


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SCSL-04-15-T
(26732 - 26749)

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SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before: Hon. Justice, Benjamin Mutanga Itoe, Presiding
Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson
Hon. Justice Pierre Boutet



Registrar: Mr. Herman Von Hebel

Date filed: 26th May 2008

THE PROSECUTOR

against

ISSA HASSAN SESAY
MORRIS KALLON
AUGUSTINE GBAO

Case No. SCSL -2004-15-T

PUBLIC CORRIGENDUM
KALLON DEFENCE APPLICATION FOR THE ADMISSION OF THE
WITNESS STATEMENTS FOR BUHARI MUSA AND
AMARA ESSE UNDER RULE 92bis OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE UNDER RULE 92ter

Office of the Prosecutor:

Peter Harrison
Reginald Fynn

Counsel for Issa Sesay:

Wayne Jordash
Sareta Ashraph

Counsel for Morris Kallon:

Charles Taku
Kennedy Ogetto
Tanoo Mylvaganam

Court-Appointed Counsel for
Augustine Gbao:

John Cammegh
Scott Martin

1. On 22 May 2008 the Kallon Defence filed “Urgent and Public with Confidential Annex Kallon Defence Application for the Admission of the Witness Statements of DMK-422 and DMK- 400 Under Rule 92bis, in the Alternative, Under Rule 92ter.”¹The defence erroneously filed the annexes as confidential.
2. On 23 May 2008 the Prosecution filed a “Request for Clarification of Status of DMK-400 and DMK-422.”²
3. The Trial Chamber issued the “Decision on Prosecution Request for Clarification of Status of DMK-400 and DMK-422”³ on 26th May 2008-05-26
4. The Kallon Defence pursuant to the Decision on Prosecution Request for Clarification of Status for DMK-400 and DMK-422 of the Trial Chamber, hereby files a corrigendum and discloses the names of the witnesses as follows:


DMK-400: Buhari Musa

DMK- 422: Amara Esse

5. The Kallon Defence herewith re-files the statements of the afore mentioned witnesses as public annexes.

DONE this 26th day of April 2008 in Freetown

For Defendant Kallon



Chief Charles A. Taku
Kennedy Ogeto
Tanoo Mylvaganam

¹ SCSL-04-T-1141

² SCSL-04-T-1142

³ SCSL-04-T-1148

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STATEMENT OF COLONEL BUHARI MUSA – DMK - 400

I joined the Nigerian Army in July 1977 and retired in 2004 after my return from Sierra Leone in 2000. I am a graduate in Political Science from the University of Lagos and have undergone a number of specialist training modules during my time in service both in Nigeria and the USA. I also served in the Peace keeping force in Lebanon and in Liberia.

I was an ECOMOG Commanding Officer during the conflict in Sierra Leone. I left Sierra Leone finally in April 2000.

The intervention of ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone occurred following the overthrow of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. In February 1998, ECOMOG troops with contingents from Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria restored constitutional legality and reinstated the government that was democratically elected. At the peak of the operations, ECOMOG had 13,000 troops in the country which conducted both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

All the warring factions and the government later signed a peace agreement in Lome in September 1999 ending the Sierra Leonean crisis.

In 2000, the United Nations Peace Keeping Force UNAMSIL replaced ECOMOG. I had a long period in Sierra Leone and was engaged with my troops fighting with the enemy on the ground between 1997 and 2000. I was recalled back to Sierra Leone in January 1999 after the attack on Freetown. I was responsible for providing security to all sensitive areas in Freetown such as Embassies and places where there were expatriates and was also responsible for the security of President Kabbah when he was brought back to Sierra Leone from Guinea by ECOMOG officers.

It was the ECOMOG officers who had charge of Foday Sankoh when he was brought back to Sierra Leone and was tried for murder and I believe treason. He was condemned to death and awaiting execution. A new peace initiative was being considered as there was at this time an effective ceasefire and there had been no serious fighting since February 1999. There were 5 meetings between Foday Sankoh and President Kabbah before Lome; these took place at a neutral venue at which I and some government officials were present. There were discussions about whether Foday Sankoh should go to Lome and whether he would honour his word and return. He was given a

satellite phone and when he went he would telephone Kabbah every evening over the two week period.

The AFRC were not present nor were they represented at the Lome talks. In view, the junta which took power in 1997 was a direct result of long disaffection within the Sierra Leonean Army. It was clear from our own information available to ECOMOG that the RUF were not involved in the 1997 coup. The other factor which became apparent was that whilst they had apparent leaders making statements, the real control of this junta was in the hands of a few; the main junior officers ex-SLA who were really in control of decisions.

I particularly remember when one of them eventually surrendered in May 1999; he said something to me which has really stuck in my memory. He said I was going to boil you and eat you up as pepper soup when he learnt who I was. There was a complete disregard and disrespect for humanity from some of these SLA personalities who fought with the junta. In this respect, they differed from the RUF combatants with whom we had come into contact. They were an organized and much disciplined force and a formidable adversary.

As a result of their strong lines of organization and their very clear commitment and loyalty from most of them to their leader Foday Sankoh, they were driven by a cause which was not just to seize power. This was very apparent to me from all my discussions with Foday Sankoh and some of the others who I was able to meet when negotiations were taking place between him and President Kabbah. Foday Sankoh was a very powerful and charismatic man. He was very bitter about the sabotage of the Abidjan Peace Accord which he blamed on President Kabbah and his use of mercenaries. I believe that Kabbah was trying to genuinely negotiate for peace which led to the meeting between the two men. Also, I believe that the RUF and Sankoh were also tired of fighting as Sankoh would always be talking about his men in the bush and how they should be engaged with the development of the country.

I also knew President Kabbah and had many discussions with him in my role as Garrison Commander. He was always very concerned about his security and relied heavily on ECOMOG to provide him with security. After Lome it was hoped that a new beginning would break.

I was based in Koso Town with my battalion in 1999 and this is the period on which I am giving my account relating to the attack on Freetown in January 1999. My time in Sierra Leone was from February 1998 to April 2000.

I am able to say that it was mainly the AFRC who were responsible for the attack on Freetown in 1999. I am confidentially able to say this for a number of different reasons. First, where we captured some, it was they who told us who their commander was and the names that were given were all ex-SLA.

We were also aware that they had many differences between them. I am also able to say that apart from those we captured through ECOMOG, we had a number of sources of information and intelligence. The ECOMOG operation had some logistical support independently which also confirmed our own findings on the ground. We also adopted a policy of giving confidence to those we captured who would then be encouraged to cooperate fully with us. Therefore, through a number of sources, we were able to build up a number of sources of information and intelligence. ECOMOG had a number of informants also after conflict and capture; many would provide information about their command structure and so on. By 1998, the AFRC had an apparent command structure which consisted of JPK, Brigadier Koroma who was executed by Kabbah and Victor Foh. However, the real fighting figures and the real power were Guillit, Bazzy, Leather Boot, Five-five and Junior Lion; also someone by the name of Vandam. These were the real fire eaters.

I am able to distinguish the RUF from AFRC from information, from intercepted material, from captured combatants and from inside information sources of intelligence and information infiltration. For instance, the weaponry they used was different as was their manner of fighting and their dress code.

I am able to say that it was AFRC and not RUF who took power in 1997 and also attacked Freetown in 1999 for the following reasons:

There were a large number of disaffected Army personnel from the Sierra Leone Army made up of disaffected individuals. It was well established that their disaffection led to the coup of 1997. It was also the main group who headed activities in 1999 until 2000. They were the main official

spokespersons of the junta that were issuing press statements and public announcements; JPK, Chief of Army Staff, who disliked ECOMOG and the Chief of Navy.

The AFRC never lacked arms and ammunition. We had over 20 encounters with them and based my assessment on that. For instance, between the 12th and 18th of July, there was a 7 day battle without 2 hour interval. This confrontation was an exclusive AFRC encounter based on the fact that the weapons were very good and they may have had outside support. Also they were the ones able to get ammunition for the helicopter gun boat always hovering around and dropping bombs on suspected ECOMOG positions. When we captured the place on 10th February 1998, we found a small air strip within the defence headquarters which had been used to receive the gun boat. Also in my encounters with the RUF, we would treat the captured soldiers very well as our mission was peace; they would be given medical care and fed. Many stayed with us as a result and became sources of intelligence and scouts. Those who wanted to return to the bush, were allowed to do so but were also given food to take with them in the hope that it would encourage others to come and surrender their arms. Both in 1997 and 1999, these names below were involved:

1. Koroma
2. Guillit
3. Bazy
4. Five-five
5. Leather Boot
6. Vandam

In 1999, SAJ Musa led the attack. I was able to identify that there were different command structures. The RUF for instance had very disciplined and organised power structure which we had identified in the manner described. The AFRC were made up mainly of young soldiers who appeared to have authority over professional commissioned officers. The apparent political leaders would make decisions as the 'Government Junta' and then those with the real power within AFRC would change the position. These men were known as honourables and as previously explained, they were the real power behind JPK in January 1999. For instance, they had sophisticated mortar bombs which were not available to the RUF. We also organized for JPK to return safely to Freetown after the Lome Peace agreement. It was understood by some Nigerian soldiers that some of those

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who attacked Foday Sankoh's home in Freetown were living with JPK at the time.

My operations in 1998 led me to as far as Daru; we also had 22 Brigade which was in Kono. In my absence, the rebels took Kono back I believe in 1998. I had left Sierra Leone in August 1998. I returned a day after the attack on Freetown in January 1999.

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STATEMENT OF AMAFA ESSY

1. My name is Amara Essy. I am the former Foreign Minister of the Ivory Coast (1990 – 1998). I represented the Ivory Coast in a number of International and Regional forums. I have also held diplomatic office in the United Nations (“UN”) over an extensive period as President of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. I was also General Secretary of the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) between 2002 and 2003. During the mid-1990’s, I chaired the peace and security committee of the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) which was the regional body with primary responsibility for peace and security. The Economic Community of West African States is a regional group of 15 West African countries established in November of 1995. I can properly be described as one of the most senior statesman of the region and I am very familiar with specific events of the Sierra Leone conflict.
2. The difficulty with conflict in one country is that it can have an impact on the entire region. Therefore, all the regional leaders in West Africa were anxious for the conflict in Sierra Leone to end as it had dragged on for a very long time. They believed it was their responsibility to bring about peace and security. Article 51 of the ECOWAS Treaty in particular provides for regional security and contained undertaking of member states to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region.
3. My first direct involvement in the Sierra Leone civil conflict was in 1994-1995 whilst I was President of UN General Assembly. I received representations from the nongovernmental organization (“NGO”), International Alert, who wanted some action on a peace initiative to be taken in respect of the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”) and in particular Foday Sankoh, with whom the organization had occasion to spend one month in the bush. The aims and the objectives of the RUF were relatively unknown to the wider world and within Sierra Leone. I could not achieve much at the time of this communication. However, after Julius Maada Bio seized power from Valentine Strasser, Mr Bio took the view that it was not possible to defeat the RUF militarily and that it was necessary to negotiate with them. I supported this position and took steps with other

regional leaders to identify the way in which we could negotiate with the Foday Sankoh and the RUF. The regional leaders took the same view and were concerned about the flow of light arms into the region. Consequently, we were all anxious to bring about any development that would further peace and stability in the region as any conflict had the potential to affect other countries in the region.

4. By this time, no one had seen Foday Sankoh for approximately three years. Julius Maada Bio said he wanted us to help him commence dialogue with Foday Sankoh. He had reached this view because he said Momoh and Strasser had used mercenaries and a military option but had not managed to eradicate the RUF. He was keen to establish dialogue in the hope that it might lead to peace. Mr. Bio said by this time no one even knew if Foday Sankoh was alive or a ghost because he had hidden himself in the bush for over three years.
5. Because this request came through the legitimate channels of power from Sierra Leone and it was also in the interest of the region to reach peace, I endeavored to establish contact with Foday Sankoh. I was able to obtain a satellite telephone number for Sankoh and began to talk to him. Foday Sankoh indicated a willingness to engage in negotiations. I told him it was in the interest of his country and his ideological objectives to come out of the bush and explain the position and grievances of the RUF. I explained that if he stayed hidden in the bush, no one would know the ideological objectives of the RUF movement.
6. I also told him that all the regional leaders and statesmen were anxious for peace. In my discussions with him, I understood the objectives of the RUF as Foday Sankoh explained them to be very noble and laudable. Foday Sankoh was very articulate and passionate about his beliefs as he expressed them to me. He believed that the poverty of his country was being exploited by outside interests with the collaboration and assistance of corrupt leadership. He was very virulent about the past and then-current leadership's inability to implement a programme which benefited the majority of Sierra Leoneans.

7. Foday Sankoh was adamant that the amputations and mutilations which gained high media attention were not the work of RUF but the Kamajors and/or others who were deliberately placing the blame on RUF in order to discredit them and alienate world and local opinion against his movement. He did not say that the RUF were without fault but he pointed out that no mutilations had ever occurred in the days when the RUF had been engaged in armed conflicts up to 1996-1997. He was certain that the horrific mutilations we read about in the media were the work of the Kamajors led by Hinga Norman. This was a subject to which Foday Sankoh often returned. He was convinced that the Kamajors were using this method because the mercenaries who he believed had been hired to assist the Sierra Leone government had taught them to use this method as a way of discrediting the RUF and bringing international attention to the conflict. He was convinced of this view; moreover, his experience in the Congo where he had come across mercenaries was also responsible for him reaching this conclusion. This is an issue that was never resolved with evidence which would support what Foday Sankoh said; nevertheless, I can say that it was something that was one of Foday Sankoh's core beliefs.

8. As he believed the mercenaries from South Africa had brought this method of punishment to Sierra Leone, it was one of the reasons that he fundamentally mistrusted the Sierra Leone government and their partners and supporters. Additionally, he believed that the whole purpose of this methodology was to drive the civilians away from the diamond mining areas so that the diamond mines could be exploited by outside forces. In his view, the diamonds were the sole point of interest for those economic forces which caused exploitation to the ordinary people of Sierra Leone.

9. In my early talks with Foday Sankoh, I explained that the purpose of my role was to persuade him to talk with Mr. Bio, who wanted to genuinely create a dialogue with him. I took steps to brief myself on the background of the RUF in order to better understand the nature of the conflict. The RUF booklet outlined a very socialist programme. They wanted clearly available water in each village, schools in each village and education as a right for all children. Development, free access to health care and the development of

roads in order to ease access and safe passage for the civilians were also very important to the RUF.

10. I stressed to Foday Sankoh that if he believed in the implications of these objectives and loved his country, it was necessary to find peaceful resolutions. I told him that a solution could be found if he sought discussions. Foday Sankoh told me that he would like to go and talk with Mr Bio but that he was fearful. He said "when you are a revolutionary like me they me they will kill you". He quoted examples of heroes of Africa committed to progressive politics, who were all killed - Lumumba, Ben Bala, Chambo Katanga. He asked, "What guarantee can you give me to leave and reach Abidjan safely?"
11. He informed me that he was an expert in radio communications, learnt from his time in military training; this expertise enabled him to decode all communications. He told me that the mercenary group Executive Outcomes and the G.A. attempted to find his location by satellite and that whenever he spoke on the phone, they would use the opportunity to try to identify his location. He said that he had to regularly keep on the move after the use of his satellite phone. In fact, he would tell me that I could only call him at specific times when he would keep the phone on and other times it would be switched off. He had very deeply held concerns about his safety and wanted to know what guarantees I could give him as to safe patronage.
12. It was my hope that the UN and OAU would assist in this peace initiative for the region. I believed that their involvement and blessing would guarantee Foday Sankoh the assurance he was seeking because he had no confidence that his security of person would be respected. I was hopeful that these international bodies would seize the opportunity to create a lasting peace in the region. After I made representations to both Boutros Gallis and Salim Salam of OAU, I heard nothing. Thereafter, the UN response was that it could not provide support on the bases that the operation was too dangerous to send any UN individuals and that it was not possible for staff member to trust the RUF.
13. Boutros Gallis said he regretted having reached this decision but it was not possible for him to take such a risk. The OAU could not help because the insurance requirement for

such a mission was quoted as very high and the OAU did not have the budget to foot such a bill on its own.

14. I was very disappointed and embarrassed at my inability to get the relevant support that I had hoped to galvanize. Also, I did not want to tell Foday Sankoh outright that there had been a negative response as it would have discouraged him. I kept in communication with him and told him these things take time. He was convinced that his enemies wanted to kill him and I believe that this sentiment would have been reinforced had I informed him of the UN's response and the OAU's inability to cover insurance costs.
15. Thereafter, Foday Sankoh suggested that I should consider coming to get him because I was a well-known person and would be able to provide a guarantee of safety if I personally accompanied him. I did not want to refuse his request and it seemed like an opportunity to progress his engagement into a peace settlement.
16. I contacted the Director of the International Red Cross. The Director was agreeable to providing a helicopter for that purpose as part of their humanitarian activity. Mr. Bio was also happy that things were progressing. Foday Sankoh indicated that if he left, he would require 18 of his people to accompany him. These 18 people composed his personal security requirement. The meeting was scheduled for 24 March 1996 and there were detailed co-coordinated arrangements. However, because the helicopter was late in taking off, I could not reach Foday Sankoh on telephone at the appointed time. Eventually, I was able to contact Foday Sankoh and flew with him to Abidjan, Ivory Coast.
17. Steps were taken to settle Foday Sankoh in Abidjan upon his arrival. The total number of his retinue was between 18-35 people. He was given a home, a car, and travel documents in the event that he wanted to travel. Every effort was made on my part to give Foday Sankoh confidence in the process and prepare him to engage in the quest for peace in Sierra Leone.

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18. There was, however, a major sticking point for Foday Sankoh, which I believe ultimately caused him to have little confidence in the peace process. Foday Sankoh had many people in Freetown from whom he gathered news about government difficulties in Freetown. Foday Sankoh wanted to postpone the Sierra Leone presidential election until after an agreement was reached. He was firmly of the view that, if there was a genuine will for political peace, an agreement should have been reached before elections were held. This did not occur. The RUF wanted to be transformed into a political party; however, most combatants never received formal education and lacked resources.
19. Foday Sankoh had a strongly held belief that Sierra Leone was the subject of economic exploitation by those who were corrupt and with local politicians who were betraying future generations of the country and the continent. He also believed that he was best-equipped to be the head-of-state of Sierra Leone.
20. I told this to ECOWAS Peace and Security Committee about Foday Sankoh's reservations but the government of Sierra Leone was determined to have elections. The international community and other significant interests were very determined elections should be held first. In particular, Mr. Ahmad Kabbah was of the mindset that if the elections were postponed, there was no knowledge about how long negotiations for the agreement would take. President Kabbah was elected by only a part of the country. There were people who boycotted the elections. The RUF also boycotted the elections. Elections before peace agreement really discouraged Foday Sankoh who always believed that he was the target of a plot to remove him from Sierra Leone. In turn, I believe that this made Foday Sankoh doubt the genuineness of the peace process because it proved to him that an election could be bought if a person had money.
21. He believed the international community chose President Kabbah to rule Sierra Leone because he came from the UN system and knew influential people in the super power nations. Foday Sankoh saw himself as the true liberator of Sierra Leone who he believed was in the control of foreigners. He saw behind the monitoring commission the hand of foreign powers.

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22. I spent a lot of time with Foday Sankoh before and after the peace negotiations. There was a period when I spent almost 2-3 hours a day with him. I became very familiar and clear about his views. As a person, Foday Sankoh was charismatic, charming, with a great smile. He was very clever and had a keen understanding of the history of all the political partners and had the ability to embarrass them on occasion. He was very distrustful of everyone and even on occasions even refused to speak with me towards the end. His time in the bush had made him paranoid and he was affected by other influences such as spiritual advisors. He was an expert in the art of communications and this fed his paranoia.
23. Negotiations for the agreement took place in Abidjan. The government of Sierra Leone was represented by a team of advisers and lawyers. The RUF team had no lawyer representing their interests but found a former OAU negotiator, Mrs. Adgoua. The government of Sierra Leone had a team of lawyers, Beruwa among them. They met every day. Discussions and negotiations lasted for approximately one month before an agreement was signed.
24. I believed from the regional players and partners they wanted peace. Also, the RUF were tired of war and fighting; however, there were forces benefiting from prolonged conflict and there were vested interests in the war continuing. I was with Foday Sankoh when he toured all the camps in the RUF in the bush to tell them about his decision to enter into peace negotiations and explained his reasons for doing so. It was clear to me at this time that he had a very strong influence over his followers but also they were all happy to embrace the prospect of peace at this time as I believe they were tired of fighting.
25. I didn't chair any subgroups but I chaired the joint meeting for the final agreement. The final agreed document was supposed to be a comprehensive reflection of all the issues. The RUF wanted a caretaker government but the Sierra Leone government was willing to give the RUF the same portfolio as it believed it was legitimate government.
26. We advised President Kabbah about the mistrust of Foday Sankoh and suggested to him that amnesty be given to the RUF, a cabinet post and a special position given to Foday

Sankoh. I believe President Kabbah was willing to do this. Ahmad Kabbah trusted James Jonah, a member of government and later Finance Minister who came once to Abidjan. Mr. Jonah was not so involved on the ground but he had a place at UN meetings representing the Sierra Leone government. I believe that his philosophy regarding the RUF was that, "You can never negotiate with the rebels because it will legitimize them." Whatever President Kabbah wanted, he also had these hardliners on his side.

27. I was very unhappy with Foday Sankoh at this time. I spent two to three hours a day with him but could not get him to speak or move. The UN was unhappy that a delegation was sent and that he did not receive them. My American Ambassador and the UN met with the Special Representative to Sierra Leone, John Flynn. They made it clear that they wanted President Kabbah back as Head of State and that he had to compose a new cabinet, which would be open to all political leaders. Foday Sankoh was so intransigent; he insulted them and informed them that they had to take responsibility. I told them if Foday Sankoh didn't move, then I didn't know what the future would be like. I also told Foday Sankoh that the future was in his hands.
28. The international community's views were expressed at high level meetings and at other designated times when Sierra Leone was on agenda. Their standpoint was always that the RUF should disarm first and they stressed upon this viewpoint. A lot of meetings took place on Sierra Leone in New York, London, Abuja, and Freetown.
29. The crafted agreement was the Abidjan Peace Agreement and signed on 30 November 1996. All parties involved in the Abidjan agreement were jubilant at the prospect of peace. Moreover, the agreement itself was very progressive. It addressed political, social, economic and military issues.
30. The enforcement of the Abidjan agreement ran into problems due to Article 11, which stated: "A neutral monitoring group (NMG) from the international community shall be responsible for monitoring breaches provided under this peace agreement. Both parties upon signing this agreement shall request the international community to provide neutral monitors. Such monitors when deployed shall be in position for an initial position of

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three months. The NMG shall report any violations of the cease fire to its HQ which shall in turn communicate the same to the HQ of the Joint Monitoring Group comprising of a representative of the Government of Sierra Leone and a representative of the RUF.” This should be read together with Article 12 which deemed that “Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn 5 weeks after the deployment of the NMG and as of the date of deployment of the NMG, the Executive Outcomes shall be confined to barracks under the supervision of the JMG and the NMG. Government shall use all its endeavors consistent with its treaty obligations to repatriate other foreign troops no later than three months after the deployment of the NMG or six months after the signing of the peace agreement, whichever is earlier.”

31. Subsequently, Sankoh complained that the cease-fire agreement was being breached by Hinga Norman's group and he believed that President Kabbah was behind those violations. The RUF filed documents about these violations. He complained to me and I believe others. I cannot say what investigations were taken to independently verify these claims but they were made and the fact that these violations were happening may have also influenced him about believing in the genuineness of the peace process as far as the government of Sierra Leone and their supporters were concerned.
32. One of the largest grievances and source of real anguish to Foday Sankoh was the Government's use of outside machineries in the form of Executive Outcome, which was to be withdrawn within 5 weeks of the Abidjan agreement's signing. Again, Foday Sankoh believed that those persons had an interest in the diamond mining areas and would not leave the mining areas. He believed that they were in collusion with local interests who was also involved in mining.
33. Foday Sankoh never trusted President Kabbah. He believed that the British and American big business interests would dominate his agenda. Even if those governments had genuine good will towards the development of Sierra Leone, it would not be sufficient to overcome the powerful multinational interests in the diamond trade and ammunition trade which he believed was setting the agenda about the conflict.

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34. Foday Sankoh had a high level of paranoia and as a result, found it hard to trust anyone. He stayed here until March 1997. For instance, Foday Sankoh did not trust Charles Taylor who he believed had his eye on Sierra Leone. He thought that Mr. Taylor wanted to put him under his control, and that it was Mr. Taylor's objective to be the strong man of the region. His lack of trust was one of the reasons which undermined the progress of the peace agreement.
35. When it was clear that Sankoh would not budge, I even encouraged other members of his delegation to consider the position of their future, and try to move forward even without him. I believe that they tried to do so when Sankoh disappeared to Nigeria but Sankoh outmaneuvered them and I believe gave instructions for their arrest when they returned to Sierra Leone. After this, Sankoh telephoned me jubilantly telling me that he was the only person who could lead the RUF.
36. He was difficult to manage and didn't trust anyone. The former President of Zimbabwe spent 3 days with Foday Sankoh and Foday Sankoh stated that he thought everyone was crazy in trying to persuade him that everyone wanted peace in Sierra Leone.
37. Omrie Gollie came to join Foday Sankoh from London. I believe Omrie Gollie encouraged Foday Sankoh to leave the Ivory Coast and go to Nigeria. Omrie Gollie was an elegant man who spoke very well. At the beginning, I had a lot of suspicion toward Gollie because I never knew whose side he was on. He became the spokesman of RUF. He stayed with Sankoh in Nigeria, and became akin to an international envoy of RUF.
38. One of the reasons I believed the peace agreement failed was due to the lack of timely implementation. Lack of implementation allows more room for something to occur; for instance, a crucial incident was that the RUF were adamant that there were forces fighting them and that the Executive Outcomes bombed their camp.
39. My difficulty at this time was that it became impossible to give this project total concentration to the exclusion of everything else. There were a number of other pressing issues that arose which required my urgent attention. Also because of my role as Foreign

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Minister, I had to travel and represent my country in other venues. My recollection therefore is that I was not present at Lome, for instance, also after Foday Sankoh left and went to Nigeria, I had little contact with him at that time. I too was emotionally exhausted by the whole process in trying my best to bring about an honest brokered peace agreement. I was also conscious of the huge mistrust from the international community towards Sankoh and the RUF and therefore was aware of the extent to which he would have to move in order to gain acceptance. It appeared to me that he was not capable of those compromises.

40. The last time I saw Foday Sankoh was when he was in captivity in Freetown, I believe it may have been in the ECOMOG barracks but I'm not sure. I requested that he be brought to see me and his captors brought him to me. He was not in a good condition but was pleased to see me and he cried when he saw me. I, too, cried and told him that I was sorry to see him in this situation and I had never expected things to end up in this way. Even though he turned out to be his own worst enemy, I felt bad because I had been the one responsible for getting him to leave the bush.

AMARA ESSY

10 MAY, 2008