



SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

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Document(s) **Gbao And Sesay Defence Filing Of Expert Report
In Compliance With Trial Chamber's 22nd May
2008 Order**

Document Dated: 26th May 2008 Received by Court Management at 16:32 on the 26th May 2008

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
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

BEFORE:

Hon. Justice Benjamin Itoe, Presiding
Hon. Justice Pierre Boutet,
Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson

Registrar: Mr. Herman von Hebel

Date filed: 26 May 2008



The Prosecutor

-v-

Issa Hassan Sesay
Morris Kallon
Augustine Gbao

Case No: SCSL-04-15-T

Public

Gbao and Sesay Defence Filing of Expert Report
in Compliance with Trial Chamber's 22nd May 2008 Order

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1. The Trial Chamber ordered that the Defence for the First and Third Accused file the final version of their military expert's Expert Report no later than 4:00pm on Monday, the 26th of May 2008 (Order 2).¹
2. There have been a number of delays in the completion of this Report. The expert has indicated he has had insufficient time to complete the Report. The expert is presently reviewing this latest Report and may provide amendments in due course.
3. Herewith, the Defence for the First and Third Accused files their military expert's Expert Report.

Dated 26th May 2008

Wayne Jordash
Sareta Ashraph

¹ *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-1139, "Order on Gbao and Sesay Urgent Application for Extension of Time to File Expert Report", 22nd May 2008.

Military Report

Foreword

Military structure/organisation

In the majority of cases a military organisation is structured to defend the country from attack. Today, more and more nations have a military organisation, which both can defend the nation, provide an anti-invasion defence, a rapid reaction defence, and even to participate in operations overseas, such as peacekeeping operations.

Different types of military structures

(I) An Anti-invasion Structure

A hierarchal structure, consisting of a mixture of a national, territorial protection forces areas and highly developed combat units (with divisions, brigades, battalions composed in efficient battle groups). These units are highly mobile and are supported by air combat units and helicopters.

(II) Rapid reaction structure

This structure is based upon a need for a high degree of vigilance, mobility and an ability to operate effectively in different types of terrain and climate zones. These units are organised into battle groups with self-supporting logistics.

(III) Territorial army structure

This type of structure is often formed in calm areas, where the units are given tasks to control the territory and civil population. Military support to the civilian administration is essential.

(IV) National protected military structure (with both military and police units)

In this structure, military units can take care of police matters and vice versa. The structure is common after an invasion (eg. post-war situation in Iraq).

(V) Peace promoting military structure

Peace-promoting operations receive a mandate from the United Nation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Examples include missions which using force keep fighting parties apart and armed missions to protect humanitarian activity and the civil population. A peace-enforcing operation is invariably conducted without consent from at least one of the parties. The military structure is almost the same as the rapid reaction structure.

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5) Mid-March 1998 to December 1998

A mixture of a territorial army structure (Kailahun) and a kind of light guerrilla organisation (Kono, Koinadugu). The structure between the AFRC and the RUF is very loose.

6) December 1998 to December 1999

The RUF appeared to exhibit more of a regular army structure. There were more planned and/or coordinated assaults typical of an organised regular army.

7) December 1999 to May 2000

The RUF seems to be a military organisation in decomposition, but with limited power. During this time the organisation was loose with unclear command circumstances.

II. The common military characteristics/features of a guerrilla/insurgency /protect movement

What are the typical characteristics of an insurgency?

1. Lack of Reform by ruling elite

An important condition for the emergence of an insurgency is that the ruling elite oppose the necessary and fundamental reforms that will reduce the elites own power and privileges. In a situation like this, it is difficult over to avoid some form of confrontation between the traditional power elite and new political (or religious) forces. Increasingly, it is likely that the confrontation will be characterised by violence. Social insurgencies often begin with strikes and demonstrations. If the ruling power responds with great violence and arrests, activists may organise themselves into various forms of armed groups. If the regime shows itself unwilling to satisfy popular demands or expectations, it will lose legitimacy and the regime often feels compelled to increase the use of forcible means to ensure that the population remains law-abiding. 'Law and order' often becomes the most common catchword used to justify this increase in force..

2. If a revolutionary leadership emerges that is motivated and well-educated, it will naturally further reinforce the tendency for the regime to exercise force against all forms of opposition. The regime will implement measures that may end up reinforcing

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(VI) A light guerrilla military structure

This structure is based on the use of small units organised mainly in a battalion combat structure using light portable weapon systems. This structure does not need to use a road system. It relies upon a high degree of mobility. This structure makes frequent use of "hit and run" tactics.

(VII) A heavy guerrilla structure.

This structure is based on the use of light and heavy units, namely light infantry units which can attack deep into the areas of the enemy (hit and run) and heavy units organized into battalions (or sometimes brigades) which are further supported by artillery and tanks.

Conclusion - The RUF military organisation from 1996 to 2000.

1) 1996 (Jungle War Period)

The RUF in this period was a light guerrilla military organisation. The area commanders had the task to fulfil guerrilla tasks within their areas. The structure was hierarchical with a HQ. The roles of the different commanders were unclear. For example, the RUF appear not to have specified the de facto characteristics of the different assignments.

2) December 1996 to May 1997

The RUF was still a light guerrilla organisation. The chain of command seems to be unclear during this period. The Kailahun District is a clear base for the RUF and appeared to have a territorial structure.

3) May 1997 to 13 February 1998

This period is more characteristic of a national protection structure. The RUF was militarily organised to control the area together with the AFRC. The structure seems to have been more like a police force. The military command structure was unclear, with double or triple command.

4) The retreat from Freetown

This was a non-military structure.

the differences within the existing social system and thereby widen the gap between those who govern and those governed. In the emerging conflict splits may develop within the ruling elite between, for example, moderates and reactionaries. This will contribute to weakening the effectiveness, cohesiveness and solidarity of the ruling elite.

3. A key theme in working towards or creating successful revolutionary movements is the question of how to increase the gap between the elite and the *expectations* of the majority of people. This is usually achieved by the insurgent leadership pointing out the narrow self-interests of the regime's supporters and 'exposing' how the regime neglects the welfare of the ordinary people. Once a revolutionary movement has been successful in establishing itself as a political force - that the ruling regime has not been able to eliminate or control - the next phase can begin, i.e., organising guerrilla forces.

4. Guerrilla warfare is a method of combat that can be utilised by people who live in an area that is either occupied by, or surrounded by, forces they see as *their adversaries*. Guerrilla warfare is the military form or method arising within an insurgency; the next military step of an insurgency. The adversary include sections of the community that, by virtue of their privileges and power, maintain or develop what the insurgent movement sees as injustice and inequality. A section of the population that feels suppressed, and cannot practice its religion or work politically towards its beliefs or ideology may thus take up arms to achieve greater influence over its own situation.

Lack of distinction between civilians and combatants

5. In conventional conflicts, there is an evident division between combatants and non-combatants. In conventional conflicts this division takes place around the issue concerning prospective soldiers, who are recruited to the army either through a format of laws of conscription or through volunteer employment as in professional armies. During the time of the military contract the individual is no longer seen as a civilian, but as a soldier. In this war situation the division is distinct, the soldier wears a uniform, carries weapons and belongs to a militarily organised unit with special tasks.

6. In the "new wars" the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is often non-existent or in some cases much more difficult to observe. This arises in part because civilians are very close to the fighting activities.

The private soldier in these new conflicts can also belong to different types of organisations, devoting themselves to a range of activities including military occupation, criminality, black-marketing, smuggling and sometimes looting of the civil

population. Soldiers of this type often do not wear uniforms in the same way as soldiers in conventional armies. There may be many important reasons for this, but one important reason is the advantage the organisation receives through mixing together with the population, thus allowing their activities to be more easily concealed. In these circumstances, civilian support is of the utmost importance.

If the soldiers receive the support of the population they can move freely, obtain lodging, hide in villages and houses, use the well-known paths. Importantly, the population also has information about the enemy, the terrain, the roads, bridges that they would be more likely to share. Food support can also be essential.

If a combatant cannot be distinguished from the population the conclusion will be that anybody could be a combatant, which can give rise to enormous difficulties. This lack of distinction between civilians and soldiers made it easier to shift roles. In one moment a soldier can be a farmer, in the next a home guard fighter and in the next a guerrilla fighter.

Lack of Hierarchical Structure

Participants in the new types of conflicts work within a highly decentralised organisation, which differs from conventional, hierarchical military organisations. Often they act in large areas, where a commander cannot control every sub-leader. He relies on that the sub-leader who should have the ability to fulfil his tasks without controlling every step.

Further, these groups are not a unified unity, but more often a mixture of local warlords, paramilitary units, gangs of bandits, units/leaders from abroad, mercenary troops and sometimes "regular units".

A guerrilla organisation often has to operate without an adequate communication system, which promotes their decentralised nature.

In the beginning of an insurgency movement help is required. Commonly, leaders of these movements utilise people who have been trained abroad. Many nations have built up camps for the training of guerrilla leaders and soldiers (Libya, Uganda, Angola, Iran, Syria etc). In these camps the leaders are trained militarily and ideology in guerrilla warfare. It is an advantage to use well-trained military people in a beginning of a conflict but not without risk, including their desire to take over the command. These nations can export guerrilla warfare to new revolutionary movements. A guerrilla movement thus has its ideological goals, the overall strategic purpose of why they are fighting to win, but the leaders cannot (and will not) instruct or give orders for each

small operation. For example the various components in Lebanon (Hizbollah) and Afghanistan (Muhajedin guerrilla) operated independently for a long period without detailed instructions.

If a commander or sub-leader does not follow the overall strategy or instructions it creates an unbalanced approach or structure.

Indirect attacks

7. Guerrilla tactics are most often indirect i.e. the guerrilla strikes in areas where the opponent is weak. The attacking force then retreats and gets out of the way so that it does not itself become a target for the opponent. This is hit and run. Without using relatively safe tactics such as this in the beginning, a guerrilla movement will normally not survive. The guerrillas are often poorly equipped and trained, especially when compared to regularly military forces. They will normally not have good, safe bases and will be threatened with extermination if, at an early phase, they try to hold, for example, geographical areas or towns, villages against a superior force.

8. Maos theories about "safe bases" can perhaps be regarded as a *myth* in modern warfare where fighters and helicopters can reach any corner of a country at war. Thus, the insurgent movements must decide either to be constantly on the move, use only concealed bases (for example in the jungle), or only to operate in such small groups that the enemy rarely knocks out more than a handful of guerrilla soldiers in air or artillery attacks at one time. The modern "safe base" of today is when a guerrilla force can go over the border to another country where the opponent cannot pursue them for political reasons.

Tactical level combat

9. These methods of warfare are often limited to the tactical level which is generally the battalion level and below depending on limited aims, due to their low strength and lack of weapon systems with larger firepower. It is seldom that a combat take place in the frame of a battalion.

Actions are conducted as small skirmishes, less tactical assaults or of attacks towards the weak points of an enemy (in the flank and in the rear). There is an attempt to avoid an attack in the front. Ambush war fighting is a common way to hinder an approach of an enemy through using roadside bombs, mines and explosive charges. A small unit can thus easily stop a larger unit.

Control of local resources

10. In new conflicts the question of control over local resources is often the triggering factor. In some cases these resources may be traded internationally (for example

minerals). Whether control ought to be viewed as a goal in itself or merely as a means of providing recourses for the contending groups varies but it is often the case that they are a mixture of local power struggles/political antagonism and ethnic and/or religious antagonism. This means that a detailed study of each individual country or area would be necessary to assess the subject matter of the conflicts in question and their causes. It is important to ask why the leaders in question opt to take the paths they do. What, for instance, do they actually talk about in the speeches they give and how are they able to get the support of the populace? On what basis will people more or less voluntarily choose to follow the leader in question? It is very important for anyone, e.g., peacekeeping forces coming from outside to this type of conflict to obtain as quickly as possible an insight into the attitudes, symbols and mythology the actual leaders use.

Evaluation of guerrilla warfare

A short overview of what one could call 'core activities' with regard to 'traditional' guerrilla warfare is provided below:

Development of Popular Support

12. Even if the development of guerrilla forces and the conducting of guerrilla warfare are of central importance to any competent revolutionary leadership, whether this is a success or not will ultimately be determined through *political* developments. Popular support for the insurgents is crucial for success here, something that means that fighting for this support and *maintaining* it will be a *main objective* during the entire struggle. Without *popular support* it is hardly possible for a guerrilla movement to win. It is particularly problematic organising and maintaining regular forces without solid popular support, something of particular necessity if one is to be able to implement the third phase: the counteroffensive.

Control of farming activities

13. In an insurgent/guerrilla movement one of its main missions is to 'out-administer' the established authorities. The main aim of this "fight for the rural districts" in developing countries will be to gain control of the farming population, which constitutes the majority of the population and is where the direct influence of the ruling regime in question is normally weak. Often the farmers associate the central power with 'negative' activities such as the conscription of soldiers and tax demands. Such activities may be interpreted as *exploitation*, as the local population feels that it gets very little in return for what it contributes. It will traditionally be the village or clan chieftain and their councils that become *intermediaries* to the central authorities. It is normally considered extremely important with *successful* insurgent movements to break the traditional ties between the farmers and government representatives. It is consequently common to put pressure on these intermediaries to 'convert' to the revolutionary cause

and they will possibly be the first victims of the gradually increasing political violence. This is when terror is most likely to be used. The *political* arm of the insurgent movement will then either directly control the 'converted' local officials or they will replace/eliminate the 'uncontrollable' local leaders/chieftains with loyal people from the insurgent movement. This systematic elimination of government control over rural districts will also further contribute to isolating the population from having any meaningful contact with the central power. This will create an active and voluntary mass of support for the insurgency; which offers the farmers an alternative and a promise of a better deal.

14. The revolutionaries main objective is to activate and subsequently maintain what we might call the 'moral isolation' of the central authorities in a country until this isolation becomes total and irreversible. The focus of the revolutionaries will consequently be in relation to 'out-administering' these areas and not primarily *overpowering* them or their enemies militarily. This should not, however, be seen as just a destructive undertaking, as a successful revolutionary movement must be able to build up its own new infrastructure with a view to *replacing* the old system. There are several examples where guerrilla movements have shown themselves not able to implement this social construction. The chances of them then succeeding politically are correspondingly slim.

15. The circumstances that lead to the outbreak of a (revolutionary) war cannot be explained through conspiracy theories. One should instead look for an explanation arising from rapid social change where the actual outbreak of war is often a result of the ruling regime not having been able to meet the new challenges that modernisation thrusts upon it. It is these challenges which thus then separates a modern revolutionary war (a longer term of insurgency) from a local insurgency. A typical peasant insurgency or an insurgency in a slum area in a large city only has *short-term* objectives while a revolutionary war led by a very motivated leadership has developed a long-term strategy with the objective of taking over social power and implementing a new political and economic order and thus dealing with this change.

Selective use of terror

16. The killing of local leaders has always been part of the activities that insurgents have engaged in but this terror has not normally been the actual basis for civilian support for guerrilla movements. It may be more correct to see the use of terror as just one of many weapons used by an insurgent movement as part of its work towards safeguarding its political interests and its military progress. Typically, the use of terror in connection with a successful guerrilla movement will be both sociologically and psychologically selective. If not, the use of terror can rebound negatively on support for the insurgent movement among the people.

This type of activity will initially normally be carried out in rural districts where the regime's supporters are often few and sparsely deployed. The use of terror ought *not*, however, to be seen as the actual main reason for the population possibly having a positive view of the revolutionaries cause. Historically it is often the case that if a movement loses control over how the terror is used, this 'weapon' can quickly rebound on the revolutionaries themselves, i.e., perhaps be the most important reason for popular support for the insurgent movement waning or drying up. Examples of the loss of popular support for guerrilla movements could be how things developed in Liberia, Angola, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Cambodia and in some parts of Sierra Leone.

17. Mostly guerrilla movements need and get the support of the population. As noted above, this enables the movement to make use of the local infrastructure, food, water supply, housing etc. The environment may be hostile and this makes the necessary task difficult.

This may also involve using civilians by force to achieve the goals and in order to survive. This enables the army or the community of military and civilians to be able to survive and to make provision for all within the insurgency territory. It is very common in insurgencies that the civil population is used as support for the different parties involved, either the guerrilla movement or the pro-government forces. The support can consist of labour, directly or indirectly as farming, building roads, organising workshops, maintenance, hospitalisation of injured soldiers or housing staff, leaders etc. The most common payment is protection from the attack of the enemy. In some instances, the civilian population is used militarily to build defences, obstacles, shelters, trenches etc. This creates the problem that if the enemy recaptures an area, the population can be punished for their support of the former party. This is very common during a long civil war.

The main characteristics of a guerrilla movement

18.

a. The military leadership has a large impact of how operations, orders, reports will be carried out. It can be more important that the leader has charisma, has a personality and can speak to the soldiers rather than have military skills.

Some examples of charismatic leaders, who have led insurgency/guerrilla movements, are Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Abu Murab al-Zarqawi (al Quaida group), Pol Pot (Cambodia), Foday Sankoh (Sierra Leone). However, the most effective guerrilla

movements have been conducted with a combination of good political and military leadership (*for eg* Ho Chi Minh and General Giap in North Vietnam).

b. The military leadership often use people from their own clan, tribe as staff members, bodyguards, intelligence officers and often choose important sub-leaders from his own community (tribe, clan, town, province) Personal bonds, relationship and even consanguinity has great importance. The leaders feel more comfortable with sub-leaders, staff members they know.

c. The guerrilla leader often has a strong need for direct control. He uses his own channels to get to know what happens in the front, in the rear, within the staff or by the civilians.

d. The highest level of operations in guerrilla movements are generally the tactical level or below. There are, of course, exceptions. They can carry out operations at brigade and battalion level, but they are seldom well-coordinated efforts. They work under a kind of an umbrella of a battalion with battles more often company and platoon affairs.

e. The military leaders on a low level (company and below) are given large freedom to solve local problems to fulfil their tasks. Freedom of action is an important part of guerrilla warfare. This does not mean that there are no rules or regulations. The communication system does not generally allow that the commander can command and control or change orders during an operation.

Large areas demand that the commander must rely on his sub-leaders, as he cannot control them. He must rely on that his orders will be executed and fulfilled within the operations. He must rely on that his sub-leaders solve the tasks in the mission. This leaves a greater room for misinterpretation between sub-leaders and the commander.

f. Guerrilla warfare has a distinct attack approach. It is seldom that the movement can build up strongholds/points that can be held for more than week or so. The units do not have the equipment to defend themselves for a long time and often the personnel lack the requisite military skills.

g. Guerrilla warfare techniques are built on using high mobile and small units, who can manage without using roads, can conceal themselves and strike with full power with surprise and then withdraw quickly. When the operations become larger there is a greater need for control of roads for supply and other support. It then becomes important to try to hold roads and in these circumstances seizing and holding junctions becomes important, but demand many people. Soldiers in the rear can take care of this.

i. Guerrilla warfare is often conducted in large areas with a weak infrastructure. The communication systems, which normally rely upon radio sets, are of the utmost importance. This gives rise to numerous problems, not least of which are the issue of how to obtain and maintain support for the systems, e.g., obtaining radio batteries.

j. Commanders often have small staffs and sometimes none at all. In well-organised guerrilla movements however you have a military staff with a Chief of staff (COS), who coordinates the staff work and gives recommendations to the commander. This happens very seldom in these movements because mostly those involved are not trained in staff work.

In some guerrillas/insurgency movements, you have a staff in a similar way as in a conventional army (a general staff - G- staff). The staff is organised to support the commander in running his military operation. (G1- personnel, G2- intelligence, G3- operations, G4- logistics, G5- planning, or civil affairs, G6- communication, G7- training). The COS is responsible for staff and its work. Outside the G-staff you have generally a political section supporting the commander with political advice. This type of staff does not generally interfere in civil affairs etc. Examples of this type of staff you can find in Palestinian Liberation Organisation ('PLO'), North Vietnam/Viet Cong, Chechnya, ANP in South Africa.

Most guerrilla movements contain only a small military staff and the staff section reports directly to the commander. In these circumstances, the military G-staff are usually mixed with a "civilian-administrative staff". It is usual thus that within a guerrilla staff there are more civilian administrators because the staff must take care of civilian issues. This can focus the staff on administrative matters as opposed to focusing on supporting the military operation.

It is usual, even in guerrilla staffs, for there to be a Coordinator (chief of staff). This was lacking in the RUF. The consequences of having a small staff or one without a Chief of Staff would include the following:

Bad long term planning

The commander would lack a second opinion from staff

The coordination would be loose leading to non – integrated operations

The staff section heads (G's) would act independently

k. Commanders often have Second in Commands (2IC's). The 2IC's are generally used to take care of the rear area, as the link to the population and the support issues or for

special tasks. Sometimes they take care of a second front (at the side of the main operation). The overall commander must concentrate his efforts to fulfil the military operations. However, within a guerrilla movement there is a need to obtain support/supply and to take care of areas that have been conquered and are under the control of the guerrilla/insurgency movement. The 2IC will often be used to take care of these tasks. This is similar to the situation within a regular army and both require a 2IC.

l. Political control

In a guerrilla movement there is a political control, but more directly in the areas, at the front. For example, political officers who control the commanders and soldiers follow the rules and follow the orders. In other words, they exercise control over the ideology, the code of conduct etc. In a guerrilla movement it is more difficult to replace the political leadership. There are a few well educated persons and it is the same with the military leadership- not many commanders are trained to execute large operations.

m. Payment and Health

Conventional armies have officers and soldiers, which usually are well paid with extra risk charges and well-built assurance system. There often is a system at home, which takes care of the families - a social network. For a conventional soldier everything is free (salary, food, clothes, laundry, transportation). He has leave periods after he has been in the frontline. For a guerrilla soldier or leader it is worse. He must often take care of his family, his house. He will be paid, but often not regularly (and not wellpaid). He often has no uniforms or other clothes. Food supply can be a problem. He must rely on the supply of the area/town/village. In a conventional army there is a well built medical treatment system. The demand is in one hour after the soldier has been injured he shall be treated by a surgeon. The guerrilla movements can have a medical treatment system but often lack of doctors or nurses, dressing stations, medicines etc. Here there is a big difference.

Phases of guerrilla warfare (as illustrated through the RUF)

19. As suggested earlier, guerrilla warfare *normally* leads to a protracted and bloody conflict. In "classic" Maoist or Marxist-Leninist theory on the topic it is common to operate with three stages of "the protracted war" where great emphasis is normally placed on explaining why it is important to prolong the war, namely to win. This theory is especially prevalent in Communist (especially Maoist) military theory as well as in places such as Libya.

It is normal thus to divide guerrilla warfare into three phases. The first phase is the defensive phase, the second is the “balance of relative strengths” and the third phase is the “general counter offensive”. The RUF guerrilla movement corresponds roughly to this analysis.

First phase

20. **A defensive phase: At this time**, the enemy (the government forces) is initially stronger than the insurgency movement (e.g. the RUF). The regime has an offensive strategy while the insurgency would be on the defensive. The enemy (read the regime) will have ‘occupied’ a number of towns, communications systems, etc. During this phase, the RUF guerrilla movement very often surrendered so-called safe areas and parts of the rural districts due to counteroffensives from the government forces. If the RUF had tried to retain areas like these, they would have been eventually overpowered. Instead, successful insurgent movements use a *defensive strategy*, while trying all the while to behave offensively as regards military tactical operations. This is seen as the best strategy, as a revolutionary force (like the RUF) would be weak in terms of numbers and inadequately equipped. During this phase, the insurgents are normally poorly trained but their morale may nevertheless be high and they may enjoy the local support of the people.

In the first few years the RUF lacked the capacity to control the whole country even if the RUF made some gains and had successes it is clear that the organisation had limited aims. The intention was clear: tire out the enemy by using simple but flexible tactics. These constant but minor hostilities typical of an insurgency in its first phase contribute to the weakening of the regime’s prestige as its forces may be both accused of ‘cracking a nut with a sledgehammer’ and at the same time of being incapable of overpowering the insurgents.

Increase in violent confrontation

21. At the beginning of an insurgency movement there may be few major military skirmishes between the guerrilla and the government forces and/or police. The guerrilla/insurgent movement is still too weak for extensive operations. Instead the insurgency movement - if it is well led - will try to avoid the majority of large confrontations with conventional military units.

As regards political killings, it is typical of a threatened regime to try to play down the killing of their local representatives or supporters. The police will deal with the killing of government representatives as traditional police matters and as issues relating to a lack of tax revenue. The refusal to pay ground rent will be explained as ‘administrative problems’. Threatened regimes are often unwilling to admit problems and often there is no one either who is in any great rush to introduce the necessary reforms. There may

also be a lack of insight into local cultural conditions or a lack of good intelligence, not to speak of an unwillingness to share or relinquish privileges. This behaviour is obviously unproductive and makes it difficult to plan and implement the countermeasures that are necessary to deal with the insurgency.

Moreover, the inevitable increase in violent incidents will be an argument employed by governmental groups as a means to avoid reforms that would be a threat to their political and/or economic interests. Violence then becomes an excuse to prevent any change 'until the insurgency is suppressed'. Normally, attitudes like these will indirectly contribute in the end to strengthening the insurgents cause. Often the same reactionary forces will exploit the situation in order to eliminate (kill, arrest) non-violent opposition, trade union leaders and other activists. In this way, an increasing number of activists are driven closer to the insurgents and their ideology whilst at the same time any non-violent opposition is weakened.

Second phase

22. The balance of relative strengths – The government and guerrilla forces gradually become more militarily equal. The government army is gradually forced on the defensive while the guerrilla's capacity to conduct offensive operations increases. The goal of any insurgency movement is to become strong enough to be able to carry out a general offensive. As the government forces are no longer able to easily tidy up a so-called 'safe area' or recapture a small village if it is lost, the guerrilla no longer needs to always quickly retreat from his base areas, even if these are attacked. Both sides seem to be able to keep each other under control. However, during this phase there are hostilities going on almost all the time. The guerrillas carry out major and minor attacks on the enemy's areas. A series of limited attacks on the government's garrisons and positions will contribute to wearing down the government forces perhaps just as effectively as winning one or more major battles and at much less risk to guerrilla forces. During this phase, regular military units, local military units for 'self-defence' (militia) and guerrilla units/bigger and more professional units are organised. Overall this creates the groundwork for the last phase which often takes the form of a general counteroffensive. It is traditionally this *second phase* that is the most difficult to organise, and it may be lengthy, something that could easily wear down morale among both the insurgents and the civilian population.

Third Phase

23. General counteroffensive—In this last and decisive phase, insurgents themselves go on the offensive. The strategy of the insurgents during this phase of the war is to carry out a counteroffensive, while the regime's strategy is now to become defensive and is often characterised by retreat. This phase will come when the government forces and the populations under their control are weakened and demoralised. Correspondingly, the

insurgent forces are now well motivated after what they see as steady progress and can now count, at least to some extent, on the support of the people. The insurgents have now created regular and relatively well-equipped units that together with the guerrilla units will be able to conduct regular strikes to overpower the government army's larger units. (At this stage the RUF seemed to have a guerrilla structure with more and more of a regular army feature).

Even if the material resources are not yet on a par with the government, army morale is normally good. The balance of relative strengths obviously varies from conflict to conflict, but a guerrilla movement can normally keep a government force in check even if the proportion of insurgents to government soldiers is 1:10. During offensive warfare, the balance of relative strengths should however, be up to 3:1 in the guerrilla's favour. Offensive warfare also requires different types of arms and different tactics than those employed during the first phase of the war. (In a normal war situation, an army would need a superiority of 3-5:1 to beat an enemy depending on how the defence is organised. These figures are important when a commander plans an attack. However, these figures may mean nothing when other factors such as will, discipline, the support of the population and political support are taken into account. At the end of a conflict, these factors are crucial to a successful operation. These factors were crucial to the RUF movement that was relatively effective and politically conscious.

II Do the Differences (if any) affect (i) the chain of command (ii) the transmission of orders or instructions through the chain of command (iii) the reporting structures and the way in which subordinates report (iv) the role or significance of non military factors such as individuals, personalities or personal loyalties.

The chain of command

In regular armies the chain of command is hierarchical. You do not bypass different sublevels of command. A brigade commander gives orders to battalion commanders; a battalion commander gives order to company commanders and so on. In a normal Western - like army organisation there is a tendency to reduce the number of levels. It is common to work with battle groups or composite units to solve specific tasks. A battle group is composed of units (battalions, companies, platoons) which can solve specific tasks. For example, when a commander plans to attack the enemy in a town then his superior commander will organise a battle group for this task (e.g. two rifle battalions, one recon platoon, one artillery company, two mortar platoons, one Logistics Company etc). A battle group commander will take care of this task. A

modern communication system will allow the commander to take this command from a high level directly to the small units. When this occurs this type of structure and operation will always be strictly regulated in standing operating procedures (SOPs) or in operational orders specific to this special operation or specific task.

In guerrilla movements, the commander tries to utilise this same structure. However, in these types of organisations the commander will have many or other chains of command with some kind of controlling system. Sometimes this controlling system will be political (especially in communist-led guerrilla movements). The controller can correct or interfere in a lower commander's business. A guerrilla commander can also use a special intelligence system that may provide information and is apart from the regular command system. However, they cannot rely on the regular communication system. They will have to use many sources to get information in order to try to obtain a clear picture. They do not possess developed technical intelligence systems unlike those in a regular army where a commander can rely upon sophisticated means to obtain information (e.g. the use of UAV unmanned aero vehicles, recon-fighters, technical monitor etc).

(ii) The transmission of orders or instructions through the chain of command

In a regular army the transmission of orders go through different levels in a very short time and are advanced coded. In a couple of minutes, the commander can give orders, get reports, change the orders or give new instructions. Within an hour or less, the commander can obtain support from artillery, mortars, air fighters, armour units etc. This is important since it means that within a short time a surprise attack can be launched which enables firepower – as opposed to manpower – to be used. This changes the centre of gravity of an attack and enables “rolling up the enemy” to occur, namely building on a success to take the next step. It is striving for initiative all the time.

In guerrilla/insurgency movement, the transmission of orders takes a relatively long time. The commander will plan an operation or an approach and will typically give orders to the sub-commander orally. The sub-commanders have significant freedom on how to solve the tasks and the commander has difficulties during an operation to correct the plan, change orders, and give new instructions.

In some guerrilla movements, the communication system is well built with a radio network system covering most of the area involved. Together with the ammunition supply, the communication system may be the most important factor for the guerrilla. Sometimes in modern guerrilla movements a mobile network system can be used (Afghanistan, Hamas, PLO). In some guerrilla movements, they have built up special

linkage systems to facilitate radio and mobile communication systems. For the guerrilla it is highly important that these linkage stations are defended by small units. (Ex Afghanistan). However, often the guerrilla movements are using simple radio nets with rather simple coded systems. Often due to long distances commanders must send messages via another commander to the commander he will reach. This often leads to misunderstandings.

(iii) Reporting Structure

In a regular army the commanders report to the superior level under the following circumstances:

- a) When you have achieved your aims;
- b) When something unusual happens;
- c) When sending daily reports containing:

- 1) The enemy situation
- 2) The units situation
- 3) The support situation
- 4) Logistics
- 5) Civil matters.

In the different branches, daily reports are issued in detail about the situation for example, ammunition, food supply, fuel, personnel strength, maintenance and so on. There also special communication links for the different services (supply units).

The G-staff (G1-G7) take care of the reports and give orders to different support or supply units to support the front live units.

Guerrilla movements also have a reporting system. It does not differ so much from a conventional army system. The bureaucracy is simpler. The flow of information does not come daily. That means that the system is the same but works much less effectively. The commander generally will get information about whether:

- the units have achieved their aims
- the support of the population
- how many of the enemies have been killed
- own losses and injured
- the ammunition situation

(IV) The role or significance of non-military factors such as individuals, personalities or personal loyalties.

Of course, there are bonds of significance in the personnel structure in a conventional army. The commander often has a say about which 2IC, COS and important sub-leaders he wants to have in his unit. However, in most cases he takes over a unit (brigade, battalion) with officers already in place. He will have good and less good sub-leaders. The leadership has a large impact of how a unit works. (Aggressive or cautious, attacking or defensive, take risks or not, using the staff or not).

However the commander and the staff are trained and exercised in a common way – there are standards, everything is systemised. It does not take long time as a new commander to jump in and directly find his role.

The commander generally knows his sub-leaders/unit commanders. He gives the difficult tasks to the most skilful and experienced leaders.

He backs up junior leaders in order to support them during an operation.

This is the same in a guerrilla movement. However, the bonds as you have to the clan, the tribe, the town, the province have an impact on which sub-leader you choose. And sometimes the commander must make sure of that he can rely on in order to be sure that the task will be solved. Sometimes the commander can use leaders which are better to take care of an area, organise the civilian population, the support, can speak to the people than command a military unit.

The charisma of a leader has probably a greater importance of guerrilla movement than in a conventional army.

There is a risk if there are strong bonds between leaders that the loyalty controls your reports. You do not report the truth. You report what you know will be good for the superior leader.

In a conventional movement, there is political control of the military leadership and the operations. The military leaders must issue daily reports to the government authorities about the prevailing situation and planning. If the military commanders does not execute in the way the political leadership wants then they can be replaced.

COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES

2. Mission tactics

The command and control method of a modern army is mission tactics. In mission tactics, the commander states a task and allocates resources and rules of action, but as far as possible leaves execution to his subordinates. Co-ordination is ensured by the will of the commander and the purpose and significance of the mission being clearly conveyed. Mission tactics presupposes a philosophy of command and control that features initiative, independent decision-taking, individual taking of responsibility and mutual trust between commander and personnel. Mission tactics in addition require a high level of training and good discipline.

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Each commander has to encourage and give scope for the action of commanders below him and other subordinates. In many guerrilla movements and also in the RUF use the method of mission tactics. In order to be able to operate in many areas all over the theatre of war. In some cases the RUF succeeded to execute utilising these mission tactics.

- many initiatives
- independent decisions- taking
- individual taking of responsibility (Sesay in Makeni)
- But in many cases you can see the opposite.
- no trust between the commanders
- a controlling organisation (IDU, IO, Vanguard, etc)
- independent decision-making, there commanders acted with their own agenda (Superman)
-

“To take the initiative” (Manoeuvre Warfare)

The environment of war demand great flexibility at all levels in the command and control of military units. (Manoeuvre warfare). Military units are forced to act in complex dynamic situations often under great uncertainty and pressure of time. An ability to act under chaotic conditions increases the prospects of attaining command and control superiority. Waiting for a definite basis for decision-making in such situations may lead to the initiative being lost. Decentralised command therefore promotes the best warfare.

Manoeuvre warfare fosters a high tempo. This necessitates commanders at all levels being able to exploit opportunities and critical vulnerabilities, which have arisen, and to take the initiative in all situations. It is also necessary to solve unforeseen problems and ensure that activity continues despite friction of a shortage of information and orders arising occasionally. The decentralised right to take decisions additionally means that the resources and other competencies of the organisation can be utilised more effectively.

The requirement of flexibility is sometimes opposed by the requirement to co-ordinate operations. Detailed control may need to be applied within the framework of mission tactics. The requirement of co-ordination is ensured, however, firstly through a fundamentally common assessment of the situation and the purpose of the mission being conveyed. Co-ordination takes place secondly through rules of action of other detailed control. It is better to take initiatives than to have a good plan and execute plans too late.

The number of situations in which detailed control from higher levels improves co-ordination is, however, small and these situations have to be weighed up against superior flexibility, which follows from consistent application of mission tactics. This

flexibility can never be created selectively and on command. You rely on your sub-leaders. You need to control them. You encourage their initiatives.

The ability of the adversary to take decisions, which reach the combat forces in time, can be reduced by engaging communications and information system. Mastering command and control warfare is thus an important component of manoeuvre warfare, to both reduce the command and control capability of the adversary and to protect one's own command and control capability, including confidence in one's own command and control system. This in turn necessitates having a robust and flexible command and control system. You must also have an ability to control the enemies command system (Decoding, disturbing and jamming).

Because of the dynamics in all combat, contradictions are part and parcel of the logic of strategy: doing the unexpected may be the safest way to success. A fundamental requirement to be met is that we generate both the tempo required and creative solutions to strategic, operational or tactical problems. Constant initiatives everywhere and unexpected actions from one's own side are not just the most effective way of attaining an effect against the adversary but are also effective protection against the measures taken by the adversary, in that the adversary finds it more difficult to predict our dispositions and actions. Manoeuvre warfare presupposes a method of command and control which promotes this action.

An important characteristic of mission tactics is that the tasks are not solved in the same way every day, as it is up to every recipient to find the route to the goal. This supports our endeavour for creative and unexpected elements in warfare. Mission tactics mean that commanders at all levels have to accept some dynamics in the procedure while it is being carried out. Those who carry out a task at the same time have responsibility to solve problems quickly and according to their own capabilities, for example when they encounter situations that the person giving the order has not been able to predict. Consistently applied mission tactics are decisive in being able to exploit manoeuvre warfare to the full and meet the requirement for both co-ordination and flexibility in warfare.

The Levels of Warfare are outlined within Appendix A.

III

With reference to the above and with reference to the available evidence how would you define/describe the RUF as a military organisation between year 1996 to 2000?

The plan and strategic aims?

1. Some all-embracing plan (strategic/operation) of execution of RUF's operations in Sierra Leone has not been found in the source material.

This does not exclude the fact that such a plan existed. It could be a written plan or just a plan discussed among the leaders or just in the head of the paramount military leader. There are however, indications that the RUF did not have a military strategy (detailing operation and tactical aims) as per a conventional model.

It is clear that the capital Freetown was a goal and this is indirectly clear in the manifesto of RUF "Footpaths to Democracy – Towards a New Sierra Leone":

"It is our collective sense of purpose the ideals and ideas we believe in and discipline that have brought us so close to Freetown".

2. To control the rural provinces was insufficient for the aims of the RUF. The size of the RUF operations and their strategic aims correspond to conventional operational plans of war and execution of wars than within the types of conflicts fought by warlords and bandit gangs with limited military resources.

3. The period from 1996 to 2000, the RUF had different roles and missions. Mainly however the RUF was a guerrilla movement with a mixture of guerrilla warfare units, some regular conventional army structure, territorial area control units, security/police tasks, civilian/military cooperation and some staff structure. The flexibility, which was demonstrated, was large depending on the different situations, progresses, defeats, the leadership, the political structure etc. During this period the RUF had different units depending upon where and how the missions were being conducted. For example in the front the RUF was organised like a guerrilla movement whereas in the rear it was organised more like a territorial defence with military, police and civilian/humanitarian tasks and also working with NGO's.

4. Classification of Phases

4.1 Year 1996

This period is characterised by the jungle warfare.

- There is a military organisation with a battlefield commander (BFC), a battle group commander (BGC) and 4-5 area commanders.
(It is unclear now, how the role played between BGC and the area commander in Kailahun area had been worked out)
- Guerrilla movements units within the western, Northern Pujehun/Kenema, Bo Highway, Penama jungle areas.
- Base, HQ's Zogoda
- The role as BGC was unclear. It seems that the BGC here is more of a kind of deputy to BFC with unclear tasks.

4.2 End of 1996 (Oct 1996, Zogoda falls)

This period is still characterised by jungle war, retreats of the RUF and delaying operations from the RUF

There is a military organisation with continuity of command within the area commands. The leadership is unclear after M. Tarawallie was killed. Sam Bockarie seems to more and more take over or utilise the disorder in the RUF.

- Guerrilla organisation and tactics within the areas.
- The RUF had still the jungle bases and a certain control of the jungle areas.
- Kailahun is the rear/base area. The solid base of the RUF. Kailahun can be considered to have a territorial army structure with close military/civilian cooperation.

4.3 December 1996 – May 1997

This period is characterised by an unclear military organisation. S Bockarie takes the lead of the RUF military organisation (BFC). The role of battle group commander (BGC) seems still unclear. The BFC (Bockarie) gave orders directly to the area commanders. It would appear that the BGC was more of an assistant to the BFC. He was not able to command any of the area commanders. On the other hand a lot of subleaders regarded BGC as the deputy to BFC. But on the other hand a lot of subleaders regarded BFC as the deputy to BGC (D Lansana)???

- The areas are still the bases for the guerrilla operations.
- Kailahun can more or less be regarded as a territorial area (a base area) with distinct roles between the military and the civilians. This is significant.
- It is the first time rank and assignment did not correspond, which caused major schisms in the RUF

Both sides seem to be apparently able to keep each other in check.

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4.4 May 1997 – 13 February 1998

This period is characterised by “cooperation between AFRC and RUF” or “the AFRC government”.

- Militarily this period can be characterised as a national protected military structure, neither a regular army structure nor a guerrilla movement. “The units” appeared like “police forces” with a lot of freedom to act.
- The coordination and cooperation between AFRC and RUF was militarily not the best.
They did not accept the ranking system of each other. In spite of they were organised to work together, the command structure was in disorder.
The AFRC and the RUF were badly organised. The AFRC had political and military leadership in Freetown, where the RUF had weak positions and influence. The RUF’s military leader was in Kenema (Bockarie). He ought to have been in Freetown to represent the RUF. Now it became a “doublecommand”, because Bockarie still had a grip and influence over the RUF.
- The “warlords” in the jungle still had large power and were not willing to relinquish their power positions.
- Unclear command structure.
- Within the RUF an organisation of brigades was developed. In this organisation there was a separation of power between RUF and AFRC. A battalion commander from the RUF had a deputy from AFRC and vice versa. The brigades had more of an administrative function than a combat role.

4.5 The Retreat from Freetown

This period is characteristic of a non-military organised structure. The RUF had no plan for defence and had no plan for retreat. It was an easy task for ECOMOG to throw out the RUF from Freetown. Almost all reports of witnesses state that it was a mess. The RUF/AFRC were surprised and it was unclear who was the military leader. Many RUF leaders would appear to have been more interested in taking care of their families than organising any military retreat. However, some military leaders (Superman) took separate initiatives to organise units and launch some attacks on the ECOMOG units.

4.6 Mid March 1998 – December 1998

This period is characterised militarily as a mixture of a territorial Army structure (KAILAHUN) and a kind of guerrilla organisation (e.g. KONO).

- Sam Bockarie has the military lead
- Still unclear structure of command, who commands who?
- Unclear between the leaders of AFRC and the RUF Substantial animosity between different parties.
- A very loose military organisation

The balance between the RUF and the government forces weigh more to the advantage of the RUF militarily in the rural areas, in spite of problems between the leaders within the organisations.

4.7 December 1998- December 1999

This period seems to be a more of a regular army structure in the RUF

- Bockarie tried to reorganise the RUF: He made Brigadier General promotions.
- The attack on Freetown in January 1999 is a well-organized military assault with signs of a regular army (clear aims, selected aims – personnel and buildings). “A planned operation and organized” (United Nations, Secretary Council, Fifth report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, p 6.) This is a SLA attack, supported personally by Bockarie. However, the RUF do not appear to have participated in planning and executing this attack. This is the last and decisive phase for the RUF. The structure seems to be more regular army like (brigades, battalions, companies, etc).
- In some areas Kailahun, Kono, Makeni the population appeared to support the RUF. The RUF had a relatively firm grip over these areas. The RUF worked with the civilian authorities to help the population. The atrocities from within the RUF/AFRC made it more difficult, however, to find practical solutions. At the end of this period the military balance had shifted more and more to the advantage of the RUF. The RUF had many units all over Sierra Leone and cooperated broadly with the civil population (districts....).

4.8 December 1999 – May 2000

The UN intervention, the end of ECOMOG and the start of the demobilisation of the RUF characterise this period. Sam Bockarie withdrew to Liberia. The RUF had a loose military organisation, where some commanders did not obey orders and instructions. The command structure seemed to be clear. On the other hand it appears that Sankoh

undermined much for Sesay. Orders and counter orders happened frequently. There was no clear staff organisation. It was left to personal initiatives within the areas to facilitate cooperation with the UN, civil order and disarmament (Sesay).

IV

From a military perspective what were the most important objective factors, ascertainable facts or historical practices which might have impacted upon the RUF's organizational structure and ability to conduct military operations (with focus on the chain of command or reporting structures) during 1996-2000?

RUF Organisation

1. The RUF was set up from the beginning with a hierarchical structure on traditional military lines. The hierarchy developed over time, as the size of the organisation and the area controlled varied, but it was based on variations of areas of combats and battalions, organised into war fronts. The unit structure seems to have been loose, with manpower switching relatively easily to where it was most needed. It also appears that individual leaders and fighters had more loyalty to individual commanders, and would identify themselves by being part of that commander's group, rather than being a member of a particular company, battalion or area.
2. Commanders were assigned ranks according to their commands or position in the organisation. After the ECOMOG intervention of February 1998, some AFRC elements were absorbed into the RUF structure, and AFRC officers appointed to positions of responsibility. Some AFRC officers appear to have been received RUF promotions. However, the RUF/AFRC was based on the RUF structures and adopted RUF methods. In many respects this "RUF/AFRC" was similar to the pre-junta RUF. In the beginning, there appears to have been a cordial atmosphere between the two parties but there was also a large degree of animosity between the RUF and AFRC officers and men especially at the top level. This of course excludes those AFRC forces and commanders who went to the Northern Jungle, and later became the AFRC Musa/Gullit faction.
3. The RUF also adopted a rudimentary staff system. Each group of any size had its G2 (intelligence), G4 (logistics), and G5 (control of civilians) officers. They supported the commander in the execution of their duties although not in any systematic way as

would be expected in a western army. In the Headquarters, there was a G1-G5 staff system, but a chief of staff did not coordinate them (COS). They reported directly to the commander as subunits. Sometimes one branch chief was able to act freely without any decision from the commander. This meant that it would have been extremely difficult for any one commander to get an overview and to form the best foundation for decisions.

1. RUF decision – making system

(i) In Western armies and the Russian army system and in other well-organised insurgency/guerrilla movements the decision-making system is well structured. The staff is involved and gives recommendations to the commander. The process is regulated in the SOP (The standard Operating Procedures).

(ii) In the RUF this did not work with the G-staff. There were no formal methods on how to make decisions. The well-experienced commanders (after 1996 a lot of them had experience) often acted without discussion with any of the staff. It is clear that with the execution of larger operations some commanders had meeting with loyal staff officers and subordinated leaders to have discussions concerning the situation and the planning but in the decision-making process there appears to have been hardly any long-term planning or decision making concerning what would happen next or what was the next step? Which alternatives do we have? And so on...

2. Control system

In all military command system you must have an effective control system.

Control has three elements: **direction**, oversight and coordination. RUF commanders generally gave strong direction: usually this was by giving orders face to face, although it could be by radio. Orders tended to be simple and clear; there is little evidence of subordinate commanders being confused over what was expected of them. **Oversight** was more difficult for the RUF, given the dispersion of guerrilla groups and given that movement was by foot.

The principal means of enforcing control was through the application of the disciplinary system at a junior level; and through control of ammunition supply at a more senior level: errant subordinate commanders were starved of ammunition by the RUF leadership while loyal subordinates were rewarded with sufficient to maintain their operations. Although many guerrilla operations were independent, commanders coordinated the efforts of their subordinates when necessary.

(iv). This meant it was not easy for the highest commanders to control the operations.

Example of a well-organised branch structure (note that IDU had other tasks as well)

The IDU-structure

- I. "Incident"
 - II. Local IDU investigates
 - III. Report to overall IDU commander (RUF) sometimes to the area commander
 - IV. JSBI (Joint Security Board Investigation)
 - V. Recommendation to the leader (punishment or not)
 - VI. The decision
 - VII. Order to MP to execute the decision
- The IDU investigated any offences fighters that may have been done to civilians and between fighters or commanders
 - Sometimes the IDU commanders reported to the overall commanders or sometimes to the area commander
 - The IDU was only contacted in difficult cases or serious cases
 - JSU putting all MP, IDU, G5 together. Wherever something happened they met together to decide on matters. Where the JSU decide on matters, they recommend the punishment to the commander

Sometimes in the IDU-structure they would not have been able to follow the right chain of command. Many initiatives could be taken by commanders in order to take command of IDU's and conduct them.


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The following are diagrams, which represent the basic chains of command, and reporting.

5. **Apparent Organisation and chains of command**

(1) 1996

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* SB was moved from a battalion commander to BGC in November 1996

** Peyama fall at the end of 1996

*** Sesay overall commander of Kailahun 94-96. Sesay disagrees with this and there is clearly some dispute; for example witness TF-360 says this was the case.

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
Many area commander (seven) under the command and control of BFC

- By the end of 1996 Kangari Hills, the western area, Kailahun were left as "areas" in the RUF
- The battalion commanders were under the command of the area commanders
- No unit commander had command over an area commander
- The BGC seems to have no units under his command
- Intelligence officers (IO) reported directly to the leader (situation reports from the different fronts)
- "Overall area commander" an unclear position, maybe a precursor to the BGC. The role of BGC has never been clearly defined.
- Sam Bockarie became BGC (November 1996)

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(II) **December 1996 - 2 May 1997**

Organisation/Chain of command




- The HQ's in BUEDU (from January 1997)
- It is extremely difficult to give orders or get reports from a lower rank position
- The role as BGC seems to be weak (2IC, advisor, assistant to BFC?) There is no evidence that Sesay was 2IC, but many considered him as next in command after Bockarie. You cannot see that the area commanders considered Sesay to be 2IC.
- The jungle areas seems to have highest priority
- Kailahun area is the base.
- But Kailahun was important militarily for the support of the operations. The civilians appear to have been treated well. You could not see any selective terror.

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
(III) **May 1997 – February 1998**

(Organisation/Chain of command)

A. Around Freetown (May 1997)



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B. September 1997


- Sesay's role appears to have been more or less a kind of a coordinator, facilitator with some logistical tasks.
- An extremely difficult structure of chain of command
- Many chains of orders and reports.

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1997


After 9 months approximately a Brigade Structure was implemented.

Brigade structure




1. Brigade Kailahun HQ Pedembu (admin role)
2. Brigade Kono
3. Brigade Tongo

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The command Structure February 1998**Some observations**

- 1) Bockarie gave orders directly to Superman
- 2) Sesay was able to get orders both from BFC and the defence/army staff
- 3) Sesay gave orders to Vandi in Kailahun
- 4) Bockarie tried to coordinate with JPK and the staffs
- 5) JPK talked directly to Superman and Sesay
- 5) Superman, Mongor and Lamin reported to SB


Chain of command RUF March 1998



From March 1998 – December 1998


After JPK was sent to Kangama and dismissed from the RUF

A) Chain of command (theoretically)




*) It is unclear if Kallon both was battlefield inspector and deputy to Superman.

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From March 1998 – December 1998**B: Chain of command (de facto)**

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January/ early February 1999




1) Cooperated in the attack on Waterloo and Masaika

- 2) Cooperation
- 3) Some order (for example attack Port Loko)
- 4) Gullit was linked with Superman

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December 1999



Here shows the structure who reported to Sesay. Some sources mentioned Sesay as Battle field inspector (which means that he had a more of a controlling function). Although the weight of the evidence suggests that he was the BFC.

De facto is a Battle field inspector a high officer, who controls the field activities, that orders and directives are executed, that rules of engagement, law and order and the discipline is fulfilled.

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graph TD
    Sankoh[Leader Sankoh] --> Gbao[Gbao IDU]
    Sankoh --> BFC[BFC Sesay]
    Sankoh --> Sman[Sman]
    Sankoh --> Massa[Massaquoi]
    Sankoh --> Gbund[Gbundema]
    Gbao <--> BFC
    BFC <--> Kallon[Kallon]
    BFC <--> Turay[Turay]
    Kallon <--> Turay
    BFC --> ColStar[Col * Short Bai Bureh  
(Magburaka/ Makeni)]
    BFC --> ColSherif[Col Sheriff  
Northern Region  
(Makeni)]
    BFC --> ColJungle[Col Jungle  
(Matotaka)]
    BFC --> ColLion[Col Lion]
    BFC --> ColBig[Col Big  
(Kono)]
    BFC --> ColBanya[Col * Banyan  
(Tongo)]
    BFC --> Star[**]
    Star --> Box1[ ]
    Star --> Box2[ ]
  
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*** Close cooperation

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What factors would you expect to have impacted upon the ability of Sesay to control those who were in lower rank or had different assignments during the different periods of the RUF?

Firstly, it is important to describe/define the various assignments/functions in the RUF system. Of course, they changed during the different periods/phases.

1. The Leader (de facto)

The leader had the paramount responsibility of all activities within the RUF. He had the political responsibility, control of, and coordination between military and civilian activities. The leader should have responsibility over:

- the administration in occupied areas
- the law/human right system
- the code of conduct of the troops
- the support to troops
- the support to the civilians in occupied areas
- diplomacy towards to other countries (supporting nations)
- The assignments and ranks of the highest military and civilian leaders
- Negotiation during peace periods or ceasefire periods

The leader should determine

- the goals for the RUF
- the military/political goals during different phases

2. Battlefield Commander (BFC)

He is the overall military commander and responsible for all military operations including military territorial activities. He shall have military strategic plan for the operations, endorsed by the leader. He shall plan, execute and control the operations. He is able to build up the support of the operations. He is responsible that there is the right balance of strength of the units. The BFC shall use a staff to support him conducting the military activities.

Under his command he has sub-leaders of units and staffs.

The BFC shall only get instructions from the leader.

3. Battle group commander (BGC)

Many sources consider the BGC as number three (after the leader and BFC) within the RUF organisation.

In western army terminology, a battle group commander is commanding a battle group, which consists of units up to the size of a brigade (2-4000 men) and minor. A battle group is an effective “war machine”, which the commander can use to settle (conclude) the decisive battle. When a battle group attacks, the area commander shall support him with all means. The BGC has right to use the support in the area in order to fulfill his tasks.

In the RUF organisation, the BGC role is extremely difficult to explain/describe. There is no clear definition. He can be considered as:

- 2 IC to the BFC
- An advanced advisor/staff member
- An assistant to BFC to clarify special problems
- A reserve for the BFC
- A leader to conduct minor operations

Sometimes a leader has been assigned as the BGC de facto to just place.

The role of the BGC in different phases and areas has been unclear.

The BGC roles shifted all the time, depending on the situations (de facto and de jure).

4. Area Commanders

The area commanders have full responsibility of all military activities in his area. The area can often be the same as a district. He has a territorial responsibility, which means he shall coordinate civilian and military activities, support the civilians, and cooperate with the civilian leaders. In the frontline areas (jungle areas) the commanders concentrate their activities in war fighting – to control the whole area. In rear areas (for example, Kailahun and Makeni at the end of 1999) the area commander has more a role as country governor, to run an civilian occupied area, supporting the civilians, act as the paramount head of the police – but also be able to defence the territory.

Different phases

5. 1996 to May 1997

Sankoh was de facto the political leader of the RUF, but had also an interest and controlled many military matters. He was in charge of the assignment and rank system within the RUF, which always is important in a military system. He gave instructions/orders to his deputy M. Tarawillie.

When Sankoh left Zogoda (HQ) for peace talks, Tarawillie was de facto the leader in charge.

Sankoh had taken a mandate to talk to anyone he wanted (Lansana). Sankoh also got reports directly from the area commanders. Sankoh wanted talk to the ground directly. He did not have to go through channels. But in most of the cases the jungle commanders at this time reported to SB in Peyawa and then he reported to Sankoh.

Sankoh's way to give "orders"/instructions and get reports established a form, which then was used by him all the time he was in charge. It was common to bypass the commanders.

The BFC was Tarawillie. He gave order and the sub-commander reported to him. The task was large and difficult depending on long communication lines, many areas and commanders and the overall strategy was unclear. At the end of 1996, it was a turbulent period. Before a new command structure was established Sam Bockarie took two steps forward from battalion commander under Superman and shortly after that he became BFC and de facto the military leader of the RUF.*)

The BGC assignment was held by Bockarie at the end of 1996. It is de facto unclear which role the BGC had. It seems to be more like a deputy to BFC. You cannot see that BGC had any troops under his command.

The area commanders had large freedom of action. They were "kings" within their areas. Some areas with a battalion structure with different sizes of the units, some area commanders had a more loose organisation.

After December 1996 Bockarie took a fast grip over the military RUF. He is the paramount military leader, the BFC and he de facto gives the orders/instructions to the staff branches and the area commanders, and they reported to him.

The area commanders have the rank of Colonels (besides Peter Vandi in Kailahun area,) same as Bockarie, however, this fact creates no problems for him.

The role of BGC seems to be weak. De Jure BGC is a high assignment in the RUF military system. Many leaders, officers, civilians consider the BGC as a kind of deputy to the BFC.

De facto, Sesay had a low rank (Lt Colonel) compared to the area commanders and the role of BGC was unclear. Sesay had here more of an assistant/advisor role. He had no command role and no troops under his command. It was more a post of honour for Sesay. Bockarie was able to rely in him and Sesay was rather well known by the Sierra Leonians especially in the Kailahun district.

In November - December 1996 and the period after that, the area commanders were the leaders in complete control and command of their parts of the RUF and were totally responsible for the various areas.

From December 1996 when Bockarie de facto took the all-embracing military command over the RUF to the end of 1999 he was the military leader of the RUF. This fact affected Sesay. When Sesay became the BGC in the end of 1996, this assignment was more of an assistant role. Bockarie commanded his area commanders and they reported to him. Sesay was Lt Colonel and in a military/guerrilla organisation or in a "normal" western like military organisation, he had big difficulties to command, instruct or give orders to the colonels. Sankoh and Bockarie did Sesay a bad turn and bad start as the BGC. Both Sankoh and Bockarie gave direct order, instructions and directives to the area commanders. Sesay got orders from Bockarie, but not directives to command Superman and the other commanders.

6. The Junta Period (May 1997 – mid February 1998)

In spite of the ambitions to achieve a full coordination of AFRC and RUF there was a lot of difficulties. The RUF tried to keep the chain of command as it has been earlier. However, it was a clear instruction that in units both the RUF and AFRC subleaders should be in command (They were able to control each other – this was part of the instruction).

Before a more stable organisation was established, different groups/commanders were deployed around Freetown. During this first period Bockarie was in the lead and gave orders to the commanders of RUF (Superman, Mongo, Vandi (in Kailahun) and to Sesay as BGC). Each commander tried to create advantages of the present situation. Sam Bockarie was still the highest military within the RUF (he tried to be second in command to the chief of defence staff, but the heads of AFRC refused). This first period of the Junta was of natural reasons extremely unclear. Bockarie tried from the rear to control the RUF and he gave orders to the commanders in order to try to have double command in every district, town or village.

During the junta period Sesay was de jure the BGC, but it appears that he still had difficulties command and control Superman, Mongo and their groups. Both the defence

staff and the Army staff gave orders directly to Sesay, Superman and Mongo. During the Junta period minor operations appear to have been well executed which suggests that the role of the BGC was not needed.

De facto the BGC role did not work during this period. The AFRC leadership treated him as good and decent man to negotiate and work with. Sesay had more or less a role as facilitator, coordinator and with some logistical tasks. Bockarie also used him as his long arm in Freetown to get reports and some control.

Bockarie's military power was limited during this period.

Sesay as BGC had a minor role more like a messenger of Bockarie, but had difficulties to influence Superman and Mongo and had no possibilities to give orders to them or get reports from them.

Here we can also see that commanders (Superman) began to not to obey orders from Bockarie.

September 1997

After September 1997, the different responsible heads tried to sort out how the organisation should be worked. The council had started to act. The different RUF commanders reported to the chief of army staff or to the chief of defence staff. Bockarie still gave orders or instructions to the commanders of RUF (Sesay, Kallon etc). This was confusing. Each RUF commander had units or sub-commanders under his command and tried to increase his own importance (especially Superman).

Sesay had been given the BGC role of Sankoh and the rank of Lt. Colonel, which also was confusing. Sesay had no or minor power. De facto the role of BGC did not work at this period. Sesay had his own groups, but he acted more like a coordinator, facilitator or assistant to the Junta heads or the RUF. Sometimes Bockarie used him as a spokesperson for himself.

Sankoh was still the leader of the RUF, but had left more or less the military command to JPK (John Paul Koroma) and gave orders to Bockarie that he should take orders from JPK, whom in his command structure used the chief of defence staff – FSY Koroma and the army chief of staff – SO Williams) as his long arm.

Even JPK used Sesay as an assistant/commander for example when he ordered Sesay to "the Ferry junction" and issued orders to Superman as well. But Superman refused to take orders from Sesay. De facto Superman was not under the command of Sesay and

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actually not “de jure”. I cannot see any examples, where Sesay had a superior role towards Superman during this period.

An example of where it should be a task for a BGC to act is the attack on Tongo in August 1997. But Bockarie and the AFRC (Brigade Commander) coordinated the attack without the interference of Sesay. Maybe this depended on the fact that Bockarie did not recognise Sesay as a good enough military leader or Sesay did not have enough rank or he had de facto no direct military command since he had to make request from the Chief of the Army Staff).

On the other hand the attack on the ECOMOG compound in Kenema late October gave Sesay a coordination role as BGC. In this instance, Sesay reported to Bockarie like the AFRC commander Col Lion. The military organisation was a kind of ad hoc structure. There was no standing procedures, no orders or rules concerning its structure.

Some military conclusions from the Junta period concerning assignments, ranks and functions.

- A real complicated chain of command structure, where many high leaders were able to command the subleaders. The chain of reports from sub-leaders and units was unclear.
 - The de facto leader seems to be JPK
 - The overall military leaders were:
 - 1) Chief of Defence staff – Koroma
 - 2) Chief of Army staff – Williams
 - 3) BFC – Sam Bockarie
- Depending on which issue it was, the different leaders took initiatives

- Sesay as BGC got orders and reported to all above
- Between the area commanders there were no coordination
- There was a will to coordinate the military collaboration between AFRC and RUF but there was a suspicion between the two groups
- Some area commanders did not obey orders
- No clear standing operating procedures. An ad hoc organisation – a real mess!

7. The Intervention period (February 1998 to December 1999)

In February 1998, when the intervention started there was a militarily unclear organisation, the AFRC/RUF was disorganised. The defence or army staff had no ability to foresee the course of events. The military organisation was a disaster. There was no plan of retreat or plan for a delaying operation eastwards. The defence staff tried to give

order through orderly officers to some commanders of AFRC and RUF to start counterattacks or to build up defence positions. However, the military operations mainly failed.

At this time, it seemed that Sam Bockarie was the de facto lead of the RUF and took initiatives, and tried to coordinate the efforts through Sesay, who had direct contact with the army chief of staff and the chief of defence staff, for example: the attack on Kenema and the re-attack on Bo.

Here you must consider that the RUF more and more took the lead of the revolution. Here was a clearer role for Sesay as BGC, but he had de facto no command over Superman, Mongo and Lamin. They acted independently and took their own initiatives. In fact the BFC – Bockarie did not neither have the ability to give orders to them (from a military point of view this fact creates a real undisciplined atmosphere within the whole RUF).

JPK ordered Superman to be the area commander of KONO and Bazzy Kamara was his deputy. But in fact in March 1998 there were two operational commanders in Kono, Bazzy for SLA and Superman for the RUF. Superman was in fact above Bazzy.

JPK gave order towards Isaac Mongor to lead the way to Kailahun
Bockarie was informed daily.

From March 1998 when Bockarie took over as Chief of Defence, he acted also as the leader of the RUF, and he was de facto the BFC with large power. It seems that he did not want advice or did not consult anybody. Practically he still acted as field commander and controlled all military activities including the storing of ammunition, which shows that he wished to control big and small things. Bockarie had a need to get reports daily from the commanders out in the areas and the unit commanders in the G-staff. He had a need to be in contact and was sending messages and instructions all the time. The small units (G-5, medicine etc) asked Bockarie about approval to do small activities. There was a controlling atmosphere. He had concentrated all power to himself.

He was more or less used as assistant to Bockarie and got tasks to control, for example to control the targets at the frontline. From May 1998 to November 1998 he was placed in Pendembu with an independent task as area commander with units under his command. This was typical for Bockarie. He used Sesay to cover a need in the system.

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In February 1998 after the intervention had started, Sesay got a more clear BGC role, when he among other things was ordered by Bockarie to coordinate and execute the attack on Kenema.

From March 1998 when Bockarie was promoted to Chief Defence Staff of the RUF and brigadier, he took over again as the paramount military leader. Sesay became de jure the new BFC. Practically Bockarie still acted as the BFC and gave direct orders to his sub-commanders and they reported to him. Sesay had a deputy position, but was not in many cases involved in Bockarie's plans and decisions. Bockarie used Sesay to cover "holes" (unsolved problems), when new needs appeared.

Sesay was a facilitator. Sesay got tasks as control the targets and became later Area Commander in Pendembu from May 1998 to November 1998, where he had a more administrative military task. It seems that Sesay had a good control over the area and the situation.

Bockarie commanded and gave orders as Chief of Defence Staff/BFC/BGC in one person. Sesay as usual obeyed orders and together with Kallon and Rambo had the mission to pursue the ECOMOG units. Sesay had here only control over his own group. You can of course wonder why Sesay did not question Bockarie's dictatorlike military leadership. However he had strong bonds to Bockarie and relied on his judgements and his military ability.

During the attack in Kono in Koidu town December 1998 Bockarie used Sesay as a real BGC, to coordinate and execute the operation. It was a well-organised operation with features of a regular army and guerrilla operation. The plan was of Bockarie. Sesay had a good overview of the operation and was placed in the rear, which was wise (Some had accused him to be not in the front, which was rather common among other warriors). A commander does not need to be in the shooting frontline. Sesay controlled the situation and his sub-leaders had confidence in him. From a strict military point of view, the plan of the assault, the execution and "the cleaning up operation" was in good order.

After the attack on Koidu Bockarie was de facto BFC and gave orders to pursue the enemy. However, Bockarie now gave orders directly to all his commanders for example Superman to attack Makeni. Sesay, Kallon. Rambo should pursue ECOMOG through Makeni and Akin should attack Tongo. After the Koidu attack Sesay became again a commander like the others. Bockarie was here a kind of BFC/BGC in one person. Bockarie's plan was to utilize the situation of panics within ECOMOG and take over as much land/towns/villages as possible. He had here a military strategy but the coordination was defective and the different commanders had a big freedom of actions.

8. January 1999 – May 2000

8.1 January/February 1999

During this period you can recognize three sources of military power:

- 1) Bockarie as Chief of Defence of the RUF with BFC Sesay and his groups including Rambo.
- 2) The former Koinadugu group with BGC Superman, General Bropleh, Brigadier Mani and Chief Admin coordinator Northern Regim HQ T. Tarawillie.
- 3) The AFRC/SLA group mainly concentrated in Freetown with Gullit and his group.

In the beginning of 1999 when there were three main groupings within the military system. Sesay still remain in the mainstream of the RUF, he was de facto loyal to Bockarie, who with a large authoritarian manner commanded Sesay and his group. Sesay was de jure the BFC, but was de facto more of an area commander in Makeni with both military and civilian tasks. Sesay acted with full authority in Makeni, in spite of that other commanders tried to question his position. In March 1999 the leadership situation in the RUF got worse, principally depending on that Superman and his group did not take orders from anybody.

De facto was Bockarie the paramount military leader of RUF, de facto BFC. He still acted with command- and controlling measures over Sesay and his group, Sesay was de jure the BFC but he was de facto a kind of BGC with limited authority. He tried to have control over Makeni and with Rambo as his sub-leader.

Superman was de jure BGC of RUF. De facto he acted independently from Bockarie and Sesay. He worked together with Bropleh and Mani. Reluctantly he coordinated some attacks with Rambo, who was under Sesay's command. De facto Superman did not take orders from Bockarie (of course not from Sesay). It seems there was little coordination between AFRC and RUF around Freetown. However, Gullit cooperated with Superman.

In February 1999, Bockarie makes promotions in order to make an impression that the RUF should be similar to a regular army structure. He promotes Sesay, Lamin, Mongor, Kallon and Vandi to Brigadier-Generals. You can observe that Sesay as BFC de jure did not get a higher rank than the other ones, which again suggests that the ranking system did not work completely.

8.2 March – December 1999

This period is characterised by a chaotic leadership situation. Sankoh as the paramount leader of the RUF gave orders/instructions directly to commanders (Bockarie, Sesay, Superman, Kallon etc). The coordination was defective. Some RUF leaders even started to fight against each other.

Superman seemed to more or less act as a totally independent warlord, not obeying orders from anyone, even not Sankoh. He never acted properly as the BGC of RUF. He had his own agenda.

After some months Sesay more and more took control of the situation, with the base of Makeni. Sesay was de jure the BFC, de facto BGC, now he acted more like a “county administrator” (especially after that Sesay had returned to Makeni in October 1999). Sankoh had an enormous control need and he used his power to talk to every commander he needed, even to junior leaders on platoon level.

8.3 December 1999 – May 2000 (the disarmament process)

This period characterises of that the strongest military leader of the RUF Sam Bockarie leaves the scene (December 1999) and Sankoh gives Sesay the role as the BFC (as he had been assigned earlier by Bockarie) and promoted to General. De jure now, Sesay was military paramount leader of the RUF.

In the beginning of this period Sankoh was the leader. He commanded his commanders directly via radio, but also through visits and meetings. He got the reports. He gave orders directly and the organisation seemed to be very flat designed.

From December 1999, after that Bockarie had left Sierra Leone Sankoh gave de jure Sesay the role of the BFC and the rank of General, but de facto Sankoh did not leave the whole military command to Sesay. Sankoh acted as military paramount leader as well and interfered in military business many times. Sesay had also difficulties to monitor Sankoh's instructions and orders.

From February 2000, the situation was chaotic if you look upon the structure from a command point of view. Sankoh gave orders/instructions both to Sesay and to other commanders. Sometimes he ordered Sesay in detail, how he should act and soon after he decided another way to act. Sesay tried to be loyal to Sankoh, but more and more find other practical solutions to fulfil his tasks or take care of Sankoh's puzzled intentions.

8.4 February 2000

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In February 2000, the whole RUF began to split up. Many commanders disliked the orders from Sankoh to arrest the UNAMSIL observers. De facto Sankoh dismissed Sesay as BFC to be an area unit commander in Kono.

But Sankoh was able to change quickly. He used de facto Sesay as his BFC to give order to the commanders (10 February 2000). It was a kind of double command.

Sesay did not get totally freedom to act militarily and to cooperate with UNAMSIL. Sankoh interfered all the time in the process.

It seems that Sankoh at this stage did not take advice. He changed many times his mind and orders, which made Sesay uncertain. Sesay choose to wait to act, before he was sure what Sankoh's intent was.

It was confused for the commanders in UNAMSIL and also for the commanders in the RUF that orders came from two ways (Sankoh and Sesay). For example (March 15, 2000) Sesay gave orders to Kallon that UN troops were able to deploy (occupy) at the Arabic college (orders from Sankoh). But at the same time Sankoh sent instructions that UNAMSIL should not be allowed to base there. Sesay tried to all the time as a military be loyal to Sankoh. The whole situation was worse according to chain of command. When the fights between UNAMSIL and RUF took place in May 2000 Sankoh acted as a BFC/BGC and bypassed Sesay.

Appendix A

1. Level of warfare independent of which type of organisation it is

The conduct of military activity can be divided into four levels: political-strategic, military-strategic, operational and tactical levels. The activity involves personnel from the top political leadership to individual servicemen on the front line in conflict environments. There are no clearly defined boundaries between the levels, and they often overlap. These levels make up a hierarchy in which aims, means and methods are co-ordinated and where activity at strategic level controls the lower levels. It is the planned effect of the warfare, that is to say the aim of the activity, which ultimately decides at what level a unit acts.

2. Political-strategic level

Political strategy comprises the co-ordination of the available means of security policy of a nation or an alliance – diplomatic, economic, military and other – in order to satisfy national or common interests, that is to say attain the political-strategic aims. The political strategy defines the strategic aims which the state authorities wish to achieve and lies down, without regulating in detail, which means and methods are to be used and limitations on the use of means indicated. The formulation of political strategy is formulated for the state authorities, regardless of whether the government decides on a national operation or, together with other governments, in a security organisation or in a temporary coalition, decides on a multinational operation.

A formulation of a political-strategic goal can also be formulated within a guerrilla movement.

3. Military-strategic level

Military strategy comprises the co-ordination of military power, the overall support, the priorities (room, area and time), nationally or multinationally, within one or more theatres of war, in order to attain the strategic aims. At the level of military strategy, the aims are clarified on the basis of the overall political purposes and what military resources and methods are to be used. The Supreme Commander, the commander in chief, is responsible for the needs of the state authorities for military means for conflict management being fulfilled by combat forces with the right capability being available for operations within given time limits.

4. Operational level

Operational warfare comprises the co-ordination of tactical activity in larger operations within an area of operations. The aims are clarified at the operational level on the basis of the overall aims of military strategy and how allocated means, in the form of combat forces, are to be utilised and co-ordinated in different types of larger, primarily joint, operations. Operational warfare thus constitutes the links between the military-strategic

aims and the tactical units which are to implement operations within demarcated areas of operation. A battlefield commander often acts on this level. Guerrilla war/combat can take place on the operational level using both heavy and light units (ex Vietcong Tet offensive) or heavy attacks on towns and villages coordinated in time in Lebanon, May 1988. But the guerrilla attacks did not work joint and with limited support from air units.

5. Tactical level

Tactics comprises the co-ordination of tactical activity within individual battles and smaller operations. At the tactical level, the aims are clarified on the basis of the overall operational aims and how tactical units, individually or with other tactical units, are to be utilised and co-ordinated in various operations. It is ultimately by combat forces attaining tactical decisions and aims on the battlefield that operational and finally strategic aims can be put into effect. The tactical level is the most common level in guerrilla warfare. A battle group commander acts on this level.

6. Joint operations

A joint operation is a military operation carried out by combat forces from more than one type of combat force. In the joint operation (land/sea land/air) operational activity and other operational functions are co-ordinated where appropriate.

7. Territorial activity

Territorial activity is intended, through collaboration, to co-ordinate military and civil resources, creating the necessary conditions for conducting and supporting military and civil missions, maintain a processed scenario as a basis for missions and through joint planning assist in the creation of a society which can withstand severe strains and limited armed missions.