

THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

CASE NO. SCSL-2004-15-T
TRIAL CHAMBER I

THE PROSECUTOR
OF THE SPECIAL COURT
v.
ISSA SESAY
MORRIS KALLON
AUGUSTINE GBAO

TUESDAY, 19 OCTOBER 2004
9.38 A.M.
TRIAL

Before the Judges:

Benjamin Mutanga Itoe, Presiding
Bankole Thompson
Pierre Boutet

For Chambers:

Ms Candice Welsch
Mr Matteo Crippa

For the Registry:

Ms Maureen Edmonds
Mr Geoff Walker

For the Prosecution:

Mr Peter Harrison
Ms Melissa Pack
Mr Lorenzo Pugliati (intern)
Mr Bobby Gboyor (Case Manager)

For the Principal Defender:

Ms Haddijatou Kah-Jallow

For the accused Issa Sesay:

Mr Wayne Jordash
Ms Sareta Ashraph

For the accused Morris Kallon:

Mr Shekou Touray
Mr Melron Nicol-Wilson

For the accused Augustine Gbao:

Mr Andreas O'Shea
Mr John Cammegh

1 [Tuesday, 19th October 2004]

2 [Open session]

3 [Upon commencing at 9.38 a.m.]

4 [Accused Sesay and Kallon entered court]

5 [Accused Gbao not present]

6 [The witness entered court]

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning learned counsel. We are
8 resuming our session. A particularly good morning to
9 Mr O'Shea who I see in the Defence bench. You are
10 welcome. I hope you had a nice trip.

11 MR O'SHEA: [Microphone not activated]

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good, you are welcome. You came after the
13 storm, you know. I don't know how to classify it.
14 Passed through, but without any destruction, really. We
15 were able to contain it. All of us collectively were
16 able to contain it. So you are welcome, Mr O'Shea.

17 Mr Witness, how are you this morning?

18 THE WITNESS: Fine.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are fine? Are you are ready to go on
20 today?

21 THE WITNESS: Yes.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Right, okay. Well, the cross-examination of
23 yesterday was not concluded and Mr Jordash will pursue
24 the cross-examination process with you. Okay?

25 THE WITNESS: Yes.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Right, Mr Jordash, you may wish to proceed,
27 please.

28 MR JORDASH: Your Honour, thank you.

29 GEORGE JOHNSON [continued]

1 CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR JORDASH:
2 Q. Good morning, Mr Johnson.
3 A. Good morning.
4 Q. Did you have the opportunity overnight to read the notes
5 which you provided, I think, from the 28th September of
6 this year onwards?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And do they accurately reflect what you told the
9 Prosecution?
10 A. There are some small mistakes that I went through after
11 reading.
12 Q. Okay. Could I just ask you - and we will come to these
13 small mistakes when I take you to a particular section -
14 please indicate if there is anything there that you don't
15 agree with?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. I think yesterday I referred you to paragraph 4 of the
18 document, 28th September 2004, I think that is 1982. I
19 think --
20 JUDGE BOUTET: No, 9182?
21 MR JORDASH: 9182. Thank you.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you have it?
24 A. [No audible response]
25 Q. Yes, okay. There it states:
26 "GM was arrested before the Iranian Embassy was
27 looted. No-one from the RUF was sitting in on the
28 Supreme Council or the council after that. The RUF
29 members were not performing their ministerial jobs,

- 1 they were just hanging around Freetown."
- 2 A. Yes, but there is a mistake there.
- 3 Q. Okay, what is the mistake?
- 4 A. "GM was arrested before the Iranian Embassy was looted."
5 That's correct. "No-one from the RUF was sitting on the
6 Supreme Council or the council after that." That I
7 disagree with, because the reason why GM was arrested is
8 for alleged on him that he wants to stage a coup. So the
9 coup was not classified that it was an RUF coup, that it
10 was making the coup for other people outside. And after
11 his arrest, still Supreme Council meetings and
12 meetings -- council meetings were going on.
- 13 Q. Okay. What about the statement, "The RUF members were
14 not performing their ministerial jobs"?
- 15 A. They were still partaking in ministerial jobs because the
16 rest of the GM -- the RUF did not stop participating, it
17 still continued through the government of the AFRC.
- 18 Q. So is what you are saying now then that the RUF pulled
19 out of the Supreme Council and the council at the time of
20 the incident of the Iranian Embassy and not the time that
21 GM, Gibril Massaquoi, was arrested, like you told us
22 yesterday?
- 23 A. Yes. But it was just the Supreme Council that the RUF
24 did not attend meeting after the Iranian Embassy was
25 looted.
- 26 Q. So effectively, then, it was Issa Sesay who pulled out of
27 the Supreme Council?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. And it was Issa Sesay then, is this right, who was not

- 1 performing his jobs?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. And just hanging around Freetown?
- 4 A. Yes, he was in Freetown.
- 5 Q. But not doing anything in relation to the AFRC; is that
- 6 fair?
- 7 A. Well, at that time he was in Freetown, he was not doing
- 8 anything for a couple of weeks and when the Nigerians
- 9 started attacking, then he started fighting together with
- 10 the SLAs.
- 11 JUDGE BOUTET: Who are we talking about now, if I may ask,
- 12 Mr Jordash?
- 13 MR JORDASH: Issa Sesay.
- 14 JUDGE BOUTET: Okay. So, even though he was no more taking an
- 15 active part in the Supreme Council, he still remained in
- 16 Freetown --
- 17 MR JORDASH: Yes, Your Honour.
- 18 JUDGE BOUTET: -- for a few weeks?
- 19 MR JORDASH: Your Honour, yes.
- 20 JUDGE BOUTET: Okay.
- 21 MR JORDASH:
- 22 Q. And at the stage of the incident involving the Iranian
- 23 Embassy, Issa Sesay --
- 24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please, I would like to get some records,
- 25 you know, clear.
- 26 Q. He said that he stayed in Freetown for a couple of weeks
- 27 or so. How many weeks? A couple of weeks, you say?
- 28 A. A couple of weeks.
- 29 Q. A couple of weeks. And that thereafter what happened?

1 Thereafter, when the ECOMOG was attacking the RUF, or
2 so --
3 A. The AFRC.
4 Q. Just explain what happened.
5 A. When the ECOMOG started attacking the AFRC --
6 Q. Yes?
7 A. -- he was with the AFRC together on operations.
8 JUDGE BOUTET: In Freetown?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes.
10 PRESIDING JUDGE: In what operations?
11 THE WITNESS: To stop the ECOMOG from coming into Freetown.
12 MR JORDASH:
13 Q. I just want to reverse a little bit so that we can just
14 explore the context of what you have just said. When
15 Johnny Paul Koroma gave an announcement for the RUF to
16 join, or invited the RUF to join, there was a delay of a
17 day, and then Superman turned up with troops; is that
18 correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Superman had been camped with troops in the western area;
21 can you confirm that?
22 A. He was camped with troops just at the outskirts of
23 Waterloo.
24 Q. And there were up to 1,000 troops under his control; is
25 that correct?
26 A. The day Superman came to Freetown, he came with about
27 1,000 troops to Freetown.
28 Q. Thank you. They were his troops under his direct
29 command; is that correct?

1 A. I will say correct, because he was the RUF commander that
2 came with the troops.

3 Q. And did you -- or see Isaac Mongor turn up with his
4 troops?

5 A. Say again.

6 Q. Did you -- or did you become aware of Isaac Mongor
7 turning up with his troops who had been based in the
8 north jungle?

9 A. I cannot recall the name again, Isaac Mongor. I know
10 CO Isaac.

11 Q. I think we are talking about the same one. You are aware
12 of CO Isaac?

13 A. Yes, I know him.

14 Q. Were you aware that he had troops who came from the
15 northern jungle after Superman had arrived in town?

16 A. Yes, he was the second commander, RUF commander, I saw in
17 Freetown.

18 Q. Can you recall how many troops he had?

19 A. I can't.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE:

21 Q. What's this man's name again? The commander, what's his
22 name, CO?

23 A. CO Isaac.

24 Q. CO Isaac. Isaac or Issic?

25 A. Isaac.

26 MR JORDASH:

27 Q. Sam Bockarie arrived soon after that with his troops.

28 A. Sam Bockarie was the last to come to Freetown.

29 Q. Did you see Mr Sesay come into Freetown?

- 1 A. Yes, he came to Freetown.
- 2 Q. Did you actually see it, or you just became aware he had
3 arrived in town?
- 4 A. On the day he arrived in Freetown I did not know, but I
5 saw him in Freetown.
- 6 JUDGE BOUTET: Mr Jordash, we are talking here of 1997, that's
7 the scenario we are talking about?
- 8 MR JORDASH: Early June 1997.
- 9 JUDGE BOUTET: The coup?
- 10 MR JORDASH: Your Honour, yes.
- 11 Q. We are talking about the early June 1997, Mr Witness?
- 12 A. Correct.
- 13 JUDGE BOUTET: If I may just to -- some clarification, the
14 first to come from the RUF was Superman?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. With troops --
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. -- that estimated to about 1,000?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. Then there was another commander, CO Isaac, who had his
21 own troops with him? Or was he part of Superman's
22 troops?
- 23 A. He was not part of Superman's troops. After the arrival
24 of Superman, the other RUF high commander I saw was
25 CO Isaac and he had --
- 26 Q. And he had troops with him?
- 27 A. He had few security guards with him.
- 28 Q. Okay. And what about Sam Bockarie, when he arrived did
29 he arrive with troops as well?

- 1 A. He came with his security guards -- well up to 50.
- 2 A. Okay, thank you.
- 3 JUDGE BOUTET: Thank you, Mr Jordash.
- 4 MR JORDASH:
- 5 Q. Can you confirm - if you can't, you can't - can you
6 confirm that Mr Sesay came with about 25 security?
- 7 A. I cannot give a specific number of security he came with,
8 but he came to Freetown with securities.
- 9 Q. I'm just moving on to Gibril Massaquoi. Did you become
10 aware of him arriving in town?
- 11 A. Gibril Massaquoi, I saw him in town.
- 12 Q. And we have touched on this subject, but he was arrested
13 early on during the junta period for an alleged plan to
14 overthrow Johnny Paul Koroma.
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. And that led to an increased distrust between the SLAs
17 and the RUF; is that correct?
- 18 A. No. Because --
- 19 Q. No?
- 20 A. -- because there was no -- there was no fracas on that.
21 They only arrested Gibril Massaquoi and all the other RUF
22 members still were working with the AFRC government.
- 23 MR JORDASH: Just excuse me a moment.
- 24 Q. Are you able to confirm that Mr Sesay played a role in
25 alerting Johnny Paul Koroma to Gibril Massaquoi's plot?
- 26 A. Say again.
- 27 Q. Can you confirm - if you can't, again just say you can't
28 - can you confirm that Mr Sesay played a role in
29 reporting Gibril Massaquoi's plan to overthrow Johnny

- 1 Paul Koroma?
- 2 A. No.
- 3 Q. You can't confirm that?
- 4 A. No.
- 5 Q. Right. Could I just ask you to turn, while we are on
6 this subject --
- 7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just hang on, please, Mr Jordash. Can you
8 hang on a minute, please?
- 9 MR JORDASH:
- 10 Q. Now, following the incident concerning the looting of the
11 Iranian Embassy, Mr Sesay fell out with Johnny Paul
12 Koroma; is that correct?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. And to use your words -- well, maybe not, but from that
15 point they were at loggerheads?
- 16 A. Yes, for a while.
- 17 Q. Is it right that following this incident, the next time
18 the RUF participated in the Supreme Council was at the
19 meeting on 12th February 1998, the meeting to decide to
20 retreat from Freetown?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. Is that correct?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Thank you. Would it be fair to say that, given Mr Sesay
25 was at loggerheads with Mr Koroma, the other members of
26 the coup - the original members of the coup - were not
27 taking orders from Mr Sesay?
- 28 A. When they fall at loggerheads, Mr Sesay was not
29 participating. So he was not giving orders to anybody at

1 that time.

2 Q. Would it be fair to say that if he - from what you could
3 observe - if he had, they would have been ignored by the
4 16 --

5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that not speculative, learned counsel?

6 MR JORDASH: Yes, perhaps it is. I will leave it at that,
7 Your Honour.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think it is speculative. You may
9 move ahead, please.

10 MR JORDASH: Yes, certainly.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please.

12 MR JORDASH:

13 Q. You spoke on Thursday last week, Mr Johnson, about
14 weapons being distributed. Do you recall that evidence?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And the weapons which you were talking about were at
17 first taken to Johnny Paul Koroma's house?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And from there distributed through the chief of staff,
20 SO Williams?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Is it fair to say that Johnny Paul Koroma kept a firm
23 grip on activities, such as distribution of weapons? Do
24 you understand what I mean by that?

25 A. Break it up.

26 Q. Johnny Paul Koroma was the president.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Despite being the president, and therefore at the top of
29 the command structure, such things as weapons

- 1 distributions, from what you have said, went to his
2 house?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. He kept such activities -- he kept aware of such
5 activities?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. And controlled them personally?
- 8 A. Well, the weapons, he did not control all personally;
9 they were distributed.
- 10 Q. Why were they taken to his house; do you know?
- 11 A. Because at that time weapons always are monitored by
12 Johnny Paul Koroma before distribution.
- 13 Q. Now, you told us that SO Williams distributed them to
14 various RUF commanders.
- 15 A. Both RUF commanders and SLA commanders.
- 16 Q. Right. You gave us various names, including Superman,
17 Sesay, Kallon, Rambo, Gibril Massaquoi.
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. Did you actually see this, or is this something that you
20 heard about?
- 21 A. When the weapons were collected, I heard about that, and
22 when they were brought to the house of Johnny Paul
23 Koroma, I saw them. The day they were distributed, I
24 knew about that.
- 25 Q. How did you know about their distribution?
- 26 A. Because I was the chief security to the Principal Liaison
27 Officer 3, and when distributions like that are done, he
28 is aware.
- 29 Q. I will come back to that in one moment. But just moving

- 1 forward, you gave evidence on Thursday last week about
2 the retreat from Freetown. There was no order; is this
3 correct?
- 4 A. It's not correct --
- 5 Q. Sorry, I haven't finished the question. Sorry. There
6 was no order to pay yourself as you left Freetown; is
7 that correct?
- 8 A. Correct.
- 9 Q. In fact, would it be fair to say there was general panic,
10 and no command and control?
- 11 A. There was command and control, but there was panic,
12 because if there had been no command and control, we
13 should not have retreated the same route we took
14 together.
- 15 Q. So you are assuming command and control from the fact
16 that the troops went the same way?
- 17 A. Yes, because if no command and control from Freetown,
18 some commanders will go in a different way, because the
19 meeting was held that we should all pull out to Tombo and
20 that was done.
- 21 Q. But apart from that were there any other orders given
22 before you arrived in Tombo?
- 23 A. Not at all.
- 24 Q. And at the time of the retreat, can you confirm that
25 Gullit was in Kono?
- 26 A. Yes.
- 27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Who? Gullit?
- 28 MR JORDASH: Gullit.
- 29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Gullit, that's Brima?

1 MR JORDASH: Yes.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please call him by the -- Gullit is AKA.

3 MR JORDASH: Yes, I apologise.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, that is all right, you know. He was
5 known by the two names, but we prefer going by the
6 conventional name.

7 MR JORDASH: Sorry.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

9 MR JORDASH:

10 Q. And Brima, after looting Koidu, went directly to
11 Kailahun; is that correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And was beaten by Sam Bockarie and sent back without his
14 possessions, basically?

15 A. Yes, when we arrived Kono and he came back to join us at
16 Kono, after the pull-out from Freetown.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: When you say "he", you mean Brima?

18 THE WITNESS: Alex Tamba Brima.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

20 JUDGE BOUTET: But your question contained more than that, so
21 I am not clear still, because he asked something about
22 being beaten by Bockarie and so on.

23 MR JORDASH: I shall break it down, Your Honour, yes.

24 JUDGE BOUTET: It was a complex question, so we only get one
25 answer.

26 MR JORDASH:

27 Q. Would you mind repeating the answer, Mr Johnson, I missed
28 it?

29 A. I would like to get the question again.

1 Q. Okay, let me break down the question, then. We got to
2 the point that Mr Brima had looted Koidu. He then went
3 to Kailahun.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. He was beaten by Sam Bockarie in Kailahun?

6 A. Yes, on his arrival to -- at Kono he told us that he was
7 beaten.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE:

9 Q. No, the question is: He was beaten by Bockarie in
10 Kailahun?

11 A. Yes, in Kailahun.

12 Q. Kailahun?

13 A. Yes.

14 MR JORDASH:

15 Q. And you learned about that in Kono when you next met
16 Mr Brima?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did Mr Brima -- it's an obvious question perhaps, but
19 Mr Brima must have been pretty angry about the whole
20 affair.

21 A. When he came back to Kono, he told us about the issue.
22 But being angry, I cannot tell, because he is -- he has
23 his own mind for himself.

24 Q. But as well as being beaten, he had had all his loot
25 taken from him?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Just can I return briefly to the issue of weapons in
28 Freetown? You say that you saw Mr Sesay receiving
29 weapons. What did Mr Sesay do with those weapons?

- 1 A. The weapons were with him and when we used to go on the
2 forefront, he used them as his own arms and ammunition to
3 fight against ECOMOG.
- 4 Q. So the weapons he was given were for him and him alone?
- 5 A. He was using it, it was not for him, he was using it to
6 fight ECOMOG and all the weapons that were given to every
7 commander, they use it to fight ECOMOG.
- 8 Q. Can I suggest to you, Mr Johnson, that the only men
9 Mr Sesay had in Freetown were the 25 men or so he turned
10 up with when he arrived in Freetown; is that correct?
- 11 A. Say again the question.
- 12 Q. I am suggesting that Mr Sesay had under his direct
13 command only 25 men; the 25 men he turned up with in
14 Freetown?
- 15 A. The 25 men were his security, and he had command and
16 control over all the RUF fighters who were thousands.
- 17 Q. I want you to think about that answer, Mr Johnson. What
18 did you see during Freetown -- Let me re-phrase that.
19 What orders did you see Mr Sesay give to Superman in
20 Freetown?
- 21 A. I could not recall.
- 22 Q. What orders did you see Mr Sesay give CO Isaac?
- 23 A. I also couldn't recall.
- 24 Q. What about Gibril Massaquoi?
- 25 A. I also couldn't recall the orders he gave to them.
- 26 Q. Isn't it right that following the fall of the junta, Sam
27 Bockarie sent a message to Superman saying that the RUF
28 guys should be in control of the SLAs?
- 29 A. That was not in Freetown those orders were given, and

- 1 those orders were given by Johnny Paul Koroma at Kono
2 before pulling out to Kailahun. That is, the SLA should
3 be under the control of the RUF.
- 4 Q. Wasn't it Superman in Kabala, following the fall of the
5 junta, who was in control of the RUF?
- 6 A. Superman was the highest commander in Kabala of the RUF.
- 7 Q. Wasn't it Superman who decided with Johnny Paul Koroma
8 that Johnny Paul Koroma should go to Kailahun?
- 9 A. Yes, because Kailahun was only the safest place for
10 Johnny Paul to go as he thinks.
- 11 Q. Wasn't it Superman who accompanied Bazzy and Mr Brima and
12 Mr Kamara with JPK to his village after the fall of the
13 junta?
- 14 A. Yes, but Bazzy was not there on the -- accompany Johnny
15 Paul Koroma to his village.
- 16 Q. But it was Superman who was trusted to accompany the
17 closer coup members with JPK to his village?
- 18 A. I will say JPK trusted Superman, so he was close by
19 Superman when we pulled out.
- 20 Q. And it was Superman who was the commander of the RUF in
21 Makeni before everybody went to Kabala; is that correct?
- 22 A. Yes, he was the highest commander.
- 23 Q. If you say that Sesay was the commander of all the RUF in
24 Freetown, do you agree he doesn't seem to be commanding
25 much after Freetown?
- 26 A. Well, after we lost Freetown, Issa Sesay went straight to
27 Kailahun. He wasn't at Makeni. So Superman was the
28 highest RUF commander at Makeni.
- 29 Q. Well, you have said - and if its just -- I am not trying

- 1 to catch you out, Mr Johnson, but you did say last week
2 that Mr Sesay had been in Kabala.
- 3 A. No.
- 4 Q. He wasn't in Kabala?
- 5 A. Issa Sesay, after the pull-out from Freetown, I saw him
6 at Masiaka. After Masiaka he came down to Makeni and
7 went to Kailahun.
- 8 Q. Could I suggest that in fact Mr Sesay was sent to attack
9 Bo under the command of Kamara?
- 10 A. Yes. AF Kamara was the commander in Bo after the fall of
11 the AFRC junta. So he pulled out to Masiaka, met Issa at
12 Masiaka and they were sent back to attack Bo and they
13 both went, Issa and Major AF Kamara.
- 14 Q. Right. And if you can't say, you can't say, but can you
15 confirm that Mr Sesay was shot in the back during the
16 attack on Bo?
- 17 A. Yes, he had a pierce of a bullet in the back.
- 18 Q. And there -- because of his injury, was not part of the
19 first group into Kono.
- 20 A. Well, I believe he just wanted to go, because the wound
21 was a minor injury.
- 22 Q. He just wanted to go?
- 23 A. To Kailahun, because the wound was a minor injury.
- 24 Q. And he was seeking -- he was trying to go, by creating a
25 channel through Bo, down to Kailahun?
- 26 A. No, the attack on Bo was for the AFRC junta to gain
27 control of Bo whilst we had lost Freetown.
- 28 Q. And from there it would be a short step to Kailahun; is
29 that correct?

- 1 A. Well, I couldn't say, because the shortest step you can
2 use to Kailahun is by Kono.
- 3 Q. So you would say, then, that the idea was to move JPK
4 through Kono, and that was the first idea as to how to
5 get JPK away down to Kailahun?
- 6 A. That idea of attacking Kono came when we reached Kabala.
7 And JPK was at his village, Mabonkani. Then we were
8 asked -- because at that axis going to Kono was the only
9 shortest route to go to Kailahun. That was why we
10 attacked Kono for him to go through.
- 11 Q. And it was Superman who was the commander of that attack;
12 is that right?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. Do you know why it was Mr Sesay went to attack Bo
15 himself?
- 16 A. It was because he was the RUF high command at Masiaka at
17 that time. So whilst Major AF Kamara went as an SLA
18 officer, that was why he went to represent the RUF. It
19 was a joint operation.
- 20 Q. You told us last week that it was Kamara who was in
21 control of that attack; you made no mention of Mr Sesay.
- 22 A. Yes. That's why I said the document has some mistakes
23 that I read over, because if you can see there are
24 mistakes here that say, "A meeting was held and it was
25 decided to attack Bo. Kamara went there with RUF and
26 AFRC fighters." The mistake here, it should be Kamara
27 and Issa Sesay went there on this document, I have it
28 here, but there are some mistakes.
- 29 Q. Just so that you are clear, Mr Johnson, I am not

1 suggesting that he didn't, I am suggesting he did go to
2 the Bo attack.

3 A. Yes, he went.

4 Q. But he wasn't in command of the attack. That's what I am
5 suggesting.

6 A. He was the commander of the attack, because
7 Major AF Kamara was a major, whilst Issa Sesay was
8 carrying the rank of a brigadier. So he is the
9 commander, the highest authority commander of any attack.

10 Q. When did he become a brigadier?

11 A. When we pulled out from Freetown, they promoted
12 themselves to become brigadiers.

13 JUDGE THOMPSON: Mr Jordash, can I get this quite clear?
14 According to the witness, the statement omitted the
15 reference to Mr Sesay. Is that what he is saying now?

16 MR JORDASH: Yes, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE THOMPSON: And that was a mistake?

18 MR JORDASH: And I also suggested to him - I don't think the
19 witness answered this - that when he gave evidence in
20 this Court --

21 JUDGE THOMPSON: Yes.

22 MR JORDASH: -- he had also missed it out.

23 JUDGE THOMPSON: Yes. What is his response to that?

24 THE WITNESS: The question again.

25 MR JORDASH:

26 Q. You told us that in the statement -- well, in the notes
27 which you read overnight, you missed out the fact that
28 Sesay was a commander in the attack on Bo.

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. And I was suggesting to you that you also missed
2 mentioning that last week on Thursday. You said that
3 Kamara was a commander and he was the command of the
4 attack.

5 A. Kamara was the commander in Bo after the fall of the
6 AFRC. He pulled out of Masiaka and he met the troops at
7 Masiaka and an operation was planned to attack Bo again.
8 He went to represent the SLA, whilst Issa was the highest
9 command of the RUF and at that time, he was a brigadier
10 general.

11 Q. What you say in the statement, or what the notes in the
12 statement say --

13 JUDGE BOUTET: Where are you looking at? What page?

14 MR JORDASH: Page 2 of the 20 -- so 9183.

15 Q. 9183, which is page 2 of the notes, Mr Johnson.

16 Paragraph 10:

17 "A meeting was held and it was decided to attack Bo.
18 Kamara went there with RUF and AFRC fighters, but
19 returned to Masiaka as the attack on Bo was
20 unsuccessful. He returned after two days. AF
21 Kamara was a major in the SLA. When he attacked Bo,
22 after coming to Masiaka, he had RUF and SLAs under
23 his command."

24 A. Yes, that was the initial -- that's why I say there are
25 mistakes that are there. He went to attack Bo with Issa
26 Sesay of the RUF.

27 Q. Let me just ask you this, if I can: How did the mistake
28 occur in the notes, do you know? Did you --

29 A. Well, I believe after each interview it should be read to

1 me and I believe I should be well satisfied before it's
2 tendered in Court. But these notes was not read to me
3 after the interview.

4 JUDGE THOMPSON: Mr Jordash, the next question from you was
5 that the reference to Mr Sesay was omitted from his
6 testimony here. Have you cleared that up?

7 MR JORDASH: I was about to, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE THOMPSON: Yes.

9 MR JORDASH:

10 Q. A mistake in the statement and you also didn't mention
11 Mr Sesay's commanding role last week. Do you know why?

12 JUDGE THOMPSON: First of all, does he agree that he did not
13 mention that?

14 MR JORDASH:

15 Q. Do you agree with that?

16 A. Last week Thursday?

17 Q. Last week Thursday.

18 A. Yes.

19 JUDGE THOMPSON: Just a minute. "I do agree that last
20 Thursday I didn't mention Mr Sesay." Yes, counsel.

21 MR JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. Do you know why?

23 A. Well, you see, these things happen back -- five years
24 back, so I mean I could only memorise it when I went
25 through these notes yesterday night, brought my memory
26 back to that.

27 [HS191004B 10.38 a.m.]

28 JUDGE THOMPSON: So in other words, having refreshed his
29 memory from the records, he now says that Mr Sesay was

1 present.

2 MR JORDASH: And commanding.

3 JUDGE THOMPSON: And commanding the attack in Bo.

4 THE WITNESS: Yes.

10:33:15 5 JUDGE THOMPSON: Thank you.

6 MR HARRISON: Just for future reference --

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Harrison, yes?

8 MR HARRISON: Just for future reference, I want the record to

9 reflect that the witness refreshed his memory at the

10:33:24 10 request of Defence counsel, not at the request of the

11 Prosecution.

12 MR JORDASH: I admit it.

13 JUDGE THOMPSON: That's okay.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is true and, Mr Jordash, it's good

10:33:48 15 enough that you've admitted it yourself. So you may

16 proceed, please.

17 MR JORDASH: Thank you.

18 JUDGE BOUTET: I should add that it was also at the suggestion

19 of the Court, so --

10:33:58 20 MR JORDASH: I'm grateful.

21 Q. Would you just have a look at paragraph 11, as well,

22 there, please, Mr Johnson?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. "All the first 16 were given the rank of Brigadier

10:34:12 25 General on reaching Masiaka. No one ordered this; they

26 promoted themselves." Weren't the 16 the original coup

27 members?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. In other words, not Mr Sesay?

- 1 A. The 16 men are the coup members. They promoted
2 themselves including the -- all the RUF commanders.
- 3 Q. So now what you say is it was the 16 coup members plus
4 some RUF commanders?
- 10:35:12 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. How did you make that mistake, Mr Johnson? Did you tell
7 the Prosecution that it was just the 16 who were given
8 the rank of Brigadier General on reaching Masiaka?
- 9 A. All -- I told the Prosecution that all the Honourables in
10:35:38 10 Freetown, when we reach Masiaka, promoted themselves to
11 Brigadier Generals. And the Honourables include RUF and
12 AFRC members, also the 16 men. They were all Brigadier
13 Generals.
- 14 Q. In reality, though, Mr Johnson, whether you're right or
10:36:28 15 not about that, nobody from the original coup members -
16 the SLAs - were taking orders from Mr Sesay at this
17 stage, were they?
- 18 A. At that stage at Masiaka I told you we all came together
19 before the pull-out, so we were altogether in joint
10:36:47 20 operations. So if Mr Sesay is going to lead an attack
21 like the one on Bo, he's the commander, all troop members
22 take instructions from him.
- 23 Q. But the only attacks -- just so that we're clear,
24 Mr Johnson, the only attack that followed this Masiaka
10:37:11 25 meeting was Bo, involving Mr Sesay?
- 26 A. Yes.
- 27 Q. And, as you've told us now, AF Kamara, a major, was in
28 control of the SLAs during that attack?
- 29 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. Not Mr Sesay?
- 2 A. It was a joint command. Mr Sesay was the overall
3 commander.
- 4 PRESIDING JUDGE: And who was the overall commander?
- 10:38:16 5 THE WITNESS: Mr Sesay was the overall commander, because he
6 was the Brigadier General.
- 7 MR JORDASH:
- 8 Q. It's been a long time since these events. You'd accept
9 that your memory may not be completely accurate. Do you
10:39:15 10 accept that?
- 11 A. It will be accurate, because I was there on the field, so
12 I could recall whatever I say here.
- 13 Q. Do you recall giving evidence last Thursday that Mr Sesay
14 was in a Kabala after Makeni -- sorry, after Masiaka?
- 10:40:05 15 A. The time we pull out of Kabala, I couldn't -- Mr Sesay
16 was not in Kabala. If he had gone to Kabala it's before
17 the troops reached Kabala on this pull-out to Kono.
- 18 Q. Do you recall giving that evidence, though, that he had
19 been in Kabala?
- 10:40:29 20 A. No.
- 21 Q. I suggest you said that on Thursday and that was just a
22 mistake of memory.
- 23 A. Yes. He was not in Kabala on the time of the troops.
- 24 Q. Okay, thank you. Now, the troops when they left
10:41:20 25 Freetown -- just jumping back very, very briefly. When
26 the troops left Freetown and travelled to Masiaka, there
27 was, as far as you're aware, no looting until they
28 reached Masiaka. Would you accept that?
- 29 A. When the troop left Freetown there was looting along the

1 Lumley Road to Goderich. After that -- there was no
2 looting after we reached Tombo to Masiaka.

3 Q. Did you travel at the back of the troops leaving
4 Freetown? Whereabouts were you in the general movement?

10:42:21 5 A. We are the last to pull out from Freetown. We pulled out
6 from Freetown on the 13th in the morning, whilst the
7 general troops pulled out from Freetown on the 12th in
8 the evening.

9 Q. Why were you one of the last?

10:42:44 10 A. Because the Principal Liaison Officer 3 was still in
11 Freetown.

12 Q. Did you actually see Mr Sesay leave or did you simply see
13 him in Masiaka?

14 A. I saw him at Masiaka.

10:43:06 15 Q. So, to be fair, you're presuming that he led the troops
16 from Freetown to Masiaka; is that fair?

17 A. No, because the day the troops pulled out the president
18 was also with the troops. So I believe he is the highest
19 command, so he led the troops on the pull-out.

10:43:41 20 Q. It's a belief rather than something you know?

21 A. That's what I know.

22 Q. Well, how do you know it?

23 A. Because I'm a military man and I know that on any
24 operation the highest in command is the leader of the
10:43:57 25 battalion.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Jordash, you think you have how much --
27 how much longer do you think you'll proceed with your
28 cross-examination?

29 MR JORDASH: I would have thought most of the day.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: The whole of today?

2 MR JORDASH: I would have thought so. I can move more swiftly
3 once we've left Freetown. I'm about to move into a
4 faster area.

10:45:03 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: I asked the question because we would like,
6 you know, to proceed as fast as we can.

7 MR JORDASH: Certainly.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: To avoid the delays, you know, which --
9 perils of, you know, General Tarnue. So, please, we need
10:45:25 10 to gain time.

11 MR JORDASH: Certainly.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: And the responsibility lies squarely on all
13 the actors here. You may proceed, please.

14 MR JORDASH:

10:45:54 15 Q. We've heard about the command structure in Kono. The
16 communication you can speak about was between Superman,
17 Sam Bockarie; is that correct?

18 A. In Kono. The communication in Kono is between Johnny
19 Paul and Sam Bockarie, telling Sam Bockarie that he is
10:46:24 20 now proceeding to Kailahun.

21 Q. When Johnny Paul arrived in Kailahun, nothing more was
22 heard directly from him?

23 A. Not at all.

24 Q. The next time you hear directly from him you're in
10:46:42 25 Liberia having arranged or helped to arrange his release
26 from captivity by Bockarie?

27 A. Yes. In Liberia was the only place I spoke with him
28 after he went to Kailahun.

29 Q. In effect, Mr Bockarie played a trick on the SLAs in Kono

1 and pretended he was receiving instructions from Johnny
2 Paul Koroma?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Is that correct?
10:47:17 5 A. Yes, correct.
6 Q. And so the SLAs were willing - is this correct - to take
7 instructions or to in fact listen to Sam Bockarie,
8 because they were under the allusion that the orders or
9 the instructions were coming from Johnny Paul Koroma?
10:47:39 10 A. Yes, that is what we are told, that all instructions sent
11 down to us was coming from Johnny Paul Koroma, which was
12 false. I got to know that when we reached Liberia, when
13 I spoke directly with Johnny Paul Koroma.
14 Q. When ECOMOG pushed into Kono a month and a half or so
10:48:12 15 after the command structure had been set up there, one of
16 the reasons for the separation of the SLAs from the RUF
17 was that nobody had heard directly from Johnny Paul
18 Koroma.
19 A. Yes, and they were not trusted by the SLAs. That was why
10:48:33 20 we pulled out to join SAJ Musa.
21 Q. The RUF were not trusted by the SLAs?
22 A. Yes, at that time.
23 Q. And is it right that there was a feeling in Kono that
24 ammunition wasn't shared equally between the SLAs and the
10:49:05 25 RUF?
26 A. Exactly.
27 Q. A level of distrust between the two groups, would you
28 agree?
29 A. Yes, after the fall of Kono.

1 Q. You can only speak of - is this correct - two
2 communications between Sam Bockarie and Superman? Is
3 that correct?
4 A. In Kono?
10:49:40 5 Q. In Kono.
6 A. Not correct, because the communication I had of the first
7 one was Superman and Sam Bockarie, and the second one was
8 Johnny Paul and Sam Bockarie.
9 Q. The command structure in Kono -- we've seen the graph --
10:50:24 10 the diagram that you've drawn with the Prosecution,
11 Exhibit 7 I think.
12 JUDGE BOUTET: Exhibit 9.
13 THE WITNESS: Please, I would like to get one.
14 JUDGE BOUTET: You're talking about Kono Command Structure?
10:50:37 15 MR JORDASH: Kono, yes.
16 JUDGE BOUTET: It's Exhibit 9.
17 MR JORDASH:
18 Q. Just for completeness sake --
19 A. I would like to get one copy at my desk of that.
10:50:48 20 Q. Sure.
21 JUDGE BOUTET: Mr Walker, can you have a copy for the witness?
22 THE WITNESS: No, Kono.
23 JUDGE BOUTET: Exhibit 9.
24 MR JORDASH: Exhibit 9.
10:51:24 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Kono Command Structure.
26 MR JORDASH: Perhaps I can deal with this fairly quickly,
27 Mr Johnson.
28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Come, come, Mr Walker, you want to give him
29 this?

1 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

2 MR JORDASH:

3 Q. Just looking at this diagram, the only other person that
4 you can say could have given any orders within this
10:51:55 5 structure would have been Sam Bockarie?

6 A. In Kono?

7 Q. In Kono.

8 A. Sam Bockarie was not in Kono, he was at Kailahun. And
9 Denis Mingo, alias Superman, talks to him, and if
10:52:13 10 instructions are given, it's from Sam Bockarie to
11 Superman.

12 Q. Thank you. And when this structure broke down and
13 yourselves and Mr Brima and the SLAs moved towards SAJ
14 Musa --

10:52:43 15 A. Yes, at Krubola.

16 Q. -- at that stage nobody was taking orders from anybody in
17 the RUF?

18 A. No. At that stage, when we lost Kono, we all SLAs and
19 some few mid-level fighters of the RUF went to join SAJ
10:53:13 20 Musa. Command structure, everything break down at that
21 point.

22 Q. And, in fact, Superman had tried to order the SLAs to go
23 to Kailahun after the fall of Kono; that order was
24 ignored.

10:53:52 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And at that stage the SLAs went towards SAJ Musa and
27 Superman went to Sokobeh; is that correct?

28 A. Yes. SLAs went to Superman and -- SLA went to SAJ Musa
29 while Superman pulled out from the central part of Koidu

1 Town to Sokobeh.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: And where was SAJ Musa at the time? Can we
3 have that precision, please?

4 THE WITNESS: He was at Krubola.

10:54:40 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you spell that, please - Krubola?

6 THE WITNESS: Krubola, K-A-R-B-O-L-A [sic].

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: And Superman went to?

8 THE WITNESS: The outskirts of Koidu Town in a village called
9 Sobokeh.

10:55:50 10 MR JORDASH:

11 Q. Do we not have a further split because Savage stayed at
12 Tombodu?

13 A. Yes, he stayed at Tombodu.

14 Q. And Savage, just so that we're clear, was SLA, wasn't he?

10:56:32 15 A. Yes, Savage was an SLA.

16 Q. And later Savage went towards Brigadier Mani in Krubola;
17 is that correct?

18 A. Yes, he join Brigadier Mani on the attack on Makeni.

19 JUDGE BOUTET: What timeframe are we talking about now?

10:57:08 20 MR JORDASH: Could I just ask the witness that?

21 Q. Mr Johnson, when was that, do you know?

22 A. No.

23 JUDGE BOUTET: Are we in '97, '98, '99, 2000?

24 MR JORDASH:

10:57:21 25 Q. That was in 98, wasn't it?

26 A. '98.

27 Q. Yes. It would have been the mid to late 1998; is that
28 right?

29 A. I cannot give a specific month about that, but I know

- 1 it's '98.
- 2 Q. Approximately -- the SLAs, including yourself, moved
3 towards Krubola and SAJ Musa in April, May of 1998; is
4 that correct?
- 10:57:53 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. And so soon after -- Savage stayed at Tombodu at that
7 stage?
- 8 A. Yes, he stayed at Tombodu under the control of Superman.
- 9 Q. And you've told us that lower ranking RUF went with you
10:58:13 10 towards SAJ Musa.
- 11 A. Yes, very few.
- 12 Q. How many do you think?
- 13 A. About 30 RUF fighters.
- 14 Q. Is it right that, in fact, in reality the AFRC only
10:58:37 15 described what was going on in Freetown during the junta
16 period; after that it became SLAs or non-SLAs?
- 17 A. Well, after the junta period in Freetown the AFRC
18 regarded itself as the AFRC. But when we went to the
19 jungle, we are all regarded as rebels. The RUF and the
10:59:04 20 AFRC that went to the jungle were all regarded as rebels.
- 21 Q. And in terms of how you described yourself after the fall
22 of the junta, the obvious way you defined yourself, as
23 separate from the RUF, was SLA and RUF, two different
24 groups in that sense?
- 10:59:32 25 A. In the jungle?
- 26 Q. Sorry, let me be a bit clearer. After Kono we have
27 effectively three main groups, would you agree - SAJ
28 Musa's and yourselves?
- 29 A. Yes.

1 Q. There's -- well, actually, let me just rewind this a bit.
2 During the time of Kono and Superman's command there --
3 A. Let me help you there.
4 Q. Please.
11:00:00 5 A. After the fall of the -- the -- after we lost Kono, we
6 went with the SLAs, gathered ourself with few RUF
7 fighters, went to SAJ Musa. That was one group. And the
8 RUF stayed in Kono; that was another group.
9 Q. And then there's Sam Bockarie in Kailahun?
11:00:25 10 A. Yeah, that was the headquarter of the RUF.
11 Q. And within these groups there are, for example in your
12 group towards SAJ Musa, some RUF?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In Superman's group in Sokobeh there's also SLAs?
11:00:49 15 A. Yes.
16 Q. For example, Savage?
17 A. Yes, and also at Kailahun.
18 Q. And in Kailahun too?
19 A. Yes.
11:00:58 20 JUDGE BOUTET: You mean to say that in Kailahun there are SLAs
21 with Bockarie?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, there were SLAs in Kailahun and there were
23 SLAs mixed up with RUF in Kono, and there were SLAs that
24 went with us to SAJ Musa. Like, for example, Alfred
11:01:17 25 Brown was an RUF and he was the signaler to SAJ Musa.
26 JUDGE BOUTET: Before you move away from that, if I may, did
27 the witness just -- just before these last answers, he
28 described -- when trying to answer your questions about
29 SLAs and RUF, he said, "When we went to the jungle we

1 were all rebels." What's the timeframe again? I'm just
2 trying to figure out time-wise where we are.

3 MR JORDASH: Certainly.

4 Q. When you made that comment, Mr Johnson, about all being
11:01:55 5 rebels, were you referring to the time after the junta
6 period and --

7 A. After the junta period we went to the jungles, we are all
8 referred as rebels. Even when we split, SAJ Musa had his
9 own group, but we are referred as rebels. And Superman
11:02:19 10 has his own group; we are all referred as rebels. So I
11 believe throughout, no matter which group you are, we are
12 all rebels.

13 Q. So in reality, then, the groups were defined by who was
14 commanding them, not whether they were AFRC or RUF?

11:02:49 15 A. Yes, but the whole troops were regarded as rebels,
16 because whenever you listen to the radio, BBC
17 broadcasting, if even they differentiate, they say "SLA
18 rebels", they say "RUF rebels". So we are all rebels
19 throughout.

11:03:23 20 Q. And would you agree that what was important post the
21 junta at lease, was who was the commander?

22 A. Say again.

23 Q. What was important in terms of trying to work out the
24 groups and who was in control, was the commander and the
11:03:40 25 command structure, not whether you were SLA or RUF?

26 A. Yeah.

27 Q. Yeah. And the movement of the SLAs -- largely SLAs from
28 Krubola and Camp Rosos was under the command, firstly, of
29 SAJ Musa?

- 1 A. The movement from Mansofinia to Camp Rosos was under the
2 command of Alex Tamba Brima. He was the field commander
3 because he moved with the troops, whilst SAJ Musa stayed
4 at Krubola as his headquarter.
- 11:04:30 5 Q. And, in fact, some of these groups changed relatively
6 rapidly. Let me tell you what I'm suggesting. At some
7 stage Superman moves from Sokobeh to go and try to
8 capture SAJ Musa; is that correct?
- 9 A. Yes. At one stage Superman left Sokobeh and went to stay
11:05:04 10 with SAJ Musa at Krubola. And in that there was a fight
11 between them.
- 12 Q. Why did Superman go to join SAJ Musa?
- 13 A. After the fall of Kono, from the RUF side, Superman
14 attacked Kono for the second time, and Issa Sesay was
11:05:32 15 sent to Kono by Mosquito, because in the RUF at that time
16 they had a split between them. So RUF -- Issa Sesay was
17 sent to Kono, and because of that Superman did not trust
18 Issa Sesay. He went to join SAJ Musa at Krubola.
- 19 Q. So from April or May of 1998 you would say Superman would
11:06:03 20 not take orders from Issa Sesay?
- 21 A. After the fall of Kono, Kono was regained by Superman.
22 After regaining Kono, Sam Bockarie sent Issa Sesay to
23 come and be the overall commander in Kono. So because of
24 that command tussle, Superman decided to go to Krubola,
11:06:33 25 because he, Superman, was even assuming that Sam Bockarie
26 had sent Issa Sesay to arrest him to Kailahun.
- 27 Q. Isn't it true that in fact it was Sam Bockarie who sent a
28 message that Superman should try to capture SAJ Musa
29 around late-ish 1998?

1 A. The time I know that Sam Bockarie sent people to arrest
2 SAJ Musa, we had just lost Kono. And when Superman took
3 over Kono, there were still that cordial relationship
4 between Superman and Sam Bockarie. What brought the
11:07:27 5 fracas is when Sam Bockarie sent Issa to command Kono -
6 brought the fracas between them.
7 Q. I would suggest you've got that slightly confused,
8 Mr Johnson, and I want to take you to your interviews.
9 8249, please.
11:08:12 10 A. Go ahead, please.
11 Q. Thank you. Looking at page 8470 of that interview.
12 JUDGE BOUTET: Can you give the date of the interview?
13 MR JORDASH: Yes, Your Honour.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, correct.
11:08:30 15 MR JORDASH: It's 8th of May.
16 Q. I don't want to in any way trick you or rush you. Just
17 take your time, Mr Johnson.
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. 8470 which is page 42 on the bottom of the page. Looking
11:08:41 20 at --
21 PRESIDING JUDGE: 84 what?
22 MR JORDASH: 8470, Your Honour.
23 Q. And we are moving back in time to the beginning of the
24 reign of Superman in Kono.
11:09:00 25 A. Yes.
26 Q. Shortly after the fall of the junta.
27 A. Yeah.
28 Q. Just to get some context we can start at line 3. Sorry,
29 line 2.

1 "Okay. But did he mention this business about you all
2 being RUFs?
3 Answer: Yes. He told us that -- or let there be no
4 fracas among us again, like how it used to be. Johnny
11:09:24 5 Paul has passed the command that all SLAs should be under
6 RUF, and the commander on the ground is Superman.
7 Question: On the ground in?
8 In Koidu.
9 Aha.
11:09:37 10 Is Superman.
11 Okay.
12 So all of us should be under the command and control of
13 Superman.
14 Question: That's what FAT said?
11:09:43 15 Yes.
16 Question: And did Superman talk at that meeting?
17 Yes. Superman told us to -- now it's time for us to come
18 together and start doing something better, because if we
19 still -- if we are still dislodged like that, everybody
11:10:00 20 is just going about his business, it will not be a good
21 thing when ECOMOG penetrates us. So he said everybody
22 should cooperate with him. If somebody cooperates with
23 him it won't be a problem, but if you don't cooperate it
24 will be a problem.
11:10:15 25 Okay. And did they mention SAJ Musa's actions at that
26 meeting?
27 Yes, SAJ told us that SAJ --
28 Question: You mean FAT?
29 Yes, FAT told us that SAJ Musa is at Krubola. And SAJ

1 said he is not going to come because Mosquito ordered for
2 SAJ Musa to go to Kailahun to stay at the headquarters.
3 He said he is a Supreme Council member, he should not be
4 at the front, he should be at the rear of the
11:10:46 5 headquarters with Johnny Paul and all of them should be
6 there, those Supreme Council members, they should be
7 there. But FAT said Superman -- FAT said SAJ said he's
8 not going anywhere to no RUF, he is going to stay on his
9 own with his own men. Yes, then -- that was all they
11:11:04 10 told us.

11 Question: Did they say they were going to try to take
12 him out or were they just going to leave him up there?
13 Answer" - and this is what I'm particularly interested
14 in - "At one time Mosquito sent some guys to go and get
11:11:18 15 SAJ so that they can take him to Kailahun forcefully.

16 Question: Was that while you were in Kono?
17 At the time we were in Kono. The guys did not pass
18 through Kono.
19 Okay.

11:11:30 20 So when these guys came to SAJ, they revealed it to SAJ
21 that Mosquito has sent them to come and to collect him to
22 go, but the way they met the ground, packed full of
23 soldiers, so they decided to stay with SAJ and they did
24 not go back. Yes, that's why some RUF guys were with
11:11:48 25 SAJ."

26 Is that a different incident?

27 A. This -- the arrest of SAJ by Mosquito came direct from
28 Kailahun and it was not from Superman.

29 Q. Right.

1 A. The guys that Mosquito sent did not pass through Kono,
2 they went straight to Krubola. But because of the
3 presence of SAJ Musa's force, they couldn't do anything.
4 They had to reveal it to SAJ Musa, and they all stayed
11:12:18 5 with SAJ Musa.

6 Q. Right. Again, would you accept, then, at least that's an
7 indication of how control arose in these times through
8 having a big army of your own effectively?

9 A. Yeah.

11:12:40 10 Q. Yeah. And the loyalties of many, such as the RUF men
11 sent to capture SAJ Musa, was fairly weak really?

12 A. Yes, because they were just small in number and they met
13 over thousands of fighters with SAJ Musa.

14 Q. But decided to stay and give their loyalty to SAJ Musa
11:13:10 15 instead of Sam Bockarie?

16 A. Yes, they stayed with SAJ Musa throughout.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Learned counsel, I think we will have to --
18 yes, you have the last question or so?

19 MR JORDASH: No, I was moving to a new subject actually.

11:13:29 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are moving to a new subject. Did you
21 want to conclude with a last question?

22 MR JORDASH: No, I'd concluded, thank you very much.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Right. Well, learned counsel, the Court
24 will recess for some minutes. We will resume sitting
11:14:21 25 very shortly. The Court will rise, please.

26 [Break taken at 11.18 a.m.]

27 [On resuming at 11.45 a.m.]

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Learned counsel, we are resuming the
29 session. Yes, Mr Jordash, you may proceed, please.

1 MR JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, please.
3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, witness?
4 THE WITNESS: I just want to say something to this Court. I'm
11:41:08 5 here, I'm testifying exactly what I know because I was on
6 the ground. And on my arrival into this Court, after the
7 break, your client is making some remarks against me.
8 But I have no fear about that because I believe I'm
9 saying the truth for the world to know and for peace
11:41:35 10 process in this country. So I have no fear about
11 anything. And I want you, please, to make it known to
12 your client that I'm here to say the truth. I'm not here
13 for war, neither for a fight. I'm here in the courts for
14 truth. That's all.
11:41:55 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: When you say "your client", who are you
16 referring to?
17 THE WITNESS: Mr Issa Sesay.
18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, it's noted on the record. We are
19 making no comment on this.
11:42:05 20 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
21 PRESIDING JUDGE: We would just ask, Mr Jordash, you know --
22 the Chamber has taken note of it for the records, but it
23 calls for no comment from the Trial Chamber for the time
24 being.
11:42:24 25 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
26 MR JORDASH: Could I --
27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Jordash, you may proceed, please.
28 MR JORDASH: Your Honour, may I, when this cross-examination
29 is complete, address Your Honours as to what the witness

1 has said. It's probably best not to do it at this time.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay.

3 MR JORDASH: Thank you.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: You may proceed, please.

11:42:45 5 MR JORDASH: Thank you.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: But as we've said, you know, he has said it

7 for the records and the records will reflect the

8 witness -- you know, what the witness has said.

9 MR JORDASH: Which is why I would like the opportunity to

11:42:58 10 respond in due course.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's right, at the appropriate time.

12 MR JORDASH: Thank you.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay.

14 MR JORDASH:

11:43:04 15 Q. Could I ask you, Mr Johnson, to turn to 8372, the

16 interview of the 6th of May 2003, your first interview.

17 And then --

18 JUDGE THOMPSON: Mr Jordash, may I have the date again,

19 please?

11:43:36 20 MR JORDASH: Yes, the 6th of May 2003. I think I may have

21 said the 8th of May. The 6th of May.

22 JUDGE THOMPSON: Thank you.

23 MR JORDASH: Page 8389.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: 6th of May 2000 and?

11:43:54 25 MR JORDASH: Three.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Three.

27 MR JORDASH: And page 8389, which is page 18 at the bottom.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: I thought we were on 8372.

29 MR JORDASH: That was the beginning of the interview.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's the beginning.

2 MR JORDASH: Yep.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: And it concludes with?

4 MR JORDASH: The section I'm interested in at this stage 8389,
11:44:27 5 Your Honour.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: 8389.

7 MR JORDASH:

8 Q. And line 30, your answer to a question about whether
9 there was a cohesive group between the SLAs and the RUF.

11:44:44 10 And you say, "No, because when we split and went to SAJ,
11 Mosquito sent a radio message to Superman that he should
12 go after us and try to capture SAJ and take him to
13 Kailahun.
14 When did that message come?

11:45:00 15 When we got the message through the rumour, because at
16 that time we were with SAJ.

17 Oh, okay. So you heard the rumour of that later?

18 Yes, that RUF want to come and attack Krubola to take SAJ
19 away."

11:45:19 20 So that there was, as far as you're aware, a message to
21 Superman to try and capture SAJ Musa?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And we know, from what you've told us later, Superman did
24 head north towards SAJ Musa.

11:45:32 25 A. Say again.

26 Q. Superman did head north towards SAJ Musa.

27 A. Yes, later when they heard a fracas between them, he head
28 towards SAJ Musa.

29 Q. When was that, do you think, when the fracas occurred?

1 A. The fracas occurred after SAJ -- after Superman took
2 regain of Kono, and when Mosquito sent Issa to come and
3 head the command structure in Kono. So Superman decided
4 to go to SAJ Musa, because he trust -- he did not trust
11:46:06 5 Issa Sesay coming to head in Kono.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: And you added earlier on that Superman had
7 the impression that Issa Sesay may have received
8 instructions from Bockarie to arrest him.

9 THE WITNESS: Yes.

11:46:26 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is what you stated earlier on.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes.

12 MR JORDASH:

13 Q. You said something about somebody not being trusted. I
14 missed your answer. What was the lack of trust and who
11:46:35 15 did it relate to?

16 A. Between the RUF high command. Superman did not trust Sam
17 Bockarie and his group.

18 Q. You've mentioned now twice Issa Sesay taking over command
19 of Kono.

11:46:57 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. According to you when was that?

22 A. When Kono was regained by Superman.

23 Q. When was that?

24 A. I couldn't tell the date, because I was with SAJ Musa.

11:47:11 25 Q. Well how do you know it to be true then?

26 A. Say again.

27 Q. How do you know it to be true?

28 A. Well, because we had our own radio sets. We used to
29 monitor whatever the RUF guys are doing.

- 1 Q. Well, just think carefully then, Mr Johnson. You've made
2 a clear allegation. When do you think you monitored the
3 messages indicating that Mr Sesay should be the commander
4 of Kono?
- 11:47:46 5 A. At the time we are at Camp Rosos.
- 6 Q. See, I'm going to suggest that when you were at Camp
7 Rosos -- when was that then, exactly? Let's just pin
8 down the time.
- 9 A. We are at Camp Rosos some time between August, July 1998.
- 11:48:25 10 Q. So you would say, then -- you would say, then, that from
11 what you heard Sesay was commander of Kono in July
12 onwards?
- 13 A. The right date Issa Sesay came to command Kono I couldn't
14 tell, but I only know we are at Camp Rosos.
- 11:49:13 15 Q. Because I would suggest that what you just said is a lie,
16 and, in fact, ECOMOG was in control of Kono until
17 December 1998.
- 18 A. Say again.
- 19 Q. I said that what you've just said is a lie and that, in
11:49:29 20 fact, ECOMOG, following the ejection of Superman and
21 yourselves, were in control of Kono until December of
22 1998.
- 23 A. No.
- 24 Q. No.
- 11:49:45 25 A. ECOMOG lost over Kono when Superman attacked Kono. At
26 that time we were at Camp Rosos. And he gain control of
27 Kono whilst Issa Sesay came there to Kono and Superman
28 head to Krubola. They came to attack Makeni around
29 December.

1 Q. Whose "they"?

2 A. Superman and -- Superman and Rambo and also Brigadier
3 Mani. That was some time in December.

4 Q. Just so that we're clear, what you're telling the Court
11:50:31 5 is that, as far as you're aware, ECOMOG were not in
6 control of Kono between April or thereabouts of '98 --
7 A. That's not so.
8 Q. -- until the end of the year?
9 A. Not say so. I couldn't remember the date ECOMOG took
11:50:52 10 over Kono, and also I couldn't remember the date Superman
11 took over Kono from ECOMOG.

12 Q. I'm going to suggest that, in fact, if you had been
13 monitoring radio messages, you would know that Mr Sesay
14 did indeed come through Kono when he was part of an
11:51:12 15 attack on Kono in December 1998 before moving onwards
16 towards Masiaka?

17 A. Issa Sesay came to Kono after Kono was regained by
18 Superman.

19 Q. So the sequence of events, according to you, then, is
11:51:36 20 that Superman went to -- is it Sokobeh, after being
21 thrown out of Kono --
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. -- by --
24 A. Yes.

11:51:50 25 Q. Yes. Stayed in Sokobeh with Savage and then returned
26 from Sokobeh to attack Kono?
27 A. He was at Sokobeh and Sokobeh is the outcast [sic] of
28 Kono. So they were from there and they attacked the
29 ECOMOG into Kono again.

- 1 Q. And, just as accurately as you're able, when was that,
2 Mr Johnson?
- 3 A. I couldn't tell the dates, neither the month. But I know
4 it's in 1998.
- 11:52:23 5 Q. Was that before Superman went north to attack SAJ Musa?
- 6 A. No. Soon we pull out from Kono, when we split, Superman
7 was still at Kono taking instructions from Mosquito. And
8 that was the time Mosquito said to Superman that he
9 should go after us and bring us back, and to arrest SAJ
11:52:51 10 Musa.
- 11 Q. And did Superman do that at that stage?
- 12 A. No, no.
- 13 Q. What did Superman do at that stage, according to you?
- 14 A. At that stage he was still in Kono, trying to gain
11:53:09 15 control of Kono.
- 16 Q. And you heard that, you would say, over the radio; is
17 that correct? Is that because you were monitoring the
18 communications?
- 19 A. It was a rumour I heard that Superman should go after us.
11:53:28 20 I did not monitor it from a radio set.
- 21 Q. What I'm interested in is, there appears, according to
22 you, to be an order from Mosquito to Superman to go and
23 attack SAJ Musa?
- 24 A. In Krubola, yes.
- 11:53:45 25 Q. SAJ Musa left Krubola around, what, August and September
26 of '98?
- 27 A. Yes.
- 28 Q. But before he -- the reason he leaves Krubola is because
29 Superman -- or one of the reasons he left there was

1 because Superman attacked him in Krubola?

2 A. The main reason they had a fight because Superman had
3 gone to join him and he stayed there for couple of weeks
4 together, and fracas came between them. So SAJ Musa left
11:54:16 5 Superman at Krubola.

6 Q. Superman had not re-taken Kono at this stage; is that
7 correct?

8 A. He had already taken control of Kono and he had left Kono
9 to Krubola.

11:54:28 10 Q. Well, who was in control of Kono then when he left?

11 A. At that time, initially I told you that Issa Sesay was to
12 come to Kono to take over command.

13 Q. And how long did he stay there - Mr Sesay - then?

14 A. I couldn't tell.

11:54:49 15 Q. Who was he in command of?

16 A. Say again.

17 Q. Who was he in command of?

18 A. He was in command of Kono, and he had with him SLAs and
19 RUF fighters.

11:55:11 20 Q. Which SLAs did he have with him?

21 A. Their names I cannot say because I was not on the ground
22 with them. But everywhere we have SLAs and RUF mixed, in
23 all the jungles that we had.

24 Q. What, and you cannot name one SLA who was with Mr Sesay
11:55:38 25 in an important area like Kono?

26 A. No, I couldn't.

27 Q. What about RUF then?

28 A. Well, RUF -- there were RUF fighters with him there.
29 Like Morris Kallon was at Kono, Banya was at Kono, and

1 other RUF fighters which I couldn't name now.

2 Q. And you would say you picked all this up from monitoring
3 the radio messages; is that correct?

4 A. Yeah, some I picked up from monitoring the radio set and
11:56:26 5 some came to us through rumours.

6 Q. What did you pick up, then, rumours as to when Mr Sesay
7 left Kono?

8 A. No.

9 Q. So you've no idea how he arrived in Makeni early 1999?

11:56:54 10 A. No.

11 Q. It's right, isn't it, that on the way to Rosos your group
12 did not have any direct communication with the RUF?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. You were not taking orders from the RUF, nor were you
11:57:21 15 communicating with them?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And as far as you're aware, neither was SAJ Musa; is that
18 correct?

19 A. Yes.

11:57:34 20 Q. So the movement of your group from Mansofinia --

21 A. Mansofinia.

22 Q. Mansofinia to Rosos was a purely SLA controlled mission;
23 is that correct?

24 A. Not purely, because we are mixed with few RUF fighters.

11:57:56 25 Q. Any RUF fighters in the command structure?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Who was that?

28 A. Arthur, who was a captain controlling a battalion, which
29 was the third battalion.

- 1 Q. Who was the head of this group?
- 2 A. The head of the group was Alex Tamba Brima, was the field
3 commander.
- 4 Q. Who was his deputy?
- 11:58:17 5 A. His deputy was Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara.
- 6 Q. Who was Kamara's deputy?
- 7 A. Say again.
- 8 Q. Who was Kamara's deputy?
- 9 A. Well, at that point in the command structure, from
11:58:30 10 that -- from the deputy to the field commander, the next
11 person close to -- close to Kamara is the operation
12 commander, which was Hassan Papa Bangura, a.k.a. Bomb
13 Blast.
- 14 [HS191004C 12.03 p.m.]
- 12:01:00 15 Q. So the mission was controlled by SLAs; will you accept
16 that?
- 17 A. Yes, because all the high commands at that time were all
18 SLAs, except the 3rd Battalion commander was an RUF.
- 19 Q. He was taking instructions from the high command to SLAs?
- 12:02:13 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. Superman, we know from you, attacked SAJ Musa; SAJ Musa
22 has to leave Krubola in a hurry and in some disarray; is
23 that correct?
- 24 A. He did not attack SAJ Musa from Kono; he was at Krubola
12:02:48 25 when they have the fight between them, so SAJ pulled out
26 from Krubola in a hurry to join us at Major Eddie Town.
- 27 Q. And at that stage we have another split, is this correct,
28 with Bropleh remaining with Superman in Krubola?
- 29 A. Yes, and also Brigadier Mani remained with Superman.

- 1 Q. Brigadier Mani and Bropleh were Liberian; is that --
- 2 A. No, Brigadier Mani is a Sierra Leonean and an SLA
- 3 soldier.
- 4 Q. Bropleh?
- 12:03:44 5 A. Bropleh is a Liberian. He was the commander of the STF.
- 6 Q. Superman?
- 7 A. Superman is an RUF.
- 8 Q. He's a Liberian, wasn't he?
- 9 A. Yes, he's a Liberian.
- 12:03:54 10 Q. Thank you. That was another grouping, would you agree,
- 11 down ethnic lines -- Liberians sticking together?
- 12 A. Say again.
- 13 Q. Would you agree that there was a tendency for Liberians
- 14 such as Bropleh, Superman, to have some allegiance with
- 12:04:14 15 each other.
- 16 A. Well, I couldn't agree, because you had another Liberian
- 17 commander by the name of Rambo who was an RUF, who was
- 18 with Issa in Kono, and in our own group we have other STF
- 19 junior officers who were with us in our own group.
- 12:04:33 20 Q. Mr Johnson, I wasn't suggesting that they always stuck
- 21 together. I was suggesting that there was some
- 22 allegiance between them.
- 23 A. I will not agree with that, because -- because both of
- 24 them are Liberians, so they decided to stay together --
- 12:04:52 25 no. It's because of the fighting -- I believe they were
- 26 all fighting for the same objective.
- 27 Q. Didn't SAJ Musa think that Bropleh's interaction with
- 28 Superman might indicate that Bropleh wanted him dead?
- 29 A. No.

1 Q. No? Are you sure?

2 A. I said no.

3 Q. Can I ask you to turn then to page 8768?

4 JUDGE BOUTET: Which is which interview?

12:05:44 5 MR JORDASH: Sorry, Your Honour, it's 22 May 2003.

6 THE WITNESS: Number again, 8 --

7 MR JORDASH:

8 Q. 8768 is the beginning of the 22 May interview.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: 2nd of May of what year?

12:06:08 10 MR JORDASH: 2003, Your Honour. I'm grateful to my learned
11 friend, thank you.

12 Q. Can I ask you to turn to page 37 on the bottom of the
13 page? I don't have the court numbering, I'm afraid, on
14 this interview.

12:08:44 15 JUDGE BOUTET: It should be 8804.

16 MR JORDASH: Thank you.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes.

18 MR JORDASH:

19 Q. 8804, please, Mr Johnson, line 33:

12:09:06 20 Answer: "And Bropleh escaped so SAJ had to move to
21 our own point for his safety, then later, Bropleh came
22 out and was working hand-in-hand with RUFs."
23 And you're discussing there, is this right, Mr Johnson --

24 A. Yes.

12:09:19 25 Q. -- Superman working with Bropleh?

26 A. Yes, correct.

27 Q. Question:

28 "Even while SAJ was still alive?"

29 "Yes, even though SAJ was still alive but SAJ was

1 with us."
2 Question: "But was SAJ in favour of that plan?"
3 Over the page, answer:
4 "Well, no, because he cut off communication with
12:09:45 5 them everything --"
6 Question: "Okay."
7 Answer: "-- because he said they wanted to kill him
8 at Krubola maybe Bropleh had joined up with RUF to kill
9 him, yes. Because although he is a Liberian STF, he had
12:10:01 10 no trust over him."
11 A number of things from that, Mr Johnson. It's
12 right you are saying there that SAJ Musa thought Bropleh
13 might have joined up with the RUF and wanted to kill him;
14 is that not correct?
12:10:22 15 A. When Superman had the gunfire with SAJ Musa, at that time
16 Bropleh was under the direct command of SAJ Musa. So
17 when SAJ Musa fled, Bropleh returned back to Krubola, and
18 he was working with SAJ Musa. So SAJ Musa hearing that,
19 he will not have the trust of Bropleh, because both of
12:10:46 20 them are Liberians.
21 Q. You're indicating in this question and answer session,
22 are you not, that SAJ Musa had a suspicion that Bropleh
23 had joined up with Superman and might want him dead?
24 A. Yes.
12:11:03 25 Q. Yes.
26 A. That's what I say.
27 Q. And when you say "because although he is a Liberian STF,
28 he had no trust over him," you're indicating there,
29 aren't you, that there might ordinarily be some

- 1 allegiance, because they were Liberian, but in this
2 instance there wasn't?
- 3 A. At the time Superman was not in Krubola, SAJ was working
4 together with Bropleh. But due to the fracas that took
12:11:34 5 place, and Bropleh stayed with Superman, so he had the
6 mistrust for Bropleh that he will kill him.
- 7 Q. Yes. And ordinarily, as you appear to indicate - is this
8 correct or not - there might be an allegiance because
9 they were Liberian, but, in this instance, he had no
12:11:54 10 trust over him?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. Thank you. Now, just moving down this page, now we're on
13 it, just to deal with the communication between the
14 various groups, line 10:
- 12:12:16 15 "So the whole time you were there with SAJ from
16 where he joined up with you at Kambia to where he was
17 killed, did he have -- in Benguema, did he have
18 communication at that point?"
- 19 "No."
- 12:12:27 20 "With Krubola?"
- 21 "No, no. We had no communication with them. We had
22 to tell them that SAJ is dead and they never believed."
23 Are you referring to communication with who there?
- 24 A. SAJ Musa had no communications neither with the RUF in
12:12:47 25 Kailahun, nor the fighters at Krubola when he left there.
- 26 Q. So SAJ's movement to you and your group at Camp Rosos
27 were effectively doing your own thing; is that correct?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. And from what you have said lower down the page at

1 line 31 -- sorry, line 34 -- no, let me just go to
2 line 31 to get the context:
3 "Because the highest commander at that time at
4 Krubola was Superman."
12:13:39 5 "So he took over the command of the SLA?"
6 "Yes, at Krubola."
7 "So Mani allowed himself to be under the commands of
8 RUF.
9 "Yes, yes, because if he does not, he will be
12:13:50 10 killed. Because at that time you will see not plenty of
11 SLA presence at Krubola."
12 Is it fair to say that what you're indicating there
13 is that the command in Krubola was defined by the force
14 that Superman could have exercised over Brigadier Mani?
12:14:18 15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. Over the page, while we're on the subject, if
17 we can, Mr Johnson, please, you were then discussing at
18 line 6 on page 8806 the movement of Superman's troops
19 down to Makeni. Do you see that, "Superman was commander
12:14:47 20 at Krubola until we came to attack Makeni." Yes?
21 A. Yes, Superman was commander at Krubola until they came to
22 attack Makeni -- not we, because I was not with them.
23 Q. Sure. Until he came to attack Makeni. Now, the bit I'm
24 particularly interested in now is line 7 down:
12:15:13 25 "Okay, so he was" - referring to Superman - "leading
26 the SLA troops coming down?"
27 "Yes, to Makeni from that side --"
28 Question: "Who was -- who was leading?"
29 "-- and from Kono it was Rambo leading the RUF from

1 Kono side to Makeni."
2 "That was Rambo?"
3 "Rambo who was -
4 Question: "RUF?"
12:15:43 5 "Yes, who was killed by Superman."
6 "In Makeni?"
7 "Yes."
8 So you're indicating there that it was Rambo leading
9 troops from Kono?
12:15:53 10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You make no mention of Mr Sesay?
12 A. No.
13 Q. And in fact it's right, isn't it, that at no stage during
14 your many interviews with the Prosecution have you
12:16:07 15 suggested that Mr Sesay was in control of Kono?
16 A. Yes, he was the high command there and Rambo was the
17 forefront commander -- he was the field commander. He
18 moves with the troops.
19 Q. So where was Mr Sesay?
12:16:22 20 A. Mr Sesay, he was in Kono and he was the overall commander
21 in Kono, because at that time in the fighting Kono was
22 known as the headquarter for the forefront.
23 Q. My question to you, Mr Johnson is: why, in -- I think in
24 ten interviews do you not mention your knowledge that
12:16:49 25 Mr Sesay was in control of Kono following Superman's
26 removal?
27 A. I believe some of your questions trigger my memory,
28 because -- and when my memory's triggered, I will
29 remember exactly in the ground and I ought to say it out

1 here.

2 Q. So your evidence is that you forgot Mr Sesay controlled
3 the richest area in Sierra Leone following the fall of
4 Superman?

12:17:30 5 A. He controlled Kono after the fall of Superman in Kono.

6 Q. And you just happened to forget that small detail?

7 A. Well, I could say that now, because you have triggered my
8 memory through your questions.

9 Q. Your memory wasn't triggered by any questions from the
12:17:54 10 Prosecution during the ten interviews you had with them?

11 A. Not at all, because I was explaining, and those questions
12 were not asked.

13 Q. Now, during the time before SAJ Musa joined your group at
14 Major Eddie Town, was it --

12:18:36 15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. -- Mr Brima was in control of your group.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And despite orders from SAJ Musa about committing crimes,
19 it was Mr Brima who ordered the attack on Karina; is that
12:19:05 20 correct?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. Could I just, while we're dealing with individual crimes,
23 just return -- I should have dealt with this earlier --
24 BS Massaquoi was a prominent man in Kenema, wasn't he.

12:19:22 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And he was killed, so the rumour went, by Bockarie?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And that killing occurred independent from any order
29 given by the AFRC?

1 A. No, it was not an order given by AFRC.
2 Q. Thank you. In fact, Johnny Paul Koroma was pretty angry
3 about it?
4 A. Yes.
12:19:49 5 Q. But there was nothing he could do, because Bockarie was
6 in sole command of Kenema?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And there was equally nothing SAJ Musa could have
9 done about Karina, because he was never told about --
12:20:09 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Learned counsel, are you suggesting to him,
11 or are you assuming the mantle of the witness in the box?
12 I mean, please, you know, frame your questions -- you
13 know, let them take the form of questions and not just
14 narrating the incident, the way you know it, for him to
12:20:27 15 be saying "yes", "yes", "no", "no". We want to have
16 either direct questions, or you're putting it to him in
17 this process, please.
18 MR JORDASH: This is what --
19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Because you have been following a series of
12:20:40 20 narrations -- "Yes, yes. And then, and then, yes. And
21 then and then. No, no, no." This is not the way it
22 should be.
23 MR JORDASH: Your Honour, with --
24 PRESIDING JUDGE: You may proceed, this comment having been
12:20:49 25 made, but you should take it as a very pertinent comment,
26 because we must draw a line as to when you're questioning
27 and when you're trying to lead evidence as if you lived
28 through the event yourself. You may proceed, Mr Jordash,
29 please.

- 1 MR JORDASH:
- 2 Q. The attack on Karina was not done under the instructions
3 of SAJ Musa, was it?
- 4 A. It was not done under the instruction of SAJ Musa.
- 12:21:32 5 Q. In fact, did he know about it?
- 6 A. No, because no radio message was sent to him.
- 7 Q. And he wasn't there?
- 8 A. Not at all.
- 9 Q. Do you know if he learned about it afterwards?
- 12:22:08 10 A. I cannot tell.
- 11 Q. Would you accept that, in these times, it was easy for
12 the likes of Mr Brima to hide his crimes from their
13 immediate superiors?
- 14 A. Say again.
- 12:22:29 15 Q. If a commander was not there at the scene of a crime,
16 would it have been easy for that crime to be hidden in
17 these times -- the movement of troops towards Freetown?
- 18 A. Yes, because Alex Tamba Brima was the field commander on
19 the ground.
- 12:22:57 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Learned counsel, I think you should put that
21 question to him again. He doesn't appear to have
22 answered it. Maybe he didn't understand it. Could you
23 put it back to him, please?
- 24 MR JORDASH: Certainly.
- 12:23:09 25 Q. Mr Brima didn't tell SAJ Musa about this crime in Karina?
- 26 A. No.
- 27 Q. SAJ Musa wasn't present in Karina?
- 28 A. He was not.
- 29 Q. Given the orders that SAJ Musa had given about committing

1 crimes, Mr Brima did not -- wouldn't have told SAJ Musa
2 about it?

3 A. I still can't understand the way you put the question.
4 I want you to break it down.

12:23:44 5 Q. Is this right: the only way that SAJ Musa could have
6 learnt about that crime would have been either he went to
7 Karina himself -- yes?

8 A. He did not go to Karina.

9 Q. Or one of the command structure, including Mr Brima,
12:24:04 10 could have told him, but they didn't?

11 A. They didn't tell him.

12 Q. Did Mr Brima give any orders to anybody under his direct
13 command not to say anything to SAJ Musa?

14 A. No.

12:24:19 15 Q. Do you know if any of them did say anything to SAJ Musa?

16 A. No.

17 Q. No, they didn't, or you don't know?

18 A. They didn't say anything.

19 Q. Do you know why?

12:24:37 20 A. No.

21 Q. Can I ask you about the attack on Mateboi? Was that done
22 by your group?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. That was about three weeks after the setting up of Rosos?

12:25:09 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. With the same command structure that we've heard about,
27 and I don't need to take you through unless it's
28 changed -- the same command structure?

29 A. The same command structure from Mansofinia to Rosos.

- 1 Q. And the attacks thereafter -- until Major Eddie Town,
2 again, same command structure?
- 3 A. Same command structure until Major Eddie Town.
- 4 Q. Now, Major Eddie Town, that's where the instructions were
12:25:47 5 given by SAJ Musa concerning the plan to attack Freetown;
6 is that right?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. The command structure was effectively SLA - is that
9 correct - at Major Eddie Town?
- 12:26:09 10 A. Yes, we had few RUF fighters still with us and SAJ Musa
11 also came with a few RUF fighters.
- 12 Q. But they're not in the high command, are they?
- 13 A. No, only Arthur, who was the battalion commander 3.
- 14 Q. Thank you. This was effectively an SLA plan?
- 12:26:34 15 A. Yeah.
- 16 Q. And is this right, the group, including SAJ Musa and the
17 command structure, were quite keen to make sure that it
18 was known that it was SLA and not RUF?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 12:26:54 20 Q. And in fact one of the aims, would you agree, of this SLA
21 mission to Freetown was so that some of the SLA can
22 return to the army; is that correct?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Return to Freetown, and let Freetown know that you are
12:27:45 25 not RUF?
- 26 A. Yes, because we wanted to be reinstated into the army.
- 27 Q. And the planning, therefore, was done by the SLA; is that
28 correct?
- 29 A. Say again.

1 Q. The planning for the attack was done by the SLA?
2 A. Yes, because the commander at that time was SAJ Musa.
3 Q. The ammunition effectively came from an attack on the
4 Guineans; is that correct?
12:28:33 5 A. Yes, at Masiaka.
6 Q. Ammunition was a problem, because effectively you were a
7 group operating on your own with no access to ammunition
8 from any of the other groups?
9 A. Yes.
12:28:55 10 Q. Now, is it right that soon after SAJ Musa joined Mr Brima
11 and yourselves at Major Eddie Town, SAJ Musa demoted
12 Mr Kamara, Mr Brima, and Papa Bomb Blast?
13 A. They were not demoted; they were still
14 Brigadier-Generals, but they were under house arrest,
12:29:43 15 until the arrival of SAJ.
16 Q. But effectively the command structure was dissolved,
17 wasn't it?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And they were given effectively monitoring jobs?
12:30:01 20 A. They were not doing -- they were not taking part in any
21 operation and neither they were given any operational
22 orders. As I said, they were under house arrest.
23 Q. Didn't he demote them just to be monitoring?
24 A. No.
12:30:18 25 Q. I beg your pardon, I'm misreading it. They were being
26 monitored?
27 A. They were being monitored.
28 Q. But effectively then the principal commanders had a
29 sudden loss of fortune and ended up with little authority

1 and little command; is that right?

2 A. Break it down, please.

3 Q. Well, in Freetown, during the junta, Mr Kamara, Mr Brima,
4 Papa Bomb Blast, Five-five and Mr Kanu had been the high
12:31:03 5 command?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In command of SAJ Musa, in effect?

8 A. Under the command of SAJ Musa.

9 Q. No, in Freetown, they were the commanders; SAJ Musa took
12:31:20 10 instructions from them.

11 JUDGE BOUTET: You're talking here of the junta time when they
12 took over. Because you are going back in time, it's
13 confusing -- certainly for me.

14 MR JORDASH:

12:31:32 15 Q. I'm sorry, Mr Johnson, I didn't mean for you to be
16 confused. Just let me rewind. What I'm suggesting is
17 that they had a change of fortune from being in the junta
18 in control effectively of SAJ Musa to now SAJ Musa is in
19 control of them?

12:31:49 20 A. Yes. SAJ Musa was respected as a strict senior
21 SLA commander, and he'd been a former vice-president, so
22 he was regarded and respected by even those principal
23 liaison officers.

24 Q. And they were demoted, is this right -- the command
12:32:16 25 structure was dissolved, because SAJ Musa was angry about
26 the fact that these four men in their commands had failed
27 to do anything, basically?

28 A. Yes, but they were not demoted and the command structure
29 was not all dissolved. The position that these guys

1 carry, SAJ slots in other commanders to do their job.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Other commanders from where?

3 THE WITNESS: Some commanders he brought with him when he was
4 coming to join us, and some commanders he took from our
12:33:06 5 own sets and relocated them to the positions that these
6 four guys held. Like, for example, he came with Alabama,
7 who was his chief security.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Who came with Alabama?

9 THE WITNESS: SAJ Musa. And when they came from Major Eddie
12:33:26 10 Town --

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: And Alabama was --

12 THE WITNESS: SLA, and he was chief security to SAJ Musa.
13 When they came to join us at Major Eddie Town, having
14 made the arrest of Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara, and Gullit and
12:33:44 15 Five-Five, Alabama was relocated to take the place of
16 Bazzy as the chief of commander.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: So when you were telling the Tribunal that
18 the command structure still remained in place
19 notwithstanding the house arrests of these principal
12:34:17 20 commanders - Brima, Gullit, Five-Five and the rest --
21 when you say that the command structure still remained in
22 place, what do you mean to say?

23 THE WITNESS: I mean to say because when SAJ came to join us
24 we had four battalions with us, and when these guys were
12:34:36 25 arrested - Alex Tamba Brima and Bazzy - the 4th Battalion
26 was still there, and he came with other fighters with him
27 that he made two battalions to join the 4th Battalion and
28 the place where Bazzy and Gullit were holding, he
29 restored other officers to do that job. Like, Papa was

1 the operation commander --

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Other officers from where?

3 THE WITNESS: From his own sets he came with. That's why

4 I want to give an example. Like Papa was --

12:35:12 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Because it was the sidelining of these

6 commanders following their detention, their house arrest,

7 or whatever you call it?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: These were all a line of RUF principal

12:35:30 10 commanders?

11 THE WITNESS: No, SLA.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, I mean -- okay, okay, yes, that's right.

13 Okay. So the replacement which he made -- which SAJ Musa

14 made was replacing the SLA officials with other

12:35:50 15 SLA commanders?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Jordash, you may move ahead.

18 MR JORDASH: Thank you.

19 Q. Do you know, Mr Johnson, what it was that had changed to

12:36:18 20 allow SAJ Musa now to be the commander of these men?

21 A. SAJ was the most respectable SLA commander in the group,

22 so that was why he had the capability to command the

23 group.

24 Q. So effectively he could command greater force?

12:36:44 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. That's what gave him the command?

27 A. Well, he commanded greater force when he came to join us

28 to come to Freetown, but when he came to join us at Major

29 Eddie Town, he only came with 120 fighters and he met

- 1 dozens of us in Major Eddie Town, so that's why I said he
2 was respected as the most senior SLA officer on the
3 ground. So that was why he gained command, because of
4 his respect.
- 12:37:22 5 Q. And from Major Eddie Town, there was an attack on
6 Masiaka; is that right?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Led by SAJ Musa?
- 9 A. He was the commander. He did not go to Masiaka. The
12:37:44 10 commander that went with the troops to Masiaka was Papa
11 17 and SLA.
- 12 Q. Why did SAJ Musa not go?
- 13 A. Well, he's the highest in command. Normally, in the
14 jungle, when you go on an operation, the highest in
12:38:03 15 command stays at the back in the camp.
- 16 Q. Now, just jumping forward, but before I do, the attack in
17 Masiaka lasted how long?
- 18 A. It was just a night for a few hours, and I did not go to
19 the attack on Masiaka.
- 12:38:33 20 Q. So you're not able to say what happened during that
21 attack in Masiaka?
- 22 A. I could say by telling you that when the group returned
23 back to the camp, when they were given situation reports,
24 I was present, so I could say through that situation
12:38:54 25 reports I had.
- 26 Q. And the situation reports were given to SAJ Musa?
- 27 A. Yes.
- 28 Q. Did they -- who gave the situation report?
- 29 A. At that time it was the operation commander 05 --

1 Colonel 05, who's an SLA.

2 Q. Did he report any crimes committed by the troops?

3 A. No. He only reported about a large cache of ammunition

4 he got there, so there was jubilation all over and

12:39:30 5 nothing again he reported about.

6 Q. Did you find out where the arms came from?

7 A. They came from the attack at Masiaka from the Guineans.

8 Q. Are you sure you didn't go on the attack, Mr Johnson?

9 A. Yes, at Masiaka, when we are coming down to Freetown,

12:40:12 10 I never went on that attack. I stayed in the camp.

11 Q. Can I ask you to turn to the 12 May 2003 interview, 8563,

12 please? 8563 is the beginning of the interview.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. You have page 35 at the bottom?

12:41:23 15 A. Page 35?

16 Q. Yeah?

17 JUDGE BOUTET: So that would be page 8497.

18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

19 MR JORDASH:

12:41:38 20 Q. Line 5:

21 "Okay, did you attack Masiaka at all?"

22 Your answer:

23 "Yes, Masiaka was attacked after attacking Mile 38.

24 We attacked RDF, we attacked Mile 38, we went to the

12:41:56 25 jungle. Then a heavy presence of fighters was sent back

26 to attack Masiaka because the letter SAJ Musa sent

27 there that we are not coming to attack there, so they

28 thought that we are coming directly to Freetown because

29 we have attacked RDF. Then we are still coming forward

1 to Freetown. And three battalions were sent to Masiaka
2 and I went on that operation to Masiaka with the three
3 battalions and we met the Guinean troops there and the
4 Nigerian troops, and we met the SLAs and a handful of
12:42:32 5 Kamajors at Masiaka. On our arrival at Masiaka we did
6 not use the main way, because the Guinean troops, all
7 their presence of heavy weapons, ground missiles, were
8 turned to the main road where we to come from the end of
9 Freetown. So we used the jungle and we came down the
12:42:48 10 swamp where -- there is a hotel at the roundabout of
11 Masiaka, so back of there, there is a deep pit and the
12 house next to the hotel, there was the headquarter of the
13 Guineans. So we concentrated attacking the Guineans. We
14 attacked the Guineans, and we moved them from there and
12:43:06 15 we had heavy ammunition, heavy machine guns, ground
16 missiles."

17 Did you go on the attack to Masiaka, Mr Johnson?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. Is there any reason why you had forgotten of that attack?

12:43:19 20 A. Well, I was confused about the attacks, because Masiaka
21 first, when we were coming, we passed through there, and
22 a team was sent later on after attacking RDF and Mile 38,
23 and I went with that team to Masiaka.

24 Q. Can I suggest you forgot about it because there were
12:43:41 25 crimes committed by the SLA there?

26 A. No.

27 Q. And that Mr Sesay arrived there after your attack to find
28 the place in some disarray, and that's why you forgot
29 about the attack, isn't it, Mr Johnson?

- 1 A. Say again.
- 2 Q. Mr Sesay came to Masiaka, having come from Kono in
3 December of 1998, to see the results of your attack on
4 Masiaka, which was an attack on civilian areas?
- 12:44:16 5 A. He did not come to find out about results on our attack
6 to Masiaka. He was proceeding to attack Freetown on
7 their own operations.
- 8 Q. What I'm suggesting is that -- well, let me put it this
9 way. Let me ask you this. What crimes did you see
12:44:37 10 committed against civilians in Masiaka by the SLA group
11 you were a part of?
- 12 A. Masiaka was attacked at night and purely we attacked the
13 Nigerians for arms and ammunition.
- 14 Q. Is that true?
- 12:44:53 15 A. Say again.
- 16 Q. Is that true, Mr Johnson?
- 17 A. Yes, we attacked Masiaka at night and the main purpose
18 was to get arms and ammunition to come down to Freetown.
- 19 Q. Have a look back at the page 8597, line 33.
- 12:45:11 20 "Yes, sir, we had..." sorry.
- 21 A. Say again the page.
- 22 Q. Line 33, page 8597.
- 23 A. Yes, right.
- 24 Q. Line 33. Answer:
- 12:45:48 25 "Yes, so we had a ground missile there, we had
26 another AA gun, anti-aircraft gun there. We captured an
27 armoured car but we cannot carry it, so the BMG on it was
28 stripped off and the armoured car was placed on fire.
29 And there were -- we captured -- we abducted 12 young

1 ladies from Masiaka, 12 young ladies."
2 And then, over the page to 8598, line 20:
3 "Yes, because on the leave for the operation
4 SAJ Musa told them that there should be no more abductees
12:46:34 5 captured to join us, because we had a lot of them, so let
6 nobody come with anybody. Even you find girl there that
7 you want to be -- that girl should be your wife in the
8 jungle, that he does not want because there are lots of
9 girls in the jungle."
12:46:48 10 And then later on, the question, line 36:
11 "Did they rape those girls before they killed them?"
12 Answer:
13 "No, they were not raped. Well, I don't know
14 whether when they were caught, whether they were sexually
12:47:13 15 abused before coming with them, but on my own presence
16 they were not raped, they were just ordered to be killed
17 by Alabama."
18 So do you accept that there were crimes committed in
19 Masiaka?
12:47:58 20 A. Yes, we had some abductees that were captured - civilians
21 - we want to carry the arms and ammunitions to the camp
22 and these young guys also were captured by other
23 fighters, but crimes committed like raping, I did not
24 see, and I don't know of.
12:48:19 25 Q. Could I just correct something which I made a mistake
26 about? I'm not suggesting that Mr Sesay came to Masiaka,
27 so I withdraw that suggestion, just so you're clear what
28 I'm saying. But I am suggesting that there were crimes
29 committed by your group in Masiaka.

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Okay. There was only communication, so you know --
- 3 A. The line you're reading, please.
- 4 Q. No, sorry, I've moved from that, Mr Johnson.
- 12:49:03 5 A. Okay.
- 6 Q. Just following SAJ Musa's death, that brought a great
7 deal of tension between Mr Brima and Mr Kamara; is that
8 correct?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 12:49:23 10 Q. Almost leading to a gunfight?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. As to who should be the next commander?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. Do you know how that was -- how it was resolved and why
12:49:36 15 Mr Brima became the next commander?
- 16 A. Yes, because Mr Brima was the deputy field commander
17 deputising SAJ, so when he died he just had to take the
18 command. But Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara had the loyalty of the
19 fighters that wanted him to be the commander.
- 12:50:08 20 Q. And as far as you're aware, it was only after the death
21 of SAJ Musa that there was some communication between
22 your group and Sam Bockarie?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Would you agree that Mr Brima was still leading your own
12:50:56 25 SLA operation into Freetown?
- 26 A. Yes, he was the leader.
- 27 Q. And is it right that even when that communication began,
28 the objective of your group was to get to Freetown and
29 become -- and continue the mission that started with SAJ

1 Musa?

2 A. Our objective was to come to Freetown to restore the
3 army, because it was disbanded.

4 Q. And that didn't change on SAJ Musa's death?

12:51:59 5 A. Following the death of SAJ Musa, Gullit changed the plan
6 to attack Freetown.

7 Q. As a result of discussion with the command structure of
8 the SLA, or just on his own?

9 A. On his own, because he was the commander -- the highest
12:52:25 10 commander.

11 Q. He didn't consult with the lower ranks?

12 A. Well, no -- if we're moving -- when SAJ Musa died, after
13 he had changed the command structure on the movement to
14 Freetown, he just sent -- called on the battalion
12:52:46 15 commanders and give them instructions.

16 Q. Do you know how Mr Kamara took that?

17 A. Yes. At that time we were at, the whole force was
18 together.

19 Q. Do you know how Mr Kamara took the change of plans
12:53:07 20 dictated by Mr Brima?

21 A. Say again.

22 Q. Well, Mr Brima decided to change the plan?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. He decided to change the plan on his own; is that
12:53:15 25 correct?

26 A. Yes, because the motive we had, we were coming with the
27 plan of SAJ, but when SAJ died, he changed the plan.

28 Q. Wasn't there any complaint by Mr Kamara or the other
29 high-ranking commanders?

1 A. Mr Kamara complained about the plan, the movement to
2 Freetown, but nothing was done. His own plan he made was
3 the one that was carried out.

4 Q. How did he -- how was he able to impose his own plan on
12:53:50 5 the command structure, do you know?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Do you understand my question -- the point I'm making?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You have, only shortly before Mr Brima fighting with
12:54:05 10 Mr Kamara almost --

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. -- and then suddenly assuming a dictatorial position; do
13 you understand?

14 A. Yes.

12:54:11 15 Q. Are you able to shed any light on how he was able to
16 exercise such control so quickly over the command
17 structure?

18 A. The only thing I can say, he was the highest in command
19 amongst the movement, so he should take over when SAJ
12:54:29 20 dies.

21 MR JORDASH: Your Honour, I'm just about to move to a new
22 subject. I can reassure the honourable Chamber I will be
23 less than the day. I think I've got one and a half hours
24 left and that's it.

12:55:02 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: If it's a new subject, I don't think we want
26 to go beyond the point you've reached. Since it's just
27 5 minutes to 1.00 o'clock, I think everybody is entitled
28 to have a lunch break this morning. So the Chamber will
29 rise and we will resume sitting at 2.30. The Chamber

1 rises, please.

2 [Luncheon recess taken at 12.56 p.m.]

3 [On resuming at 2.43 p.m.]

4 [HN191004D]

14:27:41 5 [The accused Sesay and Kallon entered court]

6 [the accused Gbao not present]

7 [The witness entered court]

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon learned counsel. We're

9 resuming the session and Mr Jordash you may proceed,

14:40:43 10 please.

11 MR JORDASH: Your Honour, thank you.

12 Q. Good afternoon, Mr Johnson.

13 A. Good afternoon.

14 Q. It is correct that between the 5th of January and when

14:41:09 15 your group entered Freetown, there was no communication

16 between Gullit and Sam Bockarie; is that correct?

17 A. The date again?

18 Q. Between the 5th of January 1999 and entering Freetown.

19 A. There was communication before the 5th at Koba Wata where

14:41:40 20 SAJ was buried and another communication on the 5th of

21 January before entering Freetown at Orugu village.

22 Q. Was the communication with -- involving Mr Brima asking

23 for assistance; is that correct?

24 A. Quite correct.

14:42:22 25 Q. And Mr Bockarie saying he would send reinforcements, but

26 those reinforcements not arriving?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And Mr Bockarie being suspicious initially about SAJ

29 Musa's death; this is before the 5th. I'm just moving

- 1 you backwards. When the first contact between
2 Mr Bockarie and Mr Brima took place, Mr Bockarie thought
3 there was some trick being played on him concerning
4 Mr Musa's death?
- 14:43:16 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. And Mr Bockarie later agreed to send reinforcements, as
7 you've just told us, but didn't; yes?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. And Mr Bockarie at some stage suggesting to Mr Brima that
14:43:43 10 the SLA should send men to Waterloo to show the RUF
11 commanders there that the route to Freetown had been
12 cleared?
- 13 A. Not Waterloo, but Foamex.
- 14 Q. Where, sir?
- 14:44:03 15 A. Foamex building.
- 16 Q. Is it your view that Mr Bockarie was still skeptical?
- 17 A. At first he was skeptical, but later he agreed to send
18 the reinforcements, which he did not.
- 19 Q. And the reinforcements he said he would send were Rambo
14:44:24 20 and Superman?
- 21 A. Yes, Superman was the head of the troops that were coming
22 leading for Freetown.
- 23 Q. And the SLA patrol team waited for three days for RUF
24 assistance which didn't arrive?
- 14:44:49 25 A. Yes.
- 26 Q. And from what you told us, it was only when the SLA
27 pulled out of Freetown to Benguema that they met the RUF?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. Rambo and Superman?

- 1 A. Rambo, Superman. Later Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay came
2 to Waterloo from Makeni.
- 3 Q. So at Waterloo there were the coming together of some
4 different groups?
- 14:45:35 5 A. Not different groups. In Waterloo the RUF was at
6 Waterloo. When we pulled out from Freetown, we joined
7 them at Waterloo.
- 8 Q. Well, was Superman still with Brigadier Mani and Bropleh,
9 A. No, they stayed at Makeni.
- 14:46:03 10 Q. And you've told us about Mr Bockarie asking for some
11 prominent people to be sent to Kailahun?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. Momoh, the Ex-President?
- 14 A. Yes.
- 14:46:18 15 Q. Victor Foh?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. Steve Bio?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. And there was Gibril Massaquoi?
- 14:46:29 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. And it was Issa Sesay's job to get those people. Can you
22 confirm that?
- 23 A. Yes, because he was the highest RUF commander.
- 24 Q. Have you heard about the attack on Mr Sesay by Superman
14:46:53 25 in March of 1999?
- 26 A. No.
- 27 Q. Are you sure about that, Mr Johnson?
- 28 A. Say it again and I want you to please locate the town or
29 where it was, whether Benguema or Makeni or Lunsar.

- 1 Q. Makeni. I'm suggesting in March 1999 Superman tried to
2 kill Mr Sesay in Makeni.
- 3 A. What I heard of, Issa Sesay came from Magburaka and
4 attacked Superman at Makeni, because they said he was
14:47:43 5 collaborating with the AFRC on the movement.
- 6 Q. Did you hear that --
- 7 A. Yes, I heard that.
- 8 Q. Let me finish the question. Did you hear that Superman
9 had killed RUF Rambo?
- 14:48:01 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. In Makeni?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. And part of that attack involved Gibril Massaquoi?
- 14 A. Gibril Massaquoi was with Superman and I cannot tell
14:48:21 15 build Gibril Massaquoi was on the, attack, but I know
16 Gibril Massaquoi was at Lunsar at that time.
- 17 Q. With Superman?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. So is it not right that when Issa Sesay went to try to
14:48:44 20 take Gibril Massaquoi to Kailahun, Gibril Massaquoi
21 refused and aligned himself with Superman in Lunsar?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. And RUF Rambo went to Makeni?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 14:49:14 25 Q. You spoke earlier about how Superman had 1998 fallen out
26 with Mr Sesay; is that correct? Or was it with
27 Mr Bockarie?
- 28 A. With Mr Sesay in Kono and also with Mr Bockarie.
- 29 Q. So Superman had problems between him and Sesay, or at

1 least as early, as far as you are aware, as May 1998;
2 would you agree with that? Or June -- May, June 1998.
3 A. Yes, at Kono.
4 Q. And you've just agreed, you'd heard about him trying to
14:50:10 5 kill him, Superman trying to kill Issa Sesay in March of
6 1999?
7 A. Issa Sesay came to Makeni to attack Superman and he
8 overrun Makeni whilst Superman fled for Lunsar.
9 Q. The question I want to ask you is this, Mr Johnson: Is
14:50:33 10 it your evidence that Superman, at any stage between
11 those dates, was taking orders from Mr Sesay?
12 A. No, Superman was not taking any order from Mr Sesay since
13 they fall apart from Kono.
14 Q. Thank you.
14:50:52 15 JUDGE BOUTET: So that is from Kono, from the time in Kono?
16 THE WITNESS: In Kono. When Issa Sesay came to take over
17 Kono, they fall apart and no command Superman was taking
18 neither to Sam Bockarie, neither to Issa Sesay.
19 MR JORDASH: Could I just take very brief instructions, Your
14:51:16 20 Honour.
21 [Defence counsel and accused Sesay confer]
22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.
23 MR JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honours.
24 Q. I just want to deal very finally, and I think I will be
14:51:48 25 finish in about 15 minutes, with the split where the West
26 Side Boys were formed.
27 A. Say again.
28 Q. I would like to deal, if I can, with the group that split
29 off from the SLAs and went to the west side.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. And maybe I can deal with this relatively quickly. In
3 March and April of 1999, the West Side Boys attacked some
4 Malian peacekeepers in Port Loko?

14:52:25 5 A. Correct.

6 Q. You were the commander?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And at this stage Superman was in Lunsar with Gibril
9 Massaquoi?

14:52:42 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. There was no --

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Where was this attack on the Malian
13 peacekeepers?

14 MR JORDASH: At Port Loko, Your Honour.

14:52:56 15 Q. At Port Loko Town; is that correct?

16 A. Outcast of Port Loko at the Sri Lanka School.

17 JUDGE BOUTET: The Malian peacekeepers?

18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

19 MR JORDASH: Yes, Your Honour.

14:53:21 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: And you say you were the leader of the West
21 Side Boys?

22 THE WITNESS: No, I was the commander on the operation.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. "I was their commander."

24 MR JORDASH:

14:53:50 25 Q. And I want to just deal with the period of March to May
26 of 1999. Can you confirm there were attacks by the West
27 Side Boys in Robis?

28 A. Robis. The attack that I know from the West Side Boys
29 was Port Loko, the Malians; the second one was at Newton

1 Junction; the third one was at Mile 38; and the fourth
2 one was at Gberi Junction before the signing of the peace
3 accord.
4 Q. What about Manaama?
14:54:46 5 A. Say again.
6 Q. Manaama?
7 A. Mamamah.
8 Q. Manaama?
9 A. I cannot recall that name.
14:54:56 10 Q. Is this correct --
11 PRESIDING JUDGE: But that name came up in evidence earlier
12 on.
13 THE WITNESS: Mamamah is the name I know of.
14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that the name learned counsel is
14:55:09 15 referring to?
16 MR JORDASH: I beg your pardon?
17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mamamah, is that the name you're referring
18 to?
19 MR JORDASH: It is, but it is not on the indictment as that.
14:55:20 20 It is on the indictment as Manaama. Yes, I am reading
21 from the indictment.
22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay.
23 MR JORDASH:
24 Q. So can you tell us anything about that?
14:55:37 25 A. I would like to know whether it is on the pullout from
26 Freetown.
27 Q. Let me try to be a bit clearer. Operating in the Port
28 Loko District from February 1999 was effectively two
29 groups: Superman's group and the West Side Boys; is that

1 right?

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Operating as independent groups and I again use this term

4 "doing their own thing"?

14:56:15 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Your group were not taking orders from anybody?

7 A. No.

8 Q. And as far as you were aware, neither was Superman who

9 had effectively set himself up as an independent

14:56:32 10 operator?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And there was, is this right, an attack in Gbentis close

13 to Port Loko involve Cyborg?

14 A. Yes, that is a village very close to Port Loko and that

14:57:03 15 is the time we went to attack the Malians.

16 Q. Cyborg was a West Side Boy?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. There was an attack by the West Side Boys in Mafori; is

19 that correct?

14:57:22 20 A. Yes, that's the route we took to attack the Malians at

21 Port Loko. We passed through those villages.

22 Q. And the route you took went through, is this correct,

23 Robis? Do you recall this?

24 A. From Gberibana to Port Loko I can remember towns like

14:57:49 25 Robot. That's one town I could remember. The others I'm

26 not too conversant with their names, but on the map

27 I could locate the routes we took to Port Loko.

28 Q. That would be perhaps useful, I think, if you would.

29 MR JORDASH: Could Mr Johnson be given the map, please.

1 A. On the map I can locate Robat.
2 Q. Take it slowly, if you would, Mr Johnson, so we can take
3 at that know. Robat, yes.
4 A. And Robis.
14:59:07 5 Q. Robis, that is R-O-B-I-S?
6 A. R-A-B-E-S-R.
7 Q. Okay. Where next?
8 A. Those are the two names I can locate on the map.
9 JUDGE BOUTET: Can you indicate, with your pencil, where it is
14:59:33 10 on the map so I can see it. Yes.
11 THE WITNESS: Just here you have Mabasi and going further you
12 have Robat.
13 JUDGE BOUTET: Okay, Robat and Mabasi. Thank you.
14 MR JORDASH:
15:00:05 15 Q. If I can also refresh your memory by asking you to look
16 at the interview of the 14th of May 2003, 8718.
17 A. 8718?
18 Q. Yes, please.
19 A. Yes.
15:00:35 20 JUDGE BOUTET: So this is the 14th of May interview?
21 MR JORDASH: Yes, 2003, 8718.
22 Q. Just so that we can refresh your memory as to what you
23 were talking about in that interview, Mr Johnson.
24 A. Yeah.
15:00:52 25 Q. Page 8718 you were asked at question at line 18.
26 A. Line?
27 Q. 18 about: "Now, we know that between March and
28 June-July-ish 1999 there were lots of attacks in" --
29 sorry -- "against civilians in villages in Koya and

1 Mafoki chiefdoms, Port Loko District. So I would like to
2 run through with you your activities and then ask you
3 about particular villages to see if you know what
4 happened there." Okay?

15:01:27 5 A. Um-hum.

6 Q. Line 27: "Okay, so you said you were the Commander for
7 the operation to attack Port Loko." Answer: "Yes." And
8 that's what you were just referring to when you were
9 pointing to map?

15:01:37 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And your were asked about the date and you believe it is
12 around March. That's line 13.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Yes.

15:01:47 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Going over the page, if you would, please. You were
17 talking there at line 8: "We attacked Port Loko, the
18 Malians, then we attacked Songo Junction."

19 A. Excuse me line 8 of 2719

15:02:15 20 Q. 8719?

21 A. 8719, line 8?

22 Q. Line 8. "We never attacked Masiaka when I was at
23 Westside. We attacked Port Loko, the Malians, then we
24 attached Songo Junction." Yes.

15:02:26 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Is that true?

27 A. True.

28 Q. "We attacked Magbuntuso."

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Is that true?
2 A. True.
3 Q. "Then we attacked -- Gberi Junction."
4 A. True.
15:02:47 5 Q. Can we just turn over the page, if you would as well, to
6 8720 and you're talking about the West Side Camp, line
7 five. "We were based at Gberibana."
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And also: "Another base across the river, Magbeni."
15:03:08 10 Line 11, true?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And could you turn over 8723, please.
13 A. Right.
14 Q. Line 16:
15:03:31 15 Q. Was he -- was Bazzy in charge at the time these
16 attacks were done on Port Loko, Gberibana?
17 A. Yes, he was the ground commander.
18 Is that true?
19 A. True.
15:03:45 20 Q. And if you would go over the page, please, to 8724.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And line 20:
23 A. We left Gberibana at about 6 o'clock in the
24 evening.
15:04:01 25 Q. Okay.
26 A. Then we started moving. We came to Furawa.
27 And you talked there about cooking food or sacrifice; is
28 that correct?
29 A. Say again.

1 Q. You talk at line 22 about coming to Furawa. "There we
2 mustered the whole troop, checked them and we cooked some
3 food or sacrifice and water to sprinkle on our weapon.
4 We prayed on it and we ate the food, and all battalions
15:04:27 5 ate the food."
6 Is that true, that's what happened there?
7 A. True
8 Q. And you talk further down at line 30: "The battle
9 Commander of Furawa, who was Foyo."
15:04:40 10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Line 32: "And the battalion commander of Laia, who was
12 Kefokeh."
13 A. True.
14 Q. Then moving to 34: "Then we moved from to Furawa we went
15:04:52 15 into this jungle which to Robis."
16 A. True.
17 Q. Line 36:
18 A. Robis we came to Rusint.
19 Q. Okay. Right. Ya.
15:05:02 20 Is that true?
21 A. True.
22 Q. And on line 36: "Robis we came to Rusint."
23 A. True.
24 Q. Over the page, please, to line 1:
15:05:27 25 A. We came to Rosint, then -- is this a highway?
26 Q. I don't know.
27 A. Because we never crossed the highway.
28 Is that true?
29 A. Yeah, we never crossed the highway to attack Port Loko

1 from our own side.

2 Q. Okay. At line 10: "Because we were avoiding being in
3 the route or any problem, but we later joined the route.
4 We moved to Masemoi."

15:05:52 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Q. Masemoi?

7 A. Yes, Masemoi.

8 Then line 17: "Then we moved to Masuba. From Masuba we
9 moved to Rogbet."

15:06:06 10 A. Correct.

11 Q. Line 19: "Yes, then we joined at highway at Rogbet till
12 we came very close to the Port Loko. The town -- no, we
13 slept at Mafuri."

14 A. True.

15:06:21 15 Q. And over the page you talk there at line 15: "We asked
16 them whether the Malians are -- the location of the
17 Malians and they told us that the location of the Malians
18 is at the school at the outcast of Port Loko, that is,
19 Schlenke." We've dealt with that, so I won't ask you any
15:06:54 20 more about that.

21 Can I ask you to turn over to page 16 at the bottom,
22 please, which is --

23 A. 16.

24 Q. Yes. 8732, I think.

15:07:27 25 A. 8733.

26 Q. Oh, it is 33, thank you, Mr Johnson. Line 15 again?

27 A. We came to one village to rest. That was -- we
28 came to Mabora.

29 Q. Mabora.

1 A. When retreating, yes.
2 Is that correct?
3 A. Yes, after the attack on the Malians.
4 Q. This is the return journey then?
15:07:49 5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Was the return route the same as the --
7 A. It was the same.
8 Q. Thank you. Could I ask you to turn to page 19 at the
9 bottom, which should be 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.
15:08:16 10 A. 8736.
11 Q. Thank you. Line 25 you talk about Gberibana and
12 abductees?
13 A. Line 25.
14 Q. Yes?
15:08:30 15 A. Read it.
16 Q. "We don't check the abductees but the abductees at
17 Gberibana mostly all the abductees are taken to the
18 battalions."
19 A. That is not what I have here, page 19 line 25.
15:08:45 20 Q. Sorry, line 21. Sorry, page 21. Sorry, Mr Johnson, my
21 fault. Line 25, 24.
22 A. 24.
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. Yes.
15:09:00 25 Q. Talking about abductees at Gberibana this is West Side
26 Operations?
27 A. Yeah.
28 Q. Yes.
29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Thank you. And over to page 25 at the bottom, which I
2 think is 8740?

3 A. 42.

4 Q. Attack on Magbuntuso, discussed at line 2?

15:09:34 5 A. Line 2.

6 Q. Line 2: "The time they attacked Mile 38 -- when going to
7 Mile 38, one of the soldiers missed the road and he went,
8 took another road so he was captured overnight. And he
9 was taken to the Magbuntuso at the cell where the ECOMOGs
10 were. So the following night the troops attack at
11 Magbuntuso and the soldier was in the cell and he had to
12 shout, 'I'm inside here.'"

13 You were then asked at line 10: "It was after.
14 Port Loko was the first. Mile 38 was the second, and
15:10:06 15 Songo Junction was the third."

16 Is that correct?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. "Who led the attack on Magbuntuso?" at line 12. "It was
19 KBC -- no KBC led the attack on Songo. The attack on
15:10:18 20 Magbuntuso was that guy -- was that guy, this commander -
21 Gun Boot, Alhaji Kamanda."

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Is it also right, Mr Johnson, that some of the attacks by
24 the West Side Boys were falsely attributed to the RUF at
15:10:46 25 Lunsar?

26 A. No. Because in Lunsar the RUF had tried on three
27 occasions to take over Port Loko. They couldn't. So the
28 RUF were attacking from Lunsar, whilst we were at the
29 West Side Jungle.

1 Q. So that would have been after you'd arrived at your camp
2 then?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. After these journeys in the interviews?
15:11:20 5 A. Yes.
6 JUDGE BOUTET: I didn't hear what you were saying, Mr Jordash.
7 It was after?
8 MR JORDASH:
9 Q. After the -- this journey that we've just gone through in
15:11:31 10 the interview and the return journey; is this right
11 Mr Johnson?
12 A. What I'm saying, RUF were based at Lunsar and they, too,
13 were carrying out attacks around the Port Loko axis.
14 Q. Do you recall an attack by the West Side Boys on a
15:12:01 15 government bus?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. When was that?
18 A. After the signing of the peace process.
19 Q. And didn't the West Side Boys seek to blame the RUF for
15:12:13 20 that attack?
21 A. Yes.
22 MR JORDASH: Could I just have a moment, please. I've almost
23 completed.
24 Q. Could I just ask you, do you know Abdul Sesay?
15:12:56 25 A. Abdul Sesay.
26 Q. Yes?
27 A. Yes.
28 Q. Was he accompanying you to Port Loko as part of the West
29 Side Boys?

1 A. Not Abdul Sesay, but Colonel Sesay. M Colonel Sesay, he
2 was called Muchanga Balanga. That's his alias name.
3 Then we have Abdul Sesay who was a brigadier.
4 Q. Okay. You're going to have to go slowly. What was his
15:13:20 5 nickname?
6 A. His nickname was Muchanga Balanga.
7 Q. Are you able to spell that?
8 MR HARRISON: That is one of the names on the chart that is
9 Exhibit 7.
15:13:48 10 THE WITNESS: Yes.
11 MR JORDASH: I'm grateful, thank you.
12 Q. Something I should have asked you earlier -- sorry --
13 JUDGE BOUTET: What is the name again?
14 THE WITNESS: Muchanga Balanga.
15:14:18 15 MR JORDASH: Colonel Sesay, Colonel Abdul Sesay.
16 PRESIDING JUDGE: We're not Abdul Sesay. We're on Colonel
17 Sesay, now.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes.
19 PRESIDING JUDGE: And it is Colonel Sesay who is also known as
15:14:32 20 Muchanga Balanga.
21 THE WITNESS: Exactly, sir.
22 MR JORDASH:
23 Q. I've just two or three areas -- questions to ask you,
24 very briefly. Can you confirm this, Mr Johnson, that
15:15:04 25 during the junta period the AFRC tried to contact Charles
26 Taylor, but he wasn't interested?
27 A. I couldn't recall that.
28 MR JORDASH: Just give me a moment, please.
29 Q. I'll come back to that, but I want to ask you about a

1 specific incident at Konta; do you remember this? This
2 was when SAJ Musa was still alive. It is a sacrifice at
3 Konta.
4 A. Major Eddie Town, please.
15:16:15 5 Q. And the sacrifice was a sacrifice decided by Pa Demba?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Is that correct?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Demba Marah?
15:16:34 10 A. Demba Marah, correct.
11 Q. A juju man?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And the sacrifice was basically three pregnant women and
14 three boys to be buried alive?
15:16:48 15 A. Yes.
16 Q. That was done to secure the success of the mission?
17 A. To Freetown.
18 PRESIDING JUDGE: This sacrifice was done where?
19 THE WITNESS: The Major Eddie Town.
15:17:14 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Three pregnant women.
21 THE WITNESS: And three boys below the ages of ten.
22 JUDGE BOUTET: Is this a different sacrifice than the one done
23 by the West Side Boys, or is it the same?
24 THE WITNESS: No, it is different.
15:17:37 25 JUDGE BOUTET: It is different. So when you were talking
26 about sacrifice with West Side Boys, it is a different
27 type.
28 THE WITNESS: Exactly.
29 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is three boys below the ages of ten

1 years.

2 THE WITNESS: Yes.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Were to be buried alive.

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, with three pregnant women.

15:18:00 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Um-hum.

6 MR JORDASH:

7 Q. I can't find it in my notes, but you may be able to

8 assist. Was there a sacrifice at some stage by the SLA

9 moving towards Freetown, which involved the smearing of

15:18:14 10 blood on uniforms?

11 A. That is the same sacrifice you're trying to talk about.

12 Q. Could you just give us some detail as to what that

13 involved, please?

14 A. The sacrifice was to bury three pregnant women and three

15:18:34 15 young boys under the age of ten. That was at Major Eddie

16 Town when SAJ Musa came before we left for the Freetown

17 mission.

18 Q. Okay. I just want to deal with this as a subject. So

19 during the time of the SLA movement, generally, from

15:19:04 20 Krubola and Camp Rosos, would you agree that there was

21 killings for black magic reasons. For sacrifice, for

22 example, we've just talked about?

23 A. It was at Major Eddie Town there was killings for black

24 magic business, for witches.

15:19:26 25 Q. Right. And that was about creating some type of good

26 luck for the mission?

27 A. Well, it was revealed that some certain people are witch

28 in the movement coming with us to Freetown. So they were

29 proved and they were arrested.

1 Q. There were -- there was killings by Adama Cuthand who
2 appeared to enjoy killing for the sake of it?

3 A. Yes. At all times when we go on operation, she goes and
4 she takes it as her hobby.

15:20:07 5 Q. No military objective, just pure personal enjoyment?

6 A. Yes.

7 JUDGE BOUTET: What was being done? As part of the black
8 magic?

9 MR JORDASH: No, I had moved on. I was just going through
15:20:22 10 reasons why the SLAs were involved in killing; the first
11 was black magic and the second at was the personal
12 enjoyment of an SLA woman named Adama Cuthand.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: She was called what?

14 MR JORDASH:

15:20:55 15 Q. Is she called Adama Cuthand?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Is she still in the Sierra Leonean Army?

18 A. I can tell now.

19 Q. Do you know what her proper name was?

15:21:11 20 A. No.

21 Q. And we heard about the attack on Karina. That was
22 ordered simply because it was --

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Learned counsel, please let me get that.
24 You talked about the burying of three pregnant women and
15:21:33 25 three boys below the age of ten. Was this sacrifice
26 performed.

27 THE WITNESS: Yes.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: It was performed?

29 THE WITNESS: Yes.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: By whom?

2 THE WITNESS: The sacrifice was performed by the SLAs at Major
3 Eddie Town on the arrival of SAJ Musa.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: SLA what?

15:22:18 5 THE WITNESS: It is performed at Major Eddie Town and it was
6 SLA that were there when SAJ arrives.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: It was done by the SLA who were there when
8 the SAJ Musa arrived?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes.

15:22:53 10 JUDGE BOUTET: And the smearing of blood that was mentioned,
11 you said it was part of same sacrifice. How is it part
12 of same sacrifice if, on the one hand, you have buried
13 these three women and three boys alive, so --

14 MR JORDASH: Could I clear this up, Your Honour. I may be
15:23:13 15 able to.

16 Q. The sacrifice involving the smearing of the blood was, in
17 fact, the sacrifice of an RUF soldier?

18 A. Yes, that was at the West Side Camp, not at Gberibana.

19 Q. Right. So this was an RUF soldier at West Side Camp
15:23:34 20 following a statement by the same juju man, Demba Marah,
21 that the sacrifice of a soldier, black, tall and slim,
22 should be made?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And that his blood should be placed on the foreheads of
15:24:05 25 the commanders on a white cloth?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And was that a sacrifice which was said to help return
28 JPK to Freetown?

29 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. And I think you also gave -- I beg your pardon. There
2 was another motive for killing, which was revealed by
3 Gullit who killed a chief at Mateboi, because the chief
4 refused to help Mr Brima's troop; is that right?
- 15:25:31 5 A. Yes. He sent to call on the chief and -- he sent to call
6 on the chief from Mateboi to join us at camp Rosos and
7 the chief refused so a team was sent there. The whole
8 Mateboi town was burnt down and the chief's head was
9 brought to camp Rosos, to Alex Tamba Brima.
- 15:26:02 10 Q. Another reason for the group - I will generally term the
11 SLAs - for killing was revealed by Janet. Do you
12 remember her?
- 13 A. Say again.
- 14 Q. Janet, who fell in love with a particular commander?
- 15:26:25 15 A. Abdul Sesay, yes.
- 16 Q. What did she do?
- 17 A. I couldn't remember unless you refresh my memory through
18 the --
- 19 Q. Did she not fall in love with a commander and --
- 15:26:54 20 A. Yes, fell in love with Abdul Sesay.
- 21 Q. And as a result spread rumours about some families, some
22 civilians in some houses. Let me ask you to turn to the
23 interview 9th of May 2003, 8495. I think it is 8495,
24 page 32 at the bottom of the page.
- 15:27:46 25 A. 32?
- 26 Q. 32.
- 27 A. Yes, 8526.
- 28 Q. Thank you. Line 14 -- sorry, line 10, we can start
29 there. They're talking about six women.

1 Q. Of those six women, do you know if any of them
2 were sexually abused that you know of?

3 A. Um, one of those women later on, um, be a wife
4 to culture. The one I told you that he said he
15:28:25 5 wants him (sic) to be his wife

6 Q. Wants her to be his wife?

7 A. Yes, he (sic) was his wife at the jungle till
8 we came to Freetown. And the other one was
9 Janet but when we came to Freetown she died in
15:28:39 10 Freetown.

11 Q. What happened to her?

12 A. Um, at his area -- at her area when we came to
13 Freetown, she was, she was too -- she was
14 too -- I can say she was too bad at the area.
15:28:50 15 She made them to kill a lot of people at the
16 area, so at the time ECOMOG pressed us in she
17 cannot join, she cannot join us again she left
18 behind and civilians captured him -- captured
19 her and she was killed.

15:29:04 20 Q. What do you mean she was too bad, what was she
21 doing? What do you mean by that?

22 A. Well, that area, she grown (sic) up, Janet, she
23 was from that place when she went to Karina.
24 And when we came back, she has (sic) some
15:29:18 25 enemy -- areas in -- enemies around the areas.
26 So because she was in love with one of the
27 commanders, so she had to give some bad
28 reputations to some families around the house.
29 So those people their houses were burnt and

1 they were killed for the sake of Janet. And
2 when we pulled out she left in Freetown and she
3 was also killed by civilians.
4 A. Yes, and she was captured at Karina.
15:29:45 5 Q. So, she was a civilian captured who then went willingly
6 with a commander?
7 A. Yes.
8 MR JORDASH: I think I've got literally two questions.
9 JUDGE BOUTET: It was two questions half an hour ago.
15:30:21 10 MR JORDASH: I know, I do apologise.
11 JUDGE BOUTET: Are we still on the same two questions?
12 MR JORDASH: I'm just returning to them, actually. I just
13 wanted to return to the JPK relationship with Charles
14 Taylor, which is dealt with by Mr Johnson. I do
15:31:21 15 apologise.
16 JUDGE BOUTET: Maybe you did ask your two questions.
17 MR JORDASH: I can ask it better, this time.
18 PRESIDING JUDGE: You ask your two questions. You will not
19 have more than two questions, Mr Jordash.
15:31:46 20 MR JORDASH:
21 Q. Could I ask you, please - I'm almost there - 8429,
22 Mr Johnson, please.
23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Whilst you're looking for -- this chief
24 whose head was cut and brought to Brima, this was in
15:32:08 25 which village again?
26 THE WITNESS: Mateboi.
27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mateboi.
28 THE WITNESS: 8429?
29 MR JORDASH:

1 Q. Yes, and page 8441. I was just turning to beginning of
2 the interview, but 8441, page 13 at the bottom.

3 A. 8441.

4 Q. Looking at page -- sorry, looking at line 27:

15:32:54 5 Q. Okay, do you know any relationship between the
6 AFRC and Taylor, President Taylor of Liberia?

7 A. Relationship with Taylor and AFRC, I can say
8 much was with RUF because the RUF have been
9 working alongside with Taylor before even
10 coming to join the AFRC. So the link with
11 Johnny and Taylor, it was not too tense like
12 the link between Sam Bockarie and Taylor or
13 Issa Sesay and Taylor.

14 Q. How do you know?

15:33:16 15 A. Because, because at the early stage I was with
16 Johnny Paul and there were -- there was one
17 time just after the coup he tried to call
18 Taylor but he did not get him, but when Sam
19 Bockarie tried to call and -- he got him. So
15:33:31 20 the relationship between Taylor and Johnny Paul
21 was not too cordial until the time when he was
22 released from the RUF zone to Liberia.

23 Is that correct?

24 A. Correct.

15:33:51 25 MR JORDASH: All right. Thank you, I have got nothing
26 further.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good, thank you. Mr Touray?

28 MR TOURAY: Your Honour, my co-counsel Nicol-Wilson is taking
29 this witness.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay. Just a minute, please. Yes,
2 Mr Nicol-Wilson.
3 MR NICOL-WILSON: Yes, Your Honour, I am Melron Nicol-Wilson
4 representing the second accused, Mr Morris Kallon.
15:35:11 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: You're Mr Wilson?
6 MR NICOL-WILSON: Nicol-Wilson. It's a compound name, Your
7 Honour.
8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Nicol-Wilson, you may proceed, please.
9 CROSS-EXAMINED BY NICOL-WILSON:
15:35:57 10 Q. Good afternoon, Mr Witness.
11 A. Good afternoon.
12 Q. I'm going to ask you some few questions and please answer
13 them as precisely as you can.
14 A. Yes.
15:36:09 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: I would like you to understand, you know,
16 that Mr Wilson is on the Defence team that is defending
17 the interests of Mr Kallon.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes.
19 PRESIDING JUDGE: So it is now his turn to ask you questions.
15:36:28 20 THE WITNESS: Yes.
21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay. All right.
22 MR NICOL-WILSON:
23 Q. Mr Johnson, when were you first approached by the Office
24 of the Prosecutor?
15:36:38 25 A. The Office of the Prosecutor, I was approached on the
26 first time at the Paddy's club.
27 Q. And who approached you from that office?
28 A. Mr Wayne Bastin.
29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Nicol-Wilson, you should note that the

1 record is being made, so you should proceed slowly.

2 MR NICOL-WILSON: Sorry, Your Honour.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, that's all right. Go ahead. You said

4 you were approached by the Prosecutors -- yes, you were

15:37:12 5 approached by the Prosecutor.

6 THE WITNESS: At the Paddy's night club.

7 MR NICOL-WILSON:

8 Q. And who approached you from the Office of the Prosecutor?

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Paddy's nightclub here in Freetown?

15:37:32 10 THE WITNESS: In Freetown.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

12 MR NICOL-WILSON:

13 Q. And who approached you from the Office of the Prosecutor?

14 A. I first met with Mr Wayne Bastin.

15:37:43 15 Q. What did he say to you?

16 A. Just met me and he said they would like to see me at the

17 OTP - that was at the Seaview - the next day, but I was

18 afraid of going there, so it took me about a week before

19 reaching them.

15:38:26 20 Q. When you went over to meet with them, what was discussed?

21 A. When I went to meet them and they asked me whether

22 I would be willing to testify to the Court. And I said

23 yes, although I was afraid, and that's the first day, but

24 later I decided to do so.

15:39:04 25 Q. Can you tell this Court why you were afraid?

26 A. Well, because I've been an insider of Bo operations, so

27 at first when I was met, I was afraid, because all

28 insiders on the operation thought that everybody would be

29 indicted at that time. So I was afraid of that.

- 1 Q. Did you express that fear to the Office of the
2 Prosecutor?
- 3 A. Yes, I did.
- 4 Q. Was any assurance given to you?
- 15:39:38 5 A. No. I was only told that the people that are indicted
6 are those who bear the greatest responsibility and there
7 was no arrangement made between us. I was willing to
8 testify willingly for the sake of peace.
- 9 Q. So there was a promise that you would not be indicted?
- 15:40:01 10 A. No, that was not spoken.
- 11 [HS191004E 3.44 p.m.]
- 12 Q. Was that understood?
- 13 A. Say again.
- 14 Q. You said that was not spoken; I am saying was that
15 understood? Was there an understanding on your part that
16 you will not be indicted if you testified?
- 17 A. Well, because I believe the courts are focusing on those
18 who bears the greatest responsibility and I am not one of
19 them.
- 20 Q. So even though you are an insider, you are not one of
21 those who bear the greatest responsibility?
- 22 A. Yes. Yes.
- 23 Q. At that meeting you decided to serve as a witness for the
24 Prosecution.
- 25 A. Yes.
- 26 Q. Were you interviewed by staff members of the Office of
27 the Prosecutor?
- 28 A. Not at all. Soon I got there and they told me and I was
29 willing, I stated my testimony at once.

- 1 Q. Can you recall being interviewed by the Office of the
2 Prosecutor on 6th May 2003?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. Do you also recall being interviewed by the Office of the
5 Prosecutor on the 8th May 2003?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. 9th May 2003?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. The 12th May 2003?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And 13th May 2003?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Let's have these dates [microphone not
14 activated]. The first one.
- 15 MR NICOL-WILSON: Your Honour, the 6th May, the 8th, the 9th,
16 the 12th, and the 13th of May 2003.
- 17 Q. Do you have a copy of the interviews you took with the
18 Office of the Prosecutor?
- 19 A. Yes, all the dates you have called, I have the copies
20 here.
- 21 Q. During the course of this cross-examination, I shall be
22 referring you to some of the answers you gave during
23 those interviews.
- 24 A. Yeah.
- 25 Q. When did you first get involved with the military?
- 26 A. I got involved with the military in the year 1993 at
27 Kenema.
- 28 Q. At that time, was a war going on in Sierra Leone?
- 29 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. And who were the parties to that conflict?
- 2 A. The Sierra Leone government was fighting with the RUF.
- 3 Q. In 1993, did you fight against the RUF?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. In 1994, did you also fight against the RUF?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. Do you recall the military government of Brigadier Julius
8 Maada Bio handing over the reins of government to Ahmad
9 Tejan Kabbah in 1995?
- 10 A. Yes, I recall.
- 11 Q. At that time was the conflict still going on?
- 12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please wait. Brigadier who?
- 13 MR NICOL-WILSON: Julius Maada Bio.
- 14 PRESIDING JUDGE: For whatever the spelling is, Julius Maada
15 Bio, handing over?
- 16 MR NICOL-WILSON: The reins of government to the elected
17 president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in 1996.
- 18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have the precise date?
- 19 MR NICOL-WILSON: No, Your Honour, I think it was in March --
- 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: But it was in 1996?
- 21 MR NICOL-WILSON: Yes, it was in 1996.
- 22 Q. Was there a cessation of hostilities as a result of this
23 democratic process?
- 24 A. Well, at that time of the handing over, I was -- I was on
25 safe custody at the Pademba Road prisons.
- 26 Q. Do you know whether the war was still going on at that
27 time?
- 28 A. The war was still going on, but it was not too tense,
29 because the government of Sierra Leone had already pushed

1 the rebels up to the edges of the country.

2 Q. Were you at Pademba Road prison on the night of 24th May
3 1997?

4 A. Yes, on the overthrow I was there.

5 Q. Were you released from Pademba Road prisons on 25th May
6 1997.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. On 28th May 1997, please confirm whether you had heard
9 this broadcast over the Sierra Leone Broadcasting
10 Station, SLBS, there was a broadcast at 10 a.m.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Microphone not activated]

12 MR NICOL-WILSON:

13 Q. On 28th May 1997, this statement was broadcasted over the
14 state radio at 10 a.m. in which Foday Saybana Sankoh
15 ordered the RUF to stop all attacks and adopt a defensive
16 posture?

17 A. Can I please get the dates again?

18 Q. 28th May 1997. Three days after the May 25th incident.
19 And then there was this broadcast over the SLBS.

20 A. When you say Foday Sankoh -- because Foday Sankoh was not
21 present here.

22 Q. Yes. So a message was broadcasted.

23 A. By who?

24 Q. Over the -- did you hear a broadcast over the SLBS radio
25 station in which Foday Sankoh was giving some orders to
26 the RUF?

27 A. No.

28 Q. At that time, did you hear any message over the SLBS that
29 is alleged to have been made by Foday Sankoh?

- 1 A. The only message I heard over the broadcasting station
2 was Johnny Paul -- it was [inaudible] over 99.9 radio
3 station, saying that it was a coup and it was done by the
4 SLA soldiers and everybody should join up on the coup.
5 That is what I heard, that is from Gborie.
- 6 Q. So the RUF wasn't part of the coup?
- 7 A. The RUF as a whole was not part of the coup-making,
8 because the coup was 16 members of the SLA and the RUF
9 joined the government later on after the day of the coup.
- 10 Q. Why was the RUF invited to join the government?
- 11 A. Well, I believe because to -- the knowing of me, Johnny
12 Paul did that because he believes that if he calls on the
13 RUF -- I mean, there will be no fighting, because these
14 are the two opponents that are fighting, the RUF and the
15 SLA.
- 16 Q. So will I be correct to say that the RUF was invited so
17 that the conflict in Sierra Leone will be settled
18 peacefully?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. In one of your answers to the counsel for the first
21 accused, you said Sam Bockarie, AKA Mosquito, took part
22 for a while and then went up country.
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. How long was Sam Bockarie in Freetown for?
- 25 A. I cannot tell how long.
- 26 Q. Was he in Freetown for a month?
- 27 A. I cannot tell whether it was a month or weeks, but he was
28 in Freetown for a while and later pulled out up country.
- 29 Q. At that point in time there was a split between the RUF

- 1 and the SLA components of the AFRC.
- 2 A. It was not a total split, because there were RUF members
3 still in Freetown doing their job with the AFRC
4 government.
- 5 Q. Just to refresh you memory a little bit, the coup took
6 place on 25th May 1997. Did Sam Bockarie leave Freetown
7 before August 1997?
- 8 A. I cannot tell. I cannot tell the month Sam Bockarie left
9 Freetown for up country.
- 10 Q. But it was definitely before September 1997?
- 11 A. Well, unless you force me to give a false statement, but
12 I cannot tell, as I said.
- 13 Q. A government gazette was published on 18th September
14 1997, which is Exhibit 6. Your Honour, I would like a
15 copy of Exhibit 6 to be shown to the witness.
- 16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Is that the gazette?
- 17 MR NICOL-WILSON: Yes, that's the gazette, Your Honour,
18 Exhibit 6.
- 19 Q. Can you see the date on which that gazette was published?
- 20 A. Thursday, 18 September 1997.
- 21 Q. Can you tell whether Sam Bockarie left Freetown before
22 the 18th September 1997?
- 23 A. I'm still on my legs, I can't tell the right dates,
24 neither the right months he left Freetown.
- 25 Q. After he left Freetown, did all the commanders of the RUF
26 accompany him to the provinces?
- 27 A. No.
- 28 Q. No? So he was the only one that left Freetown?
- 29 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. Can you tell whether there was a peace meeting in Conakry
2 between the government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah
3 and the government of Johnny Paul Koroma?
- 4 A. There was a scheduled meeting that should take place at
5 Pamelap, but it did not go on successfully.
- 6 Q. Was there any other meeting in Conakry?
- 7 A. That's the only one I knew of. The other meeting I knew
8 of was the one at Ivory Coast.
- 9 Q. In your evidence-in-chief you said you were chief
10 security to the PLO3.
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. As such, you were very close to information source.
- 13 A. Well, yes, because I was his immediate person close to
14 him.
- 15 Q. At that time did you hear anything about the ECOWAS
16 six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone?
- 17 A. Yes, I heard of.
- 18 Q. Can you tell this Court what that peace plan was all
19 about?
- 20 A. I cannot tell the Court because I just heard Principal
21 Liaison Officer 3 telling me that they have given the
22 AFRC junta three months -- six months. That's all I
23 know.
- 24 Q. When was that six months supposed to expire?
- 25 A. I cannot tell the date it started, neither the day it
26 should expire.
- 27 Q. Was it meant to expire on 12th February 1998 when you
28 left Freetown?
- 29 A. I cannot tell the day it should expire, because I only

1 heard that from my boss that the AFRC junta has been
2 given six months. But I did not know the day it started,
3 neither the date it ended -- it will expire.

4 Q. Were you forced out of Freetown before the day that six
5 months is supposed to expire?

6 A. We are forced out of Freetown, but I don't know whether
7 the dates expired before that or after that.

8 Q. Did the RUF participate in the meeting in Conakry out of
9 which the ECOWAS six-month peace plan --

10 MR HARRISON: I think, for the sake of clarity, the witness
11 has denied any knowledge of a meeting at Conakry. It can
12 be put to the witness if he knows of the meeting and
13 where it took place, but I think we are at a loss for
14 where we are located now.

15 PRESIDING JUDGE: But the counsel is on his feet, he is
16 putting his questions and I think the question is
17 relevant. It is pursuing his cross-examination of this
18 witness. Mr Wilson, can you continue, please?

19 MR NICOL-WILSON: I am grateful, your Honour.

20 Q. Did the RUF participate in the meeting in Conakry?

21 A. I cannot tell whether the RUF participated, because the
22 meeting I told you I knew about is the one at -- that
23 took place at Ivory Coast, and the meeting that took --
24 that should take place at, let me say, at the border
25 between -- between Sierra Leone and Guinea, that is
26 Pamelap. Those are the two meetings I only knew of. I
27 don't know any meeting about inside Conakry.

28 Q. Did the RUF participate at the Pamelap meeting?

29 A. Well, I cannot say, because I did not go on the trip. I

- 1 knew that Johnny Paul went, but he came back, he couldn't
2 sit on the meeting there. So I don't know whether any
3 RUF went with him or not.
- 4 Q. You said the PLO3, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara, informed you
5 about the ECOWAS six-month peace plan. What else did he
6 say about that peace plan?
- 7 A. The only thing he said to me is that they have given the
8 AFRC junta six months. That's all.
- 9 Q. And when did he give you this information?
- 10 A. He gave me the information in Freetown.
- 11 Q. What month?
- 12 A. I couldn't tell the month and time, but the information
13 was given to me in Freetown. When we are in Freetown.
- 14 Q. Do you have a good memory?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. You can remember events and dates?
- 17 A. Not all events and dates I could remember, unless --
18 events and dates I could remember are events and dates
19 that I know I was there on that day. I would be able to
20 recollect.
- 21 Q. Morris Kallon was not a minister under the AFRC
22 government.
- 23 A. Morris Kallon, if he was not a minister, he should be a
24 deputy to a ministerial -- to a ministry.
- 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, don't say "if". Witness, don't say
26 "if". Say what you know about him.
- 27 MR NICOL-WILSON:
- 28 Q. He was not a minister under the AFRC government.
- 29 A. I can't tell whether he was a minister or not.

- 1 Q. But you have a very good memory.
- 2 A. I have already told you that.
- 3 Q. Morris Kallon was also not part of your convoy on 13th
4 January -- on 13th February 1998 when you were pulling
5 out of Freetown.
- 6 A. On the 13th January when -- February, when we pulled out
7 of Freetown, a convoy we went with was with Principal
8 Liaison Officer 3.
- 9 Q. Morris Kallon was not part of that convoy.
- 10 A. No, we were the only one to pull out with our own convoy
11 on the 13th, because the rest pulled out on the 12th.
- 12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Was Morris Kallon part of that convoy? Your
13 answer is no?
- 14 THE WITNESS: No.
- 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Counsel, are you referring to -- is it the
16 pull-out on the 13th February?
- 17 MR NICOL-WILSON: Yes, that's when the last troops left
18 Freetown.
- 19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.
- 20 MR NICOL-WILSON: The pull-out started, I think, on 12th
21 February.
- 22 PRESIDING JUDGE: That was 19 --
- 23 MR NICOL-WILSON: 1998.
- 24 PRESIDING JUDGE: 1998.
- 25 MR NICOL-WILSON:
- 26 Q. Was Morris Kallon part of the convoy that left Freetown
27 on 12th February?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. Did you see him on 12th February?

1 A. I saw him on the 12th February at the residence of Johnny
2 Paul Koroma when it was made to all commanders that we
3 should pull out from Freetown. But when pulling out, I
4 was not at the residence of Johnny Paul, but I know he
5 was in town.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE:

7 Q. Can you say that besides Morris Kallon attending the
8 meeting where instructions for the pull-out were given,
9 besides, you know, his being present, did you see him
10 actually pull out, you know, on the 12th -- you pulled
11 out on the 13th?

12 A. Yes, under --

13 Q. Did you see him pulling out on the 13th?

14 A. On the 12th.

15 Q. On the 12th, I'm sorry.

16 A. No, I never saw anyone pulling out, because we were
17 deployed up to Hill Station.

18 Q. So you never saw Morris Kallon pulling out on the 12th?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. But you saw him when instructions were given --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- that troops should pull out?

23 A. Yes.

24 MR NICOL-WILSON:

25 Q. You said you fought in the war in 1993 and 1994; is that
26 correct?

27 A. Correct.

28 Q. And you were fighting on the side of the Sierra Leone
29 Army?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. Did you fight against the RUF?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did you come across Morris Kallon in 1993 and 1994?

5 A. No.

6 Q. When did you first meet Morris Kallon?

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just a minute --

8 THE WITNESS: I first saw Morris Kallon --

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just hold on. Hold on, please. Hold on.

10 He admits that he fought against the RUF.

11 MR NICOL-WILSON: In 1993 and 1994.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: He had said so before anyway.

13 MR NICOL-WILSON: I was trying to establish --

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: 1993 and 1994. Yes, go ahead, counsel.

15 MR NICOL-WILSON: -- whether at that time he met Morris

16 Kallon.

17 A. No.

18 Q. So when was the first time you saw Morris Kallon?

19 A. The first time I saw Morris Kallon was after the coup

20 when the RUF came to Freetown.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: You saw him for the first time after the

22 coup. When?

23 THE WITNESS: RUF arrived in Freetown.

24 MR NICOL-WILSON:

25 Q. Earlier, when you said you joined the army in 1993 in

26 Kenema --

27 A. Yeah.

28 Q. -- did you go to any formal training?

29 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. At which training school?
- 2 A. I was trained at Kenema. It was not a training school,
3 it was at the brigade headquarters that was there.
- 4 Q. Were you trained as a soldier or as a vigilante?
- 5 A. I was trained as vigilante, and then later -- I was later
6 on trained as a soldier.
- 7 Q. Where were you trained as a soldier?
- 8 A. At Benguema Training Centre with the Executive Outcomes.
9 South Africans.
- 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Microphone not activated]
- 11 THE WITNESS: Executive Outcomes, South Africans.
- 12 MR NICOL-WILSON:
- 13 Q. Was this regular training, or was it training for
14 selected people?
- 15 A. This was a regular training, military training.
- 16 Q. So in Kenema you were trained as a vigilante?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Can you tell this Court the difference between a
19 vigilante and a soldier?
- 20 A. A vigilante is when the war was tense, people joined
21 the -- go willingly to fight -- I mean, for the country
22 against the RUF.
- 23 Q. So will I be correct to say that vigilantes are those
24 that volunteered to serve in military capacity, but do
25 not have proper military training?
- 26 A. Yes.
- 27 Q. For how long did you serve as a vigilante?
- 28 A. Just two years.
- 29 Q. So you were fighting against the RUF in 1993 and 1994 as

1 a vigilante without proper training?

2 A. Yes.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Learned counsel, I see you are consulting.
4 We shall take a short break.

5 MR NICOL-WILSON: As Your Honour pleases.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: And we will continue after that. The Court
7 will rise, please.

8 [Break taken at 4.17 p.m.]

9 [Upon resuming at 4.42 p.m.]

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Wilson, you will proceed with your
11 cross-examination of this witness.

12 MR NICOL-WILSON: Thank you, your Honour.

13 Q. Mr Witness, you were a vigilante from 1993 to 1996;
14 correct?

15 JUDGE THOMPSON: Mr Wilson, could you speak little more into
16 your mike.

17 MR NICOL-WILSON: Yes, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE THOMPSON: I am not getting you very well.

19 MR NICOL-WILSON: Sorry, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE THOMPSON: It's okay. It's all right.

21 MR NICOL-WILSON:

22 Q. Mr Witness, you were a vigilante from 1993 to 1996.
23 A. No.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: So you were vigilante from what --

25 JUDGE THOMPSON: I thought I heard him saying 1993 and 1994.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: You said for two years.

27 JUDGE THOMPSON: Two years, yes.

28 THE WITNESS: I said for two years, yes.

29 JUDGE THOMPSON: You stand by that answer?

1 THE WITNESS: Yes.

2 MR NICOL-WILSON:

3 Q. And then in 1996 you went to Kono?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And then you were arrested in Kono and brought down to

6 Freetown.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And detained at the Pademba Road prison?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Can you tell this Court when exactly you went through the

11 military training?

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, let me get some loose ends, you know.

13 He was arrested for what? Let's --

14 MR NICOL-WILSON: At this stage, I don't wish to establish --

15 PRESIDING JUDGE: You don't want to establish that?

16 MR NICOL-WILSON: Exactly.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Right. Okay.

18 MR NICOL-WILSON: He was arrested and imprisoned at Pademba

19 Road prison.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Put the question to him again, the next

21 question which you put to him.

22 MR NICOL-WILSON:

23 Q. In 1996, you were arrested and detained at Pademba

24 prison?

25 A. Yes, yes.

26 JUDGE THOMPSON: [Microphone not activated]

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Microphone not activated]

28 MR NICOL-WILSON:

29 Q. When exactly did you go through military training?

1 A. In 1995, I trained with the Executive Outcomes, South
2 Africa.

3 Q. For how long?

4 A. Three months.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness had also said that he had
6 undergone, you know, a certain form of training in --
7 yes, in Kenema.

8 JUDGE THOMPSON: In Kenema.

9 Q. From your record he has said the Kenema was the vigilante
10 training?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And the soldier training with Executive Outcomes was at
13 Benguema.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. So that is the state of your evidence?

16 A. Yes.

17 MR NICOL-WILSON:

18 Q. Who was the adjutant at the Benguema Training Camp?

19 A. The adjutant at that time at Benguema camp was KES Boya.

20 Q. And what is your registration number?

21 A. SLA 18 17 3553.

22 JUDGE BOUTET: Run that again.

23 THE WITNESS: SLA 18 17 3553.

24 JUDGE BOUTET: Thank you.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: 18 17 3553?

26 THE WITNESS: Yes.

27 MR NICOL-WILSON:

28 Q. I am putting it to you that you have never changed the
29 status from vigilante to soldier.

1 A. No.

2 JUDGE THOMPSON: What is your answer? Do you disagree with
3 that?

4 THE WITNESS: I disagree.

5 MR NICOL-WILSON:

6 Q. Can you please turn over to the interview of 6 May at
7 page 1?

8 JUDGE THOMPSON: Which year, learned counsel?

9 MR NICOL-WILSON: Again, your Honour?

10 JUDGE THOMPSON: Is it 2003?

11 MR NICOL-WILSON:

12 Q. Yes, 6 May 2003, page 1?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Line 20.

15 A. Yes.

16 JUDGE BOUTET: Which is, for the record, 8372.

17 MR NICOL-WILSON:

18 Q. You said, "I joined the Sierra Leone Army in 1993 on the
19 6th of May."

20 A. Yes, as a vigilante.

21 Q. This statement is inconsistent with your statement now
22 that you joined the army in 1995.

23 A. Here -- in 1993, I joined alongside fighting with the
24 SLAs as a vigilante. And in 1995, I was trained as a
25 trained soldier and when I was arrested, put to Pademba
26 Road, my number was taken from me and given to another
27 soldier serving presently. And when the peace process
28 came I went back on training, the British training, and I
29 got another number: 27 12/2000.

- 1 JUDGE THOMPSON:
- 2 Q. Witness, let's have that slowly, please?
- 3 A. In 1993, I fought alongside with the SLA as a vigilante.
4 And in 1995, I went through the military training as an
5 SLA soldier carrying the number SLA 18 17 3553.
- 6 Q. Just take it back from "went through". You went through
7 what?
- 8 A. In 1993 --
- 9 Q. "1995 [sic] I went through as."
- 10 A. A military training and my registration number was SLA
11 3553, and in 1996 I was arrested and put in Pademba Road
12 prison. My number was given to another soldier serving
13 presently. And in 2000 I went through the British
14 training and I was given another registration number: 27
15 12/2000.
- 16 PRESIDING JUDGE:
- 17 Q. Let's have the number again?
- 18 A. In 1995 --
- 19 Q. No, no, no, just the number. Just the number. The
20 number you obtained after the training. The second
21 number you got.
- 22 A. 27 12/2000. That was with the British training at the
23 Benguema Training Centre in 2000.
- 24 MR NICOL-WILSON:
- 25 Q. So am I correct to say that in 1993 you fought alongside
26 the Sierra Leone Army?
- 27 A. Yes, as a vigilante.
- 28 Q. But you only joined the army in 1995.
- 29 A. Yes, when I went through the military training.

1 Q. Let us turn over to the British training for a moment.

2 You said in the year 2000 you took part in the British
3 training.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Did you complete that training?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Can you tell this Court why?

8 A. I was on the training campus. It was a six week training
9 course. I did four weeks and I was pulled out of the
10 training, brought to the army headquarters at Cockerill
11 and the CDS at that time was Brigadier Tom Carew. I went
12 to his office and he showed me a paper from Johnny Paul
13 Koroma stating that I was alleged to plan to kill him,
14 and now the government has enlist me into the army again.
15 So he is afraid of that.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE:

17 Q. Let me get the name. You said you were pulled out of the
18 training camp after four weeks?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And you were taken to whose office?

21 A. Brigadier Tom Carew, the former CDS.

22 JUDGE THOMPSON: For what reason?

23 THE WITNESS: He showed me a paper that he said Johnny Paul
24 wrote to them, the military, that I at one time wanted to
25 kill him and now I have been enlist into the army again.
26 So he is not safe.

27 JUDGE BOUTET: [Microphone not activated] kill him, meaning
28 the CDS or [overlapping speakers]

29 THE WITNESS: No, Johnny Paul Koroma.

- 1 JUDGE THOMPSON: Continue, learned counsel.
- 2 MR NICOL-WILSON:
- 3 Q. Was Johnny Paul Koroma in Sierra Leone in the year 2000?
- 4 A. Johnny Paul Koroma came to Sierra Leone in the year 2000
5 from Liberia with Corporal Foday Sankoh.
- 6 Q. In 2001, were you appointed chief security officer for
7 Johnny Paul Koroma?
- 8 A. I was appointed chief security to Johnny Paul Koroma in
9 2000.
- 10 Q. And this is after you were removed from the military
11 training school on allegations that at one point in time
12 you wanted to kill Johnny Paul Koroma?
- 13 A. No, before I went on training.
- 14 Q. Was this training for former members of the Sierra Leone
15 Army?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. I am now putting it to you that you were removed from the
18 training camp because they realised that you have never
19 been a member of the Sierra Leone Army.
- 20 A. I disagree with that.
- 21 Q. I am also putting it to you that it is not possible for a
22 military number assigned to one soldier to be taken and
23 given to another soldier.
- 24 A. It is possible, because at that time we were under the
25 NPRC military regime, so they can do anything they would
26 like to do. And the soldier is presently serving in the
27 Sierra Leone Army with my number that was given to him.
- 28 Q. Do you know the name of that soldier?
- 29 A. I only know his nickname by the name of Kaabu and he was

1 with Tom Nyuma as a civilian at the time we were at
2 Kenema.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: So what is his nickname again?

4 THE WITNESS: Kaabu.

5 MR NICOL-WILSON:

6 Q. Is this the same Tom Nyuma you worked with as a vigilante
7 in 1993?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So Kaabu was also a vigilante?

10 A. No, he was civilian at the house helping to do house
11 domestics.

12 Q. Do you know where Mr Morris Kallon was deployed during
13 the reign of the AFRC?

14 A. No, I was just seeing him in Freetown.

15 Q. Do you know if he was assigned to Bo?

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please wait for -- let's digest the
17 question.

18 MR NICOL-WILSON: Sorry, Your Honour. Sorry.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: I did not know where Morris Kallon was
20 working.

21 JUDGE THOMPSON: Was deployed during the reign of the AFRC.
22 [HS191004F 5.00 p.m.]

23 JUDGE THOMPSON: What was the other --

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: [Overlapping speakers] Put the question to
16:55:56 25 him again, please. Let's get it clear on the record.

26 MR NICOL-WILSON:

27 Q. Do you know where Morris Kallon was deployed during the
28 reign of the AFRC?

29 A. No.

- 1 Q. Do you know if he was assigned to Bo?
- 2 A. No.
- 3 Q. Do you mainly see Morris Kallon during council meetings?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 16:56:41 5 Q. And besides attending council meetings, you don't know of
6 any other function he was performing in Freetown?
- 7 A. I couldn't remember.
- 8 Q. I put it to you that Morris Kallon was based in Bo during
9 the reign of the AFRC and only came to Freetown to attend
16:57:40 10 council meetings?
- 11 A. I cannot tell that he was based in Bo because I normally
12 see him in Freetown most of the time and even on council
13 meetings.
- 14 Q. After you left Freetown in February 1998 you held a
16:58:37 15 series of meetings according to your oral testimony?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. There was a meeting at Masiaka?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. There was a meeting at Makeni?
- 16:58:50 20 A. Yeah.
- 21 Q. There was a meeting at Kabala?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. Now, can you tell this Court what was the purpose of the
24 meeting at Masiaka?
- 16:59:04 25 A. The purpose of the meeting at Masiaka was, one, to go and
26 attack Bo to gain control of Bo; two -- two, for us to
27 reorganise ourself to pursue ECOMOG.
- 28 Q. Were instructions given at that meeting?
- 29 A. The only instructions that were given was to go to attack

- 1 Bo.
- 2 Q. Was any instruction given for looting?
- 3 A. Instructions were not given for looting, but looting went
4 on at Masiaka.
- 16:59:56 5 Q. At the meeting no one was ordered to loot?
- 6 A. No.
- 7 Q. Was anyone ordered to rape?
- 8 A. No.
- 9 Q. Was anyone ordered to abduct civilians?
- 17:00:11 10 A. No.
- 11 Q. So it was merely a defensive meeting, to defend your
12 positions against ECOMOG?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. There was another meeting in Makeni?
- 17:00:45 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. Can you tell the Court the purpose of that meeting?
- 17 A. The purpose of the meeting in Makeni was for us to head
18 to Kabala, which would be more safer for the troops.
- 19 Q. At that meeting no one was ordered to loot?
- 17:01:10 20 A. No one was ordered to loot at the meeting, neither
21 ordered to rape or ordered to burn any house.
- 22 Q. And then, according to your testimony, there was another
23 meeting at Kabala?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 17:01:31 25 Q. And what was the purpose of that meeting?
- 26 A. One, the purpose of the meeting for us to go and get
27 control of Kono.
- 28 Q. That was the only purpose of the meeting?
- 29 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. Was anyone ordered to mine upon taking control of Kono?
- 2 A. No, no orders were given for mining.
- 3 Q. Were orders given for looting?
- 4 A. No.
- 17:02:06 5 Q. Rape?
- 6 A. No.
- 7 Q. So these meetings you have spoken about were meetings to
8 strategise [sic] -- meetings to establish a military plan
9 of action?
- 17:02:29 10 A. Yes, because at that time we are purely concentrating on
11 the ECOMOG forces, how we should come together and try to
12 stop them from attacking our positions.
- 13 Q. Were there different factions within the SLA from Masiaka
14 to Kabala?
- 17:03:40 15 A. No.
- 16 Q. Was the SLA united from Masiaka to Kabala?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Was there a split at Kabala?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 17:03:58 20 Q. Can you please explain to this Court how the split came
21 about?
- 22 A. The split came about on the movement to attack Kono. SAJ
23 Musa disagree of going to attack Kono with RUF, and so he
24 remain in Kabala and took on to the way with Krubola with
17:04:28 25 some SLA fighters, whilst the rest of the SLA and RUF in
26 Kabala went to attack Kono, and it was successful.
- 27 Q. So SAJ Musa went to Krubola with some members of the SLA?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. And then who took the troops to Kabala? Who was the

- 1 commander of the troops that went to Kabala?
- 2 A. We are in Kabala when SAJ Musa left Kabala to Krubola.
- 3 Q. Sorry, sorry, witness. To Kono. Who commanded these
4 troops to Kono?
- 17:05:01 5 A. Superman, Denis Mingo commanded the troops to Kono.
- 6 Q. Who was the most senior SLA commander?
- 7 A. The most senior SLA commander was Ibrahim Bazy Kamara.
- 8 Q. So at that time there was clearly a split between those
9 belonging to Bazy's group and those belonging to the
17:05:21 10 group of SAJ Musa?
- 11 A. Yes, at that time, yes.
- 12 Q. When SAJ Musa moved from Krubola to Major Eddie Town, he
13 left behind Brigadier Mani and some other members of the
14 Sierra Leone Army?
- 17:05:48 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. They were not part of the movement to Freetown?
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. So at that point again there was another split?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 17:05:59 20 Q. After the January 6 retreat from Freetown there was also
21 split between Issa Sesay, on the one hand, and Superman,
22 on the other?
- 23 A. Yes. That was when Issa Sesay was told by Mosquito to
24 take -- to arrest Gibril Massaquoi and take him to
17:06:47 25 Kailahun.
- 26 Q. There was also another split between Denis Mingo and Issa
27 Sesay in Makeni?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. Can you explain a little bit about that incident?

- 1 A. I cannot explain in details, but, due to monitoring the
2 set, I learnt that Issa Sesay came from Kono to take over
3 control of Makeni, and Superman was at Makeni so he had
4 to pull out to Lunsar.
- 17:07:32 5 Q. So would you agree with me that during this period, 1997
6 to 1999, the RUF was not operating as one united group?
- 7 A. In that period they operate as one united group in Kono
8 till when they lost Kono and Superman took over Kono,
9 they were operating as united group. But after, when
17:08:06 10 Issa was sent to take over command and control of Kono,
11 then the split began.
- 12 Q. And at Kono when they were operating as a united group,
13 no looting took place?
- 14 A. Before reaching Kono from Kabala, Kono was already
17:08:27 15 looted. So when we reached there, there was no looting
16 that took place.
- 17 Q. No mining also took place during this period?
- 18 A. During that period no mining took place, because we had
19 pressure from ECOMOG troops trying to enter Kono.
- 17:08:42 20 Q. So they acted as one in order to defend Kono from ECOMOG
21 advance?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. And after this period you had different groups within the
24 RUF?
- 17:08:59 25 A. Yes.
- 26 Q. There were occasions in which Denis Mingo was not taking
27 instructions from Sam Bockarie?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. There were also occasions in which Massaquoi was not

1 taking instructions from Denis Mingo?

2 A. Gibril Massaquoi continued taking instructions from Denis
3 Mingo since the time when we came to Freetown, January 6,
4 and released him from the Pademba Road prisons. On our
17:09:47 5 retreat to Waterloo, he was with Superman throughout and
6 he was taking instruction from Superman.

7 Q. According to your oral testimony, in May of 1998 you left
8 Kono from Mansofinia?

9 A. Yes.

17:10:27 10 Q. At that time you decided to break away from this joint
11 command with the RUF?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. So you were now operating on your own?

14 A. We are operating and our commander was SAJ Musa.

17:10:56 15 Q. So was SAJ Musa the overall commander from the moment you
16 arrived at Mansofinia?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And who was the deputy commander?

19 A. When we arrived at Mansofinia with our own troops, we
17:11:12 20 stayed at Mansofinia whilst SAJ Musa was at Krubola, and
21 we never joined up with the forces in Krubola. Our own
22 commander at Mansofinia was Alex Tamba Brima, till we
23 pull out from Mansofinia to Camp Rosos.

24 Q. So SAJ Musa was the overall commander from Mansofinia to
17:11:37 25 Camp Rosos to Major Eddie Town up to Newton?

26 A. He was the overall commander when he came and joined us
27 at Major Eddie Town for the Freetown invasion. From
28 Mansofinia to Camp Rosos the commander was Alex Tamba
29 Brima.

- 1 Q. During this period was there any communication between
2 SAJ Musa and the RUF high command?
- 3 A. No.
- 4 Q. So will I be correct to say that the SLA was operating as
17:12:17 5 an independent group?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. And were not working together with the RUF?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. Can you tell the Court why SAJ Musa did not communicate
17:12:33 10 with the RUF?
- 11 A. I can't.
- 12 Q. If I may just take you for a moment back to when you
13 arrived at Kabala. Some members of the RUF decided to
14 stay at Kabala with SAJ Musa; is that correct?
- 17:13:12 15 A. No senior commander of the RUF stayed with SAJ Musa. If
16 any RUF stayed with SAJ Musa, will be junior fighters.
- 17 Q. Do you know if any member of the RUF stayed with SAJ Musa
18 in Kabala at that time?
- 19 A. Fighters of the RUF stayed with SAJ Musa, but no senior
17:13:36 20 commander of the RUF stayed with SAJ Musa.
- 21 Q. And then when you pulled out of Kono, Savage, belonging
22 to the SLA, decided to stay and work with the RUF?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. So will I be correct to say it is usual for SLA fighters,
17:14:02 25 junior fighters to switch over to the RUF, and for RUF
26 junior fighters to switch over to the SLA?
- 27 A. Yes.
- 28 Q. And when you also moved away from Kono to Mansofinia,
29 according to your oral testimony about 20 RUF boys

1 followed you?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And at that time there was no communication between the
4 so-called RUF boys and the RUF high command?

17:14:47 5 A. No.

6 Q. They were operating under the command of the SLA?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. All instructions were given to them by commanders of the
9 SLA?

17:15:01 10 A. Yes.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Learned counsel, are you dictating -- are
12 you suggesting answers, you know, to your questions or
13 what are you up to?

14 MR NICOL-WILSON: Sorry, Your Honour. I will change this
17:15:17 15 pattern of cross-examination.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay, you may proceed.

17 MR NICOL-WILSON:

18 Q. How did Alfred Brown come in contact with SAJ Musa?

19 A. Alfred Brown was with SAJ Musa from the pull-out from
17:15:44 20 Kabala to Krubola.

21 Q. So did he switch from the RUF to the SLA under the
22 command of SAJ Musa?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. While with SAJ Musa do you know if he was taking
17:16:08 25 instructions from members of the RUF high command?

26 A. I couldn't say because I was not present at Krubola.

27 Q. From the moment he came over to Major Eddie Town with SAJ
28 Musa, do you know if he was taking instructions from
29 members of the RUF high command?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Was he taking instructions from SAJ Musa?

3 A. Yes, because he was with SAJ Musa.

4 Q. In answer to one of the questions from counsel for the
17:17:11 5 first accused you said a number of fighters from the RUF
6 were sent to capture SAJ Musa at Krubola.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You also said that they decided to stay at Krubola.

9 A. Yes.

17:17:28 10 Q. Do you know if they stayed willingly at Krubola or were
11 kept there as prisoners of war?

12 A. They were not kept as prisoners of war. They were --
13 they stayed willingly because they were not under arrest,
14 neither were they kept as prisoner of war.

17:17:47 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness added -- learned counsel, the
16 witness added, you know, that those who were sent to
17 capture SAJ Musa even revealed their mission to him.

18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: They revealed their mission to him, so --

17:18:04 20 MR NICOL-WILSON:

21 Q. So you agree with me that they switched over from the RUF
22 to the SLA at that point in time?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, from the moment you left Freetown in February 1998
17:18:51 25 up to the time you went to Kabala, Kono, back to
26 Mansofinia, Major Eddie Town, Camp Rosos and Newton, you
27 were putting on military uniforms?

28 A. Some put on military uniforms, those who had the
29 capability to have one. But some don't put on military

1 uniforms. We are dressed mixed.

2 Q. Were the majority of the fighters putting on military
3 uniforms?

4 A. No. Majorities of the fighters placed on civilian dress.

17:19:29 5 Q. So there was a mix - some with full military uniforms,
6 some with partial military uniforms?

7 A. Yes.

8 JUDGE BOUTET: And some with no military uniform?

9 THE WITNESS: Some with no military uniforms at all.

17:19:48 10 MR NICOL-WILSON: Thank you.

11 JUDGE BOUTET: And did you say that the majority were -- did
12 not have military uniforms?

13 THE WITNESS: Yes.

14 MR NICOL-WILSON:

17:20:06 15 Q. And is this the way you were dressed when you went to
16 Batkanu?

17 A. Batkanu -- when we went to Batkanu we are mixed. Some
18 with military uniforms, some with civilian clothes.

19 Q. And when you went to Mateboi?

17:20:21 20 A. Exactly so.

21 Q. Kukuna?

22 A. Exactly so.

23 Q. And in all of these villages civilians were massacred?

24 A. Civilians were abducted and civilians were also killed.

17:20:37 25 Q. And did you reveal your identity to the inhabitants of
26 these villages?

27 A. No.

28 Q. Did you tell the inhabitants of these villages that you
29 are members of the RUF?

- 1 A. No.
- 2 Q. Did you tell them you are rebels?
- 3 A. That's common name they call us - rebels. So we did not
4 tell them whether we are SLA or neither RUF. We are all
17:21:32 5 classed as rebels.
- 6 Q. And was this the mode of your dress before you came to
7 Freetown?
- 8 A. Before coming down to Freetown at Lunsar we had a handful
9 of military fatigues.
- 17:22:10 10 Q. And so we are -- [Overlapping microphones]
- 11 PRESIDING JUDGE: You had a handful of?
- 12 THE WITNESS: Military uniforms.
- 13 MR NICOL-WILSON:
- 14 Q. And so before entering Freetown all the fighters were
17:22:24 15 putting on military uniforms?
- 16 A. No.
- 17 Q. Were the majority of the fighters putting on military
18 uniforms?
- 19 A. No.
- 17:22:36 20 Q. Were members of the SLA putting on red hand bands?
- 21 A. On the attack in Freetown some members put -- who were
22 SLAs, put RUF used hand bands on their hands and their
23 heads; red. But very few.
- 24 Q. What about plasters?
- 17:23:20 25 A. Yes, very few.
- 26 Q. Can you tell the Court the significance of the red hand
27 bands?
- 28 A. The red hand bands means -- it means danger.
- 29 Q. Was it a way of identifying members of your group?

- 1 A. No.
- 2 Q. What was the objective of the military invasion of
3 Freetown on the 6th of January?
- 4 A. The objective was to restore the army. I don't know that
17:24:53 5 the army was disband.
- 6 Q. So it has nothing to do with getting the RUF to be part
7 of a government of national unity?
- 8 A. I couldn't say that.
- 9 Q. It also has nothing to do with the SLA taking over the
17:25:19 10 rein of government?
- 11 A. I couldn't say that too.
- 12 Q. Will I be correct then to say that the only reason for
13 coming into Freetown on the 6th of January was to
14 reinstate the army?
- 17:25:32 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. And was that exercise purely carried out by members of
17 the SLA?
- 18 A. We are mixed. We have few RUF fighters with us.
- 19 Q. Now, could you please turn over to page 33 of the
17:26:04 20 interview of the 6th of May 2003?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 [HS191004G 5.30 p.m.]
- 23 JUDGE BOUTET: Counsel, what's the page again?
- 24 MR NICOL-WILSON: Page 33 of the interview of 6 May 2003.
- 17:30:07 25 JUDGE BOUTET: So this is page 8404?
- 26 MR NICOL-WILSON: Yes.
- 27 Q. It is line 32. The question is, "So up to that point
28 were the RUF anywhere inside this plan?" And the answer
29 is "No". The question is, "So it was just purely SLA."

1 The objective was purely SLA?" and the answer is, "Purely
2 SLA, purely SLA."
3 A. Yes, that is said because we hadn't got any RUF commander
4 with us, but we had RUF fighters, very few on the
17:30:54 5 movement, but the commanders, where the decision-making
6 was, we had no RUF commander. So that is why that answer
7 is given.
8 Q. And the RUF members you're talking about here are the
9 few --
17:31:13 10 A. Few.
11 Q. -- who had moved over from the RUF to the SLA.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, can you turn over to page 28 of the same interview?
14 A. Yes.
17:31:28 15 Q. At line 35. The question is, "Okay. Where did the RUF
16 factor in on the move on Freetown? Was it going to be a
17 joint thing?" The answer is, "No, we did not have any
18 RUF on the movement to Freetown, purely SLAs. That I can
19 tell you fact, purely SLAs that came to Freetown on
17:31:57 20 January 6. It was not RUF."
21 A. Yes, because majority of the movement to Freetown was
22 purely SLA, and the few RUF was not even up to 40 in
23 number out of thousands of SLA, so that was why I said
24 "purely SLAs".
17:32:19 25 JUDGE BOUTET: Is it RUF total would be 40 - four zero - in
26 number?
27 THE WITNESS: Yes, few of them.
28 MR NICOL-WILSON:
29 Q. While in Freetown a number of atrocities were committed

- 1 by fighters belonging to the SLA.
- 2 A. Both SLA and RUF, atrocities were committed.
- 3 Q. Mr Witness, in your statement you have made it abundantly
4 clear that the attack of Freetown was done purely by the
17:33:32 5 SLA.
- 6 A. Yes, because the number 40 out of SLAs being thousands,
7 the SLA will just have to overrun the number, so that's
8 why I said purely SLAs and there was no RUF commander at
9 that time with us.
- 17:33:50 10 Q. Please -- please answer to my question.
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. If I refer to the RUF, you answer; if I refer to the SLA,
13 you answer, please.
- 14 A. Yes.
- 17:33:54 15 Q. Now, the question is: a lot of atrocities were committed
16 by fighters belonging to the SLA; correct?
- 17 A. In Freetown?
- 18 Q. In Freetown --
- 19 A. Yes.
- 17:34:06 20 Q. -- during the January 6th invasion?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. In your oral testimony you said a member of the SLA gave
23 an order for amputations to be effected?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 17:34:23 25 Q. Was that order effected?
- 26 A. It was effected and fighters went out to do the
27 amputations.
- 28 Q. Do you know how many people were amputated?
- 29 A. No.

- 1 Q. Did you take part in the amputations?
- 2 A. No.
- 3 Q. Did you take part in any of the killings that occurred in
4 Freetown during the January 6th invasion?
- 17:35:10 5 A. I could say killings that occurred January 6th invasion,
6 I was the task force commander and I came with the troops
7 and there were laws that were placed to the fighters and
8 whenever a fighter goes beyond that law, he will be
9 killed if he deserves killing, and on the battlefield
17:35:40 10 when I'm fighting, it is war -- killing occur through my
11 bullets.
- 12 Q. So you must have killed many people during the
13 January 6th invasion.
- 14 A. I killed enemies that held arms that were the ECOMOGs,
17:35:57 15 but I did not kill civilians that I have conscious that
16 I have killed myself.
- 17 Q. What were your functions as task force commander?
- 18 A. Task force commander is to -- for discipline of the
19 troops in Freetown.
- 17:36:16 20 Q. So did you discipline the troops in Freetown?
- 21 A. No, because after the death of SAJ Musa, he appointed me
22 as task force commander. When we reached Freetown, that
23 job was not carried, because of the command and control
24 we had.
- 17:36:33 25 Q. Again, after the death of SAJ Musa, were you still the
26 task force commander?
- 27 A. Yes, it was still my title.
- 28 Q. So did you discipline the troops in Freetown?
- 29 A. No, I couldn't, because orders were given from the above,

1 so I could not discipline anybody, because if I do, I,
2 too, will be disciplined from the senior authorities.

3 Q. You spoke about a dispute between Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara
4 and Tamba Alex Brima on the way to Freetown after the
17:38:33 5 death of SAJ Musa.

6 A. Yes, at Koba Wata.

7 Q. And the dispute pertained to the succession of SAJ Musa?
8 A. Yes.

9 Q. At that point in time, who were you supporting?
17:38:53 10 A. At that point in time, as the task force commander, I was
11 supporting Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara.

12 Q. And eventually Bazzy Kamara was not appointed the head of
13 the movement?
14 A. Yes.

17:39:08 15 Q. Were you happy about that?
16 A. Well, I will not say I'm happy, because we have an
17 objective to do in Freetown. So we just have to work as
18 a team and accomplish the mission.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: You say you were supporting Bazzy Kamara?
17:39:32 20 THE WITNESS: Yes.

21 MR NICOL-WILSON:

22 Q. So because Bazzy lost, you did not discipline the troops
23 when you arrived in Freetown?
24 A. Not because Bazzy lost. The disciplinary action got lost
17:40:09 25 because Alex Tamba Brima did not coordinate the movement
26 as how SAJ Musa had planned the movement, so discipline
27 got lost on the troops after the death of SAJ Musa.

28 Q. And from that moment you could no longer perform your
29 functions properly.

- 1 A. No, because he was sending me on operations whereas, as a
2 task force commander, I should be there to organise
3 troops to go on operation, but he was sending me on
4 operation.
- 17:40:51 5 Q. Can you approximate how many people were killed during
6 the January 6th invasion in Freetown?
- 7 A. I cannot.
- 8 Q. Can you give a rough estimate?
- 9 A. I cannot, because Freetown is a big city, and not
17:41:20 10 everywhere we got control over I was able to go, so
11 I cannot give a rough number.
- 12 Q. During that invasion, were you very much feared by
13 civilians and combatants?
- 14 A. Say again.
- 17:41:36 15 Q. Were you very much feared by civilians and combatants?
- 16 A. I was feared more by combatants.
- 17 Q. And why's that so?
- 18 A. Because, on my job, I'm a very strict person, so the
19 combatants feared me too much and that was why SAJ Musa
17:42:01 20 gave me the position as task force commander.
- 21 Q. Now, in your oral testimony you said upon your retreat
22 from Freetown you went to Benguema?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Is it also true that from Benguema you went to Waterloo?
- 17:42:45 25 A. Yes.
- 26 Q. Is it also true that from Waterloo you went to Mamamah?
- 27 A. From Waterloo a joint operation was planned to come back
28 into Freetown. When we lost, we couldn't penetrate.
29 Then we pull out back to Waterloo, and on our arrival at

1 Waterloo Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon had already gone to
2 Makeni. Alex Tamba Brima and the other troops followed
3 Issa Sesay to Makeni. That was why we stayed with Bazzy
4 to open the West Side jungle and we went to Mamamah.

17:43:34 5 Q. Can you turn to page 46 of your interview on 6 May 2003
6 starting from line 12?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. The question is:
9 "Okay. You talked about Freetown and you've talked
17:43:51 10 about when you were driven through Freetown..."

11 A. Excuse me, is it 8407?

12 JUDGE BOUTET: 17.

13 THE WITNESS: 8417 - page 46?

14 MR NICOL-WILSON:

17:44:23 15 Q. Yes. The question: "Okay" --

16 A. Which line, please?

17 Q. Line 12. The question is:
18 "Okay. You talked about Freetown and you've talked
19 about when you were driven through Freetown by ECOMOG."

17:44:38 20 And the answer is "Yes." And then the question:
21 "You said, while going back, that was the time you
22 committed all these atrocities, cutting of limbs, burning
23 of houses, et cetera, et cetera, and so where did you go
24 after leaving Freetown?"

17:44:55 25 And the answer is:
26 "After leaving Freetown we went to Waterloo. Then
27 we met -- no, Benguema -- we went to Benguema whilst RUF
28 Superman and Rambo they were in Waterloo, so we called on
29 them so that we can come to one to plan another operation

- 1 to Freetown. But they refused that they are not coming
2 because Mosquito has talked to them not to come. Then
3 they starting holding SLAs, taking out money from
4 their -- any jewellery they see from SLAs, they'd rough
17:45:29 5 you, take it from you. They said, 'We have come to
6 Freetown, we have come to loot. We have not come to
7 fight.' That's why we have gone to meet them again. So
8 they started humiliating people, so we had to break
9 away."
- 17:45:42 10 A. Yes, correct.
- 11 Q. So this is the correct state of affairs when you pulled
12 out of Freetown?
- 13 A. When we pulled out of Freetown earlier on, this happened
14 before the arrival of Issa Sesay, and when Issa Sesay
17:45:57 15 came, there was a meeting for joint operation back to
16 Freetown.
- 17 Q. I am putting it to you that this is exactly what happened
18 when you arrived at Benguema.
- 19 A. Yes, that is the early stage of our arrival at
17:46:12 20 Benguema -- this happened exactly.
- 21 Q. Okay. If I may continue on line 23:
22 "Then few of us went to open West Side -- West Side
23 camp. Then those other RUF men and few of some SLA girls
24 went back to Lunsar and then went to open the West Side
17:46:33 25 camp."
- 26 A. Yes.
- 27 Q. So from the statement --
- 28 A. Excuse me, please read it again from line 23.
- 29 Q. Yes. "Then few of us" -- I will start from line 21:

1 "They said we have come to Freetown, we have come to
2 loot. We have not come to fight. That's why we have
3 gone to meet them again. So they started humiliating
4 people, so we had to break away. Then few of us went to
17:46:59 5 open West Side -- West Side camp. Then those other RUF
6 men and few of some SLA girls went back to Lunsar. Then
7 we went to open the West Side camp. Gullit went with the
8 RUF. Then at West Side the commander was Bazy, Ibrahim
9 Bazy and he was deputised by Papa."

17:47:26 10 A. Correct.

11 Q. So what you said in your oral testimony about a joint
12 attack at Hastings together with the RUF is not correct?

13 A. It is correct, and I believe it is in this file. If it
14 is watched through properly, it is in this file, that
17:47:45 15 there was a joint operation between the RUF and the AFRC.
16 And in my oral statement I said about it and, if you
17 check properly, it will be there -- using the two routes,
18 the Tombo routes and the Hastings route.

19 Q. I am putting it to you that that joint operation did not
17:48:05 20 take place.

21 A. It took place, but it was not successful, and we pulled
22 back.

23 Q. Now, for a moment if I may just take you back to Kono in
24 1996. Were you ever referred to as Junior Bolo?

17:48:58 25 A. That was my name before I was arrested and taken to
26 Pademba Road prisons - I was called Junior Bolo.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Junior Bolo?

28 THE WITNESS: Yes.

29 MR NICOL-WILSON:

1 Q. And why were you arrested?

2 A. I was arrested because, as I initially told you, my boss
3 was Tom Nyuma, and I went on a route to Kono. On my
4 arrival at Kono I was deployed in a mining site and I had
17:49:38 5 to get a five carat, 25 per cent diamond that I failed to
6 tender to him, so he ordered my arrest.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Who deployed you to the mining site?

8 THE WITNESS: I was employed there by Mohamed Stalone, who was
9 the OC secretariat in Kono.

17:50:04 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mohamed?

11 THE WITNESS: Stalone. He's Mohamed Kallon aka Stalone --
12 Mohamed Kallon.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mohamed Kallon, who was the --

14 THE WITNESS: OC secretariat, Kono, and he was sent there by
17:50:39 15 Tom Nyuma.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: What happened? You said --

17 THE WITNESS: On my arrival at Kono, I stayed with Mohamed
18 Stalone and I was deployed to a mining site and where
19 I was deployed, I had to get five carat, 25 per cent of
17:50:57 20 diamond, which I failed to tender, and the report was
21 made to Tom Nyuma, and he ordered my arrest and brought
22 to Freetown. Because I failed to tender the diamond,
23 I was kept in Pademba Road prison as safe custody.

24 MR NICOL-WILSON:

17:51:29 25 Q. And how did you get this diamond?

26 A. I got it from the mining site -- one night they had
27 already taken out gravel, and I had to collect some and
28 wash it for myself.

29 Q. Were you involved in a fight with anyone for that diamond

1 at the mining site?

2 A. No.

3 Q. While at the mining site, were you armed?

4 A. Yes.

17:52:21 5 Q. What arm were you carrying?

6 A. I was carrying an AK-47 rifle.

7 Q. Did you ever use that weapon at the mining site --

8 A. No.

9 Q. -- on any occasion?

17:52:55 10 A. No.

11 Q. I am putting it to you that you were removed from the

12 mining site after you shot a civilian and took a diamond

13 from him.

14 A. I disagree.

17:53:53 15 MR NICOL-WILSON: Your Honour, this is a convenient point for

16 a break, because I intend to go into a different area.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: It will take time?

18 MR NICOL-WILSON: Yes, it will take some time.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay. We will at this point be adjourning

17:55:56 20 the proceedings to tomorrow at 9.30 when Mr Nicol-Wilson

21 will continue with the cross-examination of this witness.

22 The Court will adjourn until tomorrow.

23 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.55 p.m., to be

24 reconvened on Wednesday, the 20th day of October 2004, at

17:56:19 25 9.30 a.m.]

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C E R T I F I C A T E

We, Susan G Humphries, Ella K Drury, Maureen P Dunn and
Roni Kerekes, Official Court Reporters for the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, do hereby certify that the foregoing
proceedings in the above-entitled cause were taken at the
time and place as stated; that it was taken in shorthand
(machine writer) and thereafter transcribed by computer,
that the foregoing pages contain a true and correct
transcription of said proceedings to the best of our ability
and understanding.

We further certify that we are not of counsel nor related
to any of the parties to this cause and that we are in
nowise interested in the result of said cause.

Susan G Humphries

Ella K Drury

Maureen P Dunn

Roni Kerekes

WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION:

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