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SCSL-03-01-T
(12869-13021)


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**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
Freetown – Sierra Leone**

Before: Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate Judge

Registrar: Mr. Herman von Hebel

Date filed: 13 December 2007



THE PROSECUTOR

Against

Charles Ghankay Taylor

Case No. SCSL-03-01-T

**PUBLIC, WITH CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX D
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO VARY THE WITNESS LIST & TO DISCLOSE STATEMENTS OF
ADDITIONAL WITNESSES**

Office of the Prosecutor:
Ms. Brenda J. Hollis
Mr. Nicholas Koumjian
Ms. Leigh Lawrie

Defence Counsel for Charles Taylor:
Mr. Courtenay Griffiths Q.C.
Mr. Andrew Cayley
Mr. Terry Munyard

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 4 April 2007 the Prosecution filed its "Rule 73bis Pre-Trial Conference Materials" which included *inter alia* a list of witnesses the Prosecution intends to call ("**Witness List**") and a summary of the expected testimony of each witness.¹ The Witness List identified 204 factual witnesses: 139 Core witnesses and 65 Back-up witnesses. The number of factual *viva voce* witnesses numbered 64.²
2. On 6 November 2007 the Prosecution filed a "Notification of Amended Prosecution Witness List" ("**Notice**")³ which included an alternative argument that there was "good cause" for the variations to the Witness List and that the variations were in the "interests of justice", meeting the requirements of Rules 66(A)(ii) and 73bis(E), and, therefore, requested leave to amend the Witness List and an order to disclose the statements of the additional witnesses to the Defence.⁴
3. On 7 December 2007 the Trial Chamber ordered that the Prosecution comply with Rules 66(A)(ii), 73bis(E) and 73(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("**Rules**") if it wishes to disclose additional witness statements and amend its witness list.⁵
4. Pursuant to Rules 66(A)(ii), 73(A) and 73bis(B) and (E), the Prosecution seeks: (i) leave to vary the Witness List as set out in paragraph 5 below; and (ii) an order authorising the disclosure of the statements of the witnesses the Prosecution proposes to add to the Witness List.

II. VARIATION OF THE WITNESS LIST & DISCLOSURE OF STATEMENTS OF ADDITIONAL WITNESSES

5. The Prosecution seeks to vary the Witness List as follows:
 - (i) delete 17 witnesses from its Witness List;⁶

¹ *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-PT-218, "Public Rule 73 bis Pre-Trial Conference Materials", 4 April 2007.

² 8 Core Rule 92 bis/Viva Voce Witnesses + 45 Core Linkage + 11 Core Crime Base = 64.

³ *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-T-357, "Public, with Confidential Annex D, Notification of Amended Prosecution Witness List", 6 November 2007.

⁴ Notice, paras. 9-21 & 24.

⁵ *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-T-367, "Order Pursuant to Rule 54 of Prosecution's Notification of Amended Prosecution Witness List", 7 December 2007.

⁶ TF1-020, TF1-042, TF1-044, TF1-093, TF1-119, TF1-180, TF1-193, TF1-235, TF1-251, TF1-280, TF1-336, TF1-510, TF1-518, TF1-546, TF1-558, TF1-560, TF1-570.

- (ii) move 7 witnesses from the Core Witness List and add them to the Back-up Witness List;⁷
 - (iii) move 6 witnesses from the Back-up Witness List to the Core Witness List;⁸
 - (iv) add the following 11 witnesses to the Core Witness List: Stephen Smith, TF1-024, TF1-556, TF1-571, TF1-575, TF1-577, TF1-579, TF1-584, TF1-585, TF1-590, TF1-597 (**“Proposed Additional Witnesses”**); and
 - (v) identify TF1-028, TF1-035, TF1-143 and TF1-215 as witnesses who will give evidence *viva voce* rather than under Rule 92bis.
6. If leave to vary the Witness List is granted, the Prosecution seeks an order authorising the disclosure of the statements of the new witnesses to the Defence and seeks leave to file with the Court the amended witness list set out in Annex A to this motion which documents the requested variations (**“Amended Witness List”**). For completeness, the Amended Witness List identifies TF1-326 as a core factual overview witness rather than an expert, a change in status of which the Court was previously informed.⁹
7. The Amended Witness List identifies 200 factual witnesses: 137 Core witnesses and 63 Back-up witnesses. The number of Core factual *viva voce* witnesses is now 64, including TF1-326.
8. Annex B to this motion provides summaries in the form required by Rule 73bis(B)(iv) and include *inter alia* a summary of the facts and points in the Second Amended Indictment to which each Proposed Additional Witness will testify.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

9. Rule 73bis(E) governs requests to vary the witness list and provides that:

(E) After the commencement of the Trial, the Prosecutor may, if he considers it to be in the interests of justice, move the Trial Chamber ... to vary his decision as to which witnesses are to be called.

10. In relation to the disclosure of the statements of proposed additional

⁷ TF1-376, TF1-397, TF1-413, TF1-414, TF1-540, TF1-554, TF1-565.

⁸ TF1-065, TF1-076, TF1-157, TF1-158, TF1-278, TF1-555.

⁹ *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-PT-281, “Public Prosecution Notification of Change in Witness Status Pursuant to Rule 73bis(B)(iv)”, 8 June 2007.

Prosecution witnesses, Rule 66(A)(ii) provides that the Prosecution shall:

- (ii) Continuously disclose to the Defence copies of the statements of all additional prosecution witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify, but not later than 60 days before the date for trial, or as otherwise ordered by a Judge of the Trial Chamber either before or after the commencement of the trial, upon good cause being shown by the Prosecution. ...

IV. GOOD CAUSE & INTERESTS OF JUSTICE

11. In considering requests by the Prosecution to vary its witness list, the Trial Chambers of the Special Court, consistent with the practice of the ICTR, have generally considered the requirements of “*good cause*” and “*in the interests of justice*” together. This practice stems from the fact that such requests generally concerned requests to add witnesses, thus triggering the provisions of Rule 66(A)(ii) in addition to those of Rule 73bis(E). Rule 66(A)(ii) does not stipulate what amounts to “*good cause*” and Rule 73bis(E) does not stipulate what amounts to “*the interests of justice*”. However, when interpreting the provisions of Rule 66(A)(ii) together with Rule 73bis(E), this Trial Chamber has noted that guidance may be taken from the principles laid down in the ICTR case of *Nahimana*¹⁰. In the *Nahimana* Decision, the Trial Chamber noted that:

In assessing the “interests of justice” and “good cause” Chambers have taken into account such considerations as the materiality of the testimony, the complexity of the case, prejudice to the Defence, including elements of surprise, on-going investigations, replacements and corroboration of evidence. The Prosecution’s duty under the Statute to present the best available evidence to prove its case has to be balanced against the right of the Accused to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his Defence and his right to be tried without undue delay.¹¹

12. Further, both Trial Chambers¹² have noted with approval the observations

¹⁰ *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.*, SCSL-04-16-T-365, “Decision on Prosecution request for Leave to Call an Additional Witness (Zainab Hawa Bangura) Pursuant to Rule 73bis(E) and on Joint Defence Notice to Inform the Trial Chamber of its Position vis-à-vis the Proposed Expert Witness (Mrs. Bangura) Pursuant to Rule 94bis”, 5 August 2005, para. 21 (“*Brima Decision*”).

¹¹ *Prosecutor v. Nahimana*, ICTR-99-52-I, “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Oral Motion for Leave to Amend the List of Selected Witnesses”, Trial Chamber, 26 June 2001, para. 20 (“*Nahimana Decision*”).

¹² *Prosecutor v. Norman et al.*, SCSL-04-14-T-167, “Decision on Prosecution request for Leave to Call Additional Witnesses”, 29 July 2004, para. 17 (“*Norman Decision*”); *Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.*, SCSL-04-15-T-320, “Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Call Additional Witnesses and Disclose

made in the ICTR case of *Bagosora*¹³ which expand on the factors required to give rise to a showing of “good cause” and “interests of justice” identified in the *Nahimana* Decision:

These considerations require a close analysis of each witness, including the sufficiency and time of disclosure of witness information to the Defence; the probative value of the proposed testimony in relation to existing witnesses and allegations in the indictments; the ability of the Defence to make an effective cross-examination of the proposed testimony, given its novelty or other factors; and the justification offered by the Prosecution for the addition of the witness.¹⁴

13. On the basis of the foregoing and in relation to adding witnesses to the witness list, this Trial Chamber has determined that “the requirement to illustrate “good cause” and “the interests of justice” connotes a responsibility upon the Prosecution to advance credible reasons or justification for failing to disclose to the Defence the existence of ... potential Prosecution witness[es] and to disclose [their statements] within the timeframes prescribed under Rule 66(A)(ii)”.¹⁵ The Trial Chamber concluded that in assessing “good cause” and “interests of justice”, “the Prosecution must establish to the satisfaction of the Trial Chamber the following:

- (i) that the reasons or explanation advanced by the Prosecution are directly related and are material to the facts in issue;
- (ii) that the facts to be provided by [the prospective witnesses in their statements and eventually in their testimony], are relevant to determining the issues in the [current trial] and would contribute to serving and fostering the overall interests of the law and justice;
- (iii) that granting, at this stage, leave to call new witnesses and the disclosure of ... new statement[s], will not unfairly prejudice the right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial as guaranteed by Article 17(4)(a) and (b) of the Statute as well as Rule 26bis of the Rules; and
- (iv) that the evidence the Prosecution is now seeking to call, could not have been discovered or made available at a point earlier in time, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence on their part.”¹⁶

14. The above criteria must, as noted by the Trial Chamber in the AFRC case and

Additional Witness Statements”, 11 February 2005, para. 26 (“*Sesay Decision*”); *Brima* Decision, para. 22.

¹³ *Prosecutor v. Bagosora*, ICTR-98-41-T, “Decision on Prosecution Motion for Addition of Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 73bis(E), 26 June 2003 (“*Bagosora Decision*”).

¹⁴ *Bagosora* Decision, para. 14.

¹⁵ *Brima* Decision, para. 28.

¹⁶ *Brima* Decision at para. 28, applying the four criteria identified in the *Sesay* Decision at para. 35 by Trial Chamber I when considering what was meant by the standard “upon good cause being shown”.

by the ICTR Trial Chambers, be considered in the context of the obligation to balance the Prosecution's duty under the Statute to present the best available evidence against the right of the Accused to be tried without undue delay and to be given adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence.¹⁷

15. In this context, the four criteria identified above can be distilled into three principal requirements regarding the Prosecution's request to add witnesses, that there has been no undue delay;¹⁸ that the request does not unfairly prejudice the rights of the Accused and that the testimony of the Proposed Additional Witnesses is relevant and material to the charges in the Second Amended Indictment.
16. In relation to the other requested variations to the Witness List governed by Rule 73bis(E), the Prosecution notes the observations referred to in the *Nahimana* Decision that "the term 'interests of justice' ... refers to a discretionary standard applicable in determining a matter given the particularity of the case."¹⁹

V. NO UNDUE DELAY

17. As stated in previous filings, there has been a seven month interruption in current proceedings. During this time, witnesses, including vulnerable victims, who had indicated their willingness to testify have now determined they will be unable to do so, necessitating replacement evidence. Also, during this period of delay, the Prosecution has not been dormant but rather has worked to fulfil its recognised "duty ... to present the best available evidence to prove its case".²⁰ This duty to continue to investigate and to evaluate evidence led to the discovery of additional evidence and further evaluation and refinement of the Prosecution case. As a result of that review, the determination was made that some of the previously listed witnesses did not provide the best available evidence. An integral part of this ongoing process was additional critical assessment of the Witness List and the proposed variations thereto. The ultimate result is that the Prosecution's proposed variations will provide the best available evidence, which will better allow the

¹⁷ *Brima* Decision, para. 28; *Nahimana* Decision, para. 20; and *Bagosora* Decision, para. 13.

¹⁸ Points (i) and (iv) concern issues of timing.

¹⁹ *Nahimana* Decision, para. 19, which was cited with approval in the *Bagosora* Decision, para. 13.

²⁰ *Nahimana* Decision, para. 20.

Trial Chamber to determine the truth of the charges.

18. The Prosecution has worked diligently at all times to discharge its obligations. Notwithstanding this fact and consistent with the resources available to the Prosecution within the context of the overall OTP obligations, the Prosecution was unable to complete the interviews of TF1-556, TF1-571, TF1-575, TF1-577 until after 4 April 2007. Thus, the Prosecution could not accurately assess their potential significance to the case until after that date. In relation to TF1-024, the relevance and materiality of this witness' evidence was noted during the Prosecution's overall critical evidence review when it was determined that the presentation of this witness' evidence would ensure that the best available evidence is put before this Chamber. As for the remainder of the additional witnesses, their identities, and/or significance of the evidence in the context of the other available evidence only became known to the Prosecution after 4 April 2007, during the ongoing investigation and evaluation of the Prosecution evidence. In addition, the Prosecution was unable to gather evidence from TF1-585 and TF1-597 until after the 6 November submission.²¹
19. For the foregoing reasons, the Prosecution could not have made a reasoned and informed decision to add the Proposed Additional Witnesses prior to 4 April 2007, nor to make the other proposed variations to the Witness List. Indeed, the Prosecution could not have made such decisions regarding the proposed variations until its additional review of all the witness evidence was substantially completed, which occurred in early November 2007.
20. In regard to the "good cause" standard the Prosecution must meet, the Chamber in *Nahimana* noted that "the purpose of Rule 66 is to give the Defence sufficient notice and adequate time and, at the same time, to ensure that relevant Prosecution evidence is not excluded merely on procedural grounds."²² The requested variation of the Witness List and disclosure of the statements of additional witnesses achieves that purpose.

VI. RELEVANT EVIDENCE

21. The testimony of the Proposed Additional Witnesses is relevant to the issues

²¹ TF1-585 was first interviewed on 27 November 2007 and TF1-597 was first interviewed on 13 November 2007.

²² *Ibid*, para. 18.

in this complex case. The summary of the facts and points in the Second Amended Indictment to which the Proposed Additional Witnesses will testify are set out in Annex B and demonstrate the relevance of each witness' evidence.

22. As can be seen from the summaries, the additional witnesses each have a perspective and knowledge which will assist the Court in its truth-seeking function by ensuring that the best available evidence is presented. Should the Trial Chamber require additional information, attached at Annexes C and D are the statements and proffers for the additional witnesses. Annex C contains the statement and related material for Stephen Smith. The proffers in Annex D are filed confidentially to give effect to the existing protective measures to which TF1-556²³, TF1-571, TF1-575, TF1-577, TF1-579, TF1-584 and TF1-590²⁴ are subject and to protect identifying information concerning TF1-585 and TF1-597 in respect of whom protective measures are being sought. As TF1-024 has already testified before this Trial Chamber and disclosure has already been made to the Defence in May last year, the statements and transcripts of this witness are not included in the Annexes. The highly relevant testimony of these witnesses will contribute to serving and fostering the overall interest of the law and justice.

VII. NO UNFAIR PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENCE

23. In view of the current stage in proceedings, a variation to the Witness List including the addition of witnesses will not cause unfair prejudice to the Defence. Unfair prejudice would only be suffered if the Defence were given insufficient time to prepare²⁵ or if the trial were unduly delayed.²⁶
24. The disclosure of materials relating to the proposed new witnesses and the variation in the Witness List will be undertaken in a timely fashion and well in advance of the commencement of the presentation of Prosecution evidence.

²³ TF1-556 is the subject of existing protective measures which were granted in *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-1-PT-163, "Decision On Confidential Prosecution Motion For Immediate Protective Measures For Witnesses And For Non-Public Disclosure with four Annexes, One Of Which Filed *Ex-Parte*", 22 January 2007.

²⁴ *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-1-T-368, "Decision On Confidential Urgent Prosecution Motion For Immediate Protective Measures For Witnesses And For Non-Public Disclosure", 7 December 2007.

²⁵ Insufficient time being a breach of the Accused's rights set out in Article 17(4)(b) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

²⁶ The Accused has the right to be tried fairly and expeditiously under Rule 26bis.

- The Defence has been on notice of the Prosecution's intention to amend the Witness List since 6 November 2007²⁷ and in possession of the relevant and related material for nine (9) of the Proposed Additional Witnesses for some two months prior to the commencement of the presentation of evidence.²⁸ The mechanisms in the Rules designed to prevent unfair prejudice, indicate that a period of at least 60 days provide adequate time to prepare.²⁹ The Defence has been given a period in excess of 60 days as: (i) the Defence was put on notice of the evidence nine (9) of the witnesses would provide on 6 November 2007; and (ii) the summaries required by Rule 73bis(B)(iv) for nine (9) of the witnesses were provided in the Notice and are again set out in Annex B.³⁰
25. In addition, it is anticipated that only one (1) of the Proposed Additional Witnesses, TF1-556, will testify during the first trial session but that this testimony would not be given until mid-February at the earliest. TF1-556 was one of the nine (9) included in the 6 November 2007 Notice. The remaining Proposed Additional Witnesses will not be called during the first trial session. This gives the Defence, therefore, over two months to prepare for one (1) new witness and additional months to prepare for the remainder. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Trial Chamber considers that the Defence need additional time to prepare for any particular witness, the Trial Chamber may order that the testimony of the relevant witness(es) be heard later in the Prosecution case.
 26. As the Defence will be given adequate time to prepare as set out in the preceding paragraphs, the Defence will not be prejudiced by the addition of 11 witnesses.
 27. Further, to be balanced against the inclusion of the additional witnesses is the Prosecution's request to delete 17 witnesses from its Witness List. This refinement to the Prosecution's case further indicates that the addition of the new witnesses and the variation of the Witness List will not be prejudicial to the Defence nor prolong the anticipated time needed to present the

²⁷ *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, SCSL-03-01-357, "Public, with Confidential Annex D Notification of Amended Prosecution Witness List", 6 November 2007.

²⁸ On 6 November 2007, in relation to 9 of the Proposed Additional Witnesses, the Prosecution provided the Court with: (i) the actual witness material for Smith (Annex C) and TF1-556 (Annex D); (ii) notice that all the material for TF1-024 had been provided to the Defence on 17 May 2006; and (iii) proffers for TF1-571, TF1-575, TF1-577, TF1-579, TF1-584 and TF1-590.

²⁹ See Rule 66(A)(ii).

³⁰ These summaries were also provided to the Defence on 6 November 2007 as Annex B of the Notice.

Prosecution's case.


VIII. OTHER VARIATIONS TO THE WITNESS LIST

28. As noted above, variations other than additions to the Witness List are subject to a discretionary standard. The variations concern movements between the Back-up and Core Witness Lists and determinations regarding the presentation of witness evidence. The Prosecution has carefully considered how it wishes to present its case in order to discharge its burden of proof. The discretionary standard to be applied should therefore be construed in favour of the Prosecution's determination.

IX. CONCLUSION

29. The Prosecution submits that the requested variations to the Witness List strike the correct balance between the rights of the Accused with the duties of the Prosecution, are "in the interests of justice" and should be granted. These variations ensure that any evidence necessary to ascertain the truth will be presented subject to the principle that the accused has the right to trial without undue delay.³¹ Further, the Prosecution has shown "good cause" for disclosure of the statements of the Proposed Additional Witnesses to be made to the Defence, subject to the appropriate protective measures orders.
30. The Prosecution respectfully requests that the Trial Chamber:
- (i) grant leave to vary the Witness List as set out in paragraph 5 above;
 - (ii) issue an order authorising the disclosure of the statements of the Proposed Additional Witnesses subject to the appropriate protective measures orders and, in respect of TF1-585 and TF1-597, following receipt, and in accordance with, the decision on the pending request for such measures; and
 - (iii) permit the Prosecution to file with the Court the Amended Witness List.

Filed in The Hague, 13 December 2007
For the Prosecution


Brenda J. Hollis
Senior Trial Attorney

³¹ *Nahimana* Decision, para. 17.

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

SCSL

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-1-PT-163, "Decision On Confidential Prosecution Motion For Immediate Protective Measures For Witnesses And For Non-Public Disclosure with four Annexes, One Of Which Filed *Ex-Parte*", 22 January 2007

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-218, "Public Rule 73bis Pre-Trial Conference Materials", 4 April 2007

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-281, "Public Prosecution Notification of Change in Witness Status Pursuant to Rule 73bis(B)(iv)", 8 June 2007

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-357, "Public, with Confidential Annex D, Notification of Amended Prosecution Witness List", 6 November 2007

Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-367, "Order Pursuant to Rule 54 of Prosecution's Notification of Amended Prosecution Witness List", 7 December 2007

Prosecutor v. Norman et al., SCSL-04-14-T

Prosecutor v. Norman et al., SCSL-04-14-T-167, "Decision on Prosecution request for Leave to Call Additional Witnesses", 29 July 2004

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., SCSL-04-15-T

Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., SCSL-04-15-T-320, "Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Call Additional Witnesses and Disclose Additional Witness Statements", 11 February 2005

Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-04-16-T

Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-04-16-T-365, "Decision on Prosecution request for Leave to Call an Additional Witness (Zainab Hawa Bangura) Pursuant to Rule 73bis(E) and on Joint Defence Notice to Inform the Trial Chamber of its Position vis-à-vis the Proposed Expert Witness (Mrs. Bangura) Pursuant to Rule 94bis", 5 August 2005

ICTR

Prosecutor v. Nahimana, ICTR-99-52-I, "Decision on the Prosecutor's Oral Motion for Leave to Amend the List of Selected Witnesses", Trial Chamber, 26 June 2001
<http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Nahimana/decisions/260601.htm>

Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-T, "Decision on Prosecution Motion for Addition of Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 73bis(E)", 26 June 2003
<http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Bagosora/decisions/260603.pdf>

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ANNEX A
AMENDED WITNESS LIST



SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

**AMENDED WITNESS LIST
DECEMBER 2007**

AMENDED CORE WITNESS LISTS – LINKAGE & CRIME BASE

1. Amended Core List: Predominantly Linkage Witnesses

Core Predominantly Linkage Witnesses			
	TF Number	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-033	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
2.	TF1-036	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
3.	TF1-041	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
4.	TF1-045	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
5.	TF1-046	Live	Yes
6.	TF1-071	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
7.	TF1-139 ¹	Live	Yes
8.	TF1-151	Live	Yes
9.	TF1-167	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> + live	Yes
10.	TF1-168	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> + live	Yes
11.	TF1-184	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
12.	TF1-274	Live	Yes
13.	TF1-275	Live	Yes
14.	TF1-276	Live	Yes
15.	TF1-334	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> + live	Yes
16.	TF1-337	Live	Yes
17.	TF1-338	Live	Yes
18.	TF1-352	Live	Yes
19.	TF1-355	Live	Yes
20.	TF1-360	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> + live	Yes
21.	TF1-362	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> + live	Yes
22.	TF1-366	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> + live	Yes
23.	TF1-367	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> + live	No
24.	TF1-371	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> + live	Yes
25.	TF1-374	Live	No
26.	TF1-375	Live	Yes
27.	TF1-377	Live	No
28.	TF1-385	Live	No

¹ Also to be considered a factual overview witness.



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Core Predominantly Linkage Witnesses

	TF Number	Rule 92 bis / Live	Rule 93
29.	TF1-388	Live	Yes
30.	TF1-390	Live	No
31.	TF1-395	Live	Yes
32.	TF1-399	Live	Yes
33.	TF1-401	Live	Yes
34.	TF1-406	Live	Yes
35.	TF1-481	Live	No
36.	TF1-515	Live	Yes
37.	TF1-516	Live	Yes
38.	TF1-521	Live	No
39.	TF1-532	Live	Yes
40.	TF1-539	Live	No
41.	TF1-542	Live	Yes
42.	TF1-547	Live	Yes
43.	TF1-548	Live	Yes
44.	TF1-555	Live	Yes
45.	TF1-556	Live	Yes
46.	TF1-561	Live	Yes
47.	TF1-566	Live	Yes
48.	TF1-567	Live	Yes
49.	TF1-568	Live	No
50.	TF1-571	Live	Yes
51.	TF1-572	Live	Yes
52.	TF1-575	Live	Yes
53.	TF1-577	Live	Yes
54.	TF1-579	Live	Yes
55.	TF1-584	Live	Yes
56.	TF1-585	Live	Yes
57.	TF1-590	Live	Yes
58.	TF1-597	Live	Yes
59.	Stephen Smith	Live	Yes



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**2. Former Core Predominantly Linkage Witnesses: Moved to Back-up
(see table 6 below)**

	TF Number	Rule 92 bis / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-376	Live	Yes
2.	TF1-397	Live	Yes
3.	TF1-413	Live	No
4.	TF1-414	Live	Yes
5.	TF1-540	Live	Yes
6.	TF1-554	Live	Yes
7.	TF1-565	Live	Yes

3. Former Core Predominantly Linkage Witnesses: Deleted from Witness List

	TF Number	Rule 92 bis / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-042	Rule 92 bis	No
2.	TF1-093	Live	Yes
3.	TF1-336	Rule 92 bis	Yes
4.	TF1-518	Live	Yes
5.	TF1-546	Live	Yes
6.	TF1-510	Rule 92 bis	No
7.	TF1-558	Live	Yes
8.	TF1-570	Live	Yes

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4. Amended Core List: Predominantly Crime Base Witnesses

Core Predominantly Crime Base Witnesses			
	TF Number	Rule 92 bis / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-004	Rule 92 bis	Yes
2.	TF1-015	Live	No
3.	TF1-016	Rule 92 bis	No
4.	TF1-019	Rule 92 bis	Yes
5.	TF1-021	Rule 92 bis	No
6.	TF1-023	Rule 92 bis	No
7.	TF1-024	Rule 92 bis	No
8.	TF1-026	Live	No
9.	TF1-028	Live	Yes
10.	TF1-029	Rule 92 bis	No
11.	TF1-035	Live	No
12.	TF1-054	Rule 92 bis	Yes
13.	TF1-060	Rule 92 bis	Yes
14.	TF1-062	Rule 92 bis	Yes
15.	TF1-064	Rule 92 bis	Yes
16.	TF1-065	Rule 92 bis	Yes
17.	TF1-072	Rule 92 bis	Yes
18.	TF1-074	Rule 92 bis	No
19.	TF1-076	Rule 92 bis	Yes
20.	TF1-077	Rule 92 bis	No
21.	TF1-081	Rule 92 bis	No
22.	TF1-083	Rule 92 bis	No
23.	TF1-084	Rule 92 bis	No
24.	TF1-085	Rule 92 bis	No
25.	TF1-086	Rule 92 bis	No
26.	TF1-087	Rule 92 bis	No
27.	TF1-088	Rule 92 bis	Yes
28.	TF1-089	Rule 92 bis	Yes
29.	TF1-092	Rule 92 bis	Yes
30.	TF1-097	Rule 92 bis	No
31.	TF1-098	Rule 92 bis	No
32.	TF1-101	Live	No
33.	TF1-104	Rule 92 bis	yes
34.	TF1-108	Rule 92 bis	Yes
35.	TF1-113	Rule 92 bis	Yes



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Core Predominantly Crime Base Witnesses			
	TF Number	Rule 92 bis / Live	Rule 93
36.	TF1-114	Live	Yes
37.	TF1-116	Rule 92 bis	Yes
38.	TF1-122	Rule 92 bis	Yes
39.	TF1-125	Rule 92 bis	Yes
40.	TF1-129	Rule 92 bis	Yes
41.	TF1-132	Rule 92 bis	Yes
42.	TF1-141	Rule 92 bis	Yes
43.	TF1-143	Live	Yes
44.	TF1-157	Rule 92 bis	Yes
45.	TF1-158	Rule 92 bis	Yes
46.	TF1-169	Rule 92 bis	No
47.	TF1-173	Rule 92 bis	No
48.	TF1-174	Rule 92 bis	Yes
49.	TF1-189	Rule 92 bis	Yes
50.	TF1-192	Live	Yes
51.	TF1-195	Rule 92 bis	Yes
52.	TF1-197	Rule 92 bis	No
53.	TF1-198	Rule 92 bis	Yes
54.	TF1-200	Rule 92 bis	Yes
55.	TF1-201	Rule 92 bis	Yes
56.	TF1-206	Rule 92bis	Yes
57.	TF1-210	Rule 92 bis	Yes
58.	TF1-215	Live	Yes
59.	TF1-216	Rule 92 bis	Yes
60.	TF1-217	Rule 92 bis	No
61.	TF1-218	Rule 92 bis	Yes
62.	TF1-220	Rule 92 bis	Yes
63.	TF1-227	Rule 92 bis	No
64.	TF1-233	Rule 92 bis	No
65.	TF1-245	Rule 92 bis	No
66.	TF1-247	Rule 92 bis	Yes
67.	TF1-263	Rule 92 bis	Yes
68.	TF1-278	Rule 92 bis	No
69.	TF1-279	Rule 92 bis	No
70.	TF1-303	Rule 92 bis	Yes
71.	TF1-304	Rule 92 bis	No
72.	TF1-305	Rule 92 bis	Yes
73.	TF1-314	Rule 92 bis	Yes



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Core Predominantly Crime Base Witnesses			
	TF Number	Rule 92 bis / Live	Rule 93
74.	TF1-317	Rule 92 bis	Yes
75.	TF1-326	Live	Yes
76.	TF1-330	Live	Yes
77.	TF1-331	Rule 92 bis	No
78.	TF1-459	Rule 92 bis	Yes

5. Former Core Crime Base Witnesses: Deleted from Witness List

	TF Number	Rule 92 bis / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-020	Live	Yes
2.	TF1-119	Live	Yes
3.	TF1-193	Live	Yes
4.	TF1-235	Live	No
5.	TF1-251	Live	Yes
6.	TF1-280	Rule 92bis	No



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AMENDED BACK-UP WITNESS LISTS: LINKAGE & CRIME BASE

6. Amended Back-up List: Predominantly Linkage Witnesses

Back-up Predominantly Linkage Witnesses			
	TF Number	Rule 92 bis / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-030	Live	Yes
2.	TF1-187	Live	Yes
3.	TF1-335	Live	Yes
4.	TF1-347	Live	No
5.	TF1-361	Rule 92 bis + live	Yes
6.	TF1-373	Live	Yes
7.	TF1-376	Live	Yes
8.	TF1-380	Live	No
9.	TF1-381	Live	No
10.	TF1-387	Live	Yes
11.	TF1-397	Live	Yes
12.	TF1-407	Live	No
13.	TF1-408	Rule 92 bis	No
14.	TF1-410	Live	Yes
15.	TF1-413	Live	No
16.	TF1-414	Live	Yes
17.	TF1-416	Live	Yes
18.	TF1-423	Live	Yes
19.	TF1-460	Live	No
20.	TF1-517	Live	Yes
21.	TF1-519	Live	Yes
22.	TF1-522	Live	No
23.	TF1-525	Live	No
24.	TF1-540	Live	Yes
25.	TF1-554	Live	Yes
26.	TF1-559	Live	Yes
27.	TF1-563	Live	No
28.	TF1-565	Live	Yes
29.	TF1-569	Live	No



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7. Former Back-up Predominantly Linkage Witnesses: Moved to Core
(see table 1 above)

	TF Number	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-555	Live	Yes

8. Former Back-up Predominantly Linkage Witnesses: Deleted from Witness List

	TF Number	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-044	Live	Yes
2.	TF1-560	Live	Yes



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9. Amended Back-up List: Predominantly Crime Base Witnesses

Back-up Predominantly Crime Base Witnesses			
	TF Number	Rule 92 <i>bis</i> / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-013	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
2.	TF1-014	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
3.	TF1-017	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
4.	TF1-018	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
5.	TF1-022	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
6.	TF1-039	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
7.	TF1-067	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
8.	TF1-068	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
9.	TF1-069	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
10.	TF1-070	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
11.	TF1-082	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
12.	TF1-095	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
13.	TF1-099	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
14.	TF1-105	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
15.	TF1-109	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
16.	TF1-115	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
17.	TF1-131	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
18.	TF1-133	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
19.	TF1-175	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
20.	TF1-213	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
21.	TF1-226	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
22.	TF1-240	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
23.	TF1-281	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
24.	TF1-284	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
25.	TF1-307	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
26.	TF1-308	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
27.	TF1-313	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
28.	TF1-327	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
29.	TF1-339	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No
30.	TF1-393	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
31.	TF1-424	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
32.	TF1-425	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
33.	TF1-450	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
34.	TF1-477	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes



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10. Former Back-up Crime Base Witnesses: Moved to Core
(see table 4 above)

	TF Number	Rule 92 bis / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-065	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
2.	TF1-076	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
3.	TF1-157	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
4.	TF1-158	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes
5.	TF1-278	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	No

11. Former Back-up Crime Base Witnesses: Deleted from Witness List

	TF Number	Rule 92 bis / Live	Rule 93
1.	TF1-180	Rule 92 <i>bis</i>	Yes

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ANNEX B
WITNESS SUMMARIES



12891

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR**

Stephen Smith

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Viva Voce | <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92bis |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 93 | <input type="checkbox"/> Pre-Trial Protective Measures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92ter | <input type="checkbox"/> Trial Protective Measures |

Relevant Counts: 1-11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 3, 5, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34

Time required for direct examination: 1 hour

The witness may provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal background including meeting the Accused while the Witness was reporting on the war in Liberia

Meeting with the Accused on several occasions

A November 2000 interview with the Accused, in which the Accused told the witness that in his view the war in Sierra Leone was a war for diamonds and that the RUF had committed terrible atrocities.



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TF1-024

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Viva Voce | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 92bis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 93 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pre-Trial Protective Measures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92ter | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Trial Protective Measures |

Relevant Counts: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 23, 27, 28, 31

The witness will provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal Background Information

Attack on civilians by AFRC/RUF forces in various locations in Freetown in January 1999

Civilians abducted and taken to the State House where they were beaten, killed and the women raped by AFRC/RUF fighter in January 1999

Looting and burning of civilian homes in and around Kissy Road, civilians abducted and forced to carry loads to Calaba Town

Burning of civilians' homes and public buildings in Freetown from 6 January 1999

Involvement of Liberian personnel with AFRC/RUF in Sierra Leone, crimes committed by these personnel



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TF1-556

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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Viva Voce | <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92bis |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 93 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pre-Trial Protective Measures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92ter | <input type="checkbox"/> Trial Protective Measures |

Relevant Counts: 1 - 11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 2, 5, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34

Time required for direct examination: 7 hours

The witness will provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal background information

Military training of National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) personnel in Libya

Leadership of the NPFL and RUF in Libya

Libyan instructors' teaching in the training base in Libya about the advantages of using small boys in battle

Agreement between the Accused and other leaders in the late 1980's to attack Liberia first then move on to other countries

Use of arms and ammunition provided by Libya to attack Liberia and initial NPFL attack on Liberia in the end of 1989

Composition, command structure and reporting system of the NPFL from the late 1980's until the late 1990's, including but not limited to the composition and command structure of the force that initially attacked Liberia in late 1989

The Accused's command and control over the RUF throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone

Crimes against Liberian civilians committed by the NPFL in Liberia, including but not limited to murder, rapes, looting, and use as forced labour; the Accused's knowledge of the commission of these crimes

The Accused's "Operation Octopus" launched in Liberia against ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) forces

NPFL recruiting child soldiers (SBUs) in Liberia, providing military training to them



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Reports to the Accused about training of SBUs

The Accused's use of SBUs in Liberia while President of Liberia

Planning meetings in Liberia for the initial invasion of Sierra Leone in early 1990s; the Accused's presence at a planning meeting, the Accused's instruction to capture Kono and all the diamond areas and to recruit people to fight

The Accused's assistance to the RUF from the early 1990's onward, including but not limited to supplying the RUF with arms and ammunition, providing training to RUF personnel (including SBUs) and providing non-Sierra Leonean fighters for use in Sierra Leone

Composition and command structure of the forces that initially attacked Sierra Leone in the early 1990's, including NPFL SBUs

Communication between the Accused and NPFL commanders on the ground in Sierra Leone after the initial invasion about the training of civilians and children

Written files kept for Foday Sankoh and the Accused about numbers, names and ages of people trained in Sierra Leone after the initial invasion of Sierra Leone

Use of SBUs by the RUF in the early fighting in Sierra Leone

Military reports about the war situation in Sierra Leone sent to the Accused in Gbarnga

Shipments of arms and ammunition from Liberia to Sierra Leone before the Accused became President of Liberia; involvement of Benjamin Yeaten and Sam Bockarie in these shipments

Communications between the Accused and his subordinates and with the RUF to ensure the receipt of arms and ammunition and the movement of arms and ammunition and other supplies from Liberia to Sierra Leone

Meetings in Liberia between the Accused and RUF authorities and diamonds being handed over to the Accused

Following the Accused's election as President of Liberia, the shipment of arms by land to Sierra Leone by the Accused's subordinates.

Presence of high level RUF leaders in Liberia, including Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie, meetings between the Accused and those high level leaders, high level leaders bringing diamonds for the Accused



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RUF sending personnel, including but not limited to small boys, for military training in Liberia between about 1992 and 1994, the Accused's presence at ceremonies at the completion of that training

The Accused's knowledge of NPFL atrocities in Liberia, similar to those committed by the RUF in Sierra Leone

Fact that the amputations of civilians in Sierra Leone were common knowledge among civilians and the Accused's subordinates in Liberia

RUF assistance to the Accused in Liberia



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TF1-571

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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Viva Voce | <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92bis |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 93 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pre-Trial Protective Measures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92ter | <input type="checkbox"/> Trial Protective Measures |

Relevant Counts: 1 - 11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 5, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34

Time required for direct examination: 7 hours

The witness may provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal background information

Conscription of civilians into the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the early 1990's, including the witness' conscription into the RUF

The Accused's assistance to the RUF and later to the AFRC/RUF, including but not limited to providing military training to RUF personnel in the early 1990's, providing safe havens in the early 1990's, providing personnel to fight in Sierra Leone in the early 1990's, providing arms and ammunition in particular during the period from about 1998 through 2002, providing a helicopter to facilitate the movement of AFRC/RUF personnel and arms and ammunition between Liberia and Sierra Leone

The involvement of personnel subordinate to the Accused such as Benjamin Yeaten, in providing this assistance to the RUF and later to the AFRC/RUF, the provision of a helicopter to facilitate this assistance

Foday Sankoh's meeting in or around early 1997 with senior leaders of the RUF, including Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, Augustine Gbao, Morris Kallon, and subordinates of the Accused. Sankoh's instruction that, in his absence, all orders were to come from the Accused, confirmation of several promotions in the RUF; confirmation of Sankoh's instructions by the Accused's subordinates

Travel of senior level AFRC/RUF (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and RUF alliance) commanders, including but not limited to Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay, to Liberia, including to Monrovia and Foya, after the arrest of RUF leader Foday Sankoh, to meet with the Accused, give the Accused diamonds mined in Sierra Leone, and/or to obtain money, arms and ammunition from the Accused

Communications between subordinates of the Accused and the Accused regarding the capture of the Tongo diamond fields during the Junta period. Thereafter,



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communications between subordinates of the Accused and the Accused regarding packages of diamonds for the Accused from Tongo during the Junta period

AFRC/RUF diamond mining in Sierra Leone, providing diamonds to the Accused, in particular from 1997 onwards. Presence of the Accused's subordinates, including Jungle, at Cyborg pit when forced mining by civilians being performed. Flogging of civilians involved in mining in presence of Accused's subordinates

The Accused's use of subordinate Liberian personnel and/or associates to liaise with the AFRC/RUF regarding diamond mining and to monitor that diamond mining for the Accused

Organisation of diamond mining operations including command and reporting structure

Strategy meeting in Buedu (after the Intervention and before the death of Sani Abacha) with senior AFRC/RUF leaders and others including but not limited to Sam Bockarie, Johnny Paul Koroma, "Gullit", Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao, at which was discussed *inter alia* the Accused advising Bockarie that Accused would facilitate the provision of arms from Blaise Compaore in Burkina Faso to the AFRC/RUF; the initiation of construction of an air drop point site around Buedu and Dawa for the Accused to send ammunitions and supplies to the AFRC/RUF, the setting up of a training base in Bunumu, Kailahun to train more people for the movement including SBUs, and the Accused's interest in starting significant mining operations

The return of Sam Bockarie in late 1998 from Burkina Faso with arms, ammunitions and military uniforms

Strategy meeting in Buedu in or around late 1998 after Sam Bockarie returned from Burkina Faso, attended by the Accused's subordinates, to discuss a large scale operation called "Operation Free the Leader" including the attack on Freetown, whose objectives were to free Foday Sankoh and to take control of the government

The Accused ordering Sam Bockarie, senior leader of the AFRC/RUF, to assist subordinates of the Accused to attack the LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) in Liberia, RUF compliance with that order



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TF1-575

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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Viva Voce | <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92 <i>bis</i> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 93 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pre-Trial Protective Measures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92 <i>ter</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> Trial Protective Measures |

Relevant Counts: 1-11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 2, 3, 5, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34

Time required for direct examination: 8 hours

The witness may provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal background information

The Accused's style of leadership with the NPFL and RUF, the manner in which he kept informed of events in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the control the Accused exercised over subordinates.

Training of the Accused's fighters including how to make people fearful by killing, beheading and crucifying

The Accused's use of covert fighters in Lofa County, Liberia in violation of a cease fire there

Information regarding how communications systems were used.

Information about common practices in the NPFL under the Accused, including the use of child soldiers, looting of civilian property, use of forced labour, commission of sexual crimes and the killing of civilians

The Accused's lack of concern about what happened to civilians during the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone but at the same considering them his "pepper bush".

The Accused's influence and authority over the RUF and senior leaders of the RUF including Foday Sankoh.

Sam Bockarie's trips to Liberia and relationship with the Accused's subordinate, Benjamin Yeaten, and the Accused.

The Accused's assistance to the RUF, including training in Liberia and arms and ammunition; the use of the Accused's subordinates in the provision of this assistance .

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Use of radio communications by the Accused's subordinate, Benjamin Yeaten, to monitor RUF radio communications and frequencies

Arms and supplies were shipped from Liberia to the RUF

Use of RUF manpower in Liberia for military operations against the LURD

Meeting in 1999 between Accused and Johnny Paul Koroma, Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie

Fact that the commission of atrocities in Sierra Leone by the RUF was well-known in Liberia; that these atrocities were shown on BBC and CNN

The Accused comments on the RUF's notorious use of amputations

In early 1999, Sam Bockarie phoning the Accused to inform him that he was in Freetown.



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TF1-577

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|---|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Viva Voce | <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92bis |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 93 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pre-Trial Protective Measures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92ter | <input type="checkbox"/> Trial Protective Measures |

Relevant Counts: 1-11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 5, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34

Time required for direct examination: 8 hours

The witness will provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal background information

Forced conscription and training of civilians into the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) by NPFL Special Forces in early 1990's, including Witness's conscription; shooting of conscripts who tried to escape.

In the early 1990, the Accused's assistance to the RUF, including but not limited to providing military training by NPFL to RUF personnel

In the early 1990's, regular radio communication between the Accused and Foday Sankoh

Requests for ammunition by the RUF when under "fighting pressure" during the dry season 1996-97 being made to subordinates of the Accused in Liberia and such requests being satisfied

Sam Bockarie's travel to Gbarnga before the Junta period and receipt of ammunition for the RUF in Sierra Leone; the Accused presence in Gbarnga at that time

The Accused providing a satellite telephone to a senior leader of the RUF, Sam Bockarie, during the Junta period which was used for communications between Bockarie and the Accused concerning situation reports on the conflict in Sierra Leone and the provision of strategic advice by the Accused in 1998 and 1999

The Accused's instructions after the Intervention in 1998 that the RUF and AFRC work together

The Accused's promotion of Sam Bockarie as Chief of Defence Staff and General after the Intervention in 1998



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The Accused's involvement in mediation talks between Sam Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma in 1999

The Accused's assistance to the RUF at the request of: (i) Sam Bockarie shortly before the Junta period to supply ammunition to Buedu in order to assist the RUF when under military pressure; and (ii) Issa Sesay in or around 2000 including but not limited to providing ammunition and medicine and such assistance being transported to Vahun by helicopter and then by truck to Bomaru, Sierra Leone

Frequent travel of senior level AFRC/RUF (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and RUF alliance) commanders, including but not limited to Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay, to Liberia to meet with the Accused

The involvement of personnel subordinate to the Accused in providing assistance to the RUF and later to the AFRC/RUF.

Regular deliveries of ammunition, food and other supplies to Buedu in Sierra Leone by the Accused's subordinates "Jungle" and ZigZag Marzah throughout 1998, 1999 and 2000

The purchase by Sam Bockarie's bodyguards and upon his instructions in 1998 and 1999 of goods near the Guinean border using bills of USD 100 that were obtained in Liberia by the RUF

RUF diamond mining in Sierra Leone and the provision of diamonds to the Accused by Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie and other RUF commanders. In particular: (i) the exchange of diamonds for weapons (including anti-tank land mines and anti-aircraft weapons), ammunition, rice and other food items and medicine by Foday Sankoh with the Accused in the early 1990s; (ii) exchange of diamonds for arms and ammunition by Sam Bockarie with the Accused in 1998 and 1999

Meetings in 1998 in Kailahun district with representatives of the Accused and AFRC/RUF commanders and instructions from the Accused to take over Kono and the diamonds fields

The Accused's order to construct an airfield in 1998 in Buedu for the deliveries of material from Liberia

Representatives of the Accused sent to Kailahun in 1998 to assist the RUF on repairing a 40 barrel missile

Throughout the conflict the recruitment of children (as young as 9 or 10 and male and female) into the RUF their training, in particular in 1998 in Bunumbu Training Camp, and their use in fighting

Use of civilians as forced labour by RUF for mining in Kono from 1998 to 2000



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Use of civilians as forced labour by AFRC/RUF for food finding missions in Kono in 1998

Looting of civilian's properties by AFRC/RUF troops in Kono in 1998

Massacre of civilians by CO Savage in 1998 in Tombodu

Abduction and use of women as wives by AFRC/RUF after the Intervention in 1998 in Kono and Kailahun

The provision of RUF manpower by Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay at the request of the Accused to assist forces of the Accused to attack the LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) in Liberia in 1999 and 2000.

Involvement of the Accused in the departure of Sam Bockarie from the RUF at the end of 1999

In or around 2000, the transport of UN vehicles and heavy weapons captured from abducted UN peacekeepers to the Accused



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TF1-579

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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Viva Voce | <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92bis |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 93 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pre-Trial Protective Measures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92ter | <input type="checkbox"/> Trial Protective Measures |

Relevant Counts: 1-11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 2, 3, 5, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34

Time required for direct examination: 8 hours

The witness will provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal background information

Command structure of the NPFL, militias and AFL throughout the war in Liberia

Command and control of the Accused over his troops in Liberia (NPFL, militias and later AFL)

Command and control of the Accused over the RUF throughout the war in Sierra Leone

Atrocities committed by NPFL troops during the civil war in Liberia

Order from the Accused to start the war in Sierra Leone

Assistance provided to the Accused in relation to the initial invasion of Sierra Leone in 1991 including provision of officers to led the operations, manpower, , military training of RUF in Liberia and use of territory under Accused's control to launch attack

During the pre-Indictment period, presence of Foday Sankoh in Gbarnga to meet with the Accused

Training and use of small boys by NPFL in Liberia with the knowledge of the Accused

Manpower sent from Liberia – including SBUs - to Sierra Leone to fight alongside the RUF throughout the war in Sierra Leone. Knowledge of the Accused about NPFL SBUs fighting in Sierra Leone

NPFL fighters buying looted goods from RUF fighters before the Junta period



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Before the Junta period RUF troops coming to Liberia to fight the ULIMO alongside NPFL forces in order to keep the supply line open between Liberia and Sierra Leone

Before the Junta period shipments of ammunition sent from the NPFL in Liberia to the RUF in Sierra Leone

The Accused' assistance to the RUF including to senior commanders in the RUF such as Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay, during the post-Junta period to include providing ammunition and clothing for military purposes

Trips made by the Accused's subordinates, including Daniel Tamba also known as Jungle and Sampson, to Buedu during the post-Junta period to deliver ammunition and clothing and reports made by such subordinates to Benjamin Yeaten regarding the situation in Sierra Leone.

Daniel Tamba also known as Jungle as a liaison between the Accused and the RUF during the post-Junta period

Trips by the RUF high command – including Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay and Superman - to Monrovia during the post-Junta period and meetings with the Accused

During the post-Junta period communication between Benjamin Yeaten and the RUF

During the post-Junta period radio operators of Benjamin Yeaten in Monrovia monitoring the RUF radio net and reporting about it to Benjamin Yeaten.

Diamonds brought to the Accused by the RUF during the post-Indictment period and role of General Ibrahim in buying diamonds from the RUF controlled areas

Use made by the RUF of the ammunition supplied to fight battle in Kenema

RUF troops coming to Liberia to fight the LURD alongside Taylor's forces and keep the supply line open between Liberia and Sierra Leone

The Accused ordering Sam Bockarie to assist subordinates of the Accused to attack ULIMO in Liberia, RUF compliance with that order

The Accused's order that Sam Bockarie leave Sierra Leone and pass the leadership of the RUF to Issa Sesay.

Presence of and activities undertaken by Sam Bockarie in Liberia from late 1999 until 2003 and use of Bockarie's men as ATU in charge of the Presidential Motorcade

Murder of Sam Bockarie upon the order of Charles Taylor as the Accused did not want his relationship with the RUF and Sam Bockarie to be exposed



12905

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Publicity in media in Liberia regarding the atrocities being committed in Liberia by Taylor's forces

Publicity in media in Liberia during the Indictment period regarding the atrocities being committed by the RUF in Sierra Leone

Execution of RUF and NPFL former combatants in Monrovia in 2003 by subordinates of the Accused



12906

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TF1-584

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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Viva Voce | <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92bis |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 93 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pre-Trial Protective Measures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92ter | <input type="checkbox"/> Trial Protective Measures |

Relevant Counts: 1-11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 5, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34

Time required for direct examination: 7 hours

The witness will provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal background information

Capture of civilians in Kailahun District in April 1991 by fighters, the majority of whom were Liberian.

Forced military training of civilians conducted by Liberian trainers including children near Koidu in 1991

Presence of Liberian and Burkinabe fighters calling themselves "Special Forces" in Sierra Leone in early 1990s

Atrocities committed by NPFL troops in Sierra Leone in the early 1990s including killings and ripping open the stomachs of pregnant mothers to remove the unborn babies.

Operation Stop Election in 1996

Following the Intervention in 1998, the order that soldiers should "pay themselves" and the resulting widespread looting.

Forced military training of abducted civilians at Superman Ground during the post-Junta period

Reports of atrocities being committed in Tombudu during the post-Junta period.

Assistance provided by the Accused in the post-Junta period including the provision of arms and ammunition to Sam Bockarie in Buedu.

Planning and execution of the "Fitti Fatta" Operation in the post-Junta period. The Accused's regular communication with Sam Bockarie in Buedu via satellite telephone at this time.



12907

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OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

Attacks on civilians, including amputations in Kono District after the "Fiti Fatta" Operation in mid 1998

Attacks on Alikalia by fighters under the command of Kumba Gbundema and Yifin by RUF/SLA fighters during the post-Junta period and which both resulted in the large scale burning of civilian houses and killings

Formation and composition of the "Red Lion Battalion" which comprised of many Liberians. The Red Lion Battalion moving to reinforce the fighters based at Camp Rosos in the post-Junta period.

Communications between the Red Lion Battalion at Camp Rosos and Superman's group in December 1998 and January 1999. Red Lion Battalion presence in Freetown and reporting to Superman from Freetown

In the period just prior to and during the Freetown invasion on 6 January 1999, communications between: (i) Superman's group based at Lunsar and Sam Bockarie in Buedu; and (ii) Superman and the Red Lion Battalion.

Regular communications during the Freetown invasion between Sam Bockarie in Buedu and Gullit in Freetown.

During the Freetown invasion, orders of Sam Bockarie that RUF Rambo based in Makeni and Superman based in Lunsar to take their fighters to provide reinforcements to Gullit in Freetown.

In or around the time that the rebels lost State House during the January 1999 invasion, Sam Bockarie's order to Gullit to burn Freetown and **attack?** civilians

Sam Bockarie's order that Superman provide a safe corridor for fighters to retreat from Freetown.

Reports by the Red Lion Battalion to Superman, after the retreat from Freetown in January 1999 about atrocities in Freetown

Presence of SLA and RUF fighters in Waterloo following the January 1999 invasion of Freetown.

Looting of property during and after the January 1999 Freetown invasion.

Marking of civilians with the letters "RUF" and "AFRC" by RUF fighters at Lunsar prior to the January 1999 invasion.

Provision of RUF manpower to fight with NPFL forces against the LURD.

12908



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TF1-585

- | | |
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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 93 | <input type="checkbox"/> Pre-Trial Protective Measures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92ter | <input type="checkbox"/> Trial Protective Measures |

Relevant Counts: 1-11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34

Time required for direct examination: 8 hours

The witness will provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal background

RUF command structure, communications

Orders from Foday Sankoh to kill civilians and to burn civilian houses to cause panic and fear of the RUF

Operation Stop Elections, RUF mutilating civilians

Mutilations of civilians in Magburaka; reports of these acts

Communications between AFRC/RUF leaders, and between AFRC/RUF leaders and the Accused and his subordinates

Presence of associates and/or subordinates of the Accused in Sierra Leone during the Junta and after the Junta was pushed out of Freetown in early 1998

AFRC/RUF alliance after the Junta was pushed from Freetown

The retreat of Johnny Paul Koroma and his group from Freetown to Buedu, Kailahun District; the Accused's involvement in that retreat; taking diamonds from Johnny Paul Koroma at Buedu; taking those diamonds to Liberia

Assistance from the Accused to the AFRC/RUF, including providing arms and ammunition, providing warnings to the AFRC/RUF of the approach of ECOMOG aircraft; use of associates or subordinates of the Accused to effectuate this assistance

Storage of arms and ammunition by AFRC/RUF; procedure for obtaining arms and ammunition

Diamond mining and the use of diamonds to obtain arms and ammunition

12909

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00043403

INTERVIEW NOTES

28. The second shipment [REDACTED] is the one accompanied by Mohamed Talibah, who the witness already knew as the Libyan ambassador to Liberia. The witness remembers this shipment arriving before the invasion of Sierra Leone. Most of the weapons were taken to the Kumba Forest in Lofa County to be hidden and stored. They were concerned about the weapons being bombed by ECOMOG. The small arms and ammunition were put in a trailer and camouflaged in the bush and the rockets were put in the hole and buried.
29. The third shipment arrived on a Burkina Faso cargo plane which was flown by [REDACTED] from Burkina Faso. This shipment consisted of only ammunition and it was taken and stored in Charles Taylor's mansion in Gbarnga. The witness does not know the name of the person who did the G4 duties there.
30. The fourth shipment, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The shipment was made up of RPG's, GMG's, anti-aircraft missiles and Beretta pistols. Once the shipment arrived in RIA, it was divided up, with some going to Kumba Forest and remainder to a storage site in Buchanan.
31. [REDACTED] shipment of arms from Liberia to Sierra Leone [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
32. [REDACTED] transporting of weapons to Sierra Leone [REDACTED]
Benjamin Yeaten [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
33. [REDACTED] Mustapha Jallow was the commander in charge in Lofa and was based at Gus's company, before the fall of Gbarnga. [REDACTED] The NPFL sometimes requested RUF reinforcements from Sierra Leone to help open up the road (Voinjama to Gbarnga). [REDACTED] AK47's, ammunition and rockets to Sierra Leone. Weapons and ammunition were handed over to Sam Bokaria and General Sheriff in Voinjama. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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INTERVIEW NOTES

34.

[REDACTED]

The witness looked at the photos (ERN P0000643 [REDACTED] 13 attached) and identified Zigzag Marzah as one of Benjamin's Yeaten's body guards who was also involved in weapon transportation. The witness also identified Daniel Tamba [REDACTED] a body guard [REDACTED] involved in weapons transportation to Sierra Leone. [REDACTED] He did see Sam Bokarie there sometimes and knew that Bokarie referred to Charles Taylor as "Chief".

35.

[REDACTED]

REPORTING STRUCTURE

36. The witness clarified on the reporting structure relating to Charles Taylor and said that if Charles Taylor was around, everyone would go to him for orders. If he was not around, they would go to Benjamin Yeaten ("50"). Benjamin Yeaten handled routine administrative matters. The witness said that "50" always had more power than General Jackson. "50" was a 3 star General and General Jackson was a 2 star General. If Charles Taylor was away anywhere, General Jackson was always with him.

COBRA BASE

37.

[REDACTED] training [REDACTED] The instructors had three shifts and every shift had their own commander. Every commander trained their own segment ie, weapons training, guerilla fighting, or hand to hand combat. [REDACTED]

38.

A previous statement indicating that there were no Sierra Leonean SBU's at Cobra Base is incorrect. [REDACTED] SBU's (from Sierra Leone) taken there by Foday Sankoh, including

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INTERVIEW NOTES

Mende and Temne boys. The SBU's were then sent back to Sierra Leone when their training was complete.

39. The witness remembers a female NPFL General known as "245". She was initially with Prince Johnson and worked after with Charles Taylor. The witness believes that she was in charge of the women's unit. He did not see her at Cobra Base.
40. The witness stated that Charles Taylor attended the graduation ceremonies about every three months at Cobra Base. Charles Taylor would see everyone at the graduation parade and knew where they were being sent. This included SBU's from Sierra Leone.
41. [REDACTED] There was basic training conducted at Camp Nama and Sierra Leoneans did train there.
42. [REDACTED] Sam Bokarie brought in diamonds from Sierra Leone.
43. [REDACTED] Foday Sankoh took diamonds to Charles Taylor. [REDACTED] this was shortly before Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria. It was after this that Charles Taylor wanted to get his own diamond people. [REDACTED]
44. [REDACTED] there was some confusion over diamonds between Foday Sankoh and Sam Bokarie. He believes that Ibrahim Bah was working for both of them.

OTHER TOPICS

45. The witness stated that Charles Taylor knew about the atrocities throughout the war. He could have stopped them but he would have failed the war by doing so. The witness stated that most of Charles Taylor's fighters were Gio or Mano and if they were told to stop the atrocities, they would have left the war. The witness said that forced labour was very common in the NPFL and that Charles Taylor

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00040406

INTERVIEW NOTES

knew about it. Looting also happened all the time and often, when things were looted from Sierra Leone, they were brought to Gbarnga to be shared.

46. The witness said that the amputations that were happening in Sierra Leone were common knowledge as civilians, the Army, everyone knew of these things. There is no way they could not have known. This was before Charles Taylor became President
47. The witness stated that there were frequent communications between Gbarnga and Sierra Leone about the battle front situation in Sierra Leone. These messages went from the radio room in Gbarnga to the "Chief" (Charles Taylor) and they were military reports about the situation of the war in Sierra Leone.
48. The witness knows of 'Mosquito Spray'. He fought for ULIMO after Charles Taylor became President.
49. The witness stated that Gambian Jack was an MP (military police) as well as a deputy to Chuckie Taylor, but he would have direct access to Charles Taylor.
50. [REDACTED] Moses Blah, the vice president. He was Special Forces.
51. The witness stated that the friendship between Charles Taylor and the RUF started at Mataba. Charles Taylor had more power than the RUF, more money than the RUF and throughout the war in Sierra Leone, when Charles Taylor said: "Quiet!", nobody in the RUF would talk.

PHOTOGRAPHS

The witness was shown 13 pages of photographs. When the witness made an identification, he annotated such on the individual photograph. Four of the 13 pages were computer images (not hard copy) so they were not annotated by the witness. Each photograph shown had initially been entered into the Evidence Unit and given an identifying exhibit or 'ERN' number. Any photograph annotated by the witness was subsequently given a new 'ERN' number.

KEY: Persons are listed left to right in all descriptions; T-top; BL-bottom left; BR-bottom right; C-centre; LNU-Last name unknown; FNU-first name unknown.

[REDACTED]

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INTERVIEW NOTES

- [REDACTED]
2. Initial ERN 00038367: New: ERN 00040311
TL: Ibrahim Bah, Foday Sankoh, Jack 'Gambian'.
BL: Foday Sankoh.
TR: Group of five in Burkina Faso – identifies Ibrahim Bah and Jack 'Gambian'.
CR: Group of three in Burkina Faso – identifies Jack 'Gambian', Yanks Yancuba (sic).
BR: Group of three in Burkina Faso – identifies Ibrahim Bah and Jack 'Gambian'.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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

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00040408

INTERVIEW NOTES

7. 
8. Initial ERN 00029861
Issa Sesay and u/k female – identified as Sam Bokarie “Mosquito”
New: ERN 00040314
9. ERN 00029863
Dennis Mingo not identified
10. Initial ERN 00029865
Dennis aka ‘Jungle and Issa Sesay – identified as 50’s bodyguards
New: ERN 00040315
11. ERN 00029867
Photo of six including Mike Lamin, Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon – no
identification made
12. 
13. Initial ERN P0000643
Zigzag Marzah, Dennis Tamba aka ‘Jungle’ and Abu Keita – identified as Jaro
and ‘50’’s bodyguards (Sierra Leonean)
New: ERN 00040316

Prepared by: Chris MORRIS

Approved by: _____

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TF1 Number	Statements/Proffer	ERN
TF1-571	Proffer – 9 typed pages	/

WITNESS PROFFER**TF1-571**

The Prosecution provides the following proffer as to the expected testimony of witness TF1-571. Information that could identify the witness has been removed as the witness is seeking protective measures. The witness is expected to testify to the following:

1. The witness was captured in 1991 and given military training. Foday SANKOH and the NPFL soldiers did the training. Most of the people there that did the training were NPFL.
2. The first attacks on Sierra Leone were carried out by the NPFL even though it was supposed to be by the RUF. Apparently Foday SANKOH took responsibility for that attack.
3. They got new armaments from the Liberians and then struck back. The majority of any arms and ammunition that they received came in from Liberia, supplied by the Liberians.
4. After Foday SANKOH was arrested, fighters were sent by Sam BOCKARIE to collect arms in both Monrovia and Foya, Lofa County. They went with either Issa SESAY or Sam BOCKARIE. When in Monrovia they went through Benjamin YEATEN to get their arms. They went to White Flower. Handling the arms was Benjamin YEATEN.
5. Issa Sesay or Mosquito would show diamonds and say: "We are taking these to our Pape" and say: "our Pape needs these". Witness took the referral to "our Pape" as being to Charles TAYLOR.
6. Initially only arms were issued but then Charles TAYLOR told the commanders that he cannot give arms for nothing. That was when the diamond shipments started to Monrovia.
7. Arms were transported from Foya by helicopter.

8. There was a notebook in which the arms transportation trips were documented.
9. Witness was captured by rebels who were a mixture of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans, but the Liberians outnumbered the Sierra Leoneans. After his capture he was taken to a training base near the Liberia/Sierra Leone Border. The ages of the other captives ranged from 12 years to 25 years old.
10. There were over 500 civilians that had been captured and taken to the training base. There were about ten training commanders at the Gissiwo Training Base and all of them were Liberian except two who were Sierra Leonean. Witness states that the training commander at the training base was a Liberian.
11. Witness states that after about two weeks at the training base, Foday Sankoh visited. He addressed the recruits at the base where he introduced himself and explained why he brought the war. Foday Sankoh took responsibility for the attack.
12. The attack on Sierra Leone was by the NPFL though it was supposed to be by the RUF.
13. The training took one month and two weeks.
14. The SLA attacked the area and repelled the fighters chasing them to the Liberia/Sierra Leone border. The fighters retreated into Liberia and were based at Bomi Hills.
15. Whilst at Bomi Hills they were looked after by NPFL. Foday Sankoh was also based at Bomi Hills at the time. The commander of the NPFL at Bomi Hills base was 'One man One'. At Bomi Hills the fighters re-grouped. They got new armaments from NPFL fighters and then struck back into Sierra Leone with additional Liberian man power.
16. Bo Waterside axis was attacked and the SLA was chased as far as Ngofor near Zimmi. The defensive position at Ngofor was held for sometime until in the dry season of 1994.

17. Whilst in Kailahun, government troops advanced from Pendembu to Kailahun and Buedu. Issa Sesay was a RUF commander based at Ngiema, Luawa Chiefdom, Kailahun District. RUF fighters were sent from Kailahun to Ngiema as reinforcement to stop the advancement of government troops towards Kailahun and Buedu.
18. The overall commander at Baiima Axis area was a Vanguard who was trained in Liberia called Patrick Lahai. Patrick Lahai was a dual citizen of Sierra Leone and Liberia.
19. From the initial stages of the war, RUF was getting arms and ammunition from Liberia. At that time, RUF had its headquarters in Bomi Hills where arms and ammunition supplies were sent before it was delivered to the fighters in Sierra Leone.
20. There were several shipments of arms and ammunition to RUF in Sierra Leone from Liberia.
21. Sam Bockarie went to Foya. This was after the AFRC/RUF was chased out of Freetown and Sam Bockarie was based in Buedu. The witness is aware that arms and ammunition was brought to Foya by helicopter. The arms and ammunition were taken to Buedu and stored at the RUF ammunition dump.
22. These arms and ammunition were distributed by Sam Bockarie aka Mosquito to the various front lines. That the areas under threat by government troops received more of the materials.
23. Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia, Liberia again. This was the period when Mosquito spray of the LURD rebels had attacked NPFL forces from Guinea. 'Papay' called Sam Bockarie to travel to Monrovia. Charles Taylor was referred to as the 'Papay'.
24. When the LURD rebels attacked Lofa, Charles Taylor sent for Sam Bockarie to travel to Monrovia. Charles Taylor requested that the RUF to assist in repelling

- the LURD rebels who had invaded Liberia. The LURD had started blocking the supply routes from Liberia to Sierra Leone.
25. Lofa was attacked until the LURD retreated. After the LURD had been chased, Sam Bockarie received arms and ammunition from Charles Taylor's Chief of Security called Benjamin Yeaten.
 26. Sam Bockarie went purposely for some amount of money for the fighters who took part in the fight against the LURD in Lofa. A large quantity of arms and ammunition was captured during the attack on LURD and so the RUF and NPFL did not need much arms and ammunition at the time. Charles Taylor provided \$10,000/000 US dollars as 'moral booster' or compensation for the fighters who repelled the LURD rebels.
 27. Momoh Gibba was a bodyguard to Charles Taylor.
 28. The arms and ammunition brought on that trip was taken and stored at Buedu.
 29. After the May 8, 2000 incident in Freetown, when Issa Sesay was overall leader of the RUF at that time, he went from Buedu to Foya, and then by helicopter to Monrovia. Issa Sesay went to see Charles Taylor at the Executive Mansion.
 30. The arms and ammunition which were brought from Monrovia were not for nothing.
 31. Issa Sesay or Mosquito were taking the diamonds to the 'Papay' because 'Papay' needed the diamonds to purchase arms and ammunition; since no arms are produced in Liberia.
 32. At one time a 54 carats diamond was found in Tongo and handed to Issa Sesay. Issa Sesay went with it to Charles Taylor. In Tongo again, a 36 carat diamond was found which was also given to Issa Sesay and he took again to Charles Taylor.
 33. During the period of Sam Bockarie's leadership mining was not that organized. Most of the diamonds that were taken to Liberia were mostly those seized from civilians at check-points. It was during the period of Issa Sesay's regime that

organized mining was carried out and diamonds found were sent to Charles Taylor in Monrovia.

34. Apart from arms and ammunition, food, clothing and condiments were also sent from Monrovia to the RUF.
35. If there was shortage of materials mainly arms and ammunition all commanders will make a request to Sam Bockarie and later Issa Sesay. The same will happen if supply of arms arrived in Buedu; message will be sent through the RUF communication set to all commanders to report and collect supply for his area of responsibility. When JPK went to Kailahun after the AFRC/RUF was chased out of Freetown, Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay seized a large consignment of diamonds about 90 (ninety pieces of different sizes) from JPK. Sam Bockarie handed these diamonds seized from JPK to Issa Sesay who took them to Charles Taylor. Issa Sesay returned from Monrovia with arms and ammunition.
36. Quantity of diamonds was seized from Amara Massaquoi aka 'RANGER' who was the Deputy Brigade commander in Tongo. This was in 1999 after the Freetown invasion. Amongst the diamonds that were seized from Amara Massaquoi, there was one big diamond which weighed 54 carats, but the total weight of the diamonds was over 200 carats. Those diamonds that were seized from Amara Massaquoi were again handed to Issa by Sam Bockarie who took them to Charles Taylor.
37. Diamonds were seized from one civilian called "Good, Good Thing". It was one piece of diamond weighing 36 carats. Issa Sesay seized this piece of diamond from 'Good Good Thing'. That diamond was also conveyed to Charles Taylor in Monrovia by Issa Sesay.
38. Those diamonds that were taken to Charles Taylor were a form of payment for the arms and ammunition and food sent to the RUF.
39. Col. Jungle was one of the NPFL commanders who was a link between RUF and Charles Taylor. He used to go back and forth from Liberia. Zig Zag Marzah was also a Liberian NPFL Commander sent most time from Monrovia to the RUF

commanders. Col Jungle and Zig Zag traveled together most times to Sierra Leone.

40. Sam Bockarie was under arrest and detained at a Police Station on orders of Charles Taylor. The reason for his arrest was that Charles Taylor wanted to hand him over to the Sierra Leone government due to the pressure from the International Community that he was providing safe haven for Sam Bockarie. After Sam Bockarie threatened Charles Taylor that he would speak about the support Taylor had been giving to the RUF; Charles Taylor ordered his release from Police custody.
41. Sam Bockarie had traveled to Ivory Coast.
42. There was news over the media that deputy rebel leader in Ivory Coast Philip Doe had been killed by Sam Bockarie. Witness later heard over BBC media that Sam Bockarie had been killed at the Ivory Coast border. The reason why Sam Bockarie was killed must have been the fact that Bockarie threatened Taylor.
43. The order for the RUF to fight against the LURD rebels came from Charles Taylor through Sam Bockarie who was the overall commander of RUF to Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon.
44. Sam Bockarie called the various commanders in the nearby held areas by the RUF. Sam Bockarie told the commanders about the order from the 'Papay' to send man power to Voinjama and Kolahun in Lofa County, Liberia to repel the LURD.
45. Sam Bockarie sent out radio message to all commanders as far as Kono to send man power, but never revealed over the communication why he wanted the man-power. Sam Bockarie only stated that there was a mission to be carried out. Man-power was sent from all the various RUF frontlines to Buedu. The commanders present in Buedu for the Lofa mission were Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, and Morris Kallon as senior commanders. There was a large fighting force of about four hundred (400) men. The whole group was divided into two. Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay were commanders for one group attacking from Vahun.

Sam Bockarie and Col. 'Oldso' were commanders of the other group and attacking from Kolahun. Kolahun was first taken and advanced to Voinjama. The two groups met after the capture of Kolahun. Both groups backed by AFL and NPFL advanced to Voinjama where the LURD had made their headquarters. The LURD were dislodged from Voinjama and chased as far as Guinea border.

46. The arms and ammunition in RUF stores at Buedu were used for the attack to capture Voinjama and Kolahun. Large quantity of arms and ammunition was captured from the retreating LURD rebels. The arms and ammunition captured comprised of AK - 47 rifles, AK - Rounds, RPG Rockets including food like, rice, palm oil, and other condiments.
47. The captured items were shared with the AFL soldiers and the RUF brought theirs to Buedu.
48. Initially the RUF was just issued with arms and ammunition by Charles Taylor through Sam Bockarie.
49. Mosquito advised that the RUF should be mining diamonds which would be collected and sent to Charles Taylor to purchase the arms and ammunition. Mosquito formed a mining committee. Mining commanders who should be in charge of the various mining sites were appointed. Amara 'Peleto' Sallia was made the overall mining commander and in charge of Kono and Tongo. One Abdul Razak was in charge of mining activities in Kailahun Districts. One Abdul was in charge of mining in Kono and one Kamara aka 'Ngabay'; was assisting him.
50. When diamonds were collected from the various RUF mining sites, they were handed over to Amara 'Peleto' who in turn conveyed it to Issa Sesay who was based in Kono and Issa Sesay will take the consignment to Mosquito in Buedu. That is how they diamond shipment started to Charles Taylor in Monrovia. When the diamond shipment started to Monrovia, arms and ammunition were then sent from Monrovia. Civilians were used to mine for the RUF.

51. Civilians were doing the mining. Each commander also had his own group of miners doing mining for them. Some of the civilians did the mining willingly and some were not willing.
52. There would be armed fighters watching the miners working. Any diamond found will be handed over to the immediate commander who will ensure it reached to Mosquito. When the diamond shipment started, Charles Taylor used to send Col. Jungle as his representative and will report back to Charles Taylor about any diamonds found.
53. In early 1997 Foday Sankoh spoke with several commanders to say he was going on a political mission to several countries including to meet President Gadafi of Libya. Sankoh also made promotions within the RUF. Sankoh also instructed that in his absence all orders were to come from Charles Taylor. This was confirmed by Jungle, a representative of Taylor.
54. During the Junta time, Jungle communicated directly to Charles Taylor about capture of Tongo in about August of September of 1997. Charles Taylor congratulated Jungle and Sam Bockarie on the capture of Tongo. During the Junta period while the AFRC/RUF maintained control of Tongo fields, Jungle communicated with Charles Taylor on other occasions to inform Taylor of the diamond parcels he would bring to him and then proceed to meet intermediaries at the border of Liberia and Sierra Leone with said diamond parcels.
55. A radio message was also sent to JPK in Freetown about the successful capture of Tongo.
56. Civilians were forced to mine at Cyborg, and were flogged in the presence of Jungle.
57. After the Intervention, Sam Bockarie returned from Liberia and informed members of the RUF that Charles Taylor had promoted him to General. This was confirmed by Jungle.

58. After the intervention, Sam Bockarie advised that he had met with Charles Taylor in Monrovia, that Charles Taylor was going to arrange for Bockarie to liaise with Blaise in Burkina Faso to get arms and ammunitions, and that Charles Taylor was interested in starting mining to help the movement. The construction of an air drop field near Buedu was discussed. This drop zone was actually constructed to some degree between Buedu and Dawa but never used. There were plans to set up a training base in Bunumu in Kailahun to train more people for the movement including SBUs.
59. When Sam Bockarie returned from Burkina Faso he returned with trucks of ammunitions and also four bales of combat uniforms which contained about 500 uniforms per bale.
60. A meeting was held after Sam Bockarie returned from Burkina Faso in Bockarie's house. Many commanders were present and a large offensive "Operation Free the Leader" was discussed, a big offensive of Kono, Daru, Segbwema, Makeni and then Freetown. There were two objectives in Freetown, to take power and to free Foday Sankoh. The first target in Freetown was Pademba Road prison. A two flank attack was supposed to happen. Kabbah was to be executed and Foday Sankoh to be made leader.
61. Charles Taylor was contacted after this. Charles Taylor instructed to attack mining areas first.

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TFI Number	Statements/Proffer	ERN
TF1-575	Proffer – 12 typed pages	/

WITNESS PROFFER
TF1-575

The Prosecution provides the following proffer as to the expected testimony of witness TF1-575. Information that could identify the witness has been removed as the witness is seeking protective measures. The witness is expected to testify to the following:

1. There was an implied consent from Charles Taylor amongst the NPFL fighters that they could take anything they wanted within their area of operations, food, alcohol, money, vehicles, or women.
2. Taylor would tell them that there was no rice in the storeroom in Gbarnga and that you would not carry a bag of rice into battle so go fight and take what you need and feed yourself.
3. Charles Taylor sent someone into Sierra Leone to locate Sam Bockarie and escort him back to see Taylor. This was during the time of heavy fighting in Sierra Leone when Sam Bockarie took control of Freetown in late 1998 early 1999.
4. Various commanders would report to Taylor that they had taken this village or this area.
5. From the time that Charles Taylor became President till he left Liberia the only other person who had the authority to implement military orders was Benjamin Yeaten. Under Taylor, Yeaten was the head of everything, Police, SSS, Military. Yeaten only reported to Charles Taylor. If Charles Taylor was not available Yeaten would give the order and brief Charles Taylor later. Yeaten's word was Taylor's word.
6. The only others who could make decisions to various degrees were:
7. Joe Tuah who held the position of Assistant Director of Special Services in the SSS. He could interfere into Police, Military or personal matters. Joe Tuah like Benjamin was a Special Forces member. Joe Tuah was on a TDY (Temporary Duty Year) to the Military. Because of his Special Forces training he was assisting the Military.
8. Joseph Montgomery – He also could make decisions on security matters.
9. Lt. Gen. Momoh Jibba - He was a commander in the SSS and could deal directly with Charles Taylor.
10. Chuckie Taylor – ATU and son of Charles Taylor and would make decisions and brief Taylor. Chuckie was supposed to report to Benjamin Yeaten but because of the father son relationship he would discuss with Benjamin Yeaten and then go report to Charles Taylor.

11. Everything went through Benjamin Yeaten and even all the field Generals reported up to Yeaten.
12. Sierra Leoneans made up more than 40% of the ATU forces.
13. Benjamin Yeaten had about 10 body guards.
14. The first commander for SSU/ATU was Chuckie Taylor or Momoh JIBBA; they switched off as commanders of the ATU. Chuckie had connections with some arms dealers and Momoh Jibba was a commando. Chuckie was generally seen as not good for the ATU and the witness believes that many ATU fighters left and went to LURD because of Chuckie. General Winning was a deputy commander of the ATU. They had an office in the back of Executive Mansion and were at Cobra Base which was turned into the ATU base. ATU reported straight to Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor basically controlled everything.
15. The NPFL were no longer in existence after Charles Taylor was elected to the Presidency.
16. NPFL chain of command before Taylor was President: Marine Division was, Jack the Rebel, Melvin SOBANE; Navy Division was Roland DUOH, Leaman Johnson; Strike Force Division was Dupoe Markazon; Artillery Division was Joe TUAH; Executive Mansion Presidential Guard Force was Cassius Jacobs followed by Major Gen. John P. Nayamah; SSS Cobra, Gbatala Base, Benjamin Yeaten. At that time, they all reported directly to Charles Taylor. Unit 407 was Charles Taylor's code name when he was stationed in Gbarnga. Charles Taylor controlled everything; he did not want anybody to interfere with his revolution. Taylor would at times make the comment to people that they were not there when "I brought my war", meaning this is "my war and what I say goes".
17. Dr. Manneh, a Gambian, helped Charles Taylor. It was an open secret that Manneh was going to assist Taylor getting into power and Taylor was then going to help Manneh get into power in The Gambia. General Jackson was supposed to be the Vice President for Manneh. Manneh use to stay at the Flower Mill in Buchanan.
18. The Special Operations Division was a unit in the Liberian National Police and had always existed. Colonel Leo JEBBO was the overall commander of the Liberian National Police but not the direct commander over the Special Operations Division. The Division looked after serious crime and was part of the National Police Force. When the war came to Monrovia they fought in Monrovia.
19. Sam Bockarie was the field commander of the RUF in Sierra Leone and Foday Sankoh was to be the President of Sierra Leone. The witness believed that Bockarie had more power than Foday Sankoh. There was a problem between Bockarie and Sankoh and Bockarie was known as the boss of the RUF. Sam

Bockarie was very popular and because of this he had power. Sankoh was too soft to be a leader but Sam Bockarie would shine above Sankoh.

20. Sam Bockarie met with Charles Taylor many times, and he stayed with Benjamin Yeaten.
21. Sam Bockarie was a regular visitor to Monrovia, Liberians knew him from driving around in his Jeep. Bockarie reported to Benjamin Yeaten and used to call him Chief. Bockarie reported to Yeaten and when he needed to see Taylor he would call Yeaten.
22. Between 1997 and 1999, Bockarie came to visit Charles Taylor for briefings, advice; supplies. Benjamin Yeaten was in those meetings, sometimes Joe Tuah, and Momoh Jibba.;
23. Bockarie had given Yeaten trucks, generators, money and diamonds. Bockarie also bought a nice truck for Musa Cisse.
24. Charles Taylor did not like to talk on the radio or the phone and if he could not talk to Bockarie in person he would talk to him through Benjamin Yeaten. Taylor used Thuraya satellite phones.
25. Benjamin Yeaten had some of his own bodyguards with Mosquito in Sierra Leone, including Sampson Weah. Benjamin Yeaten would send messages to Mosquito through Yeaten's body guards.
26. The NPFL formed the RUF, recruited them, trained them, attacked Sierra Leone for them.
27. Once in early 1999, Sam Bockarie phoned Charles Taylor to inform him he was in the Statehouse in Freetown.
28. Bockarie would sometimes refer to Benjamin Yeaten as the 'Chief'. Between 1997 and 1999, Bockarie would brief Benjamin Yeaten about why he wanted to see Taylor and Benjamin Yeaten then would see Charles Taylor. Bockarie did not always get in to see Taylor.
29. Benjamin Yeaten would have a radio operator contact Sam Bockarie by radio and to tell "Mosquito", Sam Bockarie, to turn on his satellite phone. There was always contact between Charles Taylor and Sam Bockarie, even before Charles Taylor was elected President.
30. The radio at Benjamin Yeaten's house had the RUF frequency and there was a Sierra Leonean female radio operator there who he believed was RUF because Bockarie brought her there. The radio at this house was on 24 hours a day.
31. The war in Sierra Leone was started so that Taylor's forces could prevent the ECOMOG from attacking from Sierra Leone and also to fight against ULIMO.

32. Charles Taylor referred to Bockarie as his son. Charles Taylor liked Bockarie because he delivered results and carried out missions correctly.
33. Bockarie left Sierra Leone because of a conflict with Issa Sesay and Sankoh sometime after 1999 and Issa Sesay took over. Bockarie was kicked out by the RUF High Command. Bockarie came to Liberia because a lot of his supporters were in the ATU in Liberia.
34. The witness was told that Sam Bockarie was killed on Benjamin Yeaten's instruction. He believes that Sam Bockarie was an embarrassment to the Liberians. It was felt that Sam Bockarie had killed a person by the name of Andrea in Ivory Coast.
35. Issa Sesay did come to Monrovia many times.
36. Zig Zag was a Colonel in the SSS. Zig Zag was NPFL first and later became a bodyguard of Benjamin Yeaten. He would be sent on missions by Benjamin Yeaten as he was a tough guy. He would listen to orders, if he was told to kill someone, he would do it. He was put on assassin missions. The witness heard that Zig Zag was involved in the deaths of Superman and Sam Dokie. Sam Dokie was the former Minister of Internal Affairs for the Taylor Government.
37. The witness did not personally see arms shipped to Sierra Leone but it was common knowledge. Food and money was also sent to Sierra Leone and the witness has first hand knowledge of this.
38. There were many radio operators at White Flower. It was assumed that ECOMOG was monitoring Liberian communications.
39. The witness does not believe that there was a radio in the RUF guest house.
40. The witness does not know anything about the radio procedure followed in Sierra Leone.
41. The witness was never at a high level meeting regarding the RUF.
42. After the fighting intensified in Lofa County, RUF were used to fight with Liberian forces there. The order would have been given to the RUF and they would have no choice if it came from Taylor.
43. The RUF did fight against the LURD and did a good job.
44. The RUF were administered, supplied, trained and fought with the Charles Taylor's forces right from the start of the war. Without Charles Taylor, the RUF would have died.
45. Sam Bockarie went to meetings with Charles Taylor, Benjamin Yeaten and Joe Tuah.
46. Foya did not fall to the LURD until the end of the war.

47. The witness has no first hand knowledge of Benjamin Yeaten going into Sierra Leone.
48. The witness stated that when Charles Taylor was elected President, if he could have pulled out of Sierra Leone, he would have. But the Liberians were intertwined with the RUF and it was impossible to do. There were as many Liberians mixed into the RUF as there were RUF in Liberian forces. The attitude was that "we made them we had to stay with them".
49. There was a meeting between Taylor, JPK, Bockarie, Sankoh, Yeaten in 1999 to sort out the in-fighting between Sankoh and Bockarie. Taylor was the only one with the power and authority to sort out in-fighting between the RUF leaders.
50. Ibrahim Bah used to travel with Mustapha Jallow.
51. Persons that obtained arms were Paul Mulbah, Musa Cisse, General FOX-Mark Keshan and Joe Tuah.
52. Jungle Jim, the diamond man, did do some business with the President after 1998.
53. The witness has never heard of the term or expression "Operation Pay Yourself".
54. Some soldiers were executed for killing friendly soldiers over money or women. It was not uncommon to have men fighting over possession or women.
55. 1996: leaders of the different parties should be on a Council State, Charles Taylor for the NPFL, ULIMO-K, and others.
56. 1997: Benjamin Yeaten replaced Nathaniel Davis.
57. In 1992, witness heard that a new front was opening in Sierra Leone. There were refugees coming into the country from Sierra Leone with their sheep and goats. Sankoh was complaining about the killing of his people. There were many nice vehicles that the witness believed were looted in Sierra Leone and Sierra Leonean beautiful girls. The commanders that went into Sierra Leone were Paul Veye, General Sayah, Dupoh Mekazon, Joe Tuah, Benjamin Yeaten, Christopher Varmoh, Mark Gwoah and Jack the Rebel. These men were all Special Forces trained.
58. When the NPFL went into Sierra Leone they went to fight and train the Sierra Leoneans.
59. Taylor would often meet with Generals and give them instructions in the field, over tactics and strategy to be used. If a General did follow orders and the

attack failed, they would not live long. If you went against him, you would die.

60. Weapons and supplies were sent to the RUF throughout the entire war.
61. The witness advises that in the 1991 and early part of 1992, Foday Sankoh was in Gbarnga at times. At times when he arrived, General Jackson would go to Charles Taylor to advise Sankoh was there and come out yelling saying that 'Papy' does not want to see this man today how can this man be fighting a war in Sierra Leone if he is here and then tell him to go back to the front line. Other times Taylor would see him. Taylor down played Sankoh and looked at him as a small boy. Foday Sankoh had no money so any arms given to Sankoh by Taylor were given in support of what he was doing. Taylor liked Mosquito right from the start. The witness has no knowledge if the RUF ever received arms from any other source.
62. Taylor was the boss; Sankoh would refer to Taylor as 'Chief'.
63. The witness explains that Taylor was always paranoid about someone trying to take power away from him. Taylor likes to choose young people because they were quick and followed orders.
64. Sometime after Taylor became President, he made Martina Johnson, an NPFL commander, the commander in charge of security at RIA with the SSS.
65. Charles Taylor talked about the amputations going on in Sierra Leone. This was during the time that there was heavy pressure on Taylor from the International community for supporting the RUF. He did not like it. He called the civilians his pepperbush; a pepperbush is something that is precious to him. Taylor also considered the OTC his pepper bush because that was precious to him also.
66. Civilians would be forced into labour. If they were on a mission carrying lots of ammunition and weapons, they would go to a village and use the men and women to carry the load. All the strong men and women had no choice but to carry the load. Sometimes they would get into the forest and drop what they were carrying and run away. Sometimes before battles civilians would be placed in a safe place under guard away from the front and they would cook and do what had to be done in the camp. They were also used to load the magazines for the guns so that when fresh ammo was needed at the front line it could be brought up by civilians under guard and then they would take the empty ones back to refill. The magazines were carried in rice bags. If the fighters were forced to retreat quickly the civilians were just left to look after themselves. This was the norm.
67. Regularly men from the villages were recruited and sent for training. There were more than a thousand plus forcibly recruited over the course of the war. There were no Government farms where people were forced to work.

68. The witness advises that SBUs (Small Boy Units) will listen to instructions while older men may question orders. The SBU commander reported directly to Charles Taylor for military orders. Zubon Johnson was the commander of the SBU and was an SBU himself. The SBU unit was formed by Charles Taylor and all military orders for the SBU were given and reported to Charles Taylor. SBUs were part of the security for the Executive mansion. With the SBU there was a blind obedience to orders from Taylor.
69. SBUs were very good fighters. They would take orders well. SBUs were also used for ambush positions. If they were put in an ambush position, they would not leave it, they were very effective and very strict; for example men might smoke while in an ambush position and this could be easily detected by the enemy. The SBUs would not do that. Sometimes the SBUs were used to cook; sometimes they would be there just to make jokes. SBUs were trained the same as the men.
70. If a dignitary visited Gbarnga, all the SBUs would be removed from the gate until after the dignitary had left. Most of the government preferred SBUs to protect them. Benjamin Yeaten had a lot of SBUs. The youngest would be about 11 years of age up to 18 or 20. It was done more on height than age. Charles Taylor personally would not have SBU body guards. He did not want to be seen with SBU body guards.
71. Gambians were doing most of the training at Cobra Base.
72. Civilians who were displaced or forced down into their areas were used to do tasks like cook rice, but not too many were used. They would not be paid but they would be given food when food was cooked. The civilians would not say no, they knew they would die.
73. The witness explained that the following expressions were used to indicate that a person was being ordered to be killed: "Carry him half way", "Let him vanish from my face", "Let him go back to his people", "De be die". These were common phrases used. Only Generals had the power to do this.
74. If Charles Taylor gave an order and persons did not comply, they would be in serious trouble. A person could be executed for FFI (fail to follow instructions) or if a person did something that would cause embarrassment for him. Charles Taylor would never say to kill someone, he would say "de be die" that person or say "escort him back to his people."
75. Benjamin Yeaten was like the Vice President to Charles Taylor.
76. It was common practice for Charles TAYLOR to bypass his chain of command and give orders himself directly to individuals regardless of their rank or position.
77. Before the election in 1997, the only other people who had authority to make military decisions besides Charles Taylor were; Benjamin Yeaten, General

Jackson and Cassius Jacobs. Daniel Chea only gave operational orders if Taylor told him to. Benjamin Yeaten would already have known about it.

78. The ATU was formed after Taylor became President in 1997. The ATU became very large. AFL was not armed because they were not trusted. When LURD attacked there was no one to fight them so the ATU were sent.
79. The Special Security Unit (SSU) was the military wing of the SSS. It changed its name to the ATU. Chuckie Taylor was the first commander of the ATU in 1997 or 1998.
80. Bockarie was known as the field commander of the RUF and more powerful than Sankoh.
81. Benjamin Yeaten, when in the bush, mainly communicated with long range VHF radio.
82. In 1998, after the ECOMOG intervention, some AFRC traveled to Monrovia from Freetown by helicopter. The witness believes that these persons were arrested by ECOMOG and taken back to Sierra Leone.
83. The witness had heard information that Musa Cisse dealt with a lot of the rebel leaders in Guinea and was doing business with them.
84. John Tarnue was a member of the NPFL. He looked after planning, training, structure and discipline for the army of the NPFL. Tarnue had something to do with the structure of the ATU. He was later promoted to Brigadier General in the AFL.
85. Johnny Paul Koroma was in Monrovia.
86. One shipment of arms was very large and contained many arms and ammunition including brand new AK 47's and AK 48's, and mines. The arms were taken to White Flower.
87. Roberts International Airport would be sealed off by security before a weapon shipment arrived.
88. There was a time when Charles Taylor told the RUF to cease fire and they did. ECOMOG had asked Taylor to help and intervene. Taylor was mediating for this cease fire. This was around the time that the war was almost over in Sierra Leone, possibly around the time they were given amnesty.
89. The Scorpion Unit was NPFL.
90. The witness does not know exactly where Superman was killed but believes that it was in Liberia. If Yeaten had Superman killed, it would have been ordered by Charles Taylor.

91. Issa Sesay was a quiet boy, not like Mosquito who looked like he owned the world and had zeal.
92. Benjamin Yeaten was known by code names "50", "Magnum", and "Jungle Fire".
93. The witness does not know the name "Mosquito Spray".
94. When ULIMO-K attacked Gbarnga in 1994/95, Varmuya Sheriff was the commander at that time.
95. Cassius Jacobs was killed. Benjamin Yeaten may have been there.
96. "Operation Octopus" was to grab everything from every corner. Charles Taylor planned this operation. The mission plan was to take over Monrovia and to fight on all fronts
97. The witness does not know "No Baby on Target", to be a specific operation. It was an expression for a serious mission, meaning that all enemy that came at you should be killed, even children. If there was an obstacle in the way of the mission, the obstacle was to be removed. If it meant killing was required, that would be done right down to the smallest child.
98. Charles Taylor's style of leadership was that he controlled everything. Everything was done by Charles Taylor. He controlled everything, and he wanted to be every where. He was so much in control that people he favoured felt that they could break the rules with no consequences. He had 100% control over his regional commanders. His orders could not be questioned, and if an order was relayed, it would not be questioned.
99. , Charles Taylor, he would take action, including even having them executed.
100. Charles Taylor's leadership style with the RUF was similar to that he used in Liberia and with the NPFL, but it was covert. Charles Taylor and the NPFL equipped Foday Sankoh and the RUF so that ECOMOG would be kept busy fighting on a second front. Charles Taylor brought Sierra Leoneans to the rear, trained them and sent them back to fight, with the objective that they could take over and govern themselves.
101. At the beginning of the war in Sierra Leone, when the RUF were new, Charles Taylor was giving a lot of detailed instructions. This changed as the RUF improved and Taylor did not have to give as many instructions. The instructions he did give still had to be obeyed. The control was clandestine and Charles Taylor planned the war well. Dupoe Menkarzon was the field commander for Sierra Leone at the beginning of the war. NPFL fighters came back from Sierra Leone to Gbarnga with a lot of Leones (currency used in Sierra Leone). As Leones could not be used in Liberia the witness saw Leones being used for smoking, boot laces, and tying pony tails. Everything, that is, looted goods, was coming from Sierra Leone to Gbarnga and all the NPFL authorities knew about that.

102. Charles Taylor was also a strict disciplinarian. If a commando shot somebody by mistake, Charles Taylor would shoot him on the spot
103. The revolution was for change.
104. When Charles Taylor was in Gbarnga, before he was President, he had absolute control. He was commander in chief. That never changed. It was beyond question.
105. Foday Sankoh called Charles Taylor "Chief" as did Sam Bockarie. Charles Taylor was also called; "The Old Man", "Pappy", "Unit 1", "The Top", CIC meaning commander in chief). "Ghankay" was Taylor's traditional name, meaning strong man, warrior. Charles Taylor was smart and intelligent. He knows how to talk to people and how to convince them. He is very cunning. He was also a planner. Before Charles Taylor would make a move, he would study it a million times.
106. Benjamin Yeaten had no power to do anything unless Charles Taylor was out of country. Even then, Charles Taylor would not leave anyone else in power. There was never an Acting President.
107. There was also an implied consent regarding the treatment of civilians. Should a civilian manage to get a complaint through to Charles Taylor, Taylor would have the offender killed, not because he was concerned about the act, but because he would have been embarrassed by the complaint. Charles Taylor would act because he was concerned that if the person was able to complain to Taylor, maybe he was able to complain to others as well. Taylor did not want to be embarrassed in front of the international community.
108. The witness advised that on the subject of fighters taking wives, the fighters were told that they "could not use force". Having said that, the fighters did not have to use physical force, they used coercion. The civilian women knew that they had no choice and that they had to comply. The witness does not remember any particular time that a rape happened, but it did happen all the time. Charles Taylor never had time to go out to his forces and tell them not to rape. He did not have time for simple issues.
109. There was punishment by death for the murder and rape of civilians if you were seen by someone who could report it to a higher rank and they were willing to deal with it. If you were caught you would be shot on the spot if the commander ordered it. If a rape was reported for example, an investigation may be conducted but if nobody saw it then nothing happened. If a civilian saw an offence like theft and reported it and you were not killed on the spot you may be punished by flogging, Tie Bay (Tie arms behind back) or forced to lie on your back all day looking into the sun. The idea was for the soldiers not to get caught
110. The procedure of "Tie Bay" was a punishment whereby your arms and hands were bound behind your back.

111. Charles Taylor gave the orders to his senior commanders that they could not allow the men to rape and kill civilians. If a soldier was caught he was to be killed. The witness advised that though Taylor said it, the commanders were not listening to it when they were fighting on the front line. Taylor had to say these things to satisfy the civilians who were complaining and he would send Cassius, Yeaten and Moses Blah to do checks in areas if lots of complaints came in. They would check it out and if they found something they would fire someone and keep everyone happy.
112. Charles Taylor was not happy about crimes that were happening in Sierra Leone. Liberians did not want to fight for the RUF because Foday Sankoh complained about the looting. Charles Taylor's primary objective was to win and that all operations are successful. He was not concerned about what happened to civilians, but he thought the amputations were making the revolution unpopular. If Charles Taylor had told Sam Bockarie to stop the amputations, they would have stopped. Charles Taylor and the NPFL were like the mother of the RUF. As the RUF grew up, they asked for advice from their mother. It could not be imagined that they would ever say no to Charles Taylor. They wouldn't even think of it.
113. The fighters were taught to make the people fearful, by killing them, beheading them, or crucifying them. The RUF over did it. The witness knows that because he did see these acts on BBC and CNN.
114. The Gambians came to Liberia to help Charles Taylor. They were planning on taking power from Jammeh in The Gambia. They initially had support from "The Farm", Libya. Ghadafi gave money to Dr. Manneh to assist him and the other Gambians to overthrow Jammeh but Manneh took off with the money. After that, the Gambians had to stay in Liberia with Taylor because they did not have logistics.
115. The LDF was initially created by Francois Massaquoi from Monrovia. He was not NPFL. He attempted to get money from the UN for the LDF to fight the NPFL. This did not happen and the LDF was then set up as a covert force of NPFL fighters to fight ULIMO. The NPFL could not openly fight ULIMO as there was a cease fire with ULIMO. The figure head of LDF was "Supowood". Liberian Mosquito was part of the LDF and Morris Kallon was the head of the RUF Vanguard.
116. Daniel Tamba, Col. Jungle, "Jungle", was with Benjamin Yeaten and "Mosquito" and they were always coming and going from Sierra Leone to Monrovia. They were always together "Jungle" was with Issa Sesay and the RUF in Kailahun in 1994. Charles Taylor would know because Yeaten would never send anyone to Sierra Leone without Charles Taylor's knowledge.
117. The NPFL FM radio station in Gbarnga was within range of Monrovia. Charles Taylor did speak on this radio station.

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118. Cobra Base was a training base before the election of Taylor. There were many Sierra Leoneans in the ATU after Taylor became President.
119. Jackson F. Doe ran for President and was killed during the revolution. The witness heard that he was killed on instructions from "The Top".
120. The witness knew of the diamond transactions but did not see them. The NPFL called the diamonds, stones.

12938

TF1 Number	Statements/Proffer	ERN
TF1-577	Proffer – 8 typed pages	/

WITNESS PROFFER
TF1-577

The Prosecution provides the following proffer as to the expected testimony of witness TF1-577. Information that could identify the witness has been removed as the witness is seeking protective measures. The witness is expected to testify to the following:

1. The Witness was captured by RUF rebels at in Kailahun District in May 1991.
2. He was taken to Pendembu for guerilla training with many others, hundreds of others, at Pendembu Vocational Secondary School. He was there for two months and then he was sent to the frontlines at Bunumbu as a fighter. KALLON was the battlefield commander there. The Witness was there for about seven months and then they had to retreat back across the river to Pendembu.
3. In the early 1990s there was regular radio communication between the Accused and Sankoh.
4. At about that time, i.e. 1992, the NPRC took over. There was a massive RUF retreat to Koindu and Buedu, almost to the Liberian border. The RUF then re-organized and took to the jungle.
5. In 1996, Foday SANKOH re-shuffled RUF people from one jungle to another and the Witness went to Zogoda. The frontline there was called "Kenema By-pass".
6. During the Abidjan peace talks, which the witness believes was in mid-1996, Sam BOCKARIE was then the RUF Field Commander. When Zogoda was attacked by the Kamajors and fell in 1996, Mohamed Tarawallie was declared missing in action and Sam Bockarie moved from Buedu to Kailahun town. After the departure of Foday Sankoh for the peace talks, Mohamed Tarawallie was formally left by Sankoh in charge of the RUF on the ground. However, Sam Bockarie was the one effectively giving the orders. When Mohamed Tarawallie was declared missing in action Sam Bockarie also became formally in control of the RUF on the ground. When the AFRC overthrew the Sierra Leone government, Foday SANKOH told them to join the AFRC so the Witness et al "came out of the jungle". The Witness went to Freetown. There was a deployment at Hastings, fighting ECOMOG forces.
7. Sam BOCKARIE advised senior RUF members to return to Kailahun, etc. to set up a defensive stance as BOCKARIE felt that the AFRC was going to collapse.
8. The Witness was in Koindu around July 1998 when troops from Guinea attacked the RUF "with a serious bombardment". The RUF fought the Guineans for about 15 months.

9. The Brigade Commander in Pendembu in 1999 was Colonel Dennis LANSANA, who reported directly to Issa Sesay at that time.
10. In early 2000, over 300 troops were disarmed at Daru to UN troops who were from India.
11. Sam BOCKARIE made a request to Charles TAYLOR for ammunition through someone named "Jungle".
12. Witness believes "Jungle" was a Gio tribesman from Liberia but does not know Jungle's real name. At that time the RUF was "under pressure, fighting pressure". Jungle went by helicopter to Monrovia and sent a Jeep full of ammunition to BOCKARIE. This was during the Dry Season and the Witness thinks it was before the AFRC overthrow of the Sierra Leone government.
13. Issa Sesay made a request for ammunition and medicine to Charles Taylor through a "General 50", who was in Vahun, Liberia. This occurred after the Lome Peace Accord was signed, probably in July 2000 because it was in the Rainy Season. "General 50" was a short man, a Gio tribesman, who was one of the "top authorities" or "top guys" in Charles TAYLOR's government. TAYLOR sent ammunition and medicine by helicopter to Vahun to General 50 to give to the RUF. It was then driven to Bomaru, Sierra Leone. From Bomaru, it was moved by foot at night by RUF soldiers to Pendembu and then to Manowa. Issa SESAY sent vehicles from Kono to Manowa to pick up the ammunition and vehicles.
14. The Witness heard that Charles TAYLOR was providing financial assistance to the RUF but he has no direct knowledge of any transaction.
15. The Witness says that, when the RUF controlled diamond mining areas, they organized civilians to mine diamonds for them. The Witness says he saw Foday SANKOH in the early part of the war (what the Witness refers to as "Phase One", i.e. the years 1991 and 1992) take diamonds. SANKOH took them to Charles TAYLOR to get ammunition, arms, rice and other food, medicine and other supplies.
16. When Sam BOCKARIE was the Battlefield Commander (in what the Witness calls "Phase Two", i.e. the period 1994 to 1996), after the re-capture of Kono from government forces, the diamonds were delivered to him. Sam BOCKARIE took the diamonds to Charles TAYLOR. Diamonds were also given to the Accused by BOCKARIE and exchanged for arms and ammunition in or around 1998/1999.
17. Issa SESAY also took diamonds to Charles TAYLOR.
18. The Witness is only aware of the very senior RUF people actually taking diamonds to Liberia.

19. The Witness remembers specifically that during the big RUF retreat in 1992, when under attack by NPRC, Foday SANKOH took diamonds to Charles TAYLOR and returned with anti-tank land mines and a weapon called a "chaser", which was an anti-aircraft weapon they could use against the Alpha jets.
20. Sam BOCKARIE was given a satellite telephone by Charles TAYLOR sometime after the AFRC takeover. The only person BOCKARIE would talk to on the satellite phone was the Accused. BOCKARIE would say that "the father" would be calling at a certain time. BOCKARIE would then move to an isolated area to take these calls. These calls were preceded by a radio message from "665" (their code for Liberia) that Charles TAYLOR was going to call BOCKARIE at a particular time.
21. Sam BOCKARIE spoke on the satellite phone at least six or seven times.
22. Prior to obtaining the satellite phone, Sam BOCKARIE spoke to Charles TAYLOR over the radio. BOCKARIE called TAYLOR "sir".
23. Generally Sam BOCKARIE would give Charles TAYLOR news about the latest developments in the movement or what the Witness says they referred to as a "salute report". TAYLOR would often give BOCKARIE advice on defensive strategies, offensive strategies, etc. For example, in 1994 or 1995 ("Phase Two") in Kono. TAYLOR gave BOCKARIE the plan (and supplied the ammunition, etc.) to take Kono so that the RUF could secure access to the diamond fields so they could finance the purchase of equipment, etc. Strategic advice continued to be given to BOCKARIE by the Accused in or around 1998 and 1999.
24. The Witness says that when Sam BOCKARIE became the Battlefield Commander of the RUF, his promotion to General was announced over RUF radio systems as being made by Charles TAYLOR.
25. The Accused promoted BOCKARIE to Chief of Defence Staff and General following the Intervention in 1998. The Accused at that time was the head of the NPFL and had the authority to pass orders to the RUF and to make promotions. Sam Bockarie who was the head of the RUF on the ground had the authority to make promotions within the RUF.
26. The Witness says that the war was initiated in 1991 by Liberians. They were the ones who captured young Sierra Leoneans, like the Witness himself, and trained them as combatants.
27. The Witness knew about RUF troops going to Liberia to fight LURD in 2000 or 2001. There was a radio message sent by Issa SESAY to RUF stations requesting manpower to go to Liberia to fight against the LURD. The Witness is aware of about 100 RUF combatants going to Vahun and Foya. Issa SESAY's message

referred to this as something done at the request of Charles TAYLOR to secure the border and Foya County. RUF troops went to fight against the LURD alongside Taylor's forces in 1999 and 2000. In 1999 Taylor instructed Bockarie to send RUF troops to fight the LURD in Liberia. In 2000 Taylor instructed Issa Sesay to do the same. Bockarie and Sesay had no choice but to comply with Taylor's instruction as both regarded Taylor at the time of the instruction as the Chief.

28. The Witness was abducted and trained by Liberians at Pendembu. The Witness says all his instructors were Liberians. They referred to themselves as NPFL or as "Special Forces". Prior to being abducted, the Witness had heard of Charles TAYLOR. The Witness knew that TAYLOR was a rebel leader of the group called the NPFL in Liberia. The Witness says that everybody knew that. The Witness recalls hearing TAYLOR being interviewed on the BBC before he was abducted by the rebels.
29. The Witness says even though these Liberians were from the NPFL, they "came under the umbrella of the RUF".
30. The Witness is familiar with the recruiting of boys into the RUF. He says the young kids were called the "SBUs", meaning Small Boy Units. The Witness says some of the kids were females but there was no special name for their unit. The Witness says some of the kids were as young as nine or ten. He could tell by looking at them but some of the young kids told him their ages. Children were recruited and trained in or around 1998 at Bunumbu Training Camp and used to fight.
31. The witness will give evidence about the shooting of recruits who tried to escape from Pendembu Vocational Secondary School.
32. The other RUF training base was at Quiver. After the Witness was trained, the RUF moved the training base at Pendembu to Kailahun. The one at Quiver was "dissolved".
33. The Witness does not think Charles TAYLOR was involved in the abduction of the UN troops in 2000 because "it was not a planned thing".
34. The captured vehicles and heavy weapons captured with those UN troops were transported through Segbwema on their way to Liberia and Charles TAYLOR. Radio messages came over the RUF system telling them that those captured weapons were going to "the father", i.e. Charles TAYLOR.
35. The Witness remembers that after the Intervention in 1998 Sam BOCKARIE announced on the radio system that Charles TAYLOR instructed the RUF and the AFRC to work together. A second instruction came after Johnny Paul Koroma had been arrested by the RUF in Kailahun and stripped of diamonds and put under

house arrest. Many AFRC soldiers who were working with the RUF in Kono and Kailahun at that time got very upset about the arrest and, therefore, the message was sent for them to keep working with the RUF.

36. After the ECOMOG forces chased the AFRC/RUF out of Freetown and into the jungle, there were problems between Johnny Paul KOROMA and Sam BOCKARIE which Charles TAYLOR mediated. TAYLOR talked to BOCKARIE on the satellite phone and BOCKARIE told people that he had been requested, along with Johnny Paul KOROMA, to go to Monrovia. Upon his return, BOCKARIE advised the RUF people that "the problem has been solved".
37. Issa SESAY spoke with Charles TAYLOR on the radio when SESAY was in Kono.
38. There were many times that Sam BOCKARIE and Issa SESAY went to Monrovia to discuss things personally with Charles TAYLOR. The Witness believes the detailed conversations or instructions were done at those face-to-face meetings. The Witness says that Sam BOCKARIE went to Monrovia frequently and regularly.
39. After Foday SANKOH's arrest in May 2000, Charles TAYLOR communicated with Issa SESAY in Kono. Issa SESAY and Charles TAYLOR communicated on the radio. TAYLOR wanted the RUF to take Sam BOCKARIE back. The overwhelming majority of RUF civilians and combatants said "No" to taking BOCKARIE back. The Witness believes that was the last time Issa SESAY (or the RUF) communicated with TAYLOR.
40. Issa SESAY, Morris KALLON, Augustine GBAO and other key RUF people used to communicate by radio. RUF radio operators were "Daf" (at Kono), KABBA (also based in Kono), "Ebony" (based in Kailahun; under Issa SESAY), "Sallasie" (ph.) (based in Kamakwe) and "Daddy Bock" (based in Segbwema).
41. In early 1998, supplies would arrive about two or three times a month from Liberia. Supplies only came from Liberia via Foya to Buedu, that the Witness knows of. When there was "pressure" from the enemy the frequency of supplies would increase as per requests by Sam BOCKARIE to Charles TAYLOR. If, for example, the RUF was planning an attack, BOCKARIE would contact TAYLOR and request a big shipment of ammunition.
42. By the time the RUF linked up with the AFRC, the rebels had enough weapons so the shipments of supplies thereafter consisted of ammunition and other things, not arms.
43. Frequent deliveries of ammunition, food and other supplies were made to Buedu in 1998, 1999 and 2000 and were brought by "Jungle" and/or "Zig Zag" MARZAH.

44. After Foday SANKOH had returned to Sierra Leone and signed the Lome Peace Accord, Sam BOCKARIE disagreed with SANKOH's actions as he was power-hungry and wanted the RUF to attack Freetown and take control of the government. Three UN envoys traveled by helicopter to Buedu to discuss matters with BOCKARIE. BOCKARIE arrested them. SANKOH told BOCKARIE to release them but BOCKARIE refused and kept them for about three days. Only after Charles TAYLOR intervened did BOCKARIE release the UN people. Shortly thereafter BOCKARIE radioed to Segbwema to instruct Battalion Commander Mohamed "GMG" KOVOMA to blockade the highway and gear up for an attack on ECOMOG forces at the Daru barracks. BOCKARIE sent over 100 men from Buedu to reinforce the RUF forces in Segbwema for the attack. Their commander was "Big Darling". BOCKARIE also advised that Charles TAYLOR was sending ammunition and manpower from Liberia to augment the attack. Foday SANKOH monitored the address by BOCKARIE and thereafter addressed all RUF stations, instructing them to ignore what BOCKARIE was saying as SANKOH was still in charge and any such action would be detrimental to the Peace Accord. SANKOH ordered Issa SESAY to arrest BOCKARIE as BOCKARIE had "betrayed the movement".
45. When BOCKARIE's men arrived at Segbwema for Buedu they were arrested and jailed. Augustine GBAO, Issa SESAY and Morris KALLON came to Segbwema and then headed to Buedu to arrest BOCKARIE. BOCKARIE was aware they were coming for him so he gathered up his family and some loyal troops and fled to Foya. Issa SESAY traveled to Buedu. There he heard that BOCKARIE had encountered the Liberians coming from Foya to Sierra Leone and had advised them to turn back because of the developments.
46. The RUF followed BOCKARIE to Foya and the ones who got that far were arrested and beaten on the orders of Charles TAYLOR. RUF people who were in that group that got beaten up, such as (Vanguard) Momoh ROGERS, said that they were told by the Liberians who beat them that they did so on the orders of Charles TAYLOR.
47. Prior to the Junta period, BOCKARIE traveled to Gbarnga where the Accused was to receive arms and ammunition from the RUF in Sierra Leone.
48. In or around 1998 and 1999 BOCKARIE's bodyguards were instructed to purchase goods near the Guinean border using USD100 bills obtained from Liberia by the RUF.
49. Meetings in 1998 in Kailahun district with representatives of the Accused (Jungle and another very important Liberian General) and AFRC/RUF commanders at which the instructions from the Accused to take over Kono and the diamonds fields were discussed. Jungle was there in the meeting to demonstrate that Charles Taylor was still behind the RUF.

50. The Accused's order to construct an airfield in 1998 in Buedu for the deliveries of material from Liberia.
60. After the fall of Zogoda but before the AFRC coup in May 1997, the RUF seized a 40 barrel missile in Kambia district from the Guinean troops. The RUF tried to move that weapon but could not transport it beyond the Manowa crossing point in Kailahun district. In 1999, the Accused sent several of his men to repair the weapons. The RUF was told that after the repair the Accused would send a woman called Martina to teach the RUF how to use the weapon. This never happened as the weapon was destroyed by an Alpha Jet when the Liberians were working on repairing it.
61. The RUF forced some civilians to mine diamonds in Kono district after the first Intervention. This continued until disarmament. Some dug diamonds voluntarily in Kono district but others did not want to do it and were forced by the RUF. In any case no one was trusted when it came to the mining of diamonds and RUF armed guards in Kono always sat and watched the men digging diamonds all day in case some diamonds were pocketed by the civilians.
62. In Kono after the first Intervention, civilians were also forced by the RUF to go on food finding missions and to transport arms, ammunition and other loads. There was a pass system in existence in Kono district at that time and civilians could not move freely. If a civilian moved without a pass he would be interrogated and possibly treated like a spy. When the RUF soldiers went to villages in Kono in 1998 they used to loot goods and foodstuffs from the civilians.
63. Massacre of civilians by CO Savage in 1998 in Tombodu.
64. After the first Intervention in February 1998 a lot of civilians were abducted by the retreating AFRC and RUF troops. These civilians were brought to Kono and Kailahun districts. A lot of women brought to Kono were raped by AFRC and RUF fighters and forced to work for them. Some young boys were used in Kono by AFRC and RUF commanders to work for their wives.
65. Involvement of the Accused in the departure of Sam Bockarie from the RUF at the end of 1999.
66. ULIMO forces from Liberia and the government troops of Sierra Leone cut off the Liberia border which in turn cut off the supply of ammunition from the NPFL to Liberia to the RUF in Sierra Leone. The supply route from Liberia to Sierra Leone was cut off from late 1992 to 1996.
67. The witness thinks that Charles Taylor never spoke to Sam BOCKARIE before the arrest of Foday Sankoh.

68. In November 1998, Issa Sesay was acting Chief of Defence Staff of the RUF as Sam Bockarie had gone to Liberia to get arms and ammunition for the late 1998 offensive.
69. Foday Sankoh went back to Freetown in October 1999 and Sam Bockarie left the RUF in December 1999. On May 8th 2000, Foday Sankoh was arrested in Freetown shortly after the abduction by RUF troops of UN soldiers in Sierra Leone.
70. Following disarmament, there was some harassment of civilians in Tongo.
71. Sam Bockarie took diamonds to the Accused in Liberia only after he was promoted to General after the Intervention. Sam Bockarie made trips to see the Accused frequently in 1998 and 1999. When Bockarie went to Monrovia, he always had diamonds with him and met with the Accused. Bockarie told everyone that he was taking the diamonds to the Accused. Sam Bockarie was someone who liked to show off and impress people and he always showed the diamonds to people.
72. Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie were very close in 1998 and 1999 and even shared the same bodyguards.
73. Kailahun district was the RUF's stronghold and had been under RUF occupation for many years. At one point in time, civilians were forced to work and produce goods for the RUF in Kailahun district but in 1998 onwards that was not the case anymore as the civilians had been with the RUF for so long and agreed to work for food.
74. The witness knows that a lot of the women had to have sex with the commander or soldiers assigned to them and many of them had little choice. However the witness said that if any of these women reported a case of rape to the G5 action would be taken against the RUF man responsible. But the witness said that it would have been difficult for a woman to complain about an important RUF commander. The women who were not distributed to anyone were left on their own and some of them were sexually abused by several RUF men.
75. Some of the small boys who were abducted during the retreat after the Intervention were sent to Kailahun district and the strongest ones sent for training at Bunumbu training camp. Some of them were as young as 8 years old and many of these small boys were sent to fight after their training.

12947

TF1 Number	Statements/Proffer	ERN
TF1-579	Proffer – 7 typed pages	/

WITNESS PROFFER
TF1-579

The Prosecution provides the following proffer as to the expected testimony of witness TF1-579. Information that could identify the witness has been removed as the witness is seeking protective measures. The witness is expected to testify to the following:

1. Joining the NPFL in 1990.
2. Training took place over a period of three months and there he learned to use, dismantle and assemble an AK-47, learned about cover and concealment and hand to hand combat. Children as young as 13, 14 and 15 years old were trained. They were all volunteers. They all received the same training. During the training, they were never taught about how to treat civilians or captured enemy fighters. It was guerrilla training at that time.
3. The witness stated that there was a base called Cobra Base where they trained the S.S. Cobra Unit at Gbatala. The Cobra Unit being trained was attached to the S.S.S. and they possessed long range weapons.
4. The witness was aware of a place called Naama which was a camp where a group of NPFL soldiers were based. The witness was not aware of any training going on there.
5. RUF fighters were in Gbarnga, including "JUNGLE", who was a Liberian, and Foday SANKOH. Foday SANKOH had a house was located near Sugar Hill and this was not far from the Mansion.
6. When Sam BOCKARIE came to Monrovia he would stay at "A.B. Tolbert Road", which was a compound of three or four houses.
7. When Sam BOCKARIE came to Monrovia he brought fighting men who would have joined the ATU. These men would have been trained at the ATU Base in Gbatala. Many of them then became members of the ATU Presidential motorcade.
8. Sam BOCKARIE traveled to several countries outside Liberia.
9. Sam BOCKARIE returned to Liberia because of a conflict with André, an Ivorian Commander.
10. Sam BOCKARIE was killed by Benjamin YEATEN and his group. Sam BOCKARIE's murder was made to look like BOCKARIE was killed while trying to enter Liberia and killed during a battle with the Liberian Government forces. This created the illusion that BOCKARIE had not been in Liberia. Moses BLAH

carried the order to Benjamin YEATEN to have Sam BOCKARIE killed. This order came from Charles TAYLOR. The LURD attacked Monrovia for the third time in about mid 2003; Sam Bockarie was killed not long before this third attack.

11. "JUNGLE" (Liberian) was a liaison between Foday SANKOH and Charles TAYLOR. It was JUNGLE who acted as an "Aide de Camp" to Foday SANKOH.
12. From time to time JUNGLE would be the person that Foday SANKOH would send to Charles TAYLOR.
13. JUNGLE was a former NPFL fighter and went to the RUF. JUNGLE took training with Foday SANKOH's group that went into Sierra Leone.
14. In 1999 instructions were given by Charles TAYLOR to give supplies of ammunition to JUNGLE to carry to Sam BOCKARIE in Sierra Leone. JUNGLE and Sampson WYEE went to Buedu with arms and ammunition from White Flower.
15. JUNGLE, Sampson WYEE and Zig Zag MARZAH had previously taken ammunition to Buedu.
16. The witness heard that a group led by Foday SANKOH wanted to go into Freetown and overthrow the president of Sierra Leone. Sankoh had a meeting with NPFL commanders at that time. Sankoh said that Taylor had given the order to start the war in Sierra Leone and that fighters were on standby to do that.
17. Foday SANKOH was in Bomi Hills. Foday SANKOH's forces aided by the NPFL crossed into Sierra Leone from Bomi Hills in late 1990. Charles Taylor ordered the NPFL to assist Foday SANKOH's force in entering into Sierra Leone. The NPFL armed and supplied this force. The arms would have come from Gbarnga and under the orders of Charles TAYLOR.
18. Oliver VANNEY was executed. Benjamin YEATEN would have escorted him to his execution. No one but Charles Taylor would have had the authority to order that.
19. Foday SANKOH had meetings with Charles TAYLOR in Gbarnga during the early 1990s. Foday Sankoh was always at Gbarnga.
20. The witness stated that he has knowledge of the Small Boys Unit (S.B.U.) which was a unit comprised of young boys from the ages of 9 to 17. The overall commander of the S.B.U. was Zopon JOHNSON. Charles TAYLOR had these small boys doing security. Small boys were platoon leaders or squadron leaders.

21. Forces from Liberia entered Sierra Leone supported by small boys. SBUs fought in Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor was aware of SBUs being used as fighters. Zopon Johnson, the commander of the SBUs, reported directly to Charles Taylor.
22. Combat forces fighting in Liberia against the LURD forces were assisted by small boys.
23. The RUF from Sierra Leone assisted Taylor's forces in the fighting against the LURD, just as it had when Taylor was fighting the ULIMO. The RUF assisted to keep the border open and to clear the route to allow supplies to flow to them.
24. Benjamin Yeaten ordered arms and ammunition to be taken to Sam Bockarie in Buedu at the end of 1999 and after. Benjamin Yeaten was operating on the basis of instructions received from the President. On another occasion Yeaten ordered a shipment of clothing items taken to Mosquito.
25. SAMPSON, Zig Zag MARZAH and Daniel TAMBA "Jungle" were involved in taking supplies and ammunition to Buedu and Jungle made frequent trips to deliver ammunition to Sierra Leone in 1998 and 1999. Jungle was a liaison between Charles Taylor and the RUF.
26. Mosquito was the overall RUF commander when Foday SANKOH was in jail in Togo and Issa SESAY was the deputy-commander.
27. When Mosquito was in Liberia the Liberian Government was responsible to provide security to Mosquito. Mosquito traveled with his own bodyguards who were Sierra Leonean. Mosquito was living fulltime in Monrovia as he had left Sierra Leone after a conflict with Issa SESAY. Issa SESAY had become the overall commander of the RUF in Sierra Leone.
28. Mosquito used to bring diamonds to Charles TAYLOR to get ammunition.
29. The RUF had Sierra Leonean people digging diamonds in RUF controlled areas. There were security people monitoring the digging Mosquito received daily reports on the quantity of diamonds that were collected.
30. The diamonds were exchanged for ammunition.
31. Foday SANKOH was a close friend of Charles TAYLOR and the RUF were trained at Camp Naama, by the NPFL. At that time Charles TAYLOR was the over-all Commander of the NPFL.
32. Mosquito used to call Charles TAYLOR "Chief".
33. Charles TAYLOR was observed by some to be also the over-all Commander of the RUF as TAYLOR gave the order to Sam BOCKARIE to come to Monrovia

and to leave the leadership of the RUF to Issa SESAY. Mosquito made a statement to BBC to the effect that he was taking "direct instruction from my Chief Taylor and I do whatever he tells me to do."

34. Charles TAYLOR gave instruction to Mosquito to bring his forces to fight against the ULIMO. Mosquito came with a very large force armed with heavy weapons to fight against the ULIMO. Taylor would send ammunition to the RUF. The RUF pushed back the ULIMO forces and the Commander of the RUF for this battle was Abu KEYTA (ph- spelling provided by the witness), a Sierra Leonean. When the border was re-opened the RUF got regular supplies from Liberia.
35. There was a conflict between Issa SESAY and Mosquito about how to split the diamonds. Charles Taylor was given some of the diamonds. Foday SANKOH asked the "Chief" (Charles TAYLOR) to have Mosquito removed and have Issa SESAY put in charge of the RUF. After that, Mosquito left Sierra Leone and came to Monrovia.
36. In the middle part of 2000, there was international pressure on Charles TAYLOR "to turn over" Mosquito.
37. Charles TAYLOR spoke on the BBC saying that Mosquito was in Liberia and it was based on an agreement with Sierra Leone, that Mosquito came to Liberia- to help bring an end to the problems in Sierra Leone.
38. In 2003, several wounded soldiers both NPFL from Liberia and RUF from Sierra Leone were killed by Zig Zag MARZAH with Benjamin YEATEN in charge of the operation. Charles TAYLOR did not want those men talking and that they wanted to get rid of the evidence. Benjamin YEATEN took those men to an area called Combat Camp outside of Monrovia on the Bomi Highway. Those men were told that they were all going to be paid and they were brought by truck to this area and all shot.
39. When the NPFL attacked Liberia the NPFL captured people and forced them to carry loads, to give up their food, and physically harmed them. The NPFL told the people how the Krahn were killing Gio's and that the people must fight to protect themselves and their group.
40. Cassius Jacob was the overall commander of Cobra Base at Gbatala. The training commander was Matthew Kato. Benjamin Yeaten was the overall instructor. The Gambian training instructors whom the witness remembers were Lamine, Jack the Rebel and Camparre.
41. Cassius Jacob was also Chief of Staff in Gbarnga, that is, the commander in charge of Gbarnga. Charles Taylor gave the order to execute Cassius Jacob.
42. Moses Duoh was the G4 at Gbarnga.

43. In 1993, ULIMO controlled Lofa City and the border area between Sierra Leone and Liberia.
44. The LDF, Lofa Defence Force, was a militia group which fought against ULIMO in Lofa County. The leaders of LDF came to Charles Taylor to get his permission and support to fight against ULIMO. Taylor supported them. They were NPFL.
45. Some of the Liberians who were among the first fighters in Sierra Leone stayed there and became part of the RUF. In the early years, NPFL fighters from Gbarnga were constantly going into Sierra Leone to fight alongside the RUF. Throughout the war in Sierra Leone Taylor's fighters were going there to fight alongside the RUF.
46. Charles Taylor created militias while he was in Gbarnga. The militia groups included Marine, Army, Navy, Jungle Fire, Strike Force, Jungle Warriors. The militias reported to Charles Taylor. The militias had been in existence during the conflict in Liberia. After he became President, Charles Taylor was not satisfied with the Armed Forces of Liberia, the AFL. When the LURD attacked, Taylor began to use the militias again. He gave money to the commanders and they put the units together again.
47. In early 1999, Sam Bockarie was in Congo Town, Monrovia to see "the Old Man". Charles Taylor was called: "Chief", "Old Man" and "Papay".
48. Charles Taylor summoned Issa Sesay, Mosquito and Superman to Monrovia in order to settle the fighting between them, but problems later developed. Charles Taylor told Sam Bockarie to leave the leadership to Issa Sesay and to come to Monrovia. Very shortly after that, Sam Bockarie left the RUF and came to Liberia.
49. The Sierra Leoneans who traveled to Liberia with Sam Bockarie were trained at the Gbatala base and became ATU members. Some of them, later broke away from Sam Bockarie.
50. After Sam Bockarie left the RUF Issa Sesay continued to receive arms and ammunition which was escorted by Zig Zag and the others. Sesay came to Monrovia to see Charles Taylor.
51. Witness will provide details regarding the killing of Sam Bockarie including that the murder was carried out on the orders of the Accused as he did not want his relationship with the RUF and Sam Bockarie to be exposed.
52. During the period 1990 to 1996 people, listened to the radio. BBC radio reported about atrocities committed by rebel forces in Liberia; the NPFL were accused of killing and raping civilians, looting, burning homes. Charles Taylor and NPFL

spokesmen spoke on the radio denying these accusations. They said that the NPFL never committed any of these crimes against civilians. At times the news reporter would ask about child soldiers and they would deny that the NPFL had child soldiers.

53. The witness was told that Charles Taylor said that Sierra Leone will know the bitterness of war.
54. There was a satellite TV at the Executive Mansion in Gbarnga.
55. 1997 to 2000 - during this time many people listened to the radio including BBC. There were radio reports of the RUF raping, killing, amputating civilians and looting and burning buildings in Sierra Leone.
56. In 2000 to 2001 it was on the news that Charles Taylor was accused of supporting the RUF in Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor was on the news denying any involvement with the RUF.
57. During the conflict in Liberia Charles Taylor always wanted to know everything that was going on in the controlled areas. Whatever Charles Taylor told the commanders to do, they would do. If the commanders refused they would be arrested and jailed. If Charles Taylor told the commanders not to do anything they would not do it.
58. Charles Taylor was the boss for Benjamin Yeaten. Benjamin Yeaten was second in command to Charles Taylor. Moses Blah was the Vice President, but Benjamin Yeaten had the power.
59. The witness defined long range weapons as AK 47s up to BZT guns.
60. The witness knew of General Ibrahim. He was a big man. General Ibrahim was very close with Mosquito and worked with Mosquito to get diamonds from the RUF controlled areas. Jungle and Zig Zag sometimes escorted General Ibrahim. General Ibrahim would visit Charles Taylor.
61. Sunlight was the senior radio operator for Benjamin Yeaten. Sunlight used to communicate for Benjamin Yeaten with the RUF. He would receive or monitor communications regarding the RUF.
62. Memuna was the chief RUF radio operator.
63. General Abu Keita was one of the commanders in the RUF in the early 90s. Keita had been a ULIMO fighter who then went to Sierra Leone and joined the RUF.
64. General Fassu was a strong NPFL fighter. He was feared because he was a Deputy Chief of Staff in the Marine Division. He was close to Charles Taylor. .

65. Varmuya Sheriff was a fighter for ULIMO who later broke away and joined Charles Taylor. Sheriff was in the SSS.
66. Joe Montgomery was in the SSS.
67. General Domingo was a Gambian fighter who was killed in Monrovia by ULIMO-J headed by Roosevelt Johnson's group.
68. Martina Johnson was a commander. She took orders from Charles Taylor. Later, she was in charge of security at Roberts Field.
69. The Wild Geese Unit was a special unit. It was a militia group commanded by Matthew Chaplea.
70. Mustapha Jallow was a Gambian fighter who used to be in charge of Charles Taylor's convoy. He was one of the first generals fighting in Lofa. He was in charge of a militia group fighting against ULIMO and later, against the LURD. ULIMO was changed to LURD, but the same fighters remained.
70. Eddie Kanneh was a senior officer for the RUF and an advisor for Mosquito. He came to Monrovia and lived there when Mosquito left the RUF. He came with Sam Bockarie to see Charles Taylor. Eddie Kanneh used to travel with Sam Bockarie to Monrovia before Bockarie left the RUF.
71. Jack the Rebel was a Special Forces fighter who came with Charles Taylor when he attacked Liberia. This Jack the Rebel was the original Jack the Rebel.
72. John Tarnue was a member of the NPFL. He was a front line supervisor. Later he was the AFL Commanding General in Liberia.
73. NPFL fighters in Liberia would buy looted goods, such as TVs, from RUF fighters before the Junta period.

12955

TF1 Number	Statements/Proffer	ERN
TF1-584	Proffer – 8 typed pages	/

WITNESS PROFFER
TF1-584

The Prosecution provides the following proffer as to the expected testimony of witness TF1-584. Information that could identify the witness has been removed as the witness is seeking protective measures. The witness is expected to testify to the following:

1. Villagers were captured and confined. Witness' village in Kailahun captured when the war started. Witness was confined to the village in April 1991, along with over 100 other villagers, including her family, elderly people and young babies. The fighters did not wear uniforms, but some wore traditional robes. The fighters stayed in the village for three days. Because of their Liberian accents, witness believed all but one to be Liberian. Some of the other fighters were named: "Alice" (a Liberian of the Kissy Tribe), Phillip and Alfonso.
2. The first group left after three days and moved to Pendembu. A second rebel group, calling themselves "reinforcements" took over guarding the village at this time. They looted. Most spoke Liberian.
3. Witness and brother were taken to a training camp. The rebels took small groups there at a time, between the ages of 8 and 30. Men and women were separated. Children between the ages of 8 and 12 were trained in SBU's and SGU's. There were 300 recruits training. Witness trained for 3 months.
4. The witness heard the names of Sam Tuah, "Dupo Menkarzen" and Charles Timber, but did not see them.
5. The witness was trained with sticks, rather than guns and learned how to crawl, manoeuvre, set ambushes, parade, march, execute guerrilla warfare. Trainees were allowed to go home on a 3 day pass if they were sick. If they didn't return, the rebels would go to their house and loot it. The trainees stood in a line and held out their hands for food. There was never enough. If a trainee refused to be trained, they would be beaten or shot.
6. After training, witness was taken to Kailahun. The NPFL released witness. Many men went to the front lines. Isaac Mongor, a Liberian, Eldred Collins and CO Kargbo were present. Witness believes Foday Sankoh was still in Liberia.
7. Witness went on food-finding missions with the rebels when back in the village. They went to deserted villages looking for food or would appoint a town commander amongst the civilians to be in charge of providing them with food. If the town commander refused or did not have food for them, they would be beaten or shot.
8. At this time, the witness called the rebels "commandos". The fighters were from Liberia and Burkina Faso and called themselves "Special Forces". Witness did not hear of the "RUF" until later.

9. In the early dry season of 1992, witness fled. Shortly thereafter, but before the "Top 20" started, the fighters arrested witness's father and tied both him and the witness up. They looted and then burned witness's house. The witness's family escaped over night to the Guinean border.
10. Witness went to Liberia.
11. "Top 20" occurred while witness was in Liberia. In Nijandehun Mambabu, NPFL soldiers killed junior commandoes, took babies alive from their mothers' wombs and ate humans.
12. There was a cease fire in Liberia. Armed men travelled from Kolahun to Sierra Leone. In early rainy season, witness saw Foday Sankoh in a vehicle with a convoy. Combatants on the street said Foday Sankoh's bodyguards were Sierra Leonean. Only military vehicles and armed men drove across the border, civilians did not. They would drive from Kolahun to Voinjama and Monrovia.
13. Foday Sankoh was in Kailahun.
14. CO Rashid had replaced CO Kargbo as RUF Battle Group Commander. Mohammed Tarawallie was the Battle Field Commander. Some Liberians were there, including Sam Koleh, "Purvey" (sic) and JR.
15. In the Dawa area (on the border) during the dry season of 1993, CO Mohamed was in charge. There were no combat activities at that time because of government pressure and there was no link with NPFL at that time because of ULIMO pressure. Issa Sesay was based about 2 or 3 miles away.
16. In Ngiema CO Papa was the commander. Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie had been there, but left for Zogoda. Superman was in Peyama at the time.
17. Orders were given for the group to go to Peyama and then to open a northern jungle. Superman and his forces were already at Peyama Base. They stayed there for about 2 weeks before going to Masingbi. They attacked towns all along the way to Masingbi. They spent one week in Boajibu, crossed the Sewa River and went through Barma and Konte. They were in Masingbi for one day and were attacked by government troops.
18. A jungle base was set up at Kangari Hills. During this time, the RUF set up ambushes on Kono. These ambushes were set on both military and civilian targets. Civilians were abducted and weapons, food and ammunition were taken.
19. In 1994 when Mohamed Tarawallie received the order to open up the western jungle at Malal Hills. He left Kangari Hills. There was an attack on Kangari by a jet bomber, so they moved to "Blackwater".
20. There was a conflict over "Peace before election", so CO Mohamed - who was still at Western Jungle - ordered Operation Stop Election to disrupt the election process. Fighters attacked towns, which broke the cease fire. CO Georgie was the commander at that time.
21. Before Foday Sankoh went to Abidjan, he flew by helicopter to the different jungles to speak with the fighters about the talks. Others present with Foday Sankoh in

Abidjan: Phillip Sannoh, Martin Moyama, Sahr James, Phillip Palmer, Francis Musa.

22. At about that time, there was an order from Foday Sankoh that there should be no offensive attacks, but they should be prepared to defend if necessary. There was to be no carrying of arms at that time.
23. On November 30, the day of the signing of the peace accord, the Kamajors attacked "Blackwater". Everyone scattered in the bush and remained near Matatoka, but on the run from the Kamajors, for many months. The Kamajors attacked Matatoka. In the headquarters for the Kono District at Ngaya there were more SLA's than RUF's at the base. Major Shek Mamoud was the overall Brigade commander.
24. Morris Kallon was the mining commander of Kono at the time. He was based in Koidu and had guards to watch the civilian miners to ensure they didn't take any of the diamonds. Witness did not participate in the mining and did not witness it, but said it was common knowledge at the time.
25. CO Isaac Mongor was the RUF commander in Koidu. RUF commanders were going back and forth between Kono and Freetown.
26. When Freetown was overrun, the soldiers were ordered to "Pay Themselves" and there was widespread looting. "55" was present. Some soldiers surrendered.
27. The junta forces, led by Akim, recaptured Kono from the Kamajors. Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay, JPK, Paolo Bangura and most of the AFRC, including Eddie Kanneh, were there. They all left for Kailahun the next day. There were many corpses in Koidu. They drove to Superman Ground, aka PC Ground.
28. Superman was the overall commander in Kono, with Komba Gbundema in command of the Yomadu area, Savage and other SLAs at Tombodu. Witness did not see civilians at PC Ground.
29. Abducted men, women and children were brought to the base for training. Morris Kallon was the commander in charge of the mining going on at the outskirts of Koidu. The RUF were obtaining arms and ammunition in exchange for the diamonds.
30. Komba Gbundema was in charge of mining at #11. Witness heard of atrocities in Tombodu. CO Rocky killed a soldier, cut off his head and put it in a rice bag. Commanders investigated and brought Rocky to Superman Ground where he was put in the dungeon for 61 days.
31. Issa Sesay stripped diamonds from the wife of JPK. Those diamonds were supposed to be for arms and ammunition. This became general knowledge at that time (before "Fitti Fatta"). Fonti Kanu had been dispatched to Monrovia to get weapons and ammunition.
32. SB called a meeting in Buedu for all commanders to discuss the incident since anyone else would have been killed for losing diamonds.
33. At the meeting, what had happened with the diamonds that had been given to Issa Sesay was discussed. Witness didn't attend the meetings. Sam Bockarie was

advised there were arms and ammunition at Dawa. It was collected at night by Bockarie and his bodyguards.

34. Sam Bockarie hosted 7 Liberians, Loma men and traditional herbalists, at that time who performed a ceremony for many of the fighters. The fighters were given bullet proof clothing and "protective" marks.
35. Superman and his group, which now included the 7 Liberians, left 3 days after arriving at Buedu and walked back to Superman Ground, carrying some of the arms and ammunition such as AK rifles, mortar bombs, RPGs and ammunition which had been brought from Dawa by Bockarie. The trip took 3 days.
36. Sam Bockarie requested all target commanders in the Kono area to report to Superman Ground to get their bullet protection marks before setting out on the "Fitti Fatta" operation. There was another ceremony and Superman received these marks. The herbalists spoke Gbandi.
37. "Fitti Fatta" meant the abundance of weapons, manpower and supplies for attacking Koidu. Three separate groups attacked: Superman's group attacked from Superman Ground, Komba Gbundema's group from Sandor Chiefdom attacked through Tombodu, and the third group moved from the south and the area of Ganderhun.
38. The junta captured some arms and ammunitions from the Guineans, but the mission failed. Morris Kallon was at Superman Ground during Fitti Fatta.
39. There was an ambush of ECOMOG troops around the Kono - Freetown highway near Njaima-Sewafe where vehicles and trucks were attacked.
40. The witness heard about the amputations after Fitti Fatta. During amputations, before cutting off a limb they would say in Krio: "Man den get mind oh before den cut people (civilians) den han, den they tell them say pull u han pa de wor". Pull your hand out of the war.
41. After the Sani Abacha death, Sam Bockarie ordered Superman to go and kill SAJ Musa and his men in Korubonla. Witness thinks order related to JPK because JPK was imprisoned in a cave at the time. Superman refused.
42. Two weeks after "Fitti Fatta", Superman sent Komba Gbundema with an advanced team of 100 men and arms, ammunition and supplies. Superman left 4 days later. Morris Kallon was left in charge.
43. Komba Gbundema's advance defense group met the fighters at Wordu. The attack group, with Superman, had already left to go to Korunbonla. Present were: Superman, Saj Musa, General Bropleh, Komba Gbundema, Mohamed Kallon @ Gugumeh, "05", Major CY, Gullit, Alfred Brown. Superman was still the top commander for the RUF. SAJ Musa for the SLA, General Bropleh for the STF. The three groups were: Red Lion Battalion (made up of SLA, RUF and STF), Strike Force Battalion and the STF.
44. Gen Bropleh - commander of STF had his own battalion of mainly Liberians and ex-ULIMO fighters. Battalion included Col. Wallace, "Sea Never Dry", Colonel Ngallah, Major Koroma, and "Senegalese".

45. There was a training base at Koinadugu. Training commander was "Alabama" (one of SAJ Musa's bodyguards). Recruits were male and female from the age of 14 years old.
46. "Red Lion Battalion" was formed from 3 different groups. There were more than 400 fighters in battalion with "05" as commander and Major CY as deputy commander. Alfred Brown and King Perry were in this group. This group went to Rosos to assist a group that had been cut off.
47. There were communications between the Red Lion Battalion at Camp Rosos and Superman's group in December 1998 and January 1999.
48. The second attack on Kabala did not succeed. There were fighters with bush wives at Koinadugu. Some of the women were from Koinadugu and went home at the end of the day. There was an air raid on the base at Koinadugu during dry season (October-November). Afterward, the fighters went into the jungle during day and town at night.
49. There was in-fighting in October-November. It started as Sam Bockarie spoke to BBC on the group's behalf. SAJ Musa did not like that and collected money so that Tina Musa could purchase satellite phone and he could speak to the international community, too.
50. It was discovered that a soldier had kept money for himself. One of SAJ Musa's bodyguards, Elba, took the man and beat him to death. Superman arrested him, which angered SAJ Musa. SAJ Musa arrested RUF fighters.
51. Tombaras attacked a combat camp at Koinadugu.
52. Komba Gbundema attacked Alikalia. There were three attacks. ECOMOG and government troops were present. There were many civilian casualties, houses burned, arms and ammunition captured. The attacks were not successful. This happened in November/ December 1998 before the Yifin attack.
53. RUF attacked Yifin from Pumpkin Ground. There was a captured Nigerian ECOMOG soldier and two Sierra Leonean soldiers. Houses were burned down by RUF and SLAs. Burning was an SLA infantry tactic to make sure the enemy didn't get them. The rear group burned as they left. Sometimes they were disciplined for this, but not in this case.
54. Pa Demba told Saj Musa to meet with Superman and Freetown would not be captured if it was not done. Saj Musa did not.
55. Superman was not communicating with RUF in Buedu.
56. Some of the SGUs and SBUs and civilians were handed over to Pa Demba, a traditional herbalist.
57. Superman went toward Makeni. In early December, he passed Bumbana when he was bombed by jet. It happened around 6 pm and there were lots of injuries. RUF forces made camp around the village for two days. It was then bombed again.

58. Koidu had fallen to the RUF. RUF Rambo and Short Bai Bureh and troops were on their way to Makeni. Mosquito instructed Superman (in mid-December) to attack Makeni. Magburaka was already captured.
59. Superman sent Komba Gbundema and an advance team were to attack Teko Barracks. Colonel Tee, Gugumeh, and "TNT" were present.
60. Superman, after not hearing from Komba Gbundema for three days, attacked Binkolo with fighters. Houses and a grain house were set on fire. A missionary house was looted and a vehicle taken.
61. There was no more fighting between Superman and Sam Bockarie.
62. Superman attacked Makeni on Christmas Eve. The Magburka forces and Issa Sesay were already there. Everything but barracks was already captured. There were many casualties. The first attack on the barracks was not successful – civilians fled there for safety. An ECOMOG tank was captured and disabled. An ECOMOG helicopter flew out the senior officers. Superman captured the barracks after 12 hours of fighting.
63. The Guineans had retreated from Kabala as Sam Bockarie had ordered. "50" was a Liberian, and was at Buedu before Fitti Fatta.
64. Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay and their men went to arrest Superman at his house in Makeni. He disappeared while they waited. The house looted and there was shooting. Col T was still in Makeni with SLAs.
65. Details regarding RUF Rambo [aka Boston Flomo] attempts to make peace between Issa Sesay and Superman in the period before the Freetown invasion.
66. Superman started communicating again with "05" after the death of SAJ Musa.
67. In the period just prior to and during the Freetown invasion on 6 January 1999, Superman's group based at Lunsar was communicating with Sam Bockarie in Buedu.
68. There were regular communications during the Freetown invasion between Sam Bockarie in Buedu and Gullit in Freetown in which Bockarie issued orders to Gullit.
69. Present in Freetown were "Gullit", "55", Major CY, King Perry, Alfred Brown, Yellow Man. Witness first heard of invasion from BBC. Most prisoners from Pademba Road prison were released, including Gibril Massaquoi, Steve Bio, ex-president Joseph Momoh, and former ministers and soldiers.
70. There was heavy fighting in Freetown and State House was lost. ECOMOG was reinforced and the Red Lion Battalion was pushed back.
71. In order around the time the rebels lost State House during the January 1999 invasion, Sam Bockarie ordered Gullit to "burn" Freetown and attack civilians.
72. During the Freetown invasion, Sam Bockarie ordered RUF Rambo based in Makeni and Superman based in Lunsar to take their fighters and provide reinforcements to Gullit in Freetown.

73. Superman's group stayed at Yams Farm for 2 days to create safe corridor for the people from Freetown as Sam Bockarie ordered.
74. Fighters from Freetown and prisoners from Pademba Road Prison including Gibril Massaquoi were arriving to Yams Farm. Bockarie gave instructions to Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon to collect all freed prisoners including Massaquoi and to take them to Buedu. Superman disagreed that Massaquoi should be sent to Buedu.
75. Superman's group withdrew to Lumpa before Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay arrived at Waterloo. There were RUF and SLA fighters in Waterloo. Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon were looting returning soldiers. They had trucks and required loot in exchange for travel to Makeni. There was no infighting, but there was tension at Waterloo. Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon went back to Buedu.
76. Superman went back to Lunsar. There was a 3rd attack on Lunsar by Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and RUF Rambo. They tried to capture Massaquoi, but were unsuccessful. Issa Sesay fled to Makeni and left the vehicles. Superman chased them and there was fighting to Makeni. The SLAs joined Superman because they were not treated fairly by the RUF group in Makeni.
77. General Bropleh never moved from Makeni. Issa Sesay went to Kono.
78. During the ceasefire, there was a senior officer meeting attended by high ranking individuals such as Superman, Gibril Massaquoi, CO Isaac, Tall and Short, Komba Gbundema, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Akim, Bropleh. Sam Bockarie was not present.
79. After the meeting, Foday Sankoh took some officers to Freetown including Gibril Massaquoi, Jackson Jackema, CO Isaac, Aunty Suzanne, Pa Rogers, CO Barbi, Pa Kallon, Superman, Eddie Murphy, Akim, Momoh Rogers, Andrew Kaimby and Sarah Kandeh.
80. When Foday Sankoh was arrested, the SLA and RUF were not together.
81. There was a problem with disarmament in Makeni. The combatants started going to UNAMSIL camps – exchanging weapons for food. The RUF commanders said soldiers who had already disarmed should be turned over to them.
82. There were Liberians visiting and staying at the Lodge in Freetown. Yellow Man was a fighter in the Red Lion Battalion at Freetown.
83. Combatants harassed civilians for diamonds. Issa Sesay killed civilians for diamonds during the time of junta. Morris Kallon was in charge of mining. Arms and ammunition were received at Lunsar.
84. There was trading of weapons to the RUF by ULIMO. Wrist watches were traded for weapons.
85. There was a request for fighters to attack LURD with NPFL.
86. Sam Bockarie went to Koidu twice and Ngaya once. Sam Bockarie met with senior officers. Witness does not know if Liberians were with him. Sam Bockarie lived in Kono, people were pleased that he was there. The witness did not see Lebanese with Bockarie.

87. Gullit and "55" were visited at Koidu. The Kamajors attacked the Junta in Koidu. Morris Kallon ordered the burning of Koidu. Witness does not know if the order was given to him.
88. Witness heard of amputations happening in Sewafe, Nimikoro, Motima. Rambo was in charge of Gandorhun and Komba was in charge of Worodu.
89. Nothing was done about amputations. The only person disciplined was CO Rocky.
90. Traditional Herbalists were hired by Sam Bockarie. They did not talk but they demonstrated bullet proof clothing given to some commanders.
91. Witness heard about killings and amputations after invasion.
92. Witness heard instruction about "Operation Spare No Soul" on BBC radio. The attack on Kabala came after that. Witness knew about killings and saw captured civilians.
93. The Red Lion Battalion comprised of STF, RUF, and AFRC. Senegalese was in Freetown. He was STF. He travelled from Buedu with other Liberians in convoy and was armed and had food.
94. Major CY was reporting to Sam Bockarie during the invasion but did not hear any messages about the killing of civilians or amputations.
95. Superman's body guards were "Crazy", BG commander, Mohammed Kallon, GuGu. Woody was a bodyguard for Superman.
96. "Sea Never Dry" was in Freetown and "Dirty Way", JuJombobla, "Blood", Hector LeHigh were with Komba Gbendema. CO Mines was in Rosos. LeHigh was loyal to Superman.
97. Witness has heard of Zigzag Marzah and saw him in Buedu at the time of Fitti Fatta. He was Liberian.
98. Jackson Jackoma was training commander in Superman Ground. Yellowman went to Freetown, he had been with Superman.
99. Foday Barmarah was an SLA.
100. Witness did not loot.
101. Women were captured and turned to wives. They could not maintain themselves and requested children to assist them (captured children).
102. SLA's had a Navy group in Liberia in 1997.
103. In Lunsar before the January invasion, civilians were marked "RUF" and "AFRC" with razor blades by the body guards of Gibril Massaquoi and Superman.

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TF1-585	Proffer – 9 typed pages	/

WITNESS PROFFER TF1-585

The Prosecution provides the following proffer as to the expected testimony of witness TF1-585. Information that could identify the witness has been removed as the witness is seeking protective measures. The witness is expected to testify to the following:

1. In 1995 there were radio communications between Zogoda, Western Jungle, Kono Jungle and Sierra Rutile. The communication was mainly about Operations at their bases and general dialogue with the commanders.
2. During some missions, Foday Sankoh would order that nothing should be done against civilians and sometimes Foday Sankoh would instruct the fighters to "set an example" with some civilians which meant to kill one or two civilians to panic the other civilians and others would hear about it and would be fearful of the RUF. Foday Sankoh would sometimes order the RUF to burn houses. Such messages were sent by codes.
3. "Operation Stop Election" was ordered by Foday Sankoh in 1996 and that was to cause panic on the civil populace and to disrupt the elections. Sankoh gave this order over the radio. He said that the elections had to be stopped by all means necessary. Foday Sankoh ordered that civilian fingers should be cut off and RUF should be marked on the bodies of the civilians and they should tell the civilian to vote for RUF.
4. In Magburaka, RUF fighters wrote RUF on the bodies of civilians and amputated civilians fingers and ears. The SBUs took part on this operation. After the mission a report was given to Foday Sankoh, saying that the mission had been carried out and was successful.
5. When Sam Bockarie was in Kenema, he communicated with Johnny Paul Koroma and Issa Sesay. At this time there were secret communications between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten aka "50". Yeaten's radio operators were "Sunlight" or "Dew" Sam Bockarie had a Liberian Operator known as Sellay;

who handled all communications with Liberia. The communication with Liberia was mostly to ask Sam Bockarie to go on the satellite phone to talk with Benjamin Yeaten. Sam Bockarie spoke with "50" privately with only his securities around him but at a distance. T

6. Jungle or Memuna Deen, an RUF operator in Liberia, sent messages to Sam Bockarie that Jungle was leaving his base to come to Mosquito's base. One or two days after the communication Jungle would come to Kenema or Buedu.
7. On occasion when Jungle came to Kenema from Liberia, Sam Bockarie would go with Jungle to the mining fields in Tongo. At the time AFRC/RUF were engaged in mining in Tongo. There was a certain place in Tongo that was mined only for senior RUF commanders like Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, Mike Lamin, Morris Kallon and others. At this site nobody was allowed to mine there. But when any of the senior RUF commanders got there, they would say 'De Pa en woke for do am' meaning the work for the senior man must go on and any diamond found was given to the Commander.
8. At the end of 1997 or the beginning of 1998, after the Kamajor attacks, Sam Bockarie lived in Buedu. Sam Bockarie's radio base there was the "Planet One" radio base; it was also the RUF central radio station. The "Planet One" radio set was mounted at the residence of Issa Sesay, right opposite Sam Bockarie's residence in Buedu. Sam Bockarie had another Mobile radio unit in his vehicle and this was called "Marvel".
9. Sam Bockarie communicated to Benjamin Yeaten alias '50' on many occasions. Sometimes Benjamin Yeaten would tell Sam Bockarie that he had sent Jungle to Sam Bockarie to deliver something.
10. There were also communications between the RUF and Liberian positions in Foya and Vahun. The RUF would get information from these positions whenever ECOMOG jets were coming towards Sierra Leone. The RUF also received this information from Roberts International Airport, RIA, in Liberia as soon as the jets took off from Liberia heading to Sierra Leone. Some of the jets

were taking off from RIA. When the RUF received information from Liberia that ECOMOG jets were coming, the RUF would be notified and go into hiding.

11. Sometimes about the end of 1997, Jungle came to Buedu together with another Liberian fighter. They came with some land mines and ammunition from Liberia. At Buedu, the man Jungle came with taught Sam Bockarie how to use the land mines. After that Sam Bockarie, Jungle and the Liberian man went to the frontlines with the landmines and ammo.
12. In February 1998 after the AFRC led by Johnny Paul Koroma were chased out of Freetown, Koroma and troops went to Kono. Sam Bockarie sent a message, saying that Koroma was still in command and that every fighter should respect and take all orders given by Koroma.
13. At the time Koroma and others pulled out of Freetown, Bockarie told Eddie Kanneh that Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor had given instructions. Bockarie said the instructions were communicated to him by Benjamin Yeaten. The instructions were that Johnny Paul Koroma should be brought to Buedu, as he had "something" for them. Sam Bockarie then told Eddie Kanneh that he would instruct Superman to carry out the mission. Sam Bockarie sent a commander named Shabado from Buedu to go and receive Koroma.
14. Koroma came from Kono to Buedu together with Superman, Koroma's signaler, called Control, Leather Boot, Koroma's bodyguard called Junior, Mike Lamin, Rambo, a soldier called Lager and others.
15. Soon after Koroma arrived there was a meeting was held in Buedu that was attended by AFRC and RUF commanders. This meeting was to arrange how the two movements were to operate. In this meeting, Sam Bockarie said that since Koroma had arrived in Buedu, they were all one body working under the same umbrella. Bockarie said that, on the advice of Foday Sankoh, everybody should take orders from Koroma as the Commander in Sankoh's absence. The reality was that Sam Bockarie was in overall command over Koroma and the AFRC/RUF forces.

16. After Koroma's arrival in Buedu, Koroma's Chief Security Officer, C.S.O., Rambo told Sam Bockarie that Koroma came with a lot of diamonds and was intending to escape with them to Liberia. After this, Koroma was attacked by armed men under the command of Issa Sesay. Sam Bockarie was there but did not do much. Issa Sesay told Sam Bockarie that Koroma did not want to hand over the diamonds and money he came with from Freetown. That evening, Koroma's wife was taken by Issa Sesay. Koroma's wife later said that Issa Sesay raped her.
17. After this incident Koroma and his wife were moved and accommodated at Kangama and they were not allowed to leave from there.
18. There was an operation in Kono after the RUF were pushed out of Koidu Town. Superman ordered his RUF fighters to amputate the civilians because they were giving information to ECOMOG. This was to serve as an example for other civilians not to do the same thing. When they cut the civilians hand or foot, they would say to them in Krio language "pull u han pan de war" meaning they are losing a hand because of the war or they would say "pull u foot pan de war" meaning they are losing a foot because of the war.
19. Sam Bockarie instructed Superman that he should not just amputate the civilians but that when amputating their limbs, Superman's boys should tell the civilians the reason why their hands and feet were being cut. He should tell them "Pull u han pan de war" or give them a note to carry to the Chief and the Police telling them that the RUF were on the way. There was news later over the SLBS radio that the hands of some civilians in Kono were being cut off.
20. Sometime in mid 1998 during the rainy Season there was news over the SLBS radio that civilians were killed in a few villages along the Kono axis. This event was described as "Operation Spare No Soul".
21. Sam Bockarie asked Komba Gbundema whether the information that civilians were killed was true. Komba Gbundema confirmed that it was his group that

carried out those attacks on civilians. Sam Bockarie told Komba Gbundema to stop the killings now because the objective was achieved and the whole world had heard about the killing of the civilians.

22. On some operations Sam Bockarie would send his body guards as his "eyes". The bodyguards would come and report to Sam Bockarie directly what happened in the front line. Sam Bockarie's bodyguards did not go to Freetown for the invasion. Bockarie's bodyguards included Shabado, Blood, Banza, Small Mosquito, Foday. Shabado was the bodyguard commander to Sam Bockarie but when Shabado died Foday was appointed in his place.
23. Sam Bockarie sometimes discussed atrocities against civilians. Sam Bockarie was very boastful and hotheaded. He was a fearless man.
24. In 1998 and 1999 arms were brought to Buedu from Liberia on many occasions. Front line commanders notified Sam Bockarie when there was a shortage of ammunition. Sam Bockarie had a warehouse in his house and another a little further from his house. When commanders requested for arms/ammo he would supply them or send them to Jabati who was in charge of the other ware house.
25. The supplies in the warehouses were brought in by Jungle from Monrovia. Alpha Jalloh was Jungle's driver. Alpha was the driver that most often drove the vehicle carrying the arms and ammunitions from Liberia to Buedu. Alpha said that the supply of arms, used clothing and drugs came from White Flower, Charles Taylor's residence in Monrovia. Alpha came to Buedu with Sampson and Junior, who were Liberian ATU personnel, and CO Jungle. During his trips to Buedu, at times CO. Jungle communicated to Yeaten to inform him that he has arrived in Buedu. CO Jungle would also communicate with RUF commanders like Issa Sesay.
26. Frontline commanders would send man power to collect their arms supply from Sam Bockarie in Buedu or at times Sam Bockarie would dispatch RUF men from Buedu to deliver the supplies to the frontlines.

27. Commanders together with their bodyguards plus manpower would walk from the jungle to Buedu where arms/ammunition would be distributed from the warehouse. The commanders would sign for whatever was supplied to them. Before or after the distribution, Sam Bockarie told the commanders that they should make sure that they do not loose their arms/ammunition to the enemies but rather they should capture arms/ammunition from the enemy and take them to Buedu. Arms/ammunitions taken to Kono and Koinadugu were used during the Fitti-Fatta operation.
28. RUF gave diamonds to Charles Taylor in exchange for the arms and ammunition supplies. There was one time when Issa Sesay went to Liberia with some diamonds. These were the diamonds which had been taken from Johnny Paul Koroma. Issa called Sam Bockarie from Liberia later to say he had lost the diamonds. Sam Bockarie said it was a "set back for the movement". From the time Issa Sesay lost the diamonds Sam Bockarie carried diamonds himself to give to Charles Taylor.
29. Sam Bockarie made several trips to Liberia from Buedu in 1998. He would usually go on these trips when he was called by Benjamin Yeaten or Charles Taylor. Sometimes when Sam Bockarie returned he would return with arms and ammunition accompanied by Jungle and sometime soon after Bockarie's returns, Jungle would come with arms/ammo to Buedu.
30. The mining commander in Kono at this time was Moriba Koroma also known as Surprising.
31. Sam Bockarie made some trips by road to Monrovia and on some trips he would drive up to Foya Air Field and would be picked up by a helicopter. Most of the time when Sam Bockarie was taking diamonds with him to Liberia, he would travel by helicopter.
32. When Issa Sesay lost the diamonds in Liberia the frontline soldiers were disgruntled and wanted action to be taken against Issa Sesay. Sam Bockarie called a meeting in Buedu attended by all the Vanguarders - Superman, Isaac Mongor, Alfred Brown and others. Abu Keita and Senegalese were also there.

Senegalese was a ULIMO 'J' fighter and his commander was Commander Abu Keita. At the meeting it was decided that Issa Sesay should not be killed but he should be punished by being sent to the frontline because Issa Sesay was afraid of going to the frontline. It was also agreed during this meeting to go on the Fitti-Fata Mission in Kono.

33. Sam Bockarie provided the fighters with the arm/ammo, food and man power to go on the mission. The man power was comprised of AFRC/RUF fighters from various front lines in Kailahun.
34. The aim of the mission was to recapture Koidu town, and to capture the ammunition of the Guinean ECOMOG that were based in Kono. It was also planned because Issa Sesay lost the diamonds they were to use to buy arms/ammo; so, they had to find another source to quickly get more diamonds and ammunition.
35. The mission to capture Koidu town failed but they were able to capture some arms/ammo and some Guinean soldiers.
36. After the Fitti-Fatta mission, Superman sent Komba Gbundema to capture Samabendugu in Koinadugu, Komba Gbundema moved from his base in Tefeya to go on this mission. Short Bai Bureh was then assigned to Tefeya to replace Komba Gbundema. After Komba captured Samabendugu, Superman went there.
37. Before Komba Gbundema went to Samabendugu, there was a meeting between Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay in Buedu. Sam Bockarie told Issa Sesay that Superman should go to Koinadugu to kill SAJ Musa because SAJ Musa was refusing to come to Buedu and was suspected to have diamonds. Sam Bockarie spoke to Superman telling him to go on a joint attack to Kabala with SAJ Musa and during that attack Superman should accomplish the mission sent to him by coded message. Bockarie then sent his men with arms and ammunition to Superman in Kono.

38. Superman went on this mission but did not kill SAJ so the relationship between Sam Bockarie and Superman became strained and Superman, SAJ and Gullit were not communicating with Sam Bockarie from this point.
39. Sometime in late 1998 during the dry season, Jungle together with Sampson, Junior, Zig Zag Marzah, "50" and others arrived from Liberia. They went to Kono with Issa Sesay and other RUF fighters.
40. There was a meeting held in Buedu about the end of 1998 but before December that was attended by the commanders Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, C. O. Isaac and others. The meeting was to plan the attack on Kono and Freetown. Sam Bockarie requested the SLAs, that is to say, AFRC fighters, to join the RUF on this operation but the SLAs refused to take part.
41. Jungle, Sampson and Junior were at this meeting. When they were coming from Liberia they came with some arms and ammunition. After the meeting Sam Bockarie distributed arms and ammunition to the various commanders to go on these attacks. Issa Sesay was supplied with arms and ammunition to proceed to Kono. The meeting took place about 2 or 3 days after Jungle, Sampson and Junior arrived in Buedu.
42. During the time Gullit's group was moving into Freetown, there was no communication between Sam Bockarie and the group. There was no RUF commander involved in this operation except for few RUF fighters and radio operators who were under the SLA command.
43. Before the group entered Freetown, Sam Bockarie went over the BBC and said that in 48 or 72 hours (witness cannot recall precisely now), his group will enter Freetown. After Gullit and the troops entered the city, Sam Bockarie again came over the radio BBC and said he was a man of his word.
44. After this BBC announcement, Benjamin Yeaten (50) contacted Sam Bockarie to find out if it was true that the rebels had entered Freetown. Benjamin Yeaten congratulated Sam Bockarie and they were both happy and laughing. Benjamin

Yeaten told Sam Bockarie that if this is this case, he would come to Buedu in about 2 days. Benjamin Yeaten then told Sam Bockarie to get on the Satellite phone because the "Father" wanted to talk to him. "The father" was Charles Taylor. Yeaten did come to Buedu two days later and he stayed one night. Yeaten came with one other person. From that point there was frequent satellite phone communication between Sam Bockarie and Charles Taylor or Sam Bockarie and "50".

45. A few weeks after the group entered Freetown a message came from Gullit that the ECOMOG was pushing them out of Freetown. Sam Bockarie told Gullit "Befoe una comot nar the town, nar for burn ose dem en kill borku civilian dem" meaning before leaving the town; you should burn houses and kill a lot of civilians. Gullit responded "yes sir".
46. After Sam Bockarie gave this order, he spoke on the Satellite phone to Liberia, Witness did not know to whom he spoke but he was reporting that the troops were retreating from Freetown.
47. Three days later, Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia. Charles Taylor asked him to go there. He returned after one week. Sam Bockarie said his return was delayed because Charles Taylor asked him to wait for General Ibrahim.
48. After the Freetown invasion, around the end January or early February 1999, Victor Foh and some others who were released from Pademba road prisons were brought to Buedu. These people were released from Pademba road by Gullit's forces when they entered Freetown.
49. Sam Bockarie once told Eddie Kanneh that Gibril Massaquoi had betrayed the Movement and was refusing to go to Buedu, and for that reason at any time they get hold of Gibril he was going to be executed.

12974

TF1 Number	Statements/Proffer	ERN
TF1-590	Proffer – 3 typed pages	/

12975

WITNESS PROFFER TF1-590

The Prosecution provides the following proffer as to the expected testimony of witness TF1-590. Information that could identify the witness has been removed as the witness is seeking protective measures. The witness is expected to testify to the following:

1. The witness was born in Sierra Leone. In February 1998 he was detained in Liberia by police from the Special Operation Division (SOD) and asked to attend a meeting with some senior officials. He refused.
2. Later in Voinjama, an officer from the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) and some members of the Anti Terrorist Unite (ATU) approached us at a shop asking us to attend a quick talk over some palm wine. The Sierra Leone war was the dominate topic and the witness and colleagues were offered between \$500 to \$1000 each to agree to undergo commando training in Liberia and then go to Buedu in Sierra Leone.
3. In September 1998, there was serious fighting in Monrovia and immediately after that incident, in December the same year, Mr Chucky Taylor was in Lofa Country. Chucky Taylor was with an RUF commander, General Mosquito, a personal protocol officer to Mr Charles Taylor, "Campare" and many others including some Arab- like guys with disguised faces in green and black SUV pick ups and some personnel carrier trucks. They spent weeks gathering people while waiting for delivery at the Voinjama grassy air field. It was there that most logistics for RUF were offloaded and then taken to Kailahun in Sierra Leone. The Arabs guys were also said to be RUF/ Taylor major Gem dealers.
4. The witness saw some very small boys were with American dollars and bottled rums like "Johnny walker." Some of them left money they had received for the operation with their parents, girlfriends or others. The witness and others who had refused recruitment were subject to molestation, unnecessary arrest and even looting.
5. In February 1999, a younger brother of the witness was arrested and the witness was robbed.
6. At the police station where the brother was detained, the witness was told that in order to free his brother he should go to Kailahun for an attack on Kenema. A deputy police officer told him "If you refuse, you will be forced." He continued, "You guys have no UN security guarantee here. We rule here!"
7. The witness' brother was released.
8. In 1999, Chucky Taylor was in Foya, a border town close to both Sierra Leone and Guinea, with weapons for the Guinea and Freetown operations.
9. The witness was traveling with his family and was arrested in April 1999 at a checkpoint some kilometres from Gbarnga City. Men and boys between 10 and 40 were placed at the backyard of the military-police station. Some hours later a green range rover SUV and three more land cruiser jeeps arrived with Chucky Taylor. In his hand, was a large silver pistol and a green muffler piece tied on his head.

10. Chucky shouted at the other soldiers that he did not want to see so many women around. Families were crying for the mens' release.
11. To show how serious he was, Chucky shot 4 men. He shouted, "I heard there are rebels and Kamajors among you guys here I know and for your best stand out off the group!"
12. The heads of the dead were cut off and hung on the checkpoint. Some of the prisoners were selected and Chucky then ordered his boys to tie their hands behind their backs together with their feet and take them to the Gbarnga police station. There were many other young men and women, mostly Sierra Leonean, at the temporal detention in Gbarnga.
13. Two days later still tied up, the witness and others were then transported again to the ATU camp at Gbatala some kilometres away between Gbarnga and Monrovia, arriving about midnight. Chucky told his men to take them to the caves and teach them what happens to those who refuse to do what they are told.
14. They were then taken into a swamp and forced into very pits, some containing rotten human remains and skeletons. The next day, the witness and another prisoner attempted an escape but were arrested and taken back to the camp. At about 9:30 to 10:00am they were taken naked to Chucky.
15. The witness was beaten with barbed wire and could hardly see. Chucky asked his boys to take the rest of the other men from the pits.
16. In front of the other prisoners, Chucky ordered his boys to behead one of the detainees. The detainee begged for his life and said he would do whatever Chucky asked him to do. He was killed; his head was cut ff from the backside to his face.
17. The next day some Mandingo fellows were brought to the camp and one of them was also a former ULIMO commander and a police officer. On the 23rd of April 1999, Dumbuya whose ten toes were chopped off, escaped from his pit. He asked the witness and others to go with him, saying that otherwise they were all dead men when Chucky and Campare come back from Monrovia. He said he heard the commander and Chucky discussing the prisoners and saying that they were all of no use and should be terminated. They tried to escape but Dumbuya was not strong enough to make it. By the next morning he was killed by the same guy he was running away from, Campare.
18. Campare wanted to kill the others but he was asked to take the prisoners to Monrovia to see the then president Mr. Charles Taylor.
19. The prisoners were stripped naked, beaten and burned with plastic, cigarettes and rubber plates. The witness was stabbed in the leg by a bayonet. The witness still suffers from back and hips problems.
20. Three prisoners were loaded in a jeep and at Gbatala camp, hands tied up, blindfolded and with tape over their mouths. In front of the convoy was Chucky and Campare. The jeep went to Charles Taylor's residence in Congotown, Monrovia. After some time, Charles Taylor himself and some top officers including the then Defence Minister, Daniel Chea came outside.

21. Mr Taylor went directly to the prisoners and ordered the tape taken off their mouths. He asked "Why didn't you want to go and fight for your country while you are most wanted?" He asked them if they were Kamajors sent to overthrow his government?" They responded that they were registered refugees and that we have no idea about his claims. He then said "Well, if you are refusing to tell the truth you will be taken to the beach and be killed".
22. After some moments, he patted Campare on the back and ordered him to take them to the beach and kill them. One of the officers standing beside him told him that they should not be killed saying "we need to have information from them, the killing should have been done from where they are coming from". They were blindfolded again and then taken to BTC. At BTC, the military police there refused to put them in cells because they were almost dead. "We have no place for these guys, you take them to your unit where they have been all long" he said. The witness was mercilessly beaten and a serious confrontation ensued between the ATU soldiers and the MPs there. Finally, the men were forced into the cells for more then two weeks without food and water or medical treatment.
23. Because of their condition the other prisoners protested, almost fighting some of the MPs. "These guys smell and they should be out of here before they die" some complained.
24. The same day, the men were taken to the hospital for treatment. Later, the witness was able to get information about his situation to a family member who notified an international organization.

12972

TF1 Number	Statements/Proffer	ERN
TF1-597	Proffer – 5 typed pages	/

WITNESS PROFFER TF1-597

The Prosecution provides the following proffer as to the expected testimony of witness TF1-597. Information that could identify the witness has been removed as the witness is seeking protective measures. The witness is expected to testify to the following:

1. The witness received training in the Sierra Leone Army at Daru barracks in Kailahun District. The witness was in Koindu for a short time after the rebel war began in March 1991 before being pushed back to Daru Barracks.
2. The witness participated in the NPRC coup in Freetown, after the coup the witness worked as a security.
3. The witness participated in the May 1997 coup and participated as a member of the Junta.
4. After the coup, Johnny Paul Koroma had a telephone conversation with Foday Sankoh. The conversation concerned AFRC and RUF cooperation. During this conversation Sankoh advised Koroma that he would be sending someone on his behalf to speak about this issue. Gibril Massaquoi arrived for this purpose 3 days later.
5. In the early weeks following the May 1997 coup, Johnny Paul Koroma spoke on the telephone with Charles Taylor, Blaise Compaore, Manosera, who was the leader of Nigeria, and Moamar Gaddafi.
6. Koroma's call to Charles Taylor included discussion about planning, supplies and Charles Taylor's assurance that an alliance between the AFRC and RUF would work. During this conversation Charles Taylor told JPK that Taylor was to be notified if there were any problems with cooperation from the RUF.
7. The calls to the other leaders were calls asking for support for the coup. The conversation with Charles Taylor was more detailed. Koroma's communication man

was Banjah Marrah. Supreme Council members Zagolo, Gullit, Bazzy Kamara and Foday Kallay were present during these calls.

8. Around January 1998, after the looting of the Iranian Embassy, Johnny Paul Koroma called Taylor. Koroma expressed his concerns about problems with certain RUF members including Issa Sesay, who were resisting having arrested those RUF members who had been involved in the looting. Charles Taylor instructed Koroma to set up a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the matter. This subsequently occurred.
9. During the Junta, Liberians who were present in Freetown such as CO Lion and Senegalese stayed with the RUF High Command leaders such as Issa Sesay.
10. During a Supreme Council meeting, Koroma advised that a shipment of arms was to be delivered to the Magburaka air strip. There was no discussion about the specific origin of the arms though the witness believes that those involved in this shipment were going through Liberia. Fonti Kanu was assigned to accompany RUF commander Ibrahim Bah and other members of the RUF high command to participate in this shipment. Ibrahim Bah was responsible for making arrangements concerning this shipment. The Magburaka arms shipment arrived a week after the meeting, in late 1997. The materials were distributed to all commanders. An individual named Musa accompanied the shipment. Musa was there to provide training on the use of Stinger missiles that had been included in the shipment. Musa stayed two weeks following the shipment.
11. The RUF high command in Freetown included Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Peter Vandi, SYB Rogers, Momoh Rogers, Mike Lamin, Gibril Massaquoi, Augustine Gbao and Dennis Mingo. There were also Liberians staying with the RUF high command including CO Lion and Senegalese. Senegalese was a tall man who spoke what the witness believed was Liberian English.
12. An Ivorian or Burkinabe named Banao, who spoke French, was often with Johnny Paul Koroma. Banao was in Monrovia in 1999, after the Lomé peace Accord.

13. The witness knew Ibrahim Bioy Sesay and an RUF commander called Morie whose last name the witness does not remember. The witness was aware of mining operations in Kono District during the Junta.
14. A Lebanese businessman named Tariq Mackie was involved with Johnny Paul Koroma in diamond transactions. Diamond parcels were sold to Mackie. Another Lebanese businessman named Kazim was also involved in these transactions. At times, Koroma's Chief of Security for Koroma, Moses Kabbia, also known as Rambo, collected diamond parcels from Kono. Kabbia brought these diamonds to Freetown, and turned them over to the Chairman, Johnny Paul Koroma. The witness believed the first consignment was connected to the Magburaka arms shipment and did not go to Tariq Mackie.
15. After the ECOMOG intervention in 1998 the witness was involved in the retreat of Junta personnel. During the retreat, Johnny Paul Koroma communicated with Charles Taylor by satellite phone. Charles Taylor advised Johnny Paul Koroma that he should not stay in the jungle but should go to Liberia so that they could speak. It was arranged that a helicopter was to come for them but it failed to arrive due to the presence of ECOMOG jets.
16. Johnny Paul Koroma and his group then traveled to Kono District and on to Kailahun District. This was in February 1998. Koroma was in regular communication with Charles Taylor by satellite phone. One of these conversations involved arrangements for Taylor to send a helicopter from Liberia to pick up Koroma. This plan was not carried out due to the presence of ECOMOG jets. Charles Taylor then instructed them to proceed to Buedu where they would be picked up by vehicle to be taken to Liberia. Taylor told Koroma it was necessary to convene in Monrovia in order to regroup. At another time Taylor told Koroma that the alliance should be maintained and that they should hold Kono and retake Koidu Town from the Kamajors. After this communication Koroma had a meeting and instructed all commanders to assemble in Makeni in order to move to take Koidu Town. This was the successful operation involving Superman and Akim.

17. There was a lot of looting in Makeni and all the way to Kabala. Men on the ground said this was "operation Pay Yourself". The witness did not hear Koroma say anything about looting.
18. Gullit was the only other major SLA commander in Buedu at the time they arrived. The witness heard that the others had all fled to Liberia. While waiting for vehicles to arrive from Liberia, Koroma and his group stayed in Buedu. During this time relations between JPK and Mosquito were good.
19. Within two weeks, in March 1998, a vehicle convoy from Liberia arrived. Jungle, General Ibrahim, Mohamed Sekou Toure and SSS securities arrived with the convoy. The Liberian in charge of this convoy was Colonel Jungle. Jungle and the Special Security Service, SSS, securities wore SSS uniforms which had stripes on their sleeves. General Ibrahim and Toure did not wear these uniforms.
20. Koroma and the others were preparing to leave when Rambo, Koroma's bodyguard, was "grumbling" and told Sam Bockarie that Koroma and a few others were carrying large quantity of diamonds. Some members of Koroma's group were flogged and diamonds taken away from some of them.
21. Mike Lamin pointed a gun in Koroma's direction, fired over his head and demanded Koroma's diamonds. Koroma subsequently turned over several parcels of diamonds to Issa Sesay. Koroma and his wife were taken to Kangama; Koroma was placed under house arrest.
22. The diamonds taken from Koroma and the others were taken to Liberia by Sam Bockarie and Jungle when the convoy returned to Liberia. Bockarie returned after being away for 48 hours with a shipment of materials including AK 47 and G3 rounds as well as mortar bombs.
23. After Bockarie's return from Liberia, RUF commander Mike Lamin was deployed to Manowa Ferry for one month until ECOMOG forces were pushed back.

24. Later, Bockarie directed Mike Lamin, Rambo and others to proceed to Foya. In Foya, Jungle arrived with a shipment of materials including AK rounds, G3 rounds and RPGs. These materials were taken to Buedu.

25. In the latter part of 1998 and 1999, materials were transported from Liberia to Buedu and then to Pendembu for distribution to the front lines.

26. The UN observers were captured by the West Side Boys after the Lomé Peace Accord. Charles Taylor spoke with Issa Sesay. Taylor instructed Sesay that he wished to speak with Johnny Paul Koroma. Koroma spoke with Taylor on a satellite phone and instructed Koroma to come to Monrovia to assist in resolving the hostage issue. Koroma traveled to Foya; from there he was taken by a helicopter to Monrovia. Taylor met with Koroma and others at Taylor's office at the Mansion House. Taylor stated that the UN observers should be released and that the Lomé Peace Accord was in the favor of the fighters and should be respected.



125184

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

Travel of high level AFRC/RUF leaders to Liberia; their traveling to Liberia with diamonds; their bringing arms and ammunition from Liberia to Sierra Leone

Killing and mutilation of civilians in Kono after the Junta was pushed from Freetown; knowledge of these acts

Sam Bockarie's use of bodyguards to report to him concerning what was happening on the front lines

Subordinates or associates of the Accused bringing arms and ammunition to Sierra Leone in late 1998; their presence at planning meeting for attack on Kono and Freetown; travel of these Liberian personnel to Kono

Attack on Kono in late 1998 and on Freetown in early 1999; involvement of AFRC and RUF personnel in that attack; Sam Bockarie's communications with international media regarding that attack

Sam Bockarie's order to burn houses and kill civilians in Freetown

Communications between Sam Bockarie, Benjamin Yeaten and the Accused regarding the attack on Freetown; Sam Bockarie's travel to Monrovia to meet with the Accused during that time



12985

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

TF1-590

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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Viva Voce | <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92bis |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 93 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pre-Trial Protective Measures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 92ter | <input type="checkbox"/> Trial Protective Measures |

Relevant Counts: 1-11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 3, 5, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34

Time required for direct examination: 3 hours

The witness may provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal background information.

Efforts by Liberian government forces and RUF personnel in 1998 and 1999 to recruit Sierra Leonean men and boys living in Liberia to train and then go to fight in Sierra Leone.

Presence of high level RUF commanders in Voinjama in late 1998; use of Voinjama to fly in materiel for use by the RUF in Sierra Leone

Arrest, detention in horrible conditions and beating of Sierra Leoneans in Liberia in 1999

The Accused asking detained Sierra Leoneans "Why didn't you want to go and fight for your country when you were most wanted?"

The Accused ordering Sierra Leonean detainees to be taken to the beach and killed before being convinced to order their further interrogation.

12986



SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

TF1-597

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Relevant Counts: 1-11

Relevant Paragraphs of the Indictment: 5, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34

Time required for direct examination: 7 hours

The witness may provide evidence in relation to the following:

Personal background

May 1997 coup and the AFRC Junta period, including AFRC and RUF Supreme Council members and Supreme Council meetings

Communications between Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday Sankoh after the coup

The relationship between the RUF and AFRC during the Junta, presence of RUF commanders in Freetown

The Accused's involvement in the alliance between the AFRC and the RUF

The presence of subordinates or associates of the Accused in Sierra Leone during the Junta

Diamond mining during the Junta; persons involved in diamond transactions

Shipment of arms and ammunition to Magburaka air field in late 1997

Communications between Johnny Paul Koroma and the Accused during and after the Junta; instructions and guidance given by the Accused to Johnny Paul Koroma, including instructions to maintain the alliance between the RUF and AFRC and to hold Kono

Looting by AFRC/RUF personnel on the retreat from Freetown in 1998

The Accused's assistance to the AFRC/RUF after the Junta was overthrown, including providing arms and ammunition; use of this materiel; use of the Accused's subordinates and/or associates to facilitate this assistance



12987

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR**

Taking of diamonds from Johnny Paul Koroma and members of his group in Buedu in 1998

The presence of associates of, and/or personnel subordinate to, the Accused in Buedu in 1998 after the Junta was overthrown; Sam Bockarie accompanying these persons to Liberia with the diamonds taken from Koroma and members of his group

The Accused's involvement in the release of the United Nations Peacekeepers

12988

ANNEX C

STATEMENTS & MATERIAL FOR STEPHEN SMITH

12989

TF1 NUMBER	STATEMENTS / PROFFER	ERN
SMITH, Stephen	26.09.07 – 2 typed pages	00043976-00043977
	Le Monde article 15.11.2000 9in French) – 2 typed pages	00036286-00036287
	Second Le Monde article 15.11.2000 (in French) – 1 typed page	00036288
	Le Monde article 15.11.2000 (translated) – 2 typed pages	00043984-00043985
	Second Le Monde article 15.11.2000 (translated) – 2 typed pages	00043986-00043987

September 26, 2007

Explicatory note on the circumstances, and background, of Charles Taylor's interview published in *Le Monde* on November 15, 2000

The interview took place in a salon of the *Lutetia Hotel* in Paris where Charles Taylor and his delegation were staying during their private visit to France. It had been arranged for over a lunch meeting, on November 13 at the *Fouquet's* restaurant on Champs Elysées Avenue, with Reginald B. Goodridge, then deputy minister of state and press secretary of President Taylor, Dr. Walid Arbid, a Lebanese lawyer, and Abbas Fawaz, a Lebanese businessman based in Harper (Liberia) and in Abidjan (Ivory Coast). I had not known either Abbas Fawaz or Dr. Walid Arbid prior to this meeting. According to notes which I stored at the time in my PDA, both were acquainted with a Franco-Lebanese lawyer in Paris, Robert Bourgi, who was then – and still is – very active as a go-between in Franco-African relations.

The interview was recorded for publication. No restrictions were agreed upon, and no remarks were made "off the record". As I usually keep the tapes of important interviews, I have been searching for the cassette over the spring-summer period of 2007 at the request of Nick Koumjian from the International Tribunal – but to no avail. I might have lost it when I left *Le Monde* in 2005, throwing away parts of the personal archives I had kept in my office at the newspaper.

The interview took place in the presence of only one non-involved person, additional to Charles Taylor and my colleague Jean-Baptiste Naudet from *Le Monde*: Jewel Taylor, the President's wife. I remember her entering the room with her husband, shaking hands with us and then sitting next to Charles Taylor, without uttering a word or showing the slightest reaction to what was said. At the end, she left without any comment.

The interview was carried out, exclusively, in English. It was a professional encounter neither preceded nor followed by any socializing. Jean-Baptiste Naudet and I translated the interview subsequently, and separately, cross-checking on one another to make sure the final text faithfully reflected President Taylor's statements. As is standard practice in journalism, all that was published between quotation marks is a literal translation of what was said and recorded.

Jean-Baptiste Naudet had never met Mr. Taylor in person prior to that occasion.

President Taylor and I knew one another very well as I had been covering the Liberian civil war right from the beginning, both on his side and on the side of late-President Samuel Doe. In August 1990, after an unsuccessful attempt to open a second frontline on the beleaguered Liberian capital by closing in through swamplands, an irate Charles Taylor had branded me as a "spy" accused of having leaked his military plans to the other side (as I happened to be the only journalist present, the day of the "surprise attack", at an unfamiliar site where he had seen me while inspecting his assault units). The night of the ill-fated offensive, I had been arrested in front of several of my colleagues from the international press and taken away by three of Taylor's bodyguards who subsequently had submitted me to a mock execution. A few miles away from where I had been arrested (close to Robertsfield international airport), they had forced me to kneel down by the

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roadside and had stuck a gun to my neck – eventually firing it off next to my head. After three days in detention, I had been released under diplomatic pressure from the United States. As I am a U.S. citizen, fellow journalists had alerted the Department of State in Washington DC.

Once back in Ivory Coast, where I lived at the time, I had published an account of what had happened to me in *Libération*, the French daily newspaper I was then working for as a West Africa correspondent.

Despite my negative experience in the summer of 1990, I had decided to continue to cover the Liberian story professionally, i.e. on all sides. Therefore, prior to the interview recorded in Paris, I had met with Charles Taylor in Monrovia on at least two occasions. The first time we had seen one another again, more than a year after the mock execution, he had opened the conversation with a sonorous laugh (*"Hi Steve, I think I still have your American passport. I should give it back to you one day"*). In fact, he never returned the passport his bodyguards had seized before having me kneel down at the side of the road.

As an acknowledgement of my continuous coverage of the Liberian crisis, the former West Africa correspondent of the *Financial Times*, and then Africa correspondent of *The Guardian*, Mark Huband, who is probably the foreign journalist knowing best Charles Taylor, bestowed on me to preface his account of *The Liberian Civil War* - the title of the book he published in London in 1998.

In the aftermath of the November 2000 interview in Paris, I did not receive any complaints, official or unofficial, from Charles Taylor or his entourage. On the contrary, I recollect a brief telephone conversation with Abbas Fawaz who stated, in essence, that the President was pleased he had been given the opportunity to make his side of the story known to the public. Mr Fawaz provided me with his telephone numbers and encouraged me to contact him if ever he could be helpful to me. I did not call on him subsequently.

September 26, 2007

M. W. Fawaz

00036286



Le Monde

Charles Taylor, ancien chef de guerre et président du Liberia - « Les officiels britanniques veulent s'emparer des diamants de Sierra Leone ».

Par PROPOS RECUEILLIS PAR JEAN-BAPTISTE NAUDET ET STEPHEN SMITH.

1,213 words

15 November 2000

Le Monde

French

(c) Le Monde, 2000.

Charles Taylor revient à Paris, la seule capitale occidentale où, il y a deux ans, il ait été reçu officiellement. Boycotté par les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne, il ne sera reçu, au cours de ce séjour privé, ni à l'Elysée ni à Matignon. Mais il mise sur la France pour rompre son isolement. Accusé de trafic de « diamants de sang » sierra-léonais, ce chef de guerre devenu chef d'Etat contre-attaque.

« QUE PENSEZ-VOUS des efforts de paix en Sierra Leone ? Parfois on semble vous traiter comme si vous deviez y ramener la paix, parfois comme si vous étiez de simples trafiquants de diamants.

- Il est regrettable qu'en essayant de diaboliser le président Taylor on réduise la guerre en Sierra Leone à un conflit dont le Liberia essaye de tirer quelque chose. Le fait que des jeunes soldats britanniques aillent se battre dans les forêts de Sierra Leone pour empêcher les Sierra-Léonais de se tuer a-t-il un sens ? Non, cela ne marche pas. Oui, je crois que la guerre en Sierra Leone est une guerre pour les diamants. Mais pas parce que le Liberia veut ces diamants. Nous, nous en avons déjà. Cette guerre a lieu car les Britanniques veulent ces diamants. Il y a des officiels britanniques qui, à travers des sociétés par actions basées à Vancouver (Canada), possèdent ces mines [de diamants en Sierra Leone]. C'est pour cela que les soldats britanniques sont là-bas. Pas à cause de nous. Nous accusons de trafic de diamants, c'est comme accuser l'Arabie saoudite de faire de la contrebande de pétrole ! Le Liberia exporte des diamants depuis cent cinquante ans. Tout à coup le monde est en guerre pour faire la paix en Sierra Leone. Mais ne peut-on pas faire cette paix sans diaboliser le petit Liberia ?

- Les Etats-Unis vous sont très hostiles. Pourquoi ?

- Ils m'accusent d'être impliqué dans le trafic de diamants. Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies a créé une commission d'enquête. Mais les Etats-Unis commencent à accuser le Liberia avant même d'avoir le moindre résultat. C'est injuste. Nous sommes prêts à coopérer entièrement à n'importe quelle enquête du Conseil de sécurité. Car nous savons que ces accusations sont des mensonges. Le Liberia n'a jamais été impliqué dans un trafic organisé de diamants. Je regarde maintenant les résultats des élections américaines. Maintenant, les Etats-Unis savent que des erreurs peuvent arriver ! Maintenant, ils voient ce que peuvent traverser les pays du tiers-monde !

- Quel rôle peuvent jouer la France et l'Union européenne ?

- La France a un rôle constructif, l'expérience des problèmes africains. La France est juste avec le Liberia, même si nous ne sommes pas un pays francophone. Nous voulons lancer une enquête complète sur les accusations portées contre le Liberia. Nous sommes accusés de trafic d'armes et de diamants. Nous voulons une enquête car c'est le seul moyen pour nous d'être lavés de ces accusations. L'Europe peut aider à enquêter. On peut nous couper l'aide. On peut ne pas aimer Charles Taylor. Mais il y a des Libériens qui meurent, qui ont besoin d'aide. Les Britanniques ont réussi à arrêter l'aide européenne au Liberia. Mais je suis un chrétien. Alors Dieu a envoyé les inondations à la Grande-Bretagne. Des inondations qui lui coûteront un ou deux milliards de dollars. Dieu a puni la Grande-Bretagne !

- Pensez-vous que le Front révolutionnaire uni doit être intégré au processus de paix en Sierra Leone ?

- Seuls les belligérants peuvent résoudre les conflits. Il n'y a aucun moyen de faire la paix en Sierra Leone en excluant une partie du processus de paix. Comme on dit en Afrique: « A vec un doigt, on ne peut rien attraper, il faut deux doigts. » Le RUF a commis de terribles atrocités. Des gens devront en répondre. Mais ces mêmes gens, qui sont la cause du problème, doivent être une partie de la solution. La Grande-Bretagne a des problèmes avec l'IRA. Mais l'Armée républicaine Irlandaise participe au processus de paix. A tel point que des terroristes pro et anti-britanniques, qui étaient à la prison de Maze, en sont sortis. Cela n'en fait pas des anges. Les gens du RUF ne sont pas des anges non plus. Mais l'on doit en finir avec la crise en Afrique

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de l'Ouest. Alors peut-on appliquer certaines de vos solutions ? Plus personne n'appelle Yasser Arafat un terroriste. Alors, nous, les Africains, que devons nous faire ? Ne jamais oublier ? Ne jamais clore nos crises ?

- Foday Sankoh, le chef de la rebellion sierra-léonaise, a-t-il un autre avenir qu'un procès ?

- C'est aux Sierra-Léonais d'en décider. Je ne suis pas opposé au jugement de Foday Sankoh mais il ne doit pas être le seul à être tenu pour responsable, le seul qui ait violé les accords de paix de Lomé. Et puis l'Afrique n'est pas encore dans le tiers-monde. Vouloir appliquer des critères du premier monde va tout détruire. En Afrique il y a toujours des coups d'Etat. Il n'y en a plus en Occident depuis un demi-siècle. En Afrique il y a des problèmes ethniques, tribaux. Pendons Foday Sankoh ! Et le nord de la Sierra Leone voudra le venger. Nous ne pouvons plus continuer à appliquer des remèdes du premier monde à des problèmes du troisième et quatrième monde !

- Quelle solution voyez-vous au conflit avec la Guinée ?

- Etrangement, l'année dernière, nous avons été victimes d'une première attaque venant de Guinée. Nous avons protesté. Nous avons subi une deuxième attaque. Lors d'une rencontre, le président guinéen, Lansana Conté, a promis qu'il ferait de son mieux pour prévenir ce genre d'attaque. Mais à notre grande surprise, trois mois plus tard, nous avons subi une troisième, très sérieuse et dévastatrice attaque. J'ai dit au président Lansana Conté: « Pouvez-vous faire quelque chose pour montrer que vous faites un effort honnête [pour arrêter ces attaques] ? ». Cela n'a pas été fait. J'ai demandé à le rencontrer en face-à-face. Le président [du Nigeria], Olusegun Obasanjo, a accepté d'accueillir cette réunion.

» Ces incursions de Guinée au Liberia se font dans une zone de forêt. Il est très difficile de déterminer quand et si nous franchissons la frontière avec la Guinée. Si nous devons le faire, il y aurait de grandes justifications si une base, quelque part dans la forêt, a été utilisée contre le Liberia. Nous avons le droit de détruire ces bases. Le Liberia n'est pas en position de mener une guerre. Les Nations unies maintiennent leur embargo sur les armes contre nous. Nous ne voulons pas cette guerre. Mais si on nous y oblige, bien sûr nous devons nous battre. Et nous en trouverons les moyens. Nous avons le droit de nous défendre. Car le Liberia n'est pas l'agresseur ! »

doc: avec une carte: "La Sierra Leone, 10e producteur mondial de diamant".

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Le Monde

Charles Taylor, l'homme par qui la guerre, la paix et le scandale arrivent.

Par JEAN-BAPTISTE NAUDET ET STEPHEN SMITH.

710 words

15 November 2000

Le Monde

French

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CHEF DE GUERRE ou chef d'Etat, **Charles Taylor** fait scandale. Sous le costume du président libérien perce toujours le treillis du « warlord ». En 1989, le soir de Noël, Taylor avait déclenché la première insurrection armée d'Afrique de l'Ouest. Cette rébellion, financée avec des pétrodollars libyens, a tourné au suicide national, mêlant tribalisme et désespoir de la mondialisation. En 1997, ce petit pays de quelque 3 millions d'habitants épuisés par sept années de sanglants désordres et d'exactions commis par ses partisans, a élu **Charles Taylor** président. Attestant de la régularité du scrutin, l'ancien président américain Jimmy Carter voulait croire à un « miracle » : à la résurrection démocratique du Liberia. Mais le braconnier ne s'est pas fait garde-chasse. Aujourd'hui, **Charles Taylor** est accusé de porter la guerre en Guinée et de l'entretenir en Sierra Leone, en soutenant le RUF (Front révolutionnaire uni) pour quelques diamants de contrebande.

En trois ans de pouvoir, l'ex-rebelle devenu chef de l'Etat n'a rétabli ni l'électricité ni l'eau courante dans sa capitale. Son régime restreint les libertés publiques, viole les droits de l'homme. Mais, ironiquement, ce sont ses bons offices en Sierra Leone, au bénéfice de la communauté internationale, qui ont mis Taylor sur la sellette. Quand, en mai, un demi-millier de casques bleus de l'ONU sont pris en otage par le Front révolutionnaire uni (RUF), le président du Liberia apparaît comme le vrai patron du mouvement rebelle sierra-léonais puisqu'il obtient la libération des soldats de la paix.

POUVOIR DE NUISANCE

Or, bien avant de s'en prendre aux Nations unies, le RUF (dirigé par un ancien lieutenant de Taylor, Foday Sankoh) a terrorisé la population civile sierra-léonaise. Ses pratiques d'amputation des bras - « manches courtes » ou « manches longues » - ont horrifié le monde. **Charles Taylor** fournit-il un sanctuaire et des armes au RUF en se faisant payer en diamants exploités dans l'est de la Sierra Leone, limitrophe du Liberia ? Les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne en sont convaincus. Cet été, Washington a imposé des sanctions au Liberia, dont les officiels sont interdits de visa. Cette mesure est d'autant plus vexatoire qu'une bonne partie de la classe dirigeante libérienne, descendant d'anciens esclaves, considère l'Amérique comme sa première patrie. Le père de **Charles Taylor** est né aux Etats-Unis. Taylor y a vécu pendant dix ans, allant à l'université puis en prison, en 1983, pour le détournement de près de 1 million de dollars au Liberia. Après seize mois derrière les barreaux au Massachusetts, il s'est évadé.

L'Union européenne a également coupé son aide, à la demande de la Grande-Bretagne, qui s'est massivement engagée en Sierra Leone. Pour sauver le président Ahmed Tejan Kabbah et les 13 000 casques bleus déployés pour protéger son régime, Londres a envoyé 600 parachutistes à Freetown, la capitale sierra-léonaise. Depuis, plus de 300 millions de francs d'aide militaire n'ont pas suffi pour réorganiser une armée gouvernementale. Ce week-end, une trêve d'un mois vient d'être conclue avec le RUF, notamment grâce à l'intercession de **Charles Taylor**. C'est toute l'ambiguïté du paria de la région : il est d'autant plus réprouvé qu'il s'avère utile. Le pouvoir de nuisance de Taylor reste intact.

Depuis deux mois, la Guinée en fait l'expérience. Le long de sa frontière à l'est, les incursions armées se sont multipliées, faisant plus de 600 morts en deux mois. Des « rebelles » viennent de la Sierra Leone et du Liberia. Sans que l'on sache si des opposants guinéens se battent dans leurs rangs, s'il s'agit de partisans du RUF en quête d'une nouvelle terre à butin ou de janissaires de la déstabilisation. Ce procédé se prête, en tout cas, à la réciprocité. Au pouvoir à Monrovia, où il a fait dresser en face de la présidence un panneau géant portant sa devise favorite, « Think big », **Charles Taylor** se plaint qu'on lui envoie ses opposants. Qu'on retourne contre lui ses propres armes.

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Le Monde

Charles Taylor, former warlord and President of Liberia, "British officials are after Sierra Leone's diamonds"

Comments noted by Jean-Baptiste Naudet and Stephen Smith

15 November 2000

Charles Taylor is back in Paris, the only Western capital where, two years ago, he was given an official welcome. Boycotted by the United States and Great Britain, in the course of this private stay he will be received by neither the president nor the prime minister. But he is counting on France to end his isolation. Accused of trafficking Sierra Leone's "blood diamonds", the ex-warlord head of state counterattacks.

"What do you think of the peace efforts in Sierra Leone? Sometimes it seems you are treated as if you were to restore peace, other times as if you were nothing more than diamond traffickers?"

"It's unfortunate that by trying to demonise President Taylor the war in Sierra Leone is reduced to a conflict which Liberia is trying to get something out of. Does the fact that young British soldiers go off to fight in the forests of Sierra Leone and are doing so to stop the Sierra Leoneans from killing one another make any sense? No, it doesn't hold up. Yes, I think the war in Sierra Leone is a war for diamonds. But not because Liberia wants those diamonds. We already have diamonds. This war is taking place because the British want those diamonds. There are British officials who, via limited public companies located in Vancouver (Canada) own those (diamond) mines (in Sierra Leone). That's what British soldiers are over there for. Not because of us. Accusing us of diamond trafficking is like accusing Saudi Arabia of smuggling petroleum! Liberia has been exporting diamonds for 150 years now. Suddenly the world is at war to make for peace in Sierra Leone. But can't it make for that peace without demonising little Liberia?"

"The United States is very hostile towards you. Why?"

"The US accuses me of being involved in diamond trafficking. The United Nations Security Council set up a board of inquiry. But the US has started accusing Liberia even prior to the slightest finding. That's unfair. We are willing to co-operate fully in any investigation whatsoever of the Security Council. Because we know that these accusations are lies. Liberia has never been involved in any organised diamond trafficking. I am now looking at the results of the US elections. Now the US knows that mistakes can happen! Now they can see what third-world countries can have to go through!"

"What role can France and the European Union play?"

"France has a constructive role, experience with African problems. France is fair with Liberia, even if we are not a French-speaking country. We want to launch a full investigation into the accusations against Liberia. We are accused of trafficking arms and diamonds. We want an investigation because it's the only way to be cleared of those accusations. Europe can help investigate. They may cut off aid. They may not like Charles Taylor. But there are Liberians who are dying, who need aid. The British managed to halt European aid to Liberia.

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But I am a Christian. So God sent floods to Great Britain. Those floods which will cost a billion dollars or two. God punished Great Britain!"

"Do you think the Revolutionary United Front must be part of the peace process in Sierra Leone?"

"Only the belligerents can resolve conflicts. There is no way peace can be made in Sierra Leone while excluding a party from the peace process. As the African saying goes, 'You can't catch anything with one finger, you need two fingers.' The RUF committed terrible atrocities. People will have to answer for that. But the same people who are the cause of the problem have to be part of the solution. Great Britain has problems with the IRA. But the Irish Republican Army participates in the peace process. To the point that the pro and anti UK terrorists who were in Maze prison were let out. That doesn't make them angels. The RUF's people aren't angels either. But it's time to put an end to the crisis in West Africa. So can we apply some of your solutions? Nobody calls Yasser Arafat a terrorist anymore. So what do we Africans have to do? Never forget? Never end our crises?"

"Does Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Sierra Leone rebellion, have any future other than a trial?"

"That is for the Sierra Leoneans to decide. I am not opposed to Foday Sankoh being tried but he must not be the only one held responsible, the only one to have breached the Lomé peace accords. And what's more Africa is not yet in the third world. Wanting to apply first-world criteria will destroy everything. In Africa you always have coups d'Etat. There haven't been any in the West for half a century. In Africa there are ethnic, tribal problems. Let's hang Foday Sankoh! And the north of Sierra Leone will want to avenge him. We cannot go on applying first-world remedies to third or fourth world problems!"

"What solution do you see to the conflict with Guinea?"

"Oddly, last year we were the victims of a first attack coming from Guinea. We protested. There was a second attack on us. In the course of a meeting the President of Guinea Lansana Conté promised to do his utmost to prevent attacks of that kind. But to our great surprise, three months later there was a third, very serious and devastating attack. I said to President Lansana Conté, 'Can you do something to show me you are making an honest effort (to stop these attacks)?' That wasn't done. I asked for a face-to-face meeting with him. President (of Nigeria) Olusegun Obasanjo agreed to host such a meeting.

"These incursions from Guinea into Liberia occur in a forest area. It is very hard to ascertain if and when we cross the border with Guinea. Were we to do so there would be plenty of justification if a base in the forest somewhere had been used against Liberia. We have the right to destroy such bases. Liberia is not in a position to go to war. The United Nations maintains its arms embargo on us. We don't want this war. But if we are forced to, of course we will have to fight. And we'll come up with the means. We have the right to defend ourselves. Because Liberia is not the aggressor!"

doc. with a map 'Sierra Leone, world's tenth biggest diamond producer'

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Le Monde

Charles Taylor, the man with war, peace and indignation in his wake

By Jean-Baptiste Naudet and Stephen Smith

15 November 2000

Warlord or head of state, Charles Taylor makes for indignation. Under the suit of the President of Liberia there are still flashes of the fatigue dress of the warlord. On Christmas eve in 1989 Taylor triggered the first armed insurrection in West Africa. That rebellion, which was paid for with Libyan petrodollars, turned into a national suicide combining tribalism and despair in the face of globalisation. In 1997 this small country of some three million inhabitants who were extenuated by seven years of bloody unrest and atrocities committed by his partisans, elected Charles Taylor president. Attesting to the regularity of the voting, former US president Jimmy Carter wanted to believe in a "miracle", in the democratic resurrection of Liberia. But the poacher did not turn into a gamekeeper. At present, Charles Taylor is accused of bringing war to Guinea and keeping war going in Sierra Leone by supporting the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) for a few contraband diamonds.

In three years in power, the ex-rebel head of state has not restored either electricity or running water in his capital. His regime restricts civil liberties and breaches human rights. But, ironically, it's his good offices in Sierra Leone for the benefit of the international community which have got Charles Taylor into the hot seat. When in May half a thousand UN peacekeepers were taken hostage by the RUF, the President of Liberia appeared to be the one really in charge of Sierra Leone's rebel movement, as he obtained the peacekeepers' release.

CAPACITY TO DO HARM

And before taking on the United Nations, the RUF (led by a former lieutenant of Taylor's, Foday Sankoh) had terrorised Sierra Leone's civilian population. Its practices of amputating arms – "short sleeves" or "long sleeves" – horrified the world. Does Charles Taylor provide a sanctuary and arms to the RUF while getting paid in diamonds exploited across the border in eastern Sierra Leone? The United States and Great Britain are convinced he does. This summer Washington imposed sanctions on Liberia, whose officials are under a visa ban. That measure is all the more hurtful as a large part of Liberia's ruling class are descendants of former slaves and considers America its first home. Charles Taylor's father was born in the US. Taylor lived there for 10 years, going to college and then to jail, in 1983, for misappropriating nearly a million dollars to Liberia. After 16 months behind bars in Massachusetts, he escaped.

The European Union has also cut off its aid, at the request of Great Britain which has engaged massively in Sierra Leone. To save President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and the 13,000 peacekeepers deployed to protect his regime, London sent 600 paratroopers to Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital. Since, more than 300 million francs of military aid haven't sufficed to reorganise a government army. This weekend a one-month truce has just been concluded with the RUF, in particular thanks to the intercession of Charles Taylor. There's the whole ambiguity of the region's pariah: the more helpful he is the more reproof he gets. Taylor's capacity to do harm remains intact.

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For two months now Guinea has felt how true that is. The number of armed incursions along its eastern border has been rising steadily, making for more than 600 dead in two months. The "rebels" come from Sierra Leone and Liberia. Without it being known whether Guinean opponents are fighting within their ranks or whether these are RUF partisans looking for a new place to loot or janissaries of destabilisation. In any event, the process is open to reciprocity. In power in Monrovia, where opposite the presidency building he had a big billboard put up with his favourite motto, "Think big", Charles Taylor begrudges that his opponents are being sent against him. That his own arms are being turned against him.



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