Maboko in the Saproko Section (TMS Chiefdom), from where they raided surrounding villages between 19 April and 5 May. It is reported in general terms that during these raids, RUF/AFRC force regularly killed civilians and abducted others to carry stolen property. On 25 April, an ECOMOG platoon and an unknown number of Gbethis deployed from Lunsar to Sendugu (TMS Chiefdom), close to the RUF position at Maboko. An ECOMOG soldier on a motorbike driven by a civilian sped through Maboko and then called for air support. An ECOMOG jet bombed this location and another location in Maron (TMS Chiefdom); this second bombardment killed four civilians. Another civilian was killed during a subsequent ECOMOG air bombardment of a nearby village called Petifu. ECOMOG deployed to Maron and Sendugu but despite this, the RUF/AFRC continued to operate from Maboko.

On a Friday⁵⁰² in April 1998, a series of killings took place in the village of Rosint (Masimera Chiefdom). In the late afternoon, sporadic gunshots were heard all over the village. Three different groups of RUF/AFRC forces entered the village from different directions. The group from Masimera Town (Marampa Chiefdom) were a "Born Naked" unit, because they only wore underwear and sandals. The Mile 91 group – self-styled "Death Squad", commanded by a Liberian – were dressed in mixed civilian-military attire. The Royeben group dressed in full military fatigues.⁵⁰³

⁵⁰¹ Most likely on the road from the Batkanu/Ro-Source area. In April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces, driven by ECOMOG from Makeni and Kamakwie started targeting and occupying towns situated on the east-west road from Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom, Bombali District) to Batkanu (Lebeisayahun Chiefdom, Bombali District). Westwards movement into TMS, Dibia and Buya Romende Chiefdoms (Port Loko District) logically extends this pattern of attacks.

⁵⁰² Dating this incident at either 3, 10, 17 or 24 April 1998.

⁵⁰³ This unit may have been comprised primarily of ex-SLA.



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The groups had apparently decided to determine who stayed in Rosint by gambling on the sex of an unborn baby. Therefore, RUF/AFRC forces gathered 18 civilians under a tree close to the entrance of the village. These RUF/AFRC forces executed a pregnant woman by cutting through her lower abdomen and removing the foetus from her uterus. As the baby was female, the Royeben group withdrew from the village into the nearby bush; they had earlier gambled that the baby was a boy.

The remaining RUF/AFRC forces made preparations to amputate limbs from village residents, bringing a cutlass and an axe over to a log near the village mosque. RUF/AFRC members forced a woman to lay her hand across the log and, after a count of three, amputated her hands. RUF/AFRC personnel attacked her daughter with a machete and a female RUF/AFRC member cut her granddaughter in half. The left foot of an 8-month old baby was amputated and her mother was decapitated with a cutlass. RUF/AFRC members put the severed head on a pole near the village primary school. Another man was also decapitated with a long cutlass for being unable to provide the RUF/AFRC with five sheep. The RUF/AFRC forces punctuated the killing and amputation with song and dance. Thirteen civilians were detained overnight in a house under the threat of death.

Very early the following morning, RUF/AFRC members forced the detainees to pray at the mosque and then cook for them. The RUF/AFRC forces then resumed amputations, cutting the wrist of a woman six times before succeeding in amputating her hand, then shooting her dead after she managed to escape; they forced the other abductees to laugh loudly. Following this, RUF/AFRC forces amputated the left hand of a woman. Her nephew was held down by four RUF/AFRC members and decapitated. The woman managed to escape into the bush, arriving three days later at Mabesseneh Hospital in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) where she received emergency treatment. Staff at the hospital reported that at least seven others from Masimera Chiefdom had arrived in Lunsar with amputated limbs.

In March or April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Makaytay (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC commander announced his intention to establish a permanent base in their chiefdom. RUF/AFRC members used a sharp knife to amputate the left ear of a pregnant woman, before sending her to Sendugu. Residents of Gbaneloko (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) gave her assistance in getting to the Sendugu Health Centre, where she related her story to residents. In mid March, RUF/AFRC forces entered Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom), firing machine guns for around two hours. A large number of civilians were abducted; one of the captives, a pregnant woman, was killed later on the roadside. Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom), a few miles south of Sendugu, subsequently came under attack by the RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG forces deployed in Dibia Chiefdom retreated to Kagbantama (BKM Chiefdom), on the road between Barmoi Junction (BKM Chiefdom) and Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). Many civilians displaced due to the RUF/AFRC attack on Sendugu fled to Kabantama. ECOMOG advanced on Gbinti a week later, following reinforcements arriving from Port Loko Town.

Between 3 and 5 May, RUF/AFRC forces resumed activity in TMS Chiefdom, killing the Regent Chief of Makasi (TMS Chiefdom) by machete blows to the head and an elder of the village. Around 12 houses were also burned during the attack. At Rogbanthi and Ro-Gberray (both Maforki Chiefdom), houses were burnt and people were abducted. At Masengeh, where many civilians had



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sought safety from RUF/AFRC attacks in the area, two civilians were killed and all 30 houses in the village were burnt down. ECOMOG strengthened their Maboko position in Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom), with a 50-strong unit remaining in place until October 1998. During this period, members of ECOMOG killed a well-respected elder, frequently beat and harassed civilians and killed and ate their livestock, and other food. Additionally, ECOMOG forces raped at least three women while in Maron (TMS Chiefdom). In October, ECOMOG were replaced by around 30 ECOMOG-trained Gbethis (CDF) from Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom). These forces remained in Maron until February 1999. During this period, Gbethis decapitated a businessman suspected of being an RUF/AFRC spy, dancing the severed head around the village, harassed civilians and confiscated their livestock.

Around 400 heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces with six vehicles moved from the Lunsar area between 17 and 18 May, engaging engaged Gbethis (CDF) stationed in Robaka (TMS Chiefdom). The Gbethis were driven from the town and sustained heavy casualties, including three deaths. RUF/AFRC forces burned 13 houses during the attack. From Robaka, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masangban, Futa and Gbanah (all TMS Chiefdom), burning over 60 houses in total. Throughout June, RUF/AFRC forces carried out food-finding missions to the villages of Masu, Gbonah, Gbanneh, Kalangba and Rosent (all TMS Chiefdom).

On 4 June 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masimera village (Marampa Chiefdom), killing four civilians and burning down 300 residences; an unknown number of civilians drowned fleeing the RUF/AFRC attack.⁵⁰⁴ Beginning in August 1998, rumours of imminent RUF/AFRC attacks spread throughout Maforki Chiefdom. Seven vehicles were stolen during RUF/AFRC ambushes on the highway between Rokel Bridge and Port Loko Town.

RUF/AFRC forces established a temporary base at Kathente (BKM Chiefdom) in late August or early September 1998, from which they used canoes to cross Little Scaries River and raid many surrounding and nearby villages. During this period, Konika (BKM Chiefdom) was attacked and at least two civilians were killed. RUF/AFRC forces killed one civilian with a bladed weapon and amputated the forelimbs from a young mother. At Small Kambia village (BKM Chiefdom), the RUF/AFRC forces burnt down an unknown number of houses but no deaths were reported.

Very early on 6 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kagbantama (Kasseh Section, BKM Chiefdom), likely attacking from a temporary base in Kathente, rather than from their established base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom), or Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces entered the village and mounted a heavy machine gun high up in a tree at the entrance the village. RUF/AFRC forces cut the throats of three young men, killing them. They stripped the zinc roofing from six houses, put bullet holes in other roofing and burned down a further 18 houses. Medical supplies and a large power generator were stolen from the hospital. Leaving Kagbantama, RUF/AFRC forces headed to their permanent base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom). En route, they burnt and stole from civilian residences in the villages of Ma-Umaro, Marenka, Mayisna, Mahera and

⁵⁰⁴ AFP, 4 June 1998.



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Tasso (all BKM Chiefdom). At this time, Gbethis (CDF) were not deployed in the Kasseh Section of BKM Chiefdom, although they were deployed to Kagbantama following the 6 September attack.

A 150-strong RUF/AFRC group attacked ECOMOG between 28 and 30 September at the key Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), killing 16 civilians and leaving over 30 wounded. ECOMOG forces suffered four fatalities and 16 wounded, forcing their retreat to Port Loko Town on 2 October. Following ECOMOG's retreat, the highway was closed to civilian traffic, severely restricting the movement and livelihoods of inhabitants of Maforki Chiefdom, by cutting off the main overland route from Port Loko Town both to Freetown and inland. In the months of November and December 1998, several attacks were launched on villages in Maforki Chiefdom. For example, in November 1998, at Ro-Gbesseh, a village hosting displaced persons, over 20 men were abducted, people were killed and some houses were burnt. At Ro-Gberray Junction in early December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces looked for able-bodied men to join their movement, capturing over 10 men for this purpose. Also in December 1998, an unknown number of civilian corpses were found in Makokbo, Ma-Purseh, Ma-Barrkay and Ro-Gbil (all Maforki Chiefdom).

During the last three months of 1998, RUF/AFRC forces using the Kambia-Port Loko route through Mange in BKM Chiefdom moved in the direction of TMS Chiefdom, burning down villages along that route (located mainly in Maforki Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces put continuous pressure on the Mange Bridge. Gradually, RUF/AFRC forces moved to cut off and encircle Port Loko Town in preparation for the large-scale assault on the town that would occur on 28 December 1998. Aside from Mayoyisor, which was burnt to the ground, many villages including Rogbonko, Kabatha, Malal, Konta, Kalie and Mathineh were also attacked. At Mathineh, an unknown number of civilians were locked in a house, which was then set on fire. RUF/AFRC forces reached TMS Chiefdom in late November and set fire to villages, including Maramba and Robat, where all the houses except the mosque were burnt down.

Bureh Section (BKM Chiefdom) and its main and strategic town, Mange, were attacked for the second time in October 1998. Between 7 and 11 October, CDF and RUF/AFRC forces fought for control of the long road bridge over the Little Scaries River at Mange;⁵⁰⁵ the CDF eventually took control. After this attack, RUF/AFRC forces spread to most of the villages in Bureh Section. "Loyal"⁵⁰⁶ SLA forces and the CDF,⁵⁰⁷ including Kamajors, were also deployed in Bureh Section. However, the combined RUF/AFRC forces eventually took control of the town of Mange, burnt some houses, took property and abducted young men and women. They also opened a recruitment centre for abductees and sent other abductees to Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District), which at this time was a major RUF/AFRC headquarters. People were also tortured and some civilians had their limbs amputated. RUF/AFRC forces then spread out to other villages in Bureh Section and began occupying villages in Makonteh Section. In November 1998, RUF/AFRC forces executed a group of CDF and threw their bodies into the river. At this time, Mange Hospital, which was receiving medicine from a Red Cross Helicopter, was used to treat wounded RUF/AFRC

⁵⁰⁵ 11 October 1998, BBC Online News.

⁵⁰⁶ That is, those members of the SLA who had not joined the AFRC but remained under the command of the elected President.

⁵⁰⁷ The CDF 14th Battalion. Detail only from All Africa News, 9 December 1998, "No Rebels at Gberay Bridge".



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forces. SLA forces made several attempts to dislodge the fighters from Mange but were unable to cross the strategic bridge across Little Scaries River.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masimera Town (Marampa Chiefdom) in early December 1998. During this attack, many school children were abducted, women were raped and people were mutilated and killed. One group of armed men, dressed in military fatigue, pretended to be Government soldiers coming to protect Masimera Town and came to Royeben village, where they asked for men to assist them. Ten men were provided and all of them left for Masimera, where they arrived late at night. The civilians were then ordered to return back home to their village, but were captured by a second group dressed similarly to the group that had come to Royeben. All of the civilians but one escaped and the group went to Masimera; on their arrival, the whole town was in flames. The next day, two people were killed with cutlasses for refusing to chase a fowl. Other villages around Masimera Town were burnt down, including Mapelise and Rosent. Four people were killed with cutlasses, among them a woman who had previously been raped many times by numerous members of the RUF/AFRC.

RUF/AFRC forces again moved on Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) throughout late November and December 1998. During the first attack, on 27 November 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces passed through Foredugu at night and attacked the town, but were repelled by ECOMOG forces. On their way back to Foredugu and Robis Junction (Buya Romende Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces captured and killed a pro-Government soldier

In early December 1998, the RUF/AFRC were positioned in Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom), on the main route through TMS Chiefdom, which they had used as a staging point for their first bid to capture Port Loko Town in June 1995. In Malekuray, they fired their weapons for some time and bayoneted a civilian. After this, the RUF/AFRC forces set fire to the town and left for the next village, Maforay (TMS Chiefdom), where they burnt some houses. They continued on towards Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), to reach a base at Masokoma, known as "Combat Camp".

Between 1 and 4 December, Nigerian jets bombarded RUF/AFRC positions near Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), killing at least 70 RUF/AFRC members.⁵⁰⁸ Following this, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Lunsar before dawn on 5 December 1998 from the direction of Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) and Kumrabai (Marampa Chiefdom). A small company of ECOMOG and CDF forces managed to ambush RUF/AFRC forces at nearby Mamara but did not prevent RUF/AFRC forces from entering Lunsar. ECOMOG reinforcements arrived from Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and attacked RUF/AFRC with RPGs, mortar and heavy machine gun fire from an armoured vehicle. During the attack, three members of ECOMOG and an unknown number of civilians were killed. RUF/AFRC forces took large amounts of property and abducted an unknown number of civilians to carry the load. In addition, they managed to loot the ECOMOG battalion headquarters, stealing a number of new radio sets and ECOMOG uniforms, in addition to rifles and ammunition.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁸ AFP, 3 December 1998.

⁵⁰⁹ R.A. Adeshina, pp 130-2 *ff.*



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It is unclear whether or not RUF/AFRC forces took full control over Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) in mid-December, but they certainly remained in the immediate area. It is clear that on 8 December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Magbenthan and Mamusa, (both Marampa Chiefdom) on the highway between Lunsar and Ro-Gberray, burning all the houses. ECOMOG units displaced from fighting in other districts began arriving in Lunsar for redeployment after 15 December.⁵¹⁰

RUF/AFRC forces began pushing south into Koya Chiefdom and on 7 December they assaulted Masiaka⁵¹¹ and Magbontoso, a village further west along the highway near Mile 38. RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Masiaka between 14 and 16 December.⁵¹² During this attack, RUF/AFRC forces were coming from three different areas with the main aim of dislodging the Guinean forces and to take their arms and ammunition. The RUF/AFRC forces burnt one armoured tank, some houses and the Guinean ECOMOG HQ, but were unable to seize any weapons. After a battle that night, which left over 20 civilians dead, the Guinean forces were able to repel the RUF/AFRC forces who, while leaving, abducted many civilians, including school children.

On 21 and 22 December, RUF/AFRC forces bypassed Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) and attacked the towns of Songo (Koya RD, Western Area) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). On 23 December, RUF/AFRC forces attacked and occupied Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). On 25 December, following a month long campaign of gradual encirclement, RUF/AFRC forces assaulted Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District), forcing ECOMOG to retreat northwards to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District), which itself fell to the RUF/AFRC on 30 December. The main road to Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Masiaka was left undefended as Guinean troops withdraw from Masiaka to defend Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) from an RUF/AFRC attack on or around 26 December 1998.

Gbethis (CDF) from Mile 91 came to Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) to reinforce the CDF and ECOMOG forces based in the town. Between 28 and 30 December 1998, very large numbers of heavily-armed RUF/AFRC forces converged on Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), midway between Port Loko Town and Lunsar. On 30 December, Nigerian ECOMOG retreated in full from Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), leaving the town in the hand of RUF/AFRC forces.⁵¹³ RUF/AFRC forces then staged a major assault on Port Loko Town. RUF/AFRC units moved from Kambia Town and Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District), Mange (BKM Chiefdom) and Macoba (just north of Mange), but also from Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District).

In the late morning of 30 December, RUF/AFRC forces entered Port Loko Town and engaged the joint Nigerian and Guinean ECOMOG contingent positioned at the Falaba Primary School. During the attack on Port Loko Town, civilians were killed, including the Paramount Chief, women were raped and houses were looted. RUF/AFRC forces eventually captured the eastern part of the town,

⁵¹⁰ R.A. Adeshina, pp 130-2 ff.

⁵¹¹ A strategic location where the main Freetown highway divides into two highways, one leading to Port Loko Town and the other to Mile 91.

⁵¹² First date from record, later date from AFP, 16 December 1998

⁵¹³ BBC and AFP, 30 December 1998.



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called old Port Loko, and fought for the control of the whole town. However, the bombing of RUF/AFRC positions from the air strengthened ECOMOG resistance. On 3 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces left the town using the same route to the east along which they had advanced. It is highly likely that the bulk of these forces moved into the Western Area in preparation for the 6 January assault on Freetown. In the wake of the RUF/AFRC retreat from Port Loko, ECOMOG and CDF groups stole a large amount of civilian property.

e) Events in 1999

RUF/AFRC forces invaded Freetown between 6 and 20 January. As noted, there were preliminary attacks in late December on the towns of Port Loko, Ro-Gberray, Lunsar, Masiaka, Songo, Newton and Waterloo in preparation for the 6 January invasion. ECOMOG forces pushed the RUF/AFRC back to Waterloo, where they remained in force until at least 25 February 1999. RUF/AFRC forces retained control over the arterial routes from Western Area running through Port Loko District throughout this time.

RUF/AFRC forces occupied Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) following ECOMOG's retreat on 26 December. Following the general retreat of RUF/AFRC forces from Greater Freetown (Western Area) towards Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) after 20 January, RUF/AFRC forces began building up in Masiaka. During the occupation of Masiaka, CDF forces surrounded the town and exerted constant pressure on the RUF/AFRC. Between 18 and 24 January there was a tense standoff between the two forces, resulting in a stalemate. After 24 January, RUF/AFRC units began occupying villages near Masiaka to increase the security of their Masiaka position and to break the deadlock with the CDF. Between 24 January and 15 February, at Ma-Kanry village (Koya Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces killed an unknown number of civilians, alleged to be hostile "collaborators". On 15 March, a RUF/AFRC splinter group called the West Side Boys⁵¹⁴ exchanged gunfire with regular RUF/AFRC forces based in Masiaka. This skirmish was reportedly caused by disputes about the division of stolen property. On 3 April, ECOMOG Alfa Jets commenced fly-passes over Masiaka and nearby villages. RUF/AFRC forces reportedly rounded up civilians, placed them on the town streets and started using bladed weapons to carve the initials "RUF" on the civilian captives. On 17 April, Nigerian forces backed up by air support advanced on Masiaka, capturing the town on or around 29 April 1999. Withdrawing RUF/AFRC forces burnt down around 300 residences.

RUF/AFRC forces also occupied the town of Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) between 14 January and 22 April 1999. Mile 91 is about 30 miles east of Masiaka along the main highway on the first main road junction leading south to Bo and Kenema. As at Masiaka, RUF/AFRC forces were beaten back by a heavy ECOMOG assault. RUF forces established a sub-office responsible for monitoring military activities in the Maforki area at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom). In March 1999, RUF/AFRC activities resumed at Konta (Maforki Chiefdom), where an old woman, a man and a young girl pounding cassava leaves were given 100 lashes each by RUF/AFRC personnel. In April, three women from Masubah (Maforki Chiefdom) were taken away and raped by 15 men.

⁵¹⁴ For more information about the West Side Boys, see below.



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The Gbethis (CDF) strengthened their positions in Port Loko District during early 1999, particularly in the areas bordering Dibia Chiefdom and the RUF/AFRC base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom). These positions would present an obstacle to activity spreading from RUF/AFRC-held territory in Sanda Tendaren and Libeisayahun Chiefdoms (both Bombali District) bordering Dibia Chiefdom. Following appeals from the Regent Chief to the Paramount Chief of Port Loko Town, members of the Gbethi Society were sent to secure Kasseh Section (BKM Chiefdom) in February 1999. At first, these men had only shotguns, machetes and sticks. During a patrol on 3 February near Romeni, just north-east of Port Loko Town (both Maforki Chiefdom), the Gbethis captured an ex-SLA soldier suspected of being an RUF commander. They decapitated him and danced his severed head around Port Loko Town, demanding money and chanting, "Die dae, die nor dae. Rebel dae for die, die dae for rebel", meaning: "Death does not exist, death is for rebels and rebels are meant to die".

In March 1999, the CDF established a recruitment base at Kagbantama (BKM Chiefdom) and a training camp at Makomp, just north of Port Loko Town. Kagbantama is on the main road leading from Port Loko Town to Gbinti and Sendugu, the headquarter towns of Dibia and Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdoms respectively. ECOMOG had retreated from Dibia Chiefdom to Kagbantama in March 1998. At the Makomp camp, recruits to the CDF were instructed in the use of supernatural charms and clothes that could allegedly render them bullet-proof. Additionally, they were trained in the use and maintenance of a rifle. The main task of the CDF in Kasseh was to secure the east bank of the Little Scaries River, preventing southward RUF/AFRC infiltration from upstream towns like Bainkoro and other locations in Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom. After 18 February, SLA units deployed to Kasseh Section (BKM) but were driven from the section by civilians, following incidents of looting and poor discipline. In late March or early April, Gbethis at Makomp ambushed three SLA members who had been issued written permission to pass from CDF command in Port Loko Town. A CDF commanding officer cut one of the SLA members in half from head to pelvis. He was arrested by the CDF authorities, but returned to his unit after only two days of detention.

The traditional authorities of Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom) turned down a request from the CDF in BKM Chiefdom in late March 1999 to establish a Gbethi Society. Consequently, Gbethis from Kagbantama (Kasseh Section, BKM Chiefdom) began to harass residents of Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom) throughout March and April. For example, in March 1999, a CDF group came to Rosar (Safroko Section, TMS Chiefdom) and captured a civilian they accused of being a "rebel". Gbethis brought him back to Kagbantama, where they tied him up and dripped melted plastic on his body. On 5 April, Gbethis from Kagbantama returned to Rosar, following a general report that the inhabitants were "all rebels". Gbethis formed a firing squad, lined 27 men into two rows and shot them dead. The next day, 6 April 1999, Gbethis from Kagbantama again attacked Rosar. During the attack they raped an unknown number of women, stole property and burnt down 45 houses in the village, leaving only the mosque standing. At Maron village (TMS Chiefdom) on 8 April, Gbethis killed a blind man and threatened to kill the Section Chief and elders because they had refused to join the Gbethi Society. The Gbethis consequently accepted Le 400,000 and some food items in satisfaction. On 9 April in Makapr (TMS Chiefdom), near Maron, Gbethis from Dibia Chiefdom shot a civilian man twice and amputated one of his hands. They also took property and burnt down seven houses. On 23 April, at Mafonkay (TMS Chiefdom), Gbethis shot dead two elders and a child.



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At Makili, they killed one man, raped two women and burnt houses, after having taken property from inside. These Gbethis came from Kagbantama but also from Kareneh (Dibia Chiefdom), following the orders of a commander who was moving from section to section, initiating people into the Gbethi Society.

By the end of March 1999, RUF/AFRC activities resumed in Makama Section (TMS Chiefdom). At this time, an RUF/AFRC patrol from "Combat Camp" arrived in Malekuray and announced to residents that their commander wanted to make peace with them and the nearby villages of Mafengbeh, Robenkia and Makaneh. For acceding to this localised "peace treaty", the village elders would be given a "clearance paper", which they were ordered to display should any RUF/AFRC forces threaten the village or its residents. In return, the population had to contribute money and food to the RUF/AFRC. This arrangement was called "G5" and had been in operation in other areas of Sierra Leone held by the RUF/AFRC since at least December 1997. In brief, it provided the RUF/AFRC with a more rational, less strenuous way of extracting resources from the civilian population. On 13 April 1999, those residents of Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom) who returned to their chiefdom in accordance the terms agreed in the "peace treaty" met some Gbethis at Maforay (TMS Chiefdom), who killed two civilians. Shortly after, the CDF commander and over 100 Gbethis came to Malekuray. For making this deal with the RUF/AFRC, the CDF commander for the area threatened to kill all the inhabitants of Malekuray and use their bodies as roadblocks. The Section Chief, Imams, the headman and 10 elders were abducted and taken away to the CDF base. The Regent Chief of Masu eventually negotiated the release of those abducted, in return for which residents of Malekuray and surrounding villages would give the CDF food, livestock and Le 200,000. On 14 April, however, around 30 armed RUF/AFRC members from Combat Camp came to Malekuray. The "clearance paper" proved to be worthless. The RUF/AFRC forces shot dead five civilians; four other civilians were killed in the town, one wounded severely with a machete. Other people sustained knife wounds but survived. The RUF/AFRC forces said the attack was in retaliation for the village's support for the Gbethis. Caught between the RUF/AFRC and the Gbethis, most of the inhabitants left Malekuray for the bush or bigger towns.

Following the release of the RUF leader from Government custody on 15 April 1999, it was announced over radio that former SLA soldiers who had joined the AFRC regime should surrender to the United Nations Military Observers (UN MILOBS) for re-engagement. This resulted in infighting between RUF and AFRC forces. Nevertheless, disarmament started in November 1999.

On 7 May 1999, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom), reportedly on a food-finding mission. They moved through the villages of Maimera, Makamasa and Badara, killing 13 people in total and burning 10 houses. The large build-up and coordination exhibited in the RUF's earlier assaults on Port Loko Town was not present in this attack. The Malian ECOMOG contingent resisted the RUF/AFRC attack, incurring 7 fatalities and 11 casualties; at least 20 RUF/AFRC members were killed during the attack. Few houses were looted during the attack and an unknown number of civilians were killed. By 7 May, Ro-Gberray (Maforki Chiefdom) was reportedly accessible to humanitarian organisations, having been cleared of RUF/AFRC by

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ECOMOG.⁵¹⁵ On 13 and 14 May, Songo and Mile 38 (both Koya Chiefdom) were attacked by RUF/AFRC forces.⁵¹⁶

Despite the ongoing peace negotiations, RUF/AFRC forces continued to attack civilian settlements in Masimera Chiefdom. For example, after 20 June 1999 a chiefdom Police Officer was killed in his garden in Masimera. In nearby Mathilie, RUF/AFRC forces amputated the limb of a civilian man. In Makonton, RUF/AFRC members amputated a woman's limb; another woman was shot dead for refusing to have sexual intercourse with one of the RUF commanders. In mid-1999, Lunsar remained under RUF occupation. Following infighting between AFRC and RUF forces in Makeni (Makari Gbanti, Bombali District), AFRC forces decamped to Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), but shortly after were chased out by RUF forces.

Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (Lomé Peace Agreement). Following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, a demobilisation centre was opened at the Lungi Military Barracks (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) and in early November a centre opened near Port Loko Town. By 30 November, around 500 RUF personnel had registered as ex-combatants.⁵¹⁷

Throughout 1999, RUF/AFRC forces in Bureh Section (BKM Chiefdom) killed an unknown number of civilians suspected of being "spies" or Government forces. After the ceasefire on 24 May 1999, ECOMOG and UNOMSIL MILOBS were deployed to Government-held and RUF/AFRC-held areas in Bureh Section (BKM Chiefdom), including Mange and Mile 18. These foreign forces engaged in routine patrols, but were unable to access Makonteh Section because of the poor quality of the bridges and the difficulties imposed by the rainy season. RUF forces violated the ceasefire, often during food-finding raids; they looted villages like Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) and abducted people to carry the stolen property.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to replace the previous observer mission and assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.⁵¹⁸ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) commenced deployment with the arrival of advance teams on 29 and 30 November;⁵¹⁹ 4,500 UNAMSIL were troops were present in Sierra Leone by 10 January 2000.⁵²⁰

From October through to the end of 1999, a few isolated but brutal incidents are reported in Port Loko District. One Sunday in late October, RUF/AFRC forces in Magbankay (Masimera Chiefdom) killed a civilian man as a rite foreseeing their "peaceful stay" in the chiefdom. After he was killed, his

⁵¹⁵ UN HACU, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1 - 17 May 1999.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁷ IRIN West Africa, 30 November 1999.

⁵¹⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999).

⁵¹⁹ BBC, 29 November 1999

⁵²⁰ IRIN West Africa, 11 January 1999.



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genitals, tongue and eyes were removed from his body. These body parts were given to a virgin girl, who buried them near a small stream following a ceremony in Masimera Town. In another incident in Masimera, girls and women abducted in various villages near the Rokel River were raped, taken to a nearby bank of the river and shot dead.

In November, tensions between the RUF and the remnants of the AFRC led to a series of clashes in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom). By 2 November, Lunsar was reportedly under the sole occupation of the RUF. This was part of a wider RUF operation that established their dominance over Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).⁵²¹ On 8 November, a number of ex-AFRC who had entered the demobilisation process in at a centre in Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) rioted at a nearby market over the delayed award of financial incentives to disarm.⁵²² In addition to demanding food, clothing and medical supplies from local traders, they looted numerous civilian residences.⁵²³ A number of small skirmishes were reported between ECOMOG and demobilised ex-AFRC in mid December.⁵²⁴ On 22 December, ECOMOG reported that its forces had shot dead three ex-AFRC members in the village of Matank (Marampa Chiefdom), near Lunsar.

f) Events in 2000

In early January, UNAMSIL moved into positions throughout Port Loko District. A single Nigerian battalion was based at Freetown International Airport at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) and a second covered Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom), Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), securing the towns and the main highways. A Battalion of Kenyan troops was sent to secure Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). Nigerian forces deployed under ECOMOG would remain in county to provide additional back up to the incoming UNAMSIL forces.⁵²⁵ Zambian UNAMSIL forces commenced deployment to Sierra Leone, arriving in Lungi between 21 and 26 April coming to a full strength of 775 by 2 May 2000.⁵²⁶

Disarmament began in November 1999 in Port Loko District, but after some months, some combatants still in the bush refused to disarm and continued attacking villages in 2000 and 2001. During 1999 and 2000, RUF/AFRC forces camped at Foredugu Junction (Buya Romende Chiefdom), just north-east of Lunsar on the main highway from Makeni, at that point under firm RUF occupation until at least February 2001.

Between January and July 2000, RUF/AFRC forces had free movement along the main north-south highway running through Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom and consequently through the towns of Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) and Gbinti (Buya Romende Chiefdom). From Gbinti, the RUF could move freely south through Kamasundo (Dibia Chiefdom) to Foredugu (Buya Romende

⁵²¹ IRIN West Africa, 2 November, quoting ECOMOG sources.

⁵²² BBC, 9 November 1999; IRIN West Africa, 10 November 1999.

⁵²³ UN HACU, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 7 - 20 Nov 1999.

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁵ UN OCHA, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 5 - 16 Jan 2000.

⁵²⁶ IRIN West Africa, 21 April 2000, 26 April 2000 and 2 May 2000.



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Chiefdom); this would allow RUF forces to stage attacks on Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Ro-Gberray (Maforki Chiefdom).

RUF/AFRC forces coming from Makeni in January 2000 headed to Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom), abducting two people at Maron (TMS Chiefdom). They then proceeded to Gbinti, where they engaged Gbethis (CDF). The Gbethis were defeated and the RUF/AFRC forces stole property, burnt an unknown number of houses and advanced into Kambia District. In March 2000, RUF/AFRC forces entered Sendugu along the main north-south route through Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom towards Bombali District. They were around 120 in number, equipped with AK47s, hand grenades, cutlasses and knives. This RUF/AFRC Company carried out another series of looting operations dubbed "Operation Pay Yourself", camping for two weeks in Sendugu and stealing from the surrounding villages. At Rorange, they shot a woman who did not want to give them her bag of milled rice. The following day, Gbethis from Barmoi Junction (BKM Chiefdom) attacked Sendugu, forcing RUF/AFRC forces to retreat north-east.

In May 2000, the commander of both the RUF and AFRC forces in the Sendugu area ordered that any member caught trying to abscond and enter a DDR program would be shot on sight. That same month, near Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), RUF forces intercepted a convoy composed of civilians and RUF/AFRC members seeking to disarm. All the passengers were killed, including the RUF/AFRC members, who were accused of trying to join the DDR program in Port Loko. Consequently, civilians believed that most of the RUF/AFRC forces living in Maforki and Marampa Chiefdoms would not disarm.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked Thombo (Maforki Chiefdom) in May 2000, killing civilians and members of the CDF. At Rothava, armed men dressed only in trousers killed a civilian and took property. RUF/AFRC forces also attacked Ro-Lal, where one civilian was killed and two houses were burnt down.

On 5 May 2000, 208 members of UNAMSIL's Zambian contingent were disarmed and captured by RUF forces based at Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom). RUF forces returned to Foredugu with vehicles, communication sets, weapons and uniforms stolen from the peacekeepers. By 28 May, following the series of events outlined below, UNAMSIL announced that virtually all the peacekeepers had been released by the RUF. On 8 May, the UK commenced "Operation Palliser", deploying to Sierra Leone the *HMS Ocean* and around 800 paratroopers from the Parachute Regiment.⁵²⁷ Initially, UK forces secured the airport and Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) and commenced the evacuation of UK nationals and other expatriates.

Between 8 and 14 May, RUF forces unsuccessfully attempted to gain control of Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom). At that time, Masiaka was defended by an unknown number of AFRC "loyalists"⁵²⁸ who had split from the RUF at the end of 1999 and realigned themselves with the elected government, in

⁵²⁷ On 24 May, members of the 42 Commando Royal Marines replaced the paratroopers.

⁵²⁸ BBC Online News, 10 May 2000.

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addition to regular SLA and CDF forces.⁵²⁹ A contingent of Guinean UNAMSIL had withdrawn from the town.

RUF troops attacked SLA forces stationed in Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom) on 12 May 2000 with heavy machine gun and RPG fire. On 15 May, they advanced west towards Port Loko Town, where 500 RUF forces attacked the town in the early evening of 16 May 2000; Nigerian and SLA forces engaged the RUF, forcing their retreat soon after. During the attack, one member of the Nigerian forces was killed and six members of the SLA and five members of the Nigerian forces were injured.⁵³⁰

On the morning of 17 May, the RUF leader was captured travelling in a civilian vehicle in Freetown. The UK Secretary of Defence stated to the BBC that Sankoh was being held in “protective custody” by UK forces.⁵³¹ Also on 17 May, RUF forces attacked UK positions 6 miles east of the International Airport at Lungi. Repelling the attack, UK paratroops killed three RUF members.⁵³² On 18 May, Jordanian UNAMSIL peacekeepers were deployed at Masiaka and further north at Rokel Bridge.

Although this UNAMSIL action pushed the RUF/AFRC north, with subsequent attacks focussing on Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), the RUF still maintained pressure on Port Loko Town, regularly staging probing attacks on SLA and UNAMSIL positions in the town area and arterial roads after 16 May. On 20 and 23 May, RUF forces engaged SLA forces in the Port Loko Town area from the Lungi Road. In the evening of 28 May, they again attacked from the direction of Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom), briefly penetrating the town centre. On 1 and 4 June, RUF forces staged evening attacks on Port Loko Town from Bureh Section (BKM Chiefdom); during the 4 June attack, an RPG fired by RUF forces killed one civilian and injured six. On 12 June, RUF forces attacking Port Loko Town killed a CDF member. On 22 June, a Sierra Leone Government helicopter gunship inflicted casualties on the RUF during an attack on Port Loko Town.

On 24 May, RUF forces ambushed an SLA truck near Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), killing four members of the SLA and two foreign journalists.⁵³³ On 1 and 2 June, combat troops from the Indian UNAMSIL contingent took up positions around Ro-Gberray Junction, taking full control of it by 5 June.⁵³⁴ The same day, the RUF staged a major attack on Ro-Gberray lasting 12 hours, during which three Nigerian peacekeepers, five civilians and 23 RUF members were killed. Also on 5 June, a 12-strong RUF squad led by a former SLA member attacked the village of Romonukeh (Maforki Chiefdom), burning six houses and abducting one civilian man.

⁵²⁹ BBC Online News, 10 May 2000.
⁵³⁰ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 17 May 2000.
⁵³¹ BBC Online News, 17 May 2000 (18:03 GMT 19:03 UK).
⁵³² BBC Online News, 17 May 2000.
⁵³³ BBC Online News, 25 May 2000 (06:55 GMT 07:55 UK).
⁵³⁴ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 5 June 2000.



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Between 1 and 21 June, SLA⁵³⁵ and RUF fought for control of Lunsar (Marampa). After 8 June, Lunsar was reportedly under the control of the SLA, which repelled an RUF counter-attack on 13 June with the assistance of the West Side Boys.⁵³⁶ The RUF retook Lunsar on 21 June 2000,⁵³⁷ remaining in control of the town until 14 March 2001 when, on the invitation of the RUF, UNAMSIL deployed in the town.⁵³⁸

Two RUF attacks are reported in Makama Section (TMS) during 2000. On 29 June, 50 SLA members who had deployed to Malekuray (TMS) in March 2000 retreated, at which time RUF forces killed an old man. During the second attack on Malekuray, on 30 July, RUF forces were repelled by CDF forces and no casualties are reported. Both attacks came from the direction of Kambia–Makama, east along the road from Malekuray.

Before 10 July 2000, RUF/AFRC forces entered Kanokie (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom), some of them shouting “people of Kanokie, don’t be afraid, we are on transit to Sendugu, your village is not our target”. They left the village with no reported incidents of violence. From 10 to 13 July 2000, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Sendugu, burning down 11 residences and abducting an unknown number of civilians. A few weeks after this attack, youths and elderly men formed the Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom CDF to increase security throughout the chiefdom.

RUF attacks on Port Loko Town continued between July and September 2000, with small-scale attacks on 2 and 11 July from the Lungi road. RUF forces attacked Port Loko on 2 and 20 August using the Malekuray (TMS) road and again on 27 August using the Lungi route. In August 2000, the RUF leadership formed peacekeeping committees in Buya Romende, Marampa and Masimera Chiefdoms, possibly to boost their credibility ahead of the talks with UNAMSIL that would take place in 2001.

On 20 August 2000, a small number of RUF forces attacked Massembeh (Maforki Chiefdom), killing two civilians and injuring two others. On 2 September at Yankasa (Maforki Chiefdom), four people were killed and 10 injured, including a pregnant woman. Two civilian girls were captured and the village was looted. RUF forces again attacked Port Loko Town on 1 September. One RUF group killed 20 SLA near Kabatha, while the SLA and UNAMSIL repelled without casualties a second RUF group that moved into Port Loko Town along the Lungi road. On 10 September, the RUF staged a final attack on Port Loko Town along the Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom) road, sustaining at least 50 fatalities and a high number of casualties. RUF forces withdrew to Makeni through TMS Chiefdom to Kamasundo (Dibia Chiefdom), killing one person at Robombo and raping women at Maron. They proceeded to Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom) and onwards to Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom, Bombali District). For the remainder of September and throughout October, no events of significance are reported.

⁵³⁵ It is unclear whether UNAMSIL troops assisted in the defence of Lunsar on these dates.

⁵³⁶ See below for more detailed information on the West Side Boys.

⁵³⁷ BBC Online News, 21 June 2000 (17:57 GMT 18:57).

⁵³⁸ UNAMSIL Press Release, 14 March 2001.



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RUF forces from Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) entered the villages of Bainkoro and Robaku in Tinkatupa Section (TMS Chiefdom) soon after 10 November 2000. They abducted three civilian men to use as guides. The group travelled to Makapr, shooting and injuring a civilian woman. Moving to Lunsar, they stole livestock and food items. At Magberi, RUF forces burnt down eight houses. Around 45 SLA forces stationed in Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom) engaged this RUF group near Masangban, recovering some of the stolen property.

g) Events in 2001

The RUF allowed UNAMSIL access to two important roads in Port Loko District on 12 January 2001. First, the RUF opened the stretch of highway connecting Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) to Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District). Second, the RUF opened the road between Mange (BKM Chiefdom) and Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District),⁵³⁹ although the road bridge over the Little Scaries River would not be open until 22 March 2001.⁵⁴⁰ The following day, the UNAMSIL Force Commander met with representatives of the RUF in Lunsar to discuss the humanitarian situation and the deployment of UNAMSIL to Lunsar.⁵⁴¹ On 25 February, the first formal UNAMSIL-RUF Contact Group meeting was held in Mange (BKM). On 14 March, around 240 Nigerian UNAMSIL troops commenced deployment to Lunsar,⁵⁴² increasing to 776 by 23 March 2001.⁵⁴³

In Maforki Chiefdom, there were many incidents of RUF forces stripping corrugated zinc roofing from civilian residences. For example, in February 2001, some houses were unroofed at Rogbath, Robis, Masokor, Mathera, Rothudekun, Makambisa and Babara. In March, houses including the mosque were unroofed at Taindukum, Mabala, Rokoreh and Roforoad, all located in the lower part of Maforki Chiefdom. Similar operations were undertaken in April and June. During this period, there appears to have been no further theft, burning or killing.

Between 18 and 29 May, UNAMSIL opened a disarmament camp at Kabatha Junction near Port Loko.⁵⁴⁴ On 14 June, disarmament commenced in Lunsar. On 10 August, UNAMSIL, the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone issued a joint communiqué stating that disarmament was completed in throughout Port Loko District.⁵⁴⁵

Nevertheless, as disarmament proceeded, there were a number of violent incidents. In May 2001, a group of over 200 well-armed RUF fighters with vehicles seized from UNAMSIL peacekeepers at Makeni fought with the Gbethis (CDF) at Roctolon (TMS Chiefdom), killing some civilians and some Gbethis. The RUF forces then passed through Patifu, where they killed one man, and through Maron, where they stole civilian property before returning to Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District). In June 2001, RUF forces entered to Rosar and Maron, moving through

⁵³⁹ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 12 January 2001

⁵⁴⁰ UNAMSIL Press Release, 22 March 2001

⁵⁴¹ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 15 January 2001

⁵⁴² UNAMSIL Press Release, 14 March 2001 and IRINWA, 16 March 2001

⁵⁴³ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 23 March 2001

⁵⁴⁴ UNAMSIL Press Release, 29 May 2001

⁵⁴⁵ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 14 August 2001



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Kagbantama (BKM Chiefdom). At Maron (TMS Chiefdom), they captured women, who were later raped, and went to Lunsar. On 21 October 2001, RUF members coming from the Lunsar area attacked the village of Maron in Safroko Section (TMS). This is the final recorded event of the conflict in Port Loko District.

h) The "West Side Boys": Okra Hills, Maforki and Koya Chiefdoms, 1998-2000

The Okra Hills is a densely forested geographical area between Makambisa and Gberibana in the lower part of Maforki Chiefdom, crossing southwards over the Rokel Creek into Koya Chiefdom towards the township of Magbeni and onto the stretch of highway between Mile 38 and Masiaka. Between 15 October 1998 and mid-2001, this area was subjected to patterns of attacks by an RUF/AFRC splinter group comprising mainly ex-SLA AFRC members. The forces involved from 1998 onwards share a common thread of leadership and following the RUF/AFRC general retreat from Freetown, they re-branded themselves the "West Side Boys", although there was no substantive change in their composition. Accordingly, the group shall be referred to as the West Side Boys throughout this section.

Between 15 October and 29 December 1998, the West Side Boys attacked over 30 villages in the geographical area between Gberibana and Makambisa in the lower part of Maforki Chiefdom, bordered by the Rokel Creek to the south.⁵⁴⁶ There is little to distinguish any of these attacks from one another. The attacks were all launched from camps near Foredugu and Magbeni (both Koya Chiefdom), in the dense jungle and bush of the Okra Hills area, adjacent to the stretch of the main highway running between Mile 38 and Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom). Following these attacks, the West Side Boys forces did not remain in the villages. Throughout, the West Side Boys were directed by one of only three commanding officers and no settlement was attacked twice during this period. The settlements were undefended by SLA, ECOMOG or CDF forces, yet the West Side Boys commenced each attack by laying down heavy machine gun fire into the village. Routinely, the West Side Boys inflicted serious damage on civilian residences and stole substantial amounts of personal property, livestock and food items from civilians. The West Side Boys forces killed a total of 16 people in 33 attacks, with two instances where civilians were killed by hanging. Members of the West Side Boys raped over 20 civilian women. In total, around 80 civilians, the vast majority being male, were abducted during the series of attacks.

It is not possible to say that the West Side Boys did not fall under the command of the RUF/AFRC. However, the overall pattern of RUF/AFRC activity in Port Loko District between 15 October and 29 December 1998 suggests that the actions of the West Side Boys were only loosely connected with the RUF/AFRC's overall strategy. RUF/AFRC activity in other areas of Port Loko District was focussed on pressurising Port Loko Town and Ro-Gberray Junction (both Maforki Chiefdom), in preparation for the unsuspected RUF/AFRC breakout from Kono in December 1998 and the

⁵⁴⁶ The following villages were attacked on the following days: Gberibana, Rofurawa, Gbontho-Yama on 15 October; Mabala, Magbenthen, Rokoreh and Mapolie on 17, 21, 27 and 31 October respectively; Mamiekanuh, Robis, Kalukeh, Robala on or around 3 November; Rofindu and Roseinti on 7 November; Masawrie on 10 November; Gbonkomayer and Mathule on 15 November; Pethunr on 29 November; Rokoith and Robemeh on 1 December; Rokonther, Robamblaie and Tiama on 7 December; Magbangbara, Madora, Masebeh, Makeleh and Masemur on 13 December; and Magbontho, Madegbar and Robareh on 29 December.



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eventual invasion of the Western Area in early January 1999. As of September 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces occupied Mange Town (BKM Chiefdom), to the north of Port Loko Town, and controlled Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom, with access to the highway from Sendugu through Gbinti and Kamasundo (both Dibia Chiefdom) to Foredugu. By September 1998, RUF/AFRC attacked the key junction at Ro-Gberray (Maforki), intermittently cutting off Port Loko from road traffic from the capital. In early December, RUF/AFRC forces pushed south into Koya Chiefdom, attacking Masiaka and Magbontoso, a village further west along the highway, near Mile 38; AFRC forces again attacked Masiaka between 14 and 16 December. The West Side Boys do not appear to have taken part in these initial assaults, although they did have a presence in Masiaka until March 1999.

On 21 and 22 December, RUF/AFRC forces bypassed Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) and attacked the towns of Songo (Koya RD, Western Area) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) was occupied by RUF/AFRC forces following ECOMOG's retreat on 26 December. Between 28 and 30 December 1998, very large numbers of heavily-armed RUF/AFRC forces converged on Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), midway between Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom). On 30 December, Nigerian ECOMOG retreated in full from Lunsar, leaving the town in the hands of the RUF/AFRC forces.⁵⁴⁷ On 30 December, RUF/AFRC forces assaulted Port Loko Town. Again, the principal officers of the West Side Boys are not implicated directly in these attacks.

In the Okra Hills area itself, on 30 December, the dense pattern of hit-and-run attacks that had characterised the presence of the West Side Boys in late 1998 ceased entirely. After 22 December 1998, principal officers of the West Side Boys are identified as having taken part in attacks on Waterloo, Hastings, Joe Town and Tombo (all Waterloo RD, Western Area) during the preliminary RUF/AFRC advance into the Western Area. It is not possible to confirm whether the West Side Boys also took part in the 6 January 1999 RUF/AFRC assault in Freetown.

By 20 January 1999, ECOMOG had regained control of the bulk of the Freetown metropolitan area, and by 25 February had driven RUF/AFRC forces from Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). After 25 January, RUF/AFRC and West Side Boys forces occupying Masiaka were under pressure from the CDF. Although the RUF/AFRC would not be pushed out of Masiaka until 29 April, the West Side Boys left the town on 15 March 1999.

In March, the West Side Boys attacked and captured the village of Magbeni and established a camp there. On 7 March, a week before their withdrawal from Masiaka, the West Side Boys attacked Gberibana and resumed their intense hit-and-run attacks in lower Maforki Chiefdom. From Magbeni, they made frequent attacks on traffic on civilian traffic between Mile 38 and Masiaka.

On 9 March, West Side Boys attacked Rufura; two days later, they attacked Magbangbara, and engaged Gbethis (CDF) defending the village, killing four of them. The West Side Boys⁵⁴⁸ attacked Masuba, south of Rokel Creek on 15 March 1999. Civilians fled to the nearby bushes and villages, but over 10 inhabitants were killed, including three children who drowned in the Rokel River while

⁵⁴⁷ BBC and AFP, 30 December 1998.

⁵⁴⁸ Some were dressed in military uniforms while others were dressed in civilian attire.



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trying to escape. The West Side Boys harassed civilians who had fled to the bush, beat them and took their property. Civilians who were captured were forced to carry the loads to the West Side Boys' base. One man was told to have sex with his mother and when he refused, he was shot dead. In Masuba, the 56 houses of the village were burnt down. On the same day, West Side Boys attacked Laminaya and Romaforay. On 25 March, they attacked Romaforama and Mabassy.

In April 1999, around 20 civilians were killed publicly at their base in Gberibana in reprisal for an earlier CDF attack on a West Side Boys patrol at Magbanbara, which had left five members of the West Side Boys dead. In the forest nearby their base, there was a specific place where the West Side Boys would kill abductees, especially those who did not follow their orders. Some captured civilians also had the words "West Side Boys" inscribed on their backs. That same month, an attack took place at Maghailma⁵⁴⁹ in the late afternoon, during which 16 people were killed. The following day, they locked 73 people they had abducted from surrounding villages in a house, which they then set on fire.

In the evening of 17 May 1999, the West Side Boys fired on an ECOMOG vehicle patrolling the Mile 38-Masiaka highway. ECOMOG forces exchanged fire with the West Side Boys for about 2 hours until they ran out of ammunition and returned to Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom). Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire that entered into force on 24 May.

As peace talks continued in June 1999, a large number of civilians were burnt alive in their houses at Man'arrmah by the West Side Boys. Other villages attacked in June and July include Mathera, Rothuidekum, Makambisa, Makorobolie, Kasankor, Mekensebeh and Rotaindekun. At Mabonie on 20 July 1999, the West Side Boys burnt down the entire village, raped girls, killed around 10 people and took food items. The peace talks led to the signing of the Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (the Lomé Peace Agreement).⁵⁵⁰

On 4 August 1999, the West Side Boys kidnapped a group of around 40 UNOMSIL, ECOMOG and civil society workers who had entered the Okra Hills area to negotiate the release of some 200 children being held by the West Side Boys. The group included the Bishop of Makeni and five UK officers serving as military observers in UNOMSIL.⁵⁵¹ The kidnap met with immediate condemnation from the United Nations Secretary-General⁵⁵² and a UK-led negotiation team was dispatched to Sierra Leone. Around half of the hostages were released on 9 August and the remainder released the following day; around 200 women and children were also released.⁵⁵³ The group reportedly said to negotiators that they were loyal to the AFRC, comprised of primarily ex-SLA and their key demand was the release from RUF custody of the AFRC leader. They did not

⁵⁴⁹ The month is not specified, but this happened after the attack on Masimera Town in December 1998.

⁵⁵⁰ The full text is available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_07071999_toc.html.

⁵⁵¹ BBC Online News, 5 August 1999 (23:12 GMT 00:12 UK).

⁵⁵² UN Press Release, 5 August 1999, SG/SM/7089, AFR/162.

⁵⁵³ IRIN West Africa, 10 August 1999, quoting the Sierra Leone Information Minister.



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refer to themselves as the “West Side Boys”. A foreign journalist told the BBC that there were no RUF members present.⁵⁵⁴

Aside from this kidnapping, few attacks are noted between mid-July and December 1999. This corresponds with a sharp drop in the general levels of violence throughout Port Loko District. Additionally, disarmament centres had opened in Port Loko and Lungi. On 15 July 1999 the West Side Boys attacked Mekensebeh village and killed a civilian by hanging her. On the same day, they attacked Rotaindekun, killing four men and raping four girls. On 7 November 1999 they attacked Royabah and Marikor. One month later, the West Side Boys attacked Gberh Thuraka, Mapoyen and Ropoyen, stealing civilian property, livestock and food items. Most of the civilians fled towards Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) and sought refuge in an IDP camp. Although attacks on villages became less frequent, the West Side Boys mounted many checkpoints along the main highway between Mile 28 and Masiaka, attacking both civilian and military traffic. Between 7 December and May 2000 there are no reported incidents of attacks on villages in the Okra Hills area.

Following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a larger peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which replaced UNOMSIL. In May 2000, the RUF took hostage over 200 UNAMSIL soldiers at Foredugu, prompting a serious challenge to the peace process. The RUF again moved on Masiaka and Port Loko Town, failing to take control of either town. Between 1 and 21 June 2000, the West Side Boys fought alongside the SLA in (unsuccessfully) defending Lunsar from the RUF attack.⁵⁵⁵

On or around 9 July 2000, State radio broadcast a message from the Government of Sierra Leone issuing an ultimatum to the West Side Boys to disarm to UNAMSIL by 16.00 on 11 July.⁵⁵⁶ UNAMSIL military observers entered into negotiations with the West Side Boys to facilitate disarmament. However, on 11 July, UNAMSIL military observers in Masiaka reported that no West Side Boys had disarmed;⁵⁵⁷ nine days later the situation still remained the same.⁵⁵⁸ Before dawn on 22 July 2000, UNAMSIL carried out “Operation Thunderbolt”. This operation, which focused on the Okra Hills area,⁵⁵⁹ successfully cleared the roadblocks mounted by the West Side Boys on the main highways between Freetown and Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom). UNAMSIL strengthened patrols along the highways through the Okra Hills following “Operation Thunderbolt”. After this operation, UNAMSIL reported that 40 West Side Boys had surrendered to the UNAMSIL Jordanian contingent for disarmament, bringing the total number of West Side Boys in the DDR program to 80.⁵⁶⁰ By 9 August, around 200 had joined the DDR program.⁵⁶¹ Nevertheless, vehicle hijackings and attacks on civilians along the Mile 38–Masiaka highway continued throughout this period.

⁵⁵⁴ BBC Online News, 6 August 1999 (07:23 GMT 08:23 UK).

⁵⁵⁵ OCHA Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16-25 Jun 2000.

⁵⁵⁶ IRIN West Africa, 10 July 2000.

⁵⁵⁷ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 11 July 2000.

⁵⁵⁸ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 20 July 2000.

⁵⁵⁹ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 24 July 2000.

⁵⁶⁰ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 28 July 2000.

⁵⁶¹ Numbers taken from interceding UNAMSIL Press Briefings.

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Sporadic attacks in the Okra Hills area continued into 2000. Although the pattern follows the same formulaic style of attacks adopted by the West Side Boys in 1998, it is not certain that the West Side Boys carried out these attacks. At Masoka in June 2000, armed men in combat uniform and civilian dress entered the town firing their weapons, took palm oil and rice and burnt down three houses. At Matheperr, in the early morning, armed men killed one man, burnt two houses and moved around noon to Rothyah, where they burnt down three houses, captured two boys and took property. At Magbamgbara, armed men burnt down five houses but met SLA forces and five of the armed attackers were killed. On 7 July 2000, armed men attacked three villages, burning two houses at Robis; capturing two men and burning five houses at Ro-Mafomara; and burning seven houses at Rogbath. In August 2000, armed men attacked Magbembeh, burning down four houses and capturing three women. At Brebana, three houses were burnt, property was taken and one pregnant woman killed.

On 27 August 2000, the West Side Boys captured 11 soldiers from the UK Royal Irish Regiment engaged with the Short Term Training Team near Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and an SLA liaison officer. The patrol had taken an unauthorised deviation to visit Magbeni.⁵⁶² On 29 August, a senior UK officer met with the leader of the West Side Boys, as a result of which the West Side Boys released five of the captives two days later. The leader of the West Side Boys called the BBC on a satellite phone and demanded their reintegration in the government army, the release of their supporters from jail and a review of the Lomé Peace Agreement; all these demands were immediately rejected by the Government of Sierra Leone.⁵⁶³ On 6 September, the UK deployed paratroops from 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment.

At dawn on 25 September, UK Special Forces and Paratroops executed "Operation Barrass". Arriving by helicopter gunships and transport, they attacked the West Side Boys' camps at Gberibana (Maforki Chiefdom) and Magbeni, on either side of the Rokel Creek, rescuing the remaining hostages, killing 25 West Side Boys and incurring one fatality.⁵⁶⁴ The UK forces captured 18 West Side Boys, including the majority of the group's leadership. Over 30 West Side Boys who had abducted around 15 civilians to use as human shields were captured by Jordanian UNAMSIL.⁵⁶⁵ The town of Magbeni was deserted for three weeks because of the smell of human remains found in the surrounding bush.

Following "Operation Barrass" the total number and rate of entry of West Side Boys into the DDR program increased. By 15 September, UNAMSIL had registered 294 members of the West Side Boys at the DDR camp in Lungi. By 20 September, this figure had reached 371.

During 2001, attacks in the Okra Hills area were primarily made by demobilised former members of every faction looking for items to sell. Between 10 February and 11 June 2001, demobilised West

⁵⁶² Information revealed by a Ministry of Defence inquiry into the events: see BBC Online News, 14 September 2000 (20:45 GMT 21:45 UK).

⁵⁶³ BBC Online News, 31 August 2000 (19:59 GMT 20:59 UK)

⁵⁶⁴ BBC Online News, 10 September 2000 (20:51 GMT 21:51 UK)

⁵⁶⁵ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 11 September 2000



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Side Boys stole the corrugated zinc roofing from civilian residences in numerous villages.⁵⁶⁶ No further attacks by the West Side Boy are reported.

3. Conclusion

** TO BE DRAFTED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE**

e. Tonkolili District

1. Introduction

Tonkolili is one of the five Districts of the Northern Province, together with Bombali, Koinadugu, Port Loko and Kambia Districts. It is bordered on the north and east by Koinadugu District and on the south-east by Kono District. Kenema, Bo and Moyamba Districts compose its southern border, from east to west. To the north-west is Port Loko District and to the north is Bombali District. Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) is its headquarter town.

There are 11 chiefdoms in Tonkolili District:

Chiefdom	Headquarter
Gbokolenken	Yele
Kafe Simira	Mabonto
Kalansogoia	Bumbuna
Kholifa Mabang	Mabang
Kholifa Rowalla	Magburaka
Konike Barina	Makali
Konike Sanda	Masingbi
Malal Mara	Rochin
Sambaia Bendugu	Bendugu
Tane	Matotaka
Yoni	Yonibana

Its central position in the country would lead Tonkolili District to be affected by the conflict both from the Southern and Northern Districts. The main Sierra Leonean highway linking Freetown to Kono runs for a large part through Tonkolili District. An other major road, which runs through Tonkolili District link Freetown to Bo District and beyond, Kenema District. Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom), Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom), Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom) and Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom), all located on the main highway are the main towns of the District and their control would be a steady objective for the different fighting factions throughout the country.

Two major hilly areas are to be found in the District. Malal Mara Hills referred as Kaitkant Hills in the north-east of the country, at the border with Port Loko District and Kangari Hills in the south of the District, bordering Bo District. Those two areas are located at strategic positions, as they allow control of a wide region covering different Districts.

⁵⁶⁶ In sequence, these are: Rogbath, Robis, Masokor, Mathera, Rothhdekum, Makambisa, Babara, Taindenkum, Rokoreh, Rofoioad, Roseitin, Masawuri, Robala, Roseint, Gbpothoyama, Mapolie, Thekeyeh, Makoyeh, Matikor, Laminaya, Roboulloh, Mayefura and Mamiekanuh.

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Tonkolili District is a gold mining area and gold can be found in almost every chiefdom, except Malal Mara, Kholifa Mabang and Yoni Chiefdoms in the south of the District.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1993

Following the continuous influx of civilians fleeing the fighting in Kono District, civilians in Tonkolili District considered forming civilian militias in the chiefdoms. Their purpose would be to increase security in the chiefdoms by monitoring the movement of people.

In July 1993, the Paramount Chief of Kalansogoia Chiefdom⁵⁶⁷ organised a meeting of five elders from each of the 62 villages in the chiefdom. During this meeting, it was agreed to form a youth group in each village. This group would establish simple checkpoints across roads using a bush-stick gate, patrolling day and night to screen people coming into the villages. This was aimed at preventing RUF forces from infiltrating the chiefdom, at least from the main roads.

In September 1993, the youths who were organised in this way were officially called Civil Defence Units (CDU). The units, armed only with cutlasses and sticks, were answerable to the Paramount Chief and would refer cases where they were unwilling to let a traveller past a checkpoint to the Town Chief. Strict rules applied in the villages concerning the lodging of strangers. Anybody who lodged an outsider without referring first to the Town Chief was fined Le 10,000. This money was used to buy basic equipment like torches and batteries for the CDUs.

b) Events in 1994

Throughout 1994, RUF forces pushed west along the main road from Kono to the towns of Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) and Makeni (Bombali District). Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom) was the watershed of RUF attacks on this town in April and May. However, the RUF made the highway severely hazardous for traffic due to the continuous ambushing of civilian travellers and convoys and likely began establishing a foothold in the Kangari Hills at this time.⁵⁶⁸ Between October and December, RUF forces pushed further west, establishing a brigade headquarter in the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom), from where they assaulted the strategic towns of Mile 91 and Yonibana. From this location, the RUF pushed into the Western Area and Port Loko in 1995. Tensions between civilians and the SLA were exacerbated by the formation of Civil Defence Units in the District as well as the stealing of civilian property, the looting of civilian premises and the extortion of money and property at checkpoints by the SLA, reportedly due to poor discipline.

In February 1994, news of an attack on Bendugu (the headquarter town of Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom) reached the headquarter town of Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom).⁵⁶⁹ In March 1994, RUF forces were spotted in the bush of Konike Barina Chiefdom. On or after 25 March, two

⁵⁶⁷ Kalansogoia Chiefdom is to be found in the north of Tonkolili District, sharing border with Koinadugu District on the east and north and Bombali District on the west. Bumbuna, surrounded by hills, is the headquarter town.

⁵⁶⁸ The Kangari Hills are located in the south of Tonkolili District across two chiefdoms and expand in the north of Bo District. The base was probably established in Konike Barina Chiefdom.

⁵⁶⁹ To the north-east of Tonkolili, bordering Koinadugu District.

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miners arrived in the headquarter town of Makali and related that while they were at Mondema, RUF forces had come out of the bush and stolen their bailing machine⁵⁷⁰ before returning to the bush.

People fleeing from Masingbi, the headquarter town of Konike Sanda Chiefdom (sharing a border on the west with Konike Barina Chiefdom and on the east with Kono District) reached Makali on 1 April 1994 with the news that Masingbi had been attacked. Many residents of Makali fled into the surrounding bush. Two days later, on 3 April, 200 members of the SLA from Makeni (the headquarter town of Bombali District) arrived in Makali, encouraging people to come out of the bush. They requested inhabitants to assist them by cooking and providing them with Le 100,000 to buy food from Magburaka.

On 9 April, RUF forces launched an attack on Makali from the direction of Makong, on the edge of the Kangari Hills, south-west of Makali. Earlier in the day, SLA forces had split into four groups and moved into the bush surrounding Makali, but were unable to repel the RUF attack. During the attack, a substantial part of the town was burnt down. Civilians returning to the town following the attack found many bodies in the town, including that of a policeman and a driver. On 11 April, 60 SLA forces moved from Makeni to secure Makali.

SLA forces arrived by helicopter in April at the SDA Primary School playfield in the headquarter town of Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom), in the centre of the District on the highway that leads directly to Kono.⁵⁷¹ Shortly after their arrival, the SLA forces moved out of the town to an unknown location. On 12 and 13 April, many civilians fleeing from Masingbi and Makali reached Matotoka, together with some SLA forces who were fleeing Makali. On 14 April, many of the residents of Matotoka left the town, which prompted the Paramount Chief and government officers to travel to Kabala (Koinadugu District) to request that local hunters from the north (known as Tamaboros⁵⁷²) provide security for the chiefdom. An unknown number of Tamaboros settled in the headquarter town on 3 May 1994, provided with machine guns and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) from the Ministry of Defence.

After 20 May 1994, 175 civilians from Mamurie and Makong villages gathered at Rowaka (Konike Barina Chiefdom). They intended to hunt for food at Rosimbec,⁵⁷³ in the Mamure Section of Konike Barina Chiefdom, in the forested area 5 km south-west of Makali. The SLA commander at Makali had warned them that civilians should avoid this forest area, since RUF forces were suspected to be there; the earlier attack on Makali had come from this direction. As they approached Rosimbec, the civilians, some of whom were armed with cutlasses, met men in uniform whom they believed to be SLA forces. Although the armed men told the civilians they were SLA forces here to escort the group to Rosimbec, they turned out to be members of the RUF. They told the civilians to drop their

⁵⁷⁰ A device used to pump water from pits during excavation for minerals.

⁵⁷¹ Thus, from Magburaka, to go to Kono on the highway, vehicles passed through Matotoka (Tane), then Makali (Konike Barina Chiefdom) and then through Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom) before reaching Kono District.

⁵⁷² In early 1994, the Tamaboros who had been assisting the SLA in Kono District since 1993 went back to their District of origin, Koinadugu District. Those Tamaboros were believed to have very strong mystical powers.

⁵⁷³ Also called Simbek.



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cutlasses and go into some houses, which they then locked. The RUF forces killed all 170 captured civilians one after the other, stacking some of the bodies like bundles of wood and dumping others in a ditch. The bodies were later discovered by an SLA patrol sent to look for the missing civilians.

Makali was attacked for the second time in May 1994. After an intense gun battle, SLA forces drove away the RUF forces, with no reported casualties. On 3 June 1994, RUF forces attacked Mapakie, which is located near Matotoka. Tamaboros moved there to engage RUF forces. In the bush, they encountered men in military uniforms but did not attack them, believing them to be SLA personnel. On 11 July, an unknown number of RUF forces in full military dress attacked Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom). SLA and Tamaboro forces drove the RUF from the town, killing a female RUF member during the attack. After a short time and a quarrel with SLA forces about the weapons that the Government had provided them, the Tamaboros left the chiefdom.

The highway linking Koidu (Kono District) to Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom), passing through Konike Sanda, Konike Barina, Tane and Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdoms, was the scene of many ambushes during the conflict. For example, in mid-June 1994, a convoy of about 125 trucks left Magburaka and took the highway through Makaku to Kono. They were escorted by an SLA armoured vehicle and an unknown number of SLA members dispersed through the vehicles comprising the convoy. After 5:30 pm, as the convoy passed through Mamuri (Tane Chiefdom) and approached Rowaka (Konike Barina Chiefdom), it fell into an ambush, with RUF forces firing heavily on the convoy. The trucks attempted to turn back, but instead crashed into each other. Some people jumped out from the trucks. Many people were killed during that ambush, including the driver of a truck and two female passengers. The RUF forces ordered them out of the truck; two boys who tried to escape were shot and died. Passengers were asked to form a line and were searched for anything of value. Ten trucks were destroyed, although most were simply searched and luggage and other items were taken. A one month-old baby was taken from its mother and thrown into the bush because an RUF member said he was making too much noise. One man who had been wounded in the attack started crying for help. One of the RUF members offered assistance, but instead shot him three times. Passengers were then captured and told to carry the load the RUF forces had gathered from the vehicles back to Rosimbec, where 170 civilians had been killed one month earlier.

On the initiative of the elders of the chiefdoms of Yoni and Kholifa Mabang, a 1000-strong Civil Defence Unit composed of youths was formed in June 1994. Members of the Poro, Bundo, Ojeh and Koffo secret societies were involved in setting up these CDUs. The same principles as those applied in Kalansogoia Chiefdom were employed: CDUs would control the main roads through the chiefdoms and check the identity of the people passing through. They conducted house-to-house searches at night, screening residences for strangers and levying a Le 20,000 fine on the house if they discovered someone who had not been reported to the town authorities. If CDU personnel had any concerns about a traveller, they would refer the matter to the town elders, who could order further screening by the SLP. The person would be escorted to the Police Station at Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom). CDUs were based in the areas immediately surrounding the towns of Mile 91 and Yonibana, but patrolled the smaller villages in the two chiefdoms.



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In 1994, mistrust between civilians and SLA forces deployed to protect the chiefdoms came to a head. This mistrust was due to two beliefs widely held by the public. First, that some SLA forces at this time had defected from the army and joined the RUF. Second, that RUF forces in military fatigues often pretended to be SLA forces in order to attack villages by surprise. One incident that occurred in late June 1994 highlights the negative attitude civilians had towards the SLA forces at this time. Armed men claiming to be SLA were arrested by members of the CDU at Kumrabai Matuku (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) and brought to the Mile 91 Police Station for interrogation. Interrogators concluded that these armed men were genuine SLA members from Bo, which was reportedly confirmed by the SLA commander officer in Bo Town. The two SLA members remained in the chiefdom and installed two checkpoints at Mile 91, one on the road leading to Bo and the other on the road leading to Magburaka. Reports suggest that this was the sole SLA presence in Mile 91 until July.

A week later, in July 1994, two trucks loaded with SLA forces arrived in Mile 91 from Bo Town. After visiting the Paramount Chief at the nearby chiefdom headquarter of Yonibana, they returned to Mile 91. There, they reinforced the checkpoints established and operated by their colleagues. Nevertheless, the arrival of the SLA forces in Yonibana frightened some of the inhabitants of the town, who fled to the south of the chiefdom. At the checkpoints, SLA members started to take civilian property. In August 1994, the SLA commander came from Bo to try to resolve the matter. It was agreed with the elders that the community would feed the soldiers, with each household at Mile 91 giving the SLA forces Le 500 and two cups of rice per week.

In August 1994,⁵⁷⁴ armed men dressed in camouflage and country clothes decorated with charms and talismans and who identified themselves as "freedom fighters" coming to redeem the country, attacked Yele from a southern direction. Yele is in the south of Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, near the border with Valunia Chiefdom (Bo District) and Kamajei Chiefdom (Moyamba District). At the time of the attack, internally displaced persons (IDPs) were living in the area. The few SLA forces who were in the town at the time pulled out, overpowered and outnumbered. The RUF forces burnt the hospital and abducted young boys.

During the final days of October 1994, RUF forces⁵⁷⁵ attacked the headquarter town of Mabonto (Kafe Simira Chiefdom, to the north of the District). During this attack many houses were destroyed, property was stolen and one member of a CDU was killed. They spent the night in the town before heading north-east to the headquarter town of Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom). Bumbuna was attacked in the late morning on 1 November 1994 by hundreds of armed men. As civilians escaped into the surrounding bush, the RUF spent the whole day burning and looting the town. Returning from the bush, civilians counted 193 houses burnt and found the bodies of four civilians.

⁵⁷⁴ Although this information was reported as taking place in 1993, it is likely that it happened in 1994, since RUF forces were pushed back to the Liberian border around the middle of 1993 and the description of the attack coincides with an attack reported in open sources in August 1994: AFP, 29 August 1994.

⁵⁷⁵ These forces were dressed mainly in mixed casual attire, although some wore full military uniforms.



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On 2 November 1994, SLA forces deployed from Teko Barracks in Makeni (Makani Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and repelled the RUF forces from Bumbuna. RUF forces moved east towards Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom, abducting civilians to carry the property looted from the town. The following day, RUF forces entered Sangonie, a village located four and a half miles from Bumbuna, with 15 people they had abducted from Bumbuna. They then passed by Kegbema Junction, where they captured more civilians. This large RUF force headed to Koinadugu District and attacked towns along the route to the District headquarter town of Kabala on 7 November 1994.

The RUF launched another wave of attacks in Yoni, Kholifa Mabang and Malal Mara Chiefdoms,⁵⁷⁶ to the west of the District in December 1994. Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom) is a strategic location on an intersection between the roads going to Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District), Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) and Taiama (Kori Chiefdom, Moyamba District).

On 22 December 1994, rumours reached civilians in Yoni Chiefdom that RUF forces had crossed the Yele River.⁵⁷⁷ Early in the morning of the following day, 23 December, armed men in military camouflage uniforms and others in black t-shirts with red headbands entered Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom, near the boundary with Yoni Chiefdom). The armed men gathered the inhabitants in the Court Barrie, introduced themselves as “freedom fighters” and said that they were on their way to attack Mile 91. The commander of the groups also said that if they were to encounter resistance in Mile 91, they would return to Mafolatha.

In the morning of 23 December 1994, this RUF group attacked Mile 91 along the main roads from Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) and Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District). RUF forces killed three civilians and burnt down eight houses during the attack on Mile 91; they initially captured the town, but were displaced shortly afterwards when SLA forces regrouped and counter-attacked. Driven from Mile 91, RUF forces left the town in a northerly direction towards Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom, which is to the north-east of Yoni Chiefdom. SLA forces also moved out of the town, after kicking in the doors of many civilian residences and stealing civilian property. Shortly after this attack, other SLA forces coming from Bo Town⁵⁷⁸ were deployed at Mile 91.

The RUF forces moved back to Mafolatha with the stolen property and the civilians they had captured at Mile 91. On 26 and 27 December 1994, the RUF group settled at Makelleh, three miles from Mafolatha in Yoni Chiefdom. Before leaving the town, they burnt down around 100 houses and abducted an unknown number of young men, women and children. On 27 December 1994, some houses were also burnt at Mafolatha.

On their way to their base at Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom), RUF forces entered many villages, burning, looting and raping. On 28 December, 16 houses were burnt and property was taken in Mabariwa, three miles east of Mafolatha. On the same day, Marokie village was attacked; 14

⁵⁷⁶ Yoni and Malal Mara Chiefdoms share a boundary with Port Loko District.

⁵⁷⁷ Yele River is probably the name given to the river that flows south of Yele Town, in the south of Gbokolenken Chiefdom, which shares a boundary with Moyamba and Bo Districts.

⁵⁷⁸ An SLA Brigade was deployed in Bo Town.



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houses burnt down and property, including livestock, was taken. They stayed for two days (28 and 29 December) at nearby Rochain, where multiple RUF members raped three young mothers in the front of the village inhabitants, who they had gathered at the Court Barrie. Before leaving, RUF forces burnt down 30 houses, stole property and abducted an unknown number of people to carry their loads. In addition, an unknown number of young boys and girls all below the age of 18 were abducted to be trained as fighters.

During the final days of December, RUF forces launched an attack on Rokanrr (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), in the north of the chiefdom near Malal Mara Chiefdom. The RUF commander told the people that they should show them the way to go to Kaitkant Hills, as it was the first time they were using that road. In Rokanrr, RUF forces tied a village elder to a tree and shot him in the head for having questioned the commander about what kind of contribution the farmers of the village could give to the revolution, given they were not combatants but merely farmers. Before leaving the village, RUF forces burnt eight houses and abducted six people. On their way to the Kaitkant Hills base, the RUF forces killed eight captives who had protested that the loads on their heads were too heavy to bear.

The small Malal Mara Chiefdom is comprised mainly of woodland. The Rokel River, coming from Port Loko District, bisects the chiefdom north to south. The Kaitkant Hills are located in the west of the chiefdom at the boundary with Marampa Chiefdom (Port Loko District). The Kaitkant Hills are a strategic location, surrounded by thick forest, from which Port Loko, Bombali and Tonkolili Districts can be easily reached. Following the attack on Mile 91 and the influx of fleeing people coming from Yoni and Kholifa Mabang Chiefdoms, tension increased in Malal Mara Chiefdom. The Paramount Chief sent messages to the eight sections of the chiefdom for the youths to organise themselves.

During the last days of December and following their attack on Mile 91, RUF forces dispersed and attacked many villages in the different sections of Malal Mara Chiefdom. On 27 December 1994, four armed men entered Ropollon village, followed shortly after by a large group of armed men accompanied by children and women. Inhabitants were chased from their homes, as a result of which most of them fled to the bush. Those who were found in the village were instantly killed. An unknown number of young men coming from Rochin (Malal Mara Chiefdom) were confined in a house and beaten to death by RUF members with clubs, machetes and sticks. When they returned from the bush, civilians discovered bodies bearing wounds inflicted by bladed weapons. Most of the dead were identified as displaced persons from Mile 91. Civilians buried 19 bodies in a mass grave at the side of the Islamic prayer ground. Two other people were buried in single graves.

In the evening of 27 December, RUF forces reached the headquarter town of Rochin (Malal Mara Chiefdom). After gathering inhabitants at the Court Barrie, RUF forces killed an unknown number of them with bladed weapons. On 29 December 1994, seven civilians from Rokimbie (located in the northwest of the chiefdom, within the Kaitkant Hills), including a pregnant woman, were taken to Rochin and locked in a room. While in the room, the captured civilians could hear the forces debating on whether they should be killed. They opened the room and asked the captives to go out one after another, attacking them with cutlasses; only one person survived. RUF forces visited



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Ropollon village again on 30 December 1994 and 2 and 4 January 1995, burning houses on each visit. During their final visit, on 4 January 1995, RUF forces told people to vacate the chiefdom, as the RUF were now “the owners” of it. On hearing this, many people left the area.

c) Events in 1995

In the first months of 1995, Malal Mara Chiefdom, especially Matanka Section in the west of the chiefdom within the Kaitkant Hills area, continued to suffer attacks from RUF forces coming from their base at Kaitkant Hills. This base was said to be the 3rd Brigade camp of the RUF and was used to control the Freetown–Bo highway, to cut off the supply of food and other items to the routes leading to the three Provinces and to spread into Port Loko District. The hills were also used to store the property that RUF forces took from villages and during ambushes.

In January 1995, RUF forces attacked many villages in Matanka Section, killing many people and unroofing houses for the zinc before burning them down. At Robina, RUF forces killed many civilians, who were then buried in a mass grave in the backyard of a civilian’s house. Because many civilians decided to reside permanently in the bush, rather than return to their villages, RUF forces started trailing them in the bush. Those captured were used as forced labour, either to construct houses or as porters.

In February 1995 RUF forces based at the Kaitkant Hills again assaulted Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom. On 2 February 1995, in the late evening, RUF forces entered Mafolatha. The RUF commander told the gathered inhabitants that they had come to conscript young people to the “armed struggle”. The following day, multiple RUF members raped two young mothers and a member of a Small Boy Unit raped another girl under 18. Thirty people were abducted and conscripted into the RUF. Inscriptions were carved onto their bodies with razor blades, or they were branded with hot irons.

Relations were deteriorating between the SLA forces and the residents of Mile 91 and Yonibana. SLA members, who had been deployed to Mile 91 in January 1995 to replace those who were moved to Ma-Sesay village on the main Freetown–Mile 91 highway, were operating the checkpoints; these checkpoints were opened to traffic entering and leaving the town only once a day, at 8:00 am. Civilians were used by the SLA forces to find food in the surrounding villages. During the night, it was common practice for SLA forces to break into civilian houses to find food. Civilians were also sometimes used to carry the food to Mile 91 for the SLA forces. This harassment was concentrated across February and March, which is the main harvest time for rice, groundnuts and maize.

Another RUF unit entered Gbagbai, near Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) on 2 February 1995. RUF forces shot one man in the head and two people had two of their fingers amputated. They raped four women and abducted between 25 and 30 young people below the age of 18 to carry stolen property and livestock. RUF forces then headed for Masiprr (Yoni Chiefdom), where they stayed until 4 February. Seventeen houses belonging to civilians who were “insufficiently supportive” of the RUF were burnt. Five women were raped and many children under 18 were abducted for conscription into the RUF. The headman of the village was stripped naked and was given 24 lashes; on-looking children were told to clap. Before they left, RUF forces took cattle from the town, after which they left to go towards Malal Mara Chiefdom.



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In March 1995, RUF forces crossed the Rokel River and entered Magbondo, north of Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom. Magbondo was very difficult for people to leave, because it is located near the river and is a swamp area. The RUF commander addressed the gathered inhabitants and told them they had information that SLA forces had planned to attack them at Kaitkant Hills and to use Magbondo as a launching point. Consequently, a group of RUF forces would now be stationed at Magbondo while the rest of the forces would head for Mile 91. Before leaving, three houses were burnt, six girls below 15 were abducted to be conscripted and one was raped. The headman was deposed and one of the RUF commanding officers was appointed as Town Chief. Two days later, the RUF commander returned with a new group of RUF forces. Shortly after, he went to Rokankrr, south of Magbondo, both to prepare an offensive on Mile 91 and to intercept SLA forces said to be heading there in preparation for an attack on the Kaitkant Hills.

RUF forces attacked Mile 91 between 15 and 28 March, taking property and abducting civilians to carry the load to their Kaitkant base. There are no reports of killings or destruction of property at this time.⁵⁷⁹ After the attack on Mile 91, SLA forces withdrew from the town to an unknown location, leaving the town undefended. It is also likely that the CDUs in Mile 91 and Yonibana were disbanded in March 1995 because they had proved ineffective in increasing security in the area. However, in April 1995, SLA forces were again stationed at Camp Charlie in the outskirts of Mile 91.

Between 13⁵⁸⁰ and 20 March 1995, four military trucks loaded with SLA forces came to Matanka Section (Malal Mara Chiefdom) to dislodge RUF forces from Kaitkant Hills.⁵⁸¹ After a first unsuccessful attempt the RUF forces evacuated the base in the last week of March following heavy bombardments from a helicopter and a Guinean military jet. Those forces scattered in lower Yoni Chiefdom, where they began attacking villages. During these attacks, property was taken and people were captured to carry the loads, but no civilians were killed. RUF forces then moved into the thick forest in lower Yoni Chiefdom, at the boundary with Moyamba District.⁵⁸²

Throughout March and April 1995, the RUF moved west through Tonkolili District, putting pressure on the Western Area.⁵⁸³ On 22 June, around 150 RUF members retreating from the 8 June assault on Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) entered Mathoir (Yoni Chiefdom). Here they barricaded a road and ambushed an SLA patrol they heard coming, destroying the SLA vehicles. It is unclear whether they inflicted any casualties on the SLA. They then moved

⁵⁷⁹ At the time of the attack, SLA forces were still deployed in Mile 91.

⁵⁸⁰ AFP, 13 March 1995.

⁵⁸¹ It was stated that SLA forces came with some members of Executive Outcomes, the South African private military company, and that one of them was killed during the attack. At this time, however, Executive Outcomes, was not yet in operation in the country so this is probably a reference to the Ghukas, who were briefly contracted by the Sierra Leonean Government prior to the arrival of Executive Outcomes.

⁵⁸² During the same period, RUF forces on their way to Freetown in Moyamba District were stopped in Bradford (Ribbi Chiefdom, Moyamba District) and moved back to Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom, Moyamba District), from where they moved northwards to open a new base, called "camp Fol Fol", in an area at the junction between Bumpe, Ribbi, Kōngbora Chiefdoms (Moyamba District) and Yoni Chiefdom.

⁵⁸³ See events in 1995 in the Western Area.



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South to Roroks⁵⁸⁴ and then onto Makondu (both Yoni Chiefdom) and finally into the town of Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom, Moyamba District).

In October 1995, RUF forces entered Rokankrr (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), mainly to fetch food but also to accuse the people of having collaborated with pro-Government forces. The RUF forces said that the next time they suspected any collaboration, the civilians would “pay the price”. People were required to give them food, as Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom is a substantial rice-producing territory. One man who refused to let RUF forces inside his house to take his property was tied up and beaten to death. Two women were raped, four young men abducted and seven houses burnt down.

RUF forces coming from Yoni Chiefdom in December 1995 entered Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) and surrounded the town. The sounds of heavy gunfire and Rocket Propel Grenades (RPGs) could be heard throughout the town. The RUF commander explained that they had come to find food. Every house in the village was searched and property stolen; some houses were burnt down. RUF forces stayed there for two days, during which time they shot one man dead and raped an unknown number of women. An unknown number of children were abducted for conscription into the RUF. Other civilians were abducted to carry the stolen property.

Two days later, the same RUF group arrived in Rochain Kamandawo (Yoni Chiefdom). RUF members caught four men trying to escape, branding them “Government Spies” before shooting them. At Mananie, the entire village was looted; even the doors and windows were taken from houses. Two women were raped and others were abducted for use for sexual purposes. Children under the age of 15 were abducted and able-bodied men were captured to carry the stolen property. Following this, the RUF forces moved east to their base in the Kangari Hills (Konike Barina Chiefdom), in the south of the District.

On 31 December 1995, RUF forces coming from Mafolatha attacked the village of Matuku 1, four miles east of Mafolatha. Three girls were raped and over 20 young men were abducted. The RUF forces burnt down 8 houses and took the contents of two trailers loaded with assorted goods. After encountering and giving chase to SLA forces based at the nearby Ferry Junction (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), RUF forces returned to Matuku 1. When people came back to the village after the forces had eventually left, they saw the letters “RUF” and other things carved into the walls of the houses.

d) Events in 1996

In January 1996, civil militia known as the Gbethis mobilised in the Mabang area (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) and staged raids on villages in the Mara Section of Malal Mara Chiefdom, taking civilian property.

RUF forces staged a series of raids in the area around Kumrabai Junction⁵⁸⁵ in January 1996. Early in January 1996, RUF forces who, in late December 1995, had been in the Mafolatha area (in the

⁵⁸⁴ Also called Roruks.

⁵⁸⁵ Also called Kumarabai-Mamila, it is located at the crossroads leading to Yele (Gbonkolenken Chiefdom) and to Magburaka.



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extreme south of Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) continued their search for food in the area. The nearby villages of Matuku 2 and Kumrabai Junction were attacked on 5 January 1996. During these attacks, houses were searched for rice, some women were raped, young people were abducted to be conscripted and others were abducted to carry the loads.

On 10 January 1996, the same RUF forces entered Magbonto (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) three miles from Kumrabai Junction, north of the highway leading to Magburaka. The purpose of their visit was twofold: to search for food and to terrorise civilians by asking whether they wanted "peace before elections or elections before peace." The Section Chief of Mabang Section, who was at Magbonto at the time, pleaded with the RUF commander to return the cattle that the forces had taken. The Section Chief was captured and killed at Magbass Sugar Complex (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom). Another man was also killed in the village. Six houses were burnt, six children under the age of 15 were abducted and women were taken to be used for sexual purposes. Before leaving the town, the RUF forces promised that they would come back before the general elections, which were due to be held on 26 February 1996.

These same RUF forces re-entered Magbonto on 23 February 1996. The commander again asked the people whether they were supporting the election process. People answered they wanted peace before elections, fearing the reaction of the RUF forces. While the meeting was going on, a truck loaded with SLA forces entered the town; no fighting took place, which led people to think that the SLA were working in concert with the RUF. RUF forces also looted the town for food; they tortured and shot dead a man who asked how they could provide food when their town had been looted by the RUF on several occasions. Before leaving, RUF forces burnt four houses and abducted two women and eight boys under the age of 15. On leaving the village, RUF forces killed one boy as a warning to anyone who might challenge their authority.

Also in January, a group of RUF forces came to Rokankrr and asked the inhabitants the same question about elections. The RUF commander threatened that they would kill everyone in the town if they voted in the upcoming elections. RUF forces repeated this activity in Marunie (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), eight miles from Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom).

The group that had attacked the Mafolatha area in December 1995 returned to Mafolatha from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom in February 1996, to look for food and for a three-day meeting. Commanders coming from different directions arrived in the town and held a meeting to decide on the action to take if the Government of Sierra Leone decided to go ahead with the elections. People from Mafolatha and the neighbouring villages were warned not to vote and threatened with death if they did. At Matuku 2, over 100 young boys were abducted and boys under the age of 15 were abducted to be conscripted.

Two days before the elections, on 24 February 1996, heavily-armed RUF forces came back to Mafolatha to summon people to support peace before elections. The RUF group then headed for Magburaka, arriving there on 26 February, the day of elections. SLA forces were deployed on the roads leading to the town, but no counter-attack was made. RUF forces composed of about 200 members entered the town in the late afternoon, moved around for the rest of the night, captured



NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE

On or around 19 November 1996, Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom (in the north of Kenema District) followed RUF forces to their stronghold called "Booloko".⁵⁹⁶ Booloko Camp was a very large camp that was divided into four different sections labelled "Tenneh Ground", "Combat Camp", "Sullay Ground" and "Command Post." Tenneh and Sullay Grounds were named after a hero or heroine of the RUF. Civilians and non-combatant RUF were not allowed in Combat Camp. Command Post hosted RUF who were planning offensives. Other Kamajors from Kenema District joined the Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom, attacked the camp and killed 100 RUF members, sustaining some minor injuries themselves. A large quantity of weapons and ammunition were captured from the camp; one captured RUF commando was taken to serve as a firearms training instructor.

The peace negotiations, which started in the aftermath of the elections, reached their conclusion on 30 November 1996 with the signing of a Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Violations of this agreement were, however, rapidly reported.⁵⁹⁷

e) Events in 1997

In January 1997, renegade RUF forces went on the rampage, attacking and burning villages during food-finding missions.⁵⁹⁸

In early 1997, a civil militia known as the Kapras was formed in Kafe Simira Chiefdom in the north of the District. Kapras wore brown country clothes called "rook" and were armed with single-barrel guns, cutlasses and sticks. They established and operated checkpoints all over the chiefdom. People in Kafe Simira Chiefdom assisted the Kapras by giving money or food. The chiefdom was quiet during that period, except for one RUF attack, when forces burnt a vehicle near the chiefdom headquarter town of Mabonto and then went to Nenekoro, in the east of the chiefdom, where they burnt down the village and killed over 20 people. Those people were buried in front of their houses, as the civilians who buried them were frightened to go to the cemetery that was in the bush.

Throughout 1997, relations between local militias and SLA forces were tense.⁵⁹⁹ On 7 March, Kamajor militia clashed with the SLA in Matatoka (Tane Chiefdom), killing 12 SLA members⁶⁰⁰ from the SLA's Rapid Deployment Force. On 23 April 1997, Gbethis intercepted SLA forces who were on their way to Lower Yoni at Yonibana (Yoni Chiefdom). After a battle, the Gbethis were

⁵⁹⁶ Booloko probably refers to the name of the camp the RUF forces had firmly established in the Kangari Hills, despite SLA attempts to dislodge them. It seems that "Booloko" is a generic term and was mentioned with different spellings in other Districts.

⁵⁹⁷ Since the signing of the Peace Agreement, around 15 civilians were killed by RUF forces during food-finding missions in Tane and Yoni Chiefdoms: Sierra Leone Bi-Monthly Information, 19 November - 16 December 1996.

⁵⁹⁸ AFP, 26 January 1997.

⁵⁹⁹ The kind of relationships the SLA forces had with members of the CDF was a result of the relationship they had with the various CDUs.

⁶⁰⁰ Xinhua, 7 March 1997.



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civilians, including children, raped girls and killed civilians they found hiding in the bush. Before leaving, the RUF forces took property, which they made young boys carry. After the attack and after the RUF forces had left for an unknown direction, only a few SLA forces were found on the ground.

After the election process, RUF activities decreased in the District, except for Malal Mara, Kholifa Mabang and Yoni Chiefdoms. At this time, local hunter societies began to be organised in chiefdoms throughout the District, namely the Gbethis in the south and the Kamajors in the south-east;⁵⁸⁶ the Kapras would emerge in the north-east only in 1997. Following frequent attacks by the RUF and harassment by SLA forces, elders from the Kholifa Mabang, Yoni and Malal Mara Chiefdoms set up a civil militia called the Gbethi Society in February 1996.⁵⁸⁷ Composed of local hunters and youths who were organised to perform defence operations for the security of the chiefdoms, some Gbethis were armed with locally-made shotguns, but most possessed only machetes, cutlasses and other bladed weapons. Gbethies dressed country clothes known as “rook”, wore charms and talismans around their necks and had two overall commanders, one representing Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom and one representing Yoni Chiefdom; Malal Mara Chiefdom did not have any commander.

The Gbethis conducted day and night patrols and house-to-house searches for any people who were not inhabitants of a particular locality, who were termed “strangers.” Civilians were warned to give notice to the Gbethis of any stranger and if they failed to do so, they would be fined Le 20,000. Gbethis operated checkpoints together with SLA forces at Mile 91. However, in June 1996, a fight broke out between SLA forces and Gbethis, allegedly over property taken from civilians by SLA forces. The Gbethis said that the SLA forces had failed to give them their share. After this, the Gbethis were in charge of Mile 91 while the SLA forces remained at the nearby Camp Charlie SLA base.⁵⁸⁸ Although this arrangement persisted, some Gbethis returning from a patrol along the highway entered a skirmish with SLA forces, during which two Gbethis were killed. Reinforcements for the SLA forces came from Bo Town to Mile 91 and the chiefdom elders organised a meeting with them to try to smooth the relationship between the two forces. However, the meeting was a failure because the commander of the SLA forces accused the Gbethis of laying ambushes for SLA forces, as a result of which the situation became tense, culminating in a fight between the Gbethis and SLA forces. Six Gbethis and their commanders were killed during this encounter and SLA forces also suffered some fatalities. Overpowered and outnumbered by the SLA forces, the Gbethis retreated from Mile 91 to Mabang (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom).

On 9 March, the SLA announced 2 infantry brigades, supported by Nigerian and Guinean artillery units, had staged successful raids on RUF bases in the Kangari Hills. It was reported that over 30 RUF members were killed during the attacks.⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸⁶ Kamajors would start to be very active in 1997 in Gbonkolenken and Tane Chiefdoms.

⁵⁸⁷ In June 1994, these chiefdoms established a 1000-strong civil militia called the Civil Defence Unit to provide security for Mile 91 and Yonibana. It appears that chiefdom authorities abandoned this particular initiative in March 1995, following attacks across the chiefdoms by RUF forces.

⁵⁸⁸ Camp Charlie is located in the outskirts of Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom).

⁵⁸⁹ AFP, 9 March 1996. This attack did not, however, totally dislodge the RUF forces from this base.



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In the aftermath of the presidential elections, a ceasefire was signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in March 1996 and negotiations for the signing of a peace agreement began. Shortly after, however, RUF forces inflicted serious physical violence on civilians in and around Magburaka.⁵⁹⁰ Remnants of RUF forces carried out raids in villages, looking for food, which led civilians to find refuge in an IDP camp; around this period, over 14,000 persons had found refuge at camps in Magburaka and Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom).⁵⁹¹

In mid October, Gbethis entered Rokanrr (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) with the intention to deploy throughout the Section. The commander of the Gbethis told inhabitants of the town that it was their responsibility to feed the Gbethis, as they were fighting for the people of the town. A man was then accused of being an RUF member after pointing out that this request would impose even more hardship on the civilians. He was tied up and beaten, but later released.

In the early evening on or around 20 October 1996, the headquarter town of Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom) was attacked for the second time; the attack lasted for a few hours. In collaboration with Executive Outcomes, SLA forces stationed at Bumbuna repelled the RUF forces.⁵⁹² The RUF forces retreated along their line of advance to Kegbema 1, south of Bumbuna. In Kegbema 1, RUF forces killed the Town Chief and five other people. They also burned down 9 houses. The Italian workers were evacuated to Freetown. Executive Outcomes remained at Bumbuna to secure the Hydro Electricity Project Buildings from RUF attack and provide training for the SLA troops stationed there.⁵⁹³

Civilians from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom were asked by SLA officials to leave the chiefdom in November 1996 and settle in a camp in the west end of Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom).⁵⁹⁴ A Kamajor representative from Konike Sanda Chiefdom visited this camp and called the men to join the Kamajor Society. Those who volunteered went with him to be trained. Kamajor members were issued with rules to abide by. For example, female Kamajors should not leave their heads uncovered, should not pound grain with a mortar and pestle after 18.00 and civilians should not sit on mortars.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹⁰ Open sources revealed that four women who refused to have sexual intercourse with RUF members had their vaginas and rectum sewed with fishing line while four men also had their rectum sewed, two men had their mouths clamped with padlock and one woman had her vagina clamped with a padlock: *The Independent* (London), 5 May 1996, quoting Amnesty International.

⁵⁹¹ AFP, 5 July 1996.

⁵⁹² Executive Outcomes was a private military company contracted in 1995 by the Sierra Leonean Government to assist the SLA in repelling the RUF forces, mainly by giving military training to SLA forces. They deployed mainly in Kono District.

⁵⁹³ It is interesting to note that during their stay in the country, Executive Outcomes were hired by mining companies in Kono and Moyamba Districts to provide security in the mining sites.

⁵⁹⁴ See Inter Press Service, 2 January 1997 for more on this IDP camp.

⁵⁹⁵ It is unclear from the records whether these rules were also imposed on the civilian population in areas secured by the Kamajors.



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overpowered and withdrew. SLA forces then broke into houses and shops, from which they took a lot of property, and forced civilians to carry the load to Mile 91 and Camp Charlie.⁶⁰¹

In one incident in early 1997, Kamajors from Kholifa Rowalla, Tane and Gbonkolenken Chiefdoms who were looking for RUF forces in the Tane Chiefdom took possession of various items, including guns, they had found in the bushes. This did not please the SLA forces and in May, they attacked Kamajors who were conducting a night patrol along Bo Road. In the same month, SLA forces dressed themselves in Kamajor attire and allegedly burnt the civilian residential camp near Matotoka; as a result of that attack, civilians fled the area.

In the middle of April, following the Abidjan Peace Agreement, around 50 malnourished RUF members who had been based for almost three years in the Kangari Hills surrendered in Magburaka and demobilised.⁶⁰² On 6 May 1997, Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom (Kenema District) went back to "Booloko", the RUF base. During this attack, three members of the RUF forces were killed and 30 were captured and brought to Gorama Mende Chiefdom. These captured men were encouraged to give information about the camp; their response was described as "fruitful". On 24 May 1997, the Kamajors went to the RUF defence headquarters in the Kangari Hills. Thirty-eight RUF members were captured, including their commanders, and an unspecified number were killed. The Kamajors took a large number of weapons and ammunition back to Bo along with the captured RUF members. Those captured RUF members were still in Bo when the military coup took place the following day.

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a coup d'état and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC released over 700 people from the Pademba Road Prison, including their leader, who was formally sworn in on 17 June 1997 as Head of State.⁶⁰³ After the coup, the CDF were asked to disarm by the AFRC forces.⁶⁰⁴ Gbethis from the upper part of Yoni Chiefdom and from Kholifa Mabang and Malal Mara Chiefdoms acceded to this request, but the Gbethis from the lower part of Yoni Chiefdom refused to surrender. Instead, they joined with Kamajors from the South and attacked Camp Charlie, but were beaten; some of them were killed during the battle. Following this attack on Camp Charlie, the Gbethis were given a deadline to surrender.

Following an order allegedly from the AFRC leader, the RUF commander announced that looting should stop and that any civilians or RUF/AFRC members caught looting would "face the consequences". These consequences became clear when three civilians were killed in the town square of Mile 91 for stealing property belonging to other civilians. In a separate incident, a civilian was also shot dead in the square for stealing a foam mattress belonging to another person.

⁶⁰¹ While open sources (Sierra Leone Bi-Monthly Information (OCHA) 15 April - 12 May 1997) mentioned Kapras clashing with SLA forces in Mile 91 on April 1997, there is no information in our records about Kapras activities in the chiefdom; only Kamajors and Gbethis are mentioned in this regard.

⁶⁰² Inter Press Service, 16 April 1997.

⁶⁰³ Xinhua, 17 June 1997.

⁶⁰⁴ The AFRC Chairman made an announcement over the radio that CDF members should lay down their arms and register at the nearest police station.



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In May or June, Kamajors from Gbonkolenken and Tane Chiefdoms held a meeting at Yele, a junction town in the far south of Gbonkolenken Chiefdom. They decided to cut off the highway leading into Kono District, thereby preventing food from getting to the RUF in that District. On May 10 Kamajors units moved into to Tane Chiefdom and blocked the highway between Magburaka and Matotoka, at the place where the Pampana River crosses the highway. SLA forces tried to dislodge the Kamajors from their position so that they could reopen the highway, but were unsuccessful. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone eventually persuaded the Kamajors to clear the road. A Kamajor Society was also formed in Konike Barina Chiefdom in 1997.

In July 1997, as the deadline for the Gbethis to surrender expired in Yoni Chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces began house-to-house searches or screening patrols for Gbethis, using civilians who were familiar with the surroundings. As a result of this screening process, suspects were molested by the RUF/AFRC forces, publicly flogged with their hands tied behind their backs, forced to do frog jumps⁶¹⁵ or to lie on their backs and look at the sun. In addition, the RUF/AFRC forces passed decrees applicable to both civilians and RUF/AFRC members. Night curfews were imposed and contraveners were fined Le 5,000; those who did not pay the fine were severely flogged. RUF/AFRC forces also used civilians during their food-finding missions and forced civilians to do menial tasks in their homes. In October, RUF/AFRC forces coming from the direction of Bo District brought various items, including Honda motorbikes, cars, bicycles and accessories they had stolen and sold them to civilians at Mile 91. They also established small-scale businesses such as hawking and barrow boys. As they moved freely from Mile 91 to Magburaka, Port Loko and Makeni, they would bring back stolen items to Mile 91 to sell them. They further explained to the population that they were stealing because they were not paid and that in any case, civilians should support them and share their food with them, since they had come to save the civilians. These business transactions were, however, sometimes marred by violence and were not conducted fairly; on more than one occasion, RUF/AFRC members required people to pay for the same goods twice. Stealing in the Mile 91 area was described as being at its peak around this period.

RUF/AFRC units with different responsibilities were put in place, including the Military Police and the Task Force. The Military Police were responsible for investigating matters related to the sale and purchase of items. However, if a civilian and an RUF/AFRC member had a quarrel or a disagreement, only the RUF/AFRC member would be allowed to explain their version of what happened.⁶¹⁶

Sometime after the coup in 1997, RUF/AFRC forces settled in Magburaka. Civilians were harassed, women and girls were raped and children were abducted and forced to join the RUF/AFRC movement. Kamajors coming from the eastern part of the chiefdom attacked the town early in the morning, but were overpowered by the RUF/AFRC forces and retreated in the same direction from which they had come. In the afternoon, a member of the AFRC called together the civilians who

⁶¹⁵ To “frog jump” or to “pump” is done by first holding on to the earlobes with two hands – the left hand holding the right ear lobe and vice versa– after which the person is required to jump up and down continuously on their haunches. This form of punishment was both physically and psychologically painful, because it is a punishment meted out mostly to children and it is considered shameful for an adult to be made to “pump”.

⁶¹⁶ See below for the role of the Task Force.



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had fled during the attack. At that time, some women were raped, some civilians were beaten, property was taken and captured Kamajors were executed and thrown into water wells and latrine pits. In the afternoon of the same day, the same AFRC member launched “Operation Pay Yourself”, according to which the RUF/AFRC forces were free to take property belonging to civilians.⁶⁰⁷

One event that took place in Malal Mara Chiefdom after RUF forces had established a base at Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) in June 1997 highlights the structures that RUF forces put in place to obtain food. Malal Mara Chiefdom is a strategic position, as it is the starting point of the road that links up with the road from Magburaka to Makeni through Bombali District. RUF forces were sent to Manewa Section, in the north of Malal Mara Chiefdom, to open a Task Force office to raise funds for their base at Makeni. To achieve this, civilians were required to pay taxes. Furthermore, whenever the base at Makeni needed something, this would be communicated to the Task Force units, who would contact their local administrative heads, who in turn would demand contributions from civilians. The collection of money and property was accompanied by harassment in an attempt to get the items quickly. This process lasted until 1999.

Despite the Peace Plan signed between the AFRC leader and the Government of Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea on October 1997,⁶⁰⁸ RUF/AFRC violations were still reported in the District and RUF/AFRC forces embarked on upgrading the airstrip at Magburaka into a “fully-fledged airport for the illegal importation of arms and other supplies.”⁶⁰⁹

In December 1997, RUF/AFRC forces from Yoni Chiefdom realised that civilians were hiding their properties in the bush. An announcement was made that any civilian caught concealing property would be punished and the property would be taken.

That same month, Kamajors⁶¹⁰ unsuccessfully attacked Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom). This attack aimed at dislodging the RUF/AFRC forces from the town, considered as a springboard for Mile 91 and its environs. There were no reported casualties.⁶¹¹

f) Events in 1998

In early 1998, stealing carried out by RUF/AFRC forces continued in the District. In February, retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown en route to Kono District using the Freetown–Kono highway passed by different chiefdoms in the District. On their way to Kono District, they launched the “Operation Pay Yourself”, according to which RUF/AFRC forces would take food and other items from civilians to last them through their retreat. In addition, in February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces coming from different areas arrived in Mile 91. “Operation Pay Yourself” was also launched there and villages and towns in the chiefdom were looted, mainly for food although there were two

⁶⁰⁷ This kind of operation, namely, massive stealing would be widely carried out in 1998 by RUF/AFRC forces retreating from Freetown and would reach unprecedented levels during that period.

⁶⁰⁸ During this meeting, it was agreed that RUF/AFRC forces would hand over power to the Sierra Leonean President on 22 April 1998.

⁶⁰⁹ Sierra Leone Situation Report (OCHA), 20 December 1997 - 20 January 1998.

⁶¹⁰ They were described as a faction of the CDF speaking Mende.

⁶¹¹ No more information was available on this attack.



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secondary school girls were raped at this time. RUF/AFRC forces, however, avoided the lower part of Yoni Chiefdom since it was a CDF stronghold. While they were advancing to Kono, some RUF/AFRC forces were attacked by Kamajors in Tane Chiefdom. However, the RUF/AFRC forces managed to repel the attack, killing eight Kamajors and wounding many others. Nevertheless, during this time, it appeared to civilians that there was no command structure within the forces and the RUF commander who was familiar to everyone was not around.

RUF/AFRC forces arriving in Magburaka by truck, Honda motorbikes and cars in late February also carried out "Operation Pay Yourself" in the town,⁶¹² which had a lot of traders and many vehicles. In the early evening, some RUF/AFRC members saw a girl in the street and called to her, but she ran away. They followed her to her house. Her father came out and the RUF/AFRC members threatened to kill him if he did not give them his daughter. After begging them, the father told them to do what they had to do, for he had no alternative. One of the RUF/AFRC members then shot him in his left foot, cut off two of his toes and left. In another incident, RUF/AFRC forces met a man in the street, asked him about his money and followed him to his house. When the forces asked him why he did not have any money, he replied that the war had put him "back to square one". The RUF/AFRC forces shot at his house with an RPG, killing the man, who was inside at the time. The family of the dead man reported the case to one of the commanders, who later identified and shot the member who had killed the man. During the night, many girls were raped and some were taken to Kono District. RUF/AFRC forces burnt 50 houses in the town and executed Kamajors they had captured; their bodies were thrown in water wells or latrine pits.

On 5 March, ECOMOG forces entered Magburaka and its environs. Youths were asked to point out any RUF/AFRC member or collaborator and those suspected were detained at Magburaka's Local Prison. As ECOMOG left for Makeni,⁶¹³ RUF/AFRC forces attacked the town before dawn on the following day, 6 March 1998, from the western part of the chiefdom. The RUF/AFRC forces burnt down 25 houses; some civilians were in their houses when they were set on fire and were burnt alive. Many others were killed and many women were raped and some were taken to be used for sexual purposes. Young people were forced to carry the property the RUF/AFRC forces had stolen as they left the town before daybreak towards the south of the chiefdom. ECOMOG then returned to Magburaka and threatened the civilians, accusing them of allowing RUF/AFRC forces to stay in their chiefdom. Property was taken by ECOMOG forces and it is also reported that

⁶¹² From February to June, the number of civilians wounded or mutilated and arriving in Magburaka hospital increased considerably: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (UNOCHA), 1 - 22 May 1998 and 9 June - 6 July 1998.

⁶¹³ Following the intervention in Freetown in February 1998, a new ECOMOG Brigade – 24 Infantry Brigade – was designed for the expansion of its activities in the Provinces. After they had recaptured Lunsar (Port Loko District), ECOMOG forces headed for Makeni, where it was reported ousted RUF/AFRC forces had established their new base: Brig. Gen. R. A. Adeshina: *The Reversed Victory: Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc, pp 29 and 39. That could explain why ECOMOG forces did not stay in Magburaka that day. Accordingly, these ECOMOG forces did not belong to the same group who deployed in Bo and Mfle 91.



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civilians' wives were forced to have sexual relations with some ECOMOG members.⁶¹⁴ At this time, ECOMOG forces also deployed at many checkpoints along the Magburaka–Kono highway.⁶¹⁵

Kamajors⁶¹⁶ launched an attack on RUF positions on 5 March at Magbass village and Magbass Sugar complex, located in Mamuntha Section in the south of Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom. The head of the Kamajors held a stick wrapped in black and red cloth.⁶¹⁷ After the RUF forces sustained heavy casualties, their commander ordered his forces to withdraw towards Magburaka.⁶¹⁸ The Kamajors who had defeated the RUF forces began breaking into the factory and houses in the village, taking property and removing the zinc roof of the factory. They arrested 50 civilians who were hiding and asked them why they were supporting the RUF forces. The civilians were neither killed nor beaten, but were forced to carry the stolen property to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom. When they arrived in the Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, they were released and returned to Mamuntha Section.

Around 17 March, heavily-armed RUF forces⁶¹⁹ returned to retake their position in the south of Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom. At a village called Makorie, they launched the Operation “No Bush Shaking”, which meant they would shoot in the direction of any grass that was moving, on the assumption that people were hiding there. At Makoray, they burnt down four houses and killed three civilians. At Maiekonko, they burnt all 15 houses in the village because they could not find any people there. On the same day, they went to Mayatha, dividing themselves into three groups to attack the village. Some Kamajors were captured, killed and cut into pieces. The next morning, RUF forces called people for prayers but nobody came, as they knew that this was a tactic used by RUF forces to gather civilians and kill them. In the afternoon, the RUF forces left the village, burning down 18 houses, and went back to Magburaka.

ECOMOG forces coming from Bo,⁶²⁰ together with Kamajors from the southern Province, came to Mile 91 in March 1998. By then, the retreating RUF/AFRC forces had already left the town, heading further north. Many civilians fled with the retreating forces, allegedly frightened of being chased and treated as collaborators, since Kamajors considered that civilians in the upper part of Yoni Chiefdom and in Kholifa Mabang and Malal Mara Chiefdoms were all collaborators. Screening processes were organised by ECOMOG and Kamajors for the purposes of identifying collaborators. As a result of this screening process, ECOMOG forces killed six civilians in March. In addition to people, houses were screened and if any of the items found there led ECOMOG and the Kamajors to suspect that the house had in one way or another hosted members of the RUF/AFRC forces, the house was burnt down and the property was confiscated; up to 98 houses were burnt during this process.

⁶¹⁴ No more information was available on this incident.

⁶¹⁵ They notably deployed in Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom) on 6 April: Adeshina, op. cit., p 70.

⁶¹⁶ The Kamajors were equipped with cutlasses, axes and sticks and few of them had AK47s and RPGs.

⁶¹⁷ Red symbolised blood and black symbolised death.

⁶¹⁸ This RUF/AFRC defeat was explained by civilians through the intervention of the mystical power of the Kamajors who were believed to be able to stop the guns of the enemy.

⁶¹⁹ These RUF forces were fully equipped with a lot of RPG, AK47s, G3 and mortar bombs.

⁶²⁰ Those ECOMOG forces had arrived to Bo town from Kenema Town around 20-22 February 1998.



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Kamajors assisted by ECOMOG forces also organised patrols in the villages surrounding Mile 91 to search for “rebel collaborators”. These patrols were accompanied by destruction of property, mostly done by Kamajors. For example, in Yonibana, 45 houses were burnt; 40 houses were burnt in Mawor; and 45 were burnt in Gaindema. ECOMOG forces and Kamajors also allegedly took civilians’ property, which was then conveyed to Bo Town. Following these incidents, Gbethis from lower Yoni Chiefdom decided to confront the Kamajors, but ECOMOG forces managed to contain them and then charged them with ensuring the security of lower Yoni Chiefdom.⁶²¹

In April, some units of the RUF/AFRC forces were still in Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom. In one incident, a suckling woman who had given birth two weeks previously was raped after her husband refused to give his food to some members of the RUF/AFRC forces. Furthermore, the husband was given 36 lashes and was ordered to eat his own excrement. The following month, RUF/AFRC forces burnt down the houses that remained standing in Mafolatha when civilians refused to give them food. On or around 13 April, RUF/AFRC forces⁶²² arrived at Bolyin (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), a village in the Mabang Section that was used as a hideout by civilians. They convened a meeting in the Court Barrie and explained that the purpose of their visit was to ask CDF (Gbethis) deployed in the area to join them to fight the CDF (Kamajors) in Bo District.⁶²³ The CDF refused to join them and the two groups battled for two hours. The CDF eventually overpowered the RUF/AFRC forces, who left the town, taking away food and domestic animals and burning down four houses.

Around this period, Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom), on the highway to Koidu (Kono District), hosted thousands of IDPs fleeing battles between ECOMOG and RUF/AFRC forces in Kono District.⁶²⁴

On 1 June, ECOMOG forces at Mile 91 announced that civilians who were in the bushes could come back in their houses, with priority being given to women. Following this announcement, women arrived at Mile 91 and were taken to the Caritas building, where they were accommodated for the night. During that night, four of them were raped by Kamajors. It is reported that at this time, ECOMOG forces were unable to control the Kamajors, who had their own command structure. Later in June, men were allowed to resettle back at Mile 91 and were thoroughly screened at checkpoints operated by ECOMOG forces and Kamajors. In July 1998, a suspected “rebel” was apprehended by Gbethis and taken to ECOMOG forces at Mile 91, where he was killed.

In June, CDF from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom came to Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom and liberated Mafolatha, Makelleh (Yoni Chiefdom) and the surrounding villages from RUF/AFRC presence. Since then, no further RUF/AFRC attack was sustained in this area.

Kamajors from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom went to Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom on 5 December and entered Mabom, around 10 miles south of Magburaka. They dislodged the RUF/AFRC forces who

⁶²¹ It should be recalled that tension had existed between the Gbethis and the Kamajors since 1997.
⁶²² Some of those forces were carrying AK47s and RPGs while others were equipped with cutlasses and sticks.
⁶²³ At this time, Kamajors and ECOMOG forces had driven RUF/AFRC forces out of Bo District.
⁶²⁴ Inter Press Service, 8 July 1998.



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were there and, before returning to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, went on rampage, breaking into civilians' houses and abducting some young men and women. They took food, furniture like bed mattresses and building materials, burnt 15 houses and headed for another village called Masoria, where they asked civilians to point out the houses where RUF/AFRC forces used to live. They went in the houses identified by the civilians and searched for arms and ammunition. As they did not know how to operate the weapons they found – mortar bombs and anti-aircraft guns – they burnt them before returning to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, where they set up more checkpoints. People coming from Magburaka and crossing the border to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom were often arrested, tied with ropes called “FM”⁶²⁵ or detained in a cage where cattle slept, suspected of being a “rebel” collaborator. People who were found to be collaborators were killed, allegedly in the forest between Tane and Gbonkolenken Chiefdoms, near a stream called Nasi.

In late December, an important movement of troops were to be seen in different chiefdoms of the District. One group of armed men and women, around 300 in number, dressed in mixed military uniforms entered Mabonto (Kafe Simira Chiefdom) in December 1998. They came in a big green military truck with a foreign military plate, which was identified as belonging to ECOMOG forces deployed in Teko Barracks (Bombali District). The troops identified themselves as “Government troops” coming to protect civilians from the advancing “rebels”. They then asked the inhabitants to cook for them and civilians realised that these troops were actually RUF/AFRC forces in disguise; most of them were speaking Liberian dialects and Mende.⁶²⁶ After one week, the whole town was controlled with checkpoints and civilians were required to have a pass if they wanted to leave the town. The next day, some of the RUF forces moved towards Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom). During their stay in Mabonto, the RUF forces instituted a Court and the most common crimes prosecuted in that court were rape and stealing. Three RUF/AFRC members were executed for these crimes.⁶²⁷

Kalansogoia Chiefdom was the scene of many ambushes and attacks carried out by RUF/AFRC forces. The Hydro Compound at Bumbuna was under construction and was therefore of interest, because there were lorries, fuel and other similar items. Thus six attacks were led by RUF/AFRC forces on the town. On 14 December, two ECOMOG members on patrol along the Bumbuna-Bendugu (Sambaia Chiefdom) road fell in an ambush staged by RUF/AFRC forces and were killed.

On 21 December 1998, a large number of armed men in dirty uniforms came from Kono District to Tane Chiefdom, telling people they were tired of fighting and they were no longer going to the bush.⁶²⁸ Some of these troops went towards Magburaka and Makeni while others stayed in Tane Chiefdom, following civilians into the bush in search of food or what was called Jar Jar, which means taking things from civilians by force. Small girls were taken as their “wives” and young men were abducted to carry their loads. They sent messages to civilians to come out of the bush as they

⁶²⁵ FM means “frequency modulation”, for it was believed that once tied with this rope, which had two sticks on its edges used to tighten the rope around people’s limbs, people began to speak.

⁶²⁶ Around this time, it was believed that combatants from Liberia, allegedly supported by the Liberian President, were taking part in the hostilities in Sierra Leone.

⁶²⁷ No more information was available on these incidents.

⁶²⁸ RUF/AFRC forces retook control of Koidu (Kono District headquarter) on 20 December.



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said they were no longer fighting civilians or Kamajors, only ECOMOG forces. Following this, some Kamajors started to surrender. Twenty of them came and as nothing happened, more and more Kamajors came out, up to 80 in number. Those Kamajors who did not surrender went to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom. Many civilians went also to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, at this time a Kamajor stronghold, after the armed men had taken half of their property at gunpoint.⁶²⁹

Three days after the attack on Koidu Town, the headquarters of Kono District, hundreds of RUF/AFRC forces reached Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom, entering Magburaka Town on 23 December.⁶³⁰ Previously, the RUF Battle Field Commander had been interviewed on the BBC and declared they would enter Freetown by road. While in Magburaka, the RUF/AFRC forces raped and killed people. For example, on 26 December, a boy working in a garage was threatened with death if he could not repair the Honda that some RUF/AFRC members had brought him the night before. As he became more and more distressed, the boy attempted to run away and was shot by the forces. The same forces pushed their Honda and asked another boy to help them. The boy was then left to hide at the corner of a house and, as he thought the fighters had left, he moved along the street. The RUF forces shot in the air and called out to the boy. When he turned around, the RUF forces shot him in the head. The same night, some members of the RUF/AFRC went to Bathmorie, near Magburaka, and attacked a house, thinking they would find girls. As there were none, they took a young boy to lead them to a house where they could find girls. The boy went to a house and told the girls to vacate the place quietly. When he came back to the RUF/AFRC members, he told them there was no girls there. The members went to the house to check what the boy had said and no girls were to be found. They then started hitting the boy on his back with their G3 guns, they then shot at his feet and shot him another time, killing him. At this time, the RUF commander told civilians that the RUF/AFRC forces would attack Freetown and many civilians were abducted for use in the fighting forces.⁶³¹

g) Events in 1999

Around 1 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces entered Kumrabai Junction (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) from the direction of Magburaka, en route to Mile 91. On their way, some of the RUF/AFRC forces were left at Kumrabai Station, Matuku 1 and Matuku 2. The relationship between the RUF/AFRC forces and the CDF was allegedly cordial and a civilian was appointed as an intermediary between the two groups. Two days later, however, other RUF/AFRC forces coming from Waterloo passed through Kumrabai Junction and headed to Ferry Junction, the crossing point at the boundary between Kholifa Mabang and Gbonkolenken Chiefdoms, asking what was the mileage to the headquarter town of Yele (Gbonkolenken Chiefdom). They started firing at CDF forces, who returned fire. This group of RUF/AFRC then moved to Magburaka.

Following this encounter, about 500 CDF members from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom attacked Robis, Kumrabai Junction and Ferry Junction and took property. They killed three people at Robis, four at

⁶²⁹ No more information was available on these incidents.

⁶³⁰ No battles with ECOMOG forces were reported. It seems that after they came back to the town in March 1998, ECOMOG forces did not stay the whole year, although it could not be ascertained when they left the town. RUF/AFRC forces would hold the town until 2002.

⁶³¹ Makeni (Bombali District) was attacked around 27 December 1998.



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Ferry Junction, and eight at Kumrabai Junction; raped four women; and abducted 15 boys under the age of 15, possibly for recruitment into the fighting forces.⁶³²

On 14 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces who had attacked Magburaka at the end of 1998 entered Mile 91 and overcame the Kamajors and ECOMOG forces, who retreated south in the direction of Bo District. The RUF/AFRC forces appealed to the civilians not to run away, as they were not their focus, which was the ECOMOG and Kamajors forces. For three days, however, a lot of property was taken, before the RUF commander gave the order for it to stop. This attack on Mile 91 is believed to have taken place to cut off the highway that leads to Freetown, which had been invaded on 6 January and was still at least partly still under RUF/AFRC occupation.⁶³³

The RUF/AFRC forces began operating checkpoints at strategic locations around the town and thoroughly screened people coming in to identify any possible CDF member. Civilians coming from Lower Yoni were closely checked, as their area was hosting Gbethis and Kamajors from the Southern Province. Small Boys Units were used to confiscate property from civilians, which was then handed over to their superior officers. RUF/AFRC forces carried out food-finding missions in the surrounding villages and civilians were used to carry the food to Mile 91.

On 28 January 1999, not long after the killing of the two ECOMOG forces during a patrol in late 1998, SLA forces deployed at Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom), establishing a brigade headquarter. On their arrival, the SLA forces dug trenches around the town and laid down landmines, escorting civilians to avoid them stepping on the mines. Bumbuna was a point of passage for RUF/AFRC forces coming from Kono District using the Kayima Road (Koinadugu District). RUF/AFRC forces coming westwards from the direction of Magburaka and Mabonto launched many attacks on Bumbuna; the fiercest one took place on 15 February 1999, between 7:00 pm and 7:00 am. RUF/AFRC forces were unsuccessful in dislodging the SLA and instead occupied all the villages along the border between Kalansogoia and Kafe Simira Chiefdoms,⁶³⁴ chasing civilians in their hideouts for food and cattle and burning down houses in the villages. The aim of these attacks was mainly to capture the SLA arms and ammunition.

The presence of the SLA forces in Bumbuna brought some relief to the population. As the highway leading to Magburaka was under RUF/AFRC control, thereby preventing lorries from bringing food, the only way to secure food was for the civilians of Kalansogoia Chiefdom to go to Kabala (Koinadugu District), which was 76 miles away.⁶³⁵ As a result, civilians were mainly living on the food rations that were airlifted by helicopter from Freetown for the SLA forces. The commander in charge of the SLA forces was allegedly very strict with the forces under his command so that they would treat civilians cordially.

Throughout 1999 and 2000, the whole area surrounding Bumbuna up to Magburaka was under RUF/AFRC control. RUF/AFRC forces operated checkpoints on the Magburaka-Kono highway,

⁶³² No more information was available on these incidents.
⁶³³ See the events for the Western Area, 1999.
⁶³⁴ Kajida, Kabaray, Kasikoro and Yibai were thus occupied at this time.
⁶³⁵ It took civilians three to four days to reach Kabala.



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issuing and asking civilians for travelling documents called “passes”, which cost Le 500 and were valid for 72 hours. No other documents but these passes were accepted as valid travelling documents. People who produced “Government documents”, namely documents issued by State Institutions, were arrested and detained, accused of being one of “Tejan Kabbah’s people”, namely a supporter of the Government.

By January 1999, almost half of the civilians from Tane Chiefdom had fled to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, where the Kamajors were very active. Kamajors from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, together with those who came from Tane Chiefdom, decided to attack the RUF/AFRC forces stationed in Tane Chiefdom. In March, after some of the RUF/AFRC forces stationed in Tane Chiefdom had crossed the border to Madina (Gbonkolenken Chiefdom) and had killed one Kamajor during a fight, the Kamajors decided to cross the border between the two chiefdoms and attack positions in Tane Chiefdom. Both factions crossed the border many times, attacking each other in Yele and Matotoka. As a result, Tane Chiefdom was seriously damaged as many houses were burnt down. In April 1999 and following an RUF/AFRC attack on Yele that had left 10 houses burnt down, Kamajors went to Matotoka and burnt 50 houses, including the Paramount Chief’s compound. On their way back to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, they set more houses on fire in Makenikoray (Tane Chiefdom). When they saw flames in Matotoka, RUF/AFRC forces burnt the remaining houses, thinking they were Kamajors’ houses because they had been left standing by the Kamajors.

In March 1999, Kamajors together with Gbethis coming from Lower Yoni went to Mile 91 to attack the RUF/AFRC forces. A fierce battle took place at Yonibana but the CDF had to retreat, as some of them were killed during the attack. Following this attack, RUF/AFRC forces looted houses at Yonibana and forced civilians to carry the load to Mile 91.

Another attack was launched on Mile 91 in the middle of April 1999 by combined forces of Kamajors, Gbethis, ECOMOG and SLA. There was a lot of shooting during what was described as the heaviest attack on Mile 91 since the war started. The RUF/AFRC forces were forced to withdraw to the direction of Magburaka.⁶³⁶ After the attack, the bodies of 10 civilians, including four women, were found in the town. Thirty houses had also been burnt down. In addition, cases of rape were reported, although civilians were unable to ascertain with certainty the identity of the perpetrators.⁶³⁷ This control of Mile 91 enabled ECOMOG and Kamajors forces to reopen the highway to Bo Town, although the portion of the highway between Masiaka (Port Loko District) and Mile 91 was still considered insecure.⁶³⁸

Subsequently, Mile 91 saw an influx of civilians coming from Makeni, Magburaka and other areas in the north that had fallen under the control of RUF/AFRC forces. These displaced people had no choice but to occupy destroyed dwellings, which they tried to fix.

⁶³⁶ In May, serious fighting was reported in the area of Magburaka: IRIN West Africa, 24 May 1999.

⁶³⁷ It could not be ascertained whether those acts were committed by the RUF/AFRC forces or by the combined forces of ECOMOG, Kamajors and SLA.

⁶³⁸ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (UNOCHA), April 1999. Since March 1999, Bo District had been under Kamajor and ECOMOG control.



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Between March and May, following constant pressure from SLA forces and the CDF, a senior RUF commander issued an order to all RUF/AFRC commanders that all the young men in Makeni and Magburaka should be abducted and trained as fighters. The ground commander in Magburaka called his sub commanders to go and capture the young men of the town. Many young men fled in to the bush while this operation, which lasted two weeks, was carried out. On 10 March 1999, about 100 young men were captured and locked in the Train Store of Agriculture in Magburaka. These young men were then sent for training by vehicle to Burkina, which was the code name for Kailahun. After two weeks, the young men who were caught were fined Le 50,000 and, if they could not pay, were given 300 lashes as a punishment for hiding while the “recruitment” was being carried out. One month later, sometime in April 1999, RUF/AFRC forces in Magburaka faced a food shortage and started attacking villages to take their food. During these attacks, young girls were also taken to become the “wives” of the RUF/AFRC forces.

Throughout the year, CDF forces from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom were also very active in Kholifa Mabang and Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdoms. It is reported that a lot of destruction was carried out in the villages, where property was taken, women raped and people accused of being collaborators or sympathisers of the RUF/AFRC forces were tortured. Killings of people suspected of being “rebels” or collaborators were carried out in the CDF base at Mamilla Gbla.

In one incident in March, three members of a group of Kamajors from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom who were attempting to attack Magburaka Town were shot dead by RUF/AFRC forces, who then sprinkled petrol on the bodies and set fire to them. As they retreated, the other Kamajors shot dead a man they had called out to but who had run into the bush.

In April 1999, following civilians’ complaints about the flogging of civilians with up to 200 lashes, the rape of young girls and the killing of civilians, the commander in charge of the RUF/AFRC forces in Manewa Section (Malal Mara Chiefdom) was replaced by another senior RUF/AFRC commander. The new commander extended the RUF/AFRC’s activities towards the north to Kiampkakolo Section, to the west to Mara Section and to the south, to Massathelel Section, deploying in the major villages of the sections. A senior AFRC commander imposed that everybody in the villages should register at the military police task force; any civilian that was not registered would be considered to be a spy for the elected Government. Furthermore, civilians were responsible for feeding the troops. Routine checks were carried out in the villages and if any person who was on the registration list were missing, the local authorities appointed by the RUF/AFRC would be beaten and fined. The movement of petty traders coming from other chiefdoms was controlled by the military police, who would search everybody and confiscate anything they wanted; anyone who complained about this was flogged. Some youths from the villages were used to carry items stolen during the looting activities called Jar Jar. Those who were unable to carry the load or who were sick during the journey were shot dead. Some of the youths who were forced to carry the load were cooperative and were promoted to the rank of small unit leaders and later on to local commanders, which enticed many youths in the villages into joining the movement. The use of the youths enabled thus the RUF/AFRC forces to have access to all the hideouts, where they stole food and other domestic items.



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After a ceasefire was signed in May 1999, the negotiations between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone reached their conclusion in the signing of a Peace Agreement in Lomé, Togo. Some relief was brought to the people of Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom at this time.⁶³⁹

Starting in the middle of the year, after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, RUF/AFRC forces from Magburaka on food-finding missions were attacked by Kamajors from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom. For example, following one food-finding mission where RUF/AFRC forces arrested and beat civilians for failing to give them rice, Kamajors moved from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom and blocked the highway at Pampana Bridge in Tane Chiefdom at the boundary with Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom. It is reported that the matter was referred to the RUF High Command, who ordered that the Kamajors be dislodged using an anti-aircraft machinegun.⁶⁴⁰ The Kamajors could not resist the attack, during which 20 CDF members were killed and most of them run away. The RUF/AFRC forces threw the bodies into the Pampana River. However, they managed to capture two Kamajors, who were stripped naked and had ropes tied to their backs; these ropes were then also tied behind the lorry that was carrying the anti-aircraft machine gun. When they arrived at Magburaka, the two Kamajors were dead, their bodies severely mutilated; the RUF/AFRC forces later burnt their remains.⁶⁴¹

In October 1999, Gbethis attacked villages in Malal Mara Chiefdom, targeting both the RUF/AFRC positions and civilians. Cases of looting, rape and killing of civilians were reported. Young people were forced to carry the stolen property and since it was the harvest season, civilians were taken to their farms to carry out the work of harvesting.⁶⁴²

In early October, tension between RUF/AFRC forces⁶⁴³ escalated and an in-fight arose in Makeni (Bombali District) between RUF forces on one hand and AFRC forces on the other hand. A senior RUF commander came from Magburaka to attack AFRC forces based in Makeni. It seems that the RUF forces were first not able to dislodge the AFRC members and withdrew from Makeni to Magburaka, where they were allegedly attacked the next day from the "Old Town" section of the town. The fighting lasted for two days. Eventually, in late October, RUF forces from Magburaka and backed up with forces coming from Kailahun District dislodged the AFRC forces from Makeni and occupied the town.⁶⁴⁴

⁶³⁹ Although this assertion is not accompanied with details, it gives an idea on the activities in the chiefdom at this stage.

⁶⁴⁰ The person tasked with carrying out this assignment would later become Foday Sankoh's bodyguard.

⁶⁴¹ In October, the situation around Magburaka and Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom) was still insecure, as civilians were forced to give food to the Paramount Chief who in turn gave the food to RUF/AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces also went directly to the civilians to take food: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (OCHA), 3 - 9 October 1999.

⁶⁴² No more information was available on these incidents.

⁶⁴³ Following the retreat from Freetown in February 1998, the relationship between the RUF and the AFRC forces was often tense, culminating on some occasions in infighting: for more information, see the analyses for Bombali and Kono Districts.

⁶⁴⁴ It is alleged that this infighting was of a personal nature, because the senior RUF commander who originated from Makeni did not tolerate that the AFRC senior commander in charge of Makeni looted his home town.



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On 22 October, the UN Security Council established a 6,000-strong UN peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone in support of the Lomé Peace Agreement. According to the resolution, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) would be deployed throughout the country.⁶⁴⁵ However, the first batch of UN peacekeepers from the Kenyan contingent were denied access to Magburaka by local RUF commanders, although the peacekeepers were carrying letters of authority from the RUF leader.⁶⁴⁶

At some point in 1999, RUF forces came back to settle at Makali (Konike Barina Chiefdom) and asked the CDF to come and join them, which some CDF members did. Junior RUF members were sent on food-finding missions; later, however, they asked civilians to feed them before they began looting and using children to work for them, in particular to go on food-finding missions. People reported the matter to senior RUF commanders, who then came to the town and advised the civilians to make a war committee, which they did. Later on, the RUF leader came and declared that the war was over.⁶⁴⁷

In the middle of November, RUF forces reopened to a certain extent the Magburaka-Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom), which at that time was still under their control. Vehicles that had been stolen by RUF members were driven along this highway as commercial transport; the vehicles were generally driven by civilians under the control of RUF members. However, potential passengers were frightened to board these vehicles and continued to use bush paths on foot.

h) Events in 2000

In January, United Nations Military Observers (MILOBs) started patrolling in the Northern Province and in particular in Magburaka.⁶⁴⁸ By the middle of the month, the deployment of UN peacekeepers was near completion.⁶⁴⁹ During this period, it was hoped that the disarmament camp would be open soon in Magburaka so that the disarmament process could properly start.⁶⁵⁰

In mid January 2000, one of the well known RUF commanders was shuttling between Malal Mara Chiefdom, Makeni and Magburaka, which led the people of Malal Mara Chiefdom to think he had other assignments elsewhere. At the end of the month, another group of RUF forces arrived, headed by a different commander. During the same period, more youths joined the Gbethi Society in the chiefdom.

RUF/AFRC forces from Magburaka spent much of January and February in most of the areas in the chiefdom where Kamajors had been, then went through the western part of the chiefdom to attack

⁶⁴⁵ The number of peacekeepers would increase over the subsequent months.

⁶⁴⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (OCHA) 6 - 19 December 1999.

⁶⁴⁷ By the end of the year, the RUF leader and the former AFRC Chairman went to the Provinces to engage the disarmament process.

⁶⁴⁸ IRIN West Africa, 6 January 2000.

⁶⁴⁹ IRIN West Africa, 11 January 2000. One Kenyan Battalion was deployed in Magburaka and Makeni.

⁶⁵⁰ On 20 October 1999, the Sierra Leone President had officially launched the start of the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) program during a ceremony at Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown. The start of the DDR program had been briefly delayed as it was originally planned to take place within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999.



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Mile 91. On their way, they abducted many young men in Magburaka to carry their arms and arrived at Kumrabai Junction, where they met strong resistance from the Kamajors and had to withdraw. On their way back, they passed by Masoko, where they asked civilians to show them where the Kamajors were. Despite one boy telling them there were no Kamajors in the village, the RUF/AFRC forces burnt down 10 houses and killed three civilians whom they suspected of being Kamajors. They then passed by Mayossoh, where they burnt 13 houses, and Robinkie, where they burnt down 11 houses together with the factory.

A Guinean Battalion of United Nations peacekeepers deployed in Mile 91 around March. During the same period, the DDR camp was still under construction in Magburaka.⁶⁵¹ The situation in Tonkolili District, however, was tense and deteriorated rapidly. In April 2000, RUF forces asked the UN peacekeepers to dismantle the reception centre⁶⁵² for combatants in Magburaka.⁶⁵³

Around 2 May 2000, the RUF/AFRC regional commander for the Northern Province came to Magburaka and ordered the ground commander that all the members under his command should take up arms to attack the UN peacekeeping forces in their areas of deployment, which were the Arabic College along the highway and the Water Works Campus.⁶⁵⁴ The regional commander also declared that any RUF member failing to take up arms would be killed immediately. The ground commander for Magburaka mobilised his men and launched a first attack on the UN peacekeepers deployed at Water Works Campus. The fight lasted for three hours and, later, a gunship came to rescue the peacekeepers based at the Arabic College, who were then able to escape towards Mile 91.

However, the situation was more complicated for those based at Water Works Campus as they were surrounded by RUF/AFRC forces. The situation became extremely difficult as they ran out of food and water. After an attempt to negotiate with the RUF/AFRC forces through the intermediary of the Paramount Chief had failed, they regrouped in their armoured vehicles and left their camp using the Makeni road through the Rokel River Bridge to Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom),⁶⁵⁵ where SLA forces were deployed.⁶⁵⁶ On their way, one of their armoured cars had an accident and two peacekeepers died. In Magburaka, RUF forces also destroyed the DDR camp.

⁶⁵¹ IRIN West Africa, 17 March 2000.

⁶⁵² The reception centre is the first place where combatants were to go to disarm: they were to register and to give their weapons in there before being orientated in the DDR camp.

⁶⁵³ According to UNAMSIL, the RUF forces on the ground asked for the dismantlement because they had not been informed about this centre by their leader: IRIN West Africa, 26 April 2000.

⁶⁵⁴ These attacks coincided with the final departure from the country of the ECOMOG. BBC Online News Archive 3 May 2001. These attacks against were nation-wide, for similar actions took place at the same time in Bombali, Kambia and Kailahun Districts. Unsuccessful attacks on Mile 91 and Camp Charlie (Yoni Chiefdom) may also have taken place.

⁶⁵⁵ Reports for Mabonto, located on the highway between Magburaka and Bumbuna confirmed that UN peacekeepers passed by the town in armoured vehicles towards Bumbuna.

⁶⁵⁶ Around 10 May, Kenyan UN peacekeepers arrived in Kabala (Koinadugu District). IRIN West Africa 11 May 2000.



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Shortly after the demonstration outside the house of the RUF leader in Freetown in May 2000,⁶⁵⁷ RUF/AFRC forces from Malal Mara Chiefdom crossed the Rokel River and went to Magbondo (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), where they burnt down eight houses and took food. They moved on the same day to Rokankrr (south of Magbonto), where they took property, burnt houses and told the people they would “pay the price” for the death of their leader, as they thought he was dead following the public demonstration. The CDF who were allegedly there left the town, as they were insufficiently armed to confront the RUF/AFRC forces. The commander ordered his men to go on the rampage: they burnt nine houses, abducted eight women, raped three and took 20 young men for recruitment and to carry the stolen property to the RUF/AFRC base in Malal Mara Chiefdom.⁶⁵⁸

In May 2000, a Government gunship flew over Magburaka and fired on the Central Market, killing five civilians. The gunship went on to fire also on the Adams Hotel, which was the RUF headquarters in the town. However, many civilians were near the hotel and some fatalities were reported. Furthermore, as also happened in Kambia District, the gunship dropped leaflets intended for the RUF/AFRC forces, which explained that this time, the Government forces had come with minor weapons but if they had to come a second time, they would destroy the entire area.⁶⁵⁹ As a result of these leaflets, many people left the area and went to Mile 91, where there was an IDP camp hosting thousands of people. On the way to Mile 91, which is 35 miles from Magburaka, some civilians died from starvation while others were killed by Guinean forces, who considered people coming from Magburaka to be RUF/AFRC members. In the IDP camp, a diarrhoea epidemic started and as a result, children and adults died, before Médecins sans Frontières came into the camp to control the disease.⁶⁶⁰

During that same month, a lot of vehicles and armoured cars came during the night to Makali (Konike Barina Chiefdom) with about 150 Zambian peacekeepers, who had been captured by RUF/AFRC forces in Bombali District. The UN peacekeepers were packed in a storeroom under a two-storey building. Most of the RUF/AFRC forces guarding these peacekeepers appeared to be under the age of 15. After four days, two senior RUF commanders came one night, loaded these Zambians onto a truck and took them away. Civilians were told that they were taken to Burkina, which was a codename for Kailahun.⁶⁶¹

RUF/AFRC forces had occupied the headquarter town of Mabonto (Kafe Simira Chiefdom) since 1999. Civilians were still harassed, mainly for food, and some basic structures were put in place. Civilians were forced to give away their food and other items and a G5 committee⁶⁶² was established. A system of passes was established and civilians had to pay Le 500 for these passes, which enabled them to cross at checkpoints. Furthermore, mining villages in the chiefdom were asked to contribute

⁶⁵⁷ See the analysis on the Western Area for 2000.

⁶⁵⁸ No more information was available on these incidents.

⁶⁵⁹ The Government dropped such leaflets in various locations across the Northern Province.

⁶⁶⁰ Since fighting resumed in the Northern Province, Mile 91 hosted thousands of IDPs. For example, in early June, 22,000 IDPs had found refuge in Mile 91. This was the greatest concentration of IDPs in the north: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (OCHA), 6-10 June 2000.

⁶⁶¹ No further information was available on this incident.

⁶⁶² Members of those G5 committees were appointed by the RUF/AFRC forces.



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200 carat of gold dust every month or to pay the equivalent money if there was no gold dust. Allegedly in May, a senior RUF commander based in Magburaka came to Mabonto to oust one of the commanding officers posted there, who then moved towards Makeni with his forces. On one occasion, one member was killed by firing squad for raping a civilian. During the same period, a Government Jet bombed one house at Mabonto, injuring some civilians.⁶⁶³

Many battles took place at Tonkolili Village, on the boundary between the Kalansogoia and Kafe Simira Chiefdoms. RUF forces killed during those skirmishes with SLA forces from Bumbuna were buried in mass graves in the village. Other attacks were carried out in the area, like Thamsoberic, where some civilians were killed. Some acts directed towards civilians were still reported. For example, one man at Makama, north of Mabonto had his food taken away and his son was killed because he refused to tap palm wine for the RUF/AFRC forces. Every night, houses were searched for food and girls. One man was shot as he pleaded with some members not to cut the stomach of a pregnant woman to find out the sex of the baby.

In June, RUF/AFRC forces coming from Malal Mara Chiefdom came again to Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom, to a village called Marunia. They held a meeting in the village, the purpose of which was to enquire about the deployment of SLA forces, since they wanted to attack the highway. It is reported that those RUF/AFRC forces were furious because their leader had been arrested.⁶⁶⁴ At this time, the RUF/AFRC forces burnt eight houses, raped four women and abducted 40 young men to be used in the fighting forces. While RUF/AFRC forces were taking property in the village, one man refused them entry into his house. The matter was reported to the RUF commander, who ordered his men to kill anybody who would challenge his authority. Before they left the town, RUF/AFRC forces tortured and killed 20 people and mutilated the hands of two others. The 40 young men who had been abducted were forced to carry the stolen property.

The security situation in the Mile 91 area was delicate, for the influx of civilians did not allow the UN peacekeepers to control the area properly. As RUF/AFRC forces were approaching the area in June, the UN decided to strengthen the number of peacekeepers deployed in Mile 91.⁶⁶⁵ On 23 June, a group of heavily-armed RUF/AFRC forces equipped with armoured cars seized from peacekeepers came from Magburaka to Kumrabai Junction, after burning the remaining houses at Robis and Ferry Junction. These forces were planning to attack Mile 91 and at Kumrabai Junction, they killed eight people. The Gbethis passed information about this plan to the UN peacekeepers, who sent a helicopter gunship to Kumrabai Junction. However, they mistakenly bombed a village called Mamanso Kabla, hitting four houses and killing six people. This attack led the RUF/AFRC to move back to Kumrabai Junction, where they killed four people, and then to Mamilla Gba, a CDF base, where they burnt seven houses, killed five people, took property and abducted 10 boys below the age of 15 for recruitment into the fighting forces. They later on moved to Mathinka Bana, near Mamilla Gba, where they killed 18 civilians and dumped the bodies into an old water well. Most of the people who were killed were IDPs from Magburaka and Makeni. The RUF/AFRC forces left

⁶⁶³ No further information was available on these incidents.

⁶⁶⁴ The RUF leader was arrested shortly after the events of 8 May, when his bodyguards opened fire on the crowd that had gathered to demonstrate outside his house.

⁶⁶⁵ UNAMSIL press briefing, 23 June 2000 and IRIN West Africa. 26 June 2000.



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and crossed the River Rokel, in the north of the chiefdom.⁶⁶⁶ In late June, a convoy of UN peacekeepers were ambushed near Mile 91 by RUF/AFRC forces. One of them died and four others were wounded.⁶⁶⁷

Between June and July, RUF/AFRC forces from Malal Mara Chiefdom tried to find common ground with the Gbethis in the chiefdom in order to avoid any confrontation. After a first attempt in June, both factions agreed in July on the establishment of a system by which each faction should not cross for any reason to the other faction's area. A buffer zone was thus created and the areas of each faction were separated by the Rokel River, although it did not prevent civilians from moving from one area to the other, either to meet relatives or to undertake business activities. It therefore seems that the RUF/AFRC forces concluded this deal with the Gbethis to be able to have total control over the civilians in one area.⁶⁶⁸ Contributions required from civilians continued unabated and new forms of contributions were put in place. Civilians from one village were forced to push a truck loaded with stolen items to another village, where the lorry would be taken over by civilians from the second village. This continued until civilians reached the main road that links Magburaka to Makeni. The RUF commander in Malal Mara Chiefdom also planned to attack CDF in Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom and for this purpose, ordered civilians from Marokie, Manewa and Mamama to construct boats to cross the Rokel River.⁶⁶⁹ Youths were actively trained for this planned attack, while acts of violence against civilians continued. Women were raped, more property was stolen and more dues were levied on the civilians to feed and equip the RUF/AFRC members. This attack was not carried out and in January 2001, a new commander was put in charge of Malal Mara Chiefdom; he did not behave as his predecessor had and neither imposed harassment on civilians nor tolerated it in this forces, who were punished if they behaved this way.

In August, an Indian contingent of UN peacekeepers replaced the Guinean contingent at Mile 91. Around this period, the situation in Yoni Chiefdom as well as in the Magburaka area appeared to be rather calm and little information was reported for the remaining months of 2000. UN peacekeepers encouraged the free movement of basic items like condiments, especially in RUF-controlled areas, for they told the civilians that if they could not obtain those items, the RUF forces may attack them. Sometimes after this deployment, a member of the RUF/AFRC was sent to Mile 91 to inform UNAMSIL that they were ready for peace. The member was intercepted by Gbethis, who brought him to the commander of the UN peacekeepers. A Gbethi was sent to Magburaka to convey a message about peace process.

However, the situation in Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom) was alarming at this time, as thousands of civilians reached the SLA-controlled town in early August. Those civilians had fled the RUF/AFRC attacks and the Government bombing in Magburaka and Makeni (Bombali District) in

⁶⁶⁶ During a UN-AMSIL press briefing on 28 June, the UNAMSIL Force Commander who had made an air tour in the area disclosed that he did not see any burnt village.

⁶⁶⁷ BBC Online News Archives, 1 July 2000. During this period, the area between Masiaka (Kowa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Mile 91 was under constant RUF/AFRC threat and attack. Masiaka was attacked on 3 June 2000: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (OCHA), 26 June - 9 July 2000.

⁶⁶⁸ For civilians, the RUF commander revealed "his true colour" after the agreement with the Gbethis.

⁶⁶⁹ During the rainy season, the main rivers in Sierra Leone cannot be crossed by foot.



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May and June and had lived in the bush before reaching Bumbuna. Over the subsequent months, the humanitarian situation would deteriorate: civilians from surrounding villages that were under RUF control continued to arrive in Bumbuna, where food could only be supplied by air.⁶⁷⁰

The Lomé Peace Agreement was reactivated on 10 November in Abuja, Nigeria, where the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone signed a ceasefire agreement. The main provision of this agreement was the disarmament of the RUF forces and the deployment of UNAMSIL forces in RUF-held areas. On 8 December 2000, a meeting gathering RUF officers,⁶⁷¹ SLA forces, Gbethis, Kamajors and UN peacekeepers was held at Ferry Junction (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom). The RUF engaged to reopen all the roads in the RUF-controlled areas, to hand over all the remaining United Nations' equipment seized in May, to allow UNAMSIL deployment in RUF-controlled areas and to allow access to humanitarian assistance.⁶⁷²

In December 2000, the RUF regional commander for the Northern Province came to Mabonto (Kafe Simira Chiefdom) with over 200 armed men and women. At this time, the relation with civilians was bad as 10 cases of the rape of girls aged between 12 and 15 were reported. The RUF senior officer settled this problem and a G5 committee was set up; one of its roles was to collect rice and money for the forces. However, looting was still carried out by both the RUF and CDF forces. Youths were forced to carry the rice to the RUF/AFRC forces' houses while women were forced to pound the rice and to fetch water. The situation in the town continued to get worse as the most basic cooking and food items were becoming scarcer. Civilians were also forced to rehabilitate the road that lead to Mansoberie and Maranda, both of which are located in a mining area.

On 4 May 2001, a meeting to review the ceasefire signed on 10 November 2000 was convened between the RUF, the Government of Sierra Leone, UN representatives and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, again in Abuja, Nigeria. On 15 May, the Government and the RUF agreed that accelerated and simultaneous disarmament of the RUF and CDF would be done District by District and that meetings would be held⁶⁷³ for them to decide which districts would follow after this program began in Port Loko and Kambia Districts.⁶⁷⁴

As a sign the peace process was progressing, the different fighting factions organised football matches in July. The first match was played at Magima (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom). That same month, five RUF members came to Camp Charlie and had a meeting with the UN peacekeepers.⁶⁷⁵ However, a few skirmishes were still reported and on one occasion, on 5 September, RUF forces

⁶⁷⁰ See among others, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Reports (OCHA) 25 July - 07 August 2000, 28 August - 18 September 2000 and 28 October - 13 November 2000, UNAMSIL press briefing, 4 October 2000.

⁶⁷¹ The records only mention RUF, not AFRC or "juntas". The UNAMSIL delegation comprised six officials and was led by the Force Commander while the RUF delegation comprised 14 members and was led by the RUF interim leader: UNAMSIL press briefing, 8 December 2000.

⁶⁷² *Idem*.

⁶⁷³ Further to this meeting, tripartite meetings of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration would be held every month.

⁶⁷⁴ UNAMSIL press briefing, 3 July 2001.

⁶⁷⁵ No more information was available on this meeting. It seems that this forum was organised to discuss the peace process and the disarmament program.



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prevented SLA forces from bringing supplies to Bumbuna. Nevertheless, a supply convoy escorted by UN peacekeepers was able to reach Bumbuna on 26 September and go further to reach Kabala on 3 October.⁶⁷⁶

During the sixth meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR on 11 October, the parties agreed to have accelerated disarmament in Tonkolili District simultaneously with Pujehun District from 1 to 14 November.⁶⁷⁷ The DDR camp was located at the Mathora Government Girls' Secondary School.⁶⁷⁸ On 13 November, the UNAMSIL Force Commander witnessed the final phase of the disarmament⁶⁷⁹ and 2,911 combatants had disarmed in the District by 20 November.⁶⁸⁰

3. Conclusion

To be drafted

⁶⁷⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 1 - 30 September 2001.

⁶⁷⁷ UNAMSIL press briefing, 12 October 2001.

⁶⁷⁸ UNAMSIL press briefing, 2 November 2001.

⁶⁷⁹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 16 November 2001.

⁶⁸⁰ Of these, 1,534 were RUF combatants and 1,377 were CDF combatants: UNAMSIL press briefing, 20 November 2001.



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D. Eastern Province

a. Kailahun District

1. Introduction

Kailahun District is one of the three Districts in the Eastern Province of the Republic of Sierra Leone. It has a strategic position due to the fact that it shares borders with the Republics of Liberia on the east and Guinea on the northeast. It is also bordered by Kono District on the northwest and Kenema District on the west. Its headquarter town, Kailahun Town, is located in Luawa Chiefdom, in the north of the District a few miles from the Parrot Beak, the Guinean area that advances into Sierra Leone. This area would be greatly affected by the conflict, originally because it hosted thousands of refugees and later as it became the theatre of RUF cross-border attacks.

There are fourteen chiefdoms in the District:

<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarter</u>
Dia	Baiwala
Jawie	Daru
Kissi Kama	Dea
Kissi Teng	Kangama
Kissi Tongi	Buedu
Luawa	Kailahun
Malema	Jojoima
Mandu	Mobai
Njaluahun	Segbwema
Peje Bongre	Manowa
Peje West	Bunumbu
Penguia	Sandaru
Upper Bambara	Pendembu
Yawei	Bandajuma

The geographical position of Kailahun District made it a strategic location for the entry of RUF/NPFL forces from Liberia into Sierra Leone. The District occupies about half of the border area between the two countries and is connected with the diamond-rich District of Kono. This made it possible for the forces to access funds easily through the sale of produce, diamonds and gold, with which they procured weapons and other logistics for the forces. It is therefore not surprising that the District was at least partially occupied throughout the whole period of the conflict. Two main roads allow penetration into the District from Liberia: in the north of the District through Kissi Teng Chiefdom and in the centre through Upper Bambara Chiefdom.

Kailahun District, particularly in the north and east, is composed of dense jungle, which affected the fighting in the District. Furthermore, the road that links Kenema Town to Kailahun Town, through the main towns of Segbwema, Daru and Pendembu, is virtually impassable during the peak of the rainy season from July to August. The Moa River, which finds its source in the ocean in Pujehun District, flows in Kailahun District from the southwest to the north. The control of the few bridges



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spanning this river would be of the utmost importance, as is illustrated by the case of Daru (Jawei Chiefdom), where the town is separated from the SLA Moa Barracks by a bridge.

Aside from its mining activities, the wealth of the District comes mainly from the harvest of cash crops like cocoa and coffee. From the beginning of the conflict, the presence of the RUF in the District and their control over those resources would have dramatic economic consequences for the whole country.

The ten or more years of conflict that took place in Sierra Leone first started in the border towns of this District in 1991. The fighting forces coming from Liberia entered through border villages both in Upper Bambara and Kissi Tongi Chiefdoms. Initially, Sierra Leoneans and most of the outside world regarded these attacks not as the start of a conflict as such but more as cross-border raids by the Liberian forces waging war in Liberia. However, these two incursions into Sierra Leone – together with a third one that took place shortly after in Pujehun District – were the starting point of a systematic occurrence of several events leading to a large-scale conflict that spread throughout the country and lasted for over a decade.

The District was affected by the conflict through three discernable phases. The first one, which ran from March 1991 to the end of 1993, was characterised by the progression of RUF/NPFL forces into the District and their direct confrontation with SLA forces based mainly at the Moa Barracks in Daru (Jawei Chiefdom). RUF/NPFL forces would follow the same pattern when attacking and entering a village: they would gather the civilians in the Court Barrie and hold a meeting, introducing themselves as “freedom fighters” and deposing and replacing local authorities. Their arrival and stay was accompanied by the infliction of physical and mental violence on the people of the village, the killing of some people, in particular relatives of civilians working for the Government, as well as the abduction of members of the population, including children, for use as forced labour, as fighters, as cooks and as “wives”. RUF/NPFL forces also engaged in widespread theft and property destruction, notably the burning of houses. Some members, mainly belonging to the NPFL, engaged in massive rounds of killing, raping and cannibalism, which led to infighting between the RUF and the NPFL forces. Throughout this first phase, SLA forces engaged the RUF/NPFL forces in their various positions and by the end of 1993 to the beginning of 1994, they had confined the RUF forces to the extreme east of the District. These military victories over the RUF/NPFL forces were accompanied with violence against civilians, in particular against alleged RUF/NPFL members or “collaborators”. Screening centres were established for this purpose.

The second phase of the conflict encompassed 1994 to May 1997 and is characterised by a change in the RUF tactics. By 1994, most of the fighters were belonging to the RUF as the NPFL had withdrawn to Liberia. The RUF engaged in guerrilla warfare, took control of the bush, began to regain control of the areas previously under SLA control and raided villages. In 1996, Kamajors emerged in the District and, together with the SLA, defeated the RUF in some areas of the District. Although the Abidjan Peace Agreement was signed on 30 November 1996, fighting between the RUF on one side and the SLA and Kamajors on the other side resumed in early 1997.



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During the third phase, which ran from May 1997 to the completion of the disarmament process in January 2002, RUF forces came out of the bush and merged with the AFRC regime. Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces retreated to Kailahun District, where they established a War Office, the administrative headquarter of the forces. Around this time, more men were initiated into the Kamajor society. ECOMOG forces deployed in the District and engaged the forces on land and by air. Assisted by Kamajors, they obtained victories over RUF/AFRC positions but were unable to take over their main strongholds. RUF/AFRC forces continued attacking villages and ECOMOG positions; following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, disagreement between senior RUF members emerged over the disarmament process. RUF opposition to this process reached its peak in May 2000 with the abduction of UN peacekeepers. Throughout 2000 and early 2001, RUF/AFRC forces were still active in the District and engaged in cross-border raids into Guinea.

It should be borne in mind that unlike other Districts, the information available for Kailahun District was often chaotic and incomplete, especially for the period following 1994, partly due to the massive displacement of the population. Indeed, from the start of the conflict, a lot of inhabitants of this District fled to neighbouring countries (Guinea, Liberia) and did not come back for years, while others, although they stayed in the District, regularly moved from one chiefdom to another, fleeing attacks. The figures of the rate of internally displaced people in the District throughout the conflict was very high; indeed, OCHA reports show that Kailahun District was one of the most affected Districts in terms of internally displaced people (IDP).⁶⁸¹ Furthermore, as Kailahun District was the only District to have always been controlled to varying degrees by RUF/NPFL, RUF and, later, RUF/AFRC forces, people who stayed were forced to live with them for such a long time that single events are often blurred in more general information.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1991

On 23 March 1991, the first group of RUF/NPFL forces from Liberia entered through the border town of Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) in the central part of Kailahun District and proceeded further south. A second group crossed the border with Liberia on 27 March 1991, entering the border town of Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) in the north-eastern part of the District. These forces opened two distinct entry points into the District and would join up at Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) in April.

The forces that launched these two flanks were composed by a majority of National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) members,⁶⁸² a fighting force that had been challenging the Liberian Government since 1989, together with about 230 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) members trained in Liberia⁶⁸³ at Camp Namna.⁶⁸⁴ The Sierra Leoneans within the movement who were trained in Liberia were called "Vanguards", as opposed to the new recruits who were called "junior commandos".

⁶⁸¹ OCHA Sierra Leone Encyclopedia: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/sl/is>.

⁶⁸² It is estimated that at the time of the first attacks, those NPFL forces were roughly 5,000 in number.

⁶⁸³ In 1989, the NPFL emerged in Liberia under the leadership of Charles Taylor and began an uprising against the Government of the then President Samuel Doe. In 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent a peacekeeping force to Liberia and the President, Samuel Doe, was killed by a splinter group of



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Those attacks surprised civilians, who thought this incursion would not last long and was only a cross-border raid from the forces fighting in Liberia who were in search of food. Hundreds of these civilians fled their villages both within the territory of Sierra Leone and outside its borders into Liberia.

The first group attacked the border town of Bomaru (south-east of Upper Bambara Chiefdom), which had little military manpower in terms of Sierra Leone Army (SLA) forces deployed along the Liberian border. The RUF/NPFL forces⁶⁸⁵ killed eight civilians and three SLA members as they captured the town. The SLA forces were overpowered and left the town, heading for the Moa Barracks⁶⁸⁶ in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), the most important SLA deployment in Kailahun District. On 25 March, the RUF/NPFL forces proceeded further south to attack the towns of Baiwala and Sakiema (Dia Chiefdom). The RUF/NPFL forces entered Baiwala coming from two distinct directions: some forces passed through Seinga, a town located close to the border with Liberia, while others came from Bomaru. They encountered stiff resistance from the SLA forces, but eventually, as had happened at Bomaru, the SLA retreated and the RUF/NPFL forces were able to take control of the town. At Baiwala, the RUF/NPFL forces set some houses on fire, raped young girls⁶⁸⁷ and killed people whom they considered to be important personalities, on the accusation that they were “APC people”. Breaking down doors using the butts of guns and then looting the houses was also common, as forces were looking for money and other items they needed, although the forces presented their actions as a way to make sure there was no enemy hiding in the houses. They also wrote the letters “RUF” on the walls of some houses. Following this attack, civilians packed their belongings and headed for Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), as the SLA base appeared to be safer.

At Sakiema (Dia Chiefdom), some civilians who had escaped from Baiwala found a brief respite in the bush, thinking that the forces would only use the main road as their announced goal was to go to Freetown. However, they were discovered by RUF/NPFL forces, brought to the town, put under gunpoint and ordered not to move, or they would be shot. The RUF/NPFL forces gathered some civilians at the Court Barrie and asked them whether there was any of “Momoh’s soldiers”⁶⁸⁸ in the town. When the civilians answered that the SLA forces were at Daru, the RUF/NPFL forces stated they would kill all of them if they found any SLA member or heard any weapons being fired. The commander told the civilians that from now on everything in the town belonged to the “RUF Government”, dismissed the Town Chief and appointed a Town Commander together with a Town Mother. Civilians in the town were forced to contribute to the “revolutionary effort” by providing

the NPFL. The Economic Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces deployed a battalion near Freetown at the International Airport in Lungi as a rear base for their forces in Liberia.

⁶⁸⁴ For more information on those fighting forces, see section [X].

⁶⁸⁵ These forces were comprised of Liberian mercenaries speaking Liberian languages like Mano, Pele and Gio, while others were Sierra Leoneans, speaking the Mende, Temne and Krio languages. They wore country clothes, carried talismans and other charms and had red bandanas tied around their heads.

⁶⁸⁶ The Moa Barracks are strategically located at the entrance of Daru on the road to Kenema town and to access it from the north-east, one has to cross the Moa River. It would be a RUF/NPFL target throughout 1991 and beyond.

⁶⁸⁷ Their ages could not be ascertained from the records.

⁶⁸⁸ The President of Sierra Leone was at that time J. S. Momoh and accordingly, this term refers to SLA forces.

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the forces with food as well as going in search of food and processing palm oil. When food was not available, RUF/NPFL forces would tie up the appointed Town Commander and beat him. The RUF/NPFL forces also introduced a set of laws, which were explained to the inhabitants by the RUF commander. One of these laws was that any civilian captured by RUF forces should not attempt to leave the area under their control for areas controlled by SLA forces. Civilians were also told to go to the bush and bring back to the town their relatives who were in hiding; the RUF commander stressed that anybody caught in the bush would be considered as an enemy and, accordingly, would be killed.

From these towns located in Dia Chiefdom, RUF/NPFL forces advanced westwards to the headquarter town of Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom). This town was captured on 11 April as the SLA forces had apparently left the town earlier. The RUF/NPFL forces entered the town with an armoured tank they had captured from the SLA forces. As most of the civilians were indoors, the forces banged on the doors to make people come out of their houses, threatening to kill them or to burn their house. Most civilians, including children, were imprisoned in the town mosque. The Chiefdom Speaker, a regular policeman and a court clerk were killed. The fighting forces introduced themselves as the "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone" and explained that they had come as "freedom fighters" to free the country from APC oppression. During the time of their stay in the town, they passed a strict rule that no one was allowed to call on the name of God or to pray; anyone caught violating this law would be tortured and killed. Furthermore, all property was declared to be owned by the "Revolution". Some of the RUF/NPFL forces began raping women and young girls. They also took property of the people in the town. During the following days (12 and 13 April), a lot of other civilians were killed. On 13 April 1991, the Paramount Chief of Mandu Chiefdom was brought from Levuma (north of the chiefdom) to Mobai and killed two days later. He was the first Paramount Chief to be killed by the RUF/NPFL forces. The killing of the Chief caused the civilians to lose confidence in the revolution, as the RUF/NPFL presented and called themselves. Similarly to what happened in the other towns, civilians were told to bring their relatives out of the bushes. For example, on 23 April, six people who had left their hiding places in the bush and came back to the town were accused of being spies and were killed. This incident was later reported to the RUF leader when he came to visit his troops in May.

Although the exact dates could not be ascertained, towns located in Jawie Chiefdom were attacked and captured at around the same time between April and June, including Benduma (Jawie Chiefdom), a town close to Daru. In order to counteract any attempt by the SLA forces based in Daru to recapture the town, the RUF/NPFL forces also established a defence base at Baiima (Mandu Chiefdom) on the road leading from Daru to the east and the north of the District. Another defensive position was established at Potoru (Jawie Chiefdom), where there is a bypass bush road leading to Benduma. Some of the RUF/NPFL forces settled at Kuiva (Jawie Chiefdom), which is on the main highway to Daru, and at Patama, a small village on the road leading to Daru via Bombohon (Jawie Chiefdom). When they entered Benduma, the RUF/NPFL forces gathered the civilians in the centre of the town and forced them to kill their animals and to cook for them. Some civilians who managed to escape the town went to Daru to pass on the information about the attack to the SLA forces. During that time, Guinean troops came to reinforce the SLA forces based at the Moa

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Barracks at Daru.⁶⁸⁹ Shortly after their arrival, those Guinean forces succeeded in repelling the RUF/NPFL forces from Benduma by using mortar bombs, although neither the Guinean forces nor the SLA forces then deployed at Benduma. The repelled RUF/NPFL forces went to Gbiima (Jawie Chiefdom), which was already under their control.

The RUF/NPFL forces entered the chiefdom headquarter of Jojoima (Malema Chiefdom, south of Mandu Chiefdom) on 12 April 1991. Before the attack, Jojoima was overcrowded with civilians fleeing the areas under RUF/NPFL control and chiefs in the town had received letters from the RUF that they would come to the town on 12 April. In the town, the forces met with a rich farmer and asked him for money. The forces then apparently left the town for some days before returning on 19 April 1991. When they came back, they killed the renowned master farmer and his wife together with many other civilians. The forces also stole property, raped young girls aged between 14 and 20, whom they made their "wives" and conscripted children. Young men were forced to carry loads for them, mainly to Liberia, and they would be killed if they failed to do so. From Jojoima, they raided the surrounding villages, forcing civilians to lead them on these raids. At Sembehun village, for example, they stole one diamond dealer's land cruiser.

On 15 April, the RUF/NPFL forces entered Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) from the direction of Bomaru in the south of the chiefdom, firing gunshots as they entered. As they did in the other towns, the RUF/NPFL forces gathered the civilians in the Court Barrie, introduced themselves as "freedom fighters", explained that the town was now under the "RUF Government" and asked the civilians whether there were any SLA forces or police officers in the town. Civilians were subjected to severe harassment, their property was taken and they were beaten, raped and killed. For example, an RUF member shot two boys because they did not obey a command he had given them. Several other killings were done during the two weeks they remained in the town. One civilian was asked to show the direction to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) to one young RUF/NPFL member, who then rode a bicycle to Kailahun Town (17 miles north east from Pendembu) to tell the other front who had entered through Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) and who had reached Kailahun Town to meet the south flank at Pendembu. Shortly after, still in April, RUF/NPFL forces from Kailahun Town came to join the other group at Pendembu.

The second group mentioned at the beginning of this chapter had entered the country in the northernmost part of the District in order to establish a base at Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) on 27 March 1991. They also came from Liberia and killed a first army officer at a customs town called Beidu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom). On the same day, they reached Koindu, a strategic international commercial market centre close to the borders with Liberia and Guinea and located on the highway that leads to Kailahun Town. During this wave of attacks, this group captured all the main towns on the highway. Koindu was renamed "Kuwait" by the forces due to the valuables that it had and for two days they killed people, stole their property and burnt down houses. At this point, civilians began leaving the town and went to Guinea or inland seeking rescue. It is reported that these fighters called themselves "freedom fighters", claiming to be fighting in order to liberate Sierra Leone.

⁶⁸⁹ As early as 1991, foreign troops, namely Guineans and Nigerians, fought alongside the SLA, pursuant to bilateral treaties between their respective states and Sierra Leone.



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On 29 March, some RUF/NPFL forces advanced into Kissi Kama Chiefdom (west of Kissi Teng Chiefdom). At Dia (Kissi Kama Chiefdom), one Fullah⁶⁹⁰ businessman was killed. At Njaah in April, RUF/NPFL forces entered the town firing indiscriminately. They killed one SLA member who had retreated from Koindu, beheaded him and displayed his head on top of a big stone to the civilians they captured in the village. They gathered the civilians, explained they were "freedom fighters" and appointed a Town Commander. Those communications were made with the assistance of an interpreter, as the commander was Liberian.

On 1 April 1991, two trucks loaded with SLA forces headed for Koindu through Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) to launch an attack on the RUF/NPFL forces.⁶⁹¹ The first battle between the two forces took place the same day at Dambo, a town on the main highway close to Koindu, in Kissi Kama Chiefdom (west of Kissi Teng Chiefdom). The RUF/NPFL forces overpowered the SLA forces, who had to retreat to Kangama. Dozens of SLA forces were killed during this battle. They were further dislodged from Kangama after several unsuccessful attempts to repel the RUF/NPFL forces from Koindu. Some of the retreating SLA forces arriving at Kangama created panic among the civilian population as, similarly to what was happening in the southern part of the District, the SLA forces were quickly overpowered and did not put up strong resistance to the invading forces. Some of these SLA forces were reported to take off their uniforms, hide their weapons and flee to Guinea with the thousands of civilians who were on their way. Other SLA forces withdrew to the chiefdom headquarter of Buedu (south of Kissi Teng Chiefdom).

RUF/NPFL forces captured Kangama on 6 April 1991. While in the town, RUF/NPFL forces began inflicting violence on civilians and their property. The house of the Paramount Chief was burnt down and his property taken away. The RUF/NPFL conscripted young boys and girls, whose age is unclear,⁶⁹² who were then trained and given arms and ammunition. Cases of sexual violence were reported and in one instance, an old woman from Liberia who had found refuge in the town was raped by one of the RUF/NPFL commanders; her body was later found in the bush. The first man to be killed in the town was a Fullah businessman. Seven people were also killed by the RUF/NPFL commander allegedly for having close links with SLA forces or because they had once been in the SLA; their bodies were subsequently burnt.

In the evening hours of 10 April 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces armed with sophisticated weapons like Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), AK47, AK58 and other guns launched an attack on Buedu. At this time, SLA forces had withdrawn from Koindu and large numbers of civilians had started to flee to Guinea. The next day, the SLA forces retreated to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) after

⁶⁹⁰ The Fullah are an ethnic group living mainly in the north and east of the country who were targeted, together with civilians originating from Lebanon, by the RUF/NPFL forces, who believed they were the cause of inequality among Sierra Leonean citizens.

⁶⁹¹ Those SLA forces probably came from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) to reinforce SLA forces based at Koindu. However, according to one source, those SLA forces at Koindu were new recruits who were still undergoing training.

⁶⁹² In the Sierra Leone context, the term "young people" could refer to anyone up to their mid to late thirties, but probably does not include people under 15.



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losing three men in the battle. The RUF/NPFL forces shot and killed seven civilians and burnt down public buildings and some private houses.

On 13 April, RUF forces entered the District headquarter, Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), in the north of the District. RUF/NPFL forces on their way to Kailahun Town killed the Town Chief at Sandeya (Luawa Chiefdom). From this date on, Kailahun Town would be nicknamed "Burkina Faso". The RUF/NPFL forces entered the town from the two main roads heading east towards Buedu and Koindu.⁶⁹³ From Kailahun Town, the RUF/NPFL forces spread across Luawa Chiefdom. At Sandeya on 20 April, for example, RUF/NPFL forces told civilians to go to Kailahun Town, where they were lined up and given rice the forces had stolen from shops to take back to their villages. However, one man who had brought rice to his family, who were hiding in the bush, and who came back to ask for more rice was accused of giving rice to hidden SLA forces and was shot dead. Another civilian was also killed that day near the town clinic, accused by the forces of stealing some drugs. Civilians then returned to their various villages but without their youths, as young men and girls, including children, were kept by the forces to be trained at a training base opened in Kailahun Town shortly after the RUF had taken control of the town. Those who tried to escape were killed. Since its inception, the RUF movement was organised and had an internal structure; one RUF commander, occupying the "G5" position, was in charge of opening new training bases as their territory gains progressed and as they moved further inland. It should be noted that this massive opening of training bases did not prevent the establishment of smaller ones, often at the war front by the commander in charge of the area.

During the three months following their entry into Sierra Leone, the RUF/NPFL forces were stealing, raping and abducting people and training those abductees for battle. Many women were abducted to be slaves, their heads shaved so that they could be easily identified and could not run away. Abductees who tried to escape were beheaded by RUF/NPFL forces and their heads were put on sticks at checkpoints as a warning to others.

During the first months of the conflict, most of the commanders were members of the NPFL and therefore spoke a different dialect than that spoken by Sierra Leoneans. Civilians were frightened of these forces and they did not dare to tell them they could not understand what they were being asked, although some people were killed for answering the "wrong way". For example, on 27 April 1991, on the highway that leads to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), two men who had come to Pendembu to buy salt were interrogated at a checkpoint. As they could not understand the Liberian English spoken by the NPFL forces in charge of the checkpoint, they were mistaken for spies. The NPFL commander told the two men to step back six feet from them and shot them with an AK47. Their bodies were then decapitated and their heads put on sticks to frighten other people.

The leader of the RUF came from Liberia to visit his troops at Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), Sakeima (Dia Chiefdom) and Baiwala (Dia Chiefdom) in late April or early May 1991. He visited his troops at Mobai, where he presented himself to the civilians as the leader of the revolution, claiming that they were fighting to remove the incumbent APC regime from power and

⁶⁹³ No information concerning the fatalities for Kailahun Town was reported.
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stating that he would fight until he reached Freetown. He further promised the civilians that he would bring facilities such as free education and free medical care to the people of Sierra Leone and that equal rights would be given to all Sierra Leoneans. On this occasion, the Public Relations Officer appointed by the RUF/NPFL forces at Mobai explained to the RUF leader that his members were killing people for no good reason, with reference to the six people killed on 23 April. However, although the RUF leader told the civilians that he had not instructed his men to kill civilians, this statement sounded false to the civilians who did not believe in his sincerity.

From Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) SLA forces recaptured Benduma (Jawie Chiefdom), forcing the RUF/NPFL forces to retreat to Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom) and its environs where they forcefully conscripted young men and women into their movement. The RUF/NPFL forces established a training base at Baiwala to train young men and women whom they called "junior commandos".⁶⁹⁴ At first, RUF/NPFL forces appealed to the civilians to join them voluntarily, which some did, but as their number was not sufficient, they started arresting young men and women. At Baiwala and Sakierna (Dia Chiefdom) for example, young men and women were lined up and anybody who tried to refuse joining the forces was seriously beaten, some being instructed to roll on the ground while RUF/NPFL forces fired in the air or close to the person on the ground, killing some of them. In the process of recruiting junior commandos, the girls were used as sex slaves and some were trained as junior commandos. This prompted a lot of young men and women to flee into the bush. In several cases the forces opened fire on the civilians in the bush and food and many other items were taken from them.

The RUF/NPFL forces extended their attacks to other villages in Luawa and Kissi Tongi Chiefdoms, crossed the Moa River that divides the District in two and advanced on Peje Bongre, Peje West, Penguia and Yawei Chiefdoms. At Dawa, a border town in Kissi Tongi Chiefdom, RUF/NPFL killed nine civilians on 15 April. Some of the bodies were cut into pieces and cooked for the forces to eat that day. During the same attack, some houses were burnt down. Dawa became important for the RUF/NPFL forces, as it was located on one of their supply routes. On 17 April, RUF/NPFL forces attacked Kodu Bendu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), firing indiscriminately and killing civilians. Some civilians, including children under 15 years old, were abducted to join the forces.⁶⁹⁵

Between 18 and 27 April, RUF/NPFL forces captured Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), the first chiefdom headquarter encountered after crossing the Moa River. During their attack on the town, they killed some civilians and burnt some houses.⁶⁹⁶ Peje West Chiefdom (west of Peje Bongre Chiefdom, bordered on the west by Malegohun Chiefdom in Kenema District) was also affected during the same period.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁴ One report mentions that this training base was opened in May but this needs to be carefully considered, as there is no exact date for the information preceding the opening of the training base.

⁶⁹⁵ For both of these attacks, reports mentioned that the fighting forces came from Liberia. However, it could not be ascertained with certainty whether this meant that those forces were coming directly from Liberia when they launched those attacks or whether this was a general reference to the RUF/NPFL forces who had originally entered Sierra Leone from Liberia.

⁶⁹⁶ No further details could be obtained on this attack.

⁶⁹⁷ RUF/NPFL forces reached this chiefdom between April and May.



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On 1 May, the G2 commander⁶⁹⁸ in Kailahun Town ordered general looting as his men needed to eat and goats and sheep were taken away. During that process, vehicles were also taken away. Some women were raped, civilians killed, houses burnt and men trying to oppose the RUF/NPFL actions were severely beaten. Shortly afterwards, another RUF commander in charge of the Bandajuma Sinneh area (Luawa Chiefdom) declared that those stealing, raping and killing actions should stop and any commando involved in such actions would be killed in the presence of the civilians. Therefore, on 27 May, one commando who raped two women who had gone in the bush to fetch firewood was taken to Bandajuma and killed by the commander, who expressly stated that this kind of action should stop. However, this incident did not please other RUF/NPFL forces and soon after, another group invaded and burnt down Bandajuma and Sandeya, killing four people.

On 4 May 1991 RUF/NPFL forces entered Tangabu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom), led by a Liberian commander. This commander killed one man in the village as he said that since he started fighting in Liberia, he kills one person per day. By this time, RUF/NPFL forces had already spread to the Kissi Chiefdoms (Kissi Kama, Kissi Teng and Kissi Tongi) and Luawa Chiefdom. The commander gave orders to his forces to rape young girls in the village; old women were forced to pound rice and go fishing. Six of the members raped a 10 year-old girl on 8 July 1991, who later died from her wounds. Around this time, the RUF leader also visited his troops at Buedu, where he outlined to the civilian population the aims and objectives of his revolution. According to him, the main target was to eliminate the APC regime and its followers and, further, to liberate Sierra Leoneans from mental slavery and other acts imposed on them by the APC government. By June 1991, Kissi Teng Chiefdom was already under the control of the RUF/NPFL forces.

The RUF/NPFL also opened a training base at a small village called Bayama, three miles from Tangabu town. The training base was located at the school and young boys were forced to join the training; those who refused were tied up and imprisoned.⁶⁹⁹

In early May, RUF/NPFL forces reached Yawei Chiefdom, in the northeast of the District,⁷⁰⁰ remaining there until the end of the year. From there, they patrolled the surrounding villages, such as Massayema in the south of the chiefdom and Ngeblama in the centre of the chiefdom, west of the chiefdom headquarter of Bandajuma. When they first arrived, most notably at Baraka, they introduced themselves as “freedom fighters” coming to redeem Sierra Leoneans from the tyranny of the APC regime. This statement inspired some civilians who had indeed suffered from the APC regime to welcome the arrival of the forces and some voluntarily joined them; this happened not only in this chiefdom but in many other chiefdoms as well. However, as soon as people heard or witnessed the first killing or other acts of violence committed against the population, most of them withdrew their initial confidence in the RUF movement.

⁶⁹⁸ See section [X] for a description of the hierarchy within the RUF forces.

⁶⁹⁹ It seems that the term “imprisonment” used to report this event refers to the action of locking a civilian up somewhere. No more information could be obtained on this event.

⁷⁰⁰ Yawei Chiefdom is bordered on the north by Gbane Chiefdom (Kono District).



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Thirty RUF/NPFL members entered Woloma (Penguia Chiefdom) in mid May and forced civilians to gather in the Court Barrie, hitting some old men and women in the head with the butts of their guns. They stayed in the town for two days before 20 of them headed for surrounding villages together with some young men and women from Woloma. In the nearby villages, as they could not find young men and women, they beat elderly people, hoping that those people would ask their children to come out of their hiding places, as a result of which two of the elderly people were killed. A week later, they went to Sengema, a small village near Woloma, where the commander killed two boys and drank their blood. The RUF/NPFL forces were leaving Woloma on a daily basis to search for food, money and young people to conscript in the surrounding villages, returning to Woloma in the evening. At Sengema, young men and women were trained for three hours a day on how to use their weapons. In mid June, this group was reinforced by a group of 50 men coming from Kailahun Town. The commander of this new group immediately requested a "black goat", referring to human beings killed and eaten by the RUF/NPFL forces. Two days later, as a punishment for the escape of two civilians, the RUF/NPFL forces killed four people by cutting their throats, drank their blood and cooked and ate parts of their bodies. Among the RUF/NPFL forces, this practice was mostly carried out by the NPFL members. About two weeks later, SLA forces launched a successful attack on the town and repelled the RUF/NPFL forces. However, a large number of well-armed RUF/NPFL forces later returned, overpowered the few SLA who were in the town and recaptured it. The raids in the neighbouring villages started again.⁷⁰¹

One of the main missions given by the NPFL leader to his forces who entered Sierra Leone was to capture and dislodge the SLA forces from the Moa Barracks at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), in order to deprive SLA and Economic Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces based in Sierra Leone of one of their most strategic locations and, consequently, to restrict ECOMOG activity in Liberia.⁷⁰² However, it appears that after the initial attacks on Sierra Leone territory, NPFL forces lost this objective for a while and were more engaged in stealing property and inflicting violence on civilians as is demonstrated by the events described above.

After a first unsuccessful RUF/NPFL attack on Daru Town, the forces that led the attack had to retreat to Baiima (Mandu Chiefdom) and SLA forces based at Moa barracks were reinforced by Guinean forces. A lot of food items were stolen during the retreat and brought to RUF/NPFL bases at Mobai and Baiima, where many civilians accused of being government collaborators were killed. SLA forces began launching canon and dragon missiles on RUF/NPFL positions at Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom) and beyond, at Baiima. Some of the rockets hit private dwellings and in one incident at Baiima, some civilians were killed and others wounded when a rocket hit their house. In June, the RUF/NPFL forces led by a well-known NPFL commander regrouped their forces from different positions in Mandu and Dia Chiefdom at Baiima (Mandu Chiefdom) from where they launched their attack on the Moa Barracks. This attack was not successful as they were repelled by the SLA and

⁷⁰¹ The exact dates of these events could not be obtained from the records or from open source materials.

⁷⁰² It has to be remembered that at the time of the March attacks, Sierra Leone territory (Lungi Airport) was used by the ECOMOG forces as a base to fight the NPFL forces in Liberia.



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Guinean forces. During this attack, the NPFL commander was killed on the bridge that separates the barracks from the town.⁷⁰³

Following this general attack, the RUF/NPFL forces would launch many more attacks, sometimes using bypass roads such as the one through Malema Village (Jawie Chiefdom) without managing to capture the Moa Barracks. At this time, Mandu Chiefdom (east of Jawie Chiefdoms) and some villages and towns of Jawie Chiefdom such as Kutoma, Bombohun and Benduma were under RUF/NPFL control. Those three villages were used as informants' places to pass on information to the RUF/NPFL strongholds in Gbiima, Moiba and Mandu (Mandu Chiefdom), where the RUF/NPFL had retreated after the unsuccessful attack on the Moa Barracks. The RUF/NPFL forces lost a lot of their members during these continuous attacks and a lot of civilians were killed. In December, at Gbaama, a village close to Moa Barracks, the RUF/NPFL forces killed 62 civilians, who were later buried by SLA forces from the Moa Barracks.

In Macca Kpakpeibu (Yawei Chiefdom)⁷⁰⁴ on 21 July, a group of 110 RUF/NPFL⁷⁰⁵ members entered the town with heavy firing and assembled the 60 inhabitants, including children, in the Court Barrie. Some civilians were told to bury the 20 people the RUF/NPFL had killed so they dug a big pit, put the bodies in it and covered it over. This group made daily patrols of the surrounding villages, capturing civilians who were then sent to Kailahun Town or Geima (Luawa Chiefdom) to be trained or used to work for the forces by carrying loads. On one occasion, those RUF/NPFL forces gathered 800 civilians and sent them to Geima to work in farms. During their stay, they sexually assaulted women, including the elderly. In mid August, some SLA forces from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) came to the village and repelled the RUF/NPFL forces from the village, as at the time of this attack, the SLA were 200 in number while the RUF forces were only 30. The SLA did not, however, stay in the village and instead went back to Daru.⁷⁰⁶

During the harvest season, civilians from Senguma (Penguia Chiefdom) were forced to work for RUF/NPFL forces and had to carry the produce of the harvest on their heads to Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom). Fifty RUF/NPFL members entered Baraka on 10 May and stayed in the village for some months, raiding the surrounding area in search for food. During their raids, they always took civilians with them to carry the property they would take.

On 10 October, RUF/NPFL forces attacked Levoma (Yawei Chiefdom), gathered the civilians and appointed some to carry the property they had just taken to the chiefdom headquarter of Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom, south-east of Yawei Chiefdom), which was used by the RUF/NPFL as

⁷⁰³ It appeared that this commander was killed by one of his colleagues, another NPFL commander, who at the time was a battalion commander.

⁷⁰⁴ This town is located on the road that links Bandajuma, Yawei Chiefdom headquarter (and further north, Kono District) to Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) and Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) in the south of Kailahun District.

⁷⁰⁵ The two forces were dressed differently as the NPFL members were dressed in "Ronko", namely country clothes, while the RUF members were wearing civilian attire with red bandanas tied around their heads. Some of the NPFL members were from Burkina Faso.

⁷⁰⁶ It is possible that this attack took place in August 1992.



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their route to Camp Zogoda⁷⁰⁷ in Geima. One of the civilians who could not carry the load that was allocated to him, as it was too heavy, was severely beaten. Other civilians were told to bury the people the RUF/NPFL forces had killed in the village, among them an old woman, who was killed in her house, as she was unable to run.

For two months between October and December, the RUF/NPFL forces transferred their base from Kailahun Town to Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), which was also their headquarters.⁷⁰⁸

Following the retreat after the attack on Moa Barracks in late June, NPFL forces who had established strong positions on the east side of the Moa River embarked on massive looting, raping and killing of civilians, together with acts of cannibalism. These practices were carried out by NPFL forces at the end of 1991, throughout 1992 and part of 1993 and not the RUF forces. Different rounds of practices called 'Tap' were accomplished throughout this period, starting with Tap 20 in late 1991.⁷⁰⁹

RUF vanguards and junior commandos, inferior in number - even if by October 1991, almost 2,000 new recruits had already been trained - were unable to prevent or protest against those NPFL practices. However, in October 1991, the RUF leader welcomed the idea of an RUF commander opening a jungle base unknown to the NPFL forces. This hidden base was opened near a village called Gborworbugao, about 16 miles from Kailahun Town and about 150 new recruits (captured civilians) began to receive training in conventional and guerrilla warfare.

b) Events in 1992

In January 1992, the RUF leader visited his troops at Baraka (Yawei Chiefdom) where he had a meeting with the troops and the civilians. He explained to the civilians the objectives of his movement and later instructed the troops to be always on the offensive. Also in January, a new base was opened at Jborbu Gao (south of Luawa Chiefdom) but was never used.

On 3 January 1992, RUF/NPFL forces based in Tangabu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) killed four men from Luawa Chiefdom who had entered Tangabu without passes; their bodies were burnt and thrown into the bush. They further explained that any civilian found not staying in the area where they lived would be killed. Later, in April, a woman was killed for having more than one lover. At the beginning of June 1992, the first boys who had been trained at this base were sent to the warfront, leading and showing routes to the RUF/NPFL forces and also assisting them in identifying the civilians who used to hold any position within the APC regime. Thus, in this area composed of the three Kissi Chiefdoms, the RUF/NPFL forces had control and no fighting with SLA forces was reported. However, internal fighting arose between forces from the RUF and those

⁷⁰⁷ This means 'land of freedom'.

⁷⁰⁸ Pendembu would remain their headquarter throughout 1992 and part of 1993.

⁷⁰⁹ It should be noted that the information from the records is rather confusing on the identification of those groups as the different groups and the dates of those events are mixed. What is clear, however, is that there was no difference between those different groups with respect to the type of violence they committed against civilians.



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from the NPFL, which marked the start of a split between the two factions, leading to the withdrawal of the NPFL forces from Sierra Leone.

A reinforcement group entered from Liberia in February 1992 through the border town of Batwoma (Luawa Chiefdom), south of Kailahun Town. This group held a meeting with the civilians at Ngebgema (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) at which they informed them about the aims and objectives of their movement. They stated that the town was now under their control and chose a private dwelling to host their office. The commander in charge of this group asked one of the civilians to point out all the APC government personnel such as police officers, SLA members, civil servants and foreigners, including the Lebanese.⁷¹⁰ However, as Ngebgema was a small village, none of those categories of persons were to be found in the village. The movement of civilians was restricted and none of them was allowed to leave the village without a pass signed by the commander.

In early March 1992, the RUF leader visited this group at Ngebgema, the civilians having been gathered at the Court Barrie for the occasion, and he mentioned that about 15,000 men and women had now been trained to fight in Sierra Leone. The RUF leader explained how the APC regime was a corrupt one and how it had toured the country giving privileges to foreigners, especially businessman, rather than to Sierra Leoneans. He made it clear that civilians were no longer under the authority of the APC government but under RUF control, that every civilian had to obey RUF commanders in their controlled areas and that whatever was obtained by his RUF forces at the war front was for them, as they were not paid. He concluded his statement by saying that all young girls and boys had to join the movement for their country. The commander of the group therefore forced young boys and girls to join the RUF to be trained, to serve as carriers or, for the girls, to become "wives".⁷¹¹ It is interesting to note that the RUF appointed teachers to educate the children they had abducted, allegedly as part of their will to be and to behave as a new rulers of Sierra Leone.

In March, an NPFL member coming to fight the SLA troops at Daru entered Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), where he killed a civilian as a human sacrifice for his upcoming battle.⁷¹² At Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), RUF/NPFL forces made another human sacrifice. The forces had captured a large group of civilians from various towns and villages and gathered them in the town. One out of every ten people was killed as a ritual sacrifice and their bodies were thrown into the river.

In an attempt to repel the NPFL forces out of Sierra Leone, some RUF vanguards decided to use the services of the Poro society,⁷¹³ a male secret society at Mende Buima (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), which was full of NPFL forces using it as an assembly area in Kailahun District. The principle of

⁷¹⁰ Despite many living in Sierra Leone for generations, the Lebanese – who make up the majority of businessmen in the country – are more often than not unable to obtain Sierra Leonean citizenship and are therefore referred to and treated as foreigners.

⁷¹¹ The age of those recruits was not specified.

⁷¹² No more details on the circumstances surrounding this killing could be obtained.

⁷¹³ The Poro society and its equivalent for women, the Bondo society, are Mende societies where the initiation process gives social identities to its members. Those societies are based on common beliefs about the living, the dead and the gods.



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this society is that when the poro devil is outside, whether day or night, only the initiated or recognised of the society are allowed outside to take part or join the group in the ceremony. This society therefore would arrest the NPFL forces since they were not members of it. However, a woman went to tell the RUF/NPFL forces about this secret society, which annoyed them and, in retaliation, the NPFL forces killed 100 civilians and burnt 200 houses.

Furthermore, around the same time, the NPFL forces discovered the existence of the hidden RUF base opened late in 1991 and a lot of RUF vanguards and junior commandos were arrested and taken to Camp Namna in Liberia.⁷¹⁴ Some of the top vanguards were jailed for three to four months as a result of this operation. A lot of RUF junior commandos were killed by NPFL forces while others went into hiding in the bush. The ones kept in custody in Liberia were released after the RUF leader intervened on their behalf with the NPFL leader.

In the north of the District, a combined force of SLA and local militia (Donsos from Kono District) attacked RUF/NPFL forces, recapturing towns and villages under RUF/NPFL control, including Sandaru (Penguia Chiefdom).⁷¹⁵ While at Sandaru, the SLA forces destroyed and took property and beat and killed people.⁷¹⁶ The troops also succeeded in driving the RUF/NPFL forces out of the Luawa Chiefdom, except for the town of Geima.

SLA military successes were however reported, including a few successful attacks for at least the first half of 1992. In February, SLA forces attacked and retook towns and villages in Penguia Chiefdom, including Senguma. They stayed in the area for four months, patrolling the area but also inflicting violence on civilians⁷¹⁷ and taking civilians' property, as a result of which some of the civilians went to Guinea. However, RUF/NPFL retook the area as they were advancing further north. SLA and Guinean forces from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) also made some attempts to repel RUF/NPFL forces from Mandu Chiefdom and to capture Mobai, Baiima, Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom) and Baiwala (Dia Chiefdom). Two fronts were launched, one going to Kuiva and the other one moving towards Baiima. However, both groups were defeated and had to retreat back to Daru. The RUF/NPFL position at Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) was also attacked and captured for a short while, although the forces subsequently regrouped and recaptured the town. During their stay, the SLA forces forced the civilians to break down all the houses that were close to the bush and to uproot all the coffee and cocoa plantation. The zinc taken from the houses was used to make fences around swamps. The SLA forces also recaptured other towns in Kissi Teng Chiefdom, such as Tangabu.

By mid 1992 the RUF/NPFL forces in the North had conquered the major towns and established bases. An important base was Baraka (Yawei Chiefdom), which was a strategic town on the way to Kono District. Later on Baraka and Geima (Luawa Chiefdom) were among the RUF/NPFL forces' strongest holds in the North. In particular, Geima was also an important training camp. Even towns

⁷¹⁴ This camp is located in the Lofa County.

⁷¹⁵ Those local hunters were very active in the south-east of Kono District, in particular in Soa and Fiama Chiefdoms.

⁷¹⁶ No more information could be obtained on this incident.

⁷¹⁷ No specific incidents were reported for this period.



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like Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom) and Segbwema came under attack, although they were not captured.

One morning in April 1992, RUF/NPFL forces⁷¹⁸ led by a Liberian commander launched an offensive on the chiefdom headquarter of Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom). As they entered the town, people panicked and started fleeing to the bush. The combined forces put some people in a house and set the house on fire. They then assembled the remaining civilians in the Court Barrie and killed one pregnant woman who refused to join them. The forces used the town as a base from where they patrolled the surrounding villages in search of food and other items. During their stay, 10 school-going girls (classes 4 to 6) were raped. Bunumbu at this time was the front line as it also allowed for further advances into Kenema District, particularly into the diamond area located at Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District).

In Malema Chiefdom in the south of the District, SLA forces encouraged the formation of vigilantes, composed of young people who were given basic training, to assist the troops in prosecuting the war in the District. Most of the chiefdoms were contributing funds called "war efforts", as well as willingly giving their brothers and their young people to be trained. The successes of the SLA, however, did not last long. At this time, Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) was under constant RUF/NPFL attack. The only areas the SLA forces controlled were Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) and parts of Mandu, Jawie and Malema Chiefdoms. Following the overthrow of the President of Sierra Leone by the SLA on 26 April 1992, SLA forces began more intensive attacks on the RUF/NPFL forces, defeating a large number of them. However, at that time, they did not succeed in removing the RUF/NPFL forces completely from the various areas and their actions were more of a sporadic nature, killing and torturing captured RUF/NPFL members. Furthermore, their behaviour towards civilians began to deteriorate as SLA forces on patrol started to take away civilians' property, such as domestic animals and household items.

Civilians coming from areas under the control of RUF/NPFL forces were taken to the Moa Barracks in Daru for screening purposes; a lot of civilians were killed during this process, accused of being "rebels" or "rebel collaborators". As an example, one young man from Yawei Chiefdom was arrested by SLA forces patrolling the chiefdom and was killed in the Moa Barracks. Later on, a committee made up of the elders from the 14 chiefdoms of the District was formed so that they might identify the civilians brought to the barracks and avoid the killing of innocent civilians.

The RUF/NPFL forces continued their persistent attacks on towns and villages in both the northern and central chiefdoms of the District, including the Moa Barracks.

The "Tap 20" group, consisting of the Gio-speaking tribe of Liberia (NPFL) was active in Kissi Kama, Kissi Teng, Penguia and Luawa Chiefdoms. Their local commander gave an order to his troops that all civilians captured should be killed because for him they were "without blood", i.e. less than human. This group frequently engaged in cannibalism in these chiefdoms. In Penguia Chiefdom in May, members of Tap 20 killed and ate people selected due to their larger size.

⁷¹⁸ These forces were dressed in military combat red t-shirts with palm fronds tied around their foreheads.



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Furthermore, they often engaged in sexual assaults against women, who were raped by many men at one time.

In Ngiehun (Luawa Chiefdom), NPFL forces dropped hot melted plastic into people's eyes. Furthermore, one of the "sentences" they carried out was to put human beings in a large cooking pot with red palm oil; this kind of sentence was imposed when, for example, they thought a civilian was not obeying their commands. In Kissi Teng Chiefdom, the members of this group used to kill people and eat their flesh; babies were usually pounded in mortar to provide the type of food they liked. On 30 June 1992, a man was killed in the chiefdom and his body eaten.⁷¹⁹ This caused many civilians to flee to neighbouring Liberia.

The Tap 20 group was replaced by another group of NPFL members called Tap 40 during the last months of 1992. At this time, most of the top ranking NPFL commanders were recalled to Liberia by their leader as they were encountering serious attacks in Liberia from a fighting force called the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). The Tap 40 group also killed many civilians and often cooked and ate their flesh. One such incident happened in the Kissi Kama Chiefdom on 9 October 1992, when two civilians caught escaping were killed, cooked and eaten.⁷²⁰ Another incident of cannibalism was reported about a civilian caught trying to escape from the RUF/NPFL forces in Fobu (Luawa Chiefdom) on 5 October 1992. A man caught crossing the Guinean border was stripped naked and later killed; most of his body parts were cooked and eaten by some NPFL members. Again around this time, some RUF junior commandos were killed and eaten by those NPFL forces. There appeared to be two main reasons for these practices. First, it was simply a way to get food. Second, the forces believed that when they ate human flesh, they obtained the strength of the person they were eating; accordingly, they would first eat young, healthy, good looking men. Eating enemies was also practiced. However, reports mention that persons of any age and any gender were also eaten, including children. Indeed, in some places in the District like Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), Mende Buima (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), Kuiva and Baiima (both in Mandu Chiefdom), NPFL forces were living in separate compounds from RUF forces where they practiced cannibalism.

In Nyadahun Bambabu in March-April, the NPFL forces were the only ones living in this town. When they went on patrol, they abducted people to carry stolen goods back to their town. Upon returning to the village they then killed and ate the people they had abducted. When these NPFL forces were withdrawn from Sierra Leone to fight the advancing ULIMO forces in Liberia, the RUF forces sent to this town found a very large cauldron with three legs set up in the town mosque. These pots were usually used to cook food for large numbers of people when it was harvest time. However in this case the cauldron had been used to cook people for the NPFL forces. All around the cauldron on the floor of the mosque were the dismembered skeletal remains, including the skulls, of around 40 to 50 people. Each of these persons had been shot in the head.

⁷¹⁹ The conditions surrounding this killing could not be ascertained.

⁷²⁰ No more details could be obtained on this bit of information.



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In the south of the District, SLA forces were more successful in containing the RUF/NPFL forces, due to the presence of the ULIMO troops⁷²¹ in Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) and the Guinean troops in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom). However, on 25 December 1992, RUF/NPFL forces identified by civilians as being the "Tap 20"⁷²² group launched an attack on Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom), coming from the chiefdom headquarter of Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), the other road going to Segbwema and passing by Daru (Jawie Chiefdom). They entered the town through the hospital, where they beheaded one doctor after he had given them some drinks and money, hoping this would make them leave without killing him. Many drugs were taken away from the hospital and some people were captured. For seven hours, this group battled with SLA and ULIMO forces before being eventually repelled. Shortly after this incident, Guinean forces based at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) came to Segbwema.

Civilians escaping RUF/NPFL attacks in Yawei Chiefdom tried to find refuge in Gbane Chiefdom (Kono District) located to the north of their chiefdom. Some of those fleeing civilians were thoroughly screened by SLA forces at the chiefdom headquarter of Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom, Kono District). A young man, accused of being a "rebel collaborator" was doused with petrol by the SLA forces, who then set fire to him and let him burn. Furthermore, some animosity was prevailing between Kailahun civilians, who were mainly Mende, and Kono inhabitants. Furthermore, as the RUF/NPFL forces entered Sierra Leone through Kailahun District, civilians coming from this area were viewed as suspicious and were not welcome.

At Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom), RUF forces established an execution centre for the whole District. At this centre, alleged criminals were killed and buried in mass graves. The centre was maintained throughout the war period.⁷²³ From December until March 1993, an RUF training base was opened at Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom).⁷²⁴

In December 1992, an Eastern Region Civil Defence Committee comprised of representatives from the three Districts of the Eastern Province – Kono, Kenema and Kailahun – and from Freetown was formed in a bid to assist the SLA forces.⁷²⁵ "Well-meaning" Sierra Leoneans were to register for the Committee and to fulfil the work of vigilantes for the SLA.

c) Events in 1993

In early 1993, some RUF forces that were repelled by SLA forces from Pujehun District⁷²⁶ briefly joined the RUF forces in Kailahun District, passing through the Golan Forest at the border between Kenema District and Liberia. Furthermore, as ULIMO forces were active and inflicted serious losses

⁷²¹ This fighting faction, which emerged and fought the NPFL in Liberia, also fought on Sierra Leonean territory, alongside the SLA.

⁷²² It is more likely that this group was actually Tap 40, who replaced the Tap 20 group in late 1992.

⁷²³ No more details could be obtained on this centre.

⁷²⁴ This base would be transferred for one month only in early 1993 to Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom, Kono District).

⁷²⁵ BBC, 22 December 1992.

⁷²⁶ In December 1992 and early 1993, RUF forces launched an offensive on Pujehun District but were soon defeated by the SLA forces, assisted by ULIMO and Guinean forces.



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on NPFL forces in Liberia, the supply route for arms and ammunition and other items for the RUF/NPFL forces in Sierra Leone through Vaahun (Liberia) and Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) was cut off, leaving the RUF forces unable to resist the SLA and Guinean forces.

Following the setting up of a Civil Defence Committee in 1992, local hunters began fighting with SLA forces, notably in Jawié Chiefdom. At this time, however, no formal initiation as such was taking place. Rather the “renowned man” who was behind the establishment of the Committee played the role of a catalyst or organiser for the local hunters.

On 18 March 1993, the RUF/NPFL attacked Bandajuma (Yawei Chiefdom) from their base in Baiima. Seventy-eight RUF/NPFL members were killed; eight civilians and four SLA members were wounded. The RUF/NPFL forces were, however, repelled by the SLA forces.

Throughout 1993 and part of 1994,⁷²⁷ an RUF training base was operational at Dia (Kissi Kama Chiefdom). Furthermore, following the retreat from Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) in January 1993, RUF forces established their headquarters at Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom).

In April 1993, some RUF commanders discovered that some RUF members together with civilians from Ngiehun (Luawa Chiefdom) had talks with SLA forces to arrange for the arrest of the RUF leader. When they learnt this, RUF forces went to Ngiehun, surrounded the town and killed an unspecified number of civilians. One of the practices they carried out at this time was to pour boiling palm oil in the ears of the men and in the vaginas of the women so that they would acknowledge the planned plot against their leader. Among the people killed were one prominent businessman and his family, two teachers and two well-known women.⁷²⁸

The SLA forces proceeded to capture Kailahun Town and also captured other towns, such as Baiima, Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom), Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) and Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom), probably in April. The RUF/NPFL retreated first to Dia Chiefdom, east of Mandu Chiefdom, but as SLA forces also advanced into Dia Chiefdom and recaptured the headquarter town of Baiwala, RUF/NPFL forces withdrew from the rest of Dia Chiefdom.⁷²⁹ During this retreat, similarly to other Districts, notably Kenema District, retreating RUF forces frightened the civilians by telling them that if they stayed, they would be considered to be “rebel” collaborators by the SLA forces, as a result of which many civilians fled with the RUF forces. Thus, on 6 May 1993, Baiwala (Dia Chiefdom) and Bomaru (south of Upper Bambara Chiefdom, a few miles from Baiwala) were captured by SLA forces. Some SLA forces went to Vaahun, a Liberian town eight miles from Bomaru along on the motorable road used by RUF forces to enter Sierra Leone, to exhort the civilians who had found refuge there to resettle in Dia and Mandu Chiefdoms.

⁷²⁷ This base was operational until SLA forces repelled the RUF forces and confined them in Kissi Teng Chiefdom.

⁷²⁸ Although the precise number of fatalities could not be ascertained, it appears that a lot of people were killed during this incident.

⁷²⁹ No figures on the fatalities during these attacks could be obtained.



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SLA screening bases were operational throughout Kailahun District, including in Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) and in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom). Civilians who returned from Vaahun were taken to Daru to check whether they were RUF members or collaborators. Following interviews in these screening bases, those people who had been appointed to any position by the RUF/NPFL forces were kept in custody and sometimes killed. In May, the SLA forces succeeded in completely repelling the RUF forces from Jawie Chiefdom.⁷³⁰

In the same wave of counter attacks in which they recaptured Mandu and Dia Chiefdoms, SLA forces proceeded further north and recaptured Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) in May as well as towns in Luawa, Penguia and Yawei Chiefdoms. SLA forces occupied Ngiehun, a town located on the main road between Pendembu and Kailahun Town, and entered Kailahun Town with heavy firepower in September. From Luawa, they moved on to Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom).⁷³¹ In Penguia Chiefdom, SLA forces encouraged civilians to come out of the bushes and to resettle. Following the SLA capture of these towns, an announcement was made on the radio that all civilians and RUF members in the bush should come out and that RUF members should surrender. SLA force also went on “mopping up” operations in the bush searching for RUF forces; civilians who were discovered were sent to the screening process.

During the same period, the SLA commander gave orders to demolish houses in Mandu Chiefdom. Most houses within the chiefdom were then unroofed, including a hospital building. Civilians were forced to work for the SLA forces, mainly to brush the roads and to cut down foliage around the towns to prevent RUF forces from taking them by surprise.

The same SLA group that had recaptured Mandu and Dia Chiefdoms in April and May launched an attack on RUF/NPFL positions at Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) in June 1993. SLA forces entered the town by using the main motorable road from Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom, west of Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) and battled with RUF/NPFL forces before the latter fled the town, retreating back to Liberia and to the border town of Dawa (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom). While retreating, they shot and killed some civilians at Dawa, raped some women and captured youths. Some civilians were also killed during the battle. After the recapture of the town, the commander in charge of the SLA forces exhorted the civilians to tell their children who had been conscripted into the RUF to come out of the bush and settle peacefully in the town. However, one night, the commander ordered that 27 of those RUF members who had come out of the bush be killed and the 27 young men⁷³² were tortured to death by the SLA forces. This incident created panic among the civilians and some of them left Buedu for the neighbouring countries of Liberia and Guinea. The SLA troops further successfully recaptured Koindu⁷³³ (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) and pushed the RUF/NPFL forces back into Liberia, while some escaped to Kono District. Thus by 1993, SLA forces, together with ULIMO and Guinean forces had confined the RUF forces to the extreme east of the District, in the north of Kissi Teng Chiefdom.

⁷³⁰ This chiefdom would be free of RUF incursion throughout the following years, until the AFRC coup where RUF forces came out of the bush and merged with AFRC forces.

⁷³¹ No detail could be obtained on those attacks.

⁷³² Their ages could not be ascertained.

⁷³³ This probably took place in November.



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Tap 40 was also active in 1993, notably in Kissi Teng Chiefdom.⁷³⁴ One of their commanders used to kill people by cutting into their flesh until they died, including a refugee from Liberia who failed or refused to bring palm wine for the NPFL commanders. On 21 January 1993, a woman was killed and her body cooked and eaten in Tangabu Town. Members of Tap 40 raped young girls and forced boys to carry their loads from Tangabu to Liberia. In Kangama, a woman in her fifties coming from Liberia in February was raped by many of those NPFL members; she later died in March as a result and her body was thrown into a big pit near Kangama. In April, three men previously appointed as Town Commanders in three different villages were killed for failing to provide food to the commanders. On 3 February at Mano Sewalu (Kissi Kama Chiefdom) there was a fierce battle between RUF and Tap 40, as a result of which many civilians escaped into the bush. Many other civilians were killed together with some of the RUF fighters, their bodies thrown into a pit. In Kissi Teng Chiefdom, a senior RUF officer gave the order to RUF junior commandos to hunt and kill NPFL forces. Accordingly, NPFL forces left Sierra Leone between February and May and, while retreating, burnt down many houses and killed civilians. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in August 1993 an internal fight occurred within the RUF between two of the most senior officers belonging to two different tribes, the Mendes (from the East and South) accusing the Temnes (i.e. the RUF leader's tribe) of destroying their land.⁷³⁵

In a bid to win the support of civilians, the RUF appointed a G5 group consisting of civilians and RUF members, which served as a mediator and settled disputes between civilians and RUF forces.⁷³⁶

After losing much ground to the SLA forces, the RUF/NPFL were cut off from their supplies coming from Liberia. Furthermore, when the NPFL forces withdrew to Liberia, they took with them all their weapons, including those captured from the SLA and Guinean forces in 1991-93. Indeed, all heavy weapons, artillery, war tanks, armoured cars, small arms and vehicles were taken to Liberia. As they could not depend on irregular supplies from Liberia or on the weapons captured from the SLA forces, the RUF forces engaged in trade and barter with Guineans and Sierra Leoneans along the border towns of the two countries, in particular in Luawa Chiefdom, which was a significant black market location. They traded mostly in agricultural products like cocoa, coffee and palm oil but also in valuable items such as tape recorders, gold and diamonds. Even members of the Guinean forces protecting the borders of Guinea were involved in the trade, as well as members of ULIMO forces. However, RUF forces did not deal directly with the Guineans but traded with their own contractors who took commissions. Any property acquired through this border trade was considered to be "Government property", i.e. belonging to the RUF movement. This system enabled RUF forces to procure weapons and other logistics. Thus, while in the bush, RUF forces forced civilians they had captured to process palm oil, cocoa and coffee they would then use to trade for arms and ammunition. Another way of raising funds was through the establishment of a tax in the District, namely requiring each town or village under their control to contribute a certain amount of products, particularly coffee and cacao, depending on the size of the village.

⁷³⁴ It is believed that they entered the chiefdom in November 1992.

⁷³⁵ No more information could be obtained on this event.

⁷³⁶ See section [X] for more information on the hierarchy and organisation of the RUF forces.



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In the latter part of the year, with persistent attacks on SLA positions in the Kissi Teng Chiefdom, the RUF/NPFL forces succeeded in driving them from the chiefdom entirely. In addition, on 1 December 1993, the then Head of State, Capt. Strasser, declared a unilateral ceasefire. Further to this declaration, a lot of SLA forces left their positions thinking the war was over, which allowed RUF forces to redeploy in certain areas, mainly in the south of Kenema District⁷³⁷ and, in 1994, in Kailahun District.

d) Events in 1994

At the end of January and following renewed RUF attacks, notably in Kenema District, the Government of Sierra Leone declared “total war” against the RUF. The Head of State engaged in a massive recruitment of SLA forces and from 3,000 men in 1991, they would reach around 12,000 in 1994.

By 1994, following the successful SLA attacks and territory gains in 1993 and the retreat of the NPFL forces, the RUF now consisted of one and a half brigades composed solely of Sierra Leoneans. These RUF forces realised that they could no longer engage the enemy in face-to-face battle or conventional warfare, due to the strength and superior firepower of SLA and foreign forces. The RUF therefore decided to engage in jungle warfare in 1994 and an Operations order on jungle or guerrilla warfare was drafted and distributed to the front line commanders. Those front line commanders were trained for two weeks in guerrilla tactics and provided with first aid and a basic stock of food supplies plus arms and ammunition before they were sent in various directions into the jungle. The commanders’ individual and newly mastered skills were passed onto the squad, platoon, company and battalion levels. During the training phase, they were taught the basics of squad to battalion tactics, namely tactical deployment in diverse terrains, combined arms training, urban warfare skills, ambushes, infiltration techniques, deception operations, advanced reconnaissance and fighting patrolling.

SLA forces were occupying most of the District for the first months of the year and there were some incidents of harassment of the civilian population. In one incident in Penguia Chiefdom in February 1994, an SLA member was arrested and killed on the orders of the SLA commander for having raped a 13 year-old girl. The commander made it clear to the civilians and the SLA forces that this kind of behaviour was not acceptable.

Towards the end of March and the beginning of April 1994, RUF forces started launching massive and successful attacks on SLA positions in the District.⁷³⁸ A group from Liberia attacked the town of Koindu. A second group from Liberia entered the town of Gbolabu in the Upper Bambara Chiefdom. This group conscripted children in and around the township.⁷³⁹ In Geima (Luawa Chiefdom), a large quantity of arms and ammunition were captured from SLA forces.

⁷³⁷ See the factual analysis for Kenema District where massive and successive attacks were launched in the southeast of the District in December 1993.

⁷³⁸ Already in January 1994, RUF forces captured an SLA base, east of Pendembu.

⁷³⁹ No more information was available on these incidents.



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Once the RUF forces took the jungle and rapidly started to gain positions throughout the country,⁷⁴⁰ Kailahun District, in particular the eastern part of the District, became a stronghold and was completely under RUF control. At sometime in 1994, RUF forces captured a large number of arms and ammunition from the SLA forces at Geima (Luawa Chiefdom) and SLA forces withdrew from Luawa Chiefdom. However, throughout 1994, 1995 and 1996, Mandu and Dia Chiefdoms remained under the control of SLA forces.

In May 1994, RUF forces came to the township of Sandaru (Penguia Chiefdom) from the direction of Kono District and dislodged the SLA forces based there. They informed the civilians that all of Sierra Leone was now under their control and that civilians should not hide or they would be chased and killed. They forced young boys and girls they had captured to take illicit drugs, claiming that it was new medicine meant to develop them and make them strong. RUF forces used Sandaru as a base to patrol and raid the villages in the chiefdom and came back regularly to the town with food, stolen property and more captured civilians, so that the number of their forces was greatly increased. Most of the captured women and girls were sexually assaulted, often publicly.

RUF forces were also to be found in the 'Peje' Chiefdoms, namely Peje Bongre and Peje West Chiefdoms. In one incident in August 1994, while patrolling in Peje West Chiefdom the RUF forces discovered a group of civilians in the bush, raped two suckling mothers, whom they subsequently killed. However, Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) and Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom), where a camp for displaced persons was opened, remained under SLA control, thereby blocking strategic access to the rest of the country.

The RUF were dislodged briefly from the town of Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) by joint forces of the SLA, regrouping and recapturing the town later in the year.

As RUF forces intensified their ambushes on the Freetown-Kenema highway in late 1994, life became even more difficult for civilians in Kailahun District. They lacked essential items to live and the daily number of deaths of civilians in the District and in the refugee camps in Liberia was high.

Although RUF forces made serious gains in the country, fighting mainly in the bush and laying ambushes, it was perceived in Freetown as a "disintegrated organisation".⁷⁴¹ Furthermore, during the same period, a large number of SLA members were missing without grounds in war affected areas.⁷⁴²

e) Events in 1995, 1996 and 1997

Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) was fiercely attacked and recaptured from SLA forces by RUF forces in January 1995. In February 1995, RUF forces attacked Jojoima (Malema Chiefdom), which had been under SLA control since 1993.⁷⁴³

⁷⁴⁰ By 1995, all the Districts had come under RUF attacks.

⁷⁴¹ AFP, 16 September 1994.

⁷⁴² *Ibid.*

⁷⁴³ No details on the civilian fatalities – if any – could be obtained. It is only reported that over 20 RUF members were killed during this attack.



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In Penguia Chiefdom, many civilians who were abducted from the surrounding towns and villages were mistreated; women were sexually abused in public by RUF forces. Those who refused to have sexual intercourse with RUF members were killed.⁷⁴⁴

By the end of 1995, RUF forces from nearby Periwahun launched another unsuccessful attack on Segbwema (Njaluhun Chiefdom), where they were repelled by the SLA forces. The SLA forces were successful in repelling RUF forces' attacks on the Mandu and Dia Chiefdoms in 1995. Nevertheless, throughout 1995 and the following years, the RUF would launch attacks on these chiefdoms, occasionally controlling some areas.⁷⁴⁵

At the end of January 1996, prior to the elections to be held at the end of February, the one-week ceasefire declared by the RUF allowed voter registration in the District, particularly in four chiefdoms considered at that time to be unsafe, namely Jawie, Mandu, Malema and Upper Bambara.⁷⁴⁶ Nevertheless, in RUF-controlled areas, civilians were not allowed to vote in the February General elections.⁷⁴⁷

In 1996, the Kamajor society, which had begun initiations in Bonthe District and developed all over the Southern Province, reached Kenema and Kailahun Districts. Similarly to other Districts where local hunters were operational, young energetic men were nominated by the Chiefs and, more often, the elders of the chiefdoms⁷⁴⁸ to be initiated into the society. Dia Chiefdom for example, was asked to send 50 men for initiation. The appointment was done at the section level and each section was at least initially responsible for the welfare of the men they nominated and who came back to their various areas after the initiation. In Dia Chiefdom, the Kamajors worked with the SLA forces. The Kamajors from Jawie Chiefdom, under the leadership of a well-known commander who was also operational in Kenema District, began challenging RUF positions in Njaluhun Chiefdom.

However, around this time, Kamajors began to harass civilians. In Penguia Chiefdom, for example, civilians were forced to contribute to feeding the Kamajors and if they failed to do so, all their property would be taken away and they would be beaten. A man who had just lost his wife and was about to bury her refused to go and fetch wood as requested by some Kamajors, as a result of which they beat him severely. Again in Penguia, a businessman at Palima Village had his property taken by Kamajors and had to hide in the bush for two weeks with his family.

⁷⁴⁴ No details could be obtained on this information, either from the records or from open sources.

⁷⁴⁵ No details could be obtained on this information, either from the records or from open sources.

⁷⁴⁶ SLBS radio, a national Sierra Leone radio station, quoted the elections officer for Kailahun District: BBC, 30 January 1996.

⁷⁴⁷ The RUF-controlled areas were mainly the chiefdoms located in the east of the District, i.e. Kissi Teng, Kissi Tongi, Kissi Kama, Luawa and some parts of Penguia and Yawei Chiefdoms. No more information on what happened prior, during and following the elections could be obtained from either the records or from open source materials. In this respect it is interesting to note that the only serious incidents reported during the elections took place in Bo and Kenema Towns. While not wishing to minimise the intimidation of the voters carried out by the RUF forces prior to the elections, their scale may not have reached the levels sometimes described in the media.

⁷⁴⁸ As the Chiefs had been targeted by the RUF since the start of the war, most of them had fled while others were killed.



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In March 1996, a combined force of SLA and CDF (Kamajors) who came from Baiwala (Dia Chiefdom) attacked a major RUF base in Geima (Luawa Chiefdom), also called "Camp Burkina Faso". They overpowered the RUF forces and killed eight of them; 26 civilians were also killed during the attack. The RUF forces, however, recaptured the town four days later. The Kamajors also attacked another RUF base, established in Kailahun Town at the National Secondary School. The school was completely bombed down and some civilians were killed. Four days after the attack on Geima, RUF forces counter attacked the Kamajors and SLA forces, some of them being killed in the attack. Following this counter attack, SLA forces and Kamajors were repelled.⁷⁴⁹

Around this time, RUF forces started opening schools in the areas under their control, such as at Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom). The school was not only for children but also for the civilians living in the areas under RUF control. The teachers were paid with seven cups of rice and two beer bottles of palm oil every three months.

However, unlike what happened in the South and especially in Pujehun District, following the elections and the start of the negotiations between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone, civilians originating from Kailahun District and living in displaced camps or in neighbouring countries did not return to the District.

The peace negotiations that started in February 1996 reached their conclusion in the signing of a Peace Agreement between the RUF leader and the Sierra Leonean President at Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, on 30 November 1996. A few days before the signing of this agreement, the RUF leader had visited his troops near Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) to talk about the peace process.⁷⁵⁰

Despite the signing of the peace agreement, a few incidents between Kamajors and RUF forces took place in the Segbwema area (Njaluhun Chiefdom) in early December, where some fatalities are reported on both sides. Nevertheless, it appeared that those skirmishes initiated by the RUF were motivated by their search for food.

SLA forces were still molesting civilians they suspected of being "rebels" or "rebel collaborators". On one occasion, a civilian from Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom) accused of being a "rebel" was sent to Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), tied up, had pepper put in his nostrils, was hit with a bayonet and kept in a guardroom for six days before being released. He was given a clearance document that would allow him to return to Mobai.

At the beginning of 1997, the RUF forces in the south of the District came under fierce attacks by SLA forces, thus breaking the ceasefire provided in the Abidjan Peace Agreement. Their positions, notably in Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom), were attacked and they had to retreat to their base at Baiima.⁷⁵¹

⁷⁴⁹ No more information could be ascertained on these events.

⁷⁵⁰ See, for example, AFP, 25 November 1996.

⁷⁵¹ Many press releases relate RUF statements in January condemning the Government of Sierra Leone as having "dashed aside" the Abidjan Peace Agreement: see, for example, AFP, 22 January 1997.



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On 21 January 1997, Kamajors who were deployed in most previously RUF-controlled areas in the country proceeded further east in Kailahun District and retook Kailahun Town. Nevertheless, RUF forces managed to keep control in the furthest eastern area of the District in Kissi Teng, Kissi Tongi, Kissi Kama and parts of Luawa Chiefdoms. Buedu (Kissi Tongi) thereby became a headquarter base of the RUF.⁷⁵² On 20 February, Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), now under SLA control, was attacked by RUF forces who were defeated by the SLA, who were reinforced by their colleagues from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom).⁷⁵³ The killings of three RUF members, one SLA member and one civilian were reported.⁷⁵⁴ Also in February, the SLA forces rescued some children, once conscripted by the RUF but then living in the bush unaccompanied and malnourished.⁷⁵⁵

Due to those skirmishes in the District between the SLA, Kamajors and RUF forces, the resettlement program put in place following the Abidjan Peace Agreement was stalled in Kailahun District. The demobilisation process had not even started, as United Nations observers were unable to deploy. Around 10 May, between 20 and 60 civilians were killed during an RUF attack on the border town of Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), highlighting once more the deterioration of the security situation in the District and the country as a whole, as many attacks were reported for the same period in the Northern Districts.⁷⁵⁶

Thus, shortly before the events of 25 May 1997, the RUF forces were mainly controlling the far east of Kailahun District, even if skirmishes with SLA and Kamajors were reported in other parts of the country, in the Kangari Hills (south of Tonkolili District) and in some parts of Moyamba District.

Early 1997, following the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement on 30 November 1996, one of the people the RUF leader had sent to Freetown to represent him during the implementation of the peace process declared himself the interim leader after the RUF leader's arrest in Nigeria.⁷⁵⁷ This declaration was unilateral and did not obtain the support of the RUF forces. During a visit to Kailahun District in April to hold meetings with the RUF forces, this self-proclaimed interim leader, together with other RUF members, was arrested and kept in custody by some of the most senior RUF commanders.

Following the overthrow of the Government on 25 May 1997, RUF forces came out of the bush and merged with AFRC forces. In early June, one senior RUF commander moved to Kenema Town with 300 of his men.⁷⁵⁸ Shortly after RUF forces joined the AFRC forces, some of them went to Segbwema (Njalahun Chiefdom) where they looted shops and stole property belonging to civilians

⁷⁵² Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1-31 January 1997. This report was prepared by the Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Sierra Leone.

⁷⁵³ Pendembu would be attacked again on 6 April and reports mention there were a lot of fatalities but no more details could be obtained.

⁷⁵⁴ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1-28 February 1997. This report was prepared by the Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Sierra Leone

⁷⁵⁵ See, for example, AFP, 4 March 1997.

⁷⁵⁶ AFP, 15 May 1997 and Africa News, 26 May 1997.

⁷⁵⁷ Philip Palmer announced his self-proclamation in a press release on 15 March 1997.

⁷⁵⁸ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 02 - 03 June 1997 REG. NO. 97/0218



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and to the ICRC.⁷⁵⁹ However, few incidents were reported in the District for the period covering May 1997-February 1998, when ECOMOG forces ousted the RUF/AFRC from Freetown, as attention was mostly concentrated on Freetown, where 600 RUF members from Kailahun District were believed to have joined the AFRC members.

Further to this overthrow and the merging of RUF forces with AFRC forces, Kamajors from Penguia Chiefdom took the bush or went to Guinea, fearing to be killed by the RUF/AFRC forces who were chasing them.⁷⁶⁰ It should be recalled that shortly after the events of 25 May, the AFRC leader had ordered the members of the CDF to lay down their arms and surrender to the nearest police station to be disbanded, an order most of the Kamajors did not obey.

After May 1997, and throughout 1998 and part of 1999, civilians in Yawei and Penguia Chiefdoms suffered constant harassment by RUF/AFRC forces. During these years, RUF/AFRC forces killed, raped, tortured, amputated limbs and burnt houses down, as a result of which, many of the inhabitants fled to Guinea. At Baraka (Yawei Chiefdom) for example, the RUF/AFRC forces unroofed many houses and took property, which was brought to their various bases. Innocent civilians were accused of hating the forces and killed as a result. Many civilians fled to Liberia and Guinea.⁷⁶¹

A combined force of Guinean forces, SLA and CDF attacked and dislodged the RUF/AFRC forces in the towns of Bunumbu and Manowa.

In September 1997, Kamajors from Jawie Chiefdom successfully repelled RUF/AFRC forces from different areas of the chiefdom. Shortly after, two weeks after the start of their operation in September, the entire chiefdom was under Kamajor control. During these attacks, many RUF/AFRC forces were killed by the Kamajors. However, in December and during an attack they launched on Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), 100 Kamajors were allegedly captured by RUF/AFRC forces⁷⁶² and brought to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), an RUF/AFRC stronghold.

f) Events in 1998

On 8 February 1998, the President of Liberia reportedly visited RUF/AFRC forces in Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) to meet with the field commanders. A meeting was held at the Court Barrie, where he told the forces that produce from the District, particularly cocoa and coffee, must be transported to Liberia immediately to be sold for the procurement of weapons and other logistics for the fighting forces. He also spoke about disarmament and further warned all combatants not to disarm until they heard from him in Liberia. The supply routes for arms and ammunition coming from Liberia ran through Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) and Foya (Liberia) or Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) and Vaahun (Liberia). When they needed ammunition, RUF forces would send a large vehicle with a top senior commander carrying some diamonds to the Liberian President. On

⁷⁵⁹ It was earlier mentioned that a camp for displaced people was operational in Segbwema.

⁷⁶⁰ It is reported that at the time of the May Coup, the SLA forces numbered 14,000 while the Kamajors were roughly 37,000 in number: AFP, 29 May 1997.

⁷⁶¹ No further details are available on events during this period.

⁷⁶² Xinhua News Agency, 29 December 1997.



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their way back to Sierra Leone, they were escorted by Liberian security officers and had documents similar to clearance papers that would allow them to reach Kailahun District without encountering any problems. From Kailahun District, the arms and ammunition were distributed and dispatched to other places. The construction of an airfield at Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) was also begun, made feasible due to the increased numbers of the RUF forces, particularly the civilians they had taken with them when they retreated from Freetown. However, due to persistent air raids conducted by ECOMOG, the construction stopped.

After being pulled out from Freetown, a lot of AFRC members went to Vaahun in Liberia through Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) while the majority of the RUF forces took back the bush, which they were used to due to having conducted warfare there from 1994 to 1997, unlike the AFRC forces. When they left Freetown, the retreating forces could not take many things with them, which led to their searching civilians in Kailahun District and taking their property. "Operation Pay Yourself", meaning take what you need from civilians, was declared in the whole country but there is little direct information on its implementation in Kailahun District. Nevertheless, when they came back from Freetown, RUF and AFRC forces engaged in killing, raping and, above all, looting actions, which prompted a lot of civilians and especially those in Upper Bambara Chiefdom to leave their farms and to go to Liberia. However, RUF/AFRC forces captured civilians whom they forced to work, to go in search for food and to dig holes on the main road of the chiefdom to prevent ECOMOG forces from advancing with their armoured tanks.

In Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), the then Chief Security Officer (CSO) of the RUF invited all returnees to a meeting in which he encouraged the CDF to identify themselves so they might broker peaceful co-existence with the RUF/AFRC forces in the township. Seventy-six Kamajors identified themselves to the RUF/AFRC forces in response to the appeal and the CSO told them that they were "brothers" and that they would work together to rebuild Luawa Chiefdom. However, the CSO then ordered his forces to arrest and detain the Kamajors. The CSO set up a court in which the Kamajors appeared, summary investigations were carried out by the RUF commander appointed as chairman of the court and his verdict was that they should all be released and handed over to their family who would sign for them. While this verdict appeared to be accepted, the CSO nevertheless ordered that those Kamajors should be kept in jail and their families authorised to come and visit them. This continued for few days, until two senior RUF commanders and other RUF members arrived in town. One of the senior RUF officers killed ten of the Kamajors and ordered his men to kill the other Kamajors still being held captive. Three days later, the CSO gathered people in the town and stated that those Kamajors were Government spies and had been preparing to launch an attack on the chiefdom. He ordered the burial of the bodies in two holes behind the police station.

Throughout 1998, Bunumbu (south-east of Luawa Chiefdom) was the main training base for RUF/AFRC forces.⁷⁶³ This base was most likely set up in April following the establishment of the War Office at Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) as RUF forces needed more manpower.

⁷⁶³ In 1999, after RUF/AFRC forces captured Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District Headquarter), the training base was moved to Yengema (Kono District).



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In March 1998, CDF forces and a Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG from Kenema District came to Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) through Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom),⁷⁶⁴ supported by alpha jets and each fighting faction led by a different commander. One civilian was killed at the centre of the market area by one of the bombs launched from the airplane. On their arrival, the CDF and ECOMOG forces engaged in battle with the RUF/AFRC forces. Civilians were killed during the crossfire and houses suspected of belonging to RUF/AFRC family members were set on fire by the Kamajors. Throughout their deployment and attacks on RUF/AFRC positions in the District, ECOMOG and CDF forces would use missiles and other long-range artillery, sometimes missing their targets and destroying property and killing civilians. In Kissi Tongi Chiefdom⁷⁶⁵ during the course of the raids, civilians were killed and property destroyed by the bombs dropped by the ECOMOG jets.⁷⁶⁶

In early March, ECOMOG and CDF forces fell into an ambush two miles from Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom) while on their way to recapture Macca Kpakpeibu (Yawei Chiefdom). In this ambush, some of them were seriously injured and the ECOMOG forces lost one armoured car, which was burnt, four machine guns and a truck loaded with arms and ammunition.

The ECOMOG forces assisted the Kamajors' further advances into the District and on 12 May, launched two attacks on Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) and Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom),⁷⁶⁷ killing over 150 RUF/AFRC supporters.⁷⁶⁸ From there, they then proceeded to capture Kailahun Town, although their progress was slowed by the thick forest surrounding the town. Thus, by 20 May 1998, ECOMOG forces would claim to control Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom), Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom), Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) and Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom).⁷⁶⁹ However, those attacks did not free the District from RUF/AFRC presence and throughout 1998, Kailahun District would still be qualified as their stronghold in the media. Due to this intense fighting, thousands of civilians fled the area and found refuge in Liberia (Lofa County) and Guinea (Gueckedou region, Parrot Beak).⁷⁷⁰

⁷⁶⁴ In February 1998, ECOMOG forces deployed in Kenema Town (Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema District) advanced further in Kenema and Kailahun Districts. On 22 March, two ECOMOG battalions left the Freetown Peninsula to reinforce the contingent already deployed at Daru and to prepare the assault on Kailahun Town: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 10 - 30 March 1998. REG. NO. 98/0031. In the same report, it was also revealed that a lot of "ex-Junta" men surrendered to ECOMOG forces. In this context, "Junta" probably refers only to the members of the AFRC and not to the RUF forces.

⁷⁶⁵ Kissi Tongi Chiefdom would remain under RUF/AFRC control until disarmament started in 2001.

⁷⁶⁶ The date of this (these) bombing(s) could not be ascertained.

⁷⁶⁷ AFP, 12 May 1998.

⁷⁶⁸ No more information could be obtained on these killings.

⁷⁶⁹ AFP, 20 May 1998.

⁷⁷⁰ Between March and June, 237,000 Sierra Leoneans fled the country to Liberia and Guinea and over 50,000 IDPs were living in camps: UN News Archive, 26 June 1998. Since the ECOMOG intervention in February, it was believed that 27,000 IDPs were leaving in the Eastern Province (Kailahun, Kenema and Kono Districts) and 113,000 in the Northern Province while there were no new displacements in the Southern Province. Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 9 June - 6 July 1998. REG. NO. 98/0068.



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After the reinstatement of the President of Sierra Leone in March 1998, more men from the District, many of whom had found refuge in Guinea, were initiated in the Kamajor society. Some from Penguia Chiefdom went to Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District) for the initiation. Kamajors from Penguia Chiefdom were successful in repelling the RUF/AFRC forces from some sections of the chiefdom as far as the Moa River (south-east of the chiefdom) but the RUF/AFRC forces regrouped and retook control of some areas previously held by Kamajors, including Sengema, Kumantandu, Sandaru, Lalehun and Bagibu. The RUF/AFRC established themselves in particular in the Nimmi Hills, an area rich in gold mines. Sengema became their base in the chiefdom, as it is located on a hill. Raping, looting and the unroofing of houses was common in 1998 and the commander in charge of the area was ordered by the Battle Field Commander not to have mercy for civilians who did not support them. On one occasion and following a meeting organised at Woroma by the RUF/AFRC commander in the chiefdom, eight men and four women accused of being supporters of the Government of Sierra Leone were killed and burnt by the RUF/AFRC forces, which led civilians once again to flee to Guinea. However, shortly afterwards in June, the commander ordered to his men to kill any civilian caught attempting to cross the Moa River or the Menni River to go to Guinea. Some civilians were therefore killed and some of them drowned in the rivers, which were swollen due to the rainy season. Furthermore, another order passed by this commander was for his men to check for tattoos on the men's bodies, as this would be proof of belonging to the Kamajor society. Besides pursuing RUF/AFRC positions, the Kamajors in Penguia Chiefdom chased and killed those they suspected of being "rebel" collaborators.⁷⁷¹ Kamajors from Peje West and Peje Bongre Chiefdoms were also attacking RUF/AFRC forces in their chiefdoms.

The town of Neama (south of Jawie Chiefdom, near the border with Kenema District) was considered a safe place where many civilians from the surrounding chiefdoms were seeking refuge. The town was under the command of the CDF and was an important ECOMOG and CDF base. RUF forces attacked the town and over 300 civilians were killed; it took three days to bury them in mass graves.

When the chairman of the AFRC and his government were driven out of Freetown by the ECOMOG forces, he sought temporarily refuge in Kangama town⁷⁷² (Kissi Teng Chiefdom), four miles from Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), the headquarter of RUF/AFRC. Indeed, Buedu in 1998 became the War Office⁷⁷³ and a very important centre for supply routes, smuggling of produce and diamonds and for training. All these activities became rampant throughout the year and enabled the RUF/AFRC forces to strengthen their positions and strongholds in the entire District. The War Office was the administrative headquarters where all the operational orders were given and throughout 1998 to 2001, all the important meetings for the top ranking commanders took place there. There was only one War Office and the other headquarters were subsidiary to that office. During this time, a lot of civilians were tortured, raped, killed and conscripted into the fighting

⁷⁷¹ No specific incident was recalled on this information.
⁷⁷² He was seen during the same period in Kono District, en route to Kailahun District.
⁷⁷³ Although ECOMOG forces claimed to have recaptured Buedu in 1998, it is clear from the records and other open source materials that the war office was open in Buedu at the latest in April 1998. Accordingly, either ECOMOG forces attacked but did not capture the town or captured the town only for a short period of time.



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forces. Also children under 15 were conscripted,⁷⁷⁴ as the forces were increasing their number not only to resist and fight ECOMOG and CDF forces but also in preparation for the planned attack on Freetown.⁷⁷⁵ On one occasion that probably took place in April, the senior RUF officer in charge of the War Office at Buedu brought back about 100 machine guns from Liberia.

Kailahun Town and the Geima camp became important training bases for the RUF/AFRC.⁷⁷⁶ RUF commanders regularly shuttled between Kono District and the rest of the deployment areas in Kailahun District and were able to procure more weapons from Liberia. Weapons were stored at Foindu (Peje Bongre Chiefdom) with the aim of engaging in simultaneous attacks on Bunumbu, Segbwema and Daru. Mamboma (Peje Bongre Chiefdom) was the identified base for the attacks. Main RUF/AFRC positions in the District included Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom) and Geima (Luawa Chiefdom).

Throughout 1998 and 1999, until peace talks started, the RUF/AFRC launched several unsuccessful attacks on the ECOMOG/CDF forces based at Daru, often surrounding the town. One of these attacks took place on 25 May 1998 but no fatalities were reported. The commander of the Kamajors admonished his men not to loot houses in Daru, but his order was defied as Kamajors engaged in much stealing in the township.⁷⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Kamajors recruited children to be initiated into their society to fight the RUF/AFRC forces still in the east of the District.⁷⁷⁸

Besides their attack on Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) the RUF/AFRC forces assaulted ECOMOG and CDF positions in different places in the District, including Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom) and Benduma (Jawie Chiefdom).

During the second half of the year, ECOMOG successes in the District appeared to have come to a halt and to be hampered by the RUF/AFRC activities. In September, the ECOMOG spokesman stated that they needed at least 2,000 more troops, "real fighters, as well as logistical support" to put an end to the conflict.⁷⁷⁹ However, massive ECOMOG air raids in the District killed a lot of RUF/AFRC members in November in Pendembu, Kuiva and Geima. Furthermore, according to ECOMOG forces, they attacked and killed many RUF/AFRC forces in villages on the border with Liberia in November and December.

⁷⁷⁴ No specific dated incident could be obtained, apart from this information of a general nature.

⁷⁷⁵ It should be recalled that when they were ousted from Freetown in February 1998, the RUF/AFRC stated that they would return.

⁷⁷⁶ It seems that ECOMOG and CDF forces did not succeed in capturing Kailahun Town during their attack in May.

⁷⁷⁷ No more information could be obtained on these events.

⁷⁷⁸ According to a Kamajor field commander quoted in an IPS press release on 29 June 1998, Kamajors "have 3,000 child Kamajors... These kids are very brave on the frontline... children are unadulterated and ... they follow the laws governing the conduct of the militia like abstinence from sex, drugs and looting when in combat... We don't trust adults quite (as) much because many have breached the rules governing our militia group and so they get killed by the enemy."

⁷⁷⁹ See, for example, AFP, 30 September 1998.



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On 30 December 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces launched an attack on the combined forces of ECOMOG and CDF based in Segbwema⁷⁸⁰ (Njaluahun Chiefdom), where they battled for over nine hours, during which a lot of civilians were killed and houses were set on fire by the RUF/AFRC forces. The RUF/AFRC forces captured the town and established a base there. Apparently this was a strategic plan by the RUF/AFRC forces to cut off ECOMOG forces based at Daru and so prevent them from undertaking any counter attack while they were heading for other Districts and the capital.⁷⁸¹ Furthermore, it allowed further advances towards Kenema Town (Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema District), which would be attacked in early March 1999.

g) Events in 1999

In 1999, the population of Kailahun District was cut off from the reach of Kenema District despite ECOMOG deployment at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom).⁷⁸²

The strategic town of Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) became a battlefront for the greater part of 1999. On 6 April, CDF troops from Kenema District unsuccessfully attacked the RUF/AFRC positions there, during which one RUF/AFRC member was killed.

Two days before the ceasefire provided for in the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, a massive RUF/AFRC group attacked the Moa Barracks, Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), without being able to dislodge the ECOMOG forces who had been based there since March 1998.

On 17 July 1999, CDF forces planned an attack on an RUF/AFRC position at Daru Junction (Jawie Chiefdom). On their way, they fell into an RUF/AFRC ambush and three Kamajors were killed. The CDF forces were, however, successful in capturing Daru Junction, where they made a temporary base. RUF/AFRC forces launched an attack on this base on 29 September 1999. They succeeded in dislodging the CDF, who again launched a further attack on Segbwema, but were once again unsuccessful. During their withdrawal, a lot of Kamajors as well as civilians were killed by the RUF/AFRC forces. At this time, Pendembu, Kailahun Town and Buedu were the RUF/AFRC main bases in the District.

In August at the War Office in Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), a senior RUF commander sent one of his subordinates to Liberia to bring back all the AFRC members to Buedu⁷⁸³ so that an arrangement could be made to launch an attack on ECOMOG positions. While he was there, a woman came from Liberia and informed the commander that she had seen his subordinate at the ECOMOG base in Monrovia. On his return, the subordinate was arrested and tortured at Buedu

⁷⁸⁰ Segbwema is located on a strategic position in Kailahun District, as it allows for further advances inland towards Kenema District. It is almost a compulsory point of passage as there is only one other road to leave Kailahun District through Manowa Junction (Peje West Chiefdom). However, this road leads to Kono District while the Segbwema road leads to Kenema District and accordingly puts Freetown within much closer reach.

⁷⁸¹ This information has to be read in conjunction with what happened in December 1998 in Kono, Bombali, Magburaka and Tonkolili Districts and in Freetown on 6 January 1999.

⁷⁸² It could not be ascertained whether ECOMOG deployed in other towns, although it is known that from Daru, they were launching long-range missiles up to Kissi Tongi Chiefdom.

⁷⁸³ Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown, while some AFRC members dispatched in the provinces, others went to Liberia.



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until he explained the purpose of his visit to the ECOMOG base. The subordinate denied having visited the ECOMOG base in Monrovia and he further stated that if anyone had given such information about him it was false. He even went on to say that if that were true he would not have come with over 100 AFRC members to Buedu from Liberia. His defence never convinced his commander, who eventually killed him.

In mid October, RUF forces captured personnel of the World Health Organisation (WHO) who were on a vaccination mission in Segbwema. At that time, even if Segbwema was still a RUF stronghold, no major security threat was perceived, as illustrated in the report of the interagency humanitarian assessment mission that took place in the District between 29 September and 1 October. In this report, it was stated that “relief agencies can now move into [towns assessed by the team in the District] provided that prior information on their itineraries is made available to the Organisation for the Survival of Mankind (OSM) leadership”, which was the humanitarian wing of the RUF, based at Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom).⁷⁸⁴

Also in October, the RUF leader went to Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) to exhort his troops to disarm, accompanied by members of ECOMOG and the United Nations Observation Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).⁷⁸⁵ This visit was part of a general tour throughout the country. By the end of the month, however, hundreds of RUF members led by one senior RUF commander left the District and went to Makeni (Bombali District), where an internal fight, most likely of a personal nature, took place with the AFRC forces based there.⁷⁸⁶ This event took place almost at the same time as the first UN peacekeepers arrived at Lungi, the international airport, marking the first step of their country-wide deployment.

Immediately after the RUF leader left Buedu, the Battle Field Commander and second in command to the RUF leader based at Buedu convened a meeting in Buedu and Kailahun Town to which he invited all the RUF vanguards, namely those who were trained in Liberia before the start of the conflict in 1991. At those meetings, he openly challenged the orders of the RUF leader and requested his men not to disarm to the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces they had been fighting for almost a decade.⁷⁸⁷ He further claimed that as the Battle Field Commander, he was the only one that could order disarmament and not the RUF leader. He sent the Chief Security Officer and his bodyguard to Liberia to secure more weapons and when this officer came back, he sent him with loyal troops, mostly vanguards, to persuade the RUF members not to disarm. Furthermore, in early December, two Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) workers were abducted by RUF forces in the District, in a bid to focus the attention of the international community on the disagreement of RUF forces with the DDR process. The NGO workers were released two weeks later, unharmed.⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸⁴ IRIN West Africa, 15 October 1999.

⁷⁸⁵ The peacekeeping operation was established by UN Resolution 1181 on 13 July 1998 to monitor the military and security situation in the country; the UNOMSIL mission initially had a six-month term, which was extended.

⁷⁸⁶ IRIN West Africa, 29 October 1999.

⁷⁸⁷ He notably gave an interview to the BBC on 30 November 1999.

⁷⁸⁸ IRIN West Africa, 16 December 1999.



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The RUF men sent by the Battle Field Commander went to Pendembu, a brigade headquarter, and to Segbwema, having been requested by the Battle Field Commander to appoint new commanders in these towns that were loyal to him. At Segbwema, following the arrest of one RUF member caught trying to send a message to the RUF leader, the Battle Field Commander gave the order to arrest all the officers loyal to the RUF leader and to destroy two bridges on the way to Kono District. Those orders were never carried out as, in the meanwhile, the RUF leader ordered the arrest of those men sent by the Battle Field Commander. Those men were tied up, tortured and taken to Koakuima, the second brigade headquarter in Kono District. The RUF leader also ordered the arrest of the Battle Field Commander. However, on hearing his men had been arrested and that the RUF leader had given an order for his arrest to another senior RUF officer,⁷⁸⁹ the Battle Field Commander fled to Liberia with his family and 200 RUF members.

On 20 December, the CDF forces launched another attack on Segbwema. They received support from the ECOMOG forces based in Daru who sent their alpha jet to bomb RUF positions. This attack was again unsuccessful, as was another one that took place on 25 December, following which the CDF forces retreated to Kenema District. Two days after this last attack, CDF from Kenema District went to Fola village (Njaluahun Chiefdom) in the hope of attacking the RUF/AFRC position in Segbwema. At Fola, ceremonies were performed to enable the troops to capture Segbwema. The CDF troops fell into an ambush close to Segbwema, where one Kamajor was killed, but they continued nevertheless and launched a fierce attack on Segbwema. During this attack, which was eventually unsuccessful for the Kamajors who went back to Kenema District, a lot of houses were destroyed during the crossfire. The CDF, however, were successful in capturing the town of Pendembu Njegbla (Njaluahun Chiefdom) and made a base there.

In late December 1999 or early January 2000, the first UNAMSIL troops - part of the Ghanaian battalion, also deployed in Bo and Kenema Towns - were sent from Freetown to Daru Barracks.

h) 2000 and 2001

The demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of the estimated 45,000 combatants in the country was slower than had been envisaged at the launch of the DDR program on 20 October 1999.⁷⁹⁰ For Kailahun District, where the DDR camp was located at Daru, the RUF leader stated that the slow process was due to the lack of the necessary structures, namely no ceasefire committees and no logistics.⁷⁹¹

In early January, the RUF commander in Makeni mobilised his fighting forces and went to Buedu to attack and arrest the RUF Battle Field Commander. However, the Battle Field Commander was nowhere to be found as he had earlier left for Liberia with his loyal troops, his bodyguards, some civilians and a lot of property, including FM radio broadcasting equipment, radio communication sets, computers, fax machines, arms and ammunition. A large number of civilians were maltreated and killed by the RUF commander who came to Buedu at this time.

⁷⁸⁹ This senior RUF officer was going to be the next Battle Field Commander.

⁷⁹⁰ It should be noted that the start of the DDR program had already been delayed since it was meant to take place within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, i.e. by 18 August 1999.

⁷⁹¹ IRIN West Africa, 31 January 2000.



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In March 2000, the position of the RUF leader towards the DDR program changed, as far from appealing his men to disarm as he had done in late 1999, he stated that he would not order his men to disarm unless the other fighting forces simultaneously disarmed.⁷⁹² However, soon after, 2,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers from the Indian Battalion known as INDBATT, arrived in Kailahun Town with six unarmed military observers (MILOBS).⁷⁹³ Both RUF members and civilians in the town warmly welcomed this group.⁷⁹⁴ Within a short time, the troops had proved to be very friendly to the people of the township, engaging themselves in various activities.

Some Sierra Leoneans who had found refuge in the Parrot Beak area in Guinea returned to Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) where UNAMSIL was deployed. They were registered and screened at the entry points by the CDF, the Kailahun District Development Foundation (KADDF) and an international NGO.⁷⁹⁵

In early April, UNAMSIL personnel engaged in speeding up the disarmament process, together with the RUF leader, a representative of the ex-AFRC leader and other personalities went to Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom).⁷⁹⁶ However, on 3 May 2000, a UN helicopter and its crew were captured by RUF forces in the District. This abduction of UN troops was not isolated, as at the same moment, UNAMSIL personnel were seized at Makeni (Bombali District) and a 23 man-unit was surrounded at Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom).⁷⁹⁷ Although the helicopter and its crew were released shortly after, the rate of UNAMSIL forces' abduction grew, with over 300 estimated abductions by 5 May 2000.

Within Kailahun District, the UNAMSIL troops, including their commanders, were prevented from moving outside their compound in Kailahun Town following an order from the RUF's Chief Security Officer.⁷⁹⁸ All their vehicles and all other property were taken and conveyed to Geima (Luawa Chiefdom). The Chief Security Officer also ordered the arrest of the MILOBS in Geima. All of their property was taken and they were conveyed to the District barracks in Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) and were then brought to the UNAMSIL compound. The RUF Chief Security Officer also stopped the UN helicopter from bringing food and other logistics for the peacekeepers and instructed the Indian commander of the peacekeepers deployed at Daru to bring food for the prisoners by road. The situation of the 224 Indian peacekeepers and 11 MILOBS was similar to their colleagues at Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom) as none of these groups was allowed free movement and were surrounded by RUF forces. They were supplied with food coming by truck from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) but on various occasions, the RUF allowed only half of the load to be supplied or none

⁷⁹² IRIN West Africa, 16 March 2000.

⁷⁹³ It took more than one attempt for the UNAMSIL troops to reach the town as in early March they were stopped by RUF forces on their way to the town.

⁷⁹⁴ It was not clear why the RUF forces were happy to see UNAMSIL.

⁷⁹⁵ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 11 – 31 March 2001.

⁷⁹⁶ On 3 April, nearly 22,000 combatants were disarmed, out of the total estimated 45,000 combatants, according to the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR): IRIN West Africa, 11 April 2000.

⁷⁹⁷ IRIN West Africa, 4 May 2000.

⁷⁹⁸ Others peacekeepers were also captured in May in different places across the country, in Kambia, Bombali and Tonkolili Districts.



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at all. On 29 June, the UN troops from Kuiva were released and transferred to Monrovia before being airlifted to Freetown, their arms and ammunition being kept by the RUF forces.

UNAMSIL engaged in diplomatic and political negotiations for the release of its personnel but as those negotiations failed, around 15 July 2000, UNAMSIL helicopters bombarded the RUF position in Kailahun Town. The sound of those bombardments could be heard all over Luawa Chiefdom and beyond. During this aerial attack, the peacekeepers and MILOBS pulled out of Kailahun Town with their weapons, some being airlifted, the majority going on foot to Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), some unarmed but with air protection from helicopters. On their way to Pendembu, they were engaged by RUF forces who also fired at the helicopters. Two members of the UNAMSIL Indian Special Forces team and seven of the released members were injured while the RUF forces suffered heavy fatalities in Pendembu and Kailahun Town. The helicopter gunship afterwards made frequent trips to view the areas in and around Kailahun. Following this rescue events and the resulting fighting, nearly 5,000 civilians from the surrounding area fled to Daru.

Following the rescue of the UNAMSIL personnel, the disarmament process resumed at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), one of the two operational DDR camps in the country,⁷⁹⁹ but on a lower scale, as RUF activities were still being reported in the District. For example, although they had signed a recent agreement with the CDF forces to allow commercial trucks to use the Kenema-Daru road, in early August RUF forces captured three trucks and three taxis at Segbwema.⁸⁰⁰

Starting in September 2000, RUF forces were seriously engaged in cross-border attacks into Guinea, in the area known as the Parrot Beak in the east and at the border with Kambia District in the north. As a result of those attacks, Sierra Leoneans who had found refuge in Guinea returned to Sierra Leone and to Kailahun District; between February and April 2001, around 12,500 people arrived in Daru on foot.⁸⁰¹ In addition, some Guinean troops set up positions inside the territory of Sierra Leone to protect the Guinean border, notably in Kissi Teng Chiefdom. Furthermore, at this time Kailahun District became widely affected by the renewed hostilities in Liberia.⁸⁰²

As RUF forces still controlled areas in the District, a one-month ceasefire was signed on 10 November, known as Abuja Cease-Fire, thereby reactivating the disarmament process, which had been interrupted following the events of May 2000. Its main provision was the disarmament of the RUF forces and the deployment of UNAMSIL troops in RUF-held areas.⁸⁰³

In mid March 2001, UNAMSIL peacekeepers conducted a patrol to Kailahun Town, the first since the rescue operation the previous year. They left from Daru and on their way to Kailahun Town, passed by the RUF-held towns of Kuiva, Moiba (Mandu Chiefdom) and Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), where they met with the RUF commanders and "secured their firm

⁷⁹⁹ The other camp was in Lungi (Port Loko District).
⁸⁰⁰ IRIN West Africa, 10 August 2000.
⁸⁰¹ IRIN West Africa, 25 April 2001.
⁸⁰² Since 1998, fighting resumed in Liberia with the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) fighting to overthrow the Liberian Head of State
⁸⁰³ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 14 November - 6 December 2000.



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commitment towards collaboration with UNAMSIL”.⁸⁰⁴ At Kailahun Town, they met with the RUF High Command and raised issues concerning the deployment of UNAMSIL personnel, including the freedom of movement of UNAMSIL patrols and the opening of the Daru-Kailahun road. Around 19 April, UNAMSIL troops eventually deployed in some RUF-held areas and dispatched regular patrols to Kailahun Town.⁸⁰⁵

In early 2001, clashes between the CDF and the RUF/AFRC forces persisted along the Yawei Chiefdom bordering Gandorhun Chiefdom (Kono District). At one point in April or May, a group of CDF from Guinea⁸⁰⁶ who had earlier captured towns in the Penguia Chiefdom proceeded to attack Manowa and Bunumbu to cut the RUF/AFRC forces off from Kono District.

A meeting between the RUF, the Government of Sierra Leone, UN representatives and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council to review the cease-fire signed on 10 November 2000 was convened on 4 May 2001, again in Abuja, Nigeria. The main points of concern related to the acceleration of the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the remaining RUF forces, the release of child combatants and the freedom of movement of persons. Furthermore, during a meeting between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF on 15 May at UNAMSIL headquarters in Freetown, both parties agreed to consider the establishment of a DDR camp in Kailahun Town.⁸⁰⁷ During the following weeks, an official disarmament ceremony including the release of children was held in the District. In October 2001, during a meeting of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), comprised of the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and the RUF, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF agreed on a schedule for the completion of the disarmament process. This accelerated disarmament was to take place in Kailahun District between 15 and 30 November 2001.⁸⁰⁸

Following fresh negotiations with the RUF, 170 peacekeepers from the Pakistani Battalion (PAKBATT II) were deployed in the District on 26 October; shortly after, the main body of 800 men was airlifted to the District.⁸⁰⁹ Both in Kailahun and Kenema Districts, the disarmament, which stalled for three weeks, began in earnest around 10 December. Since the third phase of disarmament started in May 2001, the figures of the disarmament process by mid December were as follows: a total of 37,654 combatants had disarmed, among them 12,546 RUF, 24,699 CDF and 400 Others. In Kailahun, 2,936 combatants had disarmed: 1,994 RUF and 942 CDF.

⁸⁰⁴ UNAMSIL press briefing, 16 March 2001.

⁸⁰⁵ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 01 - 19 April 2001.

⁸⁰⁶ In late March 2001, Kamajors coming mostly from Kono District who had found refuge in Guinean refugee camps and were armed by the Guinean authorities launched simultaneous attacks in Kono District and in the north of Kailahun District. Accordingly, this action in Kailahun District has to be read in the light of the factual analysis for Kono District during this period.

⁸⁰⁷ UNAMSIL press release, 15 May 2001.

⁸⁰⁸ The schedule for the completion of the disarmament was agreed as follows: Koinadugu and Moyamba Districts by 22 October; Bo and Bombali Districts by 31 October; Western Area between 1-7 November; Pujehun and Tonkolili Districts between 1-15 November; and Kenema District between 15-30 November: IRIN West Africa, 12 October 2001.

⁸⁰⁹ With the deployment in November of Nepalese peacekeepers in Moyamba District, the UNAMSIL mission reached its authorised ceiling of 17,500 troops: IRIN West Africa, 20 November 2001.



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The PAKBATT II contingent sensitised the RUF forces on the urgent need for peace in the country and encouraged them to disarm. The attitude of the peacekeepers made civilians and RUF members become very friendly and cooperative. However, a senior RUF commander sent instructions that the fighters of Luawa Chiefdom, indeed the whole of Kailahun District, should not disarm until the arrival of their leader. This instruction was never obeyed as even the Chief Security Officer did not stop anybody from disarming. Those who disarmed were protected and looked after of by the peacekeepers. The senior RUF commander later visited Kailahun District in early December together with the UNAMSIL force commander and the formal order for disarmament was issued.

The disarmament process successfully continued in the District until early January 2002; on 11 January 2002, senior RUF commanders symbolically turned in their weapons to the Force Commander of UNAMSIL in Kailahun District. The eighth and final tripartite meeting between UNAMSIL, the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone took place on 17 January 2002: "Both groups called for the extension of government authority throughout the country, the reintegration of fighters back into society and they supported the on-going Community Arms Collection and Destruction Programme. They appealed for the international community to continue its support to the DDR."⁸¹⁰

3. Conclusion

The first batch of RUF forces, at that time fighting alongside the NPFL, entered the District through the two motorable roads that link the District to Liberia and the last RUF members were disarmed in early January 2002. Kailahun District was the only District where RUF forces, first with the NPFL, then alone and subsequently with the AFRC, established strong positions throughout the war. They were never completely repelled outside the boundaries of the District.

The first major incursion into Sierra Leone was carried out concurrently in Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, where the main roads between Liberia and Sierra Leone are located. The headquarters of the RUF/NPFL were established in Kailahun District from the beginning of the conflict and remained in the District throughout the conflict, although defensive headquarters were opened in Makeni and Kono, as the RUF/AFRC controlled these areas, making Kailahun District the RUF stronghold.

During the first years of the conflict, the RUF/NPFL forces directly engaged the SLA forces but never succeeded in dislodging them from their strategic position in Daru. These years were marked by the initial progression of the RUF/NPFL throughout the District, which was later halted by the SLA. Attacks and counter attacks from both sides made it difficult to have a clear picture of who was in control of any given area. However, the main SLA victory took place in late 1993, at which time they confined the RUF forces to the extreme east. This SLA progression led the NPRC Chairman to declare a unilateral ceasefire on 1 December 1993.

⁸¹⁰ Sierra Leone: Humanitarian Situation Report 1- 31 January 2002.



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This ceasefire was soon violated, when in March 1994, RUF forces, alone this time as the NPFL had earlier withdrawn to Liberia to defend their positions in the Liberian conflict, changed their military tactic to that of guerrilla warfare and began retaking positions from the SLA. Shortly before that, in December 1993, the RUF forces had launched a massive and successful offensive in the south-east of Kenema District and by March 1994, were scattered throughout the Kenema District. In 1994 also, the south-east flank of Pujehun was clearly reopened and RUF forces spread across the District. This new development of the conflict left the three bordering Districts almost under RUF control and allowed further incursions in the rest of the country. The scale of this second wave was acknowledged by the NPRC Chairman himself, who declared "total war against the rebels". By 1995, all the Districts of the country were directly affected by the RUF incursions.

From 1996 onwards, Kamajors emerged and fought the RUF and later the RUF/AFRC forces in the District. Although they retook control of some RUF-held areas, they never succeeded in taking control of the whole District.

Following the merging of the RUF with the AFRC forces, those CDF members, as in other Districts of the country, went underground before challenging the RUF/AFRC positions by late 1997 but particularly in 1998, following the ECOMOG deployment in Daru. As in 1998, Kamajors were in total control of Pujehun District and the Southern Province in general, thereby cutting off one of the supply roads from Liberia, although not the main one, which was through Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) in the north-east of Kailahun District. This strong grip over the Southern Province and especially over the Freetown-Kenema and Freetown-Pujehun highways blocked the retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown, preventing them to go to Liberia through Pujehun District and forcing them to reach Kailahun District through Kono District

RUF/AFRC forces had control over certain areas of Kailahun District, mainly in the north-east of the Moa River and continued engaging the Kamajors, who at that time were assisted by ECOMOG forces. Around this time, many RUF/AFRC forces had regrouped in the District before launching their offensive on Koidu (Kono District) in December 1998. As part of this massive operation, which ended in Freetown on 6 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces retook position of Segbwema, a strategic town on the main road to Kenema District thus blocking ECOMOG at Daru.

The period following the invasion of Freetown was mainly characterised by political negotiations and reached its conclusion by the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. Although the RUF leader exhorted his members in the District to disarm, a senior RUF officer, then Battle Field Commander and CDS categorically refused and engaged in actions to put a stop to the disarmament process. RUF forces furthermore engaged in cross border raids in the Parrot Beak in Guinea. This action was not isolated as another Guinean flank was open in Kambia District. The peace process was reactivated in November 2000 but more than one year was necessary to complete the disarmament in the District and to declare the war over in January 2002. Kailahun was amongst the last Districts to be disarmed.



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b. Kenema District

1. **Introduction**

Kenema District is one of the three Districts composing the Eastern Province, together with Kailahun and Kono Districts. It is bordered on the north by Tonkolili District and, mainly, by Kono District, on the east by Kailahun District, on the southeast by Liberia, on the south-west by Pujehun and on the west by Bo District. Its headquarter town is Kenema Town in Nongowa Chiefdom, in the centre of the District. Kenema Town is located on the highway that goes to Koidu (Kono District Headquarter) in one direction and to Bo Town (Bo District Headquarter) and further on to Freetown in the other direction. As in the other Districts of the country, control of the highway was of fundamental importance as it is the only way to bring necessary daily items for civilians in the District.

There are 16 chiefdoms in the District:

<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarter</u>
Dama	Giema
Dodo	Dodo
Gaura	Joru
Gorama Mende	Tongi
Kandu Leppeama	Gbandu
Koya	Baoma
Langrama	Ya Baima
Lower Bamabara	Panguma
Malegowun	Sembehun
Niawa	Sendumei
Nomo	Faama
Nongowa	Kenema
Simbaru	Boajibu
Small Bo	Blama
Tunkia	Gorahun
Wandor	Faala

The Moa River, which takes its source in the ocean in the south of Pujehun District, flows through the southern parts of Kenema District (Koya and Dama Chiefdoms). The Sewa River, coming from Bonthe and Bo Districts, reaches Kenema District in the central east in Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom and continues towards the north, reaching Kono District through Simbaru, Wandor and Gorama Mende Chiefdoms. On its eastern edge, at the border with Liberia, Kenema District is bordered by the Golan Forest.

After Kono District, Kenema District is one of the most important diamond mining areas of the country. The main diamond area, Tongo Field, is to be found in Lower Bambara Chiefdom, but other chiefdoms are also mainly mining areas, such as Kandu Leppeama and Gorama Mende Chiefdoms.



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Kenema District was affected by the conflict through three discernible phases. During the first phase, which encompassed 1991 to the end of 1993, Kenema District was attacked by RUF/NPFL forces coming from the south and the east. This phase was marked by widespread violations committed primarily by RUF/NPFL forces, but also by SLA forces. Initially, in the south, there was little resistance put up by the SLA, who were also inflicting violence and terror on the population as part of their "screening" of the population for "rebels". However, towards the middle of 1992, the SLA regrouped and mostly drove the RUF/NPFL forces from their positions back towards Liberia. In the east, the fighting and infliction of violence and terror on the population was more intense, in part because there was a greater concentration of SLA forces due to the location of the SLA brigade headquarter in Kenema Town.

The patterns in both incursions were remarkably similar: the RUF/NPFL forces would gather the people of the villages in the Court Barrie and hold a meeting, toppling the existing authorities and setting up new power structures. Their arrival and stay was accompanied by the infliction of physical and mental violence on the people of the village, as well as the abduction of members of the population, including children, for use as workers, as fighters, as cooks and as "wives". RUF/NPFL forces also engaged in widespread theft and property destruction, notably the burning of houses, particularly when the people had fled the village prior to their arrival. Indeed, there was much internal displacement within the District as some people fled their villages ahead of the arrival of RUF/NPFL forces until mid to late 1992, when the combined SLA and ULIMO⁸¹¹ forces began retaking control of the District and driving the RUF/NPFL forces out.

The second phase spanned from the end of 1993 until May 1997 with two concurrent incursions, one from the north and one from the south. This period saw the birth of the Kamajors, who were local hunters initially coming together in informal groups before coming under the wing of the CDF. The "Kamajors" began to fight the RUF, alongside the SLA. During this second phase, a lot of civilians were killed, abducted, forced to carry property and work in the diamonds mines; the number of rapes increased. The RUF also set up a number of camps throughout the District, from where they launched attacks on surrounding chiefdoms. These camps were also the sites where they brought abducted civilians and inflicted physical and mental violence on some and trained others to be fighters, including children. Atrocities were mostly carried out by RUF forces but also by SLA members who were actively engaged in mining activities and, to a lesser extent, the Kamajors.

The third and final phase of the conflict in Kenema District ran from May 1997, the date of the Coup that saw the AFRC seize power, until 2002, when the war officially ended across the country. During this time, there were still many incidents of violence against the population both by the RUF/AFRC forces and, to a lesser extent, by the Kamajors. This violence was most pronounced just after the Coup in May 1997, but continued throughout this phase, tapering off towards 2000 in the north, when disarmament began across the District.

⁸¹¹ This fighting faction, composed mainly of supporters of the late previous Liberian President, Samuel Doe, emerged in May 1991 to fight the NPFL, which was led by Charles Taylor.



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2. **Factual analysis**

a) First Phase: 1991 – end of 1993

The war began in Kenema District as early as 1991, when RUF/NPFL forces entered the District in Tunkia Chiefdom, in the south, from Pujehun District and Liberia, and in the east from Kailahun District, where they entered Malegohun Chiefdom, which shares a boundary with Kailahun District.

Southern incursion

In April 1991, armed men identified as RUF/NPFL fighters (the NPFL, by their Liberian accent) entered Tunkia Chiefdom⁸¹² in the south of the District from Pujehun District through the Golan forest and, to a limited extent, from bordering Liberia. After gathering people at the Court Barrie or in a school field, these forces introduced themselves as the people's "redeemers and liberators" from the APC Government.

Coming from Makpele Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in April, RUF/NPFL forces attacked the chiefdom headquarter of Gorahun. Some of these forces had leaves tied around their wrist. This is a symbol of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party⁸¹³ (SLPP) and it is reported that this was done to gain the support of the people of Tunkia Chiefdom, since it was common knowledge that Tunkia was an SLPP stronghold. After taking control of the city, the RUF/NPFL appointed new chiefdom authorities and began looting houses. SLA forces from Kenema Town repelled them for a while but they came back shortly afterwards.

RUF/NPFL forces also entered the chiefdom from Liberia, through Tolo, and rapidly advanced into the chiefdom, harassing and molesting the population, inflicting physical violence, looting, killing and raping. When they arrived at Tolo, where RUF/NPFL forces stayed two days before proceeding further, they burnt some houses and killed civilians. At Tigbwema, RUF/NPFL forces burnt houses but did not meet the inhabitants as they had already left the town. At Mano Jeigbla, one man was shot and wounded and two young women were taken as "wives".⁸¹⁴

At this time, SLA troops had recently arrived in Gegbwema, in the north of Tunkia Chiefdom, to brief the local authorities on security issues. However, when the RUF/NPFL forces approached the town and started firing, the SLA left Gegbwema, allowing RUF/NPFL forces to take control of the town without any armed opposition. One of the commanders of the RUF/NPFL forces told the people that they had come to unseat the APC Government. The day after they had arrived, chiefs from Jao (located in the centre of the chiefdom), Kamasu and the surrounding villages came to the town, unaware that the town had fallen into the hands of the RUF/NPFL, because they had previously been called upon for a meeting by the SLA Major. When they arrived, they were arrested by RUF/NPFL forces, undressed and forced to lie on the ground and look at the sky for a long time. These authorities were then told to go back to their towns, escorted by RUF/NPFL forces, and return to Gegbwema with food items.

⁸¹² The chiefdom headquarter is Gorahun, located on the Kenema-Bo Waterside (Pujehun District) road. Gegbwema and Jao are two major towns in the chiefdom.

⁸¹³ At this time, the SLPP was the opposing party to the APC regime.

⁸¹⁴ A term used by RUF/NPFL forces to denote women who they would abduct and force to perform domestic tasks and have sex with them.



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On their arrival in Jao, one group of RUF/NPFL forces settled there due to the large number of cattle in the town. During their stay at Jao, they forced civilians to cook for them and an unknown number of women were forced to have sex with RUF/NPFL personnel. Joru, Gaura Chiefdom headquarters was attacked many times during that period but without success. In June, Guinean forces⁸¹⁵ who were deployed at Joru launched heavy missiles on RUF/NPFL positions in Tunkia Chiefdom. This led RUF/NPFL forces to leave the chiefdom for Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom, Pujehun District), together with some civilians.

After their departure, people started coming back out of the bush to their villages and SLA and ULIMO forces were deployed at Jao and Gegbwema. However, many people were afraid to leave the bush, because the RUF/NPFL had told them that the SLA would kill them if they found them in places previously occupied by RUF/NPFL forces. As a result of their belief that they would be killed by the SLA, some people went to Zimmi with the RUF/NPFL forces.

Furthermore, there was also harassment of civilians by the SLA. In one incident, SLA forces assaulted a civilian from Jao, accusing him of being a “rebel”, beating his head with the butt of a gun and threatening to cut his throat. An SLA commander who knew him intervened, saving his life. At that time, Jao was hosting thousands of people who had come from various villages to avoid RUF/NPFL forces. During their stay, SLA forces routinely carried out a practice known as “screening”, checking that people coming to the villages were not “rebels”. During the rest of the year, there were two other attacks on Gorahun where SLA forces repelled the unidentified assailants.

In July 1991, the chiefdom was attacked again at Gorahun. SLA forces fought RUF/NPFL forces before withdrawing. Subsequently, SLA forces deployed at Jao and Gegbwema also withdrew. Consequently, thousands of civilians left the chiefdom for safer havens such as Kenema Town, where they received information of attacks and the burning of villages in the chiefdom. In September, the SLA mobilised its troops, driving the majority of RUF/NPFL forces from positions in the chiefdom back to the Liberian border. After these last attacks, Tunkia Chiefdom was quiet for two years until hostilities resumed in December 1993.

Eastern incursion

In 1991, Kenema Town was an SLA brigade headquarter and the Major in charge was responsible for arms and ammunition for the war front in Kailahun District.

In May 1991, the war, which had previously been contained in Kailahun District, spilled over into Malegohun Chiefdom (north of the District, sharing a border with Kailahun District). A few days after they had taken control of Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom, Kailahun District), RUF/NPFL forces entered Ngiehun (Malegohun Chiefdom). Before their arrival, a lot of people had left, hearing terrific news such as killing of sick people to save them from suffering or killing of the most frightened ones so that they do not create fear in the others. Fighters searched the bushes to bring back civilians to the town. Following the usual pattern of gathering the village in the Court Barrie, a

⁸¹⁵ Guinean and Nigerian forces, deployed in the country under bilateral treaties with Sierra Leone, fought alongside the SLA.



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Town Commander, a Deputy Commander and a clerk were appointed and a committee was set up. Two men were executed and some women were taken to become their "wives".

The Town Commander conscripted manpower, swelling the ranks of the RUF/NPFL forces and enabling them to take control over other sections (the chiefdom has seven sections). After taking Konjo Buema Section, RUF/NPFL forces controlled Konjo Njagore and Konjo Yematanga Sections.

Following a disagreement with the Town Commander,⁸¹⁶ a local RUF commander removed all the people he had previously appointed from power. Four days later, his forces came back to the town to arrest the elders. However, the elders had left and the town was deserted, so the RUF/NPFL forces burn down 19 houses. The RUF/NPFL forces who were in Ngiehun moved to Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom, Kailahun District) and intermittently patrolled the three sections in Malegohun Chiefdom that were under their control.

After these first attacks, 1992 saw RUF/NPFL activities expanding mainly in the chiefdoms of Koya, Dama and Niawa in the south of the District. Some activities were also reported in the chiefdoms of Small Bo, Gorama Mende and Lower Bambara, in the east of the District on the boundary with Bo District.

Several civilians were killed in February 1992 during SLA attacks on the headquarters of the three sections of Malegohun Chiefdom under RUF/NPFL control. SLA forces remained there, fighting to repel RUF/NPFL attacks. When SLA forces cleared Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom, Kailahun District), Ngiehun became calm and people began to return from the bush.

Gorama Mende Chiefdom is a hilly and forested chiefdom, bordered on the west by Bo District, on the north by Tonkolili District, on the east by Kono District and on the south by Wandor Chiefdom. Its location near Kono District, its forest vegetation and the wealth of its soil, in particular the diamonds, made the chiefdom ripe for bush warfare. However, like Lower Bambara and Small Bo Chiefdoms, Gorama Mende was barely affected during the first phase of the conflict. In February 1992, five armed men coming from the direction Jaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama chiefdom, Kono District) reached Punduru, a large town at the border with Nimiyama Chiefdom. Their mission appeared to be have been to carry a message informing people of the aims and objectives of the RUF/NPFL, as they stated people should not be afraid because they had come to redeem them from the oppressive ruling party. However, when they had entered the village, an old woman who threw verbal insults at the RUF/NPFL forces was shot dead.⁸¹⁷

⁸¹⁶ On hearing that the Town Commander had sent two of his men to remove chairs from the College at Bunumbu for his house, a more senior local commander followed these two men and killed them, entering Ngiehun with his men the following day.

⁸¹⁷ Although no RUF presence was noted in Nimiyama Chiefdom (Kono District) in early 1992, it is possible that a pocket of RUF members coming from this direction reached Punduru.



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Niawa Chiefdom in the south-west of the District was attacked for the first time in 1992,⁸¹⁸ although the headquarter town of Sendumei was not affected. On 22 April, RUF forces⁸¹⁹ coming from Kandorhun (Barri Chiefdom, Pujehun District) through Langrama Chiefdom attacked Gandorhun in the south of Niawa Chiefdom. Upon entering the town, they appointed new Town Commanders for Gandorhun and its surrounding area. After going back for couple of days to Potoru (Barri Chiefdom, Pujehun District), they returned to Gandorhun, from where they launched attacks in villages in the south of the chiefdom and in the north of Langrama Chiefdom.⁸²⁰ All these attacks took place in April. After this first visit in Gandorhun, RUF fighters came back to the town three days later, as they had promised they would.

At Ngolahun Vaama, civilians were killed, some houses were burnt and six girls together with five underage boys were taken away. At Gandorhun, young girls were raped and a ten year-old girl was killed. Her father was also threatened with death if he ever smiled any time they came back to the town. In another place, civilians were killed, some women raped and taken as their wives and few houses were burnt. In all the villages, property was taken. At Ngolahun Vaama, some houses were burnt and two people in two houses were burnt. Hearing that SLA forces were preparing to attack them, some of the RUF/NPFL forces went to Ngolahun Menila, hiding their identity, and were told that inhabitants were waiting for the SLA forces, for whom they had prepared food. Following this, RUF/NPFL forces attacked the town, inflicting physical violence on people, breaking doors and taking property. There were few killings at this time, apparently because the commander was mainly looking for the Chief to join their movement. A civilian who had been appointed the Town Commander of Gandorhun was killed during the attack, allegedly for hiding his people (civilians) whenever RUF forces came to the town. It is reported that the new Town Commander was doing what the rebels asked him to do. During his term, many young girls were raped and the stealing of food was commonplace.

Lower Bambara Chiefdom, located in the north of the District at the border with Kono District, comprising seven chiefdoms is well known for cash crops including cocoa, coffee and palm oil and, above all, for Tongo Field, its diamond area. Villages within this area such as Bomi, Gehama, Tokbambu, Tongola, Lalehun and Vandema are devoted to mining activities. Lower Bambara Chiefdom was affected to a limited extent during the first phase of the war and few incidents are reported, one around May 1992 and the other one at the end of the year. During the May attack, fighting forces wearing military uniforms and t-shirts and writing "RUF" on the walls of the houses attacked the diamond-mining town of Weima from Malegohun Chiefdom in the east. Civilians were killed and others were forced to carry loads.

Shortly after the overthrow of the APC Government, Dama Chiefdom authorities made an appeal to the Defence Minister to send SLA forces to the chiefdom. Dama shares a boundary with Jawei

⁸¹⁸ In Niawa Chiefdom, the following villages were assaulted by RUF/NPFL forces: Ngolahun Vaama, Woroma, Kponima, Kerga, Menila and Buwema.
⁸¹⁹ NB: On the identification of the fighters, key persons mention only the term "rebels" and RUF. No mention of NPFL. However, it is said that one of the commander was a Liberian.
⁸²⁰ In Langrama Chiefdom, as well as Yebeima, which is the first village after the border, Wanjama, Menima Langrama and Marker were attacked.



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Chiefdom (Kailahun District). SLA and ULIMO forces were deployed to Konia, on the border with Nongowa Chiefdom and Jawei Chiefdom (Kailahun District), where they established a base. Soon after, Tawahun was attacked by RUF forces, most of them speaking Krio and coming from Jawei Chiefdom. Most of the forces were dressed in civilian attire, with some in military fatigue, as the RUF had begun to use military uniforms in 1992. During this attack, some civilians were killed, one woman's breast was cut off and a family was burnt in their house.

Around May 1992, Sahun and Sherif Jembahun were also attacked. An unknown number of civilians were killed and all the important buildings were burnt down. Also in 1992, a civilian vigilante movement started operating in the chiefdom under the command of the SLA. They were armed with axes, cutlasses and single barrel guns, sent to checkpoints and asked to shout when assailants were approaching.

However, despite the presence of SLA forces in the chiefdom, attacks were still carried out until the early days of 1993, during which RUF forces mutilated civilians, including carving "RUF" on their bodies.⁸²¹

In September 1992, ULIMO forces launched a powerful attack on Gandorhun (Niawa Chiefdom) and retook control of both Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms. Almost two months later, they handed over their base to SLA forces, who were still stationed there when RUF forces attacked the chiefdoms again in March 1994.

During the end of the year, a large number of RUF/NPFL⁸²² forces attacked Konjo (Lower Bambara Chiefdom), but were repelled by SLA forces. A lot of civilians and RUF/NPFL forces were killed during the encounter. RUF/NPFL forces took a lot of property and the people of the nearby villages, such as Njaiagbahun and Venema, fled into the bush for several weeks. By the end of 1992, the population of Small Bo Chiefdom swelled as displaced people fleeing Barri Chiefdom (Pujehun District) sought refuge there.

An Eastern Region Civil Defence Committee, comprised of representatives from Kailahun, Kenema, Kono Districts and Freetown Peninsula was formed in December 1992, aiming at supporting the SLA by gathering "well-meaning" Sierra Leoneans, whose role would be of a vigilante nature.⁸²³ The youths' knowledge of the terrain would be used to lead the SLA.⁸²⁴

In 1992 and 1993, ULIMO forces used Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom) as their base to fight RUF forces in other chiefdoms and were living peacefully with the population there. However, in 1992, coming back from Yibeima (Langrama chiefdom), some ULIMO members, to manifest their bravery, displayed severed male genital organs, claiming they were those of "rebels" they had killed. However, it is reported that this claim was later proved to be false and that the people who were

⁸²¹ This statement is general and unique and no more information is available on it.

⁸²² It is specified that some of the assailants were talking with Liberian dialect.

⁸²³ BBC. 22 December 1992.

⁸²⁴ Youths in the context of Sierra Leone could refer to anybody aged over 15 up to their mid to late 30s.



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killed were actually civilians. Although following this event, people of the chiefdom wanted them to leave, they were sent back in mid 1993 by the NPRC Government.

Koya Chiefdom, in the south of the District, was left in the hands of the RUF forces, as no SLA or ULIMO forces were stationed or deployed there. People of the chiefdom felt totally neglected. Koya would later be notorious for hosting one of the main RUF bases, Camp Zogoda, meaning "Land of Freedom."⁸²⁵ Starting in May 1992 until 1994, there were massive violations committed in various villages in Koya Chiefdom, resulting in the death and abduction of hundreds of civilians. RUF forces entered the chiefdom headquarter town of Baoma in May 1992, gathered the population in the Court Barrie and opened fire, killing about two hundred people. Women are reported to have been raped "at will" and the town was set on fire before they left. The forces then proceeded to other villages and towns,⁸²⁶ where they repeated the same course of action: killing dozens of civilians, raping women and looting and burning houses before leaving. They stayed in Nyadehun from June until September and then moved to Pelewama, where they occupied the town until December. In each of these towns, before killing people, they asked civilians to tell them where SLA members were. In January 1993, they crossed the Moa River and occupied Serabu and its surroundings until September 1993 before moving to Kamasu until December.

Because SLA forces had driven almost all the RUF/NPFL forces from most of the District by the end of 1992, 1993 was relatively calm until the end of the year. The last months of 1993 mark the beginning of what can be labelled the second phase of the conflict, with the resumption of RUF/NPFL activities in Tunkia, Nomo and Gaura Chiefdoms.

b) Second Phase: End of 1993 – May 1997

This second phase started in December 1993 when RUF forces entered Nomo Chiefdom, on the border with Liberia. Those forces rapidly spread over the south of the Moa River, which flows from Pujehun District to Kailahun District through Koya and in the west of Dama chiefdom, and expanded their activities further north by crossing the river. Concurrently to this southern incursion, RUF forces entered the north of the District, attacking Lower Bambara Chiefdom.⁸²⁷

Southern incursion

During this phase, Moawama area, made up of Nomo, Gaura, Tunkia and Koya chiefdoms, was the first area to be affected. The majority of villages in these chiefdoms were devastated and most of the civilians moved to Kenema Town and further north.

⁸²⁵ The report does not specify in which of Sierra Leone's languages "Zogoda" has a meaning. Most likely Mende or Temne.

⁸²⁶ Borgboabu, Giema, Maporma, Segbwema, Gorahun, Njaluahun, Bongor and Nyadehun.

⁸²⁷ It could not be ascertained whether the north attack derived from the south one or whether the North and the South constituted two different fronts. As no troops movement from the south-east of the District to the north (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) was recorded, it could be concluded that those two attacks constituted two different flanks. However, if those flanks were autonomous, the north attack would have come from Kailahun District where no movement of troops were recorded and where RUF forces started to gain territories on the SLA around March only, i.e. two months after the attacks on Lower Bambara Chiefdom. Furthermore, it cannot be inferred from the reports whether these forces joined at one point.



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On 1 December 1993, the Head of State unilaterally announced a one-month ceasefire, which allegedly led many SLA forces to leave their positions thinking the war was over. However, towards the end of December 1993, RUF/NPFL forces crossing the Mano River from Liberia attacked Nomo Chiefdom,⁸²⁸ bordered on the east by Liberia. Shortly after their attack on Faama in the west of the chiefdom, RUF/NPFL forces proceeded further into the District and had reached Tunkia, Gaura and Dama Chiefdoms by early March 1994. When RUF forces attacked Faama, civilians and SLA forces who were deployed there suffered heavy losses. The SLA forces retreated, leaving a large cache of arms and ammunition in the hands of RUF forces, which would allow the RUF forces to spread all over the District. Doubts were also raised among civilians and some people were suggesting that SLA left this cache of arms on purpose.

On the following days, other towns in Nomo Chiefdom came under attack, including Kpendebu, Madina and Loawoma. During these attacks, civilians were killed and others were forced to carry stolen property, some to the border town of Dambala. At Madina, civilians gathered in the Court Barrie were forbidden to sleep in their houses for three days and were threatened to be killed if they were caught trying to escape. One young trader accused of carrying out reconnaissance for the SLA was shot dead. The town was surrounded and property was taken.

Beleibu (Tunkia Chiefdom) was attacked during the same period on Christmas Day in 1993. Some civilians were killed and half of the village was burnt down. The same day, RUF forces advanced towards Jao (Tunkia Chiefdom). On their way, they found two Kamajors, one at Nomo Tunkia Junction and another one at Kokoru, both of whom were instantly killed. At Jao, inhabitants were gathered and forced to sit on the ground; some were stripped naked, kicked and beaten. After looting Jao, RUF forces moved to Gegbwema where they burnt the military post and some went to Tijoyeima, where they burnt some houses. Before reaching Gegbwema, they stopped at Jewahun where they looted and burnt houses. Nobody was killed, as the inhabitants had left the town before their arrival.

Also in December 1993, Gaura Chiefdom came under attack. The chiefdom headquarter of Joru, where the SLA was stationed, was the setting of many attacks and counter attacks. SLA forces from Joru fought the assailants in the chiefdom and came back to the town with the head of a man, who they claimed was an RUF fighter, hanging on the front on their vehicle. Two other members, both from Burkina Faso and fighting for the NPFL, were captured and placed in custody.⁸²⁹

SLA forces coming from Moa Barracks, Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District) recaptured Faama (Nomo Chiefdom) from the RUF, who launched another unsuccessful attack in mid January 1994. Some civilians who had previously returned to Faama were trapped by RUF forces and killed.

At the end of January 1994, the Head of State declared "total war" against the RUF and engaged in a massive recruitment of SLA forces; from 3,000 men in 1991, they reached around 12,000 in 1994.

⁸²⁸ Nomo has only nine villages and its headquarter town is Faama.

⁸²⁹ What happened to them after during and after their custody was not reported.



NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE

The behaviour of SLA forces towards civilians was not acceptable to some of the chiefs and other elders who had stayed in the chiefdom, who were arrested and detained to answer allegations of “collaboration”. Some civilians were also regularly beaten up in Faama for allegedly convening a meeting without giving notice to the SLA.

Early 1994, RUF forces regrouped at Kokoru and bypassed Joru to attack Venima (5 miles west of Joru). They were then led by a civilian who took them to other villages, including Gboyama, Madina, Tanima and Verma, where they were hosted by the Town Chief and another local authority. ULIMO forces coming from Joru repelled the RUF forces and brought the two local authorities from Verma back to Joru, where they were stripped naked. The Town Chief allegedly faced a firing squad but he did not die, was tied up and taken into custody. The other local authority was brought to Kenema Town then to Freetown, where he was imprisoned. In April 1994, the villages of Sandaru, Nyandeyama, Mendekelema and Seifula (Gaura Chiefdom) came under RUF attack. The only actions reported concern Sandaru (north of the chiefdom), where RUF forces captured some young men, whose age could not be ascertained, to carry the property they had stolen. When they left Sandaru, RUF forces promised that they would come back at night or the next morning, returning early the following day.

On the walls of the houses at Faama (Nomo Chiefdom) and Madina, RUF forces inscribed the acronym “RUF”.

Dama Chiefdom, west of Gaura Chiefdom and where many civilians from Moawama had taken refuge at one time, came under RUF attack in 1994.⁸³⁰ At Torgboru, some civilians were killed by these forces. Gbewubu and Loppa were attacked. At Loppa, an unspecified number of civilians were killed with automatic guns and others were captured. During those attacks, some of these RUF members had their faces painted so they would not be recognised, because some of them were former SLA members. Other villages including Lelema, Konnehla, Kpandebu, Korma and Konia were attacked, mainly for looting purposes and civilians were most often forced to carry the loads. The RUF forces also killed a number of people, inflicted physical violence on the population and engaged in property destruction. At Konnehla, for example, men were captured to carry stolen property and one man who became tired and unable to continue carrying the load was killed. Korma was burnt down and at Kpandebu many people were killed, either shot or beaten to death. Some civilians were told to bury the bodies. At Konia, one pregnant woman was raped and gave birth instantly after. At Mano in June, RUF forces who were dressed in combat uniforms gathered the inhabitants in the Court Barrie and requested that they stand, placing guns very close to the civilians’ ears and then firing, killing one old man. The RUF also forced the people of the village to lie down on the ground and look at the sun. Three civilians were killed when they attempted to run away. As they left the village, RUF forces took away all the cattle and poultry.

According to their inhabitants, Small Bo, Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms form a block such that events occurring throughout this phase in one of these chiefdoms have a link with what happened in another one. RUF forces reached these chiefdoms early 1994 and launched attacks on many villages

⁸³⁰ The months when the reported attacks took place could not be ascertained. Furthermore, although no precise example was reported, it was however stated that the same kind of attacks also happened in 1995.



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throughout the year, which led the population to flee the area for displaced camps in Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District), Gerihun (Boama Chiefdom, Bo District) and Taiama (Kori chiefdom, Moyamba District).

In early March 1994, RUF forces crossed the Moa River in Koya Chiefdom and attacked Jai and Menima (Koya Chiefdom).⁸³¹ From Menima, at the border with Niawa Chiefdom, RUF forces divided into two groups, both going to Niawa chiefdom, the first one heading for Ngandorhun in the south of the chiefdom and the second one going to Bandawor at the border with Koya Chiefdom.

While on their way to Ngandorhun, the first group of RUF forces ambushed and killed a prominent local hunter with sticks and knives. They then moved to Yibeima, in the north of Langrama Chiefdom by the Waanje River. They attacked the town for the first time on 6 March. RUF forces entered Yibeima heavily armed with AK47s, RPGs and grenades and killed three civilians; one person was killed because he was speaking a language that the fighters could not understand. The RUF forces then returned back to Ngandorhun after making a promise to Yibeima inhabitants that they would come back on 8 March, which they did.⁸³²

They then moved to Woyema (Langrama Chiefdom), where they made a base from which they could attack the surrounding villages. Their intention in Woyema appeared to be to capture the Section Chief, but as he was nowhere to be found, six houses were burnt, 10 men and women captured and one civilian, a carpenter, was killed. They also entered Menima (Langrama Chiefdom), where they killed two civilians, raped three women, burnt some houses and captured civilians. They then returned to Woyema and killed one Muslim leader because he was praying day and night for his village not to be attacked. While in Woyema, people were forced to do community work like brushing the area and preparing the rice farms. Window frames and doors were used as cooking wood. From Woyema, RUF forces launched attacks on Small Bo Chiefdom.

The second group that headed for Bandawor, at the border with Koya Chiefdom, used a bush footpath through Nyandehun, where they killed three civilians, raped some women and burnt some houses. Sendumei was attacked on 4 March 1994 early in the morning, when residents heard a heavy exchange of fire with SLA forces. During this attack, civilians were killed and girls were raped. The heavily armed RUF forces entered Bandawor in the afternoon, set the town on fire and gathered civilians under a tree near the main street that leads to Small Bo Chiefdom. A few armed men guarded the gathered civilians while others went into the town, raped, looted and killed nine civilians.

In the forest of Bandawor (Koya Chiefdom), the RUF forces built a camp they named Camp Zogoda. This camp was a strong base, where the RUF leader allegedly stayed in 1994. An airfield was also established between Menima and Jai (both located in Koya Chiefdom). The RUF forces

⁸³¹ The fact that many reports mention this date adds to the confusion concerning Koya chiefdom as according to the report for Koya, RUF forces had crossed the Moa River, before March 1994. Furthermore, the group that came to Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms in March 1994 was different from the one allegedly in Koya Chiefdom.

⁸³² No details were given for this second attack and fatalities – if any – are not specified.



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used this camp to launch attacks on Small Bo Chiefdom and they also laid ambushes on the Bo-Kenema highway, despite vehicles being escorted by SLA vehicles, and on the roads going through rural areas. Many civilians were killed during these attacks, property was taken and vehicles burnt.⁸³³ Serious doubts were raised among the population as to the identity of those assailants.

One of these ambushes, which took place in April 1994 at a hilly position close to Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) called Kwalekpehun, is illustrative of how RUF forces were operating at that time. RUF forces hiding in the bush used RPGs to attack convoys of passenger vehicles that were escorted by SLA forces. The commander ordered the passengers to lie down on the ground and an exchange of fire followed, during which three civilians were killed. When the firing stopped, the civilians boarded and no sooner had the vehicle ascended the hill than firing from the bush resumed. During this second attack, the SLA members left the convoy to get some reinforcements from Joru. Some civilians were killed, some injured and others were captured, pushed out of the vehicle and beaten with the butts of rifles. In the bush where they were taken, they met other civilians. All the passengers were searched for anything valuable or of interest to the forces. Two young men believed to be Fullah traders were shot at a close range. One died instantly and had his stomach cut open. One of the captives was asked to take the names of all the captured civilians who were allocated different jobs like conveying the wounded fighters to Gegbwema, carting the goods looted from the vehicles or taking the armour boxes. Another example occurred in March 1994, when an ambush was laid between Blama and Lungima, a town two and half miles from Blama. A trailer carrying load of rice was looted and the 350 bags of rice taken away. In another incident on 14 March 1994, one driver was killed while driving his vehicle from Bo to Kenema. Stolen property and captured civilians were taken to Camp Zogoda.

Blama, the headquarter town of Small Bo Chiefdom, is located at a strategic crossroad to Kenema Town, Koribondo (Jama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District) and Potoru (Barri Chiefdom, Pujehun District). On their way to Blama Chiefdom, RUF forces passed by Topanda Ngovokpan, Kpatema and Yawuema. Between March and April, they attacked Blama six times. At this time, SLA forces were deployed at Blama, some ULIMO members were patrolling in villages and civilians from the surrounding villages had deserted their homes to come to Blama, the headquarter town. Vigilante groups⁸³⁴ controlling checkpoints in Small Bo Chiefdom were monitoring the movement of people entering and leaving the chiefdom and reporting persons suspected of being "rebel" collaborators or spies to the head of the vigilante unit, who in turn reported to the SLA Commanding Officer in Blama. On 5 March 1994, a man suspected of being an RUF spy was apprehended at Blama, taken to the Police Station and shot dead in public by a member of the military police. On 6 March, another man was captured in Blama and taken to the Police Station. He denied being a collaborator and declared that RUF forces had planned to attack the town. The man was not killed but left in the cell and the information was passed on to Kenema SLA Brigade Headquarter with a request for reinforcements, but none was sent.

⁸³³ Since June 1994 in particular, the Bo-Kenema highway came under repeated ambushes, putting pressure on Kenema Town: Inter Press Service, 10 August 1994

⁸³⁴ These vigilante groups were equipped with clubs, spears, single barrel guns and slings.



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Despite repeated efforts,⁸³⁵ RUF forces were unable to capture Blama but established a base at Yawuema, from where they raided surrounding villages, leaving civilians caught between RUF activities and SLA activities at Blama. SLA forces were using the Blama men to carry property they had stolen to Kenema Town and were forcing women to marry them. Civilians were also punished for minor reasons, such as failing to carry out work assigned to them by an SLA member. Punishments ranged from beatings to detention in a guardroom for a day or two without food. Curfews were also declared, particularly when the SLA was going on "looting missions", with civilians forced to stay in their houses from 5.00 p.m. until 11.00 a.m. the following morning. Furthermore, life for Small Bo inhabitants was made even more difficult due to the continuous ambushes laid on the Bo-Kenema highway, rendering the highway unusable for trucks and thus depriving them of necessary daily items.

In April 1994, civilians returning to Tunkia Chiefdom assembled mainly in Jao and Gegbwema where ULIMO forces were deployed. It is believed that around 15,000 civilians regrouped at Jao and around 30,000 at Gegbwema at that time. However, ULIMO forces were committing violent acts against civilians, ranging from harassment, such as asking people to go indoors during the day without any reason, to detaining or shooting dead those who ignored their orders. ULIMO forces would also draw up lists of alleged "rebels" for execution, such as seven young men from Mani village who were executed in front of their parents, accused of being "rebels". At Jao, in May, ULIMO forces gathered 15 civilians, explaining they were to be sacrificed for them to win the war and also for the death of one of their colleagues. One civilian was killed at close range, while the remaining 14 people were saved through the intervention of the Section Chief.⁸³⁶ In another incident, ULIMO forces brought inhabitants from Giewahun to Jao, executed four of them and killed three Imams. ULIMO forces based at Gegbwema displayed the same behaviour; for example, 12 young men from Damawuro, branded "rebels" or collaborators, were arrested and executed, as were seven men from Tolobu. During this period, people were living in very poor conditions and lacked food because the only vehicles that could drive on the roads were ULIMO vehicles.

Gaura Chiefdom was also the scene of the death of civilians killed by ULIMO forces. After an attack on Sandaru in 1994 and following the death of a ULIMO commander, another ULIMO commander from Joru decided to take reprisal for this death and bombed the prison, leading to the death of all the inmates. All these inmates were coming from a small village outside Joru. In another incident in May 1994, a ULIMO member was ordered to take an RUF member captured during an attack on Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) and "bath" him, meaning to execute him.

Around July, Tilorma (Tunkia Chiefdom) came under RUF attack at dawn while some people were praying at the mosque. Some people were put in one house that was set on fire. This latest development urged many civilians out of the 45,000 residing at Jao and Gegbwema to leave the chiefdom and to head for Kenema Town. On their way to Kenema at the bank of the Moa River in Dama Chiefdom, civilians heard that the RUF forces were on their back, which urged them to cross

⁸³⁵ RUF forces reportedly attacked Blama six times between March and April.

⁸³⁶ It seems that the reason given by the ULIMO forces was untrue, as it appeared instead to have been a way to obtain palm oil from civilians.



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the bridge. This panicked and disorganised movement of people resulted in the death of many civilians, who drowned in the river.

These attacks on the Moawama area (Nomo, Gaura, Tunkia and Koya Chiefdoms) left the civilians in total disarray. Most of them fled into the bush for safety and the behaviour of the SLA forces, who put up little or no resistance to the RUF forces, increased their doubt as to their loyalty to the Government. It was also believed that some of the SLA forces had completely defected and joined the RUF. This disarray was further enhanced by the fact that when escaping RUF advance, civilians also had to look out for SLA forces who often shot on sight anybody coming from the direction of a place held by RUF forces, as they were suspected of being a “rebel”. Indeed, SLA forces from Dama Chiefdom were instructed to kill anybody coming from Tunkia, Nomo or Gaura Chiefdoms as civilians from those chiefdoms were considered to be “rebels” or were believed to have made their children join the RUF forces.

Throughout 1994 and 1995, those chiefdoms were under sporadic raids, mainly for looting purposes carried out by armed men whose identity could not be ascertained with certainty, for people suspected SLA forces to be responsible for some of these raids. Young men and girls continued to be abducted. During these raids, houses were looted and burnt and people killed, although most of the civilians had fled the villages. Intermittent raids carried out by RUF forces took place throughout 1995 on Sandaru, north of Gaura Chiefdom. During these raids, people were taken to carry the stolen property.

In April 1995, ambushes took place on the Kenema-Dama road, mainly to take food from Dama farmers who were bringing their produce for sale in Kenema. In one incident, a young boy who escaped the ambush explained that four of them who attempted to escape had their throat slit as deterrence to others who might plan to escape.

The few people who stayed in the chiefdoms hid in the bushes and built huts called “sorquehun”. Armed men believed to be both RUF fighters and SLA forces who were in the chiefdoms were creating havoc, often going into the bush to find the hiding places and to loot them. People were forced to carry out tasks for the RUF forces and some were killed. The death of one Imam at Gondama (Tunkia Chiefdom) shocked people, as he was well known for being “brilliant and brave”. At Damawulo (Tunkia Chiefdom), one man who refused to join the RUF movement was killed. At Jeneh, a prominent chiefdom elder was also killed by RUF forces. Even the civilians who had earlier fled the chiefdoms were coming back regularly to get news and to find food. Those who were caught by RUF forces were often killed, alleged to be spies⁸³⁷ for SLA forces.

At Gorahun (Tunkia Chiefdom) where SLA forces were stationed, civilians were harassed and intimidated, obliged to contribute to the feeding of the SLA. Civilians also had to pay the SLA a “landing fee” to be allowed to sell extra food items.

Northern incursion

⁸³⁷ Note that at this stage, it is not possible to explain with certainty what happened in Koya Chiefdom.



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Similarly to what happened in the Moawoma area, RUF fighters attacked all the chiefdoms in the north of Kenema District in early 1994.⁸³⁸

On 30 January 1994, RUF fighters attacked Tongo (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) from Peyama. Throughout this second phase, Peyama was an RUF stronghold whereas Tongo became the SLA base. Following this attack, the RUF forces scattered all over Lower Bambara Chiefdom and launched attacks on Malegohun and Nongowa Chiefdoms, often coming in high numbers. In January 1994, Peyama and Tongo were attacked. Before coming to Peyama, RUF forces had earlier sent a letter to the inhabitants warning them they would attack their village. When the village was attacked, the identity of the assailants was not clear for people as they were wearing military uniforms. However, no doubt remained after the RUF fighters identified themselves by writing inscriptions on the walls.

After Peyama, RUF forces moved on to Tongo, where they were repelled by SLA forces. During that battle, a lot of civilians were killed and property was stolen. The precise identity of the forces responsible was unclear, as both were wearing the same attire. From Tongo, RUF forces went to Lalehun, where they abducted hundreds of adults and children, forcing some to carry loads, and burnt down a lot of houses. In February, RUF forces attacked Ghana and killed almost everybody; later on, they moved to Talamah, where they killed a lot of civilians and burnt few houses. At Talamah, they also wrote on the walls on the houses inscriptions to identify themselves.

Largo (Nongowa Chiefdom, south of Lower Bambara Chiefdom) was attacked early one morning in February 1994 by heavily armed RUF forces. People were killed and houses looted and burnt. It is reported that one of the commanders vowed to kill any living thing he saw in the town. On the same day, Mano Junction, a strategic town and major business centre at the crossroad leading to Kailahun, Tongo and Kenema, was attacked; civilians were killed and massive looting was carried out before some houses were burnt. Villages on the Mano Junction – Kailahun Road, mainly located in the Lower Bambara Chiefdom, were attacked during the same period, including Talia, Bo Ngeiya and Kangama. At Talia, some civilians were killed and at Bo Ngeiya, the Town Chief and other civilians captured by the forces were ordered to lie on the ground and their throats were cut, because they were accused of supporting the Kamajors and Government forces.

RUF forces coming from different directions attacked Panguma, the chiefdom headquarters town in the west of the chiefdom, at the border with Dodo Chiefdom. They captured some civilians and put them in one house, which they set fire to, killing all the people inside. Around 80 civilians were killed during that attack on 12 March 1994, including an Irish priest and a Dutch doctor, together with his wife and daughter. Houses in the town were destroyed and looted as well as the hospital, where drugs worth millions of Leones⁸³⁹ were stolen. Again in March, Talamah was attacked and

⁸³⁸ However, it cannot be ascertained whether the attacks on most of the chiefdoms located in the North of the District were carried out by the group that had attacked Lower Bambara Chiefdom or by the Southern group who had entered Nomo Chiefdom.

⁸³⁹ As a very rough guide, one million leones is approximately equivalent to 500 USD. This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone's position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2,000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4,000 SLL)



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RUF forces fought the SLA. During the indiscriminate firing by both forces, many civilians were killed. At Kornia Kpindima, in late March, a large number of RUF fighters coming from Foindu and Yombuma killed some civilians, looted and burnt houses and forced many civilians to carry the loads. During a second attack on this town in April 1994, the Town Speaker and his family were captured, molested and tortured; the Town Speaker was later killed at Yombuma.

RUF forces attacked Koi town (Nongowa Chiefdom) early one morning in mid 1994, reportedly to terrorise the inhabitants, whom they accused of supporting the Kamajors. They fired indiscriminately and many civilians were killed and others were wounded. The town was looted and people were forced to carry the stolen property to Peyama.

Jormu Town (in the east of Nongowa chiefdom) was attacked three times in 1994, the first being on 28 March in the early hours of the morning by RUF forces coming from Peyama. During this attack, which resulted in looting and the abduction of many people to carry the loads, civilians suspected there was collaboration between SLA forces based there at that time and RUF forces because both factions were firing into the air, rather than at each other.

Soon after, Combema was attacked and burnt down. Some civilians were killed and a man was seriously wounded in his arm. RUF forces, who sketched a map of Sierra Leone showing areas under their control on the blackboard of the primary school, did not stay long. Before leaving, they took nearly all of the food and other valuable items in the village, forcing people to carry those items to Jormu.

Jormu was attacked for the second time few months later and RUF forces fired indiscriminately at civilians, who were running here and there, dazed and confused, killing dozens. Many houses were burnt and massive looting was carried out, with people of the town being forced to carry the stolen property. As the RUF forces left the town, they painted graffiti and writings on the walls, naming some of their commandos.

SLA forces based in Tongo Field also carried out massive looting and harassed large numbers of civilians suspected of being collaborators. Civilians were also forced to work for the SLA at mining sites and many people were shot at these sites. Girls and women were raped and Chiefs and community leaders were molested and tortured, suspected of being "rebel" collaborators or sympathisers. SLA also sent messages to civilians who had earlier deserted the area to come back to the town. Checkpoints were mounted and were used to take away money and valuable items from civilians intimidated with guns and daggers. This situation remained the same under the authority of successive commanders. Besides these activities, SLA forces also undertook ambushes.⁸⁴⁰

Thus, at that time, civilians were under the pressure of both RUF and SLA forces, even if from time to time there was fighting between the two factions. Relief came in mid 1994 when a group of local hunters from Malegohun Chiefdom (east of Lower Bambara Chiefdom) established bases in Lower

per day: see UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.

⁸⁴⁰ This information was related in such general terms and no specific example can be given.



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Bambara Chiefdom. They fought RUF forces but sustained heavy losses. At the beginning, these local hunters worked directly with the SLA forces but were later on disarmed by SLA forces.⁸⁴¹

The third attack on Jormu (Nongowa Chiefdom) took place during the last months of 1994, apparently mainly for the purposes of obtaining food. Civilians were abducted and taken to the nearby village of Saami, where they were forced to harvest the rice fields. Shortly after this third attack, RUF forces searching for “pro-Government”, i.e. SLA, forces attacked Vaahun Town. A door-to-door search operation was carried out and people were gathered in the centre of the village. One young man suspected of being a Kamajor was shot in the Court Barrie in front of all the villagers, who were told by the commander to clap for him and laugh.

At Potehun (Nongowa Chiefdom), people were killed and many were taken away to work in the diamond fields. The continuous attacks on Jormu and its environs drove the inhabitants out of their villages. Sanguahun, Nyandeyama, Nekabu, Baoya, Damawulo, Guabu and Ngeyawamie were attacked during the last months of the year but few civilians were to be found. Most of these villages were burnt and RUF forces coming from Saami started looking for people in the bushes to increase the number of workers for the harvest.

Kenema Town was attacked on Christmas Day in 1994. A high number of heavily armed RUF forces⁸⁴² from Camp Zogoda launched the attack from the south-eastern part of the city, known as “Reservation side”. The battle lasted for eight days but SLA forces were unable to protect the town, although a financial contribution to help them had been asked and obtained from the inhabitants. During this attack, which lasted several days, many civilians were killed and a lot of young boys and girls were abducted. Among those killed was a prominent lawyer, whose death struck people as far away as Freetown. However, up to now, doubts still remain about the identity of those who killed him.

Throughout 1994 and 1995, villages all over Lower Bambara⁸⁴³ came under persistent attacks. In all the attacks, people were routinely molested, tortured, killed, forced to carry stolen property and forced to join the RUF. Girls and women were raped and many houses were looted and burnt. In December 1994, RUF forces coming from Peyama killed fourteen civilians and two SLA members. People were slaughtered with knives and some of their bodies were put in pots. At Lowoma (Lower Bambara Chiefdom), also in December 1994, some houses were burnt, some civilians taken away and a few others were killed. Those who were killed were thrown into water cells, which became contaminated and caused diseases. During 1995, schools, clinics, mosques and churches throughout the chiefdom were unroofed.

In February 1995, RUF forces attacked the mining town of Kpava (Nongowa Chiefdom), asking whether any Kamajors or SLA forces were in town. Following indiscriminate shooting, around 15 civilians were killed. The town was then looted and some civilians forced to carry the load to Peyama, the main RUF base in Lower Bambara Chiefdom. People who were caught trying to escape

⁸⁴¹ These events happened in 1994 and probably 1995. See above, note 165.

⁸⁴² It is believed they were 400 in number.

⁸⁴³ These villages include Torpombu, Foindu, Kamboma, Komende, Bumpe, Kornia, Sahaha and Jagor.



NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE

faced severe beatings with sticks and car tyres until they died and very young girls were routinely raped.

Government forces based in Lower Bambara Chiefdom ambushed a lorry between Ngiehun and Lalehun in May 1995. During this attack, 14 civilians, mainly businessmen, were killed. Civilians from Lalehun were forced to take the bodies and bury them in a mass grave in Lalehun. The following month, some women of Kenema Town decided to go and plead with RUF forces stationed at Tabulay Junction. On their arrival, RUF forces opened fire and many of the women died on the spot. Others sustained bullet wounds or were taken to the RUF base and raped.

In November 1995, local hunters equipped with short guns, cutlasses and knives coming from Kenema Town attacked RUF positions in Lower Bambara Chiefdom,⁸⁴⁴ repelling RUF forces who, while retreating, burnt down some villages. Civilians who had earlier fled to the bush started to come back to their villages. These local hunters at this time were not undertaking initiation as such and reporting to a man called a prominent Doctor.⁸⁴⁵

Throughout 1995 and 1996, RUF forces were coming sporadically to Nongowa Chiefdom. Fewer incidents are reported, possibly due to the fact that many people were living in the bushes and that many villages were already destroyed. During this period, RUF forces used to bypass Jormu where Kamajors and SLA forces were based, launching raids on villages out of their reach like Kpalu and Konabu.

On Election Day in February 1996, RUF forces singing "RUF says no election" attacked Kenema Town early in the morning. Among the people killed on that day was a final year student at Fourah Bay College. On the same day, the RUF launched systematic attacks on towns and villages in Dama Chiefdom, as they did not want the election to take place. An unspecified number of people were killed on that day. In some instances, the RUF forces attacking villages on that day were dressed in military fatigues. Nevertheless, despite these incidents, the elections went on as planned.⁸⁴⁶

After the 1996 elections, more SLA forces came to Foindu, Kamboma, Largo and Bendu Junction (Lower Bambara Chiefdom). At checkpoints, civilians without a written document called a "pass" were not allowed to continue their journey. They were often molested and detained for long periods of time. In another incident, in June 1996, the SLA forced a lot of civilians to brush the area near Peyama. As Peyama was a RUF base, many civilians fell into an RUF ambush and were killed.

The North-west of the District

⁸⁴⁴ These positions were located at Kornia Kpindima, Foindu, Kamboma, Largo and Kombuy.

⁸⁴⁵ Initiation of Kamajors did not take place in Kenema District before 1996. However, these local hunters, as in other places in the country, were organising themselves to protect their chiefdoms, mainly equipped with bladed weapons and local guns. The registration process will require further clarification.

⁸⁴⁶ It is interesting to note that very few reports mention RUF disturbances on Election Day. Furthermore, besides Kenema Town (Nongowa Chiefdom), the other area affected was Dama Chiefdom, to be found south of Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema Town being located nearby the border with Dama Chiefdom.



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Coming from Lower Bambara Chiefdom through Dodo Chiefdom, RUF forces reached Simbaru Chiefdom in February 1994; Wandor and Kandu Leppeama Chiefdoms were affected shortly after. These chiefdoms will be examined together as it appears that the same RUF commander was in charge of the RUF forces operational in these chiefdoms. As for Gorama Mende Chiefdom, the northernmost chiefdom of the District, it is likely that RUF forces who reached it came from two different directions and the actions of one group may be linked with what happened in Kandu Leppeama, Simbaru and Wandor Chiefdoms (south of Gorama Mende Chiefdom) while the other actions that affected mainly Punduru (north-east of the chiefdom), were directed from Kono District.

In February 1994, an RUF group called "Tay Go" entered Simbaru Chiefdom and rapidly established a camp under the Lomie Hill they called Joe Bush.⁸⁴⁷ Before establishing their camp, RUF forces attacked Goma. They entered the town with sporadic firing while people were fleeing. The RUF forces stayed for three days in the town and abducted some civilians. The civilians who came out of the bush after the attack counted 15 bodies. The houses were unroofed and young men were forced to carry the stolen property, including food, poultry and personal items such as radios, recorders and clothes to a site that became an RUF camp. Before leaving, they set the town on fire, burning down all the approximately 123 houses of the town.

Shortly afterwards, the first group was reinforced by a second group called "Death Squad", which also came from Lower Bambara Chiefdom. On their way to Simbaru Chiefdom, this second group passed by Dodo Chiefdom, east of Simbaru Chiefdom. At Guala (Dodo Chiefdom), they shot and killed nine civilians and burnt 18 people alive. After spending two days in the town, they continued towards Simbaru Chiefdom and reached the Hydro Electricity Power Dam, located in Simbaru Chiefdom at the border with Dodo Chiefdom. They vandalised the dam and killed civilians who stayed with the Security Police who were stationed there. Civilians who went to the dam afterwards counted 16 bodies, including women and children. Eight civilians were also mutilated and four young boys, allegedly below the age of 15, had melted plastic dripped into their eyes while they were being interrogated by the RUF forces.

The RUF used Camp Joe Bush as a training camp and as a permanent base to attack the whole of Simbaru Chiefdom and the surrounding chiefdoms. Civilians who had been captured were taken to the camp, where they were subjected to physical and mental violence. One example of this was called "Gunproof society". During the course of this action, captives were first forced to dig deep pits and to collect over 150 different kinds of leaves from the bush, where they had been escorted for this purpose. Captives were then obliged to lie down in the pit, where they were covered with the sticks and boiled leaves they had collected, which were then set alight for the captives to be smoked. After this, civilians were forced to wash themselves with the water in which the leaves had been boiled. They were then covered with burnt oil on their whole body and forced to sit for hours under the sun. Following this, RUF members shot them to prove they were "gunproof", as a result of which many people died. In addition, people who had been captured and brought to the camp were shot dead and their flesh cooked by women captives.

⁸⁴⁷ Joe Bush was a generic name given to training bases, like "Camp Lion" in other places. Other camps called Camp Joe Bush were to be found at other places in Kenema District.



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From this camp, RUF forces started attacking villages, systematically molesting, torturing, killing, raping and abducting people and looting and burning houses. The scale of these acts was very high. The following incidents describe the actions carried out during this period.

The first village to be attacked from the camp was Lomabu (Simbaru Chiefdom), where RUF forces killed 13 people, set the village on fire and captured some men and women. They then divided into groups to visit the whole chiefdom, coming back after the attacks to their camp with stolen property and captured civilians. Patrol groups undertaking these actions in various villages were given descriptive names such as "Operation No Mercy" and "Operation Fire".

At Borboru, a section headquarter in Simbaru Chiefdom, people fled as the RUF entered the town, firing their weapons. Those people who were caught were either captured or killed; this attack resulted in the death of 27 civilians, including children. The village was massively looted and civilians were forced to carry the stolen property, which included animals, clothes and zinc, back to the camp. The RUF forces remained in Gbangeima for nine weeks, during which time they mutilated civilians, raped women and girls, burnt people alive, skinned people alive and ate the flesh of their victims. Top commanders were given the most beautiful girls and the other women who had been caught were distributed among the junior commandos. Two young girls were buried alive as a sacrifice at the river bank. People were forced to work and cook for them. At the entrance and exit points of the town, they mounted checkpoints at which they displayed human heads. At one point, they started burning furniture instead of gathering wood and moved all the captives to the camp. Before leaving, they set the village on fire, destroying almost all the houses. People who managed to escape from the camp later found the village destroyed and over 40 bodies lying on the ground.

Deima Town (Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, south of Simbaru Chiefdom) was attacked many times during this period, as it was a diamond rich area. In March 1994, the RUF group called "Tay Go", wearing combat attire and red berets, attacked Deima, killing 20 civilians on the spot and abducting many young girls. The heavily armed RUF forces attacked and raided many villages in the chiefdom. The RUF group then settled for a while at Bouajabu, from where they attacked other villages. At Bouajabu, 15 people were captured and forced to carry stolen property. At Jenneh, many civilians drowned in a deep stream as they tried to escape an oncoming RUF attack, of which they had been warned by an inhabitant of the village. RUF forces stayed in Jenneh for three days, killing civilians and raping girls. When they entered the town, the RUF forces met a student from Milton Margai College with his aunt. Accusing him of being a SLA member, RUF forces dragged him away, beat him, wrapped him in rice bags and a bed mat and set fire to the mat. His aunt was then taken away and sexually assaulted by more than one member of the RUF. She was taken with them, forced to cook for them and they said that she was now their "Mammy Queen", forcing her to have sex with them. This woman managed to escape later during a fight between the RUF group and SLA forces that took place at Gbando.

Other villages in Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom - such as Motorma, Banda and Leppeama - also came under attack in March 1994. Civilians were killed and houses were burnt down. At the headquarter town of Gbando, one young man from Levuma who had been sent by the acting Paramount Chief



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to report on what was happening in the surrounding villages saw members of a fighting force wearing combat uniforms and identifying themselves as RUF forces. Many houses in the town were on fire and bodies were lying in the backyards of some houses, while other inhabitants who were in houses that were on fire were crying.

RUF forces raided other villages in Simbaru Chiefdom before reaching the chiefdom headquarter of Boajibu. During those raids, they vandalised and took everything they came across, including cattle and poultry, and took away civilians to carry what they had just taken. At Tawalun, they looted extensively, including domestic animals, burnt down the village, captured 19 strong young men to carry the load, killed two civilians with machetes and threw three people into a burning house. At Kpetema, where they arrived in the evening hours, they entered the village with heavy fire and captured eight men to carry their load. At Peyeila, a village of 98 family houses, they vandalised the houses and took all the property they found, including household items, cash, money, clothes and cattle. They captured civilians to bring all the items to Camp Joe Bush, set the whole village on fire and mutilated seven civilians, namely three women, a three year old girl and three young men. One woman who was six months' pregnant had her belly cut open to settle an argument the RUF forces were having about the sex of the baby she carried.

On 17 March 1994, the same group launched an attack on Simbaru Chiefdom headquarters, Boajibu, known to be a business centre for the neighbouring chiefdoms and containing the offices of many dealers in diamonds and gold. Before entering the town, they laid ambushes on all the entrances. Seven hundred and sixty-nine civilians were captured and divided into four groups, each of which was to be given a section of the town to burn down. Each day civilians were killed; they were burnt alive, dropped in boiling water, shot or had melted plastic dripped into their eyes. The bodies of their victims were cooked and eaten; this human flesh was called Yanimi. Many people were mutilated and dozens of women and girls were often raped by numerous RUF members. Relief came from SLA forces from Komboya Chiefdom (Bo District) who attacked the town after 17 days of RUF occupation, repelling the RUF forces. SLA forces then returned to their base in Bo District.

RUF forces began a looting spree on 29 March 1994 at Konta (Gorama Mende Chiefdom), a town known for its business transactions.⁸⁴⁸ RUF forces entered the town at dusk with heavy firing and, as civilians had already fled, undertook systematic looting and burning of the houses. Two people were killed: one man, described as insane, who did not leave the town was stabbed to death because RUF forces were suspicious that he did not leave and an old man was burnt alive in a house the RUF forces had set on fire. Those RUF forces then continued their looting spree in the surrounding villages and captured civilians were forced to carry the stolen property on their heads. At Palima, five civilians were killed and 20 houses left in ashes. The RUF forces went back to Konta, where they killed and ate domestic animals.

⁸⁴⁸ The direction the RUF forces came from cannot be ascertained with certainty. As Konta is located at a nodal point on a road coming from the south (Wandor Chiefdom), it is likely that those forces came from Wandor Chiefdom. However, information collected for Wandor Chiefdom does not mention any troops movement late March 1994, only in May, 1994. It could nonetheless be deduced that the troops who passed by (and only bypassed) Wandor Chiefdom in May 1994 are the same as the one who attacked Konta (Gorama Mende Chiefdom) and that one of these two dates is not completely exact.



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Three days later, the RUF forces left for Modema, which is on the road that leads to Tonkolili District, in the north of Gorama Mende Chiefdom. On their way to Modema, RUF forces burnt many houses: five houses at Gbandi, six at Kortuhun, three huts at Fulawahun and 20 at Kenyema. At the Kenyema Bridge, one civilian who was wearing a t-shirt with a NPRC logo was stabbed to death. Another civilian was captured at the bridge and joined the captives. Modema, a periodical market centre located in an area producing coffee and cocoa, was attacked on 1 April 1994. During this attack, all the public buildings were burnt down and one civilian caught trying to flee was killed. Houses were also burnt down in the surrounding villages. The RUF forces left Modema for the road leading to Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). SLA forces came to Modema late April, unsuccessfully pursued the RUF forces, stayed in the town for some days and looted what was left before leaving.

In April 1994, RUF forces entered the north-east of Gorama Mende Chiefdom. At this time, vigilante groups⁸⁴⁹ composed of local hunters and volunteered civilians trained in basic military tactics were active in the chiefdom. Those vigilante groups were to serve as local observers assisting the SLA forces and were sometimes used for reconnaissance (RECE). One of those vigilante groups had its first encounter in April 1994 when, hearing that RUF forces coming from Nimiyama Chiefdom (Kono District) were near Punduru, they ambushed those RUF forces in Kemuya forest, killing one of them and injuring others. Following this incident, RUF forces entered Kemuya and killed five civilians, including women and children, and burnt 10 houses. On their way back to their base in Nimiyama Chiefdom, those RUF forces went through Ngorgbedehun, on the east bank of the Sewa River, where they raided the houses and burnt down two of them.

On 8 May 1994, SLA forces came back to Modema (Gorama Mende Chiefdom), claiming they had been deployed to protect civilians. They taxed the people of the town and on 9 June they left, allegedly for another military assignment. Three days after they had left, Modema was attacked but the inhabitants could not tell whether the assailants were RUF or SLA forces. During this attack, five people were killed and the armed men located the civilians in their hiding places, beat them and took their property.

The situation prevailing in Simbaru Chiefdom also affected Wandor Chiefdom, north of Simbaru Chiefdom. Beginning in June 1994, small groups of RUF forces were coming from Simbaru Chiefdom, initially at least led by the same commander who had been leading the "Tay Go" group. Before these regular visits of small groups, hundreds of RUF forces passed by the chiefdom in May 1994, en route to open a new base further north, killing two people as they passed through Gendema. In June 1994, RUF forces coming from Boajibu (Simbaru Chiefdom) arrested the Town Chief and killed him in a nearby village, on the basis that the inhabitants did not feed them well. His wife was raped and the RUF forces took two young girls away with them as they moved from village to village to take food. In December, on a food-finding mission, they went to Kpangbaru, where they mutilated a man they identified as being a vigilante. While he was still alive, his stomach was slit open and his organs removed and eaten.

⁸⁴⁹ These vigilante groups were equipped with traditional weapons like swords, lances, knives and short guns (local hunters).



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At one point (reports vary between June 1994 and the end of 1995), SLA forces were based at Boajibu (Simbaru Chiefdom). When they arrived, they asked people to come out of the bushes and those who did not were later forced to come out. Civilians were forced to stay indoors from 5.00 pm until 9.30 am. Every morning, civilians were dispatched to bring food for the SLA forces in the chiefdom, which later extended to neighbouring chiefdoms when food supplies in Simbaru Chiefdom were exhausted. SLA forces were patrolling in Simbaru Chiefdom and the neighbouring chiefdoms, bringing with them civilians used to carry properties they would loot. Civilians were forced to work for SLA forces, mainly to mine diamonds for them; villages were raided to bring manpower for this purpose. Civilians were also forced to do farm work. Orders were given to shoot any civilian caught trying to steal gems. In one incident, civilians fleeing RUF attacks in Kono District and coming to Boajibu were arrested and detained for two days. Three of them were then shot to death and civilians were told to tie their feet together and to “throw them away”. Civilians were beaten if they failed to give food to the SLA forces. Orders were passed that civilians had to divide their food in two parts, one part for them and one for their commander. Civilians were harassed for their property and SLA forces were searching for civilians in their “sorquehun”. During one of these searches, some SLA members fell into a RUF ambush. In reprisal, SLA forces killed two young civilians accused of being responsible for the death of their colleagues. They cut their throats, slit their stomachs, cut out their organs and cooked them. During all this period, many women and girls were raped and anyone who denied a request from an SLA member was severely beaten. Similar actions continued under successive commanders.

Punduru (in the north-east of Gorama Mende Chiefdom) was attacked in October 1994 by RUF forces on a looting spree. Over 250 men entered the town wearing red headbands, about 50 of them unarmed, one of whom was a Lebanese businessman captured in Nimiyama Chiefdom (Kono District). The heavy firing frightened civilians and vigilantes, who all fled the town. The RUF forces then started hunting for people and property, raiding the whole town. They killed 10 civilians, mainly people who could not escape, including the elderly and young children. Other civilians they found were not killed but used as manpower to carry the stolen property. However, one man who was told to carry property taken from the pharmacy and who refused was beaten to death with a bladed weapon. Before leaving the town for their base with their captives, the RUF forces set fire to the mosque, the health centre, the primary school and two churches.⁸⁵⁰ However, some of the local hunters managed to encounter the RUF forces at the border with Nimiyama Chiefdom (Kono District). RUF forces, heavily laden with stolen property, were not able to put up strong resistance and fled, leaving most of the stolen property behind and enabling most of the captives to flee.

Another group of RUF forces⁸⁵¹ reached Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom in August 1995⁸⁵² and inflicted a lot of violence on both person and property as the following examples highlight. At Levuma, RUF forces killed civilians, sexually assaulted women, burnt some houses and captured civilians to carry their load. At Jenneh, they killed five civilians and tortured others. The RUF forces

⁸⁵⁰ Punduru would not come under other RUF attack until 1997.

⁸⁵¹ It was not the ‘Tay Go’ group.

⁸⁵² This event could have taken place in 1994.



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also killed 16 civilians, burnt 45 houses, amputated the limbs of seven civilians, raped four girls and took other women from their husbands at Gbandu, the chiefdom headquarter. Deima, a diamond rich town, was attacked not only during this wave of attacks but also many more times throughout the following months as RUF forces, although not based there, sporadically entered the chiefdom on raids.⁸⁵³ Following these attacks, local authorities addressed the Government, expressing their deep need to have some SLA forces stationed in their chiefdom. However, the SLA forces who were sent as a result of this request also began harassing civilians and taking their property.

Due to SLA attacks in 1995, RUF forces mounted serious assaults in Wandor Chiefdom. At Gendema, civilians were assembled and nine of them were locked up in a room after three had been killed. The nine men in the room were taken out one after the other and beaten to death. The RUF forces did not use bullets, both to save ammunition and to avoid alerting SLA forces based at Boajibu (Simbaru Chiefdom). RUF forces later proceeded to one of their main bases, called "Bokuri", in Valunia chiefdom (Bo District).

Tongi, the headquarter town of Gorama Mende Chiefdom, was overrun by RUF forces in March 1995. Over 500 well-armed RUF forces entered the town, coming from the north of the chiefdom,⁸⁵⁴ gathered people in the Court Barrie and declared that the town was now an "RUF entity". New authorities were appointed, including a Town Commander, a Town Mother and a clerk. The Town Commander was charged with taxing the inhabitants and gathering food for the RUF. Youths were ordered to unroof houses and to use the zinc to build a camp called Joe Bush⁸⁵⁵ in the forest near the town. During the time of the building of the camp, two civilians were beaten to death, as they did not obey the RUF order to unroof and transport some zinc.⁸⁵⁶ Young men and children were captured and trained in the camp on guerrilla warfare throughout 1995 and 1996.⁸⁵⁷

Local hunters in Simbaru Chiefdom decided to organise themselves and provide assistance to SLA forces, mainly by showing them routes within the chiefdom. At this time, proper initiation was not taking place; rather it was an informal gathering of men above 20 years who then presented themselves to the SLA. This movement also took place in Wandor Chiefdom, where a meeting with local hunters from neighbouring chiefdoms was organised.

In October 1995, at Gombu (Wandor Chiefdom), RUF forces killed 17 civilians and razed the village to the ground by setting houses on fire. Women and girls were sexually abused and civilians were taken away, forced to show the RUF forces routes by which they might avoid local hunters. At Falla the next day, one civilian who cheered, thinking those forces coming to the village were SLA forces, was killed and dismembered with a bladed weapon, his body parts scattered all over the

⁸⁵³ These continuous attacks on Deima resulted to the death of a lot of civilians, the number of casualties per attack being however not ascertained.

⁸⁵⁴ The report mentions that they came from the direction of Mondema, north of Tongi (Gorama Mende Chiefdom) and accordingly those RUF forces came either from Tonkolili or from Kono Districts.

⁸⁵⁵ Joe Bush was a generic name given to training bases, like "Camp Lion" in other places. Other camps called Camp Joe Bush were to be found at other places in Kenema District.

⁸⁵⁶ These two civilians could not carry out the task RUF ordered them to do, as they were ill.

⁸⁵⁷ The camp would later on be attacked by Kamajors.



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town. Another man who was requested to cook for them and took the meat for himself was also killed and his stomach cut open. On that same night, Falla was set on fire.

The SLA presence in Simbaru Chiefdom did not prevent RUF forces attacking villages. On 25 December 1995, as RUF forces attacked Boajibu for the second time, SLA forces fled the town. During this attack, the newly initiated Bondo society girls were captured, the few houses left standing after the first burning were burnt and nine men were killed. The entire town was destroyed, including all the buildings except two mosques and a school. The RUF forces did not stay in the town and around one week later, civilians and SLA forces came back to the town. SLA forces went back to patrolling Simbaru Chiefdom and the neighbouring chiefdoms, where they took away what was left after RUF attacks, unroofing houses and removing their doors and windows shutters. They forced civilians to go with them to carry those items back to Boajibu.

In January 1996, RUF forces came back in Wandor Chiefdom and this time engaged people to join them, organising meetings and appointing Towns Commanders. Those who refused to join were considered as enemies. According to one of the RUF commanders, they would not kill anybody if people followed orders. However, shortly after, their behaviour changed and elders were punished; one was strung up inside the Court Barrie and seriously flogged. Those civilians who had to cooperate with RUF forces were later denounced to SLA forces in Simbaru Chiefdom and, everyday, some were punished with lashes while others were fined.

In 1996, both local hunters and SLA forces attacked Camp Joe Bush in Simbaru Chiefdom and destroyed it. The bodies of many civilians were found almost fully decomposed in the deserted camp, most of them victims of the "Gunproof society" practice. From the documents found in the camp, it became clear that this camp was going to be developed as the main RUF base for the eight neighbouring chiefdoms. The interrogation of the captives revealed that RUF forces were coming from different chiefdoms all over the District. They revealed the way they were treated in the camp: they were forced to work all day long without proper food, continuously beaten or molested; women were constantly raped, often raped by multiple attackers and many of them died from those rapes; bodies were not buried but were thrown in the bushes or in streams; any time RUF forces left the camp to attack a village, they forced captives to go with them, forcing them to the frontline, to carry the property they would take; any civilian who was tired and could no longer sustain the weight of the load was either beaten to death or shot; and young boys and girls under 15 were trained to become combatants. Babies who were born in the camp were well treated, as they were viewed as future combatants. When they entered the camp, Kamajors took automatic rifles and machine guns, hiding these weapons from the SLA forces. Following the capture of the camp, RUF forces attacked Boajibu many times, trying to get back the documents they had lost.

Following this successive attack, the Kamajors of Simbaru Chiefdom established five bases in the chiefdom at Fonima, Gbonjeima, Goma, Boajibu and Njagbwema. They routinely led SLA forces on patrol. To buy the cartridges for their single barrel guns, they used to tax male civilians while women were requested to contribute with rice. As Kamajor control in the chiefdom grew stronger, civilians started coming back in the chiefdom.



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The collaboration between the SLA and local hunters did not last long, as SLA forces started molesting and, at times, disarming those local hunters. At Boajibu, the new SLA commander who arrived in April stated that “two captains cannot drive one ship at the same time”, meaning that SLA forces did not need another armed group to defend the country. SLA behaviour towards civilians became worse when the new commander arrived. Incidents of rapes, sexual harassment and forceful marriages became common practice at this time. SLA forces forced civilians to work in mines and to dig up diamonds for them. SLA forces guarding the mining areas were told by their commander to injure or kill any civilian caught trying to steal a gem. That mining activity went on throughout 1996 until early 1997, when SLA forces left the area and the Kamajors arrived. Civilians were also forced to engage in large-scale farming under the surveillance of SLA forces. Civilians worked all day and went back home in the evening without being fed. On one occasion while they were searching for civilians in the bush to take away their property, SLA forces fell into an RUF ambush and one of them was killed. The SLA commander in Boajibu accused two local hunters from Wandor Chiefdom of being responsible for the killing of this SLA member. The two local hunters had to lie down on the street and were killed, having their throats cut with a dagger. The junior SLA members then removed the organs, cut the fleshy parts of the bodies, cooked and ate them.

In December 1996, the SLA commander ordered the Bondo society heads to initiate girls into the society. At first, the heads refused, as they stated that on hearing that the initiation was going to take place, RUF forces would attack them, especially since RUF forces were constantly attacking the chiefdom headquarter of Boajibu. Nevertheless, the SLA commander forced them to perform the initiation on 23 December. In the morning of 25 December, RUF forces attacked Boajibu; the SLA forces fled and left the inhabitants, including the new Bondo initiates, in the hands of RUF forces. The RUF forces caught the new initiates with their superiors, called Soweis, and sexually assaulted the girls who had been initiated only two days previously. Furthermore, they killed nine civilians, including young married women and children. A lot of buildings were also burnt down.

The Kamajors - 1996

In 1996, on hearing that Kamajor societies were being established in Bo and Bonthe Districts, elders and Chiefs in the various chiefdoms of Kenema District started nominating their own men for initiation as Kamajors, which took place in Kenema Town. The first batches of those initiates returned to their chiefdoms in the middle of 1996 and deployed at key entry points to the towns and villages. Most of the men nominated by the elders to join the society were in displaced camps, as was almost all the population of the chiefdoms.

Events in Dama Chiefdom highlight that in 1996, the welfare of the local hunters, now regrouped under the CDF, was transferred to the Government and each chiefdom authority was required to appoint a chief Kamajor to act as chiefdom coordinator for the CDF in the chiefdom. Battalion commanders and commanding officers were also appointed.⁸⁵⁸ The conditions for initiation, as applied at least during the early stage of the Kamajors, were as follows:⁸⁵⁹

⁸⁵⁸ For more details on the structure of the CDF, see the chapter on the CDF in the Fighting Forces section of this report.

⁸⁵⁹ These conditions were specifically reported in relation to Simbaru Chiefdom, generally applied across the whole District and, indeed, the whole Kamajor movement.



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- Men must be above 18 years.
- Men must join the Kamajor society voluntary and append their signature.
- Those men must be recommended to the Paramount Chief by a Town Chief or Section Chief.
- Those men must willingly contribute condiments to the Kamajors.

In some chiefdoms, such as Gorama Mende Chiefdom, men who wished to be initiated as CDF members had to pay a fee ranging from Le 15,000 to Le 25,000. Once the money was paid, a date was set and the men who were going to be initiated were to come dressed in a “war ronko”, which is a type of country cloth.

RUF forces were in control of Langrama, Niawa and Small Bo Chiefdoms until 1996 when the first Kamajors coming back from their initiation and started fighting. In June 1996, local authorities from the three chiefdoms decided to form their own society. A Section Chief from Niawa Chiefdom encouraged people living in the displaced camps to be initiated. The first arrangements combined Small Bo, Niawa, Langurama (Kenema District), Wunde (Bo District), Wunde and Barri (Pujehun District) Chiefdoms; this group was known as the Wanjei Defence Committee. However, this initial arrangement did not last as the group as there were complications due to the fact that it was composed of chiefdoms from different Districts. It was therefore decided that the initiation for the Kamajors society should be undertaken at District level. Thus, Small Bo, Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms regrouped and became known as the Upper Wanjei Defence Committee.

After the initiation in Bo, the first group of around 200 Kamajors arrived in Small Bo Chiefdom in October 1996. With weapons provided by SLA forces and together with the SLA forces, the newly initiated Kamajors launched their first attack on RUF positions in a town located four miles west of Blama.⁸⁶⁰ It is reported that SLA forces gave weapons to the Kamajors despite the animosity and distrust between them. During this first attack, the Kamajors did not dislodge the RUF forces but obtained their first automatic rifles (AK47s). Together with the Kamajors from Wunde Chiefdom (Bo District), they successfully attacked an RUF camp at Semabu (Small Bo Chiefdom). Kamajors continued their progression into Small Bo Chiefdom, taking weapons abandoned by the retreating RUF forces.

The Kamajors of the three chiefdoms (Small Bo, Niawa, Langruma Chiefdoms), assisted by Kamajors from Bo District (Wunde and Boama Chiefdoms, sharing the border with Kenema District) and together with SLA and ECOMOG forces, then launched attacks on Niawa Chiefdom. Using two different roads, one coming from Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District) and the other from Potoru (Barri Chiefdom, Pujehun District), the combined forces advanced on RUF camps at Kpantena Ngovokpan, Topanda and Bandawor before reaching the main camp in Bandawor forest, called Camp Zogoda. The fighting lasted several days, as a result of which the combined forces were able to dislodge the RUF from the camp. In the camp, the Kamajors found many RUF documents consisting of records of RUF activities, including, *inter alia*, records of the attacks on the Bo–Kenema Highway, how many items were stolen and how many people were

⁸⁶⁰ The name of the place is not specified, only its location.



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captured to carry the load. In the camp, the combined forces found many captured civilians, who related how they were treated during their stay in the camp. For example, abductees who were caught trying to escape were shot dead or had the letters “RUF” inscribed on their body with hot iron. Civilians were forced to work in the camp and were given little or no food. Villages considered by the RUF as “enemy” bases were burnt down and captured civilians were used to carry boxes of ammunition on their heads for long distances. Young boys between eight and eleven were trained in the camp and sent to fight with weapons almost too big for them to carry. Some of those civilians found in the camp were brought to Blama to a camp that hosted them and the captured RUF forces were taken to the SLA Brigade Headquarter in Kenema.⁸⁶¹

After the Kamajors had successfully repelled RUF forces from the three chiefdoms, civilians started to come back from displaced camps and the bush to their villages. The Kamajors who had initially all been based in Small Bo Chiefdom also returned to their various chiefdoms, namely Niawa, Langruma and Small Bo Chiefdoms. From that time, Niawa and Langruma chiefdoms did not encounter any more RUF attacks.

Newly initiated Kamajors were deployed at different locations – Deima, Levuma and Gbando – in Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom. While initially they collaborated with the SLA forces, this deteriorated as they openly disagreed with the behaviour of SLA forces towards civilians. Nevertheless, Kamajors’ behaviour towards civilians was not exempt from violence either, as civilians accused of being “rebel” collaborators were chased. In one incident, two civilians who had been appointed Town Commanders at Kamboma and Koindu Villages by RUF forces and who had actively collaborated with RUF forces were killed, although it appears that these people were killed by the people of those villages, rather than the Kamajors.

In Wandor Chiefdom, strong men who were nominated by the Chiefs to be initiated in Jiama Bongor Chiefdom (Bo District) returned to the chiefdom in September 1996 and successfully repelled RUF forces. Kamajors started patrolling at the borders of the chiefdom and in order to avoid having civilians caught in crossfire during encounters with RUF/AFRC forces, Kamajors requested the civilians from surrounding villages to gather at Falla in the centre of the chiefdom. Shortly after they arrived in the chiefdom, Kamajors fought with RUF/AFRC forces who were en route to attack them at Falla⁸⁶² and succeeded in repelling them. After a second attack that took place two days later, Wandor Chiefdom did not sustain any more RUF or RUF/AFRC incursions.

In September 1996, Kamajors coming from Kenema Town repelled RUF forces from different villages in Lower Bambara Chiefdom, including Lowoma, Fowaru and Ngelaima. People who had fled to the bush started to come back to the villages. However, they were soon forced to give food to the Kamajors and those who refused were detained for hours and molested. Kamajors also deposed Chiefs and decided on private matters, punishing and fining people they found guilty. The heads of some RUF members were cut off and displayed in Tongo Field. Kamajors entered Peyama, drove the RUF out and took all the stolen property back to Tongo, where they worked with SLA forces.

⁸⁶¹ The fate of these prisoners is not known.

⁸⁶² The fighting took place near Kamboma.



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In November 1996, Kamajors from Nomo, Gaura and Tunkia Chiefdoms joined forces to dislodge the RUF, launching successful attacks in Nomo Chiefdom. They were first equipped with short guns, sticks, machetes and cutlasses and progressively, were provided with more sophisticated weapons, such as AK47s, taken from opponents during the attacks. Any person suspected of being a “rebel” would be killed, their heads sometimes chopped off. In January 1997, at Dambala (Nomo Chiefdom), three men were shot dead, alleged to be “rebels”.

Early that same month, Kamajors came back from their initiation in Gorama Mende Chiefdom and launched their first attack on the headquarter town of Tongi. They successfully repelled the RUF forces from the town and from Camp Joe Bush. After they overran Tongi, Kamajors arrested all civilians who had held positions during the RUF’s stay, threatening to kill them. However, due to the intervention of the chiefdom authorities, those people were not killed but instead were forced to pay the following fines: one bag of rice, five gallons of palm oil, two cotton cloths and Le 50,000. Kamajors also repelled RUF forces from other towns in the chiefdom such as Vengema, Modema, Keema, Jouma, Berembah, Benduma and Nyandehun. More Kamajors were sent for initiation to strengthen their forces. Another Camp Joe Bush at Kpetema Teiyeh, in the north of the chiefdom at the border with Tonkolili District, was attacked and Kamajors drove RUF forces out of the camp. Some RUF forces were killed while most of them ran away. Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom were also active outside the boundaries of their chiefdom as they fought RUF forces in Tonkolili District.⁸⁶³

On 3 March 1997, an initiator from Bonthe District was called upon to initiate more Kamajors in Gorama Mende Chiefdom. In the same week, on hearing this information, RUF forces sent a reconnaissance (RECE) to plan an attack on the chiefdom. Kamajors did not wait for the RUF forces to come and on 10 March, attacked their base at Sullay Ground. The captured RUF forces were sent to Bo Town,⁸⁶⁴ under the protection of the chiefdom coordinator of the Kamajors. After this last fight, Gorama Mende Chiefdom was virtually free of RUF presence, the only subsequent sightings being a few RUF forces seen on food finding missions, with no reported fatalities.

In March 1997, following an encounter between SLA forces and the CDF at Tongo (Lower Bamabara Chiefdom), the Kamajors left the town and many civilians were tortured and killed by SLA forces on the grounds that they were Kamajor supporters. Kamajors who were driven out to nearby chiefdoms regrouped and retook Tongo, driving out SLA forces and establishing a permanent base. Retreating SLA forces killed a lot of civilians on their way to Kono District in Konjo and Venema (both villages are located in Lower Bambara Chiefdom). At Tongo, the Kamajors targeted alleged SLA sympathisers; they tortured and killed many civilians on these grounds. From this base, Kamajors were soon controlling the chiefdom.

When initiations started to take place in Kenema, local hunters from Simbaru Chiefdom went to be initiated. On their return in March 1997, they were told that the SLA forces had left for Kenema Town. From this time on, the Kamajors were in charge of the chiefdom. In Kandu Leppeama

⁸⁶³ See the factual analysis for Tonkolili District.

⁸⁶⁴ At this time, Bo Town was under SLA control.



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Chiefdom, Chiefs recommended strong men to be initiated and when they came back from their initiation, they were divided into different groups to protect the chiefdom.

In March 1997, RUF forces attacked the following villages in Simbaru Chiefdom, setting houses on fire and killing civilians: Nyahu (over 60 dwellings were burnt and six people killed); Mamborna (over 60 houses burnt, four old men killed and two men mutilated); Paniniga (45 houses were burnt and nine people killed); Gawama (over 170 houses, two primary schools and a health centre were set on fire and 17 people were killed); Gereihun (over 250 houses and public buildings were set on fire, 48 people were killed and four people mutilated); Fawana, Garahun, Jagbwema, Gogbebu and Nyeyama.⁸⁶⁵

In May 1997, a week before the Coup, the Kamajors' Chief Initiator conducted over 300 initiations at Falla (Wandor Chiefdom) to strengthen the number of Kamajors. Others travelled to Bo District to be initiated by the Deputy Chief Initiator.

Around the same time, SLA forces attacked the Kamajor base at Kenema, chasing away the Chief Initiator. During this attack, many civilians and Kamajors and few SLA members were killed and several houses, including that of the Chief Initiator, were burnt down as well as numerous homes of Kamajors and Kamajors supporters. On seeking refuge in Konia (Dama Chiefdom), the Chief Initiator was advised by the Paramount Chief to leave, due to its proximity to Kenema Town, so he left for Bo District.

Also before the Coup in May 1997, Kamajors from Nongowa Chiefdom, on hearing that SLA forces in the Dama axis were demanding money from people at the checkpoints they were operating, went there to inquire about the matter. When they arrived, SLA forces open fire on the Kamajors, who were mainly equipped with bladed weapons and some single barrel guns. The Kamajors captured the SLA commander and hacked him to death; other SLA members were given the same treatment.

c) Third Phase: May 1997 – 2002

Following the Coup on 25 May 1997, AFRC forces asked the CDF to surrender their weapons to the nearest police station and to suspend all their activities. CDF members did not follow this request; on the contrary, although they withdrew from the battlefronts, they regrouped themselves in villages and increased their number by undertaking more initiations. During this period, young boys under 15 began joining the society. RUF/AFRC started launching attacks on Kamajor positions and vice versa.

Shortly after the coup, on 30 May 1997, it is reported in general terms that fleeing civilians were mutilated and killed by RUF/AFRC fighters at Baoma (Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom). Indeed, across the District, RUF/AFRC forces harassed and intimidated civilians, molesting them, raiding villages and taking food and other property.

⁸⁶⁵ These incidents may have taken place after the Coup of 25 May 1997.



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In the south of the District, RUF/AFRC forces established a camp called "SS Camp" at the boundary between Dama and Nongowa Chiefdoms. From there, they raided all the surrounding villages. Besides looking for food, the main purpose of these raids was to find Kamajors. Many villages were suspected of hosting Kamajors preparing to launch attack on RUF/AFRC positions. RUF/AFRC attacks were also perceived by the population as reprisal to punish the population for failing to support them. Thus, men were stripped naked and RUF/AFRC forces searched for any marks on their bodies indicating they belonged to the Kamajor society, killing those on whose bodies they found such marks. However, not to have any marks did not prevent civilians from being killed, since people were killed on suspicion of being Kamajors or Kamajor collaborators in the absence of such a mark. This practice of undressing men to search for any mark was also carried out in the SS Camp by the Moa River.

Niawa and Langruma Chiefdoms were not attacked by RUF/AFRC forces after the Coup, unlike Small Bo Chiefdom, where SLA forces had been stationed before the Coup.⁸⁶⁶ Shortly after the Coup, the commander in charge of the ex-SLA forces in the chiefdom announced that Kamajors should disarm to them as instructed by the high command in Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces launched an attack on Kamajor positions, from which the Kamajors were controlling part of the Bo-Kenema highway in the chiefdom and in Blama in August 1997. In both locations, the Kamajors were overpowered and fled. During this attack, RUF/AFRC forces burnt houses in Blama. Another battle between the two forces took place in Joyomei, a town six miles south of Blama. The town was burnt down, although the force responsible for this burning remains unknown, with Kamajors blaming the RUF/AFRC and vice versa.

During the RUF/AFRC stay in Kenema Town, girls were raped, houses were looted continuously and civilians were harassed for food and other items. Most commonly, alleged Kamajors or alleged SLPP⁸⁶⁷ or Kamajor supporters were arrested, detained, beaten and/or killed and their houses looted and burnt.⁸⁶⁸ In one incident, a man riding his bicycle on the road to Kenema was brought to the town by RUF/AFRC members and killed in front of the Sierratel Building; his stomach was cut open and his intestines tied across the road as a barricade. Civilians in the town were beaten to death if they were caught listening to the BBC.

In Small Bo Chiefdom, people who were considered to be Kamajor collaborators were severely beaten or killed. RUF/AFRC forces made civilians look for food for them and the pressure on civilians was intensified as RUF/AFRC forces in Small Bo Chiefdom had stopped receiving food and other items from their main base in Kenema. The RUF/AFRC forces believed that civilians were sending information to Kamajors who had gone in the bushes; any food found with civilians was taken away on the grounds that the food would be sent to Kamajors. Furthermore, RUF/AFRC forces used to organise groups of civilians and took them to the bush to look for food. Whatever the quantity of food brought back, it was divided into four parts, one for the forces' High Command,

⁸⁶⁶ Accordingly, the SLA base transformed into an RUF/AFRC base.
⁸⁶⁷ Since February 1996, the SLPP party has been the ruling party of Sierra Leone.
⁸⁶⁸ No details were gathered for this period but this assertion, although general, was common in the information gathered for Nongowa Chiefdom and beyond the boundaries of the chiefdom.



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one for the lower ranks, one for the civilian administration and one for the civilians who had brought the food.

Civilians in the chiefdom engaged in mining activities in villages located in the north of the chiefdom, namely in Yorvuhun, Victoria, Komoli, Limeh and Nyagbe Bo. They received food from businessmen from Kenema Town who encouraged the mining. Because of this food supply and because the movement of civilians towards these villages was perceived as sabotage,⁸⁶⁹ RUF/AFRC forces established a base at Victoria in the north of the chiefdom, mainly to seize the food and non food items they needed from civilians and to monitor the movement of Kamajors in other chiefdoms located further north. However, RUF/AFRC forces soon also engaged in mining activities.

RUF/AFRC forces were making regular visits to Dama Chiefdom to look for CDF members and to request food from civilians. At Gofor in July 1997, they killed three civilians with automatic rifles and at Bandembu, on the same day, civilians suspected of being CDF supporters were killed. Each time they entered villages, RUF/AFRC asked civilians to locate CDF members, threatening to kill them. Houses and property belonging to suspected CDF supporters were looted and burnt down and some alleged Kamajor collaborators were tortured to death. Also in July, RUF/AFRC forces entering Kpandebu through the east killed 25 civilians, mostly men, and inflicted physical violence on others, whom they alleged to be Kamajor supporters. The following month, RUF/AFRC forces coming from Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) attacked Konia, Gboyama and Manor on the same day and killed an unknown number of civilians in those villages. During this wave of attacks, other villages including Sebehun and Kbakah were also raided and 10 civilians were killed.⁸⁷⁰

The Kamajors regrouped and began attacking RUF/AFRC forces, often by laying ambushes. Captured RUF/AFRC members were killed, frequently on the spot. Across Kenema District, civilians suspected of being a member of the RUF/AFRC forces or a member of their family or a collaborator were killed. For example, at Konia (Dama Chiefdom) in August 1997, one man was shot dead and another was beaten for two days, both on the grounds that they were "not on the side of the CDF".

During the second half of the year, RUF/AFRC forces reached Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, where there were some incidents of violence inflicted on civilians. At Deima, they killed civilians for their money and property, tortured some who refused to give them their valuables and raped some girls. At Jenneh also, some people were killed. The acting Paramount Chief residing at Levuma was arrested in November 1997 as he had dismantled the checkpoints some RUF/AFRC forces had made in the town.⁸⁷¹

Throughout the third phase of the conflict, diamond-rich Lower Bambara Chiefdom was the scene of numerous attacks and counter-attacks between RUF/AFRC forces and Kamajors, as a result of

⁸⁶⁹ This movement of civilians was indeed perceived by RUF/AFRC forces as indicating that civilians had received information of imminent attacks from Kamajors and accordingly civilians were considered as fleeing the area.

⁸⁷⁰ It could not be ascertained in which village those 10 civilians were killed.

⁸⁷¹ The acting Paramount Chief subsequently managed to escape into the bush.



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which there were many civilian fatalities. In August 1997, RUF/AFRC forces launched attacks on numerous villages including Torkpombu, Buime, Laehun, Kpandebu, Lowoma, Fowaru, Ngeleima, most of them diamond mining villages or towns. Coming from Kenema Town, these heavily armed forces fired indiscriminately in the villages as they passed by, shouting the following slogan, called Cyburg: "We don't talk, the barrels talk". During these attacks, many civilians were killed and many houses were burnt. As a result of these attacks, the CDF were driven out of the chiefdom. RUF/AFRC engaged in mining activities almost everywhere, digging plantations without the consent of their owners. If the owners resisted these activities, they were seriously beaten. Civilians were forced to work in the mines and many people died at these sites.

In August also, RUF/AFRC forces planned to attack Punduru, a Kamajor base in the north-east of Gorama Mende Chiefdom. On their way to Punduru, they had an encounter with Kamajors at Bandabu and one of their members was killed during the battle. It is believed that this incident outraged the RUF/AFRC forces and on 30 August, around 700 heavily armed⁸⁷² RUF/AFRC members launched a fierce attack on Punduru. During this attack, four Kamajors and 28 civilians were killed.⁸⁷³ RUF/AFRC forces were however repelled and moved to Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom, Kono District) before burning the whole town and capturing some girls and young boys.

The following month, the Kamajors ambushed a military convoy in Lower Bambara Chiefdom and 20 members of the RUF/AFRC forces were killed and arms and ammunition were seized. In September 1997, Kamajors in Nomo Chiefdom launched an attack on RUF/AFRC forces' positions in Tunkia and Gaura Chiefdoms. Two RUF/AFRC members were captured and their heads chopped off. Any person suspected of being a RUF/AFRC member was killed such as those two men from Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) who were shot in their stomachs while entering Nomo.

That same month, CDF members came to the Court Barrie in Konia and asked the Paramount Chief of Dama where he had put the money he received from RUF/AFRC forces. Denying that he had received such money, the Paramount Chief was arrested, tied up with his hammock, taken away and killed in another village. Later, one man who tried to escape was shot on sight by a CDF member. The CDF commander stated that he was the new Paramount Chief.

In October 1997, the mountain village of Basara (Nongowa Chiefdom) came under RUF/AFRC attack, as it was suspected of being a Kamajor stronghold. The village was surrounded in the early hours of the day and forces opened fire on the civilians. Five civilians were killed during the firing and 15 were put in a hut and burnt alive when the hut was set on fire. In November 1997, the same scenario took place in another mountain village called Masao. Over 10 people were shot dead, while 10 others were forced into a house, which was then set on fire.

Kamajors started regrouping in October 1997 in Dodo Chiefdom and in Panguma (Lower Bambara Chiefdom). Jormu Kefabu (Nongowa Chiefdom) became a CDF stronghold and RUF/AFRC forces

⁸⁷² The RUF/AFRC forces were dressed in combat fatigues with red berets and armed with machine guns, an anti-aircraft gun mounted on a Hilux van, RPGs and automatic rifles.

⁸⁷³ It is worth noting that throughout this time, the more the Kamajors attacked the RUF/AFRC forces, the more the RUF/AFRC forces were harassing civilians.



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made several unsuccessful attempts, mainly in the mountain villages, to drive the Kamajors out. In December 1997, the mountain village of Bambawa (Nongowa Chiefdom), which was believed to be a Kamajor training base, was attacked and burnt and one person was killed. Also in December, RUF/AFRC forces encountered Kamajors at Combema and about 40 of them were killed by Kamajors.

In November 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Gorahun (Tunkia Chiefdom), seizing the two roads leading to the town. In this attacks, 55 people were killed at close range. After this attack, the chiefdom did not experience further RUF/AFRC attacks.

The following month, the Kamajor commander on the ground in Nomo Chiefdom received a letter from the Kamajor High Command instructing all Kamajors in all chiefdoms to launch Operation "Black December". The purpose of this operation was to restrict the movement of the RUF/AFRC forces by regaining control of the highways. Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom took part in this operation on the Kono-Makeni highway. During the same month, at Dambala, a suspected "rebel" was decapitated and his blood drunk by a Kamajor.

"Operation Black December"⁸⁷⁴ did not take place in Lower Bambara Chiefdom in December 1997. However, a fierce attack was launched on Tongo Field in January 1998, when Kamajors entered the chiefdom from two fronts, namely the east from Malegohun Chiefdom and the west from Dodo Chiefdom. Although few details were obtained on this operation, it was stated more than once that during this attack, many civilians lost their lives. Furthermore, following this attack, both fighting forces attacked villages believed to be under the control of the other force, killing civilians and burning houses. Hanga (Nongowa Chiefdom) was also attacked in January by RUF/AFRC forces. Twelve members of the same family and other inhabitants were shot dead and more than 10 houses were burnt down. Some people were forced to carry looted items for the RUF/AFRC forces, who also attacked other villages along the road from Mano Junction to Kenema Town, including Ngelehun, Kpanderu and Bambawa.⁸⁷⁵

In January 1998, RUF/AFRC forces based in Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) decided to sweep away the Kamajors deployed along the entire route leading to Bo Waterside, on the Liberian border in Pujehun District.⁸⁷⁶ Before starting their operation, they sent a letter to the Kamajors to inform them on their plans. On their way, they burnt down many villages⁸⁷⁷ and succeeded in driving the Kamajors away. At Jao (Tunkia Chiefdom), over 40 houses were burnt and at Kamasu, 15 houses

⁸⁷⁴ This operation, declared by CDF High Command, was implemented across the country in the areas where Kamajors were active, in a bid to take control of RUF/AFRC positions. As part of this operation, all the highways and roads were blocked, in order to prevent RUF/AFRC forces from attacking civilians. It is believed that this Operation was launched following the AFRC statement that it would not hand over power to the President of Sierra Leone on 22 April 1998, as planned in the Conakry Peace Plan signed on 23 October 1997.

⁸⁷⁵ As for the casualties in those villages, it is merely reported that houses were burnt but it cannot be ascertained whether all the villages had houses burnt.

⁸⁷⁶ This road passes by Tunkia Chiefdom.

⁸⁷⁷ Tilorma, Taninahun, Sokola, Sefula and Damawulo were also burnt down.



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were burnt. At Gegbwema, where they spent the night, they burnt down all the houses except the mosque and the Court Barrie.

Kamajors from Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, together with some from Simbaru and Dodo Chiefdoms, planned to launch attacks on RUF/AFRC positions in Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom. However, on 5 January 1998, when they arrived at these positions, RUF/AFRC forces had already left the area. Kamajors from Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom then controlled the chiefdom, although there were reports of harassment of the civilian population. At Deima, for example, one Kamajor arrested seven civilians and put them in a wooden box which he then locked because they failed to give him food. The matter was reported to the commander at Levuma, who ordered their release.

In January also, the Paramount Chief of Nomo Chiefdom, together with other prominent people, including a prominent doctor and a businessman, were arrested by RUF/AFRC fighters in Kenema Town. They were arrested at the time of a fierce battle between RUF/AFRC forces in the outskirts of Kenema and were accused of supporting Kamajors. They were beaten with sticks with their hands tied behind their backs. One of them is believed to have died in detention although his body was never found. The mutilated body of another was found with 35 others in a mass grave at the outskirts of the town. Some of those arrested were however released.⁸⁷⁸

At Konjo (Dama Chiefdom) in early 1998, a pregnant woman was raped by member(s) of the RUF/AFRC forces and gave birth shortly after. During the same attack, civilians were punished⁸⁷⁹ or killed, suspected of being SLPP and Kamajor supporters. Some houses were also put down.

When they withdrew from Kenema in January 1998,⁸⁸⁰ over 10 RUF/AFRC members and their families who took the Nomo Chiefdom road to go to Liberia were shot dead by some Kamajors in Nomo Chiefdom while crossing the river that borders Sierra Leone and Guinea in a canoe. Due to the shooting of the canoe, it sank, which resulted in the drowning of a suckling mother and her baby with other people. At Faama (Nomo Chiefdom), Kamajors shot dead an unknown number of “rebel sympathisers”.

As Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom) was a stronghold of RUF/AFRC forces, Kamajors from Dodo and Kandu Leppeama Chiefdoms on the one hand and from Niawa Chiefdom, Wunde Chiefdom (Bo District) and Jiama Bongor Chiefdom (Bo District) on the other hand started operations to dislodge RUF/AFRC forces from Small Bo Chiefdom. On 31 January 1998, Kamajors from Dodo Chiefdom advanced towards Small Bo and on their way, launched a successful attack on RUF/AFRC forces based at Levuma (Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom). Kamajors from Dodo Chiefdom, with those from Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, advanced on Blama, entering the town on 15 February 1998. However, no RUF/AFRC forces were to be found in the town as they had left earlier.

⁸⁷⁸ Many reports mention that the arrest of those people and the reported killings were carried out under a direct order from a senior member of the RUF general staff.

⁸⁷⁹ The kind of punishment inflicted could not be ascertained.

⁸⁸⁰ Indeed, RUF/AFRC forces stayed in Kenema town throughout 1997 until late January 1998 when, fearing the imminent Kamajor/ECONOG forces' attack, they pulled out of the town.



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In February 1998, ECOMOG troops based in Liberia entered the District and on 18 February, together with Kamajors, reached Kenema Town. They then deployed at SS Camp, Gofor, Giema and Joru (in Dama and Gaura Chiefdoms). Indeed, after the intervention in Freetown, ECOMOG forces had positions all over the country and were working with the Kamajors. In Malegohun Chiefdom, for example, ECOMOG came to Kamajor positions with arms and ammunitions. In addition, ECOMOG requested the intervention of the Kamajors from Punduru (Gorama Mende Chiefdom) to be an auxiliary force to liberate Kono District, providing them also with small arms and bullets.

Once in Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom), Kamajors killed people suspected of being collaborators or tied them with a special rope called FM,⁸⁸¹ beat them and locked them up. Civilians were gathered in the centre of the town for "screening" purposes. Two police officers were killed, while another police officer and his wife received serious cuts on their necks but did not die. Other police officers managed to escape to a nearby village and to the ECOMOG base in Kenema Town. One man, alleged to be the Small Bo CDF chairman who stayed in Blama while RUF/AFRC were occupying the town, was killed for failing to supply ammunition to the Kamajors at one time when they had planned to attack the RUF/AFRC forces in Blama. Because of failing to supply the ammunition, he was considered to be a "saboteur". The entire town was looted by Kamajors, who also established "Kangaroo Courts"⁸⁸² presided over by Commanding Officers.

When they entered Kenema Town, ECOMOG forces and Kamajors with machetes and guns killed many people who they suspected of being "rebels" or "collaborators".⁸⁸³ Some civilians were burnt alive with old tyres for supporting the RUF/AFRC forces. Those killings were a common sight in the streets of Kenema. In many parts of the town, the charred remains of bodies were seen. Many members of the SSD (Special Security Division) were killed and their bodies scattered all over the Kenema Police Barracks, some of which were set on fire by civilians.

Between January and March 1998, as they were fighting and repelling RUF/AFRC forces, Kamajors targeted alleged members of the retreating forces, their families and those who they considered to be collaborators. Those people, who in reality were mainly civilians, were tortured and killed. It is reported that a group of Kamajors called Yamotor based at Talamah and Lalehun were eating the bodies of the retreating forces and civilians accused of collaboration. Houses believed to have been occupied by RUF/AFRC fighters or by alleged collaborators were unroofed.

After the deployment of ECOMOG and Kamajors all over the District, a few RUF/AFRC incursion were still reported but on a lower scale. A CDF Office was established in Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom) for the purpose of issuing passes to monitor the movement of people. Kamajors initially based in Small Bo Chiefdom but coming from the neighbouring Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms went back to their chiefdoms. In March, civilians started returning to their villages.

⁸⁸¹ This rope has two sticks on its edges; "FM" means "frequency modulation", as it was believed that once tied with this rope, civilians began to talk.

⁸⁸² In reality, these courts were simply place where Kamajors were sitting down and issuing sentences, without following any laws.

⁸⁸³ No further details are available on these incidents.



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However, unlike what happened in most of the chiefdoms, especially in the south of the District, the situation prevailing in Lower Bambara Chiefdom after ECOMOG deployed in the District still consisted of fighting and attacks between RUF/AFRC forces and the CDF, which continued until disarmament started in December 2001.

In the south of Kenema District, RUF/AFRC forces, alleged to come from Joiroma (Kailahun District) attacked Jewahun (Tunkia Chiefdom) in April 1998, where they burnt down the village before proceeding further to Gegbwema, where they burnt the houses that remained standing. These forces were later repelled by ECOMOG troops. The following month, RUF/AFRC forces believed to come from Malema Chiefdom (Kailahun District) attacked Madina, Kwadima – where three people were killed - and Kpandebu in Nomo Chiefdom. It is interesting to note that these forces had disguised themselves as Kamajors, thus taking the civilians by surprise.

In December 1998, when RUF/AFRC forces had regained control of major towns in the country, Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom were able to defend and retain control of the chiefdom, to the extent that this chiefdom served as a safe corridor for retreating ECOMOG forces from Kono District.

At the beginning of the following year, fighting again resumed in Kenema District. In January 1999, heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces repelled Kamajors from Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom), killing many civilians and Kamajors. Towns like Kpandebu, Lalehun, Bumpeh, Semewabu or Njaigbema were under persistent attacks from Kamajors who had in their ranks young boys under 13, who were forced to hold guns and were trained only for short periods of time.

The RUF/AFRC forces abducted many civilians from their villages and forced them to work in mining sites, beating or killing those who refused. Civilians living in these areas were harassed and intimidated at gunpoint by RUF/AFRC members, who constantly stole property and abducted girls and women and used them for sexual purposes. A lot of Kamajor collaborators were killed during this period. Private houses believed to have diamonds under their foundations were dug up, especially in Kpandebu, Torkpombu, Tongola and Bomie.

In early 1999, between January and February, Small Bo Chiefdom saw an influx of people coming from a camp in Kenema Town, following threats of RUF/AFRC attacks on the Town.

In February 1999, an event that took place in Gorama Mende Chiefdom gives an insight on the CDF internal structure. On 9 February, the Kamajor membership of the chiefdom passed a “no confidence” vote on the chiefdom coordinator for his misuse of their rations from the CDF headquarter in Kenema Town. As a result, a new coordinator was appointed. This new coordinator was requested by the Kono authorities to initiate able young men from Kono to help them liberate Kono District.⁸⁸⁴ Five hundred men came to Jagbema for initiation. As they heard about this initiation, well-armed RUF/AFRC forces came early in the morning to Jagbema sometime in March

⁸⁸⁴ At this time indeed, Kono District was under RUF/AFRC control.



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or April, overran the Kamajors base, killed about 20 civilians and burnt down 45 houses, including the house of the CDF coordinator and a school. Twenty-five Kamajors sustained injuries and 10 civilians were taken away as load carriers. The Kamajor coordinator mobilised his men and they went to trace the RUF/AFRC forces, intercepting them at Laboya. During the encounter, 30 members of the RUF/AFRC were killed and the Kamajors liberated all the captured civilians.

At around the same time, heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kenema Town. Some ECOMOG forces, Kamajors and civilians were killed but ECOMOG and Kamajor forces regrouped and repelled them. On their way back to Kailahun District, those RUF/AFRC forces were ambushed by ECOMOG forces at Mano Junction; many of them died in that ambush.

Many incidents relate the destruction of numerous buildings, private and public, in 1999 in Lower Bambara Chiefdom. Ngiehun market was burnt down as RUF/AFRC forces entering the town firing with the belief that Kamajors were residing there. The Roman Catholic Primary School was unroofed as were other schools in Tongo. Zinc from these roofs was used to build booths for the forces and furniture was used as firewood for cooking. Most of the buildings of the National Diamond Mining Company quarters were also destroyed.

RUF/AFRC forces during this period were terrorising the population, who saw this period as "chaos". During their stay in Tongo Field, the RUF/AFRC were recruiting young boys between 10 and 12 years of age; these child soldiers were carrying out most of the atrocities and many of them were intimidating their parents. However, by October 1999, the security situation however improved in the Tongo Field area (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) and commercial activities resumed,⁸⁸⁵ with civilians resettling in their villages.⁸⁸⁶

The situation in Koya Chiefdom was still unusual during this period. Due to the total absence of SLA forces throughout the previous years, RUF forces had established firm control of the chiefdom and most of the civilians who had not fled were conscripted into the movement. The first forces to fight RUF/AFRC forces were Kamajors from Pujehun District in 1999. Koya Chiefdom had its own Kamajors only in 2001 after men went to Kenema to be initiated.

On 20 October 1999, the Sierra Leone President officially launched the commencement of the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) program during a ceremony at Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown.⁸⁸⁷ A DDR camp was opened in Kenema Town to disarm CDF members, while RUF members were to disarm at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District).⁸⁸⁸ The DDR process started on a low scale and on 4 November, the first day of the program, no CDF member

⁸⁸⁵ IRIN West Africa, 1 January 1999.

⁸⁸⁶ The number of IDPs in the District dropped from 63,319 at the end of October to 47,199 one month later. IRIN West Africa, 14 December 1999.

⁸⁸⁷ The start of the DDR program as it was originally planned to take place within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999.

⁸⁸⁸ During this first phase of disarmament, DDR camps were also opened in Port Loko Town, Bo Town, Moyamba Town, and Daru (Kailahun District), the security situation in Bombali, Koinadugu, and Tonkolili remaining too unsettled.



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turned out. The initial deadline of 15 December set for the completion of the program was not met and as of 23 January 2000, only 13,100 combatants had disarmed out of an estimated 45,000 total combatants.⁸⁸⁹

Nevertheless, after the DDR process began, the situation started to normalise in the District and in early January 2000, the roads linking Kenema Town to Kailahun Town in the east and Kenema Town to Koidu in the north were formally reopened by the RUF.⁸⁹⁰ As part of their country campaign to sensitise members of the fighting factions on disarmament, the RUF leader, the Deputy Defence Minister, the CDF National Coordinator and some members of ECOMOG visited Kenema Town and Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) during the first week of January 2000.⁸⁹¹ In the same month, peacekeepers from the Ghanaian battalion attached to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) were sent to Kenema Town. On 15 March 2000, around 3,500 CDF members arrived at the DDR centre at Kenema; this was surprising, as the RUF did not reciprocate in Kailahun District.⁸⁹²

However, the DDR process did not bring an end to the fighting in the District. On 28 March 2000, RUF forces numbering 3,500 returned to Fomaya (Gorama Mende Chiefdom),⁸⁹³ all dressed in t-shirts with an "RUF" inscription on the back. They set the town on fire and killed over 300 civilians.

Thus by May 2000, RUF forces were still controlling some parts of the District, especially the mining areas and were engaged in mining activities in Tongo Field. In early June 2000, RUF troop movements were recorded in the area, as forces regrouped at Tongo Field, causing tension in the area.⁸⁹⁴ By late July, between 3,000 and 3,500 civilians were reported fleeing the area, probably following the recent clashes between RUF and SLA forces⁸⁹⁵ and the rescue operation to free over 200 UN peacekeepers confined to their compound in Kailahun Town by RUF forces since May 2000 carried out by UNAMSIL troops between Kailahun Town and Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom, Kailahun District).⁸⁹⁶ In October 2000, around half of the RUF forces based in Tongo Field moved north and engaged in the cross-border attacks on Guinea that intensified in September 2000. A meeting between UNAMSIL personnel and the RUF based in Tongo took place on

⁸⁸⁹ IRIN West Africa, 31 October 1999.

⁸⁹⁰ IRIN West Africa, 5 January 2000.

⁸⁹¹ IRIN West Africa, 10 January 2000.

⁸⁹² IRIN West Africa, 15 March 2000.

⁸⁹³ RUF/AFRC had already attacked this town in 1999.

⁸⁹⁴ UNAMSIL press briefing, 1 June 2000. Furthermore, this event has to be read in conjunction with what happened in May in other parts of the country, where nearly 300 UN peacekeepers were captured by RUF/AFRC forces, thereby stalling the DDR process. In July, UNAMSIL called the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF to sign a ceasefire: UNAMSIL press briefing, 7 July 2000.

⁸⁹⁵ IRIN West Africa, 20 July 2001. No details could be obtained on the clashes between the RUF and the SLA in the Tongo field area. However, in the Sierra Leone Humanitarian Report 25 July – 07 August, it is reported that gunship attacks on the market place in Tongo killed 14 civilians, although the gunship responsible for this attack was not confirmed. An SLA gunship also targeted RUF forces at Torpombu (Lower Bambara Chiefdom), shelling and killing civilians.

⁸⁹⁶ This rescue operation was designed.



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29 January 2001 at Panguma (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) to discuss the opening of the road linking Kenema to Tongo,⁸⁹⁷ although it is not clear whether the road was reopened after this meeting.

On 10 November 2000, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed a ceasefire at Abuja, Nigeria, reactivating the disarmament process, which had come to a halt since May 2000 and the capture of UN peacekeepers.⁸⁹⁸ Its main provision was the disarmament of the RUF forces and the deployment of UNAMSIL troops in RUF-held areas. However, it would however take one more year for those provisions to be implemented, as the following events highlight.

At the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, Kamajors mounted checkpoints at Largo, at the border with Nongowa chiefdom, and harassed civilians travelling between Kenema Town and Tongo Field. Money and valuable items were taken away from civilians and alleged collaborators were detained and tied up with ropes.

Although six chiefdoms in the District were still considered to be unsafe for resettlement by the Government of Sierra Leone in March 2001,⁸⁹⁹ about 100 UN peacekeepers from the Zambian battalion made a long range patrol in Tongo (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) on 10 April. These peacekeepers met with the RUF commander of the area, asking for their collaboration to allow UNAMSIL deployment in the area.⁹⁰⁰ However, fighting between Kamajors and RUF forces resumed around 19 April, although fatalities – if any – could not be ascertained. This fighting, which once again prompted hundreds of civilians to flee the area⁹⁰¹ was seen as a step back in the ongoing disarmament process and UN deployment.

On 4 May 2001, a meeting between the RUF, the Government of Sierra Leone, UN representatives and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council to review the ceasefire signed on 10 November 2000 was convened, again in Abuja, Nigeria.⁹⁰² The main points of concern were, among others, related to the acceleration of the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the remnants of the RUF forces, the release of child combatants and the freedom of movement of persons. Mention was also made of the violation of the ceasefire that took place the previous month in Tongo and Kono District. According to UNAMSIL investigations the fighting was provoked by movements of the Civil Defence Force (CDF) perceived as being menacing by the RUF forces.

As a proof of their commitment to the ceasefire, which was renewed in May, and to the provisions contained in the ceasefire agreement, RUF forces handed over 131 child combatants to UNAMSIL during a brief ceremony in Tongo on 22 June.⁹⁰³ In mid September, 300 UN peacekeepers from the

⁸⁹⁷ UNAMSIL press briefing, 31 January 2001.

⁸⁹⁸ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 28 October - 13 November 2000.

⁸⁹⁹ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 11 March - 31 March 2001.

⁹⁰⁰ UNAMSIL press briefing, 10 April 2001.

⁹⁰¹ BBC Online News Archive, 21 April 2001; IRIN West Africa, 23 April 2001.

⁹⁰² Further to this meeting, tripartite meetings of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration would be held every month and one would take place in Kenema Town on 10 August 2001.

⁹⁰³ IRIN West Africa, 25 June 2001.



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Zambian contingent deployed in the area.⁹⁰⁴ This first deployment was strengthened within a week, putting the number of UNAMSIL forces deployed in Tongo field to a battalion.

In October 2001, during a meeting of the Joint committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), comprising of the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and RUF, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF agreed on a schedule for the completion of the disarmament process and this accelerated disarmament was to take place in Kenema District between 15 and 30 November.⁹⁰⁵ Since May 2001, 20,284 combatants from the various fighting forces had disarmed.⁹⁰⁶ However, the deadline set in the agreement was not met as RUF forces showed unwillingness to disarm outside Tongo Field,⁹⁰⁷ were unhappy with some issues of a political nature⁹⁰⁸ and due to some logistical problems, which halted the process. Nevertheless, disarmament started early December at a low pace for RUF forces. This process was fostered by the visit on 14 December of the RUF Interim Leader and the Force Commander of the UNAMSIL in Tongo where they urged remaining RUF forces to complete disarmament.⁹⁰⁹

Disarmament was therefore complete early January; in Tongo, it was completed on 5 January, one day after the visit of the Acting Force Commander of the UNAMSIL and the Deputy Chief of Mission.⁹¹⁰ As part of the events that took place in various areas across the country to symbolically mark the end of the DDR process, a ceremony was held in Kenema Town on 21 January 2002 in the presence of the President of Sierra Leone, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Force Commander of UNAMSIL. This ceremony concluded by the burning of weapons.⁹¹¹

3. Conclusion

Although it shares a boundary with Liberia on its eastern edge, Kenema District was mainly affected by RUF/NPFL incursions coming from the neighbouring Districts of Pujehun, Kailahun and Kono during the first phase of the war, which spanned from 1991 to the end of 1993. This period was marked by the incursion of the RUF/NPFL forces in three different flanks (north-west, north-east and, mainly, south-east). As in Pujehun District, those forces were repelled out of the District in the middle of 1991 by the SLA, who were assisted by foreign troops. During the subsequent months of this first phase, RUF/NPFL forces launched only sporadic actions in the District. Youths and local hunters mobilised themselves and, armed with stick, cutlasses and some shotguns, assisted the SLA

⁹⁰⁴ IRIN West Africa, 17 September 2001.
⁹⁰⁵ The schedule for the completion of the disarmament was agreed as follows: Koinadugu and Moyamba Districts: by 22 October; Bo and Bombali Districts: by 31 October; Western Area: between 1-7 November; Pujehun and Tonkolili Districts: between 1-15 November and Kailahun District: between 15-30 November: IRIN West Africa, 12 October 2001.
⁹⁰⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 01 - 15 October 2001.
⁹⁰⁷ There was one DDR camp in Kenema District, one in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District) and one in Kailahun Town.
⁹⁰⁸ Those issues included the outcome of the National Consultative Conference, the continued detention of their leader and the time taken to complete registration of the RUF as a political party: IRIN West Africa, 7 December 2001.
⁹⁰⁹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 December 2001.
⁹¹⁰ UNAMSIL press briefing, 7 January 2002.
⁹¹¹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 21 January 2002.



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in defending the boundaries of their chiefdoms, filling the role of vigilantes. Around this time, SLA forces were deeply engaged in repelling the RUF forces from Kailahun District and in late 1993, confined them to the extreme east of Kailahun District, which led the NPRC Chairman to declare a unilateral ceasefire on 1 December 1993.

Taking advantage of this ceasefire, RUF forces regrouped and launched a massive operation from Liberia in the south-east of Kenema District, using secondary roads and bush paths. This attack clearly marked the beginning of the second phase and by early 1994, RUF forces were scattered across all the chiefdoms of the District and were engaged in mining activities in the north of the District. Around the same time, RUF forces began regaining territory in Kailahun District and were also spreading through Pujehun District, making all the Districts adjoining Liberia under RUF control. This progression did not stop there, as RUF forces advanced further inland and by 1995, were present in all the Districts of the country. The SLA, whose number increased greatly in 1994, was not able to stop this rapid RUF progression, carried out using bush paths and guerrilla warfare tactics. RUF forces established important training camps in Kenema District and the main camp for the whole Southern Province and, to a limited extent, for the Eastern Province was established in the south-west of the District. From this camp, RUF forces attacked the neighbouring chiefdoms in Kenema and Bo Districts, staged ambushes on the Bo-Kenema highway and brought back hundreds of abducted civilians and stolen properties from these attacks.

These two phases were accompanied by great violence against civilians, carried out mainly by the RUF/NPFL and RUF forces but also by the SLA forces. The first acts of the RUF were to depose and replace local authorities. During their stay, they inflicted physical and mental violence, killed, sexually assaulted and abducted many civilians. Civilians' property was also widely taken away and houses were burnt down. In addition, the SLA forces also harassed civilians for food but above all chased "rebel" collaborators, whom they killed. Starting in 1994, their behaviour towards civilians deteriorated and civilians began to have doubts about their loyalty to the Government and their efficiency to fight the war, as they also engaged in killing, raping and stealing of property, although on a lower scale than the RUF forces.

However, starting in 1996, Kamajors began to fight alongside SLA forces and to occupy areas previously under RUF control, including the main camps of the District. In this regard, the pattern of actions in the District followed the patterns in the Southern Province, where Kamajors started imposing important defeats on the RUF, considerably minimising and reducing the RUF's strength and their control of the area.

However, following the Coup in May 1997 and the merging of the RUF with the AFRC regime, the RUF/AFRC forces began to push the Kamajors to withdraw from their positions. Nevertheless, the CDF regrouped, operating underground, and by September 1997 began defeating the RUF/AFRC, as was happening concurrently in the Districts of the Southern Province. During their stay in the District, RUF/AFRC forces imposed great harms on civilians, inflicting physical and mental violence, killing, raping and abducting, in particular to work in the mining areas. They also systematically stole civilians' property and burnt down many buildings. They also engaged in a



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widespread hunt for Kamajors collaborators, killing anybody they found whom they suspected of being a collaborator or Kamajor member.

In early 1998, following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in January 1998, the Kamajors, assisted by ECOMOG forces deployed in Kenema Town and repelled most of the RUF/AFRC out of the District. Their stay in the District was accompanied by strict controls on the movement of the population through the establishment of checkpoints and the harassment of civilians, which ranged from requests for food and other items to more violent actions, including physical violence and killing, in particular of alleged RUF and "Junta" collaborators.

However, unlike what happened in the Southern Province, the Kamajors were unable to gain control of the whole District, as fighting for the control of the mining area of Tongo Field continued throughout 1998, 1999 and the first part of 2000. In this regard, the pattern of actions in the north of the District was more similar to the way Kailahun District and, in particular, the mining District of Kono were affected, despite the opening of disarmament centres in Kailahun Town and Daru (Kailahun District). Indeed, after the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999, RUF/AFRC forces clearly concentrated their attacks and offensives on the mining areas of the country and, later, on Guinean territory, giving a new dimension to the Sierra Leonean conflict.

Reactivated in November 2000, the disarmament process required one more year before being declared complete in January 2002. Kenema, and Kailahun Districts, were the two last Districts to be disarmed.

c. Kono District

1. **Introduction**

Kono District is located in the Eastern Province, together with Kailahun and Kenema Districts. It is bordered in the east by the Republic of Guinea and Koinadugu District, which also borders it in the north. In the south-east, the borders of Tonkolili District and Kono District meet for a few miles, with Kenema and Kailahun Districts forming its southern border.

Koidu, a diamond rich town, is Kono District's headquarter town. It is located almost in the centre of the District and is the starting and ending point of Sierra Leone's main highway, which links Koidu to Freetown, passing through Magburaka (headquarter town of Tonkolili District) and Makeni (headquarter town of Bombali District). Two other highways are of importance in the District, as they would allow the penetration of the District by the fighting forces from the southern Districts. One leaves Koidu, passing through Tankoro and Gbane Chiefdom before entering Kailahun District. The other one leaves Koidu, reaching Kenema Town through Nimikoro and Gorama Kono Chiefdoms in Kono District and Lower Bambara Chiefdom, a diamond mining area in Kenema District. An alternative to these two roads to reach the south-east is the road that leaves Koidu and goes through the east of the District.

There are 14 chiefdoms in the District:



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<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarter</u>
Fiama	Jagbwema
Gbane	Gandorhun
Gbane Kandor	Koardu
Gbense	Koidu
Gorama Kono	Kangama
Kamara	Tombodu
Lei	Saiama
Mafindor	Kamiendor
Nimikoro	Jaiama
Nimiyama	Jaiama Sewafe
Sandor	Kayima
Soa	Kainkordu
Tankoro	Baiama
Toli	Kondewakor

Kono District is the most diamond rich District of Sierra Leone and the wealth of its soil meant that the District was the stage of severe fighting and violations against civilians throughout the war, from its inception in 1991 until late 2001. The main mining areas⁹¹² are to be found in the centre and west of the District, in Kamara (Tombodu area), Sandor (in the south of the chiefdom), Nimikoro, Nimiyama, Gbense and Tankoro Chiefdoms.

As in the other Districts of the Eastern Province, Kono District was affected by the conflict through three discernable phases. The first one encompassed 1991 to 1993. During these years, RUF/NPFL forces entered the District in the south-east through Kailahun District. Their first incursion in 1991 was limited to the two chiefdoms bordering Kailahun District and was rapidly halted by SLA forces deployed at Gbense, Sandor, Mafindor and Gbane Kandor Chiefdoms, the latter two of which share a border with Guinea. Local hunters known as Donsos began organising themselves in various chiefdoms, supported and encouraged by the local authorities. RUF/NPFL forces made successive attempts to re enter the District in 1992; by mid 1992, they had succeeded in establishing positions in Gbane Soa Chiefdom, from where they moved towards Koidu. By late 1992, Koidu was under RUF/NPFL control. SLA forces, assisted by local hunters coming from Koinadugu District, repelled the RUF/NPFL forces in early January and strengthened their bases in the east of the District. By mid 1993, the District was virtually free of any RUF/NPFL presence. This first phase was characterised by widespread violations committed primarily by RUF/NPFL forces, but also by SLA forces.

The second phase ran from 1994 to 1997. In 1994, RUF forces launched incursions in the south-east of the country and progressively advanced into the District. Koidu was attacked for the second time in April 1995, RUF forces taking advantage of the fact the SLA on the ground was more occupied in mining than in defending the District. This attack on Koidu led many civilians to leave the area, as the RUF forces began to span out in the surrounding chiefdoms. The District was recaptured

⁹¹² Besides diamonds, kimberlite mineral and gold are also mined.



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around May/June by SLA forces, newly trained by Executive Outcomes, the mercenary company in Sierra Leone under contract with the Government. The SLA, local hunters and Executive Outcomes dislodged the RUF forces from most of their positions and subsequent RUF attacks were carried out by remnants RUF members. The presence of Executive Outcomes in the District brought some relief to the population, as it also engaged in disciplining the SLA and prevented SLA members from undertaking illegal mining. During this period, RUF forces raided some villages in the south-east of the country.

As Executive Outcomes prevented the RUF from having access to Kono and, accordingly, to its diamonds, the RUF posed as condition for the signing of a peace agreement that Executive Outcomes leave the country. This condition was included into the text of the Abidjan Peace Agreement signed between the Government and the RUF on 30 November 1996. Two months later, Executive Outcomes pulled out of the District. After the military coup in May 1997, RUF forces came out of the bush and merged with the AFRC regime. Few incidents were reported for this period, as most of the RUF/AFRC activities were concentrated on mining. In fact, mining became more organised under the command of the RUF, who declared all mining areas to be their property. However, harassment of civilians increased and cases of physical violence, killing, rape and abductions were reported.

The third and final phase began in early 1998, following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown and the retreat of RUF/AFRC forces and concluded in August 2001, when the disarmament was declared complete in the District. This period is characterised by a substantial increase of violations committed by RUF/AFRC forces. Repelled from Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces arrived in Koidu in late February/early March and rapidly spread across the whole District. ECOMOG forces assisted by CDF members recaptured Koidu and other main towns on the highway in April 1998, sending RUF/AFRC forces into the bush, from where they continued to carry out "Operation No Living Thing". Hundreds of civilians were wounded, mutilated, killed, raped and abducted as part of this operation between February and May/June. During the second half of the year, the level of violations decreased, as the RUF/AFRC forces were more occupied with building huts to withstand the rainy season. At that time, most of the civilians had fled to Guinea and of those who stayed in the District, a lot of them were abducted to be trained in the training base RUF/AFRC forces had opened in Lei Chiefdom in the east of the District or to be used as workers in the mining areas in the west of the District. In December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces launched a massive operation and recaptured Koidu from ECOMOG forces. Throughout 1999 and 2000 and despite the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, RUF/AFRC forces accelerated their mining activities in the west of the District, where every single parcel of land was mined. A training base known as "Camp Lion" was opened in Yengema (Nimikoro Chiefdom), where hundreds of abductees from the Northern Province were brought for training. RUF/AFRC forces also continued their operations in the east of the District, in preparation for attacks onto the Guinean territory. Most of the RUF/AFRC raids during this period were carried out to search for food and above all to get more manpower, i.e. to abduct more people. Violations on civilians were still reported, in particular on those who were abducted. During those years, CDF forces launched attacks on RUF/AFRC positions, mainly in Sandor Chiefdom, in the north of the District and in the east, at the border with

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Guinea. These operations would continue until the completion of disarmament and the brokering of a deal to stop the illegal mining activities at the end of 2001.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1991

As a result of the attack on Pendembu⁹¹³ (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kailahun District), security personnel and the chiefdom authorities in Gbane Chiefdom, in the south of Kono District, called a meeting in April to discuss preventive measures. It was agreed during this meeting that towns and villages from the chiefdom should provide local hunters, known as Donsos and energetic youths for training, following which 200 men were trained by the Sierra Leone Police and the Special Security Division (SSD) with the support of the Paramount Chief of Gbane. At around this time, people from Kailahun District fleeing from RUF attacks, especially from Yawei Chiefdom, moved to Gbane Chiefdom and settled in the villages around Gandorhun and Koidu Buma towards the south of the chiefdom near the boundary with Kenema District. Before the war began affecting Kono District, SLA forces were deployed in Mafindor Chiefdom, at the border with Guinea. However, shortly after the attack on Gandorhun, they went to Gbane Chiefdom to join the troops posted there. The few forces who stayed in Mafindor Chiefdom were withdrawn in 1992 to Manjama, the SLA base in Soa Chiefdom in the south-east of Kono District.

On 5 June 1991, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces wearing American flag bandanas on their heads and armed with AK47s entered Koidu Buma (Gbane Chiefdom) through Yawei Chiefdom (Kailahun District). Gbane Chiefdom was the main entry point into diamond-rich Kono District, due to the highway that links Koidu with Gandorhun and Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom, Kailahun District). At Koindu Buma, they shot and killed a man who was trying to escape and searched houses for any valuable items, including food. Civilians were asked whether there were any Sierra Leone Army (SLA) forces in the town⁹¹⁴ and the RUF forces promised they would kill any SLA member they came across.

They did not stay long in Koidu Buma, soon moving onto Gandorhun, their target being the SLA forces. At this time, Gandorhun was, after Koidu Town, the biggest SLA deployment in Kono District. They were led to Gandorhun by a civilian they had recently conscripted, who showed them a bypass route. The RUF forces entered the town around 03.00 a.m. with sporadic firing, armed with AK47s, RPGs, grenades and knives. In Gandorhun, they killed three people (two shot and one burnt to death) and captured others, among them the brother of a prominent Lebanese businessman and his two daughters.⁹¹⁵ A van belonging to a civilian was taken away and used to carry property stolen from the town to Kailahun District. Most of the population fled to other chiefdoms.

A few days later, on 8 June, a combined force of Sierra Leone Police, SLA, SSD and Donsos forces repelled the RUF, who went back to Kailahun District. However, two of these RUF members got

⁹¹³ Pendembu is located on the road that enters Gbane chiefdom from Kailahun District.

⁹¹⁴ The RUF forces who entered the town referred to SLA forces as "Momoh's soldiers", from the name of the then Head of State.

⁹¹⁵ It is not clear from the records whether the two girls were the daughters of the prominent businessman or the daughters of his brother.



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lost in the forest and, after going without food for a few days, went to a farm to ask for food; youths at the farm went to Gandorhun to tell the SLA about the two men. SLA forces then captured the two RUF members and brought them to Koidu, where they were publicly tortured before being killed. Shortly after the attack on Gandorhun, SLA forces were sent from Freetown to Koidu Town and were deployed in the area under attack. RUF forces launched another attack on 9 June, but were repelled by SLA, SSD and Donsos.

During their stay in the chiefdom, those forces (SLA, SSD and Donsos) inflicted violence on civilians they accused of collaborating with RUF forces. In one instance, some people accused of being collaborators had rags and rubber placed around their necks, which were then set on fire, killing those people. This served as a signal for the population that they should not cooperate with the RUF in any way.⁹¹⁶

As early as 1991, local hunters⁹¹⁷ known as Donsos were to be found in Mafindor, Gbane, and Soa Chiefdoms in the south of the District, at the border with Guinea and Kailahun District. Those from Mafindor were often sent to Sukudu, in the south of Soa Chiefdom near the Guinean border. During the second half of 1991, Donsos started organising themselves in Sandor Chiefdom, in the north of Kono District at the boundary with Koinadugu District. In late 1991, some Donsos came to the chiefdom headquarters of Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom) to be trained by SLA forces on guerrilla tactics, military manoeuvres and staging ambushes. At that time, the SLA military headquarters were in Ngaya. As the war intensified at the boundary between Kono and Kailahun Districts, SLA forces together with Donsos or vigilantes were deployed in strategic towns such as Yormandu and Tefeya (Sandor Chiefdom), at the border with Gbense Chiefdom. Yormandu is a strategic town as it is located over the Bafi River and had one of the longest bridges in Kono District. It is worth noting that at this time, only a few SLA forces were deployed with many local hunters, also called vigilantes, more of whom were trained later on. However, at that time, SLA forces continually told civilians that they were neglected by the Government, whose support for the local hunters extended only to the supply of ammunition.

In late 1991, the Paramount Chief of Mafindor Chiefdom and “important”⁹¹⁸ Kono Authorities gathered the population in Kainkordu, the headquarter town of Soa Chiefdom. They asked for the youths and the local hunters, the Donsos, to organise themselves into a Civil Defence Unit (CDU). The youths and local hunters did so and began to organise the security of the town and the chiefdom, mainly by establishing checkpoints in the headquarter town. It is interesting to note that

⁹¹⁶ The date of this event cannot be determined with certainty and may have taken place in 1992.

⁹¹⁷ Different groups of traditional hunters organised themselves throughout Sierra Leone to fight the advancing RUF/NPFL and, later, RUF forces in the country. They were originally equipped solely with bladed weapons and long guns. Those local hunters had different names, according to the tribe to which they belonged: Donsos in Kono District; Tamaboros in Koinadugu District; Kapras in Tonkolili District; Gbethies in Port Loko District and, to a lesser extent, Kambia District; and Kamajors in the Southern and Eastern Province (Moyamba, Bonthe, Bo, Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun Districts). In 1996, those local hunters would be organised under a national structure known as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).

⁹¹⁸ This delegation consisted of the then Member of Parliament for Kono North East, Soa Chiefdom Paramount Chief, Kono Senior District Officer, All People's Congress (APC) Secretary General, the Overall commander of Tankoro Chiefdom Police Station and others.



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this meeting and the formation of vigilantes and organisation of Donsos was directly encouraged by the State authorities and also took place in other villages and towns in Soa chiefdom. At this early stage of the existence of Donsos, an embryonic administrative structure was established to assist the hunters on the ground. Thus, the 14 chiefdoms of Kono District were taxed (Le 1,000 per house) and the money was sent to the CDU headquarters in Koidu. Donsos and youths then received this money to buy torches and other simple logistical equipment to assist with their function as watchmen. At this time also, the SLA deployed one Battalion at Manjama (Soa Chiefdom), which became a strong base. Youths, Donsos and SLA forces were working together, the youths and Donsos being of a great help to the SLA as they were more familiar with the local terrain.

On hearing of RUF attacks on Sukudu and Konjo (Soa Chiefdom) in December 1991, a convoy of nearly 150 SLA members together with 19 youths went there to retake the towns. However on their arrival, no RUF forces were to be found. In Sukudu, they found five dead civilians with bullet wounds and 27 houses totally burnt.⁹¹⁹ The fact that those youths joined the SLA forces to go and confront RUF forces was rather unusual at that time, as their main function was to operate checkpoints and to undertake patrols. Indeed, when they came back from this mission, their leader forwarded the information to their headquarters in Koidu. On receiving the information, CDU headquarters in Koidu sent two packets of shotgun cartridges. As cross-border raids were reported at the boundary with Kailahun District, the Paramount Chief of Soa exhorted the Donsos and vigilantes to advance towards the border to guard all the routes. The Youths' leader did not favour this, as they lacked weapons, and a meeting was convened in Koidu to decide on what action to take.⁹²⁰ A few days later, other villages at the boundary with Kailahun District, including Maa and Workor, were also attacked, people were killed and houses burnt.⁹²¹ Civilians in these villages reported that the forces who attacked them were speaking Krio, Liberian and other languages; accordingly, they identified those forces as RUF from Sierra Leone, NPFL forces from Liberia and mercenaries from Burkina Faso. At around the same time, some youths based at Levuma (Soa Chiefdom, on the border with Kailahun District) captured a man they alleged to be a RUF collaborator. This man was brought to Manjama, where the SLA commander ordered him to be shot.

b) Events in 1992

In January 1992, RUF forces were to be found in the boundary villages between Yawei Chiefdom (Kailahun District) and Gbane Chiefdom, as well as in Gandorhun and its environs. After the attack on Gandorhun in 1991, the RUF forces had retreated to their base in Kailahun District.⁹²² This was the start of a series of battles between RUF forces and the combined forces of the SLA, SSD and Donsos. At that time, the combined forces killed some people suspected of being "rebel" collaborators, including by putting a tyre around the neck of suspects and setting fire to it.

⁹¹⁹ The reports make no mention of any casualties in Konjo or in any of villages that were attacked on the way.

⁹²⁰ Although there were no details about this meeting, it can be inferred that it was convened at the CDU headquarters. The result of this meeting could be the reinforcement of SLA forces to Manjama and the registration of armed Donsos in early 1992.

⁹²¹ The vigilantes found three dead civilian males in Maa and two burnt houses in Workor.

⁹²² During this time, RUF/NPFL forces had different bases in Kailahun District, the main one being in Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom, Kailahun District).



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At this time, local hunters from Sandor Chiefdom were sent to the south of the District where the RUF/NPFL forces were advancing. In February 1992, a military base was set up in Mboama (Gbane Chiefdom) and 30 SLA members together with 47 Donsos were deployed there.

A meeting gathering the young men of Nimikoro Chiefdom was summoned by the Chiefdom Speaker and an SLA officer in April 1992 at the chiefdom headquarters of Jaiama. The purpose of this meeting was to organise the young men into vigilante groups that could assist the SLA in defending the chiefdom from RUF/NPFL attacks. A lot of young men volunteered and received some training from the SLA.

A fierce battle took place in May 1992 in Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom), where the RUF forces were repelled from the chiefdom. The fighting continued sporadically and, shortly after, the RUF/NPFL managed to overpower the combined forces and establish their first permanent base in Kono District, which was used to attack the surrounding villages. The RUF/NPFL forces attacked Sidu (Gbane Chiefdom), at the boundary with Tankoro Chiefdom, in May. Donsos from Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom), eight miles from Sidu, informed the SLA forces deployed in Koidu of the advancing RUF/NPFL forces. The SLA therefore deployed in Baiama and Woama (Tankoro Chiefdom), where a battle took place between RUF/NPFL and SLA/Donsos. During these attacks, civilians were killed, property was taken and civilians were forced to carry the stolen property.⁹²³ RUF/NPFL were bypassing the government forces in Woama to attack villages in Tankoro Chiefdom, up to nearby Koidu. During these attacks, captured SLA forces and Donsos were killed, often after physical violence was inflicted on them.⁹²⁴

In October 1992, the RUF/NPFL forces finally drove the SLA forces from their base in Woama and established a second RUF/NPFL base there. This opened access to Koidu for the RUF/NPFL forces, since Woama is located on the Gandorhun-Koidu highway. The attack on Woama created panic among civilians in Koidu, who started to leave the town. SLA forces mounted checkpoints in Koidu to search the fleeing population for arms and suspected "rebels". For example, a prominent Tankoro Chiefdom authority was arrested at one of these checkpoints, suspected of being a "rebel" because he had in his briefcase a traditional dress like the one worn by local hunters. He was publicly tortured and beheaded in the main central area of Koidu.

Advancing RUF/NPFL forces captured an armoured car on 22 October 1992 from the SLA forces at Wordu, three miles south of Koidu. The RUF/NPFL forces burnt the car and a lot of SLA forces were killed. Some of the civilians who were fleeing the RUF/NPFL advance on Koidu drowned in the surrounding rivers, which had swollen following heavy rains. On 23 October 1992, RUF/NPFL forces launched an attack on Koidu from Woama. The following day, SLA forces together with some local hunters launched a counter attack on the town and repelled the RUF/NPFL forces. After this battle, the bodies of many civilians were left lying on the streets of the town, apparently

⁹²³ No more information was available on these events.

⁹²⁴ During that time, it was alleged that SLA forces sometime abandoned their positions at the battlefield to go to Koidu (Gbane Chiefdom) to meet their relatives or to mine.



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caught in the crossfire as they tried to escape the fighting.⁹²⁵ Houses were burnt and many civilians were abducted by RUF/NPFL forces, among them a foreign worker. In early December, RUF/NPFL forces attacked the town for the second time from the same direction and repelled the SLA forces as far as Yormandu (Sandor Chiefdom).⁹²⁶ The RUF/NPFL forces also repelled the SLA forces deployed at Bumpe (Nimikoro Chiefdom), located on the Kono-Makeni highway, up to Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom), which is near the Sewa River. In Bumpe junction, one civilian, a Limba by tribe, was shot dead by the RUF/NPFL commander who also ordered that the wife of the man be killed.

The fall of Koidu to the RUF/NPFL forces was interpreted against the Kono tribe and especially against the Paramount Chiefs, who became the target of SLA forces. Shortly after the attack on the town, a car arrived in Koidu carrying the wife of the Fiama Paramount Chief, who was in the boot of the car with his hands tied behind his back, his eyes swollen. When they recognised the Paramount Chief, civilians fled the area, fearful of being recognised by the Paramount Chief, which they believed could cause problems for them with SLA forces. The Paramount Chief was then taken to Tekko Barracks in Makeni (Bombali District); his death was subsequently confirmed. The Tombodu SLA forces later released his wife, after she had been raped by an unspecified number of SLA members. Some reports mention that the Paramount Chief was arrested because he failed to cooperate with SLA forces while another mentions that the Paramount Chief might have been arrested on the allegation that he had been found performing some ritual after the successful advance of RUF forces. Other Paramount Chiefs and other authorities from the District were arrested and sent to Pademba Road prison in Freetown on the grounds they had aided and abetted the capture of Kono District by RUF forces.

By the end of 1992, RUF/NPFL forces were therefore controlling a vast area of Kono District, including the main roads leading to Koidu.⁹²⁷ During their stay in Koidu, RUF/NPFL forces patrolled the surrounding villages in search of local hunters or pockets of SLA forces. During these patrols, the RUF/NPFL forces killed civilians, took property and abducted several civilians, taking them to Koidu to work for the RUF/NPFL forces. At Baiama, for example, about 60 men and women, including a prominent Kono authority, were taken away.

In a bid to repel the RUF/NPFL forces out of Koidu, an air campaign was undertaken, with the assistance of Nigerian Alpha Jets.⁹²⁸

When Koidu fell into the hands of the RUF/NPFL forces, most of its inhabitants left the town for Sandor Chiefdom, known to be an agricultural chiefdom full of hunters ready to defend their land. Those people coming to Sandor Chiefdom were searched at checkpoints by the SLA forces and the

⁹²⁵ This was inferred from the belongings found lying next to the bodies and needs to be clarified.

⁹²⁶ It cannot be determined with certainty whether the bodies of civilians were found on the streets after the first or the second attack.

⁹²⁷ It is interesting to note that these attacks on Koidu went virtually unreported in the media.

⁹²⁸ Inter Press Service, 18 December 1992. Since the middle of 1991, foreign troops, including Nigerians and Guineans forces were fighting alongside the SLA, further to bilateral agreements signed between Sierra Leone and Guinea and between Sierra Leone and Nigeria.



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local hunters. During these searches, SLA forces or local hunters took whatever property they desired. Any civilians who resisted were molested and risked being termed as “rebel” collaborators, for which they could be killed. In addition, some civilians were killed for their money;⁹²⁹ SLA forces and local hunters harassed businessmen in particular. At this time, Yormandu town, in the south of Sandor Chiefdom on the boundary with Kamara Chiefdom, was overcrowded with displaced people and many people were not able to sleep in houses, staying instead in the church, the mosque and the Court Barrie. Food, water and medical facilities rapidly became scarce and cholera broke out at Yormandu and Kayima, the chiefdom headquarter located in the north-west of the chiefdom, taking the lives of many people.

Another crowd of civilians left Koidu after it had been recaptured by RUF forces and headed through Nimikoro Chiefdom for Kangama (Gorama Kono Chiefdom in the south of the District). On their way to Kangama, they had to pass through many checkpoints controlled by local hunters. At Moinmadu (Nimikoro Chiefdom), they fell into an RUF/NPFL attack. In the early hours of the morning, a RUF member disguised as an Imam called the people for prayer.⁹³⁰ Shortly after, the people who had gathered in the Mosque were surrounded by RUF/NPFL forces, who fired heavily in the air, capturing those in the mosque and other civilians in the town. Three civilians and a local hunter were killed in front of the Mosque and three men and a woman sustained serious injuries. Some young girls⁹³¹ were publicly raped. Two houses alleged to belong to the Kamajor commander of the area were burnt down. The people who had been captured were gathered in the Court Barrie and those who had food were forced to give it to the RUF/NPFL forces, who also accompanied other civilians to fetch water and food from elsewhere. During this, some civilians managed to escape, which led the commander to punish his forces who had gone to the bush with the civilians by lashing them and locking them in a veranda near the Court Barrie. After three days, the RUF/NPFL forces together with their captives took a bush path towards Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom, south east of Nimikoro Chiefdom), which at that time was one of their strongholds. On their way, local hunters attacked the convoy and successfully overran the RUF/NPFL forces. The civilians who had been with the RUF/NPFL forces were then brought to Tikonko in the north of Gorama Kono Chiefdom.

As Donsos from Sandor Chiefdom needed logistics, food, medicine and ammunition, a mass meeting was summoned at the chiefdom headquarters of Kayima probably in late October to provide assistance to the hunters. At the meeting, it was agreed that each taxpayer should contribute Le 500⁹³² and a few cups of rice every month.

⁹²⁹ This information is reported in general terms and does not specify the exact location of every occurrence.

⁹³⁰ Kono District is predominantly Muslim and according to the Islam, a Muslim is bound to pray five times a day. Each of the five periods for prayers is preceded by a call, known as adhaan. The early morning prayer may be offered any time within two hours after dawn.

⁹³¹ Although the exact age is not reported, it is mentioned that they were under age.

⁹³² This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone’s position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2.000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4.000 SLL) per day: see UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.



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In November 1992, hunters from Tefeyah (Sandor Chiefdom) spread the news that a man was killed by uniformed men believed to be “rebels”, who took his money and diamonds. It was, however, later said that these uniformed men were not “rebels” but SLA forces, who did this because they had heard a few days earlier that the man had diamonds. Supporting this theory, it was said that it was highly unlikely that RUF forces would come to a big town like Tefeyah to kill only one person.

A convoy of an unspecified number of armed and unarmed men, women and children – namely RUF/NPFL forces and their captives – coming from the direction of Koidu arrived in Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom) in late November. They stayed in the town for only one hour, killing some people, breaking doors, gathering anything that was of interest for them and abducting some civilians before heading through Manjama (Soa Chiefdom) to Sandaru, the RUF/NPFL base in Penguia Chiefdom (Kailahun District). This road, which links Koidu with Kainkordu and Penguia Chiefdom (Kailahun District), was often used by RUF forces in search of food. Also in Soa chiefdom, on 8 December, an RUF commander escorted by some men arrived in the chiefdom headquarter of Kainkordu. On his arrival, he explained that his movement, the RUF, had come to put an end to the APC regime and that it now controlled the whole of Kailahun, Kono and Pujehun Districts, as well as part of Kenema District.⁹³³ He further said that the people from Soa Chiefdom should join the movement and celebrate the presence of their “new government”. He mounted green pieces of material on top of a high pole as a symbol that this was now RUF-controlled territory and appointed men and women as the new authorities of the chiefdom.

The mobilisation of youths and local hunters was reinforced and structured by the creation of Eastern Region Civil Defence Committee, aiming at mobilising “well-meaning Sierra Leoneans” to fight alongside the SLA. This committee was composed of representatives of Kenema, Kailahun and Kono Districts, with some from Freetown.⁹³⁴

c) Events in 1993

In January, SLA forces coming from Freetown were deployed at Sewafe Bridge (Nimiyama Chiefdom) and merged with another group who had retreated from Koidu. Those SLA forces recaptured Sewafe town and advanced further on the Koidu highway together with local hunters known as Tamaboros from Koinadugu, Guinean forces and ULIMO-K members. They launched different attacks in Nimikoro, Nimiyama and Tankoro Chiefdoms, successfully driving out RUF forces from the areas previously under their control. Koidu was retaken in the same wave of attacks, on 22 January.⁹³⁵ SLA forces from the Moa Barracks in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District) also took control of Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom).

Those combined forces were heavily armed with tanks, armoured personnel carriers, AA guns and AK47s. They made several deployments in the area, including Koidu, and started patrolling villages

⁹³³ The loss of Kono and Kailahun Districts to the hands of the RUF/NPFL forces had a significant impact on the economy, as most of Sierra Leone’s income came from the production of cash crops in Kailahun District and the mining activities in Kono District. Following the capture of Koidu by the RUF/NPFL forces, the National Diamond Mining Co. ceased its operations: Mining Annual Review, 1 July 1993.

⁹³⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 December 1992.

⁹³⁵ No information was obtained on the casualties sustained during those attacks.



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and towns around Koidu in search of “rebels” and “rebel” collaborators, which led to the killing of many civilians accused of being “rebel” collaborators or sympathisers. The commanding officer⁹³⁶ ordered all the civilians living in the areas formerly under RUF/NPFL control to move to Ngor Town, which is located after the Sewa Bridge in Mimiyama Chiefdom, where the first displaced camp was opened for the people of Kono.⁹³⁷ Shortly after, SLA forces engaged in massive looting, as civilians had left their homes.

After the first group of Tamaboros⁹³⁸ arrived in January 1993, a second group came in July. The Donsos also stepped up their presence and were active in Yormandu (Sandor Chiefdom) and Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom) in January, in Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) between March and August and at the border between Soa Chiefdom and Kailahun District and in Kangama (Gorama Kono) in December.

In early 1993, Kono authorities complained to the Government about looting and harassment by SLA forces during the previous month, so the Government sent a new SLA commander to Kono District. Following his arrival, the SLA forces based in Koidu started issuing passes for civilians relocated in the IDP camp who wished to visit their homes to check their belongings. Nigerian forces arrived in Koidu, while some SLA and Guinean forces moved to attack RUF/NPFL positions in Kailahun District. The Nigerian forces encouraged civilians to return and resettle in their villages. SLA and Nigerian troops were based in different strategic towns like Yengema, near the Kono-Makeni highway in Nimikoro Chiefdom; Tombodu, a diamond-rich town in Kamara Chiefdom; and Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom), where they encouraged civilians to mine for diamonds.⁹³⁹ Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) was a commercial centre and was the arrival and departure point for passenger helicopters flying to and from Freetown. Thus, by the end of 1993, most of the civilians who had earlier left the chiefdom came back to Kamara Chiefdom, as it was free of RUF presence.

However, those SLA forces killed an unspecified number of civilians suspecting of being RUF members or sympathisers. Those executions took place at Bendu II, where the bodies were dumped in a mass grave. In separate incident, another group of SLA members, who had replaced those who had arrested the Paramount Chief of Fiama, arrested a civilian and shot him twice without giving reasons. His body was left on the ground and a few civilians buried him afterwards. Also at Tombodu, Tamaboros coming from Koinadugu District to help the SLA forces drive the RUF out of the country undertook massive screening of civilians. As part of this process, in March,⁹⁴⁰ 2,000 civilians were gathered in the Court Barrie to be screened by the Tamaboros, headed by a woman dressed in traditional hunter attire. Some members of the SLA were also gathered at the Court

⁹³⁶ It cannot be inferred from the information collected whether this commanding officer was controlling all the combined forces, or just the SLA forces or the Guinean troops.

⁹³⁷ Around the same period, other camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) were operational in the country, notably in Gondama (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District), where thousands of civilians from Pujehun District found refuge.

⁹³⁸ Local hunters from Koinadugu.

⁹³⁹ It cannot however be inferred from the records whether the civilians were mining for the Nigerian and SLA forces or for themselves, with the encouragement of those forces.

⁹⁴⁰ This screening process probably continued in April and May and is also reported in Koinadugu District.



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Barrie. The woman conducted the screening through her mirror, which allegedly allowed her to assess whether a person was a “genuine civilian” or a “rebel”. Those who were identified as “rebels” were either killed or sent to Pademba Road Prison in Freetown. After the screening process, civilians were given a pass that allowed them to move freely in the chiefdom and beyond without fearing of being molested or suspected of being a “rebel”. People commonly gave the nickname “Unmolested” to this pass, which was issued by SLA officers.

Some Kono elites came together and formed an organisation called Koeyor, the primary objective of which was to restore dignity to the people of Kono. Together with the Kono Students Union, they pleaded for the release of the Kono Paramount Chiefs and other authorities who had been detained by the NPRC regime.

RUF forces were active in the eastern chiefdoms in the District during the first half of 1993, which was marked by incidents of killing and the destruction of property. For example, in Sukudu, at the beginning of the year, a prominent farmer had both of his arms chopped off. RUF forces tied a letter around his neck telling the then Head of State, Captain Strasser, that they were “still in control”. In Kundima (Soa Chiefdom), five elderly people were killed in January by RUF forces. Their bodies showed machete wounds and one woman appeared to have had her head smashed on a rock. In February, RUF forces also attacked Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom). Returning civilians later discovered 40 houses that had been completely burnt down and 27 bodies, which they buried in a dug out toilet in the southern part of the town. At that time, RUF forces also attacked Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) for the second time, although there were no reported casualties.

SLA harassment of civilians was also reported in Mafindor and Gbane Kandor Chiefdoms. For example, cattle belonging to a civilian was taken and killed for food for the SLA forces. In Koardu (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom), civilians were locked up in the SLA guardroom and beaten if they complained about the behaviour of the SLA forces. Similar acts took place in Dunamaor (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom), where SLA forces entered the village, firing their weapons. As they began to take people’s poultry, one SLA member asked a man to give them his torch as well, which he refused to do. This refusal was not taken well by the SLA forces, who chased the man into the bushes. As he was hiding in the bushes, they took property from his house and assembled all the women and men of the village to punish them in order to find out where the man was hiding.⁹⁴¹ The matter was later settled as the man’s sister gave the SLA forces some money, some cups of rice and a chicken.

In addition, acts of physical violence, torture and killing of suspected “rebel” collaborators also took place. In May 1993, SLA forces were looking for two civilians whom they suspected of being “rebel” collaborators. As the nephew of one of those two wanted men was alleged to be on his way to warn his uncle, SLA forces arrested him in Gbemandufao (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom). His head was shaved with a piece of broken bottle and he was told to eat his hair, which had been mixed with sand. He then was hit with a bayonet before being brought to Koardu, where more violence was inflicted on him. He was then brought to Manjama (Soa Chiefdom) to ascertain whether he was a

⁹⁴¹ The type and duration of punishment they received were not specified.



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“rebel”, where he was eventually killed. Another suspected “rebel” collaborator in Koardu (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom) was tied up, made to lie down in the sun and was severely beaten. In Ndanbadu, in September, a man was severely beaten then brought to Koardu, where he was locked in a guardroom because he had asked why the SLA members were taking people’s cattle.

In the meantime, the Donsos were trying to resist to RUF attacks. In June, they deployed alongside the border with Kailahun District. In mid 1993, SLA forces were deployed in Soa Chiefdom and for the rest of the year, the area was almost free of RUF attacks.

Following rumours of an approaching RUF attack on Kangama (Gorama Kono Chiefdom) and its environs in October 1993, a meeting was summoned in the town in early December. The purpose of this meeting was to motivate the youths of the chiefdom to be initiated into the Kamajors society and to take up arms.⁹⁴² After this meeting, between 100 and 200 youths registered to join the society. In mid December, 150 of these youths came back to the town with a gallon of palm oil and 10 cups of rice each for logistic support. They were then taken to a place called Jagbwema Kamba to be initiated into the Kamajors society. The initiator was also the initiator for Gorama Mende and Lower Bambara Chiefdoms (Kenema District). The initiates stayed in the bush for three weeks before returning to Kangama Town in early January 1994.

Following successful SLA attacks on RUF positions in Kailahun District in late 1993, Kono District was declared safe and IDPs from Ngor camp were repatriated to Koidu by the Government with the help of some Non-Governmental Organisations.⁹⁴³

Around the same period, the SLA had recaptured most of the RUF positions in Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, which led the NPRC Chairman to declare a unilateral ceasefire on 1 December 1993. This ceasefire was however largely violated, as RUF forces launched a massive operation in Kenema District in late December.

d) Events in 1994⁹⁴⁴

By the end of January and following the renewal of hostilities in the Eastern Province and in Pujehun District, the NPRC Chairman declared “total war” against the RUF.

In early 1994, returning chiefs created the Kono Council of Paramount Chiefs, chaired by the Paramount Chief of Mafindor Chiefdom, with the consent of the NPRC Commanding Officer Secretariat in Kono.⁹⁴⁵

⁹⁴² No Kamajor initiation had, however yet take place in the country, not even in the Southern Province, from where it originated. Accordingly, this information about the Kamajors may simply mean that youths and local hunters gathered, as they did in Kenema District, but were not initiated by an initiator as such.

⁹⁴³ In September, the NPRC Secretary General announced that the situation in Kono was calm and civilians could go back to their villages without hindrance: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 September 1993.

⁹⁴⁴ It should be noted that the information for 1994, 1995 and to a certain extent 1996 is sometimes confused and inconsistent. The information related in this report for this period was thoroughly crosschecked, notably in correlation with what happened in other places at the same time, but although there can be no doubt on the actual occurrence of the events, the exact date of those events cannot be ascertained with any certainty.



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RUF forces were reported to be in Baiama, in the south of Tankoro Chiefdom, in early 1994, where they burnt houses and raped girls. In March, they reached Levuma, a village of 70 houses south of Tankoro Chiefdom, near the border with Gorama Kono Chiefdom, where 70 people were shot and killed. This action was allegedly undertaken in reprisal for the local hunters attacking RUF positions and for the civilians' lack of support for the RUF movement. The Gorama Kono Kamajors subsequently launched an attack on Levuma and, after retaking control of the town, buried the corpses of the 70 victims in a mass grave in town, since burying them outside the town ran the risk of an encounter with RUF forces. During the RUF counter attack on Foindu (Gorama Kono Chiefdom, at the border with Tankoro Chiefdom), 10 houses were burnt, five people were killed, girls were raped and people were abducted. Others were wounded with cutlasses, including the Section Chief of Tankoro Chiefdom.

By April, the Tamaboros who had helped the SLA repelling the RUF/NPFL forces out of Koidu in January 1993 moved back to the Northern Province, their region of origin, to fight the RUF advance.⁹⁴⁶

In May, more local hunters were gathered in Gorama Kono Chiefdom,⁹⁴⁷ thereby enabling them to retake Foindu from the RUF. Other towns in Gorama Kono were also the site of fighting between Kamajor and RUF forces. As rumours spread about an attack on Kangama, the main Kamajor base for the whole chiefdom, up to 124 more youths were initiated into the Kamajor society. The anticipated attack on Kangama took place in September 1994 and after the Kamajors succeeded in countering the RUF forces, the chiefdom was free from RUF incursions until 1995. In order to ensure security, the Kamajors laid constant ambushes on the four entry points from neighbouring chiefdoms, namely at Nimiyama, Nimikoro, Tankoro and Gbane Chiefdoms.

In 1994, the taking of property was common by all factions, including RUF forces, SLA forces and Donsos, and businessmen were common targets. For example, at Yormandu, on a Friday market day, an SLA member killed a businessman for his money, approximately 4,000 to 5,000 US dollars. At Mansundu, another businessman was killed and his money was taken.

The Donsos were active in Sandor Chiefdom and were sometimes attacked by RUF forces during small-scale operations. In mid 1994, RUF forces entered Yormandu, where they killed one police officer and abducted the Donsos deputy chief's daughter. By the end of the year, 2,000 hunters were registered in Sandor Chiefdom.⁹⁴⁸

⁹⁴⁵ The main aim of the traditional authorities was to defend their District but no more information could be obtained on its precise role. It, however highlights how local authorities organised themselves to defend their land against RUF incursions.

⁹⁴⁶ Inter Press Service, 21 April 1994.

⁹⁴⁷ This gathering of local hunters at that time did not encompass initiation as such. Initiation ceremonies would not be performed in the Eastern Province before 1996.

⁹⁴⁸ The reported information concerning Sandor Chiefdom was confused and did not allow us to expand our analysis on this chiefdom. Although it is likely that the information reported above did take place in 1994, it may have taken place at a different date and no more information was available on these events.



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SLA forces were harsh with civilians they suspected of abiding or collaborating with the RUF, which led to disunity between civilians and the SLA. Civilians were also harassed without being suspected of being a RUF member and, in particular in diamond-rich Kamara Chiefdom, acts of violence and molestation were inflicted on civilians by SLA forces engaged in illegal mining, who used and took civilians' properties and abducted women to be their "wives". The smuggling of diamonds was at its peak during this period. At the same time, some civilian members of the NPRC regime organised themselves in a group called "Convoy" and engaged in mining activities, molesting any authority or landowner who stood in their way.⁹⁴⁹ A lot of small mining companies sprang up in this way.

In addition, SLA forces sometimes disguised themselves as RUF forces and attacked villages. For example, in Yorkordu (Sandor Chiefdom), located near the Bafin River, seven SLA members took property from the village before falling into a hunters' ambush. These attacks suspected to be carried out by SLA members pretending to be RUF forces led to disunity between local hunters and SLA forces and at Bakidu, SLA forces pretending to be RUF and who came to attack towns along the river were drowned by Donsos. Around the same time, between Mansundu and Worko (Sandor Chiefdom), RUF forces killed four SLA members, cut off their heads and displayed them on sticks.

A fierce RUF attack took place during that year in Yatandoe (Fiama Chiefdom).⁹⁵⁰ RUF forces, who were believed to have come from different directions, attacked the town with heavy firepower. During the course of their stay in the town, houses were burnt, people killed and women raped. A specific event was the chopping off of the two arms of one SLA member. Some civilians were abducted and taken to Kailahun. Civilians who sought refuge in the bush were chased by the RUF forces, who shot and killed some of them, looted and set on fire the huts built in the bush, known as "mansion". People from Fiama Chiefdom stayed in the bush until Executive Outcomes came to Kono District in 1995.

SLA forces remained in Mafindor and Gbane Kandor Chiefdoms, which were virtually free of RUF activity. However, SLA harassment of civilians, which was common during previous years, continued throughout 1994. In February, SLA forces requested the civilians from Sangema (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom) to come to Koardu to brush the roads. As they did not get the message early enough and accordingly did not show up on time for the work, the civilians were gathered in Sangema and made to sit on the ground. As one of the civilians tried to reach a compromise with the SLA forces, he was hit with a weapon on his head. The SLA forces present in the village also took goats and poultry. The matter was reported to the SLA officer in charge in Manjama, who ordered the arrest of the SLA members involved.⁹⁵¹ Another incident relates the fate of one woman in Marrah (Mafindor Chiefdom) in March, who was beaten and kicked by a member of the SLA, who accused her of having planned to sabotage the NPRC regime.

⁹⁴⁹ These civilians were called the "blue eye boys" and the nature of their relations with the NPRC regime it is not clear from the records. These mining activities were also carried out in 1995.

⁹⁵⁰ The date was not specified for this incident.

⁹⁵¹ The SLA members in question were not arrested.



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From November 1994, SLA forces were no longer based in Mafindor Chiefdom, although they were still patrolling the chiefdom. In Soa Chiefdom, SLA forces were still deployed in Manjama. Also in Soa Chiefdom, a jet bombardment was heard between Kongomadu and Theyor, which was believed to have been ECOMOG forces missing an RUF position.

f) Events in 1995

During this year, SLA forces were occupied with mining activities, leaving the security of the District to the under-equipped Donsos. During the first months of the year, the RUF forces succeeded in capturing major towns, including Koidu, in the wealthy west of the District, before being repelled in May and June by the combined forces of SLA, Executive Outcomes and local hunters.

In early 1995, RUF forces attacked Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom), advancing within a week on Woama (Tankoro Chiefdom) and then on Motema (Nimikoro Chiefdom). In this way, they approached Koidu town, which created panic among the inhabitants. In Motema, six police officers were killed, as well as a prominent Chief. The retreating SLA forces settled in Kamara and Sandor Chiefdoms, harassing civilians and taking their property.

RUF forces took advantage of the fact that SLA forces were more occupied with mining activities than with protecting the District borders. It has been suggested that junior SLA forces embarked on mining because they were suffering in their areas of deployment, as they did not receive much support from the Government and their officers were enriching themselves by mining diamonds. Furthermore, the attack on Motema, which is located on the Koidu-Makeni highway, created an increase in prices and a shortage of essential items in Koidu town, as the highway was no longer accessible.

In late April 1995, RUF forces launched their attack on Koidu. At this time, confusion arose in the mind of civilians about the identity of the fighting forces in control of the town. The RUF forces successfully captured one part of the bridge but the identification of the forces occupying the other part was unclear. Civilians thought that they may either be "loyal soldiers", namely SLA members fighting for the Government, or they may be "sobels".⁹⁵² This attack is referred to as "the second attack", "phase II", or "5:05" by civilians from Koidu. Unlike the first attack, which took place in late 1992, RUF forces used heavy calibre weapons such as mortar bombs, RPGs and LMGs. During the attack, a lot of civilians were killed and RUF forces took property from hundreds of houses and abducted many people, either to work in the mines or to carry their loads. Shortly after, RUF forces took control of the whole town.

After the attack on Koidu, RUF forces fanned out and attacked many more places, which soon fell under their control. During these attacks, people were ill-treated and killed and property was taken or destroyed, including houses. For example, RUF forces who were on their way to Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) cut off a woman's nose. Shortly afterwards, RUF forces attacked Tombodu. After the attack, inhabitants who returned to pack some belongings saw three houses burnt down

⁹⁵² This term refers to either SLA members who joined the RUF movement but who still used their SLA uniforms, so people thought they were fighting for the Government, or SLA members who, although they did not join the RUF as such, were acting as if they were "rebels", adopting the same behaviours.



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and two bodies, although the actual levels of destruction and killing were likely to be much higher. Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom headquarter, in the south of the chiefdom) was attacked and all the houses were burnt down. Some young women and men were abducted and taken to Koidu, which was at this time under RUF control. The abducted men were forced to carry the stolen property. RUF forces also proceeded further north and attacked Yormandu, south of Sandor Chiefdom, following the local hunters up to Bandu, three miles south-east of Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom headquarters).⁹⁵³

The April attack on Koidu led to a massive exodus of the population towards Kamara Chiefdom and towards the villages of Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) and Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom). In Jagbwema, fleeing civilians met with armed men in new uniforms, which led them to think they were SLA forces coming to recapture Koidu. However, shortly after their arrival, one of these armed men shot a civilian in the chest for asking them who they were. These armed men took personal effects and money from the civilians and burnt down one prominent businessman's house. While in their hiding place in the bush, fleeing people in Soa Chiefdom heard on the BBC "Focus on Africa" Program that "white men had come to Koidu".⁹⁵⁴ RUF forces used Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) as their base to lead ambushes in the area, during which some civilians were tortured and raped.⁹⁵⁵

During the same period, people suspected of being "rebel collaborators" were arrested and imprisoned by SLA forces. The NPRC regime imprisoned a lot of authorities they accused of collaboration with RUF forces at Pademba Road Prison in Freetown. At this time, further doubts were raised about the identity of the fighting forces carrying out certain actions, because it was reported that some SLA members organised road ambushes, attacking vehicles for their merchandise and specifically targeting businessmen, taking their belongings and, sometimes, killing them.

Between May and June 1995, a combined force of SLA, ULIMO-K and the CDU advanced from Sewa Bridge (Nimiyama Chiefdom) to recapture Koidu. On their way, they stopped for one week in Bumpe (Nimikoro Chiefdom), waiting for reinforcements from Executive Outcomes.⁹⁵⁶ Executive Outcomes arrived in the same month after having completed their first military encounter in Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and advanced from Bumpe junction to recapture Koidu. RUF forces attacked those forces at Bumpe but were defeated and 17 of them were killed.⁹⁵⁷ By the end of June 1995, Executive Outcomes, together with SLA forces, had removed the RUF forces from Sewa Bridge, Yormandu, Tombodu Chiefdom, Koidu and villages surrounding Koidu.⁹⁵⁸ They

⁹⁵³ The casualties for all these attacks are however not reported.
⁹⁵⁴ This refers to the coming of Executive Outcomes, a mercenary company from South Africa.
⁹⁵⁵ This information was related in general terms and does not specify the precise location of the events nor the exact date.
⁹⁵⁶ The precise dates of the coming of Executive Outcomes in the District could not be inferred from the records. However, it was crosschecked and corroborated with open sources that Koidu was recaptured by these combined forces in June.
⁹⁵⁷ AFP, 28 June 1995.
⁹⁵⁸ Officially, Executive Outcomes had been engaged solely to train the SLA on military tactics but many reports for Kono District recounted that they came to the District to help repelling the RUF forces.



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moved towards Koidu from three different directions, encountering little resistance from RUF forces as they had superior firepower.

Executive Outcomes organised meetings in some chiefdom headquarters, encouraged hunters to organise themselves, gave them military training, especially on how to operate weapons, and supplied them with logistics,⁹⁵⁹ shotguns and eight round automatic rifles, which did not please the SLA forces. Executive Outcomes went on patrol with Donsos, due to their knowledge of the territory, seldom taking SLA members with them. They also encouraged civilians to participate in their own security as watchmen, notably during a general meeting in Koidu that gathered thousands of civilians together. During a meeting at Tombodu, Executive Outcomes demonstrated to the people how they could participate in the security network, using a "Spider Web" diagram. The Kono District Defence Committee⁹⁶⁰ was reorganised and, as the Executive Outcome commander wished to involve the Kono people in the maintenance of security in the District, the Kono Consultative Committee (KCC) was formed. The KCC, besides the Kono District Defence Committee, embraced all facets of the Kono community. The initial meeting of the KCC took place in August, in the presence of 12 Paramount Chiefs,⁹⁶¹ which was followed by regular meetings to discuss security questions.

Donsos, the local hunters, entered Yormandu in July and at this time, Sandor Chiefdom was divided into different zones, each of them placed under the command of a different hunter. Donsos, focused on liberating their chiefdoms, did not rely on SLA forces because of their impression that those SLA forces were quick to run away during RUF attacks.

People began returning to Koidu but due to the scarcity of food, they had to search for food in the surrounding villages. As they did so, they ran into pockets of RUF forces who, when driven out from Koidu, relocated mainly at Potema Camp, Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom) and Bandafarda Camp, near Motema (Nimikoro Chiefdom). During these encounters, a large number of people were abducted and some were killed or mutilated.⁹⁶²

Probably in the middle of August, RUF forces coming from the Tongo route⁹⁶³ attacked Njaiama, headquarter town of Nimikoro Chiefdom and burnt the residence of the Chiefdom Speaker and the Court Barrie. They were repelled by SLA forces, assisted by local hunters. The SLA commander advised the residents of the town to stay indoors whenever there was a RUF attack on the town. One week later, gunshots from the direction of Njala, a very big town a few miles away, were heard in Njaiama. Indeed, RUF forces, dressed in military uniforms, attacked Njala around 28 August. During this attack, over 50 people were killed and several houses burnt down. The RUF forces then moved on to Njaiama, where over 90 people were killed and houses were burnt. During these RUF attacks on Njala and Njaiama, many civilians were wounded and several more went missing, presumably captured by the RUF forces, although some were later discovered dead in the bushes.

⁹⁵⁹ This training took place at District Office Barracks at Koidu and, after their training, the Donsos returned to their chiefdoms.

⁹⁶⁰ See the developments on this point in the year 1994

⁹⁶¹ Kono District has 14 chiefdoms.

⁹⁶² No details could be obtained on this incident.

⁹⁶³ Tongo is located in Lower Bambara Chiefdom (Kenema District). The road leading Tongo to Koidu passes by Gorama Kono Chiefdom, south of Nimikoro Chiefdom.



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SLA forces who had pulled out of the town at the time of the attack regrouped and assisted by local hunters and Executive Outcomes, recaptured the town: A house-to-house search was carried out to bury the dead, who numbered 97 in total, spread over six different locations in the town.⁹⁶⁴

SLA forces came from time to time to Mafindor Chiefdom during the first half of the year, often harassing civilians. For example, one group of SLA forces regularly carried out raids to confiscate civilian property, on one occasion beating the Chief of Sandia village. These actions ceased during the second half of the year, when the rainy season made the roads impassable. In Lei Chiefdom, which is a rich cattle-grazing area, SLA forces killed cattle belonging to civilians and forced the civilians to carry the meat to Koidu; similar events also took place in 1996. For example, in one incident which took place in the chiefdom headquarter of Saiama, some SLA members killed six cows in a pen and required the caretakers of the pen to bring the meat to Koidu. When two of them refused, they were severely beaten by the SLA forces and forced to take the meat to Koidu as previously requested. This incident was reported to the Paramount Chief of Lei, who explained to the owner of the cows that he was not the first to report such matters. As a result, the Paramount Chief had already complained to the Colonel in charge of the SLA in Koidu, who had assured him that he had taken all necessary steps to stop SLA members doing such things. The Colonel had also told the Paramount Chief that he would alert the Military Police around the chiefdom to arrest any SLA member coming to the chiefdom without an official reason.⁹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, similar actions continued even after the complaints of the Paramount Chief and the reassurances from the SLA Colonel.

In Soa Chiefdom, during the months of July to September, RUF forces believed to come from Kailahun District attacked different villages, mainly on a "hit and run" basis, searching for food and targeting villages with master farms. At this time, Donsos were active in Kainkordu and along the border villages, so RUF forces came in small groups and did not undertake sustained attacks. Rather, they would enter a village, take property and leave straightaway, as they were afraid of the Donsos based in some villages. During these raids, people were wounded, killed and forced to carry stolen property. These types of attacks took place in Bongema, Kuandor and Kainkordu. In Kainkordu, for example, one house was burnt and men and women were abducted to carry the property stolen in the village. One of these abductees was later shot dead outside Kainkordu.

In late 1995, Executive Outcomes, SLA and local hunters launched a massive attack on RUF positions at Woama and Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom), where the RUF forces had their main camp in Potema. Donsos were able to provide Executive Outcomes with information and directions on RUF positions, following which local hunters were deployed at Baiama and SLA forces at Woama. After a last unsuccessful RUF attempt⁹⁶⁶ to attack Koidu where RUF forces bypassed SLA forces at Woama and were stopped at Woardu by Executive Outcomes, those chiefdoms located in the centre and the west of the District became relatively quiet. It is interesting to note that during some

⁹⁶⁴ Some blamed the SLA for these attacks on Njala and Njaiama, as they were frustrated in their mining activities by Executive Outcomes: Inter Press Service, 6 September 1995.

⁹⁶⁵ It cannot, however, be inferred from the reports whether Military Police did arrest any SLA member or took any other kind of action.

⁹⁶⁶ This event took place between late December 1995 and early 1996.



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encounters between Executive Outcomes and the RUF, some of the RUF members who were killed were identified as ex-SLA, through the SLA identity cards found on their bodies.

f) Events in 1996

Executive Outcome mercenaries controlled illicit mining in Kono District, their presence minimising the ill treatment of civilians by SLA forces. They reprimanded undisciplined SLA forces and in one incident, killed 72 SLA members, described as “sobels”,⁹⁶⁷ at Kaneya in the outskirts of Koidu. Executive Outcomes patrolled together with Donsos who also continued to man checkpoints. For these reasons, their presence contributed to the stability of the security situation in Kono District and, to an extent, offset the economic consequences for the District of the incessant RUF ambushes on the Kono–Makeni Highway.

Around this time, it was alleged that Executive Outcomes was given a concession on the Tankoro Kimberlite mining site. The mercenary company was brought to the area by Branch Energy Ltd, a British company that secured a mining lease in the area and said it would hire its own security force. It was therefore believed that Executive Outcomes was taking a cut in the mining activities.⁹⁶⁸

At the border with Guinea and Kailahun District, Sandor Chiefdom was mainly protected by the Donsos and not by Executive Outcomes. This chiefdom was free from RUF incursions throughout 1996.

In Lei Chiefdom, SLA harassment of civilians continued, including sexual assault. At one point in 1996, some civilians came to Senehun, located on the highway going to the chiefdom headquarters of Saiama, to mourn the death of the town chief. Some SLA members asked some of them for a goat and as they explained that they had already given their only goat to some other SLA forces the day before, they were told that they should replace the goat with a woman. The civilians explained that there was no unmarried woman in the town. However, the SLA forces came across a young woman who had also come to the village on hearing of the death of the town chief. They took her away and, as she told them she was not married, they threatened the civilians with beatings as they lied to them about there being no unmarried women in the town. The woman was raped by the four SLA members during the night and then released, so the SLA members could avoid being disciplined by their commander. The incident was reported to a senior SLA commander but no action was taken.⁹⁶⁹

In Gbane Chiefdom, RUF forces intimidated voters on Election Day in an effort to prevent them from voting by sporadically firing their weapons. After the elections, some people fled the chiefdom, fearing the warning given by the RUF that they would amputate the hands of those who had voted for the newly-elected President, Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.⁹⁷⁰ Furthermore, people in Kono

⁹⁶⁷ See earlier note 42 for an explanation of this term.

⁹⁶⁸ See The Mining Journal, 8 March 1996 and Inter Press Service, 11 March 1996. Around September 1996, Executive Outcomes would also be contracted by Sieromco, a company mining Bauxite in Moyamba District.

⁹⁶⁹ The month of the occurrence of the incident could not be ascertained.

⁹⁷⁰ By the end of the year, Gbane Chiefdom was a “no-go” area, as the fighting factions were hunting each other across the chiefdom, leading civilians to flee the area.



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heard that in some parts of the country under RUF control, especially in Kailahun District, people's hands were cut off and their mouths padlocked as a punishment for having voted.

After the elections, SLA forces were deployed all around the country in strategic positions, except some parts of Kailahun District. One battalion was deployed in Gbongbokoro (Soa Chiefdom), which is on the Guinean border and is a crossing point to one of Guinea's most prominent market centres called Gueckedou. However, dissent began to ferment within the SLA forces for not being treated by the Government with the respect and the honour they deserved, while hunters (Kamajors and Donsos) were respected by the Government. For example, in August 1996, armed men believed to be SLA forces attacked Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom) and killed the treasury clerk, allegedly because the SLA forces held the treasury clerk responsible for bad reports against them being sent from the chiefdom authorities. Compounding their dissatisfaction, the President's address to the nation at the national Stadium in Freetown after the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement did not please the SLA forces, especially when he made particular mention of the Kamajors for the very outstanding job they did to put an end to the war.

RUF forces attacked Kangama (Gorama Kono) in October 1996, entering the town with heavy firing. They killed one woman and shot two other people in their hips, who were later taken for treatment to Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District). The RUF forces took all the property they could find in the town and abducted two boys to carry the load for them to their base, allegedly at Peyama (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District). One Friday in the same month, a meeting was summoned at the Court Barrie as information reached Kangama authorities about the Kamajor initiation that was taking place in Kenema District.⁷⁷¹ It was agreed that young men should be initiated to protect the chiefdom and a message was conveyed to the Paramount Chief of Gorama Kono Chiefdom, who was at that time in Koidu, to put in place modalities for the initiation. His chiefdom speaker made the shuttle between Koidu and Kangama to organise the initiation. Money was borrowed from a produce buying agent in Koidu for the initiation and 30 energetic men were selected by the elders. The 30 young newly initiated Kamajors were then provided with single and double barrel guns and deployed in different part of the town.

Also in October 1996, RUF forces attacked Bamba (Soa Chiefdom) and burnt down 32 houses. They then headed to Sukudu, south of Soa Chiefdom, where they captured people, including children, and forced them to carry heavy loads to an unknown location. SLA forces based at Yigbeda (Soa Chiefdom) advanced to Sukudu and some of their members deployed there. Two weeks later, still in October, RUF forces attacked the town of Kongonani, six miles from Sukudu, where they killed civilians, including men, women and children, before being repelled by SLA forces, who had come from Sukudu on hearing the sounds of gunfire. Before retreating, RUF forces abducted some civilians and brought them to Kailahun District. Stolen property was also transported to Liberia by boat, crossing the river bordering Sierra Leone and Liberia. While a meeting was in progress in Sukudu with SLA forces and local authorities in December, RUF forces again attacked Sukudu and killed the Section Chief of Sawa Fiama Section. SLA forces retreated to Yigbeda but later, still in December, they came back to Sukudu and warned civilians that they were

⁷⁷¹ This information backs up the previous assertions that no Kamajor initiations as such took place in Gorama Kono Chiefdom in late 1993 and early 1994.



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planting mini-landmines along the road RUF forces were using to attack Soa Chiefdom, which caused the death of some of the RUF forces and allegedly led to the ceasing of attacks on villages in the chiefdom.

The Abidjan Peace Accord, signed on 30 November 1996, stated that the war was ended with immediate effect. It required that Executive Outcomes leave the country by early 1997, which they did,⁹⁷² and also required the disarmament of the fighting forces.⁹⁷³ However, Kono people made a very strong appeal to the Government not to stop their contract with Executive Outcomes, as they ensured security for Kono District.

In the aftermath of the Abidjan Accord, the then Vice President conducted a confidence building tour in the provinces to disband the CDF. In late December,⁹⁷⁴ the Vice President of Sierra Leone visited Kono District and held a meeting in Koidu with Kono stakeholders, where he officially disbanded the CDF and required the Donsos to lay down their arms and return to their farming activities, as the Government had entered into a ceasefire agreement with the RUF. Any Donsos who failed to disarm would be detained. Many people who attended the meeting left the hall before the closure of the meeting to show their disapproval with the Vice President's statement. On the evening of that same day, the Deputy Defence Minister came to Koidu and organised a meeting at the Donsos office to encourage the Donsos to stay intact as RUF forces could not be trusted, including giving money as his own contribution for the Christmas celebration. Nevertheless, the Vice President's visit had, to all intents and purposes, paralysed further Donsos' activities.

g) Events in 1997⁹⁷⁵

In March 1997 in Gorama Kono Chiefdom, RUF forces attacked Kangama, a CDF stronghold located at the border with Tankoro Chiefdom, but were repelled. The RUF apparently wanted to capture Kangama as a transit point to block the Kamajors in Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District),⁹⁷⁶ who had strong links with the Kamajors in Kangama.

In May 1997, news of the Coup reached Kono on its very first day through the BBC's "Focus on Africa" Program. After the Coup, the RUF came out of the bush, often looking malnourished, and together with AFRC mainly spent the year taking people's property, in particular making constant demands for livestock. Furthermore, shortly after the Coup, the individual plot system was

⁹⁷² AFP, 30 January 1997.

⁹⁷³ Article 12 of the Agreement stated that the Government shall use all its endeavours, consistent with its treaty obligations, to repatriate other foreign troops (i.e., the Nigerians and the Guineans) no later than three months after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group or six months after the signing of the Peace Agreement, whichever is earlier. Article 12 also stated that Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn within five weeks of the deployment of the NMG: Sierra Leone Bi-Monthly Information Report No.11, 19 November - 16 December 1996.

⁹⁷⁴ This visit could have taken place early January 1997.

⁹⁷⁵ Little information was reported for 1997, as most of the RUF/AFRC activities were concentrated in Freetown and RUF activities now together with AFRC resumed progressively and were mainly focused on the mining areas.

⁹⁷⁶ It has to be remembered that the control of Tongo Field was of the utmost importance for RUF forces as it is the most important diamond area in Kenema District.



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abandoned and all mining areas were declared to belong to the RUF/AFRC forces, who appointed "Mines Monitoring Officials" to supervise their mining activities.⁹⁷⁷

Throughout 1997, RUF/AFRC forces undertook patrols in various places across the District. For example, Gbane Kandor Chiefdom was under the constant patrols of AFRC members. RUF/AFRC forces regularly patrolled Soa Chiefdom, except Kainkordu, which was a Kamajor stronghold.

RUF/AFRC forces established checkpoints in Koidu town⁹⁷⁸ and also conducted raids at mining sites, beating and killing civilians and seizing gravel from civilians, looking for diamonds.⁹⁷⁹ The SLPP Secretariat was occupied by the RUF/AFRC forces and used as their own administrative secretariat. A few weeks after the establishment of this secretariat, some RUF/AFRC forces arrested a man, brought him to the secretariat and shot him dead, accusing him of being a Kamajor because he was wearing country clothes, the traditional attire of the Kamajors. A member of the RUF/AFRC forces cut off both his hands. In Kamara Chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces also established checkpoints at the entry and exit points of Tombodu. They confiscated any items of value or of interest to them from people passing through the checkpoints. Also at this time, alleged CDF collaborators were executed.⁹⁸⁰

In Fiama chiefdom, RUF/AFRC harassment of civilians was initially minimal, as they only took food and only miners were harassed by RUF/AFRC forces for their diamond-containing gravel. However, shortly after, civilians were arrested and forced to wash the gravel for the combined forces. Furthermore, RUF/AFRC started visiting towns and villages where they took away food and people's personal effects, including jewellery and money. In June, RUF/AFRC forces from Yegeda attacked Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom). No wounding or fatalities were reported, but property including livestock, food items, clothes and medicine were taken. One month later, RUF/AFRC forces came back to Jagbwema from Koidu with two jeeps, opened fire and took items of the same nature as the previous month.

RUF/AFRC forces harassed authorities throughout the District, because they were suspected of being sympathisers with the Kabbah Government. For example, when news reached the RUF/AFRC forces in Koidu that a Paramount Chief had encouraged the reactivation of the CDF in his chiefdom, some forces were sent to capture him. He was not there, but his compound was looted and the Town Chief and one other young man were arrested, beaten and taken to Manjama, the RUF/AFRC military base in Soa Chiefdom. After this, panicked civilians fled to Guinea. In November and December, property was taken from the remaining civilians on a full-scale basis. The taking of property by RUF/AFRC forces took place in other areas, including Gbane and Gbane

⁹⁷⁷ See below in 1998 for details on the mining operations.

⁹⁷⁸ Koidu town had previously been under the control of SLA forces and Executive Outcomes. However, by early 1997, Executive Outcomes had left and when the Coup happened, SLA positions turned into AFRC positions, which were then reinforced by RUF forces.

⁹⁷⁹ This information was related in general terms and no further details were available.

⁹⁸⁰ This information was related in general terms and no further details were available.



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Kandor Chiefdoms, where Koardu Town (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom) was visited many times, mainly for livestock.


RUF/AFRC forces came again to Kangama (Gorama Kono Chiefdom) in June, taking advantage of the fact that the Kamajors had deserted their checkpoints during the night. Many civilians were captured, massive looting was carried out, houses were set on fire and civilians were forced to carry the stolen property to the RUF/AFRC base in Senahun (Tankoro Chiefdom). In August, the CDF launched a successful offensive on the RUF base in Senahun, as a result of which Gorama Kono Chiefdom was free of attacks for the rest of the year.

In Lei Chiefdom, two civilians accused of sabotage in Kombayende were shot to death on the orders of a member of the RUF/AFRC. In the same town, a woman was beaten with a bayonet and killed by a member of the AFRC for refusing to give him palm oil. There were also two separate incidences of rape in Lei Chiefdom, one in October when a woman was raped by three RUF/AFRC members in Kenema and one in December, when four members of the RUF/AFRC went to Senahun, requested a house in which to sleep and raped a woman.



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b) Events in February - June 1998



Legend:

ECOMOG deployment

→ RUF/AFRC forces deployment

From January to February, violence against civilians and attacks on civilian property were rampant. An AFRC member shot and killed a young boy near the Koidu Central Mosque after the boy had helped him push his motorbike up the hill. Two days before ECOMOG drove the RUF/AFRC forces out of Freetown, a group of RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Branch Energy Lodge and Warehouse in Koidu and stole items valued at over hundreds of millions of Leones. On 12 February, "Operation pay yourself" was launched, according to which looting and confiscation of property were encouraged and almost all the shops in Koidu were looted. This operation lasted for a couple of days. Shortly after, the RUF/AFRC forces decided to undertake another looting operation, which they named "Operation House to House Search". In reaction to these operations, the youths mobilised and attacked the RUF/AFRC forces, succeeding in capturing some weapons. In addition, civilians launched their own operation, "Burn soldiers", where RUF/AFRC forces were chased in their hideouts and rubber tyres were placed around their necks and set on fire. All of these successive operations took place before retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown arrived in Kono District.

CDF members from Gandorhun (Gbane Chieftdom) and Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chieftdom) came to help maintain the security of Koidu and its environs. Youths surrendered the weapons they had captured from the RUF/AFRC forces to the CDF. ECOMOG forces were expected to arrive on 21 February, through the Yengema heliport. In Koidu, suspected collaborators of the RUF/AFRC forces were summarily executed by the CDF.



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However, on 21 February, an RUF/AFRC convoy of 150 vehicles, which had been repelled from Freetown and had regrouped in Makeni, launched an attack on Koidu Town, entering the town along the Makeni-Magburaka highway. Using light artillery as opposed to the poor logistics available to the Kamajors, the RUF/AFRC forces overpowered them during the day. The Kamajors had no choice but to retreat, mainly to Manjama and Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom). Accordingly, Koidu Town and its environs fell under the total control of the RUF/AFRC forces. The burning of the town began. Abduction, rape and looting were rampant in Koidu and in all the surrounding villages. As a result of this, civilians fled the town and its environs, leaving Koidu and Woardu almost like ghost towns.⁹⁸¹

When they pulled out of Freetown, the RUF indicated that it was again in charge of the operations. RUF forces began issuing orders to AFRC members and to arrest and kill those who refused to carry out the orders. In the Provinces, the AFRC forces were outnumbered and some of them surrendered to ECOMOG forces. A senior RUF officer, probably RUF Battle Group Commander at that time, was renowned for killing many AFRC members when RUF/AFRC forces were in Koidu. On one occasion, he ordered 15 AFRC members to go and destroy a bridge on the highway. As one of them refused to go for he was unarmed, he was shot and killed by this senior officer.

The capture of Koidu town was the prelude to RUF/AFRC forces spreading all over the District. No chiefdom was left untouched after February and the violence intensified after the news that President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah had been restored to power on 10 March 1998, especially when Operation "Kill all living things" was declared. The scale of violations committed was in particular very high between February and May/June, reaching unprecedented levels. What happened during this period (February –May/June) will be outlined below according to the different areas in which things were happening, rather than chronologically, due to the high level of activity in all areas of the District, although it should be borne in mind that these events happened concurrently.

West (Kamara, Gbense, Nimiya, Nimikoro and Tankoro Chiefdoms)

Villages in Gbense Chiefdom were attacked and in late February, many civilians fled the town of Yardu, to the north of Koidu, where a well-known Reverend was killed.

On 17 March, over 30 RUF/AFRC forces discovered some people in their hiding place near Kuandor (Kamara Chiefdom). The commander, a Liberian, asked the people to cook for them. Afterwards, he decided to go to another area but two of his men asked him if they could take with them the girls who were among the civilians. The commander apparently gave permission, as the two girls, aged 13 and 14, were taken away by these forces. On 21 March, the National Chairman of the SLPP who was considered as a father for the whole District, relocated to a hiding place outside Wordu village a few miles from Koidu. He was later discovered, stripped, beaten and

⁹⁸¹ It is not totally clear when RUF/AFRC entered Koidu, as the attack may have taken place in early March 1998 (Chicago Tribune, 17 March 1998). Furthermore, information from Koinadugu District tends to suggest that RUF/AFRC forces reached Koidu from Koinadugu District. The poor conditions of the road network in Koinadugu District, compared to the good quality of the highway, which leads Makeni (Bombali District) to Koidu, through Magburaka (Tonkolili District), however suggest that the bulk of the RUF/AFRC forces reached Koidu from Makeni.



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tied up before being shot dead by six men belonging to the RUF/AFRC forces. A young girl who was under his guardianship was raped and taken to be the “wife” of their commander. Before leaving, the six men took one boy to carry the property they had just stolen. In Wordu, four young girls in their teens were captured by six RUF/AFRC men. After being ordered to cook, both the girls and some young men were severely beaten.

CDF members continued to confront RUF/AFRC forces and around 23 March, claimed to have recaptured Njaiama Sewafe and the Sewa Bridge (Nimiyama Chiefdom). In addition, they claimed to have rescued hundreds of civilians caught behind RUF/AFRC lines.⁹⁸²

Killings, indiscriminate amputations, the gorging out of eyes, the dropping of burning plastic into the eyes and the disembowelling of pregnant women were common practice in Koidu at that time. In April, six civilians were captured by RUF/AFRC forces in Yardu village (Gbense Chiefdom) and were frog-marched to Koidu Town. One of the commanders shot one of the captives six times in the legs. As the captive could not walk any more, the commander ordered his men to execute him. When they reached Koidu Town, they met a group of ULIMO members⁹⁸³ who demanded that the captured men be divided and one group be assigned to them (ULIMO). After a confrontation between the RUF/AFRC forces and the ULIMO forces, the captured men were finally taken to the RUF commander’s residence. One of the captured men was suspected of being a Donsos and was severely beaten, had his hands braced and was locked up with other civilians in a toilet being used as a cell. All of the men were subsequently released.

In April, the rate of killing, rape and mutilation increased as the RUF/AFRC forces had launched “Operation No Living Thing”. Kamara Chiefdom, a diamond-rich area northwest of Koidu, was particularly affected at this time.

AFRC/RUF forces were in the bush in Kamara and Tankoro Chiefdoms and the high number of reports for this area reveal the intensity of the violence inflicted on civilians. There were many instances of killing, acts of rape, amputation and burning of houses. One RUF commander was notorious for the amputation of several hands and legs. He ordered the abduction of a large number of people in a mining area, two to three miles away from Tombodu, and ordered the amputations according to description called ‘long sleeve’ or ‘short sleeve’. In another encounter, the same commander and his men conducted an intense raid, during which they all raped one woman and lacerated her vagina. Other incidents include shooting civilians during raids or patrols. Another RUF commander in the area conducted a raid, which resulted in the abduction of several men, women and children, who were locked a house, which was then set on fire.

⁹⁸² BBC Online News Archive, 23 March 1998.

⁹⁸³ Although ULIMO forces were officially disbanded in 1997, following the presidential elections in Liberia, it was alleged and stated by the ECOMOG commander in Sierra Leone that members of ULIMO-K were fighting alongside the RUF/AFRC forces: AFP, 21 April 1998. Some of these members would be arrested by ECOMOG forces and detained at the Pademba Road Prison in Freetown: Inter Press Service, 29 April 1998.



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At Yardu (Gbense Chiefdom) in early April, the RUF/AFRC commander ordered that three people be killed. Among those killed was an ex-worker at the Koidu Electricity House. Civilians were ordered to bury the bodies on 10 April 1998.

As news arrived that ECOMOG troops were advancing in the District and were based near Koidu, at Koakuima, two convoys of civilians, including men, women and children, moved from Yardu to Motema town, eight miles south of Koidu Town on 22 and 24 April, arriving safely at their destination.

During this period, RUF/AFRC forces were continuously running from village to village, killing, raping and amputating people and burning villages, so that most of the civilians fled for the bush. One resident of Kuandor, who was returning to the town with some other people, ran into seven members of the RUF/AFRC forces, five of them carrying AK47s and two armed with cutlasses; one of them identified himself as trained fighter from Burkina Faso. The civilians were taken to Kuandor village and were asked to give the RUF/AFRC forces money and rice, which they did not have. The forces stripped one man to his underwear, laid him flat on the ground and beat him with a cutlass, which left marks on his back. They then poured some palm wine on his head and body, tied him up firmly and planned to take him out of the town later to kill him. Another civilian who was captured started crying and was hit hard on the head with a cutlass. One of the forces came back to the civilian who was tied up and told him since the civilians did not know his name, he would write it on his back with a razor blade, but was stopped from doing so by another member of the forces. All the RUF members and the civilians then moved on and RUF forces abducted more people in the nearby village. One of the RUF members suggested that they should leave the civilians behind, meaning they should be killed. However, the commander of the group allowed the two men from Kuandor to return to their town.⁹⁸⁴

In another incident that took place in April, 11 RUF/AFRC forces carrying guns and cutlasses captured three boys⁹⁸⁵ who were going to Peyima (Kamara Chiefdom) to get salt and other items to bring back to their relatives, who were living in huts (also known as mansions) in the bush. The boys were forced to take the RUF/AFRC members to the mansions. The members covered the three boys with palm leaves, set fire to them and told the three boys to show them where all the property was kept, or they would stay in the fire until they were completely burnt. The boys showed them where the belongings were and the RUF/AFRC forces left the place taking with them the items they found. Before they left, they beat the three boys.

Also in April, in the village of Gbaima (Kamara Chiefdom), a group of RUF/AFRC members went to a farm near the village and asked the farmer to give them rice and palm oil. As the farmer only had rice to give, the RUF/AFRC members pierced his feet, passed a rope through the hole thus created and tied him up firmly. They then set fire to the palm fruits and threw the farmer into the fire. The man died nine days later. Violence was also inflicted on the other five inhabitants of the farm when the RUF/AFRC forces set fire to an empty five-gallon container and dropped the melting rubber on the five people until the container had burnt completely.

⁹⁸⁴ What happened to the remaining abductees was not specified.

⁹⁸⁵ The age of the three boys could not be ascertained from the records.



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During the same month, two civilians who left Gbaima to go to Tombodu to check the condition of their houses ran into seven RUF/AFRC members, who tied their hands and told them to show them the way where they came from. As they approached Gbaima, the armed men opened fire on the civilians they met in the village, killing one old man, whose stomach was cut open and whose intestines were tied on a stick. Another boy whose age was not specified was also cut with a bladed weapon. The RUF/AFRC forces then conducted a house-to-house search and the two civilians they had previously arrested were ordered to gather all the food items they had taken. Before leaving for Tombodu, the RUF/AFRC forces set all the houses of the village on fire. On their way to Tombodu, the seven RUF/AFRC forces and two abducted civilians passed by the village of Wordu, where one of the armed men went to a house where a blind man was living. When he came back to his colleagues, he told them he had “finished” the man. Two boys they met on their way to Tombodu were also forced to join them. When they arrived at Tombodu, the civilians saw a body with its stomach cut open lying on the street that led the RUF/AFRC forces’ headquarters. When they arrived at the headquarters, which was full of a variety of types of weapons including rifles, light artillery and bladed weapons, the commander ordered his men to tie the civilians (who were by then 14 in number), and lay them on the ground, one person on top of another. A mattress was then put on top of them and lit. One of the civilians, who kicked the mattress away as it started to burn him, was hit severely with a machete by the commander. The commander also accused him of being one of the youths who had burnt RUF/AFRC forces in February and hit his right hand with a machete, although it was not chopped off. When they saw this, the other civilians tried to escape and started running but were killed when the commander ordered his men to shoot them.

During this period, RUF/AFRC forces would burn part of the town of Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) each time an ECOMOG jet plane flew overhead. On one occasion, over 50 civilians, men, women and children were locked up in a house at Yusufuya Road and the house was set on fire. Cells in the headquarters were used to detain civilians, men and women, some of whom were later killed. The commander used a mined out crater near the lorry park in Tombodu to dump bodies of the people killed in the town.

In another incident, a man from Gbondu village (upper part of Kamara Chiefdom) was captured by some RUF/AFRC forces, who forced him to carry their load to a village in Sandor Chiefdom. Once the load was carried, the civilian was told to go back to his town. As he was returning, he met with another group of RUF/AFRC forces who cut off one of his hands. The man reached Gbondu and shortly after, the population decided to leave the village to go to Koakuima, where ECOMOG was stationed.

Around this period, a District Emergency Task Force was created by civilians who had returned to their villages. This Task Force was mandated to assess the destruction of their villages and to help the local population. Each chiefdom was represented in the Task Force.⁹⁸⁶

⁹⁸⁶ AFP, 16 and 17 June 1998.



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ECOMOG had arrived in Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom) in early April 1998.⁹⁸⁷ While their arrival was characterised by tensions with members of the CDF from Kono District, since ECOMOG came with some members of the CDF from Punduru (Gorama Mende Chiefdom, in the north of Kenema District), the advancing ECOMOG troops were welcomed. While in Njaiama Sewafe, the ECOMOG Commander-in-Chief paid them a visit and gave the order to advance on Koidu Town. Thus, a combined troop of ECOMOG and Donsos moved to Koidu on 12 April on foot through the jungle, encountering an RUF/AFRC attack at Yigbeda, during which many ECOMOG members were killed. Nevertheless, they continued their journey and within one day, captured Yengema, Motema and Small Lebanon⁹⁸⁸ (all located on the highway), after having battled for a few hours with some RUF/AFRC forces. The 5th Battalion was then deployed at Motema. The ECOMOG and CDF forces launched their first attack on Koidu Town but were repelled by RUF/AFRC forces and went back to Small Lebanon. However, ECOMOG and CDF forces launched a second attack and were able to overpower the RUF/AFRC forces, who fled the town.⁹⁸⁹ ECOMOG forces also deployed at Koakuima where, as mentioned earlier, many civilians from the surrounding chiefdoms had come to find refuge, as the ECOMOG presence appeared to represent greater safety.⁹⁹⁰

RUF/AFRC forces continued to stage ambushes and around 14 April, three buses carrying ECOMOG reinforcements and CDF members fell in one of those ambushes near Yigbeda (Nimikoro Chiefdom). Some ECOMOG members were killed, others wounded and two BBC reporters were killed while trying to find refuge in the bush. The buses were later met by some of the ECOMOG forces of the 24th Brigade infantry en route to Makeni and from there to Freetown to brief the Task Force Commander. Those ECOMOG forces loaded their dead and the wounded colleagues onto the truck and continued their journey to Makeni. Shortly after, they fell in another RUF/AFRC ambush but managed to escape the ambush without any fatalities and made their way to Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom).⁹⁹¹

⁹⁸⁷ Following the intervention in Freetown, further inland operations were carried out by the specially designed 24th ECOMOG Brigade Infantry: Brig. Gen. R. A. Adeshina: *The Reversed Victory: Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc., p 29. Members of this brigade deployed in the country and after capturing Makeni in March 1998, they proceeded further North to Kono District and arrived in Njaiama Sewafe around 11 April, where they met their colleagues already deployed since early April. It appears that the first batch of ECOMOG forces who deployed in Njaiama Sewafe waited for troops from the 24th Brigade Infantry before advancing further to Koidu.

⁹⁸⁸ Small Lebanon is a town south of Koidu.

⁹⁸⁹ It is not totally clear whether ECOMOG forces launched one or two attacks on Koidu before capturing it. In any case, these actions were carried out within a short period of time. RUF/AFRC forces, before retreating from the town, inflicting heavy casualties on civilians, killing some and burning houses. It was alleged that around 2,000 civilians were held hostages by the RUF/AFRC forces, in readiness for the expected ECOMOG attack. Inter Press Service, 16 April 1998.

⁹⁹⁰ However, unlike the people who had escaped Gbense Chiefdom for Koakuima, those who had found refuge in Sandor Chiefdom and the CDF, who had also decided to move to Koakuima, fell into the hands of RUF/AFRC forces in Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) and a lot of them were killed while others had their limbs amputated.

⁹⁹¹ Adeshina, *op cit*, pp 62-3; see also Associated Press Worldstream, 18 April 1998.



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CDF forces equipped with arms and ammunition given to them by ECOMOG troops stationed at Njaiama Sewafe attacked Yardu (Gbense Chiefdom) in April and overcame the RUF/AFRC forces. Many RUF/AFRC members were killed during that attack, while two died by drowning into the river. In late April, ECOMOG forces in the District received reinforcements, who deployed along the Njaiama Sewafe-Koidu highway, where they faced some ambushes staged by some RUF/AFRC forces. Assisted by an air campaign, they cleared the highway and reopened it in early May.⁹⁹²

A Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG was also sent to Torgbambu, an important town in Gorama Kono Chiefdom.⁹⁹³ They came with heavy artillery including Alpha Jets, tanks, mortar bombs and helicopter gunships; shortly after their deployment at Torgbambu, they attacked RUF/AFRC positions and deployed in Jaiama and Bumpe (Nimikoro Chiefdom) together with members of the CDF. The ECOMOG forces encouraged people to come out of their hiding places, so civilians started to come back to the headquarter town of Jaiama.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked ECOMOG positions at Jaiama (Nimikoro chiefdom), where they were repelled, and at Motema, where they were also repelled, but not before they had killed 24 civilians in a house situated near the national Petroleum Station at the Motema Junction along the main Freetown highway.⁹⁹⁴ Those 24 civilians were later buried in one mass grave by the house of a retired senior superintendent of the Sierra Leone Police. Several attempts were also made by the combined RUF/AFRC forces to attack ECOMOG forces based at Koakuima but they all failed.

On 10 June, two days after the announcement over the radio of the death of the Nigerian President, RUF/AFRC forces made an attempt to attack Koidu, at that time under ECOMOG control. Although this attempt continued until the end of the month, the RUF/AFRC forces did not succeed in recapturing the town.⁹⁹⁵

North-west (Sandor Chiefdom)

After taking Koidu in late February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces arrived in Sandor Chiefdom and organised themselves into different groups, namely food finding groups and mining groups. A lot of stolen property came to Sandor from Koidu, as Sandor Chiefdom was a commercial centre. In this chiefdom, they were based in Yormandu, Tefeya and Kayima, from where they controlled various chiefdoms in Koinadugu District.

AFRC/RUF forces were engaged in large-scale mining in the south of Sandor Chiefdom, in towns including Yormandu, Tefeya, Bakidu, Woidala and Bendu. The RUF/AFRC forces needed people to

⁹⁹² Former members of the AFRC regime who had surrendered were part of this deployment, re-trained and incorporated by ECOMOG: Adeshina, *op cit*, pp 66-7. This deployment of former AFRC members frightened the population, who suspected they may still be loyal to the ousted AFRC leader: AFP, 16 June 1998.

⁹⁹³ It seems that this contingent of ECOMOG came from Kenema while the other one who deployed in towns alongside the highway that leads to Koidu came from Freetown. It is likely that those deployments took place at the same time.

⁹⁹⁴ The attack on Jaiama took place shortly after ECOMOG deployed whereas the one on Motema must have taken place weeks later.

⁹⁹⁵ Adeshina, *op cit*, pp 89-93.



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work in the mines and to find food, so a lot of civilians were abducted for these purposes. Many people who were captured were divided into groups, namely tripping, extraction and washing, and forced to work in the mines all day long. Mining workers were flogged, killed or burnt to death. Sick or tired workers were either killed or driven away after a severe beating or flogging. Mining workers caught stealing diamonds were burnt to death using a five-gallon container for carrying petrol or palm wine or oil. Physical violence, mutilation and killing were rampant. At Tefeya and Sandeya for example, RUF/AFRC forces killed civilians and amputated the ears and hands of others.⁹⁹⁶ Promotion was given to RUF/AFRC members according to the results of their missions. As an example, when members, often child soldiers, were asked to burn houses and they burnt more than they had been told to, they were given rank promotion.

All over the chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces began killing people in the bush, mainly for food as their stores began to run out in April. "Where is the salt, where is the Maggi, where is the pepper" were common questions asked of civilians, who would be killed if they were unable to provide the RUF/AFRC forces with those items. For example, in Kayima area at a place called Nakor, six people were killed for refusing to give food and other items. During the same period, in Kayima area, 13 people were put in a farm, which was then set on fire.⁹⁹⁷

In April, an internal dispute arose between RUF/AFRC forces at Yormandu and some went to Tegbadu, three miles east of Yormandu.⁹⁹⁸

As they needed civilians to undertake various activities, the RUF/AFRC forces devised different ways to bring civilians out of the bushes. On one occasion, RUF/AFRC forces sent the message to the bush, in particular nearby Yiffin (Koinadugu District) where civilians from Sandor Chiefdom had fled earlier, that a former NPRC Defence Minister and son of Kayima had come to Kayima and had called people to come out of the bushes.⁹⁹⁹ On another occasion in May, one civilian leaving the bush around Masundu and heading for Guinea with his family fell into a RUF/AFRC ambush. The RUF/AFRC forces took them back to Masundu and the commander told him that if he would bring people out of the bushes, he would be appointed Town Chief or Town Commander. This man persuaded some other people to come out of the bushes and they started to brush the town and to repair damaged houses. A civilian was appointed at the G5 position. RUF/AFRC forces would then come regularly to the town to ask for food. Civilians were not killed but were forced to produce the requested items and to work for the RUF/AFRC forces. To refuse to work would lead to flogging. It appeared that Masundu was one of the first towns to be rebuilt in Sandor Chiefdom. This situation continued throughout 1998 and 1999 until Donsos came to fight the RUF/AFRC forces.¹⁰⁰⁰

⁹⁹⁶ AFP, 17 April 1998.

⁹⁹⁷ The precise location of this event was not specified in the records.

⁹⁹⁸ No further information on the reason of the dispute but also stated in general terms, it illustrates, as other similar incidents in Kono District and in other Districts that following the retreat from Freetown, internal fight appeared inside the combined RUF/AFRC forces.

⁹⁹⁹ This information revealed to be false but anyway, did not have the expected results.

¹⁰⁰⁰ When they came to Masundu, probably in 2000, the hunters called together some civilians and molested a lot of them, accusing them of having collaborated with the RUF/AFRC forces.



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However, this collaboration was not mirrored in other areas of the chiefdom, where women were raped and taken as RUF/AFRC “wives”. Young girls were raped in front of their parents and were subsequently captured to carry loads. In April, one man was killed after he begged for mercy for his daughter, who was being raped in front of him.¹⁰⁰¹

At Yormandu, the burning of five-gallon containers to drip the melted plastic onto civilians was rampant. People were flogged up to 200, 300 and even 400 lashes all over their body, mainly when they refused to work, or said they were tired, or were caught stealing minor things. However, people caught stealing diamonds had a separate treatment and were burnt to death using a five-gallon container. In one specific incident that took place at Yormandu, one man who stole a diamond, called “Government property”, was stripped naked and had melted rubber dropped on his body until he died.

As a result of these atrocities, civilians fled in large numbers to Yiffin (Koinadugu District), which saw a massive influx of people starting in late April. Indeed, throughout 1998, civilians were going on and off in the bush, to Guinea and to Koinadugu District.

Members of the CDF, together with a large number of SLA forces,¹⁰⁰² equipped with arms and ammunition provided through the ECOMOG helicopter fought RUF/AFRC forces in Sandor Chiefdom. As a result, sometime in June, RUF/AFRC forces retreated to Koinadugu District. Other groups of hunters under the command of different commanders were active in the north and north-east of the chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces, however, regularly attacked those SLA and CDF forces, often by using ambushes. In fact, ambushes were widely practiced by RUF/AFRC forces, particularly after SLA forces together with CDF members attacked them. In mid 1998, a group of between 30 to 35 civilians fell into an RUF/AFRC ambush three miles south of Kayima. Eighteen of them were beaten to death at the Yormandu Kayima and Tefeya Junction, as it was said that RUF/AFRC forces did not want to alert SLA forces by using their guns. The remaining civilians were taken to Baudu, the first town after Kayima on the road to Yormandu, where six of them were killed. The remaining people were taken away and their fate remains unknown.

Gbane Chiefdom

In Gbane Chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces forced civilians to work for them, mining diamond and gold and harvesting cash crops like coffee and cocoa, which the RUF/AFRC forces were using to get arms and ammunitions.¹⁰⁰³ By the end of March, the chiefdom was virtually empty, as people fled the villages to go to the bush and to Guinea.

South-east (Fiama, Soa, Gbane Kandor and Mafindor Chiefdoms)

When RUF/AFRC forces dislodged CDF forces from Koidu in February 1998, these CDF forces retreated mainly to Kainkordu and Manjama in Soa Chiefdom. Shortly after, RUF/AFRC forces

¹⁰⁰¹ No detail on the location of this incident could be obtained from the records.

¹⁰⁰² The report mentions that the SLA forces were composed of 846 men.

¹⁰⁰³ The records talk about the cash crops being swapped for arms and ammunitions without giving details as to where this exchange was taking place, whether it was taking place at the Guinean border.



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launched attacks on Fiama and Soa Chiefdoms, in particular in those areas where the CDF forces were concentrated. Indeed, in Soa Chiefdom, Donsos had six bases¹⁰⁰⁴ in the chiefdom, their headquarters being in Kainkordu.

On 11 March 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the headquarter town of Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC forces, coming from Koidu in military and civilian jeeps, entered the town firing indiscriminately. More than 70 houses were burnt and the town was massively looted. During the night, the RUF/AFRC forces abducted three people, including the Town Chief, who were all later killed; on 12 March 1998, the same group also killed the Town Chief of Gbetema. On 24 March 1998, RUF/AFRC forces coming from Jagbwema attacked Yeanoh, shooting and killing many people.

When they heard that the Kamajors and Donsos were in Soa Chiefdom, at Gbanmandu, north of the chiefdom headquarter of Kainkordu, the RUF/AFRC forces moved to Soa Chiefdom. On their way to Kainkordu, this group of RUF/AFRC forces fought with another group of RUF/AFRC forces, each of them thinking they were fighting with CDF forces. A number of the forces were killed during that encounter, but later, both groups¹⁰⁰⁵ joined forces to advance on Kainkordu. In Kainkordu, the RUF/AFRC forces fought with the CDF forces and both fighting factions suffered heavy fatalities, with no reported civilian fatalities. The RUF/AFRC forces then headed for Manjama, two miles from Kainkordu, where many civilians were killed. Those two attacks on Kainkordu and Manjama created panic among the civilians and a lot of them decided to flee for Guinea. This panic was intensified by the rumour that the route through Kainkordu was being used by some RUF/AFRC forces going to Liberia¹⁰⁰⁶ through Kailahun.

The same RUF/AFRC forces then proceeded further east towards Gbane Kandor Chiefdom and, on 27 March, launched simultaneous attacks on Bendu, Gbangbandor, Dugbor, Gbaidu, Dunamao and Koardu (all in Gbane Kandor Chiefdom). During this wave of attacks, several civilians, including men, women and children, were abducted, women were sexually abused and many houses were looted and burnt down. In Gbangbandor, for example, one woman was sexually assaulted and beaten to death. These attacks made the civilians leave the chiefdom for Guinea. However, in order to find food, civilians returned from time to time to the chiefdom and an unspecified number of civilians were abducted or killed. Donsos from Mafindor Chiefdom to the east of Gbane Kandor Chiefdom regrouped to try to stop the RUF/AFRC advance and agreed that the three sections of the chiefdom should each contribute one cow that would be sold in Guinea in order to buy ammunition there.¹⁰⁰⁷

¹⁰⁰⁴ The Donsos had 100 men deployed at Kainkordu, 25 at Kuandor, 25 at Fuero, 25 at Sukudu, 50 at Manjama and 15 at Medu.

¹⁰⁰⁵ While one group was coming from Koidu Town (and then Jagbwema in Fiama Chiefdom), the other group came from Pendembu, Kailahun District.

¹⁰⁰⁶ It is reported that the rumour also said that Johnny Paul Koroma was among those forces. Other reports mention that as early as February, RUF/AFRC forces passed through Soa to reach Kailahun. Furthermore, this information has to be read in conjunction with the developments of Lei Chiefdom, where it was reported that Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in March and then left the Chiefdom, leaving behind him some troops.

¹⁰⁰⁷ It is not specified who these Donsos bought their cartridges from in Guinea.



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RUF/AFRC forces continued further east and on 18 May 1998 attacked villages on the road leading to the headquarter town of Kamiendor (Mafindor Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC forces burnt many houses at Densenbadu, Fandu, Gbenkoro, Kamiendor Kormadu, Sandia and Gbendema, where the CDF base was also burnt down. At Fandu and Gbendema, an unspecified number of civilians were abducted. Following these attacks, the RUF/AFRC forces returned towards Koidu and the dislodged Donsos from Soa and Mafindor Chiefdoms went to Guinea.

Lei Chiefdom (east of the District, at the border with Guinea)

In February 1998, a convoy of RUF/AFRC forces with 18 vehicles and three trucks full of arms and ammunition arrived in Lei Chiefdom, in the east of Kono District. The RUF/AFRC forces attacked towns including Yarawadu, Wanjama, Senehun and Kenema before some of the senior commanders departed, leaving the bulk of the forces stationed at Konbayendeh, in the centre of the chiefdom on the road that leads to the headquarter town of Saima. At Senehun, located in the same section as Kissitown, RUF/AFRC forces killed four civilians coming out of the bush, including two children. One of the adults was killed with a bayonet.

While in Konbayendeh, the RUF/AFRC forces started raiding surrounding villages, indiscriminately killing and mutilating people and burning houses, as a result of which people left their villages to go to the bush. However, the RUF/AFRC forces also started chasing the civilians in the bush. In one incident that took place in a bush around Kissitown, over 20 members of the RUF/AFRC, all in military uniforms, found around 70 civilians in their hiding place, gathered them all and started killing them, shooting some and mutilating others with machetes. Realising that those RUF/AFRC forces were going to kill them all, the remaining nine civilians decided to run away. The RUF/AFRC forces opened fire, killing five. Before leaving, the RUF/AFRC forces took 11 girls with them.

In Kissitown, RUF/AFRC forces established a training camp for abducted civilians, called "Superman Camp". Civilians were trained, given weapons and sent out to different parts of the chiefdom and the District. Some senior members of the RUF/AFRC forces had once earlier warned their forces in Lei Chiefdom not to kill civilians but once they are captured, to bring them to the camp for them to be trained so that the number of their forces would increase, in anticipation of their planned attack on Freetown. On one occasion, 30 civilians who were abducted and trained for one week in the camp were sent to Boroma town, north of Kombayende, with 15 "old" RUF/AFRC forces, for it was reported that civilians were in this area. One young boy who was hiding in a garden threw a grenade at the RUF/AFRC forces who had come to the town. However, the young boy was captured and cut into seven different pieces; 13 other people were also killed. On their way back to the camp, the RUF/AFRC forces captured 100 civilians who were on their way to Guinea. Eighty of them were sent to Koidu for mining, some who tried to escape were killed and two women were amputated when they refused to have sexual intercourse with two of the RUF/AFRC members.

In March, inhabitants of Kenema, a town located in the east of the chiefdom, shouted "welcome back to Sierra Leone", referring to the news of the restoration to power of the President, when they saw a plane flying over their town. A few hours later, they saw civilians coming in the village with

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bundles on their heads, which led them to go in the bush. Shortly after, they heard gunshots from different directions in the village and saw the whole village being set on fire by RUF/AFRC forces. Other villages on the highway that leads to Siama, the headquarter town, were also set on fire. At Kombayende, five people were killed and two were amputated. On the same day, the RUF/AFRC forces proceeded further north to Kundundu in the north of the chiefdom, where eight people were shot dead and two had their legs amputated with an axe. Among the eight people who died, one had his tongue cut out with a knife. Another man was hit to death with a bayonet.

On 10 March, RUF/AFRC forces came back to Senehun, set fire to the houses that had not been burnt earlier and captured six people, one of them suspected of being a Kamajor commander. Three of those captives were killed with an AK47, one was beaten to death while another one had a blue rope tied around his neck and was dragged along the ground until he died. The sixth captive, who was suspected of being a Kamajor commander, was told by the RUF/AFRC commander that he was not yet dead because they did not know yet the kind of punishment they would give him. From Senehun, they went to Kenema, where they shot dead seven people before entering the town and captured a young man who tried to hide in a garden. One of the RUF/AFRC members was asked by the others to take a big stone and to smash the hands of the young captured man. Before leaving for another village called Samie, they burnt the remaining houses.¹⁰⁰⁸ At Samie, a man was shot three times in the head with an AK47 because he could not give the RUF/AFRC forces the location of the hiding place for the people of the village. The RUF/AFRC forces also poured petrol they found in the village on two thatch houses and set them on fire. The fire spread to other thatch houses and, eventually, 11 of them burnt down. As it was getting dark, the RUF/AFRC forces, together with the last captive they had, went back to Kombayende.¹⁰⁰⁹

After President Kabbah's restoration to power in March 1998, two points for killing people called "commaflag" were established in Kombayende, a commercial town. One of these points was located at the centre of the town and the other one on Mambo Bridge, the last bridge leading to Kissitown in the west. On one occasion,¹⁰¹⁰ the RUF/AFRC force commander who had established the commaflag system sent some members to arrest civilians in and around the town to check whether they were supporters of Tejan Kabbah Government. Thirty-one people were brought to the commaflag site. The commander addressed the captured people and told them that Lei Chiefdom was criticising their action, the proof being that people had fled to the bush. The commander called on one of his members, who had recently been promoted to Captain because he "knew how to kill people", to kill those who had been brought to the commaflag site. On that day, 10 of the captured people were shot before the operation was halted because it was getting dark. The remaining people were locked up in a room and brought back to the site the next morning. One of the captured men was given an AK47 and told to fire at one of the other captives. He did so and after one shot, the man died. Then, the commander gave the gun to another captive, but he needed three shots to kill another of the captives, so the commander told him that he had "failed the exam" and shot him.

¹⁰⁰⁸ It is highly likely that this event is related to the one described above when RUF/AFRC forces came to Kenema after people welcomed back the President.
¹⁰⁰⁹ On the way back, an unidentified fighting faction opened fire on them, which allowed the captive to escape.
¹⁰¹⁰ Although the date was not specified, it can be inferred from the record that this event happened between March and June.



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This operation continued until only eight of the captives had survived by “passing the test”. They were then recognised as Junta II¹⁰¹¹ and were forced to kill people at the commafag points. In another killing that took place at a commafag point, three out of eight people who had been abducted and sent to the Superman Camp at Kissitown for training were arrested as they were trying to escape. The abductees were brought to Kombayende and killed at the Mambo Bridge commafag, after which their bodies were thrown under the bridge.

When the commander in charge of Kombayende sent some of his men in search of food, those RUF/AFRC forces found nine people themselves were looking for food for their families. As the nine people did not answer the question of the commander of the group who asked them where he could find other civilians, the commander took the G3 rifle that was on his back and fired at two of the civilians, breaking their legs. As the people still refused to say anything, the commander killed the two wounded civilians. As the remaining seven civilians still refused to reveal where other people could be found, the commander amputated their hands with a rusty cutlass that the RUF/AFRC forces had found in the village. The RUF/AFRC forces then went to Soama, a few miles from the chiefdom headquarter of Siama, where they killed one man who refused to join them.

Rumours of imminent attacks in Guinea were rampant. However, no attack within the Guinean territory was reported for 1998 (nor 1999). It appeared that RUF/AFRC forces would have launched attacks on the Guinean territory earlier had they been larger in number, which they were unable to achieve since most of the civilians had already fled to refugee camps in Guinea.

On 8 April, RUF/AFRC forces moved from Kundundu and headed for Koidu Town. On their way, they passed by Kenema, where they hit an old man on his neck and his back with a bladed weapon for failing to take them to any civilian hiding places, as a result of which he died.¹⁰¹² Two other people were shot and killed at Kenema on that day. Before leaving for Koidu, the RUF/AFRC forces looted the village.

In April, seven men captured by RUF/AFRC forces in military uniforms in Sandor Chiefdom were taken to the Njai stream that separates Sandor and Lei Chiefdoms. Six of the men were tied with a blue plastic rope and were shot in the head. A heavy stone was then tied to each of them and they were thrown into the stream. The seventh person was not killed; the commander of the RUF/AFRC forces declared that he was not going to kill this person, because he was a Christian, as the commander himself was. Rather, the commander ordered one of his men to mutilate the man’s 10 fingers, as a result of which his left hand was broken.

RUF/AFRC forces returned to Kundundu towards the end of the month in search of food and civilians. Some of the people they found in the bush were killed while others were taken away for manpower. On 1 May, in the bush around Kenema, RUF/AFRC forces captured civilians, killing

¹⁰¹¹ Junta II refers to these people who were enrolled in the RUF/AFRC forces following the retreat from Freetown.

¹⁰¹² This incident is reported in another record to have taken place when RUF/AFRC reached Lei in February. As this information could not be reconciled, it has to be assumed that this event took place between February and April.



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two men with a bayonet, one of them being the Town Regent Chief. Those who were captured were told to form two lines, one for men and one for women and children. The commander told his men to choose a woman each for the night, himself selecting a girl who was 14 years old. Three women who refused to go with the armed men were stripped naked and sexually abused with gun barrels before being killed. RUF/AFRC forces settled temporarily in Kundundu.

At Faokor in the south of the chiefdom during the same period, RUF/AFRC forces beat to death a blacksmith allegedly because he was a Kamajor, because they had found two empty cartridge shells in his forge. Twenty-one people were also killed that day, one of them being beaten unconscious and burnt to ashes.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked Gbonkongbor a few miles from the Guinean border in the northeast of the chiefdom with heavy firing in May, during which eight civilians were killed and many people fled. The RUF/AFRC forces then sent young men to bring back the cattle and ordered six women to cook for them. After eating, they left the village with the six women and able-bodied men. On 8 June, another village near the Guinean border was attacked. Some civilians, including men and women, were captured while others were put in a house and burnt.

i) Events in the second half of 1998

Between June and the end of the year, very few incidents are reported.¹⁰¹³ At this time, most of the people of Kono District had fled to Guinea¹⁰¹⁴ or into the bush and a lot of them were forced to work for the RUF/AFRC forces in the mining areas.

In September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) and its environs. They raided the town and other villages, including civilian hiding places. Many civilians, including women and children, were killed and abducted during those attacks and Jagbwema was set on fire. As heavy bombardment could be heard, it was assumed that RPGs were used during those attacks, although it has since been revealed that RUF/AFRC forces had a tactic to produce sounds which are similar to those made by RPGs.¹⁰¹⁵ The Donsos went moved to that area to fight the RUF/AFRC forces and after firing few gunshots to test the strength of the Donsos, the RUF/AFRC forces intensified the shooting. As a result of the heavy shelling from both parties, 32 houses were burnt down.

Around the end of October, RUF/AFRC forces attacked and killed civilians at Tomboðu (Kamara Chiefdom) before being engaged by ECOMOG and CDF forces, which left 83 RUF/AFRC

¹⁰¹³ This period corresponds to the rainy season, during which heavy rains often paralyse movement. In Sierra Leone, the rainy season runs mostly from May to August.

¹⁰¹⁴ By April, around 90,000 civilians had crossed the border to Guinea since the start of the ECOMOG offensive against the RUF/AFRC in Kono and Kailahun Districts: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16 - 30 April 1998.

¹⁰¹⁵ RUF/AFRC forces used empty five-gallon containers, with their lids on, which they hit with a stick to emulate the sound of RPG fire.



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members dead. This attack on Tombodu took place in the aftermath of the passing of a death sentence on the RUF leader for treason.¹⁰¹⁶

On 5 November, RUF/AFRC forces reached Hindimi (Lei Chiefdom), where they found 62 people who had returned from Guinea to harvest their crops. The civilians were separated by gender and told to give the RUF/AFRC forces the produce of the harvest. As they were reluctant, the two first people of the line were shot and killed, which prompted the civilians to give them the 216 bags of rice they had harvested. Women were forced to cook for the RUF/AFRC forces. The following day, the RUF/AFRC forces left the village together with captives who were forced to carry the bags of rice; those bags they were unable to take, as there were not sufficient people to carry them, were burnt. When they arrived in Kombayende, the men were separated from the women; this was the last time they saw each other. The men were later taken to Koidu for mining. After mining during the day, they were locked in a container at night.

On 20 December 1998, a fierce attack was launched on Koidu by RUF/AFRC forces, who were able to dislodge the ECOMOG forces based there. This attack came from the bush and was planned from different directions. Prior to this attack, RUF/AFRC forces had regrouped in Buedu (Kailahun District), which was an RUF stronghold throughout the war, and moved with three to four battalions to Kono. RUF/AFRC forces were already in Kono District and another group of RUF/AFRC forces were deployed at Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom) to set an ambush for the retreating ECOMOG forces. Four days prior to this attack, RUF/AFRC forces had attacked Small Lebanon and dislodged ECOMOG forces; ECOMOG troops based at Koakuima, Motema and Bumpe were also dislodged. In Koidu and Koakuima, RUF/AFRC forces killed many ECOMOG and CDF forces, as well as civilians.¹⁰¹⁷ At Koakuima, the retreating ECOMOG forces left behind them a lot of arms and ammunition, which were captured by the RUF/AFRC forces. Retreating ECOMOG forces fell in the ambush staged by RUF/AFRC forces at Njaiama Sewafe and suffered heavy casualties.

RUF/AFRC forces then attacked the last ECOMOG battalion in the District, namely the 197th Battalion redeployed in Njaiama (Nimikoro Chiefdom).¹⁰¹⁸ After a fierce battle, ECOMOG repelled the RUF/AFRC forces and asked for reinforcements from Bo. However, the ECOMOG commander was instead advised to withdraw his troops from Njaiama. On 30 December, the ECOMOG commander left Nimikoro Chiefdom with CDF members and thousands of civilians, as ECOMOG did not want to leave the civilians in the hands of the RUF/AFRC forces. They took the road to Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District) in the south of Kono District. On their way, they fell into two ambushes laid by RUF/AFRC forces. After the first ambush,

¹⁰¹⁶ AFP, 26 October 1998.

¹⁰¹⁷ It cannot be inferred from the reports whether these forces were killed within the course of the battle or after being captured.

¹⁰¹⁸ Prior to this wave of attacks, this battalion was deployed at Njala and Wanjama (Nimikoro Chiefdom). When the ECOMOG position at Bumpe fell into the hands of the RUF/AFRC forces, the decision was taken to establish a blocking position at Njaiama, on the highway that leaves Bumpe to the south of the District: Adeshina, *op cit*, p 128.



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ECOMOG forces led the convoy, which allowed the RUF/AFRC forces to abduct hundreds of civilians from the rear end of the convoy during the second ambush.

Prior to this attack on Koidu, a number of troop movements were noted in the surrounding areas in Sandor Chiefdom and in Koinadugu District. In fact, in late November, RUF/AFRC forces retook control of Sandor Chiefdom and civilians at Yiffin (Koinadugu District) observed many ECOMOG forces retreating from Kono District.

At Yormandu, some RUF/AFRC forces told the civilians that were their captives that they would continue the fight until Freetown and that they got the necessary logistics, arms and ammunition from Kailahun District. Indeed, this attack on Koidu was the catalyst for the RUF/AFRC forces to proceed further south, capturing more towns in the District and the country¹⁰¹⁹ and to enter Freetown on 6 January 1999,¹⁰²⁰ using civilians from Gbane to carry their arms and ammunition.

Following the attack on Koidu, civilians and hunters decided to leave Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom) for Yiffin and Alikalia (Koinadugu District). However, they fell into an RUF/AFRC ambush on 28 December and a lot of them were captured. Over 170 of those captured were taken to Yiffin. One of the captured hunters was given a letter that requested the hunters to come out of the bush and join the RUF/AFRC forces. He was also told that if he did not convince the hunters to join them, he would be killed. The man saved his life by explaining that he only knew people in Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom). Some of the RUF/AFRC forces together with their captives thus headed for Kayima and on their way, four of the captives were killed for their belongings at Gbenekoro.¹⁰²¹

j) Events in 1999

On 1 January 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces that had killed four captives at Gbenekoro proceeded towards Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom), together with their remaining captives. On their way, the captives saw the body of somebody they knew and they learnt he was killed because he answered rudely to the RUF/AFRC forces. The captives were told to take orders from a child commander and were reminded that their lives were of no value for them. When they arrived at the RUF/AFRC forces' commander's compound, they saw one Fullah¹⁰²² man being killed for refusing to give up his sheep. They were introduced to the RUF/AFRC commander as his "slaves and servants" and were forced to do petty jobs, mainly going on food finding missions for the commander. A man was appointed to the G5 position, to look after the civilians' affairs/interests. A Formation Assembly was set up where every morning, civilians were told to pray and announcements for the rest of the day were made. The establishment of these G5 committees not only took place in Kono, but also in other Districts, as a means of rationalising the use of civilians by making them participate in administrative matters. Civilians appointed to such positions could hardly refuse the appointment,

¹⁰¹⁹ See the general overview and the analysis for Kailahun, Tonkolili, Bombali and Port Loko Districts and the Western Area.

¹⁰²⁰ See the factual analysis for Tonkolili, Makeni and Port Loko District and the Western Area.

¹⁰²¹ It could not be ascertained whether this place is to be found in Koinadugu or in Kono District.

¹⁰²² The Fullah are a tribe to be found in the north of the country and in Guinea. They would be particular targets of the RUF and, later, the RUF/AFRC during the war, as they were often healthy, earning money by raising and selling cattle.



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because a refusal would soon be followed by a severe flogging. In Sandor Chiefdom, civilians were required to follow rules imposed on them by the RUF/AFRC forces, which included no raping, no taking of civilian's property and no stealing ("Jar Jar").¹⁰²³

However, the establishment of such committees and the rationalisation of the use of civilians did not stop the harassment and violence continued to be committed against civilians. At Kayima, for example, sometime after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, civilians presented complaints to the top commander in charge at Koakuima. When they came from this meeting, they were threatened and were punished with flogging and being forced to go on food finding missions. The commander at Koakuima sent some RUF/AFRC members to investigate the matter, although the results and consequences of this investigation are unknown. Furthermore, five civilians were killed and burnt to ashes in a bush near Neakor, west of Kayima. Following this incident and a complaint made by a relative of one of the civilians killed, the commander at Kayima recalled that no one should kill civilian and if such a crime was committed, it should be reported to the G5.

On 10 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Punduru, a CDF stronghold in Nimiyama Chiefdom that was overcrowded with civilians. During this attack, both civilians and CDF were killed and their property was damaged.

From February 1999, hunters came in and out of Sandor Chiefdom from Guinea and made their permanent base in Fanema, near the border with Guinea, progressing towards the north of the chiefdom and retaking some areas from the RUF/AFRC forces. They were obtaining coffee and cocoa from the population in support for their activities, selling these items to the Guineans to buy ammunition or food. In one incident, RUF/AFRC forces came to Fanema looking for a famous hunter. They took all his belongings and brought his relatives back to Kayima, where they were molested, beaten and tied up before being released.

The abduction rate increased as people were used as diamond miners and were conscripted into the RUF/AFRC forces. At this time, Koakuima was the base for the RUF/AFRC 2nd Brigade and hosted the main office for the mining operations; it was also was the base for the Overall Mining Commander, who was assisted by a Deputy Mining Commander. Mining officers were appointed at the various mining sites. Every week, mining officers were to bring the diamonds collected at the sites to the Deputy Commander, who crosschecked them before handing them over to the Overall Mining Commander. However, diamonds over 5 carats were to be brought to the Overall Mining Commander at Koakuima as soon as they were discovered, without waiting for the weekly shipment. Every week, the diamonds were sent from Koakuima to Kailahun, from where they were sent to Liberia. Some private mining, mainly carried out for diamond dealers, was authorised by the Overall Mining Commander at the cost of Le 5,000 per week. However, diamonds over 5 carats were to be given to the Overall Mining Commander, as they were considered to be the property of the RUF.¹⁰²⁴

¹⁰²³ More details are required from the records on the G5 committees.

¹⁰²⁴ These diamonds were considered as "government property" as the RUF was considering itself as a government.



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At this time, the District was divided into operational areas under the command of a commanding officer. The training base established in Bunumbu (Luawa Chiefdom, Kailahun District) since 1998 and known as "Camp Lion" was transferred around January to Yengema (Nimikoto Chiefdom), as the centre of RUF/AFRC actions had moved to the north-west. On one occasion, six abductees, six adults and one child of a Small Boys Unit (SBU) escaped from the training base and tried to reach Koinadugu District but were caught and brought back to the base. The RUF Senior Officer in Charge of the Brigade Headquarters in Koakuima ordered these escapees to be killed. The six adults were shot and killed while the fate of the child soldier remains unknown. Hundreds of abductees from the Northern Province were sent to Yengema but as their number increased and as food supplies were not sufficient, the base was moved for three months to Gbendembu (Bombali District) before coming back to Yengema. Recruits were organised into platoons and young children as young as 10 were conscripted into Small Boy Units (SBUs).

A lot of beating, killing and rapes took place at the camp during the time of its operation. One practice carried out in the camp was called Halaka.¹⁰²⁵ A big circle, the size of a tennis court, was drawn on the ground with a smaller inner circle. The area between the two circles was full of obstacles such as barbed wires, drums and blocks. Recruits were to enter in this area and to find the exit located far from the entry, while the instructors located in the inner circle were beating them with sticks. Many civilians died from this practice.

In Lei Chiefdom, the rate of violations committed in 1998 continued and was very high after January 1999. Civilians were abducted to be trained as combatants, especially for the purpose of the upcoming attacks on Guinea. The commander in charge of Kombayende regularly sent his men to capture civilians to be trained as Junta II. A team went to Kissitown, where Superman Camp was located, but as they could not find anybody in the town, they went to the bush. There, they eventually found 160 people, who they brought to Kissitown for scrutiny.

Following those continuous developments, CDF members mobilised themselves; some of them were sent back to Guinea to bring back shotguns and they attacked the RUF/AFRC forces at Kissitown. After a three-hour battle, 15 civilians had lost their lives and the RUF/AFRC forces left the town with the civilians they had earlier abducted. Strengthened by this success, the CDF established a base at Gborgborma and successfully attacked the RUF/AFRC forces at Samie,¹⁰²⁶ where the RUF/AFRC forces fled the town leaving behind them most of their weapons. A few days after the CDF attack on Samie, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the chiefdom headquarter of Saiama, where they killed almost all the civilians they found in the town. After this attack on Saiama, the RUF/AFRC forces headed back for their base at Kombayende. On their way, they passed through a village called Kutima, where they found three bodies. As they continued their journey, they met three women who told them that men in military fatigues had attacked Kutima. The three women were then taken with the group, who used them as a shield anytime they entered a town. At Bomboro, some RUF/AFRC forces found one young woman with her baby. As she was caught trying to escape, they accused her of being a supporter of the President. They told her to throw her baby in a thatch house they had set on fire, warning her that she would be thrown in the fire as well

¹⁰²⁵ This term allegedly comes from Libya.

¹⁰²⁶ This village could also be Soama.



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if she did not do what they asked her to do. After she had thrown her baby into the burning house and she was asked to join the RUF/AFRC forces, she tried to escape and was shot in the head. The RUF/AFRC forces also attacked the CDF base at Gborgborma and dislodged the CDF members who went back to Guinea.

Teams put together to search for civilians, also called "Safari team" by the RUF, continued to be sent. On one occasion, a team came back with only 15 civilians. Three of them were women and were allocated to the RUF/AFRC forces who did not have any woman. Among the 12 other captives, three who tried to escape were brought to the commaflag located on the Mamba Bridge and were shot, their bodies thrown under the bridge. In another incident and after orders coming from Koidu told commanders in the different posts to conscript more civilians for planned attacks on Guinea, 152 civilians were captured in the bush and taken to Kombayende for scrutiny before being sent to Superman Camp. The able men and women were sent to Kissitown while the old people were brought to the commaflag in the centre of the town, at Baoya Road. All 21 of them were killed by the member of the RUF/AFRC who had been promoted to Captain because he knew how to kill. Their bodies were thrown in a very big hole previously dug by RUF/AFRC forces for this purpose. This was a common scenario, which was repeated many times.

In March 1999, an internal fight arose between RUF/AFRC forces as a group coming from Koidu entered Kombayende (Lei Chiefdom) with heavy firing. The members stationed in Kombayende fired in return. Sixteen civilians died during that fighting and 22 were seriously injured.¹⁰²⁷ Around this period, the identification of combatants was difficult but it is alleged that some AFRC members were integrated within the RUF movement and were briefed on the ideology of the movement. The senior officer in charge of the Brigade headquarters in Koakuima, who was also the Overall Mining Commander, was one of the most senior RUF members; most of the senior AFRC commanders were deployed in the Northern Province, in Kabala (Koinadugu District) and Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).¹⁰²⁸

On different occasions, civilians with amputated limbs arrived in refugee camps in Guinea and explained they had been attacked by RUF/AFRC forces in Lei Chiefdom. For example, one civilian had his left hand amputated when he was in Gbordu, a village nine miles from Siama. RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village and killed five people. The man who had his limb chopped off was accused of being a Kamajor and after he was amputated, he was given a message by the RUF/AFRC commander to deliver to the Kamajors and civilians living in Guinea that they should expect the coming of RUF/AFRC forces soon. On another occasion, one man was mutilated at Gborgborma;

¹⁰²⁷ It could not be ascertained what happened after this incident between the two RUF/AFRC groups.

¹⁰²⁸ Furthermore, unlike for Port Loko DDR, where ex-AFRC members disarmed as such, the DDR centre opened in Kono District received RUF and CDF members but no ex-AFRC members, which tend to reinforce our assumption that AFRC members who were in Kono District after the invasion of Freetown were incorporated within the RUF. However, as the distinction between the forces was difficult for civilians, we would continue referring to RUF/AFRC forces in the subsequent developments. Relations between RUF and AFRC forces were not totally sour, for in 1999, an AFRC member was appointed as personal bodyguard to the RUF leader when he was released from Prison.



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the RUF/AFRC forces who had amputated his limb told him that whoever was captured in this village would be treated as a Kamajor because the village used to be a Kamajor base.

Sometime before the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord, RUF/AFRC forces attacked a number of towns and villages in Kamara Chiefdom, including Sukudu and Peyima, killing many civilians and burning many houses. Over 200 civilians, including men, women and children, were abducted and the strongest men were used for mining. There was a food shortage at that time and what little food was available was taken by the RUF/AFRC forces. Civilians were relying mainly on roots (gari) and boiled bananas to survive. Several civilians, particularly those working in the mines, died from starvation. The same working conditions described earlier in 1998 prevailed and the same kind of corporal punishments were applied. Among others, one practice, which caused the death of 10 men in Tombodu (Tankoro Chiefdom), was called “hanging solar on the civilians”, which meant beating someone to death. Civilians caught trying to smuggle or steal diamonds were tortured or killed. It is believed that hundreds of men, women and children were killed during this period.

RUF/AFRC were occupying Fiama Chiefdom, setting ambushes for Donsos and civilians. Towns in Fiama Chiefdom, including Sandekor, Koakor, Waima, Njardu, Darkadu and Gbematambadu, were attacked and burnt down during 1999. Sometimes, the burning of different villages took place on the same day and at other times, RUF/AFRC forces decided to burn a certain number of houses per day. Rice barns were also set on fire after being looted.

RUF/AFRC forces were in control of Gbane Kandor and Mafindor Chiefdoms, which were virtually empty, as civilians had fled to the bush or to Guinea. However, people who fled came back to their chiefdoms from time to time in search of food. Attacks on villages are reported occasionally. For example, in April, as civilians were moving regularly between the bush around Sindadu, in the northeast of Gbane Kandor Chiefdom, and Guinea for food, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village and shot the hands of one civilian. In May, while searching food, RUF/AFRC forces from Mafindor Chiefdom shot a hunter who was captured in his house at Dengenyma. The hunter was caught by surprise in his house, his shotgun leaning on the wall.

During that period, Donsos forces reorganised in Guinea and launched an attack on the RUF/AFRC forces at Kamiendor (Mafindor Chiefdom). Both sides suffered fatalities, but the loss of men did not prevent the CDF from continuing to launch attacks, as a result of which they recaptured different villages in Gbane Kandor Chiefdom. Donsos freed some civilians that had been held captive by the RUF/AFRC forces and sent them to Guinea.

Following these attacks and the significant gains the Donsos were making, RUF/AFRC forces called for peace talks, which took place in July¹⁰²⁹ at Manjama (Soa Chiefdom). Over 3,000 civilians also attended the meeting. This meeting led to a ceasefire agreement, with the fighting factions agreeing that both civilians and combatants should move freely and that Manjama should serve as a buffer zone. For the purposes of freedom of movement, passes were issued to the civilians by the fighting forces. In August 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces even asked that joint security forces be formed to

¹⁰²⁹ This first meeting may have taken place in August, as reports mention both July and August for the date of this meeting.



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patrol the border area. It has been suggested that this system gave the RUF/AFRC forces the opportunity to bring their looted property to Manjama and to exchange it for other necessary items brought from Guinea by the Donsos. However in September, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Donsos positions, retaking all the areas the Donsos had held for the previous few months. The RUF/AFRC forces expanded their attacks beyond the borders of Sierra Leone, launching one attack at Gueckedou, one of the busiest commercial centres in Guinea.

After the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, the rate of violations decreased, even if molestation and other violations were still committed by RUF/AFRC forces, fearing that they would no longer be able to use civilians to carry out their mining activities and food finding operations. After July, it is reported that civilians were appointed to a G5 committee to look after civilian affairs in Kamara Chiefdom.¹⁰³⁰

The fighting with the RUF/AFRC forces in Sandor Chiefdom continued until the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999. However, the cessation of hostilities was only temporary and fighting resumed in 2000.

During the second half of the year, a mining area was opened by the RUF under the directive of the Overall Mining Commander near the bridge between Tombodu and Bundu II (Kamara Chiefdom). Many civilians were captured from across the whole District and forced to work in the mines. The captured civilians were working with barely any food or water and people were beaten or killed if they complained of hunger or thirst. On one occasion, three young men who defied instructions were killed, allegedly on the order of the Overall Mining Commander. On another occasion, 50 men were brought from Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom) to mine and it is believed that almost all of them died during the course of the mining.¹⁰³¹ Even foundations of houses were broken for the purposes of mining for diamonds.

In Sandor Chiefdom, different RUF/AFRC camps, known as Joe Bush, were operating and many violations were committed at those camps. At Tegbadu, four miles north of Yormandu where RUF/AFRC forces were still engaged mining, there was a "killing field". Nearby Tabema, on the Kayima Tefeyah highway, a camp also called "P.C. Ground" was infamous for the sexual violence inflicted on civilians. Many girls were raped and kept in the camp for sexual purposes. These women and girls were often sexually assaulted by more than one RUF/AFRC member at a time while some were taken and assigned to only one man.

On 20 October 1999, the Sierra Leone President officially launched the started of the Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program during a ceremony at Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown.¹⁰³²

¹⁰³⁰ Clarification is required from the records on the dates.

¹⁰³¹ It is believed that 95% of them died.

¹⁰³² The start of the DDR program was originally planned to take place within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999.



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In November 1999, near Jagbwema (Fiama chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces, who already had over 130 abducted civilians with them, captured an unspecified number of people. Those abductees were told to fetch water, firewood and food; one of them was given the responsibility to settle minor disputes among civilians. After three weeks, all the abductees were taken to Kailahun District, passing through Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom). Most of the journey was undertaken at night and civilians were not allowed to rest on their own volition. In Kailahun, there were over 1,000 members of the RUF/AFRC forces and a lot of abductees. Some of them were required to farm for the RUF/AFRC forces while others became teachers.

In December 1999, hunters who had found refuge in Guinea tried another time to repel the RUF/AFRC forces from Lei Chiefdom. With the support of local authorities also living in the refugee camps, they crossed the river that separates Sierra Leone and Guinea on 18 December, launched different attacks on RUF/AFRC positions and at Kombayende, they managed to inflict heavy casualties on the RUF/AFRC side and to chase out the remaining forces. However, eight days later, RUF/AFRC forces came back and this time, the CDF members were not able to withstand the heavy firing and had to retreat to Guinea. The CDF members who were captured were either killed or mutilated and given letters promising that they (RUF/AFRC forces) would chase them into Guinea.

k) Events in 2000 to 2001

Throughout 2000 and the large part of 2001, mining activities were carried out in Koidu Town and in Plant No. 11, a mining area located between Koidu Town and Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom). In Koidu Town, a place called Kaisambo was mined for the Overall Mining Commander. An unspecified number of houses in Koidu town had their foundations broken so that they could be mined. At Plant No. 11, more than 500 people were abducted and forced to mine and push caterpillars whenever they broke down.

On 14 January, the RUF leader, the Deputy Defence Minister and the ECOMOG Force Commander visited Koidu, as part of a country tour aiming at sensitising the combatants on the DDR process.¹⁰³³ Military Observers began conducting regular patrol missions in the District, although UN peacekeepers had not yet been able to deploy in the District.¹⁰³⁴ However, the situation in the country worsened and United Nations peacekeepers captured in Makeni in early May 2000 were brought to Plant No. 11 (Kamara Chiefdom).¹⁰³⁵

It was widely believed that the control by the Government of Kono District would mark the end of the conflict¹⁰³⁶ and talks were initiated between the President of Sierra Leone and the RUF to end

¹⁰³³ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 5 - 16 January 2000.

¹⁰³⁴ IRIN West Africa, 12 April 2000. On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council had adopted Resolution 1270 approving the deployment of 6,000 armed peacekeepers alongside the 260 unarmed military observers. Their number would increase over the subsequent months.

¹⁰³⁵ This group of UN peacekeepers was composed of 208 Zambians: IRIN West Africa, 8 May 2000. Around the same period, peacekeepers were also abducted in Kailahun District.

¹⁰³⁶ In early June, the Deputy Defence Minister called for an offensive military operation in the District: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report: 1-2 June 2000.



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the conflict, which faced a new development in May with the abduction of the UN peacekeepers, as mentioned, and the arrest and detention of the RUF leader in Freetown.¹⁰³⁷

Inhabitants of the District, however, began again crossing the Melie River, which separates the District from Guinea, fleeing RUF harassment.¹⁰³⁸ Around the same period, RUF/AFRC forces began attacking the Guinean territory from different fronts.¹⁰³⁹

The peace talks, which started in late May 2000 in order to reactivate the Lomé Peace Agreement found a conclusion in Abuja on 10 November with the signing of a ceasefire between the Government and the RUF forces. UNAMSIL was given the mission to monitor this ceasefire.¹⁰⁴⁰ However, in December 2000, civilians who had found refuge in a Guinean camp near the border with Lei Chiefdom saw thousands of civilians with bundles on their heads, who explained them that they had been attacked by “rebels” during their sleep.¹⁰⁴¹ The following day, another group of refugees within the territory of Guinea confirmed that the “rebels” had come to Guinea. The next morning, trucks full of RUF/AFRC forces dressed in military uniforms arrived at the place where all these refugees were at this time and announced through a microphone that they had not come to kill them but to take them back to Sierra Leone. Their commander told the civilians that they wanted peace and as a proof of their commitment to the peace process, they have come to take Sierra Leoneans back to Sierra Leone. Over 20,000 refugees were thus taken back to Sierra Leone while the RUF forces continued their attacks in Guinea. The trip to Lei Chiefdom lasted roughly 10 days and when they arrived at Kombayende (Lei Chiefdom), the civilians were allocated to different towns within the chiefdom.

At Kundundu, the returnees were forced to work for the RUF/AFRC forces and were told to plant cannabis seeds. A woman accused of performing witchcraft was stripped naked and shot six times. In another incident that took place at Yawandor, 22 miles from the headquarter town of Saiama, following the killing of two RUF/AFRC members and the wife of another member by civilians, 17 civilians were killed on the order of the commander based at Kombayende, so that the RUF/AFRC forces based at Yawandor could restore their authority. At Kombayende, the commander in charge was the same person who had established the commaflags in 1998.

During this time, RUF/AFRC forces continued to commit acts of violence against civilians. On one occasion, four RUF members raped a 42-year-old woman until she died. When the civilians took the matter to the commander in charge, he replied to them that the RUF never made complaints about the men they had lost during the war so the civilians should not complain. Two days after that

¹⁰³⁷ The RUF leader was arrested in Freetown in May, after his bodyguards had shot and killed civilians gathered for a demonstration in front of his house in Freetown on 8 May 2000.

¹⁰³⁸ IRIN West Africa, 23 August 2000.

¹⁰³⁹ Attacks on the Guinean territory were also launched from Kambia and Kailahun Districts.

¹⁰⁴⁰ UNAMSIL press briefing, 27 November 2000. Paragraph 4 of this Ceasefire Agreement stated “both parties agree that UNAMSIL shall have full liberty to deploy its troops and other personnel throughout Sierra Leone including the diamond-producing areas in the discharge of its responsibilities, when UNAMSIL is satisfied that the ceasefire is observed by all the parties.”

¹⁰⁴¹ In addition, during this period, the training base at Yengema (Nimikoro Chiefdom) was still open.



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incident, a suckling mother was raped and her child was taken away from her. A man accused of stealing was stripped naked and the commander ordered some of his men to set fire to an empty five gallon container and to drip the burning rubber onto the man. The man died three days later. Furthermore, some civilians were taken and sent to Koidu for mining.

In January 2001,¹⁰⁴² fighting between RUF/AFRC forces and hunters intensified in the upper part of Sandor Chiefdom. However, UN personnel and commanders together with the Paramount Chief of Sandor arrived in Kayima by helicopter to exhort both factions to disarm. The RUF/AFRC forces who spoke with those authorities responded positively and stated they were ready to disarm.¹⁰⁴³ However, about one month after this visit, fighting intensified north of Kayima¹⁰⁴⁴ and as they were retreating south, RUF/AFRC forces burnt the remaining houses in the villages. After a battle at Yaryah, three miles north of Kayima, the RUF/AFRC forces decided to leave the chiefdom and headed for Koidu.

In Fiama Chiefdom, in March 2001, one man on his way to Jegbwema met civilians who told him that 50 men had been abducted and used to work for the RUF/AFRC forces at Jegbwema. Women were used to cook and for sexual purposes, as a result of which some of them became pregnant and had children. Sometimes, the captured civilians were beaten at night and put in containers used as cells by the RUF/AFRC forces. One man brought from the Guinean border was suspected of being a Kamajor and was beaten for three days by RUF/AFRC forces at Jegbwema before he died on the fourth day. At Gbekor, a man met more than 12 young girls below the age of 18 who were with the RUF/AFRC forces as their "wives". As he was wondering whether these girls were with the RUF/AFRC forces for their stolen property and money, he discovered that most of them had been abducted and were afraid to go back to their parents for fear of being called "rebels" or being maltreated.

Three days after they had arrived in Kombayende, 150 men who had just come back were taken by the commander to go to Guinea with some RUF members to carry the stolen property they had in Guinea. Shortly after, the Guinean Minister of Defence and some senior military officers came to the border with Sierra Leone to find members of the Kamajors to help Guinea repel the RUF beyond the Guinean border. The Kamajors told the Guinean authorities that they could not fight without the approval of the Sierra Leone Government, as they were under the control of the Sierra Leone Government. Two weeks later, the Guinean authorities came back, told the Kamajors that they had communicated with the Sierra Leone authorities, who approved their request. Kamajors were then equipped with arms and ammunition from the Guinean authorities.

Following this, on 23 March 2001, a group of 200 Donsos and Kamajors who had regrouped and were fully armed¹⁰⁴⁵ launched simultaneous attacks on RUF/AFRC positions in Kono District

¹⁰⁴² Although this event was described as taking place in 2000, it probably took place in 2001.

¹⁰⁴³ This visit probably took place during the second half of 2000.

¹⁰⁴⁴ The CDF members fighting were those coming from the north of the Chiefdom.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Reports mention that these CDF forces had heavy artillery like tanks and that a ferry was built across the Meli River that separates Mafiendor Chiefdom and Guinea to facilitate the movement of the CDF.



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through three different flanks: Gbangbokoro¹⁰⁴⁶ in Soa Chiefdom (Kamajors/Donsos), Kamiendor in Mafindor Chiefdom (Donsos) and Kailahun District (Kamajors). Communication sets allowed the three groups to launch attacks simultaneously and to communicate any developments.

The group that headed to Kamiendor drove out the RUF/AFRC forces before separating into two groups, one going to Kombayende and the other using the Kondewakoro flank and working in concert. These two sub groups regrouped later on in Fiama Chiefdom. From Kamiendor, the group heading to Kombayende dislodged RUF/AFRC forces from Sindudu, which is located on the border between Gbane Kandor and Mafiendor Chiefdoms. As the commander in charge of the RUF forces in Kombayende noticed the advance of the CDF, he sent for reinforcements to Koidu, which was still under RUF/AFRC control. The reinforcement was composed of senior RUF commanders, who moved to Kombayende armed with anti-aircraft machine guns, RPGs, automatic rifles and other weapons seized from the UN peacekeepers. When they entered the town, the CDF forces opened fire and killed 32 of them. After a fierce battle, the RUF/AFRC retreated back to Koidu, as most of their senior commanders had been killed. The CDF chased them up to Jagbwema (Niama Chiefdom), where a battle took place. The RUF/AFRC then retreated to Maiyor, which is on the highway linking Jagbwema to Koidu.

In late April, the Acting Force Commander of UNAMSIL made a visit to Koidu to assess the situation on the ground, following RUF complaints about attacks carried out by CDF members backed up by Guineans.¹⁰⁴⁷ The CDF prepared themselves to go to Koidu, but in the meanwhile,¹⁰⁴⁸ in May, trucks full of UN peacekeepers came to the CDF deployment to advise them not to make any further assault on RUF/AFRC positions and to observe the cease-fire.¹⁰⁴⁹ The CDF told the peacekeepers that they would only observe the cease-fire after they had seen their Paramount Chiefs. About one week later, Paramount Chiefs and senior UN officials came by helicopter to meet the CDF and the Paramount Chiefs told the CDF that they did not want the Government to accuse the people of Kono of destroying the peace process. This meeting caused the CDF to desist from launching any more attacks and to stay in Maiyor until disarmament¹⁰⁵⁰ took place.

On 4 May 2001, a meeting was convened between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone¹⁰⁵¹ to review the ceasefire signed in Abuja in November 2000 and which was violated, mainly in Kono

¹⁰⁴⁶ Gbangbokoro is on the border with Guinea.

¹⁰⁴⁷ UNAMSIL press briefing, 26 April 2001.

¹⁰⁴⁸ It is alleged that a member of the RUF General Staff went to Makeni to find the UN Bangladeshi contingent to ask them to come to Kono to resolve the situation.

¹⁰⁴⁹ UN peacekeepers from Tonkolili and Kailahun Districts carried out two-day patrol missions in early May prior to the establishment of a permanent patrol presence patrol in Koidu in late May: UNAMSIL press briefings, 6 May 2001, 11 May 2001 and 22 May 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁰ The other CDF group that entered Kono District through Soa Chiefdom met this group at Jagbwema.

¹⁰⁵¹ This meeting was the second meeting of the Committee of Six of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, the United Nations, the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front: UNAMSIL press briefing, 3 May 2001.



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District.¹⁰⁵² Further to this meeting, it was decided to introduce phases of disarmament, in order to accelerate its process.

Also in May, UNAMSIL Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander visited the RUF forces at Koidu and the CDF members at Kombayende (Lei Chiefdom) and Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom), to witness the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement, signed by the RUF and the CDF on 15 May.¹⁰⁵³ This cessation of hostilities and the start of the DDR program made the atmosphere extremely tense and many officials made visits in the District to ensure the process ran smoothly.¹⁰⁵⁴

During the second meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR held at Magburaka on 2 June, the parties agreed to conduct the DDR process simultaneously in Bonthé and Kono Districts in July 2001, leaving time for the DDR facilities to be built in Yengema (Nimikoro Chiefdom). The estimated numbers of combatants to be disarmed were 1,500 combatants for the CDF and 2,500 for the RUF.¹⁰⁵⁵

Disarmament started on 1 July at a very slow pace and was intermittently halted. Different reasons were put forward to explain the stalling of the process, including the suspicion of both the CDF and the RUF forces against each other, the UN travel ban on the RUF's Political and Peace Council Chairman and, above all, tensions resulting from the mining activities.¹⁰⁵⁶ To speed up the disarmament process, UN Officials met directly with the commanders of both fighting factions on the ground, rather than with the political leaders¹⁰⁵⁷ and during the third meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR on 17 July, the parties agreed that the checkpoints established by the RUF and CDF forces be dismantled and a moratorium on mining activities be implemented.¹⁰⁵⁸ Nevertheless, skirmishes between RUF and CDF were still reported for June and July.¹⁰⁵⁹ By the end of July, two companies of the UN Bangladeshi contingent were deployed at Koidu and 500 Pakistani UN peacekeepers were based at Yengema.¹⁰⁶⁰

The initial target date of 28 July for the completion of the disarmament process was not met and the process was extended, as pockets of RUF forces were still not disarmed in the District. By 17 August, the disarmament for Kono District was complete and the figures of the combatants who

¹⁰⁵² Further to the meeting in May 2001, those parties would hold monthly tripartite meetings under the Joint Committee on DDR.

¹⁰⁵³ UNAMSIL press briefings, 17 May 2001, 24 May 2001

¹⁰⁵⁴ On 25 and 26 May 2001, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, accompanied by the UNAMSIL Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander and a Government delegation, including the Deputy Defence Minister met with representatives of the CDF and RUF in Koidu: UNAMSIL press briefing, 28 May 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁵ UNAMSIL press briefing, 5 June 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁶ UNAMSIL press briefing, 6 July 2001 and 13 July 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁷ IRIN West Africa, 12 July 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁸ IRIN West Africa, 20 July 2001; UNAMSIL press briefing, 20 July 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁹ IRIN West Africa, 24 July 2001.

¹⁰⁶⁰ UNAMSIL press briefing, 24 July 2001.



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had gone through the process were higher than originally expected, mainly for RUF members came from Koinadugu District to Kono District to disarm.¹⁰⁶¹

The completion of the disarmament in Kono District brought relief to the whole country, as it meant the war was really over. As a mark of the importance of this achievement for the country, the Sierra Leonean President, the Nigerian President and the Chairman of the ECOWAS went to Kono on 3 September, to witness the official end of the disarmament process.¹⁰⁶²

RUF forces, however, continued to mine in the Koidu area, including indiscriminate mining carried out in the centre of the township. Some incidents of violence against civilians are reported during that period.¹⁰⁶³ In one incident, one civilian went back to Koidu from Freetown to assess the level of destruction of his property. As he reached his house, he met 20 people busy mining the soil underneath his house. When he asked them to stop, one commander at the site told his boys to arrest him and tie him up. He ordered four of his men to hang four solars on the man as he had interrupted the mining activities, which means that four people will beat the person. On another occasion, the Overall Mining Commander ordered civilians to be arrested, so that they could wash gravel at mining areas. One of these civilians was accused of stealing a diamond and when a young RUF member reported that the man had swallowed the diamond, the Overall Mining Commander ordered his men to hang ten solars on the man. After the beating, the man admitted he had taken a diamond but had swallowed it. The Overall Mining Commander ordered his men to kill the man and get the diamond out of the stomach. However, nothing was found in the stomach of the dead man, which made the Overall Mining Commander say that the boy who made the report let him kill a man for no just cause. As a result, the Overall Mining Commander shot the young member three times in the chest, killing him.

This situation of continuous mining activities angered the residents of Koidu. They reported the matter to UNAMSIL, who explained that it would be solved in due time. Nevertheless, on 18 December 2001, residents from Koidu took slings and machetes to fight the RUF/AFRC forces. A lot of the residents then left the District for other Districts (Bombali and Tonkolili) as they believed some of the RUF/AFRC forces would never give up the privileges they got from the mining areas, namely control on the mineral wealth and taxes levied on traders. Following this mass exodus of the population, a meeting took place¹⁰⁶⁴ in Makeni at the headquarters of the UN Nigerian contingent with leaders of the RUF forces and a delegation from Kono authorities. On 27 December, an important delegation composed of Northern Paramount Chiefs, the UNAMSIL Acting Force Commander, officers of the Sierra Leone Police and other people arrived in Koidu and summoned a

¹⁰⁶¹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 August 2001. As of 31 August 2001, 5,634 combatants had disarmed in the District, 3,623 being RUF members and 2,011 CDF members: UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 August 2001 and Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 09 - 31 August 2001.

¹⁰⁶² IRIN West Africa, 3 September 2001.

¹⁰⁶³ In its Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 09 - 31 August 2001, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), based on information from Sierra Leone Web reports, reported on the ongoing use of child labour by the RUF for mining activities.

¹⁰⁶⁴ It is alleged that this meeting took place to clear the rumour that the incident of the previous day was carried out on tribal lines on the pretext that Temnes, Limbas and Mendes were being killed in Kono.



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meeting of stakeholders at the UNAMSIL headquarters. An agreement to put an end to the RUF mining activities in the District was signed and apparently implemented.

3. Conclusion

As with the two other Districts of the Eastern Province, Kono District was affected by the conflict since 1991 until the disarmament was declared complete in 2001. This 11-year conflict transformed the face of the District, which suffered heavily in terms of casualties, displacement of population and destruction of dwellings.

The District was first attacked in 1991 by RUF/NPFL forces coming from Kailahun District but those attacks were limited to the south-east, at the border with Kailahun District. During the following year, RUF/NPFL intensified their incursions into the District and progressively expanded their positions to attack Koidu, the headquarter town, by the end of 1992. SLA forces repelled the RUF/NPFL forces from Koidu at the beginning of 1993 and continued their “mopping up” operations throughout the year. By the middle of the year, they had dislodged the RUF/NPFL forces from their main positions in the District. Around the same period, SLA forces had confined the RUF/NPFL forces to the extreme east of Kailahun District, which led Sierra Leoneans to think the war was over and the NPRC Chairman to unilaterally declare a ceasefire.

In late December, however, RUF forces launched a massive operation in the south of Kenema District. This operation clearly marked a new phase of the conflict, during which RUF forces spread across the whole country, using guerrilla warfare tactics. RUF forces re-entered Kono District in 1994 and gradually gained territory on SLA forces, whose number had considerably increased over 1994 but whose actions aimed at repelling the RUF forces had proved wholly ineffective. By April 1995, RUF forces captured Koidu Town for the second time, inflicting high casualties on civilians and destroying and vandalising the town. From Koidu, RUF forces spanned out mainly in the diamond areas around Koidu. Their progression in the District and their mining activities were stalled around May/June by the SLA assisted by CDF forces and, above all, by Executive Outcomes, the South African mercenary company in Sierra Leone under contract with the Government. The RUF forces were rapidly driven out of their positions and throughout the rest of the year and 1996, were mainly confined to the south-east of the District, while Executive Outcomes controlled most of the remainder of the District.

Following the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes by the end of January 1997, the Kono population was left in the hands of the RUF forces, in particular following their merging with the AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces, although mainly concentrated around Koidu, patrolled the chiefdoms, harassing civilians for food items and abducting civilians who were then forced to work at the mine sites for the RUF/AFRC forces. As the harassment and physical violence against civilians increased, youths and CDF members fought the RUF/AFRC forces in Koidu and recaptured the town early 1998.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces retreated into the Provinces and reached Kono District in late February 1998. They rapidly retook Kono and spread across the whole District, carrying out the “Operation No Living Thing”. The rate of physical violence, mutilation, rape, killing, abductions for conscription, use as forced labour or for sexual purpose and



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the destruction of property reached unprecedented levels. This period, running from February to May/June, was characterised as the “reign of terror”. Although RUF/AFRC forces were also deployed across the Northern Province, where they carried out the same actions, Kono District suffered the most from this “Operation No Living Thing”, as RUF/AFRC forces clearly concentrated their operations on the main mining area. ECOMOG operations continued in the Provinces and by April 1998, ECOMOG forces had reached Kono District and recaptured the towns previously under RUF/AFRC control. RUF/AFRC forces continued their actions from the bush and abducted more civilians to conscript and train them in the new camp they had opened in the east of the District or to use them in the mining sites.

Violence began decreasing by June 1998. Around this period, hundreds of thousands of civilians had fled the District and RUF/AFRC forces were mainly engaged in large-scale mining operations. In late December, however, the RUF/AFRC regrouped and launched a massive operation on Koidu and other main towns in the west of the District, dislodging the ECOMOG forces from all their positions. The capture of Kono was the first step of a wider action, which reached its conclusion in the invasion of Freetown in January 1999.

Following the invasion of Freetown in January 1999, negotiations started between the Sierra Leonean President and the RUF leader in order to put an end to the conflict: A ceasefire was signed in May and a Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. This agreement did not end the conflict, as RUF/AFRC expanded their positions in the Northern Province and continued to be present in Kono District. RUF/AFRC forces pursued their mining activities in the District and violence was still inflicted on civilians. Local hunters in the north and the east of the District increased their attacks on RUF/AFRC forces but were often defeated. From 1999, however, the conflict got a new face, as it appeared RUF/AFRC forces planned to launch attacks onto the Guinean territory.

The number of civilians abducted and trained, in particular in “superman camp” in the east of the District clearly indicated that RUF/AFRC forces were preparing attacks onto the Guinean territory. Attacks on Guinea were launched in May 2000 and reached their peak in September. These attacks onto the Guinean territory were not isolated, for Guinea was also attacked from Kailahun and Kambia Districts.

In 2001, the CDF, backed up by Guinean authorities, engaged and defeated the RUF forces in the east of the country. They were halted in their progression through the intervention of Kono authorities and UN officials, in a bid to enforce the ceasefire renewed in Abuja. The disarmament process began shortly afterwards, an agreement to end illegal mining was reached and the war was officially over in the District by the end of 2001.



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E. Southern Province

a. Bo District

1. Introduction

Bo District is one of the four Districts composing the Southern Province together with Pujehun, Bonthe and Moyamba Districts. Its headquarter town, Bo Town, lies in its centre in Kakua Chiefdom. It is strategically located at a nodal crossroad, from which roads extend into the District in four directions.

Bordered on the east by Kenema District and in the south by Pujehun District, almost all the incursions would come from this direction following an east-west pattern. Its northern chiefdom, Valunia, shares a boundary with the central District of Tonkolili. Moyamba District on the north and Bonthe District on the south constitute its western edge.

There are 15 chiefdoms in the District:

<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarter</u>
Badjia	Ngelehun
Bagbe	Ngarlu
Bagbo	Jimi
Baoma	Baoma
Bumpeh	Bumpeh
Gbo	Gbo
Jiama Bongor	Telu
Kakua	Bo
Komboya	Njala
Lugbu	Sumbuya
Niawa Lenga	Nengbema
Selenga	Dambala
Tikonko	Tikonko
Valunia	Mongere
Wunde	Gboyama

Two roads leading to Bo Town allow its penetration from Pujehun Town, the principal road passing by Wunde Chiefdom and the secondary road passing by Bagbo Chiefdom. It was the secondary road that would find favour with the RUF/NPFL forces, who entered the District from Pujehun District in 1991. The main road in the District is the highway that links Freetown with Kenema Town. This feature would influence the conduct of the conflict, as it would be the setting of many ambushes and checkpoints. The relatively large number of roads accessible by vehicle would allow further RUF advances inland towards the Districts of Moyamba and Bonthe, even if the headquarter town, Bo Town on the Freetown-Kenema highway, would not be captured by RUF forces.

The Sewa River that flows from the south-west to the east, following one-third of the border with Kenema District, divides the District in two and would be the natural separation between the chiefdoms affected by the conflict during its first years.



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As Bo Town is the second largest city in Sierra Leone, trading and business are among the main activities of the District, as well as mining, particularly diamond mining in Jiama Bongor, Baoma, Tikonko and Lugbu Chiefdoms and cash crops such as rice, cocoa, coffee and palm oil. The mining production has however to be considered in the context of the whole country and in this regard, the production of the District comes rather far behind Kono District and the North of Kenema District.

The absence of external borders would make the District a safer haven for the inhabitants of Pujehun District, at least during the first years of the conflict, and different camps, often made of bush sticks and mud and hosting thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from others Districts, would be built in Bo District. Gondama (in the south of Kakua Chiefdom), at the junction between different chiefdoms, would host such a camp and would be severely affected during the conflict. Koribondo would be a strategic town during the conflict, due to its location at a crossroad between two strategic roads, the first running west-east and linking Bonthe District to Kenema District and the second running south-north and linking Pujehun District to Bo Town.

The main ethnic group is the Mende, renowned, among other things, for the importance of the traditional hunters in the society. Accordingly, the initiation of Kamajors, which had started in the Southern District of Bonthe, soon spread throughout Bo District, which would become a Kamajor stronghold.

Three different phases of the conflict can be clearly identified in Bo District. The first phase encompassed 1991 to 1993 and was characterised by the spreading of the RUF/NPFL forces from Pujehun District. However, only a few chiefdoms closest to Pujehun District were affected at this time, namely Bagbo, Lugbu, Jiama Bongor and Tikonko Chiefdoms. RUF/NPFL forces followed the same pattern when entering a village: they would gather people in the centre of the village, introduce themselves as "freedom fighters" coming to redeem them from the APC regime; some members would stay in the villages while others would proceed further. Physical violence, killing, abductions, the taking of property - especially food - and the burning of houses were reported from the very first incursion. Starting in June 1991, the SLA forces based in Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) and assisted by foreign troops contained these first attacks, repelled the RUF/NPFL forces from the District and patrolled in the areas previously under RUF/NPFL control, chasing "rebel" collaborators and encouraging the formation of vigilante groups. RUF/NPFL forces would later make sporadic raids in the District but did not settle in the District during this first stage.

The second phase spanned from 1994 to 1995, during which time the RUF had spread throughout the entire District. This phase saw the beginning of the organisation of youths and local hunters fighting alongside the SLA, although no formal initiations took place at this time. By the middle of 1995, SLA forces had retaken control of a large area south of Bo Town, although RUF forces still made repeated incursions and attacks, mainly in the chiefdoms on the east bank of the Sewa River and along the border with Kenema District. During this second phase, a lot of civilians were maltreated, killed, raped and abducted, a lot of houses were burnt, especially along the Kenema border, and property was taken away. These incidents were carried out mostly by RUF forces but by



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SLA forces as well. During this stage, the Freetown-Bo-Kenema highway was the setting of many ambushes, though the precise identity of the faction responsible could not always be ascertained.

The final phase ran from late 1995 to the end of the war, during which time the Kamajors were formally initiated and spread across the District. Although they initially fought alongside the SLA, their collaboration soon deteriorated and was almost nonexistent by the time of the Coup in May 1997. Fighting between those forces were reported and some SLA forces were suspected of collaborating with the RUF. The Kamajors nonetheless gained control of almost all the previous RUF strongholds in the District and during the AFRC regime, RUF/AFRC forces were only based in Koribondo and Bo Town. Following the ECOMOG deployment in the District in late February-early March 1998, no further RUF/AFRC incursion were reported, the District remaining under the Kamajors control who however harassed civilians, chasing, inflicting physical violence and killing people they suspected of being "Junta" and RUF collaborators.

2. Factual Analysis

a) Phase I: 1991 – 1993

RUF/NPFL forces entered the District in April 1991 through Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in the south-west of Bo District. These forces arrived first in Bagbo Chiefdom, where they scattered throughout April, May and June. They reached Lugbu Chiefdom in June, where they stayed for some months before being repelled by SLA forces.

On or around 24 April 1991, RUF/NPFL forces coming from the RUF base in Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) known as "Kuwait" arrived in the headquarter town of Jimi (in the east of Bagbo Chiefdom), 42 miles south-west of Bo. The RUF/NPFL forces fired their weapons¹⁰⁶⁵ and gathered the people of the town for a meeting in the Court Barrie. At this meeting, they identified themselves as fighters from Liberia, trained in Burkina Faso and fighting for their leader to liberate the people of Sierra Leone. The RUF/NPFL forces gave the people of the village palm fronds as symbols of the revolution¹⁰⁶⁶ and warned them that if they ran, they would be deemed an "enemy" and shot. They took all the Paramount Chief's belongings, including his car, claiming he was an "APC chief". While there are no reported fatalities, they abducted the Paramount Chief's staff and recruited some 82 people, including young children.¹⁰⁶⁷

The RUF/NPFL forces remained in Jimi for approximately one week, after which the forces split into three groups. One group remained in Jimi and the second group headed north west towards Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom). On the way, at Mani Junction (Bagbo Chiefdom), this group split into two, with one group continuing on their way to Sumbuya and another group heading south for Bum Chiefdom in Bonthe District. The third group headed north-east in a push towards Niagorihun, passing successively through Limba and Levuma. Niagorihun occupies the strategic position of

¹⁰⁶⁵ The RUF/NPFL forces were armed with mortar bombs, AK47 rifles, Berettas, LMG, GPMG and grenades.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Palm fronds and leaves were considered to be a symbol of the SLPP (Sierra Leone People' Party), the opponent to the then APC regime of J.S. Momoh. Reports from Kenema also mentioned RUF/NPFL forces coming to the District with palm leaves round their wrists.

¹⁰⁶⁷ No mention is made of what happened to the staff of the Chief nor whether they were included in the 82 people abducted at this time.



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junction town on the road leading to Sumbuya, the commercial centre and headquarter town of Lugbu Chiefdom, and the road coming from Jimi, from where movement between the north-east to the south-west could be controlled.

The second group, who went to Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom), stopped at Mani Junction in Momajoe on the way, where they encamped all the civilians at Lavekee compound and conscripted 85 boys and girls. In their address to the people, they made it clear that nobody should run in their presence or they would be classed as an "enemy" and would be shot on sight. Furthermore, the RUF/NPFL stated that they came more for the Fullahs and the Lebanese, who - according to them - contributed to the suffering of the masses.¹⁰⁶⁸ Thus, one Fullah businessman was tied to a stick and people were told to guard him until their return, under threat of indiscriminate killing in the area if anyone let him go.

Before leaving, they warned the population to have livestock ready for them when they passed through on their way back. They then split into two groups and left, one group going towards Bonthe District and the other continuing on their way to Sumbuya. Near Sumbuya, one young man was shot because he started running away when he saw the forces coming. One Lebanese businessman was killed at the wharf, another one was shot dead for refusing to open his store and four Lebanese people were abducted. The RUF/NPFL commander ordered his forces to take property from the town, including hundreds of bags of rice, many bags of onions, sugar and other items, including vehicles. All the property was taken back to Jimi by the young boys and girls who had been abducted when they had first arrived, some of whom were taken for training.

On their way back, the RUF/NPFL forces stopped in Momajoe and brought the man who had been tied up since they left before the assembled town, at which time the commander of the RUF/NPFL forces shot and killed him. They forced some of the townspeople to bury the body, which had started to cause panic among the inhabitants. While in Momajoe, the group that had gone to Bonthe District returned with property, including motorbikes, they had taken from the rice mill at Torma (Bum Chiefdom). They then left Momajoe and went back to Jimi with the property they had taken from Sumbuya and from Torma, some of which was then taken to the RUF base called "Kuwait" in Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District).

The third group, who were heading north-east, continued along the road to Limba, passing through Manjama on the way, where they burnt down a number of houses. On their arrival in Limba, the RUF/NPFL forces gathered the people of the town for a meeting, in which they introduced themselves as trained Liberian mercenaries who had come to put down the APC regime. After this brief meeting, they continued on to Levuma, north of Limba, and later to Niagorihun Gateway, 7 miles north of Jimi, the meeting point of the main road to Sahn Malen and Sumbuya Lugbu Chiefdoms.

On 12 May 1991, SLA and the United Liberation Movement for Liberia (ULIMO) forces stationed in Koribondo (in the south of Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) were deployed to Niagorihun to prevent the

¹⁰⁶⁸ The Fullah are one of the ethnic groups from Sierra Leone and were a particular target, as its members were known to be wealthy businessmen.



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RUF/NPFL forces from taking control of the town, which was successful. The RUF/NPFL forces made approximately four other attempts to take the town, returning each time to Jimi and passing through Limba on the way to Niagorihun, but each time they were repelled by the combined SLA and ULIMO forces. During the successive battles, both sides suffered heavy fatalities, including one of the RUF/NPFL commanders,¹⁰⁶⁹ and houses were burnt down as a result of the shelling.¹⁰⁷⁰ After their final attempt, they went back to Jimi and went on raiding missions in different towns in the chiefdom, taking what food they could find.

As a result of these battles, SLA and ULIMO forces based in Niagorihun began to move down the road towards Jimi, first taking control of Levuma and then moving on to Limba, where they established a base. The SLA and ULIMO forces, who were under SLA command, held a town meeting in the Court Barrie at which they established a curfew, set restrictions on people's movements and seized all the weapons in the town. During the following month, the SLA and ULIMO forces remained in Limba, from where they undertook covert reconnaissance missions to establish the extent of the RUF/NPFL strength in Jimi. They also went on food finding missions in nearby towns, which resulted in some skirmishes between SLA/ULIMO forces and RUF/NPFL forces.

On or around 16 June 1991, SLA and ULIMO forces launched a successful offensive with up to 250 troops to retake control of Jimi. During the battle in Jimi, the SLA and ULIMO forces killed six civilians who they believed to be "rebel" collaborators. RUF/NPFL forces coming from the direction of Pujehun District attempted several times to recapture Jimi but were unsuccessful. During these attempts, at least one house was burnt down as a result of the shelling, but no fatalities are reported. After they had recaptured Jimi, SLA forces maltreated civilians and hunted RUF collaborators. A number of people were killed because they were suspected of being "rebel" collaborators or because they came from "rebel-held" villages, although no investigations appear to have been held. Civilians who dealt with or hosted any RUF/NPFL forces, whether willingly or unwillingly, were tied up, beaten, made to look at the sun and, in some instances, killed.

In late June 1991, SLA forces launched a counter-attack to take control of Mano (Bagbo Chiefdom), which resulted in half of the town being occupied by the SLA forces and the other half of the town being occupied by the RUF/NPFL forces, although the exact dividing lines are not clear. Civilians in the town became the victims of both sides as each of the fighting factions accused them of aiding and abetting the other faction. Thus the SLA forces killed one boy, beat up the Town Chief and burnt down up to 45 houses. In return, the RUF/NPFL forces burnt down the remaining houses, killed 15 people and mutilated others.¹⁰⁷¹ Around this time, RUF/NPFL forces also attacked Sonehun Gola and Mano, west of Jimi on the way to Momajoe/Mani Junction. In Sonehun Golan, RUF/NPFL forces killed 10 people and in Mano, they killed two people and burnt down four houses.

¹⁰⁶⁹ It is reported that there were no civilian fatalities at this time.

¹⁰⁷⁰ It appears that the houses were not deliberately targeted, but were burnt down as an indirect result of the shelling.

¹⁰⁷¹ The records report that the people who were mutilated were "taken to Matru Jong or Bo for treatment", although it is not clear what this means.



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At the same time, SLA forces passed through Momajoe on the way to Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom), where they remained for around two weeks, trying to assess the extent of territory controlled by the RUF/NPFL. At the beginning of July 1991, SLA forces regained control of Momajoe/Mani Junction, and were also established in Kasseh and Sumbuya. Sumbuya was an economic and trading centre and people were moving south of Sumbuya to buy food and other items, bringing them back to Sumbuya to trade. However, the SLA commander was uncomfortable with this movement of people, so people coming to Sumbuya from the south were considered to be “enemies” and were molested or put in cells for some days. This may in part be due to an incident that occurred on or around 10 July 1991: a military truck had an accident, which resulted in one SLA member falling off the truck and accidentally discharging his weapon. This led his companions to think they were under attack and they fired in the direction the shooting had come from, accidentally killing the soldier on the ground. The soldiers then fired at the vehicle to make their commander believe they had fallen into an ambush. Based on this report, the commander declared the zone north of Momajoe an “enemy zone” and ordered preparations for a full-scale invasion, including the order to shoot anybody they saw on sight. The following day, the invasion occurred from Golawoma to Tawamahehu, during which a lot of civilians were wounded, some of whom died in the bush due to lack of medical care.

One week later, the SLA commander required young men¹⁰⁷² in the surroundings of Momajoe¹⁰⁷³ to register for a vigilante group. After registration, they formed vigilante groups in the various towns and were assigned tasks by the SLA, including building huts, hunting and general cleaning tasks. Punishments for coming late or failing to do assigned duties included frog jump,¹⁰⁷⁴ rolling, being forced to lie down and look at the sun and imprisonment for a number of days.

In mid July 1991, SLA forces required civilians to lead them to Golapo Junction¹⁰⁷⁵ following a RUF/NPFL incursion in Kasseh, south of Momajoe, from Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District), during which two people were killed. They met stiff resistance from the RUF/NPFL forces and one of the SLA soldiers was killed. However, all the civilians escaped safely, as a result of which the SLA commander imposed more stringent rules on how to deal with civilians. Civilians who had any connection with RUF/NPFL forces, including mothers of people abducted by the RUF, were all classed as “rebels” and were treated accordingly. For example, in Mogbon, five miles east of Momajoe, two women were killed by gunshot wound to the vagina because they cooked food for their children who had returned from the RUF/NPFL base and failed to surrender to the SLA. One

¹⁰⁷² The ages of these people are not clear; they are variously described as “young men” and “youths”, which in the Sierra Leone context could be anywhere up to mid to late thirties, but probably does not include people under 14.

¹⁰⁷³ The towns are reported as being Momajoe, Golawoma, Mowei, Mossamgbahuò, Nyahgorihun (all north of Mamojoe); Temgbeleh, Largo, Maniwa, Mani, Bo, Tissana, Yegelleh, Fala (all south Momajoe); and Mojemai Kpongbalia and Golapo, east of Momajoe.

¹⁰⁷⁴ To “frog jump” or to “pump” is done by first holding on to the earlobes with two hands – the left hand holding the right ear lobe and vice versa – after which the person is required to jump up and down continuously on their haunches. This form of punishment was both physically and psychologically painful, because it is a punishment meted out mostly to children and it is considered shameful for an adult to be made to “pump”.

¹⁰⁷⁵ While not explicitly stated, it appears that the civilians were used to guide the SLA forces through the area rather than provide them with any sort of protection.



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man was killed because he said that the RUF/NPFL were planning to attack Momajoe. Two boys who came to Momajoe from Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) to buy salt were suspected of being "rebel" collaborators and were forced to chew their own penises before they were shot and killed. It is estimated that during this period, up to 48 people were killed by SLA forces because they arrived in Momajoe from a direction in which RUF/NPFL forces were believed to have bases.

The District remained under the control of the SLA/ULIMO forces, who engaged the RUF/NPFL forces from all flanks, pushing them north-easterly from Sumbuya and south from Jimi through Pujehun District back into Liberia. At this time, the main SLA base was still in Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) and others had been established in Jimi, Sumbuya and Momajoe. Initially, SLA forces provided food and medicine to the civilian population, which led to good relations between them. Over time, however, civilians were forced to build camps for the SLA, were molested and flogged in public for failing to carry out the cleaning exercise and young girls were sexually harassed. A court structure was set up by the SLA and civilians were heavily fined for breaches, although it is not clear what law (if any) was applied in these courts. In November 1991, SLA forces started using civilians to mine diamonds in Niagorihun, where unidentified armed men killed 20 civilians.¹⁰⁷⁶ These events led to confusion within the population and to distrust of the SLA. At that time, civilians began to suspect that SLA soldiers were disguising themselves as RUF fighters and attacking villages.

During this time, from late 1991 to the end of 1992, the RUF/NPFL made sporadic incursions in Jimi and Limba (Bagbo Chiefdom) from Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District). They burnt seven houses in Limba and took away all the cattle in the town. One man was killed by his son in law, a member of the RUF, and his head was displayed along the road leading to Jimi. In addition, they launched some attacks in the area around Mano, in which some people were killed. However, RUF/NPFL forces did not manage to make any significant advances into Bo District and did not retake control of any territory.¹⁰⁷⁷

Foreign troops¹⁰⁷⁸ were based in Gondama (south of Kakua Chiefdom, at the border with Tikonko and Jiama Bongor Chiefdoms) and in early 1993, an influx of civilians from Pujehun District fleeing RUF forces came to Gondama through Koribondo on the advice of SLA forces in the District. Gondama would remain safe until November 1994, when RUF forces launched a major attack on the town.

In April 1993, RUF forces entered Sembehun, a mining area in Tikonko Chiefdom. The RUF forces were not wearing combat uniforms and many people did not realise they were RUF until they begin firing their weapons. The RUF forces went through houses looking for gold and diamonds and took many goods from the market place, including clothes and shoes. They then abducted a number of people to carry the stolen property, although they were not detained and were returned to Sembehun the same evening.

¹⁰⁷⁶ No further information is available on this attack or who the attackers were.

¹⁰⁷⁷ No news was made available on these attacks in the chiefdom (Bagbo) and people soon forgot about them.

¹⁰⁷⁸ These troops were either Guinean or Nigerian troops, posted in Sierra Leone in furtherance to bilateral treaties with Sierra Leone.



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In 1993, RUF forces embarked on road ambushes in Bagbo Chiefdom around Jimi, during which SLA forces and civilians suffered heavy casualties. In December 1993, during a meeting called by the SLA commander in Jimi to discuss the situation with chiefdom authorities, news broke out that a commercial vehicle had been attacked at Basaleh junction in Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) between Jimmi Bagbo and Sahn Malen Chiefdoms.

B) Phase II: Late 1993 to 1995

From February 1994, the Freetown – Bo – Kenema highway was constantly ambushed by RUF and SLA forces, cutting off food supplies for towns like Bo and Kenema whose population was swollen by thousands of civilians seeking refuge. Convoy of trucks¹⁰⁷⁹ leaving Freetown were often ambushed.

Towards the end of 1993, RUF/NPFL forces regrouped in Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) and started launching heavy attacks on Bagbo Chiefdom, starting in Jimi. In addition, in October 1993, Koribondo was attacked and many civilians moved to Bo Town. As a result of this attack, the Director of the Gondama camp initiated a self-defence program, selecting youths as vigilantes to run checkpoints both day and night. By late 1993 or early 1994,¹⁰⁸⁰ SLA forces were to a large extent dislodged from Jimi, Sumbuya and Momajoe and re-established themselves in Koribondo. This SLA withdrawal gave room to the RUF/NPFL forces to go through Bagbo Chiefdom into Bonthe District, where they also pushed out the SLA forces present in Bum Chiefdom and gained access to Matru Jong and from there the Sierra Rutile mining areas.

Most likely in early 1994,¹⁰⁸¹ upon receiving news that the war was approaching his chiefdom, the Regent Chief of Jiama Bongor Chiefdom decided that all the towns and villages of his chiefdom should mobilise their youths to guard their villages against the assailants. The old hunters were asked to give their guns to the youths and the youths and local hunters were trained, after permission was granted from the Resident Minister of Bo. Youths and local hunters from Boama and Bagbe Chiefdoms also organised themselves in a similar fashion. By June 1994, the training was complete and 2,800 men composed of youths and local hunters were issued with arms and ammunition.¹⁰⁸²

The RUF forces attacked Koribondo in March 1994, as a result of which troops on both sides were killed and one civilian was caught in the crossfire. At the time of the attack, the SLA had been sent to the town. Following the attack, a troop of Guinean soldiers came as reinforcements for the SLA forces.

¹⁰⁷⁹ These convoys could be very big, comprising up to 70 vehicles.

¹⁰⁸⁰ This information has to be read in conjunction with the attacks that started in December 1993 in Kenema District.

¹⁰⁸¹ No date is given for this meeting, but training took place in April 1994 as a result of this meeting, so it is likely these events took place in early 1994.

¹⁰⁸² This gathering of youths did not entail, at this time, the process of initiation within the Kamajor society. This initiation would begin in Bo District in 1995.



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In the early months of 1994, villages in different chiefdoms along the border with Kenema District were attacked by a small number of RUF forces, mainly for food finding purposes. For example, RUF forces entered Komboya Chiefdom in the north of Bo District by crossing the Sewa River from Kenema District. They arrived in a small village near the town of Gumahun, where the Trade Fair was situated. The RUF forces then entered Gumahun, apparently with the main intention of obtaining food, as they only took food items, palm oil, cattle and money. Before leaving, on the same night they entered, the RUF forces also burnt down three dwelling houses. SLA forces were stationed at that time at Njala (Komboya Chiefdom), but the RUF made their incursions before there was time to deploy those forces and, in addition, it is reported that the SLA forces there were themselves harassing civilians and taking away their food and property.

In 1994, most of the road ambushes were carried out by SLA forces, especially between Niagorihun and Grima (Tikonko Chiefdom), during which civilians were killed and their property stolen. These forces were referred to as “sobels”, meaning members of the SLA who had joined forces with the RUF. The loss of confidence in the SLA, which had begun towards the end of 1991, thus continued to grow stronger in 1994. People relate that wherever SLA forces deployed to protect a town or a village, that town or village would be attacked by RUF forces shortly after their arrival.¹⁰⁸³ In April 1994, inhabitants of Lugbu Chiefdom who no longer felt safe moved to Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) and Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom). Thus, the population of Bo Town swelled in 1994 and food became scarce.¹⁰⁸⁴

At some time in 1993,¹⁰⁸⁵ vigilante groups were established in Wunde Chiefdom (south-east of the District, at the border with Pujehun District), led by the former Regent Chief. In April 1994, RUF forces attacked Juhun (Wunde Chiefdom) twice and each time, people were killed, some houses were burnt and people were forced to carry the stolen property to Zimmi, near the border with Liberia in Pujehun District. Local hunters from Jiama Bongor Chiefdom sent to the border between Wunde and Jiama Bongor Chiefdoms fought with RUF forces. Four civilians are reported to have been killed in that fight and two houses were burnt down.

Many villages were attacked in 1994 in Wunde Chiefdom, property was taken, houses burnt, people killed and women raped. For example, in early 1994, RUF forces attacked Kambawana, a section headquarter town with 58 dwelling houses, causing many of the inhabitants to flee into the nearby bush. RUF forces set fire to the town, completely destroying 30 houses and damaging the remaining buildings, including by shooting at them. RUF forces killed or abducted most of the people who had remained in the village, including young children, and raped the women.¹⁰⁸⁶

In Boama Chiefdom, the youths and local hunters were mobilised in 1994 and established as a Territorial Defence Force (TDF) under the command of the chiefdom authorities in the town of

¹⁰⁸³ Cross reference to Bombali District, where people said the same thing.

¹⁰⁸⁴ It appeared that its population doubled in 1994, rising sharply from 450,000 inhabitants to roughly one million.

¹⁰⁸⁵ No month is given for the formation of the vigilante groups.

¹⁰⁸⁶ The bodies were left on the ground for some time, as a person who visited the village some time after this attack saw a number of skeletons lying on the streets. It is not clear when or where these skeletal remains were finally buried.



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Gerihun. The TDF was divided into two groups, one of which was sent to Jomu village and the other of which was sent to Kpatbu, both of which are on the border with Jaima Bongor Chiefdom. These towns were considered strategic points in the defence of Boama Chiefdom from the RUF forces fighting in Jaima Bongor Chiefdom.

Nevertheless, in May 1994, RUF forces coming from Kenema District, most likely from their base of Camp Zogoda,¹⁰⁸⁷ continuously attacked villages behind the Sewa River in Boama Chiefdom. In all these attacks, civilians were killed, women raped, houses burnt, property stolen and people abducted, including underage children. For example, in Tugbedu, two civilians were killed and four houses were burnt; in Sandia, one pregnant woman was killed; and in Kpatobu, three young men were killed, five houses burnt and a lot of property taken. In Keigbai village, one civilian was killed, women raped, three houses burnt down, property was taken and over 200 people abducted. Also in May 1994, RUF forces coming from the direction of Mile 30 on the old Koribondo-Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom, Kenema District) highway attacked Gordi (Jaima Bongor Chiefdom), burnt five buildings, including the school, and took sheep and goats away with them. No fatalities were reported at this time.

On hearing that the chiefdom headquarter of Telu (Jaima Bongor Chiefdom) had come under heavy attack in June 1994, local hunters and youths from Gbaama mobilised themselves and went to Telu. On their arrival in Telu, they discovered the 70 bodies of local hunters and youths in front of the Regent Chief's residence, which was damaged.¹⁰⁸⁸ Twenty civilians were found dead from bullet wounds. The survivors of the attack on Telu, including the Regent Chief, fled to Bo, Gerihun and other places for safety.

Similarly to the other chiefdoms at the border with Kenema District, RUF forces first entered Badjia Chiefdom in mid 1994 mainly to find food. However, these food-finding missions were also accompanied by the burning of houses and huts and the killing of civilians. In Pendebu, one old man was shot dead and one hut was set on fire. Each time they came to find food, the RUF forces were very small in number.

In August 1994, the Town Chief of Geima¹⁰⁸⁹ (Jaima Bongor Chiefdom) arrived in Koribondo with two youths whose hands had been cut off. He reported that RUF forces had attacked Geima, dumped 40 civilians in wells, killed nine men, three children and eight women, burnt down 30 houses and forced people to carry their stolen property to Zimmi, which is on the border with Liberia in Pujehun District.

That same month, RUF forces again attacked Jimi and over 20 civilians were killed and up to 50 were abducted, allegedly being taken away to "Kuwait", the RUF base in Pujehun District. Another attack took place in September, during which an SLA officer was killed. After this incident, the SLA

¹⁰⁸⁷ Camp Zogoda was located in Koya Chiefdom (Kenema District) and was operational throughout 1994-95 before being overrun by SLA and Kamajors in 1996. For further information, see Kenema District.

¹⁰⁸⁸ It is not clear how the Regent Chief's house was damaged or how the local hunters were killed.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Geima is on the Koribondo-Sumbuya Highway, the main route from Kenema District to Bonthe District through Bo District.



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intensified their search for RUF collaborators and many civilians were killed by SLA forces on this basis, including the Town Chief. During this period, up to 190 houses in Jimi were burnt down, with the exception of the Primary and Secondary Schools; civilians were killed; and many young people were abducted. Cases of rapes are mentioned and it is reported that three girls were raped on the road between Jimi and Kanga, west of Jimi. Houses were looted and people were injured with machetes in Mano; there are also reports of amputations at this time.

At the same time, the RUF forces began attacking the towns that had been left by the SLA, particularly in Niagorehun, Sumbuya, Towamaheahun and Lower and Upper Saama in the west of Lugbu Chiefdom on the road between Sumbuya and Niagorehun. During these attacks, many civilians were killed and raped and houses were burnt down. In Sumbuya, over 100 houses were burnt, including the residence of the Paramount Chief, and over 150 houses were burnt in Niagorehun.

In September 1994, RUF forces attacked Momajoe and its environs (Bagbo Chiefdom), meeting little resistance from the SLA forces based at Mani Junction. During this attack, one boy and one local hunter, who had been pointing his gun at the RUF forces, were killed in separate incidents. Property was taken away from people and around 20 young men were forced to carry that property to RUF bases in Malen Chiefdom.

Njala (Komboya Chiefdom in the north of Bo District), which is a hub for the flow of produce such as palm oil, rice, groundnuts, kola nuts, coffee and cacao during marketing seasons, was attacked in September 1994.¹⁰⁹⁰ Five civilians were killed and houses were looted and then burnt down. The RUF forces attacking the town came from the east, most likely along the road from Kenema District through Gumahun and Naigolehun. The RUF forces left the town the same day as they had arrived.¹⁰⁹¹

Also in September¹⁰⁹² 1994, a large number of RUF forces, most of them dressed in plain clothes with red headbands and commanders in uniforms with steel helmets, entered the chiefdom headquarter town of Ngelehun (Badjia Chiefdom),¹⁰⁹³ firing heavily. Although no deaths were reported, many women and children were abducted and forced to carry stolen property. RUF forces came back later and abducted many more people. In Badjia Chiefdom, few people were killed but thousands were abducted and forced to join the RUF movement, whereupon many people fled to Gerihun (Boama Chiefdom). Progressively, the villages and towns of Badjia Chiefdom became

¹⁰⁹⁰ Njala is at the foot of a steep mountain on top of which there was rumoured to be a RUF establishment called Bokurr, which was a large training camp and the sometime residence of the RUF leader. Sounds of helicopters were heard over the mountain every two days during 1995, although the duration when the helicopters were flying was unspecified

¹⁰⁹¹ Indeed, at the same period, RUF forces had reached Wandor Chiefdom (Kenema District) that lies at the east of Komboya Chiefdom.

¹⁰⁹² Reports mention two different dates for this attack, September and December. Although open sources could not confirm the date, it is likely that this attack took place in the aftermath of the one at Njala (Komboya Chiefdom) in September.

¹⁰⁹³ The land of Badjia and Komboya Chiefdoms was rich in food and the place was ideal as it is a hilly area, far from the main road.



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empty, as RUF forces made various incursions and attacks throughout the chiefdom and people sought refuge in larger towns like Kenema or Bo or in the bush.

The chiefdom headquarter of Ngarlu (Bagbe Chiefdom) was also attacked by RUF forces,¹⁰⁹⁴ using a method worth describing in more detail. The RUF assailants gathered the inhabitants in the Court Barrie and asked the Town Chief to send messages around the farms calling all the people to come at once. People were forced to sit on the floor with their legs stretched out in front of them. The RUF members explained to the people that those among them who were in uniforms with helmets on were Burkina Faso fighters while those in other clothes and red headbands were RUF members. Under heavy guard, some of them took young women and girls into a house and raped them. As these rapes were going on, the old people were separated from the youths and other RUF members searched the houses. After collecting items from the houses, they set the town on fire. One hundred and fifty youths were told to carry the things they had collected from the houses for the RUF forces. As it was time for the third Muslim prayer, they fired shots above the heads of the gathered civilians, dropped young babies and trampled on them and hit screaming children on their heads. Many young people, including children and teenagers, were abducted during this attack, most likely for recruitment purposes although their fate remains unknown. People who had escaped to the bush and returned the following morning discovered burnt houses, property missing and 25 bodies in the town and others in the nearby bushes, including adults, children and babies, whose heads had been crushed. Ten of the bodies were buried in one grave in the centre of the town, three in another one and four in a third grave.

Valunia, the northernmost chiefdom in Bo District, was first touched by the conflict in late 1994. In October, November and December, RUF forces and SLA forces were present for the first time in the three biggest towns. In early October 1994, SLA forces came by truck to the town of Baomahun, towards the north in the centre of the chiefdom, from Tekoh Barracks in Makeni (Bombali District). The SLA forces explained to the population that they had come to search for RUF forces based in Kangari Hills¹⁰⁹⁵ in Tonkolili District, from where they believed RUF forces would make an attack on Valunia Chiefdom. However on their return, very few soldiers were to be seen on the trucks. At around that time, foreigners who were operating the gold mines left the town, allegedly poisoning the food and drink in their quarters as they believed the SLA forces would be back to steal their property. Later in October 1994, SLA forces attacked Baomahun, taking a lot of property from the gold mining quarters and the town in general. The SLA forces spent some time in the quarters, drinking what was left by the expatriates who had fled earlier. Trucks loaded with food and other items were brought to Tekoh Barracks. A few days later, information reached the civilians that SLA soldiers were found dead in the forest and that wives and children of those SLA members at Tekoh Barracks were also dead, as a result of the poison the expatriates put in their food and drinks before leaving.

¹⁰⁹⁴ This event was described as happening in June 1994 but also as taking place after Njala (Komboya Chiefdom) and Ngelehun (Badjia Chiefdom) had been attacked, which took place probably in September. Accordingly, this attack was probably carried out around September.

¹⁰⁹⁵ The Kangari Hills are to be found mainly in Tonkolili District but also lie in Valunia Chiefdom. The RUF base, however, was located in Tonkolili District.



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Due to the persistent attacks on Bagbe Chiefdom, up to 600 villagers came and settled in Gerihun (Boama Chiefdom), which also hosted displaced people from Komboya and Badjia Chiefdoms after the attacks on the headquarters towns of Njala and Ngelehun respectively. Following this influx of civilians, UNHCR established a displaced camp in Gerihun, under the protection of SLA forces and Special Security Division Police.

In November 1994, RUF forces coming from Camp Zogoda¹⁰⁹⁶ in Kenema District attacked Gerihun twice. Both times, they were repelled but promised that they would not be satisfied until Gerihun was captured. In June 1995, the RUF forces returned in large numbers, attacking the town on three sides and retaking control of both the town and the IDP camp. Over 100 displaced people were killed in the camp either by shooting or by being drowned in the Beibei River. Property was taken from booths, namely huts made from bushsticks and covered with greenery for shelter, which were then set on fire. At that time, the SLA forces asked the fleeing civilians to come to their base for protection as they had sent someone to Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom) to ask for reinforcements, although it is not clear whether reinforcements were on the way.

While up to 1,000 civilians went to the base, the whole town including the military base was soon taken over.¹⁰⁹⁷ The SLA forces withdrew to an unknown destination and more people were killed, some as a result of RPG firing by RUF forces as they entered the town. Every house in the town was searched and looted. Over 200 civilians were told to carry the stolen property to the RUF base at Camp Zogoda in Kenema District. Before leaving the town, the RUF forces set the IDP camp on fire. Among those people who had to carry the property, few came back and the rest have not been seen since. Shortly after the RUF forces left, SLA forces returned with reinforcements, firing indiscriminately. After they arrived, they made the population bury the people who had been killed by the RUF forces when they had attacked the town.

During the same period, women and children who had left Bagbe, Komboya and Badjia Chiefdoms were killed on their way to Kenema District. When they had stopped at the chiefdom headquarter of Boajibu (Simbaru Chiefdom, Kenema District) and sought shelter in a large house, RUF forces set the house on fire.¹⁰⁹⁸

Monghere (Valunia Chiefdom), south-west of Baomahun at the junction between the road from Moamahun and the road from Bare in the north-west of the chiefdom, was attacked in November 1994. RUF forces believed to come from their base in Bokurr raided the town. They took people's property, in particular domesticated animals such as goats and sheep, before burning down nearly all the houses in the town. They abducted some people, forcing them to carry the stolen property. These people later escaped. While there were no reported fatalities, a number of people suffered gunshot wounds.

¹⁰⁹⁶ The camp was mentioned on the ID card found on a dead RUF member.

¹⁰⁹⁷ One key person said that an RUF member advised them to move from the SLA base to a safer place because the SLA forces were "fooling" people and were fighting together with the RUF.

¹⁰⁹⁸ No further information could be obtained on this event, which was not mentioned in relation to Kenema District.



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In December 1994, RUF forces attacked the town of Mandu, towards the south of Valunia Chiefdom along the road from Monghere. RUF forces set fire to all the houses in the town, took property, including food and valuables, and forced civilians to carry the property they had taken. The civilians were later released after the RUF forces had reached villages allegedly near their bases. SLA forces based at Grima junction,¹⁰⁹⁹ north of Mandu along the road to Monhere, arrived in the town after the RUF forces had left the town and some of them also took property belonging to civilians, although others assisted in putting out the fires in the town.

Another example of the attacks on Wunde Chiefdom in 1994 is the assault on Niagorehun in the south of the chiefdom, which was attacked by RUF forces in December 1994. Windows and doors of the houses were broken, houses ransacked and people forced to carry their property; people who refused were shot on the spot. Young girls were raped and young boys, most of them below 10 years old, were abducted. Many civilians were killed, such as one pregnant woman who refused to have sex with one of the fighters.

Later, towards the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995, RUF forces came back to Bagbe Chiefdom, this time arriving from the south. Given the location of Ngarlu at a junction, RUF forces planned to establish a base there. They drove the people out of the chiefdom by burning the main towns like Madina, Gibina, Blama, Kpetewoma, Kpakoh and Mano. Prominent people were also killed, including a schoolteacher of Blama who refused to be a teacher for their forces. Some people went into hiding and others went to Bo Town or Kenema Town (Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema District). Their arrival in Bo corresponded with the initiation of Kamajors starting in 1995.

Benduma (in the south of Bagbe Chiefdom) was overcrowded with civilians fleeing from the Sewa River, where RUF forces were settled; from the headquarter town of Ngarlu; and from Komboya Chiefdom. Villages in the area were surrounded by RUF forces and attacks were always imminent. In December 1994, five people were instantly shot dead by RUF forces arriving in Benduma. During the same visit, they raped women, stole property and forced young men to carry that property to the RUF base in Ngallu. Benduma was of interest as it was rich in food and animals. Benduma was also the largest town in the chiefdom, where the Paramount Chief lived.

However, the most striking wave of attacks that affected Bo District as a whole is the one that took place in December 1994 with the attack on the Gondama IDP camp, followed by attacks on the main towns in the centre of the District during the Christmas week.

In December 1994, RUF forces attacked Gondama camp, south of Kakua Chiefdom.¹¹⁰⁰ The attack on Gondama Camp, where thousands of people from Pujehun and Bo Districts had found refuge,

¹⁰⁹⁹ Note that while the records refer to it as "Grima junction" and "Grima town", the UNHCR maps have it named "Geima".

¹¹⁰⁰ It has to be noted that there is little information for Kakua, Tikonko and Bumpe Chiefdoms from 1993 to 1995, as almost all the civilians at that time were living either in the bushes or in displaced camps, such as Gondama camp. For example, the only information about Kakua Chiefdom, during this time, besides the December 1994 attacks, is that in July 1995, SLA forces and local hunters launched successful attacks on RUF forces in Kakua Chiefdom, resulting in the death of many RUF fighters.



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was a shock for the population. At the time of the attack, on 24 December 1994, only a few ECOMOG troops were posted at Gondama,¹¹⁰¹ where an estimated 80,000 people had sought refuge. Between 200 and 400 civilians were killed, either by drowning in the Sewa River or as a result of bullet wounds. ECOMOG troops repelled the RUF forces about one week later and the camp was transferred temporarily to Bo Town. During this time, both RUF and SLA forces raided the camp, taking property that had been left behind. In January 1995, the camp was declared safe¹¹⁰² and people were asked to come back, which they did. Nevertheless, throughout 1995 the situation was difficult, as RUF forces had blocked the main highway between Bo and Freetown, thereby cutting off a main route for the supply of food. People died on a daily basis from malnutrition and cholera broke out; some relief was provided when the route was reopened in October 1995.

After their attack on Gondama, RUF forces then moved on to make their first attack on Tikonko Town (Tikonko Chiefdom) on 25 December 1994, arriving at around 3.00 pm, killing many civilians and burning and looting many houses. At the same time, other villages in the chiefdom were also attacked. At Sengema riverside, one young man was killed and another was shot in the leg. Civilians fled in large number to Matru on the Rail (Tikonko Chiefdom),¹¹⁰³ intensifying the panic in the town.

On 26 December 1994, RUF forces attacked Matru on the Rail (Tikonko Chiefdom) in the afternoon, mutilating civilians' arms and legs. The RUF then opened sporadic gunfire on the civilians, killing many people, looting their property and burning down their houses. They also abducted civilian youths who they conscripted into the RUF forces. In the morning before this attack, 40 fully armed men wearing military uniforms entered the town, claiming to be Government forces coming to protect Matru on the Rail. However, when RUF forces who identified themselves to the civilians as such attacked the town, these Government forces were nowhere to be found.

Bo Town was attacked on 27 December 1994 for the first time by RUF forces passing through the New London quarter. Prior to this attack, fleeing civilians from Matru on the Rail and Tikonko Town had told residents of Bo Town that the RUF were bent on attacking Bo Town. The authorities of the town organised youths to erect checkpoints, which were controlled by these youths as a precautionary move in the event of an RUF attack. Thus, the youths who had mobilised themselves repelled the RUF forces out of the town. Few civilians were killed, few houses burnt and few youths abducted during this attack.

Bumpeh Town (Bumpeh Chiefdom), in the far west of Bo District, was attacked three times between December 1994 and June 1995. RUF forces coming from the north of Bumpeh attacked the town for the first time in December 1994, probably during the same wave of attacks against Bo Town, Tikonko Town and Matru on the Rail. During this attack, few houses were burnt and some property was taken. Some girls were raped and people were abducted. The Regent Chief from

¹¹⁰¹ It appears that on 22 December, the ECOMOG troops were ordered to go to Bo to provide security for a carnival that was planned, leaving only 11 soldiers in the camp.

¹¹⁰² It is not clear who declared the camp to be safe, but ECOMOG continued to provide protection at the camp, so it is possible it was ECOMOG.

¹¹⁰³ As opposed to Matru on the Jong, which is in Bonthe District.



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Mattru Jong tried to hide from the RUF forces in the Tabal River, but accidentally drowned. As had happened in Mattru on the Rail prior to the RUF attack, forces claimed to be SLA forces had come to the town, asserting they were waiting for reinforcements following the previous attacks on Tikonko, Mattru on the Rail and Bo Town. However, when the RUF forces entered the town, those forces were nowhere to be found.

The attack on these major towns in the District was perceived by the population as an indication that the RUF were now a strong force not only in the eastern and northern parts of the country but also in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone.¹¹⁰⁴

Gbo, Selenga and Niawa Lenga Chiefdoms, north of Kakua Chiefdom, were not affected by the war before 1995, following the wave of attacks on Gondama, Bo and Tikonko Town in December 1994.

In January 1995, RUF forces reached Gbo Chiefdom through Bumpah Chiefdom. The first village they attacked was Nagbana, on 3 January, killing people, raping women and taking away cattle. On hearing that they were approaching the headquarter town of Baiama, the Paramount Chief reported the threat to the SLA's Bo Brigade Headquarter. However, no action was taken by the SLA to prevent the attack on Baiama, which took place on 4 January 1995. People were gathered in the Court Barrie, beaten and kicked by the RUF forces. Six people were killed, houses looted, cattle taken and over 20 houses were burnt. On the same day, Mokeilendeh was also attacked. Confusion arose in the mind of the civilians since uniformed men came to Baiama on 6 January 1995 telling people they were Government forces but, shortly after, left the town. People did not know to which government they were belonging, particularly because the RUF was now calling itself a "Government".

RUF forces attacked Baiama a second time on 8 January 1995, killed people, burnt some houses and abducted some people who were released shortly after. After the attack, SLA forces came from Bo to Baiama, after the Paramount Chief made another appeal to the SLA Brigade Commander. However, these SLA forces, who did not stay long, took all the cattle of the town.

The headquarter town of Dambala (Selenga Chiefdom), about 12 miles north of Bo Town, was also attacked in January 1995 by RUF forces coming from the direction of Negbenah, which is four miles east of Dambala. This time as well, SLA forces who were based in the town were nowhere to be found at the time of the attack. During the attack, RUF forces killed approximately three people and burnt down up to 110 houses.

In January 1995, RUF forces attacked the SLA forces based in Grima (Valunia Chiefdom) and overpowered them. Attacks on SLA positions were frequent, including on their bases in Mandu and Monghere (Valunia Chiefdom). Throughout 1995, civilians hiding in the bush were tracked down either by RUF or SLA forces. RUF forces were raiding villages and hunting civilians in the bush, mainly for food. Civilians were maltreated as RUF forces beat them, dripped melted plastic on them, raped women and, frequently, young girls, and forced people to have sexual intercourse with

¹¹⁰⁴ Also during the Christmas week, Kenema Town and Magburaka (Tonkolili District headquarter) were attacked.
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members of their own family. Young people were taken away and some people were killed, such as one man who was killed so the RUF forces could take his animals. Another incident concerns a young farmer who had his fingers cut off when the RUF forces discovered he had set traps to get meat.

Negbema, 16 miles from Bo Town in Niawa Lenga Chiefdom, which adjoins Selenga Chiefdom to the north-east, was also attacked in January 1995. At the time of the attack, no SLA forces or local militia were based in the town. RUF forces, as they identified themselves to the civilians,¹¹⁰⁵ burnt down houses and abducted young boys. Another attack took place later during the year, probably in May 1995, during which the RUF forces burnt down more houses, killed some people and abducted some young girls. In August 1995, SLA forces came to protect the town. However, according to civilians, they were more thieves than liberators as they were taking away all the food from civilians.

The SLA forces took property from civilians in Valunia Chiefdom, including food items and livestock, claiming it was on orders. They also forced civilians to work for them, including requiring drivers to carry items for them. Anyone who refused would be punished, often by being verbally abused or beaten. The only secondary school, in Koyeima, was completely vandalised; the furniture, steel windows and doors were removed and, for the most part, taken to Bo Town, either to be sold or to be used by the SLA forces based there. In addition, checkpoints were set up in the town and operated both by SLA soldiers and by civilians. People were stopped at checkpoints and faced being “booked”, i.e. fined, for failure to carry the correct identity cards, among other things.

Momajoe and its environs (Bagbo Chiefdom) were again attacked in January 1995 but no mention is made of casualties at this time. RUF forces deposed all the chiefs and elected new ones, although it is not clear how these elections took place. The area was divided into two operational zones, with one command post at Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom) and another post in Momajoe (Bagbo Chiefdom). Soon after their arrival, RUF forces made civilians work for them, in particular to carry property taken from one town to another town and to carry wounded RUF members back to their bases. In addition, RUF forces threw civilians out of their houses so that the forces could occupy them and forced civilians to feed them. Salt was the most expensive condiment, for which people were killed. No civilian was allowed to eat proper food, which led to the death of children from malnutrition. Any civilian refusing to obey orders from the RUF forces was killed and it is suggested that rapes also occurred around this time.¹¹⁰⁶ RUF forces remained in control of Momajoe and its environs for around 9 months, up to the end of 1995.

In 1995, “loyal”¹¹⁰⁷ SLA forces began attempting to dislodge RUF forces from Bagbo Chiefdom but harassed civilians, taking away all the property that was hidden in the bush.

¹¹⁰⁵ It is reported that the commander of the RUF forces who identified them to the civilians was approximately 15 years old.

¹¹⁰⁶ Key persons talk about marital homes being “broken up”.

¹¹⁰⁷ At this time, the key persons speak of “loyal SLA forces”, who were believed to be loyal to the Government and “sobels”, who were SLA forces believed to be in collusion with the RUF.



NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE

In February 1995, Njala (Komboya Chiefdom) was attacked for the second time by RUF forces using a bypass route through Kundorma and Pelewahun rather than the route through Gumahun and Naiagolehun. SLA forces were based in Njala but were overpowered. Some civilians were killed and others were forced to carry property that was taken from the town. Those who were abducted travelled to Kpelewama (Valunia Chiefdom), where the RUF had a settlement and then moved to Kpetema, which is located near their main base, Bokurr, in Valunia Chiefdom. On their way to the base, civilians who were unable to keep up were shot dead and some women were raped. In Kpelewama, the RUF forces opened fire, killing one woman and her child before cutting her head off. After they arrived in Kpetema, all the remaining civilians were released, allegedly because RUF forces did not authorise civilians to come to their base.

During the RUF attack on Njala, the commander in charge of the SLA forces was killed by one of his subordinates, allegedly because he was a “loyal” SLA member. After the death of this commander, SLA forces relocated to Mendewa, three miles outside of Njala. From there, they occasionally returned to Njala, stealing property from the people of Njala and surrounding areas. In one incident, SLA forces came to Njala with a truck, opened fire as they entered and loaded their truck with food and non-food items. The SLA forces were at this time using the word “clearing” to refer to the taking of property in the town.

Since the SLA forces had completely left Njala, the RUF forces used this road to travel from the East to the West up to Gbaama and back. On their way, they were harassing civilians, taking food and forcing them to carry it for the RUF forces to their base at Bokurr, on top of the mountain near Njala.

Thus, starting in 1994 up to 1995, the whole of Komboya Chiefdom was affected by both RUF and SLA activities. Civilians living in the bushes in sorkoihun¹¹⁰⁸ were chased by RUF forces for food. Civilians were also killed for various reasons during this period, including for failing to show the RUF forces where other civilians were hiding. In other incidents, a man was amputated between Bauya and Tibor, seven houses were burnt down in Tibor and four civilians were killed at Talla II.¹¹⁰⁹

In 1995, RUF forces coming mainly from Bumpah and Lugbu Chiefdoms were attacking villages and sorkoihun in Tikonko Chiefdom. Property was taken, houses burnt, civilians killed and young people abducted. At Wotebehun, north of Baoma in the south-west of Tikonko Chiefdom, three men and two women were shot and killed, sheep belonging to a chief were taken away and some houses were burnt. At Yegensa, one man was killed and his body tied to a tree. At Buewama, people were killed and houses and a mosque were burnt. At Kassama, two and a half miles from Baoma, RUF forces killed two people, which the SLA forces based there made no attempt to stop. In June 1995 at Baoma, which is on the Sewa River in the south-west of Tikonko chiefdom, RUF forces entered the town from the direction of Kassama (to the north of Baoma) and stayed there for two days. RUF forces threw some people into the Sewa River, where some drowned, and killed many others.

¹¹⁰⁸ This refers to hiding places in the bushes, also spelled “sorquehun”.

¹¹⁰⁹ No further details are available on any of these incidents.



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The same scenario was repeated in many places in 1995, including Buewama, Kassama, Sembehun Tabema, Benehun, Shengema and Mano Bembehteh, which are all in the south of the chiefdom, and Dodo, Faikundor, Foidu, Samie Tabaima, which are all around Tikonko Town. In all of these attacks, many young men and women were abducted, including people who were underage. Civilians identified the assailants as RUF forces, dressed in jeans and t-shirts and some having red pieces of cloth tied around their heads.

From March to June 1995, SLA forces were deployed in Dodo (Tikonko Chiefdom). However, these forces harassed civilians, molested them, took their property and killed alleged “rebel” collaborators. On one occasion, they cut off the head of a suspected collaborator, put it on a stick and went to every house asking for some money as a sign of appreciation for their job. Tikonko Town itself was attacked for the second time in June 1995 but civilians had already fled the town. Dodo was also attacked by RUF forces in June 1995. People were shot and killed, among them the Town Chief’s son, and some were seriously wounded with knives. All of Dodo, except the mosque and a few houses, was burnt.

The second attack on Bumpah Town (Bumpah Chiefdom) took place between March and April 1995, with the third one occurring in June. The March attack on Bumpah was part of a massive RUF operation in the chiefdom allegedly in retaliation for the killing of RUF members by SLA forces in the Sierra Rutile Mining area in nearby Moyamba District. The attacks on different villages in the chiefdom left over 100 civilians dead within a few days.¹¹¹⁰ During the third attack on Bumpah Town, many people were abducted, at which time civilians were told that the RUF needed more people to be trained. In addition, a lot of people were killed, more people were tortured, some had their hands amputated and young girls and women were raped. Some people were burnt alive in a house.¹¹¹¹

Starting in July 1995, SLA forces regained control over the area and the surrounding chiefdom of Tikonko during a massive “mopping up” operation.¹¹¹² During their operation in Bumpah Town in early July 1995, SLA forces claimed to have killed a lot of RUF members but no other source of information could confirm the fatalities. However, it is clear¹¹¹³ that from July 1995, SLA forces retook control of a large area south of Bo Town, inflicting serious defeats on the RUF for the first time since the start of the second phase of the conflict.¹¹¹⁴

However, SLA control over an area never guaranteed the absence of RUF attacks, which were often carried out by pockets of forces disseminated in various areas. For example, Yengema was attacked

¹¹¹⁰ AFP, 26 April 1995.

¹¹¹¹ The precise figures of the casualties could not be obtained.

¹¹¹² It was not, however, totally clear when those SLA forces first arrived in the town as there are suggestions that some SLA members were already deployed at the time of the third attack.

¹¹¹³ Amnesty International Report, “Sierra Leone – Human Rights abuses in a war against civilians – 13 September 1995”.

¹¹¹⁴ This military victory has to be read in conjunction with the recent military training the SLA received from the Executive Outcomes, the South African mercenary company contracted by the Sierra Leonean Government. Similar “mopping up” operations were carried out in Moyamba District and, shortly after, in Bonthe District.



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in September and 60 civilians were put in five houses that were set on fire; in addition, RUF forces killed a lot of civilians at Serabu. However, after these last attacks, Bumpah Town and the entire chiefdom were free from an RUF presence. That same month, SLA forces who had gone to repel RUF forces in other town in the chiefdom, namely Kpakema and Serabel, returned with seven captured RUF members.¹¹¹⁵ These RUF members were paraded in Bo Town before they were killed and burnt in front of the NPRC Secretariat, which was witnessed by a large crowd. The bridge in Bumpah Town divided the town in two distinct living areas, one being for the civilians and the other one for the SLA forces. Shortly after, the SLA commander exhorted civilians to come out of the bushes.

In July 1995, RUF forces coming from Simbaru Chiefdom (Kenema District) launched attacks on Badjia, Bagbe and Komboya Chiefdoms, where over 40 towns and villages were destroyed and, in total, 50 civilians were killed. The armed men who carried out the attacks were dressed in full military uniforms.

The following month, panic broke out in Gondama IDP camp (Kakua Chiefdom) as people feared another RUF attack was taking place. People were running around the camp and during the confusion, ECOMOG forces fired a heavy weapon, which resulted in the death of eight civilians. ULIMO soldiers came as reinforcements from Bo Town and on their way to Gondama, arrested two boys who they believed were former RUF members. The two boys were killed immediately, one of them having his genital organ cut off before being killed and the other one being beaten and tied up. Both were thrown into the Sewa River.

A second attack on Dambala (Selenga Chiefdom) took place in August 1995 but unlike the first one, SLA forces fought the RUF forces and repelled them. Up to 30 people, identified as "strangers" passing through the village on their way to Bo, were killed during this attack, possibly by SLA forces at checkpoints, and were buried in a mass grave. Another attack took place in the nearby village of Joru, four miles from Dambala, but this time, RUF forces did not use their weapons. Rather, they hit people on their heads with stones until they died, claiming they were doing it to save their ammunition. RUF forces also burnt down up to 20 houses during this attack.

By the middle of 1995, the situation in Bo District was divided in two: while SLA forces had retaken control of a large area in the west of the District, minimising RUF activities in that area, the large eastern area was still severely affected by RUF incursions carried out mainly from other Districts.

c) Phase III: Late 1995 to 1997 and beyond¹¹¹⁶

The initiation of Kamajors began in mid to late 1995; rapidly, all the chiefdoms had their own Kamajors. They were initially armed with single barrel guns, sticks and spears.¹¹¹⁷ Furthermore,

¹¹¹⁵ It seems that the SLA forces recaptured those towns.

¹¹¹⁶ Little information was available on events in 1998 to 2001, because the District was under Kamajor control and no further RUF/AFRC attacks were reported.

¹¹¹⁷ It should be noted that compared to other Districts in the South, the records reveal little information on CDF activities, in particular on atrocities they may have committed. It is unclear whether this meant that fewer violations



NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE

except in Bagbo and Lugbu Chiefdoms and a camp in Valunia Chiefdom, it should be noted that RUF forces did not have bases in Bo District where, unlike other Districts in the south, they were entering sporadically from other Districts.

In mid to late 1995, the idea of initiation came up in Bumpah Chiefdom¹¹¹⁸ and people were sent to Bo Town for that purpose. After their initiation, Kamajors went back to Bumpah Chiefdom, in the far west of Bo District, where they worked for some time hand-in-hand with SLA forces based in Bumpah Town. While sent by the SLA commander to get some food in Nyayahun, north of Bumpah Town, Kamajors came under fire. The identity of the men attacking the Kamajors proved to be SLA forces who had started developing a camp called "Bulkoh" with RUF forces near Nyayahun. Kamajors examining the bodies found the ID card, boots and uniform of an SLA commander who had sent them. On their return to Bumpah, the SLA commander denied that the armed men were his men, which led the Kamajors to decide to join with more Kamajors to attack the camp.

During the second half of 1995, at the time the Kamajor initiation ceremonies were introduced in the District, towns and villages in Tikonko Chiefdom sent men to be initiated.¹¹¹⁹ During the first round of initiations in 1995, only people above 15 were initiated, but this changed later, although no date is specified. Tikonko Chiefdom soon came under the control of the Kamajors.

In late 1995, as the RUF forces were spreading throughout Jiama Bongor Chiefdom, the elders of the chiefdom sought the Regent Chief's permission to initiate people into the Kamajor society. After permission and full support was granted by the Regent Chief, one person was sent to the village of Tihun (Bonthe District) to contact the Kamajor's High Priest Initiator. On arriving in the headquarters of Tellu, the High Priest Initiator requested that the Gondama – Tellu road be brushed for security, to prevent any RUF incursion. However, one young man who had returned to his village to look for food had his left hand cut off when he came across some RUF forces at Nagbena, two miles from Tellu.

In late 1995, RUF forces left Njala Town (Komboya Chiefdom) for their main base on the mountain near Njala. Knowing that there were no SLA forces stationed in Njala at that time, RUF forces regularly used the road to travel from the east end through Gumahu and Korkortie to the west end at Gbaama and back.

As Kamajor operations were spreading in Bonthe and Pujehun Districts, dislodged RUF forces from those Districts joined their companions in Bagbo Chiefdom, primarily in Momajoe, Sumbuya and Kissahoi, 4 miles from Momajoe. In December 1995 in Kissahoi, RUF forces brought with them over 300 civilians, who had been forced to carry property for the RUF. The regrouped forces launched a massive attack on civilians in December and over 700 civilians were captured in different villages, including Momajoe, Maniwa, Mani-Bo and Tissana. All those abductees were taken to

were committed or whether violations were committed and we lack information, as people are reluctant to talk on this.

¹¹¹⁸ The initiation ceremonies started in Bonthe District.

¹¹¹⁹ No more details could be obtained on the place where this initiation took place.



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Madoko (Bagbo Chiefdom) before being divided into groups and taken to different locations in Bo and Pujehun Districts, depending on their origin. The fate of these people is as yet unknown.

Events in 1996

After 1995, most of the population had fled Bagbe Chiefdom, which is north-east of Bo Town. There were instances of RUF incursions, such as one in early 1996, when RUF forces attacked Benduma (Bagbe Chiefdom), one of the largest towns in the chiefdom where the Paramount Chief resides. The young RUF forces, who were described as “uncontrollable”, started firing indiscriminately, killing a member of their own forces, whose body they cut into pieces and ate, while some drank the blood.

As in other chiefdoms, Valunia Chiefdom had its own Kamajors initiated in Bo Town by the Deputy Initiator sometime before 1996.¹¹²⁰ When they returned to their chiefdom in 1996, the Kamajors successfully repelled RUF forces from their Camp Kokahun, which was near the towns of Sengina and Yamandu, close to the border with Moyamba District. The Kamajors seized arms and ammunition, including machine guns, and freed some civilians who were being held captive at the base. At that time, SLA forces were removed from the chiefdom allegedly because of controversy surrounding the fact that their attire and weapons were similar to those of the RUF forces.

In early 1996, young men of Komboya Chiefdom were initiated in Bo-Messima and came back to settle in Njala. They successfully repelled the RUF forces from the chiefdom.¹¹²¹ At this time, the hunting of alleged RUF collaborators began and those suspected were seriously beaten, tied up and forced to sit under the sun. Anybody who had stayed in the towns during RUF attacks was suspected of being a collaborator. One person, who the RUF forces had appointed Town Commander, was undressed, tied up and severely beaten before being released. Freedom of movement was restricted and passes were required from civilians before they were allowed to move from one place to another. Any civilian failing to show such a pass at checkpoints could be suspected of being a “rebel” or a “rebel” collaborator and be treated accordingly.

Kamajors from Bonthe District entered Bagbo Chiefdom through Fola, south of Momajoe, in early 1996, where they established their first base. In order to repel RUF forces still based in Momajoe, it was decided that every town should nominate four “gallant” men to be initiated. Those men, numbering up to 200 from the entire chiefdom, were taken to Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom (Bonthe District), where the Kamajor’s High Priest Initiator initiated them in February 1996.

However, RUF forces were still active in the area and in April 1996, they launched attacks on a number of towns in the environs of Momajoe that the Kamajors were unable to withstand. A number of civilians were killed and others were wounded during these attacks. In a separate incident, RUF forces killed three men accused of collaboration with Kamajors in Momajoe and displayed their heads at checkpoints. Civilians continued to suffer from the RUF presence in this area by

¹¹²⁰ No further information is available on the exact dates.

¹¹²¹ There is little information available on how the Kamajors managed to fight off the RUF forces, including information relating to the number of battles, casualties, damage to property and so on.



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having their property taken away, being denied food, being thrown out of their houses and married women were not allowed to sleep with their husbands.

Later, but probably still in April 1996, the newly initiated Kamajors took control of Momajoe and its environs.¹¹²² As a result of this, RUF forces moved to Bendu (Malen Chiefdom, Pujehun District), taking a large number of civilians with them. It appears that these civilians were later rescued sometime in April 1996 by Kamajors from Pujehun District and taken to a town near Momajoe.

The Kamajors brought a large amount of stolen property they had found during their attack in Bendu with them to Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom). Probably as a result of this, RUF forces attacked Sumbuya for the third time towards the end of April 1996. It was during this attack that Sumbuya was destroyed and many houses were burnt down.

The last attacks by RUF forces on Bagbo Chiefdom took place in May 1996, in the area surrounding Momajoe, during which houses were burnt down and two people were killed in Yegelleh. After this, the Kamajors controlled Lugbu Chiefdom, in particular the Sumbuya axis, from where the roads lead up to Bumpah Chiefdom, to Jiama Bongor Chiefdom and on to Kenema District and down through Bagbo Chiefdom to Pujehun District.

After the attack on Gerihun in 1995 in Baoma Chiefdom, adjoining Badija and Bagbe Chiefdoms to the south, RUF forces were still occupying some villages across the Sewa River from Gerihun. In some of these villages, people had to live with those forces, working for them and women were forcefully taken. As a result of this, in April 1996, 200 men were initiated into the CDF. However, their relationship with SLA forces still based in Gerihun was not friendly and problems began to arise between the two forces.¹¹²³

In April 1996, a group of well-armed people coming from the direction of Kori Chiefdom (Moyamba District) arrived in Baiama (Gbo Chiefdom). These men, whose identity is unknown, introduced themselves as SLA forces, but left the town in the evening to an unknown destination. After this, the Paramount Chief called a meeting to ask the townspeople to provide young men for initiation into the Kamajor society, which they did. A couple of weeks later, in late April 1996, the senior officer in charge of the SLA Brigade in Bo came to Baiama with 90 men, of whom 20 remained in the town and the other 70 went out on patrol. In early May 1996, unidentified uniformed men attacked Baiama and a number of houses were set on fire. The Kamajors stationed in Baiama believed the attack was perpetrated by SLA forces so there was no SLA presence in town until later in the month, when another SLA battalion was established in Baiama and began working together with the Kamajors.

Probably in early 1996,¹¹²⁴ the Kamajors from Bumpah Chiefdom attacked the RUF/SLA¹¹²⁵ camp called "Bulkoh". They killed up to 200 men, presumed to be both SLA and RUF forces. Some men

¹¹²² No further information is available.

¹¹²³ No further information is available.

¹¹²⁴ The exact date is unclear and could not be confirmed by open sources.

¹¹²⁵ As mentioned earlier, this camp was reportedly composed of both RUF and SLA forces.



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were shot on the ground and others were hiding in the trees, where they were shot, fell into the Tarba River and drowned. The female commander was killed, her body cut into pieces by the Kamajors and cooked in a large pot for the whole day. This was apparently done for retaliatory or revenge purposes and the woman was not subsequently eaten. Following this, Kamajors leaving the area of Bumpoh for Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom) were often caught by SLA forces and killed.

Following the attack on "Bulkoh" camp, Kamajors from Bumpoh Chiefdom moved from Bumpoh to Tikonko, where they established their base. Following an attack by the SLA forces, they went back to Bumpoh. On their way back to Bumpoh, they discovered villages that had been looted and burnt by SLA and RUF forces. In these villages, bodies were found with plastic in their eyes and some people had been amputated. At Serabu, for example, up to 300 buildings were burnt, including the hospital, and the convent and the Archbishop's compound appeared to have been looted.

The main Kamajor base in Valunia Chiefdom at that time was in Mandu, which is on the road leading from Tonkolili District south towards Selenga Chiefdom. After they successfully repelled the RUF forces from Kokahun, the Kamajor commander decided to initiate more men. To do so, he asked the seven Section Chiefs to give as many men as they could. It was at this stage that young boys, described as school-going boys under the age of 18, were also initiated. As their number increased, they planned to attack Bokurr, the main RUF base in the chiefdom. It is reported that they undertook this operation together with SLA forces. The Kamajors came back with a quantity of arms and ammunition and some property previously stolen by RUF forces. After this attack, RUF forces attacked the Kamajors in all the sections of the chiefdom; anytime there was any threat in one of the sections, Kamajors from the other sections would come to provide support.

On or around 20 June 1996 at Tellu (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom), the High Priest Initiator initiated up to 800 local hunters and youths into the Kamajor society. After the initiation, the new initiates were asked to return to their towns and villages to work for the protection of their towns and villages and for the chiefdom as a whole.

In July 1996, armed men attacked Tellu in large numbers, some dressed in complete military uniform and fully armed, while some were carrying two rifles, one in their hands and the other one slung across their backs. Some Kamajors were killed, as was the Fullah headman of Jiama Bongor Chiefdom. The Kamajor initiation site and some houses were burnt. Some Kamajors went to meet the advancing "rebels" - as described by civilians - and fought them near Gordie. The armed men were overpowered and the Kamajors came back with three heads, weapons and military uniforms. From what was found on the bodies, it appeared that most of them were military officers from the SLA Battalion deployed in Koribondo. The CDF National Coordinator was reported to have come to Gbaama the day after and to have left with some weapons and the military uniforms.

Thus, by the end of 1996, the whole District except Bo and Koribondo, which were controlled by SLA forces, was under CDF control. Clashes occurred many times between Kamajors and SLA forces at Koribondo and Bo Town. For example, towards the end of October 1996, fighting



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between those two forces took place in Bo Town and lasted several hours, leaving members of both sides and civilians dead.¹¹²⁶

Events in 1997

RUF forces launched subsequent attacks in Selenga Chiefdom in 1997 but each time, the Kamajors were successful in repelling those forces, with little killing of civilians or destruction of civilian property or houses.

In 1997, the Paramount Chief of Komboya Chiefdom, who had played an important role in bringing peace between the Kamajors and SLA forces in Bo, was invited together with some Kamajors to the Headquarter at Reservation Quarters, Bo Town. On his arrival, SLA forces opened fire, killing the Paramount Chief, some Kamajors and some civilians.

Kamajors controlled Bagbo and Lugbu Chiefdoms until the arrival of United Nations peacekeepers, during which time the Kamajors established a court system and assumed the mantle of authority from chiefs. At the same time, they were harassing the civilian population for food and suspected “rebel” collaborators were chased and killed. In addition, around this time,¹¹²⁷ the Commanders told the people in Limba (Bagbo Chiefdom) that the CDF National Coordinator had told them that every town under Kamajor control should contribute three stones of diamond not less than three carats each to buy weapons.

In Lugbu Chiefdom, about 85% of the male were initiated, some of them becoming initiates to avoid harassment. It is worth noting that after the Kamajors had taken control of an area, some people were initiated without the intention that they would become a fighter, in which case the initiation period was shorter. The general perception of the population and people who were initiated in this manner was that becoming a member was a protective measure, since people who were not members of the Kamajors could be suspected of being a “rebel” collaborator.

By 1997, Kamajors cleared Bagbe Chiefdom of an RUF presence and it appears that the AFRC regime did not affect Bagbe Chiefdom. In Badjia¹¹²⁸ and Boama Chiefdoms, the attitude of the Kamajors is described as having changed to become arrogant and disrespectful towards civilians.

¹¹²⁶ AFP, 31 October 1996. According to the Sierra Leone Bi-Monthly Information Report No.9, “the fighting in Bo town on 30 October, 1996 erupted following the acrimonious break-up of a meeting between the Kamajors and the military at Brigade Headquarters, the purpose of which was to enable the Kamajors and the military to resolve their differences over Talama”, a village west of Bo. Two days earlier, “[...] it was reported that Kamajors in Talama village tried to prevent members of the military from looting zinc roofing sheets from Njala University College, 7 miles outside Talama. In response, the military in Talama detained the Kamajors involved at the local barracks. On hearing this news other Kamajors in the area decided to converge on the barracks with a view to resolving the situation. En route, these Kamajors were ambushed by soldiers using RPG launchers and suffered casualties [...]”

¹¹²⁷ This date is not clear.

¹¹²⁸ RUF forces left Badjia Chiefdom, in the north-east of Bo District, in 1996, which then remained under the control of patrolling Kamajors. No further details are available as to under what circumstances the RUF forces departed or any acts committed by the Kamajors in the chiefdom at this time.



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The Kamajors deposed the Chiefs, established their own courts and required people to give them food and money and to work in the Kamajors' farms.¹¹²⁹

Once the Kamajors obtained control of Valunia Chiefdom, they operated checkpoints, where they issued travelling passes for Le 500 per day per traveller, described by the Kamajors as a war effort for their sustenance. Anybody wanting to move within this area had to purchase and, when required, produce such a pass. People who were suspected of being a member of the SLA were subject to interrogation, in some cases brief, and were punished and sometimes killed. Non-initiated civilians were required to provide them with food, which led many young adults to join the society. The Kamajors also took property from people passing through checkpoints. In one instance, one car that was seized was handed over to the Deputy Initiator, who was residing in Kongombahun in Niawa Langa village after she had fled Bo Town.

As mentioned, most of the Chiefs were deposed and the Kamajors took over their responsibilities. Civilians disobeying their orders or complaining about their authority would be punished. People were put in cages called a "kuliehun", which was so small that it would not reach the height of a person's knee. A common punishment inflicted was the use of FM rope, namely a nylon rope tied on two edges of a small stick around a person's hands and tightened.¹¹³⁰ Thus, in December 2000, while in Bo, a man who declared on the radio that the nomination of the new Regent Chief for Wunde was not endorsed by the population was arrested by Kamajors, severely beaten for six days and threatened to be killed before being released following pressure from a human rights activist. Other opponents to this nomination were also arrested and taken to CDF headquarters in Bo, although no further information is available on what happened to them.

Fighting between the Kamajors and SLA forces began spreading from Libi Junction in Malen Chiefdom to Bathurst, south of Koribondo, in April-May 1997. In one incident, SLA soldiers were captured, although no further information is available on what happened to them after their capture.

During the AFRC regime, RUF/AFRC forces were mainly concentrated in Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom) and Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) and on the highway between Bo and Koribondo. During this period, Kamajors attacked Koribondo on several occasions¹¹³¹ and RUF/AFRC forces were driven out during the beginning of 1998.

Shortly after the Coup in May 1997, the Kamajors drove the AFRC out of Gerihun (Boama Chiefdom) and back to Bo Town. However, in June 1997, when Gerihun was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces, the Kamajors were unable to defend the town as they ran out of ammunition and up to six civilians were killed, including the Paramount Chief. Many houses were burnt down, including that of the former Vice President of Sierra Leone.

¹¹²⁹ In addition, they tied people up and sometimes killed them, although no further details are available.
¹¹³⁰ This rope was called "FM", meaning "frequency modulation", because once tied with this rope, civilians spoke or confessed.
¹¹³¹ During an attack that took place in June, eight civilians were killed. However, it could not be ascertained how those civilians were killed: <http://www.focus-on-sierra-leone.co.uk>.



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In June 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked ECOMOG troops based at Gondama twice. The first time, the combined forces were not able to challenge the heavy firepower of the ECOMOG forces. However, some refugees were killed, some by drowning in the river. During the second attack, running out of ammunition, ECOMOG forces found refuge at the Mil Camp at Gbaama. As RUF/AFRC forces were controlling all the access roads to Gbaama, the welfare of these ECOMOG members were at stake, so 11 days after the attack, the local Kamajor commander took the decision to rescue them using a helicopter. The sounds of helicopter and jet fighters were heard flying towards Gbaama and Kamajors arriving by helicopter landed on the field of the Roman Catholic School. It took them several trips to rescue all the ECOMOG forces and by the end, the school was completely damaged, apparently by the constant landing and taking off of the helicopter. In November 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the township of Mamboma, to the north of Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom along the road from Telu, but were driven out by Kamajors coming from Gbaama.

RUF/AFRC forces based at Koribondo¹¹³² (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) patrolled the area and attacked Kamajor positions, killing both civilians and Kamajors. In June 1997, they attacked Bendu (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom), a Kamajor base, again killing both Kamajors and civilians and burning some houses.¹¹³³ The practice of looting by RUF/AFRC forces was also widespread at this time. As the RUF/AFRC attacks intensified, the Kamajors of Gbaama, Tikonko and Lugbu Chiefdoms attacked the RUF/AFRC base at Koribondo but were unsuccessful.

After May 1997, the Kamajors of Gbo Chiefdom started hunting what they called "Junta collaborators" and killed some people, although it was more common for them just to punish people they suspected of having any contact with the AFRC forces, for example by tying people up and making them stay out under the sun. The Kamajors also took food from civilians. It was useless to report these incidents, in particular the taking of food, to the CDF commander, who would reply by saying that his men were in the right, because they came to protect people.¹¹³⁴

A major incident took place in Tikonko Town (Tikonko Chiefdom) at this time. On 10 June 1997, the Kamajor's Chiefdom Ground Commander received a letter from the High Priest Initiator with the order to gather all Kamajors in Tikonko Chiefdom at Tikonko Town for the purpose of participating in an attack on RUF/AFRC positions at Bo Town. Approximately 200 or 300 Kamajors came from all directions of the chiefdom and two days later, more arrived. During their short stay, civilians were forced to feed them. These Kamajors engaged in stopping any RUF/AFRC movement southwards by blocking successfully the Bo-Mattru Jong (Bonthe District) road.¹¹³⁵

¹¹³² For the most part, from 1991 to 1997, the SLA had a base at Koribondo and controlled the town. When the Coup took place in May 1997, SLA forces became members of the AFRC and so, in general, former SLA bases became RUF/AFRC bases.

¹¹³³ One report states that while eight Kamajors, 11 adult civilians and one child were killed, after this attack 16 bodies dressed in military uniform were found.

¹¹³⁴ It is not clear who had control of the town at this point. While it appears that the Kamajors were in control, it is also said that at this time the CDF had been disbanded and the Kamajors were operating secretly.

¹¹³⁵ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 22 July - 4 August 1997. It is, however, not clear when the Kamajors attacked the town, as the reports make no mention of this (these) attack(s). However, according to the Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 23 August - 01 September 1997, fighting continued between



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At this time, RUF/AFRC forces began to disguise themselves as Kamajors and attack towns in Tikonko Chiefdom. People were able to identify them as RUF/AFRC forces because they had RPGs, AK47s and grenades, whereas the Kamajors were armed with single barrel guns, cutlasses, sticks and knives. One incident took place on 25 June 1997, with some men dressed in full Kamajor attire came from the direction of Bo, riding Honda motorbikes. This was confusing to the people of Tikonko, because Kamajors never rode motorbikes and, at the same time, rumours were going round that RUF/AFRC forces were heading for Tikonko Town. Shortly after the arrival of these men, the sound of RPG fire was heard in the town. RUF/AFRC forces entered the town, taking property and killing people. All those who were trapped in their houses were killed, including 11 people in one house near the market and a woman who was disembowelled. One of the Kamajors based in Tikonko Town was beaten and tortured before being killed. Many Kamajors died in the forest along Lembema Road, north of Tikonko Town. A similar incident occurred in January 1998, when RUF/AFRC forces coming from Bo went to Towama, between Bo and Tikonko towns, saying it was a Kamajor base. Four civilians were killed, up to 25 houses were burnt and property was taken away. The RUF/AFRC forces went back to Bo and stayed there until ECOMOG forces arrived.

After reports had reached the CDF National Coordinator that the Kamajor commander who had rescued the ECOMOG troops at Gondama (Kakua Chiefdom) was harassing, maiming, ill-treating and killing civilians, this commander was replaced by another one, who became commander for Jiama Bongor, Bagbe, Lugbu and Tikonko Chiefdoms. In the weeks that followed (July 1997), there was relative peace, although the Kamajors began to steal property.

RUF/AFRC forces again bombarded the ECOMOG position at Gondama on 11 October 1997; ECOMOG responded by bombing RUF/AFRC positions, using Nigerian warplanes.¹¹³⁶

In December 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kamajors at Baiama (Gbo Chiefdom). A few days later, one man and one woman who were suspected of being relatives of an AFRC member were killed at Baiama Junction and their bodies remained lying there until they decomposed.

Operation "Black December" was declared in December 1997 by the CDF High Command in a bid to take control of RUF/AFRC positions and was implemented in Boama Chiefdom. As part of this operation, all the highways and roads leading to the villages were blocked, in order to prevent RUF/AFRC forces from attacking civilians. Due to this operation, Kamajors became increasingly dependant on civilians to obtain food and medication, as the supply routes were blocked. Nevertheless, the operation also successfully prevented RUF/AFRC movement and enabled the CDF to counter-attack the RUF/AFRC forces in Gerihun.

Events in 1998

Kamajors and RUF/AFRC forces in the south of Bo Town, which may suggest that fighting already took place previously. Furthermore, it is clear that whatever battle may have taken place in the area between the RUF/AFRC and the Kamajors, the RUF/AFRC forces were still in control of the town.

¹¹³⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1 - 13 October 1997.



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In February 1998, fighting took place between Kamajors and RUF/AFRC forces all over the Southern Province, which led to the withdrawal of the combined forces. By early 1998, the Kamajors had regained control of Boama Chiefdom until the arrival of ECOMOG forces around 20-22 February 1998.¹¹³⁷

That same month, two boys came to Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom), their hands covered in blood. They told the people of Koribondo that Kamajors had shot their hands and that they were coming to attack Koribondo; indeed, the Kamajors did attack the town on 13 February. During this attack, two AFRC soldiers and two Kamajors died. Soon after, the AFRC forces withdrew from Koribondo, following the ousting of their government from Freetown in February 1998. The attitude of the Kamajors panicked people, who decided to move to Bo Town, where houses identified as occupied by Koribondo people were harassed. This situation lasted until ECOMOG arrived in Bo Town in February or early March 1998.¹¹³⁸

Around 16-17 February, there was a major battle between RUF/AFRC and ECOMOG forces in Bo Town;¹¹³⁹ hundreds of people fled the town. The town was set on fire, massively looted and bodies were left lying on the streets. RUF/AFRC forces looted three commercial banks, destroyed the telecommunications network and damaged the Bo-Kenema power facility serving the Eastern Province.¹¹⁴⁰ Shortly after, around 20 February, ECOMOG troops based at Kenema deployed in the north and east of the town, areas previously held by Kamajors and then in the town itself, where Kamajors had been fighting RUF/AFRC forces.¹¹⁴¹ After RUF/AFRC forces had left the town, youths were searching for RUF/AFRC members and their “collaborators”, including people who were suspected of being Temne.¹¹⁴² Those suspects who were caught were killed, some hacked to death and others had tyres put around their neck, which were then set on fire.¹¹⁴³ Furthermore, a committee created for processing stolen property “discovered a large dockside area that had been used to take such goods out of the country”.¹¹⁴⁴

¹¹³⁷ Key persons recognise that some atrocities were committed by Kamajors but tried to justify them, saying that anyway, there was no law or order and that these Kamajors were not trained for war as soldiers but took arms to defend democracy. They continued by stating that since most of them were not educated, you could not expect them to observe rules and regulations governing “warriors”.

¹¹³⁸ It is not clear from the records when ECOMOG arrived in Bo Town. However, ECOMOG movements in the rest of the country, in particular in Port Loko, Moyamba and Tonkolili Districts, as well as their arrival date in Kenema District suggests that ECOMOG troops had to be in Bo Town by the very beginning of March at the latest. Some contingents of ECOMOG forces were however already deployed in the District at Gondama (it has to be remembered that the Gondama Camp since 1993 was placed under the protection of Nigerian troops).

¹¹³⁹ Open sources revealed that on 16 February, over 10,000 well-armed Kamajors entered the town from three different directions and “several junta soldiers and their sympathisers were killed or tried on the spot and handed over to anti-junta youths for execution [...]”: AAP, 17 February 1998.

¹¹⁴⁰ AFP, 24 February 1998.

¹¹⁴¹ AFP, 24 February 1998; BBC Online News Archive, 25 February 1998.

¹¹⁴² The RUF leader was a Temne by tribe whereas the Kamajors were Mende.

¹¹⁴³ No more information could be obtained on this event.

¹¹⁴⁴ AFP, 24 February 1998.



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On their way out of Bo Town, civilians were thoroughly searched at Kamajor checkpoints. At one checkpoint on the way to Manguama, which lies north-east of Bo Town, some civilians were stripped naked, tied up and forced to sit on the ground, suspected of being “Junta” collaborators. These people were later killed. In another incident on 17 February, civilians coming in a truck were asked to show their passes at a checkpoint at Baiama junction (Gbo Chiefdom). Those who could not produce them were put into a cell made up of sticks and were beaten.

Kamajor harassment of the civilian population, including physical violence, looting and the burning of houses, continued throughout 1998. In one instance in Baiama (Gbo Chiefdom), a woman suspected of being an AFRC member’s wife was killed and her body was displayed at the checkpoint. In the villages where they had found refuge, people were harassed by Kamajors for food.

Around June 1998, a large number of Kamajors attacked Koribondo, looting and burning over 70 houses. Shortly after the town was set ablaze, the CDF National Coordinator came to Koribondo and held a meeting at the village square, at which people of the town were present. During this meeting, he allegedly thanked the Kamajors but reprimanded them from not having followed his instructions completely, as he had told the Kamajors not to spare any building except the church, hospital, mosque and the village square. It appears that this attack was partly done in retaliation for Koribondo people hosting SLA and RUF/AFRC forces. Following this incident, some ECOMOG troops arrived in Koribondo to investigate the matter and the Kamajor commander together with 20 of his forces were arrested and taken to Bo.¹¹⁴⁵

Kamajors went to the south of Kakua Chiefdom to villages including Baoma, Segbwema, Adala and Berehun. On three separate occasions in December 1998, they took people’s possessions, including cars, clothes and other valuable items, as well as any food they could find, including livestock. In addition, Kamajors targeted people suspected of being collaborators with both SLA and AFRC soldiers. One example is from the end of 1998, when the Kamajors drew up a list of the 25 “most wanted” people, who were suspected of having hosted soldiers in their houses. A letter was sent to Sembehun that Kamajors would attack the town to kill those 25 most wanted people and on the day they stated, a large group of Kamajors¹¹⁴⁶ came to Sembehun. Although nobody was killed, as the 25 people were nowhere to be found, a lot of houses were burnt down. A short while later, the CDF commander based at Koribondo, who had control over Sembehun and who led the search in December, required the 25 people to come to Koribondo and pay Le 50,000 each, or they would be killed. The people did as they were told and then were allowed to leave.

Following the RUF/AFRC invasion of Freetown in January 1999, negotiations started between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. A ceasefire was signed in May and a peace accord supposed to mark the end of the conflict and known as the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed on 7 July in the Togolese capital. An important part of the accord was that the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process was to start within six weeks of its entry into force. This process, somehow delayed, was formally launched by the President of Sierra Leone on 20

¹¹⁴⁵ It is not clear from the records what happened to these Kamajors after they were taken to Bo.

¹¹⁴⁶ Records relate that “thousands” of Kamajors came to Sembehun on this day.



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October 1999 during a ceremony at Wilberforce Barracks, Freetown and began properly on 4 November. However, despite the calls of the RUF leader and ex-AFRC leader to their troops to disarm,¹¹⁴⁷ disarmament was implemented at a very slow pace, thus hindering the deployment of humanitarian aid in the country. The delay of the process was mainly due to the resumed fighting in the Northern Province and in Kono District.¹¹⁴⁸ In the meanwhile, the first UN peacekeepers arrived in the country and, in January, troops from the Ghanaian contingent arrived in Bo District.¹¹⁴⁹

In a bid to foster and enhance the DDR process, sites for new DDR camps were identified around 10 March 2000, one being located at Gondama (Kakua Chiefdom).¹¹⁵⁰ However, the disarmament process was stalled in May 2000, following the capture by RUF forces of over 300 UN peacekeepers in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The process would be given a new start in November 2000 when the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed a new ceasefire agreement in Abuja, Nigeria.¹¹⁵¹

On 31 January 2001, a CDF meeting was convened at the CDF District Headquarters in Bo Town in the presence of the UNAMSIL military observers (MILOBs) team for Bo, the resident Minister, the Deputy Defence Minister, the CDF District Administrator and the NCDDR (National Commission for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) representative. At this meeting, the problems caused by the CDF in the District were discussed, including the recent attack on the NCDDR office, the reorganisation of the CDF and CDF interference in police matters. During a separate meeting convened by the Deputy Defence Minister, the reorganisation of the CDF in the District was discussed, rather than its disbanding.¹¹⁵²

By 31 March 2001, the 14 chiefdoms of the District were declared safe for resettlement, thereby making the entire Southern Province safe, unlike the North, where humanitarian activities were not possible in three-quarters of the Province, and in the East, where the whole of Kono and Kailahun Districts (except Daru) and six chiefdoms in Kenema District were still considered unsafe.¹¹⁵³

¹¹⁴⁷ On 10 January, the RUF leader, the ex-AFRC leader and the Deputy Minister of Defence and CDF National Coordinator stopped in Bo Town, as part of sensitisation trip on the disarmament campaign, aimed at exhorting combatants, namely ex-AFRC, RUF and CDF, to disarm: IRIN West Africa, 10 January 2000.

¹¹⁴⁸ In November 1999, only 1,500 combatants had disarmed out of the estimated total of 45,000 combatants: IRIN West Africa, 17 November 1999.

¹¹⁴⁹ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established by Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999), adopted on 22 October 1999. Six thousand peacekeepers were sent into the country and their number would increase over the coming months, following the security developments in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

¹¹⁵⁰ The initial camps were located at Port Loko North, Port Loko South, Kenema Town and Daru (Kailahun District): IRIN West Africa, 17 March 2000.

¹¹⁵¹ The security situation in the Northern and Eastern Provinces prevailing in 2000 urged the Government of Sierra Leone to negotiate a ceasefire with the RUF in November 2000. On 4 May 2001, those parties would meet again in Abuja, Nigeria to review the ceasefire. Further to the meeting in May 2001, those parties would hold monthly tripartite meetings as the Joint Committee on DDR. The final meeting took place in January 2002 when disarmament was declared complete and the war over.

¹¹⁵² UNAMSIL press briefing, 31 January 2001.

¹¹⁵³ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 11 – 31 March 2001.



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Following the meeting in Abuja in May 2001, disarmament was carried out at different dates across the country. It was scheduled to start in Bo District by the end of September 2001¹¹⁵⁴ but was briefly delayed. However, during a symbolic disarmament ceremony in Gerihun (Boama Chiefdom) on 20 October 2001, over 80 CDF members disarmed in the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Sierra Leone and were transported to the DDR camp at Gondama, where the SRSG addressed the now ex-combatants.¹¹⁵⁵

At the conclusion of the seventh tripartite meeting of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), comprising representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and the RUF held in Freetown on 8 November 2001, it was communicated that disarmament would be complete in Bo District on 10 November 2001.¹¹⁵⁶

3. Conclusion

The pattern of the conflict in Bo District followed to a large extent the one of the three other southern Districts. The RUF/NPFL incursion in Pujehun District in 1991 expanded in the bordering chiefdoms of Bo District. Successful SLA counter-attacks in 1991 and 1992 limited the RUF/NPFL attacks to a lower scale, mainly carried out by “pockets” of RUF/NPFL members for food finding purposes. The situation was similar in Bonthe and Pujehun Districts and would continue until the second phase of the conflict began in 1994.

As in the rest of the Southern Province, the conflict reached its peak in Bo District in 1994 and 1995, as RUF forces spread across the whole District. Their strong grip over the District would allow RUF forces to advance further inland towards the north-west (Moyamba District) and the south-west (Bonthe District), where most of the attacks in 1995 originated from Bo District through Moyamba District, unlike in 1991 when Bonthe District was affected by RUF /NPFL forces coming from Pujehun District. During this period, SLA forces were wholly unable to contain the RUF advance into the District and in the Southern Province as a whole, although (or because) their numbers increased greatly in 1994.

This RUF progression and stay in the whole Southern Province and in Bo District in particular was gradually stopped by the initiative of the Kamajors who started fighting alongside the SLA in 1996. The collaboration between those two forces however deteriorated rapidly and fighting between them reached its climax in early 1997. At this time, the Kamajors and the SLA were controlling distinct and separate areas of the District.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown and its deployment in different towns in the Provinces in 1998, the Southern Province became free of RUF/AFRC attacks and instead came under the total control of the Kamajors. Bo District was not affected by the retreating RUF/AFRC

¹¹⁵⁴ IRIN West Africa, 13 August 2001; UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 August 2001. For example, in early August 2001, the Joint Committee on DDR declared disarmament complete for Port Loko and Kambia Districts.

¹¹⁵⁵ UNAMSIL press briefing, 23 October 2001.

¹¹⁵⁶ UNAMSIL press briefing, 09 November 2001. However, the target date of 30 November 2001 for the completion of the process in the whole country was not met and the disarmament was declared complete in January 2002.



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forces from Freetown, as they regrouped and concentrated on the main mining areas (Kono District and north of Kenema District) and those areas in which CDF members did not have established and constant control, mostly in the Northern Province.

Throughout the conflict, widespread violations were committed primarily by RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC forces, but also by SLA forces and Kamajors, especially once they firmly established their control and authority over the District. Those violations were directed against civilians and their property and included stealing and destruction of property, physical violence, sexual assault, killing and abduction for use as fighters, workers or “wives”. Only a few cases of mutilation were reported for the District, as most of these incidents took place during a specific RUF/AFRC operation called “Operation No Living Thing” in the first months of 1998 and following the retreat from Freetown. Furthermore, while it hosted thousands of IDPs from other Districts, mainly Pujehun District, Bo District suffered less internal displacement of its own population.

b. Bonthe District

1. **Introduction**

Bonthe District is located in the south-west of the Southern Province of the Republic of Sierra Leone. It is the only District in the Southern Province that shares boundaries with the other three Districts in the Province, namely Moyamba and Bo Districts in the north and Pujehun District in the south and east. Bonthe District is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean in the west.

Although located on Sherbro Island,¹¹⁵⁷ its headquarter, Bonthe Town, is not part of the two chiefdoms of the island (Sittia and Dema Chiefdoms). Rather, its is part of another administrative structure, the Sherbro Rural District.

There are 11 chiefdoms in the District, two of which are located Sherbro Island:

Chiefdom	Headquarter
Bendu Cha	Bendu
Bum	Madina
Dema	Tissana
Imperi	Gbangbama
Jong	Mattru
Kpanda Kemo	Matuo
Kwamwbai Krim	Tei
Nongoba Bullom	Gbap
Sittia	Yonni
Sogbini	Tihun
Yawbeko	Talia

¹¹⁵⁷ This island is commonly known as “Bonthe Island”.



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The presence of the water, whether it is the ocean, the rivers or the swamp, is the most striking natural feature of the District. The nine chiefdoms of the mainland are separated by the ocean from the two chiefdoms located on Sherbro Island. The south of the District, especially Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom is an area made up of swampland.

The two main rivers of the District, the Sewa River and the Jong River, both of them taking their source directly in the ocean, would affect the deployment of the forces throughout the conflict. They would be a substitute way of communications, especially in the south of the District where the road network is rather poor. The highway that links Bo Town to Mattru (Jong Chiefdom), via Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom, Bo District) and Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom would allow rapid penetration into the north of the District from Bo District. From this highway, secondary roads extend into the neighbouring chiefdoms of Sogbini and Imperi.

The main economic activities include fishing, rice growing and palm plantations but the greatest revenue is generated by the rutile mining in the north of the District, particularly in Imperi Chiefdom. The north of the District and the south of Moyamba District, which advances into Bonthe District, are indeed renowned for the importance of their mining activities, which procured vital economic resources for the Government.

The ten years of conflict in Sierra Leone started in Bonthe District as early as April 1991, due to the fact that the District shares a border with Pujehun District, which was one of the entry points of the RUF/NPFL forces into Sierra Leone in March 1991. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces entered the border chiefdom of Kwamebai Krim in May. This was the start of a long series of hostilities and atrocities committed against the civilians in the District, which lasted until the completion of disarmament in the District in mid 2001.

From this first incursion, Bonthe District was affected by the conflict through three discernable phases, the first one running from 1991 until the end of 1994. During the first attack in May 1991, RUF/NPFL forces settled in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom for a short while before moving westwards to the neighbouring chiefdom of Nongoba Bullom. When entering a village, they would always proceed in the same manner: they gathered the civilians in the Court Barrie, introduced themselves as "freedom fighters" coming to redeem Sierra Leoneans from the corrupt APC regime and deposed and replaced local authorities. Defeated by the SLA forces some months later, they withdrew from Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom to their base in the south-west of Pujehun District. At the time of this first incursion, SLA forces were deployed mainly in Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island) but by the end of 1991, more bases in the east of the District were set up. RUF/NPFL forces occupied Bum Chiefdom for six months before being repelled by the SLA. Although RUF/NPFL attacks were still reported during the subsequent years of this first phase, they never succeeded in going further than the three chiefdoms of Kwamebai Krim, Bum and Nongoba Bullom. In 1994, RUF forces coming from Pujehun District re-entered the District and succeeded in controlling some areas in those three chiefdoms.



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Each of the RUF/NPFL and, later, RUF incursions was marked by violence against civilians; indeed, from the very beginning of the conflict in the District, there were incidents of physical violence against civilians, who were also killed, raped and abducted for the purposes of using them as fighters or workers. Government authorities in particular were targeted. Those forces also stole civilians' property, mainly food and domestic animals, and destroyed houses and other buildings. The SLA forces also imposed harm on civilians in general and on "collaborators" in particular, killing those suspected of having collaborating with the RUF/NPFL and RUF during their stay in their villages. Civilians were also harassed for their food and other property. As the conflict continued, SLA violence heightened, with cases of killing, rape and use of civilians for forced labour being reported. By the close of this first phase, rumours of imminent RUF attacks in the other chiefdoms of the District were rampant.

The second phase encompassed 1995 to February 1998 and is characterised by the spreading of the conflict across the District. By February 1995, RUF forces controlled all of the northern chiefdoms of the District and proceeded southwards and westwards in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to attack Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island. Training bases were opened across those chiefdoms under RUF control. This phase was marked by a clear increase in violence against civilians, as RUF forces settled in those areas. Physical violence, killings, rapes and the abductions of civilians, mainly to be trained as fighters and to work for the forces continued to be carried out on a scale much larger than during the first phase. Also during this period, a massive killing, which was scarcely reported in the media, took place in late 1995.

By the end of the year, the RUF were dislodged from most of their strongholds by SLA forces assisted by foreign troops and Kamajors, who had earlier emerged in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom and subsequently developed in the other chiefdoms. During the subsequent years until the Coup in May 1997, Kamajors entrenched their control of the District, although some skirmishes with RUF forces were still reported. The Kamajors' initial collaboration with the SLA did not last long as tension and fighting erupted between the two factions.

Following the 25 May 1997 Coup, the RUF/AFRC were concentrated in Bonthe Town, from where the Kamajors had pulled out but maintained a covert presence around the town, allowing them to retake control of the town the day after the RUF/AFRC retreat in 1998. Civilians rapidly suffered at the hands of the Kamajors, who increased their demands on civilians, chased RUF collaborators and started regulating people's everyday life. The Chiefs, whose actions had been paralysed during the RUF stay, were again deposed and had no authority over their chiefdoms, as the Kamajors set up their own administrative structures and appointed their own Town Chiefs. Civilians were constantly harassed for food and other items; this harassment included physical violence and killing, mainly of alleged collaborators.

The last phase ran from February 1998 to the completion of disarmament in late 2001. During this time, the Kamajors were in total control of the District, as no more RUF or AFRC forces were operating in the District. The brief return of RUF/AFRC forces to Bonthe Town following the invasion of Freetown did not much change the situation of the District, let alone Bonthe Town. The Kamajors continued to impose and affirm their authority in every aspect of life, deciding over



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administrative and private matters, chasing “rebel” and “Junta” collaborators and intensifying their havoc on civilians. This would continue until the completion of disarmament and the deployment of UN peacekeepers throughout the District in late 2001.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1991

In early April 1991, traders coming from Bo Waterside (Soro Gberma Chiefdom, Pujehun District) reported to inhabitants of Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom that unknown gunmen had crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia.¹¹⁵⁸ Soon after, on 9 May 1991, RUF/NPFL forces coming from Gbandapi (Panga Kabone, Pujehun District)¹¹⁵⁹ arrived by canoes to Tei (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) in the south of Bonthe District, while civilians were conducting a ceremonial rite. These forces were allegedly led by some civilians from the chiefdom who had earlier gone to Gbandapi to bring them to Tei in search of the Paramount Chief.¹¹⁶⁰

On their arrival in Tei, one member of the RUF/NPFL forces shot a person in the leg, not knowing he was the Paramount Chief for whom they were searching. The Paramount Chief fled to the bush to hide from the forces. The RUF/NPFL forces asked civilians where they could find the Paramount Chief and when civilians revealed he was the man previously shot in the leg, the RUF/NPFL forces became more aggressive and beat people. The Paramount Chief was found behind his house, had his hands tied behind his back and was brought at the front of his house, where his property was taken away¹¹⁶¹ in his presence. He was then taken into his house and shot many times before the house was set on fire. His head was cut off and allegedly brought to Gbandapi. The RUF/NPFL forces appointed a man to be Town Commander of Tei and asked him to take care of the town in their absence.

In the same month, the combined forces entered Topain (north of Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom). There, they identified themselves as RUF fighting along side the NPFL from Liberia, who were mainly Burkinabes and Liberians. They assembled all the men and elderly people in the centre of the town and made them sit in the sun, on the accusation that they knew where the SLA forces and the staff of the Paramount Chief were. Property was taken, including household items and livestock. People were abducted and forced to carry the loads.

The RUF/NPFL forces then headed for the town of Borleh, which is four miles from Topain. In that village a man was slaughtered and mutilated in his house. They went further south to Mass

¹¹⁵⁸ Bo Waterside is the crossing point between Liberia and Sierra Leone and, by April, the RUF/NPFL had spread across Pujehun District.

¹¹⁵⁹ Gbandapi is located on the bank of Malemie River, which joins the Wanjei River that flows to Bonthe District. It is renowned for hosting weekly trade fares where slat is predominantly sold. The RUF/NPFL forces were based there for a while.

¹¹⁶⁰ Reports recount that a disgruntled man who had an argument with the Paramount Chief over a land issue went to Gbandapi to relate his fate to the RUF/NPFL forces. This has to be read in conjunction with the fact that the RUF/NPFL forces had been targeting Paramount Chiefs since they entered the territory of Sierra Leone, as the Chiefs represented the APC Government in the chiefdoms.

¹¹⁶¹ The property taken away included clothing, money earmarked for the mechanical cultivation of the rice the following year, two single barrel guns, rice and other personnel belongings.



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Kpanguma, where they carried out similar actions as they had done in Topain, to where they returned in the evening of the same day. Topain was at that time selected to be a training centre as it was on a flat land and reasonably close to their base at Gbandapi (Panga Kabone Chiefdom, Pujehun District). The young men of the town were taken aside and encouraged to join the RUF/NPFL forces since they claimed to be fighting against corruption and for the liberation of the people of Sierra Leone. The young men were then assigned to operate checkpoints established at the entrance of the town.

From Topain, the forces went on daily stealing and killing sprees in the neighbouring villages. Young and elderly people were forced to carry loads from neighbouring villages to Topain and onwards to Gbandapi. A load meant to be carried by three people was often given to one person to carry.

On one Sunday in May, RUF/NPFL forces attacked Kale (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom), a town approximately 10 miles to the west of Topain. A lot of property was taken, including food items and livestock. The former Regent Chief was captured and seriously flogged before he was taken to Topain, where he was finally killed. His head was cut off and put at the main junction in the village for everybody to see.¹¹⁶² This killing was reported to the RUF High Command in Gbandapi, which led to the withdrawal of the troops based at Topain and to the court martial of the commander who had ordered the killing of the former Regent Chief. This commander was killed and replaced by another commander.¹¹⁶³ The forces continued stealing and killing in the surrounding villages and attacked the town of Benduma (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom), three miles from Topain. The Chiefdom Speaker was captured there together with his three sons and some of his relatives. The RUF/NPFL forces took all of his property, then forced him and his sons to carry it for them to Gbandapi, where one of the sons and a relative were later killed.

Later in May 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces left Topain for Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island to launch an attack on the SLA forces based there. They gathered their forces from all their minor bases in and around Topain, abducted young men and elderly people to carry stolen property for them and took away all the canoes they could find from the surrounding villages. They continued to take property in the villages they passed on their way. There are reports of clashes between them and SLA forces along the way. A few days later, a heavy battle took place in the area surrounding Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island) between the RUF/NPFL forces and the SLA forces.¹¹⁶⁴ Most of the RUF/NPFL forces retreated to their base at Gbandapi while others were killed and the SLA forces at Bonthe Town also started to advance to Topain.

From their base at Gbandapi, the RUF/NPFL forces came at intervals to attack neighbouring towns and villages in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom but this time, they did not follow the previous pattern of introducing themselves as “freedom fighters”. Rather, their attacks were allegedly carried out for

¹¹⁶² It is further revealed that to make it more fearful, a cigarette was placed into the mouth of the dismembered head. This killing led many civilians to flee to the bush.

¹¹⁶³ To a certain extent, the RUF adopted the internal structure and organisation of the Sierra Leone Army.

¹¹⁶⁴ However, attacks actually taking place on Sherbro Island were not reported. It is accordingly more likely that this battle took place somewhere between Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom and Bendu Cha Chiefdom, on the western edge of the mainland. No further information is available on this event.



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reasons of reprisal, as they accused the civilians of supporting the SLA forces. Furthermore, they were poorly dressed and some were barefoot. For example, on 14 May 1991, RUF/NPFL forces entered Topain at 6.00am and fired continuously to scare people away. Civilians ran into the bush, leaving the RUF/NPFL forces free to take whatever property they could find. They also raped five young women, some under the age of 12. A three-month-old suckling mother was raped by many assailants.

Another attack was made on the town just one week later. This time not many people were found and the forces had to search for them in their hiding places in the bush. RUF/NPFL forces inflicted physical violence on the civilians and took away nearly all of their property, which consisted mainly of food items. Those civilians found hiding were severely beaten and their property was taken from them; some were brought into the town and forced to catch the remaining livestock for the forces. A woman was beaten with sticks until her skull cracked.¹¹⁶⁵ Another was seriously beaten all over her body on the accusation of having committed adultery with the fighting forces. Others had hot melted plastic dripped in their eyes. Two houses, two kitchens and the Court Barrie were burnt by the troops on that day before they left for neighbouring villages. They returned in the evening from the direction they had come, bringing a lot of young men and boys below the ages of 12 and 15.

As their base in Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island) was too far to enable them to fight the RUF/NPFL concentrated in the south-east of the District, the SLA made a base south of Topain at Massa Kpanguma (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom). One hundred and fifty of them came to the chiefdom between June and July 1991, all in full military uniform and armed with new weapons including AK47s, RPGs, LMGs, mortar guns and grenades. From there, they went to Topain to open another base. Arriving in Topain, they gathered the young men¹¹⁶⁶ of the town and told them they must help the SLA forces in ensuring the security of the town, mainly by operating checkpoints.

At this time, the SLA forces had already begun to harass civilians; for example, anyone who refused to operate a checkpoint was severely beaten and/or arrested and put in detention. Women were sometimes raped by some SLA members while their husbands were kept in detention. Other civilians from neighbouring villages were captured and brought to Topain to work as labourers. Their wives and children were taken away to unknown places and nobody knows what happened to them. The situation was similar at Massa Kpanguma, where civilians were forced to feed the SLA forces even although these forces already had their own supplies of food.¹¹⁶⁷

After a month staying in Topain, the SLA forces commanded the civilians to arm themselves with sticks, cutlasses or any other potential weapon to be ready to fight the RUF/NPFL forces who were threatening to attack the town. An ambush was laid at Bandakor, a village close to Topain, but the RUF/NPFL forces did not come at that time.

¹¹⁶⁵ This woman reportedly had significant and permanent mental health problems following this attack.

¹¹⁶⁶ No further information is available about how young these people were.

¹¹⁶⁷ Every town or village was to contribute 24 dozen fish, a bag of rice, five litres of palm oil and Le 25,000 on a monthly basis.



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Between June and July 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces attacked the town of Sohlon (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom, which adjoins Kwamebai-Krim Chiefdom to the west). Dressed in country clothes with red bandanas tied around their heads, the forces came together with some of the inhabitants of the town and some people from Pujehun District, all speaking the Mende dialect.¹¹⁶⁸ Those civilians had allegedly joined the forces willingly and were leading them and indicating the places where they could find SLA forces, Lebanese businessman and Government authorities or their relatives. On their arrival, the RUF/NPFL forces summoned a meeting of all the people of the town and instructed the Section Chief to detain everyone until they came back from Yelewa (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom). Two days after the attack of Sohlon, Yelewa was also attacked. The forces held a meeting with the civilians in the town and killed one prosperous businessman and native hunter after he was asked to produce his gun. His body was left in the open to rot, as the RUF/NPFL forces prevented people from burying it.

At around this time, the eight SLA members who had come to Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) from Bonthe Town asked civilians to help them construct an elevation at the jetty on which they could put their anti-aircraft gun. However, the SLA forces soon realised that the RUF/NPFL forces would overpower them and went back to Bonthe Town to obtain reinforcements from the SLA naval branch. Most of the RUF/NPFL forces left Yelewa after two days by boat, taking a lot of civilians with them, allegedly for use as protection against attack. Along the route for the headquarter town of Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) on the north bank of the river,¹¹⁶⁹ the RUF/NPFL forces reached the junction on the Sewa River at Yele, which has routes going both to Bonthe and Gbap. On their arrival, they were attacked by the SLA reinforcements coming from Bonthe, who killed many of the RUF/NPFL forces. Civilians who were travelling with the RUF/NPFL forces had to dive and swim underwater to the other side, where they hid themselves until the battle was over. The SLA forces then went back to Gbap and from there to Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island).

The remaining RUF/NPFL forces (about eight of them) who were not part of the crossing went to Daama (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) where they took civilians' property, mostly clothes, food items and a box of tobacco, and forced a woman to cook for them. The troops then went to Mecca (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), where they abducted two men to bring the stolen property across the river to Yele before letting them go and telling them to go back to Mecca. The forces then withdrew from the chiefdom and retreated to Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom.

Some civilians and SLA forces who were left at Bandakor (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) were attacked in November 1991 by RUF/NPFL forces coming from the Gbandapi route. The SLA forces were forced to retreat to Topain before going on to their base at Mass Kpanguma. After two days, they returned to Topain and launched a counter-attack that successfully repelled the RUF/NPFL forces from Bandakor. More civilians were brought from neighbouring villages to Massa Kpanguma and used as labourers by the SLA forces. However, RUF/NPFL forces attacked

¹¹⁶⁸ Those RUF/NPFL forces probably came directly from Pujehun District, using the Wanjei River, which flows almost parallel to the Ocean.

¹¹⁶⁹ The natural features of Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom are very unique, as the Sewa River separates the mainland on the north from the south edge, composed of a long strip of swamps and bordered by the Atlantic Ocean.



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Massa Kpanguma two weeks later, killing a lot of civilians. Defeated, the SLA forces pulled out of the town¹¹⁷⁰ and when the SLA forces based at Topain heard of this attack, they also left the area. The surviving civilians fled to the bush but the RUF/NPFL forces did not settle in the town, destroying houses and taking livestock as they left the village. The day after the battle at Massa Kpanguma, the SLA forces who had pulled out passed by Korankor (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom); at a nearby village they tried to stop all the civilians at a checkpoint but as the fleeing population grew, they let them go.

Civilians at Mano (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), at the border with Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, abandoned the town and boarded a patrol boat together with the SLA forces to safer areas. No sooner had they left than the RUF/NPFL forces entered the towns of Korankor and Mano. Civilians who had fled Korankor described discovering bodies when they returned to the village, mostly the elderly and children who could not find their way in the bush. They also found a lot of dwellings burnt, including the mosque, the Bondo society house and the Court Barrie. Civilians were also abducted to carry the stolen property.¹¹⁷¹ This incident forced civilians to abandon the town for the bush where they made makeshift camps. Food and medicine were difficult to get while in the bush, which led to many deaths, especially of children.

SLA forces who later entered the towns of Mano and Korankor after the RUF/NPFL attacks took civilian property, such as building materials and household utensils. The forces then burnt down the remaining two houses in Korankor when leaving the town. After this incident, SLA troops went from town to town identifying civilians they alleged to be “enemy collaborators”, who they executed in public without any trial.¹¹⁷²

In November 1991, approximately 25 armed men entered the town of Kanga Oil Mill (Bum Chiefdom), at the border with Bo District (Bagbo Chiefdom). Civilians suspected those armed forces, who were carrying talisman and other charms, were NPFL forces, because they were all speaking in Liberian dialect. They were proved right as the men introduced themselves as NPFL forces who had come to liberate the people of Sierra Leone from the then APC government. The civilians cheered them and the night passed without incident, the forces leaving the next morning for Madina. On their way to Madina, they came across a commercial vehicle and took it to continue their journey. As in Kanga Oil Mill, their arrival in town passed without incident and they left to go back to Bo District. However, at some point on their way, they killed a Lebanese businessman, drank his blood and threw his body into a river.¹¹⁷³

¹¹⁷⁰ This battle at Massa Kpanguma was also reported as taking place in July 1991. As this information could not be reconciled with the attack on Bandakor, which allegedly took place in November, it has to be considered that all these actions were carried out in the same period of time, between broadly July and November 1991.

¹¹⁷¹ It is reported that the RUF/NPFL forces went back to the direction of Soro Gbema Chiefdom (Pujehun District). This action, although carried out by an important number of RUF/NPFL forces that forced SLA to escape, was probably not part of a wider movement to advance into the District, as at this time, the SLA forces had repelled most of the RUF/NPFL forces out of Bo and Pujehun Districts.

¹¹⁷² Although one report mentioned that at this time, RUF/NPFL forces were based in Topain, it seems that RUF/NPFL forces were no longer settled in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom and launched their attacks from Pujehun District.

¹¹⁷³ The exact location of this incident could not be ascertained.



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One month later, NPFL forces together with RUF forces again entered Bum Chiefdom in Madina, where they abducted the Paramount Chief and took her to an unknown destination.¹¹⁷⁴ They recruited a large number of the town's inhabitants, including young boys and girls, into the fighting forces, which swelled from 50 to about 200. During their stay in Madina, they forced civilians to carry loads, raped young girls and women in the town and flogged elderly men and women. Town Commanders and secretaries were appointed in villages and towns in the chiefdom to carry out directives from the RUF/NPFL forces, disregarding any other authority in the chiefdom.

RUF/NPFL forces, around 45 in number, also reached Kanga Oil Mill, firing randomly while entering the town. Civilians were gathered at the Court Barrie and detained there while the forces took away property and food items. They introduced themselves as "freedom fighters" who had come to liberate the people of Sierra Leone from the APC misrule. They carried with them sophisticated weapons, large quantity of arms and ammunition. During their first night, they raped young girls, most of whom were between 12 and 13. During their stay in the town,¹¹⁷⁵ RUF/NPFL forces deposed all the chiefdom authorities, appointed Town Commanders and Town Mothers and passed laws for the civilians, saying they had come to settle in the area.¹¹⁷⁶ While no incidents of mutilation, killing or destruction of property were reported, the RUF/NPFL forces forced civilians to work for them, raped women and girls, beat people and inflicted punishments such as frog jump¹¹⁷⁷ and rolling on the ground. Youths were encouraged to join the RUF/NPFL forces. Old as well as young people were forced to carry loads for the forces. After they ate all the livestock of the village, they taxed civilians to supply them with fish or meat in turns. It was later observed that the forces came into the town in batches of 25 every two months. At this time, one commander was very notorious in trafficking civilians and training them to be fighters for the forces, often shooting those who tried to resist, and for taking civilians' property away.

Sometime in December 1991, SLA forces made a base in Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), from where they went on routine checking missions in the surrounding villages.

b) Events in 1992

Between January and February 1992, SLA forces entered Sohlon (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), where they took civilians' livestock. The matter was reported to their High Command at Gbap, who warned them against such acts, as it did not present a good image of the SLA. These actions stopped for three months, during which time civilians hid all their livestock. However, on or around 15 May

¹¹⁷⁴ She would be released in 1993 in Pujehun District.

¹¹⁷⁵ This group stayed six months in the village before being dislodged by SLA forces in July 1992.

¹¹⁷⁶ Some of these laws were as follows: everyone's personal property is meant for everybody; no civilian should steal or would be killed and every civilian was to deposit his money to the RUF/NPFL forces or face arrest for carrying illegal property.

¹¹⁷⁷ To "frog jump" or to "pump" is done by first holding on to the earlobes with two hands – the left hand holding the right ear lobe and vice versa – after which the person is required to jump up and down continuously on their haunches. This form of punishment was both physically and psychologically painful, because it is a punishment meted out mostly to children and it is considered shameful for an adult to be made to "pump".



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1992, the livestock was stolen from these hiding places with the help of one of the inhabitants of the town, who was a vigilante at the time.

Around August 1992, the town of Gbap was attacked by RUF/NPFL forces who successfully dislodged the SLA forces from the town. The SLA forces retreated temporarily to an island, labelling it "F.M".¹¹⁷⁸ Civilians staying at Sohlon, a few miles away from Gbap, moved to the neighbouring town of Nyandehun, four miles from Sohlon, which became a "safe haven" for many civilians in the chiefdom. Realising that their villages were not affected by the RUF/NPFL forces and that the living conditions in the camp at Nyandehun were deteriorating, civilians decided to resettle in their houses.

In the middle of the year,¹¹⁷⁹ on hearing the rumours that SLA forces were close to Bum Chiefdom, RUF/NPFL forces left the chiefdom and made their way to Pujehun District.¹¹⁸⁰ The SLA forces did in fact enter the chiefdom later and made a base at Madina.¹¹⁸¹ After a few days, all the Town Commanders and their secretaries were gathered and interrogated by the forces on how they were helping the RUF/NPFL forces. Those people that the SLA forces considered had taken active part in aiding the RUF/NPFL were killed, while those they considered having taken lesser part were detained for a certain number of days and given manual jobs to do before they were released. Apart from the Town Commanders and their secretaries other civilians who were considered collaborator of the enemy forces were also killed. A boy of 18 was tied to a stick head downwards and fire set under him. He was then tortured to death by the heat of the fire. Sometimes civilians from other villages like Tarsor and Kassie (both of Bum Chiefdom) were alleged to be "rebel" collaborators, because they came from areas where RUF forces were known to be, and were killed by firing squad without proper investigations. In addition, civilians were forced to harvest the oil palm and process it for the SLA forces. Plantains, fish, bananas and other commodities were either seized or bought cheaply from civilians; indeed, the SLA appeared to be more interested in trading these items than in ensuring the security of the chiefdom or the District.

The SLA forces also settled at Moyia, which gave some respite to the people at first. However, not long after, the SLA forces gathered together all the Town Commanders, their secretaries and all other alleged collaborators. An unspecified number of them were killed on the basis that they had encouraged the RUF/NPFL forces to stay in the town and were helping them in their activities. Some people were forced to dig their own graves and lie down in them. They were then shot at afterwards and left there; some people were buried while they were still alive. Harassment of civilians, stealing of property and killing was taking place on a daily basis. People were grossly intimidated as the SLA forces frequently fired their weapons and made people frog jump. In addition, the SLA forces made the people work for them, processing the palm oil fruits, fishing and engaging in many other activities.

¹¹⁷⁸ The RUF/NPFL forces did not however stay in the town but it could not be ascertained when the SLA forces came back to Gbap.

¹¹⁷⁹ This may have occurred either in July or in October/November.

¹¹⁸⁰ No more information could be obtained on this movement of forces.

¹¹⁸¹ As the RUF/NPFL forces had already left the chiefdom, no confrontation was reported. The SLA forces would have control over the chiefdom for two years, until the middle of 1994 when RUF forces came back.



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In November, one Saturday afternoon, most of the SLA forces the civilians had seen the year before at Massa Kpanguma (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) entered Topain and took away civilians' property in a manner described as "much like the RUF/NPFL forces". Women were raped and livestock was taken away the same day. They came back the next day and spent a night in the town, during which they fired their guns to frighten people out of the town. However, the inhabitants stood their ground and the SLA forces soon left the way they had come.

c) Events in 1993

In June 1993, another SLA officer was sent to command the SLA forces deployed at Madina (Bum Chiefdom). They occupied the house of a civilian who later demanded payment of rent for the period. The troops not only refused to pay but also imprisoned one of the civilians after severely beating him up, accusing him of having been a "rebel" collaborator. The villagers were then forced to build more huts for the troops deployed in the town. Those who refused or tried to escape were caught and severely flogged.

In around July 1993, some SLA forces came to their base at Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) in order to expand their number in the area. They dispatched some troops at Yele (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) and at Massa Kpanguma (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom); in August, others were sent at Sohlon (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), on the other the bank of the river.¹¹⁸² Young men were asked to be vigilantes at various locations in Gbap Town. The fishermen were required to put the Sierra Leonean flag on their fishing boat, to allow the SLA to monitor and control the movement of boats on the river. At this time, the SLA only required civilians to provide fish for the troops and there were no reported incidents of physical violence or ill-treatment. At one time, when the civilians could not give them fish, the SLA took some livestock away from the people of the town and prepared it as food for the forces. However, this stopped when civilians told the forces that they would complain to their commanding officer.

In October 1993, SLA forces from Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island) visited Tissana (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) on a security tour. The troops harassed the civilians by forcing them to contribute money for their feeding. Those who failed to pay were beaten up and a teacher who incited the people not to pay was imprisoned. SLA forces also took away some property of the civilians, including fish and livestock. Civilians were detained at a Court Barrie while the SLA forces searched their homes and took away what they found.

Also in October 1993, a small group of armed men travelled along the Wanjei River and stopped in Baoma Section, west of Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom. They were all dressed in country clothes and had masks covering their faces. One of them who was speaking Liberian dialect told the civilians they were from Burkina Faso. They took away some food items and alcohol they found in the town and forced civilians to carry this load to a crossing point, where they were released. Burkinabe

¹¹⁸² This deployment was probably done to allow SLA to have control over the river, which leads to the ocean in the west, thus preventing the RUF forces not only from making incursions in the chiefdom but also from advancing towards Bonthe Town.



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mercenaries also entered Mecca (Bendu Cha Chiefdom, west of Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom),¹¹⁸³ where they took the property of civilians and forced elderly people to carry loads for them. A man who had never drunk any alcohol before was forced to drink wine to excess by one of the forces. It appeared that those armed men had come from Pujehun District and were on a raiding tour of villages in Nongoba Bullom and Bendu Cha Chiefdoms. At one point, SLA forces from Bonthe Town were informed about those armed men and laid an ambush in Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom, where many of the armed men were killed and some captured. A civilian was arrested and taken to Bonthe Town together with the captured forces for interrogation; they were all killed in Bonthe Town.¹¹⁸⁴

d) Events in 1994

Throughout 1994, RUF activities were mainly reported in the eastern chiefdoms of Bonthe District, in Kwamebai Krim, Bum and Nongoba Bullom Chiefdoms.¹¹⁸⁵

In the first week of May 1994, SLA forces based at Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island) entered Mina village and ambushed some RUF forces on their day patrol. The SLA forces attacked the first loaded boat of the RUF troops heading for the town in the early morning hours. Forty-seven of them were killed, including five women, and 12 were seriously wounded. On their way back to their base the RUF forces entered Mano (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) and captured a girl of 11 years old, whom they raped. They further went to Topain where they established a base. When the SLA forces realised that the RUF forces had left Mass Kpanguma, they immediately re-established a base there. They later attacked and dislodged the RUF forces at Topain, occupying that town as well.

Pelewahun was attacked by the RUF forces on 14 May 1994 and several people were killed in the town, including elderly people and children as young as seven, some of them being hacked to death. People who remained in the town had absolutely nothing to survive on as the forces took all the property in the town. After a month, in June 1994, Mass Kpanguma was attacked. At the time of the attack, the town was full of displaced people from the neighbouring chiefdoms of Pujehun District. The attack did not appear to be a surprise to the SLA forces based there, as some of them had already left the town the previous day with their relations.¹¹⁸⁶ During the attack, the remaining SLA forces were overpowered and some were killed. Immediately afterwards, civilians in the

¹¹⁸³ Although it is not specified when in 1993 those mercenaries reached Bendu Cha Chiefdom, we can infer from the information collected in Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom that they reached Bendu Cha Chiefdom around the same time.

¹¹⁸⁴ It cannot be ascertained whether those arrested men went through any kind of process before being killed.

¹¹⁸⁵ In 1993, most of the NPFL forces had been recalled by their leader to fight in Liberia as the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), a fighting faction that emerged in May 1991, started to defeat them in various areas in Liberia. Thus, the troops that entered Sierra Leone in 1994 were mostly composed of RUF forces whose number had considerably increased from the 250 men at the beginning of the conflict, due to the conscription that had been carried out.

¹¹⁸⁶ The day before the attack, SLA forces based at Massa Kpanguma came to Tei and told civilians they were going to Bonthe Town to get their salaries. They however told their relatives to pack quickly things they could lay hand on and to leave Tei for a safer area. It can however not be inferred from this information that the SLA acted in concert with the RUF forces during the attack. It rather seems that, having heard about the incoming attack, the SLA deserted the area.



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neighbouring villages fled their houses and went into hiding in the bush, sometimes in neighbouring chiefdoms like Bum Chiefdom.¹¹⁸⁷ This control over strategic towns in Kwamebai Krim District would allow the RUF to continue its advance in the District.¹¹⁸⁸

On 17 July 1994, the RUF forces made a move to recapture Bum Chiefdom from the SLA forces,¹¹⁸⁹ following the Sewa River and arriving from Tormabum, on the main road to Madina. Four truckloads of SLA forces together with their families and some vigilantes retreated from the chiefdom without putting up any resistance to the RUF/NPFL forces, because the SLA forces were far outnumbered. As a result, by August 1994, the RUF forces had taken control of the entire chiefdom and settled in almost all the villages, making Madina their administrative town. The forces had limited number of Liberians among them at this time and were mainly Sierra Leoneans who came through Tormabum along the Sewa River. Their behaviour towards civilians was different from the previous years, as it was reported they were violently hostile to every civilian they came across, killing unspecified numbers whenever they entered a town. At this period, the RUF forces were dressed in such a way¹¹⁹⁰ that suggests they had been living in the bush for quite some time.

RUF forces attacked the town of Kanga Oil Mill (Bum Chiefdom) during the night to recapture it from the SLA forces based there.¹¹⁹¹ They met no resistance from the SLA forces, as they killed a lot of civilians even before they entered the town. Houses were burnt and many people killed in the town. In the first two weeks after they recaptured the town there was indiscriminate killing of civilians because they regarded everyone to be the “enemy”. Civilians were forced to abandon the town for camps in the bush. They were later hunted and brought back into the town by the forces; those who refused to come were killed in the bush. This forced the civilians to return to the town, particularly following an incident where RUF forces killed two people in the bush to underscore their threats. Furthermore, it is worth noting that most of the RUF members were inhabitants of the chiefdom, who had earlier been abducted by the RUF forces. Raping and killing of civilians was an everyday occurrence. More young men and women were conscripted and people were forced to carry loads for the forces.

After two months in Madina, during which time they went on patrol missions, the RUF forces entered the village of Mami, a fairly large village situated six miles south of Madina. The RUF forces were engaged in a house-to-house search in the village when they saw some military uniforms in one

¹¹⁸⁷ It however seems that the RUF did not settle in the area for a long time as in December 1994, civilians who had fled their villages went back and did not encounter any RUF activity.

¹¹⁸⁸ The control over Mass Kpanguma would give access to the Wanjei River, which merges with the Sewa River in Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom.

¹¹⁸⁹ Early in 1994, RUF forces dislodged the SLA forces that had been in Bagbo Chiefdom (Bo District) for two years, thus allowing the RUF to attack Bum Chiefdom, knowing the SLA would not be reinforced by those who used to be based at Momajoe (Bagbo Chiefdom, Bo District), a few miles from Madina Town. Bum Chiefdom adjoins the southern part of Bagbo Chiefdom (Bo District).

¹¹⁹⁰ These forces were roughly dressed in jeans and t-shirts, with slippers on their feet and very few military boots, although their attire improved as they stole more clothes from civilians.

¹¹⁹¹ Although the report mentions that the town was attacked in December 1994, it is clear that it took place shortly after Madina town was attacked and prior to the incident in Mami (see below) took place. Accordingly, it probably took place earlier than December.



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of the houses. The inhabitants were all gathered to explain why military uniforms should be found in the village. The chief and his wife were first called upon to explain; when they failed to do so they were both shot dead. A woman in the front row was then picked to explain and when she could not, she was told to undress. Her son was called upon and told to do the same. He was then told to have sex with his mother in the presence of everybody. Shocked and panicked, he could not do it and they were both shot dead. Another woman was picked from the crowd and shot in the head. Although the troops were only three in number, the people were so terrified that they were unable to escape. Four more people were killed that day, making a total of eight. Four girls were raped on the same day and 17 more were abducted. Property was taken and removed from the village on the same day.

In a small village called Tarsor (Bum Chiefdom) located near a stream, the decomposed bodies of two RUF child combatants who had earlier gone missing were found on the seashore. Around 30 people who were found in the village were quickly gathered and asked to explain by the RUF forces. No one knew anything about the death of the boys and could not explain anything to the satisfaction of the RUF forces. Six people were immediately shot and killed and the other people were tied up and made to lie in the sun. Rubber was melted and dropped in their eyes. This was done to both young and old, including babies. Fifteen houses were burnt in the town and the farmhouses were destroyed, at which time seven more people were killed. At Bisoa, at the boundary with Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, RUF forces burnt six houses at night and killed 18 people on the grounds they were harbouring SLA forces.¹¹⁹²

Madina was made a training base for the abducted young men and boys; drugs were allegedly given to them during the course of the training that took place at the school compound, during which young girls were also trained as fighters. Although not all of them were given weapons after the training, these new recruits were used to attack SLA positions in Pujehun and Bo Districts. RUF forces also had a training base at Torma, where conscripted civilians were sent for training. The training was carried out in two phases. Training to fight was done during the first phase and then trainees were drugged during the second phase. Most of the boys that were trained in this way were below 15 years of age and they were usually sent on looting patrols called "mission" for their commander.

During their stay in Bum Chiefdom in 1994, the RUF did not face any counter-attack by government troops. This firm control over Bum Chiefdom would only be the prelude for further incursions into the District in early 1995 from Bo District.

In November and December 1994, six months after the SLA established a navy base in Bonthe Town, those navy forces patrolled the waters in Sittia and Dema Chiefdoms on the pretext that they were chasing away illegal foreign trawlers, despite the fact they never met any trawlers during their patrols. Their visits were sometime announced to the Chiefs in advance, who consequently taxed the civilians to contribute money for the feeding of the SLA members. On one occasion, the SLA forces called the people and local authorities at Tissana (Dema Chiefdom) to a meeting at which they

¹¹⁹² It was however revealed that this village did not host SLA forces.



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demanded that they should be supported financially so they could protect the lives and properties of the civilians. Women were required to give Le 1,000 and men had to give Le 1,500. One civilian, who incited the others not to give this money, on the grounds that the SLA was already paid, was arrested and put in a cell. This meeting concluded with a token by the Paramount Chief of Le 500,000;¹¹⁹³ once the SLA forces had sufficient money and food, they released the civilian who had earlier been detained.

Around this time, rumours of impending RUF attacks were spreading across almost the entire District and in late December, a Catholic priest of St. Ambrose Parish who was travelling from Rutile (Imperi Chiefdom) to Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) ran into armed RUF men. He was flogged by them and given a letter for the people of Mattru together with the sum of Le 6,000. On his arrival in Mattru, he informed the Chiefs and other civilians what had happened and gave them the letter. Most people abandoned the town for bigger towns like Bo and Freetown on account of this while others went to villages like Blama, Kabati, Wongifor, Bisao and Nyandehun all in the neighbouring chiefdoms. Furthermore, three RUF members who disguised themselves as State Security Division (SSD) officers were arrested at a dance organised by the people of Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) on 25 December 1994. They later confessed that they were RUF spies.

e) Events in 1995

On 19 January 1995, RUF forces attacked the Sierra Rutile Company in the north of Imperi Chiefdom.¹¹⁹⁴ In the morning, three groups of RUF forces¹¹⁹⁵ passed in succession by Moriba, heading to the plant-mining site where they were to gather. With them, they had abductees from the Sieromco Bauxite Mining Company in Mokañji (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District), which they had attacked the day before.¹¹⁹⁶ They did not shoot while they were going to the mining site but took with them a large number of people of all ages and both sexes. The whole population was in panic but the RUF told them that they were not here for them but for the SLA forces so that they should join their movement, which some civilians did. They arrested all the junior staff at Kpanguma, 100 yards from the mining site. When they arrived at the senior staff quarters at Mobimbi, they started shooting and arrested some of the staff, including foreign workers. Soon after, they were in control of the mining site, where they fired their weapons for some time and took almost all the property

¹¹⁹³ As a very rough guide, five hundred thousands Leones is approximately equivalent to 250 USD. This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone's position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2,000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4,000 SLL) per day: see UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.

¹¹⁹⁴ The Sierra Rutile was the world second largest producer of rutile, used in paints; before the war, the rutile extracted from this site represented 50% of Sierra Leone's total exports and 3,000 people were employed at the mining sites: AFP, 11 March 1997. At the time of this attack, the mine was in the middle of a major expansion program: Africa Review World of Information, 1 September 1995.

¹¹⁹⁵ Numbering 40, 80 and nearly 100 men in the respective groups, the RUF forces were equipped with AK47 and RPGs.

¹¹⁹⁶ This Swiss-owned mine was the world's largest producer of bauxite. These mining areas in Moyamba and Bonthe Districts were the two most important economical sectors after Kailahun and Kono Districts had fallen in 1992 and 1993, thereby depriving the Government of significant resources coming from the mining of diamond and the cultivation of cash crops like coffee and cacao.



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from the area, including vehicles, money, fuel, engines, medicines, food, livestock and other items taken from the company itself. RUF forces started giving food to civilians, which once more convinced civilians to join them.

At the time of the attack, foreign troops¹¹⁹⁷ and SLA forces were deployed in the area; members of the SSD (Special Security Division) were in charge of the security of the company. SLA and foreign troops made attempts to dislodge the RUF forces and finally succeeded on 30 January, at which time the RUF retreated to areas not far from the mining site. Doubts were raised among the civilians on the role played by the SSD and especially its commander in the overrun of the mining site by the RUF.¹¹⁹⁸

At the end of January 1995, RUF forces attacked and captured Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) without much resistance, as it seems the SLA had already pulled out of the town. While the bulk of these forces most likely came from Imperi Chiefdom, it is possible that some of these forces came from Lugbu Chiefdom (Bo District)¹¹⁹⁹ through Gbonge, stopping at the crossroad between the main road going west to Mattru and a southern one going to the chiefdom headquarter of Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom), at which time they decided to attack Mattru. When they entered the town, the RUF forces did not kill people or destroy property, informing civilians that they were only against the NPRC government and the government soldiers.¹²⁰⁰ As they settled in the town, they put in place structures to administer the town and the chiefdom, including the appointment of Town Commanders and Town Mothers. They also appointed adjunct clerks who, in charge of the control of movement in the chiefdom, were responsible for issuing passes allowing civilians to go from one area to another. They encouraged civilians to join them by giving them food, medicine, clothes and other items. However, this behaviour was not to last long and soon they began to act in a manner contrary to their words.

During the first weeks of their stay in the town,¹²⁰¹ they lived on the food and other items they had taken away from the Sierra Rutile but as they run out of those items, they forced civilians to work for them, notably by repairing and maintaining the ferry on the Jong River that allowed RUF forces to use the direct road to Sierra Rutile, where they had a lot of stolen property stored. Vehicles from civilians were used for this purpose. Civilians were also required to undertake other tasks; everyday, the young men each had to bring a bag of cassava and women had to bring vegetables, water and wood, as well as cook the food. Failure to carry out these tasks brought punishments, like being beaten or tied up and laid under the sun; the most severe punishment was death, for example if a civilian refused to give vegetables from his or her garden or if a civilian was caught hiding in the bush, like one woman who was shot at Luawa, near Mattru, in April. People were also brought from other towns and villages and killed for similar reasons at the RUF headquarter in Mattru. Youths,

¹¹⁹⁷ The records mention ECOMOG but this refers to either Nigerian or Guinean troops.

¹¹⁹⁸ The commander would have carried arms and ammunitions for the RUF at the mining site, once the RUF had overrun it and would have gone in surrounding villages

¹¹⁹⁹ Lugbu Chiefdom adjoins Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom on the east. Its headquarter town, Sumbuya, is on the main road that leads to Mattru (Jong Chiefdom). Since 1994, Lugbu Chiefdom had been under RUF control.

¹²⁰⁰ Mattru was the hometown of the Vice Chairman of the NPRC and two Government Ministers.

¹²⁰¹ RUF forces would occupy the town for eight months before being dislodged by the SLA in October.



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mostly between the ages of eight and seventeen, were also brought from the surrounding towns and villages to be conscripted.

Two bases were established in the chiefdom, one at Mattru and the other at Gambia Oil Mill. The RUF forces stole the supply of medicine and other items at the government hospital in Mattru and turned the hospital into a training base. The base at Gambia Oil Mill, nine mile from Mattru, was called "Camp Lion"¹²⁰² and hosted the more mature and top ranking members. To build the camp, the RUF forces unroofed houses in the surrounding villages. The new recruits who were trained in Mattru were presented to the commander at Camp Lion for approval to be sent at the war front.

The RUF forces also burnt down many houses in the town, including the entire compound of the Paramount Chief as well as houses that were allegedly empty. Occupied houses were also burnt and in one incident, two civilians who went back to their burnt house to gather some of the things that had not been destroyed were stopped by the RUF forces; one was killed and the other mutilated. Throughout the chiefdom, civilians' property, including furniture, clothing and money, was taken away, which led civilians to hide some of their belongings. When the RUF forces discovered that civilians were hiding property, they would take a member of the family, who would be forced at gunpoint to show them the hiding place. As at that time condiments and tobacco were only to be found in areas under SLA control, any civilian found with those items would be killed. Radios were also not allowed, to prevent civilians from hearing independent news about the war. During the time of their stay, both young and old women, including girls as young as 10, were sexually assaulted, sometimes in public and by more than one RUF member. People who escaped in to the bush were later hunted down and brought back into the town; some people were killed in the bush and their property taken.

RUF forces settled in many areas in the chiefdom, such as in Blama, south-east of Mattru, and Biawo, north-east of Mattru. When they settled in these villages, they carried out the same actions as previously described, including forcing civilians to work, to go hunting and to carry the load and conscripting children. In addition, they deposed existing authorities and installed their own structures, including the appointment of Town Commanders and Town Mothers, and established the "pass" system. At Blama, the Town Commander was sent to Camp Zogoda to be trained.¹²⁰³

On 3 February 1995, a very large number of RUF forces entered the headquarter town of Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom). Over 1,000 people were in Tihun at the time the RUF forces entered it, at which time they gathered all the civilians they met in the town, including the Town Chief. Gathering the inhabitants at the Court Barrie, the RUF forces asked the civilians who identified themselves as members of the Bio family (relations of the then NPRC Deputy Head of State, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio) to step forward. Many civilians did step forward, even if they did not belong to the family, thinking that the RUF forces were doing this to protect them; however, everyone who

¹²⁰² This was a generic name for training bases and other Camp Lions existed in the country, notably in Makeni (Bombali District).

¹²⁰³ This Camp Zogoda, although it is a generic name, probably refers to the important camp located in Koya Chiefdom (Kenema District).



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stepped forward was then killed.¹²¹⁴ Other civilians were killed on that day, including two girls and an elderly woman. Over 34 houses were also burnt down in the town, a large amount of property was taken and a lot of people were captured.

The following day, the captured civilians, including the Town Chief, three white foreigners taken from the Sieromco Company in Mokañji (Moyamba District) and hundreds of others captured from Mattru, were marshalled towards the town of Senjehun (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom), near the Sewa River.¹²¹⁵ They stopped at a junction near Senjehun, where the abductees, who were carrying stolen property for the RUF forces, were divided into five groups. The Town Chief was told that the troops were heading for their base at Camp Zogoda in Kenema District (Koya Chiefdom), where the RUF leader used to stay. These forces further explained that they had captured some elderly men, as the RUF wanted elderly people advise the parliamentarians they would have once they seized power in the House of Parliament. Some civilians, headed by the Town Chief of Tihun, were then told to go back to Tihun under an RUF escort while the others proceeded to Senjehun carrying the stolen property, crossed the Sewa River at Borleh and headed for Madina (Bum Chiefdom), from where the RUF said the civilians from Madina would continue the journey to Camp Zogoda.

Soon after this attack, SLA troops were sent to secure the town of Tihun. On 11 February 1995, the RUF attacked the town but faced stiff resistance from the SLA forces based there. Several other unsuccessful attempts were made by the RUF to recapture the town between 11 and 18 February, when the SLA forces were dislodged from the town by a strong and fierce attack. A lot of civilians were killed; young men, women and girls were abducted; and several houses were burnt. Children got lost in the battle and a lot of property was taken and carried away by the RUF forces, who left the town on the same day of the attack.¹²¹⁶ They went to neighbouring villages like Moyorgbo, Gerehun, Bauya Junction and Karleh, where they took away and destroyed civilian property and abducted several people. In each village or town they visited, they deposed the traditional chiefs and appointed Town Commanders, Town Mothers and clerks, who assumed administrative responsibilities and the running of the towns and villages. As in other places, a system of “passes” was established and civilians caught travelling without their pass were severely beaten.

When they entered Bauya Junction, RUF forces wrote “RUF” on the doors of civilian houses before leaving for the nearby village of Semabu, two miles from Bauya Junction. People in Bauya fled into the bush as soon as the RUF forces left the town. That same night, the RUF forces returned from Semabu, together with a large number of young men who carried property the RUF forces had taken from the people of Semabu. Some of the RUF forces then took the property to “Camp Charlie”,¹²¹⁷ returning four days later. They asked the civilians to return to the towns and stop

¹²¹⁴ It is estimated that around 300 people were killed during this incident.

¹²¹⁵ Information from Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom confirms that this chiefdom was used as a transit chiefdom for RUF forces, who did not settle there but used it to transport their stolen property, including televisions, bags of rice, corrugated iron sheets and food items, across the Sewa River and through Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom, Bo District) to Camp Zogoda in Kenema District.

¹²¹⁶ Although it is not certain whether RUF forces came back to the town, it is clear that SLA forces did not launch any counter-attack the following months.

¹²¹⁷ There was one famous “Camp Charlie” near Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).



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sleeping in camps in the bush. They also imposed laws on civilians preventing them from travelling to Bo Town (Bo District) without permits; people caught travelling without the permit would be killed. Indeed, movement from one place to the other could only be done with a “pass”. The forces elected administrative leaders in the town and surrounding villages. Often, people accused of coming from Bo by the RUF forces were shot dead without questioning. People were also killed if they were found with tobacco or food items like fish and any manufactured goods, as this was considered to be proof that they had gone to areas controlled by SLA forces, which were the only areas such items were available.

This continued for up to three months, when the RUF forces introduced another system known as “Man Power”, by which civilians were forced to carry loads for distances of about 50 miles. At that time, wives of civilians forcefully became the “wives” of the RUF forces and the husbands were to thank them whenever they had intercourse with their wives. Civilians were also forced to have sexual intercourse with their relatives in public and those who refused to do so were killed.

Also in February 1995, RUF forces entered the headquarter town of Matuo (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom), killed two civilians and burnt down 16 buildings including the Court Barrie. At Senjehun, a town used as a crossing point on the Sewa River, the forces terrorised the civilians by killing several people, burning down several houses and destroying the boats they found at the waterside in the town, on the grounds that civilians were using the village as an escape way to Bo District and other places.¹²⁰⁸

During that month,¹²⁰⁹ SLA forces based in Bonthe Town regularly patrolled the sea route in the north-west of Bonthe District between Dema Chiefdom and Gbangbatoke (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District). Civilians were banned from going to sea for fishing in this area, as the SLA feared that RUF forces might attack them and use their boats to continue their advance in the District. Civilians however continued to travel to Gbangbatoke, at night and SLA forces started to chase them and once captured, took away their fish and sometimes killed the faulting civilians.

On 25 February, the RUF made a successful counter-attack at the rutile mining site (Imperi Chiefdom), dislodging the SLA forces based there. During their stay, their behaviour was not as friendly as during their first stay. On the contrary, they told civilians that because civilians in the area had taken the side of the Government when the RUF was dislodged on 30 January, they would not spare any soul in the area. On that day in Imperi Chiefdom, in villages such as Mogwemo, Kpanguma and Moriba, the RUF forces ransacked villages, indiscriminately killed civilians, forced civilians into houses and set fire to them, destroyed and burnt houses, raped women and girls, conscripted young people into their movement and forced civilians to work for them. As in other places, any civilian caught with condiments or tobacco would be accused of going to areas under SLA control, where those items could be found, and would be killed.

¹²⁰⁸The same forces also entered Lawana (Bumpeh Chiefdom, Bo District) where they burnt down five houses and stole a lot of civilian property. They also killed four old people who were unable to escape from the attack. The town was attacked because of rumours that diamond mining was going on and a big diamond had been found there.

¹²⁰⁹ It is likely that this was a practice that was carried out for a number of months around February 1995.



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Following the recapture of the mining area, RUF forces scattered throughout almost the entire chiefdom, taking control of the area for over eight months before being dislodged by SLA forces in November. For example, RUF forces entered Gbangbama on 20 February 1995, where they stole a lot of property, killed two people and captured many others. One week later, on 27 February 1995, the forces attacked the nearby village of Foinda. They took a lot of property, killed one civilian and abducted many others, who were forced to carry the stolen property to Mobimbi, which was previously the headquarter of the senior staff of the Sierra Rutile Company and became the RUF headquarters when they re-captured the town. Another example is Gaindema, which was attacked on 1 March 1995. RUF forces invaded the village in the north of the District with heavy gunfire. They remarked that civilians were ungrateful to them, as they had laid down their lives to fight against the dictatorship government of the NPRC, which had earlier toppled the APC government. They described the NPRC government as selfish, not transparent and unaccountable. The RUF forces attacked the village from its landlocked side, leaving the direction to the river open; accordingly, people fled from the continuous gunfire into the river where some, who were unable to swim, drowned while others were shot. In the village, RUF forces captured civilians, killed some and conscripted others. These forces also took a lot of property, which they then transported to their headquarters.

These continuous attacks on the villages in the chiefdom led the majority of the population to leave Imperi Chiefdom and to find refuge in more secure areas like Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island. Their control of the chiefdoms in the north of the District, where the strategic roads spreading through the rest of the District originate, allowed RUF forces to proceed further southwards to Yawbeko, Nongoba Bullom and Bendu Cha Chiefdoms. In these chiefdoms, most of the civilians were already living in camps in the bush, after they heard about the attacks in the north of the District. Furthermore, it is believed that the attack on the mining company, which led hundred of civilians jobless, resulted in increased favourable public opinion for the expansion of the Kamajors in the chiefdom.

The situation for Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom was, however, slightly different as it seems that the first RUF attack in the chiefdom, which took place in February 1995, originated from Pujehun District.¹²¹⁰ Civilians ran into the bush leaving behind children and elderly people who were unable to run. Those forces, dressed in military attire,¹²¹¹ identified themselves as RUF forces based at Sulima (Soro Gbema Chiefdom, Pujehun District). Young girls who were caught were raped in front of their parents, including a 10-year-old girl, who was severely traumatised and remained ill for a long time. A lot of civilians were appointed as labourers to carry property as far as Dama, some 11 miles from Topain, where they were released and ordered to return back to Dama. People abandoned the town and stayed in the bush, where life rapidly became unbearable. Several visits were made to the town by the RUF forces in the following days but no one was found in the town so they stopped going there.

¹²¹⁰ Although RUF forces were reported to be in the chiefdom in 1994, it seems that an important attack was carried out on the chiefdom from Pujehun District.

¹²¹¹ Starting in 1992, RUF forces acquired uniforms from the SLA, often taken after a battle. Some of those uniforms also came with SLA members who deserted their ranks to join the RUF.



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Most of their activities were then carried out at Bandakor, from where they raided the neighbouring villages. Tei was also attacked in February, at a time when most of the people had gone to their farms or fishing, leaving the youngest and eldest in the town. The RUF forces burnt down the whole town, including the school, the UBC church and the Town Barrie and took away property such as fishing nets, canoes, seed rice, livestock and poultry. Five civilians were killed, among them an 85 year-old man, and some young people were abducted and forced to carry the load.

During one of their raids on the villages, three young men at Kale resisted the attack and killed two of the RUF forces. Civilians in the neighbouring towns and chiefdoms were informed and they immediately formed civilian-fighting groups or local militia to defend themselves, since the SLA forces was no longer able to contain the RUF advance. This group was composed of Kamajors, a Mende word for hunters. Civilians started contributing to the support of this civil force, donating single barrel guns and money for the purchase of cartridges. Other weapons like knives, spears and machetes were made by blacksmiths in the chiefdoms as part of their contributions.¹²¹² The main place for initiation was at Kaileh Wanjama (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) but, as the group expanded, it was further divided into sections with its headquarter base at Kale, south of Topain.

On 21 March 1995, around 120 RUF members coming from Jong Chiefdom, dressed in new combat attire with red cloth tied around their necks, entered the town of Baoma (north-east of Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) as they had heard SLA forces were in the area. The RUF forces made civilians they met in the town lead them to the farmhouses, where they took civilians' property, including food items and livestock, and captured a lot of civilians to be trained as fighters. They then went north-east to the town of Gambia (Jong Chiefdom) with all the stolen property. The attack was reported to the SLA forces based at Gbap, south-west of Baoma. They came to the town two days afterwards, took the remaining food items and livestock and returned to Gbap. On hearing about SLA troop movements, a large number of RUF forces came back to the town on 27 March 1995. One man who was asked whether he had informed the SLA about the first attack was tied up and stripped naked, as was another man. The first man was hit with a bladed weapon on his neck until he died while the second one had his genital organ cut off before being hacked to death. On the same day, RUF forces went looting in the surrounding villages, burnt down houses and came back to Baoma with captives carrying their load before leaving the town for Gambia (Jong Chiefdom).

Two members of the RUF re-entered Baoma about a week later, on 5 April 1995. They encouraged an old man they found in the village to call all the civilians who were hiding in the bush to return to the town, as there was no other person in the town, but nobody responded to the old man's appeal. A few days later, the RUF forces raided the camps of the civilians in the bush and burnt down several huts and destroyed other property. They threatened to kill all those who failed to return to the town, as a result of which civilians returned to the town a few days later. Town Commanders were appointed and arrangements were made for the support of the forces while they were in the town. However the Town Commanders were fearful for their lives, having heard that SLA forces

¹²¹² The support of the force was voluntary at the beginning but as time went on it became compulsory and also included provision of food and other essential materials for the Kamajors.



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killed civilians appointed as Town Commanders and those who stayed with the RUF on the grounds that they were collaborators, so they advised the civilians to escape back into the bush.

The RUF forces continued to harass civilians in the neighbouring towns and villages. Also in April, the RUF forces dislodged the SLA from Gbap, where civilians had already fled the town. The retreating SLA forces went to Bonthe Town before coming to the chiefdom between May and June and settle at Yele, south west of Gbap. From Yele, the SLA exhorted the civilians to leave the Baoma area, as they were going to launch an offensive on the RUF. The SLA did not however succeed in dislodging the RUF forces who themselves launched a counter-attack on SLA position at Yele five days later. During this counter-attack, RUF forces killed a large number of civilians and a few SLA forces. The few remaining SLA forces left for Bonthe Town and the RUF went back to Baoma, burning down some houses before leaving.

Around April, RUF forces attacked and settled in many villages in Yawbeko Chiefdom, in the centre of the District, including the chiefdom headquarter of Talia.¹²¹³ The pattern they followed in the villages they entered was similar to what they had done so far in the north of the District. Local authorities were particularly targeted, deposed and replaced by Town Commanders and Town Mothers. Some of the local authorities were also molested and killed.

RUF forces coming from Jong Chiefdom reached Bendu Cha Chiefdom in May 1995.¹²¹⁴ Their arrival was accompanied by severe brutality towards civilians and instances of killing, often with bladed weapons, raping, burning of houses, stealing of civilians' property and abduction of civilians were commonplace. For example, in May 1995, RUF forces reached Tigbe from Jong Chiefdom and shoot and killed two fleeing civilians. The forces cut off the dead men's genital organs, which they placed in the mouths of the bodies and left the mutilated corpses on the road. They then burnt down 10 houses before proceeding to another village, Tisama, where they beat a man with sticks almost to the point of death. Also in May, some RUF forces on their way to Malama passed by Molamdeh. They burnt a house in which a sick woman was lying in bed, allegedly because she did not give them water as they had asked. Once in Malama, they took a lot of property, including food items, which they forced captured civilians to carry to their base at Baoma (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom). They also killed a petty trader who refused to give them money.

Fighting between the RUF on one hand and SLA forces assisted with Kamajors on the other hand continued in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom. On 25 May 1995, RUF forces located the hidden camp at Taifa, where civilians from Tei had found refuge, and attacked it. The SLA and the Kamajors fought the RUF forces and a big battle took place at Tamgbassi, two miles from Taifa. About 50 RUF forces were killed while 10 SLA members and two Kamajors died.

Another heavy battle took place at Bombokor (Kwamebai Krim chiefdom) on 7 June 1995 as a result of which the RUF forces were dislodged; about 25 of them killed while five were captured alive. There were no civilian fatalities reported to have been committed by the SLA, as their

¹²¹³ The date of their arrival in Talia could not be determined with precision. More details will be added for Yawbeko Chiefdom.

¹²¹⁴ Bendu Cha Chiefdom is a small chiefdom on the western edge of mainland Bonthe.



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commander¹²¹⁵ ordered his forces not to shoot civilians. The SLA commander also returned the stolen property left behind by the retreating RUF forces to the civilians.¹²¹⁶ On their way back to their base after the defeat at Bombokor, the RUF forces, apparently in retaliation, raped, beat and killed civilians with bladed weapons, including young children. Nevertheless, the RUF forces were driven entirely from the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom. As such there was great influx of civilians from the other chiefdoms into Kwamebai Krim, which caused a lot of hunger, starvation and disease, as there were not enough food and medicine.

However, RUF forces maintained control over chiefdoms in the centre of the District and continued their actions against civilians. For example, sometime in June 1995, RUF forces entered the village of Ghaloh (Bendu Cha Chiefdom), captured civilians, flogged some and later killed some of them. They also entered Bormimahun village but found no one in the town. They burnt down all the houses and traced the footprints of people to the camp in which they were hiding, where they killed some civilians and abducted the rest. As they were about to leave, they set fire to seven houses in the town. Kanga village was also raided and eight houses were burnt down and several civilians were abducted, including a 15-year old girl together with other women. The following month, civilians made another camp between the boundary of Jong and Bendu Cha Chiefdoms in the northwest of Bendu Cha Chiefdom.¹²¹⁷ At some point during the month, this camp came under the attack of the RUF forces at about 6.00pm. A baby boy was hit with bladed weapons by the RUF forces. Several people were captured and girls were raped and abducted.

Again in Bendu Cha Chiefdom, on 30 August 1995, RUF troops coming from Baiama (Jong Chiefdom) attacked Momaya, where they abducted civilians, including one man whom they recruited into their fighting force and some young girls, who they made their wives. The RUF forces then headed to Bawoma and Kpetema (both in Jong Chiefdom). On their way they killed two civilians. On or around 15 September, the Muslim festival day of Eid al Adha, RUF forces attacked civilians who had moved out of their camps to observe prayers around Mindohun village. Civilians were captured in the mosques and abducted; two men were killed, allegedly because they did not properly carry out a task the RUF forces had asked them. On their way out, they encountered a young man of about 30, who they suspected of being an SLA member, so they tied him to a stick, poured petrol over him and set him on fire.

As RUF forces were progressing and affirming their control of the District, except Sherbro Island, and the SLA were increasingly unable to defend the District, rumours about the Kamajors began to reach Bonthe Town. This consisted of information about the development of Kamajors, armed

¹²¹⁵ This SLA officer who used to be based in the Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom favoured the idea of these local militia fighting alongside the SLA to bring the war to a speedy conclusion in the District.

¹²¹⁶ However, this action of the commander made his men dissatisfied and they became disgruntled. Shortly after, the SLA forces were over powered by the RUF during an encounter in the west of the Chiefdom; it was said the SLA forces could not face this battle, mainly due to the loss of morale following the episode of looting at Bombokor. Those RUF forces required that the commander identify himself and one junior SLA member pointed out the commander, who was then killed by the RUF forces.

¹²¹⁷ Civilians were leaving the camp during the day to go farming or fishing and were coming back after their activities.



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with cutlasses and knives and rumoured to have mystical powers, who were coming together to restore peace in their villages in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom. At this time, Bonthe Town was full of displaced people and the local authorities decided to send around 300 youths to the area where initiations were being performed.¹²¹⁸ Once initiated, the Kamajors went back to various areas in the District, engaging the RUF forces and, initially, working hand in hand with the SLA.

On their return from their initiation, a group of Kamajors engaged the RUF forces based at Baoma (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) with heavy firing between September and October 1995. About 22 members of the RUF were killed and several of them and their wives were captured. They were taken to the Kamajor base at Karleh Wanjama (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom). Following the attack, the RUF completely left Baoma but one week later they regrouped and launched a counter-attack. They succeeded in dislodging the Kamajors and burnt down the remaining houses in the town. On 5 November 1995, Kamajors also launched a fierce counter-attack on the RUF forces at Baoma. They finally succeeded in ousting them out of Baoma and Gbap and entirely chased them out of the Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom. This was the final battle between the RUF forces and the Kamajors in the chiefdom. Civilians returned to resettle in the various towns and villages in the chiefdom and also in the neighbouring Yawbeko Chiefdom.

In late October, rumours of imminent SLA attacks¹²¹⁹ and sounds of heavy gun firing coming from the Bo road led some of the RUF forces based at Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) to leave the town for Senahun, in the south-west, and Gbonge (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom),¹²²⁰ although those based at Camp Lion refused either to leave or to release the civilians. On 25 October, a group of SLA Forces known as "Special Task Force" and composed mainly of ULIMO forces entered Mattru with heavy gunfire. They were accompanied by two jets, which were clearing the way for them before they entered the town. The RUF forces who had stayed in Mattru deserted their base as soon as the members of the Task Force arrived in the town, after killing many civilians who were with them. The following day, the Task Force attacked the RUF at Camp Lion in the north of Mattru Town. A lot of civilians including men, women and children were killed during that attack and the survivors were all brought into Mattru Town. Civilians in neighbouring villages were also requested by the Task Force to come and live in Mattru Town. While bringing civilians from the villages to Mattru, the Task Force faced pockets of resistance from the RUF but continued to defeat the RUF forces who, while retreating, imposed great havoc on the population, burning down houses wherever they were dislodged and killing many civilians. For example, in Kale Kowama, RUF forces retreating from Blama came across a family (parents and two small children) and killed the two parents.

¹²¹⁸ The local authorities asked the representatives of the chiefdoms, who had found refuge in Bonthe Town, to present a number of their young men.

¹²¹⁹ Starting in August, SLA forces, who had just received military training from the South African mercenaries company Executive Outcomes, who were contracted by the Government of Sierra Leone, engaged in "mopping up" operations in the Southern Province, dislodging the RUF forces from various strongholds in Bumpel Chiefdom (Bo District) and the mining area around Mokbanji (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District).

¹²²⁰ At this time, Kamajors from Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, in the south of the District started to have successful confrontation with RUF forces and went as far as Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom). This strong grip on the south east of the District probably explains why the RUF forces did not move south, using the Sewa River and Wanjei River, that flow in Nongoba Bullom and Kwamebai Krim Chiefdoms but rather retreated to Gbonge, a hilly area in Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom.



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Civilians brought to the town undertook a massive brushing and cleaning of the town and surrounding villages but soon, started to lack food and other necessary items.

In one of their patrol to bring civilians to Mattru, members of the Task Force went to Njahun and Senjehun (Sogbini Chiefdom). On hearing this, the RUF forces at Bauya (Sogbini Chiefdom) gathered the civilians and told them to wait for a while and all the civilians would go to Mattru. More civilians, some from neighbouring chiefdoms, came to Bauya, either brought by the RUF forces or arriving of their own free will, hoping to find a safer haven in Mattru. Therefore, thousands of people were gathered at Bauya when the RUF forces divided them in two queues, one for men and one for women. The civilians were told to sing a song and the RUF forces started to take one person after the other and killed them either with a gun or a bladed weapon. When they realised what was happening, the civilians started to flee to the bush. RUF forces fired on the fleeing crowd, killing hundreds of people. The RUF forces also ambushed the town to catch and kill escaping civilians.¹²²¹ The surviving civilians went back to their camps in the bush, where RUF forces chased them, killing everyone they found, including young children. At Licono for example, they gathered the civilians they found in the Court Barrie, hacked some of them into pieces, opened the stomach of one pregnant woman and threw the foetus in the fire. Some civilians found refuge at Bahoi, on the Sewa River east of Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom, and were rescued by Kamajors from Senjehun who came and took them to their base. Around 200 RUF forces attacked the Kamajor base at Senjehun but were defeated by the Kamajors stationed there, who were assisted with civilians equipped with sticks. After this attack, the RUF forces went to the Gbonge hills from where they raided villages in Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom, burning houses, taking away property, killing and abducting civilians. Senjehun did not however sustain any further RUF attacks.

In November, SLA forces dislodged the RUF forces from Imperi Chiefdom and settled in the mining area, at Kpanguma and Mobimbi.¹²²²

Around October/November, Kamajors repelled the RUF from Yawbeko Chiefdom. To strengthen their positions, the Kamajors established more training bases in other chiefdoms than Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, so that they could spread over wider areas of operation. Many young men and boys, some aged below 15, enlisted to be trained, calling themselves "Black December". One such base was at Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom). Another base was at Gambia (Jong Chiefdom) where young men and boys initiated were called "Avondo".

On 13 November, Kamajors from Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom entered the village of Kpankpa (Bum Chiefdom) and killed 19 civilians on the allegation that they were accommodating the RUF forces in the village. The bodies were dragged into the river flowing by the village. The Kamajors who carried out this action were around 15 in number, only two of them had shotguns and all the others had cutlasses. After this incident, the Kamajors went back to their base at Karleh Wanjama (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) before returning in the same month to attack RUF positions in Bum Chiefdom.

¹²²¹ This event resulted in the death of hundreds of civilians. In 1998, over 1,000 human skulls were discovered at Bauya Junction: AFP, 10 March 1998.

¹²²² No information on fighting with RUF forces was recorded. Those SLA forces would be joined by some ULIMO-K forces for a short while in January 1996.



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The RUF forces' position at Mami was attacked and they were dislodged from the town. They regrouped at Madina, where they faced a serious confrontation with the Kamajors. The RUF forces were again dislodged from their Madina base but burnt down 25 houses and killed several civilians before leaving the town. Eighteen RUF members were killed during the encounter. The RUF left towards the north and went in the direction of Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom, Bo District).¹²²³ As they were retreating, the RUF forces killed civilians they came across, abducted a large number of people and took with them all the young girls they found. In December, RUF forces launched hit and run attacks on the chiefdom from Bagbo Chiefdom (Bo District), north-east of Bum Chiefdom, but following their retreat from Madina they no longer settled in Bum Chiefdom, where more and more young men were initiated within the Kamajors society.

At a general meeting held in Mattru on 27 and 29 November 1995, civilians who had formerly served the RUF forces in various ways were identified and condemned to death. Some were later freed after investigations proved that they were innocent. At around this time, some of the Task Force members engaged in cannibalism, cooking and eating the bodies of RUF members they had captured and killed. In one incident, one child member of the RUF and known by the civilians for making "unruly" statements about the government forces was arrested by the civilians, who brought him to the Task Force members. Those shot him, removed the organs and left the body, asking civilians to dump it in the river.

As food was lacking, civilians living in Mattru were authorised by the SLA to go back to their villages in December with an SLA escort. The civilians were divided into groups depending on the area they were from and taken to their villages in order of the directions of the compass, with a group from the north going out one day, a group from the east when the first group returned and so on.

Towards the end of the year, the RUF were still to be found in Bendu Cha Chiefdom. In an incident that took place around October or November, RUF forces came to Gordana, approaching it from the river side. Two civilians who had earlier been captured in the chiefdom were with these forces. They were mainly interested by food products and told civilians that the war was not over and that the rumours that they did not have any more ammunition were not true. Before leaving, they forced civilians to carry the property they had taken to the south of Jong Chiefdom.

f) Events in 1996

In January 1996, civilians continued to resettle in Jong Chiefdom and engaged in commercial transactions with SLA members from the navy branch and coming from Bonthe Town.¹²²⁴ This period is referred to by civilians as "being calm".

¹²²³ Information gathered for Bo District reveals that in December 1995, RUF forces arrived in Bagbo Chiefdom from Bonthe District, repelled by Kamajors.

¹²²⁴ The SLA forces were bringing condiments, tobacco, clothes and radios that the civilians in the chiefdom could buy or exchange for gari, cassava or palm oil.



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Since RUF forces had been repelled from the boundaries of the chiefdom in 1995, the inhabitants of Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom did not sustain any more RUF attacks. After the February elections, however, the Kamajors started subjecting civilians to physical violence, sometimes killing people, and stealing people's property. For example, the Kamajors erected a detention cage made of thorns at every checkpoint in the chiefdom, which they used to punish people who did not have proper papers or for other reasons. Civilians were targeted for a variety of reasons and were often ill treated.¹²²⁵

Many civilians, particularly adult males, sought initiation into the Kamajor society not because they wanted to go to the war front but to protect themselves and their families from mistreatment by the Kamajors. One specific example of this occurred at the beginning of 1997 in Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom. A civilian who was selling tobacco in the chiefdom came across Kamajors at Torma Gbangbahun, who took his tobacco. As he wanted to talk, they threatened to beat him. On his return to Sohlon, some Kamajors he knew advised him to be initiated, because it would stop this kind of harassment. Accordingly, the man went to Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom) for initiation.

The Kamajor presence expanded across the whole District, gaining control over areas previously under RUF control. They started settling in the various chiefdoms and putting in place local structures. The collaboration with the SLA rapidly became problematic as tension, amounting sometimes to fighting, erupted between the two forces. Indeed, most of the activities reported for the year concern the Kamajors and the SLA, as the RUF forces were gradually being repelled from their positions across the whole District. While RUF forces were still present in some areas, they were more likely to be acting in small groups and looking for food rather than in large numbers and on the offensive. For example, RUF forces were coming from time to time to Bendu Cha Chiefdom, chasing civilians in their camps in the bush, especially in the coastal area of Tisagbe, where they burnt down houses and took away a lot of property.

In January 1996, Kamajors joined the SLA forces based at the mining site in Imperi Chiefdom. The ground commander for the Kamajors kept his men within the rules of the Kamajors and punished the few Kamajors who harassed civilians. On one occasion, for example, he ordered the arrest of one Kamajor who had seized a whole lorry of gari from a civilian. The Kamajor was put in a culvert pipe for some time and had to pay a fine.

Kamajors also settled in Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom), which became an initiation centre where the High Priest and Chief Initiator performed initiations. A big camp was built behind the health centre, where the ceremonies were performed. Before being initiated, Kamajors had to bring money for initiation fees (Le 10,000) and other items like oil, old country clothes and razor blades. In Tihun, Kamajors and civilians together gathered the remains of civilians killed by the RUF forces and buried them in a grave dug in a graveyard.¹²²⁶

¹²²⁵ No further details are available on this information.

¹²²⁶ It is not clear when the RUF was dislodged from Tihun and whether the SLA carried out this operation alone or in conjunction with the Kamajors. On 20 November 1995, the Government claimed the SLA had retaken control over the town but this information could not be confirmed by independent sources: Xinhua News Agency, 20 November 1995.



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In January 1996, Kamajors based in the Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom held a meeting with the civilians at Baoma, where they appointed a chief or PRO they referred to as “AG” (Action Group). At the meeting, several laws were made regarding how the civilians were to behave, requiring them to observe the practices of the Kamajors, of whom there were 33 based in the town. The Kamajors took over all civil authorities in the town and surrounding villages, taking on the responsibility for judging all cases and settling disputes. Several restrictions were put on the civilians, who were forbidden to pound anything in a mortar¹²²⁷ and to hit a Kamajor with a broom. Contravention of these laws would lead to loss of life and the fine of demolition of the offender’s dwelling house. The civilians were also tasked with feeding the Kamajors. In or around March, a woman violated one of the laws by pounding in a mortar and, as the Kamajors were chasing her in order to catch and kill her, she ran to the AG for rescue. The AG pleaded with the Kamajors, who demolished part of the woman’s house as a fine. A civilian was also imprisoned on allegations that he was a rebel collaborator. On 7 August 1996, some Kamajors from Gambia (Jong Chiefdom) sent by the High Priest Initiator, took a lot of food items from the civilians at Baoma, which was also an initiation centre for the Kamajor society in the chiefdom. In a separate incident, civilians were molested and beaten when one of the initiators fell from his motorbike after hitting a stick that was lying across the road. The people of Motefoe village, where this incident happened, were brought to Baoma, where they were punished. The commander ordered the people to pay for the parts that were damaged on the motorbike. The people who had been brought to Baoma, together with the authorities of Baoma, paid the money.

SLA forces based in Bonthe Town and equipped with two gunboats (101 and 201) were working together with the Kamajors, entering the mainland to chase RUF forces. At this time, a lot of civilians labelled as RUF collaborators were brought from the mainland to Bonthe Town by both the SLA and the Kamajors, were killed and buried along the seaside, on the road opposite the military naval base. On one occasion, a man from Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) accused of being a collaborator, as he cooked for the RUF, was brought to Bonthe town and killed. In a separate incident, a man from Bendu (Bendu Cha Chiefdom) was also brought to Bonthe Town, accused of being an RUF collaborator and was killed.

On 15 February, Executive Outcomes reached the District and deployed at the rutile mining site (Imperi Chiefdom). They held meetings with the civilians, SLA and Kamajors on strategies to protect the chiefdom. These three forces had different bases in the area and Executive Outcomes worked together with the Kamajors but not with the SLA, whose behaviour towards civilians was “not cordial”. Indeed, the SLA engaged in taking away civilians’ property and in chasing RUF collaborators. In one incident, the Town Chief of Mogwemo was killed without much questioning, accused of being an RUF collaborator.

Some SLA troops came to Jong Chiefdom from Bo road, as a support body for the Task Force in February 1996. The SLA forces occupied places captured by the Task Force from the RUF forces but, after staying in the chiefdom for a while, started to take civilian property, including zinc and

¹²²⁷ This particular law did not fit in the pattern of civilians’ life, where pounding was the basis of food preparation, be it pepper, cassava leaves or rice.



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palm oil, and began to beat up civilians who refused to work for them. In the meanwhile, Kamajors had deployed at Gambia,¹²²⁸ east of the chiefdom, equipped with cutlasses, knives, shotguns, sticks and FM ropes.¹²²⁹ In the town, they appointed a chief (AG). Information gathered from Jong Chiefdom reveals the general laws the Kamajors had to abide by. For example, newly initiates could not have relations with women, could not lie on beds, could not bath and could not eat nut oil during the two weeks following their initiation. Kamajors were also not allowed to sit on mortar, to eat unscaled food or to stand at doorposts. It was believed that any Kamajors breaking those laws was no longer protected and would be killed by enemies during battles. To strengthen the force of the Kamajors in the chiefdom, more initiation began to take place at Gambia.

In a bid to control the chiefdoms where they were deployed, Kamajors established checkpoints and issued passes to civilians, thus regulating the movements of the population. In Bum Chiefdom, civilians coming to any village without such a pass were beaten, made to lie on the floor or forced to beat the back of their fingers on concreted floor, a practice referred to as "typing". They also appointed civilians as Town Chiefs (AG) and GS clerk,¹²³⁰ to deal with administrative issues. At this time, the Kamajors' attitude towards civilians started to become hostile, as the villages were taxed in order to feed the Kamajors and, above all, summary executions of alleged RUF collaborators were carried out. On 27 January, Kamajors from Bum Chiefdom attacked Torma, killed some civilians, took away some property and vandalised the quarters and offices of the swamp rice project.

Sometime in 1996,¹²³¹ Kamajors from Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom attacked RUF forces who had retreated from Mattru and re-established in the Gbonge Hills (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom). Sixty-eight civilians were rescued from the RUF, although 23 died in the crossfire. Seventeen RUF forces were killed and the Kamajors recovered the property the RUF had previously taken away.¹²³²

On 26 April, a serious fight broke between the Kamajors and the SLA forces based at Mabaka (Imperi Chiefdom), which resulted in some SLA members being killed.¹²³³ Following this encounter, the SLA withdrew from Mabaka and went to their main headquarter at Mobimbi. Sometime in 1996, reports of actions carried out by "lawless" SLA forces reached the military headquarter in Freetown and those forces were removed from the mining site and brought by helicopter to Camp Charlie, an SLA base near Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili Chiefdom). Those forces who escaped this evacuation were believed to have gone to the Mokanji area (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District).

A few months after the 1996 general elections,¹²³⁴ a conflict arose between the SLA and Kamajors in Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom. The SLA forces fell in a Kamajor ambush at the village of Kebawana, where one of the SLA members was killed. In revenge, the SLA forces killed seven Kamajors at

¹²²⁸ It was allegedly a lack of ammunition that prevented Kamajors from attacking the RUF stronghold in Mattru in 1995.

¹²²⁹ This rope, one foot long with small sticks at its edge, was used to tie people at the ankle by their backs. "FM" means "frequency modulation", because when somebody was tied with such a rope, he would talk and reveal a lot.

¹²³⁰ Those GS clerks fulfilled the same kind of tasks as the clerks appointed by the RUF.

¹²³¹ This attack probably took place early 1996, before May.

¹²³² This attack may have been carried out by Kamajors deployed in different chiefdoms.

¹²³³ This was however not the only conflict between Kamajors and the SLA in Imperi Chiefdom.

¹²³⁴ The exact date of this event could not be ascertained.



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Kebawana and displayed their bodies on the Mattru-Bo highway. Two days later, the Kamajors regrouped and attacked the SLA forces. However, the SLA forces defeated them, killing 40 Kamajors and burying them in a mass grave in Mattru. The two groups continued to live as enemies for another month until an SLA officer came and settled the conflict.

Local authorities were among the people harassed by the Kamajors. In March 1996, the Paramount Chief of Sittia Chiefdom went into hiding, opposed to the Kamajors deployment in his chiefdom and their behaviour towards civilians. This did not go down well with the Kamajors who chased them, severely beating one of his relatives to know about his hiding place. The Kamajors eventually found him, seriously beat him, went to another relative of the Paramount Chief who had hosted him and fined her Le 300,000, which she subsequently did not have to pay due to a reverend's intervention. However, the Paramount Chief was so severely beaten that he was transported for medical treatment to Freetown, where he allegedly died.

Sometime in May 1996, the Kamajors continued to harass civilians, particularly businesswomen and other civilians who often went in search of food in Sittia Chiefdom on Sherbro Island. Some of the civilians were punished by being forced to carry loads for the Kamajors or were beaten and sometimes killed. People deserted the towns and villages to go into hiding in camps. However, the Kamajors followed them to the camps and forcefully brought them back to the towns. In the same month, the Kamajors attacked the village of Mobayeh (Sittia Chiefdom), where civilians were hiding. They burnt down the whole village and killed three people, namely one old woman who had given notice to the inhabitants of the village of the Kamajors coming was tied up and left to burn in one of the houses; a pregnant woman, whose womb was slit open; and that woman's four year-old daughter.

In June 1996, the Kamajor ground commander of Sogbini Chiefdom ordered the killing of four people on the grounds that they were enemy collaborators, who were arrested at night, taken to Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom) and killed.

In September 1996, Kamajors, who were mainly from Imperi Chiefdom in the north of Bonthe District, arrested 28 civilians and killed many of them in Sittia Chiefdom. There were cases reported of human flesh being cooked and eaten by the Kamajors. SLA forces were given notice about these civilians held captive by the Kamajors and went to attack them and free the captives. In retaliation, Kamajors laid an ambush for the SLA at Mbockie (Sittia Chiefdom). During the attack, some civilians who ran to the river and could not swim across it were drowned, while others were burnt in their houses by the fire sparked by fragments of RPGs. Two members of the SLA were also killed by the Kamajors. Over 50 Kamajors attacked the town and overpowered the 10 SLA soldiers who were based there. A large amount of stolen property was loaded into boats and carried away to Gbangbatoke (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District) by the Kamajors.

By the end of the year, the main Kamajor base was at Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom). After the 25 May events, it would be called "Base Zero".



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g) Events in 1997

By 1997, the Kamajors together with the SLA forces had succeeded in removing the RUF forces from most of their strongholds in the District. This notwithstanding, there were several clashes between the Kamajors and the SLA forces. The Kamajors also wrecked a lot of havoc on the civilians, as the SLA and RUF had done previously and continued to do.

SLA forces continued to mistreat civilians in the few areas in the District where they were deployed. A group of SLA forces from the navy branch posted at York Island used to take food and other non food items away from civilians. Civilians accused of committing crimes like killing or raping were punished by the SLA forces without many investigations into the truth of these accusations. The main punishment was to tie the suspect up, hang them upside down from the roof of a house and beat them. The most senior SLA member in command used to mete out this type of punishment. Cases of sexual violence against women by SLA members were also reported, including harassing civilians in order to take their wives. In one incident, some SLA members locked a woman in one room of her house and assaulted her sexually. As they heard her husband was coming home, they went outside the house and fired in the air to make people flee the area. Those SLA forces however withdrew from York Island and went to Bonthe Town as reinforcements following the Coup in May 1997.¹²³⁵

In March 1997, a combined force of Kamajors and SLA from Bonthe Town launched a fierce attack on the RUF position at Bendu, the headquarter town in the west of Bendu Cha Chiefdom. The combined forces had about 20 to 25 wounded, who were taken to Bonthe Town for medical treatment.¹²³⁶ The RUF forces continued to occupy the town and sent several messages to the SLA forces and the Kamajors in Bonthe Town threatening to attack them and the town. Nevertheless, despite this collaboration, fighting between the two factions continued. In one incident, an SLA member who had come to an area under Kamajor control was killed at Foinda–Madina (Imperi Chiefdom).

In May 1997, the military overthrew the Government and put in place a military regime called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). This brought a total change in the attitude of the SLA forces based in Bonthe Town and its environs, who then joined the AFRC government. Civilians were continuously harassed, property was taken and a large number of people were killed on the allegation that they were Kamajors. The RUF forces, then referred to as “Peoples Army”, joined the AFRC forces and the combined forces continued to attack and mistreat civilians in the Town.¹²³⁷ The Kamajors in Bonthe Town moved out of Bonthe Town, which is part of the Sherbro Urban District, to Sittia Chiefdom and to Bendu (Bendu Cha Chiefdom), where they regrouped to attack the AFRC forces now in Bonthe Town. Furthermore, Kamajors had been deployed since 1996 in all the villages along the river from Mattru down to York Island, three nautical miles to Bonthe Town. Accordingly, the RUF/AFRC forces were surrounded by Kamajors.¹²³⁸

¹²³⁵ They would however come from time to time to patrol the island.

¹²³⁶ Casualty figures for the RUF forces could not be ascertained.

¹²³⁷ This would be the only time RUF managed to get a grip on Bonthe Town.

¹²³⁸ The Kamajors were however not deployed in York Island.



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Following threats of attack by the Kamajors on Bonthe Town, the AFRC forces mounted checkpoints at various locations in the town around July/August. Civilian movement was restricted and all boats and other vessels were grounded. Fishing nets and boats were seized from the civilians by the RUF/AFRC forces. Civilians were beaten, molested and deprived of their daily food. The AFRC commanders often sent their forces to attack villages occupied by Kamajors and to kill civilians. Sometimes civilians, suspected of being Kamajor collaborators, were arrested and brought to Bonthe Town, where they were imprisoned; those who could not be identified were shot and buried by the seaside opposite the naval base.

People were evicted from their homes to accommodate the RUF forces when they began to arrive in Bonthe Town in May 1997 and were harassed. At this time, the actions carried out by the RUF/AFRC members were masterminded by the AFRC forces, because the RUF forces, who mostly came from outside the District, did not know the area.

The Kamajors occupied SLA and RUF positions in Bendu Cha Chiefdom soon after the overthrow of the Government in May 1997. By July 1997, RUF/AFRC forces were shooting at civilian locations in the area. People in villages like Momaya were under serious attacks and during one attack, a 15-year old girl was killed. People abandoned their villages in the area for camps in the bush. Those attacks carried out by RUF/AFRC forces also prompted many young people in the chiefdom to join the Kamajor society, in Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom and at Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom). Reports however mention that as their number grew larger, they became out of control and created more havoc on civilians.¹²³⁹ In November 1997, two young boys from Bonthe Town coming to Bendu to bring their relatives to Bonthe Town were arrested at the wharf by the Kamajors posted at Bendu checkpoint. When they admitted they were coming from Bonthe Town, they were accused of being "junta" collaborators and were killed with cutlasses.

Kamajor harassment and violence against civilians was reported in almost all the chiefdoms where they were deployed. In Bum Chiefdom, they targeted businessmen, especially if they were Fullah or Temne by tribe, and killed them.¹²⁴⁰ In one instance, one man from Moyia who was coming back from Bo District with food items was intercepted by Kamajors at Moyia who took away his food, locked him up in a guard room and subjected him to punishment, as a result of which he died. Punishments included starvation or tying the elbows behind the back and projecting the chest forward. The harassment of civilians increased when an embargo was imposed on Sierra Leone. At the checkpoints they mounted, Kamajors from Bum Chiefdom used to take whatever property the civilians had. If they resisted, civilians were beaten and put in a 2' x 2' cage made of thorns. In Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, Kamajors were forcing civilians to work for them and were also taking away their property. They would load vehicles with the property they had stolen and take it to Talia (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom). On another occasion, a group of Kamajors in Matru amputated the

¹²³⁹ Around this period, it was suggested that there was "[...] a clear difference between newly-recruited Kamajors, who have access to automatic weapons and apparently operate outside the authority of chiefdom representatives, and the traditional Kamajors who are carefully screened and respect traditional chiefdom structures": Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 29 October – 18 November 1997. REG. NO. 97/0390.
¹²⁴⁰ It has to be remembered that the Kamajors were Mendes.



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ears of one civilian. He was also severely wounded on the arm and later died of the wound. Another Kamajor killed two civilians at the Keiga checkpoint (Imperi Chiefdom).

The situation for the civilians in Bonthe Town worsened when RUF/AFRC forces imposed an economic embargo on the civilians in Bonthe Township. No one was allowed to leave Bonthe Town for Freetown and those who attempted were beaten and molested. Civilians therefore found themselves caught between the Kamajors and the RUF/AFRC forces, with the RUF/AFRC forces threatening them for being relations of Kamajors and the Kamajors threatening them for being “rebel” collaborators. This situation became unbearable by August 1997, so the elders of Bonthe organised a peace deal between the Kamajors and the RUF/AFRC forces. The peace was initiated after the peacemakers met with the Kamajor High Priest and Chief Initiator who was based at Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom). Their trip to Talia was, however, accompanied by many obstacles, most of them being the Kamajors checkpoints all along the road to Mattru. Those civilian peacemakers were severely molested at a checkpoint at Momaya (Bendu Cha Chiefdom), where Kamajors opened fired into the air.¹²⁴¹ They were also molested by Kamajors on their arrival at Talia. Nevertheless, they met the High Priest and Chief Initiator, who gave them a message for the RUF/AFRC based at Bonthe Town. In that message, the Chief Initiator asked those forces to stop killing civilians and Kamajors and, in return, he promised he would try to stop his men from launching attacks on Bonthe Town. The peacemakers went back to Bonthe, escorted by some Kamajors responsible for the security of the High Priest, and the RUF/AFRC agreed to the peace plan.

However, the AFRC forces soon undermined the peace deal several times by attacking the positions of the Kamajors. For example, a few days after the return of the peacemakers from the negotiations, the RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Kamajor position at Gbangbatoke (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District). They were defeated and two members of the RUF/AFRC forces were killed. In September 1997, the RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Kamajors at Pembihun, north of Bonthe Town. The RUF/AFRC forces were again defeated and the Kamajors killed a lot of their number, including a very top RUF member. Soon after, the RUF/AFRC made another attack on Kamajor location in Bamaba, west of Bonthe Town, and were again defeated by the Kamajors. The RUF/AFRC forces continued to harass the civilians and killed people they suspected of being Kamajor collaborators in Bonthe Town. Dema Chiefdom, east of Sittia Chiefdom, was also affected by these attacks, as in December 1997, AFRC members went to Moyema by sea, over powered the few Kamajors posted there, looted some houses and a store and burnt down some houses before leaving.¹²⁴² The AFRC members left for Bonthe Town but one of them proceeded to the village of Mokutu (Dema Chiefdom) and killed a youth, who allegedly tried to be “defiant”. This AFRC member was later arrested on his way to Tissana and killed by Kamajors.

In the middle of 1997, newly initiated Kamajors settled at Mokossie (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), where they convened a meeting with the civilians to explain the new laws civilians would have to obey. These laws included no whistling in the town, no sitting on motorbikes by women, no trousers for women and no use of mortars at night. The penalty for the breach of one of these laws was the

¹²⁴¹ This checkpoint was called “the gate of hell”.

¹²⁴² During the period of 1997 to 1999, Dema Chiefdom administration was entirely in the hands of the Kamajors, who presided over cases and served as chiefdom police sub chiefs and as Paramount Chief.



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destruction of the civilian's house. The Kamajors decided on cases and tied people with a FM rope for various reasons.

Around 10 and 11 September 1997, the AFRC commanders ordered that all the important personalities in Bonthe Town be arrested, in particular those who initiated the peace talks, alleging they did not negotiate in the interests of the AFRC. The arrested people were, however, released in the evening. On 15 September, the Kamajors launched an attack on Bonthe Town, which was unsuccessful, as the RUF/AFRC forces had a large amount of weapons in the town. Several Kamajors and a lot of civilians were killed during the battle, which lasted for four hours. The dead Kamajors were buried in a mass grave dug by the RUF/AFRC forces. After the battle, the RUF/AFRC forces conducted a house-to-house search in Bonthe Town, looking for Kamajors. Civilians were advised not to host any Kamajor and to report any case of a civilian harbouring a Kamajor. Information of imminent Kamajor attacks on the town continued to arrive in Bonthe Town, through the businessmen travelling back and forth to Sittia Chiefdom. This led many RUF/AFRC forces to leave the town on gunboats for Freetown, taking with them a lot of property they had previously stolen. Few civilians were authorised to board the RUF/AFRC gunships on that occasions but on subsequent trips and during a transfer to the boat, the sea car they boarded capsized and many civilians drowned in the ocean.

The RUF/AFRC forces who stayed in the town continued to take property and kill civilians in and around Bonthe Town. On 14 October, they arrested the SLPP secretary for Bonthe District, accusing him of being among the Kamajors who launched the attack on the town on 14 September. He was detained for three days, during which time physical violence was inflicted on him; the RUF/AFRC forces also burnt down his house. On 18 October, he was brought to the United Methodist Church, where he was mutilated and had his head cut off.¹²⁴³ The RUF/AFRC forces then dismembered the body, put his head on a stick and paraded across the town, asking civilians to give them money for the good work they did.¹²⁴⁴ Four days later, the civilians asked the RUF/AFRC members for authorisation to bury what was left of his body.¹²⁴⁵

h) Events in 1998

In January, Kamajors went to York Island and stole a lot of property from civilians' houses, without killing anybody. They took their load and went back to Bendu Cha Chiefdom.

On 14 February 1998 the AFRC forces departed from Bonthe Town for Freetown.¹²⁴⁶ The Kamajors replaced them the next day, on 15 February. Two groups of Kamajors heavily armed with

¹²⁴³ It was reported that his organs were cooked and eaten at the naval base.

¹²⁴⁴ It is reported that the officers in charge of the town did not take any action, which led civilians to think that they actually masterminded every action carried out by the junior staff.

¹²⁴⁵ Those responsible for this action would be court marshalled in September 1998 and the mother of the man killed testified she was forced to eat her son's heart by the men who had killed him: AFP, 16 September 1998.

¹²⁴⁶ In late March, over 500 decomposed bodies were discovered in two shallow graves on Sherbro Island. It was believed that these bodies were hurriedly buried by the RUF/AFRC forces before they pulled out of Bonthe Town. It is not clear whether those people had been killed by the RUF/AFRC forces just before they retreated or throughout their stay in the town: AFP, 1 April 1998.



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AK47s, RPGs and LMGs under different commanders, one numbering about 30 members and the other of unknown size, entered Bonthe Town on that day. A meeting was held with the civilians in the township, where some people were killed, mostly on the grounds that they were identified as “rebel” or “junta” collaborators. One of the civilians killed was a tailor who had made the “Kamajors uniforms” the RUF/AFRC forces sometimes used to attack the Kamajors by surprise. In another instance, Kamajors arrested a man who used to live in York Island but was now hiding in Bonthe Town. He was put in prison where two civilians and two policemen were already detained. He was severely beaten by a young Kamajor around 13 years old, following the order of a commander; a few minutes later, five Kamajors entered the cell and told them they would be killed because they were collaborators. They were then taken to the Kamajors High Command, where they were tied up and beaten. It was only due to the intervention of a parish priest that their lives were spared. Instead, they were allowed to pay a fine, which – because the original punishment had been death – was set at Le 200,000, although the first civilian was allowed to leave on payment of Le 54,000.

More Kamajors from the mainland chiefdoms arrived in Bonthe Town, where they looted houses and public offices before going back to the chiefdom from which they had come. Businessmen and traders were continuously harassed by Kamajors who took all their property from them; sometimes, people were killed. Checkpoints were established at various locations at the entry points of the town through which civilians coming from the mainland or from Sherbro Island had to pass. In one instance, Kamajors went to Mania, a trading place for civilians. On their way, they met some civilians going to the nearby village of Ndainga to trade. Those civilians were flogged and one was wounded with a dagger on his back. The Kamajors took most of the items the civilians were about to trade and left for Jimi. On their way, they saw a canoe going towards Ndainga. They took away all the traders’ property and took control of the speedboat with the traders still inside, leaving their canoe out at sea. The civilians were disembarked on a piece of land and the Kamajors continued on their way to Jimi, where they set one house on fire.

The Kamajors continued to harass civilians, killing people alleged to be “junta” or “rebel” collaborators and stealing property. They were totally dependant on civilians for their food and starting taxing civilians, as a contribution to their feeding and to the purchase of ammunition. This made life for the civilians very difficult in the township and surrounding villages. The Kamajors burnt down villages like Gbogboma, Puokie and many others in the Sittia Chiefdom and killed people who occupied positions of respect in the community.

Throughout the remainder of the year and those following, Kamajors victimised civilians in towns and villages across the District. They deposed or ignored all the chiefdom authorities and themselves acted in those positions, including as chiefs and policemen. They added to the suffering of the civilians with their prohibition laws to protect their powers and their mistreatment of civilians, applicable only to the Kamajors. Civilians were required to obey a set of different laws, which included no stealing, no fighting and no travelling from one village to another without a pass, each with different penalties depending on their gravity. Furthermore, the Kamajors asserted that their authority was supreme and that the Town Commander called AG had the right to intercede between civilians and Kamajors.



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While the Kamajor initiation was going on at Gambia (Jong Chiefdom) in 1998, one Kamajor commander raped a suckling mother at the market place in Goba town. He also threatened to kill the husband of the woman. On 27 March 1998, a one-year old boy was deliberately killed at Mowagor village near Mattru by a Kamajor commander.

i) 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002¹²⁴⁷

The Kamajors were not respectful to each other let alone to the civilians in the District, including instances of riots and fighting between different groups of Kamajors in the District. The High Priest would send his own men out on looting missions, but they would often encounter troubles with other groups of Kamajors in other chiefdoms. The Kamajor structure appeared blurred or non-existent to the civilians at this time: acts of violence against civilians and their property throughout the country led people to think that there was no more structural organisation, aside from the District Coordinator and High Priest.

In January 1999, a group of Kamajors from Sittia Chiefdom entered the island town of Timbima (Dema Chiefdom) and required the civilians to pay the sum of Le 1,000.00 and a quantity of fish for their feeding. Defaulters were tied up and made to lie down and look at the sun. Another group of Kamajors from Dema Chiefdom went to attack this first group,¹²⁴⁸ but could not find them in the town. This second group therefore required the civilians to pay for the cost of fuel used to visit the village. From September 1999 to the end of 2000, the administration of all of Dema Chiefdom was in the hands of the Kamajors, with the chiefdom ground commander assuming the responsibility and position of the Paramount Chief. They also made themselves into sub chiefs down to headmen and made additional laws, including prohibiting civilians from eating certain food, like bananas. Civilians were forced to obey their instructions and defaulters were always given severe beatings. Housewives were punished together with their husbands. The Kamajors continued these practices throughout the years of 1999, 2000, 2001 and the early part of 2002, when disarmament begun in the District, although on a lower scale.

Following the Freetown invasion by the RUF/AFRC in January 1999 and their subsequent defeat by ECOMOG and others, RUF/AFRC forces retreated hastily into the country and some arrived in Bonthe Town. While in the town, they raided villages in Sittia and Dema Chiefdoms, took property and burnt houses. Four months later, Kamajors from Dema Chiefdom agreed to regroup with those of Sittia Chiefdom to attack Bonthe Town. Civilians were requested to provide them with the items they needed, like food and cartridges. During a meeting with elders at the chiefdom headquarter of Tissana (Dema Chiefdom), the Kamajors were told that civilians could not gather the money to buy the ammunition, which did not please them. They molested the Paramount Chief and some began going around to collect money from civilians while others were chasing cattle. From Tissana, they moved to an island called Nyagai, where they found a man they accused of having been an attendant

¹²⁴⁷ It is mentioned that Executive Outcome were based in the Moyamba District, and intermittently went into Bonthe District to give moral support to the Kamajors. However, Executive Outcomes left the country early 1997, therefore this information may refer to other forces.

¹²⁴⁸ This second group of Kamajors were from Dema Chiefdom and were ordered by their commander to drive the Kamajors from Sittia Chiefdom back to their chiefdom.



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for the RUF/AFRC in Bonthe Town during previous years. The Kamajors amputated the man bit by bit, starting with his ears, before removing his eyes and internal organs and finally dumping him in the river. The people for whom the man was working for were obliged to pay a fine for having harboured and kept a collaborator. The Kamajors then launched their attack on Bonthe Town but were unsuccessful¹²⁴⁹ and about one month later, those Kamajors, now over 500 in number, launched a second attack on the town. In the meanwhile, the RUF/AFRC forces had started pulling out of the town, having learnt of this attack.¹²⁵⁰

On 24 May 1999, the deputy task force commander of Bonthe District led a troop of Kamajors and attacked Mattru Police station at midday. Two police officers were killed. On 8 July 1999, the same commander led a group of Kamajors at night to launch a strong attack on Kortumahun village (Yawbeke Chiefdom). A pregnant woman was shot in the leg during the attack and later taken to Bo Government Hospital.

In Sogbini Chiefdom, the Kamajors had no regard for the Paramount Chief. They defied his authority and claimed that they were only accountable to the CDF National Coordinator. Civilians were physically and sexually harassed. Children below the age of fifteen were abducted and some were forcefully conscripted and initiated into the Kamajor society. More and more youths joined the society to protect their relations and families from the continuous harassment and havoc wreaked by the Kamajors. In the town of Semabu (Sogbini Chiefdom) a notorious Kamajor killed civilians, took property and burnt down civilian houses. Fear of the Kamajor atrocities forced civilians to go back into the bush camps for safety, abandoning their property behind them. The Kamajors took all of that property that had been abandoned, sometimes visiting the bush camps to steal property and harass civilians.

Following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration program (DDR) was formally launched on 20 October 1999 by the President of Sierra Leone during a ceremony in Freetown. Very few combatants out of the estimated 45,000 combatants, however, laid down their arms at this time.¹²⁵¹

The DDR process was halted in 2000, due to the insecurity in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and the abductions of UN peacekeepers in May 2000. To reactivate this process, a ceasefire was signed in Abuja, Nigeria on 10 November 2000, which again had to be re-activated for the second time on 4 May 2001.¹²⁵²

¹²⁴⁹ Some Kamajors and few RUF/AFRC members were killed but civilian fatalities could not be ascertained.

¹²⁵⁰ It could not be ascertained whether there had been any fighting at all between the RUF/AFRC forces and the Kamajors.

¹²⁵¹ In November 1999, only 1,500 combatants had disarmed out of the total 45,000 estimated combatants: IRIN West Africa, 17 November 1999.

¹²⁵² The security situation in the Northern and Eastern Provinces prevailing in 2000 urged the Government of Sierra Leone to negotiate a ceasefire with the RUF in November 2000. On 4 May 2001, the parties would meet again in Abuja, Nigeria to review the ceasefire. Further to the meeting in May 2001, they parties would hold monthly tripartite meetings under the Joint Committee on DDR. The final meeting took place in January 2002 when disarmament was declared complete and the war over.



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Following a meeting between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF held at the UNAMSIL headquarters in Freetown, the parties agreed on the need to accelerate and complete the disarmament process, which included the opening of a DDR centre in Bonthe District.¹²⁵³ The second meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR took place in Magburaka (Tonkolili District) on 2 June 2001 and the parties agreed on an accelerated disarmament process meant to take place simultaneously in Kono and Bonthe Districts in June 2001,¹²⁵⁴ although the disarmament camp was not yet set up.¹²⁵⁵

Disarmament finally began on 2 July 2001¹²⁵⁶ although at a slow pace, as only nine CDF members turned in their weapons on the first day of the opening of the DDR centres. In fact, CDF members from the mainland expressed their wish to disarm in Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) and not in Moyamba District, as was planned.¹²⁵⁷ Therefore, following a meeting attended by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNAMSIL's Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander, the CDF coordinator and other officials and a member of the NCDDR, the parties agreed to establish another DDR camp in Mattru.¹²⁵⁸ This camp was opened around 13 July and from this time, the disarmament process began to accelerate in the District: as of 27 July, 813 CDF members had disarmed in the two DDR camps in Bonthe District. On this date, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General visited the two centres to assess the disarmament progress and to stress the importance of having this process complete by the end of July.¹²⁵⁹

During a meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR, the parties formerly declared disarmament in Bonthe District complete in September.¹²⁶⁰ UN peacekeepers of the Nepalese contingent deployed in the District in late 2001.¹²⁶¹

3. Conclusion

Sharing a border with Pujehun District, Bonthe District was affected by the RUF/NPFL incursion into Sierra Leone as early as 1991. The effect of the conflict, however, differed slightly from the experience in Pujehun District. Until 1995 in Bonthe District, the conflict had only spread into the three chiefdoms of Kwamebai Krim, Bum and Nongoba Bullom, while in 1991, although only for a few months, RUF/NPFL forces had spread across the whole Pujehun District. After a first short stay in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom in 1991, RUF/NPFL forces would visit the District sporadically,

¹²⁵³ In addition to the existing DDR camps in Port Loko, Bo, Moyamba, Kenema and Daru, the parties also agreed on the urgent need to open new DDR camps in the country, in the Northern Province (Lunsar, Makeni, Kamakwie, Masingbi and Alikalia), the Eastern Province (Koidu and Kailahun) and the Southern Province (Pujehun and Bonthe): UNAMSIL press release, 15 May 2001.

¹²⁵⁴ UNAMSIL press briefing, 5 June 2001.

¹²⁵⁵ UNAMSIL press briefing, 8 June 2001. The acceleration of the disarmament was meant to take place District by District.

¹²⁵⁶ UNAMSIL press briefing, 3 July 2001.

¹²⁵⁷ Kamajors wanted a fast-track disarmament to be able to return rapidly to their farming activities.

¹²⁵⁸ UNAMSIL press briefing, 6 July 2001.

¹²⁵⁹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 27 July 2001.

¹²⁶⁰ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 01 - 30 September 2001. Disarmament would only be declared complete for the whole country in January 2002.

¹²⁶¹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 16 November 2001.



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often in small numbers, but would not establish a real presence there, except in Bum Chiefdom for six months in late 1991/1992.

The natural features of the District, particularly the swamp areas and rivers in the south, could explain the containment of the conflict to the three aforementioned chiefdoms during its early stage. This is reinforced by the fact that the major incursion penetrating the District in 1995 was carried out from the north of the District, where the road network is the more developed.

By 1995, the conflict had taken a new turn, as RUF forces spread across the whole country. The attacks on the east and south of Moyamba District and the north of Bonthe District in January 1995 was in fact preceded by a massive RUF operation in Bo District, where RUF forces launched attacks on camps and headquarter towns in the centre of the District all within a couple of days towards the end of December 1994. RUF forces then proceeded directly to Moyamba District and then to Bonthe District.

RUF forces attacked and thus paralysed the economically vital mining area, which spreads across the north of Bonthe District and the south of Moyamba District. This new development was dramatic for the Government of Sierra Leone, as the income from mining activities and the selling of cash crops produce had already dropped considerably following the previous occupation of Kono and Kailahun Districts. RUF forces spread across the mainland District, failing however to reach Sherbro Island.

Their progression and the violations they committed were hampered by the intervention of a special military unit in late 1995 and the continuous development and successes of the Kamajors. By the end of 1996, the RUF forces were dislodged from their positions across the District and the subsequent actions they carried out was the fruit of small pockets of RUF remnants.

Unlike Pujehun, Bo, Kenema and Kailahun Districts, after the overthrow of the Government and the establishment of the AFRC regime, the Kamajors did not withdraw from their positions and go underground, as the RUF/AFRC forces were concentrated in Bonthe Town and not in the rest of the District. Furthermore, most of the RUF forces who joined the AFRC members in the Bonthe Town did not originate from the District but came from Kailahun District.

From February 1998 and following the withdrawal of the RUF/AFRC forces from Bonthe Town, the pattern of actions in Bonthe District was similar to how the conflict affected the other Southern Districts of Pujehun, Moyamba and Bo. Free of RUF/AFRC presence, Kamajors actions, originally aiming at defend their chiefdoms against RUF attacks and violence, became oppressive for the civilians, as Kamajors affirmed their control not only of the security of District but also of the local administration, substituting themselves for the local authorities, and of the civilians living in Bonthe District.

After 1998, the conflict concentrated in the Northern Province and areas of the Eastern Province, where the CDF members were not able to put up a firm and continuous resistance to the RUF/AFRC advances and where the main mining areas were located.



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Violations committed by Kamajors during this period were fewer reported than the violence carried out by the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC forces. This is probably mainly due to the fact that key people mostly reported violence when carried out during an attack; from 1998 onwards, the Kamajors were in total control of the District, so the day-to-day violations were most of the time not reported, blurred in the memories of the key persons.

As RUF forces did not settle in the District for a long period and the intensity of fighting was generally lower than in the rest of the country, Bonthe District was one of the least affected Districts in term of destruction of property, displacement of people¹²⁶² and violence against civilians.

c. Moyamba District

1. **Introduction**

Moyamba District is one of the four Districts in the Southern Province of the Republic of Sierra Leone. It is bounded by Bo District in the east; Tonkolili and Port Loko Districts in the north; Bonthe District in the South; and the Western Area in the west. The headquarter town, Moyamba Town, is located in Kaiyamba Chiefdom, in the centre of the District.

There are 14 chiefdoms in the District:

<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarter</u>
Bagruwa	Sembehun
Banta	Gbangbantoke
Banta Mokele	Mokele
Bumpeh	Rotifunk
Dasse	Mano
Fakunya	Gandohun
Kagboro	Shenge
Kaiyamba	Moyamba
Koti	Taiama
Kamajei	Senahun
Kongbora	Bauya
Kowa	Njama
Ribbi	Bradford
Timdel	Bomotoke

Having borders with both the Southern and the Northern Province, Moyamba District would be affected by the development of the conflict in those two Provinces, both of which were used to launch attacks on its borders, primarily from the south.

¹²⁶² Although there was no massive displacement of population between towns inside the District and outside the District, civilians often took the bush, leaving in bush camps called "sorkoihun".



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Two strategic roads pass through the District. The main highway leaving Freetown for the Provinces separates into two roads at Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). The first road goes from the west to the north towards Magburaka (Tonkolili District) and Koidu (Kono District), while the second one reaches Bo and Kenema through Moyamba District. This second road reaches Moyamba District in the east, and runs in the District from the extreme north-east of Fakunya Chiefdom and its headquarter town, Moyamba Junction, Taiama (Kori Chiefdom), and Senehun (Kamajei Chiefdom) before arriving in Bo District in Gbo Chiefdom. From Moyamba Junction (at the border with Tonkolili District), a road leaves to the south-west to reach Moyamba Town. Accordingly, controlling Moyamba Junction would allow access to the north-west to Tonkolili District, to the south-west to Moyamba Town and to the south-east to Bo Town. When circumstances make using this highway impracticable, an alternate route to reach Bo from Freetown runs through Moyamba Town. It leaves the Western Area through Songo and goes south-east to Moyamba District, passing by the headquarter towns of five chiefdoms, before ultimately reaching Bo District through Bumpah Chiefdom. The control of this road would be of a critical importance, as it makes Freetown reachable from Moyamba District.

Its main economic activities, besides salt production on the coast, are rutile and bauxite mining. The mining area is located in the south of the District, in Banta Chiefdom, and in the north of Bonthe District (Imperi Chiefdom). The headquarters of the bauxite company are in Mokañji (Banta Chiefdom), while the headquarters of the rutile company is in Imperi Chiefdom (Bonthe District). Those mining activities were of vital importance for the Sierra Leone Government, as mineral resources made up the bulk of its exports before the war.

Njala University College (south of Kori Chiefdom), by the Taia River that flows south-north in the east of the District, is part of the University of Sierra Leone and is the only University Campus in the Provinces.

The way the conflict affected the District can be divided into three distinct stages. The first stage was from 1991 to 1994, the period before the RUF forces entered the District. During this time, SLA forces were deployed in the District but harassed civilians, including taking away their property. Cases of rapes and killing were reported and the chasing of collaborators increased by the end of 1994 as rumours of imminent RUF attacks grew stronger.

The second stage ran from 1994 to 1998 and saw the progression and settlement of RUF forces in the District and the development of the Kamajor society. In early 1995, RUF forces made an incursion in the District and, shortly after, began to make their way towards Freetown. As this advance was stopped by SLA forces, the RUF forces settled in the District, progressively reaching all the chiefdoms and establishing a strong base in the north. The chiefdoms in the south of the District were less affected and most of the actions were concentrated in the north of the District. Civilians began organising themselves into Civil Defence Units (CDUs) and by early 1996, the first Kamajors deployed in the District and engaged RUF forces. They however also fought SLA forces who were asked by the civilians to leave in 1996. The following year was described as the peak of



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Kamajor activities in the District. RUF forces were still active in the north of the District but had been repelled from the south and centre.

During the AFRC regime, RUF/AFRC forces were only deployed in limited areas of the District and were strongly resisted by the CDF. This second phase was characterised by violence inflicted on civilians mainly by RUF forces but also by SLA forces and Kamajors. RUF forces, once stopped on their progression to Freetown, mainly carried out hit and run attacks, entering villages, taking away property and burning houses but also killing civilians, raping girls and capturing civilians to carry their loads, usually to their main base. They also killed number of civilians on the grounds they were Kamajor collaborators. During this period, the behaviour of the Kamajors towards civilians began changing, as they intensified their fight against the RUF and, later, RUF/AFRC forces and started gaining control over different areas. Civilians were initially requested to provide them with food and other basic items but soon, Kamajors began harassing civilians and taking their property. Kamajors did not recognise the authority and power of local authorities and other Government personnel, as they only had respect for those who had been initiated and they soon extended administrative authority over civilians in the areas they occupied. Their control of an area included physical violence against civilians in general, including sexual violence against women. Alleged RUF or AFRC collaborators were killed without first undertaking an investigation. The Kamajors made certain laws for the civilians and those who broke those laws were subject to various punishments, including imprisonment in a small cage made of sticks and thorns.

The third and final stage ran from 1998 to 2001 when disarmament was complete in the District. Following the retreat from Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces pulled out of the entire District, which was therefore in total control of the District. Only few and limited attacks were carried out in the north of the District by RUF/AFRC forces based in Tonkolili District. This period was however marred with a lot of atrocities, and most of the CDF actions described in 1997 also happened in 1998. Alleged RUF or RUF/AFRC collaborators were killed and traders and businessmen were particularly targeted for their belongings. Fighting between two factions of the CDF erupted in the District in 1998 and 1999.

However, by the end of 1998 CDF activities against civilians started to decrease and, gradually, civilians became free from attacks and harassment. People returned to their various towns and villages and started resettling. This continued until the disarmament of the CDF in the entire District by 2001.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1991 – 1994

Sierra Leone Army (SLA) forces were deployed across the country in the District's headquarter towns and other sensitive areas soon after the coup d'état in 1992, with the aim of securing the country from the National Patriotic Front (NPFL) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces, which had entered Sierra Leone from Liberia in 1991. Around this time, new SLA units emerged, such as Tiger Battalion, Scorpion Battalion and SLA Rangers. In Moyamba District in 1992,¹²⁶³ some

¹²⁶³ The date is not clear from the record, but this was probably sometime in 1992.



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SLA members deployed in Fakunya Chiefdom in the central north of the District, which shares a boundary with Tonkolili District. They deployed in two sensitive areas of the chiefdom, namely Moyamba Junction, 102 miles from Freetown on the Freetown-Bo highway, 22 miles to Moyamba and Njagbahun Junction, on the Moyamba Junction-Moyamba road, 8 miles from Moyamba Junction and 14 miles from Moyamba town.¹²⁶⁴

At this time, the District was free of an RUF/NPFL presence, as those forces were confined to the south-east and north-east of the country. However, the war had already begun to affect civilians, who were harassed by SLA forces, mainly for their food and domestic animals. Food was often stolen at the checkpoints mounted by the SLA, but also when SLA forces would leave their checkpoints and visit towns and villages in the chiefdoms for the purposes of finding food. In addition, cases of physical violence, killings and rapes were reported. At the checkpoints, SLA forces took some women and girls away and sexually assaulted them. The forces also took aside civilians suspected of being “rebels”, inflicting physical violence on them and sometimes killing them when they could not be identified by relatives or other civilians.¹²⁶⁵

By the end of January 1994, the then Head of State declared “total war” against the RUF forces and launched a massive recruitment process, more than doubling the ranks of the SLA.¹²⁶⁶ In addition, in April 1994, an SLA captain visited Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom),¹²⁶⁷ in the north-east of the District, where he held a meeting with the people of the town. During that meeting, he instructed the people of the town to give their young men to be trained as vigilantes to help the SLA fight the RUF forces and to further protect their chiefdoms in the Districts. The trained youths formed a Civil Defence Unit (CDU).¹²⁶⁸ The people of the town were instructed to provide the CDU with food and logistics but as elders were reluctant to tax an already poor population, the Chiefs decided to tax themselves to support the youths. The CDU kept guard at certain locations in Rotifunk and the surrounding villages. Other units were formed in other chiefdoms in the District. Additional security was provided for the workers at the mining company¹²⁶⁹ in Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom) by SSD (State Security Division) forces, who arrived on 4 July 1994.¹²⁷⁰

However, towards the end of 1994, the actions of the SLA against civilians continued to increase. For example, SLA forces who introduced themselves as SLA members went by military truck to the town of Rotawa (north of Fakunya Chiefdom) on 14 October 1994. Those men were dressed in full

¹²⁶⁴ Whoever controlled these junctions would have open access to Moyamba Town (Kaiyamba Chiefdom), south-east of Fakunya Chiefdom.

¹²⁶⁵ No more detail was available on this information, nor the precise year of its occurrence.

¹²⁶⁶ In late 1993, RUF forces launched a massive operation in the south of Kenema District and rapidly spread across the District. By the end of 1994, they were all over Kenema, Pujehun and Bo Districts and continued their inland progression.

¹²⁶⁷ There is also a Bumpeh Chiefdom in Bo District.

¹²⁶⁸ A CDU was the most developed form of organisation the civilians put in place for the defence of their chiefdoms. This was the step prior to the initiation and development of the Kamajors.

¹²⁶⁹ Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Co. (Sieromco), a Swiss-owned mining company based in the southern area of Mokanji was the only bauxite producer in the country and was mining deposits within 4 km of the washing plant at Gondama, in the centre of the Chiefdom: *The Mining Journal*, 29 May 1994.

¹²⁷⁰ The year is uncertain, as the SSD may have deployed in July 1993.



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military uniforms. They took civilian property, mainly food items and livestock, and proceeded to Falaba and Gbotima, in the north of Fakunya Chiefdom, where they carried out the same action. Another group of SLA forces, allegedly coming from Mofokoya (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), five miles to the north of Rotawa, entered Rotawa on 16 December 1994. They entered the compound of an elder, once a Regent Chief, and took her 16-year daughter whom they began to beat up. When the girl's father and one of his guests pleaded for her release, the SLA killed them; the father was beaten with stick and the guest was shot and killed. On their way back to Tonkolili District, they came across a woman whom they raped before giving her Le 1,000. They further told her they were SLA forces from Camp Charlie at Mile 91.¹²⁷¹ Also, the town of Kwellu (Fakunya Chiefdom) was raided on 11 December by the SLA forces, who took a lot of property from civilians living there.

On 14 November 1994 the SLA forces came to Mano (Dasse Chiefdom), situated on a highway leading Fakunya Chiefdom to Dasse Chiefdom, through Kori Chiefdom southwards into Bo District. They were fully dressed in military uniforms and armed with RPG and automatic rifles. The SLA forces established a base in the town and erected checkpoints in the town at roads leading out towards Taiama to the north, Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom) to the south and Bumpeh Chiefdom (Bo District) to the south.¹²⁷² Soon afterwards the SLA forces started harassing civilians in the town, taking money from people at the checkpoints, and even went to other towns and villages in the chiefdom. Civilians were beaten and their property was taken. Following the attack on Bo Town in late December 1994, the SLA imposed a curfew from 6.00pm to 7.30am and started suspecting civilians of being "rebels" or "rebel" collaborators; several people were beaten, imprisoned in the guardroom and even killed.¹²⁷³

By the end of 1994, news about possible attacks by the RUF forces began to be heard in the District. There were rumours that the RUF forces were fast advancing to attack the mining town of Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom) and make a base there. Around 28 December 1994, SLA forces coming from Freetown were airlifted to Mokanji as reinforcements for the SSD.

Civilians were very much disturbed by the presence of the SLA forces in the District as those forces were treating them roughly and although RUF forces had not yet reached the District, civilians began to mistrust the SLA.

b) Events in 1995

On 11 January 1995, SLA forces entered Njama (Kowa Chiefdom, in the east of Moyamba District) and their commander introduced them to the Paramount Chief as troops sent from the SLA Brigade headquarter at Bo Town to secure the chiefdom, as RUF forces were on their way to the chiefdom. The SLA forces erected checkpoints in the town but departed the town on the following day, led by civilians taken to lead the way, en route to attack RUF forces that were based at Momajoe (Bagbo

¹²⁷¹ Reports for Tonkolili, however, do not make mention of SLA troops based at Mile 91 around this time.

¹²⁷² Around this time, RUF forces had spread across Bo District and were approaching Bumpeh Chiefdom, which adjoins Dasse Chiefdom to its west.

¹²⁷³ Massive attacks were carried out during the Christmas week in Bo District. RUF forces first attacked an IDP camp before attacking Bo Town and major cities in its environs.



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Chiefdom, south of Bo District). However, they returned to Njama later the following day, overrun by the RUF forces at Momajoe; that evening, Njama was attacked by RUF forces.

This first RUF attack into Moyamba District was the prelude of a massive operation, at the end of which RUF forces attacked and spread across most of the District. There was, however, some confusion at the time of the attack on Njama, as the SLA present in the town appeared to put up no resistance to the RUF forces and some of them were seen outside the town, rubbing black and blue materials on their faces and putting on masks. RUF forces entered the headquarter town, shooting randomly and shouting at civilians to fight them with sticks and cutlasses.¹²⁷⁴ As they started to set houses on fire, civilians ran away from their houses. One hundred and six houses were burnt down that day and the houses that were not burnt were looted and the shops vandalised. RUF forces molested and beat civilians, raped seven girls, whose age could not be ascertained, and killed 10 civilians, including the Chiefdom Speaker and the Paramount Chief's son and younger brother. The RUF forces spent the night in town before departed the next day, early in the morning of 14 January, with some civilians whom they had abducted to carry the load. They arrived at Mokoya (Kowa Chiefdom), where they took property from the village. No casualties were reported, as all the civilians had deserted the village before they arrived. On the same day, an SLA gunship coming from the direction of Bo shot at Njama for two hours.

On 15 January 1995, RUF forces battled with SLA coming from Mano (Dasse Chiefdom) on their way to Njama. This battle took place at Pelewahun (Kamajei Chiefdom) some six miles to the north-east of Mano. The RUF forces overpowered the SLA, which forced them to retreat hastily to Mano. Before this battle, RUF forces had attacked some villages in the extreme south-east of Kori Chiefdom, west of Kamajei Chiefdom. RUF forces attacked Njala, including the University campus, and Mosongo, where they burnt 12 houses and killed some civilians. It appeared that RUF forces then separated,¹²⁷⁵ with one group advancing north to Kamajei Chiefdom and one going south-westward to Dasse Chiefdom.

In Kamajei Chiefdom, RUF forces attacked villages in the south of the chiefdom, including Buma and Ngiyehun. At Buma, two civilians were killed and others abducted and taken to Njala (Kori Chiefdom). Although the RUF forces did not attack Senehun, the headquarter town, most of the civilians left the town and went to live in the bush or, for those who had money, to Bo Town. RUF forces established a base at Pelewahun Kenneh, where they would stay for 11 months and from where they would launch attacks on Kori and Kamajei Chiefdoms. For example, Pelewahun¹²⁷⁶ was attacked on 18 February, by RUF forces dressed in military uniforms, underneath which some of them had attire adorned with the RUF initials.

The RUF group that had advanced in the direction of Dasse Chiefdom pursued the SLA forces to Mano, where they discovered that the SLA had fled the town. The RUF forces captured eight civilians and introduced themselves as "freedom fighters", coming to redeem the Sierra Leoneans

¹²⁷⁴ This referred to the attack on Bo Town in late December, during which RUF forces were repelled by civilians equipped with sticks and cutlasses. See Bo District for further information.

¹²⁷⁵ It is not clear whether they divided before or after the battle at Pelewahun.

¹²⁷⁶ There are two Pelewahuns in the south of Kamajei Chiefdom.



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from the APC regime. The RUF forces spent six hours in the town but did not inflict harm on the civilians. They then attempted to take the Mokbanji road but were ambushed by the SLA on the bridge over the Taia River. Sixteen RUF members were killed and two civilians, who had attempted to escape, drowned in the river. The RUF left the area and spent the night at Benduma.

SLA forces and civilians who were in hiding returned to Mano and the SLA continued to harass civilians. People were killed on the suspicion that they were “rebels” or “rebel” collaborators. More checkpoints were established throughout the town and youths were asked to work as vigilantes, which included running the checkpoints but also doing menial work for the SLA like fetching water or cooking. When an attack was imminent, those youths were given weapons to fight.

From Benduma, the RUF forces proceeded to the south to attack Mokbanji (Banta Chiefdom), the location of the Sieromco Company, a Swiss-owned company that specialised in the mining of bauxite. Prior to this attack, some SLA forces who were stationed in Mokbanji had left the town for Njama (Kowa Chiefdom) to fight the RUF but were repelled at Pelewahun on 15 January and came back to the town.¹²⁷⁷ On 17 January, 30 SLA members, allegedly from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District), were airlifted as reinforcement to Mokbanji.¹²⁷⁸

On 18 January 1995, the RUF forces from Banduma passed by Kabiama (Banta Chiefdom), where they abducted a diamond dealer, his wife and other civilians and continued to Mokbanji, three miles from Kabiama.¹²⁷⁹ In Mokbanji, no houses were burnt, but several civilians, both locals and foreigners, were abducted, including the personnel manager of the Sieromco company and civilians were killed, including the Government representative to the mining companies, a retired Inspector of Police, a worker from the company, a Fullah man and two SLA members. SLA forces deployed at the Sierra Rutile Company (Imperi Chiefdom, Bonthe District) came to the town, in order to consolidate the SLA forces at Mokbanji and thus to protect the security of the other mining company. However, the RUF did not stay long in Mokbanji and by the end of the afternoon had left the town and proceeded further south to Tongor (Banta Chiefdom) where they took a lot of civilian property. From there, they moved to Imperi Chiefdom (Bonthe District), the location of the Sierra Rutile Company, which would be attacked on 19 January 1995. Military strategists in Freetown suspected that the RUF forces would use the Sierra Rutile area as a base to access the sea through the port of Nititi (Banta Chiefdom), where major shipments of mineral products from both Sieromco and Sierra Rutile companies were exported by sea to Europe.¹²⁸⁰

¹²⁷⁷ It is likely that they regrouped with the SLA forces who were deployed at Mano (Dasse).

¹²⁷⁸ A strong SLA military base was located at Daru, called Moa Barracks. This base had been attacked many times during the first years of the conflict by RUF/NPFL forces but SLA forces always repelled them, which led civilians in Mokbanji to say that those SLA forces “knew how to fight”. It is also alleged that this reinforcement was not too much encouraged, as the SLA forces already stationed in the town were poorly dressed in half combat, were carrying cutlasses and half of them were wearing bathroom slippers.

¹²⁷⁹ During the attack on Mokbanji, it appeared that the RUF were “all over the town”, as gunshots were heard from everywhere. This may suggest two things: either RUF forces were already in the town before the attack, disguised in SLA uniforms, or some SLA forces left their ranks and joined the RUF.

¹²⁸⁰ Xinhua News Agency, 24 January 1995.



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More SLA members were again airlifted to Mokanji to reinforce the forces already in the area. Supported by Nigerian Alpha Jets, they fought the RUF forces who had not gone to Bonthe District and who were allegedly still in the Mokanji Hills area.¹²⁸¹ The workers of the mining company and their families were evacuated to Freetown. SLA forces based in Mokanji, however, began to harass civilians and to chase them out of their villages to steal their property, forcing them to live in the bush. For example, around 13 February, the SLA forces went to a bush camp in order to take civilians and to make them work for them. During their escape, a woman and her four children drowned in the Taia River. They also killed civilians they accused of being “rebel” collaborators.

For two months, the RUF forces concentrated on Bonthe District¹²⁸² and to a limited extent on the south of Moyamba District. In February, RUF forces entered Mokele, the headquarter town of Banta Mokele Chiefdom. They burnt down the Paramount Chief's compound and four other houses and stayed in the town for two weeks before leaving. During the time of their stay, the civilians had fled to the bush. The RUF forces were also scattered in villages throughout Banta Chiefdom, including Yebanna and Mogbomo Junction in the south of the chiefdom, and asked civilians whether any SLA forces had visited their villages at any time. In late February, RUF forces coming from the rutile area (Imperi Chiefdom, Bonthe District) launched an unsuccessful attack on Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom). Until August, RUF forces would make other unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the SLA forces and to take control over the mining company.

In March 1995, a massive RUF operation was launched in Moyamba District. The pattern of the RUF actions clearly demonstrated that their goal was Freetown and that they initially did not intend to settle in Moyamba District, which they used more as a transit towards the capital. RUF forces simultaneously attacked Moyamba Junction (Fakunya Chiefdom) and Moyamba Town, following the same pattern in each attack.¹²⁸³ The group that attacked Moyamba Town would then follow the Moyamba-Freetown road, attacking the major roads on its way, before being halted in Ribbi Chiefdom, in the north-west of the District.

Prior to the attack on Moyamba Town, RUF forces attacked the town of Mokele (Banta Mokele Chiefdom). On their arrival in the town, the commander informed the civilians that they were peace-loving citizens fighting to liberate the people of Sierra Leone, which was why they were called “freedom fighters.” However, no sooner had the meeting ended than the harassment of civilians begun. The forces stole civilians' property and took away all the young men and women including girls between 13 and 16 years old. They looted the township and forced the young men and women to carry the loads. Another group of RUF forces entered the town of Mosekie (Banta Mokele Chiefdom) where they had a meeting with the civilians. At the meeting people were ordered to cook for the them, after which the town was looted and the property was carried for them by young men captured in the village. Some houses were burnt but no one was killed. Around the same time, the RUF forces also entered Mokepie village (Banta Mokele Chiefdom), where they introduced

¹²⁸¹ AFP, 25 January 1995.

¹²⁸² By February 1995, all the chiefdoms in the north of Bonthe District had been attacked by RUF forces.

¹²⁸³ It is probable that the RUF group who attacked Moyamba Junction, to the north of the District came from Tonkolili District, and the one who attacked Moyamba Town came from Bonthe District.



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themselves as “freedom fighters” and took property from civilians. They burnt down some houses in the town and abducted youths, for the purposes of recruiting them into their fighting force.¹²⁸⁴

These RUF forces, dressed in military uniforms, reached Moyamba Town (Kaiyamba Chiefdom), close to the centre of Moyamba District, on 14 March 1995. At the time of the attacks, members of the CDU were deployed in the town but had to withdraw, as they could not withstand the heavy firepower of the RUF forces; the SLA forces, similarly overpowered, also had to retreat. Twenty-five civilians were killed in the town and several young girls and women raped. The RUF forces also burnt down 23 houses, including the Moyamba Police station and took away a lot of property from civilians and shops. Captured civilians were forced to carry property taken by the RUF forces, who also captured some children to be conscripted into the fighting forces. The RUF forces spent only one night in the town and continued their way on the Moyamba-Freetown road, passing by Yoyema (Kaiyamba Chiefdom).

Another group of armed men entered the town on 17 March 1995 and set up base in the compound of the Moyamba Boys Secondary School. They introduced themselves as SLA forces and encouraged civilians to come back to the town; civilians were convinced that these were SLA forces, as they were wearing military uniforms. Furthermore, the commander introduced himself as a famous SLA officer. However, three days later, those men began breaking into houses, shops and Government buildings and taking everything they could lay their hands on. They stayed in the town for one more month, during which they harassed civilians for their domestic animals and created more havoc, killing, raping and abducting civilians. They only left the town on hearing the rumour that SLA forces were on their way to the town. Civilians then identified those armed men as RUF forces.¹²⁸⁵

At Yoyema (Kaiyamba Chiefdom), which they reached on 15 March, RUF forces also beat civilians, killing some, took away all the domestic animals and left the same day, continuing their journey westwards. Five days later, another group of armed men claiming to be SLA forces reached Yoyema and, as they did in Moyamba Town, persuaded people to resettle in the town; for one week, the town was calm. However, pandemonium broke out not long after, including the massive stealing of property throughout the town, and those forces were then identified by civilians as RUF forces. These forces also left on hearing that SLA forces were approaching Moyamba Town.

The next chiefdom to the west was Kongbora and Bauya, the chiefdom headquarter town, is located on the main road. RUF forces who had left Yoyema on 15 March attacked villages on the road but by-passed Bauya. They entered Morkorewo (Kongbora Chiefdom) on 16 March and burnt down the first house of the village. They killed some people, among them two elderly people, and abducted others. Those captured civilians were to carry their property while young boys, some of whom had weapons, were to fetch water. One old man who was captured at Yoyema the day before and who

¹²⁸⁴ Although this action was reported to have taken place on 19 March, it is likely that it took place before the attack on Moyamba Town on 14 March, as it is located in the south of the District and RUF forces reached Moyamba Town from Bonthe District, which is further south.

¹²⁸⁵ It is however not clear whether those armed men were RUF forces or ex-SLA forces deserting their positions and acting like the RUF. Civilians however recounted that they were RUF forces in disguise.



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told them he was tired to carry the load was killed. The RUF forces stole property from the old part of the village and stayed for three days, during which time they killed some civilians and took all the livestock. These RUF forces were accompanied by men and women fulfilling different missions, some of them being engineers, cooks, first aid men, load carriers or road map directors.

The headquarter town of Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom), which is also located on the main road, was attacked in the afternoon of 18 March 1995. Civilians were abducted and killed; people coming to the town one week later found a lot of bodies in the centre of the town, some already beginning to decompose. Many houses were burnt, mostly on City Road, and property was taken. The day before this attack, armed men introducing themselves as SLA forces had come to the town. However, on the day of the attack, those armed men took red pieces of cloth out of their pockets and tied them around their heads. This made civilians understand that those armed men were not SLA forces coming to protect them as they pretended but RUF forces.¹²⁸⁶ Before leaving the town, the forces wrote on some of the houses: "RUF heading for the city Freetown – we will be back soon".

RUF forces then attacked the headquarter town of Bradford (Ribbi Chiefdom), to the north-west of Rotifunk. All the civilians in the town ran into the bush while the forces burnt down many houses, killed 13 civilians and took a lot of property. They were however repelled by SLA forces who had come from Freetown on three trucks the day before. During the fighting, one RUF member and two SLA members were killed. Although they had defeated the RUF, the SLA forces did not stay in the town.

After the attack on Bradford and their encounter with SLA forces, RUF forces came back to Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom). They established a camp, known as "Camp Fol Fol",¹²⁸⁷ located in a strategic position on a hilly hideout at the border with four chiefdoms, Bumpeh, Ribbi and Kongbora Chiefdoms (Moyamba District) and Yoni Chiefdom (Tonkolili District). From this camp, they went on to attack villages, notably the villages surrounding Rotifunk, where they killed civilians and took property. At Berembu, a woman was killed and in Makombrabai the RUF forces killed three people, one woman and two men. At Mokebbi, five miles from Rotifunk, no one was killed but several people were captured and property was taken. Old men and women were forced to carry the stolen property, including mattresses, rice, palm oil, gari and cattle, while young boys and girls were taken to the RUF base for training and recruitment. One young boy who attempted to run in order not to be abducted was shot and killed by an RUF member. When they reached Levuma, in the north-west of Kongbora Chiefdom, near their base, RUF forces released the carriers, as they did not want them to know the location of their base. A guard place or second camp was established at Motokoh, two and a half miles from Camp Fol Fol, where civilians abducted to carry loads from the villages were released and told to return to their villages. RUF forces also made several visits to Rotifunk town, which was completely deserted by civilians for some weeks. All these attacks led many civilians to find refuge in the centre of the chiefdom, notably in Bumpeh, a village virtually only accessible by the Bumpeh River, which originates in the ocean.

¹²⁸⁶ The red headband was characteristic of the RUF forces who had worn it since the beginning of the conflict. This red headband distinguished them from the NPFL forces during the early stages of the conflict.

¹²⁸⁷ This camp was reported spelled in two different ways, the alternative one being "Camp Fall Fall".



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More than 200 RUF members, armed with AK47s, RPGs and a Anti Aircraft gun mounted on a lorry, attacked Bauya (Kongbora Chiefdom) sometime in March.¹²⁸⁸ Several buildings were burnt, including the Chief's house, the Secondary School, the Court Barrie and the market. More than 30 people were killed and a lot of property was taken. From Bauya, they attacked the surrounding villages. Besides Camp Fol Fol, a secondary training base was opened at Levuma (north-west of Kongbora Chiefdom). The area soon became deserted, as the RUF forces were settled and in control of the area.

In the other wave of attacks occurring concurrently with the attacks on Moyamba Town, Moyamba Junction (Fakunya Chiefdom) was attacked on 14 March 1995, probably by RUF forces coming from Tonkolili District.¹²⁸⁹ Early in the afternoon, armed men with full military uniforms entered the town with sporadic shooting; giving no excuse for the shooting, they left the town towards Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), where they claimed they came from.¹²⁹⁰ Late in the evening, those armed men came back and attacked the town again. At the time of the attack, the SLA forces posted there were nowhere to be found. The RUF forces burnt down nine houses and captured several people. These forces then went south, attacked Waterloo in the evening and proceeded on to Njagbahun Junction, where SLA forces were based. Although no fatalities are reported, RUF forces succeeding in capturing a lot of newly supplied arms and ammunition from the SLA. From Njagbahun, they headed back in the direction of Waterloo and, on their way, attacked Kpetema Fanday at midnight. Property was taken and several people were captured in the town.¹²⁹¹ On 15 March, civilians who had been abducted from Moyamba Junction and surrounding villages were forced to carry the stolen property to an RUF camp called "Borkor One" near Lumleblu village.¹²⁹²

In about mid April 1995, the RUF forces attacked Motobong (Bumpeh Chiefdom), 16 miles from Rotifunk. As they opened fire while entering the village, civilians ran into the bush. The RUF forces shot two cows and took away other domestic animals to Moshibara Junction, where they entered the town, killed one woman and wounded another civilian. They then advanced to Moshemoi, capturing many civilians without resistance or the need for gunfire during the night. They asked a girl to show them the direction of the Paramount Chief's farm and, as they realised she gave them the wrong direction on purpose, they raped her. They then gave her Le 10,000, telling her that they would come back for her, and left for their base at Camp Fol Fol.

The SLA forces who had earlier prompted RUF forces, disguised as SLA members, to leave Moyamba Town in late March/early April, arrived in Moyamba Town on or around 20 April 1995. The SLA forces defended the town from several more attacks by the RUF forces, who never

¹²⁸⁸ Although it took place in March, this attack may have taken place before the establishment of Camp Fol Fol. It is also possible that some of the RUF forces had settled in villages in Kongbora Chiefdom, while the bulk of the RUF forces were heading to Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom). Accordingly, the exact date of these events could not be ascertained. They took place either before or after the Rotifunk and Bradford attacks.

¹²⁸⁹ Around the same period, RUF forces attacked Mile 91, a strategic town on the highway to Freetown, in Tonkolili District.

¹²⁹⁰ At this time, SLA forces were deployed in Mile 91 in Tonkolili District.

¹²⁹¹ No further information was available on this event.

¹²⁹² Although the location of this camp could not be ascertained, it was probably a secondary camp.



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succeeded in retaking the town. Their stay in the town was described as “peaceful” and no acts of violence against civilians were reported.

Probably coming from Camp Fol Fol, RUF forces came to Rotifunk (Ribbi Chiefdom) around 14 June 1995, although at that time, most of the people were living in the bush. On their way to Rotifunk, they came across a civilian at Mokaikono, whom they asked to lead them to the other civilians in the bush. As he did not want to disclose their location, he was hit with a bladed weapon and left for dead in the bush. The man however survived and after two days, managed to go back to his camp.

Sometime between June and July, Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom) was attacked for the fourth time by RUF forces probably coming from Bonthe District. They were repelled by SLA forces and 28 of them were killed. No SLA member or civilian was killed but SLA forces were actively engaged in stealing and vandalising the Sieromco Company.¹²⁹³

During August 1995, the upper part of Bumpah Chiefdom was under the control of the RUF forces. Villages in Bumpah Chiefdom including Berembu, Topkumbu, Mosenesse, Kpamgbaya, Komrabai and Yenkissa were attacked. The RUF forces burnt a house at Tokpumbu and took the property of a civilian at Kpamgbaya. In that town, they also forced a man who was a Muslim and had never drunk wine in his life to drink alcohol; as his wife came out of the bush crying, she was shot and killed and acid was sprinkled on her body. The town of Mokebbi was attacked for the second time by the RUF forces and they proceeded to Mogbindi. Finding nobody in the town, they burnt all the houses there.

At that time, however, RUF forces were launching those attacks by group of 20 to 30 men, of whom only four to five had guns. It thus appeared that the progression force of the RUF as evidenced by their attacks on Moyamba Junction, Moyamba Town and the main towns on the highway had come to a halt during this period, and RUF forces were more engaged in looting.

In October 1995, another wave of attacks were carried out in Fakunya Chiefdom, by RUF forces coming from their main base at Camp Fol Fol. On 9 October 1995, they passed through the towns of Rotawa, Falaba Gbotima and arrived at Sembahun Kortuwabu, where they set up a temporary base. Many civilians were captured in the town on their arrival. The commander informed the people of the town that they were RUF forces and that both the town and all its surrounding villages were under their control. The RUF forces attacked neighbouring towns and villages and various items were stolen, including food products such as rice, groundnut, pepper and palm oil as well as personal effects, including tape recorders, radios, clocks, clothing and cameras. In those villages, some women were raped. On 10 October 1995, the RUF forces attacked the town of Kpangbama. After they entered the town, the RUF commander ordered the forces not to shoot, so they did not shoot. Over 100 people were captured, including women, including suckling mothers, and children. The captured civilians were forced to carry property stolen from the town to Sembahun Kortuwabu,

¹²⁹³ RUF forces carried out a fifth and last attack on Mokanji in August but were, once more, repelled by SLA forces.



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escorted by one RUF group, while another group left intending to attack Njagbahun Junction but instead went back to Sembahun Kortuwabu, as they did not find any SLA forces at the Junction.

Other attacks were launched in the surrounding villages of Ngandorhun, Kwellu, and Falaba. The attacks were successful and a lot of property was taken. Again, captured civilians were forced to carry the stolen property to Sembahun. SLA forces who had come from Moyamba Town staged an ambush for the RUF forces but, as they could not withstand the firepower of the RUF, they went back to Moyamba Town. Some captured civilians managed to escape during the crossfire. In retaliation for the attack, RUF forces burnt down Kpangbama, accusing civilians of having warned the SLA they were there. Over 100 goats from the surrounding villages were killed and smoked, for later consumption at Camp Fol Fol. During their six-day stay in Sembahun Kortuwabu, RUF forces raped women and many girls, sometimes aged below 11, and killed three civilians who attempted to escape.

On 14 October, the RUF commander sent a message to Camp Fol Fol for the High Command to send more men, both captured civilians and RUF members, to collect the looted items, as he, and his troops, together with the civilians captured in the area were heading for Njala University (south-east of Kori Chiefdom). The commander told the civilians that this university would not function until the RUF took over government.¹²⁹⁴ RUF forces entered the town of Mokorewa (Fakunya Chiefdom) on 15 October 1995 and took property, mainly personnel items like tape recorders, radios and clothing, from several houses. Two civilians were killed and several more were captured. They told the civilians they came from Sembahun Kortuwabu and were heading for Njala University. Just over a week later, on 24 October, the forces visited the town again and attacked surrounding villages, stealing property, raping and sexually harassing women and young girls. They stayed at Mokorewa for four days, during which time they abducted many civilians, the majority of whom were children. Civilians were forced to carry stolen property for the RUF forces.¹²⁹⁵

A subsequent attack was launched on Sembahun Kortuwabu and its environs around 2 December 1995. A large number of the RUF members were children between the ages of 12 and 15 years, who had been captured in schools in Lunsar, Port Loko Town (Port Loko District) or Kambia. Civilians were captured and maltreated by the RUF forces in an attempt to learn where the civilians were keeping their food and sexual violence was rampant.¹²⁹⁶ From December to March 1997, it appeared that the civilians in Fakunya Chiefdom suffered greatly, as both RUF and SLA forces raided their villages and camps in the bush, mainly to steal food and other property; some of the civilians were beaten and some women were raped.

On 15 December 1995, RUF forces coming from Camp Fol Fol reached the north of Kagboro Chiefdom, to the south of Bumpeh Chiefdom. At this time, an influx of people had arrived in Shenge, the headquarter town located by the ocean, south of Kagboro Creek. The RUF forces came

¹²⁹⁴ Njala University was attacked by RUF forces on 27 December 1995. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 December 1995.

¹²⁹⁵ This attack on Mokorewa may have been carried out a few days earlier, before the RUF forces sent their message to Camp Fol Fol.

¹²⁹⁶ No more details were available on this information.



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mainly for the purposes of finding food and, as they had done earlier in the beginning of 1995, introduced themselves as SLA forces. They entered Morkandor, where they took away domestic animals before continuing their journey to nearby villages, including Bandasuma and Mokana. In all these villages, they abducted civilians to carry the loads, mainly consisting of domestic animals, to their base at Camp Fol Fol. Civilians were warned by the RUF commander that they would be killed if they could not continue the journey. When they arrived near the base, those civilians were released and told to go back to their villages.

Following these attacks, a CDU comprised of civilians with cutlasses, swords and a few shotguns was formed in Kagboro Chiefdom. In addition, the attacks on Bumpah Chiefdom led the elders to hold a meeting in Moyeamoh in December, at which they sought to find means by which they could repel the RUF forces. One Section Chief asked all the civilians with hunting rifles to surrender them to the Chiefs. Only nine guns could be gathered and 29 youths gave themselves up for training and to form a CDU.¹²⁹⁷

On 28 December 1995, RUF forces attacked Senahun, the headquarter town of Kamajei Chiefdom, where they killed 28 civilians, burnt houses and took property, mainly money and other valuables. As a result of the attack, most of the civilians left the town and went to camps in Bo and Freetown.

c) Events in 1996

Kamajors from Bonthe District came to Moyamba District to assist the CDUs in the defence of their chiefdoms. At that time also, members of the CDUs and other young men progressively became initiated into the Kamajor society. They initially went to Bonthe District before initiation ceremonies began to be performed in Moyamba District. In February, the first Kamajors of Kagboro Chiefdom came back to the chiefdom from their initiation.

In early 1996, members of the newly formed CDU of Bumpah Chiefdom had their first encounter with RUF forces between Moyah and Mogbainchain (Bumpah Chiefdom). They staged an ambush, killing two RUF members, capturing one and taking two AK47s.¹²⁹⁸ Soon after, a few Kamajors from Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District) came to the chiefdom and started patrolling in the area, looking out for RUF members. They went to Moyah, where they joined the members of the CDU. In February, both the Kamajors and the members of the CDU went to attack Motokoh, the guard place or secondary camp near Camp Fol Fol. As they took the RUF forces by surprise, they succeeded in dislodging them. They killed some RUF members, took some arms and ammunition, destroyed the base and went back to Moyah. The relations between the Kamajors and the members of the CDU, however, began to deteriorate and they started to quarrel over the Kamajors behaviour. Their main complaints were that the Kamajors wanted the CDU to be their juniors, because the Kamajors had mystical powers; they were harassing civilians, beating them up whenever they did something wrong; and they were taxing civilians and treating the Chiefs and elders without respect.

Initiation ceremonies began to take place at Taninehun (Kongbora Chiefdom) in early 1996 at first only for men recommended by the Section Chiefs. Prior to this, in 1995, a few men had left the

¹²⁹⁷ Those men were not initiated Kamajors.

¹²⁹⁸ It could not be ascertained what happened to the captured RUF member.



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Chiefdom to be initiated as Kamajors and had come back to the chiefdom, chasing the RUF who were sporadically raiding small villages, taking away property, abducting young boys and girls and killing some people.¹²⁹⁹ As more and more men were initiated, the Kamajors established checkpoints across the chiefdom, notably three in Bauya, the chiefdom headquarter town. An administration for the Kamajors was set up in the chiefdom with the following positions: Supreme Leader and Initiator, Deputy Initiator and Battalion Commander, Deputy Battalion Commander, Chiefdom Ground Commander and Commanders. Kamajors, equipped with hunting guns, swords, spears, knives and other bladed weapons did not initially attack identified RUF positions but began by staging ambushes, capturing small groups of RUF forces on food finding missions. They killed a lot of RUF members and took their arms and ammunition. As their number grew, the Kamajors began organising their deployment in strategic areas of the chiefdom.

Before the elections scheduled for 26 February, RUF forces entered Moyoka (Fakunya Chiefdom), and killed with bladed weapons eight civilians attending a church service. They then headed for Moyolo and on their way, killed a man and left the body in the bush. On approaching Moyolo, some entered the bush and encircled the town while others in military uniforms and Kamajors attire entered the town, telling people they had come to talk about the initiation process. Youths came from their different locations and the RUF forces disguised in SLA members and Kamajors¹³⁰⁰ ordered them to assemble at the Court Barrie. The civilians were told to undress and were kept locked in houses. Some 18 civilians were then taken out of the houses, were set on fire and died. As this was going on, three women were raped by many RUF members and were then mutilated, one being forced to sit in a solution of caustic soda and another had her breast cut off with a knife. The third woman was sexually assaulted with a stick, as a result of which she died. Five more civilians including two children aged 12 and 15 were taken out of their houses and, after they were told by the RUF forces to identify which was their predominant hand, this hand was cut off.

The RUF forces left the next morning and one day later, SLA forces from Njagbahun came to the town. They told civilians who were burying their relatives that they had come to assess the damage caused by the RUF forces. However, they took civilians' property, including domestic animals, rice, groundnut and clothing. Three days later, SLA forces came back to the nearby villages of Mabayngahun, Salima, Bembeh, Mopotey, Njala Gofor, Gbeworbu, Potehun and Batama, where they took property, forced civilians to carry the load to their base at Njagbahun and sexually harassed women.

After the February elections, RUF forces came back to Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom) and burnt down more houses, but by this time most of the civilians had deserted the town. RUF forces were described as being "totally out of control", as each time they went to a village, they burnt down houses, took away property and killed anybody that they came across.

The north-east of Kamajei Chiefdom was attacked by RUF forces coming from Valunia Chiefdom (Bo District), to the east of Kamajei Chiefdom. They established a base in Yelina Section in March

¹²⁹⁹ It could not be ascertained where they went for the initiation ceremony.

¹³⁰⁰ It is also suggested that those RUF forces introduced themselves as officers of the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC), coming to educate the people of the town about the electoral system.



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1996 and abducted some young boys and girls to carry loads and to show them the various routes and passages through the chiefdom. In the same month, Kamajors arrived in the chiefdom to protect Gondama.¹³⁰¹ The Kamajors attacked the RUF forces in Yelina section and rescued many civilians, who they then brought to Gondama. However, Gondama was attacked shortly after, with over 30 people being killed by the RUF forces, and the Kamajors left the town. Most of the people killed were civilians recently brought to Gondama by the Kamajors and, accordingly, did not know any escape routes. During this attack, the RUF forces did not burn any houses but took away property, mainly livestock.

In late March/early April 1996, RUF forces attacked the town of Mokainsay (Kagboro Chiefdom), in the south of the District. At first, the Kamajors put up a stiff resistance but they were soon forced to withdraw, as they ran out of ammunition. The RUF burnt some buildings, including a mosque. They left the town and two days later, killed an old man in his hammock and burnt houses at Mojana, in the east of the chiefdom. The RUF forces then retreated to their base at Camp Fol Fol.

Bagruwa Chiefdom, also in the south of the District, was attacked by RUF forces for the first time around April 1996. RUF forces coming from the north of Bonthe District through Banta Chiefdom arrived in the south of Bagruwa Chiefdom.¹³⁰² At this time, the Paramount Chief hired Kamajors from Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District) to defend the chiefdom. RUF forces were dislodged in a fierce battle at Mogboi. The battle lasted for several hours and a large number of RUF forces were killed. At Matru Bangay, one Kamajor killed a civilian on the allegation that he was an RUF collaborator.

In late May, RUF forces came back to Kagboro Chiefdom and attacked Mokobo (north-east of the chiefdom) for the second time, with the intention to establish a base there. They stayed in the town for two days, stealing civilians' property in the town and in the surrounding villages and forcing civilians to carry the load. These attacks led civilians to desert the town and go to live in the bush. The RUF forces then divided into four groups and scattered throughout the chiefdom, including at Tissana, Morkandor, Bandajuma, Mokana, Suen and Mohiteh, where they harassed civilians, stole their property and forced them to carry the load. They also made a rapid incursion into Timdel Chiefdom, east of Kagboro Chiefdom.

RUF forces attacked Sembehun, the headquarter town of Bagruwa Chiefdom, around 3 June. They broke into all the houses, took away property and captured four boys and four girls who cooked for the RUF forces at their temporary base at Kongonani.¹³⁰³ They then left the area, heading in the direction of Bonthe District. On their way, they stopped at Mokassie, where they released some civilians they had abducted but killed one man because he refused to go with them. Another man was killed for the same reason at Jondu. Following the attack on the town, CDUs were formed in Sembehun and young people, equipped with sticks, machetes and shotguns, established checkpoints.

¹³⁰¹ This is a different Gondama Town from the one in Bo District, which hosted an IDP camp.

¹³⁰² At the time of this attack, RUF force had already been dislodged from their positions in the north of Bonthe District and had scattered throughout the bush.

¹³⁰³ It is not clear whether those children were released after doing the cooking.



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Around May or June 1996, a new wave of attacks were carried out in Fakunya Chiefdom and its environs by RUF forces using Falaba Gbotima village as their base. They raped women and took property in more than 30 villages in the area, capturing several civilians who were forced to transport their loads to Falaba Gbotima. Around the same period, Kamajors who went to be initiated came to Kwellu together with some Kamajors from Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District) and began engaging the RUF forces, who were continuing their attacks on the small villages of the area. Between June and July, Kamajors based at Kwellu heard that RUF forces were going on looting sprees in Kpangama, Gbengbedu and Mayendu. Four Kamajors met the RUF forces at Nyandehun and engaged them in battle, which left some civilians and some RUF forces, including their commander, dead. The following day, 45 RUF members came to Nyandehun to find their commander, as they could not believe four Kamajors had defeated them and killed their commander. They found the body of their commander displayed at the centre of the village and in retaliation, burnt the village. On their return to Falaba Gbotima, they captured a civilian whom they then mutilated and killed. While still alive, his genital organ was cut off and forcibly put in his mouth. His stomach was then slit open and his intestines tied across a stick by the side of the road. At the time of these attacks, the SLA forces were still based at Njagbahun, four miles from Nyandehun, but did not make any move. They would later comment on this by saying that the area was "divided" and as the RUF forces had not come to their area, there was no need for them to go and attack the RUF forces.

As Kamajors continued to attack RUF positions in Yelina Section (Kamajei Chiefdom), RUF forces launched a second attack on Gondama (Kamajei Chiefdom) around 28 June 1996. No casualties were reported, as most of the civilians were by then living in the bush, but the RUF forces burnt down the town. This attack was the last ones in the area, as the Kamajors started patrolling around Gondama. In the neighbouring chiefdom of Kori, Kamajors deployed at Wayima (north-east of the chiefdom), where they mistreated civilians and passers-by, notably by imprisoning them in cages made of thorns. On one occasion, they severely beat the Village Chief of Ketumah, near Wayima, on the grounds that he had made a statement against Kamajors. On another occasion, those Kamajors from Wayima killed three brothers who had travelled from Markoli to Ketumah to meet their mother, accusing them of being RUF members. When their father came to enquire about what had happened to them, he was hit with a bladed weapon and killed.

Around June, the Paramount Chief of Bagruwa Chiefdom sent 70 young men to be initiated at Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District). Prior to this development in the chiefdom, some members of the SSD had been sent to the headquarter town of Sembahun to protect the town from RUF attacks. However, those SSD members soon began to harass civilians, moving from village to village and taking away civilians' property, including domestic animals. On one occasion, they killed one young man at Gbangbatoke Junction. This harassment prompted the Paramount Chief to request the presence of Kamajors in the Chiefdom and to report the matter to the Paramount Chief of Kaiyamba Chiefdom. While the Kamajors did come back to Bagruwa Chiefdom, they also soon began harassing civilians.



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On 13 July 1996, RUF forces entered Waterloo Town (Fakunya chiefdom) for the second time, from the direction of Rogboya (Fakunya Chiefdom). One of the RUF forces, described as a young boy, killed a civilian. On their arrival in the town, an old deaf man was in his garden, working with a machete, and as he did not drop his machete when told to do so by the RUF forces, a child soldier shot and killed him. During this attack on Waterloo, RUF forces burnt down 23 houses and attacked nearby villages, including Kondiama, Tombay Gbahama and Togbie. In those villages, a lot of property was taken away and civilians were abducted to carry the stolen property to the RUF base at "Camp Fol Fol".

Between June and August, RUF forces battled with Kamajors in Nyaogihun (Kagboro Chiefdom). Four members of the CDF were killed, including their commander. The RUF forces beheaded two of the bodies, cut their stomachs open and displayed their intestines across the road at a checkpoint. The RUF forces then burnt the village before crossing over to neighbouring villages in Timdel Chiefdom where they took property, mainly cattle, and harassed civilians. At this time, Timdel Chiefdom had no Kamajors, as it had never been attacked by RUF forces and the Paramount Chief paid for Kamajors to come from other chiefdoms, requesting subscriptions from the civilians to pay for their services.

As this harassment on Timdel Chiefdom grew, Kamajors from Kagboro Chiefdom went to Bumpeh Chiefdom to obtain reinforcements. They agreed with the Kamajors from Bumpeh that each would send reinforcements to the other chiefdom when it was under attack. Kamajors from the two chiefdoms went to Timdel Chiefdom and staged an ambush near Mokobo (Kagboro Chiefdom), killing many RUF forces. The remaining RUF forces fled the area but promised they would come back. More men from Kagboro Chiefdom were initiated, in Banta Chiefdom and in Kangahun (Kaiyamba Chiefdom) and deployed in different sections of the chiefdom in or around October. Men from Timdel Chiefdom were sent for initiation in Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District). No further RUF attacks took place in Timdel Chiefdom and the Kamajors established a base at Mosanda.

Around August, armed men claiming to be SLA forces arrived in Yoyema Town (Kayima Chiefdom), soon followed by another group composed only of women. Despite their claims, civilians understood that they were actually RUF forces, because the initials "RUF" were written on the weapons carried by the women. The RUF forces sent a message to the SLA commander in Moyamba Town. The SLA forces went to Yoyema and after a fierce battle, repelled the RUF forces out of the town.¹³⁰⁴ The SLA commander left some troops in the town and went back to Moyamba Town. The SLA forces left in Yoyema took away civilian's property and left for Moyamba Town three days later. RUF forces came back to Yoyema and stayed for five days, during which they maltreated and killed some civilians, raped some women and abducted about 20 children for conscription.

¹³⁰⁴ This event could, however have taken place in June, as around this period, Moyamba Town was under RUF siege and SLA forces thought the RUF were provoking them to violate the ceasefire, signed earlier that year following the elections: AFP, 7 June 1996.



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Around the same time, SLA forces were asked to leave Moyamba Town by the people. It seems that following all the reports of SLA harassment across the District, the Paramount Chief of Kaiyamba asked the Government to withdraw the SLA forces, which he did. After the departure of the SLA forces, the people of the town decided to initiate themselves as Kamajors so that they could defend themselves, since they did not want any SLA forces in the town. The men in the town made it clear that the Kamajor society was only open to people who were Mende by tribe and taxed every household to pay a contribution of Le 1,000. Whoever did not pay the contribution was tied with a FM rope.¹³⁰⁵

However, the Kamajors engaged in continuous harassment of civilians, including taking property, forcing women into marriage and sexually harassing them. The Kamajors also killed two SSD officers in Moyamba Town, taking their guns and uniforms. Those Kamajors went to Yoyema after the RUF departure from the town. They told civilians to call those who were hiding in the bush and "screened" them, looking for RUF members and collaborators. As in Moyamba Town, they taxed each household as a contribution to their feeding before leaving the town.¹³⁰⁶

A large number of RUF forces returned to Kagboro Chiefdom in November. Having seen this large group, Kamajors from Mokobo asked for more reinforcements from the other sections. In the meanwhile, two Kamajors who had advanced on the RUF forces were killed. Their bodies were beheaded and their intestines were tied on two sticks across the road to act as a checkpoint. At Nyayagoihun, the RUF forces killed two pregnant women and three children, who were hiding under a bed, and burnt the houses of the village.¹³⁰⁷ Around the same period, RUF forces made another incursion in Bagruwa Chiefdom. They killed one man at Moseinongor and burnt three houses at Ngayebu. They also encountered SLA forces from Moyamba Town who were patrolling the area and some fatalities on both sides were reported. As they approached Gbangbatoke Junction, they burnt two commercial vehicles going to Shenge (Kagboro Chiefdom) but the passengers managed to escape by running into the bush. The RUF forces then left the area and went back up north.

At around this time, the Kamajors began increasing their numbers and, consequently, began putting in place structures for better coordination amongst themselves. Kamajors from Kagboro, Timdel and Bagruwa Chiefdom organised themselves and appointed one man as the Chief Kamajor for the region. Men from Banta Mokele Chiefdom were sent for initiation to Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District). Around the same period, Kamajors from Bonthe District arrived at Mano, the headquarter town of Dasse Chiefdom. However, as time went on, Kamajors started harassing civilians and summary executions of alleged collaborators took place at the Kamajor base at Mosanda. On one occasion, a man was brought to Mosanda from Sembehun (Bagruwa Chiefdom), was beaten and put in a cage made of thorns for one full day before being released.

¹³⁰⁵ This rope had two sticks on its edges. "FM" means "frequency modulation", for it was believed that once tied with such a rope, anyone would talk.

¹³⁰⁶ No more information was available on these events.

¹³⁰⁷ Although it seems that the RUF forces were repelled from the chiefdom, there is no further report on fighting with Kamajors in the chiefdom. In the south of Bumpé Chiefdom (north of Kagboro Chiefdom), RUF forces battled for two days with Kamajors before being chased away.



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By the end of the year, probably around November, the Kamajors from Kongbora Chiefdom launched their first attack on RUF positions at Levuma, north-west of the chiefdom. The Kamajors shot down a helicopter and succeeded in dislodging the RUF forces from their positions. A large cache of arms, ammunition and weapons that the Kamajors did not have so far – in particular AK47s and RPGs – was captured. Following this successful attack, Kamajors launched an offensive on Camp Fol Fol, the main RUF base in the area. The battle went on for two days and the RUF forces were eventually dislodged.¹³⁰⁸ Kamajors came back from this battle with a lot of arms and ammunition and other property, including televisions and fridges. These victories led more and more men to be initiated into the society, fighting the RUF stationed in the north-west of the chiefdom. Kamajors brought back a lot of RUF members and people they suspected of being RUF members or collaborators and killed them; civilians recounted that they regularly heard that a “rebel” had been captured and that they knew he was going to be “washed”, meaning killed.

In December 1996, RUF forces entered Benge (Bumpeh Chiefdom) where they killed a civilian who refused to have sex with his mother. They proceeded to other villages like Mobainda and Nyadahun (Bumpeh Chiefdom) where they took a lot of property from civilians.

In late 1996 and probably after the Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November, civilians refused to allow deployment of SLA forces in the District. By 1996, the population of Moyamba had developed a complete distrust of SLA forces, since the RUF forces who came to the District were wearing military uniforms and the SLA forces deployed in the District, mainly in Kaiyamba, Fakunya and Banta Chiefdoms, were harassing civilians.

d) Events in 1997

At the beginning of the year, resettlement of displaced persons, which had began in late 1997, continued as the Government declared the Southern Province safe for resettlement.¹³⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the year continued to be marked by violence against civilians and between all the different fighting factions.

On 3 January 1997, SLA forces based at Taiama (Kori Chiefdom), together with SLA forces from Bo Town, attacked Kamajors at Taiama. Prior to this event, tension between the SLA and Kamajors deployed at Taiama had built up to the extent that both forces were controlling different checkpoints in the town. In late December, one SLA member destroyed a Kamajor checkpoint in the town; civilians were killed during the subsequent attack in January. SLA forces then headed to

¹³⁰⁸ The RUF spokesman stated that the constant attacks on their main bases in the District from the air and the land around 9 and 11 November were undermining the peace process. Furthermore, conflicting information was reported about the crash of a helicopter in the Rotifunk area. According to the RUF, this was an SLA helicopter bringing reinforcements to strategic sites in preparation for a ground assault while it carried out aerial bombardment on RUF bases. The RUF claimed to have brought it down with an Anti-Aircraft weapon. However, military sources spoke about a helicopter bringing relief supplies, which had to undertake an emergency landing after developing engine trouble and was then set on fire by the Kamajors: AFP, 13 November 1996.

¹³⁰⁹ This resettlement went on in various areas in the south and at the same period, thousands of IDPs left the camps in Bo District and returned to Pujehun District.



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Njala, south of Kori Chiefdom. On their way to Njala, those SLA forces stopped by Mokonde, where they ransacked the hospital. At Njala University, they went to a “customers store”, broke into it and took everything they could carry away with them.

In January, villages in the Kovella Section (Fakunya Chiefdom) were tasked with sending men for initiation at Kwellu (Fakunya Chiefdom). On 30 January, Kamajors battled with the SLA troops based at Njagbahun for two hours before dislodging the SLA from the town, killing some SLA members during the battle. This battle was the last of a series of fights between the two fighting factions in the chiefdom.

On 26 January, Kamajors attacked the SLA forces based in Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom), allegedly because those forces had been stealing property. The Kamajors were defeated by the SLA forces and three SLA members, a lot of Kamajors, including the son of the High Priest and Chief Initiator, and some civilians were killed. Three days later, the SLA forces were transferred to Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District),¹³¹⁰ leaving the way open for the Kamajors to settle in the town and erect checkpoints. Soon, they began harassing and ill-treating civilians; any person found having a link with a member of the SLA member was targeted and killed. Kamajors also cleared out what was left in the Sieromco Company during an operation they named “Operation clear all”.¹³¹¹ Some months later in the south of the District, at Gbessebu (Kamajei Chiefdom), SLA forces killed a Kamajor while they were going to Pelewahun (Kamajei Chiefdom).

In February 1997, tired and hungry RUF forces entered Kawama (Kori Chiefdom) on a food finding mission. They asked civilians to cook for them and took away civilians’ property. They also took with them five strong men to carry the load and three young girls between the ages of 15 to 18 years; since that time, their fate remains unknown.

Since they had taken control of Moyamba Town, in around August 1996, Kamajors had been mistreating the civilians in the town. Indeed, for the inhabitants of Moyamba Town, the only difference between the Kamajors and RUF forces was that the Kamajors were in the towns, while RUF forces were in the bush. In February 1997, Kamajors from Moyamba Town went to Korgbotuma, where they beat the Village Chief for two days and forced him to swallow stones, as a result of which he died. The villagers were then taxed Le 400 as a contribution to the Kamajors, who burnt the houses of those who did not pay. Kamajors also stole most of the remaining property in the town, including zinc from the houses and zinc recently provided by an International NGO. Civilians were forced to give money and rice every two weeks and whoever did not do so was killed.

Sometime between January and May 1997, RUF forces attacked Manø (Dasse Chiefdom) but were repelled by Kamajors from Bonthe District who had deployed in the chiefdom in late 1996. This attack prompted the chiefdom elders to initiate their own Kamajors and civilians were asked to contribute a small amount of money for the initiation ceremonies. A Kamajor administration was

¹³¹⁰ Around this time, SLA forces were deployed at Mile 91, where fighting with the CDF was also reported.

¹³¹¹ Later during the year, in November, the Sieromco Director contracted Executive Outcomes to protect a team sent to evaluate the damage at Mokanji: Africa Energy & Mining, 11 September 1996. Executive Outcomes was a mercenary company hired by the Government of Sierra Leone in 1995.



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put in place in the chiefdom and the following positions were established and filled: Chiefdom Ground Commander, Deputy Chiefdom Ground Commander, Section Commanders, Patrol Commander and Welfare Officers (AG). The Welfare Officers were generally civilians appointed by Kamajors to act as a liaison between the civilians and the Kamajors.

Shortly after the Coup on 25 May, which saw the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council overthrow the government and seize power, RUF forces from Bumpenh Chiefdom left their camp and went to Freetown to join the AFRC regime.¹³¹² However, they later returned to Rotifunk, the headquarter town, and took away the zinc from the remaining houses. RUF forces brought the zinc to Waterloo (Western Area),¹³¹³ where they met their business partners. All the Kamajors from the chiefdom assembled at Mokkebi, ready to attack RUF/AFRC forces if they came back, which they did two days later and were attacked by the Kamajors.¹³¹⁴

After the Coup, the AFRC forces made an announcement over the radio that Kamajors should lay down their arms and surrender to the nearest Police Station, which the Kamajors in Moyamba District did not do. RUF/AFRC forces established checkpoints from Rotifunk (Bumpenh Chiefdom) to Mabang (Ribbi Chiefdom, at the boundary with Port Loko District) and on the highway, as they knew there were Kamajors in Bumpenh Chiefdom. Nevertheless, the Kamajors continued their attacks, and after few months, they had succeeded pushing the RUF/AFRC forces beyond the Mabang Bridge, thus controlling Ribbi, Bumpenh, Kongbora and Kayima Chiefdoms.

From May 1997 until January 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces killed a number of civilians travelling on the Taiama (Kori chiefdom) to Bo (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District) highway, during which time they also took a lot of property from the travellers. Men were particular targets, as the RUF/AFRC forces alleged that any man in Kamajei and Kori Chiefdoms was either a Kamajor or a Kamajor supporter. Kamajors from Kamajei Chiefdom, together with some Kamajors from Mongere (Valunia Chiefdom), also ambushed vehicles they claimed to belong to AFRC members. The stolen property was taken to Gondama (Kamajei Chiefdom) and to Mongere. Civilians in this area were therefore caught between the two fighting factions.

On 5 June 1997, RUF forces from Kailahun District and en route to Freetown to join the AFRC regime raided the town of Senehun (Kamajei Chiefdom). They took a lot of property from the civilians, as a result of which civilians fled the town. On 7 June, RUF/AFRC forces entered Moyamba Town, although it had been under Kamajor control since August 1996, when Kamajors forced the SLA forces out of town. RUF/AFRC forces killed 12 civilians and took away property, leaving the same day and promising they would come back.

Around 16 June, RUF/AFRC forces entered Yoyema (Kaiyamba Chiefdom), where RUF forces had been repelled around August 1996. They told civilians they had come to thank them for voting for

¹³¹² It is not clear whether an attack on the camp took place in 1996 and, if it took place, whether the RUF forces went back to the camp afterwards.

¹³¹³ There are two Waterloo Towns in Sierra Leone, one in the Western Area and one in the north of Fakunya Chiefdom.

¹³¹⁴ The outcome of this battle and any casualties could not be ascertained.



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the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). They burnt down many houses in the town and killed a tremendous number of civilians.

Since the Kamajors had been in control of Kagboro, Timdel and Bagruwa Chiefdoms, in the south of the District, since late 1996, there was a shift in their organisation. At this time, the Kamajors were identified in two different categories: the “old” and the “new”; it was believed that most of the havoc on civilians was created by the new Kamajors, most of whom had been initiated after the RUF forces made their last attack on the chiefdoms. Thus at this time both old and new Kamajors from Kagboro reorganised themselves and, having taken control over an area, began to harass not only civilians but also their own colleagues. For example, starting in June, a base commander from Sembehun (Bagruwa Chiefdom) used to visit Shenge (Kagboro Chiefdom). On these occasions he and his men would loot the town and harass the inhabitants. On one occasion he killed two civilians visiting Shenge and left their bodies near a bridge at Sembehun. One of these civilians was a trader, carrying US dollars to the value of Le 11,000,000, which was taken away by this Kamajor commander. During these raids, this Kamajor commander also threatened some Kamajors from Kagboro Chiefdom at gunpoint. On another occasion, Kamajors based at Mossanda (Timdel Chiefdom) went to Mokobo in Kagboro Chiefdom where they took some cattle away.

Kamajors at Shenge and elsewhere also made cages constructed with different kinds of thorns, where suspected “rebel” collaborators and civilians or Kamajors who violated their laws were imprisoned. Civilians were flogged with sticks and forcefully pushed into the cages, the floors of which were also lined with broken bottles. The CDF forces also had another form of punishment for civilians known as “FM”: a thin nylon rope was tied on two short equal sticks and then wrapped either on the two wrists or above the elbows. It was continually rolled until the nylon was squeezed into the body, injuring veins and muscles as the circulation of blood stopped in the affected areas. When the person was released, usually either their hands were broken or very swollen, which often led to partial deformity. These forms of punishment (FM and cages) were found in almost all the chiefdoms in the District where CDF were based. For example, at Mano Junction (Kagboro Chiefdom), two members of a church were accused of preaching against the Kamajors and were put in the cage into which hot ashes were poured; Kamajors referred to this as “a jet is bombing”.

CDF members in other chiefdoms continued their harassment of civilians, inflicting sexual, physical and mental violence. In fact, this period was described by some civilians as the peak of the CDF activities in the District, with Kamajors being described as “having spoiled their mandate”. People who defied the Kamajors’ authority were often killed. For example, at Banta Chiefdom, three youths who went to purchase gari at Gbangbatoke were arrested for not paying due respect to the CDF command. Two of them were killed and the third was severely beaten before being released. This harassment led to an incident in Gbangbatoke in September, during which civilians threw stones at Kamajors and told them they would take care of their defence themselves.¹³¹⁵ At Dodo Bridge (Bagruwa Chiefdom), summary executions were carried out. Checkpoints were established and travel cards issued to civilians. A civilian without such a card was considered to be an RUF member and was dealt with accordingly.

¹³¹⁵ AFP, 26 September 1997.



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In Banta Mokele Chiefdom, Kamajors also passed laws civilians had to abide by, presided over cases and acted as Chiefs. The Kamajors' behaviours in Kamajei Chiefdom (north-west of the District) also began to change after the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement and they were described as being the "chiefs". They decided cases and punished people they found guilty: Town Chiefs and Section Chiefs were molested by young Kamajors, civilians were maltreated and sometimes, were put the cages made of sticks and thorns. In other cases, women were beaten publicly, particularly when they refused to marry a Kamajor.

In Dasse and Kowa Chiefdoms, civilians recounted that the checkpoints, originally set up by the Kamajors to search for RUF members and weapons, were now used to harass civilians and drivers, asking them for money and taking their property. Cages made of thorns were built at these checkpoints and were used as prisons or guardrooms. On one occasion, a student coming from Bo had his shoes and his money taken away at Mano (Dasse Chiefdom). As he wanted to talk, he was a hit with a rifle one Kamajor was carrying.

RUF/AFRC activity in the second half of the year continued with numerous attacks on different towns and villages. During the night of 25 June 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Mokonde, south of Kori Chiefdom near Njala University. As it was dark, it was difficult for people to see where they were going when they tried to escape and many drowned in the Taia River. Others were shot and killed by the RUF/AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces went to Njala College and stole a lot of property. Before leaving, they captured some civilians to carry the load; one of them was later shot and killed when he said he was too tired to carry the load. RUF/AFRC launched subsequent attacks on Mokonde and its environs throughout the year, almost without exception on a hit and run basis.

In the north of the Chiefdom, at the boundary with Yoni Chiefdom (Tonkolili District), RUF/AFRC forces entered Negeleboiya at night sometime in July. They gathered the civilians who did not manage to escape at the Court Barrie and began calling people's names. Those who were called had to lie down and then the RUF forces then cut their throats; 40 men were killed that night in this way.

On 28 June 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Moyamba Junction (Fakunya Chiefdom) and villages on the road leading to Moyamba Town. Houses were burnt at Kpangbama and Ngandorhun while civilians were killed between Kpetema Junction and Waterloo. Sometime the next month, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces went from Moyamba Junction to Moyamba Town (Kayima Chiefdom). They captured 11 commercial vehicles at Moyamba Junction and mounted an anti-aircraft gun on one of the vehicles, which they used to fire at towns and villages they passed on their way to Moyamba Town. They burnt down several houses at Kpangbama and Ngandorhun (Fakunya Chiefdom). Kwellu (Fakunya Chiefdom) was fiercely attacked, as it was an important initiation centre. Despite stiff resistance from the CDF, between four to eight civilians and one CDF member were killed during the battle and eight houses were burnt down. The RUF forces reached Moyamba Town around mid to late July and dislodged the CDF forces after a stiff battle.



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Moyamba District in a whole and Moyamba Town in particular, was a target for the AFRC when it came into power in May 1997 due to the earlier rejection of SLA forces by civilians in the District. During their short stay of eight days in Moyamba Town, the RUF/AFRC forces killed almost all the young men they found; women, children and even livestock were also killed. They hunted people who had fled into the bush and killed them. Section Chiefs and elders were targeted and killed, including one prominent Section Chief. His death terrified all the chieftom elders as well as the young men, as a result of which many young men volunteered to join the Kamajor society to defend their chiefdoms.

After eight days in the town, RUF forces returned to Moyamba Junction with all the property they had taken. The RUF/AFRC settled in Moyamba Junction, which led to the harassment of civilians, who by then were mostly living in the bush. One group of RUF/AFRC members was everyday going to the bush to take away civilians' property. During this period, women and girls were constantly sexually harassed.

Two days after the RUF/AFRC forces had left, Kamajors returned to Moyamba Town, sending messages to people in the bush telling them to come back to town. Civilians were screened for RUF members or collaborators when they came out of the bush and every household was taxed Le 2,000 to contribute to the feeding of the Kamajors. The Kamajors conducted a house-to-house search and took away any property that had not been burnt or stolen by the RUF/AFRC forces. The Government agricultural office was also looted. As many civilians left the town and found refuge in the nearby village of Korgbotuma, the Kamajors went there and threatened to kill civilians who would not come back to the town. On their way back, two civilians were shot and killed by Kamajors.

Kamajors imposed their authority on everybody. They used a building on Coromboya Road as their secretariat and established laws and decrees. Chiefs were prevented from exercising their powers and were molested, beaten or tied up. Kamajors exercised all the powers normally vested in different official bodies and fulfilled the tasks of chiefs, judges and policemen. They set up tribunals and presided over cases. Civilians were continuously harassed, for all the non-initiates were treated with disrespect. Wealthy civilians were targeted and all their money and valuables were taken away, often at checkpoints. On one occasion, four Kamajors killed a trader and burnt down his compound. In another incident, a civilian was killed at a checkpoint for Le 500. Women were sexually harassed and forcefully became the "wives" of Kamajors. RUF/AFRC members, if captured, were killed. Kamajors also killed civilians, on the allegation that they were collaborators. The way they qualified the collaboration was so wide that relatives of RUF/AFRC forces were killed, even if they had nothing to do with their relatives in the RUF/AFRC: having the same name as an RUF or AFRC member was sufficient to be "washed", i.e. killed. On one occasion, an employee of the District Office was accused of being a "Junta" collaborator and beheaded at Sembehun Road.

Kwellu (Fakunya Chiefdom) became the centre of administration in the chiefdom and cases were directed to the CDF leaders based in the town. The head of the CDF initiation process and his assistants presided over all cases. RUF members captured at the war front were brought to the town and were killed. On one occasion, a civilian alleged to be a "rebel" collaborator was arrested at



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Falaba Gbotima and was hit with a knife and severely beaten before he was taken to Kwellu, where he died. Other civilians were killed on the same grounds, including one man from Madina and one man and his son from Monyanga. Cages made of thorns were built, where civilians and Kamajors who did not respect the laws the Kamajors had established were imprisoned. The local authorities, including Paramount Chiefs, Section Chiefs and Town Chiefs who did not want to be initiated no longer had any control or power.

On 10 December 1997, the CDF launched a successful attack on the RUF/AFRC forces at Moyamba Junction (Fakunya Chiefdom). Five RUF/AFRC forces were killed and the town was captured by the CDF. This attack was the first of series of battles for the control of Moyamba Junction, where RUF/AFRC forces were based and Waterloo, where Kamajors were based. Ultimately, Kamajors would keep the control of Waterloo and would also dislodge the RUF/AFRC from Moyamba Junction.¹³¹⁶

The RUF/AFRC forces launched a counter-attack on 16 December, reinforced by RUF/AFRC forces from Bo and Camp Charlie.¹³¹⁷ A helicopter gunship was also brought by the RUF/AFRC forces, which they used to overpower the CDF, leaving one of them dead. The RUF/AFRC forces captured two other CDF and killed them. Nevertheless, the CDF captured a lot of weapons from the RUF/AFRC forces. On 25 December 1997, the CDF again attacked Moyamba Junction and captured the town. However, on 27 December the RUF/AFRC forces launched a counter-attack and recaptured the town, killing one member of the CDF. On 31 December, the Kamajors finally chased the RUF/AFRC forces out of Moyamba Junction, forcing them to leave a lot of arms and ammunition behind.

Once the Kamajors consolidated their control over the whole Fakunya Chiefdom (they already had control over Kwellu), they increased their pressure and harassment of civilians, establishing laws that civilians had to abide by. Those laws, among others, prevented civilians to pound food in mortars at night and forbade them from giving the Kamajors bananas or any food containing banana. As in Kwellu, cages of 2 ½ feet high and 3 ½ feet wide and made of thorns were built and used as prisons. The punishments for not obeying the laws were varied and ranged from being fined to receiving lashes, being imprisoned in the cage and going “round the kabba”¹³¹⁸ seven times, asking for forgiveness, during which the Kamajors would encircle the violator and give them lashes while they went around seven times.

The last major attack on the town of Njala (Kori Chiefdom) was on 23 December 1997, while Kamajors were carrying out the operation “Black December”. RUF/AFRC forces burnt houses from Mokande to the College and occupied Njala for seven days. They killed civilians and captured

¹³¹⁶ In December, an increase in Kamajor activities was reported, despite the declaration of a ceasefire on 22 October as part of the Conakry Peace Plan: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 19 November - 2 December 1997.

¹³¹⁷ This camp was located in the outskirts of Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).

¹³¹⁸ The kabba is a cube-shaped building in Mecca, which Muslims believe was built by Abraham for the worship of Allah. When going on Hajj, namely the journey to Mecca, pilgrims begin by going seven times around the kabba.



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and raped a lot of young girls and women in the town. Surrounding villages like Pujehun and Bambuibu (both in Kori Chiefdom) were also attacked at this time. The RUF/AFRC forces then went south along the main road to Mano (Dasse Chiefdom), chasing civilians who had found refuge in the bush. The “sorquehun”, bush camps, were ransacked and property was taken away. On the walls of some houses, the forces wrote the names of some of their commanders in blood.

In December 1997, the CDF high command announced over the radio the commencement of the “Black December Operations”, namely that no vehicle should travel to Freetown. This operation was designed to cut off the AFRC forces in Freetown from the rest of the country. The CDF in the District stopped all vehicles and boats from travelling to Freetown and severely punished those who did not obey the announcement. For example, a defaulting vehicle, which did not stop as requested was fired on at Bengeh (Bumpeh Chiefdom), killing two people.

e) Events in 1998 to 2001

After they were driven out of Freetown during the first week of February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces left Moyamba District, although little information was recounted on this departure, except the following incident. RUF/AFRC forces attacked Korgbotuma (Kaiyamba Chiefdom) from four different points and battled with the CDF in the town, defeating the CDF and capturing the town. The RUF/AFRC commanders informed the civilians that their mission was to carry out “Operation no living thing” in the town and its environs.¹³¹⁹ The forces stayed in the town for eight days, during which they killed a lot of civilians, took property and burnt down houses in the town. Two days after their departure the CDF took over the town and ordered all the people in the bush to return to the town even when they had no where to sleep since almost all the houses were burnt.

In early 1998, Kamajors from Bo District came to Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom) and told the Kamajors from Bumpeh Chiefdom that they had received instructions from the CDF High Command to reinforce those already deployed at Rotifunk, in order to prevent the RUF/AFRC forces retreating from Freetown using the Mabang Bridge (Ribbi Chiefdom, at the border with Port Loko District). Those Kamajors soon took control of the township and the Kamajors from Bumpeh Chiefdom went under cover, for they had less arms and ammunition than the recently arrived reinforcements. One month after they had arrived, the elders of the chiefdom met at Moyamba Town to find a way to move out the Kamajors from Bo District. It was agreed that more men should be initiated, so an initiator was brought to perform initiation ceremonies at Bellentin. Within two weeks, he had initiated over 400 men and one woman. Those new initiates, equipped only with bladed weapons, drove out the Kamajors from Bo. Nevertheless, the new Kamajors established checkpoints on the highway and took money from drivers at those checkpoints. Drivers who did not want to pay would be beaten or their vehicle damaged. On one occasion, one driver who could not give Le 10,000 as requested had two of his tyres shot out.

ECOMOG forces deployed in various areas of the District in February 1998 and ensured the security of the District, notably by setting up checkpoints that they operated together with

¹³¹⁹ “Operation No Living Thing” was the name of the operation carried out by the RUF/AFRC forces retreating from Freetown, during which atrocities committed against civilians reached unprecedented levels. It was mostly carried out in the Northern Province and in Kono District.



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Kamajors. In Kamajei Chiefdom, for example, they set up checkpoints at the headquarter town of Senehun and at Lonponga. However, Kamajors who assisted the ECOMOG forces at those checkpoints were still mistreating civilians. Vehicles suspected of carrying RUF or AFRC members or goods without proper documents were detained at those checkpoints and passengers were forced to remain there and sleep on the ground. Women who openly opposed the activities carried out at those checkpoints were stripped naked and forced to lie on the ground. The situation worsened when the ECOMOG forces left the checkpoints in the hand of the Kamajors,¹³²⁰ who would only dismantle those checkpoints in November 2001.

Immediately after the RUF/AFRC forces were pushed out of power in early 1998, an internal fight occurred between different factions of the CDF. Kamajors operating in the Southern Province accused the Gbethies, who were active in the Northern Province, of supporting AFRC members in their fight against Kamajors. A group of Gbethies from neighbouring chiefdoms in Tonkolili District attacked the Kamajors base at Gondama and Fogbo (Kori Chiefdom). Nobody was killed during the attack but houses were burnt by the retreating Gbethies. Five days later, the Kamajors launched a counter-attack on the Gbethies at Pateful (Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). The situation was finally resolved through the intervention of the elders.

On 29 March, a letter issued by the CDF headquarter was circulated to all Kamajors in the District, ordering that since the Sierra Leonean President had now been reinstated, the Kamajors should let the Chiefs assuming their functions and stop presiding over issues. However, Kamajors from the chiefdoms in the south of the District, Kagboro, Timdel, Bagruwa, Banta and Banta Mokele Chiefdoms continued to affirm their authority and to maltreat civilians and authorities. CDF in Moyamba Town (Kaiyamba Chiefdom) also continued to rule as chiefs and to control the live of civilians, as they had done in 1997. For example, around 5 March 1998, a young woman moved from Foyah to Matta Gelema in Banta Chiefdom to sell cassava leaves. At a checkpoint on her way, she was asked by a Kamajor to show him her pass. The woman told the Kamajors that her father was a Town Chief and that they did not know about this system of pass. Kamajors replied by saying that Kamajors were now the chiefs and authorities and that they were not respected by the civilians, who treated them with over-familiarity. They took her cassava bag away and detained her for two hours before she was freed. Her father, the Town Chief, reported the matter to the Ground Commander to no avail, as the Ground Commander told him he had no time for reports, for he knew his men were doing a good job.

In Kagboro Chiefdom, by 1998, the CDF had established checkpoints along the road going through the middle of the chiefdom at Yoyema, Gondama Junction, Talia and Tawovahun. Vehicles were checked for guns and "rebels" or "rebel" suspects. Anyone caught as a "rebel" or "junta" soldier or who was suspected to be such by the Kamajors was immediately carried away and "washed", a term the CDF used for killing. People were killed at the checkpoints very often, sometimes for money or other property. In other places where the CDF had checkpoints, people who were not from that chiefdom were often singled out to be victims.

¹³²⁰ It could not be ascertained when ECOMOG forces exactly came in the District, nor when they left Kamajei Chiefdom.



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The CDF frequently beat women and one commander in particular travelled around the chiefdom harassing young men and women and molesting the elderly. From Bauma to Blama and from Mamboma to Senehun, this commander was well known for this type of behaviour. On one occasion, he ordered his boys to torture a civilian whose daughter was alleged to have been in love with an RUF/AFRC member. In another incident in Mokebay Section, Kamajors killed a lady who had come from Bumpo to buy fish. They removed her body parts for rituals, as they allegedly believed that the ritual murder would prevent their "evil deeds" from being exposed. Several other civilians were killed afterwards. Other civilians killed included one man from Yorgborfore, one from Mbawoma, one from Metiba and one from Bumpetoke. A Kamajor cut off the ear of a woman from Bonthe District with a cutlass and chewed it. The woman latter suffered severe pain from the ear. Another Kamajor declared one day that any civilian not abiding by their laws would be killed and eaten raw. In Timdel Chiefdom, at Morkandor, one civilian was beaten with orange sticks covered in thorns, as he failed to be his contribution for the feeding of the Kamajors. He was then asked to contribute with three bushels of husk rice or would be killed. The deputy Town Chief of Morkandor was severely beaten because he refused to act as a town crier.

In April or May, a schoolteacher riding his bike between Mokonde (Kori Chiefdom) and Pelewahun (south of Kamajei Chiefdom) was caught by Kamajors who had established a checkpoint at Pelewahun. The man was dragged in the bush, had his stomach cut open and his intestines removed. The Kamajors then set the body on fire, taking his bicycle and his two months salary he had just received. This killing was carried out because one of the Kamajors wanted to take his revenge on this schoolteacher, the new partner of his ex-girlfriend. Police officers from Taiama (Kori Chiefdom) investigated the matter and the four Kamajors who killed the schoolteacher were arrested, put in prison and tried in the High Court in Bo. Following this arrest, the other Kamajors left Pelewahun.

In 1999, some incursions were carried out in the District by RUF/AFRC forces based in Tonkolili District. Those attacks were, however, limited to villages in Fakunya Chiefdom, along the border with the Northern Province. Sometime in March 1999, RUF/AFRC forces based in Tonkolili District launched a series of attacks on villages on the Fakunya/Yoni boundary, mainly for searching for food and other items. One serious attack was made at Mataradegba, one mile from Rogboya, by the RUF forces from Mile 91 in late March 1999. It was a silent attack and they entered the town without discharging their weapons. Sixteen people were locked in a house, which was then set on fire and set ablaze. The RUF forces also shot and killed another five people. They then went to Rogboya, where they met with stiff resistance from the CDF forces in the town. On their retreat, they fell in a CDF ambush; six of the RUF forces were killed and a lot of their arms and ammunition captured. On 18 April 1999, the RUF forces launched another attack on Rogboya and succeeded in capturing the town. They were, however, soon repelled from the town by CDF from other towns nearby. On their way back to Tonkolili District, they had a battle with some Kamajors, which left over 40 RUF/AFRC members dead. This was to be the last battle between the CDF and RUF forces in Fakunya Chiefdom.

During the same period, some RUF/AFRC forces coming from their base at Okra Hills (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) crossed into the north of Ribbi Chiefdom, mainly chasing civilians in



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the camps they had built in the bush.¹³²¹ They took away the rice and burnt a farmhouse near Makabie before heading for Makabie, where they abducted one man. This man was told to deliver the message to the inhabitants of Makabie that they would come back again to the village, as one of their boxes of cigarettes had been stolen. They further added that anyone they caught would be either mutilated or killed, depending on their will. When they came back to the village, they took some property away, burnt the houses and abducted one man, who they later killed.

The inhabitants of Ribbi Chiefdom, north-west of the District at the border with Port Loko District, were in total disarray at this time because of one group of CDF, who were opposed to the Gbethies from Port Loko District and who were inflicting a lot of violence on civilians in the chiefdom. On 24 March 1999, Kamajors and Avondos came to Bradford,¹³²² the headquarter town of Ribbi Chiefdom and began to shoot indistinctly.¹³²³ One civilian was caught escaping and was accused by the Kamajors of being a “rebel”. Those Kamajors and Avondos told the civilians they had come to Ribbi because they knew they had been RUF/AFRC forces in the chiefdom. Some civilians were killed, accused by the CDF members of selling food to RUF/AFRC members. Throughout May and April, the two groups deployed in the town and went to the surrounding villages, killing civilians and burning houses. For example, they went to Rogbonkol, burnt 10 houses and killed 20 people; at Mothankey, they killed one woman and took away her two children and all her property. They also crossed the Ribbi River and went to Bathpon (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District). On their return to Bradford, the Kamajors and Avondos met a deaf woman in her garden and asked her what she was doing there. The woman told them that since they were “soldiers” – because they were wearing military uniforms – they should not disturb her. The CDF members told the woman they were going to kill her, as they said she was inhabited with devil spirits. The Avondo commander¹³²⁴ ordered his men to kill her, so she was shot and killed.

The CDF members then moved to Makabie, where they established a checkpoint on the highway leading to Freetown. Any civilian caught speaking Temne was accused of being a Gbethie collaborator, who were their targets at this time. Anybody thus accused was forced to lead them to the place where he was living and all his property was taken away. The inhabitants of Makabie were gathered, accused of being “rebels” and threatened with death; they were not, however, killed and the Town Chief was forced to pay Le 15,000 instead. Civilians were told that they could not go anywhere without the permission of the CDF members and that as long as they remained in the town, the civilians were responsible for their feeding. It was alleged that the main purpose of the CDF members was to steal their property and that the allegation of collaboration was a pretext. Some CDF members then left the town and went to Rosint Loko, where they abducted civilians, subsequently releasing all but one. The captured civilian who was not released was killed, as he failed to lead the Kamajors to the Gbethies. He was hit with a bladed weapon on his face and as he was

¹³²¹ Okra Hills was the base of the West Side Boys, a fighting faction that emerged from the RUF/AFRC forces in late 1998: see the analysis for Port Loko District for more information.

¹³²² It is not clear where those CDF members came from. It seems that the Avondos came from Taima (Kori Chiefdom) while the group of Kamajors came from Kongbora and Bumpeh Chiefdoms.

¹³²³ It seems that there were no Kamajors operating in Ribbi Chiefdom before this incident.

¹³²⁴ Both the Avondos and the Kamajors had their own commanders, although they carried most of these actions together.



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wiping away the blood, the Kamajor commander told him not to waste his blood as he was thirsty and wanted to drink it. The man was then shot and killed; he was later buried by civilians from Makabie. A report on this incident was made to the ECOMOG forces deployed at Songo (Western Area). ECOMOG forces arrested the CDF members but released them shortly after.¹³²⁵

The CDF members returned to Ribbi Chiefdom and resettled first at Mo Lamina and then at Mo Goba, from where they raided the surrounding villages, harassing civilians for their property. One truck belonging to the International Labour Organisation was stolen in Moyamba village (Ribbi Chiefdom) and used by the CDF members to carry the property they were stealing. At Massampa, for example, they entered the town shooting their guns and killing one student. They looted the town and burnt five houses. At Sueu, they shot the Chiefdom Speaker, stripped him, tied him up and took him to Bumpah Chiefdom, where they allegedly had their main base. At Rotifunk (Bumpah Chiefdom), one of the commanders wore the fingers of the late Chiefdom Speaker on a necklace around his neck. The CDF members went back to Moyamba village (Ribbi Chiefdom), burnt 19 houses and captured two traders, whom they later killed. Other incidents included another attack on Bradford, where they took a significant sum of money from traders and another attack on Sueu, where they killed one woman and took away her property. CDF members also went to Mabang, after the RUF/AFRC forces had left the bridge,¹³²⁶ and killed a lot of civilians and harassed anybody using the bridge.¹³²⁷

The Kamajors stayed in Bradford for a while, forcing civilians to bring them food and money and to work for them, harvesting palm nuts. These actions continued until the Government announced that all the fighting factions had to stop hostilities.¹³²⁸

By May 1999, some commercial vehicles used the alternative highway from Freetown to Bo, through Moyamba, without encountering any attack, although the highway was not yet reopened for traffic.¹³²⁹

Probably in 1999 or 2000, Kamajors from Bumpah Chiefdom battled with Kamajors from Kagboro Chiefdom, for one lady trader from Bumpah Chiefdom had been beaten and her money taken away by Kamajors at Ribbi (Kagboro Chiefdom). The Kamajors from the two chiefdoms were later reconciled through the intervention of the Paramount Chief of Bumpah Chiefdom and elders of Kagboro Chiefdom.

Following the Freetown invasion in January 1999, a peace accord marking the end of the conflict and known as the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed on 7 July in the Togolese capital. Pursuant to this accord, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process was formally launched by the President of Sierra Leone on 20 October 1999 during a ceremony at Wilberforce

¹³²⁵ No more details were available on this arrest.

¹³²⁶ RUF/AFRC forces were in Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District), on the other side of the bridge.

¹³²⁷ No further information was available on this incident.

¹³²⁸ A ceasefire was signed in May 1999. No more information was available on what exactly happened in the chiefdom following this announcement.

¹³²⁹ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1 - 17 May 1999.



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Barracks, Freetown and began properly on 4 November 1999.¹³³⁰ Five demobilisation centres were opened at Lungi (Port Loko District), Port Loko South, Port Loko North, Kenema and Daru (Kailahun District). In early 2000, UN peacekeepers from the Guinean contingent were deployed at Moyamba Town.¹³³¹

On 10 March 2000, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) identified two more sites, one of which was at Levuma (north of Kongbora Chiefdom).¹³³² However, disarmament started at a slow pace and was halted temporarily in May 2000, as fighting were still going on in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and peacekeepers were abducted by RUF/AFRC forces. Although Moyamba District was not directly concerned by these events, it seems clear that the CDF members would not disarm as long as the other fighting factions were still carrying out armed operations. The DDR process would be given a new start in November 2000 when the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed a ceasefire in Abuja, Nigeria on 10 November 2000. On 4 May 2001, those parties would meet again in Abuja, Nigeria to review the cease-fire. Further to this meeting, those parties held monthly tripartite meetings under the Joint Committee on DDR and decided on an accelerated schedule for the completion of the disarmament process. During the fourth meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR in Kenema on 10 August 2001, it was agreed that the next stage of disarmament was to take place simultaneously in Moyamba and Koinadugu District, between 15 and 30 August.¹³³³ However, disarmament was not complete by 31 August, mainly for logistics reasons.

In a symbolic disarmament ceremony in the town of Moyamba on 20 October 2001, CDF combatants and their senior commanders handed over more than 50 weapons to UN peacekeepers, in the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Sierra Leone.¹³³⁴ At the end of the seventh meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR on 9 November, disarmament was declared complete in Moyamba District.¹³³⁵ On 30 November 2001, a Nepalese Battalion of peacekeepers was deployed in Moyamba Town and Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom), at which time the war officially came to an end in Moyamba District.¹³³⁶

3. Conclusion

Moyamba District was the last District of the Southern Province to be attacked by RUF forces. The first incursion into the District was launched in early January 1995, at a time when NPFL forces, originally fighting alongside the RUF from 1991, had long since withdrawn to Liberia. This first wave of attacks was carried out from Bo District and in the aftermath of a series of attacks on major

¹³³⁰ The launch of the DDR process was delayed as it was meant to start within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

¹³³¹ IRIN West Africa, 12 April 2000. On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council had adopted Resolution 1270 approving the deployment of 6,000 armed peacekeepers alongside the 260 unarmed military observers. Their number would increase over the subsequent months.

¹³³² IRIN West Africa, 17 March 2000.

¹³³³ UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 August 2001. At that time, the disarmament was complete in Port Loko and Kambia Districts. As of that date, 1,500 CDF members had disarmed in Moyamba District.

¹³³⁴ UNAMSIL press briefing, 23 October 2001.

¹³³⁵ UNAMSIL press briefing, 9 November 2001.

¹³³⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 06 - 30 November 2001.



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towns in Bo District. Attacks on Moyamba District were subsequently carried out by RUF forces who settled in the District but also from the neighbouring Districts of Bonthe and Bo in the Southern Province and Tonkolili in the Northern Province.

The spreading of RUF forces into Moyamba District was one of the latest developments of a new phase of the conflict, which started in late December 1993 in the south of Kenema District. From this date on, RUF forces took to the bush and adopted guerrilla warfare tactics, progressing to Districts so far unaffected and by 1995, had established positions in all the Districts.

In March 1995, it was clear that the ultimate goal of the RUF forces who attacked Moyamba District was to reach Freetown. To this end, they progressed through the District using the highway that leads to Songo in the Western Area, systematically attacking the major towns located on this highway. It was only when their progression to Freetown was stopped that they settled in the District and established a strong base in the north.

As in the other Districts of the Southern Province, Kamajors progressively halted the actions of the RUF forces from the beginning of 1996. The initiation of youths and local hunters, members or not of the CDUs, started in early 1996 and developed throughout the year. Bonthe District played an active role in the development of Kamajors throughout Moyamba District, as many men from Moyamba District went to Bonthe District for initiation also because Kamajors from Bonthe District went to Moyamba District to fight the RUF forces.

The chiefdoms in the south of the District were under Kamajor control earlier than the chiefdoms in the north. By late 1996, Kamajors had taken control of the southern chiefdoms and no more RUF attack was reported in those areas. This was probably also due to the fact that around this period, Kamajors had already dislodged RUF forces from Bonthe District. The situation for the chiefdoms in the north of the District was far different. Although their main base, Camp Fol Fol was destroyed in late 1996 by Kamajors, the RUF forces and, shortly after, RUF/AFRC forces were present in many of the chiefdoms in the north, wreaking a lot of havoc on civilians. At this time, both Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts, which adjoin Moyamba District to the north, were also infiltrated by RUF and RUF/AFRC forces.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in early 1998, the actions of the RUF/AFRC forces were concentrated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Free from RUF/AFRC incursions, the Kamajors affirmed their control of the security of Moyamba District and expanded this control to civilians and local authorities. In this regard, the pattern of actions in Moyamba District at this time would converge with what happened in the other Districts of the Southern Province.

d. Pujehun District

1. Introduction

Pujehun District, with its headquarter of Pujehun Town, is one of the four Districts of the Southern Province, the other three being Bonthe, Bo and Moyamba Districts. It is bordered on the east by



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Liberia, on the northeast by Kenema District (Eastern Province), on the northwest by Bo District and on the west by Bonthe District. At its southern edge is the Atlantic Ocean.

There are 12 chiefdoms in the District:

<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
Barri	Potoru
Gallinas Peri	Blama
Kpaka	Massam
Makpele	Zimmi
Malen	Sahn
Mano Sakrim	Gbonjema
Panga Kabonde	Pujehun
Panga Krim	Gobaru
Peje	Futa
Soro Gbema	Fairo
Sowa	Bandajuma
Yekomo Kpukumu Krim	Karlu

The main rivers flowing through the District would prove to be of strategic importance during the conflict. The Mano River that flows on the eastern edge of Makpele and Soro Gbema Chiefdoms constitutes the natural border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. The entry point to the District is located in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, at the Mano River Union Bridge, Bo Waterside, which was a joint venture between Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Control of the bridge would be of great importance for the RUF/NPFL and later on for the RUF forces, as it allows easy penetration into the District and the transport of supplies from Liberia. Accordingly, throughout the conflict, the RUF forces would mainly be based in the east of the District. The Moa River originates from the ocean between Gallinas Peri and Soro Gbema Chiefdoms, following more or less the border between those two chiefdoms through Barri Chiefdom before reaching Kenema and Kailahun Districts, thereby isolating Soro Gbema and Makpele Chiefdoms from the rest of the District. Other rivers located in the south of the District and of lesser strategic importance would be used by the fighting factions, mainly the RUF forces, to move within the District.

Crossing the Mano River Union Bridge, there is only one motorable road linking Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom headquarters) to Sulima in the south (Soro Gbema Chiefdom) and to Zimmi in the north (Makpele Chiefdom Headquarters). Furthermore, this road to Zimmi is the only way to reach Pujehun Town, other than by using bush paths. From Zimmi, it continues westwards to Potoru (Barri Chiefdom headquarters), Futa (Peje Chiefdom headquarters) and Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom Headquarters). Bandajuma is located on the main road that links Pujehun and Bo Districts, starting in Pujehun Town and leading to Koribondo and Bo Town (Bo District). From Potoru, an alternative road passing by Gallinas Peri and Kpaka, the two central chiefdoms, goes to Pujehun Town.



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The small number of roads providing access to other Districts is an important factor in how the RUF/NPFL forces would attack surrounding Districts. To go to Kenema District in the north-east, there are only two alternative roads, through Makpele Chiefdom or through Peje Chiefdom. Two roads also allow the penetration of Bo District, the main one being a highway passing through Panga Kabone and Sowa Chiefdoms, while the second one leaves Pujehun Town to pass through Malen Chiefdom in the west. There are no motorable roads linking Pujehun District with Bonthe District in the south-east; accordingly, this District would not be affected during the first years of the war, as access was achieved only later through Bo District.

The main economic activities of the District consist of mining, fishing and cash crops, notably coffee and cocoa plantations. In some chiefdoms, primarily in Makpele Chiefdom, the main economic activity is diamond mining.

Pujehun District, at the border with Liberia was concerned by the conflict as early as March 1991 when Revolutionary United Front (RUF)/ National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) forces crossed the border at the Mano River Union Bridge into Soro Gbema Chiefdom. From this first incursion, the conflict would affect the District through three discernable phases.

The first phase, which ran from 1991 to 1993, was first marked by the first incursion in 1991, where almost all the chiefdoms and major towns, including Pujehun Town, were attacked by RUF/NPFL forces within one month. This first incursion was characterised by widespread violations committed by RUF/NPFL forces. Those forces would follow the same pattern upon entry to a village: they would gather the civilians, identify themselves as “freedom fighters” coming to redeem Sierra Leone from the corrupted All People’s Congress (APC) regime and depose and replace the local authorities, setting up basic administrative structures. Their arrival and stay in a place was accompanied by the infliction of physical and mental violence on the people of the village, as well as the abduction of members of the population, including children, for use as forced labour, as soldiers, as cooks and as “wives”. RUF/NPFL forces also engaged in widespread theft and property destruction, notably the burning of houses. However, from July to September 1991, SLA forces, assisted by foreign troops, dislodged the RUF/NPFL forces from most of their positions, pushing them back to the Liberian border. This SLA offensive and control of the District was nonetheless soon accompanied by violence inflicted on civilians, in particular those labelled as collaborators with the RUF/NPFL. Attacks, probably carried out by remnants of RUF/NPFL forces, were however still recorded at the end of 1991 and in 1992. At the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993, RUF forces launched a powerful attack from Liberia, established a stronghold in Soro Gbema Chiefdom and started spreading across the District. This second incursion was, however, less successful than the first one as they were soon defeated in most areas by SLA forces. While in control, SLA forces continued to inflict great havoc on civilians, killing a lot of alleged collaborators, chasing civilians for their property, destroying some property and engaging in mining activities in the east of the District.

The second phase spanned from 1994 to May 1997, during which time the RUF forces succeeded in spreading throughout the country, shifting their tactics away from direct confrontation with the SLA to bush warfare, during which they mainly staged ambushes. At this time, thousands of civilians had fled the District for a refuge camp in Bo District. Starting in 1996, newly initiated Kamajors, initially



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operating in collaboration with SLA forces, engaged the RUF forces and by 1997 had succeeded in taking control of most of the RUF positions across the country, which led thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to resettle in the District. However, their control was also accompanied by harassment of civilians, including constant requests for food and the taking of property. Physical violence was also inflicted, in particular on those they identified as being RUF collaborators.

The third phase of the conflict started in May 1997, when a military regime – the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) – seized power in the capital and concluded at the end of 2001, when the disarmament process was complete for Pujehun District. Shortly after the Coup, RUF forces who had been living in the bush for some months joined the AFRC and Kamajors in the District went underground. During their stay in the District, the RUF/AFRC forces imposed great harms on civilians in general and on alleged Kamajors collaborator in particular, including physical violence, killing, rape, abduction for use as forced labour, soldiers or “wives” and stealing and destruction of property. Starting in October, Kamajors regrouped and intensified their fighting against those combined forces, gaining more and more ground; by March 1998, following ECOMOG deployment in the District, the RUF/AFRC forces were repelled from the District. From this date onwards, the District remained under control of the Kamajors, who imposed their authority in all aspects of life, restricted the movement of the population by establishing checkpoints, replaced the local authorities and themselves administered the District, increased their violence against all civilians and engaged in mining activities. This would continue until the completion of disarmament at the end of 2001.

2. Factual Analysis

a) Events in 1991

On 28 March 1991, RUF/NPFL forces crossed the Mano River Union Bridge¹³³⁷ at Jendema (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), 7 miles from Fairo. They then headed for Malema, where they seized weapons from the SSD store, before heading for Fairo. From Soro Gbema Chiefdom, the RUF/NPFL forces would then head for Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom, in the east of the District), passing by Makpele, Barri, Peje, Sowa, Kpaka and Gallinas Peri Chiefdoms, leaving behind some forces to settle in each of those areas. A few days after the RUF/NPFL forces crossed the Mano River Union Bridge, the RUF and NPFL leaders paid them a brief visit at Bo Waterside, allegedly to check that the forces had crossed the river and to receive food items and furniture taken from the Police Barracks at Jendema.¹³³⁸

At the time of this incursion, SLA forces were deployed in the District, chiefly in Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom), Potoru (Barri Chiefdom) and Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom).

¹³³⁷ The control of the Mano River Union Bridge, a joint venture between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, would be of great importance as it allows penetration of the territory of Sierra Leone from Liberia.

¹³³⁸ During the first weeks of the conflict, many reports mention the visit of the RUF leader to Pujehun and Kailahun Districts, although it appeared that he spent more time in Kailahun District than in Pujehun District, while the NPFL leader is only mentioned as being present at Bo waterside.



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At Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), a short battle took place with some SLA forces and SSD members who were posted there.¹³³⁹ The house of the Paramount Chief, occupied at the time by SLA forces, was burnt down and the first killings of civilians and taking of their property was recorded at this time. Gunshots were heard in the town until night fell. The following morning, the civilians were gathered in the Court Barrie and addressed by the RUF/NPFL forces, who told them they should not be afraid, as they had come to redeem the civilians from the APC regime. However, a few days later, the RUF/NPFL forces killed one civilian who refused to give them food at Jendema. At Sulima, in the south of the chiefdom, they also killed one civilian, allegedly because he questioned them about the previous killing. Following this incursion, civilians from Wai, a town located on the main Fairo-Sulima road in the chiefdom, fled the town; some went to Liberia, first hiding their property, as they had heard from fleeing civilians that the RUF/NPFL forces were stealing food and any other items that took their interest. However, those who fled Sierra Leone did not find a safer haven in Liberia, where a civil war was raging; while in Liberia, the people who had fled the war in Sierra Leone were harassed by NPFL forces, who took their property and sexually assaulted their daughters and wives.¹³⁴⁰

After they took control of Malema and Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), two training camps were opened in those towns to train conscripts on how to use weapons. The RUF/NPFL forces first went from village to village to get people to join their movement, but when they realised that few young people were joining them, they forced villages as a whole to contribute and to give some of their inhabitants for training, threatening them with the destruction of the village if they refused. In this way, the RUF/NPFL forces recruited many young boys and girls and whoever refused to join or tried to hide during training was killed on the spot. Furthermore, those newly conscripted members were told to point out houses where young people had not volunteered to join, after which the RUF/NPFL forces looted and then burnt them. This situation led many families to give one of their family members to join the movement. RUF/NPFL forces also chased people who were hiding in farm huts in the bushes, raiding them at night, stealing their food and other valuable items and capturing young boys and girls. While the boys were conscripted into the fighting forces, the girls were used for sexual purposes. On one occasion, in the area of Malema, a five-months pregnant woman was raped by five RUF/NPFL members and, as a result, had a miscarriage. In another incident, also in the Malema area, one girl was raped during a night raid. That same night, the commander of that RUF/NPFL forces told the people that the RUF leader had told them in Liberia that all the Sierra Leonean women were their wives and all the property they could find was also theirs.

The RUF/NPFL forces nominated a former candidate in the 1982 elections to be the chairman of their war council in the chiefdom. Following the 1982 general elections, a fight had erupted between

¹³³⁹ The SLA forces were only 10, together with five SSD members, and had little ammunition, mainly only to defend themselves.

¹³⁴⁰ Since 1989, the NPFL had been waging war against the then President, Samuel Doe, who would be killed by a splinter group of the NPFL in 1990. Also in 1990, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent some Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces to assist the Liberian Government to end the war. As part of this mission, ECOMOG based some forces at Lungi, Sierra Leone's international airport to the north of Freetown.



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the partisans of the two political groups contesting the elections and many civilians were killed and much property destroyed. The nomination of the war council chairman for the chiefdom recalled these events in 1982 for the civilians of Soro Gbema, as the newly appointed chairman was the candidate in the 1982 election who had not been elected to represent the Pujehun east constituency in Parliament.¹³⁴¹ Some supporters of the man who was elected chairman and leader of the Ndorgbowusui group, saw this nomination to the war council as an opportunity to take revenge for atrocities committed against their families almost 20 years ago. For this reason, they voluntarily nominated some of their children to join the RUF/NPFL forces. Thus, civilians who were not members of the Ndorgbowusui group were particularly targeted during the RUF/NPFL presence in the chiefdom in 1991.

In late March 1991, civilians fleeing the RUF/NPFL advance in Soro Gbema Chiefdom crossed the Moa River that flows on its west edge and took refuge in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, at Gbanahun, returning to their chiefdom a week later.

Zimmi,¹³⁴² the headquarter town of Makpele Chiefdom, and the surrounding villages are diamond-rich area. On 3 April, RUF/NPFL forces entered the town and established a base there that became their main one for the District. During their stay in the chiefdom, up to December 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces attacked many villages, where they followed the same actions upon taking control of the different villages. The RUF/NPFL forces would enter the town and gather the inhabitants at the Court Barrie, where they would introduce themselves as the Revolutionary United Front, their purpose being to remove the APC Government from power and liberate Sierra Leone. At this meeting, or soon after, they would depose the Town Chief and replace him or her with their own Town Commander, who was sometimes appointed from the civilian population. While in the town, the RUF/NPFL forces would destroy property; take food and other items; force civilians to work for them, such as by cooking and fetching water; tie civilians up; kill people; and abduct people, both adults and children. The following incidents are examples of the attacks carried out and the violence inflicted on civilians in the chiefdom, most of them taking place in April.

Between April and December, Gbaa was burnt three times, virtually all the property in the town was taken and some people were killed. On 9 April, the RUF leader visited the town, gathered hundreds of civilians for a meeting and stated that RUF were peacemakers, coming to free people from slavery. Zimmi became a main base in the District and beyond, in the south-east, and the RUF leader had a lodge reserved for him there. At Palima, on 25 April, RUF/NPFL forces fired on a car full of police officers being driven into the town, as a result of which the driver and one police officer were killed. Cattle and poultry were also taken from Palima and brought to Zimmi. In the same month, RUF/NPFL forces, nine in number, attacked Vaama Kortu and entered the town accompanied by gunfire. The sheep and goats of the village were taken away. During the same attack, two women were raped and three boys (two aged 18 and one aged 15) were taken away; their

¹³⁴¹ It is accordingly not a coincidence if the RUF/NPFL nominated somebody who opposed at one time to the APC regime representative.

¹³⁴² Zimmi is a strategic town for many reasons because, aside from its location in a diamond mining area, it is the first major town to be reached when crossing the border from Liberia and it allows further inland advances in the east of Kenema District.



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fate still remains unknown. At Sembahun, a group of 15 RUF/NPFL forces took property from houses, including furniture and other belongings, and forced inhabitants to carry the loads to the RUF base in Zimmi. Those who did not obey the order were beaten, tied up, forced to roll and look at the sun and eventually carried the load at gunpoint. Goats and sheep were taken away, as well as two sewing machines and a bailing machine belonging to a diamond dealer, carpentry tools and blacksmith's equipment. Fifteen houses were burnt down at this time.

At Njabaama, also in April 1991, a woman was raped in the presence of her husband and another woman was taken to be the "wife" of one of the RUF/NPFL forces coming from Liberia. That same day, the village was burnt down in retaliation for the inhabitants not welcoming the RUF/NPFL forces. Household property, furniture and money were taken. On 22 April, a group of seven RUF/NPFL forces entered the village of Gbahama and appointed a 24 year-old man as the Town Commander. This newly appointed Town Commander, who was unable to refuse this appointment, was told to mobilise the civilians to operate checkpoints. Women were told to cook for the RUF/NPFL and eight people were forced to carry a load comprised mainly of coconuts to Zimmi. This continued until June, by which time most of the civilians had managed to leave the town and found refuge in Liberia. At Gbeakor, 27 RUF/NPFL members entered the town, instantly killing seven people. The Town Chief was deposed and a new Town Commander was appointed. Before leaving, the forces took with them all the cattle and poultry they could find.

At Ngombu, in June 1991, 70 houses were burnt and 42 kitchens and 15 toilets were destroyed by a group of 30 RUF/NPFL members. Diamond mining towns were also visited, such as Gbahama in April 1991, where property was taken and civilians were used to carry the loads. In this town and others, such as Baguihun, the RUF/NPFL forces engaged in mining activities and stole everything that was in the offices of the mining company. Daar-es-Salaam, a town north of Zimmi on the bank of the Mano River, was at this time hosting a camp for thousands of refugees from the Liberian war. In April, the camp was attacked and all the property belonging to various NGOs and UNHCR was taken; fleeing civilians died, drowning in the Moa River.¹³⁴³ It appeared that the RUF/NPFL forces had registered in large numbers as refugees in the camp, so that they would have easier access. Daar-es-Salaam became a training camp, known as the second Camp Zogoda.¹³⁴⁴ Wonde, another border town hosting a refugee camp, was also visited in April 1991; the RUF leader came to the camp and asked civilians to join the RUF. It appeared that only few of them did in fact join and a lot of refugees left the camp, leaving their few belongings in the hands of the RUF/NPFL forces. Due to these constant attacks, many civilians left the chiefdom, the majority of them going to Liberia.

On their way to Pujehun Town, in early April 1991, RUF/NPFL forces¹³⁴⁵ coming from Zimmi passed by Moala (Barri Chiefdom), located on the west bank of the Moa River. After Moala, they

¹³⁴³ No more information could be obtained on this event, either from the records or open source materials.
¹³⁴⁴ Zogoda, meaning "land of freedom" is a generic name given to training bases, like "Camp Lion" in other places. Other camps called Camp Zogoda were to be found at different times in Kenema and Kailahun Districts. This camp in Pujehun District was called "second Camp Zogoda", because the first one was established in Kailahun District.

¹³⁴⁵ These forces were armed with berretta guns, AK47s, single barrel rifles, RPGs and machetes and were dressed in military attire or with headbands with "RUF" written on it.



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headed for Potoru (Barri Chiefdom headquarter), which is at a junction on the main road to Pujehun Town (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom) from Kenema District.¹³⁴⁶ In both towns, they introduced themselves as “freedom fighters” coming to save people from the corrupt APC regime. On arrival, they searched for SLA forces and gathered the civilians in the Court Barrie. While some of the forces were addressing the inhabitants, telling them they were not going to steal anything or take their women as wives, others were parading in the towns, entering houses in search of food and money. Local authorities were deposed and new Town Commanders were appointed. At Moala, three people were killed with berretta guns, allegedly because they were reconnaissance/spies, since they run from the RUF/NPFL forces. During one night, some women were taken from their husbands. At Potoru, a Fullah man was killed for refusing to give them his sheep. Ten other civilians were also killed, accused of being reconnaissance and, for two of them, for refusing to hand over their bags; at least one man was shot in the head with an AK47 and two were beaten to death with a bladed weapon. Checkpoints were mounted where cards called “pass” were issued, which allowed civilians to move through the chiefdom. During their stay in the town, women and underage girls were sexually assaulted. All this violence led many people to leave the town for Sowa Chiefdom and Bo District.

From Potoru, some of the RUF/NPFL forces (a group of 25 to 30 men) went to Waima, four miles from Potoru. After calling the inhabitants for a meeting, they undertook a house-to-house search, removing the people they found and shooting some of them. Those forces were speaking a number of different languages, but the majority language was Liberian. Before leaving the town, they abducted girls under 15 years-old and then headed for other villages in the chiefdom, including Kotumahun and Dendegahun, where the same kind of attacks took place.

From Barri Chiefdom, some RUF/NPFL forces went to Peje and Sowa Chiefdoms, relatively small chiefdoms located to the west of Barri Chiefdom,¹³⁴⁷ while others probably went to Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom) through Gallinas Peri and Kpaka Chiefdoms.¹³⁴⁸ At Futa (Peje Chiefdom), on or around 17 April 1991, around 100 RUF/NPFL members gathered the civilians in the Court Barrie; those who refused were severely beaten with sticks and gun butts and some were killed. This first group of RUF/NPFL forces were joined the next day by another group,¹³⁴⁹ who merged before dividing into two groups: while one went to Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom, west of Peje Chiefdom), the other group went back to Potoru, allegedly to join other RUF/NPFL forces before their attack on Pujehun Town.

¹³⁴⁶ Potoru is the necessary entry point for Kenema District from the south-west, whereas Zimmi allowed penetration from the south-east.

¹³⁴⁷ Two main roads leave Potoru, one going to Peje and Sowa Chiefdoms and beyond to Wunde Chiefdom (Bo District) while the other one links Potoru to Pujehun (Panga Kabone Chiefdom), through Gallinas Peri and Kpaka Chiefdoms.

¹³⁴⁸ Information gathered concerning Kpaka Chiefdom tends to demonstrate that RUF/NPFL forces used this chiefdom as a transit point, using the main highway from Potoru to reach Pujehun Town. Accordingly, RUF/NPFL forces must have passed through Gallinas Peri Chiefdom where the highway lies in the north, although no information was recorded on this.

¹³⁴⁹ It could not be ascertained where this second group came from.



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The RUF/NPFL forces then proceeded to Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom), where SLA troops were posted. Those SLA forces advised civilians to go indoors while RUF/NPFL forces were approaching. However, after a one-hour battle, RUF/NPFL forces entered the town, forced the inhabitants at gunpoint to gather at the Court Barrie, paraded in the town and killed some civilians who attempted to escape or who refused to go to the Court Barrie. Some civilians accused of being SLA members who would go and call their colleagues were killed, while others were beheaded. It appeared that the RUF/NPFL forces then left the town¹³⁵⁰ and SLA forces arrived in the town, but RUF/NPFL forces returned with a mounted anti aircraft gun while the inhabitants were busy burying their dead. The SLA and the RUF/NPFL fought all day, with some casualties being reported on both sides. The SLA forces were unable to repel the RUF/NPFL forces and ordered the civilians to leave the town and to go to Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District¹³⁵¹) for safety. One week later, the SLA forces, reinforced by ULIMO, were eventually able to dislodge the RUF/NPFL forces from the town.

Repelled from Bandajuma, RUF forces concentrated on Futa (Peje Chiefdom) and Potoru (Barri Chiefdom), where they trained people who had joined willingly as well as those conscripted by force. They remained scattered in those two chiefdoms until the major SLA attack in August 1991. Some of the RUF/NPFL forces who had been repelled from Bandajuma went to Jeoma (Sowa Chiefdom). Civilians from the upper part of the village were gathered together and the men were forced to go into the veranda of the first house on the road from Bandajuma and Pujehun Town, while the women and children were put in a school compound. The RUF/NPFL forces shot at the men gathered in the veranda and 26 of them died; two managed to escape to the bush after pretending to be dead beneath the corpses.¹³⁵²

In mid April 1991, a RUF/NPFL group, different from the one that took control of the aforementioned chiefdoms, entered Gbanahun (Gallinas Peri), two miles east of Bumpeh. This group was coming directly from Soro Gbema Chiefdom (located to the east of Gallinas Peri Chiefdom¹³⁵³) and came mainly for the purposes of finding food, as they did not stay in the village nor did they go to Bumpeh, which is a bigger town. At Gbanahun, nevertheless, they appointed a Town Commander who was asked to provide food for them. After eating, the RUF/NPFL forces looted the shops of the village and forced young people to go with them to their base to carry the stolen property, which included domestic animals. Fullah people were targeted and two men were severely tortured. On their way back to their base in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, they passed by Bomi (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom), where they shot dead one man they accused of being a SLA member and again abducted young people to carry the property they had stolen. Those young boys from the two villages were then conscripted and when they came back to the chiefdom, they returned as members of the RUF/NPFL forces.

¹³⁵⁰ The RUF/NPFL forces apparently left the town when they heard the noise of a truck coming to the town, thinking it could be SLA reinforcements. The truck however did not pass by Bandajuma.

¹³⁵¹ At this time, SLA forces were deployed at Koribondo, their main base in Bo District.

¹³⁵² No details could be obtained on what happened to the women and the children.

¹³⁵³ The Moa River is more or less the natural border between those two chiefdoms.



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On their way to Pujehun Town on 17 April 1991, RUF/NPFL forces coming from Sowa Chiefdom passed by Koranko (Kpaka Chiefdom), reaching the headquarter town of Massam the following day. At Koranko, this RUF/NPFL group composed of 10 men dressed in black t-shirts and military trousers entered the town firing indiscriminately; they gathered the people and told them they should obey their laws forbidding raping and telling lies, which were punishable by death. The RUF/NPFL forces appointed a Town Commander and a secretary. Poultry from the village was taken and cooked for the forces. The next day, five of the RUF/NPFL members, followed by reinforcements from Potoru (Barri Chiefdom), went to Massam and, as in other villages, followed the procedure of holding a meeting in the Court Barrie, introducing themselves, appointing Town Commanders and so on. They slept in the town, mounting checkpoints to ensure their security. One man who was accused of being an APC sympathiser had his property taken away. One teenage girl was taken away to be a "wife"; her whereabouts remain unknown.

RUF/NPFL forces advanced further towards Pujehun Town, only a few miles from Massam, and laid an ambush between Massam and Yonni (Kpaka Chiefdom, at the border with Panga Kabone Chiefdom), killing one SLA member¹³⁵⁴ who was riding his bicycle to Massam to check about the rumour of an attack on the town. A reinforcement group of RUF/NPFL forces came from Potoru (Barri Chiefdom) to Yonni and headed for Pujehun Town, which they captured between 19 and 20 April 1991. By then, following the death of the SLA member in the ambush between Massam and Yonni, the few SLA members stationed at Pujehun Town had left the town. A Ministry of Social Welfare employee on his way home in the centre of Pujehun failed to stop when requested to do so by RUF/NPFL forces, so they followed him to his house. There, they asked for the keys of his motorbike and, when he refused, one of the RUF/NPFL members shot and killed him with an AK47 then took the key from his pocket. Other civilians were killed for trivial reasons, such as one man, killed because he was allegedly an APC sympathiser, although he was killed before he had time to answer the question whether he was or not. On another occasion, RUF/NPFL forces killed a petty trader who had refused to give them his motorbike. The petty trader's shop was also looted, together with other shops in the town that were broken into and looted.

Checkpoints were established to prevent civilians from escaping and the RUF/NPFL forces undertook the familiar gathering and address. Other meetings would be held during the time of their stay in the town, including one that took place four days after their arrival. At that meeting, the RUF/NPFL forces declared that the premises of a bank were now used to be as a "task force" office, revealing they were taking direct orders from the Head Office at Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) and requesting elders and other literates to work for them on administrative matters. One week later, as the elders complained about the starvation of the civilians, a system of "pass" was put in place, allowing civilians to move within the area under RUF/NPFL control.

Also in April, prior to the capture of Pujehun Town, Gallinas Peri Chiefdom was again visited by small groups of RUF/NPFL forces coming from the south of Barri Chiefdom. On their arrival in Bumpeh, they pointed guns at civilians, threatened to kill them if they did not join them and beat some of them, returning on the same day to Barri Chiefdom. As with the first incursion from Soro

¹³⁵⁴ At this time very few SLA forces – 10 in number – were based at Pujehun Town.



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Gbema Chiefdom, the elders decided to report the matter to the few SLA forces posted at Pujehun town, but no action was taken. RUF/NPFL forces came back to Bumpeh and Gbanahun, having learnt that the matter had been reported to SLA forces at Pujehun Town. At Konia (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom), one person suspected of having a link with the SLA forces was killed by the RUF/NPFL commander. Near Fonikoh, a man on his bicycle was killed after having refused to stop. Three people were killed at Blama Massaquoi and on his way back to Moala (Barri Chiefdom) with his men, the commander killed two more people at Fonima for running away when they saw the forces approaching.

From Pujehun Town, some RUF/NPFL forces boarded a car and a motorbike headed towards Gbandapi, a trade fair centre, passing through Najay. Gbandapi, in the south of Panga Kabonde Chiefdom, is located on the bank of Malemie River, which joins the Wanjei River flowing to Bonthe District. In all the villages along the road to Gbandapi that they visited, RUF/NPFL forces gathered the inhabitants, asked for weapons and enquired about the presence of SLA forces. They also established checkpoints, appointed a Town Commander, who was to send a daily report to the area commander,¹³⁵⁵ and told the civilians to bring food including rice, poultry, goats and sheep to Pujehun Town.¹³⁵⁶ Punishments for failing to bring food included beating with sticks and gun butts and the order to roll on the ground or swim in dirty water in a gutter.

The RUF/NPFL forces followed the Malemie River with speedboats to attack Benganie, which is the largest town in Mano Sakrim Chiefdom, albeit not the headquarter town. A meeting was summoned, checkpoints mounted, travelling passes issued, a Town Commander appointed and a green flag raised, meaning that the chiefdom was under RUF/NPFL control. The commander who mounted the green flag that day made it clear to the civilians that no other commander had the right to occupy the town and its environs without his consent, which would lead to internal fighting in May.¹³⁵⁷ Since it is located by the ocean, Benganie inhabitants were regularly asked to provide salt - a valuable and expensive commodity at this time - to forces stationed at Gbandapi and to those coming from time to time by boat.

Again in April, the RUF/NPFL forces from Pujehun Town proceeded further west to Malen Chiefdom, which shares boundaries with Bonthe District on the south-west and Bo District on the north-west. Before their arrival, people from the chiefdom had already fled to Bagbo Chiefdom (Bo District), upon hearing of the attack on Pujehun Town. The RUF/NPFL forces arrived in the chiefdom headquarter of Sahn on 24 April, when they summoned a meeting at the Court Barrie, asking for the Paramount Chief. When he arrived, the RUF/NPFL forces¹³⁵⁸ told the Paramount Chief that he should join them and exhort his people to do the same, while other RUF/NPFL members were looting property in the village and establishing checkpoints. An 11-year-old RUF/NPFL member called "child soldier" handcuffed the Paramount Chief. The first civilian to be

¹³⁵⁵ This information was reported specifically for Najay town, but is illustrative of general practice at this time.

¹³⁵⁶ The civilians would carry the food on their heads to the next village, where new people would take the load to the next village until it reached Pujehun Town.

¹³⁵⁷ See below for more details on this infighting.

¹³⁵⁸ The commander of these forces was speaking a Liberian Creole, which led people to identify him as a NPFL member.



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killed in this chiefdom was a man riding his motorbike from Jimmi (Bagbo Chiefdom, Bo District) to Taninahun (Malen Chiefdom) who did not stop and accordingly was considered to be a member of the SLA or SSD. The RUF/NPFL forces then departed for Pujehun Town, taking with them the motorbike of the man they had killed.

At this time, a place in Gadorhun (Malen Chiefdom) known as Kuwait, due to the valuable items that could be found in the town, was used to launch attacks on Bagbo Chiefdom in Bo District.

On 18 May, following the announcement over the BBC that the Paramount Chief from Malen Chiefdom had fled with his family between 9 and 10 May,¹³⁵⁹ RUF/NPFL forces came back to the chiefdom from Pujehun Town. Those RUF/NPFL forces coming in two trucks and armed with AK47s, bladed weapons and sticks, went straight to Taninahun in the north of the chiefdom, where they shot and killed the Town Chief with an AK47. They then went to Sahn, where they tied up prominent elderly people with bush ropes, forced six elderly women to sit on the floor in the Court Barrie, shot and killed some civilians, including women and children, raped one woman and took her away, together with her son. Fifteen houses were burnt, including the Paramount Chief's compound. At Fonikor, near Sahn, nine civilians were killed with AK47s by RUF/NPFL forces looking for the Paramount Chief's mother. From that day until July 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces remained in control of the chiefdom.

During their stay at Massam (Kpaka Chiefdom), RUF/NPFL forces forced young men to manage checkpoints for them while others were used to carry their loads, as the forces were expanding their control to surrounding villages, like Manjama, Nyayahun and Bendu, stealing food and domestic animals. In May, a training base was opened at Gobaru, two miles from Massam, where a lot of school-going children were conscripted. A herbalist and fortune teller performed rituals during the training that were believed to make members invulnerable.¹³⁶⁰

In May, an RUF/NPFL commander together with some of his forces arrived at Benganie and started stealing property. On hearing this news, the RUF/NPFL commander who had earlier warned civilians that no other commander should come to the town without his consent sent some troops, who captured the commander and the other members who carried out the looting. The captured commander tried to escape but was re-captured and brought back to Benganie, where he was publicly disgraced, tied up and seriously beaten. The other boys were taken to Gbandapi (Panga Kabone Chiefdom) for further interrogation, but their fate remains unknown. In late May, a similar incident took place and two commanders who had been stationed at Benganie were punished¹³⁶¹ by the same commander as the previous time for sabotaging the administration he had set up in the village. In early June, another commander with his troops came to Benganie and, stating he was a

¹³⁵⁹ The Paramount Chief allegedly fled through Bum Chiefdom (Bonthe District) to give information about what was happening in Pujehun District to the authorities in Bo Town.

¹³⁶⁰ It is reported that the belief in the powers of this person attracted many school children and other youths who decided to join the movement.

¹³⁶¹ The two commanders were requested to fight boldly as enemies and as one was much younger, this one was then beaten by the commander. The two men were then undressed, ordered to dig two holes, which were filled with pepper, and ordered to put their genital organs in the holes.



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good dancer, ordered the civilians to dance. Everybody was obliged to attend the dance, except the elderly, all doors had to stay open and the dance itself was organised so that the men were to lead the dance, followed by drummers and then by women at the end together with the RUF/NPFL forces. One man who defied the order and went to bed was severely beaten and tortured. When the dance started, the men at the front realised that the women at the back were being raped by the RUF/NPFL forces. This dance continued for four nights until the RUF/NPFL forces left the town.

By late June, SLA forces, together with United Liberation Movement for Liberia¹³⁶² (ULIMO) forces, recaptured Dandabu (Panga Kabone Chiefdom), on the highway linking Pujehun Town and Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom) and then Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District). As this town was the first one to be recaptured in the chiefdoms located to the west of the Moa River and as this town is on the road that goes to Bandajuma, it is highly likely that the SLA forces, reinforced with ULIMO forces, who recaptured those chiefdoms came from Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom). Within two months, the SLA and ULIMO forces were able to dislodge the RUF/NPFL forces from all the chiefdoms located on the west bank of the Moa River.

On or around 14 July 1991, combined SLA and ULIMO forces successfully repelled RUF/NPFL forces from Pujehun Town and its environs, in particular Gobaru, Yonni and Massam (Kpaka Chiefdom). The RUF/NPFL forces withdrew to Bumpeh (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom). Following this attack on Pujehun Town, a curfew from 4:00pm to 6:00am was imposed in the south of Panga Kabone Chiefdom in the villages along the road leading to Gbandapi. Inhabitants from Najay saw a truck loaded with RUF/NPFL forces passing by their village without stopping. Two days later, SLA forces boarded a jeep and pursued the RUF/NPFL forces into Gbandapi, returning to Pujehun Town the same day. The retreating RUF/NPFL forces then passed by Benganie (Mano Sakrim Chiefdom), where one civilian had his slippers and tape recorder stolen. The next day, another batch of disgruntled and hungry RUF/NPFL forces previously based at Yonni (Kpaka Chiefdom) arrived in Benganie, requested civilians to cook for them, looted the houses and forced young men to carry the loads. One day, probably in August, youths from the chiefdom went to Pujehun Town to tell the SLA and ULIMO forces they had learnt that an RUF/NPFL commander who was hiding in the bush with his wife and daughter had recently asked a civilian for accommodation. ULIMO forces arrived in the chiefdom in search of the commander and killed the civilian who had hosted him. In late August, ULIMO forces tied up young people accused of being RUF/NPFL collaborators, as a result of which two of the young people died.

SLA and ULIMO forces successfully attacked RUF/NPFL forces at Gobaru (Kpaka Chiefdom, near Pujehun Town) on 14 July 1991. Some retreating RUF/NPFL forces passed by Largo (Kpaka Chiefdom) and one of them forced a woman to have sexual intercourse with him, threatening to kill all the other women of the house if she refused. While at Gobaru, the SLA and ULIMO forces requested the civilians to come to the town, for screening and registration purposes. However, molestation of civilians was at its highest peak during this time, as young people were undressed and beaten with gun butts; the screening test was so stringent, a lot of young men were killed accused of

¹³⁶² This fighting faction, composed mainly of supporters of the late previous Liberian President, Samuel Doe, emerged in May 1991 to fight the NPFL.



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being RUF member without much investigation.¹³⁶³ Women and girls were also alleged to be the wives of the RUF/NPFL forces. Night searches for RUF/NPFL members were also instituted. In one incident, during such a search, a man who hid under his bed after SLA forces had knocked on his door was killed, on the allegation that he was a “rebel”. In early August, as the number of civilians coming to the town was increasing and as a lot of people had already been killed during the screening process, SLA forces required civilians to assist in the screening process and established an action group composed of three SLA member and six civilians. As food coming from an international NGO was provided at Gobaru, Yonni and Massam, SLA forces mounted checkpoints at Massam to enhance security, particularly because RUF/NPFL forces were still present in the District, on the east side of the Moa River (Soro Gberma and Makpele Chiefdoms). At those checkpoints, young people were screened and on one occasion, on 21 August, one man was killed as documents were found in his bag demonstrating he was a secretary for the RUF/NPFL forces. Civilians were also required to operate checkpoints for the SLA forces, especially at night. As the SLA commander was replaced sometime between September and November, the situation changed slightly as civilians were no longer required to operate checkpoints and those suspected of belonging to the RUF/NPFL were thoroughly investigated.

On 18 July, four days after the recapture of Pujehun Town, 28 members of the SLA and ULIMO forces drove the few remaining RUF/NPFL forces out of Malen Chiefdom, with ULIMO forces killing one RUF member at Sahn. However, 47 men and children were also killed by ULIMO and SLA forces. Most of them were shot with AK47s and one man was killed with a knife, accused of having been trained by RUF/NPFL forces when they took control of the chiefdom after the Paramount Chief had left. Twenty members of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) were then deployed in the chiefdom.

Repelled from Pujehun Town in July 1991, RUF/NPFL forces resettled in Bumpah (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom). A checkpoint was established at Koni Junction, ¼ mile west of Bumpah, and civilians from the surrounding villages were forced to operate it. During their one-month stay, RUF/NPFL forces harassed and beat civilians and raped girls. For example, civilians who refused to take their turn at a checkpoint were given 100 lashes each. The rate of killing increased at this time and there are reports of a practice whereby RUF/NPFL forces made people form a line and killed the 10th person in the line. A camp was opened to train young boys and girls who had been conscripted. It is reported that over 100 civilians were killed during the RUF/NPFL stay for not collaborating with them. Among those people killed were one woman who had come to buy palm oil and was accused of being a spy for SLA forces and a man who was killed because he was coming from an area behind the front line and accordingly was considered to be an SLA collaborator.

Those RUF/NPFL forces were reinforced in late July by two groups crossing the Moa River, both of whom killed civilians on their way to Bumpah. At Gbanahun, the first group shot and killed six civilians who had previously quarrelled with an RUF/NPFL child soldier. The other group that crossed the Moa River near Saama killed one man who failed to offer them his cassava leaves.

¹³⁶³ It is however reported that the ULIMO were more abrupt in screening and killing young men than SLA forces.



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On 3 August, RUF/NPFL forces resisted an attack from combined SLA/ULIMO forces who, after a fierce battle,¹³⁶⁴ went back to Pujehun Town, from where they had come. After this battle, the RUF/NPFL resettled in Saama, south of Bumpah, where they frequently mistreated civilians at their newly-established checkpoints. These forces often sought out women and girls who were still virgins and raped them and civilians' valuable items and food were stolen. In one incident, all the inhabitants were told to undress, form two lines - one for men and one for women - and dance until nightfall. Women were later raped and those who refused to have sexual intercourse were killed. At this time, the forces were under the command of NPFL commanders. However, by the end of August 1991, combined SLA and ULIMO forces successfully dislodged the RUF/NPFL forces from the chiefdom, which was declared a "rebel-free area".

Until August, it is unclear who was in real control of Potoru (Barri Chiefdom), whether it was the RUF/NPFL forces or the SLA forces who, throughout April and May, claimed to have retaken the town from the RUF/NPFL forces.¹³⁶⁵ However, the only attack that is reported by civilians, possibly because it was the major one, took place in August in Potoru and other places in Barri Chiefdom; this freed the chiefdoms from any RUF/NPFL presence. Accordingly, although they may have been exchanges of control of the town and skirmishes between SLA forces and RUF/NPFL forces from April to August, because this period is characterised by the RUF/NPFL periodically crossing the Liberian border and both SLA and RUF/NPFL forces launching sporadic attacks on the other fighting faction, two periods can clearly be identified for Peje and Barri Chiefdoms: from April to August/September, when RUF/NPFL were present in the chiefdoms and from August/September, when SLA forces took control of the chiefdoms.

During the SLA attack on Potoru (Barri Chiefdom) in August, during which SLA forces were armed with anti aircraft guns, RPGs, hand mortars and AK47s, about 30 civilians and 42 to 45 RUF/NPFL members were killed and about 15 houses were burnt. From Potoru, RUF/NPFL forces were pursued to Moala, on the bank of the Moa River, where RUF/NPFL forces managed to cross the river towards Makpele Chiefdom, together with a number of civilians.¹³⁶⁶ SLA forces also went to Peje Chiefdom to dislodge the remaining pockets of RUF/NPFL forces, taking those forces they captured to Potoru.¹³⁶⁷ SLA forces began to patrol Barri and Peje Chiefdoms, sometimes falling into ambushes laid by the few RUF/NPFL small groups who had not been dislodged.

Under SLA control, any person suspected of being a "rebel" or a "rebel collaborator" was maltreated and some were killed. Youths from different chiefdoms, accused of being RUF/NPFL members, were brought to Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom), where they were killed. The Paramount Chief of Barri Chiefdom was arrested, stripped, beaten, thrown into a military truck and taken to the

¹³⁶⁴ Both fighting forces had the same kind of weapons, including AK47s, AK58s, RPGs, hand grenades and "local" guns.

¹³⁶⁵ See, for example, BBC, 19 April 1991; there were also additional reports on this in April.

¹³⁶⁶ It is reported that the RUF/NPFL forces convinced civilians to go with them in Liberia so that they would not be killed by the SLA forces. This statement may also refer to what happened in other places such as Kailahun District where retreating RUF/NPFL forces succeeded in taking with them a large number of civilians by telling them they would be considered as RUF/NPFL collaborators by the SLA forces who would accordingly kill them.

¹³⁶⁷ It was not disclosed what happened to those captured RUF/NPFL members.



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military base at Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom). At the base, he was accused of having harboured RUF/NPFL forces in his compound; his fate remains unknown. By the end of 1991, civilians who had fled to the bush and to the nearby District of Bo had resettled and resumed farming activities in Barri, Sowa and Peje Chiefdoms.

In September 1991, people staying at Bo Waterside were requested by the retreating RUF/NPFL forces to go onto the Mano River Union Bridge, which led to over 2,000 people gathering there. The civilians were forced to stay on the bridge for two days and nights, without access to food. Some children died and youths were killed when, authorised to leave the bridge, they headed for Sierra Leonean territory.¹³⁶⁸ It is believed that it was following this RUF/NPFL forces attempt to contain advance of the SLA and Guinean forces that those SLA and Guinean forces¹³⁶⁹ retook control of the bridge, thus cutting off the supply route for the remaining pockets of RUF/NPFL forces in the District. During their stay in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, SLA and ULIMO forces killed any suspected RUF collaborator, although they could escape death once arrested if their family gave money and/or women to the SLA forces. Valuable items were also taken from civilians during this period and transported to Freetown.

Activities resumed on 3 September 1991 in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, when RUF/NPFL forces crossed the Moa River and came to Bopon, 15 miles south of Bumpah, as they saw that there was no SLA deployment along the Moa River. In Bopon, they killed one prominent man, cut off his head and displayed it at the Gondema checkpoint in Soro Gbema Chiefdom. Three miles from Bopon village, they killed the 15 inhabitants of a farmhouse, including a pregnant woman whose stomach was split open and the foetus removed. After that killing in the farm, SLA soldiers took control of the whole chiefdom and reinforcements were sent to the various crossing points along the Moa River. No RUF/NPFL incursion was felt for the rest of the year, until April 1992.

In late 1991, as fighting on the east bank of the Moa River was taking place, SLA forces based on the west side appealed to the Paramount Chiefs of Kpaka, Panga Krim and Panga Kabonde Chiefdoms to give them young men to help them maintaining the security of the chiefdoms.

b) Events in 1992–1995

The number of incidents for 1992 to 1994 drops considerably when compared to 1991,¹³⁷⁰ which is instructive of how Pujehun District was affected by the war. By 1992, SLA forces together with ULIMO forces had driven most of the RUF forces out of the District. The RUF, together with NPFL forces, nevertheless came back to the District from the Liberian border in late December 1992, when they established their stronghold in Soro Gbema chiefdom.

¹³⁶⁸ It is not clear from the records who killed those civilians, whether it was SLA or RUF/NPFL forces, and open source information does not clarify the matter. Accordingly, to say that the RUF/NPFL forces used the civilians to protect themselves from the SLA forces is an inference gleaned from the records, although it was not expressly stated.

¹³⁶⁹ According to the Agence France Presse, the bridge was retaken on 6 September 1991: 06 September 1991.

¹³⁷⁰ Thus, the number of records for 1992 represents 1/5th of the records for 1991, 1993 – 1/6th and 1994 and 1995 together 1/10th.



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Therefore most of the fighting as such was concentrated in the east, at the Liberian border, which may account for the fewer number of incidents during this time period. In addition, in 1993, most of the residents of the District were advised to go to Gondama camp, which may also explain the scarcity of the incidents of this period. However, beginning in 1992, there were increasing incidents of violations committed by SLA forces.

Events in 1992

Although SLA forces claimed to have recaptured Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) in August 1991,¹³⁷¹ it appears that Makpele Chiefdom came under SLA control only in January 1992, when SLA forces took over Daar-es-Salaam, the easternmost point of Pujehun District on the border with Liberia, and many other towns in the chiefdom. RUF/NPFL bases became SLA bases; Zimmi camp and Baquima were now under their control. SLA forces were also based at Gofor in the south of the chiefdom along the road that goes to Soro Gbema Chiefdom, where they brought poultry and other domestic animals they had found in the villages they had visited.

However, SLA forces began to harass and mistreat civilians from the beginning of 1992. Sexual assaults are reported, such as a woman from Joporwahun who was raped by an SLA member while she was at Zimmi. SLA forces chased civilians for their food, restricted their movement and forced them to work for them, including by hunting or fishing. SLA forces also engaged in mining and at Gbojibu, which became one of their mining villages, they set 13 houses on fire as they did not want to have civilians in their midst. This drove civilians to regional towns like Kenema or Bo or to Liberia.

In January 1992, following the appeal of the SLA commander to the Paramount Chiefs of Kpaka, Panga Krim and Panga Kabone Chiefdoms, youths¹³⁷² from all these chiefdoms, some of them being local hunters, gathered in Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom) to receive summary training and some ammunition for their barrel guns. Shortly after, they were sent to Bumpeh (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom), located a few miles from the Moa River. SLA forces used underage children to carry arms and ammunition to the warfront. Furthermore, not only did the SLA forces take money and food items from the population in what they called the "war effort", they also took other property, including drums of palm oil, furniture and other household items. These items were believed to be transported to Freetown by SLA trucks and other trucks they had seized from civilians.

The killing of alleged collaborators was ongoing; the standard SLA practice was to tie up alleged RUF collaborators and to throw them off the Yonni Bridge (Kpaka Chiefdom) or to execute suspects at the Makibi Bridge in Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom). For example, SLA forces beheaded a man in the Sambo section, allegedly because he had given meat to the RUF forces.

In 1992, SLA forces were well established in Panga Krim Chiefdom, which forced the RUF forces into hiding. However the presence of the SLA forces was heavily felt by the civilians, as the SLA

¹³⁷¹ AFP, 19 August 1991.

¹³⁷² The term 'youths' in Sierra Leone could refer to anybody aged up to their mid to late 30s, although it probably does not include anyone under 14.



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forces ill-treated the civilian population. For example, civilians who had previously been appointed to any position by the RUF, which they could not refuse or they would be killed, or who had been forced to join the RUF were punished by the SLA forces. Common punishments included amputations of the hands and ears, the plucking out of eyes, putting people in a bag and then setting the bag on fire, taking them to the river and drowning them and shooting and killing them.

In May 1992, RUF/NPFL forces crossed the Moa River and launched a series of attacks on different towns in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom. By the end of the month, civilians reported that the chiefdom was under their control. However, it appeared that in 1992, most of the RUF/NPFL forces had been chased out of the District and only pockets of forces were still active, mainly laying ambushes. Indeed, following the successful attacks on RUF/NPFL positions by the SLA and ULIMO forces in 1991 and the SLA control over Makpele Chiefdom in January 1992, the major RUF attacks in the District took place in December 1992 and 1993. Accordingly, those attacks on Gallinas Peri could be considered not as highlighting a massive operation for the control of the chiefdom but rather as sporadic actions carried out by isolated pockets of RUF forces. Thus in May, apparently taking advantage of the disorganisation of the SLA forces,¹³⁷³ RUF forces attacked Kakayama, where they battled for two days with SLA forces. An SLA truck with human and logistical reinforcements fell into an ambush, but there were no fatalities. The SLA forces then retreated to their other base at Saama, which - overpopulated with civilians fleeing the previous fighting - was later attacked on 3 May 1992. Some civilians were killed in the crossfire and others were captured by the RUF forces. The Town Chief of a nearby village was captured and later killed by the RUF forces, who left his body at one end of the town. Within the same month, another RUF group attacked another SLA position at Njala.

Kpaka Chiefdom was fairly quiet during this period, with only two incidents reported. Probably before the overthrow of the Government of J.S. Momoh on 29 April, RUF forces who had crossed the Moa River attacked many villages, including Gedeyama, Saama Peri, Kpetema and Mamboma, looting, killing and abducting civilians.¹³⁷⁴ Similarly to what happened in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, these actions were probably raids from some isolated groups of RUF forces. In June, unidentified armed men attacked Massam (Kpaka Chiefdom) in the early hours of the day but were repelled by some SLA forces who claimed that they fought armed men they could not identify.¹³⁷⁵

In October 1992, SLA forces counter attacked and retook some positions in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, although Saama remained an RUF base. SLA forces based at Bumpah encouraged civilians to come back and resettle. Some civilians were killed, mainly for the purposes of taking their property. For example, one Fullah businessman was killed by an SLA member who took away his belongings, namely a gold wristwatch, a gold chain, some money and a bicycle. The SLA member who carried out this killing was arrested by the SLA commander to whom the killing was reported and sent to Freetown. In November, the youths gathered at Bumpah to help the SLA forces repel the RUF forces from their chiefdom. Those youths, who brought single barrel guns and various

¹³⁷³ Although SLA forces were based at Bumpah, Kakayama and Saama, the command position on the SLA forces was just changing hands at this time.

¹³⁷⁴ No details could be obtained on these incidents.

¹³⁷⁵ Fatalities - if any - were not reported.



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bladed weapons, were dispatched by the SLA commander in two groups, one heading to Saama where the RUF forces were based. On their way to Saama, they fell into an RUF ambush, during which some of them were killed while others were captured by the RUF forces.¹³⁷⁶

RUF forces regrouped and returned in December 1992 to capture Soro Gbema Chiefdom, which became their stronghold. This attack led to a massive exodus of civilians crossing the Moa River. Towards the end of December 1992, inhabitants of Barri Chiefdom saw a large number of civilians from Soro Gbema Chiefdom crossing the Moa River and passing by their chiefdom. Those civilians, disclosing that an attack had taken place in Soro Gbema Chiefdom where many civilians were killed and houses were burnt, did not settle in Barri Chiefdom but continued their journey to find a safer haven. Civilians from Potoru heard three days later that the RUF forces were also in Makpele Chiefdom.¹³⁷⁷

Events in 1993

In January 1993, RUF forces crossed the Moa River and launched attacks on all the chiefdoms located on the west bank of the river. Thus, they attacked Saaquehun village (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom), 12 miles north of Bumpeh, where they killed 12 people, burnt many houses and abducted many civilians.

On 13 January 1993, well-armed RUF forces attacked Potoru in Barri chiefdom,¹³⁷⁸ shelling the town. Over 30 people were killed, some having their throats cut with bayonets. The forces used Potoru to attack other villages in the chiefdom, such as Waima and Kundowahun, and to make raids on Peje and Sowa Chiefdoms. In Peje Chiefdom, villages like Bumpeh and Quiva came under attack and civilians described this wave of attack as a “full-scale offensive”, “a fearful battle, worse than ever”. Over 100 civilians were killed and 30 houses burnt in Bumpeh, most of which were populated with civilians. During these attacks, young girls were raped and a lot of civilians were abducted. Indeed, throughout their stay in these areas,¹³⁷⁹ the RUF forces raped women, including rapes by many men of girls under 15, killed people for not supporting them and abducted people on a daily basis, including young boys who were abducted for the purposes of recruitment. As a result, civilians left the chiefdoms and went to Gondama camp.

Also in January 1993, an unspecified number of RUF forces¹³⁸⁰ attacked Massam (Kpaka Chiefdom) and on the same day, moved on to Yonni (Kpaka Chiefdom) and to Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom). Since this attack took place on the day of the weekly trade fare at Gbandapi (south of Panga Kabone Chiefdom), most of the women were not in Pujehun Town and the surrounding villages, which led to the abduction of many children. The SLA forces based at Pujehun Town left the town and the RUF forces occupied the town.

¹³⁷⁶ It could not be ascertained where the second group went.

¹³⁷⁷ No more information could be gathered on these attacks.

¹³⁷⁸ Some of those forces were speaking in Liberian language.

¹³⁷⁹ As for Sowa Chiefdom, conflicting information concerning Bandajuma where the SLA was stationed did not allow us to ascertain what happened in this town.

¹³⁸⁰ It is reported that some of them had their faces masked for fear of recognition.



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Civilians from the chiefdoms where these attacks took place were advised by the SLA forces to go to Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District), a major SLA base in Bo District. At Koribondo, an international NGO provided assistance to the displaced people who were advised by the SLA commander to go to Gondama, at the border between Kakua and Tikonko Chiefdoms (Bo District), where the Pujehun District Development Association had secured a land to build a camp. By March, registration started in the camp for proper food supply and each household was to build a booth before they could be registered. By the end of April, civilians from all the chiefdoms of Pujehun District were to be found in the camp.¹³⁸¹ Again, in February 1993, the SLA forces exhorted the civilians from Gallinas Peri Chiefdom to go to Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District) for their own safety. When they arrived at Koribondo, the civilians were advised by the SLA base at Koribondo to go to Gondama.

However on 28 January, coming from the direction of Dandabu (north of Panga Kabone Chiefdom), SLA forces recaptured Pujehun Town, which by that time had been under the control of the RUF for two weeks. In March 1993, the SLA recaptured Blama Massaquoi (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom) and rescued over 260 civilians who were being held captives by the RUF forces after a fierce battle in Tongie. In late March, RUF forces retook Pujehun Town overnight, armed with heavy machine guns but SLA forces successfully counter attacked four days later on 30 March.¹³⁸² In early June 1993, other unsuccessful attacks were launched on Pujehun Town, allegedly by hungry RUF members, which did not challenge SLA control over the area.¹³⁸³

Civilians began having doubts about the SLA forces; starting in 1993, there appeared to be “much understanding” between the RUF forces and the SLA forces. Indeed, civilians found that any time there was a RUF attack on a village or settlement, the SLA forces based in Pujehun Town would not go there until they heard the RUF had left the area. On their arrival, they would take away the any property left by the RUF forces and bring it to Pujehun Town, sometimes by truck and sometimes by forcing civilians to carry the load. Civilians also understood that during attacks on SLA bases, the forces stationed there would only shoot in the air and then run away, leaving their arms and ammunition behind them. Civilians further noticed that those kind of incidents happened especially after SLA forces had received deliveries of arms and ammunition and food rations. Civilians who dared to question the behaviour of the SLA forces and their efficiency in repelling RUF attacks were killed.

In May 1993, SLA forces, SSD members and ULIMO forces launched a successful attack on Potoru (Barri Chiefdom). After a three-day battle, the RUF forces were repelled from the town and had spread throughout the chiefdom. During this attack, some civilians were killed. After they recaptured Potoru, ULIMO and, to a lesser extent, SLA forces killed up to 70 civilians whom they suspected of being “rebels” or “rebel collaborators” and burnt the houses of many people they

¹³⁸¹ This camp was made up of makeshift mud and thatch huts without sewage or proper ventilation. Living conditions would start becoming catastrophic and the death toll would soon be very high, between 50 and 80 deaths per month. BBC, 16 September 1993.

¹³⁸² AFP 26 March 1993 and BBC 1 April 1993.

¹³⁸³ BBC, 3 June 1993 and 5 June 1993.



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suspected of hiding suspected “rebels” or “rebel collaborators”. Furthermore, civilians were used to carry supplies for the SLA and, accordingly, some of them were killed during ambushes laid by RUF forces. From May 1993 to 1994, SLA positions in these chiefdoms came under persistent attacks.

Those in the RUF High Command in Soro Gbema Chiefdom were members of the late Ndorgbowusui Group. However, others who were not members of this group volunteered to be recruited for the RUF, which led to dissention among the RUF ranks. When orders were given, they refused to follow them or, if they were forced to carry them out, it was not in the best interest of the commanders. The rivalries between these two RUF groups, each of them giving allegiance either to Solomon Demby or to Hon. Mannah Kpaka, led to much destruction of property and killing of civilians in Soro Gbema chiefdom. For example, one group carried out the massive destruction and burning of Malema and Fairo, the two major towns in the chiefdom, while the other group burnt down Wai and surrounding villages. In any village where either group felt there were supporters of the other group, they would wage war on those communities. Furthermore, as the Demby supporters were known for being wealthy, constant ambushes were staged along the main roads of the chiefdom.¹³⁸⁴

The population of Makpele Chiefdom suffered continuous looting and property destruction by the SLA forces, who had begun to engage in mining activities that would continue until after the 1996 elections. For example, at Palima in 1993, the roofs were taken from the Court Barrie, the mosque and other houses. By early 1993, most of the civilians had fled to camps (including the Gondama camp in Bo District, which was opened in January 1993), to larger towns such as Kenema and to Liberia. The SLA forced those who remained to mine for diamonds, bring the SLA forces food and give them money for food.

Thus, by August 1993, RUF forces were entrapped in Pujehun District by SLA and ULIMO forces whose main bases were in Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom) and Gofor (Makpele Chiefdom). The remaining RUF forces controlled only a region of marshland and tropical forest on the Atlantic coast,¹³⁸⁵ where they staged ambushes. On 28 August, some RUF forces laid an ambush at Golahun, nine miles south of Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone or Kpaka Chiefdom), and opened fire on ICRC personnel. Two ICRC nurses were killed and a third one, together with the two Gambian drivers, was wounded.¹³⁸⁶

Events in 1994

At the end of January and following the renewed RUF attacks, notably in Kenema District, the Government of Sierra Leone declared “total war” against the RUF.

Despite the SLA presence in Zimmi, RUF forces attacked Palima (Makpele Chiefdom, 1.5 miles from Zimmi) in April 1994, by passing the SLA forces. Thirty-two people were abducted and

¹³⁸⁴ None of those events could be specifically dated and happened sometime between 1993 and 1995 when the Government of Sierra Leone sent a delegation to the Mano River Union Bridge.

¹³⁸⁵ AFP, 16 September 1993

¹³⁸⁶ AFP 28 August 1993 and 29 August 1993.



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brought to their stronghold in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, where they stayed over two years, being trained as RUF member or used to work for the RUF forces, mainly as fishermen.

In 1994, RUF forces were occupying most of the villages in Barri Chiefdom, looting, raping, killing and abducting. These forces began spreading to Kenema District.¹³⁸⁷ However at that time, most of the population of these chiefdoms had fled to the bush or to Gondama camp.

Events in 1995

At the beginning of the year, the Sierra Leonean Government sent a delegation to the Mano River Union Bridge (Soro Gbema Chiefdom) to negotiate a cease-fire with the RUF. This was the second round of talks between RUF forces and the NPRC regime, the first one taking place in December 1994.¹³⁸⁸ For one of these meetings, the delegation composed of Government representatives and prominent people was airlifted to the crossing point at Bo Waterside from Monrovia and crossed the bridge towards the Sierra Leonean side, at Jendema (Soro Gbema Chiefdom) without seeing any RUF forces. RUF forces appeared shortly after and abducted them, threatening to kill them. It is believed that those people remained in the hands of the RUF forces until 1998 when the District was cleared of any RUF presence.

In 1995, SLA forces were still in control of Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) and harassment of civilians continued. In one incident, 25 people from Palima were undressed and taken to Zimmi, where they were forced to push a truck loaded with SLA forces.¹³⁸⁹ Palima (Makpele Chiefdom) was again attacked by RUF forces in October 1995 but this time, the forces came from Tunkia Chiefdom in Kenema District. Two people were killed and some houses looted.¹³⁹⁰ Thus, civilians from Makpele Chiefdom were caught between RUF attacks and SLA harassment. All the houses and other facilities (including kitchens and toilets that had been built by UNHCR) at Palima were destroyed by both the RUF forces and the SLA forces, although more destruction was done by the SLA forces.

Notwithstanding the relatively scarce information related to this period, it appears that Pujehun District together with the Mokanji Hills (Moyamba District) and the north of Bonthe District had become a stronghold of the RUF.¹³⁹¹

c) Events in 1996 – 1998 and beyond

These years are marked by the progressive initiation of Kamajors in the District. As with other Districts in the south, from the time of their initiation until the May 1997 Coup, the Kamajors together with SLA forces were successful in containing and repelling RUF forces from their

¹³⁸⁷ More detail is needed on these incidents.

¹³⁸⁸ This second round of talks failed as the RUF turned down NPRC's offer of peace: Communiqué Inter Press Service, 3 January 1995 and 11 January 1995. In April, the NPRC Chairman proposed an immediate cease-fire and negotiations to the RUF, which was rejected by the RUF. Amnesty International Report 1996.

¹³⁸⁹ No more details could be obtained on this incident.

¹³⁹⁰ Although no more details could be obtained on this incident, it has to be borne in mind that Palima is 1½ miles from Zimmi and accordingly, the reported attacks on Palima, could reveal an attempt of the RUF forces to overrun the SLA forces based at Zimmi.

¹³⁹¹ BBC, 20 February 1995.



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positions. Shortly after the Coup on 25 May, the Kamajors went underground and reassembled; from the end of 1997, they were successfully engaged in driving the RUF/AFRC forces out of the District.

CDF initiations began in late 1995 or early 1996 in Gondama camp in Bo District. It is reported that the catalyst for the commencement of initiations was the attacks on Gondama Camp and the heavy casualties suffered there. In early 1996, the first CDF members moved to Pujehun District to reinforce the SLA forces stationed there. All chiefdoms represented in the camp were to appoint a certain number of men from their chiefdom as Kamajors, in proportion to their size and population. The initiation rite was performed in Bo Town. All the adults in the camp had to contribute Le 500¹³⁹² or the equivalent in bulgur for the initiation to take place. In the early stages, the new initiates, equipped mainly with bladed weapons and single barrel guns, were under the command of the chiefdom authorities but they soon came under the command of a National Coordinator, with District Coordinators.¹³⁹³

Following the general elections in February 1996, people started leaving the camps and the bush to resettle in their villages. Displaced people who had found refuge in Bo District and refugees from Liberia began to be repatriated in the District. However, in May, Kamajors found over 100 civilians dead in Bendu (north of Malen Chiefdom), mainly aged over 50 years old. The RUF forces who killed those civilians also captured teenagers from the town and took them to Camp Libya in Soro Gbema Chiefdom.¹³⁹⁴ In late August 1996, AFP reported that tens of thousands of people left Gondama Camp as the “rebel war dies down”¹³⁹⁵ and it was believed that people had returned to 10 out of the 12 chiefdoms of the District. Makpele and Soro Gbema Chiefdoms, at the Liberian border, were the two chiefdoms where resettlement remained impossible for security reasons. Those people who resettled in the District nevertheless still received food distribution in Bo District until this distribution began also in Pujehun District later in the year.

During the period leading up to May 1997, the Kamajors, together with SLA forces, repelled RUF forces in many areas, allowing for relative tranquillity and continuing resettlement. People tried to engage in farming activities, being supplied with seeds and basic agricultural equipments by NGOs and UN Agencies. However, this collaboration between SLA forces and the Kamajors soon started to deteriorate. In Barri Chiefdom for example, quarrels over the dismantling of checkpoints arose and checkpoints mounted by SLA forces were destroyed by Kamajors. This led the SLA forces to leave the chiefdom, which was then under Kamajor control only until the May 1997 Coup.

In Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, the first attack the Kamajors launched against the RUF was in Blama Massaquoi and they continued fighting until the chiefdom was declared a “rebel free area” around

¹³⁹² This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone’s position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2,000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4,000 SLL) per day: see UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.

¹³⁹³ See section [X] for a more detailed explanation of the formation of the Civil Defence Forces.

¹³⁹⁴ Xinhua News Agency and AFP: 9 May 1996.

¹³⁹⁵ AFP, 22 August 1996.



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November 1996. Thus, from November 1996 until May 1997, the chiefdom was under Kamajor control. Kamajors from Soro Gbema Chiefdom passing through Gallinas Peri Chiefdom reached their chiefdom sometime between August and October 1996. In Barri Chiefdom, the Kamajors first joined the SLA forces based at Potoru, the chiefdom headquarters, while RUF forces were scattered mainly in the north of the chiefdom, between Vaama and Baiama. Following attacks on RUF camps, Kamajors obtained arms and ammunition that were more sophisticated than the ones they had so far.

However, the Kamajors in Makpele Chiefdom, in particular the 23 Kamajors based at Manjama, engaged in massive mining activities, the junior members undertaking mining for the most senior ones. Mining equipment was taken away from civilians, who were forced to feed the Kamajors, go hunting and fetch wood and water. No respect was paid to the chiefdom authorities and the Regent Paramount Chief had no control over the Kamajors. The movement of civilians was restricted and harassment of civilians was frequent; their houses were searched, property was confiscated and farms were harvested by the Kamajors for their own purposes. Civilians from this village went into hiding, as they could no longer withstand this situation. At Vaama in 1996, Kamajors argued with SLA forces, allegedly because both groups wanted to have access to the resources of the villages, namely food, money and women. The two groups fought, the Kamajors being equipped with single barrels guns and the SLA with automatic rifles and RPGs, as a result of which the Kamajors left town. SLA forces from Zimmi visited Ngombu, close to Zimmi, as they heard Kamajors had gathered there to fight them. As they arrived in the town, they started shooting, thus preventing people from giving explanations, as a result of which seven civilians were killed. Before leaving, those SLA forces took some furniture for Zimmi.

Kamajors based at Madina (Makpele Chiefdom) also engaged in the same behaviour towards civilians, who were forced to contribute to the Kamajor's activities by providing money, bulgur, rice and palm oil. Toobu (three miles from Zimmi) was also visited by Kamajors and in April 1997, they took away bicycles, bailing machines, a power saw, Le 1,000,000 and other property.¹³⁹⁶ Civilians made a report to the head Kamajor at Zimmi but no action was taken. Until the May Coup, more initiations took place for youth of the chiefdom and almost all the villages suffered similar kinds of harassment.

In late December 1996 following the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement, more than 8,000 people who had been captured two years earlier by RUF forces were released in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, allegedly on the directive of RUF High Command.¹³⁹⁷ During this period, it appeared that RUF forces were ordered by their High Command to regroup and encamp at Camp Libya, located in a dense rainforest on the Moa River, which was practically their only remaining stronghold in the District after the Mano River Union Bridge and Sulima (both in Soro Gbema Chiefdom) had been recaptured.

In Soro Gbema Chiefdom, before the May Coup in late 1996 or early 1997, Kamajors drove many RUF forces out of the chiefdom. At Felo Mano and other places in the chiefdom, the Kamajors

¹³⁹⁶ Those Kamajors "dressed carefully" and "behaved like RUF or SLA forces".

¹³⁹⁷ BBC, 28 December 1996.



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discovered arms stores and an airstrip was also found at Felo Mano. This information was transmitted to the Sierra Leone Government through the SLA and SLP based at Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) and the arms and ammunition were airlifted to Freetown in 1997.¹³⁹⁸ The Kamajors fought to retake the whole chiefdom up to Jendema, at the Liberian border. Many RUF forces fleeing to Liberia were caught and killed on the Mano River Union Bridge, which has been described as the “Kamajor slaughter site”, where many RUF members were tied up and thrown alive in the Mano River.

After the Coup in May 1997 and the merging of the RUF with AFRC forces, the CDF were defeated in many areas and went into hiding. They operated from underground, refusing to obey the AFRC leader’s general order to lay down their arms and to report to the nearest police station. Instead, initiations continued took place; in Sowa Chiefdom, for example, 150 young men were initiated.¹³⁹⁹

From May 1997 until they were repelled from the District in 1998, the combined RUF/AFRC forces imposed great harms on civilian population in general and on suspected Kamajors or Kamajors collaborators/sympathisers in particular. For example, three days after the overthrow of the Government, AFRC forces burnt down compounds belonging to Kamajor commanders in Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom). Other houses were looted, including those of two Limba people. In Sowa Chiefdom, AFRC forces accused civilians of being Kamajors, killing many of them. The RUF/AFRC forces went on patrols in Sowa Chiefdom and established themselves in the chiefdom headquarters of Bandajuma. RUF/AFRC forces then commenced patrols in Bandajuma, as they knew the chiefdom was initiating Kamajors, attempting to prevent the Kamajors from establishing themselves in the chiefdom headquarter. The Bo-Pujehun Highway, which passes through Sowa Chiefdom, was constantly patrolled at night and houses along the highway were set on fire. Youths who were found during these patrols were killed by the combined forces, who accused them of being Kamajors. These constant patrols led civilians once more to flee their villages to go in their settlements in the bush, called “sorquehun”.

Women were sexually abused and in Pujehun Town, one woman died as a result. The practice of padlocking the private parts of women is also reported.¹⁴⁰⁰ In Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, in December 1997, RUF/AFRC forces coming from their main base in Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom) entered Blama Massaquoi, fully armed with automatic rifles and an anti-aircraft weapon mounted on vehicle. They burnt down the house of the CDF commander using an RPG, as a result of which other houses nearby were also burnt. The RUF/AFRC forces took supplies from returnees to the

¹³⁹⁸ According to the records, ECOMOG from Freetown and Kenema would have come to the site of these discoveries and air lifted the ammunition to Freetown. However, no ECOMOG forces as such were to be found in these towns. The key person probably referred to foreign troops such as Guinean or Nigerian who have been fighting with SLA for a long time. Furthermore, the reference to Kenema should probably understood as Kenema District and not Kenema Town, as no presence of such foreign forces was reported for Kenema Town.

¹³⁹⁹ According to the OCHA report for 16-21 July 1997, in many parts of Pujehun District, “local military commanders have good relations with Kamajors and do not support AFRC” but from the information collected from key people, this could not be confirmed.

¹⁴⁰⁰ This information was related in such general terms and no more details could be obtained.



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chiefdom, mainly seed rice and other seeds, and continued to steal property throughout the chiefdom, in particular at Saahn Massaquoi, before returning to Pujehun Town.

Whenever they lost men at the battlefield, RUF/AFRC forces killed a number of civilians similar to the number of men they had lost. For example, in late 1997, in Gofor (Makpele Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces placed 20 people in a house and set fire to it. The reason advanced for this was that these people were coming from a place where the Kamajors had previously ambushed and killed RUF/AFRC forces.

The Kamajors regrouped their forces and more initiations took place, initiating often children below the age of 15.¹⁴⁰¹ Starting late 1997, Kamajors attacked RUF/AFRC forces' positions. In October 1997, RUF/AFRC forces in a four-truck convoy fell into an ambush near Fairo in Soro Gbema Chiefdom. Kamajors killed those caught in the ambush, together with the civilians who were travelling with them, because the Kamajors considered them to be collaborators. According to those Kamajors, those civilians used to lead the RUF/AFRC forces and show them the Kamajor hiding places. Between late 1997 and March 1998, many villages were burnt down in Soro Gbema Chiefdom by both Kamajors and RUF/AFRC forces to prevent the other fighting faction from settling there.

ECOMOG forces based in Liberia were carrying weapons sent by the CDF National Coordinator through the Mano River Union Bridge to the CDF District Coordinator, who in turn distributed the items to the Kamajors in the District. ECOMOG was also supplying the Kamajors with medicine and the wounded forces were transported to Tieni in Liberia by helicopter, where there was a base at that time.¹⁴⁰² Whenever arms and ammunition were seized at battlefronts, they were taken to the District Coordinator, who reallocated them as required.¹⁴⁰³

In November 1997, the Kamajors repelled most of the combined forces from Sowa Chiefdom. While fleeing, the RUF/AFRC forces burnt 30 houses in Bandajuma and set many villages along the Bandajuma-Koribondo (Bo District) highway on fire. Nevertheless, the Kamajors took control of the area and people came out of the bush where they had been hiding.

¹⁴⁰¹ According to the Sierra Leone Humanitarian Report for 29 October-18 November 1997, "[...] insecurity in Bo, Pujehun and Bonthe districts has also increased due to clashes between the military and the Kamajors. It seems that there is a clear difference between newly-recruited Kamajors, who have access to automatic weapons and apparently operate outside the authority of chiefdom representatives, and the traditional Kamajors who are carefully screened and respect traditional chiefdom structures. Aid Agencies operating in the Southern province are being increasingly harassed by some groups of Kamajors and are currently being prevented from accessing areas to the South of Bandejuma on the Bo-Pujehun highway. This is a source of concern as there are known pockets of malnutrition in parts of Bonthe and Pujehun districts." Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 29 Oct - 18 Nov 1997. REG. NO. 97/0390.

¹⁴⁰² Indeed, it seems that Kamajors had a base on the Liberian territory.

¹⁴⁰³ It is alleged that some of these weapons were sold for money by the CDF District coordinator and were thus kept out of circulation to the Kamajors. Furthermore, some weapons would have been given to civilians who were not Kamajors for them to benefit from the disarmament program. This information was also revealed during the TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) hearings in Pujehun Town in June 2003.



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On 20 to 22 December 1997, Kamajors from Gbandapi (south of Panga Kabone Chiefdom) moved to Pujehun Town in a bid to recapture the town from the RUF/AFRC forces. During this first attempt, the Kamajors were repelled and sustained heavy casualties. A few days later, on 27 December, RUF/AFRC forces from Pujehun Town went down to Gbandapi, burning houses and looting food items on their way; 23 houses were burnt down at Najay. This counter-attack would mark the first step of a series of reprisals against civilians by the Kamajors. On 8 January 1998, three Kamajors came to Najay, where they fired many shots, burnt down one house and arrested two men gathered for the morning prayer at the Mosque whom they accused of collaborating with the RUF/AFRC forces, taking them to Bonthe District.¹⁴⁰⁴ Other Kamajors later returned to the town, stripped naked six civilians and beat them, on the same grounds. On 15 February, Kamajors killed the Chief Imam of the District and the Section Chief at Bayama (Panga Krim Chiefdom) by tying a rope around his neck and stabbing him many times before shooting him. These events prompted inhabitants from Najay to leave the village for fear of further reprisals but Kamajors found them in their hiding places and took away all their belongings, including food, domestic animals and money. As they were unable to stay any longer in the bush and as many surrounding villages refused to host them, these civilians went to Bassaleh, east of Najay.

Over 20 fierce and repeated battles took place between 28 May 1997 and late February 1998 to establish and maintain control of Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom), which was a stronghold of the RUF/AFRC forces in the District. During the two first attacks¹⁴⁰⁵ launched by Kamajors coming from the direction of Gofor, civilians were killed. As the fighting intensified between Kamajors and the RUF/AFRC in June, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) sheltered over 1,000 civilians.¹⁴⁰⁶ In early July, Kamajors regrouped and launched a third attack, coming from the main road of the chiefdom, like the previous attack. This attack was unsuccessful although no casualties were reported. However, the RUF/AFRC forces burnt down houses of Kamajor supporters, which made them flee the town, leaving their belongings in the hands of the RUF/AFRC forces. During the fourth attack in early August, many civilians, RUF/AFRC members and Kamajors were wounded. Some of the wounded died in the bushes and the decomposing bodies were later discovered by civilians. While they took control, the Kamajors would control the town only for a very short period of time.¹⁴⁰⁷

Inhabitants from Palima, half a mile from Zimmi on the road to Kenema District, deserted the town following the fourth attack and went to the bush for three weeks. They were discovered by the RUF/AFRC forces, who took the produce from the harvests to Zimmi. During the subsequent battles from September to December, houses were burnt down and civilians from Zimmi and the surrounding villages suffered heavy casualties; four Chiefs and 14 counsellors were killed, accused of being supporters of the Sierra Leone President. During this period, civilians also died from

¹⁴⁰⁴ What happened to those civilians was not specified.

¹⁴⁰⁵ During the second battle on 17 June, the key person recounts that he had the impression that when it came time for the battle, the Kamajors did not have central command.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Report 24-30 June 1997.

¹⁴⁰⁷ According to Africa News, 25 August 1997, ICRC had to withdraw from its office at Zimmi.



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starvation while others drowned in Mahoi River, trying to seek refuge in other areas.¹⁴⁰⁸ On 6 January 1998, another Kamajor attack left a lot of civilians dead.¹⁴⁰⁹

Also in January, Kamajors went to Vaama (east of Zimmi) where they stole all the household property they could find and took some money from civilians. Before leaving, they set some buildings on fire and took away one civilian.¹⁴¹⁰ Starting on 23 January, there was another attack described as a 'no retreat battle' that lasted for four days. At the end of the battle, during which both fighting factions used RPGs, there was a great deal of property destruction and a large number of bodies, both civilians and members of the fighting forces, were left on the streets. Following this, the Kamajors went back to Gofor. During the battle that took place on 1 February, the Kamajors were again unsuccessful in dislodging the RUF/AFRC forces from the town. Thirteen RUF/AFRC forces were caught by Kamajors and killed opposite the R.C. School on the Zimmi Fairo Road. Three of their "wives" taken by the Kamajors to Gofor, where they were used as sex slaves before being killed.

The final battle in Zimmi, which took place on 17 February, saw the Kamajors being assisted by ECOMOG forces and some SLA forces. Those combined forces blocked all the roads leading to the town and battled for three days with the RUF/AFRC forces who had not fled the town, which some had on hearing that Freetown was no longer under their control. Over 1,500 civilians used by the RUF/AFRC forces as sex slaves or as workers to do petty jobs like brushing the town, bringing food or water were freed by the Kamajors, who then made Zimmi their base. From Zimmi, Kamajors raided surrounding villages, taking property including household items and bicycles. They also harassed civilians in these villages because for the Kamajors, any civilians near Zimmi were RUF/AFRC collaborators.

After the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in February 1998, the District rapidly became free of RUF and AFRC forces as the Kamajors took control of it. In Kpaka Chiefdom, for example, as they were cut off from Koribondo which used to be a stronghold in Bo District (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom),¹⁴¹¹ the remaining RUF/AFRC forces left the chiefdom in March.¹⁴¹² In early 1998, Kamajors from Sowa Chiefdom battled with RUF/AFRC forces at Jeoma and successfully repelled them. From this time on, civilians were forced to feed the Kamajors, the burden of which increased when Kamajors opened a new initiation base at Foindu. In Panga Kabone Chiefdom, Kamajors attacked the remaining RUF/AFRC stronghold in the District three times before eventually driving them out in March 1998, when the RUF/AFRC forces were cut off from their headquarters in Koribondo.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Also in September, the fight for the control of Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District) intensified.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Hundreds of fatalities are mentioned, but this figure could not be confirmed. Also in January, serious fighting took place at Tongo Field.

¹⁴¹⁰ Those Kamajors were described as acting like the "junta" i.e. the RUF/AFRC forces.

¹⁴¹¹ Following the coup in May 1997, the SLA base at Koribondo had become a stronghold of the RUF/AFRC forces as part of the general "transfer" of SLA bases and property to the AFRC.

¹⁴¹² No information was obtained for Kpaka Chiefdom after the departure of the RUF/AFRC forces. Kamajor harassment of civilians is reported in the same general terms as for the other chiefdoms, without relating any precise event.



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During this period, Kamajors looted Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom), Yonni and Gobaru (Kpaka Chiefdom). However, after 1998, it is reported that Kpaka Chiefdom was relatively quiet as was Mano Sakrim Chiefdom, which did not suffer much from the Kamajors after May 1997, because they were fighting RUF/AFRC forces in other parts of the District.¹⁴¹³

Kamajors controlled the District by conducting patrols and mounted checkpoints, imposing the pass system in search of arms and ammunition and alleged “enemies”. In Barri Chiefdom for example, up to 1999, Kamajors issued passes to travellers for a fee of Le 500, as a way to control the movement of people and to search for their enemies. This pass was only valid for a limited period of time and had to be renewed at the expiration of that period.¹⁴¹⁴ Kamajors from Potoru explained to civilians that only Kamajors could travel without such a pass.¹⁴¹⁵ Civilians were requested to show their pass that proved they were civilians and not RUF/AFRC members at any Kamajors checkpoints they passed through. Those checkpoints were also used to request money from drivers and passengers and to search passengers’ bags. For example, from Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) to Jendema (Soro Gbema Chiefdom, Liberian border), eight checkpoints were mounted and four were established between Zimmi and the border with Tunkia Chiefdom (Kenema District).

The Kamajors systematically ill-treated civilians across the District, mainly as a reprisal for their suspected collaboration with the RUF and RUF/AFRC forces. The District Coordinator used to go from chiefdom to chiefdom to visit the Kamajors on the ground; such visits were witnessed, for example, in Barri Chiefdom. In particular, relatives of RUF/AFRC forces were humiliated, punished and killed. The Mano River was used to drown alleged collaborators; Jijama and Jembe (Soro Gbema Chiefdom) were two towns where this practice was carried out. Traditional leaders were deposed and their power seized, some of them being molested. Prominent people were killed, such as the Assistant District Officer, who was mistaken for an AFRC lieutenant, and the Chief Imam of Soro Gbema Chiefdom. Looting was also frequently carried out and on one occasion, when this was being done and civilians were being chased into the bush, the Kamajors stated that when the RUF/AFRC forces took away their property, they never grumbled or did anything, but now they were complaining when the Kamajors were taking their property. Houses, compounds and communities termed “unfriendly” were burnt down, as happened, for example, in Nanjay (Panga Kabone Chiefdom). The killing of civilians for whatever reason was mostly carried out along the Liberian border.

¹⁴¹³ It appeared that in 1997, Mano Sakrim Chiefdom did not sustain much the presence of the RUF/AFRC forces, who were concentrated in other areas in the District.

¹⁴¹⁴ On one occasion, Kamajors told civilians that the pass would be valid only for four days. This is however not a fixed limit as information from other Districts notes that the passes issued could be valid for other periods of time.

¹⁴¹⁵ It is interesting to note that this system of pass together with the harassment suffered at checkpoints led some civilians to be initiated within the Kamajors society. This type of initiation was however different from the one the fighters to be had to go through, it was among other things much quicker. Furthermore, this type of initiation was mostly carried out once Kamajors were in control of the District and not previously while they were fighting RUF/AFRC forces.



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The houses of relatives of RUF and AFRC members were broken into, damaged and burnt down. It was common practice to send alleged collaborators to "wash" in the river, which was a euphemism for drowning, or to put them in cages where they were tied with FM ropes, which are nylon ropes wrapped around two short sticks and which often lead to loss of circulation to the hands. For example, in Sowa Chiefdom, during the Operation called "Black December" carried out in December 1997, two civilians who pleaded with the Kamajors authorities to let some vehicles come in were arrested and tied with FM ropes. Another example is a woman from Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom) who was killed and her head displayed on a sharp stick, as she was suspected of being a collaborator with the AFRC. Thirty people were killed in Bomborhun (Soro Gbema Chiefdom) for failing to report to the Kamajors that RUF/AFRC forces had crossed the Mano River.

Women were sexually abused and some of them had their heads shaved. In addition, women were also forcibly married to Kamajors, unable to refuse or they would be killed. This information was given in general terms for Soro Gbema Chiefdom but could most likely be extended to the other chiefdoms under CDF control. It is interesting to note that this was rather controversial among the Kamajors as they believed that once covered with their traditional attire and protection, they could not be approached by any woman or they would no longer be protected. Accordingly, this was used as an argument to deny the assertion that some of them had committed sexual offences against women.

The Kamajors established laws, both for Kamajors and civilians, and anyone caught breaking these laws was punished, including by public flogging, being locked in a guardroom and, for the Kamajors, being required to give up their weapons. Such incidents happened, for example, at Potoru, the CDF headquarter in Barri Chiefdom. Offices were established in the villages and Kamajors intervened in domestic affairs. They would settle cases of debts and other disputes, including marital affairs. Civilians reported cases to them and not to the Government authorities, who had no power or control over the chiefdoms at this time. Fines were levied on those civilians found guilty and other type of punishments were carried out, such as putting people in pens of two feet high and five feet long, built with palm stalks and sharp pointed materials.

One former Kamajor relates how children between the ages of 10 and 15 were initiated when the fight for Zimmi intensified towards the beginning of 1998. Those children were sent to enemy zones and battlefronts to act as spies and some became fighters. Others were also used to mine diamonds for the leaders. Kamajors also embarked on forceful conscription of men. When things started to become difficult for the Kamajors, they asked civilians to contribute with food and money to the movement. The food was for the forces and the money was used to pay initiators and to buy weapons. Civilians were also used to carry arms and ammunition, food and property stolen by the Kamajors. Those who refused to carry out these orders were arrested, beaten, put in cages, tied up or fined. Children were used to transport gravel from the mining areas to washing sites. RUF/AFRC forces captured alive during battle by the Kamajors were either initiated into the



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Kamajors or killed, depending on the situation. Other punishments were applied to these captured enemies such as imprisoning them, stripping them, tying them up and putting them in cages.¹⁴¹⁶

Kamajors also engaged in mining in different chiefdoms such as Soro Gbema, Makpele, Gallinas Peri and Malen and it is reported that the District Coordinator was allocating forces for mining. It was said that these diamonds were given to ECOMOG to get ammunition, but doubt was raised over the destination of the gems as the District Coordinator was suspected of keeping diamonds for his own use. In 1998, at Famina (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), a group of five civilians caught by the Kamajors mining diamonds without their permission were killed.¹⁴¹⁷

In September 1998, at Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom), Kamajors seized seven big trucks loaded with rice, sugar and other items coming from Liberia and en route to Kenema District. The trucks were parked opposite the police station, the SLP being unable to do anything. The passengers abandoned their loads and continued their journey to Kenema.

On one occasion, in October 1998, the killing at Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) of a man from Koya Chiefdom (Kenema District) accused of being a "rebel" led to a fight between Kamajors from Koya Chiefdom (Kenema District) and those from Makpele Chiefdom. The dispute was resolved through the intervention of the two CDF chiefdoms coordinators. Other incidents of friction between Kamajors were reported and in November 1998, some young men from Gallinas Peri Chiefdom decided to form their own society, allegedly with the assistance of the son of the Kamajor's High Priest. This decision to form a separate group of Kamajors concluded rapidly as, following the initiation, three of the young men who were to queue to test their bullet proof ability were killed and many others wounded when the initiator fired at them. The matter was reported to the police but no action was taken.

In mid October 1998, serious clashes occurred between CDF assisted by ECOMOG forces and some RUF/AFRC members accompanied by Liberian armed men at the Mano River in the south of Soro Gbema Chiefdom. According to the CDF Coordinator for Pujehun District and ECOMOG forces, those armed men were members of the Liberian Army, which was denied by the Liberian President. To avoid further incursions, the Kamajors created a buffer zone at the Liberian border by strengthening their forces in the border villages.¹⁴¹⁸

Discussions on the disarmament process began in December 1999, when the CDF National Coordinator together with the District Coordinator convened a meeting for Kamajors at Potoru (Barri Chiefdom). By April 2000, UNAMSIL forces were deployed in Zimmi and Joru and shortly after, at Pujehun Town, following ECOMOG withdrawal from the country. Possibly as a result of this, Pujehun District also became a transit area for refugees coming back from Liberia and

¹⁴¹⁶ This was apparently done on the advice of civilians, which may refer to the fact that some civilians were appointed in the administration of the CDF in the Districts.

¹⁴¹⁷ No further information is available on this incident.

¹⁴¹⁸ This incident was related by AFP, 04 November 1998, and comes from Kamajors source; it was neither confirmed nor denied by independent sources.



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originating from other Districts in Sierra Leone. A DDR camp was opened at Pujehun Town¹⁴¹⁹ in May 2001 and in October, following a meeting of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), comprised of the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and representatives of the RUF, it was agreed that the remainder of the DDR process should be accelerated between 1 and 14 November.¹⁴²⁰

At the end of 2001, SLA forces deployed alongside the Liberian border in Pujehun and Kenema Districts following intensified fighting of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)¹⁴²¹ forces in the west of Liberia.¹⁴²²

Aside from this, there is almost no information available from the end of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001, as the District was under the control of Kamajors and ECOMOG forces and, later on, UNAMSIL troops. It appears that civilians were able to resettle in their villages and were mostly engaged in farming activities.¹⁴²³

3. Conclusion

Pujehun District was an entry point to Sierra Leone for RUF/NPFL forces as early as 1991 and all the RUF incursions in the District were carried out following an east-west pattern, RUF forces first settling into the two chiefdoms bordering Liberia, namely Soro Gbema and Makpele before proceeding further west by crossing the Moa River. Accordingly, those two chiefdoms were the most affected, particularly because Makpele Chiefdom is the main mining area of the District.

The first major incursion in the District, carried out by RUF/NPFL forces was done in concert with a northern flank in Kailahun District; the RUF/NPFL forces rapidly scattered throughout the chiefdoms of both Districts. From the very start of the conflict, the headquarters of the RUF forces was, however, established in Kailahun District. Three motorable entry points into Sierra Leone were thus clearly identified, two in Kailahun District and one in Pujehun District.

The RUF/NPFL forces were repelled from Pujehun District in the middle of 1991, while some chiefdoms in Kailahun District remained under RUF/NPFL control. At that time, Pujehun District came under SLA control, with the RUF/NPFL forces being limited to launching sporadic actions in the District.

¹⁴¹⁹ Following a meeting between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF at UNAMSIL headquarters, Freetown, it was agreed between the parties that DDR camps should be opened as a matter of urgency in Lunsar, Makeni, Kamakwie, Masingbi, Koidu, Kailahun, Alikalia, Pujehun and Bonthé, in addition to the existing ones in Port Loko, Bo, Moyamba, Kenema and Daru: UNAMSIL press release, 15 May 2001.

¹⁴²⁰ IRIN West Africa, 12 October 2001. Furthermore, disarmament for the whole country was scheduled to be complete by 30 November 2001. During this disarmament period in November 2001, over 2,000 CDF members demobilised: UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 20 November 2001

¹⁴²¹ The LURD was a fighting faction engaged in the Liberian conflict and challenging the authority of the Liberian Government. This group had been fighting the Liberian Government since 1998.

¹⁴²² Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 01 - 31 December 2001.

¹⁴²³ The situation was radically different for the Districts of the Northern Province and for Kono District where RUF/AFRC activities were still ongoing, with high fatalities among the civilian population.

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In late 1993 and in 1994, RUF forces launched a second massive incursion from the Liberian border and spread across Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun Districts, before continuing further westwards, establishing positions in the whole country by 1995. As such, Pujehun District was for the second time under RUF control, although for a longer period this time. This RUF presence in the District led thousands of civilians to flee the District and go to IDPs camps in Bo District, encouraged by an SLA that was being gradually defeated in the District. Accordingly, Pujehun District was one of the most affected Districts in terms of displacement of population and of destruction of property.

From late 1995 and especially after February 1998 and the intervention in Freetown, the pattern of the conflict in Pujehun District differed from Kailahun District and was more similar to the other Districts of the Southern Province. This was due to the initiation and deployment of Kamajors, who were able to retake most of the RUF positions in the District, unlike Kailahun District, which was never completely under Kamajor control.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in February 1998 and its deployment in the District, the RUF/AFRC who had stayed in the District during the AFRC regime pulled out and the retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown did not settle at all in the District. Free from further RUF/AFRC incursions, the District was thus left under Kamajor control, as with the other Districts of the Southern Province, which deprived the RUF/AFRC forces of one of their main supply roads from Liberia. From 1998 until the completion of the DDR process, RUF/AFRC attacks were concentrated in the main mining areas of the District and in the areas where CDF members did not have constant and complete control, namely the Northern Province, Kono District, Kailahun District and the north of Kenema District.

Throughout the conflict, widespread violations were committed in the District, primarily by RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC forces, but also by SLA forces and Kamajors, especially once they firmly established their control and authority over the District. Those violations were directed against civilians and their property and included stealing and destruction of property, physical violence, sexual assault, killing and abduction for use as fighters, workers or "wives". Both the RUF forces and the Kamajors forces deposed and replaced local authorities and put in place basic systems of administration. Only a few cases of mutilation were however reported for the District, as most of the cases reported took place during a specific RUF/AFRC operation called "Operation No Living Thing" in the first months of 1998 and following the retreat of Freetown.



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F. Western Area

1. Introduction

The Western Area is located in the far central west of Sierra Leone and adjoins Port Loko and Moyamba Districts on its eastern side; its western side is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean. Roughly two-thirds of the Western Area is a mountainous peninsula, along the north of which is located Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone. Freetown has been a major international port for merchant and military shipping for the best part of 150 years.

Unlike the rest of the country, the Western Area is not composed of chiefdoms, but is divided into four Rural Districts (RD) and a metropolitan area known as Greater Freetown.¹⁴²⁴

Western Area	Main Settlements
Koya Rural District	Newton, Songo
Waterloo Rural District	Fogbo, Hastings, Kossoh Town, Newton, Tombo, Waterloo
Greater Freetown	Freetown and suburban areas
York Rural District	Goderich, Lakka, York
Mountain Rural District	Regent

Koya RD is in the far east of the Western Area and is bordered to the north by Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District). Across the River Ribbi, which delimits the southern boundary of Koya RD, lies Ribbi Chiefdom (Moyamba District). The main motorable crossing point over the River Ribbi is located at Mabang, connecting the towns of Moyamba, Rotifunk and Bradford (all Moyamba District) to Songo, in the far east of Koya RD. This Moyamba route rejoins the main highway at Tiama Junction, giving travellers access to all major locations in the Southern Province. The RUF would use this route to enter the Western Area in 1995.

From Songo, moving inland, the main hard-surface arterial route from provincial Sierra Leone passes through the north of Koya RD and its main town, Newton. From Newton, the villages of Bath Comp and Fogbo are accessible by a road running south. Fogbo is a main transit point for goods and people westward across the swamp areas of the Calmont Creek and eastward to Shenge (Kagboro Chiefdom, Moyamba District) and to other locations up the Ribbi River. A large number of small settlements can be reached from the Newton-Fogbo road. Moving east from Newton, the main arterial route leads to Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and on to all other major towns in Sierra Leone. Control of the stretch of road between Newton and Masiaka was a major strategic aim of all factions in the conflict.

Moving westward from Newton, the main highway leads to the town of Waterloo, and the Waterloo RD. The area between Newton and Waterloo is flat, highly fertile agricultural land. There is a large

¹⁴²⁴ Along with the SUDC area of Sherbro Island (Bonthe District), the Western Area is administered directly by the Government of Sierra Leone without the traditional structures found throughout Sierra Leone. This is a result of the early British administration, which did not extend its control over the provincial areas of Sierra Leone until the late 1800s, at which time it exercised authority mainly through the traditional structures already in place: see General Overview.



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palm oil plantation at Banga Farm, also on the main highway. Waterloo is on the foothills of the mountainous Western Area Peninsula. It has a number of suburban areas, including Lumpa, Kossoh and Bassu Town to the south and Cole Town to the north. The Prince Alfred Road Bridge, over which the main highway runs, is a key point in the town. The harbour settlement of Pa-Loko is located directly north of Waterloo.

The main highway into Freetown runs through Devil Hole, Rokel and Hastings. On the flat area north of Hastings town and running down to the Sierra Leone Estuary is a hard-surface airfield. The Sierra Leone Police Training School is also located at Hastings. On the Kossoh Town–Hasting axis, a number of different routes into Freetown converge. The main highway continues into the east of Greater Freetown through Wellington and Kissy. From Kossoh Town, two routes lead into Freetown. The first leads through Mountain Rural District from Grafton to Regent. This winding, cliff edge road is made of broken asphalt. At Regent, the road splits again allowing access to Freetown’s civic centre through Mount Aureol and to Freetown’s west end through Hill Station. The alternative route from Kossoh Town leads through Allen Town to Calaba Town, where it runs parallel to the main highway. This road is also of extremely poor quality and passes through the busy and densely populated areas of Wellington, Low Cost and Portee.

Another road leaves Waterloo and runs south around the Western Area Peninsula into west Freetown. The road passes through the SLA’s Benguema Training Centre,¹⁴²⁵ through to the harbour town of Tombo, which marks the southern-most point of Waterloo Rural District. The peninsular road loops around along the coast through to York, Sussex and Goderich in the York RD. From Goderich, the road passes straight into the Lumley and Juba Hill areas of west Freetown. The peninsular road is of extremely poor quality and takes around three hours to get from Freetown to Waterloo in a regular vehicle. The main highway route, through Hastings, takes only 20 minutes.

In 1991, the conflict that was taking hold in other areas of Sierra Leone had little impact on the Western Area except for troop movements to other areas of the country and the establishment of checkpoints – at which there were incidents of harassment of civilians and stealing of their property by the SLA – and defensive deployments in strategic areas, particularly in Waterloo. Following the coup in 1992, which saw the NPRC take power, harassment of civilians and stealing of their property by the SLA increased as more checkpoints were established. This also marked the beginning of Cleaning Day, according to which on the last Saturday of every month, people had to stay home during the morning hours and clean their houses: those caught on the streets would be punished by the SLA. However, these incidents were relatively few and there would continue to be little impact on the Western Area throughout 1992 to 1994.

Starting in 1995, the RUF began to extend their presence westward, at one point cutting off the main highway linking Freetown with the rest of the country and occupying much of Koya RD. There were a number of battles between the RUF on the one hand and the SLA and foreign forces on the other hand, with the SLA establishing more checkpoints in sensitive areas. Throughout 1995 there was an increase in violations committed against civilians, including killing, raping, abduction

¹⁴²⁵ The Benguema Training Centre was subsequently renamed the “Armed Forces Training Centre”.
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and looting primarily committed by the RUF, with some violations by the SLA and the Nigerian forces. Elections were held in early 1996, the run up to which was marred by incidents of violence including the first amputations (of thumbs) in the Western Area by SLA, who believed there should be peace before elections. There was little fighting in the Western Area in 1996, with SLA, Guinean and Nigerian forces deployed in strategic areas and the SLA continuing to operate checkpoints along major routes. Civilians were routinely harassed at these checkpoints and were punished for failing to produce identity cards, including being beaten, primarily by the SLA and the Nigerian forces. Towards the end of 1996, peace talks between the RUF and the Government resulted in the Abidjan Peace Agreement on 30 November 1996.

Nevertheless, the conflict only began to have a major impact on the Western Area on the magnitude experienced in the rest of the country in 1997. In May of that year, the AFRC launched a coup, as a result of which the elected government fled to Guinea. Soon after taking power, the AFRC invited the RUF to join them and a large number of RUF forces joined the AFRC forces already in Freetown and the rest of the Western Area. This period saw a massive increase in violations against civilians, with RUF/AFRC forces in particular targeting students, representatives of civil society and journalists, especially after the commencement of broadcasting by the clandestine pro-government radio station, FM98.1 Radio Democracy. Civilians were beaten, raped, killed and arrested and detained without being charged, sometimes for up to a number of weeks. Despite the formation of an anti-looting squad by the AFRC, which saw the return of some stolen property to civilians, looting was widespread; civilians were searched and their property, most commonly food, was taken at checkpoints and in their houses. Civilians were also detained and forced to work for the RUF/AFRC forces, primarily undertaking domestic work such as cooking and cleaning. There was a large build up of foreign forces at this time and fighting between the RUF/AFRC and these forces would lead to massive internal population displacement as civilians fled the fighting. In the latter half of the year, first ECOWAS and then the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone, including a travel ban on members of the RUF/AFRC.

Despite a ceasefire signed at the end of 1997, fighting continued with numerous violations of both the spirit and letter of the ceasefire. The instability in the city and the country at large prompted a military intervention by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces, reinforced by CDF and "loyal" SLA members, in February 1998, as a result of which the RUF/AFRC forces were driven from Freetown and the majority of the Western Area. The ECOMOG intervention continued to roll back the RUF/AFRC from every major town in Sierra Leone during March and April 1998. The Government returned from Guinea and sanctions were lifted, except those banning the import of weapons. For the most part, order was restored in the Western Area, although there were incidents of harassment of civilians, including the torture and killing of suspected RUF/AFRC members and collaborators by ECOMOG forces and the CDF. The middle of the year saw the commencement of a wave of treason trials against civilians and military personnel for their involvement in the coup in May 1997. The majority of those being tried were convicted, with death sentences and terms of imprisonment being imposed. Some of the military personnel, who had been court martialled, were executed in October while those who had been tried in civilian courts appealed their sentences and were still in detention awaiting the outcome of their appeals when the invasion of Freetown occurred on 6 January 1999.

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Towards the end of 1998, RUF forces had begun attacking towns in the west of the Western Area, including the strategic town of Waterloo, which led to renewed fighting in these areas. This would be the prelude to the major attack on Freetown by the RUF/AFRC on 6 January 1999. Thousands of RUF/AFRC forces converged on Freetown, occupying various locations, killing and amputating hundreds of civilians, taking their property and burning their houses. ECOMOG forces with assistance from the CDF managed to repel the RUF/AFRC forces and by the end of January had regained control of the city, although the destruction wreaked on the city and the loss of human life during the brief RUF/AFRC stay would be tremendous. In the coming weeks, ECOMOG extended its control to the areas surrounding Freetown and in April, peace talks began in Togo that would lead to the Lomé Peace Agreement, signed on 7 July 1999. That Agreement included a power-sharing arrangement for the elected Government and the RUF as well as a blanket pardon and amnesty for all combatants for all acts committed in pursuit of their objectives. From the time the AFRC and RUF leaders returned to Freetown in October 1999 until May 2000, the Western Area was mostly quiet.

In 2000, UNAMSIL began deploying across Sierra Leone and implementing the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration program agreed to during the Lomé peace talks. On 8 May, there was a large demonstration outside the house of the RUF leader, which resulted in the deaths of some of the protestors and the capture and detention of the RUF leader, accused of violating the spirit and letter of the Lomé Agreement. From then, UNAMSIL deployment continued in the Western Area, which remained quiet until the war was officially declared over in January 2002.

2. **Factual Analysis**

a) Events in 1991

At the beginning of 1991, around 2,000 members of the SLA were sent to the southern border of Sierra Leone with Liberia to prevent the incursion of forces from the Liberian war into Sierra Leone. These would be reinforced by three truckloads of SLA forces dispatched from Freetown on 25 March 1991 and 1 April 1991.¹⁴²⁶

In early 1991, the conflict broke out in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. The Government of Sierra Leone requested the assistance of Guinean and Nigerian troops to prevent RUF forces from entering Freetown and other large towns. Responding to this request, checkpoints were established between Waterloo and Tombo (both Waterloo RD) along the road running from the north to the south in the middle of the Western Area towards the border with Port Loko and Moyamba Districts. Waterloo is of strategic military importance, due to its location on the highway leading from Freetown to the rest of the country and its proximity to Freetown.

The Nigerian forces operated the checkpoint at Medina, whilst the others at Tombo and Russell (Waterloo RD) were operated by the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). SLA forces stationed at these checkpoints required people who were unable to produce their identity cards to pay them money. If

¹⁴²⁶ Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 25 March 1991 and UPI, 2 April 1991.



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civilians did not have money, SLA forces would punish them. For example, some were forced to clean up a particular area and others were forced to lie down on the ground and stare at the sun.

Following news of the first incursions, the Government of Sierra Leone – in 1991, the All Party Congress (APC) – was quick to mobilise political support for the war effort. The then President received gifts of food from representatives of the Fullah and Indian communities and entertained a gesture of solidarity from the Sierra Leone Judiciary.¹⁴²⁷

In addition, the Government of Sierra Leone made requests for assistance to various foreign governments, including those of the US¹⁴²⁸ and the UK. Officials from both governments publicly stated they were considering how to assist.¹⁴²⁹ The US provided a variety of direct assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone. First, the US Government flew in an undisclosed amount of light weapons and ammunition.¹⁴³⁰ A further shipment of materials was reported as scheduled to arrive by US Air Force cargo plane by 9 August 1991. Also in August 1991, a 15-member US Army mobile training team commenced a program of training in communications, medical care, equipment maintenance and setting-up effective command structures for non-commissioned SLA officers at the SLA's Benguema Training Centre. In September 1991, the US Government also agreed to provide \$500,000 to the Government of Sierra Leone to support the continuing involvement of the SLA in ECOMOG, then operating in Liberia. Freetown was one of the key logistic points for the 7,000-strong ECOMOG peacekeeping force stationed in Liberia.

On 13 April, the Governments of Guinea and Nigeria sent 700¹⁴³¹ military personnel and accompanying hardware to Sierra Leone.¹⁴³² The Nigerian forces arrived on 16 April 1991,¹⁴³³ at which time the Government of Sierra Leone cut air, sea and land transport links with Liberia, restricting incoming flights to Freetown to humanitarian and military traffic.¹⁴³⁴ Following the visit of delegation of Nigerian military officials to Freetown, a further 500 Nigerian forces arrived on or around 29 April 1991¹⁴³⁵ and were posted to strategic locations in the Freetown area including Lungi International Airport¹⁴³⁶ (Kaffu Bullon Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and the power station.

In May 1991 a camp for Liberian refugees was established near Waterloo town (Waterloo RD). On 6 May 1991, around 3,000 Liberian refugees were repatriated to Liberia from Freetown aboard the Nigerian vessel, the *River Adada*. Over the weekend of 4-5 May, the same ship had ferried an undisclosed number of Nigerian soldiers from Lagos.¹⁴³⁷

¹⁴²⁷ BBC, 15 April 1991.

¹⁴²⁸ UPI, 9 April 1991.

¹⁴²⁹ Independent, 7 May 1991.

¹⁴³⁰ AFP, 8 August 1991.

¹⁴³¹ Number initially undisclosed, reported as 700 by Xinhua on 29 April 1991.

¹⁴³² Xinhua, 13 April 1991.

¹⁴³³ AP 16 April 1991.

¹⁴³⁴ AP, 16 April 1991.

¹⁴³⁵ These forces were under the command of the field commander of ECOMOG in Liberia: Xinhua, 28 May 1991.

¹⁴³⁶ A short distance away (7 minutes by helicopter) from Freetown, north over the Sierra Leone River.

¹⁴³⁷ AFP, 6 May 1991.



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b) Events in 1992 - 1994

In mid-April 1992, a group of low-ranking members of the SLA Tiger Unit, armed with an anti-aircraft gun mounted on a military truck, moved from Kailahun District to Freetown. They bypassed the SLA base at Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and used the Moyamba-Rotifunk-Mabang (Moyamba) route to Freetown through Songo town (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District), south-west of the Western Area. These forces continued along the main highway and when they arrived in Freetown., other SLA forces stationed at the Benguema Training Centre were made aware of this unusual military movement.

On 29 April, the Kailahun group of SLA members overthrew the APC Government and established a military junta known as the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Led by 25 year-old Captain Valentine Strasser, the NPRC suspended the Constitution of Sierra Leone and imposed a State of Emergency. An SLA Major from the Benguema Training Centre was arrested and detained in Pademba Road prison when he tried to persuade those leading the coup to reverse their actions. The ousted President fled to the Republic of Guinea, where he was later granted asylum, as 50 SLA troops acting for the NPRC stormed the presidential offices at State House, in the centre of Freetown. Lungi International Airport was temporarily closed to air traffic and international telex and telephone lines were reportedly disabled.¹⁴³⁸

The US Government airlifted 300 expatriates out of Sierra Leone and issued a warning advising against travel to Sierra Leone. The French Government sent a frigate into Sierra Leonean waters to assist with further evacuation of expatriates should the situation in Sierra Leone deteriorate.

On 30 April 1992, the NPRC leader made a broadcast over national radio on the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service citing corruption and incompetent governance as the reasons for the coup.¹⁴³⁹ Later in the day, around 700 students marched through Freetown in support of the NPRC coup.¹⁴⁴⁰ In Freetown on 5 May 1992, students and trade unionists staged a much larger march in support of the NPRC.¹⁴⁴¹

A number of foreign Governments, including Nigeria, Japan and Ghana, were quick to recognise the NPRC as the Government of Sierra Leone. Cooperation between Nigerian troops and the SLA against the RUF continued.

Following the NPRC coup, SLA forces in Waterloo (Waterloo RD) and surrounding areas broke into shops and residences on the Calmont Road, stealing civilian property and loading it onto military trucks. SLA forces attacked villages in the Koya RD near the boundary with Port Loko and Moyamba Districts. In these villages, which included Mafonikay, Nyamgba Town and Newton, SLA forces killed an unknown number of civilians, stole property and inflicted violence on many people.

¹⁴³⁸ AFP 30 April 1992.

¹⁴³⁹ BBC, 2 May 1992, transcribing SLBS, 30 April 1992.

¹⁴⁴⁰ BBC, 30 April 1992.

¹⁴⁴¹ AFP, 5 May 1992.



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SLA forces attacked the Waterloo Oil Palm Plantation and other farms in the Waterloo and Koya RDs, taking agricultural machinery, household furniture and other high value items.

During 1992, the SLA arrested an unknown number of people in Lumpa, near Waterloo Town. On a beach near Sussex village, along the peninsular road, the then Inspector General of Police and up to 12 other people were summarily executed on the suspicion of plotting a coup. It is alleged that their bodies were buried in a mass grave in that location.

During 1992, the NPRC declared that the last Saturday of every month would be National Cleaning Day. Between 06.00 and 10.00 only those on official business were excused the task of cleaning their compounds, residences and commercial properties.¹⁴⁴² A variety of punishments were meted out to civilians who did not adhere to these rules. Civilians were beaten with belts, made to roll around on the floor, thrown into the gutter effluent and forced to quick-march 500 metres carrying a heavy rock on their heads. A common SLA punishment was termed Frog Jump, or “pumping”. Civilians were made to perform squat jumps, crossing their arms one over the other and holding their earlobes between thumb and forefinger. This exhausting punishment could last for hours. Another gruelling SLA punishment was “making civilians fly”; civilians were forced to lie down on their backs with their legs held straight into the air, their arms outstretched across the ground.

Shortly after the coup, the SLA mounted five military checkpoints along a 15km stretch of the peninsula road running from Tombo to Waterloo Town (both Waterloo RD). SLA forces operating checkpoints continued to extort money from travellers.

In late December 1992, a special military tribunal created by the NPRC condemned to death an unknown number of people for their alleged involvement in a coup attempt in November 1992. The British Government condemned the executions¹⁴⁴³ and briefly suspended all economic aid to Sierra Leone.¹⁴⁴⁴ Between 9 and 16 January 1993, the NPRC declared a week of national repentance and prayers for those who had been executed.¹⁴⁴⁵

On 18 March, NPRC security agencies arrested 7 civilians and 4 UK expatriates accused of plotting a coup. On 8 April, concerned with rumours of RUF movement towards the Western Area and a growing smuggling network, the NPRC banned movement of heavy vehicles on public roads between 19.30 and 07.00 every night. In Freetown, the ban stretched from 22.00 until dawn.

The Western Area was mostly quiet for the remainder of 1993 and throughout 1994.

¹⁴⁴² Cleaning Saturday is still observed in Freetown to date.

¹⁴⁴³ AFP, 4 January 1993

¹⁴⁴⁴ AFP, 5 January 1993

¹⁴⁴⁵ Interpress, 7 January 1993



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c) Events in 1995

In January 1995, the NPRC contracted Ghurka Security Guards,¹⁴⁶ a private military company, to run a training program for the SLA and provide security at Camp Charlie, a key SLA base near Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).

In March 1995, the RUF extended their reach further west, with RUF movement through Moyamba District towards the towns of Songo and Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) putting pressure on the Western Area. In late April, RUF forces targeted locations on the high quality, asphalt highway leading through Waterloo (Waterloo RD) to Freetown. RUF forces gained a foothold in the bush areas of the southern half of Koya RD and managed to create a frontline spanning Joe Town (Koya RD) to Pa-Loko (Waterloo RD). This had the effect of temporarily cutting off the main highway, or at least making it too dangerous for civilian traffic. Nevertheless, RUF forces were unable to penetrate or bypass Waterloo. RUF attacks on locations on the unsealed, southern route around the Peninsula to Freetown were also unsuccessful.

In February 1995, representatives of the NPRC Government held a meeting at the Waterloo Community Centre, requesting that the local community provide auxiliary support to the SLA in preventing the infiltration of RUF forces into the Western Area. Guinean forces moved from Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Bassa Town (Waterloo RD), less than a kilometre from Waterloo Town (Waterloo RD), establishing checkpoints and numerous mortar positions facing towards Newton (Koya RD). The Bassa Town Primary School was used as an ammunitions dump for the Guinean contingent. SLA forces armed with light weapons were based at nearby Lumpa (Waterloo RD), in addition to a heavily armed SLA Tiger Unit in the grounds of the Peninsular Secondary School in Waterloo. To prevent the RUF moving from Pa-Loko through Cole Town into Waterloo, SLA forces were also deployed at the Prince Alfred Road Bridge.

Between 21 and 30 March 1995, the SLA established checkpoints along the north-south Newton-Fogbo road at Newton-Fogbo Junction, Magbathi and Bath-Comp (all in Koya RD, on the border with Port Loko and Moyamba Districts). Fogbo (Koya RD) is near the mouth of the River Ribbi and is a trading centre for fish and salt. It is also a transit point for inland traffic along the river and to points further along Sierra Leone's coast, with a large wharf to handle the inland river traffic. Before 10 April, an unknown number of heavily armed SLA forces deployed on foot to Fogbo Wharf, escorted by a military helicopter. The SLA forces were equipped with a mobile anti-aircraft gun and numerous RPGs. They established a command point in the house of the then Town Chief and confiscated village livestock to use as food.

Newton is an agricultural centre on flat, fertile land between Songo (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD). The SLA forces stationed at Newton-Fogbo Junction patrolled the area between Newton (Koya RD) and Songo, mainly on a circular route running anti-

¹⁴⁶ For background information see Cillers, J & Mason, P (eds), *Peace, Profit and Plunder: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies*, pp 129-33: <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Books/PeaceProfitPlunder/Chap7.pdf> [Link alive: 7 January 2004].



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clockwise from Newton, through Makoibundo, Mabange, Garahun, Kwama¹⁴⁴⁷ and Mile 6 (all Koya RD).

Between 8 and 11 April, RUF forces attacked villages in a triangular area sketched out by Songo to the east, Waterloo to the west and Fogbo to the south, establishing a base at Mashewureh (Koya RD), about 2 km north-west of Fogbo. There, they captured fleeing civilians, raped women and destroyed houses. RUF forces attacked and captured a number of villages adjacent to Songo, including Mokobech, Maferkalay and Mathonteh (all Koya RD). RUF forces attacked the village of Kwama to the north of the main Masiaka-Waterloo highway, killing 7 civilians and burning down an unknown number of houses. Shortly after this attack, SLA forces engaged a 58-strong RUF group on the main highway at Brima Junction (Koya RD).

RUF forces attacked Newton (Koya RD) on 9 April, moving from the villages of Ragberfi and Magbafti to the south and Makoibundu and Garahun to the east, but were repelled by SLA forces stationed in Newton. On 11 April, RUF forces attacked Fogbo, where they raped a young mother, abducted an unknown number of civilians and stole civilians' livestock. The SLA forces deployed at Fogbo offered limited resistance; the RUF established a base and operated out from Fogbo and nearby Mashewureh.

Between 15 April and 20 April 1995, RUF forces advanced on Waterloo (Waterloo RD), moving through Nyamba Town¹⁴⁴⁸ and Joe Town (both Koya RD). They advanced to Pa-Loko, 10 km north of Waterloo, and to the Banga Farm palm oil plantation halfway between Newton and Waterloo. Between 21 and 22 April, RUF forces at Banga Farm came under heavy air attack from an Alfa Jet,¹⁴⁴⁹ which killed an unknown number of RUF members and civilians. On 21 April, RUF forces attacked Lumpa with RPG and AK-47s, but retreated to Pa-Loko following heavy mortar and other artillery fire by Guinean forces. During the RUF attack on Lumpa, civilians fleeing from Lumpa, Waterloo and surrounding areas were stopped by Nigerian forces operating a checkpoint at Rokel, about 4 km north-west of Waterloo on the main highway. At the checkpoint, Nigerian troops beat an unknown number of people with sticks and gun butts; saying "Let your brothers kill you", they turned the people back towards the Waterloo area, which was then under attack.

Over the weekend of 29-30 April, combined SLA and Guinean forces engaged the RUF in Pa-Loko and Joe Town, forcing their retreat by 3 May;¹⁴⁵⁰ shortly after, the corpses of RUF members could be seen floating in the Waterloo Creek. Between 3 and 7 May 1995, the NPRC Government contracted a South African based private military company called Executive Outcomes to replace the Ghurka Security Service.

In addition, around 600 demobilised Liberian militia, formerly from ULIMO-K, were concentrated in the area around Allen Town (Greater Freetown, Western Area), on the outskirts for Freetown's

¹⁴⁴⁷ Also spelled Quama.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Also called Yamba Town.

¹⁴⁴⁹ It is unclear whether the Alfa Jet was SLA or Nigerian.

¹⁴⁵⁰ AFP, 1 May 1995, 3 May 1995.



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East end.¹⁴⁵¹ RUF forces retreating from Pa-Loko moved towards Newton, ambushing civilian traffic on the Waterloo-Newton stretch of highway. A joint Executive Outcomes and ULIMO-K “Special Task Force” cleared this road of RUF activity.¹⁴⁵²

Nigerian forces were stationed at Madina, along the peninsula road between Waterloo and Tombo (both Waterloo RD). On or around 2 May, an unknown number of RUF forces attacked Kerry Town (Waterloo RD), a village on the peninsula road. Civilians fled 2 km northwards from Kerry Town to Macdonald (Waterloo RD). Although no direct contact was made between SLA-aligned forces and the RUF, Guinean and SLA forces bombarded the area.¹⁴⁵³

The beach village of Tombo, which had a large wharf, had increased in significance as a trading and passenger transit point following the RUF attacks on Waterloo and the main inland highway as well as the strengthened RUF control of Fogbo jetty and the northern chiefdoms of Moyamba District. At this time, the SLA and SSD were seeking out suspected RUF members and collaborators with increasing vigour, often beating and killing those they found. After 2 May, residents of Kerry Town captured a suspected RUF member and took him to the SLA base at nearby Tombo. Following interrogation by the SLA commanding officer, SLA forces took the man onto the beach, shot him and cut off his head and genitals. Residents of Tombo and SLA members danced the severed head around the village. After failing to set fire to the corpse using petrol, two members of the SLA tied weights to it and dumped it out at sea. Also after 2 May, unknown perpetrators captured and killed two suspected members of the RUF by placing burning car tyres around their necks.

On 15 December in Tombo, an SSD Sergeant shot dead two teenage boys and severely injured one other. The boys were on a boat, the pilot of which had refused to pay the Le500 levied on all boats entering or exiting the wharf.

d) Events in 1996

In early January, Strasser accepted offers from both the Organisation of African Unity and the Government of Burkina Faso to mediate between the NPRC and the RUF. Soon after, Julius Maada-Bio, the then Deputy Head of State, overthrew Strasser, claiming that he was planning to cancel the elections planned for 26 February 1996. Maada-Bio continued a policy of dialogue with the RUF. A nighttime curfew was imposed in Freetown from 16 to 23 January. On 24 January, the NPRC and the RUF announced a ceasefire, which was quickly followed by a 2,000-strong civilian peace march through Freetown.¹⁴⁵⁴

Doubts about the durability of the NPRC-RUF ceasefire, concerns about voter registration and whether the National Electoral Commission would be sufficiently well-resourced prompted calls for the postponement of the Presidential and Parliamentary elections scheduled for 26-28 February. Nevertheless, on 9 February, 5,000 protestors marched through Freetown in support of non-

¹⁴⁵¹ AP Worldstream, 11 May 1995.

¹⁴⁵² It is not clear whether Executive Outcomes participated directly in hostilities.

¹⁴⁵³ Event reported by AFP, 2 May 1995

¹⁴⁵⁴ Xinhua, 24 and 26 January 1996.



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postponement. A day later, grenades were thrown into the house of the Electoral Commission Chief, who was an advocate for non-postponement.

The Electoral Commission organised a national consultative conference at Freetown's Bintumani Conference Centre on the theme "Peace Before Elections or Elections Before Peace?". On 12 February, the majority of delegates participating in the conference voted in favour of non-postponement, while all 14 delegates from the RUF voted for postponement. On the same day, 43 Paramount Chiefs from the Northern Province adopted an 8-point declaration also supporting postponement pending substantive peace talks between the NPRC and the RUF. The SLA were generally in support of "Peace Before Elections" while the majority of the civilian population supported "Elections Before Peace."

Between 23 and 25 February, NPRC and RUF delegations commenced peace talks in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, chaired by the Ivory Coast's Foreign Minister. The talks were adjourned in the late hours of 25 February, the eve of elections, with RUF delegates still calling for their postponement.

Polling in the elections began at 07.00 on 26 February. A curfew was imposed overnight into the second day of polling. Shortly before the polling centres closed, at around 19.00, machine gun fire was reported on Pademba Road and at the Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown. News sources report that a 40-strong military unit dressed in blue uniforms assaulted the home of Maada Bio using RPGs and heavy machine guns.¹⁴⁵⁵ A polling station supervisor was shot dead while returning to his home. Also on 26 February, the National Reconciliation Commission was inaugurated. Polling continued on 27 February. The results of the Presidential election were inconclusive and a run-off election was planned for 15 March, despite RUF declarations on 1 March in Abidjan that they would not accept the results.

During and after the elections at Wilberforce Barracks and other military barracks, people's thumbs were held out by SLA forces and beaten because they voted. Heavy gunfire broke out near Kabasa Lodge to discourage the voting and have it cancelled, which was unsuccessful. The run-off election on 17 March, in which Alhaji Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected President of the Republic of Sierra Leone,¹⁴⁵⁶ saw the cutting off of thumbs, marking the first amputations in the Western Area.

Meanwhile, Nigerian forces established a checkpoint at Jui Junction (Waterloo RD) in March 1996, since their commander was residing at the SSD quarters in the Jui SSD Barracks. At the same time, SLA forces established checkpoints between Waterloo and Freetown. Guinean forces established a base between Lumpa and Waterloo as a back up for SLA checkpoints mounted around that area. As in other places, both Nigerian ECOMOG and SLA forces harassed people passing through these checkpoints, inflicting punishment where people were unable to produce identity cards. Punishments included forcing civilians to clean up the checkpoint area and beating them with wooden sticks.

¹⁴⁵⁵ AFP, 28 January 1996.

¹⁴⁵⁶ President Kabbah was sworn in on 29 March 1996.



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Peace talks continued in Abidjan. On 23 April, President Kabbah met with the RUF leader, continuing the peace negotiations commenced by the NPRC in late February 1996. Three joint working groups were established to draft the text of a peace agreement, hammer out details for encampment and disarmament and to work out the demobilisation process. On 15 May, talks yielded agreement on a ceasefire although by 19 May, the RUF leader was already calling for fresh elections during a visit to the Republic of Guinea. News reports indicate that removal from Sierra Leone of the South African private military company, Executive Outcomes,¹⁴⁵⁷ was an RUF precondition for a peace agreement.¹⁴⁵⁸

On 3 July, around 20 senior SLA officers from the disbanded NPRC regime were removed from their positions in the SLA. On 10 July, the Sierra Leone Parliament re-activated portions of the Constitution that had been suspended by the NPRC in 1992. On 9 September, Government security agencies uncovered a coup plot against the SLPP government and arrested at least six SLA soldiers.

The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF leadership signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996. This provided for the immediate and total cessation of hostilities and the creation of a Committee for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP). Demobilisation of RUF and other militia would commence upon the identification of suitable sites and SLA units not required for the maintenance of general security would be returned to barracks. The CCP would examine options for restructuring the SLA and the SLP would be strengthened to ensure realistic police primacy. An international, neutral monitoring group would be deployed in the country and Executive Outcomes would withdraw within five weeks of the arrival of that group. By 30 May 1997, all other foreign troops would be removed from the country, consistent with the treaty obligations of Sierra Leone. The RUF would become a legitimate political movement and a blanket amnesty was granted to all RUF members in respect of actions taken in pursuance of the objectives of the RUF up until 30 November 1996. Provision was made to guarantee the civil rights of the RUF and for the creation of an independent National Commission on Human Rights to monitor and investigate alleged abuses.¹⁴⁵⁹

e) Events in 1997

On 1 January, the Government commissioned into service a gunboat donated by the Chinese Government to combat poaching in Sierra Leone's territorial waters. The boat was able to carry around 200 security personnel and had been donated as part of a \$20 million aid package agreed to by China in 1995.¹⁴⁶⁰ On 6 January, six SLA soldiers were sentenced to 10 years in jail for piracy,

¹⁴⁵⁷ The NPRC had contracted Executive Outcomes on or around 7 May 1995 following the extension of RUF military operations into the Western Area.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Before 11 September, Executive Outcomes was reportedly contracted by Sierra Leone Ore and Mining Co (Sieromco) to secure bauxite mined in Moyamba: Africa Energy & Mining, 11 September 1996. The removal of Executive Outcomes from the country became a specific term of the Abidjan Peace Accord, signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF on 30 November 1996.

¹⁴⁵⁹ For the full text of the Abidjan Peace Accords, see http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_10301996.html.

¹⁴⁶⁰ AFP, 2 January 1997 and Xinhua 1 January 1997.



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having raided a Spanish fishing vessel in 1996, attempting to abscond with \$200,000 of fishing equipment.¹⁴⁶¹

On 30 January, Executive Outcomes completed a withdrawal that began with the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord, removing around 300 personnel and heavy weaponry from Sierra Leone.¹⁴⁶² Around a month later, Sierra Leone and Nigeria signed a new Status of Forces Agreement, redefining the legal status of Nigeria's forces in Sierra Leone and expanding Nigeria's training role from solely the SLA to other parts of the Sierra Leone armed forces.

In mid-March, there was a leadership struggle within the RUF, sparked by the arrest of the RUF leader in Nigeria on firearms charges. On 11 March, the Government of Nigeria confirmed the presence of the RUF leader in Nigeria, although they denied that he was under house arrest.¹⁴⁶³ They reversed this position a few days later, admitting that they had arrested him for the illegal possession of a firearm and detained him in a federal government guesthouse in Lagos.¹⁴⁶⁴ Spokespersons for the RUF leader insisted variously that he was in Nigeria on private business and also that he was discussing the Sierra Leone peace process with the Nigerian Government.¹⁴⁶⁵ Some days later, a senior RUF member declared himself to be the new interim leader, which was soon followed by the RUF taking into custody a number of its senior membership and the Sierra Leone Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea on 31 March¹⁴⁶⁶ and the issuance of a public statement that the RUF leadership had not been changed in any way.¹⁴⁶⁷

On 7 April, 130 troops from Burkina Faso joined ECOMOG in Liberia. On 17 April, the UK agreed to train two battalions of SLA soldiers.¹⁴⁶⁸ On 28 April, it was announced that all civil militia groups in Sierra Leone were to be put under the command of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force, reportedly to make them more effective and to facilitate their rapid demobilisation.¹⁴⁶⁹

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a coup d'etat and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC released over 700 inmates from Pademba Road Prison, including their leader, who was formally sworn in as Head of State on 17 June 1997.¹⁴⁷⁰ The AFRC immediately suspended the Constitution of Sierra Leone. President Kabbah escaped to the Republic of Guinea by helicopter.

The AFRC moved quickly to draw close to its popular personalities, political and civil society groups and organised labour groups. However, this failed to stave off a month-long strike staged by the Sierra Leone Labour Congress. Additionally, 50 members of the 80-seat Parliament met despite the

¹⁴⁶¹ AFP, 6 January 1997.
¹⁴⁶² AFP, 4 February 1997.
¹⁴⁶³ Xinhua, 11 March 1997.
¹⁴⁶⁴ He was later transferred to the Sheraton in Abuja.
¹⁴⁶⁵ AFP, 18 March 1997.
¹⁴⁶⁶ Including RUF delegates to the CCP, see AFP, 31 March 1997.
¹⁴⁶⁷ AFP, 31 March 1997.
¹⁴⁶⁸ APF, 17 April 1997.
¹⁴⁶⁹ AFP, 28 April 1997.
¹⁴⁷⁰ Xinhua, 17 June 1997,



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suspension of Parliament, condemning the AFRC's action and demanded the immediate restoration of democratic order.

Immediately after the coup, the AFRC invited the RUF to share power. On 28 May, the RUF leader appeared on SLBS Radio, encouraging RUF solidarity with the AFRC. Part of his statement is worth quoting: "You will always get instructions from me through [the AFRC leader]. They are our brothers. Let no one fool you. You have to work with them to put the situation under control, especially in the western area. As you [sic] the field commander, instruct your other Commander ... to stand by for any reinforcement needed by [the AFRC leader] for any eventualities. We have to defend our sovereignty. You are to act on these orders immediately."¹⁴⁷¹ On 30 May, the RUF declared their support for the AFRC on SLBS television and radio and on 1 June, the AFRC declared the RUF leader to be the Vice President of Sierra Leone.

In anticipation of a Nigerian led military intervention, the AFRC was quick to secure strategic locations around Freetown. This included Hastings, which was adjacent to the pre-coup Nigerian base at Kossoh Town¹⁴⁷² and near an airfield. Accordingly, around 200 AFRC members entered Hastings and took over the Hastings Police Station on 26 May 1997. In the wake of the coup, there was a large build up of predominantly RUF forces in the Hastings area. Hastings, Waterloo and the SLA's Benguema Training Centre were concentration points for RUF combatants entering the Western Area. RUF forces entering the Western Area camped in public building in Waterloo (Waterloo RD), because the town residents refused to lodge them. In Waterloo, RUF forces occupied the Commercial Secondary School, the REC Secondary School and the SDA Primary School.

On 29 May, a further 500 RUF members arrived in Hastings, bringing the total to around 2,000, taking over the expansive Police Training School complex and the Kelly's Rural Vocational and Agricultural Secondary School. That same day, the leadership of this RUF group met with the Hastings village authorities and complained that they had not offered the RUF/AFRC their support. On 30 May, RUF forces set up five large checkpoints throughout Hastings, each operated by around 20 people. Civilians trying to leave the settlement had to pass through each checkpoint, where they were searched for food. The RUF forces also conducted house-to-house searches confiscating prepared foods from civilians and held an unknown number of civilians at the Police Training School, forcing them to collect wood and fresh water for the RUF commanders.

There were a number of random shootings and extensive looting in the Freetown metropolitan area around this time. For example, a large number of armed robberies were committed in Freetown on 25 May. The National Treasury building was completely gutted, most foreign exchange bureaus were looted and the Central Bank was damaged by fire as AFRC forces unsuccessfully sought access to the vaults. As the armed men roamed the city, attacking and looting residences, many people were raped and otherwise assaulted, including girls under the age of 14 and the wives and daughters of foreigners. The son of a prominent businessman was killed when he refused or was unable to meet

¹⁴⁷¹ BBC Media Monitoring, 30 May 1997 transcribing SLBS, 28 May 1997.

¹⁴⁷² Nigerian forces, and then ECOMOG, were based at Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD) from 1994 until 1999.



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the demands from armed men for money. At an AFRC press conference on 28 May 1997, this was explained as an accidental shooting.

The AFRC took a number of largely inadequate steps to contain the widespread looting of civilian and government premises. These including creating an anti-looting squad with orders to shoot looters dead on sight and ordering the return to base of all SLA members who did not have proper deployment orders. On 9 June, the AFRC gathered property they had recovered at the Cockerill Defence HQ and invited civilians to search through it for their belongings.¹⁴⁷³

On 25 May, AFRC forces looted tourist locations in the coastal York Rural District along the coastal, peninsula road. AFRC members from the SLA Juba Barracks in west Freetown and the SLA Engineering Mechanical and Electrical Battalion near the Guma Reservoir arrived in Sussex village and looted the Florence Diving Centre and Hotel. AFRC forces also confiscated boats from civilians at the Goderich fishing village and used them to transport looted fridges, TVs, fans and furniture from the Africana Hotel Complex at Tokeh Beach back to Freetown. The RUF would later lodge at Tokeh and Mama beaches, stealing fishing hauls and other food items from civilians. On 27 May 1997, RUF forces also entered villages in the Mountain RD, establishing checkpoints in Regent and Bathurst. On 29 May, RUF forces mounted a checkpoint at St Michael's lodge near Lakka Beach, extorting money and food items from passers-by.

The period immediately after the coup is also marked by a large military build-up of foreign forces within Sierra Leone, including Nigerian, Guinean and Ghanaian forces. A small Ghanaian contingent stationed in Monrovia entered Sierra Leone to evacuate Ghanaian nationals, referred to as "Operation Ogyefo". On 27 May, two boatloads of Nigerian forces arrived in Freetown also from Monrovia, reinforcing the Nigerian base at Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD). Additional troops were airlifted to Freetown from James Spriggs Payne Airbase, just outside Monrovia, Liberia.¹⁴⁷⁴ This build-up placed huge pressure on the AFRC, resulting in intense diplomatic activity to prevent further escalation.

The armoured vehicles attached to the Nigerian Army 2nd Mechanised Battalion had been loaded onto the NSS Ambe and previously shipped to Liberia.¹⁴⁷⁵ On 1 June, orders were given to the 2nd Mechanised Battalion and 231 Tank Battalion to perform two simultaneous actions in Freetown. The first was to move from Kossoh (in Waterloo Town, Waterloo RD) and take control of Hastings Airfield and the nearby Police College (Waterloo RD). The second was to capture the Kissy Port Terminal in east Freetown, which would allow the NSS Ambe to dock and offload the armour and supplies required by the Nigerians. The codename for operation would be "Sandstorm." However, the AFRC intercepted the transmission of the operational orders, giving them ample prior warning of the Nigerian plans.

¹⁴⁷³ AFP, 9 June 1997.

¹⁴⁷⁴ AFP, 28 May 1997

¹⁴⁷⁵ This account of the Nigerian assaults on Freetown on 2 June 1997 owes much to Brig. Gen. R.A. Adeshina.



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On 2 June, at 05.30, two ships¹⁴⁷⁶ anchored out at the Cape commenced mortaring the SLA Defence HQ at Cockerill in west Freetown. AFRC spokespersons were quick to dismiss this as a training exercise, but later announced that the Nigerian naval bombardment had caused between 40 and 100 deaths. However, the family of one person claimed by the AFRC to be a victim of the bombardment later revealed that he had in fact been ambushed and killed by unidentified armed men in another part of the city. His Peugeot car was stolen, his body dumped at the central mortuary and he was recorded as one of the victims of the day's fighting. Nigerian forces set up a command post at the Mammy Yoko hotel in Aberdeen,¹⁴⁷⁷ while US marines evacuated some 200 expatriates to the USS Kearsage,¹⁴⁷⁸ stationed in waters off Freetown.

Nigerian forces stationed at Mammy Yoko were isolated, overpowered and captured by the AFRC after running out of ammunition. On 4 June the AFRC released 300 Nigerian prisoners of war, after reportedly threatening to use them as human shields¹⁴⁷⁹ at the SLA Cockerill Defence HQ and Wilberforce in Freetown.¹⁴⁸⁰ RUF/AFRC forces were lodged in the Mammy Yoko complex until the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in February 1998.

Meanwhile on 2 June, the Nigerian group moving towards Hastings (Waterloo RD) met with strong resistance from RUF/AFRC forces, who set up a defensive position at the Orogun Bridge and shelled Nigerian forces along their line of advance from Kossoh Town. With no mechanical support to clear debris dumped on the bridge by the AFRC, the Nigerian advance was delayed. Eventually, Nigerian forces moved further towards Hastings, arriving at Allen Town. RUF/AFRC forces had taken positions in the surrounding hills and continued shelling. Without significant heavy weapons support and with ammunition supplies depleted, the Nigerians were unable to advance further. Nevertheless, it is probable that Nigerian advance units were briefly in possession of Hastings Airfield and with limited artillery support were able to damage RUF positions at the Police Training School and in the village itself. RUF casualties were evacuated to Benguema Training Centre.

In the evening of 2 June, the Nigerian advance was called off following successful negotiations between the AFRC, the ICRC and foreign governments. Nigerian forces retreated from Hastings Airfield and Allen Town, returning to their base at Kossoh Town. Nigerian forces continued to use Hastings Airfield to obtain supplies of medical provisions and food until 9 June, when the RUF took over the airfield completely. Between 3 and 9 June, Nigerian forces took full control of Lungi International Airport,¹⁴⁸¹ although skirmishes with the RUF/AFRC continued throughout 1997. On

¹⁴⁷⁶ The NNS Ambe and NNS Ekun, joined on or around June 11 by NNS Aradu and NNS Ekpe: Xinhua, 11 June 1997.

¹⁴⁷⁷ The seaside location of Freetown's main hotels. Mammy Yoko would later become the Freetown Headquarters of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

¹⁴⁷⁸ Marines on the USS Kearsage evacuated over 1,200 expatriates between 25 May and 2 June 1997 both from Aberdeen and a collection point on a beach to the south of Freetown. See US Defence Department Briefing, 3 June 1997.

¹⁴⁷⁹ AFP, 3 June 1997 reports: "Sierra Leonean state radio repeatedly broadcast reports of 300 Nigerian soldiers being held as 'lucrative targets which would be targets for any possible Nigerian bombardment' of the city."

¹⁴⁸⁰ AFP, 3-4 June 1997.

¹⁴⁸¹ AFP, 9 June 1997.



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21 June, Ghanaian-led mediation between Nigeria and the RUF/AFRC led to the withdrawal of the four Nigerian warships from Sierra Leonean waters.¹⁴⁸²

Throughout June 1997, RUF/AFRC forces began targeting students and prominent people in Freetown, including journalists, lawyers, human rights activists and others for their perceived lack of support for the RUF/AFRC coup. For example, RUF/AFRC forces beat up a prominent journalist when he told another journalist that he did not support the coup, as a result of which he went into hiding. Two students were arrested and tortured for failing to support the coup. One was held for over two months without charge, while the other was cut with a razor blade for possessing a National Union of Sierra Leone Students (NUSS) card. NUSS issued a statement condemning the coup and called for the reinstatement of the elected government. Another journalist was severely beaten by armed soldiers who accused him of hiding a government minister in his house. This journalist later fled the country after receiving death threats.

Also in June, AFRC officials arrested 15 people – seven civilians and eight senior SLA officers – on allegations that they were involved in a coup plot to reverse the coup. The detainees were ill-treated in custody and held for over six weeks without charge. The same month, the AFRC anti-looting squad caught two civilians who were alleged to have broken the curfew, cut off their genitals and limbs and left their torsos on the road as a warning to others.

July 1997 was marked by similar events. In addition, this was the month when the pro-democracy pirate radio station FM 98.1 came to the air, beginning broadcasting on 7 July 1997 from locations in the Republic of Guinea and possibly from within the Nigerian base at Lungi International Airport.¹⁴⁸³ Seven media workers and visitors were arrested at offices of a Freetown newspaper on the suspicion of being connected to the clandestine station. A woman at the office, who was seven months pregnant at the time, was physically and possibly also sexually abused by her captors; she died three weeks later from a miscarriage and massive bleeding. The other detainees were released after over a week in prison. In addition, RUF/AFRC forces shot a 22-year-old woman when she defended her right to listen to the radio station, which often broadcast anti-AFRC statements and speeches from the exiled President.

The advent of Radio Democracy (FM 98.1) also saw increased attacks on journalists in general. Journalists accused of writing subversive stories were arrested, as were vendors who sold the offending editions. Many journalists were arrested, including one who was arrested and detained for several days, accused of sending messages to the Sierra Leonean President in Guinea, while others fled the country. At the time, the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) issued a statement protesting against the arbitrary arrest and detention of journalists as four media workers were held for activities deemed subversive by the AFRC.

People were also killed during this period for other reasons, including for the purposes of taking their property. For example, a civilian was killed in Freetown when a member of the AFRC

¹⁴⁸² AFP, 21 June 1997.

¹⁴⁸³ On 18 May 1998, UK Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, announced that the Foreign Office had provided £60,000 to support the clandestine radio station. BBC, 20 May 1998.



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demanded he hand over an army belt that he was wearing. The RUF/AFRC forces killed another man when he told them that he had the right to move freely at night since there was no curfew in place. In addition, a trader was shot and killed near Kline Town on 6 July 1997 when a member of the RUF/AFRC opened fire at a person he was arguing with and missed. Youth in the area left the body in the road so that the AFRC Chairman could see for himself the work of "his boys".

In the Wellington area of Freetown, a businessman was robbed of thousands of dollars when armed men in uniform ransacked his home. He was then forced to watch as the RUF/AFRC forces raped his wife. In addition, a Ports Authority worker was arrested on 10 July 1997 on suspicion of being a supporter of the ousted government and was held for over four months at Pademba Road prison.

In the early evening of 12 July 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Nigerian positions at Kossoh Town, but were overpowered and repelled by heavy gun and mortar blasts coupled with air support from an Alfa Jet. As a result of this attack, more civilians fled to the hilltop over looking Hastings and Kossoh Town. Around 450 houses were looted and partially destroyed by the contingent of the RUF based at Hastings village. Over 10,000 residents fled Hastings and sought refuge at nearby ECOMOG bases at Jui and Kossoh Town. Around Kossoh Town, ECOMOG expanded the territory under their control both to extend protection to these civilians and to block the main highway out of Freetown. Although most intense on 12 and 13 July 1997, skirmishes continued between ECOMOG and RUF/AFRC forces until 17 July 1997. ECOMOG's Kossoh Town and Jui positions were attacked again in August 1997. RUF forces moved from the Benguema Training Centre and attacked Jui, while others moved from Regent and attacked the ECOMOG base at Kossoh Town; both attacks were successfully repelled.

Between 17 and 18 July, a delegation representing the AFRC launched negotiations with the ECOWAS Committee of Five in Abidjan, resulting in a ceasefire. A second round of talks was held across 29-30 July 1997, after which the AFRC leader announced over SLBS that there would be a return to civilian rule in not less than four years.

The National Union of Sierra Leonean Students (NUSS) organised a pro-democracy demonstration on 18 August 1997. This met with an immediate and brutal response from the AFRC. Over 110 people, including 65 students, were arrested and detained for 12 days after the demonstration. Many of the detainees were seriously wounded with bayonets and cutlasses by the RUF/AFRC forces. In one case, the injuries were so serious that the prisons officials refused to accept the detainee for fear he might die. At least six female students were abducted and sexually abused by AFRC forces. One student was held captive for over a week and forced to go naked for the first two days of her captivity. In addition, the Secretary General of the Sierra Leone Teachers Union (SLTU) was arrested and beaten up, because striking teachers declared solidarity with the pro-democracy cause.

A Freetown lawyer and human rights activist was detained by the RUF/AFRC forces, beaten, tortured and forced to make a statement on the government radio, calling on students to go home. He was held incommunicado for over two weeks. A prominent female leader was also arrested a few days after the demonstration. She fled the country following her release from detention. RUF/AFRC forces captured a teacher who had participated in the 18 August demonstration at the



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ECOMOG camp at Jui when she strayed on the main road. She was sexually assaulted by at least eight soldiers on the first day of her captivity then held at the Benguema Training Centre for over a week, during which she was repeatedly raped.

AFRC forces killed at least six peaceful demonstrators. Two of them were students, one of whom was shot. After he died, AFRC forces mutilated and ate his body in what was described as “ritual cannibalism”, according to which RUF/AFRC forces allegedly believed that eating human flesh would give them “more courage”.

Following the suppression of the demonstration, hostile activity against the press in particular was stepped up. Journalists who attempted to demonstrate were injured and detained at Cockerill Military headquarters. Two journalists required stitches after they were cut deeply on the back and head respectively with a razor blade. The men were held in a freight container at Cockerill for over 24 hours without food, water or medical attention. One SLAJ Executive member was arrested and also held at Cockerill in a freight container for several days for alleged participation in the pro-democracy protest. Armed forces attacked another SLAJ Executive member in his house, who subsequently escaped and fled to Guinea. Arrests and detentions of so-called Kabbah supporters continued. Three people - a teacher, a trader and a student - were all held without charge at the Pademba Road prison for several days on this basis.

The AFRC banned all movement of commercial and relief food to the estimated 30,000 displaced people sheltering at the Jui ECOMOG camp. The death rate from disease and malnutrition rose from 22 in June to 35 by the end of August 1997. AFRC forces laid anti-personnel landmines around the ECOMOG base at the Hastings-Grafton (Waterloo RD) road. In August 1997, disgruntled RUF members started taking private property from civilians passing through their checkpoint at the Boys’ Society Compound in Regent (Mountain RD). They claimed that this was in lieu of the monthly salary that soldiers of the AFRC were receiving.

Calls for a trade embargo against the AFRC had been repeatedly made since June 1997. Nigerian forces had imposed a navel blockade on the Port of Freetown between 25 May and 21 June 1997, but were forced to back down by the AFRC’s diplomatic overtures concerning return to civilian rule. On or around 2 August a Ukrainian vessel, the *Kapitan Modest Ivanov*, docked at Freetown Kissy Terminal (Greater Freetown) carrying 6,800 tonnes of rice;¹⁴⁸⁴ a number of other ships carrying fuel also docked successfully in Freetown, including a Chinese vessel carrying 28,000 tones of fuel on 3 August¹⁴⁸⁵ and a Panamanian vessel on 1 and 10 August.¹⁴⁸⁶ This was unacceptable to the Nigerian Government, primarily since it took considerable pressure off the AFRC to continue immediate negotiations.

¹⁴⁸⁴ Lloyds List, 2 August 1997.

¹⁴⁸⁵ AFP, 3 August 1997.

¹⁴⁸⁶ AFP, 24 August 1997.



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However, on 29 August, at its 20th Annual Summit, ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone, effective throughout all ECOWAS member States.¹⁴⁸⁷ The ECOWAS embargo included military hardware, supplies and spare parts, petroleum and petrol-derived products. An export ban was also imposed. A travel ban was imposed on AFRC members and their families, in addition to a freeze on their assets. Moreover, ECOWAS formally expanded the mandate of ECOMOG to include the use of force to impose sanctions against Sierra Leone.¹⁴⁸⁸ Effectively, this gave legal backing to a complete navel blockade of the Port of Freetown and the prohibition of air-freight traffic. From this date, the Nigerian forces present in Sierra Leone operated under an ECOMOG banner. On the same day that these sanctions were approved, ECOMOG artillery at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom, Port Loko District) fired on two cargo ships moored outside the territorial waters of Sierra Leone as a warning not to enter. Aside from shelling incoming ships, ECOMOG forces at Lungi enforced the sanctions by shelling the Kissy Terminal and the Government Wharf in east Freetown. East Freetown is very densely populated, particularly around the port area, where there are a large number of marketplaces and slum settlements.

On 3 September, ECOMOG gunners fired across the bows of the Greek-registered *Proteus* as it entered the Port of Freetown, forcing it to anchor out at sea. This artillery barrage reportedly killed 15 people at Dove Cote market.¹⁴⁸⁹ The AFRC claimed that 50 people were killed across the eastern Freetown ward of Mabella, although there was intense scepticism about this number. Following these deaths, AFRC forces added further security to the Kissy Terminal. In the wake of the shelling, at least two Nigerian nationals resident in Freetown were killed; their corpses were mutilated and put on display along the streets of Freetown on 9 September 1997. ECOMOG Alfa Jets air raided Kissy Terminal on 7 September, reportedly destroying 10 moored vessels.¹⁴⁹⁰ The *Proteus* eventually entered the port, prompting an ECOMOG air sortie, which partially destroyed the boat. On 13 September, SLBS reported that ECOMOG Alfa Jets had bombed the oil tanker *Nornisco*, killing two members of the crew.¹⁴⁹¹ ECOMOG air activity was met with anti-aircraft gunfire from AFRC positions across Freetown.

Over 200,000 people fled the area following this escalation of hostilities between ECOMOG and the AFRC, amid warnings from ECOMOG that the bombing would continue. The bombings also led some AFRC forces deployed in the port and other strategic locations to withdraw from their positions to safer locations the hilltops, leaving behind many arms and ammunition of various types. Later in the month, ECOMOG also announced that they would be patrolling the harbour area with gunboats.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Decision on sanctions against the junta in Sierra Leone, Twentieth Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 28-29 August 1997. Source: ECOWAS

¹⁴⁸⁸ Ibid. "Article 7. The sub-regional forces shall employ all necessary means to impose the implementation of this decision. They shall monitor closely the coastal areas, land borders and airspace of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and shall inspect, guard and seize any ship, vehicle or aircraft violating the embargo imposed by this decision."

¹⁴⁸⁹ AFP, 4 September 1997.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Xinhua, 7 September 1997.

¹⁴⁹¹ BBC, 15 September 1997.



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On 8 October, the UN Security Council unanimously gave its support to the ECOWAS sanctions regime, extending its provisions to all UN member States.¹⁴⁹² Between 8 and 14 October, ECOMOG Alfa Jets destroyed a number of structures in the SLA Cockerill Defence HQ and silenced SLBS TV and radio by destroying a transmitter located on Leicester Peak, in the peninsular area of Freetown.

Around 8 October, RUF forces attacked and occupied the villages of Bathurst, Mongema and Charlotte (all Mountain RD) along the mountain road between Freetown and Kossoh Town, where ECOMOG were stationed. Civilians were forced to prepare food for the RUF forces, who established checkpoints in all three villages. A few days later, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Kossoh Town ECOMOG base from four flanks. The clandestine pro-democracy radio station, FM 98.1, announced the impending attack, giving civilians a chance to retreat to safer locations. Two ECOMOG soldiers were captured, killed and their corpses strung up on trees by the RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG forces went on the offensive in a bid to repel these forces and capture all the surrounding towns and villages, including Kossoh Town, Grafton, Jui and other nearby coastal villages. This expanded ECOMOG control over movement to and from Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces retreated east to Yams Farm (Waterloo RD). ECOMOG strengthened their position around Hastings, allowing civilians to return to the village.

AFRC actions against civil society continued throughout October. Armed AFRC members beat a university lecturer who was wrongly assumed to be a relative of the exiled President and looted his house. Another 18 men and two women were taken from a house and held in the container cell at Cockerill on suspicion of being informants for the exiled Government. AFRC forces shot a journalist when he went to investigate the AFRC-inspired burning of the Presidential residence, torturing him as he lay wounded on the ground. Another journalist was arrested and thrown in Pademba Road Prison for alleged anti-AFRC activities. His sister-in-law and her 13-year-old daughter were both raped by the AFRC forces during a raid of their residence. In addition, three journalists were arrested within 24 hours of each other, accused of subversive activities; all were beaten at time of their arrest and detained in Pademba Road Prison. No formal charges brought against them. On 15 October 1997, a newspaper editor was arrested and severely beaten by AFRC forces. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, the journalist sustained rifle butt wounds on his head, was blindfolded and taken to the notorious Sahr Sandi Army Camp¹⁴⁹³ near Regent (Mountain RD) and detained incommunicado with hard labour.

The AFRC shut down one of Sierra Leone's most popular newspapers during October, raiding their offices, arresting the editor and detaining him in Pademba Road Prison. All the newspaper's equipment and vehicles were seized. The AFRC spokesman told journalists that the paper had been banned. The intimidation and harassment of journalists continued into November 1997, during which the Committee to Protect Journalists posted a special action alert on the Internet warning that the AFRC was circulating a "wanted" list of 13 journalists and called on all to condemn the flagrant attacks on press freedom by the AFRC. Nevertheless, the editor of another well-known Freetown newspaper was arrested on 21 November, tortured and left at the SLP Criminal Investigation

¹⁴⁹² UNSC Resolution 1132 (1997).

¹⁴⁹³ Also known as "SS Camp".



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Division cells for subversive activities. Many other editors and publishers were also arrested and detained for a number of days for subversive activities. This clampdown on journalists continued until December, at which time some journalists went into hiding after receiving death threats from the AFRC.

Civilians fleeing ECOMOG shelling in Kissy and the east end were forced to use the poor quality peninsular road leading through Tombo to Waterloo. This movement resulted in a major road traffic accident at a place called Comfort Bridge near York, during which 67 people were killed. RUF/AFRC movement to the inland provinces was also limited to this route. Checkpoints and security points at major locations like Tombo and St Michaels Lodge on the route were maintained by the RUF/AFRC.

The continuous shelling of strategic locations in Freetown, the effects of the embargo and the AFRC's inability to dislodge ECOMOG from Kossoh and Jui prompted them to continue the negotiations started early in the year. ECOWAS mediators, led by the then Nigerian Foreign Minister, hammered out a peace plan. This led to a ceasefire on 21 October 1997, followed on 23 October by the signing of the Economic Community of West African States six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone (23 October 1997-22 April 1998).¹⁴⁹⁴ The central provisions of this agreement were the maintenance of a ceasefire and the return of the elected Government by 22 April 1998. Other provisions included the hammering out of nationwide demobilisation and disarmament plans across December 1997 and the return of internally displaced persons to their places of habitual residence. ECOMOG and UN observers would supervise the implementation process, effectively requiring the deployment of ECOMOG forces throughout Sierra Leone.

Throughout December, numerous of violations of the spirit and letter of the ceasefire occurred across Sierra Leone. The CDF High Command implemented "Operation Black December", during which Kamajor units in Boama Chiefdom (Bo District) cut off all the highways and roads leading to the villages, restricting the movement of RUF/AFRC forces. Kamajors from Gorama Mende (Kenema District) also took part, cutting off stretches of the Kono-Makeni highway. In Pujehun District, Kamajors engaged RUF/AFRC forces around Pujehun Town (Kpanga Kagonde Chiefdom, Pujehun District) and in areas of Gbondapi (Panga Kabone Chiefdom, Pujehun District). In Bombali District, ECOMOG jets bombed positions outside of Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District), claiming that the ARFC was constructing an asphalt runway to allow arms supplies to enter the country more freely in violation of ECOWAS and UN sanctions. RUF/AFRC forces conducted violent food-finding missions in Koinadugu District, attacking civilians and stealing from residences in the towns of Mansofenia and Kurobonla (Neya Chiefdom, Koinadugu District).

On 21 December, the exiled President flew from Conakry to the ECOMOG base at Freetown International Airport to spur on the implementation of the peace process.

f) Events in 1998

¹⁴⁹⁴ Full text available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_09231997.html.



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Despite the Conakry Accord, RUF/AFRC attacks on ECOMOG and their harassment of civilians, particularly businessmen and other high profile people, became frequent in the city and its environs. This instability in the city and the country at large provoked the February 1998 military intervention by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces.

ECOMOG began preparations for an invasion of Freetown in mid-January, reinforcing the ECOMOG field artillery and concentrating its forces at Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD), in addition to flying training sorties over selected positions in Freetown. On 5 February, operational orders were given to ECOMOG to break out of Kossoh Town and take control of Freetown. Three major movements were planned. The Nigerian 2nd Mechanised Battalion was to move along the main Freetown highway to capture Freetown. Protecting its flank, the Nigerian 5th Mechanised Battalion was to advance towards Freetown through Upper Allen Town, Calaba Town and Portee (Greater Freetown) along the old Freetown highway, which eventually joins the main Freetown highway through a series of junctions at Kissy. The Nigerian 5th Mechanised Battalion would disperse within Freetown and capture strategic governmental and security institutions. The Nigerian 231st Tank Battalion was ordered to seize Waterloo and the Benguema Training Centre (both in Waterloo RD), heading away from Freetown.¹⁴⁹⁵

Shortly before dawn on 6 February, the ECOMOG intervention began on three fronts. One front moved from Jui (Waterloo RD) towards Freetown; a second front moved from Hastings Airfield towards Waterloo. ECOMOG also opened a third front and moved from Kossoh Town through the hills to Regent (Mountain RD) and down into the Mount Aureol (Mountain RD) and Hill Station (Greater Freetown) entrances to metropolitan Freetown.

RUF/AFRC forces had blocked the road across Orogun Bridge with a large container, delaying the ECOMOG advance. ECOMOG fought several battles along the route into Freetown. At Portee Junction, a fierce battle was fought, forcing the RUF/AFRC to retreat towards the west end of Freetown and giving ECOMOG forces the upper hand to flush them out of Freetown on to the villages via the peninsular, the only safe exit from the city. There is very little detailed information about the conduct of the battle within the Freetown metropolitan area. It is clear that the RUF/AFRC put up stern resistance at the Kissy Terminal and used gunboats to fire on some ECOMOG advance units that reached the Connaught and Wharf areas of central Freetown. Eventually retreating from Kissy Terminal, RUF/AFRC forces booby-trapped and vandalised a considerable amount of the harbour machinery and equipment.¹⁴⁹⁶

The ECOMOG group moving from Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD) into Freetown along the mountain road encountered landmines between Mortema and Charlotte village (both Mountain RD). RUF/AFRC forces also placed a large cargo container filled with sand across the single carriageway road between Mangaba and Mortema village (both Mountain RD). ECOMOG forces assisted by local youths managed to dislodge this obstacle and entered Regent (Mountain RD) by midday on 6 February, securing the village. RUF forces stationed at Regent and Bathurst (both

¹⁴⁹⁵ This account of the advance plans is taken mainly from Adeshina, pp.22 ff.

¹⁴⁹⁶ The vandalism was comprehensive enough to delay the offloading of nearly 800 tons of humanitarian aid from a UN ship on 22 February 1998: AFP, 22 February 1998.



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Mountain RD) withdrew with their possessions along the route from Regent through Gloucester into Freetown. AFRC forces positioned mortars at Regent and shelled ECOMOG along the mountain road.

Between 10 and 12 February, ECOMOG forces advanced into Freetown along two routes into the town: through the Mount Aureol (Mountain RD) campus of Fourah Bay College and through Hill Station (Greater Freetown). Mount Aureol is the highest point in Freetown and overlooks the entire Kissy area and all approach roads into Freetown from Kossob Town. In addition, the road from Mount Aureol into Freetown leads directly to the civic quarter of Freetown. The Hill Station route leads directly to the SLA Wilberforce Barracks and into the west Freetown areas of Lumley and Aberdeen (Greater Freetown). Control of this road isolates the TV and radio transmitter at Leicester Peak (Mountain RD) and Freetown's second hospital.

Other auxiliary forces also fought alongside with the ECOMOG troops, namely the Organised Body of Hunters Society (OBHS) in addition to Kamajors and Gbethis from the CDF. These auxiliary troops were responsible for carrying ammunition for the ECOMOG forces and some few loyal¹⁴⁹⁷ SLA forces fighting alongside ECOMOG;¹⁴⁹⁸ they were also responsible for burying RUF/AFRC fatalities and civilians who were killed during the offensive. CDF forces advancing with ECOMOG through the Mountain RD villages of Charlotte, Bathurst and Regent were used to screen the many civilians who used bush tracks to flee the fighting on the main highway. The tactic was useful in preventing the RUF infiltration of territory only lightly occupied by ECOMOG throughout the main assault.

The ECOMOG advance westward into Freetown along the main highway left those RUF/AFRC forces stationed in Freetown only one option for retreat: east along the poor quality peninsula road. By 8 February, RUF/AFRC forces retreating along this route using hundreds of commandeered utility vans and jeeps started arriving at Tombo (Waterloo RD). RUF/AFRC forces threatened to kill every resident of Tombo (Waterloo RD) unless the owners of fishing boats gave them passage to Fogbo Jetty (Koya RD). The RUF/AFRC forces abandoned many of their vehicles at Tombo (Waterloo RD). Most were stripped down or burned, but vehicles in working order were taken to Waterloo between February and March of 1998 by the ECOMOG forces and parked in front of the Rural Education Committee School near the Post Office. A large cache of weapons abandoned by retreating RUF/AFRC forces was handed over to ECOMOG by the Tombo village (Waterloo RD) authorities. An RUF member who had failed to escape to Fogbo (Koya RD) shot dead a popular young man who had arranged the weapons collection.

The ECOMOG advance westward into Waterloo from Hastings (both Waterloo RD) along the main highway quickly dislodged the RUF/AFRC forces based at Yams Farm (Waterloo RD) and pursued them to Waterloo. These ECOMOG forces captured Waterloo without any resistance on 6 February 1998. All the villages on ECOMOG's route to Waterloo, including Lower Allen Town,

¹⁴⁹⁷ Namely, those SLA forces that did not change their allegiance to the leaders of the AFRC and instead retained allegiance to President Kabbah.

¹⁴⁹⁸ ECOMOG reported that 84 "loyal" SLA soldiers had surrendered to them in early February, but it is not clear whether ECOMOG had under its command any full units of the SLA that were unaffiliated with the AFRC.



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Rokel and Devil Hole (all Waterloo RD), were cleared of RUF/AFRC forces and lightly occupied. Residents of these villages fled towards Waterloo and onwards towards Newton (Koya RD) as ECOMOG advanced. Civil militia in Waterloo assisted ECOMOG in identifying the key locations in the town. During the shelling of Waterloo, ECOMOG levelled a two-story house.

At Waterloo, ECOMOG mounted a checkpoint at the Post Office, ordering local youths to dig trenches for them. ECOMOG forces shot a man with learning difficulties who had failed to identify himself promptly and executed a man alleged by villagers of Matanky (Waterloo RD) to be an RUF/AFRC collaborator. Throughout Waterloo and Lumpa, ECOMOG conducted house-to-house searches for RUF/AFRC members. Civilians were instructed to clear the streets and remain in their residences while ECOMOG searched for armaments.

In the afternoon of the ECOMOG capture of Waterloo, an Alpha Jet flew over the village and the camp. The ECOMOG forces then moved to Lumpa, where they established a base and a checkpoint near the Banga Farm palm oil plantation (straddling Waterloo and Koya RDs). ECOMOG forces executed a young man and maltreated an unknown number of others before advancing to Campbell Town (Waterloo RD), where they attacked the remnants of the RUF/AFRC forces, killing six. Three days after the capture of Waterloo, several unarmed SSD officers surrendered to ECOMOG at their Post Office checkpoint. Some were sent to Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD) while others remained at Waterloo.

Thousands of civilians, together with some of the RUF/AFRC forces based at the Benguema Training Centre, Waterloo, Lumpa and satellite villages moved towards the Waterloo Displaced Camp, east of Waterloo (all Waterloo RD). The RUF/AFRC forces stationed at the Benguema Training Centre offered resistance to ECOMOG until they were overrun on 9 February.¹⁴⁹⁹

Over the next few days, the RUF/AFRC forces moved from the Waterloo Displaced Camp and counter-attacked the ECOMOG troops based at Lumpa. This led to the renewed shelling of the camp by ECOMOG and a mass movement of civilians and RUF/AFRC forces towards the main highway at Newton (Koya RD), where the other RUF/AFRC forces from Fogbo Jetty (Koya RD) joined them. This group of RUF/AFRC forces subsequently moved inland to Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) along the main highway. They took with them a large number of abducted civilians, allegedly to prevent the ECOMOG Alpha Jet from bombing them on their way to Masiaka.

By 12 February, ECOMOG had control over the majority of the Freetown metropolitan area and had commenced intense "mopping-up" operations. Between 12 and 24 February a curfew was imposed throughout areas occupied by ECOMOG. They established checkpoints all over the city and in villages through the York and Mountain RDs. At locations in York RD, a civil militia was trained by ECOMOG to maintain these checkpoints and assist them in identifying suspected RUF/AFRC members and collaborators. Other militia groups were trained by ECOMOG at Hamilton and Lakka (both York RD). The OBHS, who were armed, also assisted ECOMOG forces

¹⁴⁹⁹ ECOMOG claimed they had captured Benguema Training Centre (Waterloo RD) on 9 February: AFP, 9 February 1998.



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with screening and operating checkpoints. During this period, ECOMOG forces killed a lot of civilians without any form of trial¹⁵⁰⁰ and “cordon and search” operations were conducted as a mechanism for trapping suspected RUF/AFRC members and sympathisers.

Between 16 February and 3 March, ECOMOG mounted checkpoints at Goderich, Lakka, Hamilton, Sussex, Bawbaw, Tokeh, York, Kissy Town (all York RD), Tombo, Russell and Madina (all Waterloo RD). The Nigerian 232nd Tank Battalion operated the checkpoint at Long Beach in Hamilton. ECOMOG forces based at Lakka imposed a fish tax on the villagers: every fishing day, a large basket was passed around among the fishers, into which everyone was supposed to contribute a minimum of four fish to feed the Nigerian contingent. These fish were demanded as a contribution to ECOMOG’s daily food ration, although sometimes they were sold and the ECOMOG forces kept the money.

Between Freetown and Newton (Koya RD), ECOMOG erected several checkpoints. At each of these checkpoints, ECOMOG forces intimidated civilians, took their money and beat and killed people, among other things. For example, people were killed for failing to produce an identity card or for being suspected of being a relative of any member of the AFRC, RUF or SLA forces.

While Nigerian ECOMOG forces were generally welcomed, there were many instances of apparently arbitrary punishment and cruel treatment of civilians. In March 1998, ECOMOG soldiers from the Nigerian 192nd Battalion were stationed at York village (York RD). On finding a vehicle burned-out by retreating RUF/AFRC forces, the ECOMOG platoon commander demanded that all the men of the village gather at the Hospital compound so they could identify who was responsible for the burning. The village elders were made to sit on the floor, which symbolically is extremely demeaning. The gathered men were divided into groups according to their age and interrogated by ECOMOG forces. When they failed to obtain information about the vehicle, ECOMOG forces beat the gathered men with doubled-up length of electrical cable. Starting with the Head Man and moving from eldest to youngest, ECOMOG forces hit each man at least 12 times before deciding that three young men had the information they sought. These three youths were left out in the sun for a day and then beaten with sticks.

After 2 March, ECOMOG forces began running night and day patrols between the villages of Sussex and Baw-Baw (both York RD). Local youths were trained to run patrols between Baw-Baw and Number Two River (York RD).

In early March 1998, there was also an influx of Kamajors into York RD from Kagboro Chiefdom (Moyamba District), establishing bases in and around Tokeh (York RD). Between 8 and 10 March, a Kamajor commander order a local youth group to mount a checkpoint at the Number Two River Road Junction (York RD); ECOMOG later ordered them to dismantle the checkpoint. In Tombo (Waterloo RD), Kamajors took up residence in the village, claiming to be providing security. The Kamajors took property from the houses of two suspected RUF/AFRC collaborators and ill-treated a number of residents who complained. Following requests from the village authorities, ECOMOG



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ordered the departure of all Kamajors from the Tombo area. Kamajors also deployed to provide security in Regent and Bathurst villages (Mountain RD).

On 17 February, a supervisory task force was set-up to provide joint leadership between ECOMOG and the exiled Government during the immediate post-intervention period. The task force met with representatives of key civil society groups and governmental institutions. British and Nigerian military vessels docked in water off Freetown on 1 March 1998 to provide technical assistance on a range of unspecified matters.¹⁵⁰¹ On 10 March, the President returned to Freetown, which was followed a few days later by the UN Security Council lifting the ban on fuel imports to Sierra Leone and deciding to review other sanctions provisions.¹⁵⁰² Nevertheless, the prohibition on the importation of arms remained in force.

Successful ECOMOG interventions in Bo (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District) and Kenema (Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema District) took place between 12 and 17 February, coinciding with operations in the Western Area. Following their successful offensives against RUF/AFRC forces in the Western Area and Southern Province, ECOMOG focussed on operations in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sierra Leone. In brief, between 1 March 1998 and 5 March, ECOMOG forces took control of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and locations in Koinadugu District thereafter. ECOMOG moved into Kono District, taking full control of Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) in early April 1998. ECOMOG forces had also moved as far east as Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District) by April 1998.

On 17 April, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of a 10-strong team of military and security observers to Sierra Leone, who arrived in May 1998.¹⁵⁰³ The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), comprising around 70 military observers and accompanying logistic support, was established on 13 July 1998.¹⁵⁰⁴

Immediately after the reinstatement of the President, criminal investigations into hundreds of alleged RUF/AFRC collaborators and surrendered SLA soldiers detained at the Pademba Road Prison commenced, ending in a wave of treason trials. Between 21 March and 14 April 1998, 35 civilians who were alleged members of the AFRC regime were charged in three separate trials with treason, a crime punishable by death in Sierra Leone. On 24 August, all 35 were found guilty by jury trial and the court handed down sentences of death to 16 of these 35. All appealed the death sentence and were still in prison awaiting their appeals when the RUF invaded Freetown in early January 1999; they were later pardoned as part of the Lomé Peace Agreement. On 24 July 1998, 34 members of the SLA accused of carrying out the AFRC coup faced a court martial. On 12 October, all were found guilty of treason by a military court and 24 were executed by firing squad on 19 October at

¹⁵⁰¹ AP, 1 March 1998.
¹⁵⁰² UN Security Council Resolution 1156 (1998), 15 March 1998.
¹⁵⁰³ UN Security Council Resolution 1162 (1998), 17 April 1998.
¹⁵⁰⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998), 13 July 1998.



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the SLA Juba Barracks in west Freetown.¹⁵⁰⁵ The remaining 10 had their sentences commuted to long prison terms. Some 300 SLA members under investigation for their suspected involvement with the AFRC were released from government custody on or around 3 September. A final set of treason charges were brought against 22 civilians on 14 December.

The RUF leader was repatriated to Sierra Leone from Nigeria on 25 July and charged with treason on 4 September. Despite efforts to locate counsel for him, he represented himself throughout the trial, which began on 4 October. A jury found him guilty and the court sentenced him to death on 23 October; the RUF leader appealed the sentence and remained in custody until he was pardoned as part of the Lomé Peace Agreement. In September, ECOMOG formally moved its headquarters from Monrovia, Liberia to Freetown.

On 21 December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Songo and Six-Mile (Koya RD) and, by the early afternoon, had arrived at Newton Village (Koya RD), resulting in a mass movement of civilians to Waterloo (Waterloo RD). The swell of people into Waterloo caused widespread panic-buying of food and palm wine. Later that same day, residents of Waterloo heard small arms fire coming from Banga Farm, on the main highway between Waterloo and Newton. Late that night, ECOMOG forces based at the Waterloo Post Office and Peninsular Secondary School launched several mortars towards Banga Farm, followed by an aerial bombardment by the Alpha Jet at the same location.

Heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces attacked Waterloo (Waterloo RD) before dawn on 22 December 1998. During this attack, they killed between 15 and 19 civilians, looted extensively and burnt down at least 53 houses. AFRC forces identified as being comprised predominantly of ex-SLA members marched down Calmont Road with powerful flashlights, targeting the houses of prominent people in Waterloo. A large RUF Small Boy Unit accompanied them, sprinkling petrol on doorframes and around houses. The AFRC forces ignited the petrol with gunfire, setting fire to the houses. A Guinean ECOMOG unit entered Waterloo and commenced shelling the RUF/AFRC forces from an armoured car, resulting in their onwards advance to the Benguema Training Centre (Waterloo RD). The RUF/AFRC forces captured a large cache of arms and ammunition before destroying the base's main ammunition dump. A prominent AFRC commander was killed in the explosion and buried nearby Koba, a few kilometres south of Benguema.

RUF/AFRC forces continued advancing southward along the peninsular road, moving from the Benguema Training Centre through Koba, During Town, Boyah Village and Russell (all Waterloo RD). At Russell, RUF/AFRC forces dislodged the small ECOMOG contingent stationed there. Not long after midnight on 24 December, RUF/AFRC forces entered Tombo through Worlai Village (both Waterloo RD), to the immediate east of Tombo. The day before, the village authorities of

¹⁵⁰⁵ Those sentenced to death in the court martial had submitted a complaint to the Committee on Human Rights under the procedure in the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, alleging that their right to appeal, guaranteed in article 14(5), had been violated: Communication Nos. 839/1998 & 840/1998 & 841/1998. Despite the Committee requesting a stay of execution, they were executed a week after they had lodged their complaint. The Committee subsequently found that their rights had in fact been violated, as there was no right of appeal from a court martial: *Anthony B Mansaraj et al; Mr Gborie Tamba et al; Mr Abdul Karim Sesay et al v Sierra Leone*, decision of 16 July 2001.



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Tombo had received warning of the coming RUF/AFRC attack from an SLA soldier who escaped the attack on Benguema Training Centre.

At that time, the RUF were accompanied by a large number of civilians, some carrying ammunition and other supplies and some banging drums and chanting about celebrating Ramadan in Tombo (Waterloo RD). To help identify each other in night attacks, RUF/AFRC forces stuck the transparent cellophane wrapping from popular boiled sweets called "Diamonds" over their torch lenses, giving the beams a red tint. The Nigerian ECOMOG contingent was outnumbered and immediately retreated towards Freetown along the peninsula road through Kassi to Kissy Town (Waterloo RD), together with thousands of civilians. Many civilians escaped by boats to Shenge (Kagboro Chiefdom, Moyamba District), Banana Island¹⁵⁰⁶ and villages inland along the Ribbi River, while others moved to Lakka Village (York RD). RUF/AFRC forces left Tombo, having taken the contents of many abandoned homes, and burned down at least 20 others without attempting to occupy the township.

Between 22 and 25 December 1998, Nigerian ECOMOG reinforced Waterloo. On 24 December, Hastings was reinforced by around 500 Kamajors, who immediately imposed a curfew between the hours of 18.00 and 07.00. Two days later, Kamajor members arrested two suspected RUF/AFRC collaborators, who were tied up, their heads forced into a large white plastic bowl and their throats cut; civilians were forced to bury the corpses. Kamajors also killed four other civilians at Jui Junction, near Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD), leaving a severed head on a pole at their checkpoint.

Waterloo Town was bombarded by ECOMOG on 26 December 1998, causing further civilian flight from the town. A Guinean ECOMOG contingent from Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) reinforced ECOMOG stationed at Waterloo (Waterloo RD), and set up a base at the SDA School compound, moving later to the PSS School compound. Guinean ECOMOG provided limited security around the market area of Waterloo, where traders remained at work until the RUF/AFRC raided Lumpa (Waterloo RD). Members of the Guinean ECOMOG contingent mistakenly killed eight traders who were running towards the PSS Compound to escape an RUF/AFRC ambush at Lumpa. The RUF/AFRC occupied Lumpa and other parts of Waterloo, effectively dividing the town in two. RUF/AFRC forces stole medical supplies from the Waterloo Health Centre. The RUF/AFRC stayed in Lumpa throughout January, forcing civilians to perform domestic services for them; they would not allow civilians to close their doors and performed frequent house-to-house searches for food. The RUF commanding officer in Lumpa personally executed at least three civilians, dumping the body of one victim in a pit latrine and cutting out and eating the heart of another. At this time, the RUF and AFRC forces were not lodging together.

Between 25 and 28 December, RUF/AFRC advance units continued from Tombo around the peninsula towards Freetown. The villages of Black Johnson and Big Water (both York RD), on the approach road to York, were infiltrated by small numbers of RUF/AFRC. RUF/AFRC forces exchanged heavy machine gun fire with Nigerian ECOMOG forces at the York Grass Field area of York town. ECOMOG gunners killed three members of the RUF/AFRC. Following these attacks

¹⁵⁰⁶ Also called Plantain Island.



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around the peninsula road, Nigerian ECOMOG redeployed at Tombo (Waterloo RD) in greater force. A Kamajor detachment was sent to guard the bridge at MacDonald (Waterloo RD). Nigerian ECOMOG imposed a strict security regime around the York Town area, organising local youth into groups to accompany them on a continuous day-and-night patrol routine. ECOMOG also began collecting and, in collaboration with locals, screening for RUF/AFRC infiltrators displaced by the fighting on the peninsular at locations. These screening centres included the Cotton Club and St. Michaels Lodge in Lakka and the Hamilton Community Centre (all York RD). After 6 January, villagers in Tombo burnt alive an RUF/AFRC member at the Tombo Grass Field area. An unknown number of other suspected RUF/AFRC members were killed with bladed weapons by the Tombo youth.

g) Events in 1999

Between 30 December and 5 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces staged attacks on Hastings and Kossoh Town (both Waterloo RD). Using bush tracks through the hills from Waterloo (Waterloo RD), RUF/AFRC forces staged major attacks on Hastings, Allen Town and Jui on 5 January. They encountered sporadic resistance from ECOMOG forces who, considerably reduced in number, progressively retreated towards Freetown. On 4 and 5 January, RUF/AFRC forces, hardware and vehicles were moving continuously through Newtown and Four Mile (Koya RD) towards Waterloo, gathering in the Ibo Town area (Waterloo RD).

Just after midnight on 6 January, RUF/AFRC forces began their assault on Freetown. An advance RUF/AFRC unit, numbering around 300, moved quickly to engage ECOMOG at their Kissy Roundabout security point. Meanwhile, RUF/AFRC forces in Waterloo started round the clock attacks on the Guinean ECOMOG contingent at PSS in Waterloo. On 9 January, the RUF/AFRC granted the Guineans safe passage from the town only in return for their remaining stock of ammunition.¹⁵⁰⁷ From Ibo Town, the RUF also began sending out units to Yams Farm (Waterloo RD), from where throughout the night they laid down heavy machine gun fire on ECOMOG positions at Hastings. Civilians were often used in these attacks.

The advancing RUF/AFRC forces were reinforced by thousands of others, who entered the Wellington and Calaba Town areas of eastern Freetown. On 7 January, RUF/AFRC forces occupied a petrol station near Kissy Road roundabout and started burning every solid structure in its immediate vicinity. The exact chronology of the movement of RUF/AFRC forces through east Freetown is not completely clear. One of their first successes, on either 6 or 7 January, was a raid on Pademba Road Prison, releasing many RUF/AFRC members captured by ECOMOG and pro-government forces over the previous year. Pademba Road Prison is to the west of central Freetown in Brookfields at the end of Pademba Road, which is also an access route through to the New England and Wilberforce areas of western Freetown. That RUF/AFRC forces made it to Pademba Road so quickly suggests that they had free movement through both the centre of Freetown, through the "PZ" junction and also through the Mountain Cut route from Kissy through to New England.

¹⁵⁰⁷ The Guineans actually handed the RUF/AFRC a haul of blank ammunition.



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However, the brunt of the RUF/AFRC assault was in east Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces quickly occupied the Clay Factory IDP camp in Kissy, killing at least 20 people. ECOMOG commenced shelling into the hills behind the Clay Factory. By the early afternoon of 6 January, RUF/AFRC forces had occupied the main Kissy Terminal, killing eight ECOMOG soldiers in the Terminal's security office. The Kissy Police Station and the Kissy Mental Hospital were set on fire and a number of churches including the Holy Trinity and the Trascott Church were burned down.

Behind their line of advance, RUF forces made every civilian in the Eastern part of Freetown hoist white pieces of cloth in front of their houses and tie white ribbons on their heads and wrists to signify their support for peace. Each night, civilians were forced to burn old tyres in order to light up the city and to sing peace songs. Some beat drums while others clapped their hands or banged empty tins together. Some were even forced to dance, especially old people. Those who failed to obey these orders were shot and killed or had their houses set on fire; many civilians were burnt alive in their houses.

At irregular intervals, ECOMOG Alpha Jets bombed various locations in Freetown including "PZ", a busy business district centre, killing an unknown number of civilians who had been forced onto the streets by the RUF/AFRC.

Between 8 and 9 January 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces advanced into the west end of Freetown and were prevented from crossing the Congo Cross Road Bridge by the combined forces of ECOMOG, "loyal" SLA and CDF. The Congo Cross Road Bridge carries a dual carriageway (dubbed "main motor road") from Brookfields through to Congo Cross, Wilkinson Road, Murray Town, Lumley and Juba. It is the only way of quickly moving a large force from central to western Freetown; alternative routes into west Freetown are longer and far easier to secure. One route moves from New England to Hill Station up a steep winding mountain road in full sight of ECOMOG's main base at Wilberforce. Other routes to Congo Cross move from King Harmon Road up the winding Old Railway Line through Tembuh Town and also through Congo Town along a poor quality road and a decrepit old bailey bridge. Combined with artillery from Wilberforce and the defence of the Hill Station route into west Freetown, RUF/AFRC movement westwards was halted at Congo Cross Road Bridge, from where the RUF/AFRC forces launched missiles into Congo Cross.

ECOMOG forces fought with RUF/AFRC forces for control of a key roundabout called Eastern Police between 8 and 9 January. By 10 January, ECOMOG were putting pressure RUF/AFRC forces stationed at Waterloo Town. By 11 January, the RUF/AFRC had begun their retreat east from the civic centre of Freetown, burning down the Law Courts, the telephone exchange and many government buildings.

Behind ECOMOG lines, a curfew was imposed from 15.00 to 06.00. Ahead of ECOMOG lines, a 24-hour curfew was then announced by the Government on Radio Democracy 98.1 FM. Anyone caught violating the curfew would be perceived as hostile and would be executed on the spot by the ECOMOG forces. By 13 January, ECOMOG had pushed the RUF/AFRC forces back from the Congo Cross Road Bridge and had taken control over the densely populated, central-west Brookfields area. The RUF/AFRC forces started burning houses as they retreated eastwards.



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ECOMOG advised civilians to move into the National Stadium,¹⁵⁰⁸ where ECOMOG in collaboration with the Kamajors and OHBS screened civilians. An unknown number of suspected RUF/AFRC members were lined up against the walls of the National Stadium and shot dead by ECOMOG. Other collection points for displaced persons included the National Workshop by Pademba Road Prison and the Parade Group on Fourah Bay Road. ECOMOG also began confiscating satellite telephones and radio communications equipment from international NGOs, reportedly to prevent them falling into the possession of the RUF/AFRC.

On 18 January, the HMS Norfolk arrived in Freetown carrying medical supplies and a 200-strong liaison and reconnaissance group. The UK denied that it was taking any military part in the conflict, but had earlier in January released over \$1.6 million for humanitarian supplies and logistic support for ECOMOG.

RUF/AFRC forces started mutilating civilians on 19 January 1999 at Black Hall Road in Freetown, as ECOMOG forces steadily forced them out of the city. At that time, ECOMOG forces had control over the Ferry Junction at Kissy eastward to Waterloo (Waterloo RD). Civilian volunteers used carts to transport the corpses of those killed in the conflict to the Kissy Road cemetery. On 16 January, RUF/AFRC forces they had befriended warned civilians remaining in Waterloo that an order had been given to amputate the arms of any non-RUF/AFRC found in the town. The ECOMOG Alpha Jet bombing of numerous RUF/AFRC positions in the east end of Freetown and Waterloo pushed RUF/AFRC forces eastwards to the outskirts of the city. As they retreated via the hills, avoiding the ECOMOG checkpoint at Kossuh Town, RUF/AFRC forces abducted hundreds of civilians, many of whom were given narcotics to make them compliant.

Although most of Greater Freetown area had come under ECOMOG control by 20 January, RUF/AFRC forces continued to stage attacks and attempt to infiltrate locations in the east of the town. ECOMOG reported having trouble with large numbers of snipers remaining in hillside locations overlooking their positions following the main RUF/AFRC retreat. Across February and March, RUF/AFRC occupied Waterloo (Waterloo RD), evading ECOMOG Alpha Jet bombardments by using bush paths and moving mainly during the nighttime from Waterloo to attack surrounding villages. For example, one night they attacked Susu Town near Devil Hole (Waterloo RD) at a location called Compound, where they raped and killed a policewoman. Many civilians escaped across the Madonke creek to villages in Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District). In addition, RUF/AFRC patrols rounded up civilians hiding in the Waterloo area and returned them to the town.

At the end of January, Nigeria announced that it wished to remove its troops from Sierra Leone by May 1999.¹⁵⁰⁹ On 2 February, ECOMOG continued to reinforce with the arrival of over 400 Malian troops¹⁵¹⁰ and around 1,000 Ghanaian troops by 8 February.¹⁵¹¹ A general mobilisation of

¹⁵⁰⁸ At the highpoint of the invasion, UN World Food Program estimated that around 40,000 civilians sought security in the National Stadium by 21 January 1999.

¹⁵⁰⁹ BBC, 28 January 1999.

¹⁵¹⁰ IRIN West Africa, 2 February 1999.

¹⁵¹¹ IRIN West Africa, 8 February 1999.



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ECOMOG throughout Freetown was announced on 5 February 1999.¹⁵¹² The Chief of Staff of the SLA reportedly announced that ECOMOG would not hesitate in firing on civilians should the RUF/AFRC use them as human shields.¹⁵¹³ The ECOMOG general mobilisation was followed by an intensification of cordon and search operations throughout the city.¹⁵¹⁴ ECOMOG restructured its operations to include a specific garrison and force for the Freetown area. The UK Government stated that it would be providing a package of comprehensive logistic and other support to ECOMOG,¹⁵¹⁵ followed soon after by the announcement that it would be providing around \$16 million in military and training support for Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.¹⁵¹⁶

Between 20 and 25 February, ECOMOG launched an attack on Waterloo by continuously shelling the town. Some of the shells landed at the creek at the Christian cemetery. The remnants of RUF/AFRC forces, who were mainly ex-SLA, pulled out of Waterloo and Campbell Town along the Prince Alfred Road towards Cole Town (all Waterloo RD) and proceeding along bush tracks to the Waterloo Displaced Camp. By nightfall, all of them had left and headed towards Newton (Koya RD). In Waterloo, around 700 houses had been burnt down during the RUF/AFRC occupation. ECOMOG and Kamajor forces secured the town, with approximately 50 Kamajors deploying to Waterloo. They were shown around town by a local man who identified suspected RUF/AFRC collaborators, of whom at least two were tortured and executed by the Kamajors. The Kamajors also deployed at Bath-Comp (Koya RD), where they looted and burnt down an unknown number of civilian residences. At Kissy Town, near the IDP camp, combined "loyal" SLA and CDF on the one hand and ECOMOG on the other, erected checkpoints.

Responding to demands made by the RUF/AFRC, on 15 April the Court of Appeal of Sierra Leone temporarily released the RUF leader from prison,¹⁵¹⁷ where he had been awaiting appeal from his treason conviction, allowing him to meet with the High Command of the RUF/AFRC and engage in peace talks in Togo, Lomé.¹⁵¹⁸ Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (the Lomé Peace Agreement).¹⁵¹⁹ The Lomé Peace Agreement provided for a number of joint RUF-GOSL processes for the provision of humanitarian assistance, return of displaced persons, demobilisation, management of natural resources and other matters related to the consolidation of the peace process. Additionally, it contains provisions for a governmental power-sharing arrangement between the RUF and the Government. The Lomé Peace Agreement also pardoned

¹⁵¹² AFP, 4 February 1999.

¹⁵¹³ IRIN West Africa, 5 February 1999.

¹⁵¹⁴ BBC, 6 February 1999.

¹⁵¹⁵ IRIN West Africa, 22 February 1999.

¹⁵¹⁶ IRIN West Africa, 3 March 1999. The UK starting exporting ammunition and military equipment to Sierra Leone after 7 October 1999.

¹⁵¹⁷ The RUF leader was reportedly taken from Pademba Road prison into protective custody in the Republic of Guinea prior to the RUF/AFRC 6 January 1999 assault on Freetown.

¹⁵¹⁸ BBC, 15 April 1999.

¹⁵¹⁹ The full text is available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_07071999_toc.html.



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the RUF leader and others and granted a blanket amnesty to all combatants and collaborators for acts done in fulfilment of their objectives.

The RUF and AFRC leaders arrived back in Freetown on 3 October 1999 from Liberia, where they had gone following the conclusion of the peace talks.¹⁵²⁰ On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone to replace the previous observer mission.¹⁵²¹

h) Events in 2000

Between January and May 2000 no violent incidents are recorded for the Western Area. By 12 April 2000, the DDR program had taken on over 22,000 ex-combatants, comprising 4,227 RUF; 7,474 CDF; 5,590 AFRC; 3,804 SLA; and 1,463 unaffiliated combatants.¹⁵²²

On 1 May, the United Nations reported that RUF forces had attacked its positions near Newton (Koya RD), a few miles east of Waterloo (Waterloo RD),¹⁵²³ that there had been a number of RUF attacks near Waterloo and that RUF forces had been seen moving towards Hastings (Waterloo RD). However, the BBC reported on 6 May that UNAMSIL had retracted the latter statement and that in an “unfortunate reporting error on our part” they had confused this with RUF activity near Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District).¹⁵²⁴ Nevertheless, while information gathered for this report confirms that there were no RUF attacks on locations in the Western Area at this time, rumours of RUF attacks sparked at least 20,000 civilians to leave Songo, Newton (both Koya RD), Waterloo and Hastings (Waterloo RD) and move into the Greater Freetown Area.¹⁵²⁵

However, UNAMSIL faced a serious crisis between 5 and 28 May: nearly 500 troops from different UNAMSIL contingents were disarmed and held hostage by RUF forces. On 8 May, the UK military commenced “Operation Palliser”, deploying to Sierra Leone the *HMS Ocean* and other vessels with around 800 soldiers from the Parachute Regiment.¹⁵²⁶ Initially, UK forces secured the airport at Lungi and commenced the evacuation of UK nationals and other expatriates. Also on 8 May, civilians in Freetown held a large demonstration outside the Spur Road residence of RUF leader. The details are not clear, but a number of gunshots were fired, reportedly by RUF members guarding the residence.¹⁵²⁷ Nineteen civilians were killed during the rally and were buried on 13 May.¹⁵²⁸ The RUF leader apparently disappeared, but was apprehended by civilians on 17 May whilst travelling in a civilian vehicle through the Lumley area of Freetown. The UK Secretary of Defence

¹⁵²⁰ Both reportedly held talks with the Liberian President in Monrovia during this time: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews0999.html>.

¹⁵²¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999).

¹⁵²² From National Commission from Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), quoted in IRIN West Africa, 18 April 2000.

¹⁵²³ IRIN West Africa, 1 May 2000.

¹⁵²⁴ BBC Online News, 7 May 2000 (06:40 GMT 07:40 UK).

¹⁵²⁵ OCHA Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 12 May 2000.

¹⁵²⁶ On 24 May, soldiers from the 42 Commando Royal Marines replaced the paratroopers.

¹⁵²⁷ BBC Online News, 8 May, 2000, (17:13 GMT 18:13 UK).

¹⁵²⁸ BBC Online News, 13 May 2000 (01:53 GMT 02:53 UK).



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subsequently stated to the BBC that the RUF leader was being held in “protective custody” by UK forces.¹⁵²⁹

Between 8 and 14 May, RUF forces unsuccessfully attempted to gain control of Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) from pro-Government forces. During the same period, UK forces bolstered security at strategic locations on the main highway at Hastings and Waterloo. On 19 May, UK Royal Marines rehearsed amphibious landings in the Freetown area¹⁵³⁰ in preparation for replacing the Paratroops deployed on 8 May.¹⁵³¹ In addition, the UK announced its decision to provide an ongoing series of six-week training courses for around 8 battalions of the SLA.¹⁵³² The 180-strong team began arriving in Freetown on 10 June 2000,¹⁵³³ dovetailing with the withdrawal of the Royal Marines after 15 June 2000.¹⁵³⁴ On 24 July, nearly 1,000 SLA members graduated from the UK-run training course,¹⁵³⁵ the first group of a total of around 8,000 who would eventually be trained this way. Various rotations of the UK military teams occurred between August and December 2000. The overall number of UK service personnel in Sierra Leone was around 550, operating from the headquarters of the 1st Mechanised Brigade in Freetown.

On 14 August, the AFRC leader announced that he had formally disbanded the AFRC,¹⁵³⁶ which had seized power in the coup on 25 May 1997. On 22 August, a senior RUF member replaced the RUF leader, who remained in custody.

The West Side Boys apprehended 11 UK soldiers from the Short Term Training Team near Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) on 27 August 2000. Although UK negotiators secured the release of five of the captives, UK Special Forces and Paratroopers arrived in Freetown and executed “Operation Barrass”, freeing the remainder on 10 September.¹⁵³⁷ In the Western Area, no further significant incidents are reported for 2000.

i) Events in 2001 and beyond

In January 2001, the Ukrainian contingent of UNAMSIL deployed from Freetown, contributing 534 men, 220 Armoured Personnel Carriers and 220 trucks to the peacekeeping mission.¹⁵³⁸ Ukrainian troops were based at Hastings (Waterloo RD). The RUF, the CDF and the Government of Sierra Leone commenced tri-partite peace talks on or around 16 May 2001.¹⁵³⁹ Disarmament proceeded at the Hockey Pitch at Wilberforce Barracks. At Waterloo the OBHS who used to patrol the village disarmed at the IDP Camp. By 30 September 2001, the UK had reduced its military presence in

¹⁵²⁹ BBC Online News, 17 May 2000 (18:03 GMT 19:03 UK).
¹⁵³⁰ BBC Online News, 19 May 2000 (15:48 GMT 16:48 UK).
¹⁵³¹ IRIN West Africa, 24 May 2000.
¹⁵³² The UK Military handed over to a UK-led International Military and Advisory Training Team (IMATT) in September 2001.
¹⁵³³ BBC Online News, 10 June 2000 (19:28 GMT 20:28 UK).
¹⁵³⁴ IRIN West Africa, 14 June 2000.
¹⁵³⁵ IRIN West Africa, 24 July 2000.
¹⁵³⁶ BBC Online News, 14 August 2000 (03:40 GMT 04:40 UK).
¹⁵³⁷ See Port Loko District: West Side Boys for more details.
¹⁵³⁸ IRIN West Africa, 10 January 2001.
¹⁵³⁹ BBC Online News, 16 May 2001 (00:26 GMT 01:26 UK).



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Sierra Leone to around 360¹⁵⁴⁰ and UNAMSIL reached the ceiling of its authorised deployment strength of 17,500 personnel on 20 November 2001.

Following disarmament and demobilisation of members of all the different fighting factions, on 18 January 2002 President Kabbah declared that the war was over and held a symbolic "Arms Burning Ceremony" at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom, Port Loko District).

3. Conclusion

** TO BE COMPLETED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE**

¹⁵⁴⁰ OCHA Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 01 - 30 September 2001.



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Annex I: List of Acronyms

AFRC	Armed Force Revolutionary Council
APC	All Peoples Congress
CDF	Civil Defence Force
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group
EO	Executive Outcomes
NPFL	National Patriotic Front for Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLPP	Sierra Leone Peoples Party
UNAMSIL	United Nation Mission in Sierra Leone
ULIMO	United Liberation movement for Democracy in Liberia.

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Annex II: Acknowledgments

This report is the result of a program carried out in Sierra Leone over many months and in which many people took part. Although it is not possible to name each and every person who participated at one point or another, the following list of people reflects the dimension and importance of the No Peace Without Justice Conflict Mapping Program in Sierra Leone.

Conflict Mapping Program

The following persons took part in the Conflict Mapping Program in Sierra Leone. All have worked with untiring commitments to the goals of the program and each has contributed their professionalism and dedication to their respective areas of work.

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Some of these Data Entry Processors also took part in the analysis of the initial draft, namely Andrea Broggi, Sharon Carroll, Martin Ebert, Ilario Fusaro, Patrick Johnbull, Nicole Nadia, Stefano Pantaleone and Hubert Tshiswaka.

The implementation of the program in the Provinces was made possible thanks to the invaluable assistance of an array of dedicated persons, including Focal Points and members of the SCWG District Chapters.

No Peace Without Justice Sierra Leone Project

As members of the NPWJ Sierra Leone Project, the following persons played an active part in the Conflict Mapping Program.

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Additional thanks also go to Sensible Data, particularly Stefano Figa-Talamanca and Francesco Burrigato, for their technical assistance and 24-hour (frequently used) hotline. Special thanks go to Richard Bednarek, who laid the groundwork for the successful implementation of this project as NPWJ's Outreach Coordinator in 2001.

Partners

The following persons have been of an invaluable help for the time they dedicated to our program, through providing assistance and advice:

The members of the Special Court Working Group (SCWG), both in Freetown and in the District Chapters, for their assistance in the planning, implementation and organisation of the Conflict Mapping tour; the Campaign For Good Governance (CGG), in particular the Coordinator, Mrs Olayinka Creighton-Randall, and the Field Monitors for their initial comments on our preliminary findings; Students from Fourah Bay College for research assistance and for their participation in the cross-checking stage; Peter and Gillian Arnot Smith, for the time they spent proofreading our drafts and helping in the design of the open sources database; Annette Rolfe and her team in Freetown at the GIS unit of the Development Assistance Coordination Unit, Sierra Leone; Nabil Bahsoon and the team at *NabsTech* for solving unsolvable problems; the Government of Sierra Leone, in particular H.E. Solomon E. Berewa, Vice President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, The Hon Eke A. Halloway, Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, and Ambassador Allieu I. Kanu, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations; Corinne Dufka, Theresa Kordeczk and all the other people in Sierra Leone and elsewhere we cannot name individually but who have contributed to this program and whose friendship and support were invaluable.

During the drafting of the legal analysis, we were fortunate to have the assistance of several people, whose knowledge, experience and expertise contributed greatly to this report. We would like to thank the following people for giving so generously of their time to review the drafts and to help us ensure the legal analysis is as accurate as it can possibly be: Stuart Alford, Olympia Bekou, Sylvia de Bertodano, Andrea Carcano, John Cerone, Robert McCorquodale and Gerry Simpson. Of course, No Peace Without Justice takes full responsibility for any errors or omissions

Key Persons

The Conflict Mapping Program was based on collecting information from identified key persons; this report would not have been possible without their involvement. We therefore address a special thanks to the 402 key people across the country, including Oscar, who gave so freely of their time and themselves to share with us their information on the violations of international humanitarian law committed during the conflict.

108) News Report

Washington Post, "An Axis connected to Gaddafi; Leaders trained in Libya have used war to safeguard wealth", Douglas Farah, 2 November 2001.

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November 02, 2001, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A22

LENGTH: 725 words

HEADLINE: An 'Axis' Connected to Gaddafi; Leaders Trained in **Libya** Have Used War to Safeguard Wealth

BYLINE: Douglas Farah, Washington Post Foreign Service

DATELINE: FREETOWN, Sierra Leone, Nov. 1

BODY:

In the 1970s and '80s, international terrorism training was centered in **Libya**. There, Col. Moammar Gaddafi, using his oil wealth to spread his vision of pan-African revolution, hosted and trained thousands of men, some of whom are now rulers of African countries.

The alliances formed then still shape the politics and wars of West Africa, and there are growing indications that, despite its public disavowals, **Libya** is in the thick of regional tensions fomented by the alumni of its training camps.

It was at a Libyan camp that Ibrahim **Bah**, a Senegalese, was trained before joining Islamic resistance fighters in Afghanistan, and then fighting with Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the late 1980s, **Bah** returned to **Libya** and met Charles **Taylor**, now the president of Liberia. **Taylor** was then being trained to launch a rebellion against the government of Samuel K. Doe. **Bah** also met Foday **Sankoh**, who, with a small cadre of men, would soon establish the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and go to war against the government of Sierra Leone.

Taylor's introduction to Gaddafi had been secured by Blaise Compaore, a zealous officer in the army of Burkina Faso and now that country's president. He is a close friend of **Bah's**.

Through the ensuing decade, the ties among the four men -- **Bah**, **Taylor**, **Sankoh** and Compaore -- have remained strong. **Bah** fought with both **Taylor's** Liberian rebels and **Sankoh's** RUF, and he now resides in Burkina Faso. **Sankoh** created the RUF with the help of the three others. When they became heads of state, Compaore and **Taylor** were able to ensure a steady flow of weapons to their allies in the region.

Through his international contacts in the illicit **diamond** and arms trade, **Bah** has helped each man become enormously wealthy, according to intelligence sources and others who know all four well.

In exchange, **Bah** has enriched himself and the movements that he supports. He has also secured political clout and government protection, including various false passports under a variety of assumed names, for his activities.

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Described by those who know him as quiet, serious and a religious Muslim, **Bah** had as his main contact in the RUF a notorious senior commander named Sam Bockerie, also known as Mosquito. Bockerie fell out with the RUF and fled to Liberia in December 1999, where he stayed under the protection of **Taylor**.

Taylor, **Bah** and dozens of senior Liberian government officials are under a U.N.-imposed travel ban and economic sanctions because of their alleged role in the illicit **diamonds-for-weapons** trade that the RUF used to keep its military supplied. **Taylor** and Compaore repeatedly have denied involvement.

Sankoh is now imprisoned in Sierra Leone, and the RUF he founded, under new leadership, has signed a peace agreement with the government and began to disarm its combatants. That peace process, according to RUF officials, Western intelligence analysts and U.N. investigators, would end RUF control over Sierra Leone's **diamond** fields -- and cut off the flow of money through **Bah to Taylor** and Compaore.

With control of the **diamond** fields threatened, Western intelligence sources said, there are several strong indicators that the old Libyan network is moving to protect its interests. Over the past six months, the sources said, **Libya** has sent several large shipments of weapons to **Taylor**.

In mid-September, Bockerie, in violation of the U.N. travel ban, visited Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, staying at the presidential lodge, according to a U.N. report and knowledgeable sources. On Sept. 26, Bockerie and **Bah** flew to **Libya** on an official airplane of the government of Chad, the sources said.

Intelligence sources say they believe Bockerie and **Bah** traveled on behalf of **Taylor** and Compaore to seek aid from Gaddafi. The aid, the sources said, would support a Bockerie-led insurgency that would enter Sierra Leone from Liberia and keep control of the **diamond** fields.

"There is an axis that is extremely dangerous that seems willing to plunge the region into war to keep control of the **diamond** fields," said an intelligence source in the region. "If it were just Bockerie, or even Bockerie and **Taylor**, it would not be of such concern. But if **Libya** is involved and we have **diamonds** already going to terrorist organizations, we have serious trouble."

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109) Ibrahim Abdullah,

“The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone”, in “African Guerrillas”, Ed.
Christopher Clapham

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African Guerrillas

EDITED BY CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM



ERITREA/TIGRAY/SUDAN/SOMALIA/UGANDA
RWANDA/CONGO-ZAIRE/LIBERIA/SIERRA LEONE

The Background to the Rebellion

Youth culture in Sierra Leone

The roots of the RUF lie in Freetown, where a rebellious youth culture began to evolve in the 1940s, based on the lumpen 'rarray boys'. These first-generation lumpens were predominantly foot soldiers for the politicians of the time. Due to defective education and an ill-formed political consciousness, they were hardly aware of their political manipulation. Mostly unlettered, these young lumpens were predominantly second-generation city residents.³ Their popular resort was the *pote*. *Potes* are peri-urban spaces constructed around the *odelay* (masquerade). Lumpen habitués were known for their anti-social behaviour – marijuana smoking, petty theft and violence – that put them at odds with the community. Their periodic carnivals on public holidays were always under the watchful eyes of the police. Permits were needed to 'pull *debel*', first from the city officials and later from the police.⁴ Revelry and riot alienated them from the sober citizenry; they were a good-for-nothing bunch, best avoided.

This picture of lumpen culture began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when middle-class youths and other participants entered this popular cultural milieu and became key players. The character and composition of the *pote* was transformed, and *odelays* emerged as a more reputable element in the urban cultural landscape. Yet the change was replete with all the contradictory tendencies inherent in lumpens as a social category. Politicians continued to try to control the wilder elements, seeking a ready supply of thugs to do their dirty work, at the same time as the emergence of middle-class youths as keen participants in periodic carnivals transformed the *pote* from an abode of anti-social elements to an arena for a more broad-based political socialization.⁵ Most of the middle-class youth element were still in high school but participated in the drug culture and gradually absorbed the mannerisms of the emerging popular culture. Others 'dropped out' of school entirely, following the footsteps of the original 'rarray boys'. This period coincided with the arrival of reggae music, and a definite turn to the political.

The influence of music was at first local – the beat was that of local bands, drugs and political talk, starting in 1971 with Purple Haze, a Freetown group, and Super Combo from Bo, later followed by Afric Jessips, Superb Seven (from Liberia) and Sabanoh '75. Of all these groups in the early 1970s, it was Super Combo that 'became youth champions' of the rebellious culture.⁶ The reggae music of Bob Marley, Peter Tosh and Bunny Wailer, and the more directly political lyrics of West African musicians like Fela Anikulapo-Kuti and later Sonny Okosun, added a further dimension to the repertoire of youth rebelliousness. Liberation struggles

³ Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Context, culture and crisis: changing identities of urban youth in Sierra Leone, 1945–1992', forthcoming.

⁴ Masquerade is popularly referred to as 'debel'; James Nunley, *Moving with the Fate of the Devil* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987).

⁵ 'Youths held at ministerial building', *Sierra Leone Daily Mail* (Freetown), 19 May 1996.

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IBRAHIM ABDULLAH & PATRICK MUANA

The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone

A Revolt
of the Lumpenproletariat

After waging a brutal and protracted war against three successive regimes, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) triumphantly marched into Freetown on 25 May 1997 amidst anarchy, mayhem and widespread looting.¹ The armed insurgency which began on 23 March 1991 had in six years displaced more than half the country's population and resulted in an estimated 30,000 deaths. A peace agreement, signed on 30 November 1996 by President Ahmad Tejan Kabba of Sierra Leone and Corporal Foday Sankoh of the RUF, failed to bring an end to the war. The RUF leadership subsequently became fractured, as a result of the peace plan – about which its military wing was ambivalent – and its leader was 'deposed' and subsequently incarcerated in Lagos, Nigeria, where he had gone in pursuit of the much-needed peace.

Central to an understanding of the war in Sierra Leone is the role of alienated youth, especially alienated lumpen youth in the urban and rural areas, for whom combat appears to be a viable survival alternative in a country with high levels of urban unemployment, where the economy is dominated by a precious minerals sector in long-term decline. This chapter discusses the evolution of the RUF and the dynamic of the civil war.² The analysis is structured in parts: an account of the background and emergence of the RUF; a discussion of the dynamics of the conflict; and an evaluation of the RUF as a guerrilla movement.

¹ On the *coup d'état* of 25 May 1997, see the following: Steve Riley, 'Sierra Leone: the militarist strikes again', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 72 (1997), pp. 287–92; Lansana Gberie, 'Sierra Leone: a "militarist" coup?', in Ibrahim Abdullah and Yusuf Bangura, eds, *African Development*, Vol. 22, Nos 2 and 3 (1997), special issue on 'Youth Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War', A. B. Zack-Williams, 'Kamajors, "sobels" and the militarist: civil society and the return of the military in Sierra Leonean politics', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 73 (1997), pp. 373–98; Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Kamajors, "sobels" and the militarist: a critique of Zack-Williams', *LeoneNet: A Discussion of Sierra Leonean Issues* (lconenet@mituma.mit.edu, 1 December 1997).

² See Paul Richards, 'Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: a crisis of youth?' in Oliver Furley, ed., *Conflict in Africa* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995); Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Revolutions in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996). For a critique of Richards, see Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Violence, youth culture and war: a critical reading of Paul Richards', *LeoneNet*, 19 May 1996; Yusuf Bangura, 'Understanding the political and cultural dynamics of the Sierra Leonean civil war', *LeoneNet*, 19 May 1996.

inst settler colonialism in Southern Africa also contributed to the development of 'culture of resistance'. The *pote* became an arena for political discussions centred on the system'. 'System dread', a refrain from popular reggae music of the period, became a slogan and rallying call for alienated youth, mostly unemployed. The DJ leader, Foday Sankoh, recently echoed this discourse in an interview: 'I said when I come out [from prison] I will organize the system.'⁷

The popularity of marijuana – the drug of choice – brought many participants to the *pote*. *Pote* language began to filter into mainstream society. Lumpen youth culture was suddenly at the cutting edge of the development of Krio language, the vocabulary expanding to incorporate *pote* terms for gambling, petty theft and drinking. 'Rarray boy' now became 'service man', complete with a new and leading 'militant' language and iconography of resistance. In the 1970s the group included many high school drop-outs and a handful of unemployed 'O' and 'A' level leavers. Some later went to university (Fourah Bay and Njala College), but others joined the city's swelling army of unemployed youth. As a group they knew the outline of the history of the slave trade and the dehumanization of the African it entailed, and could make connections between the colonial past and neo-colonial present, generally espousing some form of pan-Africanism. *Pote* discussions in this period were spiced with liberal helpings of Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, Wallace Johnson, and at times Haile Selassie. Some of the *pote* types had read a little about Frantz Fanon and Walter Rodney, bits of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, following undigested passages of Marx and Lenin from cheap or free volumes from Soviet Progress Publishers.⁸

Student politics

In the early 1980s the university students in the *pote* had become a respectable reference group for their more unfortunate brothers, their prestige enhanced by their role in the 1977 demonstrations against the All People's Congress (APC) government. In the *pote* code of honour, an extension of the *bra-babor* (patron-client relationship) found in the wider society, special regard was given to the *pote*-mentoring 'service man' who was also a university student. Their more unfortunate brothers listened to them with respect as they preached, smoked and socialized from the safe confines of the *pote*. In this environment, a change from 'service man' to *man dem* took place.⁹ Camaraderie came full circle; 'one love' and 'brotherhood' became the new slogans of the group, apparent in the popular support the students received for their 1977 actions, notwithstanding APC youth group attempts to mobilize the 'lumpens' against the students. Here we have a turning point from which the series of student protests in the 1980s become intelligible. Students immersed in the rebellious youth culture became the articulate mouthpiece of a disaffected youth cohort attacking APC rule and calling for fundamental change.

⁷ Interview with Foday Sankoh, 'The war would have started in 1988', in *Concord Times*, 10 October 1996.

⁸ See Ismail Rashid, 'Subaltern reactions: student radicals and lumpen youth in Sierra Leone, 1992', forthcoming. Abdullah and Bangura, *Africa Development*.

One of the first student groups to organize opposition to the APC was the maligned Gardener's Club, central to a number of demonstrations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1980s, however, other politically oriented student groups had emerged: the Green Book study club, the Juche Idea group, the Socialist Club and the Pan African Union (Panafu). These groups debated strictly political matters and sought to use the student union as an effective medium to channel grievances at national level. Some of these groups eschewed the drug culture, a central feature of the more rebellious world of the *pote*. Students had earlier been involved in political protest – against the One-Party Regime proposal of Sir Albert Margai, for example – but only as foot soldiers. What was distinctive about the events in 1977 is that they were planned and led by the radical students, received popular support, and forced Siaka Stevens to make concessions. The protests exposed the fragility of the regime.

The lesson of student power was not forgotten as the country entered the turbulent 1980s. Dwindling mining revenues, worsened by rampant smuggling, caused a sharp economic downturn, exacerbated by lavish spending on the 1980 Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference. Student scholarships and spending on health and social services declined. The swelling ranks of the young unemployed fuelled subversive discourse in the *pote*. Muted talk of organized protest in 1977 now gave way to open talk of revolution. How this revolution was to be prosecuted was never systematically discussed, nor were other options explored. But talk of revolution, vague and distorted as it was, remained alive in the discourse of rebellious youth. The language shifted from *man dem* to 'comrade', and finally to 'brothers and sisters', symptomatic of change among the *pote* intellectuals as well as among numerous study groups in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Njala and Kono. From this period anti-imperialist slogans became an element in the iconography of youth.

Meanwhile there had been a sharp deterioration of relations between students and the administration on the Fourah Bay College (FBC) campus. Student demonstrations in January 1984 led to a three-month lock-out. A Commission of Enquiry report apparently favourable to the student position was never published.¹⁰ By 1985 the administration had taken upon itself the task of disciplining students on extra-academic grounds to keep state interference to a minimum. The appointment of an ex-police chief, Jenkin Smith, as warden of students reflected the change of policy. It was in this context that a radical student leadership emerged to channel accumulated student grievances. The movement was a coalition of student groups with a populist platform attractive to radicals as well as democrats. The Mass Awareness and Participation (MAP) student union president, Alie Kabba, was elected unopposed, while away in Libya attending the annual Green Book celebrations. MAP was a loose coalition involving members of the Green Book club, the Gardener's Club, Panafu and the Socialist Club. Its fierce, at times adventurist, rhetoric alarmed the administration at FBC. A product of links with the world of the *pote*, the new union leadership was no longer reactive; imbued with a growing sense of the power of youth as a political force, it was prepared to seize the initiative. Anti-government posters and graffiti were spawned all over campus and city. A

people's tribunal adjudicated between students and regulated bad behaviour – an experiment in popular government reflecting alleged 'People Power'. Such activities, along with rumours that the leadership was sponsored by the Libyans, did not endear it to the authorities.

The alleged Libyan link led to the expulsion and suspension of 41 students in 1985. It was claimed that a group of students had held on to their room keys during a university break, intending to encamp Libyan mercenaries in their hostels. Neither the government nor the university investigated the charge. Instead, the college invited the notorious State Security Defence (SSD) on to campus, literally to 'flush' the students out of the hostels. When the college reopened, the authorities were faced with a militant student demonstration over the expulsions, degenerating into widespread vandalism, looting and affray. In the ensuing mêlée the principal's car was set on fire. Three members of the teaching staff judged 'friendly' to students – Olu Gordon, Jimmy Kande and Cleo Hanciles – lost their jobs.¹¹ Gordon and Hanciles were founding members of Panafit. The Union president, Alie Kabba, and four other students were arrested, detained for two months, and later charged with torching the car.¹²

The students' action might be described as infantile. They were neither politically mature enough nor sufficiently well-disciplined to realize the shortcomings of whatever leverage they imagined they might have on administration or state. They appear naively to have believed that rhetoric would deliver 'people's power' without a solid organizational base. Comparing the 1985 leadership with that of 1977, one might say the 1985 group was better organized but less politically percipient, failing to understand the difference between student and national politics. The expulsion of this student group from FBC marked the end of a phase in the making of an informal, youth-oriented, opposition in Sierra Leone. Henceforth the baton passed to the 'lumpen' youths and *poie*-affiliated 'organic intellectuals' (some ex-students of FBC and the second campus of the national university at Njala) in numerous study groups and revolutionary cells scattered around the country.

The Making of the RUF

In addition to Alie Kabba, a number of other radicals attracted to populist conceptions of political action already had some Libyan connections. Some of these groups, mostly unemployed youths, were recruited in Sierra Leone – through networks established by some of the expelled students now resident in Ghana – for guerrilla training in Benghazi, Libya. Among those recruited was an older man, Alfred Foday Saybana Sankoh, once a corporal in the Sierra Leone army, cashiered and jailed in a 1971 for a coup plot against Siaka Stevens. Trained in the army as a signals technician, Sankoh found work on release as an itinerant freelance photographer in the south-east, which was to become the major theatre of war. He later found his way into a radical study group in the Bo-Kenema area, whose coordinator, Ebiyenu Reader, was an organic intellectual from Freetown west end. It was through him that Sankoh was able to make the trip to Libya.

¹¹ Jimmy Kande took the university to court and won; Hanciles and Gordon were never reinstated.

All those who went to Libya for military and ideological training in 1987–8 and later, like Sankoh, became involved in the RUF, returned to Sierra Leone before the launching of the armed struggle. Back in Freetown, an attempt was made to recruit cadres for training at a farm in the vicinity of Yele, a small road junction settlement in Tonkolili District, on the provincial boundary between northern and southern Sierra Leone. The project was abandoned as too risky.

It could hardly be said that there was an organization. 'At the beginning, there was no leadership. All of us were [*sic*] all organizers,' Sankoh has revealed.¹³ At this stage the movement was little more than a loose collection of individuals returned from military training in Benghazi. Of the 35 people who were trained in Libya, only three had any form of regular employment. There was a high school teacher, an engineer, and Sankoh, an itinerant photographer. Most of those who took part in the military and ideological training later opted out of the counter-insurgency project, partly because it was too risky. Even the expelled student radicals from FBC who had gone to Ghana to continue their education abandoned the project as a result of their experiences in Ghana and Libya.¹⁴ Their exit from the project, according to Alie Kabba, who was the coordinator, opened the way for the 'wrong kind individuals'.¹⁵ These individuals included Foday Sankoh, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray, all of whom had gone to Benghazi for insurgency training, via Accra.

Forming a tight-knit group in Freetown, the three embarked on another recruitment drive among 'lumpens'. This time they decided to leave the city and settle in the provinces. From the time they left Libya in 1988 until they entered Sierra Leone as armed combatants in 1991, this trio travelled extensively throughout the country and in Liberia, quietly promoting their dream. In 1988 Sankoh met Charles Taylor, recently released from detention in Freetown. This meeting appears to have been the beginning of Sankoh's links with Taylor. Some RUF members, notably Mansaray and Kanu, fought alongside National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) combatants in Liberia, so that by 1991, when the RUF entered Sierra Leone, they were supported by an NPFL group – 'special forces' – under the command of Mansaray. They were also joined by lumpen Sierra Leoneans resident in Liberia.¹⁶

Paul Richards has suggested that the RUF planned to imitate a number of features of the initial successful incursion by NPFL forces into north-eastern Liberia, where the local population in Nimba County were ardent opponents of the Doe regime.¹⁷ This could have been the case, for the early RUF appropriated most of its strategy and tactics from the Liberian experience.¹⁸ Sankoh and the RUF obviously hoped to repeat the trick in eastern Sierra Leone, where the Kailahun people in particular were long-term opponents of the APC regime.

¹³ Sankoh, *Concord Times*, 10 December 1996.

¹⁴ For detail see Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Bush path to destruction: the origins and character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL)', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1998.

¹⁵ Alie Kabba, *Levenet*, 19 December 1996.

¹⁶ See the RUF propaganda pamphlet, *Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone*, Vol. 1, (1995), where this group is referred to as 'migrant workers'.

¹⁷ See Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest*.

Sankoh

The Dynamics of War

Insurrection: first phase, 1991–3

The RUF entered Sierra Leone from Liberia, at Bonaru in Kailahun District and Mano River Bridge, Pujehun District, on 23 March 1991. Two small forces, about 100–150 in all, captured border towns and villages in what Richards has referred to as a pincer movement intended to encircle Bo and Kenema, the main regional centres in the east and south of Sierra Leone.¹⁹ The RUF failed to take the strategic Moa bridge at Datu, or establish a link between the two groups at Joru south of Kenema. The southern group later pushed across Pujehun District to infiltrate Bo District from the south.

Envisaging support in a border region opposed for many years to the government of the APC, the RUF seized and summarily executed chiefs, traders, village elders, agricultural project workers and other government agents, NPFL style, but also made attempts forcibly to recruit individuals known locally for their opposition to the APC regime.²⁰ Some of these later became prominent in the leadership of the RUF.

The original insurgency forces which took Kailahun and Pujehun Districts were charged with the responsibility of establishing training bases and securing a swathe of territory, to facilitate the deployment of RUF forces which would advance further into Sierra Leone and bolster the border areas against anti-NPFL United Liberation Movement for Democracy (Ulimo) forces that were being recruited and re-armed by Nigerian and Sierra Leonean instructors.²¹ Although forewarned by military intelligence, the APC regime failed to deploy substantial defensive troops and materiel in the vulnerable border area.²²

The reaction of the civil population amongst whom the RUF hoped to foster their 'revolution' was at best ambiguous, notwithstanding the fact that these two border districts had been the scene of violent political opposition to the APC regime. On one hand alluvial diamond mining and the rich pickings of a parallel smuggler's economy had attracted lumpen youth to these areas, despairing at the malaise of economic and political exclusion but bristling with an overweening determination for self-advancement and prosperity. Here was a reserve army of fighting men who were attracted by the simplistic 'emancipatory' rhetoric of the RUF's ill-defined ideas, and motivated by the acquisition of wealth through looting, and of authority by wresting control from both the local and national political authorities whom they blamed for their predicament and the agony of the nation as a whole. The 'freedom-fighter' mantle – idealized in *pote* culture and given resonance by the RUF's appeal and initial success – coupled with the reversal of social hierarchy through the possession of the means of violence, had long been perceived

in the lumpen world view as a necessary route to heroism and self-actualization. On the other hand, the apprehension of a settled civil population was reinforced by testimonies of brutality from the Liberian crisis, and flight from RUF fighters became the ultimate security option for self-preservation. There was little scope for the transformation of political dissent in these areas into revolutionary fervour. Instead, the empowerment of the socially excluded with access to the instruments of violence and therefore power in a state teetering on the brink of collapse was more conducive to unbridled violence than was consistent with an agenda for revolutionary change.

Young people with some schooling – girls as well as boys – were taken for guerrilla training. Those without education were assigned labouring tasks. The Freetown *pote* culture already present in the hinterland provided a natural recruiting ground for the movement. The number of *potes* in Bo, Kenema and Koidu had increased from three or four in the early 1970s to a dozen or more in the early 1990s. Some, like those in Bo, were controlled by APC youth leaders as potential sources for the recruitment of political thugs. Others, such as those in Koidu and Kenema, had occupational linkages, serving as centres for unemployed drivers awaiting casual work. As in Freetown, the hinterland *potes* were centres where school drop-outs and the young unemployed converged, took recreational drugs and exchanged political ideas. They also supplied drugs and served as meeting places for illicit diamond miners, locally referred to as 'san-san boys'. It was from this group of alienated lumpen youths, who were engaged in what was probably the oldest form of collective lumpen resistance in Sierra Leone, illicit diamond mining, that the RUF recruited the bulk of its combatants during this phase. The current RUF strong man, Colonel Sam Hockarie (Maskita) was an illicit diamond miner, before moving to Liberia, where he was recruited by the RUF.

Recreational life in these illicit diamond enclaves reproduced the *pote* culture in the urban centres. In forcibly recruiting barely literate hinterland school children and the likes of diamond-digging *san-san* boys, the RUF had a confident expectation that it would be able to turn a significant number of captives into enthusiastic supporters of the movement, based upon a shared lumpen culture and political consciousness. The evidence is that many captives were quickly convinced by the movement's simplistic political analysis. The RUF's consistent 'political' message to recruits was simply that the country was immensely rich in mineral wealth controlled by a few Lebanese and business men with political connections, that the time for reasoned debate had passed, and that lasting solutions to the country's chronic economic and political problems could be found only through an explosion of destructive violence.

A significant portion of the Liberia border region into which the RUF incursion spilled is forested boundary enclave with considerable scope for clandestine smuggling, logging and diamond digging activities.²³ One of the options for young lumpens seeking a job was to drift into this off-limits frontier area and participate in illicit activities. The RUF pincer movement encircled this zone, and found within it considerable numbers of potential recruits sharing the lumpen worldview of the RUF leadership.

¹⁹ Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest*.

²⁰ This contrasts sharply with the Liberian experience, where individuals willingly joined the invading forces. See Stephen Ellis's chapter in this volume.

²¹ P. K. Muana, interview with ex-combatants, October 1996.

If the RUF was able to garner support from the alienated and uprooted youth engaged in illicit mining as a result of shared culture and worldview, it could not gain ready acceptance among the settled civilian communities of the region, despite their political alienation from the APC regime. Any potential civilian enthusiasm for the RUF was stifled by the looting and indiscriminate violence of the Liberian 'special forces', an integral part of the original invading force. Sankoh, the RUF leader, justified looting by Liberians as 'reward' for their support. His dependence on these Liberians had great political costs for the RUF, since civilians in regions under RUF control, already alienated from the APC regime in Freetown, quickly came utterly to detest the RUF as well. This double alienation paved the way for the emergence of the popular Kamajo militia, eventually to prove a decisive factor in the war.²⁴

Many captives perhaps only grudgingly accepted the anti-social political violence of the RUF in the first instance, but in order to survive they had little option but to adjust to its lumpen vision. Once sucked into the RUF, young border-zone captives found it impossible to quit. Deserters tattooed with RUF 'ID' risked summary execution by both RUF and the Sierra Leone army. Throughout the war and into the ceasefire period, those who sought to demobilize themselves were trapped by this suicidal double jeopardy, and by the expectation of revenge at the hands of rural civilians who judged all members of the movement by the values of its lumpen leadership.²⁵

Counter-insurgency operations, 1991-2

The RUF guerrilla operation bogged down in mid-1991 after the failure of early attempts to take Bo in a conventional military operation and establish a regional centre similar to Charles Taylor's base, Gbarnga. This provided the APC regime with some brief respite. Lacking confidence in its own army, the APC began to arm anti-NPFL irregulars from among Liberian refugees living in the border region. Some of these refugees were ex-soldiers in the Liberian army with combat experience against the NPFL in the war in Liberia. The Sierra Leone army also began recruitment of irregular forces from among border-zone youth, teaching them guerrilla tactics as deployed by both the NPFL and the RUF. The lead was taken, as early as April 1991, in Kailahun, by a young lieutenant from Segbwema, Prince Ben-Hirsch. Some recruited youths had lost parents or guardians in the first wave of RUF attacks and were keen for revenge. Others were seeking, in military training, a substitute for educational opportunities disrupted by the conflict. Older recruits were inducted into the army. Very young irregulars were taken on as 'apprentices', personally loyal to their recruiting officer, without army identification. A combatant refers to this officer as his or her *bia* (big brother). Like the rebels, the government side also recruited young girls, some of whom proved highly effective combatants. These juvenile and under-age combatants became the canon fodder in the war, with drugs being used as 'morale boosters' to get them into action.²⁶

²⁴ See Patrick Muana, 'The Kamajo militia: civil war, internal displacement and the politics of counter-insurgency', in Abdullah and Bangura, *African Development*.

²⁵ Interview with Josephine and her son, Freetown, 20 July 2002.

Strengthened by Guinean troops, under a defence pact between Sierra Leone and Guinea, and later by a contingent of Nigerians (deployed in Sierra Leone essentially to protect the rear bases of the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG peace-keeping operation in Liberia), the national army, assisted both by local irregular recruits and by Liberian irregulars later reorganized as Ulino, began to counter-attack RUF positions from July 1991. Expecting an easy walk-over, RUF units were surprised by this offensive and several times evacuated positions, especially in Pujehun District, without a fight. By September, government troops had recaptured Pujehun Town and were in control of main roads and some larger settlements as far as the Liberian border. From early 1992 the RUF was mainly confined to the inaccessible south-eastern corner of Pujehun District (parts of Soro-Gbeima and Barrie Chiefdoms), and that part of Kailahun District north of Pendembu.

Young officers seize power: the military coup of 1992

Exactly a year after the insurgency started, a group of young military officers from the war front trooped to Freetown and seized power. This began as a revolt over pay and conditions by young officers from the front.²⁷ Calling itself the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), the group declared a 'revolution', and a commitment to end the war, revamp the economy, and restore multi-party democracy. Contacts between the RUF leadership and the NPRC were characterized by general mistrust. Whereas the junta considered the formation of a broad based and inclusive transitional government, the RUF leadership called for the exclusion of former APC functionaries and a total purge of the civil service. The RUF also demanded the dismantling of all foreign military bases, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and the immediate incorporation of their representatives into the new regime. Fearing a backlash from civilians, and deeply suspicious of the request to dismiss all foreign troops as a precursor to a large-scale offensive by the NPFL in a bid to install the RUF and destroy forces opposed to it, the NPRC suggested a compromise plan for a phased withdrawal, to be preceded by a disarmament of the RUF forces. But under increasing military pressure from Ulino forces in Cape Mount and Lofa counties in Liberia, the NPFL is thought to have advised their RUF allies to dismiss the proposal for peace as a foreign ploy to destroy the movement. The RUF leadership declared the ceasefire null and void, and condemned the NPRC as a continuation of the APC regime. Henceforth, they were to be fought like their 'masters'.

The NPRC enthusiasm to end the war waned as the young officers became mired in the very corruption that had characterized the APC regime. The comforts of being in power ensured that the more battle-tested officers were now drawn to Freetown, far away from the war. The replacement of these officers by a group of relatively inexperienced ones turned the tide in the RUF's favour. The RUF mounted several successful raids and ambushes on these inexperienced commanders.

²⁷ See Cecil Magbailey Fyle, 'The military and civil society in Sierra Leone: the 1992 military coup d'état', in Abdullah and Bangura, eds, *African Development*, pp. 122-46; A. B. Zack-Williams and Steve D. J. ... 'Sierra Leone: the politics of the ...' *African Development*, pp. 122-46.

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Perhaps disgruntled by their treatment under the NPRC, officers abandoned positions that might have been better defended. Some appear to have paid more attention to diamond mining than to basic defence.²⁸

— Much more important was the expansion of the army to bring a speedy end to the war, and to reward its predominantly youthful constituency. Those recruited in this hasty exercise were 'mostly drifters, rural and urban unemployed, a fair number of hooligans, drug addicts and thieves'.²⁹ They came from the same social group as the RUF combatants. It is therefore not surprising that these lumpen recruits and the irregular elements in the new and expanded army freely admit to living off the brutal exploitation of civilians in the war zone. Control by officers was often minimal. For civilians caught in the war zone, conditions on the government side came increasingly to resemble those for civilians on the rebel side of the conflict. Overnight, the army became indistinguishable from the RUF.

Paranoid about the threat of an APC counter-coup, the NPRC executed a large group of political detainees at the end of December 1992, provoking a major outcry over human rights, and losing the country international support. The regime also lost local popular support as civilians began to suffer the consequences of a new enlarged, ill-trained, under-paid lumpen army scattered around the country in makeshift barracks and roadside checkpoints. RUF units began to exploit their knowledge of various smugglers' tracks and pathways linking the Kono diamond fields and the Liberian cross-border region where they had their main bases. Several effective incursions in September 1992 were followed by a major attack leading to the capture from government troops of Koidu, the main town in the Kono diamond region, in October 1992. As one of the country's main sources of foreign exchange, control of Kono was hotly contested. The RUF infiltrated the diamond-rich areas of Kono not so much as a way of establishing operational bases deep within Sierra Leone, but as a way of looting the rich bounty in that part of the country.

Outside the actual war zone, civilians quickly came to loathe the lumpen recruits in the NPRC-expanded army, suspecting them of causing as much mayhem as the rebels, and coining the term 'sobel' to account for the criminal behaviour of these ill-disciplined recruits. But in the eastern war zone, close to the RUF main concentrations along the Liberian border, matters were rather different. Here the activities of army-linked irregulars often had the support of local civilians. Civil defence groups were formed, with input from local hunters, and alliances began to develop between army irregulars and civil defence groups. Unable to control civilian enclaves except through coercion and fear, the RUF was denied access to any similar pool of local tactical and combat knowledge, and was dependent on the less certain bush knowledge of dragooned captives.

With the army concentrating its efforts on retaking and securing the Kono diamond fields, the by now well-armed Border Guard and other irregular units, supported by specialist hunters, many by origin from northern Sierra Leone, brought increasingly effective pressure to bear on RUF bases in the border zone

²⁸ See Arthur Abraham, 'War and transition to peace in Sierra Leone: a study of state conspiracy in perpetuating armed conflict', in Abdullah and Bangura, eds, *African Development*.

during 1993. By the end of the year, eye witnesses describe a bedraggled RUF leadership contingent quitting Kailahun town with a couple of broken-down vehicles, driving a group of displaced civilians ahead of them to spring any ambushes on the road, heading in the direction of the border forest reserves to the south.³⁰ Here they fetched up in a last redoubt – Nomo Chiefdom, an inaccessible finger of land along the Liberian border, partly cut off from the rest of Sierra Leone by the forested curtain of the Gola North reserve. The country at large, increasingly disillusioned with the NPRC, decided that the war was over, and that only 'banditry, looting, maiming and raping' remained.³¹ An army commander echoed similar views: 'there are rebels among us [soldiers], there are mercenaries among us, some of them our own people. The problem is not the RUF alone.'³² It was widely assumed that lumpen recruits in the national army were reverting to criminal behaviour.

At this point, the RUF leadership contemplated abandoning its struggle to return to Liberia.³³ But after Charles Taylor's attempt to take Monrovia – Operation Octopus, December 1992 – ran up against stiff ECOMOG opposition, this line of retreat was blocked by ULIMO control of the Liberian side of the border zone. To survive as a guerrilla movement, tactics had to be changed. The organization was too weak and poorly equipped to risk direct confrontation with a much better-armed enemy. Small towns were evacuated, vehicles were abandoned, and the leadership adapted to life in a series of secure forest hide-aways. Henceforth, combat operations were limited to ambush and hit-and-run raids. RUF units were instructed to strike 'softer targets' – positions not heavily defended – and seize arms and ammunition. Contact with enemy forces was to be avoided, and RUF units were ordered to infiltrate enemy territory by way of 'by-passes' or bush paths, to raid villages and ambush government forces. Small units began a pattern of deploying knowledge of bush tracks to strike at all parts of the country, apparently at will. Terror tactics, such as hostage taking and mutilation of civilians, were used to signal the desperate determination of the movement to survive and enter negotiation with the regime.

Cheated of its lumpen constituency, the RUF meanwhile opened up the wedge between civilians and the NPRC by disguising many of its own attacks as raids by army personnel, having obtained army-pattern combat fatigues and identity in raids and deals with corrupt army officers. Most weapons and ammunition came from raids on the national army forward supply posts. Some were imported by selling diamonds across the border to Liberia and Guinea.

War without front-line: the second phase, 1994–7

During this period, a reinvigorated RUF duplicated its initial secure border-zone forest camps in strategic parts of the country, connecting them by movements along secured bush trails towards Freetown. This scatter of camps then provided a platform for a second expansive phase of RUF operations: a nation-wide campaign

³⁰ See Abraham, 'War and transition', Lansana Gberie, 'War and state collapse: the case of Sierra Leone' (MA dissertation, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1997).

³¹ Chairman Strasser, Head of State, cited in *Fision* (Freetown), 22–29 July 1994.

³² Brigadier Kellie Conteh, 'Open letter to His Excellency Captain Strasser', December 1995, cited in Abraham, 'War and transition'.

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of hit-and-run raids reaching all parts of the country in late 1994 to early 1995. There was no front-line; and the national army was spread thinly across the country.

Key targets included direct attacks on the major hinterland centres of Bo and Kenema at Christmas 1994, a series of ambushes on main roads leading from the hinterland to the capital, and strikes against the Njala campus and the economically vital bauxite and rutile mines in the south of the country. Small raiding parties – at times no more than a platoon, accompanied by unarmed juveniles carrying equipment and stores – carried out hit-and-run raids far and wide, and returned to base camps with looted items. Captive youngsters, rounded up initially to carry looted items, were inducted as potential new recruits. One long-distance strike on Kabala, a town in the far north of Sierra Leone, was apparently intended to challenge the power of a powerful hunter magician based in Kabala, who had been advising the NPRC war effort in Kailahun. The raiding party encountered two British volunteer workers in a house at the edge of the town who were seized as hostages. Subsequently more foreign hostages were taken, the RUF using negotiations over their release as a means to bring the movement publicity. But the immediate political objective was to make the country ungovernable, and therefore force the military junta to yield and include them in a transitional government. Thus commenced the bloodiest phase in the civil war.

Hit-and-run raids on all parts of the country, including the town of Kambia in January 1995, at the furthest provincial extremity from the RUF's initial point of entry into Sierra Leone, conveyed an impression of remorseless advance across the country towards the capital. So effective was this message that by early 1995 aid agencies began to evacuate personnel from Freetown, apparently convinced the RUF now had the upper hand. The national mood swung from the view that the violence was all the work of disloyal soldiers to a belief that the renascent RUF was all powerful.

There can be little doubt that there was civilian disillusionment with the NPRC military government, aided by the RUF in its renaissance and advance on Freetown. There was much justified public disquiet at the way in which members of the NPRC regime had begun to enrich themselves from the war.³⁴ The suspicion grew that the regime was prolonging the war in order to create further opportunities for enrichment. This was reinforced by evidence that some war-front officers, perhaps to save their skins in vulnerable forward positions, were fraternizing with the enemy. Some appear to have abandoned materiel to RUF attack, perhaps by prior arrangement and for financial gain. Equally, there seems little doubt that ill-disciplined elements among the junior ranks were routinely harassing citizens and engaging in extensive looting. Civilians in the war zone became familiar with two-phase attacks: first a lightning raid by RUF forces in which weapons, medicines and young people might be carried away, and then a second wave in which defending troops would descend on an area with trucks to carry away heavy items, including zinc roofing materials, abandoned by fleeing civilians. Kellie Conteh and Joy Turay, force commanders under the NPRC, were on record as admitting that the regime did not control large sections of the army. The popular perception was that the country had fallen victim to a new species of armed men – 'sobels'.

Two new strategic factors on the government side began increasingly to make their mark on the conflict from mid-1995. The first was the introduction of a private South Africa-based security firm, Executive Outcomes (EO). The second and more decisive factor was the strengthening of the civil defence units, known as the Kamajo militia. With never more than a few hundred combat personnel in Sierra Leone (and latterly as few as 82), the main significance of EO was to provide training in counter-insurgency to the army, and helicopter air support for pinning down troops close to RUF camps. EO also helped locate RUF base camps by tracking and triangulating rebel radio communications.

The Kamajo intervention appears to have had a decisive impact on the war. The bush knowledge of the *sau-sau* boys and city lumpens, who were by now in control of the fighting forces, was mainly confined to by-pass routes associated with smuggling and clandestine diamond mining operations. Long-distance raiding parties, although guided by captives from the local area, not infrequently lost their way in trying to stay away from suspicious individuals. Guides with real bush knowledge were often only reluctant converts to the cause, and sometimes led parties up the wrong path only to cut and run. What made a decisive difference to the campaigns against the RUF from 1993-4 onwards was the mobilization of a mass civil defence movement with superior local knowledge of the terrain. This began with the formation of the Eastern Region Defence Committee by the late Dr Alpha Lavalie, and continued on a large scale as a mass movement in 1996, when regent chief Captain Hinga Norman was appointed as Deputy Minister of Defence. These Kamajo forces were groups of local youth with a shared knowledge of local bush tracks and ambush points, often far superior to that of the enemy. Unlike the army and the RUF, they enjoyed the support of local civilians.

By early 1995, displaced people had begun to realize that deserting their respective chiefdoms gave the RUF a huge strategic and political advantage, since their control of the 'footpaths to democracy' was unchallenged. Chiefs and other chiefdom elders decided that they had to occupy and re-settle their vacated chiefdoms in the war zone. Unable to trust the government troops, Pujehun chiefs initially inquired about the availability of Nigerian peace-keeping forces. A more durable alternative was to expand the training of the kinds of Kamajo civil defence units organized by Hinga Norman, which had proved effective in controlling RUF incursions in Gbongor Chiefdom, adjacent to the diamond-rich Sewa area. The idea of resettling chiefdoms accompanied by Kamajo militia forces rapidly became popular among the displaced population of camps in Bo and Kenema. Displaced civilian groups nominated and sponsored many of their own young people for Kamajo training and initiation. Units were organized in such a way that combatants were posted only to their own chiefdoms, to ensure loyalty, discipline and a bush knowledge superior to that of the RUF. The revered and ancient esoteric Mende cult of invincible and heroic hunters was revived as a communal militia, chosen from, trained within, and responsible to the people. Only lightly armed with shotguns, knives and the occasional captured AK47, Kamajo combatants went into battle against the hitherto invisible RUF.³⁵ Armed thus with social as well as with technical combat skills, Kamajo units began to track and counter-attack RUF groups moving over bush

paths to carry out raids or secure supplies, limiting RUF freedom to organize and exchange supplies.

The Kamajo battle song captures the collective imagination about the war and people's perception of the RUF. In this collective representation the RUF is depicted as a criminal organization that deserves to be fought at all cost.³⁶

Who set the *dambi*?

Who set the *dambi* on our forefathers' land?

Who set the *dambi* along our rivers?

Who set the *dambi* in our bushes?

Please tell me, who set the *dambi*?

We set the *dambi*

We, the Kamajo, set the *dambi*.

Why did you set the *dambi*?

Please, tell me, for whom did you set the *dambi*?

Which animal do you hope to trap with the *dambi*?

Please, tell me, why you set the *dambi* on our forefather's land?

We set the *dambi* before the rebels.

Because the rebels killed our forefathers

Because the rebels killed our mothers

Because the rebels raped our wives

Because the rebels raped our mothers.

Because the rebels raped our sisters.

Because the rebels have made us into a displaced people.

Tell me, again, why you set the *dambi* before the rebels.

Please tell me why you set the *dambi* before the rebels.

Tell me why it was necessary to set the *dambi*.

Please tell me again why it was necessary to set the *dambi* on our forefathers' land

We set the *dambi* in order to return to our homes.

We set the *dambi* in order to farm in our forefathers' land.

We set the *dambi* in order to protect our wives.

We set the *dambi* in order to protect our mothers.

We set the *dambi* in order to protect our sisters.

And we kill rebels in order to make our land safe

The *dambi* is the Mende word for trap, which essentially portrays how the people see the RUF, or the rebels, as they are locally called. As animals preying on the land of their 'forefathers', they are seen as fair game to be hunted down and killed in order to protect the community.

The Kamajo offensive was so devastating that the RUF had to admit that their enemy was the Kamajo, not the army. It forced the RUF to resort to a series of appalling atrocities intended to break the cooperative link between rural civilians and the civil defence militia. But the evident need to protect isolated groups of civilians from these barbaric attacks only served to boost recruitment and deploy-

³⁶ We are grateful to Professor Kelfala Kallon for calling our attention to this song, and for supplying

ment. Supported by more conventional forms of military intelligence provided by Executive Outcomes, the superior bush knowledge of the Kamajo had a decisive impact, in allowing army-Kamajo units to locate and surround the main RUF camps during the latter half of 1996. The RUF headquarters camp, the Zogoda, and several other key camps in the south-east were overrun in September–October 1996, and several thousand RUF combatants killed or put to flight. Many RUF combatants fled over the border into Liberia. Peace negotiations, which started under Brigadier Maada Bio in February 1996, were resumed under the popularly elected government of President Kabba, leading to a comprehensive peace agreement signed on 30 November 1996.

The RUF as a Guerrilla Movement³⁷

Leadership: Sankoh and the War Council

The RUF lumpen guerrilla force was first recruited by a small team: Sankoh, Kanu and Mansaray. At the outset Sankoh was first among equals, claiming the title 'head of ideology', and acting as spokesman for the group in speaking to the BBC African service in London, while disclaiming presidential ambitions. The initial trio was augmented by other leading figures, some recruited in Liberia, but others captured or abducted once the movement was in Sierra Leone. One Philip Palmer from Bonthe District, an engineering graduate from FBC working in Liberia, who fought in the southern (Pujehun) sector in 1991, later emerged as an influential figure in the peace process.³⁸ Once the war started there were some defections, as the violent impact of the Liberian special forces on Sierra Leonean civilians became clear. The RUF also lost leaders both in combat and through internal dissension. Blamed for military reverses against the NPRC, Rashid Mansaray and 'Commander' Fengbeh were executed in 1992 in Kailahun for 'technical sabotage' (failure to defend a position).³⁹

Just as the lumpen guerrilla force was augmented by rounding up potentially amenable *sai-sai* boys and school drop-outs in the border zone, so the depleted leadership group was later augmented by capturing and enlisting local opponents of the APC regime. Two such figures were I. H. Deen-Jalloh, a lecturer from the rural teacher's training college at Dunumbu, and his wife Agnes Deen-Jalloh, a Segbwema school teacher. Another captive recruited to the leadership was Fayia Musa, from one of the Kissi chiefdoms in Kailahun District. Noted from his early school days for his contentiousness, Musa had crossed paths with authority at Njala, where he became a student in the 1970s. Twice failing his exams and repeating years, he was

³⁷ The information contained in this section is taken from a collective study commissioned by the Sierra Leone Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation: Paul Richards, Ibrahim Abdullah, Joseph Amara, Patrick Muana, Teddy Stanley and James Vincent, *Reintegration of War-Affected Youth and Ex-Combatants: a Study of the Social and Economic Opportunity Structure in Sierra Leone*, 1996.

³⁸ Palmer led the coup against Sankoh in March 1997; he and other members of the group, all educated, are presumed dead.

³⁹ Abu Kanu, a leading vanguard and founding member, was executed in 1991 for collusion with

inally sent down without graduating. When taken by the RUF in 1991, Musa was a low-paid agricultural assistant in a rural secondary school in Kailahun. He claimed that his conversion to RUF-style violent radicalism was precipitated by a speech in which APC president Momoh announced that the government considered education a privilege, not a right. As 'Minister of Agriculture', Musa was in charge of the so-called state farms established in the early phase of the war, which turned out to be a thinly disguised system of slavery.

It is difficult to ascertain how influential these educated members were in the movement in general, or how much leverage they had on the fighting forces. They certainly contributed to its development, particularly in the sphere of public relations and in publicizing the struggle, especially during the hostage crisis and the negotiations in Ivory Coast. But the important question remains: why did they fail to attract any support from the battle group and battle front commanders when they deposed Sankoh for blocking the implementation of the peace proposal? The answer may well be that the civilian members who were not lumpen did not share the world view of the predominantly lumpen commanders. It is therefore not surprising that, apart from Philip Palmer, all of them joined the movement after it entered Sierra Leone. In the absence of Sankoh, who was detained in March 1997 by the Nigerians in growing frustration at the failure of the peace process, the future of the conflict rested solely with the lumpen vanguard battle group commanders, especially Colonel Sam Bockarie and Lieutenant Collins, and their new-found allies in the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), formed after the bloody take-over of 25 May 1997.

Officers and other ranks

RUF 'battalions' are made up of combatants in the following categories: 'vanguards' (instructors in RUF ideology, consisting of guerrilla trainers, senior battle group commanders and more junior battle front commanders); Special Forces ('Liberians', latterly perhaps mainly persons of Liberian origin but with a family connection with Sierra Leone, who accounted for a significant number of senior officers in the RUF); *Solon wosus* (rank-and-file combatants, recruited mainly by capture but converts to the cause, trained, and allowed to carry weapons); 'standbys' (captives under training, of unproven loyalty and competence); and 'recruits' (fresh intake).

Any combatant selected to command a mission is known as 'CO'. Those leading attacks on major RUF targets are 'battle front commanders', and typically hold RUF ranks of Lieutenant and Captain. The more senior 'battle group commanders' are responsible for coordination and command of all battle front commanders in their sectors. Holding the rank of Major or above, battle group commanders have a voice on the War Council. Until 1996, the most senior of these commanders was Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Tarawallie ('Colonel Zino'), a fair-complexioned man of medium height in his late 20s or early 30s, who was killed when the Kamajo overran the Zogoda.

The 'vanguard' and *wosu* groups contain some female combatants. The greater number of women in the RUF, however, belong to two groups known as Combat

Women in the Wives Unit and later Combat Wives Units were armed with 'sista beretta' (mainly Beretta submachine guns), they were charged with responsibility for policing gatherings of the captive population and occasionally acted as bodyguards. Some were later involved in 'special missions' – infiltrating 'enemy territory', and running 'survival missions' into large civilian settlements behind enemy lines in order to purchase essential commodities and medicine.

The Internal Defence Unit (IDU) is the 'intelligence' arm of the RUF. Tasks include carrying out reconnaissance (infiltration of target areas, procurement of vital supplies), target assessment (estimating army strength and materiel, and prospecting possible routes to targets and new camps from which to mount attacks), general military intelligence, liaison between commanders of battle groups and battle fronts, monitoring movements of civilians and RUF personnel in RUF-controlled enclaves (informing HQ for action), liaison with RUF head of ideology (Foday Sankoh), and monitoring deployment of civilian captives. Headed by I. H. Deen-Jalloh, the unit was once known as G-2, but the name was changed at a conference in Kailahun in 1992, after an operational mix-up with a similarly named NPRC organization. IDU representatives are present in all operational areas, even during combat.

RUF combat groupings

During the 1994 revival the RUF established a national network of six or more main combat groupings or 'battalions', based in camps in isolated and readily defended forest enclaves in strategic parts of the country, as a basis for its attempted advance on Freetown. The main concentrations so far identified were to be found as follows: Malal Hills (overlooking the Freetown-Makeni highway) was responsible for attacks on Kambia District in January 1995, during which a small group of expatriate nuns and a hundred or so children from Kambia Town were taken hostage. Fearing an attack (the NPRC government had at this time acquired the services of two or three Russian-built helicopter transports), the group rebuilt its camp at the other end of the Malal Hills, and then advanced to a new site in the vicinity of Rotifunk, from where the army post at Mile 38 on the Freetown road and villages close to the capital were attacked. Some ambushes on vehicle convoys on the Bo-Freetown road appear to have been made from a forward position at Makeni-Rofula.

Others were located around Kangari Hills, Geima, close to the Liberian border in Kailahun, and at Peyeima, based in the forested country behind Panguma, with access to the Tongo diamond field; the Sendunnei-Jui group was located in a forested ridge south of the Kambui forest reserves; the Sulima group was in the south-east of the country where it could control supplies in and out of Liberia and on the coast. In addition, the RUF maintained a headquarters camp, where Sankoh and many of the War Council appear to have been based, at the Zogoda, an elaborate defensive installation in flat forested country east of the Moa and north of Zimmi. Site descriptions from visiting combatants suggest a location in the Gola forest west reserve. It was from here that Foday Sankoh was airlifted by helicopter to begin the peace negotiations in Abidjan in January 1996. The base was overrun and destroyed

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and the Kamajo forces discovered large numbers of severely malnourished civilian captives and only very limited supplies of munitions. Anti-aircraft guns at the site were non-operational.

Guerrilla operations

The RUF was never a formidable military force. Whenever a position was seriously defended by the army, as at Daru and Joru in 1991, the rebels ran into difficulty. When operating in remote and lightly defended forested terrain the RUF expanded rapidly, not through fighting but through imposing itself by spooking small and isolated army units and then controlling civilians through fear. Among the tactics used, the RUF particularly favoured letters written to village chiefs, warning of lates of attack and consequences of resistance. Alleged opponents of the rebels were rounded up and beaten, tortured or publicly executed. Some of the methods – reheading by knife, for example – were intended to terrorize witnesses. Body mutilation (carving the letters RUF into the skin, or amputation of hands, ears, fingers and genitals) was also used to punish recalcitrants and signal certain kinds of messages to civilians. Amputations and mutilations were used to deter women from harvesting in areas outside RUF control, to ‘punish’ civilians for attempting to vote in the 1996 elections, and to ‘mark’ potential runaways so that they would not abscond again. Some specific forms of punitive torture were imported from the Liberian civil war. To *tabay* people meant to tie them so tightly (with wet ropes) that arms and shoulders were permanently damaged. Civilians were also sometimes stripped naked, arms and feet tied, and then beaten from point to point while lying prone, a punishment known as *halaka*.

Post-1993 guerrilla operations emphasized small units making long-distance hit-and-run raids, using RUF command of bush ‘by-pass’ routes. RUF units were especially skilled at spying out the ground, camping for periods in the bush, and mounting ambushes. A ‘relay’ system was used, known as ‘soldier replaces dead soldier’. Combat reserves were termed ‘standbys’ (young recruits not yet qualified to carry arms in their own right). On operations, units might make temporary bush camps, with a main section for *wosus* and a separate section for officers. Burning vehicles and seizing and eating cooked food in villages were forbidden (the latter perhaps a measure to avoid poisoning). Commanders were under orders to control rape, looting and drug abuse, and some ruled their potentially unruly lumpen troops with an iron rod of summary execution. The movement’s leadership insists it had a well-disciplined guerrilla force at its command, and that RUF discipline prevented unsanctioned rape, looting or drug abuse. Abuses are laid at the door of government troops and ‘sobels’. But in many cases it is absolutely clear that commanders sanctioned rape and torture of civilians as a means to control local populations. It is also clear from talking to combatants that both sides in the war tolerated and in some case actually encouraged use of drugs like amphetamines and crack cocaine, as ways of preparing terrified young combatants for battle. Combatants on both sides also report having used marijuana extensively. Before major battles RUF fighters were officially ‘de-sensitized’ with a concoction of amphetamines and herbal intoxicant in order to eliminate a sense of fear on the

RUF ‘civil administration’

After the resurgence of the bush war in early 1994, RUF units avoided residing permanently in villages, especially roadside settlements where the army could counter-attack. Isolated civilian enclaves were controlled from the secure forest camps where the combatants were based. These civilian enclaves were administered under the RUF’s so-called ‘ideology system’. The head of ideology, Foday Sankoh, reportedly lectured recruits on the reason for the insurrection. At the RUF’s vocational secondary school training base at Pendembu, his tirade against the APC regime effectively convinced most recruits to embrace the RUF motto ‘arms to the people, power to the people, and wealth to the people’.

The ideology system involved appointing civilian collaborators – often young people with some lumpen sympathies – to act as civil authorities under the RUF. These civilians were known as ‘town’, ‘area’ and ‘section’ commanders, and ‘town mothers’ (women chiefs), assisted by ‘civil police’ and ‘military police’. Under the ideology system, combatants were reportedly ordered not to take ‘even a single needle’ from the local population. In spite of this injunction, looting was widespread. Members were instructed to refer to one another as ‘brother’ or ‘sister’. This policy was designed to effect a kind of lumpen bonding to replace the networks which connected members to the wider society. It was reinforced by the total exclusion of RUF fighters from the civilian population in what were referred to as ‘Zoe’ bushes (militarized camps). Some were even forced to witness or even participate in atrocities against captives or family members in their own towns and villages. The main duties of civil ‘commanders’ seem to have been to organize agriculture in the RUF interest, and maintain village discipline. They were empowered to oblige civilians to pay tax in kind and provide labour for RUF ‘state farms’, and could carry out summary executions. Town commanders were also obliged to look out for and return deserting rebel combatants. Deserters were either killed or their bodies marked with tattoos (mutilations in which the letters RUF were cut into the body with a razor and rubbed with lime). Some RUF civil commanders eased their plight by giving daughters to rebel combatants as wives.

The RUF in Comparative Context

The RUF has defied all available typologies on guerrilla movements. It is neither a separatist insurgency rooted in a specific demand, as in the case of Eritrea, nor a reformist insurgency with a radical agenda superior to the regime it sought to overthrow.⁴⁰ Nor does it possess the kind of leadership that would be necessary to designate it as a warlord insurgency. The RUF has made history, it is a peculiar guerrilla movement without any significant national following nor ethnic support. Perhaps because of its lumpen social base and its lack of an emancipatory programme to garner support from other social groups, it has remained a bandit organization solely driven by the survivalist needs of its predominantly uneducated and alienated

⁴⁰ For a number of important typologies, see: (1) G. Przeworski and M. Sprague, *Democracy in*

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the front and battle group commanders. Neither the peasantry, the natural ally of most revolutionary movements, nor the students, amongst whose ranks the RUF—be originated, lent any support to the organization during the six years of fighting.

This lack of support begins to explain the initial isolation of the organization and the lack of knowledge about its activities. As Olu Gordon recently observed, the RUF is 'an armed movement with a political objective' not 'a political movement (with an armed wing)'. The RUF has emphasized the importance of military victory rather than a solid programme of societal transformation, precisely because it does not have such a programme or the wherewithal to produce one. For what marks the RUF is the chronic lack of cadres to disseminate its alleged egalitarian ideology, for which it has come to depend on the those whom it abducted in the course of the war.⁴¹

The propaganda pamphlet hurriedly produced by the organization, *Foot Path to Democracy*, is a pathetic and well-worn criticism of the APC regime, culled from an original document produced by some of the expelled students in Ghana.⁴² Unlike UNITA or any of the liberation insurgencies, the RUF does not have any programme of societal transformation. All it could do at the peace negotiations in Adjara was to make *ad hoc* populist demands about free education, free health care services, rural development and a people's budget. The movement does not have the intellectual capital that movements such as Renamo and UNITA had at their command, nor does it have a group of dedicated intellectuals, hence its reliance on a war-captured educated members to negotiate on its behalf and run its intelligence unit.

The singular importance of the RUF as a guerrilla organization is that it has defied all radical pronouncements about the political importance of the lumpen proletariat in taking political action in its own interest. Originally a product of Freetown youth culture, the movement entered Sierra Leone with combatants, mostly urban lumpens, who were joined by another group of lumpen Sierra Leoneans resident in Liberia. Failing to receive the anticipated support from the people, the RUF turned for support to its natural allies, the *san-san* boys, illicit amongst miners in the communities of the south-east, the major theatre of war. This alliance is the secret of the movement's survival and the major reason for the continuation of the war. Once the Kamajo militia was formed, the movement lost some of this support, so that it had to depend on another group of lumpens in the military who shared the same lumpen culture and interest as the RUF commanders: uncertainty about what an end to the war would mean for their collective well-being. This congruence of interest between the two erstwhile enemies provided the basis for the alliance which led to the overthrow of the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabba on 25 May 1997.

The RUF's presence in the capital took away much of the mystery surrounding the movement. The ideas of the original vanguard leadership were shaped by the urban lumpen milieu portrayed at the outset of this chapter. This lumpen world was

transformed by the specific social conditions of Freetown in the 1970s and 1980s, in which a middle-class student element came into contact with the young unemployed in the *potes* associated with *odelay* masquerade. A lumpen rebellion was hatched as a result. The movement set out to round up and convert rural youths sharing aspects of this lumpen world view, and some isolated and angry individuals opposed to the decadent APC regime. Setting no limits on the use of violence for social destabilization, using techniques imported from the Liberian civil war, the original rebellion failed in its attempts to gain any significant civilian support in the border zone.

But an NPRC military regime, fired by some of the same simplistic views about revolutionary change, was soon mired by the same lumpen violence responsible for the political failure of the RUF. New recruits into a rapidly expanded army became as great a menace to rural civilians as the RUF. This gave the RUF, bogged down in forest reserves on the Liberian border, a second chance. It re-emerged from the forest, driven by the desperate ingenuity of its lumpen leadership and the stop-at-nothing propensity for shocking violence of its young combatants, cut off from a hostile and vengeful civil society and convinced that only victory would secure its readmission to that wider society. Finally, rural civilians came to realize the vulnerability of a movement based on shock tactics but without local support and legitimacy. The civilian Kamajo militia began to better the RUF at its own game of surprise attack based on unopposed movement through the bush. 'Footpaths to Democracy' soon became 'Bush Paths to Destruction' for the RUF.

Despite the limitations and failures of the RUF, the country — indeed the continent — will have to pay more attention to the frustrated energies of its lumpen 'revolutionaries' who are asking a poignant question about how the nation is being governed: 'Is it not more sensible to pull the rug from under such pampered feet by establishing our own self-subsisting habitation?'⁴³ Establishing their own self-subsisting habitation — that is to say, moving onto the centre stage in the historical process, as opposed to being marginal — is not only a RUF agenda but the lumpen project writ large.

⁴³ Wole Soyinka, *The Open Sore of a Continent*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 130.

⁴¹ Olu Awononor-Gordon, 'A nation held hostage,' in *For Di People* (Freetown), 12 June 1997.

⁴² The second volume of this propaganda tract is still not published; some parts of it were taken from

110) News Report

BBC News, "Grim Facts of Sierra Leone's War", 13 February 1999.

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Saturday, February 13, 1999 Published at 05:24 GMT

Grim facts of Sierra Leone's war



Grim facts of Sierra Leone's war

A United Nations report has blamed rebel forces for most of the atrocities during an attack on Sierra Leone's capital Freetown last month, but has also accused the Nigerian-led intervention force of carrying out summary executions.



The UN observer mission to Sierra Leone blames the rebels for untold numbers of random killings, mutilations, and rapes and the destruction of a fifth of the capital's buildings.

But the UN document also acknowledged that there had been reports that the West African peacekeeping force Ecomog had been "summarily executing detainees who were allegedly either rebels or rebel sympathisers".

The report said that the actual number of civilian casualties suffered during last month's attack on Freetown would never be known, although one mortuary worker said on 25 January that over 2,000 bodies of men, women and children had already been disposed of.

A large number of bodies were believed to have been left in ruined buildings or to have been hastily buried on waste ground.

Since rebel forces had renewed their offensive against Sierra Leone's democratically elected government in December, conservative estimates put the total casualty figure at between 3,000 and 5,000, said the UN report.

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It says the rape of women and girls appears to have been standard practice for the rebels.

Many of the soldiers on the rebel side were children, with some as young as eight.

Rebels advancing through Freetown on 6 and 7 January had "frequently forced civilians into the streets for use as human shields".

Much of the killing had seemed to have been completely arbitrary, the document said, and a number of those interviewed had described "the execution of the entire population of residential compounds" for refusing to obey instructions to dance and make music on the streets.

"Killing occasionally occurred in the context of games in which people were lined up and the executioners teasingly chose who to kill, and who to spare," the report said, adding that perpetrators were often said to have been under the influence of cocaine, other drugs or alcohol.

Food crisis warning



UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented the report to a closed meeting of the Security Council before its public release on Friday.

The contents of the report emerged as the UN World Food Programme warned that continued fighting in the capital threatens to put the city's entire population at risk of a large-scale food crisis in as little as three weeks.

Although human rights violations by the Nigerian-led Ecomog force and Sierra Leone's Civil Defence Forces did not match the scale of rebel atrocities, they were nonetheless totally unacceptable, the report said.

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Interrogation 'inadequate'

Human rights monitors in Sierra Leone's UN observer mission had witnessed one execution by the peacekeeping force and said "witnesses of the highest probity" had reported that they were present at others.

"Witnesses make clear that, in all cases, the interrogation process was entirely inadequate and that there was no real effort to establish the guilt or innocence of execution victims," it said.

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111) News Report

Sierra Leone News Archives for dates 25, 28 May 1997

Sierra Leone News

News Archives

25 May 1997: Soldiers this morning overthrew the civilian government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. The coup was led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who announced Sunday that he had taken control of the country. "As custodians of state security and defenders of the constitution (we) have today decided to overthrow the Sierra Leone Peoples Party government because of their failure to consolidate the claims achieved by the brokers of peace," Koroma told the nation. He accused Kabbah's government of being "nurtured on tribal and sectional conflict." Koroma said he has invited RUF leader Foday Sankoh to join his government. "In this regard we appeal to the international community and the Nigerian government in particular to release Corporal Foday Sankoh," he said. Gunfire continued into the evening hours as looting soldiers moved around the city in vehicles commandeered from civilians, NGO's, and the government; soldiers also burned down the Treasury building. Freetown is under a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and coup leaders have said that looters, military or civilian, will be shot on sight. The country's borders have been sealed and Lungi Airport and the seaports have been ordered closed. Coup leaders and a Guinean newspaper said President Kabbah has fled to Conakry, Guinea. Connaught Hospital reported 5 dead--including 2 civilians--and 21 injured by midday, but said more casualties were expected.

In their first decree since assuming power, the coup leaders abolished the Kamajors, a civilian militia of traditional hunters. They have also called for the return to Sierra Leone of Captain Solomon "SAJ" Musa, who was linked to coup allegations in 1993, and General Julius Maada Bio, the leader of the NPRC until the military handed over power to the civilian government last year. An unconfirmed report from Freetown says the coup leaders have called upon United National People's Party (UNPP) leader John Karefa-Smart to join them, a suggestion strongly rejected by a family member.

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Sierra Leone News

News Archives

28 May 1997: The Revolutionary United Front High Command today ordered its fighters to back the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. A statement from RUF leader Foday Sankoh was read over SLBS (state radio) at 10:00 GMT, ordering the rebels to stop all attacks and to adopt a defensive posture. "Be on the defensive. All instructions--former instructions--for operations should be cancelled. All commanders should be on the defensive," the statement said. Sankoh ordered RUF fighters to cooperate with the military to defend Sierra Leone's sovereignty. "We ask you to work with (the army) so that peace will prevail in our beloved motherland. So I will like you all to work with them as brothers; we are no more enemies. The enemies are the politicians, not the soldiers." Field commanders were instructed that their orders from Sankoh will now come through Major Johnny Paul Koroma, the leader of the AFRC.

The AFRC banned all public demonstrations and public meetings Wednesday after learning of a planned protest against last Sunday's coup. "The government has been reliably informed that some members of the public are planning to stage a mass demonstration today," a statement said. "In consideration of the present situation in the country, particularly in the capital, Freetown, government will not permit the holding of such demonstration, public meeting, or procession until further notice." On Tuesday the AFRC suspended the constitution and banned political parties. "As from now on, all legislation will be by military decrees," AFRC leader Major Johnny Paul Koroma said. SLBS (state radio) announced Wednesday that Koroma wishes to meet with the presidents or representatives of the following organisations at Defence Headquarters on June 3rd: The Sierra Leone Association of Journalists, the Sierra Leone Bar Association, the Medical and Dental Association, the Catholic Mission, the Islamic Council, the Council of Churches, the National Union of Sierra Leone Students, and the Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce. He has also asked that representatives of the Indigenous and Petty Traders Association, the Indian Community, and the Lebanese Community meet with him on June 5th. The radio also reported that effective immediately, the 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew has been relaxed to run from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.

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Sierra Leone News Archives 25, 28, 30 June 1997

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concerns in Sierra Leone.

25 June: AFRC leader Major Johnny Paul Koroma said Wednesday that he is ready to allow President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to return as long as Kabbah stops "misleading" the international community. In an address to the nation, Koroma said he would soon announce the composition of his new government and a "timetable for a proper return to civilian rule," which he said would be as short as possible. Koroma promised to hold free and fair elections which would be unlike the polls last year when 54 people were killed in Freetown on election day. Commenting on the coup, Koroma said, "We just could not sit down and allow a president to be manipulated as people were killed or maimed." Koroma said Kabbah should have incorporated RUF leader Foday Sankoh into the political system, but had failed to do so "out of greed." On Tuesday, UNPP leader John Karefa-Smart said he had strongly advised the AFRC not to name a cabinet, as this would send a signal to the international community that the coup leaders do not intend to relinquish power.

ECOWAS foreign ministers will meet Thursday in Conakry, Guinea to assess the current situation in Sierra Leone, and to work out a framework for resolving the political crisis there. OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim and ECOWAS Executive Secretary Edouard Benjamin are expected to attend the meeting, which will be chaired by Guinean president General Lansana Conte. In Abjua, Nigeria a senior army general said that Nigeria is not contemplating removing its troops from Nigeria. "If we pull out that will be a defeatist attitude," Major-General Patrick Aziza said following a meeting of Nigeria's Provisional Ruling Council. "We have been holding consultations with the men in command there and we hope it will yield positive results," he said.

RUF rebels have been seen in churches, mosques, and other public places asking forgiveness for atrocities they committed during six years of civil war. "We have now joined our parents, our brothers and sisters. The war, mutilations, burnings and indiscriminate killings have stopped," said RUF spokesman Lieutenant Eldred Collins in a message repeatedly broadcast on SLBS radio and television this week. Collins and other members of the RUF--now renamed the People's Army of Sierra Leone--have been regularly attending church services in Freetown. "We take responsibility for the atrocities committed in the country's interior," Collins said. "We burned, looted, maimed, and killed but we did not do this because we wanted to. We had to because that was the only way we could have uprooted a rotten system." The AFRC has named three members of the RUF to its ruling council, including RUF leader Foday Sankoh, who is currently being detained in Nigeria, and Collins, who was named Supervisor of the Department of the Interior. "We are basically working out a power-sharing arrangement with the People's Army so that lasting peace would come," AFRC spokesman Colonel Abdul Sesay said. The People's Army's War Council, which serves as the RUF's high command, says that its fighters are ready to disarm, but only if the ECOMOG intervention force pulls out.

The AFRC acknowledged Tuesday that looting and killing continues in Freetown, and promised intensified patrols. The announcement, made over SLBS (state radio), did little to calm the fears of residents, some of whom have resorted to vigilantism and street justice. On Wednesday, a teenage boy was hacked to death by a mob after he was caught breaking into a house. His arms and head were chopped off and one testicle placed in his mouth. "I know the boy. He doesn't live in the area but he frequents it during the day. He has been leading gangs of boys who break into people's homes, looting them clean," a witness said.

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The human rights group Amnesty International (AI) repeated its call Wednesday for the AFRC to respect and protect the fundamental rights of all Sierra Leoneans. Among concerns already raised by directly with Major Johnny Paul Koroma was the detention of at least 15 people arrested on June 16, accused of conspiring to overthrow the military government. "We fear that some of these people may be detained only because they opposed the military coup which brought the AFRC to power. If this is the case, they should be immediately and unconditionally released," AI said. AI called for a fair trial for any of the detained who are accused of a criminal offence, and noted that there is concern that they will not receive a fair trial if tried before a military court. Those arrested are civilians associated with President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's government or the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), and senior military officers. They are reported to include Dr. Sama S. Banya (medical doctor and SLPP member), Colonel K.E.S Boyah, Dauda Bundu, Colonel Tom Carew, Major Francis Gottor (former NPRC Chief of Defence), Dr. Abdul Jalloh (Member of Parliament), Dr. Bockarie M. Kobba, Abu Aiah Koroma (Minister for Political and Parliamentary Affairs), Elizabeth Loveli (Member of Parliament), Colonel R.Y. Koroma, Captain John Massaquoi, Abdullai Mustapha (State House Liaison Officer), Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.H. Tucker (from Patricia Kabbah's family), Major Vandi Turay and David Quee (Minister for Local Government). At least two of those detained were reportedly physically assaulted by soldiers at the time of their arrest. They are currently being held incommunicado at Pademba Road Prison. AI has called for them to be allowed immediate access to their families, lawyers, and doctors. AI also expressed concern about the summary executions of suspected looters by military officials. Such killings appear to contravene international standards on the use of lethal force, the group said. Soldiers have killed at least 10 people in Freetown; similar killings have been reported in Bo.

24 June: The AFRC called Tuesday for an all-party consultative conference to discuss a timetable for new elections in Sierra Leone. Director of Military Information Colonel Abdul Sesay said the conference would bring together the military, ousted President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the Revolutionary United Front, and the Kamajor militia. "We are calling for all the major stakeholders in the present political crisis...to sit together and consult in the African tradition and resolve the present political crisis in the country and set a timetable for fresh elections in Sierra Leone in which everybody including Kabbah himself can participate," he said. Sesay said the AFRC wants "moral guarantors" to attend the talks. He said that role could be fulfilled by countries and organisations involved in the peace negotiations in Ivory Coast last year, along with Britain and the United States. He also called for the United Nations to provide security at the venue. Sesay said the timing of the conference would depend on logistical arrangements and discussions between the parties. Other agenda items would be demobilisation and reintegration of rebel fighters, addressing the grievances of the military and ensuring the welfare of all involved in the coup, consolidation of the peace deal with the rebels, and reaching consensus on what constitutes good governance for a civilian government.

23 June: The leaders of the eight member nations making up the West African Economic Monetary Union condemned the coup in Sierra Leone Monday at an economic conference in Lome, Togo. In a joint statement, the leaders said that everything possible should be done to restore the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. The statement called for peacekeeping troops to be placed under the command of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity. The member states of the Union are Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

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played in Bamako, Mali," a CAF communiqué said.

28 June: Soldiers killed at least 25 people in Bo District Thursday, according to witnesses who reached Freetown on Saturday. Among the dead was Albert Sani Demby, Paramount Chief of Baoma Chiefdom, the father of ousted vice president Joseph Demby. Chief Demby, who is said to have been blind, was taken from his compound in Gerihun by soldiers, who shot him in the stomach and killed him. The soldiers then attacked two more towns, Telu and Sembehun, killing 25 civilians including another traditional chief. The witnesses said soldiers burned town part of Telu, Jaiama-Bongor Chiefdom, the home of Deputy Defence Minister Hinga Norman. The soldiers were said to be scouring the bush for Kamajors who they believed were gathering in preparation for an attack on military bases in Bo. Military officials in Bo have declined comment. The independent newspaper *Voice of di People* reported Saturday that unidentified attackers firing automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and mortars forced residents of Moyamba to flee the town last week.

The AFRC Saturday issued a statement asking ECOWAS countries to reconsider their efforts to isolate the military government. "The AFRC regards such measures as counter-productive, in the sense that it will not only hurt the people of Sierra Leone but will further lead to the economic sinking of the country," the statement said. The Nigerian newspaper *Daily Times* reported Saturday that sanctions will be imposed on Sierra Leone and force will be used if the military does not return President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power "within a reasonable timetable."

Reaction: Tony Lloyd, British Minister for Africa: *"The demands were for the coup plotters to recognise that the game is up, and it is up. However long it takes, the game for them is up. The people of Sierra Leone do not deserve what they've had unleashed. Our commitment and that of the whole international community is to make sure that the legitimate government is back in power as quickly as possible. There's a very strong need now for the coup plotters to recognise that it is in their hands to offer proper salvation to the people of Sierra Leone. (They need to) to get round that negotiating table and to recognise that they cannot continue with the present position."*

27 June: ECOWAS foreign ministers meeting in Conakry, Guinea have agreed to pursue dialogue and economic sanctions to force Sierra Leone's military rulers to reinstate ousted president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. In a 14-point communiqué released after the meeting, which ended early Friday morning, the ministers stressed that no country should recognise the military regime. They called upon the international community to support the ECOWAS initiatives and to provide emergency aid to Guinea and other countries affected by a flood of refugees since the coup. The ministers recommended working "to restore legitimate government through a combination of three measures--dialogue, sanctions, and an embargo, as well as recourse to force." But, they added, "In order to increase the effectiveness of the above measures, the ministers...recommended prior consultations among member states at the highest level." The ministers designated a four nation committee consisting of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Ivory Coast, plus OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, to open a dialogue with the AFRC and report back to ECOWAS Chairman General Sani Abacha within two weeks. At the end of Thursday's session, a source was quoted as saying that the mood of the delegates was for "imminent military intervention." Ghana was reported to be the "lone voice" opposing military intervention; Reports said that Salim reiterated the OAU's support for "any method that would restore the legitimate government in Sierra Leone." In a message to the meeting, General Sani Abacha said that if the situation

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30 June 1997: RUF reinforcements have arrived in Freetown, saying they are willing to fight to the death to defend the capital. According to the rebels, some 2,000 RUF fighters arrived over the weekend and are now encamped in towns around Freetown. "We have come to reinforce our positions in and around Freetown in case we need to defend it against any attacks," one fighter said. "We will fight to the last man if ordered to do so."

West African countries have closed their embassies in Freetown, in line with an ECOWAS decision not to recognize the AFRC military regime. Nigeria closed its embassy the day after the May 25 coup, while Gambia closed its embassy on June 29. Guinea's embassy remains open, but the ambassador and senior diplomats have left. Staff members remaining behind say they are there to provide travel documents to Guinean citizens wishing to return home.

Reaction: John Dinger, acting U.S. state department spokesman: *"The United States wants to see early restoration of order and democracy in Sierra Leone, where soldiers and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels overthrew the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. We believe concerted efforts by Africa to find a negotiated solution offer the best hope for returning the legitimate government, and advancing stability in Sierra Leone. Thus, we applaud the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) toward a peaceful solution to the crisis in Sierra Leone. We welcome ECOWAS' June 27 Communiqué from Conakry calling for the early reinstatement of President Kabbah, the return of peace and security and the resolution of the issues of refugees and displaced persons. The United States hopes ECOWAS will take immediate steps to move the process forward. We are prepared to work with Sierra Leone's neighbors in helping to reach a peaceful settlement."*

29 June: Freetown was reported calm Sunday, and some stores are reported to be operating. Rice is selling for Le 24,000 a bag, up from Le 16,000 to 18,000 before the coup. The price of a cup of rice is Le 120. In Kono, where a source claimed Saturday that the army has unleashed a "reign of terror" on residents, the price of a bag of rice is reported to be Le 60,000 or Le 500 a cup.

The Confederation of African Football (CAF) called on Sierra Leone Sunday to ensure that the country's national soccer stadium is a safe place to play. The organisation said it wants a guarantee of good security and organisation in Freetown for African Nations Cup qualifying matches held in Freetown, or future games will be switched to neutral Mali. Last weekend, Sierra Leone's Group Four home match against Tunisia was postponed because of security concerns in the country following the May 25 coup. The CAF has now ordered the game to be played in Freetown on Wednesday, July 23—four days before Sierra Leone is to play Ghana in Freetown in the final qualifying game. Sierra Leone will need to win both games to stand any chance of qualifying for the cup finals in Burkina Faso next year. The team has lost both away games in the three-nation group. Ghana leads the group with 6 points, followed by Tunisia with 3. Sierra Leone has been given until July 10 to comply with the CAF's demands. "In case of a negative response or no reaction from the Sierra Leone Football Association, the two matches will be

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6 January 1999: AFRC/RUF rebel forces battled their way into Freetown on Wednesday, and according to many reports have seized State House and burned down the nearby Nigerian Embassy, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) headquarters, and the capital's main police station. Rebel fighters, many carrying assault rifles, roamed through abandoned streets in the city centre. "Districts in the Eastend of Freetown are under control of the rebels. We can see them from our windows patrolling the streets on foot and in looted vehicles," one resident told Reuters. Others reported that bodies were lying in the streets while rebels prepared defensive barricades. BBC correspondent Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay described the fighting: "The firing at one stage, the shelling at one stage, was actually very heavy," he said. "They burnt down the CID, they burnt down Eastend Police, and a popular place called Picadilly at St John has also been destroyed." He confirmed reports that rebel forces had captured Pademba Road Prison and released the prisoners, many of them former members of the AFRC government convicted of treason or awaiting trial on treason charges, along with surrendered soldiers of the former Sierra Leone Army whom the government feared posed a security risk. "Yes, yes, that was one of their first actions when they entered Freetown," he said. "When they came into Freetown they simply marched into Pademba Road Prison with no resistance from ECOMOG and set free all of those detained there."

At 2:30 p.m. the BBC spoke to a "Colonel Sesay" who claimed to be in State House where, he said, the rebels had "overthrown the SLPP government." State House is not currently used for governmental affairs, which are conducted from the "The Lodge" at Hill Station. Sesay said AFRC/RUF fighters had met no resistance from ECOMOG as they entered the city, and he claimed that rebel forces, which he put at "15,000 armed men," controlled nearly all of Freetown. He told the BBC that the rebels were engaged in a battle for Wilberforce Barracks. "I can't talk it to you now, the battle is going on. Someone has just told me they have captured, they have captured, the main office, that is the holding room and the guard room," he said. Sesay's claims were sharply disputed by Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer. "This fellow is lying," he said. "And he also said they've captured Wilberforce Barracks. That was a blatant lie. It's a lie. I've been to Wilberforce Barracks, I've been to State House. And I'm actually talking to you now from Wilberforce Barracks. I've been to State House earlier in the day. They are not there." Spencer acknowledged that the rebels held parts of Freetown, including the Pademba Road area, Brookfields, and Ferry Junction. He claimed many of the rebels were hiding, because they were being pursued, and predicted that the rebel onslaught would be ended before nightfall. "You see they are going to be thrown out completely, not just from Freetown. In the areas which they attacked, in Makeni, the northern part, they are also going to be thrown out...You see, the real issue is that the people of Sierra Leone have said they want a democratic government. Nobody should think that they can come and overthrow a government by force of arms and take control of the country — that is out of the question!"

BBC correspondent Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay confirmed that rebel forces had reached the city centre, although he could not say whether they had occupied State House. "I cannot again

confirm whether they are in fact in charge of State House," he said. "What I can tell you is that they are occupying several houses very close to State House. I have spoken to one or two friends of mine who have called me on the phone telling me that the rebels have actually occupied their homes, which is just about a stone's throw to State House." Ojukutu-Macaulay said it appeared fighting was going on for control of Wilberforce Barracks. "By the sound of the shelling, I think that either ECOMOG is trying to push them away or the junta and the rebels are trying to force their way into the barracks." The BBC correspondent noted that the rebels had met very little resistance when they attacked, "and that has taken a lot of people by surprise here in Freetown."

A source in Freetown reported Wednesday night that Wilberforce Barracks had not come under attack. He said the fighting which was reported took place at Congo Cross Bridge, near the stadium, when ECOMOG troops clashed with rebels to prevent them from releasing surrendered soldiers. "The barracks are safe, nothing is going on," he said by telephone from near the barracks themselves. He added that ECOMOG troops were pursuing rebels in Freetown.

RUF commander Col. Sam "Maskita" Bockarie, claiming to be "just within around Freetown" said he was confronting ECOMOG with a force of 30,000 men, but told the BBC that ECOMOG soldiers should "stay calm, cease fire" so that the rebels could "negotiate their repatriation." He said his fighters had the ECOMOG troops at Wilberforce Barracks surrounded, but that the rebels were holding off on attacking the ECOMOG base at Lungi. "Lungi Airport is just an outlet, that's why we decided to just leave it open for awhile for those foreign nationals to leave. As soon as they leave, we'll be ready to take Lungi," he said. Bockarie warned that members of the civilian government had 24 hours to leave the country or turn themselves over to the rebels. "Anyone who is caught after that, he is going to be dealt with militarily," he said. The rebel leader said he thought President Kabbah had already left the capital, a claim disputed by Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer and Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning Dr. James O.C. Jonah. In a separate interview with Reuters, Bockarie said his forces had captured most of Freetown, including the broadcasting station, but that fighting was continuing at Waterloo. "We even have the seaport. Fighting is at Waterloo now, and we are trying to get rid of the elements (of ECOMOG) that are putting up stiff resistance there," he said. Bockarie said the rebels would agree to a ceasefire once RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh were handed over to them. Sankoh was reportedly transferred from Pademba Road Prison to an undisclosed location prior to the rebel advance. "If Sankoh is released and handed over to us we are ready to cease fire. And we will see to it that we can secure the repatriation of these Nigerian soldiers, because they are our brothers," he said, adding that "the leader will tell the nation what next." Bockarie appealed to Nigerian leader General Abdulsalami Abubakar to release Sankoh to the RUF. "We are appealing to our big brother, his Excellency General Abubakar, we are appealing to him to instruct his commanders to turn our leader over to me," Bockarie said.

Nigerian leader General Abusalam Abubakar, ECOWAS Executive Lansana Kouyate, and services chiefs of the Nigerian Armed Forces met Wednesday to discuss the security situation in Sierra Leone. There was no word on details of their discussions.

Sierra Leone's High Commissioner to Nigeria, Joseph Blell, was in Abuja Wednesday to hold consultations with senior Nigerian officials. Blell said he hoped to meet with defence and government officials on Thursday to discuss the situation in Freetown. He described reports as "scanty" and "confused", but said he hoped to discuss possibilities for action with Nigerian officials.

ECOMOG officials maintained Wednesday that they were in control of Freetown. "We do have this under control and there is no way they can hold their ground," said a Nigerian ECOMOG officer at Lungi. Radio Democracy 98.1 broadcast only music for much of the morning, but Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer has made frequent broadcasts since then. "ECOMOG will deal with the rebels decisively," he said.

Residents reported that rebels held the east end and parts of central Freetown while ECOMOG units patrolled the west end of the capital.

Radio Democracy 98.1 announced that the curfew has been moved up an hour, so that residents must now be off the streets by 6:30 p.m. instead of 7:30. "Anybody found in the streets will be shot on sight," the radio warned, adding "ECOMOG is warning all civilians behind rebel lines to heed this warning and not to get involved with the rebels." Minister of Trade, Industry and Transportation Alie Bangura said that ECOMOG troops had been hampered by fleeing residents. "When the rebels tried to penetrate Allen Town, many civilians took to the streets. That is why it became difficult for ECOMOG to prevent the rebels from entering," he said. "If ECOMOG encounters any group in streets, whether civilian or rebel, it will open fire," he warned.

United Nations personnel left Freetown on Wednesday as the security situation in the capital deteriorated. Members of the United Nations Military Observer Force (UNOMSIL), along with U.N. Special Representative to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo, left Freetown by air from Lungi International Airport. Okelo confirmed that their destination was Conakry, Guinea. "We can't guarantee the security here anymore," he said. Asked about the state of fighting between ECOMOG troops and rebels in Freetown, military observer Col. Andre Bobylev replied, "It's difficult to say. It's war." A spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said seven motorised boats had arrived in Conakry on Wednesday carrying 120 persons fleeing the fighting.

BBC West Africa correspondent Mark Doyle reported Wednesday that several government ministers, including Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning Dr. James O.C. Jonah, were at the ECOMOG base at Lungi International Airport. "I'm told by people here at the airport that there are several ministers," Doyle said. "I don't know if they've taken refuge or what, but this is obviously one of the safest places in Sierra Leone for the government for the time being. And yes, Dr. Jonah is certainly here, but I wouldn't like to characterize him as taking refuge. But he is putting a very confident face on things."

AFRC/RUF rebel forces entered Freetown from the Eastend District early Wednesday and pushed to within a mile of the city centre before being turned back by ECOMOG troops, Reuters reported on Wednesday. A two-hour barrage on the Eastend beginning at 1:30 a.m. sent thousands of residents fleeing at dawn toward the center of the capital, Reuters said, adding that the sound of bombardments subsided after two hours but began again sporadically. The Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported that the latest fighting began an hour after midnight, and said the rebels which included soldiers of the disbanded Sierra Leone Army engaged ECOMOG troops in heavy fighting. The BBC cited reports that the rebels were moving in from hills overlooking Freetown. ECOMOG used artillery and Alpha fighter jets in an attempt to halt the rebel advance. The rebels burned down a police station and briefly broadcast from a private radio station until an ECOMOG bombardment put it off the air. Radio Democracy 98.1 warned residents to keep off the streets, but said ECOMOG was in "complete control." It promised an announcement on the situation shortly. Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer, in a BBC interview, told people to stay at home. "Anyone found on the streets will be considered as a rebel," he said. "Rebels have entered the east end of town and there is a bit of panic...The situation is very serious but it is going to be dealt with." Spencer said ECOMOG troops had found it difficult to engage the rebels because they had been mixing with the crowd. He said the government had no plans to flee the capital, but called developments "a disaster for Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone people," adding: "Apparently this is happening and the rest of the world is standing by and watching." BBC West Africa correspondent Mark Doyle said the latest fighting in Freetown did not necessarily mean the rebels have broken through the government's main defences, or that the government itself was threatened. He said that strategically important points in the city, such as the airport, were being defended by thousands of government and ECOMOG troops.

Members of the United Nations Security Council on Wednesday condemned outside support for rebels fighting the government in Sierra Leone, Council President Ambassador Celso Amorim said on Wednesday. Amorim said Council members expressed their strong support for President Kabbah and for the efforts of ECOWAS and its military arm, ECOMOG, to bring peace to Sierra Leone. "Council members strongly condemned penetration of rebel forces in Freetown and also condemned the support for the rebels from abroad," said Amorim. "Council Members strongly condemned rebel activities in Freetown. They expressed support for diplomatic efforts, particularly regional ones, to restore peace and security in Sierra Leone.

The British Foreign Office has condemned rebel efforts to overthrow the Sierra Leone government, while urging the 50 estimated British nationals remaining in Sierra Leone to leave as soon as they could safely do so. "We condemn the rebel efforts to overthrow by force the legitimate government of Sierra Leone and atrocities that they have committed against innocent civilians," a Foreign Office statement read. "We will work with the international community to restore peace and democracy to Sierra Leone." The statement added that Foreign Secretary Robin Cook had been in touch with "key allies" to rally support for the government.

Students occupying the Sierra Leone Embassy in Moscow have ended their protest peacefully, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin said Wednesday. "All the students, 15-20 people, who made their way yesterday into the Embassy of Sierra Leone in Moscow and besieged that country's ambassador have left the embassy building, and it is functioning normally," Rakhmanin said. The students complained of unpaid allowances and other "unresolved social and humanitarian matters," the Foreign Ministry said. The occupation of the embassy followed the death of a student in a Moscow hospital. "Naturally, these demands are the preserve of the government of Sierra Leone, but, as regards the official call from that country's ambassador for help with clearing the embassy premises of the participants in the protest action, appropriate steps were taken by the relevant Russian agencies," Rakhmanin said. He stressed that no force was used against the students.

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8 January 1999: Reuters reported Friday that "apart from the odd explosion from the rebel-held east of the city," there was no sign of fighting in the capital as night fell. During the day, the Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported, rebels intensified their attacks against pro-government positions. Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer said that there had been shooting on Thursday night. "By all indications, the rebels seem to have no intention of respecting the ceasefire," he said. He added that fires had been set in Kingtom. Spencer said he believed the central power plant had been attacked, since all electricity had been cut off in the city. The AFP reported that Nigerian ECOMOG planes stepped up their attacks on the city on Friday afternoon "after a relatively calm morning." The AFP quoted a resident of western Freetown as saying that ECOMOG "only controls the extreme west of the town. The majority of the town is in rebel hands."

The United Nations Special Representative to Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo, said he was optimistic that a ceasefire declared Thursday by President Kabbah, and in a recorded message by RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh, would hold despite shelling earlier in the day. "It is not surprising to have some clashes in the early stage of a ceasefire," he said. "What is important is that there is a cease-fire." Okelo returned to Lungi briefly on Friday to evacuate remaining U.N. staffers and other aid workers, and to hold "crisis talks" with President Kabbah, ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi, and government ministers. RUF leader Col. Sam "Maskita" Bockarie dismissed the tape of Sankoh calling for a ceasefire as having been faked. He said the recording had been made by Sankoh following the Abidjan Peace Agreement in November 1996 and was sent to RUF fighters in the bush. "Sankoh did not announce a ceasefire," he said. "That is not a recent recorded cassette. Otherwise they would have played the whole cassette. It was the cassette that our leader sent to us to join the brothers for lasting peace in Freetown...What I heard from Kabbah last night made me to intensify my offensive. He is not the one to call for a cease-fire." In an interview with the BBC, Bockarie ruled out any negotiations with the civilian government. "No chances were there when Kabbah was in power," he said. "He failed to do that, he said he was not going to talk to us, we are thieves and bandits, and that he was going to kill all of us at the end of this year, and it never succeeded. That is why God has given us the upper hand to have overrun him, and now he is gone." Bockarie said a peaceful solution to the crisis hinged on Sankoh's release. "If they are ready, our leader cannot be under duress there, being humiliated, molested, and then people asking us to cease fire. We are trying to do everything possible that will secure his release." In a separate interview, Bockarie said: "There is no cease-fire. We will take the rest of the city and save our country...We do not recognize Kabbah, we will not talk to Kabbah, he is ousted." Bockarie said he had ordered an all-out offensive on pro-government positions. "Our plan started since last night," he said. "My men are on the move. We will take Lungi...that is not a secret any more. We know we can do it." He said the rebels would pin the Nigerians down until they ran out of ammunition and surrendered, as they did during fighting at the Mammy Yoko Hotel in June 1997. "We will suppress them until they are out of food and ammunition and later they will surrender and we will negotiate how to repatriate them," he said. In an interview with the AFP, Bockarie said: "We are now fighting in Jui

and Wilberforce (and) we are heading to Lungi. "I've ordered an offensive to start today on Lungi. Anyone who is found there is considered an enemy." He denied news reports that the rebels were forcing people from their homes, and accused ECOMOG of killing civilians during their air raids on the city. "ECOMOG has killed a lot of people. No one is talking about that," he said. Bockarie told the BBC that since the start of the offensive on Thursday night, "Tongo has fallen to us."

In a BBC Network Africa interview Friday, Bockarie said he had not listened to Sankoh's appeal for a ceasefire. "I haven't heard his voice since the time he instructed me to join up with the brothers in Freetown for lasting peace; I haven't heard him," he said. "Even if we hear that, we're not going to obey that. Because we are not too sure of his health, or whether he is the one that is even talking. Let us have access to him. Let's first speak to him, and let's see face to face, and see that he is mentally and physically fit. Then we'll see what next to be done." Bockarie demanded that a caretaker government be set up. "We are asking the OAU chairman to immediately step in to call on both parties to see how best we can resolve this problem now once and for all, and now we want a caretaker government, which is a broad-based government, till we can organize a fresh election which will bring in a democratically elected government that people want."

ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate said Friday that President Kabbah and RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh had met Wednesday to discuss a ceasefire, shortly before the rebels began their offensive to capture Freetown. "President Kabbah made the request for a ceasefire two hours before the rebels came into the town. He went to Foday Sankoh and proposed they stop fighting," Kouyate said from Abuja, Nigeria. "Sankoh asked President Kabbah him to let think about it for two hours and that was when the rebels entered the city." On Thursday, the BBC quoted Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning Dr. James O.C. Jonah as saying that talks between the government and the rebels had been attempted on Tuesday through a third party. Kouyate said he believed President Kabbah had accepted the need for a "change in strategy," replacing confrontation with dialogue. "There has been a change in strategy. Previously, President Kabbah believed that the rebels should go before the courts, the process of law. Now he has agreed there must be a political solution," Kouyate said. He added that ECOMOG would continue to play a peacekeeping role in Sierra Leone. "ECOMOG is in a position to play a role. ECOMOG is playing a fantastic role, a vital role. Though the financial burden is very heavy. "What we are receiving from the international community is not enough... It is a drop in the ocean," he said. Kouyate dismissed suggestions that a civilian government in Nigeria might cut back the country's commitment to peacekeeping operations. "The commitment of Nigeria to ECOWAS and ECOMOG is permanent...Even after the elections, I am sure that the government will follow the same line," he said.

Rebels holding the East End District looted food aid warehouses, stole cars, and ransacked houses and offices there on Friday, United Nations agencies reported, quoting their remaining staff in Freetown. "This might affect the ability of agencies to respond immediately to a humanitarian situation," a U.N. official said.

OAU Chairman and President of Burkina Faso Blaise Compaore on Friday condemned the rebel invasion of Freetown. The OAU "condemns these attacks, which, far from settling the problem, are only worsening the situation, at the same time putting off prospects for a lasting peace in this country," he said.

President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, the current ECOWAS chairman, has expressed concern about the situation in Freetown. He said the surge in fighting has caused the deaths of many civilians, the fleeing of a large part of the population, and huge property damages. Eyadema appealed to President Kabbah and the rebel leader to lay down their arms and begin a political dialogue with a view to finding a final solution to the conflict.

Ghana is holding consultations with other West African countries on how to restore sustainable peace and consolidate democracy in Sierra Leone, the Pan African News Agency (PANA) reported on Friday. A delegation led by Foreign Affairs Minister James Victor Gbeho left Accra for Abuja, Nigeria early Friday, while a second delegation headed by the Deputy Minister of Defence, Lt. Col. E.K.T. Donkor, left for Guinea.

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended Friday that the the mandate of the United Nations Military Observer Force in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) be extended by two month when its original six-month mandate expires on January 13. Annan said that although the future of UNOMSIL appeared much less clear than it did a few weeks ago, there was still much it could do. He said that he intended to reduce the number of military observers, who would be based at Conakry, Guinea and would return to Sierra Leone when conditions permitted. In a letter to the Security Council, Annan said that military successes would not win the rebels legitimacy or recognition. "I therefore call on them to open discussions with the government on any legitimate political demands and grievances they or their supporters may have," he said.

The Nigerian newspaper Post Express, quoting military sources, has reported than 38 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers were killed in the battle for Freetown. Lagos P.M. News said Thursday that 26 Nigerian soldiers killed last Sunday were secretly buried at an army cemetery in Nigeria. The newspaper also reported that some 35 seriously wounded soldiers and officers had been flown back to Nigeria and were being treated at the ECOMOG ward of the Yaba Military Hospital. "(The burials) came as Nigeria's military authorities are contemplating withdrawing Nigerian soldiers from the troubled country," P.M. News said, citing "high military sources." The Guardian (Nigeria) said Nigeria, apparently worried about the situation in Sierra Leone, is consulting with regional allies.

Commonwealth Secretary-General Chief Emeka Anyaoku told the BBC from Nigeria Friday that he had met with RUF representatives and encouraged them to abide by the ceasefire announced Thursday. "Yesterday the representatives of the rebel group came to my office, had a discussion with us, and we are now encouraging them to support this cease-fire," Anyaoku said. "And I hope the international community will come in support of that as well as in support of shoring up democracy in Sierra Leone." He did not identify the RUF representatives or provide details of the talks. Anyaoku said there was mounting evidence of Liberian support for the rebels, and said international pressure should be brought to bear on Liberia while at the same time supporting peace talks. "We (the Commonwealth) are focusing on the representations made to us by the rebel group to try and help sustain this cease-fire. At the same time we are asking the international community to rally around the democratically-elected government," he said.

Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings on Thursday appealed to nations supplying arms to AFRC/RUF weapons to stop. "ECOMOG did not enter that place to wage war," he said. "We entered that place to put in place a lasting democratic process." He argued that continuing to supply weapons to the rebels would mean suffering for the innocent women and children of Sierra Leone. Rawlings said it "is not beyond the capability of the regional force to launch a full-scale offensive to reverse the rebel incursions within 48 hours. But its preference is dialogue rather than force." He urged the rebels to lay down their arms and to realise that dialogue "is the best approach, else a lot of things will go wrong and they will be the losers."

Over 200 Sierra Leonean refugees, along with other foreign nationals and U.N. staff, arrived at the Guinean port of Bassora on Wednesday, Liberian Star Radio reported Friday. A UNHCR spokesman said the refugees were being screened at Bonfi Stadium and will later be transferred to the Forecariah Refugee Camp. The spokesman said the UNHCR, WFP, and other aid agencies have met to discuss the situation in Freetown, and are making contingency plans to receive some 30,000 refugees in Guinea.

Kabbah's statement Thursday night (English translation from Krio): "I have been very, very busy doing what we have to do in this situation to make sure that all the security apparatus is in place. Foday [Sankoh] and myself have had straight talks — straight talks about the country. During the seven-day cease-fire period, we will work out modalities as to how Sankoh will get access to his people. If we just go on fighting and win the war, as we could surely do, after all that, we will still have to talk peace. So let us do both at the same time. Let us go back to the Abidjan Peace Accord, but let us be sincere this time. I am sorry for the inconvenience that we have all had to suffer."

Sankoh's recorded statement: "Fellow Sierra Leoneans: I, Corporal Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, am speaking to you on a matter of interest. I am always committed to peace for my beloved country. I can say I am a prisoner of peace; and President Kabbah and I met today for several hours to discuss the situation in our country. President Kabbah and I agreed that for the eradication of poverty in the country, there must be security, peace, and stability. So our combatants should keep to their defensive positions and cease all hostilities. We further agreed that the best way to achieve a sustainable peace is to use the Abidjan Peace Accord."

Sierra Leone News

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12 January 1999: RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh held talks with the foreign ministers of Ivory Coast and Togo on Tuesday after being flown to Conakry, Guinea. According to the United Nations Special Representative to Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo, who attended the talks, Sankoh said he wanted his freedom and official recognition for the RUF before agreeing to a cease-fire. "He is 100 percent committed to peace...He is willing to order a cease-fire and he recognizes the legitimacy of President Kabbah," Okelo said. Foreign Ministers Amara Essy of Ivory Coast and Joseph Kokou Koffigoh of Togo said Sankoh had expressed his "willingness for peace" and for a "political, not a military solution" to the Sierra Leone crisis. The two ministers found Sankoh in "good shape, dynamic, combative, and having a clear vision of his objectives." The RUF leader, dressed in a prison uniform marked with the letter "C", did not repeat the unconditional call for a cease-fire which was attributed to him by Kabbah on Thursday. A U.N. official said the result of the talks were unclear, but that U.N. delegates attending the meeting were "optimistic." Further talks were a possibility, he said. Because of Sankoh's terms, no cease-fire was arranged and the talks were adjourned after three hours. Okelo said he and the mediators would convey Sankoh's position to President Kabbah at Lungi. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dr. Sama Banya also took part in the talks, representing the Sierra Leone government. Military sources said Sankoh remained in Conakry on Tuesday night.

RUF commander Col. Sam "Maskita" Bockarie said Tuesday he would continue the armed struggle until RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh was released. "We want our leader to be freed. We want to meet him on neutral ground," he said. "I am carrying his orders." Bockarie told the Agence France-Presse (AFP) his forces had seized missiles from the Guinean ECOMOG contingent, and would use them to attack Lungi International Airport. "We will fire the missiles," Bockarie said. "We will use them on all aircraft that land at Lungi." He claimed that fires which have destroyed parts of Freetown were not set by rebel forces, but resulted from attacks by ECOMOG Alpha fighter jets. "The jet bombed the civilians. Now they want to conceal it...All that they are saying is propaganda," Bockarie said. He dismissed ECOMOG claims to have regained control of most of the capital, saying his forces controlled most of Freetown, except for Wilberforce Barracks and Goderich Barracks to the west of the city. "If they controlled the city, they would be distributing food, but that isn't the case," Bockarie said. He told the AFP that the execution of 24 military officers for treason last October was responsible for the rebel offensive against Freetown. "Kabbah killed 24 people, one of them a woman. Some of them gave themselves up to authorities but were still killed," he said.

Reuters reported no sound of fighting overnight Monday in Freetown, although the news service said clouds of smoke were billowing over the eastern part of the city. The Associated Press, however, said artillery fire and small arms bombardments were heard Monday night and Tuesday morning. The Bishop of Makeni, George Biguzzi, said ECOMOG troops had captured the city center and were battling for the eastern suburbs. "There is a lot of fighting and you can hear it and see it from miles away. The fires lit up the sky last night and the explosions continued this morning," Biguzzi said from Lungi. Reuters said "sketchy reports from the battle zone" indicated

that the ECOMOG force, believed to number about 15,000, was recapturing the city street by street Tuesday. Witnesses said the streets of the capital were littered with bodies, adding that rebels had burned houses and cars as they retreated. The Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported Tuesday, quoting an ECOMOG helicopter pilot, said that "much of Freetown lay in ruins." Fourah Bay College, Connaught Hospital, the central telephone exchange (SLET), the Government Wharf, warehouses at Kissy Dockyards, and countless homes had been set on fire, he said. The AFP reported that residents whose houses had escaped the blaze remained inside for fear of being attacked by rebels or Kamajor militiamen. One resident told Reuters that he was hijacked with his car by four Kamajor militiamen holding a rebel fighter. The Kamajors then stopped the car and summarily executed their prisoner, he said.

RUF commander Col. Sam "Maskita" Bockarie promised Tuesday to free Italian missionary priest Father Mario Guerra, but denied any knowledge of two other priests kidnapped on Sunday. Bockarie said Guerra was being held by the RUF "for his own safety," and would be turned over to church officials when "the security situation allows." He refused to reveal Guerra's location, saying this was to prevent pro-government forces from killing him and blaming it on the rebels. Bockarie refused to confirm or deny that his forces were behind the attack on an ECOMOG convoy on Sunday which killed one journalist and seriously wounded another. "This is war and it is a dangerous situation. It is not professionalism to go into a situation like this," Bockarie said. He suggested that the journalists secure the protection of the RUF.

The United Nations Security Council, meeting behind closed doors on Tuesday, voted unanimously to extend the mandate of the United Nations Military Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for two months, until March 13.

The European Union (EU), in a statement issued Tuesday by its German presidency, condemned AFRC/RUF rebel attempts to overthrow Sierra Leone's civilian government, and gave the EU's full backing to President Kabbah. "The European Union strongly condemns all those who have supported the rebels in Sierra Leone and expresses its grave concern at reports that arms and personnel are being supplied, in particular, from the territory of Liberia. It calls on all states to comply strictly with existing arms embargoes," the statement said. The EU said it supported diplomatic efforts and the efforts of ECOMOG to restore peace to the country.

The South African foreign ministry issued a statement on Tuesday calling for a cease-fire in the Sierra Leone conflict. The statement expressed support for the government of President Kabbah, and called the use of force by RUF rebels unacceptable. "South Africa believes that the underlying causes of the violence have to be addressed through negotiation," the statement said. "An immediate cease-fire would furthermore allow the U.N. and other international aid agencies to carry on their vital role of addressing the urgent needs of Sierra Leone's internally displaced population." The foreign ministry statement condemned the RUF for using civilians as human shields, and urged them to halt their offensive as a prerequisite to dialogue leading to national reconciliation.

Commonwealth Secretary-General Chief Emeka Anyaoku urged AFRC/RUF rebels Tuesday to cease hostilities, accept President Kabbah as the democratically-elected president of Sierra Leone, and demonstrate a willingness to negotiate in good faith. "The only way forward is for them to accept the futility of fighting...and that the international community wants democracy in every country and carve out a role for themselves under a democracy," Anyaoku said. "The rebels were in my office last Wednesday, and I made it clear to them that the Commonwealth is in support of President Tejan Kabbah's democratically-elected government." He added: "I don't believe the rebels are at the moment anymore on the offensive as the tide of the battle is now turning against them. They have been on the retreat from Freetown and the ECOMOG are on the offensive. So I don't think things are hopeful for them." He reaffirmed that the Commonwealth supported "peaceful resolution of the crisis in the country."

The British naval frigate HMS Norfolk, on its way to Sierra Leone, is due to dock in Senegal on Wednesday for refueling.

Local staff of the the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have reported that Freetown residents remain trapped in their homes without water or electricity, unable to go and search for food. "They say a humanitarian disaster is looming in the capital unless some kind of cease-fire is arranged and humanitarian supplies can be brought in," UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said in Geneva. "The situation is quite terrifying for civilians. People are holed up, and are not in a position to move out of their homes, let alone flee the capital. That may explain while so few people have moved out."

The journalists' group Article 19 has condemned the killing of Associated Press journalist Myles Tierney, and "all parties to the civil war in Sierra Leone to respect international humanitarian and human rights principles in relation to local and foreign journalists reporting the conflict." In a press release issued by Article 19 Acting Director Malcolm Smart, the group said, "Journalists are a prime target for repression and violence by both governments and rebels in such situations. We call on all sides in Sierra Leone to respect the efforts of journalists, in the most difficult of circumstances, to engage in their legitimate professional activities."

Liberian House Majority Leader Momolu Massale, responding to allegations that of Liberian support for AFRC/RUF regels fighting in Sierra Leone, said his country was being used as a scapegoat. "We have repeatedly said that Liberia is not supporting rebels in that country, but they are finding a scapegoat by repeatedly accusing us of involvement," Massale said. "The problem in Sierra Leone is the responsibility of Sierra Leoneans and not Liberians." He urged "peaceful negotiations rather than fighting as the way forward in solving the crisis."

The Ukrainian foreign ministry said Tuesday it had no official knowledge of Ukrainian nationals involved in mercenary activities in Sierra Leone, according to the Kiev UT-3 Television Network. Diplomats in Kiev know the facts that Ukrainian citizens are trying to enlist as mercenaries," the report said. A foreign ministry spokesman, Andriy Veselovskyy, who heads the political analysis and planning directorate, said that as the number of trouble spots around the world was growing, he could not rule out the possibility of Ukrainian citizens taking part in the conflicts. "If it is possible to rescue these unfortunates—or these fools, depending on the circumstances—by diplomatic means, we certainly will do so," he said.

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13 January 1999: RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh spoke with his military commander, Sam "Maskita" Bockarie, on Wednesday, reportedly by satellite telephone. "They spoke for about three hours. I set up the discussion and it went beautifully," said United Nations Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo. He declined to comment on the talks or where Sankoh was when the two spoke, but U.N. officials said the RUF leader had been returned to Freetown. A U.N. official said Sankoh "urged the rebels to stop the looting and the killing, and that they should be committed to peace." Okelo held "private talks" with Sankoh in Freetown on Wednesday, according to U.N. sources. The foreign ministers of Ivory Coast and Togo, together with U.N. mediators, will continue to try to arrange a cease-fire on Thursday. "I am very hopeful we will make a breakthrough in cease-fire negotiations," Okelo said after mediators met with President Kabbah at the presidential lodge.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie, in a BBC interview Wednesday, recounted his conversation with RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh: "He spoke to me, he asked me about everybody. I told him that everybody is doing well, and that the operation is going on, and that we have been wishing to receive him and to hear from him, and he told us that we should not worry, that they're talking. The foreign ministers of Togo, Abidjan, and the ECOWAS Secretary-General, together with Mr. Francis Okelo, the U.N. representative to Sierra Leone, and that they are trying to reach an agreement [words indistinct] may be leaving from Conakry to go to Abidjan and from Abidjan, he will be taken to a neutral ground, where he will remain and instruct me to announce a unilateral cease-fire." Bockarie said he thought that Sankoh would be taken to Ivory Coast within the next 48 hours. "They are just going there to see how best they can reach real agreement for him to be taken to neutral grounds to assure us that he is not under any duress as to the instructions that he will be passing on to us," he said. Bockarie insisted that mediation of the Sierra Leone conflict should be conducted by "the OAU chair," President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso. The Sierra Leone government has ruled out Compaore as a mediator because of allegations that Burkina Faso is providing support for the rebels. "We are still standing by our word, Bockarie said. "We do not want to change our venue of this negotiation, where we have suggested, of the negotiation being held in Burkina Faso." Refusal to accept Burkinabe mediation "means it must be a trick again. They want me to be the next man to be arrested. I will not allow that. [Words indistinct] also will not allow for RUF to be destroyed," Bockarie said.

RUF spokesman Omrie Michael Golley called Wednesday for Sankoh's immediate release, and deplored the fact that the RUF leader had conducted peace negotiations dressed in prison garb. "A man who is negotiating a cease-fire should be properly attired, for goodness sake," Golley said in Abidjan. "The fundamental issue is that he is still a prisoner. We have not been able to talk to Corporal Foday Sankoh, the leader of our movement."

ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shepodi said Wednesday that his troops were in control of most of Freetown and that the greater part of the rebel forces had retreated to the hills

surrounding the capital. "The operation is almost complete." He acknowledged some rebels remained in areas around Kissy, but described them as isolated pockets. Shelpidi claimed ECOMOG casualties had been "light," but refused to give numbers. He said more than 1,000 rebel fighters had been killed in the fighting. There has been no independent confirmation of these claims. On Monday, journalists based at Lungi reported heavy casualties on both sides. A U.N. security officer who accompanied U.N. Special Representative to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo to Freetown said about 200 bodies were lying around Connaught Hospital, near the city centre. Guinean Foreign Minister Lamine Camara, following talks with President Kabbah, said the city appeared quiet. "We've just been on a tour of the town. Everything is calm. We believe ECOMOG has everything under control," he said. Shelpidi said the rebels had caused "colossal" damage to parts of Freetown, but that he hoped electricity and telephone service would be restored by the weekend. Residents reported power had already been restored to parts of the western area by late Wednesday.

ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi has blamed rebel successes on a shortage of military equipment. He said Wednesday that ECOMOG needed assistance from friendly countries, and deplored a cut in U.S. financial assistance for the ECOMOG force. "What we need is hardware, military hardware. If only we could have helicopter gunships, MI24s, then we would have ended this thing a long time ago. Right now we're relying on one single helicopter and that is slowing down operations," he said.

Shooting was heard overnight, but residents said there was no fighting in the western and central districts of Freetown, Reuters reported Wednesday, adding that the situation in the east remained unclear. Italian missionary news agency MISNA reported that fighting was continuing in the east of the capital. "Very heavy fighting is currently underway in Kissy, where artillery fire can be heard and ECOMOG is using a fighter plane," the news agency reported. Reuters quoted residents who said the rebels had killed many people and taken others hostage, including women and children. Many bodies have washed up along the shore of the western peninsula, and fisherman have reported seeing bodies at sea. Radio Democracy 98.1, which began broadcasting again Tuesday after having been off the air for several days, warned that any boats trying to leave Freetown would be sunk. The warning followed reports that prisoners, including soldiers loyal to the former junta, who were freed from Pademba Road Prison, had been trying to leave Freetown by boat.

BBC correspondent Prince Brima reported Wednesday that thousands of people had fled to Kenema following three days of fighting between Kamajors and AFRC/RUF fighters from Tongo Field, creating a humanitarian crisis in the town. Brima said the refugees had told him the Kamajor militia was in control of the town. "Definitely at the moment now the Kamajor militias are now controlling Tongo Field because the rebels had fled from the area on Monday," he said. "In fact, thousands of Kamajors were seen yesterday moving toward Tongo Field just to strengthen their position on the ground." Brima said Civil Defence Forces commanders in Kenema told him they were preparing to launch more attacks on rebels in Kailahun District. "In fact, most of the fleeing rebels are also burning houses, murdering people, just as what is happening in Freetown," he said. He reported that youths had erected checkpoints to prevent rebel infiltration into Kenema. "But one thing interesting that I saw yesterday was that three rebels were caught, that is, three rebels infiltrated into the township and were apprehended by the youths and burned alive," he said.

The commander of the 181-member British "reconnaissance and liaison team" aboard the British frigate HMS Norfolk, Brigadier David Richards, said Wednesday that his mission was to support the government of President Kabbah. "Our aim is...to see whether or not we can do something more to assist the restoration of stability in support of Mr. Kabbah and the democratically elected regime there," Richards said during a refueling stop in Dakar. "How we are going to do that is really my business." The ship was due to sail later Wednesday, heading for Conakry, Guinea.

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) has appealed to both sides to allow safe passage for urgently-needed food supplies to reach starving Freetown residents. WFP Regional Manager for Coastal West Africa, Paul Ares, said people were being forced out onto the streets either in search of food or because rebels had burned down their homes. He said there were no markets or fresh food because all roads to Freetown were blocked.

Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings, meeting with a Liberian delegation led by Vice President Enoch Dogolea on Wednesday, bluntly accused Liberia of supporting AFRC/RUF rebels fighting in Sierra Leone. "You are being accused of supporting the RUF. You have a hard task on your hands to prove that you are not playing any role in Sierra Leone. It is a stab in the back," Rawling said. He told the Liberians that ECOMOG was in Sierra Leone not to wage war, but to support a democratically-elected government. "This is exactly what we did in Liberia," he said. He also accused another West African country and a North African country of aiding the rebels, but did not name them. Rawlings said neighbouring countries had nothing to gain from involving themselves in the Sierra Leone conflict. "Are there any gains to be made in this conflict? Frankly speaking, there are no gains. The political and economic stability of West Africa is being jeopardised." In response, Liberian Foreign Minister Monie Captan repeated the Liberian government's assertion that Liberia was not backing Sierra Leone's rebel forces, although Liberian mercenaries were involved in the conflict. "We are not involved at the government level," Captan said.

ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate has sent a message of condolence to the family of Myles Tierney, the Associated Press journalist who was killed Sunday while covering the fighting in Freetown.

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14 January 1999: RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie said Thursday the RUF had agreed to an unconditional cease-fire, beginning on Monday. "After that one week, if (RUF leader Corporal Foday) Sankoh is not released, we are going to resume our offensive," he said. Bockarie said the RUF had agreed to the cease-fire at the behest of Liberian President Charles Taylor. "He only said to me that we should allow a temporary cease-fire to allow the humanitarian relief officers to be given a chance and that during that period Foday Sankoh would be released. That's why I agreed," Bockarie said. Rebel spokesman Eldred Collins added that after "lengthy discussions" with Taylor, the rebels agreed to a week-long cease-fire. Taylor, who announced the cease-fire at a press conference in Monrovia's Executive Mansion, said agreement with the rebels was reached after two days of stringent negotiations. He said that the rebels had agreed to institute their cease-fire at 6:00 p.m. on Saturday. The Liberian government wanted to secure the cease-fire to allow humanitarian agencies to reach the civilian population with relief assistance, he added. Taylor said he was encouraging other parties to the conflict to respect the cease-fire, and for negotiations to continue. Despite international accusations that Liberia supported the rebels, he said, Liberia would continue its efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Liberia was suggesting that the ECOWAS Committee of Six on Sierra Leone meet in Ivory Coast within the next seven days to discuss the release of RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh, so that he could be part of the peace process, Taylor added. Bockarie, in a BBC interview, said that while the cease-fire was originally to have started on Saturday, difficulty in communicating with his forces meant it could not be implemented before next week. "(The cease-fire) should have started on Saturday, but after I have passed on this information to them, some of our chiefs of stations or commanders told me that some men...they have dispatched men already to go on operation, so it will take time to get to withdraw them back to return to base. So, I decided to call back to the president the number he gave me this morning to call him back. I called him and informed him that: 'Oh, chief, yes, you have talked to me about a temporary cease-fire, but I asked him so that it shouldn't be on Saturday again, but on Monday or Tuesday.'" Bockarie said the fighting would continue "for a couple days" because his fighters had already left to conduct operations. "You cannot just cease fire as you want," he said. "You have to, I mean, send other men to withdraw from operations." Bockarie said the cease-fire would take effect on Monday. "We don't want to announce a cease-fire, then break it," he said.

U.N. Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo said the RUF was insisting on meeting with Sankoh this weekend, and had demanded that he be released next week. "This message has been conveyed to President Kabbah and there will be further consultations before we know if it is a genuine development," Okelo said. He added that it was unclear whether President Kabbah's government or ECOMOG would support the proposal. Sankoh has demanded his freedom and recognition of the RUF as the price for his agreeing to a cease-fire, mediators said. "We're still waiting for Kabbah's response," said a U.N. official. "What we were briefed on yesterday (by Okelo in Conakry) did not include President Kabbah's response to the cease-fire proposal. I think President Kabbah just wants some time to study the proposal, but obviously, with Sankoh there is an agreement."

The foreign minister of Ivory Coast, Amara Essy, has said that the two sides in Sierra Leone's conflict have expressed their willingness to seek a peaceful solution. "Concerning Corporal Foday Sankoh...He told us and repeated to us that, according to him, the conflict cannot be resolved through the use of force. He added that there must be absolutely a political solution and that he was determined to change the Revolutionary United Front into a political movement. President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who was elected on a program of peace, is also seeking peace for the country...That is why it is up to all of us to make efforts to reach a consensus on how to solve the crisis." Essy said ECOWAS had ruled out a military solution to the conflict. "I think that the ECOWAS has never been a war body," he said. "All that we have done so far with the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group is aimed at achieving peace." He added that although "lack of information gives the impression" of divergent opinions within ECOWAS on how to solve the Sierra Leone crisis, "actually, there is no divergent views" among ECOWAS countries. "However, at a certain moment there is the need to coordinate all the various views so that we can achieve the same objective," he said.

AFRC/RUF rebels have abducted Archbishop Joseph Henry Ganda, the Italian missionary news agency MISNA reported on Thursday. The 66-year old archbishop is believed to have been taken from his home on Tuesday or Wednesday. MISNA said it had been informed of Ganda's kidnapping by Bishop George Biguzzi. According to Biguzzi, Ganda was being held along with Xaverian missionary priest Father Mario Guerra, who was kidnapped in November. "Biguzzi told us that the kidnapers have maintained contact with the church and permitted a series of exchanges with Monsignor Ganda," MISNA said. A MISNA spokesman in Rome said the rebels had offered to release Ganda in return for a cease-fire. MISNA also reported that Fr. Guerra had been released for a few hours on Tuesday. He took a meal with members of his order and spoke with Biguzzi before returning to his captors.

Two Italian missionaries priests kidnapped on Sunday, Rev. Maurizio Boa and the Rev. Giuliano Pini, have been freed, according to the Italian missionary news agency, MISNA. "The two priests are safe and sound in a zone controlled by ECOMOG, the African intervention force," the news service reported. The two said ECOMOG soldiers who found them Monday had at first believed them to be European mercenaries and had beaten them. The ECOMOG soldiers had wanted to kill them, but then decided to take them to their headquarters where a Sierra Leonean priest confirmed their identity, the priests related. In a BBC interview on Wednesday, Pini described the damage he had observed in the center of Freetown. "I can see that the scene was apocalyptic," he said. "The city was deserted, many houses destroyed — completely destroyed. The town is in ruins." He said the rebels had detained the two priests at State House on Sunday and Monday. "While ECOMOG was moving up, we called their attention and a soldier took us to Wilberforce Barracks," he said. Pini said State House itself "is not damaged too much for what we saw at that moment."

Food stores in Freetown began to reopen on Thursday as residents ventured out in search of rice or "anything edible," Reuters reported. In the aftermath of a week of fighting, the Associated Press said Thursday that "raging fires and artillery explosions" had destroyed large areas in Freetown's suburbs. A Reuters correspondent reported seeing dozens of bodies while touring the city in the company of ECOMOG troops. State House was "honeycombed with bullet-holes" and was serving as a shelter for residents flocking to the city center in search of food, the Reuters report added. The Italian missionary news agency MISNA said Connaught Hospital was "overflowing with dead," posing a clear risk of epidemic.

ECOMOG has enlisted the help of Nigeria's 72nd Airborne Regiment to help fight AFRC/RUF rebel forces who have withdrawn to the hills around Freetown, according to a "senior source" in ECOMOG. "Last time we made the mistake of not going all the way, this time we're going to finish the job," the source said. He said the regiment would arrive in Freetown on Thursday afternoon.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has evacuated its last five expatriate staff from Freetown at the request of the Sierra Leone government, ICRC Michael Kleiner said on Thursday. The five, including three medical staff who were believed to be the last expatriate medical workers in the capital, were flown to Conakry on Wednesday evening aboard a chartered helicopter. "The ICRC has been asked by a member of the Sierra Leone government to leave Freetown for security reasons," Kleiner said. "The ICRC regrets this decision because it obliges its delegates to leave Freetown while the humanitarian situation remains highly preoccupying as most civilians are trapped in their homes by incessant fighting. The five were a reassuring presence for 180 civilians who had sought shelter in the ICRC compound and for the wounded at Netland Surgical Hospital in the capital," Kleiner said, adding: "The ICRC has informed the authorities of its readiness to resume its humanitarian activities in favour of the victims of the conflict as soon as it is authorised to do so." ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said on Wednesday that he had requested the deportation of aid workers from an unnamed non-governmental organisation. ECOMOG sources said Thursday that Shelpidi was referring to the ICRC staff because they had communications equipment which could listen in on ECOMOG transmissions. Dutch battlefield surgeon Willem Boere said the staff were surprised to be ordered to leave at a time when there was such huge humanitarian need. "Chaos is enormous and wounded have not been able to get any treatment. There has been no access to food or water for the population which is getting desperate," he said. Some 200 Sierra Leonean ICRC staff remain in Freetown.

The Nigerian government has termed it "regrettable" that AFRC/RUF rebels have been receiving support from a number of countries, some of whom were members of ECOWAS and the OAU. "The actions and policies of these countries not only subvert the principles and collective decisions of these organizations but also jeopardize bilateral relations among states," the statement said. "In this regard, Nigeria's Federal Government views with grave concern the nefarious role being played by Liberia and some other countries, in and outside the sub-region, in Sierra Leone. It cannot be business as usual with countries which provide the bullets that kill and maim our sons and daughters."

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News Archives

17 January 1999: Fighting between ECOMOG troops and AFRC/RUF rebels continued to the east of Freetown on Wednesday. London Times journalist Sam Kiley reported that the sounds of tanks and heavy artillery could be heard from around the university area, where "rebels are believed to be using a disused quarry and caves around there for cover." The number of casualties in the city since the onset of the fighting has been conservatively estimated at 2,000, the BBC and the Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported on Sunday. The number is expected to rise on account of the number of injured, starving children, and because of the lack of medical care. Fires started by the rebels which have destroyed key installations, and reportedly even whole streets, coupled with damage from ECOMOG bombing raids, have left the city badly damaged.

ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said Sunday that re-establishing complete control over Freetown was a matter of "a few days," but he acknowledged that "urban warfare creates a lot of difficulties." He said bands of RUF rebels, often teenagers carrying assault rifles, and snipers on rooftops posed a threat which ECOMOG needed "better and more efficient means" to counter. He said the Nigerian Alpha fighter jets used by ECOMOG were too rapid, and said the force required helicopters, light arms, more communications equipment, and a commitment from other ECOWAS countries to contribute troops to the ECOMOG force. "We're now organising civil defence," Shelpidi added. He said the rebels, who had been prevented from getting back to the interior of the country, were now in the forested hills overlooking Freetown. "The worst thing is that the rebels change their clothes all the time," said a Nigerian major. "One minute, they're on the street in jeans and t-shirts, like you or me; the next they're in stolen ECOMOG battle dress."

Freetown was reported calm on Sunday morning, Reuters reported. Saturday night was reported generally quiet, although distant bombardments could occasionally be heard from the east. The news service described Freetown as a "disaster area," with bodies littering the streets. At Connaught Hospital, a few local doctors with almost no medicine attempted to care for the sick and wounded, while dogs and vultures disturbed bodies piled in the hospital driveway. "The hospital is in a dire situation right now. There are over 80 war wounded requiring all kinds of medical help, and we just do not have the means to assist them," said surgeon Dr Johnston Taylor. "There are bodies littered everywhere, unattended as well. We are appealing for any kind of help and assistance that we can get." Most aid agencies evacuated their personnel to Conakry following the AFRC/RUF rebel attack on Freetown. Five expatriate staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), including a Dutch battle surgeon, were expelled by ECOMOG last week without explanation. On Friday, ECOMOG ordered non-government organisations and United Nations agencies to hand over their communications equipment, further hampering humanitarian operations.

The British frigate HMS Norfolk anchored off Freetown on Sunday. The British government has said the warship will not take direct part in fighting, but might provide logistical support for the ECOMOG force and assist in humanitarian operations, according to the British Foreign Office. In March 1998 the British frigate HMS Cornwall provided humanitarian and technical assistance following the ouster of the AFRC military government. The Foreign Office said Friday that the Norfolk would not undertake an evacuation of the estimated 50 British nationals remaining in Freetown. "That particular boat is equipped to provide humanitarian assistance, they have crew who will probably help to restore some of the essential services that the people so badly need," President Kabbah said on Saturday. Brigadier David Richards, the leader of the British Reconnaissance Team, said the Norfolk was carrying three tons of medical supplies. "Our focus in the first instance is clearly on the humanitarian situation," he said. Richards added that the British "plan to support ECOMOG in any way we can to do whatever is necessary to restore stability in the country." London Times journalist Sam Kiley said Sunday that the Norfolk's immediate mission would be to airlift the medical supplies from Lungi to Connaught Hospital in Freetown. He also reported that Richards met with Chief of Defence Staff Maxwell Khobe and President Kabbah to discuss the situation in Freetown both from a humanitarian and a military point of view. "So as yet the British certainly haven't ruled out some sort of military role, although the Foreign Office in London of course have ruled out an actual direct combat role of the frigate that's here, which may in fact be augmented in the future," Kiley said. He pointed out that the frigate was equipped with only one Lynx helicopter, capable of lifting about half a ton of equipment, but speculated that it could possibly supply "guidance or intelligence-gathering equipment" to direct ECOMOG Alpha fighter jets. RUF political spokesman Omrie Golley said RUF commanders in the field feared the Norfolk would help ECOMOG's Alpha jet fighters locate rebel positions. "They are worried it will eavesdrop on our communications and help the Alphas pinpoint our positions," Golley said. "Britain seems to have confused objectives. They say they are looking for dialogue and yet they are playing a great part in supporting ECOMOG." On Friday, Britain flew a planeload of military vehicles to Freetown, destined for the ECOMOG force. RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie, in an interview on Sunday, accused the Norfolk of shelling rebel positions. "Their shells have landed on our soil," he said. "We will attack their embassy. It's going to be burned down." A British Defence Department spokeswoman in London called the accusation "absolute rubbish." "All that has happened is that HMS Norfolk has arrived in international waters off Sierra Leone, and has sent a reconnaissance party in a helicopter to assess the situation from the air," she said. The British Reconnaissance Team intends to remain in Freetown until early February to assess the situation in the country.

The Ivory Coast reacted Saturday to criticism by Nigerian Foreign Minister Ignatius Olisiemeka of efforts by the foreign ministers of Ivory Coast and Togo to mediate the Sierra Leone conflict. A statement issued by the Ivorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Abidjan recalled that the final communiqué issued by the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone following their extraordinary meeting on December 28 called both for reinforcement of ECOMOG and for a restoration of dialogue between the government and the rebels in Sierra Leone, as provided for by the Abidjan Accord and the Conakry Peace Plan. The ECOWAS foreign ministers called on Ivory Coast and Liberia to use their influence to establish contacts between the government and the rebels for possible further negotiations, the statement said, adding that the decision had received the support of all of Committee of Five foreign ministers. "It is worth recalling that the involvement of Ivory Coast in the settlement of the crisis in Sierra Leone is the result of an urgent request made in this regard by former Sierra Leone President Maada Bio and President Kabbah to President Henri Konan Bedie, who had made great efforts toward the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996, an accord which had received the support of the entire international community," the statement added.

Malian army spokesman Aboulaye Coulibali said Sunday that 428 Malian troops were sent to depart for Freetown following an assessment mission Friday by General Nimkaro Kame. "Our aim is not to fight, unless we're attacked, but to provide security for the population and facilitate negotiations between the belligerents," Coulibali said. Reuters reported that a military delegation

from Mali flew to Freetown Saturday for talks with ECOMOG as to when the long-expected contingent of Malian troops might arrive.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie said Sunday that the rebels would go ahead with a seven-day cease-fire set to begin at 6:00 p.m. on Monday. "Our guns will go silent for a week. If the Nigerians do not try to do anything, they will stay silent for a week," he said. Bockarie warned, however, that any ECOMOG action — even a single flight by an ECOMOG jet — would end the cease-fire. "We will not sit down and look at them shooting at us," he said. Bockarie threatened to unleash anarchy on the capital unless RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh were released. "We have made Freetown ungovernable," he said. "We can do that until Kabbah steps down or they release Sankoh." United Nations Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo, quoted by the Agence France-Presse (AFP), said he feared "the intransigence" of President Kabbah toward the AFRC/RUF troops "could trigger, very quickly, a new wave of violence."

The Associated Press, quoting an unnamed "rebel official" in an "undisclosed location" in Sierra Leone reported Sunday that AFRC/RUF rebels will abandon their unilateral cease-fire unless President Kabbah agrees to release RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh. "We are hoping that there will be a significant shift on Kabbah's part," he said. "But if (there isn't), we fight and fight to the bitter end." President Kabbah, in a Reuters television interview on Saturday, refused to release Sankoh. "What the rebels are saying is 'Mr. President, we have a gun pointed at your head. Either you release our man or we are going to shoot you'", Kabbah said. "They are saying that we should ignore our constitution, we should ignore our legal system, and just obey their orders to release Sankoh. I am not going to succumb to that." RUF political spokesman Omrie Golley told Reuters Saturday that the rebels planned to go ahead with their cease-fire beginning Monday, and that Sankoh's release was not a pre-condition. The "rebel official" told the Associated Press that rebel forces remain entrenched in parts of Freetown and could regain full control of the city within ten days. He acknowledged that the rebels were hampered in their movements by ECOMOG Alpha fighter jets and artillery, but said they were able to move freely after dark. "We have the upper hand by night, and they have the upper hand by day," the official said. "Although they are better equipped, we are smarter." He claimed that the rebels controlled most of Sierra Leone, except for the cities of Bo and Kenema.

BBC correspondent Prince Brima reported Sunday that AFRC/RUF rebels clashed with Kamajor militiamen at Jomu, 12 miles from Kenema. Brima said the battle lasted for three hours "before the rebels were repelled with heavy casualties." An afternoon curfew lasting from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. was imposed on Kenema Saturday, he said, adding that the town was calm Sunday. Heavy fighting also broke out Saturday near Masingbi, on the Makeni-Kono highway, between rebel forces and the Kamajor militia, Brima reported. He said the two sides continued to battle along the highway Sunday.

United Nations Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo flew from Conakry to Freetown Saturday to try to revive mediation efforts, and to arrange to bring humanitarian aid to Freetown by road from Guinea. "We've been assured of the necessary escorts and security and I'm on my way back to Conakry to relay this good news to the (aid agencies) so that they can begin right away," Okelo said.

The First Secretary at Sierra Leone's embassy in Liberia, James Sawi, has described as "false and misleading" a report by the Daily Times newspaper that the Sierra Leone government had asked Liberian refugees to leave the country. The newspaper said the Liberians were being expelled because of Liberian support for AFRC/RUF rebels. Sawi acknowledged that there were serious problems between the two countries, but said this would not cause Sierra Leone to expel Liberian nationals.

Sierra Leone News

News Archives

22 January 1999: Archbishop Joseph Henry Ganda and five Catholic missionary priests escaped from rebel captivity on Wednesday and were picked up by ECOMOG troops on Friday. The priests were identified as Fr. Giuseppe Berton, Fr. Giovanni Ceresoli, Fr. Giuseppe Cavallin (Giuseppino dei Murialdo), and Fr. Mario Guerra of the Xaverian order, and Spanish priest Fr. Luis Perez Hernandez. Six nuns of the Missionaries of Charity, and two Xaverian missionaries, Father Girolamo Pistoni and Brother Guglielmo Zambiasi, are still in rebel hands. Bishop George Biguzzi said the priests had been held along with many other prisoners, including former President Joseph Momoh, at what he described as a brewery building at Grassfield. Fearing an ECOMOG attack, the rebels decided to relocate in great haste, Biguzzi related. "There was a sudden advance of ECOMOG from outside Freetown. There was a lot of chaos and shooting. Everybody was trying to move into a safer area and eventually we were freed by ECOMOG," said Fr. Mario Guerra, who was abducted in November from the Catholic mission at Kamalo, in northern Sierra Leone. Biguzzi related that the rebels first moved the six nuns and two Xaverian missionaries, leaving Archbishop Ganda and the other priests alone. "They were able to find shelter, where they spent the first night," Biguzzi told the Missionary Service News Agency (MISNA). "The following day they cautiously continued their escape and then found shelter in another building for the second night. This morning they tried to reach the 'main road' but were intercepted by a group of rebels. Though in that same moment also a civil defence patrol arrived and the rebels decided to not confront them and escaped." The six were retrieved by ECOMOG and taken to Ferry Junction with an escort which included "an armoured tank and a truck loaded with soldiers," Biguzzi added. "Their health conditions are satisfactory, and now they are resting," he said. "They were not mistreated, though they were not able to wash for two weeks." Said Archbishop Ganda, "We're happy to be alive but there are others still there with the rebels. We're praying for them."

Thousands of displaced persons formed long lines Friday to receive emergency food aid being distributed by church and relief groups. Rev. Moses Khanu, President of the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone, said that stores of 8,000 to 10,000 tons of food had not been looted from warehouses near the port during the rebel attack on Freetown. The stocks, which include high nutrition corn and soya blend, bulgar, and vegetable oils, are owned by the United Nations World Food Programme, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision. "We believe that we have enough for the first phase of emergency aid," Khanu said. Aid workers said the number of displaced persons sheltering at the National Stadium had decreased by half, to about 17,000. They added that many had gone to check their homes but would return to the stadium to sleep.

ECOMOG officers said Friday that Nigerian fighter jets were attacking rebel strongholds in the mountains surrounding Freetown, while Nigerian and Guinean ECOMOG units were closing in on rebels trapped on the eastern fringes of the city. "(The rebels) have been devastated and (are) running in all directions," said ECOMOG spokesman Colonel Chris Oluokuade. "We are now on phase two of the operation, which is cordon and search." RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie told the Agence France-Presse (AFP) Friday that AFRC/RUF rebels planned to launch

an attack to retake the capital. "We are changing our tactic and planning a surprise attack on Freetown," he said, adding that despite their retreat the rebels "were still a strong fighting force." Bockarie denied allegations that the RUF was receiving assistance from Liberia and Burkina Faso. He claimed that the rebels had purchased or captured their arms from ECOMOG. "The Nigerians in ECOMOG are selling us arms and ammunition. They are collaborating with us," Bockarie said. He added that other weapons had been "seized from ECOMOG soldiers who were captured," adding that had captured "250 ECOMOG soldiers so far."

Kissy residents reported that "continuing atrocities by pockets of rebels," who attacked Thursday for the second night in a row, Reuters reported. World Food Programme (WFP) spokeswoman Christiane Berthiaume said Friday that ECOMOG had recorded at least 30 cases of mutilations. "The people are traumatised and in a state of shock," she said, adding that there had been summary executions and other human rights violations. Quoting witnesses, she said up to half of the houses had been burned down in the east of the city. A United Nations World Health Organisation official said retreating rebels had hacked off the limbs of civilians, including babies, in eastern part of the city. "The rebels have resorted to amputating arms and fingers of civilians, some as young as one-year-old babies," the official said. RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie denied that the rebels had mutilated civilians or burned houses. Instead, he blamed the atrocities on the Kamajor militia. "The Kamajors are known for using machetes. They are committing these atrocities," he said. Bockarie deplored the "incredible suffering of Sierra Leoneans in Freetown," and said the RUF had called a cease-fire for this week which was to have allowed food and emergency relief supplies to reach civilians trapped by the fighting. He warned that any future suffering would be "the responsibility of the Kabbah government and the Nigerians who have rejected a peaceful solution to the crisis." RUF spokesman Omrie Michael Golley also denied that the rebels were responsible for the atrocities. "The RUF was not responsible for the horrific recent atrocities in the east of the capital," Golley said. "ECOMOG said it had completely cleared the area of rebels on Tuesday. How is it possible then that rebels burst into people's homes on Wednesday and began cutting off their arms and legs?" In a separate interview, Golley said: "I have investigated this and spoken to our military high command, and I want to refute the idea that the RUF was behind these mutilations." Asked to comment on why survivors at Connaught Hospital had blamed their wounds on the rebels, Golley responded, "If anything happened, it must have been the civil militia going in and mutilating people they thought were rebels... There are a lot of terrible things going on. I'm not saying we've never committed atrocities, especially in the early stages of the war," he added. "In recent times, in the north and east, events will show it was not the RUF, it was the Kamajors that did the atrocities."

Following a closed-door meeting of the United Nations Security Council on Friday, Council President Ambassador Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (Brazil) read out a statement expressing grave concern about the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone, and the increasing number of refugees. Council members expressed the need for all parties to ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel, to allow them to work effectively, and to respect their impartiality and neutrality, the statement said. "Council members expressed support for the democratically-elected government of President Kabbah, and the efforts that are being made by ECOMOG," Amorim said. Council members urged the international community for "continued and sustained" support for the ECOMOG force, while indicating "their hope for an early resumption of dialogue that respect the legitimate government of President Kabbah."

The London-based human rights group Amnesty International on Friday termed "unacceptable" plans by the United Nations Security Council to reduce the number of human rights monitors attached to the United Nations Military Observer Force in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) from five to two or three. "At a time when it is more urgent than ever to monitor human rights abuses in Sierra Leone and to report them accurately and impartially, the UNOMSIL human rights section is being weakened dramatically" Amnesty International said. "Despite the difficulties posed by the security situation in Freetown, there is still much that UNOMSIL human rights officers can do." The Amnesty statement detailed human rights violations committed by both sides in the fighting. It

said rebel fighters had "deliberately and arbitrarily" killed hundreds of unarmed civilians, and abducted large numbers of civilians, including children and young people. Rebels also killed eleven police officers near the Cotton Tree, in central Freetown. Amnesty said rebel forces had arrived in Freetown with lists of people to be targeted, including members of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, lawyers, and journalists. Amnesty said ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) had summarily executed "captured rebels or people they suspect of supporting rebel forces." The statement said ECOMOG troops had summarily executed 22 captives on Aberdeen Bridge on January 13, and that such executions were continuing. The CDF last week summarily executed six young men at Kingtom whom they alleged were rebels. Amnesty said indiscriminate aerial bombardments by ECOMOG had resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties. The human rights group also said eight Sierra Leonean humanitarian aid workers had been detained by ECOMOG and accused of cooperating with rebel forces. "Most of them are reported to have been beaten while detained," the statement said.

The West African Journalists' Association (WAJA) on Friday said it was "outraged and shocked" by indiscriminate attacks and persecution of foreign and local journalists in Sierra Leone. "We condemn in no uncertain terms the abduction of journalists by the rebels, the killing of journalists, and the destruction of media houses and equipment," WAJA said in a statement. "WAJA has had occasion in the past to condemn the anti-media measures of the Tejan Kabbah regime, particularly the death sentence passed against some journalists. Whilst urging all parties in the crisis in Sierra Leone to lay down arms and bring peace to the long-suffering people of Sierra Leone, we equally appeal to them to respect the dignity and right of journalists, irrespective of their perceived political leanings, to do their work."

Sierra Leone News

News Archives

26 January 1999: ECOMOG bombarded suspected rebel positions overnight in the hills overlooking Kissy and in the wooded areas beyond Lumley before dawn on Tuesday. Shelling was also reported Monday night around around Calaba Town. ECOMOG officers said they were targeting "rebel infiltrators," Reuters reported. The Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported "relatively little shooting" overnight, but said tension in Freetown remained high. A military source said ECOMOG troops were "moving south, and would start bombarding adjacent hills in the next 48 hours." In conflicting reports, Reuters quoted medical staff at Connaught Hospital Tuesday as saying that the number of wounded arriving there had decreased substantially, while the AFP said wounded victims, many of them mutilated, continued to arrive at the city's five hospitals. The AFP, quoting hospital sources, reported more than 3,000 persons are known to have died during nearly three weeks of fighting between ECOMOG troops and AFRC/RUF rebel forces, with the final death toll expected to be much higher. No estimate of military casualties has been released.

The Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported Tuesday that some 60 people were killed Sunday in an attack on Waterloo. The number is based on reports by residents of 25 civilian deaths and a claim by Guinean ECOMOG sources that 35 rebels were killed during clashes in the town. Some 17 houses at Waterloo were reported to have been burned down. On Monday, ECOMOG said rebels were present at Wellington, but claimed to have surrounded the rebels on all sides. "We have blocked all known routes and are patrolling the coast," said ECOMOG spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Jimoh Okunlola, adding that rebel forces were caught between ECOMOG troops at Kissy and in Waterloo. Okunlola said the rebels' supply lines had been cut and that they were running out of ammunition. ECOMOG spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Olukulade said Tuesday that neighbourhood vigilante groups which have sprung up in Freetown have the support of ECOMOG. "We encourage that but there should be orderliness. They should be organised enough to help ECOMOG in countering the movement of suspicious characters or likely rebels in the society," he said in a radio broadcast.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie threatened Tuesday that the RUF would make Sierra Leone ungovernable unless the movement was given a share of power. "No government can rule. We'll make the country ungovernable," he said. "We are demanding a political role." Bockarie said ECOMOG troops would be "unable to provide security" for the Sierra Leone government. "We are negotiating the liberation of (RUF leader Corporal) Foday Sankoh, and we want a new government of inclusion," he said. "No government can succeed in this country if it doesn't include Foday Sankoh." Bockarie ridiculed ECOMOG claims to have "trapped" rebels southeast of Freetown. "Can you trap a rebel in the bush?" he asked.

The Spanish foreign ministry said Tuesday that the BBC had interviewed French journalist Patrick Saint Paul who, along with Spanish reporter Javier Espinosa, was kidnapped by rebels on Monday. Saint Paul was released with a message which the rebels have demanded be read over the BBC as a condition for Espinosa's release. As reported by Madrid EFE (radio), the BBC said

stressed that its broadcasts could not include communiqués from guerilla groups anywhere in the world, adding that it could not "shape its news programmes as dictated by violent groups of any kind," the interview closely paralleled the rebel statement. Saint Paul said the rebel group wanted to assure the international community that in no case would it harm the civilian population. Earlier, the Spanish foreign ministry said RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie had given assurances to Spain's ambassador to the Ivory Coast that he would order the release of Espinosa, who allegedly was being held by a "Colonel Rambo." The Spanish foreign minister confirmed that Spanish embassies in Nigeria, Senegal, and Ivory Coast, as well as the French secret service, were working to secure Espinosa's release. ECOMOG press spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Olukolade called the two journalists "irresponsible" Wednesday, adding they had put "their lives in danger to publicise people who have committed the worst atrocities." He said the journalists had ignored all the rules of caution in entering a zone believed still to be occupied by the RUF.

Freetown experienced fuel shortages Tuesday, a day after a fire at the Kissy fuel terminal on Monday further reduced already diminished supplies. "This is what we expected to happen. There has not been any supply for weeks and oil companies have had to supply ECOMOG with lots of fuel," said an engineer close to Safecon. "We don't know when the next shipment is coming in as no insurance company will cover any tanker docking at Kissy," he added.

Some shops began to reopen in the central business district of Freetown on Monday, Reuters reported on Tuesday. Some banks and shops reopened last week in western Freetown, which largely escaped the fighting. Few cars were on the streets Tuesday afternoon due to the fuel shortage.

Telephone and electrical service, which was partially restored in some areas last week, remain disrupted in central and eastern Freetown due to the destruction of power lines and overhead cables. "It will take several weeks to get things to near normal as burnt buildings have to be knocked down to prevent any catastrophe," a construction worker was quoted as saying.

The Sierra Leone Council of Churches continued emergency food distribution of rice and flour on Tuesday, Reuters reported.

The Nigerian newspaper P.M. News reported Tuesday that the bodies of 31 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers were returned to Nigeria on Sunday for burial. "A military source revealed that the dead soldiers include a major," the newspaper reported.

Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings called for peace talks to resolve the Sierra Leone conflict, but said AFRC/RUF rebels must first stop committing atrocities. "We are prepared to sit down to talk provided they stop those acts of violence, killing and maiming of innocent civilians," he said following talks with the United Nations Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo. Rawlings said ECOWAS should review its strategy of using force. "We do not believe this is the only way to handle the situation," he told Okelo, adding that constitutional legality must be respected. "The will of the people must be made to prevail," Rawlings said. "I implore you to get to some of the sober-minded allies of the rebels to bring their influence to bear on them to see reason."

International humanitarian agencies, whose foreign staff had fled Freetown following the rebel attack on January 6, began to return to the capital on Monday. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesman Judith Kumin said security concerns had forced cancellation of an aid flight to Kenema, where the UNHCR said there are currently 50,000 displaced persons. ECOMOG reportedly wants to move these people because of their proximity to the rebels. Kumin said a Sierra Leonean employee of the Irish aid agency Concern was killed when rebels set his house on fire. The victim worked with Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone, she said.

The Japanese foreign ministry has called on AFRC/RUF rebels holding its honorary consul, Kishoie Shankerdas, who was reported to have abducted Sunday along with ten other Indian nationals. "We are deeply concerned about the report," a Foreign Ministry statement said. "We strongly demand the anti-government rebels release the honorary consul general and other civilians." Japanese foreign ministry spokesman Sadaaki Numata said Japan was working through several countries, including Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Britain, to confirm the whereabouts of the eleven. Shankerdas, who has served as honorary consul for Japan since 1986, contributed greatly to the evacuation of Japanese citizens from Sierra Leone, the statement said.

Five Italian Xaverian missionary priests departed Sierra Leone for Italy via Conakry on Tuesday. Three of the five, Father Giuseppe Berton, Father Giovanni Ceresoli, and Father Mario Guerra, escaped from RUF custody last week, along with Archbishop Joseph Henry Ganda. A fourth, Father Girolamo Pistoni, survived an execution attempt by RUF fighters on Friday, and was hospitalised for a bullet wound in the chest. Father Giuseppe Cavallin (Giuseppino del Murialdo) had been isolated by the fighting and hid out for some days. The flight, which also includes civilians, was organised by the Crisis Unit of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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114) News Report

Radio Netherlands Report
21 January 2000.

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Radio Netherland English

Themes: *human rights* | other themes | news | about RNW

Highlights:

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

Updated: 21 January 2000

In 1997, a group of soldiers overthrew President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, 14 months after he was elected in a democratic poll. The troops, led by army major Johnny Paul Koroma, were incensed at the government's decision to cut military spending. They accused the government of putting greater trust in the Civilian Defence Forces than in them. The junta became known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). It soon formed an alliance with the RUF in opposition to President Kabbah.

Read their reasons for joining the junta:



Brig Sesay: "We overthrew the government in 1997 because we felt they were marginalising us. We had been fighting the war against the rebels since 1991, but the government seemed more interested in the civilian militias, the Kamajors. We were being paid a pittance compared to what the West African troops and the Kamajors were receiving. And we were living in slums. That's why we decided to go into the jungle."

Current story:

Within a month of the coup, West African states were sending in more troops to Sierra Leone. Four months later, ECOMOG pushed the RUF/AFRC out of Freetown and the rebels took refuge upcountry. The rebels then launched a campaign of terror called "Operation No Living Thing". They advanced steadily, and on January 6th, 1999, they re-entered Freetown.

Chapters:

By the end of January, ECOMOG troops and civilian militias expelled the RUF/AFRC again, and the rebels again took refuge upcountry. The number of AFRC combatants still in the bush is unclear. 30,000 according to some AFRC leaders, though a local reconciliation group, Movement to Unite People believes the number is closer to 7,000.

Demands

Not many of the AFRC fighters in the bush are able to express in English the conditions that must be fulfilled for them to report en masse to reception centres. Brigadier Sesay, for instance, believes the combatants



Lieut. Col. Ad Guy: "I decided to join the rebellion because I had to defend my rights. Ordinary people were so angry at us that they wanted to kill us. We had to go into the bush, just to defend ourselves."

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should be paid \$700 rather than \$300 to go through the demobilisation process. He also insists that donors provide them with proper accommodation in Freetown.

Others demand the reinstatement of AFRC combatants in the Sierra Leone Army. Some AFRC men assert that the government has already spent large sums to train them so it would be much easier and cheaper to reintegrate them in the armed forces. They also call for the payment of months of back wages. Yet others yearn for their lost status. They feel they were unceremoniously kicked out of the army, losing not only their jobs and careers but also any prospects of gainful employment.



Brig. Gen. Gullit: "By taking over power, we believed we were going to free the people. This revolution is a grass-roots movement to achieve the basic, fundamental rights of every Sierra Leonean. We wanted to sweep all the rotten corruption out of our country for a true and lasting democracy."

We are committed to peace. But we, the commanders, need to be satisfied. Behind me, there are 4 or 5 brigades.

- Brig. Gen. Gullit

Many of the AFRC are clearly trying to cash in on the threat they pose to peace. AFRC leaders are widely rumoured to have extracted millions of dollars by illegally mining Sierra Leone's rich diamond fields. Men lower down the ranks are also trying to push the government and donor community. "Let's take the example of Somalia and Rwanda," one rebel explained. "People there received food and clothing at least. But here in Sierra Leone, we have no rights. So do you expect me to come out from the bush?"

Did the AFRC commit atrocities?

In Sierra Leone, it's always the other who seems to have been responsible for the atrocities:

♦ "These atrocities were committed by rebel RUF leader Sam Bokari", - who has since fled to Liberia - asserts Brigadier Sesay. "He said the US embassy and the British and Nigerian High Commissions should be burnt down. It was the RUF men we released from Pademba Road - the main prison in downtown Freetown - who carried out the amputations. We tried to stop them. We are soldiers and we believe in the Geneva Convention." Nonetheless, Brig. Sesay admits that AFRC men set fire to houses and buildings in Freetown.

♦ "It would be very illogical for anybody to think we destroyed our country's mighty buildings," says another AFRC member. "We love our people. It's because of our



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people that we decided to leave the city and go to the bush. If we had wanted to stay in the city, we would have. We had armoured cars, gun ships and all those things."

♦ Another AFRC leader boasts that he was the operation commander of the forces that invaded Freetown on January 6, 1999. But a senior rebel quickly shuts him up.

♦ Brigadier General Gullit is categorical: "We didn't commit human rights violations. I never gave destructive instructions, only operational instructions." Besides, he says, the AFRC were fighting for the civilian population. ECOMOG, he implies, were responsible for the atrocities during the rebel intervention, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. "As a military man," says Brig. Gullit, "I know they caused some of the destruction to regain their credibility."

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115) News Report

AAP Newsfeed, "AFR: Sierra Leone Villagers tell of rebel atrocities", Clarence Roy-Macauley, 10 May 1998.

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May 10, 1998, Sunday

SECTION: Western Australian Regional; Overseas News

LENGTH: 405 words

HEADLINE: AFR: SIERRA LEONE VILLAGERS TELL OF REBEL **ATROCITIES**

BYLINE: By Clarence Roy-Macaulay

BODY:

FREETOWN, Sierra Leone, May 9 AP - Ousted from power by a West African force loyal to Sierra Leone's president, former junta members hiding in the countryside were wreaking revenge with ethnic killings and maimings.

Aid workers today transported 18 amputees from the northern town of Karina to a hospital in the capital of Freetown after rebel fighters hacked off their hands on Thursday.

The victims said their attackers told them they were being punished because they were from President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah's Madingo tribe. "The rebels told me to use my amputated hands to vote for Tejan Kabbah in the next presidential elections," said Abu Mansaray, maimed Thursday in the northern Bombali district.

Witnesses said another 18 villagers were killed and 30 maimed Friday in similar ambushes by rebels from other ethnic groups.

"A rebel drank the blood of a man murdered in front of us," said one victim, who asked not to be identified, who saw four members of his family killed in the nearby Ndaraya village.

After spending months in exile, Kabbah was restored to power in March after the Nigerian-led West African force known as ECOMOG ended 10 months of rule by fighters loyal to junta leader Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma.

Koroma came to power in a bloody coup last May.

In small villages throughout the country, reports of revenge attacks have intensified.

A private radio station, Radio Mankneh, reported that the northern towns of Karina, Kamabai, Ndaraya and Worodala have been abandoned after attackers killed dozens and torched a number of homes.

Amnesty International yesterday said that it has new evidence of **atrocities** committed by the retreating rebel forces, including the amputations of one or both arms of at least four villagers in the country's Kono District.

The human rights groups accused the rebel forces, the Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, of brutalising hundreds of civilians.

Eight West African governments have recommended reinforcing the 10,000-member Nigerian-led force, which was trying to disarm rebel and military groups.

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Kabbah has disbanded the army and has asked ECOMOG to train a new national force.

"As long as there are groups of rebels moving about, we will continue to hear about **atrocities** committed against civilians," presidential spokesman Septimus Kai Kai said today.

AP ac

LOAD-DATE: May 9, 1998

Document 1 of 40 [next](#) >

116) News Report

BBC News, "Freetown Bears the Scars", 27 February 1999.

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Freetown bears the scars



Civilians said the rebels had attacked them with machetes

BBC West Africa Correspondent Mark Doyle was among the first foreign journalists to tour the Sierra Leonean capital after the rebels were driven out in 1999:

Freetown is a devastated city. While bullet and bomb damage speak of a city caught in the crossfire during heavy fighting, much of the destruction is the result of a systematic scorched earth policy used by the rebels when they took the capital.

The rebels, who have now been driven out of most of the city, say they are fighting against government corruption. Most Sierra Leoneans believe, however, that they simply want to grab power. For this reason, the Nigerian-led west African troops who now control the capital are seen as a liberation force by most residents.

As the rebels retreated from the city, they burnt buildings and attacked civilians.

'Killed little children'

"They started beating people, burning houses, seizing things, stealing," one resident recalled.

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The BBC's Mark Doyle "The situation is still tense and dangerous"



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"There are some things they do which I cannot explain. They went to houses, killed little children in the houses."



Residents are starting to rebuild their homes

Men and women with bandaged stumps of limbs told how the rebels had attacked them with machetes, cutting off hands and feet in order to discourage them and others from supporting the government.

Tens of thousands of people made homeless by the war have taken refuge in a football stadium. Most foreign aid workers have fled the conflict, but local Sierra Leonean charities are doing a good job distributing what food aid they have available.

UK support for government

A British naval frigate, HMS Norfolk, is off the coast, helping to co-ordinate aid plans, and showing Britain's support for the democratically elected government.



Penfold: UK must support Sierra Leonean democracy

Shuffling between the ship and shore is United Kingdom High Commissioner Peter Penfold, an important figure here. The Sierra Leone Government sees him as one of their key backers. In the past, he caused controversy back in London because of his actions. But he made no secret of Britain's current role:

"It's always been a close link between Britain and Sierra Leone. When the Sierra Leoneans decided to embrace democracy, we were very much involved then.

"We want to be the lead with the international community in supporting this restoration of democracy," Mr Penfold concluded.

5065

Tense situation

The Nigerian troops still have a heavy presence on the streets of Freetown, and the situation remains tense with the rebel resistance continuing in the eastern end of the city.



Nigerian-led troops control most of the city

Volunteers are queuing up to join the Sierra Leone army, which has been decimated by soldiers defecting to the rebel side. However, unless there is a lasting political solution to the chronic instability, any new soldiers could end up simply fighting a new war.

Even when Freetown is finally cleared of all pockets of rebel resistance, the war could continue in the countryside.

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117) News Report

Article from SL News Archives, 1 February 1999, published on the Sierra Leone Web

Sierra Leone News

News Archives

1 February 1999: An official with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said approximately 3,000 civilians had died since the rebel offensive in Freetown, and there existed an acute need for medicine, health care, and sanitation. "It is estimated that approximately 3,000 civilians have lost their lives, largely as a result of a deliberate campaign by rebel forces to terrorize the population, through forced amputations, shootings, house burnings and rapes," said Kevin Kennedy, who visited Sierra Leone between January 19 and 28. He said aid workers had been unable to enter eastern Freetown, but flights over the area indicated that 80% of the buildings may have been damaged or destroyed in the fighting, creating an urgent need for shelter. Kennedy said the United Nations was shipping plastic sheeting for 10,000 families. He described the situation in hospitals and clinics in western Freetown as "fairly desperate," saying medical teams in hospitals and 23 clinics opened in the past ten days were unable to handle all the injuries and amputations. After Connaught Hospital reopened it had received 300 cases requiring surgery in five days, mostly people wounded in the fighting or victims of rebel amputations, he said.

118) News Report


BBC News, "Covering the battle for Freetown", 18 January 1999.



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
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
Covering the battle for Freetown



Ecomog soldiers: Regained Freetown after fierce battle

By West Africa Correspondent Mark Doyle

I found covering the battle for Freetown extremely difficult. I was there when the worst of the fighting broke out between the rebels and the Nigerian-led Ecomog forces.




The rebels terrorised the population with tactics which included murder, rape and arson. It was fierce house-to-house battles, until the Nigerians succeeded in clearing most of the rebels out of central Freetown.

Not only was it so dangerous that most of the time I could not venture into the city, but worse, my best sources of information there had either fled or gone into hiding.

Almost all foreign residents had been evacuated before the fighting reached the city centre, but more important than the foreigners were my Sierra Leonean journalist colleagues. Over more than a year of visiting Sierra Leone, I have come to trust the best of them, sometimes literally, with my life.

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Ecomog forces kept control of Freetown airport

now, or do we pull back? Is it safe to speak to this armed man at that road block, or is it better not to try?

Most of the time only a local journalist knows and understands the subtle signs which can help answer these questions.

But when the rebels reached the centre of town, these journalists, like almost all of the residents of

Freetown, had to go into hiding.

Then the phones were cut by the fighting and the rebels hit the power station. Added to the cut in electricity, there was an information blackout as well.

Airport base

The only safe place to be in Freetown was the airport. Throughout the battle it was firmly in the hands of the Ecomog troops who, with a mandate from the United Nations and partly paid for by Britain, are defending the elected Sierra Leone government against the rebels.

But the airport was not such a bad place to be. Over the months I have made friends with some of the Nigerian officers and the people who work with them. They allowed me to stay at the airport and report on the operations of their rear base.



Extra Nigerian troops were brought in

I saw Nigerian air force jets scream off on bombing missions against the rebels. I watched a Hercules transport plane disgorge hundreds of fresh Nigerian troops and then saw them ferried into Freetown on a military helicopter.

When the chopper returned to the airport, it was usually full of terrified civilians who had been saved by the Nigerians from the chaos in

the city. They were pitifully few compared with the hundreds of thousands of people trapped there.

Slowly, as these evacuees told their stories, with tears and terror still in their eyes, I built up a picture of what was going on.

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Civilians abused

The horror of it was almost unbelievable. The rebels were using the population as human shields. Gangs of young men with guns, some high on drugs, were forcing innocent people onto the streets and then hiding among them, tried to advance against the Nigerians.

Anyone who did not wave a white handkerchief as a sign of support for the rebels, some of whom were boys as young as eight, risked being shot or having their house burned down.



A Freetown civilian is searched by soldiers

The citizens of Freetown faced a dreadful dilemma. The government controlled radio station told people to stay indoors. If not, they would be considered a rebel and risked being shot by the Nigerians. The rebels, on the other hand, were telling them to stay out on the streets.

At one point a Nigerian fighter-jet attacked a gathering of people in the centre of the city because the pilot, following his orders, was told to hit any group which could be a rebel concentration. I asked the commander of the Nigerian forces about this incident and he replied angrily that he would use the best weapon he had to deal with any potential threat.

The sounds of war

After a few days at the Nigerian held airport, I travelled briefly into Freetown on board a military helicopter. The helicopter flew low and fast to avoid possible rebel snipers and landed inside a Nigerian military base at the far western tip of the Freetown peninsula. Even in this relatively safe part of town there was virtually nobody on the streets.

I travelled a few, short miles from one Nigerian base to another and heard the sounds of war. Mortar bombs were exploding in the centre of the city. Nearer to the terrifying shrapnel released by the mortars, people were being killed.

A Nigerian general at the military base assured me that this was the sound of his men bombarding the rebels. But another source



Journalist Myles Tierney: Killed by rebels

inside the city later told me that the rebels had heavy mortars as well.

Some of the rebels, for sure, were poorly trained elements out to loot and kill. But others were hardened combatants who knew how to fight.

A few hours after reaching western Freetown I learnt that an American journalist I had been working with a few days before, Miles Tierney, had been killed in the centre of town by the rebels.

Another colleague, a Canadian, was severely wounded in the incident with a bullet in the head. The death of the journalist, a human tragedy in itself, illustrated just how dangerous Freetown was for everybody there. His name will be added to the long list of Sierra Leoneans, Nigerians and others whose bodies are still being collected and counted.

The journalists had been travelling in a convoy organised by the Sierra Leonean Minister of Information and they had 20 armed Nigerian soldiers to protect them. The Minister said he thought that the area they were travelling in was safe.

It was not.

I still do not know what has become of most of my Sierra Leonean colleagues in Freetown.

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119) News Report

Article from SL News Archives, 5 March 1999, published on the Sierra Leone Web

Sierra Leone News

News Archives

5 March 1999: The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) condemned on Friday the kidnapping of hundreds of children by AFRC/RUF rebels during their offensive to capture Freetown in January. Parents in Freetown have reported 2,615 children still missing two months after rebel forces were repulsed from Freetown, UNICEF spokesman Patrick McCormick said. Nearly 700 children of 1,120 cases studied had been separated from their parents in the chaos surrounding the fighting, but about 40 percent had been abducted by the rebels, he added. Most of those abducted were between the ages of 11 and 17, but 26 were below the age of six. UNICEF has managed to reunite 152 children with their families. Some of the abductees have been forced to participate in the fighting, while others were used as porters or sex slaves, UNICEF said, adding that eyewitness testimonies "paint a devastating picture for thousands of children in the aftermath of the failed rebel offensive."

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120) News Report

Article from SL News Archives, 25 February 1999, published on the Sierra Leone Web

Sierra Leone News

News Archives

25 February 1999: Some 2,000 children between the ages of 5 and 14 have been missing since AFRC/RUF rebels attacked Freetown on January 6, a Ministry of Social Welfare official said on Thursday. "We believe that many of the children have been abducted by the rebels when they were chased out by ECOMOG and have been taken to the bush," he said. "Some are being used as cooks, carriers of looted goods, while others have been illegally married to rebel commandos." The Agence France-Presse (AFP) quoted escapees from rebel camps who said boys were receiving weapons training or were sent on spying missions. The Social Welfare official disclosed that 980 former child soldiers who had received rehabilitation between 1992 and 1997 rejoined the rebels after the project folded in November 1997 for lack of funds. "With assistance not forthcoming, the children joined their colleagues in the jungle after the ousting of the junta in February last year," he said. His account was disputed by former AFRC Secretary of State for Information Mohamed Bangura, who was subsequently quoted by the National Neutral Journalists Association of Sierra Leone as saying that the late Lieutenant-Colonel Kula Samba had continued the demobilisation project even after aid agencies had been prevented from assisting her efforts. Bangura alleged that Samba's records had been destroyed in February 1998 by supporters of the civilian government.

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121) News Report

Article from SL News Archives, 20 May 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

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Sierra Leone News

News Archives

20 May 1998: Rebels holding out in Kono District have completely devastated the city of Koidu, London Times journalist Sam Kiley told the BBC "Network Africa" program on Wednesday. "Koidu has effectively ceased to exist as a city in a way that you or I would understand it," Kiley said. "Every single structure -- and I mean every single structure -- everything, from chicken coops to hotels, has been reduced to rubble by the RUF/AFRC forces as they withdrew ahead of the Nigerian-led advance. They burned down every single building. I have covered a large number of cities that have been very badly damaged during conflict, but this is a city that has been annihilated." Kiley said most of Koidu's estimated 100,000 population had fled into the bush and to surrounding villages. "A few are now filtering back to Koidu proper, about 6,000 people, but they are filtering back to a city that really doesn't offer them very much hope at all. There is nowhere to sleep, there isn't any kind of shelter from the rains that have just begun, and they now face a very miserable future of trying to rebuild lives from the ground up, quite literally." Kiley said the government was cooperating with NGO's to bring medicine and food into the district, but that serious security concerns still remained. Kiley reported a brief firefight between ECOMOG troops and rebels who mounted a hit-and-run attack on the city during his visit to the area on Wednesday. "The rebels are continuing their reign of terror not very far beyond the city limits," he added.

122) News Report

Article from SL News Archives, 29 April 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

Sierra Leone News

News Archives

29 April 1998: 52 more civilians are reportedly being treated in Freetown after an attack Wednesday by AFRC/RUF rebels at Motema, in Kono District. Close to 100 people are currently undergoing medical treatment at Connaught Hospital. More than 30 had their fingers or wrists chopped off with machetes, while at least 15 had their ears amputated.

123) News Report

Article from SL News Archives, 13 April 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

Sierra Leone News

News Archives

13 April 1998: ECOMOG has begun a "final offensive" against junta loyalists in Kono and Kailahun Districts, ECOMOG task force commander Colonel Maxwell Khobe announced on SLBS (state radio) late Sunday. "Our troops commenced the final push today," Khobe said. Aid workers said Monday that the ECOMOG force was using tanks and warplanes in its drive against junta positions. Civilians reaching Bo and Kenema reported fierce fighting near Koidu and the town of Kailahun. Khobe said his troops were converging from Kabala, Sewafe, Bo, Kenema, and Daru, while Guinean ECOMOG troops were advancing from their border. "At the moment, the central axis is making good movement," he said. "The junta troops are divided into pockets and are fighting in different directions." Yengema, on the outskirts of Koidu, had already been captured by ECOMOG troops, he added. On Friday, Khobe told reporters that ECOMOG would "liberate" Kono and Kailahun Districts by Wednesday. ECOMOG Force Commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said the rebels have made use of Sierra Leone's thick forests to evade capture and to launch ambushes against ECOMOG troops, but he noted that the attacks were infrequent and did not appear to be well-organised. He said it was not clear how long it would take to complete the offensive. Junta loyalists and RUF fighters have vowed to make their final stand at Koidu, and witnesses say they have fortified the city and massed thousands of fighters in preparation for the ECOMOG assault. Civilians fleeing Kono have told of widespread killing of civilians and destruction of property by junta forces at Koidu and in numerous villages throughout the district.

124) News Report

“Sierra Leone-Children: Young, Armed and Dangerous”
Lansana Fofana, Inter Press Service, July 1, 1997

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July 1, 1997, Tuesday

Child soldiers
Junta

LENGTH: 692 words

HEADLINE: SIERRA LEONE-CHILDREN: YOUNG, ARMED AND DANGEROUS

BYLINE: By Lansana Fofana

DATELINE: FREETOWN, Jul. 1

BODY:

Since the military coup in May, hundreds of child soldiers have fled camps for demobilized fighters and are back on the streets armed with AK-47s and rocket propelled grenades.

It is a common sight to see the child soldiers patrolling the streets in major cities throughout Sierra Leone, bringing renewed fears that children are once again being drawn into armed conflict.

According to some reports, the children are being armed by the new military junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (**AFRC**), and its allies, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), now known as the People's Army, to fight the local hunters' militia, the Kamajors.



The Kamajors, who fought alongside government troops against the RUF during the civil conflict, have vowed to march on Freetown, the capital, to oust the junta and re-instate President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. There have been reports of fighting in the Southern District of **Bo** between the combined forces of the **AFRC/RUF** and the Kamajors. Hundreds of child soldiers are reportedly among the **AFRC/RUF** fighters.

Many of the children had been placed in camps for demobilized soldiers following the November 1996 Peace Accord signed between the ousted government of President Kabbah and the RUF rebels.

According to one weekly newspaper report here, more than 60 percent of 1,000 fighters screened by the Disarmament, Demobilization and Resettlement Committee before the May 25 coup were children.

Thousands of child soldiers had been demobilized and encamped at Jui, about 30 kilometers east of Freetown, where they were receiving technical and vocational training in a program sponsored by the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF).

Referring to the flight of the children back into the conflict, Thomas Sesay, a counselling officer at the Jui camp said: "This is unfortunate because we had succeeded in transforming most of these kids and had reintegrated them into society."

Sierra Leone has one of the world's worse records for recruiting children as soldiers. Between 1992 and 1996, the period of the worst fighting between the government forces and the RUF, an estimated 4,500 children were forced to fight on both sides.

Children were abducted and forced to commit various atrocities. Some were ordered to torture and murder their own relatives before being taken to other villages to slaughter others.

UNICEF, an international advocacy organization for children's rights, has repeatedly called on the Sierra Leonean authorities to stop using children as soldiers. "UNICEF calls on all warring sides to put an end to the use of children as combatants and to incorporate provisions for their physical and emotional welfare in a future peace settlement," Carol Bellamy, UNICEF's Executive Director said at the height of the conflict.

"Children should have no part in war. By making them agents of civil conflict and depriving them of their childhood, the vicious cycle of violence is perpetuated," she added. "Child soldiers are a symptom of the wider problem, the complete neglect of a whole generation."

Thousands of children have been orphaned by the Sierra Leonean conflict, making them ripe for recruitment. According to some estimates, 8,000 children were separated from their families or orphaned by the civil unrest.

The chair of the Civil Liberties Congress, lawyer Sulaiman Banja Tejan-Sie, said this trend must be reversed immediately.

"We cannot wait until the situation gets worse. These kids have the temptation of drugs and money and many have lost their parents," Tejan-Sie said. "It is high time someone tells these soldiers and rebels to stop recruiting innocent kids."

According to sociologist Kama Bangura of the University of Sierra Leone, children are not just affected by being forced to carry a gun. The war, he said, has disrupted their lives in many ways.

"Children will be hardest hit by the gradual collapse of basic services," Bangura said. "Food distribution has been disrupted, immunization campaigns have been halted, leaving children susceptible to epidemics of measles, typhoid, and whooping cough."

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125) News Report

Guardian Article: "UN gets evidence of war-zone diamonds trade", Richard Norton-Taylor, 1 August 2000

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


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UN gets evidence of war-zone diamonds trade

Special report: Sierra Leone

Richard Norton-Taylor
Tuesday August 1, 2000
The Guardian

Detailed evidence that the president of Liberia is providing rebel forces in Sierra Leone with guns and equipment in return for diamonds has been presented to the UN by western governments, the Guardian has learned.

President Charles Taylor is personally "orchestrating" a campaign which has taken on a west African dimension, involving Burkina Faso, Guinea and Angola, according to well-placed sources.

He regularly meets leaders of Sierra Leone's rebel Revolutionary United Front, including Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay.

They have made joint visits to Burkina Faso for meetings hosted by its president, Blaise Compaore.

Mr Taylor and Mr Bockarie visited Burkina Faso on June 5 and June 23, when Mr Compaore supplied arms to the RUF in return for diamonds, the sources say.

Burkina Faso also supplies weapons to the Unita rebel forces in Angola.

On June 1, RUF leaders with a consignment of diamonds travelled to the

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*Compaore
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
[Diamonds buy peace for
Sierra Leone city](#)

Liberian capital, Monrovia, where President Taylor assured them of both his full support and supplies of arms, trucks, food and medicine for use in operations against the Sierra Leone army and UN forces.

A few days later the equipment, with operators and helicopters from Liberia, left Monrovia for the eastern Sierra Leone town of Kailahun, where UN troops were under siege. Fifty-five mercenaries from Burkina Faso also arrived in Sierra Leone, according to reports sent to the UN.

Western sources say that last year Liberia exported 6m carats of diamonds - worth £200m - to Belgium alone. Liberia's diamond industry has an annual capacity of 150,000 carats at most. It is estimated that 40% of Sierra Leone's diamonds reach the outside world via Burkina Faso, the rest going via Liberia.

The sources say that Mr Taylor and the RUF are plotting with dissidents to overthrow the government of Guinea.





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126) Map

Map of Sierra Leone, Scale 1:350,000

Sierra Leone



- Legend**
- Primary Headpost
 - Secondary Headpost
 - Airport
 - Populated Place
 - Section Boundary
 - District Boundary
 - Railroad
 - Gridline
 - International Boundary
 - Primary Road
 - Secondary Road
 - Tertiary Road
 - Track
 - Unsettled Area
 - Lake/Inlet
 - Swamp
 - Bank-up Area
 - Islands

Sierra Leone
Scale 1:250,000




Produced by
UNIVERSITY OF SIERRA LEONE
1 JAN 2002

127) Treaty

Article 3(1) of the Convention (IV) to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War Geneva 12 August 1949.

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articles



**Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva,
12 August 1949.**

Part I : General provisions

ARTICLE 3

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) taking of hostages;

(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

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INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

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128) Treaty

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977

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fulltext



Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.

Preamble

The High Contracting Parties, Recalling that the humanitarian principles enshrined in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, constitute the foundation of respect for the human person in cases of armed conflict not of an international character,

Recalling furthermore that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the human person,

Emphasizing the need to ensure a better protection for the victims of those armed conflicts,

Recalling that, in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience,

Have agreed on the following:

Part I. Scope of this Protocol

Art 1. Material field of application

1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions or application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.

2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.

Art 2. Personal field of application

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1. This Protocol shall be applied without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria (hereinafter referred to as "adverse distinction") to all persons affected by an armed conflict as defined in Article 1.

2. At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such conflict, as well as those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons, shall enjoy the protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liberty.

Art 3. Non-intervention

1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.

2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs.

Part II. Humane Treatment

Art 4 Fundamental guarantees

1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.

2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever:

(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;

(b) collective punishments;

(c) taking of hostages;

(d) acts of terrorism;

(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;

(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;

(g) pillage;

(h) threats to commit any or the foregoing acts.

3. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular:

(a) they shall receive an education, including religious and moral education, in keeping

with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those responsible for their care;

(b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated;

(c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities;

(d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take a direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of subparagraph (c) and are captured;

(e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the consent of their parents or persons who by law or custom are primarily responsible for their care, to remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country and ensure that they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-being.

Art 5. Persons whose liberty has been restricted

1. In addition to the provisions of Article 4 the following provisions shall be respected as a minimum with regard to persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained;

(a) the wounded and the sick shall be treated in accordance with Article 7;

(b) the persons referred to in this paragraph shall, to the same extent as the local civilian population, be provided with food and drinking water and be afforded safeguards as regards health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the climate and the dangers of the armed conflict;

(c) they shall be allowed to receive individual or collective relief;

(d) they shall be allowed to practise their religion and, if requested and appropriate, to receive spiritual assistance from persons, such as chaplains, performing religious functions;

(e) they shall, if made to work, have the benefit of working conditions and safeguards similar to those enjoyed by the local civilian population.

2. Those who are responsible for the internment or detention of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall also, within the limits of their capabilities, respect the following provisions relating to such persons:

(a) except when men and women of a family are accommodated together, women shall be held in quarters separated from those of men and shall be under the immediate supervision of women;

(b) they shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards, the number of which may be limited by competent authority if it deems necessary;

(c) places of internment and detention shall not be located close to the combat zone. The persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall be evacuated when the places where they are interned or detained become particularly exposed to danger arising out of the armed conflict, if their evacuation can be carried out under adequate conditions of safety;

(d) they shall have the benefit of medical examinations;

(e) their physical or mental health and integrity shall not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject the persons described in this Article to any medical procedure which is not indicated by the state of health of the person concerned, and which is not consistent with the generally accepted medical standards applied to free persons under similar medical circumstances.

3. Persons who are not covered by paragraph 1 but whose liberty has been restricted in any way whatsoever for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be treated humanely in accordance with Article 4 and with paragraphs 1 (a), (c) and (d), and 2 (b) of this Article.

4. If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure their safety shall be taken by those so deciding.

Art 6. Penal prosecutions

1. This Article applies to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences related to the armed conflict.

2. No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality.

In particular:

(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence;

(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility;

(c) no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law, at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;

(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;

(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;

(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.

3. A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised.

4. The death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eighteen years at the time of the offence and shall not be carried out on pregnant women or mothers of young children.

5. At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.

Part III. Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked

Art 7. Protection and care

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1. All the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, whether or not they have taken part in the armed conflict, shall be respected and protected.
2. In all circumstances they shall be treated humanely and shall receive to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition. There shall be no distinction among them founded on any grounds other than medical ones.

Art 8. Search

Whenever circumstances permit and particularly after an engagement, all possible measures shall be taken, without delay, to search for and collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead, prevent their being despoiled, and decently dispose of them.

Art 9. Protection of medical and religious personnel

1. Medical and religious personnel shall be respected and protected and shall be granted all available help for the performance of their duties. They shall not be compelled to carry out tasks which are not compatible with their humanitarian mission.
2. In the performance of their duties medical personnel may not be required to give priority to any person except on medical grounds.

Art 10. General protection of medical duties

1. Under no circumstances shall any person be punished for having carried out medical activities compatible with medical ethics, regardless of the person benefiting therefrom.
2. Persons engaged in medical activities shall neither be compelled to perform acts or to carry out work contrary to, nor be compelled to refrain from acts required by, the rules of medical ethics or other rules designed for the benefit of the wounded and sick, or this Protocol.
3. The professional obligations of persons engaged in medical activities regarding information which they may acquire concerning the wounded and sick under their care shall, subject to national law, be respected.
4. Subject to national law, no person engaged in medical activities may be penalized in any way for refusing or failing to give information concerning the wounded and sick who are, or who have been, under his care.

Art 11. Protection of medical units and transports

1. Medical units and transports shall be respected and protected at all times and shall not

be the object of attack.

2. The protection to which medical units and transports are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit hostile acts, outside their humanitarian function. Protection may, however, cease only after a warning has been given, setting, whenever appropriate, a reasonable time-limit, and after such warning has remained unheeded.

Art 12. The distinctive emblem

Under the direction of the competent authority concerned, the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun on a white ground shall be displayed by medical and religious personnel and medical units, and on medical transports. It shall be respected in all circumstances. It shall not be used improperly.

Part IV. Civilian Population

Art 13. Protection of the civilian population

1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances.

2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.

3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

Art 14. Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population

Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.

Art 15. Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces

Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

Art 16. Protection of cultural objects and of places of worship

Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the military effort.

Art 17. Prohibition of forced movement of civilians

1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.

2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict.

Art 18. Relief societies and relief actions

1. Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting Party, such as Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations may offer their services for the performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict. The civilian population may, even on its own initiative, offer to collect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.

2. If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as food-stuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.

Part V. Final Provisions

Art 19. Dissemination

This Protocol shall be disseminated as widely as possible.

Art 20. Signature

This Protocol shall be open for signature by the Parties to the Conventions six months after the signing of the Final Act and will remain open for a period of twelve months.

Art 21. Ratification

This Protocol shall be ratified as soon as possible. The instruments of ratification shall be

deposited with the Swiss Federal Council, depositary of the Conventions.

Art 22. Accession

This Protocol shall be open for accession by any Party to the Conventions which has not signed it. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the depositary.

Art 23. Entry into force

1. This Protocol shall enter into force six months after two instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited.

2. For each Party to the Conventions thereafter ratifying or acceding to this Protocol, it shall enter into force six months after the deposit by such Party of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Art 24. Amendment

1. Any High Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Protocol. The text of any proposed amendment shall be communicated to the depositary which shall decide, after consultation with all the High Contracting Parties and the International Committee of the Red Cross, whether a conference should be convened to consider the proposed amendment.

2. The depositary shall invite to that conference all the High Contracting Parties as well as the Parties to the Conventions, whether or not they are signatories of this Protocol.

Art 25. Denunciation

1. In case a High Contracting Party should denounce this Protocol, the denunciation shall only take effect six months after receipt of the instrument of denunciation. If, however, on the expiry of six months, the denouncing Party is engaged in the situation referred to in Article 1, the denunciation shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict. Persons who have been deprived of liberty, or whose liberty has been restricted, for reasons related to the conflict shall nevertheless continue to benefit from the provisions of this Protocol until their final release.

2. The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the depositary, which shall transmit it to all the High Contracting Parties.

Art 26. Notifications

The depositary shall inform the High Contracting Parties as well as the Parties to the Conventions, whether or not they are signatories of this Protocol, of:

- (a) signatures affixed to this Protocol and the deposit of instruments of ratification and accession under Articles 21 and 22;
- (b) the date of entry into force of this Protocol under Article 23; and

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(c) communications and declarations received under Article 24.

Art 27. Registration

1. After its entry into force, this Protocol shall be transmitted by the depositary to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration and publication, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The depositary shall also inform the Secretariat of the United Nations of all ratifications, accessions and denunciations received by it with respect to this Protocol.

Art 28. - Authentic texts

The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic shall be deposited with the depositary, which shall transmit certified true copies thereof to all the Parties to the Conventions.

I N T E R N A T I O N A L H U M A N I T A R I A N L A W

129) Record of States Party to Geneva Conventions, International Committee of the Red Cross,

States party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977



notifications

**Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.****Sierra Leone**

Succession ⓘ 10.06.1965

In a note dated 31 May 1965 and received by the Swiss Federal Council on 10 June of that year, the government of Sierra Leone declared that State to be party to the four Conventions by virtue of their ratification by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 23 September 1957. The Conventions entered into force for Sierra Leone retroactively as from 27 April 1961, the date on which that country became independent.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

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notifications



Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949³, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.

Sierra Leone

Ratif.Accession ① 21.10.1986

I N T E R N A T I O N A L H U M A N I T A R I A N L A W

130) Accord

The Abidjan Peace Accord, 30 November 1996, The Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)

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Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL).

Moved by the imperative need for a just and durable peace in Sierra Leone;

Inspired by the equally imperative need for genuine national unity and reconciliation to end the fratricidal war in Sierra Leone;

Committed to promoting popular participation in governance and full respect for human rights and humanitarian laws;

Dedicated to the advancement of democratic development and to the maintenance of a socio-political order free of inequality, despotism and corruption;

Convinced that a sense of common purpose and patriotism is the need of the hour;

HEREBY AGREE as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL is hereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the two foes will ensure that a total cessation of hostilities is observed forthwith.

ARTICLE 2

The Government and the RUF/SL undertake that no effort shall be spared to effect the scrupulous respect and implementation of the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement to ensure that the establishment and consolidation of a just peace becomes a priority in Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE 3

A national body to be known as the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace shall be established within two weeks of the signing of this Agreement. The Commission shall be a verification mechanism responsible for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with all the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement.

The Commission, in fulfilment of this task during the period of consolidating the peace, shall coordinate and facilitate the work of the following bodies which will proceed to establish:

- (i) Socio-Economic Forum;
- (ii) Citizen's Consultative Conferences;
- (iii) Multi-partisan Council;
- (iv) Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace;
- (v) Demobilization and Resettlement Committee;
- (vi) National Budget and Debt Committee.

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The Commission shall comprise representatives of the Government and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, drawing on the resources of state and civic institutions as and when necessary.

The Commission shall have the power to recommend the preparation of enabling measures contained in this Peace Agreement. It shall have the power to issue publicly its conclusions. The parties undertake to comply with the conclusions of the Commission.

The Commission shall have the power to prepare preliminary legislative drafts necessary for the implementation and development of the provisions contained in the present Peace Agreement.

The Parties undertake to consult the Commission before taking decisions on measures relating to the present Peace Agreement.

The Commission may similarly consult the Parties at the highest level whenever it is appropriate.

The Commission shall have access to and may inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the present Peace Agreement. The Commission shall have full powers to organise its work in the manner in which it deems most appropriate and to appoint any group or sub-committee which it may deem useful in the discharge of its functions.

The Commission shall have its own offices, adequate communication facilities and adequate secretariat support staff.

A Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace shall be established to provide funding for the implementation of the present Peace Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

Citizens' Consultative Conferences shall be organised once a year the first of which shall be organised within one hundred and twenty days of the signing of the present Peace Agreement in order to encourage people's participation and to invite recommendations for the formulation of guidelines and their implementation that will ensure truly fair and representative political processes.

ARTICLE 5

The disarmament of combatants will be effected upon their entry into the designated assembly zones, and demobilization and reintegration as soon as practicable thereafter.

The upkeep and welfare of the encamped combatants shall be the primary responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone in conjunction with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, assisted by the international community.

ARTICLE 6

The Parties commit themselves to a well planned national effort on encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement linked to national development objectives. To that end, a Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall be established within a month of the signing

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of the present Peace Agreement.

The Committee shall coordinate the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement of RUF/SL combatants. The Committee shall work in coordination with all the relevant institutions and agencies.

Both Parties shall consult on the nomination of the membership of the Committee which shall not exceed seven persons.

The Committee shall be provided with adequate funding.

ARTICLE 7

The Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall identify assembly zones and camp areas for RUF/SL combatants where they shall be registered, encamped and disarmed. The movement into the Assembly Zones shall commence within once month of the signing of this Agreement and be completed as soon as practicable but no later than three months from this date.

ARTICLE 8

The Parties shall request the international community to help supervise and monitor the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. The Joint Monitoring Group shall have observers at any of these processes.

ARTICLE 9

The Commission shall, as a priority, make recommendations on the restructuring and re-orientation of the military as well as its leadership. In this context, members of the RUF/SL who may wish to be part of the country's military can become part of the new unified armed forces within a framework to be discussed and agreed upon by the Commission.

ARTICLE 10

The Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure the return to barracks of those units of the army not required for normal security duties and the downsizing of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (RSLMF), taking into account the security needs of the country.

ARTICLE 11

A Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG) from the international community shall be responsible for monitoring breaches provided under this Peace Agreement.

Both Parties upon signing this Agreement shall request the international community to provide neutral monitors.

Such monitors when deployed shall be in position for an initial period of three months.

The Neutral Monitoring Group shall report any violations of the ceasefire to its headquarters which shall in turn communicate the same to the headquarters of the Joint Monitoring Group

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comprising of representative of the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF based in Freetown.

ARTICLE 12

The Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn five weeks after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG). As from the date of the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group, the Executive Outcomes shall be confined to barracks under the supervision of the Joint Monitoring Group and the Neutral Monitoring Group. Government shall use all its endeavours, consistent with its treaty obligations, to repatriate other foreign troops no later than three months after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group or six months after the signing of the Peace Agreement, whichever is earlier.

ARTICLE 13

The Parties agree that immediately following the signing of the present Peace Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to function as a political movement with the rights, privileges and duties provided by law; and that within thirty days, following that, the necessary conditions shall be created to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political movement according to law.

ARTICLE 14

To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization up to the time of the signing of this Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee former RUF/SL combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.

ARTICLE 15

The mandate and membership of the existing National Unity and Reconciliation Commission shall be expanded in consultation with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to enable it to undertake a sustained and effective campaign of civic education aimed at enhancing national unity and reconciliation, taking into account the imperative need to heal the wounds of the conflict.

ARTICLE 16

The Parties agree that the standards of accountability, integrity and probity in the public services of Sierra Leone shall be raised. To that end, immediate steps shall be taken to establish the office of Ombudsman to promote the implementation of a professional code of ethics, and the integrity and patriotism of all public servants. It shall also seek to eradicate all forms of corruption.

ARTICLE 17

The Parties shall approach the international community with a view to mobilizing resources which will be used to establish a trust fund to enable the RUF/SL to transform itself into a

political party.

ARTICLE 18

The Parties agree to the principle of reforming the present electoral process in Sierra Leone. There shall, in that regard, be the full participation of citizens and their organizations in formulating electoral reforms.

The independence and integrity of the National Electoral Commission shall be guaranteed to ensure fair and acceptable electoral exercise.

In reconstituting the National Electoral Commission, the President shall consult all political parties and movements including the RUF/SL to determine the membership and terms of reference of that Commission, paying particular attention to the need for a level playing field in the nation's electoral politics.

Both the Government and the RUF/SL shall, together with other political parties, nominate men and women of professionalism, integrity and objectivity to the National Electoral Commission, not later than three months after the signing of the present Peace Agreement.

It is hereby agreed that no member of the National Electoral Commission shall be eligible for appointment to a political office by any government formed as a result of an election they were mandated to conduct.

ARTICLE 19

The Parties agree that the basic civil and political liberties which are recognised by the Sierra Leone legal system and are contained in the Declarations and Principles on Human Rights adopted by the UN and the OAU, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, shall be fully guaranteed and promoted within Sierra Leone society.

These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture; the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of one's country.

To foster national reconciliation and ensure the full and unrestricted participation of the RUF/SL in the political process, the RUF/SL shall enjoy:

- (i) freedom of the press and access to the media in order that they may be heard and informed.
- (ii) freedom of association, expression, assembly and the right to mobilise and demonstrate freely, and to communicate politically in order that they may organise effectively and set up appropriate infrastructure.

All political prisoners and prisoners of war, if any, shall be released.

ARTICLE 20

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To monitor compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement, as well as to promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including schools, the media, the police and the military, an independent National Commission on Human Rights shall be established.

In pursuance of the above, technical and material assistance may be sought from the UN Special Commission on Human Rights, UN Centre for Human Rights, African Commission on Human and People's Rights and other relevant international organisations.

The National Commission on Human Rights shall have the power to investigate human rights violations and to institute legal proceedings where appropriate.

Further, a consortium of local human rights groups shall be encouraged to help monitor human rights observance.

ARTICLE 21

The Parties undertake to respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

ARTICLE 22

In the pursuit of the reconstruction, rehabilitation and socio-economic development of Sierra Leone as a matter of the utmost priority, special attention shall be given to rural and urban poor areas, war victims, disabled persons and other vulnerable groups. The Government in conjunction with the Committee for Demobilization and Resettlement shall co-operate with all political parties and movements, including the RUF/SL, to raise resources internationally for these objectives during the initial phase of the consolidation of peace.

ARTICLE 23

The Government shall do all in its power to mobilize resources internally and externally to meet the needs of the post-war reconstruction and socio-economic development.

ARTICLE 24

The Parties agree that the independence of the Judiciary shall be strengthened in accordance with its role of ensuring the fair and impartial dispensation of justice in a democratic order. The composition of the present Judicial and Legal Service Commission shall be determined so as to ensure the independence of the Judiciary from the other organs of state as well as the political parties. Its membership shall include, in addition to judges and representatives of the legal profession and public services, representatives of other sectors of society not directly connected with the administration of justice.

ARTICLE 25

The Police Force shall be strengthened to ensure that the rule of law is upheld throughout Sierra Leone. To that end, the present Police Force shall be vetted. Furthermore, the professional training of the Police Force shall henceforth assure a new orientation, but emphasizing professionalism, the importance of human dignity and democratic values and respect and

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protection of human rights. It shall, further, emphasise that the conduct of members of the Police Force shall be free from all partisan considerations of politics, ideology and social position and that the Police Force shall avoid and combat corruption.

Nominations for the Police Council will come from wider sectors of society prior to their appointment so as to ensure their truly civilian and non-partisan character.

ARTICLE 26

It is recognised that there is a socio-economic dimension to the conflict which must also be addressed in order to consolidate the foundation of peace. Accordingly, the socio-economic policy of Sierra Leone shall be guided among other things, by the following principles, taking into account available resources:

- i. Enhancement of the nation's productive capacity through meaningful grassroots participation in the reconstruction and development of the country;
- ii. The provision of equal opportunities to all Sierra Leoneans especially those in the countryside and the urban poor, with the aim of equitable distribution of the nation's resources thereby empowering them to contribute effectively to decisionmaking and implementation of policies which affect their lives;
- iii. Improving the quality of life of the people through the provision of, inter alia,
 - a. primary health care in all villages and towns;
 - b. affordable and quality housing, especially in the countryside and poor urban areas;
 - c. improved educational services to enable all children of primary and junior-secondary school age to receive free and compulsory schooling as well as provide the opportunity for the youth and all other Sierra Leoneans to receive affordable quality education;
 - d. clean drinking water and sewerage system in every village and town;
 - e. provide job opportunities in a systematic and sustainable way for the people, especially the youth;
 - f. promote and sustain rural development and support agriculture in terms of technical, credit and marketing facilities;
 - g. provide support for production and provision of basic food and nutritional requirements of the people and food security in general;
 - h. protect the environment and regulate the exploitation of natural resources in the interest of the people, as well as prohibit monopolies;
 - i. provide the required infrastructure such as roads, transport and communications, energy and rural electrification, for improved living conditions, especially of the

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rural people;

j. seek to obtain debt relief in order to transfer funds from debt servicing to meet the urgent requirements of rebuilding a war-torn society.

ARTICLE 27

A broad-based Socio-Economic forum, in which the RUF/SL shall participate, shall be established with a view to enriching policy formulation and execution in the socio-economic sector.

ARTICLE 28

The Government of Cote d'Ivoire, the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth shall stand as moral guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties.

Annex to this Agreement:

A nationwide sensitization programme for the peace process shall be pursued by the Parties, using all available means of communication to impress upon their combatants and the nation at large:

- the fact that hostilities have ended;
- the reasons for demobilization;
- the opportunities for reintegration of combatants; and
- the need for reconciliation and lasting peace.

Done in Abidjan this 30 day of the month of November, 1996.

Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Henri Konan Bedie
President of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire

Berhanu Dinka
Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Sierra Leone

Adwoa Coleman (M/S)
Representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Moses Anafu (DR)
Representative of the Commonwealth Organization

131) Accord

The Conakry Accord: 23 October 1997 - ECOWAS SIX-MONTH PEACE PLAN FOR SIERRA LEONE, 23 OCTOBER 1997 - 22 APRIL 1998

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**ECOWAS SIX-MONTH PEACE PLAN FOR SIERRA LEONE
23 OCTOBER 1997 - 22 APRIL 1998**

(SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION)

PREAMBLE:

Pursuant to the ECOWAS mandate to implement proposals for the resolution of the Sierra Leone crisis contained in the Final Communique of 26 June, 1997 in Conakry, a seven-point peace plan has been devised for the early return of constitutional governance to Sierra Leone. These are:

1. Cessation of hostilities throughout Sierra Leone

- i. With immediate effect
- ii. Establish monitoring and verification mechanism

Note: Process to be undertaken by ECOMOG, and the UN military observers. Participation of UN military observers needs the agreement of the UN Security Council.

2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Combatants: 1 to 31 December, 1997

Note: ECOWAS Committee of Five Ministerial Assessment visit (20 November, 1997)

3. Commencement of Humanitarian Assistance: 14 November 1997

Note: ECOMOG to monitor the process

4. Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons

Commencement date: 1 December, 1997

UNHCR assisted repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons

5. Restoration of the constitutional Government and Broadening of the Power Base: Takes effect from 22 May, 1998.

6. Immunities and Guarantees: Takes effect from 22 May, 1998

ELABORATION OF ECOWAS PEACE PLAN

1. Cessation of Hostilities:

It is considered that cessation of hostilities should come into force immediately. However, this will have to be accompanied by a monitoring and verification regime. Leaders of the various combatant units will be expected to disseminate information concerning these measures and ensure compliance with them. These measures will be supervised by ECOMOG, assisted by UN military observation group. The verification process will continue right up to the termination of the peace plan, i.e. 22 April 1998.

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2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Combatants:

It is considered that a minimum of 30 days would be required to conduct an effective disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. This should take place from 1 to 31 December, 1997. Given the nation-wide dislocation of infrastructures and administration, a simple and uncomplicated procedure is envisaged. Combatants will be directed to report at designated centres in order to be engaged in the disarmament process. ECOMOG will supervise the entire process of disarmament and demobilisation. Where necessary, incentives may have to be provided to encourage the voluntary participation of combatants in all this process.

3. Humanitarian Assistance:

Considering that sanctions/embargoes will be strictly enforced throughout the period of the implementation of the Sierra Leone peace plan, the flows of humanitarian assistance beginning 14 November 1997 will continue to be monitored by ECOMOG and UN military observers. To this effect, a mechanism will be established by ECOMOG to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance. All this will be worked within the context of UN Security Council Resolution.

4. Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons:

Recognising that refugees, particularly those in neighboring countries, may wish to voluntarily return following the cessation of hostilities, UNHCR assistance should begin from 1 December, 1997.

5. Restoration of Constitutional Government and Broadening of the Power Base:

The restoration of constitutional order to Sierra Leone is at the heart of the ECOWAS peace plan. Consequently, it is considered necessary that the Government of Tejan Kabbah should be enabled to exercise effective control once he is restored to office on 22 May 1998. Nevertheless, it is recognised that for an enduring peace to be restored which will enjoy the support of the majority of Sierra Leoneans and the confidence of the subregion, efforts should be made to ensure that an all-inclusive government is evolved. In this regard, the goodwill and assistance of the international community, both financial and material, would be necessary.

The interest of the various parties in Sierra Leone should be suitably accommodated. Accordingly, it is recommended that the new Cabinet should be a cabinet of inclusion.

Furthermore, in order to accommodate the aspirations of their supporters, Board and Senior Civil Service appointments are to reflect broad national character.

All the above power sharing formulas should come into effect 22 May 1998.

It is recognised that Corporal Foday Sankoh as a leader of RUF could continue to play an active role and participate in the peace process.

In the spirit of the Abidjan Accord and in the context of this Agreement, Corporal Foday Sankoh is expected to return to his country to make his contribution to the peace process.

6. Reintegration of Combatants:

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All those who disarm as a result of the implementation of the peace process, should be provided with either job training to fit them for alternative employment or given scholarships and grants for further education. Access to education at all levels should be made available to all demobilised persons. Ex-combatants should be provided with assistance to facilitate their re-integration into their communities. We strongly appeal to the UN, OAU, ECOWAS and indeed the international community to render appropriate assistance to achieve this objective.

7. Donor Appeals for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation:

The United Nations and the OAU in cooperation with ECOWAS are requested to launch these appeals as soon as hostilities cease.

8. Immunities and Guarantees:

It is considered essential that unconditional immunities and guarantees from prosecution be extended to all involved in the unfortunate events of 25 May, 1997 with effect from 22 May 1998.

DONE AT CONAKRY, THIS 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER 1997

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE
OF ECOWAS ON SIERRA LEONE

Chief Tom Ikimi
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Federal Republic of Nigeria

Lamine Kamara
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Guinea

FOR THE DELEGATION REPRESENTING
MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMAH

Col Abdul Karim Sesay
Secretary General AFRC

Alimamy Pallo Bangura
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

WITNESSES

For U.N.

Prof. Ibrahima Fall
Asst. Secretary-General UN

For O.A.U.

Ms. Adwoa Coleman

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OAU Representative

132) Ceasefire Agreement

The Agreement on Ceasefire in Sierra Leone
18 May 1999 (Paragraph 6)

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AGREEMENT ON CEASEFIRE IN SIERRA LEONE

President Ahmed Tejan KABBAH and Rev. Jesse Jackson met on 18 May 1999 with Corporal Foday Saybana SANKOH, under the auspices of President Gnassingbe EYADEMA. At that meeting, the question of the peace process for Sierra Leone was discussed.

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL),

- Desirous to promote the ongoing dialogue process with a view to establishing durable peace and stability in Sierra Leone; and
- Wishing to create an appropriate atmosphere conducive to the holding of peace talks in Lome, which began with the RUF internal consultations to be followed by dialogue between the Government and the RUF;
- Have jointly decided to:
 1. Agree to ceasefire as from 24 May 1999, the day that President EYADEMA invited Foreign Ministers of ECOWAS to discuss problems pertaining to Sierra Leone. It was further agreed that the dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF would commence on 25 May 1999;
 2. Maintain their present and respective positions in Sierra Leone as of the 24th of May 1999; and refrain from any hostile or aggressive act which could undermine the peace process;
 3. Commit to start negotiations in good faith, involving all relevant parties in the discussions, not later than May 25 in Lome;
 4. Guarantee safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need; establish safe corridors for the provision of food and medical supplies to ECOMOG soldiers behind RUF lines, and to RUF combatants behind ECOMOG lines;
 5. Immediate release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants;
 6. Request the United Nations, subject to the Security Council's authorisation, to deploy military observers as soon as possible to observe compliance by the Government forces (ECOMOG and Civil Defence Forces) and the RUF, including former AFRC forces, with this ceasefire agreement.

This agreement is without prejudice to any other agreement or additional protocols which may be discussed during the dialogue between the Government and the RUF.

Signed in Lome (Togo) 18 May 1999, in six (6) originals in English and French

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For the Government of Sierra Leone

ALHADJI Dr. Ahmad Tejan KABBAH
President Of The Republic Of Sierra Leone

For the Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra
Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, Leader of
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

WITNESSED BY:

For the Government of Togo and Current
Chairman of ECOWAS

GNASSINGBE EYADEMA
President of the Republic of Togo

For the United Nations

Francis G. Okelo
Special Representative of the Secretary
General

For the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) US Presidential Special Envoy for the
Promotion of Democracy in Africa

Adwoa COLEMAN
Representative of the Organization of African
Unity Rev. Jesse JACKSON

133) Accord

The Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) "The Lome Peace Accord" 7 July 1999

PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND
THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

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THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE and
THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE (RUF/SL)

Having met in Lome, Togo, from the 25 May 1999, to 7 July 1999 under the auspices of the Current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadema;

Recalling earlier initiatives undertaken by the countries of the sub-region and the International Community, aimed at bringing about a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and culminating in the Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November, 1996 and the ECOWAS Peace Plan of 23 October, 1997;

Moved by the imperative need to meet the desire of the people of Sierra Leone for a definitive settlement of the fratricidal war in their country and for genuine national unity and reconciliation;

Committed to promoting full respect for human rights and humanitarian law;

Committed to promoting popular participation in the governance of the country and the advancement of democracy in a socio-political framework free of inequality, nepotism and corruption;

Concerned with the socio-economic well being of all the people of Sierra Leone;

Determined to foster mutual trust and confidence between themselves;

Determined to establish sustainable peace and security; to pledge forthwith, to settle all past, present and future differences and grievances by peaceful means; and to refrain from the threat and use of armed force to bring about any change in Sierra Leone;

Reaffirming the conviction that sovereignty belongs to the people, and that Government derives all its powers, authority and legitimacy from the people;

Recognising the imperative that the children of Sierra Leone, especially those affected by armed conflict, in view of their vulnerability, are entitled to special care and the protection of their inherent right to life, survival and development, in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child;

Guided by the Declaration in the Final Communiqué of the Meeting in Lome of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS of 25 May 1999, in which they stressed the importance of democracy as a factor of regional peace and security, and as essential to the socio-economic development of ECOWAS Member States; and in which they pledged their commitment to the consolidation of democracy and respect of human rights while reaffirming the need for all Member States to consolidate their democratic base, observe the principles of good governance and good economic management in order to ensure the emergence and development of a democratic culture which takes into account the interests of the peoples of West Africa;

Recommitting themselves to the total observance and compliance with the Cease-fire Agreement signed in Lome on 18 May 1999, and appended as Annex 1 until the signing of the present Peace Agreement;

HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

PART ONE

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

ARTICLE 1

CEASE-FIRE

The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL is hereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the two sides shall ensure that a total and permanent cessation of hostilities is observed forthwith.

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ARTICLE II

CEASE-FIRE MONITORING

1. A Cease-fire Monitoring Committee (hereinafter termed the CMC) to be chaired by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (hereinafter termed UNOMSIL) with representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF/SL, the Civil Defence Forces (hereinafter termed the CDF) and ECOMOG shall be established at provincial and district levels with immediate effect to monitor, verify and report all violations of the cease-fire.
2. A Joint Monitoring Commission (hereinafter termed the JMC) shall be established at the national level to be chaired by UNOMSIL with representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF/SL, CDF, and ECOMOG. The JMC shall receive, investigate and take appropriate action on reports of violations of the cease-fire from the CMC. The parties agree to the definition of cease-fire violations as contained in Annex 2 which constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement.
3. The parties shall seek the assistance of the International Community in providing funds and other logistics to enable the JMC to carry out its mandate.

PART TWO

GOVERNANCE

The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL, recognizing the right of the people of Sierra Leone to live in peace, and desirous of finding a transitional mechanism to incorporate the RUF/SL into governance within the spirit and letter of the Constitution, agree to the following formulas for structuring the government for the duration of the period before the next elections, as prescribed by the Constitution, managing scarce public resources for the benefit of the development of the people of Sierra Leone and sharing the responsibility of implementing the peace. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in a separate Article of this Part of the present Agreement; and may be further detailed in protocols annexed to it.

Article III Transformation of the RUF/SL Into a Political Party

Article IV Enabling Members of the RUF/SL to Hold Public Office

Article V Enabling the RUF/SL to Join a Broad-Based Government of National Unity Through Cabinet Appointment

Article VI Commission for the Consolidation of Peace

Article VII Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development

Article VIII Council of Elders and Religious Leaders.

ARTICLE III

TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUF/SL INTO A POLITICAL PARTY

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every facility to the RUF/SL to transform itself into a political party and enter the mainstream of the democratic process. To that end:
2. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to organize itself to function as a political movement, with the rights, privileges and duties accorded to all political parties in Sierra Leone. These include the freedom to publish, unhindered access to the media, freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to mobilize and associate freely.
3. Within a period of thirty days, following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political party.
4. The Parties shall approach the International Community with a view to mobilizing resources for the purposes of enabling the RUF/SL to function as a political party. These resources may include but shall not be limited to:
 - (i) Setting up a trust fund;

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- (ii) Training for RUF/SL membership in party organization and functions; and
- (iii) Providing any other assistance necessary for achieving the goals of this section.

ARTICLE IV

ENABLING MEMBERS OF THE RUF/SL TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary steps to enable those RUF/SL members nominated by the RUF/SL to hold public office, within the time-frames agreed and contained in the present Agreement for the integration of the various bodies named herein.
2. Accordingly, necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone, within a period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, to amend relevant laws and regulations that may constitute an impediment or bar to RUF/SL and AFRC personnel holding public office.
3. Within seven days of the removal of any such legal impediments, both parties shall meet to discuss and agree on the appointment of RUF/SL members to positions in parastatals, diplomacy and any other public sector.

ARTICLE V

ENABLING THE RUF/SL TO JOIN A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY THROUGH CABINET APPOINTMENTS

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every opportunity to the RUF/SL to join a broad-based government of national unity through cabinet appointments. To that end:
2. The Chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) as provided for in Article VII of the present Agreement shall be offered to the leader of the RUF/SL, Corporal Foday Sankoh. For this purpose he shall enjoy the status of Vice President and shall therefore be answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone.
3. The Government of Sierra Leone shall give ministerial positions to the RUF/SL in a moderately expanded cabinet of 18, bearing in mind that the interests of other political parties and civil society organizations should also be taken into account, as follows:
 - (i) One of the senior cabinet appointments such as finance, foreign affairs and justice;
 - (ii) Three other cabinet positions.
4. In addition, the Government of Sierra Leone shall, in the same spirit, make available to the RUF/SL the following senior government positions: Four posts of Deputy Minister.
5. Within a period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to remove any legal impediments that may prevent RUF/SL members from holding cabinet and other positions.

ARTICLE VI

COMMISSION FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE

1. A Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (hereinafter termed the CCP), shall be established within two weeks of the signing of the present Agreement to implement a post-conflict programme that ensures reconciliation and the welfare of all parties to the conflict, especially the victims of war. The CCP shall have the overall goal and responsibility for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the present Agreement relative to the promotion of national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace.
2. The CCP shall ensure that all structures for national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace already in existence and those provided for in the present Agreement are operational and given the necessary resources for realizing their respective mandates. These structures shall comprise:
 - (i) the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development;
 - (ii) the Joint Monitoring Commission;

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- (iii) the Provincial and District Cease-fire Monitoring Committees;
 - (iv) the Committee for the Release of Prisoners of War and Non-Combatants;
 - (v) the Committee for Humanitarian Assistance;
 - (vi) the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration;
 - (vii) the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction;
 - (viii) the Human Rights Commission; and
 - (ix) the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
3. The CCP shall have the right to inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the present Agreement.
4. The CCP shall have full powers to organize its work in any manner it deems appropriate and to appoint any group or sub-committee which it deems necessary in the discharge of its functions.
5. The Commission shall be composed of the following members:
- (i) Two representatives of the civil society;
 - (ii) One representative each named by the Government, the RUF/SL and the Parliament.
6. The CCP shall have its own offices, adequate communication facilities and secretarial support staff.
7. Recommendations for improvements or modifications shall be made to the President of Sierra Leone for appropriate action. Likewise, failures of the structures to perform their assigned duties shall also be brought to the attention of the President.
8. Disputes arising out of the preceding paragraph shall be brought to the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders for resolution, as specified in Article VIII of the present Agreement.
9. Should Protocols be needed in furtherance of any provision in the present Agreement, the CCP shall have the responsibility for their preparation.
10. The mandate of the CCP shall terminate at the end of the next general elections.

ARTICLE VII

COMMISSION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC RESOURCES,

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Given the emergency situation facing the country, the parties agree that the Government shall exercise full control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources, for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone. Accordingly, a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter termed the CMRRD) shall be established and charged with the responsibility of securing and monitoring the legitimate exploitation of Sierra Leone's gold and diamonds, and other resources that are determined to be of strategic importance for national security and welfare as well as cater for post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, as provided for under Article XXVIII of the present Agreement.
2. The Government shall take the necessary legal action within a period not exceeding two weeks from the signing of the present Agreement to the effect that all exploitation, sale, export, or any other transaction of gold and diamonds shall be forbidden except those sanctioned by the CMRRD. All previous concessions shall be null and void.
3. The CMRRD shall authorize licensing of artisanal production of diamonds and gold, in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations. All gold and diamonds extracted or otherwise sources from any Sierra Leonean territory shall be sold to the Government.
4. The CMRRD shall ensure, through the appropriate authorities, the security of the areas covered under this Article, and shall take all necessary measures against unauthorized exploitation.

5. For the export or local resale of gold and diamonds by the Government, the CMRRD shall authorize a buying and selling agreement with one or more reputable international and specialized mineral companies. All exports of Sierra Leonean gold and diamonds shall be transacted by the Government, under these agreements.
6. The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public monies which shall enter a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. Priority spending shall go to rural areas.
7. The Government shall, if necessary, seek the assistance and cooperation of other governments and their instruments of law enforcement to detect and facilitate the prosecution of violations of this Article.
8. The management of other natural resources shall be reviewed by the CMRRD to determine if their regulation is a matter of national security and welfare, and recommend appropriate policy to the Government.
9. The functions of the Ministry of Mines shall continued to be carried out by the current authorized ministry. However, in respect of strategic mineral resources, the CMRRD shall be an autonomous body in carrying out its duties concerning the regulation of Sierra Leone's strategic natural resources.
10. All agreements and transactions referred to in this Article shall be subject to full public disclosure and records of all correspondence, negotiations, business transactions and any other matters related to exploitation, management, local or international marketing, and any other matter shall be public documents.
11. The Commission shall issue monthly reports, including the details of all the transactions related to gold and diamonds, and other licenses or concessions of natural resources, and its own administrative costs.
12. The Commission shall be governed by a Board whose Chairmanship shall be offered to the Leader of the RUF/SL, Corporal Foday Sankoh. The Board shall also comprise:
 - (i) Two representatives of the Government appointed by the President;
 - (ii) Two representatives of the political party to be formed by the RUF/SL;
 - (iii) Three representatives of the civil society; and
 - (iv) Two representatives of other political parties appointed by Parliament.
13. The Government shall take the required administrative actions to implement the commitments made in the present Agreement; and in the case of enabling legislation, it shall draft and submit to Parliament within thirty days of the signature of the present Agreement, the relevant bills for their enactment into law.
14. The Government commits itself to propose and support an amendment to the Constitution to make the exploitation of gold and diamonds the legitimate domain of the people of Sierra Leone, and to determine that the proceeds be used for the development of Sierra Leone, particularly public education, public health, infrastructure development, and compensation of incapacitated war victims as well as post-war reconstruction and development.

ARTICLE VIII

COUNCIL OF ELDERS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS

1. The signatories agree to refer any conflicting differences of interpretation of this Article or any other Article of the present Agreement or its protocols, to a Council of Elders and Religious Leaders comprised as follows:
 - (i) Two members appointed by the Inter-Religious Council;
 - (ii) One member each appointed by the Government and the RUF/SL; and
 - (iii) One member appointed by ECO WAS.

2. The Council shall designate its own chairperson from among its members. All of its decision shall be taken by the concurrence of at least four members, and shall be binding and public, provided that an aggrieved party may appeal to the Supreme Court.

PART THREE

OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES

The Part of the present Agreement Consists of the following Articles

Article IX Pardon and Amnesty

Article X Review of the Present Constitution

Article XI Elections

Article XII National Electoral Commission

ARTICLE IX

PARDON AND AMNESTY

1. In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon.

2. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives. up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.

3. To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.

ARTICLE X

REVIEW OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

In order to ensure that the Constitution of Sierra Leone represents the needs and aspirations of the people of Sierra Leone and that no constitutional or any other legal provision prevents the implementation of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary steps to establish a Constitutional Review Committee to review the provisions of the present Constitution, and where deemed appropriate, recommend revisions and amendments, in accordance with Part V, Section 108 of the Constitution of 1991.

ARTICLE XI

DATE OF NEXT ELECTIONS

The next national elections in Sierra Leone shall be held in accordance with the present Constitution of Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE XII

NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

1. A new independent National Electoral Commission (hereinafter termed the NEC) shall be set up by the Government, not later than three months after the signing of the present Agreement.

2. In setting up the new NEC the President shall consult all political parties, including the RUF/SL, to determine the membership and terms

of reference of the Commission, paying particular attention to the need for a level playing field in the nation's elections.

3. No member of the NEC shall be eligible for appointment to political office by any government formed as a result of an election he or she was mandated to conduct.

4. The NEC shall request the assistance of the International Community, including the UN, the OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations, in monitoring the next presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone.

PART FOUR

POST-CONFLICT MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL, recognizing that the maintenance of peace and security is of paramount importance for the achievement of lasting peace in Sierra Leone and for the welfare of its people, have agreed to the following formulas for dealing with post-conflict military and security matters. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in separate Articles of this Part of the present Agreement and may be further detailed in protocols annexed to the Agreement.

Article XIII Transformation and New Mandate of ECOMOG

Article XIV New Mandate of UNOMSIL

Article XV Security Guarantees for Peace Monitors

Article XVI Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Article XVII Restructuring and Training of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces

Article XVIII Withdrawal of Mercenaries

Article XIX Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission

Article Notification to Military Commands.

ARTICLE XIII

TRANSFORMATION AND NEW MANDATE OF ECOMOG

1. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the parties shall request ECOWAS to revise the mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone as follows:

(i) Peacekeeping;

(ii) Security of the State of Sierra Leone;

i. Protection of UNOMSIL.

i. Protection of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration personnel.

2. The Government shall, immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, request ECOWAS for troop contributions from at least two additional countries. The additional contingents shall be deployed not later than 30 days from the date of signature of the present Agreement. The Security Council shall be requested to provide assistance in support of ECOMOG.

3. The Parties agree to develop a timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG, including measures for securing all of the territory of Sierra Leone by the restructured armed forces. The phased withdrawal of ECOMOG will be linked to the phased creation and deployment of the restructured armed forces.

ARTICLE XIV

NEW MANDATE OF UNOMSIL

1. The UN Security Council is requested to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the various provisions outlined in the present Agreement.

ARTICLE XV

SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR PEACE MONITORS

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL agree to guarantee the safety, security and freedom of movement of UNOMSIL Military Observers throughout Sierra Leone. This guarantee shall be monitored by the Joint Monitoring Commission.
2. The freedom of movement includes complete and unhindered access for UNOMSIL Military Observers in the conduct of their duties throughout Sierra Leone. Before and during the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, officers and escorts to be provided by both Parties shall be required to facilitate this access.
3. Such freedom of movement and security shall also be accorded to non-military UNOMSIL personnel such as Human Rights Officers in the conduct of their duties. These personnel shall, in most cases, be accompanied by UNOMSIL Military Observers.
4. The provision of security to be extended shall include United Nations aircraft, vehicles and other property.

ARTICLE XVI

ENCAMPMENT, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

1. A neutral peace keeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG shall disarm all combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups. The encampment, disarmament and demobilization process shall commence within six weeks of the signing of the present Agreement in line with the deployment of the neutral peace keeping force.
2. The present SLA shall be restricted to the barracks and their arms in the armoury and their ammunitions in the magazines and placed under constant surveillance by the neutral peacekeeping force during the process of disarmament and demobilization.
3. UNOMSIL shall be present in all disarmament and demobilization locations to monitor the process and provide security guarantees to all ex-combatants.
4. Upon the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall immediately request the International Community to assist with the provision of the necessary financial and technical resources needed for the adaptation and extension of the existing Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Sierra Leone, including payment of retirement benefits and other emoluments due to former members of the SLA.

ARTICLE XVII

RESTRUCTURING AND TRAINING OF THE SIERRA LEONE ARMED FORCES

1. The restructuring, composition and training of the new Sierra Leone armed forces will be carried out by the Government with a view to creating truly national armed forces, bearing loyalty solely to the State of Sierra Leone, and able and willing to perform their constitutional role.
2. Those ex-combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF and SLA who wish to be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria.
3. Recruitment into the armed forces shall reflect the geo-political structure of Sierra Leone within the established strength.

ARTICLE XVIII

WITHDRAWAL OF MERCENARIES

All mercenaries, in any guise, shall be withdrawn from Sierra Leone immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement. Their withdrawal shall be supervised by the Joint Monitoring Commission.

ARTICLE XIX

NOTIFICATION TO JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION

Immediately upon the establishment of the JMC provided for in Article II of the present Agreement, each party shall furnish to the JMC information regarding the strength and locations of all combatants as well as the positions and descriptions of all known unexploded bombs (UXBs), explosive ordnance devices (EODs), minefields, booby traps, wire entanglements, and all other physical or military hazards. The JMC shall seek all necessary technical assistance in mine clearance and the disposal or destruction of similar devices and weapons under the operational control of the neutral peacekeeping force. The parties shall keep the JMC updated on changes in this information so that it can notify the public as needed, to prevent injuries.

ARTICLE XX

NOTIFICATION TO MILITARY COMMANDS

Each party shall ensure that the terms of the present Agreement, and written orders requiring compliance, are immediately communicated to all of its forces.

PART FIVE

HUMANITARIAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF\SL recognizing the importance of upholding, promoting and protecting the human rights of every Sierra Leonean as well as the enforcement of humanitarian law, agree to the following formulas for the achievement of these laudable objectives. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in separate Articles of this Part of the present Agreement

Article XXI Release of Prisoners and Abductees

Article XXII Refugees and Displaced Persons

Article XXIII Guarantee of the Security of Displaced Persons and Refugees

Article XXIV Guarantee and Promotion of Human Rights

Article XXV Human Rights Commission

Article XXVI Human Rights Violations

Article XXVII Humanitarian Relief

Article XXVIII Post War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Article XXIX Special Fund for War Victims

Article XXX Child Combatants

Article XXXI Education and Health

ARTICLE XXI

RELEASE OF PRISONERS AND ABDUCTEES

All political prisoners of war as well as all non-combatants shall be released immediately and unconditionally by both parties, in accordance with the Statement of June 2, 1999, which is contained in Annex 3 and constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE XXII

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The Parties through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction agree to seek funding from and the involvement of the UN and other agencies, including friendly countries, in order to design and implement a plan for voluntary repatriation and reintegration of Sierra Leonean refugees and internally displaced persons, including non-combatants, in conformity with international conventions, norms and practices.

ARTICLE XXIII

GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF DISPLACED

PERSONS AND REFUGEES

As a reaffirmation of their commitment to the observation of the conventions and principles of human rights and the status of refugees, the Parties shall take effective and appropriate measures to ensure that the right of Sierra Leoneans to asylum is fully respected and that no camps or dwellings of refugees or displaced persons are violated.

ARTICLE XXIV

GUARANTEE AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1. The basic civil and political liberties recognized by the Sierra Leone legal system and contained in the declarations and principles of Human Rights adopted by the UN and OAU, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, shall be fully protected and promoted within Sierra Leonean society.
2. These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of one's country.

ARTICLE XXV

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

1. The Parties pledge to strengthen the existing machinery for addressing grievances of the people in respect of alleged violations of their basic human rights by the creation, as a matter of urgency and not later than 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement, of an autonomous quasi-judicial national Human Rights Commission.
2. The Parties further pledge to promote Human Rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including the schools, the media, the police, the military and the religious community.
3. In pursuance of the above, technical and material assistance may be sought from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and other relevant international organisations.
4. A consortium of local human rights and civil society groups in Sierra Leone shall be encouraged to help monitor human rights

observance.

ARTICLE XXVI

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

1. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.

2. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with the question of human rights violations since the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict in 1991.

This Commission shall, among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.

3. Membership of the Commission shall be drawn from a cross-section of Sierra Leonean society with the participation and some technical support of the International Community. This Commission shall be established within 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement and shall, not later than 12 months after the commencement of its work, submit its report to the Government for immediate implementation of its recommendations.

ARTICLE XXVII

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to their Statement on the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Sierra Leone of June 3, 1999 which is contained in Annex 4 and constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement. To this end, the Government shall request appropriate international humanitarian assistance for the people of Sierra Leone who are in need all over the country.

2. The Parties agree to guarantee safe and unhindered access by all humanitarian organizations throughout the country in order to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms which govern humanitarian operations. In this respect, the parties agree to guarantee the security of the presence and movement of humanitarian personnel.

3. The Parties also agree to guarantee the security of all properties and goods transported, stocked or distributed by humanitarian organizations, as well as the security of their projects and beneficiaries.

4. The Government shall set up at various levels throughout the country, the appropriate and effective administrative or security bodies which will monitor and facilitate the implementation of these guarantees of safety for the personnel, goods and areas of operation of the humanitarian organizations.

ARTICLE XXVIII

POST - WAR REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

1. The Government, through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction and with the support of the International Community, shall provide appropriate financial and technical resources for post-war rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.

2. Given that women have been particularly victimized during the war, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE XXIX

SPECIAL FUND FOR WAR VICTIMS

The Government, with the support of the International Community, shall design and implement a programme for the rehabilitation of war victims. For this purpose, a special fund shall be set up.

ARTICLE XXX

CHILD COMBATANTS

The Government shall accord particular attention to the issue of child soldiers. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources, both within the country and from the International Community, and especially through the Office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and other agencies, to address the special needs of these children in the existing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.

ARTICLE XXXI

EDUCATION AND HEALTH

The Government shall provide free compulsory education for the first nine years of schooling (Basic Education) and shall endeavour to provide free schooling for a further three years. The Government shall also endeavour to provide affordable primary health care throughout the country.

PART SIX

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

ARTICLE XXXII

JOINT IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE

A Joint Implementation Committee consisting of members of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) and the Committee of Seven on Sierra Leone, as well as the Moral Guarantors, provided for in Article XXXIV of the present Agreement and other international supporters shall be established. Under the chairmanship of ECOWAS, the Joint Implementation Committee shall be responsible for reviewing and assessing the state of implementation of the Agreement, and shall meet at least once every three months. Without prejudice to the functions of the Commission for

the Consolidation of Peace as provided for in Article VI, the Joint Implementation Committee shall make recommendations deemed necessary to ensure effective implementation of the present Agreement according to the Schedule of Implementation, which appears as Annex 5.

ARTICLE XXXIII

REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The parties request that the provisions of the present Agreement affecting the United Nations shall enter into force upon the adoption by the UN Security Council of a resolution responding affirmatively to the request made in this Agreement. Likewise, the decision-making bodies of the other international organisations concerned are requested to take similar action, where appropriate.

PART SEVEN

MORAL GUARANTORS AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

ARTICLE XXXIV

MORAL GUARANTORS

The Government of the Togolese Republic, the United Nations, the OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations shall stand as Moral Guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties.

ARTICLE XXXV

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Both parties call on the International Community to assist them in implementing the present Agreement with integrity and good faith. The international organisations mentioned in Article XXXIV and the Governments of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are facilitating and supporting the conclusion of this Agreement. These States and organisations believe that this Agreement must protect the paramount interests of the people of Sierra Leone in peace and security.

PART EIGHT

FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE XXXVI

REGISTRATION AND PUBLICATION

The Sierra Leone Government shall register the signed Agreement not later than 15 days from the date of the signing of this Agreement. The signed Agreement shall also be published in the Sierra Leone Gazette not later than 48 (Forty - Eight) hours after the date of registration of this Agreement. This Agreement shall be laid before the Parliament of Sierra Leone not later than 21 (Twenty-One) days after the signing of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XXXVII

ENTRY INTO FORCE

The present Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signing by the Parties.

Done in Lomé this seven day of the month of July 1999 in twelve (12) original texts in English and French, each text being equally authentic.

Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone

His Excellency Gnassingbe Eyadema
President of the Togolese Republic
Chairman of ECOWAS

His Excellency Blaise Compaore
President of Burkina Faso

His Excellency Dahkpanah Dr. Charles Ghankey Taylor
President of the Republic of Liberia

His Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo
President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

His Excellency Youssoufou Bamba
Secretary of State at the Foreign Mission in charge of
International Cooperation of Cote d'Ivoire

His Excellency Victor Gbeho
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ghana

Mr. Roger Laloupe
Representative of the ECOWAS Special Representative
Ms. Adwoa Coleman
Representative Organization of African Unity

Ambassador Francis G. Okelo
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Secretary General
Dr. Moses K.Z. Anafu
Representative of the Commonwealth of Nations

ANNEX 1

AGREEMENT ON CEASEFIRE IN SIERRA LEONE

President Ahmed Tejan KABBAH and Rev. Jesse Jackson met on 18 May 1999 with Corporal Foday Saybana SANKOH, under the auspices of President Gnassingbe EYADEMA. At that meeting, the question of the peace process for Sierra Leone was discussed.

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL),

- Desirous to promote the ongoing dialogue process with a view to establishing durable peace and stability in Sierra Leone; and

- Wishing to create an appropriate atmosphere conducive to the holding of peace talks in Lome, which began with the RUF internal consultations to be followed by dialogue between the Government and the RUF;

- Have jointly decided to:

1. Agree to ceasefire as from 24 May 1999, the day that President EYADEMA invited Foreign Ministers of ECOWAS to discuss problems pertaining to Sierra Leone. It was further agreed that the dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF would commence on 25 May 1999;
2. Maintain their present and respective positions in Sierra Leone as of the 24th of May 1999; and refrain from any hostile or aggressive act which could undermine the peace process;
3. Commit to start negotiations in good faith, involving all relevant parties in the discussions, not later than May 25 in Lome;
4. Guarantee safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need; establish safe corridors for the provision of food and medical supplies to ECOMOG soldiers behind RUF lines, and to RUF combatants behind ECOMOG lines;
5. Immediate release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants;
6. Request the United Nations, subject to the Security Council's authorisation, to deploy military observers as soon as possible to observe compliance by the Government forces (ECOMOG and Civil Defence Forces) and the RUF, including former AFRC forces, with this ceasefire agreement.

This agreement is without prejudice to any other agreement or additional protocols which may be discussed during the dialogue between the Government and the RUF.

Signed in Lome (Togo) 18 May 1999, in six (6) originals in English and French

For the Government of Sierra Leone

ALHADJI Dr. Ahmad Tejan KABBAH
President Of The Republic Of Sierra Leone

For the Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, Leader of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

WITNESSED BY:

For the Government of Togo and Current Chairman of
ECOWAS

GNASSINGBE EYADEMA
President of the Republic of Togo

For the United Nations

Francis G. Okelo
Special Representative of the Secretary General

For the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

Adwoa COLEMAN
Representative of the Organization of African Unity

US Presidential Special Envoy for the Promotion of
Democracy in Africa

Rev. Jesse JACKSON

ANNEX 2

DEFINITION OF CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS

1. In accordance with Article II of the present Agreement, both parties agree that the following constitute cease-fire violations and a breach of the Cease-fire Agreement:

a. The use of weapons of any kind in any circumstance including: -

- (i) Automatic and semi-automatic rifles, pistols, machine guns and any other small arms weapon systems.
- (ii) Heavy machine guns and any other heavy weapon systems.
- (iii) Grenades and rocket-propelled grenade weapon systems.
- (iv) Artillery, rockets, mortars and any other indirect fire weapon systems.
- (v) All types of mine, explosive devices and improvised booby traps.
- (vi) Air Defence weapon systems of any nature.
- (vii) Any other weapon not included in the above paragraphs.

b. Troop movements of any nature outside of the areas recognized as being under the control of respective fighting forces without prior notification to the Cease-fire Monitoring Committee of any movements at least 48 hours in advance.

The movement of arms and ammunition. To be considered in the context of Security Council Resolution 1171 (1998).

d. Troop movements of any nature;

d. The construction and/or the improvement of defensive works and positions within respective areas of control, but outside a geographical boundary of 500m from existing similar positions.

f. Reconnaissance of any nature outside of respective areas of control.

g. Any other offensive or aggressive action.

2. Any training or other military activities not provided for in Articles XIII to XIX of the present Agreement, constitute a cease-fire violation.

3. In the event of a hostile external force threatening the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Sierra Leone, military action may be undertaken by the Sierra Leone Government.

ANNEX 3

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE ON THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND NON-COMBATANTS

The Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL) have agreed to implement as soon as possible the provision of the Cease-fire Agreement which was signed on 18 May 1999 in Lome, relating to the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of this provision in the interest of the furtherance of the talks.

They therefore decided that an appropriate Committee is established to handle the release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants.

Both the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone decided that such a Committee be established by the UN and chaired by the UN Chief Military Observer in Sierra Leone and comprising representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF and other relevant UN Agencies and NGOs.

This Committee should begin its work immediately by contacting both parties to the conflict with a view to effecting the immediate release

of these prisoners of war and non-combatants.

Lomé - 2 June 1999

ANNEX 4

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE ON THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN SIERRA LEONE

The parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone meeting in Lomé Togo on 3rd June 1999 in the context of the Dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone (GSL) and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL):

Reaffirm their respect for international convention, principles and norms, which govern the right of people to receive humanitarian assistance and the effective delivery of such assistance.

Reiterate their commitment to the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement signed by the two parties on 18th May 1999 in Lomé.

Aware of the fact that the protracted civil strife in Sierra Leone has created a situation whereby the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans in need of humanitarian assistance cannot be reached.

Hereby agree as follows:

1. That all duly registered humanitarian agencies shall be guaranteed safe and unhindered access to all areas under the control of the respective parties in order that humanitarian assistance can be delivered safely and effectively, in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms govern humanitarian operations.

2. In this respect the two parties shall:

a. guarantee safe access and facilitate the fielding of independent assessment missions by duly registered humanitarian agencies.

b. identify, in collaboration with the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Sierra Leone and UNOMSIL, mutually agreed routes (road, air and waterways) by which humanitarian goods and personnel shall be transported to the beneficiaries to provide needed assistance.

c. allow duly registered humanitarian agencies to deliver assistance according to needs established through independent assessments.

d. guarantee the security of all properties and of goods transported, stocked or distributed by the duly registered humanitarian agencies, as well as the security of their project areas and beneficiaries.

3. The two parties undertake to establish with immediate effect, and not later than seven days, an Implementation Committee formed by appropriately designated and mandated representatives from the Government of Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, the Civil Society, the NGO community, and the UNOMSIL; and chaired by the United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordinator, in co-ordination with the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Sierra Leone.

The Implementation Committee will be mandated to:

a. Ascertain and assess the security of proposed routes to be used by the humanitarian agencies, and disseminate information on routes to interested humanitarian agencies.

b. Receive and review complaints which may arise in the implementation of this arrangement, in order to re-establish full compliance.

4. The parties agree to set up at various levels in their areas of control, the appropriate and effective administrative and security bodies which will monitor and facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in all approved points of delivery, and ensure the security of the personnel, goods and project areas of the humanitarian agencies as well as the safety of the beneficiaries.

5144

Issued in Lomé
June 3 1999

ANNEX 5

DRAFT SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

1. ACTIVITIES WITH SPECIFIC TIMING:

TIMING	ACTIVITIES	ACTION REQUIRED	FOLLOW-UP ACTION
DAY 1	Signing of the Peace Agreement		
	Amnesty	The Government to grant absolute and free pardon to the RUF leader Foday Sankoh through appropriate legal steps	
	Transformation and new mandate of ECOMOG	Request to ECOWAS by the parties for revision of the mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone Request to the UN Security Council to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the various provisions outlined in the present Agreement; Request to the international community to provide substantial financial and logistical assistance to facilitate implementation of the Peace Agreement. Request to ECOWAS by the parties for contributions of additional troops.	
	Transformation of the RUF into a political party	RUF/SL to commence to organize itself to function as a political party	
	Encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)	Request for international assistance in adapting and extending the existing DDR programme	
	Withdrawal of mercenaries	Supervision by Joint Monitoring Commission	
	Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission	Communication by the parties of positions and description of all known warlike devices/materials	
	Notification to Military Commands	Communication by the parties of written orders requiring compliance	
DAY 15	Enabling members of the RUF/SL to hold public office, and to join a broad-based Government of National Unity through Cabinet appointments	Removal by the Government of all legal impediments	
	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP)	Creation of the Commission to implement a post-conflict reconciliation and welfare programme	Mandate of the Commission to terminate at the end of next general elections Jan. - Feb. 2001
	Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD)	Ban on all exploitation, sale, export, or any transaction of gold and diamonds except those sanctioned by the CMRRD	
DAY 22	Enabling members of the RUF/SL to hold public office	Discussion and agreement between both parties on the appointment of RUF/SL members to positions of parastatal, diplomacy and any other public sector	For a period of fourteen days
DAY 31	Transformation of the RUF into a political party	Necessary legal steps by the Government for the registration of the RUF as a political party	
	Commission for the management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD)	Preparation and submission by Government to the Parliament of relevant bills for enabling legislation commitments made under the peace agreement	
	Transformation, new mandate, and phased withdrawal of ECOMOG	Deployment of troops from at least two additional countries	
DAY 60	Completion of encampment, disarmament and demobilization	Restriction of SLA soldiers to the barracks and storage of their arms and ammunition under constant surveillance by the Neutral Peace-Keeping Force during the disarmament process Monitoring of disarmament and demobilization by UNOMSIL	
DAY 90	Human Rights Commission	Creation of an autonomous quasi judicial national Human Rights Commission Request for technical and material assistance from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African	

		Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights and other relevant organizations Creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
	Elections	Establishment of a new independent National Electoral Commission (NEC) in consultation with all political parties including the RUF/SL Request for financial and logistical support for the operations of the NEC Request for assistance from the international community in monitoring the next presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone
DAY 456	Human Rights Violations	Submission by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of its report and recommendation to the Government for immediate implementation

II. ACTIVITIES WITHOUT SPECIFIC TIMING: (SHORT/MEDIUM/LONG TERM):

SERIAL NO.	ACTIVITIES	ACTION REQUIRED	FOLLOW-UP ACTION
1.	Ceasefire monitoring (Ceasefire Agreement signed on 18 May 1999)	Establishment of a Ceasefire Monitoring Committee at provincial and district levels Request for international assistance in providing funds and other logistics for the operations of the JMC	JMC already established and operational
2.	Review of the present Constitution	Establishment of a Constitutional Review Committee	
3.	Mediation by the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders	Appointment of members of the Council by the interreligious Council, the Government, the RUF and ECOWAS	
4.	Timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG	Formulation of the timetable in connection with the phased creation and deployment of the restructured Armed Forces	
5.	Security guarantees for peace monitors	Communication, in writing, of security guarantees to UNMILOs	
6.	Restructuring and training of the SLA	Creation by the Government of truly national armed forces reflecting the geo-political structure of Sierra Leone within the established	

134) Radio message from The Lion

29 April 1995

FROM - THE LION

S-DIRECTIVE

5147

TO - STAFF-AUGUSTINE

KARGBO AND HARDER
ADJUTANT

D-29-04-95

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU SHOULD PREPARE I.D CARDS FOR ALL REGISTERED COMBATANTS FROM PEYAMA AND THE NORTH. NO SOLDIER SHOULD JOIN YOU FOR OPERATION WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENT. ALL SOLDIERS THAT ESCAPED AND JOINED YOU SHOULD RETURN TO THEIR ASSIGNMENT AREAS. LASTLY A.B SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REPORT TO MY LOCATION UPON THE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE.

FROM - THE LION

DATE -

~~DATE~~ 29-04-95

TO - HARDER

~~DATE~~ SUB-DIRECTIVE

YOU ARE TO WARN STRONGLY YOUR RADIO OPERATORS AS THEY ARE PLAYING LOW PROFILE ON OPERATION. IF THEY DO NOT CHANGE WITHIN THE NEXT 72 HRS, THEY WILL BE REPLACED BY OTHER OPERATORS FOR SMOOTH OPERATION.

FROM - THE LION.

SUB-MANDATE.

TO - THE TARGET COMMANDER.

DATE - 28th April 1995.

you are to send all officers who took part in the previous mission immediately after the ambush mission.

FROM - THE LION

SUB-DIRECTIVE

TO - CAPTAIN MOMOH ROGERS

DATE - 29th - 04 - 95

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO REPORT TO MY LOCATION NOW WITHOUT FAIL.

TO ~~FROM~~ THE AREA COMMANDER (84)

DIRECTIVE

~~FROM~~ - THE LION

DATE - 29-04-95

YOU ARE TO REPORT WITH ONE GRENADE LAUNCHER (FUNCTIONABLE) TO MY LOCATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR SMOOTH OPERATION AT CIS ZS LOCATION.

TELL ME WHETHER THE GRE. LAUNCHERS ARE FUNCTIONABLE WHEN READY TO MOVE YOU CONTACT ME FOR LAST STRUCTION.

FROM - ~~CAPTAIN~~ THE LION
TO - CAPTAIN BEN

SUB-DIRECTIVE
DATE - 29-04-95

514

BY MY DIRECTIVE GAYA AND YENGENA SHOULD BE BURNT TO GROUND LEVEL AFTER THE RECAPTURING -
YOU ARE NOT TO EVEN SPARE A ~~HOUSE~~ TOILET BUILDING THESE TWO TOWNS.

FROM - THE LION
TO - ~~THE~~ CPT. MICHAEL BORDEN

SUB-DIRECTIVE
DATE - 30-04-95

By ^{MY} DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO REPORT TO MY LOCATION WITH THE GRENADE LUNCHER TODAY WITH OUT FAIL.

FROM - THE LION
TO - ~~CAPTAIN~~ LT. MANKWA

SUB-DIRECTIVE
DATE - 30th - 04 - 95

By my DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO DISOLVE THE AMBUSH TODAY WITHOUT FAIL, AND RETURN ON BASE.

FROM - THE LION
TO - THE COMMANDER INCHARGE (ACROSS)

SUB-DIRECTIVE
DATE - 30th 04 - 95

By my DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO REPORT WITH THE ARM MEN THAT I SENT TO YOU, TOGETHER WITH THE OFFICERS THAT CAUSING PROBLEM TODAY WITH OUT FAIL.

FROM - THE LION
TO - CAPTAIN BEN

SUB-DIRECTIVE
DATE - 30th - 04 - 95

By my DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO SHOW

5149

135) Radio message from the Lion

6 May 1995

GRENADE LUNCHER RACKETS

5150

- ⑥ 20 HAND GRENADES
- ⑦ 40 R.P.C. RACKETS WITH INT'S
- ⑧ 15 BAZOOKA RACKETS WITH 21 INT'S
- ⑨ 2 BAZOOKA MORTARS
- ⑩ 2 60 MM MORTAR GUNS (1 STANDING TYPE AND 1 TRIGGER TYPE).

YOU ARE TO SEND THIS ITEMS TO MY LOCATION WITH IN THE NEXT 48 HRS TIME WITH OUT FAIL.

- ⑪ 17 PKTS OF SINGLE BARREL ROUNDS

OP. ~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE LION
TO: CAPTAIN AJAMIN
SUB: RESPOND
4/05/95.

YOU ARE NOT TO GO TO RUTIFUNK AS THERE IS NO ENEMY THERE TO WASTE MATERIALS. LOOK FOR AN AREA TO SET MATERIALS OR YOU SET AMBUSH ON THE MAIN HIGH WAY.

OP. ~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE LION
TO: LT JUMUI
SUB: RESPOND
4/05/95.

YOU ARE TO WAIT FOR ME UNTIL I INQUIRY FROM THE DOCTORS ABOUT YOUR SICKNESS BEFORE ANY OPERATION SHOULD BE DONE ON ^{YOU} FOR SUCH A SICKNESS.

THE MATERIAL SHOULD NOT BE WASTED IN ATTACKING VILLAGES THAT ARE NOT ON THE MAIN ROAD. THAT CAN BE DONE LATER WHEN THE SUPPLY LINE IS FINALLY CUT DOWN FROM KONO.

OP. ~~Z~~
Z = MANN

FROM: THE LION
TO: CAPTAIN GEORGE
SUB: RESPOND

6/05/45.

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO KEEP THE ITEMS CAPTURED BY YOU SAFELY. YOU ARE NOT TO GIVE ANY BODY UNTIL YOU HEAR FROM ME LATER.

OP. ~~Z~~
Z = MANN

G.M.G. ROUNDS CHINESE TYPE
R.P.G. ROCKETS
AUTOMATIC GRENADE LAUNCHER

FROM: THE LION

TO: CAPTAIN BEN

SUB: DIRECTIVE

6405195.

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO MAKE SURE THAT ONE SENIOR OFFICER FROM YOUR POINT SHOULD ESCORT THE MATERIALS TO C/S S4 LOCATION FOR SECURITY REASONS. THE MOST IMPORTANT MATERIALS SHOULD BE SENT FIRST AS THE MEN POWER IS GOING TO TRANSPORT THIS ITEMS TWICE OR THREE TIMES UNTIL THE WHOLE THING REACHED MY LOCATION SAFELY WITHOUT FAIL. YOU HAVE TO GO BY PLAN AND THE PEOPLE WHO ARE TO BE SENT BACK FROM YOUR POINT LIKE AB (I.O) SHOULD COME BACK WITHOUT FAIL.

OP. ~~OP~~

FROM: ~~THE LION~~ THE LION

TO: CAPTAIN BEN AND AUGUSTINE

SUB: DIRECTIVE

6405195.

MY PEOPLE SHOULD NOT GO TO TOMBUH AS THAT IS NOT OUR PLAN. THE PLAN IS LIPON CAPTURING BUMPEH, YOU PEOPLE ARE TO ADVANCE AND CUT THE SUPPLY LINE FROM TONKORLIELIE TO KONO AS THIS ^{IS} THE AREA THEY ARE GETTING SUPPLY FROM PRESENTLY. YOUR PLAN IS TO PUT BUMPEH UNDER CONTROL AND ADVANCE TO SWAFEH. LET YOUR DEFENSIVE BE BETWEEN SWAFEH AND MASINGBI SO THAT THE WHOLE SUPPLY LINE FOR KONO WILL BE CUT OFF FROM TONKORLIELIE.

FROM: THE LION

TO: LT RASHID TRAINING COMMANDANT

SUB: RESPOND

6/05/95.

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO ENCOURAGE THE RECRUITS YOU HAVE GOT ON BASE FOR THE CITY MISSION. YOU ARE TO RUSH UP WITH THEM AS I WILL NEED THEM SOON. ~~FIND OUT~~ THE P.O.W SHOULD JOIN THEM AS LONG AS HE KNOWS THE AREA.

ALSO FIND OUT ~~AMONGST~~ AMONG THE P.O.W'S FOR THOSE WHO BETTER KNOW DARU BARRACKS. THE AREA FOR THE AMMOURDOM AND THE TYPES OF WEAPONS THEY HAVE INCLUDING THEIR STRENGHT. THOSE THAT ~~+~~ HAVE WORKED IN THE BARRACKS ARE THE RIGHT PEOPLE I NEED.

OP. 
E-MAN

FROM: THE LION

TO: PA. ROGERS

SUB: RESPOND.

6/05/95.

YOUR DELIGATION SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF THE ICRC DELIGATION TO MY LOCATION AFTER WHICH I WILL GIVE YOU THE GREEN LIGHT FOR YOUR DELIGATION TO REACHED ME AT MY LOCATION.

YOU WILL RECEIVE THE MANDATE FROM ME ANY TIME NEXT WEEK. YOU ARE TO COME ^{AND} SEE WITH THEM AS THERE IS A LOT TO BE DISCUSSED FOR THE BENEFIT OF OUR CIVILIANS WITH IN OUR ZONES.

OP. 
E-MAN

TO: LT. MANAWA COM. IN CHARGE BLAMA HIGHWAY

5154

FROM: THE LION

SUB: DIRECTIVE

6/05/95

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE TO SEND THE 50 CALIBRE AND THE GRENADE LUNCHER TO MY LOCATION TODAY WITH OUT FAIL FOR SECURITY REASONS.

OP. ~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE LION

TO: LT. MORIBA

SUB: RESPOND

6/05/95

YOU ARE TO HAND OVER WHAT YOU ~~HAVE~~ HAVE FOR THE BROTHERS AT THIS POINT TO SGT. AUSUMANA MUSA (S-4) WHO WILL COME ALONG WITH IT WHEN EVER HE IS COMING. THE S-4 HAS THE RIGHT TO ASK ME FOR RECRUITS AND IT IS MY PLACE TO REINFORCE HIM BUT NOT YOU. IF THIS IS GOING ON, THEN ALL OTHER SOLDIERS WILL PRAISE THE SAME IDEA. I ADVISE THAT YOU DO EVERY THING THROUGH THE S-4.

OP. ~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE LION

TO: LT. MANAWA

SUB: RESPOND

6/05/95

YOU CAN CARRY ON YOUR PLAN AS FAR AS THE BRINGING OF THE 2 BIG WEAPONS IS CONCERN TO MY LOCATION WITH OUT FAIL.

5155

FROM: THE LION
TO: CAPTAIN BEN
SUB: DIRECTIVE AND BLUNDER STANDING
04/95.

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE ALSO TO SEND THE 2 PISTOLS, 17 PKT'S OF SINGLE BARREL ROUNDS. YOU ARE TO SEND THEM WITH THE OTHER MATERIALS WITH OUT FAIL.

YOU CAN REDUCE THE R.P.G RACKETS TO 40 INSTEAD OF 50 AS I HAVE WORKED EVERY THING OUT. ALSO REDUCE THE G-3 ROUNDS TO 9 INSTEAD OF 10 FOR THE SAME REASON.

MY SON DONT FEEL BAD BECAUSE OF THIS AS MY OBJECTIVE FOR TAKEN THIS MATERIALS FROM YOU IS FOR GR. FOOT ATTACK AND FOR THE FIELD COMMANDERS MISSION FOR THE CITY. WE ALSO HAVE A BIG MISSION FOR OUR OWN AREA OF WHICH I WILL INFORM YOU LATER. ONCE AGAIN INFORM YOUR SOLDIERS NOT TO FEEL BAD ABOUT THIS IDEA. WE ARE ALL AIMING AT ONE GOAL. OP. ~~OP~~

FROM: THE LION
TO: CAPTAIN AUGUSTINE KOROMA
SUB: RESPOND
04/05/95.

YOU ARE TO CARRY ON WITH YOUR PLAN AS STATED IN YOUR MESSAGE. YOU ARE TO TAKE GREAT CARE AT THAT POINT. ONLY VISIT 01/22 AND COME BACK. PUT THINGS UNDER CONTROL AT 01/26.

136) Speech

Document headed "restricted" speech by AFRC Chairman

~~RESTRICTED~~
RESTRICTED

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ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

SPEECH BY THE CHAIRMAN

MY FELLOW COUNTRYMEN THIS IS MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (A.F.R.C.) OF SIERRA LEONE.

SINCE MY LAST BROADCAST TO THE NATION ANNOUNCING THE OVERTHROW OF FORMER PRESIDENT TEJAN KABBA I NOW WISH TO APPRISE YOU OF THE FOLLOWING:

I HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED TO THE NATION DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COUNTRY JUST BEFORE A.F.R.C. INTERVENED THAT THREATENED THE CLOSENESS OF THE COUNTRY.

THE POLITICS IN THE COUNTRY HAD POLARISED INTO REGIONAL OR TRIBAL FACTIONS. THE FORMER PRESIDENT HAD LOST TOTAL CONTROL OF THE SITUATION AS ATROCITIES SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

THE OVERTHROWN GOVERNMENT MADE ONLY HALF-HEARTED MOVES, BUT MORE DISASTROUSLY WAS THE FACT THAT, THE FORMER, ARMED CIVILIANS FORM ONLY ONE

PART OF THE COUNTRY TO HARASS SERVICEMEN AND MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY.

THE REBEL WAR WHICH STARTED IN THIS COUNTRY WAS FOUGHT GALLANTLY BY OUR FORCES, SERIOUSLY AIDED BY THE GUINEAN TROOPS, NIGERIAN TROOPS, THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE AND THE SSD'S .

MY COUNTRY MEN AND COUNTRY WOMEN IN OUR EFFORTS TO LIBERATE OUR FATHER LAND THE ONLY CIVILIANS WHO VOLUNTEERED TO FIGHT DURING THE DIFFICULT DAYS WERE THE TAMABOROS WHO WERE FIGHTING ALONGSIDE THE ARMY AS AN AUXILIARY FORCE, AND THE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE TAMABOROS WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL AS THE TAMABOROS DEFENDED MOSTLY THEIR LOCALITIES.

SOMETIME IN JANUARY 1994 A GROUP CALLED HINDO-HINDO WAS ORGANISED IN KENEMA AND THE FORMATION OF HINDO-HINDO WAS A RESULT OF THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE REBELS DURING THE OPERATION TO BE DISBANDED.

IN 1996, THIS SAME GROUP THAT HAD BEEN DISBANDED RE-EMERGED AS THE KAMAJORS AND LIKE IN THE DAYS OF HINDO-HINDO, THE KAMAJORS INSTANTLY TARGETED THE ARMY AS THEIR PERCEIVED ENEMY. HOWEVER THE MILITARY OVERLOOKED THE ACTIVITIES OF THE KAMAJORS

RESTRICTED

AND FOUGHT ALONGSIDE WITH THEM AS LOCAL HUNTERS. BUT WHEN THE S.L.P.P. CAME TO POWER, THE S.L.P.P. GOVERNMENT EMPHASISED THAT THE KAMAJORS SHOULD BE GIVEN ANTI-MILITARY TRAINING WHICH CAUSED SERIOUS CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SOLDIERS AND KAMAJORS . WHEN THE ARMY WAS ONLY MADE UP OF 14,000 MEN, WHILE THE NUMBER OF KAMAJORS HAD SWOLLEN UP TO 37,000 MEN, VASTLY OUTNUMBERING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARMY.

WELFARE OF THE ARMY: THE S.L.P.P. WHICH GOT THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE ARMY AFTER THE ELECTIONS SUDDENLY BECAME VERY PARTISAN IN HANDLING THE SECURITY OF THE STATE. THE WELFARE OF THE KAMAJORS WAS TREATED MORE SERIOUSLY THAN THE WELFARE OF THE ARMY.

IT WAS NOT SURPRISING THAT A ONE TIME CHIEF KAMAJOR WAS APPOINTED DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE WHO SPENT ALL HIS ENERGY ORGANISING THE KAMAJORS.

EVENTHOUGH THE MILITARY HAD FOUGHT THE WAR FOR FIVE YEARS, THE S.L.P.P. SPENT ALL ITS TIME PROVIDING LOGISTICS FOR THE KAMAJORS AND TOTALLY FORGETTING THE WELFARE OF ARMY. THE KAMAJORS IN THE EYES OF THE S.L.P.P. SUDDENLY BECAME A SUPERIOR FORCE, EVENTHOUGH THE ARMED FORCES IS CONSTITUTIONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STATE . THE

RESTRICTED

KAMAJORS STARTED TO ENGAGE THE ARMY IN BATTLES, CAUSING THE DEATH OF MANY SOLDIERS.

EVENTHOUGH THE S.L.P.P. CLAIMED TO HAVE SPENT BETWEEN 2 BILLION AND 2.5 BILLIONS LEONES ON THE ARMED FORCES EVERY MONTH THIS WAS NOT REFLECTED IN THE STATUS OF THE ORDINARY SOLDIER.

THE KAMAJORS ON THE OTHER HAND WERE WELL CATERED FOR AS DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER HINGA NORMAN ALONE COLLECTED 35 MILLION LEONES ON BEHALF OF KAMAJORS EVERY MONTH. THIS DOES NOT COVER THE AMOUNT HINGA NORMAN COLLECTED FROM GOVERNMENT TO COVER LOGISTICS FOR THE KAMAJORS.

SALARIES FOR SOLDIERS ARE DELAYED FOR LONG PERIODS WHEREAS MONIES FOR KAMAJORS ARE PAID INSTANTLY ON DEMAND. RATION FOR THE FIGHTING MEN WAS REDUCED THEREBY PUTTING A LOT OF PRESSURE ON THE COMMANDERS WHO STILL HAD TO HANDLE THE SAME NUMBER OF MEN.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE MY COUNTRY MEN, THE S.L.P.P. GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED AN ALL OUT WAR AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE WHO WERE SUSPECTED TO BE NON-S.L.P.P. SUPPORTERS. MANY PERMANENT SECRETARIES AND HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS WERE SENT ON



RESTRICTED

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LEAVE JUST BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THE S.L.P.P.

THE CIVIL SERVICE CAME TO A STAND STILL WHEN IMPORTANT OFFICERS SUCH AS THE ESTABLISHMENT SECRETARY, THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL AND OTHER HEADS OF DEPARTMENT WERE SENT ON LEAVE WITHOUT EXPLANATION. EVENTHOUGH THE FORMER HEAD OF STATE PROMISED A 20% INCREASE IN THE SALARIES OF WORKERS, NO SUCH INCREASE TOOK PLACE, INSTEAD GOVERNMENT WHEN AHEAD TO RETRENCH MORE WORKERS FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE. THE TEACHERS REMAINED UNPAID FOR A LONG TIME TO THE EXTENT THAT MANY TEACHERS COULD NO LONGER PAY THEIR WAY TO WORK. THIS SITUATION IS NOT TENABLE, AND WE PROMISE TO CHANGE THIS IMMEDIATELY.

THE PRESS BILL.

MY COUNTRY MEN AND COUNTRY WOMEN, WE THE MEMBERS OF THE A.F.R.C. CONDEMN THE PRESS BILL THAT S.L.P.P. INTENDED TO USE TO WIPE OUT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. AS FAR AS THE A.F.R.C. ARE CONCERNED THE PRESS HAS A RIGHT TO OPERATE FREELY ACCORDING TO THE LAID DOWN RULES AND REGULATIONS IN OUR LAW BOOKS. NO SIERRALEONEAN REPEAT NO SIERRALEONEAN,

RESTRICTED

HAS A RIGHT TO STOP ANOTHER SIERRALEONEAN FROM MAKING HIS VIEW KNOWN OR HEARD.

THE TEMPORARY CLOSURE OF THE F.M. RADIO STATION IS A SECURITY MOVE TO PROTECT THE JOURNALISTS IN THE RADIO STATION AT A TIME WHEN MASSIVE SHOOTING WAS STILL TAKING PLACE. THE F.M RADIO STATION WILL SOON BE REOPENED.

COUNTRY MEN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN-WE DID NOT OVERTHROWN THE S.L.P.P GOVERNMENT FOR SELFISH REASONS, INDEED WE INTEND TO OPERATE ACCORDING TO THE TENETS OF FREEDOM. IN A VERY SHORT TIME WE WILL ANNOUNCE THE NAMES OF MEMBERS OF OUR GOVERNMENT.

WE ARE ALSO AWARE OF THE FACT THAT DEMOCRACY IS THE VOGUE IN THE MODERN WORLD IN THIS REGARD, WE WILL SOON PUBLISH A TIME TABLE FOR A RETURN TO FULLER DEMOCRACY AFTER FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. WE DON'T WANT ANY DEMOCRACY THAT IS BASED ON TRIBALISM AND REGIONALISM. WE ASSURE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT AS FROM TODAY WE ARE GRADUALLY MOVING TOWARDS ACCEPTABLE DEMOCRACY.

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MY COUNTRY MEN AND WOMEN THE ECONOMIC POLICY WILL REMAIN THE MARKET ECONOMY AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE I.M.F, THE WORLD BANK AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANISATIONS.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE ASSURE YOU THAT, WE ARE RELIABLY INFORMED BY THE RUF THAT THE REBEL WAR IS OVER. THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY VERY INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE RUF- SAM BOCKARIE, SUPPERMAN (COLONEL DENNIS) AND COLONEL ISAAC. WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO US IS TO BRING BACK PEACE TO SIERRA LEONE SO THAT OUR PEOPLE CAN MOVE FREELY AND ENGAGE THEMSELVES IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES FOR THE GOOD OF THE NATION.

RUF LEADER, FODAY SANKOH WILL SOON RETURN TO TAKE PART IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE A.F.R.C. HAS ALREADY MADE STRONG CONTACTS WITH CORPORAL FODAY SANKOH.

THE A.F.R.C, TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DETERMINATION TO RESTORE LASTING DEMOCRACY, RECOGNISE THE FOLLOWING -THE SIERRA LEONE LABOUR CONGRESS, ALL TRADE UNIONS IN THE COUNTRY, THE BAR ASSOCIATION, THE MEDICAL AND DENTAL ASSOCIATION, THE COMMISSION FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE, THE NATIONAL

RESTRICTED

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137) Decree

AFRC (Establishment of Council of Secretaries) Decree 1997 – Decree no.2 of 1997.
Signed by Johnny Paul Koroma

5165

2 No. 1 *The Bank of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Decree* 1997

Section 2 of Act No. 6 of 1963 amended. 2. Section 2 of the Bank of Sierra Leone Act, 1963 is hereby amended by the insertion in the appropriate place of the following interpretation—

P.N. No. 3 of 1997. "Council" means the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council established by the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997".

Section 13 of Act No. 6 of 1963 amended. 3. Section 13 of the Bank of Sierra Leone Act is amended by the insertion immediately after subsection (1) of the following proviso—

"Provided that in the case of the temporary absence or incapacity of the Governor and Deputy Governor, the Council may appoint persons of recognised financial experience to carry out the functions of Governor and Deputy Governor respectively, until the resumption of duty or return of the substantive holders of the aforementioned positions."

MADE and ISSUED this 3rd day of July, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE,
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.
GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY No. 41 OF 7TH JULY, 1997.

DECREES

Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary Vol. CXXVIII, No. 43
dated 14th July, 1997

A.F.R.C. Decree
No. 2



Sierra Leone

1997

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(Establishment of Council of Secretaries) Decree,
1997

Short title.

[10th July, 1997] Date of commencement.

PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree:—

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Commencement.

1. This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the 10th day of July, 1997.

Establishment of Council of Secretaries.

2. There is hereby established a Council to be known as the COUNCIL OF SECRETARIES which shall be directly and collectively responsible to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Composition of Council of Secretaries.

3. The Council of Secretaries shall consist of —
- (a) the Chief Secretary of State who shall be the head of the Council of Secretaries, and
 - (b) other Secretaries of State that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may from time to time appoint.

Functions of the Council of Secretaries.

4. The Council of Secretaries shall —
- (a) be responsible for the preparation and consideration of policy papers or matters and shall advise the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and make recommendations on all matters of good governance;
 - (b) execute the policies and directives of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Meetings of the Council of Secretaries.

5. The Chief Secretary of State shall convene regular meetings of the Council of Secretaries over which he shall preside and in his absence the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council shall appoint another person to preside from amongst members of the Council of Secretaries.

Establishment of office and functions of Chief Secretary of State.

6. (1) There is hereby established the office of Chief Secretary of State.
- (2) The Chief Secretary of State shall be responsible for communicating the policy decisions and directives of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council to the Council of Secretaries and conveying the decisions of the Council of Secretaries to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

(3) The Chief Secretary of State shall submit to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council regular reports from the Secretaries of State regarding the operations in their respective Departments of State.

(4) The Chief Secretary of State shall be the co-ordinating Secretary who shall receive and collate regular reports from the Secretaries of State for submission to the Council regarding the work of their Departments and the implementation of the policies of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and may submit to the Council proposals for legislative changes.

(5) The Chief Secretary of State shall effect the publicity of and cause notice of the policies of the Council to be circularised or communicated generally through the machinery of Government.

(6) Whenever the Office of the Chief Secretary of State becomes vacant, or the person holding that Office dies, resigns, retires, is absent from Sierra Leone or is removed from Office or is for any other reason unable to perform the functions of his Office, the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council shall appoint another person in his place from amongst members of the Council of Secretaries.

7. (1) A Secretary of State shall exercise Ministerial responsibility for a Department of State or such other business of Government as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may from time to time assign to him.

Functions of Secretary of State.

(2) A Secretary of State shall be entitled to such remuneration, allowances, gratuities and other incidents of office as may be prescribed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

8. The Chief Secretary of State and every other Secretary of State shall take and subscribe the oath of office as set out in the Schedule hereto.

Oath of Office.

1995

Secretary to the Council of Secretaries.

9. (1) There shall be a Secretary to the Council of Secretaries whose office shall be a public office.

(2) The Secretary to the Council of Secretaries shall be appointed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in consultation with the Public Service Commission.

(3) The functions of the Secretary to the Council of Secretaries shall include—

- (a) having charge of the Secretariat of the Council of Secretaries;
- (b) responsibility for arranging the business for and keeping the minutes of, the Council of Secretaries; and
- (c) any other functions that the Council of Secretaries may from time to time assign to him.

(4) The Secretary to the Council of Secretaries shall take and subscribe the oath of office as set out in the Schedule hereto.

Change of title in Acts.

10. In every enactment continued in existence by virtue of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997, relating to the Ministries and Departments of Government, any reference to President, Vice-President, Minister or Cabinet shall be construed as a reference to the office or person with responsibility for the subject-matter to which the enactment relates, and any reference to "Ministry" shall be read as "Department".

SCHEDULE

Oath of the Chief Secretary of State, Secretaries of State and the Secretary to the Council of Secretaries.

I HEREBY (in the name of God/Allah swear) (solemnly affirm) that I will faithfully and truly discharge the duties of the Office of of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and that I will support, uphold and maintain the provisions of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (Public Notice No. 3 of 1997) and the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 1991 which are not inconsistent with the Proclamation. (So help me God/Allah)."

MADE and ISSUED this 12th day of July, 1997.

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

5168.

138) RUFPP Parliamentary Candidates

List of RUFPP Parliamentary Candidates - Contains the full name of Accused Sesay

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WEST-WEST

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Mohamed Alie Kamara	Businessman	9.	Mr. John Abu Bakar Bangura	Businessman
2.	Mr. Mohamed Alhassan	Businessman	10.	Ms. Aminata Kamara	Businesswoman
3.	Ms. Bridget Collins	Businesswoman	11.	Mr. Abdul Sesay	Businessman
4.	Ms. Marian Aminata Sankoh	Businesswoman	12.	Mr. Hamidu Bangura	Businessman
5.	Ms. Adama Sesay	Businesswoman	13.	Mr. Alpha Kamara	Businessman
6.	Mr. Hassan Kamara	Businessman	14.	Ms. Posseh Kamara	Businesswoman
7.	Mr. Abdulai Benson-Conteh	Businessman	15.	Mr. Stevens Attawia	Businessman
8.	Ms. Victoria Peacock	Businesswoman	16.	Mr. Abu Conteh	Businessman

WEST-EAST

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Eldred Collins	Engineer	7.	Mr. Ibrahim Alie Kargbo	Businessman
2.	Mr. Ernest Jordan-Kanu	Research Economist	8.	Mr. Moses Bangura	Businessman
3.	Ms. Adama Bai Sesay	Businesswoman	9.	Mr. Abdul Beeas Kamara	Businessman
4.	Alhaji Magba Kamara	Businessman	10.	Mr. Abdul Karim Bangura	Businessman
5.	Mr. Samuel Gbassay Kanu	Businessman	11.	Mr. Hamid Y. Kamara	Businessman
6.	Mr. James Bangura	Businessman	12.	Mr. Osman Deen Sesay	Businessman

BOMBALI

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Issa Hassan Sesay	Businessman	7.	Mr. Paul D. Sesay	Businessman
2.	Mr. Brima Martin Bangura	Agriculturalist	8.	Mr. Raymond K. Koroma	Asst. Valuation Off.
3.	Ms. Adama Farnah	Businesswoman	9.	Mr. Kalawa Conteh	Teacher

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4.	Mr. John Bokelo Bangura	Businessman	10.	Mr. David A. Kamara	Teacher
5.	Mr. Alfred G. Conteh	Farmer	11.	Mr. Salu Sesay	Teacher
6.	Mr. Samuel Haward	Farmer	12.	Mr. Hassan Tarawallie	Driver

PORT LOKO

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Alhaji Kamara	Politician	9.	Mr. Osman Bangura	Businessman
2.	Mr. John Conteh	Businessman	10.	Mr. Sulaiman Sesay	Businessman
3.	Mr. Osman Sesay	Farmer	11.	Mr. Sorie Kargbo	Businessman
4.	Mr. Siak Mansaray	Businessman	12.	Haja Sankoh	Businesswoman
5.	Mr. Abdul Mollon	Businessman	13.	Mr. Alpha Kamara	Farmer
6.	Mr. Francis Bangurah	Businessman	14.	Mr. Santigie Gbla	Farmer
7.	Mr. Idris Stardo Kamara	Farmer	15.	Mr. John Bangura	Farmer
8.	Mr. Bassiru Daramy	Farmer	16.	Mr. Saidu Mansaray	Businessman

KONADUGU

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Bockarie Keldambason Marrah	Farmer/Business	9.	Mr. Momorie Kamara	--
2.	Mr. Banet Borbor Kamara	--	10.	Mr. Daniel Balla Koroma	--
3.	Mr. Sidikie Abubakar Mansaray	Farmer	11.	Mr. Abubakar Samura	Farmer
4.	Mr. Sinkarie Jalloh	Trader/Farmer	12.	Ms. Isatu Jalloh	--
5.	Mr. Sheku Hassan Samura	--	13.	Ms. Amine Kamara	Businesswoman
6.	Mr. Mohamed Keildambason Marrah	Farmer/Business	14.	Mr. Kuliako K. Turay	--
7.	Mr. Sheku Mohamed Jawara	Businessman	15.	Mr. Dennis A. B. Kargbo	--
8.	Mr. Momodu Samura	--	16.	Mr. Thomas Marrah	--

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TONKOLLI

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Alimamy Pallo Bangura	Public Servant	9.	Mr. Thomas P. Conteh	Politician
2.	Mr. Abdul Satar Fuad Sankoh	Businessman	10.	Mr. Joseph S. K. Halliwell	Teacher
3.	Mr. Tariqui O. Sidique	Farmer	11.	Mrs. Aminata Kamara	Businesswoman
4.	Mr. Abdulai Benzon Conteh	Politician	12.	Mr. Foday Kerra	Businessman
5.	Mr. Shyllon Karbo Sesay	Pastor	13.	Mr. Joshua J. Sesay	Businessman
6.	Mr. Mohamed S. Kamara	Politician	14.	Mr. Mohamed Gebrill Sesay	Businessman
7.	Mr. Daniel Pawoo Kamara	Trader	15.	Mrs. Alice V. Kamara	Trader
8.	Mr. Samuel Koroma	Businessman	16.	Mr. Abu Bakarr Conteh	Trader

KAMBLA

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Haroun A. Kamara	Farmer	9.	Mr. Abdul Sesay	Farmer
2.	Mr. Adikahe G. Sankoh Yillah	Farmer	10.	Mr. A. B. S. Bangura	Farmer
3.	Mr. Idrissa Kanu	Farmer	11.	Mr. Abdulai S. Kamara	Teacher
4.	Mr. Edward S. Kargbo	Teacher	12.	Mr. Tejan Kargbo	Farmer
5.	Mr. Hassan Kamara	Trader	13.	Mr. Daniel M. Cole	Teacher
6.	Mr. Hassan M. Kamara	Farmer	14.	Mr. Sorie I. Kamara	Teacher
7.	Mr. Mohamed Lamin Kargbo	Farmer	15.	Mr. Foday S. Kargbo	Farmer
8.	Mr. Foday M. Sankoh	Trader	16.	Mr. Mohamed Takoyo Mansaray	Trader

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No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Morris Kallon	Politician	9.	Mr. Moses Bassie	Teacher
2.	Mr. Mike Lamin	Politician	10.	Mr. Peter J. Trye	Teacher

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3.	Mr. Jonathan Joe Demby	Photographer	11.	Mr. Maxwell Foday	Politician
4.	Shek Abdulai Lebbie	Nurse	12.	Mr. Mohamed Bureh	Politician
5.	Ms. Jenneh Kpawoh	Politician	13.	Mr. Bobor J. Gbandawa	Agriculturalist
6.	Mr. Alfred Jimmy	Ex-Combatant	14.	Ms. Confort Kamara	Housewife
7.	Mr. Augustine M. S. Brima	Nurse	15.	Mr. Alieu Deen Sankoh	Typist/Computerist
8.	Ms. Farnata Alie Lebbie	Teacher	16.	Mr. Francis Hindowa	Farmer

MOYAMBA

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Jonathan Kposowa	Teacher	5.	Mr. Nipline Kpange	Teacher
2.	Mr. Ibrahim Fambulleh	Farmer	6.	Mr. Musa Tarmu	Teacher
3.	Mr. Patrick Gbanah	Dispenser	7.	Mr. Sylvester L. Kieh	Teacher
4.	Mr. Simeon Hindowa	Nurse	8.	Mr. Emmanuel Pabai	Doctor

PUJEHUN

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Andrew L. Kamara	Politician	7.	Mr. Samuel Massaquoi	Farmer
2.	Mr. Hindolo Mohamed Rogers	Trader	8.	Mr. Gbassah Pabai	Politician
3.	Mr. Mohamed A. Sowa	Businessman	9.	Mr. Paul Swaray	Politician
4.	Ms. Musto Rogers	Trader	10.	Mr. Ibrahim Fambuleh	Businessman
5.	Mr. Gibril Massaquoi	Trader	11.	Ms. Mariama Mahona	Politician/Trader
6.	Mr. Patrick Kamara	Politician			

BONTHE

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
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5173.

1.	Mr. Dwight Beaborn	Operator	9.	Mr. Joseph A. Vandy	Teacher
2.	Mr. Abu Kaimapo Hotaguan	Plant Mechanic	10.	Ms. Saibau Kamara	Nurse
3.	Mr. Abu Bakarr Conteh	Teacher	11.	Mr. Foday Bangura	Businessman
4.	Mr. Joe Mornoh	Boat Captain	12.	Mr. Josephus Sengeh	-
5.	Mr. James Foday D.	Const. Engineer	13.	Mr. Patrick Lahai	Computerist
6.	Mr. Zachariah Kamara	Teacher	14.	Mr. John Peter	Teacher
7.	Mr. Alie Kanu	Businessman	15.	Mr. Jonathan Dauda	Businessman
8.	Mr. Augustin Belewa	Pastor	16.	Mr. George Tyier	Teacher

KENEMA

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Kaisulu Kaisamba	Trader	9.	Mr. Saidu Kallon	Trader
2.	Mr. Alhassan Kamara	Trader	10.	Mr. Morrison Kallon	Trader
3.	Mr. Augustine Gbao	Trader	11.	Mr. Mohamed Mansaray	Trader
4.	Mr. Samuel Massaquoi	Farmer	12.	Mr. Sahieu Gevao	Farmer
5.	Ms. Jeneba Ansumana	Trader	13.	Mr. Daniel Jones	Trader
6.	Mr. Salim Anthony	Trader	14.	Mr. Emmanuel Sovula	Farmer
7.	Mr. Habib Kamanda	Trader	15.	Mr. Daniel Massaquoi	Farmer
8.	Mr. Morie Saffa	Trader	16.	Mr. Hindo Koroma	Farmer

KONO

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Cyril Foray	Farmer	9.	Mr. Sahr Fajah	Farmer
2.	Mr. Kailifa Koroma	Trader	10.	Mr. Mohamed Saffa	Farmer
3.	Mr. Ahmed Sabana Allie	Trader	11.	Mr. Sahr Gbanie	Farmer
4.	Mr. Hassan Koroma	Trader	12.	Mr. Mohamed Kallon	Farmer
5.	Mr. Francis Borway	Farmer	13.	Mr. Brima Jalloh	Farmer

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6.	Mr. Sahr Sandy	Farmer	14.	Mr. Mohamed Jalloh	Trader
7.	Mr. Sahr Kelly	Farmer	15.	Mr. Alusine Bah	Trader
8.	Mr. Sallu Kamara	Farmer	16.	Ms. Fatmata Kongo	Trader

KAILAHUN

No.	Candidate	Occupation	No.	Candidate	Occupation
1.	Mr. Peter Bobson Vandi Nabieu	Politician	9.	Ms. Susan Kulagbanda	Trader
2.	Mr. Erick Senessi	Farmer	10.	Mr. Kailondo Sama Banya	Trader
3.	Mr. Moray Tarawally	Farmer	11.	Mr. Peter Jusu	Agriculturalist
4.	Mr. Foday Adebama	Farmer	12.	Mr. Amara Bockarie	Trader
5.	Mr. George Mansaray	Farmer	13.	Mr. Ishmael A. Elie	Farmer
6.	Mr. Sahr Steven Williams	Politician	14.	Mr. Francis Saffa	Trader
7.	Ms. Iye Isatta Kallon	Farmer	15.	Mr. Foday I. Kamara	Businessman
8.	Mr. Sahr Jabba	Farmer	16.	Mr. Forray Sannoh	Businessman

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139) News Report

Sierra Leone News Archives from Sierra Leone Web
Dates: 29, 28, 4, 2, 1 May 2000

News Archives

29 May: West African heads of state and government meeting at an ECOWAS summit in Abuja have endorsed a proposal made by ECOWAS nation defence ministers and and chiefs of staff which would send an additional 3,000 troops to Sierra Leone. In a communiqué issued after the meeting, the regional leaders called for UNAMSIL's mandate to be changed from "peacekeeping to peace enforcement" and for the force, currently headed by Indian Major-General Vijay Kumar Jetley, to be headed by a West African. The West African leaders also "decided to ensure the safety of (detained RUF leader) Corporal Foday Sankoh by keeping him out of Sierra Leone," the communiqué said. A committee of six ECOWAS members — Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo — will be sent to Sierra Leone immediately to determine a date for a cease-fire and to end renewed fighting in the country. The committee has been mandated "to make contact with all the parties concerned and prevail on them to redeploy to the positions held as at 1 July, 1999, the date of signature of the Lomé Peace Accord." The summit resolved to conduct an inquiry into the renewed hostilities and to study the illegal trade in diamonds in the region. The leaders also called on the RUF to disarm and demobilise voluntarily. Malian President Alpha Oumar Konare, the current ECOWAS chairman, was directed "to prevail on member states who had pledged to contribute contingents to honor their commitments." Seven countries have reportedly offered troops for the mission, which is expected to be heavily dominated by Nigerian soldiers. Several countries which made similar pledges to provide troops to the ECOMOG force failed to follow through on their commitments. Earlier, ECOWAS spokeswoman Dr. Adrienne Diop told reporters it had been agreed that the West African troops would work under the United Nations rather than as a separate parallel force. She said Sankoh "would be taken out of Sierra Leone to be kept in a safer place" while efforts to revive the peace process continued.



ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate told journalists that ECOWAS would take charge of the rebel leader. "We have decided to give security to Foday Sankoh, probably outside Sierra Leone...but that does not mean that we accept massacres and mutilation of the population," he said. "That does not mean either that he cannot be tried later...this is a decision taken unanimously, with Sierra Leone's President Ahmad Kabbah." But the BBC's Robin White quoted Sierra Leonean Foreign Minister Dr. Sama Banya as saying Sierra Leone had not agreed to hand Sankoh over. "Well this is part of a communiqué and I think it has been discussed with the government of Sierra Leone, and this is what the heads of state have agreed on," Kouyate said in a BBC Focus on Africa interview. "I can assure you this was an agreement reached between the heads of state." He declined to disclose when the rebel leader would be handed over, or where he might be held. Kouyate stressed that assuring Sankoh's safety did not mean he would not be tried. "It is premature to say anything on (where he might face trial) because I don't know what the heads of state will decide later," he said. "But again I repeat it,

assuring his safety does not mean he will be out of trial." In New York, Sierra Leone's Ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Kamara, told the Washington Post on Sunday that Sankoh would face trial in Sierra Leone. "He's with us now, and we're not going to let him go," Kamara said.

Pro-government forces said Monday they had captured the RUF-held town of Lunsar. "Lunsar has been liberated. It happened today, early today," said Army spokesman Major John Milton. Earlier in the day, Reuters said heavy fighting had been reported around Rogberi Junction. The news agency quoted military sources as saying pro-government troops had made a push toward Lunsar, but had pulled back after a heavy exchange of fire. Fighting was also reported Monday in various parts of the north or west, causing civilians in Kambia District to flee over the Guinea border. "We are advancing towards Kambia," Major told reporters. He acknowledged, however, that government forces had not yet captured the town of Mange, which lies about halfway between Port Loko and Kambia. Milton said government forces were concentrating their strength in the north because the RUF in the east had shown no sign of attempting to advance, and appeared ready to respect the Lomé Peace Accord. "Since we want peace, perhaps we can cajole those ones and they will lay down their arms," he said.

Despite problems experienced by United Nations peacekeepers since they began to deploy in Sierra Leone late last year, UNAMSIL force commander Major-General Vijay Kumar Jetley said the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process was "still very much on" as far as the U.N. was concerned. "We are going to move forward in a planned and systematic way to deploy to all the places where we were deployed earlier," Jetley told a news conference in Freetown. Since arriving in Sierra Leone at least 11 peacekeepers have been killed and 25-30 wounded. U.N. troops sent to disarm the rebels have been disarmed themselves, including an entire Guinean battalion on its way to join UNAMSIL earlier this year. This month over 500 U.N. peacekeeping troops and military advisors were abducted and disarmed by the RUF. The last group of abductees was released on Sunday. Jetley said his troops were using "force when necessary" and had inflicted major casualties on the rebels when attacked. "The rebels are still licking their wounds," Jetley said. "The RUF is in a total state of demoralization at the moment," he asserted.



A battalion of 1,014 Jordanian peacekeeping troops left for Sierra Leone on Monday, according to the state-owned Petra news agency. The contingent includes a field hospital. There are currently some 980 Jordanians serving with the UNAMSIL force.

Fatou Sankoh, the wife of detained RUF leader Foday Sankoh, arrived in Johannesburg on Saturday despite South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs having told her host — entrepreneur MK Malefane — that she would not be welcome. Fatou (Mbawe) Sankoh reportedly married the rebel leader in February and accompanied him on his controversial trip to Johannesburg. Born in Senegal, she is a naturalised U.S. citizen, and reportedly entered South Africa on an American passport. In a press release she sent the Sierra Leone Web earlier this month, described herself as "a lawyer by profession and also president of an NGO by avocation." While she declined to discuss her reasons for the current trip, MK Malefane informed the Department of Foreign Affairs Friday that he had invited her to South Africa to discuss her

participation in a music and arts festival. Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad said the Department of Foreign Affairs was seeking clarification from the United Nations as to whether Fatou Sankoh was affected by the U.N. travel ban on her husband. "We are obviously investigating this matter. We will be getting in touch with the United Nations to see whether she is affected by the sanctions," Pahad said. A spokesman for the Department, Dumisani Rasheleng, said Department of Foreign Affairs was liaising with the Department of Home Affairs in trying to expedite her departure from South Africa. Fatou Sankoh "is travelling on a U.S. private passport that exempts her from a visa," Rasheleng said. "She is also apparently travelling on a different name." In an interview with South Africa's Sunday Independent newspaper, Fatou Sankoh denied reports of RUF brutality or of forcing young children to fight as soldiers. "Foday loves children. He's not the monster the British want people to believe he is," she said. She claimed pictures of people with amputated limbs were "British propaganda" and claimed that pro-government forces, not the RUF, were responsible for mutilations and killings in Sierra Leone. Fatou Sankoh told the Independent that she was Sankoh's only wife. "I am his first wife. There has been no other," she said. But Foday Sankoh himself has acknowledged that he has been married more than once. "In 1977...I went to the eastern part of the country where I married my first wife," Sankoh told the New African in November 1999. In the same interview he spoke of having 11 children.

28 May: 85 freed U.N. peacekeepers arrived in Freetown Sunday night, the last of over 500 U.N. personnel seized by RUF rebels in northern and eastern Sierra Leone at the beginning of the month. "We are optimistic that the release of the hostages signals a positive change of direction by the Revolutionary United Front in coming back to seek a peaceful settlement," said UNAMSIL spokesman David Wimhurst. Four soldiers were unaccounted for, but Wimhurst told reporters earlier they were likely to have been among the bodies discovered last week at Rogberi Junction. All of those freed Sunday were Zambians, with the exception of one Gambian military observer with a broken leg. Wimhurst discounted reports by Liberian President Charles Taylor that 30-40 of the peacekeepers had been wounded. A contingent of 23 Indian peacekeepers along with 11 unarmed military observers still remains surrounded in the eastern town of Kuiva, but Wimhurst expressed hope earlier Sunday that the situation would soon be resolved. In New York, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's spokesman said Annan was "delighted" with the releases, and said he hoped "that the freeing of the remaining peacekeepers will help create conditions in which the long and agonizing search for peace and stability in Sierra Leone can at last be brought to a successful conclusion."

RUF forces failed to retake the town of Rogberi Junction Saturday in a battle in which, according to military sources, 12 pro-government troops and 29 rebels were killed. Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service said 14 other RUF fighters were wounded. According to British military spokesman Lieutenant-Commander Tony Cramp, the RUF mounted a "large attack" on government forces holding the town. "The attack was repelled very successfully by the government forces, with large numbers of casualties inflicted on the RUF," Cramp told the BBC. "And what's significant about that is it's a very clear indication in fact that the government forces are now uniting together to be a lot more effective and a lot more robust force...The fact that they've repelled what was a very large attack will give them a lot of confidence and they will also be looking at moving even further forward into the east of the country."

Cramp indicated that pro-government forces, which consist of a coalition of SLA and ex-SLA soldiers and CDF militiamen under a recently-unified command, were moving toward the RUF strongholds in eastern Sierra Leone. He added that at least some factions of the RUF appeared interested in negotiating an end to the fighting. "We're getting a lot of mixed messages," he said. "There have been a number of RUF personnel coming over in the last couple of days giving themselves up. They do have a problem. There are signs of splits and clearly at the moment with the RUF on the back foot and pro-government forces pushing ahead there should be a lot of worried people there." Meanwhile, Reuters said heavy fighting had been reported on the Kambia road, where government forces said Saturday they were advancing toward the Mange Bridge.

West African leaders gathered in Abuja, Nigeria on Sunday for a summit marking the 25th anniversary of ECOWAS. The heads of state and government will consider recommendations made by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, which worked into the early hours of Sunday morning on a proposal which would send up to 3,000 additional troops to Sierra Leone. "The meeting has ended, but the conclusions will be passed on to the full summit," ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate said at the conclusion of the mini-summit. He told reporters an announcement would be made following the full summit. An original draft proposal, which was submitted ten days ago by ECOWAS defence ministers and chiefs of staff, left open the question of whether the new force would work within the framework of UNAMSIL or whether it would constitute a parallel force with a more robust mandate and its own command. In his address to the summit, President Kabbah indicated that the new troops should be separate from, and work alongside, U.N. peacekeepers. "ECOMOG still has a job to do in Sierra Leone," he said, adding that it should work in a "partnership for peace and security" with the U.N. "What we need is a joint effort — national, regional and international — to achieve peace and security in Sierra Leone," he said. On Saturday, however, Nigerian Foreign Minister Sule Lamido said the West African troops would be part of UNAMSIL — a prediction echoed Sunday by BBC correspondent Barnaby Philips. "I think since then the West Africans and specifically the Nigerians — because they're really the driving force here — have had to face the reality that it's going to be the the international community — the governments in the West and the Americans are going to supply the logistics and the money for West African soldiers to go to Sierra Leone, and to that extent its inevitable, I think, that the West Africans will be within UNAMSIL," Philips told the BBC Focus on Africa programme. He added that the West Africans continued to have misgivings about placing their troops under UNAMSIL control. "They don't have entire faith in UNAMSIL's ability or indeed UNAMSIL's methods in enforcing peace in Sierra Leone," he said.

4 May: U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said Thursday he had asked regional leaders to pressure leader Foday Sankoh into releasing some 92 U.N. personnel now believed held by his RUF rebel faction in northern and eastern Sierra Leone. The secretary-general met with reporters following a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on the crisis in Sierra Leone — the third such meeting in three days. "I have spoken to quite a few leaders who have direct contact and some influence on him and who have sent envoys," including the leaders of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Liberia,





Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Togo, he said. Annan said Sankoh promised Liberian President Charles Taylor that some of the detainees, including "at least" a four-man Russian helicopter crew, would be freed starting Friday. "We'll wait and see if this happens," he said. He said the U.N. was working to strengthen its force in Sierra Leone "as quickly as possible." Currently some 8,700 U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed in the country out of 11,100 authorised by the Security Council. The remaining three battalions were due to arrive in mid-June. Discussions are now underway to speed up their deployment, Annan said, possibly by enlisting the aid of Western countries such as Britain, France or the United States to transport the troops and equipment to Sierra Leone. He said that while he would like to deploy a rapid reaction force to deal with the crisis, this would only be possible if those with such a capacity were willing to provide it. Annan added that discussions were underway with some member states on the matter. Sankoh signed an agreement late Wednesday to release all U.N. hostages, while at the same time denying his followers were holding them. "Nobody believes him," Annan said. "(The African leaders) have told him to take action. They have told him to release (the hostages). They have tried to impress on him the seriousness of the situation and the fact that he is placing himself in a very difficult situation. He is already isolated and it is going to get worse. All the leaders are giving him the same message. If they thought he were not holding hostages, they would not be acting that way with him."

In a presidential statement read out following Thursday's meeting of the U.N. Security Council, Ambassador Wang Yingfan of China said members supported international and regional efforts to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone, including those of ECOWAS. The Council demanded that the RUF end its hostile actions immediately and immediately release all detainees unharmed, cooperate to establish the whereabouts of U.N. personnel still unaccounted for, and comply fully with the Lomé Peace Accord. Council members expressed outrage at the killing of U.N. peacekeepers and deep concern for those wounded or still not located. The Security Council said that Foday Sankoh, as leader of the RUF, was responsible for the attacks on U.N. personnel, that he had "deliberately failed" to cooperate with UNAMSIL to end the incidents, and that he must be held accountable together with the perpetrators. Meanwhile, UNAMSIL Public Information Officer Philip Winslow pointed out that the amnesty included in last year's peace agreement did not cover acts committed since the signing of the accord. "Those responsible will definitely be prosecuted," he said.

The bodies of four Kenyan peacekeepers have been recovered and are being sent home, UNAMSIL spokesman Osman Lahai told the Voice of America late on Thursday. Three other Kenyans wounded in fighting with the RUF remain at the U.N.'s hospital in Freetown, Lahai said.

The United Nations has revised downward its estimate of the number of U.N. peacekeepers killed in Sierra Leone this week to "four missing and presumed dead," a spokeswoman in New York said Thursday afternoon. The four were reported to have belonged to UNAMSIL's Kenyan battalion. U.N. spokeswoman Marie Okabe said at least 69 civilian and military UNAMSIL personnel were now believed to be held by RUF — 39 in the Makeni area and 30 in Kailahun. Eight other U.N. personnel are reported to have been wounded. In addition, Okabe said, a 23-man Indian battalion was reported surrounded by RUF troops at Kuiva, near Kailahun. She said UNAMSIL had lost contact with some of its units, comprising up to 100 personnel, but noted

that the force was sending reinforcements to Makeni and Magburaka. Okabe said there are currently about 8,700 U.N. troops in Sierra Leone with three additional battalions due by mid-June.

The Missionary Services News Agency (MISNA) has reported that rebels disarmed and abducted a contingent of U.N. peacekeepers in the town of Kambia, near Sierra Leone's border with Guinea, at about 9:00 Thursday morning. The rebels, apparently members of the RUF, had confined the U.N. troops to the centre of town and sacked the local police barracks, MISNA said. U.N. officials confirmed that Zambian troops had come under attack at Kambia late Wednesday, but had no details. Reuters cited unconfirmed reports that 200 of the peacekeepers were encircled, but were said to still have their weapons. U.N. spokeswoman Marie Okabe confirmed said there had been gunfire in Kambia Wednesday night, but that it had died down before midnight. According to MISNA, a team of doctors from the French-based medical charity Medécins sans Frontières (MSF - Doctors Without Borders) was forced to flee to Guinea on Wednesday following shooting in the town.

There was sporadic firing in Kambia and Makeni overnight, UNAMSIL officials told reporters in Freetown on Thursday. They said about five U.N. peacekeepers wounded in fighting at Makeni had been evacuated to Freetown, where they were undergoing treatment at a military hospital. The disarmament camps at Makeni and Magburaka, at the centre of the dispute between the RUF and the U.N., have reportedly been completely destroyed and vandalised. BBC correspondent Lansana Fofana reported that the RUF had allowed peacekeepers from UNAMSIL's Indian contingent to provide food for their U.N. colleagues held by the rebels in Kailahun. He said U.N. officials were not planning to confront the RUF in order to secure the hostages' release. "They were saying that all they will do is to continue negotiating with the High Command of the Revolutionary United Front," Fofana said. "They were saying they've had regional leaders talking to Foday Sankoh. They've had government officials talking to Foday Sankoh, and that they are hoping things will turn out positive. But in any case they are expressing grave concern about developments there, because their disarmament camps have been targeted and there is no indication the rebels will not take more hostages."



RUF leader Foday Sankoh has again blamed the United Nations for this week's fighting between his followers and UNAMSIL in northern Sierra Leone — a charge the U.N. has rejected. "There was a fight Makeni and Magburaka because of the forcible disarmament," Sankoh said. "They forced their way into the barracks to disarm the men, but then started firing. And I think our men with no alternative but to defend themselves." A U.N. spokesman in Freetown insisted Wednesday that the attacks on U.N. personnel were "completely unprovoked," and he dismissed Sankoh's claim his men had been forcibly disarmed as "completely untrue." Sankoh said the RUF had lost six men in the fighting with an unknown number wounded. The RUF leader also denied rumours that he had been placed under house arrest in Freetown, and warned of serious consequences if he were to be detained. "(Wednesday afternoon) we drove around Freetown from my residence to Kissy, going around to Clinetown, Fourah Bay Road, Sani Abacha Street, to PZ and we (came) back home," he said. "You know they can do anything but it (would) be a big mistake to detain Foday Sankoh. Forget about the combatants. The civilian populace will rise. So I advise and appeal even to President Kabbah

not to try it." In a separate interview with BBC Radio 4's World at One programme, Sankoh denied that his men were holding U.N. personnel hostage. "That is fabrication. This is something I really have no knowledge of," he said. "He accused U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan as taking part in an "international conspiracy" with President Kabbah to keep him out of power. "(The U.N.) said the only way they could get peace in Sierra Leone is to use force and they did it by firing at my men and disarming my men forcefully. When commanders arrived to investigate, they opened fire at my men," Sankoh said, adding: "I know I have lost about seven men, but that is all I know. This is something that has been planned to destroy the reputation of the RUF."

UNAMSIL Public Information Philip Winslow rejected Thursday Foday Sankoh's denial that his RUF rebel force was holding United Nations personnel hostage. "Mr. Sankoh has denied on several occasions in the last 24 hours that he is holding any hostages," Winslow told the BBC. "His RUF, the RUF of which he is the chairman, is the group that seized our personnel, the peacekeepers." He added that on Tuesday and Tuesday night the RUF had "launched an attack on the disarmament camp where our people were at Makeni, in northern Sierra Leone." Winslow said negotiations for the hostages' release were ongoing at a number of different levels. "There is quite a lot of international pressure being brought to bear on Mr. Sankoh from various other governments trying to convince him to see the light and have these people released," he said.

Shooting heard in western Freetown Wednesday night was "accidental firing by Sierra Leonean Army personnel," BBC correspondent Lansana Fofana said on Thursday. "(UNAMSIL officials) were saying the Nigerian contingent in UNAMSIL quickly took care of the situation, and within five minutes they had contained it," Fofana said. "But then there was very heightened tension around the city. People were running around and then security was mounted. Vehicles were stopped and rigorously searched, and it actually put people on the edge." As of Thursday morning Freetown was reported to be calm.

RUF rebels have released a Malaysian U.N. military observer, Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Razak said on Thursday. Razak said Major Ganase Jaganathan was freed Wednesday night. Two other Malaysians, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamzah Bachik and naval Lieutenant-Commander Aminuddin Rashid, were still being held as of midday on Thursday. Malaysia has ten military observers attached to the UNAMSIL force in Sierra Leone. In Moscow, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said Thursday he had been given assurances by Sierra Leonean leaders that the hostages would be freed soon. A Russian foreign ministry spokesman said Ivanov was handling the issue personally after it was learned that four of the hostages were Russian members of a helicopter crew working under contract to the United Nations. In London, British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon told the House of Commons that one of the U.N. personnel detained by the RUF in Sierra Leone was a British officer. "We understand that he is safe and well," Hoon said. "No other British citizens have been detained. Negotiations are taking place on the political and diplomatic fronts to secure the safe release of all those who have been detained." A British foreign office spokesman said the British officer, a U.N. military observer, was being held with some 27 other U.N. personnel in Kailahun. "It seems the hostages are being kept in reasonable conditions," the spokesman said. "We are letting the UN take the lead in talking to the RUF but we are in constant touch with them. We are calling on the RUF's leaders to

exercise control over their forces."



Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, has condemned this week's RUF killings and abduction of U.N. personnel in Sierra Leone, and has warned of consequences. Holbrooke is currently on a five-day mission to Africa. "I think you are going to see the international community prepare a very strong and swift response against those responsible (for the Sierra Leone attacks), and we all know who they are," Holbrooke said shortly after arriving in

Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo.

Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon has denounced the "reported killings and kidnappings" of UNAMSIL personnel in Sierra Leone as "heinous crimes for which the leadership of the Revolutionary United Front must take full responsibility." Calling the RUF actions a breach of the Lomé Peace Accord, McKinnon warned that the RUF "should be left in no doubt as to the determination of the international community to stand by the people of Sierra Leone in the defence of their democracy and their legitimately elected government."




British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook issued a statement Thursday "strongly condemning" RUF attacks on United Nations forces, and pledging British support for Sierra Leone's peace process. "The leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, must order an immediate end to current violence and respect for the provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement," Cook said. "He bears a personal responsibility for his followers' actions. The

leadership of the RUF is directly accountable for the safety of those U.N. and other personnel who are currently detained. He must ensure their immediate release." Cook said he had informed U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan that Britain was prepared to increase its support for UNAMSIL. "In particular, we are willing to provide technical and logistical support to increase the mission's efficiency," he said, adding that he and Annan had agreed on the importance of a rapid deployment of peacekeeping troops not yet deployed in Sierra Leone. "The rebels appear to have chosen the transition between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL to challenge the peace process," Cook said. "They must be stopped. Britain has done more than any other country outside the region to support the peace process. A lot of progress had been made with over half the rebel forces demobilised, and most of the country brought under the control of the U.N. forces. We are determined to see the job done in the interests of the people of Sierra Leone."

National Security Advisor Sheka Mansaray said Thursday that the Sierra Leone government had appealed to the leaders of neighbouring countries and the heads of international organisations to convince RUF leader Foday Sankoh to release U.N. hostages held by his rebel group. Mansaray told the BBC the government was not in a position to use military force to bring about the hostages' release. "Under the Lomé Peace Agreement we have an obligation not to use force here any more," he said. "In fact the government has been the subject of massive disarmament by the U.N. We've disarmed many of our forces, including the regular army." Sankoh "has always believed

in shooting his way into power," Mansaray said. He's consistently tested the patience of the government, patience of the international community. He's seen nothing come out of those actions. And I think he's encouraged to continue to do that." Mansaray called for the United Nations to take action against the RUF. "Right now there is a mood of hopelessness because the people feel betrayed," he said. "There's been a number of assurances from all quarters that the people of this country will be protected. We were even encouraged to accept that the ECOMOG peacekeeping force could go without the security situation deteriorating. It's interesting that the last day the troops spent here was the day Mr. Sankoh started the attacks on the U.N. peacekeepers, because he's always said that what you do to U.N. peacekeepers is start shooting at them and then there'll be a cry for them to be withdrawn. So he's lived up to that kind of reasoning."

OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim condemned the RUF killing and abducting of U.N. peacekeepers in a statement issued on Thursday. "I wish to condemn in no uncertain terms these wanton acts," Salim said, adding that the RUF actions were in violation the RUF's obligations under of the Lomé Peace Accord. He urged the RUF to allow U.N. peacekeepers, humanitarian workers to enter areas under its control, and to pursue the path of dialogue in the peace process. Salim said the OAU would send a representative to Sierra Leone to get on on-the-spot assessment of the situation in the country.



Members of Sierra Leone's Parliament will join civil society groups in Freetown Friday for a protest march against the RUF "for their action against the peacekeeping force in the country," a parliamentary source told the Sierra Leone Web on Thursday. By voice vote Thursday, Parliament adopted by voice vote Thursday a motion expressing concern over what it called "a resumption of hostilities" by the RUF calling it a breach of the cease-fire agreement and the peace accord signed in Lomé, Togo last year. The private members motion, proposed by Hon. A.O. Bangura and seconded by Hon. Dr. Raymond S. Kamara, called on the Sierra Leone government to place RUF leader Foday Sankoh under house arrest and to restrict the movement of RUF ministers and appointees until the hostilities have ended, and to disarm all combatants within 45 days. The motion called on Parliament to enact legislation suspending "some of the privileges accorded to Mr. Foday Sankoh and other elements of the RUF by virtue of the Lomé Peace Agreement" until the RUF showed "genuine commitment to the peace process." It suggested Sankoh be invited before Parliament to explain the circumstances leading to the RUF attacks on UNAMSIL, and that the RUF leadership be held responsible for further acts of violence "and accountable to the International War Crimes Tribunal." The motion called on UNAMSIL to "forcefully disarm" combatants unwilling to disarm and join the DDR programme within 45 days, to institute cordon-and-search exercises in Freetown and in provincial headquarters "with unusual concentration of ex-combatants, and to restrict curfew hours and limit permits for street demonstrations until security was assured throughout the country. The parliamentarians called on the moral guarantors of the Lomé Peace Accord to "use their influence and good offices" to prevail on Sankoh to respect the peace agreement in view of a "series of co-ordinated attacks against UNAMSIL troops" which, they said, showed

Sankoh and his supporters "are not interested in peace but are committed to derailing the peace process and seizing power by force."



RUF leader Foday Sankoh is "definitely behind" attacks this week on U.N. personnel in Sierra Leone, the country's Permanent Representative to the United Nations told PBS Newshour on Thursday. "The United Nations knows this, that he is behind all this new outbreak," said Ambassador Ibrahim Kamara. "His people are the ones. What he does is he goes out and tells the international community, or when he's faced with the cameras, the media, he tells his fighters to disarm, and when the observers leave, he tells them something completely different. He's not a man of peace. The people know it, the U.N. knows this, the international community knows that this man is not a man of peace." Kamara said Sankoh's motive for the attacks "is rule Sierra Leone by whatever means," adding "But that will be against the wish of the people." The ambassador said the Sierra Leone government had given in to pressure from the international community to sign the Lomé Peace Accord, which gave the RUF a role in the government. "The ball now is in the court of the international community...and we are only waiting to see, because not a small man like Foday Sankoh cannot hold the world to ransom," he said.

The Libyan government said Thursday U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan had requested President Muammar al-Qadhafi to intervene to help free U.N. personnel held hostage by the RUF in Sierra Leone. "As a result, the Great Jamahiriya had carried out contacts with the parties concerned in the [crisis in] Sierra Leone, where the government said that the RUF had abducted 50 UN troops. However, the RUF Chairman Foday Sankoh noted that he was not aware of the abductions," the Libyan news agency said. "Therefore, the secretary of the General People's Committee for African Unity will leave immediately for Sierra Leone to deal with the issue."

Human Rights Watch condemned this week's killings and hostage-taking of U.N. personnel in Sierra Leone, but noted that civilians had been enduring similar abuses from rebels for several years. "Human Rights Watch opposed the amnesty (provision of the Lomé Peace Accord) because we feared that impunity for such atrocities would only breed more atrocities," the group said in a statement on Thursday. "Events of this week have only confirmed our fears. Peter Takirambudde, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch's Africa Division, said RUF leader Foday Sankoh should be held responsible for the actions of troops under his effective command. He called Colonel Augustine Gbao, an RUF commander in the Makeni region where the U.N. killings took place, one of Sankoh's leading deputies.



2 May: United Nations officials have reacted angrily to a series of RUF attacks this week on United Nations peacekeepers, and the abduction of at least 17 UNAMSIL personnel in northern and eastern Sierra Leone. On Monday, about 100 RUF troops led by a self-styled colonel surrounded a disarmament camp at Makeni and demanded the U.N. turn over ten RUF fighters who voluntarily disarmed last week, UNAMSIL Public Information Officer Philip Winslow told the



BBC on Tuesday. When an unarmed U.N. military observer refused to turn over the men, who in fact had already left the area, "the RUF became quite menacing and they threatened to burn down the camp," Winslow said. The RUF officer, identified as Colonel Gbao, forced the U.N. observer into a car and took him away. Two other military observers and four soldiers from UNAMSIL's Kenyan battalion were detained as well, Winslow added. UNAMSIL force commander Major-General Vijay Jetley (pictured right) told reporters in Freetown that the abducted military observers included a Gambian, a Malaysian and a Norwegian. On Tuesday, Winslow said, RUF rebels surrounded a U.N. helicopter at Kailahun and took away five civilian personnel, including the two-man flight crew. Another seven U.N. peacekeepers were captured in the area after the rebels erected a roadblock, according to U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Hedi Annabe. A source in Freetown told the Sierra Leone Web late Tuesday that the helicopter had been on a special mission to pay UNAMSIL staff in Bo, Kenema, Kono, Daru and Kailahun. Among those detained, the source said, was UNAMSIL Finance Officer Abebe Dubenru, an Ethiopian national. He cited an unconfirmed report that UNAMSIL's team leader in Kailahun is among those being held by the RUF. In the latest incident, RUF fighters and Kenyan troops exchanged fire in Magburaka Tuesday when the rebels attempted to seize the peacekeepers' weapons, a U.N. spokesman said in New York. Two U.N. soldiers were reported wounded in the incident. Jetley said UNAMSIL had protested to RUF leader Foday Sankoh, who denied the incidents had occurred. "It seems as if Foday Sankoh is trying to derail the peace process," Jetley said. "We are not in Sierra Leone to fight, but I am appealing to the combatants not to continuously push us into a corner...If negotiations fail, military action will be taken to get the men released."



The United Nations Security Council, which met in special session Tuesday afternoon following reports of RUF attacks on U.N. personnel in Sierra Leone, has condemned "in strongest terms the hostile and destructive" actions against U.N. peacekeepers. In a presidential statement read out following the meeting, Security Council President for May, Ambassador Wang Yingfan of China, expressed members' "grave concerns" over the incidents. Meanwhile, a U.N. spokesman said Tuesday U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan was "deeply disturbed" about the RUF's attacks on U.N. civilian and military personnel. "The secretary-general condemns these outrageous and criminal acts against U.N. peacekeepers and calls upon the leadership of the RUF, in particular Mr. Foday Sankoh, to cease these acts immediately," the spokesman said.

The Sierra Leone government has denounced what it called "indiscriminate violence perpetrated by some misguided ex-combatants" this week against United Nations peacekeeping troops in Sierra Leone. In a statement submitted to the U.N. Security Council on Thursday, the government noted that UNAMSIL had been given a mandate to use force to protect the people of Sierra Leone from physical violence. While the force had exercised "considerable restraint," the statement asserted, UNAMSIL had the means and the capability to discharge its responsibilities." The government statement warned that future violations of the Lomé Peace Accord would be dealt with "immediately and appropriately," and that those responsible would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

The ECOMOG force completed its final withdrawal from Sierra Leone on Tuesday, ending nearly three years of involvement in the country's civil conflict. "We are leaving Sierra Leone with optimism that the world has heard the cry of the people of your country," ECOMOG force commander Major-General Gabriel Kpamber told President Kabbah in a farewell ceremony on Monday. "Anyone who attempts to derail the peace process will not succeed." ECOMOG intervened in Sierra Leone in 1997, shortly after the coup which brought the AFRC military junta to power. In October 1997 the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on the junta, and delegated to ECOMOG the task of enforcing an arms and fuel embargo against Sierra Leone. In February 1998, ECOMOG moved to oust the junta from power and restored President Kabbah's civilian government, which had been operating from exile in Guinea. The under-equipped ECOMOG force was unable to achieve a military victory in the provinces, however, and in late 1998 it was forced to retreat in the face of a rebel counter-offensive. In January 1999 the rebels used human shields to break through ECOMOG's defences, and launched an attack on the capital which devastated much of eastern and central Freetown. ECOMOG reinforcements finally succeeded in driving the rebels from the city. More recently, ECOMOG has provided security in Freetown and has worked with the UNAMSIL force to disarm Sierra Leone's warring factions.



Freetown's historic City Hotel was gutted by fire early Tuesday, according to police sources. Reuters quoted police as saying a Sierra Leonean and a Lebanese national were killed, and four others seriously injured. The fire was apparently caused by a "naked lamp," Reuters said. City Hotel, which dates back to the 1920s, had become dilapidated in recent years and was badly in need of repair. The hotel, Sierra Leone's oldest, was a favorite hangout for British expatriates during the colonial era. Graham Greene wrote one of his best-known works, the 1948 novel *The Heart of the Matter*, while staying at the hotel.

A Nigerian UNAMSIL sergeant shot by AFRC rebels while on patrol near Rogbere Junction on Sunday was sent home Monday for treatment, Reuters reported. A U.N. spokeswoman in New York said the soldier remained in critical but stable condition.



1 May: National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) Executive Secretary Dr. Francis Kai-Kai said Monday that RUF insistence they be given a wide range of government posts before they would agree to hand in their weapons were not new, but he warned that the demands "will stall the (disarmament) process if they really want to push it too much." Kai-Kai noted that provisions were made in the Lomé Peace Agreement for some positions to be given to the RUF, and said the government was trying to address these. "I know that the issue is being discussed between (RUF leader) Chairman Sankoh and His Excellency the president," he told the BBC. "These are issues they are discussing. It's really at their level." Kai-Kai also played down concerns over a security vacuum following the final withdrawal of the ECOMOG force. "The withdrawal plan of ECOMOG was already foreseen," he said. "Yes, there are some concerns being raised but as far as we know UNAMSIL is also bringing in more troops and they are deploying them. And

UNAMSIL has made an undertaking to take over the security of the state and also the protection of government and civilians."

Rebel AFRC soldiers ambushed a ten-member Nigerian UNAMSIL patrol near Port Loko early Sunday, disarming the peacekeepers after shooting their sergeant, UNAMSIL Public Information Officer Philip Winslow said on Monday. Winslow told the BBC the incident took place near the AFRC's Okra Hills base, where there had been a great deal of banditry and attacks on civilians by AFRC rebels. "Four of the peacekeepers held a position on the main road and six others then went about 700 meters into bush, and the purpose was to block this track back to the main road so that the bandits could not then reach back to the main road," Winslow said. "Once they had got in there they found lying in wait about 100 heavily-armed AFRC rebels, and so our six soldiers found themselves surrounded. The rebels then approached Nigerian sergeant who was leading the UNAMSIL patrol, and demanded that he surrender his weapon. The sergeant refused to surrender his weapon and the rebels subsequently shot him twice, once in the chest and once in one leg. When one of the other peacekeepers went to summon help, the other four [soldiers] found themselves completely surrounded by a numerically superior force and they were overpowered and their weapons confiscated." Winslow said all of the UNAMSIL troops had been released. The wounded sergeant was admitted to hospital in Freetown, where he is in stable condition with a punctured lung and a severe wound in one leg. "This is the first time that a UNAMSIL soldier has been directly attacked, so it's a very serious situation indeed," Winslow said. He warned that UNAMSIL had no intention of abandoning its patrols in the area. "We're here to try to keep these roads open and that's what we intend to do," he said. A U.N. spokesman in New York said UNAMSIL had protested the incident to President Kabbah and to AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma, who is now chairman of the government's Commission for the Consolidation of Peace.

AFRC commander Lieutenant-Colonel George "Junior Lion" Johnson, who was wounded Friday in a shootout with ECOMOG troops in Freetown, is "still alive and responding to treatment" at a military hospital in Wilberforce, a source in Freetown told the Sierra Leone Web on Monday. Johnson's driver was killed in the incident. The clash occurred after the AFRC soldiers refused to turn over two vehicles, allegedly seized from departing ECOMOG troops, to six Nigerian soldiers sent to retrieve them. AFRC soldiers reportedly went on a rampage, smashing windshields and threatening retribution, until UNAMSIL troops deployed to calm the situation. Meanwhile, RUF leader Foday Sankoh blamed ECOMOG for Friday's clash. "This is a violation of the cease-fire, killing people in Freetown," Sankoh told reporters.

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UNCHR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Sierra Leone (Nov 98)

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Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Sierra Leone

UNHCR
Centre for Documentation and Research
Geneva, November 1998

This information paper was prepared in the Country Information Unit of UNHCR's Centre for Documentation and Research on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment, in collaboration with the UNHCR Statistical Unit. All sources are cited. This paper is not, and does not, purport to be, fully exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

PREFACE

Sierra Leone has been an important source country of refugees and asylum-seekers over a number of years. This paper seeks to define the scope, destination, and causes of their flight.

The first and second part of the paper contains information regarding the conditions in the country of origin, which are often invoked by asylum-seekers when submitting their claim for refugee status. The Country Information Unit of UNHCR's Centre for Documentation and Research (CDR) conducts its work on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment, with all sources cited.

In the third part, the paper provides a statistical overview of refugees and asylum-seekers from Sierra Leone in the main European asylum countries, describing current trends in the number and origin of asylum requests as well as the results of their status determination. The data are derived from government statistics made available to UNHCR and are compiled by its Statistical Unit.

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Bibliography

Acronyms

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	All-Peoples Congress
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
SLPP	Sierra Leonean People's Party
UNPP	United National People's Party
RSLMF	Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force
RUF	Revolutionary United Front

1. Country Profile of Sierra Leone

1.1 Basic Country Information

The republic of Sierra Leone is located on the West Coast of the African continent surrounded by Guinea to the north, Liberia to the southeast and the Atlantic Ocean. It covers an area of 71,740 sq. km. (Encyclopedia of the Third World, 1992, 1711). The country is divided administratively in three provinces: eastern, southern and northern provinces plus one area known as the western peninsula in which the capital Freetown is located. According to the last national census in 1985, the country's population was 3,515,812. In 1995, estimates of Sierra Leone's population amounted to 4,509,000 inhabitants (Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 903).

Of the 13 indigenous ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, the two main ones are the southern-based Mende and the Temne who live mainly in the north, together constituting about one third of the population (Pitsch, A., 1997, 2). The Limba constitute less than 10 per cent of the population and they co-exist with the Temne in the north. The Mende and the Temne have different attitudes towards the other neighbouring ethnic groups. The Mende have influenced the smaller ethnic groups to the extent that languages of the Sherbo, Krim Vai, Gola and Kissi are all in various stages of retreat. The Temne have been fairly liberal and the Limba, Koranko, Loko, Yalunka and Susu continue to speak their own language and hold to their own traditions (Freetown, J., 1996, 2). Krios, constituting about 3 per cent of the total population, are descendants from the freed slaves (Pitsch, A., 1997, 1). The Krios were widely used by the colonial administration and assimilated British education and culture, distancing themselves from the rest of the local population (World Directory of Minorities, 1997, 451). However, their influence in politics has gradually been decreasing since independence (Freetown, J., 1996, 2).

Although the two most important political parties, the All-Peoples Congress (APC) and the Sierra Leonean People's Party (SLPP) have their main support base in the two main ethnic groups, ethnicity has not had any major influence in Sierra Leonean politics to date (Pitsch, A., 1997, 2).

Cultural elements cross the boundaries between the different ethnic groups in Sierra Leone. While English is the official language, *Krio* is spoken by all ethnic groups and it acts as a unifying factor among the different ethnic groups of Sierra Leone (Freetown, J., 1996, 2). Inter-marriage is very common and traditional religious beliefs prevail in all ethnic groups.

It is estimated that 50 to 70 per cent of the population follow traditional religious beliefs, 25 to 40 per cent adhere to Islam and 5 per cent are Christians, mainly descended from freed slaves (Encyclopedia of the Third World, 1992, 1715; Contemporary Religions, A World Guide, 1992, 464). The traditional religions follow a belief in charms, medicine men, divination and witchcraft and they are often related to secret societies (Ibid.). All the heads of government until 1992 have been Christian (Ibid.). Nevertheless, leaders from the three main religious groups (Muslim, Christian and traditional belief) united in a public statement condemning the military overthrow in May 1997 of the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone (Christian Aid, 29 May, 1997 [internet]).

The economy of Sierra Leone has been marked by a decline in growth since the 1960s, and severe stagnation and recession since the early 1980s. The World Bank put the country's average GDP growth rate between 1980 and 1990 at 0.6 per cent, decreasing to -3.3 per cent between 1990 and 1996 (The World Bank, 1998), falling to -3.6 per cent in 1996 (Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 43). This sharp economic decline is generally attributed to the internal conflict since 1991 and economic mismanagement during the 1970s and 1980s (Ibid., 45). In 1994, Sierra Leone recorded a trade deficit of US\$72.7 m. (Europe World Year Book 1998, 1998, 2977).

Sierra Leone is rich in minerals, the most important being gold, diamonds, bauxite and rutile (The Stateman's Yearbook, 1998-99, 1998, 1236). Rutile and bauxite production contributed approximately 80% of Sierra Leone's foreign-exchange earning before the war forced the mines in the south of the country to close in January 1995 (EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 43). The exploitation of the country's mineral resources has experienced serious setbacks by the fighting, which has compelled companies to stop production. Although some multinational companies did resume production in 1997, the mining sector as a whole will probably not recover speedily (Ibid.). The economy is, however, dominated by agriculture, which in 1994/95 was responsible for 49% of the GDP (The Stateman's Yearbook, 1998-99, 1998, 1236; EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 43).

Despite the massive potential wealth, Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking lowest in the human development index (United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report, 1997, 1998). Life expectancy at birth was 33.6 years in 1997 and adult illiteracy is estimated between 64% and 69% (Ibid.; National Human Development Report, 1996, 11; The World Guide 1997/98, 1997, 498).

1.2 Historical Overview

Colonial Period

Freetown, on the Sierra Leone peninsula, was established by Great Britain in 1787 as a settlement for freed slaves and was administered by the Sierra Leone Company (Freetown, J., 1996, 4; Encyclopedia of the Third World, 1992, 1715). During the next twenty years, former slaves from Britain, North America, the Caribbean and recaptives from slave ships were settled there (Ibid.). Freetown became a British Crown Colony in 1808, and thereafter colonial administrators, teachers and missionaries were installed (Ibid.). The indigenous kingdoms in the hinterland of Sierra Leone stayed unaffected by the development of Freetown until 1896 when they were joined and declared a British protectorate (Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 903; EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 40).

Freetown and the hinterland were governed as two different political entities; the former directly under British administration and the latter through indirect rule with selected chiefs acceptable to the British colonial administration (Freetown, J., 1996, 5). It was not before 1951 that the two entities were administratively joined together by a unitary constitution. However, the historical difference in the administration still prevails. The western part of the country, the peninsula containing the capital Freetown is governed by a city government whereas the three provinces are each headed by a minister of state and the districts within the provinces are administered directly by the central government in Freetown (Encyclopedia of the Third World, 1992, 1717).

Post-Independence period

Sierra Leone became independent on the 27 April 1961 as a constitutional monarchy within the Commonwealth (Europa World Year Book 1998, 1998, 2972). The first constitutional elections were held in 1962, at which the Sierra Leonean People's Party (SLPP) won the majority of votes (Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East, 1993, 245). The winning party, conceived as right-wing, had been created in 1951 by Sir Milton Margai, Sierra Leone's first Prime minister (Political and Economic Encyclopaedia of Africa, 1993, 245). The SLPP held power until the general elections of 1967, which were won by the opposition All-People's Congress (APC) party, a left-wing party, created in 1960 by Dr Siaka Stevens (Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East, 1993, 246).

The APC was prevented, however, from governing by the first military *coup d'etat* in 1967, until a *counter coup d'etat* in April 1968 restored civilian rule, with the APC's Dr Siaka Stevens as Prime minister (Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 903).

In 1971, Sierra Leone was proclaimed a republic and a new republican constitution was adopted in which the head of state, Dr Siaka Stevens, became executive president (Freetown, J., 1996, 6). Due to irregularities during the legislative elections in 1973, they were boycotted by the opposition. Thus, Sierra Leone became a de facto one-party state. In a new constitution adopted in 1978, the one-party rule became official and the APC became the only legitimate political party (Encyclopedia of the Third World, 1992, 1715). Dr Siaka Stevens retained the presidential power until 1985 when the cabinet minister and commander of the armed forces, Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh was nominated by the APC to succeed Dr Siaka Stevens as president (Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 904).

The 1980s were characterised by recurrent financial crises and corruption scandals. A state-of-emergency rule was regularly imposed, often to suppress general strikes and civil unrest such as occurred in 1987, when public workers went on strike to protest against the non-payment of their salaries (Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 904).

The high level of corruption in Sierra Leone is said to be attributable to the distribution of state resources. To gain and retain political power, political leaders reportedly created a network of supporters on the basis of the personal distribution of state resources (Richards, P., 1996, 34). Strong patron-client ties were developed after independence and increased in the 1970s. In the early 1970s, President Siaka Stevens is said to have used up to 70 per cent of state revenues for "preferred (untaxed) concessions in diamond mining areas to political allies who were essential to his effort to resist local demands for greater revenue allocations" (Reno, W., 1997, 18). President Momoh was subsequently not able to change this well established system which functioned without reference to principles of accountability or a rational bureaucratic system (Richards, P., 1996, xviii). President Momoh faced business men with allegedly strong connections in the political sphere who would not permit any effort to strengthen the state bureaucracy. A 1987 business backed attempt to overthrow President Momoh discouraged further initiatives in this area (Reno, W., 1997, 18).

In the early 1990s, following popular demands for a multi party system and democracy, the APC-led government undertook a review of the constitution (Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 904). A new constitution was formally adopted in September 1991 by the government which provided for the restoration of a plural political system (Europa World Year Book 1998, 1998, 2972, 2973).

It was, however, suspended after the 29 April 1992 *coup d'etat*, led by a group of young army officers, who elevated the 27-year-old Captain Valentine Strasser to the position of head of state (ibid.). A National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was subsequently established, which declared a state of emergency, and governed by decree (EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 41).

Captain Strasser was deposed in January 1996 by military officers led by Captain Julius Maada Bio who scheduled presidential and legislative elections for the following month (ibid.). The presidential and legislative elections, monitored by international observers, had 13 political parties participating. It was the reconstituted SLPP who took most seats in the election for the parliament (27 seats out of 68) and their presidential candidate Ahmed Tejan Kabbah won 59.5% of the votes in the second round (Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 906) against the candidate John Karefa Smart from the United National People's Party (UNPPP), which came second after the SLPP in the parliamentary elections. The government was formed by SLPP, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), which had

obtained 15.3% of the vote, and the Democratic Center Party (DCP) with 4.8 % (Derksen, W., 25 October 1998 [Internet]). The government is said to be more broad-based than previously, with the Mende ethnic group in the minority (Carver, R., 1998). Although the elections were boycotted by the movement Revolutionary United Front, rebels, who had been fighting against the central authorities since 1991, and violent incidents took place, international observers recognised the elections as fair and found "no irregularity or fraud ... that would cast into doubt the ultimate outcome of the vote" (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1996).

1.3 Background to the Current Conflict

It has been suggested that the war in Sierra Leone should be understood as a breakdown in law and order and not as a civil war (Freetown, J., 1996, 9). A special feature of the Sierra Leonean conflict which distinguishes it from many other recent internal conflicts is that the fighting parties do not identify themselves with a specific ethnic group. Therefore it can be seen as a conflict not based on ethnicity (Richards, P., 1996, xix; Cruvellier, T., 1996, 87; Abraham, A., 1997, 107). Although relations between ethnic groups are held to be competitive, there is little ethnic strife in Sierra Leone (Freetown, J., 1996, 2).

The conflict in Sierra Leone began in March 1991 when armed combatants crossed the border from Liberia into the South-Eastern part of the country, attacking and subsequently occupying the border town of Bomary in Kailahun District (Muana, P., 1997, 77).

The attack has been variously attributed to a "spill over" of the Liberian civil war (Carver, R., 1997, 1) organised by Charles Taylor, at that time a faction leader in Liberia, after the Sierra Leone regime joined the ECOMOG forces which tried to bring to an end the fighting in Liberia (Freetown, J., 1996, 7). Other sources indicate that the rebels were members of the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF) movement (Abraham, A., 1997, 101). Most observers, however, suggest a combination of the two. In this view, a number of Sierra Leonean opposition groups had existed for a long period in neighbouring countries even before December 1989, when the Liberian civil war began, ostensibly united and armed by Charles Taylor (Alao, A., 1998, 2; Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 907). The closeness and association between the Sierra Leonean and Liberian rebels has been traced back, by observers, to the joint military training they received in Benghazi, Libya in the 1980s. (Richards, P., 1996, 2). Among them was the RUF leader Foday Sankoh, a former corporal in the national army of Sierra Leone who was jailed for seven years for plotting to overthrow the regime in 1971. (Ibid.). The attack caught the national army, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) unprepared: it was ill-equipped, badly trained and highly politicised (Freetown, J., 1996, 7).

In retaliation, the government of Monoh increased the number of soldiers enrolled in the armed forces sharply. The armed forces rose from 3,000 to 14,000 men in the first two years of the conflict and expenditures of the conflict accounted for 75% of state spending (Reno, W., 1997, 19). A few months after the first attack, the RUF controlled one fifth of the country in the South-East region. In a counter offensive, the army (RSLMF) joined its forces with ULIMO (the United Liberian Movement for Democracy), an armed faction fighting against Charles Taylor's faction, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF) and active in the border region between Liberia and Sierra Leone (Richards, P., 1996, 5ff). Nigeria and Guinea also contributed with military support (Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 907). This collaboration eventually placed the RUF in an inferior position. The next major advance by the RUF was in the autumn of 1992, when they launched attacks on economic targets in the diamond-rich Kono district (Africa Confidential, 27 April 1998 [Internet]).

In Freetown, the APC-led government had been overthrown by a group of junior officers in April 1992, the army was re-equipped and the subsequent fighting caused major losses among RUF combatants (Ibid.). In turn, the RUF changed its tactics. With the objective of avoiding established settlements which could easily be identified, several bush camps were built where young conscripts received military and ideological training. When the armed forces managed to recapture some of the locations in the diamond-rich area of Pendemby, Kailahun and Koidu in late 1993, a new party in the war entered the scene: local civil defence forces, also known as *Kamajors* which had clashes with the army (Richards, P., 1996, 13ff).

In 1994, RUF launched a major campaign involving attacks on several locations in the country within very short intervals. New RUF camps were established during this campaign. The civil defence forces became very important in the effort to protect the civilians. In Bo, controlled by the army, a civil defence force patrolled in the streets at night and also tried to take control of the town (Ibid.).

The military situation was now in favour of the RUF. The advancement of the RUF had cut the government off its major source of revenue: the diamond trade. The RUF had attacked and shut down the Sierra Rutile and SIEROMCO plants in January 1995 (Reno, W., 1997, 20). The government then turned to foreign mercenary companies for arms force. Executive Outcomes from South Africa was identified. The military operations of Executive Outcomes were linked to a business branch exploiting the diamonds of Sierra Leone. The revenue generated from the sale of the diamonds enabled the payment of Executive Outcomes. This strategy changed the military balance at the war front and the RUF rebels were repelled from the diamond mining areas by mid-1995 (Reno, W., 1997, 21-22). The mercenaries from Executive Outcomes, assisted by the civil defence groups, worked 22 months in Sierra Leone (Alao, A., 1998, 6; Shearer, D., 1998, 49).

These successful attacks on the RUF were followed by a number of RUF captives surrendering to the army. The fact that the armed forces treated them well, constituted a danger to the RUF who then initiated a new wave of atrocities against the civilians (Richards, P., 1996, 17). Apart from the surrender of smaller groups, the RUF also suffered major losses on the battlefield. Of the total number of rebels, estimated at 1,500, one-third were reportedly killed (Reno, W., 1997, 22). The change in the military balance was followed by free multiparty elections in March 1996, the first since 1973 (Ibid.).

Attempts to reach a peace settlement had stalled because of the government's demand for peace before negotiations, while the RUF insisted on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country (Richards, P., 1996, 17). A peace agreement was eventually signed on 30 November 1996 in Abidjan between the government of President Kabbah and the RUF (United Nations Security Council, S/1997/80, 26 January 1997), who had been assisted in the effort by representatives of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Richards, P., 1996, 18; Alao, A., 1998, 4). The agreement provided, *inter alia*, for the transformation of RUF into a political party (EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 40). However, the restoration of peace was problematic as violence reportedly continued to be inflicted by rebels, soldiers or *sobels*, the latter said to be men who were allegedly soldiers by day and rebels at night (Abraham, A., 1997, 103). The peace process collapsed completely in March 1997, when RUF leader Foday Sankoh was arrested on charges of arms trafficking in Nigeria (EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 41).

Civilians organise themselves

The armed forces did not provide protection to the civilians nor did the RUF although it stated its intention to liberate the Sierra Leonean people (Abraham, A., 1997, 101). The civilian population had been targeted by both fighting parties since the beginning of the conflict and the lack of protection became self-evident. This led in early 1994 traditional institutions such as local paramount chiefs, men's secret societies and traditional hunter/warriors to initiate their own protection of the civilian population (Freetown, J., 1996, 8). According to the US Department of State Country Report on Sierra Leone, three civil defence groups were active: Mende Kamajohs, Temne Kapras and Koranko Tamaboros. Like the RSLMF, they were not fully under government control (U.S. Department of State Sierra Leone Country Report for Human Rights Practices 1997, 1998). Local militias based on traditional institutions in the provincial towns of Bo and Kenema started to cooperate with foreign troops from Nigeria and Guinea to ensure the protection of the civilians (Ibid.).

Links between the two fighting parties: RUF and RSLMF

The relationship between the two chief contenders in the conflict, the RUF and the national army, is said to have become increasingly intertwined and ultimately led to their fusion. In May 1997, the combined forces overthrew the fourteen-month-old democratically elected government of president Kabbah (Alao, A., 1998, 4). The union was formalised officially by the new leader, Major Johnny Paul Koroma who appointed RUF leader Foday Sankoh Vice President and invited all RUF rebels to join the new administration (Ibid.). The new leaders established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) comprising members of the RUF and the army (Abdullah, I., 1997, 6).

The collaboration between the army and the RUF is emphasised by many observers (Richards, P., 1996; Alao, A., 1998; Abraham, A., 1997; Reno, W., 1997, de Waal, A., 1997). Allegedly, it started already in the beginning of the RUF rebellion when rebels were said to have transmitted political messages, encouraging the overthrow of the APC government, to the soldiers at the war front (RUF/SL paper, 1995, 8). The leaders of the military takeover were a group of discontented officers who had arrived in Freetown from the fighting against the RUF in the Southeast of the country. It has been suggested that they had been in contact with RUF, initiating a secret "collaboration agreement" between the two warring parties (Abraham, A., 1997, 103). According to various sources, the *sobel* phenomenon was an aspect of this collaboration (Richards, P., 1996; Alao, A., 1998; Abraham, A., 1997; Reno, W., 1997; de Waal, A., 1997). The term *sobel*s was invented by Sierra Leonean villagers to designate the fact that a clear distinction between soldiers and rebels had ceased to exist (de Waal, A., 1997, 305; Abraham, A., 1997, 103).

The soldiers and the rebels had common economic interests. The low paid soldiers at the war front were neglected by their colleagues in NPRC in Freetown and the complicity between the rebels and the soldiers was both a question of survival as it was a will to pursue personal economic gain in the diamond mines (Richards, P., 1996, 10, 23; Africa Confidential, 27 April 1998). The *sobel*s would loot civilian properties and commit similar atrocities as the rebels in order to shift the blame to the RUF (Ibid.).

The NPRC government (in power from 1992 to 1996) incorporated one of RUFs major tactics in the conflict: the conscription of the youth. Thus, both parties made extensive use of child soldiers in the fighting (Africa Confidential, 27 April 1998 [internet]; Richards, P., 1996, 9,10).

Regional Peace-Keeping Efforts: ECOMOG

Created in August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was conceived as a multilateral regional peacekeeping force to intervene in Liberia's civil war. From the beginning, it was dominated by Anglophone West African States, in particular Nigeria, who contributed the majority of troops, materials and finances (OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa (IRIN-WA), 5 February 1998, 1 [Internet]). During the mission in Liberia, Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone and several other African states also supplied troops, adding to a total of 15,000 soldiers at the height of the mission. In October 1990, ECOMOG succeeded in expelling the National Patriotic Front for Liberia, led by Charles Taylor, from the country. In successive years, ECOMOG gradually drove the Taylor faction out of Liberia. The force gained a bad reputation in Liberia, where they are thought to have attacked and looted humanitarian convoys (International Crisis Group, March 1998, 6 [Internet]). It also assisted the demobilisation process and monitored elections in Liberia in July 1997.

ECOMOG troops had used Freetown as a rear base since almost the start of the Liberian intervention. Moreover, Nigerian forces have been based in Sierra Leone as part of a bilateral defence pact (Africa South of the Sahara, 1998, 117). After the *coup d'état* of 25 May 1997, additional Nigerian troops, which had been serving in Liberia under ECOMOG's mandate, arrived in order to drive the RUF out of Sierra Leone. On 28 May 1997, Freetown came under naval bombardment in an attempt by the Nigerian armed forces to put down the *coup d'état* - under ECOMOG's auspices, also reinforced by troops sent from Guinea and Ghana (Pitsch, A., 1997, 11 [Internet]) Although ECOMOG's involvement was supported both by the OAU and the UN from July 1997 onwards, many commentators criticised what they saw as 'a Nigerian unilateral initiative which [...] had contradicted the humanitarian nature of the force's mandate (Africa South of the Sahara, 1998, 117).

After a peace plan for Sierra Leone had been drawn up by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ministers of foreign affairs in Conakry (Guinea) at the end of June 1997, ECOMOG's mandate was extended to Sierra Leone on 29/30 August 1997. The ultimate aim of the peace agreement was to remove the junta from power, be it by dialogue, sanctions or force. To this end, ECOMOG's mandate consisted of enforcing the economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS, namely an air, land and sea blockade (Economic Community of West African States, 23 October 1997 [Internet]). There was, however, no specification as to the time limitation for sanctions before considering military force (Ibid.).

On 27 October 1997, after the peace agreement between AFRC representatives and the ECOWAS Committee was signed, ECOMOG became a regular peacekeeping force (OCHA IRIN-WA, 5 February 1998, 3 [Internet]).

On 5 February 1998, ECOMOG invaded Freetown unilaterally in order to overthrow the junta. During the period between the intervention and the return of president Kabbah on 10 March 1998, ECOMOG effectively acted as an interim government. The re-instatement of the Kabbah government by the ECOMOG intervention has provoked different reactions: although the overthrow of the junta has generally been welcomed and the intervention has been accepted as a *fait accompli* by the UN, the CAU, the US and the UK (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 27), several African states questioned its legitimacy, alleging 'that the offensive was unilaterally initiated at the behest of the Nigerian government' (Ibid.). Furthermore, some observers hold that Nigeria's commitment might also be a means of diverting attention from Nigeria's own military regime (Carver, R., 1998, 8). In any case, ECOMOG's presence in Sierra Leone will certainly contribute to Nigeria's position as a regional peacekeeping force (Ibid., 7): on 24 June 1998, more Nigerian troops were moved from Liberia to Sierra Leone in anticipation of the relocation of the headquarters of ECOMOG from Monrovia to Freetown (Panafrikan News Agency, 24 June 1998 [Internet]), totalling some 10.000 troops in Sierra Leone, 90% of which are Nigerian nationals.

1.4 RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

On 25 May 1997, the government was overthrown by a *coup d'état* led by Major Johnny Paul Koromah, ostensibly because of President Kabbah's failure to implement the peace agreement with RUF and his alleged 'ethnic favouritism' (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 11). The *coup d'état* has been described as 'unprecedented in the history of Africa in terms of violence involved' (Abdullah, I., 1997, 5) and led to a total collapse of the judiciary as many judges, attorneys and police officers fled the country. As a quick replacement, Major Koromah's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) created 'People's Revolutionary Courts' led by people with little or no legal training. The court suspended the constitution and parliament, banned political parties, public meetings and demonstrations and imposed rule by decree (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 11). Later, the RUF joined forces with the AFRC. During the period of RUF/AFRC rule, gross and widespread human rights violations were committed (Amnesty International, 20 October 1997, 2 [Internet])

The international refusal to recognise AFRC rule was, however, unanimous, and various groups of countries, including the OAU and the UN, supported ECOWAS efforts to resolve the crisis (Carver, R., 1998, 4). Under a committee of four ECOWAS foreign ministers (Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria, with Liberia added later), an agreement for peace-talks was reached on 18 July 1997. On 23 October 1997, a regionally backed agreement to restore constitutional rule in Sierra Leone by April 1998 was signed in Conakry, Guinea. This included 'an immediate cease-fire and disarmament, the return of refugees and displaced people; a programme of humanitarian assistance; the return of an expanded Kabbah government; and the immunities and guarantees for acts carried out during the period the AFRC was in power' (Economic Community of West African States, 23 October 1997). As time passed, however, the AFRC showed itself increasingly unwilling to adhere to the agreement and relinquish its power. In particular, the AFRC questioned the legitimacy of ECOMOG presence in Sierra Leone on the grounds of the high percentage of Nigerian troops within ECOMOG, and demanded that the AFRC/RUF forces be recognised as legitimate national army, as well as the release of RUF leader Foday Sankoh from a Nigerian prison. Thus, the deadline for return to civilian rule was unlikely to be met.

On 5 February 1998, after RUF fighters blocking the road to Freetown had demanded the immediate release of Foday Sankoh, large-scale fighting erupted between ECOMOG and RUF/AFRC forces - who dubbed themselves the 'People's Army' - at the outskirts of Freetown. ECOMOG, acting unilaterally under command of Nigerian Major-General Timothy Shelpidi, initially claimed to be acting out of self-defence (International Crisis Group (ICG), March 1998, 5 [Internet]), but acknowledged after five days of heavy artillery bombardment that its attack was 'an all-out offensive intended to flush the junta out of the capital' (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 25; ICG, March 1998, 5 [Internet]). As the junta gradually retreated from Freetown, they engaged in massive looting and burning, threatening and terrorising citizens they passed (ICG, March 1998, 6 [Internet], EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter

1998, p.25). More than 100 civilian deaths have been confirmed for this period (Carver, R., 1998, p.5). Contrary to the expectations of many, ECOMOG reportedly behaved in a relatively disciplined manner (Carver, R., 1998, 5; ICG, March 1998, 6) and had secured most of the Freetown peninsula by 16 February (ICG, March 1998, 6 [Internet]). Fighting continued in major towns in the provinces, where the retreating RUF - and sometimes the *Kamajors* - inflicted 'widespread damage, shooting at random and looting wildly' (ICG, March 1998, 8 [Internet]). However, ECOMOG had gained control over almost all major cities by early March 1998 (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 27). Thousands of civilian refugees fled to neighbouring Guinea and Liberia, whose refugee camps were already overcrowded (Ibid.).

Fierce fighting between ECOMOG and RUF forces has reportedly continued in the north and east of Sierra Leone since February 1998. ECOMOG, with the help of Kamajor fighters, is said to have gained control over the cities of Bo, Makeni and Kenema by early March, but fighting continued at Koidu. However, the RUF has not yet given up and continues to spread violence near the Malal Hills, attacking the main roads between Freetown and the Provinces. Other RUF groups are said to be present in the south-eastern part of Koindangu District and in northern Kailahun, where both groups are 'poised to harass the rich diamond-mining areas around the town of Koidu in Kono District (EIU Country Report, 3rd quarter 1998, 26). The RUF/AFRC forces appear to number 7000, with the AFRC representing only ten per cent of the rebels' overall strength (Ibid.) and with up to 80 per cent said to be children between seven and 14 years of age (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 29). However, ECOMOG has also increased its strength: in June 1998, more Nigerian troops were reportedly moved from Liberia to Sierra Leone. More troops were expected from Gambia and Guinea, bringing the total of ECOMOG troops to 10,000 soldiers, of which 6,000 are reportedly from Nigeria (Panafrikan News Agency, 24 June 1998 [Internet]).

As of October 1998, fighting continued also in the northern part of Sierra Leone, namely in Kambia District, where more than 50 people died in clashes between Guinean ECOMOG and AFRC/RUF rebels (Sierra Leone News, 4 October 1998 [Internet]). In the town of Mange, 90 miles north of Freetown, more than 25 people died as a result of rebel attacks (Ibid., 9 October 1998[Internet]) Furthermore, the RUF still maintains important bases at Koindu, Kailahun and Gangagama (Ibid., 15 October 1998 [Internet]), and is in virtual control of Kono District (Ibid., 13 October 1998 [Internet]).

On 4 October, the rebels called on the government to participate in peace talks mediated by either the United Nations or the Commonwealth. The initiation of talks, however, hinges on RUF's willingness to accept the Commonwealth's terms for talks, which call on the RUF 'to recognise the legitimacy of President Kabbah's government, to accept an unconditional and indefinite cessation of hostilities, and to enter into talks to bring about an immediate end to the conflict' (Sierra Leone News, 9 October 1998 [Internet]). Also in October 1998, the eight-nation Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), concerned about the continuing atrocities in Sierra Leone, called on the RUF 'as a mark of their good faith, to make an immediate statement accepting the terms for talks as conveyed to them by the Commonwealth Secretary-General' (Ibid.).

Effect on the economy

The war, along with an embargo imposed by ECOWAS and enforced by ECOMOG, has brought Sierra Leone's economy to a virtual standstill. During the May 1997 *coup d'état*, all commercial banks were closed and many civil servants abstained from work in silent protest (Carver, R., 1998, 10). Agriculture, fishing and mining activities had already been disrupted since the start of rebel hostilities in 1991 (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 29). As a result, government revenues have fallen by 90 percent, all foreign aid (30 per cent of the budget had been stopped) and custom duties were stopped by the embargo (Ibid.).

Sierra Leone relies heavily on aid and donations by foreign governments and international institutions. In October 1997, the UN Security Council introduced sanctions, including a ban on the supply of arms and petroleum products (UN Security Council, Resolution 1132 (1997)). The ECOMOG intervention on 5 February 1998, however, led to an ease of the economic sanctions imposed by the UN and ECOWAS (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 29). On 7 October 1998, Sierra Leone received US\$28.7 million in aid from the World Bank, the European Union and Great Britain to draw up a budget. The World bank provided US\$15 million of a US\$55 million package, Britain gave US\$8.2 million, and the European Union US\$5.5 million (Sierra Leone News, 7 October 1998 [Internet]). On 12 October 98, the World

Bank extended a \$40 million grant to Sierra Leone to help revive agriculture in the country (Ibid., 12 October 1998 [Internet]), on condition that the money be spent on the construction of feeder roads, the provision of farm inputs for farmers, food processing, purchase of equipment and capacity building.

For its part, on 9 October 1998 the government of Sierra Leone allocated US\$90.000 for ECOMOG operations in the country (Sierra Leone News, 9 October [Internet]). It also committed itself to make the country more self-reliant, especially in response to the alleged strong participation of Lebanese nationals in the diamond sector, many of whom are said to be illegal immigrants. To this end, the government of President Kabbah reportedly launched a crackdown on illegal immigrants (Ibid., 8 October 1998 [Internet]). In the meantime, however, the country's mining sector is beginning to recover - on 13 October 1998, the government of President Kabbah, eager to reopen the mines, and Nord Resources, a 50 per cent owner of Sierra Rutile Limited, have concluded talks on reopening the Sierra Rutile titanium oxide mine in an area now free of fighting (Ibid., 13 October 1998 [Internet]).

On the whole, it is believed that on a short-term basis, the country's economy will be revived by the renewed flow of foreign aid. Long-term development, however, will depend on stability in the country, which has not as yet been achieved (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 23). Also, a transparent taxation system has to be set up, and mining policies and quotas have to be enforced (Ibid.)

1.5 PROFILES OF CONTENDING ARMED GROUPS

The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF)

The national armed forces of Sierra Leone have played a decisive role in the political life of the country. This can be observed in the number of military *coups d'état* in Sierra Leone where the army has acted independently or as an instrument for political factions. Fourteen *coups d'état*, either foiled or successful, have taken place since independence in 1961 (Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 903ff). The armed forces are integrated in the patron-client relations which have been the backbone in the functioning of the political system (Richards, P., 1996, xviii, 23). The patrons have extended favours to essential parts of the army and in return, they could count on their loyalty even after temporary set-backs (Ibid.). The number of *coups d'état* since independence taught politicians the crucial role of the military: it became imperative to have the army on one's side, leading to selective recruitment and promotion based on the government's political and ethnic affiliations (Aiao, A., 1998, 2).

The number of the armed forces increased significantly from 3,000 to 14,000 men during the first two years of the civil conflict from 1991 to 1993 (Reno, W., 1997, 19).

According to a speech given by President Kabbah, a challenge for the new government is the reconstruction of the national army (Presidential Address, 22/5/98 [internet]). One factor is the question of loyalty since an important number of the army officers were associated with the AFRC military junta. The Civil Defence Force, known as the *Kamajors*, supportive to the government, will be integrated in the national army, but have not been organised around an effective command structure and are ostensibly ill-disciplined (UN Security Council, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998, 3 [Internet]); EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 42).

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

In the beginning, RUF only had about 100 members but during the years of fighting, the movement expanded to several thousands (Richards, P., 1996, xix, 5). At the beginning of 1997, the number of RUF forces was estimated to be 5,000 armed combatants and 5,000 non-armed combatants (Security Council, S/1997/80, 26 January 1997). Its inner core consists of a 21 member war council (Richards, P., 1996, xix, 5). The RUF conscripted young people who did not have much of a choice whether or not they wanted to join. They were terrorised in the beginning but later treated generously and were given into the secrets of the movement. This initiation process is by some sources seen as similar to a centurie's old initiation whereby young people are separated from their families and adult loyalties are created to a wider society (Ibid.).

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The RUF leadership is mainly composed of former student activists of the late 1970s and early 1980s. They were strongly influenced by Pan-Africanism and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya's *Green Book*. RUF leaders still appear to be committed to aspects of this revolutionary heritage and especially to the populism of the *Green Book* (Ibid., 21). This has, *inter alia*, found expression in public statements in which it has been declared that the issues of war should be resolved through a national assembly of ordinary Sierra Leoneans (Ibid.). The personal backgrounds of the RUF leaders as well as some of the newer recruits have a common denominator which is social exclusion for political protest and student activism (Ibid., 25). The huge number of unemployed young people without prospects for the future is also an important aspect in the understanding of the RUF movement (Abraham, A., 1997).

Initially, the RUF did not articulate a particular political agenda regarding its political aims and objectives were for Sierra Leone (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 13 [internet]). It was not before 1995 that a formal statement from RUF was published on its political programme (and their version of the conflict) (Richards, 1996, 1). However, shortly after the first rebel attack in 1991, the leader Sankoh contacted the British Broad Casting and announced that the aim of the RUF was to overthrow the corruptive regime of APC in power since 1968 and to install a democratic plural political system (Richards, P., 1996, 5,7). The *coup d'etat* in 1992 had among others the implication that the RUF lost its original *raison d'etre*. The fighting, however, persisted (Ibid.).

Opinions vary as to the political foundation of the RUF. Some sources describe the movement as bandits and teenage hoodlums and emphasise the lack of ideology and politics (Bradshaw, S., 1996; Kaplan, R., 1994). Other observers, however, hold that the political message of the RUF is implicit and that the RUF leadership has a political vision of a reformed and accountable state (Richards, P., 1996). In late 1992, a testimony of an American hostage confirmed the existence of organised bush camps in which the RUF trained young conscripts and led the political element in the movement (Ibid., 12).

The hostage taking of international workers was a means for the RUF to obtain media coverage which in late 1994 led to the production of a film about the movement, parts of which were shown on BBC television. This was to have helped the RUF to modify the "bandit image" of the movement (Ibid., 16). Representatives of RUF delivered a speech on the national radio in June 1997 entitled "Revolutionary United Front's apology to the Nation" in which the movement tried to explain their actions during the conflict years: "[the atrocities] were the result of the rottenness of a system which could not be uprooted except by brutal means....in the process of cleaning the system, however, we have wronged the great majority of our countrymen" (Revolutionary United Front, 18 June 1997 [internet]). However, the joint AFRC/RUF forces committed severe atrocities against the civilian population, using campaigns of fear and terror of which two are known as "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Pay Yourself". According to Human Rights Watch/Africa, they consisted of looting, destroying and killing anything in the path of combatants: "The AFRC/RUF] often summarily execute civilians, accusing them of being Kabbah or Kamajor supporters....soldiers further terrorise their victims by forcing them to participate in their own mutilation, asking them to make choices about which finger, hand or arm, for example, to have amputated (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 1,2 [internet]; Jeune Afrique, 3-9 novembre 1998, 38).

The future of the RUF is uncertain as their original leader Foday Sankoh has been in detention since March 1997 for illegal arm trade, first in Nigeria and presently in Sierra Leone. However, RUF forces have allegedly grown in number, are better armed, and their attitude has been interpreted as to have nothing to lose by fighting on indefinitely (EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 22, 26). The movement has reorganised into three main groups in the north, east and centre of the country (Ibid., 23). One group attacks mainly on the main roads between Freetown and the provinces (Ibid., 26). A second group, mainly comprising ex-army irregulars and commanded by the former vice-chairman of the NPRC, Solomon "SAJ" Musa, is deployed in the north-east of the country. A third group, led by Samuel Bockarie, a RUF hard-liner, has re-established itself in the eastern region. The two latter groups continue to constitute a threat to the rich diamond-mining areas (Ibid., 26).

The *Kamajors*

The *Kamajors*, who operate mainly in the south-east diamond-rich area of the country, are one of several pro-Kabbah hunting 'brotherhoods' in Sierra Leone. Other existing brotherhoods include the *Kapras* (mainly Temne, whereas the *Kamajors* are mainly Mende), the *Tamaburos* and the *Dunsos* (Muana, P. K., 1997, pp. 81; United Nations Security Council, 9 June 1998[Internet], 3,

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Electronic Mail & Guardian, 3 April 1998 [Internet]). The *Kamajors* are said to have around 17,000 members (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 22). Most of these 'brotherhoods' were formed as local self-defence militias in the early 1990's, as the civilian population lost faith in the national army's ability to counter the threat posed by the RUF (Muana, P. K., 1997, 78). Unlike the RUF, the *Kamajor* militia relies heavily on Mende traditional mysticism, reflected in their colourful and elaborate dress which is supposed to make them invulnerable (Carver, R., 1998, 10). Moreover, the *Kamajors* are said to maintain close relations with local chiefs, and as such enjoy considerable popular support (Muana, P. K., 1997, 87).

Since 1994, the *Kamajors* have been the greatest opponents to the RUF (Carver, R., 1998, 10; Pitsch, A., 1997, 2) and as such have gained steadily in importance, especially in the later stages of the RUF insurgency (Carver, R., 1998, 10). During ECOMOG's assault to the AFRC/RUF government in February 1998, *Kamajors* fought alongside ECOMOG troops, effectively seizing control of towns such as Bo and Pehun (Ibid.). However, according to several sources, the *Kamajors* contributed to the general chaos through looting, rape, arson, reprisal killings and terrorisation of civilians (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 25; Amnesty International, 11 February 1998 [Internet]; International Crisis Group, March 1998, 2 [Internet]).

The *Kamajors'* close alliance to the government of President Kabbah is reflected by the fact that Samuel Hinga Norman, the Kamajor Movement National Coordinator, holds the place of deputy defence minister within the Kabbah government (Muana, P. K., 1997, p.89; Electronic Mail and Guardian, 3 April 1998, 4 [Internet]; EIU Country Report, 3rd quarter 1998, 27). Although the *Kamajor* forces have been recently united with the former national army under a single command to form the civil defence forces, in reality the two parts continue to function as two separate entities (Carver, R., 1998, 10). The *Kamajors* neither receive food rations nor wages, which raises the question as to how they can subsist at the same time as enforcing their security role (Ibid.).

1.6 PROFILES OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The political development in Sierra Leone, characterised by an extended period of one party rule (1978-91) and several military regimes (1967-68; 1992-1996; 1997-98) has constrained the development of political parties. Politics have been dominated by the two main parties APC and SLPP (Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East, 1993; Europa World Year Book, 1998).

All People's Congress (APC)

The party was founded in 1960 by Siaka Stevens as a left-wing party (Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East, 1993, 246). APC is traditionally supported by the Temne tribe in the North (Pitsch, A., 1997, 2; EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 41), wage-earners and part of the lower middle class (Political Parties of the World, 1998, 478). It was the main opposition party after independence and won the majority of seats in the 1967 elections but was prevented from taking power by a military takeover (Political and Economic Encyclopaedia of Africa, 1993, 245). However, a counter *coup d'état* in 1968 installed the party in power which was retained for the next 24 years. The APC has held a monopoly of political power in Sierra Leone from 1968 to 1992 of which it was the sole legal party for the last 14 years (Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East, 1993, 245). It was the party which in 1971 re-created Sierra Leone as a republic, when a republican constitution was adopted (Political Parties of the World, 1988, 478).

In the 1996 elections, the APC gained a mere 5.7 per cent of the votes, equivalent to five seats in the parliament (Derksen, W., 25 October 1998 [Internet]). Senior politicians from the party including the former president, Joseph Momoh, are currently in jail on treason charges, ostensibly for providing the AFRC with strategic advice (EIU Country Profile, 1998-99, 1998, 42).

Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)

This party, the oldest in the country, was formed in 1951 by Sir Milton Margai who became Prime minister in 1958 (Political and Economic Encyclopaedia of Africa, 1993, 245; EIU Country Profile

1998-99, 1998, 40). The party, described as conservative (Political and Economic Encyclopaedia of Africa, 1993, 245), was the dominant party at independence and led the government until 1967 (Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East, 1993, 246). It was banned, along with all other parties, in 1978, when the APC government adopted a new constitution based on one-party rule (ibid.). It resurfaced in 1991 in connection with the adoption of a new constitution which provided for the creation of new parties. The SLPP gained 27 seats in the elections for parliament in 1996, making it the leading party in the government (Derksen, W., 25 October 1998 [Internet]). The party's leader Ahmed Tejen Kabbah was elected president with 59.5% of the vote (ibid.). In February/March 1998, after one year of military rule, the former elected president and government were reinstated by ECOMOG forces (EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 41). The SLPP has traditionally been dominated by the southern Mende tribe (Pitsch, A., 1997, 2; EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 41). However, the SLPP president has a Mandingo background and strong northern connections (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1996, 23).

It is said that rivalry currently prevails within SLPP, in particular between the president Ahmed Kabbah, the vice-president Albert Joe Demby and the deputy defence minister and Kamajor chief, Sam Hinga Norman (EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 41).

United National People's Party (UNPP)

The party is headed by Dr John Karefa-Smart who helped the country in achieving independence (EIU Country Profile, 1997-98, 1997, 41). He was a presidential candidate in the 1996 elections in which he obtained 40.5% of the vote, following the current president Ahmed Kabbah who achieved a vote of 59.5%. (Derksen, W., 25 October 1998 [Internet]). At present, the party is in a weak position due to the alleged association with the AFRC, the military junta, which UNPP should have provided with advise. Some senior politicians are imprisoned on treason charges (EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 1998, 42).

2. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Sierra Leone has ratified or acceded to a number of international conventions. The status of accession by Sierra Leone as a state party to the international conventions is as follows:

Convention	Date of Accession
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)	23 August 1996
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	23 August 1996
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	13 August 1996
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)	22 May 1981
Protocol to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1967)	22 May 1981
Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952)	25 May 1962
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969)	14 March 1988
African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981)	24 January 1984

Source: UNHCR Refworld, Legal Databases, January 1998

Sierra Leone has ratified:

<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/cdr/cdrsie.htm>

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Convention	Date of Ratification
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)	2 August 1967
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)	11 November 1988
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990)	18 June 1990
Charter of the Organization of African Unity (1963)	11 September 1963

Source: UNHCR Refworld, Legal Databases, January 1998

Sierra Leone has signed:

Convention	Date of Signature
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)	18 March 1985
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990)	14 April 1992

Source: UNHCR Refworld, Legal Databases, January 1998

Sierra Leone is not a state party to:

- the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
- the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
- the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
- the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
- the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

(UNHCR, REFWORLD, Legal databases, January 1998).

2.2 THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT

The legal system in Sierra Leone is based on English common law. However, the legal system has suffered under the repeated military regimes. Since independence in 1961, Sierra Leone has been governed under different constitutions which all provided for distinct political power structures including a republican system, one-party regime and multi-party system. The most recent constitution was adopted in 1991. However, it has barely been functional as it was suspended during the military regimes over the period 1992-1996 and again 1997-1998.

The constitution of 1991 provides for the recognition and protection of fundamental human rights as well as the establishment of a multi-party system enumerating practical procedures including, *inter alia*, the registration of voters, electoral commissions and secret ballots (The Constitution of Sierra Leone, Chapter III, IV, section 31, 32, 36). The parties that secure a minimum of 5% of votes in the legislative elections will be allocated seats on a system of proportional representation (Europa World Year Book 1998, 1998, 2982).

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The legislative power under the 1991 constitution is vested in an unicameral 80-member parliament with 68 members elected by universal adult suffrage for a five-year term and 12 chiefs representing provincial districts (Ibid.). The chiefs are governing at the local level together with a Council of Elders known as the Tribal Authorities to ensure the maintenance of law and order in villages (The Stateman's Yearbook 1998-99, 1235). While the executive power is vested in the President, who is elected for a maximum of two five-year terms (Europa World Year Book 1998, 1998, 2982), the judicial branch is composed of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court, Magistrates' Courts and Local Courts (Ibid.). Moreover, the Supreme Court is entrusted to guarantee the stated protections and fundamental human rights of the constitution (Constitution of Sierra Leone, chapter III, section 28; Thompson, 1998, 3 [internet]). The constitution also provides for the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeal (Ibid., section 120, 128-130, 146).

Former President Ahmed Kabbah reinstated constitutional rule and the national legislature again upon his return to Sierra Leone in March 1998. However, he proclaimed a state of emergency immediately which gave him far-reaching powers of arrest and detention (EIU, 2nd quarter, 1998, 28). The constitution provides for the president to proclaim a state of public emergency, under certain circumstances, such as "when Sierra Leone is at war" or "when there is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety" (chapter III, section 29, subsections 2a+2d).

2.3 GENERAL RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

The constitution of Sierra Leone provides for the protection of citizens and non-citizens within the territory of the state. The supreme court is entrusted to guarantee fundamental human rights, most importantly the Protection of the Right to Life (Section 16), Protection from Arbitrary Arrest or Detention (Section 17), Protection from Inhuman Treatment (Section 20), Protection from Slavery and Forced Labour (Section 19) and Protection of Freedom of Expression of the Press (Section 27).

Although Sierra Leone is party to a number of international treaties concerning the protection of human rights, 'there is strong evidence of the systematic and widespread perpetration of multiple forms of human rights abuse against the civilian population, including rape' (UN Security Council, 9 June 1998, 7 [Internet]). According to the U. S. Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, government forces committed human rights abuses even before the RUF/AFRC *coup d'état*, for example lengthy delays in trials, prolonged pretrial detention, violations of due process and harassment of the press. Discrimination against ethnic minorities and violence against children and women, including female genital mutilation and rape, continued to be widespread in 1997 (United States Department of State Country Report for 1997, 2 [Internet]).

The majority of human rights abuses, however, are reported to have been committed by RUF/AFRC forces both in government and in the rebel war (Amnesty International, Annual Report 1997, 8 [Internet]). During their period in power, RUF and AFRC human rights violations included deliberate extrajudicial killings of civilians, torture, mutilation, rape, beatings, arbitrary arrest and detention and ill-treatment of human rights activists, students and journalists (US DOS Country Report for 1997, 2 [Internet], Amnesty International 1997, p.10ff. [Internet]). Since RUF/AFRC forces were overthrown by ECOMOG forces in February 1998, they 'have been engaging in a war of terror against civilians in Sierra Leone' in which thousands of civilians are believed to have died (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 4). The most widely reported human rights violations are: extrajudicial executions, mutilation, rape, arbitrary arrest and detention, abduction, house burnings, looting and forced labour, including sexual slavery (Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998, 5 [Internet]; UN Security Council, S/1998/750, 12 August 1998, p.4 [Internet]; UN Security Council, S/1998/1960, 16 October 1998, 7 [Internet], Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 4)

Kamajors are said to be responsible for 'violation of the human rights and rights under humanitarian law of both combatants and non-combatants (UN Security Council, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998, 7 [Internet]), in particular with regard to the *Kamajors'* recruitment of child soldiers (HRW 1998, 25). Extrajudicial executions and torture of civilians by kamajor forces have also been reported (Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998, 4 [Internet]; Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 23f.). According to Human Rights Watch, *Kamajors* repeatedly executed AFRC/RUF forces by beheading or burning them

alive (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 24; Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998, 4 [Internet]), and allegedly there have also been cases in which *Kamajors*, after having killed AFRC/RUF soldiers, consumed their vital organs (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 24).

About 450,000 Sierra Leonean refugees are currently in exile of which 155,000 fled after the renewed fighting in February 1998. The majority of the refugees are in Guinea (350,000) and the remainder in Liberia (90,000) and other West African countries (10,000) (UNHCR Country Updates - Liberia & Sierra Leone, 22/04/98 [internet]; Situation Reports from UNHCR/Freetown). The number of internally displaced people was in 1995 estimated to one million (Norwegian Refugee Council, IDP - A Global Survey, 1998, 4 [Internet]). During 1996 and 1997, it decreased to 160,000 people but after the renewed fighting in February 1998, this number increased again to more than 200,000 people (Ibid.). An estimated 15,000 civilians have been killed and more than 40% of the total population displaced during the first five years of the war between 1991 and 1996 (Richards, P., 1996, xix).

Extrajudicial executions

Numerous extrajudicial killings have been reported following the May 1997 coup which brought the RUF/AFRC alliance to power (U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 3 [Internet]). During the period of RUF/AFRC rule, hundreds of civilians have reportedly been killed either in random violence or political killings (Ibid.). RUF/AFRC forces are said to have routinely executed captured *Kamajors*, as well as killing and torturing civilians while searching for *Kamajors* (Ibid.). Supporters of President Kabbah and human rights activists, many of which were students, have also been tortured and executed in public during that period (Ibid.).

Since the RUF was forced to retreat from power in February 1998, it has been waging a guerrilla-style war throughout the country, especially in the Northern and Eastern parts (EIU Country Report, 3rd quarter 1998, 3). Between February and April 1998, more than 700 civilian war-related deaths have been reported (UN Security Council, S/1998/750, 12 August 1998, 7 [Internet]), including 200 in the city of Yifin in the Northern province (Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998, 5 [Internet]; UN Security Council, S/1998/750, 12 August 1998, 7 [Internet]). The high number of civilian casualties involved (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 11, 14), along with the extreme cruelty of RUF activities, has caused a severe deterioration of the human rights situation in Sierra Leone (U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 2 [Internet]).

According to Amnesty International, a deliberate and systematic campaign of killing, rape and mutilation - called by the AFRC and RUF 'Operation no living thing' has emerged since April 1998 (Amnesty International, 28 July 1998). Reportedly, 663 bodies were buried following the fighting in the area of Koidu in mid-June (UN Security Council, S/1998/750, 12 August 1998, 7 [Internet]). During the month of September 1998, an escalating number of summary executions have been confirmed (Ibid.). For instance, on 6 September, the RUF the town of Kamalu in the North-West, killing 40 people. Photographic evidence of this incidence reportedly shows the victims subjected to forms of extreme torture and sexual abuse (UN Security Council, S/1998/1960, 16 October 1998, 4 [Internet]). In the same week, 20 villages were attacked and destroyed in the same area (Ibid.). In the first week of October 1998, more than hundred people, mostly civilians, were killed during RUF attacks in Kukana (near the border with Guinea), Kassah Burah (Port Loko) and in Kambia district (Sierra Leone News, 2, 3, 8 October 1998 [Internet]).

After RUF leader Foday Sankoh was sentenced to death by the government of Sierra Leone in Freetown on 23 October 1998, RUF violence escalated further, with captured RUF rebels that reporting they had been 'on a genocide mission to slaughter civilians' (Sierra Leone News, 26 October 1998 [Internet]). During an attack on the town of Alikalia in northern Sierra Leone on 24 October 1998, 48 civilians were locked up in a building which then was blown-up by the RUF. Observers note that this reflects a change of strategy by the RUF from mutilations to carrying out mass executions of civilians (Sierra Leone News, 30 October 1998 [Internet]). Although there is little information about exact number of such executions, it is estimated that several thousands of victims have been killed in the past few months (EIU Country Report, 3rd quarter 1998, 25; Amnesty International, 24 October 1998 [Internet]).

Torture

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Numerous reports of torture by government forces and RUF elements have been made public, with practices ranging from beating to electric shocks (Amnesty International, October 1997, 14 [Internet]; U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 5 [Internet]). Students were frequently the victims of these attacks: on 18 August 1997, a large number of students detained for publicly taking part in a pro-democracy march were attacked with machetes and bayonets. Four students had their arms cut off, and approximately 20 female students were sexually assaulted by RUF/AFRC members (U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 5 [Internet]; Amnesty International, October 1997, 14 [Internet]). A number of journalists suspected of supporting the democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbah were reportedly arbitrarily detained by security forces and tortured (Amnesty International, Annual Report 1997, 15 [Internet]).

Since the restoration of the Kabbah government by ECOMOG forces in February 1998, the incidents of human rights violations committed by the retreating RUF/AFRC has increased dramatically, as has the number of civilians tortured and subjected to ill-treatment (UN Security Council, 9 June 1998, 6 [Internet]). According to multiple sources, hundreds of victims who sought treatment in hospitals have been mutilated, most notably by having their limbs cut off, while thousands of victims are believed to have been killed or abducted (EIU Country Report, 3rd quarter 1998, 25; UN Security Council, 9 June 1998, 6 [Internet]). The mutilation of civilians by rebels is one of the 'most chilling features' of this conflict: the RUF systematically maims large numbers of people, which then are sent to government-controlled areas with messages of defiance pinned to them (Refugees International, 29 July 1998).

Between 6 April and 21 May 1998, 225 people with war-related injuries arrived at Connaught Hospital in Freetown (plus 500 in other hospitals in the country). Of these, all but one were reported to be civilians, and a quarter of them had been maimed (UN Security Council, 9 June 1998, 6 [Internet]). Although most of the victims were male, ranging in age between 8 and 60 years, females and children also have suffered from RUF violence (Ibid.). Following a relatively quiet period between July and August, violence flared up again from mid-August onwards, after Foday Sankoh had been transferred from Nigeria to Sierra Leonean custody to await his trial. On 17 August 1998, the RUF announced a terror campaign against civilians, the Civil Defence Forces and ECOMOG if the government failed to release Sankoh within seven days (UN Security Council, S/1998/1960, 16 October 1998, 1 [Internet]). During September 1998, an increasing number of human rights abuses, including mutilation and sexual abuse, were reported. Other atrocities include the carving of slogans into the flesh of victims and the burning of houses into which elderly people had been herded (ibid). In an incident in Kambia District, at least 25 people had their limbs cut off on 3 October (Sierra Leone News, 3 October 1998 [Internet]). The RUF has also been accused of beheading civilians and disemboweling pregnant women (Ibid., 29 October 1998 [Internet]).

Several possible reasons have been given to explain the unprecedented cruelty of the RUF, one of them being that maiming people saves bullets (EIU Country Report, 3rd quarter 1998, 25). Some sources hold that the violence can be related to the *Kamajors'* use of traditional magic in battle (ibid). It has also been suggested that maiming serves strategic purposes: in a spate of incidents between Bo and Moyamba between September and October 1995, the RUF repeatedly maimed village women by cutting off their hands, ostensibly to deter women from venturing out into the fields, which in turn served to undermine the harvest which might have drawn RUF captives and conscripts back to their villages (Richards, P., 1996, XX). Another source reports that civilians caught by the RUF have to pick up one of several pieces of paper, each of which describes the amputation of a limb. The civilians get maimed according to what is written on the paper they select (Rod Mac-Johnson, Gemini [Internet]).

Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

Following the *coup d'état* of 25 May 1997, the RUF arbitrarily detained or arrested opponents. Targeted in particular were those associated with the government of President Kabbah or opposed to AFRC activities, as well as journalists. It has been stressed, however, that 'with the complete collapse of the rule of the law, all Sierra Leonean citizens [were] at risk of arbitrary arrest or detention' (Amnesty International, Annual Report 1997, 8 [Internet]). Many of the people detained were held in Pademba Road Prison in Freetown, and while a few have been released after a short time, many were held in administrative detention without charge or trial and apparently without any legal basis for their detention (Ibid.). Moreover, the conditions of the prison are said to be life threatening (U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 2 [Internet]).

Many supporters of President Kabbah were accused of conspiring against the government. However, observers note that 'most of those arrested had been detained only because of their opposition to the *coup d'état* which brought the AFRC to power and their lack of cooperation with the AFRC (Amnesty International, October 1997, 9 [Internet]). Several journalists have also been arrested on unclear charges (ibid., p.11, Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998, 3 [Internet]), while the press has been continuously harassed. Following a march for democracy on 18 August 1997, more than 120 people, mainly students, were arrested (Ibid., 12; U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 6 [Internet]). Human rights activists were arbitrarily detained. The president of a Sierra Leonean Human Rights Organization, Sulaiman Banja Tehan-Sie, was arrested in August 1997. He was beaten, ill-treated and forced at gunpoint to appear on television calling on students not to proceed with their demonstrations (Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998, 2 [Internet], U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 5 [Internet]). No information about arbitrary arrest and detention since the restoration of President Kabbah's government is currently available.

The Death Penalty

Sierra Leone is one of the countries which retains the death penalty for ordinary crimes, *inter alia*, for property (Ibid., 77). According to Amnesty International, Sierra Leone resumed executions in 1992 after a moratorium of over ten years, when alleged plotters of a *coup d'état* were summarily executed (Amnesty International, Annual Report 1993, 254-57). However, another source states that death sentences were still carried out in 1987 (Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World, 1991, 289).

Immediately after his return to power in March 1998, President Kabbah declared a state of emergency which gave him far-reaching constitutional powers of arrest and detention (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 28). At present, almost 2000 people accused of supporting or collaborating with the junta, including RUF leader Foday Sankoh, are awaiting trial. Public opinion has been generally supportive of the Kabbah government, demanding swift and strong action to be taken against those who have committed atrocities during RUF/APRC rule (Amnesty International, 14 October 1998 [Internet]). Although President Kabbah's government has reportedly asked the UK to provide judges in order to ensure a fair and proper trial (EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1998, 28), doubts have been raised as to the lawfulness of the request. Trials before courts martial in Sierra Leone differ from international standards insofar as the defendants have no right to appeal against the conviction and sentence to a higher jurisdiction (Amnesty International, 14 October 1998 [Internet]). They may, however, seek clemency from a special committee chaired by the president.

On 12 October 1998, 34 soldiers were sentenced to death on charges of 'treason, murder, and collaborating with the enemy' (Sierra Leone News, 12 October 1998 [Internet]). Despite appeals by human rights organizations (including the UN, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) and several governments (Ibid.), 24 of the soldiers were publicly executed by firing squad at Goderich Beach in Freetown on 19 October 1998, the remaining ten sentences were commuted to life imprisonment (Sierra Leone News, 19 October 1998 [Internet]). Various organisations have condemned these executions, including the EU, stating that 'the executions which have been carried out will not be conducive in fostering the peace and reconciliation process which the international community is aiming to encourage' (Agence Europe, 28 October 1998). On 21 October 1998, death sentences were imposed on 11 of 16 civilians convicted of treason (Ibid., 21 October 1998), whereas RUF leader Foday Sankoh was sentenced to death on 23 October 1998. Foday Sankoh is currently seeking a lawyer in order to appeal to the president. The offer of a London-based law firm to defend Sankoh was turned down by the Sierra Leonean government as too expensive (Ibid., 3 November 1998 [Internet]). A further 16 people, including the former President Joseph Saidu Momoh, were charged with verdicts of treason on 5 November. The former President was sentenced to ten years of prison and the 15 others received the death sentence (Ibid., 5 November 1998 [Internet]).

Freedom of Expression

Sierra Leone has a history of repressive press legislation, and journalists and editors have often been intimidated or imprisoned (EIU Country Profile 1998-99, 48). During the 1980s, the independent press was totally banned in periods, while in other periods censorship by the government was pervasive (Regional Surveys of the World 1998, 1997, 904). Often, newspapers were prevented from

renewing their licences (Ibid., 906).

Although the constitution of 1991 provides for freedom of speech and the press, the government of President Kabbah arrested several journalists prior to the May 1997 *coup d'état*, frequently on libel and sedition charges (U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 10 [Internet]). On 14 May 1997, the government passed the Media Practitioner Act, which aimed at curtailing the numbers of journalists and newspapers by requiring all journalists to have an academic degree - a demand which about 80 per cent of Sierra Leone's journalists could not meet (Ibid.).

After the AFRC took power in May 1997, dozens of journalists fled the country for fear of persecution. In September, the AFRC announced that newspapers were required to obtain permission before publishing. As a result, the number of newspapers was reduced to six, all of which operated under the discretion of the Ministry of Information. When in July 1997 a radio station transmitting messages from the ousted government began to operate, numerous people suspected of connection to the station were arrested (Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998, 2 [Internet]). Journalists were detained on a variety of charges - including drug possession - in this period, and newspaper offices were looted by military personnel (U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 11 [Internet], Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998, 3 [Internet]). Many journalists and their families have been harassed, and some have been subjected to torture in prison. For instance, Punch newspaper editor David Tambaryoh was arrested by AFRC military personnel on 10 October 1997 and held three days in prison, while armed men searching through his property looted his sister-in-law's home, raping her and her daughter twice (U.S. DOS Country Reports for 1997, 12 [Internet], Amnesty International, October 1997, 11 [Internet]). Another example is journalist Vandi Kallon, who on 16 December 1997 was detained and brutally beaten by AFRC officials (Ibid.).

After President Kabbah was reinstated, the taxation imposed on the press was increased by 383% in June 1998 (IFEX, 12 June 1998 [Internet]) which makes it near impossible for independent newspapers to continue publishing. On 24 August 1998, 16 civilians accused of collaboration with the junta were sentenced to death. Five of them, namely Hilton Fyle, Gipu Felix George, Dennis Smith, Olivia Mensah and Imbrahin Ben Kergbo, were journalists. This has led some humanitarian organizations to believe that 'in the absence of sufficient transparency...[the journalists' conviction] may have been connected to their activities as journalists' (IFEX, 25 August 1998 [Internet]). Also, it has been suspected that ECOMOG may be exercising some censorship over the press (EIU Country Report, 3rd quarter 1998, 27)

2.4 THE SITUATION OF SPECIFIC GROUPS

Children

The recruitment of children as soldiers is a particular problem in Sierra Leone, and several human rights organizations, and UNICEF, have called on the government to demobilise the approximately 4,000 child soldiers in Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone News, 1 October 1998 [Internet]). Child soldiers have been recruited both by the RUF and the *Kamajors*, often by abduction.

According to Human Rights Watch, the AFRC/RUF is using and forcibly recruiting children and young men to engage in armed attacks against Sierra Leonean civilians, the Civil Defence Forces, and ECOMOG Soldiers (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 21). Children are targeted because they are considered less afraid to fight and not likely to be bound by family ties - even more so if they have lost or were separated from their parents in the fighting. As they have little possibility of making a living on their own, the provision of food and shelter by the RUF often provides a big incentive (Ibid., 22). In any case, children, being more vulnerable than adults, are more readily manipulated. It has also been suggested that the RUF forces children to commit atrocities, sometimes against their own community or relatives, to deliberately destroy emotional ties and enforce the identification with the rebel movement (Ibid.).

The conscription of children and young people where RUF advanced was an essential element in the warfare strategy of the movement since the beginning of the conflict. Fear was a major weapon in the

capture as well as in avoiding the young recruits to escape. Brutal executions of village leaders and other atrocities were effectuated to this end (Abraham, A., 1997, 108). The armed forces contributed to this situation by encouraging the conscripted to stay in the RUF due to the execution of youngsters suspected of association with the movement (Richards, P., 1996, 28). Another important aspect of the conscription of young men was the fact that they saw a possibility of acquiring knowledge and training by joining the two warring parties (whether it be the RUF or the armed forces). They saw the rebellion as a possibility of resuming their education : "The arts of war are better than no arts at all" (Richards, P., 1996, 24, 29).

The *Kamajors* have recently admitted to forcibly recruit child soldiers - in Kailahun District alone, there are said to be as many as 3,000 of them (IPS World News, 29 June 1998 [Internet]). According to an *Kamajor* field commander, children are used because 'they are unadulterated and keep the laws governing the conduct of the militia like abstinence from sex, drugs and looting when in combat' (Ibid.). Despite assurances by the government that the children would soon be demobilised and no new children would be recruited, there has been no demobilisation of child *Kamajors* until now (Sierra Leone News, 3 October 1998 [Internet]). On the one hand, this is due to the ongoing fighting, but on the other hand many child soldiers themselves are psychologically not prepared to give up their existence as soldiers. On 8 July 1998, however, the Government of Sierra Leone has offered an amnesty to all child soldiers (Reuters, 9 July 1998).

Women

The constitution provides for equal rights to women, but in practice women are severely disadvantaged: they do not have equal access to education, economic opportunities, health facilities, or social freedoms (U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 15 [Internet]). Only six per cent of women in Sierra Leone are literate, and their education is markedly below their male counterparts. Violence against women ranges from wife beating to rape and female genital mutilation (FGM).

FGM is widely practiced on young women and girls, especially in traditional ethnic groups and among the less-educated. In a ritual ceremony in January 1997, the secret Bondo society, one of the main societies in favour of FGM, circumcised between 600 and 700 girls in a displaced persons camp near Freetown. As a result, some 100 of the young women had to be admitted to hospital (Electronic Mail and Guardian, 22 January 1997 [Internet]). It is estimated that the percentage of women who have undergone this procedure may be as high as 90 per cent (U.S. DOS Country Report for 1997, 16 [Internet]).

Rape and sexual violence is widespread and used by RUF forces as a means of control and punishment (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 17, 18). Women and girls, including pregnant women, have been gang-raped by RUF members, sometimes in front of family members (Ibid.). Often, the rape is followed by murder or mutilation. Women and girls are also reported to have been abducted individually or collectively by RUF/AFRC soldiers and kept for reasons of sexual slavery and to perform domestic tasks (Human Rights Watch, July 1998, 17, 18, 20; Amnesty International, October 1997 [Internet], 15, Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998, 3 [Internet]).

3. Trends in Asylum Applications and Adjudication

Asylum Applications

In 1997, the number of Sierra Leonean nationals applying for asylum in the 19 European countries considered here (3,200) more than doubled as compared to 1996 (1,300). During 1992-1995, between 2,500 and 2,800 Sierra Leonean nationals applied for asylum in Europe.

In 1997, three out of every four Sierra Leonean asylum-seekers applied for asylum in Germany, the United Kingdom (26 per cent, cases only) and the Netherlands (12 per cent).

During 1997, the distribution of Sierra Leonean asylum-seekers within Europe has become more even than in the years before. Thus, whereas Germany received 47 per cent of all Sierra Leonean

applications during 1990-1997, this proportion had fallen to 36 per cent in 1997. Similarly, the share of the main receiving countries (Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) fell to 74 per cent in 1997 as compared to 85 per cent for the entire period.

Sierra Leonean asylum-seekers constituted 1 per cent of the total number of asylum-seekers in Europe in 1997. During the period 1990-1997, this was around 0.5 per cent.

Recognition

During 1990-1997, some 124 Sierra Leonean asylum-seekers were recognised under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in the 19 European countries under consideration. The largest numbers were granted asylum in Germany (66 persons), followed by France (17 persons), the United Kingdom (15 persons) and the Netherlands (14 persons).

Rejections

Some 10,700 asylum requests of Sierra Leonean nationals were rejected during 1990-1997.

Humanitarian Status

During 1990-1997, some 500 Sierra Leonean nationals were allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds, 90 per cent of whom were allowed to stay in the Netherlands (260 persons), Germany (128 persons) and the United Kingdom (60 persons).

Recognition Rates

During 1990-1997, one per cent of all Sierra Leonean asylum-seekers were granted refugee status under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. When the granting of humanitarian status is included, the recognition rate for Sierra Leonean asylum-seekers in Europe amounts to six per cent.

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141) AFRC Press Release

AFRC Press Release, 3 January 1998

AFRC press releases are written and distributed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

AFRC PRESS RELEASE

3 January 1998

The following is a press release from the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Colonel A.B.Y. Kamara.

The Government of Sierra Leone under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel John-Paul Koroma would like to thank all of our gallant soldiers for strictly obeying orders which requested all personnel of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces to refrain from firing shots on December 31st in their usual bid to welcome in the New Year. The government is proud of all our gallant soldiers who, understanding the reasons behind this order, strictly abided by them. No jubilating soldier fired any shot in any city or town through-out the whole of Sierra Leone.

Under the leadership of the former Head of State, Mr Tejan Kabbah, ten (10) people died as a result of firing on December 31st 1996 and several more were seriously wounded and hospitalised.

The government however expresses its regret, anger and shock at the involvement of some senior government personnel in the looting of the Iranian embassy at Wilkinson Road, Freetown, on December 31st 1997.

Based on the report from the committee set up by His Excellency, Lt-Colonel John-Paul Koroma, the Under-Secretary of State, Defence, Colonel A.B.Y. Kamara has taken the following disciplinary measures:

The following People's Revolutionary Leaders and State Monitors have been sacked from the Supreme Council of State, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the armed forces with immediate effect:

1. People's Revolutionary Leader Hassan Bangura.
2. People's Revolutionary Leader Foday Kallon.
3. People's Revolutionary Leader Brima Kamara.
4. People's Revolutionary Leader w/o II Mohamed Kallon.
5. People's Revolutionary Leader Alfred Brown (People's Army)

All government property and looted items have been recovered from these sacked individuals and have been handed over to civil police.

6. People's Revolutionary Leader Tamba Gborie has been reduced in rank from sergeant to lance-corporal and he has been sacked from the Supreme Council and the A.F.R.C. government with immediate effect. All government vehicles have been removed from him except for one utility vehicle which he would be using

for errands. All security personnel attached to Tamba Gborie have been recalled to defence headquarters except for two personal bodyguards. L/Cpl Tamba Gborie is on a very stiff probation.

7. Lt-Colonel Issa Sesay [People's Army] will lose three months salary and will be dealt with severely if he embarks on any further anti-revolutionary inclination.

The government looks on these acts of looting at the Iranian Embassy as a deliberate act of sabotage and the above corrective measures are to act as a deterrent to any other personnel or civilian embarking on looting.

Western Area Security Personnel [WASP] will henceforth guard the Iranian Embassy. Army engineers will do all necessary assessment of the damage to the Embassy and immediate repairs have already been embarked on.

The Department of Foreign Affairs has issued a letter of apology to the Iranian government yesterday.

All civilians who were involved in the looting of the Embassy, should with immediate effect return all looted food and other looted items to the police or be prepared to face the full penalty of the law.

Signed

Colonel A.B.Y. Kamara
Under-Secretary of State, Defence
Freetown,
Sierra Leone

142) Photographs

Pictures taken by OTP Investigations Unit corresponding to witness statements

This exhibit will be filed later

5219

143) Video cassette

Video taken by OTP Investigations Unit Corresponding to witness statements

This exhibit will be filed later

52210

144) Video cassette

Video clips of AFRC/RUF during the Coup and video of eastern Freetown after the AFRC/RUF invasion in January 1999

This exhibit will be filed later

145) Video cassette

Video clip of eastern Freetown as shown by witness PN TF1-093, former RUF who was part of invasion.

This exhibit will be filed later

5222

146) Photos

Pictures taken of killed civilians during the January 1999 Freetown invasion

This exhibit will be filed later

147) Photos

Pictures taken of BS Massaquoi after his arrest in Kenema Town in 1998

This exhibit will be filed later

5224

148) Photos

Pictures taken of mass grave in Kailahun Town.

This exhibit will be filed later

5225

149) Memorandum

Memo from G5 office of the Peoples' Army to Johnny Paul Koroma signed by Lamin,
dated 22 December 1997

FROM: The Office of the G-5, The Peoples'
Army of Sierra Leone - Freetown

5226

TO: The Chairman and Head of State
H. E. Major J.P. Koroma
State House
Freetown

DATE: 22nd December 1997

SITUATION REPORT ON SOME PARTS OF
KAILAHUN DISTRICT

The following personnel's of the Peoples' Army:

1. Capt. Patrick V. Lamin, The G-5 Commander
2. Madam Isatu Kallon - A Business Woman
3. Chief Tamba Boima of Kissi Kama Chiefdom
4. Cpl. Alpha Jalloh - Security and
5. Charles Kamara were part of a Government delegation headed by the Under Secretary of State Internal Affairs to deliver a special message from H.E. The head of State to the People of Kailahun District, to assess and suggest ways and means of rehabilitation of Government Departments and especially the Institutions of Chiefs in the District.

After a long briefing by the Secretary of State Internal Affairs in his office the delegation finally left Freetown on Thursday, the 11th December 1997 at 6:45 p.m. With some members of the delegation of the People's Army expressing dissatisfaction over: -

- a. conjection since there were few vehicles for the delegates and so we had to squeeze in the vehicles that were available
- b. A sum of Twenty five thousand leones was handed out to each delegate of the Peoples Army which we in turn gave our different dependants to up-keep them while we were away.

The Head of the Peoples Army delegation Capt. [redacted] were happy to proceed on the trek after his sugar-coated speech to us. Having gone through a lot of hazards we finally arrived in Bo during the early morning hours of Friday 12th December, 1997. At about 10:30a.m. that morning we paid a courtesy call on the SOS South, Mr. A.F. Kamara whom we found to be a fine gentleman and dedicated member of our Revolution. He helped us recover from the events of the past night by discussing some of his struggles with corrupt officials in his Department in particular and the entire Department in general. We were later joined by the former S.O.S. East Capt. E.J. Kanneh and we left Bo for Kenema almost immediately.

5227

In Kenema, our delegation drove up to the Residence of the SOS East. After some rest, we were invited to a meeting at the Office of the SOS East in Kenema. It was at this meeting that it was revealed to us that H.E. The Chairman gave a mission to the SOS East to proceed with two Guinean soldiers to Buedu to verify allegations that the Peoples Army was recruiting Guinean Nationals to launch an attack on the Guinean Government in collaboration with the son of the Late Guinean President, President Ahmed S. Toure. Our delegation hesitated since we could not go along with such a mission without the approval of Col. Sam Bockarie the battle Field Commander of the Peoples Army who was, as we were made to understand, giving a bloody nose to the Kamajors at Panguma and Tongo on that very day. We also saw, in the company of the SOS East some members of staff of the Radio and Television.

We were made to understand at this meeting also that they were on a special assignment to see whether our prisoners Capt. Philip Palmer and others were still alive and if so, the Radio and TV crew were to be granted permission to film and interview them. The head of the Peoples Army Delegation Capt. Patrick Vandi Lamin sent a radio message to Col. Sam Bockarie (alias Mosquito) informing him about the above situation. Col. Sam Bockarie expressed a desire to be present while the interviews were given for security reasons. He arrived from Tongo on the night of the 14th December 1997. After some long discussions with the SOS East, he agreed to go with us on these missions and to beef up the security, much to the relief of all delegates since there was a Kamajor threat at the Mano Junction. Segbwema road the previous night, Major S.F. Gortor the former Under Secretary of State Internal Affairs also said he would like to

Segbewema and invited Mr. Sulaiman Koroma, Assistant District Officer to join us. We all arrived in Pendembu at about 10:30 a.m. Monday 15th December 1997.

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In Pendembu, the following morning Madam Isatu Kallon held a brief meeting at the home of one of her close friends Madam Fatmata with some members of the womens wing in Pendembu. Madam Isatu Kallon disclose to the members of the Womens Wing that H.E. Major Johnny Paul Koroma sent them seasons greetings. She further stated that the Chairman and Head of State wants every body in Kailahun District in particular to be aware that RUF and AFRC are an embodiment of the People of Sierra Leone. We are one body and one soul. Madam Kallon told the women. In reaction to Madam Kallon's speech, the women expressed grieviances. that H.E. Major Johnny P. Koroma cared more for the men than they the women because he sent vehicles to collect their men and left them behind to continue the struggle.

They were however, hopeful that since Madam Kallon was in Freetown, they would not be entirely forgotten. They were grateful to the Head of State for having considered them by including Md Isatu Kallon in this delegation. They said they realise the big challenge the AFRC Government is facing. They expressed solidarity with every effort the government is making to secure the release of our Leader Cpt. Foday Saybana Sankoh from detention in Nigeria. The delegation left that every day for Kailahun.

We arrive in Kailahun at about 11:15 a.m. and we were met by the Chiefdom Commander of Luawa Chiefdom. After exchanging customary greetings, Capt. Patrick Vandí Lamin expressed dismay over the poor attendance of the meeting since he had sent various radio messages to all G-5 commanders informing them about our mission to parts of the Kailahun District. Reacting, the Chiefdom Commander expressed his sincere apology to the delegation and said that the attendance was poor because of the news they got about the destruction the ALPHA Jet had caused a few days ago at Benduma a few miles from Daru. Capt. Lamin disclosed to the gathering that one of his daughters had being one of the victims killed in that bombardment at Benduma which is his home town. He told the people that God had sent H.E. Major Johnny

the grips of criminal and greedy politicians. We later witnessed the filming and interview of thirty four captured Kamajors in front of Bauya's compound in Kailahun.

5229

We noticed that the entire Town was badly damaged with several houses razed to the ground. The areas where the District Office and other offices stood were thick forests. Some people, however, have started returning to clean their homes and start life anew. We hope that before long more people will return to Kailahun which is thinly populated for now. The delegation later left for Buedu.

Buedu is the shabby and dusty chiefdom headquarter town of Kissi Tong chiefdom. We could not reach the Chiefdom Commander probably because he did not get our message. We were told that he resides at Benduma about four miles from Buedu. We saw a good number of houses erect but the town was temporarily deserted because we suspected the people were holding a Trade Fair along the banks of the river for several miles from Buedu. We were informed that our people exchanged some produce for valuable items of food stuffs and clothers. We could not wait for them because we had to go to Kangama, the Chiefdom Headquarter town of Kissi Teng Chiefdom.

Paramount Chief Tamba Jusu Gamawa is the Paramount Chief of Kissi Teng Chiefdom. He was captured by our fighting forces since 1991 and had stayed with us ever since. We would have loved to meet him at Kangama but he was visibly absent from the town. We later discovered that he was in fact playing host to our prisoners. Since he was away in his farm harvesting his rice, the authorities order that the prisoners be brought before the TV and radio crew for an interview and filming. The following people, Captain Philip Palmer, Fayia Musa, Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh, Dr. Mohamed Barrie and a Radio Operator Miss Juliet Gbassay James were paraded before the cameras and journalists who started working immediately.

Our delegation could not speak to the people Kangama on that day as we did not control our movements. Co. Sam Bockari who gave us a lift all the way to Kangama could not wait because he was in a hurry to return to the Kenema District to put down the activities of the Kamajors. Our delegation had only one vehicle which was used by

the Under Secretary of State and his colleagues. We also met with Tamba Boima, Madam Isatu Kallon and Charles Kamara told Col. Sam Bockari that we had a special mission for the area but we could not do it properly because we had no vehicles of our own. We asked the then Under Secretary of State, Internal Affairs if he could stay with us and accomplished our mission but he was in such a hurry to leave the area. We could not tell why he was in such a hurry to leave that area. So we had to return without accomplishing our mission for the lack of our own vehicle.

5230

ASSESSMENT

The administration of the entire district had broken down for nearly seven years now. The road condition is deplorable which is why the war started in that district. It was one of the most neglected district from Independence to the present day. The politicians sucked the district dry year in year out for the past thirty seven years, thus breeding a fertile ground for a Revolution. We were considered Sierra Leoneans when it was time to harvest our produce during the dry seasons. We are cut off from the rest of our country during the rainy seasons. At such times we looked up to Liberia and sometimes Guinea for our basic requirements. We could not even speak the Krio of Sierra Leone instead we speak the "Liberian English". This is part of the reasons why we are mistaken sometimes for Liberians. These and many many more reasons why we are so head-strong in putting down arms.

SUGGESTIONS

- (1) A delegation of this nature should be visiting the area frequently to prove that the new Government cares for the people.
- (2) A road network should be constructed to open up the district to the rest of the country so that communication with the rest of Sierra Leone could be possible at all times.
- (3) We suggest that the present leadership remain in power until unification and rehabilitation is effected so that we do not see those politicians who are responsible for our present plight show their ugly and corrupt faces to us at election times.

(4) In the long development...

factories are necessary for the district because the plantations can readily feed these factories and at the same time easing unemployment and improving infrastructure in the district.

5231

(5) With the sanctions and embargo imposed on us, a graded road between Koindu and Segbwema could fetch us fuel from neighbouring Liberia and Guinea in exchange for cocoa and coffee.

(6) The Government should make arrangements for the people to return home now that the rains have hung limp. They could begin the process of rehabilitation within the country.

(7) It will be in the interest of the Government if she could make arrangements for refugee in neighbouring Liberia return home after thorough screening. Refugees along the Moa river can wait until relationship between us and the Kamajors improves because most of the Kamajors in the country now are brought from our refugee in Guinea and brain-washed to join the Kamajor militia. We experience this situation while the ousted Government was in power.

The delegation left Kangama for Buedu where we were asked to wait for food and refreshment. While waiting for such good gestures since we were all hungry we heard the sound of the ALFA Jet and every body took to his or her heels. As a result the convoy had to seek shelter along the bushy part of the Buedu-Kailahun road and waited for food. We ate hastily and drove off to Pendembu via Kailahun. We hoped to pass the night at Pendembu but the delegation did not still recover from the rude shock the ALFA Jet opened us to and so the delegation travelled to Kenema. In that hurry one delegate was left behind that night. Mr. Charles Kamara had to pay his way all the way from Pendembu to Kenema where he found the rest of the delegation waiting for him.

Between Kenema and Bo we had series of break down with the vehicle the Peoples Army Delegation was travelling. The vehicle visited the garage several times in Bo without success. The then Under Secretary Internal Affairs grew impatient and

abandoned us. We were stranded as we had no money to pay for our trip home. Major S.F. Gottor told us before he left that he had spent all the money he had for us on that vehicle. Captain Patrick Vandi Lamin therefore contacted the S.O.S. South in Bo, Captain A.F. Kamara and he was kind enough to assist with ~~five~~ ⁵²³² thousand leones as transport fare for the five members of our delegation. Before we could board another vehicle for the trip our vehicle emerged which we boarded. We drove up to about three miles to Taiama junction where the vehicle nearly caught fire. The vehicle broke down completely. All efforts to get it running again failed. We became stranded and night was falling. We had to push that vehicle up to Taiama junction where we found a good number of brave soldiers at Taiama junction headed by Lieutenant Kabia.

They put Lieutenant Koker who was urgently moving to his assignment area in Makeni on board an over loaded trailer. We were to wait for help from other vehicles plying the Bo/Freetown route. But there was no luck, Madam Isatu Kallon boarded a vehicle which conveyed her to mile Ninety-One for a fare of three thousand leones. Chief Tamba Boima and Charles Kamara had to pass the night at Taiama junction amidst the threats of Kamjors threatening to attack the area. We had a sleepless night but by the grace of God no Kamjor came.

The following morning Lieutenant Kabia asked some ladies to prepare some food for us before we continued our journey to Freetown downcast and dispirited. Captain Patrick Vandi Lamin and his security had journeyed on board another vehicle the previous night.

Faithfully submitted by:

Captain Patrick Vandi Lamin

Madam Isatu Kallon

Chief Tamba Boima

Alpha Jalloh and Charles Kamara

PEOPLES ARMY DELEGATION

cc: The Battle Group Commander

" Battle Field Commander

" G-1 Commander

" Col A.K. Sesay, Sec. Gen. AFRC.

" Col. Peter B. Vandi - S.L.P.A

" Madam Isatu Kallon

" File Copy

" War Council Chairman RUF - PEOPLES ARMY

KAILAHUN DISTRICT

PLACES VISITED			
CHIEFDOMS	PARAMOUNT CHIEFS	REMARKS Deceased	ELECTED
Jawie	vacant	"	Brima John Bull
Luaua	vacant	"	Sallu Ensa (I) (Lamina)
Upper Bambara	vacant	"	Foday Adembaima
Kissi Kama	F.M. Jabbah *	"	Tamba Boima
Kissi Teng	Tamba Jusu Gamawa	-	Tamba Jusu Kamara
Kissi Tongi	Nyuma Sengu Sahr Kallon	-	Samuka Tamba
AREAS UNREACHED			
Dea	Thomas Ngaima	-	M.B. Jimmy Jajuah
Penguia	Francis S. Kabba Sei	-	
Jaluhun	M.B. Jimmy Jajuah	-	
Mandu	-	-	
Malema	-	-	
Yawei	-	-	
Peje Bongie	-	-	
Peje West	-	-	

5236..

151) SLBS Radio Broadcast

SLBS Radio Broadcast - 25 May 1997, 18:42 GMT

5237

SLBS TRANSCRIPTIONS

SLBS Radio, 25 May, 18:42 GMT

Good evening fellow citizens. This is (?Captain) [name indistinct], spokesman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, AFRC. The government of Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah has been overthrown. In view of the above, the following should be adhered to with immediate effect and all government ministers should report at Defense Headquarters. All foreign troops with particular [words indistinct] should return to base and await further instructions. All borders -- land, air, and sea -- are closed until further notice. All commanders at the front must be in full control of their men [passage indistinct].

152) SLBS Radio Broadcast

SLBS Radio Broadcast - 28 May 1997 10:00 GMT

SLBS TRANSCRIPTIONS

SLBS Radio, 28 May, 10:00 GMT

Here now is a special message from the Revolutionary United Front High Command to all RUF combatants: Message to all RUF combatants: [Words indistinct] people's welcome to the High Command and all combatants of the RUF through the gallant field commanders of the RUF, your leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh of the RUF, I am now instructing you to disregard all previous instructions given, and to stop all attacks and keep defensive. Do not go on the offensive, I repeat, do not go on the offensive. Be on the defensive. All instructions -- former instructions -- for operations should be canceled. All commanders should be on the defensive.

At this moment, you have to work with the brothers in Freetown and the provinces. The entire Army of the Sierra Leone military forces will allow working together to bring peace in Sierra Leone. We ask you to work with them so that peace will prevail in our beloved motherland. So I will like you all to work with them as brothers; we are no more enemies. The enemies are the politicians, not the soldiers.

Field commanders and all commanders, you will always get instructions from me through Major Koromah. They are our brothers. Let no one fool you. You have to work with them to put the situation under control, especially in the western area. As you the field commander, instruct your other Commander Bingo to stand by for any reinforcement needed by Major Koromah for any eventualities. We have to defend our sovereignty. You are to act on these orders immediately. Do not delay and you will hear me over the media -- BBC and VOA in (?support) to the present operation in Freetown.

Thank you all. My absence in Sierra Leone is the presence of God, RUF, and to the people. [sentence as heard]

Power to the people and the word of our people is to be in the hands of the people. RUF, be strong, intelligent. (Egbure, nyakoa) [local language -- meaning unknown]

My people: You are the children, great, great grandchildren. Let's move the revolution with our brothers. Peace be with you. I will join you very soon. I say again: This is your leader and Commander in Chief of the RUF, Corporal Foday Sankoh.

Thank you all.

5240

153) SLBS Radio Broadcast

SLBS Radio Broadcast - 30 May 1997 19:22 GMT

SLBS TRANSCRIPTIONS

SLBS Radio, 30 May, 19:22 GMT

["Special Message" by Revolutionary United Front Spokesman Lieutenant David Collins] Fellow citizens of this our beloved Sierra Leone, brothers and sisters in arms, and serious concerned citizens, it gives me great pleasure at this time when history is being made within the borders of Sierra Leone in the liberation of our people in this our blessed country. you will agree with me that the Sierra Leone Army is in a deplorable condition according to existing standards; that is, molestation, intimidation, harassment, tribalism, state protectionism and the main sources of these conditions.

The Army needs a complete revolution so as to defend and protect the sovereignty of the state. The RUF/SL [Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone] has called for your cooperation to accomplish this desired mission. You all will agree with me that the rights of the Sierra Leonean people have been denied them by a handful of criminals who have been using their position to boast and perpetrate their selfish aims--the politicians in this regard. The RUF has come to give the power to the people through pure democracy and it is the voice of the people.

Since 1991, we have been fighting against the APC [All People's Congress], the NPRC [National Provisional Ruling Council], and the SLPP [Sierra Leone People's Party] governments respectively. These various governments did not understand the RUF calls. But today, the AFRC government has [words indistinct] and understandably invited the RUF/SL for a concerted effort. We are determined to bring complete safety to the people of this country with our sincerity, [word indistinct], and dedication of purpose.

We have come with 5,000 armed men to safeguard and to give security to this nation. As you all know, this is an internal affair. We need no foreign intervention. We need no more war in this our blessed country. This country of liberty, unity, justice, and freedom. We ask the international community to bear with us to put things into correct shape. As you all know, the RUF, under the leadership of Corporal Saybannah Sankoh, is struggling very hard to bring good sanity, good living conditions and other aspects to the Sierra Leonean people. But the politicians have been sabotaging these efforts. We welcome the present government in Sierra Leone. We embrace them so that we can bring total peace to this country.

Any intervention into the internal affairs of this our country, the RUF will never leave no stone unturned but to put things into correct shape. On behalf of the RUF and the whole country and especially our leader, Foday Saybannah Sankoh, we are here to bring peace and sanity to Sierra Leone. We are urging all citizens to be law-abiding, to embrace this revolution so that we can build a society worth living in.

RUF, as you have heard from our leader, Foday Saybannah Sankoh, now we are on march with the AFRC, and we are now the People's Army. No more RUF, but the People's Army, to bring peace and security to the people of this our country. I thank you all.

5242

154) SLBS Radio Broadcast

SLBS Radio Broadcast - 29 May 15:26 GMT

SLBS TRANSCRIPTIONS

SLBS Radio, 29 May, 15:26 GMT

[Proclamation issued by the Administration of Sierra Leone Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Proclamation 1997, in Freetown on 28 May 1997]
Proclamation to make provisions for the interim administration of the Republic of Sierra Leone by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council [AFRC] -- its establishment, [words indistinct] and for other matters connected therewith.

Whereas it is a fundamental duty of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone to secure and maintain the safety of the state and public order, and whereas the action and utterances of the (?ousted government), political parties and their leaders have created conditions which can lead to tribal faction, bloodshed, and tribal warfare, and whereas it is necessary and expedient to avert immediately that trend of affairs and for provisions to be made for the maintenance of law and order in Sierra Leone, [words indistinct] administration by law of the state of Sierra Leone, [words indistinct]; We, the members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in cooperation with the people of Sierra Leone, in order to ensure the maintenance of law and order, domestic tranquility, the enjoyment of the blessings of liberty, unity, and democracy for the people of Sierra Leone and all persons living therein, we hereby proclaim as follows:

Constitution of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council -- There is hereby established a council to be known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council carrying out [words indistinct]. The council shall be (?chaired) by a chairman and a deputy chairman and other members of the [words indistinct] and secretary general shall be appointed by the council and shall uphold the functions [words indistinct] the council will determine. The council [words indistinct] provisions of the Constitution [words indistinct] 1991. All the provisions of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991 which came into operation on 30 October (?1996) which are inconsistent or in conflict with this proclamation or any law made thereafter shall be deemed to have been suspended as from 25 May 1997. Without [words indistinct] the generality of [words indistinct] the permanent [words indistinct] under the said constitution [words indistinct] 25 May 1997 is dissolved. All political parties are dissolved and membership in political parties is prohibited with effect from 25 May 1997.

(?Decree To Empower Council To Make Law) [subhead]

1. The Council shall have power as [words indistinct] and in the national interest to make laws which shall be known as decrees.
2. Any decree made by the Council may be amended, repealed or [words indistinct] made by the Council.
3. Every decree made by the Council shall be deemed to be an act as defined in Section III of the Interpretation Act, 1971.
4. Any decree made by the Council shall be signed by the chairman or, in the

absence of the chairman, by the deputy chairman of the Council.

5. Subject to any decree made by the Council, all or enactments in force in Sierra Leone immediately [words indistinct] 25 May 1997 shall continue in force, provided that any enactment in force in Sierra Leone immediately before the 25 May 1997, which is inconsistent or in conflict with any provisions of this proclamation or any [words indistinct] made thereunder shall be deemed to have been suspended as from the 25 May 1997.

Publication and (?implementation) of Decree: Every decree made by the Council will be published in the gazette and shall come into operation on the date of such publication or on such other date as may be provided in or under the decree or in any public enactment.

6. Subject to any decree made by the Council, the public service of Sierra Leone as it existed immediately before the 25 May 1997 shall continue in existence, and any person holding or acting in any office in the public service immediately before that date shall continue in office subject to any decree or other enactments in force after that date.

7. Subject to any decree made by the Council, any reference to president, vice president, minister or prime minister in the constitution of Sierra Leone which came into operation on 1 October 1991 or in any enactment, continues in existence by virtue of this proclamation, shall, on and after 25 May 1997, be considered as a reference to the Council or such authority as the Council may by order appoint. [words indistinct] the Council may, while it considers it necessary to appoint [words indistinct] make an order against any person [words indistinct] made thereunder shall be deemed to have been suspended as from the 25 May 1997. Any order made under [words indistinct] directing that any person be detained shall not be [words indistinct] without prejudice to the generality of [words indistinct] accordingly.

Power to Amend or Repeal the Proclamation: The Council shall have power to amend, repeal, or suspend this proclamation or [words indistinct]. This proclamation shall [words indistinct] operation on the 25 May 1997.

Made in Freetown on 28 May 1997.

Major Johnny Paul Koroma [word indistinct] on behalf of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone.

5245

155) Report

Report to Foday Sankoh from Major Francis Musa
31 August 1999

5246

FROM ETHEL: Sept 16, 2000
A MESSAGE FORM EJ, I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT LIKE TO HAVE AN ELECTRONIC
VERSION AS WELL AS HARD COPY -- I'M SURE YOU ALREADY GOT THE HARD COPY?

Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
(People's Army of Sierra Leone)
Ops. Segbwema
Date: 31st August 1999

To: Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh
RUF/SL.

From: Major Francis M. Musa
District I.D.U. Commander
Kailahun

Sub: Brief comprehensive report on all salient activities that took
place in the absence of the leader from
the 24th, March, 1996 to the 31st, August, 1999.

The leader, Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh left Zogoda on the 24th, March,
1996 for the Abidjan (Ivory Coast) Peace Talk. Brigadier Morris ***
Kallon now, took over command at Zogoda in the absence of Lt. Col.
Mohamed Tarawally. Seventy-two hours later, Lt. Col. Mohamed Tarawally
arrived and took over command from Co. Morris Kallon as instructed by
the leader before he left for Abidjan.

Lt. Col. Mohamed Tarawally started fine but later he was wrongly advised
by his bodyguards and late Capt. Daniel Wankeh (Rambo, who was
bodyguards commander to the leader). For instance, all kinds of
civilians and standbys were now entering in and going out of Zogoda
without proper security. The Camp Lion Training Base became a ground of
revenge rather than for ideology. Lt. Titesu, Pujehun District I.D.U.
Commander was killed in halaka at the Camp Lion Training Base sometimes
July, 1996. All those who were involved including Major Junior
andi, Major Muyepeh, late Capt. Cobra, etc, were all demoted and
removed from the training base to other areas of assignments. The
lethargic or delaying attitude of Lt. Col. Mohamed Tarawally in
responding to instructions sent by the leader made the Kamajors to
over-run our positions from the end of 1996 to early 1997.

While the peace talk was going on in Abidjan in 1996, Kamajors together
with soldiers loyal to Tejan Kabba continued to attack our positions
with flimsy excuses that they were returning to their villages, defend
and harvest their agricultural produce. The instruction given to Lt.
Col. Mohamed Tarawally by the leader to evacuate Zogoda and send some
people to Pujehun and the rest to Kailahun was delayed until the enemies
over-ran Koribondo Jungle, Bandawor, Zogoda, Kenema by-pass, Across Moa,
etc. A good number of both civilians and soldiers including good
brothers like Capt. Augustine Koroma, Capt. Papa, Capt. Long By-pass,

Lt. Shalolow, Lt. A.B. Dundas, etc. died in this incident. All our positions were over-run by the enemies with the exception of the Kailahun axis, Western jungle, Peyama axis and Pujehun axis. Later on, Pujehun axis fell to the enemies. This was as a result of the materials and disunity between the very citizens of this area – both civilians and soldiers. Thanks be to God and Major-General Sam Bockarie, because he observed the cruel determination of the enemies to massacre us, he instructed that Peyama jungle must be dissolved. This was done, as everybody crossed over to Burkina to put effort together to defend the original land of the RUF/SL rebels in Sierra Leone. At this Juncture, the RUF/SL could only boast of the Western jungle and the Kailahun axis. A very big praise to Brigadier Denis Mingo and other who upheld this jungle upto the time the AFRC took over on the 25th, May, 1997. Again, a very big thank you and praise to Major-General Sam Bockarie, Brigadier I. H. Sesay, Brigadier Peter B. Vandj, other devoted soldiers and civilians. If it were not the co-operation of these mentioned people under the commandership of Major-General Sam Bockarie... [line illegible]...

... [r. Barrie told the SLFP government alot about the RUF/SL They disclosed to the government that we are lack of ammunition, that we **depend on the arms and ammunition we capture from the enemies. So they advised the Tejan Kabba government to concentrate on Kamajors *** with single barrels, knives and sticks to fight us, thining that when we are suppressed, we would have accepted their government and betrayed the RUF/SL. Thanks to the Lord Almighty, with the help of Major-General Sam Bockarie, Brigadier I.H. Sesay and Brigadier Peter B. Vandj, these betrayers (coup plotters) were rounded up at the Sierra Leone-Guinea border somewhere around Koindu. *** The information previously given to the enemies about the RUF/SL by these coup plotters triggered the enemies to suppress us in Ngieme [sp?] axis attacking our positions including Ngieme [sp?] HQ. twice or thrice every week. They used single-barrels, sticks and knives with limited automatic riffles to fight us, and hence we captured nothing from them anytime they were ** killed or pushed back. Major-General Sam Bockarie who was gifted by God worked very hard to save the movement. He sacrificed his life, went to Foye [sp?], contacted the Liberian soldiers and established strong relationships between the RUF/SL and the Liberian soldiers. Devoted soldiers and civilians freely offered cocoa beans, coffee beans, pistols, single-barrels, X-bass tape, presentable dressings, etc. to the movement to be exchanged for ammunition. This ammunition was what we used to fight the enemies and with-held the Burkina axis until the AFRC took over the reigns of government of Sierra Leone from Tejan Kabba on May 25th, 1997 (Sunday) and called upon the RUF/SL.

We joined the brothers on May 29th., 1997. The following day positions were offered to the RUF/SL. Vice president – Pa Foday Sankoh, Minister of Trade and Industry – Major Eldred Collings, Minister of agriculture and Forestry – Mr. A.A. Vandj, Minister of Energy and Power – Major Lawrence [??]rmandia, Minister of Lands and Mines – Mr. S.Y.B. Rogers,

deputy Minister of Education – Major P.S. Baina and deputy Minister of Lands and Mines – Brigadier Peter B. Vandí. Very minimal positions in the army were offered to the RUF/SL. Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma was wrongly advised by prominent military men who were Kamajors and Tejan Kabba supporters. The RUF/SL was treated with infinitesimal dignity. Most advice given by our own authorities by them were not adhered to. Little attention was paid to security information from the RUF/SL securities. Recommendations were never attended to. On the whole, the brothers had no confidence in us. However, we accepted everything in good faith because we were instructed by our leader to take all orders and instructions from Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma. This enabled the Tejan Kabba government supported by the Nigerian led ECOMOG and the Sandline International from Britain to overthrow the AFRC government in February, 1998. Tejan was to come together with the RUF/SL leader to Freetown on April 22nd, 1998 to regain presidency but the enemies did not wait for this time. The Nigerian led ECOMOG with British mercenaries attacked Freetown in February 199[?] and this extended to all the provinces and towns. Two displeasing incidents that took place while we were in Freetown included the alleged misusing of nine million leones (le.9,000,000) by Brigadier Superman and the use of about forty-five million leones (le.45,000,000) on a marriage ceremony by Major Eldred Collins.

Considering our military strength and the pressure that was put on us by the Nigerian led ECOMOG, we withdrew into the bush (parts of the Kailahun and Kono districts) to re-organize ourselves and regain strength. We still continue to thank and praise Major-General Sam Bockarie, Brigadier I. H. Sesay, late Col. Boston Flomo [sp?] (Rambo), Brigadier Superman, Brigadier Morris Kallon, Brigadier Peter B. Vandí and many others who stood firm and made sure that the enemies did not overcome us. The rampant promotion of soldiers served as incentives that motivated the combatants to double-up their efforts. The consultation, co-ordination... [line illegible]...

... [line illegible]... the RUF/SL rebel leader and sign the Lome Peace Treaty [line illegible] will lead to every lasting peace in this country** as we can see for * ourselves now.

During our ***** withdrawal into the bush, security divulged * that some former SLA soldiers were in possession of diamonds and foreign currencies which they wanted to use only to satisfy their personal needs. Some of them even wanted to escape with these wealth and left us struggling. In fact a good number of them with or without wealth escaped to Liberia and Guinea. Since in RUF/SL diamonds and foreign currencies are government properties, authorities decided to collect diamonds and foreign currencies in possession of individuals so that they could be used in the interest of the movement with priority to arms and ammunition. Some important items like mini satellite, Radio Freedom, etc. were acquired for the use of the movement. Small-small diamonds which only the higher authorities and the miners will account for, were collected from the minings done in Kone and Tonge Field but

the proceeds according to my understanding were all used in the interest of the movement. In the course of promoting the movement, diamonds were also collected from Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma himself. Rather unfortunate some of these diamonds and foreign [line of deleted text] currencies got [missen?] in the hands of Brigadier I. H. Sesay when he went to cater for ammunition for the movement. This is the number one grievance of Brigadier Superman, that Brigadier I. H. Sesay was not queried when he lost the diamonds and the foreign currencies but he misused the nine million leones in Freetown, he was brought to quarterdeck. To be frank enough, Brigadier I. H. Sesay was the only strong man under Major-General Sam Bockarie at that time who helped to put situation under control as the enemies were seriously pressing us. Taking Co. Issa from whatever he was doing at that time * and brought him for investigation would have done more harm than good because something worse than the lost of the diamonds and the foreign currencies would have occurred. Moreover, the collection of diamonds from some former SLA soldiers, money and diamonds from pe**ople who were in Kono when the former SLA soldiers (some of them) broke the bank in Kono, the failure of the authorities to provide Lt. Col. J.P. Koroma with vehicle and communication set may be responsible for the indifference that cropped-up between the men in the Western jungle and we on this side. Above all, they were expecting that we were going to subdue ourselves to them in our own territory like we did when we were in Freetown which resulted to our retreat into the bush. If we have subdued ourselves to these guys, we would have moved from the "frying pot to the fire". The above points triggered the former SLA brothers presenting in the Western jungle to incite Superman to disobey Major-General Sam Bockarie ***** unwarranted excuse that Major-General Sam Bockarie insulted and condemned his Lebanese woman. This problem escalated to a point that Brigadier Superman either all by himself or through giv[ing?] or[ders?] killed Col. Boston Flomo (Rambo) by shooting him.

Although about 90-95% of the SLA brothers including Col. Akim Turay, Lt. Col. Soriba, Lt. Col. Dumbuya, Lt. Col. Bakerr, Major Leather Boot and many others are loyal to this movement, but out of observations, the balance 5-10% are power conscious, materialistic and so can be incited by the politicians. Moreeover, it will take some of the them time to ** get use to some of the rules and regulations (ideology) binding the RUF/SL movement. Since we joined together with the brothers, crimes rates have maximally **** increased.

Hence you have come as our leader to join us all to make Sierra Leone a better place to live, you have set your eyes sir, to wipe out all forms of corruptions and in the interim, you and all of us should be concerned about your security as the...[illegible]...

WELCOME AND GOD BLESS ALL SIR.

Signed: <sig>
Major Francis M. Musa

5250

file:///Untitled

District I.D.U. comander
Kailahun.

cc:

Chief of Defence Staff
Battle Field Commander
War Office
File.

5257

156) Radio Announcement

Copy of SLBS FM 99.1 radio announcement by Foday Sankoh
Toward the end of May 1997

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIERRA LEONE
HOLDEN AT FREETOWN

THE STATE


Vs

CPL. FODAY SAYBANA SANKOH

TAKE NOTICE that at the hearing of this case the prosecution intends to call Francis Hindowa as additional witness who will say as follows:

1. That he has always been a regular listener to the radio
2. That after the events of the 25th May, 1997 he became particularly keen to listen to all announcements on SLBS FM 99.1
3. That towards the end of May 1997 there was a broadcast over that radio station which was attributed to Cpl. Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF
4. That because of the nature and content of that broadcast he recorded it and had kept the recorded tape safely ever since.

DATED the 6th October, 1998.


 ATTORNEY-GENERAL &
 MINISTER OF JUSTICE

To: Master & Registrar
High Court
Freetown

5253

EXH. "C 1"
D.

To all RUF Combatants: I am writing it to all RUF Combatants, People's War Council of high command and all Combatants and the RUF. You know, the gallant and Field Commander of RUF. Your Leader Corporal Foday Sankoh and the RUF I am now instructing you to disregard all previous instructions and orders and stop all attacks and take defensive and don't go on the offensive. All, do not go on the offensive, I repeat, do not go on the offensive be on the defensive. All instructions, former instruction and operations should be cancelled. All Commanders should be on the defensive. At this moment you have to work with the brothers in Freetown, in the provinces and the entire army of the Sierra Leone Military Forces and allow working together to bring peace in Sierra Leone. They ask me to work with them so that peace could prevail to our beloved motherland. So I will like you all to work with them as brothers we are no more enemies. The Enemies are the Politicians not the Soldiers, presently. The Field Commander and all Commanders, you always get instructions from me through Major Koroma. They are our brothers let no one fool you. You have to work with them to put situation under control, especially in the Western Area. You the Field Commander instruct the other Commander **MINGO** to stand by for any reinforcement needed by Major Koroma for any eventuality. We have to defend our sovereignty. You are to act on these orders immediately. Do not delay and you will hear me over the media, BBC and VOA only support the present operation in Freetown. Thank you all. My absence in Sierra Leone is of the blessing of God. RUF; arms to the people; power to the people; and wealth of our people should be in the hands of the people. RUF, brave, strong, intelligent, Bai Bureh, Jagua, Kailondo you are the children, victory, grant to them. Lets keep the revolution with our brothers, peace be with you. I will join you very soon. I say again

this is your Leader and Commander-in-Chief of the RUF Corporal Foday Sankoh.

Thank you all

“This portion is being translated into English as it was in Creole”

My brothers, that is all I have to tell you. You should take great care, work with the brothers, I hope they will not disappoint you and disappoint the other ranks who stand behind them today. You know we stand for peace, this can be achieved. Thank you.

Davies

Transcribed by - Miss Cornelia Adekumbi Patricia
Davies - Stenographer

157) Letter

Letter to Sankoh from The Black Guard
14 January 2000

The Revolutionary War in Sierra Leone
The Chief Minister's Office
Freetown. 5256
Date January, 2000.

To: The Leader of the Revolution
From: The Black Guard
Subj: Information received from Lt Col George Steven.

Sir:

With your great permission, the unit is here presenting to you the below informations:

- 1) The government has deployed the SLA's to work together with the UN peace keeping force (UNAMISIL) at Gbugbuna with the intention to take Kono from the R.U.F party. At the moment, they have given them the full UN kits (badges) as identity to be known as UNAMISIL's.
- 2) These 5 L'A's in the mixed # of the UN's has fortified the whole Gbugbuna and they are all in arms.
- 3) There are a group of people in the village between Gbugbuna and Kabala where they are an elicide ming of Gold. The village is called Konebaya.
- 4) The aim of the UN is to deploy their armaments in Kono and use force to disarm the RUF as they have found out that we don't want to leave Kono. As they have

taken Kond, ~~they~~ then we have no power again to resist them, as imagined.

- (4) They want to use the township of Kond to the border of Guinea ie, by Kisy town, as route for their men power.
- (5) The Lt. George bordered with two missiles circular enroute towards the area as he was coming yesterday. He met them at between Mile shades and Gbelle junction.
- (6) To conclude, the Lt. George gathered all these information as eye ~~with~~ witness when he went to Gbugbuna the past few days. And that the ~~gult~~ do not mean peace.

Sir,

You may call the Lt. Col. George, and he will explain to you in details as he is ~~present~~ presently on the Ground.

Best Regards

signed ~~[Signature]~~

Mr. Jackson Swarney

158) Manifesto

Footpaths to Democracy, 1995

5259



Revolutionary United Front

**FOOTPATHS TO DEMOCRACY
TOWARD A NEW SIERRA LEONE**

Prologue
RUF/SL Anthem
Forward
What Are We Fighting For?
Why the Armed Struggle?
Why, we continue to fight?
The Ideas and Ideals We Believe in

PROLOGUE

Each generation must out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it.
(Frantz Fanon)

When a society demands a change there is no need attempting to change it on old principles.
(Foday Saybana Sankoh)

In furtherance of sustainable peace, we call on the UN Security Council to place a universal arms embargo, including the importation and use of land mines, on Sierra Leone forthwith.
(People's War & Peace Council)

We deem as more dangerous the quick-fix and prescriptive hidden-agendas of self-seeking mediators. We have every right to be suspicious of those who have made careers out of Africa's plight. They invariably end up as meddlers in internal conflicts prolonging the suffering of our people. *(Foday Saybana Sankoh)*

RUF/SL Anthem

RUF is fighting to save Sierra Leone
RUF is fighting to save our people
RUF is fighting to save our country
RUF is fighting to save Sierra Leone

*Chorus: Go and tell the President, Sierra Leone is my home
Go and tell my parents, they may see me no more
When fighting in the battlefield I'm fighting forever
Every Sierra Leonean is fighting for his land*

5db0

Where are our diamonds, Mr. President?
Where is our gold, NPRC?
RUF is hungry to know where they are
RUF is fighting to save Sierra Leone

*Chorus: Go and tell the President, Sierra Leone is my home
Go and tell my parents, they may see me no more
When fighting in the battlefield I'm fighting forever
Every Sierra Leonean is fighting for his land*

Our people are suffering without means of survival
All our minerals have gone to foreign lands
RUF is hungry to know where they are
RUF is fighting to save Sierra Leone

*Chorus: Go and tell the President, Sierra Leone is my home
Go and tell my parents, they may see me no more
When fighting in the battlefield I'm fighting forever
Every Sierra Leonean is fighting for his land*

Sierra Leone is ready to utilise her own
All our minerals will be accounted for
The people will enjoy in their land
RUF is the saviour we need right now

*Chorus: Go and tell the President, Sierra Leone is my home
Go and tell my parents, they may see me no more
When fighting in the battlefield I'm fighting forever
Every Sierra Leonean is fighting for his land*

RUF is fighting to save Sierra Leone
RUF is fighting to save our people
RUF is fighting to save our country

Forward

We can no longer leave the destiny of our country in the hands of a generation of crooked politicians and military adventurers...It is our right and duty to change the present political system in the name of national salvation and liberation...This task is the historical responsibility of every patriot... We must be prepared to struggle until the decadent, backward and oppressive regime is thrown into the dustbin of history. We call for a national democratic revolution - involving the total mobilisation of all progressive forces. The secret behind the survival of the existing system is our lack of organisation. What we need then is organised challenged and resistance. The strategy and tactics of this resistance will be determined by the reaction of the enemy forces - force will be met with force, reasoning with reasoning and dialogue with dialogue. (*Basic Document of RUF/SL*)

We entered Sierra Leone through Liberia and enjoyed the sympathy of Sierra Leonean migrant workers some of whom joined us to cross the border to start our liberation campaign. This generation of Sierra Leoneans who have had to migrate to make a living in Liberia are now referred to as "mercenaries and bandits" by the Freetown-based military junta. The military junta has also used this fact to gain support from Guinea, Nigeria, Ghana, the US and Britain in its avowed policy of war to rid Sierra Leone of "alien rebels".

We do not deny the fact that some of those who volunteered to join our cause were veterans of the Liberian civil war but majority were of Sierra Leonean parentage. However, this minor "alien" involvement in our just and human cause was curtailed as early as May 1992 when it became a nightmarish experience for our civil population. Ever since we have fought a self-reliant war depending mainly on what we capture from the troops of the rebel National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) of the regimes in Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana and of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO).

The RUF/SL is surrounded on all sides by hostile forces. To the north and west, Guinea exercises a strangle-hold on the common border. To the east and south, the Liberian counties of Lofa, Bomi and Grand Cape Mount sharing a common border with Sierra Leone have been controlled by ECOMOG by way of ULIMO. The sea and air space are patrolled by ECOMOG. With the situation as it is, how do we get supplies from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) or for that matter from anywhere else? The NPFL could not have lost those three strategic counties if it had sufficient arms to spare. Therefore, the theory and accusations that we receive weapons and ammunition from Libya by way of Burkina Faso and the NPFL and at the same time being a conduit for the supply of materials to the NPFL are nonsense. These are calculated lies to justify the pursuit of a policy of military option by the Freetown-based military junta against our entreaties for peace through dialogue. It is an insult to every patriotic Sierra Leonean for the "Libya card" to be played to confuse as well as betray the genuine democratic and equal opportunity demands of our people. In respect of the above, we, hereby, challenge the US and Britain to support and see to the implementation and monitoring of our call for the UN Security Council to place a universal arms embargo on Sierra Leone, forthwith. We are tired of being demonised, only to prolong the civil war which, left to themselves, the African people of Sierra Leone are capable of resolving through an enlightened process of dialogue. And for this process of dialogue to be successful, it has to be entirely owned by the people as a vehicle for their empowerment.

It has become quite clear now, even in Freetown, that the NPRC was "introduced" to hi-jack the revolution and betray the cause of the uprising against a rotten plantation system which impoverished Sierra Leone while at the same time enriched its slave masters. Why is it therefore strange to the backers of the besieged NPRC that the historically neglected, used and abused countryside would rise up to the simple call that "No more slave, no more master" and "Arms to the people; power to the people and wealth to the people"? It is this rallying call that has been set to song as the RUF Anthem which journalists are jailed for, for publishing and distributing this motivating anthem in Freetown.

What is clear is that the patriotic and democratically minded Africans of Sierra Leone are waging a successful guerrilla warfare using their feet and brains, footpaths and by-passes to surprise, disarm and totally disorganise the offensive operations of the rebel NPRC. The rebel NPRC has made its priority the defeat and destruction of the RUF/SL. Why seek to defeat and as well as destroy your own brothers and sisters that you were forced into conflict with? Why inherit the destructive policies of the masters you overthrew if you mean peace when you say so? Where does the rebel NPRC want to drive us away to? May be this is why the regime in Guinea is fighting on the rebel NPRC side to prevent an anticipated spillover which has never occurred because the RUF/SL has no quarrel with the people of Guinea and likewise Nigeria, Ghana and Britain.

Our self-reliant revolution deserves a more objective study and analysis. We continue to be demonised by those who benefit by doing so. As Pan-Africanists, we are proud of our self-reliant struggle. Initially we fought a semi-conventional war relying heavily on vehicles of

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mobility. This method proved fatal against the combined fire power of Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana. By late 1993 we had been forced to beat a hasty retreat as successful infiltration almost destroyed our ranks. We were pushed to the border with Liberia. Frankly, we were beaten and were on the run but our pride and deep sense of calling would not let us face the disgrace of crossing into Liberia as refugees or prisoners of war. We dispersed into smaller units, whatever remained of our fighting force. The civilians were advised to abandon the towns and cities, which they did. We destroyed all our vehicles and heavy weapons that would retard our progress as well as expose our locations. We now relied on light weapons and on our feet, brains and knowledge of the countryside. We moved deeper into the comforting bosom of our mother earth - the forest.

The forest welcomed us and gave us succour and sustenance. The forest continues to be our main sources of survival and defense to date. We regained our composure and engaged ourselves in a sustained period of intensive self-examination and self-criticism. We moved forward with a clearly defined programme and liberation ideology. We learned from our mistakes and laboured hard to correct them. We continue to make mistakes but we are not overwhelmed by them. Our collective sense of discipline continues to mature and the result is an effective command and control procedures and structures in our administrative territory.

We have created settlements, we call *sowo* bushes (i.e. sacred grove for the initiated). We endeavour to provide limited health care, schooling, housing and seedlings, free. Our civilians receive no humanitarian assistance. Efforts by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to supply much need relief aid have been undermined by the rebel NPRC. The rebel NPRC behaves as if we are despicable aliens from another planet and not Sierra Leoneans. We bear all these deprivations with equanimity and a collective sense of purpose. We have not lost our sense of humanity.

We have learnt the value of treating captives and prisoners of war with utmost civility. Our ranks keep swelling daily. We have no need to conscript by force. Forced conscription is an inferior method which tends to pose security risk in the long run. Those forcibly conscripted, when they manage to escape, lead enemy troops back to locations they are familiar with. Experience and honesty have been our best teacher.

We do exercise limited martial rule in our liberated zone for the sake of internal security. We are religiously Godly in our bearings and beliefs. We enjoy communal prayers and communication twice daily and on all occasions prayers are said both in the Islamic and Christian ways. The people, through their own initiative, have removed doctrinal differences from their way of worship. They say if there is one God/Allah then there ought to be one congregation. In respect of this awakening there has emerged the Jungle United Christian Council (JUCC) and the Jungle United Muslim Council (JUMC). The different divisions in Islam and Christianity respectively worship under one roof and under the guidance of a Chief Imam or Priest and a church Mother.

We survive by hunting, gathering and vigorous rice farming. We tend the cocoa, coffee and palm fruit and fruit farms and we find ways to barter them for drugs, clothes, footwear, supplementary food items, schooling materials and of course, radios, music cassettes and batteries. Sometimes we have the presence of mind to indulge our young ones with sweets and toys.

It is our collective sense of purpose, the ideals and ideas we believe in and discipline that

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have brought us so close to Freetown. Often times towns have fallen to our advancing troops without a single shot being fired. The rebel NPRC troops run away leaving behind quantities of weapons and ammunition. We are blessed by God/Allah because of our just cause.

It has become crucial that the world knows that there is something happening in the Sierra Leone countryside. A change for the better has gripped Sierra Leone. A consciousness of ourselves as an enterprising people has developed because of the self-reliant struggle. We are daily diversifying our stock of food and eating habits. We are discovering new nutritional values in the flora and fauna that we have grown to respect as our embodiment. We have become pro-active conservationists as we live close to and by the soil, rivers, streams, hills, valleys and mountains. In effect, we have come to know our country better and understand the potential of its pristine flora and fauna and the resources that lie underneath our soil. The developing consciousness is all embracing and enriching. We continue to say that we are blessed and by God/Allah. We are therefore guided by a liberation theology consistent with our pride in ourselves as Africans.

No more shall the rural countryside be reduced to hewers of wood and drawers of water for urban Freetown. That pattern of exploitation, degradation and denial is gone forever. No RUF/SL combatant or civilian will countenance the re-introduction of that pattern of raping the countryside to feed the greed and caprice of the Freetown elite and their masters abroad. In our simple and humble ways we say, "No more slave and no more master." It is these very exploitative measures instituted by so-called central governments that create the conditions for resistance and civil uprising. The importation of the "apartheid dogs of war", Executive Outcomes, to strengthen the chosen policy of war by the rebel NPRC is a case in point. What irks the population most is the fact that these mercenaries are business men to the boot and they are mining away the non-renewable resource of diamonds. If they came to fight the RUF/SL that would not have bothered the population because they know that the "apartheid dogs of war" will be handled the same way the Gurkhas were disgraced to a man on the battlefield.

As much as we continue to seek a peaceful solution to our internal civil conflict we do not at the same time seek to become a casualty of peace. We have every reason to mistrust military juntas and particularly those who are waging war against us, even if they have mutated into mufti-Presidents. How they came to power and how they manage their countries are a matter for their own people. With Sierra Leone, our people continue to say no to the rotten system of the All People's Congress (APC) party which the rebel NPRC has inherited as a matter of course because they were the watchdogs of the APC government.

We continue to appeal to Guinea, Nigeria, Ghana and Britain not to interfere. We have put these concerns to song and sing them knowing that the people of these countries do not support the warring policies of the ruling elite. In this respect, we find it so reasonable to make a simple demand that all foreign troops, including military and intelligence advisers and trainers leave the soil of Sierra Leone to give the required space for Sierra Leoneans to settle their own internal conflict. The presence of foreign troops and the importation of mercenaries indicate a continuation of a policy of war and the choice of the military option. It signals that all the declared intentions of the rebel NPRC for a negotiated settlement have been mere prattles. This also justifies our conviction that the hopes of our people for an enriching and enterprising democratic culture cannot be placed in the hands of a military junta.

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As a practical demonstration of our commitment to peace we call for a universal arms embargo to be placed on Sierra Leone forthwith. We herein appeal to the United Nations Security Council to seize itself of the grave matter of the spread of small arms and the planting of anti-personnel mines. The constant use of heavy artillery and cluster bombs have devastated the countryside. We demand an arms embargo now in anticipation of the problems associated with disarmament and demobilisation. The RUF/SL is confident that it can disarm its freedom fighters as soon as it becomes necessary to do so. Our stringent discipline is such that every single bullet is recorded and accounted for.

The RUF/SL is open to dialogue and has consistently demonstrated this fact by risking to meet with representatives of independent civic groups, peace movements, labour unions, teachers, students, professional bodies, religious leaders and chiefs and elders. In late 1994 we risked to meet with a Freetown-based peace group at the Mano River bridge but a scouting jet bomber forced us to abandon that contact. In September 1995, we entertained the idea of trying another meeting and went ahead and spoke with some political leaders and peace activists. An independent delegation being put together was rudely interfered with by the rebel NPRC which objected to the inclusion of certain personalities. Such is the character of military juntas that seek to control every aspect of national life in order to feel secure.

The RUF/SL seeks the path of peace. In this respect, our unilateral declaration of cease-fire announced in April 1992, as soon as the rebelling government troops seized power from their masters, still stands. We remain steadfast to this cease-fire declaration so far as we are not attacked and the civil society is allowed to determine its own future, through a representative sovereign national conference leading to a people's constituent assembly which in turn would form a government of national unity.

We recognise that, even in the event of victory, they RUF/SL will have to sign a political, economic and social contract with the rest of society in keeping with the demands of democratic governance. We are democrats and we stand for progress through work and happiness. The New Sierra Leone we are striving for can only be built by the combined energy and industry of all Sierra Leoneans and others of good will in a programme of work and happiness drawn up by the empowered people to create that essential wealth vital to the elimination of the scourge of poverty and human degradation.

Our liberation ideology and theology are therefore clear and unambiguous.

Foday Saybana Sankoh

The Zogoda
Sierra Leone

What Are We Fighting For?

We continue to fight because we are tired of being perpetual victims of state sponsored poverty and human degradation visited on us by years of autocratic rule and militarism. But, we shall exercise restraint and continue to wait patiently at the rendez-vous of peace - where we shall all be winners. We are committed to peace, by any means necessary, but what we are not committed to is becoming victims of peace. We know our cause to be just and God/Allah will never abandon us in our struggle to reconstruct a new Sierra Leone.

(Foday Saybana Sankoh)

5/26/03

We are fighting for a new Sierra Leone. A new Sierra Leone of freedom, justice and equal opportunity for all. We are fighting for democracy and by democracy we mean equal opportunity and access to power to create wealth through free trade, commerce, agriculture, industry, science and technology. Wealth cannot be created without power. Power cannot be achieved without struggle. And by struggle, we mean the determination, the humanistic urge to remove the shame of poverty, hunger, disease, squalor, illiteracy, loafing and hopelessness from this African land of Sierra Leone blessed with minerals, forests, rivers, and all that is required to restore the dignity, prestige and power of the African as an equal competitor on the world stage. This is what we are fighting for and this is why we are fighting to save Sierra Leone. For, a society has already collapsed when majority of its youth can wake up in the morning with nothing to look up for.

Why the Armed Struggle?

We have chosen the long and winding road (footpaths and by-passes) to democratic salvation. Sooner or later the citizens of Freetown, Bo and Kenema shall wake up to our call and with brooms and dusters, buckets and pans, sticks and stones, they will rid themselves of the rotten APC system along with its watchdogs, including the apartheid dogs. (*Foday Saybana Sankoh*)

Why not, when those who by our votes or default use state power to enrich themselves by accumulating wealth and property in foreign lands while teachers, doctors, nurses, civil servants, the police, soldiers and workers are not paid for weeks and months? And what happens to them, their children and other dependants, when they say "enough is enough" and ask for what is theirs? And what happens to them when in addition they demand wages they can survive on? What happens to them when they point out the fact that it is immoral for those who hold state power to run down the health services and go abroad periodically for medical check-up with all expenses paid out of state funds? What happens to those journalists and press houses who take up the cause of the suffering and denied and comment on it?

What did the All People's Congress (APC) regime do in response to the above? Where were the avenues and channels of protest, mediation and restitution? Why did the youth, particularly school children, take to the streets in support of their striking parents? And what happened to these school children who life had taught that if they did not stand up then they would be the next victims of the collapsing society where their seniors graduate without hopes of job and any form of social security; where their parents cannot make ends meet? The APC regime both under Siaka Stevens and Joseph Saidu Momoh showed "them where power lies."

Whenever society complained about their state of poverty, hunger, disease and hopelessness, the security forces were deployed against them. Intimidation, violence and threats of violence were used to control and contain the anger and frustrations of the suffering people. The APC regime will intimidate the people by a show of force with guns to "show the people where power lies". It is experience that has taught the suffering Africans of Sierra Leone that power lies in the gun and whoever controls the guns controls the means of suppression and the means to steal the wealth of the country. And the only way to stop this corruption of power is for the people to take up arms in order to take back their power and use this power to create wealth for themselves and generations to come by reconstructing a new African society in Sierra Leone consistent with the highest ideals of our glorious past and the challenges of the modern world we live in.

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What we are saying is that the only way to a democratic future for all the Africans of Sierra Leone lies in the abolishment of militarism and dictatorship. And the only force that can defeat militarism and dictatorship is the armed force of the suffering people as expressed in a guerilla campaign. The guerrilla is the people in arms. It is the guerrilla who removes the fear imposed on society by the uniformed "men in arms". These watchdogs' of the corrupt and rotten APC regime are still with in the form of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).

With continued pressure from below and also from the international community Siaka Stevens transferred power to Joseph Momoh who would protect Stevens and his stolen wealth from the angry population. The pressure continued under Momoh who responded with cosmetic reforms which were not far-reaching enough to transform the whole of society. Momoh was playing with the intelligence of the voting population by initiating an electoral process that would ensure the continued hold on power of the APC. It was at this juncture in March 1991 that the RUF/SL came out in the open and stated categorically that there will never be elections under Momoh. The RUF/SL demanded a process towards genuine democratic transformation of society within ninety days or the Momoh militaristic regime would be removed by force of arms. The APC scorned the RUF/SL and provided the spark that set off the armed challenge on 23 March 1991.

It was the successful challenge of the militaristic APC regime by the armed uprising of the historically denied and exploited countryside which brought a strain in the hitherto impregnable APC political machinery. The young, disaffected and demoralised soldiers who were deployed against the RUF/SL freedom fighters received education from RUF/SL vanguards at the frontline. We were patient with the government soldiers. We spoke to them and pricked their consciences as to why they were fighting us as we all were suffering at the hands of their commanders and politicians they kept in power with their guns. Why should they be fighting their own suffering brothers? We pointed out to them that for the first time they were out of the security of Freetown and the barracks into the insecurity and poverty of the countryside. They were now getting to know their country and they could see for themselves what all the diamonds and gold taken from the countryside have done to the environment and the people. The land has been despoiled and the irresponsible and corrupt mining magnates leave the villagers only with the gift of pits and craters that breed mosquitoes, malaria and cholera. Farmlands are destroyed in the insatiable quest for diamonds and gold. The only way out of their cringing poverty is for the youth and able to yield to the false attraction of urban and cosmopolitan life. We opened their eyes to the widening cycle of poverty and degradation and the increasing opulence of the very few. We encouraged them to rebel. We encouraged them to desert. We encouraged them to join us.

Some did join the RUF/SL. Some left the army. It will be dishonest to attribute this education process to the RUF/SL alone. We believe that the ECOMOG experience in Liberia fertilised the minds of these young government soldiers.

By this process of education and armed struggle the RUF/SL strategically weakened the apparatus of government on which the APC rested. Panic struck the political apparatus and the loyalty of the armed forces was broken by hard economic realities. The unpaid, ill-armed and disgruntled front-line government troops, who had benefitted from RUF/SL political education and ideology, one day decided to leave the hard life of the bush to Freetown to demand their earned income and also to complain about their neglect by their commanders. Emboldened by a new consciousness and "the power of the gun" these young soldiers took to the streets of Freetown and to their surprise the military General turned President, Joseph Saidu Momoh and his APC stalwarts, took to flight at the mere sight of

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the barrel of the gun. The Commander-in-Chief really knew "where power lies". The young soldiers seized state power by virtue of its concentration in Freetown. In effect Freetown was Sierra Leone and has always been Sierra Leone, like Monrovia was Liberia and Port au Prince was Haiti.

How did RUF/SL react to the coup d'état later to be led by ECOMOG/Liberia war veteran, Captain Valentine Strasser-King? The leader, Foday Saybana Sankoh, called a public meeting of the chiefs, elders, religious leaders and citizenry of Kailahun district. This is what ensued. Sankoh told them that he brought the war to remove the rotten APC system and now that the APC had been removed by their own brothers in arms peace must be sought and the war brought to an end to pave way for national reconciliation, reconstruction and development. Sankoh frankly told the gathering of his mistrust of coup-makers and military rulers but he was willing to stretch an olive arm for peace, development and progress if the gathering advised him to do so. The chiefs and elders asked for three days to think over matters.

They gathered again to listen to the chiefs and elders. They said they promised and offered him support to wage a liberation war and also to rebuild the country after victory and peace. Their conviction remained the same and if he felt that it was time for peace, he had their support, and if he felt the liberation war should continue, he had their support. Sankoh, after reflection, told the gathering that it was time for peace and with their blessing he would approach the coup leaders and ask for peace talks backed by a unilateral declaration of cease-fire.

Sankoh communicated the offer of the olive branch and peace by radio to the young soldiers and some senior officers, who knew him personally. They reacted positively and particularly to the unilateral declaration of cease-fire. We proposed a representative and sovereign national conference of all Sierra Leoneans at a mutually accessible location to present a way forward for the bringing into being a new Sierra Leone.

The coup-makers promised to get back to us. The next thing we heard over the air was what amounted to summoned visits to the military rulers of Ghana and Nigeria, J J Rawlings and I B Babangida respectively. They returned to Freetown and without coming back to the RUF/SL announced a continuation of the APC policy of war. Assured of sponsorship, the young coup leaders opted for a military solution and made the defeat and extermination of the RUF/SL as their priority. It is said that birds of the same feathers flock together. It is sad that West Africa was under the boots of military dictators at that historical period and the NPRC chose to go the way of all dictators. The RUF/SL has been defending itself, ever since, from unprovoked military operations with various enthusiastic cod names (like Operation Clean Sweep for Kono district; Operation Destroy All for Kailahun district and Operation Locate and Destroy, to name a few).

The RUF/SL waited and hoped that the international community would wake up to the implications of the continuation of a policy of war. Locked up in the forest with no access to the outside world we could not communicate our frustrations and fears. We hoped that the junta would not be recognised in the light of the global call for democracy and good governance. We believed that the international climate did not favour coups and waited in anticipation for denunciations and condemnations.

Why, we continue to fight?

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Each generation has the onerous task to judge the performance of its institutions, particularly the government. The African people of Sierra Leone evaluated the performances of the APC regime and the consensus was that in order to save the nation from its perennial political, social and economic predicament, the entrenched systems could only be changed by the armed uprising of the people imbued with a clear ideology. And now what do we see? The watchdogs of the rotten APC system, the army, is standing in the way of the chosen path of the people, organised in their guerilla action. The struggle continues... (*Revised Basic Document of RUF/SL*)

We conferred again among ourselves and it dawned on us that it was suicidal to place the hopes of a society struggling to free itself from state sponsored poverty, denial and degradation in the hands of military rulers. And that militarism is an anathema to democracy. As liberation fighters it was unbecoming of us to have misread the situation. We therefore embarked on a serious study of coups and liberation movements and the historical tendency of the military holding on to power by any means necessary became obvious to us. The military can never be trusted. Nigeria under military rule points very well to the way of all military dictators. But, the African people of Sierra Leone do not want half-way measures to democracy. The African continues to be schooled to be satisfied with inferior measures, mediocre leaders and with crumbs from the tables of slave masters and plantation owners. The sickening mind-set of the "house niger" remains with us and it is only such a mentality that can import "apartheid dogs" to extract wealth, in diamonds, from a bleeding nation. Militarism and autocratic rule continue to stand in the way of the suffering African masses whose only salvation lies in democracy secured through their own seizure and protection of state power.

This seeks to explain our mistrust of the APC watchdogs, NPRC, and all military regimes. We accept our failure in explaining ourselves to that we can gain the support and understanding of all democratic forces and governments. The RUF/SL has been demonised and continues to be referred to as bandits even by no other international personality as James Jonah, a former UN under-Secretary General, who is now supposed to be an independent and neutral electoral commissioner. In order to justify their policy of war the NPRC must continue to demonise the RUF/SL. In order to gain support from the international community the NPRC must continue to demonise the RUF/SL. How long can this continue? How long will the international community allow itself to be misled and used by the military junta whose claim to power has been confined to Freetown ever since it seized this town, by default, from its masters, the APC?

By lending recognition to the NPRC military junta, in a civil war situation, ECOWAS, dominated by military rulers, set a pattern for the OAU and UN to follow without critical examination of the consequences. A military incursion, civil uprising and sustained pro-democracy campaigns bring to question as well as challenge the centres of power and governance in a given nation state. In a successful guerrilla campaign, in the light of a full blown civil war, there the only source of strength and capability to engage the guerilla movement lies in external support and interests, the national capacity to resolve the conflict is removed by these very same external forces and interests. For it is their presence and contribution which prolong the civil conflict by ever confusing the balance of power on the ground. A state of permanent war develops only to the benefit of the hawkers of military hardware and those who benefit from the arms trade.

The rebel NPRC seized power from its masters whose hold on the country was the symbolism of the state capital. This is what the APC watchdogs (NPRC) have inherited. The APC watchdogs exercise no governance or administrative control over the whole of Sierra Leone. They can only extract taxes and custom duties in Freetown. The rebel NPRC

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can only play the game of governing without governance at the behest of its military backers. It is the blind recognition of these APC watchdogs by the international community which fuels the civil war situation in Sierra Leone. ECOWAS, OAU, Commonwealth, European Union and the UN have no business lending recognition to military regimes in the wake of Nigeria and Zaire. If the international community through pressure or through direct intervention can act in Haiti, Sao Tome and Principe and the Comoro Islands then it is not too late to act in Sierra Leone. The hopes of democracy in Africa cannot be placed in the hands of military juntas and mufti-Presidents.

The rebel NPRC, brought up and fed on the rotten and corrupt culture of its masters, the APC, like the proverbial house niger, can only mimick the habits of its masters. The rebel

NPRC conjures opponents and executes them. The rebel NPRC jails and harasses journalists, closes down press houses, takes away the daily bread of presumed potential political opponents, and it has unleashed a pack of spies, informers and security agents on the population of Freetown. Freetown has reverted to slave town under the whip and boots of Captain Valentine Strasser-King and his cohorts. All our minerals are still unaccounted for and like Siaka Stevens when a valuable gemstone is found they jump into a plane and shoot off the Europe to sell the diamonds trusting no one but themselves. The greed and rush to accumulate wealth and property is such that even the elder Strasser-King works in the Executive Outcomes' controlled diamond fields as a commander. A thief is always a thief and those who steal power can steal the wealth of a country, like Mobutu of Zaire and Bokasa of Central African Republic. And when foreign diplomats, like the German, Karl Prinz, complain about corruption, human rights abuse and denial of civil liberties they are forced to be recalled.

In short, the rebel NPRC is cast in the image of its masters, the APC and it continues to be the watchdog of the APC rotten system that it plans to play musical chairs with. And who else would fall for this politricks but the same old politicians? The politicians are lending themselves to be used by the APC watchdogs to solve the problem faced by all military rulers and autocrats - the problem of legitimation and succession. It is therefore not an accident that Rawlings' neo-colonial castle has become the second home of the APC watchdogs. These politicians dancing to the tune of the rebel NPRC should seek advice from the politicians in Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea and Togo. We, the African people of Sierra Leone, do not want this curse to afflict us for we have suffered enough and continue to suffer under the rotten APC system. We are tired of the state sponsored poverty and degradation. We are tired of our children dying of preventable diseases. We are tired of drinking muddy water. We are tired of our rural folks being exploited day in and day out and not by apartheid dogs brought into the diamond areas by the APC watchdogs. These dogs are not only exploiting the wealth of the countryside but they are planting anti-personnel mines all over. What do they care about peace and the problems and challenges of peacetime reconstruction?

Against this background, patriotic and democratically-minded Africans of Sierra Leone are left with the option of armed struggle to remove the rotten APC system now bolstered by apartheid dogs.

It is also against this background of twenty-five years of APC misrule and its continuation by the rebel NPRC that the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone was and is still conceptualised and transformed into action by mobilising and organising patriotic Africans of Sierra Leone; the marginalised, neglected and excluded of society, intellectuals, workers, professionals, members of the armed forces and police, students, traders, farmers, chiefs and

elders and people of all shades of opinion for a protracted and sustained armed struggle to remove the rotten APC system. A rotten system cannot be reformed. When a society demands change there is no need attempting to change it on old principles.

Each generation has the onerous task to judge the performance of its institutions, particularly the government. The African people of Sierra Leone evaluated the performances of the APC regime and the consensus was that in order to save the nation from its perennial political, social and economic predicament, the entrenched system could only be changed by the armed uprising of the people imbued with a clear ideology.

The Ideas and Ideals We Believe In

We seek preventive solutions to our endemic state of poverty and hopelessness. We deplore squalor and poverty. There is no virtue in being poor for God/Allah created us in the majesty of his own image. Poverty dishonors Allah/God. Poverty is a human imposed affliction which only the redeemed, organized and empowered population can eradicate. (*Foday Saybana Sankoh*)

The RUF/SL is committed to democratic ideals and holds as sacrosanct the right of a people to organise themselves to re-take power when a government fails to be representative and sustaining in all intent and purpose. Through the armed struggle we, the African people of Sierra Leone, have chosen not to fold our arms and sit on the fence while our society collapses in front of us. We have chosen to act to remove a rotten system and to own and champion our destiny. In pursuance, therefore, of the sacred objective of total empowerment of the people for genuine democratic order or culture, the RUF/SL has divided the struggle into three phases:

One: "Arms to the People "

Believing that it is an organised and informed people who constitute the motive force of any political and economical revolution, the RUF/SL has trained a large number of men and women including the elderly, youth, children and the disabled from all corners of Sierra Leone and given them arms to mantle the corrupt APC system and its sordid successors. This phase is currently being vigorously pursued and the RUF/SL will not relent until the task is accomplished. The RUF/SL believes that the possession of arms should not be the monopoly of a privileged group. Everybody should be a fighter to defend their rights.

Two: "Power to the People"

The RUF/SL has abiding faith in the necessity of democratic empowerment of the people in order to wipe out the scourge of poverty and human degradation that affects us as a people. The power to initiate policies, and to make decisions must be the preserve of the people. Politics, the RUF/SL is convinced, is the process by which the people provide the standards of judgment and choose the government officials to apply them so as to get results that will not be intolerable to any section of the community.

Political power can only stand the test of time when it originates from the people themselves. This is the kind of political power the RUF/SL aspires for. All local government structures are going to be overhauled so that everybody participates fully and actively in the decision making and implementing processes according to their ability. RUF/SL's mission is to redeem Sierra Leone from economic, political and social enslavement and to radically bring about a change of positive attitudes so that people will live as humans

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should in an enabling environment.

Three: "Wealth to the People"

We all know that Sierra Leone is endowed with natural resources that would have ranked us as one of the richest in the West African sub-region. Yet, the mass of our people live in state sponsored squalor and our children denied a brighter future. We have a clique, a handful of unscrupulous elite, who enjoy our resources. This horrendous situation cannot be allowed to continue if posterity should live meaningful lives. We either destroy this horrible system or we perish by it.

When the RUF/SL voices out the slogan "Wealth to the People" this is what it means. It means that the people should empower themselves in order to harness their resources and use them for their own survival and development. The natural resources are the natural property of the people, therefore, the exploitation of these God/Allah given resources must be to their natural benefit. In the past we have seen how our resources have been snatched from us by small selfish groups. The wealth of this blessed nation of ours belongs to all of society. It should not be monopolised by anybody.

As stated clearly in the **Basic Document of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL): The Second Liberation of Africa**, prepared in 1989:

"We can no longer leave the destiny of our country in the hands of a generation of crooked politicians and military adventurers who, everyday since independence, have proved beyond all reasonable doubt that they are inefficient, irresponsible and corrupt. Posterity will never forgive us if we sit passively by while a few desperate men and women, who are nothing but an organised bunch of criminals, continue to despoil, rape and loot the people's wealth. It is our right and duty to challenge and change the present political system in the name of salvation and liberation. We must build a political system over which we, the oppressed people of Sierra Leone, must have absolute control. It must be reflective of our needs and aspirations; a political system that will give maximum priority to popular participation and control. This task is the historical responsibility of every patriot. We must be prepared to struggle until the decadent, backward and oppressive regime is thrown into the dustbin of history. We call for a national democratic revolution - involving the total mobilization of all progressive forces. The secret behind the survival of the existing system is our lack of organisation. What we need then is organised challenge and resistance. The strategy and tactics of this resistance will be determined by the reaction of the enemy forces - force will be met with force, reasoning with reasoning and dialogue with dialogue.

The economic crisis today is enough evidence to justify the level of determination. We are told that our foreign debt stands over one billion dollars. What happened to the money? Mismanagement, poor economic planning and shameless thievery of public wealth stand as the root causes of the loans having no impact. The 'voucher gate' and 'squandergate' phenomena have assumed a more frightening proportion under the much defamed regime of 'new order'.

We are determined, through our collective struggle, to liberate the economy from all forms of domination, both local and foreign. The wealth of the land belongs to the people.

The parasitic and unscrupulous few will have to live or perish on the people's terms. A

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people and environmental friendly, self-reliant, flexible and interdependent economy is our goal. The major sectors of the economy; agriculture, mining, industry and energy will have to feed each other in the noble task of national reconstruction. Cash crops production in itself does not help in the anti-neo-colonial struggle for genuine independence. This is because the crops goes to feed the industries of Europe and North America. In turn, we buy finished products at incredibly high cost. In the end we produce what we don't consume and consume what we don't produce. The centuries of unequal exchange can be corrected only through an integrated economic program that is designed, tailored, suited and implemented to fulfill and satisfy our internal, sub-regional, African and Pan-African needs and aspirations.

The RUF/SL position on the social plight is a radical social transformation of our society. To achieve this, the RUF calls for a cultural revolution whose main objective will be the liberation of our minds to instill in everyone of us a high sense of African patriotism. The building of alternative social structures created by the people and for the people is the only way to destroy the existing corrupt and rotten ones.

There is a need for a complete overhauling of the present educational system. The prevailing system is a major contributing factor to our current state of industrial and technological backwardness. The educational system was initially a colonial imposition, which did not take into consideration the aspirations and needs of our people. The sole intention was to train passive and obedient Africans to man the colonial state structure. What was expected of any serious minded African ruling class was to radically alter the inherited educational system immediately after the attainment of independence. In our country, the ruling class simply continued from where the British colonialist left. Now it has become a common dictum of the APC ruling class that education is a privilege and not a right.

The way to end exploitation and oppression, economic and social injustice, ignorance, backwardness and superstition is to make education available to all - both the young and old, male and female, and also the disabled. We need to create a new educational system that is more purposeful, dynamic and relevant, which will take into consideration the demands of the present scientific and technological world and value of research, critical thinking and creativity."

In summary, from the conceptualisation of the revolution, the RUF/SL has firmly believed in the organized power of the people as the motive force critical to the radical transformation of society and in our particular circumstances in the reconstruction of a new Sierra Leone. It is with this conviction that the RUF/SL has mobilized the people to pursue the armed struggle to bring about the demise of the decadent system. Every citizen in the liberated zone is made responsible for the security of the zone by the formation of a civil defense unit.

The RUF/SL believes that the new Sierra Leone cannot afford to keep a standing army for the defence of the state, because the experience has shown that a state army is manipulated by dictators to perpetuate their regimes and terrorise the people. What the RUF/SL is doing now during the "Arms to the People" phase is the development of a nucleus of a people's defence system, wherein every citizen will be equipped to defend the state at any time so no one person or a cabal of conspirators can monopolise the tools of physical violence.

The RUF/SL revolution is a democratic revolution whose aim is to create the enabling space

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for the democratic empowerment of the people. It is only an organised people who can liberate themselves from political suppression and economic exploitation.

It is the aspiration of the RUF/SL that the new Sierra Leone will decide on an economic policy that is consistent with our national and Pan-Africanist interest. We must seek not to be polarised to either state capitalism or private capitalism, instead, the RUF/SL believes, we must seek enabling and turn-key partnership with investors in the exploitation of the natural resources. It must be a partnership which leaves no opening for anybody to claim economic hegemony over others.

The RUF/SL is of the conviction that both political and economic powers are inalienable rights of the people. In recognition of this fundamental principle, the RUF/SL has encouraged and motivated the people in the liberated zone to form administrative structures through which they can effectively manage their resources and direct the course of the armed struggle to its successful conclusion.

This is our vision for in the period of the second liberation of Sierra Leone. Our mission therefore is to contribute to the task of total political and economic liberation and unification of Africa.

159) Map

Map of Freetown

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160) Government Notice

Government Notice 272 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997)



The Sierra Leone Gazette

(Extraordinary)
Published by Authority

VOL. CXXVIII

WEDNESDAY, 31ST DECEMBER, 1997

No. 69

FREETOWN, 31st December, 1997

Govt. Notice No. 271

The following are published as supplement to this number of the *Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary*:—

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 15 of 1997

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Detention) Order, 1997 under the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997).

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 16 of 1997

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Detention) Order, 1997 under the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997).

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 17 of 1997

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Detention) Order, 1997 under the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997).

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 18 of 1997

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Detention) Order, 1997 under the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997).

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 19 of 1997

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Detention) Order, 1997 under the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997).

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 20 of 1997

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Detention) Order, 1997 under the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997).

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 21 of 1997

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Detention) Order, 1997 under the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997).

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 22 of 1997

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Detention) Order, 1997 under the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997).

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
Annual Subscription:—Inland—Le90,000.00, Overseas—Le300,000.00

To be purchased from the Government Bookshop, Wallace Johnson Street, Freetown. Price:—Le1,000.00 G.P. C/1570/97/1,200/12.97.

PUBLIC NOTICE, No. 57 of 1997.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Detention) Order, 1997 under the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (P.N. No. 3 of 1997).

ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

Govt. Notice No. 272

ADMINISTRATION OF SIERRA LEONE
(ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) PROCLAMATION, 1997

(P.N. No. 3 of 1997)

P.N. No. 3 of 1997. Pursuant to sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 1 of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997, the following person is a member of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council with effect from the 25th day of May, 1997—

Staff-Sergeant Alex T. Brima *Member*

DATED this 31st day of December, 1997.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Govt. Notice No. 273

ADMINISTRATION OF SIERRA LEONE
(ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) PROCLAMATION, 1997

(P.N. No. 3 of 1997)

P.N. No. 3 of 1997. Pursuant to sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 1 of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997, the following person is a member of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council with effect from the 18th day of October, 1997—

Haroun S. Sankoh *Member*

DATED this 31st day of December, 1997.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Govt. Notice No. 274

ADMINISTRATION OF SIERRA LEONE
(ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) PROCLAMATION, 1997

(P.N. No. 3 of 1997)

P.N. No. 3 of 1997. Pursuant to sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 1 of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997, the following persons are members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council with effect from the 8th day of December, 1997—

Madam Kai Bangura *Member*
Mrs. Kadi Sawyerr *Member*

DATED this 31st day of December, 1997.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
Chairman,
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

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161) Report
RUF G-5 Central Command, Makeni to Regional I.O. Commander
17 September 1999
This exhibit will be filed later

5280

162) Report
Sierra Leone People's Army – Makeni
G-5 Command to Lt. Gandi
13 October 1999
This exhibit will be filed later

5281.

163) Report

G-5 Report

Not dated

This exhibit will be filed later

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164) Report

Restricted Report from the Sierra Leone People's Army G-5 Central Command

18 October 1999

This exhibit will be filed later

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165) Notice

Notice from Revolutionary United Front Headquarters in Makeni to "Functional RUF Authorities"

13 July 2000

This exhibit will be filed later

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166) Memo
Memorandum to Honourable S.B. Khanu, Ops Kono
22 August 1997

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AFRC SECRETARIAT

FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL

TO: HONOURABLE S. B. KHANU, OPS, KONO

REF: SG/AFRC/02A


DATE: 22nd AUGUST 1997

REDEPLOYMENT - HON. S. B. KHANU

1. I write under the instructions of His Excellency the Chairman, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Head of State and Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council to have you Honourable S. B. Khanu (55) be immediately withdrawn from Kono.

(B.K. padlock 55)

2. By copy of this letter, you are to move to Freetown with your men.


A. K. SESAY
Colonel
Secretary-General

cc: H. E. The Chairman and Head of State

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167) Record of Meeting
Supreme Council Meeting, Minutes dated 23 January 1998

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AFRC - SECRETARIAT

Minutes of Meeting held on the 9th December, 1997

Ref: SG/AFRC/02

23rd January, 1998

See Distribution:

Present:

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------|------------------|---|-----------------------|
| 1. | HON. | ABU SANKOH | - | PLO I |
| 2. | " | TAMBA ALEX BRIMA | - | PLO II <i>GULLITT</i> |
| 3. | CAPT | SAJ MUSA | - | CSOS |
| 4. | LT-COL | ISSAC H SESAY | | |
| 5. | COL | ISSAC MOREGO | | |
| 6. | COL | MIKE LAMIN | | |
| 7. | MAJ | MORRIES KANOU | | |
| 8. | MR | GEORGE ADAMS | | |
| 9. | MR | MOSES D KABIA | - | CSO-AFRC |
| 10. | MR | BRIMA KAMARA | | |
| 11. | WOII | SAMUEL KARGBO | | |
| 12. | HON | SB KHANU (55) | | |
| 13. | HON. | TAMBA GBORIE | | |
| 14. | COL | AK SESAY | - | Secretary |

INTRODUCTION

ACTION

1. The Chairman allowed Hon. Gborie to explain to members the events that led to a scuffle that he had with some security men manning the Chairman's gate. He was advised to maintain his status as Honourable and avoid such awful confrontations.
2. The Chairman reassured members that the problem in the Armed Forces will soon be over, and alerted all members to remain security conscious. He called on Colonel Issac to ensure that he brings in more of his men to Freetown in readiness for any eventuality.
3. On the question of sanctions, he urged members to work assiduously in the interest of the people. He noted that sanctions are biting and so modalities are being worked out to bring in humanitarian assistance and medicine to help our people who have been needlessly made to suffer.
4. The Chairman cautioned members to be very careful in the manner they entertain themselves as it is likely to give wrong signals to the public.

ACTION

- 5. He drew the attention to the PLO II to the misguided rumours about the rice business his wife is alleged to be involved in.
- 6. The Chairman elaborated on the problems the AFRC is faced with as the world is against us. However, he wondered by what miracle we keep getting on. He intimated members that he had been able to make contact with some businessmen in Dakar to work on the modalities to bring in Rice and Petroleum products. He emphasised that council members can be helpful in identifying stores where rice and other commodities are stored and ask the police to take appropriate action. He asked the PLOs to organise the Honourables in consultation with the SOS Trade so that they can divide the City into Zones for effective monitoring.
- 7. Members discussed extensively on the possible method of solving the current political impasses, however, he made it clear to all that under the current situation the Army must not be allowed to go without rice.
- 8. On the question of the Hotels, the Chairman observed that most of the Hotels have been looted and considered the need to provided security to save the remaining items.
- 9. The Chairman observed with extreme concern that the route along which the power pylons pass, could possibly be used by the enemy and therefore advised that the Army takes appropriate action.

DECISION

- 10. It was decided that Security must be provided for the hotels to save the remaining items that have not been looted.
- 11. It was decided that the army must surveillance the route along which the pylon pass to avoid posible use by the enemy.

SEC-GEN

SEC-GEN


A K Sesay
 Col
 Secretary General

Distribution:
 All Council Members
 Attorney General

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168) Memo
Memorandum from the G-5 Office, The People's Army
22 December 1997

FROM: The Office of the G-5, The Peoples'
Army of Sierra Leone - Freetown

TO: The Chairman and Head of State
H. E. Major J.P. Koroma
State House
Freetown

DATE: 22nd December 1997

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SITUATION REPORT ON SOME PARTS OF
KAILAHUN DISTRICT

The following personnel's of the Peoples' Army:

1. Capt. Patrick V. Lamin, The G-5 Commander
2. Madam Isatu Kallon - A Business Woman
3. Chief Tamba Boima of Kissi Kama Chiefdom
4. Cpl. Alpha Jalloh - Security and
5. Charles Kamara were part of a Government delegation headed by the Under Secretary of State Internal Affairs to deliver a special message from H.E. The head of State to the People of Kailahun District, to assess and suggest ways and means of rehabilitation of Government Departments and especially the Institutions of Chiefs in the District.

After a long briefing by the Secretary of State Internal Affairs in his office the delegation finally left Freetown on Thursday, the 11th December 1997 at 6:45 p.m. With some members of the delegation of the People's Army expressing dissatisfaction over: -

- a. conjection since there were few vehicles for the delegates and so we had to squeeze in the vehicles that were available
- b. A sum of Twenty five thousand leones was handed out to each delegate of the Peoples Army which we in turn gave our different dependants to up-keep them while we were away.

The head of the Peoples Army delegation Capt. ...
were happy to proceed on the trek after his sugar-coated speech to us. Having gone through a lot of hazards we finally arrived in Bo during the early morning hours of Friday 12th December, 1997. At about 10:30a.m. that morning we paid a courtesy call on the SOS South, Mr. A.F. Kamara whom we found to be a fine gentleman and dedicated member of our Revolution. He helped us recover from the events of the past night by discussing some of his struggles with corrupt officials in his Department in particular and the entire Department in general.. We were later joined by the former S.O.S. East Capt. E.J. Kanneh and we left Bo for Kenema almost immediately.

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In Kenema, our delegation drove up to the Residence of the SOS East. After some rest, we were invited to a meeting at the Office of the SOS East in Kenema. It was at this meeting that it was revealed to us that H.E. The Chairman gave a mission to the SOS East to proceed with two Guinean soldiers to Buedu to verify allegations that the Peoples Army was recruiting Guinean Nationals to launch an attack on the Guinean Government in collaboration with the son of the Late Guinean President, President Ahmed S. Toure. Our delegation hesitated since we could not go along with such a mission without the approval of Col. Sam Bockarie the battle Field Commander of the Peoples Army who was, as we were made to understand, giving a bloody nose to the Kamajors at Panguma and Tongo on that very day. We also saw, in the company of the SOS East some members of staff of the Radio and Television.

We were made to understand at this meeting also that they were on a special assignment to see whether our prisoners Capt. Philip Palmer and others were still alive and if so, the Radio and TV crew were to be granted permission to film and interview them. The head of the Peoples Army Delegation Capt. Patrick Vandi Lamin sent a radio message to Col. Sam Bockarie (alias Mosquito) informing him about the above situation. Col. Sam Bockarie expressed a desire to be present while the interviews were given for security reasons. He arrived from Tongo on the night of the 14th December 1997. After some long discussions with the SOS East, he agreed to go with us on these missions and to beef up the security, much to the relief of all delegates since there was a Kamajor threat at the Mano Junction. Segbwema road the previous night, Major S.F. Gortor the former Under Secretary of State Internal Affairs also said he would like to

Segbewema and invited Mr. Sulaiman Koroma, Assistant District Officer to join us. We all arrived in Pendembu at about 10:30 a.m. Monday 15th December 1997.

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In Pendembu, the following morning Madam Isatu Kallon held a brief meeting at the home of one of her close friends Madam Fatmata with some members of the womens wing in Pendembu. Madam Isatu Kallon disclose to the members of the Womens Wing that H.E. Major Johnny Paul Koroma sent them seasons greetings. She further stated that the Chairman and Head of State wants every body in Kailahun District in particular to be aware that RUF and AFRC are an embodiment of the People of Sierra Leone. We are one body and one soul. Madam Kallon told the women. In reaction to Madam Kallon's speech, the women expressed grieviances that H.E. Major Johnny P. Koroma cared more for the men than they the women because he sent vehicles to collect their men and left them behind to continue the struggle.

They were however, hopeful that since Madam Kallon was in Freetown, they would not be entirely forgotten. They were grateful to the Head of State for having considered them by including Md Isatu Kallon in this delegation. They said they realise the big challenge the AFRC Government is facing. They expressed solidarity with every effort the government is making to secure the release of our Leader Cpt. Foday Saybana Sankoh from detention in Nigeria. The delegation left that every day for Kailahun.

We arrive in Kailahun at about 11:15 a.m. and we were met by the Chiefdom Commander of Luawa Chiefdom. After exchanging customary greetings, Capt. Patrick Vandi Lamin expressed dismay over the poor attendance of the meeting since he had sent various radio messages to all G-5 commanders informing them about our mission to parts of the Kailahun District. Reacting, the Chiefdom Commander expressed his sincere apology to the delegation and said that the attendance was poor because of the news they got about the destruction the ALPHA Jet had caused a few days ago at Benduma a few miles from Daru. Capt. Lamin disclosed to the gathering that one of his daughters had being one of the victims killed in that bombardment at Benduma which is his home town. He told the people that God had sent H.E. Major Johnny

the grips of criminal and greedy politicians. We later witnessed the filming and interview of thirty four captured Kamajors in front of Bauya's compound in Kailahun.

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We noticed that the entire Town was badly damaged with several houses razed to the ground. The areas where the District Office and other offices stood were thick forests. Some people, however, have started returning to clean their homes and start life anew. We hope that before long more people will return to Kailahun which is thinly populated for now. The delegation later left for Buedu.

Buedu is the shabby and dusty chiefdom headquarter town of Kissi Tong chiefdom. We could not reach the Chiefdom Commander probably because he did not get our message. We were told that he resides at Benduma about four miles from Buedu. We saw a good number of houses erect but the town was temporarily deserted because we suspected the people were holding a Trade Fair along the banks of the river for several miles from Buedu. We were informed that our people exchanged some produce for valuable items of food stuffs and clothers. We could not wait for them because we had to go to Kangama, the Chiefdom Headquarter town of Kissi Teng Chiefdom.

Paramount Chief Tamba Jusu Gamawa is the Paramount Chief of Kissi Teng Chiefdom. He was captured by our fighting forces since 1991 and had stayed with us ever since. We would have loved to meet him at Kangama but he was visibly absent from the town. We later discovered that he was in fact playing host to our prisoners. Since he was away in his farm harvesting his rice, the authorities order that the prisoners be brought before the TV and radio crew for an interview and filming. The following people, Captain Philip Palmer, Fayia Musa, Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh, Dr. Mohamed Barrie and a Radio Operator Miss Juliet Gbassay James were paraded before the cameras and journalists who started working immediately.

Our delegation could not speak to the people Kangama on that day as we did not control our movements. Co. Sam Bockari who gave us a lift all the way to Kangama could not wait because he was in a hurry to return to the Kenema District to put down the activities of the Kamajors. Our delegation had only one vehicle which was used by

the Under Secretary of State and his assistant Tamba Boima, Madam Isatu Kallon and Charles Kamara told Col. Sam Bockari that we had a special mission for the area but we could not do it properly because we had no vehicles of our own. We asked the then Under Secretary of State, Internal Affairs if he could stay with us and accomplished our mission but he was in such a hurry to leave the area. We could not tell why he was in such a hurry to leave that area. So we had to return without accomplishing our mission for the lack of our own vehicle.

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ASSESSMENT

The administration of the entire district had broken down for nearly seven years now. The road condition is deplorable which is why the war started in that district. It was one of the most neglected district from Independence to the present day. The politicians sucked the district dry year in year out for the past thirty seven years, thus breeding a fertile ground for a Revolution. We were considered Sierra Leoneans when it was time to harvest our produce during the dry seasons. We are cut off from the rest of our country during the rainy seasons. At such times we looked up to Liberia and sometimes Guinea for our basic requirements. We could not even speak the Krio of Sierra Leone instead we speak the "Liberian English". This is part of the reasons why we are mistaken sometimes for Liberians. These and many many more reasons why we are so head-strong in putting down arms.

SUGGESTIONS

- (1) A delegation of this nature should be visiting the area frequently to prove that the new Government cares for the people.
- (2) A road network should be constructed to open up the district to the rest of the country so that communication with the rest of Sierra Leone could be possible at all times.
- (3) We suggest that the present leadership remain in power until unification and rehabilitation is effected so that we do not see those politicians who are responsible for our present plight show their ugly and corrupt faces to us at election times.

factories are necessary for the district because the plantations can readily feed these factories and at the same time easing unemployment and improving infrastructure in the district.

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- (5) With the sanctions and embargo imposed on us, a graded road between Koindu and Segbwema could fetch us fuel from neighbouring Liberia and Guinea in exchange for cocoa and coffee.
- (6) The Government should make arrangements for the people to return home now that the rains have hung limp. They could begin the process of rehabilitation within the country.
- (7) It will be in the interest of the Government if she could make arrangements for refugee in neighbourng Liberia return home after thorough screening. Refugees along the Moa river can wait until relationship between us and the Kamajors improves because most of the Kamajors in the country now are brought from our refugee in Guinea and brain-washed to join the Kamajor mulitia. We experience this situation while the outsted Government was in power.

The delegation left Kangama for Buedu where we were asked to wait for food and refreshment. While waiting for such good gestures since we were all hungry we heard the sound of the ALFA Jet and every body took to his or her heels. As a result the convoy had to seek shelter along the bushy part of the Buedu-Kailahun road and waited for food. We ate hastily and drove off to Pendembu via Kailahun. We hoped to pass the night at Pendembu but the delegation did not still recover from the rude shock the ALFA Jet opened us to and so the delegation travelled to Kenema. In that hurry one delegate was left behind that night. Mr. Charles Kamara had to pay his way all the way from Pendembu to Kenema where he found the rest of the delegation waiting for him.

Between Kenema and Bo we had series of break down with the vehicle the Peoples Army Delegation was travelling. The vehicle visited the garage several times in Bo without success. The then Under Secretary Internal Affairs grew impatient and

abandoned us. We were stranded as we had no money to pay for our trip home. Major S.F. Gottor told us before he left that he had spent all the money he had for us on that vehicle. Captain Patrick Vandi Lamin therefore contacted the S.O.S. South in Bo, Captain A.F. Kamara and he was kind enough to assist with ~~FIFTY~~ ⁵²⁹⁶ thousand leones as transport fare for the five members of our delegation. Before we could board another vehicle for the trip our vehicle emerged which we boarded. We drove up to about three miles to Taiama junction where the vehicle nearly caught fire. The vehicle broke down completely. All efforts to get it running again failed. We became stranded and night was falling. We had to push that vehicle up to Taiama junction where we found a good number of brave soldiers at Taiama junction headed by Lieutenant Kabia.

They put Lieutenant Koker who was urgently moving to his assignment area in Makeni on board an over loaded trailer. We were to wait for help from other vehicles plying the Bo/Freetown route. But there was no luck, Madam Isatu Kallon boarded a vehicle which conveyed her to mile Ninety-One for a fare of three thousand leones. Chief Tamba Boima and Charles Kamara had to pass the night at Taiama junction amidst the threats of Kamjors threatening to attack the area. We had a sleepless night but by the grace of God no Kamjor came.

The following morning Lieutenant Kabia asked some ladies to prepare some food for us before we continued our journey to Freetown downcast and dispirited. Captain Patrick Vandi Lamin and his security had journeyed on board another vehicle the previous night.

Faithfully submitted by:

Captain Patrick Vandi Lamin

Madam Isatu Kallon

Chief Tamba Boima

Alpha Jalloh and Charles Kamara

PEOPLES ARMY DELEGATION

cc: The Battle Group Commander

" Battie Field Commander

" G-1 Commander

" Col A.K. Sesay, Sec. Gen. AFRC.

" Col. Peter B. Vandi - S.L.P.A

" Madam Isatu Kallon

" File Copy

" War Council Chairman RUF - PEOPLES ARMY

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KAILAHUN DISTRICT

PLACES VISITED			
CHIEFDOMS	PARAMOUNT CHIEFS	REMARKS Deceased	ELECTED
Jawie	vacant	"	Brima John Bull
Luaua	vacant	"	Sallu Ensa (I) (Lamina)
Upper Bambara	vacant	"	Foday Adembaima
Kissi Kama	F.M. Jabbah *	"	Tamba Boima
Kissi Teng	Tamba Jusu Gamawa	-	Tamba Jusu Kamara
Kissi Tongi	Nyuma Sengu Sahr Kallon	-	Samuka Tamba
AREAS UNREACHED			
Dea	Thomas Ngaima	-	M.B. Jimmy Jajuah
Penguia	Francis S. Kabba Sei	-	
Jaluhun	M.B. Jimmy Jujuah	-	
Mandu	-	-	
Malema	-	-	
Yawei	-	-	
Peje Bongie	-	-	
Peje West	-	-	

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169) Letter
Ministry of Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs
7 October 1997

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**Ministry of Social Welfare, Children and Gender
Affairs**
9th Floor Youyi Building

Tel: 240-808
240-635

Tuesday, October 07, 1997

The Attorney General & Secretary of State
Judicial Affairs
Goerge Street, Freetown

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
RECEIVED
- 8 OCT 1997
Law Officers' Department

Dear Sir,

**Request to make a position statement on Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration of Children in arms**

I am pleased to inform you that, the Chairman and Head of State, AFRC, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, through the Ministry of Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs will be launching the programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of children in arms on Thursday 9th October, 1997 at the Miatta Conference Hall starting 10:00 a.m.

Our Ministry recognizes your role as a major stakeholder in this exercise and therefore requests that you make a position statement in relation to the disarmament of children in arms, at the Opening ceremony on Thursday 9th October, 1997 at the Miatta Conference Hall at 10:45 a.m.

Thank you.


H.E. Bangura (Ms)
Assistant Secretary