
24)

SCSL-03-01-PT
(8347 – 9258)

8347

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
Freetown – Sierra Leone




Before: Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty

Registrar: Mr. Herman von Hebel, Acting Registrar

Date filed: 17 May 2007

**THE PROSECUTOR** **Against** **Charles Taylor**

Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT

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**PUBLIC**

**PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92 *BIS***

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Office of the Prosecutor:

Ms. Brenda J. Hollis
Ms. Ann Sutherland

Defence Counsel for Charles Taylor:

Mr. Karim A. A. Khan
Mr. Roger Sahota

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to Rules 73, 89(C) and 92*bis* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("Rules"), the Prosecution files this motion. The Prosecution requests the Trial Chamber to exercise its discretion and admit into evidence the material[1] listed in Annex A and contained in Annex B[2] attached to this Motion. This material formed part of the Prosecution's Rule 73*bis* Exhibit List filed on 4 April 2007.

2. The Prosecution informs the Chamber that a number of items contained in Annex A attached to this motion are contained in Annexes A and B to the Prosecution's Motion for Admission of Material Pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis* for Use During Opening Statement ("Opening Statement Motion") filed on 16 May 2007.[3] This has been duly noted in Annex A attached to this motion. The Prosecution in the Opening Statement Motion asks the Trial Chamber to admit material, pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis*, or provisionally mark it for identification as trial exhibits for the purpose of the opening.[4] The timing of the Prosecution's opening requires that the Opening Statement Motion be given priority in an admissibility review. At the time of consideration of this motion, should the Trial Chamber have ruled that the exhibits in the Opening Statement Motion be admitted provisionally, then the Prosecution requests that these documents now form part of this motion that they be admitted pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis*.

3. The Prosecution repeats below its submissions with respect to the law to be applied in considering whether to admit evidence pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis*.[5]

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[1] "Material" for the purposes of this motion, includes the information contained in the documents or audio-visual recordings as listed in Annex A (and contained in Annex B).
[2] Annex B contains four parts: B.1-B.4.
[3] The Prosecution in the Judicial Notice Motion asks the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of certain facts, and in the alternative, should the Trial Chamber decline to do so, the Prosecution requests that the Trial Chamber admit into evidence, pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis*, the corresponding documentary extracts set out in Annex B to that motion (*see* Judicial Notice Motion, paragraph 14).
[4] Opening Statement Motion, para. 19.
[5] *See* Opening Statement Motion, paras. 4-17.

## II. APPLICABLE LAW

4. The general rule on admission of evidence is Rule 89(C), which provides the Chamber with the discretion to admit relevant evidence.[6]

5. Rule 92*bis* (A) provides that a Chamber may admit as evidence, in whole or in part, information in lieu of oral testimony.

6. Rule 89(C) constitutes the basic rule regulating the admission of evidence which applies in addition to, and not instead of, the more specific provisions contained in Rules 92*bis*.[7] The requirements of Rules 92*bis* must be met by the Prosecution in order for the Trial Chamber to admit the evidence pursuant to Rule 89.

7. Rule 92*bis* (B) requires that two conditions be cumulatively satisfied, namely that the evidence ('information' – being assertions of fact, but not opinion, made in documents or electronic communications[8]) is relevant to the purpose for which it is being submitted and that its reliability is susceptible of confirmation.

8. The phrase "susceptible of confirmation" contained in Rule 92*bis* (B) has been interpreted by the *Norman et al.* Appeals Chamber to mean that the "proof of reliability is not a condition of admission: all that is required is that the information should be capable of corroboration in due course."[9] Further, the *Norman et al.* Appeals Chamber held that:

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[6] "By parity of reasoning, under Rule 95, the Trial Chamber can exclude evidence where its admission would bring the administration of justice into serious disrepute. Thus, the Chamber may exercise its discretion under this Rule and under its inherent jurisdiction to exclude evidence where its probative value is manifestly outweighed by its prejudicial effect." *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-391, Ruling on Gbao Application to Exclude Evidence of Prosecution Witness Mr. Koker, 23 May 2005 ("*Gbao* Ruling"), para. 7.

[7] *Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević*, IT-02-54-AR73.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence-In-Chief in the Form of Written Statements, App. Ch., 30 September 2003, paras 9-10.

[8] *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-AR73-398, Fofana – Decision on Appeal Against 'Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence 16 May 2005, ("*Fofana* Appeals Decision"), para. 26.

[9] *Fofana* Appeals Decision, para. 26. A panel of three Appeals Judges in the *Norman et al.* case (dealing with a bail application appeal) held that "under Rule 89(C), "[e]vidence is admissible once it is shown to be relevant: the question of reliability is determined thereafter, and is not a condition for its admission." *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-AR65, Fofana – Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail, App. Ch., 11 March 2005 ("*Fofana* Bail Appeals Decision"), para. 24, citing *Prosecutor v. Delalić et al.*, IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion of the Prosecutor for the Admissibility of Evidence, 19 January 1998, para. 19: "...it is neither

> It is for the trial chamber to decide whether the information comes in a form, or is of a kind, that is 'susceptible to confirmation'. It follows, of course, from the fact that its reliability is 'susceptible to confirmation', that it is also susceptible of being disproved, or so seriously called into question that the court will place no reliance upon it.
>
> Rule 92*bis* permits facts that are not beyond dispute to be presented to the court in a written or visual form that will require evaluation in due course. [...]. The weight and reliability of such 'information' admitted via Rule 92*bis* will have to be assessed in light of all the evidence in the case.[10]

9. This Trial Chamber in the *Brima et al.* case reiterated that "evidence may be excluded because it is unreliable, but it is not necessary to demonstrate the reliability of the evidence before it is admitted."[11] The Trial Chamber further considered that "reliability of the evidence is something to be considered by the Trial Chamber at the end of the trial when weighing and evaluating the evidence as a whole, in light of the context and nature of the evidence itself, including the credibility and reliability of the relevant evidence."[12]

10. The requirement to be met, therefore, for evidence to be *admitted* pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis*, is whether the evidence is relevant, its reliability is susceptible of confirmation, and its admission would not unfairly prejudice the Accused.[13] Unfair prejudice does not arise merely because evidence is incriminating. The analysis requires a determination of whether the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. "What is crucial in any such determination, where it

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necessary or desirable to add to the provisions of sub-Rule 89(C) a condition of admissibility which is not expressly prescribed by that provision."

[10] *Fofana* Appeals Decision, paras. 26-27.

[11] *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Prosecution Tender for Admission into Evidence of Information Contained in Notice Pursuant to Rule 92*bis*, 18 November 2005 ("*Brima* Rule 92*bis* Decision"), page 2 (last para), citing *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Joint Defence Application for Leave to Appeal from Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude All Evidence from Witness TF1-277, 2 August 2005, para. 6.

[12] *Brima* Rule 92*bis* Decision, page. 3 (second full paragraph). *See also Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-T-447, Decision on Prosecution's Request to Admit into Evidence Certain Documents Pursuant to Rules 92*bis* and 89(C), 14 July 2005 ("*Norman* Decision"), page 3.

[13] *Fofana* Appeals Decision, para. 26; *Fofana* Bail Appeals Decision, para. 24; *Norman* Decision, pp. 3-4 (fourth paragraph on page 3 and second paragraph on page 4); *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-618, Decision on Prosecution Notice Pursuant to Rule 92bis to Admit Information into Evidence, Tr. Ch.,2 August 2006, page 3 (paragraph 2).

is alleged that the probative value of the evidence under scrutiny is [substantially] outweighed by its prejudicial effect, is whether admitting the evidence will impact adversely and unfairly *upon the integrity of the proceedings* before the Court."[14]

11. The Prosecution respectfully submits that "capable of corroboration" as defined by the *Norman* Appeals Chamber[15] must be given a liberal interpretation. The material may not require corroboration at all, or at the very least, a scintilla of corroboration. For example, a United Nations map of Sierra Leone should not require corroboration and should be properly admissible without corroboration.

12. It is clear from the relevant provisions of the Rules that there is no blanket prohibition on the admission of the contents of documents/audio-visual recordings simply on the ground that their purported author has not been called to testify in the proceedings. Instead the conditions for admissibility are those contained in Sub-rule 89(C) and Rule 92*bis* discussed above.

## III. SUBMISSIONS

13. The Prosecution submits that the material sought to be admitted meets the above requirements. The material is relevant to the facts in issue in this case, its reliability is susceptible of confirmation, and is not unfairly prejudicial to the Accused.

14. The relevance of the material to this case, and the indictment in particular, is set out in Annex A. The material relates either to contextual elements of crimes, elements of underlying crimes alleged in the Indictment, or to the Accused's individual criminal responsibility.

15. Admitting the material pre-trial, enabling the trial proceedings to be conducted in a smooth and expeditious manner, does not prejudice the rights of the accused to challenge the relevance, reliability or authenticity of specific items of the material at

[14] *Gbao* Ruling, para. 8. Emphasis added. ICTR/ICTY Rule 89(C) provides that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is **substantially** outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. (emphasis added).
[15] *Fofana* Appeal Decision, para. 26.

trial.[16] Thus, admission of the material pre-trial is not inconsistent with the Accused's right to a fair trial. Further, it would serve the interests of justice by guaranteeing judicial economy.[17]

16. None of the material in question has been obtained by methods which either cast substantial doubt on its reliability, or would lead to a conclusion that its admission would bring the administration of justice into serious disrepute. A large percentage of this material sought to be admitted is open source. In addition, search and seizure missions have been conducted by members of the SCSL Office of the Prosecutor, the Sierra Leonean Police and the Liberian Government in which a number of documents were seized. Copies of the solemn declarations, statements or letters from the relevant authorities relating to these missions are contained in Annex C attached to this motion.[18] Unless the Trial Chamber deems it necessary, the Prosecution does not, at this time, seek to have the solemn declarations, statements or letters from the relevant authorities admitted into evidence.

17. Where the exhibits contained in Annex B do not bear an Evidence Register Number (ERN), the Prosecution seeks leave to substitute these copies with copies bearing ERNs where the Trial Chamber determines that the exhibits be admitted.

## III. CONCLUSION

18. For the reasons stated above, the Prosecution respectfully requests the Trial Chamber in exercising its discretion, admit into evidence, pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis* of

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[16] *See Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al.*, Case No. IT-98-30-PT, Order Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence, Tr. Ch., 17 March 1999; *See Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al.*, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, Decision Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence, Tr. Ch., 1 August 2000; *Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al.*, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, Decision Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence Regarding Duško Sikirica, Tr. Ch., 22 September 2000.

[17] *See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, IT-00-39-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motions for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts and for Admission of Written Statements of Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 92*bis*, Tr. Ch., 28 February 2003, para. 11: ". . . Judicial economy has been held up as one of the procedural legal principles of the International Tribunal in Articles 20(1) and 21(4)(c) of the Statute, i.e. the right of the accused to an expeditious trial and the right to be tried without undue delay. The Chamber emphasizes, however, that its first concern is always to ensure that the Accused is offered a fair trial. As long as this principle is accomplished, the Chamber is under a duty to avoid that unnecessary time and resources are wasted on unnecessary disputes."

[18] Annex C contains six parts: C.1-C.6.

the Rules, the material listed in Annex A and contained in Annex B attached to this Motion.

19. The Prosecution requests that the Trial Chamber issue a ruling as follows:

(1) The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the material contained in Annex B to the Motion is relevant to this case and its reliability is susceptible to confirmation to admit the aforesaid material into evidence in this case;

(2) The material contained in Annex B to the Motion be admitted for the purposes of the trial of the Accused;

(3) Counsel for the Accused is at liberty to challenge the relevance, reliability or authenticity of specific items of the material during the trial; and

(4) The Prosecution shall deal with any issues raised as to the reliability or authenticity of specific items of the material so admitted by way of rebuttal;

(5) The issue of weight will be determined by the Trial Chamber during its final deliberations, in the context of the trial record as a whole.

Filed in Freetown,

17 May 2007

For the Prosecution,

Brenda J. Hollis
Senior Trial Attorney

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## LIST OF AUTHORITIES

**SCSL**

***Prosecutor v. Taylor* – Case No. SCSL-03-01**

*Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution's Motion for Admission of Material Pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92*bis* for Use During Opening Statement, filed on 16 May 2007 ("Opening Statement Motion").

**Other Cases**

***Prosecutor v. Brima et al.* – Case No. SCSL-04-16**

1. *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Joint Defence Application for Leave to Appeal from Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude All Evidence from Witness TF1-277, 2 August 2005.

2. *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Prosecution Tender for Admission into Evidence of Information Contained in Notice Pursuant to Rule 92*bis*, 18 November 2005 ("*Brima* Rule 92*bis* Decision").

***Prosecutor v. Norman et al.* – Case No. SCSL-04-14**

3. *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-AR65, Fofana – Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail, App. Ch., 11 March 2005 ("*Fofana* Bail Appeals Decision").

4. *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-AR73-398, Fofana – Decision on Appeal Against 'Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence, 16 May 2005 ("*Fofana* Appeals Decision").

5. *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-T-447, Decision on Prosecution's Request to Admit into Evidence Certain Documents Pursuant to Rules 92*bis* and 89(C), 14 July 2005 ("*Norman* Trial Decision").

***Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.* – Case No. SCSL-04-15**

6. *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-391, Ruling on Gbao Application to Exclude Evidence of Prosecution Witness Mr. Koker, 23 May 2005 ("*Gbao* Ruling").

7. *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-617, Decision on Prosecution Notice Pursuant to Rule 92bis to Admit Information into Evidence, Tr. Ch.,2 August 2006,

**ICTY Cases**

8. *Prosecutor v. Delalić et al.*, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion of the Prosecutor for the Admissibility of Evidence, Tr. Ch., 19 January 1998.

http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/decision-e/80119EV21.htm

9. *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, Case No. IT-00-39-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motions for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts and for Admission of Written Statements of Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 92*bis*, Tr. Ch., 28 February 2003.

http://www.un.org/icty/krajisnik/trialc/decision-e/kra-dec030228e.pdf

10. *Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al.*, Case No. IT-98-30-PT, Order Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence, Tr. Ch., 17 March 1999.

http://www.un.org/icty/kvocka/trialc/order-e/90317EV55982.htm

11. *Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević*, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence-In-Chief in the Form of Written Statements, App. Ch,m 30 September 2003.

http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decision-e/030930.htm

12. *Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al.*, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, Decision Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence, Tr. Ch., 1 August 2000.

http://www.un.org/icty/sikirica/trialc/decision-e/00801EV513343.htm

13. *Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al.*, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, Decision Granting Request for Admission of Documentary Evidence Regarding Duško Sikirica, Tr. Ch., 22 September 2000.

http://www.un.org/icty/sikirica/trialc/decision-e/00922EV513523.htm

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# Annex A

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B.1 Documents which exist in the Public Domain | | | | | | |
| 1.028 | AFRC Decrees No. 2, 3 and 4. Establishing parts of the Junta Government. | 10/07/1997 & 14/07/1997 | 00007650-00007661 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.029 | Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette No. 49 - AFRC Decree No. 5. Imposing a curfew throughout Sierra Leone. | 19/08/1997 | 00007662-00007662A | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.031 | Supplement to the SL Gazette No. 66 - Public Notice 11, 12, 13, 14 of 1997. Establishing personnel changes within the Junta government. | 11/12/1997 | 00007675-00007682 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.032 | The Sierra Leone Gazette No. 43 and No. 49. Junta personnel postings. | 14/07/1997 | 00007701-00007702 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.053 | Hard copy of speech by RUF leader Foday Sankoh on cooperation and achievement of peace in Sierra Leone after Lome Peace Accords. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | undated | 00009476-00009477 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |



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| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.060 | Transcript of SLBS Radio Broadcast, 29 May 1997 15:26 GMT. [Proclamation issued by the Administration of Sierra Leone Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Proclamation 1997, in Freetown on 28 May 1997]. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 29/05/1997 | 00009685-00009686 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.064 | Revolutionary United Front's Apology to the Nation delivered on SLBS, 18 June 1997. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 18/06/1997 | 00009769-00009771 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **4, 5, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18), *ICR*, (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.071 | Statements made by the Parties following four days of mediation talks to harmonise Relations between the RUF and the AFRC under the auspices of the Government of the Republic of Liberia, with the support of ECOWAS Member States. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 02/10/1999 | 00011183-00011190 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.074 | Personal Statement by Lt. Col. J. P. Koroma on October 1st 1999. Thanking Charles Taylor for seeing that the first face-to-face meeting with Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma went smoothly - hosted at the Liberian Executive Mansion. | 01/10/1999 | Public document | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.088 | Bewildering Coup. Media report in the Sierra Leonean newspaper the Weekend Spark relating to how the AFRC is determined to consolidate their grip on power. | 13/06/1997 | 00019281-00019282 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6), **11,** (28), *ICR,* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.089 | AFRC Troops to Libya. Media report in Sierra Leonean newspaper For di People. | 09/06/1997 | 00019283-00019283 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.091 | Excerpts from Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis. Report to Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs from David Pratt dated April 23, 1999 describing the deteriorating situation in Sierra Leone. (pp. cover, 4, 5, 10, 11, 15, 22, 25, 33-35, 37, 38) | 23/04/1999 | 00020909-00020985 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **7, 8,** (18; 21), **9,** (22), **10,** (23; 27), *ICR,* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.092 | Integrated Regional Information Networks Update 438 of events in West Africa. Relating to ECOMOG's knowledge of a March 1999 arms shipment through Burkina Faso to Monrovia and then Sierra Leone. | 18/04/1999 | 00021257-00021261 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.093 | Excerpts from Diamond Hunters Fuel Africa's Brutal Wars; In Sierra Leone, Mining Firms Trade Weapons and Money for Access to Gems. (p. 1, 2) | 16/10/1999 | 00021306-00021316 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **4, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18), **11** (28), *ICR,* (33; 34) | Public Domain |



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| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.094 | The Liberian Government Finally Admits Support to RUF. | 27/11/2002 | 00023426-00023428 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.125 | Untitled Video. RUF in training sings in praise of Charles Taylor, while waiting to receive their leader Foday Sankoh at their rebel base. **(Video contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | undated | EV0007<br><br>ERN: D0000057 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.128 | Killing Democracy. Documentary providing an overview of the RUF's decade-long effort to take power in Sierra Leone. **(Video contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | undated | EV0071<br><br>ERN: D0000060 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8) **2, 3,** (9; 13), **4, 6,** (14; 17), **7, 8,** (18, 21), **9,** (22), *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |



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| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.129 | Operation Annihilation. Documentary focusing on efforts in Freetown to rehabilitate former RUF child combatants. **(Video contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | undated | EV0074<br><br>ERN: D0000061 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8) **2, 3,** (9; 13), **4, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18; 21) **9,** (22), **10,** (23; 27), **11,** (28; 31), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.130 | Excerpts from Soldiers of Fortune. Shows mercenaries in Sierra Leone, rebels seizing Freetown in January 1999, discusses and shows amputees, RUF taking 500 peacekeepers hostage, smuggling of weapons and diamonds, child soldiers, amputee camp including a 3-year old girl whose arm was hacked off when she was 18 months old. (22:50 – 30:56) | 29/08/2000 | EV0075<br><br>ERN: D0000062 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1**, (5), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **4, 6,** (14; 17), **7, 8,** (18; 21), **9,** (22), **10,** *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.132 | Untitled Video. Showing the attempts by the AFRC/RUF to dislodge the Sewa Bridge so that Kono could be declared second Gbanga. **(Video contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | undated | EV0158<br><br>ERN: D0000067 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1**, (5; 6; 7), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.134 | US wants RUF Backers Exposed - Doubts Talks with Rebels. | 13/04/1999 to 15/04/1999 | Picture 029<br><br>00028211 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (8), **2, 3,** (13), **10,** (27), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.136 | S/Leone Warlords Meet Here Today … To Meet Taylor Later. | 29/09/1999 | Picture 041<br><br>00028223 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.142 | Taylor Linked to SA. Leone Coup? | 29/05/1997 | Picture Monrovia Mission Sept 6-12, 027 00028257-00028258 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.145 | Horror in Freetown. Continued in exhibit 1.268. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 26/01/1999 to 28/01/1999 | Picture Monrovia Mission Sept 6-12, 032 00028262 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8), **2, 3,** (13), **7, 8,** (21), **9,** (22), **10,** (27), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.268 | Horror…Chronicling the atrocities committed during the AFRC/RUF Invasion of Freetown. Continuation of exhibit 1.145 **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 26/01/1999 to 28/01/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 122 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8), **2, 3,** (13), **7, 8,** (21), **9,** (22), **10,** (27), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.148 | In S/Leone: 52 Burned Alive. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 20/02/1998 | Picture Monrovia Mission Sept 6-12, 047 & 48 00028277-00028278 | ☒Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), **10,** (23), **11,** (28), *ICR* (33; 34), | Public Domain |
| 1.149 | In Sierra Leone: Massacre Again. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 12/06/1998 to 15/06/1998 | Picture Monrovia Mission Sept 6-12, 049 00028279 | ☒Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.150 | Rebels Nearing African Capital Two Burned Alive in Sierra Leone. | 27/12/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☒R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.153 | Excerpts from Murders, Tortures and Crimes Against Citizens Go Unfettered in Sierra Leone. (p. 1) | 16/10/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice ☐Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (13), **7, 8,** (21), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.154 | Sierra Leone rebels declare offensive - Want to see their leader freed. | 08/01/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice ☒Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.156 | Excerpts from We'll kill you if you cry, Sexual violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict. Detailing widespread and systematic perpetration of rape and sexual violence by AFRC/RUF. (pp. cover, 3, 4, 12, 15-53, 61-76) **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 01/01/2003 | Public document | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1**, (5), **2, 3,** (13), **4, 5, 6,** (14; 17), **9,** (22), **10,** (23) | Public Domain |
| 1.158 | BBC News: Covering the battle for Freetown. | 18/01/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **4,** (14; 17), **7, 8,** (18; 21), **9,** (22), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.159 | BBC News: Grim Facts of Sierra Leone's War. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 13/02/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (13), **7, 8,** (21), **4, 5, 6,** (17), **9,** (22), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.160 | BBC News: Freetown Bears the Scars. | 27/02/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 8), **2, 3,** (13), **7, 8,** (21), **11,** (31), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.161 | Bockarie died a wanted man. | 08/05/2003 | Public document | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | Consciousness of Guilt, *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |



23694

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.162 | Brutal child army grows up. | 10/05/2000 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **4, 5, 6,** (14; 17), **7, 8,** (18; 21), **9,** (22), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.163 | Sierra Leone: The balance of forces. BBC News Online reports the RUF rebels are "renowned for wanton barbarity, and staffed partly by child soldiers" and "thanks to its wealth from the sale of diamonds, the RUF is believed to be well supplied with a variety of weapons." | 10/05/2000 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1**, (5), **9,** (22), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.164 | Diamonds: A rebel's best friend. | 15/05/2000 | Public document | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.165 | Liberia fishes in troubled waters. BBC News Online links Charles Taylor to diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone. | 16/05/2000 | Public document | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **9,** (22), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.171 | Excerpts from Sierra Leone: Humanitarian Situation Report, 17/02/1998. Details the beginning of ECOMOG's campaign to push the Junta out of Freetown. Reports of widespread looting in Kenema, Makeni and Bo by the AFRC. (p. 1) **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 17/02/1998 | Public Document | ☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), **9,** (22), **11,** (28; 30), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.182 | UN Says Sierra Leone Rebels Holding 1,000 Children. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 10/09/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), **4, 5, 6,** (14), **9,** (22), **10,** (23), *ICR,* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.183 | Sierra Leone rebels free 227 child soldiers: report. | 19/01/2000 | Public document | ☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), **9,** (22), **10,** (23), *ICR,* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.184 | Sierra Leone Rebels Said to Mutilate 68 Civilians. | 27/04/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (11), **7, 8,** (19), *ICR,* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.188 | Sierra Leone rebels release 80 child soldiers. | 14/05/2001 | Public document | ☒Notice ☐Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), **9,** (22), **10,** (23), *ICR,* (33; 34) | Public Domain |



9367

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.190 | Communiqué of the ECOWAS Sixth Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone. The Committee of Five and representatives of Koroma adopted an ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone | 22/10/1997 & 23/10/1997 | Public document | ☒Notice ☐Contextual ☐CB ☐R93 ☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.193 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 01/02/1999. Detailing that Nigeria is readying measures to "contain" the Liberian government, which has been accused of providing assistance to AFRC/RUF rebels fighting in Sierra Leone. Liberia has continually denied the charges. | 01/02/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice ☐Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5; 8), **2, 3,** (13), **7, 8,** (21), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.194 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 25/02/1999. Detailing that Nigerian civilians had property looted or destroyed during Freetown offensive, 2,000 children between 5-14 are missing, & rebels are holding three Christian priests. | 25/02/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice ☐Contextual ☒CB ☐R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), **4, 5, 6,** (17), **9,** (22), **10,** (27) , *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.195 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 13/04/1998. Detailing ECOMOG offensive against Junta loyalists in Kono and Kailahun districts. | 13/04/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5; 6; 7), **2, 3,** (9; 11), **11,** (28; 29) , *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.196 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 27/04/1998. Report of civilian victims of AFRC/RUF rebel attacks in Kono district. | 27/04/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice ☒Contextual ☒CB ☒R93 ☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9; 11), **4,** (14), **7, 8,** (18; 19) , *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.197 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 29/04/1998. Detailing that 52 civilians are being treated in Freetown after an attack by AFRC/RUF rebels at Motema, in Kono District. Close to 100 being treated at Connaught. | 29/04/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 7), **2, 3,** (9; 11), **4, 6,** (14; 15), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.198 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 08/05/1998. Detailing victims of AFRC/RUF rebels in northeastern Sierra Leone have suffered killings and/or crude amputations. | 08/05/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6), **2, 3,** (9), **4, 5, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.199 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 20/05/1998. Detailing that the UN Security Council has issued a statement. Reports of amputations on civilians. Burkina Faso denies accusations that it was the main supplier of arms to the rebels. Report of people with their eyes gouged by rebels in a village near Kabala. Reports that illicit diamond mining in the east is fueling the violence in Sierra Leone. | 20/05/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 7), **7, 8,** (18; 19), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.200 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 25/06/1997, 28/06/1997, 30/06/1997. News reports on the RUF joining the AFRC soon after the coup. Extrajudicial killings in Bo. | 30/06/1997 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), **11,** (28), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.201 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 30/07/1998. Detailing that Kofi Annan said that since the civilian government was reinstated in March 1998, some 500 people mutilated by AFRC/RUF rebels had been treated and more than 2,000 more had died in the bush. | 30/07/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.202 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 03/10/1999. Detailing that Foday Sankoh, Johnny Paul Koroma arrive in Freetown. Foday Sankoh says that he ordered the release of all abductees and that the order had been complied with. Johnny Paul Koroma orders illegal mining to cease. | 03/10/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.203 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 11/11/1998. Reports of a rebel attack on Gbendembu. | 11/11/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), **9,** (22), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.204 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 19/11/1998. Sam Bockarie announces the commencement of Operation No Living Thing. | 19/11/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.205 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 22/12/1998. Reports that rebel attack on Waterloo, Bockarie reports RUF captured Koidu last weekend and denies that RUF is receiving any help from outside the country. | 22/12/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 8), **2, 3,** (13), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |



19578

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.206 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 26/12/1998 & 27/12/1998. News Reports leading up to the invasion of Freetown. | 26/12/1998 & 27/12/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.207 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 17/12/1999. Sam Bockarie flees Sierra Leone after allegedly executing eight officers loyal to Foday Sankoh and vandalized his Field Command HQ, according to ECOMOG press release. Report claims Sam Bockarie called a UN official to claim he was in Liberia. | 17/12/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **10,** (23; 26), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.210 | What War Has Wrought: Sierra Leone's Sad State. | 31/01/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8), **9,** (22), *ICR,* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.218 | AAP Newsfeed, "AFR: Sierra Leone Villagers Tell of Rebel Atrocities." **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 10/05/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18; 19) | Public Domain |
| 1.219 | Excerpts from BBC Broadcast Video: Blood Diamonds.WMV, produced and directed by Rachel Morgan. Program ties conflict diamonds to RUF, Liberia and Al Qaeda. (9:28-13:40) **(Video contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | undated | V0000041 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), **9,** (22), **10,** (23), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |



8528

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.224 | US State Dept. Video showing footage of a wide variety of events during the conflict. | undated | V0000048 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8) **2, 3,** (9; 13), **7, 8,** (18), **9,** (22), **10,** (23; 25; 27), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.231 | Excerpts from The Usual Suspects: Liberia's Weapons and Mercenaries in Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Report on Liberia's involvement in the illegal arms and mercenaries trade and the inciting of conflicts in Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. (pp. 1, 6, 7, 12-15, 22, 25-28, 32) | 01/03/2003 | Public Document | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), **9,** (22), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.244 | For Alleged Involvement in Sa. Leone Crisis Liberia May Face Sanctions. | 23/02/1999 to 25/02/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 4 and 5<br><br>ERN: 00031366-00031367 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.245 | In Sierra Leone Over 300 Liberian Fighters Killed. Reports that 300 Liberian fighters were killed by RUF/AFRC rebels in SL. | 11/03/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 6 and 7<br><br>ERN: 00031368-00031369 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.249 | In Rivercess Co., NPFL Burns 200 Alive. Chronicling burnings, killings, & rapes by the NPFL. | 03/03/1994 | March 2007 Mission Photo 29 and 30<br><br>ERN: 00031374-00031375 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 6), **2, 3,** (9), **4, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.250 | Gbarnga Upside Down - Fighters on Looting Spree. | 02/09/1992 | March 2007 Mission Photo 37 and 38<br><br>ERN: 00031376-00031377 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **11,** (28), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.251 | 3 Civilians Killed, Others Wounded in Ambush - Chinese Feared Dead. | 24/01/1994 | March 2007 Mission Photo 39 and 40<br><br>ERN: 00031378-00031379 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 6), **2, 3,** (9), **10,** (23), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.252 | R'cess Citizens Send Out SOS. Citizens of Rivercess County ask interim government and international community for help. | 24/01/1994 | March 2007 Mission Photo 39 and 40<br><br>ERN: 00031378-00031379 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 6), **2, 3,** (9), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |



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| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.253 | LCC Issues Statement on Sa. Leone Crisis. Liberia Council of Churches (LCC) issues a statement calling on Liberian mercenaries fighting in Sierra Leone to come home. | 05/02/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 41 and 42<br><br>ERN: 00031380-00031381 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.254 | 3 AFL Soldiers Captured in Sa. Leone. One of the AFL soldiers captured told the BBC that there are other AFL soldiers fighting alongside the AFRC and RUF in other parts of Sierra Leone. | 10/09/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 45 and 46<br><br>ERN: 00031382-00031383 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.255 | In LPC, NPFL Fight Over 100 Killed. "Reports coming from Rivercess County speak of widespread looting, burning of towns, and killing of innocent civilians by forces of the NPFL." | 04/02/1994 | March 2007 Mission Photo 47 and 48<br><br>ERN: 00031384-00031385 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 6), **2, 3,** (9), **11,** (28), *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.257 | Rebels Abduct Liberians in Freetown. | 13/01/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 73<br><br>ERN: 00031388-00031388 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 13), *ICR*, (33; 34) | Public Domain |



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| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.259 | Thousands Trapped in Freetown…Foday Sankoh Flown to Guinea; Rebels Still Burning Buildings. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 13/01/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 85 and 86<br><br>ERN: 00031391-00031392 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1**, (5; 8), **2, 3** (9; 13), **10**, (23; 27), *ICR*, (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.260 | In Freetown: More Bloodbath - As Rebels Reject Peace Talk. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 08/01/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 101 and 102<br><br>ERN: 00031393-00031394 | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1**, (5), **2, 3** (13), *ICR*, (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.261 | 2,000 Liberians Fighting in S/Leone. Chronicling Liberians who are reportedly fighting in Sierra Leone alongside all factions in the Sierra Leone war. | 04/01/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 110 and 111<br><br>ERN: 00031395-00031396 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.262 | NPFL Ships Arms to Libya. | 01/10/1996 | March 2007 Mission Photo 112<br><br>ERN: 00031397 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |



4258

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.265 | Khaddafi Wants Weapons Back. Reports that Khaddafi told Charles Taylor not to turn weapons acquired from Libya to ECOMOG. | 13/09/1996 | March 2007 Mission Photo 115 and 116<br><br>ERN: 00031400-00031401 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.266 | Fear Engulfs Kakata - Residents Reported Leaving. Chronicling harassment of civilians by NPFL fighters. | 19/03/1996 to 21/03/1996 | March 2007 Mission Photo 117 and 118<br><br>ERN: 00031402-00031403 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **11,** (28), | Public Domain |
| 1.267 | Taylor's Aide-de-Camp, Others Surrender. Reports that senior commanders of the NPFL who recently turned themselves over to ECOMOG say Taylor's thinking is "far from disarmament" and his aim is "to achieve power by gun against the will of the suffering civilians." | 20/03/1995 | March 2007 Mission Photo 120 and 121<br><br>ERN: 00031404-00031405 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.269 | S. Leoneans Recruiting in Liberia - for Foday Sankoh. | 18/10/1994 | March 2007 Mission Photo 123 and 124<br><br>ERN: 00031407-00031408 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.270 | Gen. Konah Heads AFL. Chronicles Taylor's establishment of control over the AFL. | 19/11/1999 to 22/11/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 125 and 126<br><br>ERN: 00031409-00031410 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.271 | An Act to Amend the Executive Law to Create a Special Security Service. | 23/02/1966 | MFA Doc 1 P1 – 3<br><br>ERN: 00031431-00031433 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.275 | Liberia Assessment - Version 4. | 09/1999 | Public Document | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.277 | Excerpts from No Peace Without Justice Conflict Mapping Report. NGO Report extensively chronicling the Sierra Leone Conflict. (pp. 1, 7-9, 16-17, 20-41, 44-48, 72, 90-94, 125, 127, 130, 131, 133-136, 138-140, 143, 144, 147, 160, 163, 172, 173, 177, 181, 183, 185, 190, 192, 193, 199, 200, 205, 218, 221, 225, 233-235, 238, 251, 253-264, 266, 267, 277, 279, 288, 319-321, 330-380, 383, 384, 412, 415, 425, 435, 436, 482, 485, 486, 494, 504, 514, 540-545 | 09/03/2004 | Public Document | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 6; 7; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 10; 11; 12; 13) **4, 5, 6,** (14; 15; 16; 17) **7, 8,** (18; 19; 20; 21) **9,** (22) **10,** (23; 24; 25; 26; 27), **11,** (28; 29; 30; 31), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.278 | Map of West Africa. | 02/2005 | Map No. 4242 United Nations | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | Factual | Public Domain |
| 1.279 | Map of Africa. | 01/2004 | Map No. 4045 Rev. 4 United Nations | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | Factual | Public Domain |
| 1.280 | Map of Burkina Faso. | 11/2004 | Map No. 4230 United Nations | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | Factual | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.281 | Map of Guinea. | 06/2004 | Map No. 4164 Rev. 3 United Nations | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | Factual | Public Domain |
| 1.283 | Map of Sierra Leone. | 01/2004 | Map No. 3902 Rev. 5 United Nations | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | Factual | Public Domain |
| 1.284 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 25/12/1998. Detailing events leading up to the Freetown invasion. | 25/12/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.285 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 31/12/1998. Detailing events leading up to the Freetown invasion. | 31/12/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.287 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 09/01/1999. Detailing events during the Freetown invasion. | 09/01/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | 1, (5; 6; 8), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.288 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 11/01/1999. Detailing events during the Freetown invasion. | 11/01/1999 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8) **2, 3,** (9; 13) **4, 6,** (14; 17) **7, 8,** (18; 21) **11,** (28; 31) *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.289 | Votes Counted in S. Leone Amidst Protests. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 29/02/1996 to 05/03/1996 | Public document<br><br>ERN: 00031411-00031411 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.291 | Taylor Dines with Khaddafi. Detailing Taylor's trip to Libya and Burkina Faso. | 03/09/1996 | Public document<br><br>ERN: 00031413-00031414 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.293 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 20/12/1998. Detailing events leading up to the Freetown invasion. | 20/12/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 7), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.294 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 28/12/1998. Detailing events leading up to the Freetown invasion. | 28/12/1998 | Public document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |



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| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.297 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 17/04/1998. Reporting that ECOMOG has retaken Koidu from RUF and junta. | 17/04/1998 | Public document | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.305 | AFRC-RUF Statement on historic return to Freetown. RUF-AFRC announces that it has returned to Freetown and the war is over. The Alliance begs forgiveness for all its wrongs. | 03/10/1999 | 00013419-00013421 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.316 | The United Nations special conference on Sierra Leone: the protection of human rights must be a priority for the international community. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 24/07/1998 | Public Document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9; 11), **4, 5, 6,** (14), **7, 8,** (18; 19), **9,** (22), **10,** (23), | Public Domain |
| 1.321 | AFRC's Response to Article on Discord in Rebel Ranks. Open Letter posted on Internet Website from Banjah Marrah, the AFRC Communications Officer, to "set the record straight" about problems between the AFRC and RUF that were reported by Ambrose Ganda. | 07/11/1999 | 00011292-00011293 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.324 | Will ECOWAS Restore Peace in Sierra Leone? | 07/08/1997 | 00028225<br><br>Picture Monrovia Mission 011 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **4, 6,** (14), **11,** (28), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.330 | Return to Freetown. Documentary focusing on the plight of children soldiers in Sierra Leone as peace returns to the country. **(Video contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | undated | EV0107 (also GC16)<br><br>ERN: D0000064 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **7, 8,** (18), **9,** (22), **10,** (23), | Public Domain |
| 1.333 | Sierra Leone Rebels Halted Near Capital but Active Elsewhere. | 12/05/2000 | Public document | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.334 | Ivory Coast Map. | 1988 | Public Document | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | | Public Domain |
| 1.336 | Libya Map. | undated | Public Document | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.338 | Excerpt from CD and Unofficial Transcripts containing recordings of radio broadcasts from the BBC World Service's Focus on Africa Archive relating Sam BOCKARIE: 10) Sam Bockarie: 08/01/1999. | various | D0000046 & 00025083-00025105 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.348 | Taylor Takes the Blame for Those Killed. | 28/07/1994 | March 2007 Mission Photo 55 and 56<br><br>ERN: 00031419-00031420 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9), **11,** (28), *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.350 | Kabbah Agrees to Ceasefire - Foday Sankoh to be Freed. | 08/01/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 99-100<br><br>ERN: 00031423-00031424 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.362 | Libya Threatens to Expose Taylor Reporting that Libya, widely believed to be one of the strongest backers of the NPFL, is considering exposing the NPFL if it continues to be intransigent to the current peace process. | 11/08/1994 | March 2007 Mission Photo 49 and 50<br><br>ERN: 00031425-00031426 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.384 | Shell Map of Sierra Leone. | Undated | Public Document | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | | Public Domain |
| 1.385 | Map of The Gambia. | Undated | Public Document | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | | Public Domain |
| 1.388 | UNICEF Wants Child Soldiers Disarmed First. Talks about the first 10 days of disarmament and demobilization of fighters from the Liberian conflict and says a large number of fighters under 18 have disarmed and demobilized. | 26/11/1996 | March 2007 Mission Photo 138<br><br>ERN: 00031427 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **9,** (22), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.390 | Cease-Fire Fails. Taylor previously announced he had secured a cease-fire, then Sam Bockarie said the RUF would observe a unilateral truce. | 20/01/1999 | March 2007 Mission Photo 74 and 75<br><br>ERN: 00031429-00031430 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.391 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 24/12/1998. Waterloo atack, accusation against senior Liberian officials denied by Liberian spokesperson, Bockarie demands Sankoh's release or his forces will attack Freetown after the New Year. | 24/12/1998 | Public Document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (6; 8), **11,** (28; 31), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |

| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.393 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 29/12/1998. News Reports leading up to the invasion of Freetown. | 29/12/1998 | Public Document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.394 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 08/01/1999. AFRC/RUF Invasion of Freetown. | 08/01/1999 | Public Document | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1**, (5; 6; 8) , **11**, (28; 31), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.395 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 12/01/1999. AFRC/RUF Invasion of Freetown. | 12/01/1999 | Public Document | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **7, 8,** (18), **10,** (23; 27), *ICR,* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.396 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 13/01/1999. AFRC/RUF Invasion of Freetown. | 13/01/1999 | Public Document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 6; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 13) *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.397 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 14/01/1999. AFRC/RUF Invasion of Freetown. | 14/01/1999 | Public Document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9; 13), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |



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| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.398 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 17/01/1999. AFRC/RUF Invasion of Freetown. | 17/01/1999 | Public Document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (9; 13), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.399 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 22/01/1999. AFRC/RUF Invasion of Freetown. | 22/01/1999 | Public Document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **7, 8,** (21), **10,** (23; 27), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| 1.400 | Sierra Leone News Archive for 26/01/1999. AFRC/RUF Invasion of Freetown. | 26/01/1999 | Public Document | ☒Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5; 8), **2, 3,** (9; 13), **7, 8,** (21), **10,** (23; 27), *ICR* (33; 34) | Public Domain |
| B.2 RUF Documents. | | | | | | |
| 1.024 | RUF/SL Defence Headquarters Promotion - Officers/Other Ranks from Sam Bockarie that he has approved the promotions of those listed in the report. | 22/01/1998 | 00007058-00007059 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| 1.039 | Two letters from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talibi, in Accra, Ghana. | 04/12/1996 | 00007797-00007801 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |



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| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.079 | Attendance list of a 24 Dec. 1999 meeting chaired by Foday Sankoh with 28 names. | 24/12/1999 | 00012932-00012936 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| 1.081 | Verbatim Report on discussion between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his return from his detention at Nigeria in 1999 explaining their Activities during his Detention in 1996-1999. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | undated | 00012955-00012970 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| 1.096 | An Address made by General Issa Sesay to President Charles Taylor. | 14/11/2000 | 00025491-00025491 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| 1.097 | RUF Names of Vanguard in Makeni 09/02/2000. | 09/02/2000 | 00025492-00025493 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| 1.098 | RUF Bombali District Report 21/01/1999. | 21/01/1999 | 00025494-00025495 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |



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| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.099 | RUF Comprehensive report on the plan and major take over on Koidu sent by Brigadier Issa. | 24/01/1999 | 00025503-00025507 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| 1.100 | RUF Situation Report on meeting held at Sierra Mining Village 10/02/2001 . | 10/02/2001 | 00025536-00025537 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| 1.101 | Report from RUF 2nd Brigade HQs, Kono District, Major Mohamed Christopha. | 12/12/1998 | 00025706-00025707 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| 1.105 | RUF Memo to 2nd Brigade Adjutant from 2nd Brigade G4 Commander. | 22/01/1999 | 00026072-00026073 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| 1.359 | Three undated letters from Blackguard to The Leader written throughout 1999. Contains evidence of cooperation and infighting between several commanders during Junta, transport and loss of diamonds and other RUF business. | 1999 | 00010253-00010256 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| 1.365 | Various RUF Directives regarding the abduction of UNAMSIL personnel. | 03/05/2000 to 04/05/2000 | 00012937-00012938 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |



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| Ex. # | Title/Description | Date | ERN | Relevance | Indictment | Certified By |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.386 | Intelligence Report to the National Coordinator CDF/SL, Deputy Minister of Defence. Reports that Sam Bockarie alias Mosquito has made himself head of the Kailahun District and is training a large number of men. | 09/12/1999 | 00007061-00007061 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | RUF Documents |
| | B.3 Other Documents. | | | | | |
| 1.072 | The Medical Report on Abducted Victims treated by the FAWE Medical Team - March - December 1999. | 03/1999 to 12/1999 | 00011193-00011194 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **4, 6,** (17), **7, 8,** (21), **10,** (27) | n/a |
| 1.133 | Records of Deaths for the period of 01/01/1999-31/01/1999, Births and Deaths Registry, Freetown. | 01/01/1999 | None recorded | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (13) | n/a |
| 1.306 | Statement of Samuel Randolph Tenga to SLP about young men traveling to Libya to train in the late 1980s. | 11/02/1999 | 00023311-00023322 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | n/a |

| B.4 Documents Certified in Annex C.1. | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.035 | Information Received from Lt. Col. George Steven. Intelligence report of UN forces in Gbugbuna. | 14/01/2000 | 00007736-00007737 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |
| 1.036 | Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Issa Sesay. | 27/09/1999 | 00007756-00007768 (*duplicate*: 00009645-00009657) | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 for certification of duplicate |
| 1.040 | Trained RUF/AFRC/SLA Child Combatants at Lungi. | undated | 00007806-00007807 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **9,** (22) | See Annex C.1 |
| 1.047 | Excerpts from Radio Log Book #2 for the period of 28/04/1999 - 11/09/1999. Particularly, but not exclusively: 00008696-00008697 [Ordering Johnny Paul Koroma to wait at his present location until Foday Sankoh arrives at Kailahun.] 00008642 [Directive from Foday Sankoh to Sam Bockarie to defend Kono and Tongo]. | 28/04/1999 to 11/09/1999 | 00008636-00008726 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **10,** (23; 27) | See Annex C.1 |
| 1.048 | Excerpt from Radio Log Book #3 covering the period of 23/09/1999 - 16/04/2000. Radio message to the RUF from Sam Bockarie telling them he resigns from the RUF. | 14/12/1999 | 00008764 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |



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| 1.049 | Excerpt from Radio Log Book #3 covering the period of 23/09/1999 - 16/04/2000. Radio message from Ibrahim Bah to Foday Sankoh notifying Sankoh of departure for Monrovia and asking advice on the production. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 12/01/2000 | 00008779 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |
| 1.050 | Excerpt from Radio Log Book #3 covering the period of 23/09/1999 - 16/04/2000. Radio message to Foday Sankoh from Dennis Mingo reporting that there was rampant looting of civilian properties in Makeni by the brothers under the command of Moris Kallon. | 16/10/1999 | 00008845-00008847 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **11,** (28), *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |
| 1.051 | Excerpt from Radio Log Book #3 covering the period of 23/09/1999 - 16/04/2000. Sam Bockarie through Foday Sankoh sends a message to Issa Sesay to instruct Kallon to move to Magboroka. | 16/10/1999 | 00008848 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |
| 1.052 | Excerpt from Radio Log Book #3 covering the period of 23/09/1999 - 16/04/2000. Radio message from Foday Sankoh to Issa Sesay directing Sesay to warn all soldiers not to touch any of the Liberian brothers who are coming together with General Ibrahim and others. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 22/12/1999 | 00008881 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |

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| 1.054 | Letter (typed) from Blackguard to "The Leader.": 2 September 1998. Assertions by Mingo refuting Bockarie's charges against him, expressing concern about Bockarie threatening to kill his wife. | 02/09/1998 | 00009485-00009485 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |
| 1.057 | Letter to Leader from Black Guard, Jackson Swaray on 25 September 1999. | 25/09/1999 | 00009489-00009491 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |
| 1.058 | Letter to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander. Summary Report to Foday Sankoh of the situation on the ground while he has been absent.<br>**(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | undated | 00009672-00009681 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |
| 1.063 | Report to Foday Sankoh from Major Francis Musa; Subject: Brief Comprehensive Report of all Salient Activities that took Place in the Absence of the Leader from 24 March 1996 - 31 August 1999. | 31/08/1999 | 00009765-00009768 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |
| 1.080 | Letter from Johnny Paul Koroma to Charles Taylor asking for help in the Defence of the country against ECOMOG which are about to invade Freetown. | 03/10/1997 | 00012940-00012942 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.1 |

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| B.5 Documents Certified in Annex C.2. | | | | | | |
| 1.042 | Lists of diamond production at Kono from August 1999 to January 2000. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 08/1999 to 01/2000 | 00007852-00007862 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.2 |
| 1.239 | Mining Units Record Book. | 02/08/1999 to 11/01/2000 | 00012914-00012927 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.2 |
| B.6 Documents Certified in Annex C.3. | | | | | | |
| 1.084 | Minutes of an RUF forum meeting chaired by Issa Sesay at 2nd Brigade Headquarters - Kono Axis. | 11/12/1998 | 00015401-00015403 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | **1**, (5), **11**, (29), *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.3 |
| 1.085 | Forum With the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 02/12/1998 | 00015487-00015491 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.3 |



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| 1.086 | Minutes of a Meeting/Forum held at the Sierra Leone People's Army, 4th Brigade Lion Strike Force HQ Oct. 1999. | 01/10/1999 | 00015506-00015508 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☐Other | **1**, (5), **7**, **8**, (18) | See Annex C.3 |
| 1.087 | Minutes of a forum at the 2nd Brigade Office of HQ Commander Makeni, Bombali District. | 12/02/1999 | 00015513-00015516 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.3 |
| 1.360 | Foday Sankoh's speech upon visiting Makeni and addressing the people about the Togo-Lome Peace Accord between the RUF/AFRC and Kabbah. | 22/11/1999 | 00015502-00015505 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1**, (5), **7**, **8**, (18), **11**, (28), *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.3 |
| B.7 Documents Certified in Annex C.4. | | | | | | |
| 1.339 | Foday Sankoh orders all RUF combatants to join the AFRC after the 25 May 1997 Coup. | undated | T0000267 & 00015616-00015620 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.4 |

| B.8 Documents Certified in Annex C.5. | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.107 | Situation Report from Lt. Gen. Samuel G. Varney at NPFL HQ in Gbarnga City to Charles Taylor, Chairman & C-I-C of NPFL. | 30/09/1994 | 00028870-00028871 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☒R93<br>☒Other | **1,** (5), **11,** (28), *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.108 | News Article: Journalists Arrested in Sierra Leone. | 14/06/1999 | 00028914 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☒CB<br>☐R93<br>☐Other | **1,** (5), **2, 3,** (13), *ICR* (33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.110 | Memo from U-52 to U-50 dated 04 Oct. 2000. elects 20 people to escort and protect Charles Taylor on his trip to Nigeria, Burkina Faso and the Gambia on October 6, 2000. | 04/10/2000 | 00028767-00028767 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.111 | Memo from U-52 to U-50 dated 12 April 1999. Selects 20 people to escort and protect Charles Taylor on his trip to Libya and South Africa on the 15th through the 20th of April, 1999. | 12/04/1999 | 00029303 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR,* **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.112 | Burkina Faso ID card. | 13/01/1989 | 00028795-00028796 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | Consciousness of Guilt | See Annex C.5 |



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| 1.113 | The original fax of Johnny Paul Koroma's letter to Charles Taylor dated 1 November, 1997. | 01/11/1997 | 00028799-00028800 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.114 | Letter from Christian M. Wisseh to Minister Monie R. Captan, MFA/1-3/192/'98. Detailing that the Chairman of the Security Council Sanctions committee met with the Liberian ambassador to the UN to tell him that ECOMOG is reporting Liberians are fighting in Sierra Leone. | 12/06/1998 | 00028931-00028931 | ☒Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.118 | Letter from Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to Charles Taylor dated 29 Jan. 2001 with cover letter. | 29/01/2001 | 00028775-00028777 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.121 | Blank Stationary entitled "Combined Junta and R.U.F. Forces of the Republic of Sierra - Leone" Randall Street, Zone 2, P.O. Box 5261. | undated | 00028837-00028837 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.123 | The Roster of the [Liberian] Special Forces Commandoes as of December 7, 1999. | 07/12/1999 | 00028847-00028849 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |



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| 1.124 | Excerpts from Complete Roster for the SSS, ATU, and Border Patrol Unit. (pp. 1, 2, 4, 7, 16) | 04/12/1999 | 00028801-00028835 | ☐Notice<br>☒Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.308 | Unsigned letter to "Your Excellency." Describing that the Excellency still has friends and that his family is ensured safe travels to a "country in question." Mentions "parcels" from Asia and middlemen who are trustworthy. | undated | 00029004-00029007 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.310 | Letter from "your son". Letter cautions that the Sierra Leoneans are cracking down on the border with external support. Also speaks to Guinea base of operations for Liberian insurgency. | 05/03/2002 | 00029025-00029026 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.313 | Liberian NSA briefing. "The President's Eye Only" detailing a meeting at the US embassy between Kathlyn List, Mr. Teh Quiah, & Weade Kobbah-Wureh where they discussed the plight of former fighters. | 26/06/1998 | 00029192-00029198 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5 |
| 1.326 | Congressman Frank Wolf, House Armed Services Committee Special Oversight Panel on the Merchant Marine Vessel Operations under "flags of convenience" and National Security Implications. | 13/06/2002 | 00028950-00028954 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5. As well as Public Domain |
| 1.327 | Congressman Frank Wolf's Testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means Hearing on Conflict Diamonds. | 10/10/2001 | 00028964-00028966 | ☐Notice<br>☐Contextual<br>☐CB<br>☐R93<br>☒Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.5. As well as Public Domain |

| B.9 Documents Certified in Annex C.6. | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.401 | Letter from Foday Sankoh to Charles Taylor dated 5th May 1992. Thanks Taylor for the brotherly help he is rendering to Sankoh's liberation struggle. Requests an audience with Taylor to discuss ECOMOG at the borders. I appreciate the five boxes of AK-47 raffle (sic) ammunition and the ten boxes of RPG gun rockets which I should receive from you today. **(Document contained in Annex B to Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007)** | 05/05/1992 | 00029778-00029779 | ☐ Notice<br>☐ Contextual<br>☐ CB<br>☐ R93<br>☒ Other | *ICR*, **Counts 1-11** (5; 9; 14; 18; 22; 23; 28; 33; 34) | See Annex C.6 |



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# Annex B

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# Annex B.1

## Public Documents

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**DECREES**

*Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary Vol. CXXVIII, No. 43*

*dated 14th July, 1997*

Ex C 1-3

**A.F.R.C. Decree No. 2**

**1997**

**Sierra Leone**

# Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment of Council of Secretaries) Decree, 1997

Short title.

*[10th July, 1997]* Date of commencement.

PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree:—

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Commencement.

**1.** This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the 10th day of July, 1997.

Establishment of Council of Secretaries.

**2.** There is hereby established a Council to be known as the COUNCIL OF SECRETARIES which shall be directly and collectively responsible to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Composition of Council of Secretaries.

**3.** The Council of Secretaries shall consist of —

(a) the Chief Secretary of State who shall be the head of the Council of Secretaries, and

(b) other Secretaries of State that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may from time to time appoint.

Functions of the Council of Secretaries.

**4.** The Council of Secretaries shall —

(a) be responsible for the preparation and consideration of policy papers or matters and shall advise the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and make recommendations on all matters of good governance;

(b) execute the policies and directives of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Meetings of the Council of Secretaries.

**5.** The Chief Secretary of State shall convene regular meetings of the Council of Secretaries over which he shall preside and in his absence the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council shall appoint another person to preside from amongst members of the Council of Secretaries.

Establishment of office and functions of Chief Secretary of State.

**6.** (1) There is hereby established the office of Chief Secretary of State.

(2) The Chief Secretary of State shall be responsible for communicating the policy decisions and directives of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council to the Council of Secretaries and conveying the decisions of the Council of Secretaries to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

(3) The Chief Secretary of State shall submit to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council regular reports from the Secretaries of State regarding the operations in their respective Departments of State.

(4) The Chief Secretary of State shall be the co-ordinating Secretary who shall receive and collate regular reports from the Secretaries of State for submission to the Council regarding the work of their Departments and the implementation of the policies of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and may submit to the Council proposals for legislative changes.

(5) The Chief Secretary of State shall effect the publicity of, and cause notice of the policies of the Council to be circularised or communicated generally through the machinery of Government.

(6) Whenever the Office of the Chief Secretary of State becomes vacant, or the person holding that Office dies, resigns, retires, is absent from Sierra Leone or is removed from Office or is for any other reason unable to perform the functions of his Office, the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council shall appoint another person in his place from amongst members of the Council of Secretaries.

Functions of Secretary of State.

**7.** (1) A Secretary of State shall exercise Ministerial responsibility for a Department of State or such other business of Government as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may from time to time assign to him.

(2) A Secretary of State shall be entitled to such remuneration, allowances, gratuities and other incidents of office as may be prescribed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Oath of Office.

**8.** The Chief Secretary of State and every other Secretary of State shall take and subscribe the oath of office as set out in the Schedule hereto.

00007653



Secretary to the Council of Secretaries.

**9.** (1) There shall be a Secretary to the Council of Secretaries whose office shall be a public office.

(2) The Secretary to the Council of Secretaries shall be appointed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in consultation with the Public Service Commission.

(3) The functions of the Secretary to the Council of Secretaries shall include—

(a) having charge of the Secretariat of the Council of Secretaries;

(b) responsibility for arranging the business for, and keeping the minutes of, the Council of Secretaries; and

(c) any other functions that the Council of Secretaries may from time to time assign to him.

(4) The Secretary to the Council of Secretaries shall take and subscribe the oath of office as set out in the Schedule hereto.

Change of title in Acts.

**10.** In every enactment continued in existence by virtue of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997, relating to the Ministries and Departments of Government, any reference to President, Vice-President, Minister or Cabinet shall be construed as a reference to the office or person with responsibility for the subject-matter to which the enactment relates, and any reference to "Ministry" shall be read as "Department".

00007654



SCHEDULE

Oath of the Chief Secretary of State, Secretaries of State and the Secretary to the Council of Secretaries.

"I, .....
DO HEREBY *(in the name of God/Allah swear) (solemnly affirm)* that I will faithfully and truly discharge the duties of the Office of ..... of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and that I will support, uphold and maintain the provisions of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (Public Notice No. 3 of 1997) and the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 1991 which are not inconsistent with the Proclamation. (So help me God/Allah)."

MADE and ISSUED this *12th day of July, 1997.*

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
*Chairman,*
*Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.*

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A.F.R.C. Decree
No. 3

1997

Sierra Leone

**Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment of Office of Principal Liaison Officer) Decree, 1997**

Short title.

**Being a Decree to make provision for the establishment of the office of Principal Liaison Officer.**

*(10th July, 1997)* Date of commencement.

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PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree:—

Commencement.

**1.** This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the 10th day of July, 1997.

Establishment of Office Principal Liaison Officer.

**2.** (1) There is hereby established the Office of PRINCIPAL LIAISON OFFICER.

(2) The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may appoint from amongst its members such number of Principal Liaison Officers as the Council may think fit.

Functions of Principal Liaison Officer.

**3.** A Principal Liaison Officer shall be responsible for supervising, monitoring and co-ordinating the operations of any Department of State or such other business of Government, as may from time to time be assigned to him by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Allowances, etc..

**4.** A Principal Liaison Officer shall be entitled to such allowances and other incidents of office as may be prescribed by the Armed Forces Revoloutionary Council.

Oath of Office.

**5.** A Principal Liaison Officer shall take and subscribe the Oath of Office as set out in the Schedule hereto.

00007658



SCHEDULE

"I, .....

DO HEREBY *(in the name of God/Allah swear) (solemnly affirm)* that I will faithfully and truly discharge the duties of the Office of Principal Liaison Officer of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and that I will support, uphold and maintain the provisions of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997 (Public Notice No. 3 of 1997) and the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 1991 which are not inconsistent with the Proclamation

(So help me God/Allah)."

MADE and ISSUED this *12th day of July, 1997.*

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
*Chairman,*
*Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.*

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**A.F.R.C. Decree No. 4**



**Sierra Leone**

**1997**

**Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation (Amendment) Decree, 1997** Short title.

**Being a Decree to increase the membership of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.**

*[ 14th July, 1997.]* Date of commencement.

PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree:—

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Increase in membership of A.F.R.C.

P.N. No. 3 of 1997.

1. Sub-paragraph 2(c) of paragraph 1 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997" is amended by deleting the figure "27" and inserting the figure "40" in its stead.

MADE and ISSUED this *12th* day of *July, 1997.*

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
*Chairman,*
*Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.*

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE.
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.
*GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY* No. 43 OF 14TH JULY, 1997.

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**DECREE**

*Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary Vol. CXXVIII, No. 49*

*dated 20th August, 1997*

**A.F.R.C. Decree No. 5**

**1997**

**Sierra Leone**

# The Imposition of Curfew Decree, 1997

Short title.

**Being a Decree to make provision for the imposition of a Curfew.**

*[19th August, 1997]* Date of commencement.

PURSUANT to paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997", published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes and issues the following Decree:—

00007662A C.W.

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Commencement.

**1.** This Decree, except subsection (2) of Section 3, shall be deemed to have come into operation on the 19th day of August, 1997.

Power to impose curfew.

**2.** (1) The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may, in the interest of public order or public safety, by Order impose a curfew throughout Sierra Leone or in any part thereof as shall be specified in such Order.

(2) While such Order is in force, no person shall be out of doors between the hours specified in the Order except under the authority of a written permit granted by the Inspector-General of Police or any officer deputed by him in that behalf.

Offence and penalty.

**3.** (1) Any person who contravenes any provision of an Order made pursuant to Section 2 commits an offence and may be detained by any member of the Armed Forces or the Police Force, who shall take that person immediately to the nearest police station.

(2) Any person convicted of an offence under subsection (1) shall be liable to a fine not exceeding thirty thousand leones or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

Operation of Order.

**4.** Every Order made pursuant to Section 2 shall come into operation upon publication in the *Gazette* or upon publication in such other manner as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may deem necessary for bringing such Order to the notice of all persons.

Persons deemed lawfully detained.

**5.** Any person detained pursuant to this Decree before its date of publication in the *Gazette* shall be deemed to have been held in lawful custody during the period of such detention.

MADE and ISSUED this *20th* day of *August, 1997.*

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
*Chairman,*
*Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.*

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE.
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.
*GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY* No. 49 OF 20TH AUGUST, 1997.

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**PUBLIC NOTICES**

***Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXXVIII, No. 66***

***dated 11th December, 1997***

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 11 OF 1997

*Published 11th December, 1997*

## *THE CHANGE OF TITLES ACT, 1984*
## *(No. 6 of 1984)*

THE CHANGE OF TITLES ORDER, 1997 — Short title.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 2 and 3 of the Change of Titles Act, as adapted by sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3 of the Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council hereby makes the following Order:— P.N. No. 3 of 1997.

1. This Order shall be deemed to have come into operation on the 28th day of May, 1997. Commencement.

2. The titles of Ministers, Public Officers and Ministries set out in the second column of the Schedule hereto shall be substituted for the corresponding titles set out in the first column thereof wherever such titles may appear in any enactment now in force in Sierra Leone. Change of titles.

SCHEDULE

| *Old Title* | *New Title* |
|---|---|
| President ... ... ... | Chairman, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council |
| Vice-President ... ... | Deputy Chairman, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council |
| Minister ... ... ... | Secretary of State |
| Deputy Minister ... ... | Under Secretary of State |
| Attorney-General and Minister of Justice | Attorney-General and Secretary of State for Legal Affairs |
| Minister of Lands, Housing, Town and Country Planning | Secretary of State, Lands, Housing and the Environment |

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| *Old Title* | | *New Title* |
|---|---|---|
| Minister of Presidential Affairs and the Public Service | ... | Secretary of State, Office of the Chairman |
| Minister of Information and Broadcasting | | Commissioner of Information and Broadcasting |
| Minister of Tourism and Culture | ... | Commissioner of Tourism and Culture |
| Secretary to the President | ... | Secretary to the Chairman and Head of the Civil Service |
| Secretary to the Cabinet | ... | Secretary to the Council of Secretaries |
| Ministry of Gender and Children Affairs | | Department of Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs |
| Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and the Environment ... | ... | Department of Agriculture and Forestry |
| Ministry of Marine Resources | ... | Department of Fisheries and Marine Resources |
| Ministry of Lands, Housing, Town and Country Planning | | Department of Lands, Housing and the Environment |
| Ministry of Labour, Social Welfare and Sports | | Department of Employment and Industrial Relations |
| | | Department of Youths, Sports and Social Mobilization |
| Ministry of Works, Energy and Power ... ... ... | | Department of Works |
| | | Department of Energy and Power |
| Ministry of Local Government and Community Development | ... | Department of Internal Affairs |

MADE AND ISSUED this *3rd* day of *December, 1997.*

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
*Chairman,*
*Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.*

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PUBLIC NOTICE No. 12 OF 1997

*Published 11th December, 1997*

## *THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, 1965*

## *(No. 32 of 1965)*

THE HIGH COURT (CRIMINAL SESSIONS) RULES, 1965
(P.N. 74 OF 1965)

THE HIGH COURT (APPOINTMENT OF CRIMINAL SESSIONS) ORDER, 1997 Short Title.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by paragraph 2 of Rule 2 of the High Court (Criminal Sessions) Rules 1965, the Honourable Chief Justice hereby makes the following Order:—

1. The following times and places are hereby appointed for the holding of Criminal Sessions of the High Court in places other than Freetown, Bo and Kenema for the year 1988. Appointment of places for Criminal Sessions in places other than Freetown, Bo and Kenema.

| *Times* | *Places* |
|---|---|
| 6th January ... ... ... | Moyamba |
| 6th January ... ... ... | Sefadu |
| 13th January ... ... ... | Port Loko |
| 3rd March ... ... ... | Makeni |
| 7th April ... ... ... | Moyamba |
| 7th April ... ... ... | Sefadu |
| 14th April ... ... ... | Port Loko |
| 12th May ... ... ... | Makeni |
| 23rd June ... ... ... | Moyamba |
| 23rd June ... ... ... | Sefadu |
| 23rd June ... ... ... | Port Loko |
| 15th September ... ... ... | Makeni |
| 20th October ... ... ... | Moyamba |
| 20th October ... ... ... | Sefadu |
| 3rd November ... ... ... | Port Loko |
| 1st December ... ... ... | Makeni |

DATED this *3rd* day of *December, 1997.*

Issued under my hand

00007678

S. BECCLES DAVIES, MRSL
*Chief Justice.*

PUBLIC NOTICE No. 13 OF 1997

*Published 11th December, 1997*

## *THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ACT, 1965*

*(No. 50 of 1965)*

THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES (COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT FOR THE FREETOWN CITY COUNCIL) ORDER, 1997 — Short title.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 2 of the Local Authorities (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1965, as adapted by sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997" published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council makes the following Order:—

1. This Order shall be deemed to have come into force on the 2nd day of November, 1995. — Commencement.

2. The following Committee of Management is appointed for the purpose of exercising and performing all the powers and duties of the Freetown City Council under the Freetown Municipality Act, 1973 and this order shall remain in force until the 1st day of November, 1996 unless sooner revoked by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. — Appointment of Committee of Management. Act. No. 20 of 1973.

COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT

| | |
|---|---|
| Miss Florence Dillsworth ... ... ... | *Chairman* |
| Mr. N. H. T. Boston ... ... ... | *Member* |
| Mr. M. A. James ... ... ... ... | *Member* |
| Alhaji Badamassie Mahdi ... ... ... | *Member* |
| Mr. E. Bundu Kamara ... ... ... | *Member* |
| Mr. M. P. Bayoh ... ... ... ... | *Member* |
| Mr. B. Kakay ... ... ... ... | *Member* |

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| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Col. E. G. O. Caulker (Rtd.) | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mr. Sulaiman Tejan-Jalloh | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mr. Saidu Conton-Sesay | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mr. V. C. Johnson | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mr. E. J. A. Norman | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mr. Plummer J. C. Hamilton | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mr. Nelson Okrafor | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mrs. Esterline Palmer | ... | ... | *Member* |

Revocation of P.N. No. 4 of 1995.

3. The Local Authorities (Committee of Management for the Freetown City Council) Order, 1995 is revoked.

MADE this *4th* day of *December, 1997.*

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
*Chairman,*
*Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.*

*(This Public Notice supersedes Public Notice No. 7 of 1997.)*

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PUBLIC NOTICE No. 14 OF 1997

*Published 11th December, 1997*

*THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ACT, 1965*

*(No. 50 of 1965)*

THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES (COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT FOR THE FREETOWN CITY COUNCIL) (No. 2) ORDER, 1997 — Short title.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 2 of the Local Authorities (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1965, as adapted by sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3 of the Proclamation entitled "Administration of Sierra Leone (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation, 1997" published in the *Gazette* on the 28th day of May, 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council makes the following Order:—

1. This Order shall be deemed to have come into force on the 2nd day of November, 1996. — Commencement.

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COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT

| | |
|---|---|
| Miss Florence Dillsworth ... ... ... | *Chairman* |
| Mr. N. H. T. Boston ... ... ... | *Member* |
| Mr. M. A. James ... ... ... ... | *Member* |
| Mr. E. Bundu Kamara ... ... ... | *Member* |
| Mr. M. P. Bayoh ... ... ... ... | *Member* |
| Mr. B. Kakay ... ... ... ... | *Member* |
| Col. E. G. O. Caulker (Rtd.) ... ... ... | *Member* |

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| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mr. Saidu Conton-Sesay | ... | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mr. V. C. Johnson | ... | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mr. E. J. A. Norman | ... | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mr. Plummer J. C. Hamilton... | | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mr. Nelson Okrafor... | ... | ... | ... | *Member* |
| Mrs. Esterline Palmer | ... | ... | ... | *Member* |

Revocation of P.N. No. 7 of 1997.

3. The Local Authorities (Committee of Management for the Freetown City Council) Order, 1997 is revoked.

MADE this *4th* day of *December, 1997.*

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
*Chairman,*
*Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.*

*(This Public Notice supersedes Public Notice No. 8 of 1997.)*

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE.
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.
*GAZETTE* No. 66 OF 11TH DECEMBER, 1997.

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# The Sierra Leone Gazette

## (Extraordinary)

Published by Authority

VOL. CXXVIII MONDAY, 14TH JULY, 1997 No. 43

FREETOWN. *14th July, 1997*

**Govt. Notice No. 191**

The following are published for general information as supplement to this number of the Sierra Leone *Gazette Extraordinary*:—

A.F.R.C. DECREE NO. 2 OF 1997.

"Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment of Council of Secretaries) Decree, 1997."

A.F.R.C. DECREE NO. 3 OF 1997.

"Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment of Office of Principal Liaison Officer) Decree, 1997." - Being a Decree to make provision for the Establishment of the Office of Principal Liaison Officer.

A.F.R.C. Decree No. 4 of 1997.

"Administration of Sierra Leone(Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) Proclamation (Amendment) Decree, 1997." - Being a Decree to increase the membership of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
Annual Subscription:—Inland Le90,000.00, Overseas Le244,000.00
To be purchased from the Government Bookshop, Wallace Johnson Street, Freetown. Price:—Le1,000.00 G.P.O 280 97 1,200 7.97.

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# The Sierra Leone Gazette

## (Extraordinary)

### Published by Authority

VOL. CXXVIII WEDNESDAY, 20TH AUGUST, 1997 No. 49

FREETOWN. *20th August, 1997*

**Govt. Notice No. 202**

The following is published for general information as supplement to this number of the Sierra Leone *Gazette Extraordinary*:—

A.F.R.C. DECREE NO. 5 OF 1997.

"The Imposition of Curfew Decree, 1997"— Being a Decree to make provision for the imposition of a Curfew.

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**Govt. Notice No. 203**

The following is published as supplement to this number of the Sierra Leone *Gazette Extraordinary*:—

PUBLIC NOTICE NO. 4 OF 1997.

The Imposition of Curfew Order, 1997 under the Imposition of Curfew Decree, 1997 (A.F.R.C. Decree No. 5 of 1997).

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT, SIERRA LEONE
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
Annual Subscription:—Inland Le90,000.00, Overseas Le244,000.00
To be purchased from the Government Bookshop, Wallace Johnson Street, Freetown. Price:—Le1,000.00. G.P. O/306/97/1,200/8.97.

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# Exhibit 1.053 Contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

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# Exhibit 1.060 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

# Exhibit 1.064 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

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# Exhibit 1.071 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

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PERSONAL STATEMENT BY Lt. Col. J.P. Koroma on October 1st 1999.

Previous to May 1997, I did not collude with the RUF/SL nor did I ever collaborate with any coup plot. I want to hereby inform my brothers and sisters in the Diaspora that yesterday was the very first time that I ever met with the RUF leader.

On the 23rd March 1991, I was the very first officer who was sent from Daru Barracks to counter the RUF at Bomaru in Eastern Sierra Leone and until May 1997, God being my witness, I never had any contact with the RUF leadership. However, I had seen the devastation that the war had wrought on the country. In 1997, when I saw an opportunity to get peace for Sierra Leone through dialogue and power sharing, I worked hard to achieve this in spite of the enormous misunderstandings that were created.

Yesterday, after meeting with Chairman Foday Sankoh, I am very pleased that we are one step closer to the meeting between President Kabbah, Foday Sankoh and myself that I repeatedly called for in 1997 and 1998.

I am fully aware of the concerns by the International Community and my countrymen about the state of the Lomé Peace Accord. I want to assure all that the meeting between Chairman Sankoh and myself went well. I want to assure all that my men and I are fully committed to the Lomé Peace Accord albeit the necessary addendum(s) that would have to be attached in the near future. I am very sincere in seeing my country at peace and seeing that the socio-economic problems that caused the RUF to take up arms be addressed.

I am very thankful to President Charles Taylor for the role he has played in seeing that the first face to Face meeting between Chairman Sankoh and myself went smoothly. My first meeting with Foday Sankoh was successful because of the diplomacy showed by President Charles Taylor. After the meeting at the Liberian Executive mansion, I held a second meeting with Foday Sankoh again last evening. This ended at 11pm. I had suspected that Chairman Sankoh's earlier statements referencing me had been made based on a lot of misinformation that he had received. Yesterday, after meeting with me, the RUF Leader publicly told President Taylor and others that he had been largely misinformed about my motives.

Again, I want to assure my brothers, sisters and the International Community that Chairman Sankoh and myself will work together to see the full implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord. There are however a few points that we wish the world to be made aware of:

1. The document released this week by the Sierra Leone Government, which promises to see to the grievances of the Sierra Leone Army, was signed not by our Commander-In-Chief, President Kabbah but by his deputy, Vice President Demby. We welcome the written promise by the government to see to the re-instatement and payment of salaries of my men but we question the rationale behind Demby's signature on the document as against President Kabbah's.

2. The exact role of the Civil Defence Force in the Peace process has to be seriously considered by all concerned. These fighters should not be made to feel that they have been used and are now being marginalised. The assurance from their leaders that all is well is in sharp contrast to the reality on the field. A package must be designed to rehabilitate and re-integrate the civil defence force fighters. In the current situation, any fighting force, however small can disrupt the Lomé Accord if they feel aggrieved.

3. All addendum(s) to the Lome Peace Accord including the current proposal signed by Vice President Demby must be signed by President Kabbah, Chairman Sankoh, myself and all the moral guarantors of the Lome Peace Accord before they can be considered as Addendum(s) to the Lomé Accord. They must also be speedily passed through parliament for legislative approval.

Finally but most importantly, I want to appeal to my countrymen to forgive my men for atrocities that they might have committed. I sympathise with the suffering of my brothers and sisters throughout Sierra Leone and I am again assuring them that I, Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma, am fully committed to making Sierra Leone a land of peace and subsequent development. I had been kept out of contact with my men for 18 months since February 1998; However, as from now, I will see to it that the suffering inflicted on the populace be brought to an end. Too many innocent people on all sides of the war spectrum have died. I want to encourage us all against the shedding of blood. Let us now look towards making our rich country a place we can all be proud of.

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COUP SPECIAL (1)

# WEEKEND Spark

The Nation's Liveliest and most Popular Newspaper


...FRIDAY JUNE 13, 1997 * INDEPENDENT * FREETOWN ROTTO FORWARD PRICE: Le 200




WE ARE TIRED OF WAR, TIRED OF DESTRUCTIONS, TIRED OF LIVING WITH FEAR...NO MORE VIOLENCE, PLEASE! LET'S GIVE PEACE A CHANCE TO RE-BUILD OUR LIVES ANEW... —TO ABACHA WITH ECOWAS L O V E —

# BEWILDERING COUP

## —AS AFRC CONSOLIDATES GRIPS



A F R C CHAIRMAN MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA: CLEAR THE AIR TO HELP THE PEOPLE TAKE A DECISION




The bewildering military take-over of the reins of government in Sierra Leone last May 25 is still reverberating throughout the length and breadth of the country, particularly in the capital of Freetown. The violence was unprecedented, apparently bolstered by the release of hard-core criminals who seemingly revenged on their "victims".

Many Sierra Leoneans did not believe their eyes and ears as the soldiers and their cohorts stormed the city and consolidated their grips on power which they took over that Sunday May 25.

A number of Sierra Leoneans interviewed during the take-over were bewildered, they still can not just understand how the coupists did it with the

CONTD. ON PAGE 2

"WEN WAATAR DORTY...E-DORTY...WAYTIN DON-BE — E-DON BE" (WE CAN NOT UNDO HAPPENSTANCE, WE CAN ONLY CHANGE WHAT IS IMMINENT)— "MAY 25 MUST BE THE LAST COUP IN Sa. LEONE — P3* HERCULEAN TASK FACES Sa. LEONE — P2* BRA RABBIT ON HEROES AND COUP — A GODLY PUNISHMENT? — P3



...AT OUR FUTURE?' WITH PEACE THERE CAN BE HOPE

# WE CONDEMN THE USE OF FORCE

The continued talk of using military force to resolve the present Political crisis in the country should be strongly condemned by all right thinking and responsible Sierra Leoneans. Only selfish people who do not care a hoot about the overall safety of Sierra Leonean lives will still advocate such an action, designed either to play it to the gallery or to cater for special interests, that is not nationalistic.

Have such people thought about their vulnerableness in the event of a military attack on the city at this time? Do they expect the repercussions to be a child's play?

Well-placed Sierra Leoneans living in the city who cannot positively contribute to the achievement of national Peace should not worsen the plight of Sierra Leoneans by inflaming the machinery of war through verbal provocations and incitement to more violence.

To do this is to demonstrate insensitivity to the continued suffering of the people. How long should we stay at home without money and food?

Is the Labour Congress in

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# BEWILDERING COUP — "VIBRANT" PRESS BREEDS "VIBRANT" COU



REPATRIATED HOSTAGES FROM FORMER RUF AREAS: "WE ARE HAPPY TO SEE PEACE AT LAST. "NO INDIVIDUAL INTEREST SHOULD BE ABOVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST." LET THE PEACE STAY

presence of all the Nigerian troops helping in the general security of the State and that of the former Head of State Alhaji Ahmad Tejan-Kabbah.

"These guys are wonderful...you just can't beat the Sierra Leonean in his country" said a surprised Nigerian businessman.

"The massive lootings and destructions of property dented the coup operation...Perhaps they were done specifically to give the coup a bad name" said a Lebanese businessman whose shop was looted beyond belief, adding, "many of us have lost all what we had and we just do not know how to get our pieces together..."

"Many of us are now bankrupt. What did we do to warrant this revenge?" asked a wounded Indian boss.

Nearly all major shops in the city were broken into and ravaged with absolute callousness.

Vehicles belonging to private and business people as well as foreign agencies including those of the United Nations (UNDP) were commandeered, cannibalised and abandoned along gutters and on the way side.

The old and famous colonial architecture which harboured the Ministry of Finance and Treasury (under active Police investigations and to be cleaned up by an SLPP deputy minister) was gutted by fire with the ugly carcass now bearing the stump of colonial history.

The last three floors at the Bank of Sierra Leone building at the heart of Freetown were on fire for more than 12 hours. No one knows the extent of the fire damage and the amount of documents destroyed.

The Sierra Leone Commercial Bank and the earlier vandalised Salpost building had their frontage glasses damaged.

Many foreign exchange bureaux were also vandalised, and property worth millions of Leones were either destroyed or looted.

"What a coup!!"

take-over.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), as the new junta called itself, was instantly joined by RUF fighters on the prompting of Foday Sankoh N.A. in detention by Nigeria.

AFRC had pledged efforts to consolidate national reconciliation and peace by closing the war chapter even though domestic and international support was hard to come by. With this new found collaboration between the military and RUF, further efforts were relentlessly being made to curry some kind of sub-regional favour from less violently opposed countries to the May 25 successful coup d'etat to avert foreign military intervention and secure support within the wider community for the junta's message of a peaceful Sierra Leone.

The best practical alternative to peaceful negotiations is far from being a Nigeria-led military intervention which could be as futile as the talks and even more costly. Sierra Leoneans need to be given chance to solve their own problems, however long it takes, through conscious efforts given expression in mounting pressure by especially the civil society to reverse the tragic episode of May 25 this year.

Peace is quintessential to a thriving democracy and not the other way round. Granted the scope to exercise our willpower fruitfully this understood, it is certain Sierra Leone will leap from being last to being among Africa's foremost nations in human development terms.

A "militarily" backed solution to the political stalemate in this country has the capacity to worsen the situation more than ever before.

Documents of a peace treaty were signed between the Sierra Leone government and RUF/SL in Abidjan on November 30 1996, thus ending the senseless war. But lack of political ingenuity did jeopardise the peace accord and finally shattered it, resulting in the new military

pouted many Leoneans in the c

Frankly, SPA long anticipat justification for although not of th and had even wa and sundry to be in how they apportioning unn blames.

Not a day pa earlier than May year without a s reckless attacks government of th both the Privat stations and media.

Some of such were obviously while many othe absolutely baseles were a mere pro meant only to disc government. "In they were an incr

People were parochial in thinking...

How unfortun

## ISSUES

WITH KOTAY & CONTEH

# IS MILITARY INTERVENTION THE SOLUTION?

Since the early hours of May 25 this year the Sierra Leonean capital, Freetown, has been increasingly besieged by invading Nigeria-led Ecomog forces poised to militarily restore the ousted civilian government which had controlled the reins of power for a little over one year.

While listening to one of BBC's programmes, "Talk about Africa", last Wednesday which focused attention on the coup crisis in Sierra Leone, this writer was impressed by the views expressed by some of the panelists who opted for non-military intervention even when peaceful negotiations could have been exhausted.

Much as the electorate of Sierra Leone voted to experiment with democracy, it was most shocking to see the naked and blatant strangulation of that fragile democracy. Most well-meaning and patriotic citizens readily disapproved of another horrible experience under the country's military intervening in politics.

The sad and fatal events on Monday, June 2, which claimed both civilian and military casualties put at over 150 in the west and far east of the city were one of the repercussions expected from any violent means to oust the self-styled revolutionaries.

The stark realities of the Sierra Leone crisis today have a direct bearing on the absence of concrete peace the past six years during which period democratic elections were organised and a popular government put in place. It was this government which continued round-table talks begun by the previous NPRC junta with the RUF Leader Foday Sankoh to end the blood-letting armed conflict in this country.

Documents of a peace treaty were signed between the Sierra Leone government and RUF/SL in Abidjan on November 30 1996, thus ending the senseless war. But lack of political ingenuity did jeopardise the peace accord and finally shattered it, resulting in the new military

**MEMBERS OF THE RULING ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL:**

1—Major Johnny Paul Koroma — Chairman
2—Deputy Chairman Rtd. Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh
3—Brigadier (Rtd.) L.M. Lymon
4—Brigadier Hassan K. Conteh
5—Brigadier S.F.Y. Koroma — Chief of Defence Staff
6—Colonel Max-Kanga
7—Naval Captain A.B. Sesay
8—Colonel K.I.S. Kamara
9—Colonel A.K. Sesay
10-Colonel S.O. Williams - Chief of the Army
11-Squadron Leader Colonel V. L. King
12-Colonel Sam Bockarie (Alias Mosquito) - RUF
13-Colonel Denis Mingo (RUF)
14-Lieutenant Eldred Collins (RUF)
15-Inspector General of Police Teddy Williams
16-Mr. Kemoh Lumumba Fofana (SSD)
17-P L O (I) -Staff Sgt. Abu Sankoh
18-P L O (II) Staff Sgt. Alex Brimah
19-P L O (III) Staff Sgt. Bassy Kamara
20-Sec-Gen: — Mr. S.A.T. Bayoh
21-Mr. Charles Margai — Attorney-General
22-Mr. M.A. Showers — Deputy Director of Prisons
23-Secretary of State (South) - Major A.F. Kamara
24-Secretary of State (North) - Major A.M. Koroma
25-Secretary of State (East) - Capt. E.P. Kenneh.

**STEPS TO REGAIN CONFIDENCE**

Meanwhile the new military rulers have ordered all armed soldiers roaming the streets undeployed to report at the Military barracks or face arrest and stern discipline.

Many armed men are currently being disarmed following reports of harassments, armed Robberies and the settling of old scores.

According to the spokesman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), this is not a coup of vendetta "No vendetta, please".

The removal of armed men from the streets will surely go a long way to convince the people that the country is now returning to normalcy.

## SPARK EDITORIAL

# THE HERCULEAN TA

WEEKEND SPARK foresaw it coming in th
zon of its perception. The stage was well
the local PRESS and in utterances of so
concerned citizens. It was inevitable -
matter of time. And so today Sierra Le
have to take the WILL for the DEED!

THE massive destruction perpetrated in the c
other big provincial towns by hard-core
nals passing as concerned soldiers has sur
the country extremely poorer and gover
partially paralysed. May 25, 26 and 2
been sad days of destruction. Wicked
Leoneans with satanic hate vandalised pr
raped women, distressed their own peop
made genuine business houses that em
their own brothers and sisters collapse t
tent penury.

GOVERNMENT'S inability to function effe
will soon be realised when all the cc
destructions could have been assessed.

HOW on earth did fellow Sierra Leoneans wi
for this country stoop so low to respond
basic instincts of degrading animals to d
ately destroy anything good they saw o
way to self-gratification? It surely beat t
agination of many a civilised soul.

DEFINITELY the perpetrators of such mor
crimes against the people and the state w
helping the coupists in any way. They w
stead planting lasting seeds of hate again
triotic soldiers. What an herculean task
new government or any government to
take in re-building war-torn Sierra Leon
revitalising the old good Sierra Leonean

NO one need remind it home that Sierra Leone
the whole are extremely saddened by the
tude or scale of these destructions and are
disillusioned. The military government
do quite a lot to restore hope or optimism
future. It will not be easy to return the
economic normalcy and to restore busines
fidence throughout the land.

THE loss of the stately historic edifice that harl
the Treasury, the nerve-centre of gover
operations will be felt for many, many
to come. The revitalisation of the Econon
need a miracle of some sort. Let us hop
Godsin His sparing mercies will provide c
us in a world that is now fed up with Sierra
the old problem child.

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For di PEOPLE

MON JUNE 9, 1997 INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER 200LE

## briefs

### 15 sojas die from pole shock

ABOUT 15 AFRC soldiers died from electrocution last Thursday June 5 after their vehicle somersaulted uprooting several electric poles along Savage Square.

Residents say they were being chased by an anti-looting squad and there was a sizeable consignment of vegetable oil in their vehicle.

### peacemaker shot dead

A PRISON officer who tried to pacify men in military uniform was shot dead around the Campbell street vicinity last Thursday June 5.

### students troop out

FOURAH BAY College students are trooping down from their Mount Aureol campus due to the heavy presence of rebels within their vicinity.

### banks suspend business

ALL BANKING activities have been paralysed in the entire country and bankers are not certain of a resumption of commercial activities within the next month.

# Labour Congress Tells Workers To Stop Work!

THE SIERRA Leone Labour Congress Secretariat has ordered all workers to stay home due to the prevailing job insecurity in the country.

In a statement, Secretary General Kandeh B Yillah and President Hassan M Barrie said this is because of the absolute insecurity in the country especially with the release of all hardened criminals from the maximum security prisons at Pademba Road.

Furthermore, there is an apparent problem of job security and in meeting the payment of salaries/wages of workers in both public and private institutions.

"In the light of the prevailing circumstances, we as a Congress have the firm conviction that the atmosphere is not conducive for our members to give their services and must therefore stay home," the statement reads. Labour Congress also said the atrocities committed by the last NPRC junta to this nation are still fresh in our minds and therefore strongly convinced that either military junta can never be a solution to the problems of this country. Meanwhile, the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists said even though Armed Forces Revolutionary Council mentioned the "inhuman press bills" as one of the justifications for the coup, SLAJ in any case was committed to fighting its case within the framework of the democratic system. "A peaceful, negotiated settlement is necessary and possible. All Sierra Leoneans must work towards that end. "The verdict of Bintumani Two still stands. We call on the military authorities to recognise and respect the people's will and to conduct any peace negotiations with the RUF within the framework of the Abidjan Peace Accords of November 30, 1996," SLAJ statement reads.

## KNOW YOUR ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SET-UP

*by*

*FDP REPORTERS*

1. Major Johnny Paul Koroma - Chairman
2. Cpl Foday Saybana Sankoh - Vice Chairman
3. Rtd Brigadier ML Lymon
4. Brigadier Hassan Conteh
5. Brigadier SYF Koroma - Chief of Defence Staff
6. Colonel Max Kangar
7. Naval Captain AB Sesay
8. Colonel KIS Kamara
9. Colonel Abdul K Sesay
10. Colonel SO Williams - Chief of Army Staff
11. Squadron Leader Col VL King
12. Colonel Sam Bockarie - RUF
13. Colonel Dennis Mingo - RUF
14. Lt Eldred Collins - RUF
15. Teddy Williams - Inspector General of Police
16. Kemoh Lumumba Fofanah - SSD
17. Sheku AT Bayoh - Secretary General
18. PLO I - Staff Sgt Abu Sankoh
19. PLO II - Staff Sgt Alex Brima
20. PLO III - Staff Sgt Bassie Kamara
21. MA Showers- Deputy Director of Prisons
22. SOS South - Major AF Kamara
23. SOS North - Major AM Koroma
24. SOS East - Capt EB Kanneh
25. Charles Margai - Attorney General

## AFRC troops to Libya

**THE AFRC has sent RUF strongman Colonel Sam Bockarie alias *Mosquito* as head of a delegation to Libya intended to win support from Colonel Muammar Al Qadaffi in whose country the Mathaba campaign to destabilize the entire African continent began.**

According to sources close to Military Headquarters, a delegation to La Cote D'Ivoire had already left to solicit President Konan Bedie's intervention on the tense situation here and to persuade non-military intervention by ECOWAS troops headed by Nigeria.

Meanwhile, the Chairman and Head of State Major Johnny P Koroma is still holding consultative meetings with politicians and heads of religious organisations. Most Sierra Leoneans condemn the coup but support a negotiated settlement to the current political impasse.

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# Sierra Leone:

# The Forgotten Crisis

**Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P.
from David Pratt, M.P., Nepean-Carleton,
Special Envoy to Sierra Leone**

**April 23, 1999**

Note: This is not a Government of Canada report. It is the report of a private Member of Parliament who has, with the help of Foreign Affairs staff and working within some tight time frames, directed a fresh pair of eyes and ears to the current crisis in Sierra Leone.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The stark reality is that war and suffering are not new phenomena in Sierra Leone. Since gaining its independence in 1961, this tiny African nation has experienced almost every known political system from totalitarianism to democracy and everything in between, with the past eight years being particularly savage by any standard. This report examines three broad themes that are central to the current crisis in Sierra Leone - the security situation, the humanitarian situation and the political situation. It attempts to better understand this brutal conflict and identify areas of greatest need so that Canada and others might focus what resources they might muster to assist a desperate nation.

*The Security Situation*

The overall situation in Sierra Leone is extremely tense. The government and ECOMOG, nearly defeated in January 1999, are now firmly in control of Freetown. ECOMOG, a multinational force consisting of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, can guarantee freedom of movement on the Freetown Peninsula, but there continues to be significant rebel activity throughout the rest of the country. ECOMOG is in desperate need of a significant amount of logistical support, both lethal and non-lethal, and it appears that the rebels are re-arming themselves in preparation for the next round of hostilities.

Foreign involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict is a serious problem, and there is clear evidence that Liberia and Burkina Faso are supporting the rebel efforts. The diamond mining industry provides the rebels with potential revenue of approximately $300 million per year. Precisely how much is spent on small arms and ammunition is unknown. What is known is that arms are apparently procured in eastern Europe and staged through Burkina Faso and then continue on to Liberia for eventual delivery to rebel forces in Sierra Leone.

Security in Sierra Leone and the region also covers the role of civilian police. The Sierra Leone police require instruction in most modern police skills, ranging from crime detection to investigation to prevention for both policemen and police trainers. The police problem is equally serious in Guinea and they also need significant levels of support.

This section of the report concludes that any activities taken with respect to security would have to take into consideration not only the situation in Sierra Leone but of neighbouring states as well, in particular francophone Guinea. As well, both humanitarian efforts and the peace process itself have little hope of success without an extension of ECOMOG's security envelope.

*The Humanitarian Situation*

The scope for humanitarian assistance is immense. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone is critical and has the potential to get much worse. There are 700,000 displaced people internally and another half a million refugees outside Sierra Leone' borders. More specifically, there are

400,000 Sierra Leone refugees in Guinea, approximately 100,000 in Liberia and the estimates of displaced people in Freetown alone are 250,000. Neither the Government of Sierra Leone nor international non-governmental organizations have any idea what the humanitarian situation is beyond the Freetown peninsula or the towns, and unofficial estimates put the number of people living in rebel-controlled areas with no access to humanitarian aid at close to 1.5 million.

Of particular note is the plight of women and children, who have borne the worst of the atrocities inflicted by the rebels. Refugee camps and hospitals are full of victims who have had one or more limbs amputated, the youngest witnessed (a girl) being less than four years old. Approximately 3,000 kidnapped children are still unaccounted for, and for those that have survived, there are no schools to attend. Most of the schools in the Freetown area were destroyed and many teachers have left the country.

The needs range from the immediate provision of shelter, food assistance and the provision of prostheses to long term rehabilitation for victims of the war and education assistance. Following a careful review of the requirements, Canada could provide significant bilateral humanitarian support in those areas where resources permit, and work with various partners (federal, provincial, municipal, non-governmental institutions and other governments) to meet those aims where resources could best be pooled with others.

*The Political Situation*

The Government of Sierra Leone is committed to its two track strategy for peace, which calls for enhancing security while promoting dialogue. However, both the government and the rebels face internal and external obstacles in their pursuit of a negotiated peace. The rebels do not appear to have a formal political agenda and are divided between those who believe in a military victory and those who would opt for a negotiated settlement. The same divisions also exist within President Kabbah's government, which is as well under pressure from ECOMOG sources to seek a negotiated peace.

Regional neighbours have played an important role in the pursuit of peace in Sierra Leone. In 1996, the President of Côte d'Ivoire, Henri Konan Bédié, brokered the Abidjan Accord which, despite its lack of implementation or monitoring mechanisms, could still provide a sound framework for any future peace agreements. Other organizations also have a significant role to play in the Sierra Leone peace process. The United Nations Security Council has authorized the deployment of a UN Observers Mission to Sierra Leone and has established a sanctions regime against the rebels and their supporters. ECOWAS and its Group of Six (Ghana, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria and Togo) is well placed to assist in the peace process. However, it will require international support to do so. Finally, there is the Contact Group on Sierra Leone, an *ad hoc* grouping of nations, including Canada, whose aim is to sustain and promote international support for Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.

*The Momoh Years: 1985-92*

Joseph Momoh came to power on a wave of popular enthusiasm. It was hoped that he might be able to revive the collapsing state and revitalize the economy with his 'Constructive Nationalism'. Corruption and indiscipline continued, however, with high inflation, repeated devaluations, blackouts and shortages of food and fuel. Official diamond exports fell from two million carats in 1970 to 48,000 in 1988 - a result of mismanagement and corruption rather than declining mineral resources.

During the Momoh years there were two trends, largely unnoticed at the time, that would have important ramifications later. One was the continued and dramatic growth in the number of unemployed and disaffected youth. They drifted from the countryside in one of two directions: either to Freetown and other urban centres, or to the diamond fields of Kono. In either case, they became socialized in a climate of violence, drugs and criminality. The other trend was a growth in student militants. During the second half of the 1980s, many university students had become radicalized, in part by the violence of the government's suppression of their demonstrations, and in part by exposure to new ideas, including the thoughts of Col. Qaddafi, as expressed in *The Green Book*. Initially, Libyan sponsorship of Sierra Leonean student groups and student trips to Libya was open, but following the violent expulsion of 41 university students with alleged Libyan links in 1985, *The Green Book* and its author took on more symbolic importance, and the tangible connection went underground. Between 1987 and 1988, between twenty-five and fifty Sierra Leoneans were taken to Libya for training in the "art of revolution"(Gberie).

Among the students was a functional illiterate who had become part of a 'revolutionary cell' in Kono. Foday Sankoh was a gray-haired former army corporal and photographer who had been jailed for seven years for alleged implication in the 1971 coup plot against Siaka Stevens. Ironically, only three of those trained in Libya showed up later in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and the only survivor after a year or so was Foday Sankoh (Gberie).

In the late 1980s, events were taking place in Liberia that would soon have a profound effect on Sierra Leone. At the end of 1989, Charles Taylor launched an attack on Samuel Doe's government with a small band of men, several of them, including Taylor himself, with Libyan training or connections. Taylor also received support from the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, in part through political, family and personal relationships that some have described as 'like the dynastic marriages and alliance of European princes of old'(Ellis). Burkinabè support for Taylor was later extended to Foday Sankoh and the RUF.

Operating initially out of the Ivory Coast, Taylor's rebellion quickly took on ethnic overtones and within a year had become a major humanitarian disaster. In 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) put together an intervention force made up of troops from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and the Gambia. Known as the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), it thwarted Taylor's drive to an early military victory. Because Taylor had earlier been refused support by Momoh (and was briefly arrested in Freetown using a

Burkinabè passport), and because ECOMOG used Freetown as a staging ground, Taylor spoke frequently during 1990 and 1991 of plans to attack Sierra Leone.

By 1991 the Momoh regime was in serious difficulty. Beset by a crumbling economy, growing popular agitation and factional turmoil within the government, Momoh announced a return to multi-party politics, and general elections were planned for 1992. Before the elections could be held, however, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked. With the assistance of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Foday Sankoh and a small band of men crossed from Liberia into Sierra Leone's Eastern Province in March 1991, with the express aim of ending the APC's 24 year grip on power. Raids on several border towns over the next few days demonstrated the weakness of the Sierra Leone military, and within a month, most of Kailahun District was under rebel control.

A humanitarian crisis quickly resulted from the RUF's tactics, which involved brutal attacks on unarmed civilians and children. Attempting to copy the ethnic incitement that had served Charles Taylor well in Liberia, the RUF at first targeted Fula and Madingo traders, murdering more than 100 in its first two months of operations. It also targeted Lebanese traders, beheading five in Bo District. The atrocities never sparked an ethnic divide, but they created alarm among the civilian population and caused rapid and widespread displacement. Panicked, President Momoh quickly doubled the size of the army from 3,000 men to almost 6,000, drawing most of his new recruits from vagrants in Freetown - the 'rural...unemployed, a fair number of hooligans, drug addicts and thieves' - as his foreign minister at the time later put it. Further confusion was added to the mix by the formation in Sierra Leone of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO), a coalition of anti-Taylor Liberians who, with Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) support, initially fought both the RUF and Taylor's NPFL.

Because of corruption and mismanagement, Sierra Leone's front line troops were badly underpaid and demoralized. In April 1992, a group from the Eastern front travelled to Freetown to protest their situation. Within a day, the mutiny became a coup and Joseph Momoh fled to Guinea. A military junta, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was formed, with 29-year-old army paymaster, Capt. Valentine Strasser as Chairman.

*The NPRC Regime: 1992-6*

Initially, the NPRC was enormously popular, especially among Sierra Leone's youth. The leadership itself was young and many had grown up in the slums of Freetown. Young people in Freetown embarked on a voluntary cleanup and beautification campaign, and a new 'youth volunteer' force was recruited to prosecute the war. Many of the newcomers were not volunteers, however, and one estimate places the number of child soldiers under the age of 15 at more than a thousand by 1993. Soon the NPRC came to resemble the regime it had ousted.

During 1992 and 1993 the fortunes of the RUF fluctuated. On occasion, they overran the diamond areas were pushed back and retook the area again. Civilians accused by the government

With Foday Sankoh and other AFRC/RUF defendants appealing their convictions, the RUF again appeared at the gates to Freetown in January 1999, catching both the government and ECOMOG off guard. Using women and children as a human shield, some RUF troops were able to bypass ECOMOG troops and join comrades who had already infiltrated the city. Among their number were Liberians and a small number of European mercenaries. In the fighting that ensued, an estimated five thousand people died, including cabinet ministers, journalists and lawyers who were specifically targeted. Before the rebels were beaten back, large parts of the city were burned and 3,000 children were abducted as they retreated. While many of the convicted AFRC/RUF collaborators were freed, Foday Sankoh remained in government custody. RUF commander Sam Bockarie, a former *san san boy*, said at the end of January that "*No government can succeed in this country if it doesn't include Foday Sankoh.*" Unless the RUF was given a share of power, he said, "*No government can rule. We'll make the country ungovernable.*" (Sierra Leone News). He later announced that Johnny Paul Koroma had been named deputy leader of the RUF.

The RUF and its newfound army colleagues defy all definitions and typologies of guerilla movements. Abdullah and Muana argue that the RUF "is neither a separatist uprising rooted in a specific demand, as in the case of Eritrea, nor a reformist movement with a radical agenda superior to the regime it sought to overthrow. Nor does it possess the kind of leadership that would be necessary to designate it as a warlord insurgency. The RUF is a peculiar guerilla movement without any significant national following or ethnic support. Perhaps because of its social base and its lack of an emancipatory programme to garner support from other social groups, it has remained a bandit organization solely driven by the survivalist needs of its predominantly uneducated and alienated battle front and battle group commanders. Neither the peasantry, the natural ally of most revolutionary movements, nor the students, amongst whose ranks the RUF-to-be originated, lent any support to the organization during the eight years of fighting."

*Foreign Troops and Mercenaries*

The presence of troops from neighbouring countries of the sub-region in support of the rebels as well as foreign mercenaries has had a significant impact on the nature of the conflict in Sierra Leone. In the case of the former, this has provided the rebels with experienced fighters, and in the latter case it may be manifesting itself in training as well as the provision of logistical support.

There is ample evidence that Liberian fighters are an integral part of the rebel force and that the rebels have been receiving substantial support from Liberia and President Charles Taylor. There are no accurate numbers, but they appear to comprise a significant part of RUF field commander Sam Bockarie's forces that are operating in the south of Sierra Leone. The Liberian Government at first denied the involvement of its nationals in the Sierra Leone conflict, but have since admitted that there are Liberians fighting on the side of the RUF, albeit without official Liberian government support or backing. All information indicates that they are involved both in combat operations as well as in the provision of logistical support and the trafficking of small arms.

There were also widespread allegations of the involvement of troops from Burkina Faso in rebel operations, but these allegations have proven somewhat difficult to substantiate. Sources from ECOMOG vary drastically in their views on Burkinabè involvement, with some saying that two of every ten captured rebels are Burkinabè, whereas others claim that no Burkinabè troops have been captured. There seems to be strong evidence of Burkinabè complicity in the shipment of small arms to the rebels, and it is therefore possible to speculate that in support of this operation there may have been Burkinabè military personnel deployed in Sierra Leone. To date, however, there has been little hard evidence of the involvement of Burkinabè combat troops in the Sierra Leone conflict.

There is also compelling evidence that there are foreign mercenaries operating with the rebels. Since the return to power of the Kabbah government, most foreign mercenary involvement appears to have been limited to the provision and delivery of small arms both into and within Sierra Leone, using small planes and helicopters. Nationals from the Ukraine have apparently been the most active in this area, and all parties visited by the Canadian delegation unanimously cited their involvement. There were also uncorroborated reports of nationals from France and Angola being seen in the country connected with shipments of small arms. Recent information, however, points to the distinct possibility that foreign mercenaries may now be involved in limited training of rebel forces, and again the Ukrainians were named by various sources as being part of this effort. It is not known at this time whether the Government of the Ukraine is aware of the level of involvement of its nationals in the conflict in Sierra Leone.

Finally, there is the possibility that private security firms, which are likely still operating in the diamond mining regions of the country, may be providing some form of training to the rebels as part of a cooperative deal with them. This is all but impossible to verify given the lack of access to this region.



[redacted]

firmly entrenched in the diamond mining regions, with well-established communications and transportation networks. The nature of their relationship with rebel forces is not known. It is believed that private security firms protect many diamond mining companies. They will likely prove to be difficult to move out of the way to make room for the reforms in the industry envisaged by GOSL. That said, it is interesting to note that no one with whom our delegation met viewed any form of immediate military operations to recapture or control the diamond mining region as in any way feasible.

Of particular interest is the fact that diamonds from this region are apparently quite unique and can readily be identified as coming from Sierra Leone. Moreover, they are very easy to transport - hence moving them to markets, legally or otherwise, is not a major problem. As well, the diamonds in Sierra Leone are alluvial and thus relatively easy to acquire.

The diamonds and the revenues they generate fund appear to move through a network of middlemen of Lebanese descent who are now indigenous to the region and have been involved in the diamond industry for over 60 years. Sierra Leone diamonds have allegedly turned up on the diamond markets of Beirut as recently as March 1999. Little, if any, action has been taken to control or regulate the trade of Sierra Leone diamonds, which has permitted rebel forces to re-arm and re-equip themselves with new and modern weaponry not often seen in a bush army.

*Trafficking in Small Arms*

There is ample evidence to show that several nations in the sub-region are heavily involved in the procurement and transfer of small arms and ammunition to the conflict in Sierra Leone, and that this trade is closely linked to the diamond mining industry in Sierra Leone.

It appears that arms are procured in eastern Europe (either Bulgaria or Ukraine) and moved to Tripoli, Libya where they are transferred to ships or charter aircraft for shipment into the region. Air shipments are staged through Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso and then continue on to Liberia, where they are transferred to smaller aircraft or trucks for delivery into rebel-held territory in Sierra Leone.

Both Liberia and Burkina Faso have denied any involvement in the trafficking of small arms, but solid evidence exists that firmly implicates both nations. In late March, 1999 there was an air shipment (in a Ukrainian chartered aircraft) of over 68 tonnes of small arms that was recently delivered to Sam Bockarie in southeastern Sierra Leone. This shipment was flown to Ouagadougou, where the aircraft sat for several days on the presidential tarmac, as the Ukrainian crew refused to fly to Monrovia, saying their job was to simply deliver the arms to Burkina Faso. The shipment was transferred to another aircraft and flown to Monrovia, where it was subsequently delivered to Bockarie in Sierra Leone. This latest shipment was announced by ECOMOG on April 8, 1999, but our delegation had been made aware of its existence during its trip to the region.

The plans of the OCHA for shelter at the National Workshops and the eight other camp sites show only enough shelter for 16,800 people. However, at the present time, approximately 50,000 families are targeted for shelter and non-food assistance in Freetown and areas in the hinterland such as Bo, Kenema and Kambia. Since February, the U.S. Office of Foreign Development Assistance has provided approximately 1,600 rolls of plastic sheeting and 50,000 blankets which has the potential to provide shelter and non-food items to about 10,000 families. However, it is going to take a herculean effort by all concerned to ensure that the population of Freetown has adequate shelter with the onset of the rainy season.

In addition to the basic shelter needs, our group also heard a plea for additional non-food assistance. In particular, officials with the National Commission for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation (NCRRR) told us that there is an urgent need for household items - goods such as cooking utensils, pots, pans, bowls, dishes, plates, cutlery and soap well as jerry cans for water. It was also apparent to us that, if possible, cots would be far preferable to sleeping mats in these shelters especially in the rainy season.

In the longer term, the housing stock of much of the eastern portion of Freetown must be rebuilt. During our tour of the devastated eastern sections, we did see evidence of reconstruction. Residents are struggling against the deadline that the rainy season imposes. Mud bricks are being used to build small new shelters although it appears that many types of building material such as tin for roofing, windows, etc. may be in short supply. Access to credit in order to acquire loans for rebuilding has also been very restricted as only a very small number of banks have re-opened since the fighting in January. Interestingly, during our meeting with President Kabbah, he mentioned Canada's expertise in the area of pre-fab low-cost housing and spoke of Maurice Strong's involvement in the UN Habitat project. He added that "We don't want it for free, but need repayments organized over several years."

*Amputees*

While it is hoped that the serious shelter problem in Sierra Leone can be addressed with building materials and financial resources, some of the physical and emotional scars that are borne by the men, women and children of Sierra Leone will be present for generations. The practice of amputating and mutilating civilians has become the trademark of the RUF, their calling card. As a terror tactic, the practice began in the early 90's but seemed to have attracted international attention during the first free democratic elections in 1996. To discourage people from voting during those elections, RUF leader Foday Sankoh issued orders to his men to cut off the hands of people who had cast a ballot. (Those who had voted received an ink mark on their hands.) The tactic was not successful. Often voting at great personal risk to themselves, the people eventually elected President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. For those in the rural areas, the amputations were particularly cruel since they destroyed the livelihoods of many rural subsistence farmers who were rendered incapable of working the soil.

MSF currently reports treating hundreds of civilians who have had one or more hands, arms, legs or ears amputated by rebel forces. Many of the victims are young children, even some infants. It was also noted that instances of amputations and mutilations by the rebels increased dramatically when they were forced to retreat from Freetown in January. MSF has also publicly stated that their experience in 1998 indicates that for every amputee victim who makes it to hospital, there are several others who never receive medical care and die from their wounds.

A visit to the Connaught Hospital in Freetown and the ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency) amputee camp at Murray Town brought our delegation face to face with the horrible atrocities this conflict has produced. The ADRA camp contained about 250 amputees as well as other family members who had fled areas in the interior of the country that had come under rebel attack. At the camp, our delegation was met by the assistant administrator and escorted on a tour of the camp by a spokesperson chosen from among the amputees - a young man in his early twenties.

The camp's accommodation consists of mud dwellings, old sheds and some new plastic shelters which had been constructed, similar to the ones we had seen at the National Workshops. The camp spokesman explained to us how he had become a victim. He said that he was from the north of Sierra Leone, but that he was studying in the eastern area of the country when the rebels arrived. In addition to robbing and looting the area, the rebels inflicted death and mutilation upon the inhabitants. They then demanded that the young man's uncle hold his arm while they chopped it off. When the uncle refused, they shot him. These rebels severed the young man's right arm with a machete about half way between his elbow and his wrist. His right ear was also sliced off.

The camp administrator led us outside where the young man explained the purpose of our visit to the amputees and their families. It was here that our delegation saw a little girl four years old – probably the youngest amputee victim in the camp. The RUF rebels had cut this little girl's arm off at the shoulder. She was accompanied by both parents – each of whom had a hand chopped off. The horrific brutality that was inflicted on that poor child and her parents is in many ways symbolic of the nihilistic violence that has brought Sierra Leone to the brink of complete destruction.

A few hours later, our delegation was at the Connaught Hospital in the centre of Freetown. There were another fifty amputees, male and female, being treated in two wards. Dr. Kamara, the chief surgeon of the hospital and a nurse matron accompanied us with a TV crew from a local station. The doctor explained to the patients in Krio that our delegation was from Canada and that our mission was to assess the condition of the people in Sierra Leone, so that Canada could provide assistance.

The doctor also explained that during the crisis in January Connaught Hospital was flooded with victims. The hospital has 250 beds, but treated upwards of 350 people when the fighting broke out. Amputees and people with gunshot wounds were treated in some cases on the grass in the

little courtyard. Our delegation observed bed after bed of young and old with bandaged limbs and blank stares. It is in the faces of the people who have been the victims of this tragedy that one sees utter despair – like the man whose both hands had been cut off by the rebels.

Judging from the age and gender of those occupying the hospital beds, there appeared to be no rhyme or reason to who was chosen as a victim. The violence certainly appeared to be completely indiscriminate. Once again, our delegation saw more evidence of the victimization of children - another little girl with her left leg amputated a few inches above her knee. She was about eight years old. The doctor advised that the youngest amputee he had treated was two and a half years of age.

It is difficult to determine with any precision the number of amputees in Freetown or indeed Sierra Leone as a whole. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the number in the Freetown area is between 1,000 and 1,500. There are also hundreds of amputees among the refugee population who have fled Sierra Leone. Because of the state of medical care in the country, reliable statistics are virtually non-existent.

Although we were advised that the situation concerning the amputees would improve with the provision of prosthetics by groups like Handicap International (HI), our delegation does not recall seeing one prosthetic device while touring either the camp or the hospital. At a meeting of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in Brussels at the end of March, it was noted by HI that whatever service was being delivered in Freetown was being done on an *ad hoc* basis by non-experts because of security limitations. The problem is particularly difficult for children, who, because they are growing, need to be refitted periodically with new devices. In addition, it is also extremely important that psychological assistance be provided to the victims of atrocities at the earliest opportunity.

*Food Aid*

A March 15 assessment of the food supply in Sierra Leone contained in a report by the OCHA stated that "*unless food security agencies are given access to get the population started on food production, the country is likely to slide further into a major food emergency in the coming months.*" The report goes on to say that: "*The outlook for agricultural input is grim given the present circumstances. End of year projections in 1998 by food agencies in Sierra Leone forecasted a yearly requirement of 483,000 metric tons for the entire population. Approximately half of this was to come from commercial imports, 17 percent from food aid, ten percent from milled rice from the 1997-98 harvest with a projected 23 percent food deficit.*"

These projections have been overtaken by events to the extent that the existing situation is now much more pessimistic. The rainy season is already known as "the hungry season" in Sierra Leone. This year, it could be even more so. For instance, the harvesting of inland valley swamp rice which should have occurred between November and January was severely disrupted due to rebel activities. In addition, land preparation, which is normally done during February to get the

recent report out of the northern town of Kamakwie stated that at least 20 people per day were dying from starvation, lack of medical attention and rebel atrocities.

Our delegation heard from one NGO official involved in food aid that, once security is restored in Sierra Leone, the country will be in need of assistance with a long-term strategy for food production. Sierra Leone has the capacity to feed itself and produce enough for export. In fact, the country was self-sufficient in food in the 1960's and it is said by some that if its arable land was properly utilized it could feed all of West Africa. Another food NGO representative that our group spoke with indicated that it was not unreasonable to believe that with the proper conditions Sierra Leone could return to self-sufficiency in food production in two to three years.

Unfortunately, distortions in the marketplace as a result of monopolistic practices that have developed (arrangements between businesses and politicians) have also caused serious problems. In order for food security to be re-established once again, the small producer must be encouraged. Until the security situation changes substantially, it is likely that Sierra Leone will be in a position where it must rely on a substantial amount of outside food aid.

*The Children*

The children of Sierra Leone have borne the brunt of the conflict. Whether it is in the refugee camps of Guinea, the displaced persons camps in Freetown, the malnutrition and disease that is everywhere or the child soldiers, it is the children of Sierra Leone who are the victims. It is estimated that the eight years of conflict have resulted in the separation of 12,000 children from their families. UNICEF is struggling to put in place programs which will re-unite children with their families. While they have had some success with the National Family Tracing and Reunification Network, it continues to be an uphill battle. One of the most disturbing facts of the rebel invasion of Freetown in January was that it resulted in the 3,000 children reported missing. It is believed that they were abducted by the rebels and that they are not receiving sufficient food or care. Of this figure, the most recent information available for this report indicated that 256 children had been re-united with their families including 51 recently released by the rebels. The location of the other children is simply not known.

Certainly one of the most high profile issues that has come out of the war in Sierra Leone has been the issue of child soldiers. The Secretary General's March report to the Security Council noted that *"A significant number of the rebel combatants were children. Reports were received of death and injuries being inflicted by boys as young as eight to 11 years old."* One of the means by which these young children are drawn into the conflict is through a process called "de-institutionalization." In many cases, these children are forced by the rebels at gunpoint to kill family members or neighbours. By committing an act of violence against people close to them, not only are they traumatized, they also cannot go back to their families or their communities because of fear of retribution.

The rebels have found this to be a very useful method of socializing these children into a life of extreme violence. In fact, the children also begin to "attach" or bond with their commanders. Their blind obedience, combined with the effects of alcohol, drugs and a popular belief in juju spirits, convince them of their own invincibility and make them some of the most courageous and disciplined fighters within the rebel factions. The rebels' widespread use of child soldiers – and the countries that sustain their activities – deserve the strongest condemnation by the international community. Unfortunately, our delegation also saw evidence on the streets of Freetown of under-aged combatants who were evidently part of the Kamajor forces. While the Kamajors are supportive of the Government of Sierra Leone, it would seem the Government is able to exercise very little control over Kamajor activities.

Yet another one of the tragedies of this conflict has been the massive numbers of victims of sexual abuse. Many reports both by the media and international agencies have corroborated instances of individual and gang rape of girls and young women who have been rounded up by the rebels. Many rape victims were said to have been subsequently mutilated or murdered. Others have been abducted and have been forced into service as porters, cooks, sex slaves and spies. When our delegation met with NGO's in Freetown, it was evident they believed that this was a problem of significant proportions which was not being adequately addressed. The strong stigma attached to a victim of sexual abuse in West African society meant that many young women and girls were simply not coming forward for psychological treatment.

Also of great concern is the issue of education. The Ministry of Education has reported that 300 schools were damaged or destroyed throughout Sierra Leone in the period following the May, 1997 military coup. After the January fighting in Freetown, 64 government schools, both primary and secondary, were closed because of damage. Another 30 schools are currently being used for shelter. There are no schools functioning in the interior of the country even in towns that have Kamajor protection like Bo, Kenema and Makeni.

The full school population of Sierra Leone is between 600-700,000. The primary population is estimated at 350,000. The number of primary school age children now receiving some form of education is estimated at about 30-35,000. In many of the schools in Freetown, instruction occurs for only a few hours per day since a large number of teachers have left the country. Textbooks, benches and desks have been looted or burned as fuel. Many children have lost up to three years of education, and as a result, are losing their future. One encouraging project worthy of note is an initiative that was launched recently by Mr. Peter Penfold, the British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone. Through this project, schools in Britain will donate educational materials and equipment to Sierra Leone.

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U N I T E D N A T I O N S Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa

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IRIN-WA Update 438 of events in West Africa (Thursday 8 April)
SIERRA LEONE: ECOMOG warns "warmonger presidents"
ECOMOG's new force commander in Sierra Leone, Major General Felix Mujakperuo, has issued a strong warning to the presidents of Liberia and Burkina Faso, according to a press statement IRIN received on Thursday.
In the statement, titled 'Warning to Warmonger Presidents', Mujakperuo described events leading up to an alleged delivery of arms to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels fighting the Sierra Leonean government. He said ECOMOG "has now confirmed the activities of two countries and their leaders involved in the shipment and delivery of arms to the rebels through the government of a neighbouring country."
He warned that ECOMOG will "strike at all the channels involved in this movement of heavy arms and ammunition to the rebels by land, sea and air."
According to the statement, faxed to IRIN by ECOMOG, a Ukrainian registered cargo aircraft, Antonov 124, carrying 68 tons of arms arrived in Ouagadougou on 14 March 1999, and was parked at the presidential wing of the airport. The pilot was told to continue on to Monrovia to deliver the cargo but he refused to do this on the grounds that it was not the initial arrangement, Mujakperuo said.
On 15 March, a smaller aircraft with Ukrainian crew members landed at Robertsville International airport in Liberia, accompanied by a Liberia Special Security Services Director, the statement said. Its cargo, it added, was taken to Gbanga and then to the Sierra Leone border for delivery to the RUF and to the Guinea border for rebels in Guinea.
The statement said that this process continued with additional aircraft and added that RUF commander Sam Bockarie "has indicated receipt of the arms from Liberia in recent conversations with some of his commanders."
ECOMOG said it "will no longer watch this mischief by supposed leaders continuing side by side with the peace initiative in view of the danger it poses to us and the whole sub-region." It also called upon the international community "to prevail on Charles Taylor and his colleagues to desist from this evil action if peace is to be restored."
Both Liberia and Burkina Faso have consistently denied supporting the RUF.

Traduzione:

**ECOMOG Comunicato Stampa, diffuso a Freetown, 8 aprile, 1999**

NAZIONI UNITE Ufficio per il coordinamento degli Affari Umanitari.
Rete di Informazione Regionale Integrata per l'Africa Occidentale (IRIN)

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*Questo articolo è stato pubblicato sul servizio che riporta le notizie dell'Africa Occidentale. IRIN-WA vuol dire appunto IRIN West Africa, cioè IRIN Africa Occidentale*]

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IRIN-Africa Occidentale aggiornamento 438 sugli eventi dell'Africa Occidentale (Giovedì 8 aprile)

SIERRA LEONE: L'ECOMOG ammonisce i "presidenti guerrafondai".

Secondo un comunicato stampa ricevuto dall'IRIN giovedì, il nuovo comandante delle forze ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, Maggiore Generale Felix Mujakperuo, ha rivolto un deciso ammonimento ai presidenti della Liberia e del Burkina Faso. In un comunicato, intitolato "Ammonimento ai presidenti guerrafondai", Mujakperuo descrive gli eventi conseguenti a una sospetta fornitura di armi ai ribelli del Fronte Unito Rivoluzionario che combattono il governo della Sierra Leone. Egli ha detto che l'ECOMOG "ha ora avuto conferma sulle attività delle due nazioni e dei loro leader coinvolti in una spedizione e consegna di armi ai ribelli attraverso il governo di una delle nazioni vicine".
Egli ha ammonito che l'ECOMOG "colpirà tutti i canali coinvolti in questo traffico, via terra, mare e cielo, di armi pesanti e munizioni ai ribelli".
Secondo il comunicato, faxato all'IRIN dall'ECOMOG, un aereo cargo Antonov 124, registrato in Ucraina, con a bordo 68 tonnellate di armi è arrivato a Ouagadougou in 14 Marzo 1999 ed è stato parcheggiato nell'area presidenziale dell'aeroporto. Al pilota era stato chiesto di continuare fino a Monrovia per consegnare il carico ma egli ha rifiutato perché [*il viaggio*] non era compreso nell'accordo iniziale, ha sostenuto Mujakperuo.
Secondo il comunicato, il 15 Marzo, un piccolo aereo con membri dell'equipaggio ucraini è atterrato all'aeroporto internazionale Robertsville in Liberia accompagnato dal direttore dei servizi speciali di sicurezza liberiani [*YEATEN Benjamin*]. Il suo carico, aggiunge il documento, venne portato a Gbanga e quindi al confine con la Sierra Leone per essere consegnato al RUF e al confine con la Guinea per i ribelli in Guinea.
Il comunicato dice che queste operazioni sono continuate con altri aerei e aggiunge che il comandante del RUF, Sam Bockarie [*detto Mosquito*], "ha rivelato in recenti conversazioni con alcuni dei suoi comandanti di aver ricevuto armi dalla Liberia".
L'ECOMOG dice che "non sopporterà ancora a lungo queste offese da parte dei supposti leader - che continuano a svilupparsi nonostante le iniziative di pace – perché [*le offese*] costituiscono un pericolo per noi e per tutta la subregione". L'ECOMOG ha anche rivolto un appello a tutta la comunità internazionale "perché costringa il presidente Charles Taylor e i suoi colleghi a smetterla con queste azioni diaboliche, se bisogna restaurare la pace".
Sia la Liberia sia il Burkina Faso hanno con forza negato di sostenere il RUF.

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# DIAMOND HUNTERS FUEL AFRICA'S BRUTAL WARS; IN SIERRA LEONE, MINING FIRMS TRADE WEAPONS AND MONEY FOR ACCESS TO GEMS

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*JAMES RUPERT*
WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE
Saturday, October 16, 1999 ; Page A01

FREETOWN, Sierra Leone -- When Sierra Leone's lone combat helicopter blew an engine one day last year, it meant disaster for the government. The aging Soviet-built gunship had been the government's most effective weapon against a rebel army that was marching on the capital, burning villages and killing and mutilating civilians.

Officials scrambled to repair or replace the helicopter. But rather than relying on conventional arms dealers, they took bids from mining companies, gem brokers and mercenaries, most of whom held or wanted access to Sierra Leone's diamond fields. The government finally agreed to buy $3.8 million worth of engines, parts and ammunition through a firm set up by Zeev Morgenstern, an executive with Belgium-based Rex Diamond Mining Corp.

In the end, the parts proved unsuitable, and the helicopter stayed grounded. The rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) seized Freetown, killing thousands of residents and -- in their signature atrocity -- amputating the arms or hands of hundreds of civilians.

Although the government later retook the capital, the rebels' success forced the government this summer to accept a deal to share power. Though controversial, the peace agreement has drawn enough U.S. and other international support that Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright will visit here Monday on the first day of an African tour.

The key role of mining interests in the fighting was nothing new in Sierra Leone. The eight-year conflict that has shattered this country and brutalized its 5 million people has been fueled by foreigners' hunger for diamonds. Rival mining companies, security firms and mercenaries -- from Africa, Europe, Israel and the former Soviet Union -- have poured weapons, trainers and fighters into Sierra Leone, backing the government or the rebels in a bid to win cheap access to diamond fields.

Across Africa, foreign firms are fueling wars for natural resources that in some ways recall the 19th-century "scramble for Africa" by European imperial powers. Since the end of the Cold War -- when major countries pulled back from African conflicts -- oil and mining companies, security firms and mercenaries have filled the void. They have provided arms and expertise for civil wars in Angola, Congo, Liberia and here.

These conflicts are singularly brutal, scholars say, because many of their sponsors are outsiders with little motive to limit destruction. The superpower patrons of Cold War conflicts "did not allow the wholesale ripping up of the economy, the use of children

as soldiers, the attacks on relief groups" that have become the norm in Sierra Leone and elsewhere, said Herbert Howe, a Georgetown University political scientist.

In Sierra Leone, both the government and the RUF have attracted military backers by offering payment in diamonds or diamond-mining rights. The fortunes to be made from such ventures have prolonged and escalated the war, analysts say. According to documents and African, U.S. and European sources, the spoils have also encouraged the involvement in the conflict of a number of prominent foreigners:

Charles Taylor, president of Sierra Leone's neighbor, Liberia, and his son, Charles Jr., have helped the RUF obtain foreign arms and military training, said African and Western military intelligence sources and Liberians. An American with military experience described watching at Liberia's main airport as members of one of the president's security forces supervised the unloading of two truckloads of automatic rifles and ammunition that he said were then sent to the Sierra Leonean border.

A Liberian government spokesman denied that Taylor or his son had provided weapons to the RUF, or had interests in Sierra Leone's diamond trade. International diamond merchants and other sources say that by helping the RUF control Sierra Leone's diamond fields, Liberia can divert more Sierra Leonean diamonds through its territory on the way to world markets, reaping part of the profits.

A retired South African army intelligence officer, Fred Rindle, has provided training to Taylor's forces and to the RUF, African and Western military sources say. Rindle, who also helped arm UNITA rebels in Angola, is also exporting diamonds from Liberia, according to other African and Western sources.

A Ukrainian businessman, Leonid Minin, has supplied arms to Taylor and the RUF, according to a senior officer of the West African peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone. Minin, who is well connected to government officials in Ukraine, operates a timber company in Liberia that also is dealing in arms and diamonds, according to the officer and Liberian sources.

Morgenstern, the Rex Mining executive, and the company's Antwerp-based president, Serge Muller, set up a company to sell weapons to the Sierra Leonean government, which has granted Rex several diamond mining leases. In separate interviews, Morgenstern and Muller said the arms deals were unrelated to Rex's mining activities.

A retired Israeli army officer, Yair Klein, has provided military material and training in Liberia and Sierra Leone since 1996, according to West African sources and the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Aharonoth. Israel convicted Klein in 1991 of illegally selling arms and training to Colombian groups that the Colombian government says were fronts for the Medellin cocaine cartel.

Klein competed with Morgenstern last year for a helicopter contract in Sierra Leone while seeking mining rights, according to Yedioth Aharonoth. Sierra Leone arrested Klein last January and is trying him for alleged fraud in the proposed purchase of a helicopter from Belarus.

Mired in Corruption

# The Liberian Government Finally Admits Support to RUF

By Cllr. Tiawan S. Gongloe

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The Perspective

Atlanta, Georgia

November 27, 2002

When the world, led by the United States, accused the Taylor Government of supporting the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone a few years ago, Taylor did not only clearly deny but started a big public relation campaign to prove that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and Sierra Leone were great liars. Taylor called meetings and press conferences at the Executive Mansion to tell the Liberian people that his government was being falsely accused and called upon the Liberian people not to believe the accusation against his government. Taylor conducted interviews with the BBC, West Africa Weekly, The New African and other international media institutions, denying his government's support for the RUF.Addittionally, he sent his foreign minister and other officials of his government abroad on public relation campaigns to tell the world that a big lie was being told against his government. Taylor's big argument was that his accusers had no evidence to link him to the RUF. Well, a few days ago, Taylor finally admitted his support for the RUF in the Washington POST.

This is what Taylor said in the November 12, 2002 edition of the Washington Post at page A16, column six:

"In the Sierra Leone crisis, for example, Liberia was not the only country involved. The other countries got off the hook, because other major countries protected them. We had good reasons for our association with the RUF (Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone) at that particular period, purely for national security concerns."

What Taylor said in the Washington Post is what the whole world knew was the truth all along. However, he kept denying and asking for evidence. The question that lingers in the mind of every reasonable person who has followed this issue is why did Taylor wait for the United States and the United Nations to impose sanctions on Liberia before he could admit his involvement with the RUF.Why did Taylor wait for the United Nations to spend so much money (money that could have been spend on Liberia's

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reconstruction) on panels of investigation to prove his support for the RUF before he could admit his involvement with the RUF? Why did Taylor unnecessarily use government revenue to send his cronies abroad to lie that he was not involved in Sierra Leone, when he knew the truth was that he was actively supporting the RUF? Why is Taylor admitting his involvement with the RUF less than one month before the formal opening of the special war crime tribunal in Sierra Leone? Is the admission by Taylor a strategy to make him a star prosecution witness to testify against those other countries he says were involved with the RUF, or is it intended to mitigate whatever punishment he could get following his trial by the Special Court? Now that Taylor has voluntarily admitted, he has provided more than sufficient reason for his indictment by the Special Court.

The admission made by Taylor in the Washington Post is not the first admission made by him; nonetheless, it is the clearest, so far. The first admission was circumstantial and was by the way he conducted himself in the UN hostage crisis in Sierra Leone a few years ago when the RUF took hostage 500 UN peacekeepers. Taylor was asked by the international community to persuade the RUF to release the 500 UN peacekeepers to the UN, in the same way President Jimmy Carter was asked by ECOWAS in 1992 to persuade the NPFL to release 500 ECOMOG soldiers held hostage by the NPFL.

Instead of Taylor persuading the RUF to release the hostages at the buffer zone manned by the UN between the Sierra Leonean army and the RUF, Taylor released all 500 of the UN hostages from Lofa county in Liberia and air-lifted them from Lofa county by helicopters provided by Libya for the purpose. He began this exercise one day after he was contacted as though he had custody of the hostages. The speed with which he acted and the fact that the hostages were released from Liberian territory created suspicion as to who had actual custody of the hostages. In addition, the speed with which Taylor acted created the impression that instead of persuading the RUF to release the hostages, he just informed them that he was releasing the hostages and he did. The second admission made by Taylor was through a statement issued by the Foreign Minister of Liberia, which said, "The government of Liberia has disengaged from the RUF". The foreign ministry later clarified that it meant Sierra Leone, not the RUF. Howbeit, the interesting thing is that most Liberians knew that the Government was referring to the RUF. The third admission was made by President Taylor himself, when he appeared before the Liberian Legislature, a year ago, during his annual message. On that occasion, he said that he had closed

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down the RUF liaison office in Monrovia, as well as, its bank account at the Liberia Bank for Development and Investment (LBDI). He did not tell the Liberian people when the office and the bank account were opened.

In spite of all these admissions, the admission made by Taylor recently in the Washington Post is the clearest admission he has made of his involvement in the Sierra Leonean conflict. In that admission, he did not only admit, but gave justification for his involvement. According to Taylor, he got involved" purely for national security concerns." If this is true, why did he not tell the Liberian people, who all along knew, that he was involved in Sierra Leone. What was his motive for denying the truth, even to Liberians who were in Gbarnga during the Liberian civil war with Foday Sankor and other Sierra Leonean rebels?

The puzzling thing about Taylor's admission is the avenue he chose to make it. Of all newspapers, he chose the Washington Post for this important revelation and did so in a public relation peace intended to persuade the American Government to assist his Government. The timing and the manner in wish this revelation was made say a lot about the wisdom of Taylor and his lieutenants. Now that this admission has been clearly made, Liberians should stop arguing among themselves about whether or not there is evidence against Taylor. What should be done now is for Liberians to unite in an effort to make Taylor account for the pain, suffering and embarrassment he has put Liberia through by his support for the RUF. What Taylor has done is an impeachable offense but the current Legislature of Liberia does not have the courage to impeach Mr. Taylor. I will be pleasantly surprised if they even discuss it for a minute. Therefore, the Liberian people, acting through their various civil society organizations should take their destiny in their hands. This is an important historical moment that the people of Liberia must not let pass without doing anything. The world is watching.

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# Exhibit 1.125 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

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# Exhibit 1.128 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

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# Exhibit 1.129 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

# Exhibit 1.132 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

**EV0158- Kono After the ARC-RUF Retreat**
**Total Time: 39:50**

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**0:00-0:54**
**Fighting**

- *Title: "Kono After the AFRC-RUF Retreat".*

**0:54-17:27**
**Destruction Footage**

Voiceover:

There was a war that started in Sierra Leone in 1991 that had devastating effects on the lives of Sierra Leoneans. The destruction of private and public property. The maiming and amputation and killing of innocent and defenseless civilians have ____ the rebel movement within the country. This situation has happened in a country that was once regarded as a most peaceful.

**1:34-2:31**
**Images of fighters, both junta and ECOMOG. No footage of fighting or atrocities being committed.**

Voiceover:_____ for the poor Sierra Leoneans before the merger of the RUF and the Sierra Leonean army on May 25th, 1997 compounded the suffering of the people both in the cities and the rural areas. Looting, commandeering of vehicles, maiming, raping, and of course killing of civilians became the order of the day by the junta. The atrocities continued under the West African Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, on the 12th of February, 1998 flushed the marauders out of the city, Freetown. The ejection of the junta from the city resulted in an all out rampage in the rural areas and the major cities in the region. As ECOMOG continued to dislodge them, the junta declared an Operation named Operation No Living Thing, destroying whatever their path lies.

**2:31-3:07**
**Destruction images.**

Voiceover: Kono District in eastern Sierra Leone, a diamond-ferous area in the country, was never sad in the state of destruction, killing and maiming. Apart from killing innocent civilians, every infrastructure was destroyed.

**3:07-4:37**
**Sewa bridge images.**

Voiceover: The Sewa bridge is the main bridge that links Kono District to the rest of the country. The bridge was cutoff by the fleeing AFRC-RUF bandits in an effort to prevent the entry of the Nigerian led ECOMOG into the district. The civil defense forces in the area were prompted to come to the aid of the people in the districts, by resurfacing and refilling the gaps so that the West African peacekeepers will be let in and liberate the people. St. Francis Brundo is the CDF coordinator of Kono.

**4:37-5:14**
**Interview with Kamajor.**
Brundo: [in Krio]

**5:14-5:25**
**Market in Kono, lots of people talking.**

**5:25-6:34**
**More burned down buildings.**
Voiceover: ____ is about 45km from Koidu town with over 15,000 displaced persons from Kono and its environs. Gborie Yamba is the senior town chief. ____ by the efforts being made by the Kono district's emergency task force and ____ them to continue their contracts with the governments and international organizations for the people in that district.

**6:34-8:10**
**Interview with Town Chief.**
Yamba: [in Krio]

**8:10-9:12**
**Bumpeh destruction, which isn't as bad as other footage**
~8:55 Voiceover: Bumpeh is another town that has suffered at the hands of the fleeing AFRC-RUF bandits. And it is just _ km from Koidu Town. Aiah Lebbie is the acting paramount chief.

**9:12-10:00**
**Interview with Acting Paramount Chief.**
Lebbie: [in Krio]

**10:04-13:53**
**Interview with a Kamajor.**
Voiceover: A member of the civil defence forces based in the Districts of _____ is ____ the situation in the area of 90% guarantee.
~10:16 CDF: The situation for now, you see, from Sewa all the way to Koidu Town we can give 90% assurance that it's safe. The only thing I wish to emphasize on this Sierra Leone surrendered junta were deployed. After the fight from Sewa onto Koidu Town [Krio]

**13:53-14:48**
**Destruction (houses and vehicles burned)**

**14:48-15:34**
~15:07 Voiceover: Koidu town of which is the District Headquarter of the District had an abnormal share of the destruction. The infrastructure in major sections along the streets were all razed to the ground. Coquina and Small Lebanon areas are presently the abode for all those who are only been in Koidu Town. Major Joe Adeyeye is the ground commander in the area.

**15:34-16:00**
**Marketplace or IDP camp.**

**16:00-16:12**
**More dancing fighters.**

**16:12-17:27**
**Destruction**

**17:27-19:32**
**Interview with ECOMOG Peacekeeper**
Adeyeye: The security, from us here is a little _____.
Interviewer: What do you mean exactly, what type of _____.
Adeyeye: Let's say, ahh, about 500 [indecipherable]
Interviewer: So,um, how do you see the people themselves, inhabitants, how do you see them in terms of cooperation.
Adeyeye: Actually, we've been receiving them, we've fed them, they feel that, yes, ECOMOG has come to rescue them. And save them from the juntas. For example, in terms of medical, feeding, (incomprehensible) it's part of coming out of the bush.
Interviewer: So, what advancement are you make today?
Adeyeye: As you aware that the mop up operation is in progress. It is ___ in this area also. So it is everywhere.
Interviewer: So, umm, you also have the local militia, are they cooperating with you?
Adeyeye: They are very, very cooperative.
Interviewer: In front of the general output out of the main, are there any _____?
Adeyeye: Very, very, they are very high.
Interviewer: So, what message have you for the general population now that, ah, calm is returning to the place? What do you have to tell them?
Adeyeye: If they have any means of telling their brother who are still with the junta if there is any way they can tell them and pass a message to them that they _____ and it will be better.
Interviewer: That's all?
Adeyeye: Um, and again, they should not hesitate to tell us, anywhere they know the rebels are and if there is any one of them in their midst. For example to find them out.
Interviewer: So finally, so what have you to say to the government of the people of Sierra Leone?
Adeyeye: Actually I have to congratulate them, because they. I really sympathize with them, since we came in to rescue them from the hands of the junta. And I implore them to cooperate with the present government. And forget everything about the junta.

**19:32-33:54**
~21:32 Voiceover: Koidu Town has nothing to show as the destruction is massive. Hospitals and other infrastructure providing essential services were all reduced to rubble.
Narrator: [talking, but it is hard for me to cull out. Appears that he is just pointing out the buildings that were burned.]
~31:04 Narrator: Bio Street, Bio Street, everything gone down.

**33:54-37:23**
**Displaced Persons Camp**


~33:48 Voiceover: As a result of the massive destruction in their district, Kono residents were able to put into place and emergency task force to do a needs assessment survey in the district. The team, in their own little way, resulted (?) food and non-food items to the survival of displaced persons at ____, ____ and Koidu. In the ____ displaced camp where over 10,000 displaced persons from Kono and its environs are temporarily encamped life is difficult as there is little or nothing that the people can feed on, not to mention the inadequate shelter.
~34:48-36:35 Sahr Komba, Camp Chairman: [needs translation from Krio]
~36:47 Voiceover: ___ announces their desire to go back home. With this determination, the ECOMOG Task Force Commander in Sierra Leone, Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe, has assured the people of maximum security in the district.

**37:23-39:50**
**Interview with Khobe**
Khobe: The rebels are scattered in groups, very little, mobile. [Tape is messed up here] They have little ammunition. And so the majority of them are carrying cutlasses. Even then, out of that number, very few are actually willing to fight. We have put in place troops to kill them wherever they appear. We are pursuing them. There will be no rebel left in this country at the end of the day. As _____ boundary, we'll get, we'll clear them out as time goes on.
Interviewer: So what have you to tell the Kono people?
Khobe: I sympathize with Kono people. Very seriously. Like others to the lost everything, their houses, their children, their hands and legs, eyes and so on. Some their ears even. I take it that that is the biggest sacrifice they can give so that they can continue to live without any fear of ____, because already they have sacrificed everything that they have. I want to tell them for the college, they have ___, because the rebels were out to ensure they eliminate them. And, I want them to understand that they have God with them above everything and that the destruction of property, by the grace of God, they will have a better future that their children will be proud of. And they will have better housing units, and so on, in that same flat Kono. So I give them a message of hope that tomorrow is definitely going to be better than today.

[redacted]


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
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
Vol. 3 No. 143

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Bayse Headquarters of the TWP that originally there were seven political parties in the marriage of convenience, but that the withdrawal of four parties puts the legality of the Alliance in question.

Justifying his decision to support the presidential candidacy of the standard bearer of the Patriotic Party (NPP) Mr Charles Taylor in the forthcoming election while still maintaining his membership in the TWP, Mr Carter disclosed that since his party is not fielding a presidential candidacy in the elections, he has chosen to exercise his constitutional right by supporting a candidate of his choice. Political analysts have said that this decision somehow contradicts the spirit and intent of the Alliance of which the TWP is one of the architects.

Mr Carter told The National that politically, he is not pleased with the personalities selected to head the Alliance as Presidential and Vice Presidential aspirants. "I don't know who they will marry. Tubgie I have met once some time before, so how can I support a man I don't know?" Mr. Carter asked and said by the dictates of his conscience, "I will support the presidential candidate of the NPP and support all the Legislative aspirants of the TWP."

On fears expressed by some members of the TWP that it is possible the NPP could use him to recruit more members from within the TWP, the TWP Executive member noted that all the members of the TWP are mature people who have the ability to judge for themselves, and added that "it is not my plan to do so."

Meanwhile, an executive committee meeting convened by the TWP to discuss Mr Carter's decision Tuesday resolved to suspend Mr Carter's membership from the party until an investigation can be conducted.

The TWP during the meeting set up a five-man committee chaired by former Education Minister Dr Theophilus Sampson to investigate the intention of Mr Carter whose decision to support Mr Taylor of the NPP is his bid for the presidency while supporting the

**Proposal Invitation**

**UNOPS PETROLEUM PROJECT**

The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), Project LIB/96/P01, invites proposals from suppliers to supply and deliver petroleum and oil products as detailed in the tender specification.

To be considered, any potential supplier must provide a US Dollar price per US gallon for the above mentioned products and provide a written guarantee to ensure a supply capacity of approximately 30,000 gallons of diesel and 4,000 gallons of gasoline per month. The supplier must also arrange storage for the petroleum at UNOPS premises at Duhuly Compound, Virginia, the electrical pumps and 4,000 gallons tank at their expense. The diesel will be released via a separate system, at the supplier's pumps. This bid must be reviewed as deemed necessary.

All bids must be received by Monday, 2nd June 1997, at 12:00 noon, sealed in an envelope marked *Petroleum Bid* and addressed to:

*Project Manager*
UNOPS
Duhuly Compound
Virginia, Monrovia, Liberia

Please note that all premises will be inspected to ensure suitability.

For further information, please contact the Project Manager by telephone 227019/227013.

P48

# Exhibit 1.145 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

Exhibit 1.268 contained in
Annex B
to
Prosecution's Opening
Statement Motion
filed on 16/05/2007

8471

# Exhibit 1.148 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

8492

# Exhibit 1.149 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

1.150 8473



1 of 1 DOCUMENT

Copyright 1998 Globe Newspaper Company
The Boston Globe

December 27, 1998, Sunday ,City Edition

**SECTION:** NATIONAL/FOREIGN; Pg. A18PHOTO

**LENGTH:** 586 words

**HEADLINE:** Rebels nearing African capital;
Two burned alive in Sierra Leone

**BYLINE:** Associated Press

**BODY:**

FREETOWN, Sierra Leone - Fearing an impending rebel assault on Sierra Leone's capital, angry residents surged through the streets yesterday and burned alive at least two men accused of being rebel spies.

The rebel Revolutionary United Front, meanwhile, reported it had killed 60 Nigerian soldiers belonging to a West African intervention force while capturing the town of Makeni, 60 miles east of the capital, Freetown.

Fighting has intensified in recent weeks in the West African nation that is slightly smaller than Indiana. The country, with a population of 4.7 million people, was settled two centuries ago by freed slaves from the United States, Britain and Jamaica.

The rebels, who controlled Freetown after a bloody May 1997 coup, are seeking revenge for their ouster from the capital in February.

Rebel commander Sam Bockarie said yesterday his forces dragged the bodies of the dead Nigerian soldiers through the streets of Makeni with an armored car "as an example to everyone."

But the government denied that Makeni had been captured and said the Nigerian-led forces, known as ECOMOG, continued to battle rebels for the town. Troops remained firmly in control of the country, the Information Ministry said in a statement.

The government bolstered Freetown's defenses yesterday by trucking in Kamajors, traditional militiamen from rural villages. It also flew in soldiers from Nigeria and Ghana to reinforce ECOMOG troops.

At a downtown square in the capital, a mob singled out two young men accused of being rebels in civilian disguise.

The men were severely beaten before some in the crowd thrust gasoline-filled tires around their necks and set them on fire. Their charred remains were carried away by police, who did not attempt to stop the killings.

Several other mob attacks were reported around Freetown but could not be confirmed.

The Kamajor militiamen, members of a secret society of hunters and traditional fighters, wore leather tunics and carried rusty guns and machetes, setting up checkpoints in the city and carrying out random searches of pedestrians and

drivers.

Together with ECOMOG, the militia has been given defense duties by Sierra Leone's government, which dissolved the country's rebellious military earlier this year.

Remnants of that military and their rebel allies who took power for a 10-month period following the May 1997 coup have over the past week launched lightning attacks against loyalist forces throughout the country.

The rebels are widely believed to have killed, maimed and raped thousands of villagers.

Refugees fleeing the fighting have flooded into Freetown and rebels have threatened to attack the capital unless the government releases their imprisoned leader, Foday Sankoh, who is awaiting an appeal on a death sentence handed down for treason.

Bockarie, one of the rebels' top commanders, demanded yesterday that President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah resign or face a rebel assault on Freetown before New Year.

"Failure of Kabbah to resign, and we will start bombarding Freetown and will not stop until victory is won," Bockarie said.

That was a change from a day earlier when Bockarie demanded only talks and Sankoh's release.

By late Friday, a British-led evacuation had airlifted about 100 foreigners, mostly Britons.

The US Embassy was expected to close soon, although only a handful of staff were in the country and most Americans have been advised to stay out of Sierra Leone for security reasons since 1997.

**GRAPHIC:** Evacuees from Freetown, Sierra Leone, boarded a connecting flight Friday afternoon in Dakar, Senegal, en route to London. / AP PHOTO

**LOAD-DATE:** December 30, 1998

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

# Murders, Tortures and Crimes Against Citizens Go Unfettered in Sierra Leone

By Richard Dicker, director of the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch, published in *Earth Times Daily Web Edition*

Kaima, an eleven year old girl, described to Human Rights Watch how she and two of her friends were taken away by the Revolutionary United Front guerillas in Sierra Leone. She and her friends each had both hands hacked off -- as part of a strategy by the rebels to terrorize the local population. Rebel forces in Sierra Leone systematically murdered, mutilated and raped civilians during their efforts to capture Freetown early this year. The rebels carried out large numbers of pre-meditated mutilations of civilians, in particular the amputation of arms, hands, legs and other parts of the body.

The victims of crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone have no international tribunal to look to for justice for the murder, torture and mutilation there. The plight of the juvenile amputees underscores the humanitarian imperative in the early establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court agreed to in Rome last summer. One year after the completion of the treaty creating the ICC, eighty-three states, including all of the United States's closest allies, have committed themselves to supporting the Court.

The groundwork for ratification of the treaty is being laid at regional conferences of states and nongovernmental partners from southern Africa to the Caribbean. Resolutions from the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth Law Ministers and other parliamentarians are infusing the momentum with a sense of inevitability. With sufficient political will, the establishment of the ICC is now a matter of time.

Last week, negotiators resumed work at UN headquarters on the Court's rules of procedure and evidence, along with the elements for proving war crimes. The meeting room, packed as never before with delegates from around the world, generated an almost palpable sense of expectation that the Court was coming to life and its birth was likely to be quite a bit sooner than anyone had expected. It is quite a distance from this time last year when the US insisted on a weakened Court and then threatened to kill the Court when its views were not accepted.

While the ill-conceived threats of active US opposition to the ICC have not chilled enthusiasm among the states supporting the Court, unfortunately, Washington is still seeking to eviscerate the Court

AD INFO



# Sierra Leone rebels declare offensive

## Want to see their leader freed

January 8, 1999
Web posted at: 10:43 a.m. EST (1543 GMT)

FREETOWN, Sierra Leone (CNN) -- A leader of the rebel movement that seized control of key parts of the capital Freetown said Friday he had ordered a general offensive, despite a cease-fire announcement a day earlier by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.

Sam Bockarie, described as deputy leader of the Revolutionary United Front, said he ordered the offensive against the Nigerian-led West African intervention force in the capital, and the Nigerian military base at Freetown's nearby Lungi airport.

"I have given orders to our men to launch a general offensive on Freetown, an offensive on Lungi," Bockarie said. "There is no question of a cease-fire."

Kabbah said on Thursday that the main rebel leader, Foday Sankoh, had agreed to a week-long cease-fire. But Bockarie rejected that statement on Friday, saying he first wanted to talk to Sankoh.

"Let us have access to him, let us talk to him, let's see face to face and see that he is mentally and physically fit. And we'll see what's next to be done," Bockarie said in an interview with British radio.

He also made a new demand, saying the rebels wanted a caretaker government that would be "broad-based and will organize fresh elections."

The rebels have previously said they will only stop fighting once Sankoh has been freed from prison. He was sentenced to death last year on charges of high treason for his involvement in the coup against Kabbah by a military junta in 1997.

Kabbah said Thursday he was willing to free Sankoh, should the rebels adhere to a seven-day cease-fire and mediation talks on the future of

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
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
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the country.

Kabbah and Sankoh reached a short-lived peace accord in 1996 under the mediation of Ivory Coast.

After his ouster by the junta, Kabbah was reinstated last year by ECOMOG, the Nigeria-led intervention force which has been protecting him ever since but which was taken by surprise by the rebel attack on Freetown this week.

Civilians in the capital have huddled in their homes over the past three days. Some have reportedly been used as human shields for the rebels.

Aid workers, contacted by radio on Friday morning, said small groups of civilians ventured into the rubble-strewn city streets to seek food.

There have been no figures on how many people have died or been wounded in the fighting.

The rebels are said to be in control of eastern and central districts of Freetown.

*The Associated Press and Reuters contributed to this report.*

## Message board:

- Post your opinion on turmoil in Sierra leone

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- Sierra Leone president, rebels agree to cease-fire - January 7, 1999
- Rebels launch offensive on Sierra Leone capital - January 6, 1999

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- Sierra Leone Page - African Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania
- Sierra Leone Web
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
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# Exhibit 1.156 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007






Monday, January 18, 1999 Published at 19:46 GMT


# Covering the battle for Freetown




Ecomog soldiers: Regained Freetown after fierce battle

**By West Africa Correspondent Mark Doyle**

I found covering the battle for Freetown extremely difficult. I was there when the worst of the fighting broke out between the rebels and the Nigerian-led Ecomog forces.




The rebels terrorised the population with tactics which included murder, rape and arson. It was fierce house-to-house battles, until the Nigerians succeeded in clearing most of the rebels out of central Freetown.

Not only was it so dangerous that most of the time I could not venture into the city, but worse, my best sources of information there had either fled or gone into hiding.

Almost all foreign residents had been evacuated before the fighting reached the city centre, but more important than the foreigners were my Sierra Leonean journalist colleagues. Over more than a year of visiting Sierra Leone, I have come to trust the best of them, sometimes literally, with my life.

Is it safe to drive ahead

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Ecomog forces kept control of Freetown airport

now, or do we pull back? Is it safe to speak to this armed man at that road block, or is it better not to try?

Most of the time only a local journalist knows and understands the subtle signs which can help answer these questions. But when the rebels reached the centre of town, these journalists, like almost all of the residents of Freetown, had to go into hiding.

Then the phones were cut by the fighting and the rebels hit the power station. Added to the cut in electricity, there was an information blackout as well.

**Airport base**

The only safe place to be in Freetown was the airport. Throughout the battle it was firmly in the hands of the Ecomog troops who, with a mandate from the United Nations and partly paid for by Britain, are defending the elected Sierra Leone government against the rebels.

But the airport was not such a bad place to be. Over the months I have made friends with some of the Nigerian officers and the people who work with them. They allowed me to stay at the airport and report on the operations of their rear base.



Extra Nigerian troops were brought in

I saw Nigerian air force jets scream off on bombing missions against the rebels. I watched a Hercules transport plane disgorge hundreds of fresh Nigerian troops and then saw them ferried into Freetown on a military helicopter.

When the chopper returned to the airport, it was usually full of terrified civilians who had been saved by the Nigerians from the chaos in the city. They were pitifully few compared with the hundreds of thousands of people trapped there.

Slowly, as these evacuees told their stories, with tears and terror still in their eyes, I built up a picture of what was going on.

In the face of protest
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A sacking and a coup
Feelings run high in post-war Kosovo

**Civilians abused**

The horror of it was almost unbelievable. The rebels were using the population as human shields. Gangs of young men with guns, some high on drugs, were forcing innocent people onto the streets and then hiding among them, tried to advance against the Nigerians.

Anyone who did not wave a white handkerchief as a sign of support for the rebels, some of whom were boys as young as eight, risked being shot or having their house burned down.



A Freetown civilian is searched by soldiers

The citizens of Freetown faced a dreadful dilemma. The government controlled radio station told people to stay indoors. If not, they would be considered a rebel and risked being shot by the Nigerians. The rebels, on the other hand, were telling them to stay out on the streets.


At one point a Nigerian fighter-jet attacked a gathering of people in the centre of the city because the pilot, following his orders, was told to hit any group which could be a rebel concentration. I asked the commander of the Nigerian forces about this incident and he replied angrily that he would use the best weapon he had to deal with any potential threat.

**The sounds of war**

After a few days at the Nigerian held airport, I travelled briefly into Freetown on board a military helicopter. The helicopter flew low and fast to avoid possible rebel snipers and landed inside a Nigerian military base at the far western tip of the Freetown peninsula. Even in this relatively safe part of town there was virtually nobody on the streets.

I travelled a few, short miles from one Nigerian base to another and heard the sounds of war. Mortar bombs were exploding in the centre of the city. Nearer to the terrifying shrapnel released by the mortars, people were being killed.

A Nigerian general at the military base assured me that this was the sound of his men bombarding the rebels. But another source



Journalist Myles Tierney: Killed by rebels

inside the city later told me that the rebels had heavy mortars as well.

Some of the rebels, for sure, were poorly trained elements out to loot and kill. But others were hardened combatants who knew how to fight.

A few hours after reaching western Freetown I learnt that an American journalist I had been working with a few days before, Miles Tierney, had been killed in the centre of town by the rebels.

Another colleague, a Canadian, was severely wounded in the incident with a bullet in the head. The death of the journalist, a human tragedy in itself, illustrated just how dangerous Freetown was for everybody there. His name will be added to the long list of Sierra Leoneans, Nigerians and others whose bodies are still being collected and counted.

The journalists had been travelling in a convoy organised by the Sierra Leonean Minister of Information and they had 20 armed Nigerian soldiers to protect them. The Minister said he thought that the area they were travelling in was safe.

It was not.

I still do not know what has become of most of my Sierra Leonean colleagues in Freetown.

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
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# Exhibit 1.159 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

Wednesday, 27 January, 1999, 12:09 GMT

# Freetown bears the scars



Civilians said the rebels had attacked them with machetes

**BBC West Africa Correspondent Mark Doyle was among the first foreign journalists to tour the Sierra Leonean capital after the rebels were driven out in 1999:**

Freetown is a devastated city. While bullet and bomb damage speak of a city caught in the crossfire during heavy fighting, much of the destruction is the result of a systematic scorched earth policy used by the rebels when they took the capital.

The rebels, who have now been driven out of most of the city, say they are fighting against government corruption. Most Sierra Leoneans believe, however, that they simply want to grab power. For this reason, the Nigerian-led west African troops who now control the capital are seen as a liberation force by most residents.

As the rebels retreated from the city, they burnt buildings and attacked civilians.

## 'Killed little children'

"They started beating people, burning houses, seizing things, stealing," one resident recalled.

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The BBC's Mark Doyle "The situation is still tense and dangerous"

**See also:**

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Analysis: Sierra Leone's brutal rebellion

08 Jul 99 | Sierra Leone
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27 Jan 99 | Africa
Amnesty blasts Sierra Leone abuses

12 Jan 99 | Africa
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"There are some things they do which I cannot explain. They went to houses, killed little children in the houses."




Residents are starting to rebuild their homes

Men and women with bandaged stumps of limbs told how the rebels had attacked them with machetes, cutting off hands and feet in order to discourage them and others from supporting the government.

Tens of thousands of people made homeless by the war have taken refuge in a football stadium. Most foreign aid workers have fled the conflict, but local Sierra Leonean charities are doing a good job distributing what food aid they have available.

**UK support for government**

A British naval frigate, HMS Norfolk, is off the coast, helping to co-ordinate aid plans, and showing Britain's support for the democratically elected government.



Penfold: UK must support Sierra Leonean democracy

Shuffling between the ship and shore is United Kingdom High Commissioner Peter Penfold, an important figure here. The Sierra Leone Government sees him as one of their key backers. In the past, he caused controversy back in London because of his actions. But he made no secret of Britain's current role:

"It's always been a close link between Britain and Sierra Leone. When the Sierra Leoneans decided to embrace democracy, we were very much involved then.

"We want to be the lead with the international community in supporting this restoration of democracy," Mr Penfold concluded.

## Tense situation



Nigerian-led troops control most of the city

The Nigerian troops still have a heavy presence on the streets of Freetown, and the situation remains tense with the rebel resistance continuing in the eastern end of the city.

Volunteers are queuing up to join the Sierra Leone army, which has been decimated by soldiers defecting to the rebel side. However, unless there is a lasting political solution to the chronic instability, any new soldiers could end up simply fighting a new war.

Even when Freetown is finally cleared of all pockets of rebel resistance, the war could continue in the countryside.

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BBC NEWS

# Bockarie died a wanted man

By Lucy Jones
BBC News Online

**Sierra Leone warlord Sam Bockarie will be remembered for allegedly advocating a particularly horrific tactic of war: the deliberate and widespread practice of hacking off the limbs, lips and ears of his victims.**

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) - the rebel group of which Mr Bockarie was a general - also received world attention for its systematic rape of women and abduction of thousands of children who were forced to fight.

Mr Bockarie, who died aged 40, was wanted by the United Nations-backed war crimes tribunal for his alleged part in the atrocities

In his time, he was also a disco dancing champion, diamond miner, hairdresser, electrician and waiter.

Known as "Mosquito" for his ability to attack while people were off their guard - he was one of the most feared guerrilla fighters to emerge from Sierra Leone's decade-long civil war which ended in 2002.

He was also accused of being behind bloodshed, looting and rape in rebel-held western Ivory Coast where his supporters have been held responsible for the killing in April of the rebel leader Felix Doh.

He once said in an interview: "I cannot tell how many people I have killed. When I am firing during an attack, nobody can survive my bullets.

"I never wanted myself to be overlooked by my fellow men."

He has spoken of a childhood of acute poverty in the jungles of eastern Sierra Leone.

His father could not afford schoolbooks - Mr Bockarie was illiterate - and he often went to bed hungry.

**Liberia connection**

Mr Bockarie started out in Liberia, where he trained with a guerrilla force that the now President Charles Taylor had formed in 1989 to overthrow the United States-backed government of Samuel Doe.

Mr Taylor later helped to form the RUF which Mr Bockarie joined just before it invaded Sierra Leone in 1991.

Mr Bockarie rose to the rank of deputy commander under the RUF's leader, Foday Sankoh - who

is currently being tried by the war crimes tribunal in Sierra Leone.

When Mr Sankoh temporarily left the scene in the late 1990s, his underlings gave the ragtag RUF rebels a structure and - reportedly with support from Mr Taylor, who became Liberia's president that year - took the rich diamond mines of Sierra Leone.

With money from diamonds, the RUF was able to buy weapons and communications equipment.

When he fell out with Mr Sankoh allegedly over diamonds in 1999, Mr Bockarie and several hundred loyalists fled to Liberia where President Taylor provided him with villas.

But international pressure mounted forcing Mr Taylor to ask Mr Bockarie to leave in 2001.

The United Nations-backed war crimes tribunal in Sierra Leone has accused the Liberian president of sheltering the warlord and another fugitive, Johnny Paul Koroma.

**Body mystery**

President Taylor, who is under UN sanctions for allegedly backing the RUF, appears to have bowed to the pressure.

Sanctions on his government have just been extended for 12 months and will be widened to include the timber trade.

Liberian authorities say Mr Bockarie was killed by Liberian forces as he tried to enter the country from Ivory Coast with his bodyguards.

Many people would have preferred to see him captured alive and tried for his alleged crimes.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/3006851.stm

Published: 2003/05/08 22:23:18 GMT

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Wednesday, 10 May, 2000, 16:17 GMT 17:17 UK

# Brutal child army grows up



RUF fighters fire into an angry crowd outside Sankoh's house

The thousands of surgical syringes found amid the squalor at the abandoned home of Sierra Leonean rebel leader Foday Sankoh are an eloquent testimony of the conduct of his followers.

The child army, which has beaten back well-equipped regular troops and terrorised the population since the mid-1990s, has grown up and thrived.

Drug abuse has been a key factor in the shocking fanaticism of Mr Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

Former child soldiers say they were forcibly injected with cocaine before being sent into battle.

They have gone on to kill, abduct, rape and maim thousands of their fellow countrymen, famously imposing their reign of terror by hacking off the limbs of victims, including children and infants, with machetes.

## Youth power

The RUF has no identifiable ideology, but can be defined by opposition to the corrupt political elite in Freetown which has plundered the

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nation's mineral wealth.



Many soldiers were enlisted through drugs and brutality

Many foot soldiers were conscripted through kidnapping or the temptation of winning power and status by wielding a gun.

Its roots go back to 1991, when Mr Sankoh, a former army corporal, formed an alliance with a Liberian militia, the National Patriotic Front for Liberia, led by Charles Taylor, who went on to become President of Liberia.

Far from being a puppet offshoot of the Liberian factions, the RUF took on a life of its own and fought successive Sierra Leonean governments.

In May 1997, the RUF joined forces with a group of junior army soldiers, to overthrow the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.



Foday Sankoh, known as Papa by his followers

Their youthful brutality and swaggering self-confidence, with matted locks and tattered clothes, inspired terror in the adult population.

**Discipline**

Appearances belie their tight discipline and fierce loyalty to commanders.

They travel light, care little for their personal safety, and are at home in the thick forest that comes to the very edge of the city.

The junta which the RUF supported was ousted by the West African intervention

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force, Ecomog, in February 1998, but the rebel soldiers returned a year later to inflict more horrific punishment on the inhabitants of the capital Freetown.


Rebels have terrorised the civilian population

In the subsequent peace process, which gave the RUF a share in government, there were allegations that rebels were continuing their familiar tactics of deliberate mutilation, rape, sexual slavery and murder.

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# BBC News Online: World: Africa

**Wednesday, 10 May, 2000, 16:05 GMT 17:05 UK**

## Sierra Leone: The balance of forces



**As the fighting continues in Sierra Leone, BBC News Online looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the different sides in the conflict - the rebels, the government troops with their allies, and - caught in between - the UN forces:**

### RUF rebels

The rebels have shown they can take on detachments of United Nations peacekeepers and win.

Renowned for wanton barbarity, and staffed partly by child soldiers, the rebels are presenting a strong challenge to the poorly-trained national army and the lightly-armed UN peacekeeping force.

Thanks to its wealth from the sale of diamonds, the RUF is believed to be well supplied with a variety of weapons.



In March 1999 Human Rights Watch alleged that 68 tonnes of weapons flown from Ukraine to Burkina Faso were diverted to the RUF.

The shipment apparently included Kalashnikov assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank weapons, and may have been only one of five such deliveries in 1998 and 1999.

It has been estimated that the RUF has 5,000 to 10,000 combat troops, though experts say the figure would be higher if arms-carrying youngsters were included in the count.

As part of its efforts to disarm them the UN had taken 4,000 weapons from the rebels by the end of April.

## UN forces

The UN has complained that its peacekeeping operations are conducted on a shoestring, leading to problems with equipment failure, while others say that the peacekeepers simply haven't got the powerful weapons they need.

Defence analysts say a disciplined, well-armed force - such as the Western units sent to Bosnia and Kosovo - would have little difficulty in deterring Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

The BBC's defence correspondent, Jonathan Marcus, says that one of the problems of the existing UN force is that its soldiers - from Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, India, Guinea, Jordan and Zambia - have little training for peacekeeping operations, and have no previous experience of working together.

The mandate of the UN force is to "stabilise" the situation, so it has the powers to shoot back and use force, but in a battle at Masiaka, 220 Nigerian and Guinean soldiers were outgunned.

Armed with only light weapons, they were forced to withdraw when their ammunition ran out.

The UN force, meanwhile, currently numbers 8,700, well below its full strength of 11,000. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called for urgent reinforcements.

## Pro-government forces

Aside from the UN, the forces facing the RUF are the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) - which is currently allied with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) headed by former military ruler Johnny Paul Koroma - and civil defence forces including the Kamajors, militiamen originally from a tribe of

hunters.



The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates the strength of the national armed forces at 3,000 poorly-armed men.

The British government has been training them, but a BBC regional analyst, Tom Porteous, says the army's tendency to disintegrate in times of trouble means that it is of little use.

Soldiers have in the past defected both to the RUF and to Koroma's AFRC. Both of these groups took part in a devastating invasion of Freetown in January 1999, and both joined the government after July's peace deal. The AFRC remains loyal.

The Kamajors, led by Deputy Defence Minister Sam Hinga Norman, fought effectively against the Koroma junta at the beginning of 1998, in an attack co-ordinated with the Nigerian-led West African intervention force, Ecomog.

As Ecomog stormed Freetown, the Kamajors fought their way up through the country from their stronghold in the south-east.

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*The recent history of Sierra Leone shows that mercenaries ... may be the best answer*
**Author, William Shawcross**

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Because of the successful experience of the Nigerian-led Ecomog forces the US is discussing the possibility of financing the return of Nigerian battalions to the country to take on the RUF again.

**Mercenary option**

Other options could include hiring private military firms.

Tim Spicer, the director of Sandline - a British company at the centre of a scandal supplying arms to ousted president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah two years ago - told London's Guardian newspaper that privately run forces could put the RUF "right back in its box".

The author and journalist, William Shawcross, argued in the same newspaper that developed countries should hire merceneries to enforce peace in Sierra Leone, if they were reluctant to send their own soldiers.

He said a group called Executive Ooutcomes had succeeded in protecting civilians in some areas from rebel atrocities until President Kabbah was persuaded to make peace with the rebels, and, in the process, to dispense with the company's services.

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
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
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# Diamonds: A rebel's best friend




The civil war in Sierra Leone has been financed by diamonds, and has always largely been a conflict about who controls the fabulous prize of the country's diamond mines.

The latest wave of instability has come about as United Nations peacekeepers have tried to wrest control of the mines from rebels who have held on to them in contravention of a regional peace deal brokered a year ago.



Sierra Leone: Widespread proverty unaffected by diamonds

It is easy to say the gems have been a curse on the country, especially as hardly any of the proceeds of mining have reached ordinary people, who remain among the poorest anywhere in the world.

Millions of dollars worth of high-quality diamonds are mined in Sierra Leone's eastern and northern badlands every month, much of the haul being

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smuggled out of the country.

Deposits are to be found close to ground level so men with guns employ labourers simply to dig holes and see what turns up.

**Broken commitment**

The diamond fields are in territory controlled by the feared rebel army of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh.

The RUF youths have done nothing to relinquish their control of the mines to UN forces as required under the 1999 peace accord signed in the Togolese capital Lome.



Rebels have not relinquished control of mines

Part of the deal was that Mr Sankoh became chairman of the Strategic Resources commission, giving him responsibility for the management of the diamond trade.

Anyone wishing to mine diamonds had to go through his Commission to obtain a licence - with any evaders being treated with "the full consequences of the law", he said.

**Smugglers' spoils**

Over the last two years, the value of official annual diamond exports by Sierra Leone has halved to $30m.

In the same period, diamond exports by neighbouring Liberia - a country which possesses relatively few diamond fields - has risen dramatically to $300m.

These fluctuations give the lie to denials by the Liberian Government of



Displaced by the struggle for gems

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Charles Taylor, a
former rebel leader
with historical links with Mr Sankoh's RUF,
that it has any interest or involvement in
prolonging the war in Sierra Leone.

Indeed, the recently-visiting Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, observed that this year's instability in Sierra Leone had been sparked in part by UN forces trying to wrestle control of the diamond-producing areas from the rebels.

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Tuesday, 16 May, 2000, 03:30 GMT 04:30 UK

# Liberia fishes in troubled waters



Charles Taylor: Accused of prolonging neighbour's war

**By News Online's Martin Asser**

Unlike the former colonial rulers, the people enriching themselves through Sierra Leonean diamonds today have little incentive to guarantee stability.

One of those - if recent investigations into diamond smuggling are to be believed - is President Charles "Chuckie" Taylor of neighbouring Liberia.

Sierra Leone mines some of the world's best diamonds in terms of size and quality, and the predatory forces encroaching on the diamond trade since 1991 have thrived on war and lawlessness to cover their activities.

Western intelligence reports say Liberia is the main conduit for smuggled diamonds out of Sierra Leone, while Mr Taylor, a long-time ally of Sierra Leone's rebel leader Foday Sankoh, has supplied many of the weapons and drugs that have fuelled the civil war.



Taylor, like Sankoh, put boys at the sharp end of the rebellion

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Mr Taylor still maintains close links with field commanders of the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which now controls most of the diamond producing areas in north and east Sierra Leone.

**Major crime centre**

Mr Taylor has always denied playing a destabilising role in Sierra Leone, but his protestations are hard to square with the available data.


A girl's best friend...

Liberia's annual capacity for diamond mining is 100,000-150,000 carats, but imports of diamonds from Liberia to Belgium, where more than half the world's rough stones are traded, rose to 6 million carats in the late 1990s as the war in Sierra Leone was raging.

A recent study by Partnership Africa Canada says Liberia has become "a major centre for massive diamond-related criminal activity, with connections to guns, drugs and money laundering throughout Africa and considerably further afield".


...or not: A victim of Sierra Leone's RUF

The Ottawa-based group says Liberia has supplied weapons to rebels in a number of diamond producing countries "fuelling war and providing a safe haven for organised crime of all sorts".

**Warlord statesman**

Charles Taylor launched a military rebellion against the government of Samuel Doe in late 1989 which led to six years of bitter civil war.

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His rise was mirrored by that of the RUF, the rebel organisation set up by Foday Sankoh in 1991, with the help of Mr Taylor.

Both rebel armies used brutal tactics to terrorise the civilian populations and put children in the front line.

After killing some 200,000 Liberians and displacing hundreds of thousands more, the war ground to a halt and Mr Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) scored an overwhelming election victory in July 1997.

Since his political victory he has sought portray himself in the role of as measured statesman rather than warlord.

His recent "good offices" between the rebels and the United Nations in Sierra Leone are being seen as an attempt to enhance that image.

Certainly, Liberia has benefited in terms of stability since Mr Taylor was elected, but as the recent closure of two independent radio stations attests - they had broadcast items critical of the government - he still holds the country in a iron grip.

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# Exhibit 1.171 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

8504

# Exhibit 1.182 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

1.183

8505

Source: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
Date: 19 Jan 2000

# Sierra Leone rebels free 227 child soldiers: report

**ROME, Jan 19 (AFP) -** Rebels in Sierra Leone have released 227 child soldiers held hostage and forced into rebel ranks, the missionary news agency Misna reported Tuesday.

It quoted the Bishop of Makeni, Giorgio Biguzzi, as saying the children had been freed in Kabala, 100 kilometres (65 miles) northeast of Makeni in the north of Sierra Leone.

Two hundred and sixty other children had been released last Thursday in the Makeni region, the agency reported.

The prelate said the children, "victims of breath-taking violence," had been taken to a religious centre at Lunsar.

The release is a point in the July 7 peace accord between the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) which formally brought to an end one of the most brutal civil wars in Africa.

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Source: Reuters Foundation
Date: 27 Apr 1998

# Sierra Leone rebels said to mutilate 68 civilians

**FREETOWN, April 27 (Reuters) -** Rebels holding out in eastern Sierra Leone have mutilated 68 civilians and the country's main hospital was battling on Monday to save their lives, eyewitnesses and medical workers said.

They said the men and women were rescued by Nigerian-led West African troops who recaptured four mining villages from rebels in Kono district last week.

They were brought to the Connaught Hospital in the capital Freetown on Sunday, most with a limb or two amputated or fresh gunshot or machete wounds.

A spokesman for the regional ECOMOG force said the peacekeepers had seized the villages of Jaiama Sewafe, Bumpeh, Tumbudu and Motema. All four are around the district headquarters of Koidu taken earlier by the peacekeepers.

``Rebels entered my house and killed my wife and son before chopping off my hand," said Tumbudu resident Sumana Kapio from his hospital bed.

All those able to tell of their ordeal spoke of close relatives killed or mutilated in front of them.

ECOMOG, enforcing a regional mandate, entered Freetown in February and defeated the military junta that toppled President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in a coup on May 25.

The peacekeepers reinstated Kabbah from exile in Guinea in March and went on to take control of most of the country from junta troops and rebels.

But rebels have been putting up a stiff resistance in the diamond-rich region close to Liberia and Guinea. Aid workers say thousands of refugees, many mutilated, had been streaming into the two countries with tales of guerrilla atrocities.

In a broadcast on Monday marking Sierra Leone's 37 years of independence from Britain, Kabbah deplored the atrocities. He called on Sierra Leoneans to join in efforts to reconcile the country, torn by civil strife since 1991.

``I am distressed by atrocities being committed in the east by junta forces and destruction of bridges in these areas to slow down the rapid movement of ECOMOG troops," Kabbah said.

He called on Sierra Leoneans to reflect on their 37 years of independence, ``to think of our mistakes in the past and...what we can do to bring peace, reconciliation and national cohesion back to Sierra Leone."

``Sierra Leone is classified as the least developed country in the world, but at the time of independence Sierra Leone was stronger economically than Singapore and Malaysia," Kabbah said.

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Source: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
Date: 14 May 2001

# Sierra Leone rebels release 80 child soldiers

**FREETOWN, May 14 (AFP)** - Rebels of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) have released 80 children fighting in its ranks and handed them over to the Italian Catholic organisation Caritas, witnesses said Monday.

They said the children, some with gunshot wounds, looked exhausted and undernourished.

The children were released in the town of Lunsar, 80 kilometres (50 miles) northeast of Freetown, and were being cared for in a special facility, they said.

The RUF had last week promised to release 400 child soldiers. The rebels' 10-year campaign against successive governments in Freetown has been marked by widespread atrocities, including mass murder, rape, looting and chopping off the limbs of civilians.

rmj-ach/gd AFP

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**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES**

**SIXTH MEETING OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE ON SIERRA LEONE**

**CONAKRY, 22-23 OCTOBER 1997**

# COMMUNIQUE

1. The ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone held a meeting in Conakry on 22-23 October, 1997.

2. In continuation of the negotiations initiated in Abidjan on 17 and 18 July, 1997 and 29 and 30 July, 1997, the Committee held discussions with an enlarged delegation of Major Johnny Paul Koroma.

3. The meeting reviewed the situation in Sierra Leone since the break-down of negotiations between the Committee of Five and the representatives of the junta since 30 July 1997. It recalled the ECOWAS decisions concerning the monitoring of the ceasefire, the imposition of sanctions and the embargo, as well as the restoration of peace to Sierra Leone by ECOMOG. It also recalled Resolution 1132 of the United Nations Security Council dated 8 October 1997 placing an embargo on Sierra Leone.

4. The Committee of Five and the junta's delegation agreed to accelerate efforts towards the peaceful resolution of the Sierra Leonean crisis.

5. To this end, the Committee of Five and the representatives of Major Johnny Paul Koroma adopted an ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone and a time-table for its implementation over a six-month period with effect from 23 October, 1997.

6. It is recognised that Corporal Foday Sankoh as a leader of RUF could continue to play an active role and participate in the peace process. In the spirit of the Abidjan Accord and in the context of this Agreement Corporal Foday Sankoh is expected to return to his country to make his contribution to the peace process.

7. The ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone provides for:

- the reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Tejan Kabbah within a period of six months
- the immediate cessation of hostilities
- cooperation of the junta with ECOMOG in order to peacefully enforce the sanctions
- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants
- the provision of humanitarian assistance
- return of refugees and displaced persons
- immunities and guarantees to the leaders of the May 25, 1997 coup d'etat
- modalities for broadening the power base in Sierra Leone.

8. The Committee of Five and the representatives of Major Johnny Paul Koroma agreed to continue negotiations towards effective and prompt implementation of the peace plan.

9. The meeting renewed its appeal to the international community to provide appropriate humanitarian assistance to the refugees and displaced persons and to facilitate their return.

10. The meeting reiterated its appeal to the international community to provide adequate assistance to the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone which have recorded an increased influx of refugees on their territory.

11. The meeting expressed its appreciation to the UN and the OAU for their cooperation with ECOWAS and appealed to them for material, logistic and financial support to ECOMOG to enable it (to) carry out the mandate given by the Authority of Heads of State and Government and the United Nations Security Council.

12. The Committee expressed its deep gratitude to His Excellency, General Lansana Conte, President of the Republic of Guinea, Head of State, and to the Government and People of Guinea for the excellent facilities put at their disposal and for the hospitality accorded to all the delegations.

DONE AT CONAKRY THIS 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER, 1997

**1 February:** Mortar fire was heard from Aberdeen on Monday, as ECOMOG officials acknowledged that they had failed to dislodge rebel forces on the outskirts of the city, the Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported. On Sunday, Guinean ECOMOG troops which had been in control of Waterloo reportedly pulled back, abandoning large supplies of arms and ammunition, the AFP said. ECOMOG sources said Monday they needed military equipment "better adapted for the terrain," such as combat helicopters, in order to "finish off the war." An AFP correspondent witnessed ECOMOG soldiers execute a number of men believed to be rebels or collaborators in previously "liberated" areas of Freetown. Residents said ECOMOG was trying to slow down the mass return of residents to their homes, fearing that rebels might "mix into the crowd." The Italian Missionary Service News Agency (MISNA) said Monday that there were still units of the RUF spread throughout the capital, adding that the possibility of additional attacks could not be ruled out. A clinic in western Freetown has treated an estimated 8,000 victims of gunshot wounds since the fighting began in the capital on January 6. Most of the victims were said to be residents of Kissy.

The cost of food and essential commodities has soared in Freetown as stocks dwindle, the Agence-France Presse (AFP) reported on Monday. The price of a cup of rice, which normally sells for U.S. 12¢, now costs more than $2.00. A bag of rice sells for $38 to $40. A diplomatic source, quoting aid sources on Monday, maintained that the prices of rice and bulgur wheat were "down to their pre-invasion level," while Kevin Kennedy of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said the price of rice, which had soared 300 percent at the start of the fighting, had fallen to "just above the pre-fighting cost." According to the AFP, a bundle of firewood now costs $5.00, while a bag of charcoal, previously 50¢, has shot up to $10.00. A government official said authorities would "definitely not tolerate any move to bring further hardship on the people by any arbitrary increase consumer goods," adding: "The people have suffered too much through rebel atrocities." Two banks in Freetown, including the Union Trust Bank, have reopened, but Barclays and Standard Chartered Banks, whose premises suffered extensive damage during the fighting, remain closed.

Director of Health Services Sheku Kamara has welcomed the arrival of drugs donated by the British government, WHO, UNICEF, and other aid organisations. The shipments have "helped us cope with what would otherwise have been a calamity," Kamara said.

Three French aid workers attached to the French medical charity Medicins du Monde (Doctors of the World) said they would leave Sierra Leone after being prevented from providing medical assistance. The workers said they had written a letter to the Minister of Health complaining about the way they had been treated. They said they had been told they could not continue working at Connaught Hospital for "administrative reasons," but said given the desperate need for doctors they did not believe this was the real reason they had been excluded. The BBC noted allegations that access to care and medicine in Freetown is currently "the subject of a thriving black market."

A rebel leader accused of mutilating civilians in Freetown, "Bush-Lieutenant" Tafaikoh was captured Thursday by ECOMOG, an ECOMOG source said on Monday. Tafaikoh was reportedly captured in Wellington in a joint ECOMOG-Kamajor operation. "He was responsible for amputating the arms and limbs of civilians as well as killing people after their houses had been set on fire," the ECOMOG source said.

The British government is considering whether to send additional aid to Sierra Leone and to the ECOMOG force, a British Foreign Office spokesman

said on Monday. The British government is awaiting the results of an assessment mission in Sierra Leone which is being conducted by officials of London's International Development Department and the British High Commission. "We are looking at possible areas where we can help, both for ECOMOG and more widely in Sierra Leone," the spokesman said. "We have people there at the moment assessing and as soon as they tell us what's needed we will make a decision on any further support." He said the support could take the form of "immediate humanitarian aid," as Sierra Leone was not "in a position to implement its own solutions."

Nigerian Foreign Minister Ignatius Olisemeka said over the weekend that Nigeria is readying measures to "contain" the Liberian government, which has been accused of providing assistance to AFRC/RUF rebels fighting in Sierra Leone. Liberia has continually denied the charges. "We are fashioning a policy to contain (Liberian President Charles Taylor)," Olisemeka said at a reception honouring former Nigerian diplomats. "We are fashioning a policy to contain the countries from where they get arms to kill innocent peace-keeping troops in Sierra Leone." He called it unthinkable that Liberia would be sabotaging peace efforts in Sierra Leone, considering the resources and lives expended by ECOWAS nations in bringing peace to Liberia. "No one had imagined that Liberia will turn round to bite the fingers that fed her," Olisemeka added.

The Sierra Leone Red Cross said Monday that two of its workers had been killed since fighting began in Freetown on January 6. The Red Cross added that its president, Muctarr Jalloh, and one of its agronomists had been admitted to hospital with machete wounds.

The Nigerian newspaper P.M. News reported Monday that the Nigerian army had buried 16 more Nigerian soldiers killed in Sierra Leone. The bodies arrived in two trucks at the Ojo Military Barracks in Lagos before being buried with full military honours, the newspaper said.

Sister Hindu, one of three nuns of the Missionaries of Charity who were freed by rebels on Friday, has undergone surgery in a Conakry hospital for a gunshot wound in the abdomen which she suffered while in captivity. "The doctors have not yet released a prognosis," said Bishop of Makeni George Biguzzi. Two other nuns were killed in crossfire during clashes between the rebels and ECOMOG troops, while a third was murdered while in captivity.

A United Nations assessment team has arrived in Freetown from Guinea to evaluate the security situation prior to the expected return of U.N. staff. The team will reportedly spend four days in the capital.

An official with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said approximately 3,000 civilians had died since the rebel offensive in Freetown, and there existed an acute need for medicine, health care, and sanitation. "It is estimated that approximately 3,000 civilians have lost their lives, largely as a result of a deliberate campaign by rebel forces to terrorize the population, through forced amputations, shootings, house burnings and rapes," said Kevin Kennedy, who visited Sierra Leone between January 19 and 28. He said aid workers had been unable to enter eastern Freetown, but flights over the area indicated that 80% of the buildings may have been damaged or destroyed in the fighting, creating an urgent need for shelter. Kennedy said the United Nations was shipping plastic sheeting for 10,000 families. He described the situation in hospitals and clinics in western Freetown as "fairly desperate," saying medical teams in hospitals and 23 clinics opened in the past ten days were unable to handle all the injuries and amputations. After Connaught Hospital reopened it had

received 300 cases requiring surgery in five days, mostly people wounded in the fighting or victims of rebel amputations, he said. U.N. World Food Programme warehouses had been looted, losing some 3,300 tons of food, Kennedy added.

**25 February:** A Nigerian cargo ship, the Bulk Challenge, has left Freetown carrying 1,048 Nigerian civilians whose property was looted or destroyed during last month's fighting in Freetown, port officials said on Thursday. Many of the evacuees had been long-term residents of Sierra Leone. "This exercise is solely aimed at ameliorating the suffering of our nationals displaced by the war and it does not in any way mean a total evacuation of the over 35,000 Nigerians resident in Sierra Leone," the Nigerian High Commission said in a statement. Nigerian diplomats said, however, that more evacuations by sea might be necessary.

Some 2,000 children between the ages of 5 and 14 have been missing since AFRC/RUF rebels attacked Freetown on January 6, a Ministry of Social Welfare official said on Thursday. "We believe that many of the children have been abducted by the rebels when they were chased out by ECOMOG and have been taken to the bush," he said. "Some are being used as cooks, carriers of looted goods, while others have been illegally married to rebel commandos." The Agence France-Presse (AFP) quoted escapees from rebel camps who said boys were receiving weapons training or were sent on spying missions. The Social Welfare official disclosed that 980 former child soldiers who had received rehabilitation between 1992 and 1997 rejoined the rebels after the project folded in November 1997 for lack of funds. "With assistance not forthcoming, the children joined their colleagues in the jungle after the ousting of the junta in February last year," he said. His account was disputed by former AFRC Secretary of State for Information Mohamed Bangura, who was subsequently quoted by the National Neutral Journalists Association of Sierra Leone as saying that the late Lieutenant-Colonel Kula Samba had continued the demobilisation project even after aid agencies had been prevented from assisting her efforts. Bangura alleged that Samba's records had been destroyed in February 1998 by supporters of the civilian government.

The situation at Kambia remains "extremely chaotic," the Italian-based Missionary Services News Agency (MISNA) reported on Thursday. While ECOMOG troops are positioned near the city, the area surrounding Kambia is subject to frequent rebel incursions, MISNA said, adding that in the past few days "many men of both sides have lost their lives in the heavy fighting." The news agency confirmed that both Lunsar and Makeni remained in rebel hands where, it said, young men were being recruited to join the rebel forces.

RUF legal representative Omrie Golley told the Agence France-Presse (AFP) Wednesday that RUF representatives and U.N. Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo had together drafted a document "in which we express our desire for the search for a peaceful solution" to the Sierra Leone conflict. He added that a copy of the document had been sent to President Kabbah. "We see that the United Nations is exercising its moral authority to reach a negotiated solution, and we are glad of it," said Golley. He said he had spoken directly to President Kabbah two weeks ago "for the first time in two years" in a conversation arranged by the U.S. State Department while he was in Washington, D.C. "It wasn't talks strictly speaking, but a simple discussion during which I repeated our demand for Sankoh's release. Since then we have had no contact," he said.

Freetown's Inter-Religious Council appealed Wednesday for the rebels to free three Christian priests they are holding: Italian Xaverian missionary priest Father Vittorio Mosele, Irish Brother Noel Bradshaw of the "Brothers of Christian Instruction," and Sierra Leonean priest Dominic Kargbo. "If the rebels should consent, it would indicate a political opening and a positive step towards, dialogue," Makeni Bishop George Biguzzi told the Missionary

Services News Agency (MISNA).

**13 April:** ECOMOG has begun a "final offensive" against junta loyalists in Kono and Kailahun Districts, ECOMOG task force commander Colonel Maxwell Khobe announced on SLBS (state radio) late Sunday. "Our troops commenced the final push today," Khobe said. Aid workers said Monday that the ECOMOG force was using tanks and warplanes in its drive against junta positions. Civilians reaching Bo and Kenema reported fierce fighting near Koidu and the town of Kailahun. Khobe said his troops were converging from Kabala, Sewafe, Bo, Kenema, and Daru, while Guinean ECOMOG troops were advancing from their border. "At the moment, the central axis is making good movement," he said. "The junta troops are divided into pockets and are fighting in different directions." Yengema, on the outskirts of Koidu, had already been captured by ECOMOG troops, he added. On Friday, Khobe told reporters that ECOMOG would "liberate" Kono and Kailahun Districts by Wednesday. ECOMOG Force Commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said the rebels have made use of Sierra Leone's thick forests to evade capture and to launch ambushes against ECOMOG troops, but he noted that the attacks were infrequent and did not appear to be well-organised. He said it was not clear how long it would take to complete the offensive. Junta loyalists and RUF fighters have vowed to make their final stand at Koidu, and witnesses say they have fortified the city and massed thousands of fighters in preparation for the ECOMOG assault. Civilians fleeing Kono have told of widespread killing of civilians and destruction of property by junta forces at Koidu and in numerous villages throughout the district.

RUF leader Sam "Maskita" Bockarie has disputed reports that ECOMOG is closing in on Kono District. "I learned [indistinct] they are trying to do so, that they are forcing their way to take Kono, but we haven't given any chance and I am telling you that I will not allow them to take Kono. We will not allow them. We will fight till as much as they want us to fight. We will not give up. It is true they have launched an all-out offensive, but they will not succeed," Bockarie told the BBC by satellite telephone. He said that the RUF was prepared to wage guerilla warfare against ECOMOG. "As a guerilla, we don't want to fight in the big towns. We trick them to get into the jungle where we can deal with them, before ever marching to the towns." Bockarie rejected a suggestion that the RUF lay down its weapons. "We are fighting a just cause. We are fighting because ECOMOG has moved into our country," he said.

Deputy Minister of Defence and Civil Defence Leader Sam Hinga Norman denied rumours Monday that he planned to overthrow the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah with the aid of Kamajor militiamen. "No presidents have performed better for the ousting of the illegal AFRC regime and the return of civilian rule that President Kabbah," Norman told a crowd at Bo Town Hall. He promised he would remain loyal to the head of state "till the end of the world." Norman disclosed plans for the formation of a regional task force for the defence of the eastern, southern, and northern provinces in times of aggression.

**27 April:** Medical workers at Connaught Hospital in Freetown are working around the clock to save the lives of 68 persons mutilated or otherwise injured by AFRC/RUF rebels in Kono District over the weekend. The attacks left 23 people, including children, with arms or feet crudely amputated, while others suffered from bayonet, machete, or gunshot wounds. The victims were among some 3,000 persons rescued by ECOMOG troops when they captured the towns of Jaiama Sewafe, Bumpeh, Tombodu, and Motema. All of those able to tell of their ordeal spoke of close relatives killed or mutilated in front of them.

President Kabbah, in a speech broadcast Monday to mark the 37th anniversary of Sierra Leonean independence, said the day should be one for reflection rather than for celebration. "We have to think of our mistakes in the past, how such mistakes could be avoided in the future, and what we can do to bring peace, reconciliation, and national cohesion back to Sierra Leone," Kabbah told the nation. "Sierra Leone is classified as the least developed country in the world, but at the time of independence, Sierra Leone was stronger economically than Singapore and Malaysia." He added that this Independence Day called for "national reflection to identify things to be done to move the country forward." No public celebrations were held to mark the occasion after Kabbah cancelled an official reception, saying that the cost was too high and that the money could better be spent on development. In his address, Kabbah deplored recent atrocities carried out by AFRC/RUF rebels holding out in eastern Sierra Leone. "I am distressed by atrocities being committed in the east by junta forces and destruction of bridges in these areas to slow down the rapid movement of ECOMOG troops," he said.

Nearly 70,000 Sierra Leonean refugees have arrived in Guinea since March 15, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) legal officer Machiel Salomons said in Conakry on Monday. Salomons said 40,000 of the new refugees had fled fighting in eastern Sierra Leone. The new influx brings to 130,000 those who have fled the country since last May's military coup. "The situation is under control but could deteriorate at any time," Salomons said.

Two or three Sierra Leonean refugees a day are reportedly dying in the overcrowded refugee camps in Vahun, Liberia. Paramount Chief Collins Brima Ganda said six deaths were reported on Tuesday. Despite the influx of refugees into the district, Ganda said, there had been no delivery of relief supplies since February. He said all the cassava farms in the area had been harvested, and that people will soon have nothing to eat if food is not immediately brought to the area. Ganda also complained about inadequate drugs to treat the influx of new arrivals, which currently stands at between 90 and 120 daily. Alfred Boima, field supervisor of the government refugees agency, described the death rate among the more than 20,000 refugees as low. He attributed the food shortage to bad road conditions. Boima said the World Food Programme (WFP) was doing its utmost to supply food, and that there was some 12 metric tons of food at Kolahun for the refugees, but that bad roads were making it difficult to transport the food to Vahun.

Over 300 AFRC/RUF fighters have surrendered to Liberian immigration authorities at Vahun since February, Liberian *Star Radio* reported on Monday. The fighters have been transferred away from the border to prevent them from returning to the bush.

Aid officials in Liberia have expressed alarm at reports of the growing incidence of venereal disease among the Sierra Leonean refugee population at Vahun. As many as 9,000 of the 20,000 refugees in the area are thought to have been affected. An aid worker with the British medical charity MERLIN

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attributed the high incidence of venereal disease to several factors, emphasizing that many of the female refugees had been victims of rape.

A local official in Lofa County, Liberia has expressed concern that fighting from Sierra Leone might spill over into Liberia. Foya District Commissioner Tennyson Farcornia told Elections Commission officers that ECOMOG Alpha jets were constantly flying low over border towns. He said the Liberian towns of Warsonga, Mendicorma, and Sodu were separated from Sierra Leone by land boundaries, and expressed the fear that Alpha jets might stray into Liberian territory and cause problems, as the borders are not visible from the air.

**29 April:** A Kamajor militia leader has called for the registration of all Civil Defence Forces (CDF) fighters because of growing lawlessness among them, SLBS (state radio) said on Wednesday. Allieu Kondowa, speaking to paramount chiefs and CDF leaders in Bo, criticised "acts of lawlessness by some Kamajors who now roam the streets of Bo," and said that all militia members should be registered. "All Kamajors not deployed in Bo should return to their respective bases, as ECOMOG has been mandated to arrest all roving Kamajors and send them back to their operational areas," Kondowa said.

Deputy Minister of Education Abass Collier said Wednesday that Sierra Leonean students who fought alongside ECOMOG would receive government grants of between $100 and $150. Ten such students have so far been identified, and dozens more are known to have fought against the junta.

Desmond Luke was sworn in as Chief Justice on Tuesday, after his appointment was confirmed by parliament. At the swearing-in ceremony, Luke said he was "prepared to face the daunting task of salvaging the image of the battered judiciary which once ranked among the best in Africa and the Commonwealth about 30 years ago." Luke holds law degrees from Cambridge and Oxford Universities, and has served as foreign minister, health minister, and ambassador to the European Union. He was a candidate for president in the 1996 elections, finishing tenth with 1.1 percent of the vote. He has been a strong advocate of democratic government, and during the period of AFRC rule emerged as a leading supporter of the Kabbah government-in-exile. During the ceremony, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah said: "Ethics and morality in the judiciary started to decline in the 1960s when some judges became partisans in politics and involved in high-level impropriety." He succeeds Justice Samuel Beccles-Davis, who was reportedly forced to retire due to his swearing in of AFRC Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma as head of state following last May's coup. Beccles-Davis has denied that he collaborated with the military regime. Many of the judges who fled the country following the coup have returned since the restoration of the civilian government. There are now seven High Court judges in the country. Only one Supreme Court judge remains active, while three others are on leave prior to retirement.

52 more civilians are reportedly being treated in Freetown after an attack Wednesday by AFRC/RUF rebels at Motema, in Kono District. Close to 100 people are currently undergoing medical treatment at Connaught Hospital. More than 30 had their fingers or wrists chopped off with machetes, while at least 15 had their ears amputated.

ECOMOG task force commander Colonel Maxwell Khobe has said that close to 100 Liberian mercenaries have been captured in the past week, either in combat or in towns and villages in the interior where AFRC/RUF rebels are still fighting. He said 50 fighters from Liberia's former ULIMO-K militia and 20 from the NPFL were being detained at Pademba Road Prison in Freetown. "This is enough evidence to show you that the Liberian leader and his ex-rebels are helping the deposed junta in its military campaigns in eastern Sierra Leone," Khobe said. The Inter-Press Service (IPS) quoted a former NPFL fighter being detained at Pademba Road, Samuel Konneh, who said he was not certain how many ex-NPFL fighters had been sent to Sierra Leone. "Perhaps more than 1500, because we were driven in trucks to RUF-controlled areas, along the Sierra Leonean border, and since then, three weeks ago, we have been fighting in Kono district where I was captured," he said. Konneh said it was easy to recruit Liberian fighters, since thousands of youths who had fought in Liberia's civil war had nothing to do. "I was happy

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to come fight in Sierra Leone because I know nothing other than the gun," he said. "President Taylor could not integrate us into the Liberian army and I thought coming to Sierra Leone to fight, could have helped me out." Other Liberians interviewed said they had been promised diamonds and gold by the AFRC and by unnamed Liberian officials. "(Liberian officials) told us not to allow Kono and Kailahun districts in the east to fall, because these places have rich diamond and gold deposits," Konneh said. As the rebels have continued to lost ground in Kono, they have resorted to atrocities against the civilian population. "Most of the rebels speak with Liberian accents and do not understand the terrain in Kono, so they just kill, rape and burn without compunction," said Aiah Ngegba, a civil servant from Yengema whose left hand was chopped off by junta forces.

Several non-governmental organisations implementing food and development programs are in danger of running out of food in June or July if donors are not found soon, a humanitarian source said Wednesday. USAID, the primary donor for most of the programs, has not yet approved its 1998 food commitment. The World Food Programme (WFP) said it was unable to loan food because of its own low reserves. Humanitarian agencies said their efforts were also hampered by security and access problems in the east. AFRC/RUF forces holding out in the east have destroyed several key bridges, preventing the delivery of humanitarian aid.

**8 May:** At least 20 people have been killed by AFRC/RUF rebels in northeastern Sierra Leone, and 30 more who suffered crude amputations in the attacks have been admitted to Makeni Government Hospital, Catholic church sources and survivors said Friday. Most of the victims were said to be from Ndaraya, Worodala, and Karina, about 30 miles from Makeni. Witnesses said 10 people were killed in Ndaraya and eight in Kareena, adding that the attackers also burned down many houses in the villages. A Catholic priest from the area said he had no details from Worodala, other than that 12 houses had been burned down. "The rebels cut off the arms of our townsmates, telling them: 'You're Kabbah supporters. Now we have cut off your arms we'll see how you vote for Kabbah in the next election,'" a survivor quoted the rebels as saying. Church sources say ECOMOG has sent trucks carrying troops and several hundred Kamajor militiamen to flush out the rebels in the north. The London-based human rights group Amnesty International has denounced the killings, mutilations, and rapes by junta loyalists and RUF fighters. "Victims have reported women and children being rounded up, locked into a house which was then set alight. Women have been raped and have suffered other forms of sexual assault. Men who refused to rape members of their own family were reported to have had their arms hacked off," Amnesty International said.

The government-owned *Daily Mail* newspaper reported Friday that RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie has been shot and seriously wounded at Daru, in Kailahun District. "Bockari was trapped in an ambush Wednesday set up by civil defence forces," the newspaper reported. "He sustained serious gunshot wounds but managed to escape to his base at a small village, Gbehu, deep in the forest some seven miles from Kailahun Town." There has been no independent confirmation of the report. The Daily Mail alleged that Bockarie had been trading coffee and cacao for arms and ammunition in Liberia.

The British mercenary firm Sandline International said Friday it had received British government approval to train and supply arms to militias supporting Sierra Leone's exiled civilian government, in contravention of a U.N. arms embargo. Sandline lawyer Richard Slowe released a letter sent to British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook which said that Britain's High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold, had first suggested to President Kabbah that he approach Sandline for help in regaining power. The letter named five senior diplomats and two military officers the company claims had been briefed about the operation. Sandline was "led to believe that clearance was given at Head of Department level," the letter said. "Sandline was involved quite openly and with the full prior knowledge and approval of Her Majesty's Government, with an operation which involved assisting, with both personnel and military equipment, the restoration of the lawful government of Sierra Leone, which was the express purpose for which sanctions were applied in the first place. Far from any offence having been committed in these circumstances, it would merit serious criticism that one department of government (Customs and Excise) should be investigating, to the considerable inconvenience and distress of our clients, a matter which was conducted with the knowledge and approval of another department." The company also alleged that the U.S. State Department and Pentagon had been kept informed and had approved the deal. According to the letter, State Department Country Desk Officer for Sierra Leone and the Gambia Michael Thomas communicated "the U.S. government's full support for Sandline International's involvement" to Philip Parnam, a diplomat at the British Embassy in Washington, D.C.--a charge rejected by State Department sources. A State Department official acknowledged on Friday that Sandline had kept in touch with the State Department following the coup, but denied the company's assertion that Thomas had indicated support for Sandline activities in Sierra Leone. "The State Department has asked the British

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government to take a strong lead in soliciting logistical and technical support for ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone, as requested by three U.N. Security Council resolutions," the official said. U.S. State Department Spokesman James Foley said Friday that Sandline had periodically contacted the department "and commented on the situation in Sierra Leone, but provided no information on arms shipments. A State Department official told Sandline that "meeting with them did not endorse what they were doing," Foley said. "Sandline provides security for private mining and construction interests, including an American mine in the Sierra Leone countryside," Foley added. "I would note that Sandline employees were among the few expatriates who remained in Sierra Leone after the coup and kept in touch with State Department officials, as was perfectly legitimate for them to do and for us to do on our side."

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) announced Friday that it had stepped up food deliveries to the Guinean town of Gueckedou to cope with an influx of some 150,000 Sierra Leonean refugees fleeing fighting during March and April. The WFP said it had positioned 3,000 metric tons of food in Gueckedou, enough to feed 250,000 people for one month. The agency is now bringing in additional food from Conakry and from Liberia and Ivory Coast before the start of the rainy season, which will render most of the roads in the region impassable. In the last five days, the WFP headquarters in Abidjan has delivered at least 970 tons of various food commodities to Gueckedou with its 64 chartered trucks. Four trucks were sent from the Liberian town of Voinjama, marking the first time in seven years a food convoy has been allowed to cross the border from Liberia into Guinea. The border between the two countries is officially closed.

**20 May:** The United Nations Security Council issued a presidential statement Wednesday calling for an immediate end to the violence against civilians in Sierra Leone, and expressing grave concern about reports of foreign military support for AFRC/RUF rebels. The statement called on all states to observe relevant Security Council resolutions and avoid destabilising the situation in the country. The statement welcomed efforts by the civilian government since its return from exile, and urged the rebels to lay down their arms and surrender to the ECOMOG force.

Guinea has extradited 48 members of Sierra Leone's military government to Freetown to stand trial. According to a Ministry of Information news release, those sent back included AFRC Secretary-General Colonel Abdul Karim Sesay, Freetown City Council Chairman Dr. Wiltshire Johnson, and former Secretary of State for Transport and Communications Osho Williams. Upon arrival in Freetown, the 48 were taken to Wilberforce Military Barracks for questioning. In a press conference in Freetown, Col. Sesay called on forces loyal to the former military junta to end their resistance and surrender to ECOMOG. He appealed to them to stop their campaign of terror, which has resulted in the death and mutilation of scores of civilians.

Former NPRC Attorney-General Claude Campbell collapsed in court Tuesday after his request to be tried without a jury was turned down. Campbell had argued that "the adverse effects of radio, TV, and newspaper publications" would so influence the jury that a fair trial would be impossible. Attorney-General Solomon Berewa objected to the application, saying that Campbell "should not be frightened" by the adverse pretrial publicity. "The jurors are human beings, and the trial judge will advise them not to take account of what they saw during junta rule such as the burning of houses, killings and maiming of innocent people," Berewa said. After Judge Alhaji Rashid ruled that he had "failed to produce sufficient argument of law to convince the court," Campbell collapsed in the dock.

Rebels holding out in Kono District have completely devastated the city of Koidu, London Times journalist Sam Kiley told the BBC "Network Africa" program on Wednesday. "Koidu has effectively ceased to exist as a city in a way that you or I would understand it," Kiley said. "Every single structure -- and I mean every single structure -- everything, from chicken coops to hotels, has been reduced to rubble by the RUF/AFRC forces as they withdrew ahead of the Nigerian-led advance. They burned down every single building. I have covered a large number of cities that have been very badly damaged during conflict, but this is a city that has been annihilated." Kiley said most of Koidu's estimated 100,000 population had fled into the bush and to surrounding villages. "A few are now filtering back to Koidu proper, about 6,000 people, but they are filtering back to a city that really doesn't offer them very much hope at all. There is nowhere to sleep, there isn't any kind of shelter from the rains that have just begun, and they now face a very miserable future of trying to rebuild lives from the ground up, quite literally." Kiley said the government was cooperating with NGO's to bring medicine and food into the district, but that serious security concerns still remained. Kiley reported a brief firefight between ECOMOG troops and rebels who mounted a hit-and-run attack on the city during his visit to the area on Wednesday. "The rebels are continuing their reign of terror not very far beyond the city limits," he added.

An ECOMOG spokesman said Wednesday that the ECOMOG force is in "effective control" of all district capitals in the country. "There is no doubt that we are in effective control of these of these areas and our presence is undisputed," the spokesman said. He added that ECOMOG held the key towns Daru, Segbwema, Pendembu, Mobai, Kailahun, Buedu, and Koindu in

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Kailahun District and maintained it was "just a matter of time" before the border town of Bomaru--from where the RUF launched its rebellion in 1991--was captured. The spokesman said ECOMOG was "appalled over the wave of amputations on innocent civilians," but denied that Sierra Leone was degenerating back into civil war. "It is unreasonable to think so," he said. "As far as we are concerned and with the reports available so far, there is no problem for us in any of the districts in the country, as we are pursing the war according to the schedule of the ECOMOG commander."

Burkina Faso's foreign minister has denied accusations by Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea Monday that his country was "the main supplier of arms, ammunition and food" to AFRC/RUF rebels. "Our people have problems with water. With such a situation, we are not going to find the means to get involved in a country as far away as Sierra Leone," Foreign Minister Ablasse Ouedraogo said. "Do you think we have the means to support a rebellion with such financial obligations lying ahead?...We say that in the case of Sierra Leone, it is intolerable to seek legality through force, one must use dialogue. Perhaps that is the cause of the opposition levelled against Burkina and Liberia"

United Nations military liaison officer Brigadier General Subhash Joshi said Wednesday that the cities of Bo, Kenema, and Makeni were "quite ready to start the process of disarmament and demobilisation." Joshi said he intended to position military liaison officers in the three areas shortly to work with ECOMOG and Sierra Leone government agencies.

The head of the London-based mercenary firm Sandline International has disputed British Foreign Secretary Robin Cooks' account of events in the so-called "Arms to Africa Affair." Tim Spicer told the BBC Sandline had received no "red letter warning" over his company's proposal to supply arms to the government-in-exile of President Kabbah. Of Cook's assertion Monday that Sandline had been warned it risked violating the U.N. arms embargo, Spicer said, "I would say my recollection is somewhat different to that which has been articulated already," regarding a January 19 meeting at the Foreign Office. "We spoke to the Foreign Office," Spicer said. "I spoke to the British High Commissioner, the government's representative, and we touched base with the State Department in the United States." He acknowledged that he had no evidence the information had reached the ministerial level, but said: "If one has conversations with senior (Foreign Office) officials, one assumes that fits in with normal procedure in that ministry." Spicer also disputed a Foreign Office claim that a Sandline helicopter serviced by the H.M.S. Cornwall was being used for humanitarian purposes. Spicer said it was also being used for military missions. "The helicopter was there to support ECOMOG. Its task was to provide tactical air mobility. They need to transport troops," he said. "I believe (British officials) knew of its presence but were not concerned with the detail." Spicer promised to cooperate with the independent inquiry being conducted by Sir Thomas Legg, QC.

British Defence Secretary George Robertson, in a written response to parliament, has said his office first became aware of the Customs and Excise Office investigation of Sandline International on April 24, when it received a copy of a letter from the company's lawyers protesting the investigation. Sandline claimed its activities had Foreign Office approval. "The first my private office knew of the existence of the Customs and Excise investigation into the involvement of Sandline International in operations in Sierra Leone was the afternoon of April 24, when they received a faxed copy of the letter from SJ Berwin and Company to Mr. Cook," Robertson said. In Parliament Tuesday, Prime Minister Tony Blair defended Foreign Secretary Robin Cook from a Conservative charge that he had "given the impression of misleading"

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the House. "He corrected the facts as soon as he knew of them," Blair responded, adding that "all this" would be looked at by the independent inquiry headed by Sir Thomas Legg, QC.

Some 50 junta supporters were killed over the weekend when the Kapra militia attacked a rebel base in the Mandaha forest, about 30 miles from Makeni, local journalists reported. Missionary sources said the rebels then attacked the nearby villages of Kassassi and Mabuya, mutilating some 17 civilians including mothers and children, and burning 10 houses. A message attached to one of the mutilation victims warned that ECOMOG had "90 days to quit Sierra Leone or the rebel operation 'No Living Thing' will continue with intensity."

Sources at Connaught Hospital in Freetown said Wednesday that six people had been admitted after having their eyes gouged out by AFRC/RUF rebels in a village near Kabala. Some of the victims had their arms cut off and were stabbed in the back.

Plans are underway in Freetown for a march on Saturday in support of Nigerian leader General Sani Abacha. "We want to bring to the forefront the achievements of the Nigerian leader in fighting for peace in the sub-region," said Alimamy Kamara of the Sierra Leone-Nigeria Brotherhood. "We expect a massive turnout to show the world that we do not hide our support for General Abacha."

The state-owned *Daily Mail* newspaper called Tuesday for the arming of civilians. In a front page editorial, the newspaper called for "township and village people to organise themselves into strong self-defence groups. Let them be given the appropriate training and weapons to defend themselves. The civil defence forces must be beefed up to serve as vanguard and as supplements to ECOMOG."

Minister of Political and Parliamentary Affairs Abu Aiah Koroma has warned that illicit diamond mining in the east is fueling the violence in Sierra Leone. "Allowing illicit miners at this point in time is a recipe for junta rebels and their civilian supporters to stay and harass the people of Kono, Kailahun, and Koinadugu Districts," Koroma said, adding that he had witnessed illicit mining in several areas. "I have brought these developments to the attention of ECOMOG authorities and civilians who have joined in committing such acts are not different from RUF and junta bandits and they should be treated as such," Koroma added.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Sierra Leone Red Cross Society are conducting a joint operation to distribute some 180 tons of upland seed rice to 60,000 people in seven chiefdoms in Tonkolili and Kenema Districts, the ICRC said in a statement released in Geneva. The distributions are due to begin May 30. Each recipient will also receive a food ration to ensure proper use of the seeds, the statement said. "Thanks to the good results achieved with last year's agricultural programmes, many farming families can still live on their reserves, provided they were able to save them from looters", said Helene Cunat, ICRC relief coordinator in Freetown. "But if the seed is not planted now, there could be serious food shortages in the second half of this year." The seed was purchased locally to ensure optimum results and to help the economy recover. A distribution of swamp rice seed to 170,000 people in Tonkolili, Kenema, Kailahun, and Pujehun districts is currently being planned and is scheduled to start in late June.

**30 June 1997:** RUF reinforcements have arrived in Freetown, saying they are willing to fight to the death to defend the capital. According to the rebels, some 2,000 RUF fighters arrived over the weekend and are now encamped in towns around Freetown. "We have come to reinforce our positions in and around Freetown in case we need to defend it against any attacks," one fighter said. "We will fight to the last man if ordered to do so."

West African countries have closed their embassies in Freetown, in line with an ECOWAS decision not to recognize the AFRC military regime. Nigeria closed its embassy the day after the May 25 coup, while Gambia closed its embassy on June 29. Guinea's embassy remains open, but the ambassador and senior diplomats have left. Staff members remaining behind say they are there to provide travel documents to Guinean citizens wishing to return home.

Reaction: John Dinger, acting U.S. state department spokesman: *"The United States wants to see early restoration of order and democracy in Sierra Leone, where soldiers and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels overthrew the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. We believe concerted efforts by Africa to find a negotiated solution offer the best hope for returning the legitimate government, and advancing stability in Sierra Leone. Thus, we applaud the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) toward a peaceful solution to the crisis in Sierra Leone. We welcome ECOWAS' June 27 Communiqué from Conakry calling for the early reinstatement of President Kabbah, the return of peace and security and the resolution of the issues of refugees and displaced persons. The United States hopes ECOWAS will take immediate steps to move the process forward. We are prepared to work with Sierra Leone's neighbors in helping to reach a peaceful settlement."*

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**28 June:** Soldiers killed at least 25 people in Bo District Thursday, according to witnesses who reached Freetown on Saturday. Among the dead was Albert Sani Demby, Paramount Chief of Baoma Chiefdom, the father of ousted vice president Joseph Demby. Chief Demby, who is said to have been blind, was taken from him compound in Gerihun by soldiers, who shot him in the stomach and killed him. The soldiers then attacked two more towns, Telu and Sembehun, killing 25 civilians including another traditional chief. The witnesses said soldiers burned town part of Telu, Jaiama-Bongor Chiefdom, the home of Deputy Defence Minister Hinga Norman. The soldiers were said to be scouring the bush for Kamajors who they believed were gathering in preparation for an attack on military bases in Bo. Military officials in Bo have declined comment. The independent newspaper *Voice of di People* reported Saturday that unidentified attackers firing automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and mortars forced residents of Moyamba to flee the town last week.

The AFRC Saturday issued a statement asking ECOWAS countries to reconsider their efforts to isolate the military government. "The AFRC regards such measures as counter-productive, in the sense that it will not only hurt the people of Sierra Leone but will further lead to the economic sinking of the country," the statement said. The Nigerian newspaper *Daily Times* reported Saturday that sanctions will be imposed on Sierra Leone and force will be used if the military does not return President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power "within a reasonable timetable."

Reaction: Tony Lloyd, British Minister for Africa: *"The demands were for the coup plotters to recognise that the game is up, and it is up. However long it takes, the game for them is up. The people of Sierra Leone do not deserve what they've had unleashed. Our commitment and that of the whole international community is to make sure that the legitimate government is back in power as quickly as possible. There's a very strong need now for the coup plotters to recognise that it is in their hands to offer proper salvation to the people of Sierra Leone. (They need to) to get round that negotiating table and to recognise that they cannot continue with the present position."*

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**25 June:** AFRC leader Major Johnny Paul Koroma said Wednesday that he is ready to allow President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to return as long as Kabbah stops "misleading" the international community. In an address to the nation, Koroma said he would soon announce the composition of his new government and a "timetable for a proper return to civilian rule," which he said would be as short as possible. Koroma promised to hold free and fair elections which would be unlike the polls last year when 54 people were killed in Freetown on election day. Commenting on the coup, Koroma said, "We just could not sit down and allow a president to be manipulated as people were killed or maimed." Koroma said Kabbah should have incorporated RUF leader Foday Sankoh into the political system, but had failed to do so "out of greed." On Tuesday, UNPP leader John Karefa-Smart said he had strongly advised the AFRC not to name a cabinet, as this would send a signal to the international community that the coup leaders do not intend to relinquish power.

ECOWAS foreign ministers will meet Thursday in Conakry, Guinea to assess the current situation in Sierra Leone, and to work out a framework for resolving the political crisis there. OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim and ECOWAS Executive Secretary Edouard Benjamin are expected to attend the meeting, which will be chaired by Guinean president General Lansana Conte. In Abjua, Nigeria a senior army general said that Nigeria is not contemplating removing its troops from Nigeria. "If we pull out that will be a defeatist attitude," Major-General Patrick Aziza said following a meeting of Nigeria's Provisional Ruling Council. "We have been holding consultations with the men in command there and we hope it will yield positive results," he said.

RUF rebels have been seen in churches, mosques, and other public places asking forgiveness for atrocities they committed during six years of civil war. "We have now joined our parents, our brothers and sisters. The war, mutilations, burnings and indiscriminate killings have stopped," said RUF spokesman Lieutenant Eldred Collins in a message repeatedly broadcast on SLBS radio and television this week. Collins and other members of the RUF--now renamed the People's Army of Sierra Leone--have been regularly attending church services in Freetown. "We take responsibility for the atrocities committed in the country's interior," Collins said. "We burned, looted, maimed, and killed but we did not do this because we wanted to. We had to because that was the only way we could have uprooted a rotten system." The AFRC has named three members of the RUF to its ruling council, including RUF leader Foday Sankoh, who is currently being detained in Nigeria, and Collins, who was named Supervisor of the Department of the Interior. "We are basically working out a power-sharing arrangement with the People's Army so that lasting peace would come," AFRC spokesman Colonel Abdul Sesay said. The People's Army's War Council, which serves as the RUF's high command, says that its fighters are ready to disarm, but only if the ECOMOG intervention force pulls out.

The AFRC acknowledged Tuesday that looting and killing continues in Freetown, and promised intensified patrols. The announcement, made over SLBS (state radio), did little to calm the fears of residents, some of whom have resorted to vigilantism and street justice. On Wednesday, a teenage boy was hacked to death by a mob after he was caught breaking into a house. His arms and head were chopped off and one testicle placed in his mouth. "I know the boy. He doesn't live in the area but he frequents it during the day. He has been leading gangs of boys who break into people's homes, looting them clean," a witness said.

The human rights group Amnesty International (AI) repeated its call

Wednesday for the AFRC to respect and protect the fundamental rights of all Sierra Leoneans. Among concerns already raised by directly with Major Johnny Paul Koroma was the detention of at least 15 people arrested on June 16, accused of conspiring to overthrow the military government. "We fear that some of these people may be detained only because they opposed the military coup which brought the AFRC to power. If this is the case, they should be immediately and unconditionally released," AI said. AI called for a fair trial for any of the detained who are accused of a criminal offence, and noted that there is concern that they will not receive a fair trial if tried before a military court. Those arrested are civilians associated with President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's government or the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), and senior military officers. They are reported to include Dr. Sama S. Banya (medical doctor and SLPP member), Colonel K.E.S Boyah, Dauda Bundu, Colonel Tom Carew, Major Francis Gottor (former NPRC Chief of Defence), Dr. Abdul Jalloh (Member of Parliament), Dr. Bockarie M. Kobba, Abu Aiah Koroma (Minister for Political and Parliamentary Affairs), Elizabeth Loveli (Member of Parliament), Colonel R.Y. Koroma, Captain John Massaquoi, Abdullai Mustapha (State House Liaison Officer), Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.H. Tucker (from Patricia Kabbah's family), Major Vandi Turay and David Quee (Minister for Local Government). At least two of those detained were reportedly physically assaulted by soldiers at the time of their arrest. The are currently being held incommunicado at Pademba Road Prison. AI has called for them to be allowed immediate access to their families, lawyers, and doctors. AI also expressed concern about the summary executions of suspected looters by military officials. Such killings appear to contravene international standards on the use of lethal force, the group said. Soldiers have killed at least 10 people in Freetown; similar killings have been reported in Bo.

**30 July:** United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened a Special Conference on Sierra Leone Thursday. The conference, which brings together Sierra Leonean leaders, diplomats, and non-governmental organisations, looks to raise funds to support ECOMOG peacekeeping operations, and to address emergency relief and humanitarian issues as well as the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Sierra Leone. Annan said that since the civilian government was reinstated in March, some 500 people mutilated by AFRC/RUF rebels had been treated and more than 2,000 more had died in the bush "terrified of meeting another human being." He called on the rebels to "lay down their arms without further delay." Since the restoration of the Kabbah government, Annan said, the rebels had been "resisting the government's authority in this fighting. Horrific attacks have been carried out against civilians, including children, that shame all humanity." Among those taking part in the conference were President Kabbah, British Minister of State for Africa Tony Lloyd, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Susan Rice, ECOMOG Commander General Timothy Shelpidi, OAU Secretary-General Salim Salim, European Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs Emma Bonino, Commonwealth Secretary-General Chief Emeka Anyoaku, and ECOWAS Secretary-General Lansana Kouyate.

President Kabbah told delegates to the United Nations Special Conference on Sierra Leone Thursday that the gathering represented "an act of solidarity" with the people of Sierra Leone. "More importantly, we see it also as a concrete assurance of your determination to join forces with us in finding substantive solutions to the critical political, social and economic problems, including those which emerged over the past fourteen months, and which continue to afflict our people," he said in his address. Kabbah told delegates that the ECOMOG force had been experiencing logistic and related problems and, unless assistance were forthcoming, "the rebel activities will not only continue and create more human tragedy, but will also drain our limited resources." He also stressed the deteriorating infrastructure which had deterred progress in returning life to normal and compromised the government's ability to resettle refugees and the displaced. "I have no doubt that this conference, while assessing the programme of economic recovery, will also give the plight and vulnerability of refugees and the displaced the attention which they deserve," he said. Kabbah said that, in the short term, the government would disband the army and replace it with a new military "based on competence, professional integrity, loyalty to our democratic institutions, and patriotism." The new security force, he said, would take into account ethnic and regional considerations to reflect the diversity of the nation. Citing the Costa Rican and Panamanian models, Kabbah said that in the long term Sierra Leone would consider whether it needed an army at all. "However, I should emphasize that before considering this as an option, we should definitely have to take into account the availability of a regional or sub-regional multilateral force, such as ECOMOG, to meet the security needs of small and relatively weak states such as Sierra Leone," he said, adding that the availability of such a force would allow the country to devote its limited resources to economic development, literacy, employment, and job training "and thus help to eradicate some of the causes of political and economic instability which have plagued the nation over the past several decades." Kabbah stressed Sierra Leone's commitment to the rule of law, and adding that his government had resisted "the popular clamour for revenge" and the "demand for draconian laws and measures to deal with the present situation." He said that the trials of junta supporters would be open, fair, and transparent, and that international observers would be given unrestricted access to the accused.

Sierra Leone was represented at the United Nations Special Conference on Sierra Leone by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Dr. James O.C. Jonah,

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(Minister of Finance and Economic Planning), Dr. Sama Banya (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Sheka Mansaray, (National Security Adviser), Dr. Jah (National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation), John Leigh (Ambassador to the United States), Fode Dabor (Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Charge d'Affaires), Sylvester Rowe (Political Adviser), Otto During (Head of Chancery), Nikita Kyne-Sam (First Secretary), and Fode Kamara (Second Secretary).

AFRC/RUF rebels carried out a surprise attack on ECOMOG troops at Kabala on Monday, ECOMOG task force commander and Chief of Defence Staff Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe said at a press conference in Freetown on Thursday. Khobe said some 200 arrived in Kabala, saying they wanted to take advantage of an amnesty following Saturday's call for a ceasefire by RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh. However, Khobe said, the rebels "regrouped under the guise of surrendering to ECOMOG." He said the rebels had formed three groups, with the first two groups wearing white headbands, signaling their intention to surrender. He said the men lined up in front of a set of tables on which surrender documents were placed. "While ECOMOG soldiers were making arrangements to have them surrender, a third batch entered the town [walking behind others who were carrying palm leaves] and opened fire on ECOMOG solders, which led to a fierce battle between my troops and them," he said. "But we expected this type of action, and our men were prepared and returned fire." The rebels apparently surrendering joined in the fighting, as their arms had not yet been taken from them. Khobe acknowledged there had been deaths on both sides, but said ECOMOG casualties had been "minimal." The rebels were armed with rocket-propelled grenades and heavy guns, he said, adding that sporadic fighting continued on the outskirts of Kabala until midnight on Wednesday, but that ECOMOG remained in control of the town. "We have now moved the military commander and more troops from Makeni to reinforce Kabala, but there is no cause for alarm," he said. Khobe said he was also sending reinforcements from Lungi, but that ECOMOG had no plans to go on the offensive after having agreed Tuesday to respect Sankoh's unilateral call for a ceasefire. "No, we will not go on the offensive. Two wrongs don't make a right," he said. Catholic priests in the area said by radio that heavy fighting was still continuing around Kabala on Thursday, and that thousands of residents had been forced to flee the area. "There was shooting everywhere and we had to flee 20 miles on foot," one missionary told the BBC, adding that there was no time for the priests to collect the 100 handicapped children in their care. The BBC reported that three Catholic priests had moved to Makeni along with several of the handicapped children. "The Catholic Mission we spoke to told us that the rebels were not in control of Kabala, but they were all over the place in Kabala," BBC correspondent Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay said.

Khobe said there had also been in increase in rebel attacks at Koidu and Kayima in Kono District and Daru in Kailahun District, but gave no details. He repeated allegations that weapons reaching the rebels in Sierra Leone would have had to come through Liberia. "The Guinean border is closed and manned by Guinean guards," he said. "The Liberian border is free, so definitely, if they do not come through the Guinean border and the sea area is sealed off, the only option remains the border with Liberia." Khobe complained that "the countries that promised to send troops to beef up ECOMOG in Sierra leone have still not sent anyone. We cannot just sit and wait."

Makeni residents reported that, prior to the attack on Kabala, six people died when rebels ambushed a government bus on the Makeni-Kabala road. The bus, worth some $70,000, was destroyed by fire, a bus company official said.

Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe introduced his successor as ECOMOG task force commander on Thursday, Brigadier-General Abu Ahmadu. Khobe was last week named as Sierra Leone's Chief of Defence Staff by President Kabbah.

**3 October:** RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh (pictured left) and former AFRC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma (right) finally





arrived in Freetown on Sunday, nearly three months after the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord on July 7 to end more than eight years of civil war. "We are here. We are here," said Sankoh as he stepped off the plane at Lungi International Airport. "It's a success for the people of Sierra Leone. It's a victory," he added. Koroma followed from the plane, accompanied by his wife and holding a small girl in his arms. A delegation of ECOWAS and international officials accompanied the two rebel leaders on their flight from Monrovia to Freetown. The two rebel leaders were greeted by a small group of family members and well-wishers on the balcony of the airport terminal. An earlier plane brought senior rebel aides, field commanders, and their families including.

Sankoh and Koroma met at the airport with government ministers, officials of ECOMOG and the United Nations Military Observer Force in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), members of the RUF and the pro-government Kamajor militia, and international officials, including U.N. Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo and U.S. Ambassador Joe Melrose. They were then flown by helicopter to Cockerill Military Headquarters, and from there proceeded by motorcade to the Presidential Lodge for talks, and later for a joint press conference, with President Kabbah.

"Ladies and gentlemen, today, we hail the dawn of a new era. The war has ended. The hour of peace, forgiveness, and reconciliation has come. We stand before you today to ask for your forgiveness and a spirit of reconciliation across this country," Sankoh said in a prepared statement which was broadcast over the radio. "You, who we have wronged, you have every human right to feel bitter and unforgiving, but we plead with you for forgiveness. Those who have died, those who are grieving for the loss of their loved ones, those who have been disabled, whose property has been destroyed, those traumatized — the children, the youth, the women, the aged — we ask their forgiveness." However, Sankoh denied that the RUF was holding thousands of civilians, including some 3,000 children, documented missing since the rebel attack on Freetown in January. "The question is irrelevant, all lies," he said in answer to a question on when the civilian abductees would be released. "We, the Revolutionary United Front, do not abduct people, we rescue them." Sankoh maintained he had instructed his commanders to release all prisoners-of-war and abductees, and that those orders should already have been carried out. Koroma, too, called for reconciliation. "Let bygones be bygones," he said. "If we don't forgive one another we cannot implement the peace accord." Koroma said a key demand of the rebel soldiers — that they be reinstated in the Sierra Leone Army — had been granted, although there was no confirmation of this from Sierra Leone government officials. Koroma called on his followers in control of the diamond areas to cease illicit mining. "I want them to know that the war is over, and the riches of this country must go to the people of this country and not individuals," he said. President Kabbah declared that "this is indeed a great day for the people of Sierra Leone," adding: "By this symbolic occasion we have demonstrated to our people that the war is over." He declined Sankoh's request, however, for the immediate lifting of the state of emergency and night curfew, saying he would first have to consult with his security chiefs.

Four European non-governmental organisations announced a campaign Sunday to prevent rebels in Africa from funding their military operations with illicit diamond sales. The "Fatal Transactions" campaign will target diamonds

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originating in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola. The four participating organisations, Britain's Global Witness, Germany's Medico International, The Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, and the pan-European development group Novib, called on the legitimate diamond trade to put effective controls in place to ensure that diamonds can no longer fund weapons purchases by rebel armies.

**11 November:** The death toll from Monday's rebel attack on the northern town of Gbendembu has risen to about 100 as more bodies have been found, aid workers said on Wednesday. Some of the victims were beheaded, while others suffered bullet wounds or had their throats cut. "Inside the Wesleyan Church in Gbendembu town, people have found 11 men, women, and children with their throats savagely cut," one aid worker said. "It is still not definite how many people died in the fighting but it is now certain that it is close to 100." An ECOMOG officer said 20 of the dead were ECOMOG troops and Sierra Leonean soldiers. "We also killed more than 30 rebels," he said. "We will be flying the bodies of ECOMOG soldiers to Nigeria for burial." Another "senior source" close to ECOMOG said the combined death toll among pro-government forces was 39. A survivor related to *Reuters* Wednesday how he had watched the attack as he hid on the roof of a building next to the Wesleyan Church. "They searched from house to house...Then I saw them march 11 people, men, women and children from (the) nearby bush into the church. The wife of the church pastor, Marie Fornah, was among the 11 and also the pastor's uncle," he said. "The rebels closed the door after they entered. After two or three minutes I heard their hostages screaming. It was horrible. They were screaming that the rebels were killing them, cutting their throats." The survivor said the rebels, numbering about 20, left the church after about 30 minutes. "I waited another half hour and stole into the church. There were the bodies of the 11, all of them with their throats cut and blood still gushing out," he said. "I don't know if my parents were captured by the rebels." He added that he saw the rebels driving scores of people, mainly women and children, into the bush. At the Connaught Hospital morgue, relatives of slain soldiers were claiming the bodies and taking them away for burial, witnesses said.

United Nations officials in eastern Sierra Leone say they have been unable to verify reports, carried by the BBC and news wire services, that AFRC/RUF rebel forces killed about 100 civilians near Tongo on Monday morning. The Associated Press quoted ECOMOG spokesman Paul Aghimimen in Freetown, while BBC correspondent Prince Brima attributed his report to eyewitnesses. The U.N. said it is still investigating, but that initial findings suggest the reports were based on rumours.

RUF rebels have blocked and cut the road between Makeni and Kamakwie, Liberian *Star Radio* reported on Wednesday. People fleeing the area said the rebels attempted to overrun an ECOMOG base, but were repelled. A number of civilians were reported killed, while others escaped by bush paths.

About 100 Sierra Leonean refugees arrived in Freetown from Guinea Wednesday aboard plane chartered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). A UNHCR spokesman said two flights a day, each carrying about 50 refugees, would continue until Saturday.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has begun registering child soldiers in Sierra Leone as part of a demobilisation programme. Fewer than 100 child soldiers have so far been demobilised. Media reports have cited the Kamajor militia, which has been unwilling to release child soldiers.

The government of the Netherlands has donated $4 million to ECOMOG to facilitate the deployment of Malian troops in Sierra Leone, Liberian *Star Radio* reported on Wednesday.

Sierra Leone's university lecturers have ended their "indefinite strike" after meeting with Education Minister Dr. Alpha T. Wurie. The lecturers began their work stoppage last week to demand an agreed-upon salary increase

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and arrears. Wurie described the lecturers' action as a small misunderstanding, and said they were demanding what was due them.

Sierra Leone's national soccer team has been forced to withdraw from the Olympic Games in Sydney, Australia in the year 2000 because of lack of funding. The Sierra Leone Football Association said it had to withdraw the team after the government failed to come up with the money to allow the team to travel to Gabon for a qualifying match. The International Football Federation, FIFA, has already agreed to pay for two of the team's next international matches, against Morocco and Mali.

**19 November:** The Revolutionary United Front will destroy "every living thing" if anything happens to their leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh, RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie told the newspaper *For di People* in a report published on Wednesday. Sankoh is currently being held at Pademba Road Prison in Freetown where he is preparing an appeal against his conviction and death sentence on treason charges. "I am a ruthless commander," Bockarie said in a telephone interview. "I am ready to damage but I am waiting until something happens to Sankoh. When I take Freetown I shall clear every living thing and building. To my God, I'll fight. I'll kill and kill, and the more they tell me to stop, the more I'll kill. Only Sankoh can tell us to stop." Bockarie rejected a call by United States Special Envoy to Africa Rev. Jesse Jackson for the RUF to lay down its arms. "(The U.S. is) a big hypocrite whose intention is to steal our natural resources rather than bring peace to the country," he said. "America and the world should know that we shall not lay down arms, because only a defeated man can do so."

ECOMOG troops on Monday attacked suspected rebels on Tasso Island, 12 miles from Freetown, and captured 35 of them, an ECOMOG officer said on Thursday. Witnesses who fled the island said at least five rebels had been killed in the raid. "The rebels had suddenly re-emerged on the island, training and planning to carry out attacks on Freetown," one ECOMOG commander said. "We captured 35 of them and inflicted casualties." He gave no further details.

ECOMOG officers said Thursday they were committed to ending the Sierra Leone conflict militarily, and displayed five "hard core" rebel leaders captured recently in Lungi. Among them was a Lieutenant Kargbo, a member of the disbanded Sierra Leone Army, who had opposed disarming the army after the signing of the Conakry Peace Accord.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said Tuesday it had suspended the airlift repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees from Kissidougou, Guinea on November 13 after discovery of several cases of meningitis in refugee camps in the Prefecture of Gueckedou, where candidates had registered for a return to Freetown. The UNHCR had begun a second phase of the operation on November 11, returning 305 persons on several flights. All returnees undergo medical screening before returning to Freetown. The operation, for which 1,800 persons have registered so far, will be restarted if no further cases of meningitis are identified in the refugee camps.

President Kabbah raised the possibility Thursday of an amnesty for five key rebel leaders if they would lay down their arms and agree to leave Sierra Leone for a period of time. In an ECOMOG security briefing, Chief of Defence Staff Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe identified the five as Captain SAJ Musa, Sam "Maskita" Bockarie, Eldred Collins, Dennis "Superman" Mingo, and AFRC Chairman Major Johnny Paul Koroma. Kabbah said he would be willing to consider allowing them to depart "to a third country that is not neighboring Sierra Leone for awhile," and to later be resettled in Sierra Leone. "But I cannot do that as long as they go on committing the crimes that they've been committing, and chopping off people's limbs, and all the rest of it, burning homes, and above all always threatening, just a bluff, bluffing that they're going to kill everybody in this country," Kabbah told the BBC. He stressed, however, that rebel leaders who "have committed very, very serious crimes will have to face the law." General Khobe confirmed at the security briefing that the government has been in constant contact with rebel leaders, particularly with Captain SAJ Musa. He said the entire sub-region was interested in peace in Sierra Leone, and if what was needed was to provide safe passage for rebel leaders to

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depart so that Sierra Leoneans could live peacefully, the entire sub-region would be prepared to provide refuge for them. Minister of Information, Communications, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer stressed that no negotiations had taken place. He said the rebel leaders must be prepared to lay down their arms, and that then the possibility exists for them to live elsewhere in the sub-region.

**22 December:** AFRC/RUF rebels attacked Waterloo Tuesday, causing thousands to flee toward Freetown and reportedly advancing as far as Wellington before being turned back by ECOMOG troops. Government and ECOMOG officials instituted a press blackout and banned unauthorised news dispatches Tuesday, but a number of refugees reported the rebels burned houses and randomly killed civilians at Wellington. ECOMOG soldiers manning checkpoints said the rebels had been turned back from Wellington early Tuesday, but that the situation remained unstable. The *Associated Press* cited unconfirmed reports of heavy fighting in towns closer to the capital. A "forest guard in Waterloo District", Abubakar Sesay, told the BBC that the rebels had been brought into Lumpa, an extension of Waterloo, by sympathisers, who kept them in their homes. "So at about 3:00 a.m. these rebels just opened fire," he said. "There was a lot of shooting, but their number was about 50. And not all of them were armed. There was a lot of shooting in the air." Sesay said the ECOMOG troops stationed at Waterloo withdrew to a nearby garrison and returned with armored personnel carriers. "Waterloo came under the control of ECOMOG at 5:00 a.m. this morning, and at this time I'm talking they're in control of Waterloo," he added. ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi, in a written statement read over SLBS (state radio) late Tuesday, appealed to residents to remain calm. "I wish to assure you that ECOMOG is in control of the situation and is presently engaged in seeking out and destroying the rebels," Shelpidi said. "Do not panic and abandon your homes at the sound of gunfire...You need to be aware that the rebels are using your fear to achieve their aims." He warned refugees to beware of "rebels who may have mingled among you, pretending to be displaced people." Civilians attempting to leave Freetown were turned back by ECOMOG troops, while others attempting trying to reach the capital were searched before being allowed to enter.

The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported Tuesday that Kabba Kargbo, a freelance journalist with the independent Pathfinder newspaper, was arrested in Freetown Tuesday afternoon by Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officers and transported to CID headquarters. The arrest came shortly after Kargbo told the BBC's Focus on Africa programme that he had witnessed Saturday's attack on Waterloo, and said that the rebels appeared to be militarily superior to ECOMOG.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie told the BBC Tuesday that his forces captured Koidu last weekend following a 48 hour battle with ECOMOG and Civil Defence Forces troops. "I can tell you we destroyed them a whole lot. It is just that we cannot talk," Bockarie said by satellite telephone. "Now today, my men reported that they have taken Masori with two armed tanks from them again and which have gone up to five now." He denied that the RUF had stepped up its military campaign to coincide with the Christmas season. "We decided to intensify our military campaign simply because the Tejan Kabbah-led government has denied the people peace. We now want to force him to adhere to peace. As we know, dialogue is only the solution to the present problem in Sierra Leone. Dialogue is the only solution to this problem. We know that and we know military option cannot solve the problem. The Nigerians are not worth enough to get us out of Sierra Leone as we are citizens of this land and we are fighting a just cause and we do not believe if there is any reason for Tejan Kabbah to kill everybody in Sierra Leone who is fighting for his or her right." Bockarie denied that the RUF was receiving any help from outside the country. "The RUF has been existing ever since without any outside support," he said. "If we had been getting support from abroad, then there is no need for them (the civilian government) to be in Freetown now." Bockarie maintained that the RUF had the capability to take Freetown. "That is our belief. Freetown is our goal and that is our target," he said. He said that the RUF was seeking dialogue and the release of their leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh, who is

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currently appealing a treason conviction and death sentence in Freetown. "We want dialogue and that Kabbah should know that Sankoh is our sole and legitimate leader of the RUF," he said. "We stand strong against the idea of imprisoning and molesting our leader. We can do anything if Kabbah does not release our leader. He is going to face the same of what he is doing now. "

**27 December:** ECOMOG troops fought AFRC/RUF rebels on Sunday for control of Makeni, an ECOMOG official said in Freetown. He said about 50 rebels were killed Saturday when Nigerian Alpha jet fighters attached to the ECOMOG force bombed rebel positions in the town. The official said he expected the planes to return to take action against take action against the rebels, who had regrouped at Makeni Teachers College. The college, which is on the outskirts of the city, is close to ECOMOG's main military base in northern Sierra Leone. "Most of the civilians in Makeni and the surrounding area have fled so we are only left face to face with the rebels," the official said. Communications links to Makeni have been cut, and no independent assessment of the situation in Makeni could be made, *Reuters* reported. Makeni residents who reached Freetown on Saturday confirmed that ECOMOG was in control, although some reported that the rebels were in parts of the town or that ECOMOG was defending the military barracks. RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie also made claims that his fighters had captured the town, saying Saturday that the rebels had killed 60 ECOMOG soldiers and dragged their bodies through the streets "as an example to everyone." Bockarie, who has threatened an AFRC/RUF rebel assault on Freetown, called on President Kabbah to resign. "Failure of Kabbah to resign, and we will start bombarding Freetown and will not stop until victory is won," Bockarie told the *Associated Press*.

Hundreds of people have reached Freetown, saying they were forced to flee rebel attacks between Thursday and Saturday on the fishing village of Tombo, just south of the capital.

A delegation headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dr. Sama Banya arrived in Abidjan, Ivory Coast on Saturday night for a meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone. In Freetown, Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer said the Sierra Leoneans will plead for additional troops to reinforce ECOMOG. A "senior Western diplomat" told *Reuters* that the Sierra Leone government may come under increased pressure to negotiate with the rebels. "There is a growing fear in the region that a new civilian government taking over in Nigeria in May next year may not want to shoulder the burden of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone," the diplomat said. "The Sierra Leone government may need to look at what happened in Mozambique in 1992. The government there concluded a successful accord with Renamo rebels, and Renamo were just as vicious as the Sierra Leone rebels." Committee members include the foreign ministers of Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia. The foreign ministers of Burkina Faso and Togo will also attend, as their countries hold the presidencies of ECOWAS and the OAU, respectively. The United States is sending its Director of the State Department Office of West African Affairs and Special Envoy to Liberia Howard Jeter, and Ambassador to Sierra Leone Joseph Melrose. Britain will be represented by its High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold. ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi will also be present.

The Sierra Leone government has condemned the mob killing of two suspected rebel spies during a demonstration in Freetown on Saturday. "Mob justice cannot be a solution to our problems as it could lead to the loss of innocent lives," a government statement broadcast over SLBS (state radio) said. "While government understands the cause of anger among the majority of Sierra Leoneans, it will not condone people taking the law into their own hands. All cases of rebels and suspected rebels must be referred to ECOMOG or the law enforcement bodies." According to news accounts, the two men were severely beaten before some in the crowd put petrol-filled tires around their necks and set them on fire. The charred bodies were taken away by police, who did not interfere with the killings.

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United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has condemned the upsurge in fighting in Sierra Leone and attempts by ARC/RUF rebels to overthrow the country's civilian government. "The Secretary-General is extremely concerned by the latest news of rebel armed activities in Sierra Leone," Annan's spokesman said in a statement issued in New York. "He condemns the refusal of the RUF and junta remnants to lay down their arms, as well as their continuing military actions...He wishes to take this opportunity to emphasise the unacceptability of attempting to overthrow duly-elected governments by force. He appeals to the rebels to lay down their arms at once and to enter the peace process without preconditions."

The government, in a radio broadcast, has condemned the evacuation of British nationals from Sierra Leone, saying it played into rebel plans to spread panic.

ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi has called on the international community to "rally round and support Sierra Leone, which is trying to restore democracy."

**26 December:** ECOMOG troops have turned back a rebel attack on Makeni, an ECOMOG spokesman said on Saturday. "The rebels can never take Makeni from us, even though they are heavily armed and in quite large numbers," he added. AFRC/RUF rebels and ECOMOG had battled for control of of the town since Thursday. A Catholic priest who was in Makeni on Friday said most residents had fled, and that rebels controlled parts of the town. A Ministry of Defence spokesman quoted by *Reuters* acknowledged that the rebels had captured part of Makeni. Sources in radio contact with the area earlier on Saturday that the fighting was continuing.

Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer said Saturday that Freetown was calm, and maintained that the security situation in Sierra Leone was firmly under the control of ECOMOG and other security forces. "As far as Government is concerned, we remain faithful to the position adopted by the United Nations Security Council with respect to the conflict in Sierra Leone, which is to simultaneously pursue the military option and dialogue," he said in a press release. Spencer said that despite media reports to the contrary, "Makeni town is in the hands of ECOMOG, although there are continuing rebel attacks on the township. With regard to Kono, no military occupation has been established in the area by the rebels. Rather, the area was invaded by marauding gangs of illegal miners, among whom are rebels. This situation is being addressed by the security forces." Spencer said that of the twelve districts in Sierra Leone, the rebels were known to operate in parts of only three. "It is also important to stress here that the rebels are currently under severe pressure in the Eastern part of the country where they have their main base," he said. "All other parts of the country are calm and secure."

British Foreign Office Minister of State for Africa Tony Lloyd reiterated Saturday Britain's support for Sierra Leone's civilian government. He made the statement as British nationals evacuated from Freetown arrived in London. "But our strong support for the democratically-elected government of President Kabbah remains undiminished," Lloyd said. "We continue to lead international support for the legitimate government in Sierra Leone, and we are in close touch with our partners in the Security Council and elsewhere on how to take things forward."

Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer, in a BBC interview on Saturday, called "absolutely false" rebel claims to have captured Makeni. "It is simply propaganda that they are trying

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to mount," he said. "They have been trying to take control of Makeni. They have been attacking the place for the past three days. They have not succeeded. They have not taken control of Makeni. Indeed, there has been fighting going on around Makeni, not right inside the town. They have been trying to get into the town and up to this point that I am talking to you they have not succeeded...ECOMOG hasn't gone on an offensive in that area. They are simply holding defensive positions, ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces in that area, and very soon they will be thrown out of the area completely." Spencer rejected a suggestion that the civilian government might be overthrown a second time by the rebels. "That is absolutely impossible. What we are going to see in the new year is the total elimination of rebel activity in this country. That I assure you. Let them wait and see. Nobody is going to run away anywhere. Even the women are saying they are going to stand up. Nobody is running away. For the Kabbah government to be removed is absolutely impossible, totally out of the question. Anybody who thinks that is dreaming. "

The ECOWAS Committee of Five foreign ministers charged with finding ways to end the Sierra Leone conflict will convene in Ivory Coast on Monday, an Ivorian official was quoted as saying on Saturday.

Thousands of demonstrators turned out in Freetown Saturday to show support for President Kabbah and to denounce rebel attacks and Liberian President Charles Taylor, whom they accuse of backing the rebels. The demonstration, called by the Citizens' Security Movement, ended outside the law courts in the center of the capital. Witnesses said youths caught and burned to death two suspected rebels during the rally.

**17 December:** RUF field commander Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie has fled Sierra Leone after allegedly executing eight senior officers loyal to RUF leader Foday Sankoh and vandalising his Field Command Headquarters, ECOMOG said in press statements released on Friday. According to ECOMOG, Bockarie fled Sierra Leone with his family in the early hours of the night of December 16 after executing the RUF officers on Wednesday. No details were provided, and there has been no independent confirmation of the report. While ECOMOG said Bockarie fled to an "undisclosed country," a diplomatic source told the Sierra Leone Web that the rebel commander had called a U.N. official to claim he was in Liberia. In an interview with the BBC on Friday, ECOMOG commander Major-General Gabriel Kpamber disclosed that Bockarie had attempted to seize the town of Segbwema earlier in the week. "Three days ago, he attempted to take a position close to the ECOMOG position in Daru," Kpamber said. "Daru is also one of our demobilisation centers. He tried to take that position by sending some troops who went in. The actual place is called Segbwema, but these troops were overpowered by the RUF chaps loyal to Foday Sankoh and thereafter, this morning, we heard that he fled the country...We are trying to ascertain the number of people he took away, but prior to this, some of the RUF officers who were apparently advising him to abide by the will of Chairman Foday Sankoh were reported to have been assassinated by him. So, we feel he has so much blood on his hands that he has decided to flee the country." Kpamber said he felt it unlikely that Bockarie had left Sierra Leone for the purpose of meeting with RUF leader and CMRRD Chairman Foday Sankoh in Monrovia. "He left the command post of the RUF, and we learned that he has vandalised the headquarters by removing the communications gadgets. Now, this would not be true if his intention was only to answer the summon of the Chairman Foday Sankoh. So, I believe he has fled." Reuters, quoting "a senior aide to Sankoh, reported Friday that the RUF had named Momoh Rogers to replace Bockarie as its new field commander in Kailahun District.

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) is being deployed in record time, the U.N. Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, Oluyemi Adeniji, said on Friday. Speaking at a joint press conference in Freetown with the UNAMSIL commander, Major-General Vijay Jetley, Adeniji emphasised that UNAMSIL was in Sierra Leone at the invitation of the government to assist with the disarmament and demobilisation process. "The deployment of UNAMSIL, contrary to the general impression that it's been long delayed is being done practically at a record time," he said, adding: "The international community is now facing its responsibility. It is not only a problem in West Africa for the West Africans." Adeniji noted that the United Nations had a primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. "There is no reason why the United Nations, which is often prepared to go elsewhere, should not come to Africa," he said. Since arriving last Sunday to take up his post, Adeniji has met with President Kabbah and senior government officials, AFRC leader and CCP Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma, ECOMOG force commander Major-General Gabriel Kpamber, the heads of diplomatic missions and political parties, and representatives of civil society. He said he was looking forward to meeting with RUF leader and CMRRD Chairman Foday Sankoh upon his return to Sierra Leone.

Two Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF - Doctors Without Borders) medical workers held by the RUF in Kailahun District for more than a week were flown by helicopter from Daru to Freetown on Thursday. MSF Country Director Giuseppe Scollo said the two, Belgian doctor Patrick Cloos and German logistics expert Klaus Leppolled "were fine when they arrived, but they said they had been depressed as they did not know their fate" while being held by the rebels. A source told the Sierra Leone Web that Dr. Cloos would soon return to Belgium." Leppolled's plans were not immediately known.

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), in an update issued on Friday and covering the period through December 14, said that an inter-agency team comprising representatives of WFP, CAD, HACU, UNICEF, OXFAM, International Medical Corps, Concern World Wide, LEONNET, Save the Children Fund (SCF) and Caritas, undertook a mission to Port Loko on December 3 to assess the condition of 6,560 internally displaced persons (IDPs) registered at the Maforki Displaced Camp. The mission recommended that the IDPs, who were found to be in need of food, water and sanitation, be relocated away from the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) camp and provided with a one-off food ration, shelter, water and sanitation. During the week ended December 5, the WFP distributed 464 tons of assorted food commodities to 31,400 beneficiaries in Kenema and Bo. The agency also delivered six tons of seed rice to Daru for distribution to farmers between Daru and Segbwema for planting in perennial swamps. "WFP has been forced to postpone distribution of some 70 tons of assorted food aid commodities to 9,400 school children under the school feeding programme in Lungi on 6 December due to security concerns," the report said.

1 of 1 DOCUMENT

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**SECTION:** Section 1; Page 6; Column 3; Foreign Desk

**LENGTH:** 1501 words

**HEADLINE:** What War Has Wrought: Sierra Leone's Sad State

**BYLINE:** By NORIMITSU ONISHI

**DATELINE:** FREETOWN, Sierra Leone

**BODY:**

Issa Alison-Konteh sat at an intersection in this capital, an unsteady stool beneath him, the gutted Piccadilly chicken grill behind him, a crumbled house beside him and two burned-out buildings before him.

The two buildings were set aflame last February, when Nigerian-led peacekeeping troops swarmed into Freetown and restored President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power. He had been ousted a year earlier by rebels who contend that they are battling a rich clique that they say runs what the United Nations ranks as the world's poorest nation.

Then in a so far vain but extremely brutal campaign to recapture the city, the rebels returned and destroyed the house and restaurant.

"The politicians do their own, the rebels do their own, and you're caught in the middle," said Mr. Alison-Konteh, 39.

After eight years of civil war between the rebels and a Government that says the guerrillas are merely out for their own gain, Sierra Leone lies in ruins, a country only in name. More than 440,000 of its people -- about 10 percent of the population -- have fled to neighboring countries. Government authority has dissolved. The main national defense force is the Kamajors, a ragtag militia of men and boys who often wear mirrors on their chests in the belief this will ward off bullets.

Until now, the Government's only significant support has come from a West African peacekeeping force headed by soldiers from sub-Saharan Africa's most populous country, Nigeria.

But that support seems about to evaporate, leaving Sierra Leone's capital under attack and its northern and eastern regions in the sway of rebels who, according to the Government, foreign diplomats and locals, terrorize residents by hacking off hands and feet of captives to show what vengeance they can deliver.

"It's a big mess," said a Western diplomat in the region. "It is not a mess that will be easy to clean up."

The reasons for this change lie in Nigeria. The former dictator there, Gen. Sani Abacha, found it useful to draw attention away from his record of abuse at home by promoting democracy abroad -- which in Sierra Leone meant

heading up the peacekeeping force known as Ecomog and restoring Mr. Kabbah to power in 1998 (the grateful Mr. Kabbah promptly renamed one of Freetown's main arteries Sani Abacha Street).

But General Abacha died in June, and his successor, Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, has promised to restore civilian rule in Nigeria and said he hopes to withdraw all its troops from Sierra Leone by May. In addition, the price of oil, Nigeria's chief source of wealth, is plummeting, slicing at the money needed to help keep Sierra Leone together.

As for Washington, it gave Ecomog $3.9 million in 1998 for peacekeeping in Sierra Leone. This year, as part of the United States' shrinking total peacekeeping budget in Africa, only $1.3 is budgeted. No reliable figures exist about the costs incurred by Nigeria, though some diplomats have suggested that they might reach as high as $1 million a day.

For now, the Nigerians are still in Freetown, a city of ruins that belies the optimism of its name, given when it was settled two centuries ago by freed slaves from Britain and America.

The first university in sub-Saharan Africa was founded here. But now there is only death, despair and devastation. Nigerian forces shell the hilly outskirts of eastern Freetown, where the rebels have fled for now, retreating from their latest offensive, launched Jan. 6, to retake this skeleton of a city.

The latest assault on Freetown followed three months during which the rebels killed and maimed villagers in eastern and northern Sierra Leone. The rebels' actions seemed to be a reaction in part to the public execution in Freetown of 24 soldiers involved in the 1997 coup against Mr. Kabbah and, more important, the death sentence handed out last October to their leader, Foday Sankoh.

Mr. Sankoh, who is appealing the death sentence and is believed to be in jail somewhere in Sierra Leone, founded the Revolutionary United Front in 1991, saying he was disgusted with the mismanagement and corruption of successive civilian Governments.

A cashiered army corporal, Mr. Sankoh directed his guerrillas from the bush. He has been seen in the outside world only a few times and is said to inspire religious devotion among his followers, an unknown number of whom are now fighting on his behalf and demanding his release.

In 1996, Mr. Sankoh signed a peace agreement with Mr. Kabbah, who had been chosen President in what were considered fair elections. The elections followed five years of rule by the military, whose young officers enriched themselves in the country's diamond mines -- tapped since by the Government and the rebels to finance their war efforts.

But the 1996 accord quickly unraveled. The military staged a coup in 1997 and invited the rebels to join them in Freetown in a partnership that lasted until February 1998 when the Nigerians helped restore Mr. Kabbah.

The rebels now trying to topple the President are made up of Mr. Sankoh's group and former members of the military. No one knows exactly how many they are; nor is there a precise number for the Ecomog forces in the country.

Mr. Sankoh's group, consisting of men and boys from rural areas, says it represents disaffected Sierra Leonans against a powerful, small elite in Freetown who exploit and monopolize the country's diamonds.

"We have vast mineral resources and yet we are the poorest country on the face of the planet," said Martin Coker, the special assistant to Sam Bockarie, the rebels' battlefield commander.

Reached in the bush on his satellite phone, Mr. Coker said: "Our people are deprived of basic human rights to health, education, and a better standard of living. It is a noble cause that we have embarked on."

Mr. Coker, who said he lived illegally in the United States for a decade and worked as carpenter in Washington until 1996, denied charges by ordinary Sierra Leonans, the Government, foreign diplomats and international

humanitarian groups that members of his organization had committed atrocities. He blamed instead the militia fighting for the Government.

Septimus Kaikai, the President's spokesman, rejected the rebels' criticisms. "There are no issues for these people," he said. "They do not have a political agenda. They do not have a religious agenda. There's no social agenda. What they're simply doing is simply personal; it's personal aggrandizement, selfishness on their part, just to amass wealth."

The Government -- along with the United States, Britain and Nigeria -- has accused Liberia of helping the rebels in Sierra Leone with arms and men. Mr. Sankoh is a longtime ally of Liberia's President, Charles Taylor, who was once a guerrilla leader himself waging an extremely vicious seven-year civil war that ended in a stalemate and in his eventual election as President.

Mr. Taylor has denied his Government's involvement in Sierra Leone, although he has said that Liberian individuals are fighting in the country.

The legacy of the Liberian war -- reflected later in wars in countries like Zaire, now Congo, Rwanda, the Congo Republic and Sierra Leone -- included the widespread use of child soldiers and the notion that unarmed citizens are fair targets. But the influence of Liberia's war may have been greatest on Sierra Leone: in addition to close ties between Mr. Sankoh and Mr. Taylor, soldiers, rebels and mercenaries from both countries are believed to have fought in each other's wars, easily crossing the porous border between the two countries.

When Sierra Leone's rebels briefly held power, they proved extremely unpopular among residents of Freetown, many of whom lined the streets this month to cheer Nigerian soldiers. After the deaths and mutilation of thousands in the capital during the latest offensive, any reconciliation with the rebels is hard to imagine.

In the city's main sports stadium, where thousands of refugees and hungry gathered, there was no talk of forgiveness.

"We want them to be flushed out of the country," said Abdul Margai, 28, whose house had been set afire by rebels. "Just kill them. We don't want to see them again."

"Just kill them," echoed Emmanuel Dijohn, 25.

On the streets, men, women and children walked in file, staring straight ahead, carrying on their heads bags of rice, branches and other tools to start over again.

"Hello! How are you? Welcome!" a woman cried to a reporter drawn to a small fire burning in the ruins of her house.

A group of boys had burned down the front of her house, leaving only a back portion, which Fatimata Koroma was now cleaning. Mrs. Koroma, 40, said she had fled the fire by jumping over a backyard fence at least two feet above her head.

"Imagine a woman like me jumping this fence and then jumping another fence higher than this one," she said.

"It was fearful," she said. "I would prefer to die than see such things again." Then she returned to cleaning the remains of her house.

http://www.nytimes.com

**GRAPHIC:** Photo: After eight years of civil war in Sierra Leone, Freetown, the capital, is a city in ruins. A soldier of the Nigerian-led intervention force checked the bag of a resident on the Main Motor Road. (Agence France-Presse)

Map of Sierra Leone shows location of Freetown: Freetown, Sierra Leone, now belies the optimism of its name.

**LOAD-DATE:** January 31, 1999

Exhibit 1.218 contained in
Annex B
to
Prosecution's Opening
Statement Motion
filed on 16/05/2007

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# Exhibit 1.219 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

Recommendations contained on pages 3 & 4

1.231

global witness

# The Usual Suspects

## Liberia's Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone

Why it's Still Possible, How it Works and How to Break the Trend

*A Report by Global Witness.*



# 3 Executive Summary

This report documents the involvement of the Liberian Government in the international markets for illegal arms and mercenaries, and how its access to these outlets has permitted Liberian President Charles Taylor and his associates to launch and maintain a mercenary attack in Côte d'Ivoire, and begin implementing an incursion into Sierra Leone.

In Côte d'Ivoire, President Charles Taylor has used his illegal arms imports and ties to groups of ex-combatants to organise, arm and deploy the two Western Ivorian[b] rebel groups: the Popular Movement for the Ivorian Great West (MPIGO)[c] and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)[d]. The Liberian Government's aim is to destabilise the current Ivorian Government and install a leader more amenable to the Liberian Government.

In Sierra Leone, the Liberian Government has planned a two-pronged attack, activating cells of well-armed, Liberian paid operatives already within Sierra Leone, which will be joined by an external force of Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) fighters attacking from Liberia. Fearing prosecution for war crimes by the Special Court in Sierra Leone, President Charles Taylor and his closest associates plan to disrupt the Court's proceedings, release ex-RUF leader Foday Sankoh, and regain full access to Sierra Leone's lucrative diamond resources. The Liberian Government's cross-border strategies, combined with the UN's continued withdrawal from Sierra Leone, are setting the stage for regional turmoil.



**Members of the Navy Rangers. 2003.**

Liberia's continued access to illegal arms and mercenaries is due to the availability of funds and logistics provided by the Liberian timber industry. The omission of timber sanctions in *Resolution 1343 (2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4287th meeting, on 7 March 2001*[e] *and Resolution 1408 (2002) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4526th meeting, on 6 May 2002*[f] has allowed Liberia to maintain regular imports of arms and cash to pay both its domestic security forces and the mercenaries recruited for Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone.

The information contained in this report results from extensive Global Witness investigative interviews and research trips conducted across four continents. The key findings are:

- The Liberian Government continues to import illegal weapons on a regular basis, which come primarily from Eastern Europe but transit through Libya, Nigeria, and France. Most weapons are delivered by ship to Buchanan and Harper ports, with shipments coming in two or three times per month. Additional deliveries are made by air to Robertsfield International airport (see When: Regular Delivery of Illegal Weapons in 2002 and 2003, page 26). Liberian logging companies remain actively involved in facilitating illegal arms shipments, both for the government's forces within Liberia and for the mercenaries fighting in Côte d'Ivoire. MWPI, based at Harper port, receives weapons at Harper port and ships them to its River Gbeh bush camp, where they are stored for use by the MPIGO and MJP rebels groups (see Where: Points of Entry for illegal arms, page 26).
- The Liberian Government is directly involved in the Côte d'Ivoire conflict through its control of the two western Ivorian rebel groups, MPIGO and MJP. President Charles Taylor's goal is to maintain a land-route to Burkina Faso, destabilise the Gbagbo regime, install one more favourable to Liberia, and create an escape route should he be threatened by the situation in Liberia.
- The MPIGO and MJP forces are comprised

[b] "Ivorian", when used in this document with regard to MPIGO and MJP, is used to define area of operation and not the nationality of combatants. Approximately 90% of MPIGO and MJP forces are paid mercenaries from Liberia and Sierra Leone.

[c] Mouvement Populaire Ivorian du Grand Ouest.

[d] Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix.

[e] Referred to in the remainder of this document as UNSC Resolution 1343 (2001).

[f] Referred to in the remainder of this document as UNSC Resolution 1408 (2002) and available in Annex X.

of 90% Liberian and Sierra Leonean mercenaries, many ex-RUF, which were assembled in Liberia and sent across in the months prior to their initial attack on 28 November 2002, under the command of Cucoo Dennis and Benjamin Yeaton. President Charles Taylor continues to maintain ties with ex-RUF forces, including Sam "Maskita" Bockarie, who commands 1,000 mercenaries fighting for Taylor in Côte d'Ivoire (see The Liberian Government in Côte d'Ivoire, page 29)

- The Liberian Government has begun implementing a plan to destabilise Sierra Leone using cells of ex-RUF, ex-Sierra Leone Army (SLA), and ex-junta[g] fighters inserted into the country. There are four cells, one based in Freetown, with additional sub-cells within the army and police forces. A second invasion force plans to attack from Liberia near the border with Foya-Kamala. President Charles Taylor's primary goal is to disrupt the functioning of the Special Court, by which he and many close associates expect to be indicted (see Plotting ahead: The Liberian Government's plans for Sierra Leone, page 31). The Liberian Government is delivering small amounts of weapons for these cells into Sierra Leone two or three times per week by small boats.
- The Liberian Government is hiding large sums of embezzled money in bank accounts in Switzerland, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. Liberian deposits in Swiss accounts are more than either Nigeria or South Africa, and are, at a minimum, approximately US$3.8 billion.
- The Oriental Timber Company and its importer to China, Global Star (Asia) Trading, have been directly linked to the large mainland Chinese timber processor Global Timber Corporation, which has very close ties to the Chinese government. All three, through a complex network of off shore companies and registrations, have a common investor.

The Liberian Government's access to the international arms and mercenary market is largely dependent on the Liberian timber industry, and the financial and logistical support it provides to this end. In order to restrict the Liberian Government's ability to engage in such aggressive, cross-border activities, Global Witness calls upon the United Nations to recognise the facilitative role the timber industry plays with this regard, and impose sanctions on timber exports.

# 4 Introduction

The illicit trade in arms and the employment of mercenaries is a worldwide problem that is growing. Brokers who deal in illicit weaponry are feeding an insatiable market in impoverished and fragile states, usually to rogue governments and rebel groups, while mercenaries roam from one conflict to another. In the case of Liberia, the arms trade spans from President Charles Taylor, timber companies, shipping agents, and brokers from Eastern Europe and Hong Kong, to facilitators in Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Libya. The result is a country and region that is deeply embedded in conflict.

Liberia has been the greatest threat to West African peace and stability for over a decade; its own civil wars spill over into neighbouring countries, and calculated moves by Liberian President Charles Taylor and his associates undermine peace and security in the region for political and economic gain (see Annex I: A Regional Analysis, page 36).

Liberian President Charles Taylor began his National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) rebellion from Côte d'Ivoire in 1989, with the aid of then president Houphouet-Boigny and future president General Robert Guei[1]. This fractious civil war eventually claimed more than 250,000 lives and displaced half the country's population[2], lasting almost a decade. Rebel leader Charles Taylor very quickly began making deals with timber companies to exploit the territory under his control, in exchange for cash and weapons.[3] The timber industry was both lucrative financially and helpful logistically, and has become even more so since Charles Taylor became President of Liberia in 1997.

President Charles Taylor was also personally involved in facilitating the Sierra Leone civil war in the 1990s through his support of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels[4], a group infamous for its use of child soldiers, amputation and mutilation

### *Targeted Sanctions*

"[Targeted sanctions] are directed against significant national decision-makers (political leaders and key supporters or a particular regime) and resources that are essential for their rule" From: Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy Option, p iii.

[g] This includes Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and pro-Taylor militias.

# 6 Cast of Characters


This list is comprehensive though not exhaustive. It includes the names behind the logistics and the finances of the arms trade. Sources and further information on the activities of individuals mentioned herein are contained in Parts One and Two of this document.


Courtesy of Global Policy

**Charles Taylor** – President of Liberia, and former NPFL warlord. Supported the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone during 1990s, and is currently behind the two splinter groups MJP and MPIGO in Côte d'Ivoire, while planning another destabilisation of Sierra Leone. Imports arms in contravention of UN sanctions, with the aid of timber companies, in which he has large, personal financial stakes.


Courtesy of Agence France Presse

**Sam Bockarie (aka Maskita)** – Former RUF commander who had been hiding in Burkina Faso until returning to Côte d'Ivoire[16] and Liberia to carry out Charles Taylor's orders. He receives orders from Taylor through Benjamin Yeaton, and commands approximately 1,000 troops in Côte d'Ivoire.


Courtesy of All About Liberia

**Daniel Chea** – Minister of Defence in Liberia and was active in Taylor's NPFL rebel incursion. He set up the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) and is in charge of its recruitment. He also oversees the remnants of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).


Courtesy of All About Liberia

**Moussa Cisse** – Chief of Protocol for the Executive Mansion. He runs the Mohammed Group of Companies (MGC), which is owned by Mohammed Salamé and involved in importing illegal weaponry[17]. He is a businessman whose association with Taylor goes back to the NPFL rebel incursion in 1989. His brother, Jebbah Cisse, is the Liberian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and Moussa uses his brother to make contacts there. Moussa Cisse was living in Côte d'Ivoire, where he has been in charge of logistics for the Liberian-backed rebels. He is on the UN travel ban and used to handle the Taylor-Guei connection[18].

**Maurice Cooper , Oscar Cooper** – Run the Inland Logging Company (ILC) and were involved in a US$2.5 million timber deal with Limad AG, a company owned by Leonid Minin who has been linked to Ukrainian organised crime. Maurice is also on the UN travel ban, having been implicated in providing financial or military support to the RUF[19].

**Cucoo Dennis (aka Captain Marvel)** – Executive of the Salami Molawi Logging Company (part of the Mohammed Group of Companies), and head of a large militia that has incorporated several of the logging company militias. He is commanding rebel troops in Côte d'Ivoire[20], has a history of recruiting and training troops for President Charles Taylor.

**Gabriel Doe** – Owner and manager of the Cavalla Timber Company (CTC) operating in Grand Gedeh and River Gee Counties. Doe is also a government official and on the UN travel ban. Before the Ivorian conflict started he was sighted in Côte d'Ivoire several times in violation of the UN travel ban.


Courtesy of All About Liberia

**Roland Duo** – Head of the National Port Authority[21], and has direct control over all the security forces in Liberian ports.

**George Dwanah (aka Jack the Rebel)** – Oversees Liberian mercenary forces fighting as MPIGO and MJP rebel in Côte d'Ivoire.

**Talal El-Ndine** – Handles President Charles Taylor's international finances for both diamond and timber deals. He is on the UN travel ban for his role as paymaster of the RUF. His offices are in Monrovia, on 13th street, Sinkor.

**Abbas Fawaz** – President and chief shareholder of Maryland Wood Processing Industries (MWPI)[22] and a close associate of President Charles Taylor. Fawaz helps oversee the importation of weaponry into Liberia through Harper Port, which is under the management of MWPI. He brought weapons in last year that were destined for use by Liberian-backed rebels in Côte d'Ivoire.

**Major Andrew Guei (aka Junior)** – Affiliated with MPIGO and MJP troops. He is the son of former Ivorian President General Robert Guei. Major Andrew Guei has taken over his father's relationship with President Charles Taylor, who knew Guei from his days as army commander under Houphouet-Boigny's government. When Robert Guei staged a bloodless coup against President Bedie in 1999, Taylor supported him.


General Guei was one of Taylor's key supporters during the rise of the NPFL.

**Philip Kibbo** – Largely unknown beyond Liberia's borders. He was in the NPFL Special Forces and one of Charles Taylor's numerous business managers since 1990. OTC pays Kibbo, who then pays the ATU.

**General Koffee** – Head of OTC's militia forces.



**Gus Kouwenhoven** – Managing Director of the OTC, the largest logging company in Liberia, and runs RTC and other smaller logging companies. He is very close to President Charles Taylor, and an integral player in the illegal arms trade. The OTC currently maintains a militia in excess of 2,500 armed fighters. OTC also manages Buchanan Port, a principal entry point for illegal arms into Liberia.



Courtesy of Liberian Orbit

**Grace Minor** – Senator and current Senate President Pro-tempore, as well as very close associate of President Charles Taylor[23]. She opened a bank account for President Charles Taylor in Switzerland in 1993, which is used for hiding embezzled funds.

**Aziz Nassour** – Lebanese diamond merchant implicated in trading for Al Qaeda via Liberia[24]. Nassour was involved in the May 2002 shipment of arms from Bulgaria to Liberia. In the past, Nassour would pay for arms that were brought in for Sam "Maskita" Bockarie, a senior RUF rebel.

**Sanjivin Ruprah** – Arms dealer for Africa, he was involved in logging before the OTC came in, and then turned his focus to diamonds. The Panel of Experts on Liberia cited a transfer of $500,000 by OTC's parent company in Singapore, Borneo Jaya Pte Ltd to San Air, an arms trafficking company owned by Ruprah. He had an office at the Executive Mansion on the same floor as President Charles Taylor's office.

**General Sackie** – Mobilised in Bong County for actions in Côte d'Ivoire. He is one of President Charles Taylor's closest operatives through his marriage with Taylor's cousin, Leilan Neufuille Sackie. He is part of the National Bureau of Intelligence (NBI), which deals with state security matters and is known for its brutality.

**Fatu Sankoh** – Former RUF-leader Foday Sankoh's wife, who is currently in Côte d'Ivoire, where the RUF had their first bases[25]. She is reported to be in Côte d'Ivoire with Johnny Paul Koroma's sister, and has been in charge of running ex-RUF and other combatants from there. The RUF were originally based in Danane but were forced out by Ivorian President Gbagbo. Fatu and Koroma's sister remain active in Abidjan, where their primary role is to secure more funds for the RUF and to gain the release of Foday Sankoh. The network that is being set up in Côte d'Ivoire is designed to be at the disposal of President Charles Taylor should he go into exile. Fatu Sankoh is trying to restructure the RUF from the outside, with the help of Bockarie and President Charles Taylor.


**William Sumo** – Chairman of the Joint Security in the southeast and liaison between the MWPI management and Charles Taylor in Maryland County. Sumo also set up a training base for the rebels in Côte d'Ivoire.

**Bob Taylor** – President Charles Taylor's brother, who serves on the Board of the Forestry Development Authority (FDA).

**Charles Taylor, Jr. (aka Chuckie)** – Son of President Charles Taylor and head of ATU. As head of the ATU, he has been implicated in numerous human rights abuses, including summary execution and torture[26].


**Joe Tuah** – Assistant Director of the Special Security Services and personally manages the unloading of weapons upon arrival into port. He is involved in importing illegal weaponry[27], as well as commanding troops in Côte d'Ivoire.

**Joseph Wong** – Executive of the OTC, suspected gunrunner, and alleged son of Global Star (Asia) Group owner. He moved to Liberia at the same time as OTC operations began. He is on the UN travel ban as the UN determined that he was involved in providing financial and military support to armed rebel groups in the region[28].



Courtesy of All About Liberia

**Benjamin Yeaton** – President Charles Taylor's most trusted security commander and Military General in charge of operations in Côte d'Ivoire, although he maintains a presence in Liberia. He is involved in importing illegal weaponry,[29] and serves as the liaison between President Charles Taylor and Sam "Maskita" Bockarie. He has been involved in the deployment of the rebels in Côte d'Ivoire[30], and is a senior figure in MPIGO and MJP acting on President Charles Taylor's behalf.


Charles Taylor
President of Liberia
Joseph Wong
Executive
OTC
Global Star (Asia)
Borneo Jaya Pte Ltd
San Air
Sanjivan Ruprah
Harper Port
Buchanan Port
National Port Authority
Maryland Wood Processing Industries
Abbas Fawaz
Roland Duo
Gus Kouwenhoven
RTC
Philip Kibbo
Aziz Nassour
Daniel Chea
Minister of Defense
Armed Forces of Liberia
Talal El-Ndine
Benjamin Yeaton
Sam "Maskita" Bockarie
RUF
Fatu Sankoh
Foday Sankoh
Head of RUF
Grace Minor
Maurice & Oscar Cooper
Bob Taylor
FDA Board Member
Gabriel Doe
Cavalla Timber Company
Robert Guei
Ex President of CDI
Major Andrew Guei
Moussa Cisse
Mohammed Group of Companies
Mohammed Salame
Jebbah Cisse
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
General Sackie
National Bureau of Intelligence
Leonid Minin
(linked to Ukrainian organised crime)
Limad AG
Inland Logging Company
Salami Molawi Logging Company
Cucoo Dennis
Joe Tuan
Assistant Director of SSS
Large militia
Liberian-backed rebels in Cote d'Ivoire MPIGO and MJP
1,000 troops
Swiss bank accounts to hide Taylor's money
$2.5 million timber deal
Shipment of arms from Bulgaria
Militia of 2,500
Gun running
Alleged Son of
Implicated in
Owner
Ships timber for
Subsidiary of
Arms trafficking
Involved in $500,000
Site of illegal weapons imports
Illegal weapons imports
Controls
Via
Manages
Money for ATU
Involved in
Maintains
Managing Director
Runs
Head
Oversees
President & Chief Shareholder
Allegedly involved in
Business manager of
Money from OTC
Set up/ Recruits for
ATU
Associate
Associates
Brother
Close friends
Supporter
Chief of Protoco
Son
Supports
In charge of logistics
Linked to
Controls finances of
Paymaster
Supporter
Gives orders from Taylor to
Commands
Commander
Former head
Married
In charge of ex-RUF rebels
Commands Troops
Commands
Run
Set up
Owns
Part of
Executive
Implicated in importing illegal weaponry
LEGEND
Liberian Government Agency
Timber company
Other company
Armed group

## *Liberia's Security Apparatus*[a]

The Liberian government has a large security apparatus, though this number fluctuates as logging company militias are often seconded into various government forces. OTC, for example, has a private militia of 2,500 troops, and is headed by General Koffee while MWPI has 500 troops. Both groups were trained by top ATU officials. Benjamin Yeaton, Director of the Special Security Services (SSS), acts as battle front commander for Liberia. Other commanders such as Roland Duo and Cocoo Dennis command their own troops and also have equal access to Liberia's President. Each of these commanders coordinates with the others but may not necessarily be subjected to the others' instructions.

**Armed Forces of Liberia:**
Headed by Daniel Chea, Minister of Defence. Largely disbanded since 1996, and replaced by the ATU and other affiliated security services.

**Special Operations Division (SOD):**
Overseen by Paul Mulbah. Officially part of the Liberian National Police, and made up mainly of ex-NPFL fighters.

**Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU):**
Commanded by Chuckie Taylor, President Charles Taylor's son. However, a Sierra Leonean called Momo Jibba from Kailahun District was reported to be head of ATU last March 2002. The ATU was created by President Charles Taylor in 1997, is notorious for its brutality, and is President Charles Taylor's most trusted security apparatus. It is comprised of approximately 90% Sierra Leonean ex-RUF combatants.

**Navy Rangers**
Commanded by Roland Duo, who is head of the National Port Authority and, as such, Chief of Security for all Liberian Ports. The Navy Rangers are a large fighting force, the bulk of whose personnel is comprised of logging company militias. They can be identified by their yellow t-shirts with "Navy Ranger" printed on the front. The group was originally referred to as the Bush Marines.

**The Marine Division**
Commanded by George Dwanah, aka Jack the Rebel. The Marine Division used to be called the "Strike Force Marines" during the NPFL insurgency. Following Taylor's election in 1997, they were disbanded but have recently being reinstated. They are made up of approximately 6,700 men and are one of the largest militia units. They used to be headed by Melvin Sogbani, who is now Minister of Post and Telecommunications

**Special Security Service (SSS)**
Commanded by Benjamin Yeaton, who also acts as head of all militias and field-commander of the war in Liberia. The SSS was created by Taylor in 1997, but is used only rarely, and particularly when foreign diplomats visit.

**Delta Force**
Commanded by Major Sam Cheplay. They are based in Fasama, in lower Lofa. They comprise 150 troops in total.

**Wild Geese**
Commanded by Major Sam Cheplay. They are a reconnaissance team of about 75 men, operating in different parts of Lofa.

**Man Moving Man Dropping**
Commanded by Major General Samuel Varney who is also the Chief of Staff of the AFL. They comprise 300 men and operate on the highway between Lofa and Gbarnga, where Cucoo Dennis heads the operation.

**Lofa Defence Force**
Commanded by George Dwanah, aka Jack the Rebel. It is made up mainly of child soldiers from Lofa, but the exact size is unknown. Massaquoi used to head the force until his death in 2000, when he was reportedly shot in the back by General Momo Gebah, Aide-de-Camp to Liberian President Charles Taylor, and former head of the ATU.

brokers in Hong Kong and mainland China (See Murder and Intrigue in the Logging Industry OTC's Chain of Custody, page 20).

Joseph Wong, Director of OTC and subject to the UN travel ban for his role in supporting armed rebel groups in region[65], is alleged to have used connections with Hong Kong and mainland China to procure weapons for shipment from the Freeport of Hong Kong on behalf of OTC[66]. The use of Hong Kong Freeport is not unusual in arms smuggling. According to an investigative report in July 2002, China's two largest arms factories, Norinco and Poly Technology, provided weaponry to underground arms brokers[67]. Goods were then shipped in crates and sometimes by cargo ship from Hong Kong to destination ports.

**Nigeria:**

There has been an increase in arms and ammunition being shipped from Nigeria to Liberia[68]. Whether or not this is state-sanctioned is uncertain. However, evidence points to a several indicators that some government knowledge may indeed exist.


A Nigerian diplomat in Monrovia arranges shipments to Liberia from Nigeria. He currently coordinates the arms transfers between the Nigerian and Liberian Governments. In September 2002, he was staying at the Metropolitan Hotel, Broad Street, Monrovia, in room 308[69]. President Charles Taylor has since arranged a house for him in Congo town.[70]

Significant arms shipments from Nigeria to Liberia are delivered by sea. Arms are first shipped or flown into Nigeria, then transferred in containers to smaller cargo boats, which sail disguised as supplies[71]. Arms are also transferred to smaller fishing boats on the high seas to avoid detection[72]. The Nigerian government is also involved in arms-shipments to Sierra Leone for the Liberian Government[73] (see Plotting ahead: The Liberian Government's plans for Sierra Leone, page 31).


**Libya and Burkina Faso:**

Taylor went to Libya in the late 1980s, where he was trained by Libyan leader Colonel Ghaddafi to launch a rebellion against the government of then-Liberian president Samuel Doe. It was through the support of Ghaddafi that Taylor organised his National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL). Taylor had been introduced to Ghaddafi through Blaise Campaore, President of Burkina Faso and who was then an officer in the Burkina Faso army[74]. It was in Libya that Taylor met Ibrahim Bah, the Senegalese soldier of fortune who would become Taylor's main fixer of illegal diamond and arms deals[75]. Today, both Burkina Faso and Libya act as transhipment points for arms destined for Liberia[76].

[x] A company that deals in various types of weaponry from aviation engines to infrared missiles.




i 2



订 购 合 同

PURCHASE CONTRACT

NO.:

DATE:

PLACE:

甲方: 中航技国际租赁有限公司

The Buyer: CHINA NATIONAL AERO-TECHNOLOGY IMPORT & EXPORT CORPORATION (CATIC) INTERNATIONAL LEASING CO., LTD.

ADDRESS: 28 F., CATIC TOWER, 212 JIANG NING ROAD SHANGHAI, CHINA

TEL: 0086 - 21 - 52995399 FAX: 0086 - 21 - 52995390

乙方: 利马德集团

The Seller: Limad AG

ADDRESS: 2 METALLSTRASSE CH-6304 ZUG SWITZERLAND

TEL: 0041- 41 - 7287928 FAX: 0041 -41- 7287929

经买卖双方同意，由买方向卖方购进下列货物，并按下述条款签定合同。

This Contract is made by and between the Buyer and the Seller, whereby the Buyer agrees to buy and Seller agrees to sell the under mentioned commodity according to the terms and conditions stipulated below:

一、商品介绍:

COMMODITY INTRODUCTION

(1)产地: 利比里亚

(1) COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Liberia

(2)商品名称:

(2) NAME OF COMMODITY

a. 塔希西娃木或科戈拉（利比里亚）

a Tetraberlinia tubmaniana J Leonard or Gola (Liberia)

b. 非洲檀或姆比利（利比里亚）

b Canarium schweinfurthii Engl or Billi (Liberia)

**Timber deal between Chinese government-owned company and Limad AG, owned by arms dealer Leonid Minin. 1999.**

Guns (GPMs), sub-machine guns (SMGs), RPGs, as well as BZTs, M-16 rifles and PKM machine guns. The majority of weapons for LURD come from Guinea, some are also taken from the AFL when LURD rebels learn that the AFL has been re-supplied[81].

- The UN Panel of Experts also listed weaponry including hand grenades, automatic and long range rifles and ammunition (see Annex V: List, page 49)

**Helicopters:**

There are currently four operational helicopters in Liberia, including one owned by OTC. The government has three – two can go from Monrovia up to the Lofa/Foya area without stopping to refuel. One of these is a police helicopter, and marked "Police", the other is marked "ATU 003", and is an MI8 helicopter. One of the government's helicopters is painted in camouflage.

Recent reports have mentioned the existence of a helicopter gunship owned by the Liberian Government[82]. This could either be true, explaining the recent increase in imports of heavy-weaponry; or it could be a case of mistaken identity, confusing it with one of the helicopters mentioned above that does in fact exist with a Multi-Purpose Machine Gun (MPMG)[83] mounted onto it. OTC currently has a small MI2 helicopter, based at Gus Kouwenhoven's Hotel Africa compound in Monrovia. It is used to fly supplies up to the Lofa/Foya area. Ukrainian pilots who fly the helicopters stay in Hotel Komoma on 24th street in Sinkor. The Komoma Hotel is owned by Ms Kadiatu Diarra, one of President Charles Taylor's business managers[84].



**Members of Navy Rangers, including child soldier, using illegally imported weapons. 2003.**

## A Failed Audit

In UN Resolution 1408 (2002) the Security Council, highlighting concerns over the misappropriation of revenue from the logging industry and shipping and corporate registries, called upon the Liberian government "to take urgent steps, including through the establishment of transparent and internationally verifiable audit regimes, to ensure that revenue derived by the Government of Liberia from the Liberian Shipping Registry and the Liberian timber industry is used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes, and is not used in violation of this resolution". The Government of Liberia was ordered to respond within three months, by 7 August 2002.

What has ensued is a year of stalling and attempts to pass off substandard submissions to the Council as compliance. The Government of Liberia did not respond to the initial demand until mid September, and that submission was unanimously dismissed by the Security Council as unacceptable[27]. In response, the government of Liberia offered up a tender to international auditing firms to do the work, and very quickly chose Deloitte & Touche's Ghana office[28].

However, the deal was rife with conflicts of interest, raising legitimate doubts about the accuracy and validity of any end product. First, the Liberian government chose the small Ghanaian country office of Deloitte & Touche, to be staffed by an audit team of mainly Liberians and Ghanaians. Moreover, while Deloitte & Touche Ghana was to act as official auditor, and thus bring the international credibility the Liberian government desired, the real auditing work was in fact sub-contracted to a small, Monrovia-based firm called Voscon, which is personally owned by the Deloitte team's lead auditor, a Liberian named George Fonderson[29]. Moreover, the draft terms of reference were chiefly a systems audit of procedures, and not a retrospective review of funds received and/or missing[30].

In response, Global Witness and others expressed their concerns to the parent company Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu over a period of months from October 2002[31]. Eventually, on 13 December, Global Witness received word from Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CEO James Copeland that the contract had been terminated with immediate effect, thus ending another attempt by the Liberian government to deceive the Security Council and international community. No other reputable auditing firm has signed an agreement with the Government of Liberia to perform the audit, although according to the Secretary-General's report from February 2003, "Viscon" is proceeding with implementation of temporary measures[32].

## 10 When: Regular Delivery of Illegal Weapons in 2002 and 2003

The importation of weapons to Liberia is frequent and regular. The mode of transport is mainly by sea and by air. Imports by air are flown into Robertsfield International Airport (RIA) usually in the early hours of the morning before sunrise to avoid attracting attention. Imports by ship happen on average of 2-3 times per month and depend on the timber industry. The following list of shipments of arms came to Liberia in 2002 and 2003, and is not exhaustive.

- On 16 February, an arms shipment aboard a Boeing 707 left Kinshasa in DR Congo at 07:40 hours, arriving at Robertfield at 1921 hours[85].
- On 05 February 2003, an Antonov aircraft departed Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso at 0358 hours, eventually arriving at Robertsfield at 00:32 on 06 February 2003, with a consignment of weapons[86].
- On the 19 December 2002, the MV Posen brought illicit arms to Harper Port for the use of the MPIGO and MJP rebels in Côte d'Ivoire. It unloaded 19 camouflaged trucks; all had sealed containers on board loaded with arms and ammunitions[87].
- In October and December 2002, the Liberian coastguard gunboat VB2, also called 467 by local security forces, made regular trips to Harper under the pretence of bringing food supplies for forces in the southeast. Following a tip off, Global Witness investigators began to closely monitor activities in the port while the vessel was docked there. It was discovered that the vessel was there to transfer arms and ammunitions from a vessel stationed at high seas. Several containers carrying arms and ammunitions were delivered by the gun boat to the Harper port and then temporarily housed in the MWPI warehouse before being transferred to the MWPI bush camp at River Gbeh for storage. River Gbeh now serves as the nerve centre for the operations of the rebel groups[88].
- As mentioned above, in September 2002 food aid was given to Liberia from Libya. Global Witness investigations have found that the consignment of rice in fact accompanied a weapons shipment from Libya. The vessel was docked at Buchanan port for two weeks[89].
- In July 2002, there was a 15-ton weapons shipment that was organised in the same way and by the same people as the shipment in May. Most of the cargo was ammunition, shipped in containers painted navy blue and grey. Upon docking, the containers were loaded by ATU members onto commercial trucks and driven to Gbarnga via Zwedru for use in Lofa. As in May, Joe Tuah oversaw the offloading of weapons[90].
- In May 2002 a 30-ton weapons-shipment was sent from Bulgaria via Nice on the Arktis Fighter, a logging ship. Logistics were handled in Nice by a French arms broker. OTC provided the vessel, and the shipment was unloaded at Harper port, managed by Maryland Wood Processing Industries (MWPI), with the offloading overseen by Joe Tuah and staffed by ATU members. The broker has been involved in shipping weapons from Bulgaria to Liberia since 1991 and has strong ties in both countries. He stopped shipping weapons in 1998, and the May 2002 shipment marked his return as a supplier to Liberia. Aziz Nassour paid for the shipment, which consisted mainly of AK47s and RPGs and GLOCK machine guns that were given to President Charles Taylor's top commanders, including Benjamin Yeaton[91].

## 11 Where: Points of Entry for illegal arms

The imports of weapons come by air, land and sea. Robertsfield International Airport (RIA) is the primary point of import for weapons shipped by air. Weapons imported by land used to enter via Man and Danane in Côte d'Ivoire, however, with the change in regime from Guei to Gbagbo, and given the present hostilities, the overland route is not used as often. Liberia has four major seaports. They are the Buchanan Port, operated by the OTC; Harper Port, run by the MWPI; Greenville Port, run by ILC; and the Freeport of Monrovia. When an arms shipment is made, port-security is heightened and overseen by Joe Tuah, Assistant Director of the Special Security Service (SSS), while Roland Duo, head of all port security, handles security logistics. When weapons shipments arrive receipts are made

that have neither stamps nor signatures[92]. After weapons are unloaded they are stored near the ports in Buchanan and Harper before being moved to Monrovia, Gbarnga or other destinations[93].

While weapons continue to come into Buchanan port, imports to Harper Port have increased. The following are details of the logistics of imports by sea.

Buchanan Port: As this port remains under the management of the OTC, so are the logistics of illicit arms imports into this location. This port has been the primary location for arms imports by sea and is overseen by Gus Kouwenhoven.

Harper Port: Remains under the management of MWPI. Weapons are entering this port with increasing regularity. The management and logistics are conducted by MWPI on behalf of OTC, which arranges the actual arms deals. Upon arrival, General William Sumo handles the local logistical aspects of supervising offloading, temporary storage in the MWPI warehouse, and onward land transport to River Gbeh from where the arms are transported to other parts of Liberia and into Côte d'Ivoire for the use by the MPIGO and MJP rebel groups (see The Liberian Government in Côte d'Ivoire, page 29).

## 12 Why: Liberia's appetite for weapons





President Taylor continues to import arms because he constantly needs to fuel his expanding involvement in the region's instabilities. The more widespread his involvement, the more crucial his weapons re-supplies via logging ships and airplanes become. Taylor effectively leverages the lucrative logging concessions that he controls as head of state, to ensure logging companies provide not only a steady supply of illicit weapons and militia fighters to fuel his regional ambitions, but also supply money with which to finance his military operations and his own corruption. His use of logging ships by which to import arms is also a convenience, as the ships are tied to the logging industry and thus their regular arrival and departure does not raise much notice. As mentioned previously, it is extremely difficulty to track the route of ships internationally should one wish to investigate.

The institutionalised structures that make the arms trade with Liberia possible have sustained conflict in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, threatened peace in Sierra Leone and perpetuated the build-up of Liberian mercenaries in the region.



**Navy Rangers and other pro-Liberian Government fighters. 2003.**

# PART TWO: Rebels without a Cause: Liberian Government Mercenaries in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone


*Part Two*

The region encompassing Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia is one of the most problematic and violent in the world, and at the core of this is the Liberian Government. The international community has placed sanctions on Liberia for its role in fuelling regional conflict. However, these sanctions have not been comprehensive enough and have not contributed to lasting peace in the region.

Liberian President Charles Taylor continues to finance the training of militias and continued import of illegal arms and ammunition. In essence, the Security Council's failure to sanction timber has allowed for the continuation of cross-border activities and regional destabilisation led by Liberia's government and the build-up of forces.

The Liberian Government has a strong security apparatus, many of the members of which have been designated for the ongoing insurgency in Côte d'Ivoire and planned destabilisation of Sierra Leone (see Plotting ahead: The Liberian Government's plans for Sierra Leone, page 31). The fact that logging companies have their own militias means that the number of fighters available to the government increases significantly. The Oriental Timber Company (OTC), for example, has a force of 2,500 militiamen[94], many of whom are absorbed into government security groups, such as the ATU, when required[95].

A significant contingent of Sierra Leonean ATU and other militia forces were ordered by Benjamin Yeaton to report to Camp Base in Gbarnga for a military briefing[96]. The meeting, held on 17 October 2002, was led by Sam "Maskita" Bockarie who briefed those assembled about the operations designed for both Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. Approximately 2,000 men were designated to fight, split equally between the operations in both countries. The group destined for Côte d'Ivoire was to return, upon successful completion of their aims, to reinforce the troops designated for Sierra Leone[97]. This section details the actions planned for both countries.



Présidence de la République
Le Président

République de Côte d'Ivoire
Union - Discipline - Travail

Abidjan, le 26 Mai 2000

N°22/PR

CERTIFICAT D'ACHAT

Nous, son Excellence Général de Brigade, Robert GUEI, Ministre de la Defense de la République de Cote d'Ivoire autorisons la Compagnie AVIA TREND representee par Monsieur CHERNY VALERY de conclure le contrat d'achat des articles ci-dessous désignés :

| N° D'ORDRE | LIBELLES | QUANTITES |
|---|---|---|
| 12 | [illegible] | 100 |
| 13 | [illegible] | 100 |
| 14 | [illegible] | 50 |
| 1 | [illegible] | 50 |
| 2 | [illegible] | 1 500 |
| 3 | [illegible] | 1 500 |
| 4 | [illegible] | 1000 |
| 5 | [illegible] | 1000 |
| 6 | [illegible] | 1 500 |
| 7 | [illegible] | 1000 |
| 8 | [illegible] | 50 |
| 9 | [illegible] | 50 |
| 10 | [illegible] | 2000 |
| 11 | [illegible] | 200 |
| 12 | [illegible] | |
| 13 | [illegible] | |
| 14 | [illegible] | 150 |
| 15 | [illegible] | 5000 |
| 1 | [illegible] | 150 |
| 2 | [illegible] | 1500 |
| 3 | [illegible] | 50 |
| 4 | [illegible] | 50 500 |
| 5 | [illegible] | 10 500 |
| 6 | [illegible] | |
| 7 | [illegible] | 1 200 |
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| 9 | [illegible] | 2 500 |
| 10 | [illegible] | 10 500 |
| 11 | [illegible] | 50 |
| 12 | [illegible] | 250 |

Nous Ministre de la Defense de la République de Côte d'Ivoire certifions que ces presents articles sont exclusivement pour utilisation et emploi sur le territoire ivoirien et non pour exportation dans un pays tiers.

Le Président de la République

Général Robert GUEI

**Arms list found on Leonid Minin, signed by then-President of Cote d'Ivoire Robert Guei. 2000.**

## *President Charles Taylor and his days at NPFL*

With Libyan, Burkinabé and Ivorian support, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) massed its troops in Côte d'Ivoire , and entered Liberia on Christmas Eve 1989. The ensuing civil war, which saw the involvement of ECOMOG forces and various rebel groups, was marked by its excesses of human rights abuses committed by all sides, with particularly brutal tactics employed by the NPFL. The war ended officially with the signing of a peace accord on August 19, 1995 and the creation of an interim government. In July 1997, Charles Taylor was elected as head of state.[43]

or plane in Sierra Leone. It was thought the ensuing security concerns would disrupt the functioning of the Special Court; however, the plan was never carried out[127].

President Charles Taylor's interest in Sierra Leone is also economic. President Charles Taylor has been closely planning the resurgence of the RUF and illicit diamond deals with Foday Sankoh's wife, Fatu Sankoh, who is currently in Côte d'Ivoire[128]. In September 2002, Global Witness investigations uncovered that Fatu Sankoh had been trying to set up a meeting with President Charles Taylor and Sam "Maskita" Bockarie. Bockarie was allegedly hesitant to meet because of misgivings he had towards Fatu Sankoh[129]. This meeting reportedly took place in August in Burkina Faso. Present were the wives of President Charles Taylor and Fatu Sankoh and Sam "Maskita" Bockarie. The meeting mandated Sam "Maskita" Bockarie to conduct work between Burkina Faso and eastern Sierra Leone[130].


### 14.1 Tapping old sources: Liberia's Recruitment and Deployment of soldiers in Sierra Leone

President Charles Taylor maintains close ties with people with whom he navigated the rise of the RUF and with whom he plotted his own violent rise to power. When the RUF was disbanded, President Charles Taylor absorbed a sizeable amount of Sierra Leonean ex-RUF, ex-SLA and ex-AFRC military into his own security forces, most notably into the ATU. These forces now provide

> The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment (from the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone).

Taylor with troops who have invaluable knowledge of Sierra Leonean terrain and also contacts in Sierra Leone. Given the fears of Taylor and his entourage about indictment by the Special Court for war crimes, the Liberian Government plans to destabilise Sierra Leone starting from two points, the capital Freetown and from the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone:

- On 17 October 2002 troops were amassed in Liberia for destabilisation attempts in Sierra Leone. They were gathered at Gbarnga and briefed by Sam "Maskita" Bockarie. They were to enter Sierra Leone at Koindu and Bomaru in Kailahun district when called upon to do so[132]. These troops would then



Pa'o Kowa

Freetown, Republic of Sierra Leone

11 June, 1997

Dear Mr. Charles Taylor,

I have pleasure to inform you that I had a talk with your brother in Freetown who introduced himself to me as Mr. Charles Taylor a few days after the overthrow of former President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on 2. May, 1997 on I my assuming the office of Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Head of State of Sierra Leone. As brothers and immediate neighbours, I decided to take advantage of his return to Liberia to brief you on the recent political developments in Sierra Leone that led to the military take over.

In addressing the matter

Another area where you can be of great assistance to us is to give every support to our present efforts to forestall the threat of an imminent Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention forces in our country as this would only further endanger the peace and stability we are at present trying to restore. Furthermore, we need your support in deploring the present military build up of ECOMOG Forces in Sierra Leone in flagrant violation of our sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Finally, I hope you will take me in confidence as your brother and give what ever counsel you can that would bring about a peaceful settlement of this crisis which, to me, is purely an internal matter which ECOMOG wants to blow out of proportions.

Your truly

MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
CHAIRMAN, ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (AFRC) AND HEAD OF STATE

**Letter from AFRC leader J.P. Koroma to President Charles Taylor. 11 June 1997.**

> ## *The Special Court*
>
> The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone (from the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone).

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NEW DEMOCRAT WEEKLY

# Will Gov't. Turn Over "Rebel Collaborators" TO ECOMOG?

## Justice Min. Comments Today

00031366



Gen. Abdusalam Abubackar



Justice Min. Edington Varmah

The government's official position on Nigeria's request to turn over those arrested for allegedly collaborating with the junta forces in Sierra Leone is expected to be made public today when Justice Minister Eddington Varmah appears on the DC talk show to discuss national issues.

Organizers of the program said in an announcement yesterday that the Justice Minister will serve as guest this morning on their program, DC Talk. They said he will be answering questions from the public on whether the RUF junta rebels have a base in Liberia as is being widely held and whether Liberia is lending support to the rebels as claimed by the international community.

Min. Varman is also expected to explain the government's position on its recent arrest of people it described as "collaborators" of junta rebels in Sierra Leone and say whether the government will turn them over to ECOMOG as requested by Nigeria or conduct its own investigation into the matter.

Nigeria has asked Liberia to turn over to ECOMOG (the West African Peacekeeping Force) certain persons it arrested and described as "collaborators" of the ousted junta rebels fighting the Sierra Leone government. Nigeria's request is expected to allow ECOMOG conduct full-scale investigation into the acts of the arrested "junta collaborators"

Liberia recently [illegible] within its territory [illegible] arrested a number of people [illegible] with a conspiracy [illegible] Ecomog [illegible] Joseph Taha was also arrested on charges that they have been collaborating with the RUF/AFRC rebels.

Ousted junta leaders [illegible] came again overthrow the government of President Tejan Kabbah continue to carry out [illegible] execution and [illegible] of civilians and other forms of extreme torture. They also destroy any of Sierra Leone's vital infrastructure in sight.

The international community has condemned the disastrous acts of the rebels. Britain, United States and Nigeria have accused Liberia of supporting the rebels but Liberia has always denied the allegations.

A press release from the Nigerian Embassy in Monrovia said the Federal Government has taken due note of the announcement by the Liberian authorities of the arrest in Monrovia Wednesday, February 17, 1999 of certain persons is described as "collaborators" of the Sierra Leone RUF/AFRC rebels.

It said this development is a clear vindication of the Federal

Cont'd on Page 6

## Treason Trial In -Court

One of the defendants standing trial on treason charges the allegedly attempting to overthrow the government Friday described the trial as a cover up designed to pin some people.

University lecturer Charles [illegible] told the court that there were two writs of arrest served on him for one crime while in police detention. The first writ said he and his co-defendants attempted to attack the government.

But he asked "What constituted this attempt" If we attempted on

## Accused Ex In Poll

Former presidential Affa Minister Charles Bonner Fy explained his ordeals at the hand the police while in detention charges of attempting to overt the government.

A lecturer of English Linguistics at the Universi Liberia and Chairman of Lan Department of the Zion Uni College in Monrovia, he said arrested September 19, [illegible] stripped naked and [illegible] the police cells in Cong

He said he was served writs of arrest and as in charging with 'attempting the government. He said writs and indictment had "This trial is to suffer an i were jailed on that writ other writ that we are be today was being prepar with was issued in a "Let's arrest them, put and we go look for charge and evidence later", he informed the

"Since my arrest, I injuries of dislocate swollen left eye and ear drum". He said month of his de never allowed to injuries sustained

## Trial Heard

One of the ac case involving to the Criminal trying them the under which are being put Charles Breez government's towards pro animosity an

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# For Alleged Involvement in Sa. Leone Crisis

# Liberia May Face Sanctions

## JPC Urges Gov't To Probe Accusation

The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) says in the face of numerous allegations of Liberia's support to the rebellion in Sierra Leone, talks are currently being held in the international community about the likelihood of the imposition of sanctions against Liberia.

The JPC said it is not clear what forms these sanctions may take, but what is clear, the human rights organization noted, is that the Liberian people will be the ones to suffer the effects of such sanctions when imposed.

Against this background, the Catholic human rights organization pointed out that the allegations coming from the international community, in particular ECOWAS



Stephen Wreh-Wilson
JPC Boss

member states, including Nigeria, and from the United States of America, Liberia's oldest traditional friend, the government of Liberia should launch a full investigation into these allegations as a first step in laying the matter to rest once and for all.

"The Commission takes cognizance of Government's denials of involvement in Sierra Leone. However, the Commission urges government to go beyond bare denials by launching a full scale investigation into these allegations," the Commission said.

The JPC made these observations in a press statement titled, "On the Prevailing Situation in the Country", issued February 19, 1999 which covered recent developments in the country.

Continuing with its concerns on the

Cont'd on Page 6

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# TION THIS WEEK

## molition Exercise Suspended



**ght with shop owners**

"Since the exercise began, complaints have poured into our offices alleging mistreatment and maltreatment of victims by police officers conducting the exercise. Many of these people are well meaning people who once cared and fared for their families well enough but are now unable to do so owing to the effects of the devastating 7 year long civil conflict," the JPC noted in its February 19, 1999 situation report.

The Catholic Commission said against the backdrop of very high unemployment, a virtually stagnant and depressed economy and the complete absence of a social safety net to cushion the resultant effects of the demolition exercise, indications are that the exercise is causing more harm than good as it is leaving many, particularly low income earning families in distress.

Besides, the Commission pointed out that a research it has conducted reveals that the demolition exercise is being carried out without any significant input by the Ministry of Public Works. The Ministry is charged with the responsibility to enforce zoning regulations in the city of Monrovia, which is done within the framework of the Zoning Act. Chapter 4 sub section 4.1 of the Zoning Act entitled Exceptions and Exemptions, says the Zoning Council may issue a permit to anyone wishing to erect certain prescribed structures within residential or business districts. Regrettably, "the Commission notes that the demolition of structures without first determining whether those structures were erected without proper authority or without doing same properly through the courts is the wrong way to proceed as it violates the rights of victims, most of whom are poor and lack the wherewithal, both political and economic, to secure adequate and proper redress before the law.

**Read The *New Democrat Weekly* Every Tuesday & Thursday**

## Liberia May Face Sanctions

everything in its power to discourage and to bring to justice those found guilty of involvement in Sierra Leone.

On Liberia's relations with her neighbors, the JPC said the current chill in relations between Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria, which stemmed from the situation in Sierra Leone does not augur well for sustained peace and stability in Liberia and the sub-region.

Besides, the JPC said utterances from various government officials on the matter has only confused the situation even more and has tended to lend credence to the accusations currently being levied against Liberia in the international media. The human rights organization noted that in the face of the prevailing situation, "our country could face isolation in the international community if rapid progress is not made in the restoration of normal relations with Sierra Leone and other countries in the sub-region." In addition, the organization called on the government to take the lead in efforts to restore peace and normalcy to Sierra Leone.

It can be recalled that when the RUF/AFRC Junta rebels under the command of Sam Bockarie, alias "General Mosquito," launched an ill-fated military onslaught to seize power in Sierra Leone last December, relations between Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria turned sour as the two countries who played a pivotal role in ending the Liberia civil crisis, accused the Government of Liberia of allegedly supporting the rebel forces, an allegation Liberia continues to deny.

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[redacted]

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 1999

## IN SIERRA LEONE

# OVER 300 LIBERIAN FIGHTERS KILLED



Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma.

Reports monitored from the international wire by the National Chronicle Newspaper yesterday have said that over 300 Liberian fighters have been killed by the RUF/AFRC rebel forces in Sierra Leone.

According to the reports, the Liberians had been fighting alongside the RUF/AFRC rebels against the combined forces of the Sierra Leonean Government and the West African Peacekeeping Force, ECOMOG.

The more than 300 Liberians were reportedly rounded up and slaughtered by the Sierra Leonean rebels in Segbwema in the Eastern District of Kailahun. The RUF/AFRC forces are said to be blaming their Liberian counterparts for the mass death of most of their men by ECOMOG during the battle for the capture of Freetown in January this year.

The reports said that as a result of the killing of the Liberians, the RUF/AFRC rebels and the remaining Liberian mercenaries have

TURN TO PAGE 6

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## SAWYER

contained in its 1998 report by the Administrative Board of the First United Methodist Church on Ashmun Street. The report carries the signatures of Getrude Brewer, Chairperson; John Flama, Secretary and Stephen Dweh, Treasurer.

When contacted at his Mamba Point residence to get his side of the story, our reporter was told by his personal security that he has left the country since three weeks now. When pressed for

six-year plan of action.

Having patiently calmed the weepers during a brief reception at his then office, Senator Brumskine was finally seen vacating the ground of the Capitol and did not return to Session.

Meanwhile, Montserrado County Senior Senator Grace Beatrice Minor lauded Senator Brumskine for resigning his post as a gentleman, reports J.T. Blamiyon.

## FINANCE

also happy because he succeeded in building a strong foundation for accountability and transparency at the Finance Ministry. He promised to always make himself available when ever he is called upon.

## SENATE HOLDS

to fill the vacancy.


The Senate later voted on the motion with 17 for, 1 against and 1 abstention. The President of the Senate, Vice President Enoch Dogolea than mandated the Secretary of the

letter from the Mansion until today.

## 300 LIBERIANS

fallen apart.

In a related development, the President elect of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo has assured the Sierra Leonean Government that his administration will continue to support ECOMOG's military operations in that country in the interest of lasting peace in the West African sub-region.



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Liberian
# Daily News

VOL.3 #52, THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 1994 MONROVIA,LIBERIA PRICE $1.00

Following Sheriff's defeat:


# ULIMO contemplates replacing Ziah

Hours after the five-man State Council elected its officials at the United Nations Riverview Compound in Virginia, there are reports that the ULIMO High Command is contemplating to replace one of its representatives, Mr. Thomas Ziah, who was recently elected vice chairman of the Council.

It is not reports say that readily known who ULIMO has decided will succeed Mr. to take the stance Ziah if ULIMO because the takes the latter movement has decision. However, allegedly lost confidence in Mr. Ziah, for what was termed his "dubious role" during the just-ended elections held Monday, March 1, 1994.

Mr. Ziah a ULIMO representative on the Council, is occupying the post of vice Chairman of the Council but, resigned last Sunday to contest the chairmanship of the Council which had been vacant for some months as a result

cont'd on p-6



Vice Chairman Ziah

## In Rivercess Co.: NPFL burns 200 alive

Over 200 people were last Thursday burned alive when fighters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) set a town ablaze in Rivercess County.

Darsaw Town is said to have come under attack at mid-night while its residents were at sleep.

The town was reportedly used as one of the bases of the Liberia Peace Council (LPC's) since it captured Rivercess County last year.

A returnee told this paper that those burnt included women, men and children and other displaced people from Monrovia and Buchanan who took refuge with their relatives since 1990.

Our source who fled the area said

cont'd on p-6

## UNOMIL deploys in Maryland Co.

The United Nations Observer mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) have been deployed in Harper, Maryland County.

According to a UNOMIL release, the team was received with enthusiasms by the citizens of the county and surrounding towns and villages.



Gen. Opande

Recently, the Chief Military Officer (CMO) of UNOMIL visited Gbarnga, Yekepa, Louguato, Ganta, Sanniquellie, Butuo, Tappita, among others.

In Gbarnga and

cont'd on p-3

## ANNOUNCEMENT

**The Ecumenical Women's Organization will be observing the World Day of Prayer on March 4th at 2:00P.M. at Trinity Cathedral on Broad Street. All Church Women are asked to be in attendance. Dress for the occasion is white.**

**Signed: J. Ebba-Davidson**
**Secretary**
**Approved: Eva Jorkey**
**President**

**LOTTO**



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**EASY TO WIN**
**Every TUESDAY and FRIDAY**

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**Last Machine Numbers**

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | 9 | 52 | 23 | 13 |
| 38 | 58 | 42 | 29 | 71 |

**WITH ONLY $ 10!!!**

**WIN UP TO $ 300,000**

## ULIMO

cont'd from p-6

of Mr. Bismarck Kuyon's removal by IGNU. Kuyon was serving as chairman at the time.

An unimpeachable source quipped to this paper that ULIMO is taking the stance against Ziah because the movement feels that he had "betrayed" them by not voting for Dr. Sheriff.

According to the results, even if Ziah had voted for Dr. Sheriff, he would stilled not have won because, it would have been a tie. Banks, another contestant would have been the tie breaker and from indications, Banks was surely going to vote in for Kpormakpor.

This paper learned that ULIMO is pointing fingers at Ziah, accusing him of allegedly been bribed by IGNU to take side with the government.

None of the ULIMO top brass could be reached up to press time for confirmation or denial of the issue yesterday, as most of them are said to be in Bomi County trying desperately to calm their fighters who had reportedly gone amok when the news broke that Dr. Sheriff had lost all during the elections.

Under the Cotonou Accord, all parties have a right to replace any of its representatives on the Council prior to the seating of the LNTG on March 7.

In keeping with this provision, the NPFL and IGNU have respectively caused a change in their respective nominations to the Council, the NPFL being the first to do so.

## NPFL

cont'd from p-1

among those who are believed to be buried in mass Jolie Summer

Reporter, V. Daniel Sonpon and her husband Landor Kollar along with their entire family.

Our sources also said the Open Bible Mission which is about half a-mile from the town, was also burnt.

The mission had been used as a training base by the LPC when they took over the county.

The returnee said the NPFL hit the town from Yarnee District through Twoe, a border town with Timbo District, where Darsaw Town is located.

Meanwhile, over 5000 civilians from the county are making their way to Buchanan, while others have fled into the bushes in safety.

Our source further explained that since the attack last Thursday which forced the few LPC Fighters in the town to take to their heels, NPFL fighters have gone on the rampage burning town and villages.

He named Taykon and other villages along the road to Centos City as being among those burnt by the front.

This paper recently reported that over 32 people were killed in Riverces by forces of the National Patriotic Front on accusation that the victims were supporters of the Liberian Peace Council.

IT was also reported that the NPFL was on the rampage in Yarnee District raping women as well as killing and burning down towns in the district for what they term, supporting LPC.

## UNOMIL

cont'd from p-1

Yesterday, he discussed with the top officials authorities on the implementation of the cessation of the conflict.

The CMO further discussed the submission of essential information regarding number of combatants, locations, number of prisoners of war and locations of mines.

In his visit to other areas (not named in the release), the CMO assessed the state of prepared of the sites for the deployment of UNOMIL and ECOMOG.

## EAGLES

cont'd from p-7

The girls of Wells Hairston convincingly walloped Christian Foundation 13-0 to also move to the final which is reportedly scheduled for next week.

## OPPONG

cont'd from Page 7

he noted helped to impart some good discipline in him.

He added that this was one of the best ways Weah could demonstrate his love for the LFA.

Receiving the items LFA Secretary-General, Sackie Kennedy, expressed thanks and appreciation to Weah for the undying love and concern he continues to demonstrate for the growth and development of sports in Liberia.

Mr. Kennedy said such a gesture will always be remembered by the LFA.

Meanwhile, the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) has released referee badges for 1994.

The new badges, according to Mr. Kennedy, were received recently, and will only be given to referees accredited by FIFA.

(Continued on Page 7)

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#114 FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1992 MONROVIA, LIBERIA PRICE $5.00

# GBARNGA UPSIDE DOWN

## Fighters on Looting Spree

By: Augustus Nimley & James S. King

Latest reports from Gbarnga, the central base of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) say the city is in a complete state of confusion as fighters of the NPFL have gone on a looting spree.


According to aid workers who returned from Gbarnga on Monday, NPFL fighters have again gone on the rampage with no one in control of the situation.

Our source revealed that the fighters have looted three vehicles from the Lutheran World Service and several other vehicles from Medicine San Frontier (Holland), and other relief organizations operating in the NPFL controlled area.

The aid workers told The News that the NPFL Leader, Charles Taylor has acquired Russian made weapons which are being issued to fighters in preparation for an alleged attack on Monrovia.

The source further explained that displaced civilians in Gbarnga and other areas are in severe need of food. "This is

*Cont'd on page 6*



Mr. Charles Taylor

## Police Urged Positive

Officers and men of the Liberia National Police (LNP) have been told to do away with those things that are contrary to the police ethics and embrace those virtues that will not only narrow the differences between the police and the public, but will enhance public support for the police department.

The Chairman of the Council of State, His Excellency Prof. David Kpomakpor, made the call last Wednesday, when he paid a brief visit at the Headquarters of the Liberia

## 1,140 Combatants Infected -Says NRC Boss

By Augustine Nimely

The Executive Director of the National Re-Adjustment Commission, Mr. D. Karn Carlor has disclosed in Monrovia that 9.9% or 1,140 of the 60,000 combatants in the country are carriers of sexually transmitted


## PUL Press Club Announces 1st Anniversary

The Press Club of the PUL has announced the first anniversary of the Edward Wilmot Blyden Forum this Saturday, September 3rd.

The Blyden Forum was launched last September 3rd, following the reactivation of the Press Club of the PUL which was dormant prior to the Liberian civil conflict.

A PUL release yesterday said, since the launching of the Forum, the Press Club has organised 13 sessions, including two special sessions, with one commemorating the 29th anniversary of the PUL and the other with a political professor from the University of New Orleans who addressed the forum on the Topic: THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY AND GENDER.

However, the 14th session of the forum which is expected to be held today, has been called off due to the ongoing Liberia National Conference and the proposed 30th



Sam Van Keesely
PUL Prexy

anniversary program of the PUL.

Moreover, the release said, the forum will play a major role in the 30th anniversary program which

*cont'd on page 6*

*cont'd on page*

## OLD FOL... OV... FOOD

By James S. K...

Despite the denial Special Emergenc... for the Elderly ... that it has reduc... rations for ... displaced p... displaced ... interviewed rec... this paper at the ... of Health (M... Congo Tow... expressed ... dissatisfaction ... food rations.

The elders ... that they are onl... three cook spoo... per day, while ... soya blend (CS... served once a w...

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# Fighters

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*cont'd from page 1*

evident by the huge pile of sugarcane dirt in the streets".

The sugar cane dirt, the aid workers explained, can be compared to the experience at Fendell during the height of the war. "It may be true that some people are saying that things are alright with them; these are people who can afford to make ends meet, but not the displaced majority", the source added.

The state of confusion in Gbarnga comes amidst reports that the city which is the seat of the NPFL, is being beseiged by the rival Liberia Peace Council (LPC) and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO).

In another development, the former Defense Spokesman of the NPFL, now Labour Minister in the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG), Mr. Jucontee Thomas Woewiyu has accused the NPFL leader, Mr. Charles Taylor of the death of General Nixon Gaye.

Mr. Woewiyu in a press conference last Wednesday at his Camp Johnson Road office, told reporters that Mr. Taylor had earlier ordered the late Gaye to use the eight thousand men then under his command, to launch an attack on the Roberts International Airport (RIA), Unification Town, Harbel and Monrovia.

Minister Woewiyu said that when the late Gaye refused the order on grounds that his men had told him that they were tired of fighting, Mr. Taylor ordered his bodyguards, led by General Domingo, to move on Nixon's base and carry him either dead or alive to Gbarnga.

Mr. Woewiyu said when General Domingo and his men arrived at Nixon's base, they met him (Gaye) briefing his men. Mr. Woewiyu said General Domingo and his men then opened fire on Gaye, wounding him in the stomach.

He further disclosed that Mr. Taylor's bodyguards "later took Gaye to Gbarnga under the cover that they were rushing him to the Phebe hospital, since the shooting was an accident".

Meanwhile, the Central Revolutionary Committee (CRC) of the NPFL of which Mr.Woewiyu is a member, has condemned and described the death of Nixon Gaye as "barbaric, cruel and inhumane".

He said the CRC is therefore calling on all fighters of the NPFL to take notice of the "reckless" killing being carried out by Mr. Taylor, and remain vigilant against his calls for another war.

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The PATRIOT

VOL. 4 NO. 6 $ 5.00

AS FIGHTING CONTINUES IN R'CESS

# 3 CIVILIANS KILLED, OTHERS WOUNDED IN AMBUSH

## CHINESE FEARED DEAD

By: Gibson W. Jecue
From Buchanan, Grand Bassa County

Forces of the National Patriotic Front reportedly ambushed several civilians fleeing from No. 4 District to Buchanan killing three and abducting others.

Three of those reportedly killed include the brother of our reporter's most, Harrison Davis, who was attempting to escape NPFL hostage in District No. 4 around the Liberia Agriculture Company (LAC) areas.

According to some of those who survived the ambush and reached Buchanan safely, the NPFL fighters had barred them from leaving the [illegible] to come to Buchanan.

The survivors informed our reporter that they [illegible] forced themselves to leave at all cost because there were lots of harassments and intimidations coupled with lack of food.

One of them only identified in Martina said: "the people can't allow us to find

cont'd on page 5

## 'Ethnic Politics Gains Momentum'

A Liberian sociologist had observed that ethnic politics in Liberia is gaining far wider ramifications [illegible] than expected.

Mr. Steve Jabbeh, Chairman of the Sociology Department of the University of Liberia, said it is not far fetched to deduce the inter-ethnic rivalries that are gradually gathering

cont'd on page 6





## R'cess citizens send out SOS

Citizens of Rivercess County residing in Monrovia have sounded an SOS call to the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and the international community to rescue their fellow countrymen who are now dying at the hands of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and Liberia Peace Council.

The citizens in a statement outlining massacres being committed in the County said fighting is raging in Rivercess which is claiming lives and causing

cont'd on page 6

[illegible] VISITS LIBERIA

## R'CESS CITIZENS

from front page

untold sufferings to their people.

In the statement presented Friday at the Executive Mansion to IGNU President, Dr. Amos C. Sawyer, by Rivercess Representative Francis Johnson, the citizens said currently the fighters are killing civilians indiscriminately and burning down towns.

The citizens said several citizens including paramount chief Neety Freeman have been slaughtered by the fighters while towns in Yarnea, Norweh and other areas in the country have been burned down.

## LIBERIAN STUDENTS

cont'd from back page

economic and political future of the Country.

The LNSU president, Mr. Alexander Menguah, who is in the country told The INQUIRER in an interview recently that he is in the country to meet with leaders of the Cotonou parties- IGNU, NPFL and ULIMO.

He said Liberians in Nigeria are worried about their relatives and friends in Liberia and added that, "I am here to see to it that I get the realities on the ground so that when I return, I will be able to explain to them my findings."

Mr. Menguah said, "already I have met with some officials of ULIMO and NPFL and even IGNU, but my main concern now is to meet the leaders; by this week and next week.

## JUSTICE TAKEN TO COURT

cont'd from back page

$60,000 Liberian dollars.

The writ said after having purchased the generator by Mr. Kassiz, Madam Washington later informed the businessman that she wanted the generator back but upon the objection of the businessman to return the generator, Ms. Washington and James Sumo filed a complaint to the Ministry of Justice to retrieve the item. When the Ministry informed the court about the case, the court in turn ordered the Ministry to conduct an investigation into the case and submit its findings to the court.

The Ministry having failed to conduct the investigations, sent several police officers to the Lesse man's store, broke into the store and took away the generator and gave it to Ms. Washington.

During a preliminary hearing, the court had advised the Ministry not to enter the Plaintiff's premises to remove the generator, but the Ministry issued orders to its officers to break into the store to take away the generator.

The generator is owned by Mr. Flomo Washington, who is also the father of Ms. Korto Washington who sold the item.

Mr. Kassiz is being represented in court by Counsellor Isaac Wiles, but when this paper contacted the latter about the case, he declined to comment and referred our reporter to the court for more information.



## NPFL AMBUSH

from front page

food in the bush and they did not want us to come to Buchanan, so we had to force our way; that's the time they killed Harris and two others when we fell in their ambush Saturday evening."

Another mass killing was also reported in lower Rivercess County involving a foreign national when fighting broke out between NPFL and LPC forces.

Survivors in Buchanan told The INQUIRER that those killed came from Dobor, Sayah Gborzon, Jamza, and Topor towns. Others came from Nein-Zeon, Bakay (Dwein section) and Senghozon towns.

The displaced all of whom refused to give their names disclosed that the towns including the Worldwide Church in Nein-zeon town were also burned. They said that it was before the burning of the towns that the foreign national, a Chinese, identified only as Jerry, and two others identified as Wulu, and Sammy Morris were shot dead in Senghozon town.

"We were about 250 to 300 persons who by-passed LPC points and reached Buchanan. There are several others in Jappah Town who want to come, but LPC is stopping them," one survivor said.

They told our reporter that the LPC forces always tell them, "Buchanan is hard." The survivors noted that "some were hit by bullet and yet LPC is stopping us from coming to Buchanan."

"Sometimes we will be in the town, then LPC people will yell that rebels are coming and in few seconds we will hear shooting. We will just see fighters jump among us and start shooting at anybody," they said.


HAPPY B



HYONEN ANG
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TWO YEARS AGO,
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TO YOU AND MAMA.
FROM: PAPA, MAMA
STEVE, HANDFUL,
LAWRENCE, VANNPLA

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The INQUIRER

VOL. 8 No. 14 Friday, February, 5, 1999 $20.00

# SECURITY BRUTALITY HITS SENATE

## ...Senator's Bodyguard, Driver Flogged; Joe Tate, Others Cited

By: Jackson T.S. Sesay

Justice Minister Cllr. Eddington Varmah and Police Director Joseph R. Tate, Jr., have been cited to appear before the Liberian Senate on Monday for an investigation into the alleged floggings of peaceful civilians by government security personnel.


The security forces have been constantly and persistantly accused of manhandling and flogging ordinary Liberians on a daily basis, a situation which some unstoppable.

The Senate action comes in the wake of a formal complaint filed before it at Thursday's plenary by Bomi County Senator Mohammed Dukuly, of the alleged brutal attack on his car, bodyguard and driver on February 3, by a police officer identified as Capt. Korkpor, with Badge # 329 on Broad Street.

The Senate viewed the action of Capt. Korkpor as a complete violation of its constitutional rights and also, a complete violation of the Liberian Constitution, and further called for disciplinary action to be taken against the police officer.

Since County Senator

cont'd on page 6



*Senator Brumskine*

## Taylor Makes Judicial, Security Appointments

### ...Sacks Some

The President Dr. Charles Ghankay Taylor has made additional judicial appointments in government pending confirmation by the Liberian Senate.

Those appointed are Joseph Fayiah, magistrate, Monrovia City Court; Peter T.K. Gonshan, magistrate, West Point Magisterial Court; Marcus W. Johnson, magistrate, Brewerville Magisterial Court; Joseph Tawah, associate magistrate, New Kru Town Magisterial Court; Woodah S. Sendah associate magistrate, Monrovia City Court and Joseph O. Wheern, associate magistrate, Careysburg Magisterial Court.



*President Taylor*

Meanwhile, President Taylor has dismissed with immediate effect, three judicial personnel for acts not portraying the credibility and integrity of the Judiciary. Those dismissed are Ethan Kahn, acting stipendiary

cont'd on page 6

## LCC Issues Statement on Sa. Leone Crisis

The Liberia Council of Churches (LCC) is calling on Liberian mercenaries fighting alongside parties of the Sierra Leonean war to return home and contribute to the national reconstruction parties of the Sierra Leonean war to return home and contribute to the national reconstruction program. WRITES BILL K. JARKLOH.

According to a statement transmitted to the Sierra Leonean Council of Churches under the signature of LCC President, Bishop William Nah Dixon, the LCC welcomes the recent move by the President Pro Tempore of the Liberian Senate seeking a legislation whereby Liberian mercenaries in action elsewhere will be prosecuted.

The LCC wishes and hopes that this move by Senator Charles Brumskine

cont'd on page 6



*President Kabbah*

## Bomi Lawmaker Clarifies Vandalism Report

Bomi County Representative Sando Johnson has clarified that he did order the vandalization of the T and M. Logging Company premises in Suehn District as was reported in the February 3, 1999, edition of this paper.

Making the clarification yesterday when he and the two superintendents of

Johnson further noted that after receiving information from some of his citizens about the detention of one of his chiefs, he drove to Tubmanburg, and upon inquiring from the police there, he was informed that there were no charges against

cont'd on page 6

## Treason Trial: Witness Testifies for 4hrs

By Bill K. Jarkloh

Lemuel Reeves' testimony in the treason trial did not


Today marks the fourth

cont'd on page 3

INSIDE
TODAY

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The INQUIRER, Friday, February, 5, 1999 PAGE 6

## LCC issues Statement

cont'd from front page

will win the support other lawmakers as "it is a right step in the right direction..."

By this step, the LCC statement pointed out that the peace loving image of Liberia will not only be restored, but will also help to thwart international vengeance on Liberia, a country of war-weary people.

The LCC also called on the Liberian Goverument to urgently heed to the advice of Senator Brumskine that Liberian Ambassador be appointed to Sierra Leone to help salvage the war relationship between Liberia and those countries.

"We share in the grief, sorrow and anguish of the peace-loving people of Liberia," the statement averred saying that the LCC is disturbed about the innocent lives that are being destroyed and the persistent accusation that the Liberian Government supports the Sierra Leonean war, has seriously damaged the image of Liberia in the international community. The government has always denied the accusation.

The LCC statement was attached to a letter by LCC Secretary General, Rev. Pierzant C. Harris addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Council of Churches, Alliance of Churches, informing the World Leaders, Harris explained.

## C. C. Pennoh Holds

cont'd from back page

At present, there is massive

## Good Governance

cont'd from front page

Senate Executive Committee. It is not known what the theme of the guest speaker but it is expected that she will speak on how Good could be achieved

## Witness

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The NEWS

## 2000 SCAM AT POST OFFICE


## ...r U.S Embassy Shooting Incident:

# GOVERNMENT ...PRESSES REGRETS

## ...Maintains Stance on U.S.S. Chinook

By Y. Nyakeh Farkpa

...showing a diplomatic protest by the U.S. Government over the shooting incident at its embassy premises in Mamba Point which resulted into the deaths of four persons and the wounding of four U.S citizens, the Liberian government has finally acknowledged receipt of an October 5th diplomatic note and has subsequently expressed regrets. The government averred that it did not condone any firing at the U.S. Embassy or at American citizens.



Pres. Charles Taylor

The government's comment was contained in a MICAT release issued yesterday which also stated that it has informed the United States government of having conducted a preliminary investigation into the matter, but because of the "grave accusations contained in the American's note, it has invited the U.S. Government to join in an investigation of the matter."

A Government statement by the Foreign Ministry on October 5th stated that it had not received any diplomatic note to the effect of the status of the Embassy. It did not however mention whether it received a note pertaining to other issues from the U.S. government.

"It is unfortunate that the U.S. Charge d' Affaires and other embassy personnel unnecessarily and knowingly exposed themselves to imminent danger when they left the protective walls of the Embassy Compound and went outside into the public street into a potentially unsafe environment in which sporadic gun firing had ensued from the previous night", the Government said, adding, "Nevertheless, it regrets any injury which may have been suffered

Cont'd on Page 6



Pres. Bill Clinton

## 3 AFL Soldiers Captured In Sa. Leone

By Sheriff Z. Adams

...claims by the Sierra Leonean authorities that the Liberian government had been supporting insurgents of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone appears to be increasing as reports monitored have it that three soldiers of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) have been captured in that country.

According to a BBC Focus on Africa program monitored yesterday, the three AFL soldiers captured are Sgt. Morris Sonnoh, Cpr. Momo Fahnbulleh

cont'd on page 3

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**Opt for Stability for We Cannot Build a Great Nation in the Midst of Chaos.**

# 3 AFL SOLDIERS CAPTURED

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and Pvt. Patrick Kajde.

The report furthered that the three AFL men were captured along with 15 fighters of the dislodged African Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and RUF who have been battling against Kamajos fighters in Eastern Serra Leone.

The men, according to the BBC's report, have been taken to Kenema where they are under detention at the civil defense headquarters.

According to the BBC, Sgt. Morris Sonneh revealed that they were assigned to assist the AFRC and RUF in their fight against ECOMOG and the Kamajos in Eastern Sierra Leone.

Sgt. Sonneh further told the BBC that there are other AFL soldiers fighting along side AFRC and RUF in other parts of Sierra Leone.

The Sierra Leonean Deputy Defense Minister Sam Hongan Norman told the BBC that M-60 raffles were captured from the Liberian soldiers.

This, according to Norman was the first time such weapons had been seen during the war.

The Sierra Leonean Deputy Defense Minister reportedly left Kenema yesterday for Freetown to brief President Tejan Kabbah about the latest report.

The Kamajor Battalion commander, Ramme Hassa Jallo told the BBC that the three Liberian soldiers were yesterday afternoon ambushed along with RUF and AFRC rebels while trying to infiltrate into the Kenema district.

The Kamajor Commander said during the battle which lasted for three hours, 34 RUF rebels were killed as large quantity of arms and ammunition including M-60 raffles were captured.

Despite this latest development, the Liberian government has constantly denied its involvement in the Sierra Leonean conflict.

Meanwhile efforts by our reporter to get government side of the story from the Defense Ministry proved futile as senior officials were said to be out of office.

[redacted]

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the FACTS

SPACE FOR SALE!!

NO.9 FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1994 MONROVIA LIBERIA PRICE: $5.00

# IN LPC, NPFL FIGHT OVER 100 KILLED

...ts coming from Rivercess ...speak of widespread ... burning of towns, and ... of innocent civilians ...ps of the NPFL.

...ding to an ... from River- Borkay towns, ...ween fight- their commander



...Taylor, NPFL Leader

... took demanded that the ... and residents feed his fighters on a daily basis.

In an effort to meet the LPC fighters' demand, the residents convened an urgent meeting on Jan. 9, 1994, under a palava but in the center of the town. During the meeting the NPFL contereattacked and recaptured the town, rounding attendants of the meeting and shot 34 persons in Neoztten to death for being LPC sympathizers, the source explained.

The source further added that the NPFL fighters later proceeded to Borkay Town, where they killed over 95 persons who were then attending a church service and took several other hostages.

An eleven year kold boy, Oldpa/ Zarh, who sustained bullets wounds in his right foot and upper hand, and currently receiving treatment at the JFK, reportedly lost his mother and father during the incident. He said that during the attack on Borkay Town he saw nine persons who were seriously

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## ON KUNYON'S ISSUE


# Chiefs threatened with dismissal

Reports emanating from the Internal Affairs Ministry have revealed that Chiefs and Governors of that ministry have been threatened with dismissal from their jobs if they engaged in any deliberations concerning the Kuyon issue.

According to an insider from the Ministry of Internal Affairs who prefers anonymity, the threat came about as a result of a planned meeting by Chiefs and Governors to issue a position statement on the removal of Hon. Bismarck Kuyon.

When news of the proposed meeting leaked, Minister Brima called the Chiefs and Governors to an emergency meeting at his Internal Affairs office, the source added.

The source indicated that while they were in meeting with the minister, they expected talks pertain-



...Hon. Kuyon

...ing to their ...tion due them by government, but to "everyone's surprise, the issue

Cont'd on P-6

# Cllr. Korkpor ... UNOMIL

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# 100 KILLED

Cont'd from P-1

wounded, out of which two persons, Eric Cooper and Nathan Mandeh died from hemorrhage.

In an interview with Mr. Roberto Dole, Deputy minister of Internal Affairs, who is also a citizen from Riverccess, he disclosed that the NPFL and LPC have launched a full scale war, looting and killing at random.

He said the NPFL was currently heading towards Jappah Town and Cestos City, where thousands of civilians are trapped, and could be slaughtered by the ruthless NPFL rebels, adding, "we want the UN, OAU and ECOMAS to intervene and save our people from another Nathal massacre."

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DAILY TIMES

...3 NO. 5 WEDNESDAY JANUARY 13, 1999 MONROVIA, LIBERIA PRICE: $20

# REBELS ABDUCT LIBERIANS IN FREETOWN

...diplomatic efforts are ...made to end the ongoing ... in neighboring Sierra ... reports coming out of ...ital suggest that several ...s residing in Freetown, ...apital, have been ...d by rebels of the ...tionaty United Front ...and the ousted military ... which are battling ... ECOMOG to depose ...ent Ahmed Tejan ...

...paper learned that the ... Ministers of Togo and ...oire d'Ivoire have been ... between Freetown ...g Conakry, Guinea, holding ...with President Kabbah on ... hand, and rebel leader ... Sankoh on the other. ...hough the envoys claimed that Sankoh wants a political solution to end the fighting, reports say some other Liberians and Sierra Leoneans are entrapped indoors due to bombardment by ECOMOG.

In other areas, many citizens and residents are also suffering, with no food or safe drinking water to sustain themselves, as rebels continue to set public buildings and private dwellings ablaze.

Since the Liberians were abducted a few days ago, there have been no reports regarding their welfare or whereabouts.

Reports have it that only those residing in areas occupied by ECOMOG are well off, while smoke vapor is seen over the city from buildings set ablaze by fleeing rebels who are being dislodged a few days after they infiltrated Freetown using civilians as human shields.

A couple who recently escaped a rebel-held area and fled to positions occupied by ECOMOG explained in a BBC interview that while escaping, they saw bodies of both civilians and soldiers in the streets, while houses were seen burning.

Due to the hostilities there, relief agencies are finding it difficult to get to the vulnerable people of Sierra Leone, while rebels are said to have looted warehouses and crated away relief supplies as they were retreating.



FODAY SANKOH

**In Treason Trial:**

In...
Lib...
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# Exhibit 1.259 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

# Exhibit 1.260 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

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DAILY TIMES

VOL. 3 NO. 1 MONDAY JANUARY 4, 1999 MONROVIA, LIBERIA PRICE: $20

# 2,000 LIBERIANS FIGHTING IN S/LEONE

As the civil conflict intensifies in Sierra Leone, there are reports that more than 2,000 Liberians, whom President Charles Taylor has described as "mercenaries" fighting alongside all of the various factions in that country.



PRES. CHARLES TAYLOR

He said although the Liberian Government fully recognizes and supports the Sierra Leonean Government headed by President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, Liberian mercenaries have been fighting in Sierra Leone since the regime of President Joseph Momoh.

Addressing a news conference in the Parlors of the Executive Mansion on New Year's Eve, President Taylor explained that since President Momoh allowed Liberians to use Sierra Leone to organize ULIMO, a former warring faction in the Liberian conflict, these mercenaries have remained in that country, actively participating in the conflict there.

He said under President Momoh, Liberians were paid to fight for that government, just as they are now offering their services to the present government, as well as the ousted military regime, including the RUF rebels on the one hand, and the Kamajores on the other, but denied that the Liberian Government is providing support for any group.

President Taylor said since the United Nations has refused to provide observers to ascertain the facts regarding allegations that Liberia is fueling the war in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS should instruct ECOMOG to station troops in Lofa County to authenticate whether or not the Liberian Government is indeed supporting the rebels.

He said it is an open secret that Liberians are fighting in Sierra Leone, and called on the Sierra Leonean

CONT'D ON PAGE 6

## Gov't To Be Cleaned Up - Taylor

President Charles Taylor has resolved to clean up correct errors of the past, there are still people going around

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### ARMS

government recently retrieved more weapons from Lofa, Grand Kru and Maryland Counties, as well as other parts of the country, as compared to those retrieved during the disarmament exercise, confirming utterances by former ECOMOG Force Commander General Victor Malu that the country was not arms-free in spite of the disarmament exercise carried out by ECOMOG.

He also confirmed that the government is training its military and para-military forces to ensure that they can professionally maintain peace and stability, adding that it would be appropriate if human rights organizations could move into the various training bases to educate recruits on human rights.

### ATS

neglected to either import or procure a locally-made scoreboard.

As for the stadium itself, then any LFA authorities continue to exhibit a lackadaisical attitude with regard to the replacement of the roof, which was uprooted by a rainstorm.

### GOV'T

improve the quality of their lives because every citizen has a stake in the country. This is why, he added, his government continues to implement the process of inclusion, participation and reconciliation.

### SUPT.

Samuel K. Nyemah said, "It is disappointing to note that since the superintendent went to Monrovia for President Taylor's inauguration, he has not returned."

Mayor Nyemah said while in Monrovia, Supt. Nyemah received the rice, totalling 800 bags, after which it was agreed, during a meeting, that the rice be sold and the proceeds used for developmental purposes.

However, when contacted, according to Mayor Nyemah, former Trehn District Commissioner Elijah Tarr, who presently resides at Matadi, Monrovia, confirmed that the entire consignment was turned over to the superintendent.

Efforts to contact Supt. Nyemah, through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, proved futile up to press time.

### LIBERIANS

Government to arrest any Liberian found bearing arms in that country.

He explained that it is virtually impossible for a conventional army to win a guerrilla war, as was shown in Liberia, and this is why, according to him, the Liberian Government continues to call for dialogue in finding a peaceful settlement to the conflict in that neighboring state.

President Taylor said because of the importance he attaches to seeing peace restored to Sierra Leone, he will shortly dispatch his Vice President with special messages to ECOWAS Chairman, Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema, and Nigerian President Abdulsalami Abubakar, who has done much to help stabilize the sub-region.

He said he is willing to make in finding a peaceful solution to the Sierra Leonean conflict, but noted that RUF leader Foday Sankoh, now facing trial in that country, has to be a part of the solution, as was the case in Liberia, where all of the factions were brought together by ECOWAS to form a government of inclusion.

### TAYLOR

taking a pragmatic approach in helping to solve problems within the sub-region.

He explained that since the founding of Liberia, the country has continued to exemplify a strong leadership role which, in the past, helped attain independence for other nations on the continent and, as such, Liberia will continue to speak openly on issues affecting the sub-region, especially the ongoing conflict in neighboring Sierra Leone.

Mr. Taylor said past administrations always respected friends and allies, and it will be no different during his administration, which stands ready to work with all once the issue of sovereignty is not compromised.

He then called on the United States Government to use the expertise of President Bill Clinton's Special Envoy, Rev. Jesse Jackson, to bring about conflict resolution in the ECOWAS sub-region.

He said most of those trying to broker peace in the sub-region are burned-out envoys who have lost the respect and credibility of war-affected nations because, according to him, they lacked the experience needed to be applied in solving conflicts.

### POLIO

the crippling disease, toured Sinoe, Grand Gedeh, Maryland and Grand Kru Counties, spreading the word through songs, drama and cultural performances, in order to encourage the total participation of the general populace during the pending national polio vaccination campaign.

During visits to towns and villages in the southeast, members of the team dispelled the fears of many adults who were of the opinion that vaccination causes skin sores, telling them that the polio vaccine which will be given to their children will be administered orally, with no side effect.

The team was cordially and enthusiastically received throughout the region, to the extent that one town chief recommended that a mobilization bureau be set up there in the in the interest of national development.

At the end of the tour, the Assistant Minister for Technical Services at the Internal Affairs Ministry and National Co-Chairman of the Social Mobilization Committee of the NID's, Amelia Sherif, expressed gratitude on behalf of the National Chairman, Ambassador Julia Duke, for the level of cooperation received from all they came into contact with, and urged local authorities to lend the same support to the medical teams which will administer the vaccine to ensure the successful implementation.

He said the polio vaccine, like all other vaccines in Liberia, is free, effective, safe and a sure way of protecting children against the deadly childhood disease.

Meanwhile, the mobilization team is scheduled to tour Lofa County shortly.

### CAF

from sitting on the bench for two matches. He was accused of attacking the referee following that match in Tunis, which Lone Star lost 1-2.

### SEEKIE

economy, believing that the are the only ones academically competent, thereby makin unilateral decisions which ha no professional basis.

He said there is no need personalize public institutio since individuals a governments come and while institutions remain, recalled that during his ten as governor, the NBL ha competent and professi staff which could be retai while authorities revitaliz bank instead of laying off, a move which he would affect the g society.

### TAXES

Development Auth Liberia Petroleum Re Company, and the I Telecommunicat Corporation, among oth well as from importe other businesses, all of should be used for th being of the people.

Sen. Menyongai political parties and organizations, includi Press, to do away w complacency of silence awaiting elections preaching about the society.

"It is a little over now since democr restored to Libe observed, "but civil se dissatisfied with the of living and low sala austerity measures places have created in homes which, cause moral breakd

He said journ respect the laws and live up to the serving as watche larger society so th can have a s everyone can live harmony.

### GOVER

Jallah, Montser Coordinator The and Land Comm N. Watkins.

The lawmake in favor of M stating that her office was illegal will be given ins President Ty which she subscribed.

However, a b Senator Jome G Grand Bassa County, the

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NATIONAL

VOICE JUSTICE JUSTICE

Price $20.00

Tuesday, October 1, 1996

# NPFL SHIPS ARMS TO LIBYA

belonging to the Cuban Unit of the Executive Strike Force in Gbarnga, and left the Central Liberian City at about 4:45 that morning.

Our source observed that the escort green jeep is one of the many vehicles looted from the United Nations Offices in Monrovia and further disclosed that it was driven by one Gen. Manaye of the NPFL.

When Councilman Charles G. Taylor arrived in Gbarnga on September 20, 1996, the report said, it was concluded during an NPFL leadership meeting that the weapons be transported to the Ivory Coast for shipment to Libya.

Our Source also disclosed that the transfer of the weapons to the Ivory Coast was made possible through the assistance of an Ivorian Security delegation headed by one Captain Jose A'Issante of the Ivorian Police Station in Douane, La Cote d' Ivoire.

It was also revealed to The National that another consignment of weapons was also transported to the port of San Pedro to begin shipment to Libya between the 29th and 30th September, 1996.

It can be recalled that upon the return of Councilman Taylor from Libya last month, a local daily reported that the NPFL leader had promised the Libyan leader to return weapons taken from that country to destabilize the government of the late President Samuel K. Doe.

With the shipment of the weapons back to Libya, observers are skeptical as to what the NPFL leader will revert to if he loses the pending election.

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Monrovia
# Daily News
...AY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1996 MONROVIA, LIBERIA PRICE: $2C

# ...haddafi Wants ...eapons Back

...ding this paper from the ...political circle speak of the ...Col. Mohammed Khaddafi ...ising the leader of the ...rian Charles Taylor not to ...ECOMOG weapons acquired

...weapons which were given ...to the NPFL during the ...course of the Liberian civil ...war, to ECOMOG who ...Khaddafi considered as an ...agent of "imperialis ...America."

...According to our source, the Libyan leader wants their weapons returned to Libya, since they were mostly acquired by the NPFL as assistance, during its warfare with the Government of the late President Samuel Doe.

The Libyan leader, the source noted, told the NPFL leader in the presence of President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso to properly send those weapons back to Libya if he (Taylor) is surely in for disarmament of combatants.

Before leaving for Libya, Councilman Charles G. Taylor announced that he had disarmed 500 fighters of the front while 3000

Cont'd On Page 6



COL. KHADDAFI

## ...e Wants Bill On Cooperation

### Money Market

The exchange rate between the United States Dollar and the Liberian Dollar still stands at 79 LD to one USD; while the one USD buys the following currencies, 80 Naira, 1,000 Leones, 1,000 Guinea France, 1,000 Cedis and 525 CFA on the Liberian market.



COUNCILMAN TAYLOR

## GOL Receives Medical Supplies

...Executive Mansion yesterday, Foreign Minister

## Back

demobilized.

what is not

who the NPFL

concerned in the

of the ECOMOG

stationed in Liberia

to carry out

disarmament of the

60,000

to the Liberian

It is not known

weapons taken

fighters are

whether the

were

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It is

is charged

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fighters.

reliable

informed this

that the NPFL

to send weapons

from its fighters in

Buchanan Fuso.

It must be recalled that to

the disarmament exercise, the

of the U.S.-

Kromah

ECOMOG

like

of it

leader tried to prevail on the Libya leader about the difficulty in sending the arms back to Tripoli, but "it seem that Khaddafi is insisting."

## Plotters

coup plot and investigation continuing.

The report said most of those arrested in connection with alleged coup plot were lower ranking soldiers.

Some of the soldiers were bodyguards to the former Military rulers who handed power to the civilian elected government few months ago.

On Monday, a small group of soldiers planned to seized the bridge leading to the home of the President before attacking his home.

## Gov't

misusing public funds give account to the Liberian people.

He said: "it is unfortunate, unpatriotic and regretable for money which should have been used for the survival of hungry Liberians are being eaten by few people."

## Medical

Excellency Ruth S. Perry, thanked the donor countries for the assistance and said the items will be used for the benefit of the Liberian people.

Chairman Perry used the occasion to declare both Mount and Bomi as State of zone" for relief for the people of who are said desperate need for and other assistance.

loss

two matches against Junior Professionals which defeated them in the first rounds. But, wheather the Rollers will stand the might of professionals will be seen.

Invincible Eleven, dogged by technical inconsistency faces NPA-Anchors, which bounced into the premier picture following the withdrawal of

## Information

in the country to see how best they can contribute towards the peace process.

He admonished the press to promote unity among members of the Council of State, adding "you should not knock their heads together" through bias reporting.

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## IE

*The IE President narrated that as the result of the situation his club has threatened to pull out from the league because individuals who served as a support base for the team are not around to assist.*

*Another reason for his decision*

*Mr. Hoff said is because his team has been operating on losses as was shown during recent of season matches played at the Antoinette Tubman Stadium*

*Despite this LFA Gene Secretary announced tha the league will still kick o on October 13*

## ECOMOG

the invitation of t pressmen to be airlifted Voinjama was to ensu that the disarmame exercise was given adequ publicity.

ECOMOG stated that the inability to air all the pressmen who h

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Towards Democracy For Social Justice

NEW DEMOCRAT WEEKLY

Five Months Left For The Ballot
Two Months For Interim Candidates To Quit Office
-AN ND CAMPAIGN

# FACTIONS CHARGED

## With Criminal Violations



**Criminal Violations-ECOWAS Chiefs of Staff at the Unity Conference Center Monday**

...ic signals of a split in the ...gar regarding welcoming ... Chiefs of Staff here, military ... sub region commenced meeting ... doors at the Unity Conference ... Monday, with Dr. Edouard ... ECOWAS Executive Secretary, ... some factions of "criminal ... the peace process.

ECOMOG forces were due to be ... across the entire Liberian territory ... October and 16 December 1995. ... of men and of resources and ... call criminal violations by ... warring factions, have set back ... on of this essential phase of the ... tion schedule for the Abuja ... Accra averred.

... Acting Foreign Minister ... John Cummings of the NPFL ... that the government was ... to host the Chiefs of Staff. ... Cummings said, in his press ... the Liberian government will ... the ECOWAS delegation the ... easy it deserves because it has defied the "sovereignty" of Liberia. But the Council's Chairman, Prof. Wilton Sankawulo, just back from Accra, issued a statement contrary to that of the Foreign Ministry. He said the ECOWAS' military chiefs were welcome.

Councilman Oscar J. Quiah also told the New Democrat that he and Paramount Chief Tamba Taylor, along with the Chairman, were not part of the decision to stop the West African Military Chiefs from coming. He said the meeting of the West African Army Chiefs of Staff at this time "will be crucially important at this time" when the peace process is in disarray and stalled. He said he only heard the Government's statement on radio. Councilman Boley was reported out of town and it is not yet clear if the decision to stop the meeting now was endorsed by Councilman Kromah of ULIMO-K.

The Chiefs of Staff meeting comes at a time when the disarmament process is in disarray with renewed fighting in Kakata and the Southeastern region.

The ECOWAS Executive Secretary said the task before the meeting, among others, will be centered on evolving strategies for ECOMOG to not only defend itself decisively when attacked, but also carry out its mandate without making itself an easy prey to such attacks. The Executive Secretary's statement can be seen as an apparent reference to the unprovoked attack launched against ECOMOG in Gbarnia and Tubmanburg, lower Lofa and Bomi counties respectively in December 1995 by forces loyal to Gen. Roosevelt Johnson of ULIMO-J. In that attack, several ECOMOG soldiers, mainly of the Nigerian contingent, were killed and large quantities of arms, including some deadly weapons--122mm artillery pieces and seven mortar tubes--were seized by the ULIMO-J militias. Many civilians were also killed.

Cont'd On Page 10

## Kromah Wants Council Arms Registered

Amidst controversy over the former ULIMO-J leader, Roosevelt Johnson's house search for arms, and NPFL refusal for ECOMOG to carry out a search in the home of the NPFL - Prince Moye, Councilman Alhaji Kromah has suggested that warring faction leaders register their arms for personal security after which a mass house to house search conducted by ECOMOG.

Councilman Kromah, speaking Saturday when he was honored by his former neighbors in Congo town, said arms intended for registration with ECOMOG would be first declared.

The Councilman, who once lived in this community, was reported to have also called for the reduction of personal body guards of warring faction leaders.

It may be recalled that Councilman Oscar Quiah was the first to called for the dismantling personal body guards because of the misbehavior of these body guards.

Most of them, especially those of Councilman Taylor, were reported to be beating up people in the city for simple reasons.

Bishop Michael Francis of the Catholic Church, also called for the dismantling of these bodyguards for their "indiscipline attitudes."

Speaking further at the program Councilman Kromah warned against any plan for attack on the city. He said such aggression will be met with equal resistance.

"You will be a fool to plan an attack on the city," he said, adding, "we are all walking dead bodies who have sacrificed our lives."

# Fear Engulfs Kakata Residents Reported Leaving



**Battle prepared Taylor in Kakata with followers**

Following the fall of Kakata to the NPFL, there are reports that fighters of the faction have gone on an harassment and eviction spree of the town's residents, forcing many to leave.

One resident, who walked into our office with his story Monday, said fighters are evicting and harassing them from their houses and seizing their belongings. The state-owned radio station, the Liberia Broadcasting Corporation, has also recei

Cont'd On Page 10

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# Kakata

Cont'd From Page 1

similar developments. The NPFL-owned station, Kiss FM, interviewed several residents following the town's fall who complained of looting, saying their dream now is for peace.

After the fall of the town, Councilman Taylor promised to turn it over to the new ULIMO- J leadership. He also pledged that ECOMOG would be in charge of the town. But travelers returning from the town told this paper that contrary to reports that the Police have been placed in charge and civil authority installed, fighters are still roaming Kakata heavily armed.

The Kakata fighting flared last week after the Council of State suspended ULIMO-J leader Roosevelt Johnson from the cabinet and recognized the faction's new leadership headed by its Brig. Gen. William Karyee. Fighters loyal to Mr. Johnson proceeded to erect roadblocks in protest. Councilman Taylor thereafter vowed to put at the disposal of the Government the "entire strength of the NPFL" to dislodge the fighters and have the roadblocks removed. He also said his personal security was at risk since he usually travels through Kakata to his stronghold of Gbarnga. It has been revealed that the man who led the NPFL fighters in the Kakata fighting, the front's "Marines" head, Subanie, is a bodyguard to Councilman Taylor and lives on Du Port Road. This implies that many of the NPFL fighters who took over the town traveled from Monrovia.

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The NEWS REPORTER

VOL. 5 NO. 42 MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1995 $ 10.00

# TAYLOR'S AIDE-DE-CAMP, OTHERS SURRENDER

By J. Grady Dorbor

The senior commanders of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), who recently turned themselves to the ECOMOG, say the leader of the Front, Mr. Charles Taylor's thinking is "far from disarmament."

"Mr. Taylor's aim is to achieve power by gun against the will of the suffering civilians," they said.

The commandos are former Aide-de-Camp to Charles Taylor, Gen. Mellie Dahn (Ms) and Col. Johnson Kweme.

Gen. Dahn, 28, told journalists at the ECOMOG Base last Saturday that Mr. Charles G. Taylor still wants to fight on, adding "I left with the fear that the next war to be launched by Mr. Taylor could be my end."

Gen. Dahn who came to Monrovia by way of Ivory Coast said while in that country,

cont'd on page 10



Charles Taylor

## KPOMAKPOR FOR GHANA TODAY

The Chairman of the State Council, Prof. David D. Kpomakpor is appealing to the United Nations, the United States and European Governments to contribute funds to the UN Trust Fund for Liberia.

The State Council Chairman made the appeal yesterday in the parlors of the Executive Mansion during a news conference on the eve of his departure for Accra, Ghana for consultations with Rawlings.

He confirmed

cont'd on page 10



## JUSTICE PRESENTS U.N. CONVENTION ON DRUGS

The Justice Ministry last Thursday presented to the Transitional Legisla-

cont'd on page 4

## Several Evangelists Arrive Tomorrow

21, 1995.

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# TAYLOR'S AIDE-D

con'd from front

she was constantly called and hunted by fighters of the NPFL.

She said she fled the Front following her detention in Ganta after the fall of Gbarnga, the former stronghold of the NPFL.

She noted further that it has become useless to fight on and therefore asked her colleagues still in arms to drop them and leave the bushes, pointing out "If any one wants to rule this country let he/she do so through the ballot box."

For his part, Col. Johnson [illegible] ex., said he sees peace [illegible] cement as the [illegible] solution to [illegible] civil [illegible] stating, "[illegible] talk for [illegible] years, will [illegible]

He said [illegible] that Taylor [illegible] has [illegible] the [illegible] the [illegible]

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The INQUIRER

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1994

# S.Leoneans recruiting in Liberia

## —For Foday Sankor

The Sierra Leonean Ambassador accredited near this capital, H.E. Rtd. Lt. Col. Wilfred Y. Kanu has revealed plans by some Sierra Leoneans in Sierra who are allegedly recruiting in Liberia for the sole purpose of overthrowing their Government.

Ambassador Kanu said, "I want those agents to know that we know about them and if they do not stop their clandestine activities, they will only have themselves to be blamed."

He continued: "I have been informed from reliable sources of agents within our midst who are recruiting men in this country (Liberia) whom I will describe as 'agents of destruction' to go to Sierra Leone, either for the purpose of forming another

cont'd on page 10

# Pentecostal Bishop May Undergo Treatment

The Supreme Court of Liberia has upheld the ruling of the Criminal Court "A" which permitted the former Pentecostal Assemblies of the World (PAW) Bishop, Peter J. Warkie to undergo a psychiatrist examination.

The Government of Liberia last year filed a petition for a Writ of Ceteriorari against Judge Alexander B. Zoe of the Criminal Court before the Supreme Court, requesting the latter to review the ruling of lower court.

The Government had alleged that

cont'd on page 10



# S. LEONEANS RECRUIT

cont'd from back page

faction or joining Foday Sankor's rebels with the ultimate aim of trying to overthrow our present Government."

The Sierra Leonean Ambassador made the disclosure Sunday when he addressed the Sierra Leone Community and Leone Descendants Association in Liberia at the Muslim Congress High School Auditorium on Mechlin Street. More than 300 Sierra Leoneans attended the meeting.

He said, "On that note, I want to singled out one particular group that first called themselves Concerned Citizens of Sierra Leone but lately changed to Sierra Leoneans Initiative for Peace (SLIP) who are the only group that have come out in the open to try to [illegible] this senless [illegible] in our country and their intention to give support in trying to [illegible] this war in [illegible] country (Sierra Leone)."

Ambassador [illegible] noted that [illegible] paradox of [illegible]

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The NEW DEMOCRAT

# Gen. Konah Heads AFL

President Charles Taylor, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), announced major changes in the command structure of the force.

He made the announcement yesterday at the Executive Mansion.



Brig./Gen. John Tarnue

President Taylor nominated career soldier Lt. Gen. Kpenkpah Y. Kona as the new Chief of Staff of the AFL.

Prior to his nomination to the new portfolio, Gen. Konah served as Deputy Chief of Staff of the AFL with a rank of Major General.

Gen Kona, before the civil war, served as Deputy Chief of Staff under former AFL Chief of Staff Lt/Gen. Henry Dubar. Also during the first transitional government under Professor David Kpomakpor. Gen.



Brig/Gen. [illegible]

Konah headed the military tribunal that tried Gen. Charles Julu after his ill-fated attempt to overthrow the Kpomakpor government.

The new Army Chief served as chairman of the committee set by Government of Liberia to restructure the AFL.

Also nominated to various positions and ranks include, Brig/Gen. Samuel Varney who now becomes Major General and promoted to Deputy Chief of Staff. Gen. Varney prior to his new position served as Director of Staff of the AFL.

The next nomination was Brig/Gen. Moses Wright who was appointed Director of Staff. He earlier the AFL as Military Advisor to the Chief of Staff. He also served as Commanding General of the AFL during the period of the transitional government.

Brig./Gen. Daniel Gboveh who was Commanding General now becomes Training Commandant of the AFL.

Also nominated was Col. John Tarnue, the former SSU Commander and Training Commandant of the AFL, who was

*Cont'd on Page 2*

## Lack of good g under develop

by Leroy S. Nyan

A partner of the Subah Belleh Associates, Prof. Willie Belleh, Jr., has attributed the under development of Liberia to the lack of

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# Literary Scene

e patheric case of a land of

## Gen. Konah Heads AFL

promoted to the rank and position of Brig./Gen. and Commanding General of the AFL.

Making the pronouncements, President Taylor said, he will de-politicize the Armed Forces of Liberia. He said, the time for assigning ranks to military personnel without the required training is over. In the meantime, all the appointees are to appear before the Senate for confirmation.

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# AN ACT TO AMEND THE EXECUTIVE LAW TO CREATE A SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE.

*It is enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Republic of Liberia, in Legislature Assembled:*

Section 1. The Executive Law is hereby amended by adding thereto ten new sections to be sections 1256 through 1265 respectively, constituting a new Chapter to be Chapter 49–A to read as follows:

## CHAPTER 49–A. SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE

Section 1256. SERVICE ESTABLISHED. There is hereby created and established in the Office of the Chief Executive, a Service to be known as the Special Security Service. The Special Security Service shall be conducted under the direction and supervision of a Director.

Section 1257. FUNCTIONS OF SERVICE. The functions of the Service shall be:

(a) To protect and secure the President, his immediate family, other officials and visiting dignitaries (VIPS), to be designated by the President;

(b) To protect the Executive Mansion and grounds;

(c) To protect all documents, Top-Secret, Secret, Confidential and Informatory Materials;

(d) To security check all in-coming mails, packages and things addressed to or for use or consumption by the President and his household;

(e) To security check all means of transportation used by the President, his family and other VIPS;

(f) To security check the residence of the President both temporary and permanent;

(g) To serve as Liaison with other Security Agencies in matters pertaining to the screening of persons to be employed at the Executive Mansion and for other services of the President; and

(h) Such other functions as may from time to time be delegated by the President.

Section 1258. APPOINTMENT AND DUTIES OF DIRECTOR.—The President, with the advice and consent of the

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(a) To report directly to the President on all phases of the operation of the Service and all matters appertaining to the Service, as may be required or as directed by the President.

(b) To develop all operations required to carry out the functions of the Service;

(c) To select investigate, hire and train personnel for the Service;

(d) To call on other Security -Agencies for additional strength, whenever the need should arise for reinforcement of the Service. Such Agents, Detectives, Policemen and Soldiers assigned to the Service in accordance with the request of the Director, shall be under the complete command and supervision of the Director; and

(e) To develop, prepare and implement rules and regulations pertaining to personnel, finance, logistics, training, operations and organizations necessary for the efficient operation of the Service, subject to the approval of the President.

Section 1259. APPOINTMENT AND DUTIES OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR.—The President with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint an Assistant Director of the Special Security Service who shall be the principal assistant to the Director. He shall perform such duties as may be assigned him from time to time by the Director.

Section 1260. OTHER OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE SERVICE.—The Director may appoint all such other officers and employees of the Service as he may deem necessary and assign their duties, subject to the approval of the President.

Section 1261. EMPLOYEES OF SERVICE AS TRUSTEES OF STATE SECRETS.—Officers and employees of the Special Security Service shall be deemed Trustees of the secrets of the President and the Republic and shall be sworn to secrecy by the Director when entering upon duty of the Service. Violation of such Oath, whether willfully or not shall be considered a crime, and the violator shall immediately be dismissed from the Service and prosecuted under provisions prescribed in the Penal Law.

Section 1262. POWER OF THE SERVICE TO COLLECT INFORMATION.—The Service shall have the power to

Department, Bureau or Agency of the Government who receives from the Service a request for information which it is empowered to collect, and fails or refuses to comply with sush request shall be penalized in keeping with the provisions of Section 121 of the Penal Law.

1263. ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT.—In the performance of the functions of the Service, an Agent may arrest or cause to be arrested any person or persons committing a crime *flagrante delicto*, or aiding and abetting any crime or violation, or who may reasonably be suspected of the commission of a crime.

Section 1264. COMPENSATIONS FOR WIDOWS AND MINOR CHILDREN OF MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE KILLED OR WOUNDED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES.—In case of the death of a member of the Special Security Service as a result of wounds received or injuries inflicted in the course of actual service in the lawful discharge and execution of his duties, his widow and minor children shall receive a pension in a sum equal to the amount of compensation which the member of the Special Security Service was receiving at the time of his death.

Section 1265. COMPENSATION FOR TENURE OF SERVICE.—Any member of the Special Security Service who shall serve with good conduct and behaviour for twenty five (25) consecutive years regardless of age, or any member of the Service who shall attain the age of 50, or any member of the Service who because of necessity or circumstances beyond his control is unable to efficiently perform his functions shall be honourably retired and receive a pension of two-thirds (2/3) of his salary for the remainder of his natural life.

This Section shall operate retrospectively commencing from the date of the establishment of the said Service whereby all members at that time employed and who continue in the Service shall enjoy the benefit herein provided.

Section 2. This Act shall take effect immediately upon publication in hand-bills.

Any law to the contrary notwithstanding.

Approved February 23, 1966.

PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
(DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
MONROVIA
FEBRUARY 26, 1966

# LIBERIA ASSESSMENT

## Version 4

## September 1999

## Country Information and Policy Unit

## HOME OFFICE

## COUNTRY ASSESSMENT

### I. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT

**1.1** This assessment has been produced by the Country Information & Policy Unit, Immigration & Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a variety of sources.

**1.2** The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive, nor is it intended to catalogue all human rights violations. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum claims made in the United Kingdom. It represents the current assessment by the Immigration & Nationality Directorate of the general socio-political and human rights situation in the country.

**1.3** The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain.

**1.4** It is intended to revise the assessment on a 6-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum producing countries in the United Kingdom.

**1.5** The assessment will be placed on the Internet (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/cipu1.htm). An electronic copy of the assessment has been made available to the following organisations:

Amnesty International UK

Immigration Advisory Service

8601

Immigration Appellate Authority

Immigration Law Practitioners' Association

Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants

JUSTICE

Medical Foundation for the care of Victims of Torture

Refugee Council

Refugee Legal Centre

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

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II.GEOGRAPHY

**A. Location and Climate**

**2.1.** Liberia is a coastal West African state of approximately 97,754 sq kms, bordered by Sierra Leone to the west, Republic of Guinea to the north and Cote d'Ivoire to the east. The capital city is Monrovia. The country is divided into thirteen counties, each having its own administrative centre.[1a]

**2.2.** Liberia experiences a distinct rainy season, between May and October, with a short break in the southern coastal region, and is generally hot and humid throughout the year. The country consists of a wide coastal plain, with several low-lying hill ranges inland, and is densely forested in most parts.[1a]

**B. Population**

**2.3.** The last pre-civil war census, conducted in February 1984, estimated Liberia's total population to be 2,101,628, with a revised mid-1994 estimate of 2,800,000. The population is divided into 16 main indigenous tribal groups, plus groups of non-tribal Liberians and non-Liberian Africans.[1a,2a]

**2.4.** As a result of the civil war (1989-1996), approximately 1.2 million people (around 45% of the population) are believed to have been internally displaced. In May 1996, it was estimated that there could be as many as 410,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea, 305,000 in Cote d'Ivoire, a further 15,000 in Ghana, 5,000 in Sierra Leone and 4,000 in Nigeria. By the end of 1997, the number of Liberian refugees in neighbouring West African states was estimated to have fallen to 480,000. Meanwhile, the US State Department has estimated that there have been up to 200,000 fatalities as a result of the fighting and that a total of 750,000 people have fled from Liberia, in addition to the 1.2 million internally displaced persons.[1a,2ab,19]

**2.5.** In 1995, UNESCO estimated that 61.7% of the adult population remained illiterate (approximately 46% and 77% of the total number of male and female adults respectively). Although primary and secondary education is largely free, and officially compulsory between the ages of 7 and 16 years, the closure or disruption of educational institutions during the civil war has deprived many children of even basic education in Liberia since 1990.[1c]

**C. Language**

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**2.6.** The official language of Liberia is English. There are a number of native, or tribal, languages spoken which were largely confined to traditional tribal homelands. However, changes in Liberia's economy, growth and infrastructure, and the effects of a long-running civil war, have led to the inevitable blurring of geographically-based language demarcations.[3,4]

## III. HISTORY

### A. The Foundation of Liberia and One-Party Rule, 1847-1980

**3.1.** Liberia was founded by freed black slaves from the southern states of the US who were settled on the Grain Coast under the auspices of the American Colonization Society in the early part of the nineteenth century. The Liberian Republic was declared in 1847, under the presidency of Joseph Roberts. Descendants of the original settlers and colonists, the Americo-Liberians, dominated the politics of Liberia until 1980.[4]

**3.2.** Between 1871 and 1980, Liberia was effectively a one-party state, under the governance of the True Whig Party. However, in 1979, following a 50% increase in the price of rice (a staple food in Liberia), "rice riots" in Monrovia resulted in approximately 100 deaths and the fatal weakening of President William Tolbert's authority.[4]

### B. Samuel Doe and the PRC, 1980-1989

**3.3.** The Americo-Liberian hegemony ended in a bloody coup on 12 April 1980 led by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, killing Tolbert along with his presidential guard. Doe established the People's Redemption Council (PRC), and summarily executed 13 members of the deposed government.[1a]

**3.4.** The PRC were the first leaders of Liberia to come from the indigenous population, but were largely dominated by Doe's Krahn ethnic group. The PRC soon attracted criticism for its conspicuous corruption and the lavish lifestyle enjoyed by Doe and his associates. A draft constitution, approved by the PRC in March 1983, was adopted in July 1984 following a referendum. Doe promised a return to democracy in 1985, but the elections in October that year witnessed blatant fraud by the PRC, who won with 51% of the vote.[1b]

**3.5.** As a result of the PRC's brutality and corruption, there were several attempts to depose Doe, the most notable being led by Thomas Quiwonkpa, a founder member of the PRC who fled Liberia in 1983. Quiwonkpa returned to Liberia in November 1985 to launch a coup attempt, which claimed an estimated 1,500 lives, with the army massacring many of Quiwonkpa's Gio tribespeople.[1a,4]

### C. Civil War and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996

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? **The Outbreak of Civil War, 1989**

**3.6.** Doe's regime came to an end following an armed insurrection, which began in Nimba county, led by Charles Taylor, a former Doe official. Taylor's forces, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), were few in number and, initially, did not enjoy much support, but the brutality of Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), who had massacred hundreds of civilians in Nimba county, led to a massive boost in support for the NPFL, along with the exodus of some 150,000 refugees into neighbouring Guinea.[4]

**3.7.** The war quickly escalated beyond Nimba county and took on an alarmingly tribal nature. Doe's Krahn dominated army and the allied Mandingo tribe massacred other ethnic groups, particularly the Gio and Mano. In return, the NPFL massacred Krahn civilians and, by May 1990, had taken control of large portions of the country, with the exception of Monrovia and its environs. Attempts at mediation and negotiation of a ceasefire, made by ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), ended in failure, with Taylor demanding Doe's resignation as a precondition. By July 1990, Doe was besieged in his presidential palace as the NPFL advanced on Monrovia. Taylor established the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), based in Gbarnga, Bong county. A breakaway faction, the Independent NPFL, led by Prince Yormie Johnson, took control of much of the capital.[1a]

? **ECOMOG Intervention, 1990**

**3.8.** Fighting in Monrovia led to further massacres, with the AFL being held responsible for the murder of over 600 Mano and Gio, mainly women and children, who had taken refuge in a church compound in an eastern suburb of Monrovia. In August 1990, and with the agreement of both Doe and Johnson, ECOWAS sent a seaborne force of 2,500 West African troops to Monrovia. ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) entered Monrovia and took hold of the port area, but were opposed by Taylor's NPFL, who offered armed resistance to ECOMOG's attempts to pacify the city.[5]

**3.9.** At the end of August 1990, at an ECOWAS meeting in Banjul, Gambia (which was boycotted by the NPFL), prominent Liberian political and social dignitaries appointed Dr Amos Sawyer, former head of the Liberian People's Party, as President of an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). The IGNU was not, however, recognised as being authoritative by the NPFL. Despite ECOMOG efforts, clashes between the AFL and the INPFL continued and, on 10 September 1990, Johnson captured Doe, who was later brutally tortured and killed. Johnson subsequently pronounced himself head of state.[1a]

**3.10.** In October 1990, ECOMOG, with the assistance of the INPFL, were successful in driving the NPFL beyond the outskirts of Monrovia. However, the NPFL controlled the remainder of the country, including the strategic port city of Buchanan, from where they continued to receive arms supplies and revenue from the export of timber. Taylor was reluctant to compromise with ECOMOG, who in turn lacked the strength required for an all out offensive on the NPFL. The IGNU, now established in Monrovia (Sawyer was installed as Interim President in November 1990), was powerless beyond Monrovia and entirely dependant on ECOMOG's protection for its survival. A ceasefire signed at Bamako in late November 1990 effectively recognised the division of Liberia into two distinct parts.[1a,4]

**3.11.** In the period following the Bamako ceasefire agreement, Liberia existed in a state of uneasy truce,

punctuated by further negotiated ceasefires and numerous ceasefire violations. A peace agreement, signed at Yamassoukro in October 1991, led to the encampment of the AFL, while the INPFL surrendered to ECOMOG and was subsequently dissolved in September 1992.[1a,5]

? **The Resumption of Civil War, 1991**

**3.12.** A previously unheard of group, the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), based in Sierra Leone, had emerged in June 1991. They immediately declared their opposition to Taylor's NPFL, and entered into combat against it in north-western Liberia during September 1991. In August 1992, the fragile peace was shattered by a ULIMO offensive on NPFL-held territory, which resulted in ULIMO gaining large portions of the western region. It later emerged that ULIMO comprised Doe supporters and many ex-AFL soldiers and officers. ULIMO's offensive re-started the war, and led directly to an NPFL offensive on Monrovia, beginning on 15 October 1992. Fierce fighting continued for weeks, as ECOMOG sought to contain the NPFL advance, and was ultimately forced into an uneasy alliance with ULIMO and the AFL remnants, who had been effectively confined to barracks since November 1990. ECOMOG managed to repel the NPFL offensive but attracted much criticism for its partnership with ULIMO and the AFL, and was accused of partiality by the NPFL. It also received considerable condemnation for its use of aerial bombardment which often resulted in widespread civilian casualties.[1a,4,5]

**3.13.** In late 1992 and early 1993, a bolstered ECOMOG force (now comprising some 15,000 troops, mainly Nigerian) began overtly offensive operations against the NPFL, and succeeded in imposing a blockade on certain NPFL areas, causing food shortages in the interior of Liberia and, of more significance to the NPFL, partially depriving Taylor's forces of much needed arms, ammunition and revenue. The United Nations imposed an arms embargo on all the warring factions (excluding ECOMOG) and appointed a special envoy to Liberia.[1a]

**3.14.** As a result of the increasingly successful ECOMOG-led offensive against the NPFL, Taylor recommenced negotiations with ECOMOG and the IGNU. During these negotiations, it emerged that between 500-600 civilians had been massacred in June 1993 at the displaced persons' camp in Harbel, 50 kms from Monrovia, where they had been sheltering from the recent fighting. Although initially blamed on the NPFL, a UN Commission of Inquiry, established to investigate the killings, concluded that the AFL were responsible.[1a,6]

? **Cotonou Peace Agreement, 1993**

**3.15.** All-party talks, held in Geneva in the spring of 1993, resulted in a peace accord being signed by all warring factions in Cotonou, Benin, on 25 July 1993. The agreement called for a UN-sponsored ceasefire, the disarmament of all combatants, the establishment of a transitional government and, eventually, nationwide elections. An expanded ECOMOG, together with the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), established by UN Security Council Resolution 886 in September 1993, were to monitor the implementation of the agreement. Although several problems were initially encountered, the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG), represented by all factions, was installed on 7 March 1994, headed by a prominent lawyer, David Kpomakpor, and disarmament of the estimated 60,000 combatants began, albeit slowly.[1a,6,7]

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**3.16.** Fighting broke out again after both ULIMO and the NPFL split. There was heavy factional fighting in Tubmanburg during March 1994, following the division on ethnic grounds between the Mandingo and Krahn ULIMO contingents, and around the NPFL headquarters at Gbarnga, Bong county, in September 1994. In the same month, a former AFL commander, Charles Julu, led an unsuccessful coup attempt in Monrovia. Julu and six other officers were sentenced to seven years' imprisonment after being convicted of sedition in July 1995. All were, however, later pardoned by the transitional ruling council.[1b,7]

? **Akosombo Peace Agreement, 1994**

**3.17.** A Ghanaian initiative, established during Rawlings' Presidency of ECOWAS, led to further peace talks between Taylor (NPFL), Bowen (AFL) and Kromah (ULIMO-K) in the summer of 1994, culminating in the signing of the Akosombo Accord on 12 September 1994. The Accord met with widespread disapproval as it did not encompass all Liberian factions, and effectively partitioned Liberia. Due to vocal opposition by church leaders, civilian politicians and other civic groups, who were concerned about the likelihood of a military government being established, the provisions contained in this agreement were not fully implemented. However, further inclusive talks led to the signing of another more comprehensive peace accord at Accra on 21 December 1994. The agreement (known as Akosombo II or the Accra Agreement) provided for a ceasefire (which took effect on 28 December 1994), a timetable for disarmament beginning in April 1995, elections at the end of the year, and a new government to be installed by 1 January 1996. Before this was to be achieved, the peace accord initially provided for a reconstituted Council of State. The elections, which were scheduled to take place in November 1995, were later postponed and tentatively rescheduled for August 1996.[8,9]

? **Abuja Accord, 1995**

**3.18.** The original ceasefire was recognised by all factions, but ultimately failed prior to disarmament of the fighters. Fighting between most factions, throughout the country, resumed in February 1995. A further peace agreement, signed in Abuja, Nigeria, in August 1995, was more successful, having provided for an interim Council of State, which was installed on 1 September 1995, backed by a more effective ceasefire, which came into force on 26 August 1995. The Council of State (LNTG II) contained representatives of all the major warring factions in Liberia (except the AFL who were, however, recognised as Liberia's constitutional armed forces), and was headed by a neutral chairman, Professor Wilton Sankawulo. Again, there was some disagreement over the distribution of portfolios amongst the various factions, but most problems were later overcome.[9]

**3.19.** Sporadic violations of the ceasefire were reported, mainly in Gbarnga, the NPFL stronghold, and Tubmanburg (the traditional ULIMO base). In addition, the proposed disarmament programme suffered serious setbacks, with ULIMO-J (the predominantly Krahn group led by ex-AFL commander General Roosevelt Johnson) refusing to surrender weapons to ECOMOG troops. The distribution of humanitarian aid to areas outside Monrovia was also seriously restricted, and the renewed fighting

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brought further civilian casualties.[9]

**3.20.** Following the ceasefire, which had been largely effective since its beginning on 26 August 1995, rival groups were to disengage, withdraw behind established buffer zones, report to disengagement centres and surrender their weapons to ECOMOG troops, under the observation of UNOMIL. However, due to extremely limited resources and skirmishes with some of the unco-operative factions, ECOMOG were unable to disarm the estimated 60,000 combatants (later revised down to approximately 30,000) at anywhere near significant levels, and their programme quickly fell behind schedule. A special Ceasefire Violations Committee (CVC) was established by UNOMIL, charged with the responsibility for investigating breaches of the already tenuous peace plan.[10a]

**3.21.** In the most serious violation of the ceasefire, during December 1995, fighting broke out at Tubmanburg between a weak ECOMOG force, comprising mainly Nigerian troops, and a large contingent from the ULIMO-J camp. Several ECOMOG troops were killed, many more wounded and approximately 130 were taken hostage. On 16 January 1996, after lengthy periods of negotiation, ULIMO-J agreed to an exchange of prisoners and bodies, and to surrender any arms captured during the incident. However, on 1 March 1996, ECOMOG withdrew from Tubmanburg owing to ULIMO-J's reluctance to surrender any weapons or withdraw from Tubmanburg, and responded forcefully to ULIMO-J's continued belligerence. ECOMOG troops were later able to deploy in order to implement the disarmament plan agreed under the Abuja peace accord, and create the much needed buffer zones to separate the various factions.[1c,9,10b]

? **The Siege of Monrovia, 1996**

**3.22.** In February 1996, the Executive of ULIMO-J ousted General Roosevelt Johnson as their commander-in-chief. This was quickly followed by Johnson's removal from the Council of State. A warrant for his arrest was issued by the Ministry of Justice, in connection with the murder of the new ULIMO-J leader. Johnson, supported by troops still loyal to him, sought refuge in the Barclay Training Centre in Monrovia, former base of the AFL. An attempt by Taylor to implement the arrest warrant led to intense fighting in Monrovia during April, between Taylor's NPFL, supported by Alhaji Kromah's ULIMO-K, and the AFL/ULIMO-J of Johnson. Johnson was, in turn, supported by the leader of a separate Krahn faction, the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), led by George Boley. The resultant fighting, the heaviest and most costly Monrovia had witnessed since the beginning of the civil war, led to approximately 3,000 deaths, including several hundred from starvation and disease.[1c,9,10cd]

**3.23.** Foreign residents of Monrovia, who had taken refuge at the US Embassy complex at Mamba Point, were evacuated and thousands of Liberians civilians fled from the city by boat. Three boats, chartered to carry refugees, made their way to Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Takoradi, Ghana. A ceasefire was eventually negotiated and, after the factions withdrew from their frontlines, peacekeeping troops deployed around Monrovia in an attempt to recommence the implementation of the Abuja Accord. However, sporadic fighting continued into June 1996, before a general ceasefire was declared after the Krahn factions, the LPC and ULIMO-J agreed to surrender their weapons before retreating from Monrovia to encampment centres outside the city.[1c,9,10d]

**3.24.** Following heavy international pressure, the major warring factions, with the exception of Roosevelt Johnson (ULIMO-J) who was not present, signed a further agreement at an ECOWAS summit in July 1996, indicating their willingness and desire to adhere to the principles set out in the Abuja

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Accord. A further meeting of the summit in August, which included Johnson, approved a reconstituted Council of State (LNTG III), to be led by Ruth Sando Perry, a former senator during the Doe regime. The Council of State was later installed in September 1996. The accord also provided for an immediate ceasefire, disarmament of all combatants by the end of January 1997 and nationwide elections to take place in May 1997, with an elected government to be installed by 15 June 1997. The ECOWAS foreign ministers also agreed that they would take punitive action against any faction leader who failed to comply with the principles of the Abuja Accord.[10d]

**3.25.** Following the Abuja summit, there were several significant instances of ceasefire violations, despite the various factions' pledges to abide by the new agreement. Aid workers, who were for the first time able to venture into areas beyond Monrovia under ECOMOG protection, discovered thousands of starving Liberians, who had been effectively cut off from all humanitarian supplies as a result of skirmishes between the rival groups. ECOMOG deployment, in an attempt to disarm all the combatants by the January 31 deadline, succeeded in re-opening most major highways, thereby allowing relief agencies to deliver aid to where it was most needed. During the disarmament period, various agencies reported signs of massacres, and there were several serious clashes which resulted in civilian casualties.[10d]

## D. Return to Politics, 1996

**3.26.** There was an assassination attempt against Charles Taylor in Monrovia in October 1996. However, no faction claimed responsibility. The AFL, who had remained quiet in the previous months, declared that, despite the fact that they had effectively been disarmed already, they would disband as a gesture of goodwill, and in order to restore confidence in the electorate. ECOWAS assumed full responsibility for security.[10h,14b]

**3.27.** In March 1997, Alhaji Kromah was arrested following the discovery of an arms cache at his property near Monrovia. Charges were later dropped, but not before a strike in support of Kromah. Although ceasefire violations continued, there were no serious security problems in Liberia after the disarmament deadline. ECOMOG secured buffer zones separating the various factions, some of which continued to fight despite having been partially disarmed.[10h]

## E. Elections, 1997

**3.28.** The major factions continued preparations for the forthcoming elections by declaring that they had dissolved their armed wings and had been reconstituted as political parties. Charles Taylor (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO-K) and George Boley (LPC) all announced their intention to stand for election in May 1997 but, under Electoral Commission (ECOM) regulations, were obliged to resign from the interim Council of State. The LNTG III also encountered many political problems, concerning doubts as to the supervision of the elections, the possible amendment of the 1984 constitution and Mrs Perry's efforts to reimburse civil servants, many of whom had not been paid for more than 10 months.[15a]

**3.29.** The Liberian elections were postponed until 19 July 1997 as the necessary legislation and logistics were not in place for the original May deadline. Polling passed off peacefully, monitored by independent foreign observers including the Carter Centre and representatives of the European Union, who declared

the elections to be free and fair with no significant irregularities. Charles Taylor was elected President and his National Patriotic Party (NPP) gained 21 of the 26 seats in the Senate and 49 of the 64 in the House of Representatives.[10j]

## F. Economy

**3.30.** Liberia's principal sources of income, that is shipping registration, export of timber, rubber and the mining of ores and gemstones, had been badly affected by the 1979-1989 recession. The sharp decline in the demand for iron ore and rubber, and the dramatic rise in the price of rice, one of Liberia's staple crops, were key factors in the opposition to, and eventual downfall of, the True Whig Party government in 1979-80.[1c]

**3.31.** Liberia's infrastructure, which was poorly developed before the civil war began, has suffered greatly through years of neglect, under-investment and cancelled development programmes. However, more recently, the civil war caused extensive damage to the industrial and agricultural economy, to the extent that the country's external debt is estimated to be more than US$2 billion, while the domestic debt is put at over US$230 million.[10k,2b]

**3.32.** As a result of the civil war, there are no accurate figures concerning the state of the Liberian economy, at either national or personal levels. The continued fighting led to an almost complete cessation of the official export of rubber, iron ore, timber and precious gems, on which Liberia's economy had been based. In 1996, the World Bank estimated that the average wage was $725 per annum, which put Liberian wage earners in the "low annual income" bracket. With an 85% unemployment rate, the continued internal displacement of civilians and the absence of infrastructure throughout the country, productive capacity remained depressed until the end of 1997, despite Liberia's rich natural resources and potential self-sufficiency in food.[2ab,1c]

**3.33.** The principal source of electrical power for Monrovia, the Mount Coffee Hydroelectric power station, had been almost completely destroyed by the end of 1990, and the main international airport, the Robertsfield International Airport at Harbel, remained closed for several years as a result of severe damage sustained from 1992 onwards. The smaller James Spriggs-Payne Airfield in Monrovia was re-opened to regional flights in June 1996, but had remained operational sporadically throughout the war. Both airports are currently undergoing significant rebuilding programmes.[14a] In December 1997, the Robertsfield International Airport was re-opened to international flights, and while the government indicated that there was still a considerable amount of reconstruction work to be completed there, it also expressed hope that the re-opening would help to facilitate the recovery of Liberia's economy.[15e]

# IV INSTRUMENTS OF THE STATE

## A: JUDICIARY

**4.1.** Although the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, judges have always been subject to political, social, familial and financial pressures. Corruption and lack of professionalism remained a recurrent problem. The judiciaryis divided into 4 levels with the Supreme Court at the apex. All levles of the court system in Monrovia, including the Supreme Court, functioned, though erratically. A new

juvenile court, the first in the country's history, was established in 1997 but it tried no cases during the year. A criminal court established late in 1997 specifically to handle armed robbery cases heard only one case during 1998. Outside Monrovia the judiciary did not function in most areas due to and acute lack of trained personnel, infrastructure and resources. Several localities reverted to traditional forms of justice administered by clan chieftains.

**4.2.** Under the Constitution defendants have due process rights that conform to internationally accepted standards. However, in practice these rights are not always observed. Courts regularly received kickbacks on damages awarded in civil cases. Defence attorneys often suggested that their clients pay a gratuity to appease judges, prosecutors and police officers and ensure a favourable ruling. In August 1998 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court summarily sentenced a Deputy Minister of Information to 5 days in the central prison for criminal contempt after he said in a radio interview that he felt that the judiciary was rotten. In December 1998 the President called for reform of the judiciary and dismissed a number of magistrates and justices of the peace accused of incompetence or malfeasance. [24]

**4.3.** In February 1998 President Taylor sacked Justice Minister Jallah for administrative reasons and replaced him with Eddington Varmah who was a senator in the national legislature representing Taylor's National Patriotic Party. [2b]

**4.4.** Clan chieftains continued to use the tradtional practice of trial by ordeal to resolve criminal cases in rural areas. Although the Supreme Court ruled that trial by ordeal, commonly the placement of a burning metal object on a suspect's body to determine whether he or she is telling the truth, is unconstitutional, the Ministry of Internal Affairs continued tacitly to condone the practice in an unknown number of cases in 1998. A lawsuit brought in 1994 for injuries resulting from trial by ordeal was still pending before the Supreme Court at the end of the year. [24]

## B: ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES

**4.5.** The security forces included the armed forces, the national police, which have primary responsibility for internal security, the Special Security Service (SSS), a large and heavily armed executive protective force as well as numerous other irregular security services attached to certain key ministries and parastatal corporations, the responsibilities of which appeared poorly defined. The national army, which fought against Taylor's faction during the civil war, has yet to be downsized and restructured as required by the Abuja Peace Accords although a restructuring plan exists. Only a few contingents have been deployed to maintain security in parts of rural areas. The many, newly created security services absorbed Taylor's most experienced civil war fighters. Armed units within these services consisted almost exclusively of undisciplined Taylor loyalists. While civilian authorities generally maintained control of the security forces, there were frequent instances in which the security forces acted independently of government authority. Members of the security forces committed numerous human rights abuses. [24]

**4.6.** Since coming to power in August 1997 President Taylor has made it a priority to rebuild the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) ridding it of its Krahn dominance. In January 1998 the defence ministry demobilized and retired more than 2,400 soldiers, including hundreds of senior officers. In May 1998 retired and demobilised soldiers went on the rampage for the third time to protest at not receiving their retirement benefits. Also in May the government announced plans to establish a national social policy

for former factional fighters which would provide them with free medical treatment. A new centre had also been set up which would provide vocational training. President Taylor said that restructuring of the AFL would only take place after approval by the National Legislative. He said the present exercise of demobilisation and retirement was for those who had joined the army during the war. In July Defence minister Daniel Chea announced plans to streamline the armed forces. **21abc and 22ab** In May 1999 he said that we would accelerate the process of restructuring the armed forces. **26**

**4.7.** See Section V B In July 1999 a defence ministry spokesman said that a lack of funds has delayed the relocation of the army from the Barclay Training Centre (BTC) to the Coast Guard Base on Bushrod Island in the western suburb of Monrovia. **27**

**4.8.** Security forces committed a substantial number of extra judicial killings during the year. Most were killings of ethnic Krahn on or after 18 September. See Section V B

**4.9.** On this date security forces in the capital conducted a military assault codenamed Operation Camp Johnson Road against Johnson's base. Hundreds of SSS officers and members of the police Special Task Force, joined by scores of irregular former combatants of Taylor's former faction, employed automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars. Much of the shooting occurred at nightime and was indiscriminate. Credible reports indicate that as many as 300 people, most of them Krahns and many of them women and children, were killed in a 17 hour battle and in subsequent house to house searches and summary executions by government forces. Several officers of the Krahn dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) were subsequently interrogated and tortured before being summarily executed. The Government falsely claimed that the men had been caught in crossfire during the earlier fighting. Following these events about 9,000 people, most members of the Krahn ethnic group, fled from the country to neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire.. **24** A UN fact finding team arrived in the country on 17 May 1999 to gather facts on the fighting in September 1998. **25**

**4.10.** A local human rights organisation claimed that security personnel often use torture in interrogating those they suspect of criminal activity. There were numerous credible reports that security forces subjected citizens to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. On several occasions during the year security forces publicly disrobed, flogged and humiliated perceived opponents of the administration. In April 1998 the Director of Police ordered the flogging of a member designate of the Liberia Human Rights Commission for an alleged traffic violation. J. Kormah Bryemah sustained multiple contusions from the flogging. President Taylor appointed a commission to investigate the matter but refused to publicise its findings claiming that he had ordered the probe for his personal information. The Senate subsequently declined to confirm Bryemah's appointment to the commission. **24**

**4.11.** The Government often despatched security force units to rural areas without paying or provisioning them. There were many incidents in which members of the security services and the armed forces serving in rural parts of the country harassed and extorted money and goods from civilians. There were many credible reports that security forces harassed returning refugees, displaced people and refugees from Sierra Leone, especially in the border areas. **24**

## C: POLICE AND PRISONS

**4.12.** The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the rights of the accused, including warrants for arrest and the right to be either charged or released within 48 hours. However, many people arrested were not released or brought before a judge within this timescale. [2b] Although the Government generally adhered to these constitutional requirements warrants were not always based on sufficient evidence and detainees, especially those without the means to hire a lawyer, were often held for more than 48 hours without charge. [24]

**4.13.** In April 18 police officers were suspended for alleged unprofessional conduct including police brutality. [21e] Lengthy pre-trial detention is also a serious problem. The police have only limited logistics and forensic capabilities and cannot adequately investigate many crimes including murder cases. When the courts release known criminals for lack of evidence, police officers often re-arrest them on specious charges. [24]

**4.14.** In August 1999 President Taylor appointed Paul Mulbah a former aide of an exiled civil war rival as his new police chief. He replaced Joe Tate who was killed in a plane crash on 10 August. [28] Following his appointment Mr Mulbah announced measures to clean up his crime-ridden force beginning with gun control among police officers. [29]

**4.15.** Prison conditions were harsh and in some cases life threatening. The Government did not provide prisoners with adequate food or medical care. Cells at Monrovia Central Prison were occasionally overcrowded with prisoners awaiting trial. The Deputy Minister of Justice for Corrections welcomed and supported initiatives by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission and other NGOs to make improvements to prison facilities in Monrovia and Kakata. President Taylor visited Monrovia's Central Prison in December and subsequently ordered the release of some prisoners being held without charge. Women, who constituted about 5% of the prison population, were held in separate cells. There were no separate facilities for juvenile offenders. Human rights groups were granted frequent access to prisoners in Monrovia and these groups often obtained medical treatment for prisoners. In a number of cases, human rights groups and interested individuals achieved the release of prisoners. [24]

## V. HUMAN RIGHTS

## A. INTRODUCTION

### Human Rights Abuses During the War

**5.1.** Throughout the seven year war there were numerous credible reports of human rights abuses committed with impunity by all the warring factions, mainly against innocent civilians as territory was seized or raided. These abuses include looting and destruction of property, abductions, enforced conscription, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extrajudicial killings and massacres of civilians. It is difficult to get an exact number of victims of serious human rights violations during the period, but it is estimated that about 200,000 were killed, up to 750,000 became refugees, and over 1.2 million of a pre-war population of 2.8 million were internally displaced.[1a,2a,10k]

**5.2.** The civil war, which began on 24 December 1989, was dominated by ethnically-aligned factions, most of which have been accused of participating in various atrocities, the majority against innocent and unarmed civilians. ECOMOG troops, the majority of which are Nigerian, have also been accused of human rights abuses and partiality. The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) are believed to have been responsible for the massacre of over 1,000 civilians in two separate instances: St Peter's Lutheran Church in Monrovia in July 1990 and Harbel Plantation in June 1993. Personnel of the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), established by the LNTG II in 1995 in order to combat a dramatic rise in crime in Monrovia, have also been accused of committing serious abuses of human rights and other unconstitutional acts. These abuses include unlawful arrest and detention, torture and extrajudicial executions.[2a]

**5.3.** The conflict in Liberia was essentially a power struggle, with some ethnic elements. Because the control of faction leaders over their troops was often loose and the central government, law and order, and physical infrastructure of Liberia had been either seriously damaged or eliminated altogether, the hostilities were characterised by widespread lawlessness, the easy availability of small arms and gross violation of human rights by all factions against innocent civilians. The IGNU and the LNTGs were unable to exercise effective control due to the poor security situation and were therefore limited in their ability to provide protection to Liberian citizens outside Monrovia. Furthermore, in April 1996, following the escalation of fighting in Monrovia, the already fragile judicial system collapsed and courts did not resume operation until September 1996. While Monrovia continued to operate with a degree of normalcy for the greater part of the war, the remainder of the country has been subject to the general lawlessness which has permitted the various factions to act with impunity and with no regard for human life. The long-term absence of a responsible, accountable or representative government has compounded the systematic abuse of civil liberties which has characterised Liberia's past.[10k,7]

### The Liberian Constitution and the New Government

**5.4.** The 1984 Liberian constitution provides for certain fundamental human rights, and is supported by a theoretically independent judiciary. However, the security situation during the war meant that there was little chance to adhere to the constitution or uphold its tenets. Furthermore, tribal affiliations and loyalties, together with corruption and general inefficiency, have played significant roles in the Liberian way of life and have all been major factors affecting the impartiality of the police, judiciary and other government bodies.[1c,2a] Following the July 1997 elections, Charles Taylor was sworn in as President of the Republic of Liberia on 2 August 1997. A new government has also since been sworn in under the

1984 constitution, which remains the operative basic law of the land. [2b]

## B. SECURITY SITUATION

**5.5.** Prior to the July 1997 elections, the Liberia National Police (LNP) and the National Security Agency (NSA), which report to the Ministry of Justice, together with the Special Security Services (SSS), which report directly to the head of state, were nominally responsible for internal security, but they lacked the resources and training to function effectively. ECOMOG troops, numbering approximately 10,500 and deployed throughout the country, remained the key military force maintaining security and supporting the government, both before and after the July 1997 elections. During the seven year civil war, ECOMOG had assumed many police powers in the absence of a central government capability, and while it also generally maintained internal discipline, there were a number of incidents in which individual ECOMOG soldiers tortured and killed both former combatants and civilians.[2b]

**5.6.** The security situation in Liberia remained reasonably calm throughout late 1996 and early 1997, with only minor and sporadic outbreaks of fighting, mainly between rival militia in the hinterland. ECOMOG troops were able to exercise control in most regions, having established firm buffer zones, and were successful in disarming large numbers of former combatants. Following the February 1997 deadline for faction leaders to dismantle their paramilitary forces, there were few instances of ceasefire violations, which enabled ECOMOG to provide the necessary security for the safe conduct of the elections. There were no reports of ceasefire violations after January 1997.[10h] However, while significant disarmament had been achieved, factional command and control structures were not completely dismantled and remained largely in place.[2b]

**5.7.** While there were no significant security incidents, either immediately prior to or immediately after the elections, Monrovia has experienced an increase in violent crime,[10k] including looting, ritualistic killings and vigilante justice.[2b] A National Security Council, which includes the ECOMOG Force Commander, was established by President Taylor and a meeting of the ECOWAS heads of state in Abuja in August 1997 recommended that ECOMOG remains in Liberia in order to help the Liberian government establish and train a reconstituted national police force. The government has since appointed superintendents for all thirteen Liberian counties and the Liberia National Police have begun preparations to re-open police stations across the country.[10k] During 1997, there were reports that members of the security forces, including the police, had committed serious human rights abuses, which increased towards the end of the year. [2b]

**5.8.** In November 1997, President Taylor stated that the task of restructuring the AFL was now his responsibility, not ECOMOG's, and announced the formation of a 1,000 man force to form the nucleus of a new AFL, most of whom it is believed will come from Taylor's disbanded NPFL militia. For its part, ECOMOG's commander, General Victor Malu, has stated that the force is ready to leave as soon as the Liberian government has made a case to the ECOWAS that it is prepared to assume full responsibility for Liberia's security. It was expected that ECOMOG would not remain in Liberia beyond the expiry of its current mandate on 2 February 1998. However, in November 1997, Taylor stated that he favoured ECOMOG's continuing presence beyond that date, but only as a capacity-building mission

which would assist him in maintaining peace and security in Liberia.[15b,18] Nigeria said it would withdraw its last batch of peace-keeping soldiers in late September 1999. Some 80 Nigerian soldiers are still in Liberia as part of the ECOMOG force charged with overseeing the destruction of weapons remaining from the country's 7 year civil war. [34] See paragraph 5.26

**5.9.** On 27 June 1997, the United Nations Security Council approved the extension of UNOMIL's mandate to cover the elections and the installation of the new government. However, that mandate finally expired on 30 September 1997, whereupon the UNOMIL observers commenced their withdrawal from Liberia. The UN Secretary General has recommended that a permanent office is established in Liberia to promote peace, reconciliation and reconstruction.[10j] In December 1997, it was announced that a UN peace-building mission would be established in Monrovia for six months.[2b]

**5.10.** The July 1997 elections have been accepted as credible by international observers and the majority of the Liberian political parties. President Taylor gave his assurances that he would establish and promote a human rights commission and a national reconciliation commission in Liberia, and has called for continued international aid in order to rebuild the country's ravaged economy and infrastructure.[14e]

**5.11.** The UN Secretary General has reported that humanitarian assistance is still much needed in Liberia. Although the security situation has remained relatively stable for over a year, the provision of humanitarian aid in rural areas is sporadic, mainly due to the poor condition of roads and the effects of the rainy season (May to October). Basic medical, sanitation and drinking water supplies are well below normal levels, and only approximately 25% of pre-war public and private health facilities are functioning. The UNHCR and other UN organisations and NGOs are in the process of attempting to persuade the externally displaced refugees to return to Liberia, and are establishing welfare and agricultural programmes to assist those who do return.[10ijk] By the end of 1997, approximately 1.5 million people in Liberia were said to be dependent upon humanitarian assistance to survive.[2b]

**5.12.** On 9 December 1997 President Taylor appointed Alhaji Kromah of the Coalition Party of All Liberian People as chairman of the National Commission on Reconciliation. However, Kromah who had remained outside Liberia, said that he felt unsafe about returning and was replaced in March 1998. On 1 December opposition politician, Samuel Doike, and several other family members were detained on the orders of Taylor's chief bodyguard. Their deaths were later confirmed and 5 members of the Special Security Service were arrested in connection with the murders. Charges against 3 of these were subsequently dropped so that they could serve as state witnesses. These suspects were later freed by a court for lack of evidence. **21d f 23 22c**

**5.13.** In March 1998 ECOMOG troops surrounded the area around the home of former warlord Roosevelt Johnson after overnight shooting there. Johnson, minister for rural development, accused members of the Special Security Service, of attacking his home and trying to kill him. This was denied by the Information Minister. President Taylor later removed Johnson from his position as rural development minister and named him ambassador to India. **21g 22d e**

**5.14.** The chairman of the National Human Rights Monitor alleged that former generals of dissolved warring factions were holding women and children hostage in south east Liberia. In June 1998 ECOMOG troops withdrew from Monrovian streets alleging harassment from Liberian security services. However, they redeployed at checkpoints across the capital Monrovia in July when a government spokesman said that ECOMOG was working jointly with government security forces to tighten security in the city. Following the improved security situation the curfew in Monrovia which had been in place

since 1992 was lifted. 21h 22f g

**5.15.** In June 1998 the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) said that its staff had been placed under security surveillance and security officers had been enquiring about its Director Kofi Woods. The Commission referred to a press statement by the Information Minister, Joe Mulbah, in which he termed the Commission and its director as anti-government. The Justice Ministry later denied that the government intends to arrest the Director of the JPC. 22g h

**5.16.** In July a former member of Liberia's dissolved Council of State, Vamba Kanneh, said that there was a security threat on his life. This followed a meeting with President Taylor who accused Kanneh of involvement in a planned coup. Kanneh accused a security agency of misinforming the President and called for the replacement of the police director Joe Tate. Also in July the Deputy Information Minister accused former warlord Roosevelt Johnson of planning subversion to destabilise the country. The Liberian Women Initiative (LWI) complained about disappearances and subsequent murders of individuals which were linked to government security forces. This followed the arrest of a member of the Special Security Service in connection with the abduction and probable murder of a 37 year old woman. The Secretary General of the LWI was later charged with inciting the public. In addition legislators from Montserrado Country also referred to such disappearances and described the criminal justice system as ineffective. 22h i

**5.17.** The Liberian Council of Churches (LCC) accused the government of doing nothing to halt human rights abuses in the country. In July the Liberian Senate approved amendments to the act creating the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). The amended act empowers the Commission to reach decisions by simple majority and not consensus. The Commission's decision, according to the act, can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court and the Commission's decision is enforceable by the Circuit Court. It also has the right to subpoena witnesses to testify.

22j 21i

**5.18.** Grand Gedeh superintendent confirmed that national security forces were constantly harassing citizens in the country and this was undermining the resettlement programme in the area. The superintendent lodged a formal complaint about the harassment to Defence ministry authorities and said that joint security operations in the country were dominated by the Armed Forces of Liberia. A member of the NHRC also called for an investigation into the alleged harassment of citizens in Margibi and Rivercess counties. A Grand Kru County senator later described human rights groups as enemies of the State and said that they were painting a bad picture of the country. In July police authorities in Lofa County admitted to continuous security harassment of civilians in the county. However, a police commander in Kolahun District said that the police were not involved and accused soldiers of the AFL of being responsible. He said these soldiers were performing police duties and the police detachment itself was working to restore law and order. 22i k

**5.19.** In August tension flared again around former warlord Johnson's home following the shooting of one of his bodyguards by ECOMOG troops who were trying to stop a fracas. In September Johnson took

refuge in the US Embassy following clashes between government troops and his supporters. The fighting led to many deaths. Subsequently some prominent religious leaders complained of looting, harassment and intimidation by security forces. The offices of the opposition leader of the Unity Party, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, were also looted

**5.20.** President Taylor subsequently apologised for these acts and said that some security men had been arrested for their involvement. President Taylor also promised a fair trial for those people charged with sedition. Roosevelt Johnson was also one of those charged with treason and Taylor called upon the US government to hand over Johnson and his supporters. Approximately 1 week after he had sought refuge at the embassy the US authorities flew Johnson and some of his entourage out of the country.[22l 21j 22m]

**5.21.** Following these events the JPC issued a statement demanding transparency and accountability. As a result of this 4 JPC members were called to the Ministry of Justice to clarify their statement. Rumours that a warrant had been issued for the arrest of the JPC director were later denied by the authorities. 29 officers and enlisted men of the AFL were subsequently detained and charged with mutiny, sedition and aiding and abetting enemies. An attempt to forcibly free them in October led to the deaths of 11 people after a shootout at the detention centre. In November Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said that she had been named in an indictment which listed those charged with treason. Justice minister Varmah later said that Ms Sirleaf was not one of the 32 indicted. Amnesty International expressed concern at the climate of growing insecurity and said that independent media and human rights defenders had recently been the target of an increasing clamp-down at the hands of the authorities. On 9 Nobember 32 people, mostly ethnic Krahn supporters of former warlord, Roosevelt Johnson, went on trial for treason. Johnson and another former warlord, Alhaji Kromah, were to be tried in absentia. Justice minister Varmah said the trial would be fair and fully transparent and that rights groups and the press would be able to follow the proceedings. [22n o p q]

**5.22.** Until mid September the Taylor administration permitted domestic and international human rights groups to operate largelhy without interference but members of the security forces frequently harassed individual democracy and human rights activists. Although the Government routinely criticised these actions and pledged to investigate them and punish the perpetrators, it did not follow through on these pledges. Harassment increased significantly during the last 3 months of the year as domestic human rights groups and international NGO workers attempted to gather data on the number of persons who were killed, wounded and remain missing as a result of Operation Camp Johnson Road.

**5.23.** Domestic human rights organisations were underfunded, understaffed and their personnel lacked adequate training. There are 2 coalitions of human rights groups: the National Human Rights Centre of Liberia has 12 member organisations while 4 other groups joined together to form the Liberia Federation of Human Rights Organisations. Both of these organisations sought to further public discussion of human rights problems.

**5.24.** Some of the human rights groups paid regular visits to detainees at police headquarters and prisoners at the central prison. Several domestic human rights organisations have established branches outside the capital and perform similar monitoring functions there. There was no discernible pattern of government interference with these activities. [24] In May 1999 the National Human Rights Commission called for support saying that the lack of funds and logistics have paralysed the Commission. He said the commission is facing difficulties in investigating and monitoring human rights cases in the country. [30]

**5.25.** On 14 May President Taylor dismissed 11 cabinet ministers and several heads of public corporations and autonomous agencies after they failed to attend the official programme marking the

end of 3 days of national prayer and fasting. He later re-instated them. [31]

**5.26.** In June 1999 an elite security unit known as the Anti-Terrorist Unit was set up and the government called upon all public and private interests, observers and international organisations to feel at liberty to assess the behaviour and operational methods of the ATU. President Taylor said that the unit specialises in the protection of all facilities, both public and private, which have the capacity to accommodate large gatherings. The ATU are experts in the deterrence of sabotage. [32]

**5.27.** On 26 July some of the weapons used in the civil war were burned at a symbolic ceremony in Monrovia. The weapons were handed over by former warring factions in the civil war in 1997. The rest of the weapons used in the war are to be burned in Bomi County. [33]

**5.28.** In August 1999 the UN World Food Programme began distributing emergency food aid to thousands of civilians in the Voinjama area of Northern Liberia following fighting between government forces and rebels. [35] The Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) said that fighting in the Vahun, Lolahun and Voinjama areas had stalled the operation of most aid agencies and the humanitarian situation was alarming. [36]

## C: SPECIFIC GROUPS

## MINORITIES/ETHNICITY

**5.29.** In its 1974 census, the Liberian government recognised sixteen indigenous ethnic groups, including the Bassa, Gbandi, Gio, Grebo, Kpelle, Kru, Krahn, Loma, Mandingoes (Malinke), Mano, Vai. These groups are distinguished by linguistic rather than physical characteristics, although there may be as many as six distinct dialects within just one of them, and while most fall into geographical clusters, these areas are not necessarily unified by any common culture, sociology, religion or political loyalty. So in reality, they appear to be more a reflection of the fairly arbitrary system which the old Whig government used to catalogue and organise the indigenous people. They, along with the Americo-Liberians, the Fande (an ethnic group of Ghanaian origin) and a small number of miscellaneous groups, constitute the population of Liberia.[4]

**5.30.** It is widely recognised that Liberia has not been traditionally afflicted by inter-ethnic strife, with members of the different ethnic groups living in close proximity and with frequent intermarriage between them. However, while ethnic tensions did increase with the arrival of the Americo-Liberians in the early nineteenth century in a situation that can best be described as a case of "indigenous" versus "outsider", ethnic difference only became a serious problem with Samuel Doe's accession to power, his privileging of his own Krahn group, and his severe mistreatment of the Gio and Mano. As a result, the Krahn themselves later became the targets of Charles Taylor's NPFL forces, in retaliation for abuses

against the Gio and Mano.[8] More recently, some Krahn have claimed systematic discrimination by the Taylor administration, although there are some Krahn holding ministerial positions in the new government.[2b] No ethnic or regional group was conspicuously over represented in the Government. [24]

**5.31.** Although the Liberian constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination, the war involved fighters from all factions torturing and deliberately killing unarmed civilians suspected of opposing them, often solely because of their ethnic origin, as they seized or raided another group's territory, which led civilians to flee the areas of fighting. Even previously aligned ethnic groups were affected by the spiralling violence, as can be seen in the case of the ULIMO faction. In March 1994, this split into ULIMO-J, led by Roosevelt Johnson and dominated by the Krahn, and ULIMO-K, led by Alhaji Kromah and dominated by the Mandingo. Heavy fighting broke out between the two factions, who raided each other's territory, harassing, torturing and killing civilians. Much of the fighting between the two factions was focused on occupation of the town of Tubmanburg, which had served as the ULIMO headquarters before the split. In November 1994, the two factions agreed a ceasefire and peace negotiations began in April 1995, but fighting was resumed in Grand Cape Mount and Bomi counties in May 1995, and clashes continued into late 1996. In January 1996, there were reports that members of the LPC were killing, raping and harassing members of the Grebo ethnic group in south-eastern Liberia. [7,17ab]

**5.32.** While the constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination, it also provides that only "persons who are negroes or of negroe descent" may be citizens or own land, thus denying full rights to many persons who were born or lived most of their lives in Liberia including those of Asian descent. Although there has been no government initiative to repeal this provision, there are reports that non-Liberians have acquired Liberian passports. The 1975 economic "Liberianisation" law prohibits foreign ownership of certain businesses, such as travel agencies, retail gasoline stations, and beer and soft-drinks distributors.[2a] In October 1997, several bills extending the Liberianisation law were passed by the legislature, but by the end of that year they had not yet been signed into law by the president.[2b]

**5.33.** A very large but undetermined number of innocent citizens who happened to be of the Krahn ethnic group were victimised during house to house searches following Operation Camp Johnson Road. Government security forces also turned away from hospitals virtually every Krahn who sought treatment for wounds received during the fighting.

**5.34.** Many members of the predominantly muslim Mandingo minority encountered hostility when they sought to return, after the end of the civil war, to their to their villages in Lofa, Bong and Nimba counties. Many Mandingos were unable to re-occupy their own homes, which had been taken over by squatters. Members of the Lorma, Gio and Mano minorities generally held all Mangingos responsible for atrocities committed by the ULIMO-Mandingo faction during the civil war. The lack of competent security forces and a fully functioning judiciary in these areas prevented many Mandingos from seeking redress. [24]

**5.35.** During 1997, there were several instances of mistreatment of foreigners, including citizens of ECOWAS countries, especially Nigerians. Several immigration officers were dismissed for beating and harassing foreign nationals in October 1997.[2b] In November 1997, there were reports that some Nigerians living in Liberia were fleeing the country because of alleged torture and hostilities at the hands of Liberian security personnel. It is claimed that about 3,000 Nigerians and other Africans have left Monrovia as a result. However, the reports were subsequently denied by the Liberian authorities, which stated that its immigration bureau has at no time launched a crackdown on Nigerians or any other foreign nationals in Liberia. They claimed that the recent departure of hundreds of Nigerians from Liberia was facilitated by the Nigerian Embassy, which recognised that all those repatriated to Nigeria

were without valid travel documents, in contravention of ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of citizens in member states.[14ij]

**Women and Children**

**5.36.** Women have been particular victims of violence during the war, suffering a dramatic increase in rape and sexual harassment, in addition to being targeted indiscriminately by the various factions, along with children and the elderly. In June 1995, 652 women were reported to have been raped in Buchanan within the prior six months, mostly by members of the warring factions. In some areas, the rate of teenage pregnancy has doubled, with corresponding effects on the educational level and social status of girls. Even before the war, domestic violence against women was extensive, but never seriously addressed as an issue by governments, the media or women's groups. However, during the war, several women's organisations were established to advance family welfare issues, to help promote political reconciliation and to assist in rehabilitating former combatants as well as civilian victims of war. Meanwhile, several NGOs in Monrovia and Buchanan have developed programmes designed to treat abused women and girls and to increase awareness of their human rights. A related problem is the rapid spread of HIV infection, as a result of rape and forced prostitution in Liberia and among refugees in neighbouring countries.[6,2a,19]

**5.37.** The status of women varies according to region, ethnic group and religion. Before the outbreak of the war, women held one-fourth of the professional and technical occupations available in Monrovia, and women currently hold skilled jobs in government, including in the judiciary. In urban areas, women can inherit land and property, but in rural areas, where traditional customs are stronger, a woman is normally considered the property of her husband and his clan, and cannot usually inherit from him.[2a] or retain custody of her children if her husband dies. There continued to be few programmes to help former combatants re-integrate into society and there were none specifically to benefit former female combatants. However, several women's organisations advanced family welfare issues, helped promote political reconciliation and assisted in rehabilitating both former female combatants and women who were victims of the civil war. [24]

**5.38.** Throughout the year, professional women's groups, including lawyers, marketers and businesswomen, remained vocal about their concerns. Government officials often responded negatively to public criticism. There were credible reports of harassment and possible surveillance of outspoken critics. Security officers forcibly brought a prominent womens rights activist to police headquarters for questioning and detained her for several hours after she revealed to the media that there were witnesses to the killing and secret burial of a market woman. The activist was eventually set free but only after thousands of women threatened to march on police headquarters to demand her release. [24]

**5.39.** Female genital mutilation is widely condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health. FGM traditionally has been performed on young girls by northern, western and central tribes, particularly in rural areas among traditional societies. Prior to the onset of the civil war in 1989 approximately 50% of women in rural areas between the ages of 8 and 18 were subjected to FGM. In some instances female health professionals in the tribes participated in the practice to the extent of providing post operative care.

**5.40.** The war totally disrupted traditional village life. Most of the population fled to neighbouring countries or became displaced within the country. Social structures and traditional institutions such as

the secret societies which often performed FGM as an initiation rite were also undermined by the war. While many experts believe the incidence of FGM had dropped to as low as 10% by the end of the war, traditional societies are re-establishing themselves throughout the country and a rise in the incidence of FGM is expected. The most extreme form of FGM, infibulation, is not practised. The Government has taken no action against FGM. [24] Social workers in Liberia estimate that more that 90% of rural women between the ages of 8 and 18 have undergone the practice. UN agencies, in collaboration with the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFLL), said that they will lobby influential female legislators and judges to fight the scourge. Liberia's 5 human rights organisations have assured AFLL that they will lobby parliament to pass legislation against the practice. [37]

**5.41.** Due to the poor condition of government schools most children who attended school went to private institutions. Since many private schools had to be refurbished due to wartime damage, school fees were increased greatly, thereby making education unattainable for many school age children. In both public and private schools children were often asked to provide their own books, pencils and paper. No date was known to be available on either school enrolment or government expenditure on education. [24]

**5.42.** Children in Liberia have also been seriously victimised during the civil war. 77% of children are estimated to have lost a close relative. Many became orphaned when their parents were brutally killed in front of them, while others became separated from their families when they were caught in the fighting, and thus accepted the "protection" that it was thought joining a faction would bring. The Liberian war has been characterised by the forcible or voluntary conscription of child soldiers, a practice forbidden under the Protocols of the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which Liberia has signed. Children proved easy prey for the various factions, some of which provided addictive drugs to ensure their compliance and continued participation in warfare. 50,000 children are estimated to have been killed, while many were wounded, or themselves committed atrocities. It has also been estimated that those under the age of 15, including some as young as 8, made up 10% of the 40,000 to 60,000 combatants in Liberia, with an added 20% being under the age of 18. Many youths remain traumatised and some are still addicted to drugs. The reintegration of these children into their communities presents enormous problems, as close relatives may have died or fled, and some have refused to take their children back because of the abuses they have committed. An estimated 1.4 million children experienced violence, hunger and homelessness during the war. The number of street children in Monrovia and the number of abandoned infants increased significantly following disarmament. NGOs and UNICEF continued retraining and rehabilitation programmes for a limited number of former child fighters. A new juvenile court was established in Monrovia in 1997 but it lacked the resources and personnel to function. Children continued to be incarcerated with adults and there were long delays in deciding cases involving minors. [24 2ab,6,8,12]

## D: OTHER ISSUES

## FREEDOM OF POLITICAL OPINION

**5.43.** The Constitution provides for the right to vote in free and fair elections and citizens exercised this right in 1997 in elections that international observers deemed free and transparent. However, the elections were conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation as most voters believed that the forces loyal to Charles Taylor would resume the civil war if Taylor were to lose the election. Since the legislative election was held on the basis of proportional representation Taylor's National Patriotic Party won control of the legislature by the same 75% majority that Taylor reveived in the popular vote for the presidency. The 1997 legislative and presidential elections were held under a special election law in accordance with the terms of the Abuja peace process.

**5.44.** In July the chariman of the Election Commission issued a warning that candidates for public office who engaged in ritualistic killing in the belief that it would enhance their electability would be disqualified and would face criminal prosecution for murder. This appeared to be a response to a genuine social problem rather than an attempt by the Government to create a pretext for restricting political competition.

**5.45.** The Congress did not exercise genuine independence from the executive branch. Opposition legislators, who controlled only one quarter of the seats in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, were generally more docile than some maverick members of the ruling NPP. Although all representatives and senators had been elected by proportional representation and did not campaign in their individual districts, most demonstrated a strong sense of responsibility towards their constituents. However, Congressional cimmittees failed to develop expertise in their respective areas of responsibility. No major legislation was passed into law during the year.

**5.46.** The State is highly centralised. The President appoints the governors of the 13 counties. Municipalities and chieftancies elect their own officials. Subnational governments at all levels have no independent revenue base and rely entirely on the central Government for funds. Education, health and public works are provided by central Government civil servants. Local officials serve mainly as lobbyists to the central Government.

**5.47.** Municipal and cheiftaincy elections were to have been held in May. Due to disorganisation, poor planning and financial mismanagement, polls were held in just one county where a by-election was required to fill a vacant senate seat. The election commission spent 480,000 dollars on the Lofa County election in which only 40,000 citizens cast ballots. Disgruntled poll workers who claimed that they did not get paid held a amember of the Election Commission hostage for several weeks to dramatise their demands. Polling in the country's 12 other counties was at first put off until October and then postponed until the spring of 1999. [24]

**FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS**

**5.48.** The Liberian constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press, but the government limited and continually challenged these freedoms. In April 1997, the NPFL-appointed Information Minister blocked the publication of six Monrovia newspapers, claiming that they had not paid the required registration fees. After the July 1997 election, the Information Minister repeatedly cautioned members of the press to scrutinise their newspapers, to ensure that they accorded due courtesy and respect for the government and its officials. In November 1997, the Taylor administration also threatened to close the national radio station, which was known for its independence, whereafter its reporting became more favourable towards the government. Government harassment of the press increased towards the end of 1997, including arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, and intimidation of journalists by the security forces. The restrictive media law, instituted during the Doe regime in the 1980s, remained in force and provided the Ministry of Information with wide discretion to regulate journalists.[2b] The Justice and Peace Commission researched the matter and found that an interim legislature had repealed the decree in August 1993. However, to allay lingering concern President Taylor formally repealed the decree in July. [24] On 20 March 1998 the Ministry of Information announced new media guidelines which, if enforced, would have driven most private newspapers and radio stations out of business. The Press Union of Liberia challenged the guidelines as unconstitutional because they restricted freedom of expression. After discussing the issue with the press union, the Ministry agreed to revise the guidelines to the satisfaction of the private media. [24]

**5.49.** During the years of civil war, the lack of security and an increasingly difficult economic climate meant that independent newspapers and radio stations were unable to disseminate information widely. In addition, both ECOMOG and the NPFL have been criticised for their attempts to restrict the dissemination of information regarding the war. Several newspapers and radio stations came under attack by various factions throughout the war, especially during fighting in Monrovia in April 1996, which led to the almost total destruction of Liberia's free press. The NPFL have, however, established pro-Taylor radio stations, which were able to broadcast election propaganda in the build-up to the July 1997 elections. The US-controlled Voice of America, and the BBC world service programmes continued to broadcast throughout the war, while the UNOMIL Public Information Unit provided broadcast material to all the functioning radio stations throughout the registration and voting process.[2a,10j] In February 1998 a daily newspaper accused the police of severely flogging its editor. President Taylor promised to take disciplinary action against the police officer concerned but no action was taken by years end. The government also forced the private Star radio station to close after accusing it of illegally using two wavelengths. However, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications allowed the radio to resume normal broadcasting pending the regularisation of the appropriate documentation. In October the Minister for Information stopped Star radio from issuing information on the internet. This prohibition was lifted after the radio station complied with legal requirements to operate.

**21a k 22n p 24**

**5.50.** Security forces periodically threatened private print media editors and journalists throughout the year. Several leading private journalists did not sleep in their own homes for extended periods because of frequent night time visits and verbal threats by security officers. The harassment of private journalists intensified greatly following Operation Camp Johnson Road, resulting in a high degree of self censorship, particularly with regard to security issues.

**5.51**. In April 1999 the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) and the Press Union of Liberia (PUL) renewed their Memorandum of Understanding. The memorandum provides for collaboration between the two organisations in promoting social justice and democracy. The JPC and the PUL will also work together to advocate and protect the rights of journalists. [38]

**5.52.** Seven private newspapers were published regularly in the country. Two were dailies and five appeared once or twice weekly. Some of them carried articles that were critical of the Government. However, their editors admitted to practising self censorship by witholding news reports which relected unfavourably on, and commentary that was highly critical of, the President, the security services and official corruption.

**5.53.** Due to limited literacy and the relatively high costs of newspapers and television, radio remained the most important medium of mass communication. Six private FM radio stations located in the capital broadcast to the greater Monrovia area aand in some cases beyond. The Monrovia Communications Network affiliated with President Taylor's NPP party and reportedly financed by the President personally, operated one of these stations and also maintained a short wave station which broadcasts to the entire country from the town of Totota near the centre of the country. Its programming was not critical of the executive branch of the government. Of the 5 other privately owned domestic FM radio stations, 2 were owned by Liberians, 1 was operated by the Catholic archdiocese, 1 was an evangelical station and 1 was foreign owned. The Catholic Church also operated a weak short wave transmitter. Programming on these private stations, largely domestically produced, was occasionally critical of the Government.

**5.54.** Two television stations operated in the country both were privately owned. Two private Internet service providers, the country's first, began operations during the year. Several government officials publicly criticised citizens citizens who disseminated damaging information and criticism of the Government to Liberians abroad. However, there have been no known attempts to disrupt or otherwise limit access to the Internet. The government maintained its own website which it used to counter what it considered false allegations propagated on the Internet. [24]

**5.55.** Academic freedom was generally respected at the University of Liberia. In July and August, speakers at a 3 week long natinal conference on the future of the country were openly critical of the Taylor administration's first year in office. There were no known reprisals. [24] The Liberian constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respects these rights, but limited them in some instances.[2b] Throughout the civil war, political parties, NGOs and civilian groups continued to hold demonstrations and public meetings. These meetings were generally free from disruption by the Liberian authorities and ECOMOG in Monrovia, although ECOMOG continued to discourage large-scale demonstrations organised by civilian groups, mainly on security grounds. Meanwhile, such activities were severely restricted in faction-controlled areas outside Monrovia.[2a] During the 1997 election campaign, there were several instances of political harassment and violence against candidates, particularly in Monrovia, although these incidents diminished as the election campaign progressed.[2b]

**Freedom of Religion**

**5.56.** The Liberian constitution recognises freedom of religion as a fundamental right, and while Liberia has no established state religion, it is at least nominally a Christian country. As many as 40% of the population profess to be Christian, with the many Protestant churches constituting the largest group. The Americo-Liberians, who constitute 5% of the population, are predominantly evangelical Protestants (mainly Methodist or Baptist), and most Liberians who became urbanised, regardless of ethnic group, also became at least nominally Protestant. Roman Catholicism is the religion of around 6% of the population, whose members are concentrated largely in the Kru ethnic group. Islam is the religion of

14% of the population and is believed to be gaining adherents. The majority of both the Vai and the Mandingoes (Malinke) are Muslim (75% and 95% respectively). Most of the remaining ethnic groups, including 80-95% of the Kpelle, Gio, Mano, Loma, Krahn and Gbandi, still adhere to traditional religions.[1c,2a,3,4]

**5.57.** Religious divisions have not played a major role in the strife in Liberia, and there is no evidence of systematic violation of religious freedom by the warring factions.[4] However, while the law prohibits religious discrimination, Islamic leaders have complained that Liberia's secular culture gives preference to Christianity in civic ceremonies and observances, and that discrimination spills over into areas of individual opportunity and employment. Although there are some Muslims in senior government positions, many Muslims believe that they are disregarded for other highly sought government jobs.[2a] Only one cabinet minister is a muslim. [24] Taylor's administration dismissed many Muslims, particularly Mandingoes, from longstanding jobs, and following his public accusation in September 1997 that Muslim Mandingoes were fighting in Sierra Leone, prominent Mandingoes in Monrovia and elsewhere began to receive threats. There were also credible reports that returning Muslim Mandingo refugees were not allowed to resettle in their home villages in Lofa, Bong and Nimba counties.[2b]

**5.58.** There are indications of religious involvement in human rights issues during the civil war, which has led to the arrest of at least one prominent Christian leader. In March 1996, Lutheran Bishop, Ronald Diggs, was arrested and charged with hindering law enforcement when the Interfaith Mediation Committee of which he was chairman proposed that a national commission of enquiry be set up to investigate alleged human rights abuses committed by Roosevelt Johnson and others. He was released on bail the day before fighting broke out in Monrovia the following month.[17b]

**5.59**. In May 1998 a mosque was burnt down in Nimba County and another in Lofa County where some 27 houses belonging to Muslims were also damaged. Police arrested 5 people in Nimba county in connection with the arson. A delegation from the Inter-Faith Council of Liberia also investigated the incident. Two suspects were later released on bail together with several traditional chiefs of Zoe-Geh and other suspects. Some were bailed whilst others were released because of lack of evidence. [22g h j]

**Freedom of Movement, Exit and Return**

**5.60.** The Liberian constitution recognises the right to freedom of movement throughout the country, as well as the right to leave or enter. However, during the war, the movement of civilians and humanitarian aid workers was severely restricted by factional fighters, and even within Monrovia, ECOMOG was not always successful in ensuring safe passage. Inaccessibility to displaced persons, due to fighting and security concerns, severely limited the amount of relief assistance that could be provided. Late into 1997, access to major parts of the country, particularly in the north and south-east, remained limited owing to the poor conditions of the roads.[2a,10k] Freedom of movement was further restricted by numerous checkpoints set up by the security forces since the Taylor administration took office in July 1997. [2b] In June 1998 the Government repealed an exit visa requirement for all residents and no longer required foreign visitors to register with the immigration service within 48 hours of arrival. [24]

**5.61.** Since 1990, over 1.2 million citizens, of an estimated pre-war population of 2.8 million, have been internally displaced, while in early 1997, there were estimated to be around 750,000 Liberian refugees in neighbouring West African states: 410,000 in Guinea, 305,000 in Cote d'Ivoire, 15,000 in Ghana, 5,000 in Sierra Leone, and 4,000 in Nigeria.[1a,2a,19] With the improved security conditions, made possible by ECOMOG, more than 100,000 internally displaced persons and refugees returned to their homes to

register for and vote in the July 1997 elections. Some faced harassment and extortion at newly installed roadblocks, by government officials, including the police, and some former fighters, who also subjected other civilians and humanitarian aid workers to such treatment. By the end of 1997, the number of Liberian refugees in neighbouring West African states was estimated to have fallen to 480,000.[2b] Meanwhile, the UNHCR has been organising an operational plan for the repatriation and reintegration of Liberian refugees. Several hundred returned from Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire in November 1998. [10j 22s]

**5.62** At the end of 1997, Liberia was itself host to more than 120,000 Sierra Leonean refugees, who had been fleeing their country since the May 1997 military coup there. Most have taken refuge along the western border in Grand Cape Mount and Lofa counties. Despite Taylor's closure of the border with Sierra Leone in October, refugees continued to cross into Liberia through unmanned border crossing points.[2b] The UNHCR together with the Liberian government and other NGOs, is monitoring the situation and attempting to cater for the emergency needs of Sierra Leoneans arriving in accessible areas.[10jk] However, while the new government has co-operated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations in attempting to assist the refugees, inaccessibility to many, due to poor road conditions and the limited capacity of local NGOs, severely limited the amount of relief assistance that could be provided. [2b]

## ANNEX A - COMMON ABBREVIATIONS/POLITICAL GROUPS

**AFL Armed Forces of Liberia**

Formerly the national army of Samuel Doe, Krahn-dominated but also with a significant number of Mandingoes. Led by General Hezekiah Bowen until October 1994. Has supported two armed factions: the LPC and ULIMO, and was found responsible for the June 1993 massacre of more than 500 displaced civilians near Harbel.[7,8]

**ALCOP All Liberian Coalition Party**

Led by Alhaji G V Kromah, of ULIMO-K, it came third in the 19 July 1997 elections, winning 4% of the vote, with two seats in the Senate and three in the House of Representatives.[15c]

**APP Alliance of Political Parties**

Led by Cletus Wotorson of the LAP (Liberia Action Party), and comprising the LAP and the LUP (Liberia Unification Party), it won 3% of the total vote in the 19 July 1997 elections, obtaining two seats in the House of Representatives.[15c]

**BB Black Berets**

Created in Guinea by the IGNU in 1992, as a unit of several hundred soldiers from different ethnic groups.[6,8]

**BDF Bong Defence Front**

Aligned with ULIMO-K, it operated in NPFL-held territory in Bong county during the civil war.[6]

**CRC Central Revolutionary Council**

Formed in September 1994 by dissident members of the NPFL, it was engaged in conflict with forces loyal to Taylor. Led by Thomas J Woewiyu.[1c]

**ECOMOG ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group**

A peacekeeping multi-national force sent to Monrovia in August 1990 by the ECOWAS. In 1993, it was accused of impeding relief efforts and conducting its own attacks against non-combatant, neutral targets, and has also been criticised for allying itself with the AFL and ULIMO, both of which are known to have perpetrated serious human rights violations.[7,8]

**ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States**

An intergovernmental organisation of 16 West African states, with headquarters in Nigeria, whose aim is to promote economic development and regional co-operation.[7]

**EMG Executive Mansion Guard**

Presidential guard created by President Samuel Doe, and attached to the AFL during the civil war.[8]

**IGNU Interim Government of National Unity**

Seated in Monrovia from April 1991 until March 1994, under the protection of ECOMOG troops. In March 1994, it handed over power to the Transitional Government, in accordance with the terms of the Cotonou Agreement.[7]

**INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia**

A breakaway faction of the NPFL, led by Prince Yormie Johnson, a former senior NPFL lieutenant. Formed in 1990, Prince Johnson gave himself up to ECOMOG and left the country in October 1992, following which many INPFL fighters rejoined the NPFL.[7]

**LDF Lofa Defence Force**

Formed in 1993 to counter attacks from the Mandingo faction of ULIMO, it engaged in conflict with ULIMO forces in Lofa county. Aligned to the NPFL and led by Francis Massaquoi.[1c,6]

**LNC Liberian National Conference**

Organised by Liberian citizens to discuss aspects of the peace process in August 1994, it continued to discuss and make recommendations to the different parties involved in the conflict and peace negotiations.[7]

**LNH Liberia New Horizons**

Led by Charles Julu and William Glay, both Krahns, it emerged in May 1994, advocating a strong military-style government. In September 1994, Julu was arrested and charged with treason for his part in an attempted coup by AFL personnel against the transitional government, but was later pardoned.[6]

**LNTG Liberian National Transitional Government**

The first LNTG (LNTG I) was installed in Monrovia in March 1994, and was presided over by a five-member Council of State, elected by the three groups which signed the Cotonou Agreement (IGNU, NPFL and ULIMO), and led by David Kpomakpor. LNTG II was installed following the Abuja Accord of August 1995, and led by Wilton Sankawulo. LNTG III was installed following the further peace agreement a year later, under the leadership of Ruth Perry. Like its immediate predecessor, its members included the NPFL, LPC and ULIMO-K.[1abc]

**LPC Liberia Peace Council**

Formed in 1990, with predominantly Krahn support, it was engaged in conflict with NPFL forces in south-eastern Liberia from 1993, and in 1994 is said to have stepped up attacks against civilians, particularly those suspected of supporting the NPFL. Backed by the AFL and ULIMO, and led by George Boley.[1c,8]

**LPP Liberia People's Party**

Led by Togba Nah-Tipoteh, it won 1.6% of the vote in the 19 July 1997 elections, obtaining one seat in the House of Representatives.[15c]

**LUDF Liberian United Democratic Front**

Krahn faction of former AFL soldiers, led by Arma Youlu. Formed in Sierra Leone in 1991 and later merged into ULIMO.[6]

**NDPL National Democratic Party of Liberia**

Led by George Boley and a participant in the 19 July 1997 elections, it failed to gain sufficient votes to obtain any seats in either the House of Representatives or the Senate.[15c]

**NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia**

Formed in Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire, it began the civil war under the leadership of Charles Taylor in December 1989, with an invasion into Nimba county that led to its control of large parts of Liberia. It acquired largely Gio and Mano membership, and is said to have been responsible for a number of atrocities committed against members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. Between 1990 and 1994, it controlled the bulk of Liberian territory, which it ruled through the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), based in Gbarnga, Bong county. In 1994, a substantial faction of the NPFL split from Taylor, over doubts about his commitment to the peace process.[1c,6,7]

**NPP National Patriotic Party**

Led by Charles Taylor, it won approximately 75% of the total vote, obtaining 21 out of the 26 seats in the Senate and 49 out of 64 in the House of Representatives in the 19 July 1997 elections.[15c]

**NPRAG National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government**

Led by Charles Taylor, it was the instrument of NPFL rule over the bulk of Liberian territory between 1990 and 1994, based in Gbarnga, Bong county.[1c]

**NRC Nimba Redemption Council**

An anti-NPFL group, formed in 1993, led by Karpeh Dwanyen, based in Nimba county and composed of Gios and Manos. It carried out several attacks against NPFL positions, and did not spare civilians in the process.[6,8]

**OAU Organisation of African Unity**

Founded in 1963, to promote unity and solidarity among African states, 52 of which are members, including Liberia.[1b]

**PRC People's Redemption Council**

Established by Samuel Doe on his assumption of power in 1980 and largely dominated by his Krahn ethnic group, it lasted until his overthrow in 1990.[1a]

**RRU Rapid Response Unit**

Formed in 1995 to combat soaring violent crime in Monrovia, it was infiltrated and corrupted by the NPFL, and committed serious human rights abuses.[2a]

**SATU Special Anti-Terrorist Unit**

The AFL's special anti-terrorist unit, believed to have been responsible for massacres carried out in Nimba county at the beginning of 1990, which contributed to the rapid escalation of the conflict. It had reportedly dissolved by 1994.[8]

**ULIMO United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia**

Formed at Tubmanburg in 1991, by supporters of the late President Samuel Doe and members of the AFL. Split into two ethnic factions in 1994: ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K. The two factions have since effectively functioned as separate organisations.[1c,6,7]

**ULIMO-J United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia-Johnson**

Krahn faction of the original ULIMO, led by Roosevelt Johnson. In early 1996, ULIMO-J officials announced Johnson's deposition, resulting in a further split between Johnson's supporters and those loyal to the new leadership. In 1997, he converted the faction into a new pressure movement, called UDEMO (United Democratic Movement in Liberia), not a political party but dedicated to the

principle of democratic rule.[1c,15d]

**ULIMO-K United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia-Kromah**

Mandingo faction of the original ULIMO, led by Alhaji G V Kromah since 1994.[1c]

**UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia**

Established by the UN Security Council in September 1993, to monitor the ceasefire and disarmament process, supervise the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, and to assist ECOMOG in overseeing the overall implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, UNOMIL was also given the task of assisting in the co-ordination of humanitarian relief and of reporting violations of international humanitarian law to the UN Secretary General. The UNOMIL mandate expired on 30 September 1997.[7,10k]

**UP Unity Party**

Led by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, it was the runner-up in the 19 July 1997 elections, but won only 9.6% of the total vote, thereby obtaining three seats in the Senate and seven in the House of Representatives.[14d,15c]

**UPP United People's Party**

Led by Gabriel Bacchus Matthews, it won approximately 3% of the vote in the elections on 19 July 1997, thereby obtaining two seats in the House of Representatives.[15c]

**ANNEX B - PROMINENT PEOPLE**

**Dr George Boley** Founder and leader of Liberia Peace Council. Led the NDPL in the July 1997 elections, but failed to gain sufficient votes to secure any seats in the Senate or House of Representatives.[15c]

**Bishop Ronald Diggs** Lutheran Bishop & Representative of the Liberian Council of Churches, appointed to IGNU as Vice-President in August 1990. In March 1996, was charged with hindering law enforcement when he proposed a national commission

of enquiry into human rights abuses.[1a,17b]

**Samuel Kanyon Doe** Former Non-Commissioned Officer in the Armed Forces of Liberia. Led coup against Tolbert government in 1980 and assumed power as leader of the People's Redemption Council. Publicly executed in September 1990.[1a]

**Karpeh Dwanyen** Leader of the NRC, a Gio and Mano anti-NPFL group, formed in 1993 and based in Nimba county.[6,8]

**William Glay** With Charles Julu, founded the LNH party in May 1994, advocating a strong military-style government.[6]

**Prince Yormie Johnson** Former teacher, who joined Taylor's NPFL at the beginning of the civil war. Split to lead the Independent NPFL in 1990, when he tortured and killed ex-President Doe in September. Fled Liberia in October 1992.[7]

**Gen Roosevelt Johnson** Commander of Krahn ULIMO-J faction, since it split from the original ULIMO in 1994. In 1997, converted the faction into UDEMO, and following the July elections was appointed Transport Minister in the new government.[1c,15d]

**Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf** Former Finance Minister during the Doe government. Imprisoned in 1985 for criticising Doe, and fled Liberia in 1986. United Nations Development Programme Director for Africa. Led the UP to second place in the July 1997 elections, but won only 9.6% of the vote.[15c]

**Charles Julu** With William Glay, founded the LNH party in May 1994, advocating a strong military-style government. In September 1994, was arrested and charged with treason for his part in an attempted coup by AFL personnel against the transitional government. In July 1995, received a custodial sentence of seven years, but was subsequently pardoned.[1c,6]

**David Kpomakpor** President of LNTG I, installed in Monrovia in March 1994 and remaining until August 1995.[1a]

**Alhaji G V Kromah** Leader of the Mandingo ULIMO-K, since the original ULIMO split in 1994. In the July 1997 elections, led the ALCOP to third place. In December 1997, was appointed chairman of the national reconciliation commission.[15c,2b]

**Francis Massaquoi** Leader of the LDF, which engaged in conflict with ULIMO forces in Lofa county from 1993.[1c]

**Gabriel B Matthews** Led the UPP during the July 1997 elections, winning 3% of the vote and obtaining two seats in the House of Representatives.[15c]

**Togba Nah-Tipoteh** Led the LPP in the July 1997 elections, winning 1.6% of the vote, with one seat in the House of Representatives.[15c]

**Ruth Sando Perry** Senator during the Doe government, was elected chairman of the transitional Council of State in August 1996, becoming President of LNTG III in September 1996.[1c]

**Thomas Quiwonkpa** Brigadier-General in the AFL and original member of the PRC. Fled Liberia in 1983, accused of plotting to overthrow Doe. Returned to Liberia in 1985 to lead an unsuccessful coup attempt. Killed in November 1990.[1a]

**Prof Wilton Sankawulo** President of LNTG II, installed following the Abuja Accord of August 1995, and remaining for one year thereafter.[1b]

**Dr Amos Sawyer** Leader of the LPP, appointed as President of the IGNU in August 1990 and inaugurated in November 1990. In March 1994, handed over power to the first LNTG.[1c]

**Charles Ghankay Taylor** President of the Republic of Liberia. Former Ministry of Finance official under Doe. Formed the NPFL and started civil war in 1989. Self-declared President of Liberia in 1990. Survived an assassination attempt in October 1996. Appointed to the transitional Council of State in August 1995. Leader of the National Patriotic Party (NPP), elected President on 19 July 1997 and inaugurated on 2 August 1997.[1c,6,15c]

**Thomas J Woewiyu** Led the CRC, formed by dissident members of the NPFL in September 1994.[1c]

**Cletus Wotorson** Member of the LAP, led the APP through the July 1997 elections, winning 3% of the total vote.[15c]

**Arma Youlu** Leader of the LUDF, the Krahn faction of former AFL soldiers formed in 1991, which later merged into ULIMO.[6]

## ANNEX C - CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS, 1847-1997

**1847** Liberia, founded by freed African slaves, becomes Africa's first independent republic on 26 July 1847.

**1871** Americo-Liberian True Whig Party begin 109 years of uninterrupted political rule.

**1980** In April, Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe stages a successful coup against President Tolbert. The Krahn-dominated People's Redemption Council (PRC) government becomes Liberia's first administration to be led by members of the indigenous population.

**1985** In November, President Doe survives an unsuccessful coup attempt led by former Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) Brigadier-General Thomas Quiwonkpa. The pro-Doe AFL massacre Mano and Gio tribes in Nimba county.

**1989** In December, armed insurrection in Nimba county by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) begins the seven year civil war.

**1990** The NPFL overcome government troops in Nimba county and go on to control all Liberian territory except Monrovia and its environs by May. The NPFL attacks government troops defending Monrovia and the Independent NPFL (INPFL) emerges. In August, Western diplomatic staff are evacuated from Monrovia. ECOMOG troops arrive in Liberia in late August, and about the same time the AFL and INPFL form an alliance against the NPFL, but armed clashes between the AFL and INPFL begin soon after. Doe is captured and executed by the INPFL, whose leader, Yormie Johnson, declares himself President of Liberia. ECOMOG establishes a protectorate around Monrovia in

October.

**The peace process** is initiated on 30 August at the ECOWAS Conference in Banjul, where Dr Amos Sawyer is elected President of a new Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). A further step in 1990 is the **Bamako Ceasefire Agreement**, signed on 28 November, whereby Liberia is effectively partitioned between Taylor's National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG) and the IGNU.

**1991** In June, former supporters of Doe who had taken refugee in Sierra Leone form the ULIMO, which declares its opposition to the NPFL. In October, the **Yamassoukro Accord** is signed, whereby all factions were to be encamped and disarmed, and national elections to be held.

**1992** ULIMO forces engage NPFL in Lofa county. In October, the NPFL launches Operation Octopus against Monrovia. In November, the UN Security Council imposes an arms embargo, and a special envoy to Liberia is appointed.

**1993** In July, the IGNU, NPFL and ULIMO sign the **Cotonou Agreement**, whereby the IGNU is to be replaced with the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG), including a five-member Council of State, who are appointed in August. Presidential elections are scheduled for February 1994. UN establishes UNOMIL in September.

**1994** In March, ULIMO splits into Krahn and Mandingo factions. In the same month, the LNTG Council of State is inaugurated, with David Kpomakpor as chairman. In September, the **Akosombo Agreement** is signed by the leaders of the major factions (NPFL, AFL and ULIMO-K), providing for an immediate ceasefire, a reconstituted Council of State, elections in October 1995 and the installation of a new government by January 1996, but disputes over power sharing prevent its implementation. In December, **Akosombo II** is signed, immediately following which a ceasefire is implemented, and a commitment to elections in late 1995 is confirmed.

**1995** At the ECOWAS summit in August, the **Abuja Accord** is signed by all factions. A ceasefire is confirmed and a reconstituted Council of State (LNTG II) subsequently established in September, including leaders of the major factions (NPFL, LPC and ULIMO-K), with Wilton Sankawulo as Chairman. Elections are scheduled for August 1996, and by December ECOMOG troops begin to deploy.

**1996** In April, heavy fighting breaks out in Monrovia after Taylor's troops attempt to arrest Roosevelt Johnson, recently dismissed from the ruling Council on charges of murder. Hundreds of people are killed and the city is virtually destroyed in two months of intense violence. Peace is eventually restored following a further peace agreement signed in August in Abuja (**Abuja II**), whereby a reconstituted Council of State, with Ruth Perry as its chairman (LNTG III), is to be installed in September, armed factions are to be disarmed by the end of January 1997 and elections are to be held by the end of May 1997.

**1997** ECOMOG implements disarmament plan. All warring factions order their troops to abide by the Abuja Accord and dismantle their military wings. Elections (originally scheduled for May) take place in July, with overwhelming victory for the NPP. Charles Taylor is declared President in August.

**1998** August - tension flares around former warlord Johnson's home following the shooting of one of his bodyguards by ECOMOG troops.

September - Johnson takes refuge in the US Embassy in Monrovia following clashes between government troops and his supporters. Approximately 1 week later the US authorities fly Johnson out of the country.

November - 32 people, mostly ethnic Krahn supporters of Roosevelt Johnson, go on trial for treason. Johnson and another former warlord, Alhaji Kromah, are to be tried in absentia.

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**14. a. REUTERS**, 19 June 1996

**b. REUTERS**, 1 November 1996

**c. REUTERS**, 2 April 1997

**d. REUTERS**, 25 July 1997

**e. REUTERS**, 2 August 1997

**f. REUTERS**, 15 September 1997

**g. REUTERS**, 6 October 1997

**h. REUTERS**, 28 October 1997

**i. REUTERS**, 20 November 1997

**j. REUTERS**, 26 November 1997

**15. a. FROM BULLET TO BALLOT**

West Africa, 21-17 April 1997

**b. THE KEY TO SECURITY**

West Africa, 24-30 November 1997

**c. A RESOUNDING VICTORY**

West Africa, 4-10 August 1997

**d. THE MOST WANTED MAN**

West Africa, 28 April-4 May 1997

**e. LIBERIA: AIRPORT BACK IN BUSINESS**

West Africa, 22 December-11 January 1998

**16. LIBERIA: TIME TO TAKE HUMAN RIGHTS SERIOUSLY**

Amnesty International

1 October 1997

**17. a. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1996: LIBERIA**

**b. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1997: LIBERIA**

**18. BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS**

Liberia Communications Network radio, 22 November 1997

**19. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996: LIBERIA**

**20. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (EIU) REPORT: LIBERIA**

4th Quarter, 1997

**21. a. WEST AFRICA 9-15 February**

**BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS** 9 February 1998

**b.** " " " " 11 May 1998

**c.** " " " " 30 May 1998

**d.** " " " " 28 February 1998

**e.** " " " " 18 April 1998

**f.** " " " " 1 April 1998

**g.** " " " " 26 March 1998

**h.** " " " " 5 May 1998

**i.** " " " " 22 July 1998

**j.** " " " " 24 September 1998

**k.** WEST AFRICA 16-22 February 1998

**22. a. REUTERS** 25 May 1998

**b.** " 31 July 1998

**c.** " 25 August 1998

**d.** " 28 March 1998

**e.** " 31 March 1998

**f.** " 21 and 22 July 1998

**g.** " 9; 24 and 30 June 1998

**h.** " 1 and 2 July 1998

**i.** " 9 and 17 July 1998

**j.** " 14 July 1998

**k.** " 24 July 1998

**l.** " 29 August 1998

**m.** " 25 September 1998

**n.** " 19 October 1998

**o.** " 2 and 9 October 1998

**p.** " 3; 4 and 5 November 1998

**q.** " 9 November 1998

**r.** " 9 June 1998

**23. KEESINGS RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS DECEMBER 1997**

**24. LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PROCTICES FOR 1998**

Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor


US Department of State January 1999

**REUTERS**

25. 19 May 1999
26. 24 May "
27. 12 July 1999
28. 22 August 1999
29. 30 August 1999
30. 4 May "
31. 16 & 17 May "
32. 30 June "
33. 26 July "
34. 2 September "
35. 28 August "

36. 22 " "
37. 20 April "
38. 25 " "

# WEST AFRICA




Map No 4242 UNITED NATIONS
February 2006


Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

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
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



Map No. 4045 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section



BURKINA FASO
Province Names
1 Balé
2 Bam
3 Banwa
4 Bazéga
5 Bougouriba
6 Boulgou
7 Boulkiemdé
8 Comoé
9 Ganzourgou
10 Gnagna
11 Gourma
12 Houet
13 Ioba
14 Kadiogo
15 Kénédougou
16 Komondjari
17 Kompienga
18 Kossi
19 Koulpélogo
20 Kouritenga
21 Kourwéogo
22 Léraba
23 Loroum
24 Mouhoun
25 Nahouri
26 Namentenga
27 Nayala
28 Noumbiel
29 Oubritenga
30 Oudalan
31 Passoré
32 Poni
33 Sanguié
34 Sanmatenga
35 Séno
36 Sissili
37 Soum
38 Sourou
39 Tapoa
40 Tuy
41 Yagha
42 Yatenga
43 Ziro
44 Zondoma
45 Zoundwéogo
MALI
NIGER
BENIN
TOGO
GHANA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Douentza
Djibo
Aribinda
Markoy
Gorom-Gorom
Ayorou
Bankilaré
Dori
Téra
Seytanga
Niamey
Thiou
Titao
Ouahigouya
Séguénega
Kongoussi
Bouroum
Sebba
Boundouré
Djibasso
Tougan
Gourcy
Yako
Kaya
Mané
Bogandé
Toma
Nouna
Samba
Boussé
Ziniaré
Boulsa
Gayéri
Foutouri
Torodi
Kantchari
Dédougou
Réo
Ouagadougou
Koudougou
Zorgo
Koupéla
Fada N'Gourma
Matiakoali
Diapaga
Bobo-Dioulasso
Orodara
Sindou
Banfora
Sidéradougou
Diébougou
Dano
Quessa
Léo
Hamale
Tumu
Nawongo
Bolgatanga
Wulugu
Gaoua
Niangoloko
Kampti
Batié
Wa
Tenkodogo
Manga
Ouargay
Pô
Zabré
Pama
Madjoari
Porga
Dapaong
Mango
Kombissiri
Sapouy
Kassou
Sili
Boromo
Boni
Houndé
Koumbia
Ferkessédougou
Varalé
Solenzo
Ouarkoy
Bissiri
Morolaba
Kayen
Samorogouan
Mouhoun
Nakambé
Nazinon
Pendjari
Mékrou
White Volta
Black Volta
National capital
Provincial capital
Town, village
Major airport
International boundary
Provincial boundary
Main road
Secondary road
Track
Railroad
0 50 100 150 km
0 50 100 mi
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Map No. 4230 UNITED NATIONS
November 2004
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

4230


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
SIERRA LEONE
GUINEA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
LIBERIA
International boundary
County boundary
National capital
County capital
Town, village
Road
Railroad
Airport
0 20 40 60 80 km
0 10 20 30 40 50 mi
Kailahun
Buedu
Pendembu
Vahun
Guéckédou
Mendekoma
Voinjama
Kolahun
Kanema
Gelahun
Zigida
Zorzor
Yela
Nzérékoré
Yekepa
Saniquellie
Danané
Kahnple
Gahnpa (Ganta)
Belle Yella
Wiesua
Kongo
Gbange
Belefuanai
Bendaja
Sugbar
Bo
Bopolu
Tubmanburg
Robertsport
Klay
Bong Town
Zienzu
Suakoko
Gbarnga
Palala
Kpein
Sagleipie
Yela
Butto
Zekera
Kpeaple
Tapeta
Gbooyi
Tebli
Kola (Kola Town)
Towabli (Towai Town)
Tchien (Zwedru)
Poabli
Debli
Babu
Drubo (Dubwe)
Tai
Guiglo
Toulepleu
Sassandra
Gallo
Duabo
Pelokehn
Shabli
Yaakakahn
Yibuke (Kaobli)
Juazohn
Kopo
Tishnipo
Fish Town
Tawake
Kodeke
Nyaake
Nimba
Cavally
Saye
Sinoe
Dugbe
Dubo
Grand Cess
Sinoe Bay
Greenville
Sehnkwehn
River Cess
Timbo
Bokoe
Gonglee
Ghapo
Trade Town
Edina
Buchanan
Harbel
Marshall
Careysburg
Brewerville
Monrovia
MONTSERRADO
Hartford
Guata
Tubmanburg
Bopolu
Gbarnga
Suakoko
Zienzu
Bong Town
Klay
Robertsport
Lake Piso
Mano
Moa
Lofa
Woaga
Wonegizi Range
Yedi
Lofa
Mano
St. Paul
Lofa
Nimba
Cavally
Saye
St. John
Cess (Cestos)
Dugbe
Sehnkwehn
Duo
Dubo
Dugbe
Sinoe
Cavally
Sassandra
Bafing
Baoulé
Bandama
Nzo
Bia
Tanoe
Ehy
Aby
Lagoon
Tendo
Ehotile
Lake
Ebrié
Lagoon

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## SIERRA LEONE

- National capital
- Provincial capital
- City, town
- Major airport
- International boundary
- Provincial boundary
- Main road
- Secondary road
- Railroad

Map No. 3902 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004


Department for Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

**25 December:** ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said Friday he could see no reason for the evacuation of foreign nationals from Sierra Leone. He said there had been no significant rebel activity around the city since the rebel raid on Waterloo on Tuesday. "I heard foreign diplomats reported 2,000 rebels around Waterloo and when I asked my commanders on the ground they laughed. There are just local people salvaging their belongings," Shelpidi said. "I cannot speak for foreign governments and if they want their citizens out then very well, but my personal view is that the international community should not abandon Sierra Leone at this crucial time." Shelpidi said AFRC/RUF rebels had attacked near Makeni on Friday. Makeni was under ECOMOG control, he said, but outlying villages were in rebel hands. "ECOMOG cannot be in every settlement everywhere. We don't have the manpower so sometimes there are attacks when these rebels raid villages for food, then we go there as soon as we can and they run away," he said. "We have appealed for the public to cooperate and mostly they are giving us very good cooperation but sometimes they connive with the rebels and give them food and shelter." Shelpidi also said ECOMOG had killed 14 rebels Wednesday in a clash near the Benguema training barracks.

Two British Royal Air Force planes found only one person waiting to be evacuated when they returned to Lungi International Airport on Friday. One businessman who was evacuated on Thursday explained that the lack of interest was probably due to an improving security situation in Freetown. "There is tension in Freetown and the embassy brought in planes to take us out. We did so but I don't think the rebels can take Freetown," he said. Another evacuee said there had been panic in Freetown following rebel attacks on Tuesday, but added: "I don't think the evacuation was necessary." Britain had sent its two aircraft back to Freetown on Friday to evacuate more British and other foreign nationals in the wake of recent rebel activity near the capital. "Two Royal Air Force Hercules aircraft went back to the airport in Freetown to pick up any stragglers," a Foreign Office spokesman said. "They brought out around 80 people last night. The majority were Britons, although there were a fair smattering of European nationals. He said that while the measure was precautionary, Britain was strongly advising its nationals in Sierra Leone to take advantage of this offer to leave. "The situation is very volatile," he said. "I don't say they would be targeted just because they were British, but the rebels have a pretty awful history of atrocity. We don't want any of our nationals put at risk." British High Commissioner Peter Penfold and one staff member would remain in Freetown for now, he said, but they may also have to leave. He added that Britain was still "strongly supporting" the Sierra Leone government. "We are very anxious to make it clear that the fact that we have evacuated as a precautionary measure doesn't diminish our very strong support for President Kabbah's democratically elected government," he said.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie threatened on Friday to attack Freetown on New Year's Day, then moved up the deadline claiming the arrival of ECOMOG reinforcements, unless the government agreed to negotiate with the rebels. "If Kabbah does not agree to respond to our request to open dialogue, then in 48 to 72 hours we will enter Freetown," Bockarie told the Agence France-Presse (AFP). "We are going to march into Freetown on New Year's Day unless the government agrees to our terms," Bockarie said in a separate Reuters interview. "We have the will and the way." Bockarie claimed that AFRC/RUF rebels had captured Makeni and were battling for Kenema. He also claimed to have captured Waterloo, about 20 miles from southeast of Freetown, and nearby Benguema, where he said rebel forces had seized the military training barracks. There has been no independent confirmation of his claims.

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**No Peace Without Justice**

Sierra Leone Conflict Mapping Program

Preliminary edition for the opening of the SCSL Courthouse

10 March 2004

# *Conflict Mapping in Sierra Leone: Violations of International Humanitarian Law from 1991 to 2002*

L. Alison Smith, Catherine Gambette and Thomas Longley, for No Peace Without Justice

aspects of the Rules, in particular with reference to the laws of Sierra Leone. In addition, NPWJ brought an international law expert to Sierra Leone to consult with the Special Court and others on potential models for defence before the Special Court. Both activities resulted in reports that were made available to, among others, the Judges of the Special Court during their first plenary meeting to consult on the Rules in early 2003.

The Legal Profession Program also worked closely with the Outreach Program on the public lecture series, including selecting an international law expert to provide specialised training for the members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court.[4] In July 2003, NPWJ in partnership with the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales held a week-long "IHL Training Seminar" for members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association and other interested legal practitioners. This training resulted in a set of lecture notes, which was widely distributed in Sierra Leone and abroad. In addition, many of the trainers participated in another NPWJ activity, the Lawyers' Guide to the Special Court, which is a guide to the substantive and procedural law relating to the Special Court.[5]

A major component of the Legal Profession Program was providing access to relevant library resources through the establishment of the NPWJ International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Library in Freetown. This library was a continuation of the "Book Donation" program launched in 2000, whereby foreign universities, individuals and others donated legal books and materials to NPWJ's international law reading room and resource centre in Sierra Leone. NPWJ was fortunate to receive a large donation from the Colombia University Human Rights Law Program, which was shipped to Sierra Leone in 2002 and formed the backbone of the library, which also included donations from Penguin Publishers, the Canadian Law Book Company, Geoffrey Robertson QC (as he then was), Caroline Morgan and others. The library was officially opened at the beginning of 2003 by Desmond de Silva, QC, the Deputy Prosecutor of the Special Court. NPWJ hired a qualified librarian to manage the collection, which included a digital library compiled by NPWJ, and to oversee the library itself, which also contained internet stations and photocopying facilities. The majority of users consisted of human rights activists and university and school students, who used the library for research on human rights, humanitarian law and related matters. Following the conclusion of the NPWJ Sierra Leone project in 2003, NPWJ embarked on a partnership with the Campaign for Good Governance, who are now housing the library at their Freetown headquarter office and ensuring continued public access to the collection.

### 2.(d) Conflict Mapping Program

In 2002, NPWJ launched the Conflict Mapping Program, which reconstructs the chain of events during a conflict through gathering information in the field and analysing the decision-making processes to ascertain the role of those who bear the greatest responsibility for policies of systematic and massive violations of the laws of war. This analysis is based on testimonial and other data overlaid with order of battle and command structures of the various forces as they evolved over time and space. This chronological and geographical mapping of the conflict, including reconstructing the order of battle and chain of command, serves to prevent denial of those events. An analysis of events according to international law establishes prima facie accountability for

[4] Staff of the Special Court also attended these training seminars.

[5] The Lawyers' Guide is available from www.specialcourt.org.

violations of international humanitarian law. In so doing, it both serves to strengthen the rule of law and to promote and defend human rights by publicising the price for violating them. In addition, establishing the chain of command within the armed forces operating in Sierra Leone and assembling these disparate pieces of information to create the bigger picture of the decade-long conflict in Sierra Leone enables the crucial first phase of establishing who bears direct and command responsibility for crimes committed during the conflict. This will enable the people of Sierra Leone to establish who should be held accountable for those crimes, thereby avoiding the trap of blaming a group or segment of society and promoting peaceful conciliation.

Beginning in 2002, the Outreach Program increased its geographic spread. This opened up new channels, networks and possibilities for collaboration and consequently increased the diversity and size of NPWJ's network of partner organisations and individuals. In addition, the Outreach Program deepened NPWJ's pre-existing relationships with many key sectors of society. These factors made it possible to conceive of a field based nation-wide Conflict Mapping Program in two main ways. NPWJ's extensive and trusted network of partners would be essential in devising and implementing any system of collecting information. Following this, NPWJ's network of partners embedded in communities throughout the country would also be essential in maximising the possible impact of the program: in encouraging people to participate in the program; in promoting the underlying rationales of accountability; and then in disseminating the results.

Meaningful long-term conciliation and reintegration can only take place if the accountability process belongs to each and every community – and if each community is able to participate in it. Rehabilitation and reintegration is not simply a matter of locating next of kin and assisting in individual reintegration; it is about enabling society and each community to move forward and to accept individuals back into their fold. The outreach and information gathering processes have contributed towards establishing confidence in the accountability mechanisms, by providing victims and witnesses with the opportunity to recount their stories and the stories of others in such a way as to help them understand their personal and their communities' experiences in the context of the conflict.

In the implementation of the Conflict Mapping Program, NPWJ worked closely with local partner organisations, with whom an excellent relationship had been built over the previous two years. The Conflict Mapping Program has therefore involved as much of the country as possible in conducting sensitisation and documentation in this manner so as to encourage a sense of ownership of the processes by the people of Sierra Leone.

The results of this work, which are found in this report, together with the work of organisations in Sierra Leone undertaking human rights reporting, are hoped to support the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court. It must however be emphasised that the process in itself is as important as the final document, because the direct involvement of Sierra Leoneans (both as interviewer and interviewee) in this program has allowed them to be at the heart of the accountability work being carried out in the country.

## Chapter One: Methodology

The purpose of the Conflict Mapping Program, as outlined in the preface, is two-fold: to gather reliable information so as to put together an accurate picture of what happened in Sierra Leone and to make the process meaningful for Sierra Leoneans. Initially, on the basis of NPWJ's experience in other situations, it was determined that there were four main ways in which a report such as this one could be produced, namely:

1. Individuals recounting their own experiences;
2. Individuals giving an overview of what happened in their area, through their own experience and what they have learnt from others;
3. Groups recounting their experiences in a shared environment; and
4. Open source materials.

The question facing the program during the conceptual phase was which method to select in order to maximise both the quality of the information gathered and the impact of information-gathering on Sierra Leoneans, given the resources and constraints. The main constraints were limited financial resources; a limited amount of time; the size of the country and lack of ease of movement, including the condition of the roads; and the fact that Sierra Leone experiences torrential rains for six months of the year, making many roads completely impassable.

In addition, each method listed above has its own pros and cons. For example, while the first method involves Sierra Leoneans to the greatest degree, every single person in the country would have to be given an opportunity to tell their story in order to gather enough information to be able to put together an accurate picture of what happened across the country. This would be difficult if not impossible to achieve at the national level for a ten-year conflict with limited resources and limited time. On the other hand, while the last method can also give a very comprehensive picture of what happened across the country, it would have limited to no impact on or involvement of the people of Sierra Leone.

Given these factors, it was considered that the most appropriate method for NPWJ to conduct a Conflict Mapping Program that focused on the whole of the country rather than a limited geographical area was to use information gathered from people in Sierra Leone with a good general overview of the conflict in their area ("key persons"),[6] supplemented with open source materials. In order to maximise community participation, enhance the quality of the information and overcome potential cultural and linguistic barriers, it was considered that the best people to take records from people with an overview were Sierra Leoneans from the same geographical area as the key persons ("Conflict Mapping Recorders" or "CMRs"). In addition, it was considered that in order to enhance community "ownership" of the accountability mechanisms, the Conflict Mapping and Outreach Programs should as much as possible be conducted together. Marrying the sensitisation and the documentation processes ensures that the perception of the communities reached is not that of being "told" about the accountability process as something that happens elsewhere and is relevant to others, but rather of truly taking part in it.

[6] Key persons provided information to NPWJ on the basis of confidentiality, subject to certain exceptions for which the consent of the key person was obtained prior to taking the record, including use of the information in the compilation of this report.

each entry went through a thorough process of checking and cross-checking, to ensure that it was consistent, complete and correct.[12]

## 4. The analysis

### 4.(a) District level analysis

At the conclusion of the data entry stage, NPWJ's analysts began piecing together what happened during the 10 years of war in Sierra Leone, using three tools: the database; detailed maps, mostly at District level; and the typed records. The result of this stage, which involved collating and cross-checking vast amounts of information, was a rough outline of what happened in each District during the conflict, highlighting troop movements, chains of command and events, including acts likely to constitute violations of international humanitarian law.

Following this stage, the rough drafts for each District were reviewed in Freetown with field monitors from the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) responsible for that District. CGG's field monitors are very experienced human rights activists with an in-depth knowledge about what happened during the conflict in the District for which they are responsible. NPWJ specifically did not hire any CGG field monitors as Conflict Mapping Recorders, so that their experience could be better utilised once the first analyses were done, to ensure that there were no major errors or inconsistencies in the District-level analyses, thus providing a crucial first level of cross-checking.

In addition, over a six month period, NPWJ debriefed a former high-level member of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who provided a great deal of information on the inner workings of the RUF and an overview of the conflict since it began in 1991. The hours spent working with this key person yielded a statement of over 100 pages, plus various documents and maps describing the structure, procedures and geographical locations of the RUF, which were of immense benefit during the analysis phases. A senior Kamajor was also debriefed for the same purposes, although not as extensively.

The process as a whole enabled analysts to piece together the conflict as it happened across time and space and, in particular, to draw out patterns of conduct that may constitute crimes against humanity, namely those crimes committed in a widespread or systematic manner.

### 4.(b) The first draft factual analysis

Once these stages were complete, experienced analysts began the long process of putting all the information together, which consisted of three stages. First, a "first review" was conducted of the rough drafts, checking for internal sense and consistency. Second, each rough draft went through a more thorough review, addressing potential problems in the analysis, often going back to the original records and maps to clarify issues. Finally, the rough drafts for each District were put together and cross-referenced, which enabled the compilation of the general overview of the conflict. This first stage was based purely on the information gathered in the field and, as such, did not incorporate any information from open sources or other materials.

[12] In compiling the database and the data entry process, NPWJ hired personnel who had worked on the ICG Humanitarian Law Documentation Project so as to enable this phase to benefit from lessons learnt during that project.

### 4.(c) The second draft factual analysis

The first draft factual analysis formed the backbone of the work that followed, namely the incorporation of information from open sources and other materials, going back to the records when necessary to iron out inconsistencies and to fill in details. Further, at this time, cross-checking, filling in details and checking dates and other information was undertaken when there was conflicting, contradictory or inadequate data. To facilitate this process, NPWJ incorporated a range of diverse information into a fully searchable open source database, with 8,500 entries comprised of news reports,[13] UNAMSIL press briefings,[14] situation reports from NGOs and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations press briefings and documents, press releases from other relevant bodies, such as mining companies, and other relevant information. Other open source materials were also used, including reports from major human rights organisations, particularly Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

The primary purpose for open source and other material was to provide background material, cross-check the information gathered from key persons and to fill in gaps where any existed. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the main source of information for the facts as analysed in this report was Sierra Leoneans themselves, through the records of key persons gathered by Conflict Mapping Recorders throughout the country. Wherever open sources provided information used in the report, that is noted in a footnote to the relevant portion of the text.

The result of this was the second draft factual analysis, which incorporated all verified information from the first draft, with the addition of open sources and other material that had not been gathered directly by NPWJ in the field, but which was useful for confirming or correcting the data. This second draft factual analysis was then sent to a selected number of "resource persons", namely Sierra Leoneans and foreigners with expertise in the conflict in Sierra Leone who had agreed to review the information contained in the draft report and help clear up any lingering inconsistencies or unclear information.

### 4.(d) The legal analysis

While the factual analysis was being perfected with the assistance of resource persons, NPWJ put together a legal analysis of the events that happened during the conflict. This involved researching, presenting and discussing the relevant principles of international humanitarian and criminal law, which were then applied to the information contained in the factual analysis, so as to ascertain what crimes under international law and Sierra Leonean law were committed during the conflict.

The draft of the legal analysis was sent to NPWJ's network of international law experts, many of whom have had experience working on similar projects, such as the Humanitarian Law Documentation Project in Kosovo, or practicing before international courts or tribunals. These people are to the legal sections what the CGG field monitors and the factual resource persons are to the factual sections.

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[13] The main sources used were BBC and AFP wire reports and reports from the Xinhua News Agency.

[14] Often, the records did not contain as detailed information about events that occurred from late 2000, partly because the decade-long conflict was beginning to come to an end. As such, UNAMSIL press briefings – which were regular and very detailed about UNAMSIL deployment in particular – were used to bring structure to the recollections of key persons, where necessary.

## Chapter Two: A General Overview of the conflict in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002

Sierra Leone is located on the south-west coast of Africa, bordered on the north and north-east by Guinea, on the east and south-east by Liberia and on the west coast by the Atlantic Ocean. Sierra Leone's compact shape and coastal situation mean that her international borders are only 555 miles in total, sharing 397 miles with Guinea and 158 miles with Liberia. Sierra Leone's territory covers 27,699 square miles (71,740 $km^2$), housing a pre-conflict population estimated at 4.3 million. The 13 ethnic groups in Sierra Leone had strong administrative structures in the provinces prior to British colonisation in the late 18$^{th}$or early 19$^{th}$ century, which were utilised by the British when they expanded control from Freetown across the rest of the country. This is echoed in today's legal and administrative systems, which are comprised of both traditional structures and traditional or customary law as well as a Westminster style Parliament and the application of British common law.

Sierra Leone is endowed with mineral resources, namely diamond, gold, bauxite, rutile and iron ore. Although only 6.7% of the land is arable, it also produces cash crops, in particular, coffee, cocoa, ginger and rice. Of the 800 km of waterways running through the country, 600 km is navigable the year round. Very few of the major highways running through the country are paved and there are no common carrier railroads, rendering travel through the country difficult during the rainy season, which runs from May to October. Indeed, rainfall along the coast can reach 495 cm (195 inches) per year, making Sierra Leone one of the wettest countries in West Africa. Prior to the rainy season, from December to February, the dry haramattan winds carry sand from the Sahara, depositing large amounts of sand throughout the country and bringing corresponding dust storms.

The early years of independence, which Sierra Leone attained in 1961, are marked by a number of military coups until 1968, after which the one-party State was established in the late 1970s. Once prosperous Sierra Leone would experience a steady decline throughout the 1980s, widely regarded to be the result of rampant corruption, which would set the stage for the conflict that erupted in the 1990s.

On 23 March 1991, combined forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) entered Kailahun District from Liberia through the town of Bomaru in Upper Bambara Chiefdom. On 27 March 1991, another group of RUF/NPFL entered Kailahun District from Liberia through the town of Koindu in the north of the District. By mid April, these two fronts would join in the centre of the District, having by then occupied the majority of it. On 28 March 1991, a third RUF/NPFL group crossed the Mano River forming the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone, in the south-east part of the country. They immediately occupied Zimmi, the southern-most town on the road network in Pujehun District.

As at 23 March 1991, units of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) were stationed in the towns of Koribondo (Bo District), Daru (Kailahun District), Gandorhun (Kono District) and Kenema Town (Kenema District). RUF/NPFL forces would move towards these locations to confront directly the SLA in an aggressive inland-moving campaign that was accompanied by systematic attacks against the civilian population.

In April 1991, the RUF unit that had entered Bomaru was engaged with the SLA at Daru Barracks in the south of the District. This was an important SLA position on the northern bank of the Moa

River, as it controlled further inland access by road. Occupying Daru Barracks would be a continuing objective of RUF/NPFL forces throughout 1991 and 1992. Again in April, the RUF/NPFL unit that entered through Koindu town immediately attacked SLA forces stationed some 20 km south in the town of Buedu, forcing them to retreat to Kailahun Town.

When the RUF/NPFL forces entered a town or village, civilian residents were gathered together in the centre of town, at the Court Barrie, where the RUF/NPFL forces introduced themselves as "freedom fighters" seeking to redeem the people of Sierra Leone from the corrupt All People's Congress (APC). Government. NPFL members were immediately identified as Liberian through their foreign accent and use of Liberian dialects. Enlisting, conscripting and training of both adults and children started immediately, particularly in Kailahun, where numerous training camps were established; the ranks of the RUF swelled quickly.

Reacting to such events, the Government of Sierra Leone requested and received support from the Governments of Nigeria and Guinea, who sent forces to provide security for strategic locations in and around Freetown. The Government of the United States would also provide indirect logistical and training assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone throughout 1991.

The RUF/NPFL unit entering Pujehun District from Liberia spread out across the District in a 45 mile arc from the town of Zimmi. They attacked through Pujehun Town, northwards into the southern chiefdoms of Bo District and north-east toward Koribondo Town, where the SLA was garrisoned. RUF/NPFL forces would attack the SLA in villages on the route to Koribondo until August 1991. The advance of RUF/NPFL forces in April allowed them access to land running south-west into Bonthe District, where RUF/NPFL occupied a number of small towns in the extreme south and east of the District, eventually trying but failing to occupy the District headquarter town of Bonthe, on Sherbro Island. Around this time, SLA forces were deployed in Bonthe Town and by the end of the year had opened new bases in the south-east of the District. RUF/NPFL forces moved into the southern chiefdoms of Kenema District using the main road linking Zimmi to the south of the District. Combined Guinean and SLA forces checked their advance through Kenema District into Kenema Town, where the main SLA brigade was located.

As they advanced, RUF/NPFL forces uniformly abducted civilians, simply killing them, or forcing them to carry looted property and perform domestic tasks. Almost without exception, sexual violence against women accompanied the arrival of RUF/NPFL forces in a locality. The burning of civilian residences and targeting of government and traditional authorities, in addition to the violence against civilians, caused massive panic and an exodus of civilians northwards inland. Rudimentary administrative structures – pass systems, checkpoints and appointment of their own personnel as town and chiefdom authorities – were put in place by the RUF/NPFL as they advanced. This would continue throughout the following years.

In June 1991, RUF/NPFL forces moved further north into Kono District along the main road to the District headquarter town of Koidu, staging a number of attacks on SLA positions in the south of Kono District. Throughout August and September, SLA forces from Koribondo would react offensively, forcing RUF/NPFL forces to retreat back through Pujehun District along the routes by which they had entered. In recapturing Pujehun and pushing the RUF/NPFL southwards, the SLA

collaborated with forces of the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), a Liberian movement engaged in warfare with the NPFL in Liberian territory.

To consolidate their own advance and successes against RUF/NPFL forces, SLA forces in Kono District began supporting the establishment of civilian vigilante groups, armed with bladed weapons and short-barrel shotguns. Throughout Pujehun District, SLA forces executed civilians suspected of collaborating with RUF/NPFL forces in even the most menial of ways.

By December 1991, RUF/NPFL forces had consolidated positions in Kailahun District and were compressed into small pockets of activity away from main towns in Pujehun District.

In April 1992, junior officers from the SLA Tiger Unit led by 25 year-old Captain Strasser moved from the war front to Freetown to complain about poor conditions. They successfully staged a coup, ousted the APC Government and established a military government known as the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Following the coup, SLA forces looted many civilian shops and residences in the Western Area, which was accompanied by the infliction of violence upon civilians.

In early 1992, the SLA, now under the command of the NPRC, continued to unseat RUF/NPFL forces throughout Pujehun District. Moving southwards from Koribondo (Bo District), SLA and ULIMO forces retook the network of roads crossing the Sewa River and moved towards Pujehun Town. With the assistance of the SLA, a civil militia group comprised of local hunters called the "Donsos" gained in strength in Kono District, participating as auxiliary forces to the SLA and ULIMO. The Donsos, together with other local hunting societies across the country – the largest of which were the Kamajors – would later join forces under the umbrella of the Civil Defence Forces.

RUF/NPFL forces attempted again to enter Kenema District, having failed in 1991. Entering Kenema from points in the east of the District, RUF/NPFL were resisted by ULIMO and freshly deployed SLA forces. SLA secured these positions until late 1993.

RUF/NPFL forces continued to attack Kono District, uniformly attacking the civilian population as they advanced until their expulsion from the District in early 1993. In mid 1992, in response to this increasing northwards movement of RUF/NPFL forces, the NPRC Government initiated, supported and strengthened the process of mobilising a civil militia group in Koinadugu District, in the extreme north-east of Sierra Leone. Comprised of local hunters, the "Tamaboros" – as they became known – were deployed to Kono District to engage RUF/NPFL forces. In late October 1992, RUF/NPFL forces occupied Koidu Town and were able to attack further inland in the northern chiefdoms of Kono District. Combined SLA, ULIMO and civil militia forces pushed them out of Koidu Town and Kono District in early 1993.

By May 1992 in Pujehun District, combined SLA and ULIMO forces had pushed RUF/NPFL forces back across the Moa River, leading by the end of the year to their retreat back into Liberia across the Mano River. Pockets of RUF/NPFL activity continued to pressure the SLA in the southern chiefdoms of Pujehun District and in the extreme south-east of Bonthe District.

The SLA intensified attacks on "collaborators" from October 1992 to February 1993. To the SLA, there appeared to be little distinction between civilians who cooperated enthusiastically with the RUF/NPFL and those who found themselves with little choice or simply failed to escape when the RUF/NPFL entered an area. The criteria used to determine who was and was not a "collaborator" were largely arbitrary. The SLA forced civilians to mine diamonds, provide food and carry out other forms of manual labour. In Pujehun Town, the SLA started providing basic military training, weapons and ammunition to civilians.

In Kailahun District, RUF/NPFL forces continued to attack Daru and other SLA positions in the west of the District. At the end of 1992, the RUF/NPFL grip on the northern chiefdoms of Kailahun District was unchallenged. Within these areas, a special unit of NPFL forces known only as "TAP 20" executed terror operations against the civilian population, including the widespread killing and cannibalism of civilians. Later, in 1993, "TAP 40" and "TAP Final" would continue this operation.

In the early months of 1993, SLA forces established positions in advance of Daru and started to engage RUF/NPFL forces stationed in the northern chiefdoms of Kailahun District, where RUF/NPFL forces had first entered Sierra Leone. The SLA built on this eastward progression by successfully preventing the RUF/NPFL from moving northwards into Kono District. By mid-1993, the SLA had rolled back and confined RUF/NPFL forces to the far eastern part of Kailahun District.

RUF/NPFL activity in Pujehun District resumed in December 1992 to January 1993 when the RUF/NPFL moved a large force into the District, crossing the Moa River, entering Pujehun Town and Potoru, a strategic town giving access to Kenema District. Their push into Pujehun District, while brief, was accompanied by a brutal attack against the civilian population; the RUF/NPFL forces routinely killed, raped and abducted people and burnt down large numbers of civilian residences. However, their control of these two towns and the surrounding areas was quickly overturned by SLA and ULIMO forces. RUF/NPFL forces were then confined to the bordering chiefdoms with Liberia and in the swampland south of Pujehun District. RUF/NPFL forces also made intermittent attacks on locations in the south-east of Bonthe District, following the course of the Wanjei River.

In December 1993, the then Head of State announced a unilateral ceasefire, RUF/NPFL forces having been repelled almost entirely back to Liberia. Taking advantage of this ceasefire, in the last days of December 1993, RUF forces moved across the border from Liberia into Kenema District, occupying its seven southern chiefdoms by March 1994 and inflicting violence on the civilian population. By this point, NPFL had withdrawn from Sierra Leone to fight ULIMO forces in Liberia. "Camp Zogoda", established in March 1994 to the north of the Moa River in the south-west of Kenema District, became the RUF's main base until 1996. From Camp Zogoda, RUF forces were able to stage ambushes on the main Bo-Kenema highway, a major arterial route.

In early 1994, the number of forces under arms in the SLA swelled to around 12,000 owing to a recruitment drive by the NPRC Government. RUF forces in Pujehun District fully repelled the SLA eastwards towards Koribondo, allowing their forces to push northwards into Bo District. SLA

forces stationed in Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island used boats to patrol the coastal waters off Sherbro Island, engaging on the water RUF forces entering the mouth of the Sewa River. The RUF had control over the boundary between Bonthe and Pujehun Districts, setting up a number of town and village level administrations and continuing to inflict similar violence on the civilian population as had begun earlier in Kenema District.

Although in April 1994, RUF forces made incursions into Kono District, they were from the beginning of 1994 unable to undermine significantly the hold over the District exercised by the Donsos and SLA forces in the northern chiefdoms and the Civil Defence Units, mainly composed of local hunters known as the Kamajors, in the south. This prevented RUF forces moving directly through to Koinadugu District, to the immediate north of Kono District. However, an alternative route was found.

Thus the RUF expanded their operations in a westerly direction from the three Districts bordering Liberia, continuing to inflict serious violence against the civilian population as part of an attack that had begun in Kenema District in 1993 and would last until the end of 1994. Thousands of civilians in Pujehun District were asked by SLA forces to go to an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in Gondama (Bo District), placed under the protection of foreign forces. RUF forces established a base in the north of Kenema District in February 1994, thus preceding their advance through Kenema District from the south and guaranteeing control over the entire District, bar Kenema Town, by April 1994. From this northern base, RUF forces staged ambushes on the main Koidu-Makeni highway in Tonkolili District, making it impassable for civilian and military traffic alike. In April, RUF forces attacked the towns of Masingbi and Makali, both along the Koidu-Makeni highway, very close to the northern tip of Kenema District. SLA forces sent from Makeni were repelled from Makali by the RUF. RUF forces would move progressively further along this road, attacking Matotoka in July. Getting ever closer to Magburaka Town, by October the RUF were able to loop round through Tonkolili District into the southern chiefdoms of Koinadugu District. A string of attacks on the Magburaka-Alikalia highway by an RUF expeditionary force culminated in a heavy attack on Kabala Town on 7 November 1994. This force would leave Kabala the next day and return to Tonkolili District in the following week, leaving in its path a trail of destruction and hundreds of civilian deaths.

The RUF grip on Pujehun and Kenema Districts presented opportunities for the RUF to further infiltrate Bo and Bonthe Districts. In early 1994, RUF forces executed countless "hit and run" attacks on villages in the eastern chiefdoms of Bo District along the entire boundary with Kenema District. Initially, these were "food-finding missions", mostly staged from Camp Zogoda. Between June and December, however, these missions became more substantial, with RUF forces attacking but not occupying towns just across the District boundary. In November, RUF forces attacked an IDP camp in Gerihun, but were repelled by SLA forces. On 24 December, RUF forces attacked the IDP camp at Gondama, killing hundreds of civilians displaced from the fighting in the preceding years. On 25 December, Kenema Town was attacked but left unoccupied. Towns in the centre of Bo District, including the District headquarter town of Bo on 27 December, were attacked by the RUF; none of these towns were occupied. RUF forces re-entered Bonthe District, occupying the eastern chiefdoms, using the natural features of the District to expand their control in areas in the three chiefdoms on the east and south.

Responding to RUF advances into Bo and Tonkolili Districts, groups of civilians were formed into civil militia, variously labelled "Civil Defence Units" or "Territorial Defence Forces". In Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom (Bo District), these units were gathered, trained and armed under the auspices of the Resident Government Minister for Bo District. In Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom alone, 2,800 civil militia were under arms by June 1994.

Initially, these units were deployed alongside SLA forces, used to operate checkpoints, identify RUF "collaborators" and carry out patrols within chiefdoms. Despite this cooperation, tensions between the SLA and civil militia groups had been simmering since 1993 throughout the country. This was due to widespread civilian mistrust of the SLA, owing to their involvement in the same enterprises of killing civilians, raping women, looting private property and exploiting mineral resources. For example, in the Tongo Field area of Lower Bambara Chiefdom, the SLA engaged in diamond mining in Tongo Town itself and forced civilians to work at the mining sites. In nearby Peyema, also in Lower Bambara, the RUF did the same. These practices were aggravated further by numerous attacks on civilian settlements and ambushes on civilian traffic carried out by unknown assailants suspected to be members of the SLA. Two such attacks occurred in Moyamba District in 1994. Civilians branded such SLA members "So-bels", or "Soldier-Rebels".

By late December 1994, RUF forces had entered the western chiefdoms of Tonkolili District, having had access to the eastern chiefdoms since April. Earlier in 1994, it is highly likely that RUF forces began establishing a foothold in the Kangari Hills in the south of the District, which they would use as a launching point for attacks on the surrounding villages. Since June, SLA forces had been stationed in Mile 91, which is located on a key junction; to the west lies Masiaka, the gateway to Freetown. Leading north-east from Mile 91, the highway goes to Magburaka. Leading south-east, the highway runs through to Bo, Kenema and Kailahun. On 22 December, the SLA were forced out of Mile 91 by the RUF, although they regrouped outside of the town and regained control the following day. Many locations in the chiefdoms around Mile 91 were attacked as the RUF forces established a new Brigade base in the Kaitkant Hills, spanning the borders of Tonkolili with Port Loko and Bombali Districts. The location of the Kaitkant Hills between the two main highways leading into the Western Area allowed the RUF to begin a new phase of their campaign, opening up for the first time since 1991 the possibility of attacking Freetown. By the end of 1994, rumours of imminent RUF attacks on Moyamba District, so far unaffected by the RUF, were widespread. Since 1992, SLA forces had been deployed in the District, although they had also been harassing civilians, including stealing property, which intensified from December 1994 to early 1995.

As the RUF expanded the territory over which it had control throughout 1994, violence against the civilian population continued unabated. The proliferation of "hit and run" missions into Bo District, across Kenema District and in Tonkolili District resulted in the widespread burning and looting of civilian residences, accompanied by a high number of civilian deaths. Sexual violence against women was perpetrated by RUF forces during raids. Beating, molestation and abduction of both men and women for use as porters to carry stolen property or for conscription into the fighting force continued. The RUF assaults on Bo, Kenema and Kabala resulted in the denigration and destruction of public infrastructure such as government offices, hospitals, schools and Police barracks.

As 1995 began, RUF forces controlled the southern Districts of Kailahun, Pujehun and Kenema. Deployments of SLA within the occupied Districts occasionally offered short-term effective resistance to RUF attacks, but had little long-term strategic influence. Camp Zogoda continued to be the RUF's main base in the south and it was common practice for abducted civilians and looted property from the whole occupied area to be sent to the camp. The RUF expanded their operations in Bo District, opening a new base, "Camp Bokurr", in the north-east. The Bo-Freetown highway, at least until Mile 91, and the entire Bo-Kenema highway were under RUF control. The IDP camp in Gerihun was attacked again, this time successfully. RUF forces killed over 100 civilians. Even before 1995 ended, the RUF controlled all of Bo District and would attack the civilian population there until April 1996, systematically killing civilians, burning houses and committing similar acts of violence against civilians.

The strong grip on Pujehun and Bo Districts and on the south-east part of Bonthe District allowed a rapid and large-scale expansion of RUF forces into the whole of Moyamba and Bonthe Districts. Entering the eastern part of Moyamba District in January 1995 from Bo District, RUF forces proceeded southwards and took control of the bauxite mining area of Mokanji before moving south-west to upper Bonthe District, the location of the economically important Sierra Leone Rutile Mining Company. By February 1995, RUF forces controlled all the northern chiefdoms of the District, using the developed road network in this area. These attacks on the south of Moyamba District and the north of Bonthe District paralysed an economic area vital to the Government of Sierra Leone. From the north of Bonthe District, RUF forces rapidly spilled over into the southern chiefdoms of the District. Despite this, they failed to gain control of Sherbro Island and Bonthe Town. This movement in Bonthe District was carried out during the same period of a concerted action accompanied by attacks against civilians in Moyamba District.

Throughout January and February 1995, RUF forces attacked villages and towns in the chiefdoms of Tonkolili District in which the Kaitkant Hills are located. In early January, the RUF extended military operations into Port Loko District, attacking two key towns on the Freetown-Makeni highway. On 1 January 1995, RUF forces advanced north-west from their Kaitkant Hills base and from positions near Mataboi in Bombali District, towards the town of Foredugu in Port Loko District. The RUF force, which numbered 500, overcame the SLA forces stationed in the town, forcing their retreat. RUF forces attacked other villages in the Foredugu area. From Foredugu, RUF forces attacked Lunsar, but were beaten back by SLA forces stationed in the town. Lunsar would fall to the RUF later in the year.

At the end of January 1995, RUF forces moved north from Port Loko District and attacked Kambia, the headquarter town of Kambia District. RUF forces did not attempt to occupy Kambia Town and the attack was staged primarily to demonstrate their ability to strike in areas previously thought to be secure.

In early March 1995, RUF forces moved north into Kono District from Kailahun District and the Tongo Field area in Kenema District, taking advantage of SLA groups abandoning a comprehensive defensive position in favour of illicit mining operations. Throughout March, April and May, RUF forces occupied many towns in the western, diamond-rich area of Kono District, including Koidu Town, which was accompanied by violent acts against the civilian population.

The pattern of RUF activity in Moyamba District in March-April 1995, part of an overall attack from December 1994 to April 1995 across several Districts, clearly shows that their immediate objective was to attack Freetown. The RUF did not initially intend to settle in Moyamba District, rather use it as a transit into the Western Area and the capital. RUF forces attacked Moyamba Junction, in the north of the District, to paralyse any SLA response to a simultaneous attack on Moyamba Town. The group that attacked Moyamba Town would then follow the Moyamba-Freetown road, attacking the major roads and settlements on its way, before being slowed down by SLA forces in the north-west of the District. In March, RUF forces settled in Moyamba District, progressively reaching all the chiefdoms and establishing a strong base in the north, known as "Camp Fol Fol". As the RUF consolidated their hold over Districts in the south and encamped in Moyamba District, SLA forces increased security activities throughout the Western Area, adopting defensive deployments at locations along the road running around the Freetown Peninsula and on the main inland highway.

Also in early March 1995, RUF forces deployed from their Kaitkant Hills base and attacked Mile 91, partly in response to reports of an advance by SLA forces towards RUF positions. In late March, SLA forces coordinated by members of a private military company called the Gurkha Security Group attacked RUF forces at Kaitkant Hills using intensive bombardment from a helicopter gunship and a Guinean Airforce fighter jet. Evacuating the base, RUF forces consolidated at the recently established Camp Fol Fol (Moyamba District). From this location, RUF forces raided the surrounding chiefdoms in Moyamba District between March to May 1995.

In early April, RUF forces moved into the Western Area in a bid to attack Freetown. RUF forces attacked settlements in Koya Rural District in a triangular area delimited by Songo to the east, Waterloo to the west and Fogbo Jetty to the south. RUF forces met resistance from SLA forces. Many civilians were killed and many civilian houses were burnt down by RUF forces. By late April, the RUF had pushed its front lines into Waterloo, where they attacked SLA and Guinean positions in the town. Replacing the Gurkha Security Group, the Government of Sierra Leone contracted another private military company called Executive Outcomes at the beginning of May 1995.

Executive Outcomes started training activities at the Benguema Training Centre near Freetown and formed a "Special Task Force" using a large number of demobilised Liberian militia from ULIMO. The Special Task Force attacked the RUF, pursuing them out of the Western Area. Following this, civilians and SLA forces in the Western Area attacked and killed persons suspected to be "rebel collaborators".

In mid-May, the RUF established a camp at Ro-Source in the west of Bombali District and commenced attacking nearby towns. RUF activity in northern Port Loko District, near Camp Ro-Source, recommenced, following a lull during the RUF push into the Western Area.

Moving to the north-east, Executive Outcomes, together with the SLA and civil militia, attacked RUF positions in Kono District from land and air. They successfully recaptured Koidu Town from the RUF by June. By the end of 1995, Executive Outcomes had control over the western chiefdoms of Kono District, where the mining areas are to be found. This did not, however, prevent RUF

forces from launching "food-finding missions" into the eastern chiefdoms of Kono District and the southern chiefdoms of Koinadugu District.

In June 1995, the RUF commenced a second wave of attacks in Port Loko District, advancing beyond the Foredugu area towards Port Loko Town, attacking on two fronts. The first advance came from the south, possibly again from Kaitkant Hills or from Camp Fol Fol. The second advance was from the north, through Gbinti Town from Camp Ro-Source in Bombali District. Both advances converged upon Port Loko Town on 8 June 1995. RUF forces attacked and entered Port Loko, but did not capture the town from the SLA forces stationed there. Following this attack, RUF forces took up temporary positions in the chiefdoms to the north and east of Port Loko Town. By mid June, a contingent of Guinean soldiers deployed into Port Loko, commencing heavy artillery bombardments on the RUF's positions. This forced an RUF retreat towards Camp Fol Fol (Moyamba District) and Camp Ro-Source (Bombali District). Following their stalled advance on Freetown and the failure to take Port Loko Town, RUF activity concentrated on the strategic town of Masiaka and other towns in the surrounding area across June 1995.

In October 1995, the Special Task Force, comprised of Executive Outcomes, SLA and ULIMO members, deployed to Bonthe District and started dislodging the RUF forces from their positions, notably in the primary mainland town of Mattru Jong. Joined later by Kamajors, the Special Task Force progressively dislodged the RUF from their positions throughout Bonthe District. In late 1995, RUF forces, defeated in certain areas of the District, gathered thousands of civilians at Bauya Junction, killing hundreds of them. A few years later, over 1,000 human skulls would be discovered in that area. RUF activity in Port Loko District continued unabated, with the attack and brief occupation of Lunsar in December.

In 1996, Executive Outcomes controlled the diamond mining areas of Kono District, also taking control of other strategic sites. In collaboration with the Kamajor Society, Executive Outcomes took control of the Sierra Rutile mining operation in mainland Bonthe District and were contracted by the Sierra Ore and Metal Company (Sieromco) in Moyamba District. Alongside the SLA, Executive Outcomes were hired by the owners of the hydroelectric plant at Bumbuna (Tonkolili District) to provide security.

In January 1996, the NPRC Deputy Chairman overthrew the NPRC Chairman, thereby seizing power. In the weeks preceding the Presidential and Parliamentary elections planned for 26 February 1996, RUF forces in a number of locations across Sierra Leone threatened civilians, posing the question about whether they wanted peace before elections, or vice versa; the implication being that "elections before peace" would lead to reprisals against the civilian population. A national consultative conference held in Freetown in February gauged the national mood and decided that elections should go ahead. This decision was not without dissenters other than the RUF, including sections of the SLA and a number of Paramount Chiefs.

In late January and across February, RUF forces attacked Madina, Kukuna and Rokupr in Kambia District and Kamakwie in Bombali District, resulting in huge damage to civilian residences and some particularly brutal killings of civilians. RUF forces staged attacks on villages in Moyamba District, killing, raping and mutilating civilians. Just before Election Day, the NPRC commenced peace talks

with the RUF in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. On Election Day itself, RUF forces attacked the towns of Kenema and Magburaka, the elections nevertheless proceeding in the wake of killing, rape and looting.

Following the February elections which resulted in the formation of a government by the candidate of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), Guinean armed forces were deployed at two locations in the north-west of Sierra Leone. Nigerian forces set up checkpoints in the Western Area and the Nigerian 28th Battalion arrived in Port Loko District. An entire SLA battalion deployed from Freetown to the far east of Kono District. Guinean forces were also deployed in small numbers in southern Koinadugu District and established a base in Kambia District.

Around this period, the various civil militia groups that had formed throughout Sierra Leone were united under a central coordination system known as the Civil Defence Force (CDF) and the Kamajor leader was appointed to the position of Deputy Defence Minister by the newly elected President. The Kamajor Society was the largest component of the CDF, which also included the Gbethis, the Kapras the Donsos and others.

The process of initiating Kamajors already underway in Bonthe District since 1995 spread in 1996 to Bo District. The Kamajor High Priest and Chief Initiator was moved from Bonthe District to Bo District to initiate young men into the Kamajor Society. By late 1995, Kamajor Societies were formed in some of the southern chiefdoms of Bo District. By mid-1996, the initiation process had spread throughout Kenema, Bo and Pujehun Districts and into parts of Moyamba, Kailahun and Tonkolili Districts.

In the early stage of this process, recruitment for the Kamajor Society was carried out exclusively through the traditional authorities, who nominated men from their chiefdoms for initiation. However, as the war escalated and the territory over which the Kamajors gained control increased, new initiates did not require this nomination by traditional authorities.

The most striking feature of 1996 is the exponential increase in strength of the Kamajor Society throughout the Southern and Eastern Provinces. By early 1996, a Kamajor Society had formed in every chiefdom of Bo District. Initiates in Bo District were first sent to locations in Bo Town and Jiama Bongor Chiefdom where they were initiated and given basic military training. In the first half of 1996, initiates from Kenema were sent either to Kenema Town or a location in Bo District for training. In the southern Kenema chiefdoms, Kamajors were initially gathered into two battle groups, one of which was known as the Upper Wanjei Defence Committee. Alongside Nigerian, Guinean and SLA forces and other Kamajor groups from chiefdoms in Bo and Pujehun Districts, the Upper Wanjei Defence Committee successfully destroyed the RUF stronghold of Camp Zogoda. In the north of Kenema District, Kamajor units successfully confronted and eliminated RUF camps, including "Camp Joe Bush", undermining completely the hold over Kenema District that was enjoyed by the RUF throughout 1995. In late 1996, Kamajors attacked another main RUF base known as "Camp Booloko", just north of Bo District. Also in late 1996, Kamajor units in Moyamba District attacked the RUF at Camp Fol Fol, removing one of the RUF's main staging points for attacking Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts. On other occasions, Kamajors from different chiefdoms regrouped in order to engage the RUF more efficiently. Kamajors from Bonthe District

were also active in Moyamba District, assisting those chiefdom authorities that did not have a Kamajor Society.

In Tonkolili District, other components of the CDF were formed. Civil militia movements known as the Gbethis and the Kapras were formed in the south and north of the District respectively. The Gbethis were active in the area surrounding the Kaitkant Hills, a former RUF stronghold. In June 1996, Gbethis worked alongside SLA forces stationed in Mile 91, before being driven out of town by SLA forces after a skirmish concerning the division of contributions offered by civilians under their control. The Gbethi leadership demanded that the civilian population provide support for their positions, punishing with physical violence those "RUF collaborators" who did not cooperate willingly. The Gbethis set up checkpoints and patrolled villages at night, looking for "strangers" and fining civilians who failed to give notice of their arrival. Similar practices were carried out by members of the CDF throughout the territory they occupied.

On 30 November 1996, the Government of Sierra Leone negotiated a peace agreement with the RUF leadership in Côte d'Ivoire. One of the key provisions of the Abidjan Peace Accord, as it became known, was the removal of all foreign forces and Executive Outcomes from the country; Executive Outcomes would leave the country by early 1997.

At the beginning of 1997, SLA and CDF forces continued to confront the RUF. "Camp Libya" in Pujehun District, one of the RUF's longest held positions, fell to a combined SLA and CDF attack in the first months of 1997. Until May, Kamajors also engaged the RUF, sacking the RUF's main defence headquarters in the Kangari Hills. RUF activity in Bombali District continued from Camp Ro-Source with a number of food-finding raids into Port Loko. In mid May, RUF forces captured the northern town of Kamakwie, meeting no resistance and capturing an ammunition dump from the SLA forces stationed there.

The tensions between the CDF and SLA that were ignited in 1996 burned on into 1997, with numerous armed confrontations between the two forces throughout the country. For example, in Tonkolili District, SLA forces ambushed a Kamajor night patrol and attacked Gbethis defending Yonibana. Kamajors in Pujehun District forcibly dismantled SLA checkpoints. These tensions led the SLA to abandon some chiefdoms. Already in the middle of 1996, civilians from Moyamba District had asked the governmental authorities in Freetown to withdraw the SLA forces from the District. SLA forces moved out shortly after and left the security of the District to the Kamajors who, by the end of the year, had control of the south of the District, while RUF forces were still active in the north of the District. The CDF, however, was partially weakened in Kono District with the disbanding of the Donsos in February 1997 as a sign of good faith in the wake of the Abidjan Peace Accord.

Civilian populations fared badly throughout areas controlled by both CDF and SLA forces. Throughout Moyamba and Bonthe Districts, civilians suspected of being "RUF collaborators" or who were considered to be insufficiently supportive or respectful of the CDF, were subjected to gruesome punishments. In the areas they controlled, Kamajors put in place rudimentary administrative structures, preventing regular local authorities from exercising any power and took actions affecting various aspects of civilian life. These practices continued throughout the following

years. The SLA also continued their illicit mining and looting activities, often using civilians to carry the loads.

On 25 May 1997, junior elements of the SLA overthrew the elected government of President Kabbah. This coup d'état resulted in the formation of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by an SLA officer awaiting trial in Pademba Road Prison in Freetown, charged with treason for a planned coup attempt. Immediately following the advent of the AFRC, its leadership called for the RUF to join them and share power, an offer the RUF leadership promptly accepted. Immediately following the coup, AFRC forces looted extensively throughout Freetown and the Peninsula area. A large RUF force moved into the Western Area, initially concentrating around Waterloo and Hastings, stealing from and harassing civilians.

Following the coup, former-SLA deployments gave the AFRC a strong foothold throughout the country, particularly in the major towns of Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Koidu, Pujehun and Bonthe. The AFRC did not inherit territory the SLA did not control, such as CDF strongholds. Nevertheless, AFRC positions were reinforced and strengthened when RUF forces allied with them, moving from the bush towards towns where the AFRC was deployed. The RUF also established new positions throughout the north. RUF forces moved into Port Loko District, living amongst the civilian population. In Bombali District, they occupied a number of strategic locations. They also established a large base in Kambia District. At this time, the RUF/AFRC staged a sharp and brutal attack against the civilian population, including massive killings, abductions, rapes and other acts of severe violence; staged simultaneously across the whole country, every District would be affected to different degrees.

The RUF/AFRC immediately found itself in a tense standoff with Nigerian forces stationed in Freetown. Nigerian forces were reinforced by sea and air in the days following the coup. At the beginning of June, Nigerian forces attempted to unseat the RUF/AFRC but the operation was called off the day it had begun, when RUF/AFRC forces overpowered and briefly held hostage around 300 Nigerian soldiers. Nigerian forces took control of Freetown International Airport in the following days, although civilians were killed during exchanges of mortar fire between Nigerian and RUF/AFRC forces throughout the year.

Throughout 1997, the RUF/AFRC appeared to have two closely related priorities. The first was to destroy the base of support for the CDF movement. The second was to consolidate their hold over the country and find ways of supporting their regime. Accordingly, the RUF/AFRC began suppressing political dissent, civil society and student activism in Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces in Freetown arrested many journalists, activists and demonstrators. Some were tortured and killed, others detained in freight containers and other places.

In June, the CDF rejected a call by the leadership of RUF/AFRC to demobilise and surrender their arms and register at Police Stations. Instead, the CDF retreated to strongholds where there was no previous SLA – now RUF/AFRC – deployment and commenced attacking combined AFRC and RUF positions. CDF forces in Bonthe District did not, however, go underground, as RUF/AFRC forces were concentrated in Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island and not on the mainland.

On the boundary between Kenema and Kailahun Districts, RUF/AFRC forces established a base known as "SS Camp" and used this to attack surrounding villages and towns in the hunt for "CDF collaborators". Throughout the areas in which they were deployed, RUF/AFRC forces attacked civilian settlements and hunted through the bush for civilians, stealing any property they found. In general, screening systems were put in place, especially at checkpoints, where RUF/AFRC forces were searching civilians thoroughly for any evidence that they were supporters of the CDF. Such brutal tactics swelled the numbers of civilians willing to give active support and be initiated into the Kamajor Society.

In some places, more sophisticated methods of extracting support from civilians were put into place by the RUF/AFRC, including local tax administrations and systems allowing the regime to communicate demands to civilians less violently. Nevertheless, the number of "food-finding missions" ballooned, including such plainly-titled looting sprees as "Operation From your Hand to My Hand, from Your Pocket to my Pocket". In Tonkolili District, RUF/AFRC forces concentrated their actions in the chiefdoms around Mile 91 and in the area around Magburaka, where they were strongly engaged by the CDF from the south and west of the District.

In Moyamba District, a CDF stronghold, the RUF/AFRC commenced an aggressive campaign, culminating in the attack on and week-long occupation of Moyamba Town in July 1997. RUF/AFRC forces perpetrated large scale violence against civilians in retaliation for the earlier rejection by civilians of SLA protection. Until CDF forces repelled the RUF/AFRC from Moyamba Junction, the Mile 91-Bo highway fell under RUF/AFRC control, evidenced by intense attacks on towns and their civilian inhabitants along the route. The mainland of Bonthe District remained under CDF control, but they were forced to move from Bonthe Town after the RUF/AFRC deployment in the town. Throughout 1997, RUF/AFRC forces occupied the diamond-rich areas of Kono District, continuing the established practice of forcing civilians to work in the mines.

In August 1997, ECOWAS imposed a trade and arms embargo on Sierra Leone and extended the mandate of their Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to cover sanctions enforcement in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG artillery and Alfa Jets began shelling vessels approaching Freetown's Kissy Terminal; stray ECOMOG shells resulted in the deaths of civilians in Freetown's densely populated east end. Eventually, ECOMOG and the RUF/AFRC negotiated a ceasefire in late October. This, however, did not hold firm and there were many breaches of the letter and spirit of the ceasefire agreement.

Starting in September 1997, having regrouped in villages and strongholds, CDF forces successfully launched attacks on RUF/AFRC positions. These actions would yield greater results in early 1998 with the inland advance of ECOMOG forces. In late December 1997, CDF forces intensified pressure on provincial RUF/AFRC positions by preventing civilian and military traffic from moving towards Freetown and vice versa. The consequences of "Operation Black December" – namely the deprivation of food and other supplies - were sharply felt in the towns of Bo, Kenema and Pujehun. From then until March 1998, the CDF would engage in a systematic attack against the civilian population, including massive killing of "RUF collaborators", the widespread use of small cages in which they imprisoned people and similar acts of brutality.

Between 6 and 12 February 1998, following renewed RUF/AFRC attacks on ECOMOG positions, ECOMOG forces invaded Freetown and gained control of the Western Area, forcing RUF/AFRC forces to retreat inland. From the Western Area, RUF/AFRC forces retreated along the main highway to Masiaka, where they split into three groups. The first headed directly towards Magburaka through Mile 91. The second group moved to Makeni (Bombali District) through Lunsar. These two groups would meet after 14 February and move to Kono District, occupying main towns along the route. The third group regrouped at a pre-existing RUF/AFRC base in Port Loko District and moved northwards into Kambia District. RUF/AFRC forces counter-attacked ECOMOG and CDF positions on the roads to Port Loko Town. All these groups left in their wake a trail of destruction, including the loss of civilian life and property.

The RUF/AFRC forces reaching Makeni and Magburaka moved into Kono District along two routes. One group moved along the main highway though southern Tonkolili District, enduring ambushes from CDF forces positioned along the route. The second group moved into Koinadugu District, both by the main highway through Foredugu and along a secondary road though Bumbuna, before moving south into Kono District.

By 21 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces had reasserted control over Koidu Town and its immediate environs. A large RUF/AFRC base known as "Superman Camp" was established in the east of Kono District and served as a training base through 1998 and 1999. Shortly after, RUF/AFRC forces scattered throughout the District and parts of the southern chiefdoms of Koinadugu District.

At the beginning of March, ECOMOG forces deployed from Port Loko and moved into towns throughout the Northern Province, following the retreating RUF/AFRC forces and reaching Lunsar, Magburaka, Masingbi and Makeni. By mid March, they had entered Kabala, Foredugu and Alikalia (Koinadugu District). In addition, by mid March, ECOMOG had also occupied the towns of Kamakwie (Bombali District), Falaba and Mongo Bendugu (Koinadugu District), which are the key access routes to the Guinean border for the entire Northern Province. ECOMOG forces also deployed from Guinea to Kambia Town. Throughout their deployment, ECOMOG forces were assisted by CDF members in patrolling these areas.

From the southern entry point, ECOMOG moved directly north and in early February entered Kenema Town, which had been deserted by RUF/AFRC forces a few days earlier. Since December 1997, CDF forces had undermined RUF/AFRC control over Kenema District. Shortly after entering Kenema Town, ECOMOG and CDF forces overran SS Camp. By March 1998, the RUF/AFRC had retreated from Kenema District entirely, although in April they made a few minor incursions from Kailahun District.

As ECOMOG forces coming from Kenema Town retook Bo Town from the RUF/AFRC in early March, CDF forces dislodged the RUF/AFRC from Pujehun District. RUF/AFRC forces withdrew from Sherbro Island in the days following the ECOMOG intervention, leaving the District entirely under the control of the CDF (Kamajors). From Bo Town, ECOMOG deployed in Mile 91, where they engaged in patrolling the area, assisted by the CDF. By March 1998, the entire Southern Province was free of the presence of RUF/AFRC forces and would remain so throughout the year,

although RUF/AFRC forces retreating from Freetown who went through the Northern Province towards Makeni and ultimately Koidu Town made a few rapid incursions into the north of Moyamba District. Nevertheless, the level of violence inflicted upon civilians and those alleged to have collaborated with the RUF/AFRC heightened in 1998 since CDF forces, primarily Kamajors, were unchallenged throughout this Province and in most of Kenema District. The CDF progressively exercised greater control over civilian life, replacing both State and traditional structures with their own invasive and largely arbitrary system of administration.

By April, ECOMOG units attacked and occupied Koidu Town and other major towns on the main highway, forcing the RUF/AFRC further into Kono District. ECOMOG forces based in Kenema Town, together with SLA and CDF forces, reinforced the Moa Barracks at Daru and other positions in the south of Kailahun District. Between March and May, RUF/AFRC forces attacked these positions as ECOMOG Jets attacked the RUF/AFRC headquarters in Buedu, in the far east of Kailahun District.

Following their ejection from Freetown and the commencement of ECOMOG provincial operations, RUF/AFRC forces launched "Operation Pay Yourself". In all the areas passed through or occupied while retreating from the Western Area, RUF/AFRC forces stole civilian property. Between mid February and mid March, towns and villages throughout the entire Northern Province and, to a limited extent, the north of Moyamba District were attacked. RUF/AFRC forces took anything that could be of use, from livestock and other food items, domestic items such as mattresses and cooking pots and motor vehicles, trucks and motorcycles. Although looting had been standard practice throughout the previous RUF campaigns and "food-finding missions" had been commonplace since 1992, the scale and intensity of "Operation Pay Yourself" was unprecedented in Sierra Leone.

A heightened level of violence against civilians accompanied "Operation Pay Yourself". Shortly after the reinstatement of the exiled Sierra Leonean President on 10 March 1998, RUF/AFRC forces launched "Operation No Living Thing". During a period running from February to June, in locations across Sierra Leone, but primarily in Kono District, hundreds of civilians were killed, or had limbs amputated and hundreds of women were raped. This operation marked a specific period of military activity during which the scale and intensity of violence against civilians in Sierra Leone was elevated to new and unprecedented levels. Thousands of civilians in Kono District were abducted and brought into the mining areas in the western part of the District to work, many of them dying as a result of the squalid living conditions.

From April to early December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces in Kambia, Koinadugu and Bombali Districts expanded the territory over which they had control and consolidated their positions in some areas in Tonkolili District. A striking feature of this period in 1998 was how ineffective CDF forces and other civil militia groups in Bombali and Koinadugu Districts were compared to their high concentration and success in the Southern and Eastern Provinces and, to a lesser extent, in the south and west of Moyamba District. In those areas where ECOMOG cooperated with what groups did exist and CDF forces deployed alongside them, their forces often had success in holding rural outposts, gaining good intelligence and extending their influence throughout smaller settlements in the surrounding bush. There are episodes, however, indicating that ECOMOG was reluctant to

leave main fortified positions, or support others in so doing, thereby handing RUF/AFRC forces immeasurable advantages.

In Koinadugu District, RUF/AFRC forces gradually expanded their activity around the two main roads arcing in towards Kabala from the south of the District, while at the same time moving fluidly through bush areas bypassing ECOMOG positions and continuing their operations without needing recourse to main roads and tracks. A strong ECOMOG and SLA presence in Kabala guaranteed that the RUF/AFRC never captured Kabala for more than five days in late July 1998, despite many attacks during the course of 1998. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC placed all other major towns in the District under constant pressure, offering RUF/AFRC forces easy access to the area surrounding Kabala Town and influence over the arterial roads leading to it. ECOMOG forces were prevented from moving south, pre-empting any attempt to reinforce or counter-attack from Kabala.

In Bombali District, the RUF/AFRC adopted a similar strategy. They expanded their territorial hold and continued the occupation of towns to east of Makeni Town, thereby controlling the major east-west axis roads through the District. Throughout November, RUF/AFRC advanced closer to Makeni Town. Additionally, they secured control over a main latitudinal road, which gave the RUF/AFRC free access to the eastern boundary of Port Loko District.

In Port Loko District, RUF/AFRC forces intensified activity to the north of Port Loko Town between May and November 1998, with the formation of large looting squads and the gradual encroachment on Port Loko Town. ECOMOG forces based in the town were reinforced by CDF from numerous locations. CDF forces proved effective in Port Loko District, creating with ECOMOG a defensive arc around the north of Port Loko Town that prevented RUF/AFRC forces infiltrating southwards from Kambia District. During this period, RUF/AFRC forces attacked many villages in the south of the District. As for Tonkolili District, CDF continued engaging the RUF/AFRC forces concentrated in the north-west of the District. A massive IDP camp hosting thousands of civilians fleeing fighting in Kono District was opened in Masingbi in the west of the District.

In mid April, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 10-strong team of military and security observers to Sierra Leone, who arrived in May 1998. The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), comprising around 70 military observers and accompanying logistic support, was established on 13 July 1998.

In October 1998, a splinter group of the RUF/AFRC comprised primarily of ex-SLA members commenced operations in the Okra Hills area in the south of Port Loko District. The "West Side Boys", as they later became known, staged "hit and run" attacks on a large number of villages in the area that would continue until April 1999, with a lull in January and February when the West Side Boys were in Freetown. During this period, the West Side Boys systematically killed civilians, stole property and burnt houses. In addition, they ambushed civilian and military traffic on the main highway to Masiaka, often making the road impassable.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked ECOMOG forces in Masiaka (Port Loko District), and Kamalo, in the north of Bombali District in November 1998. These preparations would put the logs beneath the

stones of a large-scale RUF/AFRC action in December. Kono Town was overrun by RUF/AFRC forces on 20 December 1998, beginning a chain of attacks across the Northern Province that culminated in the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999. These would be accompanied by massive violence systematically inflicted on the civilian population in all areas in which the RUF/AFRC had a presence. While retreating south from Koidu, ECOMOG left with thousands of civilians, hundreds of whom were abducted by the RUF/AFRC during ambushes on convoys.

On 21 December, RUF/AFRC forces from Port Loko District attacked Songo and Mile 38 and moved into Waterloo – the gateway to Freetown – by 22 December. This foothold was reinforced over the following days, as RUF/AFRC forces began moving from Kono District on 21 December. RUF/AFRC forces advanced from Koidu towards Magburaka and Makeni, taking control of both towns by 24 December. The attack from Magburaka was coordinated with attacks on Makeni from RUF/AFRC positions immediately north-east of the town. ECOMOG was forced to retreat north to Kamakwie, which by 28 December would also be in RUF/AFRC hands.

RUF/AFRC forces continued the westwards movement from Makeni directly to Port Loko Town, where they were supplemented by RUF/AFRC forces already in Port Loko District and prepared for the assault. From 28 December 1998 until 3 January 1999, they launched a sustained attack from three directions on ECOMOG forces stationed in Port Loko Town. Meanwhile, on 30 December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces in Kailahun District moved from their headquarters in Buedu and successfully forced SLA and ECOMOG units out of the town of Segbwema. This move was undertaken to pre-empt any possible counter-attack on Freetown from SLA and ECOMOG forces based at the Moa Barracks in Daru. In mid January, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Mile 91, blocking the highway leading to Freetown and pre-empting any ECOMOG counter-attack.

After staging a number of preliminary attacks on towns west of Waterloo in the Western Area, RUF/AFRC forces advanced on Freetown. On 6 January, RUF/AFRC entered the eastern end of Freetown and advanced into the centre. On the first day, RUF/AFRC forces released 700 inmates from Pademba Road Prison. During their advance in the capital, hundreds of civilians were killed, mutilated or raped in the eastern end of Freetown. At night, in the Freetown suburbs held by the RUF/AFRC, civilians were forced to gather in the streets and sing songs about peace in support of the RUF/AFRC. Others were burned alive in their homes. Behind ECOMOG lines, civilians were gathered in the National Stadium and screened; a number were lined up against the walls and shot dead by ECOMOG forces. The westward movement of RUF/AFRC forces into Freetown was halted by ECOMOG at the Congo Cross Road Bridge on Freetown's Main Motor Road, held by ECOMOG, SLA and CDF forces. By 9 January, unable to advance further into the Freetown urban area and under constant attack from ECOMOG Alpha Jets, the RUF/AFRC were forced to retreat gradually from Freetown back towards Waterloo.

In the following days, ECOMOG forces pushed the RUF/AFRC out of the Greater Freetown Area. During the retreat, RUF/AFRC destroyed much of the State infrastructure in the centre of town, killed and mutilated civilians and burnt down many houses. RUF/AFRC forces held firm in Waterloo until late February and remained in control of Masiaka and Mile 91. The towns of Lunsar and Magburaka, however, remained under firm RUF/AFRC control for much longer.

Following the assault on Freetown, the RUF/AFRC clearly concentrated their actions on mining activities, strengthening their positions in the Northern Province and planning actions to take place on Guinean territory. At this time, the RUF/AFRC commenced a large defensive operation, at the heart of which was their continuing occupation of Makeni and Kono District. The RUF/AFRC defensive headquarters was also moved to Makeni at that time. Between February and July 1999, RUF/AFRC forces consolidated their positions as of December 1998 and expanded their control over Kambia District. The RUF/AFRC's strength throughout the Northern Province guaranteed a strong hand during the peace negotiations that started in the aftermath of the Freetown invasion.

Across the Northern Province and Kono District, RUF/AFRC forces devised methods of rationalising the use of civilians by making them participate in their own administration. Throughout Koinadugu, Bombali and Kambia Districts, RUF/AFRC commanders selected individuals to form committees of "G-5" civil-military intermediaries, communicating RUF/AFRC demands for food and human resources to local communities. The G-5 committees administered the collection of house and trade taxes, food and other financial contributions from the civilian population to the RUF/AFRC. In western Tonkolili District, civilians were required to register with the RUF/AFRC military police. Unregistered civilians were deemed "CDF collaborators" and were flogged, fined or killed. However, G-5 committees proved to be inadequate in providing enough subsistence resources for the combined RUF/AFRC forces, and "food-finding missions" again proliferated through the Northern Province. In a cynical irony, the same commanders that supported the G-5 system by ordering their subordinates to cease looting and theft also ordered the commission of food-finding missions, again increasing the levels of violence inflicted on civilians. Facing shortages, RUF/AFRC forces raided trade fairs in Guinean towns just over the border from Kambia District, prompting the Guinean armed forces to bombard suspected RUF/AFRC positions in the District.

In late January 1999, SLA forces deployed in Bumbuna, a town in the north of Tonkolili District. This brought a limited amount of relief to the civilian population who quickly converged on the town. The area surrounding Bumbuna remained under RUF/AFRC control, although Kamajors from the south of the District continually attacked this concentration of RUF/AFRC forces. This fighting led to the substantial destruction of much of the central chiefdoms of Tonkolili District.

CDF forces strengthened their deployment in Port Loko District, where they established a recruitment and training centre, and the south of Tonkolili District. CDF forces directed excesses of violence at civilians as a means of encouraging the creation of more Gbethi Societies in the District, as people frequently joined in order to avoid harassment by the CDF. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Port Loko Town in May 1999. In April 1999, CDF, SLA and ECOMOG forces retook control of Mile 91, which rapidly saw the influx of thousands of civilians from the areas around Makeni and Magburaka.

In the north of Kenema District, the RUF/AFRC retook control of Tongo Field, the most important diamond mining area in the District. CDF forces continually attacked RUF positions in Tongo Field, but did not disrupt mining operations. South-east of Tongo Field, RUF/AFRC forces maintained a hold over Segbwema (Kailahun District), denying the CDF, ECOMOG and the SLA the opportunity of moving north into Kono District from Moa Barracks. The RUF/AFRC diamond mining office was established in Koakuima, to the immediate south of Koidu. All diamonds mined

by RUF/AFRC operations were trafficked through Koakuima onto their final destinations. Throughout 1999, hundreds of civilians from Kono District who had not fled into neighbouring Guinea were abducted to work in the mining areas of the District. RUF/AFRC forces continued to inflict physical violence on civilians, although on a lower scale than in 1998. Throughout RUF/AFRC-occupied areas of Sierra Leone, civilians were forcibly transported into Kono District to work in the mines.

In Koinadugu District, RUF/AFRC intensified gold mining operations in Diang Chiefdom, at the same time putting pressure on the SLA Brigade stationed at the strategic hydroelectric plant in nearby Bumbuna (Tonkolili District). RUF/AFRC forces had unimpeded access along all main roads in Koinadugu District, surrounding Kabala Town completely. RUF/AFRC brigade headquarters were established in Kayima, in Kono District and in Gberifeh (Koinadugu District) splitting between them responsibility for administering the expansive Neini Chiefdom.

The RUF/AFRC divided Bombali District into two, establishing headquarters in Makeni for the south and Kamakwie for the north. The intermediate territory remained under complete RUF/AFRC control. The RUF/AFRC began conscripting large numbers of able-bodied men in Bombali and Tonkolili Districts, in part due to CDF attacks on Magburaka Town. The RUF/AFRC increased their control over the northern chiefdoms of Bombali District, crossing the Little Scarcies River and establishing stronger supply lines by land through to Kambia Town, which was occupied completely in February 1999. The RUF/AFRC's increasing hold over Kambia District was sealed with the establishment of additional RUF/AFRC bases and a brigade headquarter in the District. The RUF/AFRC also occupied many of the wharf towns on the Great Scarcies River, thereby controlling a valuable economic and strategic asset. ECOMOG forces created checkpoints on main roads leading to Kambia Town, but this did little to prevent the RUF/AFRC moving freely throughout the District.

Throughout 1999, the West Side Boys raided villages located on each side of the Rokel Creek in Koya and Maforki Chiefdoms (Port Loko District). Initially operating from a base in the densely forested Okra Hills inside Koya Chiefdom, the West Side Boys opened a new base on the other bank of the Rokel Creek in Maforki Chiefdom.

Except for brief "food-finding missions" carried out by RUF/AFRC units into parts of northern Moyamba District, the CDF hold over Moyamba, Bonthe, Pujehun, Bo and most of Kenema Districts, bar the mining area in the north, remained unchallenged.

Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (Lomé Peace Agreement). Shortly after the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, the main RUF/AFRC training centre at Camp Superman (Kono District) was supplanted by a new one in Gbendembu Town, north of Makeni. This was primarily to train conscripts for missions into Guinea.

After a few months, however, hostilities resumed in Bombali District, with the RUF/AFRC attacking civilians. Internal divisions within the RUF/AFRC created following the retreat from Freetown heightened, resulting in violent confrontations between the senior commanders of the combined movement as the disarmament process grew nearer. To a certain extent, the RUF and the remnants of the AFRC started controlling different parts of the country. In Kailahun District, disagreements over disarmament between the RUF leader and the most senior RUF officer resulted in the flight of the latter to Liberia.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) commenced deployment in late November 1999 and by 10 January, 4,500 UNAMSIL troops were present in Sierra Leone. The UNAMSIL force was initially deployed alongside ECOMOG forces and was gradually reinforced as the United Nations Security Council expanded the size of the mission.

Despite the official launching of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program by the Sierra Leonean President in Freetown on 4 November 1999 and a nationwide sensitisation tour conducted by the leaders of the RUF, the AFRC and the CDF, hostilities rapidly resumed. The CDF in Kono District engaged the RUF/AFRC forces in the north and east of the country but failed to impact upon the strongly embedded RUF/AFRC forces, who retained their positions in the north of Tonkolili District and in the areas bordering Bombali and Port Loko Districts.

In early May 2000 and following the withdrawal of the last Nigerian ECOMOG contingent, RUF forces launched a number of attacks against UNAMSIL peacekeepers in Kambia, Port Loko, Tonkolili, Bombali and Kailahun Districts, leading to the taking of around 500 UN peacekeepers as hostages. Following the capture of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers, RUF forces first advanced south-west along the main highway towards Masiaka and Songo, unsuccessfully attempting to occupy the towns. As these events unfolded, the bodyguards of the RUF leader fired on a crowd of thousands of civilians gathered around his home in Freetown, killing around 20 people. The RUF leader was later captured in Freetown and detained by the Government of Sierra Leone. RUF/AFRC forces then attacked Port Loko Town, but were repelled by UNAMSIL and SLA forces. UK armed forces arrived in Freetown to provide security for the Freetown area and, in the following months, to re-train the SLA. By the middle of July, the RUF/AFRC had released all the UNAMSIL peacekeepers it had previously captured. The SLA also staged a number of counter-attacks, attempting to retake Lunsar and using a helicopter gunship to bombard RUF/AFRC positions in and around the major towns of Makeni, Magburaka and Rokupr and other locations in the Northern Province, resulting in civilian casualties.

On 30 August, 11 UK Royal Marines were taken hostage by the West Side Boys in the Okra Hills area. Following a breakdown in negotiations, UK paratroops rescued the hostages in September 2000, practically destroying this volatile splinter group in the process.

Starting in July, the hostilities had become sporadic and in August 2000, RUF/AFRC forces surrendered to UN peacekeepers in Kabala. The disarmament process continued, although the RUF/AFRC were still engaged in mining activities, mainly in the centre of Koidu Town.

In May 2000, RUF forces in Kono District started engaging Guinean forces in the Guinean area known as "The Parrot's Beak", using the hundreds of civilians they had abducted and trained during the previous months. In early September 2000, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Guinean towns of Pamelap and Madina Oula and carried out similar actions in the Parrot's Beak area from Kailahun District. Throughout September and October, Guinean forces also adopted a "hot pursuit" policy, in which RUF bases inside Sierra Leone along the Guinean–Sierra Leonean border were directly attacked in addition to the pursuit of RUF/AFRC forces from inside Guinea. This was manifested through intensified artillery and helicopter gunship bombardment of towns just south of the border in Sierra Leone, resulting in many civilian casualties and in the large-scale displacement of the population, mainly Sierra Leoneans who had found refuge in Guinea. Guinean armed forces also moved their security checks three miles inside the territory of Sierra Leone in Bombali District and erected some checkpoints in Kailahun District. RUF/AFRC forces nevertheless continued to attack Pamelap and Guinean infantry and airborne operations against RUF/AFRC positions in Kambia District continued into 2001.

Representatives of the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone met in Abuja, Nigeria, to negotiate the reactivation of the ceasefire and peace agreement signed in Lomé in July 1999. The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 November 2000. In December 2000, RUF forces went to Guinea to bring back Sierra Leonean refugees as a proof of their commitment to the peace process. By January 2001, thousands of Sierra Leoneans were thus brought back to the east of Kono District, where they were relocated by the RUF to different towns across RUF territory. Harassment, however, continued and many civilians were sent to Koidu to work in the mines.

In the first three months of 2001, RUF/AFRC forces entered into negotiations with UNAMSIL. This resulted in the opening of a number of key stretches of road leading into Kambia and Bombali Districts and the eventual deployment of UNAMSIL peacekeepers throughout those areas.

In March and April 2001, Donsos and Kamajors who had sought refuge in Guinea were armed by Guinean authorities and launched successful attacks on RUF forces in the east of Kono District, thereby opening three flanks in Kono and Kailahun Districts. They were, however, prevented from entering Koidu Town when the RUF requested the intervention of UMASIL to remind the CDF of the terms of the successive ceasefire agreements.

The November 2000 ceasefire was renewed in Abuja on 4 May 2001 and it was agreed that an accelerated disarmament should be carried out on a District-based level. To this end, disarmament was to take place successively and simultaneously in two Districts. The DDR program started in Kambia and Port Loko Districts, where in May 2001, reception centres were opened. In Port Loko District, the DDR process was accompanied by sporadic looting of civilian settlements by demobilised members of all factions. The stealing of corrugated zinc roofing material from houses was commonplace. Nevertheless, disarmament continued across the country throughout 2001; the

last two Districts to be disarmed were Kailahun and Kenema. Mining activities would continue in Kono District until the last days of the disarmament.

Following disarmament and demobilisation of members of all the different fighting factions, the Sierra Leonean President declared that the war was over and held a symbolic "Arms Burning Ceremony" at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom, Port Loko District) on 18 January 2002.

early September.[17] Newly trained SLA members began fighting alongside ECOMOG forces. Earlier in the year, former SLA members were hastily retrained by ECOMOG forces and absorbed into the ECOMOG force structure to help fight the retreating RUF/AFRC forces in the Provinces.[18]

In the middle of 2000 and at the request of the Sierra Leonean Government, the United Kingdom started providing assistance in the "national restructuring exercise" of the SLA by providing advice and training.[19] UK forces carried out a series of six-week basic training courses for around eight battalions of the SLA.[20] The 180-strong team began arriving in Freetown on 10 June 2000,[21] dovetailing with the withdrawal of the Royal Marines after 15 June 2000.[22] On 24 July, nearly 1,000 SLA members graduated from the UK-run training course,[23] the first group of a total of around 8,000 who would eventually be trained this way. SLA forces again began to participate in combat actions against the RUF/AFRC in mid 2000.

Following the initial rounds of UK short-term training programs, a UK-led long-term International Military and Training Team (IMATT) was established to push a wider process of military reform. In 2002, the SLA was renamed Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) and the separate army, navy, and air force command structures were restructured.[24]

### b. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) commenced attacks inside Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991, at which time little information about the RUF was available to the public. The RUF finds its origins in a movement to overthrow the regime of the All People's Congress (APC). In an internal RUF document written in the early stage of the conflict and entitled "Reasons Why We Took Up Arms to Fight", it is stated that, "We are fighting against corruption, because the past and present government seized political, economic and social justice in this country".[25] In 1991, the RUF was composed of around 230 members. These included former Fourah Bay College students, political opponents of the APC, former members of the SLA and other public figures that considered themselves victims of the APC regime. The majority were trained in Liberia at Camp Namma, although eight of the original members – referred to as "vanguards" –were trained in warfare and the "ideology"[26] in Libya. RUF numbers swelled rapidly following their entry into Sierra Leone.

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[17] See point 10 of the Broadcast to the Nation on Peace and Security by the Sierra Leonean President.

[18] The ECOMOG 128th Infantry Battalion was created to remedy the ECOMOG personnel shortage in their "mopping up operations" in the province and was mainly composed of former SLA members: Brig. Gen. R. A. Adeshina: *The Reversed Victory: Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc., pp. 66-7.

[19] Address by the Sierra Leone President at the Pass Off Ceremony for the First 1000 Military Personnel, under the UK Short-term Training Program, Benguema Training Centre, 22 July 2000:

[20] The UK Military handed over to the UK-led International Military and Advisory Training Team (IMATT) in September 2001.

[21] BBC Online News, 10 June 2000 (19:28 GMT 20:28 UK).

[22] IRIN West Africa, 14 June 2000.

[23] IRIN West Africa, 24 July 2000.

[24] IRIN West Africa, 22 January 2002. See also the speech of the Sierra Leone President at the Opening of the New Defence Ministry Building, Tower Hill, Freetown, 21 January 2002.

[25] See also the RUF's manifesto, *The Footpaths to Democracy, Towards a new Sierra Leone*. For a full text of this manifesto, see http://www.sierra-leone.org/documents.html#RUF.


[26] Including the Green Book of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi.

At first, many civilians joined the RUF voluntarily, seeing it as a solution to corruption and poverty. Nevertheless, the RUF commenced abducting and conscripting civilians shortly after, a practice that continued throughout the conflict. The RUF conscripted thousands of Sierra Leoneans of all ages and of both sexes to be trained as fighters at large training bases. These were opened from time to time depending on the state of the RUF advance, on the number of new conscripts and recruits and on the logistic support available. While one senior RUF officer was responsible for the opening of bases and the provision of training, this did not stop other, smaller training bases from being opened under localised commands. When the RUF needed "manpower" for planned actions, RUF members known as "Safari Teams" were sent to the villages to bring back civilians in accordance with pre-agreed figures. Children under the age of 15 were abducted, conscripted and trained to operate as Small Boy Units (SBU) and Small Girl Units (SGU). Adults were organised into platoons and trained. Instructors in the training bases were responsible for providing training on drill, military tactics, weapons and ideology, among other things.

The NPFL clearly supported and even controlled, to an extent, RUF operations in Sierra Leone. NPFL members fought alongside RUF forces and the NPFL provided logistical support to the RUF as a whole. When they first entered Sierra Leone and during the early stage of the conflict, NPFL members, who not only outnumbered the RUF but also held most of the commanding positions, dominated the RUF forces. Although the NPFL withdrew from Sierra Leone in 1993, links with the NPFL and its leader were never severed completely.

Following the SLA coup in May 1997, the AFRC invited the RUF to join the regime. RUF forces joined with and strengthened AFRC positions throughout areas of Sierra Leone that the SLA had previously controlled. RUF members held ministerial positions in the Council of the AFRC and the movement re-branded itself the "Peoples' Army".

From the beginning of the movement, the RUF, who leader was a retired signals corporal from the SLA, adopted a military-style internal organisation and disciplinary system, with clearly identified positions and tasks allocated to its members:



The BFC moved between front lines depending on to the battles in preparation and ongoing military activity, while the BGC remained in the rear at headquarters. The BGC's primary function was to take care of logistics, under the orders of the BFC. The Battle Front Line Commander moved between the front lines according to logistical needs. RUF forces were divided into brigades,[27] battalions, companies, platoons and sections. A section was composed of 8 to 10 combatants and five sections made a platoon. A platoon was composed of 30 or more combatants and five platoons made a company. A company was composed of 100 or more combatants and five companies, plus an administrative one, made a battalion. A battalion comprised around 1,000 combatants; three battalions made one brigade.

Representatives from specific supporting units were attached at battalion level. The G-5 Unit was responsible for coordinating relations between combatants and civilians, including the collection of taxation and food contributions from civilians. G-5 was also responsible for disseminating political ideology. The Army Agricultural Unit was to take care of all farming and food production in the battalion. The S-4 Unit was responsible for the storage and distribution of food and was battalion quartermaster. The Intelligence Office Unit was responsible for monitoring all operations within the battalion and for sending intelligence reports to headquarters. The Combat Medic Unit was responsible for all medical affairs and the health for everybody in the battalion. The G-4 Unit took care of all arms and ammunitions. Armoury was a sub-unit and was responsible for the maintenance of all arms. The Logistics and Motor Pool was responsible for the maintenance of all mechanical and vehicular equipment in the battalion. The Signal Unit was responsible for internal and external communications. The Military Police (MP) Unit was responsible for disciplinary actions and, therefore, for the maintenance and enforcement of law and order. Military Police (MP) also escorted prisoners and were attached to brigades, battalions and companies. The Internal Defence Unit was responsible for all necessary investigations in the battalion and also served as a link between the G-5 and other operational units.

When they entered Sierra Leone in 1991, the RUF established a headquarters in Pendembu (Kailahun District), where they remained until 1993 when SLA forces retook the town. From 1994 until they joined the AFRC in Freetown, the RUF leader was not settled in one place but was generally mobile.[28] When the RUF joined with the AFRC in Freetown, the high command established headquarters in Freetown in the Defence Headquarter at Cockerill. Following the retreat from Freetown in February 1998, a War Office was opened in Buedu (Kailahun District, on the border with Liberia). This was the administrative headquarter, the permanent radio base and the base for one of the most senior RUF officers. Important meetings involving the senior RUF command took place in Buedu until disarmament in 2001. The RUF defensive headquarter was moved as RUF forces captured towns, but remained in Makeni (Bombali District) from 1999. As the RUF's positions stabilised following the general retreat from Freetown in 1999, the territory under their control was subdivided further and a number of brigade headquarters were established.

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[27] Growing rapidly after the first attack in March 1991, the RUF had one and a half brigade. Following the retreat from Freetown in 1998, the RUF had three brigades, one in Kailahun District, one in Kono District and one in Bombali District.

[28] During this period, it is not completely clear whether the RUF retained a headquarters as such and if it existed, where it was located.

The appointments of the most senior officers within the movement were approved personally by the RUF leader. Some appointments were approved by the Liberian President, in particular when the RUF leader was in custody in Nigeria in 1997 and then Sierra Leone in 1998. When the RUF leader was again arrested after the 8 May 2000 events,[29] the then Battle Field Commander was made Interim Leader and would take instructions directly from the Liberian President.

The RUF set up a disciplinary system to deal with offences committed by its members. When an RUF member committed an offence, he or she was sent to the Military Police (MP), which would obtain a statement and issue a report. When the offence reached a certain level of severity, the MP had to refer the matter to the General Staff Officer Class One (GSO1),[30] who in turned would convene a Board of Investigation. The report of the Board of Investigation would then be sent to the RUF leader or the most senior RUF officer,[31] who would be responsible for taking appropriate measures, including recommending that a court martial be conducted. For minor offences, local commanders were vested with certain powers to conduct investigations and administer punishment in line with the gravity of the offences committed. Most of the time, commanders settled cases at the front line without going through the proper channels. The senior officers in charge of the RUF were allegedly aware of this conduct, but did not intervene to deter it. During the 11-year conflict, very few courts martial were conducted.[32]

### c. National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL)

The National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) emerged in the neighbouring country of Liberia in 1989. The NPFL's aim was to oust the Liberian President, who had been in power since 1980 and whose regime was accused of being corrupt and excessively tribalistic. Backed up by foreign countries, the NPFL movement rapidly expanded its actions across the country towards Monrovia, the capital. In August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent to Monrovia a peacekeeping force known as the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG established a rear base near Freetown's International Airport in Lungi. In September 1990, the President was arrested, tortured, killed and his body paraded through Monrovia by an NPFL splinter group called the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). An Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was formed in November 1990. Despite a

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[29] On 8 May 2000, a crowd gathered outside the Freetown residence of the RUF leader to protest the resumption of hostilities in Sierra Leone and the taking hostage of UN peacekeepers by RUF forces. RUF bodyguards fired on the crowd, killing around 20. The RUF leader was detained by the Sierra Leone Police on 17 May and was subsequently held in custody.

[30] As an example of the structuring of the RUF, the functions given to the GSO1 were as follows: to maintain an ongoing roadmap or prepare a yearly forecast of events concerning general training, including bush camps, recreational sports, ceremonial parades and the planning and implementation of training courses; maintenance of a list of all courses to be undertaken by RUF members throughout the year; to maintain a manifest of the seniority of officers and senior NCO's in the RUF for promotions; appointments and reversions; to request course bids based on existing vacancies for various courses stating educational qualifications required; to be in charge of general discipline; and to post officers.

[31] Depending on the period, it was sent to the RUF leader, to the Battle Field Commander, or to the officer who later became the Interim Leader.

[32] For example, a Board of Investigation was seized of a case involving a senior RUF officer who allegedly diverted some Guinean currency and failed to give it to the movement. The Board investigated some of the most senior RUF officers.

reconciliation accord signed in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, between the President of the IGNU and the NPFL leader in October 1991, fighting continued in Liberia. In March 1991, the NPFL assisted the RUF in launching its "revolution"[33] in Sierra Leone. NPFL members started fighting alongside the small RUF force. The strength and involvement of NPFL forces in Sierra Leone would decline over the subsequent years owing to the emergence of the United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), a counter-revolutionary force comprised of supporters of the late President. The NPFL's physical withdrawal from Sierra Leone did not, however, lead to the withdrawal of the NPFL's active support for the RUF.

In March 1994, pursuant to the Cotonou Agreement signed in July 1993 between the NPFL, ULIMO and the Interim Government of National Unity, a tripartite Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG), headed by a five-seat Council of State replaced the IGNU. The three signatories each obtained one seat in the Council of State. Hostilities continued in Liberia and a splinter group of the NPFL, the NPFL-Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC) emerged and formed a coalition with the ULIMO-J. Following a new peace agreement signed in Abuja, Nigeria in August 1995, a new six seat Council of State was established, and the coalition obtained a seat in the Council.[34] Pursuant to a peace accord signed between the same fighting factions in August 1996 – referred to as Abuja II – disarmament started and in February 1997, the various groups were disbanded. In July 1997, Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held in Liberia; the NPFL leader was elected President of Liberia, his National Patriotic Party also winning a majority of seats in the National Assembly.

### d. United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)

The United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), mainly composed of former members of the Liberian Armed Forces (AFL) and other refugees who had found refuge in Sierra Leone and who were supporters of the late Liberian President, emerged in 1991 as an opposing force to the NPFL. In September 1991, ULIMO forces attacked NPFL forces in the west of Liberia, using Sierra Leonean territory as a staging point. ULIMO rapidly started fighting alongside the SLA to push the combined RUF/NPFL assault back into Liberia.

Over the subsequent years, the existence of this fighting force would be punctuated by rivalries between two personalities, leading to various splits and reunifications. In May 1992, the ULIMO Chairman was removed and the movement was split between two potential leaders, one of whom was accused of using ULIMO to wage a holy war while the other was accused of financial impropriety and hijacking the movement for political ends. Nevertheless, between August and December 1992, ULIMO reunified and resumed fighting with the NPFL. Following this, two branches of ULIMO clearly appeared: a Freetown-based branch, fighting alongside the SLA in Sierra Leone, and a branch based solely in Liberia.

A reunification congress between the two branches in October 1993 and a selection of joint communiqués issued in early 1994, some at the initiative of the Sierra Leonean NPRC Chairman, did not prevent the two branches from fighting. One of the main points of disagreement was the

[33] This is how the RUF referred to its actions in Sierra Leone. The RUF would further consider itself a government, referring to property stolen from civilians by RUF members as "government property".
[34] For a full text of these peace agreements, see http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/pa_liberia.html.

Because the Special Court only has jurisdiction over those crimes specifically included in the Statute, the answer to this question does not have a practical effect on the work of the Court. Nevertheless, it is useful from the perspective of contextualising the conflict in Sierra Leone and, furthermore, as an indication of whether international or internationalised courts should have jurisdiction over all crimes under international humanitarian law and then determine on the basis of evidence presented to them whether a conflict was international or non-international in nature.

The test of whether an armed conflict is an international armed conflict is based on the presence of forces that are under the control of a foreign power. This falls to be determined by who was controlling the different fighting factions at any given time, for which the ICTY has identified a test consisting of three parts, namely:

1. Overall control of an armed group or individuals;
2. Specific instructions to an armed group or individuals; and
3. Actual behaviour of an armed group or individuals, irrespective of any specific instructions.[133]

Factual information gathered in Sierra Leone reveals very clearly that the RUF was operating under direct orders from Charles Taylor, the leader of the NPFL[134] to greater and lesser degrees throughout the entire conflict, particularly during the early years of the conflict. Indeed, NPFL forces had entered Sierra Leone together with the RUF in 1991 under the direct orders of their leader. Throughout the conflict, logistics and weapons were supplied from Liberia – first through the NPFL and subsequently through the Liberian President, who was the former NPFL leader – in exchange for property taken by RUF/NPFL forces and later by RUF forces from civilians and other commodities, in particular diamonds mined throughout the country.

Therefore, given that the test of control is satisfied, the conflict in Sierra Leone was international in nature during those periods when Charles Taylor was an official of the State of Liberia. For those periods when he was not an official of the State of Liberia, even during times when the NPFL controlled up to 90% of the territory, there is at least a question about the nature of the conflict, although the answer to this question is beyond the scope of this report. However, as noted, the fact that the conflict was international in nature for at least some periods of time does not alter the crimes over which the Special Court has jurisdiction and it is those crimes that this report will focus on in the following sections.

4.b.iii Conclusion

The facts clearly demonstrate that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone from 23 March 1991 until the most definitive statement of peace, namely in 18 January 2002. In addition, albeit with less clarity, the facts also demonstrate that at times, this armed conflict was international in character, at the very least from 1997 until sometime in 2001. Given this, international humanitarian law began to apply in Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991 and continued to apply across the whole territory until 18 January 2002.

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[133] See *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, point IV.B.3.

[134] This section does not consider the position of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) or other foreign forces engaged in Sierra Leone, which is also beyond the scope of this report.

that more crimes were committed by the RUF without absolving the members of any other fighting faction of responsibility for the crimes that they committed. Similarly, the description of specific crimes in the various categories of crimes against humanity are not exhaustive of *all* the crimes committed during a particular attack, but are highlighted as representative examples of the types of crimes that were committed.[237]

4.d.i Crimes Against Humanity Committed by members of the RUF, the RUF/NPFL and the RUF/AFRC

The RUF, joined by the NPFL between 1991 and 1993 and the AFRC from 1997 onwards, committed a general attack against the civilian population lasting from 1991 until 2000. This attack was both widespread, in that it took place on a large scale and with a multiplicity of victims, *and* systematic, in that it constituted an organised pattern of conduct. That there was a policy to attack the civilian population is clearly demonstrated by the targeting of civilians in virtually every month in every District in which the RUF or their allies had a presence, particularly during military advances and retreats, but also when military manoeuvres were not being undertaken. Those instances in which there was relative calm usually represent periods during which the RUF was regrouping and rearming or periods during which the population had fled. During the period spanning from 1991 to 2000, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes against humanity:

(a) **Murder**, for the intentional and reckless killings of thousands of civilians;
(b) **Extermination**, for several mass killing events, namely the gathering of hundreds of civilians at different times in different locations to be shot or hacked to death;
**(c) Enslavement**, for the abduction of thousands of civilians and their use as porters, cooks, food-gatherers, domestic work, construction work and for similar purposes;[238]
(d) **Rape**, for the rape of hundreds of women and girls, including girls aged below 14, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of hundreds of women and girls as "wives", for sexual violence, including numerous incidents of sexual abuse and sexual assault, including forcing people to have sex with members of their own families;
(e) **Imprisonment**, for the arrest and detention of hundreds of civilians, who were held for weeks without charge;
(f) **Torture**, for the infliction of pain and suffering on people under RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC custody and control, including severe beatings and floggings, dripping melted plastic or rubber into people's eyes and onto people's bodies and a range of other equally grave acts;
(g) **Other inhumane acts**, for the variety of severe acts of violence committed against civilians throughout the attack, including mutilation, amputation, beatings, floggings and a range of other similar acts as well as for the effect on the population of cannibalism, drinking blood, displaying internal organs and severed heads at checkpoints, parading severed heads around

[237] All of the specific examples listed in these sections are detailed in the factual analysis.
[238] The crime of enslavement requires that the perpetrator exercise any or all of the powers of ownership over the abducted person. As such, this report does not characterise as enslavement the thousands of incidences where civilians were abducted but the purpose is not revealed; in addition, it does not characterise as enslavement the thousands of incidences where civilians were abducted and forced to carry loads for a short period of time before being released.

villages and forcing civilians to sing and dance at gunpoint in celebration of the actions of the RUF/NPFL, the RUF and the RUF/AFRC.

Within that general attack, there were a series of specific attacks committed against the civilian population. Of the 21 identified attacks committed against the civilian population,[239] six will be discussed below as being representative of the types of actions carried out by the RUF/NPFL, the RUF and the RUF/AFRC throughout the conflict. It should, however, be emphasised that the selection of these attacks is in no way intended to reflect any judgment about the relative importance of the attacks not selected for further exploration.

a) The RUF/NPFL attack from March to July 1991

In March 1991, the RUF/NPFL entered Sierra Leone from Liberia, arriving first in Kailahun and Pujehun Districts and spreading across Bonthe, Bo, Kenema and Kono Districts before being gradually pushed back in early August. During that time, the pattern of conduct employed by the RUF/NPFL reveals a clear policy to direct attacks against the civilian population, as evidenced by the abduction, killing, sexual assault, massive burning of houses and countless other actions inflicted on civilians. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/NPFL committed the following crimes against humanity:

a) **Murder**, for the numerous intentional and reckless killings of civilians, including the killing of 100 people in Pujehun District in July 1991 and the killing of 62 people in Kailahun District in June 1991;
b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of hundreds of civilians and their use as porters, guides, food-gatherers and similar purposes, including the abduction of 800 civilians to work in farms in Kailahun District in July 1991;
c) **Imprisonment**, for the detention of children who refused to be conscripted in Kailahun District in May 1991;
d) **Torture**, for the numerous beatings administered to people under the control of the RUF, for the dripping of rubber or plastic into people's eyes in Bonthe District in May 1991 and for tying a man up under the sun for one week in Bo District in May 1991;

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[239] Those attacks that are not discussed in detail in this report are: the RUF/NPFL attack in Kailahun, Kenema and Pujehun Districts from January to June 1992; the RUF/NPFL attack from May 1992 to early 1993, primarily the movement from Kailahun to Kono District; the RUF/NPFL attack in Pujehun District from December 1992 to the end of January 1993; the RUF attack across several Districts from December 1993 to September 1994; the RUF attack on Bo from January 1995 to April 1996; the RUF attack from May to June 1995 in Port Loko, Bombali and Koinadugu Districts following the failure to take Freetown; the RUF attack in Kono District from April to September 1995; the RUF attack in Moyamba District from August 1995; the RUF attack in the northern Districts in the lead up to elections from January to February 1996; the RUF/AFRC attack from May to December 1997 in Freetown, during which journalists and civil society were particularly targeted; the RUF/AFRC attack from July to January 1998 in District Headquarter towns in Bonthe, Kailahun, Kenema, Tonkolili, Bo and Pujehun Districts; the RUF/AFRC attack from February to November 1998, during which there named policies to commit certain acts, including "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Pay Yourself"; the RUF/AFRC attack in the Northern Province from February 1999 to February 2000; the RUF/AFRC attack in Kono District for the purposes of mining from 1999 to March 2001; and the RUF/AFRC attack on the Northern Province from May to November 2000.

e) **Rape**, for the rape and sexual assault of dozens of women, including the rape of a 10-year-old girl in Kailahun District in May 1991, and for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as "wives";
f) **Other inhumane acts**, for ordering people to dance while women were being raped in Pujehun District in June 1991 and for the effect on the population of frequent acts of cannibalism.

b) The "TAP" operation: April 1992 to May 1993

From April 1992 to May 1993, successive groups of NPFL forces committed an ongoing attack against the civilian population, which was striking in terms of the similarity of the conduct employed, including cannibalism, and the brutality inflicted on civilian men, women and children in the areas of Kailahun District over which the RUF/NPFL forces exercised control. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the NPFL committed the following crimes against humanity:

(a) **Murder**, for the intentional killing of scores of people, including people who tried to escape, people who were abducted for use as porters and people selected for their large size in Penguia Chiefdom in May 1992;
(b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of dozens of people for use as porters;
(c) **Torture**, for the infliction of severe pain and suffering on people under RUF control, including the severe cutting of people's flesh and dripping melted plastic or rubber into people's eyes in Luawa Chiefdom;
(d) **Rape**, for the rape of dozens of women, including young girls, and often by multiple assailants, including the rape of women by multiple assailants in Penguia Chiefdom in May 1992 and the rape of a woman in Kissi Teng Chiefdom in February 1993;
(e) **Other inhumane acts**, for cooking people alive, pounding a baby in a mortar and for the effect on the population of frequent acts of cannibalism, including the people who had been selected for their large size in Penguia Chiefdom in May 1992.

c) RUF attack between December 1994 and May 1995

From the end of 1994, the RUF had consolidated its control over Kailahun, Pujehun and Kenema Districts. From there, they expanded across Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba and Port Loko Districts in a clear push towards Freetown, which culminated in April 1995 in attacks on settlements in the Western Area. Throughout this westward expansion and their subsequent retreat on being repelled from the Western Area, the RUF engaged in an attack on the civilian population in towns through which they passed. This attack was both widespread, in that it affected a large area of the country and a large number of victims, and systematic, in terms of the remarkable similarity among the acts carried out across these Districts. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF committed the following crimes against humanity:

(a) **Murder**, for the intentional and reckless killing of thousands of people, including the killing of dozens of civilians at an IDP camp in Bo District in 1994;
(b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of hundreds of people for use as porters, food-gatherers and cooks;

(c) **Rape**, for the rape of scores of women and girls, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as "wives" and for sexual violence, including forcing people to have sex with their own family members;
(d) **Torture**, for beatings and other acts inflicting pain and suffering on people under RUF control, including dripping melted plastic in people's eyes,
(e) **Other inhumane acts**, including amputation of limbs, branding people with hot irons and carving words on their bodies with razor blades.

d) RUF attack on Bonthe District: 1995

Throughout 1995, the RUF were progressively taking firm control of Bonthe District; their arrival in towns across the District was accompanied by severe brutality against civilians and the deposing and replacement of traditional authorities. The attack was carried out in a systematic manner, in that it was clearly conducted according to an organised plan. From January to November, not a month passed without significant violations being committed against the civilian population. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF committed the following crimes against humanity:

**(a) Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including the killing of 300 people in Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom) in February;
(b) **Extermination**, for rounding up thousands of civilians from many different places and killing hundreds of them in Bauya Junction (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom) in October;
(c) **Enslavement**, for abducting civilians and forcing them to work, including as food-gatherers, cooks and porters;
(d) **Rape**, for the rape of scores of women and girls, including the rape of young girls in front of their parents, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as "wives" and for sexual violence, including forcing people to have sex with their own family members;
(e) **Other inhumane acts**, for the amputation of limbs, for the effect on the population of leaving mutilated corpses on the road, for severe beatings and for pouring petrol over a man and setting him on fire.

e) RUF/AFRC Attack in May and June 1997

On 25 May 1997, the AFRC staged a military coup, and were joined in power soon after by the RUF, thereby establishing a presence in areas previously held by the SLA. Between the end of May and the middle of June, the RUF/AFRC staged a sharp and brutal attack against the civilian population across the country that would affect every District to greater and lesser degrees. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes against humanity:

(a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including reprisal killings against civilians for failing to be "sufficiently supportive", the killing of civilians deemed to be "enemy collaborators" and civilians who refused to work;
(b) **Enslavement**, for the use of civilians as food-gatherers, cooks and porters;
(c) **Imprisonment**, for the arbitrary arrest and detention without charge of dozens of journalists, lawyers and civil society activists;
(d) **Torture**, for the infliction of severe pain and suffering on people detained by the RUF/AFRC, including severe beatings;

(e) **Rape**, for the rape and sexual abuse of dozens of women, including young girls, and the padlocking of women's genital areas in Pujehun District;
(f) **Other inhumane acts**, for the mutilation of several civilians, the amputation of one or more of their limbs, the effect on the population of displaying people's intestines at checkpoints and forcing people under gunpoint to dance and sing in support of the RUF/AFRC.

f) RUF/AFRC Attack from December 1998 to January 1999

From December 1998, the RUF/AFRC orchestrated a campaign to retake Freetown, moving from various Districts, particularly in the north, towards the Western Area. As they advanced, as well as during their retreat, the RUF/AFRC implemented a systematic attack against the civilian population that reached its peak during the invasion and brief occupation of parts of Freetown. This attack was striking particularly in terms of the sheer number of acts committed against the population and the destruction wrought in such a short period of time. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes against humanity:

(a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including alleged "enemy collaborators" and the killing of 27 people in a market place in Bombali District in January 1999;
(b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of hundreds of civilians for their use as porters and cooks;
(c) **Torture**, for the regular and severe beatings administered to people under the control of the RUF/AFRC, including one man who was beaten for 24 hours and then buried alive in Bombali District in January 1999;
(d) **Rape**, for the rape of dozens of women and girls;
(e) **Other inhumane treatment**, for forcing people at gunpoint to dance and sing in support of the RUF/AFRC in Freetown's East End in January 1999, for the mutilation of dozens of civilians, including carving words onto their bodies, and the amputation of one or more of their limbs.

4.d.ii Crimes Against Humanity Committed by members of the West Side Boys

The West Side Boys committed an attack against the civilian population in Port Loko District lasting from October 1998 to April 1999 across Koya and Maforki Chiefdoms.[240] This attack was both widespread, in that it took place on a large scale and with a multiplicity of victims, *and* systematic, in that it was an organised pattern of conduct. The facts clearly demonstrate that there was a policy to commit such an attack, with civilians being targeted for a variety of reasons. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the West Side Boys committed the following crimes against humanity:

(a) **Murder**, for the killing of dozens of civilians, including the killing of two civilians by hanging and the public execution of 20 civilians and the burning of 73 civilians in a house in April 1999;

[240] There was a lull in this attack in January and February 1999, during which time the West Side Boys were participating in the attack on Freetown. Nevertheless, the actions before and after that time form part of the same attack against the civilian population.

## C. Northern Province

### a. Bombali District

### 1. Introduction

Bombali District is in the centre-north of Sierra Lone. The town of Makeni is both the district headquarters of Bomalia, and the administrative centre of the Northern Province. The northern boundary of Bombali District is formed by the Republic of Guinea. Koinadugu District is found to the east and north east of Bombali District, and Tonkalili District is located to the south and south east. Kambia and Port Loko Districts border Bombali District to the west.

There are 13 chiefdoms in Bombali District:

| Chiefdom | Headquarter Town |
|---|---|
| Biriwa | Kamabai |
| Bombali Sebora | Makeni |
| Gbanti Kamaranka | Kamaranka |
| Gbendembu Ndowahun | Kalangba |
| Libeisaygahun | Batkanu |
| Magbaiamba Ndowahun | Hunduwa |
| Makari Gbanti | Masongbon |
| Paki Masabong | Mapaki |
| Safroko Limba | Binkolo |
| Sanda Loko | Kamalo |
| Sanda Tendaren | Mataboi |
| Sella Limba | Kamakwie |
| Tambakha | Fintonia |

A main highway runs from the Western Area through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni (Bombali Sebora). At Makeni, the highway splits. The southern fork runs to Magburaka, the headquarter town of Tonkalili District. The northern fork runs through the towns of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) and Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom) to Kabala, the headquarter town of Koinadugu District. Makeni and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) are linked by a poor quality secondary road that runs north-south through the towns of Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) and Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). Running north from Kamakwie, the road continues to a ferry point over the Little Scarcies River into Tambahka Chiefdom. A route running north through Tambahka Chiefdom leads directly to the international border with Guinea and the Guinean town of Madina Oula. From Kamakwie, a road runs west over the Little Scaries River into Kambia District, and the town of Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District) and Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District). A route runs east from the main Makeni-Kabala highway nearby Karina, through Gbendembu, Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom) to Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom). From Batkanu, the road continues west into the northern chiefdoms of Port Loko District, ending at Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District).

The Little Scarcies River runs latitudinally through the north of Bombali District, forming the boundary between Sella Limba and Tambakha Chiefdoms. It also forms the boundary between

In early February, ECOMOG forces attacked Freetown, dislodging the combined RUF/AFRC forces and forcing their retreat into provincial Sierra Leone. On 14 February, heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces retreating from the Western Area began concentrating in Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom), commencing a 17 day spree of looting and violence known as "Operation Pay Yourself". RUF/AFRC forces performed house to house searches, stealing valuable items and food from civilians. In early March, ECOMOG commenced provincial operations and moved from Port Loko (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni, establishing a base at Makeni's Teko Barracks. CDF forces deployed in the town, and a hunt for "collaborators" began. ECOMOG also occupied the northern towns of Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

Following ECOMOG's arrival in Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces dispersed throughout Bombali District, staging hit-and-run attacks on settlement on the Makeni-Kamalo axis, and attacking towns in the northern Tambakha Chiefdom. In the chiefdom headquarter of Fintonia (Tambakha Chiefdom), RUF forces executed 11 civilians and burned down large numbers of houses. Civilians from the town were abducted to assist RUF/AFRC forces in navigating the dense jungle terrain. In late April, RUF/AFRC forces amputated the arms from over ten civilians in Komoyah (Tambakha Chiefdom). They erected à rudimentary checkpoint, a rope across the road and tied the amputated arms along the length of the rope, leaving the amputees for dead nearby. Mid-year, towns on the Batkanu-Karina axis, and throughout the north of Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom came under attack from RUF/AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces strengthened their positions in Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom) and commenced frequent food-finding missions or "Jar Jar" throughout the west of the Chiefdom. By August, RUF/AFRC forces were again active in Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom). ECOMOG artillery shelled the base from Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom) for seven days continuously, leaving the base littered with the corpses of RUF/AFRC forces.

At the end of October 1998, RUF/AFRC forces concentrated around Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) in preparation for an attack of the town. Villages to the east of Kamalo were raided by RUF/AFRC squads. This forced many civilians to seek safety behind ECOMOG lines in Kamalo. During these preliminary attacks, RUF/AFRC forces cut a man in half from head to groin. Despite reinforcing in advance of the RUF/AFRC attack, ECOMOG withdrew north from Kamalo to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), taking casualties. From Kamalo, RUF/AFRC forces moved south attacking Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). During both attacks, large number of houses were burnt down, and civilians killed. ECOMOG forces, and SLA and CDF forces that had been infused into ECOMOG took up positions at Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), Kamaranka and Kamakwie on the northern axis running from Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom). The CDF began initiating local youths around Gbendembu, "washing" them spiritually to render them bullet-proof.

In early December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked SLA and ECOMOG forces in Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), killing over 20 SLA soldiers and amputating the limbs of six civilians. In the closing weeks of late December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces cleared ECOMOG forces from within a corridor from Koidu (CHIEFDOM, Kono District) through Magburaka (Kholifa

were raped. Following the attack on Rogboreh, RUF forces chanted slogans about the leader of the RUF. Rogboreh was occupied for 2 weeks, during which no houses were burned. An RUF Commander was identified as killing three people in Makalan, taking their property. In Mateboi, RUF forces burned down an unknown number of homes.

On 3 April 1994, 200 SLA soldiers in Makali (Konike Barina Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) were also under the command of the Resident Minister for the Northern Province. On 11 April, SLA forces deployed from Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom) and recaptured the town of Makali from RUF forces.

In Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom), on 18 April 1994, there was a public demonstration by civilians in response to a strongly-held belief that those SLA forces had been responsible for earlier attacks on the villages of Masanga and Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and on Magburaka town (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). SLA forces fired on civilian demonstrators, killing at least two people.

In the late morning of 1 November 1994, a large RUF force attacked the town of Bungbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), southwest of Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom). One hundred and ninety-three houses were burned during the attack. Civilians displaced from Bungbuna moved westwards to Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom). On 2 November 1994, SLA forces moved from Teko Army Barracks in Makeni and repelled the RUF forces from Bungbuna. Over the following week, these forces eastwards towards the town of Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom, Koinadugu District).

b) Events in 1995 and 1996

RUF activity in 1995 was concentrated on attacking the Western Area, through major assaults on town like Port Loko (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). Although the RUF established two camps in Bombali District – at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom) and Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) – the RUF forward operating bases in 1995 were in the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara, Tonkolili) and later at Camp Fol-Fol in the south of Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili. The bases in Bombali would take on a greater significance in 1996, as the RUF suffered a series of military defeats and failed to move into Freetown or hold territory in the Western Area.

Between 1 and 5 January 1995, RUF forces attacked the town of Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom, Port Loko District) from the direction of Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom) and Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom).

In May 1995, RUF forces entered the Bombali District from Kambia or Port Loko, neighbouring districts to the west. Between 14 and 18 May 1995, RUF moved eastwards from Romeni (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) towards Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District) crossing into Bombali District and establishing a base on an island beween two river at Ro-Source (Sanda

Tendaren Chiefdom)[348]. RUF forces operated from Ro-Source until at least September 1997. RUF forces again attacked the village of Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), southeast of Ro-Source along the primary route between Batkanu and Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) in May 1995. RUF forces raped five women and burnt down 10 homes. Civilians were abducted and forced to carry stolen property to an unknown destination. In the same year, RUF forces also established a base at Masonkorie, a village in Sanda Loko Chiefdom, 15km east of the town of Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

Sometime in February 1996, before the Presidential and Parliamentary elections on 26 February, RUF troops left their camp in the Kangari Hills, (Malal Mara Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) crossed the Makeni–Freetown highway and headed in the direction of Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom, Bombali District). From this point, RUF forces took an alternative route towards the town of Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), avoiding the main Batkanu–Gbendembu road, and attacked Makundu village (Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom). At least four civilian men were killed during the attack. Subsequently, 200 RUF forces moved in the direction of Gbendembu, attacking the town early in the morning on 22 or 23 February 2003 having camped the previous night in dense forest to the west of the town.

It is likely that RUF forces were active around the Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) area from 1 February, since they had control over Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District). On or around 23 February 1996, civilians in Kamakwie learned of the RUF attack on Gbendembu (Gbendembu-Ndowahun Chiefdom) prior to the subsequent attack on their town. Attacking Gbendembu, RUF forces were armed with AK47s, G3s, RPGs and hand grenades. Properties were looted and the doors of homes were destroyed. Civilian traffic travelling northwards from Gbendembu towards Kamakwie was targeted by RUF forces. The driver and passenger of a passing car were shot and wounded, and their car looted. RUF forces burned the car with the dying occupants trapped inside.

Between 23 and 26 February 1996, an RUF of between 150 and 200 personnel attacked Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) to the north of Makeni, north east of their base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), and 15 Km west of the RUF base at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). The attack came from the south of the town, through the village of Kathumpeh (Sella Limba Chiefdom). The main north-south road through Kamakwie passes through Gbendembu. The attack commenced in the morning, when a member of the RUF entered the town on a motorbike and began firing indiscriminately, possibly with an RPG. In addition to the burning down of 67 houses, RUF forces also burned offices of several international NGOs operating in the town. At least two people were abducted during this attack and taken to an RUF base at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko chiefdom). In the same period, in the village of Kagberi (Sella Limba Chiefdom), about 4 km west of Kamakwie, RUF forces captured and killed a farmer. They cut open his stomach and for an unspecified reason placed some "gari"[349] inside it. Although no location was specified, it is likely that these same RUF forces also shot a deaf and mute man in Kagberi for not responding to their orders

[348] Given the attacks in the north eastern chiefdoms of Port Loko in early January 1995, and accounts in the records detailing attacks on locations in these chiefdoms as coming from the direction of Mateboi (Sanda Tenderen, Bombali), it is likely that the RUF had a presence around Ro-Source well before June 1995.
[349] Dried, cracked cassava root.

animals. In May 1997, it had a very high degree of agricultural productivity, including a large cattle stock, making it a valuable location for the RUF to control.

In the early hours of 27 May 1997, the town of Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom) was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces carrying guns and other weapons. Soldiers surrounded the central mosque and killed 10 civilians celebrating the Muslim feast of "Jonbedeh", including the Section Chief. Of those escaping this attack on the mosque, an unknown number were injured. The majority of residents of the town heard gunfire and fled into the surrounding bush. RUF/AFRC forces raped an unknown number of women, and abducted 30 young civilian men and women. During the attack, numerous houses were burned down including those belonging to the town chief and the section chief. RUF/AFRC forces stole property. On the same day, RUF/AFRC forces moved west towards the village of Mandaha towards Gbendembu town (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), taking with them the 30 abductees. Some of the abductees were given military training and forced to join the RUF/AFRC, and some were forced into sexual slavery. The next day, the residents of Karina returned to the town and buried ten corpses in a mass grave. Given that Karina was on a regular patrol route from the RUF/AFRC camp at Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom), the burial was performed quickly, as residents feared the return of RUF/AFRC forces.

Also on 27 May 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Malongbo (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), nearby Karina. A father and son were killed when RUF/AFRC forces set their house on fire. An old man was killed when RUF/AFRC forces set fire to his grass house. RUF/AFRC forces amputated the hand of a civilian man, before shooting him dead in response to his complaints that he was now useless to his community.

From May 1997 to October 1997, Guinean forces were stationed at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District). During August and September 1997, the RUF/AFRC base at Ro-Source came under pressure from long-range rockets fired by Guinean forces at Madina. RUF/AFRC forces moved from their camp at Ro-Source (Ro-source) and established a new camp at Bainkoro (between Dibia and Sanda Magbolontho Chiefdoms, Port Loko).

On 16 December, ECOMOG jets bombed RUF/AFRC positions outside of Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom), claiming that the RUF/AFRC was constructing a runway to allow arms supplies to enter the country more freely in violation of ECOWAS and UN sanctions.[352]

c) Events in 1998

Between 6 and 14 February 1998, ECOMOG forces attacked Freetown, dislodging the combined RUF/AFRC forces and forcing their retreat into provincial Sierra Leone. This general retreat moved northwards, along the Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) –Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) - Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) axis.[353] After 14 February, RUF/AFRC forces were stationed in Lunsar, to the west along the highway from Makeni Town (Bombali Sebora). RUF/AFRC forces also attacked key locations in Kambia District, including the economic centres of Kambia Town and Rokupr (both Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District).

[352] AFP, 16 December 1997.

[353] See factual analysis for Western Area and Port Loko District in 1998 for further information.

On 13 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered the village of Masongbo (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom), 3 km west of Makeni along the main Freetown-Makeni highway. They were identified as RUF/AFRC because of their half military, half civilian attire. One member of the RUF/AFRC fired a single round between the legs of a civilian man in order to extort money from him; another civilian was robbed. On 14 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces regrouped in Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom) following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown. On the same day, ECOMOG Alpha Jets attacked Teko Barracks in Makeni. In addition, ECOMOG targeted the Makeni Police barracks, believing them to be the RUF/AFRC brigade headquarters. At least five civilians were killed during this attack.

RUF/AFRC commenced "Operation Pay Yourself", which lasted 17 days in Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom), from 14 February 1998 until 3 March 1998. "Operation Pay Yourself" was executed in response to the failure of the AFRC to resist attacks on Freetown by ECOMOG forces between 8 and 14 February 1998.[354] A similar operation was launched between the same dates in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District). RUF forces were reported as entering Makeni from the Magburaka (Kholifa Rhowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) highway with Toyota Hi-Lux and Mazda pick-up trucks. They were armed with AK-47s and G3s. At night, RUF/AFRC forces fired upon the exterior of houses before entering and performing searches. During these searches, mattresses, watches, foodstuffs, and personal and saleable items were taken. RUF/AFRC forces retreated from Makeni in the wake of ECOMOG forces

In the early evening of 1 March 1998, troops from the ECOMOG 24th Infantry Brigade entered Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) from Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District). They engaged RUF/AFRC snipers en route at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and exchanged fire with RUF/AFRC forces for about an hour as they entered Lunsar. Apart from that, ECOMOG met no further resistance from RUF/AFRC forces in Lunsar.[355]

On 2 March 1998, ECOMOG forces moved from Lunsar and arrived at the village of Magbema, 2km west of Makeni (both Bombali Sebora Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces retreated northwards from Makeni in the direction of Kamaboi (Biriwa Chiefdom), to the east of Makeni, which had been under RUF control since May 1997. Some forces moved further towards Kabala Town (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District), settling in the town of Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). On 2 or 3 March 1998, ECOMOG arrived in Makeni and established a base at Teko Barracks, taking control of Makeni. At some point after ECOMOG entered the town, forces from the CDF 9th Battalion were deployed to assist in patrolling the Makeni area.[356] An ECOMOG major stated that any civilian who is caught and found to have been an RUF/AFRC collaborator "will be treated as if they are not human" and commenced house to house searches, screening civilians and searching for possible RUF/AFRC infiltrators.

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[354] Clarification is required from the records about the date, as the starting date of "Operation Pay Yourself" is reported at different times across different Districts, the earliest being in the Western Area in 1997.
[355] R.A. Adeshina, pp.36-38.
[356] All Africa News, 11 December 1998 taken from Concord Times

Around midday on 22 March 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Kambia Mapulen (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). They were driven to Kambia Mapulen through the town of Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) on the main northern road to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), in a big truck with a civilian driver. Some of the RUF/AFRC forces were dressed in full military attire and others were dressed in civilian clothes. All were well armed with G3 and AK-47 rifles, and support weapons including RPGs. The RUF Commander first called a village meeting and informed the assembled civilians that they were being "liberated from their struggle". As the meeting progressed, RUF/AFRC forces surrounded the village. In the afternoon, the RUF/AFRC forces began firing on civilians, who fled the village. One girl did not escape the attack, was captured and raped by five members of the RUF/AFRC. The RUF/AFRC forces left the village along the same road they entered in the direction of Kamaranka. Villagers returned to find their valuables and livestock looted by the RUF/AFRC forces.

At this point, ECOMOG forces had taken control of Kamolo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom). ECOMOG met little resistance and easily took control of Kamakwie. During this time, RUF/AFRC forces were based at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District) at the other end of a highway leading directly to Kamakwie. In April and May 1998, ECOMOG informed representatives of the village of Laya (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) that they had insufficient logistical capacity to patrol the road between Kamalo and Laya.

In April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered the northern Tambakha Chiefdom, passed through the Northern Jungle from Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom (Koinadugu District) on their way to the chiefdom headquarter town of Fintonia. Duguta (Tambakha Chiefdom), a village along their route, was the first town to be attacked in the chiefdom. Reports indicate that the RUF/AFRC did not fire a shot as they entered, although RUF/AFRC forces aged between 13 and 16 years were given orders to shoot should anyone try and escape. Fifty residents were held under armed guard for the duration of the attack. Twenty-five homes were burned down and 30 people were abducted and forced to carry stolen property, including livestock and poultry. Nobody was killed, although threats were made to abductees by RUF/AFRC forces that anyone caught resting would be killed.

In the early hours of one Wednesday in April 1998, over 100 RUF/AFRC forces eventually arrived at and attacked Fitonia (Tambakha Chiefdom). They were armed with AK-47 rifles, RPGs and bladed weapons. The town was surrounded within 30 minutes of their arrival. Over 20 people were caught trying to escape the town. They were rounded up and placed into groups. During the RUF/AFRC attack, eleven people were killed. sixty-eight houses were looted and burned. At least 17 civilians were abducted to carry stolen property. Those abducted were ordered by RUF/AFRC forces to assist them in avoiding "Government positions", because of their familiarity with the terrain.

On the same day the same RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Kottoh (Tambakha Chiefdom) in the Outanma Kilimi National Park, three miles west of Fintonia. At this village, they amputated the hand of an old civilian man, who died from loss of blood whilst heading south to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) to seek medical attention. Following this assault, the same RUF/AFRC forces proceeded towards Komoyah (Tambakha Chiefdom), which is about sixteen miles south west of Fintonia. RUF/AFRC forces killed 10 civilian men one after the other in this attack and

amputated the arms of a further 11 civilian men. An unknown number of houses were also looted by RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG forces visiting Komoyah following the attack reported that RUF/AFRC forces had erected a checkpoint, a rope across the road. They had tied the amputated arms along the length of the rope and left the amputees dying nearby. ECOMOG forces took the amputees to their base at Kamakwie, where they received medical attention. From here, RUF/AFRC forces continued westwards to Sarakuda (Tambakha Chiefdom) where they killed an old woman.

Overnight between 10 and 11 May 1998, RUF/AFRC force attacked Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), a town on the road to Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District) that sits upon the Batkanu–Gbendembu route. During the attack, the Chiefdom Speaker and another prominent elder were killed. Seven other civilians were also killed. Many of the brick houses in the town had been burnt down, and much of the property stolen by RUF/AFRC forces.

In late June 1998, Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) once again came under attack by RUF/AFRC forces. The town was surrounded before the RUF/AFRC forces announced their presence with a single signature shot. Further sporadic firing by RUF/AFRC forces caused many of the residents to flee the town. An hour after RUF/AFRC forces first entered the village, a large group of RUF/AFRC forces in full combat fatigues passed through the village in a westerly direction, heading towards Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom). Following these military forces were between 1000 and 1500 people in civilian dress carrying looted property. In Mayainku village (Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom), on the road to Batkanu, RUF/AFRC forces abducted a man, who was later found dead, his body containing many bulletholes. In Mamaya (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), also on the road to Batkanu from Gbendembu, RUF/AFRC forces raped a 10-year old girl, who later died of blood loss.

In July 1998, villagers in Gbendembu heard from displaced persons that the village of Loihindi (both Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), east of Gbendembu on the route to Kabala, had been attacked by RUF/AFRC forces. During the attack, RUF/AFRC forces had mutilated a young boy and an old man.

In July 1998, the village of Masiba (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces from the direction of Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces went from house to house searching for civilians. Those captured were first tied up as the search continued, and were then taken to the village of Kortulay (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and forced to take the rice of the Section Chief. The captives then transported the rice in the direction of Biriwa Chiefdom. Two days after the initial attack, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masiba again, to recapture a number of abducted civilians who had escaped and returned to Masiba. The second RUF/AFRC attack on Masiba came from the village of Hundowa, to the north. A trader was shot dead in the centre of town. RUF/AFRC forces broke into all the houses in Masiba, looting what could be carried. At least 10 houses were burnt down. The escapees were recaptured by RUF/AFRC forces. Following this attack, the RUF/AFRC forces immediately moved to the nearby village of Wanworowah (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), where they captured 20 civilians. The men were hung beneath trees and set on fire. The women were cut with blades on their chests and backs.

which had been held by ECOMOG forces since early March 1998. Following the attack, RUF forces departed westwards for Bankabie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), a village immediately south of Kamalo and joined with other RUF/AFRC units. RUF/AFRC units that participated in this attack re-established Camp Ro-Source (Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom), which had previously been abandoned in September 1997.

About fifteen miles south of Kamalo (Sella Limba Chiefdom), on 8 October, two groups of RUF/AFRC forces joined at a camp outside Masomba (Sella Limba Chiefdom), where some 500 RUF/AFRC forces were already deployed. RUF/AFRC forces abducted a man rumoured to have mystical powers, and forced him to perform religious rites for the unit. These including creating talisman to guarantee RUF forces would not suffer injuries, in addition to offerings of kola-nuts, sacrifices of goats and sheep for military success. The RUF/AFRC were certain that that another group of RUF/AFRC forces would arrive at the camp on 20 October. Once that unit arrived, all RUF/AFRC forces stationed at the camp would prepare for an attack on Kamalo. In the northern part of Magbaiamba Ndowahun Chiefdom, RUF forces attacked the village of Gbendebu on 27 October. RUF forces captured one civilian and divided him into two sections by splitting his body in two from head to groin. On 31 October, the group of RUF/AFRC forces who had been expected entered the RUF camp outside Masomba (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

By the end of October 1998, around 500 "loyal" SLA troops had been deployed to Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), south of where the RUF/AFRC were concentrating for the attack on Kamalo. The CDF deployed at Kalangba frequently patrolled Gbendembu. Parents were encouraged by the CDF commander to send their children to be initiated into the CDF, or "washed", so they could become bulletproof. A number of people died when trainers shot them at during the final stages of initiation.

As RUF forces prepared to attack Kamalo (Sella Limba Chiefdom) from the south, ECOMOG reinforced their positions in the town on 13 November 1998 with troops from Kamakwie. On 14 November, RUF forces attacked Kamalo. During this assault, RUF/AFRC forces killed an unknown number of ECOMOG forces, who were buried by civilians two days later, on 16 November. In addition, 80 homes were burnt and an unknown number of civilians were killed. Five RUF/AFRC wounded were returned to the camp outside Masomba (Sella Limba Chiefdom). ECOMOG and SLA forces were driven out of Kamalo and retreated north to the town of Kamakwie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom), still at this stage held by ECOMOG.

On 21 November RUF/AFRC forces headed south from Kamolo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) along the main highway and on 21 November they attacked Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces abducted seven men and two women, burnt down homes, and took property. The village clinic was also destroyed. They then established a base there that was still in operation in December 1998. On 22 November, ECOMOG deployed to Kamaranka, but did not engage forces at a nearby RUF/AFRC camp identified by two youths who had escaped from the camp the night before. ECOMOG troops remained in Kamaranka. It is reported in general terms that ECOMOG forces treated civilians accused to being "rebel collaborators" with extreme brutality. On 23 November 1998 in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), ECOMOG forces tied-up and beat to death

a well known and popular businessman accused of being a "rebel collaborator" by a woman in the town.

CDF forces established a checkpoint Ferrah Loko village, on the main Makeni-Kamkwie highway south of Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). On 27 November 1998, CDF forces detained two civilians at the checkpoint and accused them of being "rebel collaborators". The civilians were led to a nearby river and shot dead with AK-47s. On 28 November, at the same checkpoint, CDF confiscated a quantity of prescription drugs to be used in the treatment of an outbreak of cholera in Kamaranka from a pharmacist travelling from Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom) to Kamaranka.

In December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked many villages in Sella Limba Chiefdom, around the headquarter town of Kamakwie. Six miles from Kamakwie, at the crossing point over the Mongo River at Kabbah Ferry, RUF/AFRC forces burnt several houses and looted property in their attack on the village. Then, seven miles from Kamakwie, the town of Kamaportho (Sella Limba Chiefdom) was also attacked. RUF/AFRC forces killed an unknown number of civilians, burnt homes and looted properties.

Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) was attacked on 9 December by RUF/AFRC forces again entering the town from the west along the Batkanu–Gbendembu Highway. ECOMOG and SLA forces stationed in the town were driven out by RUF/AFRC forces. During the engagement, RUF/AFRC forces lined up eleven civilians and shot them one after the other. RUF/AFRC forces set fire to two machine guns located in the vacated ECOMOG position. ECOMOG and "loyal" SLA forces regrouped to the south of Gbendembu and launched a counter attack. During the attack RUF/AFRC forces killed 23 SLA forces and amputated the limbs of six civilians. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC forces were successfully dislodged from Gbendembu. Residents buried the dead civilians in mass grave near the Wesleyan Church. The 25 dead SLA soldiers were taken to Makeni (Bombali Sembora). Civilians buried an unknown number of RUF/AFRC dead in the bush surrounding Gbendembu.

On Monday 20 December, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Binkolo town (the headquarter town of Safroko Limba Chiefdom), near Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom) on the main road to Kabala (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). On 21 December, RUF forces took property, including food items, and burnt down 133 homes. Five people were shot dead in the attack. RUF/AFRC forces established and manned checkpoints in Binkolo between 30 December 1998 and 4 January 1999.

On 23 December, RUF/AFRC forces took control of Magburaka Town (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). Later that day RUF/AFRC forces commenced a major assault on Makeni from three directions. The nearby towns of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom), Karina and Kamabai (both Biriwara Chiefdom) to the northeast were already under RUF/AFRC control. Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and Kamolo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) to the northwest were both under pressure from RUF/AFRC forces. From the south, RUF/AFRC forces entered Bombali district through Magburaka town (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and continued towards Makeni, whilst another RUF/AFRC force launched their attack on the town

from the north. RUF/AFRC forces also moved from Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), attacking Makeni from the west.

On 24 December at 1200 RUF/AFRC forces succeeding in dislodging ECOMOG forces from the Teko Barracks in Makeni. ECOMOG forces retreated north to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom). Teko Barracks was home to the brigade headquarters of the ECOMOG 24th Infantry Brigade. ECOMOG forces ran short of ammunition and were overpowered by the attacking RUF/AFRC force. During the attack, RUF/AFRC forces inflicted heavy casualties on ECOMOG, and managed to capture the ECOMOG brigade intelligence officer and much of the brigade documentation.[358] By 26 December, ECOMOG had withdrawn from Makeni.

In late December, RUF/AFRC forces Fintonia (Tambakah Chiefdom) was attacked. Many people were abducted some of whom were made to carry looted goods. Eleven civilians were killed and at least one woman was sexually assaulted and forced to be a sex slave for RUF/AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces abducted over 40 people, 11 were killed. 68 houses were burned down. Civilians were forced to carry looted items for the RUF/AFRC forces.

On 24 December 1998, SLA forces retreating from Makeni towards Koinadugu District arrived in the village of Bombali Bana (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom), 3km west of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom), to the north of Makeni. Bombali Bana was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces after 24 December 1998. In this attack, 25 houses were burned down. Throughout the night of 25-26 December report hearing the movement of convoys of vehicles moved towards Makeni through Binkolo on the Kabala-Makeni highway. Between 30 December 1998 and 1 January 1999, convoys of civilians carrying sacks of rice on their heads, and livestock over their shoulders, were being escorted by armed RUF/AFRC forces through Binkolo towards Makeni.

After 26 December, ECOMOG forces retreated from the town of Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) through the village of Konba towards Kambia District, and eventually to Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District). On 30 December, RUF/AFRC forces entered the town immediately, without engaging ECOMOG. RUF/AFRC forces quickly set up an administration, and started recruiting young men and women from throughout Sella Limba Chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces also crossed into Kamakwie from Tambakha Chiefdom, stealing much of the kerosene and food waiting to be ferried across the Little Scarcies River to Kamakwie. Soon after arriving in Kamakwie, RUF/AFRC forces sought to extend their authority over the Mongo River north towards the border with Guinea. Also on 30 December, RUF/AFRC forces advanced into Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and engaged ECOMOG positions.

d) Events in 1999

Through December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces cleared ECOMOG forces from within a corridor from Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) through Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkalili District) and Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District, Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). RUF/AFRC forces assaulted Freetown between 6 and 20 January. Following an intense battle for

[358] Detail only. R.A. Adeshina, p.133

headquarter town of Fintonia, on the northerly Kamakwie–Madina Oula[361] (Guinea) route on 11 January. RUF/AFRC forces were also based seen in border villages such as Sanya and Symbecki (both Tambakha Chiefdom), where they regularly sold items stolen during attacks to intermediaries who would sell them at the weekly market in the Guinean border towns of Madina Oula, Sekusoria and Lakantha. In Kambia District, RUF/AFRC forces used the Great Scaries River to access trade fairs in towns just over the Guinean border.[362] The Guinean authorities tightened border security checks on traders. In relation to the Guinean operations, RUF forces in Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom) attempted to conscript civilians.

By March 1999, RUF/AFRC forces had effective control over the surrounding area of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) and proceeded to take food from its inhabitants. In Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom, food-finding missions were conducted in Kamaranka and Kambia Mapalun in April. At a meeting that occurred sometime between before peace negotiations commenced, a G5 committee of RUF/AFRC forces and civilians met to discuss food contributions to the RUF/AFRC war effort. An order was passed passed requiring civilians to contribute food to RUF/AFRC forces on a daily basis. The RUF commander officially ordered the beginning of food-finding missions around Binkolo in middle to late 1999.

Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May in the Togolese capital, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (Lomé Peace Agreement). On the same day the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, RUF/AFRC forces in Thama Village (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) tied up, beat and executed four young boys. Residents of the village buried their corpses in a mass grave in Thama.

After the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, the RUF/AFRC established a large training camp in Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), on the Guinea-Makeni road. The Gbendembu camp replaced a camp located previously located in Kailahun District. It was set up both to bolster the RUF/AFRC ground force in Sierra Leone, and to train forces for attacks on towns in Guinea. Many civilians in Gbendembu were forced to work in the training camp preparing food for trainees. Conditions in the camp were harsh, and food was scare. To ensure they did not escape, trainees were monitored continually by RUF/AFRC security forces. RUF/AFRC "Food Finding Missions" became commonplace in villages surrounding Gbendembu, and a specific group of RUF/AFRC "Night Combatants" carried out frequent looting raids in the area overnight. This contributed to a sense of heightened terror amongst civilians in and around the town.

In August 1999, "Operation Pay Yourself" began in Magbema. This was an ongoing RUF/AFRC slogan targeting towns and villages with a looting spree, the stolen property from which served as pay for the forces. This operation lasted for 72 hours. If any civilians refused to provide RUF/AFRC forces with food or with whatever goods they sought, they were either beaten or killed. Also in August, RUF/AFRC established "G5" civilian-military liaison committees throughout

[361] In late January 1999, UNHCR established a refugee camp in Madina Oula, although Sierra Leonean refugees had been seeking safety there since 1997. AFP, 28 January 1999.
[362] See the factual analysis for Kambia District for 1999 for further information.

Safroko Limba Chiefdom. Like in other places, the G5 committee was tasked with administering the collection of daily contributions of foodstuff from the civilian population to the RUF/AFRC. Shortly after its establishment, RUF/AFRC forces were ordered to search the bush surrounding settlement to collect food for themselves.

In the southern headquarter tension was beginning to exhibit itself between RUF and AFRC commanders and ranks in Makeni (Bombali Sembora). In August, a senior RUF commander was captured and detained in Port Loko District by an AFRC splinter called the West Side Boys.[363] The West Side Boys, based in the Okra Hill Area of lower Maforki Chiefdom and Koya Chiefdom in Port Loko District eventually released the senior RUF commander, who commandeered a number of vehicles in Lunsar (Port Loko District) and Magbema and returned to Makeni. In August 1999, in Makeni's Independence Square, one of the RUF commanders shot an AFRC commander at point blank range, killing him immediately. RUF and AFRC members fought for control of Makeni. Following this battle, the AFRC forces left Makeni and moved into Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) led by a different commander[364]. During their withdrawal from Makeni, AFRC forces abducted civilians en route to Lunsar to carry wounded AFRC personnel.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to replace the previous observer mission and assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement. [365] The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) commenced deployment with the arrival of advance teams on 29 and 30 November;[366] 4,500 UNAMSIL were troops were present in Sierra Leone by 10 January 2000.[367]

e) Events in 2000

On 5 January, a contingent of 450 Kenyan UNAMSIL peacekeepers and military observers (MILOBS) tried to enter Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom) but was denied entry by RUF/AFRC forces on the grounds that they had not been authorised by the RUF/AFRC high command to deploy in the town. By 6 January, companies of Kenyan UNAMSIL peacekeepers had set up camp in Makeni. In January 2000, RUF/AFRC forces in Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) stoned a civilian to death after accusing him of killing an RUF/AFRC member. The civilian's body was left unburied and dragged along the road to the nearby village of Mongoreh (Safroko Limba).

In February or March 2000, diamonds were found in Kambia Makuhun (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) by residents of the village. A member of RUF/AFRC senior command oversaw the mining operation, in which abducted civilians were forced to work as miners. Those accused of stealing were given 200 lashes. Within the month, RUF/AFRC forces moved from Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) and Makeni to reinforce Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom), a village at the intersection of a route that leads to Kambia Makuhun and the Gbundema– Kamakwie highway. On 24 February, the RUF/AFRC commander in Kamakwie captured the Paramount Chief of

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[363] See factual analysis for Port Loko District for further information.

[364] This information will require further clarification, since it is also mentioned in the factual analysis for Tonkolili District.

[365] UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999)

[366] BBC, 29 November 1999

[367] IRIN West Africa, 11 January 1999

In late September, RUF/AFRC forces raided Thama (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) and went house-to-house looking for valuable items. Seventeen civilians were abducted and forced to carry the stolen items to Makeni, a journey of over 40 miles.

f) Events in 2001

On 3 January, the RUF high command met with the UNAMSIL force commander in Magburaka.[376] In January, the RUF/AFRC agreed with UNAMSIL to open the stretch of highway connecting Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko Distrcit) and Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni Town. On 31 January and 13 February, the UNAMSIL Core Contact Group met with the RUF/AFRC command in Makeni Town. At the latter meeting the RUF/AFRC returned 56 weapons, some communications equipment, and nine vehicles seized from UNAMSIL since deployment.[377] On 16 February, a Bangladeshi UNAMSIL unit conducted a long-range patrol to Makeni from Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), passing through 16 RUF/AFRC checkpoint en route. The patrol met with the RUF brigadier in Makeni.[378] Patrols continued throughout February, also moving from Ro-Gberray (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni. On 14 March, around 240 Nigerian UNAMSIL soldier commenced deployment to Lunsar,[379] increasing to 776 by 23 March 2001.[380] On 17 April, Nigerian UNAMSIL soldiers moved from Lunsar and commenced deployment to Makeni[381] On 25 May, RUF/AFRC forces released 591 child combatants to UNAMSIL in Makeni.[382]

On 24 September, disarmament commenced in Bombali District. UNAMSIL established reception centres in Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom), Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom)[383] and in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) in late October.[384] On 15 November, 150 Sierra Leone Police deployed to Makeni.[385]

**3. Conclusion**

** TO BE DRAFTED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE**

b. Kambia District

**1. Introduction**

Kambia District is located in the north-west of Sierra Leone. The Republic of Guinea runs along the entire northern boundary of Kambia District, with the Atlantic Ocean lying to the west. Port Loko District is to the south of Kambia District and Bombali District is found to the east.

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376 UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 3 January 2001
377 UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 13 February 2001
378 UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 16 February 2001
379 UNAMSIL Press Release, 14 March 2001 and IRINWA, 16 March 2001
380 UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 23 March 2001
381 UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 17 April 2001.
382 UNASMIL Press Briefing, 29 May 2001.
383 UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 25 September 2001.
384 OCHA, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 16 Oct - 05 Nov 2001
385 UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 16 November 2001.

RUF/AFRC forces entering Kassirie. ECOMOG forces killed at least three members of the RUF/AFRC and captured a number of others. RUF/AFRC forces retaliated in the following days and burnt down over 100 houses in Kassirie.

Following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the RUF/AFRC began requiring the inhabitants of villages throughout Tonka Limba Chiefdom to pay money and feed the RUF/AFRC forces. On market day in Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom), which occurs every Friday, RUF/AFRC forces levied Le 500 and three cups of rice or oil from each house; those who defaulted were ill-treated. For example, at Kasuroh village, just north of Madina, RUF/AFRC forces broke the leg of an old man who refused to let them take his livestock. In Mapotolon (Samu Chiefdom), local youths responded to this ill-treatment by killing a number of RUF/AFRC members in the village. The RUF/AFRC forces in Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) launched a heavy attack on Mapotolon in retaliation, surrounding the village and burning down every residence.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to replace the previous observer mission and assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement. [417] The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) commenced deployment with the arrival of advance teams on 29 and 30 November;[418] 4,500 UNAMSIL were troops were present in Sierra Leone by 10 January 2000.[419]

f) Events in 2000

In late April, UNAMSIL commenced long-range patrols in Kambia District, particularly around the border areas. UNAMSIL plans to continue deployments into Kambia District were interrupted when the RUF/AFRC disarmed and detained around 300 UNAMSIL peacekeepers in different locations across Sierra Leone. In early May 2000, RUF/AFRC forces disarmed a 100 strong Nigerian UNAMSIL contingent near Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom). They were released in Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) a few days later.

The RUF/AFRC moved the Kambia Brigade headquarters to Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) at some point in early 2000. On 26 May 2000, a Sierra Leone Government helicopter gunship bombarded Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), killing three people and wounding two others. Shortly before this, around late March or early April 2000, the same gunship had dropped leaflets telling the RUF to surrender and disarm to UNAMSIL, warning that the next time it would be bombs,[420] not leaflets. This practice was also carried out in Bombali and Tonkolili Districts. RUF/AFRC forces would shoot at civilians attempting to take one of the leaflets. After 26 May 2000, the helicopter gunship came regularly, which resulted in civilian deaths in Rokupr, Kambia Town (both Magbema Chiefdom) and Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). This continued until June 2000, when the Guinean forces bombarded Rokupr on numerous occasions, killing up to 17 civilians.

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[417] UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999).
[418] BBC Online News, 29 November 1999.
[419] IRIN West Africa, 11 January 1999.
[420] The leaflets refer specifically to Gatling machine guns, 57mm rockets, 23mm guns and 30mm grenades, accompanied by a picture of a Mi-24 "Hind" helicopter gunship.

### 3. Conclusion

** TO BE DRAFTED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE**

c. Koinadugu District

### 1. Introduction

Koinadugu District is located in the northwest of Sierra Leone. It shares a border with Guinea to the north and east, with Kono and Tonkolili Districts to the south and with Bombali District to the west. The town of Kabala is the Headquarter Town of Koinadugu District. There are eleven Chiefdoms in Koinadugu District:

| Chiefdom | Headquarter Town |
|---|---|
| Dembelia Sinkunia | Sinkunia |
| Diang | Kondembaia |
| Follosaba Dembelia | Musaia |
| Mambolo (Kasunko) | Fadugu |
| Mongo | Mongo Bendugu |
| Neini | Yiffin |
| Neya | Krubola |
| Sengbe | Yogomaia |
| Sulima | Falaba |
| Wara Wara Bafodia | Bafodia |
| Wara Wara Yagala | Gbawuria |

[geographical overview and summary of factual analysis to be drafted pending incorporation of comments from resource persons]

### 2. Factual Analysis

a) Events in 1992

On 29 April 1992, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), led by Valentine Strasser and elements of the SLA, overthrew the government of the All Party Congress.

In the first half of 1992, Fadugu town (Mambolo) experienced an influx of civilians from Makeni town (Makari Gbanti, Bombali) and Kono District. On 2 May 1992 a local civilian militia was formed in Fadugu town (Mambolo). For this militia, local blacksmiths manufactured single-barrel shotguns known as "Chaka Bulla." Others were armed with sticks through which nails were driven, metal bars, axes and cutlasses. Reports indicate that the Government of Sierra Leone was setting up and recruiting for a civilian militia called the "Donsos," the headquarter of which was Koidu town (Gbense, Kono District). An unknown number of civilian militia from Mambolo chiefdom joined the Donsos.

In mid 1992 the SLA started reinforcing their positions in the eastern Chiefdoms of Neya and Mongo in the towns of Kumba Wullen Balia and Tumonia.[433] In July 1992, in Mongo Bendugu

[433] This town could be Tomania, Sengbe Chiefdom.

because it was the Saturday market day (called "Lumor" locally). SLA troops were ultimately dislodged from the bridge.

Early on 6 November 1994 RUF forces departed Badala, and moved across the Seli river northwards towards Kabala, bypassing the town of Kondembaia, to where the SLA had retreated. They attacked a number of villages within a 10km area to the immediate south of Kabala. Surkurela (Dieng Chiefdom) and Kamadugu Sokurela (Neini Chiefdom) were attacked. RUF forces arrived in Fasowaya (or Fasawaia, Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom) early on 7 November and cooked a large amount of food. RUF forces were in three groups around the Fasawaya area. The first group was on a patch of farmland called Maworona, the second on the farm of Madam Fatmata Roko, and the third at a location called Centre Bolt's Garden.

In the afternoon of 7 November 1994, RUF forces moved from their Fasowaya encampment and attacked Kabala. Shortly before the attack, residents of Kabala recall hearing an announcement over the radio informing them that the SLA were about to test their AK47 rifles, and therefore nobody should worry. There was limited resistance from the small SLA contingent stationed in the town. Reports indicate that Guinean and Nigerian troops were also present. They would be reinforced on 11 November by SLA forces retreating from Kono District. During the attack, RUF forces killed a prominent former Tamaboro leader, beating him severely with metal bars before cutting his throat. At least four other civilians were killed by RUF forces. In addition to burning over 100 residences, RUF forces looted and destroyed public buildings, including the Police Barracks, the District Office, the District Council Hall and the hospital. Twenty civilians were abducted to carry stolen property. RUF forces also destroyed the businesses of many civilians thought to have been Tamaboros. Fleeing the battle much of the Kabala people fled the town of Kabala heading northeast towards Fadugu and Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) and also towards the town of Tomania (Mongo Chiefdom).

Following the attack, RUF forces left Kabala in the morning of 8 November 1994, moving directly southwards through the villages of Yisimaia (Sengbe Chiefdom), Fasawaya (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom) and Kamadugu Sokurela (Neini Chiefdom). In Fasawaya, 18 civilians were abducted to carry looted property. They continued southwards off the main motorable road, moving through Singbini (Neini Chiefdom) before veering westwards towards the town of Foria (Diang Chiefdom). A further 18 civilians were abducted in Singbina. Reports indicate that this RUF group, active in Diang chiefdom prior to the 7 November attack on Kabala, abducted over 3000 civilians.

By 10 November 1994, the RUF forces responsible for the attack on Kabala on 7 November reached Dondoya (Diang Chiefdom). Instead of taking the main motorable road from Foria (which continued south towards Alikalia and Yiffin) RUF forces headed to Darakuru (Diang). Darakuru is one of the main gold mining areas in Sierra Leone. RUF forces camped in Darakuru until 13 November 1994, during which time they received 300 ounces of gold from the residents of the village in return for not attacking Darakuru. This group of RUF moved into Tonkolili District.

RUF forces departed Mansofinia (Neya Chiefdom) on 8 November, moving to Yiffin on 9 November 1994. Before entering Alikalia on 9 November, RUF forces overpowered armed significant resistance from local militia. Eleven civilians and four local militia were killed by RUF

Around midday on 12 January, RUF forces used a machete to cut off four fingers from the right hand of the Section Chief. An unknown number of civilians in the town were whipped and beaten by RUF forces, who looted extensively. Twenty-six men and 15 women, all civilians, were forced to carry the looted property. RUF forces burned down four houses before departing Yarawadugu.

Between 12 and 13 January 1998, this RUF unit returned to Kurubonla from Yarawadugu passing through the villages of Tilikoro, Fasombnuya, Sandia, Tenkeya, Toroya and Marliya. In Tilikoro, two men were caught and their property taken away. In Fasonbnuya, three men were caught, and property including radios, casette tapes and a gun was taken. Five houses were also burned down. Many houses in other towns were also burnt down, including 10 in Sandia, two in Tenkeya, 10 in Toraya and 6 in Marliya. On 13 January, the unit arrived in Kurubonla, whereupon the people who had been abducted to carry stolen property on the patrol were released. A truck from the RUF base at Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom) was provided to carry the 50 man unit back to Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District).

On 15 January 1998, RUF forces burned a total of 11 houses in the villages of Dunamara, Fandala and Henekuma (all Neya Chiefdom) en route from Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District) to Mansofenia (Neya Chiefdom). In Mansofenia, RUF forces began to burn houses. Villagers report begin surprised, having been informed earlier by one of the RUF commanders that Mansofenia was an RUF base. That RUF commander shot dead another RUF commander with a pistol.[450]

In February 1998, the combined forces of the ARFC and the RUF were driven out of Freetown by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention force.

After 14 February 1998, a 1000-man RUF/AFRC unit known as "Junta One" arrived in Fadugu (Mambolo HQ town) and proceeded to attack many surrounding villages as part of "Operation Pay Yourself". Attacks were made upon Kagbasia, Kafogo, Kassasie, Thankorosidia, Madina, Kasandakoro, Kakayo and Kamanda.[451]

On 15 February 1998, ECOMOG forces entered Fadugu town forcing ARFC/RUF forces to retreat towards Kabala. Fadugu town became the focus point for surrenders by RUF/AFRC forces present in the surrounding villages, as a result of which ECOMOG set up a screening process.[452] At least two killings of surrendered RUF/AFRC forces by ECOMOG soldiers are recorded. ECOMOG cooperated with the CDF to set up a town defence plan that included civilians.

CDF forces had made the main route between Magburaka and Koidu impassable to retreating RUF/AFRC forces, so the main route used was through Bumbuna (Kalansogoia, Tonkolili) and Bendugu (Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili) into Neini chiefdom. After 14 February 1998, a large convoy of RUF/AFRC vehicles moved through the towns of Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) and Yiffin (Neini Chiefdom) through towards Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District). In both Alikalia and Yiffin,

[450] More detail is required from the records on this.
[451] More detail is required from the records on these attacks.
[452] More detail is required from the records on the screening process.

until early March 1998, there are reports of continual harassment of civilians and their property being taken by RUF/AFRC forces as part of "Operation Pay Yourself".

Throughout March and April 1998 in Sebeneh chiefdom, the number of RUF/AFRC forces present grew. There are also reports of continual looting of civilian property and expropriation of dwellings to house RUF/AFRC forces and their families. Civilians in Kalkoia (Sengbeh Chiefdom) report seeing small ECOMOG patrols shortly after the arrival of the main ECOMOG 2nd Battalion reached Kabala in early March. Shortly after ECOMOG arrived in Kabala, RUF/AFRC forces occupied the town of Serekolia (Mongo Chiefdom).

After 13 March 1998, ECOMOG forces commanded by entered the town of Alikalia from the north. A company of ECOMOG forces remained in Alikalia, whilst a platoon was dispatched to Yiffin town (Neini Chiefdom), in pursuit of RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG met little resistance on entering Yiffin. In both Yiffin and Alikalia, ECOMOG forces and Section Chiefs accepted the surrender of unknown numbers of RUF/AFRC forces, who were issued with documents identifying them and then sent to Kabala or Makeni for further questioning by ECOMOG.

Immediately after entering both Yiffin and Alikalia, ECOMOG met with the Section Chiefs and requested that hunters be gathered together to assist ECOMOG troops. In Alikalia, 50 hunters were rapidly assembled and registered at the ECOMOG base. ECOMOG firstly provided training to those who registered in how to use an AK-47 rifle, and secondly ordered those trained to search the bush around Alikalia town for RUF/AFRC forces.

By 14 March 1998, ECOMOG troops had deployed to the northern town of Sinkunia (Dembelia Sinkunia Chiefdom) to the North of Kabala. Civilians in nearby Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) report arresting and tying up a local ARFC leader and handing him over to ECOMOG forces in Sinkunia. After 14 March 1998, ECOMOG forces arrived in Falaba town.

On 26 March 1998, an RUF/AFRC unit attacked the town of Kosaba in the Republic of Guinea, bordering Mondo chiefdom The previous day this unit abducted 40 civilian men in Kamaron and Kiridu (both in Mongo Chiefdom) to guide them through to Kosaba. Two civilians were killed during the attack. RUF/AFRC forces took items like foam mattresses, guns, radios and foodstuffs from Kosaba. The abductees were forced to carry the looted property back to the RUF/AFRC base in Mansofenia.

On 28 March 1998, ECOMOG forces stationed in Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) received reports of an RUF/AFRC buildup to the south of the town. A young boy reported that RUF/AFRC forces had captured his friend and killed him as a ritual sacrifice. An ECOMOG armoured car fired from Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) in the direction of Alia (Alieya Chiefdom) village. In the early hours of the morning on 29 March, RUF/AFRC forces responded and attacked Falaba town with heavy machine guns and RPGs, killing 18 civilians, looting and burning down over 50 houses. ECOMOG withdrew to their pre-existing position in Sinkunia. Falaba was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces again on 3 April, thereby securing RUF/AFRC control of Falaba until the arrival of Guinean troops in late May 1998. The Guinean contingent remained until late November 1998.

RUF/AFRC forces on the road into Firawa. After 2 hours, CDF retreated into the town, informing residents that they should hide in the bush. RUF/AFRC forces entered the empty town, burning down 20 houses and killing one civilian. They remained in Firawa until 28 July, until they moved westwards towards the town of Foria (Diang Chiefdom)

In the evening of 27 or 28 July 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked and occupied Kabala town from the direction of Makeni. They were armed with AA guns, RPGs, mortars and other weapons and arrived in about 30 vehicles including Toyota land cruisers, Land Rovers and Mercedes Benz cars. While RUF/AFRC forces looted private property, there are no reports of violent incidents or burning of houses. Nigerian and Guinean ECOMOG troops stationed in Kabala secured their defensive positions and remained in town until they were reinforced. The occupation lasted until the evening of either 1 or 2 August, when RUF/AFRC forces were driven from Kabala by ECOMOG forces and the SLA 2nd Battalion.[455]

Retreating from Kabala, RUF/AFRC forces settled in towns and villages on the arterial road leading eastwards from Kabala through Sebeneh chiefdom. These included Yamadugu, Koinadugu and Kalkoia (Sebeneh Chiefdom). Another unit moved further south, arriving in the town of Gberefeh (Sebeneh Chiefdom).

In the early hours of 11 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Fadugu (Mangolo Chiefdom) in an operation called "Operation Die." They were armed with RPGs, AK-58s and AK-47 machine guns. RUF/AFRC forces came through the Madingotown area of Fadugu, avoiding the ECOMOG checkpoint on the road from Kafogo and Kabala. ECOMOG forces engaged the RUF/AFRC forces but were unable to repel the attack. The Paramount Chief of Mambolo was shot dead at his home by RUF forces, who afterwards set fire to his corpse. Sixty-eight houses were burned down and eight civilians were killed, two of them being set on fire. The RUF/AFRC forces moved from the town later in the day on 12 September. The attack was primarily to loot ECOMOG ammunition dumps in the town.

On 18 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Karia (Diang Chiefdom) from the direction of Darakaru, in gold-rich area of Diang chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces burned 36 houses and abducted 10 civilians. One hundred SLA soldiers were deployed to Karia at the request of the chiefdom elders.

On 23 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces left Kuronbonla (Neya Chiefdom) for the town of Kamaron (Mongo Chiefdom), arriving in the early evening. Twenty-five men and 15 women were detained by RUF forces in a church in the town. RUF/AFRC forces entered every house in the town and took property, including food items, livestock and domestic goods. The stolen property was loaded onto trucks and driven to Kuronbonla. Fifteen houses were burnt when the RUF/AFRC forces left Kamaron the next day.

On 8 October 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) from Firawa (Neini Chiefdom) in the north. Although CDF and ECOMOG resisted the attack, RUF/AFRC burned

[455] Clarification is required from the records about the exact dates these incidents took place.

On 18 July 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces attacked the gold-rich mining area of Binkokoh (Diang Chiefdom). In Foraya, the RUF forces killed 3 people, looted the whole village, demanded gold and abducted some young boys and girls to carry the stolen property.[467] On 3 August, the RUF/AFRC forces moved from Binkokoh to attack Barakan and Dalakuru (Diang Chiefdom), which are also gold-mining areas. While in Dalakuru, the RUF/AFRC forces raped a woman.

In September 1999 the CDF attacked the RUF/AFRC position in Dondoya (Diang Chiefdom). In the southern Neya chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the towns of Dalawullay-feh, Bendu III and Yarawadu.

On 3 September RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kafogo and Fadugu, (Mambolo), where they, given their great number, overwhelmed the ECOMOG, CDF, SSD and SLA checkpoints and entered Fadugu carrying sophisticated weapons like RPG, AK47, AK58, G3 and AA guns. In Fadugu, the RUF forces burnt 80 houses, took all the property they could find, abducted some girls and boys to use them as forced labour and killed some people.

On 17 September 1999 in Diang chiefdom there were several attacks by RUF/AFRC forces, based in Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom). The RUF forces attacked Kombonkalia and Nyawulenya (both in Diang Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC forces were resisted by an organised group of youth[468] in Nyawulenai (Diang chiefdom), therefore the town was totally burnt down while Kombonkalia (Diang Chiefdom) was spared because did not put up any resistance. The same day the CDF, based in Faraya, attacked RUF/AFRC positions in Dondonya (Diang Chiefdom).

In October 1999, CDF-Kamajors coming from Kono district attacked Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom), an important RUF/AFRC base. The CDF took property and burnt down the town, but the RUF commander was not captured. Consequently, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the nearby town of Henekuma (Diang Chiefdom), where 27 civilians were killed, property was taken and the town was described as being completely destroyed.

On 16 and 19 October 1999, RUF/AFRC forces planned an attack on Kabala. They entered Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom) and looted all the surrounding villages in Mambolo chiefdom. Following this, they moved on to Kabala, but failed to occupy the town. The group was reorganized in Fadugu and moved towards Freetown. In the following days many locations in the chiefdom were looted by RUF/AFRC forces.[469]

In November 1999, in Bafodia (Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces engaged SLA forces. The RUF/AFRC forces were driven from the town and SLA forces subsequently left for Kabala. On 3 November 1999, one senior AFRC commander, coming through Folosaba Dembeia

[467] More detail is required from the records on these incidents.
[468] More information is required from the records on this group, including who they were organised by and how old they were.
[469] More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

Also in June 2000, RUF forces attacked several towns in Neya chiefdom, including Porpon, where they killed 25 people and burnt down 70 houses, taking property such as rice, corn, groundnut, guns, which were later transported to Yiraia. The RUF forces then attacked Tenkeya, killing four people, burning 15 houses and taking property. This unit also attacked Maraliya, killing two people, burning down 12 houses and taking all the property in the town. They then attacked Yarandor, Kekowafeh, Bondofeh, Bunbania and Terero II, in all of which houses were burnt down and all the property was taken away. Many villages in Sandoh chiefdom were burnt down like Farandala, Dunamaro, Waldu, Kayima and Teleya.[472]

In July CDF-Kamajors attacked the RIUF/AFRC base at Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom) and Sumbaraya. The RUF commander managed to escape capture, but the Kamajors killed his mother, sister and nephew. The body of the RUF commander's mother was left hung on a stick above the road entering in the town. The town was completely burnt down, all fruit-trees were cut down and also the old zinc from the houses were punctured with nails to prevent their use as roofing. All the stolen property gathered from other villages were taken away by the Kamajors.[473]

In Firawa (Nieni Chiefdom) RUF/AFRC forces captured about 400 young civilian men to be taken to Kono district for mining.

In August 2000, RUF/AFRC forces left Alikalia to surrender either to UNAMSIL or to ECOMOG troops in Kabala.[474] On 14 August a group of RUF/AFRC forces from Kono and Kailahum district passed through Alikalia on their way to attack Kabala. The town of Kabala was attacked on 17 August 2000, where they fought a battle against the SLA and CDF based in the town.

During this month, RUF forces regularly tried to attack Kabala, but were repelled by SLA forces. After the attack on Kabala, at the end of the month, RUF forces stormed Wara Wara Bafodia chiefdom attacking towns and villages such as Kapongo, Kassaye and Gbentu.

On 26 September 2000 Sinkunia (Dembelia Sinkuria Chiefdom) and Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) were attacked by CDF, who beat people and took most of people's belongings.[475] In retaliation for these attacks, on 3 October 2000, RUF forces mobilized their troops and launched an attack on Falaba and Sinkunia and took over the towns and burnt them down and left, abducting 50 civilians including women and children.

In October 2000, RUF/AFRC forces entered Fadugu town (Mambolo Chiefdom), where a fight without casualties took place. Two days later, another group reached them.

[472] It is possible that these events took place in 1998. Further clarification is required from the records on when these events took place.
[473] Clarification is required from the records on who took the property initially, the RUF or the CDF, and what happened to it after the CDF took it away.
[474] More information is required from the records about the surrender, including how it came about and to whom they surrendered.
[475] It is not clear from the records whether the people being beaten were RUF or civilians. Clarification is required from the records on this.

In March 2001, RUF/AFRC forces came from Kono district to Nieni chiefdom in search of food and they looted every house, then the RUF forces conveyed the looted properties to Kayima (Kono District). A similar incident took place in May 2001 in Firawa (Neini Chiefdom), with RUF forces coming from Sinkunia (Dembelia Sinkuria Chiefdom).

RUF/AFRC forces returned to Sinkunia on 15 June 2001, while another group, on the same day, went to Alikalia and held a meeting with G5 and the village chiefs announcing the end of the war and the beginning of disarmament and asking for people's political support to the RUF, soon to be transformed into a political party.

On 24 August 2001 RUF/AFRC went from Falaba, Sulima chiefdom to Kabala to submit to disarmament. This was the last group of RUF/AFRC forces to disarm in the District.

In November, CDF from the whole district went to Alikalia for disarmament. In December 2001, Kamajors led by Mohamed Mansaray fought a battle against RUF forces, shortly after UNAMSIL troops arrived, prompting disarmament.

This was the final episode of the decade long war in Koinadugu District.

### 3. Conclusion

*[to be drafted pending incorporation of comments from resource persons]*

d. Port Loko District

### 1. Introduction

Port Loko District is located in the north-west of Sierra Leone. It is bordered by the Western Area, Moyamba District and Tonkolili District to the south, Bombali District to the east and Kambia District to the north. To the west lies the Atlantic Ocean.

There are 11 chiefdoms in Port Loko District:

| Chiefdom | Headquarter Town |
|---|---|
| Bureh Kasseh Makonte (BKM) | Mange |
| Buya Romende | Foredugu |
| Dibia | Gbinti |
| Loko Massama | Petifu |
| Kaffu Bullom | Mahera |
| Koya | Songo |
| Maforki | Port Loko |
| Marampa | Lunsar |
| Masimera | Masimera |
| Sanda Magbolontor | Sendugu |
| Tinkatupa Makama Safroko (TMS) | Malekuray |

## 2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1995

RUF activity in Port Loko District in 1995 began in early January in Buya Romende Chiefdom. Between 1 and 5 January 1995, RUF forces moved from their base in the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom, Tonkolili District on the boundary with Marampa Chiefdom to the south of Buya Romende Chiefdom) and attacked the villages of Mabettor and Royana, where they burnt down an unknown number of houses.

RUF forces numbering around 500 attacked the headquarter town of Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) early in the morning of 2 January 1995. Foredugu is located on the main highway leading east to Makeni and south-west to Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom). Residents fled into the nearby bush on hearing heavy machine gun fire. SLA forces stationed in Foredugu were unable to repel the RUF attack. The surrounding villages of Robis Junction, Romende, Makinkiba, Handalai, Paiteful Junction and Gbomru (all Buya Romende Chiefdom) were also attacked. During these attacks RUF forces burnt down eight houses in Mabettor, five in Royana and 42 in Foredugu. RUF forces also killed nine people, mostly with guns, amputated a man's hand with an axe and abducted an unknown number of people.

From then until 5 January 1995, RUF forces moved north from Foredugu and attacked Rogberen Gberen, a settlement in the far north of Buya Romende Chiefdom. Hundreds of civilians were killed during this attack. The RUF forces established a camp at Rogberen Gberen and used abducted civilians to dig trenches. From Rogberen Gberen, RUF forces staged an attack on Mabureh village (Buya Romende Chiefdom), where they decapitated the Section Chief and a prominent businessmen. Before returning to their camp, RUF forces burnt down at least 50 houses and stole a lot of civilian property.

On 15 January 1995, around 45 RUF members moved towards the headquarter town of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, in the north-west on the boundary with Masimera Chiefdom). They came from the south of the chiefdom through the villages of Rokatic and Robom Limba. Before reaching Lunsar, they were repelled by SLA forces stationed in the town.[478] The RUF exerted continuous pressure on Lunsar, staging numerous attacks on unknown dates between January and July 1995. On 16 February, the NPRC announced that it had commenced heavy bombardment of a medium-sized "rebel base" in the Lunsar area.[479]

The RUF delivered a letter[480] to the residents of Kantia (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) towards the end of January 1995, announcing their intention to use the road passing through Kantia as a route to attack Kambia, the District headquarter town of Kambia District. The people of the town resolved to attack the RUF forces if they pursued this course of action. Consequently, male members of the Gbamgbani traditional society formed a local militia and established a checkpoint on the roads entering the village. A day after delivering the letter, RUF forces attacked Kantia. A local man confronted the RUF as they tried to pass the checkpoint; the RUF members tortured and killed him

[478] This detail is reported by the key person as occurring on 1 January 1994, but cross-checking during analysis makes it clear that this refers to an RUF attack on Lunsar on or around 15 January 1995.
[479] Xinhua, 16 February 1995.
[480] There are many reports of the RUF leaving letters on the road for villagers to find.

with his own cutlass. On entering the village, RUF forces sought out the Local Court Chairman at his home and beat him to death with pestles[481] and sticks. The RUF forces remained in Kantia for at least a day before moving south to Kanokie village (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom), arriving there in the late evening. At Kanokie, the RUF forces divided and entered the village in two groups, taking palm wine from civilians and shooting dead a 12-year-old boy who was carrying a cutlass. The RUF commanding officer issued an order to the villagers stressing that anyone caught fleeing the village would also be shot. The RUF forces stayed overnight in Kanokie, leaving for Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District) before dawn the following morning. RUF forces looped southwest from Kanokie arriving in Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom, Kambia District) on 23 January 1991, before moving north to attack Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District) on 25 January 1995.

Around 21 January 1995, RUF forces coming from Bombali District passed through Dibia Chiefdom on the way to Safroko Section in the north of TMS Chiefdom. From Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom), RUF forces moved through Rogbakai (six miles south-east of Maron), Rotombo, Maron and Roctolan along the road north towards the headquarter town of Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom). At this time, around 20 members of the SLA were stationed in Gbinti. In Gbinti, between 21 and 23 January 1995, RUF forces killed a number of people, burnt down at least 70 houses with petrol bombs, stole property and abducted civilians, including around 23 school children. After about four hours in Gbinti, during which there was fighting between the SLA and RUF forces, the RUF forces left with the people they had abducted and moved south to Roctolan (TMS Chiefdom).

RUF forces again attacked Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) between 3 and 5 March 1995, killing 12 SLA members in an ambush on the outskirts of the town.[482] In response to this attack, the Government of Sierra Leone closed sections of the Makeni–Freetown highway to traffic as SLA forces combed the bush for RUF forces.[483]

Through intense activity in Ribbi, Bumpe and Kaiyanga Chiefdoms (Moyamba District)[484] immediately south of Port Loko District, the RUF were able to attack the town of Songo (Koya Chiefdom) by 7 April 1995. Songo is a located on the boundary between Port Loko District and the Western Area, just south of the main asphalt highway leading to Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) and the ring road around the Freetown peninsular into Freetown itself.

In the morning of 7 April 1995, about 100 RUF members, some in full military fatigues and others in casual dress, launched an attack with artillery and heavy machine gun fire on Songo. The attack came from the west end of the town, near the Roman Catholic Primary School, and was met with no

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[481] Club-shaped implements used for fine-pounding wheat and other granular foods in mortars.
[482] AP, 6 March 1995.
[483] Xinhua, 7 March 1995.
[484] On 15 March 1995, RUF forces attacked Bradford (Ribbi Chiefdom, Moyamba District). On 17 March, RUF forces took control of Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom, Moyamba District) and Moyamba (Kaiyamba Chiefdom, Moyamba District). On 18 March, RUF forces clashed with SLA forces for control of the strategic Mabang Bridge over the Ribbi River. On 20 March, SLA forces counter-attacked the RUF at Bradford, but this did not halt the RUF westward movement and their crossing the Ribbi River to access Songo (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District).

officer by radio informing him that the RUF had already bypassed the town and had arrived in Robat (TMS Chiefdom), to the west of Malekuray. The SLA moved from Malekuray and engaged the RUF near Robat, as a result of which three SLA members were killed and the remaining group were forced to retreat into the bush. The RUF forces then moved west from Robat over the road bridge to Romaka, through the villages of Ropolon, Rotombo, Tawa, Rolal I and II and then into Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) by the late evening.

During their attack on Port Loko Town, RUF forces killed an unknown number of people, burnt down around 30 houses and abducted up to 200 people, predominantly children. RUF forces ceased their attack in the early hours of 9 May, retreating in two directions when the SLA was reinforced.

One group of RUF retreated to Kamalo (BKM Chiefdom), on the boundary with Maforki Chiefdom, where they established a temporary base, killing a number of people and burning down some houses. Two days later, on 11 June 1995, SLA forces held a meeting in Port Loko with the Town Chief and some senior military officers who had come from Freetown. On 14 June 1995, Guinean forces deployed under the Mano River Union arrived in Port Loko Town. Using heavy artillery, they shelled the RUF base at Kamalo, forcing their withdrawal north towards Romeni (BKM Chiefdom), where the RUF forces put around 16 people abducted in Port Loko Town into a house and set fire to it. The following day, they made a ritual sacrifice and left Romeni northward along the main road. Three days later, on 18 June 1995, the RUF forces attacked Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom). After burning houses and stealing property in Gbinti, RUF forces moved to their base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District).

Another group of RUF forces retreated from Port Loko Town towards Rokatimpi (TMS Chiefdom) on 9 June, avoiding the main highways as they moved south towards Moyamba District. On 10 June, they went to Rosent (TMS Chiefdom), close to the boundary with Maforki Chiefdom. They stayed in Rosent for around 12 days, raiding the surrounding villages. From 16 to 20 June, Guinean forces based in Port Loko Town also fired long-range weapons towards Rosent. At the end of this period of heavy bombing, RUF forces moved in two groups from Rosent, dispersing throughout Tinkatupu Section (TMS Chiefdom) to avoid artillery barrages. One group fanned out through Romaka and the other group fanned out around Masangban and Worreh (all TMS Chiefdom). The two groups rejoined in Robat, near Rosent (but closer to the boundary with Maforki Chiefdom), where they abducted an unknown number of men and women. They then moved to Maranka, where they abducted more people before moving to Malekuray by 20 June. Here, RUF forces carried out a house-to-house search, destroying what private property they could find, defecating in houses and ruining food items like rice and palm oil. On the night of 20 June, RUF forces danced and fired into the air before leaving on 21 June, abducting at least six people. They moved south through Marforay and Mafira, resting close to Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) before attacking and driving the SLA forces out of the town. On the same day, RUF forces crossed the Rokel River south of Lunsar and continued to Masimera (Marampa Chiefdom). The RUF continued south into Yoni Chiefdom (Tonkolili District), before moving to Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom, Moyamba District) by 23 June.

RUF activity near the junction town of Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) continued as their forces retreated from Port Loko. On 16 June 1995, the RUF forces again attacked Masiaka and were repelled by the

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SLA forces stationed there. This pattern was repeated on 18 June 1995 and again at other times during 1995.

Between 10 and 16 June 1995, RUF forces coming from the north-eastern part of Masiaka went to Mansumana, where they attacked the town and surrounding villages, including Masherry-Potho, which is nine miles from Mile 38 (all Koya Chiefdom). At this time, the RUF forces were searching for food. In the following days, there were more RUF attacks on Mile 38, after which they were driven out of the area by SLA forces coming from the western part of Mile 38 along the Freetown Highway.

RUF forces attacked both Masiaka and Mile 38 (both Koya Chiefdom) on 18 June, but were repelled by SLA forces. Fifteen civilians were killed in Mile 38. On 20 June, RUF forces ambushed SLA forces near Mile 38. On 22 June, RUF forces cut off the main highway near Mile 38 at two points by setting fire to large trailers and setting up a defensive position around their skeletons. On or around 28 June 1995, SLA forces again attacked Mile 38 with support from a Sierra Leone Armed Forces Alpha Jet, which bombarded the town. During this attack, a large number of civilians and members of the SLA were killed, houses burnt down and vehicles destroyed.

At this time, ambushes and fighting along this road were common, as a result of which the SLA forces mounted checkpoints along the road. In July 1995, the SLA set up a checkpoint at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), controlling traffic moving north along the arterial road from Masiaka and Mile 38 towards Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and other inland northern towns such as Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Kabala (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). Harassment of civilians by SLA and other government security personnel intensified at this checkpoint following the RUF assault on Port Loko Town. On 9 September 1995, RUF forces ambushed SLA forces on the highway at Karrfay (Buya Romende Chiefdom) killing two; one of whom was buried in Foredugu and the other was left on the highway. RUF forces took the property that was in the SLA truck and forced civilians to carry it for them. On 11 September 1995, seven Guinean soldiers travelling to Makeni in a military vehicle were killed in an RUF ambush on the east-west road between Foredugu and Madina (Buya Romende Chiefdom).[487] RUF forces took the weapons and ammunition from the military vehicle before setting fire to it.[488]

Towards the end of 1995, the RUF launched numerous attacks on Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), but were again repelled by the SLA forces based there. At this time, there were no fatalities in Lunsar, but RUF forces killed people in surrounding villages in Marampa and Buya Romende Chiefdoms, including Pan House, Marampa, Rogbele and Foredugu. In December 1995, the RUF forces were successful in dislodging the SLA forces. The RUF forces entered Lunsar and killed four people, raped an unknown number of women, abducted 10 people and burnt down 55 houses, although they did not occupy Lunsar at this time and left soon afterwards.

b) Events in 1996

[487] AP, 15 September 1995.
[488] Xinhua 15 September 1995.

In March 1998, RUF/AFRC activities resumed in TMS Chiefdom, although the three sections were concerned at different times: Tinkatupa and Safroko Sections as early as April and May and Makama Section in December. Tinkatupa Section is sandwiched between Safroko Section to the north and Makama Section to the south. In early March, Gbethis (CDF) deployed at Masangban, Rogbanneh, Romamboi and Robaka, all in Tinkatupa Section. Shortly after their arrival, Gbethi members started harassing civilians for contributions of money and food. It is also reported in general terms that during this period, Gbethis raped women and flogged men.

After Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) had come under the control of ECOMOG from around 1 March, RUF/AFRC forces were dispersed throughout Buya Romende Chiefdom. They settled in numerous locations including Buya, Ro-Sint Buya, Foredugu, Gbonsama and Massenebe (all Buya Romende Chiefdom). At this time, RUF/AFRC activity in the chiefdom focussed on Jar-Jar operations, which involved the formation of squads dedicated to the widespread robbery of civilian property, both for subsistence and enrichment. Squads of around 150 RUF/AFRC members roved around villages in the chiefdom on a daily basis taking food and valuables, flogging people and forcing civilians to carry stolen property to RUF/AFRC camps.

Between 17 and 19 April, around 300 RUF/AFRC forces moved from a camp called "Kenema"[501] in Libeisaygahun Chiefdom (Bombali District) to TMS Chiefdom. They established a base at Maboko in the Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom), from where they raided surrounding villages between 19 April and 5 May. It is reported in general terms that during these raids, RUF/AFRC force regularly killed civilians and abducted others to carry stolen property. On 25 April, an ECOMOG platoon and an unknown number of Gbethis deployed from Lunsar to Sendugu (TMS Chiefdom), close to the RUF position at Maboko. An ECOMOG soldier on a motorbike driven by a civilian sped through Maboko and then called for air support. An ECOMOG jet bombed this location and another location in Maron (TMS Chiefdom); this second bombardment killed four civilians. Another civilian was killed during a subsequent ECOMOG air bombardment of a nearby village called Petifu. ECOMOG deployed to Maron and Sendugu but despite this, the RUF/AFRC continued to operate from Maboko.

On a Friday[502] in April 1998, a series of killings took place in the village of Rosint (Masimera Chiefdom). In the late afternoon, sporadic gunshots were heard all over the village. Three different groups of RUF/AFRC forces entered the village from different directions. The group from Masimera Town (Marampa Chiefdom) were a "Born Naked" unit, because they only wore underwear and sandals. The Mile 91 group – self-styled "Death Squad", commanded by a Liberian – were dressed in mixed civilian-military attire. The Royeben group dressed in full military fatigues.[503] The groups had apparently decided to determine who stayed in Rosint by gambling on the sex of an

[501] Most likely on the road from the Batkanu/Ro-Source area. In April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces, driven by ECOMOG from Makeni and Kamakwie started targeting and occupying towns situated on the east-west road from Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom, Bombali District) to Batkanu (Lebeisaygahun Chiefdom, Bombali District). Westwards movement into TMS, Dibia and Buya Romende Chiefdoms (Port Loko District) logically extends this pattern of attacks.

[502] Dating this incident at either 3, 10, 17 or 24 April 1998.

[503] This unit may have been comprised primarily of ex-SLA.

unborn baby. Therefore, RUF/AFRC forces gathered 18 civilians under a tree close to the entrance of the village. These RUF/AFRC forces executed a pregnant woman by cutting through her lower abdomen and removing the foetus from her uterus. As the baby was female, the Royeben group withdrew from the village into the nearby bush; they had earlier gambled that the baby was a boy.

The remaining RUF/AFRC forces made preparations to amputate limbs from village residents, bringing a cutlass and an axe over to a log near the village mosque. RUF/AFRC members forced a woman to lay her hand across the log and, after a count of three, amputated her hands. RUF/AFRC personnel attacked her daughter with a machete and a female RUF/AFRC member cut her granddaughter in half. The left foot of an 8-month old baby was amputated and her mother was decapitated with a cutlass. RUF/AFRC members put the severed head on a pole near the village primary school. Another man was also decapitated with a long cutlass for being unable to provide the RUF/AFRC with five sheep. The RUF/AFRC forces punctuated the killing and amputation with song and dance. Thirteen civilians were detained overnight in a house under the threat of death.

Very early the following morning, RUF/AFRC members forced the detainees to pray at the mosque and then cook for them. The RUF/AFRC forces then resumed amputations, cutting the wrist of a women six times before succeeding in amputating her hand, then shooting her dead after she managed to escape; they forced the other abductees to laugh loudly. Following this, RUF/AFRC forces amputated the left hand of a woman. Her nephew was held down by four RUF/AFRC members and decapitated. The woman managed to escape into the bush, arriving three days later at Mabesseneh Hospital in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) where she received emergency treatment. Staff at the hospital reported that at least seven others from Masimera Chiefdom had arrived in Lunsar with amputated limbs.

In March or April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Makaytay (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC commander announced his intention to establish a permanent base in their chiefdom. RUF/AFRC members used a sharp knife to amputate the left ear of a pregnant woman, before sending her to Sendugu. Residents of Gbaneloko (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) gave her assistance in getting to the Sendugu Health Centre, where she related her story to residents. In mid March, RUF/AFRC forces entered Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom), firing machine guns for around two hours. A large number of civilians were abducted; one of the captives, a pregnant woman, was killed later on the roadside. Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom), a few miles south of Sendugu, subsequently came under attack by the RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG forces deployed in Dibia Chiefdom retreated to Kagbantama (BKM Chiefdom), on the road between Barmoi Junction (BKM Chiefdom) and Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). Many civilians displaced due to the RUF/AFRC attack on Sendugu fled to Kabantama. ECOMOG advanced on Gbinti a week later, following reinforcements arriving from Port Loko Town.

Between 3 and 5 May, RUF/AFRC forces resumed activity in TMS Chiefdom, killing the Regent Chief of Makasi (TMS Chiefdom) by machete blows to the head and an elder of the village. Around 12 houses were also burned during the attack. At Rogbanthi and Ro-Gberray (both Maforki Chiefdom), houses were burnt and people were abducted. At Masengeh, where many civilians had sought safety from RUF/AFRC attacks in the area, two civilians were killed and all 30 houses in the village were burnt down. ECOMOG strengthened their Maboko position in Safroko Section (TMS

RUF/AFRC forces invaded Freetown between 6 and 20 January. As noted, there were preliminary attacks in late December on the towns of Port Loko, Ro-Gberray, Lunsar, Masiaka, Songo, Newton and Waterloo in preparation for the 6 January invasion. ECOMOG forces pushed the RUF/AFRC back to Waterloo, where they remained in force until at least 25 February 1999. RUF/AFRC forces retained control over the arterial routes from Western Area running through Port Loko District throughout this time.

RUF/AFRC forces occupied Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) following ECOMOG's retreat on 26 December. Following the general retreat of RUF/AFRC forces from Greater Freetown (Western Area) towards Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) after 20 January, RUF/AFRC forces began building up in Masiaka. During the occupation of Masiaka, CDF forces surrounded the town and exerted constant pressure on the RUF/AFRC. Between 18 and 24 January there was a tense standoff between the two forces, resulting in a stalemate. After 24 January, RUF/AFRC units began occupying villages near Masiaka to increase the security of their Masiaka position and to break the deadlock with the CDF. Between 24 January and 15 February, at Ma-Kanry village (Koya Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces killed an unknown number of civilians, alleged to be hostile "collaborators". On 15 March, a RUF/AFRC splinter group called the West Side Boys[514] exchanged gunfire with regular RUF/AFRC forces based in Masiaka. This skirmish was reportedly caused by disputes about the division of stolen property. On 3 April, ECOMOG Alfa Jets commenced fly-passes over Masiaka and nearby villages. RUF/AFRC forces reportedly rounded up civilians, placed them on the town streets and started using bladed weapons to carve the initials "RUF" on the civilian captives. On 17 April, Nigerian forces backed up by air support advanced on Masiaka, capturing the town on or around 29 April 1999. Withdrawing RUF/AFRC forces burnt down around 300 residences.

RUF/AFRC forces also occupied the town of Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) between 14 January and 22 April 1999. Mile 91 is about 30 miles east of Masiaka along the main highway on the first main road junction leading south to Bo and Kenema. As at Masiaka, RUF/AFRC forces were beaten back by a heavy ECOMOG assault. RUF forces established a sub-office responsible for monitoring military activities in the Maforki area at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom). In March 1999, RUF/AFRC activities resumed at Konta (Maforki Chiefdom), where an old woman, a man and a young girl pounding cassava leaves were given 100 lashes each by RUF/AFRC personnel. In April, three women from Masubah (Maforki Chiefdom) were taken away and raped by 15 men.

The Gbethis (CDF) strengthened their positions in Port Loko District during early 1999, particularly in the areas bordering Dibia Chiefdom and the RUF/AFRC base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom). These positions would present an obstacle to activity spreading from RUF/AFRC-held territory in Sanda Tendaren and Libeisaygahun Chiefdoms (both Bombali District) bordering Dibia Chiefdom. Following appeals from the Regent Chief to the Paramount Chief of Port Loko Town, members of the Gbethi Society were sent to secure Kasseh Section (BKM Chiefdom) in February 1999. At first, these men had only shotguns, machetes and sticks. During a patrol on 3 February near Romeni, just north-east of Port Loko Town (both Maforki Chiefdom), the Gbethis captured an ex-SLA soldier suspected of being an RUF commander. They decapitated him and danced his severed head around

[514] For more information about the West Side Boys, see below.

At dawn on 25 September, UK Special Forces and Paratroops executed "Operation Barrass". Arriving by helicopter gunships and transport, they attacked the West Side Boys' camps at Gberibana (Maforki Chiefdom) and Magbeni, on either side of the Rokel Creek, rescuing the remaining hostages, killing 25 West Side Boys and incurring one fatality.[564] The UK forces captured 18 West Side Boys, including the majority of the group's leadership. Over 30 West Side Boys who had abducted around 15 civilians to use as human shields were captured by Jordanian UNAMSIL.[565] The town of Magbeni was deserted for three weeks because of the smell of human remains found in the surrounding bush.

Following "Operation Barrass" the total number and rate of entry of West Side Boys into the DDR program increased. By 15 September, UNAMSIL had registered 294 members of the West Side Boys at the DDR camp in Lungi. By 20 September, this figure had reached 371.

During 2001, attacks in the Okra Hills area were primarily made by demobilised former members of every faction looking for items to sell. Between 10 February and 11 June 2001, demobilised West Side Boys stole the corrugated zinc roofing from civilian residences in numerous villages.[566] No further attacks by the West Side Boy are reported.

### 3. Conclusion

** TO BE DRAFTED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE**

e. Tonkolili District

### 1. Introduction

Tonkolili is one of the five Districts of the Northern Province, together with Bombali, Koinadugu, Port Loko and Kambia Districts. It is bordered on the north and east by Koinadugu District and on the south-east by Kono District. Kenema, Bo and Moyamba Districts compose its southern border, from east to west. To the north-west is Port Loko District and to the north is Bombali District. Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) is its headquarter town.

There are 11 chiefdoms in Tonkolili District:

| Chiefdom | Headquarter |
|---|---|
| Gbokolenken | Yele |
| Kafe Simira | Mabonto |
| Kalansogoia | Bumbuna |
| Kholifa Mabang | Mabang |
| Kholifa Rowalla | Magburaka |
| Konike Barina | Makali |
| Konike Sanda | Masingbi |
| Malal Mara | Rochin |

564 BBC Online News, 10 September 2000 (20:51 GMT 21:51 UK)

565 UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 11 September 2000

566 In sequence, these are: Rogbath, Robis, Masokor, Mathera, Rothhdekum, Makambisa, Babara, Taindenkum, Rokoreh, Roforoad, Roseitn, Masawuri, Robala, Roseint, Gbpothoyama, Mapolie, Thekeyeh, Makoyeh, Matikor, Laminaya, Robouloh, Mayefura and Mamiekanuh.

provide security for the chiefdom. An unknown number of Tamaboros settled in the headquarter town on 3 May 1994, provided with machine guns and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) from the Ministry of Defence.

After 20 May 1994, 175 civilians from Mamurie and Makong villages gathered at Rowaka (Konike Barina Chiefdom). They intended to hunt for food at Rosimbec,[573] in the Mamure Section of Konike Barina Chiefdom, in the forested area 5 km south-west of Makali. The SLA commander at Makali had warned them that civilians should avoid this forest area, since RUF forces were suspected to be there; the earlier attack on Makali had come from this direction. As they approached Rosimbec, the civilians, some of whom were armed with cutlasses, met men in uniform whom they believed to be SLA forces. Although the armed men told the civilians they were SLA forces here to escort the group to Rosimbec, they turned out to be members of the RUF. They told the civilians to drop their cutlasses and go into some houses, which they then locked. The RUF forces killed all 170 captured civilians one after the other, stacking some of the bodies like bundles of wood and dumping others in a ditch. The bodies were later discovered by an SLA patrol sent to look for the missing civilians.

Makali was attacked for the second time in May 1994. After an intense gun battle, SLA forces drove away the RUF forces, with no reported casualties. On 3 June 1994, RUF forces attacked Mapakie, which is located near Matotoka. Tamaboros moved there to engage RUF forces. In the bush, they encountered men in military uniforms but did not attack them, believing them to be SLA personnel. On 11 July, an unknown number of RUF forces in full military dress attacked Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom). SLA and Tamaboro forces drove the RUF from the town, killing a female RUF member during the attack. After a short time and a quarrel with SLA forces about the weapons that the Government had provided them, the Tamaboros left the chiefdom.

The highway linking Koidu (Kono District) to Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom), passing through Konike Sanda, Konike Barina, Tane and Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdoms, was the scene of many ambushes during the conflict. For example, in mid-June 1994, a convoy of about 125 trucks left Magburaka and took the highway through Makaku to Kono. They were escorted by an SLA armoured vehicle and an unknown number of SLA members dispersed through the vehicles comprising the convoy. After 5:30 pm, as the convoy passed through Mamuri (Tane Chiefdom) and approached Rowaka (Konike Barina Chiefdom), it fell into an ambush, with RUF forces firing heavily on the convoy. The trucks attempted to turn back, but instead crashed into each other. Some people jumped out from the trucks. Many people were killed during that ambush, including the driver of a truck and two female passengers. The RUF forces ordered them out of the truck; two boys who tried to escape were shot and died. Passengers were asked to form a line and were searched for anything of value. Ten trucks were destroyed, although most were simply searched and luggage and other items were taken. A one month-old baby was taken from its mother and thrown into the bush because an RUF member said he was making too much noise. One man who had been wounded in the attack started crying for help. One of the RUF members offered assistance, but instead shot him three times. Passengers were then captured and told to carry the load the RUF forces had gathered from the vehicles back to Rosimbec, where 170 civilians had been killed one month earlier.

[573] Also called Simbek.

During the final days of October 1994, RUF forces[575] attacked the headquarter town of Mabonto (Kafe Simira Chiefdom, to the north of the District). During this attack many houses were destroyed, property was stolen and one member of a CDU was killed. They spent the night in the town before heading north-east to the headquarter town of Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom). Bumbuna was attacked in the late morning on 1 November 1994 by hundreds of armed men. As civilians escaped into the surrounding bush, the RUF spent the whole day burning and looting the town. Returning from the bush, civilians counted 193 houses burnt and found the bodies of four civilians.

On 2 November 1994, SLA forces deployed from Teko Barracks in Makeni (Makani Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and repelled the RUF forces from Bumbuna. RUF forces moved east towards Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom, abducting civilians to carry the property looted from the town. The following day, RUF forces entered Sangonie, a village located four and a half miles from Bumbuna, with 15 people they had abducted from Bumbuna. They then passed by Kegbema Junction, where they captured more civilians. This large RUF force headed to Koinadugu District and attacked towns along the route to the District headquarter town of Kabala on 7 November 1994.

The RUF launched another wave of attacks in Yoni, Kholifa Mabang and Malal Mara Chiefdoms,[576] to the west of the District in December 1994. Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom) is a strategic location on an intersection between the roads going to Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District), Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) and Taiama (Kori Chiefdom, Moyamba District).

On 22 December 1994, rumours reached civilians in Yoni Chiefdom that RUF forces had crossed the Yele River.[577] Early in the morning of the following day, 23 December, armed men in military camouflage uniforms and others in black t-shirts with red headbands entered Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom, near the boundary with Yoni Chiefdom). The armed men gathered the inhabitants in the Court Barrie, introduced themselves as "freedom fighters" and said that they were on their way to attack Mile 91. The commander of the groups also said that if they were to encounter resistance in Mile 91, they would return to Mafolatha.

In the morning of 23 December 1994, this RUF group attacked Mile 91 along the main roads from Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) and Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District). RUF forces killed three civilians and burnt down eight houses during the attack on Mile 91; they initially captured the town, but were displaced shortly afterwards when SLA forces regrouped and counter-attacked. Driven from Mile 91, RUF forces left the town in a northerly direction towards Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom, which is to the north-east of Yoni Chiefdom. SLA forces also moved out of the town, after kicking in the doors of many civilian residences and stealing civilian property. Shortly after this attack, other SLA forces coming from Bo Town[578] were deployed at Mile 91.

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575 These forces were dressed mainly in mixed casual attire, although some wore full military uniforms.

576 Yoni and Malal Mara Chiefdoms share a boundary with Port Loko District.

577 Yele River is probably the name given to the river that flows south of Yele Town, in the south of Gbokolenken Chiefdom, which shares a boundary with Moyamba and Bo Districts.

578 An SLA Brigade was deployed in Bo Town.

In the evening of 27 December, RUF forces reached the headquarter town of Rochin (Malal Mara Chiefdom). After gathering inhabitants at the Court Barrie, RUF forces killed an unknown number of them with bladed weapons. On 29 December 1994, seven civilians from Rokimbie (located in the northwest of the chiefdom, within the Kaitkant Hills), including a pregnant woman, were taken to Rochin and locked in a room. While in the room, the captured civilians could hear the forces debating on whether they should be killed. They opened the room and asked the captives to go out one after another, attacking them with cutlasses; only one person survived. RUF forces visited Ropollon village again on 30 December 1994 and 2 and 4 January 1995, burning houses on each visit. During their final visit, on 4 January 1995, RUF forces told people to vacate the chiefdom, as the RUF were now "the owners" of it. On hearing this, many people left the area.

c) Events in 1995

In the first months of 1995, Malal Mara Chiefdom, especially Matanka Section in the west of the chiefdom within the Kaitkant Hills area, continued to suffer attacks from RUF forces coming from their base at Kaitkant Hills. This base was said to be the 3rd Brigade camp of the RUF and was used to control the Freetown–Bo highway, to cut off the supply of food and other items to the routes leading to the three Provinces and to spread into Port Loko District. The hills were also used to store the property that RUF forces took from villages and during ambushes.

In January 1995, RUF forces attacked many villages in Matanka Section, killing many people and un-roofing houses for the zinc before burning them down. At Robina, RUF forces killed many civilians, who were then buried in a mass grave in the backyard of a civilian's house. Because many civilians decided to reside permanently in the bush, rather than return to their villages, RUF forces started trailing them in the bush. Those captured were used as forced labour, either to construct houses or as porters.

In February 1995 RUF forces based at the Kaitkant Hills again assaulted Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom. On 2 February 1995, in the late evening, RUF forces entered Mafolatha. The RUF commander told the gathered inhabitants that they had come to conscript young people to the "armed struggle". The following day, multiple RUF members raped two young mothers and a member of a Small Boy Unit raped another girl under 18. Thirty people were abducted and conscripted into the RUF. Inscriptions were carved onto their bodies with razor blades, or they were branded with hot irons.

Relations were deteriorating between the SLA forces and the residents of Mile 91 and Yonibana. SLA members, who had been deployed to Mile 91 in January 1995 to replace those who were moved to Ma-Sesay village on the main Freetown–Mile 91 highway, were operating the checkpoints; these checkpoints were opened to traffic entering and leaving the town only once a day, at 8:00 am. Civilians were used by the SLA forces to find food in the surrounding villages. During the night, it was common practice for SLA forces to break into civilian houses to find food. Civilians were also sometimes used to carry the food to Mile 91 for the SLA forces. This harassment was concentrated across February and March, which is the main harvest time for rice, groundnuts and maize.

Another RUF unit entered Gbagbai, near Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) on 2 February 1995. RUF forces shot one man in the head and two people had two of their fingers amputated.

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had fled during the attack. At that time, some women were raped, some civilians were beaten, property was taken and captured Kamajors were executed and thrown into water wells and latrine pits. In the afternoon of the same day, the same AFRC member launched "Operation Pay Yourself", according to which the RUF/AFRC forces were free to take property belonging to civilians.[607]

One event that took place in Malal Mara Chiefdom after RUF forces had established a base at Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) in June 1997 highlights the structures that RUF forces put in place to obtain food. Malal Mara Chiefdom is a strategic position, as it is the starting point of the road that links up with the road from Magburaka to Makeni through Bombali District. RUF forces were sent to Manewa Section, in the north of Malal Mara Chiefdom, to open a Task Force office to raise funds for their base at Makeni. To achieve this, civilians were required to pay taxes. Furthermore, whenever the base at Makeni needed something, this would be communicated to the Task Force units, who would contact their local administrative heads, who in turn would demand contributions from civilians. The collection of money and property was accompanied by harassment in an attempt to get the items quickly. This process lasted until 1999.

Despite the Peace Plan signed between the AFRC leader and the Government of Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea on October 1997,[608] RUF/AFRC violations were still reported in the District and RUF/AFRC forces embarked on upgrading the airstrip at Magburaka into a "fully-fledged airport for the illegal importation of arms and other supplies."[609]

In December 1997, RUF/AFRC forces from Yoni Chiefdom realised that civilians were hiding their properties in the bush. An announcement was made that any civilian caught concealing property would be punished and the property would be taken.

That same month, Kamajors[610] unsuccessfully attacked Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom). This attack aimed at dislodging the RUF/AFRC forces from the town, considered as a springboard for Mile 91 and its environs. There were no reported casualties.[611]

f) Events in 1998

In early 1998, stealing carried out by RUF/AFRC forces continued in the District. In February, retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown en route to Kono District using the Freetown–Kono highway passed by different chiefdoms in the District. On their way to Kono District, they launched the "Operation Pay Yourself", according to which RUF/AFRC forces would take food and other items from civilians to last them through their retreat. In addition, in February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces coming from different areas arrived in Mile 91. "Operation Pay Yourself" was also launched there and villages and towns in the chiefdom were looted, mainly for food although there were two secondary school girls were raped at this time. RUF/AFRC forces, however, avoided the lower part

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607 This kind of operation, namely, massive stealing would be widely carried out in 1998 by RUF/AFRC forces retreating from Freetown and would reach unprecedented levels during that period.

608 During this meeting, it was agreed that RUF/AFRC forces would hand over power to the Sierra Leonean President on 22 April 1998.

609 Sierra Leone Situation Report (OCHA), 20 December 1997 - 20 January 1998.

610 They were described as a faction of the CDF speaking Mende.

611 No more information was available on this attack.

of Yoni Chiefdom since it was a CDF stronghold. While they were advancing to Kono, some RUF/AFRC forces were attacked by Kamajors in Tane Chiefdom. However, the RUF/AFRC forces managed to repel the attack, killing eight Kamajors and wounding many others. Nevertheless, during this time, it appeared to civilians that there was no command structure within the forces and the RUF commander who was familiar to everyone was not around.

RUF/AFRC forces arriving in Magburaka by truck, Honda motorbikes and cars in late February also carried out "Operation Pay Yourself" in the town,[612] which had a lot of traders and many vehicles. In the early evening, some RUF/AFRC members saw a girl in the street and called to her, but she ran away. They followed her to her house. Her father came out and the RUF/AFRC members threatened to kill him if he did not give them his daughter. After begging them, the father told them to do what they had to do, for he had no alternative. One of the RUF/AFRC members then shot him in his left foot, cut off two of his toes and left. In another incident, RUF/AFRC forces met a man in the street, asked him about his money and followed him to his house. When the forces asked him why he did not have any money, he replied that the war had put him "back to square one". The RUF/AFRC forces shot at his house with an RPG, killing the man, who was inside at the time. The family of the dead man reported the case to one of the commanders, who later identified and shot the member who had killed the man. During the night, many girls were raped and some were taken to Kono District. RUF/AFRC forces burnt 50 houses in the town and executed Kamajors they had captured; their bodies were thrown in water wells or latrine pits.

On 5 March, ECOMOG forces entered Magburaka and its environs. Youths were asked to point out any RUF/AFRC member or collaborator and those suspected were detained at Magburaka's Local Prison. As ECOMOG left for Makeni,[613] RUF/AFRC forces attacked the town before dawn on the following day, 6 March 1998, from the western part of the chiefdom. The RUF/AFRC forces burnt down 25 houses; some civilians were in their houses when they were set on fire and were burnt alive. Many others were killed and many women were raped and some were taken to be used for sexual purposes. Young people were forced to carry the property the RUF/AFRC forces had stolen as they left the town before daybreak towards the south of the chiefdom. ECOMOG then returned to Magburaka and threatened the civilians, accusing them of allowing RUF/AFRC forces to stay in their chiefdom. Property was taken by ECOMOG forces and it is also reported that civilians' wives were forced to have sexual relations with some ECOMOG members.[614] At this time, ECOMOG forces also deployed at many checkpoints along the Magburaka–Kono highway.[615]

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[612] From February to June, the number of civilians wounded or mutilated and arriving in Magburaka hospital increased considerably: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (UNOCHA), 1 - 22 May 1998 and 9 June - 6 July 1998.

[613] Following the intervention in Freetown in February 1998, a new ECOMOG Brigade – 24 Infantry Brigade – was designed for the expansion of its activities in the Provinces. After they had recaptured Lunsar (Port Loko District), ECOMOG forces headed for Makeni, where it was reported ousted RUF/AFRC forces had established their new base: Brig. Gen. R. A. Adeshina: *The Reversed Victory: Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc, pp 29 and 39. That could explain why ECOMOG forces did not stay in Magburaka that day. Accordingly, these ECOMOG forces did not belong to the same group who deployed in Bo and Mile 91.

[614] No more information was available on this incident.

[615] They notably deployed in Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom) on 6 April: Adeshina, op. cit., p 70.

them before returning to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, where they set up more checkpoints. People coming from Magburaka and crossing the border to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom were often arrested, tied with ropes called "FM"[625] or detained in a cage where cattle slept, suspected of being a "rebel" collaborator. People who were found to be collaborators were killed, allegedly in the forest between Tane and Gbonkolenken Chiefdoms, near a stream called Nasi.

In late December, an important movement of troops were to be seen in different chiefdoms of the District. One group of armed men and women, around 300 in number, dressed in mixed military uniforms entered Mabonto (Kafe Simira Chiefdom) in December 1998. They came in a big green military truck with a foreign military plate, which was identified as belonging to ECOMOG forces deployed in Teko Barracks (Bombali District). The troops identified themselves as "Government troops" coming to protect civilians from the advancing "rebels". They then asked the inhabitants to cook for them and civilians realised that these troops were actually RUF/AFRC forces in disguise; most of them were speaking Liberian dialects and Mende.[626] After one week, the whole town was controlled with checkpoints and civilians were required to have a pass if they wanted to leave the town. The next day, some of the RUF forces moved towards Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom). During their stay in Mabonto, the RUF forces instituted a Court and the most common crimes prosecuted in that court were rape and stealing. Three RUF/AFRC members were executed for these crimes.[627]

Kalansogoia Chiefdom was the scene of many ambushes and attacks carried out by RUF/AFRC forces. The Hydro Compound at Bumbuna was under construction and was therefore of interest, because there were lorries, fuel and other similar items. Thus six attacks were led by RUF/AFRC forces on the town. On 14 December, two ECOMOG members on patrol along the Bumbuna-Bendugu (Sambaia Chiefdom) road fell in an ambush staged by RUF/AFRC forces and were killed.

On 21 December 1998, a large number of armed men in dirty uniforms came from Kono District to Tane Chiefdom, telling people they were tired of fighting and they were no longer going to the bush.[628] Some of these troops went towards Magburaka and Makeni while others stayed in Tane Chiefdom, following civilians into the bush in search of food or what was called Jar Jar, which means taking things from civilians by force. Small girls were taken as their "wives" and young men were abducted to carry their loads. They sent messages to civilians to come out of the bush as they said they were no longer fighting civilians or Kamajors, only ECOMOG forces. Following this, some Kamajors started to surrender. Twenty of them came and as nothing happened, more and more Kamajors came out, up to 80 in number. Those Kamajors who did not surrender went to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom. Many civilians went also to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, at this time a Kamajor stronghold, after the armed men had taken half of their property at gunpoint.[629]

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[625] FM means "frequency modulation", for it was believed that once tied with this rope, which had two sticks on its edges used to tighten the rope around people's limbs, people began to speak.
[626] Around this time, it was believed that combatants from Liberia, allegedly supported by the Liberian President, were taking part in the hostilities in Sierra Leone.
[627] No more information was available on these incidents.
[628] RUF/AFRC forces retook control of Koidu (Kono District headquarter) on 20 December.
[629] No more information was available on these incidents.

## D. Eastern Province

### a. Kailahun District

### 1. Introduction

Kailahun District is one of the three Districts in the Eastern Province of the Republic of Sierra Leone. It has a strategic position due to the fact that it shares borders with the Republics of Liberia on the east and Guinea on the northeast. It is also bordered by Kono District on the northwest and Kenema District on the west. Its headquarter town, Kailahun Town, is located in Luawa Chiefdom, in the north of the District a few miles from the Parrot Beak, the Guinean area that advances into Sierra Leone. This area would be greatly affected by the conflict, originally because it hosted thousands of refuges and later as it became the theatre of RUF cross-border attacks.

There are fourteen chiefdoms in the District:

| Chiefdom | Headquarter |
|---|---|
| Dia | Baiwala |
| Jawie | Daru |
| Kissi Kama | Dea |
| Kissi Teng | Kangama |
| Kissi Tongi | Buedu |
| Luawa | Kailahun |
| Malema | Jojoima |
| Mandu | Mobai |
| Njaluahun | Segbwema |
| Peje Bongre | Manowa |
| Peje West | Bunumbu |
| Penguia | Sandaru |
| Upper Bambara | Pendembu |
| Yawei | Bandajuma |

The geographical position of Kailahun District made it a strategic location for the entry of RUF/NPFL forces from Liberia into Sierra Leone. The District occupies about half of the border area between the two countries and is connected with the diamond-rich District of Kono. This made it possible for the forces to access funds easily through the sale of produce, diamonds and gold, with which they procured weapons and other logistics for the forces. It is therefore not surprising that the District was at least partially occupied throughout the whole period of the conflict. Two main roads allow penetration into the District from Liberia: in the north of the District through Kissi Teng Chiefdom and in the centre through Upper Bambara Chiefdom.

Kailahun District, particularly in the north and east, is composed of dense jungle, which affected the fighting in the District. Furthermore, the road that links Kenema Town to Kailahun Town, trough the main towns of Segbwema, Daru and Pendembu, is virtually impassable during the peak of the rainy season from July to August. The Moa River, which finds its source in the ocean in Pujehun District, flows in Kailahun District from the southwest to the north. The control of the few bridges spanning this river would be of the utmost importance, as is illustrated by the case of Daru (Jawei Chiefdom), where the town is separated from the SLA Moa Barracks by a bridge.

this time, more men were initiated into the Kamajor society. ECOMOG forces deployed in the District and engaged the forces on land and by air. Assisted by Kamajors, they obtained victories over RUF/AFRC positions but were unable to take over their main strongholds. RUF/AFRC forces continued attacking villages and ECOMOG positions; following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, disagreement between senior RUF members emerged over the disarmament process. RUF opposition to this process reached its peak in May 2000 with the abduction of UN peacekeepers. Throughout 2000 and early 2001, RUF/AFRC forces were still active in the District and engaged in cross-border raids into Guinea.

It should be borne in mind that unlike other Districts, the information available for Kailahun District was often chaotic and incomplete, especially for the period following 1994, partly due to the massive displacement of the population. Indeed, from the start of the conflict, a lot of inhabitants of this District fled to neighbouring countries (Guinea, Liberia) and did not come back for years, while others, although they stayed in the District, regularly moved from one chiefdom to another, fleeing attacks. The figures of the rate of internally displaced people in the District throughout the conflict was very high; indeed, OCHA reports show that Kailahun District was one of the most affected Districts in terms of internally displaced people (IDP).[681] Furthermore, as Kailahun District was the only District to have always been controlled to varying degrees by RUF/NPFL, RUF and, later, RUF/AFRC forces, people who stayed were forced to live with them for such a long time that single events are often blurred in more general information.

## 2. Factual analysis

### a) Events in 1991

On 23 March 1991, the first group of RUF/NPFL forces from Liberia entered through the border town of Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) in the central part of Kailahun District and proceeded further south. A second group crossed the border with Liberia on 27 March 1991, entering the border town of Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) in the north-eastern part of the District. These forces opened two distinct entry points into the District and would join up at Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) in April.

The forces that launched these two flanks were composed by a majority of National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) members,[682] a fighting force that had been challenging the Liberian Government since 1989, together with about 230 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) members trained in Liberia[683] at Camp Namna.[684] The Sierra Leoneans within the movement who were trained in Liberia were called "Vanguards", as opposed to the new recruits who were called "junior commandos".

Those attacks surprised civilians, who thought this incursion would not last long and was only a cross-border raid form the forces fighting in Liberia who were in search of food. Hundreds of these

[681] OCHA Sierra Leone Encyclopedia: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/slis.

[682] It is estimated that at the time of the first attacks, those NPFL forces were roughly 5,000 in number.

[683] In 1989, the NPFL emerged in Liberia under the leadership of Charles Taylor and began an uprising against the Government of the then President Samuel Doe. In 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent a peacekeeping force to Liberia and the President, Samuel Doe, was killed by a splinter group of the NPFL. The Economic Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces deployed a battalion near Freetown at the International Airport in Lungi as a rear base for their forces in Liberia.

[684] For more information on those fighting forces, see section [X].

civilians fled their villages both within the territory of Sierra Leone and outside its borders into Liberia.

The first group attacked the border town of Bomaru (south-east of Upper Bambara Chiefdom), which had little military manpower in terms of Sierra Leone Army (SLA) forces deployed along the Liberian border. The RUF/NPFL forces[685] killed eight civilians and three SLA members as they captured the town. The SLA forces were overpowered and left the town, heading for the Moa Barracks[686] in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), the most important SLA deployment in Kailahun District. On 25 March, the RUF/NPFL forces proceeded further south to attack the towns of Baiwala and Sakiema (Dia Chiefdom). The RUF/NPFL forces entered Baiwala coming from two distinct directions: some forces passed through Seinga, a town located close to the border with Liberia, while others came from Bomaru. They encountered stiff resistance from the SLA forces, but eventually, as had happened at Bomaru, the SLA retreated and the RUF/NPFL forces were able to take control of the town. At Baiwala, the RUF/NPFL forces set some houses on fire, raped young girls[687] and killed people whom they considered to be important personalities, on the accusation that they were "APC people". Breaking down doors using the butts of guns and then looting the houses was also common, as forces were looking for money and other items they needed, although the forces presented their actions as a way to make sure there was no enemy hiding in the houses. They also wrote the letters "RUF" on the walls of some houses. Following this attack, civilians packed their belongings and headed for Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), as the SLA base appeared to be safer.

At Sakiema (Dia Chiefdom), some civilians who had escaped from Baiwala found a brief respite in the bush, thinking that the forces would only use the main road as their announced goal was to go to Freetown. However, they were discovered by RUF/NPFL forces, brought to the town, put under gunpoint and ordered not to move, or they would be shot. The RUF/NPFL forces gathered some civilians at the Court Barrie and asked them whether there was any of "Momoh's soldiers"[688] in the town. When the civilians answered that the SLA forces were at Daru, the RUF/NPFL forces stated they would kill all of them if they found any SLA member or heard any weapons being fired. The commander told the civilians that from now on everything in the town belonged to the "RUF Government", dismissed the Town Chief and appointed a Town Commander together with a Town Mother. Civilians in the town were forced to contribute to the "revolutionary effort" by providing the forces with food as well as going in search of food and processing palm oil. When food was not available, RUF/NPFL forces would tie up the appointed Town Commander and beat him. The RUF/NPFL forces also introduced a set of laws, which were explained to the inhabitants by the RUF commander. One of these laws was that any civilian captured by RUF forces should not attempt to leave the area under their control for areas controlled by SLA forces. Civilians were also told to go to the bush and bring back to the town their relatives who were in hiding; the RUF

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685 These forces were comprised of Liberian mercenaries speaking Liberian languages like Mano, Pele and Gio, while others were Sierra Leoneans, speaking the Mende, Temne and Krio languages. They wore country clothes, carried talismans and other charms and had red bandanas tied around their heads.

686 The Moa Barracks are strategically located at the entrance of Daru on the road to Kenema town and to access it from the north-east, one has to cross the Moa River. It would be a RUF/NPFL target throughout 1991 and beyond.

687 Their ages could not be ascertained from the records.

688 The President of Sierra Leone was at that time J. S. Momoh and accordingly, this term refers to SLA forces.

commander stressed that anybody caught in the bush would be considered as an enemy and, accordingly, would be killed.

From these towns located in Dia Chiefdom, RUF/NPFL forces advanced westwards to the headquarter town of Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom). This town was captured on 11 April as the SLA forces had apparently left the town earlier. The RUF/NPFL forces entered the town with an armoured tank they had captured from the SLA forces. As most of the civilians were indoors, the forces banged on the doors to make people come out of their houses, threatening to kill them or to burn their house. Most civilians, including children, were imprisoned in the town mosque. The Chiefdom Speaker, a regular policeman and a court clerk were killed. The fighting forces introduced themselves as the "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone" and explained that they had come as "freedom fighters" to free the country from APC oppression. During the time of their stay in the town, they passed a strict rule that no one was allowed to call on the name of God or to pray; anyone caught violating this law would be tortured and killed. Furthermore, all property was declared to be owned by the "Revolution". Some of the RUF/NPFL forces began raping women and young girls. They also took property of the people in the town. During the following days (12 and 13 April), a lot of other civilians were killed. On 13 April 1991, the Paramount Chief of Mandu Chiefdom was brought from Levuma (north of the chiefdom) to Mobai and killed two days later. He was the first Paramount Chief to be killed by the RUF/NPFL forces. The killing of the Chief caused the civilians to lose confidence in the revolution, as the RUF/NPFL presented and called themselves. Similarly to what happened in the other towns, civilians were told to bring their relatives out of the bushes. For example, on 23 April, six people who had left their hiding places in the bush and came back to the town were accused of being spies and were killed. This incident was later reported to the RUF leader when he came to visit his troops in May.

Although the exact dates could not be ascertained, towns located in Jawie Chiefdom were attacked and captured at around the same time between April and June, including Benduma (Jawie Chiefdom), a town close to Daru. In order to counteract any attempt by the SLA forces based in Daru to recapture the town, the RUF/NPFL forces also established a defence base at Baiima (Mandu Chiefdom) on the road leading from Daru to the east and the north of the District. Another defensive position was established at Potoru (Jawie Chiefdom), where there is a bypass bush road leading to Benduma. Some of the RUF/NPFL forces settled at Kuiva (Jawie Chiefdom), which is on the main highway to Daru, and at Patama, a small village on the road leading to Daru via Bombohun (Jawie Chiefdom). When they entered Benduma, the RUF/NPFL forces gathered the civilians in the centre of the town and forced them to kill their animals and to cook for them. Some civilians who managed to escape the town went to Daru to pass on the information about the attack to the SLA forces. During that time, Guinean troops came to reinforce the SLA forces based at the Moa Barracks at Daru.[689] Shortly after their arrival, those Guinean forces succeeded in repelling the RUF/NPFL forces from Benduma by using mortar bombs, although neither the Guinean forces nor the SLA forces then deployed at Benduma. The repelled RUF/NPFL forces went to Gbiima (Jawie Chiefdom), which was already under their control.

[689] As early as 1991, foreign troops, namely Guineans and Nigerians, fought alongside the SLA, pursuant to bilateral treaties between their respective states and Sierra Leone.

The RUF/NPFL forces entered the chiefdom headquarter of Jojoima (Malema Chiefdom, south of Mandu Chiefdom) on 12 April 1991. Before the attack, Jojoima was overcrowded with civilians fleeing the areas under RUF/NPFL control and chiefs in the town had received letters from the RUF that they would come to the town on 12 April. In the town, the forces met with a rich farmer and asked him for money. The forces then apparently left the town for some days before returning on 19 April 1991. When they came back, they killed the renowned master farmer and his wife together with many other civilians. The forces also stole property, raped young girls aged between 14 and 20, whom they made their "wives" and conscripted children. Young men were forced to carry loads for them, mainly to Liberia, and they would be killed if they failed to do so. From Jojoima, they raided the surrounding villages, forcing civilians to lead them on these raids. At Sembehun village, for example, they stole one diamond dealer's land cruiser.

On 15 April, the RUF/NPFL forces entered Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) from the direction of Bomaru in the south of the chiefdom, firing gunshots as they entered. As they did in the other towns, the RUF/NPFL forces gathered the civilians in the Court Barrie, introduced themselves as "freedom fighters", explained that the town was now under the "RUF Government" and asked the civilians whether there were any SLA forces or police officers in the town. Civilians were subjected to severe harassment, their property was taken and they were beaten, raped and killed. For example, an RUF member shot two boys because they did not obey a command he had given them. Several other killings were done during the two weeks they remained in the town. One civilian was asked to show the direction to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) to one young RUF/NPFL member, who then rode a bicycle to Kailahun Town (17 miles north east from Pendembu) to tell the other front who had entered through Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) and who had reached Kailahun Town to meet the south flank at Pendembu. Shortly after, still in April, RUF/NPFL forces from Kailahun Town came to join the other group at Pendembu.

The second group mentioned at the beginning of this chapter had entered the country in the northernmost part of the District in order to establish a base at Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) on 27 March 1991. They also came from Liberia and killed a first army officer at a customs town called Beidu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom). On the same day, they reached Koindu, a strategic international commercial market centre close to the borders with Liberia and Guinea and located on the highway that leads to Kailahun Town. During this wave of attacks, this group captured all the main towns on the highway. Koindu was renamed "Kuwait" by the forces due to the valuables that it had and for two days they killed people, stole their property and burnt down houses. At this point, civilians began leaving the town and went to Guinea or inland seeking rescue. It is reported that these fighters called themselves "freedom fighters", claiming to be fighting in order to liberate Sierra Leone.

On 29 March, some RUF/NPFL forces advanced into Kissi Kama Chiefdom (west of Kissi Teng Chiefdom). At Dia (Kissi Kama Chiefdom), one Fullah[690] businessman was killed. At Njaah in April, RUF/NPFL forces entered the town firing indiscriminately. They killed one SLA member who had retreated from Koindu, beheaded him and displayed his head on top of a big stone to the civilians

[690] The Fullah are an ethnic group living mainly in the north and east of the country who were targeted, together with civilians originating from Lebanon, by the RUF/NPFL forces, who believed they were the cause of inequality among Sierra Leonean citizens.

they captured in the village. They gathered the civilians, explained they were "freedom fighters" and appointed a Town Commander. Those communications were made with the assistance of an interpreter, as the commander was Liberian.

On 1 April 1991, two trucks loaded with SLA forces headed for Koindu through Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) to launch an attack on the RUF/NPFL forces.[691] The first battle between the two forces took place the same day at Dambo, a town on the main highway close to Koindu, in Kissi Kama Chiefdom (west of Kissi Teng Chiefdom). The RUF/NPFL forces overpowered the SLA forces, who had to retreat to Kangama. Dozens of SLA forces were killed during this battle. They were further dislodged from Kangama after several unsuccessful attempts to repel the RUF/NPFL forces from Koindu. Some of the retreating SLA forces arriving at Kangama created panic among the civilian population as, similarly to what was happening in the southern part of the District, the SLA forces were quickly overpowered and did not put up strong resistance to the invading forces. Some of these SLA forces were reported to take off their uniforms, hide their weapons and flee to Guinea with the thousands of civilians who were on their way. Other SLA forces withdrew to the chiefdom headquarter of Buedu (south of Kissi Teng Chiefdom).

RUF/NPFL forces captured Kangama on 6 April 1991. While in the town, RUF/NPFL forces began inflicting violence on civilians and their property. The house of the Paramount Chief was burnt down and his property taken away. The RUF/NPFL conscripted young boys and girls, whose age is unclear,[692] who were then trained and given arms and ammunition. Cases of sexual violence were reported and in one instance, an old woman from Liberia who had found refuge in the town was raped by one of the RUF/NPFL commanders; her body was later found in the bush. The first man to be killed in the town was a Fullah businessman. Seven people were also killed by the RUF/NPFL commander allegedly for having close links with SLA forces or because they had once been in the SLA; their bodies were subsequently burnt.

In the evening hours of 10 April 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces armed with sophisticated weapons like Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), AK47, AK58 and other guns launched an attack on Buedu. At this time, SLA forces had withdrawn from Koindu and large numbers of civilians had started to flee to Guinea. The next day, the SLA forces retreated to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) after losing three men in the battle. The RUF/NPFL forces shot and killed seven civilians and burnt down public buildings and some private houses.

On 13 April, RUF forces entered the District headquarter, Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), in the north of the District. RUF/NPFL forces on their way to Kailahun Town killed the Town Chief at Sandeya (Luawa Chiefdom). From this date on, Kailahun Town would be nicknamed "Burkina Faso". The RUF/NPFL forces entered the town from the two main roads heading east towards Buedu and Koindu.[693] From Kailahun Town, the RUF/NPFL forces spread across Luawa

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[691] Those SLA forces probably came from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) to reinforce SLA forces based at Koindu. However, according to one source, those SLA forces at Koindu were new recruits who were still undergoing training.

[692] In the Sierra Leone context, the term "young people" could refer to anyone up to their mid to late thirties, but probably does not include people under 15.

[693] No information concerning the fatalities for Kailahun Town was reported.

Chiefdom. At Sandeya on 20 April, for example, RUF/NPFL forces told civilians to go to Kailahun Town, where they were lined up and given rice the forces had stolen from shops to take back to their villages. However, one man who had brought rice to his family, who were hiding in the bush, and who came back to ask for more rice was accused of giving rice to hidden SLA forces and was shot dead. Another civilian was also killed that day near the town clinic, accused by the forces of stealing some drugs. Civilians then returned to their various villages but without their youths, as young men and girls, including children, were kept by the forces to be trained at a training base opened in Kailahun Town shortly after the RUF had taken control of the town. Those who tried to escape were killed. Since its inception, the RUF movement was organised and had an internal structure; one RUF commander, occupying the "G5" position, was in charge of opening new training bases as their territory gains progressed and as they moved further inland. It should be noted that this massive opening of training bases did not prevent the establishment of smaller ones, often at the war front by the commander in charge of the area.

During the three months following their entry into Sierra Leone, the RUF/NPFL forces were stealing, raping and abducting people and training those abductees for battle. Many women were abducted to be slaves, their heads shaved so that they could be easily identified and could not run away. Abductees who tried to escape were beheaded by RUF/NPFL forces and their heads were put on sticks at checkpoints as a warning to others.

During the first months of the conflict, most of the commanders were members of the NPFL and therefore spoke a different dialect than that spoken by Sierra Leoneans. Civilians were frightened of these forces and they did not dare to tell them they could not understand what they were being asked, although some people were killed for answering the "wrong way". For example, on 27 April 1991, on the highway that leads to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), two men who had come to Pendembu to buy salt were interrogated at a checkpoint. As they could not understand the Liberian English spoken by the NPFL forces in charge of the checkpoint, they were mistaken for spies. The NPFL commander told the two men to step back six feet from them and shot them with an AK47. Their bodies were then decapitated and their heads put on sticks to frighten other people.

The leader of the RUF came from Liberia to visit his troops at Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), Sakeima (Dia Chiefdom) and Baiwala (Dia Chiefdom) in late April or early May 1991. He visited his troops at Mobai, where he presented himself to the civilians as the leader of the revolution, claiming that they were fighting to remove the incumbent APC regime from power and stating that he would fight until he reached Freetown. He further promised the civilians that he would bring facilities such as free education and free medical care to the people of Sierra Leone and that equal rights would be given to all Sierra Leoneans. On this occasion, the Public Relations Officer appointed by the RUF/NPFL forces at Mobai explained to the RUF leader that his members were killing people for no good reason, with reference to the six people killed on 23 April. However, although the RUF leader told the civilians that he had not instructed his men to kill civilians, this statement sounded false to the civilians who did not believe in his sincerity.

From Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) SLA forces recaptured Benduma (Jawie Chiefdom), forcing the RUF/NPFL forces to retreat to Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom) and its environs where they forcefully conscripted young men and women into their movement. The RUF/NPFL forces established a

training base at Baiwala to train young men and women whom they called "junior commandos".[694] At first, RUF/NPFL forces appealed to the civilians to join them voluntarily, which some did, but as their number was not sufficient, they started arresting young men and women. At Baiwala and Sakiema (Dia Chiefdom) for example, young men and women were lined up and anybody who tried to refuse joining the forces was seriously beaten, some being instructed to roll on the ground while RUF/NPFL forces fired in the air or close to the person on the ground, killing some of them. In the process of recruiting junior commandos, the girls were used as sex slaves and some were trained as junior commandos. This prompted a lot of young men and women to flee into the bush. In several cases the forces opened fire on the civilians in the bush and food and many other items were taken from them.

The RUF/NPFL forces extended their attacks to other villages in Luawa and Kissi Tongi Chiefdoms, crossed the Moa River that divides the District in two and advanced on Peje Bongre, Peje West, Penguia and Yawei Chiefdoms. At Dawa, a border town in Kissi Tongi Chiefdom, RUF/NPFL killed nine civilians on 15 April. Some of the bodies were cut into pieces and cooked for the forces to eat that day. During the same attack, some houses were burnt down. Dawa became important for the RUF/NPFL forces, as it was located on one of their supply routes. On 17 April, RUF/NPFL forces attacked Kodu Bendu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), firing indiscriminately and killing civilians. Some civilians, including children under 15 years old, were abducted to join the forces.[695]

Between 18 and 27 April, RUF/NPFL forces captured Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), the first chiefdom headquarter encountered after crossing the Moa River. During their attack on the town, they killed some civilians and burnt some houses.[696] Peje West Chiefdom (west of Peje Bongre Chiefdom, bordered on the west by Malegohun Chiefdom in Kenema District) was also affected during the same period.[697]

On 1 May, the G2 commander[698] in Kailahun Town ordered general looting as his men needed to eat and goats and sheep were taken away. During that process, vehicles were also taken away. Some women were raped, civilians killed, houses burnt and men trying to oppose the RUF/NPFL actions were severely beaten. Shortly afterwards, another RUF commander in charge of the Bandajuma Sinneh area (Luawa Chiefdom) declared that those stealing, raping and killing actions should stop and any commando involved in such actions would be killed in the presence of the civilians. Therefore, on 27 May, one commando who raped two women who had gone in the bush to fetch firewood was taken to Bandajuma and killed by the commander, who expressly stated that this kind of action should stop. However, this incident did not please other RUF/NPFL forces and soon after, another group invaded and burnt down Bandajuma and Sandeya, killing four people.

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[694] One report mentions that this training base was opened in May but this needs to be carefully considered, as there is no exact date for the information preceding the opening of the training base.

[695] For both of these attacks, reports mentioned that the fighting forces came from Liberia. However, it could not be ascertained with certainty whether this meant that those forces were coming directly from Liberia when they launched those attacks or whether this was a general reference to the RUF/NPFL forces who had originally entered Sierra Leone from Liberia.

[696] No further details could be obtained on this attack.

[697] RUF/NPFL forces reached this chiefdom between April and May.

[698] See section [X] for a description of the hierarchy within the RUF forces.

On 4 May 1991 RUF/NPFL forces entered Tangabu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom), led by a Liberian commander. This commander killed one man in the village as he said that since he started fighting in Liberia, he kills one person per day. By this time, RUF/NPFL forces had already spread to the Kissi Chiefdoms (Kissi Kama, Kissi Teng and Kissi Tongi) and Luawa Chiefdom. The commander gave orders to his forces to rape young girls in the village; old women were forced to pound rice and go fishing. Six of the members raped a 10 year-old girl on 8 July 1991, who later died from her wounds. Around this time, the RUF leader also visited his troops at Buedu, where he outlined to the civilian population the aims and objectives of his revolution. According to him, the main target was to eliminate the APC regime and its followers and, further, to liberate Sierra Leoneans from mental slavery and other acts imposed on them by the APC government. By June 1991, Kissi Teng Chiefdom was already under the control of the RUF/NPFL forces.

The RUF/NPFL also opened a training base at a small village called Bayama, three miles from Tangabu town. The training base was located at the school and young boys were forced to join the training; those who refused were tied up and imprisoned.[699]

In early May, RUF/NPFL forces reached Yawei Chiefdom, in the northeast of the District,[700] remaining there until the end of the year. From there, they patrolled the surrounding villages, such as Massayema in the south of the chiefdom and Ngeblama in the centre of the chiefdom, west of the chiefdom headquarter of Bandajuma. When they first arrived, most notably at Baraka, they introduced themselves as "freedom fighters" coming to redeem Sierra Leoneans from the tyranny of the APC regime. This statement inspired some civilians who had indeed suffered from the APC regime to welcome the arrival of the forces and some voluntarily joined them; this happened not only in this chiefdom but in many other chiefdoms as well. However, as soon as people heard or witnessed the first killing or other acts of violence committed against the population, most of them withdrew their initial confidence in the RUF movement.

Thirty RUF/NPFL members entered Woloma (Penguia Chiefdom) in mid May and forced civilians to gather in the Court Barrie, hitting some old men and women in the head with the butts of their guns. They stayed in the town for two days before 20 of them headed for surrounding villages together with some young men and women from Woloma. In the nearby villages, as they could not find young men and women, they beat elderly people, hoping that those people would ask their children to come out of their hiding places, as a result of which two of the elderly people were killed. A week later, they went to Sengema, a small village near Woloma, where the commander killed two boys and drank their blood. The RUF/NPFL forces were leaving Woloma on a daily basis to search for food, money and young people to conscript in the surrounding villages, returning to Woloma in the evening. At Sengema, young men and women were trained for three hours a day on how to use their weapons. In mid June, this group was reinforced by a group of 50 men coming from Kailahun Town. The commander of this new group immediately requested a "black goat", referring to human beings killed and eaten by the RUF/NPFL forces. Two days later, as a punishment for the escape of two civilians, the RUF/NPFL forces killed four people by cutting their throats, drank their blood and cooked and ate parts of their bodies. Among the RUF/NPFL forces, this practice was mostly

[699] It seems that the term "imprisonment" used to report this event refers to the action of locking a civilian up somewhere. No more information could be obtained on this event.
[700] Yawei Chiefdom is bordered on the north by Gbane Chiefdom (Kono District).

carried out by the NPFL members. About two weeks later, SLA forces launched a successful attack on the town and repelled the RUF/NPFL forces. However, a large number of well-armed RUF/NPFL forces later returned, overpowered the few SLA who were in the town and recaptured it. The raids in the neighbouring villages started again.[701]

One of the main missions given by the NPFL leader to his forces who entered Sierra Leone was to capture and dislodge the SLA forces from the Moa Barracks at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), in order to deprive SLA and Economic Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces based in Sierra Leone of one of their most strategic locations and, consequently, to restrict ECOMOG activity in Liberia.[702] However, it appears that after the initial attacks on Sierra Leone territory, NPFL forces lost this objective for a while and were more engaged in stealing property and inflicting violence on civilians as is demonstrated by the events described above.

After a first unsuccessful RUF/NPFL attack on Daru Town, the forces that led the attack had to retreat to Baiima (Mandu Chiefdom) and SLA forces based at Moa barracks were reinforced by Guinean forces. A lot of food items were stolen during the retreat and brought to RUF/NPFL bases at Mobai and Baiima, where many civilians accused of being government collaborators were killed. SLA forces began launching canon and dragon missiles on RUF/NPFL positions at Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom) and beyond, at Baiima. Some of the rockets hit private dwellings and in one incident at Baiima, some civilians were killed and others wounded when a rocket hit their house. In June, the RUF/NPFL forces led by a well-known NPFL commander regrouped their forces from different positions in Mandu and Dia Chiefdom at Baiima (Mandu Chiefdom) from where they launched their attack on the Moa Barracks. This attack was not successful as they were repelled by the SLA and Guinean forces. During this attack, the NPFL commander was killed on the bridge that separates the barracks from the town.[703]

Following this general attack, the RUF/NPFL forces would launch many more attacks, sometimes using bypass roads such as the one through Malema Village (Jawie Chiefdom) without managing to capture the Moa Barracks. At this time, Mandu Chiefdom (east of Jawie Chiefdoms) and some villages and towns of Jawie Chiefdom such as Kutoma, Bombohun and Benduma were under RUF/NPFL control. Those three villages were used as informants' places to pass on information to the RUF/NPFL strongholds in Gbiima, Moiba and Mandu (Mandu Chiefdom), where the RUF/NPFL had retreated after the unsuccessful attack on the Moa Barracks. The RUF/NPFL forces lost a lot of their members during these continuous attacks and a lot of civilians were killed. In December, at Gbaama, a village close to Moa Barracks, the RUF/NPFL forces killed 62 civilians, who were later buried by SLA forces from the Moa Barracks.

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[701] The exact dates of these events could not be obtained from the records or from open source materials.
[702] It has to be remembered that at the time of the March attacks, Sierra Leone territory (Lungi Airport) was used by the ECOMOG forces as a base to fight the NPFL forces in Liberia.
[703] It appeared that this commander was killed by one of his colleagues, another NPFL commander, who at the time was a battalion commander.

In Macca Kpakpeibu (Yawei Chiefdom)[704] on 21 July, a group of 110 RUF/NPFL[705] members entered the town with heavy firing and assembled the 60 inhabitants, including children, in the Court Barrie. Some civilians were told to bury the 20 people the RUF/NPFL had killed so they dug a big pit, put the bodies in it and covered it over. This group made daily patrols of the surrounding villages, capturing civilians who were then sent to Kailahun Town or Geima (Luawa Chiefdom) to be trained or used to work for the forces by carrying loads. On one occasion, those RUF/NPFL forces gathered 800 civilians and sent them to Geima to work in farms. During their stay, they sexually assaulted women, including the elderly. In mid August, some SLA forces from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) came to the village and repelled the RUF/NPFL forces from the village, as at the time of this attack, the SLA were 200 in number while the RUF forces were only 30. The SLA did not, however, stay in the village and instead went back to Daru.[706]

During the harvest season, civilians from Senguma (Penguia Chiefdom) were forced to work for RUF/NPFL forces and had to carry the produce of the harvest on their heads to Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom). Fifty RUF/NPFL members entered Baraka on 10 May and stayed in the village for some months, raiding the surrounding area in search for food. During their raids, they always took civilians with them to carry the property they would take.

On 10 October, RUF/NPFL forces attacked Levoma (Yawei Chiefdom), gathered the civilians and appointed some to carry the property they had just taken to the chiefdom headquarter of Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom, south-east of Yawei Chiefdom), which was used by the RUF/NPFL as their route to Camp Zogoda[707] in Geima. One of the civilians who could not carry the load that was allocated to him, as it was too heavy, was severely beaten. Other civilians were told to bury the people the RUF/NPFL forces had killed in the village, among them an old woman, who was killed in her house, as she was unable to run.

For two months between October and December, the RUF/NPFL forces transferred their base from Kailahun Town to Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), which was also their headquarters.[708]

Following the retreat after the attack on Moa Barracks in late June, NPFL forces who had established strong positions on the east side of the Moa River embarked on massive looting, raping and killing of civilians, together with acts of cannibalism. These practices were carried out by NPFL forces at the end of 1991, throughout 1992 and part of 1993 and not the RUF forces. Different

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[704] This town is located on the road that links Bandajuma, Yawei Chiefdom headquarter (and further north, Kono District) to Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) and Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) in the south of Kailahun District.
[705] The two forces were dressed differently as the NPFL members were dressed in "Ronko", namely country clothes, while the RUF members were wearing civilian attire with red bandanas tied around their heads. Some of the NPFL members were from Burkina Faso.
[706] It is possible that this attack took place in August 1992.
[707] This means 'land of freedom'.
[708] Pendembu would remain their headquarter throughout 1992 and part of 1993.

rounds of practices called 'Tap' were accomplished throughout this period, starting with Tap 20 in late 1991.[709]

RUF vanguards and junior commandos, inferior in number - even if by October 1991, almost 2,000 new recruits had already been trained – were unable to prevent or protest against those NPFL practices. However, in October 1991, the RUF leader welcomed the idea of an RUF commander opening a jungle base unknown to the NPFL forces. This hidden base was opened near a village called Gborworbugao, about 16 miles from Kailahun Town and about 150 new recruits (captured civilians) began to receive training in conventional and guerrilla warfare.

b) Events in 1992

In January 1992, the RUF leader visited his troops at Baraka (Yawei Chiefdom) where he had a meeting with the troops and the civilians. He explained to the civilians the objectives of his movement and later instructed the troops to be always on the offensive. Also in January, a new base was opened at Jborbu Gao (south of Luawa Chiefdom) but was never used.

On 3 January 1992, RUF/NPFL forces based in Tangabu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) killed four men from Luawa Chiefdom who had entered Tangabu without passes; their bodies were burnt and thrown into the bush. They further explained that any civilian found not staying in the area where they lived would be killed. Later, in April, a woman was killed for having more than one lover. At the beginning of June 1992, the first boys who had been trained at this base were sent to the warfront, leading and showing routes to the RUF/NPFL forces and also assisting them in identifying the civilians who used to hold any position within the APC regime. Thus, in this area composed of the three Kissi Chiefdoms, the RUF/NPFL forces had control and no fighting with SLA forces was reported. However, internal fighting arose between forces from the RUF and those from the NPFL, which marked the start of a split between the two factions, leading to the withdrawal of the NPFL forces from Sierra Leone.

A reinforcement group entered from Liberia in February 1992 through the border town of Batwoma (Luawa Chiefdom), south of Kailahun Town. This group held a meeting with the civilians at Ngebgema (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) at which they informed them about the aims and objectives of their movement. They stated that the town was now under their control and chose a private dwelling to host their office. The commander in charge of this group asked one of the civilians to point out all the APC government personnel such as police officers, SLA members, civil servants and foreigners, including the Lebanese.[710] However, as Ngebgema was a small village, none of those categories of persons were to be found in the village. The movement of civilians was restricted and none of them was allowed to leave the village without a pass signed by the commander.

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[709] It should be noted that the information from the records is rather confusing on the identification of those groups as the different groups and the dates of those events are mixed. What is clear, however, is that there was no difference between those different groups with respect to the type of violence they committed against civilians.

[710] Despite many living in Sierra Leone for generations, the Lebanese – who make up the majority of businessmen in the country – are more often than not unable to obtain Sierra Leonean citizenship and are therefore referred to and treated as foreigners.

In early March 1992, the RUF leader visited this group at Ngebgema, the civilians having been gathered at the Court Barrie for the occasion, and he mentioned that about 15,000 men and women had now been trained to fight in Sierra Leone. The RUF leader explained how the APC regime was a corrupt one and how it had toured the country giving privileges to foreigners, especially businessman, rather than to Sierra Leoneans. He made it clear that civilians were no longer under the authority of the APC government but under RUF control, that every civilian had to obey RUF commanders in their controlled areas and that whatever was obtained by his RUF forces at the war front was for them, as they were not paid. He concluded his statement by saying that all young girls and boys had to join the movement for their country. The commander of the group therefore forced young boys and girls to join the RUF to be trained, to serve as carriers or, for the girls, to become "wives".[711] It is interesting to note that the RUF appointed teachers to educate the children they had abducted, allegedly as part of their will to be and to behave as a new rulers of Sierra Leone.

In March, an NPFL member coming to fight the SLA troops at Daru entered Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), where he killed a civilian as a human sacrifice for his upcoming battle.[712] At Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), RUF/NPFL forces made another human sacrifice. The forces had captured a large group of civilians from various towns and villages and gathered them in the town. One out of every ten people was killed as a ritual sacrifice and their bodies were thrown into the river.

In an attempt to repel the NPFL forces out of Sierra Leone, some RUF vanguards decided to use the services of the Poro society,[713] a male secret society at Mende Buima (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), which was full of NPFL forces using it as an assembly area in Kailahun District. The principle of this society is that when the poro devil is outside, whether day or night, only the initiated or recognised of the society are allowed outside to take part or join the group in the ceremony. This society therefore would arrest the NPFL forces since they were not members of it. However, a woman went to tell the RUF/NPFL forces about this secret society, which annoyed them and, in retaliation, the NPFL forces killed 100 civilians and burnt 200 houses.

Furthermore, around the same time, the NPFL forces discovered the existence of the hidden RUF base opened late in 1991 and a lot of RUF vanguards and junior commandos were arrested and taken to Camp Namna in Liberia.[714] Some of the top vanguards were jailed for three to four months as a result of this operation. A lot of RUF junior commandos were killed by NPFL forces while others went into hiding in the bush. The ones kept in custody in Liberia were released after the RUF leader intervened on their behalf with the NPFL leader.

In the north of the District, a combined force of SLA and local militia (Donsos from Kono District) attacked RUF/NPFL forces, recapturing towns and villages under RUF/NPFL control, including

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[711] The age of those recruits was not specified.
[712] No more details on the circumstances surrounding this killing could be obtained.
[713] The Poro society and its equivalent for women, the Bondo society, are Mende societies where the initiation process gives social identities to its members. Those societies are based on common beliefs about the living, the dead and the gods.
[714] This camp is located in the Lofa County.

of the SLA, however, did not last long. At this time, Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) was under constant RUF/NPFL attack. The only areas the SLA forces controlled were Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) and parts of Mandu, Jawie and Malema Chiefdoms. Following the overthrow of the President of Sierra Leone by the SLA on 26 April 1992, SLA forces began more intensive attacks on the RUF/NPFL forces, defeating a large number of them. However, at that time, they did not succeed in removing the RUF/NPFL forces completely from the various areas and their actions were more of a sporadic nature, killing and torturing captured RUF/NPFL members. Furthermore, their behaviour towards civilians began to deteriorate as SLA forces on patrol started to take away civilians' property, such as domestic animals and household items.

Civilians coming from areas under the control of RUF/NPFL forces were taken to the Moa Barracks in Daru for screening purposes; a lot of civilians were killed during this process, accused of being "rebels" or "rebel collaborators". As an example, one young man from Yawei Chiefdom was arrested by SLA forces patrolling the chiefdom and was killed in the Moa Barracks. Later on, a committee made up of the elders from the 14 chiefdoms of the District was formed so that they might identify the civilians brought to the barracks and avoid the killing of innocent civilians.

The RUF/NPFL forces continued their persistent attacks on towns and villages in both the northern and central chiefdoms of the District, including the Moa Barracks.

The "Tap 20" group, consisting of the Gio-speaking tribe of Liberia (NPFL) was active in Kissi Kama, Kissi Teng, Penguia and Luawa Chiefdoms. Their local commander gave an order to his troops that all civilians captured should be killed because for him they were "without blood", i.e. less than human. This group frequently engaged in cannibalism in these chiefdoms. In Penguia Chiefdom in May, members of Tap 20 killed and ate people selected due to their larger size. Furthermore, they often engaged in sexual assaults against women, who were raped by many men at one time.

In Ngiehun (Luawa Chiefdom), NPFL forces dropped hot melted plastic into people's eyes. Furthermore, one of the "sentences" they carried out was to put human beings in a large cooking pot with red palm oil; this kind of sentence was imposed when, for example, they thought a civilian was not obeying their commands. In Kissi Teng Chiefdom, the members of this group used to kill people and eat their flesh; babies were usually pounded in mortar to provide the type of food they liked. On 30 June 1992, a man was killed in the chiefdom and his body eaten.[719] This caused many civilians to flee to neighbouring Liberia.

The Tap 20 group was replaced by another group of NPFL members called Tap 40 during the last months of 1992. At this time, most of the top ranking NPFL commanders were recalled to Liberia by their leader as they were encountering serious attacks in Liberia from a fighting force called the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). The Tap 40 group also killed many civilians and often cooked and ate their flesh. One such incident happened in the Kissi Kama Chiefdom on 9 October 1992, when two civilians caught escaping were killed, cooked and eaten.[720] Another incident of cannibalism was reported about a civilian caught trying to escape from the

[719] The conditions surrounding this killing could not be ascertained.
[720] No more details could be obtained on this bit of information.

RUF/NPFL forces in Fobu (Luawa Chiefdom) on 5 October 1992. A man caught crossing the Guinean border was stripped naked and later killed; most of his body parts were cooked and eaten by some NPFL members. Again around this time, some RUF junior commandos were killed and eaten by those NPFL forces. There appeared to be two main reasons for these practices. First, it was simply a way to get food. Second, the forces believed that when they ate human flesh, they obtained the strength of the person they were eating; accordingly, they would first eat young, healthy, good looking men. Eating enemies was also practiced. However, reports mention that persons of any age and any gender were also eaten, including children. Indeed, in some places in the District like Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), Mende Buima (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), Kuiva and Baiima (both in Mandu Chiefdom), NPFL forces were living in separate compounds from RUF forces where they practiced cannibalism.

In Nyadahun Bambabu in March-April, the NPFL forces were the only ones living in this town. When they went on patrol, they abducted people to carry stolen goods back to their town. Upon returning to the village they then killed and ate the people they had abducted. When these NPFL forces were withdrawn from Sierra Leone to fight the advancing ULIMO forces in Liberia, the RUF forces sent to this town found a very large cauldron with three legs set up in the town mosque. These pots were usually used to cook food for large numbers of people when it was harvest time. However in this case the cauldron had been used to cook people for the NPFL forces. All around the cauldron on the floor of the mosque were the dismembered skeletal remains, including the skulls, of around 40 to 50 people. Each of these persons had been shot in the head.

In the south of the District, SLA forces were more successful in containing the RUF/NPFL forces, due to the presence of the ULIMO troops[721] in Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) and the Guinean troops in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom). However, on 25 December 1992, RUF/NPFL forces identified by civilians as being the 'Tap 20'[722] group launched an attack on Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom), coming from the chiefdom headquarter of Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), the other road going to Segbwema and passing by Daru (Jawie Chiefdom). They entered the town through the hospital, where they beheaded one doctor after he had given them some drinks and money, hoping this would make them leave without killing him. Many drugs were taken away from the hospital and some people were captured. For seven hours, this group battled with SLA and ULIMO forces before being eventually repelled. Shortly after this incident, Guinean forces based at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) came to Segbwema.

Civilians escaping RUF/NPFL attacks in Yawei Chiefdom tried to find refuge in Gbane Chiefdom (Kono District) located to the north of their chiefdom. Some of those fleeing civilians were thoroughly screened by SLA forces at the chiefdom headquarter of Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom, Kono District). A young man, accused of being a "rebel collaborator" was doused with petrol by the SLA forces, who then set fire to him and let him burn. Furthermore, some animosity was prevailing between Kailahun civilians, who were mainly Mende, and Kono inhabitants. Furthermore, as the RUF/NPFL forces entered Sierra Leone through Kailahun District, civilians coming from this area were viewed as suspicious and were not welcome.

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[721] This fighting faction, which emerged and fought the NPFL in Liberia, also fought on Sierra Leonean territory, alongside the SLA.

[722] It is more likely that this group was actually Tap 40, who replaced the Tap 20 group in late 1992.

On 8 February 1998, the President of Liberia reportedly visited RUF/AFRC forces in Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) to meet with the field commanders. A meeting was held at the Court Barrie, where he told the forces that produce from the District, particularly cocoa and coffee, must be transported to Liberia immediately to be sold for the procurement of weapons and other logistics for the fighting forces. He also spoke about disarmament and further warned all combatants not to disarm until they heard from him in Liberia. The supply routes for arms and ammunition coming from Liberia ran through Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) and Foya (Liberia) or Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) and Vaahun (Liberia). When they needed ammunition, RUF forces would send a large vehicle with a top senior commander carrying some diamonds to the Liberian President. On their way back to Sierra Leone, they were escorted by Liberian security officers and had documents similar to clearance papers that would allow them to reach Kailahun District without encountering any problems. From Kailahun District, the arms and ammunition were distributed and dispatched to other places. The construction of an airfield at Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) was also begun, made feasible due to the increased numbers of the RUF forces, particularly the civilians they had taken with them when they retreated from Freetown. However, due to persistent air raids conducted by ECOMOG, the construction stopped.

After being pulled out from Freetown, a lot of AFRC members went to Vaahun in Liberia through Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) while the majority of the RUF forces took back the bush, which they were used to due to having conducted warfare there from 1994 to 1997, unlike the AFRC forces. When they left Freetown, the retreating forces could not take many things with them, which led to their searching civilians in Kailahun District and taking their property. "Operation Pay Yourself", meaning take what you need from civilians, was declared in the whole country but there is little direct information on its implementation in Kailahun District. Nevertheless, when they came back from Freetown, RUF and AFRC forces engaged in killing, raping and, above all, looting actions, which prompted a lot of civilians and especially those in Upper Bambara Chiefdom to leave their farms and to go to Liberia. However, RUF/AFRC forces captured civilians whom they forced to work, to go in search for food and to dig holes on the main road of the chiefdom to prevent ECOMOG forces from advancing with their armoured tanks.

In Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), the then Chief Security Officer (CSO) of the RUF invited all returnees to a meeting in which he encouraged the CDF to identify themselves so they might broker peaceful co-existence with the RUF/AFRC forces in the township. Seventy-six Kamajors identified themselves to the RUF/AFRC forces in response to the appeal and the CSO told them that they were "brothers" and that they would work together to rebuild Luawa Chiefdom. However, the CSO then ordered his forces to arrest and detain the Kamajors. The CSO set up a court in which the Kamajors appeared, summary investigations were carried out by the RUF commander appointed as chairman of the court and his verdict was that they should all be released and handed over to their family who would sign for them. While this verdict appeared to be accepted, the CSO nevertheless ordered that those Kamajors should be kept in jail and their families authorised to come and visit them. This continued for few days, until two senior RUF commanders and other RUF members arrived in town. One of the senior RUF officers killed ten of the Kamajors and ordered his men to kill the other Kamajors still being held captive. Three days later, the CSO gathered people in the town and stated that those Kamajors were Government spies and had been preparing to launch an attack on the chiefdom. He ordered the burial of the bodies in two holes behind the police station.

this intense fighting, thousands of civilians fled the area and found refuge in Liberia (Lofa County) and Guinea (Gueckedou region, Parrot Beak).[770]

After the reinstatement of the President of Sierra Leone in March 1998, more men from the District, many of whom had found refuge in Guinea, were initiated in the Kamajor society. Some from Penguia Chiefdom went to Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District) for the initiation. Kamajors from Penguia Chiefdom were successful in repelling the RUF/AFRC forces from some sections of the chiefdom as far as the Moa River (south-east of the chiefdom) but the RUF/AFRC forces regrouped and retook control of some areas previously held by Kamajors, including Sengema, Kumantandu, Sandaru, Lalehun and Bagibu. The RUF/AFRC established themselves in particular in the Nimmi Hills, an area rich in gold mines. Sengema became their base in the chiefdom, as it is located on a hill. Raping, looting and the unroofing of houses was common in 1998 and the commander in charge of the area was ordered by the Battle Field Commander not to have mercy for civilians who did not support them. On one occasion and following a meeting organised at Woroma by the RUF/AFRC commander in the chiefdom, eight men and four women accused of being supporters of the Government of Sierra Leone were killed and burnt by the RUF/AFRC forces, which led civilians once again to flee to Guinea. However, shortly afterwards in June, the commander ordered to his men to kill any civilian caught attempting to cross the Moa River or the Menni River to go to Guinea. Some civilians were therefore killed and some of them drowned in the rivers, which were swollen due to the rainy season. Furthermore, another order passed by this commander was for his men to check for tattoos on the men's bodies, as this would be proof of belonging to the Kamajor society. Besides pursuing RUF/AFRC positions, the Kamajors in Penguia Chiefdom chased and killed those they suspected of being "rebel" collaborators.[771] Kamajors from Peje West and Peje Bongre Chiefdoms were also attacking RUF/AFRC forces in their chiefdoms.

The town of Neama (south of Jawie Chiefdom, near the border with Kenema District) was considered a safe place where many civilians from the surrounding chiefdoms were seeking refuge. The town was under the command of the CDF and was an important ECOMOG and CDF base. RUF forces attacked the town and over 300 civilians were killed; it took three days to bury them in mass graves.

When the chairman of the AFRC and his government were driven out of Freetown by the ECOMOG forces, he sought temporarily refuge in Kangama town[772] (Kissi Teng Chiefdom), four miles from Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), the headquarter of RUF/AFRC. Indeed, Buedu in 1998 became the War Office[773] and a very important centre for supply routes, smuggling of produce and diamonds and for training. All these activities became rampant throughout the year and enabled the

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[770] Between March and June, 237,000 Sierra Leoneans fled the country to Liberia and Guinea and over 50,000 IDPs were living in camps: UN News Archive, 26 June 1998. Since the ECOMOG intervention in February, it was believed that 27,000 IDPs were leaving in the Eastern Province (Kailahun, Kenema and Kono Districts) and 113,000 in the Northern Province while there were no new displacements in the Southern Province. Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 9 June – 6 July 1998. REG. NO. 98/0068.

[771] No specific incident was recalled on this information.

[772] He was seen during the same period in Kono District, en route to Kailahun District.

[773] Although ECOMOG forces claimed to have recaptured Buedu in 1998, it is clear from the records and other open source materials that the war office was open in Buedu at the latest in April 1998. Accordingly, either ECOMOG forces attacked but did not capture the town or captured the town only for a short period of time.

control and allowed further incursions in the rest of the country. The scale of this second wave was acknowledged by the NPRC Chairman himself, who declared "total war against the rebels". By 1995, all the Districts of the country were directly affected by the RUF incursions.

From 1996 onwards, Kamajors emerged and fought the RUF and later the RUF/AFRC forces in the District. Although they retook control of some RUF-held areas, they never succeeded in taking control of the whole District.

Following the merging of the RUF with the AFRC forces, those CDF members, as in other Districts of the country, went underground before challenging the RUF/AFRC positions by late 1997 but particularly in 1998, following the ECOMOG deployment in Daru. As in 1998, Kamajors were in total control of Pujehun District and the Southern Province in general, thereby cutting off one of the supply roads from Liberia, although not the main one, which was through Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) in the north-east of Kailahun District. This strong grip over the Southern Province and especially over the Freetown-Kenema and Freetown-Pujehun highways blocked the retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown, preventing them to go to Liberia through Pujehun District and forcing them to reach Kailahun District through Kono District

RUF/AFRC forces had control over certain areas of Kailahun District, mainly in the north-east of the Moa River and continued engaging the Kamajors, who at that time were assisted by ECOMOG forces. Around this time, many RUF/AFRC forces had regrouped in the District before launching their offensive on Koidu (Kono District) in December 1998. As part of this massive operation, which ended in Freetown on 6 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces retook position of Segbwema, a strategic town on the main road to Kenema District thus blocking ECOMOG at Daru.

The period following the invasion of Freetown was mainly characterised by political negotiations and reached its conclusion by the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. Although the RUF leader exhorted his members in the District to disarm, a senior RUF officer, then Battle Field Commander and CDS categorically refused and engaged in actions to put a stop to the disarmament process. RUF forces furthermore engaged in cross border raids in the Parrot Beak in Guinea. This action was not isolated as another Guinean flank was open in Kambia District. The peace process was reactivated in November 2000 but more than one year was necessary to complete the disarmament in the District and to declare the war over in January 2002. Kailahun was amongst the last Districts to be disarmed.

b. Kenema District

**1. Introduction**

Kenema District is one of the three Districts composing the Eastern Province, together with Kailahun and Kono Districts. It is bordered on the north by Tonkolili District and, mainly, by Kono District, on the east by Kailahun District, on the southeast by Liberia, on the south-west by Pujehun and on the west by Bo District. Its headquarter town is Kenema Town in Nongowa Chiefdom, in the centre of the District. Kenema Town is located on the highway that goes to Koidu (Kono District Headquarter) in one direction and to Bo Town (Bo District Headquarter) and further on to Freetown in the other direction. As in the other Districts of the country, control of the highway was

When initiations started to take place in Kenema, local hunters from Simbaru Chiefdom went to be initiated. On their return in March 1997, they were told that the SLA forces had left for Kenema Town. From this time on, the Kamajors were in charge of the chiefdom. In Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, Chiefs recommended strong men to be initiated and when they came back from their initiation, they were divided into different groups to protect the chiefdom.

In March 1997, RUF forces attacked the following villages in Simbaru Chiefdom, setting houses on fire and killing civilians: Nyahu (over 60 dwellings were burnt and six people killed); Mamboma (over 60 houses burnt, four old men killed and two men mutilated); Paniniga (45 houses were burnt and nine people killed); Gawama (over 170 houses, two primary schools and a health centre were set on fire and 17 people were killed); Gereihun (over 250 houses and public buildings were set on fire, 48 people were killed and four people mutilated); Fawana, Garahun, Jagbwema, Gogbebu and Nyeyama.[865]

In May 1997, a week before the Coup, the Kamajors' Chief Initiator conducted over 300 initiations at Falla (Wandor Chiefdom) to strengthen the number of Kamajors. Others travelled to Bo District to be initiated by the Deputy Chief Initiator.

Around the same time, SLA forces attacked the Kamajor base at Kenema, chasing away the Chief Initiator. During this attack, many civilians and Kamajors and few SLA members were killed and several houses, including that of the Chief Initiator, were burnt down as well as numerous homes of Kamajors and Kamajors supporters. On seeking refuge in Konia (Dama Chiefdom), the Chief Initiator was advised by the Paramount Chief to leave, due to its proximity to Kenema Town, so he left for Bo District.

Also before the Coup in May 1997, Kamajors from Nongowa Chiefdom, on hearing that SLA forces in the Dama axis were demanding money from people at the checkpoints they were operating, went there to inquire about the matter. When they arrived, SLA forces open fire on the Kamajors, who were mainly equipped with bladed weapons and some single barrel guns. The Kamajors captured the SLA commander and hacked him to death; other SLA members were given the same treatment.

c) Third Phase: May 1997 – 2002

Following the Coup on 25 May 1997, AFRC forces asked the CDF to surrender their weapons to the nearest police station and to suspend all their activities. CDF members did not follow this request; on the contrary, although they withdrew from the battlefronts, they regrouped themselves in villages and increased their number by undertaking more initiations. During this period, young boys under 15 began joining the society. RUF/AFRC started launching attacks on Kamajor positions and vice versa.

Shortly after the coup, on 30 May 1997, it is reported in general terms that fleeing civilians were mutilated and killed by RUF/AFRC fighters at Baoma (Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom). Indeed, across the District, RUF/AFRC forces harassed and intimidated civilians, molesting them, raiding villages and taking food and other property.

[865] These incidents may have taken place after the Coup of 25 May 1997.

In the south of the District, RUF/AFRC forces established a camp called "SS Camp" at the boundary between Dama and Nongowa Chiefdoms. From there, they raided all the surrounding villages. Besides looking for food, the main purpose of these raids was to find Kamajors. Many villages were suspected of hosting Kamajors preparing to launch attack on RUF/AFRC positions. RUF/AFRC attacks were also perceived by the population as reprisal to punish the population for failing to support them. Thus, men were stripped naked and RUF/AFRC forces searched for any marks on their bodies indicating they belonged to the Kamajor society, killing those on whose bodies they found such marks. However, not to have any marks did not prevent civilians from being killed, since people were killed on suspicion of being Kamajors or Kamajor collaborators in the absence of such a mark. This practice of undressing men to search for any mark was also carried out in the SS Camp by the Moa River.

Niawa and Langruma Chiefdoms were not attacked by RUF/AFRC forces after the Coup, unlike Small Bo Chiefdom, where SLA forces had been stationed before the Coup.[866] Shortly after the Coup, the commander in charge of the ex-SLA forces in the chiefdom announced that Kamajors should disarm to them as instructed by the high command in Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces launched an attack on Kamajor positions, from which the Kamajors were controlling part of the Bo-Kenema highway in the chiefdom and in Blama in August 1997. In both locations, the Kamajors were overpowered and fled. During this attack, RUF/AFRC forces burnt houses in Blama. Another battle between the two forces took place in Joyomei, a town six miles south of Blama. The town was burnt down, although the force responsible for this burning remains unknown, with Kamajors blaming the RUF/AFRC and vice versa.

During the RUF/AFRC stay in Kenema Town, girls were raped, houses were looted continuously and civilians were harassed for food and other items. Most commonly, alleged Kamajors or alleged SLPP[867] or Kamajor supporters were arrested, detained, beaten and/or killed and their houses looted and burnt.[868] In one incident, a man riding his bicycle on the road to Kenema was brought to the town by RUF/AFRC members and killed in front of the Sierratel Building; his stomach was cut open and his intestines tied across the road as a barricade. Civilians in the town were beaten to death if they were caught listening to the BBC.

In Small Bo Chiefdom, people who were considered to be Kamajor collaborators were severely beaten or killed. RUF/AFRC forces made civilians look for food for them and the pressure on civilians was intensified as RUF/AFRC forces in Small Bo Chiefdom had stopped receiving food and other items from their main base in Kenema. The RUF/AFRC forces believed that civilians were sending information to Kamajors who had gone in the bushes; any food found with civilians was taken away on the grounds that the food would be sent to Kamajors. Furthermore, RUF/AFRC forces used to organise groups of civilians and took them to the bush to look for food. Whatever the quantity of food brought back, it was divided into four parts, one for the forces' High Command, one for the lower ranks, one for the civilian administration and one for the civilians who had brought the food.

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[866] Accordingly, the SLA base transformed into an RUF/AFRC base.

[867] Since February 1996, the SLPP party has been the ruling party of Sierra Leone.

[868] No details were gathered for this period but this assertion, although general, was common in the information gathered for Nongowa Chiefdom and beyond the boundaries of the chiefdom.

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Civilians in the chiefdom engaged in mining activities in villages located in the north of the chiefdom, namely in Yorvuhun, Victoria, Komoli, Limeh and Nyagbe Bo. They received food from businessmen from Kenema Town who encouraged the mining. Because of this food supply and because the movement of civilians towards these villages was perceived as sabotage,[869] RUF/AFRC forces established a base at Victoria in the north of the chiefdom, mainly to seize the food and non food items they needed from civilians and to monitor the movement of Kamajors in other chiefdoms located further north. However, RUF/AFRC forces soon also engaged in mining activities.

RUF/AFRC forces were making regular visits to Dama Chiefdom to look for CDF members and to request food from civilians. At Gofor in July 1997, they killed three civilians with automatic rifles and at Bandembu, on the same day, civilians suspected of being CDF supporters were killed. Each time they entered villages, RUF/AFRC asked civilians to locate CDF members, threatening to kill them. Houses and property belonging to suspected CDF supporters were looted and burnt down and some alleged Kamajor collaborators were tortured to death. Also in July, RUF/AFRC forces entering Kpandebu through the east killed 25 civilians, mostly men, and inflicted physical violence on others, whom they alleged to be Kamajor supporters. The following month, RUF/AFRC forces coming from Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) attacked Konia, Gboyama and Manor on the same day and killed an unknown number of civilians in those villages. During this wave of attacks, other villages including Sebehun and Kbakah were also raided and 10 civilians were killed.[870]

The Kamajors regrouped and began attacking RUF/AFRC forces, often by laying ambushes. Captured RUF/AFRC members were killed, frequently on the spot. Across Kenema District, civilians suspected of being a member of the RUF/AFRC forces or a member of their family or a collaborator were killed. For example, at Konia (Dama Chiefdom) in August 1997, one man was shot dead and another was beaten for two days, both on the grounds that they were "not on the side of the CDF".

During the second half of the year, RUF/AFRC forces reached Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, where there were some incidents of violence inflicted on civilians. At Deima, they killed civilians for their money and property, tortured some who refused to give them their valuables and raped some girls. At Jenneh also, some people were killed. The acting Paramount Chief residing at Levuma was arrested in November 1997 as he had dismantled the checkpoints some RUF/AFRC forces had made in the town.[871]

Throughout the third phase of the conflict, diamond-rich Lower Bambara Chiefdom was the scene of numerous attacks and counter-attacks between RUF/AFRC forces and Kamajors, as a result of which there were many civilian fatalities. In August 1997, RUF/AFRC forces launched attacks on numerous villages including Torkpombu, Buime, Laehun, Kpandebu, Lowoma, Fowaru, Ngeleima, most of them diamond mining villages or towns. Coming from Kenema Town, these heavily armed

[869] This movement of civilians was indeed perceived by RUF/AFRC forces as indicating that civilians had received information of imminent attacks from Kamajors and accordingly civilians were considered as fleeing the area.
[870] It could not be ascertained in which village those 10 civilians were killed.
[871] The acting Paramount Chief subsequently managed to escape into the bush.

forces fired indiscriminately in the villages as they passed by, shouting the following slogan, called Cyburg: "We don't talk, the barrels talk". During these attacks, many civilians were killed and many houses were burnt. As a result of these attacks, the CDF were driven out of the chiefdom. RUF/AFRC engaged in mining activities almost everywhere, digging plantations without the consent of their owners. If the owners resisted these activities, they were seriously beaten. Civilians were forced to work in the mines and many people died at these sites.

In August also, RUF/AFRC forces planned to attack Punduru, a Kamajor base in the north-east of Gorama Mende Chiefdom. On their way to Punduru, they had an encounter with Kamajors at Bandabu and one of their members was killed during the battle. It is believed that this incident outraged the RUF/AFRC forces and on 30 August, around 700 heavily armed[872] RUF/AFRC members launched a fierce attack on Punduru. During this attack, four Kamajors and 28 civilians were killed.[873] RUF/AFRC forces were however repelled and moved to Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom, Kono District) before burning the whole town and capturing some girls and young boys.

The following month, the Kamajors ambushed a military convoy in Lower Bambara Chiefdom and 20 members of the RUF/AFRC forces were killed and arms and ammunition were seized. In September 1997, Kamajors in Nomo Chiefdom launched an attack on RUF/AFRC forces' positions in Tunkia and Gaura Chiefdoms. Two RUF/AFRC members were captured and their heads chopped off. Any person suspected of being a RUF/AFRC member was killed such as those two men from Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) who were shot in their stomachs while entering Nomo.

That same month, CDF members came to the Court Barrie in Konia and asked the Paramount Chief of Dama where he had put the money he received from RUF/AFRC forces. Denying that he had received such money, the Paramount Chief was arrested, tied up with his hammock, taken away and killed in another village. Later, one man who tried to escape was shot on sight by a CDF member. The CDF commander stated that he was the new Paramount Chief.

In October 1997, the mountain village of Basara (Nongowa Chiefdom) came under RUF/AFRC attack, as it was suspected of being a Kamajor stronghold. The village was surrounded in the early hours of the day and forces opened fire on the civilians. Five civilians were killed during the firing and 15 were put in a hut and burnt alive when the hut was set on fire. In November 1997, the same scenario took place in another mountain village called Masao. Over 10 people were shot dead, while 10 others were forced into a house, which was then set on fire.

Kamajors started regrouping in October 1997 in Dodo Chiefdom and in Panguma (Lower Bambara Chiefdom). Jormu Kefabu (Nongowa Chiefdom) became a CDF stronghold and RUF/AFRC forces made several unsuccessful attempts, mainly in the mountain villages, to drive the Kamajors out. In December 1997, the mountain village of Bambawa (Nongowa Chiefdom), which was believed to be a Kamajor training base, was attacked and burnt and one person was killed. Also in December,

[872] The RUF/AFRC forces were dressed in combat fatigues with red berets and armed with machine guns, an anti-aircraft gun mounted on a Hilux van, RPGs and automatic rifles.
[873] It is worth noting that throughout this time, the more the Kamajors attacked the RUF/AFRC forces, the more the RUF/AFRC forces were harassing civilians.

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RUF/AFRC forces encountered Kamajors at Combema and about 40 of them were killed by Kamajors.

In November 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Gorahun (Tunkia Chiefdom), seizing the two roads leading to the town. In this attacks, 55 people were killed at close range. After this attack, the chiefdom did not experience further RUF/AFRC attacks.

The following month, the Kamajor commander on the ground in Nomo Chiefdom received a letter from the Kamajor High Command instructing all Kamajors in all chiefdoms to launch Operation "Black December". The purpose of this operation was to restrict the movement of the RUF/AFRC forces by regaining control of the highways. Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom took part in this operation on the Kono-Makeni highway. During the same month, at Dambala, a suspected "rebel" was decapitated and his blood drunk by a Kamajor.

"Operation Black December"[874] did not take place in Lower Bambara Chiefdom in December 1997. However, a fierce attack was launched on Tongo Field in January 1998, when Kamajors entered the chiefdom from two fronts, namely the east from Malegohun Chiefdom and the west from Dodo Chiefdom. Although few details were obtained on this operation, it was stated more than once that during this attack, many civilians lost their lives. Furthermore, following this attack, both fighting forces attacked villages believed to be under the control of the other force, killing civilians and burning houses. Hanga (Nongowa Chiefdom) was also attacked in January by RUF/AFRC forces. Twelve members of the same family and other inhabitants were shot dead and more than 10 houses were burnt down. Some people were forced to carry looted items for the RUF/AFRC forces, who also attacked other villages along the road from Mano Junction to Kenema Town, including Ngelehun, Kpanderu and Bambawa.[875]

In January 1998, RUF/AFRC forces based in Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) decided to sweep away the Kamajors deployed along the entire route leading to Bo Waterside, on the Liberian border in Pujehun District.[876] Before starting their operation, they sent a letter to the Kamajors to inform them on their plans. On their way, they burnt down many villages[877] and succeeded in driving the Kamajors away. At Jao (Tunkia Chiefdom), over 40 houses were burnt and at Kamasu, 15 houses were burnt. At Gegbwema, where they spent the night, they burnt down all the houses except the mosque and the Court Barrie.

Kamajors from Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, together with some from Simbaru and Dodo Chiefdoms, planned to launch attacks on RUF/AFRC positions in Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom. However, on 5 January 1998, when they arrived at these positions, RUF/AFRC forces had already

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[874] This operation, declared by CDF High Command, was implemented across the country in the areas where Kamajors were active, in a bid to take control of RUF/AFRC positions. As part of this operation, all the highways and roads were blocked, in order to prevent RUF/AFRC forces from attacking civilians. It is believed that this Operation was launched following the AFRC statement that it would not hand over power to the President of Sierra Leone on 22 April 1998, as planned in the Conakry Peace Plan signed on 23 October 1997.

[875] As for the casualties in those villages, it is merely reported that houses were burnt but it cannot be ascertained whether all the villages had houses burnt.

[876] This road passes by Tunkia Chiefdom.

[877] Tilorma, Taninahun, Sokola, Sefula and Damawulo were also burnt down.

left the area. Kamajors from Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom then controlled the chiefdom, although there were reports of harassment of the civilian population. At Deima, for example, one Kamajor arrested seven civilians and put them in a wooden box which he then locked because they failed to give him food. The matter was reported to the commander at Levuma, who ordered their release.

In January also, the Paramount Chief of Nomo Chiefdom, together with other prominent people, including a prominent doctor and a businessman, were arrested by RUF/AFRC fighters in Kenema Town. They were arrested at the time of a fierce battle between RUF/AFRC forces in the outskirts of Kenema and were accused of supporting Kamajors. They were beaten with sticks with their hands tied behind their backs. One of them is believed to have died in detention although his body was never found. The mutilated body of another was found with 35 others in a mass grave at the outskirts of the town. Some of those arrested were however released.[878]

At Konjo (Dama Chiefdom) in early 1998, a pregnant woman was raped by member(s) of the RUF/AFRC forces and gave birth shortly after. During the same attack, civilians were punished[879] or killed, suspected of being SLPP and Kamajor supporters. Some houses were also put down.

When they withdrew from Kenema in January 1998,[880] over 10 RUF/AFRC members and their families who took the Nomo Chiefdom road to go to Liberia were shot dead by some Kamajors in Nomo Chiefdom while crossing the river that borders Sierra Leone and Guinea in a canoe. Due to the shooting of the canoe, it sank, which resulted in the drowning of a suckling mother and her baby with other people. At Faama (Nomo Chiefdom), Kamajors shot dead an unknown number of "rebel sympathisers".

As Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom) was a stronghold of RUF/AFRC forces, Kamajors from Dodo and Kandu Leppeama Chiefdoms on the one hand and from Niawa Chiefdom, Wunde Chiefdom (Bo District) and Jiama Bongor Chiefdom (Bo District) on the other hand started operations to dislodge RUF/AFRC forces from Small Bo Chiefdom. On 31 January 1998, Kamajors from Dodo Chiefdom advanced towards Small Bo and on their way, launched a successful attack on RUF/AFRC forces based at Levuma (Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom). Kamajors from Dodo Chiefdom, with those from Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, advanced on Blama, entering the town on 15 February 1998. However, no RUF/AFRC forces were to be found in the town as they had left earlier.

In February 1998, ECOMOG troops based in Liberia entered the District and on 18 February, together with Kamajors, reached Kenema Town. They then deployed at SS Camp, Gofor, Giema and Joru (in Dama and Gaura Chiefdoms). Indeed, after the intervention in Freetown, ECOMOG forces had positions all over the country and were working with the Kamajors. In Malegohun Chiefdom, for example, ECOMOG came to Kamajor positions with arms and ammunitions. In addition, ECOMOG requested the intervention of the Kamajors from Punduru (Gorama Mende

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[878] Many reports mention that the arrest of those people and the reported killings were carried out under a direct order from a senior member of the RUF general staff.

[879] The kind of punishment inflicted could not be ascertained.

[880] Indeed, RUF/AFRC forces stayed in Kenema town throughout 1997 until late January 1998 when, fearing the imminent Kamajor/ECOMOG forces' attack, they pulled out of the town.

Chiefdom) to be an auxiliary force to liberate Kono District, providing them also with small arms and bullets.

Once in Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom), Kamajors killed people suspected of being collaborators or tied them with a special rope called FM,[881] beat them and locked them up. Civilians were gathered in the centre of the town for "screening" purposes. Two police officers were killed, while another police officer and his wife received serious cuts on their necks but did not die. Other police officers managed to escape to a nearby village and to the ECOMOG base in Kenema Town. One man, alleged to be the Small Bo CDF chairman who stayed in Blama while RUF/AFRC were occupying the town, was killed for failing to supply ammunition to the Kamajors at one time when they had planned to attack the RUF/AFRC forces in Blama. Because of failing to supply the ammunition, he was considered to be a "saboteur". The entire town was looted by Kamajors, who also established "Kangaroo Courts"[882] presided over by Commanding Officers.

When they entered Kenema Town, ECOMOG forces and Kamajors with machetes and guns killed many people who they suspected of being "rebels" or "collaborators".[883] Some civilians were burnt alive with old tyres for supporting the RUF/AFRC forces. Those killings were a common sight in the streets of Kenema. In many parts of the town, the charred remains of bodies were seen. Many members of the SSD (Special Security Division) were killed and their bodies scattered all over the Kenema Police Barracks, some of which were set on fire by civilians.

Between January and March 1998, as they were fighting and repelling RUF/AFRC forces, Kamajors targeted alleged members of the retreating forces, their families and those who they considered to be collaborators. Those people, who in reality were mainly civilians, were tortured and killed. It is reported that a group of Kamajors called Yamotor based at Talamah and Lalehun were eating the bodies of the retreating forces and civilians accused of collaboration. Houses believed to have been occupied by RUF/AFRC fighters or by alleged collaborators were unroofed.

After the deployment of ECOMOG and Kamajors all over the District, a few RUF/AFRC incursion were still reported but on a lower scale. A CDF Office was established in Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom) for the purpose of issuing passes to monitor the movement of people. Kamajors initially based in Small Bo Chiefdom but coming from the neighbouring Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms went back to their chiefdoms. In March, civilians started returning to their villages.

However, unlike what happened in most of the chiefdoms, especially in the south of the District, the situation prevailing in Lower Bambara Chiefdom after ECOMOG deployed in the District still consisted of fighting and attacks between RUF/AFRC forces and the CDF, which continued until disarmament started in December 2001.

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[881] This rope has two sticks on its edges; "FM" means "frequency modulation", as it was believed that once tied with this rope, civilians began to talk.

[882] In reality, these courts were simply place where Kamajors were sitting down and issuing sentences, without following any laws.

[883] No further details are available on these incidents.

In the south of Kenema District, RUF/AFRC forces, alleged to come from Joijoma (Kailahun District) attacked Jewahun (Tunkia Chiefdom) in April 1998, where they burnt down the village before proceeding further to Gegbwema, where they burnt the houses that remained standing. These forces were later repelled by ECOMOG troops. The following month, RUF/AFRC forces believed to come from Malema Chiefdom (Kailahun District) attacked Madina, Kwadima – where three people were killed - and Kpandebu in Nomo Chiefdom. It is interesting to note that these forces had disguised themselves as Kamajors, thus taking the civilians by surprise.

In December 1998, when RUF/AFRC forces had regained control of major towns in the country, Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom were able to defend and retain control of the chiefdom, to the extent that this chiefdom served as a safe corridor for retreating ECOMOG forces from Kono District.

At the beginning of the following year, fighting again resumed in Kenema District. In January 1999, heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces repelled Kamajors from Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom), killing many civilians and Kamajors. Towns like Kpandebu, Lalehun, Bumpeh, Semewabu or Njaigbema were under persistent attacks from Kamajors who had in their ranks young boys under 13, who were forced to hold guns and were trained only for short periods of time.

The RUF/AFRC forces abducted many civilians from their villages and forced them to work in mining sites, beating or killing those who refused. Civilians living in these areas were harassed and intimidated at gunpoint by RUF/AFRC members, who constantly stole property and abducted girls and women and used them for sexual purposes. A lot of Kamajor collaborators were killed during this period. Private houses believed to have diamonds under their foundations were dug up, especially in Kpandebu, Torkpombu, Tongola and Bomie.

In early 1999, between January and February, Small Bo Chiefdom saw an influx of people coming from a camp in Kenema Town, following threats of RUF/AFRC attacks on the Town.

In February 1999, an event that took place in Gorama Mende Chiefdom gives an insight on the CDF internal structure. On 9 February, the Kamajor membership of the chiefdom passed a "no confidence" vote on the chiefdom coordinator for his misuse of their rations from the CDF headquarter in Kenema Town. As a result, a new coordinator was appointed. This new coordinator was requested by the Kono authorities to initiate able young men from Kono to help them liberate Kono District.[884] Five hundred men came to Jagbema for initiation. As they heard about this initiation, well-armed RUF/AFRC forces came early in the morning to Jagbema sometime in March or April, overran the Kamajors base, killed about 20 civilians and burnt down 45 houses, including the house of the CDF coordinator and a school. Twenty-five Kamajors sustained injuries and 10 civilians were taken away as load carriers. The Kamajor coordinator mobilised his men and they went to trace the RUF/AFRC forces, intercepting them at Laboya. During the encounter, 30 members of the RUF/AFRC were killed and the Kamajors liberated all the captured civilians.

At around the same time, heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kenema Town. Some ECOMOG forces, Kamajors and civilians were killed but ECOMOG and Kamajor forces

[884] At this time indeed, Kono District was under RUF/AFRC control.

clearly concentrated their attacks and offensives on the mining areas of the country and, later, on Guinean territory, giving a new dimension to the Sierra Leonean conflict.

Reactivated in November 2000, the disarmament process required one more year before being declared complete in January 2002. Kenema, and Kailahun Districts, were the two last Districts to be disarmed.

c. Kono District

**1. Introduction**

Kono District is located in the Eastern Province, together with Kailahun and Kenema Districts. It is bordered in the east by the Republic of Guinea and Koinadugu District, which also borders it in the north. In the south-east, the borders of Tonkolili District and Kono District meet for a few miles, with Kenema and Kailahun Districts forming its southern border.

Koidu, a diamond rich town, is Kono District's headquarter town. It is located almost in the centre of the District and is the starting and ending point of Sierra Leone's main highway, which links Koidu to Freetown, passing through Magburaka (headquarter town of Tonkolili District) and Makeni (headquarter town of Bombali District). Two other highways are of importance in the District, as they would allow the penetration of the District by the fighting forces from the southern Districts. One leaves Koidu, passing through Tankoro and Gbane Chiefdom before entering Kailahun District. The other one leaves Koidu, reaching Kenema Town through Nimikoro and Gorama Kono Chiefdoms in Kono District and Lower Bambara Chiefdom, a diamond mining area in Kenema District. An alternative to these two roads to reach the south-east is the road that leaves Koidu and goes through the east of the District.

There are 14 chiefdoms in the District:

| Chiefdom | Headquarter |
|---|---|
| Fiama | Jagbwema |
| Gbane | Gandorhun |
| Gbane Kandor | Koardu |
| Gbense | Koidu |
| Gorama Kono | Kangama |
| Kamara | Tombodu |
| Lei | Saiama |
| Mafindor | Kamiendor |
| Nimikoro | Jaiama |
| Nimiyama | Jaiama Sewafe |
| Sandor | Kayima |
| Soa | Kainkordu |
| Tankoro | Baiama |
| Toli | Kondewakor |

Kono District is the most diamond rich District of Sierra Leone and the wealth of its soil meant that the District was the stage of severe fighting and violations against civilians throughout the war, from its inception in 1991 until late 2001. The main mining areas[912] are to be found in the centre and west of the District, in Kamara (Tombodu area), Sandor (in the south of the chiefdom), Nimikoro, Nimiyama, Gbense and Tankoro Chiefdoms.

As in the other Districts of the Eastern Province, Kono District was affected by the conflict through three discernable phases. The first one encompassed 1991 to 1993. During these years, RUF/NPFL forces entered the District in the south-east through Kailahun District. Their first incursion in 1991 was limited to the two chiefdoms bordering Kailahun District and was rapidly halted by SLA forces deployed at Gbense, Sandor, Mafindor and Gbane Kandor Chiefdoms, the latter two of which share a border with Guinea. Local hunters known as Donsos began organising themselves in various chiefdoms, supported and encouraged by the local authorities. RUF/NPFL forces made successive attempts to re enter the District in 1992; by mid 1992, they had succeeded in establishing positions in Gbane Soa Chiefdom, from where they moved towards Koidu. By late 1992, Koidu was under RUF/NPFL control. SLA forces, assisted by local hunters coming from Koinadugu District, repelled the RUF/NPFL forces in early January and strengthened their bases in the east of the District. By mid 1993, the District was virtually free of any RUF/NPFL presence. This first phase was characterised by widespread violations committed primarily by RUF/NPFL forces, but also by SLA forces.

The second phase ran from 1994 to 1997. In 1994, RUF forces launched incursions in the south-east of the country and progressively advanced into the District. Koidu was attacked for the second time in April 1995, RUF forces taking advantage of the fact the SLA on the ground was more occupied in mining than in defending the District. This attack on Koidu led many civilians to leave the area, as the RUF forces began to span out in the surrounding chiefdoms. The District was recaptured around May/June by SLA forces, newly trained by Executive Outcomes, the mercenary company in Sierra Leone under contract with the Government. The SLA, local hunters and Executive Outcomes dislodged the RUF forces from most of their positions and subsequent RUF attacks were carried out by remnants RUF members. The presence of Executive Outcomes in the District brought some relief to the population, as it also engaged in disciplining the SLA and prevented SLA members from undertaking illegal mining. During this period, RUF forces raided some villages in the south-east of the country.

As Executive Outcomes prevented the RUF from having access to Kono and, accordingly, to its diamonds, the RUF posed as condition for the signing of a peace agreement that Executive Outcomes leave the country. This condition was included into the text of the Abidjan Peace Agreement signed between the Government and the RUF on 30 November 1996. Two months later, Executive Outcomes pulled out of the District. After the military coup in May 1997, RUF forces came out of the bush and merged with the AFRC regime. Few incidents were reported for this period, as most of the RUF/AFRC activities were concentrated on mining. In fact, mining became more organised under the command of the RUF, who declared all mining areas to be their property. However, harassment of civilians increased and cases of physical violence, killing, rape and abductions were reported.

[912] Besides diamonds, kimberlite mineral and gold are also mined.

The third and final phase began in early 1998, following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown and the retreat of RUF/AFRC forces and concluded in August 2001, when the disarmament was declared complete in the District. This period is characterised by a substantial increase of violations committed by RUF/AFRC forces. Repelled from Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces arrived in Koidu in late February/early March and rapidly spread across the whole District. ECOMOG forces assisted by CDF members recaptured Koidu and other main towns on the highway in April 1998, sending RUF/AFRC forces into the bush, from where they continued to carry out "Operation No Living Thing". Hundreds of civilians were wounded, mutilated, killed, raped and abducted as part of this operation between February and May/June. During the second half of the year, the level of violations decreased, as the RUF/AFRC forces were more occupied with building huts to withstand the rainy season. At that time, most of the civilians had fled to Guinea and of those who stayed in the District, a lot of them were abducted to be trained in the training base RUF/AFRC forces had opened in Lei Chiefdom in the east of the District or to be used as workers in the mining areas in the west of the District. In December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces launched a massive operation and recaptured Koidu from ECOMOG forces. Throughout 1999 and 2000 and despite the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, RUF/AFRC forces accelerated their mining activities in the west of the District, where every single parcel of land was mined. A training base known as "Camp Lion" was opened in Yengema (Nimikoro Chiefdom), where hundreds of abductees from the Northern Province were brought for training. RUF/AFRC forces also continued their operations in the east of the District, in preparation for attacks onto the Guinean territory. Most of the RUF/AFRC raids during this period were carried out to search for food and above all to get more manpower, i.e. to abduct more people. Violations on civilians were still reported, in particular on those who were abducted. During those years, CDF forces launched attacks on RUF/AFRC positions, mainly in Sandor Chiefdom, in the north of the District and in the east, at the border with Guinea. These operations would continue until the completion of disarmament and the brokering of a deal to stop the illegal mining activities at the end of 2001.

## 2. Factual analysis

### a) Events in 1991

As a result of the attack on Pendembu[913] (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kailahun District), security personnel and the chiefdom authorities in Gbane Chiefdom, in the south of Kono District, called a meeting in April to discuss preventive measures. It was agreed during this meeting that towns and villages from the chiefdom should provide local hunters, known as Donsos and energetic youths for training, following which 200 men were trained by the Sierra Leone Police and the Special Security Division (SSD) with the support of the Paramount Chief of Gbane. At around this time, people from Kailahun District fleeing from RUF attacks, especially from Yawei Chiefdom, moved to Gbane Chiefdom and settled in the villages around Gandorhun and Koidu Buma towards the south of the chiefdom near the boundary with Kenema District. Before the war began affecting Kono District, SLA forces were deployed in Mafindor Chiefdom, at the border with Guinea. However, shortly after the attack on Gandorhun, they went to Gbane Chiefdom to join the troops posted there. The few forces who stayed in Mafindor Chiefdom were withdrawn in 1992 to Manjama, the SLA base in Soa Chiefdom in the south-east of Kono District.

[913] Pendembu is located on the road that enters Gbane chiefdom from Kailahun District.

On 5 June 1991, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces wearing American flag bandanas on their heads and armed with AK47s entered Koidu Buma (Gbane Chiefdom) through Yawei Chiefdom (Kailahun District). Gbane Chiefdom was the main entry point into diamond-rich Kono District, due to the highway that links Koidu with Gandorhun and Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom, Kailahun District). At Koindu Buma, they shot and killed a man who was trying to escape and searched houses for any valuable items, including food. Civilians were asked whether there were any Sierra Leone Army (SLA) forces in the town[914] and the RUF forces promised they would kill any SLA member they came across.

They did not stay long in Koidu Buma, soon moving onto Gandorhun, their target being the SLA forces. At this time, Gandorhun was, after Koidu Town, the biggest SLA deployment in Kono District. They were led to Gandorhun by a civilian they had recently conscripted, who showed them a bypass route. The RUF forces entered the town around 03.00 a.m. with sporadic firing, armed with AK47s, RPGs, grenades and knifes. In Gandorhun, they killed three people (two shot and one burnt to death) and captured others, among them the brother of a prominent Lebanese businessman and his two daughters.[915] A van belonging to a civilian was taken away and used to carry property stolen from the town to Kailahun District. Most of the population fled to other chiefdoms.

A few days later, on 8 June, a combined force of Sierra Leone Police, SLA, SSD and Donsos forces repelled the RUF, who went back to Kailahun District. However, two of these RUF members got lost in the forest and, after going without food for a few days, went to a farm to ask for food; youths at the farm went to Gandorhun to tell the SLA about the two men. SLA forces then captured the two RUF members and brought them to Koidu, where they were publicly tortured before being killed. Shortly after the attack on Gandorhun, SLA forces were sent from Freetown to Koidu Town and were deployed in the area under attack. RUF forces launched another attack on 9 June, but were repelled by SLA, SSD and Donsos.

During their stay in the chiefdom, those forces (SLA, SSD and Donsos) inflicted violence on civilians they accused of collaborating with RUF forces. In one instance, some people accused of being collaborators had rags and rubber placed around their necks, which were then set on fire, killing those people. This served as a signal for the population that they should not cooperate with the RUF in any way.[916]

As early as 1991, local hunters[917] known as Donsos were to be found in Mafindor, Gbane, and Soa Chiefdoms in the south of the District, at the border with Guinea and Kailahun District. Those

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[914] The RUF forces who entered the town referred to SLA forces as "Momoh's soldiers", from the name of the then Head of State.

[915] It is not clear from the records whether the two girls were the daughters of the prominent businessman or the daughters of his brother.

[916] The date of this event cannot be determined with certainty and may have taken place in 1992.

[917] Different groups of traditional hunters organised themselves throughout Sierra Leone to fight the advancing RUF/NPFL and, later, RUF forces in the country. They were originally equipped solely with bladed weapons and long guns. Those local hunters had different names, according to the tribe to which they belonged: Donsos in Kono District; Tamaboros in Koinadugu District; Kapras in Tonkolili District; Gbethies in Port Loko District and, to a lesser extent, Kambia District; and Kamajors in the Southern and Eastern Province (Moyamba, Bonthe, Bo,

from Mafindor were often sent to Sukudu, in the south of Soa Chiefdom near the Guinean border. During the second half of 1991, Donsos started organising themselves in Sandor Chiefdom, in the north of Kono District at the boundary with Koinadugu District. In late 1991, some Donsos came to the chiefdom headquarters of Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom) to be trained by SLA forces on guerrilla tactics, military manoeuvres and staging ambushes. At that time, the SLA military headquarters were in Ngaya. As the war intensified at the boundary between Kono and Kailahun Districts, SLA forces together with Donsos or vigilantes were deployed in strategic towns such as Yormandu and Tefeya (Sandor Chiefdom), at the border with Gbense Chiefdom. Yormandu is a strategic town as it is located over the Bafi River and had one of the longest bridges in Kono District. It is worth noting that at this time, only a few SLA forces were deployed with many local hunters, also called vigilantes, more of whom were trained later on. However, at that time, SLA forces continually told civilians that they were neglected by the Government, whose support for the local hunters extended only to the supply of ammunition.

In late 1991, the Paramount Chief of Mafindor Chiefdom and "important"[918] Kono Authorities gathered the population in Kainkordu, the headquarter town of Soa Chiefdom. They asked for the youths and the local hunters, the Donsos, to organise themselves into a Civil Defence Unit (CDU). The youths and local hunters did so and began to organise the security of the town and the chiefdom, mainly by establishing checkpoints in the headquarter town. It is interesting to note that this meeting and the formation of vigilantes and organisation of Donsos was directly encouraged by the State authorities and also took place in other villages and towns in Soa chiefdom. At this early stage of the existence of Donsos, an embryonic administrative structure was established to assist the hunters on the ground. Thus, the 14 chiefdoms of Kono District were taxed (Le 1,000 per house) and the money was sent to the CDU headquarters in Koidu. Donsos and youths then received this money to buy torches and other simple logistical equipment to assist with their function as watchmen. At this time also, the SLA deployed one Battalion at Manjama (Soa Chiefdom), which became a strong base. Youths, Donsos and SLA forces were working together, the youths and Donsos being of a great help to the SLA as they were more familiar with the local terrain.

On hearing of RUF attacks on Sukudu and Konjo (Soa Chiefdom) in December 1991, a convoy of nearly 150 SLA members together with 19 youths went there to retake the towns. However on their arrival, no RUF forces were to be found. In Sukudu, they found five dead civilians with bullet wounds and 27 houses totally burnt.[919] The fact that those youths joined the SLA forces to go and confront RUF forces was rather unusual at that time, as their main function was to operate checkpoints and to undertake patrols. Indeed, when they came back from this mission, their leader forwarded the information to their headquarters in Koidu. On receiving the information, CDU headquarters in Koidu sent two packets of shotgun cartridges. As cross-border raids were reported at the boundary with Kailahun District, the Paramount Chief of Soa exhorted the Donsos and vigilantes to advance towards the border to guard all the routes. The Youths' leader did not favour

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Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun Districts). In 1996, those local hunters would be organised under a national structure known as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).

[918] This delegation consisted of the then Member of Parliament for Kono North East, Soa Chiefdom Paramount Chief, Kono Senior District Officer, All People's Congress (APC) Secretary General, the Overall commander of Tankoro Chiefdom Police Station and others.

[919] The reports make no mention of any casualties in Konjo or in any of villages that were attacked on the way.

this, as they lacked weapons, and a meeting was convened in Koidu to decide on what action to take.[920] A few days later, other villages at the boundary with Kailahun District, including Maa and Workor, were also attacked, people were killed and houses burnt.[921] Civilians in these villages reported that the forces who attacked them were speaking Krio, Liberian and other languages; accordingly, they identified those forces as RUF from Sierra Leone, NPFL forces from Liberia and mercenaries from Burkina Faso. At around the same time, some youths based at Levuma (Soa Chiefdom, on the border with Kailahun District) captured a man they alleged to be a RUF collaborator. This man was brought to Manjama, where the SLA commander ordered him to be shot.

b) Events in 1992

In January 1992, RUF forces were to be found in the boundary villages between Yawei Chiefdom (Kailahun District) and Gbane Chiefdom, as well as in Gandorhun and its environs. After the attack on Gandorhun in 1991, the RUF forces had retreated to their base in Kailahun District.[922] This was the start of a series of battles between RUF forces and the combined forces of the SLA, SSD and Donsos. At that time, the combined forces killed some people suspected of being "rebel" collaborators, including by putting a tyre around the neck of suspects and setting fire to it.

At this time, local hunters from Sandor Chiefdom were sent to the south of the District where the RUF/NPFL forces were advancing. In February 1992, a military base was set up in Mboama (Gbane Chiefdom) and 30 SLA members together with 47 Donsos were deployed there.

A meeting gathering the young men of Nimikoro Chiefdom was summoned by the Chiefdom Speaker and an SLA officer in April 1992 at the chiefdom headquarters of Jaiama. The purpose of this meeting was to organise the young men into vigilante groups that could assist the SLA in defending the chiefdom from RUF/NPFL attacks. A lot of young men volunteered and received some training from the SLA.

A fierce battle took place in May 1992 in Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom), where the RUF forces were repelled from the chiefdom. The fighting continued sporadically and, shortly after, the RUF/NPFL managed to overpower the combined forces and establish their first permanent base in Kono District, which was used to attack the surrounding villages. The RUF/NPFL forces attacked Sidu (Gbane Chiefdom), at the boundary with Tankoro Chiefdom, in May. Donsos from Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom), eight miles from Sidu, informed the SLA forces deployed in Koidu of the advancing RUF/NPFL forces. The SLA therefore deployed in Baiama and Woama (Tankoro Chiefdom), where a battle took place between RUF/NPFL and SLA/Donsos. During these attacks, civilians were killed, property was taken and civilians were forced to carry the stolen property.[923] RUF/NPFL were bypassing the government forces in Woama to attack villages in Tankoro

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[920] Although there were no details about this meeting, it can be inferred that it was convened at the CDU headquarters. The result of this meeting could be the reinforcement of SLA forces to Manjama and the registration of armed Donsos in early 1992.

[921] The vigilantes found three dead civilian males in Maa and two burnt houses in Workor.

[922] During this time, RUF/NPFL forces had different bases in Kailahun District, the main one being in Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom, Kailahun District).

[923] No more information was available on these events.

Chiefdom, up to nearby Koidu. During these attacks, captured SLA forces and Donsos were killed, often after physical violence was inflicted on them.[924]

In October 1992, the RUF/NPFL forces finally drove the SLA forces from their base in Woama and established a second RUF/NPFL base there. This opened access to Koidu for the RUF/NPFL forces, since Woama is located on the Gandorhun-Koidu highway. The attack on Woama created panic among civilians in Koidu, who started to leave the town. SLA forces mounted checkpoints in Koidu to search the fleeing population for arms and suspected "rebels". For example, a prominent Tankoro Chiefdom authority was arrested at one of these checkpoints, suspected of being a "rebel" because he had in his briefcase a traditional dress like the one worn by local hunters. He was publicly tortured and beheaded in the main central area of Koidu.

Advancing RUF/NPFL forces captured an armoured car on 22 October 1992 from the SLA forces at Wordu, three miles south of Koidu. The RUF/NPFL forces burnt the car and a lot of SLA forces were killed. Some of the civilians who were fleeing the RUF/NPFL advance on Koidu drowned in the surrounding rivers, which had swollen following heavy rains. On 23 October 1992, RUF/NPFL forces launched an attack on Koidu from Woama. The following day, SLA forces together with some local hunters launched a counter attack on the town and repelled the RUF/NPFL forces. After this battle, the bodies of many civilians were left lying on the streets of the town, apparently caught in the crossfire as they tried to escape the fighting.[925] Houses were burnt and many civilians were abducted by RUF/NPFL forces, among them a foreign worker. In early December, RUF/NPFL forces attacked the town for the second time from the same direction and repelled the SLA forces as far as Yormandu (Sandor Chiefdom).[926] The RUF/NPFL forces also repelled the SLA forces deployed at Bumpe (Nimikoro Chiefdom), located on the Kono-Makeni highway, up to Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom), which is near the Sewa River. In Bumpe junction, one civilian, a Limba by tribe, was shot dead by the RUF/NPFL commander who also ordered that the wife of the man be killed.

The fall of Koidu to the RUF/NPFL forces was interpreted against the Kono tribe and especially against the Paramount Chiefs, who became the target of SLA forces. Shortly after the attack on the town, a car arrived in Koidu carrying the wife of the Fiama Paramount Chief, who was in the boot of the car with his hands tied behind his back, his eyes swollen. When they recognised the Paramount Chief, civilians fled the area, fearful of being recognised by the Paramount Chief, which they believed could cause problems for them with SLA forces. The Paramount Chief was then taken to Tekko Barracks in Makeni (Bombali District); his death was subsequently confirmed. The Tombodu SLA forces later released his wife, after she had been raped by an unspecified number of SLA members. Some reports mention that the Paramount Chief was arrested because he failed to cooperate with SLA forces while another mentions that the Paramount Chief might have been arrested on the allegation that he had been found performing some ritual after the successful advance of RUF forces. Other Paramount Chiefs and other authorities from the District were

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[924] During that time, it was alleged that SLA forces sometime abandoned their positions at the battlefront to go to Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom) to meet their relatives or to mine.

[925] This was inferred from the belongings found lying next to the bodies and needs to be clarified.

[926] It cannot be determined with certainty whether the bodies of civilians were found on the streets after the first or the second attack.

arrested and sent to Pademba Road prison in Freetown on the grounds they had aided and abetted the capture of Kono District by RUF forces.

By the end of 1992, RUF/NPFL forces were therefore controlling a vast area of Kono District, including the main roads leading to Koidu.[927] During their stay in Koidu, RUF/NPFL forces patrolled the surrounding villages in search of local hunters or pockets of SLA forces. During these patrols, the RUF/NPFL forces killed civilians, took property and abducted several civilians, taking them to Koidu to work for the RUF/NPFL forces. At Baiama, for example, about 60 men and women, including a prominent Kono authority, were taken away.

In a bid to repel the RUF/NPFL forces out of Koidu, an air campaign was undertaken, with the assistance of Nigerian Alpha Jets.[928]

When Koidu fell into the hands of the RUF/NPFL forces, most of its inhabitants left the town for Sandor Chiefdom, known to be an agricultural chiefdom full of hunters ready to defend their land. Those people coming to Sandor Chiefdom were searched at checkpoints by the SLA forces and the local hunters. During these searches, SLA forces or local hunters took whatever property they desired. Any civilians who resisted were molested and risked being termed as "rebel" collaborators, for which they could be killed. In addition, some civilians were killed for their money;[929] SLA forces and local hunters harassed businessmen in particular. At this time, Yormandu town, in the south of Sandor Chiefdom on the boundary with Kamara Chiefdom, was overcrowded with displaced people and many people were not able to sleep in houses, staying instead in the church, the mosque and the Court Barrie. Food, water and medical facilities rapidly became scarce and cholera broke out at Yormandu and Kayima, the chiefdom headquarter located in the north-west of the chiefdom, taking the lives of many people.

Another crowd of civilians left Koidu after it had been recaptured by RUF forces and headed through Nimikoro Chiefdom for Kangama (Gorama Kono Chiefdom in the south of the District). On their way to Kangama, they had to pass through many checkpoints controlled by local hunters. At Moinmadu (Nimikoro Chiefdom), they fell into an RUF/NPFL attack. In the early hours of the morning, a RUF member disguised as an Imam called the people for prayer.[930] Shortly after, the people who had gathered in the Mosque were surrounded by RUF/NPFL forces, who fired heavily in the air, capturing those in the mosque and other civilians in the town. Three civilians and a local hunter were killed in front of the Mosque and three men and a woman sustained serious injuries. Some young girls[931] were publicly raped. Two houses alleged to belong to the Kamajor commander of the area were burnt down. The people who had been captured were gathered in the Court Barrie and those who had food were forced to give it to the RUF/NPFL forces, who also accompanied

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927 It is interesting to note that these attacks on Koidu went virtually unreported in the media.

928 Inter Press Service, 18 December 1992. Since the middle of 1991, foreign troops, including Nigerians and Guineans forces were fighting alongside the SLA, further to bilateral agreements signed between Sierra Leone and Guinea and between Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

929 This information is reported in general terms and does not specify the exact location of every occurrence.

930 Kono District is predominantly Muslim and according to the Islam, a Muslim is bound to pray five times a day. Each of the five periods for prayers is preceded by a call, known as adhaan. The early morning prayer may be offered any time within two hours after dawn.

931 Although the exact age is not reported, it is mentioned that they were under age.

other civilians to fetch water and food from elsewhere. During this, some civilians managed to escape, which led the commander to punish his forces who had gone to the bush with the civilians by lashing them and locking them in a veranda near the Court Barrie. After three days, the RUF/NPFL forces together with their captives took a bush path towards Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom, south east of Nimikoro Chiefdom), which at that time was one of their strongholds. On their way, local hunters attacked the convoy and successfully overran the RUF/NPFL forces. The civilians who had been with the RUF/NPFL forces were then brought to Tikonko in the north of Gorama Kono Chiefdom.

As Donsos from Sandor Chiefdom needed logistics, food, medicine and ammunition, a mass meeting was summoned at the chiefdom headquarters of Kayima probably in late October to provide assistance to the hunters. At the meeting, it was agreed that each taxpayer should contribute Le 500[932] and a few cups of rice every month.

In November 1992, hunters from Tefeyah (Sandor Chiefdom) spread the news that a man was killed by uniformed men believed to be "rebels", who took his money and diamonds. It was, however, later said that these uniformed men were not "rebels" but SLA forces, who did this because they had heard a few days earlier that the man had diamonds. Supporting this theory, it was said that it was highly unlikely that RUF forces would come to a big town like Tefeyah to kill only one person.

A convoy of an unspecified number of armed and unarmed men, women and children – namely RUF/NPFL forces and their captives – coming from the direction of Koidu arrived in Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom) in late November. They stayed in the town for only one hour, killing some people, breaking doors, gathering anything that was of interest for them and abducting some civilians before heading through Manjama (Soa Chiefdom) to Sandaru, the RUF/NPFL base in Penguia Chiefdom (Kailahun District). This road, which links Koidu with Kainkordu and Penguia Chiefdom (Kailahun District), was often used by RUF forces in search of food. Also in Soa chiefdom, on 8 December, an RUF commander escorted by some men arrived in the chiefdom headquarter of Kainkordu. On his arrival, he explained that his movement, the RUF, had come to put an end to the APC regime and that it now controlled the whole of Kailahun, Kono and Pujehun Districts, as well as part of Kenema District.[933] He further said that the people from Soa Chiefdom should join the movement and celebrate the presence of their "new government". He mounted green pieces of material on top of a high pole as a symbol that this was now RUF-controlled territory and appointed men and women as the new authorities of the chiefdom.

The mobilisation of youths and local hunters was reinforced and structured by the creation of Eastern Region Civil Defence Committee, aiming at mobilising "well-meaning Sierra Leoneans" to

[932] This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone's position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2.000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4.000 SLL) per day: see UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.

[933] The loss of Kono and Kailahun Districts to the hands of the RUF/NPFL forces had a significant impact on the economy, as most of Sierra Leone's income came from the production of cash crops in Kailahun District and the mining activities in Kono District. Following the capture of Koidu by the RUF/NPFL forces, the National Diamond Mining Co. ceased its operations: Mining Annual Review, 1 July 1993.

fight alongside the SLA. This committee was composed of representatives of Kenema, Kailahun and Kono Districts, with some from Freetown.[934]

c) Events in 1993

In January, SLA forces coming from Freetown were deployed at Sewafe Bridge (Nimiyama Chiefdom) and merged with another group who had retreated from Koidu. Those SLA forces recaptured Sewafe town and advanced further on the Koidu highway together with local hunters known as Tamaboros from Koinadugu, Guinean forces and ULIMO-K members. They launched different attacks in Nimikoro, Nimiyama and Tankoro Chiefdoms, successfully driving out RUF forces from the areas previously under their control. Koidu was retaken in the same wave of attacks, on 22 January.[935] SLA forces from the Moa Barracks in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District) also took control of Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom).

Those combined forces were heavily armed with tanks, armoured personnel carriers, AA guns and AK47s. They made several deployments in the area, including Koidu, and started patrolling villages and towns around Koidu in search of "rebels" and "rebel" collaborators, which led to the killing of many civilians accused of being "rebel" collaborators or sympathisers. The commanding officer[936] ordered all the civilians living in the areas formerly under RUF/NPFL control to move to Ngor Town, which is located after the Sewa Bridge in Mimiyama Chiefdom, where the first displaced camp was opened for the people of Kono.[937] Shortly after, SLA forces engaged in massive looting, as civilians had left their homes.

After the first group of Tamaboros[938] arrived in January 1993, a second group came in July. The Donsos also stepped up their presence and were active in Yormandu (Sandor Chiefdom) and Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom) in January, in Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) between March and August and at the border between Soa Chiefdom and Kailahun District and in Kangama (Gorama Kono) in December.

In early 1993, Kono authorities complained to the Government about looting and harassment by SLA forces during the previous month, so the Government sent a new SLA commander to Kono District. Following his arrival, the SLA forces based in Koidu started issuing passes for civilians relocated in the IDP camp who wished to visit their homes to check their belongings. Nigerian forces arrived in Koidu, while some SLA and Guinean forces moved to attack RUF/NPFL positions in Kailahun District. The Nigerian forces encouraged civilians to return and resettle in their villages. SLA and Nigerian troops were based in different strategic towns like Yengema, near the Kono-Makeni highway in Nimikoro Chiefdom; Tombodu, a diamond-rich town in Kamara

934 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 December 1992.

935 No information was obtained on the casualties sustained during those attacks.

936 It cannot be inferred from the information collected whether this commanding officer was controlling all the combined forces, or just the SLA forces or the Guinean troops.

937 Around the same period, other camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) were operational in the country, notably in Gondama (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District), where thousands of civilians from Pujehun District found refuge.

938 Local hunters from Koinadugu.

Chiefdom; and Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom), where they encouraged civilians to mine for diamonds.[939] Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) was a commercial centre and was the arrival and departure point for passenger helicopters flying to and from Freetown. Thus, by the end of 1993, most of the civilians who had earlier left the chiefdom came back to Kamara Chiefdom, as it was free of RUF presence.

However, those SLA forces killed an unspecified number of civilians suspecting of being RUF members or sympathisers. Those executions took place at Bendu II, where the bodies were dumped in a mass grave. In separate incident, another group of SLA members, who had replaced those who had arrested the Paramount Chief of Fiama, arrested a civilian and shot him twice without giving reasons. His body was left on the ground and a few civilians buried him afterwards. Also at Tombodu, Tamaboros coming from Koinadugu District to help the SLA forces drive the RUF out of the country undertook massive screening of civilians. As part of this process, in March,[940] 2,000 civilians were gathered in the Court Barrie to be screened by the Tamaboros, headed by a woman dressed in traditional hunter attire. Some members of the SLA were also gathered at the Court Barrie. The woman conducted the screening through her mirror, which allegedly allowed her to assess whether a person was a "genuine civilian" or a "rebel". Those who were identified as "rebels" were either killed or sent to Pademba Road Prison in Freetown. After the screening process, civilians were given a pass that allowed them to move freely in the chiefdom and beyond without fearing of being molested or suspected of being a "rebel". People commonly gave the nickname "Unmolested" to this pass, which was issued by SLA officers.

Some Kono elites came together and formed an organisation called Koeyor, the primary objective of which was to restore dignity to the people of Kono. Together with the Kono Students Union, they pleaded for the release of the Kono Paramount Chiefs and other authorities who had been detained by the NPRC regime.

RUF forces were active in the eastern chiefdoms in the District during the first half of 1993, which was marked by incidents of killing and the destruction of property. For example, in Sukudu, at the beginning of the year, a prominent farmer had both of his arms chopped off. RUF forces tied a letter around his neck telling the then Head of State, Captain Strasser, that they were "still in control". In Kundima (Soa Chiefdom), five elderly people were killed in January by RUF forces. Their bodies showed machete wounds and one woman appeared to have had her head smashed on a rock. In February, RUF forces also attacked Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom). Returning civilians later discovered 40 houses that had been completely burnt down and 27 bodies, which they buried in a dug out toilet in the southern part of the town. At that time, RUF forces also attacked Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) for the second time, although there were no reported casualties.

SLA harassment of civilians was also reported in Mafindor and Gbane Kandor Chiefdoms. For example, cattle belonging to a civilian was taken and killed for food for the SLA forces. In Koardu (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom), civilians were locked up in the SLA guardroom and beaten if they complained about the behaviour of the SLA forces. Similar acts took place in Dunamaor (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom), where SLA forces entered the village, firing their weapons. As they began to

[939] It cannot however be inferred from the records whether the civilians were mining for the Nigerian and SLA forces or for themselves, with the encouragement of those forces.

[940] This screening process probably continued in April and May and is also reported in Koinadugu District.

take people's poultry, one SLA member asked a man to give them his torch as well, which he refused to do. This refusal was not taken well by the SLA forces, who chased the man into the bushes. As he was hiding in the bushes, they took property from his house and assembled all the women and men of the village to punish them in order to find out where the man was hiding.[941] The matter was later settled as the man's sister gave the SLA forces some money, some cups of rice and a chicken.

In addition, acts of physical violence, torture and killing of suspected "rebel" collaborators also took place. In May 1993, SLA forces were looking for two civilians whom they suspected of being "rebel" collaborators. As the nephew of one of those two wanted men was alleged to be on his way to warn his uncle, SLA forces arrested him in Gbamandufao (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom). His head was shaved with a piece of broken bottle and he was told to eat his hair, which had been mixed with sand. He then was hit with a bayonet before being brought to Koardu, where more violence was inflicted on him. He was then brought to Manjama (Soa Chiefdom) to ascertain whether he was a "rebel", where he was eventually killed. Another suspected "rebel" collaborator in Koardu (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom) was tied up, made to lie down in the sun and was severely beaten. In Ndanbadu, in September, a man was severely beaten then brought to Koardu, where he was locked in a guardroom because he had asked why the SLA members were taking people's cattle.

In the meantime, the Donsos were trying to resist to RUF attacks. In June, they deployed alongside the border with Kailahun District. In mid 1993, SLA forces were deployed in Soa Chiefdom and for the rest of the year, the area was almost free of RUF attacks.

Following rumours of an approaching RUF attack on Kangama (Gorama Kono Chiefdom) and its environs in October 1993, a meeting was summoned in the town in early December. The purpose of this meeting was to motivate the youths of the chiefdom to be initiated into the Kamajors society and to take up arms.[942] After this meeting, between 100 and 200 youths registered to join the society. In mid December, 150 of these youths came back to the town with a gallon of palm oil and 10 cups of rice each for logistic support. They were then taken to a place called Jagbwema Kamba to be initiated into the Kamajors society. The initiator was also the initiator for Gorama Mende and Lower Bambara Chiefdoms (Kenema District). The initiates stayed in the bush for three weeks before returning to Kangama Town in early January 1994.

Following successful SLA attacks on RUF positions in Kailahun District in late 1993, Kono District was declared safe and IDPs from Ngor camp were repatriated to Koidu by the Government with the help of some Non-Governmental Organisations.[943]

Around the same period, the SLA had recaptured most of the RUF positions in Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, which led the NPRC Chairman to declare a unilateral ceasefire on 1 December

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[941] The type and duration of punishment they received were not specified.

[942] No Kamajor initiation had, however yet take place in the country, not even in the Southern Province, from where it originated. Accordingly, this information about the Kamajors may simply mean that youths and local hunters gathered, as they did in Kenema District, but were not initiated by an initiator as such.

[943] In September, the NPRC Secretary General announced that the situation in Kono was calm and civilians could go back to their villages without hindrance: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 September 1993.

1993. This ceasefire was however largely violated, as RUF forces launched a massive operation in Kenema District in late December.

d) Events in 1994[944]

By the end of January and following the renewal of hostilities in the Eastern Province and in Pujehun District, the NPRC Chairman declared "total war" against the RUF.

In early 1994, returning chiefs created the Kono Council of Paramount Chiefs, chaired by the Paramount Chief of Mafindor Chiefdom, with the consent of the NPRC Commanding Officer Secretariat in Kono.[945]

RUF forces were reported to be in Baiama, in the south of Tankoro Chiefdom, in early 1994, where they burnt houses and raped girls. In March, they reached Levuma, a village of 70 houses south of Tankoro Chiefdom, near the border with Gorama Kono Chiefdom, where 70 people where shot and killed. This action was allegedly undertaken in reprisal for the local hunters attacking RUF positions and for the civilians' lack of support for the RUF movement. The Gorama Kono Kamajors subsequently launched an attack on Levuma and, after retaking control of the town, buried the corpses of the 70 victims in a mass grave in town, since burying them outside the town ran the risk of an encounter with RUF forces. During the RUF counter attack on Foindu (Gorama Kono Chiefdom, at the border with Tankoro Chiefdom), 10 houses were burnt, five people were killed, girls were raped and people were abducted. Others were wounded with cutlasses, including the Section Chief of Tankoro Chiefdom.

By April, the Tamaboros who had helped the SLA repelling the RUF/NPFL forces out of Koidu in January 1993 moved back to the Northern Province, their region of origin, to fight the RUF advance.[946]

In May, more local hunters were gathered in Gorama Kono Chiefdom,[947] thereby enabling them to retake Foindu from the RUF. Other towns in Gorama Kono were also the site of fighting between Kamajor and RUF forces. As rumours spread about an attack on Kangama, the main Kamajor base for the whole chiefdom, up to 124 more youths were initiated into the Kamajor society. The anticipated attack on Kangama took place in September 1994 and after the Kamajors succeeded in countering the RUF forces, the chiefdom was free from RUF incursions until 1995. In order to ensure security, the Kamajors laid constant ambushes on the four entry points from neighbouring chiefdoms, namely at Nimiyama, Nimikoro, Tankoro and Gbane Chiefdoms.

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[944] It should be noted that the information for 1994, 1995 and to a certain extent 1996 is sometimes confused and inconsistent. The information related in this report for this period was thoroughly crosschecked, notably in correlation with what happened in other places at the same time, but although there can be no doubt on the actual occurrence of the events, the exact date of those events cannot be ascertained with any certainty.

[945] The main aim of the traditional authorities was to defend their District but no more information could be obtained on its precise role. It, however highlights how local authorities organised themselves to defend their land against RUF incursions.

[946] Inter Press Service, 21 April 1994.

[947] This gathering of local hunters at that time did not encompass initiation as such. Initiation ceremonies would not be performed in the Eastern Province before 1996.

In 1994, the taking of property was common by all factions, including RUF forces, SLA forces and Donsos, and businessmen were common targets. For example, at Yormandu, on a Friday market day, an SLA member killed a businessman for his money, approximately 4,000 to 5,000 US dollars. At Mansundu, another businessman was killed and his money was taken.

The Donsos were active in Sandor Chiefdom and were sometimes attacked by RUF forces during small-scale operations. In mid 1994, RUF forces entered Yormandu, where they killed one police officer and abducted the Donsos deputy chief's daughter. By the end of the year, 2,000 hunters were registered in Sandor Chiefdom.[948]

SLA forces were harsh with civilians they suspected of abiding or collaborating with the RUF, which led to disunity between civilians and the SLA. Civilians were also harassed without being suspected of being a RUF member and, in particular in diamond-rich Kamara Chiefdom, acts of violence and molestation were inflicted on civilians by SLA forces engaged in illegal mining, who used and took civilians' properties and abducted women to be their "wives". The smuggling of diamonds was at its peak during this period. At the same time, some civilian members of the NPRC regime organised themselves in a group called "Convoy" and engaged in mining activities, molesting any authority or landowner who stood in their way.[949] A lot of small mining companies sprang up in this way.

In addition, SLA forces sometimes disguised themselves as RUF forces and attacked villages. For example, in Yorkordu (Sandor Chiefdom), located near the Bafin River, seven SLA members took property from the village before falling into a hunters' ambush. These attacks suspected to be carried out by SLA members pretending to be RUF forces led to disunity between local hunters and SLA forces and at Bakidu, SLA forces pretending to be RUF and who came to attack towns along the river were drowned by Donsos. Around the same time, between Mansundu and Worko (Sandor Chiefdom), RUF forces killed four SLA members, cut off their heads and displayed them on sticks.

A fierce RUF attack took place during that year in Yatandoe (Fiama Chiefdom).[950] RUF forces, who were believed to have come from different directions, attacked the town with heavy firepower. During the course of their stay in the town, houses were burnt, people killed and women raped. A specific event was the chopping off of the two arms of one SLA member. Some civilians were abducted and taken to Kailahun. Civilians who sought refuge in the bush were chased by the RUF forces, who shot and killed some of them, looted and set on fire the huts built in the bush, known as "mansion". People from Fiama Chiefdom stayed in the bush until Executive Outcomes came to Kono District in 1995.

SLA forces remained in Mafindor and Gbane Kandor Chiefdoms, which were virtually free of RUF activity. However, SLA harassment of civilians, which was common during previous years, continued throughout 1994. In February, SLA forces requested the civilians from Sangema (Gbane

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948 The reported information concerning Sandor Chiefdom was confused and did not allow us to expand our analysis on this chiefdom. Although it is likely that the information reported above did take place in 1994, it may have taken place at a different date and no more information was available on these events.

949 These civilians were called the "blue eye boys" and the nature of their relations with the NPRC regime it is not clear from the records. These mining activities were also carried out in 1995.

950 The date was not specified for this incident.

Kandor Chiefdom) to come to Koardu to brush the roads. As they did not get the message early enough and accordingly did not show up on time for the work, the civilians were gathered in Sangema and made to sit on the ground. As one of the civilians tried to reach a compromise with the SLA forces, he was hit with a weapon on his head. The SLA forces present in the village also took goats and poultry. The matter was reported to the SLA officer in charge in Manjama, who ordered the arrest of the SLA members involved.[951] Another incident relates the fate of one woman in Marrah (Mafindor Chiefdom) in March, who was beaten and kicked by a member of the SLA, who accused her of having planned to sabotage the NPRC regime.

From November 1994, SLA forces were no longer based in Mafindor Chiefdom, although they were still patrolling the chiefdom. In Soa Chiefdom, SLA forces were still deployed in Manjama. Also in Soa Chiefdom, a jet bombardment was heard between Kongomadu and Theyor, which was believed to have been ECOMOG forces missing an RUF position.

f) Events in 1995

During this year, SLA forces were occupied with mining activities, leaving the security of the District to the under-equipped Donsos. During the first months of the year, the RUF forces succeeded in capturing major towns, including Koidu, in the wealthy west of the District, before being repelled in May and June by the combined forces of SLA, Executive Outcomes and local hunters.

In early 1995, RUF forces attacked Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom), advancing within a week on Woama (Tankoro Chiefdom) and then on Motema (Nimikoro Chiefdom). In this way, they approached Koidu town, which created panic among the inhabitants. In Motema, six police officers were killed, as well as a prominent Chief. The retreating SLA forces settled in Kamara and Sandor Chiefdoms, harassing civilians and taking their property.

RUF forces took advantage of the fact that SLA forces were more occupied with mining activities than with protecting the District borders. It has been suggested that junior SLA forces embarked on mining because they were suffering in their areas of deployment, as they did not receive much support from the Government and their officers were enriching themselves by mining diamonds. Furthermore, the attack on Motema, which is located on the Koidu-Makeni highway, created an increase in prices and a shortage of essential items in Koidu town, as the highway was no longer accessible.

In late April 1995, RUF forces launched their attack on Koidu. At this time, confusion arose in the mind of civilians about the identity of the fighting forces in control of the town. The RUF forces successfully captured one part of the bridge but the identification of the forces occupying the other part was unclear. Civilians thought that they may either be "loyal soldiers", namely SLA members fighting for the Government, or they may be "sobels".[952] This attack is referred to as "the second attack", "phase II", or "5:05" by civilians from Koidu. Unlike the first attack, which took place in late 1992, RUF forces used heavy calibre weapons such as mortar bombs, RPGs and LMGs. During

[951] The SLA members in question were not arrested.

[952] This term refers to either SLA members who joined the RUF movement but who still used their SLA uniforms, so people thought they were fighting for the Government, or SLA members who, although they did not join the RUF as such, were acting as if they were "rebels", adopting the same behaviours.

the attack, a lot of civilians were killed and RUF forces took property from hundreds of houses and abducted many people, either to work in the mines or to carry their loads. Shortly after, RUF forces took control of the whole town.

After the attack on Koidu, RUF forces fanned out and attacked many more places, which soon fell under their control. During these attacks, people were ill-treated and killed and property was taken or destroyed, including houses. For example, RUF forces who were on their way to Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) cut off a woman's nose. Shortly afterwards, RUF forces attacked Tombodu. After the attack, inhabitants who returned to pack some belongings saw three houses burnt down and two bodies, although the actual levels of destruction and killing were likely to be much higher. Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom headquarter, in the south of the chiefdom) was attacked and all the houses were burnt down. Some young women and men were abducted and taken to Koidu, which was at this time under RUF control. The abducted men were forced to carry the stolen property. RUF forces also proceeded further north and attacked Yormandu, south of Sandor Chiefdom, following the local hunters up to Bandu, three miles south-east of Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom headquarters).[953]

The April attack on Koidu led to a massive exodus of the population towards Kamara Chiefdom and towards the villages of Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) and Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom). In Jagbwema, fleeing civilians met with armed men in new uniforms, which led them to think they were SLA forces coming to recapture Koidu. However, shortly after their arrival, one of these armed men shot a civilian in the chest for asking them who they were. These armed men took personal effects and money from the civilians and burnt down one prominent businessman's house. While in their hiding place in the bush, fleeing people in Soa Chiefdom heard on the BBC "Focus on Africa" Program that "white men had come to Koidu".[954] RUF forces used Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) as their base to lead ambushes in the area, during which some civilians were tortured and raped.[955]

During the same period, people suspected of being "rebel collaborators" were arrested and imprisoned by SLA forces. The NPRC regime imprisoned a lot of authorities they accused of collaboration with RUF forces at Pademba Road Prison in Freetown. At this time, further doubts were raised about the identity of the fighting forces carrying out certain actions, because it was reported that some SLA members organised road ambushes, attacking vehicles for their merchandise and specifically targeting businessmen, taking their belongings and, sometimes, killing them.

Between May and June 1995, a combined force of SLA, ULIMO-K and the CDU advanced from Sewa Bridge (Nimiyama Chiefdom) to recapture Koidu. On their way, they stopped for one week in Bumpe (Nimikoro Chiefdom), waiting for reinforcements from Executive Outcomes.[956] Executive

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953 The casualties for all these attacks are however not reported.

954 This refers to the coming of Executive Outcomes, a mercenary company from South Africa.

955 This information was related in general terms and does not specify the precise location of the events nor the exact date.

956 The precise dates of the coming of Executive Outcomes in the District could not be inferred from the records. However, it was crosschecked and corroborated with open sources that Koidu was recaptured by these combined forces in June.

Outcomes arrived in the same month after having completed their first military encounter in Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and advanced from Bumpe junction to recapture Koidu. RUF forces attacked those forces at Bumpe but were defeated and 17 of them were killed.[957] By the end of June 1995, Executive Outcomes, together with SLA forces, had removed the RUF forces from Sewa Bridge, Yormandu, Tombodu Chiefdom, Koidu and villages surrounding Koidu.[958] They moved towards Koidu from three different directions, encountering little resistance from RUF forces as they had superior firepower.
Executive Outcomes organised meetings in some chiefdom headquarters, encouraged hunters to organise themselves, gave them military training, especially on how to operate weapons, and supplied them with logistics,[959] shotguns and eight round automatic rifles, which did not please the SLA forces. Executive Outcomes went on patrol with Donsos, due to their knowledge of the territory, seldom taking SLA members with them. They also encouraged civilians to participate in their own security as watchmen, notably during a general meeting in Koidu that gathered thousands of civilians together. During a meeting at Tombodu, Executive Outcomes demonstrated to the people how they could participate in the security network, using a "Spider Web" diagram. The Kono District Defence Committee[960] was reorganised and, as the Executive Outcome commander wished to involve the Kono people in the maintenance of security in the District, the Kono Consultative Committee (KCC) was formed. The KCC, besides the Kono District Defence Committee, embraced all facets of the Kono community. The initial meeting of the KCC took place in August, in the presence of 12 Paramount Chiefs,[961] which was followed by regular meetings to discuss security questions.

Donsos, the local hunters, entered Yormandu in July and at this time, Sandor Chiefdom was divided into different zones, each of them placed under the command of a different hunter. Donsos, focused on liberating their chiefdoms, did not rely on SLA forces because of their impression that those SLA forces were quick to run away during RUF attacks.

People began returning to Koidu but due to the scarcity of food, they had to search for food in the surrounding villages. As they did so, they ran into pockets of RUF forces who, when driven out from Koidu, relocated mainly at Potema Camp, Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom) and Bandafarda Camp, near Motema (Nimikoro Chiefdom). During these encounters, a large number of people were abducted and some were killed or mutilated.[962]

Probably in the middle of August, RUF forces coming from the Tongo route[963] attacked Njaiama, headquarter town of Nimikoro Chiefdom and burnt the residence of the Chiefdom Speaker and the Court Barrie. They were repelled by SLA forces, assisted by local hunters. The SLA commander advised the residents of the town to stay indoors whenever there was a RUF attack on the town.

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957 AFP, 28 June 1995.
958 Officially, Executive Outcomes had been engaged solely to train the SLA on military tactics but many reports for Kono District recounted that they came to the District to help repelling the RUF forces.
959 *This training took place at District Office Barracks at Koidu and, after their training, the Donsos returned to their chiefdoms.*
960 See the developments on this point in the year 1994
961 Kono District has 14 chiefdoms.
962 No details could be obtained on this incident.
963 Tongo is located in Lower Bambara Chiefdom (Kenema District). The road leading Tongo to Koidu passes by Gorama Kono Chiefdom, south of Nimikoro Chiefdom.

One week later, gunshots from the direction of Njala, a very big town a few miles away, were heard in Njaiama. Indeed, RUF forces, dressed in military uniforms, attacked Njala around 28 August. During this attack, over 50 people were killed and several houses burnt down. The RUF forces then moved on to Njaiama, where over 90 people where killed and houses were burnt. During these RUF attacks on Njala and Njaiama, many civilians were wounded and several more went missing, presumably captured by the RUF forces, although some were later discovered dead in the bushes. SLA forces who had pulled out of the town at the time of the attack regrouped and assisted by local hunters and Executive Outcomes, recaptured the town: A house-to-house search was carried out to bury the dead, who numbered 97 in total, spread over six different locations in the town.[964]

SLA forces came from time to time to Mafindor Chiefdom during the first half of the year, often harassing civilians. For example, one group of SLA forces regularly carried out raids to confiscate civilian property, on one occasion beating the Chief of Sandia village. These actions ceased during the second half of the year, when the rainy season made the roads impassable. In Lei Chiefdom, which is a rich cattle-grazing area, SLA forces killed cattle belonging to civilians and forced the civilians to carry the meat to Koidu; similar events also took place in 1996. For example, in one incident which took place in the chiefdom headquarter of Saiama, some SLA members killed six cows in a pen and required the caretakers of the pen to bring the meat to Koidu. When two of them refused, they were severely beaten by the SLA forces and forced to take the meat to Koidu as previously requested. This incident was reported to the Paramount Chief of Lei, who explained to the owner of the cows that he was not the first to report such matters. As a result, the Paramount Chief had already complained to the Colonel in charge of the SLA in Koidu, who had assured him that he had taken all necessary steps to stop SLA members doing such things. The Colonel had also told the Paramount Chief that he would alert the Military Police around the chiefdom to arrest any SLA member coming to the chiefdom without an official reason.[965] Nevertheless, similar actions continued even after the complaints of the Paramount Chief and the reassurances from the SLA Colonel.

In Soa Chiefdom, during the months of July to September, RUF forces believed to come from Kailahun District attacked different villages, mainly on a "hit and run" basis, searching for food and targeting villages with master farms. At this time, Donsos were active in Kainkordu and along the border villages, so RUF forces came in small groups and did not undertake sustained attacks. Rather, they would enter a village, take property and leave straightaway, as they were afraid of the Donsos based in some villages. During these raids, people were wounded, killed and forced to carry stolen property. These types of attacks took place in Bongema, Kuandor and Kainkordu. In Kainkordu, for example, one house was burnt and men and women were abducted to carry the property stolen in the village. One of these abductees was later shot dead outside Kainkordu.

In late 1995, Executive Outcomes, SLA and local hunters launched a massive attack on RUF positions at Woama and Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom), where the RUF forces had their main camp in Potema. Donsos were able to provide Executive Outcomes with information and directions on

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964 Some blamed the SLA for these attacks on Njala and Njaiama, as they were frustrated in their mining activities by Executive Outcomes: Inter Press Service, 6 September 1995.

965 It cannot, however, be inferred from the reports whether Military Police did arrest any SLA member or took any other kind of action.

RUF positions, following which local hunters were deployed at Baiama and SLA forces at Woama. After a last unsuccessful RUF attempt[966] to attack Koidu where RUF forces bypassed SLA forces at Woama and were stopped at Woardu by Executive Outcomes, those chiefdoms located in the centre and the west of the District became relatively quiet. It is interesting to note that during some encounters between Executive Outcomes and the RUF, some of the RUF members who were killed were identified as ex-SLA, through the SLA identity cards found on their bodies.

f) Events in 1996

Executive Outcome mercenaries controlled illicit mining in Kono District, their presence minimising the ill treatment of civilians by SLA forces. They reprimanded undisciplined SLA forces and in one incident, killed 72 SLA members, described as "sobels",[967] at Kaneya in the outskirts of Koidu. Executive Outcomes patrolled together with Donsos who also continued to man checkpoints. For these reasons, their presence contributed to the stability of the security situation in Kono District and, to an extent, offset the economic consequences for the District of the incessant RUF ambushes on the Kono–Makeni Highway.

Around this time, it was alleged that Executive Outcomes was given a concession on the Tankoro Kimberlite mining site. The mercenary company was brought to the area by Branch Energy Ltd, a British company that secured a mining lease in the area and said it would hire its own security force. It was therefore believed that Executive Outcomes was taking a cut in the mining activities.[968]

At the border with Guinea and Kailahun District, Sandor Chiefdom was mainly protected by the Donsos and not by Executive Outcomes. This chiefdom was free from RUF incursions throughout 1996.

In Lei Chiefdom, SLA harassment of civilians continued, including sexual assault. At one point in 1996, some civilians came to Senehun, located on the highway going to the chiefdom headquarters of Saiama, to mourn the death of the town chief. Some SLA members asked some of them for a goat and as they explained that they had already given their only goat to some other SLA forces the day before, they were told that they should replace the goat with a woman. The civilians explained that there was no unmarried woman in the town. However, the SLA forces came across a young woman who had also came to the village on hearing of the death of the town chief. They took her away and, as she told them she was not married, they threatened the civilians with beatings as they lied to them about there being no unmarried women in the town. The woman was raped by the four SLA members during the night and then released, so the SLA members could avoid being disciplined by their commander. The incident was reported to a senior SLA commander but no action was taken.[969]

In Gbane Chiefdom, RUF forces intimated voters on Election Day in an effort to prevent them from voting by sporadically firing their weapons. After the elections, some people fled the chiefdom,

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[966] This event took place between late December 1995 and early 1996.

[967] See earlier note 42 for an explanation of this term.

[968] See The Mining Journal, 8 March 1996 and Inter Press Service, 11 March 1996. Around September 1996, Executive Outcomes would also be contracted by Sieromco, a company mining Bauxite in Moyamba District.

[969] The month of the occurrence of the incident could not be ascertained.

fearing the warning given by the RUF that they would amputate the hands of those who had voted for the newly-elected President, Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.[970] Furthermore, people in Kono heard that in some parts of the country under RUF control, especially in Kailahun District, people's hands were cut off and their mouths padlocked as a punishment for having voted.

After the elections, SLA forces were deployed all around the country in strategic positions, except some parts of Kailahun District. One battalion was deployed in Gbongbokoro (Soa Chiefdom), which is on the Guinean border and is a crossing point to one of Guinea's most prominent market centres called Gueckedou. However, dissent began to ferment within the SLA forces for not being treated by the Government with the respect and the honour they deserved, while hunters (Kamajors and Donsos) were respected by the Government. For example, in August 1996, armed men believed to be SLA forces attacked Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom) and killed the treasury clerk, allegedly because the SLA forces held the treasury clerk responsible for bad reports against them being sent from the chiefdom authorities. Compounding their dissatisfaction, the President's address to the nation at the national Stadium in Freetown after the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement did not please the SLA forces, especially when he made particular mention of the Kamajors for the very outstanding job they did to put an end to the war.

RUF forces attacked Kangama (Gorama Kono) in October 1996, entering the town with heavy firing. They killed one woman and shot two other people in their hips, who were later taken for treatment to Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District). The RUF forces took all the property they could find in the town and abducted two boys to carry the load for them to their base, allegedly at Peyama (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District). One Friday in the same month, a meeting was summoned at the Court Barrie as information reached Kangama authorities about the Kamajor initiation that was taking place in Kenema District.[971] It was agreed that young men should be initiated to protect the chiefdom and a message was conveyed to the Paramount Chief of Gorama Kono Chiefdom, who was at that time in Koidu, to put in place modalities for the initiation. His chiefdom speaker made the shuttle between Koidu and Kangama to organise the initiation. Money was borrowed from a produce buying agent in Koidu for the initiation and 30 energetic men were selected by the elders. The 30 young newly initiated Kamajors were then provided with single and double barrel guns and deployed in different part of the town.

Also in October 1996, RUF forces attacked Bamba (Soa Chiefdom) and burnt down 32 houses. They then headed to Sukudu, south of Soa Chiefdom, where they captured people, including children, and forced them to carry heavy loads to an unknown location. SLA forces based at Yigbeda (Soa Chiefdom) advanced to Sukudu and some of their members deployed there. Two weeks later, still in October, RUF forces attacked the town of Kongonani, six miles from Sukudu, where they killed civilians, including men, women and children, before being repelled by SLA forces, who had came from Sukudu on hearing the sounds of gunfire. Before retreating, RUF forces abducted some civilians and brought them to Kailahun District. Stolen property was also transported to Liberia by boat, crossing the river bordering Sierra Leone and Liberia. While a

[970] By the end of the year, Gbane Chiefdom was a "no-go" area, as the fighting factions were hunting each other across the chiefdom, leading civilians to flee the area.

[971] This information backs up the previous assertions that no Kamajor initiations as such took place in Gorama Kono Chiefdom in late 1993 and early 1994.

meeting was in progress in Sukudu with SLA forces and local authorities in December, RUF forces again attacked Sukudu and killed the Section Chief of Sawa Fiama Section. SLA forces retreated to Yigbeda but later, still in December, they came back to Sukudu and warned civilians that they were planting mini-landmines along the road RUF forces were using to attack Soa Chiefdom, which caused the death of some of the RUF forces and allegedly led to the ceasing of attacks on villages in the chiefdom.

The Abidjan Peace Accord, signed on 30 November 1996, stated that the war was ended with immediate effect. It required that Executive Outcomes leave the country by early 1997, which they did,[972] and also required the disarmament of the fighting forces.[973] However, Kono people made a very strong appeal to the Government not to stop their contract with Executive Outcomes, as they ensured security for Kono District.

In the aftermath of the Abidjan Accord, the then Vice President conducted a confidence building tour in the provinces to disband the CDF. In late December,[974] the Vice President of Sierra Leone visited Kono District and held a meeting in Koidu with Kono stakeholders, where he officially disbanded the CDF and required the Donsos to lay down their arms and return to their farming activities, as the Government had entered into a ceasefire agreement with the RUF. Any Donsos who failed to disarm would be detained. Many people who attended the meeting left the hall before the closure of the meeting to show their disapproval with the Vice President's statement. On the evening of that same day, the Deputy Defence Minister came to Koidu and organised a meeting at the Donsos office to encourage the Donsos to stay intact as RUF forces could not be trusted, including giving money as his own contribution for the Christmas celebration. Nevertheless, the Vice President's visit had, to all intents and purposes, paralysed further Donsos' activities.

g) Events in 1997[975]

In March 1997 in Gorama Kono Chiefdom, RUF forces attacked Kangama, a CDF stronghold located at the border with Tankoro Chiefdom, but were repelled. The RUF apparently wanted to capture Kangama as a transit point to block the Kamajors in Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District),[976] who had strong links with the Kamajors in Kangama.

In May 1997, news of the Coup reached Kono on its very first day through the BBC's "Focus on Africa" Program. After the Coup, the RUF came out of the bush, often looking malnourished, and together with AFRC mainly spent the year taking people's property, in particular making constant

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[972] AFP, 30 January 1997.

[973] Article 12 of the Agreement stated that the Government shall use all its endeavours, consistent with its treaty obligations, to repatriate other foreign troops (i.e., the Nigerians and the Guineans) no later than three months after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group or six months after the signing of the Peace Agreement, whichever is earlier. Article 12 also stated that Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn within five weeks of the deployment of the NMG: Sierra Leone Bi-Monthly Information Report No.11, 19 November - 16 December 1996.

[974] This visit could have taken place early January 1997.

[975] Little information was reported for 1997, as most of the RUF/AFRC activities were concentrated in Freetown and RUF activities now together with AFRC resumed progressively and were mainly focused on the mining areas.

[976] It has to be remembered that the control of Tongo Field was of the utmost importance for RUF forces as it is the most important diamond area in Kenema District.

demands for livestock. Furthermore, shortly after the Coup, the individual plot system was abandoned and all mining areas were declared to belong to the RUF/AFRC forces, who appointed "Mines Monitoring Officials" to supervise their mining activities.[977]

Throughout 1997, RUF/AFRC forces undertook patrols in various places across the District. For example, Gbane Kandor Chiefdom was under the constant patrols of AFRC members. RUF/AFRC forces regularly patrolled Soa Chiefdom, except Kainkordu, which was a Kamajor stronghold.

RUF/AFRC forces established checkpoints in Koidu town[978] and also conducted raids at mining sites, beating and killing civilians and seizing gravel from civilians, looking for diamonds.[979] The SLPP Secretariat was occupied by the RUF/AFRC forces and used as their own administrative secretariat. A few weeks after the establishment of this secretariat, some RUF/AFRC forces arrested a man, brought him to the secretariat and shot him dead, accusing him of being a Kamajor because he was wearing country clothes, the traditional attire of the Kamajors. A member of the RUF/AFRC forces cut off both his hands. In Kamara Chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces also established checkpoints at the entry and exit points of Tombodu. They confiscated any items of value or of interest to them from people passing through the checkpoints. Also at this time, alleged CDF collaborators were executed.[980]

In Fiama chiefdom, RUF/AFRC harassment of civilians was initially minimal, as they only took food and only miners were harassed by RUF/AFRC forces for their diamond-containing gravel. However, shortly after, civilians were arrested and forced to wash the gravel for the combined forces. Furthermore, RUF/AFRC started visiting towns and villages where they took away food and people's personal effects, including jewellery and money. In June, RUF/AFRC forces from Yegeda attacked Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom). No wounding or fatalities were reported, but property including livestock, food items, clothes and medicine were taken. One month later, RUF/AFRC forces came back to Jagbwema from Koidu with two jeeps, opened fire and took items of the same nature as the previous month.

RUF/AFRC forces harassed authorities throughout the District, because they were suspected of being sympathisers with the Kabbah Government. For example, when news reached the RUF/AFRC forces in Koidu that a Paramount Chief had encouraged the reactivation of the CDF in his chiefdom, some forces were sent to capture him. He was not there, but his compound was looted and the Town Chief and one other young man were arrested, beaten and taken to Manjama, the RUF/AFRC military base in Soa Chiefdom. After this, panicked civilians fled to Guinea. In November and December, property was taken from the remaining civilians on a full-scale basis. The taking of property by RUF/AFRC forces took place in other areas, including Gbane and Gbane

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977 See below in 1998 for details on the mining operations.

978 Koidu town had previously been under the control of SLA forces and Executive Outcomes. However, by early 1997, Executive Outcomes had left and when the Coup happened, SLA positions turned into AFRC positions, which were then reinforced by RUF forces.

979 This information was related in general terms and no further details were available.


980 This information was related in general terms and no further details were available.

Kandor Chiefdoms, where Koardu Town (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom) was visited many times, mainly for livestock.

RUF/AFRC forces came again to Kangama (Gorama Kono Chiefdom) in June, taking advantage of the fact that the Kamajors had deserted their checkpoints during the night. Many civilians were captured, massive looting was carried out, houses were set on fire and civilians were forced to carry the stolen property to the RUF/AFRC base in Senehun (Tankoro Chiefdom). In August, the CDF launched a successful offensive on the RUF base in Senehun, as a result of which Gorama Kono Chiefdom was free of attacks for the rest of the year.

In Lei Chiefdom, two civilians accused of sabotage in Kombayende were shot to death on the orders of a member of the RUF/AFRC. In the same town, a woman was beaten with a bayonet and killed by a member of the AFRC for refusing to give him palm oil. There were also two separate incidences of rape in Lei Chiefdom, one in October when a woman was raped by three RUF/AFRC members in Kenema and one in December, when four members of the RUF/AFRC went to Senehun, requested a house in which to sleep and raped a woman.

h) Events in February - June 1998




Legend:
ECOMOG deployment
——▶ RUF/AFRC forces deployment

From January to February, violence against civilians and attacks on civilian property were rampant. An AFRC member shot and killed a young boy near the Koidu Central Mosque after the boy had helped him push his motorbike up the hill. Two days before ECOMOG drove the RUF/AFRC forces out of Freetown, a group of RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Branch Energy Lodge and Warehouse in Koidu and stole items valued at over hundreds of millions of Leones. On 12 February, "Operation pay yourself" was launched, according to which looting and confiscation of property were encouraged and almost all the shops in Koidu were looted. This operation lasted for a couple of days. Shortly after, the RUF/AFRC forces decided to undertake another looting operation, which they named "Operation House to House Search". In reaction to these operations, the youths mobilised and attacked the RUF/AFRC forces, succeeding in capturing some weapons. In addition, civilians launched their own operation, "Burn soldiers", where RUF/AFRC forces were chased in their hideouts and rubber tyres were placed around their necks and set on fire. All of these successive operations took place before retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown arrived in Kono District.

CDF members from Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom) and Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom) came to help maintain the security of Koidu and its environs. Youths surrendered the weapons they had captured from the RUF/AFRC forces to the CDF. ECOMOG forces were expected to arrive on 21 February, through the Yengema heliport. In Koidu, suspected collaborators of the RUF/AFRC forces were summarily executed by the CDF.

However, on 21 February, an RUF/AFRC convoy of 150 vehicles, which had been repelled from Freetown and had regrouped in Makeni, launched an attack on Koidu Town, entering the town

along the Makeni-Magburaka highway. Using light artillery as opposed to the poor logistics available to the Kamajors, the RUF/AFRC forces overpowered them during the day. The Kamajors had no choice but to retreat, mainly to Manjama and Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom). Accordingly, Koidu Town and its environs fell under the total control of the RUF/AFRC forces. The burning of the town began. Abduction, rape and looting were rampant in Koidu and in all the surrounding villages. As a result of this, civilians fled the town and its environs, leaving Koidu and Woardu almost like ghost towns.[981]

When they pulled out of Freetown, the RUF indicated that it was again in charge of the operations. RUF forces began issuing orders to AFRC members and to arrest and kill those who refused to carry out the orders. In the Provinces, the AFRC forces were outnumbered and some of them surrendered to ECOMOG forces. A senior RUF officer, probably RUF Battle Group Commander at that time, was renown for killing many AFRC members when RUF/AFRC forces were in Koidu. On one occasion, he ordered 15 AFRC members to go and destroy a bridge on the highway. As one of them refused to go for he was unarmed, he was shot and killed by this senior officer.

The capture of Koidu town was the prelude to RUF/AFRC forces spreading all over the District. No chiefdom was left untouched after February and the violence intensified after the news that President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah had been restored to power on 10 March 1998, especially when Operation "Kill all living things" was declared. The scale of violations committed was in particular very high between February and May/June, reaching unprecedented levels. What happened during this period (February –May/June) will be outlined below according to the different areas in which things were happening, rather than chronologically, due to the high level of activity in all areas of the District, although it should be borne in mind that these events happened concurrently.

***West (Kamara, Gbense, Nimiyama, Nimikoro and Tankoro Chiefdoms)***

Villages in Gbense Chiefdom were attacked and in late February, many civilians fled the town of Yardu, to the north of Koidu, where a well-known Reverend was killed.

On 17 March, over 30 RUF/AFRC forces discovered some people in their hiding place near Kuandor (Kamara Chiefdom). The commander, a Liberian, asked the people to cook for them. Afterwards, he decided to go to another area but two of his men asked him if they could to take with them the girls who were among the civilians. The commander apparently gave permission, as the two girls, aged 13 and 14, were taken away by these forces. On 21 March, the National Chairman of the SLPP who was considered as a father for the whole District, relocated to a hiding place outside Wordu village a few miles from Koidu. He was later discovered, stripped, beaten and tied up before being shot dead by six men belonging to the RUF/AFRC forces. A young girl who was under his guardianship was raped and taken to be the "wife" of their commander. Before leaving, the six men took one boy to carry the property they had just stolen. In Wordu, four young

[981] It is not totally clear when RUF/AFRC entered Koidu, as the attack may have taken place in early March 1998 (Chicago Tribune, 17 March 1998). Furthermore, information from Koinadugu District tends to suggest that RUF/AFRC forces reached Koidu from Koinadugu District. The poor conditions of the road network in Koinadugu District, compared to the good quality of the highway, which leads Makeni (Bombali District) to Koidu, through Magburaka (Tonkolili District), however suggest that the bulk of the RUF/AFRC forces reached Koidu from Makeni.

girls in their teens were captured by six RUF/AFRC men. After being ordered to cook, both the girls and some young men were severely beaten.

CDF members continued to confront RUF/AFRC forces and around 23 March, claimed to have recaptured Njaiama Sewafe and the Sewa Bridge (Nimiyama Chiefdom). In addition, they claimed to have rescued hundreds of civilians caught behind RUF/AFRC lines.[982]

Killings, indiscriminate amputations, the gorging out of eyes, the dropping of burning plastic into the eyes and the disembowelling of pregnant women were common practice in Koidu at that time. In April, six civilians were captured by RUF/AFRC forces in Yardu village (Gbense Chiefdom) and were frog-marched to Koidu Town. One of the commanders shot one of the captives six times in the legs. As the captive could not walk any more, the commander ordered his men to execute him. When they reached Koidu Town, they met a group of ULIMO members[983] who demanded that the captured men be divided and one group be assigned to them (ULIMO). After a confrontation between the RUF/AFRC forces and the ULIMO forces, the captured men were finally taken to the RUF commander's residence. One of the captured men was suspected of being a Donsos and was severely beaten, had his hands braced and was locked up with other civilians in a toilet being used as a cell. All of the men were subsequently released.

In April, the rate of killing, rape and mutilation increased as the RUF/AFRC forces had launched "Operation No Living Thing". Kamara Chiefdom, a diamond-rich area northwest of Koidu, was particularly affected at this time.

AFRC/RUF forces were in the bush in Kamara and Tankoro Chiefdoms and the high number of reports for this area reveal the intensity of the violence inflicted on civilians. There were many instances of killing, acts of rape, amputation and burning of houses. One RUF commander was notorious for the amputation of several hands and legs. He ordered the abduction of a large number of people in a mining area, two to three miles away from Tombodu, and ordered the amputations according to description called 'long sleeve' or 'short sleeve'. In another encounter, the same commander and his men conducted an intense raid, during which they all raped one woman and lacerated her vagina. Other incidents include shooting civilians during raids or patrols. Another RUF commander in the area conducted a raid, which resulted in the abduction of several men, women and children, who were locked a house, which was then set on fire.

At Yardu (Gbense Chiefdom) in early April, the RUF/AFRC commander ordered that three people be killed. Among those killed was an ex-worker at the Koidu Electricity House. Civilians were ordered to bury the bodies on 10 April 1998.

As news arrived that ECOMOG troops were advancing in the District and were based near Koidu, at Koakuima, two convoys of civilians, including men, women and children, moved from Yardu to

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982 BBC Online News Archive, 23 March 1998.

983 Although ULIMO forces were officially disbanded in 1997, following the presidential elections in Liberia, it was alleged and stated by the ECOMOG commander in Sierra Leone that members of ULIMO-K were fighting alongside the RUF/AFRC forces: AFP, 21 April 1998. Some of these members would be arrested by ECOMOG forces and detained at the Pademba Road Prison in Freetown: Inter Press Service, 29 April 1998.

Motema town, eight miles south of Koidu Town on 22 and 24 April, arriving safely at their destination.

During this period, RUF/AFRC forces were continuously running from village to village, killing, raping and amputating people and burning villages, so that most of the civilians fled for the bush. One resident of Kuandor, who was returning to the town with some other people, ran into seven members of the RUF/AFRC forces, five of them carrying AK47s and two armed with cutlasses; one of them identified himself as trained fighter from Burkina Faso. The civilians were taken to Kuandor village and were asked to give the RUF/AFRC forces money and rice, which they did not have. The forces stripped one man to his underwear, laid him flat on the ground and beat him with a cutlass, which left marks on his back. They then poured some palm wine on his head and body, tied him up firmly and planned to take him out of the town later to kill him. Another civilian who was captured started crying and was hit hard on the head with a cutlass. One of the forces came back to the civilian who was tied up and told him since the civilians did not know his name, he would write it on his back with a razor blade, but was stopped from doing so by another member of the forces. All the RUF members and the civilians then moved on and RUF forces abducted more people in the nearby village. One of the RUF members suggested that they should leave the civilians behind, meaning they should be killed. However, the commander of the group allowed the two men from Kuandor to return to their town.[984]

In another incident that took place in April, 11 RUF/AFRC forces carrying guns and cutlasses captured three boys[985] who were going to Peyima (Kamara Chiefdom) to get salt and other items to bring back to their relatives, who were living in huts (also known as mansions) in the bush. The boys were forced to take the RUF/AFRC members to the mansions. The members covered the three boys with palm leaves, set fire to them and told the three boys to show them where all the property was kept, or they would stay in the fire until they were completely burnt. The boys showed them where the belongings were and the RUF/AFRC forces left the place taking with them the items they found. Before they left, they beat the three boys.

Also in April, in the village of Gbaima (Kamara Chiefdom), a group of RUF/AFRC members went to a farm near the village and asked the farmer to give them rice and palm oil. As the farmer only had rice to give, the RUF/AFRC members pierced his feet, passed a rope through the hole thus created and tied him up firmly. They then set fire to the palm fruits and threw the farmer into the fire. The man died nine days later. Violence was also inflicted on the other five inhabitants of the farm when the RUF/AFRC forces set fire to an empty five-gallon container and dropped the melting rubber on the five people until the container had burnt completely.

During the same month, two civilians who left Gbaima to go to Tombodu to check the condition of their houses ran into seven RUF/AFRC members, who tied their hands and told them to show them the way where they came from. As they approached Gbaima, the armed men opened fire on the civilians they met in the village, killing one old man, whose stomach was cut open and whose intestines were tied on a stick. Another boy whose age was not specified was also cut with a bladed weapon. The RUF/AFRC forces then conducted a house-to-house search and the two civilians they

984 What happened to the remaining abductees was not specified.
985 The age of the three boys could not be ascertained from the records.

had previously arrested were ordered to gather all the food items they had taken. Before leaving for Tombodu, the RUF/AFRC forces set all the houses of the village on fire. On their way to Tombodu, the seven RUF/AFRC forces and two abducted civilians passed by the village of Wordu, where one of the armed men went to a house where a blind man was living. When he came back to his colleagues, he told them he had "finished" the man. Two boys they met on their way to Tombodu were also forced to join them. When they arrived at Tombodu, the civilians saw a body with its stomach cut open lying on the street that led the RUF/AFRC forces' headquarters. When they arrived at the headquarters, which was full of a variety of types of weapons including rifles, light artillery and bladed weapons, the commander ordered his men to tie the civilians (who were by then 14 in number), and lay them on the ground, one person on top of another. A mattress was then put on top of them and lit. One of the civilians, who kicked the mattress away as it started to burn him, was hit severely with a machete by the commander. The commander also accused him of being one of the youths who had burnt RUF/AFRC forces in February and hit his right hand with a machete, although it was not chopped off. When they saw this, the other civilians tried to escape and started running but were killed when the commander ordered his men to shoot them.

During this period, RUF/AFRC forces would burn part of the town of Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) each time an ECOMOG jet plane flew overhead. On one occasion, over 50 civilians, men, women and children were locked up in a house at Yusufuya Road and the house was set on fire. Cells in the headquarters were used to detain civilians, men and women, some of whom were later killed. The commander used a mined out crater near the lorry park in Tombodu to dump bodies of the people killed in the town.

In another incident, a man from Gbondu village (upper part of Kamara Chiefdom) was captured by some RUF/AFRC forces, who forced him to carry their load to a village in Sandor Chiefdom. Once the load was carried, the civilian was told to go back to his town. As he was returning, he met with another group of RUF/AFRC forces who cut off one of his hands. The man reached Gbondu and shortly after, the population decided to leave the village to go to Koakuima, where ECOMOG was stationed.

Around this period, a District Emergency Task Force was created by civilians who had returned to their villages. This Task Force was mandated to assess the destruction of their villages and to help the local population. Each chiefdom was represented in the Task Force.[986]

ECOMOG had arrived in Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom) in early April 1998.[987] While their arrival was characterised by tensions with members of the CDF from Kono District, since ECOMOG came with some members of the CDF from Punduru (Gorama Mende Chiefdom, in the north of Kenema District), the advancing ECOMOG troops were welcomed. While in Njaiama

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986 AFP, 16 and 17 June 1998.

987 Following the intervention in Freetown, further inland operations were carried out by the specially designed 24th ECOMOG Brigade Infantry: Brig. Gen. R. A. Adeshina: *The Reversed Victory: Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc., p 29. Members of this brigade deployed in the country and after capturing Makeni in March 1998, they proceeded further North to Kono District and arrived in Njaiama Sewafe around 11 April, where they met their colleagues already deployed since early April. It appears that the first batch of ECOMOG forces who deployed in Njaiama Sewafe waited for troops from the 24th Brigade Infantry before advancing further to Koidu.

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Sewafe, the ECOMOG Commander-in-Chief paid them a visit and gave the order to advance on Koidu Town. Thus, a combined troop of ECOMOG and Donsos moved to Koidu on 12 April on foot through the jungle, encountering an RUF/AFRC attack at Yigbeda, during which many ECOMOG members were killed. Nevertheless, they continued their journey and within one day, captured Yengema, Motema and Small Lebanon[988] (all located on the highway), after having battled for a few hours with some RUF/AFRC forces. The 5th Battalion was then deployed at Motema. The ECOMOG and CDF forces launched their first attack on Koidu Town but were repelled by RUF/AFRC forces and went back to Small Lebanon. However, ECOMOG and CDF forces launched a second attack and were able to overpower the RUF/AFRC forces, who fled the town.[989] ECOMOG forces also deployed at Koakuima where, as mentioned earlier, many civilians from the surrounding chiefdoms had come to find refuge, as the ECOMOG presence appeared to represent greater safety.[990]

RUF/AFRC forces continued to stage ambushes and around 14 April, three buses carrying ECOMOG reinforcements and CDF members fell in one of those ambushes near Yigbeda (Nimikoro Chiefdom). Some ECOMOG members were killed, others wounded and two BBC reporters were killed while trying to find refuge in the bush. The buses were later met by some of the ECOMOG forces of the 24th Brigade infantry en route to Makeni and from there to Freetown to brief the Task Force Commander. Those ECOMOG forces loaded their dead and the wounded colleagues onto the truck and continued their journey to Makeni. Shortly after, they fell in another RUF/AFRC ambush but managed to escape the ambush without any fatalities and made their way to Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom).[991]

CDF forces equipped with arms and ammunition given to them by ECOMOG troops stationed at Njaiama Sewafe attacked Yardu (Gbense Chiefdom) in April and overcame the RUF/AFRC forces. Many RUF/AFRC members were killed during that attack, while two died by drowning into the river. In late April, ECOMOG forces in the District received reinforcements, who deployed along the Njaiama Sewafe-Koidu highway, where they faced some ambushes staged by some RUF/AFRC forces. Assisted by an air campaign, they cleared the highway and reopened it in early May.[992]

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988 Small Lebanon is a town south of Koidu.

989 It is not totally clear whether ECOMOG forces launched one or two attacks on Koidu before capturing it. In any case, these actions were carried out within a short period of time. RUF/AFRC forces, before retreating from the town, inflicting heavy casualties on civilians, killing some and burning houses. It was alleged that around 2.000 civilians were held hostages by the RUF/AFRC forces, in readiness for the expected ECOMOG attack. Inter Press Service, 16 April 1998.

990 However, unlike the people who had escaped Gbense Chiefdom for Koakuima, those who had found refuge in Sandor Chiefdom and the CDF, who had also decided to move to Koakuima, fell into the hands of RUF/AFRC forces in Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) and a lot of them were killed while others had their limbs amputated.

991 Adeshina, *op cit*, pp 62-3; see also Associated Press Worldstream, 18 April 1998.

992 Former members of the AFRC regime who had surrendered were part of this deployment, re-trained and incorporated by ECOMOG: Adeshina, *op cit*, pp 66-7. This deployment of former AFRC members frightened the population, who suspected they may still be loyal to the ousted AFRC leader: AFP, 16 June 1998.

A Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG was also sent to Torgbombu, an important town in Gorama Kono Chiefdom.[993] They came with heavy artillery including Alpha Jets, tanks, mortar bombs and helicopter gunships; shortly after their deployment at Torgbombu, they attacked RUF/AFRC positions and deployed in Jaiama and Bumpe (Nimikoro Chiefdom) together with members of the CDF. The ECOMOG forces encouraged people to come out of their hiding places, so civilians started to come back to the headquarter town of Jaiama.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked ECOMOG positions at Jaiama (Nimikoro chiefdom), where they were repelled, and at Motema, where they were also repelled, but not before they had killed 24 civilians in a house situated near the national Petroleum Station at the Motema Junction along the main Freetown highway.[994] Those 24 civilians were later buried in one mass grave by the house of a retired senior superintendent of the Sierra Leone Police. Several attempts were also made by the combined RUF/AFRC forces to attack ECOMOG forces based at Koakuima but they all failed.

On 10 June, two days after the announcement over the radio of the death of the Nigerian President, RUF/AFRC forces made an attempt to attack Koidu, at that time under ECOMOG control. Although this attempt continued until the end of the month, the RUF/AFRC forces did not succeed in recapturing the town.[995]

***North-west (Sandor Chiefdom)***

After taking Koidu in late February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces arrived in Sandor Chiefdom and organised themselves into different groups, namely food finding groups and mining groups. A lot of stolen property came to Sandor from Koidu, as Sandor Chiefdom was a commercial centre. In this chiefdom, they were based in Yormandu, Tefeya and Kayima, from where they controlled various chiefdoms in Koinadugu District.

AFRC/RUF forces were engaged in large-scale mining in the south of Sandor Chiefdom, in towns including Yormandu, Tefeya, Bakidu, Woidala and Bendu. The RUF/AFRC forces needed people to work in the mines and to find food, so a lot of civilians were abducted for these purposes. Many people who were captured were divided into groups, namely tripping, extraction and washing, and forced to work in the mines all day long. Mining workers were flogged, killed or burnt to death. Sick or tired workers were either killed or driven away after a severe beating or flogging. Mining workers caught stealing diamonds were burnt to death using a five-gallon container for carrying petrol or palm wine or oil. Physical violence, mutilation and killing were rampant. At Tefeya and Sandeya for example, RUF/AFRC forces killed civilians and amputated the ears and hands of others.[996] Promotion was given to RUF/AFRC members according to the results of their missions. As an example, when members, often child soldiers, were asked to burn houses and they burnt more than they had been told to, they were given rank promotion.

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[993] It seems that this contingent of ECOMOG came from Kenema while the other one who deployed in towns alongside the highway that leads to Koidu came from Freetown. It is likely that those deployments took place at the same time.

[994] The attack on Jaima took place shortly after ECOMOG deployed whereas the one on Motema must have taken place weeks later.

[995] Adeshina, *op cit*, pp 89-93.

[996] AFP, 17 April 1998.

All over the chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces began killing people in the bush, mainly for food as their stores began to run out in April. "Where is the salt, where is the Maggi, where is the pepper" were common questions asked of civilians, who would be killed if they were unable to provide the RUF/AFRC forces with those items. For example, in Kayima area at a place called Nakor, six people were killed for refusing to give food and other items. During the same period, in Kayima area, 13 people were put in a farm, which was then set on fire.[997]

In April, an internal dispute arose between RUF/AFRC forces at Yormandu and some went to Tegbadu, three miles east of Yormandu.[998]

As they needed civilians to undertake various activities, the RUF/AFRC forces devised different ways to bring civilians out of the bushes. On one occasion, RUF/AFRC forces sent the message to the bush, in particular nearby Yiffin (Koinadugu District) where civilians from Sandor Chiefdom had fled earlier, that a former NPRC Defence Minister and son of Kayima had come to Kayima and had called people to come out of the bushes.[999] On another occasion in May, one civilian leaving the bush around Masundu and heading for Guinea with his family felt into a RUF/AFRC ambush. The RUF/AFRC forces took them back to Masundu and the commander told him that if he would bring people out of the bushes, he would be appointed Town Chief or Town Commander. This man persuaded some other people to come out of the bushes and they started to brush the town and to repair damaged houses. A civilian was appointed at the G5 position. RUF/AFRC forces would then come regularly to the town to ask for food. Civilians were not killed but were forced to produce the requested items and to work for the RUF/AFRC forces. To refuse to work would lead to flogging. It appeared that Masundu was one of the first towns to be rebuilt in Sandor Chiefdom. This situation continued throughout 1998 and 1999 until Donsos came to fight the RUF/AFRC forces.[1000]

However, this collaboration was not mirrored in other areas of the chiefdom, where women were raped and taken as RUF/AFRC "wives". Young girls were raped in front of their parents and were subsequently captured to carry loads. In April, one man was killed after he begged for mercy for his daughter, who was being raped in front of him.[1001]

At Yormandu, the burning of five-gallon containers to drip the melted plastic onto civilians was rampant. People were flogged up to 200, 300 and even 400 lashes all over their body, mainly when they refused to work, or said they were tired, or were caught stealing minor things. However, people caught stealing diamonds had a separate treatment and were burnt to death using a five-gallon container. In one specific incident that took place at Yormandu, one man who stole a diamond,

997 The precise location of this event was not specified in the records.
998 No further information on the reason of the dispute but also stated in general terms, it illustrates, as other similar incidents in Kono District and in other Districts that following the retreat from Freetown, internal fight appeared inside the combined RUF/AFRC forces.
999 This information revealed to be false but anyway, did not have the expected results.
1000 When they came to Masundu, probably in 2000, the hunters called together some civilians and molested a lot of them, accusing them of having collaborated with the RUF/AFRC forces.
1001 No detail on the location of this incident could be obtained from the records.

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called "Government property", was stripped naked and had melted rubber dropped on his body until he died.

As a result of these atrocities, civilians fled in large numbers to Yiffin (Koinadugu District), which saw a massive influx of people starting in late April. Indeed, throughout 1998, civilians were going on and off in the bush, to Guinea and to Koinadugu District.

Members of the CDF, together with a large number of SLA forces,[1002] equipped with arms and ammunition provided through the ECOMOG helicopter fought RUF/AFRC forces in Sandor Chiefdom. As a result, sometime in June, RUF/AFRC forces retreated to Koinadugu District. Other groups of hunters under the command of different commanders were active in the north and north-east of the chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces, however, regularly attacked those SLA and CDF forces, often by using ambushes. In fact, ambushes were widely practiced by RUF/AFRC forces, particularly after SLA forces together with CDF members attacked them. In mid 1998, a group of between 30 to 35 civilians fell into an RUF/AFRC ambush three miles south of Kayima. Eighteen of them were beaten to death at the Yormandu Kayima and Tefeya Junction, as it was said that RUF/AFRC forces did not want to alert SLA forces by using their guns. The remaining civilians were taken to Baudu, the first town after Kayima on the road to Yormandu, where six of them were killed. The remaining people were taken away and their fate remains unknown.

***Gbane Chiefdom***

In Gbane Chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces forced civilians to work for them, mining diamond and gold and harvesting cash crops like coffee and cocoa, which the RUF/AFRC forces were using to get arms and ammunitions.[1003] By the end of March, the chiefdom was virtually empty, as people fled the villages to go to the bush and to Guinea.

***South-east (Fiama, Soa, Gbane Kandor and Mafindor Chiefdoms)***

When RUF/AFRC forces dislodged CDF forces from Koidu in February 1998, these CDF forces retreated mainly to Kainkordu and Manjama in Soa Chiefdom. Shortly after, RUF/AFRC forces launched attacks on Fiama and Soa Chiefdoms, in particular in those areas where the CDF forces were concentrated. Indeed, in Soa Chiefdom, Donsos had six bases[1004] in the chiefdom, their headquarters being in Kainkordu.

On 11 March 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the headquarter town of Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC forces, coming from Koidu in military and civilian jeeps, entered the town firing indiscriminately. More than 70 houses were burnt and the town was massively looted. During the night, the RUF/AFRC forces abducted three people, including the Town Chief, who were all later killed; on 12 March 1998, the same group also killed the Town Chief of Gbetema. On 24 March 1998, RUF/AFRC forces coming from Jagbwema attacked Yeanoh, shooting and killing many people.

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[1002] The report mentions that the SLA forces were composed of 846 men.

[1003] The records talk about the cash crops being swapped for arms and ammunitions without giving details as to where this exchange was taking place, whether it was taking place at the Guinean border.

[1004] The Donsos had 100 men deployed at Kainkordu, 25 at Kuandor, 25 at Fuero, 25 at Sukudu, 50 at Manjama and 15 at Medu.

When they heard that the Kamajors and Donsos were in Soa Chiefdom, at Gbanmandu, north of the chiefdom headquarter of Kainkordu, the RUF/AFRC forces moved to Soa Chiefdom. On their way to Kainkordu, this group of RUF/AFRC forces fought with another group of RUF/AFRC forces, each of them thinking they were fighting with CDF forces. A number of the forces were killed during that encounter, but later, both groups[1005] joined forces to advance on Kainkordu. In Kainkordu, the RUF/AFRC forces fought with the CDF forces and both fighting factions suffered heavy fatalities, with no reported civilian fatalities. The RUF/AFRC forces then headed for Manjama, two miles from Kainkordu, where many civilians were killed. Those two attacks on Kainkordu and Manjama created panic among the civilians and a lot of them decided to flee for Guinea. This panic was intensified by the rumour that the route through Kainkordu was being used by some RUF/AFRC forces going to Liberia[1006] through Kailahun.

The same RUF/AFRC forces then proceeded further east towards Gbane Kandor Chiefdom and, on 27 March, launched simultaneous attacks on Bendu, Gbangbandor, Dugbor, Gbaidu, Dunamao and Koardu (all in Gbane Kandor Chiefdom). During this wave of attacks, several civilians, including men, women and children, were abducted, women were sexually abused and many houses were looted and burnt down. In Gbangbandor, for example, one woman was sexually assaulted and beaten to death. These attacks made the civilians leave the chiefdom for Guinea. However, in order to find food, civilians returned from time to time to the chiefdom and an unspecified number of civilians were abducted or killed. Donsos from Mafindor Chiefdom to the east of Gbane Kandor Chiefdom regrouped to try to stop the RUF/AFRC advance and agreed that the three sections of the chiefdom should each contribute one cow that would be sold in Guinea in order to buy ammunition there.[1007]

RUF/AFRC forces continued further east and on 18 May 1998 attacked villages on the road leading to the headquarter town of Kamiendor (Mafindor Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC forces burnt many houses at Densenbadu, Fandu, Gbenkoro, Kamiendor Kormadu, Sandia and Gbendema, where the CDF base was also burnt down. At Fandu and Gbendema, an unspecified number of civilians were abducted. Following these attacks, the RUF/AFRC forces returned towards Koidu and the dislodged Donsos from Soa and Mafindor Chiefdoms went to Guinea.

***Lei Chiefdom (east of the District, at the border with Guinea)***

In February 1998, a convoy of RUF/AFRC forces with 18 vehicles and three trucks full of arms and ammunition arrived in Lei Chiefdom, in the east of Kono District. The RUF/AFRC forces attacked towns including Yarawadu, Wanjama, Senehun and Kenema before some of the senior commanders departed, leaving the bulk of the forces stationed at Konbayendeh, in the centre of the chiefdom on the road that leads to the headquarter town of Saima. At Senehun, located in the same section as

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1005 While one group was coming from Koidu Town (and then Jagbwema in Fiama Chiefdom), the other group came from Pendembu, Kailahun District.

1006 It is reported that the rumour also said that Johnny Paul Koroma was among those forces. Other reports mention that as early as February, RUF/AFRC forces passed through Soa to reach Kailahun. Furthermore, this information has to be read in conjunction with the developments of Lei Chiefdom, where it was reported that Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in March and then left the Chiefdom, leaving behind him some troops.

1007 It is not specified who these Donsos bought their cartridges from in Guinea.

Kissitown, RUF/AFRC forces killed four civilians coming out of the bush, including two children. One of the adults was killed with a bayonet.

While in Konbayendeh, the RUF/AFRC forces started raiding surrounding villages, indiscriminately killing and mutilating people and burning houses, as a result of which people left their villages to go to the bush. However, the RUF/AFRC forces also started chasing the civilians in the bush. In one incident that took place in a bush around Kissitown, over 20 members of the RUF/AFRC, all in military uniforms, found around 70 civilians in their hiding place, gathered them all and started killing them, shooting some and mutilating others with machetes. Realising that those RUF/AFRC forces were going to kill them all, the remaining nine civilians decided to run away. The RUF/AFRC forces opened fire, killing five. Before leaving, the RUF/AFRC forces took 11 girls with them.

In Kissitown, RUF/AFRC forces established a training camp for abducted civilians, called "Superman Camp". Civilians were trained, given weapons and sent out to different parts of the chiefdom and the District. Some senior members of the RUF/AFRC forces had once earlier warned their forces in Lei Chiefdom not to kill civilians but once they are captured, to bring them to the camp for them to be trained so that the number of their forces would increase, in anticipation of their planned attack on Freetown. On one occasion, 30 civilians who were abducted and trained for one week in the camp were sent to Boroma town, north of Kombayende, with 15 "old" RUF/AFRC forces, for it was reported that civilians were in this area. One young boy who was hiding in a garden threw a grenade at the RUF/AFRC forces who had come to the town. However, the young boy was captured and cut into seven different pieces; 13 other people were also killed. On their way back to the camp, the RUF/AFRC forces captured 100 civilians who were on their way to Guinea. Eighty of them were sent to Koidu for mining, some who tried to escape were killed and two women were amputated when they refused to have sexual intercourse with two of the RUF/AFRC members.

In March, inhabitants of Kenema, a town located in the east of the chiefdom, shouted "welcome back to Sierra Leone", referring to the news of the restoration to power of the President, when they saw a plane flying over their town. A few hours later, they saw civilians coming in the village with bundles on their heads, which led them to go in the bush. Shortly after, they heard gunshots from different directions in the village and saw the whole village being set on fire by RUF/AFRC forces. Other villages on the highway that leads to Siama, the headquarter town, were also set on fire. At Kombayende, five people were killed and two were amputated. On the same day, the RUF/AFRC forces proceeded further north to Kundundu in the north of the chiefdom, where eight people were shot dead and two had their legs amputated with an axe. Among the eight people who died, one had his tongue cut out with a knife. Another man was hit to death with a bayonet.

On 10 March, RUF/AFRC forces came back to Senehun, set fire to the houses that had not been burnt earlier and captured six people, one of them suspected of being a Kamajor commander. Three of those captives were killed with an AK47, one was beaten to death while another one had a blue rope tied around his neck and was dragged along the ground until he died. The sixth captive, who was suspected of being a Kamajor commander, was told by the RUF/AFRC commander that he was not yet dead because they did not know yet the kind of punishment they would give him. From Senehun, they went to Kenema, where they shot dead seven people before entering the town and

captured a young man who tried to hide in a garden. One of the RUF/AFRC members was asked by the others to take a big stone and to smash the hands of the young captured man. Before leaving for another village called Samie, they burnt the remaining houses.[1008] At Samie, a man was shot three times in the head with an AK47 because he could not give the RUF/AFRC forces the location of the hiding place for the people of the village. The RUF/AFRC forces also poured petrol they found in the village on two thatch houses and set them on fire. The fire spread to other thatch houses and, eventually, 11 of them burnt down. As it was getting dark, the RUF/AFRC forces, together with the last captive they had, went back to Kombayende.[1009]

After President Kabbah's restoration to power in March 1998, two points for killing people called "commaflag" were established in Kombayende, a commercial town. One of these points was located at the centre of the town and the other one on Mambo Bridge, the last bridge leading to Kissitown in the west. On one occasion,[1010] the RUF/AFRC force commander who had established the commaflag system sent some members to arrest civilians in and around the town to check whether they were supporters of Tejan Kabbah Government. Thirty-one people were brought to the commaflag site. The commander addressed the captured people and told them that Lei Chiefdom was criticising their action, the proof being that people had fled to the bush. The commander called on one of his members, who had recently been promoted to Captain because he "knew how to kill people", to kill those who had been brought to the commaflag site. On that day, 10 of the captured people were shot before the operation was halted because it was getting dark. The remaining people were locked up in a room and brought back to the site the next morning. One of the captured men was given an AK47 and told to fire at one of the other captives. He did so and after one shot, the man died. Then, the commander gave the gun to another captive, but he needed three shots to kill another of the captives, so the commander told him that he had "failed the exam" and shot him. This operation continued until only eight of the captives had survived by "passing the test". They were then recognised as Junta II[1011] and were forced to kill people at the commaflag points. In another killing that took place at a commaflag point, three out of eight people who had been abducted and sent to the Superman Camp at Kissitown for training were arrested as they were trying to escape. The abductees were brought to Kombayende and killed at the Mambo Bridge commaflag, after which their bodies were thrown under the bridge.

When the commander in charge of Kombayende sent some of his men in search of food, those RUF/AFRC forces found nine people themselves were looking for food for their families. As the nine people did not answer the question of the commander of the group who asked them where he could find other civilians, the commander took the G3 rifle that was on his back and fired at two of the civilians, breaking their legs. As the people still refused to say anything, the commander killed the two wounded civilians. As the remaining seven civilians still refused to reveal where other people could be found, the commander amputated their hands with a rusty cutlass that the RUF/AFRC

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1008 It is highly likely that this event is related to the one described above when RUF/AFRC forces came to Kenema after people welcomed back the President.

1009 On the way back, an unidentified fighting faction opened fire on them, which allowed the captive to escape.

1010 Although the date was not specified, it can be inferred from the record that this event happened between March and June.

1011 Junta II refers to these people who were enrolled in the RUF/AFRC forces following the retreat from Freetown.

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forces had found in the village. The RUF/AFRC forces then went to Soama, a few miles from the chiefdom headquarter of Siama, where they killed one man who refused to join them.

Rumours of imminent attacks in Guinea were rampant. However, no attack within the Guinean territory was reported for 1998 (nor 1999). It appeared that RUF/AFRC forces would have launched attacks on the Guinean territory earlier had they been larger in number, which they were unable to achieve since most of the civilians had already fled to refugee camps in Guinea.

On 8 April, RUF/AFRC forces moved from Kundundu and headed for Koidu Town. On their way, they passed by Kenema, where they hit an old man on his neck and his back with a bladed weapon for failing to take them to any civilian hiding places, as a result of which he died.[1012] Two other people were shot and killed at Kenema on that day. Before leaving for Koidu, the RUF/AFRC forces looted the village.

In April, seven men captured by RUF/AFRC forces in military uniforms in Sandor Chiefdom were taken to the Njai stream that separates Sandor and Lei Chiefdoms. Six of the men were tied with a blue plastic rope and were shot in the head. A heavy stone was then tied to each of them and they were thrown into the stream. The seventh person was not killed; the commander of the RUF/AFRC forces declared that he was not going to kill this person, because he was a Christian, as the commander himself was. Rather, the commander ordered one of his men to mutilate the man's 10 fingers, as a result of which his left hand was broken.

RUF/AFRC forces returned to Kundundu towards the end of the month in search of food and civilians. Some of the people they found in the bush were killed while others were taken away for manpower. On 1 May, in the bush around Kenema, RUF/AFRC forces captured civilians, killing two men with a bayonet, one of them being the Town Regent Chief. Those who were captured were told to form two lines, one for men and one for women and children. The commander told his men to choose a woman each for the night, himself selecting a girl who was 14 years old. Three women who refused to go with the armed men were stripped naked and sexually abused with gun barrels before being killed. RUF/AFRC forces settled temporarily in Kundundu.

At Faokor in the south of the chiefdom during the same period, RUF/AFRC forces beat to death a blacksmith allegedly because he was a Kamajor, because they had found two empty cartridge shells in his forge. Twenty-one people were also killed that day, one of them being beaten unconscious and burnt to ashes.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked Gbonkongbor a few miles from the Guinean border in the northeast of the chiefdom with heavy firing in May, during which eight civilians were killed and many people fled. The RUF/AFRC forces then sent young men to bring back the cattle and ordered six women to cook for them. After eating, they left the village with the six women and able-bodied men. On 8 June, another village near the Guinean border was attacked. Some civilians, including men and women, were captured while others were put in a house and burnt.

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1012 This incident is reported in another record to have taken place when RUF/AFRC reached Lei in February. As this information could not be reconciled, it has to be assumed that this event took place between February and April.

i) Events in the second half of 1998

Between June and the end of the year, very few incidents are reported.[1013] At this time, most of the people of Kono District had fled to Guinea[1014] or into the bush and a lot of them were forced to work for the RUF/AFRC forces in the mining areas.

In September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) and its environs. They raided the town and other villages, including civilian hiding places. Many civilians, including women and children, were killed and abducted during those attacks and Jagbwema was set on fire. As heavy bombardment could be heard, it was assumed that RPGs were used during those attacks, although it has since been revealed that RUF/AFRC forces had a tactic to produce sounds which are similar to those made by RPGs.[1015] The Donsos went moved to that area to fight the RUF/AFRC forces and after firing few gunshots to test the strength of the Donsos, the RUF/AFRC forces intensified the shooting. As a result of the heavy shelling from both parties, 32 houses were burnt down.

Around the end of October, RUF/AFRC forces attacked and killed civilians at Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) before being engaged by ECOMOG and CDF forces, which left 83 RUF/AFRC members dead. This attack on Tombodu took place in the aftermath of the passing of a death sentence on the RUF leader for treason.[1016]

On 5 November, RUF/AFRC forces reached Hindimi (Lei Chiefdom), where they found 62 people who had returned from Guinea to harvest their crops. The civilians were separated by gender and told to give the RUF/AFRC forces the produce of the harvest. As they were reluctant, the two first people of the line were shot and killed, which prompted the civilians to give them the 216 bags of rice they had harvested. Women were forced to cook for the RUF/AFRC forces. The following day, the RUF/AFRC forces left the village together with captives who were forced to carry the bags of rice; those bags they were unable to take, as there were not sufficient people to carry them, were burnt. When they arrived in Kombayende, the men were separated from the women; this was the last time they saw each other. The men were later taken to Koidu for mining. After mining during the day, they were locked in a container at night.

On 20 December 1998, a fierce attack was launched on Koidu by RUF/AFRC forces, who were able to dislodge the ECOMOG forces based there. This attack came from the bush and was planned from different directions. Prior to this attack, RUF/AFRC forces had regrouped in Buedu (Kailahun District), which was an RUF stronghold throughout the war, and moved with three to four battalions to Kono. RUF/AFRC forces were already in Kono District and another group of RUF/AFRC forces were deployed at Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom) to set an ambush for

1013 This period corresponds to the rainy season, during which heavy rains often paralyse movement. In Sierra Leone, the rainy season runs mostly from May to August.

1014 By April, around 90,000 civilians had crossed the border to Guinea since the start of the ECOMOG offensive against the RUF/AFRC in Kono and Kailahun Districts: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16 - 30 April 1998.

1015 RUF/AFRC forces used empty five-gallon containers, with their lids on, which they hit with a stick to emulate the sound of RPG fire.

1016 AFP, 26 October 1998.

the retreating ECOMOG forces. Four days prior to this attack, RUF/AFRC forces had attacked Small Lebanon and dislodged ECOMOG forces; ECOMOG troops based at Koakuima, Motema and Bumpe were also dislodged. In Koidu and Koakuima, RUF/AFRC forces killed many ECOMOG and CDF forces, as well as civilians.[1017] At Koakuima, the retreating ECOMOG forces left behind them a lot of arms and ammunition, which were captured by the RUF/AFRC forces. Retreating ECOMOG forces fell in the ambush staged by RUF/AFRC forces at Njaiama Sewafe and suffered heavy casualties.

RUF/AFRC forces then attacked the last ECOMOG battalion in the District, namely the 197th Battalion redeployed in Njaiama (Nimikoro Chiefdom).[1018] After a fierce battle, ECOMOG repelled the RUF/AFRC forces and asked for reinforcements from Bo. However, the ECOMOG commander was instead advised to withdraw his troops from Njaiama. On 30 December, the ECOMOG commander left Nimikoro Chiefdom with CDF members and thousands of civilians, as ECOMOG did not want to leave the civilians in the hands of the RUF/AFRC forces. They took the road to Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District) in the south of Kono District. On their way, they fell into two ambushes laid by RUF/AFRC forces. After the first ambush, ECOMOG forces led the convoy, which allowed the RUF/AFRC forces to abduct hundreds of civilians from the rear end of the convoy during the second ambush.

Prior to this attack on Koidu, a number of troop movements were noted in the surrounding areas in Sandor Chiefdom and in Koinadugu District. In fact, in late November, RUF/AFRC forces retook control of Sandor Chiefdom and civilians at Yiffin (Koinadugu District) observed many ECOMOG forces retreating from Kono District.

At Yormandu, some RUF/AFRC forces told the civilians that were their captives that they would continue the fight until Freetown and that they got the necessary logistics, arms and ammunition from Kailahun District. Indeed, this attack on Koidu was the catalyst for the RUF/AFRC forces to proceed further south, capturing more towns in the District and the country[1019] and to enter Freetown on 6 January 1999,[1020] using civilians from Gbane to carry their arms and ammunition.

Following the attack on Koidu, civilians and hunters decided to leave Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom) for Yiffin and Alikalia (Koinadugu District). However, they fell into an RUF/AFRC ambush on 28 December and a lot of them were captured. Over 170 of those captured were taken to Yiffin. One of the captured hunters was given a letter that requested the hunters to come out of the bush and join the RUF/AFRC forces. He was also told that if he did not convince the hunters to join them, he would be killed. The man saved his life by explaining that he only knew people in Kayima

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[1017] It cannot be inferred from the reports whether these forces were killed within the course of the battle or after being captured.

[1018] Prior to this wave of attacks, this battalion was deployed at Njala and Wanjama (Nimikoro Chiefdom). When the ECOMOG position at Bumpe fell into the hands of the RUF/AFRC forces, the decision was taken to establish a blocking position at Njaiama, on the highway that leaves Bumpe to the south of the District: Adeshina, *op cit*, p 128.

[1019] See the general overview and the analysis for Kailahun, Tonkolili, Bombali and Port Loko Districts and the Western Area.

[1020] See the factual analysis for Tonkolili, Makeni and Port Loko District and the Western Area.

(Sandor Chiefdom). Some of the RUF/AFRC forces together with their captives thus headed for Kayima and on their way, four of the captives were killed for their belongings at Gbenekoro.[1021]

j) Events in 1999

On 1 January 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces that had killed four captives at Gbenekoro proceeded towards Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom), together with their remaining captives. On their way, the captives saw the body of somebody they knew and they learnt he was killed because he answered rudely to the RUF/AFRC forces. The captives were told to take orders from a child commander and were reminded that their lives were of no value for them. When they arrived at the RUF/AFRC forces' commander's compound, they saw one Fullah[1022] man being killed for refusing to give up his sheep. They were introduced to the RUF/AFRC commander as his "slaves and servants" and were forced to do petty jobs, mainly going on food finding missions for the commander. A man was appointed to the G5 position, to look after the civilians' affairs/interests. A Formation Assembly was set up where every morning, civilians were told to pray and announcements for the rest of the day were made. The establishment of these G5 committees not only took place in Kono, but also in other Districts, as a means of rationalising the use of civilians by making them participate in administrative matters. Civilians appointed to such positions could hardly refuse the appointment, because a refusal would soon be followed by a severe flogging. In Sandor Chiefdom, civilians were required to follow rules imposed on them by the RUF/AFRC forces, which included no raping, no taking of civilian's property and no stealing ("Jar Jar").[1023]

However, the establishment of such committees and the rationalisation of the use of civilians did not stop the harassment and violence continued to be committed against civilians. At Kayima, for example, sometime after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, civilians presented complaints to the top commander in charge at Koakuima. When they came from this meeting, they were threatened and were punished with flogging and being forced to go on food finding missions. The commander at Koakuima sent some RUF/AFRC members to investigate the matter, although the results and consequences of this investigation are unknown. Furthermore, five civilians were killed and burnt to ashes in a bush near Neakor, west of Kayima. Following this incident and a complaint made by a relative of one of the civilians killed, the commander at Kayima recalled that no one should kill civilian and if such a crime was committed, it should be reported to the G5.

On 10 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Punduru, a CDF stronghold in Nimiyama Chiefdom that was overcrowded with civilians. During this attack, both civilians and CDF were killed and their property was damaged.

From February 1999, hunters came in and out of Sandor Chiefdom from Guinea and made their permanent base in Fanema, near the border with Guinea, progressing towards the north of the chiefdom and retaking some areas from the RUF/AFRC forces. They were obtaining coffee and cocoa from the population in support for their activities, selling these items to the Guineans to buy

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[1021] It could not be ascertained whether this place is to be found in Koinadugu or in Kono District.

[1022] The Fullah are a tribe to be found in the north of the country and in Guinea. They would be particular targets of the RUF and, later, the RUF/AFRC during the war, as they were often healthy, earning money by raising and selling cattle.

[1023] More details are required from the records on the G5 committees.

ammunition or food. In one incident, RUF/AFRC forces came to Fanema looking for a famous hunter. They took all his belongings and brought his relatives back to Kayima, where they were molested, beaten and tied up before being released.

The abduction rate increased as people were used as diamond miners and were conscripted into the RUF/AFRC forces. At this time, Koakuima was the base for the RUF/AFRC 2nd Brigade and hosted the main office for the mining operations; it was also was the base for the Overall Mining Commander, who was assisted by a Deputy Mining Commander. Mining officers were appointed at the various mining sites. Every week, mining officers were to bring the diamonds collected at the sites to the Deputy Commander, who crosschecked them before handing them over to the Overall Mining Commander. However, diamonds over 5 carats were to be brought to the Overall Mining Commander at Koakuima as soon as they were discovered, without waiting for the weekly shipment. Every week, the diamonds were sent from Koakuima to Kailahun, from where they were sent to Liberia. Some private mining, mainly carried out for diamond dealers, was authorised by the Overall Mining Commander at the cost of Le 5,000 per week. However, diamonds over 5 carats were to be given to the Overall Mining Commander, as they were considered to be the property of the RUF.[1024]

At this time, the District was divided into operational areas under the command of a commanding officer. The training base established in Bunumbu (Luawa Chiefdom, Kailahun District) since 1998 and known as "Camp Lion" was transferred around January to Yengema (Nimikoro Chiefdom), as the centre of RUF/AFRC actions had moved to the north-west. On one occasion, six abductees, six adults and one child of a Small Boys Unit (SBU) escaped from the training base and tried to reach Koinadugu District but were caught and brought back to the base. The RUF Senior Officer in Charge of the Brigade Headquarters in Koakuima ordered these escapees to be killed. The six adults were shot and killed while the fate of the child soldier remains unknown. Hundreds of abductees from the Northern Province were sent to Yengema but as their number increased and as food supplies were not sufficient, the base was moved for three months to Gbendembu (Bombali District) before coming back to Yengema. Recruits were organised into platoons and young children as young as 10 were conscripted into Small Boy Units (SBUs).

A lot of beating, killing and rapes took place at the camp during the time of its operation. One practice carried out in the camp was called Halaka.[1025] A big circle, the size of a tennis court, was drawn on the ground with a smaller inner circle. The area between the two circles was full of obstacles such as barbed wires, drums and blocks. Recruits were to enter in this area and to find the exit located far from the entry, while the instructors located in the inner circle were beating them with sticks. Many civilians died from this practice.

In Lei Chiefdom, the rate of violations committed in 1998 continued and was very high after January 1999. Civilians were abducted to be trained as combatants, especially for the purpose of the upcoming attacks on Guinea. The commander in charge of Kombayende regularly sent his men to capture civilians to be trained as Junta II. A team went to Kissitown, where Superman Camp was

[1024] These diamonds were considered as "government property" as the RUF was considering itself as a government.
[1025] This term allegedly comes from Libya.

located, but as they could not find anybody in the town, they went to the bush. There, they eventually found 160 people, who they brought to Kissitown for scrutiny.

Following those continuous developments, CDF members mobilised themselves; some of them were sent back to Guinea to bring back shotguns and they attacked the RUF/AFRC forces at Kissitown. After a three-hour battle, 15 civilians had lost their lives and the RUF/AFRC forces left the town with the civilians they had earlier abducted. Strengthened by this success, the CDF established a base at Gborgborma and successfully attacked the RUF/AFRC forces at Samie,[1026] where the RUF/AFRC forces fled the town leaving behind them most of their weapons. A few days after the CDF attack on Samie, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the chiefdom headquarter of Saiama, where they killed almost all the civilians they found in the town. After this attack on Saiama, the RUF/AFRC forces headed back for their base at Kombayende. On their way, they passed through a village called Kutima, where they found three bodies. As they continued their journey, they met three women who told them that men in military fatigues had attacked Kutima. The three women were then taken with the group, who used them as a shield anytime they entered a town. At Bomboro, some RUF/AFRC forces found one young woman with her baby. As she was caught trying to escape, they accused her of being a supporter of the President. They told her to throw her baby in a thatch house they had set on fire, warning her that she would be thrown in the fire as well if she did not do what they asked her to do. After she had thrown her baby into the burning house and she was asked to join the RUF/AFRC forces, she tried to escape and was shot in the head. The RUF/AFRC forces also attacked the CDF base at Gborgborma and dislodged the CDF members who went back to Guinea.

Teams put together to search for civilians, also called "Safari team" by the RUF, continued to be sent. On one occasion, a team came back with only 15 civilians. Three of them were women and were allocated to the RUF/AFRC forces who did not have any woman. Among the 12 other captives, three who tried to escape were brought to the commaflag located on the Mamba Bridge and were shot, their bodies thrown under the bridge. In another incident and after orders coming from Koidu told commanders in the different posts to conscript more civilians for planned attacks on Guinea, 152 civilians were captured in the bush and taken to Kombayende for scrutiny before being sent to Superman Camp. The able men and women were sent to Kissitown while the old people where brought to the commaflag in the centre of the town, at Baoya Road. All 21 of them were killed by the member of the RUF/AFRC who had been promoted to Captain because he knew how to kill. Their bodies were thrown in a very big hole previously dug by RUF/AFRC forces for this purpose. This was a common scenario, which was repeated many times.

In March 1999, an internal fight arose between RUF/AFRC forces as a group coming from Koidu entered Kombayende (Lei Chiefdom) with heavy firing. The members stationed in Kombayende fired in return. Sixteen civilians died during that fighting and 22 were seriously injured.[1027] Around this period, the identification of combatants was difficult but it is alleged that some AFRC members were integrated within the RUF movement and were briefed on the ideology of the movement. The senior officer in charge of the Brigade headquarters in Koakuima, who was also the Overall Mining Commander, was one of the most senior RUF members; most of the senior AFRC commanders

[1026] This village could also be Soama.

[1027] It could not be ascertained what happened after this incident between the two RUF/AFRC groups.

were deployed in the Northern Province, in Kabala (Koinadugu District) and Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).[1028]

On different occasions, civilians with amputated limbs arrived in refugee camps in Guinea and explained they had been attacked by RUF/AFRC forces in Lei Chiefdom. For example, one civilian had his left hand amputated when he was in Gbordu, a village nine miles from Siama. RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village and killed five people. The man who had his limb chopped off was accused of being a Kamajor and after he was amputated, he was given a message by the RUF/AFRC commander to deliver to the Kamajors and civilians living in Guinea that they should expect the coming of RUF/AFRC forces soon. On another occasion, one man was mutilated at Gborgborma; the RUF/AFRC forces who had amputated his limb told him that whoever was captured in this village would be treated as a Kamajor because the village used to be a Kamajor base.

Sometime before the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord, RUF/AFRC forces attacked a number of towns and villages in Kamara Chiefdom, including Sukudu and Peyima, killing many civilians and burning many houses. Over 200 civilians, including men, women and children, were abducted and the strongest men were used for mining. There was a food shortage at that time and what little food was available was taken by the RUF/AFRC forces. Civilians were relying mainly on roots (gari) and boiled bananas to survive. Several civilians, particularly those working in the mines, died from starvation. The same working conditions described earlier in 1998 prevailed and the same kind of corporal punishments were applied. Among others, one practice, which caused the death of 10 men in Tombodu (Tankoro Chiefdom), was called "hanging solar on the civilians", which meant beating someone to death. Civilians caught trying to smuggle or steal diamonds were tortured or killed. It is believed that hundreds of men, women and children were killed during this period.

RUF/AFRC were occupying Fiama Chiefdom, setting ambushes for Donsos and civilians. Towns in Fiama Chiefdom, including Sandekor, Koakor, Waima, Njardu, Darkadu and Gbematambadu, were attacked and burnt down during 1999. Sometimes, the burning of different villages took place on the same day and at other times, RUF/AFRC forces decided to burn a certain number of houses per day. Rice barns were also set on fire after being looted.

RUF/AFRC forces were in control of Gbane Kandor and Mafindor Chiefdoms, which were virtually empty, as civilians had fled to the bush or to Guinea. However, people who fled came back to their chiefdoms from time to time in search of food. Attacks on villages are reported occasionally. For example, in April, as civilians were moving regularly between the bush around Sindadu, in the northeast of Gbane Kandor Chiefdom, and Guinea for food, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village and shot the hands of one civilian. In May, while searching food, RUF/AFRC forces from

[1028] Furthermore, unlike for Port Loko DDR, where ex-AFRC members disarmed as such, the DDR centre opened in Kono District received RUF and CDF members but no ex-AFRC members, which tend to reinforce our assumption that AFRC members who were in Kono District after the invasion of Freetown were incorporated within the RUF. However, as the distinction between the forces was difficult for civilians, we would continue referring to RUF/AFRC forces in the subsequent developments. Relations between RUF and AFRC forces were not totally sour, for in 1999, an AFRC member was appointed as personal bodyguard to the RUF leader when he was released from Prison.

Mafindor Chiefdom shot a hunter who was captured in his house at Dengenyma. The hunter was caught by surprise in his house, his shotgun leaning on the wall.

During that period, Donsos forces reorganised in Guinea and launched an attack on the RUF/AFRC forces at Kamiendor (Mafindor Chiefdom). Both sides suffered fatalities, but the loss of men did not prevent the CDF from continuing to launch attacks, as a result of which they recaptured different villages in Gbane Kandor Chiefdom. Donsos freed some civilians that had been held captive by the RUF/AFRC forces and sent them to Guinea.

Following these attacks and the significant gains the Donsos were making, RUF/AFRC forces called for peace talks, which took place in July[1029] at Manjama (Soa Chiefdom). Over 3,000 civilians also attended the meeting. This meeting led to a ceasefire agreement, with the fighting factions agreeing that both civilians and combatants should move freely and that Manjama should serve as a buffer zone. For the purposes of freedom of movement, passes were issued to the civilians by the fighting forces. In August 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces even asked that joint security forces be formed to patrol the border area. It has been suggested that this system gave the RUF/AFRC forces the opportunity to bring their looted property to Manjama and to exchange it for other necessary items brought from Guinea by the Donsos. However in September, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Donsos positions, retaking all the areas the Donsos had held for the previous few months. The RUF/AFRC forces expanded their attacks beyond the borders of Sierra Leone, launching one attack at Gueckedou, one of the busiest commercial centres in Guinea.

After the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, the rate of violations decreased, even if molestation and other violations were still committed by RUF/AFRC forces, fearing that they would no longer be able to use civilians to carry out their mining activities and food finding operations. After July, it is reported that civilians were appointed to a G5 committee to look after civilian affairs in Kamara Chiefdom.[1030]

The fighting with the RUF/AFRC forces in Sandor Chiefdom continued until the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999. However, the cessation of hostilities was only temporary and fighting resumed in 2000.

During the second half of the year, a mining area was opened by the RUF under the directive of the Overall Mining Commander near the bridge between Tombodu and Bundu II (Kamara Chiefdom). Many civilians were captured from across the whole District and forced to work in the mines. The captured civilians were working with barely any food or water and people were beaten or killed if they complained of hunger or thirst. On one occasion, three young men who defied instructions were killed, allegedly on the order of the Overall Mining Commander. On another occasion, 50 men were brought from Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom) to mine and it is believed that almost all of them died during the course of the mining.[1031] Even foundations of houses were broken for the purposes of mining for diamonds.

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1029 This first meeting may have taken place in August, as reports mention both July and August for the date of this meeting.

1030 Clarification is required from the records on the dates.

1031 It is believed that 95% of them died.

In Sandor Chiefdom, different RUF/AFRC camps, known as Joe Bush, were operating and many violations were committed at those camps. At Tegbadu, four miles north of Yormandu where RUF/AFRC forces were still engaged mining, there was a "killing field". Nearby Tabema, on the Kayima Tefeyah highway, a camp also called "P.C. Ground" was infamous for the sexual violence inflicted on civilians. Many girls were raped and kept in the camp for sexual purposes. These women and girls were often sexually assaulted by more than one RUF/AFRC member at a time while some were taken and assigned to only one man.

On 20 October 1999, the Sierra Leone President officially launched the started of the Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program during a ceremony at Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown.[1032]

In November 1999, near Jagbwema (Fiama chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces, who already had over 130 abducted civilians with them, captured an unspecified number of people. Those abductees were told to fetch water, firewood and food; one of them was given the responsibility to settle minor disputes among civilians. After three weeks, all the abductees were taken to Kailahun District, passing through Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom). Most of the journey was undertaken at night and civilians were not allowed to rest on their own volition. In Kailahun, there were over 1.000 members of the RUF/AFRC forces and a lot of abductees. Some of them were required to farm for the RUF/AFRC forces while others became teachers.

In December 1999, hunters who had found refuge in Guinea tried another time to repel the RUF/AFRC forces from Lei Chiefdom. With the support of local authorities also living in the refugee camps, they crossed the river that separates Sierra Leone and Guinea on 18 December, launched different attacks on RUF/AFRC positions and at Kombayende, they managed to inflict heavy casualties on the RUF/AFRC side and to chase out the remaining forces. However, eight days later, RUF/AFRC forces came back and this time, the CDF members were not able to withstand the heavy firing and had to retreat to Guinea. The CDF members who were captured were either killed or mutilated and given letters promising that they (RUF/AFRC forces) would chase them into Guinea.

k) Events in 2000 to 2001

Throughout 2000 and the large part of 2001, mining activities were carried out in Koidu Town and in Plant No. 11, a mining area located between Koidu Town and Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom). In Koidu Town, a place called Kaisambo was mined for the Overall Mining Commander. An unspecified number of houses in Koidu town had their foundations broken so that they could be mined. At Plant No. 11, more than 500 people were abducted and forced to mine and push caterpillars whenever they broke down.

On 14 January, the RUF leader, the Deputy Defence Minister and the ECOMOG Force Commander visited Koidu, as part of a country tour aiming at sensitising the combatants on the

[1032] The start of the DDR program was originally planned to take place within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999.

DDR process.[1033] Military Observers began conducting regular patrol missions in the District, although UN peacekeepers had not yet been able to deploy in the District.[1034]
However, the situation in the country worsened and United Nations peacekeepers captured in Makeni in early May 2000 were brought to Plant No. 11 (Kamara Chiefdom).[1035]

It was widely believed that the control by the Government of Kono District would mark the end of the conflict[1036] and talks were initiated between the President of Sierra Leone and the RUF to end the conflict, which faced a new development in May with the abduction of the UN peacekeepers, as mentioned, and the arrest and detention of the RUF leader in Freetown.[1037]

Inhabitants of the District, however, began again crossing the Melie River, which separates the District from Guinea, fleeing RUF harassment.[1038]Around the same period, RUF/AFRC forces began attacking the Guinean territory from different fronts.[1039]

The peace talks, which started in late May 2000 in order to reactivate the Lomé Peace Agreement found a conclusion in Abuja on 10 November with the signing of a ceasefire between the Government and the RUF forces. UNAMSIL was given the mission to monitor this ceasefire.[1040] However, in December 2000, civilians who had found refuge in a Guinean camp near the border with Lei Chiefdom saw thousands of civilians with bundles on their heads, who explained them that they had been attacked by "rebels" during their sleep.[1041] The following day, another group of refugees within the territory of Guinea confirmed that the "rebels" had come to Guinea. The next morning, trucks full of RUF/AFRC forces dressed in military uniforms arrived at the place where all these refugees were at this time and announced through a microphone that they had not come to kill them but to take them back to Sierra Leone. Their commander told the civilians that they wanted peace and as a proof of their commitment to the peace process, they have come to take Sierra Leoneans back to Sierra Leone. Over 20,000 refugees were thus taken back to Sierra Leone while the RUF forces continued their attacks in Guinea. The trip to Lei Chiefdom lasted roughly 10 days and when they arrived at Kombayende (Lei Chiefdom), the civilians were allocated to different towns within the chiefdom.

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[1033] Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 5 - 16 January 2000.
[1034] IRIN West Africa, 12 April 2000. On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council had adopted Resolution 1270 approving the deployment of 6,000 armed peacekeepers alongside the 260 unarmed military observers. Their number would increase over the subsequent months.
[1035] This group of UN peacekeepers was composed of 208 Zambians: IRIN West Africa, 8 May 2000. Around the same period, peacekeepers were also abducted in Kailahun District.
[1036] In early June, the Deputy Defence Minister called for an offensive military operation in the District: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report: 1-2 June 2000.
[1037] The RUF leader was arrested in Freetown in May, after his bodyguards had shot and killed civilians gathered for a demonstration in front of his house in Freetown on 8 May 2000.
[1038] IRIN West Africa, 23 August 2000.
[1039] Attacks on the Guinean territory were also launched from Kambia and Kailahun Districts.
[1040] UNAMSIL press briefing, 27 November 2000. Paragraph 4 of this Ceasefire Agreement stated "both parties agree that UNAMSIL shall have full liberty to deploy its troops and other personnel throughout Sierra Leone including the diamond-producing areas in the discharge of its responsibilities, when UNAMSIL is satisfied that the ceasefire is observed by all the parties."
[1041] In addition, during this period, the training base at Yengema (Nimikoro Chiefdom) was still open.

At Kundundu, the returnees were forced to work for the RUF/AFRC forces and were told to plant cannabis seeds. A woman accused of performing witchcraft was stripped naked and shot six times. In another incident that took place at Yawandor, 22 miles from the headquarter town of Saiama, following the killing of two RUF/AFRC members and the wife of another member by civilians, 17 civilians were killed on the order of the commander based at Kombayende, so that the RUF/AFRC forces based at Yawandor could restore their authority. At Kombayende, the commander in charge was the same person who had established the commaflags in 1998.

During this time, RUF/AFRC forces continued to commit acts of violence against civilians. On one occasion, four RUF members raped a 42-year-old woman until she died. When the civilians took the matter to the commander in charge, he replied to them that the RUF never made complaints about the men they had lost during the war so the civilians should not complain. Two days after that incident, a suckling mother was raped and her child was taken away from her. A man accused of stealing was stripped naked and the commander ordered some of his men to set fire to an empty five gallon container and to drip the burning rubber onto the man. The man died three days later. Furthermore, some civilians were taken and sent to Koidu for mining.

In January 2001,[1042] fighting between RUF/AFRC forces and hunters intensified in the upper part of Sandor Chiefdom. However, UN personnel and commanders together with the Paramount Chief of Sandor arrived in Kayima by helicopter to exhort both factions to disarm. The RUF/AFRC forces who spoke with those authorities responded positively and stated they were ready to disarm.[1043] However, about one month after this visit, fighting intensified north of Kayima[1044] and as they were retreating south, RUF/AFRC forces burnt the remaining houses in the villages. After a battle at Yaryah, three miles north of Kayima, the RUF/AFRC forces decided to leave the chiefdom and headed for Koidu.

In Fiama Chiefdom, in March 2001, one man on his way to Jegbwema met civilians who told him that 50 men had been abducted and used to work for the RUF/AFRC forces at Jegbwema. Women were used to cook and for sexual purposes, as a result of which some of them became pregnant and had children. Sometimes, the captured civilians were beaten at night and put in containers used as cells by the RUF/AFRC forces. One man brought from the Guinean border was suspected of being a Kamajor and was beaten for three days by RUF/AFRC forces at Jagbwema before he died on the fourth day. At Gbekor, a man met more than 12 young girls below the age of 18 who were with the RUF/AFRC forces as their "wives". As he was wondering whether these girls were with the RUF/AFRC forces for their stolen property and money, he discovered that most of them had been abducted and were afraid to go back to their parents for fear of being called "rebels" or being maltreated.

Three days after they had arrived in Kombayende, 150 men who had just come back were taken by the commander to go to Guinea with some RUF members to carry the stolen property they had in Guinea. Shortly after, the Guinean Minister of Defence and some senior military officers came to the border with Sierra Leone to find members of the Kamajors to help Guinea repel the RUF

[1042] Although this event was described as taking place in 2000, it probably took place in 2001.
[1043] This visit probably took place during the second half of 2000.
[1044] The CDF members fighting were those coming from the north of the Chiefdom.

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beyond the Guinean border. The Kamajors told the Guinean authorities that they could not fight without the approval of the Sierra Leone Government, as they were under the control of the Sierra Leone Government. Two weeks later, the Guinean authorities came back, told the Kamajors that they had communicated with the Sierra Leone authorities, who approved their request. Kamajors were then equipped with arms and ammunition from the Guinean authorities.

Following this, on 23 March 2001, a group of 200 Donsos and Kamajors who had regrouped and were fully armed[1045] launched simultaneous attacks on RUF/AFRC positions in Kono District through three different flanks: Gbangbokoro[1046] in Soa Chiefdom (Kamajors/Donsos), Kamiendor in Mafindor Chiefdom (Donsos) and Kailahun District (Kamajors). Communication sets allowed the three groups to launch attacks simultaneously and to communicate any developments.

The group that headed to Kamiendor drove out the RUF/AFRC forces before separating into two groups, one going to Kombayende and the other using the Kondewakoro flank and working in concert. These two sub groups regrouped later on in Fiama Chiefdom. From Kamiendor, the group heading to Kombayende dislodged RUF/AFRC forces from Sindudu, which is located on the border between Gbane Kandor and Mafiendor Chiefdoms. As the commander in charge of the RUF forces in Kombayende noticed the advance of the CDF, he sent for reinforcements to Koidu, which was still under RUF/AFRC control. The reinforcement was composed of senior RUF commanders, who moved to Kombayende armed with anti-aircraft machine guns, RPGs, automatic rifles and other weapons seized from the UN peacekeepers. When they entered the town, the CDF forces opened fire and killed 32 of them. After a fierce battle, the RUF/AFRC retreated back to Koidu, as most of their senior commanders had been killed. The CDF chased them up to Jagbwema (Niama Chiefdom), where a battle took place. The RUF/AFRC then retreated to Maiyor, which is on the highway linking Jagbwema to Koidu.

In late April, the Acting Force Commander of UNAMSIL made a visit to Koidu to assess the situation on the ground, following RUF complaints about attacks carried out by CDF members backed up by Guineans.[1047] The CDF prepared themselves to go to Koidu, but in the meanwhile,[1048] in May, trucks full of UN peacekeepers came to the CDF deployment to advise them not to make any further assault on RUF/AFRC positions and to observe the cease-fire.[1049] The CDF told the peacekeepers that they would only observe the cease-fire after they had seen their Paramount Chiefs. About one week later, Paramount Chiefs and senior UN officials came by helicopter to meet the CDF and the Paramount Chiefs told the CDF that they did not want the Government to accuse the people of Kono of destroying the peace process. This meeting caused the CDF to desist from launching any more attacks and to stay in Maiyor until disarmament[1050] took place.

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[1045] Reports mention that these CDF forces had heavy artillery like tanks and that a ferry was built across the Meli River that separates Mafiendor Chiefdom and Guinea to facilitate the movement of the CDF.
[1046] Gbangbokoro is on the border with Guinea.
[1047] UNAMSIL press briefing, 26 April 2001.
[1048] It is alleged that a member of the RUF General Staff went to Makeni to find the UN Bangladeshi contingent to ask them to come to Kono to resolve the situation.
[1049] UN peacekeepers from Tonkolili and Kailahun Districts carried out two-day patrol missions in early May prior to the establishment of a permanent patrol presence patrol in Koidu in late May: UNAMSIL press briefings, 6 May 2001, 11 May 2001 and 22 May 2001.
[1050] The other CDF group that entered Kono District through Soa Chiefdom met this group at Jagbwema.

On 4 May 2001, a meeting was convened between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone[1051] to review the ceasefire signed in Abuja in November 2000 and which was violated, mainly in Kono District.[1052] Further to this meeting, it was decided to introduce phases of disarmament, in order to accelerate its process.

Also in May, UNAMSIL force Commander and Deputy Force Commander visited the RUF forces at Koidu and the CDF members at Kombayende (Lei Chiefdom) and Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom), to witness the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement, signed by the RUF and the CDF on 15 May.[1053] This cessation of hostilities and the start of the DDR program made the atmosphere extremely tense and many officials made visits in the District to ensure the process ran smoothly.[1054]

During the second meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR held at Magburaka on 2 June, the parties agreed to conduct the DDR process simultaneously in Bonthe and Kono Districts in July 2001, leaving time for the DDR facilities to be built in Yengema (Nimikoro Chiefdom). The estimated numbers of combatants to be disarmed were 1,500 combatants for the CDF and 2,500 for the RUF.[1055]

Disarmament started on 1 July at a very slow pace and was intermittently halted. Different reasons were put forward to explain the stalling of the process, including the suspicion of both the CDF and the RUF forces against each other, the UN travel ban on the RUF's Political and Peace Council Chairman and, above all, tensions resulting from the mining activities.[1056] To speed up the disarmament process, UN Officials met directly with the commanders of both fighting factions on the ground, rather than with the political leaders[1057] and during the third meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR on 17 July, the parties agreed that the checkpoints established by the RUF and CDF forces be dismantled and a moratorium on mining activities be implemented.[1058] Nevertheless, skirmishes between RUF and CDF were still reported for June and July.[1059] By the end of July, two companies of the UN Bangladeshi contingent were deployed at Koidu and 500 Pakistani UN peacekeepers were based at Yengema.[1060]

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[1051] This meeting was the second meeting of the Committee of Six of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, the United Nations, the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front: UNAMSIL press briefing, 3 May 2001.

[1052] Further to the meeting in May 2001, those parties would hold monthly tripartite meetings under the Joint Committee on DDR.

[1053] UNAMSIL press briefings, 17 May 2001, 24 May 2001

[1054] On 25 and 26 May 2001, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, accompanied by the UNAMSIL Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander and a Government delegation, including the Deputy Defence Minister met with representatives of the CDF and RUF in Koidu: UNAMSIL press briefing, 28 May 2001.

[1055] UNAMSIL press briefing, 5 June 2001.

[1056] UNAMSIL press briefing, 6 July 2001 and 13 July 2001.

[1057] IRIN West Africa, 12 July 2001.

[1058] IRIN West Africa, 20 July 2001; UNAMSIL press briefing, 20 July 2001.

[1059] IRIN West Africa, 24 July 2001.

[1060] UNAMSIL press briefing, 24 July 2001.

The initial target date of 28 July for the completion of the disarmament process was not met and the process was extended, as pockets of RUF forces were still not disarmed in the District. By 17 August, the disarmament for Kono District was complete and the figures of the combatants who had gone through the process were higher than originally expected, mainly for RUF members came from Koinadugu District to Kono District to disarm.[1061]

The completion of the disarmament in Kono District brought relief to the whole country, as it meant the war was really over. As a mark of the importance of this achievement for the country, the Sierra Leonean President, the Nigerian President and the Chairman of the ECOWAS went to Kono on 3 September, to witness the official end of the disarmament process.[1062]

RUF forces, however, continued to mine in the Koidu area, including indiscriminate mining carried out in the centre of the township. Some incidents of violence against civilians are reported during that period.[1063] In one incident, one civilian went back to Koidu from Freetown to assess the level of destruction of his property. As he reached his house, he met 20 people busy mining the soil underneath his house. When he asked them to stop, one commander at the site told his boys to arrest him and tie him up. He ordered four of his men to hang four solars on the man as he had interrupted the mining activities, which means that four people will beat the person. On another occasion, the Overall Mining Commander ordered civilians to be arrested, so that they could wash gravel at mining areas. One of these civilians was accused of stealing a diamond and when a young RUF member reported that the man had swallowed the diamond, the Overall Mining Commander ordered his men to hang ten solars on the man. After the beating, the man admitted he had taken a diamond but had swallowed it. The Overall Mining Commander ordered his men to kill the man and get the diamond out of the stomach. However, nothing was found in the stomach of the dead man, which made the Overall Mining Commander say that the boy who made the report let him kill a man for no just cause. As a result, the Overall Mining Commander shot the young member three times in the chest, killing him.

This situation of continuous mining activities angered the residents of Koidu. They reported the matter to UNAMSIL, who explained that it would be solved in due time. Nevertheless, on 18 December 2001, residents from Koidu took slings and machetes to fight the RUF/AFRC forces. A lot of the residents then left the District for other Districts (Bombali and Tonkolili) as they believed some of the RUF/AFRC forces would never give up the privileges they got from the mining areas, namely control on the mineral wealth and taxes levied on traders. Following this mass exodus of the population, a meeting took place[1064] in Makeni at the headquarters of the UN Nigerian contingent with leaders of the RUF forces and a delegation from Kono authorities. On 27 December, an important delegation composed of Northern Paramount Chiefs, the UNAMSIL Acting Force

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[1061] UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 August 2001. As of 31 August 2001, 5,634 combatants had disarmed in the District, 3,623 being RUF members and 2,011 CDF members: UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 August 2001 and Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 09 - 31 August 2001.

[1062] IRIN West Africa, 3 September 2001.

[1063] In its Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 09 - 31 August 2001, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), based on information from Sierra Leone Web reports, reported on the ongoing use of child labour by the RUF for mining activities.

[1064] It is alleged that this meeting took place to clear the rumour that the incident of the previous day was carried out on tribal lines on the pretext that Temnes, Limbas and Mendes were being killed in Kono.

Commander, officers of the Sierra Leone Police and other people arrived in Koidu and summoned a meeting of stakeholders at the UNAMSIL headquarters. An agreement to put an end to the RUF mining activities in the District was signed and apparently implemented.

### 3. Conclusion

As with the two other Districts of the Eastern Province, Kono District was affected by the conflict since 1991 until the disarmament was declared complete in 2001. This 11-year conflict transformed the face of the District, which suffered heavily in terms of casualties, displacement of population and destruction of dwellings.

The District was first attacked in 1991 by RUF/NPFL forces coming from Kailahun District but those attacks were limited to the south-east, at the border with Kailahun District. During the following year, RUF/NPFL intensified their incursions into the District and progressively expanded their positions to attack Koidu, the headquarter town, by the end of 1992. SLA forces repelled the RUF/NPFL forces from Koidu at the beginning of 1993 and continued their "mopping up" operations throughout the year. By the middle of the year, they had dislodged the RUF/NPFL forces from their main positions in the District. Around the same period, SLA forces had confined the RUF/NPFL forces to the extreme east of Kailahun District, which led Sierra Leoneans to think the war was over and the NPRC Chairman to unilaterally declare a ceasefire.

In late December, however, RUF forces launched a massive operation in the south of Kenema District. This operation clearly marked a new phase of the conflict, during which RUF forces spread across the whole country, using guerrilla warfare tactics. RUF forces re-entered Kono District in 1994 and gradually gained territory on SLA forces, whose number had considerably increased over 1994 but whose actions aimed at repelling the RUF forces had proved wholly ineffective. By April 1995, RUF forces captured Koidu Town for the second time, inflicting high casualties on civilians and destroying and vandalising the town. From Koidu, RUF forces spanned out mainly in the diamond areas around Koidu. Their progression in the District and their mining activities were stalled around May/June by the SLA assisted by CDF forces and, above all, by Executive Outcomes, the South African mercenary company in Sierra Leone under contract with the Government. The RUF forces were rapidly driven out of their positions and throughout the rest of the year and 1996, were mainly confined to the south-east of the District, while Executive Outcomes controlled most of the remainder of the District.

Following the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes by the end of January 1997, the Kono population was left in the hands of the RUF forces, in particular following their merging with the AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces, although mainly concentrated around Koidu, patrolled the chiefdoms, harassing civilians for food items and abducting civilians who were then forced to work at the mine sites for the RUF/AFRC forces. As the harassment and physical violence against civilians increased, youths and CDF members fought the RUF/AFRC forces in Koidu and recaptured the town early 1998.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces retreated into the Provinces and reached Kono District in late February 1998. They rapidly retook Kono and spread across the whole District, carrying out the "Operation No Living Thing". The rate of physical violence, mutilation, rape, killing, abductions for conscription, use as forced labour or for sexual purpose and

the destruction of property reached unprecedented levels. This period, running from February to May/June, was characterised as the "reign of terror". Although RUF/AFRC forces were also deployed across the Northern Province, where they carried out the same actions, Kono District suffered the most from this "Operation No Living Thing", as RUF/AFRC forces clearly concentrated their operations on the main mining area. ECOMOG operations continued in the Provinces and by April 1998, ECOMOG forces had reached Kono District and recaptured the towns previously under RUF/AFRC control. RUF/AFRC forces continued their actions from the bush and abducted more civilians to conscript and train them in the new camp they had opened in the east of the District or to use them in the mining sites.

Violence began decreasing by June 1998. Around this period, hundreds of thousands of civilians had fled the District and RUF/AFRC forces were mainly engaged in large-scale mining operations. In late December, however, the RUF/AFRC regrouped and launched a massive operation on Koidu and other main towns in the west of the District, dislodging the ECOMOG forces from all their positions. The capture of Kono was the first step of a wider action, which reached its conclusion in the invasion of Freetown in January 1999.

Following the invasion of Freetown in January 1999, negotiations started between the Sierra Leonean President and the RUF leader in order to put an end to the conflict: A ceasefire was signed in May and a Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. This agreement did not end the conflict, as RUF/AFRC expanded their positions in the Northern Province and continued to be present in Kono District. RUF/AFRC forces pursued their mining activities in the District and violence was still inflicted on civilians. Local hunters in the north and the east of the District increased their attacks on RUF/AFRC forces but were often defeated. From 1999, however, the conflict got a new face, as it appeared RUF/AFRC forces planned to launch attacks onto the Guinean territory.

The number of civilians abducted and trained, in particular in "superman camp" in the east of the District clearly indicated that RUF/AFRC forces were preparing attacks onto the Guinean territory. Attacks on Guinea were launched in May 2000 and reached their peak in September. These attacks onto the Guinean territory were not isolated, for Guinea was also attacked from Kailahun and Kambia Districts.

In 2001, the CDF, backed up by Guinean authorities, engaged and defeated the RUF forces in the east of the country. They were halted in their progression through the intervention of Kono authorities and UN officials, in a bid to enforce the ceasefire renewed in Abuja. The disarmament process began shortly afterwards, an agreement to end illegal mining was reached and the war was officially over in the District by the end of 2001.

## E. Southern Province

### a. Bo District

### 1. Introduction

Bo District is one of the four Districts composing the Southern Province together with Pujehun, Bonthe and Moyamba Districts. Its headquarter town, Bo Town, lies in its centre in Kakua Chiefdom. It is strategically located at a nodal crossroad, from which roads extend into the District in four directions.

Bordered on the east by Kenema District and in the south by Pujehun District, almost all the incursions would come from this direction following an east-west pattern. Its northern chiefdom, Valunia, shares a boundary with the central District of Tonkolili. Moyamba District on the north and Bonthe District on the south constitute its western edge.

There are 15 chiefdoms in the District:

| Chiefdom | Headquarter |
|---|---|
| Badjia | Ngelehun |
| Bagbe | Ngarlu |
| Bagbo | Jimi |
| Baoma | Baoma |
| Bumpeh | Bumpeh |
| Gbo | Gbo |
| Jiama Bongor | Telu |
| Kakua | Bo |
| Komboya | Njala |
| Lugbu | Sumbuya |
| Niawa Lenga | Nengbema |
| Selenga | Dambala |
| Tikonko | Tikonko |
| Valunia | Mongere |
| Wunde | Gboyama |

Two roads leading to Bo Town allow its penetration from Pujehun Town, the principal road passing by Wunde Chiefdom and the secondary road passing by Bagbo Chiefdom. It was the secondary road that would find favour with the RUF/NPFL forces, who entered the District from Pujehun District in 1991. The main road in the District is the highway that links Freetown with Kenema Town. This feature would influence the conduct of the conflict, as it would be the setting of many ambushes and checkpoints. The relatively large number of roads accessible by vehicle would allow further RUF advances inland towards the Districts of Moyamba and Bonthe, even if the headquarter town, Bo Town on the Freetown-Kenema highway, would not be captured by RUF forces.

The Sewa River that flows from the south-west to the east, following one-third of the border with Kenema District, divides the District in two and would be the natural separation between the chiefdoms affected by the conflict during its first years.

The final phase ran from late 1995 to the end of the war, during which time the Kamajors were formally initiated and spread across the District. Although they initially fought alongside the SLA, their collaboration soon deteriorated and was almost nonexistent by the time of the Coup in May 1997. Fighting between those forces were reported and some SLA forces were suspected of collaborating with the RUF. The Kamajors nonetheless gained control of almost all the previous RUF strongholds in the District and during the AFRC regime, RUF/AFRC forces were only based in Koribondo and Bo Town. Following the ECOMOG deployment in the District in late February-early March 1998, no further RUF/AFRC incursion were reported, the District remaining under the Kamajors control who however harassed civilians, chasing, inflicting physical violence and killing people they suspected of being "Junta" and RUF collaborators.

## 2. Factual Analysis

a) Phase I: 1991 – 1993

RUF/NPFL forces entered the District in April 1991 through Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in the south-west of Bo District. These forces arrived first in Bagbo Chiefdom, where they scattered throughout April, May and June. They reached Lugbu Chiefdom in June, where they stayed for some months before being repelled by SLA forces.

On or around 24 April 1991, RUF/NPFL forces coming from the RUF base in Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) known as "Kuwait" arrived in the headquarter town of Jimi (in the east of Bagbo Chiefdom), 42 miles south-west of Bo. The RUF/NPFL forces fired their weapons[1065] and gathered the people of the town for a meeting in the Court Barrie. At this meeting, they identified themselves as fighters from Liberia, trained in Burkina Faso and fighting for their leader to liberate the people of Sierra Leone. The RUF/NPFL forces gave the people of the village palm fronds as symbols of the revolution[1066] and warned them that if they ran, they would be deemed an "enemy" and shot. They took all the Paramount Chief's belongings, including his car, claiming he was an "APC chief". While there are no reported fatalities, they abducted the Paramount Chief's staff and recruited some 82 people, including young children.[1067]

The RUF/NPFL forces remained in Jimi for approximately one week, after which the forces split into three groups. One group remained in Jimi and the second group headed north west towards Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom). On the way, at Mani Junction (Bagbo Chiefdom), this group split into two, with one group continuing on their way to Sumbuya and another group heading south for Bum Chiefdom in Bonthe District. The third group headed north-east in a push towards Niagorihun, passing successively through Limba and Levuma. Niagorihun occupies the strategic position of junction town on the road leading to Sumbuya, the commercial centre and headquarter town of Lugbu Chiefdom, and the road coming from Jimi, from where movement between the north-east to the south-west could be controlled.

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[1065] The RUF/NPFL forces were armed with mortar bombs, AK47 rifles, Berettas, LMG, GPMG and grenades.
[1066] Palm fronds and leaves were considered to be a symbol of the SLPP (Sierra Leone People' Party), the opponent to the then APC regime of J.S. Momoh. Reports from Kenema also mentioned RUF/NPFL forces coming to the District with palm leaves round their wrists.
[1067] No mention is made of what happened to the staff of the Chief nor whether they were included in the 82 people abducted at this time.

The second group, who went to Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom), stopped at Mani Junction in Momajoe on the way, where they encamped all the civilians at Lavekee compound and conscripted 85 boys and girls. In their address to the people, they made it clear that nobody should run in their presence or they would be classed as an "enemy" and would be shot on sight. Furthermore, the RUF/NPFL stated that they came more for the Fullahs and the Lebanese, who - according to them - contributed to the suffering of the masses.[1068] Thus, one Fullah businessman was tied to a stick and people were told to guard him until their return, under threat of indiscriminate killing in the area if anyone let him go.

Before leaving, they warned the population to have livestock ready for them when they passed through on their way back. They then split into two groups and left, one group going towards Bonthe District and the other continuing on their way to Sumbuya. Near Sumbuya, one young man was shot because he started running away when he saw the forces coming. One Lebanese businessman was killed at the wharf, another one was shot dead for refusing to open his store and four Lebanese people were abducted. The RUF/NPFL commander ordered his forces to take property from the town, including hundreds of bags of rice, many bags of onions, sugar and other items, including vehicles. All the property was taken back to Jimi by the young boys and girls who had been abducted when they had first arrived, some of whom were taken for training.

On their way back, the RUF/NPFL forces stopped in Momajoe and brought the man who had been tied up since they left before the assembled town, at which time the commander of the RUF/NPFL forces shot and killed him. They forced some of the townspeople to bury the body, which had started to cause panic among the inhabitants. While in Momajoe, the group that had gone to Bonthe District returned with property, including motorbikes, they had taken from the rice mill at Torma (Bum Chiefdom). They then left Momajoe and went back to Jimi with the property they had taken from Sumbuya and from Torma, some of which was then taken to the RUF base called "Kuwait" in Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District).

The third group, who were heading north-east, continued along the road to Limba, passing through Manjama on the way, where they burnt down a number of houses. On their arrival in Limba, the RUF/NPFL forces gathered the people of the town for a meeting, in which they introduced themselves as trained Liberian mercenaries who had come to put down the APC regime. After this brief meeting, they continued on to Levuma, north of Limba, and later to Niagorihun Gateway, 7 miles north of Jimi, the meeting point of the main road to Sahn Malen and Sumbuya Lugbu Chiefdoms.

On 12 May 1991, SLA and the United Liberation Movement for Liberia (ULIMO) forces stationed in Koribondo (in the south of Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) were deployed to Niagorihun to prevent the RUF/NPFL forces from taking control of the town, which was successful. The RUF/NPFL forces made approximately four other attempts to take the town, returning each time to Jimi and passing through Limba on the way to Niagorihun, but each time they were repelled by the combined SLA and ULIMO forces. During the successive battles, both sides suffered heavy fatalities, including one

[1068] The Fullah are one of the ethnic groups from Sierra Leone and were a particular target, as its members were known to be wealthy businessmen.

This RUF progression and stay in the whole Southern Province and in Bo District in particular was gradually stopped by the initiative of the Kamajors who started fighting alongside the SLA in 1996. The collaboration between those two forces however deteriorated rapidly and fighting between them reached its climax in early 1997. At this time, the Kamajors and the SLA were controlling distinct and separate areas of the District.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown and its deployment in different towns in the Provinces in 1998, the Southern Province became free of RUF/AFRC attacks and instead came under the total control of the Kamajors. Bo District was not affected by the retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown, as they regrouped and concentrated on the main mining areas (Kono District and north of Kenema District) and those areas in which CDF members did not have established and constant control, mostly in the Northern Province.

Throughout the conflict, widespread violations were committed primarily by RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC forces, but also by SLA forces and Kamajors, especially once they firmly established their control and authority over the District. Those violations were directed against civilians and their property and included stealing and destruction of property, physical violence, sexual assault, killing and abduction for use as fighters, workers or "wives". Only a few cases of mutilation were reported for the District, as most of these incidents took place during a specific RUF/AFRC operation called "Operation No Living Thing" in the first months of 1998 and following the retreat from Freetown. Furthermore, while it hosted thousands of IDPs from other Districts, mainly Pujehun District, Bo District suffered less internal displacement of its own population.

b. Bonthe District

**1. Introduction**

Bonthe District is located in the south-west of the Southern Province of the Republic of Sierra Leone. It is the only District in the Southern Province that shares boundaries with the other three Districts in the Province, namely Moyamba and Bo Districts in the north and Pujehun District in the south and east. Bonthe District is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean in the west.

Although located on Sherbro Island,[1157] its headquarter, Bonthe Town, is not part of the two chiefdoms of the island (Sittia and Dema Chiefdoms). Rather, its is part of another administrative structure, the Sherbro Rural District.

There are 11 chiefdoms in the District, two of which are located Sherbro Island:

| Chiefdom | Headquarter |
|---|---|
| Bendu Cha | Bendu |
| Bum | Madina |
| Dema | Tissana |
| Imperi | Gbangbama |
| Jong | Mattru |

[1157] This island is commonly known as "Bonthe Island".

The last phase ran from February 1998 to the completion of disarmament in late 2001. During this time, the Kamajors were in total control of the District, as no more RUF or AFRC forces were operating in the District. The brief return of RUF/AFRC forces to Bonthe Town following the invasion of Freetown did not much change the situation of the District, let alone Bonthe Town. The Kamajors continued to impose and affirm their authority in every aspect of life, deciding over administrative and private matters, chasing "rebel" and "Junta" collaborators and intensifying their havoc on civilians. This would continue until the completion of disarmament and the deployment of UN peacekeepers throughout the District in late 2001.

## 2. Factual analysis

### a) Events in 1991

In early April 1991, traders coming from Bo Waterside (Soro Gbema Chiefdom, Pujehun District) reported to inhabitants of Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom that unknown gunmen had crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia.[1158] Soon after, on 9 May 1991, RUF/NPFL forces coming from Gbandapi (Panga Kabone, Pujehun District) [1159] arrived by canoes to Tei (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) in the south of Bonthe District, while civilians were conducting a ceremonial rite. These forces were allegedly led by some civilians from the chiefdom who had earlier gone to Gbandapi to bring them to Tei in search of the Paramount Chief.[1160]

On their arrival in Tei, one member of the RUF/NPFL forces shot a person in the leg, not knowing he was the Paramount Chief for whom they were searching. The Paramount Chief fled to the bush to hide from the forces. The RUF/NPFL forces asked civilians where they could find the Paramount Chief and when civilians revealed he was the man previously shot in the leg, the RUF/NPFL forces became more aggressive and beat people. The Paramount Chief was found behind his house, had his hands tied behind his back and was brought at the front of his house, where his property was taken away[1161] in his presence. He was then taken into his house and shot many times before the house was set on fire. His head was cut off and allegedly brought to Gbandapi. The RUF/NPFL forces appointed a man to be Town Commander of Tei and asked him to take care of the town in their absence.

In the same month, the combined forces entered Topain (north of Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom). There, they identified themselves as RUF fighting along side the NPFL from Liberia, who were mainly Burkinabes and Liberians. They assembled all the men and elderly people in the centre of the town and made them sit in the sun, on the accusation that they knew where the SLA forces and the

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[1158] Bo Waterside is the crossing point between Liberia and Sierra Leone and, by April, the RUF/NPFL had spread across Pujehun District.

[1159] Gbandapi is located on the bank of Malemie River, which joins the Wanjei River that flows to Bonthe District. It is renowned for hosting weekly trade fares where slat is predominantly sold. The RUF/NPFL forces were based there for a while.

[1160] Reports recount that a disgruntled man who had an argument with the Paramount Chief over a land issue went to Gbandapi to relate his fate to the RUF/NPFL forces. This has to be read in conjunction with the fact that the RUF/NPFL forces had been targeting Paramount Chiefs since they entered the territory of Sierra Leone, as the Chiefs represented the APC Government in the chiefdoms.

[1161] The property taken away included clothing, money earmarked for the mechanical cultivation of the rice the following year, two single barrel guns, rice and other personnel belongings.

were both shot dead. A woman in the front row was then picked to explain and when she could not, she was told to undress. Her son was called upon and told to do the same. He was then told to have sex with his mother in the presence of everybody. Shocked and panicked, he could not do it and they were both shot dead. Another woman was picked from the crowd and shot in the head. Although the troops were only three in number, the people were so terrified that they were unable to escape. Four more people were killed that day, making a total of eight. Four girls were raped on the same day and 17 more were abducted. Property was taken and removed from the village on the same day.

In a small village called Tarsor (Bum Chiefdom) located near a stream, the decomposed bodies of two RUF child combatants who had earlier gone missing were found on the seashore. Around 30 people who were found in the village were quickly gathered and asked to explain by the RUF forces. No one knew anything about the death of the boys and could not explain anything to the satisfaction of the RUF forces. Six people were immediately shot and killed and the other people were tied up and made to lie in the sun. Rubber was melted and dropped in their eyes. This was done to both young and old, including babies. Fifteen houses were burnt in the town and the farmhouses were destroyed, at which time seven more people were killed. At Bisoa, at the boundary with Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, RUF forces burnt six houses at night and killed 18 people on the grounds they were harbouring SLA forces.[1192]

Madina was made a training base for the abducted young men and boys; drugs were allegedly given to them during the course of the training that took place at the school compound, during which young girls were also trained as fighters. Although not all of them were given weapons after the training, these new recruits were used to attack SLA positions in Pujehun and Bo Districts. RUF forces also had a training base at Torma, where conscripted civilians were sent for training. The training was carried out in two phases. Training to fight was done during the first phase and then trainees were drugged during the second phase. Most of the boys that were trained in this way were below 15 years of age and they were usually sent on looting patrols called "mission" for their commander.

During their stay in Bum Chiefdom in 1994, the RUF did not face any counter-attack by government troops. This firm control over Bum Chiefdom would only be the prelude for further incursions into the District in early 1995 from Bo District.

In November and December 1994, six months after the SLA established a navy base in Bonthe Town, those navy forces patrolled the waters in Sittia and Dema Chiefdoms on the pretext that they were chasing away illegal foreign trawlers, despite the fact they never met any trawlers during their patrols. Their visits were sometime announced to the Chiefs in advance, who consequently taxed the civilians to contribute money for the feeding of the SLA members. On one occasion, the SLA forces called the people and local authorities at Tissana (Dema Chiefdom) to a meeting at which they demanded that they should be supported financially so they could protect the lives and properties of the civilians. Women were required to give Le 1,000 and men had to give Le 1,500. One civilian, who incited the others not to give this money, on the grounds that the SLA was already paid, was arrested and put in a cell. This meeting concluded with a token by the Paramount Chief of Le

[1192] It was however revealed that this village did not host SLA forces.

They succeeded in dislodging the Kamajors and burnt down the remaining houses in the town. On 5 November 1995, Kamajors also launched a fierce counter-attack on the RUF forces at Baoma. They finally succeeded in ousting them out of Baoma and Gbap and entirely chased them out of the Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom. This was the final battle between the RUF forces and the Kamajors in the chiefdom. Civilians returned to resettle in the various towns and villages in the chiefdom and also in the neighbouring Yawbeko Chiefdom.

In late October, rumours of imminent SLA attacks[1219] and sounds of heavy gun firing coming from the Bo road led some of the RUF forces based at Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) to leave the town for Senehun, in the south-west, and Gbonge (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom),[1220] although those based at Camp Lion refused either to leave or to release the civilians. On 25 October, a group of SLA Forces known as "Special Task Force" and composed mainly of ULIMO forces entered Mattru with heavy gunfire. They were accompanied by two jets, which were clearing the way for them before they entered the town. The RUF forces who had stayed in Mattru deserted their base as soon as the members of the Task Force arrived in the town, after killing many civilians who were with them. The following day, the Task Force attacked the RUF at Camp Lion in the north of Mattru Town. A lot of civilians including men, women and children were killed during that attack and the survivors were all brought into Mattru Town. Civilians in neighbouring villages were also requested by the Task Force to come and live in Mattru Town. While bringing civilians from the villages to Mattru, the Task Force faced pockets of resistance from the RUF but continued to defeat the RUF forces who, while retreating, imposed great havoc on the population, burning down houses wherever they were dislodged and killing many civilians. For example, in Kale Kowama, RUF forces retreating from Blama came across a family (parents and two small children) and killed the two parents. Civilians brought to the town undertook a massive brushing and cleaning of the town and surrounding villages but soon, started to lack food and other necessary items.

In one of their patrol to bring civilians to Mattru, members of the Task Force went to Njahun and Senjehun (Sogbini Chiefdom). On hearing this, the RUF forces at Bauya (Sogbini Chiefdom) gathered the civilians and told them to wait for a while and all the civilians would go to Mattru. More civilians, some from neighbouring chiefdoms, came to Bauya, either brought by the RUF forces or arriving of their own free will, hoping to find a safer haven in Mattru. Therefore, thousands of people where gathered at Bauya when the RUF forces divided them in two queues, one for men and one for women. The civilians were told to sing a song and the RUF forces started to take one person after the other and killed them either with a gun or a bladed weapon. When they realised what was happening, the civilians started to flee to the bush. RUF forces fired on the fleeing crowd, killing hundreds of people. The RUF forces also ambushed the town to catch and kill

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[1219] Starting in August, SLA forces, who had just received military training from the South African mercenaries company Executive Outcomes, who were contracted by the Government of Sierra Leone, engaged in "mopping up" operations in the Southern Province, dislodging the RUF forces from various strongholds in Bumpeh Chiefdom (Bo District) and the mining area around Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District).

[1220] At this time, Kamajors from Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, in the south of the District started to have successful confrontation with RUF forces and went as far as Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom). This strong grip on the south east of the District probably explains why the RUF forces did not move south, using the Sewa River and Wanjei River, that flow in Nongoba Bullom and Kwamebai Krim Chiefdoms but rather retreated to Gbonge, a hilly area in Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom.

escaping civilians.[1221] The surviving civilians went back to their camps in the bush, where RUF forces chased them, killing everyone they found, including young children. At Licono for example, they gathered the civilians they found in the Court Barrie, hacked some of them into pieces, opened the stomach of one pregnant woman and threw the foetus in the fire. Some civilians found refuge at Bahoi, on the Sewa River east of Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom, and were rescued by Kamajors from Senjehun who came and took them to their base. Around 200 RUF forces attacked the Kamajor base at Senjehun but were defeated by the Kamajors stationed there, who were assisted with civilians equipped with sticks. After this attack, the RUF forces went to the Gbonge hills from where they raided villages in Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom, burning houses, taking away property, killing and abducting civilians. Senjehun did not however sustain any further RUF attacks.

In November, SLA forces dislodged the RUF forces from Imperi Chiefdom and settled in the mining area, at Kpanguma and Mobimbi.[1222]

Around October/November, Kamajors repelled the RUF from Yawbeko Chiefdom. To strengthen their positions, the Kamajors established more training bases in other chiefdoms than Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, so that they could spread over wider areas of operation. Many young men and boys, some aged below 15, enlisted to be trained, calling themselves "Black December". One such base was at Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom). Another base was at Gambia (Jong Chiefdom) where young men and boys initiated were called "Avondo".

On 13 November, Kamajors from Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom entered the village of Kpankpa (Bum Chiefdom) and killed 19 civilians on the allegation that they were accommodating the RUF forces in the village. The bodies were dragged into the river flowing by the village. The Kamajors who carried out this action were around 15 in number, only two of them had shotguns and all the others had cutlasses. After this incident, the Kamajors went back to their base at Karleh Wanjama (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) before returning in the same month to attack RUF positions in Bum Chiefdom. The RUF forces' position at Mami was attacked and they were dislodged from the town. They regrouped at Madina, where they faced a serious confrontation with the Kamajors. The RUF forces were again dislodged from their Madina base but burnt down 25 houses and killed several civilians before leaving the town. Eighteen RUF members were killed during the encounter. The RUF left towards the north and went in the direction of Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom, Bo District).[1223] As they were retreating, the RUF forces killed civilians they came across, abducted a large number of people and took with them all the young girls they found. In December, RUF forces launched hit and run attacks on the chiefdom from Bagbo Chiefdom (Bo District), north-east of Bum Chiefdom, but following their retreat from Madina they no longer settled in Bum Chiefdom, where more and more young men were initiated within the Kamajors society.

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[1221] This event resulted in the death of hundreds of civilians. In 1998, over 1,000 human skulls were discovered at Bauya Junction: AFP, 10 March 1998.

[1222] No information on fighting with RUF forces was recorded. Those SLA forces would be joined by some ULIMO-K forces for a short while in January 1996.

[1223] Information gathered for Bo District reveals that in December 1995, RUF forces arrived in Bagbo Chiefdom from Bonthe District, repelled by Kamajors.

The chiefdoms in the south of the District were under Kamajor control earlier than the chiefdoms in the north. By late 1996, Kamajors had taken control of the southern chiefdoms and no more RUF attack was reported in those areas. This was probably also due to the fact that around this period, Kamajors had already dislodged RUF forces from Bonthe District. The situation for the chiefdoms in the north of the District was far different. Although their main base, Camp Fol Fol was destroyed in late 1996 by Kamajors, the RUF forces and, shortly after, RUF/AFRC forces were present in many of the chiefdoms in the north, wreaking a lot of havoc on civilians. At this time, both Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts, which adjoin Moyamba District to the north, were also infiltrated by RUF and RUF/AFRC forces.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in early 1998, the actions of the RUF/AFRC forces were concentrated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Free from RUF/AFRC incursions, the Kamajors affirmed their control of the security of Moyamba District and expanded this control to civilians and local authorities. In this regard, the pattern of actions in Moyamba District at this time would converge with what happened in the other Districts of the Southern Province.

d. Pujehun District

**1. Introduction**

Pujehun District, with its headquarter of Pujehun Town, is one of the four Districts of the Southern Province, the other three being Bonthe, Bo and Moyamba Districts. It is bordered on the east by Liberia, on the northeast by Kenema District (Eastern Province), on the northwest by Bo District and on the west by Bonthe District. At its southern edge is the Atlantic Ocean.

There are 12 chiefdoms in the District:

| Chiefdom | Headquarters |
|---|---|
| Barri | Potoru |
| Gallinas Peri | Blama |
| Kpaka | Massam |
| Makpele | Zimmi |
| Malen | Sahn |
| Mano Sakrim | Gbonjema |
| Panga Kabonde | Pujehun |
| Panga Krim | Gobaru |
| Peje | Futa |
| Soro Gbema | Fairo |
| Sowa | Bandajuma |
| Yekomo Kpukumu Krim | Karlu |

The main rivers flowing through the District would prove to be of strategic importance during the conflict. The Mano River that flows on the eastern edge of Makpele and Soro Gbema Chiefdoms constitutes the natural border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. The entry point to the District is

On 28 March 1991, RUF/NPFL forces crossed the Mano River Union Bridge[1337] at Jendema (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), 7 miles from Fairo. They then headed for Malema, where they seized weapons from the SSD store, before heading for Fairo. From Soro Gbema Chiefdom, the RUF/NPFL forces would then head for Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom, in the east of the District), passing by Makpele, Barri, Peje, Sowa, Kpaka and Gallinas Peri Chiefdoms, leaving behind some forces to settle in each of those areas. A few days after the RUF/NPFL forces crossed the Mano River Union Bridge, the RUF and NPFL leaders paid them a brief visit at Bo Waterside, allegedly to check that the forces had crossed the river and to receive food items and furniture taken from the Police Barracks at Jendema.[1338]

At the time of this incursion, SLA forces were deployed in the District, chiefly in Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom), Potoru (Barri Chiefdom) and Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom).

At Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), a short battle took place with some SLA forces and SSD members who were posted there.[1339] The house of the Paramount Chief, occupied at the time by SLA forces, was burnt down and the first killings of civilians and taking of their property was recorded at this time. Gunshots were heard in the town until night fell. The following morning, the civilians were gathered in the Court Barrie and addressed by the RUF/NPFL forces, who told them they should not be afraid, as they had come to redeem the civilians from the APC regime. However, a few days later, the RUF/NPFL forces killed one civilian who refused to give them food at Jendema. At Sulima, in the south of the chiefdom, they also killed one civilian, allegedly because he questioned them about the previous killing. Following this incursion, civilians from Wai, a town located on the main Fairo-Sulima road in the chiefdom, fled the town; some went to Liberia, first hiding their property, as they had heard from fleeing civilians that the RUF/NPFL forces were stealing food and any other items that took their interest. However, those who fled Sierra Leone did not find a safer haven in Liberia, where a civil war was raging; while in Liberia, the people who had fled the war in Sierra Leone were harassed by NPFL forces, who took their property and sexually assaulted their daughters and wives.[1340]

After they took control of Malema and Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), two training camps were opened in those towns to train conscripts on how to use weapons. The RUF/NPFL forces first went from village to village to get people to join their movement, but when they realised that few young people were joining them, they forced villages as a whole to contribute and to give some of

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[1337] The control of the Mano River Union Bridge, a joint venture between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, would be of great importance as it allows penetration of the territory of Sierra Leone from Liberia.

[1338] During the first weeks of the conflict, many reports mention the visit of the RUF leader to Pujehun and Kailahun Districts, although it appeared that he spent more time in Kailahun District than in Pujehun District, while the NPFL leader is only mentioned as being present at Bo waterside.

[1339] The SLA forces were only 10, together with five SSD members, and had little ammunition, mainly only to defend themselves.

[1340] Since 1989, the NPFL had been waging war against the then President, Samuel Doe, who would be killed by a splinter group of the NPFL in 1990. Also in 1990, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent some Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces to assist the Liberian Government to end the war. As part of this mission, ECOMOG based some forces at Lungi, Sierra Leone's international airport to the north of Freetown.

their inhabitants for training, threatening them with the destruction of the village if they refused. In this way, the RUF/NPFL forces recruited many young boys and girls and whoever refused to join or tried to hide during training was killed on the spot. Furthermore, those newly conscripted members were told to point out houses where young people had not volunteered to join, after which the RUF/NPFL forces looted and then burnt them. This situation led many families to give one of their family members to join the movement. RUF/NPFL forces also chased people who were hiding in farm huts in the bushes, raiding them at night, stealing their food and other valuable items and capturing young boys and girls. While the boys were conscripted into the fighting forces, the girls were used for sexual purposes. On one occasion, in the area of Malema, a five-months pregnant women was raped by five RUF/NPFL members and, as a result, had a miscarriage. In another incident, also in the Malema area, one girl was raped during a night raid. That same night, the commander of that RUF/NPFL forces told the people that the RUF leader had told them in Liberia that all the Sierra Leonean women were their wives and all the property they could find was also theirs.

The RUF/NPFL forces nominated a former candidate in the 1982 elections to be the chairman of their war council in the chiefdom. Following the 1982 general elections, a fight had erupted between the partisans of the two political groups contesting the elections and many civilians were killed and much property destroyed. The nomination of the war council chairman for the chiefdom recalled these events in 1982 for the civilians of Soro Gbema, as the newly appointed chairman was the candidate in the 1982 election who had not been elected to represent the Pujehun east constituency in Parliament.[1341] Some supporters of the man who was elected chairman and leader of the Ndorgbowusui group, saw this nomination to the war council as an opportunity to take revenge for atrocities committed against their families almost 20 years ago. For this reason, they voluntarily nominated some of their children to join the RUF/NPFL forces. Thus, civilians who were not members of the Ndorgbowusui group were particularly targeted during the RUF/NPFL presence in the chiefdom in 1991.

In late March 1991, civilians fleeing the RUF/NPFL advance in Soro Gbema Chiefdom crossed the Moa River that flows on its west edge and took refuge in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, at Gbanahun, returning to their chiefdom a week later.

Zimmi,[1342] the headquarter town of Makpele Chiefdom, and the surrounding villages are diamond-rich area. On 3 April, RUF/NPFL forces entered the town and established a base there that became their main one for the District. During their stay in the chiefdom, up to December 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces attacked many villages, where they followed the same actions upon taking control of the different villages. The RUF/NPFL forces would enter the town and gather the inhabitants at the Court Barrie, where they would introduce themselves as the Revolutionary United Front, their purpose being to remove the APC Government from power and liberate Sierra Leone. At this meeting, or soon after, they would depose the Town Chief and replace him or her with their

[1341] It is accordingly not a coincidence if the RUF/NPFL nominated somebody who opposed at one time to the APC regime representative.

[1342] Zimmi is a strategic town for many reasons because, aside from its location in a diamond mining area, it is the first major town to be reached when crossing the border from Liberia and it allows further inland advances in the east of Kenema District.

all the other women of the house if she refused. While at Gobaru, the SLA and ULIMO forces requested the civilians to come to the town, for screening and registration purposes. However, molestation of civilians was at its highest peak during this time, as young people were undressed and beaten with gun butts; the screening test was so stringent, a lot of young men were killed accused of being RUF member without much investigation.[1363] Women and girls were also alleged to be the wives of the RUF/NPFL forces. Night searches for RUF/NPFL members were also instituted. In one incident, during such a search, a man who hid under his bed after SLA forces had knocked on his door was killed, on the allegation that he was a "rebel". In early August, as the number of civilians coming to the town was increasing and as a lot of people had already been killed during the screening process, SLA forces required civilians to assist in the screening process and established an action group composed of three SLA member and six civilians. As food coming from an international NGO was provided at Gobaru, Yonni and Massam, SLA forces mounted checkpoints at Massam to enhance security, particularly because RUF/NPFL forces were still present in the District, on the east side of the Moa River (Soro Gbema and Makpele Chiefdoms). At those checkpoints, young people were screened and on one occasion, on 21 August, one man was killed as documents were found in his bag demonstrating he was a secretary for the RUF/NPFL forces. Civilians were also required to operate checkpoints for the SLA forces, especially at night. As the SLA commander was replaced sometime between September and November, the situation changed slightly as civilians were no longer required to operate checkpoints and those suspected of belonging to the RUF/NPFL were thoroughly investigated.

On 18 July, four days after the recapture of Pujehun Town, 28 members of the SLA and ULIMO forces drove the few remaining RUF/NPFL forces out of Malen Chiefdom, with ULIMO forces killing one RUF member at Sahn. However, 47 men and children were also killed by ULIMO and SLA forces. Most of them were shot with AK47s and one man was killed with a knife, accused of having been trained by RUF/NPFL forces when they took control of the chiefdom after the Paramount Chief had left. Twenty members of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) were then deployed in the chiefdom.

Repelled from Pujehun Town in July 1991, RUF/NPFL forces resettled in Bumpeh (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom). A checkpoint was established at Koni Junction, ¼ mile west of Bumpeh, and civilians from the surrounding villages were forced to operate it. During their one-month stay, RUF/NPFL forces harassed and beat civilians and raped girls. For example, civilians who refused to take their turn at a checkpoint were given 100 lashes each. The rate of killing increased at this time and there are reports of a practice whereby RUF/NPFL forces made people form a line and killed the 10th person in the line. A camp was opened to train young boys and girls who had been conscripted. It is reported that over 100 civilians were killed during the RUF/NPFL stay for not collaborating with them. Among those people killed were one woman who had come to buy palm oil and was accused of being a spy for SLA forces and a man who was killed because he was coming from an area behind the front line and accordingly was considered to be an SLA collaborator.

Those RUF/NPFL forces were reinforced in late July by two groups crossing the Moa River, both of whom killed civilians on their way to Bumpeh. At Gbanahun, the first group shot and killed six

[1363] It is however reported that the ULIMO were more abrupt in screening and killing young men than SLA forces.

Kamajors obtained arms and ammunition that were more sophisticated than the ones they had so far.

However, the Kamajors in Makpele Chiefdom, in particular the 23 Kamajors based at Manjama, engaged in massive mining activities, the junior members undertaking mining for the most senior ones. Mining equipment was taken away from civilians, who were forced to feed the Kamajors, go hunting and fetch wood and water. No respect was paid to the chiefdom authorities and the Regent Paramount Chief had no control over the Kamajors. The movement of civilians was restricted and harassment of civilians was frequent; their houses were searched, property was confiscated and farms were harvested by the Kamajors for their own purposes. Civilians from this village went into hiding, as they could no longer withstand this situation. At Vaama in 1996, Kamajors argued with SLA forces, allegedly because both groups wanted to have access to the resources of the villages, namely food, money and women. The two groups fought, the Kamajors being equipped with single barrels guns and the SLA with automatic rifles and RPGs, as a result of which the Kamajors left town. SLA forces from Zimmi visited Ngombu, close to Zimmi, as they heard Kamajors had gathered there to fight them. As they arrived in the town, they started shooting, thus preventing people from giving explanations, as a result of which seven civilians were killed. Before leaving, those SLA forces took some furniture for Zimmi.

Kamajors based at Madina (Makpele Chiefdom) also engaged in the same behaviour towards civilians, who were forced to contribute to the Kamajor's activities by providing money, bulgur, rice and palm oil. Toobu (three miles from Zimmi) was also visited by Kamajors and in April 1997, they took away bicycles, bailing machines, a power saw, Le 1,000,000 and other property.[1396] Civilians made a report to the head Kamajor at Zimmi but no action was taken. Until the May Coup, more initiations took place for youth of the chiefdom and almost all the villages suffered similar kinds of harassment.

In late December 1996 following the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement, more than 8,000 people who had been captured two years earlier by RUF forces were released in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, allegedly on the directive of RUF High Command.[1397] During this period, it appeared that RUF forces were ordered by their High Command to regroup and encamp at Camp Libya, located in a dense rainforest on the Moa River, which was practically their only remaining stronghold in the District after the Mano River Union Bridge and Sulima (both in Soro Gbema Chiefdom) had been recaptured.

In Soro Gbema Chiefdom, before the May Coup in late 1996 or early 1997, Kamajors drove many RUF forces out of the chiefdom. At Felo Mano and other places in the chiefdom, the Kamajors discovered arms stores and an airstrip was also found at Felo Mano. This information was transmitted to the Sierra Leone Government through the SLA and SLP based at Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) and the arms and ammunition were airlifted to Freetown in 1997.[1398] The Kamajors

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[1396] Those Kamajors "dressed carefully" and "behaved like RUF or SLA forces".

[1397] BBC, 28 December 1996.

[1398] According to the records, ECOMOG from Freetown and Kenema would have come to the site of these discoveries and air lifted the ammunition to Freetown. However, no ECOMOG forces as such were to be found in these towns. The key person probably referred to foreign troops such as Guinean or Nigerian who have been

## F. Western Area

### 1. Introduction

The Western Area is located in the far central west of Sierra Leone and adjoins Port Loko and Moyamba Districts on its eastern side; its western side is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean. Roughly two-thirds of the Western Area is a mountainous peninsula, along the north of which is located Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone. Freetown has been a major international port for merchant and military shipping for the best part of 150 years.

Unlike the rest of the country, the Western Area is not composed of chiefdoms, but is divided into four Rural Districts (RD) and a metropolitan area known as Greater Freetown:[1424]

| **Western Area** | **Main Settlements** |
|---|---|
| Koya Rural District | Newton, Songo |
| Waterloo Rural District | Fogbo, Hastings, Kossoh Town, Newton, Tombo, Waterloo |
| Greater Freetown | Freetown and suburban areas |
| York Rural District | Goderich, Lakka, York |
| Mountain Rural District | Regent |

Koya RD is in the far east of the Western Area and is bordered to the north by Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District). Across the River Ribbi, which delimits the southern boundary of Koya RD, lies Ribbi Chiefdom (Moyamba District). The main motorable crossing point over the River Ribbi is located at Mabang, connecting the towns of Moyamba, Rotifunk and Bradford (all Moyamba District) to Songo, in the far east of Koya RD. This Moyamba route rejoins the main highway at Tiama Junction, giving travellers access to all major locations in the Southern Province. The RUF would use this route to enter the Western Area in 1995.

From Songo, moving inland, the main hard-surface arterial route from provincial Sierra Leone passes through the north of Koya RD and its main town, Newton. From Newton, the villages of Bath Comp and Fogbo are accessible by a road running south. Fogbo is a main transit point for goods and people westward across the swamp areas of the Calmont Creek and eastward to Shenge (Kagboro Chiefdom, Moyamba District) and to other locations up the Ribbi River. A large number of small settlements can be reached from the Newton-Fogbo road. Moving east from Newton, the main arterial route leads to Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and on to all other major towns in Sierra Leone. Control of the stretch of road between Newton and Masiaka was a major strategic aim of all factions in the conflict.

Moving westward from Newton, the main highway leads to the town of Waterloo, and the Waterloo RD. The area between Newton and Waterloo is flat, highly fertile agricultural land. There is a large palm oil plantation at Banga Farm, also on the main highway. Waterloo is on the foothills of the

[1424] Along with the SUDC area of Sherbro Island (Bonthe District), the Western Area is administered directly by the Government of Sierra Leone without the traditional structures found throughout Sierra Leone. This is a result of the early British administration, which did not extend its control over the provincial areas of Sierra Leone until the late 1800s, at which time it exercised authority mainly through the traditional structures already in place: see General Overview.

long prison terms. Some 300 SLA members under investigation for their suspected involvement with the AFRC were released from government custody on or around 3 September. A final set of treason charges were brought against 22 civilians on 14 December.

The RUF leader was repatriated to Sierra Leone from Nigeria on 25 July and charged with treason on 4 September. Despite efforts to locate counsel for him, he represented himself throughout the trial, which began on 4 October. A jury found him guilty and the court sentenced him to death on 23 October; the RUF leader appealed the sentence and remained in custody until he was pardoned as part of the Lomé Peace Agreement. In September, ECOMOG formally moved its headquarters from Monrovia, Liberia to Freetown.

On 21 December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Songo and Six-Mile (Koya RD) and, by the early afternoon, had arrived at Newton Village (Koya RD), resulting in a mass movement of civilians to Waterloo (Waterloo RD). The swell of people into Waterloo caused widespread panic-buying of food and palm wine. Later that same day, residents of Waterloo heard small arms fire coming from Banga Farm, on the main highway between Waterloo and Newton. Late that night, ECOMOG forces based at the Waterloo Post Office and Peninsular Secondary School launched several mortars towards Banga Farm, followed by an aerial bombardment by the Alpha Jet at the same location.

Heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces attacked Waterloo (Waterloo RD) before dawn on 22 December 1998. During this attack, they killed between 15 and 19 civilians, looted extensively and burnt down at least 53 houses. AFRC forces identified as being comprised predominantly of ex-SLA members marched down Calmont Road with powerful flashlights, targeting the houses of prominent people in Waterloo. A large RUF Small Boy Unit accompanied them, sprinkling petrol on doorframes and around houses. The AFRC forces ignited the petrol with gunfire, setting fire the to the houses. A Guinean ECOMOG unit entered Waterloo and commenced shelling the RUF/AFRC forces from an armoured car, resulting in their onwards advance to the Benguema Training Centre (Waterloo RD). The RUF/AFRC forces captured a large cache of arms and ammunition before destroying the base's main ammunition dump. A prominent AFRC commander was killed in the explosion and buried nearby Koba, a few kilometres south of Benguema.

RUF/AFRC forces continued advancing southward along the peninsular road, moving from the Benguema Training Centre through Koba, During Town, Boyah Village and Russell (all Waterloo RD). At Russell, RUF/AFRC forces dislodged the small ECOMOG contingent stationed there. Not long after midnight on 24 December, RUF/AFRC forces entered Tombo through Worlai Village (both Waterloo RD), to the immediate east of Tombo. The day before, the village authorities of Tombo had received warning of the coming RUF/AFRC attack from an SLA soldier who escaped the attack on Benguema Training Centre.

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alleging that their right to appeal, guaranteed in article 14(5), had been violated: Communication Nos. 839/1998 & 840/1998 & 841/1998. Despite the Committee requesting a stay of execution, they were executed a week after they had lodged their complaint. The Committee subsequently found that their rights had in fact been violated, as there was no right of appeal from a court martial: *Anthony B Mansaraj et al; Mr Gborie Tamba et al; Mr Abdul Karim Sesay et al v Sierra Leone*, decision of 16 July 2001.

At that time, the RUF were accompanied by a large number of civilians, some carrying ammunition and other supplies and some banging drums and chanting about celebrating Ramadan in Tombo (Waterloo RD). To help identify each other in night attacks, RUF/AFRC forces stuck the transparent cellophane wrapping from popular boiled sweets called "Diamonds" over their torch lenses, giving the beams a red tint. The Nigerian ECOMOG contingent was outnumbered and immediately retreated towards Freetown along the peninsula road through Kassi to Kissy Town (Waterloo RD), together with thousands of civilians. Many civilians escaped by boats to Shenge (Kagboro Chiefdom, Moyamba District), Banana Island[1506] and villages inland along the Ribbi River, while others moved to Lakka Village (York RD). RUF/AFRC forces left Tombo, having taken the contents of many abandoned homes, and burned down at least 20 others without attempting to occupy the township.

Between 22 and 25 December 1998, Nigerian ECOMOG reinforced Waterloo. On 24 December, Hastings was reinforced by around 500 Kamajors, who immediately imposed a curfew between the hours of 18.00 and 07.00. Two days later, Kamajor members arrested two suspected RUF/AFRC collaborators, who were tied up, their heads forced into a large white plastic bowl and their throats cut; civilians were forced to bury the corpses. Kamajors also killed four other civilians at Jui Junction, near Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD), leaving a severed head on a pole at their checkpoint.

Waterloo Town was bombarded by ECOMOG on 26 December 1998, causing further civilian flight from the town. A Guinean ECOMOG contingent from Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) reinforced ECOMOG stationed at Waterloo (Waterloo RD) and set up a base at the SDA School compound, moving later to the PSS School compound. Guinean ECOMOG provided limited security around the market area of Waterloo, where traders remained at work until the RUF/AFRC raided Lumpa (Waterloo RD). Members of the Guinean ECOMOG contingent mistakenly killed eight traders who were running towards the PSS Compound to escape an RUF/AFRC ambush at Lumpa. The RUF/AFRC occupied Lumpa and other parts of Waterloo, effectively dividing the town in two. RUF/AFRC forces stole medical supplies from the Waterloo Health Centre. The RUF/AFRC stayed in Lumpa throughout January, forcing civilians to perform domestic services for them; they would not allow civilians to close their doors and performed frequent house-to-house searches for food. The RUF commanding officer in Lumpa personally executed at least three civilians, dumping the body of one victim in a pit latrine and cutting out and eating the heart of another. At this time, the RUF and AFRC forces were not lodging together.

Between 25 and 28 December, RUF/AFRC advance units continued from Tombo around the peninsula towards Freetown. The villages of Black Johnson and Big Water (both York RD), on the approach road to York, were infiltrated by small numbers of RUF/AFRC. RUF/AFRC forces exchanged heavy machine gun fire with Nigerian ECOMOG forces at the York Grass Field area of York town. ECOMOG gunners killed three members of the RUF/AFRC. Following these attacks around the peninsula road, Nigerian ECOMOG redeployed at Tombo (Waterloo RD) in greater force. A Kamajor detachment was sent to guard the bridge at MacDonald (Waterloo RD). Nigerian ECOMOG imposed a strict security regime around the York Town area, organising local youth into groups to accompany them on a continuous day-and-night patrol routine. ECOMOG also began collecting and, in collaboration with locals, screening for RUF/AFRC infiltrators displaced by the

[1506] Also called Plantain Island.

fighting on the peninsular at locations. These screening centres included the Cotton Club and St. Michaels Lodge in Lakka and the Hamilton Community Centre (all York RD). After 6 January, villagers in Tombo burnt alive an RUF/AFRC member at the Tombo Grass Field area. An unknown number of other suspected RUF/AFRC members were killed with bladed weapons by the Tombo youth.

g) Events in 1999

Between 30 December and 5 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces staged attacks on Hastings and Kossoh Town (both Waterloo RD). Using bush tracks through the hills from Waterloo (Waterloo RD), RUF/AFRC forces staged major attacks on Hastings, Allen Town and Jui on 5 January. They encountered sporadic resistance from ECOMOG forces who, considerably reduced in number, progressively retreated towards Freetown. On 4 and 5 January, RUF/AFRC forces, hardware and vehicles were moving continuously through Newtown and Four Mile (Koya RD) towards Waterloo, gathering in the Ibo Town area (Waterloo RD).

Just after midnight on 6 January, RUF/AFRC forces began their assault on Freetown. An advance RUF/AFRC unit, numbering around 300, moved quickly to engage ECOMOG at their Kissy Roundabout security point. Meanwhile, RUF/AFRC forces in Waterloo started round the clock attacks on the Guinean ECOMOG contingent at PSS in Waterloo. On 9 January, the RUF/AFRC granted the Guineans safe passage from the town only in return for their remaining stock of ammunition.[1507] From Ibo Town, the RUF also began sending out units to Yams Farm (Waterloo RD), from where throughout the night they laid down heavy machine gun fire on ECOMOG positions at Hastings. Civilians were often used in these attacks.

The advancing RUF/AFRC forces were reinforced by thousands of others, who entered the Wellington and Calaba Town areas of eastern Freetown. On 7 January, RUF/AFRC forces occupied a petrol station near Kissy Road roundabout and started burning every solid structure in its immediate vicinity. The exact chronology of the movement of RUF/AFRC forces through east Freetown is not completely clear. One of their first successes, on either 6 or 7 January, was a raid on Pademba Road Prison, releasing many RUF/AFRC members captured by ECOMOG and pro-government forces over the previous year. Pademba Road Prison is to the west of central Freetown in Brookfields at the end of Pademba Road, which is also an access route through to the New England and Wilberforce areas of western Freetown. That RUF/AFRC forces made it to Pademba Road so quickly suggests that they had free movement through both the centre of Freetown, through the "PZ" junction and also through the Mountain Cut route from Kissy through to New England.

However, the brunt of the RUF/AFRC assault was in east Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces quickly occupied the Clay Factory IDP camp in Kissy, killing at least 20 people. ECOMOG commenced shelling into the hills behind the Clay Factory. By the early afternoon of 6 January, RUF/AFRC forces had occupied the main Kissy Terminal, killing eight ECOMOG soldiers in the Terminal's security office. The Kissy Police Station and the Kissy Mental Hospital were set on fire and a number of churches including the Holy Trinity and the Trascott Church were burned down.

[1507] The Guineans actually handed the RUF/AFRC a haul of blank ammunition.

Behind their line of advance, RUF forces made every civilian in the Eastern part of Freetown hoist white pieces of cloth in front of their houses and tie white ribbons on their heads and wrists to signify their support for peace. Each night, civilians were forced to burn old tyres in order to light up the city and to sing peace songs. Some beat drums while others clapped their hands or banged empty tins together. Some were even forced to dance, especially old people. Those who failed to obey these orders were shot and killed or had their houses set on fire; many civilians were burnt alive in their houses.

At irregular intervals, ECOMOG Alpha Jets bombed various locations in Freetown including "PZ", a busy business district centre, killing an unknown number of civilians who had been forced onto the streets by the RUF/AFRC.

Between 8 and 9 January 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces advanced into the west end of Freetown and were prevented from crossing the Congo Cross Road Bridge by the combined forces of ECOMOG, "loyal" SLA and CDF. The Congo Cross Road Bridge carries a dual carriageway (dubbed "main motor road") from Brookfields through to Congo Cross, Wilkinson Road, Murray Town, Lumley and Juba. It is the only way of quickly moving a large force from central to western Freetown; alternative routes into west Freetown are longer and far easier to secure. One route moves from New England to Hill Station up a steep winding mountain road in full sight of ECOMOG's main base at Wilberforce. Other routes to Congo Cross move from King Harmon Road up the winding Old Railway Line through Tembah Town and also through Congo Town along a poor quality road and a decrepit old bailey bridge. Combined with artillery from Wilberforce and the defence of the Hill Station route into west Freetown, RUF/AFRC movement westwards was halted at Congo Cross Road Bridge, from where the RUF/AFRC forces launched missiles into Congo Cross.

ECOMOG forces fought with RUF/AFRC forces for control of a key roundabout called Eastern Police between 8 and 9 January. By 10 January, ECOMOG were putting pressure RUF/AFRC forces stationed at Waterloo Town. By 11 January, the RUF/AFRC had begun their retreat east from the civic centre of Freetown, burning down the Law Courts, the telephone exchange and many government buildings.

Behind ECOMOG lines, a curfew was imposed from 15.00 to 06.00. Ahead of ECOMOG lines, a 24-hour curfew was then announced by the Government on Radio Democracy 98.1 FM. Anyone caught violating the curfew would be perceived as hostile and would be executed on the spot by the ECOMOG forces. By 13 January, ECOMOG had pushed the RUF/AFRC forces back from the Congo Cross Road Bridge and had taken control over the densely populated, central-west Brookfields area. The RUF/AFRC forces started burning houses as they retreated eastwards. ECOMOG advised civilians to move into the National Stadium,[1508] where ECOMOG in collaboration with the Kamajors and OHBS screened civilians. An unknown number of suspected RUF/AFRC members were lined up against the walls of the National Stadium and shot dead by ECOMOG. Other collection points for displaced persons included the National Workshop by Pademba Road Prison and the Parade Group on Fourah Bay Road. ECOMOG also began

[1508] At the highpoint of the invasion, UN World Food Program estimated that around 40,000 civilians sought security in the National Stadium by 21 January 1999.

confiscating satellite telephones and radio communications equipment from international NGOs, reportedly to prevent them falling into the possession of the RUF/AFRC.

On 18 January, the HMS Norfolk arrived in Freetown carrying medical supplies and a 200-strong liaison and reconnaissance group. The UK denied that it was taking any military part in the conflict, but had earlier in January released over $1.6 million for humanitarian supplies and logistic support for ECOMOG.

RUF/AFRC forces started mutilating civilians on 19 January 1999 at Black Hall Road in Freetown, as ECOMOG forces steadily forced them out of the city. At that time, ECOMOG forces had control over the Ferry Junction at Kissy eastward to Waterloo (Waterloo RD). Civilian volunteers used carts to transport the corpses of those killed in the conflict to the Kissy Road cemetery. On 16 January, RUF/AFRC forces they had befriended warned civilians remaining in Waterloo that an order had been given to amputate the arms of any non-RUF/AFRC found in the town. The ECOMOG Alpha Jet bombing of numerous RUF/AFRC positions in the east end of Freetown and Waterloo pushed RUF/AFRC forces eastwards to the outskirts of the city. As they retreated via the hills, avoiding the ECOMOG checkpoint at Kossoh Town, RUF/AFRC forces abducted hundreds of civilians, many of whom were given narcotics to make them compliant.

Although most of Greater Freetown area had come under ECOMOG control by 20 January, RUF/AFRC forces continued to stage attacks and attempt to infiltrate locations in the east of the town. ECOMOG reported having trouble with large numbers of snipers remaining in hillside locations overlooking their positions following the main RUF/AFRC retreat. Across February and March, RUF/AFRC occupied Waterloo (Waterloo RD), evading ECOMOG Alpha Jet bombardments by using bush paths and moving mainly during the nighttime from Waterloo to attack surrounding villages. For example, one night they attacked Susu Town near Devil Hole (Waterloo RD) at a location called Compound, where they raped and killed a policewoman. Many civilians escaped across the Madonke creek to villages in Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District). In addition, RUF/AFRC patrols rounded up civilians hiding in the Waterloo area and returned them to the town.

At the end of January, Nigeria announced that it wished to remove its troops from Sierra Leone by May 1999.[1509] On 2 February, ECOMOG continued to reinforce with the arrival of over 400 Malian troops[1510] and around 1,000 Ghanaian troops by 8 February.[1511] A general mobilisation of ECOMOG throughout Freetown was announced on 5 February 1999.[1512] The Chief of Staff of the SLA reportedly announced that ECOMOG would not hesitate in firing on civilians should the RUF/AFRC use them as human shields.[1513] The ECOMOG general mobilisation was followed by an intensification of cordon and search operations throughout the city.[1514] ECOMOG restructured its operations to include a specific garrison and force for the Freetown area. The UK Government

[1509] BBC, 28 January 1999.
[1510] IRIN West Africa, 2 February 1999.
[1511] IRIN West Africa, 8 February 1999.
[1512] AFP, 4 February 1999.
[1513] IRIN West Africa, 5 February 1999.
[1514] BBC, 6 February 1999.

stated that it would be providing a package of comprehensive logistic and other support to ECOMOG,[1515] followed soon after by the announcement that it would be providing around $16 million in military and training support for Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.[1516]

Between 20 and 25 February, ECOMOG launched an attack on Waterloo by continuously shelling the town. Some of the shells landed at the creek at the Christian cemetery. The remnants of RUF/AFRC forces, who were mainly ex-SLA, pulled out of Waterloo and Campbell Town along the Prince Alfred Road towards Cole Town (all Waterloo RD) and proceeding along bush tracks to the Waterloo Displaced Camp. By nightfall, all of them had left and headed towards Newton (Koya RD). In Waterloo, around 700 houses had been burnt down during the RUF/AFRC occupation. ECOMOG and Kamajor forces secured the town, with approximately 50 Kamajors deploying to Waterloo. They were shown around town by a local man who identified suspected RUF/AFRC collaborators, of whom at least two were tortured and executed by the Kamajors. The Kamajors also deployed at Bath-Comp (Koya RD), where they looted and burnt down an unknown number of civilian residences. At Kissy Town, near the IDP camp, combined "loyal" SLA and CDF on the one hand and ECOMOG on the other, erected checkpoints.

Responding to demands made by the RUF/AFRC, on 15 April the Court of Appeal of Sierra Leone temporarily released the RUF leader from prison,[1517] where he had been awaiting appeal from his treason conviction, allowing him to meet with the High Command of the RUF/AFRC and engage in peace talks in Togo, Lomé.[1518] Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (the Lomé Peace Agreement).[1519] The Lomé Peace Agreement provided for a number of joint RUF-GOSL processes for the provision of humanitarian assistance, return of displaced persons, demobilisation, management of natural resources and other matters related to the consolidation of the peace process. Additionally, it contains provisions for a governmental power-sharing arrangement between the RUF and the Government. The Lomé Peace Agreement also pardoned the RUF leader and others and granted a blanket amnesty to all combatants and collaborators for acts done in fulfilment of their objectives.

The RUF and AFRC leaders arrived back in Freetown on 3 October 1999 from Liberia, where they had gone following the conclusion of the peace talks.[1520] On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone to replace the previous observer mission.[1521]

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[1515] IRIN West Africa, 22 February 1999.

[1516] IRIN West Africa, 3 March 1999. The UK starting exporting ammunition and military equipment to Sierra Leone after 7 October 1999.

[1517] The RUF leader was reportedly taken from Pademba Road prison into protective custody in the Republic of Guinea prior to the RUF/AFRC 6 January 1999 assault on Freetown.

[1518] BBC, 15 April 1999.

[1519] The full text is available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_07071999_toc.html.

[1520] Both reportedly held talks with the Liberian President in Monrovia during this time: http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews0999.html.


[1521] UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999).

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
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
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The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
GUINEA
LIBERIA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTHERN
WESTERN AREA
EASTERN
SOUTHERN
SIERRA LEONE
National capital
Provincial capital
City, town
Major airport
International boundary
Provincial boundary
Main road
Secondary road
Railroad
Freetown
Kenema
Bo
Kabala
Makeni
Magburaka
Port Loko
Lunsar
Waterloo
Rokupr
Kambia
Kukuna
Konta
Kamakwie
Kamalu
Fadugu
Falaba
Gberia Fotombu
Musaia
Bafodia
Koinadugu
Bendugu
Kurubonla
Afikalia
Karina
Pendembu
Bumbuna
Binkolo
Kayima
Yomadu
Koidu-Sefadu
Tefeya
Yengema
Njalama
Njalama-Sewafe
Tongo
Gandorhun
Koindu
Bendou Bodou
Yele
Tungie
Masingbi
Matotoka
Mongeri
Falla
Panguma
Bomi
Manowa
Kailahun
Buedu
Giehun
Pendembu
Boajibu
Bendu
Daru
Segbwema
Lago
Blama
Tokpombu
Gerihun
Tikonko
Bumpe
Gbangbatok
Nitti
Kpetewoma
Koribundu
Sumbuya
Matru
Potoru
Gorahun
Zimmi
Kongo
Bendaja
Bopolu
Bomi Hills
Bong
Kle
Sulima
Robertsport
Pujehun
Bonthe
Sherbro I.
Sherbro River
Shenge
Sembehun
Sierromco
Mokanje
Plantain Is.
Turtle Is.
Banana Is.
Yawri Bay
Lungi Int'l Airport
Pepel
Masiaka
Mile 91
Yonibana
Rotifunk
Bradford
Songo
York
Hastings
Wellington
Moyamba
Bauya
Njala
Mano
Dambara
Talama
Taiama
Yonibana
Mateboi
Batkanu
Gbinti
Mange
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Mambolo
Kortimew Is.
Port Loko
Lunsar
Magburaka
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Bumbuna
Bendugu
Afikalia
Kurubonla
Kayima
Yomadu
Koidu-Sefadu

**25 December:** ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said Friday he could see no reason for the evacuation of foreign nationals from Sierra Leone. He said there had been no significant rebel activity around the city since the rebel raid on Waterloo on Tuesday. "I heard foreign diplomats reported 2,000 rebels around Waterloo and when I asked my commanders on the ground they laughed. There are just local people salvaging their belongings," Shelpidi said. "I cannot speak for foreign governments and if they want their citizens out then very well, but my personal view is that the international community should not abandon Sierra Leone at this crucial time." Shelpidi said AFRC/RUF rebels had attacked near Makeni on Friday. Makeni was under ECOMOG control, he said, but outlying villages were in rebel hands. "ECOMOG cannot be in every settlement everywhere. We don't have the manpower so sometimes there are attacks when these rebels raid villages for food, then we go there as soon as we can and they run away," he said. "We have appealed for the public to cooperate and mostly they are giving us very good cooperation but sometimes they connive with the rebels and give them food and shelter." Shelpidi also said ECOMOG had killed 14 rebels Wednesday in a clash near the Benguema training barracks.

Two British Royal Air Force planes found only one person waiting to be evacuated when they returned to Lungi International Airport on Friday. One businessman who was evacuated on Thursday explained that the lack of interest was probably due to an improving security situation in Freetown. "There is tension in Freetown and the embassy brought in planes to take us out. We did so but I don't think the rebels can take Freetown," he said. Another evacuee said there had been panic in Freetown following rebel attacks on Tuesday, but added: "I don't think the evacuation was necessary." Britain had sent its two aircraft back to Freetown on Friday to evacuate more British and other foreign nationals in the wake of recent rebel activity near the capital. "Two Royal Air Force Hercules aircraft went back to the airport in Freetown to pick up any stragglers," a Foreign Office spokesman said. "They brought out around 80 people last night. The majority were Britons, although there were a fair smattering of European nationals. He said that while the measure was precautionary, Britain was strongly advising its nationals in Sierra Leone to take advantage of this offer to leave. "The situation is very volatile," he said. "I don't say they would be targeted just because they were British, but the rebels have a pretty awful history of atrocity. We don't want any of our nationals put at risk." British High Commissioner Peter Penfold and one staff member would remain in Freetown for now, he said, but they may also have to leave. He added that Britain was still "strongly supporting" the Sierra Leone government. "We are very anxious to make it clear that the fact that we have evacuated as a precautionary measure doesn't diminish our very strong support for President Kabbah's democratically elected government," he said.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie threatened on Friday to attack Freetown on New Year's Day, then moved up the deadline claiming the arrival of ECOMOG reinforcements, unless the government agreed to negotiate with the rebels. "If Kabbah does not agree to respond to our request to open dialogue, then in 48 to 72 hours we will enter Freetown," Bockarie told the Agence France-Presse (AFP). "We are going to march into Freetown on New Year's Day unless the government agrees to our terms," Bockarie said in a separate Reuters interview. "We have the will and the way." Bockarie claimed that AFRC/RUF rebels had captured Makeni and were battling for Kenema. He also claimed to have captured Waterloo, about 20 miles from southeast of Freetown, and nearby Benguema, where he said rebel forces had seized the military training barracks. There has been no independent confirmation of his claims.

**31 December 1998:** ECOMOG troops repelled an AFRC/RUF rebel attack Thursday on their military barracks near the garrison town of Hastings, according to an ECOMOG spokesman. Residents fleeing the town reported that the rebels had attacked overnight, and said they had also attacked the Hastings Air Field. The spokesman said ECOMOG was forced to abandon its frontline trenches at Hastings during the initial onslaught. At least 40 persons were killed in the fighting, he added. Residents said the fighting had stopped by mid-morning, but that ECOMOG soldiers later shelled hills around the town.

The fighting at Hastings followed attacks Wednesday on Waterloo and Lunsar. Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer told a news conference Thursday that ECOMOG had driven the rebels back from Waterloo. "ECOMOG troops killed a lot of rebels in their attack yesterday on Waterloo," he said. He said the rebels had just attacked an ECOMOG barracks near Kossoh Town. "The infiltration of rebels into the Peninsular area is a cause for concern," Spencer said, but told reporters that those who had attacked Kossoh Town and Waterloo were cut off from the rear and trapped. BBC West Africa Correspondent Mark Doyle said hundreds of pro-government militiamen, armed with shotguns, knives, and spears, were massing for a probable new operation against the rebels. He quoted government sources as saying a counter-offensive would begin soon.

Spencer repeated assurances that the rebels posed no military threat to Freetown, and he said they were mounting attacks near the capital in order to create a negative psychological effect on the population. Spencer dismissed as "disinformation" a statement by United Nations Special Envoy Francis Okelo that the northern half of Sierra Leone was under rebel control, but conceded that an area in the centre of the country was held by the insurgents. He said about five towns in the north were under rebel control: Lunsar, Makeni, Binkolo, Kamabai, and Kabumbe. He said ECOMOG controlled Kabala, all of Kambia District, parts of Port Loko District, and all of Tonkolili and Koinadugu Districts. He said there was no rebel activity in the south, while in the east the rebels were still holding Koidu and had tried to attack Daru.

Spencer noted that the rebels had mounted attacks on Port Loko and Lunsar on Wednesday, and he reported that Lunsar had fallen. A "senior ECOMOG commander" quoted by the Associated Press denied that Lunsar was under rebel control, but he acknowledged that rebel forces were in the area. Spencer told reporters that Makeni was also in rebel hands. Aid workers and "sources close to" the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) militia told Reuters, however, that the rebels had pulled out of Makeni and that the CDF was now in control. CDF sources said the rebels left Makeni in three groups, one heading for their eastern base, one moving toward Lunsar, and one going in the direction of Port Loko.

Heavy fighting raged between ECOMOG troops and AFRC/RUF rebels Thursday for control of Port Loko, which has been mostly deserted by its civilian population. The town came under attack by hundreds of rebel fighters on Wednesday. "Our jet fighters bombed their positions in the town," an ECOMOG spokesman said. Journalist Emmanuel Turay, who fled Port Loko on Thursday, said rebels and ECOMOG troops held different parts of the town, and that both sides were firing mortars. "The death toll is not clear but there are bodies lying in the streets," he said. Spencer said the rebels had attacked Port Loko, but had been turned back. The Agence France-Presse (AFP) quoted residents of nearby villages who reported hearing prolonged bombardments throughout the night directed at areas of suspected rebel concentration.

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A spokesman for RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie claimed Thursday that the rebels had captured Segbwema and that heavy fighting was going on at Daru. Spencer said ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces were moving towards the Sierra Leone-Liberia border to seal off the area. He said ECOMOG maintained a strong presence in the towns of Zimmi, Gufor, and Wonde. "There is the possibility of the war ending militarily," Spencer said. "But this does not mean that if the rebels laid down their arms, we would not talk peace." Kamajor sources were quoted as saying that the area between the Moa River and the Liberian border are now fully under the control of the Civil Defence Forces.

ECOMOG troops closed roads from Freetown to Waterloo and Hastings on Thursday to prevent rebel infiltrators from reaching the capital by mingling with fleeing civilians, an ECOMOG spokesman said. Police in Freetown announced Thursday that about 300 civilians had been detained as suspected infiltrators.

Nigeria sent further reinforcements to Freetown on Thursday. The Nigerian government has reportedly sent more than 9,000 troops since the weekend, bringing the total strength of the ECOMOG force to around 19,000. An ECOMOG spokesman said Wednesday that additional battalions would continue to arrive from Nigeria, and that ECOMOG's strength could reach 20,000 by the end of the week. He said that of the other ECOWAS countries which had promised to send troops, the only ones to arrive were 200 Ghana who had had transferred from Liberia in the week. According to estimates reported by Reuters, rebel strength could exceed 20,000 while the Civil Defence Forces militia, made up of various hunters' militias, numbers about 30,000.

Gambian President Yayah Jammeh will begin to mediate in the Sierra Leone conflict shortly, Gambia's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mohamed Lamin Sedat Jobe, said Wednesday. "The Gambia's stance has been that of an apostle of peace," he said. Jobe said Jammeh did not believe in the use of arms to resolve the conflict. "The president, after consultation with both parties in the conflict, has decided to mediate based on the fact that his offer has been solicited, welcomed and he feels comfortable in doing it," Jobe declared. He added that Gambia was working to end or lessen the killing and maiming going on in Sierra Leone. Jobe said Gambia would follow through on its promise to supply troops to the ECOMOG force, but that Gambia had a new role in Sierra Leone other than contributing troops. He claimed Jammeh was the first person to make an international offer to mediate the conflict, and that his offer had been supported by many nations. At the recently concluded Committee of Six foreign ministers conference, he said, Sierra Leone's file was handed over to Gambia. Asked about the death sentence imposed on RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh, Jobe said Gambia could not involve itself in the judicial system of a another sovereign nation. "Anyway, I am made to understand that Sankoh has appealed against the sentence," he said.

Liberian President Charles Taylor has offered to put pressure on RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh to help restore peace in Sierra Leone. Sankoh is currently jailed in Freetown, appealing his conviction and death sentence on treason charges. "With our knowledge of Sankoh, we may be able to exert some pressure to bring about peace," Taylor said in a press conference. "Sankoh is part of the problem in Sierra Leone and should be part of the solution." He added that "Sankoh is better alive than dead," because if he were to die in jail the war in Sierra Leone might continue for a long time. Taylor called on the U.S. Special Envoy to Africa, Rev. Jesse Jackson, to help find a peaceful solution to the Sierra Leone crisis. "We believe

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Reverend Jackson can bring a whole lot of credibility to the process in solving the problem in Sierra Leone," he said. Taylor said his government "supports and recognizes the government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, and we do not support the (rebel) activities against President Kabbah in Sierra Leone in any shape or form...But we still believe that the way forward is a ceasefire on all sides, and for President Kabbah to dialogue with the rebels rather than continue to fight them." Taylor denied any Liberian government involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict, but he acknowledged that there were Liberians fighting alongside the rebels. "It is very clear and factual that there are Liberians in Sierra Leone fighting," he said. "Liberians have been used as mercenaries in Sierra Leone for a long time by all governments of Sierra Leone," he said. "They have always been there -- about 3,000 of them. But they are there on their own."

Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer accused Taylor on Thursday of "not doing anything to prevent rebels from crossing his border into Sierra Leone." Spencer threatened that if the situation were not checked, "We shall have to exercise our right of hot pursuit."

Nigerian U.N. Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari met with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday to press for urgent assistance for ECOWAS's efforts in Sierra Leone. Gambari appealed for the U.N. to tighten the arms embargo on Liberia and to prevent the illegal supply of weapons into Sierra Leone. He also asked the Council to investigate countries accused of violating the arms embargo to the rebels, naming Liberia and Ukrainian mercenaries. He pleaded with the Council to prevail upon the international community to honour pledges of support they made to ECOMOG, and for the U.N. to be more proactive in getting member nations to assist Sierra Leone. Gambari warned that, with Nigeria's financial problems and after the country's elections in May, a continuation of its involvement at present levels was impossible. "With democratisation coming, it is impossible to expect such a new government to continue to maintain such levels of external involvement, which is very expensive," he said. Gambari said after the meeting that he had received a positive response from the five permanent Council members. "They said they will bring all these concerns to the council immediately and to convey all these urgent requests to their respective countries," he said.

**9 January:** Witnesses reported Saturday seeing large numbers of wounded soldiers being evacuated by helicopter from Freetown to the ECOMOG base at Lungi International Airport. "I saw 60 or 70 wounded ECOMOG men evacuated. They looked like fresh injuries," one witness told Reuters. The casualties provided evidence of heavy fighting between ECOMOG troops and rebel fighters for control of the capital. Nigerian Alpha fighter jets took off from Lungi to attack rebel positions.

Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer told the BBC that an ECOMOG counter-offensive had made advances in Freetown Saturday. "So as of now, ECOMOG troops are in the center of the city, clearing the rebels out of that part of the city. In fact they're already moving toward the eastern part of the city," he said. He added that "the rebels are in disarray. They're fleeing." Spencer said he was unable to give an assessment of civilian casualties in the fighting. "I don't think it has been high, because ECOMOG has tried to be very careful. But the casualties are those caused really be rebels, because they've gone to knock at people's houses, pulled people out of their houses, shot them dead." News accounts have emphasised civilian casualties resolting from bombardments by Nigerian Alpha jet fighters attached to the ECOMOG force. Spencer denied, however, that the government was planning a final counter-offensive to defeat the rebels. "The government has said we are prepared to adopt the multi-track or dual-track approach: dialogue and military force," he said.

News agencies gave varying reports of the fighting on Saturday. The AFP, quoting witnesses, spoke of a "precarious calm," in Freetown Saturday morning, with deserted streets and few direct clashes between rebel and pro-government troops. "(Friday) night was quiet, and ECOMOG's Alpha jets were not seen early Saturday," the AFP said. The Associated Press (AP) reported that artillery fire pounded Freetown Friday night and Saturday morning, and said heavy street fighting took place Saturday near Wilberforce Barracks and in Congo Town. The AP described Nigerian ECOMOG jets screaming over Freetown, "firing rockets into rebel-held territory." The report said Alpha jets circled the capital for about an hour searching for groups of rebel fighters, while platoons of ECOMOG soldiers patrolled near-empty streets in the West End and artillery was fired at rebel positions in the hills to the south. Reuters described smoke rising from burning buildings in the east of the city after strikes by ECOMOG Alpha jets "which screamed low over the dilapidated city." The Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) said rebels and pro-government troops engaged in heavy fighting on Saturday, with ECOMOG claiming successes on Saturday evening.

Artillery fire pounded Freetown through Friday night and there were unconfirmed reports Saturday that Wilberforce Barracks was under attack by AFRC/RUF rebels. Reuters reported that smoke could be seen billowing from burning buildings in the rebel-held areas of the capital. "We can see burning buildings in the eastern district but the rest of the city looks calm," a Reuters television journalist said. "A handful of people are stepping out cautiously to assess the damage in the streets. There is no traffic on the roads." The Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) quoted witnesses as saying that rebel forces were firing on Wilberforce Barracks and that ECOMOG troops stationed there were returning fire. The DPA quoted residents as saying that numerous houses were burning in the rebel-held east of the city, and noted "partly unconfirmed reports" that Kamajor militiamen were engaging the RUF in street battles.

The Sierra Leone government is trying to arrange a meeting between RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh and RUF leaders, Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning Dr. James O.C. Jonah told the BBC

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on Saturday. "We spent over three hours with President Conteh, reviewing the situation and trying to determine what role Guinea might play," Jonah said. "For example, Sam Bockarie had expressed the interest to meet somewhere or to have some connection with Foday Sankoh, and we were exploring the possibility of a venue in Conakry perhaps through the U.N. mediation." He said there would be no preconditions, but he ruled out holding the meeting in "certain foreign countries which have been hostile to Sierra Leone. See, we will not accept either Liberia or Burkina Faso. That's out of the question." Jonah confirmed that he had requested mediation by Togo and Ivory Coast to facilitate negotiations between the government and the rebels. He said he was exploring the possibility of travelling to Togo, and that the government "might have some meeting" with Ivory Coast representatives, "perhaps in Conakry," within the next 24 hours. Jonah explained why outside mediation was deemed necessary: "(Sankoh) said he has been out of circulation for a long time. Therefore, he cannot go beyond the Abidjan Accords. And that is a reasonable position, so we believe that that's why my government is prepared to facilitate contact even between the U.N., Sankoh, and Bockarie to find out precisely what we should do."

Ivory Coast Foreign Minister Essy said Saturday he had been asked to mediate the conflict in Sierra Leone. "Both President Kabbah and the leaders of the Revolutionary United Front have asked me," he said. He did not indicate whether he would accept the requests. Essy said the rebels had faith in Ivory Coast as an honest broker, but in an interview with the government newspaper Fraternite-Matin, he denied that Ivory Coast was pro-rebel. "Everything Ivory Coast has done so far has been to help the government of Sierra Leone, not the rebels," he said. Essy said he doubted whether Togo, which currently chairs ECOWAS, would succeed in diplomatic efforts or organise a new regional summit on Sierra Leone. In a separate interview, Essy said he spoke to RUF commander Col. Sam "Maskita" Bockarie on Saturday and tried to convince him to agree to a ceasefire. "I told him there's no point humiliating a great power like Nigeria which can send reinforcements to dislodge him," Essy said. "I told him he should agree a ceasefire because at the moment he is in a strong position to negotiate something."

Britain has despatched the Royal Navy frigate HMS Norfolk to the Sierra Leone region, a Ministry of Defence spokesman said on Saturday. "The ship will be monitoring events," the spokesman said. "It's a straightforward precautionary measure to give us a ship available in that part of the world. No decision has been taken yet on what, if anything, to use the Norfolk for." The Norfolk is expected to arrive in the area next week. RUF commander Col. Sam "Maskita" told the BBC that he had "intelligence reports" that the Norfolk was planning to land British mercenaries in Freetown, and threatened retribution should that take place. "We want to express ourselves that that is not going to be accepted and if British naval boats attempt that, we are going to burn down all invading countries' embassies. First step. Second step, we'll start burning state house, all banks, all government offices, electricity, water supply, and all buildings that have been functioning with the government are going to be burned down," he said. "I also got an information from Mr. Amara Essy, Foreign Minister of Ivory Coast, telling me that the Nigerians are bringing in more reinforcements and artillery pieces to come and join up with the British nationals to invade Freetown. And if that's the case, before we leave Freetown, we are going to burn down all these areas that I have just mentioned to you — After we have evacuated all civilians out of the town."

OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmad Salim called on President Kabbah and RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh Saturday "to follow the path of peace and proceed to establish a ceasefire," and called for dialogue between the

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two sides. He said the OAU is ready to facilitate, "together with the countries of ECOWAS and other members of the international community, the conduct of a sustained process of dialogue and negotiations for the achievement of lasting peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone." Salim repeated the OAU's "unyielding support" for Sierra Leone's civilian government, and appealed to the international community to provide assistance for the Sierra Leonean people.

BBC correspondent Prince Brima reported Saturday that an RUF offensive to capture the diamond mining town of Tongo, in eastern Sierra Leone, had been turned back by Kamajor militiamen. "During the four hour battle, 87 rebels were killed and large quantities of arms and ammunition were captured," Brima said, quoting residents fleeing the area. "The success of the Kamajors, who have been guarding their towns and villages against rebel attacks, was greeted with joy in the eastern town of Kenema. The Kamajors laid down a display of arms and ammunition they captured from the rebels. These include rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, and AK-47 rifles."

**11 January:** There was renewed heavy fighting between ECOMOG troops and AFRC/RUF rebels in the central part of Freetown on Monday, Reuters reported, quoting witnesses. The BBC and Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that there had been heavy casualties on both sides, and said rebels had used non-combatants as human shields, resulting in civilian casualties. At Lungi International Airport, numerous ECOMOG casualties were brought in, while journalists and a pilot who had flown over the city reported seeing many uniformed bodies lying in the streets. "There is continued shelling and gunfire from the central district. It started around 9.00 a.m.," one witness said. BBC West Africa correspondent Mark Doyle reported that the rebels had set fire to Freetown. "Whole streets have been burnt down," he said. "The United Nations military headquarters has been burnt down, the roof collapsed. As a result it's completely destroyed. Other buildings, government buildings, have been set on fire by the rebels, and it seems that what they can't have they're going to destroy." A local journalist who walked on Monday morning through parts of the city behind ECOMOG lines, including Tengbeh Town, Brookfields, Congo Cross, and Pademba Road, said many houses had been burned. From a distance, he said, he could see the telephone exchange (SLET) and the City Hall on fire, while a thick cloud of smoke hung over the city, obscuring some buildings. The ECOMOG force said Monday it was gradually regaining control of the city. While claims of who controls various parts of Freetown are difficult to confirm independently, Doyle said ECOMOG appeared to be making advances. "I do know though that the Nigerian-led forces have entered an area, quite an important area of the city, where they weren't yesterday, and the Nigerians say that they are advancing, and that certainly does appear to be the case," he said. ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said his troops had secured the port and State House, and were pushing the rebels southeast towards "Kissy, Wellington, and Calaba Town." The AFP reported that Nigerian Alpha fighter jets made continuous sorties from Lungi on Monday, while helicopters ferried in ECOMOG and Kamajor reinforcements and evacuated casualties.

The government's spokesman, Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer, claimed that ECOMOG had retaken the central part of the city reached the eastern parts of the capital. "They should have gone past the Cline Town roundabout and probably are now in the Kissy area," he said. Spencer acknowledged that ECOMOG had met stiff resistance from rebel forces at Kingtom, Brookfields, Tengbeh Town, and Pademba Road.

Overnight Sunday the city was reported quiet. "We didn't hear a single shot fired overnight. It seems to be very, very calm," one journalist in Freetown said. At least 500 new Nigerian soldiers reportedly reinforced ECOMOG troops at Wilberforce Barracks on Sunday.

The foreign ministers of Togo and Ivory Coast, together with a United Nations negotiator, flew into Lungi on Monday in a bid to mediate the conflict in the strife-torn country. Foreign Minister Amara Essy of Ivory Coast and Togo's Foreign Minister, Joseph Kokou Koffigoh met first with President Kabbah and ECOMOG commanders. "(Without speedy action) this could turn into another Somalia and the international community will no longer take care of the situation," Essy said. The two foreign ministers plan to meet next with RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh. According to Information Minister Dr. Julius Spencer, they will confirm that Sankoh's call for a cease-fire was genuine and not made under duress, and communicate their findings to RUF commander Col. Sam "Maskita" Bockarie. Sankoh's location has not been disclosed, but the BBC referred last week to persistent rumours that he is being held aboard a Nigerian naval ship off the coast of Sierra Leone.

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Nigeria hosted a meeting on the Sierra Leone conflict on Monday, according to Nigerian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammed Abdul-Wahab. "Efforts are being made to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone," he said. "A lot of contacts are being made. Consultations have been going on."

ECOWAS said Monday that its secretary-general, Lansana Kouyate, would travel to Lome, Togo on Tuesday to meet with President Gnassingbe Eyadema, the current ECOWAS chairman, for consultations on Sierra Leone. "Consultations are currently going on between ECOWAS heads of state and parties to the conflict with a view to convening a dialogue meeting as soon as possible on the crisis," an ECOWAS statement said. The statement said ECOMOG troops were making headway against rebel positions. "The rebels are now being pushed out of Freetown following reinforcement by ECOMOG," the statement said. "ECOMOG has successfully taken control of the State House in Freetown. Efforts are being made to flush the rebels out of private residences in Freetown where some of them are still taking refuge."

ECOWAS Secretary-General Lansana Kouyate said ECOWAS had received a proposal from the rebels for talks in Burkina Faso, to be mediated by Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore, the current OAU chairman. Sierra Leone's Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning, Dr. James O.C. Jonah, on Saturday rejected any Burkinabe role, accusing Burkina Faso of being "hostile to Sierra Leone." Kouyate said ECOWAS had rejected a rebel demand to ensure their safety prior to the commencement of the proposed talks in Ouagadougou. "ECOWAS is prepared to allow the talks at any agreed venue so that apart from the rebels meeting their leader, the peace process could also move forward, for the talks will not be based on conditionalities," Kouyate said. In an interview on Monday, Kouyate said that ECOMOG was now making headway in its battle with AFRC/RUF rebels in the capital. "In Freetown, (ECOMOG) troops are about to retake control of practically the entire city," he said. "For about three days now, the rebels have run out of ammunition and men. The reinforcements they were expecting did not come, because naturally ECOMOG troops are behind them. Although the situation has radically changed, there are still some pockets of resistance." In a separate interview with the Pan African News Agency (PANA), Kouyate said: "As I speak to you now, I can confirm that the State House is under ECOMOG control."

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) expressed deep concern Monday about the plight of the civilian population in many parts of Freetown. "Incessant fire from both light and heavy weapons in the crowded capital and the destruction of civilian property and essential infrastructure are giving rise to serious fears for the safety of the inhabitants," the ICRC said in a statement issued from its Geneva headquarters. "In some areas of the city people are finding it difficult to leave their homes in order to gather food, assist the wounded or simply bury the dead. A continued power and communication blackout is further aggravating the situation." The ICRC also deplored the misuse of its red cross symbol, as vehicles taken by force from the Sierra Leone Red Cross and the ICRC were being driven around the capital. "The ICRC calls on all the parties involved to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law, and in particular to make a clear distinction between combatants and civilians and spare persons who are not or are no longer taking part in the hostilities," the statement said. "The ICRC urges all those bearing weapons to respect the men and women displaying the protective red cross emblem, to allow them to carry out the necessary surveys and to give unimpeded passage to urgently needed humanitarian assistance." The ICRC currently has five expatriates and about 200 Sierra Leonean staff in Freetown. The statement said more than 180 persons had taken refuge in the ICRC compound in the past few days, and 126 patients

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were receiving treatment at the Netland Surgical Hospital and Rehabilitation Centre.

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) warned Monday that hundreds of thousands of Freetown residents trapped in their homes for almost a week could soon face starvation if fighting continues. "We urgently need all parties to the conflict to allow unimpeded access to needy people in Freetown and the rest of the country," said the WFP Regional Manager for Coastal West Africa, Paul Ares, in a statement issued in Abidjan. Freetown residents have been trapped with little or no food, water, and electricity since the fighting started last week. "We are gravely concerned about the severe hardship imposed on the civilian population," Ares said. Prior to the rebel attack on Freetown, the WFP was providing food to some 63,000 farmers and vulnerable persons in Sierra Leone. At present, the WFP is continuing to feed some 20,000 persons who arrived in Bo and Kenema last month, fleeing fighting between rebel forces and ECOMOG. The agency has sufficient food reserves to feed them for two months, the statement said.

Russia has called on the Sierra Leone government and the rebels to institute an immediate cease-fire and start a dialogue, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin said in Moscow on Monday. "We can feel nothing but regret at seeing the hostilities continuing in that country lead to casualties and damage, especially in its capital, Freetown," Rakhmanin said. He added that he hoped the conflict could be settled by negotiations, and said Russia supports the regional efforts, including those of ECOWAS, to find a peaceful settlement.

The United States on Monday directly accused the Liberian government of support for AFRC/RUF rebels in Sierra Leone. "We have told the government of Liberia that we know they are supporting RUF activities, and we condemn support from any source to the insurgence," State Department spokesman James Rubin said in a press conference. "This has come from a growing body of evidence that indicates that the government of Liberia has been supporting those activities, and we continue to urge Liberia to stop the support and play a more constructive role in the conflict in Sierra Leone." Rubin said the U.S. was "extremely concerned" about the welfare and safety of Freetown residents caught up in the fighting. "So far in the current RUF offensive against Freetown, we have not received reports of mass executions, mass kidnappings and other forms of extreme torture that the RUF has been known for since 1991," he said. "We do, however, have reports of rapes, looting, house burnings and other abuses of civilians by rebel forces."

Italy's Ambassador to Sierra Leone, Luigi Costa Sanseverino Di Bisgnano, said Monday that two Italian missionary priests kidnapped on Sunday had been "tricked" by rebels who told them they could meet their fellow priest, Father Mario Guerra, who was abducted at Kamalo in November. Di Bisgnano, who resides in Ivory Coast, was accompanied by the Bishop of the Diocese of Makeni, George Biguzzi.

About 100 Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees in Dakar, Senegal protested Monday in front of the UNHCR office to demand legal refugee documents, assistance, and medical care. "We have made several attempts to discuss our situation here in Senegal with the appropriate UNHCR authorities but they have always refused to talk to us. This is what prompted us to lead this demonstration," said the leader of the Sierra Leonean group, John Kanu. "It is appalling that we continue to live here without shelter, food, medical facilities, or even a legal document." The regional UNHCR delegate, Ousseni Fassassi, tried to calm the refugees and called for "understanding

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and dialogue." He said he had looked into their situations, and a positive decision would soon be made regarding them. "We will now issue them a six-month attestation and hold meetings with them in order to look into the modalities of working out an assistance programme for them," he said.

# Exhibit 1.289 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

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## Succeeds Sankawulo

See Story On Page 4

## Taylor Dines With Khaddafi

About six years ago, in early December, 1989, the grim faces of four young Liberians were paraded

But what was their crime? They were all Libyan trained dissidents



*Councilman Charles Taylor*
*He has been consistent in denying his Libyan connection*




*Libyan leader Muammar Khaddafi*
*Ostracized by the world for his sponsorship of terrorism, he sent "Special Invitation" to Councilman Taylor*

on national television here in Monrovia. The suspects, all males had been ensnared by a tight security dragnet.

among them at the time, revealed that a total of 96 dissidents had entered Liberia in November that year via Ivory Coast to Monrovia. And their mission to stage a coup in Monrovia and topple the Samuel Doe regime.

During interviews by security forces in the presence of journalists, all four of the young men further revealed that they had undergone 18-month basic guerrilla training at the Tamura Military Academy in Libya and that they were the first batch of dissidents prone to invade Liberia.

cont'd on page 4



**Wilton Sankawulo -Did he**



**Rev. Worth Yeaton**

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# Taylor Dines With Khaddafi

Of course, some three weeks later, everything happened just as the young man had predicted: some dissidents attacked the border town of Butuo and they tagged themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). But Mr. Taylor, speaking a week after the Butuo incident, denied knowing the young men who had been arrested in Monrovia and vehemently disclaimed his Libyan connection.

However, six years later, the NPFL leader Councilman Charles Ghankay Taylor is in Tripoli as guest of Col. Muammar Khaddafi, the unpredictable leader of that oil reservoir.

The NPFL-owned "KISS-FM" proudly quoted Taylor's press secretary Reginald Goodridge as saying that the NPFL leader's pilgrimage to Tripoli stemmed from a "special invitation" he had received from Col. Khaddafi while visiting an unnamed African country, a veiled reference to Burkina Faso.

Taylor who has been repeatedly trumpeting his desire to become president of Liberia thru democratic means, is in Libya to take part in festivities commemorating the 27th year of Khaddafi's coup of September 1, [illegible] the NPFL leader is not the only anniversary pilgrim to Libya. Ghana's Jerry Rawlings, Sudan's al-Bashir and the controversial Black American Nation of Islam leader, Louis Farrakhan [illegible]

[illegible] ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

All along, there have been widespread media reports that Taylor's military hardwares originate from Libya via Burkina Fasso, but Mr. Taylor has been consistent in his fierce denials. Speaking in a VOA interview July 11th this year, Mr. Taylor again denied earlier claims by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Amb. William Twaddell that Libya was the main source of arms supplies for the NPFL. Taylor claimed at the time that most of his arms and ammunition were seized from the Armed Forces of Liberia during the course of the war.

He also disclosed that some "western countries" were sympathetic to his cause and were also rendering some assistance to his front.

Mr. Taylor's Libyan visit comes at a time when the United States Government, traditional ally of Liberia is making frantic effort to isolate the Khaddafi regime. At the same time, the U.S. Congress has passed a law threatening sanction against any western company which would henceforth, invest more than US40m in Libya and Iran.

According to U.S. officials, the regimes of the two countries are sponsors of international terrorism. The Clinton Administration has, however, come under stern criticisms from its western European allies for promulgating what they term as extra-territorial laws; they are also threatening possible retaliation.

Meanwhile, up to press time last night, there was no news of Mr. Taylor's arrival back to the capital for the induction ceremonies of Mrs. Perry [illegible] reports had it that he [illegible] the Libyan capital, Tripoli [illegible] France, instead of flying [illegible] Monrovia. If the latter [illegible] then it is a glaring indication [illegible] western country which [illegible] sympathetic to the NPFL's [illegible]

Although the NPFL leader [illegible] journalists earlier last week [illegible] trip was intended to seek some [illegible] of assistance for ECOM[illegible] observers believe that Mr. [illegible] is embarking on a [illegible] procurement spree so as to [illegible] his campaign during the elections.

The Nation's NEWS Since 1990

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## Another Disaster

rocks and sand bags were [illegible] to prevent further tides.

A resident of the town [illegible] our reporter that "the G[illegible] needs to appeal to the [illegible] community to help fi[illegible] the erosion."

Others talked to [illegible] the months of [illegible] September, since [illegible] always been bad, [illegible] has never been ea[illegible]

In a related de[illegible] Kru Town, Coas[illegible] Popo Beach [illegible] Bangor comm[illegible] and several o[illegible] swiped away s[illegible] preventive [illegible] instituted [illegible] government

**20 December:** AFRC/RUF rebels captured Koidu on Saturday after ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) militia withdrew their troops following heavy fighting, survivors and aid workers said on Sunday. ECOMOG officers in Freetown said they had withdrawn to avoid civilian casualties. "We had to pull out of the town to save civilian lives," one officer said. "We could have beaten the rebels back but it would have resulted in the loss of many civilian lives. We are giving the civilians a few days to leave the town, then we will strike and crush the rebels." Survivors who reached Freetown told of many bodies lying in the streets of Koidu, many of the apparently rebels. Fighting began on Wednesday when the rebels launched an attack in the area of Small Lebanon, but were beaten back by ECOMOG and the CDF. Aid workers said thousands of civilians had fled Koidu on foot to Makeni. "At least 10,000 people have reached Makeni since Friday. Thousands more are on the road and thousands more have gone to other towns in the north," one aid worker in Makeni said. Medical sources said dozens of wounded had been admitted to the Makeni Government Hospital.

The Liberian government has closed Liberia's border with Sierra Leone and ordered all army soldiers to report for duty immediately, Liberian President Charles Taylor announced late Saturday in a statement read on his radio station, KISS-FM. The statement said the Liberian government had been informed of plans by Liberians in exile, aided by neighbouring countries, to overthrow Liberia's elected government. *Reuters* cited a rumour circulating in Monrovia that an attack would be launched on December 24. Taylor's radio station said Friday the government had learned that 5,000 armed men were crossing into Liberia from Sierra Leone. A spokesman for President Taylor said the measure was being taken to prevent the violence in Sierra Leone from spilling over into Liberia, and warned that any individual involved in the unrest would be arrested. At a meeting in Abuja, Nigeria on July 2, President Kabbah and President Taylor "expressly reaffirmed their commitment not to permit their territories to be used for actions aimed at destabilizing the other." The two leaders renewed this pledge at their Monrovia summit on July 20 and at the Mano River Union summit on November 12. However, Sierra Leone has continued to accuse Liberia of aiding AFRC/RUF rebels, a charge which Taylor has continually denied.

**28 December:** AFRC/RUF rebels reportedly seized control of Makeni from retreating ECOMOG troops on Monday, but ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi, attending the ECOWAS Committee of Five foreign ministers conference in Abidjan, refused to concede that the town had fallen to the rebels, describing it instead as a "no-man's land." "Our troops have pulled back from Makeni," he said. "We had to make a tactical withdrawal in order not to stretch our communication lines." Shelpidi said the Kamajor militia would defend the town against the rebels. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Dr. Sama Banya, declined to say who controlled the town but confirmed that all of Makeni's residents had fled. He said Nigeria had sent two battalions to Freetown on Sunday night, reportedly some 600 additional troops, to reinforce ECOMOG, bringing the force's estimated strength in Sierra Leone to about 12,000.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie claimed Friday to have captured Waterloo and Benguema, 20 and 30 miles from Freetown, respectively. ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi denied the rebel claim, saying ECOMOG troops were "in control of the area." In an interview on Sunday, Bockarie said the rebels "were no longer seeking dialogue," adding it was "too late now."

No new initiatives emerged from a one-day emergency meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Five foreign ministers on Sierra Leone in Abidjan on Monday, but delegates issued a communiqué following the conference demanding that AFRC/RUF rebels cease fighting, and condemning those who were providing them support. The communiqué called on the rebels "to cease fighting immediately, to lay down their arms and to recognize the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah as the legitimate government of Sierra Leone," and "strongly condemned the activities of the countries which are providing support to the rebels." Sierra Leone's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Dr. Sama Banya, and ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi "implicated Liberia in providing military support to the rebels," the communiqué said. Shelpidi, in an interview, said arms for the rebels "are coming from Liberia and through Liberia," and accused Liberia of supporting the rebel insurgency. "I maintain my position that Liberia is aiding the rebels," he said. "We have a destabilising situation in the sub-region, and if it's allowed to continue, it's going to be very, very serious. It won't end in Sierra Leone, it's going to spill over and affect every country in the sub-region," Shelpidi said. Delegates said Britain, Nigeria, and the United States also accused Liberia of aiding the rebels in their current offensive. "There is a growing body of evidence in support of Liberia's involvement in Sierra Leone," the Director of the U.S. State Department Office of West African Affairs and Special Envoy to Liberia, Howard Jeter, was quoted as saying. Liberian Foreign Minister Monie Captan countered by demanding proof of his government's involvement, and called for an international investigation. "I don't deny that there are Liberians in Sierra Leone, but the Liberian government is not involved," he told reporters. ECOWAS General Secretary Lansana Kouyate called for additional troops for ECOMOG, and deplored the "lack of military backup" for the force despite the "good will" of ECOWAS countries. Togolese Foreign Minister Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, who chaired the talks, called on Western countries to provide logistical equipment while maintaining the key to peace in Sierra Leone was national reconciliation. "We must insist on the necessity to organize a true dialogue -- a frank and sincere dialogue between Sierra Leone's feuding brothers," Koffigoh said. "But dialogue demands, above all, a halt in fighting," he added, urging delegates to "work together to convince belligerents to agree to a ceasefire." Koffigoh said the United Nations and the Netherlands had "given the green light" to finance 400 troops from Mali and 100 from Gambia.

The U.S. Department of State, in a strongly-worded statement issued by Acting Spokesman M. Lee McClenny on Monday, said the United States "condemns in the strongest terms the brutal RUF insurgency" in Sierra Leone. "The United States Government stands firmly with the democratically elected government of President Kabbah," the statement said. "We can not countenance any renewed attempt to overthrow the Kabbah government by force. Nor will the people of Sierra Leone accept another coup d'etat as was demonstrated yesterday in Freetown by their march in support of the legitimate government." In a reference to allegations of Liberian support for rebels fighting in Sierra Leone, the statement said the United States Government "is especially concerned about external regional support for the RUF insurgency. We continue to urge the Government of Liberia to take all necessary measures to stop support for RUF activities emanating from its territory."

Liberian officials say they arrested eight Sierra Leoneans inside Liberia over the weekend, accusing them of being members of the Kamajor militia. According to a press report in Monrovia, two were arrested at Bo Waterside, while the remaining six were taken into custody at Dambala. Military sources at Bo Waterside said heavily armed Kamajor fighters had crossed the Mano River at Mowahn in the Wednesday evening in search of food. The sources, quoting villagers, said the Kamajors stole twelve bags of seed rice and a large quantity of palm oil before fleeing. Kamajors in canoes were reportedly seen near the abandoned mining town of Kongo, on the Liberian side of the border. There has been no direct confrontation between the Kamajor militiamen and Liberian troops, but Liberia has stepped up patrols along the border.

ECOMOG Press Secretary Malam Buhari Ali, in a statement issued in Abuja, Nigeria on Monday, claimed rebel faction leader and former AFRC Chief Secretary Solomon "SAJ" Musa was killed December 24 during an an attack on Benguema Military Training Centre. There has been no independent confirmation of the claim.

**17 April:** Presidential spokesman Septimus Kaikai said Friday that ECOMOG had taken control of Koidu from junta loyalists and RUF fighters holding the city. "I won't tell you when we took the town. What is important is that we have captured Koidu and we are pushing forward on Kailahun and Koindu," Kaikai told a news conference. Sources close to the ECOMOG force said ECOMOG, backed by the the Kamajor militia, had driven junta troops from much of Koidu on Thursday afternoon, but that the rebels were still holding the eastern part of the city. Aid workers in Kono District reported by radio that an estimated 1,000 civilians were crossing into Liberia every day to escape the fighting. They said the rebels, backed by about 500 Liberian fighters, had withdrawn to the east end of the district with the stated aim of striking back against the ECOMOG force.

The United Nations Security Council on Friday unanimously approved deployment of up to ten U.N. military liaison and security personnel to Sierra Leone. The U.N. personnel will report on the military situation in the country, and will assist ECOMOG in identifying former combatants to be disarmed and drawing up a disarmament plan. U.N. Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okello said the mission would reassure former combatants that they would not be treated outside the law, and would observe that this was the case.

The European Union has contributed $7 million to help Sierra Leone to demobilise combatants, according to National Security Advisor Sheka Mansaray. He said had been set up, or were in the process of being set up, throughout the country, and that the reintegration process would begin in the coming weeks.

ECOMOG task force commander Colonel Maxwell Khobe told the BBC that Liberian rebels fighting in the east of Sierra Leone are causing his troops more trouble than the junta forces and their RUF allies. Khobe said the Liberians, whom he identified as members of President Charles Taylor's NPFL militia, were hampering ECOMOG's efforts by destroying the infrastructure, such as bridges. He said the Liberians, along with their local allies, were killing large numbers of Sierra Leoneans. Khobe described as "very credible" a report that retreating junta forces had killed 80 people in the village of Ngolahun last weekend.

About 200 civilians were killed last Saturday night by retreating AFRC-RUF rebels in an attack on the village of Bambatendu, Liberian *Star Radio* reported on Friday.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesman Kris Janowski has said that the exodus of refugees fleeing the fighting in Sierra Leone has reached alarming proportions. Janowski said more than 100,000 refugees had crossed into Liberia and Guinea since the beginning of the year. Since January, 50,000 Sierra Leoneans had arrived at Kissidougou, he said, and during the past week at least 1,000 Sierra Leoneans a day had crossed into Guinea—many of them suffering from malnutrition and respiratory infections. "According to people who recently arrived, there are tens of thousands more who are on their way to Guinea from Sierra Leone. So, we are seeing an emergency situation building up slowly. The people who flee Sierra Leone are in a very bad shape healthwise. Many of them have been on the road for four months." Janowski said the UNHCR was trying to move people awa from the border area, but that so far only about 15,000 Sierra Leoneans had been moved into the interior. "Some refugees, not very many, are trying to make their way to Conakry -- but, we're talking here about a few dozen a day -- and then try and take a boat or be transferred from Conakry to the capital of Sierra Leone or to areas in Sierra Leone which are safe." He said that while the situation in Guinea was critical, the flow of refugees to Liberia had almost ceased. About 50,000 Sierra Leoneans have fled to Liberia this year, but only a handful had arrived in the country since ECOMOG took control of the area along the Liberian border, Janowski said.

Physically handicapped Sierra Leonean refugees in Bopolu, Lofa County, have complained they are being neglected by relief agencies, Liberian *Star Radio* reported on Friday. The refugees, who number about 15, said they had not received food or medical attention since the

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International Committee of the Red Cross pulled out of the area last July. Most of them were maimed during fighting between the Kamajors and the RUF. The refugees have integrated with Bopolu residents and are engaged in farming. They said they were willing to return home when it was safe for them to do so.

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STATEMENT ON THE HISTORIC RETURN TO FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE, OF THE LEADERS OF THE ALLIANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

Freetown, Sunday, October 3, 1999

We herald the dawn of a new era. The war has ended. The era of peace, forgiveness and reconciliation has come.

We stand before you today to ask for forgiveness and a spirit of reconciliation across the country.

We offer hands of kindred understanding and love to all those who we have wronged. You, who we have wronged, you have every human right to feel bitter and unforgiving but we plead with you for forgiveness.

Those who have died; those who are grieving for the loss of their loved ones; those who have been disabled; those whose property have been destroyed; those traumatized - the children, the youth, the women and the old aged - we ask for their forgiveness.

We ask for forgiveness from the displaced and refugees.

We also ask for forgiveness and a spirit of reconciliation from the relatives and governments of all those foreign troops who lost their lives and suffered casualties in their tour of duty in Sierra Leone.

We ask for forgiveness and a spirit of reconciliation from members of the international community whose good will has been frustrated by this war. We ask of the same from non-governmental organisations, journalists and civil society groups both local and foreign.

We will like to repeat that the war has ended. To this effect, all prisoners of war are to be released. All roads are opened. To complement this, we call on the government to release all political prisoners and prisoners of war.

We are no longer in a state of war. We are in a state of peace and our presence here today is a testimony to our commitment to the full implementation of the Lome Peace Accord.

We have come to stay and to help consolidate the peace. We want all fears to be removed from our society starting from today. We are now in an era of peace. We are in an era of absolute respect for human rights.

All fears must be removed from our society. The state of emergency must be lifted immediately as we are no longer in a state of war. We have a responsibility now to remove all signals of mistrust, fear and war. The curfew must be lifted. All so-called

collaborators are freed of their charges and we welcome them back into our society. Let know one be intimidated or live in fear in the new Sierra Leone we are about to create.

We are happy to announce to the nation today that the reason that brought together the Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council still remains. We came together to end the war. We shall remain together to consolidate the peace. Nothing will divide us as our union or alliance is with the blessing of the Almighty Allah/God and our glorious ancestors. Our alliance is for peace! Our alliance is for peace! Our alliance is for peace.

With peace comes politics. The RUF/AFRC alliance will enter into politics. By this, therefore, the RUF/AFRC alliance is to be transformed from a military alliance to a political alliance in accordance with the Lome Peace Accord.

To further demonstrate our abiding commitment to peace, we the leadership and high command of the Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council are happy to announce today the transformation of the RUF/AFRC alliance into a political movement. We usher in a vibrant political movement for peace. The RUF/AFRC alliance is now the ALLIANCE FOR PEACE (AFP)!

Very soon we will announce the symbol and flag of the Alliance for Peace (AFP). Our chosen symbol will be that of peace, goodwill and respect for human rights. Our chosen flag will reflect the strength and pride of our Pan-African heritage. We shall strive for the empowerment of our people so that the root causes of the civil war shall be removed from our society forever. Our rallying call shall be "Power to the People". Our Alliance is for Peace and we are here to sustain the peace and contribute to the creation of a new Sierra Leone of equal opportunity, freedom and justice for all.

We have come home to stay! We have come home to build! We have come home to remove fear, intimidation and mistrust from our society.

We embrace you, our people, in the spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation.

Our dear nation has suffered enough but at long last peace is now at hand. All the fighting forces of this country will be mobilised to rebuild this country. We will transform ourselves into builders of homes, schools, hospitals, markets, roads, bridges, airfields and dams to provide electricity. We shall make farms, fish ponds and raise livestock. We will be the motivating force behind the regeneration of our mining industry. We will transform the motivation on the battlefield to the fields of construction and development. This is the challenge we have put before us. Our movement for peace is also a movement for reconstruction and development.

Fellow Sierra Leoneans, join us in expressing our profound gratitude to all those who have patiently assisted us on this our footpath to peace and democracy. We thank the Heads of State of the ECOWAS Authority, their governments and people for helping us to achieve peace at last. We thank the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity,

the European Union and the Commonwealth for listening to the cries of Sierra Leoneans for peace and helping the nation to focus on the benefits of peace. We thank the NGO community, journalists and the civil society groups who constantly reminded the warring factions of their human rights obligations. To them and the international community who supported them we reaffirm our commitment to the observance of human rights. Let their collective voice continue to ring in our ears and remind us of our human rights obligations to the rest of society.

We hold our Alliance for Peace sacred and therefore our commitment to peace and our desire to see to the implementation of the Lome Peace Accord in full.

We are at home and there is no turning back. We have come to help build a new Sierra Leone. May the Almighty Allah/God and our glorious ancestors continue to guide and bless us all.

# Exhibit 1.316 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

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FOCUS on SIERRA LEONE

# AFRC'S RESPONSE TO ARTICLE ON DISCORD IN REBEL RANKS

Dear Ambrose

There were factual inaccuracies in your analysis about the problems between the AFRC and the RUF. We would like you to set the records straight, in your otherwise excellent tradition of fair and unbiased reporting and comment:

- Gborie did not lead the coup of May 25 1997. He was recruited by the real leaders - Abu Zagalo Sankoh, Ibrahim Bazzy and Tamba Brima - in the early hours of the morning of May 25th 1997. Before 24th May, the man knew nothing of the plans. A mere look at the cassette of the treason trial where Gborie gives his last explanation to the world confirms this fact and clearly says that he was not a coup maker but that he was approached by Zagalo.

- The talk of a Tamba Gborie faction is therefore not correct. We know who is behind those rumours and the damage that it has caused. It was not Johnny Paul Koroma (JPK) who left Gborie at Pademba Road. It was not even JPK who sacked him or locked him at Pademba Road. It was SAJ Musa! He led the investigation into Gborie's actions at the Iranian Embassy. The Investigating Committee led by SAJ submitted their findings to the Supreme Council and the decision to dismiss Gborie was a collective decision of the Supreme Council. Gborie was then misled into taking a contingent of men to attack the Chairman's residence.

- Again, the decision to lock him up for this action of insubordination was not that of JPK. After a supreme council meeting, in which all council members were present, it was decided that Gborie be locked up. It was SAJ Musa and the RUF's Issa Sesay who actually went to Brigadier Mani's house where Gborie was staying, placed him under arrest and drove him to Pademba Road.

- It is not true to say that JPK left Gborie in jail. Where were the so called "Tamba Gborie faction" when Gborie was left behind in jail? JPK gave orders to Zagalo to release Gborie. Zagalo was too busy securing his own safety and later explained that he had malaria. Gborie knew of this and those who were with him at Pademba Road know that Gborie died without any bitterness for JPK. There is no Tamba Gborie faction. What happened to him was unfortunate and very, very sad.

- JPK did not abandon his men to go to the East; nor is he a weak man who "is too religious". This is delibearate misinformation told by those who are out to make money out of Sierra Leone's crisis, and you should not be decieved to repeat it. They see JPK's gentle approach to the crisis as a stumbling block. They want more SLAs to be sacrificed and to die on the battlefield so their own selfish interests can be realised. JPK, on the other hand is not interested in power or emoluments. All he wants is a decent package for the soldiers so that these young men are not left alienated by society and so resort to creating havoc on a country they believe they

protected. Let it not be forgotten that they protected Sierra Leone. Your readers should remember that it took Charles Taylor less than seven months to march from Ivory Coast to Monrovia, decimating the Armed Forces of Liberia along the way. Our boys refused to allow the RUF this success. For seven years the RUF tried and failed to even secure any major town (for any considerable time) after the army's offensive. Johnny Paul Koroma was the first officer sent to counter the RUF in 1991. He was the officer who stopped the RUF's Mohamed Tarawallie (Zeno) from crossing Waterloo into Freetown in 1995.


- The Lomé Accord says nothing about what happens to the SLA soldiers. Yes, the hostage taking was unfortunate but it drew the world's attention to the real plans of the RUF. You said it was "totally unjustified". We say, it was totally justified. Even those who were taken hostage understood the desperation of the soldiers who abducted them.

- JPK was a moderate and religious man throughout his term as Head of State. No "chastening" experience made him so. He decided to relocate to the South instead of his homeland in the North because he feared that the conflict might change to a North versus South matter. If, as your article suggests, the soldiers in the North felt betrayed by Koroma, why did they hold hostage UN personnel to bring the plight of Koroma to the world? Why not hold the hostages, damn Koroma and make heroes of officers like Brigadier Mani who stayed with them up North throughout?

- Rambo was not killed because (as you wrongly stated) he was "popular among the young AFRC soldiers" but because he had been sent by an RUF Commander to kill Dennis (Superman) Mingo. It was 'Superman, not Rambo, who was seen by the RUF as being too closely aligned with the SLAs in the North.

**Banjah Marrah**
AFRC Communications Officer
7 November 1999

HOME



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# Exhibit 1.330 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

1 of 1 DOCUMENT

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May 12, 2000, Friday, Late Edition - Final

**SECTION:** Section A; Page 14; Column 2; Foreign Desk

**LENGTH:** 742 words

**HEADLINE:** Sierra Leone Rebels Halted Near Capital but Active Elsewhere

**BYLINE:** By NORIMITSU ONISHI

**DATELINE:** FREETOWN, Sierra Leone, May 11

**BODY:**

Forces loyal to the government appeared to push back rebels attacking the capital today but fighting intensified and spread to other areas.

A coalition of United Nations peacekeepers, Sierra Leone soldiers and a militia known as Kamajors secured the road leading to Waterloo, about 18 miles southeast of Freetown, but heavy fighting broke out about 10 miles east of Waterloo, said David Wimhurst, the spokesman of the United Nations force.

On Wednesday, fighting around Waterloo drove thousands of civilians to gather at Jui Junction, 10 miles from Freetown, as they fled toward the capital. Today, many left Jui Junction for their homes.

In the capital, pro-government forces tightened security, mindful that infiltrators played a critical role last year in rebel attacks that nearly overran Freetown.

British paratroopers limited access to the western part of the city, the site of the United Nations headquarters, even setting up barbed wire along the beach.

United Nations peacekeepers operated checkpoints alongside Sierra Leone soldiers, militiamen and rifle-toting men of unknown affiliation who were dressed mostly in T-shirts and flip-flops.

"Every minute that goes by strengthens our resolve to bring lasting peace in this country," said Prince Nicol, the spokesman for Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma. In alliances that have shifted rapidly since last week, Colonel Koroma is now supporting the government against his former ally, Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front. Colonel Koroma led a short-lived junta that toppled President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in 1997; Mr. Kabbah is now president again.

Shadowing today's fighting was the continuing search by the United Nations for 500 peacekeepers whose capture by the rebels set off the newest crisis.

The whereabouts of Mr. Sankoh are still unclear, Mr. Wimhurst said. But talks with the Revolutionary United Front are being held through intermediaries, including President Charles Taylor of Liberia, a former guerrilla who has long

supported Mr. Sankoh.

Securing Freetown has become the priority of the United Nations force. But thousands of peacekeepers remain deployed across the country, some in rebel territory.

In Makeni, in the center of the country, hundreds of Kenyan peacekeepers who had been surrounded by rebels broke through the cordon and made it to friendly territory. But six were wounded, three seriously, when they came under fire by Sierra Leone soldiers who mistook them for rebels disguised in United Nations uniforms.

Some rebels have apparently begun wearing uniforms that they stripped from the 500 United Nations hostages. Others have been using the hostages' equipment, including 13 armored cars belonging to Zambian troops. In Port Loko, about 65 miles from Freetown, United Nations peacekeepers were attacked overnight by rebels using armored cars, Mr. Wimhurst said. No casualties were reported.

The heaviest battles broke out east of Waterloo, despite the heavy presence of Jordanian and Nigerian peacekeepers, and three Land Rovers filled with elite SAS British troops were seen heading east of Waterloo. The 850 British soldiers in Sierra Leone, who came to evacuate European citizens, have been under intense pressure to play a more active role in peacekeeping.

The 8,700 peacekeepers here include Nigerians, Indians, Kenyans, Jordanians, Zambians, Guineans and Ghanaians.

The Sierra Leone Army, which is said to number 5,000, was far larger before the junta took power in 1997. At the time most soldiers reportedly sided with Colonel Koroma against the government. In the anarchy of Sierra Leone, many who were soldiers during the day became rebels at night, and came to be known as sobels.

According to the peace accord that briefly halted the earlier battles, rebellious soldiers fit to be rehabilitated were to be reintegrated into a new government army. But in the desperation that gripped the government in recent days, the government effectively permitted Colonel Koroma to rally his men against Mr. Sankoh's group without any pretence of official rehabilitation.

"The government has not stopped them from doing what they are doing," Septimus Kaikai, President Kabbah's spokesman, said in an interview today.

The Revolutionary United Front and the Kamajor militia, which is made up of traditional hunters who often provide security in West Africa, are each thought to total more than 15,000 members.


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**GRAPHIC:** Photos: Sierra Leone troops and ragtag militiamen near Waterloo headed toward the line of battle with rebels yesterday, and seemed to halt the push against the capital, but the rebels still hold 500 peacekeepers hostage. (Associated Press); Refugees fleeing Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, thronged a boat landing yesterday. Attacking rebel forces were apparently pushed back. (Reuters)

Map of Sierra Leone highlighting Freetown: Troops loyal to the government seem to control Freetown for now.


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Baladīyah (municipalities)
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2. AZ ZĀWIYAH
3. AL 'AZĪZĪYAH
4. TARĀBULUS
5. AL KHUMS
6. TARHŪNAH
7. ZLĪṬAN
8. MIṢRĀTAH
9. AL JABAL AL AKHḌAR
Mediterranean Sea
Ionian Sea
Gulf of Sidra
Sicily (ITALY)
Malta
Crete (GREECE)
Tripoli
Banghāzī
Misrātah
Surt
Sabhā
Murzūq
Ghadāmis
Ghāt
Al Qaṭrūn
Tobruk
Derna
Al Bayḍā'
Tāzirbū
Al Jawf
Ma'ṭan as Sārah
Al 'Uwaynāt
Zuwārah
Al Khums
Gharyān
Nālūt
Yafran
Mizdah
Hūn
Waddān
Adīrī
Birāk
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Zawilah
Ubari
Ghadāmis
Al Qarīyah ash Sharqīyah
Banī Walīd
As Sidrah
Jālū
Ajdābiyā
Qamīnis
Tūkrah
Susah
Darnah
Bardīyah
Sidi Barrani
Marsá Maṭrūḥ
Khaniá
Iráklion
Cyclades
Dodecanese
Sousse
Sfax
Gabès
Annaba
Bizerte
Tunis
Agrigento
Catania
Pantelleria (ITALY)
Valletta
Isole di Lampedusa
Îles Kerkennah
Île de Djerba
Ohanet
In-Amenas
Illizi
Ghadāmis
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GHADĀMIS
GHARYĀN
NALŪT
YAFRAN
SAWFAJJĀN
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**TRANSCRIPTS OF INTERVIEWS BROADCAST ON THE BBC**

Un-official transcripts prepared by the OTP.

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*So the fly in the ceasefire ointment seems to be Sam Bockarie alias – perhaps aptly – Mosquito. He's urging his rebels to go on the offensive we called him up and Robin White asked him why he wasn't taking this chance to work for peace with the President Kabbah Government.*

**SB** That chances was there when Kabbah was in power. But he failed to do that. He said he was not going to talk to us, we are thieves and bandits and that he was going to kill all of us at the end of the year and he never succeeded that's why God has given us the upper hand to have overrun him and now he's gone.

**RW** But isn't this a golden opportunity for a peaceful solution?

**SB** There is an opportunity if they are ready.

**RW** But they say they're ready.

**SB** If they are ready, our leader cannot be under duress there, being humiliated, molested and then people asking us to cease-fire. We are trying to do everything possible that will secure his release.

**RW** Now I've just spoken to the Information Minister and he says that if you want to see your leader Foday Sankoh face-to-face he's sure that that can be arranged.

**SB** Oh, if he can do that then let him arrange that.

[sounds like gun shots in background]

**SB** I'm sorry Robin. My men are coming around me. They don't want any bush to shake around me.

**RW** So what are they doing?

**SB** They are coming the bush. I don't want any bush to shake. Any bush shake we're gonna come[1] there.

**RW** But I mean is anybody trying to attack you?

**SB** Yes, maybe somebody will attack, attempt an attack, attacking me.

**RW** Anyway you were saying about the possibility of you going to see Foday Sankoh face-to-face. You're game for that are you?

**SB** If he say he is ready to do that, then we are looking up to them but all we want an immediate release of Corporal Sankoh and to be turned over to us or to a neutral ground where we have suggested through the usual channel.

[1] "Come" in this context means 'shoot'.

You've called for you know a general offensive. Do you think your men are going to obey you?

**SB** It is happening now they are obeying me. This morning I got on the air and I asked if the offensive started last night and all of them answered me yes and as I'm speaking to you Tongo has fallen to us.

**RW** Where is that?

**SB** Tongo is another diamond …, a rich diamond mining area

**RW** But what about the people in Freetown, are they going to obey you?

**SB** I tell you, you are the first people I spoken to. I called the task force commander on the air and I spoke to him who is Brigadier G who is commonly called as "Gullit". He is there. I told him that I asked him whether the offensive started since last night. He told me "yes".

RUF *rebel commander Sam Bockarie.*

8865 Liberia

Daily News

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In Civil Conflict:

# Taylor takes blame for those killed

In an apparent response to allegations levied against him recently by Labour Minister Thomas Woewiyu, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, Charles Taylor, says he stands responsible for all the atrocities and killings committed by his fighters during the civil war over the last four years.

BY BOCKARIE MUSA

Woewiyu recently accused Taylor of ordering the execution of several prominent Liberians as well as political figures in a bid to foster his plan

Cont'd On Page 6



CHARLES TAYLOR

## IGNU accused o siphoning foreig aid funds

The erstwhile Interim Government headed by President Amos Sawyer has been accused of allegedly misappropriating US aid and other funds donated by the intern community assist Liberia.

Accordi

NEW YORK NEWS, a which i possessi MDM, D and so offici accuse high o some luxur the U and F Th as this not som ren Lib lo Se w $



DR. SAWYER

## Dee takes Myers to task

An assertion by Prince Myers, former Security Advisor to the rebel-NPRAG, that David Dwanyen died a "natural death" while displaced in NPFL held territory, has been described as a "blatant evasion of the facts and circumstances."

On Monday, ELBC granted an interview to the NPPL Security Advisor at which time Myers denied revelations made by the former NPPL Defense Spokesman, Mr. Tom Woewiyu, that Mr. Dwanyen was among several other prominent politicians and educators ordered killed by Charles Taylor.

But in his reaction to Prince Myers' denial and clarification, Mr. Borbor Smith Dee, a displaced from NPPL-controlled area, said that the former Commerce Minister was humiliated and severely beaten by NPPL fighters on two occasions.

He recalled that on July 10, 1990 the late Dwanyan was beaten at his Soul Clinic residence, and on the following day, July 11, he was taken to the Omega Station area where he was again beaten and forced

Cont'd On Page 6

## ELRM P U

The President and founder of Liberia's first independent an commercial Radi Station, ELRM f 98.6, leaves t country today t United States attend a spec training sess in Washington Mr. Char Spotter will

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## Taylor Takes

Cont'd From Page 1

of becoming President of Liberia.

However, in a speech delivered on Tuesday at the City Hall in Gbarnga, Bong County, in observance of the country's 147th Independence Day Anniversary and monitored by this paper, Mr. Taylor said " I know my men looted your farms, killed up your cattles and committed all sorts of evils against you, the people of this great land, but I am sorry and take responsibility for their doings."

Taylor said he is aware that all these vices occurred but were masterminded by some unscrupulous people within the front without his knowledge, but as a leader "I have to bear the burnt and that is exactly what I am doing."

Expressing dismay over happenings over the last four years, Taylor called on the Liberian people to bury the past and work towards the building of a peaceful society where justice and democracy will prevail.

Taylor also told those attending the programs that he supports the Liberian National Transitional Government and everything must be done to allow the government to extend its authority nationwide.

The NPFL leader said he was optimistic that peace will soon return once the necessary implements can be put into place to resume total disarmament of all combatants to the Liberian conflict.

## AFL Soldiers

Cont'd From Page 1

Radio Gbarnga.

He explained that after being captured, they disarmed, [illegible] taken across the St. John River by the fighters to the NPFL command post and later driven off to Gbarnga.

When Assistant Defense Minister for Public Affairs Arthur Dennis was contacted yesterday, he said he was not been informed about such an incident, terming it as one of the NPFL's cheap propaganda.

Minister Dennis, however, admitted that NPFL fighters had taken over the AFL position at Bright's Farm.

He explained that the NPFL fighters did not drive the AFL out of the area, but it was the AFL which retreated to avoid confrontation with either the NPFL or the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) which was battling at the time.

This paper in its Wednesday edition published that the NPFL had taken over Bright Farm.

## U.S.

Cont'd From Page 1

need some source of inspiration that will contribute immensely towards the process of national de-traumatization."

## LCC

Cont'd From Page 8

release said.

The LCC is meanwhile urging the general public to be a part of this memorable occasion.

## LMA

Cont'd From Page 8

because the Act which created the LMA and the by-laws of the association do not provide for an advisory Board to be the last decision-making body of the LMA.

The advisory Board he disclosed, was created by the People's Redemption Council (PRC).

## Restructure

Cont'd From Page 1

The proposals were made by an [illegible] at the [illegible]

Mr. Bukuly said although there is a need to restructure the army at the appropriate time, the formation of a transitional army at the moment is unthinkable.

He also proposed that the national army be restructured before the inauguration of the elected government as the formation of an army by the government in power has a tendency to breed a "partisan army" like the one prior to the national crisis.

## IGNU

Cont'd From Page 1

Liberian Consulate and U.N. Mission are facing a difficult time because their landlords are threatening them with eviction.

To show how serious the situation is, the electricity within the embassy was turned off last May 23, and has yet to be put on and Liberian diplomats there are said to be using flashlights to conduct official business.

"Those who have their desks situated near the window are lucky because they don't need a flashlight to operate but are instead relying on the sun-light that beams into the office through the window.

Besides this, most of the employees at the embassy, some with families to support, have not been paid in months and have to find extend jobs to help make ends to meet since they are not eligible for US food stamps.

## Children

Cont'd From Page 5

## Dee

Cont'd From Page 1

to sleep on the bare floor, which subsequently led to his untimely death.

Mr. Dee noted that when Hon. Dwanyan died in August 1990, no one shouldered the hospital bill as alleged by Prince Myers. "Even at that time there were looted drug all around and Dee wondered h could somebody that Taylor t care of the bil

He said for to say that late Dwanyeh a "natural de would only ex the narr mindedness Prince Myers son-in-law o deceased wh no remorse

"Prince who is lobbying staying at friends at Africa, th polishing of Tayl would get the LNTG, stated

Mr. that he with Mr that Je Doe was to Tal Cou Cl [illegible] the cit

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MONROVIA
# GUARDIAN

VOL. 3 NO. 1 FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1999 PRICE: LS20.00

# KABBAH AGREES TO CEASE-FIRE

## —FODAY SANKOH TO BE FREED

***Sierra Leone's embattled president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, has announced a one-week cease-fire between his forces backed by ECOMOG and combined forces of the RUF and former Junta soldiers.***

Addressing a news conference at the Lungi Airport in Freetown where he and other top officials are taking refuge from the three days of fighting in the city, President Kabbah disclosed that he had held talks with detained RUF leader Foday Sankoh and both had agreed to a one-week cease-fire, after which Corporal Sankoh would be released. The President said the cease-fire would allow for mediation between the government and rebels, and that such talks would involve the government of La Cote d'Ivoire and Togo. BBC's correspondent who attended President Kabbah's press conference at Lungi said the President displayed a tape which he said contained instructions from

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Pres. Kabbah

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### Continental

to him there was no legitimate agreement with Continental but the arrangement was rather a gentleman one. "I don't expect Tarpeh to go to the press with this matter" he added. Mr. Herron however informed our reporter that his Counselor and that of Dr. Tarpeh will henceforce handle the matter.

For his part, the General Manager of the Company, Mr. George Dahn emphatically told our reporter that his entity did not have any case with the clinic as far as he was concerned.

Contrary to Mr. Herron's claim that there was no legitimate agreement between Continental General and Crown Hill Clinic in the possession of this paper is the copy of a communication dated April 28, 1998 under the signature of his General Manager Mr. George Dahn which was forwarded to authorities of the Clinic officially informing them of the number of clients coupled with the category of treatments.

Meanwhile, authorities at the Clinic are currently contemplating on pursuing the necessary means to have commercial suits on claims cause all other efforts have failed to yield any result thus far. *Writes Herbert Johnson*

## CAMEROON

fighting by two factions of the Cameroonian Football Association (FECAFOOT) before and after France '98. FIFA accused Cameroon of not respecting the accord reached after the dissolution of FECAFOOT. According to the accord, Cameroon and FIFA would both run the affairs of the FA for a period of about 6 months during which time election of new Chairman would take place. But Cameroon failed to name all of its members to the committee and insisted that FECAFOOT should chair the committee, a row which continued until the expiration of the deadline set by FIFA.

Cameroon fell apart with FIFA immediately after France '98. FECAFOOT Chairman Mr. Vincent Onannan was accused of racketeering some world cup tickets alloted to be sold by the Cameroonian Football Association by FIFA. This accusation prompted the Cameroonian government to detain Mr. Onannan. But since his detention some six months ago, no formal charge has been brought against him, and it is widely believed that Mr. Onannan is just being used as a scape goat and an attempt to investigate him will implicate so many public figures in the Cameroon sporting arena. Politics in Cameroonian football is not anything new, it has since begun to be the case after every four years after the world cup.

## COMMISSION

kings, NPA Pythons, Invicible Eleven (IE) and Mighty Barrolle.

On Saturday, the opening day, Uhuru Kings will face IE in the first match while Barrolle engages the NPA Pythons to climax the activities of the day.

On Sunday comes the big one when the winner of the Uhuru Kings/IE's encounter meets the winner of the second encounter to decide who clenches the trophy.

According to the organizers, a trophy will be presented to the winner and the tournament is geared at raising funds for the upkeep of the association.

### *Kabbah*

Foday Sankoh ordering his men to cease-fire to allow for peace talks to begin.

Although President Kabbah did not disclose where he had met Sankoh, but the meeting is believed to have been held aboard a Nigerian ship. On Tuesday a rebel spokesman said the BBC he had received information that their leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh, had been moved from his prison cell by ECOMOG Task Force Commander Maxwell Khobe and flown to Lungi Airport, possibly to be taken to Nigeria.

Kabbah's decision to talk with the rebels is a major reversal of his earlier stance of insisting that he would not negotiate with them inspite of repeated calls from several quarters both locally and internationally for dialogue, and it comes as rebels have made major military gains.

Almost a year after being driven out of that country's shattered capitol, combined forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and ex-Junta soldiers over-ran most parts of Freetown and seized full control of the Statehouse, the presidential residence and seat of government.

Eyewitness quoted by most international media including the BBC and Associated Press report that the rebels are presently occupying Statehouse and most of the eastern parts of the city, plus a portion of the western end.

Officials of President Kabbah's government and ECOMOG however continue to deny reports of major gains by the rebels. Information Minister Julius Spencer told the BBC yesterday that ECOMOG was effectively in control of Freetown and were simply carry on a mopping-up operation.

But independent reports indicate that ECOMOG troops and Kabbah's loyalists are concentrated in parts of the capitol. ECOMOG is said to be in firm control of Lungi Airport, 15 miles from downtown Freetown, whilst a fierce battle was ensuing for control of Wilberforce Barracks.

The rebels Wednesday marched into Freetown with virtually no resistance and burned down the Nigerian Embassy, the Police Headquarters and that of Sierra Leone's secret service.

Yesterday afternoon at least 17 civilians were killed when Nigerian jets zoomed over Freetown and dropped bombs in the Rebel-controlled section of the city; a rebel spokesman put the number of civilians killed in the ECOMOG bombing raids at "more than a thousand". A journalist reporting from downtown Freetown said the civilians had come out in large numbers in the streets and were chanting, "we want peace", "we want peace", when ECOMOG plane roar above and dropped the bombs. He described the scene as "terrifying", and said he saw several persons severely injured, including a pregnant woman.

Information Minister Julius Spencer said ECOMOG was not targeting civilians, but said if civilians were killed in the process, it was very unfortunate. He recalled that the government had earlier warned civilians to stay off the street.

Minister Spencer announced earlier Wednesday that anyone who ventured out of his home would be considered a rebel and shot on sight.

Meanwhile latest reports indicate that former President Joseph Momoh and other prominent Sierra Leoneans have been released from custody by the rebels and are currently residing at Statehouse.

The whereabouts of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah is still unclear. Sierra Leone government officials and ECOMOG have remained tight-lipped on his specific location but insist he is in Freetown. It is widely believed that Kabbah and most of his officials are seeking refuge at the ECOMOG-protected Lungi Airport portion of Freetown.

NEWSFLASH: As we went to press, RUF Commander Sam Bokare, alias "Mosquito", rejected President Kabbah's calls for an immediate cease-fire. He argued that Corporal Foday Sankoh must first be released before there can be any halt to the rebel offensive in Freetown.

# HELL ON EARTH

It was one of those breezy evenings when the sun and the rain both chose to take a holiday, and your poor CNN could not fail to take full advantage of such an ideal period for relaxation after an unusually hectic week.

That Saturday as I drew out the April 22, 1998 edition of *Awaked* from my cabinet and shook off the dust that had accumulated since I received that copy six weeks earlier without reading a line, the first thing that drew my attention was the cover photograph: the partially-hooded faces, stern looks, dark sunglasses and the pistols, automatic weapons, and knives wielded by these teenagers, were enough to tell me they were gangsters - Urban Rebels, to be exact.

So even before delving into the articles within the magazine, I focused my mind on the unconscionable tragedies, scourges and pains afflicting millions of people around the globe- the millions who were living in HELL ON EARTH. Civil wars upon civil wars (I beg your pardon, may I share with you a comment once made by a dear friend - he said "Africa offers the best opportunity for backwardness." I couldn't help but agree with that fellow, but I added that the scourges of today are circulated all over the globe. Poverty, drug abuse, prostitution and homosexuality have made our world so abhorable.

The problem of gangsterism certainly does not surpass the ones listed above, however, my interest was arisen by the fact that such acts could be going on in some "safe heaven" of our world apparently with no end in sight.

Now get a gist of how these "Urban Rebels' operate:

Little Robert was only 11 years old, yet he was found face down under a desolate bridge. There were two bullet holes in the back of his head. He had been killed, it was believed, by members of his own youth gang. Fifteen - year old Alex was headed for gang membership and perhaps toward an early grave but he saw a friend die and thought to himself "I don't want to end up like that.

## FOOTPATHS

*WITH CNN*

Violent street gangs, once associated with the widely known Lo Angeles gangs called the Bloods and the Crips have spread worldwid But wherever they are gangs are amazingly alike.

England's "Teddy Boys" shocked the world in the 1950's. The Tim of London said they used axes, knives, bicycle chains, and other weapo to "inflict terrible injuries" on innocent people. "Knife fights broke o cafes were ripped apart, and coffee bars were wrecked; people w molested, beaten up, and sometimes killed.

*Die welt* of Hamburg, Germany, reported that more recently yo people "on their way to the disco or on their way home" have been

upon by gangs wielding "baseball bats, knives, and guns". Mun *Suddeutsche Aeitung* said that skinheads in Berlin attack anyone is noticeably weaker - the homeless, the handicapped, retired wom

An *Awakel* correspondent in Spain reported that the probl teenage gangs is a recent one but is growing. ABC, a newspa Madrid, carried the headline "Skinheads - The New Nightmare Streets." A former skinhead from Spain said they would milit foreign pigs, prostitutes and homosexuals". He added: "A night violence (was) worthless."

In South Africa the *Cape Times* said that much of the violent there is "the by-product of a vicious gang culture." A book publ Cape Town says that South African gangs became "parasites poorer townships and that they "robbed and raped members of t communities and indulged in gang fights over territory, mur women.

In New York City, a rash of gang-related violence erupted Members of the Bloods and the Crips, gangs originally formed Angeles, were said to have been involved. According to the mayo York, between July and September, the police made 702 incidents directly related to streets gangs.

Wow! The plague of violence has afflicted every nook a of this world. No doubt, we are living in HELL ON EARTH.

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143 THURSDAY, AUGUST 11, 1994 $5.00

# LIBYA THREATENS TO EXPOSE TAYLOR

Libya, widely believed to be one of the strongest backers of the NPFL leader, Mr. Charles Taylor, is reportedly considering exposing the Front if it (the Front) remains intransigent to the current peace process.

Reports monitored from the Libya News Agency, JANA recently by our correspondent in Accra, Ghana, said that Libya was considering the plans to expose the NPFL because the NPFL has refused to stop prolonging the sufferings of the Libe-

cont'd on page 6

Col. Kaddafi
Libyan Leader

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THE ENQUIRER, THURSDAY, AUGUST 11,1994 Page 6

## LIBYA THREATENS

cont'd from back page

rian people.

Libya, according to the reports, during its exposure campaign, will bring forth countries that had supported the NPFL with arms and ammunition as well as arms dealers and even present supporters.

The Libyan authorities, the reports continued, are also considering the mass evacuation of Liberians to neighboring countries as a result of fightings in the Country. They said Liberia is among 43 war-ravaged countries in the world that have accumulated higher number of refugees in other countries.

JANA also reported that Libya is attaching seriousness to the plan and is warning the NPFL to desist from creating obstacles in the peace process sothat lasting peace would come to Liberia.

The Libya news agency, according to our correspondent also disclosed that Libya is seriously concerned about the current state of affairs as reported in the media and has expressed concern about the deadlock in the process which might lead to the withdrawal of the peace keepers and relief agencies.

Libya warned that if the NPFL continues to delay the peace process by putting impediments in the way "we will unveil documents, information and tape recorded messages regarding the military operations of the NPFL in Liberia..."

JANA went on to say that "a leader of a revolution is not a president, not a dictator. Power in Libya is in the hands of the people and since you are like a dictator let us talk about restoration of sanity."

Recently, the NPFL reportedly discharged 12 trucks loaded with arms and ammunition in Gbarnga, Bong County in order to rain another terror on defenseless civilians in Monrovia and other parts of

## S. LEONEAN REFUGEES

cont'd from front page

vernment (LNTG).

The strike action by the refugees caught many residents in Mamba Point unaware as it started few minutes after the curfew at 7: am.

Upon hearing the news about the refugees' strike, this paper dispatched

Leone due to the war. "We have been denied the necessary facilities as refugees and the UN has failed to provide us necessary relief assistance."

Some of the facilities the refugees were talking about include education, free medication and which


the country.

In a related development, the leader of the United Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (UNPFL), Prince Johnson, has named Libya, Burkina Faso as well as the Ivory Coast as supporters of the NPFL. Gen. Johnson,


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# Sierra Leone



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Thursday, November 26, 1996

NEWS

# UNICEF Wants Child Soldiers Disarmed First

disarmament and demobilization exercise, a large number of fighters under 18 is disarmed and demobilized," says UNICEF Representative to Liberia, Dr. Omar Abdi, "it will send a strong positive signal to the international community about the commitment of the fighters to the process."

The programmes UNICEF plans for the rehabilitation of child soldiers include reactivation of schools, vocational and skills training, family tracing and reunification, transit homes, physical rehabilitation, trauma counselling and other psychological interventions.

UNICEF's call came against the background of world leaders' pledge 1990 at the World Summit on Children to promote the survival, protection and development of children.

That principle, says experts on children's rights, means that children must be given priority in any national effort.

# Lib on A

At 8:30 friend calle about a sched about Libe Nightline.

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The new played to its out Liberians concerned ab country. Bu hardly con information anarchy that

# ...ST Challenged To Raise Men for Leadership

...political power ... that are ... spirit were ... Presbyterian ... leadership ... sermon at the ... of the Liberian ... Children of Isreal from bondage of Egypt.

"But some cowboys with their books just want to march through the people, no matter how much they ... to train men and women in humble spirit and God fearing to take away the ark so that Liberia would "hear of war no more."

Biblical authorities interprete the ark spoken about by Rev. Heib in its

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VOL. 9, NO. 118

# AFL Chief Appears In Court

today at the criminal court "A" in Monrovia.
Lt./Gen. Johnson who earlier testified in court last week, produced a cache of ammunition as well as 38

## As Fighting Rages On In Sierra

# CEASE-FIRE

## Catholic Bishop, Nuns, Mi

Despite pronouncement last week by President Taylor that he had secured a cease-fire in Sierra Leone and a subsequent confirmation by Rebel spokesman Sam Bockarie that the RUF would observe a unilateral truce as of Monday the 18, reports from Sierra Leone say fighting is still raging in that country state, clearly indicating that the ceasefire has failed to hold.

Sierra Leone's Information Minister Dr. Julius Spencer told the BBC that the RUF rebels battling ECOMOG forces are continuing their attacks on several fronts in the country, including the hills overlooking Freetown. Minister Spencer said he was not surprised because the rebels intended to lure them in a position of complacency which they would eventually take advantage of. The BBC also quoted sources as saying that the RUF rebels took over Kondu yesterday.

Minister Spencer reasoned that the rebels onslaught has lost its ferocity because, "President Taylor has decided to extricate his men from Sierra Leone". Liberia has been consistently accused by the Sierra Leonean Government and others in the international community of supporting the RUF rebels. The Government of Liberia has persistently denied these simmering allegation. It has taken a step aimed at winning the trust and confidence of its regional colleagues by sending a high powered delegation headed by Vice President Enoch Dogolea to deliver a special message. There are no reports, however, that the special message fell on fertile grounds.

Government spokespersons have termed the barrage of allegations by prominent members of the international community as a 'conspiracy' against the Government of Liberia. They have, however, fallen short of saying why should there be a conspiracy against Liberia.

The Sierra Leonean Information chief also stated that ECOMOG had flushed the RUF rebels out of the city and are now engaging them in the hills where they are still posing pockets of resistance. This has allowed the resumption of basic social services like



Pres. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah
Parliament must approve and freedom
for RUF's Foday Sankoh

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## ARMY CHIEF APPEARS IN COURT TODAY

The Criminal Court Judge William A. Metzger in his ruling, sustained the request of the prosecution to have the AFL Chief of Staff appear in court this morning.

Judge Metzger said he sustained the application of the prosecution to have Gen. Johnson in court today based on his position as a General in the Armed Forces of Liberia.

However, the Judge was quick to add that once a witness has been questioned, he remains under the jurisdiction of the court until he is discharged.

Meanwhile, there has been no development concerning the remedial notice announced by State Prosecution against Judge Metzger last week. Judge Metzger refused to comment when asked. State and defense lawyers also declined to comment as well.

The prosecution said they were taking the Judge to the Supreme Court to show that he has made an error.

The move followed a ruling by Judge Metzger who denied a request by the State prosecution to mark the cache of arms and ammunition as well as other documents to be admitted into evidence.

rtues

## AFL HONORS SEVERAL

Rowans at an honoring and confirmation program held in the sanctuary of the Charlotte Tolbert Memorial Chapel at the Barclay Training Center on United Nations Drive in Monrovia, were the Honorary Aides Camp-General to Liberia Mr. Uppit Jooty, Mrs. Jewel Howard-Taylor, Defense Minister Daniel L. Chea, Mr. Arthur B. Dennis and Mother Hannah B. Williams.

Others honored included Mother Victoria Young, Mr. Joe W. Mulbah, National Security Minister Phillip B. Kamah, Mr. William Tea, Philbert Bowen, Mr. J. Hendrick Bowen, among others.

Also, among the military honorees were Lt./Gen. Prince C. Johnson, II, Lt./Gen. Kpenkpeh Y. Konah, Col. John S. Tarwoe, Lt./Col. Davies D. Jarbo, B/Gen. Samuel G. Varney, B/Gen. Daniel M. Chea, among other top brass of the AFL.

In his sermon delivered at the occasion, AFL Deputy Chaplain General, Captain S. Weah Wilson, who dwelled on the topic:" Give Tribute to Whom Tribute is Due," noted that honor must be bestowed on people not because of their riches, pomposity, selfishness, but because of their humanity to mankind and the State.

Capt. Weah said the honorees should not see their honor as a prize but rather an honor to give them the zeal to continue serving God, mankind and the nation, and admonished them "to strive to maintain the dignity you have all built for yourselves over the years."

For the honorees, they said they accepted the honor with joy, delight and respect, and promised to continue to identify with the needs of the Liberian people as well as contribute towards the development of the nation.

Meanwhile, AFL Chief of Staff, Gen. Prince C. Johnson who spoke briefly at the occasion, warned against deceitfulness, gossip in the society and the national army, adding, "These social vices have the propensity to divide us as a people."

General Johnson also called on men and women of the AFL to be committed, take initiatives as well as make sacrifices to make the nation's army second to none in Africa.

## VONYEEGAR INTERVENES

Confirming the dubious act of the FDA, the General Manager of ELDs, Mr. Toure Abdramane said 6,000 acres of his company's 880,000 forest was later sold to LASTA by FDA without any notification to him or the company. He said when he later came to resume operation early January '99 ironically to him, he saw LASTA in his camp regrading existing road that his company had constructed. Mr. Abdramane who refused to comment further said he has reached an agreement with the management of LASTA for a meeting on the 21th of this month along with authorities of Internal Affairs Ministry to settle the dispute between LASTA & ESDL in order to resume operation.

Meanwhile, the Internal Affairs Ministry has called upon the FDA to send logging companies to them after all their requirements to be introduced to citizens in areas where they are to operate.

Minister Vonyeegar said this will minimize the constant complaints between zoes and elders who are said to be controlling the forest and loggers. He said his Ministry is only important to logging companies when they are in confrontation.

Speaking earlier, the commissioner of Number Two District Mr. Robson Y. Reeves commended Minister Edward Sackor for sending his Operations Minister who understands the language of the zoes, and elders, adding that with his presence, he believes that everything will be under control. Mr. Reeves then assured the Minister of his district's cooperation with LASTA and ELDs.

## PUL SETS UP C'TTEE

the responsibility to select journalists and others who performed very well in 1998.

Those appointed are: Cllr. David A.B. Jallah, Chairman; Mrs. Medina Wesseh, Co-Chair; Mrs. Hawa Gall-Kotchi, Secretary.

Others appointed as members of this committee are: Hon. J. Milton Teahjay, Deputy Information Minister, Colin Kao and Chinwe I. M. Okegbe, Press Counsellors at the Embassies of the Republic of China and Nigeria. Also, a seven-member program committee to organize the awards indoor program has been set up.

This committee include: Janet Johnson, Chairman; Terrence Sesay, Co-Chairman; Linford Gweh, Secretary; Zoegar Jaynes, Timothy Seaklon, Jarwinken Wiah and J. Caesar Padmore, members.

Appointments to other committees will be announced shortly.

## CEASEFIRE FAILS

retreating rebels. Their fate is yet uncertain.

Rebels spokespersons who frequently called the international press, especially the BBC and VOA did not do so yesterday. Up to press time, there was still no word from the RUF camp concerning their position on the failed cease-fire which they promised to observe for one week, only to resume fighting when their leader, Foday Sankoh is not released. President Kabbah has ruled out the possibility of granting Sankoh his absolute freedom.

## YOUTH WARNED AGAINST

schools.

For his part, the President of Logan Town Chapter, Mr. Elijah Johnson, said drug addicts are enemies to society, and pointed out that students are the future leaders of the country, and if Liberia was built on Christian principles, then the youth should do away with drugs.

During the programme, the students made recitations, selections, amongst others against drug abuse to grace the occasion.

Meanwhile, a 12-year-old student of the Victor M. Wilson Elementary School in the community, Emmanuel Teah who gave the keynote address with emphasis on the eradication of drug and substance abuse within the community, was awarded a two-year scholarship by the Executive Director of LUADA, Mr. Samuel G. Gibson, Jr.

**24 December:** Kamajor militiamen arrived in Freetown Thursday to reinforce ECOMOG troops defending the capital. *Reuters* reporter Christo Johnson put the number of Kamajors at around 2,000, while BBC correspondent Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay reported the arrival of "about 5,000 dare-devil Kamajors." According to Ojukutu-Macaulay, the militiamen have been deployed "across Freetown along the peninsula from Waterloo and right across the west, the entire Western Area." The militia reinforces an estimated 5,000 ECOMOG troops deployed around the capital, according to figures provided by the United Nations Military Observer Force (UNOMSIL). UNOMSIL chief, General Subashi Joshi, told aid workers on Wednesday that more than 1,000 additional ECOMOG troops had been flown in from Liberia to increase security. ECOMOG officials have not confirmed the reinforcements nor provided information on how many troops it has deployed within and outside of the capital.

ECOMOG reopened the main highway to the interior, closed since rebel attacks on Tuesday. An ECOMOG spokesman said vehicles can now travel without fear, as all highways leading to the provincial capitals are under air and ground military surveillance.

Hundreds of residents returned to Waterloo in trucks and busses Thursday after ECOMOG troops had cleared the area of rebel fighters. One resident told the Agence France-Presse that: "Over 40 houses were burnt down, including one of our popular nightclubs after it was heavily looted." ECOMOG troops in Waterloo staged a military parade through the town on Wednesday evening. The procession, which lasted for several hours and continued on toward Freetown, was led by ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi. Chief of Defence Staff Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe, along with other top officials, also took part.

The United States has suspended operations at its embassy in Freetown and ordered the departure of all U.S. personnel in view of the deteriorating security situation in the country. A travel advisory issued by the U.S. Department of State on Thursday warned that "travel within Sierra Leone should be considered extremely hazardous due to possible attacks by deposed military and rebel forces." The advisory said that "U.S. citizens in Sierra Leone should review their own personal security situations and are urged to depart the country."

Britain has sent to Royal Air Force planes to Sierra Leone to evacuate British citizens as AFRC/RUF forces neared Freetown. "This is a precautionary measure, because of the deteriorating security situation," a Foreign Office spokesman said on Thursday. The first of two Hercules aircraft landed at Lungi, with a second to arrive shortly, a Ministry of Defence spokeswoman said. She added that about 300 British nationals were expected to depart as soon as possible amid expectations that Lungi International Airport could close within hours. "We do not know if we will be able land another plane after these," she said. Consular staff were arranging helicopters to fly Britons from Freetown to Lungi. The Foreign Office spokesman said the first plane was due to leave Freetown shortly for Dakar, Senegal carrying about 150 persons, mostly British nationals but also with other Europeans including nine Italian priests. "This is a precautionary measure, and does not mean a lack of support for the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone," he stressed.

A United Nations spokesman spokesman said Thursday that the U.N. is evacuating about one third of its 116-members staff from Sierra Leone. He said about 40 employees, mainly civilians, were being sent to Guinea while others in outlying areas were being brought to Freetown.

Minister of Information, Communications, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer has accused senior Liberian officials of being actively involved in supporting AFRC/RUF rebels, the BBC reported on Thursday. In an interview with the BBC's Focus on Africa programme, Liberian Deputy Information Minister Milton Teahjay "categorically" denied that Liberia was involved in the fighting. "We deny categorically the presence of Liberian troops in Sierra Leone, he said. He acknowledged that individual Liberians may have entered Sierra Leone to take part in the fighting

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"but no member of the Armed Forces of Liberia, or any of the paramilitary units in Liberia, will ever, and have ever, gone into Sierra Leone to fight war for or on behalf of any of the factions. Our interest is to resolve the conflict diplomatically." Teahjay repeated Liberia's call for the Sierra Leone government to negotiate with the rebels. "I think the leaders of Sierra Leone have to begin to approach this issue with pragmatism," he said. "The issue of Foday Sankoh is an important factor that we have to address in a collective way. What that means is the man who is a part of the problem must be given an opportunity to be part of the solution. And this is what we've personally said. President Kabbah and President Taylor have been talking on this very issue. And we believe that that and many other approaches from the Liberia experience could be exploited to be utilised in the process of bringing peace to Sierra Leone." Teahjay rejected accusations that the Liberian government involved in the Sierra Leone conflict. "President Taylor has won the presidency here, he won the elections here. He has no interest in ensuring that conflict continues in Freetown, or in Sierra Leone for that matter. What does that benefit him? He does not want to be president of Freetown or Sierra Leone. He wants to be president of Liberia, and he's president of Liberia already."

Liberia sent additional troops to the Sierra Leone border Wednesday following new charges by the government that fighters from former Liberian militia groups planned to infiltrate Liberia from Sierra Leone. The measure was intended to "prevent a spill-over of escalated military operations in Sierra Leone," according to an official statement. Liberian President Charles Taylor said he had intelligence reports that elements of the disbanded ULIMO militia "have been amassing fighters to infiltrate them into Liberia." Deputy Information Minister Milton Teahjay, in a BBC interview on Thursday, called the move "normal in the conduct of of domestic policy and international policy." He said Liberia didn't want to be a party to the conflict in Sierra Leone. We don't want anybody fighting to reach Sierra Leone then coming back into Liberia and regrouping and going back in there," he said. "If there is a conflict in a neighbouring country, it is incumbent on the country nearby to make sure that their borders are not used for hit-and-run tactics on the other side of the border."

ECOMOG has confirmed the presence of white mercenaries in last week's AFRC/RUF rebel attack on Koidu. Their nationality was unknown.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie said Thursday his forces would attack Freetown "after the New Year" if the government would not agree to negotiate. "Our men are standing by to take the city. We are ready to attack at any moment," Bockarie said, speaking by satellite telephone from "somewhere in the northwestern jungle." He said his force numbered "30,000 strong seasoned fighters" across the country, some of them already in the capital. "We have a strong enough force to take ECOMOG out of Freetown," he warned. Bockarie said his fighters would launch the attack "after the holidays...after the New Year", but added "We are asking for peace. We are not coming for revenge or to kill civilians. We want to enter into dialogue." He rejected President Kabbah's demand that the rebels lay down their arms as a pre-condition to negotiations, and called on Burkina Faso President and OAU Chairman Blaise Compaore to mediate. Bockarie demanded the "immediate and unconditional" release of RUF leader Foday Sankoh, currently appealing his conviction and death sentence on treason charges, saying the rebels would give up their arms only if Sankoh made the request, on the condition that Sankoh were "free, on neutral territory, and not under duress."

Sierra Leonean refugees living in and around Monrovia complained Thursday that they had been subject to arbitrary arrest, detention, and harassment by Liberian security forces on "unjustified" charges of illegal residence since Sunday, when Liberia closed its border with Sierra Leone. A refugee spokesman at Samuka Town Refugee Camp said nine refugees, including himself, had been arrested at dawn on Monday. He said they were detained at police headquarters for two days without food or water and that their personal effects, including money and watches, were taken from them. He said many of the 5,000 refugees at the camp were frightened of police who conduct early morning visits to the camp, make threats, and appropriate their belongings. Police

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also arrested 21 Sierra Leoneans Monday in the Monrovia suburb of Fiamah, claiming they were "dissidents." A police officer said the 21 were released "after it was proven that they were refugees seeking safety in the city." He added that the raids were "part of the security operation for the Christmas season." The First Secretary at the Sierra Leone Embassy in Monrovia, James Sarwee, said the embassy was aware of the situation but could not comment publicly because the new ambassador had not yet presented his credentials to President Charles Taylor. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees acknowledged receiving complaints from the Sierra Leonean refugees, and said they had been forwarded to the Liberia Refugee, Repatriation and Resettlement Commission.

AFRC/RUF rebels came within striking distance of Freetown before being repelled by ECOMOG troops, the BBC reported on Thursday. It added that ECOMOG re-established its positions in Waterloo on Wednesday. "A number of young people were kidnapped by the rebels and several houses in Waterloo burned down in the fighting," the report said, adding that the capital remained tense. Freetown was reported calm on Thursday morning.

51 persons rescued from the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Malta on December 6 and "believed to be Sierra Leoneans" were not, according to the Honourary Consul For Sierra Leone in Malta, J. A. Dougall. "I have interviewed all the 51 survivors of the rescue at sea drama which happened on the 6th instant during the three days that followed," Dougall said in a statement. "I have circulated to the press that it was ascertained that none of these people do as of fact come from Sierra Leone. The international press were misinformed about this whole issue, and it has become frequent that illegal immigrants do pretend to be allowed in foreign countries if they claim to be coming from Sierra Leone because of the current problems facing the country."

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**29 December:** 1,000 additional Nigerian soldiers arrived in Sierra Leone on Tuesday, bringing the total strength of the ECOMOG force to over 14,000, according to an ECOMOG spokesman. "This batch of 1,000 men brings the total of Nigerian troops flown into Freetown to 3,000 since Sunday," he said. "Several thousand more men will be flown in within the week." The Agence France-Presse (AFP), quoting "reliable sources", said ECOMOG had some 9,500 troops in Sierra Leone, 7,000 of them Nigerian, prior to the arrival of additional Nigerian soldiers on Sunday. Nigeria has also brought in three warplanes, increasing the number operating in the country to at least seven. A senior Ghanaian Defence Ministry official said ECOMOG troops were now concentrating on defending Freetown. "We have sent some men and officers to help beef up what is already on the ground," he said.

ECOMOG sent 300 troops toward Lunsar Tuesday as RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie claimed his forces had captured the town. Bockarie said the rebels seized Lunsar on Tuesday after heavy fighting with ECOMOG troops. "We have captured Lunsar, and ECOMOG soldiers are now on the run," Bockarie said. He added that 60 Nigerian soldiers had been killed in the fighting. An ECOMOG official dismissed the claim "pure propaganda," adding: "There was no fighting in Lunsar today." Local journalists reporting from Port Loko said the rebels had overrun villages between Lunsar and Makeni, and reported hearing explosions and gunfire around Lunsar on Tuesday. A member of the United Nations Military Observer Force in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) said that as of mid-day Tuesday the ECOMOG unit had reported no military confrontation. A "U.N. humanitarian official" said there had been reports of "civilian movements" from Lunsar. Bockarie said his forces would continue to head toward Freetown despite calls by ECOWAS for negotiations. "The issue is not laying down arms. The issue is dialogue and getting our leader Foday Sankoh released from prison," Bockarie said. "This is our ultimatum. If a dialogue is not started we will have to invade Freetown. They have 48 hours." He repeated his call for Burkinabe President and current OAU Chairman Blaise Compaore to mediate between the rebels and President Kabbah. "We are still appealing to the OAU chairman to prevail on ECOWAS and the Tejan Kabbah government to respond positively to our demand for dialogue," Bockarie said. "But we will not stop shelling Freetown until we see the Tejan Kabbah government out."

Gambian President Yahya Jammeh has repeated his offer to mediate between the Sierra Leone government and the rebels, and has reportedly called on the U.N., the OAU, and ECOWAS to let him handle the crisis. Referring to the conflict in Guinea Bissau, Jammeh said, "I initiated and handled the negotiations in Bissau before involving the full support of the international community," adding that only a peaceful settlement of the crisis will work in Sierra Leone. Jammeh first offered to mediate during President Kabbah's four-day state visit to Banjul in early December, but he said he had heard nothing since Kabbah returned to Freetown.

The United Nations Security Council issued a statement Tuesday condemning renewed fighting and atrocities by AFRC/RUF rebels in Sierra Leone. "The members of the Council are gravely concerned about the situation in Sierra Leone. Council members condemn atrocities by rebel forces, assisted by external factors to those rebel forces," the Council said in a statement read out by its current president, Ambassador Jassim Mohammed Buallay of Bahrain. "They call upon states concerned to take immediate action to cease the interference in Sierra Leone's domestic affairs," he said in an apparent reference to Liberia. The Council called on U.N. member states to strengthen the arms embargo against AFRC/RUF rebels and against Liberia, where a U.N. arms embargo remains in effect.

The Liberian government has reacted to scathing criticism of its alleged role in aiding AFRC/RUF rebels fighting in Sierra Leone by threatening to withdraw from the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, which is charged with finding a solution to the country's civil conflict. A statement issued by the Liberian government on Tuesday said it "views with disappointment and indignation" suggestions that the Liberian government is backing rebels fighting to overthrow Sierra Leone's civilian government. It said Liberia was being destabilised by the use of Liberian

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mercenaries by a succession of Sierra Leonean regimes to increase their security. "The government of Liberia considers this situation as grave," it said, and called on President Kabbah to open a dialogue with the rebels as the only way to guarantee peace in Sierra Leone. "The Liberian government further calls on the United Nations to establish a commission of inquiry with immediate effect to establish the circumstances leading to the involvement of foreign nationals, including Liberians, in the Sierra Leone civil war," it added. The statement said the accusations had created a crisis of confidence, compromising its participation in the ECOWAS Committee of Five. "As a result of the situation, Liberia may be prepared to recluse (sic.) itself from the process until such a time when the crisis of confidence is resolved," it said.

Liberian President Charles Taylor repeated his call Tuesday for the Sierra Leone government to negotiate with the rebels rather than to try to defeat them militarily. "I call on the leadership in Sierra Leone to show real statesmanship by engaging in dialogue with the joint RUF and ousted junta rebels rather than using force," Taylor said on his private radio station. "We believe this is the only way to achieve genuine peace in Sierra Leone...We realize that if there is no peace in Sierra Leone, there is no peace in Liberia."

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) said Tuesday that escalating hostilities could jeopardise relief programmes in the provinces. "Those most likely to be affected by the lack of food are displaced persons who were living in camps and urban areas in the north and the east," Sierra Leone's WFP representative Patrick Buckley said in a statement. He said food shipments to Makeni and other areas had been halted, affecting close to 24,000 people. Food stocks in the town are now depleted. At estimated 80,000 Sierra Leoneans have been displaced by the recent upsurge in fighting. The WFP expressed particular concern about the fate of some 8,000 civilians who fled Koidu during a rebel attack two weeks ago. "We are gravely concerned about the situation of people fleeing the Kono region. We estimate that a total of 40,000 displaced persons are either hiding in the bush in the region or moving towards other towns spared by the fighting," Buckley said. "WFP and its food aid partners have sufficient food stocks for all the country in Freetown but with the increased rebel activity, trucking companies face serious security constraints to deliver our food to vulnerable people in the interior." On Monday, the WFP sent 90 metric tons of food to Bo and Kenema. As of late Tuesday, the food had not arrived.

United Nations Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo has said that the Sierra Leone government may have no choice but to negotiate with "those who have grievances" sooner rather than later. The situation on the ground is getting worse," he said. "The government has to take this seriously. It can't stand back and wait for things to get better."

A boat carrying African refugees has been rescued by a Libyan ferry boat in the Mediterranean near Malta, Honourary Sierra Leone Consul in Malta J. A. Dougall said on Tuesday. The refugees are thought to come from Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Algeria, although their identities have not yet been confirmed. "All of these are in a bad shape and are all receiving medical attention," Dougall said. Police authorities postponed interviewing of the refugees as they were suffering from exhaustion, Dougall added.

Military officials say they have detained 25 suspected rebels, along with eight Ukrainians suspected of being mercenaries. The Ukrainians are being questioned, they added. According to the Agence France-Presse, SLBS (state radio) had announced that eight Ukrainians who entered the country last week should report to the police.

**8 January:** Reuters reported Friday that "apart from the odd explosion from the rebel-held east of the city," there was no sign of fighting in the capital as night fell. During the day, the Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported, rebels intensified their attacks against pro-government positions. Minister of Information, Communication, Tourism and Culture Dr. Julius Spencer said that there had been shooting on Thursday night. "By all indications, the rebels seem to have no intention of respecting the ceasefire," he said. He added that fires had been set in Kingtom. Spencer said he believed the central power plant had been attacked, since all electricity had been cut off in the city. The AFP reported that Nigerian ECOMOG planes stepped up their attacks on the city on Friday afternoon "after a relatively calm morning." The AFP quoted a resident of western Freetown as saying that ECOMOG "only controls the extreme west of the town. The majority of the town is in rebel hands."

The United Nations Special Representative to Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo, said he was optimistic that a ceasefire declared Thursday by President Kabbah, and in a recorded message by RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh, would hold despite shelling earlier in the day. "It is not surprising to have some clashes in the early stage of a ceasefire," he said. "What is important is that there is a cease-fire." Okelo returned to Lungi briefly on Friday to evacuate remaining U.N. staffers and other aid workers, and to hold "crisis talks" with President Kabbah, ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi, and government ministers. RUF leader Col. Sam "Maskita" Bockarie dismissed the tape of Sankoh calling for a ceasefire as having been faked. He said the recording had been made by Sankoh following the Abidjan Peace Agreement in November 1996 and was sent to RUF fighters in the bush. "Sankoh did not announce a ceasefire," he said. "That is not a recent recorded cassette. Otherwise they would have played the whole cassette. It was the cassette that our leader sent to us to join the brothers for lasting peace in Freetown...What I heard from Kabbah last night made me to intensify my offensive. He is not the one to call for a cease-fire." In an interview with the BBC, Bockarie ruled out any negotiations with the civilian government. "No chances were there when Kabbah was in power," he said. "He failed to do that, he said he was not going to talk to us, we are thieves and bandits, and that he was going to kill all of us at the end of this year, and it never succeeded. That is why God has given us the upper hand to have overrun him, and now he is gone." Bockarie said a peaceful solution to the crisis hinged on Sankoh's release. "If they are ready, our leader cannot be under duress there, being humiliated, molested, and then people asking us to cease fire. We are trying to do everything possible that will secure his release." In a separate interview, Bockarie said: "There is no cease-fire. We will take the rest of the city and save our country...We do not recognize Kabbah, we will not talk to Kabbah, he is ousted." Bockarie said he had ordered an all-out offensive on pro-government positions. "Our plan started since last night," he said. "My men are on the move. We will take Lungi...that is not a secret any more. We know we can do it." He said the rebels would pin the Nigerians down until they ran out of ammunition and surrendered, as they did during fighting at the Mammy Yoko Hotel in June 1997."We will suppress them until they are out of food and ammunition and later they will surrender and we will negotiate how to repatriate them," he said. In an interview with the AFP, Bockarie said: "We are now fighting in Jui and Wilberforce (and) we are heading to Lungi. "I've ordered an offensive to start today on Lungi. Anyone who is found there is considered an enemy." He denied news reports that the rebels were forcing people from their homes, and accused ECOMOG of killing civilians during their air raids on the city. "ECOMOG has killed a lot of people. No one is talking about that," he said. Bockarie told the BBC that since the start of the offensive on Thursday night, "Tongo has fallen to us."

In a BBC Network Africa interview Friday, Bockarie said he had not listened to Sankoh's appeal for a ceasefire. "I haven't heard his voice since the time he instructed me to join up with the brothers in Freetown for lasting peace; I haven't heard him," he said. "Even if we hear that, we're not going to obey that. Because we are not too sure of his health, or whether he is the one that is even talking. Let us have access to him. Let's first speak to him, and let's see face to face, and see that he is mentally and physically fit. Then we'll see what next to be done." Bockarie demanded that a caretaker government be set up. "We are asking the OAU chairman to

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immediately step in to call on both parties to see how best we can resolve this problem now once and for all, and now we want a caretaker government, which is a broad-based government, till we can organize a fresh election which will bring in a democratically elected government that people want."

ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate said Friday that President Kabbah and RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh had met Wednesday to discuss a ceasefire, shortly before the rebels began their offensive to capture Freetown. "President Kabbah made the request for a ceasefire two hours before the rebels came into the town. He went to Foday Sankoh and proposed they stop fighting," Kouyate said from Abuja, Nigeria. "Sankoh asked President Kabbah him to let think about it for two hours and that was when the rebels entered the city." On Thursday, the BBC quoted Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning Dr. James O.C. Jonah as saying that talks between the government and the rebels had been attempted on Tuesday through a third party. Kouyate said he believed President Kabbah had accepted the need for a "change in strategy," replacing confrontation with dialogue. "There has been a change in strategy. Previously, President Kabbah believed that the rebels should go before the courts, the process of law. Now he has agreed there must be a political solution," Kouyate said. He added that ECOMOG would continue to play a peacekeeping role in Sierra Leone. "ECOMOG is in a position to play a role. ECOMOG is playing a fantastic role, a vital role. Though the financial burden is very heavy. "What we are receiving from the international community is not enough... It is a drop in the ocean," he said. Kouyate dismissed suggestions that a civilian government in Nigeria might cut back the country's commitment to peacekeeping operations. "The commitment of Nigeria to ECOWAS and ECOMOG is permanent...Even after the elections, I am sure that the government will follow the same line," he said.

Rebels holding the East End District looted food aid warehouses, stole cars, and ransacked houses and offices there on Friday, United Nations agencies reported, quoting their remaining staff in Freetown. "This might affect the ability of agencies to respond immediately to a humanitarian situation," a U.N. official said.

OAU Chairman and President of Burkina Faso Blaise Compaore on Friday condemned the rebel invasion of Freetown. The OAU "condemns these attacks, which, far from settling the problem, are only worsening the situation, at the same time putting off prospects for a lasting peace in this country," he said.

President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, the current ECOWAS chairman, has expressed concern about the situation in Freetown. He said the surge in fighting has caused the deaths of many civilians, the fleeing of a large part of the population, and huge property damages. Eyadema appealed to President Kabbah and the rebel leader to lay down their arms and begin a political dialogue with a view to finding a final solution to the conflict.

Ghana is holding consultations with other West African countries on how to restore sustainable peace and consolidate democracy in Sierra Leone, the Pan African News Agency (PANA) reported on Friday. A delegation led by Foreign Affairs Minister James Victor Gbeho left Accra for Abuja, Nigeria early Friday, while a second delegation headed by the Deputy Minister of Defence, Lt. Col. E.K.T. Donkor, left for Guinea.

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended Friday that the the mandate of the United Nations Military Observer Force in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) be extended by two month when its original six-month mandate expires on January 13. Annan said that although the future of UNOMSIL appeared much less clear than it did a few weeks ago, there was still much it could do. He said that he intended to reduce the number of military observers, who would be based at Conakry, Guinea and would return to Sierra Leone when conditions permitted. In a letter to the Security Council, Annan said that military successes would not win the rebels legitimacy or

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recognition. "I therefore call on them to open discussions with the government on any legitimate political demands and grievances they or their supporters may have," he said.

The Nigerian newspaper Post Express, quoting military sources, has reported than 38 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers were killed in the battle for Freetown. Lagos P.M. News said Thursday that 26 Nigerian soldiers killed last Sunday were secretly buried at an army cemetery in Nigeria. The newspaper also reported that some 35 seriously wounded soldiers and officers had been flown back to Nigeria and were being treated at the ECOMOG ward of the Yaba Military Hospital. "(The burials) came as Nigeria's military authorities are contemplating withdrawing Nigerian soldiers from the troubled country," P.M. News said, citing "high military sources." The Guardian (Nigeria) said Nigeria, apparently worried about the situation in Sierra Leone, is consulting with regional allies.

Commonwealth Secretary-General Chief Emeka Anyaoku told the BBC from Nigeria Friday that he had met with RUF representatives and encouraged them to abide by the ceasefire announced Thursday. "Yesterday the representatives of the rebel group came to my office, had a discussion with us, and we are now encouraging them to support this cease-fire," Anyaoku said. "And I hope the international community will come in support of that as well as in support of shoring up democracy in Sierra Leone." He did not identify the RUF representatives or provide details of the talks. Anyaoku said there was mounting evidence of Liberian support for the rebels, and said international pressure should be brought to bear on Liberia while at the same time supporting peace talks. "We (the Commonwealth) are focusing on the representations made to us by the rebel group to try and help sustain this cease-fire. At the same time we are asking the international community to rally around the democratically-elected government," he said.

Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings on Thursday appealed to nations supplying arms to AFRC/RUF weapons to stop. ""ECOMOG did not enter that place to wage war," he said. "We entered that place to put in place a lasting democratic process." He argued that continuing to supply weapons to the rebels would mean suffering for the innocent women and children of Sierra Leone. Rawlings said it "is not beyond the capability of the regional force to launch a full-scale offensive to reverse the rebel incursions within 48 hours. But its preference is dialogue rather than force." He urged the rebels to lay down their arms and to realise that dialogue "is the best approach, else a lot of things will go wrong and they will be the losers."

Over 200 Sierra Leonean refugees, along with other foreign nationals and U.N. staff, arrived at the Guinean port of Bassora on Wednesday, Liberian Star Radio reported Friday. A UNHCR spokesman said the refugees were being screened at Bonfi Stadium and will later be transferred to the Forecariah Refugee Camp. The spokesman said the UNHCR, WFP, and other aid agencies have met to discuss the situation in Freetown, and are making contingency plans to receive some 30,000 refugees in Guinea.

Kabbah's statement Thursday night (English translation from Krio): "I have been very, very busy doing what we have to do in this situation to make sure that all the security apparatus is in place. Foday [Sankoh] and myself have had straight talks — straight talks about the country. During the seven-day cease-fire period, we will work out modalities as to how Sankoh will get access to his people. If we just go on fighting and win the war, as we could surely do, after all that, we will still have to talk peace. So let us do both at the same time. Let us go back to the Abidjan Peace Accord, but let us be sincere this time. I am sorry for the inconvenience that we have all had to suffer."

Sankoh's recorded statement: "Fellow Sierra Leoneans: I, Corporal Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, am speaking to you on a matter of interest. I am always committed to peace for my beloved country. I can say I am a prisoner of peace; and President Kabbah and I met today for several hours to discuss the situation in our country. President Kabbah and I agreed that for the

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eradication of poverty in the country, there must be security, peace, and stability. So our combatants should keep to their defensive positions and cease all hostilities. We further agreed that the best way to achieve a sustainable peace is to use the Abidjan Peace Accord."

**12 January:** RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh held talks with the foreign ministers of Ivory Coast and Togo on Tuesday after being flown to Conakry, Guinea. According to the United Nations Special Representative to Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo, who attended the talks, Sankoh said he wanted his freedom and official recognition for the RUF before agreeing to a cease-fire. "He is 100 percent committed to peace...He is willing to order a cease-fire and he recognizes the legitimacy of President Kabbah," Okelo said. Foreign Ministers Amara Essy of Ivory Coast and Joseph Kokou Koffigoh of Togo said Sankoh had expressed his "willingness for peace" and for a "political, not a military solution" to the Sierra Leone crisis. The two ministers found Sankoh in "good shape, dynamic, combative, and having a clear vision of his objectives." The RUF leader, dressed in a prison uniform marked with the letter "C", did not repeat the unconditional call for a cease-fire which was attributed to him by Kabbah on Thursday. A U.N. official said the result of the talks were unclear, but that U.N. delegates attending the meeting were "optimistic." Further talks were a possibility, he said. Because of Sankoh's terms, no cease-fire was arranged and the talks were adjourned after three hours. Okelo said he and the mediators would convey Sankoh's position to President Kabbah at Lungi. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dr. Sama Banya also took part in the talks, representing the Sierra Leone government. Military sources said Sankoh remained in Conakry on Tuesday night.

RUF commander Col. Sam "Maskita" Bockarie said Tuesday he would continue the armed struggle until RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh was released. "We want our leader to be freed. We want to meet him on neutral ground," he said. "I am carrying his orders." Bockarie told the Agence France-Presse (AFP) his forces had seized missiles from the Guinean ECOMOG contingent, and would use them to attack Lungi International Airport. "We will fire the missiles," Bockarie said. "We will use them on all aircraft that land at Lungi." He claimed that fires which have destroyed parts of Freetown were not set by rebel forces, but resulted from attacks by ECOMOG Alpha fighter jets. "The jet bombed the civilians. Now they want to conceal it....All that they are saying is propaganda," Bockarie said. He dismissed ECOMOG claims to have regained control of most of the capital, saying his forces controlled most of Freetown, except for Wilberforce Barracks and Goderich Barracks to the west of the city. "If they controlled the city, they would be distributing food, but that isn't the case," Bockarie said. He told the AFP that the execution of 24 military officers for treason last October was responsible for the rebel offensive against Freetown. "Kabbah killed 24 people, one of them a woman. Some of them gave themselves up to authorities but were still killed," he said.

Reuters reported no sound of fighting overnight Monday in Freetown, although the news service said clouds of smoke were billowing over the eastern part of the city. The Associated Press, however, said artillery fire and small arms bombardments were heard Monday night and Tuesday morning. The Bishop of Makeni, George Biguzzi, said ECOMOG troops had captured the city center and were battling for the eastern suburbs. "There is a lot of fighting and you can hear it and see it from miles away. The fires lit up the sky last night and the explosions continued this morning," Biguzzi said from Lungi. Reuters said "sketchy reports from the battle zone" indicated that the ECOMOG force, believed to number about 15,000, was recapturing the city street by street Tuesday. Witnesses said the streets of the capital were littered with bodies, adding that rebels had burned houses and cars as they retreated. The Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported Tuesday, quoting an ECOMOG helicopter pilot, said that "much of Freetown lay in ruins." Fourah Bay College, Connaught Hospital, the central telephone exchange (SLET), the Government Wharf, warehouses at Kissy Dockyards, and countless homes had been set on fire, he said. The AFP reported that residents whose houses had escaped the blaze remained inside for fear of being attacked by rebels or Kamajor militiamen. One resident told Reuters that he was hijacked with his car by four Kamajor militiamen holding a rebel fighter. The Kamajors then stopped the car and summarily executed their prisoner, he said.

RUF commander Col. Sam "Maskita" Bockarie promised Tuesday to free Italian missionary priest Father Mario Guerra, but denied any knowledge of two other priests kidnapped on Sunday. Bockarie said Guerra was being held by the RUF "for his own safety," and would be turned over

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to church officials when "the security situation allows." He refused to reveal Guerra's location, saying this was to prevent pro-government forces from killing him and blaming it on the rebels. Bockarie refused to confirm or deny that his forces were behind the attack on an ECOMOG convoy on Sunday which killed one journalist and seriously wounded another. "This is war and it is a dangerous situation. It is not professionalism to go into a situation like this," Bockarie said. He suggested that the journalists secure the protection of the RUF.

The United Nations Security Council, meeting behind closed doors on Tuesday, voted unanimously to extend the mandate of the United Nations Military Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for two months, until March 13.

The European Union (EU), in a statement issued Tuesday by its German presidency, condemned AFRC/RUF rebel attempts to overthrow Sierra Leone's civilian government, and gave the EU's full backing to President Kabbah. "The European Union strongly condemns all those who have supported the rebels in Sierra Leone and expresses its grave concern at reports that arms and personnel are being supplied, in particular, from the territory of Liberia. It calls on all states to comply strictly with existing arms embargoes," the statement said. The EU said it supported diplomatic efforts and the efforts of ECOMOG to restore peace to the country.

The South African foreign ministry issued a statement on Tuesday calling for a cease-fire in the Sierra Leone conflict. The statement expressed support for the government of President Kabbah, and called the use of force by RUF rebels unacceptable. "South Africa believes that the underlying causes of the violence have to be addressed through negotiation," the statement said. "An immediate cease-fire would furthermore allow the U.N. and other international aid agencies to carry on their vital role of addressing the urgent needs of Sierra Leone's internally displaced population." The foreign ministry statement condemned the RUF for using civilians as human shields, and urged them to halt their offensive as a prerequisite to dialogue leading to national reconciliation.

Commonwealth Secretary-General Chief Emeka Anyaoku urged AFRC/RUF rebels Tuesday to cease hostilities, accept President Kabbah as the democratically-elected president of Sierra Leone, and demonstrate a willingness to negotiate in good faith. "The only way forward is for them to accept the futility of fighting...and that the international community wants democracy in every country and carve out a role for themselves under a democracy," Anyaoku said. "The rebels were in my office last Wednesday, and I made it clear to them that the Commonwealth is in support of President Tejan Kabbah's democratically-elected government." He added: "I don't believe the rebels are at the moment anymore on the offensive as the tide of the battle is now turning against them. They have been on the retreat from Freetown and the ECOMOG are on the offensive. So I don't think things are hopeful for them." He reaffirmed that the Commonwealth supported "peaceful resolution of the crisis in the country."

The British naval frigate HMS Norfolk, on its way to Sierra Leone, is due to dock in Senegal on Wednesday for refueling.

Local staff of the the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have reported that Freetown residents remain trapped in their homes without water or electricity, unable to go and search for food. "They say a humanitarian disaster is looming in the capital unless some kind of cease-fire is arranged and humanitarian supplies can be brought in," UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said in Geneva. "The situation is quite terrifying for civilians. People are holed up, and are not in a position to move out of their homes, let alone flee the capital. That may explain while so few people have moved out."

The journalists' group Article 19 has condemned the killing of Associated Press journalist Myles Tierney, and "all parties to the civil war in Sierra Leone to respect international humanitarian and

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human rights principles in relation to local and foreign journalists reporting the conflict." In a press release issued by Article 19 Acting Director Malcolm Smart, the group said, "Journalists are a prime target for repression and violence by both governments and rebels in such situations. We call on all sides in Sierra Leone to respect the efforts of journalists, in the most difficult of circumstances, to engage in their legitimate professional activities."

Liberian House Majority Leader Momolu Massaley, responding to allegations that of Liberian support for AFRC/RUF regels fighting in Sierra Leone, said his country was being used as a scapegoat. "We have repeatedly said that Liberia is not supporting rebels in that country, but they are finding a scapegoat by repeatedly accusing us of involvement," Massaley said. "The problem in Sierra Leone is the responsibility of Sierra Leoneans and not Liberians." He urged "peaceful negotiations rather than fighting as the way forward in solving the crisis."

The Ukrainian foreign ministry said Tuesday it had no official knowledge of Ukrainian nationals involved in mercenary activities in Sierra Leone, according to the Kiev UT-3 Television Network. Diplomats in Kiev know the facts that Ukrainian citizens are trying to enlist as mercenaries," the report said. A foreign ministry spokesman, Andriy Veselovskyy, who heads the political analysis and planning directorate, said that as the number of trouble spots around the world was growing, he could not rule out the possibility of Ukrainian citizens taking part in the conflicts. "If it is possible to rescue these unfortunates—or these fools, depending on the circumstances—by diplomatic means, we certainly will do so," he said.

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**13 January:** RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh spoke with his military commander, Sam "Maskita" Bockarie, on Wednesday, reportedly by satellite telephone. "They spoke for about three hours. I set up the discussion and it went beautifully," said United Nations Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo. He declined to comment on the talks or where Sankoh was when the two spoke, but U.N. officials said the RUF leader had been returned to Freetown. A U.N. official said Sankoh "urged the rebels to stop the looting and the killing, and that they should be committed to peace." Okelo held "private talks" with Sankoh in Freetown on Wednesday, according to U.N. sources. The foreign ministers of Ivory Coast and Togo, together with U.N. mediators, will continue to try to arrange a cease-fire on Thursday. "I am very hopeful we will make a breakthrough in cease-fire negotiations," Okelo said after mediators met with President Kabbah at the presidential lodge.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie, in a BBC interview Wednesday, recounted his conversation with RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh: "He spoke to me, he asked me about everybody. I told him that everybody is doing well, and that the operation is going on, and that we have been wishing to receive him and to hear from him, and he told us that we should not worry, that they're talking. The foreign ministers of Togo, Abidjan, and the ECOWAS Secretary-General, together with Mr. Francis Okelo, the U.N. representative to Sierra Leone, and that they are trying to reach an agreement [words indistinct] may be leaving from Conakry to go to Abidjan and from Abidjan, he will be taken to a neutral ground, where he will remain and instruct me to announce a unilateral cease-fire." Bockarie said he thought that Sankoh would be taken to Ivory Coast within the next 48 hours. "They are just going there to see how best they can reach real agreement for him to be taken to neutral grounds to assure us that he is not under any duress as to the instructions that he will be passing on to us," he said. Bockarie insisted that mediation of the Sierra Leone conflict should be conducted by "the OAU chair," President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso. The Sierra Leone government has ruled out Compaore as a mediator because of allegations that Burkina Faso is providing support for the rebels. "We are still standing by our word, Bockarie said. "We do not want to change our venue of this negotiation, where we have suggested, of the negotiation being held in Burkina Faso." Refusal to accept Burkinabe mediation "means it must be a trick again. They want me to be the next man to be arrested. I will not allow that. [Words indistinct] also will not allow for RUF to be destroyed," Bockarie said.

RUF spokesman Omrie Michael Golley called Wednesday for Sankoh's immediate release, and deplored the fact that the RUF leader had conducted peace negotiations dressed in prison garb. "A man who is negotiating a cease-fire should be properly attired, for goodness sake," Golley said in Abidjan. "The fundamental issue is that he is still a prisoner. We have not been able to talk to Corporal Foday Sankoh, the leader of our movement."

ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said Wednesday that his troops were in control of most of Freetown and that the greater part of the rebel forces had retreated to the hills surrounding the capital. "The operation is almost complete." He acknowledged some rebels remained in areas around Kissy, but described them as isolated pockets. Shelpidi claimed ECOMOG casualties had been "light," but refused to give numbers. He said more than 1,000 rebel fighters had been killed in the fighting. There has been no independent confirmation of these claims. On Monday, journalists based at Lungi reported heavy casualties on both sides. A U.N. security officer who accompanied U.N. Special Representative to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo to Freetown said about 200 bodies were lying around Connaught Hospital, near the city centre. Guinean Foreign Minister Lamine Camara, following talks with President Kabbah, said the city appeared quiet. "We've just been on a tour of the town. Everything is calm. We believe ECOMOG has everything under control," he said. Shelpidi said the rebels had caused "colossal" damage to parts of Freetown, but that he hoped electricity and telephone service would be restored by the weekend. Residents reported power had already been restored to parts of the western area by late Wednesday.

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ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi has blamed rebel successes on a shortage of military equipment. He said Wednesday that ECOMOG needed assistance from friendly countries, and deplored a cut in U.S. financial assistance for the ECOMOG force. "What we need is hardware, military hardware. If only we could have helicopter gunships, MI24s, then we would have ended this thing a long time ago. Right now we're relying on one single helicopter and that is slowing down operations," he said.

Shooting was heard overnight, but residents said there was no fighting in the western and central districts of Freetown, Reuters reported Wednesday, adding that the situation in the east remained unclear. Italian missionary news agency MISNA reported that fighting was continuing in the east of the capital. "Very heavy fighting is currently underway in Kissy, where artillery fire can be heard and ECOMOG is using a fighter plane," the news agency reported. Reuters quoted residents who said the rebels had killed many people and taken others hostage, including women and children. Many bodies have washed up along the shore of the western peninsula, and fisherman have reported seeing bodies at sea. Radio Democracy 98.1, which began broadcasting again Tuesday after having been off the air for several days, warned that any boats trying to leave Freetown would be sunk. The warning followed reports that prisoners, including soldiers loyal to the former junta, who were freed from Pademba Road Prison, had been trying to leave Freetown by boat.

BBC correspondent Prince Brima reported Wednesday that thousands of people had fled to Kenema following three days of fighting between Kamajors and AFRC/RUF fighters from Tongo Field, creating a humanitarian crisis in the town. Brima said the refugees had told him the Kamajor militia was in control of the town. "Definitely at the moment now the Kamajor militias are now controlling Tongo Field because the rebels had fled from the area on Monday," he said. "In fact, thousands of Kamajors were seen yesterday moving toward Tongo Field just to strengthen their position on the ground." Brima said Civil Defence Forces commanders in Kenema told him they were preparing to launch more attacks on rebels in Kailahun District. "In fact, most of the fleeing rebels are also burning houses, murdering people, just as what is happening in Freetown," he said. He reported that youths had erected checkpoints to prevent rebel infiltration into Kenema. "But one thing interesting that I saw yesterday was that three rebels were caught, that is, three rebels infiltrated into the township and were apprehended by the youths and burned alive," he said.

The commander of the 181-member British "reconnaissance and liaison team" aboard the British frigate HMS Norfolk, Brigadier David Richards, said Wednesday that his mission was to support the government of President Kabbah. "Our aim is...to see whether or not we can do something more to assist the restoration of stability in support of Mr. Kabbah and the democratically elected regime there," Richards said during a refueling stop in Dakar. "How we are going to do that is really my business." The ship was due to sail later Wednesday, heading for Conakry, Guinea.

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) has appealed to both sides to allow safe passage for urgently-needed food supplies to reach starving Freetown residents. WFP Regional Manager for Coastal West Africa, Paul Ares, said people were being forced out onto the streets either in search of food or because rebels had burned down their homes. He said there were no markets or fresh food because all roads to Freetown were blocked.

Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings, meeting with a Liberian delegation led by Vice President Enoch Dogolea on Wednesday, bluntly accused Liberia of supporting AFRC/RUF rebels fighting in Sierra Leone. "You are being accused of supporting the RUF. You have a hard task on your hands to prove that you are not playing any role in Sierra Leone. It is a stab in the back," Rawling said. He told the Liberians that ECOMOG was in Sierra Leone not to wage war, but to support a democratically-elected government. "This is exactly what we did in Liberia," he said. He also accused another West African country and a North African country of aiding the rebels, but did not name them. Rawlings said neighbouring countries had nothing to gain from involving themselves in the Sierra Leone conflict. "Are there any gains to be made in this conflict? Frankly

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speaking, there are no gains. The political and economic stability of West Africa is being jeopardised." In response, Liberian Foreign Minister Monie Captan repeated the Liberian government's assertion that Liberia was not backing Sierra Leone's rebel forces, although Liberian mercenaries were involved in the conflict. "We are not involved at the government level," Captan said.

ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate has sent a message of condolence to the family of Myles Tierney, the Associated Press journalist was was killed Sunday while covering the fighting in Freetown.

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**14 January:** RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie said Thursday the RUF had agreed to an unconditional cease-fire, beginning on Monday. "After that one week, if (RUF leader Corporal Foday) Sankoh is not released, we are going to resume our offensive," he said. Bockarie said the RUF had agreed to the cease-fire at the behest Liberian President Charles Taylor. "He only said to me that we should allow a temporary cease-fire to allow the humanitarian relief officers to be given a chance and that during that period Foday Sankoh would be released. That's why I agreed," Bockarie said. Rebel spokesman Eldred Collins added that after "lengthy discussions" with Taylor, the rebels agreed to a week-long cease-fire. Taylor, who announced the cease-fire at a press conference in Monrovia's Executive Mansion, said agreement with the rebels was reached after two days of stringent negotiations. He said that the rebels had agreed to institute their cease-fire at 6:00 p.m. on Saturday. The Liberian government wanted to secure the cease-fire to allow humanitarian agencies to reach the civilian population with relief assistance, he added. Taylor said he was encouraging other parties to the conflict to respect the cease-fire, and for negotiations to continue. Despite international accusations that Liberia supported the rebels, he said, Liberia would continue its efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Liberia was suggesting that the ECOWAS Committee of Six on Sierra Leone meet in Ivory Coast within the next seven days to discuss the release of RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh, so that he could be part of the peace process, Taylor added. Bockarie, in a BBC interview, said that while the cease-fire was originally to have started on Saturday, difficulty in communicating with his forces meant it could not be implemented before next week. "(The cease-fire) should have started on Saturday, but after I have passed on this information to them, some of our chiefs of stations or commanders told me that some men...they have dispatched men already to go on operation, so it will take time to get to withdraw them back to return to base. So, I decided to call back to the president the number he gave me this morning to call him back. I called him and informed him that: 'Oh, chief, yes, you have talked to me about a temporary cease-fire, but I asked him so that it shouldn't be on Saturday again, but on Monday or Tuesday.'" Bockarie said the fighting would continue "for a couple days" because his fighters had already left to conduct operations. "You cannot just cease fire as you want," he said. "You have to, I mean, send other men to withdraw from operations." Bockarie said the cease-fire would take effect on Monday. "We don't want to announce a cease-fire, then break it," he said.

U.N. Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo said the RUF was insisting on meeting with Sankoh this weekend, and had demanded that he be released next week. "This message has been conveyed to President Kabbah and there will be further consultations before we know if it is a genuine development," Okelo said. He added that it was unclear whether President Kabbah's government or ECOMOG would support the proposal. Sankoh has demanded his freedom and recognition of the RUF as the price for his agreeing to a cease-fire, mediators said. "We're still waiting for Kabbah's response," said a U.N. official. "What we were briefed on yesterday (by Okelo in Conakry) did not include President Kabbah's response to the cease-fire proposal. I think President Kabbah just wants some time to study the proposal, but obviously, with Sankoh there is an agreement."

The foreign minister of Ivory Coast, Amara Essy, has said that the two sides in Sierra Leone's conflict have expressed their willingness to seek a peaceful solution. "Concerning Corporal Foday Sankoh...He told us and repeated to us that, according to him, the conflict cannot be resolved through the use of force. He added that there must be absolutely a political solution and that he was determined to change the Revolutionary United Front into a political movement. President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who was elected on a program of peace, is also seeking peace for the country...That is why it is up to all of us to make efforts to reach a consensus on how to solve the crisis." Essy said ECOWAS had ruled out a military solution to the conflict. "I think that the ECOWAS has never been a war body," he said. "All that we have done so far with the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group is aimed at achieving peace." He added that although "lack of information gives the impression" of divergent opinions within ECOWAS on how to solve the Sierra Leone crisis, "actually, there is no divergent views" among ECOWAS countries. "However,

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at a certain moment there is the need to coordinate all the various views so that we can achieve the same objective," he said.

AFRC/RUF rebels have abducted Archbishop Joseph Henry Ganda, the Italian missionary news agency MISNA reported on Thursday. The 66-year old archbishop is believed to have been taken from his home on Tuesday or Wednesday. MISNA said it had been informed of Ganda's kidnapping by Bishop George Biguzzi. According to Biguzzi, Ganda was being held along with Xaverian missionary priest Father Mario Guerra, who was kidnapped in November. "Biguzzi told us that the kidnappers have maintained contact with the church and permitted a series of exchanges with Monsignor Ganda," MISNA said. A MISNA spokesman in Rome said the rebels had offered to release Ganda in return for a cease-fire. MISNA also reported that Fr. Guerra had been released for a few hours on Tuesday. He took a meal with members of his order and spoke with Biguzzi before returning to his captors.

Two Italian missionaries priests kidnapped on Sunday, Rev. Maurizio Boa and the Rev. Giuliano Pini, have been freed, according to the Italian missionary news agency, MISNA. "The two priests are safe and sound in a zone controlled by ECOMOG, the African intervention force," the news service reported. The two said ECOMOG soldiers who found them Monday had at first believed them to be European mercenaries and had beaten them. The ECOMOG soldiers had wanted to kill them, but then decided to take them to their headquarters where a Sierra Leonean priest confirmed their identity, the priests related. In a BBC interview on Wednesday, Pini described the damage he had observed in the center of Freetown. "I can see that the scene was apocalyptic," he said. "The city was deserted, many houses destroyed — completely destroyed. The town is in ruins." He said the rebels had detained the two priests at State House on Sunday and Monday. "While ECOMOG was moving up, we called their attention and a soldier took us to Wilberforce Barracks," he said. Pini said State House itself "is not damaged too much for what we saw at that moment."

Food stores in Freetown began to reopen on Thursday as residents ventured out in search of rice or "anything edible," Reuters reported. In the aftermath of a week of fighting, the Associated Press said Thursday that "raging fires and artillery explosions" had destroyed large areas in Freetown's suburbs. A Reuters correspondent reported seeing dozens of bodies while touring the city in the company of ECOMOG troops. State House was "honeycombed with bullet-holes" and was serving as a shelter for residents flocking to the city center in search of food, the Reuters report added. The Italian missionary news agency MISNA said Connaught Hospital was "overflowing with dead," posing a clear risk of epidemic.

ECOMOG has enlisted the help of Nigeria's 72nd Airborne Regiment to help fight AFRC/RUF rebel forces who have withdrawn to the hills around Freetown, according to a "senior source" in ECOMOG. "Last time we made the mistake of not going all the way, this time we're going to finish the job," the source said. He said the regiment would arrive in Freetown on Thursday afternoon.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has evacuated its last five expatriate staff from Freetown at the request of the Sierra Leone government, ICRC Michael Kleiner said on Thursday. The five, including three medical staff who were believed to be the last expatriate medical workers in the capital, were flown to Conakry on Wednesday evening aboard a chartered helicopter. "The ICRC has been asked by a member of the Sierra Leone government to leave Freetown for security reasons," Kleiner said. "The ICRC regrets this decision because it obliges its delegates to leave Freetown while the humanitarian situation remains highly preoccupying as most civilians are trapped in their homes by incessant fighting. The five were a reassuring presence for 180 civilians who had sought shelter in the ICRC compound and for the wounded at Netland Surgical Hospital in the capital," Kleiner said, adding: "The ICRC has informed the authorities of its readiness to resume its humanitarian activities in favour of the victims of the conflict as soon as it is authorised to do so." ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy

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Shelpidi said on Wednesday that he had requested the deportation of aid workers from an unnamed non-governmental organisation. ECOMOG sources said Thursday that Shelpidi was referring to the ICRC staff because they had communications equipment which could listen in on ECOMOG transmissions. Dutch battlefield surgeon Willem Boere said the staff were surprised to be ordered to leave at a time when there was such huge humanitarian need. "Chaos is enormous and wounded have not been able to get any treatment. There has been no access to food or water for the population which is getting desperate," he said. Some 200 Sierra Leonean ICRC staff remain in Freetown.

The Nigerian government has termed it "regrettable" that AFRC/RUF rebels have been receiving support from a number of countries, some of whom were members of ECOWAS and the OAU. "The actions and policies of these countries not only subvert the principles and collective decisions of these organizations but also jeopardize bilateral relations among states," the statement said. "In this regard, Nigeria's Federal Government views with grave concern the nefarious role being played by Liberia and some other countries, in and outside the sub-region, in Sierra Leone. It cannot be business as usual with countries which provide the bullets that kill and maim our sons and daughters."

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**17 January:** Fighting between ECOMOG troops and AFRC/RUF rebels continued to the east of Freetown on Wednesday. London Times journalist Sam Kiley reported that the sounds of tanks and heavy artillery could be heard from around the university area, where "rebels are believed to be using a disused quarry and caves around there for cover." The number of casualties in the city since the onset of the fighting has been conservatively estimated at 2,000, the BBC and the Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported on Sunday. The number is expected to rise on account of the number of injured, starving children, and because of the lack of medical care. Fires started by the rebels which have destroyed key installations, and reportedly even whole streets, coupled with damage from ECOMOG bombing raids, have left the city badly damaged.

ECOMOG commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said Sunday that re-establishing complete control over Freetown was a matter of "a few days," but he acknowledged that "urban warfare creates a lot of difficulties." He said bands of RUF rebels, often teenagers carrying assault rifles, and snipers on rooftops posed a threat which ECOMOG needed "better and more efficient means" to counter. He said the Nigerian Alpha fighter jets used by ECOMOG were too rapid, and said the force required helicopters, light arms, more communications equipment, and a commitment from other ECOWAS countries to contribute troops to the ECOMOG force. "We're now organising civil defence," Shelpidi added. He said the rebels, who had been prevented from getting back to the interior of the country, were now in the forested hills overlooking Freetown. "The worst thing is that the rebels change their clothes all the time," said a Nigerian major. "One minute, they're on the street in jeans and t-shirts, like you or me; the next they're in stolen ECOMOG battle dress."

Freetown was reported calm on Sunday morning, Reuters reported. Saturday night was reported generally quiet, although distant bombardments could occasionally be heard from the east. The news service described Freetown as a "disaster area," with bodies littering the streets. At Connaught Hospital, a few local doctors with almost no medicine attempted to care for the sick and wounded, while dogs and vultures disturbed bodies piled in the hospital driveway. "The hospital is in a dire situation right now. There are over 80 war wounded requiring all kinds of medical help, and we just do not have the means to assist them," said surgeon Dr Johnston Taylor. "There are bodies littered everywhere, unattended as well. We are appealing for any kind of help and assistance that we can get." Most aid agencies evacuated their personnel to Conakry following the AFRC/RUF rebel attack on Freetown. Five expatriate staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), including a Dutch battle surgeon, were expelled by ECOMOG last week without explanation. On Friday, ECOMOG ordered non-government organisations and United Nations agencies to hand over their communications equipment, further hampering humanitarian operations.

The British frigate HMS Norfolk anchored off Freetown on Sunday. The British government has said the warship will not take direct part in fighting, but might provide logistical support for the ECOMOG force and assist in humanitarian operations, according to the British Foreign Office. In March 1998 the British frigate HMS Cornwall provided humanitarian and technical assistance following the ouster of the AFRC military government. The Foreign Office said Friday that the Norfolk would not undertake an evacuation of the estimated 50 British nationals remaining in Freetown. "That particular boat is equipped to provide humanitarian assistance, they have crew who will probably help to restore some of the essential services that the people so badly need," President Kabbah said on Saturday. Brigadier David Richards, the leader of the British Reconnaissance Team, said the Norfolk was carrying three tons of medical supplies. "Our focus in the first instance is clearly on the humanitarian situation," he said. Richards added that the British "plan to support ECOMOG in any way we can to do whatever is necessary to restore stability in the country." London Times journalist Sam Kiley said Sunday that the Norfolk's immediate mission would be to airlift the medical supplies from Lungi to Connaught Hospital in Freetown. He also reported that Richards met with Chief of Defence Staff Maxwell Khobe and President Kabbah to discuss the situation in Freetown both from a humanitarian and a military point of view. "So as yet the British certainly haven't ruled out some sort of military role, although

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the Foreign Office in London of course have ruled out an actual direct combat role of the frigate that's here, which may in fact be augmented in the future," Kiley said. He pointed out that the frigate was equipped with only one Lynx helicopter, capable of lifting about half a ton of equipment, but speculated that it could possibly supply "guidance or intelligence-gathering equipment" to direct ECOMOG Alpha fighter jets. RUF political spokesman Omrie Golley said RUF commanders in the field feared the Norfolk would help ECOMOG's Alpha jet fighters locate rebel positions. "They are worried it will eavesdrop on our communications and help the Alphas pinpoint our positions," Golley said. "Britain seems to have confused objectives. They say they are looking for dialogue and yet they are playing a great part in supporting ECOMOG." On Friday, Britain flew a planeload of military vehicles to Freetown, destined for the ECOMOG force. RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie, in an interview on Sunday, accused the Norfolk of shelling rebel positions. "Their shells have landed on our soil," he said. "We will attack their embassy. It's going to be burned down." A British Defence Department spokeswoman in London called the accusation "absolute rubbish." "All that has happened is that HMS Norfolk has arrived in international waters off Sierra Leone, and has sent a reconnaissance party in a helicopter to assess the situation from the air," she said. The British Reconnaissance Team intends to remain in Freetown until early February to assess the situation in the country.

The Ivory Coast reacted Saturday to criticism by Nigerian Foreign Minister Ignatius Olisiemeka of efforts by the foreign ministers of Ivory Coast and Togo to mediate the Sierra Leone conflict. A statement issued by the Ivorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Abidjan recalled that the final communiqué issued by the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone following their extraordinary meeting on December 28 called both for reinforcement of ECOMOG and for a restoration of dialogue between the government and the rebels in Sierra Leone, as provided for by the Abidjan Accord and the Conakry Peace Plan. The ECOWAS foreign ministers called on Ivory Coast and Liberia to use their influence to establish contacts between the government and the rebels for possible further negotiations, the statement said, adding that the decision had received the support of all of Committee of Five foreign ministers. "It is worth recalling that the involvement of Ivory Coast in the settlement of the crisis in Sierra Leone is the result of an urgent request made in this regard by former Sierra Leone President Maada Bio and President Kabbah to President Henri Konan Bedie, who had made great efforts toward the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996, an accord which had received the support of the entire international community," the statement added.

Malian army spokesman Aboudlaye Coulibali said Sunday that 428 Malian troops were sentX to depart for Freetown following an assessment mission Friday by General Nimkaro Kame. "Our aim is not to fight, unless we're attacked, but to provide security for the population and facilitate negotiations between the belligerents," Coulibali said. Reuters reported that a military delegation from Mali flew to Freetown Saturday for talks with ECOMOG as to when the long-expected contingent of Malian troops might arrive.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie said Sunday that the rebels would go ahead with a seven-day cease-fire set to begin at 6:00 p.m. on Monday. "Our guns will go silent for a week. If the Nigerians do not try to do anything, they will stay silent for a week," he said. Bockarie warned, however, that any ECOMOG action — even a single flight by an ECOMOG jet — would end the cease-fire. "We will not sit down and look at them shooting at us," he said. Bockarie threatened to unleash anarchy on the capital unless RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh were released. "We have made Freetown ungovernable," he said. "We can do that until Kabbah steps down or they release Sankoh." United Nations Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo, quoted by the Agence France-Presse (AFP), said he feared "the intransigence" of President Kabbah toward the AFRC/RUF troops "could trigger, very quickly, a new wave of violence."

The Associated Press, quoting an unnamed "rebel official" in an "undisclosed location" in Sierra Leone reported Sunday that AFRC/RUF rebels will abandon their unilateral cease-fire unless President Kabbah agrees to release RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh. "We are hoping that

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there will be a significant shift on Kabbah's part," he said. "But if (there isn't), we fight and fight to the bitter end." President Kabbah, in a Reuters television interview on Saturday, refused to release Sankoh. "What the rebels are saying is 'Mr. President, we have a gun pointed at your head. Either you release our man or we are going to shoot you'", Kabbah said. "They are saying that we should ignore our constitution, we should ignore our legal system, and just obey their orders to release Sankoh. I am not going to succumb to that." RUF political spokesman Omrie Golley told Reuters Saturday that the rebels planned to go ahead with their cease-fire beginning Monday, and that Sankoh's release was not a pre-condition. The "rebel official" told the Associated Press that rebel forces remain entrenched in parts of Freetown and could regain full control of the city within ten days. He acknowledged that the rebels were hampered in their movements by ECOMOG Alpha fighter jets and artillery, but said they were able to move freely after dark. "We have the upper hand by night, and they have the upper hand by day," the official said. "Although they are better equipped, we are smarter." He claimed that the rebels controlled most of Sierra Leone, except for the cities of Bo and Kenema.

BBC correspondent Prince Brima reported Sunday that AFRC/RUF rebels clashed with Kamajor militiamen at Jomu, 12 miles from Kenema. Brima said the battle lasted for three hours "before the rebels were repelled with heavy casualties." An afternoon curfew lasting from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. was imposed on Kenema Saturday, he said, adding that the town was calm Sunday. Heavy fighting also broke out Saturday near Masingbi, on the Makeni-Kono highway, between rebel forces and the Kamajor militia, Brima reported. He said the two sides continued to battle along the highway Sunday.

United Nations Special Envoy to Sierra Leone Francis Okelo flew from Conakry to Freetown Saturday to try to revive mediation efforts, and to arrange to bring humanitarian aid to Freetown by road from Guinea. "We've been assured of the necessary escorts and security and I'm on my way back to Conakry to relay this good news to the (aid agencies) so that they can begin right away," Okelo said.

The First Secretary at Sierra Leone's embassy in Liberia, James Sawi, has described as "false and misleading" a report by the Daily Times newspaper that the Sierra Leone government had asked Liberian refugees to leave the country. The newspaper said the Liberians were being expelled because of Liberian support for AFRC/RUF rebels. Sawi acknowledged that there were serious problems between the two countries, but said this would not cause Sierra Leone to expel Liberian nationals.

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**22 January:** Archbishop Joseph Henry Ganda and five Catholic missionary priests escaped from rebel captivity on Wednesday and were picked up by ECOMOG troops on Friday. The priests were identified as Fr. Giuseppe Berton, Fr. Giovanni Ceresoli, Fr. Giuseppe Cavallin (Giuseppino del Murialdo), and Fr. Mario Guerra of the Xaverian order, and Spanish priest Fr. Luis Perez Hernandez. Six nuns of the Missionaries of Charity, and two Xaverian missionaries, Father Girolamo Pistoni and Brother Guglielmo Zambiasi, are still in rebel hands. Bishop George Biguzzi said the priests had been held along with many other prisoners, including former President Joseph Momoh, at what he described as a brewery building at Grassfield. Fearing an ECOMOG attack, the rebels decided to relocate in great haste, Biguzzi related. "There was a sudden advance of ECOMOG from outside Freetown. There was a lot of chaos and shooting. Everybody was trying to move into a safer area and eventually we were freed by ECOMOG," said Fr. Mario Guerra, who was abducted in November from the Catholic mission at Kamalo, in northern Sierra Leone. Biguzzi related that the rebels first moved the six nuns and two Xaverian missionaries, leaving Archbishop Ganda and the other priests alone. "They were able to find shelter, where they spent the first night," Biguzzi told the Missionary Service News Agency (MISNA). "The following day they cautiously continued their escape and then found shelter in another building for the second night. This morning they tried to reach the 'main road' but were intercepted by a group of rebels. Though in that same moment also a civil defence patrol arrived and the rebels decided to not confront them and escaped." The six were retrieved by ECOMOG and taken to Ferry Junction with an escort which included "an armoured tank and a truck loaded with soldiers," Biguzzi added. "Their health conditions are satisfactory, and now they are resting," he said. "They were not mistreated, though they were not able to wash for two weeks." Said Archbishop Ganda, ""We're happy to be alive but there are others still there with the rebels. We're praying for them."

Thousands of displaced persons formed long lines Friday to receive emergency food aid being distributed by church and relief groups. Rev. Moses Khanu, President of the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone, said that stores of 8,000 to 10,000 tons of food had not been looted from warehouses near the port during the rebel attack on Freetown. The stocks, which include high nutrition corn and soya blend, bulgar, and vegetable oils, are owned by the United Nations World Food Programme, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision. "We believe that we have enough for the first phase of emergency aid," Khanu said. Aid workers said the number of displaced persons sheltering at the National Stadium had decreased by half, to about 17,000. They added that many had gone to check their homes but would return to the stadium to sleep.

ECOMOG officers said Friday that Nigerian fighter jets were attacking rebel strongholds in the mountains surrounding Freetown, while Nigerian and Guinean ECOMOG units were closing in on rebels trapped on the eastern fringes of the city. "(The rebels) have been devastated and (are) running in all directions," said ECOMOG spokesman Colonel Chris Olukuoade. "We are now on phase two of the operation, which is cordon and search." RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie told the Agence France-Presse (AFP) Friday that AFRC/RUF rebels planned to launch an attack to retake the capital. "We are changing our tactic and planning a surprise attack on Freetown," he said, adding that despite their retreat the rebels "were still a strong fighting force." Bockarie denied allegations that the RUF was receiving assistance from Liberia and Burkina Faso. He claimed that the rebels had purchased or captured their arms from ECOMOG. "The Nigerians in ECOMOG are selling us arms and ammunition. They are collaborating with us," Bockarie said. He added that other weapons had been "seized from ECOMOG soldiers who were captured," adding that had captured "250 ECOMOG soldiers so far."

Kissy residents reported that "continuing atrocities by pockets of rebels," who attacked Thursday for the second night in a row, Reuters reported. World Food Programme (WFP) spokeswoman Christiane Berthiaume said Friday that ECOMOG had recorded at least 30 cases of mutilations. "The people are traumatised and in a state of shock," she said, adding that there had been summary executions and other human rights violations. Quoting witnesses, she said up to half of the houses had been burned down in the east of the city. A United Nations World Health Organisation official said retreating rebels had hacked off the limbs of civilians, including babies,

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in eastern part of the city. "The rebels have resorted to amputating arms and fingers of civilians, some as young as one-year-old babies," the official said. RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie denied that the rebels had mutilated civilians or burned houses. Instead, he blamed the atrocities on the Kamajor militia. "The Kamajors are known for using machetes. They are committing these atrocities," he said. Bockarie deplored the "incredible suffering of Sierra Leoneans in Freetown," and said the RUF had called a cease-fire for this week which was to have allowed food and emergency relief supplies to reach civilians trapped by the fighting. He warned that any future suffering would be "the responsibility of the Kabbah government and the Nigerians who have rejected a peaceful solution to the crisis." RUF spokesman Omrie Michael Golley also denied that the rebels were responsible for the atrocities. "The RUF was not responsible for the horrific recent atrocities in the east of the capital," Golley said. "ECOMOG said it had completely cleared the area of rebels on Tuesday. How is it possible then that rebels burst into people's homes on Wednesday and began cutting off their arms and legs?" In a separate interview, Golley said: "I have investigated this and spoken to our military high command, and I want to refute the idea that the RUF was behind these mutilations." Asked to comment on why survivors at Connaught Hospital had blamed their wounds on the rebels, Golley responded, "If anything happened, it must have been the civil militia going in and mutilating people they thought were rebels...There are a lot of terrible things going on. I'm not saying we've never committed atrocities, especially in the early stages of the war," he added. "In recent times, in the north and east, events will show it was not the RUF, it was the Kamajors that did the atrocities."

Following a closed-door meeting of the United Nations Security Council on Friday, Council President Ambassador Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (Brazil) read out a statement expressing grave concern about the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone, and the increasing number of refugees. Council members expressed the need for all parties to ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel, to allow them to work effectively, and to respect their impartiality and neutrality, the statement said. "Council members expressed support for the democratically-elected government of President Kabbah, and the efforts that are being made by ECOMOG," Amorim said. Council members urged the international community for "continued and sustained" support for the ECOMOG force, while indicating "their hope for an early resumption of dialogue that respect the legitimate government of President Kabbah."

The London-based human rights group Amnesty International on Friday termed "unacceptable" plans by the United Nations Security Council to reduce the number of human rights monitors attached to the United Nations Military Observer Force in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) from five to two or three. "At a time when it is more urgent than ever to monitor human rights abuses in Sierra Leone and to report them accurately and impartially, the UNOMSIL human rights section is being weakened dramatically" Amnesty International said. "Despite the difficulties posed by the security situation in Freetown, there is still much that UNOMSIL human rights officers can do." The Amnesty statement detailed human rights violations committed by both sides in the fighting. It said rebel fighters had "deliberately and arbitrarily" killed hundreds of unarmed civilians, and abducted large numbers of civilians, including children and young people. Rebels also killed eleven police officers near the Cotton Tree, in central Freetown. Amnesty said rebel forces had arrived in Freetown with lists of people to be targeted, including members of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, lawyers, and journalists. Amnesty said ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) had summarily executed "captured rebels or people they suspect of supporting rebel forces." The statement said ECOMOG troops had summarily executed 22 captives on Aberdeen Bridge on January 13, and that such executions were continuing. The CDF last week summarily executed six young men at Kingtom whom they alleged were rebels. Amnesty said indiscriminate aerial bombardments by ECOMOG had resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties. The human rights group also said eight Sierra Leonean humanitarian aid workers had been detained by ECOMOG and accused of cooperating with rebel forces. "Most of them are reported to have been beaten while detained," the statement said.

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The West African Journalists' Association (WAJA) on Friday said it was "outraged and shocked" by indiscriminate attacks and persecution of foreign and local journalists in Sierra Leone. "We condemn in no uncertain terms the abduction of journalists by the rebels, the killing of journalists, and the destruction of media houses and equipment," WAJA said in a statement. "WAJA has had occasion in the past to condemn the anti-media measures of the Tejan Kabbah regime, particularly the death sentence passed against some journalists. Whilst urging all parties in the crisis in Sierra Leone to lay down arms and bring peace to the long-suffering people of Sierra Leone, we equally appeal to them to respect the dignity and right of journalists, irrespective of their perceived political leanings, to do their work."

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**26 January:** ECOMOG bombarded suspected rebel positions overnight in the hills overlooking Kissy and in the wooded areas beyond Lumley before dawn on Tuesday. Shelling was also reported Monday night around around Calaba Town. ECOMOG officers said they were targeting "rebel infiltrators," Reuters reported. The Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported "relatively little shooting" overnight, but said tension in Freetown remained high. A military source said ECOMOG troops were "moving south, and would start bombarding adjacent hills in the next 48 hours." In conflicting reports, Reuters quoted medical staff at Connaught Hospital Tuesday as saying that the number of wounded arriving there had decreased substantially, while the AFP said wounded victims, many of them mutilated, continued to arrive at the city's five hospitals. The AFP, quoting hospital sources, reported more than 3,000 persons are known to have died during nearly three weeks of fighting between ECOMOG troops and AFRC/RUF rebel forces, with the final death toll expected to be much higher. No estimate of military casualties has been released.

The Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported Tuesday that some 60 people were killed Sunday in an attack on Waterloo. The number is based on reports by residents of 25 civilian deaths and a claim by Guinean ECOMOG sources that 35 rebels were killed during clashes in the town. Some 17 houses at Waterloo were reported to have been burned down. On Monday, ECOMOG said rebels were present at Wellington, but claimed to have surrounded the rebels on all sides. "We have blocked all known routes and are patrolling the coast," said ECOMOG spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Jimoh Okunlola, adding that rebel forces were caught between ECOMOG troops at Kissy and in Waterloo. Okunlola said the rebels' supply lines had been cut and that they were running out of ammunition. ECOMOG spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Olukulade said Tuesday that neighbourhood vigilante groups which have sprung up in Freetown have the support of ECOMOG. "We encourage that but there should be orderliness. They should be organised enough to help ECOMOG in countering the movement of suspicious characters or likely rebels in the society," he said in a radio broadcast.

RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie threatened Tuesday that the RUF would make Sierra Leone ungovernable unless the movement was given a share of power. "No government can rule. We'll make the country ungovernable," he said. "We are demanding a political role." Bockarie said ECOMOG troops would be "unable to provide security" for the Sierra Leone government. "We are negotiating the liberation of (RUF leader Corporal) Foday Sankoh, and we want a new government of inclusion," he said. "No government can succeed in this country if it doesn't include Foday Sankoh." Bockarie ridiculed ECOMOG claims to have "trapped" rebels southeast of Freetown. "Can you trap a rebel in the bush?" he asked.

The Spanish foreign ministry said Tuesday that the BBC had interviewed French journalist Patrick Saint Paul who, along with Spanish reported Javier Espinosa, was kidnapped by rebels on Monday. Saint Paul was released with a message which the rebels have demanded be read over the BBC as a condition for Espinosa's release. As reported by Madrid EFE (radio), the BBC said stressed that its broadcasts could not include communiqués from guerilla groups anywhere in the world, adding that it could not "shape its news programmes as dictated by violent groups of any kind," the interview closely paralleled the rebel statement. Saint Paul said the rebel group wanted to assure the international community that in no case would it harm the civilian population. Earlier, the Spanish foreign ministry said RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie had given assurances to Spain's ambassador to the Ivory Coast that he would order the release of Espinosa, who allegedly was being held by a "Colonel Rambo." The Spanish foreign minister confirmed that Spanish embassies in Nigeria, Senegal, and Ivory Coast, as well as the French secret service, were working to secure Espinosa's release. ECOMOG press spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Olukolade called the two journalists "irresponsible" Wednesday, adding they had put "their lives in danger to publicise people who have committed the worst atrocities." He said the journalists had ignored all the rules of caution in entering a zone believed still to be occupied by the RUF.

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Freetown experienced fuel shortages Tuesday, a day after a fire at the Kissy fuel terminal on Monday further reduced already diminished supplies. "This is what we expected to happen. There has not been any supply for weeks and oil companies have had to supply ECOMOG with lots of fuel," said an engineer close to Safecon. "We don't know when the next shipment is coming in as no insurance company will cover any tanker docking at Kissy," he added.

Some shops began to reopen in the central business district of Freetown on Monday, Reuters reported on Tuesday. Some banks and shops reopened last week in western Freetown, which largely escaped the fighting. Few cars were on the streets Tuesday afternoon due to the fuel shortage.

Telephone and electrical service, which was partially restored in some areas last week, remain disrupted in central and eastern Freetown due to the destruction of power lines and overhead cables. "It will take several weeks to get things to near normal as burnt buildings have to be knocked down to prevent any catastrophe," a construction worker was quoted as saying.

The Sierra Leone Council of Churches continued emergency food distribution of rice and flour on Tuesday, Reuters reported.

The Nigerian newspaper P.M. News reported Tuesday that the bodies of 31 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers were returned to Nigeria on Sunday for burial. "A military source revealed that the dead soldiers include a major," the newspaper reported.

Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings called for peace talks to resolve the Sierra Leone conflict, but said AFRC/RUF rebels must first stop committing atrocities. "We are prepared to sit down to talk provided they stop those acts of violence, killing and maiming of innocent civilians," he said following talks with the United Nations Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo. Rawlings said ECOWAS should review its strategy of using force. "We do not believe this is the only way to handle the situation," he told Okelo, adding that constitutional legality must be respected. "The will of the people must be made to prevail," Rawlings said. "I implore you to get to some of the sober-minded allies of the rebels to bring their influence to bear on them to see reason."

International humanitarian agencies, whose foreign staff had fled Freetown following the rebel attack on January 6, began to return to the capital on Monday. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesman Judith Kumin said security concerns had forced cancellation of an aid flight to Kenema, where the UNHCR said there are currently 50,000 displaced persons. ECOMOG reportedly wants to move these people because of their proximity to the rebels. Kumin said a Sierra Leonean employee of the Irish aid agency Concern was killed when rebels set his house on fire. The victim worked with Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone, she said.

The Japanese foreign ministry has called on AFRC/RUF rebels holding its honorary consul, Kishoie Shankerdas, who was reported to have abducted Sunday along with ten other Indian nationals. "We are deeply concerned about the report," a Foreign Ministry statement said. "We strongly demand the anti-government rebels release the honorary consul general and other civilians." Japanese foreign ministry spokesman Sadaaki Numata said Japan was working through several countries, including Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Britain, to confirm the whereabouts of the eleven. Shankerdas, who has served as honorary consul for Japan since 1986, contributed greatly to the evacuation of Japanese citizens from Sierra Leone, the statement said.

Five Italian Xaverian missionary priests departed Sierra Leone for Italy via Conakry on Tuesday. Three of the five, Father Giuseppe Berton, Father Giovanni Ceresoli, and Father Mario Guerra, escaped from RUF custody last week, along with Archbishop Joseph Henry Ganda. A fourth,

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Father Girolamo Pistoni, survived an execution attempt by RUF fighters on Friday, and was hospitalised for a bullet wound in the chest. Father Giuseppe Cavallin (Giuseppino del Murialdo) had been isolated by the fighting and hid out for some days. The flight, which also includes civilians, was organised by the Crisis Unit of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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# Annex B.2

## RUF Documents

1.024
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REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE
DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS.

Received by Intelligence Dept 16/3/98

22nd January, 1998.

From: The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)

To: 4th Battalion Commander

Subject: PROMOTION- OFFICERS/OTHER RANKS:

00007058

1. The Chief of Defence Staff, Major General Sam Bockarie is pleased to approved promotions to the under-mentioned officers and NCO's as shown against their names.

| NO. | NAME | PROMOTED TO: | ASSIGNMENT |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Lt. Nyuma Joseph | Capt. | 1st Pl. Comm. B/Coy. |
| 2. | " Simeon B. Momoh | " | 2nd " " |
| 3. | " Augustine Pyne | " | 3rd " " |
| 4. | " Sahr Bobor | " | 4th " " |
| 5. | S/Sgt Dauda A. Saffa | Lt. | 1st Pl. D/Comm " |
| 6. | " Lahai Sallia | " | 2nd " " |
| 7. | " Manjo Ansumana | " | 3rd " " |
| 8. | " Alhaji Kakay | " | 4th " " |
| 9. | " Morison P. Keiffa | 2/Lt. | B/Coy Clerk |
| 10. | Sgt Wonneh Lansana | S/Maj. | " S/Maj. |
| 11. | " Saidu Musa | Lt. | B/Coy/Ops/Comm. |
| 12. | " Vandi Momoh | Lt. | B/Coy/H.Q |
| 13. | " Hawa Tia | " | " WAC |
| 14. | " Lamin Sheku | S/Sgt. | Combatant |
| 15. | Cpl. Vandi Bockarie | Sgt. | " |
| 16. | S/Sgt Briama Samba | 2/Lt. | " |
| 17. | Sgt Alpha Mambu | S/Sgt. | " |
| 18. | S/Sgt Sheku Momoh | 2/Lt. | " |
| 19. | Sgt Abdulai A. Senesie | S/Sgt. | " |
| 20. | Sgt Fodie Umaru | S/Sgt. | " |
| 21. | " Umaru Sam | " | " |
| 22. | Cpl Moses James | Sgt. | " |
| 23. | Sgt Sengbeh Momoh | S/Sgt. | " |
| 24. | " Surba Marcullay | " | " |
| 25. | " Alfred Turren | " | " |
| 26. | " Briama Lahai | " | " |
| 27. | Cpl Francess Kamara | Sgt | 1st Pl. WAC. Comm. |
| 28. | " Christiana Peter | " | 2nd " " |
| 29. | " Nancy Umaru | " | 3rd " " |
| 30. | " Massah Mbogba | " | 4th " " |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31. | Sgt | Aruna Bassie | S/Sgt. | Combatant |
| 32. | " | Samai Briama | 2/Lt. | " |
| 33. | Cpl | Lamin Bangura | S/Sgt. | " |
| 34. | " | Alhaji Koroma | Sgt | " |
| 35. | " | Moiwo Bockarie | " | " |
| 36. | " | Musa Kallon | " | " |
| 37. | Sgt | Sumaila Samuka | 2/Lt | " |
| 38. | Cpl | Morie Sidikie | Sgt | " |
| 39. | " | Vandi Moigua | " | " |
| 40. | Sgt | Bockarie Sama | 2/Lt | " |
| 41. | Cpl | Swaray Briama | Sgt | " |
| 42. | Sgt | Ansumana Briama | 2/Lt | " |
| 43. | Cpl | Momoh Musa | Sgt | " |
| 44. | Sgt | Mustapha Momoh | 2/Lt | " |
| 45. | " | Satta Bundeh | S/Sgt | WAC |
| 46. | Cpl | Aruna Thomas | Sgt | Combatant |
| 47. | Sgt | Lawrance Kpandewah | 2/Lt | " |
| 48. | " | Nyuma Ngossah | " | " |
| 49. | Cpl | Lahai Mansaray | Sgt | " |
| 50. | Sgt | Jusu Musa | S/Sgt | " |
| 51. | " | Bobor Kallon | 2/Lt | " |
| 52. | " | Bobor Jusu | " | " |
| 53. | Capt | Lansana Wonneh | Major | " |

00607059

2. The Chief of Defence Staff, Major General Sam Bockarie congratulates every member of the 4th Battalion on their recent promotion and they would continue to give off their best loyalty, dedication and devotion in the execution of their duties as they have always done before.

Approved:

Major General Sam Bockarie
Chief of Defence Staff-RUFSL.

cc: C.D.S - RUFSL
File.

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REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

"4" Ident.

DATE : DEC. 4, 1996

FROM: Cpl. FODAY S. SANKOH,
LEADER, RUF/SL
ABIDJAN, LA COTE D'IVOIRE

TO : BROTHER MOHAMED TALIBI,
PEOPLES BUREAU OF LIBYAN ARAB PEOPLES JAMAHIRIYA
ACCRA, GHANA.

SUB: URGENT INFORMATION

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EXH. "E"

00007797

I received the USD 29,000 (twenty-nine thousand United states dollars) through Mr. Daniel Kallon for which I am very grateful to you and the other brothers back home. We have signed the Peace Accord on November 29, 1996 just so as to relieve our movement of the enormous pressure from the International Community while I will use this opportunity to transact my business in getting our fighting materials freely and easily.

I have already finished negotiations with my business partners and I have so far paid USD 300,000 (three hundred thousand United states dollars Our agreement is that they should receive USD 700,000 (seven hundred thousand United states dollars) from me in Sierra Leone upon their arrival with the materials into my controlled territory. The total cost of the material is USD 2,000,000 (two million United States dollars). The balance amount will be paid when the operation is completed.

I am therefore asking you and your brothers

to urgently provide the needed USD 700,000 (Seven hundred thousand United States dollars) so that I will be in position to live up to my commitment to my business partners who will be coming very soon with these materials. As I have always learnt from you people, there is some money with the Burkinabe Government for the provision of our needed materials. But as you might have known by now that government have really not shown any keen interest in assisting us as a movement. I even had conversation with Comandant DIENDERE these few days but with no positive result.

I would therefore suggest that you prepare a letter for me to meet President Campaore on this issue as we never received anything from them and even my delegates at Ouagadougou have returned ever since to my location here. Please advice on this issue.

When I went in last week, I was able to organize serious mining operations in precious minerals which I believe will help us to generate the needed foreign exchange for our mission. For now I am highly in need of this USD 700,000 inorder to go in and be waiting for the arrival of my business partners. Please help me in this great hour of need and I promise not to let you down. Palmer will give you the rest of my message. My best regard to you and your family.

Col. FODAY S. SANKON.

00007798

8908

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

"4" ident. DATE : DEC. 4, 1996

FROM: Cpl. FODAY S. SANKOH, 75
LEADER, RUF/SL
ABIDJAN, LA COTE D'IVOIRE

EXH. "E"

TO: BROTHER MOHAMED TALIBI,
PEOPLES' BUREAU OF LIBYAN ARAB PEOPLES JAMAHIRIYA
ACCRA, GHANA.

SUB: URGENT INFORMATION

I received the USD 29,000 (twenty-nine thousand United states dollars) through Mr. Daniel Kallon for which I am very grateful to you and the other brothers back home. We have signed the Peace Accord on November 29, 1996 just so as to relieve our movement of the enormous pressure from the International Community while I will use this opportunity to transact my business in getting our fighting materials freely and easily.

I have already finished negotiations with my business partners and I have so far paid USD 300,000 (three hundred thousand United states dollars Our agreement is that they should receive USD 700,000 (seven hundred thousand United states dollars) from me in Sierra Leone upon their arrival with the materials into my controlled territory. The total cost of the material is USD 2,000,000 (two million United states dollars). The balance amount will be paid when the operation is completed.

I am therefore asking you and your brothers

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"2" ident.

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT
OF SIERRA LEONE (RUF/SL)

DATE: JUNE 26, 1996

FROM: Cpl. FODAY S. SANKOH,
LEADER, RUF/SL.

EXH. "D"

TO: BROTHER MOHAMED JALUBI,
LIBYAN ARAB PEOPLES JAMAHIRIYYA,
ACCRA, GHANA.

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP REQUEST

I want to thank you and the other brothers back home again very much for the half million United States dollars (500,000 USD) which I received through you for the purchase of needed material to pursue the military mission.

However, I wish to let you all be informed that my business partners for these materials are here with me and we have had extensive discussions on this subject. Attached to this letter, you will find a list of materials (arms and ammunitions) and their costs for your serious and urgent attention. I now need one and a half million United States dollars (USD 1,500,000) in order to purchase twice the listed materials for effective and smooth operation.

My representative, Capt. PHILIP S. PALMER, will elaborate on this all important and urgent mission as he is expected to travel along with my business partners somewhere for these materials if and only if the above-mentioned amount is available. These materials will be given to me at discount rates and the requested amount plus the one already at hand will cover in addition all transportation costs for airlifting these materials

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The airlifting of these materials to our controlled territory will be done before any payment for this mission is done by me. This is why I am urgently appealing to you and the other brothers back home for your usual coperation in providing this time the one and a half million United states dollars (USD 500,000) to be at hand with me so that my business partners and my representative can proceed for these materials very quickly for fast and smooth operation.

Kind regards.

Sign:

Cpl. FOBAY S. SANKOH,
LEADER, RUF/SL

T.079

Bo Sub-Com Attendance List 24th Dec, 1999 8911

— Chairman & Leader of the RUFP — F. S. Sankoh

1. Daniel G. Kallon
2. Sheku Coomber
3. Dr. Williams
4. Rashid Sandy
5. Col Samba Mcarthy
6. Bakenneh.
7. C.O. Issac
8. Major Tommy Sandy
9. Col. Kamoh Kaneh (eagle)
10. Gl. Foday Massaquoi
11. Kembabu mondeh
12. Maj Mattew Jabbie
13. Maj. Collins
14. J.T. Bayo
15. Gibnell Massaquoi
16. Sheik Abu Bakarr Nabbie
17. Major Swaray (Ray)
18. Njawhen
19. Alicious Alpha
20. Francis S. Bando
21. Abdul Rahman D Kobbah
22. Francis C. Charlie
23. Mohamed musa (Gadaffie)
24. Lt. Col. M.I. Sheriff
25. Col. Tidds Tarawallie
26. Tamba Jimmy
27. Alex Kamara.
28. Sidi Kumma

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- Rashid Foday
- 22/3/69
- Student.
Pendembu-Kailahun Dist
Father - Foday Kamara (Kpeama Mariama St 5
Mother - Mariama Kamara
(Kenton a pendembu)
- He lost Dad business
Farmer
-

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Minutes of Meeting with the Leader and Senior Officers 24/12/99

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prayers: both Christian and Muslim way

The Leader: Thank all of us for our work in his absence and continued to state that he is opened to criticism. We are all to encourage ourselves to do the right thing for the feature of the party and ourselves.

I admire Mons Kallon and Issa. They never join Sam Bockarie on his plan or else the whole movement could have been destroyed. Issa also told Superman that, they should work together and give the people of SL peace. The leader reiterated that he advices all of us to take the same direction.

The Leader also said that Omrie Golley is no more Spokesman, No more legal representative and no more Ambassador at large to the RUFP. ~~Sylvia~~ He is not discommunicated yet but he has to change his attitudes. Everybody is warn to desist from Corruption.

Gen Ibrahim is not involved in Mosquito's plot Sam Bockarie over insulted Gen Ibrahim times. All the officers and Combatants wants Sam Bockarie to be sent back to Kailahun for trial. A message I will write and sent to the brother. I will like to get your own views. The leader said further that president Kabbah met at Togo and are not Conspirating and he is one of him. president said he will change all the Commanders. Mosquito should be tried for atrocities committed by ~~us~~ his bodyguards to rape the officers wife, detention of NGO's against these with ele. Those who Connived with him all going to be tried. Brigadier Mike Lamin to set up a people's court. We will ask the views of all soldiers for more promotion this was re-instated by Brigadier

The leader also warned Colonell Kabbah & ~~...~~ from disobeying orders given by Brigadier Eben he will be disciplined by Issa upon arrival for killing and damaging his comrade soldiers.

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The leader also asked Kamba to comment on the report of refugees going to Guinea

Kamba said it was the same complain I made and some of My men have returned but up till now a little and an S.B.U are yet not to be seen. Kamba raised the paramount chief of A Mixing himself with the section chief who organised group to attack my men.

The Leader further ask Kamba to still meet the Chief and ask his section chief for the men. I support you hundred percent for defending your men but at the same time you have to discipline your men. No tribalism, No sectionalism said the leader.

The Leader then read the position statements and made some other contributions such as; Man deployment of ECOMOG or UN until J.M.C and C.M.C are ~~formed~~ exercising their duties.

The welfare of the men poor. All forces in S/L besides ECOMOG and UNAMSIL are to disarm and go through the DDR program.

Appointments to the various Commissions to be done by both parties and not Kabbah's group alone. No UNAMSIL to disarm as not in the Lome agreement. Mandate of UNAMSIL change to enable it to move for the flank approach, i.e. Military and deplomatic option but only deplomatic option now i.e dialogue and be present at DDR Centres. RUF to form a committee and meet Kabbah on these issues, and only the leader coming back to San Pedro. He

Leader said all those who committed with San Pedro (Vanguards) are all to be tried. They have now been arrested by Brigadier Issa Sesay.

press conference to be held this week to explain our position as far as how the implementation of the agreement is going.

(5)

All SCA's to send their Nominal roll, formal unit Served, Military numbers for their back payments. This to be done within 72hrs said the leader.

To also re-interate on the Nominal roll of RUF and its Armament as per article (19) of the Lome agreement.

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Co. Issac ask that why Foya Musa and Dies are not to be included in the trial.

The leader responded that from 1991 upto 7th July 1999, what ever anyone have done, there is Complete Amnesty.

press Release to be made for those taking money in the name of RUFP without the Knowledge of the leader or either Confirming with the leader by Telephone Omrie Golley Suspend for Corruption. He has been doing it even in the Arab Countries Including Sylvia and Eddie Kanneh. Unless they change their attitudes.

Andra and _____ to sent their apointments as RUFP representaties with Washington and we will put it on Internet. Said the leader.

From now onwards to Jan 15th all senior officers 3-4 to look for horses so that the party will pay for them for a year.

Special letters written to various Committee heads for lodging, trasportation and feeding of their representaties with from the RUFP.

RRR - Information received that $25 million dollars sent by International Community. This falls directly under CMRRD i.e reconstruction and Development RRR to be formed immediately and not the old one. In which the RUF is not represented

Below is the list of ~~addon~~ attendance.

# Exhibit 1.081 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

1.096

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(68)

**HIS EXCELLENCY DR. CHARLES G. TAYLOR** **14TH NOV,2000**
**PRESIDENT, REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA**
**WEST AFRICA.**

**HIS EXCELLENCY:**
**THE RUF FAMILY COMMENDS YOU AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA FOR YOUR TRANSPARENT EFFORT RENDERED TO A PEACE MAKING SOLUTION IN SIERRA LEONE.**

**YOUR EXCELLENCY, BE INFORMED THAT COL.GIBRIL MASSAQUOI IS HENCEFORTH INPEACHED FROM THE EXTERNAL DELEGATION.**

**HIS EXCELLENCY SIR, GIBRIL IS REPLAECED BY COL.JONATHAN JIM KPOSOWA; AVANGUARD AND A COLLEGE GRADUATE.**

**YOUR EXCELLENCY, COL KPOSOWA HAS HELD NUMEROUS POSITIONS IN THE RUF. SUNCE THE STRUGGLE. HE SERVED AS ADJUTANT GENERAL, NOW CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATION.**

**HIS EXCELLENCY, THE ENTIRE RUF HOPES YOU CALL ON COL. KPOSOWA FOR ALL EXTERNAL DISCUSSIONS AND NOT COL.GIBRIL EFFECTIVE THE DATE ABOVE AND SHOWER YOUR EXCELLENCY'S GUIDANCE UNDER THE BLESSING OF OUR LORD, ON COL.KPOSOWA AT ALL TIMES.**

**COL.JONATHAN KPOSOWA WILL RESIDE IN MONROVIA AS USUAL WITH THE ENTIRE DELEGATION OF SEVEN.**

**MAY GOD BLESS US AND SAVE OUR SUB-REGION.**

**SIGNED** _____
**COL.JOANTHAN KPOSOWA**
**CHIEF OF ADM. RUF**

**APPROVED** _____
**BRIGAGEN.ISSA H. SESAY**
**AG. CHAIRMAN**
**RUF/P**
**DA**

UNITED REVOLUTIONARY FRONT SIERRA LEONE
FIELD COMMANDER RUF/SL

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(17)

THE NAMES OF VANGUARDS WITH APPOINTMENT IN MAKENI ARE AS FOLLOWS -

1. Gen. Issa H. Sesay - Regional Chairman
2. C.O. V. Varney
3. C.O. Allen T. Blamo
4. " Augustine Bao
5. " David Ballah
6. " David Padmore
7. " Thomas Cooper
8. " Ibrahim Dugbeh
9. " Sellieu Kallon
10. " James Seitua
11. " Alfred Brown
12. " Matthew Barbue
13. " Marlvine Keita
14. " John Peter
15. " M. B. Christopher
16. " Daniel Wolo
17. " Robertson Dowee
18. " Carew Samba

THE NAMES OF VANGUARDS WITHOUT APPOINTMENT IN MAKENI ARE AS FOLLOWS -

1. C.O. A. B. BAKARR
2. " Ben Biah
3. " Fatu Gbamo/ Wac's
4. " Agnes Manning/ "
5. " Marie Robertson "
6. " John Vincent
7. " E. M. K. Brooks
8. " Janko Mulbah
9. " Morris Massaquoi
10. " Ibrahim Jallah
11. " Ben Kerkula
12. " Isaac Galama
13. " Alimamy Kanu

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LIST OF VANGUARDS PERSONNEL Feb. 9, 2000

1. Brig. Gen. Issa H. Sesay - Regional Chairman
2. C.O. Isaac Morego
3. C.O. Sam Bockarie
4. " Dennis Mingo
5. " Morris Kallon
6. " Augustine Bao
7. " Peter Vandy
8. " Emmanuel Johnson
9. " V. Varney (Kai)
10. " Johands Robert
11. " Sam Kolleh
12. " Prince Taylor
13. " Monika Pearson
14. " Mike Lamin
15. " Matthew Kannedy
16. " Momoh Rogers
17. " John Vincent
18. " Matthew Barbue
19. " Augustine Mulbah
20. " Babby Wesseh
21. " Alfred W. Brown
22. " Ben Biah
23. " John Peter
24. " David Ballah
25. " David Padmore
26. " M. B. Christopher
27. " Ibrahim Dugbeh
28. " Thomas [illegible]
29. " James [illegible]
30. " Agnes M. [illegible]
31. " A. B. [illegible]
32. " James [illegible]
33. " Sam [illegible]
34. " Nya [illegible]
35. " Kolo [illegible]
36. " Martin [illegible]
37. " Jonathan [illegible]
38. " Sellieu [illegible]
39. " Allen T. Blamo
40. " Robertson Dowee
41. " Fatu Gbamo
42. " Musa Gbamo
43. " Eldred Collins
44. " Isaac Galama
45. " Marie Robertson
46. " Daniel Wolo
47. " Junior Dair-
48. C.O. Morrison Torkpoah
49. " H. B. Fahnbulleh
50. " Idrissa Passaway
51. " Jakai Voweh
52. " Fatu Kallon
53. " John K. Mulbah
54. " Mawulo Kollie
55. " George [illegible]aniel
56. " Morris Massaquoi
57. " Ibrahim Barry
58. " Varney Kosia
59. " Miatta Fallah
60. " Eric Dolo
61. " Mose Dobah
62. " Jonathan Kposowa
63. " Marlvine Keita
64. " Ben Kerkula
65. " Ibrahim Jallah
66. " Philip Palmer
67. " Joseph Brown
68. " E.M.K. Brooks
69. " A. J. Kanu
70. " Janjo Mulbah
71. " Richard Cooper
72. " Mulbah Toto
73. " Varney Samala
74. " Mohamed Kamara
75. " Joseph Jarteh
76. " Charle D. Flomo
77. " Oscar Flomo
78. " Robert Toe
79. " Edwin Garteh
80. " Francis Manning
81. " Jeremiah Sei
82. " Alfred Sam
83. " Benedit Nelson
84. " Carrew Samba
85. " [illegible] (Varney)

Varney Samla

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RESTRICTED

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE - RUFSL
[redacted]

DATE: 21/11/1999

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TO :- The RFC (Brigadier I. M. Sesay.

FROM:- The Over All Intelligent Officer Commander and B lack Guard Adjutant.

SUB :- REPORT

Upon hearing the confirm report that the Strike Force Commander Brigadier Goodial entered Freetown with his troops, Colonel Bosten Fleme(Alias Verndamo) was instructed to meet with him with his troops date 05 Jan 1999. We launched a serious attack on Magiaka around 5:55 in the morning, the enemies were not able to with stand or confront us.

LOGISTICS CAPTURED:

1. One (1) American GMG.
2. Some light authomatic Rifles.
3. Some assort GMG rounds.

CASUALTY:- Two (2) wounded in action (WIA), with that zeal we advanced to RUF but no enemy confronted us, straight away we headed for Waterloo, with confidence that Waterloo may be out of enemy control, unfurtunately we got in the mist of Guinean troops we fight for the whole day unto the night.

LOGISTICS CAPTURED RUF:

1. Six (6) Rockets RPG Bombs with 6 TNT'S.
2. One (1) Box of Mortar Bombs.

Date:- 06 Jan, 1999. In the noon whilst resting at Waterloo displaced and Refugees Camp, the deployed soldiers sent some civilians to us from the Guineans saying that they want to go to Guinea.

Date:- 07 Jan, 1999. 0300 hrs we launched attack on their position at Peninsular Secondary School Waterloo. This act gathered them from their deployment zone to the said Secondary School. In the afternoon the enemies communicated with us through letter that they does'nt want to figth any longer with us, Colonel Bosten Fomo replyed this letter to thier high commands.

Date:- 08 Jan, 1999. 1300 hrs we attacked them again. In the noon 1500 hrs heavy and thick enemy convoy left from Port Loko bombading whilst the Alpha Jet was flying over as special escort 1545 hrs the convoy including the deployed enemies that were at Waterloo evaquated Waterloo back towards Port Loko Axis, We embarrassed them and with the panic in them because we tried them every where they left behind some logistics; 120mm Mortar Gun, 40 Barrel Missile with some assorted rounds of AK rounds, G3, GMG, Balibre, Bombs indeed the capturing of surrendered soldiers is eminent also at Waterloo and more Benguina, we do capture materials almost everyday Casualty on the operation overall operation at Waterloo 2 Killing in action (KIA) and around 15 Wounded in action (WIA).

Date:- 09 Jan, 1999. We deployed at Hastings, we discovered enemies at Jui and Kosso town earlier on thier number was not much, from this said date onto now, we everyday attack the guys, but the Air Raid is desperate on and we attaked Jui and Kosso town, however the Helicopter which landed every day at the point had re-inforced the enemies with both armament and manpower.

CASUALTY ON JUI OPERATION:-

1. One Killing in action (KIA)

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Date:- 15 Jan, 1999. It was agreed that the men in Freetown and the men at our point were to do joint operation on Jui and Kosso town. The Freetown men schedule to attack Jui and we to attack Kosso town, that night we attacked Kosso town clear the enemies but the Freetown men never turn up, therefore the enemies with the support of the Alpha Jet drove us from Kosso town .

Date:- 18 Jan, 1999. The Guinean troops from Port Loko entered vehemently at Waterloo with sporadic shelling and firing. Infact Two (2) Alpha Jets escorted the troops consisting of five (5) War Tanks, Two (2) Armourd Car, One (1) 40 Barrel Missile and serries of AA one Barrel and Twin Barrels. they occupied Waterloo from that evening onto the morning around 0300 hrs.

PROBLEMS:- For the main while the only problems thier at the front line are;-

(1) We have not yet connected physically with our brothers in Freetown.
(2) Menpower indeed to be engaged on this Urban Warfare.
(3) The stratigic positions of the enemies mainly Port Loko, Lungi, Jui, Kabala are delaying our progress.

These problems are to be looked into kindly and to find fast solution.

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SUGGESTION:-

We suggested that as we are on Urban gaurrile Warfare, that we use mainly artilary weapons.

That we speedily recruits abled and gallant men as population matters.

All Units to be active especially at the frontline especially Units like IDU, G5, G4, and S4.

That Tombo Road should be engaged wile fighting force-enemies are at Tombo.

That monitary group should be formed, should assess and bring in situation report from at the Flanks Waterloo, Port Loko, Mile 91, and Kabala.

That the commanders should give chance to we the securities to be reached to you with processed situation report.

All Front lines to be re-inforce with correct combat medics.

RECOMMENDATION;-

Anyway the morale of the soldiers especially to the point I have visited is high. Brave to Colonel Boston Flomo, Major Barkar, Lieut.ColVister, Lieut.Col Amara Sallia (Alias Peleto) and all Black Guards. Only the regards for one another is lagging but I pray that we will put this together fastly I beg sir, that you look into my problems and you rectify it with General Sam Bockarie ie; the conflicting position between Ben Kenneh and me.

Best regards. 21-01-99

Signed:_____
Lieut Raymond Kartewu
Black Guard Adjutant.

Approved: 21-01-99
Major Christ A. Mannah
Overall I.O. Commander.

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**RESTRICTED**

**REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE**

**RUF/SL**

00025503

To : Major General Sam Bockarie
Chief of Defence Staff - RUF/SL

From: Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battle Field Commander - RUF/SL

Subj: COMPREHENSIVE REPORT

Date: January..24... 1999.

Remarks:

Sir,

On the 6th December 1998, I left the Defence Headquarters on your instruction for assignment and mission to attack Koidu, the second (2nd) Brigade, RUF/SL axis.

The below enumerated materials and items were then handed over to me for said mission.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | AK Rounds | - | Thirty (30) boxes |
| 2. | G3 Rounds | - | Sixteen (16) boxes |
| 3. | RPG Bombs | - | Two and half (2½) boxes |
| 4. | Drugs | - | One medium and one small carteons |
| 5. | Diesel | - | One (01) drum |
| 6. | Petrol | - | Two (02) five-gallons tins |
| 7. | Mortar Gun | - | One (01) |
| 8. | Bazuga | - | One full set with a rocket and TNT |
| 9. | Fifty calibre rounds | - | Twenty-five (25) belt-feds |
| 10. | Chasers | - | Two (02) magazines with five (05) fuses |
| 11. | GPMG Rounds | - | Twenty boxes but after checking at Senguma, two (02) of the boxes were discovered to be BIT rounds |
| 12. | BMG Rounds (British Calibre) | - | One (01) |
| 13. | Rice | - | Seventeen (17) Bags |
| 14. | Salt | - | Nineteen (19) Bags with twenty (20) packets in each bag |
| 15. | Big Battery | - | Two (02) Carteons |
| 16. | Rensen Cigarette | - | Three (03) Carteons |

§§.....2/.....

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 17. | 555 Cigarette | Thirty (30) Grosses |
| 18. | Maggi Maggi | Four (04) big cartoons |
| 19. | Cane Juice | Six (06) Five-gallons rubbber |
| 20. | Acid | Two (02) Gallons |
| 21. | Stationery | Two (02) Cartoons |
| 22. | Engine Oil | Seven (07) Gallons |

The below listed materials and items were also given to me for Sengema target:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | AK Rounds | Two (02) Boxes |
| 2. | G3 Rounds | One (01) Box |
| 3. | Maggi Maggi | Six (06) Packets |
| 4. | Rensen Cigarette | Five (05) Grosses |
| 5. | Salt | One (01) Bag |
| 6. | RPG Bombs | Half (½) Box |
| 7. | GPMG Rounds | Two (02) Boxes but after opening, they were discovered to be BET Rounds |

Members of delegation included myself as head and:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2. | Colonel | Morison Kallon | B.F.I. | RUF/SL |
| 3. | Lt-col. | Foday Lansana | | |
| 4. | Major | Edward Pemboh | | |
| 5. | Major | Samuel P. Jabba | Adjutant | |
| 6. | Major | Victor Kamara | Security Commander to me | |
| 7. | S/Captain | Mohamed Kamara | | |
| 8. | Captain | Morie Jibao | | |
| 9. | Captain | Abdulai Massalay | | |
| 10. | Captain | Musa Vandi including other soldiers and NCOs. | | |

December 7th, 1998, we made a cross to Sengema, materials and items were handed over to the Commander in charge. We then arrived at Wuwama where we spent the night.

December 9th, 1998, we arrived safely at Guinea Highway, second (2nd) Brigade Headquarters. We were hundred percent welcomed by the Commander, Colonel Boston Flomo (Alias Rambo) including his advicer, Lt-col. Peter B. Vandi and others. Materials and items as mentioned above were turned over to the Commander.

December 11th, 1998, the Commander then called a general forum at his Headquarters. Battalion and Unit Commanders were then invited

to this forum. At 11 am, the forum commenced and mostly centralised on the mission given to me by you to attack and capture Koidu including Yengema and the Air Field for quick transportation of our materials by air.

The Brigade Commander, Colonel Boston Flemo thanked us for said mission and promised to co-operate on the mission together with his men.

During the Forum, Colonel Kailondo S. Banya, third (3rd) Battalion Commander was appointed the mission Commander. Details of the forum is attached to this document.

December 16th, 1998, the mission was carried out as re-scheduled by me. It was carried out successfully and there was understanding among the Officers and other ranks. On the 17th December 1998, the town was under complete control. After the mission when Koidu was under complete control, the below listed items and materials were captured.

1. KOIDU TOWN

a) Five (05) Fifty Calibres but incomplete
b) One (01) full set of S.P.G.
c) Three (03) full sets of 81 mm gun
d) Two (02) spare stands
e) Two (02) spare stands of mortar guns
f) One (01) full set of grenade launcher
g) One (01) 82mm Mortar gun without stand
h) One (01) incomplete set of American AA
i) One (01) set flame thrower with fifteen (15) rockets without TNTs
j) Thirty-nine (39) 120mm Mortar bombs in boxes
k) One (01) RPG tube with two (02) rockets without TNTs
l) Seventy-three (73) boxes of American AA Rounds
m) Sixteen (16) boxes of 81mm Mortar bombs
n) Thirty-one (31) rockets, commands Mortar bombs with fuses
o) Three (03) boxes of S.P.G. bombs and five (05) bombs without fuses
p) One )01) sardine tin of GPMG Rounds
q) One (01) Box of Chinese Calibre Rounds
r) One (01) Box of Hand grenade
s) Three (03) Armoured Banks

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t) Different types of Drugs
u) Eleven (11) drums of Diesel
v) Two and half (2½) drums of Petrol
w) One (01) box of Twin Barrel Rounds
x) Several missiles were burnt

2. KIMBERLITE - DECEMBER 17TH 1998

a) Thirty-four (34) incomplete 60mm Mortar Bombs
b) Eight (08) Boxes and one (01) tin of GPMG Rounds
c) Thirty-one (31) Boxes of 82mm Mortar Bombs
d) One (01) RPG Bomb without TNT
e) One and half(1½) Magazines of grenade launcher bombs

Sewafe was also captured by the ambush team and same team advanced to attack Gold town on the highway leading to Makeni. The below listed materials were captured in this mission:

a) One hundred and twenty (120) RPG Bombs
b) Seven (07) RPG Tubes
c) Two (02) Boxes of G3 Rounds
d) Five (05) Boxes of AK Rounds
e) Two (02) 60mm Mortar Guns
f) Two (02) 81mm Mortar Guns
g) Two (02) 82mm Mortar Guns
h) Two (02) AA Guns
i) Ten (10) Boxes of AA Rounds
j) Two (02) American GPMGs
k) Twenty-five (25) Boxes of 81mm Mortar Bombs

December 22nd, 1998, Masingbe was attacked and captured after the second (2nd) Brigade Commander, Colonel Boston Flomo advanced with the troops. The below were captured:

a) Five (05) Boxes of 60mm Mortar Bombs
b) Seven (07) Boxes of Twin-Barrel Rounds
c) Two and half (2½) Boxes of Chinese Rounds
d) Two (02) American GPMG Guns
e) Twelve (12) RPG Rockets and eleven (11) TNTs
f) One (01) Box of 120mm Mortar Bombs
g) One (01) incomplete Chinese 50 Calibre

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h) One (01) incomplete 60mm Mortar Gun

The following day on the 23rd December 1998, Magburaka was captured. Not much was captured however in this town as its Military strength was not much. On the 24th of December 1998, Makeni was captured.

Sir, Some of these materials were used for operation i.e. defensive etc. and as events unfolded, our troops were able to capture some Nigerians (Soldiers). To my knowledge, some Kamajors are surrendering too.

Faithfully submitted for your necessary attention Sir.

24/1/99.

APPROVED: _____ ; SIGNED: _____ ;

Battle Field Commander
RUF/SL

Adjutant
RFCAS Office

1.100

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REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT PARTY OF SIERRA LEONE(RUFP/SL).

3rd BRIGADE 1st BATTALLION-NORTHERN REGION.

00025536

TO :- THE BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER - RUFP/SL

FROM :- LT. COL. AUGUSTINE VANDI(DUBL)

DEPUTY 3rd BRIGADE BLACK GUARD COMMANDER ASSIGNED TO THE MINING UNIT.

SUBJ :- SITUATION REPORT/MINUTES ON A MEETING HELD AT SERRIA MINING VILLAGE:

DATE :- 10/02/2001.

TEXT :-

SIR,

WE HELD A MEETING AT SERRIA VILLAGE IN THE SANDA LOKO CHIEFDOM ON THE 6th FEBRUARY,2001 TUESDAY AT 10:00.A.M. THIS MINUTES/SITUATION REPORT WAS PRESENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGENDA OF THE MEETING.

AGENDA:

(1).PRAYERS
(2). INTRODUCTION OF PROMINENT MEMBERS WORKING IN THE MINING COMMITTEE
(3). INTRODUCTION OF GROUND SOLDIERS AND IN-COMING SOLDIERS
(4). PURPOSE OF THE MEETING
(5). PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE PEOPLE(LAND OWNERS,COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND THE MINERS)
(6). A . O . B .
(7). VOTE OF THANKS
(8). CLOSING PRAYERS

THE MEETING STARTED IN MUSLIM PRAYERS BY SHEIK ABDUL AND CHRISTIAN PRAYERS BY MR. THOMAS SESAY.

THE PUBLIC RELATION OFFICER(PRO) FOR THE MINING MR. LANSANA KAMARA INTRODUCED THE MINING WORKING COMMITTEE THUS:

(1). PA. ALIMAMY SORIE KAMARA SECTION CHIEF
(2). MR. M.S. KAMARA CHIEF ADVISER
(3). MR. LAMRANA BANGURA COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
(4). MR. THOMAS SESAY DEPUTY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
(5). MR. LANSANA KAMARA P.R.C.
(6). MR. ALIMAMY KAMARA TOWN CHIEF
(7). MR. LAMIN SESAY SECRTTARY GENERAL
(8). MR. DAUDA TURAY ELDER BROTHER TO THE PARAMOUNT CHIEF
(9). PA. MANSARAY CHIEF FOR ALL STRANGERS
(10). PA. KAMARA ELDER BROTHER TO THE LAND OWNERS
(11). SHEIK ABDUL CHIEF IMAM
(12). SHEIK MULKUL DEPUTY CHIEF IMAM
AND TO NAME BUT A FEW FOR TIME FACTOR.

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE GROUND SOLDIERS WAS DONE BY CAPTAIN MINKAILU BANGURA (ADJUTANT) TO COL. KONDOWA. THUS:

(1). LT. COL. KONDOWA - FORMER MINING COMMANDER
(2). S/CAPT. NYARA - SECOND IN COMMAND TO ### LT.COL. KONDOWA

THE INTRODUCTION OF IN-COMING SOLDIERS WAS DONE BY CAPTAIN TURAY AS FOLLOWS:

(1). LT.COL. LAMIN KAMARA - O/ALL 3rd BRIGADE MINING COMMANDER

(2). LT.COL. AUGUSTINE VANDI - DEPUTY 3rd BRIGADE BLACK GUARD COMMANDER ASSIGNED IN THE MINING.

(3). MAJOR ASSULT - GROUND COMMANDER

00025537

(4). S/CAPT. ABDUL KAMARA - O/ALL MINING ADJUTANT

(5). S/CAPT. SORIE BANGURA - MILITARY POLICE COMMANDER ASSIGNED IN THE MINING

(6). S/CAPT. FRANCIS - TASK FORCE COMMANDER ASSIGNED IN THE MINING

(7). INCLUDING ORDER RANKS ETC.

THE [illegible] WAS FINALLY HIT ON THE HEAD BY BRIEFING THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING DONE BY LT.COL. AUGUSTINE VANDI AS BELOW:

THE FIRST, MOST IMPORTANT WAS THE CHANGE THAT HAD OCCURED IN THE MINING MANAGEMENT. HE MADE A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF NEWLY SENT PERSONNELS TO THE MINING UNIT AS FOLLOWS: THE O/ALL MINING COMMANDER - LT.COL. LAMIN KAMARA, MAJOR ASSULT AS GROUND COMMANDER TO NAME BUT A FEW FOR TIME SAKE.

HE FURTHER HIGHLIGHT TO THEM ABOUT THE NEW PROCEDURE IN RELATION TO THE MINING THUS:

ALL GRAVELS ARE NOW TWO PILE SYSTEM i.e. ONE FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND [illegible] FOR THE MINERS.

ALL GOVERNMENT DAIMONDS MUST TO BE REPORTED DIRECTLY TO THE DEFENCE HEAD QUARTERS(D.H.Q) NOT TO ANY BATTALLION COMMANDER NOR NEITHER THE BRIGADE COMMANDER. HE PROMISED THE PEOPLE THAT PEACE CONDITIONS AND COMING [illegible] WITH THE HIGH COMMANDS.

HE THANKED THE PEOPLE FOR THEIR PREVIOUS EFFORTS IN UP-GRADING THE MINING IN THEIR AREA WITH CASH, SACRIFIES IN THE FORM OF MONEY, ANIMALS, FOOD STUFF, THEIR ENERGY ETC. HE TOLD THE PEOPLE THAT, THEIR PRESENCE WAS TO UNITE WITH THE PEOPLE, SECURE THEM, CONSULT AND COORDINATE AMONG ONE ANOTHER FOR BETTER DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR LAND AND THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE. HE SAID, IF THE PEOPLE COULD WORK HARD AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE MOVEMENT, HE PROMISED THEM THAT, HE WILL COMMEND AND TELL THE HIGH COMMANDS ABOUT YOUR POSITIVE EFFORTS IN SUPPORTING THE REVOLUTION.

HE SHOWED THE PEOPLE THE MINING IMPLEMENTS SENT BY THE BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER.BRIGADIER MORRIS KALLON TO ENHANCED THE MINING ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA. THEY ARE: TWELVE(12) SHOVELS AND ONE(1) ROLL SKINNER NET(WIRE). HE PROMISED TO SEND IN MORE AS TIME AND YOUR CO-OPERATION PROVES.TO THEM.

LT.COL. VANDI ASKED THE PEOPLE IF THEY HAVE ANY PROBLEM(S) AFFECTING THEM AND THE MINING ACTIVITIES ?

THE P.R.O. MR. LANSANA KAMARA BRIEFLY EMPLAINED THAT FEEDING FOR MINING SOLDIERS WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM TO THEM. BECAUSE MOST OF THESE PEOPLERS DEPEND SOLELY TO MINING AND LESS TO AGRICULTURE(FARMING) SINCE ALL THEIR SWAMPS HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN MINING WITH NO OR LITTLE LAND FOR FARMING.

THE P.R.O. ENPHASIS THE STRAINS OF THE PEOPLE TO THE SOURCE OF GETTING

1.101

8929

223

Revolutionary United Front
of Sierra Leone.
2nd Brigade Headquarters.
Kono District.
Date: 12th Dec---1998.

00025706

To :- The 2nd Brigade Commander.

From :- The 2nd Brigade G-4 Commander.

Sub :- REPORT OF MATERIALS ISSUED OUT:

REMARKS:-

The below listed issued yesterday pmm instructions from the 2nd Brigade Commander.

Materials recieved by the BFI - Colonel Morison Kallon for the mission are as follows:-

1) Four (4) Boxes of AK Rounds.
2) Two (2) Boxes of G-3 Rounds.
3) Four (4) Boxes of GMG Rounds.
4) Two (2) RPG Rockets and Two (2) TNT"s.

MATERIALS RECIEVED BY MAJOR IBRAHIM DUGBAH as follows:-

1) Three(3) Boxes of AK Rounds.
2) One (1) Box of G-3 Rounds.
3) Two (2) GMG Rounds.
4) Two (2) RPG Rockets, Two (2) TNT"s.

MATERIALS RECIEVED BY THE BATTALION COMMANDER-LT-COL KS BANYA

1) Ten (10) Packets of AK Rounds.
2) Five (5) Packets of G-3 Rounds.

Best regards.

Signed:---[signature] 12-98

2nd Brigade G-4 Commander
Major Mohamed Christopha

Approved:---[signature]

2nd Brigade Commander
Colonel Boston Flomo.

8930

00025707

To :- The 2nd Brigade Commander.

From :- The 2nd Brigade G-4 Commander.

Subj :- RETURN OF MATERIALS ISSUED OUT:

REMARKS:-

The below listed items were returned yesterday per instruction from the 2nd Brigade Commander.

Materials received by the BPI - Colonel Morrison Kellon for the mission are as follows:-

1) Four (4) Boxes of AK Rounds.
2) Two (2) Boxes of G-3 Rounds.
3) Four (4) Boxes of CAL Rounds.
4) Two (2) RPG Rockets and Two (2) "MT"s.

MATERIALS RECEIVED BY MAJOR EMMANUEL PUGMAN as follows:-

1) Three(3) Boxes of AK Rounds.
2) One (1) Box of G-3 Rounds.
3) Two (2) CAL Rounds.
4) Two (2) RPG Rockets, Two (2) TM"s.

MATERIALS RECEIVED BY THE ARTILLERY CO. RANDOM-RI-O.B KS R...

1) Ten (10) Boxes of AK Rounds.
2) Five (5) Boxes of G-3 Rounds.

Best regards.

Signed:----------
2nd Brigade G-4 Commander
Major Jhamed Ohiritoba

Approved:----------
2nd Brigade Do ...der
Colonel Boston Kom...

1.105
8931

(78)

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE - RUF/SL
2ND BDE [illegible]
THE OFFICE OF THE Q.4 UNIT

TO :- The 2nd Brigade Adjutant.
FROM :- The 2nd Brigade Q.4 Commander.
SUBJECT:- REPORT
DATE :- 22nd January, 1999.

00026072

REMARKS:-

The Materials we transported to KONO (Koidu) on the 15th January, 1999 reached safely at KONO (Koidu) on the 16th January, 1999. the materials are listed below :-

1. 94 Boxes of American A.A. Rounds.
2. One Box of 60mm Mortar Bombs.
3. Two Boxes of 120mm Mortar Bombs.
4. One Box of 81mm Mortar Bombs.
5. One 81mm Mortar Stand.
6. Four Boxes of Armoured Tank Bombs.
7. One 1 Barrel Gun.
8. Three Boxes of 82mm Mortar Bombs.

Among these Materials the one Barrel Gun was asked for, by the RFC Brigadier Issa. The weapon including one spear Barrel that have been with us were brought by Major Fadhullah per instruction from the RFC when we got mechanical problem at Masingbi.

Best regards.

05/1/99
Signature
2nd Bde Adjt.

1-2-99
Signature
2nd Bde Q.4 Adjutant.

TO

8932

THE B.F.C

R.U.F.S/L

00026073

SIERRA LEONE PEOPLES ...
ARMY HEAD QUARTER, MAKENI. ...

00010253

DATE: .....

1.359

TO: THE LEADER OF REVOLUTION. R.U.F.S.L.
FROM: THE OFFICE OF BLACK GUARDS.
SUBJ: CONFIRMED REPORT.

SIR,

UPONED YOUR INSTRUCTION GIVEN FOR US TO JOINED THE JUNTAS, ON THE 29TH MAY, 1998. WE LEFT THE BUSH FOR VARIOUS TOWNS AS PER YOUR INSTRUCTION.

.DURING OUR ARRIVAL, THERE WAS THAT LINE OF DEMACATION BETWEEN THE R.U.F. FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND THE JUNTAS. INFACT, THE JUNTAS USUALLY CALLED THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS (BUSH BOYS WITH BUSH RANKS.)

BLACK GUARDS FORUM WAS HELD AT WATERLOO C.S.C. COMPOUND UNDER THE COMMANDERSHIP OF F.O.C. (BLACK GUARDS). THE FORUM DISCUSSED ABOUT THE WAR COMBABANTS ARE SUFFERING AND THE WOUNDED SOLDIERS. WE DISCUSSED AND DOCUMENTED IT TO THE WAR COUNCIL OF R.U.F. THE HIGH COMMANDS AND ALL UNITS WITHIN THE STRUGGLE.

THESE DOCUMENT REACHED TO GEN: SAM BOCKARIE AND BDE: I.H. SESAY WHICH GREW THEM ANNOYED AND CALLED FOR ALL BLACK GUARDS THAT WAS PRESENT IN THAT FORUM. WE RESPONDED ACCORDINGLY AS PER THEIR INSTRUCTION AT BENGUEMA MILITARY BARRACK.

WE WERE SERIOUSLY BLASTED BY BOTH OF THEM, THAT THIS IS NOT THE REGIM OF PA; SANKOH, SO TO HELL WITH ALL BLACK GUARDS. DUE TO THIS BLASTATION, FEW BLACK GUARDS REDREW THEIR STATEMENT LIKE F.O.C. MORIE GIMOA AND LATE; MAJOR A.B. DENIED THAT THEY WERE NOT AWARED OF THAT FORUM. THEREFORE, WE WERE SERIOUSLY BLASTED AND KICKED OFF BY THEM.

BRIGADIER SUPERMAN WAS ISSUED 9,0000 LEONES BY JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA AFTER HE LEFT FROM MOYAMBA ATTACKED. THIS MONEY WAS CONSUMED WITHOUT ANY GOOD REASON. WHILE WOUNDED SOLDIERS WERE SUFFERING IN THE HOSPITALS. HE WAS DISCIPLINED BY GEN: SAM BOCKARIE BY KEEPING HIM INTO OFFICERS MESS AT WILBER FORC BARRACK.

VARIOUS MINISTRIES WERE GIVEN TO R.U.F. PERSONNELS BY A.F.R.C GOVERNMENT. BELOW ARE AS FOLLOWS:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | PA; E.E. ROGERS. | DEPT: | LAND AND HOUSING. |
| 2 | ELDRED COLLINS. | " | TRADE AND INDUSTRY LATER TO ENERGY AND POWER. |
| 3 | RAURENCES | DEPT: | ENERGY AND POWER LATER TO TRADE AND INDUSTRY. |
| 4 | PA; HAIDA. | " | EDUCATION. |
| 5 | PETER VANDY | " | AGRICULTURE. |
| 6 | A.K. VANDY. | " | " |
| 7 | DR: FABAL. | " | HEALTH AND SANITATION. |

8934

C.O. ISSACC
" BALLAY
9 MIKE
9 MIKE LAMIN " DEPT: ANTI LOUTING.
" S.I.S.

00010254

UPONED ALL THESE MENTIONED DEPARTMENT, NONE BODY AFFORD TO RENDER HELP TO THE PEOPLES OF KAILAHUN NEITHER THE COMBATANTS AS WELL AS THE WOUNDED SOLDIERS. AS A RESULT, ELDRED COLLINS PREFERRED TO MARRIED INSTEAD OF HELPING THE STRUGGLERS.

ZOGODA FELL DUE TO VIOLUATION OF ORDER BY LT: COL: MOHAMED. BUT HE REFUSED THE ORDERED BECAUSE OF THREANING REMARKS GIVEN BY GEN MOSSQUITOE DURING HIS STAYING AT PEIYAMA. HE EVEN ARRESTED HIS FOOD THAT WAS SURPOSED TO REACHED HIM AT ZOGODA BY THEM.

AFTER OUR [illegible] WITHDRAWAL FROM FREETOWN, DUE TO THE SUFFERING THAT MOST COMBATANTS USUALLY BEGGED BEFORE EARNING THEIR LIVING; MOST DECIDED TO LEAVE THE CITY FOR PROVINCES. AS THE RESULT, THERE WAS NO STROUNG COMBATANTS TO ENGAGED THE CITY. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ECOMOG OVERCOMED US AND WE WERE DRIVEN.

AFTER OUR WITHDRAWAL, SOME TROOPS BASED AT KOINADUGU JUNGLE WHILE OTHERS BASED AT KONO. WE ORGANISED OURSELVE AND STARTED LAUNCHING OFFENSIVE INORDER TO REGAINED THE LAND. AND FORTUNATELY, WE SUCCEEDED BY CAPTURING KONO, MAKENI, SEGBWEMA, LUNSER, MAGBRAKA AND ETC. WHICH ARE UNDER CONTROL TODAY TODAY.

AFTER OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CITY, THE COMMANDS WERE NOT IN UNIFORMITY. FOR EXAMPLES; BETWEEN GEN: SAM BOCKARIE AND SUPERMAN.

BRIGADIER I.H.SESAY. CARIED DIAMONDS TO LIBERIA, ACCORDING TO HIM, IT GOT MISSING. AND NO MILITARY ACTION WAS TAKEN AGAINST HIM BY THE HIGH COMMAND. WHILE SUPERMAN WAS DISCIPLINED FOR THE 9.0000 LEONES.

JOHNEY PAUL KOROMA WAS RAIDED TOGETHER WITH HIS WIFE UPONED THEIR ARRIVAL IN KAILAHUN. ACCORDING TO SOURCES, 9.PLASTIC OF DIAMOND WAS RAIDED FROM THEM BY GEN: SAM BOCKARIE AND BRIGADIER I.H.SESAY AND THE WIFE OF J.P.K. WAS TAKEN TO UNKNOWN LOCATION BY ISSA FOR THE REST OF THE DAY.

DUE TO THIS INFORMATIONS RECEIVED BY MOST S.L.A.S. MOST DECIDED DIS LOYALTY AND MANY PREFERED TO JOINED SUPERMAN INSTEAD OF C.O. ISSA OR MORIS KALLON OR GEN: SAM BOCKARIE. INFACT MANY S.L.AS WERE KILLED BY KALLON WHICH RESULTED TO THEIR DIS LOYALTY.

THERE WAS NONE CONSULTATION DURING OUR STAYING IN TOWN AND UP TO THE TIME WE LEFT THE TOWN. INFACT WE THE BLACK GUARDS NOT CONSULTED ON ANY EVENT.

YOUR BODY GUARD DOLO WAS KILLED BY MAJOR SADAM AND NO ACTION WAS TAKEN TOWARDS THAT ISSUE.

SIR, WE ARE SORRY TO SAY THE ADMINISTRATION WAS COLLAPS. THE HIGH COMMANDS THAT LEFT TO TAKE CONTROL NEVER ENTER HIS FEET INTO YOUR SHOES. AS THE RESULT, ASK THE COMBATANTS ABOUT THEIR VIEW.

8985

...E PARAGRAPH WHERE BRIGADIER SAM BOCKARIE REFERRED TO THE WIFE OF SUPERMAN AS IDIOT, THE CRULORD CONTINUE.

COMMUNCATION WAS CUT-OFF BETWEEN SUPERMAN AND SAM BOCKARIE BY THE INSTRUCTION OF SAM BOCKARIE.

0010255

ON THE 25TH DECEMBER, 1998 UP-WARD, AFTER MAKENI HAVE BEEN CLEARED. BRIGADIER SUPERMAN AND BRIGADIER I.H. SESAY MET TOGETHER IN FORUM. IN THE FORUM, SUPERMAN GRUMBLED OVER THE WAY HE WAS TREATED BY SAM BOCKARIE THAT IS NOT FAVOURABLE TO HIM AND THE WAY HE IS NOT REGARDED BY RAMBO AS HE IS SENIOR. ONE

THEY DISCUSSED ABOUT WAR PLAN AND SUPERMAN WAS TO ATTACKED KABALA. ON THE 28TH DECEMBER, 1998. BRIG: SUPERMAN UNDERTOOK THE MISSION; AND ON THE 30TH DECEMBER, 1998 HE ATTACKED, BUT HE DID NOT SUCCEED. ON HIS WAY BACK TO MAKENI, HE GOT VICELE ACCIDENT AND SUSTAINED PAIN.

UPONED HIS ARRIVAL, MORIS KALLON AND C.O. ISSA ARRIVED TO HIS HOUSE WITH INVITATION FOR SUPERMAN TO JOINED THEM TO THEIR VILLA.

ACCORDING TO SUPERMAN, THE APPEARANCE OF C.O. ISSA AND KALLON DID NOT PROVED FAVOURABLE TO HIM. THEREFORE, HE TOOK AN EXCUSSED FOR HIM TO DRESS AS A RESULT, HE EXCAPED FROM THEM TO LUNSER.

SIR, ON THE 16TH FEBUARY, 1999. THER WAS OUT BREAK OF INFIGHTING BETWEEN BRIGADIER SUPERMAN AND BRIG: ISSA. ACCORDING TO BRIGADIER ISSA, HE INSTRUCTED COL: GIBRIL BY THE COMMAND OF GEN C.O. SAM BOCKARIE TO REPORT TO BUNDU AFTER HE HAS BEING FREED FROM JAILED TO GIVE ALL DETAIL REPORT ABOUT FREETOWN.

AFTER THIS STATEMENT, BRIGADIER ISSA WENT AND ARRESTED CO. COL: GIBRIL MASSAQUOI AND ATTEMPTED FOR BRIGADIER SUPERMAN. ACCORDING TO BRIGADIER [redacted], ISSA, BRIGADIER SUPERMAN OPPEN FIRED ON THEM AND USED SEVEN R.P.G. ROCKETS AND FREED COL GIBRIL MASSAQUOI FROM THEM. THE SAME NIGHT, BRIGADIER SUPERMAN FOLLOWED THEM IN MAKENI AND VARDALISED HIS COMPOUND AND RETURNED BACK ON HIS BASE LUNSER.

ON THE 3RD APRIL, 1999. AT ABOUT 1:30 AM, THE CONVOYED OF BRIGADIER SUPERMAN. ENTERED MAKENI. BUT MOST WERE AT SLEEP, ONLY THE GUN SOUND WOKE MOST UP. WE DECIDED TO CHECKED WHERE THE FIREING FROM. JUST AFTER THE MARKET, GOING TOWARDS TEKOR ROAD, THERE WE MET WITH C.O. SUPERMAN ALIAS TIMING BOMB AND HIS CONVOYED COMING FROM COL RAMBO'S PLACE OR LOCATION. INFACT HE WAS RIDING MOTTO BIKE AND CALLED RAY WE TURNED AROUND AND HE SAID, GEN: SAM BOCKARIE AND BRIGADIER ISS REFUSED TO ANSWER TO THE CALLED FROM THE LEADER BY COMMUNICATION AND ALSO HE DROPED PHONE ON THE LEADER AND LAUGHED.

THEREFORE, SUPERMAN SAID, HE HAS BEING INSTRUCTED BY THE LE LEADER TO SEARCH FOR THEM AND ARREST ALL THOSE THAT ARE NOT LOYAL TO THE LEADERSHIP OF R.U.F.S.L. HE FURTHER SAID, HE CAME

8936

COL: COMBA AND COL: GIBRIL MASSAQUOI. AND THE ARE PRE-
DEPLOYED AT THE COMPOUND OF ISSA.

00010256

CASUALTY: COL: RAMBO.
MAJ: BRUNO BODY GUARD TO COL: GIBRIL.

THE FOLLOWING MORNING, WE MET SUPERMAN WITH THE ADVICES THAT " SO LONG YOU HAVE GOT INSEARCH OF THEM TO TALK TO THE LEADER, WITHDRAW YOUR TROOPS AND ALL BELONGING TAKING FROM C.O.ISSA AND RETURNED BACK TO LUNSER", WE FURTHER ASKED HIM " WHO KILLED RAMBO" ACCORDING TO BRIGADIER SUPERMAN, HE WAS NOT THE ONE KILLED THE RAMBO BUT HE SENT MEN TO CALL HIM."

REALLY BRIGADIER SUPERMAN PREPARED TO RETURNED TO HIS BASE LUNSER. UPONED HIS READNESS, ON THE 14TH APRIL, 1999. BRIGADIER ISSA'S TROOPS LAUNCHED OFFENSIVE ON SUPERMAN AT MAKENI. SUPERMAN, CAMED AND INFORMED THAT THEY ARE COMING AND IF HE RETURNED TO LUNSER, THE NEXT PLACE WILL BE HIS BASE. THEREFORE, HE IS GOING TO DEFEND ANY ATTACKED COMING TO MAKENI.

ON THE 15TH APRIL, 1999. THEY RE-ATTACKED WITH MANY CIVILIAN CASUALTY AND SOLDIERS. ON THE 22ND AND THE 23RD APRIL, 1999 THE ALSO ALSO ATTACKED THE TOWNSHIP OF MAKENI. BUT THEY NEVER SUCCEEDED, ONLY PANDEMESS WAS IN THE TOWN.

PLEASE SIR, SO FAR WE ARE CONCERNED, WE THEW ADVICES BOTH SIDE AS IT IS OUR DUTY.

BEST REGARDS.

SIGN.....
APPROVED.....
O/A. BLACK GUARDS COMMANDER.

SIGNED: .....
O/A. BLACK GUARDS ADJUTANT

ATTESTED: .....
O/A. POERATION H.Q. COMMANDER.

1.365

FM - C/S SATELITE 2 BDE COMD
(KOINDU TOWN)
TO - C/S JUPITER SUNRAY (SENAFE)
SUBJ: INSTRUCTIONS DATE: 03/5/00
BY THE INSTRUCTION OF BRIG ISSA SUBAY
CMDR YOU ARE HEREBY INSTRO. TO DAMAGE
ALL MOTORABLE ROADS LEADING TO YOUR
POINT EXCLUDING C/S PUMPAY (MAKENI)
SATELITE (KOIDU) H/WAY () ACT AS
INSTRO.

FROM: 2 BDE COMDR C/S OCEAN - NGAIYA
TO: BRIG ISSA SUBAY
SUBJ: INFORMATION 04/5/2000
1033 HRS
SIR, FOR YOUR INFORMATION CMDR. I
HAVE, RECEIVED FIGURE 188 UN POWS
FROM CO BASE MARING THIS MOR-
NING ALONG WITH FIGURE TWO(2)
TRUCKS AND FIGURE FIVE(5) VANS
(X) SIR, I NEED YOUR ADVISE.

00012937

WITH REF TO THE MSG SENT FM US OCEAN (NGAIYA) (.) BELOW IS THE NO. AND RANKS OF UN. POW PRESENTLY AT HAND EXCLUDING THE FIRST 20 MEN THAT WERE BROUGHT TO THIS POINT (KOND) Y/DAY FOR CONFINEMENT (.) ON THEIR WAY Y/DAY AN ACCIDENT OCCURED WHEREIN LTCOL JOSEPH MENDY (ZAMBIAN) BREAK HIS ~~H~~ LEG AND THREE (3) OTHERS SEVERELY INJURED (.) THE TOTAL FIG IS NOW 208 POW.

| RANK | NO. | RANK | NO. |
|---|---|---|---|
| BRIGGEN | 1 | PTE | 114 |
| LT COL | 1 | LTS/2/LTS | 7 |
| MAJS | 3 | L/CPL/CPL | 84 |
| CAPTS | 10 | SGTS | 19 |
| WO I | 2 | TOTAL | 188 |
| WO II | 2 | Y/DAY | 20 |
| | | TOTAL | 208 |

THE VEHS WERE AS FOLLOWS:
1 LANDCRUISER, 2 UN TRUCKS & 4 LAND-ROVERS
(X) EXCEPT FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING 041155ZMAY.

00012938

1.386

8929

DTG: 09 11 20 Z Dec - 99

00007061

Fm: Dist. Adm. CDF/SL H/Q BO

To: Nat. Co-Ordinator - CDF/SL Nat. H/Q - Deputy Minister Of Defence - Ministry Of Defence - State Avenue - Freetown.

INFO:

Regional Director of Intellegent - CDF/SL Nat. H/Q F/T

Text:

Sitrep fm BO t/ship and its environs is cool and calm ⊙ A reliable information received that Sam Bockarie allias Mosquita has make himself head of the Kailahun Dist. ⊙ He is training young men in large number to add to the existing thousands ⊙ Arms and Ammunition also receive in Quantum fm Lib. where he is marketing all Agricultural Produce cmm Coffee and Cacao Grabbed fm farmers unwarrantedly ⊙ Mass movement of AFRC/RUF combatants fm Ken-to BO Dist. in all flanks of the South-Eastern Part ⊙ Accept info for your understanding ⊙ Firm regards ⊙

1159HRS

09-12-99

8940

# Annex B.3

## Other Documents

1.072

00011193 9941

## The Medical Report on Abducted Victims treated by the FAWE Medical Team – March – December 1999

FAWE Medical Team

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dr Y Koso-Thomas | - | Circular Road Clinic |
| 2 | Dr S D Gassama | - | PCMH |
| 3 | Dr V George | - | PCMH |
| 4 | Dr J B Koroma | - | Grafton Camp Clinic |
| 5 | Dr L Whitfield | - | 5 Heddle Street |
| 6 | Dr M A S Anthony Williams | - | 33 Goderich Street |

**Introduction**

A total of 1168 abductees were treated from March to December 1999 and all included in this report. Although over 2000 patients were treated by the medical team, only the patients with a complete record of their history and treatment, have been included in this report.

**Sex:**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Females treated | - | 901 (77%) |
| Males treated | - | 139 (11.9%) |
| Gender not specified | - | 128 (10.9%) |

**Age:** The age range was from 1 month to 50 years

| Years | <12 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | <19 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No | 207 | 37 | 24 | 48 | 83 | 92 | 127 | 103 | 67 | 294 |
| % | 17.7 | 3.1 | 2 | 4.1 | 7.1 | 7.8 | 10.8 | 8.8 | 5.7 | 25 |

**Occupation:**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | School Girls/students | - | 541 (46.3%) |
| 2 | Trader/Business | - | 190 (16.2%) |
| 3 | Category not stated | - | 393 (33.6%) |

**Abduction:**

99% of the patients were abducted. The majority of these abductees were captured in Freetown during the January 1999 invasion. A few were abducted from Makeni and Kono.

**Trauma:**

(a) Physical – 274 (23.4%) were beaten. The degree of violence ranged from slaps to severe and brutal beating.

(b) Psychological – 114 (9.7%) clients suffered psychologically.

(c) Sexual – 648 (55.4%) of the abductees were raped and some of the girls were raped by one, two, three or even ten men. Two women particularly were raped by 15 and 30 rebels respectively. The former had only given birth to a baby two weeks before being raped. Both patients suffered from prolapse of the uterus (the womb descending out of the vagina). The former woman had a repair to replace the uterus in its proper position. The latter woman had a major degree of prolapse and therefore the uterus had to be taken out – (a total hysterectomy was done).

MSF (Holland) supplied the surgical materials and drugs. The surgical fee was also paid by MSF (Holland).

Similarly, an abductee who had a prolapse of the uterus, after delivering in the bush, her surgery was paid for by MSF (Holland).

**Military Training:**

An insignificant number of abductees were trained for military action. These were the few patients abducted from Kono and Makeni.

**Use of Drugs:**
52 (4.4%) of the clients were given drugs like valium and cannabis. A few were given cocaine. Alcohol was given in the form of Totapak. Palm wine (or Poyo) was the most abused alcohol.

**Medical Treatment**

589 (50.4%) of the abductees were treated for malaria. Malaria was the commonest cause of illness among the abductees. 275 (23.5%) were treated for worm infestation. Roundworms were the commonest type diagnosed. 144 (12.3%) patients had skin rashes, mainly fungal infections and scabies. There were also some respiratory tract infections among the children.

**Sexually transmitted Diseases – STD**

281 (24.1%) complained of vaginal discharge while 327 (27.9%) had pelvic inflammatory disease.

**Pregnancy:**

200 (17.1%) of the abductees were pregnant. 79 (6.7%) of the abductees had their pregnancy terminated. More than 80% of the pregnant women were teenagers, in the age range from 14 to 18 years of age.

Many have delivered normally via the vagina. Only about 3 patients have had surgical intervention – that I am aware of.

**Conclusion**

The programme has been implemented by FAWE and sponsored by MSF (Holland).

ICRC at PCMH has supplied the surgical materials and drugs for all the caesarian section cases.

Prepared by:

Dr S D Gassama

| No. | NAME OF DECEASED | AGE | SEX | CAUSE OF DEATH | DATE OF DEATH | NAME OF INFORMANT AND ADDRESS. (1) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ibrahim K. Bangura | 40 | M | Gun Shot injury | 09-01-99 | Issa Adam Conteh 22C Blackhall Road, Freetown |
| 2 | Banda Johnny Conteh | 53 | M | Severe Gun Shot wounds | 09-01-99 | |
| 3 | Teshina Davies | 20 | F | Gun Shot Wounds | 18-01-99 | Dr. J. D. Sandy Prisons Medical Service. |
| 4 | Patrick T. Gbaya-Kokoya | 4 | m | Gun Shot injury | 06-01-99 | Saidu Bangura, 5 Mountain Cnt |
| 5 | Abdul Noah Sawaneh | 56 | M | Gun Shot Wounds | 21-01-99 | David T. J. Gbaya-Kokoya 16, Savage St. Flt |
| 6 | Johannes M. Jones | 84 | m | Cerebral Haemorrhage | 15-01-99 | Sylvanus Sawaneh - 3 Bright St Freetown. |
| 7 | Rev Isaac Mackay | 43 | m | Gun Shot wounds | 12-01-99 | Delwyn C. Barber, 7F Hennessy St New England |
| 8 | Virginia Ademu-John | 36 | F | Gun Shot Wounds | 12-01-99 | Joseph Ademu John - 2 Flogrusta farm |
| 9 | Euphemia Ademu-John | 24 | F | Gun Shot Wounds | 12-01-99 | Joseph Ademu John - 2 Flogrusta farm |
| 10 | Joseph George | 39 | m | Bomb blast | 15-01-99 | Joseph Ademu John - 2 Flogrusta farm |
| 11 | Olga Griffiths-John | 81 | m | Gun Shot Wounds | 11-01-99 | Annette Louis - 6, Kapsella St Flt |
| 12 | Warima Wadi Williams | 47 | m | Gun Shot injury | 17-01-99 | Harold Taylor - 2 Cawker Rd |
| 13 | Gitta Kamara | Not | m | Gun Shot Wounds | 08-01-99 | Susan Williams - 5, Liberty St Murray Town |
| 14 | Fatmata Silla | 28 | F | Bomb blast | 15-01-99 | Abibatu Kamara - 8ft, Ascension Town |
| 15 | Georgina Dorothy Gayll | 74 | F | Gun Shot injury | 22-01-99 | Annette Louis - 6 Kapsella St. |
| 16 | Isha Bangura | 7 | F | Gun Shot wounds; Haemorrhage | 06-01-99 | Anthony Robbin-Coker - 19 Lumley St |
| 17 | Samuel F. Williams | 74 | m | Gun Shot injury | 09-01-99 | Dr. Kabba Koita - |
| 18 | Cyrus Konda Wright | 32 | m | Gun Shot wounds | 12-01-99 | Alice Williams - 3, White St, Wilberforce |
| 19 | Ernest Arthur French | 68 | m | Gun Shot injury | 14-01-99 | Ma-Jaet Farm |
| 20 | Renard Edmund Cole | 44 | M | Gun Shot wounds | 31-[illegible]-99 | Cecil French - 25 Bundos St Flt |
| | | | | | | Nathaniel [illegible] |

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| | NAME OF DECEASED | AGE | SEX | CAUSE OF DEATH | DATE OF DEATH | NAME OF INFORMANT ADDRESS (2) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Jamesina Bangura | 4/12 | F | Gun shot injury | 22-01-99 | Nana Semba - 33 Davies St; Kissy |
| 2 | Mustapha Kamara | 52 | m | Gun shot wounds, thorax | 29-01-99 | Abdul A. Bangura - 14 William St |
| 23 | John P.F. Conray | 53 | m | Gun shot injury | 22-01-99 | Lahai A. Conray - Kingtom Police Brks |
| 24 | Joseph Roy - Macauley | 76 | m | Gun shot wounds | 31-01-99 | Eric Macauley - 6, Kinsella St. F/T |
| 25 | Balogun A. Smith | 55 | m | Gun shot wounds | 17-01-99 | Aaron Smith - 5, Hamilton St. F/T |
| 26 | Bill Kargbo | 65 | M | Gun shot injury | 06-01-99 | Canon E.F. Thomas - K4 Fourah Bay College |
| 27 | Alusine Balogun Karrie | 23 | m | Gun shot injury | 11-01-99 | Mohamed L. Sillah - 13 Upper Bombay St |
| 28 | PC 1910 Ransford Ka-Pure | 35 | m | Gun shot wounds | 07-01-99 | Georgia Pratt - 16 Allen St. |
| 29 | Amadu Kabba | 30 | m | Gun shot injury | 07-01-99 | Abdulai Kamara - 16 Malamah Thomas St |
| 30 | Christian Sunny Boy Bundle Cole | 67 | m | Gun shot injury | 27-01-99 | Constance A. Benedict - 29 Nainbana St. |
| 31 | Alhaji Alh Bakarr Dumbuya | 39 | m | Gun shot injury | 18-01-99 | Binta Dumbuya - 92 Kissy Rd, F/T |
| 32 | Prof. Mohamed Danyah | 55 | m | Gun shot injury | 19-01-99 | Moses D. Carew - 24 Blackhall Rd, Kissy |
| 33 | Florence Danyah | 56 | F | Gun shot injury | 19-01-99 | Moses D. Carew - 24 Blackhall Rd, Kissy |
| 34 | Onike Collier | 23 | F | Blast injury | 29-01-99 | Francis O.R. Collier - 6, Cardew St; F/Tm. |
| 35 | Soba George | 9 | m | Gun shot | 20-01-99 | Julius Dixon - 4 Pine St; F/Tm. |
| | Momoh Koroma | 58 | m | Gun shot injury | 15-01-99 | John Bangura - 38, Steward St. F/T |
| | Mustapha Amin Khalil | 52 | m | Gun shot injury | 20-01-99 | Amin Khalil - 35 Kissy Bye Pass Rd, Kissy |
| 38 | Frank Albert Kongo | 61 | m | Gun shot injury | 21-01-99 | John Seaga - 218 Kinsella Street F/T |
| 39 | Alhaji Conteh | Abt | M | Gun shot wound | 06-01-99 | Alhaji Conteh - 70 Lower Bombay St; F/T |
| 40 | Mohamed Savage | 17 | m | Gun shot injury | 12-01-99 | Abdul R. Savage - 132 Fourah Bay Rd. |
| 41 | Haja Rakieta Alghaley | 78 | f | Burns | 13-01-99 | Abdul R. Savage - 132 Fourah Bay Rd |
| 42 | Sheriff Cole | 68 | m | Burns | 19-01-99 | Alhaji A.K. Cole - 8 New St, Cline Town |
| 43 | Samuel Sundius Mesebo | Abt | M | Gun shot injury | 07-01-99 | Jonathan R. Solomon - 258 Bai Bureh Road |
| 44 | Manei Tucker | 17 | F | Gun shot injury | 06-01-99 | Nathan R. Solomon - 258 Bai Bureh Road |

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| | NAME OF DECEASED | AGE | SEX | CAUSE OF DEATH | DATE OF DEATH | NAME OF INFORMANT AND ADDRESS (3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Fatmata Sesay | 15 | F | Gun Shot | 12-01-99 | Simeon B.K.M Kuyembeh (Uncle) 7, Metzger lane FM |
| 46 | Desmond Davies | 25 | M | Gun Shot injury | 06-01-99 | John Davies (Father) 95, Pademba Rd |
| 47 | Alusine S. Kamara | 24 | M | Gun Shot injury | 06-01-99 | Ibrahim S Turay (Nephew) 92, Kissy Rd |
| 48 | SLP PC Gonsang Karim | 24 | M | Gun Shot injury | 08-01-99 | Hangay Karim (mother) Kissy Police Brks |
| 49 | Sulaiman Sankoh | 39 | M | Gun Shot injury | 22-01-99 | M Shamed Salam (Nephew) 14, Taylor St, Wilb |
| 50 | Emmanuel Williams | 52 | M | Gun Shot injury | 06-01-99 | Foko Wyse (Informant) 38, Robert St |
| 51 | Fonnay Squire | 64 | F | Gun Shot wounds | 20-01-99 | Peter Squire (Husband) 36, Newcastle St |
| 52 | Ophelis Squire | 36 | F | Gun Shot wounds | 20-01-99 | Peter Squire (Father) 36, Newcastle St. |
| 53 | SLP PC 2132 A.B. Conteh | 28 | M | Gun Shot | 07-01-99 | Saidu Conteh (Brother) 85, Lakeside Rd, Wilb |
| 54 | Leonard Walker | 37 | M | Gun Shot | 15-01-99 | G. Bla Dixon (Brother) 30, Containment Rd |
| 55 | Neneh Fadel Wattg | 58 | M | Gun Shot | 14-01-99 | Osman Labbs (Nephew) 23, Kroomah Ramp Rd |
| 56 | Francis Buckner | 45 | M | Gun Shot injuries | 03-02-99 | Binns Mansaray (Cousin) 147 Pademba Rd |
| 57 | Desmond Wilfred Chalk | 41 | M | Gun Shot wounds | 11-01-99 | matilda Pratt (Wife) 4, William Street |
| 58 | Fatu Kamara | 8 | F | Gun Shot injury | 07-01-99 | Amadu G Kamara (Cousin) 16 Skelton St. |
| 59 | Hassan Sesay | 28 | M | Gun Shot injury | 07-01-99 | Amadu G. Kamara (Cousin) 16 Skelton St. |
| 60 | Kadie Nash | 6 | F | Gun Shot injuries | 22-01-99 | Rose-marie M'Boma (Sister) 28, Leicester Rd |
| | Magdalene Isata Mboma | 35 | F | Gun Shot injuries | 22-01-99 | Rose-Marie M'boma (Neice) 28 Leicester Rd |
| 62 | Dennis Jackson-Williams | 72 | M | Gun Shot injuries | 06-01-99 | Valentine Pratt (Nephew) 4, Rasmussen St. |
| 63 | Richard P. Robinson | 47 | M | Gun Shot | 08-01-99 | Edith Robinson (Cousin) 1, Fetter Lane |
| 64 | Sampha Conteh | 20 | M | Gun Shot | 06-01-99 | Alie B. Kargbo (Uncle) 12 Kennedy St. |
| 65 | Osman Ibrahim | 58 | M | Burns | 21-01-99 | Binns Cole (Brother) 19 William Street |
| 66 | Gbessay Conteh | 21 | M | Burns | 09-01-99 | Binns Cole (Informant) 19 William Street |
| 67 | Allie Kargbo | 57 | M | Gun Shot wounds | 07-01-99 | [illegible] |
| 68 | Zainab Annie Conteh | 24 | F | Gun Shot injuries | 22-01-99 | [illegible] |

Sheet 8

| No. | | | | | | | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 69 | Sahthie Shellay Kargbo | 26 | m | Gun shot wounds | 24/01/99 | Ibrahim N. Kamara (Cousin) 4 first st; F/T |
| 70 | Christian E. Roberts | 53 | m | Gun shot injury | 26/01/99 | Sarah C. Roberts (Wife) 3, Ranger St; F/T |
| 71 | Harold Albert Roberts | 25 | m | Gun shot wounds | 26/01/99 | Sarah C. Robert (Mother) 3, Ranger St; F/T |
| 72 | S.I. Balla Musa Koroma | 43 | m | Gun shot injury | 15/01/99 | S.I. Koroma (Kinsman) Police HQ |
| 73 | Alhaji Idris Abass Kargbo | 40 | m | Gun shot injury | 01/99 | Mohamed S.H. Kamara (Cousin) 4, 6 Bathurst St |
| 74 | Victor S.J. Walker | 27 | m | Gun shot injuries | 16/01/99 | Josephine Walker (Mother) 2[C] Wilberforce St |
| 75 | Tunde J. Langley | 65 | m | Gun shot injuries | 28/01/99 | Abioseh Langley (Brother) 8, Rowe St; Wellington |
| 76 | Margarett Sheriff | 50 | F | Gun shot wounds | 25/1/99 | Emily Johnson (daughter) 2, Sanders St |
| 77 | Winifred A. Attia-Davies | 56 | f | Gun shot wounds | 09/01/99 | Lavina Thomas (Sister) 31, Upper Brook St; F/T |
| 78 | Abdulai Sow | 54 | m | Gun shot injuries | 10/01/99 | Amadu Kamara (Informant) 7, Block Lane F/T |
| 79 | Osman Sesay | 45 | m | Gun shot wounds | 14/01/99 | Abdul Bangura (Cousin) 14 William St |
| 80 | Mohamed Charm | 21 | m | Gun shot injuries | 15/01/99 | Rebecca Charm (Wife) 33A, Grassfield, Lumley |
| | Momodu Samura | 10mths | M | Gun shot | 07/01/99 | Samuel Samura (Uncle) 37, Grassfield Lumley |
| 82 | Sahr Nasiru Gborie | 48 | m | Gun shot injuries | 14/01/99 | Bianpo Johnny Abdul (Cousin) 43 William St; F/T |
| 83 | Tamba Amadu Bianpo | 15 | m | Gun shot injuries | 14/01/99 | Bianpo Johnny Abdul (Brother) 43 William St; F/T |
| 84 | Solomon T. Johnny | 32 | m | Gun shot injuries | 26/01/99 | Francis Gbondo (Brother) 11, Sackville St; F/T |
| 85 | Francis Boyle | 18 | m | Gun shot injuries | 11/02/99 | Ebenezer Boyle (Father) 8, Savage Square F/T |
| 86 | Hawa Nabieu | 62 | F | Butchered by rebels | 27/01/99 | Joseph Kabia (Brother) 37, Newcastle St; Kissy |
| 87 | Sheriff H. Sesay | 43 | m | Gun shot injuries | 07/01/99 | Kabia T.G. Sesay (Brother) 14 Johnson St; Aberdeen |
| 88 | Mary Kamara | 41 | F | Gun shot injuries | 23/01/99 | Hannah, [illegible] (Daughter) 15, Hennessey St; Fitzwm. |

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| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | Daniel Cornelius Palmer | 63 | M | 21/01/99 | Gun shot injuries | Muzhupeh Davies (wife) 15B, Rose St; Kissy |
| 30 | Allieu Badara Kamara | 45 | M | 20/01/99 | Gun shot injuries | Abdul Kamara (Step-father) 9, Horton Lane FT |
| 31 | Maddy J. Kobe | 34 | M | 09/01/99 | Gun shot injuries | Aminata Jenda Kobe ( ) 8 Joseph St Cotton, Lumley |
| 32 | Regina Williams | 18 | F | 06/01/99 | Gun shot injuries | Ann-Marie Vincent (Auntie) 35, Percival St, FT |
| 33 | Moses A. Adu | 43 | M | 23/01/99 | Gun shot injuries | Wuyata Adu (wife) 53, Pademba Rd. FT |
| 34 | Moses Fayia Stevens | 31 | M | 21/01/99 | Gun shot | Fallah A. Brains (Co-worker) 61, 2nd Bo Terrace, Wilkinson |
| 35 | Sampha Kann Jeary | 60 | M | 21/01/99 | Gun shot | Franklyn Kann Jeary (Son) 61, Thunder Hill, Kissy |
| 36 | SLF Sgt 1837 John Tokawa | 35 | M | 07/01/99 | Gun shot injuries | James Tokawah (Brother) 6F, Goafe Brook FT |
| 37 | Daphne J.A. Kai-Kai | 35 | F | 07/01/99 | Gun shot wounds | Patrick Kai-Kai, 20A Mayor Ameed Terrace |
| 38 | Mamie Lappia Kamara | 78 | M | 22/01/99 | Gun Shot | Rev. Darlington Morrison (Son) 58 Liverpool St; FT |
| 39 | Amelia Cole | 77 | F | 01/02/99 | Butchered by rebels | Rev Darlington Morrison (Son) 38, Liverpool St; FT |
| 40 | Ramatu Gibrill | 55 | F | 22/01/99 | Gun shot | Haman O.B. Giball (Brother) 7 Main Rd; Wilberforce |
| 41 | | 35 | M | 23/01/99 | Gun Shot | John Kamara (Brother) 9, Kamanda Farm, Kissy |
| 42 | Phelix S. Mansaray | 48 | F | 07/01/99 | Gun shot | Foday Osbson Tommie (Son) 86 11 Campo valley, Temple Farm |
| 43 | Fatmata Tommie | 70 | M | 06/01/99 | Gun shot | Elizabeth Max-Peters (wife) 45, Main Rd, Allen Town |
| 103 | Theodore B Max-Peters | 55 | M | 06/01/99 | Gun shot | Issata Kargbo (Wife) 9, Lawson Lane, FT |
| 104 | Samuel A. Kargbo | | M | 19/01/99 | Gun shot | Abdul A. Kabba (Son) 55, Adolphus St. Kissy |
| 105 | Alaghie Davids Kabba | 21 | M | 12/01/99 | Gun shot injuries | Alpha Kamara (Father) 35, Newsite, Mayiba |
| 106 | Mohamed Salieu Kamara | 38 | M | 21/01/99 | Gun Shot | Amadu Dumbuya (Father) 3, Ecowas St; Freetown |
| 107 | Aruna Mano Dumbuya | | | | | Amadu Dumbuya (Grandfather) 3, Ecowas St; FT |
| 108 | Mohamed Salieu | Bombali | | 22/01/99 | | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 110 | Mamah A. Mansaray | 39 | m | Bomb Blast | 11-01-99 | Unisa Mansaray (Brother) 15, Cambrose St, Fit |
| 111 | Mariama Jalloh | 22 | f | Gun shot wounds | 08-01-99 | Abu Bakarr Kamara (Father-in-L) 21, Kanosa Wate, Campbe |
| 112 | Adama Turay | 31 | f | Gun shot wounds | 09-01-99 | Abu Sesay (Cousin) Davies St, Kissy |
| 113 | Elizabeth Lakoh | 46 | f | Gun shot wounds | 09-01-99 | Alhaji J.A Lakoh ( ) 6, Kek Turay Lane |
| 114 | Abu Bakarr Dean | 20 | m | Gun shot | 09-01-99 | Abdul Karim Dean (Father) 6, Dan St, Fi Town |
| 115 | Pele Macauley | 33 | m | Gun Shot | 06-01-99 | Mary Pratt (mother) 24, Cunard St, Fit |
| 116 | Talibi Kamara | 13 | m | Gun shot | 11/01/99 | Abdulai Fillah |
| 117 | Kai Charles | 23 | m | Gun shot | 06/01/99 | Chief Tambs Feika Kanpalie (uncle) 19 Regent St |
| 118 | Tambu Sambu Kanpalie | 13 | m | Gun shot | 06/01/99 | Chief Tambi Feika Kanpalie ( ) 19 Regent St |
| 119 | Marie Mansaray | 45 | f | Gun shot | 08/01/99 | Abu Bakar Kanpuru (Son) 1 East Brook Lane |
| 120 | Mohamed Kamara | 50 | m | Bomb blast | 12/01/99 | Alie I Turay (uncle) 10, Emmanuel St, Fit |
| 121 | Dawda Kanpua | 28 | m | Gun shot | 12/01/99 | Alie I. Turay (Brother) 10, Emmanuel St, Fit |
| 122 | Alhapie Kamara | 19 | m | Gun shot | 12/01/99 | Alie I. Turay (Brother) 10, Emmanuel St |
| 123 | Yeabu Kanpua | 28 | f | Gun shot | 04/02/99 | Alie I. Turay (Brother) 10, Emmanuel St |
| 124 | Usman B. Koroma | 32 | m | Gun shot | 17/01/99 | Mohamed Amadu Koroma (Brother) 42 Byrne Lane, Wilkinson |
| 125 | George D. Taylor | 50 | m | Gun shot | 01/02/99 | Velma Laura Thomas (Sister) K10, Fourah Bay College |
| 126 | Issa Kamara | 65 | m | Gun shot | 22/01/99 | Mohamed Alhassan Sofanah (Nephew) 28, City Rd, Wellington |
| 127 | Nathaniel Pratt | 30 | m | Gun shot | 08/01/99 | Augustus B. Pratt (Father) 13, Water Street, Cotton Tree |
| 128 | Sidi Y Bonis | 22 | m | Gun shot | 09/01/99 | Mike Salia Massaquoi (uncle) 14, Koroma St, Calaba Town |
| 129 | Joseph N. Conteh | 27 | m | Gun shot | 10/01/99 | Barbat Augustini Conteh (Father) 20, Fly St, Fit |
| 130 | George D. Browne | 53 | m | Gun shot | 21/01/99 | Festus Jon. Thompson (Nephew) 67 Wellington St |
| 131 | Kata Turay | 17 | | | | Amina (Sister) 26, Aberdeen Street, Fi Town |

(6)

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| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Massa Bassie | 48 | m | Gun shot | 21-01-99 | Mamie Bah... (Sister) 64, Foster... |
| 2 | James N. O Osho-Williams | 66 | m | Gun shot | 11-01-99 | Victor Osho-Williams (Son) 96, Dundas St, ... |
| 3 | Mohamed H. Kargbo | 19 | m | Gun shot | 9-01-99 | Alpha Kargbo (Father) 1, Robert St, Fff |
| 4 | Almamie Sankoh | 47 | m | Gun shot | 21-01-99 | Esther Sankoh (wife) 51, Dames St |
| 5 | Desmond Parsons | 37 | m | Gun shot | 06-01-99 | Isata Parsons (wife) 9, Nicol Lane, Kissy |
| 6 | Kassim Tejan Jawara | 47 | m | Gun shot | 12-01-99 | Tejan Kassim Jawara |
| 7 | David Caree | 24 | m | Gun shot | 23-01-99 | Topham St. Caree (Father) 10 Small Lane |
| 8 | Ernest M. Coker | 25 | m | Gun shot | 07-01-99 | Josephine Coker (Mother) 1 Goderich Rd, ... |
| 9 | Alan Bakarr Kamara | 44 | M | Gun shot | 25/01/99 | Usman Thray (Cousin) 65, Small ... Tun, ... |
| 10 | Martin Thray | 43 | m | Gun shot | 19-01-99 | Salamatu Thray (wife) 48W, Blackhall Rd, ... |
| 11 | Lehman Lansana Jarrett | 50 | M | Gun Shot | 23-01-99 | Paul Musa Jarrett (Brother) 4, John St, Kissy |
| | Ibrahim Thray | 15 | M | Gun Shot | 19-01-99 | Salamatu Thray (Mother) 48 Blackhall Rd. |
| | Ismail Koroma | 23 | M | Gun Shot | 22-01-99 | Salamatu Thray (Sister) 48W, Blackhall Rd |
| 14 | Vetia Roberts | 21 | F | Gun Shot injuries | 07-01-99 | Mary Barnes (Mother) 23, Benjamin Lane |
| 15 | Hannah Sesay | 12 | F | Gun Shot injuries | 07-01-99 | Mary Barnes (Mother) 23, Benjamin Lane |
| 16 | Richard Koroma | 15 | M | Gun Shot | 09-01-99 | ? |
| 17 | Alpha Osman Barrie | 40 | m | Gun Shot | 06-01-99 | Amadu Jawallie (Informant) 25, Regent St. |
| 18 | Ruben Amachie Abotey | 14 | M | Blast Injuries | 11-01-99 | ? |
| 19 | Emmanuel Lansana | 45 | m | Gun Shot | 14-01-99 | David M. Charles - 21C Pyke St, Fff. |

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SIERRA LEONE POLICE FORCE

NAME: SAMUEL RANDOLPH TENGA

ADDRESS: No. 16 Samuels Lane, Kissy

NATIONALITY: Sierra Leonean

Occupation: Student

RELIGION: Christian

AGE: 40 years

Statement commenced on Thursday the 11th day of February 1999 at 11:15 hours at the Military Headquarters, Cockrill, North Freetown. I have been asked if I wish to say anything and cautioned that I am not obliged to say anything unless I wish to do so but whatever I say will be taken down in writing and may be submitted in evidence.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| D/Cpl 4745 | 1995 | |
| ..... | ..... | ..... |
| 11/2/99 | 11/2/99 | 11/2/99 |

I am a Sierra Leonean a native of Bonthe District in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone. I was born at Mania Village in the Yawbeko Chiefdom Bonthe District to the late Mr Moses Demby Tenga former Education Secretary of the United Brethren in Christ Mission (UBC) Mattru Jong Bonthe District and Mrs Caroline Kati Tenga presently staying with me at No. 16 Samuels Lane, Kissy. I started my primary schooling at the UBC School Campbell Street, Freetown and completed at the UBC Primary School Mattru Jong where I sat the Selective

Entrance Examination and passed for Centennial Secondary School Mattru Jong. Whilst attending Centennial Secondary School I underwent a medical operation that made the school authorities to allow me to repeat Form III but I decided to transfer to Bonthe Secondary School where I was allowed to Form IV. There I completed my Fifth Form and sat to the GCE Examination in June 1980 and passed the exams with a Division II. I taught for two years at UBC Primary School Talia in Yawbeko Chiefdom, Bonthe District and UBC Primary School Mogbwamo in the Moyamba District respectively. Sometime in 1983, I proceeded to Milton Margai Teachers' College at Goderich Village in the Western Area to pursue a Certificate Course in Physical Education. I completed my studies sometime in 1986 with a Higher Teachers Certificate in Physical Education. During my college days at Milton Margai Teachers College, I was the Student Union Minister of Sports a post I held for two consecutive years, Secretary-General for Bonthe District Students' Union, and I also became one of the students that were interested in the Juche Ideg of Kim Il Sung of Korea and the Green Book of Mohamed Gadaffi of Libya, when some Sierra Leoneans called at the College compound to give lectures. For the Juche Ideg, it was the Korean themselves that do go to the college compound to give lectures. Later on symposiums were held in colleges and universities on those two ideas that made some students to be flown to these countries on site seeing and to compare the way of life of the people of that country to ours. I was unfortunate during my college days to go and those who went brought with them property and few dollars that made life for them comfortable. Sometime in 1989 while I was a teacher at the Independence Secondary School at Kissy, a colleague of mine whilst in college by the name of Abu Hassan Kroma met me at my school that I was teaching, and told me that an opportunity had come for some people to go to Libya on a site

seeing and a symposium. That since he was fortunate on two occasions he would like me to go if I was interested. I said yes. Abu Hassan therefore promised to contact me in due course when he would have made sure of the trip. In about two weeks later during school hours Abu Hassan called on me at my school and told me that I should prepare an Emergency Travelling Certificate and that at any time the trip will materialise. Abu Hassan said that it was a symposium on "African Consciences" a topic related to Pan Africanism. He further explained to me that it was a sort of scholarship they had won and wanted to share the opportunity with me, since we all share the idea of the Green Book in college. Since it was school hours Abu Hassan left and promise to contact me during the course of the week. In about a week later I prepared the Travelling Certificate at the Immigration Headquarters along Siaka Stevens Street and also obtained Vaccination Injection at the China Town Freetown. After some days that I prepared all my travelling documents, Abu Hassan contacted me to enquire as to whether I have prepared my travelling documents. I told him yes and he asked me to get myself prepared for the following day and meet him at Free Street at about 8:00 a.m. Abu Hassan left and went away after he had told me that it was he who was going to foot my transport fare to the Republic of Guinea as I will be travelling by road together with other students and school leavers. In the next day during the morning hours I came to Free Street where I met Abu Hassan who introduced me to other eight Students by the names of Samuel Kargbo, Mohamed Koroma, Unisa Kamara, another Mohamed Koroma, Ansumana Lamin and Sheku Bangura. I could not remember the names of the other three but can be identified if seen. It was my first encounter with these men introduced to me by Abu Hassan. Abu Hassan gave me some Leones which amount I cannot now remember. All of us boarded the City Link Bus with the

exception of Abu Hassan and we left for Conakry in the Republic of Guinea. There was some one among our group that knows our destination in Conakry, besides somebody was to receive us at the park in Conakry. I cannot actually now remember with whom I was sitting in the bus but we arrived safely at about 7.30 p.m. at the lorry park in Conakry.

At the lorry park in Conakry, all of us assembled near a house as it was raining by then. The man among us who knew our destination in Conakry, left us for few minutes and came back with a fairly old man with grey hair who welcomed us and asked if we were the group that are going to Libya and we all said yes. He then took us to a near by restaurant where he bought some food for all of us. I became anxious to know the name of this man, and asked me why I am worried to know his name, and I said because you are our host. He then told me to call him Pa Morlai Sheriff. This man after my trip to Liby and back, I came to know him as Foday Sankoh the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (R.U.F.) when he led the rebel incursion into Sierra Leone some time in 1991. After eating the food he later led us to a private house in Conakry where we spent the night. Between 8.00 and 9.00 a.m. after breakfast the following morning, we went and boarded two peugeot familiar Guinean taxi cars for Mali. I cannot now remember with whom I traveled with in the taxi car I boarded. However Mr. Foday Sankoh did not travel in my own car but made the trip with us in the other car. I did not know whether Mr. Foday Sankoh was responsible for our lorry fare but there was some one in my car that paid the fare for us to Mali. And of course I paid the fare from Freetown to Conakry from the money given to me by Abu Hassan Koroma. We spent a night on the way and arrived at Bamako the following day at mid-day. In this same day we all boarded a bus and left Bamako for Burkina Faso together with Mr. Foday Sankoh. We arrived at

Attended Meeting in Conakry by Sankoh 1991

the boarder of Mali and Burkina Faso at about 6.00 p.m. We spent the night at the Malian side of the boarder since it was 6.00 p.m. and we cannot cross to Burkina Faso. We of course slept on board the bus. Early the following morning between (8.00 and 9.00) we were then allowed to cross to Burkina Faso on board the same bus. We subsequently arrived at Ougadougu the Capital City of Burkina Faso after mid-day of the same day. At Ougadougu we were taken to some quarters by Foday Sankoh where we were accommodated in one of them. In the neighborhood quarters I observed that there were about four to five Liberian nationals and besides so many other Liberians were coming in and going out. I personally did not have any closed discussion with these Liberian nationals since we only spent about a day there. However on the following day of our arrival Mr. Foday Sankoh who did not sleep with us came at about 11.00 a.m. with a Pougeot car. On board the peugeot car were about three Liberian nationals whose names I do not know. They also brought with them two empty cars, which we boarded. On the instruction of Mr. Foday Sankoh explaining that we were heading to the Airport. On the way to the airport we had cause to stop at a residence and asked us to climb down from the cars. We were taken inside the residence and introduced us to a man I later in the cause of time I came to know as Charles Taylor now President of the Republic of Liberia. I can actually not remember whether he was then called Charles Taylor. However Charles Taylor briefly spoke to us that we were going on a programme and that he wished us well. When we were about to ask some questions he said he would not accommodate questions. We were then told to go and board the cars and we continued to the airport. On our arrival at the airport at Ougadougu we were lined up. Mr. Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh were standing by a table and demands our Sierra Leone travelling certificates that we secured in Freetown from us. Mr.

Charles Taylor then issued us with Liberian travelling certificate signed by the said Mr. Charles Taylor bearing our respective names that we carried on our Sierra Leonean emergency travelling certificate, that we used to present to the immigration authorities at the airport. We were then allowed to board the Libyan plane that was in the airport. It was nine of us Sierra Leoneans and Mr. Foday Sankoh that made the trip to Libya. We arrived at Libya on the same day, but it was at night. Whilst at the airport at Tripoli, four white men who speak both English and Arabic came and met us. They had some discussions with Mr. Foday Sankoh and after sometime they left and went away with Mr. Foday Sankoh living us at the airport. After about twenty minutes Foday Sankoh and three of the Libyan came with a white van, and they told us to board it. That we did and we were driven to an area within the Tripoli city and we were lodged in a long building together with Mr. Foday Sankoh. The building was like a boarding home with beds in the hall. We were allocated to a bed each. While we were in this building, some of us that is myself included, that were highly educated were every day taken to attend a symposium on African Consciencesm which was just a mile from our place of lodging. This symposium lasted for about three days. Foday Sankoh did not attend the symposium as he was always going up and down with the Libyans. In fact the symposium was not interesting as we were expecting it to be. It was too boring as all the discussion was done through an interpreter who was a Ghanaian national by the name of Mohamed whose surname I do not know. After the three days symposium, the Libyans started coming every day at about 5.00 a.m. to go out on jogging exercise which in fact brought doubts to us, as that was not part of our programme. However, we thought the exercise was just to keep us fit and so we accepted it. The jogging exercise continued every day and the distance of jogging increased every day. We then became

worried and suspicious about the trip we made to Libya. We who attended the symposium started to conclude that it was a ploy to brainwash us. We then started grumbling among ourselves and we put up a rebellious attitude towards the exercise by giving all kinds of excuses. This really did not go down well and Sheka Bangura who said Mr. Foday Sankoh is his uncle started to cry. He even attacked Foday Sankoh that, that was not the reason he went and took him from his mother. Sheka said that Foday Sankoh took him with the pretext that he was taking him to Ghana to do studies in journalism. We also grumbled to Mr. Foday Sankoh about the treatment we were getting from the Libyans. His reply always was that we are men and should accept it. We told him that that was not the reason of the programme we came to Libya for. On the following day during the morning hours Foday Sankoh left us that he was going to the central part of the city. As soon as he had gone, the Libyans another set of group, came with a white van and asked us to board the van with all our belongings. We abide on their instructions and we were taken far off the city to a camp called Wadra Libya. This camp is fenced all over with two steel gates at the frontage whilst at the extreme end of the camp is opened with no gate. That part of the camp leads to the desert. Later that day, Foday Sankoh came to the said camp driven by the Libyans. The camp is fairly a big camp with eight long buildings that will accommodate forty people each. There were also four hanga buildings down by the field which housed vans and car. There was another big building which had about four to six buses. On entering the camp, there was a long building by the left which was used as an office and there was a kitchen there for the Libyans. In the camp, we met the following nationals, Indonesians (Sumatians), South Africans, Liberians who were in the majority, Niger citizens, Malians and West Indians. All these groups we met were training militantly to go in to their respective

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counties and cause some insurgence as we were made to understand. We then asked Foday Sankoh to tell us why we were brought to that camp. Foday Sankoh who was a man very quick to anger remarked that if some of us are not careful we will not go back to Sierra Leone. With this kind of threat we kept our cool and we only grumbled among ourselves. We were then housed in the hall occupied by the Liberian nationals but in a separate apartment. Whilst at the camp, the jogging exercise continued to intensify every day, as any one who remained behind during the exercise, will be beaten up and forced to run and catch his fellow men in front. We were faced with no alternative but to obey the Libyans because the punishment given to one for not obeying their command is so fearful. For example you will be tied to a rope behind a van and dragged on the hard ground for some distance, at a speed of about thirty to forty miles per hour. Whilst we were being trained, Foday Sankoh was always out of the camp on trips abroad which he said were mostly to Ghana to solicit funds from his friends. Whilst in the training exercise we got the wind that we are been trained to go and assist Charles Taylor who was planning to launch an attack on Liberia his motherland to over throw the legitimate government of President Samuel K. Doe. This message did not go down well but little could we do. Apart from the early morning exercise, every Thursday, every body in the camp goes out on a marathon exercise of about five to ten kilometers to and fro with the Libyans behind us in a vehicle to pick those that faint on the way, who will be later on punished by beating, standing naked at night under the snow as if you deliberately refused to do the marathon or training exercise. You will be tied on a jeep and dragged as earlier mentioned. After about a month on the physical exercise, we were taken to the desert on board vehicles where we were taught weapon drill by dismantling and assembling AK47 and General Purpose Machine Gun (G.P.M.G.). We were also shown Rocket

Propelled Guns (R.P.G.) and Mortar which we never used by ourselves. We were given AK47 with five bullets each to aim and fire at an object thirty to fifty meters distance. The Libyans demonsurated how to take position in firing the G.P.M.G. Whilst at the desert where we spent a week, we were housed in those ancient broken buildings. We were also taught map reading in the desert. This exercise was led by Liberians and South Africans most of whom were ex-military men. After our exercise at the desert, we returned back to the camp. In the camp that night we were all removed from our bellets and made to assemble in the field by nationality. Even though we travelled with Liberian emergency travelling certificates we still mentioned our nationality. We were then called one by one to face a panel of about eight people with sticks and hard rubber. They ask your name and nationality and as soon as you start to explain, they will accuse you as a liar and will give you a good beaten. This exercise they did to every trainee in the camp. Some trainee even lost their eye sight and some sustained wound and body pain. As a whole every body sustained major injuries. As for me, my right hand was scrapped and sustained blisters on my back and my operation area was swollen. I cried bitterly and vowed to revenge on Abu Hassan Koroma when I return back home. We were all allowed to stay in doors for a week to heal our wounds as doctors were brought in to attend to us. During that week the instructors told us that our training exercise has been completed. After a day or two while we were healing our wounds, Mr. Foday Sankoh came to the camp where he stayed with us until we passed out. During that week he was attacked by Sheka Bangura his nephew every day who promised to explain to his mother all that Foday Sankoh did to him. Foday Sankoh replied that the day he will reach Freetown Sheka Bangura will be afraid to say a word about him to any one. We passed out from the training sometime in December 1989. The passing

out was attended by some Libyans whose faces were covered with veil except for their eyes that you will see. They cheer us as we were marching. We the Sierra Leoneans waited at the camp for a week before we left whilst the Liberians left a day or two after the passing out. It was during our week's stay at the camp waiting for a flight that we heard over the B.B.C. radio that Charles Taylor had launched a rebel attack in Liberia. Ansumana Lemin who was my intimate colleague in the training called my attention with regards the information we got that we are been trained to go and assist Charles Taylor. Both of us agreed that we are not going to be party to destroy that fine country and so we planned to escape. Foday Sankoh gave us five hundred Dollars ($500 USD) each as a transport fare whilst the Liberians got one thousand Dollars ($1000 USD) each. When we asked them how comes, they said the Libyan Government gave $1,000 USD to each trainee and that it was Foday Sankoh who cheated us. Fortunately for Ansumana and myself, our departure was divided into two groups and we both happened to fall in the same group. Our group took a flight for Qugadougu in Burkina Faso whilst with instructions from Foday Sankoh that we should wait for him there whilst he boarded a flight with the other group and went to Ghana. When we arrived at Qugadougu, Ansumana and myself decided to move and find our way out. We spent the night in a hotel and the following day we took a train and travelled to Bobodalaso a town in Burkina Faso. Ansumana continued with the train to Gambia via Senegal whilst I came to Sierra Leone by road via Mali and Guinea with my Sierra Leone emergency travelling certificate that were earlier taken from us at Burkina Faso. When I arrived, every body that asked where I have been all the time, I just told them that I was in Ghana. I did not say a word to anybody because my mouth was just filled with surprises and dismay, coupled with bitter sadness because I cannot imagine what I went through

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but to thank God for my life. I vowed within myself that nothing should make me join them, but vowed to revenge on Abu Hassan Koroma alias Askia. Even my parents I did not tell them what I went through, instead I told them that I was in Ghana. Early in 1990 on my return, I went and sought a teaching job at the Ahmadiyya Muslim Secondary School at Kissy Dock Yard. I was employed as a teacher. While I was teaching at the Ahmadiyya secondary school, sometime in 1991, I heard of a rebel attack on Sierra Leone by Foday Sankoh but I never knew who this Foday Sankoh was until when I went to the Criminal Investigation Department Headquarters (C.I.D.) to pay a visit to my college colleagues of mine Sheka Bangura with whom I was trained with in Libya identified me to the C.I.D. officers as one of those that Foday Sankoh the R.U.F. leader took and trained. At first I doubted because I had never been taken out of the country by a name which [illegible] was then shown by the C.I.D. officers the picture of Foday Sankoh whom I know as Pa Morlai Sheriff. I straight admitted of knowing him as the man that took us to Libya from Conakry the Republic of Guinea to attend a symposium on African Consciencesim, which happens to be a brain washing in other to destabilise Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. This I now say was disclosed to us on the passing out parade by Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh. It was then that the $500 USD and our Sierra Leonine Emergency Travelling Certificates that were withdrawn from us at the Ouagadougu air port were given to us that we used to find our way. In fact I came straight to Sierra Leone. At the C.I.D. I was subsequently detained and spent four years seven months in detention at the maximum prison at Pademba Road. I was released sometime in December 1995 on Amnesty by the then N.P.R.C. Government. This is all. Statement concluded at 1602 hours. Statement was commenced on Thursday the 11/2/99 at 11.15 hours break off at 17.15 hours continued on 12/2/99 at

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10.45 hours. Statement made in English read over and admitted to be true and correct.

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SIERRA LEONE POLICE FORCE

NAME: SAMUEL RANDOLPH TENGA

ADDRESS: No. 16 Samuels Lane, Kissy

NATIONALITY: Sierra Leonean

Occupation: Student

RELIGION: Christian

AGE: 40 years

Statement commenced on Thursday the 11th day of February 1999 at 11:15 hours at the Military Headquarters, Cockrill, North Freetown. I have been asked if I wish to say anything and cautioned that I am not obliged to say anything unless I wish to do so but whatever I say will be taken down in writing and may be submitted in evidence.

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| D/Cpl 4745 | 1995 | |
| ..... | ..... | ..... |
| 11/2/99 | 11/2/99 | 11/2/99 |

I am a Sierra Leonean a native of Bonthe District in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone. I was born at Mania Village in the Yawbeko Chiefdom Bonthe District to the late Mr Moses Demby Tenga former Education Secretary of the United Brethren in Christ Mission (UBC) Mattru Jong Bonthe District and Mrs Caroline Kati Tenga presently staying with me at No. 16 Samuels Lane, Kissy. I started my primary schooling at the UBC School Campbell Street, Freetown and completed at the UBC Primary School Mattru Jong where I sat the Selective

Entrance Examination and passed for Centennial Secondary School Mattru Jong. Whilst attending Centennial Secondary School I underwent a medical operation that made the school authorities to allow me to repeat Form III but I decided to transfer to Bonthe Secondary School where I was allowed to Form IV. There I completed my Fifth Form and sat to the GCE Examination in June 1980 and passed the exams with a Division II. I taught for two years at UBC Primary School Talia in Yawbeko Chiefdom, Bonthe District and UBC Primary School Mogbwamo in the Moyamba District respectively. Sometime in 1983, I proceeded to Milton Margai Teachers' College at Goderich Village in the Western Area to pursue a Certificate Course in Physical Education. I completed my studies sometime in 1986 with a Higher Teachers Certificate in Physical Education. During my college days at Milton Margai Teachers College, I was the Student Union Minister of Sports a post I held for two consecutive years, Secretary General for Bonthe District Students' Union, and I also became one of the students that were interested in the Juche Ideg of Kim Il Sung of Korea and the Green Book of Mohamed Gadaffi of Libya, when some Sierra Leoneans called at the College compound to give lectures. For the Juche Ideg, it was the Korean themselves that do go to the college compound to give lectures. Later on symposiums were held in colleges and universities on those two ideas that made some students to be flown to these countries on site seeing and to compare the way of life of the people of that country to ours. I was unfortunate during my college days to go and those who went brought with them property and few dollars that made life for them comfortable. Sometime in 1989 while I was a teacher at the Independence Secondary School at Kissy, a colleague of mine whilst in college by the name of Abu Hassan Kroma met me at my school that I was teaching, and told me that an opportunity had come for some people to go to Libya on a site

seeing and a symposium. That since he was fortunate on two occasions he would like me to go if I was interested. I said yes. Abu Hassan therefore promised to contact me in due course when he would have made sure of the trip. In about two weeks later during school hours Abu Hassan called on me at my school and told me that I should prepare an Emergency Travelling Certificate and that at any time the trip will materialise. Abu Hassan said that it was a symposium on "African Consciences" a topic related to Pan Africanism. He further explained to me that it was a sort of scholarship they had won and wanted to share the opportunity with me, since we all share the idea of the Green Book in college. Since it was school hours Abu Hassan left and promise to contact me during the course of the week. In about a week later I prepared the Travelling Certificate at the Immigration Headquarters along Siaka Stevens Street and also obtained Vaccination Injection at the Clinic Town Freetown. After some days that I prepared all my travelling documents, Abu Hassan contacted me to enquire as to whether I have prepared my travelling documents. I told him yes and he asked me to get myself prepared for the following day and meet him at Free Street at about 8:00 a.m. Abu Hassan left and went away after he had told me that it was he who was going to foot my transport fare to the Republic of Guinea as I will be travelling by road together with other students and school leavers. In the next day during the morning hours I came to Free Street where I met Abu Hassan who introduced me to other eight Students by the names of Samuel Kargbo, Mohamed Koroma, Unisa Kamara, another Mohamed Koroma, Ansumana Lamin and Sheku Bangura. I could not remember the names of the other three but can be identified if seen. It was my first encounter with these men introduced to me by Abu Hassan. Abu Hassan gave me some Leones which amount I cannot now remember. All of us boarded the City Link Bus with the

exception of Abu Hassan and we left for Conakry in the Republic of Guinea. There was some one among our group that knows our destination in Conakry, besides somebody was to receive us at the park in Conakry. I cannot actually now remember with whom I was sitting in the bus but we arrived safely at about 7.30 p.m. at the lorry park in Conakry.

At the lorry park in Conakry, all of us assembled near a house as it was raining by then. The man among us who knew our destination in Conakry, left us for few minutes and came back with a fairly old man with grey hair who welcomed us and asked if we were the group that are going to Libya and we all said yes. He then took us to a near by restaurant where he bought some food for all of us. I became anxious to know the name of this man, and asked me why I am worried to know his name, and I said because you are our host. He then told me to call him Pa Morlai Sheriff. This man after my trip to Liby, and back, I came to know him as Foday Sankoh the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (R.U.F.) when he led the rebel incursion into Sierra Leone some time in 1991. After eating the food he later led us to a private house in Conakry where we spent the night. Between 8.00 and 9.00 a.m. after breakfast the following morning, we went and boarded two peugeot familiar Guinean taxi cars for Mali. I cannot now remember with whom I traveled with in the taxi car I boarded. However Mr. Foday Sankoh did not travel in my own car but made the trip with us in the other car. I did not know whether Mr. Foday Sankoh was responsible for our lorry fare but there was some one in my car that paid the fare for us to Mali. And of course I paid the fare from Freetown to Conakry from the money given to me by Abu Hassan Koroma. We spent a night on the way and arrived at Bamako the following day at mid-day. In this same day we all boarded a bus and left Bamako for Burkina Faso together with Mr. Foday Sankoh. We arrived at

the boarder of Mali and Burkina Faso at about 6.00 p.m. We spent the night at the Malian side of the boarder since it was 6.00 p.m. and we cannot cross to Burkina Faso. We of course slept on board the bus. Early the following morning between (8.00 and 9.00) we were then allowed to cross to Burkina Faso on board the same bus. We subsequently arrived at Ougadougu the Capital City of Burkina Faso after mid-day of the same day. At Ougadougu we were taken to some quarters by Foday Sankoh where we were accommodated in one of them. In the neighborhood quarters I observed that there were about four to five Liberian nationals and besides so many other Liberians were coming in and going out. I personally did not have any closed discussion with these Liberian nationals since we only spent about a day there. However on the following day of our arrival Mr. Foday Sankoh who did not sleep with us came at about 11.00 a.m. with a Peugeot car. On board the peugeot car were about three Liberian nationals whose names I do not know. They also brought with them two empty cars, which we boarded. On the instruction of Mr. Foday Sankoh explaining that we were heading to the airport. On the way to the airport we had cause to stop at a residence and asked us to climb down from the cars. We were taken inside the residence and introduced us to a man I later in the cause of time I came to know as Charles Taylor now President of the Republic of Liberia. I can actually not remember whether he was then called Charles Taylor. However Charles Taylor briefly spoke to us that we were going on a programme and that he wished us well. When we were about to ask some questions he said he would not accommodate questions. We were then told to go and board the cars and we continued to the airport. On our arrival at the airport at Ougadougu we were lined up. Mr. Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh were standing by a table and demands our Sierra Leone travelling certificates that we secured in Freetown from us. Mr.

Charles Taylor then issued us with Liberian travelling certificate signed by the said Mr. Charles Taylor bearing our respective names that we carried on our Sierra Leonean emergency travelling certificate, that we used to present to the immigration authorities at the airport. We were then allowed to board the Libyan plane that was in the airport. It was nine of us Sierra Leoneans and Mr. Foday Sankoh that made the trip to Libya. We arrived at Libya on the same day, but it was at night. Whilst at the airport at Tripoli, four white men who speak both English and Arabic came and met us. They had some discussions with Mr. Foday Sankoh and after sometime they left and went away with Mr. Foday Sankoh living us at the airport. After about twenty minutes Foday Sankoh and three of the Libyan came with a white van, and they told us to board it. That we did and we were driven to an area within the Tripoli city and we were lodged in a long building together with Mr. Foday Sankoh. The building was like a boarding home with beds in the hall. We were allocated to a bed each. While we were in this building, some of us that is myself included, that were highly educated were every day taken to attend a symposium on African Consciencesm which was just a mile from our place of lodging. This symposium lasted for about three days. Foday Sankoh did not attend the symposium as he was always going up and down with the Libyans. In fact the symposium was not interesting as we were expecting it to be. It was too boring as all the discussion was done through an interpreter who was a Ghanaian national by the name of Mohamed whose surname I do not know. After the three days symposium, the Libyans started coming every day at about 5.00 a.m. to go out on jogging exercise which in fact brought doubts to us, as that was not part of our programme. However, we thought the exercise was just to keep us fit and so we accepted it. The jogging exercise continued every day and the distance of jogging increased every day. We then became

worried and suspicious about the trip we made to Libya. We who attended the symposium started to conclude that it was a ploy to brainwash us. We then started grumbling among ourselves and we put up a rebellious attitude towards the exercise by giving all kinds of excuses. This really did not go down well and Sheka Bangura who said Mr. Foday Sankoh is his uncle started to cry. He even attacked Foday Sankoh that, that was not the reason he went and took him from his mother. Sheka said that Foday Sankoh took him with the pretext that he was taking him to Ghana to do studies in journalism. We also grumbled to Mr. Foday Sankoh about the treatment we were getting from the Libyans. His reply always was that we are men and should accept it. We told him that that was not the reason of the programme we came to Libya for. On the following day during the morning hours Foday Sankoh left us that he was going to the central part of the city. As soon as he had gone, the Libyans another set of group, came with a white van and asked us to board the van with all our belongings. We abide on their instructions and we were taken far off the city to a camp called Wadra Libya. This camp is fenced all over with two steel gates at the frontage whilst at the extreme end of the camp is opened with no gate. That part of the camp leads to the desert. Later that day, Foday Sankoh came to the said camp driven by the Libyans. The camp is fairly a big camp with eight long buildings that will accommodate forty people each. There were also four hanga buildings down by the field which housed vans and car. There was another big building which had about four to six buses. On entering the camp, there was a long building by the left which was used as an office and there was a kitchen there for the Libyans. In the camp, we met the following nationals, Indonesians (Sumatians), South Africans, Liberians who were in the majority, Niger citizens, Malians and West Indians. All these groups we met were training militantly to go in to their respective

counties and cause some insurgence as we were made to understand. We then asked Foday Sankoh to tell us why we were brought to that camp. Foday Sankoh who was a man very quick to anger remarked that if some of us are not careful we will not go back to Sierra Leone. With this kind of threat we kept our cool and we only grumbled among ourselves. We were then housed in the hall occupied by the Liberian nationals but in a separate apartment. Whilst at the camp, the jogging exercise continued to intensify every day, as any one who remained behind during the exercise, will be beaten up and forced to run and catch his fellow men in front. We were faced with no alternative but to obey the Libyans because the punishment given to one for not obeying their command is so fearful. For example you will be tied to a rope behind a van and dragged on the bare ground for some distance, at a speed of about thirty to forty miles per hour. Whilst we were being trained, Foday Sankoh was always out of the camp on trips abroad which he said were mostly to Ghana to solicit funds from his friends. Whilst in the training exercise we got the wind that we are been trained to go and assist Charles Taylor who was planning to launch an attack on Liberia his motherland to overthrow the legitimate government of President Samuel K. Doe. This message did not go down well but little could we do. Apart from the early morning exercise, every Thursday, every body in the camp goes out on a marathon exercise of about five to ten kilometers to and fro with the Libyans behind us in a vehicle to pick those that faint on the way, who will be later on punished by beating, standing naked at night under the snow as if you deliberately refused to do the marathon or training exercise. You will be tied on a jeep and dragged as earlier mentioned. After about a month on the physical exercise, we were taken to the desert on board vehicles where we were taught weapon drill by dismantling and assembling AK47 and General Purpose Machine Gun (G.P.M.G.). We were also shown Rocket

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out was attended by some Libyans whose faces were covered with veil except for their eyes that you will see. They cheer us as we were marching. We the Sierra Leoneans waited at the camp for a week before we left whilst the Liberians left a day or two after the passing out. It was during our week's stay at the camp waiting for a flight that we heard over the B.B.C. radio that Charles Taylor had launched a rebel attack in Liberia. Ansumana Lamin who was my intimate colleague in the training called my attention with regards the information we got that we are been trained to go and assist Charles Taylor. Both of us agreed that we are not going to be party to destroy that fine country and so we planned to escape. Foday Sankoh gave us five hundred Dollars ($500 USD) each as a transport fare whilst the Liberians got one thousand Dollars ($1000 USD) each. When we asked them how comes, they said the Libyan Government gave $1,000 USD to each trainee and that it was Foday Sankoh who cheated us. Fortunately for Ansumana and myself, our departure was divided into two groups and we both happened to fall in the same group. Our group took a flight for Qugadougu in Burkina Faso whilst with instructions from Foday Sankoh that we should wait for him there whilst he boarded a flight with the other group and went to Ghana. When we arrived at Qugadougu, Ansumana and myself decided to move and find our way out. We spent the night in a hotel and the following day we took a train and travelled to Bobodalaso a town in Burkina Faso. Ansumana continued with the train to Gambia via Senegal whilst I came to Sierra Leone by road via Mali and Guinea with my Sierra Leone emergency travelling certificate that were earlier taken from us at Burkina Faso. When I arrived, every body that asked where I have been all the time, I just told them that I was in Ghana. I did not say a word to anybody because my mouth was just filled with surprises and dismay, coupled with bitter sadness because I cannot imagine what I went through

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but to thank God for my life. I vowed within myself that nothing should make me join them, but vowed to revenge on Abu Hassan Koroma alias Aekia. Even my parents I did not tell them what I went through, instead I told them that I was in Ghana. Early in 1990 on my return, I went and sought a teaching job at the Ahmadiyya Muslim Secondary School at Kissy Dock Yard. I was employed as a teacher. While I was teaching at the Ahmadiyya secondary school, sometime in 1991, I heard of a rebel attack on Sierra Leone by Foday Sankoh but I never knew who this Foday Sankoh was until when I went to the Criminal Investigation Department Headquarters (C.I.D.) to pay a visit to my college colleagues of mine Sheka Bangura with whom I was trained with in Libya identified me to the C.I.D. officers as one of those that Foday Sankoh the R.U.F. leader took and trained. At first I denied because I had never been taken out of the country by a man with that name. I was then shown by the C.I.D. officers the picture of Foday Sankoh whom I know as Pa Morlai Sheriff. I straight admitted of knowing him as the man that took us to Libya from Conakry the Republic of Guinea to attend a symposium on African Consciencesim, which happens to be a brain washing in other to destabilise Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. This I now say was disclosed to us on the passing out parade by Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh. It was then that the $500 USD and our Sierra Leonine Emergency Travelling Certificates that were withdrawn from us at the Ouagadougu air port were given to us that we used to find our way. In fact I came straight to Sierra Leone. At the C.I.D. I was subsequently detained and spent four years seven months in detention at the maximum prison at Pademba Road. I was released sometime in December 1995 on Amnesty by the then N.P.R.C. Government. This is all. Statement concluded at 1602 hours. Statement was commenced on Thursday the 11/2/99 at 11.15 hours break off at 17.15 hours continued on 12/2/99 at

10.45 hours. Statement made in English read over and admitted to be true and correct.

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# Annex B.4

## Documents Certified in Annex C.1

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'he Revolutionary [redacted] Leone.
The Ch[redacted]on.
[redacted] January, 2000.

To: The Leader Of the [redacted]
From: The Black Guard
subj: Information received from [redacted] Steven.
Sir.

With your greate permission, the unit is here presenting to you the bellow infoimations:

(1) The government has deployed the SLA's to work together with the UN peace keeping force (UNAMSIL) at Gbongbonor with the intention to take [redacted] from the R.U.F. Party. At the moment they have given them the full UN kits (Badges) as identy to be known as UNAMSILS.

2) These SLA's in the mixed [redacted] of the UN's has fortified the whole Gbongbonor and they are all in arms.

(3) There are a group of people in the village between Gbongbonor and Kabala where they are on elicide ming of Gold. The village is called Konekaya.

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(4) The aim of the UN is to deploy their armaments in land and use force to disarm the R U F as they have [redacted] out that we don't want to leave [redacted]. As they have

taken Kono, they then we have no power again to resist them, as immagined.

(4) They want to use the township of Kono to the border of Guinea ie, by Koidu town, as route to [redacted] man power.

(5) The Col George bordered with two missiles circular enroute towards the area as he was coming yesterday. He met them at between Mile eleven and Gbelle junction.

(6) To Conclude, the Lt. George gathered all these information as eye witness when he went to Gbangbama the past few days. And that the govt do not mean peace.

Sir,

You may call the Lt-Col George, and he will explain to you in detailes as he is presently on the Ground.

Best Regards

signed

Mr. Jackson Swaray

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REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

27TH SEPTEMBER 1999

TO: THE LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION

FROM: BRIGADIER ISSA H SESAY
BATTLEFIELD COMMANDER RUF S/L

SUBJECT: SALUTE REPORT

Sir,

After working on the Draft document of the Abidjan Peace Accord, you returned behind RUF Lines to consult with the Military High Command and all combatants on the Accord and its implications. While in the Kailahun District, we received reports that Colonel Mohamed Tarawallie had been destabilized by Kamajohs and SLA troops at your former base of Camp ZOGODA.
On hearing this news , I and other senior officers convoyed from Gaima to Buedu with the leader.
The next-day ,before returning to Abidjan to conclude documentation and signing of the Accord, you instructed that General Sam Bockarie ( Mosquito ) take over as Battle Group Commander of the RUF.

From Abidjan, the Leader instructed that men should be sent across the Moa River to receive those of our troops who were fortunate enough to have successfully retreated from ZOGODA and to actively go in search of Colonel Mohamed Tarawallie. This order was implemented in full and though we were able to [illegible] both soldiers and civilians that had retreated from ZOGODA, we were unable to locate Colonel Tarawallie.

From Abidjan, we received further instructions that General Mosquito was to take effective command on the ground in your

absence and to assume the assignment of Battle Field Commander, RUF S/L.
I was to assume the duties and responsibilities of Battle Group Commander and together we were to work to maintain the ground, by any means necessary.

General Mosquito was able to make positive contact with ULIMO and make all necessary arrangements to buy materials from them. The money that you had left with us on the ground ( 7000USD ) was utilized to buy materials from ULIMO and with these materials, we were able to resist enemy advances in the Kailahun District.

It became obvious to us on the ground that the Abidjan Accord was nothing but paper, as the Kamajohs were being used against us with vicious attacks on our positions.
It was not long before we heard that the Leader had been arrested in Nigeria, and as we were trying to understand the circumstances of your arrest and implications to the RUF, we learnt that Phillip Palmer, Faia Musa and other members of the External Delegation were now claiming leadership of the RUF.

General Mosquito contacted Palmer telling him that since this was the action that they had taken, it was necessary for them to come back behind our Lines and brief the Military High Command and combatants accordingly. Palmer and others eventually agreed to meet us at the Nongowa Crossing Point. There, amidst drumming and dancing to receive them, the General was able to persuade all of the Coup-plotters, including the Sierra Leone Ambassador to Guinea, Lt. Col. Djabi to cross-over into RUF zone. They were promptly arrested and their statements revealed an international conspiracy, to which they were party, aimed at changing the leadership of the RUF. They have since been in custody until your recent instruction to release them.

Soon after, we received information that Superman, who was operating as Battalion Commander for the Western Area Jungle, had arrested the bodyguards of Colonel Tarawallie and had executed two of them, namely Emanuelle and Victor without consulting with and obtaining such instructions from the Military High Command left on the ground by the Leader.
An investigation was launched and before action could be taken against Superman, the SLPP Government was overthrown by the AFRC on the 25th of May 1997.
A few days later General Mosquito was instructed to move and join our SLA brothers in Freetown,

In accordance with the Leaders instructions, General Mosquito postponed action against Superman and instructed him to lead the advance team from Bradford to Freetown, whilst Colonel Isaac and Brigadier Kallon were to move to join the SLA Forces in Makeni. After ensuring that the security of the High Command was paramount, the General and I moved to Freetown.

Once in place in Freetown we assessed the security situation and deployed our troops in all strategic areas of the Capital and indeed the entire country. In accordance with the instructions of the Leader we took all instructions from Chairman J P Koroma and maintained the same sense of discipline and loyalty that we had developed growing within the ranks of the RUF.

Lt. Col. Gibril Massaquoi arrived in Freetown from Nigeria where he had been under detention with the Leader. He briefed us informally that he had been arrested together with the Leader but that he had escaped, all with the knowledge and consent of the Leader. A few days later Gigril would present a document to Chairman J P Koroma that he, Gibril alleges, was given to him by the Leader.
In the document, it was instructed that no member of the RUF was to accept any Ministerial position or participate in politics in any way. It also endorsed the promotion of Gibril to the rank of a full colonel .
These events were reported to General Mosquito as he had not been in Freetown when Gibril arrived.

On the arrival of Steve Bio in Freetown, he became very closely associated with Lt. Col. Gibril and both seamed to be on their own agenda.

I left Freetown for Kenema in-order to distribute rations and morale boosters to the troops, as well as to organize the various deployments. Whilst waiting for my Jeep to be repaired, a vehicle pulled-up with Steve Bio and Lt. Col. Gibril within.
Gibril greeted me and introduced Steve Bio to me. Though I knew Steve from a brief meeting in Abidjan at the signing of the Peace Accord, I had never really talked to him or knew much about him. They then began to discuss the AFRC and complained about the way in which the RUF was being marginalised and treated with disrespect. We were in a public place and I advised that such talk from them was not to be done around civilians. On this advise, we, including Major Eddie Bockarie ( who was with me ) walked to a point out of the earshot of others. Gibril went on to say that our meeting was not a coincidence and that they had searched the entire town for me as they had an important issue on which they

had to brief me. Mr. Bio then stated that he had come with a special mission and was seeking my support in launching a coup. I listened as both he and Gibril went into details of the numerous grievances held against the AFRC. He said that the AFRC had refused to share power with us and had even marginalised us in the military. I told them that the instructions that we had received from the Leader called on us to join and take all orders from Chairman J P Koroma. Steve Bio responded saying that I should disregard all that as we were all young men and that this was an operation that was necessary for the four of us, Gibril, Steve, General Mosquito and myself to undertake and assume command of the Government and State. I asked them if they had already discussed this with General Mosquito as they had just left him in Freetown. Gibril replied that they had left the General in Freetown but that he was afraid of General Mosquito and could not summon the courage to approach him on such an issue. In fact it was this very reason that had made it necessary for them to search for me in Kenema. Knowing that if I could be convinced, they were close to getting General Mosquito's support.
The two of them left Kenema that night for Bo. At around 0400HRS the following morning General Mosquito arrived in Kenema. I immediately informed him of my previous day's discussions with Gibril and Steve Bio. I told the General that they were asking us to overthrow the very Government that the Leader had instructed us to join and secure. I told General Mosquito that since that dialogue I had been thinking of a secure way of informing him and was very relieved that he was in Kenema. The General was shocked to hear this and in turn informed me that he had been called to the State House in Freetown where he was informed by Chairman J P Koroma that some members of the RUF were planning a coup together with other SLA officers. The General informed me further that he had been given the instructions to investigate the situation and report back to him. That day I moved to Bo and Gibril and Steve joined my convoy to Freetown. On arrival in Freetown I asked them in the presence of Brig. Mike Lamin, Col. Isaac and other security personnel to repeat their statements made to me in Kenema. They repeated the same statements and they were detained and turned over to Army Headquarters at Cockerill.

On new- years- eve, I left home in search of a pharmacy that was still open for business as I was in poor health. I met the Late. Honorable Ghorie who informed me that he had chairs for me and had been trying to get a hold of me for two days. I thanked him sincerely and accepted his gift. Despite all the allegations and testimonies against the character of this man, I say with no hesitation that he welcomed the RUF with all his heart. On

numerous occasions he would provide rations and boosters to our troops and every RUF problem was his problem. I accepted his gift in good faith only to be notified on SLBS Radio the following day that I had looted the Iranian Embassy and as a result , I had been removed from the Supreme Council and that my arrest had been ordered.

Knowing that while we the RUF were securing the Government of the AFRC, they were killing our soldiers with no action being taken and that the RUF High Command had been targeted for elimination, and knowing that I was innocent and the measures taken against me, extreme, I refused arrest and maintained the integrity of the High Command of the RUF.

In general, we were not trusted or respected by the AFRC even though they had called on us to join them. Our troops were the only ones committed to their assignments whilst the AFRC High Command rejected our war plans and strategies referring to us as 'blood-thirsty, bush-colonels'.

It became apparent to us in Freetown, that Lt. Col. Gibril had leaked information to the AFRC pertaining to Military Equipment belonging to the RUF that the Leader had kept in a safe place. Before we could confront Gibril and arrest the situation, he and the AFRC had arranged for the equipment to be delivered to them. They took delivery of the equipment without the concern or consent of the RUF High Command and stored the equipment where we had no say or access to it. When we retreated from Freetown a large quantity of the said equipment was left in storage at the residence of Chairman J P Koroma.

Due to the lack of command and control, shortage of issued materials to our front-line troops and the total lack of support of the SLA soldiers, the enemy were able to move us from Freetown and ousted the AFRC Government.
I retreated first to Waterloo and then to Masiaka . By then, the ECOMOG Force had taken Bo and Kenema and it was agreed that I should attack Bo and begin to organize to move to attack Freetown. I was successful in capturing Bo but sustained an injury that forced me to retreat back to Mile 91 and then to Makeni in search of good medical treatment.
Whilst in Makeni, I went to visit J P Koroma who was in hiding in his village. J P Koroma asked me to arrange and supervise the movement of his entire family to Kailahun as ECOMOG were advancing and the Clandestine Radio 98.1 FM, had accounted that he was in hiding in his village.

I contacted General Mosquito and the order was given to escort the Former Head of State to our Kailahun base.
First, we had to open the road to Kono. This was done in conjunction with Superman and Brig. Mike Lamin. Having put Kono under our Control ,we attacked Gandohun with the intention of opening the road from Koidu-Geya to Sandialu but failed in our attempts. We were then ordered by General Mosquito to enter the Jungle and use the cover of the Jungle to secure J P Koroma and his family to the banks of the Moa River. Across the Moa, General Mosquito had sent vehicles ahead of us and we all reported to Buedu.
All hospitalities were extended to J P Koroma and his family and General turned over his bedroom to J P Koroma and his wife.

J P Koroma appointed General Mosquito as Chief of Defence Staff, with overall command over both the RUF and the SLA and promoted him to the rank of Brigadier General. General Mosquito called on me and informed me that since he had been made Chief of Defence Staff for both the RUF and the SLA by J P Koroma he wanted to turn over his assignment of Battle Field Commander to me and asked me to turn my assignment of Battle Group Commander over to Superman. The General said that he was doing this to draw Superman within the High Command structure of the RUF in a bid to encourage him. I accepted and assumed the assignment of Battle Field Commander and Superman assumed the assignment of Battle Group Commander.

One morning, the Chief Security Officer to the former AFRC Chairman J P Koroma informed me that his boss was planing to escape to Ghana along with his entire family. The CSO further told me that J P Koroma had a parcel of diamonds that he was planning on selling once out of the country.
This information came as a surprise to me and found it hard to believe that at a time when we were trying to put the fighting-men under command and control and provide the necessary logistics to halt our retreat and move forward, J P Koroma would keep diamonds for his own use and flee, leaving us with a problem that he had created.
Accompanied by Brig Mike Lamin and the CSO to J P Koroma I asked the latter to present the diamonds for the use of the Revolution. He complied and the matter was settled.

While in Buedu, Captain Michael Comber of the Mining Unit reported with a parcel of diamonds from Kono.
The parcel was placed in my care by General Mosquito with the instructions to move with it to a transit point where I would be met

by General Ibrahim and together we were to travel to a business associate of the Leader for arrangements and procurement of Military Equipment.
I arrived at the transit point and booked into a hotel.
On the evening of my third day at the hotel, Colonel Jungle and I went across the street to a tea-shop. Whilst there, it started to rain and Jungle and I ran from the shop across the street to the hotel. As we climbed the steps to enter, I touched my pockets, as I had gotten accustomed to doing since the parcel was put in my care.
To my shock and dismay, my pockets were empty. I screamed and put my hands on my head and cried. Jungle and I then retraced our steps from the tea-shop to the hotel. We searched in the rain on our hands and knees. Staff from the hotel helped us in our search, all to no avail. For the first time in my life I contemplated suicide. I above all knew the importance attached to the materials that the diamonds were to facilitate for the movement. How could I ever look my commander in the eyes and tell him that I Issa, who could be trusted with the security of the Nation, could not secure a small parcel of diamonds. As the days went by, I grew frustrated and could not eat or sleep.
Four days after the loss, Jungle and I were sitting on his bed when we monitored National Radio announcing that diamonds had been discovered on the very same street that I had suffered my loss.
Jungle and I cried knowing that the mentioned diamonds were the property of the RUF. Till this day, people still prospect this area thinking that diamonds are underground.
General Mosquito dispatched Lt. Col. Moriba to meet me and escort me back to DHQ.
On arrival, I was met by an enraged General Mosquito who angrily chastised me for the loss. I was ordered to ' fall-out ' and for over a week, the General would not talk to me or even respond to my curtsies.
Finally one morning, I was summoned by the General and instructed that I should leave Buedu and make my base at Pendembu from where I was to coordinate all Front-Line Operations.
I complied with his order and stepped-up operations against the enemy at Daru. I also launched successful Jungle Missions to Joru and Niama.

General Mosquito left on a trip to secure materials for the Movement and on his return I was issued a liberal quantity of ammunition and instructed to cross the Moa River and re-capture Kono from the enemy. Prior to this, the same instructions had been given to Superman who misused the materials given to him and failed to capture the target.

On arrival in Kono I called the Brigade Commander, Rambo and other senior officers and together we arranged a forum in which general security issues were discussed and a war-plan was made for the attack of Koindu Town.

I instructed Brig. Kallon to move to Gold Town and 'cut-off the enemy. I led the troops in the attack of Koidu Town, attacking the enemy at 0600HRS. They put up a strong resistance using their four Mechanized Battalions deployed to defend Kono and its diamonds. Our troops proved too aggressive for them and after fourteen hours of heated combat we captured Koindu Town. The Nigerians retreated to Bumpe. Very early the next morning we attacked their positions at Bumpe and raised them from the town. The enemy were forced to retreat through the road leading to Massingbi where they fell in Kallons ambush. All in all. The enemy lost four war-tanks, armored cars, and a multitude of heavy artillery pieces personal rifles and huge amounts of ammunition. They also suffered heavy casualties the likes of which they have never experienced in the history of ECOMOG. They were forced to retreat on foot with not even a bicycle being able to pass our defenses.

Our Forces moved for Massingbi, Rambo and Kallon moving with the advance team whilst I moved to repel a Kamajoh Attack at Nimikoro. Our forces had by then captured Massingbi and Magboroka and were advancing to attack Makeni.
I joined them, taking with me all needed Military Materials for the attack. We quickly put the Township under our Military Control.
General Mosquito called me 'on set' and instructed that we allow Superman to join in the operations. The General explained that though Superman had earlier refused his orders, he Mosquito was man enough to put it behind him and accept Superman back, referring to him as ' a brother in arms.'
Rambo proceeded to a village beyond Binkolo where Superman had been in hiding and brought him to Makeni.
That morning the two of us met and had polite discussions.
Together we attacked the Barracks and captured it .
At that point, I received information that the enemy were moving to attack Njiama-Swafe and I moved to put the situation under control.
Upon my return to Makeni, Rambo and Kallon reported that all Military Equipment in their care had been reported to the G-4. They reported that Superman on the other hand had taken the Materials ~~he collected to~~ his house. Accompanied by Kallon, I went to Superman's house and confronted him with the issue. I informed him that it was proper procedure to report all captured Military Materials to the G-4 who would then file a comprehensive report to DHQ and issue the said Materials upon instructions. I asked that

Superman present the Materials so as to ensure proper accountability. Superman led Kallon and I into the house and showed us where he had kept the Materials. I instructed that it be moved and reported to the G-4.

Two days later General Mosquito again asked for understanding and allowed Superman to rejoin the operations.

* Rambo was instructed to advance and attack Port Loko which he did, deploying his forward defensive at the Port Loko turn-table, leading to Kambia. Rambo shared the town with the enemy for seven days.
Superman, pleaded that eventhough Rambo had done well, he as Battle Group Commander knew the ground well and should take over the ground . He said that he had received Intelligence that the Leader had been moved to Lungi and wanted to advance as far as Lungi and rescue the Leader.

* At this time our forces Freetown were under enemy ' cut-off ' from the rear and were in danger of being boxed-in and either captured alive or killed.
Rambo was withdrawn from his operation in Port Loko and instructed to open a through- way to connect with our men in Freetown.
Rambo then attacked and captured Masiaka, advanced and captured RDF, and attacked the Guineans at Waterloo, engaging them in combat for four days and four nights.
* The Guineans wrote us a letter asking for their safe passage back to Guinea, saying that they were taking their hands out of the war.
I replied, denying their request. I told them that if they wanted ' safe passage ' they should leave behind all their Military Equipment.
A few days later I monitored the sound of heavy bombardment from the direction of Port Loko. On inquiring, I was informed that our troops had dissolved the ground and that the enemy were advancing towards Gberay Junction. I asked for Superman and was informed that he was in Lunsar and not on the ground that he had asked for and been given.
The Guinean convoy bulldozed all the way to Masiaka where my position was also bulldozed. Their mission was to rescue the Guineans at Waterloo. Upon reaching Waterloo they joined forces and made a 'U-turn', bulldozing my ambush for a second time at RDF. The Guinean convoy consisted of over four war-tanks, eight armored vehicles, a Forty Barrel Missile , four Anti-Aircraft Guns and countless other mounted weapons and over eight trucks full of personnel. As they moved they bombarded and assaulted, clearing a path for themselves.

I was extremely annoyed at my position being bulldozed and issued strong orders for an ambush to be set ahead of them. They fell in the ambush and my Bodyguard commander led a team of less than a squad of men in the capture of the Forty Barrel Missile and a large quantity of its bombs.

I moved to Escort the Missile to our rear and on my return, Superman asked to join Rambo at Waterloo. He sighted the fact that as the SLA Commanders had operated with him before he would be able to consolidate them and exercise command and control over them . Taking into consideration his status as Battle Group and the logic behind his explanations, I gave the OK for Superman to join Rambo in Waterloo.
At Waterloo Superman incited SLA Commanders and soldiers against Rambo and generally did his best to cause a break-down in command on the ground.

A few days later` General Mosquito on hearing that Lt. Col. Gibril had been rescued and had joined operations at Waterloo, called me and asked me to inform Gibril that he was welcome back and that no ill-feelings were borne against him. Gibril was to also report to DHQ to brief the High Command and all on the condition of the Leader as they had been in prison together.
Superman , monitoring the dialogue on field-radio responded that He would not allow Gibril to come to the call of the High Command.
A few days later, I received information from the Waterloo Front-Line that Superman and Gibril had retreated to Lunsar and had moved with a good number of men. As a result, the enemy had advanced and were now at Yams Farm.
I informed Rambo who was at my location on a Medical Pass . Rambo asked for ammunition to be given to him so that he could collect the Force from Lunsar and move to stop the enemy advance at Yams Farm. I arrived at Lunsar with only eight bodyguards and met Rambo and Gibril discussing. Gibril greeted me and we exchanged pleasantries. I told him that General Mosquito wanted him to report to DHQ not to face any charges but to give account of the state and condition of the Leader as they had been in prison together. Gibril complied and entered my vehicle. At that moment, Superman and his men came from the back of the building, opened suppressive fire and launched RPG rockets against my position. Gibril left my vehicle and joined Superman in attacking me. I managed to escape with my life but they had killed two RUF soldiers assigned to me as bodyguards.
I got in a vehicle with Major Kolo Mulba and escaped through Gberay Junction, Masiaka, Mile 91 to Magboroka.

Meanwhile, Superman and Gibril moved to Makeni and attacked my residence. They shot at my house, tied and beat up RUF soldiers and raised my compound. They entered my house, beating up my wife, undressing her and taunting her with rude and abusive remarks before she was able to escape under gun-fire.
Mr. E T Samara and others rescued from prison in Freetown, were staying with me in Makeni and were also molested and raised. RUF Military Materials given to me by the General for a planned re-attack of Freetown were looted along with 9,000 USD also RUF property.
That same day Superman and Gibril attacked the home of Brig. Kallon. The entire house was raised and his wife was stripped off all her clothing and made to sit on the ground. Her suckling- child was snatched from her and repeatedly banged against a wall. This resulted in serious injuries to the child.

I reported the incident to General Mosquito who asked me to exercise restraint and he dispatched a Delegation headed by Col. Isaac to calm the situation down and investigate the incident.
The Delegation obtained statements from me and proceeded to Lunsar to get a statement from my attackers. Superman and Gibril refused to co-operate and issued threats against the Delegates.

During this impasse the enemy had advanced to Gberay Junction. General Mosquito instructed that in the interest of the Revolution, we should put our differences aside temporarily and act to repel the enemy. Along with Kallon, Rambo and Brig. Isaac, four trucks of armed men were mobilized and we joined the Force at Lunsar and moved for Gberay Junction. Four of Rambo's men were killed in that attack by ' friendly fire ' from the rear suggesting foul-play.

Again the enemy moved against our positions advancing towards Mile 91. I sent Rambo, equipping him with a Single Barrel BZT. He met and joined Col. Bai Bureh and they were able to push the enemy past Moyamba Junction to Tiama Junction where they deployed our troops.
Rambo proposed an attack of BO and it was arranged that Kallon would hit Yele.
Kallon was dispatched to DIIQ to receive logistics for the said mission. Two days later I made a day's trip to Matotoka as the area was under Kamajoh threat. On returning to Makeni, Rambo visited me to inform me that he had repaired the BZT Weapon and wanted to move to capture Bo the next morning. He left my house at around 2100HRS and I stayed up past mid-night. I stayed awake and at 0110HRS I heard heavy firing from outside. I entered my ' living-room ' and my bodyguards were running from the direction of the firing. Some of them had been shot. I exited the house through a

back entrance and ran for cover. A RPG rocket was launched against me and I was hit in the toe by fragment from the blast. I ran as guns blazed behind me. I got to a safe place and spent the night. The next morning with the aid of civilians, I escaped to Makali. The hunt was on for me and I had to bye-pass major towns on my way. At Makali I was at the Signal Station monitoring the Network when the Leader called. I responded and reported that I was faced with a serious problem. Not wanting to let the enemy know that there was serious in-fighting going on within the RUF, I could not go into details. At the end of my dialogue with the Leader I was attacked again by Gibril. They took me by surprise as I had been very careful not to disclose my location. The people of Makali, including the Paramount Chief Pa Alimamy Kann, will testify that Gibril led the attack. He raised the town shooting and wounding people on the ground. He swore that he would kill me and take my head to Makeni where he would put it on display.

Away from my ground at Makeni, Superman took the opportunity of calling a meeting at the Town Hall where he informed those assembled that General Mosquito and I had collaborated to hijack the leadership of the RUF and sighted the Generals advise not to respond to the call of the Leader on field-radio as proof. He informed the meeting that he had received instructions from the Leader to take full command of the RUF and to arrest and execute both General Mosquito and I, Brig. Issa.

By then I had maneuvered to Kono, after spending five days in the bush as a result of the attack on me in Makali.
Kallon moved to Magboroka to take command and was able to repel numerous attacks from Superman and Gibril.

Upon receiving instructions from the Leader, through the General, calling for Kallon to take command at Makeni. I mobilized Kallon and the said operation was undertaken. We were allmost in control of the entire Township when the General informed us that that the Leader wanted us to abort the operation and for Kallon to return to Makeni.
A Military Order was passed and we withdrew the force to await the arrival of the Leader on the ground.

Sir, if my Report is centered on the activities of Superman and Gibril it is not so merely because of their attacks on me but rather because of the negative results their ' out-law ' actions have brought to the Movement.

Superman sought the advise of ULIMO General Boplch and SLA Brig. Mannie. Both strong critics and self-confessed enemies of the RUF. Superman placed Former President J S Momoh in the hands of Mannie who arranged for Momoh to escape to Guinea. Mannie refused to hand Momoh over to me stating that Momoh is SLA property and not RUF.
He incited SLA soldiers to go against RUF Command and together with Gibril sought to sabotage the progress of the movement thus delaying the release of the Leader.
Superman killed Rambo in cold blood and made several attempts on my life in a bid to eliminate the RUF High Command left on the ground by the Leader.

Sir, it has not been easy controlling my emotions and harder still controlling the men who witnessed the cold-blooded killing of Rambo.
General Mosquito, I Brig. Issa and other senior officers have obediently taken all orders from you and at this time we await most anxiously your arrival when we look to have the matter resolved by you.

Lastly Sir, the vast majority of the men are in ' high spirit ' and remain loyal to the Leadership of the RUF. They have fought hard and longed for the return of the Leader.
As Battle Field Commander I pledge my loyalty to the Leader and ask that he moves earliest, to look into the internal-affairs of the RUF.
The High Command, officers, combatants and civilians of the RUF are on the ground and on full-alert awaiting the ' last-order ' of the Commander In Chief of the RUF S/L, Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh.

Militarily Yours,

Brigadier Issa H Sesay
Battle Field Commander
RUF S/L

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REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

00009645

27TH SEPTEMBER 1999

TO: THE LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION

FROM: BRIGADIER ISSA H SESAY
BATTLEFIELD COMMANDER RUF S/L

SUBJECT: SALUTE REPORT

Sir,

After working on the Draft document of the Abidjan Peace Accord, you returned behind RUF Lines to consult with the Military High Command and all combatants on the Accord and its implications. While in the Kailahun District, we received reports that Colonel Mohamed Tarawallie had been destabilized by Kamajohs and SLA troops at your former base of Camp ZOGODA.
On hearing this news , I and other senior officers convoyed from Gaima to Buedu with the leader.
The next-day ,before returning to Abidjan to conclude documentation and signing of the Accord, you instructed that General Sam Bockarie ( Mosquito ) take over as Battle Group Commander of the RUF.

From Abidjan, the Leader instructed that men should be sent across the Moa River to receive those of our troops who were fortunate enough to have successfully retreated from ZOGODA and to actively go in search of Colonel Mohamed Tarawallie. This order was implemented in full and though we were able to [illegible] both soldiers and civilians that had retreated from ZOGODA, we were unable to locate Colonel Tarawallie.

From Abidjan, we received further instructions that General Mosquito was to take effective command on the ground in your

absence and to assume the assignment of Battle Field Commander, RUF S/L.
I was to assume the duties and responsibilities of Battle Group Commander and together we were to work to maintain the ground, by any means necessary.

General Mosquito was able to make positive contact with ULIMO and make all necessary arrangements to buy materials from them. The money that you had left with us on the ground ( 7000USD ) was utilized to buy materials from ULIMO and with these materials, we were able to resist enemy advances in the Kailahun District.

It became obvious to us on the ground that the Abidjan Accord was nothing but paper, as the Kamajohs were being used against us with vicious attacks on our positions.
It was not long before we heard that the Leader had been arrested in Nigeria, and as we were trying to understand the circumstances of your arrest and implications to the RUF, we learnt that Philip Palmer, Faia Musa and other members of the External Delegation were now claiming leadership of the RUF.

General Mosquito contacted Palmer telling him that since this was the action that they had taken, it was necessary for them to come back behind our Lines and brief the Military High Command and combatants accordingly. Palmer and others eventually agreed to meet us at the Nongowa Crossing Point. There, amidst drumming and dancing to receive them, the General was able to persuade all of the Coup-plotters, including the Sierra Leone Ambassador to Guinea, Lt. Col. Djabi to cross-over into RUF zone. They were promptly arrested and their statements revealed an international conspiracy, to which they were party, aimed at changing the leadership of the RUF. They have since been in custody until your recent instruction to release them.

Soon after, we received information that Superman, who was operating as Battalion Commander for the Western Area Jungle, had arrested the bodyguards of Colonel Tarawallie and had executed two of them, namely Emanuelle and Victor without consulting with and obtaining such instructions from the Military High Command left on the ground by the Leader.
An investigation was launched and before action could be taken against Superman, the SLPP Government was overthrown by the AFRC on the 25th of May 1997.
A few days later General Mosquito was instructed to move and join our SLA brothers in Freetown,

In accordance with the Leaders instructions, General Mosquito postponed action against Superman and instructed him to lead the advance team from Bradford to Freetown, whilst Colonel Isaac and Brigadier Kallon were to move to join the SLA Forces in Makeni. After ensuring that the security of the High Command was paramount, the General and I moved to Freetown.

Once in place in Freetown we assessed the security situation and deployed our troops in all strategic areas of the Capital and indeed the entire country. In accordance with the instructions of the Leader we took all instructions from Chairman J P Koroma and maintained the same sense of discipline and loyalty that we had developed growing within the ranks of the RUF.

Lt. Col. Gibril Massaquoi arrived in Freetown from Nigeria where he had been under detention with the Leader. He briefed us informally that he had been arrested together with the Leader but that he had escaped, all with the knowledge and consent of the Leader. A few days later Gigril would present a document to Chairman J P Koroma that he, Gibril alleges, was given to him by the Leader.
In the document, it was instructed that no member of the RUF was to accept any Ministerial position or participate in politics in any way. It also endorsed the promotion of Gibril to the rank of a full colonel .
These events were reported to General Mosquito as he had not been in Freetown when Gibril arrived.

On the arrival of Steve Bio in Freetown, he became very closely associated with Lt. Col. Gibril and both seamed to be on their own agenda.

I left Freetown for Kenema in-order to distribute rations and morale boosters to the troops, as well as to organize the various deployments. Whilst waiting for my Jeep to be repaired, a vehicle pulled-up with Steve Bio and Lt. Col. Gibril within.
Gibril greeted me and introduced Steve Bio to me. Though I knew Steve from a brief meeting in Abidjan at the signing of the Peace Accord, I had never really talked to him or knew much about him.
They then began to discuss the AFRC and complained about the way in which the RUF was being marginalised and treated with disrespect. We were in a public place and I advised that such talk from them was not to be done around civilians. On this advise, we, including Major Eddie Bockarie ( who was with me ) walked to a point out of the earshot of others. Gibril went on to say that our meeting was not a coincidence and that they had searched the entire town for me as they had an important issue on which they

had to brief me. Mr. Bio then stated that he had come with a special mission and was seeking my support in launching a coup. I listened as both he and Gibril went into details of the numerous grievances held against the AFRC. He said that the AFRC had refused to share power with us and had even marginalised us in the military. I told them that the instructions that we had received from the Leader called on us to join and take all orders from Chairman J P Koroma. Steve Bio responded saying that I should disregard all that as we were all young men and that this was an operation that was necessary for the four of us, Gibril, Steve, General Mosquito and myself to undertake and assume command of the Government and State. I asked them if they had already discussed this with General Mosquito as they had just left him in Freetown. Gibril replied that they had left the General in Freetown but that he was afraid of General Mosquito and could not summon the courage to approach him on such an issue. In fact it was this very reason that had made it necessary for them to search for me in Kenema. Knowing that if I could be convinced, they were close to getting General Mosquito's support.

The two of them left Kenema that night for Bo. At around 0400HRS the following morning General Mosquito arrived in Kenema. I immediately informed him of my previous day's discussions with Gibril and Steve Bio. I told the General that they were asking us to overthrow the very Government that the Leader had instructed us to join and secure. I told General Mosquito that since that dialogue I had been thinking of a secure way of informing him and was very relieved that he was in Kenema. The General was shocked to hear this and in turn informed me that he had been called to the State House in Freetown where he was informed by Chairman J P Koroma that some members of the RUF were planning a coup together with other SLA officers. The General informed me further that he had been given the instructions to investigate the situation and report back to him. That day I moved to Bo and Gibril and Steve joined my convoy to Freetown. On arrival in Freetown I asked them in the presence of Brig. Mike Lamin, Col. Isaac and other security personnel to repeat their statements made to me in Kenema. They repeated the same statements and they were detained and turned over to Army Headquarters at Cockerill.

On new- years- eve, I left home in search of a pharmacy that was still open for business as I was in poor health. I met the Late. Honorable Ghorie who informed me that he had chairs for me and had been trying to get a hold of me for two days. I thanked him sincerely and accepted his gift. Despite all the allegations and testimonies against the character of this man, I say with no hesitation that he welcomed the RUF with all his heart. On

numerous occasions he would provide rations and boosters to our troops and every RUF problem was his problem. I accepted his gift in good faith only to be notified on SLBS Radio the following day that I had looted the Iranian Embassy and as a result , I had been removed from the Supreme Council and that my arrest had been ordered.

Knowing that while we the RUF were securing the Government of the AFRC, they were killing our soldiers with no action being taken and that the RUF High Command had been targeted for elimination, and knowing that I was innocent and the measures taken against me, extreme, I refused arrest and maintained the integrity of the High Command of the RUF.

In general, we were not trusted or respected by the AFRC even though they had called on us to join them. Our troops were the only ones committed to their assignments whilst the AFRC High Command rejected our war plans and strategies referring to us as 'blood-thirsty, bush-colonels'.

It became apparent to us in Freetown, that Lt. Col. Gibril had leaked information to the AFRC pertaining to Military Equipment belonging to the RUF that the Leader had kept in a safe place. Before we could confront Gibril and arrest the situation, he and the AFRC had arranged for the equipment to be delivered to them. They took delivery of the equipment without the concern or consent of the RUF High Command and stored the equipment where we had no say or access to it. When we retreated from Freetown a large quantity of the said equipment was left in storage at the residence of Chairman J P Koroma.

Due to the lack of command and control, shortage of issued materials to our front-line troops and the total lack of support of the SLA soldiers, the enemy were able to move us from Freetown and ousted the AFRC Government.
I retreated first to Waterloo and then to Masiaka . By then, the ECOMOG Force had taken Bo and Kenema and it was agreed that I should attack Bo and begin to organize to move to attack Freetown. I was successful in capturing Bo but sustained an injury that forced me to retreat back to Mile 91 and then to Makeni in search of good medical treatment.
Whilst in Makeni, I went to visit J P Koroma who was in hiding in his village. J P Koroma asked me to arrange and supervise the movement of his entire family to Kailahun as ECOMOG were advancing and the Clandestine Radio 98.1 FM, had accounted that he was in hiding in his village.

I contacted General Mosquito and the order was given to escort the Former Head of State to our Kailahun base.
First, we had to open the road to Kono. This was done in conjunction with Superman and Brig. Mike Lamin. Having put Kono under our Control ,we attacked Gandohun with the intention of opening the road from Koidu-Geya to Saudialu but failed in our attempts. We were then ordered by General Mosquito to enter the Jungle and use the cover of the Jungle to secure J P Koroma and his family to the banks of the Moa River. Across the Moa, General Mosquito had sent vehicles ahead of us and we all reported to Buedu.
All hospitalities were extended to J P Koroma and his family and General turned over his bedroom to J P Koroma and his wife.

J P Koroma appointed General Mosquito as Chief of Defence Staff, with overall command over both the RUF and the SLA and promoted him to the rank of Brigadier General. General Mosquito called on me and informed me that since he had been made Chief of Defence Staff for both the RUF and the SLA by J P Koroma he wanted to turn over his assignment of Battle Field Commander to me and asked me to turn my assignment of Battle Group Commander over to Superman. The General said that he was doing this to draw Superman within the High Command structure of the RUF in a bid to encourage him. I accepted and assumed the assignment of Battle Field Commander and Superman assumed the assignment of Battle Group Commander.

One morning, the Chief Security Officer to the former AFRC Chairman J P Koroma informed me that his boss was planing to escape to Ghana along with his entire family. The CSO further told me that J P Koroma had a parcel of diamonds that he was planning on selling once out of the country.
This information came as a surprise to me and found it hard to believe that at a time when we were trying to put the fighting-men under command and control and provide the necessary logistics to halt our retreat and move forward, J P Koroma would keep diamonds for his own use and flee, leaving us with a problem that he had created.
Accompanied by Brig Mike Lamin and the CSO to J P Koroma I asked the latter to present the diamonds for the use of the Revolution. He complied and the matter was settled.

While in Buedu, Captain Michael Comber of the Mining Unit reported with a parcel of diamonds from Kono.
The parcel was placed in my care by General Mosquito with the instructions to move with it to a transit point where I would be met

by General Ibrahim and together we were to travel to a business associate of the Leader for arrangements and procurement of Military Equipment.
I arrived at the transit point and booked into a hotel.
On the evening of my third day at the hotel, Colonel Jungle and I went across the street to a tea-shop. Whilst there, it started to rain and Jungle and I ran from the shop across the street to the hotel. As we climbed the steps to enter, I touched my pockets, as I had gotten accustomed to doing since the parcel was put in my care.
To my shock and dismay, my pockets were empty. I screamed and put my hands on my head and cried. Jungle and I then retraced our steps from the tea-shop to the hotel. We searched in the rain on our hands and knees. Staff from the hotel helped us in our search, all to no avail. For the first time in my life I contemplated suicide. I above all knew the importance attached to the materials that the diamonds were to facilitate for the movement. How could I ever look my commander in the eyes and tell him that I Issa, who could be trusted with the security of the Nation, could not secure a small parcel of diamonds. As the days went by, I grew frustrated and could not eat or sleep.
Four days after the loss, Jungle and I were sitting on his bed when we monitored National Radio announcing that diamonds had been discovered on the very same street that I had suffered my loss.
Jungle and I cried knowing that the mentioned diamonds were the property of the RUF. Till this day, people still prospect this area thinking that diamonds are underground.
General Mosquito dispatched Lt. Col. Moriba to meet me and escort me back to DHQ.
On arrival, I was met by an enraged General Mosquito who angrily chastised me for the loss. I was ordered to ' fall-out ' and for over a week, the General would not talk to me or even respond to my curtsies.
Finally one morning, I was summoned by the General and instructed that I should leave Buedu and make my base at Pendembu from where I was to coordinate all Front-Line Operations.
I complied with his order and stepped-up operations against the enemy at Daru. I also launched successful Jungle Missions to Joru and Niama.

General Mosquito left on a trip to secure materials for the Movement and on his return I was issued a liberal quantity of ammunition and instructed to cross the Moa River and re-capture Kono from the enemy. Prior to this, the same instructions had been given to Superman who misused the materials given to him and failed to capture the target.

On arrival in Kono I called the Brigade Commander, Rambo and other senior officers and together we arranged a forum in which general security issues were discussed and a war-plan was made for the attack of Koindu Town.

I instructed Brig. Kallon to move to Gold Town and 'cut-off' the enemy. I led the troops in the attack of Koidu Town, attacking the enemy at 0600HRS. They put up a strong resistance using their four Mechanized Battalions deployed to defend Kono and its diamonds. Our troops proved too aggressive for them and after fourteen hours of heated combat we captured Koindu Town. The Nigerians retreated to Bumpe. Very early the next morning we attacked their positions at Bumpe and raised them from the town. The enemy were forced to retreat through the road leading to Massingbi where they fell in Kallons ambush. All in all. The enemy lost four war-tanks, armored cars, and a multitude of heavy artillery pieces personal rifles and huge amounts of ammunition. They also suffered heavy casualties the likes of which they have never experienced in the history of ECOMOG. They were forced to retreat on foot with not even a bicycle being able to pass our defenses.

Our Forces moved for Massingbi, Rambo and Kallon moving with the advance team whilst I moved to repel a Kamajoh Attack at Nimikoro. Our forces had by then captured Massingbi and Magboroka and were advancing to attack Makeni.
I joined them, taking with me all needed Military Materials for the attack. We quickly put the Township under our Military Control.
General Mosquito called me 'on set' and instructed that we allow Superman to join in the operations. The General explained that though Superman had earlier refused his orders, he Mosquito was man enough to put it behind him and accept Superman back, referring to him as ' a brother in arms.'
Rambo proceeded to a village beyond Binkolo where Superman had been in hiding and brought him to Makeni.
That morning the two of us met and had polite discussions.
Together we attacked the Barracks and captured it .
At that point, I received information that the enemy were moving to attack Njiama-Swafe and I moved to put the situation under control.
Upon my return to Makeni, Rambo and Kallon reported that all Military Equipment in their care had been reported to the G-4. They reported that Superman on the other hand had taken the Materials he collected to his house. Accompanied by Kallon, I went to Superman's house and confronted him with the issue. I informed, him that it was proper procedure to report all captured Military Materials to the G-4 who would then file a comprehensive report to DHQ and issue the said Materials upon instructions. I asked that

Superman present the Materials so as to ensure proper accountability. Superman led Kallon and I into the house and showed us where he had kept the Materials. I instructed that it be moved and reported to the G-4.

Two days later General Mosquito again asked for understanding and allowed Superman to rejoin the operations.

* Rambo was instructed to advance and attack Port Loko which he did, deploying his forward defensive at the Port Loko turn-table, leading to Kambia. Rambo shared the town with the enemy for seven days.
Superman, pleaded that eventhough Rambo had done well, he as Battle Group Commander knew the ground well and should take over the ground . He said that he had received Intelligence that the Leader had been moved to Lungi and wanted to advance as far as Lungi and rescue the Leader.

* At this time our forces Freetown were under enemy ' cut-off ' from the rear and were in danger of being boxed-in and either captured alive or killed.
Rambo was withdrawn from his operation in Port Loko and instructed to open a through- way to connect with our men in Freetown.
Rambo then attacked and captured Masiaka, advanced and captured RDF, and attacked the Guineans at Waterloo, engaging them in combat for four days and four nights.
* The Guineans wrote us a letter asking for their safe passage back to Guinea, saying that they were taking their hands out of the war.
I replied, denying their request. I told them that if they wanted ' safe passage ' they should leave behind all their Military Equipment.
A few days later I monitored the sound of heavy bombardment from the direction of Port Loko. On inquiring, I was informed that our troops had dissolved the ground and that the enemy were advancing towards Gberay Junction. I asked for Superman and was informed that he was in Lunsar and not on the ground that he had asked for and been given.
The Guinean convoy bulldozed all the way to Masiaka where my position was also bulldozed. Their mission was to rescue the Guineans at Waterloo. Upon reaching Waterloo they joined forces and made a 'U-turn', bulldozing my ambush for a second time at RDF. The Guinean convoy consisted of over four war-tanks, eight armored vehicles, a Forty Barrel Missile , four Anti-Aircraft Guns and countless other mounted weapons and over eight trucks full of personnel. As they moved they bombarded and assaulted, clearing a path for themselves.

I was extremely annoyed at my position being bulldozed and issued strong orders for an ambush to be set ahead of them. They fell in the ambush and my Bodyguard commander led a team of less than a squad of men in the capture of the Forty Barrel Missile and a large quantity of its bombs.

I moved to Escort the Missile to our rear and on my return, Superman asked to join Rambo at Waterloo. He sighted the fact that as the SLA Commanders had operated with him before he would be able to consolidate them and exercise command and control over them . Taking into consideration his status as Battle Group and the logic behind his explanations, I gave the OK for Superman to join Rambo in Waterloo.
At Waterloo Superman incited SLA Commanders and soldiers against Rambo and generally did his best to cause a break-down in command on the ground.

A few days later` General Mosquito on hearing that Lt. Col. Gibril had been rescued and had joined operations at Waterloo, called me and asked me to inform Gibril that he was welcome back and that no ill-feelings were borne against him. Gibril was to also report to DHQ to brief the High Command and all on the condition of the Leader as they had been in prison together.
Superman , monitoring the dialogue on field-radio responded that He would not allow Gibril to come to the call of the High Command.
A few days later, I received information from the Waterloo Front-Line that Superman and Gibril had retreated to Lunsar and had moved with a good number of men. As a result, the enemy had advanced and were now at Yams Farm.
I informed Rambo who was at my location on a Medical Pass . Rambo asked for ammunition to be given to him so that he could collect the Force from Lunsar and move to stop the enemy advance at Yams Farm. I arrived at Lunsar with only eight bodyguards and met Rambo and Gibril discussing. Gibril greeted me and we exchanged pleasantries. I told him that General Mosquito wanted him to report to DIIQ not to face any charges but to give account of the state and condition of the Leader as they had been in prison together. Gibril complied and entered my vehicle. At that moment, Superman and his men came from the back of the building, opened suppressive fire and launched RPG rockets against my position. Gibril left my vehicle and joined Superman in attacking me. I managed to escape with my life but they had killed two RUF soldiers assigned to me as bodyguards.
I got in a vehicle with Major Kolo Mulba and escaped through Gberay Junction, Masiaka, Mile 91 to Magboroka.

Meanwhile, Superman and Gibril moved to Makeni and attacked my residence. They shot at my house, tied and beat up RUF soldiers and raised my compound. They entered my house, beating up my wife, undressing her and taunting her with rude and abusive remarks before she was able to escape under gun-fire.
Mr. E T Samara and others rescued from prison in Freetown, were staying with me in Makeni and were also molested and raised. RUF Military Materials given to me by the General for a planned re-attack of Freetown were looted along with 9,000 USD also RUF property.
That same day Superman and Gibril attacked the home of Brig. Kallon. The entire house was raised and his wife was stripped off all her clothing and made to sit on the ground. Her suckling- child was snatched from her and repeatedly banged against a wall. This resulted in serious injuries to the child.

I reported the incident to General Mosquito who asked me to exercise restraint and he dispatched a Delegation headed by Col. Isaac to calm the situation down and investigate the incident. The Delegation obtained statements from me and proceeded to Lunsar to get a statement from my attackers. Superman and Gibril refused to co-operate and issued threats against the Delegates.

During this impasse the enemy had advanced to Gberay Junction. General Mosquito instructed that in the interest of the Revolution, we should put our differences aside temporarily and act to repel the enemy. Along with Kallon, Rambo and Brig. Isaac, four trucks of armed men were mobilized and we joined the Force at Lunsar and moved for Gberay Junction. Four of Rambo's men were killed in that attack by ' friendly fire ' from the rear suggesting foul-play.

Again the enemy moved against our positions advancing towards Mile 91. I sent Rambo, equipping him with a Single Barrel BZT. He met and joined Col. Bai Bureh and they were able to push the enemy past Moyamba Junction to Tiama Junction where they deployed our troops.
Rambo proposed an attack of BO and it was arranged that Kallon would hit Yele.
Kallon was dispatched to DIIQ to receive logistics for the said mission. Two days later I made a day's trip to Matotoka as the area was under Kamajoh threat. On returning to Makeni, Rambo visited me to inform me that he had repaired the BZT Weapon and wanted to move to capture Bo the next morning. He left my house at around 2100HRS and I stayed up past mid-night. I stayed awake and at 0110HRS I heard heavy firing from outside. I entered my ' living-room ' and my bodyguards were running from the direction of the firing. Some of them had been shot. I exited the house through a

back entrance and ran for cover. A RPG rocket was launched against me and I was hit in the toe by fragment from the blast. I ran as guns blazed behind me. I got to a safe place and spent the night. The next morning with the aid of civilians, I escaped to Makali. The hunt was on for me and I had to bye-pass major towns on my way. At Makali I was at the Signal Station monitoring the Network when the Leader called. I responded and reported that I was faced with a serious problem. Not wanting to let the enemy know that there was serious in-fighting going on within the RUF, I could not go into details. At the end of my dialogue with the Leader I was attacked again by Gibril. They took me by surprise as I had been very careful not to disclose my location. The people of Makali, including the Paramount Chief Pa Alimamy Kanu, will testify that Gibril led the attack. He raised the town shooting and wounding people on the ground. He swore that he would kill me and take my head to Makeni where he would put it on display.

Away from my ground at Makeni, Superman took the opportunity of calling a meeting at the Town Hall where he informed those assembled that General Mosquito and I had collaborated to hijack the leadership of the RUF and sighted the Generals advise not to respond to the call of the Leader on field-radio as proof. He informed the meeting that he had received instructions from the Leader to take full command of the RUF and to arrest and execute both General Mosquito and I, Brig. Issa.

By then I had maneuvered to Kono, after spending five days in the bush as a result of the attack on me in Makali.
Kallon moved to Magboroka to take command and was able to repel numerous attacks from Superman and Gibril.

Upon receiving instructions from the Leader, through the General, calling for Kallon to take command at Makeni. I mobilized Kallon and the said operation was undertaken. We were allmost in control of the entire Township when the General informed us that that the Leader wanted us to abort the operation and for Kallon to return to Makeni.
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General Mosquito, I Brig. Issa and other senior officers have obediently taken all orders from you and at this time we await most anxiously your arrival when we look to have the matter resolved by you.

Lastly Sir, the vast majority of the men are in ' high spirit ' and remain loyal to the Leadership of the RUF. They have fought hard and longed for the return of the Leader.
As Battle Field Commander I pledge my loyalty to the Leader and ask that he moves earliest, to look into the internal-affairs of the RUF.
The High Command, officers, combatants and civilians of the RUF are on the ground and on full-alert awaiting the ' last-order ' of the Commander In Chief of the RUF S/L, Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh.

Militarily Yours,

Brigadier Issa H Sesay
Battle Field Commander
RUF S/L

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# REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT - SIERRA LEONE

# (RUF/SL)

## TRAINED RUF/AFRC/SLA CHILD COMBATANTS AT LUNGI

| S/No. | RANK | NAME | BASE TRAINED | NAME OF TRAINING COMMANDANT | YEAR TRAINED | WHERE/WHEN CAPTURED | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sgt. | Allie Brima | Pendembu | Alysious Koker | May-91 | Pendembu - 1991 | Trained - RUF |
| 2 | Pte. | Boboh Brima | Jui-Koya | C.O. Rashid | 1994 | Komboma - 1994 | Trained - RUF |
| 3 | Pte. | Foday Koroma | Feradugu | C.O. Thompy-Lala | 1998 | Lunsar - 1998 | Trained - RUF |
| 4 | Pte. | Justine Wilson | Rosos | C.O. Ranger (SLA) | 1997 | Waterloo - 1997 | Trained - SLA |
| 5 | Pte. | Kassim Conteh | Camp Lion | C.O. Monica | 1997 | Makeni Town - 1997 | Trained - RUF |
| 6 | Pte. | Hassan Bah | Barri Potoru | Lt. George | 1997 | Bandajuma Sowa - 19971 | Trained - SLA |
| 7 | Pte. | Ansumana Pay | Lunsar | Lt. Alabama (SLA) | 1997 | Lunsar - 1997 | Trained - SLA |
| 8 | Pte. | Lamin Sankoh | Camp Lion | Camp Lion | 1997 | Magburuka - 1997 | Trained - RUF |
| 9 | Pte. | Philip Wabber | Koinadugu, Kabala | CSM Munu | 1997 | Makeni - 1997 | Trained - SLA |
| 10 | Pte. | David Peeler | Nil | Nil | 1997 | Koidu Town, Kono - 1997 | Untrained |
| 11 | Pte. | Thaimu Fofana | Koidu, Kono | Sgt. S. A. Junior (SLA) | 1998 | Koidu Town, Kono - 1998 | Trained - SLA |
| 12 | Pte. | Mustapha Kargbo | Camp Rosos, Batkanu | C.O. Jaja (SLA) | 1998 | Kpendembu, Kalangba Chiefdom - 1998 | Trained - SLA |
| 13 | Pte. | Frederick Mansaray | Lunsar | Lt. Alabama (SLA) | 1999 | Waterloo - 1999 | Trained - SLA |
| 14 | Pte. | Adikalie Kamara | Gbera-Bana | RSM Kalawa (SLA) | 1999 | Kambia - 1999 | Trained - SLA |
| 15 | Pte. | Ansumana Jawara | Yengema, Kono | Capt. Mandele (SLA) | 1999 | Sembalia, Kabala - 1999 | Trained - SLA |
| 16 | Pte. | Sullay Kamara | Nil | Nil | 1999 | Lunsar - 1999 | Untrained - SLA |
| 17 | Pte. | Murray Kakpa | Okro Hills | Sgt. Bobby (SLA) | 1999 | Okro Hills - 1999 | Trained - SLA |

# REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT - SIERRA LEONE
# (RUF/SL)

## NOMINAL ROLL OF TRAINED RUF/SL AFRC/SLA CHILD COMBATANTS

| S/No. | RANK | NAME | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sgt. | Allie Brima | RUF Trained - 1991 |
| 2 | Pte. | Boboh Brima | RUF Trained - 1994 |
| 3 | Pte. | Foday Koroma | RUF Trained - 1998 |
| 4 | Pte. | Justine Wilson | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1997 |
| 5 | Pte. | Kassim Conteh | RUF Trained - 1997 |
| 6 | Pte. | Hassan Bah | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1997 |
| 7 | Pte. | Ansumana Pay | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1997 |
| 8 | Pte. | Lamin Sankoh | RUF Trained - 1997 |
| 9 | Pte. | Philip Wabber | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1997 |
| 10 | Pte. | David Peeler | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1997 |
| 11 | Pte. | Thaimu Fofana | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1998 |
| 12 | Pte. | Mustapha Kargbo | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1998 |
| 13 | Pte. | Frederick Mansaray | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1999 |
| 14 | Pte. | Adikalie Kamara | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1999 |
| 15 | Pte. | Ansumana Jawara | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1999 |
| 16 | Pte. | Sullay Kamara | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1999 |
| 17 | Pte. | Murray Kakpa | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1999 |
| 18 | Pte. | Joseph M. Jalloh | AFRC/SLA Trained - 1998 |

9005 1.097

9006

00008637

9607

00008638

9008

FM- LOG
TO - OPR. D.AF

28TH 04-99

INFO COPY OF MONITORED MSG. BTWN S/MAN AND UNUSAL STN. TO SURRENDER WITH ELEMENTS OF THE S.L.A ⊙ ON THIS ISSUE DIALOGUE ENDED WITH PROMISSED TO SEND PARCEL TO S/MAN ON FRIDAY AT A SCHEDULE POINT FOR COLLECTION ⊙

28/04/99

00008639

FM- THE LION
TO - S/MAN, BRIG. MANI, BLACK JAH & GAFFA
INFO - LOG ⊙

30TH 04-99

-REF. MY DIR. RELATING YR. MOVT. TO TOGO I'M AGAIN RE-INFORCING THAT YOU PEOPLE SHOULD MOVE TO KAILAHUN SO THAT HELI. WILL PICK YOU UP FOR TRANSMISSION TO TOGO ⊙ YR. DEL. IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR US TO REACH A UNANIMOUS PROPOSAL FOR THE FORTH COMING NEGOCIATION ⊙ LET US FORGET ALL DIFFERENCES AND COMPLY STRICTLY WITH MY DIRRECTIVES ⊙ WHEN I COME ON THE GND. I WILL SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS ⊙ THE HELI WILL PICK YOU ALL FM THE BORDER AND THE OTHER BROTHERS WHO ARE PRESENTELY IN [redacted] ⊙

30/04/99

U 9009

TO - THE LION 01ST 05-99
FM- BLACK JAH
INFO- ALL STNS:

SITREP MOVT TO TOGO © SIR, REF TO YOUR MSG IN RESPECT OF- SUBJ ABOVE, DELIGATION FM THIS LOC HAVE FOUND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO TRAVEL TO YR LOC DUE TO SECURITY REASON © THE ROUTE LEADING TO YOUR LOC IS PRESENTELY OCCUPIED BY THE EN ©

I THERE FOR ADVICE THE UN TO MAKE A PROPER ARRANGEMENT TO LIFT UP THE DELIGATION FM THIS © REMEMBER THAT THE NEGOCIATION/DIALOGUE IS FOR EVER LASTING PEACE IN S/LEONE AS NOT INDIVIDUAL MATTER BUT SHOULD INVOLVE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL STAKE HOLDERS © ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING © 01 05 99

00008640

FM- THE LION
TO - BLACK JAH, BRIG. MANI & GAFFA
SUBJ- DIRECTIVE 1ST-05-99

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW MY DIRECTIVES DESPATCHED TO YOU RELATING YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE LOME CONSULTATION © THE HELI WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO PICK PEOPLE UP FROM INSIDE S/LEONE TO [redacted]ERIA © YOU SHOULD REPORT TO KAILAHUN WHERE YOU WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO MONROVIA FOR ONWARD TRANS. TO MY LOC. (LOME) © STRICTLY COMPLY TO THIS ORDER AND MAKE SURE YOU PARTICIPATE IN THE CURRENT TALKS IN LOME © ALSO OBEY MY

U

9010

LAST ORDERS ~~AND ~~MADE~~~ TRANSMITTED TO GIBRIL RELATING TO THE MOVT. OF JOSEPH MOMOH TO KAILAHUN ⊙ HE SHOULD BY ALL MEANS REPORT TO KAILAHUN WITHOUT DELAY ⊙

DA 05/05/99

FM- THE LION
TO - LOG
00008641
SUBJ - DIRECTIVE 04TH 05-99

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO SEND A COMPRIHENSIVE REPORN PERTAINING PRESENT SIT. ON ALL THE F/LINES MORE ESPECIALY ~~TO~~ THE BO/FREE TOWN H/WAY ⊙

DA 04/05/99

FM- THE LION 05TH-05-99
TO - EQUALIZER, BRIG. MANI, BLACK JAH & GAFFA
THROUGH - PLANET

YOU HAVE VIOLATED MY DIRECTIVES GIVEN YOU FOR MORE THAN THREE (03) DAYS ⊙ YOU WILL BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR ANY [redacted] DOWN TOWARDS THAT AXIS ⊙

DA 05/05/99

FM- THE LION [redacted] 99
TO - EQUALIZER, BLACK JAH, BRIG. MA[redacted] GAFFA
THROUGH PLANET

I'M STILL INSTRUCTING ~~THAT~~ YOU SHOULD MOVE TO KAILAHUN FOR MY POINT (CLOME) AS GEN. WILL BE AT KAILAHUN TOMORROW TO RECEIVE YOU PEOPLE ⊙

JO 05/05/99

U 9011

TO - THE LION
FM- LOG
SUBJ - ~~IMMATO~~ RESPONSE

06TH 05-99

SIR,

PER OUR LAST DISCUSSION I HAVE ALREADY SENT FOR THE SAID ITEM UP ON RECEIVING IT I WILL DESPATCH IT TO YOUR LOC ⊙

06/05/99

00008642

FM- THE LION
TO - LOG
SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

07TH 05-99

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO DO ALL WHAT YOU CAN TO DEFEND KONO AND TONGO MORE OVER YOU SHOULD TRY VERY HARD TO RECAPTURE MILE-91 AND MASIAKA WHILE AT THE SAME TIME YOU RESUME IMMEDIET OFFENSIVE TOWARDS KENEMA AND BO ⊙

ALSO MR. KAI GBANJA AND PATRIC (PRO) SHOULD COME ALONG WITH GEN. IBRAHIM ⊙

07/05/99

[redacted] - THE LION
[redacted] LOG
[redacted] - TWO RELIGIOUS GROUP HEADERS FM THE RUF

I will

FM- THE LION
TO- LOG

00008643

12TH 05-99

SUBJ- TWO (2) RELIGIOUS GROUPS FROM THE RUF/SL ZONES TO TRAVEL TO TOGO-LOME ©

THE INTER-RELIGIOUS COUNCEL OF S/LEONE (I.R.C.SL) HAVE KINDLY ASKED THE LEADER IN PERSON CPL. FODAY SANKOH TO PLEASE SEND ~~THE~~ BOTH THE HEADS OF CRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS TO TRAVEL WITH GEN IBRAHIM TO MEET ME IN TOGO AND TO MEET THE ABOVE NAMED GROUP ALREADY APPROVED BY MEC

① REV. M.S ALPHA-BUEDU © THE C/MAN JUNGLE UNITED CRISTIAN COUNCEL (J.U.C.C)

② ALHAJI OMARU SESAY - NAMIMA © THE DISTRICT CHIEF IMAM OF THE RUF/SL LIBERATED ZONES©

PLEASE ARRANGE FASTER FOR THESE PEOPLE TO COME WITH GEN IBRAHIM ©

MANY REGARDS TO ALL ©

12/05/99

20 HRS

TO- THE LION
FM- SUPER MAN
SUBJ- INFORMATION

12TH-05-99

SIR,

GAFFA AND LT COL F.A.T. SESAY HAVE LEFT ~~WITH~~ AS A DELIGATION TO YOUR LOCATION© VERY SOON YOU WILL RECEIVE THEM© I DID NOT GO BECAUSE OF THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE GROUND© I'M DOING MY LEVEL BEST TO CONTAIN SITUATION TO OUR OWN ADVANTAGE©

20 45

12/05/99

9013

TO - THE HON 12TH 05-99
TO - LOC
SUBJ - DIR 00008644

BY MY DIR YOU ARE TO DISREGARD MY PREVIOUR ORDERS PERTAINING THE MOVEMET OF MR KAIGBANJA, PATRIC AMARA AND THE RELIGIOUS HEADS ⊙ 12 05 99
2115 HRS ///

FM - THE LEADER
TO - S/MAN 13TH 05-99
SUBJ - RESPONSE

REF YOUR LAST MSG. DATED 12TH-05-99, YOUR STAYING AT OK67 IS NOT APPROVED BY ME ⊙ YOU ARE TO REPORT TO KAILAHUN FOR ONWARDS MOVEMEN TO MY LOC (LOME - TOGO) AS PER MY PREVIOUS DIRECTIVE ⊙ 12 05 99

TO - THE HON
FM - CONCORD 14TH 05-99
SUBJ - INFOS

SIR,

GEN IBRAHIM HAS BEEN DESPATCHED YOUR LOC WITH $ 20.000 US AND ALL FROM MEO ALSO SIR, YOU ARE TO GIVE US TWO WEEKS SO THAT WE CAN SEND YOU EXAMPLE OF A QUALITY AS WE WILL BE UNDERTAKING A VERY SERIOUS MISSION ACTIVITY ⊙

GREETINGS TO YOU FM ALL THE BROTHERS AND

P.T.O

9014

SISTERS ⊙

PSE ACCEPT INFO FOR NEC ACTION ⊙ 17/5/99

2154 HRS.

00008645

FM- THE LION

TO- CONCORD 17TH 05-99

SUBJ- INFOS

AS PER THE RESULT FROM THE PEOPLES CONGRESS MEETING AT YOUR LOC, ~~THE DELEGATES~~ THE DELEGATES WERE NOT TO ENGAGE IN ANY NEGOCIATION/PEACE TALKS WITH THE GOVT UNLESS I AM A FREE MAN ⊙ HOWEVER, THE DEVELOPEMENT HERE IS GEARED TOWARDS MY RELEASE THROUGH POLITICAL DIALOGUES ⊙ III

I HAVE THEREFORE DESPATCHED BRIG MIKE LAMIN TO BRIEF YOU AND TO GET THE VIEW OF EVERY BODY ⊙ HE IS TO RETURN WITHIN FOUR TO FIVE DAYS TIME TO ENABLE HIM TAKE PART IN THE FORTH COMING NEGOCIATION SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE ON THE 24TH OF THIS MONTH ⊙ HE WILL GIVE YOU DETAIL BREFING UPON HIS ARRIVAL ⊙

EXTEND MY REGARDS TO EVERY ONE ⊙

17/05/99

2145 HRS

FM- THE LION

TO- BRIG. MORRIS KALLON 17TH 05-99

SUBJ- DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO SEND A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT PERTAINING ~~TO~~

P.T.O

9015

THE ENEMY MOVEMENT WITH IN YOUR AREA OF OPERATION EXPECIALLY IN THE NORTHERN PROVIENCE ⊙ 00008646

2217 HRS. 19/05/99

FM- THE LION 19TH 05-99

TO - ZOG

SUBJ- INFOS

REF YOU ARE TO INFORM ALL SOLDIERS AND ~~[illegible]~~ THAT EYE HAVE SIGNED A CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT WITH THE S.L.P.P. GOVT. ON THE 26TH DAY OF MAY 1999 WITH A HOPE OF CREATING AN APPROPRIATE ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE FOR THE HOLDING OF THE PEACE TALKS IN LOME - TOGO ⊙

BELOW LISTED ARE THE RULES BINDING THE CEASE FIRE:

1, AGREE TO CEASE FIRE AS FM 26TH MAY 1999, THE DAY THAT ~~THE~~ PRESIDENT EYADEMA INVITED FOREGN MINISTE OF ECOWAS TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO S/LEONE ⊙ IT WAS ~~ALSO~~ FURTHER AGREED THAT THE DIALOGUE BTW THE GOVT OF S/L AND THE R.U.F WOULD COMMENCE ON THE 25TH MAY 1999 ⊙

2, ~~[illegible]~~NTAIN THEIR PRESENT AND RESPECTIVE POSSITIONS ~~[illegible]~~ S/LEONE AS OF THE 26TH MAY 1999, AND REFRAIN FM. ANY HOSTILE OR ~~[illegible]~~ AGGRESSIVE ACTS WHICH COULD UNDER MINE THE PEACE PROCESS ⊙

3, COMMIT TO START NEGOCIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH INVOLVING ALL RELEVANT PARTIES IN THE DISCUS-

SIONS, NOT LATER THAN 25TH MAY 1999 IN LOME-TOGO

00008647

4, GUARANTEE SAFE AND UNHINDERED ACCESS BY
a, COMMITTI HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO ALL PEOPLE INNEED, ESTABLISH SAFE CORRIDORS FOR THE PROVISION OF FOOD AND MEDICALS SUPPLIES TO ECOMOG SLDRS. BEHIND RUF- LINES, AND TO RUF COMBATANTS BEHIND ECOMOG LINES ⊙

5, IMM. RELEASE OF ALL NON COMBATANTS AND PRISONALS OF WAR ⊙

6, REQ. THE UN SUBJECT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S AUTHORISATION TO DEPLOY MILITARY OBSERVERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO OBSERVE COMPLAINCE BY THE GOVT. FORCES (ECOMOG AND C.D.F) AND THE RUF INCLUDING THE FORMER A.F.R.C FORCES, WITH THE CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT ⊙

THIS AGREEMENT IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY OTHER AGREEMENT OR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS WHICH MAY BE DISCUSSED DURING DIALOGUE BTW. THE GOVT. AND THE R.U.F ⊙

WITH REGARDS TO THE ABOVE LISTED RULES SPELT OUT IN THE AGREEMENT, YOU THEREFORE TAKE THE FOL. POINTS IN TO CONSIDERATIONS

1, SET UP CHECK POINTS IN ALL PLACES UNDER YR. CONTROL ⊙

2, SEARCH ALL VEHS. ENTERING YOUR ZONES FOR

ARMS AND AMMO ⊙ 00008648

3, YOU SHOULD LOOSE NO GROUNDS ALREADY HELD AS OF THE 26TH OF MAY 1999 ⊙

4, NO MIL VEH OR PERS SHOULD PASS THROUGH YR ZONES WITH ARMS AND AMMO ⊙

5, DO NOT HARRAS ANY CIV OR TAKE ANY THING FM THEM AS IT IS AGAINST OUR CODE OF CONDUCT ⊙

6, ANY ATTEMPT BY THE EN TO INFILTRATE OUR POSSITIONS AS THEY DID IN 1996, IS SERIOUSLY LIABLE TO REPELL AND PURSUE TO THE POINT OF ORIGIN

7, ALL SLDRS SHOULD KEEP TO THEIR TERRITORIES AND AVOID TOO MUCH OF PDS MOST ESPECIALLY THE EN ZONES

8, ALLOW HUMANITARIAN ORGANS TO PASS THROUGH YR AREAS/ZONES AS SPELT OUT IN POINT FOUR OF THE AGREEMENT ⊙ BUT NOT WITH ARMS AND AMMO ⊙

9, MY BEST REGARDS AND GREETINGS TO ALL THE MEN ⊙

2125

20/05/99

9018.

TO- THE LION
FM- BRIG. KALLON
SUBJ- RESPONSE

21ST 05-99

00008649

SIR,

REF. TO YOUR LAST MSG, FROM KONO; MAGBORAKA, MAKALI, MATOTOKA, MASINGBI, MABONTO AND OTHTE IMPORTANT TOWNS ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL IN THE NORTHERN PROVENCE ⊙ ONLY SUPER MAN AND OTHERS STILL CAUSING PROBLEMS AND HARASSING AROUND MY AREAS ⊙

2325 HRS

DA 21/05/99

TO- THE LION
FM- SUPERMAN
INFO ALL STATIONS
SUBJ- RESPONSE

24TH 05-99

SIR,

YOUR MSG WAS RECEIVED AND ALL CONTENTS BEARING FULL APPREHENDED ⊙ I STAND TO RESPECT AND OBEY YOUR COMMAND AT ANY POINT IN TIME ⊙ YOU ARE HONOURED AS OUR LEADER AND COMMANDER INCHIEF OF THE RUF/SL ⊙

IN MY OWN CAPACITY AS A BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER APPOINTED IN YOUR ABSENCE BY LT COL I P KOROMA AND LOG, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN THE ROLE I HAVE PLAYED AND EVEN IN YOUR PRESENT ABOVE ALL, I HAVE ALWAYS EXPRESSED LOYALTY AND DEDICATION TO

00008650

THE CAUSE THAT HAVE BLENDED US TOGETHER ⊙ THERE FOR ON NO ACCOUNT WILL I STAND TO CHALLANGE A COURSE THAT I KNOW STAND's ~~FOR~~ FOR OUR BENEFIT ⊙

IF YOU COULD RE-CALL THERE HAS BEEN SERIES OF PROBLEMS CREATED BY PEOPLE TOWARDS OUR LIVES ⊙ EVEN BEFORE THE PHASE II (Φ2) OPERATION STARTED, I WOULD HAVE JOINED THE OPERATION ALONG WITH YOU BUT BECAUSE OF FRACAS THAT AKISED BETWEEN MY SELF AND LOG, I COULDNT JOIN UP NOT UNTIL LATER I JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE LATE BROTHER PAPA TO ESTABLISH A JUNGLE WITH THE SOLE INTENTION TO EASE BURDEN ON TROOPS YOU WERE ADVANCING WITH ⊙

OF COURSE SINCE THAT OPERATION, NOTHING ACTUALLY HAPPENED AGAIN BETWEEN MY SELF AND ANY COMMANDER ⊙ UNTIL YOU LEFT FOR THE ABIDJAN PEACE TALKS, I ~~MAINTAIN~~ MAINTAINED MY COMMAND AND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY ⊙ ZENO OF COURSE WAS CALLED UPON FROM MY JUNGLE TO TAKE OVER COMMAND AT ZOGODA ⊙

ZOGODA FELL IN YOUR ABSENCE AND UP TILL NOW ZENO IS AT LARGE ⊙ I LISTENED AND OBEYED THE INSTRUCTION SENT BY YOU TO JOIN FORCES WITH THE AFRC ⊙ BUT EVEN THAT AGAIN WAS MISCONSTRUCTED BY THE HIGH COMMAND ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE A FLIF MAIN THRUST TO F/TOWN THAT

I'M SURE CAN BE POSSIBLE REASON FOR OUR UN-WARRANTED WITHDRAWAL FROM F/TOWN WITH ALL THESE MISTAKES ON THE PART OF OUR COMMANDERS, I STILL TRIED VERY HARD TO MENTAIN MY HOLD ~~ON~~ KOND ☺ AND I CAN TELL YOU THAT SINCE OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM F/TOWN THE ENEMY NEVER CAPTURED THE ENTIRE TOWN SHIP OF KOIDU (KOND) ☺ EVERY COMBATANT IN KOND CAN ATTEST TO THAT ☺

FROM KOND, I ORGANISED OPERATIONS FOR KABALA, MAKENI AND F/TOWN ☺ BUT BEFORE THAT THERE WERE LOT OF APPREHENSIONS FROM THE SLA TOWARDS THE R.U.F BECAUSE OF THE UN-LAWFUL REPUTTION OF THEIR BROTHERS ☺ UPON ARRIVAL IN THIR MIDST, REF. YOUR MSG. AFTER THE MAY 25 COUP, I WAS ABLED TO EASE THAT TENSSION AND THEY GAVE THEIR FULLEST CO-OPERATION THAT HAS REACHED US TO THIS POINT ☺

IN KONADUGU AGAIN AFTER THE ATK AND CAPTURE OF KABALA I WAS THREATENED BY LOG AFTER ALL MY EFFORTS ☺ OF COURSE, THAT PROBLEM ACCORDING TO THE PEOPLE'S WAR COUNCIL WAS HAMMONISED ☺ BUT WHEN WE GOT AGAIN TO MAKENI AFTER A TEDIOUS FIGHT AND CASUALITY A TROOP WAS ALSO ORGANISED BY BRIG MORRIS KALLON AND OTHERS TO HARM ME BUT BY GOD'S PRAISE I WAS ABLED TO ESCAPE THE PROBLEM THAT LED TO THE DEATH

OF RAMBO WAS NOT INTENTIONAL ⊙ AFTER YOU TRIED TO SPEAK LOG ON ONE OR TWO OCCATIONS, I WAS INSTRUCTED BY YOU TO TRY VERY HARD TO KNOW FROM THEM WHY THEY DIDN'T TALK TO YOU ⊙ ON MY WAY TO MAKENI, I WAS AMBUSHED AND A MAJOR DIED FROM MY GROUP ⊙ FROM THAT TIME THERE WAS A FIRE FIGHT THAT LED TO THE DEATH OF THE LATE BROTHER (RAMBO) ⊙ INDEED HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD BURRIAL AT THE MAKENI TOWN HALL ⊙

ALSO, THE INFORMATION THAT I INSULTED ALL C/SIGNS AND THAT I SEEMINGLY BECOME AN ENEMY IS NOT CORRECT ⊙ IT WAS LOG THAT ORDERED ALL STATIONS TO REFRAIN FROM TALKING TO ME ⊙ BUT NEVER THE LESS WE REMAIN COMMITED TO THE CAUSE ⊙

SIR, TALKING OF MY MOVEMENT TO YOUR POINT VIA KAILAHUN CAN NOT BE IN THE INTERES OF MY LIFE ⊙ ON SEVERAL OCCATIONS THESE BROTHERS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ELEMINATE ME EXCEPT THAT THEY WISH TO SEE MY MANY YEARS STRUGGLE GO INVAIN EVEN WITHOUT SEEN YOU ⊙

CONCLUSIVELY I WOULD LIKE TO MENTAIN THE LOYALTY OF ALL THE SLA/RUF OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS TO OUR LIBERATION CAUSE ⊙

YOUR BODY GUARD RAY, JACKSON, RICHIE LIVING STONE, VALUE AND MANY OTHERS AND EVEN PA-PS BANDA AND BRIG ISSAC ARE WITH US ⊙ UPON YOUR ARRIVAL SIR, YOU WILL

9022

BE BRIEFED ABOUT ALL DEVELOPENENTS IN YOUR ABSENCE ⊙

BEST REGARDS ⊙

2215 HRS

24/05/99

00008653

TO- THE LION

FM- PLANET

24TH-05-99

SUBJ- INFOS

SIR,

REPORTS FM THE VARIOUS FRONT LINES STATED THE FOLLOWING FOR TODAY ⊙

MATOTOKA, MAGBAS AN KUKUPRUWGRE ATTACKED BY THE ENEMIES TODAY IN THE NORTHERN PROVIENCE ⊙ MATOTOKA ATTACK WAS REPUR-TEDLY REPELLED BUT DETAILS FROM KUKUPRU AND MAGBAS AS YET TO FOLLOW ⊙

ALSO SEMBEYEMA AND KAMBOMA AROUND TONGO FIELD IN THE EASTERN PROVIENCE CAME UNDER ATTACK BUT NO DETAIL REPORT YET RECEIVED FROM THERE ⊙

THIS IS FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ACTION ⊙

24/05/99

2302 HRS.

TO- PLANET INFO- THE LION

FM- SLAMING BOMB (CS/MAN) 25TH-05-99

SUBJ- RESPONSE

SIR,

YOUR MESSAGE YESTERDAY WAS WELL

00008654

RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD BUT SIR, I MAY FIRST LIKE TO GET THE STATISTICS OF MEN FROM THE FRONT LINE COMMANDERS FOR A PROPER HAND OVERING ☺ AFTER ALL I WILL REPORT TO YOUR HOC ☺

PSE. ACCEPT FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING ☺

0900 HRS

25/05/99

FM- THE LION
TO - PLANET
SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

25TH 05-99

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO SEND A COMPREHENSIVE RESPOND MESSAGE CONCERNING THE MESSAGE SENT BY SUPER MAN LAST NIGHT ☺

I'M STANDING BY TO GET THE MESSAGE THIS MORNING ☺

1030 HRS

25/05/99

TO - THE LION THROUGH PLANET
FM - MR. HILTON FYLE

25TH 05-99

SUBJ - INFORMATION

SIR,

GREETINGS TO YOU OUR LEADER ☺ THIS IS TO INFOR YOU THAT ON SATURDAY 12TH OF JUNE 1999, WE SHALL BE MOVING THE OFFICIAL LAUNCHING OF OUR FM STATION AND THE GRADUATION CEREMONY FOR THE STUDENTS WHO ARE GOING TO WORK THERE ☺ WE ALL WANT YOU TO COME AND BE OUR GUEST OF HONOUR ☺ BUT IF YOU CAN NOT COME PLEASE APPOINT

9024

SOME ONE TO REPRESENT YOU ⊙ WE SHALL ALSO BE AWORDING A SPECIAL PRISE TO THE BEST RELIGIOUS STUDENT ⊙ IT IS CALLED FODAY SANKOH'S PRIZE ⊙ IF YOU HAVE ANY SPECIAL MESSAGE OR DONATION FOR HIM, THAT WILL BE FINE ⊙

WE ARE ALL PRAYING FOR VICTORY AND FOR YOU THE GREAT SURVIVAL ⊙

1155 HRS 25/05/99

00008655

F- SMILE

TO- PLANET

25TH MAY, 1999

SUBJ- DIRECTIVE

YOU ARE TO STRICTLY ORDER ALL SENIOR OFFRS, COMDRS, ESPECIALLY LT. COL. JUNIOR LION TO DESIST FM ANY CONTACT WITH E.C.O.M.O.G AND UN. OBSERVERS ⊙ THIS IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED ⊙ THEY SHOULD TAKE COMMAND/ ORDERS FM. THE HIGH COMMAND AT D.H.Q ⊙

THIS DIRECTIVE IS IN REFERENCE ~~TO THE~~ TO THE INSTRUCTION INTERVIEW ON B.B.C AT 1705HR TODAYS DATE WHERE RUFSL/AFRC SLDRS MET WITH ECOMOG 40 MILES FM. F/ TOWN ⊙

THIS IS OUT OF COURTESY AND DOSE NOT CONFORM TO ORDERS OF THE HIGH COMMAND ⊙ I AM SO MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT SUCH BEHAVIOURS AS THE NEGOCIATION HERE IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MOUEMENT ⊙ THEY SHOULD HAVE NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH ECOMOG AS THEY ARE ENEMIES THAT

9025

HAVE CAUSED THE WAR TO BE PROLONGED ⊙
EXTEND MY SINCERE GREETINGS AND
APPRECIATIONS TO ALL Q 2245 HRS 25/05/99

00008656

87TH 05-99

TO - PLANET
INFO - LION
FM - TIMING BOMB

SIR,

BELOW QUOTED IS A SITREP
FROM COL KOMBA ⊙ QUOTE FROM COL KOMBA
TO - T/BOMB SUBJECT SITREP DATE
26TH-05-99 ⊙ ON THE 24TH OF MAY, 1999
THE GUINEANS ATTACKED OUR POSSITION
AT KUKUPR BUT THEY WERE REPELLED @
WE GOT THREE (03) K.I.A, FIVE (05)
W.I.A AND THREE M.I.A ⊙ IN RESPECT
OF THE ABOVE SIR, YOUR URGENT RESPOND
IS HIGHLY SOLICITED FOR FAST AND
SMOOTH OPERATION ⊙ SIR, I DESPATCHED
ONE HUNDRED (100) MAN POWER AS
RE-ENFORCEMENT FOR THE SAID
GROUND ⊙

MORE OVER SIR, I MAY LIKE
YOU TO SEND US ONE (01) GROUND
MISSILE AND A.A. ROUNDS AS WE ARE
HIGHLY INNGED OF THEM ⊙
UN QUOTE ⊙ ACCEPT FOR YOUR
ADVICE ⊙ BEST REGARDS ⊙ 27/05/99
2022 HRS

9026

FM- PLANET 00008657 27TH 05-99
TO - TIMING BOMB
SUBJ- RESPONSE
YOUR MSG RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD. YOU ARE TO FIRST WORK BY THE DIRECTIVE GIVEN BY THE LEADER FOR ME TO RE-ENFORCE. YOU SHOULD DO THE HAND OVERING TO THE NEWLY APPOINTED COMMANDER. WE HAVE TO DO HIS ASSIGNMENT FIRST AND SEND IN THE REPORT.
PLEASE TREAT AS VERY URGENT.
BEST REGARDS 27/05/99
2045 HRS

27-05-99

FM- SPIKE
TO - PLANET
SUBJ- DIRECTIVE
BY MY DIRECTIVE - TIMING BOMB IS TO DELAY THE HANDING OVER AND TAKING OVER FROM SPARROW AND YOU SHOULD CALL ME THROUGH THE OTHER SYSTEM.
BEST REGARDS 27/05/99
2049 HRS

27TH-05-99

FM- THE LION
TO - TIMING BOMB
SUBJ- DIRECTIVE
BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU SHOULD DELAY THE HANDING OVER TO SPARROW FOR SEE REASON. 27/05/99
B/REGARDS
2057 HRS

9027

00008658

05TH-06-99

TO- PLANET
INFO O/S -VISSION ONE
FM- SURVIVAL
SUBJ- INFOS

SIR,

BELOW ARE THE TOWNS WHERE THE CEASE FIRE HAS BEEN VIOLATED BY THE KAMAJORS AND THE NIGERIAN ALFA JETS ⊙

3rd June
① SHEGBWEMA AND MOBAI IN THE KAILAHUN DIST ⊙
② LAYIA, KAIMADO AND KOIDU TOWN IN THE KONO DIST ⊙
③ TONGO IN THE KENEMA DIST ⊙
④ MATOTOKA AND MAKENI IN THE NORTHERN PROVIENCE

PSE ACCEPT INFO FOR NEC. ACTION ⊙

BEST REGARDS///

1424 HRS

WDS
DC
99

TO- SMILE
FM- GAGGA
SUBJ- REPORT

SIR,

TH
10-06-99

9028

TO - SMILE
FM - GAFFA
SUBJ - REPORT 00008659

SIR,

I SAFELY ARRIVED ON BASE ON THE 09TH 06-99 ⊙ ALL INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO BE PASSED ON TO SUPER MAN HAS GONE THROUGH ⊙ THERE WILL BE A FORUM TOMORROW 12TH-06-99 INCLUDING ALL COMMANDERS AND SENIOR OFFICERS TO PUT ALL MESSAGES TOGETHER ADRESSED TO THEM EXPECIALLY TAKING ORDERS FROM LOG AND ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS ⊙

BESIDES THAT I MAY BE VISITING ALL TARGETS TO TALK TO THE MEN PERTAINING ALL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATIONS ABOUT HOW THE PEACE PROCESS IS GOING ON ⊙ AND WHAT ARE OUR OWN STAND ⊙

I SPENT TWO (02) DAYS IN ABIDJAN, ONE (01) DAY IN GUINEA AND JUST AFTER THAT I WAS IN OUR TERITORY ⊙ I STARTED TALKING TO THE MEN RIGHT FROM KABALA AXIS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE INSTRUCTION GIVEN ⊙ I WILL BE TALKING TO THE SIGNALERS TO MAKE SURE THEY ERECT THEIR ANTENNAE PROPERLY FOR BETTER COMMUNICATION WITH YOU ⊙

SIR, I WILL PUT THE FOLOWING TO YOU AND ALL ACTIVITIES FOR AMINATA AND BABY-TEE ⊙ THE AUTHORITY SAID ACCEPT YOU INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR ~~FOR~~ THEIR DOCUMENTS FOR THEM TO BE INFORMED ABOUT THEIR MOVEMENT

9029

(THE FOREIGN MINISTER) BEFORE THE SISTERS COULD MOVE. JUST AS I TOLD YOU EARLIER GREETINGS AND BEST REGARDS

12 DEC 99 00008660

TO-SMILE
FM-CONCORD
SUBJ-INTREP

12TH DEC-99

SIR,

ACCORDING TO INTREP RECEIVED THE EN (ECOMOG) HAVE PLANED TO LAUNCH A MASSIVE OFFENSIVE ATTACK ON ALL OUR POSSITIONS BY NEXT WEEK IN-ORDER TO BREAK THE CEASE FIRE. THEY ARE PRESENTLY BUILDIND UP THEIR DEFE-ENSIVE POSSITIONS AS FOLLOWS. ALFA FOUR (4) PAC TRUCKS ARE LOADED WITH EN TROOPS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED WITHIN GBERRAY AND PORT-LOKO.
BRAVO FM WATERLOO TO MILE 47.
CHARLIE FM WATERLOO TO MASAKA BRIDGE
OWN TROOPS HAVE THERE FOREDECIDE TO DESIST FM MOVEMEN TOWARDS EN DEFEN-SIVE POSSITION. ALSO, WE ARE ALL ON MAXIMUM ALERTNESS TO DENY ENEMY PROPOSED INTENSSION.

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ACTION.

12 DEC 99

1935HRS

9030

TO- SMILE 00008661 12TH Ø6-99
FM- CONCORD
SUBJ- SITREP

SIR,

ON THE 10TH-Ø6-99, 14 OF OUR MEN WHICH INCLUDES SENIOR OFFICERS WENT TO TALK TO CIVILIANS IN OUR LIBERATED ZONES AT MASIN AND MARONI AND THEY WERE ADOPTED BY THE EN-(ECOMOG TPS) THAT ARE DEPLOYED AT LOKO-MASAMA Ⓞ

AFTER THE ADUCTION OF OUR MEN THEY WERE TAKEN TO LUNGI GARISON AND WERE FORCEFULLY DISARMED BY THE ECOMOG COMMANDER THERE (LT. COL. BON), LATER DESPATCHED THEM TO F/TOWN Ⓞ

UP ON ARRIVAL AT F/TOWN THEY WERE GIVEN ACCESS TO COMMUNICATION BY UNIMSIL AND THROUGH THE COMMUNICATION THEY WERE ABLED TO GIVE THEIR OWN VERSON OF STORY Ⓞ I SPOKE WITH ONE UNIMSIL MAJOR AT WILBER FORCE BKS. WHO GAVE ME ASSURANCE THAT OUR MEN WILL BE WELL TAKEN CARE OF AND NOTHING WILL WRONG WITH THEM AND THEY WILL INFO GEN GEORGIE Ⓞ

SIR, I WILL INFO YOU THE LATEST UPON GETTING IN TAUCH WITH GEN GEORGIE Ⓞ THIS IS THE PRESENT ACT OF THE ECOMOG Ⓞ

PSE ACCEPT INFO FOR YOUR NEC. ADVICE Ⓞ

ILSO TPS

12/Ø6/99

TO - SMILE
FM - CONCORD
SUBJ - RESPONSE

0000866?

14TH-06-99

SIR,

BELOW IS DETAIL SCHEDULE FOR THE BROADCASTING STATION ⊙

1, THE NAME OF THE STATION IS RADIO FREEDOM
2, THE OFFICIAL OPENING DATE WILL BE ON THE 21ST JUNE 1999 (NEXT WEEK MONDAY) ⊙
3, OPERATION DAYS - FROM SUNDAYS TO SATURDAYS (EVERY DAY) ⊙
4, OPENING HOURS IN THE MORNING WILL BE AT 0700 HRS AND CLOSE DOWN AT 1100 HRS IN THE MORNING ⊙
5. THE EVENING BROADCASTING WILL BEGIN AT 1600 HRS AND CLOSE DOWN AT 2200 HRS IN THE NIGHT EVERY DAY ⊙ THE FREEQUENCY IS 98.00 ⊙

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR NECESSARY INFOS ⊙

0915 HRS

14/06/99

TO - SMILE
FM - CONCORD
SUBJ - REPORT

19TH-06-99

SIR,

THE KAMAJORS ATTAKED KANTA VILLAGE IN THE KAMBIA DISTRICT ON THE 16TH OF JUNE 1999 ⊙ WE SUCCESSFULLY REPELLED THEM AND CAPTURED THE FOLLOWING FROM THEM

(1) TWO (02) SINGLE BARRELS
(2) 9-3 RIFFLES - TWO (02)

9032

00008663

ALSO I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING ITEMS FROM MEMUNA THROUGH THE BROTHER JUNGLE ⊙

① TWO (02) SATGUIE TELEPHONES

② 56 CASSETES

③ ONE (01) RECORDED CASSETE WITH YOUR VOICE ON IT.

④ THE CODE WORDS

SIR, THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND NECESSARY ADVICE ⊙

1121 HRS

TO- SMILG THROUG LOG

FROM- TIME BOMB 8TH 06-99

INFO ALL STATIONS

SIR,

I HAVE LISTENED TO YOU AND ON BEHALF OF THE NORTHERN JUNGLE, I WILL RE-ASURE YOU THAT OUR COMMITMENT AND DEDICATIO N TO THE STRUGGLE WHICH WE HAVE STRUGGLED FOR OVER YEARS REMAIN UNCHANGE ⊙ MISTAKES THAT HAVE BEEN DONE BY THE BROTHERS WHICH I THINK NO HUMAN BEIN INFALLABLE AND AS SUCH ARE SUBJETS TO MISTAKE ⊙

NOT WITHSTANDING, I HAVE BEEN ABLED TO CURTRAIL THIS AND WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE SENIOR OFFICERS ON THE GROUND WE CAN PUT EVERY MISHAPENING UNDER CONTROL ⊙

PERMIT ME SIR TO INFORM YOU THAT

WHAT YOU HEARED YESTERDAY CAN NOT BE DISPUTED OR CHALLANGED ⊙

HOWEVER, BEFORE THE DIALOGUE THIS MORNING WITH YOU, I HAVE ALREADY DESPATCHED A FACT FINDING TO THE WESTERN END TO ASARTAIN WHAT WENT WRONG ⊙ 00008661

I WILL RE-ASURE YOU AGAIN THAT THE ENTIRE NORTH AND WESTERN JUNGLE ARE WITH YOU IN SPIRIT AND ASPECT ⊙ PLEASE BE ASUR OF OUR FULLEST AND UNRELENTLES SUPPORT OF A FATHERLY LOVE IN THE INTEREST OF OUR STRUGGLE

BEST REGARDS ⊙

2230 HRS

D A Quire 21/06/99

TO - THE LION INFO - CONCORR

FM - THE 1ST BDE HQ (C/S VULTURE) 22TH-06-99

SUBJ - REPORT ⊙

SIR.

RELEASE OF OWN TROOPS ARRESTED WHILE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING ⊙ SUBJECT MATTER BEARING YESTERDAY THROUGH THE ASSISTANT OF UN MILITARY OBSERVERS IN S/LEONE ⊙ 14 OF THE MEN WERE CECEIVED AND THE OTHER THREE WERE NOT RELEASED ⊙ THE SAID GROUP NEVER COMPLAIN ON ANY ILL TREATMENT OR HARRASSMENT ⊙

THE SAID OFFICERS ARE PRESENTELY UNDER MESS ARREST AND INVESTIGATION IS GOING ON ⊙ YOU WILL BE INFO OF ANY DEVELOPEMENT AFTER THE INVESTIGATION ⊙

2004 HRS

D A Quire 22ND/06/99

9084

TO. CONCORD 00008665 28TH-06-99

INFO SMILE

FROM - TIME BOMB

SUBJ- INFORMATION

SIR,

TWO UNOMSIL REPRESENTATIVES VISITED LUNSAR YESTERDAY THE 26TH JUNE 1999 BUT I ASKED THEM TO RETURN AND WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIO N O

SIR, PLEASE RESPOND QUICKLY AS THE CIVILIAN IN THIS AREA ARE IN DESPARATE NEED OF FOOD AND MEDICINE O

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ACTION O

BEST REGARDS

1100 HRS

27/06/99

TO- SMILE

FROM- CONCORD

SUBJ- REPORT

27TH 06-99

SIR,

MAKONI JUNCTION WHICH IS BETWEEN MASINGBI AND MAKALI WAS ATTACKED YESTERDAY BY THE KAMAJORS BUT THEY WERE REPELLED SUCCESSFULLY

SIMULTANIOUSLY ANOTHER ATTACK WAS CARRIED ALONG THE GUINEA BOADER ALONG KOND AXIS BY BOTH THE GUINEANS AND THE KAMAJORS IN A VILLAGE CALLED GBEREFEH BUT THEY WERE ALSO REPELLED ACCORDINGLY O 40 KAMAJOR BADGES WERE CAPTURED INCLUDING VITAL DOCUMENTS

9085

00008666

FROM THE GUINEANS ⊙

MORE OVER THE NIGERIAN ALFA JET IS STILL CARRYING ON CONTINEOUS RAIDS IN THE BELOW LISTED TOWNS ⊙

① MADINA
② KAMAKWE
③ RUKUPR
④ MAMBOLO AROUND KAMBIA ⊙

DETAILS OF THE AIR RAID WILL FOLLOW LATER ⊙

BEST REGARDS

1109 HRS

27/06/99

FM- THE LION 28-06-99

TO - DR. WILLIAMS THROUGH CONCORD

SUBJ- DIRECTIVE ⊙

YOU ARE TO GIVE A SPECIFIC LOC TO THE UNHCR TEAM AS TO WHERE YOU WANT THEIR PLANE TO LAND ⊙ THEY ALSO NEED CLEARANCE FROM THE HIGH COMMAND ⊙ THE TEAM CONSIST OF TEN DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONS EXCLUDING ANY LOCAL N.G.O ⊙

PSE. ORIGINATE A MSG TO THEM NOW CONCERNING THE FLIGHT LOCATION AT TIME - 1700 HRS ⊙ WE WILL FAX ANOTHER CLEARANCE TO THEM FROM HERE (LOME)

BEST REGARDS ⊙

1715 HRS

28/06/99

9086

FROM - HERO
TO - SATELITE
SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

00008667

29TH - 06 - 99

I ADVICE YOU NOT TO ALLOW THE NIGERIANS, TOGOLAISE AND THE LIBERIAN DELIGATE TO BE PRESENT WHILE STUDING THE DOCUMENT. I SAY AGAIN, YOU SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO BE AROUND OR EVEN NOT TO INFLUENCE YOU TO TAKE DESITION ⊙

PLEASE STUDY IT PROPERLY AND YOUR DESITION SHOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE RUF, SLA AND THE PEOPLE OF S/LEONE ⊙ ANY DESITION TAKEN, PUT IT IN BLACK AND WHITE WHICH SHOULD BE CONFIDENCIAL AND GIVE TO PA ROGERS TO COME WITH IT WITH THE REST OF THE DELIGATION ⊙

TO RE-ENFORCE MY PREVIOUS ORDERS MAKE IT A POINT OF DUTY TO RELEASE THE 10 NIGERIANS P.O.W TO THE DELIGATION ⊙ FINALLY YOU SHOULD NOT ALLOW ANY BODY TO INFLUENCE YOU AND YOUR BROTHERS AND SISTERS ⊙ HOPE TO HEAR FROM YOU TUESDAY 29TH JUNE 1999 IN RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE ⊙

0031 HRS

DA Omrie 29/06/99

9037

TO- HERD 00008[illegible] C.W 29TH 06-99
THROUGH SATARLITE
FM- DR. SS. WILLIAMS (O.S.M CO-ORDINATOR)
SIR, 00008767A C.W
BE INFORMED THAT SERIOUS CONTACT WITH THE N.G.O STARTED SINCE 20TH-06-99 ⊙ FOLLOWING MY PREVIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE MSF BRANCH IN TOGO, I'm HAPPY TO INFORM YOU THAT WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS ⊙ MSF IS DUE IN OUR KAILAHUN ZONE ON THE 02ND 07-99 ⊙ DURING WHICH WE WILL CONDUCT A JOINT SURVAY FOLLOW BY A MEETING ⊙ SIR ACCORDING TO THE PLAN, ACF IS COMING ALONG WITH MSF ON THE ABOVE DATE ⊙ 00008668
ALSO SIR, CONTACT BETWEEN THE UN RELIEF STARTED ON THE 26TH 06-99 ⊙ ACCORDING TO PLAN THEY ARE DUE IN OUR KAILAHUN ZONE ON THE 04TH 07-99 ⊙ WE ALSO PLAN TO CONDUCT A SURVAY AND A MEETING WITH THEM ON RELIEF ISSUE ⊙ SIR, IT HAS BEEN AGREED BY ALL NGO'S INTERESTED TO ENTER OUR ZONE BY USING HELICOPTER FOR NOW ⊙
SIR, THE NGO ASKED TO USE THEIR LOGISTIC IN ORDER TO ENTER OUR KAILAHUN DISTRICT BUT THE MEANS IS NOT POSSIBLE NOW AS BOTH ROADS JORU AND SHEGBWEMA HIGH WAYS ARE PRESENTELY OUT OF USE ⊙ ALL NGO HELICOPTERS ARE TO EIGHTHER LAND AT GBALAHUN OR BUEDU ⊙ THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE GIVEN BY THE HIGH COMMAND ⊙
SIR, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO MAKE THE

ROAD ISSUE CLEAR TO ALL THE NGO's THAT IT IS BECAUSE OF THE PRESENT HUDDLES LEADING INTO OUR ZONES THAT I HAVE ASKED FOR THEM TO COME BY AIR ⊙ ALSO, THEY SHOULD RESERVE ALL THEIR LOCAL TASKS ON THEIR SIDE AS WE HAVE QUALIFIED TASKS TO WORK WITH THEM ⊙ SIR, THIS DESITION IS TO HELP EMPLOY ALL QUALIFIED SKILL AND UNSKILL MEN AND WOMEN ALL OVER IN OUR CONTROLLED ZONE ⊙ THIS IS POLITICS TIME WE SHOULD START PLAYING POLITICS FROM ALL QUATERS NOW ⊙

THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND NECCESSARY ACTION SIR ⊙

BEST REGARDS ⊙

129/06/99

**00008668A** 1120 HRS

TO - SMILE THROUGH CONCORD
FROM - MAJ. JACKSON SWARAY (RAY)
SUBJ - INFORMATION 01ST 07-99

SIR,

ALL YOUR ADVICES GIVEN CONCERNING THE INFIGHTING IS NOT IMPLIMENTED ACCORDINGLY ⊙ AS I'm SPEAKING ROCKY - CO. IS ON THE MOVE BECAUSE HE WAS ATTKED BY TROOPS OF SPARROW LAST NIGHT ⊙ EVEN YOUR BODY GUARD MAJ. YAYAY WAS UNDER DURES AND CARRIED TO THE ZONE OF SPARROW ⊙

MORE OVER, 200 ULIMO FIGHTERS (ARMED MEN) CHARTERED BY SSS ARE PRESENTELY AT MAGBURAKA STANDING BY TO ATTACK BOTH LUNSAR AND MAKENI ⊙

9089

00008669

SIR, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION CONCORD HAS DECIDED TO BASE AT KONO TO RECEIVE YOU AND MAKE SURE HE DRIVE OUT SUPER MAN FROM MAKENI TO THE BUSH ⊙ FURTHER MORE, I HOPE YOU WILL RECEIVE MY INFORMATION FOR QUICK ACTION BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE ⊙

IF POSSIBLE SIR, I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK YOU FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING ⊙

1915 HRS

01/07/99

FROM - HERO 1ST 07-99

TO - SATARLITE

INFO - TAUGHEST; SUDDEN & MAJ. RAY

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

YOU SHOULD INSTRUCT SPARROW NO TO LAUNCH ANY ATTACK ON MAKENI ⊙ THIS IS TO REINFORCE MY INSTRUCTION THE LAST TIME THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO INFIGHTING ⊙

/ REFERENCE MESSAGE FROM MY BODY GUARD MAJ. JACKSON SWARAY (RAY) WHICH IS UNBELIEVABLE RELATING TO AN ALLEGED ATTACK ON MABONTORO ⊙ INVESTIGATE AND REPORT TO ME ACCORDINGLY ⊙ IF IT IS TRUE THOSE INVOLVED SHOULD DESIST (INFIGHTING) IMMEDIETLY ⊙

SUPERMAN AND MAJ. JACKSON SWARAY SHOULD REPORT TO MY LOCATION FOR BRIEFING ⊙

2300 HRS

01/07/99

9040

TO- SMILE
FM- CONCORD
SUBJ- RESPONSE

03rd 07-99

00008679

SIR,

REFERENCE TO THE MESSAGE SENT BY MAJ RAY, MERCENARIES HAVE NEVER FOUGHT ALONG SIDE THE AUF ⊙ THIS IS A CLEAR INDICATION OF LACK OF RESPECT FOR COMMAND AND THE INTENSION OF SUPERMAN TO ORGANISE ALONG THE MAKENI AXIS TO CONTINUE CAUSING PROBLEM ⊙

FURTHER MORE SIR, THERE IS MESSAGE RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES AND INTENSION OF SUPERMAN AND HIS ALLIES ⊙

① SPARROW REPORTED ON THE 30TH JUNE 99 THAT HE HAD A DIALOGUE WITH BRIG. 55 ⊙ HE STATED THAT HE WILL ATTACK SPARROW ON THE 1ST JULY 99 ⊙

② A MESSAGE FROM LT. COL. GUERILLA STATED THAT ACCORDING TO CAPT. GABON, CO ROCKY CONTACTED FROM BUMBUNA AND SAID HE WILL ATTACK MABONTOR AND MAGBURAKA ⊙

③ MESSAGE MUSTERED BY 2ND BRIGADE COMMANDER (COL. BIG REBEL) STATED THAT BRIG. MANNI AND PA. DEMBA ARE INROUT TO KAYIMA AND THEIR ADVANCE TEAM IS ALREADY AT ALKALIA ⊙ FOR YOUR INFOS SIR, THESE BROTHERS HAVE INTENSION TO ATTACK KONO AND ANY ATTEMPT WILL BE TREATED VERY SERIOUS ⊙

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR NECESSARY ACTION SIR

1145 Pm

03/07/99

FROM- SMILE TO
TO - CONCORD
SUBJ- DIRECTIVE 00008671 04TH JULY, 1999
INFO ALL STATIONS

REFERENCE TO MY LAST INSTRUCTIONS ANY ATTEMPT BY ANY BODY TO CREATE INFIGHTING, WHILE THE PEACE TALKS IS ON-GOING IN LOME WILL FACE THE CONSEQUENCES⊙ ALL COMMANDERS AND THEIR TROOPS SHOULD STAY AT THEIR LOCATIONS ⊙ I WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY ATTEMPT THAT WILL JEOPARDISE THE PRESENT PEASE TALKS ⊙ THERE FORE, ALL COMMANDERS ARE TO COMPLY STRICTLY TO MY INSTRUCTIONS ⊙

ALSO, REF. MY LAST MESSAGE RELATING TO THE INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE 1ST JULY 1999, MY ORDERS ARE HERE BY REINFORCED THAT SUPER MAN AND MAS. JACKSON BWARAY SHOULD REPORT TO MY LOCATION IMMEDIETLY ⊙

I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO ALL COMMANDERS THIS EVENING ⊙ INSTRUCT ALL OPERATORS ESPECIALLY THOSE IN THE KONO AND NORTH TO ERECT THEIR ANTENNALS FROM 18 — 24 FEET FOR BETTER COMMUNICATION ⊙ 04/07/99

1130 HRS

9049

TO- HERO
FROM- SATELLITE 00008672 04TH 07-99
SUBJ- INFORMATION

SIR,

ACCORDING TO SPARROW THE KAMAJORS ATTACKED OWN POSSITION AT MATOTOKA THIS AFTERNOON BUT THEY WERE REPELLED ⊙ THERE WAS NO CASUALITY ON OUR SIDE ⊙

THIS IS FOR YOUR INFO. AND NECESSARY ACTION SIR ⊙

1940HRS

04/07/99

FROM - SMILE 05TH 07-99
TO - SCORPION
SUBJ - FLASH

WITH REGARDS TO OUR LAST DISCUSSION, YOU ARE TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE REQUESTED BROTHERS NAMELY COL. EDDIE KANNEH, MAJOR SHEKU KUMBA AND ONE OTHER OFFICER FROM YOUR POINT ⊙ SUPERMAN, LT COL. CIBRIL MASSAQUOI AND ENG. MANI SHOULD ALSO MOVE TODAY TO KAILAHUN SO AS TO MOVE WITH THE DELIGATION TO MEET ME AT LOMÉ - TOGO ⊙

COL. EDDIE KANNEH, MAJ. SHEKU KUMBA AND THE OTHER ONE PERSON FROMYOUR POINT ARE TO MOVE TODAY TO FOYA AS THEY WILL BE PICKED UP BY HELICOPTER TO MONROVIA ⊙ THEY WILL LATER JOIN PRESIDENT TAYLOR TO MEET ME AT TOGO ⊙

1300 HRS-MANEL
1321 HRS-TEMPLE/DEFENDER

05/07/99

9043

TO - HERO 05TH-07-99

THROUGH - SATARLITE

FROM - DR. WILLIAMS (O.S.M. CO-ORDINATOR)

SIR, 00008673

WE RECEIVED SIX (06) NGO'S FROM F/TOWN TO OUR ZONE FOR ACCESSMENT AND SURVAY ⊙ THE UNDER MENTIONED NGO'S WERE RECEIVED:

① NATHALIANE BRONUCI - HEAD OF MISSION ACTION COUTRE LA FAIN (ACF)

② MERCEDIES TATAY - HEAD OF PROJECT DOCTOR (MSF

③ MARTHA CAREY - OUT GOING HEAD OF MISSION (MSF)

④ GUISEPPE SOOLLO - PROJECT OF MISSION (INCOMING - MSF)

⑤ JEAN-GUY VAIAUX - LOGISTICS (MSF)

⑥ LAWRENCE JERDEVAL - REGIONAL CO-ORDINATOR (ACF) ⊙

FOUR OF THEM LEFT BACK FOR F/TOWN TODAY AND TWO ARE STILL ON THE GROUND FOR ACCESSMENT ⊙

ALSO SIR, WE ARE EXPECTING ANOTHER NGO'S TOMORROW ⊙ THE UNHCR AND THE W.F.P ⊙ WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLED TO GET INTAUCH WITH THEM THIS EVENING FOR CONFIRMATION ⊙ WE WILL BE VERY GREATFUL SIR IF SISTER JOSEPHINE COULD REACH

THEM BY TELEPHONE TO GET CONFIRM-
ATION FROM THEM TOMORROW ⊙
BEST REGARDS ⊙
2200 HRS ⊙ 05/07/99

00008674

07TH 07-99

FROM - THE LEADER
TO - GEN. SAM BOCKARIE INFO ALL MEN & WOMEN OF RUF/SL
SUBJ - INFORMATION

INFORM ALL THE MEN AND WOMEN OF RUF/SL, THE CIVIL SOCIETY AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS THAT I WILL BE SIGNING THE PEACE ACCORD TODAY ⊙ I AND MY DELEGATION IN LOMÉ HAVE NEGOCIATED IN GOOD FAITH AND HAVE REACHED A COMPROMISE ⊙ LAST NIGHT FOUR (04) HEAD OF STATES — PRESIDENT CHARLSE TAYLOR OF LIBERIA, BLAISE CAMPAORI OF BURKINA FASO, OBASANJO OF NIGERIA AND NYASINGBI EYADEMA OF TOGO MET WITH ME AND PRESIDENT ⊙ WE HAVE MANAGED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT FINALLY ⊙ I WILL BE RELEASED BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE ACCORD TODAY ⊙

I WANT EVERY BODY TO TRUST MY LEADERSHIP ⊙ I WILL BE JOINING ALL THE BROTHERS AND SISTERS SO THAT WE CAN ALL WORK TOGETHER FOR CONSOLIDATING THE PEACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF RUF/SL INTO A POLITICAL MOVEMENT ⊙ WE SHOULD REMAIN UNITED, DEDICATED

AND SINCERE TO THE MOVEMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF S/LEONE ⊙ WE SHOULD GIVE PEACE A CHANCE ⊙ 00008675

EXTEND MY REGARDS TO EVERYBODY AND I WISH THEM ALL GOD'S BLESSING ⊙ VERY SOON I WILL JOIN THEM ⊙

WHEN IT IS ANNOUNCED THAT I'M RELEASED THE SOLDIERS SHOULD NOT DISCHARGE THEIR WEAPONS ⊙ FIRING MUST NOT TAKE PLACE ⊙ EVERY SOLDIER MUST ABIDE BY THIS DIRECTIVE ⊙

REGARDS

07/07/99

1200 HRS

TO - SMILE

THROUGH CONCORD

FM - DR. WILLIAMS. SUBJ-INFOS. 09TH-07-99

SIR,

THE ACCESSMENT AND THE SURVAY SISSION HAD BEEN COMPLETED BY BOTH M.S.F AND AC.F ⊙ ANOTHER ACCESSMENT WAS CARRIED OUT ON THE 07TH-07-99 BY (7) SEVEN UN. RELIEF NGO'S AND THEIR PERSONIELS ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

① MR. KINGSLY AMANING - HEAD OF THE UN DELIGF TION
② MR. MARS O. MOHAMED - UN. SECURITY
③ MR. ROBERT PAINTER
④ MR. LAKANGA TABAN - WFP
⑤ MRS. DEBURCA - UNICEF

0008676

(6) MR. LUIS – UNOMSIL
(7) MR. NATALIA ANAULT – ACF
(8) MR. WEBBER – CARE INTERNATIONAL
(9) MR. BAZIL TEZERA – MSF
(10) MR. ANDREW – WORLD VISSION

SIR, BOTH TEAMS WER RECEIVED BY THE OSM AND WERE LEAD TO THE HIGH COMMAND RUF/SL ON THE GROUND ⊙ ACCORDING TO THEM THEY ARE NOW READY TO COME AND HELP OUR CIVILIANS ⊙

SIR, THE TWO KEY ISSUE RAISED WIERE TO OPEN THE KAILAHUN KENEMA HIGH WAY AS THE TRIP BY AIR IS VERY EXPENSIVE ⊙ CONCORD PROMISSED TO GET ~~GET~~ ORDERS SO AS TO FIX THE ROAD ⊙ ALSO, THEY WANT TO VISIT AND ACCESS MAKENI ⊙ CONCORD PROMISSED TO INFORM YOU AND THE BROTHERS ALSO ON THE GROUND ⊙

SIR, I'M ON THE STAND BY TO SEND THE OSM TEAM TO MAKENI IN ORDER TO ORGANISE THE OSM IN THE ENTIRE NORTHERN PROVENCE AND TO ALSO RECEIVE THE NGO ACCESSMENT TEAM ⊙

SIR, I'M WAITING FOR YOUR ADVICE⊙

BEST REGARDS
0915 HRS///

10/04/99

9047

FROM - SMILE
TO = CONCORD
SUBJ - DIRECTIVE
INFO - DR. WILLIAMS

00008677

10TH 07-99

REF. THE MESSAGE FROM DR. WILLIAMS DATED 10TH 07-99 YOU ARE TO OPEN THE ROADS LEADING TO OUR LIBERATED ZONES AND RE-CONSTRUCT THEM INORDER TO ENABLE THE NGO'S TO REACH OUR PEOPLE WITH FOOD SUPPLY AND DRUGS ⊙ MAKE SURE YOU ~~SEARCH~~ CREAT CHECK POINTS AND SEARCH ALL VEHICLES THAT ENTER OUR ZONES ⊙

ALSO INSTRUCT DR. WILLIAMS TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PROPOSAL MADE BY EXTENDING THE RELIEF OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE ⊙ DR. WILLIAMS SHOULD ALSO CONTACT MSF AT 2000 HRS EVERY DAY ⊙ - EITHER MARTHA OR JOSEPHINE ⊙

BEST REGARDS

10/07/99

2235 HRS

9048

TO- CONCORD THROUGH BRIG. ISSAH SESAY
INFO - SMILE
FROM - BRIG. KALLON 00008678 15TH07-99
SUBJECT - REPORT

SIR,

UPON THE INSTRUCTION BY THE LEADER FOR ME TO PROCEED TO MAKENI, I DID SO. THREE DAYS AGO ⊙ UPON OUR ARRIVAL AT MAKENI, WE WERE HIGHLY RECEIVED BY BRIG. MANNIE, BRIG. GUDITH AND PA. DEMBA MARA ⊙ THEY TRIED THEIR LEVEL BEST TO BRGG US TO GETHER BUT UPON THE ARRIVAL OF COL. GIBRIL MASSAQUOI, LT. COL. NYA AND BRIG. ISSAC, THEY STATED THAT THEY WILL NEVER WORK WITH ME ⊙

THEY PROVOKED ME ALOT, SAYING THA I'M A REFUGEE ⊙ THEY DISARMED SIXTY (60) ARMS FROM MY MEN INCLUDING TWO R.P.G. TUBES WITH THREE ROCKETS AND THREE PACKETS OF AK ROUNDS ⊙ WITH ALL THIS, I WAS ADVICED BY THE ACTING PARAMOUNT CHIEF OF MAKENI INCLUDING MOST OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO BEHAVE AS A MAN AND KEEP TO MY SELF ⊙ THIS REASON GAVE ME THE CAUSE TO BASE AT TEKOR BARRACKS ⊙

SIR, KINDLY TELL THE BROTHERS THAT WE ARE ALL THE SAME AND WE ARE ALL FIGHTING FOR THE SAME GOAL SINCE PEACE IS NOW ON THE WAY FOR US ⊙ SIR, PLEASE ACCEPT INFO FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION ⊙

BEST REGARDS

15/07/99

1200 HRS

9049

00008679

FROM - SMILE
TO - SPARROW
INFO - BRIG. MANNIE AND COL. ISSAC
SUBJ - RESPONSE

REF. YOUR MESSAGE DATED 15TH 07-99, IT WAS RECEIVED WITH GREAT PLEASURE ⊙ BY MY DIRECTIVE I ORDER THAT YOU STAY INWHERE YOU ARE PRESENTELY AND TAKE NO ACTION ⊙ CONTINUE TO EXERCISE PATIENT UNTIL MY ARRIVAL IN DUE CAUSE ⊙ AS SOON AS I ARRIVE, THE ALMIGHTY GOD/ALLAH WILL SOLVE ALL THESE PROBLEMS ⊙ FOR COL. ISSAC AND MAJ MASSAQUOI, YOU SHOULD RETURN ALL RUF PROPERTIES (ARMS AND AMMO.) YOU TOOK FROM SPARROW'S MEN ⊙ I REPEAT, RETURN ALL ARMS AND AMMO YOU TOOK FROM SPARROWS MEN UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE ⊙ FOR COL. ISSAC ENOUGH IS ENOUGH WE ARE NOT ENEMIES ⊙ I ADVICE YOU NOT TO BE STUPID OR TO BE MISLED BY ANY ONE IN PERTICULAR MAJ GIBRIL MASSAQUOI AND OTHERS ⊙ YOU ARE A VANGUARD OF THE RUF/SL, DONT ALLOW YOUR SELF TO BE FOOL BY ANY BODY ⊙ I WILL JOIN YOU VERY SOON ⊙

RE-ERECT YOUR ANTTENALS AND CHARGE YOUR BATTERIES PROPERLY AS I MAY LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ALL IN THE EVENING

BEST REGARDS ⊙

1327 HRS

15/07/99

9058

FROM- SISTER JOSEPHINE 15TH 07-99
TO - DOCTOR WILLIAMS 00008689
SUBJECT- INFORMATION

SIR,

THE MSF TEAM WILL BE WORKING ON THEIR OWN, NOT UNDER UN AS THEY CAME FIRST AND ARE NOT REGISTERED WITH UN ⊙ THIS IS AN INDIPENDENT ORGANISATION THAT WORKS BETTER BY THEMSELVES ⊙ BUT WE CANT TELL UN THIS ⊙ JUST INFORM THE UN THAT THE MSF STARTED THEIR WORK EARLIER THAN THEM AND SO WE CANT MAKE NEW ARRANGEMENT NOW AS WE HAD GIVEN THEM OUR MANDATE AND THEY HAVE ALREADY STARTED WORKING ⊙ WE HAVE TO PUT IT IN A DEPLOMATIC WAY ⊙

I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK YOU TODAY ON THIS MATTER ⊙

BEST REGARDS

BOB

15/07/99

TO- SMILE 15TH 07-99
FM- SSS
SUBJ- INFORMATION

SIR,

SITREP RECEIVED FROM GOLD TOWN AND MASINGBI STATED THAT THE KAMAJORS ATTACKED OUR POSITION AT FUTANE JUNCTION THIS EVENING AND THE FIGHTING IS STILL GOING ON ⊙

I HAVE INSTRUCTED BRIG- PETER VANDI

TO DESPATCH RE-ENFOREEMENT TO THE SAID POINT TO REPELL THE ATTACK ⊙ DETAILS WILL FOLLOW UPON RECEIVING THE SAID STATIONS ⊙

SIR, PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ADVICE ⊙

BEST REGARDS

2015 HRS

00008681 16TH-07-99

TO - CONCORD
THROUGH SSS
INFO - THE LION
FROM - SPARROW

SIR,

THE DIREC

TO - THE LION 16TH-07-99
INFO - SSS
FM - SPARROW
SUBJ - REPORT

SIR,

THE DIRECTIVE GIVEN BY YOU WAS RECEIVED AND IMPLIMENTED ⊙ I IMMEDIETELY MOVED ~~WITH~~ TO MAGBURAKA WITH HONDA BUT I LEFT SOME OF THE MEN IN THE BARRACKS AT TEKOR TO FOLLOW ME WITH THE TRUCK ⊙ I IMMEDIETELY MOVED WITH THE TWIN BARREL TO FUTANE JUNCTION WHERE THE RAMAJORS ATTACKED YESTERDAY AND PUT THE SAID AREA UNDER CONTROL ⊙

UNFORTUNATELY SIR, UPON MY ARRIVAL ON BASE FROM FUTANE JUNCTION, I RECEIVED A LETTER FROM MY MEN THAT LEFT IN THE BARRACKS WHICH REVEALED THAT MAJ. GIBRIL MASSAQUOI AND OTHERS SAID THEY CANT ALLOW THEM TO MOVE WITH THE TRUCK ⊙

00008682

SIR, KINDLY ADVICE THE MEN AT MAKENI TO ~~MOVE~~ ALLOW THE MEN TO MOVE WITH THE TRUCK FROM THE BARRACKS ⊙

BEST REGARDS

1932 HRS

16/07/99

FM- SMILE

TO- MAJ. MASSAQUOI 16TH-07-99

INFO- SPARROW

SUBJ- DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE ORDERED TO RETURN TO LUNSAR WITH ALL YOUR MEN WITHIN THE NEXT 12 HOURS ⊙ SPARROW'S MEN ARE TO STAY IN THE BARRACKS AND MAKE SURE YOU ALLOW THE TRUCK TO RTN TO MAGBURAKA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ⊙ I REPEAT, YOU SHOULD ONLY GO TO MAKENI WHEN YOU ARE INSTRUCTED BY ME ⊙

FOR SPARROW, YOUR MEN ARE TO STAY IN THE BARRACKS TILL FUTHER NOTICE ⊙

TAKE NOTE AND GOVERN YOURSELF

2030 HRS

16/07/99

17TH-07-99

TO - CONCORD
INFO - SMILE
FROM - SSS
SUBJ - INFORMATION

00008683

SIR,

I MAY LIKE TO ~~DESPATCH~~ PROCEED WITH THE OSM PERSONNELS TO KONO AND SOME MATERIALS FOR THE KONO ASCS AS THERE IS ENEMY THREAT FROM THE GUINEA BOADER AND THE HIGH WAY O UPON MY ~~ARRIVAL~~ AT ~~KARKAN~~ KOIDU I WILL DESPATCH THE OSM PEOPLE TO MAKENI AND I WILL RETURN AS FAST AS POSSIBLE O

SIR, PLEASE ACKNOWLLEDGE FOR ADVICE O

BEST REGARDS

0920 HRS

DATED 17/07/99

17TH-07-99

TO - CONCORD
THROUGH SSS
INFO. SMILE
FROM - SPARROW

SIR,

THE MAN POWER THE LEADER INSTRUCTED TO STAY IN THE BARRACKS ARRIVED AT MY LOC THIS MORNING (MAGBURAKA) THE MEN MADE ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT AT AROUND 2000 HRS LAST NIGHT, COL. ISSAC, MAJ. GIBRIL MASSAQUOI, CO. MATHEW BABOO AND HUGE NUMBER OF ARMED MEN INCLUDING ONE BARREL B.Z.T VIOLENTLY APPROACHED ~~THE~~ THEM ~~AND~~ ASKED THEM

00008684

TO LEAVE AND IF THEY DONOT LEAVE THEY WILL OPEN FIRE ON THEM ⊙ ACCORDING TO THE MEN, DUE TO THE PRESURE FROM COL. ISSAC, LT. COL. NYA AND MAJ. GIBRIL MASSAQUOI AS THEY WERE ALMOST AT THE POINT OF OPENING FIRE ON THEM, CAUSED THEM TO LEAVE THE BARRACKS ~~AS THEY~~ AS THEY DO NOT WANT TO CAUSE ANY PROBLEM ⊙

TWO TRUCKS, ONE TRACTOR AND 80 BAGS OF RICE WERE LEFT IN THE BARRACKS INCLUDING TWO HONDAS ⊙ THEY ARRESTED MAJ. GOBBERGEORGE AND TWO OTHER BODY GUARDS OF BRIG. ISSAH WITH ALL ITEMS IN THEIR POSSESSION ⊙ AMONG THE ITEMS ARRESTED WAS 250 CARRAT OF GOLD DUST WHICH I, GAVE TO MAJ. GEORGE GOBBER ⊙ ONE OF THE MEN SGT ALPHA KARGBO MANAGED TO ESCAPE FROM THEM WHILE THE OTHER TWO ARE STILL IN JAIL WITH THE GOLD DUST AT MAKENI ⊙ THE PROPERTY OF THE MEN, THE TWO TRUCKS, THE 80 BAGS OF HUSK RICE AND THE TWO HONDAS ARE STILL WITH COL. ISSACS AND OTHERS AT MAKENI ⊙

PLEASE ACKNOWLLEDGE SIR FOR NECESSARY ACTION ⊙

BEST REGARDS

16 10 HRS

17/07/99

9085

00008685

FROM – COL. ISAAC 17TH-07-99

TO – SSS

INFO – SMILE AND CONCORD

SUBJ – INFORMATION

SIR,

THE COMMANDER AT LUNSAR RECEIVED TWO UNOMSIL AT 1400 HRS YESTERDAY ⊙ THE COMMANDER INSTRUCTED THEM TO PROCEED TO MAKENI BUT THEY SAID GEN SAM BOCKARIE HAS TOLD THEM (UNOMSIL) NOT TO TRAVEL TO MAKENE AT ALL AS HE NEVER INSTRUCTED THEM TO SUPPLY EITHER LUNSAR, MAKENI OR KAMBIA ⊙

IN THIS REGARDS I'M ASKING YOU TO INFORM THE LEADER ABOUT THIS AS THE CIVILIAN POPULIST ARE IN NEED OF FOOD AND DRUGS ⊙ I'M AWAITING YOUR ADVICE ⊙

BEST REGARDS ⊙

16 15 HRS

17/07/99

FM – SMILE 07TH-07-99

TO – SSS

INFO – CONCORD

SUBJ – RESPONSE

REF. YOUR MSG DATED 17TH JULY 99, YOU ARE GIVEN THE GO AHEAD TO TRAVEL TO KOND AND RETURN ⊙

BEST REGARDS

18 15 HRS

9058

00008686

17TH-07-99

FROM - SMILE

TO - SUPER STAR (COL. ISSAC)

SUBJ - RESPONSE AND DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE ORDERED TO RELEASE THE TWO MEN (MAJ. GEORGE GOBER AND JR.) YOU ARRESTED YESTERDAY ⊙ ALSO RETURN ALL THE PROPERTIES YOU TOOK FROM THE MEN THAT SPARROW LEFT IN THE BARRACKS ⊙ I ORDERED SPARROW'S MEN TO STAY IN THE BKS AND I'M STILL RE-ENFORCING MY ORDERS FOR THEM TO STAY THERE ⊙

YOU AND MAJ. GIBRIL MASSAQUOI SHOULD RETURN TO LUNSAR AND STAY THERE IMMEDIETLY UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE ⊙ MIND YOU THIS IS MY LAST DIRECTIVE I'M GIVING YOU PEOPLE ⊙ YOU ARE TO STOP CAUSING PROBLEM AND REALISE THAT I WILL GO BACK TO SIERRA LEONE ⊙

REF. YOUR MESSAGE DATED 16TH-07-99 YOU HAVE NO BUSINESS TO DO WITH RELIEF ORGANISATION ⊙ TAKE NOTE AND GOVERN YOUR SELF ⊙

1745

17/07/99

9057

18TH-07-99

TO-CONCORD
INFO-SMILE
FM-SSS

00008687

SIR,

GOLD TOWN AND MASINGBI WERE SIMULTANIOUSLY ATTACKED BY THE KAMAJORS THIS AFTERNOON BUT I HAVE DESPATCHED RE-ENFORCEMENT THERE TO CONTAIN SITUATION. I WILL FURNISH YOU DETAILS UPON RECEIVING COMPREHENSIVE REPORT FROM THERE.

MORE OVER, I WOULD HAVE DESPATCHED THE OSM REPRESENTATIVES TO MAKENI TODAY BUT DUE TO THE CURRENT DEVELOPEMENT FROM THE ABOVE TOWNS HAVE CAUSED THE DELAYANCE.

PLEASE ACKNOWLLEDGE INFOS FOR YOUR NECESSARY ADVICE SIR. 19/07/99

BEST REGARDS

1911 HRS

FROM-SMILE
TO-BRIG MANJ
SUBJ-DIRECTIVE

19TH 07-99

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO FIND OUT ABOUT ALHAJI A.B. KAMARA. HE IS MARRAGE TO ONE OF MY SISTERS (MABINTY) AT MAKENI-BELAL MISSION. AWAITING TO RECEIVE THE RESPONSE WITH IN 24 HOURS. 19/07/99

BEST REGARDS

9058

THE SIERRA LEONE PEOPLE'S ARMY - SLPA
NORTHERN REGION - MAKENI
FROM - THE PEOPLE AND CHIEF DOMS OF BOMBALI
DISTRICT HQ. OF MAKENI
TO - CPL. FODAY S. SANKOH
THROUGH GEN. SAM BOCKARIE
SUBJECT - INFORMATION

SIR, 00008688

WE WISH TO CONGRATULATE YOU FOR RETURNING PEACE TO SIERRA LEONE ☺ YOU HAVE SUCCEDED IN HAVING THE GUN SILENT BUT WE ARE STILL LEFT WITH THE GREATEST ENEMY OF HUNGER AND NEED FOR MEDICATION ☺ IT HAS BEEN RELIABLE LEARNT FROM THE SLPA COMMANDER IN MAKENI THAT GEN. SAMBOCKARIE HAS STOPED THE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FROM COMING TO THE NORTH ☺ IF THAT IS CORRECT SIR, THEN YOU WILL COME AND FIND ALL OF US STERVED TO DEATH ☺ SO WE ARE KINDLY REQUESTING YOUR TIMELY INTERVENSION WITH THE VIEW OF ALLEVIATING THE ACUTE HUNGER AND MEDICAL CRISIS THAT WE ARE FACING ☺ WE HOPE TO HEAR FROM YOU AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVINIENCE ☺

2212 HRS

18/07/99

9059

TO - CONCORD 00008689
INFO - SMILE
SUBJ - INFORMATION
FROM - SSS 19TH 07-99

SIR,

ACCORDING TO REPORT RECEIVED FROM MASIAKBI AND GOLD TOWN, OUR MEN HAVE REPELLED THE ENEMIES AND OUR MEN ARE PRESENTELY CHASING ~~THE~~ THEM TO WHERE THEY CAME FROM ⊙ BRIG. PETER VANDI HAS PROCEEDED THERE TO MAKE SURE THE AREA IS SECURE ⊙

MORE OVER, I HAVE DESPATCHED THE OSM REPRESENTATIVES TO MAGBURAKA FOR ONWARDS MOVEMENT TO MAKENI ⊙

ACCORDING TO DR. WILLIAMS SIR, THE UNHCR WOULD LIKE TO ENTER OUR ZONE BY ROAD THROUGH MANO JUNCTION, SHEGBWEMA AND DARU TO PENDEMBU ⊙ IN RESPECT OF THE ABOVE SIR, DR. WILLIAMS SUJJESTED FOR US TO PROVIDE DRIVERS FOR THEM UPON THEIR ARIVAL AT OUR ZONE ⊙

YOUR ADVICE IS NEEDED SIR ON THIS ISSUE ⊙

BEST REGARDS
1650

19/17/99

9060

FROM- SMILE
TO - SSS
00008699
19TH-07-99
SUBJ- RESPONSE

REF. YOUR MESSAGE DATED 19TH JULY 99, YOU ARE TO CHASE THE KAMAJORS TO WHERE THEY CAME FROM ⊙

CONTACT RONCORD TO RECEIVE THE RESPONSE PERTAINING THE MOVEMENT OF THE NGOS ⊙

BEST REGARDS
1030 HRS

TO - SMILE
FROM- BRIG. MANI
SUBJ - RESPONSE
20TH-07-99

SIR,

REF. YOUR SIGNAL MESSAGE DATED 19TH JULY 99, PLEASE BE INFORM THAT I MET WITH THE SAID MAN (ALHAJI A. B. KAMARA) YESTERDAY ⊙ HE STAYS AT NO. 9 TURAY STREET MASENI WITH ALL HIS CHILDREN BUT LACK OF FOOD AND MEDICINE ⊙ THEY ARE EXTENDING THEIR SINCERE GREETINGS TO YOU AND ALL ⊙ WAITING TO SEE YOU ⊙

BEST REGARDS ⊙
1130

20/07/99

21ST-07-99

TO- CONCORD 00008691
INFO- SMILE
SUBJ- INFORMATION
FROM- DR. WILLIAMS
THROUGH - SSS

SIR,

I WILL BE GREATFUL IF THE PRESEN COMMANDER IN MAKENI CAN PROCEED TO MAGBURAKA AND RECEIVE THE OSM DELEGATES OR IF THE COMMANDER IN MAGBURAKA CAN ACCOMPANY THEM AS FAR AS MAKENI WITHOUT ANY MOLESTATION FROM THE BROTHERS AT MAKENI ⊙ THIS IS BECAUSE ACCORDING TO SPARROW, THE ROAD FROM MAGBURAKA TO MAKENI IS COMPLETELY BLOCKED BY THE BROTHERS AT MAKENI ⊙

SIR, I'M AWAITING YOUR ADVICE AND INSTRUCTION FOR THE BROTHERS AS THE NGO'S ARE PRESENTELY SET TO MOVE INTO MAKENI TODAY UPON THE ARRIVAL OF THE OSM PERSONNELS THERE ⊙

BEST REGARDS ⊙

21/07/99

735 HRS

21ST-07-99

FROM- SMILE
TO - BRIG. MANI
INFO - ALL COMMANDERS
SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE ORDERED TO OPEN ALL THE ROADS THAT LEADING TO MAKENI

9062

ALSO PREPARE TO RECEIVE THE OSM DELEGATION FROM KAILAHUN ~~WHO~~ ARE PRESENTELY AT MAGBURAKA ⊙ ~~WORK~~ WITH THEM ACCORDINGLY AND GIVE THEM ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO ENABLE THEM CARRY ON THEIR JOB SUCCESSFULLY ⊙

**00008692**

FOR SPARROW, BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE TO DESPATCH THE OSM DELEGATION TO MAKENI TOMORROW ~~WITHOU~~ FAIL ⊙

ALL COMMANDERS ARE STRICTLY ADVICED ~~ADVISED~~ TO ABIDE BY THIS DIRECTIVE AS IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR BOTH THE CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS TO START RECEIVING FOOD AND DRUGS SUPPLY ⊙

ACCEPT FOR NEC. ACTION 21/07/99

2113 HRS

* FM- THE LEADER

TO - ALL ~~COMMANDERS~~ COMMANDERS 25TH-07-99

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

REF MY LAST MESSAGE DATED 26TH-07-99, YOU ARE TO PREPARE TO HAND OVER THE P.O.W's AND ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS TO I.C.R.C, UNOMSIL OR ECOMOG AT ANY TIME THEY CALL UPON YOU ⊙

PHILIP PALMER, DEEN JALLOH, FAYIA MUSA, DR. BARRIE AND GBESSAY JAMES SHOULD ALSO BE RELEASED BUT YOU ARE NOT TO ALLOW THEM TO GO ANY WHERE ⊙ THEY SHOULD STAY AT THE HQ (BUEDU) TILL ~~HE~~ I ARRIVE AT THAT LOC ⊙

1700 HRS

25/07/99

9063

TO- CONCORD 25TH 07-99

INFO- SMILE

FM- SSS 00008693

SUBJ- REPORT

SIR,

REPORT RECEIVED FROM BANDAJUMA YAWEI REVEALED THAT, THE KAMAJORS ATTAKED OUR POSSITION THIS MORNING AT THE ABOVE MENTION TOWN ⊙ OUR MEN REPELLED THEM AND CAPTURED THE UNDER MENTION ITEMS FROM THEM

① 6 ROCKETS OF R.P.G. AND 5 T.N.T's
② 1 R.P.G TUBE
③ 5 PKTS OF AK. ROUNDS

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ACTION ⊙

BEST REGARDS

1904 HRS

DA Omrie 25/07/99

TO- SMILE

FROM- SSS

SUBJ- INFORMATION

25TH 07-99

SIR,

YOUR MESSAGE PERTAINING THE RELEASE OF ALL P.O.W's ~~WERE~~ WAS RECEIVED AND NOTED ⊙ ACCORDING TO THE COMMANDER AT FREE TOWN HIGH WAY (BRG. BAZIE), HE IS ASKING YOUR KIND PERMISION TO CONTACT THE GUINEAN GOVT. TO RELEASE THE BALANCE ECOMOG TROOPS (SIERRA LEONE CONTIGENT) WHO WERE ARRESTED IN GUINEA WHILE ENROUT TO SIERRA LEONE ABOUT ONE MONTHE AGO ⊙ THEY ARE ABOUT 37 IN NUMBER ⊙

ACCORDING TO BRIG. BAZIE, ONE OF THEM MANAGED TO REACH THEIR LOC. AT FREETOWN HIGH WAY AND PASSED ON THIS INFORMATION⊙ THE OTHERS ARE STILL UNDER ARREST AND TORTURE ⊙

00008694

IN REGARDS TO THE RELEASE OF THE 3 GUINEANS AND 3 MALIANS WITH BRIG. BARZIL, HE IS KINDLY ASKING FOR THE RELEASE OF THE POW's TO COINSIDE WITH THE RELEASE OF OUR BROTHERS UNDER ARREST IN GUINEA (THE SIERRA LEONE CONTIGENT OF ECOMOG) WHO WERE BASED IN LIBERIA ⊙

BEST REGARDS
2030 HRS

DA 25/07/99

FROM - THE LEADER
TO - SSS
INFO - ALL STATIONS
SUBJ - RESPONSE

25TH 07-99

YOUR LAST MESSAGE RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD ⊙ YOU ARE TO RELEASE ALL OTHER POW's WITH EXCEMPTION OF THE GUINEAN AND MALIANS POW ⊙

I WILL TRY TO HANDLE THE MATTER ACCORDINGLY AS REQUIRED ⊙

ACCEPT FOR NEC. ACTION ⊙
2100 HRS

DA 25/07/99

9065

TO - SMILE
FROM - BRIG. MANT
INFO - CONCORD

00008695

26TH 07-99

SIR.

REF YOUR MESSAGE DATED 25TH 07-99 IN RESPECT OF THE RELEASE OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR AND NON COMBATANTS, WE HAVE ONLY TWO GUINEANS AND ONE NIGERIAN AS PRISONERS OF WAR ⊙ WE ARE WAITING THE I.C.R.C TO RELEASE THE ONE NIGERIAN TO ~~HIM~~ THEM AS PER YOUR INSTRUCTION ⊙

BEST REGARDS

DA Quinn 26/07/99

TO - SMILE
FROM - SSS
SUBJ - RESPONSE

27TH 07-99

SIR,

REF YOUR MESSAGE DATED 25TH JULY 1999, WE HAVE ONLY 12 NIGERIANS ~~AT~~ THE HEAD QUATER (BUEDU) AND ONE AT MAKENI ⊙ THEY HAVE BEEN RELEASED ONLY WAITING FOR THE I.C.R.C TO HAND THEM OVER ⊙ I HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY REPORT FROM LUSAR DUE TO POOR COMMUNICATION ⊙

BEST REGARDS

1159 HRS

DA Quinn 27/07/99

9066

TO - CONCORD
THROUGH SBS
00008696
27TH-07-99
INFO - SMILE AND LT. COL. JOHNEY P. KOROMA
FROM - BRIG. MANI ARMY HEAD QUATERS (MAKENI)

SIR,

REF. YOUR SIGNALS MESSAGE DATED 25TH JULY 1999, RELEASE OF POLITICAL AND WAR PRISONERS ☉ NOW THAT THESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RELEASED INRESPECT OF SUBJECT MATTER, COULD LT. COL. J P KOROMA BE PLEASE ALLOW TO TRAVEL TO THE NORTH FOR DISCUSSION OF PERTINENT ISSUE RELATING TO THE PEACE ACCORD

YOUR CO-OPERATION IS HIGHLY SOLICITED ☉

1800 HRS

27/07/99

FROM - SMILE
TO - BRIG MANI
INFO - ALL COMMANDERS
SUBJ - RESPONSE

REF. YOUR MESSAGE DATED 27TH JULY 1997, LT. COL. J.P. KOROMA IS TO WAIT AT HIS PRESENT LOC. TILL I ARRIVE AT KAILAHUN YOU (BRIG. MANI), EX-PRESIDENT JOSEPH MOMOH, COL. ISSAC MAJ. GEN. MASSAQUOI SHOULD REPORT TO KAILAHUN AND WAIT FOR ME TILL MY ARRIVAL AS THERE ARE VERY IMPORTANT ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED ☉

ALSO, VICTOR FOH AND ALL THE CONVICT-

ED PRISONERS THAT WERE RELEASED FROM PA. DEMBA ROAD PRISON ARE TO STAY AT KAILAHUN TILL MY ARRIVAL O VERY SOON I WILL BE AT KAILAHUN O

00008697

THE CHILDREN AND WEMEN THAT WERE ABDUCTED FROM F/TOWN SHOULD BE IMMEDIGTLY RELEASED TO GO BACK TO THEIR RELATIVES O

BEST REGARDS O

1954

DA Guire 27/07/99

TO - SMILE
THROUGH - CONCORD
FROM - SSS
SUBJ - RESPONSE

27TH-07-99

SIR,

REF YOUR SIGNAL MESSAGE DATED 25TH JUNE 1999, THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR O THIS HEAD QUATER ONLY HAVE 12 NIGERIAN WAR PRISONERS AND ONE AT MAKENI O WE ARE PRESENTELY WAITING FOR THE I.C.R.C TO HAND OVER THEM O FURTHER REPORT RECEIVED FROM FREETOWN HIGH WAY AND MAKENI STATED THAT THERE ARE THREE GUINEANS AND THREE MALIANS AT FREETOWN HIGH WAY AND TWO GUINEANS AT MAKENI O THE GUINEAN AND MALIAN WAR PRISONERS ARE STILL IN PRISON TILL WE HEAR FROM YOU AS PER YOUR DIRECTIVE O

AS FOR FAYIA MUSA AND HIS GROUP, THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN RELEASED AS PER YOUR

DIRECTIVE BUT THEY ARE PRESENTELY ON THE GROUND WITH US FOR SECURITY REASON UNTIL YOUR ARRIVAL ⊙ 00008698

FOR THOSE POLITICIANS FREED FROM PADEMBA, THEY ARE FREED ⊙ INFACT ACCORDING TO THEM FROM PADEMBA, SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN FREED BY US FROM PADEMBA PRISON, THEY ARE NOW MEMBERS OF THE RUF/SL ⊙

SIR, THIS IS FOR YOUR INFO AND NECESSARY ACTION ⊙

BEST REGARD!!! DFMorlai 27/07/99

2200 HRS

TO SMILE 28TH-07-99

FROM THE COMMAND HQ. MAKENI

INFO - CONCORD AND ALL COMMANDERS

SUBJ - SITREP

SIR,

TEXT OSITREP AS AT 18TH JULY 1999 ⊙ ONE ⊙ GENERAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY CALM BUT TENSE AS KAMAJORS AND GBENTIS FROM MILE-91 ATTACKED OUR POSSITIONS AT KOLISOKOR AND SURROUNDING VILLAGES ON THE 21ST JULY 1999 KILLED THREE CIVILIANS AND CARRIED ONE CAPT. ABERITA AND ONE RSM. IBRAHIM AS P.O.W ⊙ TWO ⊙ THREE UNOMSIL DELEGATES ARRIVED MAKENI ON THE 18TH JULY 1999 ON A FACT FINDING MISSION ⊙ THEY HELD A MITTING WITH THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTE OF THE NORTHERN RIGION ⊙ SIR, RELIGIOUS BODY,

ELDERS OF THE CHIEFDOMS AND THE EXECUTIVE COMMANDER ASSURED THE ABOVE DELEGATES SECURITY AS REQUESTED AN IMMEDIETE FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLY FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH ⊙ THREE ⊙ ON RETURN OF UNOMSIL TO FREETOWN, REPRESENTATIVES OF SEVEN RELIEF AJENCES WHICH INCLUDED WFP, CONCERN WORLD WIDE (CWW), CRISTIAN ESSENTIAL SERVICE (CES), ACF, MSF, CRS, UNICEF AND BISHOP BIGOSSI ARRIVED MAIRENI BY ROAD AND SOME BY HELICOPTER TO ACCESS THE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE ⊙ THE RELIEF AJENCES HELD SERIES OF MEETING WITH THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND AND THE PEOPLE OF MAKENI ⊙ THE CHIEFDOM COMMADERS AND THE PEOPLE REQUESTED FOR AN IMMEDIETE FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLY AS THEY ARE DESPARATELY IN NEED ⊙ FOUR ⊙ THE THREE MEN DELEGATION OF O.S.M FROM KAILAHUN ARRIVED MAIRENI ON THE 22ND JULY 1999 TO WORK IN CONJUCTION WITH THE RELIEF AJENCES ⊙ THEY EXPLAINED THEIR DUTY TO THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND BRIG. MANI ⊙ FIVE ⊙ ABOUT 150 TEACHERS FROM VARIOUS SCHOOLS ASSEMBLED AT OUR ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDING AT 0900HRS ON THE 26TH JULY 1999 WAITING FOR TRANSPORT AS PROMISSED BY UNOMSIL TO ENABLE THEM TRAVEL TO FREE TOWN FOR THEIR SALARIES ⊙ SIX ⊙ MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIP ⊙

9020

CORDIAL ⊙ MORAL OF TROOPS SATISFACTORY ⊙
THIS IS FOR YOUR INFO AND NECE-
SSARY ACTION SIR ⊙
BEST REGARDS/// 28/07/99
1640 HRS
00008709

TO-SSS
INFO-SMILE AND CONCORD 28TH 07 99
FROM-SPARROW
SIR,
COL BAI-BUREH AND MOST OF THE BRIGADE OFFICERS ARE PRESENTELY AT MAKENI SINCE THE 21ST JULY 1999 ⊙ REPORT RECEIVED FROM THEM REVEALED THAT THERE IS NO PROBLEM, MOLESTATION NEITHER INTIMIDATION BETWEEN THE BROTHES AND THEM BUT THE WORKING RELATION SHIP IS NOT CORDIAL AT ALL IN RESPECT OF THE MOVEMENT ⊙
ALSO, I RECEIVED REPRESENTATIVES FROM VARIOUS AREAS LIKE MILE 91 AND YELE ON THE 25TH-07-99 ⊙ THEY ARE PRESENTELY WITH ME AT MAGBURAKA ⊙ ACCORDING TO THEIR COMMANDER THEY ARE MANY AND ARE WILLING TO WORK WITH US ⊙ THEY ARE JUST AWAITING OUR POSSITIVE RESPONSE FOR THEM TO JOIN US ALONG WITH THEIR WEAPONS ⊙ THEY ALSO REVEALED THAT THERE IS AN INFIGHTING BETWEEN THEM (THE GBWIS AND THE KAMAJORS ⊙
TO CONCLUDE SIR, BOTH THE SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS WITHIN AND AROUND MAKENI

ARE BITTERLY CRYING FOR FOOD AND MEDICINE ⊙
THE CIVILIANS ARE WELL ORGANISE AND WILLING
TO WORK WITH US IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE, UNITY
AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING FOR OUR COUNTRY ⊙
BEST REGARDS///
0947
0008701
29/07/99

TO-SMILE
FM- SSS
THROUGH CONCORD
SUBJ- REPORT

29TH 07-99

SIR,

ON THE 24TH JULY 1999, A PATROL TEAM COMPRISING OF TEN MENPOWER WAS DESPATCHED BY LT. COL. ABDUL GASSAMA TOWARDS THE GUINEA SIERRA LEONE BORDER TO EDUCATE OUR PEOPLE ON THE CURRENT PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED IN LOMÉ-TOGO ⊙ IT WAS NOT TOO LONG WHEN THE KAMAJORS CAME FROM GUINEA AND ATTARED OUR MEN IN A VILLAGE CALLED GODOR ⊙ OUR MEN WERE ABLED TO REPEL THE ATTACK AND CAPTURED THE FOLLOWING MATERIALS ⊙

(1) ONE RPG TUBE
(2) SIX RPG BOMBS AND FIVE TNT's
(3) 5 PACKETS OF AK ROUNDS
(4) ONE STICK GREENADE

THERE WAS NO CASUALITY ON OUR SIDE ⊙

BEST REGARDS FROM EVERY ONE SIR ⊙

1930 HRS

29/07/99

9072

00008702

30TH 07-99

TO-SSS

INFO-SMILE, CONCORD AND ALL STATIONS

FM- BRIG BAZIL

SUBJ- SITREP

SIR,

AS AT 290800 HRS TO 30 0800 HRS JULY 1999 ⊙ ALFA ⊙ GENERAL AREA CALM BUT TENSE AS THE ECOMOG PERSONNELS ARE IN THE HABIT OF KIDNAPING OUR MEN GOING ON FOOD FINDING INCLUDING MEN MOVING FROM LUNSAR TO MY LOCATION ⊙ BRAVO ⊙ MOST OF OUR MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED WHILE CROSSING THE HIGH WAY FROM LUNSAR TO OUR ZONE ⊙ 35 MEN ARE PRESENTLY IN THE ECOMOG GUARD ROOM AT PORTLOKO FOR REASON BEST KNOWN TO THEM ⊙ SIR, YOU ARE PLEASE REQUESTED TO CONTACT THE UNOMSIL FOR SAME ⊙ TREAT VERY IMMEDIET FOR SMOOTH RUNNING OF THE CEASE FIRE AND THE PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN LOMÉ ⊙ DELTA ⊙ CIVILIANS AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIP CORDIAL ⊙

BEST REGARDS///

1950 HRS

30/07/99

TO - SMILE

30TH 07-99

THROUGH THE HIGH COMMAND

FROM - DR S.S. WILLIAMS

SUBJ - COMPREHENSIVE REPORT

SIR, THE UN AND OTHER NGO AGEN-

CES HAVE EXTENDED THEIR RELIEF ACCESSMENT MISSION IN TO OUR CONTROL AREAS OF MAGBURAKA AND MAKENI ⊙ THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL NGO'S AND THE OSM CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ⊙ SIR, THERE IS SERIOUS SET BACK ON THE SIDE OF THE OSM INTERMS OF COMMUNICATION AS THERE IS NO SET ⊙ THIS ISSUE NEED AN IMMEDIET ACTION AS THERE IS NO GOOD COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE OSM AND THE NGO'S IN FREETOWN ⊙ 00008703

SIR, IN AS MUCH AS THE NGO OPERATION IN THE NORTH IS ON THE HIGH PACE, I REGRET TO INFORM YOU THAT THE NGO OPERATION IN KAILAHUN DISTRICT AND THE REST OF THE EAST IS VERY SLOW AS COMPARED TO THE NORTH ⊙ THIS IS PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE ATTITUDE OF OUR MEN MOLESTATION, WASTING OF THEIR TIME AND OFF LOADING ⊙ SIR, THE OSM WELCOM CHECKING FOR SECURITY REASON BUT SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE ⊙

SIR, THE OSM PERSONNELS SENT TO MAKENI HAVE NO ACCESS TO COMMUNICATION ⊙ FOR THIS REASON REPORT IS NOT COMING FROM THEM SINCE THEY ARRIVED AT THAT POINT ON THE 22ND-07-99 ⊙ I HAVE MADE SEVERAL ATTEMPT TO TALK TO THEM BUT TO NO AVAIL ⊙ ABOVE ALL SIR I STILL DONT KNOW THE COMMANDER AT MAKENI TO CO-ORDINATE WITH ⊙ LASTLY SIR, THE COMMANDERS IN MAKENI ARE IN THE

9074

HABIT OF ~~COMMUNICATING~~ DIRECTLY WITH THE NGO'S IN FREETOWN ⊙ EVIDENCE OF THIS IS THE 2ND 07-99 VISIT BY THE NGO'S ~~TO~~ MAKENI ⊙ IT WAS CO-ORDINATED AND CLEARANCE WAS GIVEN TO THE NGO'S ⊙ I HAVE JUST BEEN BRIEF BY THE UN THAT SOME NGO'S HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO GO TO KABALA ⊙

BEST REGARDS///
BIZZ

30/07/99

**00008704**

FM- SMILE 30TH 07-99
TO- DR. WILLIAMS
SUBJ- RESPONSE

REF YOUR MESSAGE DATED 30TH 07-99, I GAVE THE INSTRUCTION TO THE MEN AT MAKENI TO OPEN ALL THE ROADS AND ALLOW THE NGO'S TO CARRY FOOD AND DRUGS SUPPLY FOR THE PEOPLE AS THEY ARE IN DESPARATE NEED ⊙

0901 HRS

31/07/99

FROM- SMILE
TO- THE O/ALL SIGNALS COMMANDER
THROUGH- SSS
INFO- ALL OPERATORS AND OSM
SUBJ- DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE, YOU ARE ORDERED TO ALLOW THE OSM PERSONNELS TO USE ~~YOUR~~ THE SETS TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE NGO'S WHENEVER THEY ARE IN NEED ⊙

BEST REGARDS///
0855 HRS

31/07/99

9075

FM- SMILE 30TH 07-99

TO-BRIG. BAZIL 0000705

THROUGH CONCORD

INFO-SSS AND ALL COMMANDERS

SUBJ-RESPONSE

I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE DATED 30TH 07-99 AND I'M GOING TO TAKE ACTION ⊙ I WOULD LIKE TO ~~IBK~~ TALK TO YOU ALL TOMORROW 31ST 07-99⊙

BEST REGARDS ///

0855 HRS

DA Omu 31/07/99

TO-SMILE 01ST 08-99

INFO-CONCORD & SSS

FROM-SUPER STAR

SUBJECT-INFORMATION

SIR,

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MAKENI, THE D.D.R AND THE WORLD BANK REPRESENTATIVES ARRIVED AT MAKENI YESTERDAY BY HELICOPTER⊙BUT WE NEVER HAD KNOWLLEDGE ON THEIR MOVEMENT SO I INSTRUCTED THEM TO RETURN TILL THEY GET INTAUCH WITH YOU BEFORE PROCEEDING TO THIS POINT⊙

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR NECESSARY ACTION⊙

BEST REGARDS ///

1930 HRS ⊙

DA Omu 01/08/99

9076

03TH-08-99

TO- SMILE **00008706**

INFO- CONCORD AND ALL STATIONS

FROM- COMMAND HQ MAKENI

SUBJ- SITREP

SIR,

ONE ⊙ GENERAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY ~~etc~~ CALM AND QUIET ⊙ TWO ⊙ THE UN SECURITY AGENTS AND WORLD FOOD PROGRAMM (W.F.P) DELEGATES ARRIVED MAKENI YESTERY ON ACCESSMENT ~~TEAM~~ ON FOOD FINDING ⊙ THREE ⊙ THE UNOMSIL DELEGATES ARRIVED THIS HQ AT ABOUT 1100 HRS TODAY TO FACILITATE THE VISIT OF THE WORLD BANK REPRESENTATIVES TO MAKENI BY ~~HELICOPTER~~ ⊙ THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND AT MAKENI BRIG MANI IMMIDIETELY MOVED TO THE WUSUM FIELD TO RECEIVE THE DELEGATES AS THEY HAVE ALREADY MOVED FROM FREETOWN ⊙ HELICOPTER LANDED ABOUT 1250 HRS BUT THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND REFUSED TALKING TO THE DELEGATES AS THE VISIT WAS NOT MADE KNOWN OFFICIALLY BEFORE TIME AS EXPECTED ⊙ THE HELICOPTER WITH DELEGATES TOOK OFF FOR WHERE THEY CAME FROM AT ABOUT 1300 HRS ⊙ FOUR INFO COLLECTED FROM SAME UNOMSIL MAJ KABIZA REVEALED THE KIDNAPPING AND ABDUCTING OF OWN COMBATANTS BY ECOMOG TROOPS WITHIN PORT LOKO DISTRICT (HQ 22 INFANTRY BDE OF ECOMOG) ⊙ MESSAGE DATED 301100 Z JULY REFERS AND ECOMOG ALFA-JET WAS REPEATEDLY FLYING OVER RUKUPAR AND OTHER RUF HELD TERRITORIES IN THE PORT LOKO DISTDICT ⊙ FIVE ⊙

9077

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIP VERY CORDIAL ☺ MORALE OF TROOPS REMAIN SKY HIGH ☺ PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO ☺

BESTREGARDS FROM EVERY ONE ☺

00008707

2029 HRS ///

JEE Smile 03/08/99

FROM: SMILE 03 · 08 · 99

TO: COMMAND HQ MAKENI

INFO: CONCORD AND ALL STATIONS

SUBJ: RESPONSE

REF. YOUR MESSAGE. HAPPY TO NOTE THAT YOUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY IS CALM AND QUIET AND THAT ASSESSMENT TEAM HAS VISITED. RESPONSE TO UNOMSIL DELEGATES IS APPROPRIATE. ACCEPT NO VISITORS UNTIL I AM IN THE COUNTRY, CERTAINLY NOT ECOMOG. CONTINUE TO BE ON ALERT. I WOULD LIKE TO TO TALK ~~BEST REGARDS~~ TO ALL COMMANDERS TOMORROW WHEN COMMUNICATION IS IMPROVE ☺

BEST REGARDS ///

JEE Smile 03/08/99

2145 HRS

9078

TO- CONCORD
FROM- SSS
INFO - SMILE
SUBJ - INFORMATION

04TH-08-99

0008708

SIR,

SOURCES FROM SATERLITE PHONE FROM GEN JOSHI REVEALED THAT FOR THE PAST THREE DAYS, UNOMSIL AND BRIG. BAZIL HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT IN ORDER TO RELEASE SIX ECOMOG WAR PRISONERS (TWO NIGERIANS, TWO GUINEANS AND TWO MALIANS) ⊙ AS PER ARRANGEMENT A DELEGATION COMPRISING OF DR. ROBERT GRAVEWLE SENIOR POLITICAL ADVICER UN, COL. MOTALE, COL. ZAMIR AND THREE OTHER SENIOR UNOMSIL OFFICERS, MISS JACQUELLINE CLENARD - UN PRO FIVE NGOS AND TWO UNICEF REPRESENTATIVES ⊙ ACCORDING TO GEN. JOSHI OF UNOMSIL, THE OVER LAND CONVOY STOPED BETWEEN MASIAKA AND ROGBERI WHILE A TACTICAL VEHICLE ENTERED ⊙ THE SAID COMMUNICATION LASTED FROM 1200 HRS TO 1220 HRS TODAY ⊙ ACCORDING TO SOURCES BRIG. BAZIL HAS DETAINED THIS TEAM AT MAGBENI VILLAGE ON THE RIVER ROKEL BANK ⊙ IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, UNOMSIL IS REQUESTING THE SWIFT AND URGENT INTERVENTION OF THE LEADER AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE RUF/SL ⊙ THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE PRESENT MISSION IN NEW YORK HAS BEEN INFORMED AND AN EMERGENCY MEETING HAS BEEN CALLED ⊙ ACCORDING TO GEN. JOSHI, THESE

9079

00008709

PEOPLE SAID THEY WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PEACE PROCESS THAT WAS WHY THEY ARRESTED THOSE PEOPLE ⊙

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION ⊙

BEST REGARDS
2001 HRS

04/08/99

TO - SMILE
INFO - CONCORD
FROM - SSS
SUBJECT - INFORMATION

SIR, AS AT 2045 HOURS SOURCE FROM GEN. JOSHI OF UNOMSIL VIDE SATELITE PHONE SUBJECT OKRA HILLS SITUATION REPORT UPDATE ⊙ BISHOP BIGGI OF MAKENI AND MISS JACQUELINE CLENARD THE UN ARO HAVE BEEN RELEASED BY BRIG. BAZIL AND HIS MEN THEY FURNISHED GEN. JOSHI WITH THE FOLLOWING INFORMATIONS ⊙

① THE OTHERS ARE STILL BEING HELD BY BRIG. BAZIL

② BRIG. BAZIL AND HIS MEN HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS

a) THE AFRC/SLA WERE NOT RECOGNISED IN THE LOMÉ - TOGO PEACE AGREEMENT ⊙

b) LT. COL. J. P. KOROMA WHO IS THEIR LEADER REMAINS UNDER CUSTODY OF THE RUF/SL IN KAILAHUN

c) THEY DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF

J.P. KOROMA TO THEM AND ALSO REQUEST A DIALOGUE WITH HIM ⊙

D) ALL ARRESTED HAVE BEEN STRIPPED OFF VALUABLES AND CLOTHING AND ARE BEING DENIED ACCESS TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR HEAD QUARTERS ⊙ 00008710

③ THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE NAMES OF THOSE ARRESTED BY BRIG. BAZIL AND HIS MEN@

1, DR. ROBERT GRAVELLE – CANADIAN (SENIOR POLITICAL ADVISER UN)
2, MR. PIERRE ANTHONE – LOUIS (USA) UN.
3, LT. COL. ZAMIR SOVERDGLOV – KROGYSTAI (UNOMSIL)
4, LT. COL. JUSTIN MUTALE – ZAMBIA (UNOMSIL)
5, LT. COL. HOWEL WILLIAMS – UK (UNOMSIL)
6, MAJ. KHARADDIN – MALAYSIA (UNOMSIL)
7, MAJ. KRIVCHENKO – RUSSIA (UNOMSIL
8, MAJ. I. KYLE – UK (UNOMSIL)
9, MAJ. J. MOREOWN – UK (UNOMSIL)
10, MAJ. M. RAWLINGS – UK (UNOMSIL)
11, MAJ. P. ELLET – UK (UNOMSIL)
12, MAJ. G. GRADLEY UK (UNOMSIL)
13, SQUADRON LEADER F. CARR – UK (UNOMSIL)
14, CAPT. T. HICHALWE – ZAMBIA (UNOMSIL)
15, MAJ. A. MWALE – ZAMBIA (UNOMSIL)

CIVILIANS

1, MR. ADAKWA – GHANA
2, MR. JOHNSON – SIERRALEONE S/LEONE
3, MR. CAMPBELL – S/LEONE

AND ALSO 17 ECOMOG SOLDIERS ALL BELIEVED TO BE NIGERIANS ⊙ THE UN. SECURITY

9081

COUNCIL IS TO SIT ON THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE ⊙

BEST REGARDS

2328 HRS

04/08/99

FM - SMILE

TO - BRIG. BAZIL

INFO - SSS 00008711

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

04TH 08-99

REF. THE MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM SSS ON THE 04TH AUGUST 1999, BY MY DIRECTIVE YOU ARE ORDERED TO RELEASE THE PEOPLE YOU ARRESTED TODAY (THE UN AND THE OTHER DELEGATES FROM FREETOWN) ⊙ I AM WORKING ON THE RELEASE OF THE MEN WHO WERE ARRESTED IN GUINEA AND THOSE AT PORT LOKO ⊙

NO BODY SHOULD TRY TO CAUSE PROBLEM BY GOING WITH THE IDEA THAT THE PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN LOMÉ IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST ⊙ THE MEN SHOULD DISCIPLINE THEM SELVES, SUCH ATTITUDE AMOUNTS TO BREAKING OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT AND IS A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE FIRE ⊙

NO BODY SHOULD TALK TO THE UNOMSIL OR ANY OTHER ORGANISATION WITHOUT CONSULTING ME ⊙

I WILL TALK TO YOU ALL TOMORROW IN THE MORNING ⊙

0808 HRS

05/08/99

9082

00008712

05TH 08-99

TO- THE LEADER
FM- COMAND HQ. MAKENI
INFO- GEN. SAM BOCKARIE
SUBJECT- SITUATION REPORT

SIR, ALFA ⊙ SITUATION CALM AND QUIET ⊙ BRAVO ⊙ THE HUMANITARIAN AID WITH FOOD SUPPLT FOR CHILDREN UNDER 5 ARRIVED MAKENI AT 1515 HRS ON THE 3RD AUGUST 1999 ⊙ UNOMSIL ARRIVED TWO HOURS LATER WITH WORLD BANK REPRESENTATIVES FOR DISARMAMENT DEMOBILISATION AND RE-INTEGRATION ⊙ THEY INFORMED THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND (BRIG. MANI) THAT THEIR MISSION WAS TO CENTRALISE ALL CHILD COMBATANTS FOR DISAMAMENT ⊙ CHARLIE ⊙ AT ABOUT 1400 HRS THE OTHER DAY, UNOMSIL ARRIVED AT MAKENI FOR ASSESSMENT ⊙ SAME EDUCATED THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND ABOUT THE OUR OWN MEN ARRESTED BY ECOMOG ⊙ ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THEM, THEY WERE 26 BUT NOT 25 ⊙ AS PER REPORT 18 HAVE ALREADY BEEN RELEASED BUT 16 ARE CHILD COMBATANTS, TWO ESCAPED AND TWO WERE SENT TO FREE TOWN FOR VARIOUS CRIMES THEY COMMITTED AND FOUR ARE STILL HELD AS POWs ⊙ DELTA ⊙ BRIG. T.A.B. YAYAH (GUDITH) DEPARTED THIS HEAD QUARTER ON THE 29TH 07-99 WITH 200 ARMED MEN FOR FREETOWN HIGH WAT ⊙ ACCORDING TO THE OFFICERS ON THE GROUND THE

ECOMOG HAVE ABDUCTED ANDTHER ARMED MEN ⊙ SOURCES FROM LUNSAR STATED THAT BRIG. T.A.B. YAYAH DISARMED SEVEN SUPPORT WEAPONS AND TWO COMMUNICATION SETS ⊙ ACCORDING TO THE OFFICERS ON THE GROUND (LUNSAR) THEY OPENED FIRE DURING WHICH STAFF SGT. SAMUEL GOT WOUNDED ⊙ THESE MEN ARE ALSO SAID TO HAVE HARRASSED BOTH CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS DURING THEIR FOUR DAYS STAY AT LUNSAR ⊙ ECHO ⊙ MILITARY AND CIVIL RELATIONSHIP REMAIN CORDIAL ⊙ TROOPS MORALE REMAIN HIGH ⊙

BEST REGARDS/// DS 68 99

2350 HRS

00008713

05TH 08-99

TO-SMILE 00008714

FROM- SSS

SUBJ- INFORMATION

SIR,

AT 2015 HOURS ON THE 05TH AUGUST 1999, GEN. JOSHI CONTACTED ON THE SATELLITE PHONE AND CONFIRM THAT TWO PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RELEASED BY BRIG. BAZIL ⊙

1, MR. PIERRE LOUIS - A UNITED STATES CITIZEN AND HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER TO THE U.N ⊙

2, MR KRISTO JOHNSON - A SIERRA LEONEAN JOURNALIST ⊙

ACCORDING TO THEM THE OTHERS ARE STILL UNDER THE ARREST OF BRIG. BAZIL WHO STATED THAT THEIR LEADER BRIG. OR LT. COL. J. P. KOROMA IS STILL UNDER ARREST AND DURESS ⊙ HE WAS UNDER DURESS WHEN SPEAKING TO [redacted] THEM THIS MORNING ⊙ THEY MAINTAIN THAT THEY WERE NOT PART OF THE LOMÉ PEACE AGREEMENT AND DEMAND TO BE RECOGNISED ⊙ THEY SAID THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD ONTO THE PEOPLE TILL THEIR DEMANDS ARE MET ⊙ THEY ALSO ASKED FOR FOOD AND MEDICINE TO BE AVAILABLE FOR THEM ⊙

GEN. JOSHI IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE [redacted] FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE VARIOUS

9085

CITIZENS PLACED UNDER THE ARREST OF BRIG. BAZIL ARE AGAIN APPEALING TO THE LEADERSHIP AND THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE RUF/SL TO INTERVENE SWIFTLY AND MOST URGENTLY TO BRING THIS MATTER TO A REST ⊙ THEY WILL CONTINUE CONTACTING THROUGH OUT THE NIGHT ⊙

BEST REGARDS 05/08/99

2330 HRS

00008715

Fm - SMILE

TO - COL ISSAC 05TH 08-99

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE I WOULD LIKE YOU TO PROCEED TO C/S-VULTURE AND INVESTIGATE ABOUT THE ARREST OF THE PEOPLE ARRESTED BY BRIG. BAZIL AND MAKE SURE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RELEASED BUT NOT BY MEANS OF FORCE ⊙ I REPEAT, DO NOT USE ANY MILITARY FORCE ⊙ CONVINCE THEM AS BROTHERS TO RELEASE THOSE PEOPLE MAKE THEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE NOT BANDITS TO MAKE SUCH DEMANDS ⊙

BEST REGARDS

FROM - SMILE 05TH 08-99

TO - BRIG. BAZIL

SUBJ - DIRECTIVE

I AM STILL ADVICING YOU TO RELEASE THE PEOPLE UNDER YOUR ARREST ⊙ THAT IS NOT PART OF OUR MOTIVE TO HELD PEOPLE AS HUSTAGES ⊙

AND MAKE DEMANDS ⊙ LT. COL. J. P. KOROMA IS NOT UNDER ANY ARREST OR DURESS AS WE ARE TELLING PEOPLE IN FREETOWN THAT HE WAS UNDER ~~ARREST~~ DURESS THIS MORNING WHILE TALKING TO YOU ON A FIELD RADIO ⊙ . 05/08/99

BEST REARDS 00008716

2145 HRS

IMM DTG - 060900 Z AUG. 99
FROM - BRIG. BAZIL
TO - SMILE
INFO - LT. COL J. P. KOROMA
SUBJECT RESPONSE

TEXT ⊙ REF. YOUR SIGNAL MESSAGE DATED 05TH 08-99, YOU ARE HERE BY REQUESTED TO RELEASE OUR LEADER ⊙ WHETHER HE TALK'S UNDER ARREST OR DURESS HE SHOULD COME TO OUR LOC. AND RELEASE THE HUSTAGES ⊙ FAILURE TO THAT, WE ARE NOT READY TO SUBDUE OUR SELVES UNDER ANY OTHER COMMAND ⊙

ACCEPT FOR PROMPT ACTION

0920 HRS 06/08/99

TO - SMILE
INFO - CONCORD
FM - ~~GAR~~/MAJOR CI

TO-THE LEADER 00008717 07TH 08-99
INFO ~ CONCORD
FROM- MAJ. GIBRIL MASSAQUOI
SUBJ- INFORMATION

SIR,

NO RUF/SL SOLDIER ON THIS SIDE AND NOT EVEN ALL SLA SOLDIERS ARE INVOLVE IN THE CURRENT ACT ⊙ MY SELF, CO. ISSAC, CO. NYA AND OTHER SLA SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE BEEN TRYING AND ARE STILL TRYING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THOSE PEOPLE ⊙ I WILL BE LEAVING THIS EVENING TO ESCORT 3 ACF NGO VEHICLES TO MAKENI AND AT THE SAME TIME TO GET IN TOUCH WITH BRIG. MANI WHERE EVER HE IS BECAUSE HE (BRIG. MANI) SENT A MESSAGE THIS MORNING TO ALL SLAs THAT NO ONE SHOULD BE INVOLVE IN SUCH AN ACT AS IT WAS THE WRONG METHOD ⊙

BRIG. BAZIE AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN THIS ACT ARE ALL FORMER BODY GUARDS OF THE FORMER N.P.R.C. CRIMINALS AND ARE INJECTED IN THEIR BRAINS WITH DRUGS AND POWER CONSCIOUSNESS ⊙ WHEN I LEFT TOGO, I VISITED THEIR END AS YOU INSTRUCTED ⊙ THEY BROUGHT UP THIS SAME GRIEVANCES OF LT. COL. J.P. KOROMA STILL BEING DETAINED, PEACE MAY BE TALKED TODAY AND THEY ARE CAPABLE OF DESTROYING IT ⊙ AGAIN, IF NOT CONSIDE-

9088

00008718

RCD THEM AS THEY SAID THEY WERE NOT PROPERLY REPRESENTED, AND THERE FOR ASKED THEIR RESERVATION OF THE ABOVE ⊙ I SPOKE TO THEM SO AS TO CALM THEM DOWN AND I DEEMED IT NECESSARY TO SEND THE MESSAGE ON THE 22ND JUNE 99 BUT AS MAVEL REFUSED TO RECEIVE THE MESSAGE ⊙

SO FAR FOR LUNSAR KAMBIA AND MAKENI AXIS, WE ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT ONGOING PROBLEM ⊙ NO PROBLEM AS I AM IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE OTHER AXIS ⊙ YOUR MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED FROM COL. ISSAC AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEE MEANS OF SOLVING THE PRESENT PROBLEM ⊙ I WILL NEVER BE AN OBSTACLE TO YOUR ORDERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROBLEM OF ~~BRIG~~ BRIG. MORRIS KALLON ⊙

GREETINGS AND BEST REGARDS

07/08/99

-2035 HRS

FM- SMILE

07TH 08-99

TO- ALL COMMANDERS

SUBJ- DIRECTIVE

BY MY DIRECTIVE ALL COMMANDERS ARE TO ENSURE THAT MAXIMUM SECURITY IS PROVIDED FOR ALL RELIEF ORGANISATIONS ⊙ I DONT WANT TO HEAR ANY STORIES ABOUT LOOTING OR HARRASMENT OF THEM ⊙

SUPERMAN BRIG. SS AND MAJ. JACKSON SWARAY WILL BE ARRIVING BY HELICOPTER TODAY

AT MAKENI ⊙ PLEASE RECEIVE THEM PROPERLY⊙ ALL ROADS LEADING TO MAKENI AND LINKING PROVINCIAL TOWNS SHOULD BE MADE ACCESSIBLE, PROVIDE SECURITY TO AND FOR CIVILIAN POPULATION ⊙ ONLY THIS WAY WILL THE MILITARY WIN SUPPORT AND GOOD WILL OF PEOPLE ⊙

BEST REGARDS///

1205 HRS

07/08/99

TO - SMILE 00008719 10TH 08-99

THROUGH - CONCORD

FM - DR. SS WILLIAMS

SUBJ - REPORT

SIR,

WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR MESSAGE GIVEN TO ME TO ONLY CONTACT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NGOs TO BRING FOOD AND DRUGS SUPPLY IN TO OUR ZONE, I REGRET TO INFORM YOU THAT THE SAID ORDER IS NOT IMPLEMENTED IN MAKENI AS THERE IS NO COORDINATION WITH THE HIGH COMMAND AND ME ⊙ THEY ALLOW BOTH THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NGOs IN MAKENI WITH THEIR LOCAL PERSONNELS ⊙ I AM NOW FINDING IT VERY DIFFICULT TO STOP BOTH THE INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL NGOs FROM ENTERING INTO OUR ZONES WITH THE STAFFS WHOM THEY HAVE ALREADY EMPLOYED FROM FREETOWN ⊙

SIR, ACCORDING TO MR. ROBERT PINTE (UN. 1), THEY ARE NOT READY TO EMPLOY

00008720

ANY BODY FROM OUR CONTROLED ZONE ⊙ WE ARE NOT TO TELL THEM WHOM TO EMPLOY TO WORK IN OUR ZONE ⊙ SIR, AS REGARDS THE ABOVE, IF WE ALLOW SUCH PRACTICE FROM THE NGOs THEY WILL EMPLOY ALL THEIR LOCAL STAFF IN FREETOWN LEAVING BEHIND THE CAPABLE AND QUALIFIED CIVILIANS THAT HAVE SUFFERED WITH US FOR THE PAST 8 TO 9 YEARS ⊙

SIR, ANY ATTEMPT BY ME TO STOP THE NGOs AND THEIR LOCAL PERSONNELS WITH OUT YOUR SUPPORT WILL BE INTERPRETED AS PREVENTING THE NGOs FROM SUPPLYING FOOD AND DRUGS TO OUR PEOPLE ⊙ SO SIR I NEED YOUR ADVICE ON THIS ISSUE AS THE RUF IDEOLOGY SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN ⊙

BEST REGARDS

1258 HRS

10/08/99

00008721

28TH 08-99

TO - SMILE
THROUGH - SSS
INFO - CONCORD
FROM - DR. S.S. WILLIAMS
SUBJ - INFORMATION

SIR,

OUR COMBATANTS AT OKRA HILLS AND LUNSAR WERE SUPPLIED WITH FOOD ON THE 14/15 AUGUST 1999. OUR CIVILIANS AT LUNSAR RECEIVED FOOD ALSO. FOOD DISTRUBITION FOR MAKENI AND THE REST OF OUR ZONE IS NOT YET POSSIBLE DUE TO THE DISORDERLY CONDUCT OF OUR COMBATANTS AT ORRA HILLS.

THE MSF MADE THEIR FIRST TRIP BY ROAD FROM KENEMA TO PENDEMBU ON THE 07TH AUG. 1999. THEY WERE ABLED TO ACCESS JOJOIMA, BAIWALLA, MOBAI, PENDEMBU AND NGIEHUN CLINICS. ON THEIR WAY BACK TO KENEMA, THEY ALSO ACCESSED THE KUIVA AND SHEGBWEMA HOSPITALS AND LEFT VERY FEW DRUGS TO THE ABOVE CLINICS. THERE ARE NOW PLANS FOR THE MSF TO OPEN THEIR OFFICES IN THE KAILAHUN ZONES AND TO START THE VACCINATION CAMPAIN NEXT WEEK. ACCORDING TO THEM ALSO THEY ARE NOW WILLING TO WORK WITH OUR PERSONNELS. FINALLY SIR, ACCORDING TO UN 1 (ONE) THEY WANT THE

IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTE TO START WORKING AND AS SUCH THEY ARE EXCPECTING SISTER JOSEPHINE TENGBEH AND I TO JOIN THEM NEXT WEEK TO FREETOWN ⊙

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR NECESSARY ACTION SIR ⊙ . 28/08/99

00008722

1930 HRS

TO - THE LEADER
FROM - COL ISSAC
INFO - CONCOORD
SUBJ - INFORMATION

30TH 08 - 99

SIR,

THE FORUM WAS SUCCESSFUL THIS MORNING ⊙ THER WAS NO PROBLEM AS ALL THE OFFICERS CO-OPERATED ⊙ AWAITING TO RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ⊙

BEST REGARDS///

30/08/99

2015 HRS.

9093

TO - CONCORD 00008723 31ST 08-99
FM - SSS
INFO - SMILE
SUBJ - INFORMATION

SIR,

ONE HELICOPTER LANDED AT KANGAMA THIS AFTERNOON WITH FIVE UN. PERSONNELS ⊙ ACCORDING TO THEM IT WAS A REQUEST MADE BY LT. COL. J. P. KOROMA FOR GEN. JOSHI TO ASSIST AIRLIFT HIS FAMILY FROM KANGAMA TO MONROVIA ⊙

BELOW ARE THE NAMES OF THOSE WHO CAME WITH THE HELICOPTER ⊙

1. MAJ. A. SOLANKEY - INDIAN
2. MAJ. GARRY BRADLEY - UK
3. PILOT GENNADY BELIYATE - RUSIAN
4. PILOT GENNADY GUPALO - RUSIAN
5. ENGINEER GENNAY POLEKHAY - RUSIAN

I HAVE APPREHENDED THEM INCLUDING THE HELICOPTER ⊙ AWAITING TO RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTION FROM YOU ON THE ABOVE ISSUE ⊙

BEST REGARDS///

1725 HRS ⊙

31/08/99

31ST 08-99

FM - SMILE
TO - SSS
SUBJ - RESPONSE

REF. YOUR LAST MESSAGE YOU ARE TO RELEASE THE CREW TO GO BACK TO WHERE THEY CAME FROM WITHOUT DELAY ⊙

1815 HRS

31/08/99

SO 31-08-99

TO- SMILE
FROM- SSS
SUBJ - RESPONSE

00008724

SIR,

YOUR LAST DIRECTIVE WAS RECEIVED AND WELL NOTED ① BUT ACCORDING TO THE CREW THEY ARE NOT ABLED TO GO BACK THIS EVENING BECAUSE TIME IS TOO LATE FOR THEM TO FLY ①

SO SIR, I NEED YOUR ADVICE ON THE ABOVE ISSUE ①

BEST REGARDS
1955 HRS

31/08/99

6th September, 1999.

TO- SMILE
FM- COL ISSAC
THROUGH - PLANET
SUB- INFORMATION

SIR,

BE INFORM THAT THE GUINEA SOLDIERS BASED AT PORT LOKO HAVE ASKED OUR MEN INORDER TO GIVE THEM WAY TO PASS WITH THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS TO GUINEA. SO SIR I NEED YOUR ADVICE.

1510 HRS

YY UAWT - ΦΦ's NUMBER
REF 6937

00008725

69060 LSB - FOR MSF
99870 USB - FOR UNITED NATION RELIEF AJENCY

TO - SMILE
FROM - CONCORD
SUBJ - INFORMATION

10TH 09-99

SIR,

ACCORDING TO COL. ISSAC, HE RECEIVED 2 UN. PERSONNELS FROM FREETOWN YESTERDAY ⊙ ACCORDING TO THE THEY WILL BE COMING WITH ~~REF~~ RELIEF SUPPLY (FOOD AND MEDICINE) FOR THE CIVILIANS ON THE 11TH SEPT. 1999 ⊙

PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFO ⊙

BEST REGARDS
1225 HRS

10/09/99

TO - SMILE
FM - COL. ISSAC
THROUGH - CONCORD

11TH 09-99

SUBJ - INFORMATION


SIR,

THE UN. RELIEF AGENCES FROM F/TOWN ARRIVED AT MAKENI WITH (60) SIXTY TRUCKS OF RICE AND MEDICINE FOR THE CIVILIANS THIS AFTERNOON ⊙

BEST REGARDS
2130 HRS

11/09/99

9096



between Sierra Leone - Liberia is closed until situation improved.

Faithfully Submitted

Signed

Maj. JJ Kposowa

Gen adj.

00008764

App By Mr. M Kallon

Ack 1052Hrs 19/12/99

To: The RUFISL

Fm: Maj. Gen Sam Bockarie

Sub: information and Resignation

Date: 14/12/99

On this day 14/12/99, as a result of the increasing tension within the RUF/SL and in a bid to prevent more bloodshed in this our beloved country. I Maj Gen Sam Bockarie (Maskita) declared that, I'm no longer a member of the RUF/SL ☺

I thanked all the gallant men and women of the movement for their nine years of Struggle. May God bless and keep you all. I leave with a clear Conscience knowing that I've always worked in the interest of the movement and its my love for the Combatants and civilians that has force all these actions against me. I remained brave, Strong and intelligent ☺

Signed

Maj. Gen Sam Bockarie

# Exhibit 1.049 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

1.050
9099

TO. SMILE
FM. BRIG SUPERMAN
SUB. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT DATE 16/10/99

SIR, REF. TO MY LAST LETTER TO YOU EXPRESSING MY CONCERN OVER THE UNFRIENDLY SECURITY ATMOSPHERE THAT PREVAIL WITHIN LUNSAR, MAKENI, AS WELL AS KAMAKWE AXIS WHILST I WAS AWAY. I CAME DOWN TO SEE HOW BEST I CAN HURRIEDLY CURTAIL ALMOST ALL SUCH UNFORESEEN SECURITIES CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH I BELIEVE IF NOT PROPERLY ADRESSED BY ME AT THIS MATERIAL POINT IN TIME CAN INTERFERE WITH THE DETAILS OF THE PEACE ACCORD ON WHICH YOU ARE ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES. UPON MY ARRIVAL IN MAKENI ON 14/10/99 I URGENTLY DECIDED TO SUMMON SENIOR OFFICERS MEETING WITH THE BROTHER IN ARM I LEFT ON THE GROUND BUT IT WAS LATER AGREED THAT THIS KIND OF MEETING BEING POSTPONED TO THE NEXT DATE 15/10/99. AN OFFICIAL LETTER WAS CIRCULATED TO ENSURE THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF SENIOR OFFICERS CONCERNED.

00008845

UNFORTUNATELY, THE MEETING DIDN'T TAKE THE SHAPE MYSELF AND THE OTHER OFFICERS WERE EXPECTING AS ALL THOSE SENIOR OFFICERS EXPECTED (PARTICULARLY THE EXSLA TO ATTEND SUCH A VIABLE MEETING TO TURN UP ON THE STIPULATED PERIOD OF TIME. UNANIMOUS DECISION BY OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WITH ME IN THE FORUM WAS TAKING TO ENSURE THAT WE GET IN TOUCH WITH REGIONAL COMMANDER RESPECTIVELY.

IN THE EVENT JUST ABOUT THE TIME MY MAN-

POWER APPROACH THE ROUND ABOUT (PZ) COL ? M YAMBA (REGIONAL COMMANDER) AND COL BAKAR (BRIGADE COMMANDER) ALL OF EX SLA OPENED SUPPRESIVE FIRING AGAINST MY MAN POWER, HENCE ENSUED BETWEEN BOTH PARTY ONLY TO SAVE ONES LIFED EVENTUALLY, MY MAN POWER WERE VERY STRONG ENOUGH TO REPEL THIER COMBATANT AT A DISTANCE AFAR D OF COURSE OUR REVOLUTIONARY BROTHER, (RUFS/L) FROM TEKO BARRACK JOIN THE MOPING UP OPERATION TO HELP PUTTING THE SITUATION UNDER PERFECT CONTROL D

WHAT SEEMED TO BE MORE WORRYING TO ME AT THIS POINT IS THE RAMPANT LOOTING OF CIVILIAN PROPERTIES BY THIS SAME BROTHERS UNDER THE COMMANDERSHIP OF BRIGADIER MORIS KALLON D

00008846

SUGGESTIONS:

I THEREFORE WOULD LIKE TO ADVISE FROM THIS POINT THAT IN GOOD INTEREST OF EVERLASTING PEACE IN THIS COUNTRY, YOU ENDEAVOUR TO FUTHER INSTRUCT OUR BROTHERS WHO CAME FROM KAILAHUN AXIS THROUGH KONO TO GO BACK TO THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS AS MY PRENSENCE IN THE ENVIROMENT IS QUITE SUFFICIENT TO CALM ALL OTHER UNUSUAL SECURITIES HABIT WHICH WOULDN'T BE IN THE PLEASANT IMAGE OF OUR MOVEMENT ESPECIALLY WHEN ALL ARE WATCHING US D

I AM PERSONALLY INFORMING YOU FROM THIS POINT ON THE GROUND THAT THIS INFOS CAN GUIDE YOU TO GIVE FURTHER CONFIDENTIAL TO ALL OTHER PARASTATALS, NGOS AS WELL AS THE CIVILIAN POPULACE TO FEEL TROUBLE FREE FROM ANY INTIMIDATION D WITH MY PRESENCE ON THE GROUND ALL OTHER SECURITIES ISSUE ARE PUT UNDER CONTROL ACCORDINGLY AS A WAY

9/01

OF RESTORING SANITY TO THE CIVILIAN POPULACE ⊙
ONLY THAT, WHOSOEVER IS READY AND WILLING TO TAKE TO
MY STANDING ORDER WITHIN OUR LIBERATED ZONE(
NOTHERN REGION) WILL BE ALLOW TO WORK WITH US
AMICABLY UNTIL THE COMBATANT FINALLY SEE YOU
ON THE GROUND SIR ⊙ 00008847
I THINK I CAN BETTER MEET THE COMMITMENT
OF BEEFING UP THE SECURITY POTENTIAL OF THIS
ENVIROMENT MORE THAN ANY OTHER COMMANDER AS
I HAVE STRONG CONFIDENCE IN THE NEUTRAL
RELATIONSHIP THAT HAD EXISTED BETWEEN ME AND
THE CIVILIAN AS WELL AS THE COMBATANT I LEFT
ON THE GROUND ⊙
THE MAIN REASON WHILE I'M ADVISING ON THE
SUCH WITHDRAWAL OF THIS TROOP IS THAT
I WANT TO PERSONALLY AVOID ARM CONFLICT WITH
THE BROTHERS WHO WOULD LIKE TO INFILTRATE
MY AREA OF CONTROL WITH INDISCIPLINE ⊙ THE
LOYAL COMBATANT AND MYSELF ARE BETTER IN PLACE
TO CREAT AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONVINIENT FOR BOTH
THE COMBATANT AND ESPECIALLY THE CIVIL POPULACE
WITHIN OUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY SIR ⊙
ACCEPT FOR YOUR INFOS AND STEP SPEEDY
ADVISE SIR ⊙

BEST REGARDS!!

YOUR REQ. 1625 HRS
OPT

16
10
79

9/02 1.051

FROM SMILE 001
TO. SUPERMAN
SUB. DIRECTIVE DATE 16/10/99

REF TO YOUR MSG., ~~YOU ARE HER~~ ACK. BUT YOU ARE TO CALL ME ON THE RADIO FOR FUTHER INSTRUCTION.

~~BEST~~ REGARDS!!.

00008848

Transmitted: 1TA: H3 1TRS
Signed: ~~Edward~~
16/10/99

FM: CONCOLD THROUGH SMILE
TO. ~~SPARROW~~ SSS 002
SUB INSTRUCTION DATE 16/10/99
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO SEND ~~BRIGADIER~~ MORO KALLON TO MAGBOROKA ALONG WITH ~~HIS~~ SECURITIES TO TAKE COMMAND POST AT THE AREA

FROM. SMILE TO: SSS/TB 003
SUB: INSTRUCTION DATE. 18/10/99
YOU SHOULD ALLOW THE NGOS OPERATING AT YOUR AREA (MAKENI) TO USE THEIR FIELD RADIO TO ENABLE THEM REACH THEIR MEN ~~BY~~ AIRD ALL PROPERTIES TAKING AWAY FROM THEM SHOULD BE HANDED OVER ~~TO THEM~~. THIS INCLUDE COMMUNICATION SET, TELEPHONE AS THEIR BROTHERS ~~HERE~~ ARE GRUMBLING ABOUT HOW THEY HAVE LOST CONTACT WITH THEIR MEND YOU SHOULD DESIST THIS HABIT OF LOOTING AND HARRASSING PEOPLE MORE THE NGOS AS ITS TOTALLY AGAINST THE LOME ACCORD AND EVEN THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REVOLUTIOND I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK WITH YOU PEOPLE ONCE MORE ON THIS ISSUE.

FIRM REGARDS!!

TRANSMITTED 1H: 50HRS
SIGNED: ~~Edward~~ 18/10/99

~~THIS~~ TRANSMITTED TB

9108

# Exhibit 1.052 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

1.054

9104

To: The Leader RUFSL
From: THE BLACK COMMANDER
Subj: INFORMATION.
Date: 2nd September, 1998.

About 11:00am to 12:00 this day today, i heard Brigadier Sam Bockarie. In the dialogue, i was accussed of very slow in peration and that i not virtually done anything saing simce our withdrawal from Free Town. I was also accussed of having huge quantity of diamond that is under safe keeping to my wife whom he reffered to as idiot.

00009485

To this point, he treantened to kill my wife if she was here. Furthermore, he also accussed me that the Juntas twe that unanimously decided to preach idialogy are not considered by him as Soldiers but bandits or Civilliam. In did, i will like to make it very clear to the movement that i still remain Commander to the movement commented to the Leadership of Cpl: Foday .S. Sankoh and i will im my capacity as a Battle Group Commander in my ability to secure his release. Beside that, iam not working to satisfy any particular somebody wishes to deviate my attention from the above mention objective.

On the part of his accussation that i am in possesion of diamond I also wish to make it clear to all Combatants that i have in did shed blood for this struggle and what so ever regulation that were put in place during our Leader staying with us still remain constant, I knew that diamond fall amoung the lot of items consider as Government property.

Therefore, i always make sure that what so ever diamond i receive is always reported to Brigadier Sam Bockarie who is our present high in Command. Even recently, the diamond mining Group that was sent to Kona is plased under its own Commander from my reference. Beside, i have never been given mining contract to dig on behalf of R.U.F.S.L like how some of them did within the Nine months staying in Free Town. The Movement has not not intrusted diamond in my hands so that i could go out for any purchase of a single pin like other peoples i am a Combatant from the very crucial stage of this War. I have played releasses effort to see the success of the R.U.F.S.L. Therefore, i can never betray it. But i have noticed all my effort i have played seem not to be appreciated by Brigadier Sam Bockarie. Some action was displayed on me in Free Town, but he later spoke to me and i forget. I also want to make it, now he is threatening my Wife and my Family. I also want to make it clear to all Combatants that i am a very senior officer of the R.U.F. and that todays dialogue with Brigadier Sam Bockarie did not go down well with me. If any body could recall, Pa. Sankoh has never referred to the wife of a senior Officer as idiot on air as you all know that the air is monitored.

To prove my sincerety to the movement, i will in the shortest possible time furnish the entire Combatants with present strenght of man power presently operating with me. But to say the fact, i will not report within his 72 hours stated time because, of thethreat he has played on my life. If he has any charges for me, i appeal he reserve it until we meet face to face with our Leader.

L

1.057 9105

00009489

Revolutionary United Front
To : The Leader RUF S/L
From : Jackson Ray Swaray
Blackguard Commander RUF S/L.
Date. 25/09/99.
Sub. Suggestion and Advice.

Sir

With your kind permission to put across the above subject as follows:

1. The problem between General Sam Bockarie (Mosquito) and Brigadier Denis Mingo (Supper Man) should be properly look into as three (3) side of my stories I mean the side of General Sam Bockarie (Mosquito), and the side of Brigadier Denis Mingo (Supper man) and the truth to avoid embarrassment from both side.

2. You are to look up to the Combatants and the Civilians

P.T.O.

00009490

under our Controled area as
Most of them are loyal to the
R-U-F.SL Movement.
3. The problem of ex-SLA Should
be properly address as most
of them are loyal.
4. All Commanders / units heads are
to give you a Comprehensive
reports and Later Called a
general forum ~~which must be~~
~~follow by general forum~~ to
address on issues.
5. Not to forget the problems
of food and Medicines for the
Combatants and Civillians
behind the rebel Controlled as
you previously do.
6. To Consider the families of
the later fighters who died
in the Struggle.
7. Not to forget about the
BLACKguards as security Came

P.T.O

9107

FROM : PHONE NO. : Oct. 15 1999 11:37PM P12

00009491

in doing things.

5. NOT To forget the School teacher behind our area of Control and School-Materials like; Books, Pens and Pencils.

9. To Contact Mr. Mamoud at Freetown who was Struggling with us for all latest informations as we are not there now.

Sir your Kind attention is Called to focus on this problems for neccessary action at your own Convinces.

Thanks with Regards,

Signed 10/99

Jackson Sewavoy
Background Commander
RUF/SL

9/08

# Exhibit 1.058 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

1.063

9/09

Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone
( People's Army Of Sierra Leone)
Ops. Segbwema.

Date: 31st August 1999

To: Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh
RUF/SL.

00009765

From: Major Francis M. Musa
District I.D.U. Commander
Kailahun.

Sub: Brief comprehensive report on all salient activities that took place in the absence of the leader from the 24th. March, 1996 to the 31st. August, 1999.

The leader, Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh left Zogoda on the 24th. March, 1996 for the Abidjan ( Ivory Coast ) Peace Talk. Brigadier Moris ~~xx~~ Kallon now took over command at Zogoda in the absence of Lt. Col. Mohamed Tarawally. Seventy-two hours later, Lt. Col. Mohamed Tarawally arrived and took over command from Co. Moris Kallon as instructed by the leader before he left for Abidjan.

Lt. Col. Mohamed Tarawally started fine but later he was wrongly advised by his bodyguards and late Capt. Daniel Wankeh (Rambo, who was bodyguards commander to the leader). For instance, all kinds of civilians and standbys were now entering in and going out of Zogoda without proper security. The Camp Lion Training Base became a ground of revenge rather than for ideology. Lt. Titesu, Pujehun District I.D.U. Commander was killed in halaka at the Camp Lion Training Base sometimes in July, 1996. All those who were involved including Major Junior Vandi, Major Muyepeh, late Capt. Cobra, etc. were all demoted and removed from the training base to other areas of assignments. The lethargic or delaying attitude of Lt. Col. Mohamed Tarawally in responding to instructions sent by the leader made the Kamajors to over-run our positions from the end of 1996 to early 1997.

While the peace talk was going on in Abidjan in 1996, Kamajors together with soldiers loyal to Tejan Kabba continued to attack our positions with flimsy excuses that they were returning to their villages, defend and harvest their agricultural produce. The instruction given to Lt. Col. Mohamed Tarawally by the leader to evacuate Zogoda and send some people to Pujehun and the rest to Kailahun was delayed until the enemies over-ran Koribondo Jungle, Bandawor, Zogoda, Kenema by-pass, Across Moa, etc. A good number of both civilians and soldiers including good brothers like Capt. Augustine Koroma, Capt. Papa, Capt. Long By-pass, Lt. Shalelow, Lt. A.B. Dundas, etc. died in this incident. All our positions were over-run by the enemies with the exception of the Kailahun axis, Western jungle, Peyama axis and Pujehun axis. Later on, Pujehun axis fell to the enemies. This was as a result of the lack of materials and disunity between the very citizens of this area - both civilians and soldiers. Thanks be to God and Major-General Sam Bockarie, because when he observed the cruel determination of the enemies to massacre us, he instructed that Peyama jungle must be dissolved. This was done, as everybody crossed over to Burkina to put effort together to defend the original land of the RUF/SL rebels in Sierra Leone. At this Juncture, the RUF/SL could only boast of the Western jungle and the Kailahun axis. A very big praise to Brigadier Denis Mingo and others who upheld this jungle upto the time the AFRC took over on the 25th. May, 1997.

Again, a very big thank you and praise to Major-General Sam Bockarie, Brigadier I. H. Sesay, Brigadier Peter B. Vandi, other devoted soldiers and civilians. If it were not the co-operation of these mentioned people under the commandership of Major-General Sam Bockarie, the enemies would have finally flushed us out of Sierra Leone. This was the time Capt. Palmer, Fayia Musa, Deen-Jalloh and

FROM : PHONE NO. : Oct. 12 1999 11:28PM P02

Dr. Barrie had told the SLPP government alot about the RUF/SL. They disclosed to the government that we are lack of ammunition, that we depend on the arms and ammunition we capture from the enemies. So they advised the Tejan Kabba government to concentrate on Kamajors wit with single barrels, knives and sticks to fight us, thinking that wh- en we are suppressed, we would have accepted their government and be- trayed the RUF/SL. Thanks to the Lord Almighty, with the help of Maj- or-General Sam Bockarie, Brigadier I.H.Sesay and Brigadier Peter B. Vandi, these betrayers (coup plotters) were rounded up at the Sierra Leone-Guinea border somewhere around Koindu. The The information pre- viously given to the enemies about the RUF/SL by these coup plotters triggered the enemies to suppress us in Nginea axis attacking our po- sitions including Nginea HQ. twice or thrice every week. They used single-barrels, sticks and knives with limited automatic riffles to fight us, and hence we captured nothing from them anytime they were kf killed or pushed back. Major-General Sam Bockarie who was gifted by God worked very hard to save the movement. He sacrificed his life, went to Foya, contacted the Liberian soldiers and established strong relationship between the RUF/SL and the Liberian soldiers. Devoted soldiers and civilians freely offered cocoa beans, coffee beans, pis- tols, single-barrels, X-Base tape, presentable dressings, etc. to the movement to be exchanged for ammunition. This ammunition was what we used to fight the enemies and with-held the Burkina axis until the AFRC took over the reigns of government of Sierra Leone from Tejan Kabba on May 25th. 1997 (Sunday) and called upon the RUF/SL.

We joined the brothers on May 29th., 1997. The following key positions were offered to the RUF/SL. Vice president - Pa Foday San- koh, Minister of Trade and Industry - Major Eldred Collins, Minister of agriculture and Forestry - Mr. A.A. Vandi, Minister of Energy and Power - Major Lawrence Wormandia, Minister of Lands and Mines - Mr. S.Y.B. Rogers, deputy Minister of Education - Major P.S. Beinda and deputy Minister of Lands and Mines - Brigadier Peter B. Vandi. Very minimal positions in the army were offered to the RUF/SL. Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma was wrongly advised by prominent military men who were Kamajors and Tejan Kabba supporters. The RUF/SL was treated with infinitesimal dignity. Most advise given by our own authorities by them were not adhered to. Little attention was paid to security information from the RUF/SL securities. Recommendations were never attended to. On the whole, the brothers had no confidence in us. Ho- wever, we accepted everything in good faith because we were instruc- ted by our leader to take all orders and instructions from Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma. This enabled the Tejan Kabba government supported by the Nigerian led ECOMOG and the Sandline International from Brit- ain to overthrow the AFRC government in February, 1998. Tejan was to come together with the RUF/SL leader to Freetown on April 22nd. 1998 to regain presidency but the enemies did not wait for this time. The Nigerian led ECOMOG with British mercenaries attacked Freetown in February 1998 and this extended to all the provinces and towns. Two displeasing incidents that took place while the we were in Freetown included the alleged misusing of nine million leones (le.9,000,000) by Brigadier Superman and the used of about forty-five million leones (le.45,000,000) on marriage ceremony by Major Eldred Collins.

Considering our military strength and the pressure that was put on us by the Nigerian led ECOMOG, we withdrew into the bush(parts of Kailahun and Kono districts) to re-organise ourselves and regain str- ength. We still continue to thank and praise Major-General Sam Bocka- rie, Brigadier I.H.Sesay, late Col. Boston Flomo(Rambo), Brigadier Su- perman, Brigadier Moris Kallon, Brigadier Peter B. Vandi and many othe- rs who stood firm and made sure that the enemies did not overcome us. The rampant promotion of soldiers served as incentives that motivated the combatants to double-up their efforts. The consultation, co-ordina- tion and co-operation amongst senior officers and other ranks brought about the recapture of Joru jungle, Kono, Makeni, Magburaka, Segbwema, Tongo Field, Western jungle, Freetown and many other places from the end of 1998 to early 1999. This drew the attention of the Western and Tejan Kabba to call for cease-fire,

9976000

00097697

ree the RUF/SL rebel leader and sign the Lome Peace Treaty
will lead to every lasting peace in this country as we can see for
ourselves now.

During our strtw withdrawal into the bush, security divulged t
that some former SLA soldiers were in possession of diamonds and fo-
reign currencies which they wanted to use only to satisfy their per-
sonal needs. Some of them even wanted to escape with these wealth
and left us struggling. Infact a good number of them with or with-
out wealth escaped to Liberia and Guinea. Since in RUF/SL diamonds
and foreign currencies are government properties, authorities deci-
ded to collect diamonds and foreign currencies in possession of in-
dividuals so that they could be used in the interest of the movement
with priority to arms and ammunition. Some important items like mini
satellite, Radio Freetown, etc. were acquired for the used of the mo-
vement. Small-small diamonds which only the higher authorities and the
miners will account for, were collected from the minings done in Kono
and Tongo Field but the proceeds according to my understanding were
all used in the interest of the movement. In the course of promoting
the movement, diamonds were also collected from Lt. Col. Johnny Paul
Koroma himself. Rather unfortunate some of these diamonds and foreign
currencies got missed in the hands of Brigadier I.H.Sesay in Liberia
when he went to cater for ammunition for the movement. This is the
number one grivance of Brigadier Superman, that Brigadier I.H.Sesay
was not queried when he lost the diamonds and the foreign currencies
but he missed the nine million leones in Freetown, he was brought
to Quarterdeck. To be frank enough, Brigadier I.H.Sesay was the only
strong man under Major-General Sam Bockarie at that time who helped
to put situation under control as the enemies were seriously pressi-
ng us. Taking Co. Issa off from whatever he was doing at that time &
and brought him for investigation would have done more harm than
good because something worse than the lost of the diamonds and the
foreign currencies would have occured. Moreover, the collection of
diamonds from some former SLA soldiers, money and diamonds from pe-
ople who were in Kono when the former SLA soldiers (some of them)
broke the bank in Kono, the failure of the authorities to provide
Lt. Col. J.P.Koroma with vehicle and communication set may be res-
ponsible for the indifferences that cropped-up between the men in
the Western jungle and we on this side. Above all, they were expe-
cting that we were going to subdue ourselves to them in our own
territory like we did when we in Freetown which resulted to our
retreat into the bush. If we have subdued ourselves to these guys,
we would have moved from the "frying pot to the fire". The above
points triggered the former SLA brothers presenting in the Western
jungle to incite Superman to disobey Major-General Sam Bockarie
with unwarranted excuse that Major-General [illegible] escalated
insulted and condemned his Lebanese woman. This pro[illegible]
to a point that Brigadier Superman either all by himself or thro-
ugh giving orders killed Col. Bestan Flomo(Rambo) by shooting him.

Although about 90-95% of the SLA brothers including Col.
Akim Turay, Lt. Col. Soriba, Lt. Col. Dumbuya, Lt. Col. Bakarr,
Major Leather Boot and many others are loyal to this movement, but
out of observations, the balance 5-10% are power conscious, materi-
alistic and so can be incited by the politicians. Moreover, it
will take some of them time to get use to some of the rules
and regulations(ideology) binding the RUF/SL movement. Since we
joined together with the brothers, crimes rates have maximally
not increased.

Hence as you have come as our leader to join us all to make
Sierra Leone a better place to live, you have to set your eyes
air, to wipe out all forms of corruptions and in the interim, you
and all of us should be concerned about your security as the po-
liticians would want to prevail on these power and material hun-
gry men to do any thing to distort your good intention for
country.

9/12

00009768

WELCOME AND GOD BLESS ALL SIR.

31-09-99.

Signed: Maj

Major Francis M. Musa
District I.D.U. comander
Kailahun.

cc:
Chief of Defence Staff
Battle Field Commander
War Office
File.

1,080 9/13

00012940

*State House*

*Freetown, Republic of Sierra Leone*

3rd October, 1997.

**His Excellency**
**Charles G. Taylor**
**President of the Republic of Liberia**
**Monrovia**
**REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA**

Your Excellency and Dear Brother,

I wish on behalf of every living Sierra Leonean and the Government of Sierra Leone to express our sincere gratitude and appreciation for the staunch supportive position you took during your last intervention at the UN General Assembly on the pacific resolution of the crisis in our country. The people of this country shall be ever grateful to Your Excellency for your hand of brotherhood of understanding and friendship in this our moment of dire need.

Your Excellency, inspite of this and inspite of everything that we ourselves here in Sierra Leone are doing to avert disaster for our war-weary people, based on intelligence that we have received, Nigeria appears intent and bent on invading our capital city of Freetown and imposing their will on our people. For a succession of days the Nigerian component of ECOMOG occupying the Lungi International Airport has been indiscriminately shelling and bombarding Freetown on a nightly basis evidently in preparation for their invasion plan. We have no option but to defend our sovereignty and to protect our citizens from the carnage and wanton destruction that will be intensified by such an impending act of aggression by the Nigerians.

Your Excellency we need your help and we call on you to come to our rescue. Let us together defend Sierra Leone for in doing so we shall be

/... ... ...

defending each other and consolidating peace within our sub-region. We are cognisant of the tremendous constraints that you are currently confronted with at this material point in time. We however entreat you to support us with the following list of arms and ammunitions:

**ARMS**

| | |
|---|---|
| 2,000 | AK 47 rifles |
| 500 | G3 rifles |
| 300 | RPG 7 tubes |
| 100 | 60 mm mortar tubes |
| 6 | 105 Howitzer guns |

**Ammunition**

| | |
|---|---|
| 1,000 boxes | 7.62x39 (CH) |
| 500 boxes | 7.62x51 (NATO) |
| 1,000 rounds | 60 mm mortar |
| 2,000 rounds | 105 mm Howitzer |

Your Excellency, our situation is grave and our determination strong. It is our sacred duty to defend our country and to protect our people and to create the basis for lasting peace among all of our peoples.

The people of Sierra Leone shall be eternally indebted to you.

/... ... ...

9/15

00012942



Please accept my assurances of the highest esteem.

**MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA**
**CHAIRMAN**
**ARMED FORCES REVOLUTINARY COUNCIL**
**AND HEAD OF STATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF**
**SIERRA LEONE**

9116


# Annex B.5

## Documents Certified in Annex C.2

9117

# Exhibit 1.042 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

1.239
9118



## Stage II Kono production

| Date | received From | No. of Pieces | Caratage | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 02-08-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 3 | 1 | 05 % | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Kai Foday | 1 | — | 39 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ — | Komba Buah | 2 | — | 05 % | Mix |
| 03-08-99 | Kai Foday | 3 | 1 | 24 % | 11 |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Komba Buah | 5 | — | 72 % | 11 |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 5 | 2 | 04 % | 11 |
| 04-08-99 | Kai Foday | 1 | — | 15 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Komba Buah | 3 | — | 95 % | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | 1 | 36 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 10 | 3 | 28 % | Mix |
| 05-08-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | 9 | 74 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 16 | 5 | 65 % | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ — | Komba Buah | 1 | — | 04 % | industrial |
| 07-08-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | 1 | 19 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 18 | 4 | 60 % | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Komba Buah | 4 | — | 50 % | 11 |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Kai Foday | 2 | — | 33 % | 11 |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Sam Bockarie | 1 | — | 42 % | White |
| | Ground total of diamonds = 78 pieces ✓ | | | | |
| 7-8-99 | Ground garatage of Whites = 26 garat 95% | | | | |
| | Ground garatage of industrial = 7 garat 17% | | | | |

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9120

## Stage 12 Kono Production

| Date | recieved From | No of Pieces | Carratage | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08-08-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 7 | 3 | 36 % | White |
| 08-08-99 | Saidu Sam (Tefeya production) | 1 | 1 | 52 % | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 1 | 1 | 47 % | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 1 | 2 | 70 % | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 14 | 5 | 80 % | Mix |
| | Tefeya total and garatage = | 17 | 11 | 49 % | |
| | " " Gold weighed | | 8 GM | | |
| 09-08-99 | Komba Bush | 2 | — | 13 % | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | 3 | — | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 1 | 1 | 28 % | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 13 | 2 | 72 % | Mix |
| 10-08-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 15 | 8 | 54 % | Mix |
| 11-08-99 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | — | 46 % | orange |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | 2 | 80 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 11 | 4 | 20 % | Mix |
| 12-08-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 9 | 2 | 40 % | " |
| 14-08-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | 3 | 28 % | Coffee |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 9 | 3 | 85 % | Mix |

00012916

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# 00012917

| Date | received From | No: of Pieces | Caratage | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16-08-99 | Sam Bockorie | 1 | — | 14 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | 7 | — | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 1 | 3 | 74 % | orange |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 1 | 2 | 62 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 10 | 4 | — | " |
| 18-08-99 | Sam Bockorie | 2 | — | 88 % | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 8 | 1 | 95 % | Mix |
| 19-08-99 | Tamba Konoboy | 1 | 4 | 15 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ | 5 | 1 | 75 % | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | 3 | 05 % | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 11 | 3 | 05 % | Mix |
| 21-08-99 | Tamba Konoboy | 4 | — | 90 % | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 2 | — | 40 % | " |
| 23-08-99 | Tamba Konoboy | 6 | 1 | 60 % | " |
| 24-08-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | — | 42 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Tamba Konoboy | 5 | — | 80 % | Mix |
| 25-08-99 | Sam Bockorie | 3 | — | 78 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 2 | — | 88 % | " |
| 26-08-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | — | 28 % | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ | Sam Bockorie | 4 | — | 75 % | Mix |
| 28-08-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | — | 27 % | orange |

9122

**00012918**

| Date | Recieved From | No. of Pieces | Breakage | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30-08-99 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | — | 05% | industrial |
| 31-08-99 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | — | 13% | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 3 | 1 | 05% | Mix |
| 01-09-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 3 | — | 46% | " |
| 02-09-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 3 | — | 76% | " |
| 04-09-99 | Sam Bockarie | 3 | — | 20% | " |
| 07-09-99 | Kai Foday | 1 | — | 05% | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | 3 | 40% | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ — | 1 | 1 | 38% | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 10 | 2 | 58% | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Tamba Koroboy | 1 | 6 | 70% | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ | 1 | 5 | 42% | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ | 1 | 3 | 26% | orange |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ | 23 | 7 | 32% | Mix |
| | Ground total and garatage of White = 81 pieces 54 gram 78% | | | | |
| 8-9-99 | total and weight of Colored and industrials = 131 pieces = 66.66% | | | | |
| | Ground total of diamond = 212 pieces | | | | |
| | Ground total weight of Gold = 8 gram (Cash) | | | | |

## Stage 13 : Kono production

| Date | received From | No. of Pieces | Carats | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08-09-99 | Kai Foday | 4 | — | 88 % | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Tamba Konoboy | 5 | — | 76 % | 11 |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 11 | 2 | 20 % | 11 |
| 09-09-99 | Tamba Konoboy | 3 | — | 92 % | 11 |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Kai Foday | 2 | — | 30 % | 11 |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S Conteh | 14 | 3 | 55 % | 11 |
| ~~13-09-99~~ | ~~Tamba Konoboy~~ | ~~3~~ | ~~—~~ | ~~50~~ | |
| 11-09-99 | Founding diamond | 1 | — | 08 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Kai Foday | 1 | — | 05 % | Coffee |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Tamba Konoboy | 3 | — | 50 % | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 12 | 4 | 06 % | 11 |
| 13-09-99 | Tamba Konoboy | 3 | — | 35 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ — | Mohamed S. Conteh | 11 | 5 | 95 % | Mix |
| 14-09-99 | Kai Foday | 4 | 4 | 58 % | 11 |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S Conteh | 1 | 1 | 52 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ — | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 10 | 2 | 30 % | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | | 1 | — | 22 % | Coffee |
| 15-09-99 | Tamba Konoboy | 7 | 1 | — | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Kai Foday | 1 | — | 22 % | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S Conteh | 9 | 2 | 75 % | Mix. |

00012919

9/24

00012920

| Date | Received from | No of Pieces | Carat | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16-09-99 | Tamba Konoboy | 1 | 4 | 27% | orange |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ | 2 | — | 26% | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Kai Foday | 1 | — | 08% | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | 8 | 15% | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 3 | 1 | 02% | Mix |
| 18-9-99 | Mohamed S Conteh | 6 | 1 | 78% | White |
| 20-9-99 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | 2 | 96% | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S Conteh | 4 | 2 | 34% | Mix |
| 21-9-99 | Kai Foday | 2 | — | 25% | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S Conteh | 5 | 1 | 60% | " |
| 22-9-99 | Mohamed S Conteh | 2 | — | 20% | " |
| 23-9-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 3 | — | 80% | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Sam Bockarie | 1 | 10 | 40% | orange |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ | 1 | — | 15% | " |
| 25-9-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 1 | — | 10% | White |
| 27-9-99 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | 1 | 08% | " |
| 28-9-99 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | 0 | 24% | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S Conteh | 1 | + | 75% | " |
| 29-9-99 | Mohamed S Conteh | 4 | 1 | 40% | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Sam Bockarie | 3 | — | 75% | Mix |
| | | | | | |

00012821

| Date | recieved From | No of Pieces | Caratage | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30-9-99 | Kai Fonday | 1 | — | 40% | Coffee |
| 〃 〃 〃 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 3 | 1 | 20% | Mix |
| 02-10-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 7 | 1 | 68% | 〃 |
| 04-10-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 5 | 3 | 12% | 〃 |
| 05-10-99 | Mohamed S'Conteh | 3 | — | 52% | industrial |
| 06-10-99 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | 5 | 75% | White |
| 〃 〃 〃 | 〃 〃 | 1 | — | 06% | 〃 |
| 〃 〃 〃 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 3 | — | 68% | Mix |
| 07-10-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 8 | 3 | 75% | 〃 |
| 09-10-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 2 | — | 90% | industrial |
| 11-10-99 | Ground total and gora tage of diamond | | | | |
| | 5 pieces of Whites and total gora tage = 19 : 40% | | | | |
| | 2 pieces of orange and total gora tage = 14 : 72% | | | | |
| | 14 pices of Whites and total gora tage = 8 : 10% | | | | |
| | 162 pieces of industrial and total gora tage = 61 : 40% | | | | |
| 11-10-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 4 | 2 | 11% | Mix |
| 12-10-99 | Mohamed S Conteh | 1 | — | 28% | industrial |
| 〃 〃 〃 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | — | 34% | 〃 |
| 13-10-99 | Mohamed S. Conteh | 2 | — | 64% | 〃 |
| 〃 〃 〃 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | — | 15 | 〃 |

0001292

| Date | recieved From | No of Pieces | Carat | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 14-10-99 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | 5 | 33% | Coffee |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ | 1 | — | 25% | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Mohamed S Conteh | 1 | 2 | 20% | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 7 | 2 | 33% | Mix |
| 16-10-99 | Ground total of diamond = 19 pieces | | | | |
| | Ground total garatage = 13 Carat 63% industrial | | | | |
| | Stage 14 Kono Production | | | | |
| Date | recieved From | No of Piece | Garatage | Percentage | Colour |
| 16-10-99 | Mohamed S Conteh | 2 | 1 | — | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Sam Bockarie | 2 | — | 30% | " |
| 18-10-99 | Mohamed S Conteh | 7 | 6 | 28% | " |
| 19-10-99 | Mohamed S Conteh | 1 | 3 | 45% | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 1 | 1 | 20% | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 4 | 2 | 55% | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Sam Bockarie | 1 | — | 25% | " |
| 20-10-99 | Mohamed S Conteh | 1 | 1 | 20% | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ ✓ | 3 | 2 | 70% | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Sam Bockarie | 1 | — | 60% | Coffee |
| 21-10-99 | Mohamed S Conteh | 1 | — | 23% | industrial |
| 23-10-99 | Mohamed S Conteh | 3 | 1 | 03% | " |
| 28-10-99 | Sam Bockarie | 1 | — | 10 | " |

00012923

| Date | received From | No of Pieces | Gwarat | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 02-11-99 | Combatant 2nd Bde | 6 | 1 | 40% | industrial |
| 02-11-99 | Sam Bockarie | 2 | — | 45% | " |
| 08-11-99 | Steven Monyah | 1 | 1 | 10% | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ | 3 | — | 50% | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | Sam Bockarie | 1 | — | 30% | " |
| 09-11-99 | Steven Monyah | 5 | 1 | 70% | " |
| 10-11-99 | Steven Monyah | 1 | 1 | 40% | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | ✓ ✓ | 5 | 3 | 80% | industrial |
| 11-11-99 | Steven Monyah | 4 | — | 50% | " |
| 16/11/99 | Ground total and weight of diamonds | | | | |
| | 14 pieces of Whites weighed 17 gwarats 87% | | | | |
| | 36 pieces of industrials weighed 12 gwarats 95% | | | | |

Stage 15 Kono production

| Date | No of Pieces | Gwaratage | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 28/12/99 | 12 pieces | 4 | 20% | Mix |
| 29/12/99 | 6 | 3 | 54% | " |
| 30-12-99 | 10 | 5 | 04% | " |
| 31-12-99 | 22 | 17 | 54% | " |
| 1-1-2000 | 16 | 5 | 25% | " |

9/28

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| Date | No. of Pieces | Garatage | Percentage | Colour |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 02-01-2000 | 11 pieces | 4 | 07 % | Mix |
| 03-01-2000 | 18 | 17 | 42 % | " |
| 04-01-2000 | 36 | 19 | 97 % | " |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | 1 | 3 | 70 % | White |
| 05-01-2000 | 20 | 10 | 45 % | Mix |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | 1 | 14 | 66 % | White |
| 06-01-2000 | 7 | 3 | 45 % | Mix |
| 07-01-2000 | 9 | 3 | 60 % | " |
| 08-01-2000 | 6 | 1 | 80 % | " |
| 10-01-2000 | 3 | 1 | 08 % | industrial |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | 1 | 1 | 61 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | 1 | 14 | 85 % | industrial |
| 11-01-2000 | 1 | 7 | 93 % | White |
| ✓ ✓ ✓ | 15 | 4 | 28 % | Mix |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2-8-99 | 8-8-99 | No. of Pieces (Diamond) = 1562 | Gold = 8 Grams |
| 9-8-99 | 15-09-99 | 301 | |
| 16-09-99 | 30-09-99 | 48 | |
| 02-10-99 | 28-10-99 | 17 | |
| 02-11-99 | 16-11-99 | 28 | |
| 28-12-99 | 31-12-99 | 32 | |
| 1-1-2000 | 11-1-2000 | 1146 | |
| | | 2134 | |


00012925

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Marsh
Engineering, Inc. Jeffersonville, Indiana

00012926



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# Annex B.6

## Documents Certified in Annex C.3

1.084

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RESTRICTED

(10)

Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
2nd Brigade Headquarters
Kono Axis

00015401

SUBJECT: FORUM MINUTE
DATE : 11th December, 1998.
TIME : 11 am
CHAIRMAN: Colonel ISSA H. SESAY - Battle Field Commander - (RUF/SL)
The forum was commenced on the 11th December 1998 at around 11 am

THE OPENING PRAYERS OF BOTH CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS:

The Christian prayers was said by Captain Patrick Jusu and the Muslim prayers by Captain JK Bangalie

WELCOME SPEECH BY COLONEL PB VANDY - 2ND BRIGADE ADVICER

The 2nd Brigade advicer welcomed the BFC, the BFI and all authorities present in the forum. He appealed to Ofiicers and men to forgive and forget about the past and implement all instructions given by the BFC in the interest of the Revolution. He faithfully expressed that the mission will be accomplished by God,s power.

INTRODUCTION OF IN-COMING OFFICERS - BY MAJOR SAMUEL JABBA

The introduction of all in-coming Officers was done by Major Samuel Jabba, Adjutant to the BFC as follows:

i) Colonel Issah H. SEsay
ii) Colonel Morison Kallon
iii) Lt-col. Foday Lansana
iv) Major M. Fembeh
v) MAJOR Victor Kamara
vi) Major Samuel S. Jabba
vii) S/Capt. Mohamed Kamara and bodyguards

INTRODUCTION OF HOST OFFICERS - BY MAJOR CHRIST A. MANNAH

The introduction of Host Officers was done by Major Christ A. Mannah - Overall I. O. Commander as follows:

i) Colonel Boston Flomo - 2nd Brigade Commander
ii) Colonel P.B. Vandy - 2nd Brigade Advicer
iii) Lt-col. Akim Turay - 1st Battalion Commander
iv) Lt-col. Vanicious Varney - 2nd Battalion Commander
v) Lt-col. Kailondo S. Banya - 3rd Battalion Commander
vi) Lt-col. Andrew B. Kamara - 4th Battalion Commander
vii) Major Lansana Conteh - 2nd Brigade Major
viii) Major Alpha Momoh - 2nd Brigade Adjutant
ix) Major Amara Salia - 2nd Brigade Operational Comdr and all Officers present.

SHORT SPEECH BY THE 2ND BRIGADE COMMANDER - COLONEL BOSTON FLOMO

Colonel Boston Flomo thanked the BFC and the BFI for their effort towards the Revolution. He expressed with confidence that on behalf of the 2nd Brigade, he is ready to implement and accomplish all missions that will be given to him in the name of the Almighty.

He stressed on Unity and advised all Officers to know each others problems. He asked for the co-operation of everyone and that all should make sure that the present mission at hand be accomplished in the name of God.

THE 2ND BRIGADE ADJUTANT'S EXPRESSION ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE MEN

He mostly deliberately deliberated on the possession of documents for the present ranks carried by men as we all know that our present ranks determine the responsibilities we carry.

PURPOSE OF THE FORUM - WAR PLAN BY THE BFC

The BFC thanked God for making it possible for us to hold the present forum. He said before the war plan that he has a message for all brothers. He expressed that from the origin of this war we had had no supply to this tune and that all we had depended on have been captured materials which will not easily accomplish our missions. He explained to the forum that thirty-one drums of fuel were used to construct the Air Field. He advised on unity and oneness in the Revolution which will lead us to success. He concluded that we need Kono and therefore we are to discuss on document and implement all that will be discussed in the forum as the mission have been given to the 2nd Brigade Commander - Colonel Boston Flomo and that we are to take all orders from the 2nd Brigade Commander. He revealed that there are uniforms up to 500 and boots for the men. He aonly strictly advised the Vanguards to govern themselves accordingly and take all command from the mission Commander and that no one should provoke situation and that any one who sabotages will undergo full military discipline.

The BFI appealed to all Battalion Commanders to be ready to move and not to stay in the bush and further said we need Yengema. He appealed to all Officers and men to forgive him for the past and asked for fresh operation to advance forward. He refered to the present mission as ' A do or die mission ' and ' operation free the Leader '. He concluded that all Officers should take orders from the mission Commanders, and pray that God be with us in our operations.

The BFI suggested that we work on the number of men for the operation thus:

1ST BATTALION
70 Armed Men
one 103 missile
one 50 calibre
one GMG
one Mortar Gun

2RD BATTALION
200 Armed Men
two 50 calibre
one basuga
one GMG
Two Mortar Guns
Two Ground missiles

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ND BATTALION
75 Armed Men
Two GPMG
One Mortar Gun

4TH BATTALION
100 Armed Men
One GPMG
One Bazooga
One Mortar Gun

2ND BRIGADE
100 Armed men
One GPMG
One Bazooga
One Mortar Gun

AK RIFLES
545
Two 103 Missiles
three 50 calibres
Eight GPMGs
Six Mortar GUNS

SUGGESTIONS FROM THE FORUM

1. No looting until the mission is accomplished.
2. All Government properties should be reported to the mission Commander
3. Ammunitions are to be used on main targets and that we should use our Guerilla tactics( Bypasses)

APPOINTMENTS

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lt-col. | Kailondo | S. | Banya | - Mission Commander |
| Lt-col. | Vanicious | | Varney | - Adviser |
| Lt-col. | Foday | | Lansana | - Artillery Advicer |
| Major | Victor | | Kamara | - Deputy mission Commander |
| Major | Andrew | B. | Kmara | - Ambush Commander |
| Major | Bakarr | | Bangura | - Operational Commander |
| Major | Amara | | Bockarie | - Deputy operational Commander |
| Major | Amara | | Salia | - Re-inforcement Commander |
| Captain | Ibrahim | | Kanneh | - Artillery Commander |
| Captain | Mohamed | | Kanneh | - Deputy Artillery Commander |
| Lieutenant | Vnady | | Mohamed | - Master Chaser |

VOTE OF THANKS BY THE BFI

The BFI thanked everyone present in the forum and appealed for unity and co-operation for the present mission at hand to be accomplished.

CLOSING PRAYERS

Muslim prayers by Captain Vnady S. Koroma and Christian prayers by the 2nd Brigade Adjutant Major Alpha Momoh. It was lastly discussed that deputies for said mission would be appointed when all missionaries would or are garthered. The forum endde in a good atmosphere.

Compiled and written by Signed: _____:
2nd Brigade Adjutant
Major Alpha Momoh

Approved: _____:
Adjutant to the BFC
Major Samuel F. Jabba.

CC copy to:
B.F.C.
B.F.I.
2ND BRIGADE
FILE.

RESTRICTED

# Exhibit 1.085 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

1.086

B- 114

9/37

Sierra Leone Peoples' Army (SLPA)
4th Brigade Lion Strike Force H/Quarters,
Take Barracks,
Makeni
October, 1999.

00015506

SUBJECT: MEETING/FORUM TIME: 11:00 am.

A G E N D A

(1) PRAYERS
(2) SELF INTRODUCTION
(3) SECURITY GENERAL
(4) CENTRALISATION OF ADMINISTRATION
(5) ISSUEING OF PASSES
(6) DIVISION OF MAKENI INTO ZONES
(7) COMMAND STRUCTURE AND CONTROL
(8) TIME FOR PARADE AND DUTIES.

After the prayers and introduction, the Chairman, Col: Augustine Gbao in his opening remarks informed about purpose of Forum. He explained that the Forum was called to organise well, spell out our responsibilities, more especially security of Makeni and the entire movement. The Chairman also implored all officers to:-

a. To enhance free movement of civilians.
b. To stop soldiers from harrassing civilians.
c. To promote the movement both internally and externally.

3. SECURITY GENERAL:- Under security general, the Chairman requested for comprehensive nominal roll of all Units man-power and how they were deployed since 3rd April, 1999.

For the first unit M.P., the Commander Lt-Col: Bedora responded that they had made several deployments, but requested for ample time to get round and compile comprehensive nominal roll of the M.P. unit not later than Saturday.

He also informed that deployments were made at Brigade and Battalion level as well as Army Headquarters (AHQ).

Briefing the floor, the Deputy Over/All M.P. Commander Lt-Col: Jalloh informed command structure within M.P. remains the same as before April the 3rd crisis. From the Provost Marshal, to Deputy Over/All M.P. Commander, O.C. M.P. Makeni , O.C. Traffic for Army Headquarters.

For Brigades:-

1. 1st Brigade - Makeni
2. 2nd Brigade - Lunsar

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3. 3rd Brigade - Kambia/Kamakwie Axis.
4. 4th Brigade - Okra Hill.

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The Chairman advised all M.P.'S to report at Agriculture to do necessary settlements.

Under .I.D.U., the Commander Lt-Col: Bangalia informed that IDU personnels were deployed at every check point, Battalions and Companies, and the structure remains the same as before 3rd April, 1999 crisis. The personnels are both soldiers and civilians.

I.D.U. Commander also informed about recruitment made by the Brigade I.D.U. Commander Capt: Amadu.

The Commander also requested for ample time to compile comprehensive nominal.

The Chairman also advised him to meet at Agriculture on Saturday for settlement.

Under: G-5, the commander Lt-Col: Kenneh Mindo informed that he had covered Bombali District, part of Tonkolili District and Kambia District and had also appointed G-5 Agent there. The Commander requested for the ample time to nominal roll of G-5 personnels in the various areas.

The Liaison officer to give report on Saturday at Agriculture.

Lt-Col: Bangura, Commander Revolutionary Anti-Sabotage Syndicate (RASS), his functions similar with functions of welfare Commander, the Chairman, Col: Gbao advised him to meet together with the welfare Commander at Agriculture to do necessary settlement.

4. CENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION:- Under the Centralization of Administration, the Chairman advised all officer to co-operate fully with centralization of command.

The Deputy Over/All M.P. Commander, Lt-Col: M.Y. Jalloh, in his contribution advised to use old structures before April 3rd crisis. He also suggested all units' reports be directed to the Over/All Security Commander, and then he'll contact the High Command for info and nec action or advise.

For the Brigades, he advised all reports to be directed to the Brigade Commander.

The Chairman advised M.P. post established at entrance of the market to stop in-flow of soldiers there. He also advised M.P. deparchment at the prisons, Araki check point and Pallap Junction check point.

5. ISSUING OF PASSES:- For the issueing of passes, a particular officer has to be incharge of signing the passes of soldiers and his office should be at the Centre of the town. The G-5 should take care of civilians passes, and should

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...y on signatoring. All passes prepared should have recommended from Senior ...ficer.

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On both soldiers and civilians passes the time to leave and time return should be indicated.

All documents in the Brigade should be signed by the Brigade Adjutant and Brigade Commander.

6. DIVISION OF MAKENI INTO ZONES:- Four (4) Zonal areas have been identified, and and commanders appointed.

Every Zone has to have Senior officer to advice, and representative of Joint Securities. Each Zonal Headquarters should serve as station (Police), and all reports from the Zones should be directed to the Zonal Commanders. The Zonal Commander to the Headquarters Commander, from Headquarters Commander to Over/All Security Commander and finally the High Command.

NAMES OF ZONAL SECURITY COMMANDERS

a. Majors Mohamed Kansaray - Zone I Security
Areas of control:- (i) Main Magburaka Road.
(ii) Makama and Ropolon Axis.

b. Lieut: Frankly .K. Samba - Zone II Security
Areas of control:- (i) Teko Axis.

c. Majors Daniel Monicoh - Zone III Security.
Areas of control:- (i) Kabala Road
(ii) Water Works Axis.

d. S/CAPT: Gibril Turay - Zone IV Security.
Areas of control:- (i) Main Lunsar Road
(ii) Looking Town Axis.

7 TIME FOR PARADE AND DUTIES:- For Muster Parade :

- Time for Prayers - 7:45 am
- Time for duty - 8:30 am
- Time chosen to off - 4:30 pm, but could go beyong that time.

The Chairman advised strongly against lateness.

8. ANY OTHER BUISNESS (A . O. B):-

1. Majors Jabba suggested to raise fund through due collection for example, But the Chairman advised to leave one collection with Chiefs and his people, and we only request from them certain percentages convenient to them to maintain our men.

2. Lieut: Sesay report serious harrassment on civilians in the Sanda Chiefdom.

3. Lt-Col: Bangura informed some soldiers at Mabari assigned with the mother of the Leader, but was requested by the Chairman to come along with the OMA and the soldiers.

The Forum ended with prayers .

Forum minuted by Headquarters Commander.
Lt-Col: A.M. Timor

1.087 9140

B-29

00015513

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE RUFSL
THE OFFICE OF THE HEADQUARTER COMMANDER
2ND INF BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS - BOMBALI DISTRICT
MAKENI

SUBJECT: FORUM
DATE: 12th February, 1999
TIME:

A G E N D A

1. Prayers - Muslim and Christian
2. Mutual understanding amongst officers
3. Responsibilities of Officers
4. General security within(AOR)
5. Punctuality
6. Excessive use of vehicles and motor bikes by unauthorised Holders
7. General Muster(Morning Parade)
8. Closing Prayers

The Forum fully commenced later in the afternoon after thorough advice by the BFC to strike common understanding amongst us - disregarding association with either SLA or RUF.

Lt. Col. Augustine Gbao, addressing the floor advised also to desist from identifying oneself with either SLA or RUF, rather, he expressed that we carry one identity as brothers. He cited peoples Army' as General Name for both Forces. It is about time' he said, to come together and fight back for our Liberation.

Moreover, he identified consultation, co-operation and co-ordination as basis of methodology required to gain progress.

However, to create atmosphereof better understanding, he suggested every Friday to be holding Forums to iron out and to maintain balance in the operation, Lt. Col. Titus, deliberating on mutual understanding emphasised to deassociate from the practice of identifying with a particular Force(SLA/RUF). He contended that we constitute same Force with same ideology fighting for same Goal. He strongly advised officers against inciters who might want to upset operations by their sabotage methodologies.

Talking about responsibilities of officers, Lt. Col. Titus disclosed too many floating officers within the township. He requested for knowledge on the actual strength of officers and personnels in Makeni Township.

thus issue it that any soldier or officers moving along the street thout document of assignment endorsed by recognise authority should be arrested. There should be no floating officers, he emphasised strongly He therefore, alerted the H/Q Commander, M.P. Commander, 2nd Bde Adjutant to effect full operation along that line; properly screening every Personnel.

Additionally, Lt. Col. Augustine Gbao observed Task Force non functional regarding security on the ground. Lt. Col. Titus, thus suggested Lt. Col. Abu - Task Force Lt. Col. Augustine Gbao advised very strongly all zonal Commanders to implore efficiency in their discharge of duties. He identified, unnecessary firing, harrassment etc as their main security concern in their areas of control. He warned that any problem arising from any zone shall be settled through the reprimand of the particular zonal Commander. Moreover, addressing security advised against self designed patrol, or personal patrols. He suggest centralised system by which everyone would involved under properly structured command. He advised any officer sending men out on mission to give them authentic document.

Furthermore, to foster co-ordination for better operation, general muster was suggested every morning at the Administrative H/Quarters.

Reminding the floor on secufity, the deputy overall M.P. Commander suggested every member to have balanced security to discourage association with a particular force and create the basis of foundation on which we shall build reliable confidence in our interaction and determination to succeed.

In the cause of deliberation, report were put to the board by Lt.Col. K.S. Banya and Major Bakarr against Doctor Jinnah for not attending to them for quite sometime, now. Immediately, Doctor Jinnah was called to account. In his response, he inform about the Devolution and deconcentration of wounded soldiers making the job difficult. Unanimously the board suggest to centralised them but advised to contact authorities with whom wounded soldiers live.

The Admin-Co-ordinator, advising on security suggest to deploy 5 to 6 miles of the township particularly on the routes leading to the enemies, behine TEKO BARRACKS and MAGBURAKA were the main areas identified for such deployment.

On the area of punctuality, Admin-Co-ordinator disclosed negligence on the part of officers. He warned against late coming, making it very clear problems created on account of that.

Buttressing deliberation on attendance, Lt. Col. Augustine Gbao suggested 8:30am as time for all officers to be in for prayers and other necessary settlements. Additionally, the Admin-Co-ordinator warned strongly against failure to meet required time.

The Admin-Co-ordinator, addressing excessive use of vehicles informs the board about previous instruction issued by the High Command denouncing use of vehicles by officers without legal assignment. He ordered all such vehicles parked under command of logistic Commander calling it authoritative command subject to no debate.

Under AOB the deputy overall M.P. Commander informed to have lost certain Government properties during raid at his resident. According to him, he lost 2 Gem Stones and some gold dust.

Lt. Col. Augustine Gbao suggest to have Board of enquiry to be handling matters and taking decision on them. Now that problem seem imminent amongst us.

As parts of the many settlements we are to do, we resolved to meet Brigadier Mani at 6PM same day. He ended up with prayers, with everyone confident of Major break through.

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1. Major A.M. Jimmy - Headquarter Commandant
2. Capt. Patrick Jusu - 3rd Bde. G-5 Command
3. Major Christ A Hannah - C/A IO Commander
4. Capt John T Desay -
5. Major Alpha Monoh - 2nd Bde. Adjutant
6. Lt. Col. K S Banya - 3rd Battalion Commabder
7. Major Bakarr Bangura - 2nd Bde, Strick Force Commander
8. Lt. Col. T Yumba - Col. G/S.
9. Lt. Col. A Mansaray -
10. Major J Moseray
11. Major JRA. Bangali - 2nd Bde. IDU Commander
12. Capt. George P Aruna - 2nd Bde. IDU Dep. Commander
13. Capt. Emmanuel B Sovula - 2nd Brigade G-5 Commander
14. Capt. Abukarr Brima - Adjutant to Gen. Bropleh
15. Capt. Mohamed Desay - MIO (EFI)
16. Major Thoronka Foray -
17. Lt. Joseph S Kpakiwa - Task Force
18. Capt. D. Momicoh - Zone III Security Commander
19. Capt. J Nyunelly - Zone IV Security Commander
20. Cpl. Emmanuel Sengai - 2nd Bde. G-5 Adjutant
21. Capt. Kabiru Desay - District IDU Commander
22. Major Samue F. Jabba - Adjutant to EFC.
23. Major Christopher Mohamed C/A G-4 Commander
24. Major Mohamed Y Jalloh - C/A Dep. IO Commander
25. Lt.Col. Jarawali D.L. - Chief Admin Officer
26. Capt. Koroma Bindo - 2nd Bde. G-5 Commander
27. Lt. Foh Hannah - 2nd Bde. I.O. Adjutant
28. Capt. Felix M. Moriba - 2nd Bde. G-4 Adjutant
29. Capt Fomba Brima - 4th Battalion Armourer Commander.
30. Capt. Justine Bangura 2nd. Battalion Armourer "
31. Capt. Morison V Lamin - 2nd Bde. Armourer Commander.

FURTHER MINUTED: 12/02

Signed: .....

BRIGADIER COMMANDER

BF1

B-13

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SIERRA LEONE PEOPLES' ARMY.
ARMY HEADQUARTERS - MAKENI
NORTHERN REGION - MAKENI

22:11:99

To:- The O/All Security Commander
From:- The O/All I.D.U. Commander
Sub:- VISITATION OF THE LEADER CPL. FODAY SAYBANA SANKOH, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES AND ECOMOG SECURITIES.

Sir,

The long awaiting Leader and Chairman Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh visited Makeni on Sunday 14th November, 1999. His visit in Makeni follows a 10 days of Intensive prepration by the G-5 Civil Wing and the Security Forces.

2. On Sunday, about 210 hrs. a helicopter gun ship and a white helicopter landed with International Communities Rep, and Ecomog High Commands.

3. At about 2:15 hrs. the Paramount Airlines helicopter landed with the Leader wherein civilians were jubilating, singing cultural songs and longing to see the Leader. A guard of honour parade was mounted wherein he visited the seen for Inspection and left for his seat. Due to the number of soldiers present on the field, he instructed all soldiers to assemble at the Town Hall and wait for him, So that he will be chanced to talk to the people. Soldiers left the field immediately upon the introduction of the Leader with the exception of the Securities only. The Leader talked briefly to the people and departed for his lodge to have a rest.

4. On Monday 15th November, 1999, at 12:00 pm, the Leader, and the entire delegates and members of G-5 departed Makeni for Magburaka.

5. On Tuesday 16th November 1999 at 5:30 p.m., the delegates and the Leader arrived back to Makeni from Magburaka.

6. On Wednesday 17th November, the population in Makeni stormed the Wusum Field to see the Leader and hear the message from him.

7. At 12:35 p.m., the Header arrived on the Field with the delegates, after addressing the Soldiers at the Town Hall Grounds. There was an applanse of jubilation from the crowd. They entered the pavilion and took their various seats. After the brief speeches and introduction of some personalities in Makeni the chair was turned over to the Leader and Chairman, Cpl. Foday Sankoh.

8. In his keynote address to the people of Bombali District, Cpl. Foday Sankoh expressed on behalf of the RUF/AFRC and the government of Tejan Kabba for the warm welcoming accorded him and his entourage in Makeni. The Leader was accoompanied by ECOMOG Officers, Gen. G.A. Kpamber, Unomsil Commander CoL. Josie, the State house Police Analyst, Mr. Patrick Foyah, the adviser and Chairman, Mr. Kallon, RUF Spokesman Mr Eldred Collins and the SLA Warrior Col. Akim - (Wartanker) Their arrival in Makeni was fosterd on Friday 12th November 1999 by the arrival of 100 ECOMOG troops under the Command of Lt. Col. Nmoye, brought a sign of relief in the Township that Chairman Foday, Sankoh will visit Makeni.

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The Leader took the Microphone whereby he introduced (4) journalist amongst them were Chris Johnson and Kelvin Lewis. He further comphasised that the war is finished and that Peace has come to our beloved land Sierra Leone. He said there will be no more war, and the RUF is not prepared to wage any other war, his mission in Makeni and Tonkolili is to explain the Togo-Lome Peace Accord which the RUF/AFRC and President Tejan Kabba have signed.

10. He further appologised to all for the atrocities which the Kamajors, RUF/AFRC have committed against the innocent people and the violation of human rights and pleaded for forgiveness and to turn to a new chapter in the history of Sierra Leone in which peace and reconcilation will move this Country ahead.

11. He further lamented on the developments of this Country and blamed those who have conivied with Politicians to deteriorate the Country to where it is.

12. He also denounced the principles of Nepotism that had been praticed by other Leaders of this Country, and further said that his visit is a clear indication for Peace and confidence building. He said the struggle was a national issue, to liberate and eradicate corruption in this Country which caused people unable to feed themselves and to manicipate all Sierra Leoneans from this civilised stavery.

13. He also said that the Revolution which he launched in 1991 forced the A.P.C. Government to re-introduce the Multi Party system, and told all combatants to transform into a political wing and must be ready to hand over weapons to ECOMOG and U.N. Disarmament team at anytime he instructs us to do so. He also blamed the educated people of this Country, the crooked politicians and their allies from the time of Independence. He also said that taking the Arms from us doesn't means that our mouths are kept shut and said this is the time we are to get in full fledge with politics, which he reffers to us as the real battle.

14. He also called on Unomisil observers for absolute intention for peace in Sierra Leone. He commented that though war is bad, but the most important issue is what the people will gain after the war, and promised that the RUF/SL will surely wipe tears of sorrow from the people of this Country and that the wealth of this Country must be in the hands of the people of Sierra Leone

5. He further went to say that the RUF still stands to be the name for our new party and that its symbol should be a Lions' head with green colours and he will never tolerate any Commander for any former attack in this Country. He added and I quoted "We are to respect the customs and traditions as a basis of the Revolution." He also said that he Instructed Brigadier Gen. Issa .H. Sesay to come in Makeni on October, 15th. He said complains of looting harrassment and other violations of human rights have been going on from certain members within the SLA. This mitivated him to instruct Brigadier Gen. Issa to come and put situations under control within Makeni and the North as a whole.

6. Moreover, the ECOMOG Commander Gen. G.A. Kpamber said the war is over. He said in the past years Sierra Leone was in 'Bush shaking' but now no more bush shaking. ECOMOG and RUF/AFRC combatants are no longer enemies but friendly brothers developing Sierra Leone. He advised combantants to lay down arms to reconstruct our Country. He further said that it is high time for Government to reopen schools, hospitals, to reabilitate eletricity water supply and agriculture. In this areas he said Unomsil, ECOMOG are ready to help when peace is guranteed in Sierra Leone. He also advised the combatant. to work hand in hand with ECOMOG for peace in Sierra Leone and commented that they too are eagar te go back home and see their families.

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17. Moreover, the Unosil Commander Gen. Josie centralised his speech on disamament and reconcilation. The UN he said are ready to help this Country back to its normal roots but all depends on us, and to embrace the peace accord which Tejan Kabba, Chairman Foday Sankoh and the people of Sierra Leone have signed in Togo-Lome on July 7th 1999. He said the D.D.R. Programme will be Implemented according to the Lome Peace Accord. He congratulated the great solidarity for Peace which the people of Makeni has shown.

18. Moreover, the G-5 Personnel Mr. Benjamin Kargbo noted that the visit of Cpl. Foday Sankoh in Makeni has been celebrated on (4) occassions. The people of Makeni he said, has celebrated the molestation harrassment and Intimidation and persisted to live in harmony with his combatants. The people of Makeni were greatly hopeful that the DDR Programme would be successfully Implemented in the North?

19. The people of Makeni, he said had suffered the greatest degradation for the fact that they had all been branded as rebels and rebel collaborators. He thanked Pa. Sankoh for sending Brigadier Gen. Issa Sesay in Makeni who has done all his best to maintain security in the Township.

20. Mr Kargbo pleaded on behalf of the G-5 Central Command in Makeni to necessitate the retrival of properties belonging to Missionaries that are still in the hands of Combatants.

21. Talking on behalf of the combatants, the Battle Field Commanders (B.F.C.) Brigadier Issa Sesay confirmed their loyalty to Chairman Sankoh and their committment to the Lome Peace Accord signed by the Leader and Chairman and the Tejan Kabba Government. He commented that they are ready to work with the ECOMOG brothers to bring lasting peace in Sierra Leone. He however urged the authorities not to rush with the DDR Programme before the Welfare of the Combatants. He expressed on the absence of the former AFRC Chairman Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma from Pa Sankoh's team, and he was expected to talk to the SLA Brothers who are numerous amongst the RUF Combatants here.

22. He also appealed to ECOMOG, Unomsil and the Government to address the problems of the combatants and their families. A spokesman for the S.L.A. combatants Cpt. E.T. Amara disclosed that there are over two thousand S.L.A. Soldiers among the RUF Combatants. They were all moving in harmony, and there was mutual understanding and respect for each other. He further said that they are unhappy about the absence of their Leader Lt. Col. J.P. Koroma " Papay Sankoh and Jhonny Paul Koroma are the same. They are working together, and anything said by Cpl. Foday Sankoh will be accepted by all SLA Soldiers in Makeni and the North as a whole".

23. The vote of thanks was delivered by the G-5 District Chairman Mr. Denis Kamara praised the Commanding Officer of the G-5 Lt. Col. Hindolo Koroma, whom he describe as the strong pillar behind the success of the visit of the Leader and Chairman Foday Saybana Sankoh in Makeni. The meeting ended with prayers in Muslim and Christian ways, and everybody returned to their various homes.

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24. On Thursday, the 18th November, 1999 and at 1:00 p.m., the Leader, Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh departed from the lodge, walked through the heart of the town and arrived at the Wusum Field, where he made additional and farewell address to the people of Makeni. The entire populance of Makeni pledged to the Leaders that their security mentained by the RUF is fully guaranteed and that they dont' need ECOMOG Force here. The Leader made this appeal to the ECOMOG High Command and International Community here and added that minus ECOMOG's presence, in Makeni the RUF is committed to the disarmament process. The Leader at the end of his speech, handed over to the Guinean ECOMOG, the one 40 barrel missile Guns that was disarmed from them by the RUF around the Kambia axis to prove to the ECOMOG contingent and United Nation representatives that we are ready to be disarmed at anytime. The Leader introduced former Head of State, Joseph Saidu Momoh to the people of Makeni and casted a lot of blame on him for his stubborness in prolonging the war.

25. At the end of the whole exercise the Leader was air lifted in an helicopter together with the former President, Joseph Saidu Momoh to Freetown. They were followed by all the ECOMOG Forces back to Freetown.

Faithfully, Submitted

SGD:-.....

OVERALL I/D.U. COMMANDER
NORTHERN REGION.

CC:- The BFC
" The BCG
" BFI
" Admin. Co-ordinator
" M.P. Commander
" I.O. Commander
" File.

9148

# Annex B.7

## Documents Certified in Annex C.4

1.339
9149

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

FREETOWN – SIERRA LEONE

**00015616**

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**SOLEMN DECLARATION OF CORNELIA ADEKUMBI PATRICIA DAVIES**

---

DECLARANT: CORNELIA ADEKUMBI PATRICIA DAVIES
DECLARED AT: FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE
DATE: 17 NOVEMBER 2005

On 17 November 2005, I, Cornelia Adekumbi Patricia Davies, employee of the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, Youyi Building, Freetown, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. During 1998 I worked for the Cabinet Secretariat in Freetown, Sierra Leone. About October 1998, I was attached to the Attorney General's Office as a stenographer.

2. As part of my duties at the Attorney General's Office, I transcribed an audio cassette recording that was played during the matter of *The State –v- Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh* at the High Court of Sierra Leone (hereinafter "**the Sankoh Trial**").

3. On 17 November 2005, Joseph Saffa, a senior investigator from the Office of the Prosecutor (hereinafter "**the OTP**"), Special Court for Sierra Leone, showed me a 2 page transcript marked by the OTP with the numbers "00009636" & "00009637" (hereinafter "**the transcript**").

---

Date: 17.11.05 17 November 2005
Declarant: Davies Witness:

4. Having been shown the transcript and after reviewing its content, I hereby state that this is the transcript I prepared as part of the Sankoh Trial in October 1998, which was admitted into evidence during the Sankoh Trial. Attached hereto and marked **"ANNEX CD1"** is a copy of the transcript.

5. On 17 November 2005, Joseph Saffa, also showed me a Maxwell ELN 90 audio cassette marked by the OTP "Original, T0000267" (hereinafter **"the audio cassette"**).

6. Having been shown the audio cassette and after listening to the recording on it, I hereby state that the audio cassette contains the same recording that was played during the Sankoh Trial and admitted as an exhibit in the Sankoh Trial. I was present at the High Court when this recording was played, the content of which I transcribed as set out in ANNEX CD1.

7. I make this solemn declaration by virtue of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, conscientiously believing that the statements contained herein are true and correct in every particular.

Cornelia Adekumbi Patricia Davies
Freetown, Sierra Leone

Declared at Freetown, )
This 17th day of November, 2005, )
before me )
)
)

Joseph Saffa
Senior Investigator
Office of the Prosecutor
Special Court Sierra Leone

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person who knowingly and wilfully makes a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court may be liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

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**ANNEX CD1**

00015618

Davies

Cornelia Adekumbi Patricia Davies
17 November 2005

9152

00015619 ~~00009636~~ EXH. "C 1"

To all RUF Combatants: am writing it to all RUF Combatants, People's War Council of high command and all Combatants and the RUF. You know, the gallant and Field Commander of RUF. Your Leader Corporal Foday Sankoh and the RUF I am now instructing you to disregard all previous instructions and orders and stop all attacks and take defensive and don't go on the defensive. All, do not go on the offensive, I repeat, do not go on the offensive be on the defensive. All instructions, former instruction and operations should be cancelled. All Commanders should be on the defensive. At this moment you have to work with the brothers in Freetown, in the provinces and the entire army of the Sierra Leone Military Forces and allow working together to bring peace in Sierra Leone. They ask me to work with them so that peace could prevail to our beloved motherland. So I will like you all to work with them as brothers we are no more enemies. The Enemies are the Politicians not the Soldiers, presently. The Field Commander and all Commanders, you always get instructions from me through Major Koroma. They are our brothers let no one fool you. You have to work with them to put situation under control, especially in the Western Area. You the Field Commander instruct the other Commander **MINGO** to stand by for any reinforcement needed by Major Koroma for any eventuality. We have to defend our sovereignty. You are to act on these orders immediately. Do not delay and you will hear me over the media, BBC and VOA only support the present operation in Freetown. Thank you all. My absence in Sierra Leone is of the blessing of God. RUF; arms to the people; power to the people; and wealth of our people should be in the hands of the people. RUF, brave, strong, intelligent, Bai Bureh, Jagua, Kailondo you are the children, victory, grant to them. Lets keep the revolution with our brothers, peace be with you. I will join you very soon. I say again

this is your Leader and Commander-in-Chief of the RUF Corporal Foday Sankoh.

Thank you all

"This portion is being translated into English as it was in Creole"

My brothers, that is all I have to tell you. You should take great care, work with the brothers, I hope they will not disappoint you and disappoint the other ranks who stand behind them today. You know we stand for peace, this can be achieved. Thank you.

Transcribed by - Miss Cornelia Adekunbi Patricia Davies - Stenographer

9154

# Annex B.8

## Documents Certified in Annex C.5

1.107 9/55

HEADQUARTERS
NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA
GBARNGA CITY, BONG COUNTY R.L.

00028870

Office of the
SR. MILITARY ADVISOR
ARMED FORCES OF THE NPFL

30 September 1994

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

TO : His Excellency
Charles G. Taylor
CHAIRMAN & C-I-C
NPFL
Republic of LIBERIA

FROM : LT-GEN. Samuel G. Varney
Sr. Military Advisor
Armed Forces of the NPFL
LIBERIA

1. I have the honour most respectfully to submitt to your good offices the following Situation Report and recommendation from the frontline for your official information and persual.

a. MG'S. Edward T.Zaymay, Robert G.Paye, Augustine Wehyee, Geroge Tpkpa, and Peter Saider, all Special Forces commandos NPFL, led thirty armed men on yesterday by way of bye-passes unto the UN Compund Gbarnga, upon their arrival it was discovered that LPC is posted at the UN Compound a company size well armed with caves bags on their backs. While menuveriming to a suitable position, LPC open supressive gun-fire and began to dispatch a bye-pass team aganist NPFL that hit as far as the garage appraching Welcome Gate in Gbarnga City. NPFL received two wounded soldiers who were evacuated at the rear. Immediately thereafter, LTG. Yeatin dispatched men within Gbarnga City for the next course of action.

a. It has been keenly observes that LPC is using Coco-yah Road to bring in her re-inforcement from Buchanan into Gbarnga. Moreover civilains captured by NPFL on yesterday confirmed that two trucks load of LPC reinforcement came into Gbarnag few days ago by way of the same route as mentioned above.

3. There is a tape recording cassette captured from enemies in possesion of LTG. Benjamin Yeatin, that the Kpelle people in Gbarnga are wholeheartly supporting the enemies forces that are in Gbarnga presently.

4. The 100 un-armed men requested for by LTG'S JOE TOUH, and JOHN L. TEAH, to assist combantants who are tired or retreating from the fronline arrived in Palala on yesterday headed by LTG. Oldpa Zogbay.

5. The Radio Station in Gbarnga has been burned down by enemies forces.

6. LTG. John L. Teah, LTG. Joe K. Touh, and LTG. Benjamin Yeatin dispatched men on yesterday to set up an armbush so as to block enemies infiltration by way of Coco-yah Road.

7. Predicated upon the above mentioned and for the sucessful re-capturing of the entire Gbarnga City and its environs, I humbly request for sufficient rockets and ammunitions to be used witin the fronline in the most possible time.

Most respectfully submitted,

SAMUEL G. VARNEY
LTG. SF
SR. MILITARY ADVISOR
ARMED FORCES OF THE NPFL

1.108 9157

FOR



Partner Sites:
· Newsweek.com
· Britannica Internet Guide

# Journalists Arrested in Sierra Leone

Monday, June 14, 1999; 5:49 p.m. EDT

00028914

FREETOWN, Sierra Leone (AP) -- West African soldiers defending Sierra Leone's government have arrested two journalists in a raid on the editorial offices of a newspaper, an international press freedom group said Monday.

A pregnant secretary was also reportedly beaten in the attack.

The Paris-based watchdog group, Reporters Without Borders, said the Nigerian-led force known as ECOMOG claimed to have seized weapons and ammunition during the June 10 raid at Freetown's Independent Observer.

Newspaper employees said the soldiers planted the ordnance inside their offices.

The journalists, Sorie Sudan Sesay and Jerry Tryson, were beaten and arrested by the soldiers, who also seized computers and other publishing equipment, Reporters Without Borders said.

The paper's managing editor, Jonathan Leigh, was arrested several weeks ago after writing an article critical of the West African force and the officer who led the subsequent raid and arrests.

Reporters Without Borders demanded ECOMOG release the journalists and requested an investigation into the February murder, allegedly by ECOMOG troops, of Juma Jalloh, a journalist with Freetown's African Champion newspaper.

The West African contingent, composed largely of Nigerian troops, is the main fighting force defending Sierra Leone's elected government as it engages in peace talks with a rebel movement the United Nations has accused of widespread atrocities.

More than 5,000 people perished during an assault on the capital in December and January by the Revolutionary United Front.

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Back to the top

1510 9/58

Mrs. Harris

HOLD

00028767

**REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA**

# SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE

**Executive Mansion**
**Monrovia, Liberia**

TO : U - 50

FROM : U - 52

SUBJ : AS STATED BELOW :

DATE : October 4, 2000

Sir:

Please be informed officially that the below listed Personnel have been selected to be inreadiness to escort and protect HIS EXCELLENCY Dakpannah Dr. Charles G. Taylor, President of the Republic of LIBERIA on a Official visit to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Bokina Faso and the Gambia on Friday, October 6, 2000.

THOSE CONCERNED ARE:


| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Hon. | Joseph M. Montgomery | ...Dep. Dir./Operations |
| 2. | " | Adolphus Taylor | ...Dep. Dir./NSA |
| 3. | " | Edward K. Thomas | ...Asst. Dir./Operations |
| 4. | B/Gen. | Edwin Charles | ....ADC |
| 5. | ~~B/Gen.~~ | ~~Marie Ragnagee~~ | ~~...ADC~~ |
| 6. | Inspt. | Ocebio N. Dehmie | ...Chief of Protective Services |
| 7. | Inspt. | William Dennis | ....Special Attendant |
| 8. | " | Charles Kollie | ....Commdr./Bodyguard Unit |
| 9. | " | Patrick Paye | .... " " " |
| 10. | " | Ben Wolo | .... " " " |
| 11. | " | Charles Cooper | .... " " " |
| 12. | " | Eric Lawrence | .... " " " |
| 13. | " | Cyrus Johnny | .... " " " |
| 14. | " | Benson Lloyd | .... " " " |
| Hon. | ~~"~~ | ~~David Norris~~ | ~~....Butler/President~~ |
| 16. | LTC. | James Garrison | ....Cameraman/President |
| 17. | Inspt. | Anthony Paye | .....Advance Team Commander |
| 18. | Maj. | Edwin Cassell | ....Motorcade Commander |
| 19. | Capt. | Teddy Holder | ....Anti-Terroism Unit |
| 20. | " | Sabastian N. Lahai | ..... " " " |

Henceforth, same is submitted for your attention and necessary action.

(18) Regards,

**MOTTO: Courage, Discipline, Loyalty, Reliability & Sacrifice**


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N° 385

**BENEFICIAIRE**



NOM : SORE

PRENOMS : Jean Michel

QUALITÉ : .....


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OUAGADOUGOU, LE. 13/1/19

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*State House*

*Freetown, Republic of Sierra Leone*

Ref: CONF. H/58

1st November, 1997.

His Excellency
Mr. Charles G. Taylor
President of the
**REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA**

00028799

Your Excellency and Dear Brother,

I [illegible] behalf of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), he Government and People of Sierra Leone and on my own personal behalf to hank you most sincerely for the understanding, guidance and support that you have been according me and my Government as we go through this our most difficult and trying moment. I express our special gratitude for your stance at he [illegible] negotiations with the Committee of Five where your firm and [illegible] voice of reconciliation helped in penetrating the wall that may [illegible] have shrouded and derailed the cause of peace. Permit me to [illegible] your worthy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Monie Captan, whose [illegible]nding intervention, I am told, contributed immensely in shaping the [illegible]come of the meeting.

Your Excellency, I wish to [illegible] aim as a [illegible]overnment is the restoration of peace, [illegible]rmality to our [illegible]. I firmly believe that they are entitled [illegible] to pursue this [illegible]using every ounce of energy and endeav[illegible]oal within the shortest possible time frame. It is our fervent ho[illegible]e that all parties and witnesses to the Conakry Accord with the Committee of Five will demonstrate equal commitment and willingness to end the suffering of the four million inhabitants of this my senselessly distressed country.

/... ... ...

Your Excellency, you have drunk from the bitter cup of adversity in the same manner as your brothers and sisters in Sierra Leone are doing now. Help us as best as you can to liberate ourselves from the slavery of outside interference. The solution of the problem of Sierra Leone is in Sierra Leone. As always we count and rely on your support and understanding.

Please accept, Your Excellency, my commitment of continued esteem.

00028800

**MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA**
**CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED FORCES**
**REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND**
**HEAD OF STATE OF THE REPUBLIC**
**OF SIERRA LEONE.**

1.114 9164

00028931

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
820 SECOND AVENUE NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

MFA/1-3/192/'98

June 12, 1998

Mr. Minister:

I present my compliments to [illegible] to inform that on June 10, 1998, Ambassador William Bull met [illegible] Dahlgreen of Sweden, Chairman of Security Council Sanctions Com[illegible]Leone.

Ambassador Dahlgreen provi[illegible] from the Secretariat which contained the following:

1. There are reports that many of the fighters supporting the former junta in the east of Sierra Leone are in fact Liberian nationals;

2. After clashes with junta elements ,ECOMOG believes it has identified some of the combatants as Liberians;

3. ECOMOG has reportedly captured more than 100 fighters in the vicinity of Kailahun and in Kono district; and

4. Accoording to ECOMOG in Freetown, there are 65 persons in its custody at Pademba Road prison who are considered to be of Liberian origin and who were taken prisoners during combat.

In this connection, he requested that Government institutes a thorough investigation of the matter and submit its findings to the Sanctions Committee within thirty (30) days.

In response, Ambassador Bull reiterated Government's position that Liberia will not support the destabilization of Sierra Leone, a sisterly state. The Government of Liberia deplored such unfriendly acts by Liberians who were acting on their own, for purely economic gains. Moreover, the Government of Liberia had made several appeals for the United Nations to deploy an Observer Group on the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border to monitor the situation.

The Mission shall await Government's response on the matter.

With sentiments of esteem.

Christian M. Wisseh
Charge d'Affairs,a.i.

H.E. Mr. Monie R. Captan
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Monrovia, Liberia

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PERMANENT MISSION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

DM MAF

TEL: (212) 688-1656
FAX: (212) 688-4924

245 EAST 49TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

Mr. Jonathan Taylor,
Minister for Presidential Affairs
Monrovia, Liberia

30 January, 2001

00028775

Dear Mr. Minister,

On instruction of my Government, I have the honour to forward herewith, as a matter of urgency, the attached letter from His Excellency, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, addressed to His Excellency, President Charles G. Taylor of Liberia. Due to communication problems between our two capitals yesterday, the President's office was unable to fax the letter directly to Monrovia.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sylvester Ekundayo Rowe
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative (Political Affairs)

9166

State House
Freetown, Republic of Sierra Leone

00028776

January 29, 2001

**His Excellency**
**Dakpanah Dr.Charles Ghankay Taylor**
**President of the Republic of Liberia**
**MONROVIA**

Your Excellency,

I refer to our telephone conversation yesterday, January 28, 2001. As I informed Your Excellency, the package consigned to you is ready for collection at Lungi with exemption from customs examination. My Ambassador to Liberia should have conveyed this information to Your Excellency by now.

With regard to Sam Bockarie alias Maskita, your Foreign Minister is reported to have said in New York that the continued stay in Liberia of this former RUF Field Commander and other high ranking members of the RUF is as a result of the failure of the Sierra Leone Government to request their surrender to the Government of Sierra Leone.

As I told Your Excellency yesterday, that statement does not represent the true position, as it exists between our two Governments with regard such matters. There is a Mutual Non

00028777

Aggression Security Treaty since 1986 which imposes an obligation on Mano River Union State to take all measures necessary to surrender to another member state of that Union all persons found on the territory of that other state who threaten the security of any member state.

Your Excellency may recall that we reiterated these provisions when the three of us, that is Your Excellency, President Lansana Conte of Guinea and myself met in Bamako under the auspices of President Alpha Oumar Konare. I had expected that the Government of Liberia would comply with its obligation under that Treaty, and to have surrendered the said Sam Bockarie alias Maskita and the other members of the RUF now resident in Monrovia.

My Government still wishes that Your Excellency's Government, in compliance with its treaty obligation to indicate its willingness to surrender these people to the Sierra Leone authorities and to state the time of surrender. I did assure Your Excellency that the men would be treated justly under the terms of the Lome Peace Accord.

While waiting for a positive response on this matter, please accept Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest esteem.

A. Kabbah

**ALHAJI DR AHMAD TEJAN KABBAH**
**PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE**

1.121

9/68

# COMBINED JUNTA AND R.U.F FORCES

**of the Republic of Sierra – Leone.**

Randall Street
Zone 2
P.O. Box 5261

00028837

1.123 9169

00028847

THE ROSTER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDOES
DECEMBER 7, 1999

1. Dr. Charles Ghankay Taylor - President/R.L
2. Hon. Enoch M. Dogolea, Jr. - Vice President/R.L
3. Mr. Alfred S. Mehn
4. Hon. Tiagen M. Wantee
5. Hon. Isaac S. Mussah
6. Hon. Dopoe G. Menkarzon
7. Hon. Benjamin Yeaten
8. Hon. Joe K. Touah
9. Col. John L. Teah
10. M/Gen. Samuel G. Varney
11. Hon. Francis G. Menwon
12. Col. Edward T. Zaymay
13. Maj. Sam T. Slehsee
14. Maj. Peter Saikpedeh
15. Amb. Moses Z. Blah
16. Ltc. B. Mitcheal Paygar
17. Col. Anthony Kurmahum
18. Ltc. George D. Mansue
19. Ltc. Albert G. Paye
20. Maj. Robert G. Paye
21. Hon. George K. Tokpah
22. Cpt. Sylvester K. Willor
23. LTc. Titus K. Menlee
24. Mr. Paul Vaye
25. Mr. William Wongbaye
26. Hon. Paul B. Nimely

27. Maj. Peter Worleah
28. Col. James D. Glassco
29. Hon. Johnson Leamah
30. Ltc. Solomon Serwah
31. 1Lt. Peter Tahn
32. Cpt. Cooper Mensahn
33. Maj. Joe G. Doe
34. Maj. Henry Keidiah
35. Mr. Wormen Kerpeh
36. Mr. Tarkpor Gweh
37. Cpt. Edward K. Mlehn
38. Mr. D. Sirgarwain Meanyen
39. Maj. Charles G. Touwon
40. Ltc. John Z. Decee
41. Cpt. John B. Wonnah
42. 1LT. John Workai
43. Mr. George T. Wowoah
44. Maj. Alphanso Suomie
45. Mr. Jessie M. Gbehyarnue
46. Ltc. J. Yeani Keizou
47. Mr. Saye Boayou
48. Cpt. James L. Boayou
49. Hon. Medonald Boam
50. Maj. J. Brooks Gonkarnue
51. Maj. James G. Siaway
52. Cpt. Cooper B. Dailah
53. Mr. Cooper B. Saye

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54. Maj. Cooper Woyah
55. Cpt. Gonlee Voahn
56. Mr. Henry S. Gaye
57. Mr. Austine D. Gweh
58. Mr. Nuah M. G. Leagbaye
59. Mr. Joseph Miamen
60. Cpt. Peter Q. Duo
61. Ltc. John N. Duo
62. Maj. Johnny T. Chea
63. William Sumo (Mr.)
64. Maj. John S. Grugbaye
65. Mr. Joseph Keiyigar
66. Cpt. Prince Bargue
67. Col. Prince Barclay
68. Cpt. Moses P. Kwemie
69. Cpt. Patrick T. Quakar
70. Mr. Victor Gensee
71. Mr. John Dolo
72. Maj. Arthur N. Guahn
73. Col. Morris G. Myers
74. Cpt. John D. Wopleh
75. Mr. Y. Babbit Beh
76. Cpt. Sammy G. David
77. Mr. Mangou Menlor
78. Amb. Jeba Saysay
79. B/Gen. Peter Sum
80. 1Lt. John S. Serweah
81. Col. Oliver S. Counsil
82. Mr. G. Moses Mahn
83. Mr. Alex Kwamie
84. Mr. Edwin Lassah

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REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE
EXECUTIVE MANSION
MONROVIA, LIBERIA

00028801

Hon. Benjamin L. Yeaten
L I B E R I A
Special Security Service
Executive Mansion
Monrovia, Liberia

Dear Sir:

As per your directive to submit to you the complete roster of men of the SSS, ANU and the Special Border Patrol Unit, I here with submit same for your review.

Sir, we presently have a total manpower of 3,122. This includes SSS, ANU and Special Border Patrol Officers. Please see detail below:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| S.S.S. | - SSS | 1,212 |
| | ANU | 1,090 |
| | SBPU | 449 |
| | SBPO | 371 |
| Total | | 3,122 |

Submitted By:

Col. Iona Kapu Jallah
CHIEF OF FINANCE

9173

COMPLETE ROSTER FOR THE
SSS, ATU AND BORDER PATROL
UNIT.....

Dec. 4, '99

00028802

1. Benjamin D. Yeaten/DIRECTOR
2. Col. Victor [illegible] Wisley
3. Maj. John [illegible] Bohlen
4. Lt-Col. Stanislaus Seegy
5. 1/Lt. J. Abel Sackie
6. Cpt. Victor Crayton
7. 1/Lt. David J[illegible]h
8. Col. Robert Fofana
9. 2/Lt. Andrew Gaye
10. Col. Johnson Beh
11. 1/Lt. James S. Cooper
12. Cpt. Lawrence Norris
13. Col. Kessely [illegible] Sukuly
14. 2/Lt. James L. Marshall
15. [illegible]. Mayson N. Togbah
16. Pvt. Alfred T. Newley
17. 2/Lt. James M. Kollie
18. " Christian Norris
19. Maj. Aaron J. Smith
20. Col. Stephen B. Tarpeh
21. Cpt. Alexander Karley
22. Pvt. Christopher Owen
23. 1/Lt. Jolo T. Nesy
24. Col. Lisa J. Kromah
25. " Aletha [illegible]. Yates
26. " Matthew E. Thompson
27. Maj. Alexander B. Kotz
28. 2/Lt. Shack Sherriff
29. L/Col. Lesena Freeman
30. " Sherman [illegible]. Brown
31. Maj. Albert Cummings
32. Cpt. Borbor J. Koon
33. L/Lt. Forpoh Kpetsy
34. 2/Lt. Andrew Nyekan
35. Pvt. George Massaquoi
36. 2/Lt. Simzoe Grey
37. 1/Lt. Josephine Santee
38. Cpt. Martha Goll
39. 2/Lt. Matilda Jallah
40. Pvt. Robert Peh
41. Cpt. Morris Nyei
42. Pvt. Nathaniel Nimley
43. 1/Lt. Samuel Koffa
44. Pvt. Tommy Togbah
45. Mr. Christain Jah
46. 1/Lt. Frank Kamara
47. Pvt. Anthony Sangheh
48. Sgt. David Nulbah
49. Pvt. Kunna Perry
50. " Theofelix Sobeh
51. " Beejay Johnson
52. " Lavali Doe
53. " Alfred Darnga
54. 2/Lt. Brown Blayah
55. Pvt. George Kamara
57. Pvt. Isaac Jabbah
58. 2/Lt. Jartu Konadakai
59. Pvt. Joseph Borlu
60. L/Lt. George Freeman
61. Pvt. Tefleh Nyanmiah
62. Maj. Lomo Murphy
63. Pvt. Jones Balloh
64. " Abraham Dawolo
65. " Emmet Metgzer
66. " J. Nah Wilson
67. 2/Lt. Gyidi[illegible] Nah
68. Cpt. Elizabeth Smith
69. Col. George C. Kollie
70. Pvt. Jukuba Krouh
71. " Rockson Solor
72. " Sarde Badio
73. " Sam Kesselly
74. " Marvin Lawson
75. 1/Lt. Philip Tye
76. Pvt. Grando Hne
77. " Francis Yeah
78. " Darlington Smith
79. " Ruth Sleh
80. " Irving Kai Cooper
81. 1/Lt. Robert Wollo
82. L/Col. Blowene Kyne
83. 2/Lt. David Banks
84. Pvt. William Akoi
85. " Isac Sando
86. Col. William Kerkula
87. Pvt. Jeimory Keita
88. Col. Joseph M. Montgomery -D/OPRs!
89. " Zackariah B. Russ -D/T!S!
90. " Zwannah B. Johnson -D/ADM.
91. " Emmannel Z. Lackay -D/TRG!
92. " Emmanuel Ndebe
93. " Amos Quoiquoi
94. 1/Lt. Thomas Nyengar
95. Col. Joseph Jangar
96. " Richard Saleiba
97. " Richard Mendien
98. " Peterson Marbiah
99. " Thompson Danfolee
100. " Isaac Flomo
101. " Jimmy Nessehtue
102. " Leo Weatoe
103. " John G[illegible]ikolo
104. " Charles L. Gaye
105. 2/Lt. Mohammed Kaba
106. Maj. William Jarbia
107. " Mohammeh Jabateh
108. " Mohammeh Kamara
109. " Foster Kannah
110. " Korboi Johnson
111. " Dweh Tarlee

238. 2/Lt. Joe B. Lewis
239. Sgt. Soluiho Tassawe
240. 2/Lt. Alexander Gray
241. Cpt. David Kleh
242. Ltc. Gloria Brown
243. Maj. Mary Bohlen
245. " Thomas O. Swen
246. 1/Lt. Alfred Johnson
247. Col. Lawrence Mulbah
248. " Christain B. Harris
249. Cpt. Benjamin Morgan
250. " Jerry Jenyongar
251. " Morris Williams
252. Maj. Charles Seton
253. Cpt. Emmanuel Bossen
254. " Emmanuel Kleh
255. 2/Lt. Anthony Dweh
256. Cpt. Albert Gittens
257. Pvt. Dennis Garweah
258. 1/Lt. Charles Wallace
259. " Gabriel Wilson
260. 1/Lt. Samuel Baker
261. Cpt. John Faye
262. 2/Lt. Sinnah Gibson
263. " Michael Farr
264. Cpt. James Tamba
265. " Larry Thompson
266. Sgt. Hudson Teedor
267. Ltc. Tweh Kolor
268. Cpt. Ffederick Kunneh
269. " Theophiolus Davies
270. Sgt. Kulu Gee
271. Col. Jackson Toe
272. 1/Lt. Garrison Kleh
273. " James Kamara
274. Cpt. Samuel Fanciah
275. Sgt. Emmanuel Nelson
276. 1/Lt. Mamadee Kamara
277. Maj. William Queartis
278. Sgt. William Toe
279. Col. John Notty
280. " Nankollie Dwana
281. " Stanley Bedell
282. Ltc. Irving Carter
283. Maj. Augustine Solomon
284. Ltc. Beh Banks
285. Capt. Alfred Yarvan
286. Maj. Michael Jebboe
287. Col. Dexter Tiah
288. 1/Lt. Benjamin Kamara
289. Maj. David Fartorma
290. Ltc. Betty Broh
291. Maj. Charles Kamara
292. Cpt. Amos Gbagalo
293. " Jerry Nyepon
294. Col. Arthur Kerkulah
295. Maj. Sekou Sama
296. Cpt. Sam Teah
297. " Lester Faye
298. 1/Lt. Deannah Kulodee
299. Sgt. Jelleh O. Pyzack
300. 2/Lt. Frank Davies
302. Sgt. Robertson Pour
303. " Junior Larmouth
304. " Francis Hannah
305. 1/Lt. Anthony Bonar
306. Sgt. Lawrence Mulbah
307. 2/Lt. Victoria Grant
308. Pvt. James Dwalu
309. Sgt. Francis Browne
310. Cpt. Napoleon Govego
311. Pvt. John Scotland
312. " Jeh Neah
313. 2/Lt. Philip Dawroh
314. Pvt. James J. Korzubah
315. Sgt. John Kdorbor
316. Pvt. James Kula
317. 2/1t. Wesseh Diahyou
318. " Solomon Dyer
319. Agt. David Roberts
320. Cpt. Ansumana Johnson
321. 1/Lt. George Coker
322. Maj. Nathaniel Wilson
323. 1/Lt. Martin Brown
324. Pvt. Momo Kamara
325. Pvt. Samuel Walker
326. Cpt. Joseph Massaquoi
327. " Augustine Korvah
328. 2/Lt. Philip Tmah
329. **Maj. Roseline Lewis**
330- Robert G. Beer /AST! DIR/TS
331. Col. Ocebio Dehnie
332. " Mohamed Adams
333. " Vasco Dulgar
334. " William Dennis
335- " Amos Duomie
336. " Richard Flomo
337. " Midway Tmah
338. " Edwin Lewis
339. " Austin Gray
340. " Dehlein Gbor
341. " James Coalin
342. Maj. Fayiah Taylor
343. Cpt. James Neuville
344. " Paul Gobehy
345. 1/Lt. Cheyee Dyea
346. 2/Lt. Doeliae Brownell
347. " Charles Towon
348. " George Kulu
349. Sgt. Charles Cooper
350. 1/Lt. Abraham Teah
351. Cpt. David Nimely
352. Col. Benjamin Mason
353. Ltc. Joseph Mazane
354. Cpt. Herbert Cheeks
355. Maj. Adolphus Simpson
356. Cpt. Sampson Cheyee
357. " Rudolph Togba
358. Maj. Othello Guie
359. 2/Lt. Moses Gbelee
360. Cpt. John Verdier

9175

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| | RANKS: | NAME: |
|---|---|---|
| 601. | Capt. | Abraham Hannah |
| 602. | " | Daudu A. Sheriff |
| 603. | 1/Lt. | Falco J. Kamara |
| 604. | 2/Lt. | Constance Mokep |
| 605. | " | Lance G. Beer, Jr. |
| 606. | " | Sam Collins |
| 607. | Capt. | Chadrick Nyantee |
| 608. | 1/Lt. | Victor Singbay |
| 609. | " | Francis Johnson |
| 610. | Sgt. | Cyrus P. Junior |
| 611. | Capt. | John Moore |
| 612. | 2/Lt. | Jallah Kolubah |
| 613. | Col. | Jolly S.C. Dukuly |
| 614. | " | Adolphus S. Kolo |
| 615. | 1/Lt. | Alvin W. Taylor |
| 616. | " | Robert A. Gibson |
| 617. | " | Samuel Lee |
| 618. | " | Morris Roger |
| 619. | " | Clarence N. Cooper |
| 620. | " | Boima F. Sambai |
| 621. | " | Thomas Smith |
| 622. | " | Henry Hoff |
| 623. | 2/Lt. | Alston A. Bloeum |
| 624. | Lt/Col. | Yeaseen H. Nyanguoi |
| 625. | Maj. | Amos G. Young |
| 626. | " | John J. Bingo |
| 627. | Capt. | Amos M. Monseh |
| 628. | Lt/Col. | Patrick O. Paye |
| 629. | Maj. | Tarmue S. Bass |
| 630. | Capt. | Johnny K.K. Naebe |
| 631. | " | Emmanuel Dallan |
| 632. | Maj. | Jackson Yreh |
| 633. | " | Steve Cone |
| 634. | Capt. | Francis Nye |
| 635. | " | Newton Nyeanneh |
| 636. | Maj. | Moses Harris |
| 637. | Capt. | Dominic Neal |
| 638. | Lt/Col. | James P. Jerbo |
| 639. | 2/Lt. | Boniface Browney |
| 640. | 1/Lt. | Moses Brownine |
| 641. | Lt/Col. | Gobon Johnson |
| 642. | Capt. | Gobon H. Mayson |
| 643. | " | Alice Tudor |
| 644. | Lt/Col. | John A. Mandi |
| 645. | Capt. | Augustine Nyenfoe |
| 646. | " | Tommy-n Mollie |
| 647. | PFC. | Julius Gbeh |
| 648. | CPL. | Oliver Dorley |
| 649. | Sgt. | Sam Diggs |
| 650. | CPL. | George Flomo |
| 651. | Pvt. | Johnson A. Grimes |
| 652. | PFC. | Stephen A. Kpoto |
| 653. | 2/Lt. | Moses Duo |
| 654. | 1/Lt. | Jacob Monboe |
| 655. | 2/Lt. | Allie Lewis |
| 656. | Lt/Col. | Mustapha Macaroni |
| 657. | " " | Jaleke Tofena |
| 658. | Maj. | Daniel Kemba |
| 659. | " | Kemb Bateh |
| 660. | Capt. | Sampson Paye |
| 661. | 1/Lt. | Franklin K. Paye |
| 662. | " | Calvin N. Malley |
| 663. | " | Anthony Morris |
| 664. | Capt. xx | Edwin K. Williams |
| 665. | " | Boke Nave |
| 666. | Lt/Col. | John B. Lema |
| 667. | Capt. | Emmanuel Gono |
| 668. | 1/Lt. | Jankubah Tofena |
| 669. | " | Jangubah V. Harley |
| 670. | " | Geabah T. Karneh |
| 671. | 2/Lt. | Abolaye Kromah |
| 672. | " | Varlee Telleh |
| 673. | Maj. | Charles E. Kousdio |
| 674. | 1/Lt. | Peter Saye |
| 675. | " | George Kai |
| 676. | CPL. | Joseph K. Tokpah |
| 677. | Pvt. | George Larmouth |
| 678. | Lt/Col. | Moses G. Duoh |
| 679. | Maj. | Edison M. Morris |
| 680. | " | Augustine D. Yeanmie |
| 681. | " | Cooper B. Mabeah |
| 682. | Capt. | Jerry E. Kerkulah |
| 683. | " | John B. Konnah |
| 684. | " | Matthew K. Kahn |
| 685. | " | Peter C. Sunnyway |
| 686. | " | Emmanuel G. Mowah |
| 687. | 1/Lt. | Annie Johnbaye |
| 688. | " | Joseph T. Kennedy |
| 689. | " | Samuel Q. Barseh |
| 690. | " | David Moore |
| 691. | 2/Lt. | Saye L. Monsaye |
| 692. | " | Peter Mielicoon |
| 693. | " | Sankulay Quelongbaye |
| 694. | " | Albert G. Kenneth |
| 695. | " | Titus K. Bufford |
| 696. | " | Marvie J. Gbarbea |
| 697. | Sgt. | Jerry N. Kerkulah |
| 698. | " | Lahn Kpahn |
| 699. | " | Moses Acquoi |
| 700. | " | Alfred G. Sumo |
| 701. | Pvt. | Shiaka Kromah |
| 702. | 2/Lt. | Eric Thomas |
| 703. | M-sgt. | Francis P. Singbe |
| 704. | Pvt. | Abdulai Kromah |
| 705. | " | Augustine Landeh |
| 706. | " | Obediah Nimely |
| 707. | " | Eric T. Grimes |
| 708. | Sgt. | Emmanuel J. Kennedy |
| 709. | M-Sgt. | Sieh M. Bernard |
| 710. | Sgt. | Jacob Thomas |
| 711. | CPL. | Koiyah Jallah |
| 712. | PFC. | Rufus Johnson |
| 713. | Capt. | William Jimmy |
| 714. | " | Jerry G. Morris |
| 715. | " | Patrick T. King |
| 716. | 1/Lt. | Azarriah Keibah |
| 717. | Capt. | Ferkai J. Morris |
| 718. | " | Saye Guanu |
| 719. | " | Kpannkpa Z. Mabandi |
| 720. | " | Alfred C. Garnley |

9/76

00028816

| | RANKS: | NAMES: |
|---|---|---|
| 1706. | 1/Lt. | Moses G. Dailey |
| 1707. | 2/Lt. | Martin Brown |
| 1708. | " | Jeremiah M. Gongor |
| 1709. | " | Adolphus Karjay |
| 1710. | Sgt. | John J. Somo |
| 1711. | " | Aaron Tolbert |
| 1712. | " | John G. Moore |
| 1713. | " | Oliver J. Beh |
| 1714. | " | Arthur Bartuah |
| 1715. | " | Stephen Y. Dolo |
| 1716. | " | Alvin Benson |
| 1717. | " | Eric S. Thompson |
| 1718. | " | Wesseh Touwah |
| 1719. | " | Joe S. Nana |
| 1720. | " | Moses Y. Hills |
| 1721. | " | Enoch Menwon |
| 1722. | " | Abraham Kulbah |
| 1723. | " | Augustine Gogbaye |
| 1724. | " | Emmanuel Mambuyah |
| 1725. | " | Bono C. Kapa |
| 1726. | " | Stephen Ghern |
| 1727. | CPL. | Anthony Sahway |
| 1728. | " | Zaire Buahn |
| 1729. | " | Sampson Lesargpaye |
| 1730. | " | Joshua D. Derzer |
| 1731. | " | Othello T. Gongor |
| 1732. | Pvt. | Sonkarley F. Gongbaye |
| 1733. | CPL. | Morris D. Karnea |
| 1734. | Pvt. | Romeo Marvah |
| 1735. | " | Peter G. Miabah |
| 1736. | " | Sam M. Gbor |
| 1737. | " | Melvin S. Quoi |
| 1738. | " | David N. Johnny |
| 1739. | " | Anthony Karmie |
| 1740. | " | Amos K. Kollie |
| 1741. | " | Ernest Sokay |
| 1742. | " | William Bartush |
| 1743. | " | Kla J. Lunaford |
| 1744. | " | Anthony S. Momo |
| 1745. | " | John V. Flomo |
| 1746. | CPL. | Ronnie Doelakeh |
| 1747. | Pvt. | Prince F. Kulbah |
| 1748. | Sgt. | Sunny-Boy Howe |
| 1749. | " | Francis Sando |
| 1750. | " | Andrew Tengbeh |
| 1751. | " | George K.D. Mansahn |
| 1752. | " | Zack P. Carson |
| 1753. | " | Charles King |
| 1754. | " | Christopher T. Paye |
| 1755. | " | Jackson Lonnay |
| 1756. | " | Harold Sayon |
| 1757. | " | Joseph Tongor |
| 1758. | " | Augustine Cooper |
| 1759. | " | Julius Johnson |
| 1760. | 1/Lt. | Morris Quie |
| 1761. | Sgt. | Moses P. Hohnsonk |
| 1762. | " | Otis Karbakeh |
| 1763. | " | Nelson K. Doebay-Zoe |
| 1764. | " | William Cuput |
| 1765. | " | David A. Winston |
| 1766. | CPL. | Prince Sorsiah |
| 1767. | " | Sahe S. Walker |
| 1768. | Sgt. | Malkin Wongbaye |
| 1769. | " | Prince B. Johnson |
| 1770. | " | Morris Matadi |
| 1771. | " | Charles S. Geh |
| 1772. | " | Morris Saysay |
| 1773. | " | Ernest N. Bartor |
| 1774. | " | Constance Nerlekabah |
| 1775. | " | Arthur Karsay |
| 1776. | " | Darkoni Damah |
| 1777. | " | Sam Saye Luogon |
| 1778. | Pvt. | Matthew Santoe |
| 1779. | Capt. | Isaac B. Farmer |
| 1780. | 1/Lt. | Gray S. Dennis |
| 1781. | " | Federick G. Decee |
| 1782. | 2/Lt. | Washington Dolamo |
| 1783. | " | Nemehtorbor Grugbaye |
| 1784. | " | Cooper F. Brooks |
| 1785. | Sgt. | Denicia Z . Gibson |
| 1786. | " | James H. Komo |
| 1787. | " | Junior C. Jackson |
| 1788. | Col. | Joe K. Tough - Asst/Dir. |
| 1789. | Lt/Col. | Arthur Waheeb-Saah |
| 1790. | Maj. | Andrew N... Kakia |
| 1791. | " | Jackson F. Zuo |
| 1792. | " | George K. Toknah |
| 1793. | " | Robert A. Paye |
| 1794. | " | John O. Kulbah |
| 1795. | " | Joe G. Doe |
| 1796. | " | John Grugbaye |
| 1797. | " | Alphonso Soumie |
| 1798. | " | Peter Sakpaier |
| 1799. | Capt. | Kankandel Kpantee |
| 1800. | " " | Anthony G. Gueh |
| 1801. | " | Foday W. Johnson |
| 1802. | Maj. | Janet M. Jackson |
| 1803. | Capt. | William S. Menwon |
| 1804. | " | Edward L. Nowoah |
| 1805. | " | Prince Brown |
| 1806. | " | Peter G.C . Kwehmie |
| 1807. | " | Amos Elegaye |
| 1808. | " | John K. Tokpah |
| 1809. | 1/Lt. | Bartuah Gbor |
| 1810. | " | Sando Musah |
| 1811. | " | Jerry W. Lolemon |
| 1812. | " | Peter G. Zain |
| 1813. | " | Peter Karkor |
| 1814. | " | Josiah G. Paye |
| 1815. | " | Francis Zuue |
| 1816. | " | Koko Kreh |
| 1817. | " | Ericson Barlee |
| 1818. | " | Zanay-Tay Zamay |
| 1819. | 2/Lt. | Harris W. Johnson |
| 1820. | " | Morris J. McCul |
| 1821. | " | Joseph D. Kollie |
| 1822. | " | William Dahn |
| 1823. | " | Jerry Sackie |
| 1824. | " | Darious D. Feika |
| 1825. | " | George Kaidii |

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Your Excellency

Despite the extended lapse in direct contact, I can assure you of my continued activity in the ultimate interests of yr and of your Government.

Since your brother [redacted] from school managed to re-establish contact with me in the past few days, we have had several long and fruitful discussions on achieving the objectives which we all seek.

In consequence I must advise that for the present it is of vital importance that as Chairman you should remain in your present strategic place. If you were to contemplate travel in the belief that this would expedite certain matters I would ask that you reconsider such a move. It is my view that this would have a detrimental effect on morale. Those of us that you trust can ensure that your directives are followed in neighbouring countries. Be assured you are not without friends.

In the case of your family, the bearer of this letter will explain in detail, the proposals for their transit to the country in question. No insurmountable obstacles are envisaged and you are assured of their safety.

As far as any parcels are concerned, arrangements have already been made in Asia for their disposal and distribution in accordance with your directives. This is a new contact, totally trustworthy and honest, of the same extraction as your envoy originally sent to Asia, who incidentally is here with me in the House.

Nevertheless whilst full security will be in place for their transfer from you to here, I must advise

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that they be split into at least 2 or 3 parcels to be released at intervals after completion of the first operation.

We will work on the communications problem which has been outlined. This will not present any difficulty.

Finally, it is the nature of guerilla warfare that the cause often seems lost when it isn't. Time and again liberation movements have swept to ultimate victory on a string of defeats.

never forget The AFRC will succeed. because the cause is just.

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For your information, after the Kaabat meeting, the pronouncement by Tejan Kabbah here has been very bad against your Govt. First of all on Television he said if you sent people to light fire here others may do it with you some thereine and is what is going on now with you. He said you asked him to send C.I.Ds to join you to work for Mosquito.

On the 4th of March, there was a meeting between the british and the desident Commanders here (4) of them One called Kia-Dee. They were to resolve the matter between the Kamajors who are pulling out of Liberia because their demands are not met with pro arrangements between CDF and Alhaji Koroma after the last meeting. Your men on the ground need to put more pressure.

They also said your Ground troops can't make it up with them and therefore you are using more of helicopter gunship. The british have said by the 20th of this Month, they will supply them with chasers (sams). In the meeting the American Ambassador's Military Chief here was present who also ~~agreed~~ promise given them anti aircrafts through their training Unit in Guinea. The british helicopters (Blue-Black) two of them were engaged in transporting Ammunitions for the desident into Guinean town of Masanta on the 5th and 6th respectively. This is because the desident office said they were shot of Ammunition and.

The troops of Bropleh have also now been supplied with new british L.A.Rs. All the borders of Sierra Leone should be manned Carefully especially the forest areas

Be also informed that 33 Liberians were brought by either Koroma or Ellen into Guinea according to

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to sources they were from various part of the region and are currently training in Masanta area.
There will also be a meeting in Guinea on the 17th between the resident Commanders, Koroma, the british officials and Guineans to find as the way forward. The Guinea are bitterly complaining about their presence in the Masanta Region and the British who went in there said it will be impossible to have a full scale train base in their so called area of the resident as they are only engage in hit and Run.

There are now serious plans by American officials, British and the Sierra leone Govt to indicte you to face the Special Court in Sierra and if you refuse they call you elsewhere and if you refuse, they will class you as a criminal. That is the latest plan.

Prophet wants to move in but the Govt is afraid yet that you have Mosquito and in case of any back fire, Mosquito will be sent by you to distabilize Sierra Leone.

They want to use the liberias in prison here to give Evidences against you for war crimes.


Greetings to you and tell your men to put more pressure as Kamajors are moving out on daily basis. Mr Kia-Dee claims to be the logistic officer for the resident.

Your son.


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
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
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
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
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
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Thank you.

***Congressman Frank Wolf***

00028950

House Armed Services Committee
Special Oversight Panel on the Merchant Marine
Vessel Operations under "flags of convenience" and National Security Implications

June 13, 2002



Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and the rest of the committee for giving me the opportunity to testify on an issue of vital importance both to the long-term stability of West Africa and to our country's national security interests. Mr. Chairman, I am specifically here to talk about Liberia, its maritime flag registry, and its relationship to Liberia's despotic President, Charles Taylor.

Today I want to focus on several issues. First, I want to outline for the committee the record of Charles Taylor and why it is urgent that our government take all steps to deny Mr. Taylor the means to maintain his grip on Liberia. Also, I want to discuss the implications that Liberia has for our national security interests in light of Mr. Taylor's relationship with international arms dealers and even terrorist networks, including al Qaeda. Finally, it is critical that we are able to guarantee that the Liberian flag registry revenues are transparent and are going toward the needs to the people of Liberia, who have suffered so much. If we cannot guarantee this, it should be shut down.

Because of the time limitation, I will only be able to offer you a brief glimpse into these issues. Therefore, I would like to submit additional information to the committee including several news reports and excepts from three United Nations Security Council reports on the Liberian Sanctions that outline the connections between Charles Taylor, his revenue from the Liberian maritime flag registry, conflict diamonds, the humanitarian disaster in West Africa and international terrorism. Read in their entirety, these reports and investigations lead to one conclusion -- in the past the Liberian flag registry has been implicated in contributing to the continued reign of Charles Taylor, the leader one of the most brutal, murderous and dangerous regimes in the world. In short, there is blood on the flag, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Charles Taylor's rise to power has been characterized by violence. In Polish author Ryszard Kapuscinski's work, The Shadow of the Sun, the chapter on Liberia is titled, "The Cooling Hell." Kapuscinski describes coming upon children from Charles Taylor's infamous Small Boys Units, child soldiers that Taylor recruited to fight for his insurgent group during the Liberian civil war. Kapuscinski writes:

"I haven't walked a hundred meters and I'm already surrounded by small boys with swollen faces and bleary eyes, sometimes missing an arm or a leg. They beg. These are former soldiers from Charles Taylor's Small Boys Units, his most frightful divisions. Taylor recruits small children and gives them weapons. He also gives them drugs, and when they are under the influence, he makes them attack. The stupefied youngsters behave like kamikaze fighters, throwing themselves into the heat of the battle, advancing straight into flying bullets, getting blown up by mines. When they become addicted to the point of uselessness, Taylor throws them out. Some of them reach Monrovia and end their short lives in ditches or on garbage heaps, consumed by malaria or cholera, or by jackals."

After Charles Taylor became the president in 1997, his ruthless tactics did not change. Mr. Chairman, this is a picture taken while I was traveling with my colleague Tony Hall in December 1999 in Sierra Leone. This 2-year-old girl was just one of the many victims of the Revolutionary United Front otherwise known as the RUF. It is a criminal insurgent group started and supported by Charles Taylor which terrorized civilians in Sierra Leone by engaging is mass amputations, murder, rape and torture. Taylor's interest in promoting and supporting the RUF insurgency was driven by greed -- Sierra Leone's vast diamond resources. Victims told us that when the RUF would arrive in a village, they would ask their victims if they wanted a long sleeve or a short sleeve and amputate accordingly.

The civil war in Sierra Leone took nearly 100,000 lives and left almost 2 million people as refugees. Finally, after United Nations and British intervention, today the situation seems to be temporarily stabilizing as Sierra Leoneans recently participated in elections. For Taylor's culpability in Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council finally voted to place sanctions on Liberia, which remain in effect today.

For years, though, Charles Taylor's trail of misery was thought to be confined only to a small corner of West Africa. Only recently though, we learned that the terror of Charles Taylor went beyond West African shores. In November, The Washington Post and several other media

outlets outlined in detail how the RUF in Sierra Leone transferred "blood" diamonds to al Qaeda operatives in Liberia who then traded them for cash in the European diamond market. These terrorists include Ibrahim Bah, a Libyan-trained former Senegalese rebel who is cited as the Sierra Leonian rebels' primary diamond dealer. Charles Taylor himself is directly implicated in these reports for taking commissions on all deals made between the RUF and the al Qaeda network.

Taken together, all of these facts point to an inescapable conclusion. Not only will the people of Liberia and West Africa continue to suffer as long as Charles Taylor is in power. But, the importance of preventing Charles Taylor from obtaining sources of revenue to run his international criminal enterprise is now a matter of national security. As long as Charles Taylor has access to the financial resources, the people of West Africa will continue to be threatened by wars, humanitarian disasters and misery.

Which brings me to the issue at hand for this committee – the relationship between Charles Taylor's criminal state and the Liberian flag registry and its implications on our national security.

The United Nations and several news reports have revealed that the revenue obtained from the Liberian flag registry and the company that runs the registry, the Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry, known as LISCR, made payments that violated the UN sanctions on Liberia.

Also, the United Nations has reported that LISCR was set up precisely so that Charles Taylor would have immediate access to the flag registry funding. While estimates vary, according to the October 2001 UN report, the flag registry accounts for approximately 50 percent to 75 percent of Liberia's annual revenue.

The distinction between whether this money goes to Liberia and its legitimate needs or Charles Taylor and his international criminal enterprise is of immense importance. If the flag registry can be effectively audited and "ring fenced" and these funds used for legitimate purposes, then I believe the flag registry should be saved. But so far, as the UN reports and the many news stories indicate, that has not happened. Instead, the revenue from the registry is still controlled by the "Executive Mansion," meaning Charles Taylor.

Besides the troubling consequence that the exploitation of the flag registry has for Liberia's people, the UN reports also indicate that the

lack of transparency surrounding Liberian finances may have troubling national security implications for the U.S. government as well. For instance, the UN reports document how certain portions of the flag registry revenue were channeled to the notorious arms dealer, Victor Bout, who has connections to the Taliban, al Qaeda and Abu Sayyeef, the radical Muslim group in the Philippines.

Finally, the UN reports implicate the registry in playing a role in facilitating the illicit trade in conflict diamonds through the use of shell companies that trade in the so-called "blood" diamonds. The UN's December 2000 report states that "a physical check of the Monrovia street addresses given by most of these firms revealed that there were no such companies, and no such addresses. Courier firms in Monrovia, however, have in the past been instructed to route correspondence for these addresses to the International Trust Company (ITC), which in January 2000 changed its name to the International Bank of Liberia Ltd. Since then, mail addressed to the companies in question has been forwarded to the newly established Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry (LISCR) which now handles the Liberian maritime registry. This means that if the companies in question are more than shells, they are not physically present in Liberia, and none of the diamonds in question were either mined in, or passed through, Liberia."

Mr. Chairman, I believe that if we can get guarantees that the Liberian flag registry can be put to legitimate uses for the people of Liberia, it should be preserved. But this notion cannot ignore an undeniable reality of today -- Charles Taylor runs Liberia as a personal fiefdom, deciding what to do with the revenues from all state ventures.

Just last year his personal control was codified in a new law that states, "The President of the Republic of Liberia is hereby granted the sole power to execute, negotiate and conclude all commercial contracts or agreements with any foreign or domestic investor for the exploitation of the strategic commodities of the Republic of Liberia." It is not surprising that Liberia is often referred to as Charles Taylor Inc.

Mr. Chairman, I want to close by leaving the committee with a final thought. Since my visit to Sierra Leone, I have been deeply concerned amount the plight of the citizens of that region. Looking at the little girl in this picture, it is unconscionable that anyone could justify a business relationship with Charles Taylor. But beyond this humanitarian concern, the links between al Qaeda and other international terrorist activity and Charles Taylor put this entire matter in a new light. We need a guarantee that Charles Taylor can no longer exploit this

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resource. A financial relationship no longer just supports a brutal African dictator causing misery for a far away people; it tacitly supports a terrorist organization dedicated to the destruction of the United States.

Thank you for allowing me to testify and I welcome any questions you may have.

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**Statement of the Hon. Frank R. Wolf, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia**
**Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means**
**Hearing on Conflict Diamonds**
**October 10, 2001**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today about the issue of conflict diamonds. I appreciate your committee taking the time to hold this important hearing and I also thank Chairman Thomas for his willingness to facilitate the passage of conflict diamonds legislation before the end of this session.

For nearly two years now, I have been supporting the efforts of my friend and colleague, Tony Hall, who has truly been the champion in bringing Congress's attention to the severe consequences of diamonds that fuel civil conflict in several of Africa's most troubled areas including Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. His efforts have brought the world's attention to people blessed to live in areas rich in diamond resources, but who have been cursed by the violent conflict that these diamonds have caused.

I also want to recognize and thank the Bush Administration for working with us on developing effective legislation to address this problem, specifically the State Department and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. I especially appreciate their efforts in light of recent circumstances, and the attention that the Administration is dedicating to the critical needs of our nation's security matters, both at home and overseas.

In the interest of allowing the Committee and the Administration to have as much time as possible at this hearing, I will be brief. I just want to emphasize why I believe we need legislation such as H.R. 2722, introduced by Congressmen Houghton and Rangel with support of Congressman Hall and myself, before Congress adjourns this year.

As this committee is aware, the U.S. is involved in multilateral negotiations with over 40 other nations at what is known as the "Kimberly process." While it is undoubtedly difficult to have so many nations agree on a system of such a complex nature, our passage of legislation facilitates this international system. We import almost 70 percent of the world's jewelry diamonds. We therefore have a unique responsibility to address this issue and take steps to only import clean



[redacted]

diamonds, untainted by the blood of innocent victims. Legislation that requires clean diamonds will spur the many nations interested in maintaining their imports to the U.S. into making such a system a reality.

At the same time, the legislation has the necessary flexibility for the Administration to meet its international trade requirements under the WTO and more importantly, enough flexibility for the Administration to delay its implementation as the global system becomes a reality. Our staffs are ready to continue working with the Office of USTR to meet their concerns.

A second reason why this legislation is so important is for the diamond industry itself. While I do not purport to speak for the NGOs on their future plans, I do believe that failure to pass legislation will result in a significant consumer backlash in the near future. This will be especially true as new conflicts develop or old ones resurface. For instance, Angola's conflict rages on and recently the UNITA rebel group has shown signs of again heightening the violence. Given the importance of diamonds for places such as South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, it is critical that we act to protect the legitimate trade before it is too late and the image of a diamond is tarnished forever.

Finally, I would like to address the issue of conflict diamonds in relation to recent events. As President Bush has stated so eloquently, the scope and reach of global terror networks such as Al Qaeda will require our fighting them on all fronts. One of these will be on the financial front and the Treasury Department has already taken steps in this direction.

Diamonds are easy to launder and court testimony after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 indicates that Al Qaeda has financial interests in the diamond trade. While it is impossible to know how closely tied in this group or other groups are to those who trade in conflict diamonds, it is significant that such connections may exist.

According to the State Department, the RUF rebel leaders in Sierra Leone are a terrorist group. Many of their leaders have connections to traders of conflict diamonds in Lebanon and, of course, were very closely connected to Liberian President Charles Taylor. In short, there is a global network of "bad guys" out there. Passage of this legislation will at least impart some accountability to a highly launderable item and make it more difficult for any criminal or terrorist organization to use it as a financing mechanism.



@PJL ENTER LANGUAGE=PCL

I would like to end with one closing thought. Members of this committee are some of the strongest and most eloquent advocates for free trade, globalization and international commerce. You point to the great economic opportunity that increased commerce offers for both our country and developing nations as well. I share and understand this basic principle.

However, too often the argument of free trade and globalization is framed too simplistically --you are either for or you are against. Rather, I believe that cleaning up the diamond trade offers unique opportunity to address the issue in more realistic terms -- international commerce with accountability. The benefits of the diamond trade need to reach the people on the ground that live in these regions. If we can successfully address the issue of conflict diamonds, human rights, labor conditions and the general welfare of people living in these conflict areas will improve.

Again, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify here today. With the Chairman's permission, I will submit my entire written testimony for the record.

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# Annex B.9

## Documents Certified in Annex C.6

9197

# Exhibit 1.401 contained in Annex B to Prosecution's Opening Statement Motion filed on 16/05/2007

9198

# ANNEX C

9/99

# C.1

00015356-00015361

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**

**THE PROSECUTOR**

**Against**

**ISSA HASAN SESAY**
**MORRIS KALLON**
**AUGUSTINE GBAO**

CASE NO. SCSL – 2004 – 15 – T

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**SOLEMN DECLARATION OF ALFRED SESAY**

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DECLARANT: ALFRED SESAY
DECLARED AT: FREETOWN
DATE: 7 JULY 2005

On 7 July, 2005, I, Alfred Sesay, an Investigator with the Office of the Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. I have been working with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) since June 8th 2003. Prior to working at the Special Court I was an investigator with the CID. The CID is Criminal Investigations Department.

2. On the 8th May 2000, I was working at the CID headquarters in Freetown. On this day, the Parliamentarians, Civil Society Groups and Women's Organizations organized a demonstration in Freetown at the residence of Foday Sankoh's house on Spur Road to protest against reports that some UN Peace Keepers (UNAMSIL) in Sierra Leone had been arrested by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

3. Whilst this demonstration was going on during the morning hours, I heard the sound of gun shots from the western part of Freetown. I also saw people running helter skelter and some saying that there was a shoot out at the residence of the late RUF leader Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh on Spur Road.

4. On the 9th May 2000, I was given a carton full of documents and I was told by Thomas Lahun, one of the Directors at the CID, that they were seized from the residence of Foday Sankoh. Thomas Lahun transferred to my custody this carton and instructed me to maintain custody of these materials. The documents were thereafter stored in a big cupboard under lock and key at the CID HQ and I remained in possession of these documents. They were locked in a big cupboard and I possessed the only key.

5. At some point in that year representatives from the Sierra Leone Attorney General's Office made copies of these documents. The CID remained in possession of the originals. I do not remember exactly when this occurred.

6. Also, at some point in the year 2000, representatives from the United Nations came to the CID headquarters to inspect these documents. I do not recall their names or which specific department they belonged to. They remained at the CID office and inspected the documents for several hours. They did not take possession of any of the documents. I am uncertain if they made copies of any of the documents. They took personal notes about the documents.

7. On 20 May 2005, Christopher Santora, an attorney with the OTP and Tariq Malik, with the Evidence Unit for the OTP, presented several original documents to me with internal OTP reference numbers marked on each page. To the best of my recollection I recall that these documents were among the set of materials originally turned over to me by Thomas Lahun and were stored in my custody.
    a. ERN00007868-00008048
    b. ERN00008049-00008077
    c. ERN00008078-00008109

d. ERN00008228-00008232
e. ERN 00008251-00008252
f. ERN00008636-00008726
g. ERN00008727-00008903
h. ERN00009645-00009657
i. ERN00009658-00009671
j. ERN00007754-00007755
k. ERN00007802-00007807
l. ERN00007852-00007862
m. ERN00012914-00012927
n. ERN00012875-00012891
o. ERN00009672-00009681
p. ERN00008251-00008252
q. ERN00008253-00008255
r. ERN00007769-00007770
s. ERN00009746-00009764
t. ERN00009765-00009768
u. ERN00007736-00007737
v. ERN00009629-00009630
w. ERN00009772-00009775
x. ERN00007671-00007674
y. ERN00008200-00008207
z. ERN00009636-00009637
aa. ERN00008196-00008198
bb. ERN00008196-00008198
cc. ERN00009489- 0009491
dd. ERN00009485-00009485
ee. ERN00012940-00012942
ff. ERN00012973-00012975
gg. ERN00012912-00012913
hh. ERN00012976-00012976

ii. ERN00012971-00012972

jj. ERN00012955-00012070

kk. ERN00009481-00009484

8. At some point in late 2002, Thomas Lahun, who was at this point an investigators with the OTP arrived at the CID headquarters and requested to take possession of certain documents that were among the Sankoh materials related to communications. He took possession of these documents.

9. On 20 May 2005, Christopher Santora, an attorney with the OTP, and Tariq Malik, the Evidence Custodian for the OTP, again presented several original documents to me with internal OTP reference numbers marked on each page. I have inspected the documents marked below and affirm that these were the documents that Thomas Lahun took possession of from me on behalf of the OTP at some point in late 2002.

   a. ERN00007852-00007862
   b. ERN00012914-00012927
   c. ERN00007868-00008048
   d. ERN00008049-00008077
   e. ERN00008078-00008109
   f. ERN00008228-00008232
   g. ERN00008636-00008726
   h. ERN00008727-00008903

10. Also, at some point in late 2002, I turned over certain documents to investigator from the OTP including one Corinne Dufka, who was an investigator with the OTP at the time. She arrived at the CID headquarters and requested to take possession of certain documents that were among the Sankoh materials. I transferred custody of certain documents to her after her request.

11. On 20 May 2005, Christopher Santora and Tariq Malik again presented several original documents to me with internal OTP reference numbers marked on each page. I have inspected the documents marked below and affirm that these were the documents that

Corinne Dufka and other investigators from the OTP took possession of from me on behalf of the OTP at some point in late 2002.

a. ERN00009645-00009657
b. ERN00009658-00009671
c. ERN00007754-00007755
d. ERN00007802-00007807
e. ERN00012875-00012891
f. ERN00009672-00009681
g. ERN00008251-00008252
h. ERN00008253-00008255
i. ERN00007769-00007770
j. ERN00009746-00009764
k. ERN00009765-00009768
l. ERN00007736-00007737
m. ERN00012940-00012942
n. ERN00012973-00012975
o. ERN00012912-00012913
p. ERN00012976-00012976
q. ERN00012971-00012972
r. ERN00012955-00012070
s. ERN00009481-00009484

12. I make this solemn declaration by virtue of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, conscientiously believing that the statements contained herein are true in every particular.

Alfred Sesay
Investigator for the Office of the Prosecutor
The Special Court for Sierra Leone

Declared at Freetown, )
this 7th day of July 2005, )
before me )
)

Wambui Ngunya
Office of the Prosecutor
Special Court for Sierra Leone

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person making a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court is liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

9206

# C.2

00015356-00015361

This solemn declaration can
be found in C.1

00015362-00015364

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**

**THE PROSECUTOR**

**Against**

**ISSA HASAN SESAY**
**MORRIS KALLON**
**AUGUSTINE GBAO**

CASE NO. SCSL – 2004 – 15 – T

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**SOLEMN DECLARATION OF THOMAS LAHUN**

---

DECLARANT: THOMAS LAHUN
DECLARED AT: FREETOWN
DATE: 11 JULY 2005

On 11th July, 2005, I, Thomas Lahun, an Investigator with the Office of the Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. I have been working with the Office of the Prosecutor since August 2002. Prior to working at the Special Court I was one of the Directors with the CID. The CID is Criminal Investigation Department.

2. On the 8th May 2000, I was working at the CID headquarters in Freetown. On that same day, Parliamentarians, Civil Society Groups, and Women's Organizations, organized a demonstration in Freetown against the reports of the arrest of UN Peace Keepers [UNAMSIL] by the RUF. This demonstration was being held on Spur Road, near the residence of RUF leader Foday Sankoh. During the time of the demonstration, we saw people running all over saying that there was shooting was going on at Foday Sankoh's house on Spur Road.

3. On the 9th May 2000, after our morning meeting at the CID Headquarters, we tasked Assistant Superintendents, Samuel Sanni Sesay and Albert Conteh, to move with a team to Foday Sankoh's house on Spur Road to find out what was happening there as we learned that he had fled the house. They were also asked to see how best the house could be secured, and to also secure any valuable evidence.

4. The team, led by Samuel Sanni Sesay and Albert Conteh, informed us on their arrival at Foday Sankoh's house that the house was looted and that documents were scattered all over in the compound. We advised them to immediately secure whatever documents they could and take them to the CID. Samuel Sanni Sesay then returned later to the CID with a big carton containing documents. I, along with other Directors of the CID and Alfred Sesay received from Samuel Sanni Sesay the documents in the carton.

5. After we viewed some of these documents, I handed custody of the carton of documents from Foday Sankoh's house to Alfred Sesay, who was my Special Assistant to keep it in a cupboard under lock and key in the CID office I was sharing with him, which he did. The documents were under his custody from that point onward.

6. Shortly after my transfer to the Special Court in August 2002, I went to the CID headquarters and inspected the same set of documents from Sankoh's house that were still at the CID under the custody of Alfred Sesay. I was instructed by my supervisors at the OTP to take possession of documents related to "communications." I took possession from Alfred Sesay at CID certain documents that were part of the materials seized at Sankoh's house and were still in the custody and control of the CID.

7. On 20 May 2005, Christopher Santora with the Office of the Prosecutor, and Tariq Malik, the evidence custodian for the OTP, presented several original documents to me with internal OTP reference numbers marked on each page. I have inspected the documents below and affirm that I took possession of these documents and turned them over to the OTP around September or October of 2002.
    a. ERN00007852-00007862

b. ERN00012914-00012927

8. I make this solemn declaration by virtue of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, conscientiously believing that the statements contained herein are true in every particular.

Thomas Lahun
Investigator for the Office of the Prosecutor
The Special Court for Sierra Leone

Declared at Freetown, )
this 11th day of July 2005, )
before me )
)

Peter Harrison
Office of the Prosecutor
Special Court for Sierra Leone

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person making a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court is liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

9240

# C.3

00015537-00015538

00015539-00015540

00015541-00015541

00015542-00015543

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE

# WITNESS STATEMENT

Family Name: Cuffey
First Name: George Kofa
Maiden Name:

[redacted]

Date_of_Interview[ 19th June 2005
Location_of_Interview[ Tankoro Police Station
Language_during_Interview[ English
Name_of_Investigator(s)[ Joseph Saffa and Jusu Yarmah
Other_Persons_Present[
Name_of_Interpreter[

Text of Witness Statement

*Witness was interview by Joseph Saffa and Jusu Yarmah on Sunday 19th June 2005 at the Tankoro Police Station Kono in respect of RUF Documents in possession of the Office of the Prosecutor.*

I am presently the Officer Commanding Gandorhun Police Station. Sometime in 2002 I was the source manager at the Special Branch Headquarters. On a date I cannot remember, I traveled with the Head of Special Branch and other Intelligent Officers to the provinces on a provincial tour. Whilst at Tankoro Police Station, the then Officer Commanding Special Branch in Kono Division, A.S.P. Aiah B. Ansumana showed us one old rice bag (white) full of documents and he explained to Mr. Jalloh that they were documents seized from the RUF interim leader's office in Kono. Then General Issa Hassan Sesay was the RUF interim Leader. The Head of Special Branch Mr. Jalloh then instructed me as source manager to take custody of the bag which I did. I took it to Freetown and kept it in the Source Manager's Office. I did not untie the bag not did I go through the content of the bag or documents. Some time in March 2004, I was transferred to

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Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE
**WITNESS STATEMENT**

Tongo and I handed the bag in the same form to my successor Sergeant 553 Bangura I.Z . That is all.

Prepared by: _Jusu Yarmah_____ Approved by:_____

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Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE
**WITNESS STATEMENT**

Family Name: **Ansumana**
First Name: **Aiah Bamba**
Maiden Name:

[redacted]
Date_of_Interview[ **20th June 2005**
Location_of_Interview[ **Tankoro Police Station**
Language_during_Interview[ **English**
Name_of_Investigator(s)[ **Jusu Yarmah**
Other_Persons_Present[
Name_of_Interpreter[

**Text of Witness Statement**

*Witness was interview by Jusu Yarmah on Monday 20th June 2005 at Kono in respect of RUF Documents handed to the Office of the Prosecutor.*

I am the operation Officer at the Special Branch Headquarters Freetown. Sometime in 2001, I was the Special Branch Officer in Kono. I was in a group of criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D) personnel led by the late Abu Mansaray from Tankoro Police Station who conducted a search at a premise at Koakoyima. The said premise was the Mines Office of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). One Alhaji Musa Kamara was in charged of the office as he was the RUF diamond valuator. During the search, we discovered documents pertaining to the RUF movement. I collected all the documents and placed them in an imported rice sack and took them to my office at Tankoro Police Station. I went through the documents and found out that they were useful documents and that they could be needed in the future. The documents were RUF documents mainly on RUF diamond mining activities. I tied the documents up in the sack and kept them in my Office. In early December 2001, the Head of Special Branch Mr. M.K. Jalloh

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Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE
**WITNESS STATEMENT**

(CSP) and the source manager then Mr. G.K Cuffey (ASP) came on a routine visit to Kono. I showed them the documents and they became interested. I gave them those documents and they took them along. Since then the documents have been in the custody of the Source Manager. Alhaji Musa Kamara was using the said office along side with other RUF officers. One such I remember was one Conteh who was working as Mines Monitoring Officer. That is all.

Prepared by: __Jusu Yarmah_____ Approved by:_____

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Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

# SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE

## WITNESS STATEMENT

Family Name: Poraj-Wilczynski

First Name: Joseph

Maiden Name:

[redacted]

Date_of_Interview[ 30th June 2005

Location_of_Interview[ OTP

Language_during_Interview[ English

Name_of_Investigator(s)[ Jusu Yarmah

Other_Persons_Present[

Name_of_Interpreter[

Text of Witness Statement

Early in 2005, I think it was February I was speaking with Mr. Philip King the Police Advisor on the Commonwealth Advisory team with the SLP. Mr. King said that at the SLP Special Branch Office there were some documents that originated from the RUF Headquarters in Makeni. He asked if the Special Court wanted them. I asked him to deliver them to the court so that they might be assessed. Next the documents were delivered by the SLP in two rice sacks. I handed the sacks over to Mr. Gilbert Morissette then the Deputy Chief of investigation serving in the Office of the Prosecutor.

On 30 June 2005 I was shown these documents by Jusu Yarmah and I recognized them (because many are marked as originating in the RUF H/Q in Makeni fact I noted at the time they were handed tome earlier this year as the documents transmitted to me by Mr. Philip King.

Prepared by: _Jusu Yarmah_____ Approved by:_____

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Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

**For Official Use Only**

# SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE

## WITNESS STATEMENT

Family Name: Bangura

First Name: Ibrahim Zidyankay

Maiden Name:

[redacted]

Date_of_Interview[ 13th June 2005

Location_of_Interview[ OTP

Language_during_Interview[ English

Name_of_Investigator(s)[ Jusu YARMAH

Other_Persons_Present[

Name_of_Interpreter[

Text of Witness Statement

*Witness was interview by Jusu Yarmah on Monday 13th June 2005 at the OTP in respect of RUF Documents handed to the Deputy Chief of Investigations.*

Witness said he is a police officer attached to the Source Management Unit at the Special Branch. He said some times in July 2003, he was posted to the Source Management Unit. He said when he went to the Office; he saw one old rice bag containing some documents. He said he didn't know the content then. Witness said he asked the then Source Manager, Inspector G.K Cuffey about how the bag came to be in the office. In reply witness said Inspector cuffey told him that the bag contained documents that the police got from a search conducted in the RUF Office at both Makeni and Kono. Mr. Cuffey according to the witness did not tell the date these searches were conducted into the RUF Office at both Makeni and Koidu. Witness said however Mr. Cuffey did not take any action on the documents. Witness said in the same month of July 2003, he was appointed to head the Source Management Unit. When he took over, the Witness said he suggested to the head of Special Branch Mr. M.K. Jalloh who told him to go through the bag and

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Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
FREETOWN • SIERRA LEONE
**WITNESS STATEMENT**

see if there was any one of security interest. Witness said as he was going through the documents, Mr. Philip King a British Police Consultant came into the office and he grew interest in the documents. The following day, Mr. Philip King instructed Witness to hand over the bag and its contents to him. On the approval of the head of Special Branch, Witness said he handed the whole bag and its content to Mr. Philip. Witness said he came with Mr. King to the Special Court gate together with the bag. Witness said Mr. King then took the bag from him, entered the court premises and handed the bag to Mr. Joe Poraj Wilcynk who works for the Special Court. Witness said the documents contained in the bag were many but that if he sees them he could remember some of them. Witness said he was not on the search when the documents were found. Witness said he could not tell how the documents came into bag, all he knows is that he found them in a rice bag and Mr. Cuffey told him that they got them from an exploitation in the RUF Offices at Makeni and Kono. Witness is requesting that he will want copies of these documents sent back to them to see those of security interest to the state. Having looked at the documents, Witness confirmed that they are the same documents that he handed to Mr. Philip King. Mr. Philip King was the Common Wealth Security Safety Project Special Branch Consultant/Adviser to the SLP.

Prepared by: _Jusu Yarmah_____ Approved by:_____

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Interviewee's Signature Eligible Witness

9218

# C.4

00015616-00015620

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

FREETOWN – SIERRA LEONE

**00015616**

## SOLEMN DECLARATION OF CORNELIA ADEKUMBI PATRICIA DAVIES

DECLARANT: CORNELIA ADEKUMBI PATRICIA DAVIES
DECLARED AT: FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE
DATE: 17 NOVEMBER 2005

On 17 November 2005, I, Cornelia Adekumbi Patricia Davies, employee of the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, Youyi Building, Freetown, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. During 1998 I worked for the Cabinet Secretariat in Freetown, Sierra Leone. About October 1998, I was attached to the Attorney General's Office as a stenographer.

2. As part of my duties at the Attorney General's Office, I transcribed an audio cassette recording that was played during the matter of *The State –v- Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh* at the High Court of Sierra Leone (hereinafter "**the Sankoh Trial**").

3. On 17 November 2005, Joseph Saffa, a senior investigator from the Office of the Prosecutor (hereinafter "**the OTP**"), Special Court for Sierra Leone, showed me a 2 page transcript marked by the OTP with the numbers "00009636" & "00009637" (hereinafter "**the transcript**").

Date: 17.11.05 17 November 2005
Declarant: Davies Witness:

4. Having been shown the transcript and after reviewing its content, I hereby state that this is the transcript I prepared as part of the Sankoh Trial in October 1998, which was admitted into evidence during the Sankoh Trial. Attached hereto and marked **"ANNEX CD1"** is a copy of the transcript.

5. On 17 November 2005, Joseph Saffa, also showed me a Maxwell ELN 90 audio cassette marked by the OTP "Original, T0000267" (hereinafter **"the audio cassette"**).

6. Having been shown the audio cassette and after listening to the recording on it, I hereby state that the audio cassette contains the same recording that was played during the Sankoh Trial and admitted as an exhibit in the Sankoh Trial. I was present at the High Court when this recording was played, the content of which I transcribed as set out in ANNEX CD1.

7. I make this solemn declaration by virtue of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, conscientiously believing that the statements contained herein are true and correct in every particular.

Cornelia Adekumbi Patricia Davies
Freetown, Sierra Leone

Declared at Freetown, )
This 17th day of November, 2005, )
before me )
)
)

Joseph Saffa
Senior Investigator
Office of the Prosecutor
Special Court Sierra Leone

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person who knowingly and wilfully makes a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court may be liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

9224

**ANNEX CD1**

00015618

Davies

Cornelia Adekumbi Patricia Davies
17 November 2005

00015619 ~~00009636~~ EXH. "C 1"

To all RUF Combatants: am writing it to all RUF Combatants, People's War Council of high command and all Combatants and the RUF. You know, the gallant and Field Commander of RUF. Your Leader Corporal Foday Sankoh and the RUF I am now instructing you to disregard all previous instructions and orders and stop all attacks and take defensive and don't go on the defensive. All, do not go on the offensive, I repeat, do not go on the offensive be on the defensive. All instructions, former instruction and operations should be cancelled. All Commanders should be on the defensive. At this moment you have to work with the brothers in Freetown, in the provinces and the entire army of the Sierra Leone Military Forces and allow working together to bring peace in Sierra Leone. They ask me to work with them so that peace could prevail to our beloved motherland. So I will like you all to work with them as brothers we are no more enemies. The Enemies are the Politicians not the Soldiers, presently. The Field Commander and all Commanders, you always get instructions from me through Major Koroma. They are our brothers let no one fool you. You have to work with them to put situation under control, especially in the Western Area. You the Field Commander instruct the other Commander **MINGO** to stand by for any reinforcement needed by Major Koroma for any eventuality. We have to defend our sovereignty. You are to act on these orders immediately. Do not delay and you will hear me over the media, BBC and VOA only support the present operation in Freetown. Thank you all. My absence in Sierra Leone is of the blessing of God. RUF; arms to the people; power to the people; and wealth of our people should be in the hands of the people. RUF, brave, strong, intelligent, Bai Bureh, Jagua, Kailondo you are the children, victory, grant to them. Lets keep the revolution with our brothers, peace be with you. I will join you very soon. I say again

this is your Leader and Commander-in-Chief of the RUF Corporal Foday Sankoh.

Thank you all

"This portion is being translated into English as it was in Creole"

My brothers, that is all I have to tell you. You should take great care, work with the brothers, I hope they will not disappoint you and disappoint the other ranks who stand behind them today. You know we stand for peace, this can be achieved. Thank you.

Davies

Transcribed by - Miss Cornelia Adekumbi Patricia Davies - Stenographer

9224

# C.5

00028335-00028338

00028754-00028755

00029356-00029357

9225

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**

**THE PROSECUTOR**

**Against**

06028335

Charles Ghankay Taylor

---

**SOLEMN DECLARATION of Phillip Ross**

---

I, Phillip Ross, of Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, do solemnly and sincerely declare the following:

1. That I am a member of the Cape Breton Regional Police Service, currently seconded to the Office of the Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and as such I have knowledge of the facts and matters hereinafter declared.

2. That on February 28th$^{th}$, 2007 I attended at the Temple of Justice, Monrovia Liberia and met with Sheriff Fofia Kamara who provided me access to the Evidence Room located at the Temple of Justice in order to photograph the area and manner in which exhibits seized under warrant in March of 2004 from White Flower were stored.

3. That on Wednesday February 28$^{th}$, 2007 I obtained digital photos of Sheriff Fofie Kamara standing in the exhibit locker, pointing specifically to a (not plugged in) deep freezer located in a corner of the room. Sheriff Kamara also removed a clump of wet, paper, from within the said freezer, destroyed beyond recognition, and allowed me to photograph it, confirming that some unknown quantities of documents were damaged by water.

¼ P.K

4. That I downloaded these pictures from my digital camera to my computer, pasted them, 2 on a page adding a written narrative to each picture, and printed them in color, signing and dating each photo prior to entering them into evidence.

5. I make this solemn declaration by virtue of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, conscientiously believing that the statements contained herein are true in every particular.

Declared before me at Freetown, )
Sierra Leone on the 1st day )
of March, 2007.

Office of the Prosecutor
Special Court for Sierra Leone

Phillip Ross 07/03/05
Phillip Ross

00028336

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person making a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court is liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

9227

00025337



07/03/15

Photo showing **Sheriff Fofia Kamara** pointing to the non - operational deep freezer in the evidence locker in which the exhibits were stored.



07/03/15

Photo showing **Sheriff Fofia Kamara** next to the deep freezer.


3/4 RS

00028338



07/02/05

Photo showing **Sheriff Fofia Kamara** pointing to some of the many pieces of damaged documents found at the bottom of the deep freezer.



07/02/05

Photo showing a piece of water damaged cardboard and papers removed from the deep freezer.

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**

**THE PROSECUTOR**

**00028754**

**Against**

**CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR**

CASE NO. SCSL–2003-01

---

## SOLEMN DECLARATION OF RUTH MARY HACKLER

---

I, Ruth Mary Hackler, of Arlington, Texas, United States, do solemnly and sincerely declare the following:

1. That I am a contractor with the Office of the Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and as such, went to Monrovia, Liberia on February 27, 2007.

2. That on February 28, 2007, I accompanied OTP investigators Phillip Ross, Christopher Morris, Magnus Lamin, and Joseph Saffa to the Temple of Justice in Monrovia, Liberia. We met with Sheriff Fofie Kamara, who gave us access to the documents and materials seized under warrant in March 2004 from White Flower and The Executive Mansion.

3. That on February 28, 2007, I used my digital camera to take photos of those documents and materials which we determined were relevant from amongst the items seized. Christopher Morris also took pictures of the relevant items using his digital camera and mine.

4. That I watched Christopher Morris download the photographs from my camera into his computer on March 2, 2007 and that he gave me a complete electronic copy of all pictures taken on February 28, 2007, both from my camera and his.

5. That on February 28, 2007, I photocopied documents that we determined were relevant from the seized items. Some of the documents that were photocopied were not photographed, and some of the documents that were photographed were not photocopied. However, I made two complete sets of everything I photocopied. The photocopies were made at the UNMIL offices under the supervision of Liberian National Police Captain Sumo, who accompanied us from the Temple of Justice to the UNMIL offices and back.

6. That upon returning to the Temple of Justice from the UNMIL offices, we gave one set of the photocopies to County Counselor Jacobs to retain at the Temple of Justice as a record of what we copied. All of the original seized items were returned to Sheriff Kamara at approximately 6:45 p.m. on February 28, 2007.

7. I make this solemn declaration by virtue of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, conscientiously believing that the statements contained herein are true in every particular.

Ruth Mary Hackler
Consultant

Declared in Freetown, Sierra Leone )
this 26th day of March, 2007 )
before me )
)

Office of the ~~Prosecutor~~
Special Court for Sierra Leone
WENDY VAN TONGEREN
TRIAL ATTORNEY

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person making a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court is liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

9231

00029356

# Office of the sheriff

***Temple Justice***
***MONROVIA***

February 28, 2007

To: Whom It May Concern:

**IN RE:** *Exhibits seized from white flower in March of 2004.*

The Exhibits that were seized from White Flower under a Writ of search and seizure warrant No. 826 in March of 2004 were stored in the warehouse of the Monrovia City Court, Temple of Justice Building, Monrovia, Liberia from March of 2004 until July of 2006 at which time the exhibits were accessed to be examined by the special court for Sierra Leone. At the time, it was discovered that a portion of the said exhibits were destroyed by water, etc.

The remaining exhibits were removed from the warehouse and stored in a secured area at the rear of the court room and locked up by the sheriff, Capt. Fofie V. Kamara.

No person /s have had asset to these exhibits other than the Special Court for Sierra Leone from March 2004 until today February 28, 2007.

Respectfully submitted,

Capt. Fofie V. Kamara
***SHERIFF***

MONROVIA CITY COURT
TEMPLE OF JUSTICE
REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

9282

00029357

**DECLARATION OF CUSTODY**

This statement certifies that the documents that were seized from Whiteflower in March 2004 and were thereafter stored in the Temple of Justice, Monrovia, Liberia, were taken from the Temple of Justice by personnel from the Special Court for Sierra Leone on February 28, 2007 to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) offices for purposes of copying. County Counselor Jacobs gave his permission for this process. Sheriff Fofia Kamara, who was in charge of the evidence, assigned Captain Sumo of the Liberian National Police to accompany the SCSL personnel to the UNMIL offices and to ensure that no documents were altered or compromised in any way.

Captain Sumo oversaw the photocopying done by Ruth Mary Hackler of the SCSL and certifies that two sets of copies were made of the documents selected by SCSL personnel. One set of copies was kept by the SCSL to take back to Freetown. The second set of copies was given to County Counselor Jacobs to maintain at the Temple of Justice. The originals were returned to Sheriff Fofia Kamara at approximately 6:45 p.m. on February 28, 2007 at the Temple of Justice.

This statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

Capt. Sumo
Captain Sumo, Liberian National Police

Sheriff Fofia Kamara

9233

# C.6

00029780-00029780

00029781-00029783

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00029780

May 21, 2005

To whom it may concern,

The attached letter from Sierra Leone RUF Leader Foday Sankoh to Liberian leader Charles Taylor was given to me in late 2000 while I was in Freetown, Sierra Leone on business.

The letter was given to me by a gentleman named John Benjamin who was a local business leader and later became a government official in the Kabbah Administration.

I was told by Mr. Benjamin that he received the letter from someone who went to Foday Sankoh's compound in Freetown, Sierra Leone after it was abandoned by Sankoh. This was sometime after May 8, 2000 when Sankoh's gunmen opened fire on a crowd of protesters outside his compound.

Sankoh later escaped into the hills outside of Freetown and left many documents in his residence. I was told by John Benjamin that this document was retrieved by a friend of his. John Benjamin gave me the document and asked that I try and do what I can to get it "in the hands of the right people."

In May of this year, I posted a short column and PDF file of the original letter on a news and commentary site at www.techcentralstation.com. I was then contacted by a special investigator at the United Nations asking for a copy of the letter which I am enclosing.

I contacted the UN War Crimes Tribunal on one other occasion in approximately 2001/2002 and offered the letter as evidence but was never contacted again.

Sincerely,

William Coles Hudgins
3617 Legation St. NW
Washington, DC 20015

District of Columbia : SS
Subscribed and Sworn to before me
this 24 day of May, 2006
Ruth M Schultz
Notary Public, D.C.

My commission expires

Ruth M. Schultz
Notary Public, District of Columbia
My Commission Expires 5/14/2011

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
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# SOLEMN DECLARATION OF TARIQ MALIK

Declarant: TARIQ MALIK
Declared At: FREETOWN
Date: 30 MARCH 2007

00029781

I, Tariq Malik, do solemnly and sincerely declare to the best of my knowledge and belief as follows:

1. I have been employed as Chief, Evidence Unit in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the Special Court for Sierra Leone since 28 April 2003.

2. On 13 June 2006, Ms. Harpinder Athwal, then employed at the Special Court for Sierra Leone as the Special Assistant to the Prosecutor, deposited an artifact in the Evidence Unit which comprised of a signed document dated 05 May 1992, purporting to be a letter written by Sankoh of RUF to Charles Taylor, encased in a brown glass frame. This artifact has remained in possession of the Evidence Unit from 13 June 2006 to this date.

3. Accompanying this framed document was a one page affidavit from Mr. Williams Coles Hudgins, dated 21 May 2005 and sworn before a Notary Public on 24 May 2006. The affidavit provides information as to how Mr. Hudgins came into possession of the document inside the frame. This affidavit has been entered into the Evidence Unit and stamped the Evidence Register Number (ERN) 00029780.

4. The glass face of the framed artifact showed the front side of a double-sided single page signed original document set against an off-white matting board. It was evident that the back side of the document contained some handwritten text but the casing of the frame prevented one from being able to turn over the page and read it.

5. The rear side of the framed artifact was sealed with a brown sheet of paper. Affixed to the brown sheet of paper with scotch tape was a handwritten document titled "Proclamation for Kono Dist.". This appeared to be a facsimile of the back side of the document inside the frame and was apparently affixed to the rear side of the frame in order to show the handwritten text which otherwise could not be seen without dismantling the frame (see paragraph 4 above). I made a further copy of the facsimile found affixed to the rare of the frame and the Evidence Unit stamped ERN 00029779 on the copy.

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6. On 13 March 2007, I dismantled the frame and removed the enclosed document from its casing. The document was affixed to the off-white matting board using three pieces of double-sided adhesive tape. It is impossible to separate the document from the matting without tearing or damaging parts of the document. Because of the manner in which the document is glued to, and set on the matting board, it is not possible to copy or scan either the front or the back side of the document.

7. In the period since the back side of the document was affixed to the matting, the adhesive tape has 'bled' through from the back to the front of the document, which has resulted in there being three rectangular-shaped patches visible near the top part of the front page of the document.

8. Due to the back side of the original document being permanently affixed to the matting (see paragraph 6 above), it cannot be viewed in its entirety. However, approximately three-quarters or more of the rear side of the document is visible. I have compared the facsimile document bearing ERN 00029779 (see paragraph 5 above) to the back side of the original signed document. I have determined that ERN 00029779 is a true copy of the back side of the original document found inside the frame.

9. On 09 March 2007, Ms. Ruth Mary Hackler, a consultant employed by the OTP, forwarded an e-mail to me which related to the abovementioned framed document. This e-mail was sent on 30 March 2006 by John Petrie, a former staff member of the OTP, to John Berry, presently employed as Investigations Commander in the Office of the Prosecutor, and contained an attached document named 'sankoh_letter.pdf'.

10. On 27 March 2007, I opened and printed the document named 'sankoh_letter.pdf'. The Evidence Unit stamped ERN 00029778 on the printout of 'sankoh_letter.pdf'.

11. I have compared ERN 00029778 (printout of 'sankoh_letter.pdf') with the front side of the original document found enclosed within the framed artifact and determined that, with the exception of the three rectangular-shaped adhesive patches (see paragraph 7 above), 00029778 is a true copy of the front side of the original document inside the frame.

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12. It is my determination that the two pages entered in the Evidence Unit and assigned ERN 00029778-00029779, represent true and accurate copies of both sides of the original document contained in the glass framed artifact brought to the Evidence Unit by Ms. Harpinder Athwal on 13/06/2006.

Tariq Malik
Chief, Evidence Unit

Declared at Freetown, )
This 30th Day of March, 2007 )
before me )
)

Peter Harrison
Office of the Prosecutor
Special Court Sierra Leone

Note: Pursuant to Rule 91 of the *Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone* a person making a false statement in a written statement which the person knows, or has reason to know, may be used in evidence in proceedings before the Special Court is liable to a maximum penalty of 2 million Leones or a term of imprisonment of 2 years, or both.

**PUBLIC**

**PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF MATERIAL PURSUANT TO RULES 89(C) AND 92 *BIS***

Media List

| EXH. # | ERN |
|---|---|
| 1.130 | D0000062 |
| 1.224 | V0000048 |
| 1.338 | D0000046 |
| 1.339 | T0000267 |