

Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T
THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
ALEX TAMBA BRIMA
BRIMA BAZZY KAMARA
SANTIGIE BORBOR KANU

TUESDAY, 17 OCTOBER 2006
9.15 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:	Richard Lussick, Presiding Teresa Doherty Julia Sebutinde
For Chambers:	Mr Simon Meisenberg
For the Registry:	Ms Advera Kamuzora
For the Prosecution:	Mr Karim Agha Ms Maja Dimitrova (Case Manager)
For the accused Alex Tamba Brima:	Ms Glenna Thompson
For the accused Brima Bazy Kamara:	Mr Mohamed Pa-Momo Fofanah
For the accused Santigie Borbor Kanuu:	Mr Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops

1 [AFRC17OCT06A - MD]

2 Tuesday, 17 October 2006

3 [Open session]

4 [The accused present]

5 [The witness entered court]

6 [Upon commencing at 9.15 a.m.]

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning, Mr Knoops. This is your
8 expert witness; is that correct?

9 MR KNOOPS: Yes, Your Honour. This is Major General Prins.

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: He is a common witness?

11 MR KNOOPS: He is a common expert witness testifying in
12 open session without any protective measures. Just to inform the
13 Court, unfortunately, TRC-03 was not available for this morning,
14 so we would like to reserve our decision whether or not to call
15 him later and, in order to move on with the trial, we decided to
16 now interpose General Prins.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, the witness should be
18 sworn.

19 WITNESS: WILLEM PRINS [Sworn]

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead, Mr Knoops.

21 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 EXAMINED BY MR KNOOPS:

23 Q. Good morning, general.

24 A. Good morning.

25 Q. General, before we would like to take you through your
26 statement and your testimony of today, let us first turn to the
27 first question. That is the question how you were approached for
28 this task to appear as a military expert for the Defence case?

29 A. I was approached in October of last year, by you, on the

1 request to look into military matters concerning the case and,
2 later on, I was assigned by the Principal Defender, and that was
3 March 26, I believe, this year.

4 Q. Could you please indicate to the Court what the assignment
5 given to you by the Principal Defender of the Special Court for
6 Sierra Leone entailed, in short?

7 A. It was a broadly formulated assignment to look into the
8 military aspects of the SLA, and the AFRC and following on to go
9 into the way the AFRC operated and, lastly, to give an opinion on
10 an analysis on the report by Colonel Iron.

11 Q. Thank you, sir. General, let us move now to your
12 professional background, education background, training, et
13 cetera. General, you were born in 1948 in The Netherlands, you
14 are married and you have one son?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. You graduated in 1970 from the Royal Netherlands Naval
17 Academy and you were commissioned as a second lieutenant in the
18 Royal Netherlands Marine Corps?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. In the course of your career, you became a naval aviator
21 flying helicopters in counter-terrorism missions and you operated
22 two years on board of frigates?

23 A. I became a fixed wing pilot first and later specialised
24 helicopters and indeed flew counter-terrorism missions and on
25 board ships; that's correct.

26 Q. In the course of this same career, you became a specialist
27 in mountain and arctic warfare and you completed the special
28 forces training?

29 A. Correct.

1 Q. Can you recall the year when you completed the special
2 forces training, general?

3 A. I was sent to the special forces course in the year 1975.

4 Q. You attended the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School in
5 Quantico Virginia, United States of America?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. And you also served in the periods 1980, 1982, as a company
8 commander within The Netherlands Marine Corps together with the
9 British Royal Marines?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. And at that time you were part of the so-called United
12 Kingdom Netherlands Landing Force?

13 A. Yes, that's correct. That was an organisation that started
14 in 1973 so, by that time, we were so full swing integrated;
15 that's correct.

16 Q. Could you please explain shortly to the Court what the main
17 purpose of this force was? You mentioned the word integrated but
18 could you explain to the Court what the United Kingdom
19 Netherlands Landing Force actually aimed for?

20 A. Well, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands was the Royal
21 Marines on the British side, then the Dutch marines on The
22 Netherlands side, decided in 1973 that it was important to
23 integrate both forces, so you would have a highly readily
24 available landing force and that was the main purpose.

25 Q. Thank you, sir. General, in 1987, you became the adjutant
26 to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, so-called Saclant in
27 Norfolk, Virginia and you were assigned as adjutant for the
28 Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic until 1989; is that correct?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Are you able to tell the Court what the Supreme Allied
2 Commander Atlantic stands for?

3 A. The Supreme Allied Command Atlantic, it was the Atlantic
4 area in NATO. By that time, NATO had three major NATO
5 commanders, and one was a US four-star admiral, who was
6 responsible for the entire sea area of NATO, and so I worked for
7 him two years as an aide-de-camp.

8 Q. Thank you, sir. General, after graduation from the Royal
9 Netherlands Navy Staff College, you were assigned as head of the
10 personnel department of the headquarters of the Royal Netherlands
11 Marine Corps; is that correct?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. Can you recall the year when you were assigned as head of
14 the personnel department?

15 A. The year was 1991.

16 Q. Thank you. General, in 1992 you were promoted to the rank
17 of full colonel, within the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, and
18 you assumed command of operation maritime units in The
19 Netherlands. Could you explain to the Court what this function
20 precisely meant?

21 A. The function I got in that year was that I was commanding
22 officer of all operational marine units in The Netherlands.

23 Q. And just for our indication, general, how much marines are
24 we speaking about?

25 A. 2,000.

26 Q. How many battalions are we speaking about?

27 A. We had four battalions.

28 Q. General, in that capacity as commanding officer over all
29 operational marine units in The Netherlands, you also served as a

1 deputy brigade commander of the United Kingdom Netherlands
2 Landing Force; is that correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. And is it correct to say, sir, that this landing force was
5 a combined force of Dutch and British marines?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And, sir, is it correct to say that this landing force was
8 based on a total integration of the British and Dutch marines?

9 A. It was a total integration, and the integration also went
10 that far that my boss at that time was a one-star brigadier from
11 the Royal Marines and I was his number two as deputy brigade
12 commander.

13 Q. Yes. General, in that capacity as a deputy brigade
14 commander of this combined force, United Kingdom Netherlands
15 Landing Force, did you serve in that period as acting brigade
16 commander of that same landing force?

17 MR AGHA: Objection, Your Honour, as to leading the
18 witness.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: I will allow it. Go ahead, Mr Knoops.

20 MR KNOOPS:

21 Q. Thank you.

22 A. Yes, there was one point in time that the commanding
23 officer of the United Kingdom Netherlands Landing Force decided
24 to send me on a large-scale exercise in which he could not
25 participate so he asked me to do that so, in effect, I was acting
26 brigade commander with the British, Dutch staff.

27 Q. Can you recall, general, which year this happened?

28 A. Not exactly, no.

29 Q. Can you recall the location of the exercise or the events

1 you operated as acting brigade commander?

2 A. Indeed, I can. It was a large-scale exercise off the coast
3 of Spain, which was the first stage of this exercise, amphibious
4 exercise, and then later on we moved into the Mediterranean and
5 there my boss, so to speak, lined up again with me.

6 Q. And just, general, for our indication, how many marines
7 we're speaking about over of which you had command during this
8 event, speaking about both the British and the Dutch marines, who
9 were part of this landing force?

10 A. Well, normally the UK and ours is about 6,500 but not the
11 entire force participated, so an estimate is about 3,000 men that
12 participated in the exercise.

13 Q. General, can you recall whether you were part of this
14 United Kingdom Netherlands Landing Force involved in any other
15 missions during that year or the year after?

16 A. I didn't carry out real-time missions, to my regret, with
17 the UK landing force. However, during a time we were in the
18 preparation of an operation in Bosnia. However, that was never
19 implemented.

20 Q. But you were involved in the preparation of that mission;
21 is that your evidence?

22 A. That is correct, yes.

23 Q. And, general, just to come back to your position in 1992,
24 as a commanding officer of the whole operational marine units in
25 The Netherlands, could you please explain to the Court what your
26 responsibility entails in that function, as the commanding
27 officer of all the operational marines units in The Netherlands?

28 A. Well of course, being the commanding officer, I was mainly
29 responsible to prepare the battalions for missions they had to

1 carry out.

2 Q. And what do you mean with preparation; preparing the
3 battalions?

4 A. During the time I was in command we participated in three
5 years, or a year-and-a-half, in Cambodia and, of course, we had
6 to send out, prepare and send out battalion groups for that
7 mission. Also in that time we took the responsibility of a
8 mission in Haiti with one company. So, in fact, we had to -- I
9 had to prepare the battalions for those missions.

10 Q. General, can you explain to the Court what type of missions
11 we are speaking about when you refer to the mission Cambodia and
12 Haiti?

13 A. As well Cambodia as Haiti were peacekeeping operations.

14 Q. Thank you, sir. General, in 1998, July 1998, you were
15 promoted to brigadier general, and you assumed command of The
16 Netherlands forces in the Caribbean while at the same time being
17 responsible for a combined US/Netherlands task group. Could you
18 explain to the Court -- first of all, is that correct?

19 A. It is correct.

20 Q. Are you in position, general, to briefly indicate what your
21 task as brigadier general having command of The Netherlands
22 forces in the Caribbean entailed?

23 A. Well, to keep it short and simple, that job had, in effect,
24 three hats. One, flag officer Netherlands forces in the
25 Caribbean. And in that position I also was a subordinate
26 commander in a counter-drug organisation led by the US out of Key
27 West. That was the second hat. And my third hat was commandant
28 of the coast guard, Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and in that
29 position I was a law enforcer.

1 Q. General, the area of the Caribbean, could you explain to
2 the Court what territory this entailed?

3 A. I was based on the island of Curacao, just north of
4 Venezuela and, of course, the Kingdom of The Netherlands covers
5 another five islands. But basically, as subordinate commander in
6 the US counter-drug organisations, I had a huge area of
7 responsibility that extended from Colombia into Puerto Rico and
8 eastwards towards Martinique and further down to Suriname so it
9 was a huge area in which I had the co-ordination of counter-drug
10 operations.

11 Q. You just mentioned that you were also acting as a law
12 enforcer. Could you give us a short account of what you mean
13 with law enforcer?

14 A. As in the third hat I mentioned, which was commandant of
15 the coast guard, basically, I had to perform the coast guard
16 duties within the territorial waters. So it's search and rescue,
17 fishery inspection, but also predominantly the counter-drug
18 operations and, of course, in order to be able to carry out that
19 job you need law enforcement, let me say that, possibilities. So
20 I was sworn in by the minister of justice from The Netherlands
21 Antilles Aruba as a law enforcer.

22 Q. Did you, in this regard, gain any experience with the
23 doctrines on law enforcement?

24 A. I did because, basically, when I was in Curacao, we had
25 just set up the coast guard, so all sort of doctrines, modus
26 operandi, et cetera, how to operate within the coast guard, we
27 had to set up and create, that's correct.

28 Q. General, with respect to the other element of one of the
29 tasks in the Antilles, you referred to commander of the combined

1 US Netherlands task group, working with the United States. Could
2 you please explain to the Court what this function actually
3 meant?

4 A. Well, I may not have been clear in my previous answer, but
5 what I meant was the huge sea area to Puerto Rico was mainly the
6 subordinate hat in the combined task group. I was commanding
7 officer of a task group within that organisation. And, once
8 again, as stated, on the high seas, whenever there was a drug
9 transport, and it was picked up, I had the responsibility of
10 co-ordinating this intercept. So, all ships and planes, whether
11 they were from the US or from The Netherlands, they came under my
12 command to execute that task.

13 Q. Are you able to say to the Court how much personnel were
14 under your command in your function as commanding officer of the
15 royal -- of the forces in the Antilles?

16 A. In all three hats, I had 1,200 men, including planes and
17 ships and all that, and another 1,300 dependants, of course, came
18 also under my responsibility.

19 Q. Were you involved, at that time, general, in the setting up
20 of any military doctrines?

21 A. No, I was not in setting up military doctrine. I was
22 involved in, as I said, in setting up doctrine for coast guard
23 operations.

24 Q. General, before you assumed the position as commanding
25 officer of The Netherlands forces in the Caribbean you became, in
26 1995, 1996, just before you went to that position, you were the
27 chief of staff to the flak officer Netherlands forces in the
28 Caribbean and, during this period, you were appointed as a
29 magistrate within the appeal court of the Dutch Antilles as a

1 permanent member; is that correct?

2 A. That is correct. However, the timings were different. I
3 was sent out to the Caribbean at the beginning of 1997 and, for a
4 year-and-a-half, I was chief of staff. So I was then assigned
5 commanding officer in 1998, but it's correct, for a
6 year-and-a-half, I was in that position, as chief of staff.

7 Q. You mean the position --

8 A. And that also was the combination with the magistrate.

9 Q. Can you explain to the Court in which division you operated
10 within the Bench of the Appeal Court in the Court of Appeal of
11 the Dutch Antilles?

12 A. Criminal division.

13 Q. Criminal division. You actually worked on criminal cases
14 as a judge?

15 A. I did.

16 Q. You mentioned the period one year-and-a-half. You, at a
17 certain moment, stopped with your work as a permanent judge?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Can you please explain to the Court what the reason was
20 that you did not continue in that capacity?

21 A. I was asked by the Court to stay on in that capacity.
22 However, I got good advice from the Governor-General from The
23 Netherlands Antilles who advised me that the combination of being
24 in the Court, and being commanding officer of all the forces,
25 might have a conflict of interest so, with a certain regret, I
26 had to step out of Court.

27 Q. Thank you, sir. General, whilst being commander of The
28 Netherlands forces in the Caribbean, you participated in the
29 preparation, setting up, of jungle warfare courses in Suriname

1 and Belize in 1998, 2001?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Could you please shortly explain to the Court what these
4 jungle warfare courses actually meant?

5 A. The Netherlands marines needed to have experience in jungle
6 warfare, how to operate in the jungle environment. And so,
7 initially, we started on with Suriname but, due to several
8 political reasons and a relationship between Suriname and The
9 Netherlands, we had to cancel it for the time being. Then we
10 continued these trainings in Belize until we could go back to
11 Suriname again. Basically, it was a six-week period in which the
12 marines were trained how to survive, how to operate and how to
13 fight in a jungle environment.

14 Q. And, general, you actually yourself participated in these
15 events?

16 A. In Belize I stayed for a while to observe the training over
17 there.

18 Q. Was this training related to the Dutch marines or were
19 there other marines involved from other countries?

20 A. No. Initially it was for the Dutch Marine corps. However,
21 later on, the Dutch army also participated.

22 Q. And general, whilst in the Caribbean, as the commanding
23 officer of The Netherlands forces there you, in 1998 until 2001,
24 were involved in the training of militia; is that correct?

25 A. That's correct.

26 Q. Are you able to say to the Court what this training of
27 militia actually meant?

28 MR AGHA: Your Honour, I object to all the leading
29 questions that are actually being put to the witness.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Why?

2 MR AGHA: Why? Because I think it is a witness who can be
3 led in the ordinary as to, example, what kind of missions were
4 you involved in? What kind of work did this entail? Rather than
5 you were doing X or Y. That is my objection, Your Honour.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: What's your reply to that, Mr Knoops?

7 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, I'm happy to rephrase the question
8 but it's my understanding that it was a common practice -- it
9 became a common practice before this Court that the witness could
10 be led, just by way of efficiency, to go through his bio but I am
11 happy to ask the general any other -- the question in another
12 form but it's just a matter of, I think, expediency to pose the
13 question.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I am sure the witness is very
15 familiar with his bio anyway. It's just a matter of you
16 directing his attention to the area that you want him to testify
17 on.

18 MR KNOOPS: Okay. I am happy to rephrase that question.

19 MR AGHA: And, Your Honour, the point is some of these
20 areas are not in his bio, which is more important.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, if that's the case, Mr Knoops, it's
22 all the more reason that you don't lead if they are not disclosed
23 in the bio.

24 MR KNOOPS: Okay.

25 Q. General, you heard the objection of the Prosecution. We
26 have to rephrase the questions, unfortunately. General, are you
27 in a position to tell the Court what you -- whether you had any
28 specific assignments in the year 1998, 2001, whilst you were at
29 Curaçao, within your position as a commanding officer at that

1 time brigadier general?

2 A. Well, basically, my assignment was, in that capacity, the
3 defence of The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. And for that I
4 had at my disposal several marine formations and ships and planes
5 and all that. And, indeed, there was still on Curaçao and Aruba
6 conscript service by that time and so the conscripts from Curaçao
7 and -- or from The Netherlands Antilles, I must say, and Aruba --
8 did a national service and so one of my responsibilities was to
9 train, let's say, the local youngsters for their conscript
10 service.

11 Q. And when you speak about training, are you able to specify
12 more in detail what this training meant at that time?

13 A. I can. The training had changed over the years.
14 Initially, the conscripts were trained in a way we should train
15 regular marines or soldiers. However, we noted that due to the
16 background, their schooling and so on, and also the environment
17 they lived in Curaçao, we thought it more important to train
18 them, let's say, in a way -- give them a hardship course instead
19 of giving them all the military skills and drills that didn't
20 serve a purpose. So what we did, we trained them for half a
21 year, let's say in a sort of outward bound school challenging
22 environment, and the last half year we trained them in skill
23 civilian labour, a carpenter, a painter and so on, so they could
24 immediately go into society with a job.

25 Q. Thank you, general. General, we move on to the year 2001
26 and, for the record, it's in the bio of the general on page
27 18970. General, you were promoted on 26 September 2001 to the
28 rank of major general and appointed as the commandant of the
29 Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. Now, are you able to tell the

1 Court what your -- the area of your responsibility was?

2 A. As commandant of the marine corp, I was responsible for the
3 entire marine corps in The Netherlands covering 3,500 men. In
4 the capacity of marine corps commandant I was also member of the
5 Supreme Board of the Royal Netherlands Navy and, in my capacity,
6 I was ultimately, in this capacity I was ultimately responsible
7 for the marine units also in preparing them for missions.

8 Q. General, can you recall any missions in which you were
9 involved as far as preparation concerns?

10 A. Yes. I was involved in the preparation of two battalion
11 groups to Iraq and an operation off the coast of Liberia.

12 Q. And general, what type of operations we speak here when you
13 refer to mission Iraq and Liberia?

14 A. Liberia was basically an amphibious ship off the coast of
15 Liberia, with marine forces embarked in support operations, in
16 Liberia, and Iraq was after the war, of course, under British
17 command to establish peace and security in the southern region of
18 Iraq, and we carried out that mission for eight months.

19 Q. Thank you, general. General, when you speak about
20 preparation of two battalion groups, or battalion groups as such,
21 in this regard could you tell the Court what you mean with
22 preparation of battalion groups?

23 A. What I mean is that if you're sent out to, for example,
24 Iraq, depending on the mission, you have to make sure that the
25 men are trained properly. Now of course you have your
26 subordinate commanders to do that. However, it was my ultimate
27 responsibility to make sure it was done, to make sure they had
28 the right personnel, which was my direct responsibility and my
29 staff to make sure they had the right equipment. So training

1 equipment personnel.

2 Q. Thank you, general. Whilst you were the commandant of the
3 Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, you were ultimately responsible
4 also for the integration of the marine corps into The Netherlands
5 fleet organisation in that year?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Are you able to tell the Court what this integration
8 actually meant of these two forces, organisations?

9 A. I can. Basically, the marine corps and the fleet were,
10 when I started as commandant, two separate organisations.
11 However, due to enormous reorganisations within the defence of
12 The Netherlands we had to integrate the marine corps staff, my
13 headquarters, with the fleet headquarters and basically, from the
14 marine side, or from my headquarters, the plan came how to do
15 that.

16 Q. And can you tell the Court how much personnel was involved
17 in this integration of these two organisations?

18 A. If you ask me about personnel then I have to relate only to
19 the staff because it didn't change anything for marine battalion
20 but my headquarters was approximately 120 men strong and the
21 fleet headquarters was about 300 strong so in total well over 400
22 staff officers had to -- had to integrate in the staff, in the
23 combined staff.

24 Q. But when we speak about the strength of The Netherlands
25 Marine Corps and The Netherlands Fleet Organisation, about how
26 much servicemen or women we speak, in total?

27 A. I think by the time, when I left the navy marine corps was
28 a -- had a total strength of about 16,000.

29 Q. Thank you. Are you able to tell the Court how much time it

1 took you, or the staff you were responsible for, to undertake
2 this integration of these two organisations?

3 A. I can partly answer the question because the -- the
4 planning, how to do it, we could do that in about four months,
5 but the actual integration so how -- how do you combine the two
6 staffs together, how are you making the procedures, etcetera,
7 that started right after I left the marine corps and the time set
8 for that and needed, as I was told, was about a year.

9 Q. And general, in that period, were you involved in the
10 setting up of any other organisations or reintegrations, apart
11 from the one you just mentioned?

12 A. No.

13 Q. General, in September 2004, you retired from active
14 service?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. Are you able to tell the Court what position you assumed
17 after being retired?

18 A. Well, I decided it was not the time to pick up a permanent
19 position. However, I was asked to, on a part-time basis, to join
20 the centre for strategic studies, in The Hague, again on a -- on
21 a part-time basis.

22 Q. That's in The Netherlands?

23 A. That's in The Netherlands.

24 Q. And what is the overall purpose or aim of this centre for
25 strategic studies The Hague?

26 A. The area they cover is extremely wide. All sort of studies
27 are carried out, whether it's how to deal with counter-terrorism,
28 how to judge plans within the Defence, so it's an advisory group,
29 so, but it's extremely wide.

1 Q. Were you approached to become a member of this centre?

2 A. I was.

3 Q. Was there -- is there a specific area of or discipline you
4 are involved in within that centre?

5 A. Again, on a -- on a part-time basis, I was involved heavily
6 in -- in dealing with intelligence structures after 9/11. In
7 other words, after 9/11, looking carefully in The Netherlands are
8 we doing business well, dealing with sharing information and I
9 carried out that -- that study, together with others for quite a
10 while.

11 Q. Was this study published within the centre?

12 A. It was published only within the centre.

13 Q. Was there a specific reason for that?

14 A. I think the specific reason not to -- to bring it outside
15 the centre was because the proposals were within the context of
16 The Netherlands and political world in The Netherlands, a little
17 far.

18 Q. Thank you, general. General, at the end of your active
19 military career, but I think also before, according to your bio,
20 you were decorated with the Officers Cross of Oranja Nassau by
21 Her Majesty, the Queen of Beatrix, of The Netherlands?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. Can you please explain to the Court why you were decorated
24 with this officers cross?

25 A. It's not always totally known to the one who receives the
26 decoration but it was basically for my performance in The
27 Netherlands Antilles.

28 Q. And general, is it also correct to say that the appointment
29 to you as a permanent judge, in the Antilles, in the years

1 before, was actually issued by Her Majesty, the Queen Beatrix of

2 The Netherlands?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. And general, in 2001 you were awarded with the Legion or
5 Merit. Are you able to tell the Court what the Legion of Merit
6 means?

7 A. The Legion or Merit is a decoration from the United States
8 of America, and it has different degrees, and I was awarded the
9 highest degree commander for, basically for my work as commandant
10 of the coast guard and subordinate commander of a US organisation
11 in the counter-drug organisation in the Caribbean.

12 Q. Actually, with the latter, you referred to your position as
13 the commander of the task group of the -- in the
14 counter-terrorism enforcement?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. General, after being retired, were you appointed in any
17 other case as a military expert?

18 A. I was.

19 Q. Could you please inform the Court when you were appointed
20 as military expert and in what case?

21 A. I was appointed as a military expert last July by a union
22 for professional military personnel, and the case had to do with
23 the liability of the state of The Netherlands in a case of a
24 Dutch soldier who served in Srebrenica and who got post-traumatic
25 stress syndrome. So, in fact, for the union, whose member got
26 post-traumatic syndrome, I wrote a military expert report.

27 Q. And, general, were you asked to be military expert in this
28 capacity based on the operational aspects which pertain to the
29 Srebrenica case?

1 MR AGHA: Objection, Your Honour. It's the leading nature
2 of that question.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say, Mr Knoops?

4 MR KNOOPS: I'm happy to rephrase it, Your Honour.

5 Q. General, are you in a position to briefly indicate what
6 areas of expertise were asked from you becoming military expert?

7 A. Of course, I have not served in Srebrenica, but I was asked
8 to look into basically the decision-making process by the Dutch
9 government in all the phases of Srebrenica, and basically also
10 the question if the Dutch government took care of the battalions
11 and their men properly.

12 Q. Thank you, general. Did you prepare a report in this case?

13 A. I did. I filed my report to the union at the end of
14 September.

15 Q. And was your report filed with the Court?

16 A. It was.

17 Q. Thank you, general. That concludes the first part of my
18 examination and, general, let us now turn to what you actually
19 researched and what your research specifically entailed. Are you
20 in a position, general, to inform the Court, shortly, what the
21 composition of your report is? In other words, how your research
22 for the FC case was set up?

23 A. Yes, I can. Based on the broad assignment, I wrote a
24 report of five let's say paragraphs or chapters. After an
25 introduction, I addressed an historical analysis in part B and
26 then in part C I went to describe based on -- on a little bit of
27 doctrine the types of conflict that exist, normally, and then the
28 character of the operation of the AFRC and then, in the next
29 chapter, I analysed in detail the report written by Colonel Iron,

1 and of course, I had to address the three question, initially
2 for, as you know, the three questions posed by Colonel Iron,
3 whether it was hierarchy and structure, the characteristics of
4 the AFRC, whether there was coherence between strategic
5 operational and technical level and, in addition to that, a
6 fourth question was posed to me whether and to what -- whether
7 and to what extent, let's say a joint military structure had
8 existed between the AFRC and the RUF. So that's basically the
9 Iron report and then my last part is conclusions.

10 Q. Thank you, general. I will now turn to the question how
11 you undertook this research. And perhaps, general, you are in a
12 position to inform the Court first about your starting point.
13 Can you explain to the Court what was your starting point when
14 you assumed this assignment?

15 A. My starting point was the report written by Colonel Iron
16 which -- who had then just had delivered his report, I think it
17 was in October last year.

18 Q. General, are you able to tell the Court whether you made
19 use of any primary and/or secondary sources?

20 A. I did.

21 Q. You did both?

22 A. Sorry, yes, both.

23 Q. Thank you. General, let us first start with the primary
24 sources of your report. Can you tell the Court what type of
25 primary sources you used to come to your report?

26 A. The primary source were interviews with senior officers,
27 retired, and still on active duty.

28 Q. Thank you. Are you able to tell us the names of the
29 retired senior officers?

1 A. I'm afraid I can't. I cannot. I can write them down
2 because I know for one has a specific number, and the other two,
3 indicated that they were in no position to have their names
4 revealed, so, but the retired officers are concerned, I cannot do
5 that. I can write them down but I cannot mention their names.

6 MR KNOOPS: Your Honours, if the Court allows the general
7 to write down the names of the retired senior officers he
8 interviewed?

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Court attendant, if you will
10 assist.

11 MR KNOOPS:

12 Q. And, general, whilst you are doing that, perhaps you could
13 number them so we could, in the course of my examination, refer
14 to the numbers of the retired officers you are going to write
15 down for us. I am grateful for that.

16 A. Excuse me, only the retired officers, is that correct?

17 Q. Yes. Let's start with retired officers, sir.

18 MR AGHA: Your Honours, at this stage, could the
19 Prosecution make an observation, that the witness seems to have
20 with him some papers other than what he's writing on, and the
21 Prosecution is wondering whether it's proper that he should have
22 those other documents there in front of him while he's giving his
23 evidence.

24 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, perhaps the general can first
25 indicate what papers he has on his desk.

26 THE WITNESS: I can. What I have here is my report, the
27 report by Colonel Iron and some notes of one of the retired
28 officers.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, all right. I haven't seen the

1 witness refer to any of those notes.

2 MR KNOOPS: I would, Your Honour, ask the Court's
3 permission that the witness, that the expert, excuse me, would be
4 permitted to at least have the notes available of one of the
5 senior officers because these notes are, first of all, disclosed
6 to the Prosecution.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, look, Mr Knoops, let's do it in the
8 context of some questions. You are talking in the abstract at
9 the moment. I'm not sure in connection with what questions you
10 want the notes there. So let's go through it in the form of
11 evidence.

12 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Knoops, while we are still on the
14 issue of this sheet of paper that is going around, you asked the
15 witness questions which elicited the answer: These were retired
16 officers. Now, I presume that they were retired officers of the
17 Sierra Leone Army; is that correct?

18 MR KNOOPS: That's correct, Your Honour.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Knoops. Do you want this
20 document back or what do you wish to do with it?

21 MR KNOOPS: I would like to have it tendered as a
22 confidential document, Your Honour.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Right. Mr Agha, any objection?

24 MR AGHA: We have no objection, Your Honour.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, this piece of paper on which the
26 witness has written the names of three retired officers, will be
27 admitted into evidence as Exhibit D34.

28 [Exhibit No. D34 was admitted]

29 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. General, do you know whether there was a specific reason
2 for these three officers?

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am sorry to interrupt, Mr Knoops, but I
4 have done it again. I should have ordered that that last
5 exhibit, D34, be marked confidential. I will make that order
6 now.

7 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. General, do you know whether there was a specific reason
9 for these three officers not to have their names revealed?

10 A. Basically, they, all three, indicated that, by revealing
11 their names, they were afraid of repercussions from the
12 government, which is a broad sort of thing to state. But, from
13 the government, they were afraid of having repercussions.

14 Q. During which periods you were able to interview them?

15 A. Different time frames. All of them, I interviewed in the
16 October time frame, month of October, last year, and also in the
17 period which is from March, I believe, 26 or 24, this year, until
18 4 or 6 April.

19 Q. Can you indicate approximately how many interviews you
20 conducted with the three seniors, starting with number one?

21 A. Number one, I met in October several times -- I can't
22 indicate how many, exactly. But, even more so, I met number one
23 in the period in October, excuse me, in March/April, at least
24 five times.

25 Q. Did, general, number one, at a certain moment, provide you
26 with written notes?

27 A. Yes, he did. Initially, I took the notes, interviews, and
28 went back to The Netherlands. However, during my research, I had
29 additional questions which -- which I -- I asked number one and

1 then he came up, which was a necessity, he came up with the
2 written notes and sent them to The Netherlands.

3 Q. General, are you able to identify these written notes?

4 A. I am.

5 Q. When I would give you a document with notes, would you be
6 able to say whether these are the notes you refer to?

7 A. I am.

8 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, at this point, I would like the
9 Court's permission to provide the expert with some notes I have
10 here, and ask the witness whether he recognises the notes as
11 being the notes of officer number one.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. You want him to identify the notes?

13 MR KNOOPS: Yes.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Go ahead.

15 THE WITNESS: I recognise the notes.

16 MR KNOOPS: Thank you. Your Honour, at this stage, we
17 would like to have the record reflect that the general clarified
18 the notes the Defence provided him with, and we would like to
19 tender these notes as a confidential Defence exhibit, D35.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Agha?

21 MR AGHA: Depending on the nature of the notes, the
22 Prosecution may have an objection. If these notes are the actual
23 written notes which the colonel -- I beg your pardon, which the
24 expert took from the witness himself, whilst in this country,
25 then the Prosecution would have no objection, provided the
26 Prosecution is also provided with a copy of those documents. If,
27 on the other hand, they are notes by someone else, which were
28 sent to him, then the Prosecution would suggest that those notes
29 be marked for identification only, and that the person who then

1 gave those notes can come and identify them, if need be.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, weren't you filed with a copy of
3 some notes on the -- weren't you served with a copy of some notes
4 on 13th October?

5 MR AGHA: We requested all the notes, Your Honour, and we
6 were only provided with the notes in respect of witness DSK-082
7 who, as yet, hasn't been put on the list with Mr Knoops. So we
8 are not dealing with that witness, Your Honour.

9 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, just for, of course,
10 clarification, we are dealing about the same notes.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: They are the same notes that were served;
12 is that correct?

13 MR KNOOPS: That's correct, Your Honour.

14 MR AGHA: But they were served to us under the heading of
15 DSK-082, not under the heading of these other gentlemen. Is the
16 learned Defence counsel saying that all their set of notes are a
17 mismatch of all of those people who sent him the notes?

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: No. It was served on you as the written
19 notes of DSK-082 as an annexure to the military expert report.

20 MR KNOOPS: And, Your Honour, to be clear, the person
21 number one on the list of D34, is the same person as DSK-082.
22 And we are not suggesting that these notes are a compilation
23 written by the three officers, one, two, three. We are just
24 speaking about officer number one.

25 MR AGHA: In that case, Your Honour, it's clear to me now
26 because where I have number one, I only had the second name, the
27 surname, and there could have been numerous surnames in respect
28 of that name. Even so, the Prosecution starts, now that has been
29 clarified, that the notes should be marked for identification

1 rather than exhibited, so that the witness himself, who indeed
2 was on the Defence list, can come, if need be, to authenticate
3 them or indeed give live evidence.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Are these notes that the witness took or
5 they are notes that were posted to him by the person he spoke to?

6 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, these are the notes written by
7 number one, based on the questions the general referred to, based
8 on the initial interviews. So these are handwritten notes of
9 number one himself. And I don't see any reason why this could
10 not be admitted as an annexure to the report, because it
11 clarifies some of the primary sources of the expert. Secondly,
12 the expert has indicated the reason why the person itself is not
13 able or willing to testify. But, apart from that, we are
14 speaking about the foundation of the report. And, thirdly, I
15 recall that the Prosecution expert, Mr Iron, relied on interviews
16 without making any notes, without being asked to reveal any notes
17 which he took from his sources.

18 So I would think it's unfair, when the Prosecution now
19 requires from the Defence, original notes from witnesses or
20 sources on which an expert relies. There is no jurisprudential
21 foundation for that, whilst the Prosecution expert is able to
22 give evidence live in Court, relying on interviews he took from
23 several Prosecution witnesses, without revealing any notes.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, correct me if I am wrong, but these
25 notes are the foundation for certain observations made by the
26 expert in his report.

27 MR KNOOPS: That's totally correct, Your Honour.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: And these notes are produced for the
29 purpose of establishing that he had material on which to come to

1 his conclusions?

2 MR KNOOPS: Exactly, Your Honour. I'm just laying the
3 foundation for the primary sources. I'm not yet here for the
4 secondary sources, so I am trying to establish the primary
5 sources on which the expert relied, and I would say if the expert
6 is able to produce original notes from one of his sources, that
7 may even be far more clear than derivative notes which he took
8 from the source, one of the primary sources. So I would say the
9 Prosecution should perhaps be happy that we, as Defence, were
10 able and willing to produce these notes because there is no legal
11 obligation for us to provide any of the confidential notes and
12 expert takes from his sources.

13 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Knoops, can I clarify: These were not
14 notes taken in a face-to-face interview, as I understand your
15 submission. Did they arrive in the post as a result of questions
16 posed by the expert?

17 MR KNOOPS: It's my understanding, but the general has to
18 correct me if I am wrong, that these notes were provided to the
19 general, in person, by number one after being extensively
20 interviewed and, on the basis of these interviews, the general
21 has posed additional questions on paper to number one, which he
22 has answered in this piece of paper, 21 pages, which go into the
23 substance of the report or at least the live substance of the
24 report. And the general was in the position to verify whether
25 these notes were indeed produced by number one.

26 Q. General, now you should correct me if I summarise this not
27 correctly but --

28 A. Yes, I'm afraid I have to correct you on this. The way it
29 happened was that I talked extensively to number one, or 082, in

1 the time-frame March, April. And by writing my report I needed
2 some clarification on certain issues. So by the time I left for
3 The Netherlands, I handed number one or 082, additional questions
4 and they came in, and the answers came in by email.

5 Q. General, we are speaking about the handwritten notes?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. So you are saying they came in through email. Were you
8 able to verify the handwriting of number one with other materials
9 you had from him?

10 A. Not other than that while I was here I got notes from him,
11 and then they had the same handwriting.

12 Q. And you were able to speak with him about these notes?

13 A. Oh, absolutely.

14 Q. And he never said to you that "I didn't give you any
15 notes"?

16 A. Oh no, no, no, no. They, we, by the time I left I asked
17 him specifically: Can you give me answers on these items I want
18 to know.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Agha, it's not necessary for two
20 counsel to be on their feet at the one time.

21 MR KNOOPS: Your Honours, one final question for the
22 general in this regard.

23 Q. General, were these, you say they were sent to you via
24 email. Was it sent -- were they scanned to you?

25 A. Well, my technical knowledge doesn't go that far. I opened
26 my computer and that was on.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I notice another objection,
28 possible objection that hasn't been specifically put, is that
29 these notes don't comply with Rule 94bis because under that rule

1 the full, I emphasise full report of the expert must be filed
2 within not later than 21 days from his testimony, and these would
3 seem to be part of the expert's report that were never served
4 within that timeframe.

5 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, with all due respect, I
6 respectfully disagree with your opinion because there is no rule
7 saying that the expert was obliged to file the primary sources.
8 This is just the foundation of one of the primary sources and
9 we --

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: No. No, I will interrupt you there.
11 What do you think the meaning of the words "full statement of any
12 expert witness" means?

13 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, that refers to the statement of
14 the experts himself; the full report of the expert. We are not
15 speaking about the primary or secondary sources. Now, I also
16 recall that the Prosecution expert, Colonel Iron, was not obliged
17 to reveal his primary or secondary sources as well.

18 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: But, Mr Knoops, you are confusing two
19 issues here. Nobody is obliging the Defence to disclose anything
20 at this stage. It is you who are seeking to tender this document
21 that is now in issue. So, please, don't draw in the Prosecution
22 comparison. It's two different -- it's a different kettle of
23 fish, if you like. But the issue here, let's stick with the
24 issue, which is the status of this document that you seek to now
25 tender. It was filed as an annex to the report. Now, in your
26 understanding, is an annex to the report part of the report or
27 not?

28 MR KNOOPS: It's not part of the full statement of any
29 expert witness within the meaning of Rule 94 bis (A), Your

1 Honour. That is my standpoint. And if we are going into an
2 interpretation of the word "annex" I am happy to delete that word
3 "annexure." We can also mention it, refer to it as a disclosure
4 of one of the primary sources of the expert, but it's not part
5 and parcel of the statement of the expert itself. And notes
6 taken, again, form not part and parcel of the full statement of
7 the expert witness. It doesn't say the full statement of the
8 expert witness and his underlying sources. It is the statement
9 of the expert himself. So the statement of General Prins is
10 revealed, this close in time. And, actually, there is no
11 foundation for such interpretation within the case law of the
12 ICTY.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, that may be because it has never
14 been adjudicated before. But when you say statement, are you
15 saying to us that anything in General Prins' report that is not a
16 direct statement from him is inadmissible, because most of the
17 report is based on statements of other people? So is that what
18 you are saying, Mr Knoops?

19 MR KNOOPS: Could you please recall -- rephrase your
20 question, sorry, I am --

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, you can't have it both ways. You
22 are saying that this document that you now wish to tender, which
23 you formerly called an annexure, is not part of the general
24 statement and therefore it's not part of his report but, if you
25 look at his report, a lot of that information is also not the
26 general's statement. He is quoting other people's statements.
27 So are you saying that those parts of the report are not
28 admissible because they are not his statement?

29 MR KNOOPS: But then, Your Honour, I have to say that the

1 general did reveal the full statement, including the statement of
2 witness number one, the source number one. If the Court --

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, but look, you have got a double
4 standard here, Mr Knoops. For the purpose of getting this
5 annexure in you say it's not his statement, it's not the expert's
6 statement, for the purpose of getting this annexure in but for
7 the purpose of getting in other people's statements in the
8 general's report you are saying they are his statements, not the
9 other people's.

10 MR KNOOPS: But, with all due respect, Your Honour, it's --
11 we are not saying that this is the statement of the expert. What
12 we are trying to do with this document is that --

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I know what you are trying to do. I am
14 just getting you to answer the requirements of 94bis and I think
15 I have heard your submissions on those, Mr Knoops. That is only
16 one of the objections that the Prosecution have against the
17 admission of this material that is described as written notes of
18 DSK-082.

19 MR KNOOPS: But, Your Honour, with all due respect, if you
20 are speaking about the timeframe of 21 days and, in your view,
21 it's not potentially complying with Rule 94bis, I think we cannot
22 ignore the fact that the expert --

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just a minute, just a minute. I will
24 correct you there. We haven't formed any view yet.

25 MR KNOOPS: No, no. I said potentially.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am just drawing your attention to the
27 requirements of 94bis to hear your submissions on it.

28 MR KNOOPS: Well, my submission, Your Honour, and then I
29 conclude my argumentation, that it did fulfil the requirement

1 because the report of the general quotes, cites, the interviews
2 with this first witness, this first source. So the Prosecution
3 was put on notice, timely, way before the 21 days, about the
4 so-called statement of primary source number one. So it's not a
5 matter of -- that the Defence, last Friday, for the first time
6 revealed his statement from one of the sources, because it's
7 already in the report and, as Your Honours rightly observed, the
8 general, indeed, cited from the interviews with, for instance,
9 number one. So, in my view, he, this report fully complies with
10 Rule 94bis, in various -- in all its various aspects. Thank you.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, look, in fairness to
12 Mr Agha, we haven't given him a chance, if he wishes to, to
13 address on 94bis. We have noted your other objections, Mr Agha.
14 Did you want to say anything on 94bis?

15 MR AGHA: Just generally, on 94bis, my submission would
16 essentially be that all parts of the report have to be filed and,
17 in the case of DSK-082, my learned friend is correct. It is
18 referred to in the report, and we requested that statement so
19 that it could form a part of the report and that was the reason
20 why we requested it. Initially, it was denied and then, very
21 lately, at the last moment, in fact, Friday, we have now received
22 it which is clearly outside the 21-day period and I suspect it
23 has been given to us at the last minute for the purposes of its
24 use today. So I would say that its attempted filing in as an
25 annexure is in breach of Rule 94, Your Honour.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, look, we will take the
27 morning break a little early and we will come back with a
28 decision. We will come back at say 11 a.m. with a ruling on
29 this. We will adjourn until then.

1 [Break taken at 10.35 a.m.]

2 [Upon resuming at 11.17 a.m.]

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: This is a decision on the objection to
4 the tender of certain notes produced by the expert. The
5 Prosecution objects to the tender by the Defence of handwritten
6 notes made by a person with the pseudonym of DSK-082, who is
7 described in the military expert report as a primary source of
8 information.

9 The Prosecution objection is that since the notes were not
10 made by the expert, but by someone else, the notes should be
11 marked for identification so that the person who made those notes
12 can come to Court to identify them.

13 The Prosecution also objects on the basis that the Defence
14 is in breach of Rule 94 bis (A), in that the notes are part of
15 the expert's report, but were not filed with the Trial Chamber at
16 least 21 days prior to the date on which the expert was expected
17 to testify.

18 We note that the Prosecution, by email sent to the Defence
19 on 10 October 2006, specifically requested that it be provided
20 with the said notes. Instead, the Defence chose to file the
21 notes in a formal Court document entitled "Confidential Joint
22 Defence Disclosure of Confidential Handwritten Notes of DSK-082
23 as an Annexure to the Military Expert Report."

24 Being an annexure the notes thus became part of the
25 expert's report. Since the notes were filed on 13 October 2006
26 we hold that they were filed in contravention of Rule 94 bis (A).
27 We of course have jurisdiction to disregard strict compliance
28 with that rule. However, there is no reason to do so in the
29 present case because we hold that the notes are otherwise

1 inadmissible. The notes are said to have been received by email
2 by the expert. The notes are unsigned, and the expert is not
3 able to identify the handwriting, although he did say that the
4 notes were sent in answer to certain questions which he had asked
5 before he left Sierra Leone.

6 Since the notes are statements of the opinion of the maker
7 of the notes, on various issues, and since the maker has not been
8 qualified as an expert witness, we rule that the notes are
9 inadmissible and we reject the tender.

10 Yes, Mr Knoops.

11 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Q. General, thank you for your patience. General, do you know
13 whether the three individuals which you mentioned in your
14 handwritten document just provided with the Court, exhibited D34,
15 whether they were present on the territory of Sierra Leone during
16 the conflict, in specific, the period of May 1997 till the end of
17 1998?

18 A. Of course then I have to specify one-by-one, which I will
19 do. Number one was on the territory of Sierra Leone in the
20 period you mentioned, let's say from the start of May '97
21 onwards, and when he left Freetown, February of 1998, he fled
22 into the so-called bush and he stayed in the bush or in -- on the
23 territory of Sierra Leone approximately until May 1998.
24 Subsequently, he left the territory of Sierra Leone and, in
25 August, but then I have to reflect to the curriculum vitae to be
26 precise but, in August, he returned to Sierra Leone. Now, for
27 the number two and three --

28 Q. Excuse me, general, before you continue, excuse me, sir.
29 You were provided, do I understand you correctly, you were

1 provided with his CV?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. Were you able to observe what his position was after May
4 1998, in terms of his presence during the conflict?

5 A. After May 1998, as I recall correctly, he fled to Guinea,
6 returned to Sierra Leone in August, and started working for
7 ECOMOG.

8 Q. And do you know whether in that capacity he was into the
9 area where the conflict involved?

10 A. As I understood, number one was in Freetown, and also in
11 the countryside but again working for ECOMOG.

12 Q. Yes. Thank you, sir. What about number two?

13 A. For sure, I know that number two was on the territory of
14 Sierra Leone for about four months after February 1998. After
15 that, I believe he fled to Guinea, but then I didn't have any
16 data on that.

17 Q. Do you know, general, whether number two himself was
18 involved in the conflict as a soldier in -- after May 1997?

19 MR AGHA: Objection; it's a leading question.

20 MR KNOOPS: I'm asking whether the general knows, has
21 knowledge about this issue.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I don't think that's the objection.
23 I think the objection is that the form you put the question in is
24 leading.

25 MR KNOOPS:

26 Q. General, do you know whether number two was present here,
27 in Sierra Leone, after May 1997?

28 A. Well, he certainly was present in Sierra Leone during the
29 year 1997 and, subsequently, he left Freetown, February 1998, and

1 for sure I know that then he stayed on the territory of Sierra
2 Leone for a couple of months and, after that, I don't have any
3 recollection.

4 Q. Can you recall on how many occasions you were able to speak
5 with number two?

6 A. I spoke with number two three times in the October 2005
7 timeframe, and I met him also again in the March, April,
8 timeframe this year, and that was only one time.

9 Q. Do you know, general, what his position was during the
10 month after May 1997, without disclosing his exact rank?

11 A. Are we still talking about number two now?

12 Q. Yes, number two. What -- do you know whether he held any
13 specific position after May 1997?

14 A. No, I know his rank, which I've indicated on the paper, but
15 I -- I don't know which position he then held.

16 Q. Thank you. What about number three?

17 A. Number three, as I understood from him, was basically on
18 the territory of Sierra Leone the entire period you mentioned, so
19 also including the year 1998.

20 Q. Do you know where exactly within the territory he was over
21 that period?

22 A. That, I don't know. He is mentioned in my report, but I
23 don't know. I can't identify specifically in which city he was.
24 He was somewhere in north-western part but that's all I know
25 about him.

26 Q. Do you know, general, whether number three, himself, was
27 actively involved in the conflict?

28 A. From -- from the sources I read and studied, and also from
29 my interview with him, he was leading, if I may call it that way,

1 one of the factions, the AFRC factions.

2 Q. Are you at liberty, general, to mention that faction in
3 public?

4 A. Well, as I state in my report, after 1998, upon departure
5 of so many groups leaving Freetown, I noticed that, and
6 discovered in the notes, and from my interviews, that several
7 groups, if I may call them so, AFRC, spread out in the country,
8 and he was leading one of the groups.

9 Q. Did you, in this regard, encounter whether there was any
10 relationship between those groups?

11 A. No. Not in the sense that I came across the fact that
12 there was communication between the several factions. There may
13 have been, but I don't know if that existed formally or
14 informally.

15 Q. And, general, when you speak about different groups, how
16 many of those groups you encountered in your research, without
17 mentioning names of the various --

18 A. I mentioned in my report, if I am, if I can recall, I
19 mention a few -- I think four or five factions I was aware of --
20 or I came across.

21 Q. Thank you, general. General, we just spoke about the
22 primary sources of your report in terms of the three retired
23 senior officers. You also mentioned in your testimony before
24 that you were able to speak with two acting senior officers?

25 A. That's correct.

26 Q. Are you able to mention their names before this Court?

27 A. Well, one of the names I cannot mention because he got a
28 code, a TRC, a one, if I am correct. Correct? And I think the
29 other one, I don't see a reason why I can't name his name.

1 Q. Would you mention his name, general?

2 A. Yeah, the man I talked to was a chief of defence staff of
3 the Sierra Leone Army, Major General Sam Mboma.

4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I am sorry, could we have a spelling of
5 that surname, please?

6 MR KNOOPS: Yes, Your Honour. Sorry, Your Honour. That's
7 Sam, S-A-M, Mboya M-B-O-Y-A. Sam Mboya. Correction, Your
8 Honours. It's Sam, S-A-M, Mboma, M-B-O-M-A. Mboma.

9 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: He is the chief of --

10 MR KNOOPS: Defence staff of the army.

11 Q. General, just to make sure: He is the acting defence,
12 chief of defence staff?

13 A. I'm sure he was the acting chief of defence staff when I
14 visited him but that was only a couple of months ago. He -- I
15 think he still is.

16 Q. And to make sure: He is the chief of defence staff of the
17 whole Sierra Leone Army at this moment?

18 A. Well, if I talk about chief of defence staff, you talk
19 about the overall commander. I didn't ask him specifically
20 whether he was chief of the army. In my recollection he was the
21 chief of defence staff of the entire, may I call it that way,
22 Sierra Leone Armed Forces.

23 Q. Just to make sure, general, are you able and willing to
24 write down the name on the piece of paper of the person you refer
25 to as the person with the code TRC-01?

26 A. Yeah, I can do that.

27 MR KNOOPS: Your Honours, may the witness, please, put down
28 that name? We would like to seek for tendering of this document
29 as Defence Exhibit D35.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?

2 MR AGHA: We have no objection, Your Honour. Perhaps we
3 could just mark on it that he is actually TRC-01 that person he
4 is talking to because I think it is just a surname that's been
5 put there which could be many people. It may be helpful.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, yes, I will read it onto the record
7 actually, or do you want to get the witness to write something
8 else on there as well, Mr Knoops?

9 MR KNOOPS: If the general is able to also put down the
10 first name, to make sure that we are speaking about the same
11 person. By the way it's TRC-01. Perhaps the general is able
12 to --

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, we will hand the paper
14 back to the general.

15 THE WITNESS: If I may, I don't recall his first name but I
16 can write down his function, his present position.

17 MR KNOOPS:
18 Q. And rank, please.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, all right. You are tendering that,
20 are you, Mr Knoops?

21 MR KNOOPS: Yes, Your Honour, please.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: There's no objection from the
23 Prosecution?

24 MR AGHA: No objection, Your Honour.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, the witness has just --

26 COURT ATTENDANT: Your Honour, it will be Exhibit D35.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. The witness has just written
28 on a piece of paper the name of the person with the pseudonym
29 TRC-01. And also the position held by that person. That will be

1 admitted into evidence as Exhibit D35.

2 [Exhibit No. D35 was admitted]

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: And it will be marked confidential.

4 MR KNOOPS: Yes, please. Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Grateful.

6 Q. General, in the course of my further examination, I will
7 refer to the person you just indicated on the Exhibit D35 as
8 TRC-01; is that all right with you?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. General, on how many occasions you were able to speak with
11 TRC-01?

12 A. Excuse me. I talked to TRC-01 twice. One in the timeframe
13 March, April this year and very recently a couple of days ago.

14 Q. Did TRC-01 provide you with any written documentation?

15 A. He did.

16 Q. Could you please indicate to the Court what document you
17 were provided with by TRC-01?

18 A. TRC-01 provided me with a couple of notes. One, stating
19 his position or his view he had about the state of the army, in
20 the timeframe of the AFRC, so after May 1997, and he also
21 provided me with notes about my written report.

22 Q. So it's my understanding that he was able to read through
23 your report; is that correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Could you inform the Court what his -- no, let me think.
26 Were you able to speak with him about the contents of your
27 report?

28 A. In general terms, yes.

29 Q. And do you know whether TRC-01 did give you any comment on

1 your report?

2 MR AGHA: Objection, Your Honour. TRC-01, as I believe he
3 is referred to, has already been ruled that he is not an expert
4 so any comment or opinion which TRC-01 gave on this expert's
5 report would have no relevance before this learned Court.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Do you wish to reply to that
7 objection, Mr Knoops?

8 MR KNOOPS: Yes. Your Honour, I am not asking about any
9 opinions of TRC-01 but my question is, and I can specify that
10 whether, when it concerns the factual observations put in the
11 report of the expert, whether any comments were received in --
12 were received on the factual part of the report. So I'm not
13 asking any qualifications through this expert from TRC-01.

14 MR AGHA: And, Your Honour, if I may, I think it's quite
15 important that we learned through TRC-01 the periods of time in
16 which he was in and out of the country. So he would therefore
17 have no personal knowledge or be in a position to comment upon
18 anything beyond -- I think he spent August '97 in the country.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, let's not object in advance. Let's
20 hear what timeframe Mr Knoops is referring to.

21 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, I am very grateful but, in all
22 honesty, the Prosecution has extensively cross-examined TRC-01
23 about the timeframe he was not in. And now the Prosecution is
24 trying to object against the same time period about which they
25 have cross-examined TRC-01?

26 MR AGHA: No, we didn't cross-examine him --

27 MR KNOOPS: You did cross-examine him.

28 MR AGHA: -- after the period in which he was there. We
29 simply asked a couple of questions on commanders. Our questions

1 related to whilst he was there and fighting with the forces.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Look, ask the question.

3 MR KNOOPS: The Prosecution questioned TRC-01 extensively
4 about what happened at the coup and after the coup of May 1997.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, so what? What is your point?

6 MR KNOOPS: That the objection of the Prosecution, that we
7 could not ask the expert anything what TRC told him about the --

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, look --

9 MR KNOOPS: -- factual part of the report.

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: -- my point was --

11 MR KNOOPS: You see my point?

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: -- my point, Mr Knoops, is will you
13 please ask the question first before we deal with whether it's
14 admissible or not.

15 MR KNOOPS: Okay.

16 Q. General, do you know whether TRC-01 gave you any comment
17 when it concerns the factual part of your report over the period
18 1992, 1996? And I can specify it further, when it concerns your
19 description of the state of the army, in that period?

20 MR AGHA: Again, I object to that question, Your Honour.
21 TRC-01 has given sworn evidence under oath about what he
22 considered to be the state of the army, and that was a witness
23 called by the Defence, so any evidence elicited from this witness
24 would be in direct confrontation of their witness which was not
25 declared hostile.

26 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, we are mixing things here. This
27 is --

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Look, this is getting very -- we are
29 talking about two different things here.

1 MR KNOOPS: This is still about the foundation of the
2 report of General Prins. I am not -- we are not challenging
3 TRC-01 in any way. We are simply putting --

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, all right. I overrule the
5 objection. Can you answer that question, general?

6 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it's getting a little difficult
7 for me but --

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't blame you at all. Would you like
9 the question asked again?

10 MR KNOOPS:

11 Q. General, shall I rephrase or recall the question for you?

12 A. Yes, please.

13 Q. General, you testified that you had two interviews or
14 conversations with TRC-01. During one of the conversations your
15 report was discussed with him. Did you receive, from TRC-01, any
16 factual comments, I am not speaking about conclusions or opinions
17 from him, but any factual information on the state of the army
18 over the period 1992, 1996?

19 A. I don't believe so. If I understand correctly the factual,
20 not the general comment about the report.

21 Q. Specifically, the historical part of your report?

22 A. Yeah, I don't know if I then go into correct answer, but he
23 generally stated that my report he supported for 95 percent.

24 MR AGHA: I object to that. It's his opinion.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, yes.

26 MR AGHA: That's exactly what we've been talking about
27 here, Your Honour.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I thought the answer was going to
29 be based on a commentary on the factual content.

1 MR KNOOPS: Correct.

2 Q. General, I'm asking you just to say whether you received
3 any written comments about your report when it concerns the
4 factual part. You can answer "yes," "no," or "I don't know"?

5 A. Look, the question is very hard for me. He gave me notes
6 about my report but, as I recall, no facts in the period '92,
7 '96.

8 Q. Okay. Thank you. General, apart from the two officers you
9 just mentioned acting within the army, did you consult anyone
10 else, apart from the three senior officers retired, the two
11 acting senior officers, apart from those, did you consult anyone
12 else in making your report in the context of the primary source?

13 A. Well, I didn't consult -- I consulted someone in The
14 Netherlands but I don't know if you -- is that the primary
15 source? That I don't know. But I consulted someone in The
16 Netherlands after writing my report.

17 Q. And what was the reason for you to do so?

18 A. The reason to do so was that I had my report read by Major
19 General Frank Van Kappen and Major General Frank Van Kappen was,
20 during the time of the conflict, he was military adviser to Mr
21 Kofi Annan, and I thought from his experience, general
22 experience, but also about his general knowledge about Africa,
23 and also about the conflict in Rwanda and in Sierra Leone, I
24 thought it wise to ask his general opinion.

25 Q. And are you able to, general, to share his opinion --

26 MR AGHA: Objection, Your Honour, we are not talking about
27 the opinions here.

28 MR KNOOPS: I'll rephrase, rephrase.

29 MR AGHA: Or even comment on this. This report was given

1 to this gentleman. Now the comment of that person on that
2 report, the Prosecution submits, is an opinion.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, all right. We note your objection.
4 What is your reply to that objection?

5 MR KNOOPS: First of all, Your Honour, I think that the
6 general is still in the context of speaking about his primary
7 sources, so I can ask him whether there were any -- was there --

8 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: But, Mr Knoops, when someone reads one's
9 document and comments on that document, can you technically
10 describe that as a primary source for a report? Can you describe
11 that person's comments as a source, a primary source?

12 MR KNOOPS: In my humble submission, Your Honour, it could
13 be a primary source if it's pertaining to an interview or an
14 exchange of professional thoughts with a person who has direct
15 knowledge on the issue at hand, such as the source mentioned by
16 the expert; that could fall within the ambit of the primary
17 source. It's clearly not literature, it's clearly -- it's
18 clearly not any treatise. It's clearly not any documentation or
19 documentary evidence. And an expert, who is able to verify
20 certain information with other potential experts, or in this
21 event, senior military officers, who were in charge of an overall
22 operation, or have direct knowledge on an international, internal
23 armed conflict, I would say that that could be primary source.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: But what you are laying down to us as a
25 primary source is you want this witness to say that he showed his
26 report to another witness who said that his report is correct.

27 MR KNOOPS: No.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Who gave an opinion on his report.

29 MR KNOOPS: No. My question is, to this expert, whether he

1 was able to receive factual information from that source, which
2 he used in reaching his conclusions.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, your question did mention opinion.

4 MR KNOOPS: That's correct. And I directly after that
5 corrected myself but then I was interrupted by my learned friend.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Let's have an -- why don't you rephrase
7 the question?

8 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. General, did you receive from that source, apart from being
10 the primary or secondary source, factual information from that
11 specific individual you mentioned which you implemented in your
12 report in arriving at any of your conclusions?

13 A. I did not.

14 Q. Thank you. General, now we return to the secondary sources
15 of your report. Could you -- did you use -- you already stated
16 that you used secondary sources. Are you able to tell the Court
17 which ones, secondary sources, you were able to use in arriving
18 at your conclusions?

19 A. Yes, I can. After -- do you want me just to mention them
20 or explain about them?

21 Q. Perhaps first mention them in general and I'll -- we'll go
22 back to each of them separately.

23 A. The first one is the report made up by the Truth and
24 Reconciliation Committee, or commission; TRC. Then I studied
25 extensively the book written by Dr David Keen, Conflict and
26 Conclusion in Sierra Leone. And I also studied doctrine and
27 literature, articles, and last but not least, I can't recall the
28 amount of pages but I think I went through thousands of
29 transcripts.

1 Q. Referring to which transcripts?

2 A. Mainly the transcripts that came from the Prosecution, if I
3 explain that correctly, and the transcript of course by, given
4 by, or the testimony given by Colonel Iron.

5 Q. Thank you. Now, let us return to the first secondary
6 source, the TRC report. I assume you refer to the TRC report of
7 the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Yes. What was your approach in digesting this report?

10 A. My view was, and is, that after reading the report by
11 Colonel Iron, I needed to know about -- I needed to know more
12 about the background of the conflict. And, as I stated somewhere
13 in my report, you cannot understand the present if you don't look
14 in history. It's something in the military, you always look at
15 what history tells you. And so, my source I came across with
16 was, of course, this extensive report of -- I can't recall how
17 many pages -- and I went through that, initially to establish my
18 thought on history, how did it all come this way, so that's what
19 I did. And, by reading through the history, I found a lot of
20 information because, apparently, that was also the mandate of the
21 TRC about military aspects of the conflict. And that's why, of
22 course, if you say this extensive report, did I all digest it,
23 the answer is no, but I went through it, watching the history and
24 the military aspects.

25 Q. General, do you know whether that report, as you have read
26 it, enhanced any military aspects? Did you encounter them?

27 A. Yes. Like, like I said, but probably not clear, while my
28 initial approach was looking into history, general history, on
29 the conflict in Sierra Leone, I found immense, quite extensively

1 description about military aspects in the conflict as well, let's
2 say from the start of the war, in 1991, until the period I
3 described in my report.

4 Q. To what sources you refer to when you say there were
5 sources in the report about military aspects?

6 A. Well, we may come back to history, of course, but the
7 sources I found in my review on the history, and then especially
8 what did the history do to the Sierra Leone Army, I came across
9 numerous testimonies, if that is the right word, of very senior
10 officers and by studying the report further on I came across many
11 remarks or statements about the modus operandi which was later
12 part of my report.

13 Q. General, can you recall any of the names of those senior
14 officers you came across in that study?

15 A. I came across -- there is a list in my report of officers
16 named in the TRC, but the ones that really come back to my mind
17 are the remarks made by the chief of defence staff. Now, the
18 chief of defence staff in any country is the highest military
19 person in the organisation, and especially the statement of Tom
20 Carew, and I think he was chief of defence staff in 2003, I am
21 not sure, I have to look into the report, but also the statement
22 made by the very well-respected Maxwell Khobe, who was ECOMOG
23 commander, I believe, and later on became chief of defence staff
24 under President Kabbah.

25 Q. General, just pause, please.

26 MR KNOOPS: Spellings, Your Honours, are Tom Carew. T-O-M,
27 C-A-R-E-W, and Maxwell Khobe, M-A-X-W-E-L-L, Maxwell Khobe,
28 K-H-O-B-E. Khobe.

29 Q. Sorry, general, for the interruption. Please continue.

1 A. There are numerous statements. There is one other chief of
2 defence staff, but I don't know if I pronounce his name right.
3 Tarawally, or something like that, who was chief of defence staff
4 in 1991 I believe, but, following that, numerous statements,
5 numerous statements by Brigadier General Kally Conteh. Well, you
6 know, I have to go back to my report, but quite extensively.

7 Q. Thank you, general.

8 MR KNOOPS: The name, Tarawally, Your Honours, is
9 T-A-R-A-W-A-L-L-Y, Tarawally, and Kally Conteh, K-A-L-L-Y.
10 C-O-N-T-E-H, Conteh.

11 Q. Now, general, let us turn to the second, secondary source.
12 You mentioned the study of Dr Keen. Can you first explain to us
13 why you made use of his study?

14 A. I can. While I was at the Centre of Strategic Studies, in
15 The Hague, I asked someone who was working in that area of the
16 study centre about latest publications which give -- which could
17 give me background knowledge on the conflict. And he said, well,
18 the book you have to read is the book I mentioned by Dr David
19 Keen, and that's what I did.

20 Q. Do you know who David Keen is?

21 A. Yes. Well, I know that David Keen has doctorate from
22 Oxford and has numerous -- he is a researcher, researcher and
23 adviser, but he's mainly, as I see his list of books which I
24 don't -- I have his bio but I can't recall it now -- is numerous,
25 so mainly a writer.

26 Q. Do you know, general, whether David Keen implemented any
27 statements from witnesses who were present during the conflict
28 after 1997, in Sierra Leone, in his research?

29 A. Yes, and I have to correct a mistake in a sense that I

1 previously said that Maxwell Khobe was stated by, in the TRC, but
2 without my notes, now I recall Maxwell Khobe was specifically
3 stated by Dr Keen, if I'm correct. But, apart from that, Dr
4 David Keen named a lot of people in his book, or referred to
5 other people in his book.

6 Q. Do you know whether he referred to, apart from Maxwell
7 Khobe, to other individuals who were not part, sorry, during the
8 conflict of the Sierra Leone Army? Excuse me.

9 A. I'm afraid now you ask a question which, without referring
10 to the numerous statements and notes, there are so many names
11 that I am afraid I can't answer that one.

12 Q. Thank you, general. Now let's go to the third, secondary
13 source. I believe you mentioned the doctrines and literature.
14 Are you able to tell the Court which doctrines you refer to?

15 A. In certain areas of my report I refer to NATO, NATO
16 doctrine. I refer to British doctrine and I refer to The
17 Netherlands defence doctrine.

18 Q. And what kind or what type of doctrines you refer to when
19 you speak about doctrines?

20 A. Can you specify that?

21 Q. Well, I could imagine that the words "military doctrines"
22 is quite general. Are there any specific doctrines you refer to?

23 A. Well, I thought that to make my report more clear, for
24 people who don't have a military background, that certain areas
25 of my report, you can basically only read when you have a limited
26 amount of knowledge on background. For example, if you talk
27 about regular and irregular forces, to name an example, you have
28 to come to a certain basis. And that's why I used "limited"
29 because it's not a doctrine book but limited, I used doctrine.

1 Q. General, are you in a position to tell the Court why you
2 were referring to NATO doctrine?

3 A. I was referring to NATO doctrine at certain places because
4 NATO, like the US, realise that you have to come up with a sort
5 of hierarchy in doctrine, otherwise everybody has his own
6 doctrine. So the NATO established, a couple of years ago, a
7 hierarchy in doctrine. Now, the NATO doctrine have been ratified
8 by NATO members. So whenever a NATO country then writes doctrine
9 it should be not contradictory to NATO doctrine. So I started
10 with NATO doctrine at certain areas and then I used, you know,
11 British doctrine, when I thought it was very clear, but they
12 don't fight each other, the doctrines, but one doctrine says it a
13 little clear than other doctrine. That is why I did.

14 Q. Thank you. General, are you in a position to tell the
15 Court why you specifically used the Dutch military doctrine?

16 A. Yes, I did, because at one area of my report I thought the
17 Dutch doctrine was -- which was brand new as I recall in 1990 or
18 2005 -- and an area I researched that doctrine was very, very
19 clear.

20 Q. Did you use that doctrine for specific areas of your
21 research?

22 A. Yes, I did.

23 Q. Could you tell the Court which areas you -- you used
24 actually the Dutch doctrine?

25 A. I used the Dutch doctrine in the area where I, in my
26 report, go into the different types of conflict. Again, very
27 limited. But where I addressed it, the different types of
28 conflict, and then move over to the way the AFRC faction, in my
29 mind, operated. That's why -- where I used the Dutch doctrine.

1 Q. General, are you in a position to tell the Court whether
2 this doctrine, this Dutch doctrine, is relying on any foundation,
3 military foundation, I mean?

4 A. Well, what I'm saying is that of course every country
5 writes his own doctrine, but by ratifying NATO doctrine you can
6 put actions or emphasis in your own doctrine but it should never
7 contradict the NATO doctrine as long as you are a NATO member.

8 Q. You just testified that this doctrine was ratified in 2005?

9 A. I have to go to the notes.

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. But I think I mentioned 2005.

12 Q. Do you know, general, whether this was based on any
13 practical experience within the Dutch army, this doctrine?

14 A. Absolutely, because The Netherlands armed forces, over the
15 recent years, have come into the top league of army and navy and
16 marine corps providers for nations, to name a few, Iraq but now
17 at this time we operate in Afghanistan, in Orisghan [sic] under a
18 high threat environment. So the Dutch military have acquired a
19 great deal of professionalism and, of course, then it's also time
20 that you reflect on your doctrine.

21 Q. General, when you refer to Afghanistan, do you know which
22 spectrum within the use of force the Dutch forces operate there?

23 A. Well, no doubt that The Netherlands forces, but also the
24 British forces are operating, and the US, they're operating in a
25 high threat environment and a lot of force is used.

26 Q. Thank you, general. Now, lastly, you referred to the
27 transcripts, and I believe that you already indicated to the
28 Court that you went through thousands of pages of transcripts.
29 Can you recall the time span within which you read these

1 transcripts? In other words, can you recall which time span
2 these transcripts covered?

3 A. Yes, I can. If I recall correctly, but again, I read so
4 many, I think the first transcripts I started to read was May
5 2005 timeframe, up to October 2005, in that period roughly, I
6 read most of the transcripts.

7 Q. Were you able to digest also the transcripts based upon the
8 testimony of the Prosecution expert, Colonel Iron?

9 A. Yes, I read it fully.

10 Q. Thank you. General, in order to conclude the part on the
11 sources, I would ask you two final questions: First of all, did
12 you visit any sites in Sierra Leone during your research and your
13 time spent here in Sierra Leone?

14 A. I did not, in that the time available to me, and the task
15 given to me, the questions posed to me by the Principal Defender,
16 I don't think it was necessary to go into the country and to
17 reconstruct a campaign, and to go into all sort of details where,
18 when, how. More importantly, for what I've read, were other
19 questions but not so much the campaign as such.

20 Q. Was there any specific reason for you to make that
21 decision, other than time and your reflection just a minute ago?

22 A. Well, yes, because if you write about, you know, the
23 paragraphs or the topics I've written in my report, then you can
24 see from there that that doesn't relate to technical manoeuvres,
25 or the campaign as such. It has to deal with other questions.
26 That's why I didn't think it was necessary. Moreover, if, even
27 if you would do that, in my mind, it's absolutely impossible, so
28 many years after the conflict, to reconstruct and even the
29 smallest campaign you can't reconstruct that, so, too many

1 people, too many visions, so that's not what I did.

2 Q. Thank you, general. The final question in this regard is:

3 We noticed whilst you gave this summary of your primary and
4 secondary sources that you didn't include any interviews with
5 junior ranks, other ranks?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Was there a specific reason? Let me first ask you: Did
8 you encounter any junior other ranks during your investigation,
9 during your research?

10 A. What do you mean by did I encounter?

11 Q. Did you meet them?

12 A. Well, I know that during my stay I came across juniors,
13 without specifically knowing what position they had, but I met a
14 couple of them, yes, I did.

15 Q. Thank you. Now, you didn't include any information or
16 interviews with them in your report. Was there any specific
17 reason for you to make that decision?

18 A. There was a good reason for that. And, again, if you read
19 my report and see the topics I cover, those are not the topics
20 you should cover with junior ranks. What I mean is the things I
21 describe, and coming to the conclusions, those are the items you
22 should address with seniors, with people who can understand the
23 problem. It's not all that difficult. However, it's -- you must
24 have a sort of a basis to understand that, and the other reason
25 is that my long experience in the armed forces is that when you
26 ask junior ranks about their opinion -- no, let me rephrase that.
27 In my experience you should ask a junior rank only within his
28 limitation of his job. Let me give an example. You ask a
29 soldier the range of his rifle and you ask a soldier the fields

1 of his fire and his comrade. But you don't ask a soldier what
2 the purpose of the mission is. So, if you ask a soldier a
3 specific question, which is over his scope, or is that the right
4 word, over his -- well, over his vision, he starts speculating.

5 Q. And general, do you have, yourself, based on your
6 biography, any direct experiences with what you are saying? In
7 other words, is this based on any direct experience you have?

8 A. The experience is extensive. Whenever you are on a mission
9 there is always press and press is a nightmare. The press will
10 ask the individual soldier, for example, in Northern Iraq, in
11 1991, "Marine, what is your mission here in Iraq?" Don't ask him
12 because he doesn't know. He may have a good idea, some idea, but
13 you have to ask his battalion commander or brigade commander what
14 the mission is. And in the legal world one of my men, a sergeant
15 major, fired two warning shots in Iraq, on an Iraqi mob, and he
16 was prosecuted for murder and manslaughter, I believe, and in the
17 appeal court in The Netherlands, and rightly so, it was stated
18 while the question was asked to a marine who was also present,
19 "What would you have done if you would have been the sergeant
20 major?" Don't ask him the question because he is not the
21 sergeant major, and I think it's the right word, the appeal court
22 in The Netherlands ruled that you have to have a commander on
23 scene view, or a mission analysis. You must have a view on what
24 is happening. So, it's a little bit of a long story, but my view
25 is that ask someone within the scope of his knowledge.

26 Q. General, do you know when this case occurred you referred
27 to lastly?

28 A. Yeah, indeed. It happened, the shots were fired, I believe
29 the last day of, or one of the last days of 2003, and then the

1 court case developed over a period of a year-and-a-half.

2 Q. Thank you, general. General, that concludes my section
3 about the sources and how you came to your conclusions. And I
4 would like you to turn now to your conclusions themselves, and
5 the basis for that, starting with the historical part of your
6 analysis. Are you, general, in a position to tell the Court,
7 shortly, how you actually approached the historical part of your
8 research?

9 A. Yes, of course I can. What I did is, reading the history
10 and knowing about the independence of Sierra Leone, in 1961, I
11 then followed up briefly over, I don't know, 15 or so pages,
12 about the question what happened to the military from the moment
13 that, from the military only, what happened to the military after
14 the British -- they were not under the British command anymore?
15 So a little bit extensive but, in big steps, I went through all
16 the way the history towards the moment, basically, February 1998.

17 Q. And general, are you able to tell the Court, in short, at
18 what conclusions did you arrive as to the history, and I would
19 not ask you to go from 1961, but I will ask you specifically
20 about the period 1992 up to 1997?

21 A. Well, of course that period but, and of course very brief,
22 in general, my view was quite shocking over the entire period,
23 and we don't go into that, but over the entire period, I had
24 never seen, in my military career, descriptions so bad as I've
25 seen in the armed force of Sierra Leone and, of course, I can't
26 look at the notes and my -- but also, before the '92 timeframe,
27 and I can't all recall by heart all the different aspects why I
28 was so shocked but, basically, I thought that -- and then back to
29 the 1992 timeframe, when the NPRC came into power, I believe, you

1 know, you can't read it so bad as it was and there was at that
2 time also a tremendous increase in manpower with no solid
3 training, mismanagement. You know, I don't know really where to
4 start to explain how bad it was.

5 Q. Let us start, general, with, for instance, the level of
6 training and discipline over the period 1992, 1996, based on your
7 review.

8 MR AGHA: Your Honour, if I may, at this time the
9 Prosecution has an objection on the basis of the relevance of the
10 material on which this review is founded. If it is based on the
11 TRC report then that is just a bundle of secondhand statements,
12 so coming to any conclusions which is based on a document the TRC
13 report, which has its own conclusions, I don't see how they can
14 be of any value.

15 PRESIDING JUDGE: What is your reply to that, Mr Knoops?

16 MR KNOOPS: I think it's proper just to answer, to ask the
17 question of the general and ask him about his foundation. And I
18 believe that the general never has said, in answer to this
19 question, that he relied only on the TRC report, so I think it's
20 quite presumptuous to say that the general is not in a position
21 to comment on the historical part, let alone on which basis he
22 came to that conclusion.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I don't think he has reached that
24 stage in his evidence on this point as yet. Yes, I will overrule
25 the objection. Go ahead.

26 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour.

27 Q. General, and I will anticipate the Prosecution in this
28 regard, before I ask you anything further about the set questions
29 I have in mind for you, in terms of the level of training and

1 discipline, recruitment, et cetera, could you please tell the
2 Court what is the basis of your conclusion, or conclusions is, or
3 are, when we are speaking about just the part, the historical
4 part you refer to in your testimony?

5 A. Absolutely. If I leave the TRC completely out, I come to
6 the same conclusion, based on the extensive report by Dr Keen.
7 Then I come to the exact conclusion that how can it be so bad?

8 Q. And can you indicate to the Court, just to avoid any
9 further objections, whether you find support in this, in arriving
10 at this conclusion, in your primary sources?

11 A. I can. There were -- it relates to the latter part of the
12 historical chapter, because I didn't go into, let's say, the
13 period before 1992 but, indeed, I became convinced, from the
14 interviews I had, that also what Keen and TRC wrote came, it was
15 clear to me.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 MR KNOOPS: At this point I would ask the Court or the
18 Prosecution whether there is any further clarification needed
19 from the expert before I am further interrupted by other
20 objections?

21 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Except, Mr Knoops, I am not quite sure
22 that I understand the witness when he says there were very
23 shocking descriptions. I am not sure that I understand that
24 term; descriptions of what? Are you going to go into details to
25 elucidate?

26 MR KNOOPS: Yes, but in terms of efficiency, I thought I
27 would ask the foundation first before I ask the general to go
28 into how, what he means with the word "shocking," et cetera.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I think it's very difficult to ask

1 Mr Agha, at this point in time, to state what objections he might
2 have in the future.

3 MR KNOOPS: Well, I invite the Prosecutor now to object or
4 not.

5 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Please do not invite objections; just
6 proceed.

7 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. General, the Honourable Judge rightly indicated that you
9 used the qualification shocking. First of all, can you indicate
10 what you mean with the word shocking, in a more precise manner?
11 And after that, I will ask you to go into the set questions. So,
12 first, could you please sort of define the word shocking, from
13 your expertise?

14 A. I now realise that it's a very -- that it's not a very good
15 term, shocking. What I mean is that I have been brought up in
16 military tradition, like we know in the western armies, and
17 marine corps, and many things that I read in many sources showed
18 a picture that -- which came across shocking to me, how can you
19 treat an army so bad? Or how can you treat soldiers so bad by
20 senior officers? And the examples, you know, are in my report,
21 and I have so many notes and statements, giving examples based on
22 Keen, well, like I said, if you leave TRC out, Keen has the same
23 conclusion. That is why I thought I was shocked, reading as a
24 professional military officer, the way the -- it is described,
25 the development or the degeneration of the armed forces of Sierra
26 Leone up till 1997.

27 MR AGHA: And this is the objection of the Prosecution,
28 Your Honour, in that even leaving out the TRC report he is
29 relying on a book by Keen. Now Keen himself is not an expert

1 before this Court. He doesn't have any particular military
2 expertise and a reading of that book will show he is relying on
3 statements which he has gathered from other people of untested
4 evidence. And if one is to look carefully at the footnotes of
5 the military expert's report, in the large part it is from TRC
6 excerpts. It is from Keen and it is from DSK-082. They are not
7 his own conclusions and that is the main bone of contention the
8 Prosecution has. They are conclusions reached by other people.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, aren't you a bit premature here,
10 Mr Agha? I think Mr Knoops is just asking him what is the
11 foundation for the material in his report.

12 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, if I may reply to this objection.
13 I think it's ultimately to this Court to decide about the weight
14 of the report of General Prins, vis-a-vis the report of Colonel
15 Iron. When we speak about foundation, I can speak for an hour
16 about the foundation of Colonel Iron's report, when it comes to
17 footnotes. It is the nature of research, it is the nature of
18 research, that a researcher, a proper researcher uses primary and
19 secondary sources, and on the commendation of these sources he
20 comes to his conclusions based on his practical experience and
21 professional backgrounds. That is what an expert should do and
22 that is what this expert has done. And I think if the
23 Prosecution is not challenging the sources of this expert then I
24 think we should start by challenging the sources of the expert of
25 the Prosecution.

26 Now, I think, in my humble submission, that it's ultimately
27 up for the Court, it's a matter of probative value and it not a
28 matter of admissibility, when an expert like General Prins is
29 able to rely on both primary and secondary sources.

1 I also recall this Prosecutor, that the expert of the
2 Prosecution, Mrs Bangura, testifying about forced marriage,
3 didn't use any sources at all. She was qualified to give
4 evidence before this Court.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Look, this is a wasted discussion and a
6 waste of time. What Mr Agha is saying is more properly put when
7 you offer to tender the statement, not at this stage. There is
8 nothing for us to decide at this stage. I'm overruling the
9 objection. You go ahead, Mr Knoops.

10 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Q. General, excuse me, I was brought in some confusion by my
12 learned friend. I believe that we were speaking about your
13 definition about shocking and I believe you expressed it from
14 your military background. Now, let us go into more detail and go
15 into, for instance, the level of training and discipline within
16 the Sierra Leone Army over that period of 1992, 1996, and I ask
17 you what, to what conclusion did you arrive within your research,
18 based on the sources you indicated or a combination of those
19 sources?

20 A. Well, you know, if you talk about that timeframe and
21 recruiting, then there was a plan developed to increase the army
22 in size. So what you got, and what was stated in my sources, was
23 that the level of people brought in were -- was very poor. What
24 you brought in were people, you know, on the lower side of
25 society and you had -- they had -- the amounts of recruits had to
26 be made. So what you got, which I also read in, by the way, the
27 transcripts, is that training, which should be for a recruit, if
28 you see The Netherlands marine corps, the initial training is six
29 months. It is only the initial training where you follow on

1 other training, the training is specified by many, many witnesses
2 in the transcripts as three months, six weeks. The training went
3 down and it was -- there was no capacity in the training centres
4 to probably, properly transform the many recruits from the lower
5 side of society into proper military soldiers. And so I came,
6 concerning that, to the conclusion my sources, that one, the
7 training was substandard, and, two, that the level of people
8 coming in from society, was also I can't count of all the
9 recruits but if you want to make these amounts then the level was
10 very poor.

11 Q. Yes. Also, here, general, perhaps could you indicate what
12 you mean with the lower level of society; it's quite a general
13 term?

14 A. Yeah, it is, and how do I make myself clear? But, from the
15 sources I read, you know, people with a crime record, people with
16 drug abuse records, and, you know, numerous offences came in and
17 basically sources say well, the only thing you gave them was a
18 weapon instead of a knife. So what I mean is, the lower end of
19 society is that not with the proper schooling and the proper
20 background and, even then, if you have people come in then, if
21 you have a system, and the time to train them, and to transform
22 them into proper soldiers, then that is something else.

23 Q. General, do you know whether this had any impact, if any at
24 all, on the salary and/or promotion system in those days?

25 A. You know, it's a hard question because my historical
26 analysis had so many notes and sources but, if you ask the
27 question about salary, I recall that sources indicate that forces
28 operating on campaigns, in the eastern part of Sierra Leone, are
29 fighting the RUF, did not get paid at all for months. So didn't

1 get a salary at all. What it did with promotions, the only
2 thing, but again I do it by heart, of course, is that a lot of
3 promotions were unmerited but were the result of who knows who,
4 and et cetera.

5 Q. General, speaking about that issue of salary, did you
6 conclude whether that existed within all ranks of the army, in
7 those days, 1992, 1996?

8 A. Well, for me, as a professional soldier, retired, I found
9 that the people who were suffering from this, again based on my
10 sources, the people who were suffering from this were the lower
11 ranks or the juniors, the junior officers, and the people who
12 benefitted highly, in general, were the senior officers. And
13 that in my mind, you know, is beyond belief but again, then I
14 have to go into specifics about my report, where I state all
15 this, so I can answer it only in sort of broad terms.

16 Q. We will come back to that later, general. I would like you
17 to go to another aspect of that historical part, the specific
18 level of training in the period 1992, 1997. Are you able to say
19 what, from your professional background, the level of training
20 was based on your sources?

21 A. Based on my sources but then I also regard sources as
22 transcripts.

23 Q. General, just when you refer to transcripts, you refer to
24 the fourth secondary source; is that correct?

25 A. Yeah, the transcript, yes.

26 Q. Of the Court?

27 A. Yes. I mean, the Court transcripts, yes.

28 Q. Okay. Please continue, sorry.

29 A. Now where was I?

1 Q. The level of training you were saying relying on --

2 A. Yes. Also when you read the transcripts your question was,
3 what was the training and I think the training, in general, was
4 substandard because on, in many instances it's written that you
5 were trained how to fire a rifle, how to move in a formation and
6 the rest was left over to your own survival instinct, and you had
7 to carry out a job. And knowing and having been involved in
8 training, you know, it takes a long time to train a recruit in
9 all aspects, like I mentioned in the marine corps and I know that
10 in the royal marines they have a similar training systems as we
11 have, so.

12 Q. Thank you, general. You just stated that, with respect to
13 the reimbursement system, the senior ranks benefitted from the
14 situation you described. Do you know whether this had any impact
15 on the junior ranks, according to your research?

16 A. According to my research, no doubt. Because the seniors
17 were living the good life, with courses outside the country, good
18 housing, et cetera and so I think, I don't think -- I found in my
19 sources that the junior ranks were suffering from that. It has
20 to do with motivation. You get depressed. It -- I tried to find
21 another word but it's for the morale of the men who sees that,
22 it's devastating.

23 Q. General, do you know whether this had any impact on the
24 leadership structure within the Sierra Leone Army in those days,
25 according to your research?

26 A. Well, leadership, of course leadership is a broad thing and
27 I name, in my report, according to doctrine, what is good
28 leadership. Now, notwithstanding the doctrine, in my mind,
29 leadership is setting the example by senior officers, or by

1 superiors. Now, you have leadership at the top but you also have
2 what we have in our armed forces junior leadership. Junior
3 leadership is the leadership by a sergeant over his men. It does
4 make a difference. Leadership boils down to the fact that you
5 have impeccable behaviour, that you set the example and last, but
6 not least, that you always take care of your men and I have not
7 seen any of that in my sources.

8 Q. And could you please specify for the Court, when you say "I
9 didn't see anything in my sources," to which period you refer to?

10 A. Basically, a big area but basically it started from the end
11 of the 70s onwards.

12 Q. And can you specifically comment on the situation of the
13 army in May 1997?

14 A. Well, in my mind, in my conclusion, the May 1997 was a sort
15 of, on the one hand an end period of a devastating treatment of
16 the troops but again, then, it was a new time of the junior ranks
17 taking, coming into power, you see. But then things didn't
18 improve.

19 Q. General, were you able to, let's put it differently. Do
20 you know whether, general, this whole situation you've just
21 described had any impact on the command structure, within the
22 army, at May 1997?

23 A. The sources indicate that there was not a proper command
24 structure, or let me rephrase it, the military leadership was not
25 able to set up a proper command structure before May 1997, and no
26 doubt in my mind, afterwards, even if there was some sort of a
27 command structure, totally collapsed.

28 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, general. Your Honour, in light of
29 the time, I've now concluded the historical part of the

1 examination. And I'm moving now to another part of the report of
2 the general, so --

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think it's an appropriate time to
4 take the break, Mr Knoops.

5 MR KNOOPS: Thank you.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: General, we are going to have a break
7 until 2.15. You are probably familiar with this but please, we
8 are just cautioning you that don't discuss your evidence or the
9 case in the meantime.

10 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, we will adjourn the Court until
12 2.15.

13 [Luncheon recess taken at 12.45 p.m.]

14 [AFRC17OCT06B - MD].

15 [Upon resuming at 2.15 p.m.]

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead, Mr Knoops.

17 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour. Good afternoon.

18 Q. Good afternoon, general.

19 A. Good afternoon.

20 Q. General, before the break, we indicated that we would turn
21 now to the second part of your research. Do you know what you
22 researched in that third part C?

23 A. Yes, sir, I do.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: You said the second part?

25 MR KNOOPS: Sorry, the second part, yes. Sorry.

26 Q. The second part. Could you please shortly indicate to the
27 Court what you researched in that second part?

28 A. You mean, part C now, don't you?

29 Q. Part C of your report?

1 A. Yes. What I researched was, I wanted to go in the types of
2 conflict, briefly, as a sort of doctrinal background and then
3 give my opinion on the way the AFRC operated or carried out
4 operations. That's basically what I researched.

5 Q. To what conclusions did you arrive in that second part?

6 A. I came to the conclusion that the AFRC was carrying out
7 operations in an irregular way. In other words, the AFRC has to
8 be considered as an irregular force.

9 Q. Before, general, we go into the specificities of your
10 answer and the foundation, you just mentioned that you looked
11 into the way the AFRC operated?

12 A. Yes. What for me was important was for me, as a military
13 man important, is how operations are carried out more than how
14 you structure it, or whatever. How do you perform? How do you
15 behave and what are the correct characteristics of your
16 behaviour? That's, in essence, the modus operandi while carrying
17 out operations.

18 Q. Do you know, general, whether there are other approaches to
19 answer the question as to the regularity of a force?

20 A. Can you rephrase that question, please?

21 Q. Do you know, sir, whether there are other approaches to
22 investigate the question whether a force is regular?

23 A. Not really. I think you can identify different way of
24 addressing a conflict, but that's something else than the
25 difference between regular and irregular. For example, excuse
26 me.

27 Q. No, go ahead, sorry.

28 A. Well, for example, if you want to address a conflict you
29 can look at the parties involved, who is fighting who, or you can

1 address the issue what weapons are used, conventional or
2 non-conventional weapons, but, when you look at the way a force
3 operates, then you look into whether they do that regular, in a
4 regular way or an irregular way.

5 Q. You just used the word *modus operandi*. Just for clarity,
6 could you state to the Court what you mean with the word *modus*
7 *operandi*?

8 A. What I mean is, basically, how do you fight a war; how do
9 you carry out operations? That is what I mean, instead of you
10 also can look in how is an organisation structured, you know, how
11 many battalions and so on. Primarily, I looked firstly into the
12 question because, in my mind, that is essential: How does an
13 organisation or a force operate? In what way and that's what I
14 mean, I hope I am clear, but that is what I mean by *modus*
15 *operandi*.

16 Q. General, did you -- can you indicate to the Court what your
17 foundation is of using this criterion, *modus operandi*?

18 A. Dutch doctrine.

19 Q. Can you specify what that doctrine actually says?

20 A. Well, to basically make it very simple, the doctrine
21 indicates that if you operate in a regular way, you operate in an
22 open, structured way with fixed formations, according to doctrine
23 and, on the other hand, if you operate in an irregular way, it
24 can best be described as guerrilla warfare or rebels and there
25 are numerous terminology for that.

26 Q. General, can you, before we go into the *modus operandi* in
27 the instant case, please explain to the Court what you understand
28 to be a regular force?

29 A. Well, I am afraid I have done not being clear. That's what

1 I basically meant with my previous explanation. Regular means
2 open, structured formations, according to doctrine and fixed
3 procedures. In other words, the United Kingdom Netherlands
4 Landing Force would operate in a regular way.

5 Q. Okay, thank you. What is, in your view, the modus operandi
6 of an irregular force?

7 A. Well, let me first say that the difference between regular
8 and irregular, like in so many things, it's not totally black and
9 white. However, irregular, like I indicated, rebels, guerrilla,
10 have the tendency to operate in an irregular way and I, in my
11 report, I listed about 14 or so many points which indicate an
12 irregular force. But let me give some examples. Normally, an
13 irregular force would not operate in uniforms; are not
14 distinguishable. An irregular force do not have established
15 rules of engagement. An irregular force has the tendency to
16 operate out of a defensive posture, sometimes where they have --
17 where they are in defence but against a larger force, and
18 sometimes they attack positions when they have more force
19 available to them. So, you know, I can sort of -- they operate
20 at night under cover; stay out of big confrontations; that's what
21 I mean with irregular.

22 Q. General, you just used the word "rules of engagement."
23 Could you please, are you in a position to tell the Court what
24 you mean with rules of engagement?

25 A. Rules of engagement in the, let's say in military
26 organisations, are established at the highest level. For
27 example, in The Netherlands, the rules of engagement are
28 established at the level of minister of Defence. And they give
29 an authorisation, or a limitation, in the use of force. So, for

1 the men, for the units, it's an indication on when can you use
2 that force, in what instance. So it's a basic set of rules which
3 allows you to use force but also limits your use of force.

4 Q. General, you just stated to the Court that you arrived at
5 the conclusion that the AFRC operated as an irregular force. Can
6 you tell the Court the foundation for that conclusion?

7 A. You mean foundation as in sources?

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. Well, I found a foundation for it in what you call
10 secondary sources, the publications in TRC but, also, Colonel
11 Iron and I shared the same opinion as far as this is concerned,
12 which I found in his report, as well as in the transcripts.

13 Q. Could you please, sir, go into that issue: What do you
14 mean with Colonel Iron and I shared the same view?

15 A. Well, Colonel Iron, and I think rightly so, came to the
16 conclusion that the AFRC had to be considered as a guerrilla
17 force rather than a conventional army. In his transcript but
18 again I -- it's from the top of my head -- in the transcript he
19 says somewhere, it's in my report, he states that the AFRC had to
20 be considered as a non-regular army. Now whether you call it
21 irregular, non-regular, that's a matter of wording, I think, but
22 we, both of us, Colonel Iron and I, came to the conclusion that
23 at least the way Colonel Iron didn't explain the modus operandi
24 like I did but he said they operated like a guerrilla force, you
25 see, so we came both to that conclusion about the way they
26 operated.

27 Q. Apart from the sources you mentioned, did you encounter
28 anything specific in this regard in your fourth secondary source?

29 A. Yes, I did, because very important in my mind is the fact,

1 as I explained, an irregular force has the tendency to operate in
2 civilian clothes or in a half sort of uniform but is not
3 recognisable. Now it's very clear that in the transcript, among
4 others, in the transcripts from Mr Massaquoi, he indicates that
5 there was absolutely no way you could distinguish the RUF and the
6 AFRC. There are numerous examples elsewhere, I found, that you
7 couldn't distinguish. That is only one example. Now, in the
8 report, there are more examples not relating to the uniforms but,
9 for example, relating to their posture. I said an irregular
10 force has the tendency to be on the defensive, in hiding, in the
11 bush, staying under cover. Colonel Iron mentioned that they
12 have -- that the AFRC at least in the first, the majority of the
13 1998, was on a defensive posture. So there are other things but
14 I found proof in the transcript.

15 Q. General, were you able to find support for this conclusion
16 in any of your primary sources?

17 A. Yes, absolutely. Number one, which is --

18 Q. Don't mention the name, sir.

19 A. No, I don't. It's 082 indicated likewise.

20 Q. Can you recall any examples he gave you about --

21 A. He emphasised on the fact that, basically, the AFRC had to
22 be considered as a survival organisation. The main purpose no
23 doubt --

24 MR AGHA: Objection, Your Honour.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Why is that?

26 MR AGHA: This is opinion evidence of DSK-082 and I don't
27 see that the opinion evidence of a layman is relevant in this
28 context.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say to that objection?

1 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, it's never been alleged that this
2 was opinion. It's never been alleged by the defence that this is
3 an opinion of, or it has never been alleged by the expert that
4 this information was based on opinion. It's an assumption of the
5 Prosecution that it is an opinion but there is a foundation that
6 this person was actually in the field; he was there throughout
7 four months and after that he returned with ECOMOG. So it's, I
8 think, quite presumptuous to say that DSK-082 gave the expert
9 just an opinion.

10 MR AGHA: I would say at this point, Your Honour, that
11 there hasn't been a foundation to say that DSK-082 was operating
12 in the jungle with the AFRC faction after the intervention.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, I agree with that, Mr Knoops. You
14 haven't made it clear whether in fact it is an opinion or actual
15 experience.

16 MR KNOOPS:

17 Q. General, when the number one gave that information to you,
18 were you able to -- do you know whether this was a direct
19 knowledge? Did he tell you that it was his experience or was it
20 just his opinion?

21 A. Well, in my mind it had to be his experience because after
22 the intervention, when everybody sort of fled into the bush, he
23 was part of that. I think he stayed for a long time in Masiaka
24 and he observed of course that, you know, the only way to survive
25 was to stay and hide and that is what he explained to me.

26 Q. And with respect to his stay with ECOMOG, later on I
27 believe you testified about August 1998, he returned with ECOMOG.
28 Do you know from your recollection whether he actually went into
29 the bush with ECOMOG at that time?

1 A. It was stated that on occasions he went into the bush but I
2 thought it was extremely interesting to note that someone first
3 is on the one side, so to speak, in the bush and then all of a
4 sudden after so many -- then he is on the other and no doubt, no
5 doubt, ECOMOG knew the way the AFRC in general operated.

6 Q. Okay. Now what about, general, number three. You
7 indicated to the Court that number three was, you call him a
8 leader of one of the AFRC groups. Did number three provide you
9 any information which enabled you to come to this conclusion you
10 just stated?

11 A. Number three, and he stayed, as far as I know, the entire
12 period in the bush, so that the only way he could, the only way
13 he could perform was to survive and stay in hiding.

14 Q. And do you know whether he was speaking for himself or for
15 his entire group he was leading at that time?

16 A. I can't answer that question. He was saying that as an
17 alleged boss, or commanding officer, I don't know how you call
18 that, of his group, so when I speak as a commander, commanding
19 officer, I speak for the entire force. So, but that was an
20 assumption on my side that he of course as leader spoke for the
21 entire group.

22 Q. And, general, you just informed the Court about your fourth
23 secondary source, the transcripts of the Prosecution evidence,
24 and you mentioned Mr Massaquoi. Can you recall any other
25 examples from the transcripts which enabled you to arrive at this
26 conclusion?

27 A. I mentioned Massaquoi because Massaquoi indicated that you
28 couldn't distinguish between the two groups and I'm afraid it can
29 be that it's in my report but among the many, many examples, I

1 don't know if I can recall another one at this point of time, I
2 think. I don't -- I don't know.

3 Q. General, were you, during your research, been brought into
4 a position to arrive at the conclusion what the main purpose of
5 the AFRC was in military terms, after May 1997?

6 A. After May 1997, I don't know. They were here. I mean,
7 here, as in Freetown and I know what their purpose was after
8 February 1998.

9 Q. One final question, general, with respect to this part.
10 Assuming, general, you have a force which has an official
11 structure, let's call it organisation, but in its modus operandi
12 it's irregular, according to the criteria you applied to the
13 instant case, what is in your view the outcome of the question
14 whether we are dealing with a regular or an irregular force?

15 A. With my operational background I think the only relevance
16 is how you perform, operate, behave during the operations. Now,
17 how you are structured is another matter but I think that if you
18 operate, or have all the characteristics or many of the
19 characteristics of an irregular force, Your Honour, or an
20 irregular action, you are an irregular force or, like Colonel
21 Iron says, you are non-conventional or you are non-regular or you
22 are a guerrilla force.

23 Q. Yes. Thank you, general. General, that concludes my
24 questions with respect to part C and I would like you to go to
25 your third part D where you addressed the three questions of
26 Colonel Iron. First, what is your conclusion as to the
27 pre-condition Colonel Iron stated with respect to the
28 availability of recognisable groups?

29 A. Colonel Iron stated in his report that, if I recall

1 correctly, he stated something in the wording like military
2 organisations exist when there is a conflict or fighting between
3 recognisable forces. Otherwise, he stated, but again it's here
4 in the head, he stated it's mere -- merely chaos. I think that's
5 about the wording he used.

6 Q. Thank you, general. Now, let us turn to the first question
7 which was researched by Colonel Iron and researched by you,
8 namely, did the AFRC faction have a recognisable military
9 hierarchy and structure? First of all, at what conclusion did
10 you arrive with respect to that question, in your research?

11 A. The conclusion was they didn't have a recognisable
12 hierarchy and structure.

13 Q. Can you please explain to the Court how you came to that
14 conclusion?

15 MR AGHA: Your Honour, I would object at this stage on the
16 basis that, if I recall rightly, and I may be wrong, do not such
17 responses go to the ultimate issue in this case?

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: In what way?

19 MR AGHA: In we are talking about command responsibility
20 under 6.3 and the question of hierarchy and if the conclusion is
21 there was no hierarchy and no structure then that would directly
22 affect a judgement, based on fact, which this Court needs to find
23 on its own.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: You want to reply to that objection,
25 Mr Knoops?

26 MR KNOOPS: Yes, Your Honour, I am happy to. I don't agree
27 with my learned friend. First of all, it's not a matter of the
28 ultimate issue. As the Court knows, the report of Colonel Iron
29 was challenged by the Defence in its entirety on the basis of the

1 ultimate issue and, specifically, the fourth question was there
2 effective command and control. Now, this is directly indeed
3 related to the indictment and, I think rightfully, the Court
4 excluded that question from the examination by Colonel Iron.

5 Secondly, the issue of the existence of a recognisable
6 military structure was repeatedly addressed by the Prosecution to
7 witnesses of fact, not experts, and that doesn't go to the
8 indictment as such, whilst it has nothing to do with the
9 existence of effective command and control, as such, merely
10 whether command and control, as such, existed without giving a
11 judgement call on the effectiveness of there. And based on the
12 jurisprudence of the ICTY it's predominantly the term, the
13 effectiveness of command and control which is the ultimate issue,
14 not the question whether command and control existed from the
15 opinion of a military expert.

16 So, in my humble submission, this is not a valid objection
17 but if the Court would sustain that objection, then actually,
18 what we have done is establishing the foundation that the whole
19 report, I am sorry to say that, of Colonel Iron, and his
20 testimony, should be excluded because he went into this question.
21 And then of course we could be probably finishing soon because
22 then there is no question to be answered to any of the experts
23 anymore.

24 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Knoops, your question was: Was there a
25 recognisable hierarchy and structure? Hierarchy and structure to
26 me do not appear to be the same. Are you asking two questions or
27 are you equating those, two hierarchy and structure, as one?

28 MR KNOOPS: Thank you for this question. I think it's,
29 from a military perspective, a very interesting question. When

1 you ask me personally I would say there could be a difference
2 between hierarchy and structure, although it may be a question of
3 wording, and perhaps it's up to the expert to ask whether there
4 is, from his perspective, a difference between a hierarchy and a
5 structure because if there is a structure there is, in essence, a
6 hierarchy or vice versa. Well, the question actually is adopted
7 from the question which was put to Colonel Iron in his report and
8 if we, as Defence, would have rephrased questions for the experts
9 we may have done it differently but, in all fairness, also to the
10 Prosecution, we thought it viable to use the same questions as
11 were put to Colonel Iron but I agree with you, Your Honour, that
12 you can discuss about the question whether they can be equated or
13 not. I would say if the Court has not a problem with that that
14 we could ask the expert whether he thinks that hierarchy and
15 structure can be divided or they are actually the same.

16 JUDGE DOHERTY: Well, perhaps then, Mr Knoops, in light of
17 what you say, we should rule on this objection that is already
18 before us.

19 MR KNOOPS: Yes. And may I just briefly indicate, Your
20 Honour, that what is being asked is whether or not that structure
21 was recognisable. We are not asking any judgement call on the
22 judicial qualification of that structure. So it's merely, I
23 think, a judgement from a military perspective, whether such a
24 structure was visible, recognisable, and that's, in my view,
25 something different than when you qualify it from a legal
26 perspective, so it doesn't go to the ultimate issue.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are not talking about effective
28 command and control?

29 MR KNOOPS: Not at all.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are just talking about a structure
2 that can be recognised as such?

3 MR KNOOPS: That is quite right, and, Your Honours, what I
4 have noticed that we expressly made sure that the whole
5 terminology which was put by Colonel Iron in his report, and
6 which was included, is not being put and will not be put to this
7 expert.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, yes, we note that, Mr Knoops. In
9 fact, you probably will recall that in the Prosecution case the
10 Defence did make an objection along those lines.

11 MR KNOOPS: Correct. But Your Honour, that was regarding
12 the fourth question in the report of Colonel Iron: Was there
13 effective command and control? That goes directly to the
14 indictment and goes also to the ultimate issue and therefore we
15 objected only to the fourth question, and Your Honours ruled on
16 that saying indeed the fourth question cannot be put to Colonel
17 Iron, although his report was ultimately tendered, his document
18 as a whole, and that's why we opted for not asking anything to
19 this expert about the effectiveness of the organisation, or the
20 command and control issue; we are merely asking the expert was
21 there a recognisable structure or hierarchy, and then we followed
22 the two other questions which also were put to Colonel Iron: Had
23 it the characteristics of traditional military organisation?
24 That's the second question. And the third question relates to
25 was there any linkage between strategic operational technical
26 levels. That question was also put to Colonel Iron and answered
27 by him; he also were in explanation in chief.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Mr Knoops, now that you've
29 explained the parameters of your questions we overrule the

1 objection. We will allow the question.

2 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour.

3 Q. General, my apologies for the intervention. Just to go
4 back, I believe my question to you was, sir, whether you were
5 able to come to the -- to any conclusion as to the first
6 question, which was also put to Colonel Iron and, just for
7 clarity, I rephrase the question: Did the AFRC faction have a
8 recognisable military hierarchy and structure? And I emphasise
9 that we are not asking you to comment on the issue of the
10 effectiveness of the organisation but merely whether, as an
11 observation, as a mere fact, the recognisable structure existed
12 in your view. And we, more precisely, we are speaking about the
13 timeframe of May 1997, till the end of 1998, before the advance
14 to Freetown started. I hope I am now really precise for you.

15 A. As indicated, I completely followed the methodology of
16 Colonel Iron in the questions raised by him. And, in response to
17 your question, I could not agree with Colonel Iron that the AFRC
18 had a recognisable hierarchy and a structure as he described.

19 Q. And are you in a position to tell the Court on what
20 foundation you came to that conclusion?

21 A. I can.

22 Q. Could you please do, and please indicate also directly your
23 sources?

24 MR AGHA: Your Honour, at this stage I would point out that
25 the witness does seem to be writing and referring to notes and
26 I'm not sure if that's entirely proper.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: What is your witness doing, Mr Knoops?

28 MR KNOOPS:

29 Q. General, I see you have a notebook there?

1 A. Your Honour, while the question is posed to me, and I can't
2 refer to my notes, I make notes what my response will be.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, anything wrong with that, Mr Agha?

4 MR AGHA: I think as long as he then turns the page so that
5 he can't use it as an aide-memoire, I wouldn't object to that,
6 Your Honour.

7 MR KNOOPS: I can also mention that whilst there are
8 objections that the general wants to have some memories, some
9 guidance as to the questions that were put to him but it's not in
10 general -- it's not like blank papers?

11 THE WITNESS: No, I only write as the question is posed, is
12 there a clear hierarchy and structure, I know that it concerns
13 chain of command, chain of command and staff structure, so I
14 write those down to make sure that I address them accordingly.

15 MR AGHA: That is objectionable, Your Honour, in the view
16 of the Prosecution.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, what's objectionable about it?

18 MR AGHA: Writing the question is one thing as an
19 aide-memoire but taking down a note as to how you are going to
20 answer that question, and you can refer to that note, the
21 Prosecution would suggest is objectionable.

22 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, the reports of General Prins
23 comprises 86 pages with 300 footnotes, as opposed to the report
24 of Colonel Iron. Now, I cannot imagine that an expert witness is
25 able to recall everything which is in his report and I can really
26 imagine --

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, to be fair to Mr Agha, who has
28 objected, by one question the witness is not being asked to
29 recall everything in his report. He is just being asked to reply

1 to one question at a time.

2 MR KNOOPS: Okay.

3 Q. General, are you willing to put down the notebook, sir?

4 Thank you.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, but that is what you are being asked
6 to address. It's just the fact that he is writing down the
7 answer before he speaks it.

8 MR KNOOPS: Well, it's my understanding, Your Honour, that
9 the general is just, whilst the question is being put, he
10 remembers of course certain things from his reports.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

12 MR KNOOPS: And he is writing those key words down to have
13 his answer fluently for the Court and, based on those key words,
14 like span of command, which is an important topic, one of the
15 characteristics in his reports which deals only with ten pages
16 that's my understanding that -- how the general operates, but --

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, I see that, Mr Knoops. He, the
18 general, is simply writing down --

19 MR KNOOPS: Key words.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: -- something he is about to say. He is
21 not using any extraneous material to -- as a basis for what he
22 writes down. It's just coming from his mind. We don't see
23 anything wrong with that. So go ahead.

24 MR KNOOPS: Thank you.

25 Q. Sir, I am about to ask that you come to help me with the
26 question I've put to you. I believe --

27 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Knoops, you were asking the witness
28 about the foundations for his conclusions.

29 MR KNOOPS: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you very much.

1 Q. General, are you able to indicate the foundation of your
2 conclusion and it could be helpful to the Court, when you specify
3 directly, your primary and/or secondary sources?

4 A. Now, that is the hardest question of the day because it's
5 such an enormous broad area which I tried to simplify for the
6 Court, if possible. So probably I can take it step-by-step and
7 if I'm too long then well hopefully you can --

8 Q. Yes. And general, maybe you can help the Court and also my
9 learned friends on the opposite side and myself by, you used the
10 word span of command and we notice in your report certain
11 criteria you use that you take it per criteria, just to keep it
12 simple for us.

13 A. All right. Let me give it a try. Colonel Iron, in his
14 report, asked the question: Was there a recognisable hierarchy
15 and structure? And in order to answer that question he had three
16 criteria; one, span of command; two, chain of command; three,
17 staff structure. And so he addressed all these three in order to
18 come to his conclusion. That's what he did. And to make things
19 easy I followed precisely the same methodology or the same
20 parameters as Colonel Iron did. I didn't feel -- I didn't see
21 any good reason why I should come up with different criteria.
22 So, the first question Colonel Iron posed was: Was there a span
23 of command? Now, Colonel Iron states in his report, rightly so,
24 that span of command has to do with how many people can you
25 actually control, and Colonel Iron comes to the conclusion it's
26 about three to five you can actually control. So if you were the
27 boss, you can control three to five subordinates in a chaotic
28 situation, and he says you can have some more if the situation is
29 stable. And I fully agree with Colonel Iron. So, in my mind, to

1 deal with the span of command, the organisation of the AFRC, and
2 I don't want to make things difficult but hopefully I can
3 clarify, the AFRC had also, according to Iron, one boss, that was
4 SAJ Musa, and he was called himself the brigade commander, or
5 earlier he was called the battalion commander, but then in a
6 latter stage he called himself the brigade commander. Now,
7 that's wording, so I don't fight Colonel Iron on that, it's just
8 wording. So, under Musa, there were a couple of battalions, and
9 these battalions varied in strength between 80 and 150. Now,
10 normally, and also Colonel Iron agrees, that a battalion in
11 western armies is 700 but it's only for the wording. So Musa was
12 the boss as battalion or as brigade commander and he had a couple
13 of battalions under him; assume it was four. Later it was stated
14 by Colonel Iron, six or eight. Now, Musa then had span of
15 command over his battalions because Musa could direct six, three,
16 six, eight people max. So the span of command was established
17 one level. Now, in a normal organisation, in an organisation
18 Colonel Iron and I are familiar with, you have a battalion, a
19 brigade commander with several battalion commanders, and every
20 battalion commander has companies, and every company commander
21 has platoons, and every platoon commander has squads in order to
22 maintain the span of command with eight subordinates. And in my
23 findings I have -- I agree that there was probably one level of
24 span of command from the brigade commander to the battalion
25 commander but now the problem is here. The problem is that the
26 battalions, as stated previously, had a strength of about 80 to
27 120. Transcripts vary in strength. But in my entire research I
28 have not come across the fact that these battalions of, keep it
29 simple, 100 men --

1 Q. Each?

2 A. -- each, were further broken down into companies, platoons
3 and squads. So my conclusion is that the span of command was
4 only established for one level. Now, Colonel Iron introduces
5 another -- another thing, chain of command. What he means with
6 chain of command is what I've just described. You have a brigade
7 commander, who has under him battalion commanders, and each of
8 these battalion commanders have company commanders, and each of
9 these company commanders have platoon commanders, and each of the
10 platoon commanders have section commanders. That is what Colonel
11 Iron describes as chain of command. Now, in my view, that was
12 not established.

13 Q. Why not?

14 A. I have never, I have not seen any transcript that indicates
15 the existence of companies, platoons, and squads. It was not so
16 surprising because the AFRC consisted merely of junior ranks and
17 no trained officers. So there were not men to fulfil the jobs.
18 So then you come to the conclusion that one man is taking care of
19 direct 80 to 120. Now, I've been company commander for, I guess,
20 three years and the company was 120 men, equal to what the AFRC
21 called a battalion -- I don't want to confuse the Court but equal
22 to a battalion. Now, I have platoon commanders and section
23 commanders and, with 120 men, the moment you say forward march,
24 with 120 men you can't stop them without having a proper span of
25 command and chain of command and the communications with it. So
26 I hope I have not been too -- that my answer is understandable,
27 that I agree with Colonel Iron that there was one level
28 established but that is just not good enough because then one man
29 has to control 80 up to 120. So Colonel Iron uses the

1 combination span of command, chain of command simultaneously to
2 tackle this problem, so that was not established, in my
3 view. Now, Colonel Iron had a third criteria, criterion, which
4 was staff structure, and he is right because that is another
5 criteria for an organisation. Now, I don't disagree with Colonel
6 Iron that there was some form of staff structure. You can
7 deliberate about what sort of structure. Colonel Iron mentions
8 one staff structure, 082 mentions another, you know, don't go
9 into the detail which staff structure they had. So I agree with
10 Colonel Iron that there was some form of staff structure but,
11 then again, they didn't have, the AFRC, they didn't have the
12 level of trained officers to carry out the staff jobs. Neither
13 did they have the proper officers or non-commissioned officers to
14 carry out the jobs in the chain of command.

15 So, in short, with numerous examples, and based on mainly
16 the transcripts concerning span of command and chain of command,
17 I came to the conclusion that the structure and hierarchy was
18 there merely on paper. It -- there was some form of structure,
19 but it was just not good enough. So basically, in short, that is
20 why I came to the conclusion that there was only one level.

21 Q. Thank you, general, for your answer. Let us breakdown your
22 answer in various subquestions. First of all, general, in your
23 opinion, how many levels do you exactly need to have a span of
24 command?

25 A. If we can combine the two, like Colonel Iron did, span of
26 command, chain of command, because it relates to each other but,
27 you know, from the brigade to the battalion is one; from the
28 battalion to the company is two; from the company to the platoon
29 is three; from the platoon to the squad is four, so you must have

1 four levels.

2 Q. As to the level of the subordinates, did you come to any
3 specific conclusions?

4 A. Well, of course, from my secondary sources, the force that
5 sort of fled out of Freetown, in February 1998, were the, so to
6 speak, most of them were junior ranks, so the AFRC faction, as I
7 described, didn't have trained staff officers. There were, I
8 think, one or two, as I came across, who were trained officers,
9 regular officers, and the rest was former soldiers.

10 Q. Can you mention, by the way, those two names?

11 A. Well, FAT Sesay was one. There's another one, I don't know
12 if it's King, but there was another one who was a trained staff
13 officer but, you know, that on a force of 800 is just not -- with
14 that you can't run a force.

15 Q. Are you in a position to tell the Court how exactly this,
16 the absence of trained officers, except of those two you have in
17 mind, interrelates to the span of command, the chain of command?
18 How should we -- could you visualise that for the Court?

19 A. Well, assume you have a correct span of command and chain
20 of command then at all these levels you need trained officers and
21 in your staff you need trained staff officers, so at all these
22 levels you need trained, trained officers.

23 Q. General, did you come across, while reading the transcripts
24 of the Prosecution witnesses, the words "battalion supervisor"?

25 A. I came across battalion supervisor because it was named in
26 the report by Colonel Iron. It's also named in one of the
27 transcripts. I understood from my interviews with primary
28 sources that those were not functions used in the Sierra Leone
29 Army. They were unknown. But I know that, apparently, Musa

1 established those functions in order to see what the subunits
2 were doing.

3 Q. In your professional opinion, did the existence of
4 battalion supervisor change your conclusion you just mentioned to
5 the Court?

6 A. No, it didn't, because with a battalion supervisor you can
7 merely supervise what the subordinate commander, the battalion
8 commander, is doing. But the commander -- the battalion
9 commander can't -- cannot oversee the 80 to the 120 men.

10 Q. Did you come across, in the transcripts, the term
11 "battlefield inspectors"?

12 A. It was a similar -- similar -- I don't know if it's
13 described exactly the same way but I think it had the same
14 purpose. But also that didn't solve your problem of the span of
15 command and chain of command.

16 Q. Now, general, I just asked you specifically about the
17 period May 1997 till the end of 1998, before the advance to
18 Freetown. What is your conclusion as to the existence of a
19 recognisable structure, or hierarchy, when we would deal with the
20 periods that the faction left Colonel Eddie Town and was on the
21 advance to Freetown?

22 A. The period you indicate, you indicate then that SAJ Musa
23 was in command; is that right?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. Well, then, again, that period I examined. I came to the
26 conclusion that the situation I described previously, that was
27 the case, in that period.

28 Q. And let us assume that Musa was able to restructure the
29 whole, let's call it organisation, in Colonel Eddie Town, as

1 stated in the transcripts which you saw. What is your view as to
2 the existence of a structure after that restructuring? Does it
3 change your conclusion?

4 A. It doesn't because at one point in time, and I don't know
5 precisely when, Musa restructured and came up with an
6 organisation of him, the boss, and subordinate commanders. And I
7 have no reason not to agree with that; neither does Colonel Iron;
8 neither do my primary sources. But it remains the fact that
9 under that, nothing was established.

10 Q. Well, general, you just spoke about the third criterion,
11 the staff structure, and you explained for the Court your opinion
12 as to the existence or non-existence of a staff structure. Could
13 you please tell the Court how, what you need to set up in staff
14 structure, from your professional experience?

15 A. From, let's say the professional background of Colonel Iron
16 and I, you come up with a structure which he names G1, 2, 3, 4 so
17 it deals with personnel, intelligence, operations and logistics
18 and you can go on further until G9, or what have you. In order
19 to carry out these functions you, number one, need an officer,
20 for example. Who is trained in logistics or an officer who is
21 trained in operations. Now, that is an officer who has gone to
22 officer candidate school, who preferably joins a staff college,
23 and has a lot of experience in the field he operates in. So, for
24 example, in our forces, in the British forces, if you are a sort
25 of in a logistic line you will stay in a sort of a logistic line
26 because that is where you gain the experience. So that is what
27 you need and you just cannot pick someone and make him the head
28 of a personnel staff branch.

29 Q. Thank you, general. General, the second question you dealt

1 with --

2 A. Sorry, may I add something to it?

3 Q. Go ahead.

4 A. What I found, which I think was very important, also
5 dealing with the staff structure and hierarchy, I mentioned it
6 briefly, was the level of subordinate commanders. So when Musa
7 was commander, commanding officer, and he had battalion
8 commanders, I want to emphasise that the level of command,
9 subordinate commanders, among others, I don't know if I can call
10 his name, 167, or 176, I forget, he was a battalion commander but
11 I was astonished to read in all the transcripts that the man
12 didn't have any level, any training, to carry out his being a
13 subordinate commander. He didn't have the training. He didn't
14 have the military experience and, even more important is the fact
15 that out of, I think his transcripts, I read that he didn't want
16 to take any responsibility while carrying out the job of a
17 subordinate commander. Now, in my mind, that's another factor
18 because I emphasise these three but, in my report, I go more into
19 detail into these aspects. You cannot run a military
20 organisation if your subordinates don't take responsibility for
21 their actions, so if I am a brigade commander my battalion
22 commanders carry out orders and they are responsible themselves
23 to make sure these orders are carried out. And, you know, I read
24 in several occasions that, you know, the specific 176, or 67
25 said, you know, I didn't give orders, the orders came from the
26 top. I only was there and then later he was, also in the view of
27 Iron, he was assigned that battle group commander. He said:
28 "Well, I didn't give orders to my battle group, I was just there.
29 The orders came from the top." So I just want to emphasise that

1 you don't have the structure, but if you don't have the men, who
2 take the responsibility, you can't run the force. I just wanted
3 to add that.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. That came into my mind.

6 Q. So, just to conclude this point, general, what is your
7 overall conclusion as to the question: Did the AFRC faction have
8 a recognisable hierarchy or structure?

9 A. Based on the parameters, as stated by Colonel Iron, I
10 cannot agree. They didn't have that.

11 Q. Thank you, general. I would like to move on, general, to
12 the second question addressed by Colonel Iron, and also by you,
13 namely, the question: Did the AFRC faction exhibit the
14 characteristics of a traditional military organisation? You did
15 research that question, sir?

16 A. I did.

17 Q. Could you please first describe to the Court how you
18 approached this question from your professional view?

19 A. Again, I followed in the footsteps of Colonel Iron. Now,
20 he addressed 13 characteristics and I didn't have any reason to
21 doubt his knowledge. You can come up with 15 or 11 but that's
22 basically not so relevant. So, what I did is, to analyse any of
23 the 13 and answer the question: How, how was that established?
24 Was that, in fact, in place? And I came to the conclusion that
25 it was different.

26 Q. And, general, we will come back to the conclusion and the
27 way you arrived at the conclusion but what was for you the
28 foundation to arrive at the conclusion you made in this regard?

29 A. Well, it basically varied. With some of the

1 characteristics, I went back to the history of the armed forces
2 and the procurement of equipment, and then I tried to find
3 evidence, so to speak, if that was in place; for example,
4 communications. In other instances I relied on Iron himself,
5 what was Iron's view and if they -- if Colonel Iron came to the
6 conclusion that they were not there then that was fairly easy for
7 me to -- well, I agreed with him, but I looked at whether he was
8 right or wrong. And then in the many, many transcripts you, for
9 example, you come to the aspect of discipline, but then you have
10 to find a basis that discipline really was established in the
11 force. And so I went through, I think what that is concerned to
12 the transcripts, and I sort of tried to find where do I find the
13 answer to whether, and to what extent, discipline was a character
14 of that organisation, you see. So it was basically a mixture
15 where I tried to --

16 Q. And, general, to be clear, the transcripts, these were the
17 transcripts of the Prosecution witnesses over the period May,
18 October, of last year, you researched?

19 A. Exactly.

20 Q. Thank you. Were there any other sources, apart from the
21 history and transcripts, which enabled you to come to any
22 conclusion as to this second question; either primary or
23 secondary?

24 A. Primary, certainly. I certainly got interviews in which,
25 and to what extent it was stated, whether a characteristic was in
26 place.

27 Q. And, general, in this regard, you are referring to the,
28 when you speak about the primary sources, can you please specify
29 whether any of these numbers you mentioned were under those

1 interviews referred to?

2 A. Yes. Predominantly, number one.

3 Q. Apart from number one?

4 A. It may have come across in my, you know, as I indicated, I
5 talked with the senior officers retired over a period of time
6 and, in fact, number two, my first sort of inquiry was a
7 combination of one and two; that's correct. And afterwards, it
8 was only one, in the timeframe in May, April, sorry, March,
9 April, 2006.

10 Q. And specifically, with respect to number two, did, what you
11 call him the leader of one of the groups, the AFRC groups, did he
12 provide you with any specific factual information which enabled
13 you to come to any conclusions as to this second question?

14 A. Well, that's hard because it was so many characteristics
15 and so many -- I find it hard now to say yes, that was a specific
16 fact where he based himself on.

17 Q. Okay. Thank you, general. Going back to the 13
18 characteristics you adopted from Colonel Iron's research. What
19 was -- were you able to come to any conclusion on the existence
20 of these 13 characteristics?

21 A. I was.

22 Q. Can you first tell the Court the overall outcome of that
23 research and then we go into the specificities of the various
24 characteristics?

25 A. If I can recall correctly, because it's in my report, a
26 list, out of the 13, I think, I am sure that seven were not
27 applicable in the AFRC faction. Three were limited. There was a
28 limited availability of that characteristic. Two, it was very
29 limited, in my mind, and one was only applicable at the start of

1 a planning and orders process, if I can recall correctly.

2 Q. Now, I'm not going to rehearse you today about which
3 criteria exactly but we may come to that in a later stage. Now,
4 let us start with the first criterion of Colonel Iron, the
5 intelligence process. What was your conclusion as to the non, or
6 availability of that criterion, that characteristic, within the
7 AFRC faction after May 1997?

8 A. Well, I didn't want to be too harsh in my verdict so, as I
9 recall correctly, the intelligence I stated as limited available.

10 Q. With respect to the second characteristic mentioned by
11 Colonel Iron, the communication system, what was your conclusion
12 as to the existence or non-existence of that characteristic
13 within the AFRC faction?

14 A. The same applies for communications limited, and again I
15 didn't want to be too harsh, and that was based, basically, on
16 the short availability of communication after the attack on
17 Lunsar, and the use of runners, which also Colonel Iron states.
18 So my conclusion was communication limited.

19 Q. General, can you recall any specific transcripts in this
20 regard, which enabled you to arrive at this conclusion?

21 A. You are asking specifically transcripts or general sources?

22 Q. No, specifically whether you found support for your
23 conclusion in one of the Prosecution witness statements in the
24 transcripts?

25 A. Yes, because in the several transcripts my first finding
26 was that witnesses had a tendency to talk about communication
27 equipment while they didn't have the slightest idea what they
28 were talking about. They couldn't identify what sort of
29 equipment, neither could they explain how much. And then, again,

1 I didn't find any documentation on the question on maintenance of
2 equipment, training, batteries, generators, because it was not
3 available in the bush, at least according to my opinion.

4 Q. In this regard, general, can you please tell the Court what
5 the duration is of a battery of a VHS radio or another radio,
6 mobile radio, used by the military?

7 A. Well, it depends, you see. VHF is very high frequent. And
8 the battalion commanders' witnesses talk about VHS which I have
9 never heard about. It depends on several factors. It depends on
10 how much, how long you use the radio. Whether you operate in
11 Norway, in the extreme cold, a battery is down in five hours.
12 Now a battery may go 24 hours, depending on the use. So there
13 are a lot of factors which dictate the batteries but a battery,
14 if you use a radio, then the battery won't, if you use a radio
15 permanently, the battery will be down in, let's say 24 hours, and
16 then you have to recharge it so --

17 Q. Well, you testified before that you have experience in
18 jungle warfare. What is your estimation as to the duration of a
19 battery under the conditions in the jungle?

20 A. I couldn't answer that, really. I don't have that
21 knowledge. It would be a guess. The only thing I am saying is
22 that in warm temperatures batteries have the tendency to last
23 longer than in colder temperatures, and the fact is that you need
24 to have spare batteries and then you have to have a system where
25 you recharge your batteries, like you and I would do in normal
26 circumstances.

27 Q. Did you come across any of such equipment in the
28 transcripts you read?

29 A. No, absolutely not.

1 Q. Thank you, general. Let's go to the third characteristic,
2 the planning and orders process. I believe you've just stated
3 that it only existed, in your view, at the start of the -- what
4 you call the process. What is your view as to the availability
5 of a planning and orders process within the AFRC?

6 A. I have the tendency to agree with Colonel Iron that written
7 orders were not used. Colonel Iron said there were no written
8 orders in, within the AFRC faction, so the only sort of orders
9 you would have is the order by way of getting your subordinates
10 together and brief on what you are going to do. But, then again,
11 there is an old saying in the military that, I think it's from
12 Maltke, who stated that -- an old Prussian general -- stated that
13 the first enemy contact does -- the best operation plan doesn't
14 survive the first enemy contact. What I'm saying is that you can
15 order, you can brief and order your subordinate commanders and
16 then they go away and the operation starts. But immediately, as
17 soon as you go on the move, or on the offensive, or what have
18 you, things change instantly and then you didn't have the option
19 of directing your subordinates. So, like in traditional military
20 organisations like our forces and the royal marines, you have the
21 equipment to immediately, if a situation changes, to direct your
22 subordinates how to act. So, in my view, the only other thing
23 they could do was use runners. Now, the use of runners was
24 extremely dangerous because they might fall in the hands of
25 enemy. And the other thing is if you use a runner, and you tell
26 the runner go and tell Mr So-and-So this message, by the time he
27 is with Mr So-and-So he lost half the message. So what I was
28 saying was that also based on the transcripts, I have in my
29 report examples of planning groups. I have examples of that at

1 one stage the force was briefed and about 3,000 men, this is in
2 the transcript, were briefed without a [indiscernible] Taylor I
3 think by SAJ Musa. Well, anyway, so I believe -- I agree with
4 Colonel Iron when he states, you know, that order groups were
5 held, could be, but then that is only the start. And that is why
6 I came to the conclusion that the planning and orders process
7 must have existed at the start of an operation but not during the
8 operation, you have to adapt the plans.

9 Q. Colonel, sorry, I am not trying to mix you up with Colonel
10 Iron. General, sorry. You indicated at introduction the word
11 rules of engagement and explained to the Court what rules of
12 engagements are. Are normally, in your world, the military
13 world, rules of engagement, been issued by way of written orders
14 or documents?

15 MR AGHA: Objection to leading, Your Honour.

16 MR KNOOPS: We will rephrase it.

17 Q. General, are you able to say how rules of engagement are
18 being issued and distributed amongst the forces?

19 A. In the military organisations Colonel Iron and I know, or I
20 know, rules of engagements are always written.

21 Q. Why is that?

22 A. Well, because the rules of engagement are often very
23 difficult, very sort of difficult way phrased, and are a mixture
24 of operational, judicial and political aspects. So you cannot
25 just simply hand out rules of engagement to the men. You can
26 hand out rules of engagement to a battalion commander, or to
27 senior non-commissioned officers, but what you then need to do is
28 rephrase, in a simple way, the rules of engagement for the
29 troops, for a card they can put in their pocket, which gives

1 them, based on the rules of engagement, a way they have to handle
2 but they are always written.

3 Q. What do you mean, general, with judicial? You used the
4 word judicial?

5 A. When, I don't know if judicial is the right word then.
6 What I mean is the rules of engagement have a part in it where
7 judicial wording issues like, is that correct, subsidiarity and
8 proportionality, and so on. So those aspects are always in a
9 rule of engagement. And then again rules of engagement are also
10 based on political wishes and operational requirements. There is
11 always a fight between the politicians and the military; military
12 want more rules of engagement and the politicians have the
13 tendency to take it on easy on them. So it's a compromise.

14 Q. General, based on your research in the transcripts of the
15 Prosecution witnesses, did you encounter any sort of document
16 which could be qualified as rules of engagement?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Thank you. General. Let's move on to the fourth --

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: The fifth.

20 MR KNOOPS: Sorry.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's the fifth.

22 MR KNOOPS: Already? Sorry. Sorry, Your Honour. The
23 fifth.

24 Q. The fifth criterion, general, relates to lessons learnt
25 system and doctrine development and dissemination. I'm just now
26 rephrasing the characteristic put forward by Colonel Iron. What
27 conclusion did you arrive when it concerns this fifth
28 characteristic, sir?

29 A. Again, if I remember correctly, I stated very limited. I

1 don't know if it's correct but I think I stated very limited.

2 Q. I can --

3 A. Because again, I didn't want to be too harsh in my verdict,
4 and agreed to a certain extent with Colonel Iron that there was
5 no formal system of lessons learned. You have to realise that in
6 normal military organisations, whenever you carry out an
7 operation, you have lessons learned and a database. Now within
8 future exercises these lessons learned are applied. Now nothing
9 existed like that. But it probably has to be said that the AFRC
10 learned how to operate as a guerrilla force on the job. I think
11 they learned on the job. I think I have also stated that in my
12 report and therefore I think I came to the conclusion very
13 limited.

14 Q. And general, for that conclusion, was there any foundation
15 discovered by you in the sources?

16 A. Well, in effect, that I didn't see any, in all my sources,
17 whether it were the transcripts or other documentation, I never
18 saw this characteristic. So, in that respect, I followed Colonel
19 Iron. I, you know, I didn't have a reason to say, well, because
20 they only learn on the job it is not available but you can argue
21 about it but I don't think that is all too relevant.

22 Q. Thank you, sir. Six. The disciplinary system. What was
23 your conclusion about the disciplinary system?

24 A. I didn't think there was a disciplinary system.

25 Q. Could you please tell the Court why you think there was no
26 disciplinary system in place?

27 A. Well, first of all, as I've written in my report, to
28 establish disciplinary system I named a couple of factors. One,
29 you have to train the man in discipline. You have to make

1 disciplined troops. Secondly, you need to have commanding
2 officers who enforce discipline but also are themselves operating
3 in a disciplined manner and then, thirdly, when you have a
4 disciplinary system -- or certainly you need to have a
5 disciplinary system. Now, Colonel Iron describes the way it is
6 set up in the British forces, that's not the way it's set up in
7 the Dutch forces but, either way, you need to have a system in
8 place. How to enforce discipline? For example, if someone
9 commits a crime in The Netherlands forces, it is the military
10 police working for the minister of justice and I think in the
11 British forces you have a provost marshall. If it's less than a
12 crime then you need to have a system that someone, what we call
13 reports you. You are too late to show up for work and a corporal
14 sees the soldier too late for his work, so he writes a report to
15 his boss. And then you need to have a system where the boss
16 looks at it and punishes or, in the criminal world, you need to
17 have a system set up how it's done and I'm afraid that I have not
18 come across that at all.

19 Q. Did you, general, come across anything referring to some
20 kind of disciplinary system in the transcripts which you studied?

21 A. You know, I have -- I have come across in the transcripts
22 wording like the order was placed no rape, no killing, or words
23 to that extent. It's not a disciplinary system. In the
24 transcripts I have come across the fact that one of the
25 witnesses, without any training, and without any military
26 background, other than -- sorry, without -- only with the
27 background of a soldier, goes through the rank in a heart beat
28 and I believe, you know, gets a position as a provost marshall,
29 so -- and then I never see, I never saw a system where actually

1 there was a method of punishment or law enforcing.

2 Q. Thank you. General, the seventh criterion, the
3 recruitment, recruiting and training; what was your conclusion as
4 to this element, sir?

5 A. Now, I think that I said very limited. Based on my primary
6 source, I could have said not available because my primary source
7 said: Well, you know, the people serving with the AFRC were
8 former SLA and they didn't need training. Colonel Iron stated:
9 Well, they needed to have sort of replacement troops but came up
10 with a minor figure -- it was either 30 or 70 trained troops.
11 Now you can argue one way or the other. If it was available it
12 was very limited.

13 Q. Now we arrive at the element of the system for promotions
14 and appointments within the AFRC faction, in terms of non or
15 availability. What was your conclusion in this regard, sir?

16 A. I came to the conclusion that it was not available.

17 Q. And what was the foundation for this conclusion?

18 A. Well, you see, that a system for promotion, and I'm sure
19 that it has been discussed here before, but a system for
20 promotion deals with merit, experience, age, so on. A formal
21 announcement by someone, who is entitled to give you that rank,
22 now, within the AFRC faction, and based on numerous transcripts,
23 you know, people were just assigned ranks, assigned ranks to fill
24 in the post of battalion commander. Now, we have come to the
25 conclusion that Musa had a couple of battalion commanders, so
26 whenever somebody needed to fill that job he became
27 lieutenant-colonel, or colonel, or something like that. But that
28 was not a system. And, of course, that is how you look at it. I
29 think Colonel Iron states that it was, in fact, the case, because

1 he said: Well, they got ranks. They didn't get rank insignia.
2 There were no rank insignia. There were no uniforms. So you
3 just tell a man, okay, you are now lieutenant-colonel. He goes
4 around the troops and says: Hey, by the way, I am now Lieutenant
5 Colonel. That's a difference of opinion. I don't agree with
6 that opinion so I came, based on that and on the transcripts, the
7 way people were promoted that it was not available.

8 Q. Thank you, general. What about logistics supply including
9 arms procurement? What was your overall conclusion as to this
10 ninth characteristic?

11 A. Not available.

12 Q. And did you find specific support for this conclusion in
13 any of your sources, specifically the transcripts?

14 A. Well, first of all, Colonel Iron stated, I think literally,
15 that logistics were the Achilles heel. There were no logistics.
16 There was nothing available in the bush. There were no supply
17 lines like in a normal organisation. People had their rifle and
18 their bullets, but that was about it. So I have not, like Iron,
19 we have not come to a conclusion that there was a logistics
20 system at all. And, if there was, you know, people in the AFRC
21 needed something then you had to steal it. Now, there is a
22 debate between my primary source and the fact that it was stated
23 that if you needed something you would just steal it with ECOMOG.
24 The question, of course, is one that was not so very smart to do
25 because, as I have concluded, it was a survival force. So by way
26 of attacking ECOMOG you would expose your positions. But,
27 secondly, ECOMOG had different equipment. So you can steal
28 something but it may not work. And if you steal spare parts, who
29 is going to repair your kit? Who has the experience to repair

1 something you have in your inventory? So I came to the
2 conclusion, also based on the transcripts and the Iron study,
3 that it was not available.

4 Q. Thank you, general. The tenth element of the list of
5 Colonel Iron, the repair and maintenance of equipment, which
6 probably intertwines with the foregoing element but, apart from
7 that, what is your conclusion as to the non or availability of
8 that element?

9 A. Not available.

10 Q. And just to make clear, general, when you say "not
11 available," you are speaking about the -- which timeframe?

12 A. Well, basically, I speak about the timeframe from the
13 moment of February 1998 till, well, name a date; 6 January 1999.

14 Q. Can you, in this regard, recall any examples you
15 encountered in one of the transcripts, when speaking about
16 repair, maintenance of equipment?

17 A. I think, if I can recall correctly, I base it on my primary
18 source and in the transcripts. I cannot recall a specific
19 witness addressing the repair element except for Colonel Iron,
20 who says: Well, if you needed something you just steal it.

21 Q. Okay. The next criterion, the medical system. What was
22 your conclusion as to the existence or non-existence of a medical
23 system within the AFRC?

24 A. Very limited. I had the tendency to say not available but
25 it was stated in many, I think transcripts, but also primary
26 source, that there was a sort of minimal first aid. Now, a
27 normal medical system, even if you are in an outpost, you would
28 have a trained -- not a trained doctor but a trained personnel
29 and good equipment. What I understood was that if something

1 occurred to someone there was limited -- in other words, nothing
2 available; there was no blood, no infusion, no medicine but maybe
3 local herbs were administered, so I came to the conclusion very
4 limited available.

5 Q. What about fundraising and finance, the next criterion of
6 Colonel Iron; what was your overall conclusion?

7 A. Not available.

8 Q. And what was the basis for that conclusion?

9 A. Well, the basis was that the AFRC, as a survival
10 organisation, was complete locked, sealed off from the outside
11 world. There was no money flow and I have not come across
12 statements that there were salaries paid and so on. You know,
13 there was no -- there was Operation Pay Yourself, as I recall,
14 pay yourself in some sort of mission.

15 Q. Thank you, general. That relates actually to the next
16 criterion, the pay and reward system for soldiers. What is the
17 conclusion as to the availability or non-availability of this
18 criterion in your report?

19 A. Non-available.

20 Q. And perhaps just to be clear, what is the foundation of
21 that conclusion?

22 A. You know, again, my primary source, and the fact that there
23 was no money flow in the organisation.

24 Q. Thank you, general. Lastly, the religious welfare system;
25 what was your conclusion in your research?

26 A. Not available.

27 Q. And the foundation for that?

28 A. Well, the foundation for that was, like in the report of
29 Colonel Iron, when from a traditional background you talk about

1 that characteristic, you talk more about taking care of the
2 morale of the troops, having a system to cope with difficulties
3 and so on. Now, my primary source says that there were prayers
4 but that is not what we mean by a system like that.

5 Q. Yes, general. General, I mean, while you enumerated the
6 criterion, and gave your answer, I counted and, in my view, you
7 came to the conclusion, and you have to correct me if I am wrong,
8 that seven functions criteria were not applicable, three
9 functions were only applicable to a certain extent, and two
10 functions were only applicable to a very limited extent, whilst
11 one function, the planning and order process, was only applicable
12 at the outset of the process. You think that's a correct
13 summarisation of the characteristics?

14 A. That indeed is a correct way of saying it, yes.

15 Q. And when we now return to the overall question of this
16 second part, namely, whether the AFRC exhibited the
17 characteristics of a traditional military organisation, what is
18 your overall conclusion based upon this assessment?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Thank you, general.

21 MR KNOOPS: In light of the time, I would suggest perhaps
22 to conclude here before I go into the third question.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We will adjourn now, Mr Knoops.
24 Before we do, tomorrow there are two witnesses scheduled to be
25 cross-examined in the morning and, as you know, we won't be
26 sitting in the afternoon. So what is your way ahead tomorrow?

27 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, of course I cannot speak for the
28 expert and for my colleagues, but I wouldn't have a problem when
29 I continue tomorrow afternoon with the expert.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is what I just said, we don't sit on
2 Wednesday afternoons, we attend to --

3 MR KNOOPS: I know, Your Honour, but in order to
4 accommodate the Court, if the Court appreciates the continuation
5 I wouldn't have. Otherwise, I would suggest to continue with the
6 expert on Thursday morning, but I'm not sure whether there is any
7 other cross-examination planned.

8 To inform the Court, after the military expert, and it's my
9 estimation that I may need one morning to finish the
10 examination-in-chief, of course depending on the length of the
11 cross-examination, I'm bringing in this weekend the expert from
12 Sweden, Dr Thorsen, on the issue of arranged marriage and we
13 actually tried to have her flight scheduled earlier, so she would
14 be here in the weekend, instead of Monday, and then she could
15 only start on the Tuesday. So I'm trying to arrange that she is
16 here available in the weekend so we could start Monday with
17 Dr Thorsen. I have also available Dr Gbla, the expert on child
18 soldiers, and he will be prepared tomorrow afternoon, by me, and
19 I could start, if the Prosecution has no objection, despite the
20 21 day rules with him before the weekend. If not, I suggest that
21 Dr Gbla will be scheduled after Dr Thorsen. But it was my
22 estimation that we could perhaps continue Thursday with Major
23 General Prins and I could conclude the examination-in-chief in
24 the morning and the Prosecution could probably start in the
25 afternoon with the cross-examination.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, tomorrow we have scheduled DBK-012
27 and DBK-129. They are both scheduled for cross-examination.

28 MR KNOOPS: Yes, Your Honour.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't know whether you are doing both

1 of those, Mr Agha?

2 MR AGHA: I certainly hope not, Your Honour, but I can say
3 that there will be people ready and prepared to take both the
4 witnesses should -- well, when they do arrive tomorrow morning.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. The problem with that,
6 Mr Knoops, is we can't say how long the cross-examination will
7 take tomorrow. If it's short, we might find that unless you have
8 the general ready to continue, we end up with some spare time in
9 the morning.

10 MR KNOOPS: That's okay with me, Your Honour. Your Honour,
11 just to be complete, Mr Chekera, our legal assistant, just
12 informed me that there are problems with the flights on the
13 weekend, so it may not be so that Dr Thorsen is here in the
14 weekend and probably only arrive on Monday, or Sunday night,
15 Monday. That could just give us some leeway to perhaps schedule
16 Dr Gbla for Monday and Dr Thorsen for Tuesday.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Thank you. Well, we will see
18 how things work out. Well, we are going to adjourn until 9.15
19 and, general, I'll remind you of that caution again: Please
20 don't discuss the evidence with anybody.

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

22 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, sorry to interrupt. In all
23 honesty, I have to tell the Court, and also for my learned
24 friend, that I'm staying in the same hotel as Major General
25 Prins. Actually, we travel together to Freetown, and I see no
26 way in asking the general to go to a different hotel or that I
27 book out. But I think you can trust our professionalism, and
28 also the Prosecution, that apart from sharing perhaps a cup of
29 tomato soup with the general tonight, I will not speak with him

1 about his statement. But, in all fairness, I must say to the
2 Court that we travel together and we are staying in the same
3 hotel.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

5 MR AGHA: The only suggestion I make, Your Honour, is I
6 think it's fine that they stay in the hotel and out of
7 professionalism that perhaps they should forego their tomato soup
8 until the evidence-in-chief and cross-examination is completed.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. I have been in the same situation
10 myself many a time, Mr Knoops, and I think the emphasis is on
11 studiously avoiding one another.

12 MR KNOOPS: Your Honour, you can trust the general in this
13 regard and hopefully also myself, that we will in no way of
14 course influencing his testimony and not discussing. I am sure
15 after this long day the general wants to hear something else than
16 speaking about all kinds of characteristics in this case.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, we -- certainly we weren't forming
18 any adverse inferences there, Mr Knoops, whatsoever.

19 MR KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour. Very grateful.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Well, we will adjourn until
21 9.15.

22 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.08 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of
24 October 2006, at 9.15 a.m.]

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EXHIBITS:

Exhibit No. D34 23

Exhibit No. D35 41

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

WITNESS: WILLEM PRINS 2

EXAMINED BY MR KNOOPS 2