



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 13 AUGUST 2009  
9.32 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg  
Ms Sidney Thompson

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Terry Munyard  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Thursday, 13 August 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.]

09:33:22 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances  
6 first, please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Mohamed A  
9 Bangura, Christopher Santora, Brenda J Hollis and Ula  
09:33:39 10 Nathai-Lutchman.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis.

12 Yes, Mr Griffiths.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
14 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay  
09:33:51 15 Griffiths, assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah,  
16 Mr Silas Chekera, Mr Terry Munyard and again with us is  
17 Ms Kathryn Hovington.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. Mr Taylor, just  
19 before you are asked further questions, I will remind you that  
09:34:10 20 you are still on your declaration to tell the truth.

21 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

22 [On former affirmation]

23 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

24 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday when we adjourned for the evening, we  
09:34:21 25 were looking at the arrival of Johnny Paul Koroma in Liberia,  
26 yes?

27 A. That is correct, yes.

28 Q. And we examined the degree of collaboration with President  
29 Kabbah, the United Nations and others in securing his presence in

1 Monrovia, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You also dealt with the assistance provided to the Liberian  
4 government by President Obasanjo to make that possible.

09:34:50 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. And just remind us, what was that assistance?

7 A. Well, in the beginning, just as far as his acquiescence.  
8 Actually, at this point we used our own facilities. He later  
9 assists in his departure.

09:35:14 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this morning, before we proceed further  
11 with the chronology, I would like us, please, to deal with and  
12 tidy up one or two matters which we overlooked earlier in the  
13 year. Do you follow me?

14 A. Yes, I do.

09:35:29 15 Q. Now, do you recall in late December of 1998 certain  
16 accusations had been made against the Government of Liberia by  
17 special representative Okelo and also by General Shelpidi? Do  
18 you recall that?

09:36:02 19 A. Yeah, I recall. The accusations you're referring to were  
20 made by Shelpidi and the foreign minister of Sierra Leone. But  
21 before that, you're right, Okelo had made it earlier during the  
22 year, '98.

23 Q. Now, we failed to deal with certain aspects of that, and  
24 I'd like to deal with, finally, certain aspects of that now. At  
09:36:32 25 the time that Shelpidi made these accusations, what was his role?

26 A. Shelpidi was still the forces commander of ECOMOG still  
27 assigned to Liberia and Sierra Leone, but he was still resident  
28 in Liberia in a preparatory stage of moving into Sierra Leone.

29 Q. Now, why was he moving from Liberia?

1 A. Well, at this time, ECOMOG was stepping up its activities  
2 in Sierra Leone. He had come under fire from the Liberian  
3 government because of his own attitude that - I may be wrong, but  
4 I described as being very unbecoming of an officer of his  
09:37:39 5 stature, a major general. Apparently, for me, he had not  
6 understood his role as forces commander of ECOMOG vis-a-vis the  
7 sovereign rights of the Republic of Liberia. And so we had also  
8 asked - I had asked for him to be transferred from Liberia or I  
9 would throw him out of the country. So all this hastened the  
09:38:07 10 process of Shelpidi moving, and then he finally is out by that  
11 time, going into early January.

12 Q. He's out to where?

13 A. Out to Sierra Leone.

14 Q. Did he remain there?

09:38:21 15 A. No. Apparently, General Shelpidi did not last very long.  
16 In about three months, he actually gets fired.

17 Q. Who by?

18 A. By his government. By the commander-in-chief of the armed  
19 forces of Nigeria. He actually gets removed.

09:38:39 20 Q. Why was that?

21 A. Well, he came under, I think, a series of - he came under a  
22 series of pressures. Let's put the Liberian side first. Because  
23 of the 6 January attack on Freetown of 1999 and the ability of  
24 what we know as the SLA being able to successfully attack the  
09:39:13 25 city and carry out so much mayhem. Even the British - in fact,  
26 the British level are very skilled in attack, and they also  
27 claimed that he's not competent to continue to lead the force.  
28 That, combined with all of the other little complaints that had  
29 come, I think he just - it was just too much for him to remain,

1 and so he was dismissed and removed from the post and replaced by  
2 another major general. What do you call him? Majukperuo or  
3 something. His name came up on yesterday's - it's such a long  
4 name. But he replaced Shelpidi.

09:40:03 5 Q. So how do you know all of this?

6 A. It was reported widely. In fact, the New African magazine  
7 did an extensive piece on it. Africa No 1, which is a major  
8 radio station out of Gabon, did extensive reportings on it, but  
9 New African did an extraordinary piece explaining all of the

09:40:27 10 details of his dismissal, some of the problems that led to his  
11 dismissal, the dealing - how the British were opposed to him  
12 remaining in Sierra Leone as forces commander. It also dealt  
13 with even some of the bluntness of the special representative of  
14 the Secretary-General. Downes-Thomas himself came under some  
09:41:04 15 fire for being so blunt in some of his reportings to the United  
16 Nations. All of this is covered at length by this New African  
17 publication.

18 Q. And can you help us with the month of that publication?

19 A. Yes. To the best of my recollection, that publication  
09:41:30 20 comes out I think around May of 1999 or thereabouts. I think  
21 about May of 1999.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'd like to draw the witness's attention,  
23 please, to a document behind divider 18 in bundle 1 of 4 for week  
24 33. This is a new volume.

09:42:13 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Did you say week 33?

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, I did, your Honour.

27 Do we all have it? I'm grateful:

28 Q. Is this the article you're telling us about, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, this is the article.

1 Q. Let us take a careful look at this document, please. We  
2 see it's the New African magazine, May of 1999, and the cover  
3 story is "Why General Shelpidi was fired":

4 "In March, the Nigerian commander of the ECOMOG forces in  
09:43:30 5 Sierra Leone, Major General Timothy Shelpidi, was abruptly told  
6 to leave his post and return to Nigeria because Britain, Sierra  
7 Leone and Nigeria itself were unhappy with his record at the  
8 front. A new commander, a Nigerian as always, Major General  
9 Felix Mujakperuo, was appointed, but people are asking what  
09:44:00 10 business Britain has in the selection of ECOMOG commanders."

11 Is that a question you asked, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, all of us.

13 Q. "According to ECOMOG forces, Major General Timothy  
14 Shelpidi, the recently sacked ECOMOG commander, returned to his  
09:44:22 15 native Nigeria only at the end of his one-year tour of duty.  
16 ECOMOG commanders serve only one year terms insists the ECOMOG  
17 press officer Ali Buhari. 'General Shelpidi had completed his  
18 tour of duty and was duly recalled home. As a senior ranking  
19 officer he was needed back home, especially at this time of  
09:44:49 20 Nigeria's transition to democracy,' Buhari, one of the most  
21 affable Nigerians you will ever meet, said matter of factly.

22 But was he telling the truth?

23 According to a report broadcast on 12 March by the  
24 Gabon-based Africa No 1 radio station, General Shelpidi's removal  
09:45:14 25 was a joint decision made by the governments in London, Freetown  
26 and Abuja.

27 The decision was taken at a 'mini summit on Sierra Leone'  
28 held in the Nigerian capital Abuja during the recent visit of the  
29 British foreign secretary Robin Cook. President Tejan Kabbah of

1 Sierra Leone, and Nigeria's outgoing military state of head,  
2 General Abdulsalami Abubakar attended the summit.

3 The three leaders, according to Africa No 1, agreed to  
4 remove General Shelpidi for the following reasons:

09:45:57 5 The UK, which is the main supplier of weapons and other  
6 logistics to ECOMOG, reportedly blamed General Shelpidi and his  
7 close aids for the poor management of the human and material  
8 resources placed at their disposal, thus causing the low morale  
9 of the ECOMOG troops.

09:46:21 10 President Kabbah saw the near capture of his capital  
11 Freetown by the RUF/AFRC rebels on 6 January, despite the  
12 presence of the ECOMOG general headquarters, as a stab in the  
13 back.

14 Nigeria's top military officers see the temporary victory  
09:46:37 15 of the RUF in Freetown" - and then there is some text which is  
16 missing - "as a real humiliation for the Nigerian army.

17 Because of this, General Shelpidi's head had to roll and  
18 his two immediate aids, Brigadier Generals Abu Ahmadue and  
19 Gabriel Kpamber, also had to go. In Shelpidi's place Major  
09:47:07 20 General Felix Mujakperuo, a veteran of the ECOMOG campaign in  
21 Liberia, was appointed. Robin Cook and company think General  
22 Mujakperuo would be a better commander and might just win the war  
23 against the rebels.

24 But what business does Britain have in the selection of  
09:47:30 25 ECOMOG commanders? ECOMOG is supposed to be the peacekeeping,  
26 but in reality the interventionist, wing of ECOWAS, the 16-nation  
27 Economic Community of West African States. In an ideal world,  
28 ECOMOG should have the sole right to appoint ECOMOG commanders.  
29 But this is not an ideal world, at least not when it comes to

1 African geopolitical matters.

2 Britain, the colonial master, likes to think of itself as  
3 the major supplier of weapons and other logistics to ECOMOG. The  
4 peacekeepers deny this vehemently. ECOMOG sources tell New  
09:48:12 5 African that the bulk of Britain's assistance to Sierra Leone  
6 goes to the Sierra Leonean government, not ECOMOG. They say  
7 America has been the largest supplier of weapons, logistics and  
8 money to ECOMOG, not Britain.

9 'We haven't got very much assistance from Britain, I can  
09:48:35 10 tell you,' said one ECOMOG source in Freetown.

11 London has always tried to hide the fact that the foreign  
12 office in Whitehall exercises excessive influence over President  
13 Kabbah and his government. To his critics, Kabbah has  
14 increasingly become a rubber stamp of decisions taken by foreign  
09:48:59 15 office mandarins since his inauguration in March 1996.

16 They say the empty national treasury he inherited means  
17 Kabbah has been at the mercy of the aid packages that come from  
18 London. In March, Robin Cook announced a new 10 million pound  
19 aid package to Sierra Leone, 5 million pounds of which went to  
09:49:28 20 ECOMOG, 4.5 million to the new Sierra Leone Army, and half a  
21 million for humanitarian work.

22 This is on the top of the 30 million given to Kabbah's  
23 government last year by Britain after Nigerian troops had kicked  
24 out Johnny Paul Koroma's junta in February 1998.

09:49:52 25 While the junta lasted, Britain also paid the expenses of  
26 Kabbah's exiled government in Guinea."

27 You mentioned that yesterday, didn't you, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, I did.

29 Q. "On top of this, Britain also provided 60,000 pounds for a

1 clandestine radio station on which Kabbah routinely broadcast  
2 from his base in the Guinean capital Conakry."

3 Again, you told us about that yesterday, didn't you?

4 A. Yes, but I asserted that it was based at Lome. I stand  
09:50:22 5 corrected, but that was our intelligence information.

6 Q. "In Britain they say, 'He who pays the piper calls the  
7 tune,' and Robin Cook's foreign office has been doing fine on  
8 Sierra Leone in this respect. This is why Britain must have a  
9 say in the choice of ECOMOG commanders in Sierra Leone.

09:50:44 10 Robin Cook's work was made easy by General Shelpidi's  
11 seemingly abysmal record at the battlefield. Prior to the rebel  
12 attack on Freetown on 6 January, the ECOMOG force, then almost  
13 all Nigerian bar a token force from Guinea - now there are  
14 contingents from Ghana and Mali - had gone for several months  
09:51:10 15 without pay.

16 Besides, senior officers who died on duty were flown home  
17 for burial, while ordinary soldiers were buried in unmarked  
18 graves in Sierra Leone.

19 This naturally had incensed the junior soldiers and,  
09:51:27 20 coupled with non-payment of salaries, they had completely lost  
21 interest in the job at hand. Morale was low amongst the troops.  
22 Therefore, when the rebels attacked on 6 January, the Nigerian  
23 soldiers just caved in.

24 In fact, on 12 January, Alex Duval Smith, the African  
09:51:50 25 correspondent of the British daily The Independent, reporting  
26 from Freetown and quoting a western diplomatic source, had said:  
27 'It been clear to a high ranking Nigerian government delegation  
28 to Freetown that donor nations to ECOMOG were disappointed with  
29 the Nigerian effort.'

1 'The Nigerian troops, many of them battle-weary after  
2 serving in Liberia,' Duval Smith continued, 'had not been paid  
3 since 10 December. Many who were supposed to receive \$150 a  
4 month, 93 pounds sterling, say openly that they do not see why  
09:52:35 5 they should put down their lives for Sierra Leone.'

6 That explains why the rebels had had such free rein in the  
7 January campaign - right from their redoubt in Kailahun in the  
8 far east of the country to the very doors of State House in  
9 Freetown. The Nigerian ECOMOG opposition just melted.

09:53:00 10 Who can blame the Nigerian soldiers? Sierra Leone is not  
11 their motherland. They were there to do what they saw, and still  
12 see, as a thankless job, and in fact for several months they had  
13 not been paid for the job they had already done. To be asked on  
14 top of it all to stand up and fight and possibly die, and be  
09:53:19 15 buried without proper dignity in an unmarked grave, was a bit  
16 much. So they voted with their feet, and the rebels very nearly  
17 ousted Kabbah's government again.

18 ECOMOG senior officers on the ground have blamed the  
19 non-payment of salaries on a bureaucratic bottleneck in Abuja.  
09:53:41 20 'It wasn't our fault,' they say. They also blame the rebels'  
21 January victory on the lack of sufficient manpower and firepower  
22 at the time. 'We didn't have enough troops in Sierra Leone and  
23 the few we had were spread too thin on the ground,' they add.

24 Sadly, London is not too impressed with these excuses,  
09:54:08 25 however genuine they may be. Britain wanted a change of  
26 personnel at the top of ECOMOG, commanders who can inspire the  
27 troops and prosecute the war properly.

28 Once London had made up its mind, General Shelpidi was  
29 living on borrowed time. At the mini summit in Abuja, Robin Cook

1 did not even need to raise his voice above the necessary decibels  
2 and General Shelpidi was sent backing. New African has learned  
3 that the General is very bitter for being made a scapegoat for  
4 things clearly beyond his control; for example, the non-payment  
09:54:42 5 of salaries and the insufficient international assistance to  
6 ECOMOG in terms of weapons and logistics. He has since said  
7 Sierra Leoneans are not serious. They want others to do for them  
8 what they can do themselves.

9 From Abuja, New African sources have reported that high  
09:55:02 10 ranking Nigerian military officers are equally angry at the  
11 humiliation General Shelpidi presided over.

12 The outgoing head of state, General Abubakar, is said to  
13 have recently appealed to people with contacts to the RUF to ask  
14 the rebels to facilitate a dignified Nigerian withdrawal. A  
09:55:26 15 ragtag rebel army forcing the armed forces of the giant of Africa  
16 to withdraw in disarray is too much a humiliation Nigeria cannot  
17 swallow.

18 This is one reason why the incoming President, General  
19 (retired) Olusegun Obasanjo, has reneged on his pre-election  
09:55:48 20 promise to bring the troops home. Nothing but a dignified  
21 withdrawal is what Nigeria needs for its own sake in terms of  
22 national and military pride.

23 Before General Shelpidi left finally for home, he went  
24 round to bid farewell to the troops, restating in places the now  
09:56:07 25 discredited allegation that the rebels' January victory was made  
26 possible because of support from Liberia and Burkina Faso. Even  
27 the head of the United Nations office in Liberia, Felix  
28 Downes-Thomas, no longer accepts this allegation.

29 On 12 March, Downes-Thomas told correspondents at the

1 United Nations headquarters in New York that, 'Much of the  
2 problem between Liberia and Sierra Leone hinges on the fact that  
3 many ex-fighters of the seven-year Liberian civil war have become  
4 unemployed and therefore prone to mercenary activities.'

09:56:51 5 The Pan-African News Agency reported Downes-Thomas as  
6 telling the New York correspondents: On the veracity of the  
7 allegations of Liberian support for the RUF, he remarked that his  
8 office has found it difficult to find proof of the charges.

9 'So far, he said, even countries that have claimed to have  
09:57:13 10 evidence to prove the allegations have balked from presenting it  
11 on the ground that doing so would mean exposing their sources.'

12 New African has learned that the US State Department, not a  
13 friend of Liberia's President Charles Taylor, was very angry at  
14 Downes-Thomas's frank speaking, more so doing it on American  
09:57:39 15 soil."

16 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Now this was the General Shelpidi  
17 who in December had made that allegation about Liberian and  
18 Burkina Faso involvement, wasn't it?

19 A. That is correct. That is correct.

09:57:58 20 Q. "Liberia has always denied involvement in Sierra Leone, but  
21 though ECOMOG and its allies like to repeat the allegation, not  
22 even the State Department or the foreign office in London would  
23 present their 'evidence' to the United Nations. Rather,  
24 Washington and London, working together with other western  
09:58:21 25 capitals, are tightening an unofficial economic squeeze on  
26 Liberia. As a result, things have become so bad in  
27 Charles Taylor's country that a recently released song 'Time So  
28 Hard, Everybody Getting Crazy' has gone to number one in the  
29 Liberian charts.

1 Composed by a German based Liberian musician, Ebenezer Kajo  
2 Samuels, the lyrics have struck a chord in suffering Liberians.  
3 'Time so hard, time so hard, everybody getting crazy, everybody  
4 going bananas', the song says.

09:59:04 5 Our correspondent in Monrovia, Albert Gayflor, reports that  
6 because of the economic squeeze, things have become really so  
7 hard that each morning thousands of people of all ages converge  
8 at the Monrovia city centre seeking the day's meal, often in  
9 vain. Begging has now become a national pastime."

09:59:27 10 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

11 A. That is true.

12 Q. Was that the state of affairs in Liberia?

13 A. To a great extent, yes.

14 Q. And what had caused it?

09:59:38 15 A. The squeeze. The same problem with these allegations,  
16 Sierra Leone and arms that are never proven, or no factual  
17 evidence presented, but the squeeze was on. Apparently, a  
18 decision had been taken. And if we go back, some of the  
19 intelligence that we had received, and even from some diplomats,  
10:00:05 20 that a decision had been taken by certain countries to bring down  
21 my government. And so everything just froze up on us. No loans,  
22 no assistance, no aid, nothing, and so things were very tough.  
23 Things very were tough.

24 Q. "Unfortunately, the message has not filtered to the  
10:00:26 25 population yet that 'times is so hard' because international  
26 donors hostile to their President are economically squeezing the  
27 life out of the country.

28 The aim is to make 'everybody going bananas' so that the  
29 people would throw Charles Taylor out at the next election in

1 four years' time or even earlier."

2 Now, you touched upon that, did you not, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. And what is it you're telling us about that?

10:00:58 5 A. What I was saying, this is the normal style. You want to  
6 bring a small government down, you turn off the taps and  
7 eventually things dry up. By "things" I mean aid, assistance dry  
8 up. The people get despondent, they take to the streets, they  
9 demonstrate, eventually you get thrown out. And this was the  
10:01:25 10 attitude taken by these countries going back.

11 There is no - I said here before, this Charles Taylor  
12 situation was an accident waiting to happen from before  
13 elections, during the elections, the unlawful funding of  
14 political parties by the United States government through IFES.  
10:01:50 15 IFES is this State Department operation. We contested it. We  
16 protested against it. It did not stop it. Unlawfully, if you  
17 did that in their country, if you put money into an American  
18 campaign, it's unlawful. It's also unlawful in our country.  
19 They broke the law, but they didn't care. And it just went on  
10:02:12 20 and on. For all of the years that I was in government, not a  
21 dime came from those countries, no matter what we did. Whether  
22 human rights commission was passed, whether the rule of law,  
23 whatever we did, the dye was cast, this government is not going  
24 to stay. So it went on and went on. That's why nobody wanted to  
10:02:29 25 conclude any accusation. We throw it out there and just let it  
26 stay. It did not end. And, eventually, it ended up with a what?  
27 An insurgency by LURD in 1999 after we were virtually misled and  
28 fooled into burning all of our arms.

29 Who burns all of his arms if he's not sure he's going to

1 get protection? We were so sure we would get protection. "Burn  
2 all of your arms." We did. Boom, right after the burning of the  
3 arms, LURD attacks. This was an accident waiting to happen and  
4 it happened.

10:03:07 5 Q. "Unfortunately, the message has not filtered to the  
6 population yet that 'time is so hard' because international  
7 donors hostile to their President are economically squeezing the  
8 life out of the country. The aim is to make 'everybody going  
9 bananas' so that the people would throw Charles Taylor out at the  
10:03:28 10 next elections in four years' time or even earlier.

11 Meanwhile, in Sierra Leone itself, President Kabbah  
12 continues to send out conflicting signals about how to end the  
13 war with the rebels. Officially he says he wants negotiation  
14 with the rebels to start as soon as possible in Togo. He had  
10:03:50 15 called a national consultative conference on the crisis by the  
16 time New African was going to press, yet he keeps repeating his  
17 twin-track policy of fighting the rebels and negotiating peace at  
18 the same time.

19 Incidentally, the twin-track policy exposes how much  
10:04:09 20 President Kabbah and other leaders in West Africa are under the  
21 thumb of some western powers.

22 Reporting the mini summit in Abuja, the British daily The  
23 Guardian said on 10 March: 'Britain wants Kabbah to follow twin  
24 tracks, fighting the RUF but also starting the peace process with  
10:04:31 25 the rebels.'

26 Since then, both President Kabbah and Nigeria's incoming  
27 President Obasanjo have pretended as if the twin-track policy was  
28 their own original idea. Obasanjo was quoted by Nigerian TV on 9  
29 March, in justification for not withdrawing Nigerian troops as

1 promised, that he would 'pursue a twin-track peace approach in  
2 Sierra Leone.'

3 On 14 March, President Kabbah was quoted by the BBC  
4 monitoring service as saying in Freetown that there was  
10:05:11 5 'increasing international support for his government's two-track  
6 approach of military force and dialogue in attempting to resolve  
7 the Sierra Leone conflict.'

8 But unless The Guardian is lying, the twin-track policy  
9 cannot be President Kabbah's or Obasanjo's original idea, but  
10:05:33 10 London's.

11 However, the trouble with that policy is that it's just not  
12 possible to fight and talk peace at the same time. The two are  
13 not never done together. You either fight or you talk peace.

14 When Tony Blair's government wanted peace in Northern  
10:05:52 15 Ireland, it asked all the warring factions to declare a ceasefire  
16 first before peace talks. They did.

17 Even in Kosovo, NATO started bombing only after months of  
18 protracted peace talks had failed.

19 In Sierra Leone, if President Kabbah is to be believed,  
10:06:13 20 bombs and peace talks are to be dropped and held at the same  
21 time. No wonder the war is eight years old and counting."

22 Now, Mr Taylor, you tell us that you saw this article at  
23 the time in May, yes?

24 A. Yes.

10:06:36 25 Q. And at that time in May, of course, preparations were being  
26 made for Lome.

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. How did this article make you feel given the efforts that  
29 you were making in that cause?

1 A. Well, it was not a major surprise because to a great extent  
2 you can see the handwriting on the wall as you're going along.  
3 We knew that - in all frankness, we knew that our colleague in  
4 Sierra Leone was not calling the shots. There was nothing  
10:07:11 5 surprising in this article about that. We knew he was not  
6 calling the shots.

7 As a matter of fact, I publicly, publicly, in Abuja at a  
8 meeting with Kabbah in an interview with the BBC, accused Britain  
9 of trying to re-colonise Sierra Leone. I did that publicly. A  
10:07:35 10 lot of us knew. I said that, in this day and age in Africa -  
11 right after this, you know what happens. They send in an army  
12 officer to command the Sierra Leonean armed forces and send in an  
13 inspector general of police. I thought that this was trying to  
14 re-colonise Sierra Leone, but we knew that they had been funding  
10:07:56 15 the whole process of Kabbah's government. So that's normal with  
16 the big countries.

17 I guess we in Liberia needed a godfather too. We didn't  
18 have one. Our traditional godfather was not listening to me, so  
19 the Sierra Leonean godfather, Britain, was listening, and so good  
10:08:11 20 for them.

21 Q. And help us, remind us, Mr Taylor, this article was in May.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. What was the date of that rather interesting letter you  
24 received from the British embassy? Can you recall?

10:08:23 25 A. The ambassador writes that letter a little later on.  
26 That's after - if I'm not mistaken, after the publication that we  
27 had done by my foreign minister in February. That came out a  
28 little later than that, about the steps taken by Liberia in  
29 granting amnesty and all of that. A little before this time.

1 Q. Actually, it was 10 June.

2 Now, I want to move on from that.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: But before I do, I would like to mark this  
4 document for identification, please, MFI-98.

10:09:23 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for  
6 identification MFI-98.

7 I'm sorry. I didn't notice you there, Ms Hollis.

8 MS HOLLIS: Quite all right. We would want to know if this  
9 document was part of the accused's archive. That hasn't been  
10:09:42 10 established. And we do have at least some requirement for a  
11 connection. Now, in the past, your Honours have said, if was  
12 part of his archive and he had read it, that was sufficient.  
13 There was no indication this was part of his archive.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say, Mr Griffiths?

10:09:58 15 MR GRIFFITHS: We're merely asking for the document to be  
16 marked at this stage. Issues of admissibility, as I understand  
17 it, arise at a later stage, when we seek to exhibit it. But, of  
18 course, I'm quite happy to inquire from Mr Taylor at this stage,  
19 while we have the opportunity, as to what the position is:

10:10:15 20 Q. Mr Taylor, this article in the New African magazine, which  
21 clearly puts a different slant on the 6 January invasion, help  
22 us, was this part of your archives? Can you remember?

23 A. Yes, it was.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, in any event, the document is  
10:10:44 25 marked MFI-98 for identification purposes.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want to deal with another matter now, and  
28 we're still in May of 1999. You mentioned yesterday something  
29 being said about Liberia sliding back into - drifting back into

1 instability. Do you remember that?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Who had made that statement?

4 A. This is - the early part of May, the

10:11:34 5 Under-Secretary-General of the United States, Prendergast, writes  
6 a letter to his special representative in Liberia stating, from  
7 his vantage point, that there was an appearance that Liberia is  
8 slipping into instability. I think this could be coming from the  
9 April attack on Voinjama by rebels out of Guinea. This could

10:12:08 10 have been his personal assessment of that attack and what he saw  
11 as coming and wanted for the special representative to review it,  
12 study it and respond, and of which the special representative did  
13 the investigation, the Liberian government did its own  
14 assessment, and a report was filed back to the

10:12:36 15 Under-Secretary-General by the special representative a little  
16 later on that month, I would say a space of two and a half, maybe  
17 three weeks after this particular, I would call it an assertion  
18 made by the Under-Secretary-General, because it was a little  
19 strange to the government.

10:12:57 20 This report is not emanating from Liberia, but the  
21 Under-Secretary-General sitting in New York and saying that, "Oh,  
22 wait a minute. It looks like they're slipping into instability  
23 and chaos." I think it was a little strange to us, and we took  
24 it very seriously.

10:13:16 25 JUDGE DOHERTY: Sorry, Mr Griffiths, to interrupt. Before  
26 you proceed, I wish to clarify the position of Mr Prendergast.  
27 He's been referred to as Under-Secretary-General of the United  
28 States, whereas previous documentation referred to him as United  
29 Nations.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. What is he, Mr Taylor?

3 A. He's the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for  
4 Political Affairs.

10:13:39 5 Q. For political affairs?

6 A. That is correct. I'm sorry, your Honour.

7 Q. Now, the letter which he sent to Downes-Thomas, did you see  
8 that?

9 A. Oh, yes. Remember I said that everything containing - that  
10:13:54 10 pertained to Liberia we received a copy, except for secret United  
11 Nations documents. But open, public documents, yes, we were  
12 given a copy. I had all of these in my archives, that plus  
13 Downes-Thomas's response some two and a half weeks or so later.

14 Q. And help us, can you help us in which month it was that  
10:14:14 15 this message was sent from New York?

16 A. That's around May and the response is also the same month,  
17 just about the end of the month.

18 Q. Could we have a look behind divider 20 in the same volume  
19 we've just been looking at, please. Do you recognise that  
10:14:56 20 document, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes, this is it. This is it.

22 Q. Now, we see that it's from Prendergast, United Nations, to  
23 Downes-Thomas in Monrovia, yes?

24 A. Yes.

10:15:13 25 Q. And we see that it's dated 7 May 1999, and the subject  
26 matter is "Liberia", yes?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. "As discussed with Mahmoud" - who is that?

29 A. I really don't know who Mahmoud is.

1 Q. "We are concerned that Liberia may be drifting back to  
2 instability. If you concur, this does not auger well for Liberia  
3 or the sub-region, which is already wracked by conflict."

10:15:56

4 Now, Mr Taylor, did you consider your country to be  
5 drifting back to instability in May of 1999?

6 A. No. No, we were taken aback by this. Of course, just  
7 before that, in April, we had had an incursion into Voinjama out  
8 of Guinea. We had taken care of it and we had heard nothing else  
9 from that. And so when we saw this, we were very concerned --

10:16:26

10 Q. But let me interrupt you, Mr Taylor, and I apologise for  
11 doing so. But help us, was the incursion on 21 April into  
12 Voinjama the only incident of that kind of scale of violence  
13 which had taken place in the preceding 12 months?

10:16:58

14 A. No. No, not exactly, no. We had had before then, back in  
15 September of 1998, it's the famous Roosevelt Johnson situation  
16 which was, in our opinion, more threatening, because this  
17 occurred in the capital. And remember the incident with the  
18 United States embassy and all of that, and nothing came out from  
19 New York or any other place trying to say that we were slipping  
20 into stability, which lasted longer - this whole conflict, even  
21 though the war in Monrovia lasted for a few days, but the  
22 succeeding conflict with - diplomatic conflict, may I say, did  
23 not lead to this type of conclusion.

10:17:28

24 Q. And help us --

10:17:46

25 A. So for this conclusion we were concerned.

26 Q. -- after the conclusion of the Camp Johnson Road incident,  
27 had there been any similar incident up to 21 April 1999?

28 A. To the best of my recollection, nothing that would grab my  
29 attention.

1 Q. Let's go back to the document:

2 "I should be grateful to receive an analysis of the overall  
3 situation in Liberia as you see it together with an account of  
4 how UNOL is helping Liberia manage this difficult post-conflict  
10:18:23 5 peace-building phase.

6 I would also be interested in your views on what the UN  
7 system, including UNOL and the international community at large,  
8 could realistically do to help stabilise the situation in  
9 Liberia.

10 I should also be grateful if you could send me, on a  
11 monthly basis, starting June, an analysis of UNOL's  
12 peace-building activities and the contribution of other partners  
13 to these activities.

14 The insights we gain from UNOL's pioneering efforts would  
10:19:06 15 be valuable to other peace-making and peace-building field  
16 officers under the purview of DPA."

17 Now, you've told us there was a response to this,  
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes, there was a response to this after we reacted very  
10:19:26 20 seriously and --

21 Q. How did you react?

22 A. We called in - we had the special representative called in  
23 to the foreign ministry - that's the normal procedure when you're  
24 protesting - and we told the special representative that we were  
10:19:42 25 not happy with what we saw coming out of New York, and we  
26 insisted on knowing the basis for such statements. What did he  
27 know or what did the UN know that we didn't know? and we  
28 demanded that information. Of course we didn't get further - but  
29 we made that very clear on that call to the foreign ministry, and

1 after he did his work he responded to the  
2 Under-Secretary-General's statement I think in about two, maximum  
3 three weeks' time.

10:20:35 4 MR GRIFFITHS: We'll come to look at that in a moment. But  
5 first can I ask that this code cable from Under-Secretary-General  
6 Prendergast to special representative Downes-Thomas dated 7 May  
7 1999 on the subject matter of Liberia be marked for  
8 identification MFI-99, please.

10:20:55 9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That document is marked for  
10 identification MFI-99.

11 Mr Griffiths, just before you leave that document, I'm  
12 curious as to the processing of this particular document. You'll  
13 see that it is to "Downes-Thomas, UNOL" and typed in to the right  
14 of his name is "only". And then just to make things a bit more  
10:21:23 15 clear, there's a rubber stamp apparently above his name with  
16 bigger letters saying "Only". So how does it make its way to  
17 Mr Taylor? What's the process involved?

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. You tell us, Mr Taylor. How does it make its way to you?

10:21:41 20 A. Yes. I've explained to the Court before that the  
21 arrangement in Monrovia is that all documents concerning the  
22 Government of Liberia will be made available except for secret  
23 documents or secret communication between the office. So all  
24 public - this is really a public document, even though it's only  
10:22:08 25 - but it's not a secret document. If not, it would be stamped  
26 "secret", okay? All such documents that have to do with the  
27 Republic of Liberia or any interaction with the republic that is  
28 not top secret, the government is provided copies of that.

29 Q. So what's the meaning - what's the purpose of stamping it

1 "only" then, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Well, this is a message to him and not maybe to other  
3 special representatives. If you look at some of the other  
4 documents, it has several other names. This is directed to him.

10:22:45 5 This is my understanding.

6 Q. Now, you told us there was a response, yes?

7 A. There was a response.

8 Q. Look behind divider 21, please, in this same bundle. Now,  
9 we see that this is to Prendergast and also for the attention of

10:23:14 10 Fall. You've mentioned who Fall was before, Mr Taylor?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Who is he?

13 A. Fall is the Assistant Secretary-General. Well, we  
14 pronounced it Fall.

10:23:29 15 Q. And it's from Downes-Thomas. It's dated 31 May, so, as you  
16 say, it's a couple of weeks later, and it's on the topic of  
17 Liberia, and we note that this one is not marked with the stamp  
18 "only". Yes, Mr Taylor?

19 A. That is correct. And may we just say probably, to help  
10:24:01 20 with the President's question, some of these documents - and it's  
21 come up before the Court on the numbering - the secret part of  
22 these documents are not given to the government, so a document  
23 may be - let's say, for example, this is one of 17. We have the  
24 public part, but the rest of his secret communication with this  
10:24:28 25 office that is not for public use is not given to the government.  
26 So this document, you will see here, will only stop to the part  
27 dealing with what is public, and this is how this works.

28 Q. It's headed:

29 "Liberia. I refer to your code cable of 7 May on the

1 subject above. The reasons for your observation that Liberia may  
2 be drifting back to instability are not easily discernable."

3 Pause there. And if we just flick back over the page, we  
4 note that in the code cable sent by Prendergast there appears to  
10:25:17 5 be a total absence of factual foundation for the assertion he  
6 makes. Is that correct, Mr Taylor?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Let's go back then to the response:

9 "It is true, however, that the absence in Liberia of an  
10:25:35 10 adequate safety net, usual provided through bilateral and  
11 multilateral aid to post-war situations, does not auger well for  
12 Liberia or the sub-region."

13 What do you understand by the reference to a safety net?

14 A. Assistance, that capacity building, aid, donor aid, and  
10:26:05 15 other assistance for the government to build its capacity.

16 Q. "Liberians had hoped that after voting into office a  
17 democratically elected government, the international community  
18 would come to their aid. But there has been no peace dividend.  
19 Both in terms of quantity and quality, Liberia has yet to receive  
10:26:30 20 anything close to the post-war international assistance enjoyed  
21 by Mozambique, Bosnia, Herzegovina or Rwanda. Some observers  
22 claim that even strife-ridden Sierra Leone is currently a  
23 recipient of more international assistance than Liberia. As I  
24 see things here, it is very clear that if the international  
10:27:10 25 community continues to withhold its much needed assistance to  
26 Liberia, particularly with respect to the reintegration and  
27 resettlement of the war affected and for certain urgent  
28 infrastructural requirements, the results could be disastrous.  
29 Apart from certain road networks, the destruction of the economic

1 infrastructure in Liberia is complete. This is also true for  
2 social and health services."

3 Now, we recall, of course, do not we, Mr Taylor, the  
4 observation made in the New African article about Liberia being  
10:27:55 5 squeezed, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. "The 'instability' to which you allude, and which once  
8 characterised Liberia, was marked principally by factional  
9 warfare, the disintegration of a connected countrywide  
10 administrative (including judicial as well as law enforcement)  
11 system and by the absence of an elected or otherwise popularly  
12 legitimised government. As you know, that situation has changed  
13 dramatically. Liberia has, indeed, turned the corner, and at the  
14 moment it is difficult to imagine that it would change course. I  
10:28:37 15 do realise, however, that the Camp Johnson Road incidents and the  
16 unfortunate episode in Voinjama, both of which involved exchange  
17 of gunfire and the loss of life and property, could appear to be  
18 indications that Liberia may be drifting back to instability.

19 However, the Camp Johnson Road incident took place in  
10:29:06 20 September 1998 and did not last for more than 48 hours.  
21 Similarly, the Voinjama attack and counterattack was not  
22 protracted. It took place in April 1999 and was over within 24  
23 hours. In this connection, I am keenly aware that duration is an  
24 insufficient argument to support the contention that these  
10:29:33 25 incidents are not indicative of a drifting back to instability.  
26 It is, therefore, useful to note that these unfortunate events,  
27 Camp Johnson and Voinjama, have not resulted in any large scale  
28 or widespread societal upheaval, nor did they give rise to a  
29 transformation of the political landscape. While they could be

1 regards as the residual effects of a civil conflict that had  
2 factionalised the entire Liberian society, they do not seem to be  
3 symptomatic of a relapse into either anarchy or instability. A  
4 consideration of the interval between Camp Johnson and Voinjama  
10:30:31 5 should suggest that they do not constitute either a trend or a  
6 solid basis for the conclusion that Liberia may be drifting back  
7 to instability.

8 Indeed, among the easily noticeable features in Liberia are  
9 economic hardship and poverty, which left unattended could give  
10:30:52 10 rise to an internal and spontaneous combustion. Also, a certain  
11 degree of tension exists. This is occasioned by the rather  
12 frequent allegations about external plots to overthrow the  
13 government of President Taylor" --

14 Were there such frequent allegations, Mr Taylor?

10:31:15 15 A. Yes, there were.

16 Q. "... and by the equally frequent threats of retaliation  
17 from various quarters for either the Government of Liberia's  
18 accusations directed at ECOMOG or its alleged untoward  
19 interference in the affairs of Sierra Leone. A similar  
10:31:32 20 phenomenon, accusations and counteraccusations and denials,  
21 defines relations between Guinea and the Government of Liberia.  
22 All of this creates an unease which remains worrisome with regard  
23 to sub-regional stability. To date, however, all concerned have  
24 displayed an ability to accommodate these allegations and threats  
10:32:00 25 of retaliation in a manner that precludes any form of military  
26 activity.

27 In assessing the various elements that constitute sources  
28 of tension in the sub-region, the issue of the prevalence of the  
29 demobilised combatants, who are yet to be rehabilitated and

1 reintegrated into society, warrants special and focused  
2 attention. This is matter on which I placed emphasis when I met  
3 with donors in America and Europe prior to my assumption of  
4 duties in Monrovia. I continue to maintain that neglect of  
10:32:42 5 ex-combatants would pose severe security problems at both  
6 national and sub-regional levels. In this connection and until  
7 this matter is addressed satisfactorily, Liberia will most  
8 probably remain a source of mercenaries."

9 Mr Taylor, how seriously did you take that particular  
10:33:09 10 aspect of the socioeconomic conditions in Liberia, particularly  
11 with regard to unemployed ex-combatants?

12 A. This is real. It is true. We did not have jobs for these  
13 young men and women that had fought. They had not been properly  
14 demobilised and given assistance, and they were always out there  
10:33:37 15 available to join another fight because they needed income, and  
16 so they were always available.

17 So non-state actors, as we called them, were just sitting  
18 there, waiting to be called. And people used them. And that's  
19 why we said Sierra Leone used them a whole lot. Some of them -  
10:33:58 20 we understand that some Liberians travelled as far as Angola.  
21 Some of them travelled as far as Congo. There was nothing to do,  
22 and people just took advantage of these young men and took them  
23 away.

24 Q. But note how it continues:

10:34:21 25 "On the national plane, it should be pointed out that a  
26 good number of the personnel of Liberian's various state security  
27 agencies are ex-combatants."

28 That's true, isn't it?

29 A. Yes, that's true.

1 Q. People like Varmuyan Sheriff?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "They are grossly underpaid." Was that true?

4 A. Yes.

10:34:42 5 Q. "They continue to suffer from a lack of adequate  
6 training" - was that true?

7 A. That is true.

8 Q. "... and proper orientation" - is that true?

9 A. That is true.

10:34:49 10 Q. "... especially in the area of civil and human rights." Is  
11 that true?

12 A. That's true.

13 Q. "Not surprisingly, therefore, their modus operandi has  
14 often resulted in violations of human rights and in otherwise

10:35:10 15 unprofessional behaviour."

16 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes. There's a great deal of truth to this, yes.

18 Q. Now, tell me, what kind of unprofessional behaviour are we  
19 talking about here?

10:35:20 20 A. Well, people - some of these guys are assigned across the  
21 country, at border points, did not know how to address - you  
22 know, to speak to, let's say, dignitaries or diplomats. We had  
23 to go through short programmes. Let's say, for example, after  
24 the war you say cars are supposed to be stopped and checked to

10:35:44 25 make sure that weapons or stolen properties are not being moved,  
26 but we had to even train them that you don't stop - you do not  
27 search diplomatic cars. That was one thing. Some people didn't  
28 really know that a car carrying a diplomatic plate was not  
29 supposed to be stopped and searched. And so all of these little

1 things, short programmes, but a lot of them, this is what he's  
2 talking about, unprofessional. You see a diplomatic car, you  
3 wave it threw, and all these things. And some people had to  
4 really learn this.

10:36:20 5 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, help us. Was there a connection between  
6 gross underpayment and unprofessional behaviour?

7 A. Well, no. I don't see - I don't care how much these guys  
8 were paid. If they were not properly trained, there would be  
9 these unprofessional behaviours.

10:36:48 10 Q. Mr Taylor, when somebody is underpaid, do you agree they  
11 might attempt to supplement their income?

12 A. Yes, they would attempt to do that. But, again - and maybe  
13 - but when it comes to unprofessional, okay - you have unlawful,  
14 but if he's speaking here about unprofessional, he's dealing with  
10:37:10 15 a certain categories of individuals and the compartmentation of a  
16 security or police officer. Now, that comes under - a  
17 well-trained person must know what to do. And I don't care  
18 whether you pay him a million dollars, if he's not trained, there  
19 will be some unprofessional behaviour.

10:37:32 20 Q. All right. Forget unprofessional. Let's try unlawful.

21 A. Okay. Unlawful, yes. Being underpaid, you would do some  
22 things to supplement your salaries and --

23 Q. Like what?

24 A. Receiving bribes and tips and letting people get through.

10:37:56 25 Sometimes these things used to happen, even people come into the  
26 country through the borders with goods to be sold. We had  
27 problems with people - they would quicker take a bribe than  
28 collect the taxes. We had this kind of situation now. You know,  
29 that's the matter of training. Somebody comes in - and some

1 people were silly, they would pay almost more in terms of bribes  
2 than paying the normal duties on items coming into the country.  
3 It's this type of situation we had across the board.

10:38:35 4 Q. And you were aware as President, were you, that there was  
5 that level of illegality widespread throughout your republic?

6 A. Well, look, let's put it this way: When you come out of a  
7 war that engulfed the entire country - let's look at knowledge,  
8 on the one hand, let's look at the capacity to doing something  
9 about what is wrong, let's look at maybe, on the other hand, the  
10:39:19 10 desire to correct it. So we have to put it in a nutshell,  
11 because, yes, we received information about some of these things,  
12 we were correcting them along the way, but it's not just one  
13 little incident. Maybe there are several little things jumping  
14 up, and you are in the process, coming out of a war that engulfed  
10:39:37 15 the entire country, of trying to correct things as you go.

16 But the bottom line, you cannot get it accomplished unless  
17 there is adequate assistance to train and re-tool people. It's a  
18 difficult process. And I don't want to - because knowledge, too,  
19 you can have knowledge and then after knowledge you talk about  
10:40:02 20 impunity. I want to be careful with this kind of thing because  
21 sometimes you can have the knowledge, you are doing something,  
22 but there are just so many things happening.

23 But, to answer your question, I was aware of some of these  
24 things, and we were working on them.

10:40:12 25 Q. Mr Taylor, I don't want you to be careful. I want you to  
26 tell us what the reality of the situation was. Help us. To what  
27 level within the Liberia you were governing at this time, the  
28 Liberia that Mr Downes-Thomas is describing, to what level was  
29 illegality and corruption a problem, a real problem?

1 A. A very high level. Especially corruption. Very high.

2 Q. As high as what?

3 A. Let's say on a bar of 1 to 10, I would put it to about 8,  
4 officials doing things that they're not authorised to do, taking  
10:40:57 5 matters into their own hands. This is a very troubling period.  
6 Very troubling period.

7 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor. To what extent did you feel able  
8 to control that?

9 A. It may be a shameful thing to say for a President, but to a  
10:41:21 10 great extent we - I had no real control to a great extent.

11 Q. Why not?

12 A. Well, you come from a war, there are factions, many of  
13 them. You bring everybody into the bowl trying to first of all  
14 reconcile. People are not trained. In fact, most of them you  
10:41:44 15 did not have control before the war and during the war. I didn't  
16 have any control over ULIMO-J. I didn't have any control over  
17 ULIMO-K. I didn't have control over coalition, LPC people that  
18 have come all into the government. There are a million things  
19 going on that I do not know. It may be a shameful thing, but  
10:42:08 20 this is what you find, and I had no real control. And that

21 control could have been made possible if we had gotten the type  
22 of assistance from the international community to begin to -  
23 that's this word, to properly demobilise these combatants. They  
24 were not properly demobilised. So people were just out there  
10:42:29 25 hustling and we were trying our best, but we did not have control  
26 and we did not have the assistance to build the capacity. So for  
27 a long time we had this problem that is being described here:  
28 Corruption, serious. I mean, people were doing things that -  
29 without authorisation. That was just out there, yes.

1 Q. Things like what?

2 A. I would say aiding crooked business people coming in,  
3 making deals for people going out. We had a big scheme when I  
4 first came into office of - there was a big passport scheme that  
10:43:25 5 we had to finally break up. People had stolen passports, they  
6 were issuing passports. There were people come in - there were  
7 people out there with Liberian passports that we didn't even  
8 know. Just this kind of stuff. So even - let me be clear. When  
9 I hear about trickles of arms going into Sierra Leone by ULIMO  
10:43:53 10 in, let's say, around '99 and others, my argument is not - I  
11 don't have any argument to say that it IS not true. I cannot -  
12 cannot contest that, because there is - it's highly probable.  
13 Because they were in that area, it's highly probable that there  
14 were these were these kinds of actions going on, even by  
10:44:18 15 officials in my government that --

16 Q. Officials like who?

17 A. Maybe Benjamin Yeaten I'm hearing about and other  
18 officials. I know Musa Cisse I've heard about here, and I'm not  
19 here to say yes or no. I have no way of being able to say  
10:44:37 20 pointblank it did not happen. I cannot say that, because there  
21 were some seriously corrupt people that were capable of doing  
22 things that are being spoken about. I had no control over, or  
23 knowledge of, what they were doing. A lot of people did things.

24 Q. "At the sub-regional level it is clear that the problems of  
10:44:59 25 Liberia, Sierra Leone and, indeed, Guinea, are significantly  
26 interrelated. The circulation of former combatants and their  
27 recycling within the countries of the Mano River Union, combined  
28 with the exchange of accusations among these neighbouring  
29 countries, suggests that one should move from isolated

1 assessments of individual countries, to a bold attempt to grapple  
2 with the recurrent and common problems in these countries. This  
3 should be done in a manner that would allow for the search and  
4 provision of comprehensive solutions to problems related, for  
10:45:41 5 instance, to border security, the economic development of border  
6 towns and villages, the reintegration of ex-combatants, and to  
7 sub-regional road and communication systems. Appropriately  
8 designed regional projects and programmes could address these  
9 problems, especially if their implementation were to take place  
10:46:05 10 within a resuscitated and adequately staffed Mano River Union  
11 secretariat.

12 Attached is the requested analysis of the overall situation  
13 in Liberia, together with an account of how UNOL is helping  
14 Liberia manage this difficult post-conflict peace-building phase.  
10:46:32 15 You will notice that the attachment also addresses your other  
16 requests for views on what the UN system, including UNOL and the  
17 international community at large, could realistically do to help  
18 stabilise the situation in Liberia."

19 Now, let's pause there, Mr Taylor, to address a practical  
10:46:54 20 issue. You told us earlier that sometimes aspects of a report  
21 may be secret, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, we see here reference is being made here by the writer  
24 to an attachment, yes?

10:47:11 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. If you look at the first page of the document, do you see  
27 it's marked 1 of 17?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. When you go over the page to the final page, which ends in

1 "Best regards", that's only page 4?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Where are the remaining 13 pages?

4 A. When you see here, that's what I'm talking about. It dealt  
10:47:29 5 with internal United Nations business, and so he wouldn't give -  
6 the UN would not make that available to us, okay? This only  
7 deals with an overall assessment of the Liberian situation, but  
8 when it comes to the request for the - of what the UN system,  
9 including UNOL and the international community at large can do,  
10:47:55 10 that level of internal information would not be supplied us until  
11 a decision is taken, so we don't get that part.

12 Q. "However, in the light of what appears to be an implication  
13 of your set of requests to me, I believe that decisions regarding  
14 UNOL's existence could be best informed by an objective  
10:48:14 15 assessment to determine whether or not the reasons, conditions,  
16 circumstances and the purposes which had justified the  
17 establishment of UNOL continue to be either valid or in  
18 existence. For such an endeavour the attached analysis, as well  
19 as our usual reports, could be contributory.

10:48:40 20 In this connection I could perhaps draw your attention to  
21 the fact that UNOL's efforts in Liberia could have benefited  
22 tremendously from an earmarked financial allocation which could  
23 have been used to give practical and concrete support to  
24 initiatives geared towards peace-building and reconciliation. I  
10:49:04 25 therefore lament the stillbirth of the trust fund. UNOL has yet  
26 to learn about the circumstances surrounding the death of the  
27 trust fund. Another constraint within UNOL has been obliged to  
28 muddle through is the absence of a human rights role in its  
29 mandate. UNOL continues to suffer the criticism that it does not

1 do enough about human rights in Liberia. It is not too late for  
2 headquarters to begin correcting, on the appropriate occasions,  
3 the misperception that UNOL is mandated to investigate and act on  
4 human rights violations. On this matter, however, there are  
10:49:49 5 pertinent observations and suggestions in the attachment.

6 Concerning your request for a monthly report on UNOL's  
7 activities, I wish to draw attention to the fact that since its  
8 establishment, UNOL has been providing daily and weekly reports  
9 as well as the regular fare of reports transmitted through code  
10:50:13 10 cables. Since each of these different reports often reflect, in  
11 one form or another, the activities of UNOL, it would be very  
12 much appreciated if you could reconsider your request for an  
13 additional set of reports. To do otherwise would mean engaging  
14 in an exercise in duplication, which would only place  
10:50:38 15 considerable strain on UNOL staff. I agree entirely with your  
16 observation that the insights we gain from UNOL's pioneering  
17 efforts would be valuable to other peace-making and  
18 peace-building field officers under the purview of DPA."

19 DPA is, what Mr Taylor?

10:50:58 20 A. I'm not sure. This is a UN term. I don't know. I'm  
21 sorry, I can't help you.

22 Q. "However, I am doubtful that a monthly reporting to begin  
23 June 1999 and end in December 1999 would provide insights more  
24 useful than those gained during UNOL's almost and a half's  
10:51:19 25 existence and experience."

26 Now, had Mr Downes-Thomas been the head of UNOL since it  
27 was first established, Mr Taylor?

28 A. In Liberia for this period, yes.

29 Q. So by this date, May 1999, he'd been there for a year and a

1 half?

2 A. Just about, yes.

3 Q. And we've also seen, in looking at other documents bearing  
4 his name, that he sent regularly those code cables to

10:51:52 5 Prendergast?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. "The insights gained during this significantly longer  
8 period have been recorded in the various reports which have been  
9 provided to headquarters on a regular basis. They were also

10:52:09 10 reflected in the draft Secretary-General's first report to the

11 Security Council on the activities of the United Nations

12 peace-building support office in Liberia which, though submitted

13 to headquarters on 20 November 1998, was never issued.

14 Nevertheless, the attachments to this message have attempted to

10:52:33 15 synthesise the most important of those insights which have a

16 bearing on substantive matters. Admittedly, it does not address

17 similarly important matters related to the administrative aspects

18 of UNOL's existence. I would prefer to deal with those matters

19 under separate cover."

10:53:00 20 Now, Mr Taylor, what did you feel was the most significant

21 difficulty faced by Liberia? Was it that mercenary situation as

22 identified by Downes-Thomas?

23 A. You know, when you have so many problems, it's very

24 difficult to see which is the most. These are all very crucial

10:53:30 25 issues. I'm not sure. I'm not sure whether this is the chicken

26 or the egg, because you have these mercenaries, but if we get - I

27 would say the assistance from the international community as far

28 as helping to begin the capacity building process in Liberia for

29 me was the most important, which involves settling the problems

1 of non-state actors. So I would say that mere absence was the  
2 most difficult part for me, because it would have helped with all  
3 of the other problems that we are now looking at. An idle brain,  
4 it's said, is the devil's workshop, and once we got this  
10:54:25 5 assistance to build our capacity, I think all of these other  
6 problems would have come under control.

7 Q. Now let's come more up to date, shall we. We dealt with  
8 the arrival of Johnny Paul Koroma yesterday afternoon?

9 A. Yes.

10:54:47 10 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And noted that he arrived on 7 August of 1999?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And you helped us with where he was staying, whether he had  
10:55:07 15 contact with the RUF and so on, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Help me with this, Mr Taylor. Who was financing Johnny  
18 Paul Koroma's stay in Liberia?

19 A. The Liberian government had to make do with what we had.  
10:55:28 20 We did that.

21 Q. And was Mr Koroma by himself?

22 A. No. Johnny Paul came with a delegation of security  
23 personnel. I don't recollect the exact number, but the entire  
24 group, I would say, was in excess of 15 persons that came to  
10:56:01 25 Liberia at that time.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I get ahead of myself can I ask,  
27 please, that that code cable to Prendergast from Downes-Thomas  
28 dated 31 May be marked for identification, MFI-100.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That document is marked MFI-100.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. So just help us, Mr Taylor. So he's there now in Monrovia  
3 living at the expense of the Liberian government?

4 A. Did I hear you say the code cable from Prendergast to  
10:56:46 5 Downes-Thomas? It's supposed to be from Downes-Thomas to --

6 Q. No, the code cable from Downes-Thomas to Prendergast dated  
7 31 May. I'm grateful. What's Mr Koroma doing after he arrives?

8 A. The first thing - maybe to help the Court - it's just an  
9 open situation maybe - just for a little information - at the  
10:57:24 10 removal of Koroma from Sierra Leone, we were also - we also  
11 reported to our colleagues at that particular time former  
12 President Momoh were able to leave and go to Guinea before Koroma  
13 comes to Liberia. He comes to Liberia. He is put in a hotel.  
14 We have to keep the Koroma people away from the RUF people that  
10:57:55 15 are at the guesthouse.

16 There is bad blood, everybody is angry. Koroma is very  
17 upset about his incarceration by the RUF at the time and he's  
18 very upset, so this is why we have to move him across town.  
19 Where Hotel Africa is in Liberia, they are toward the northern -  
10:58:21 20 northwestern part of the city. That's not too far from this  
21 famous area, one day we'll get a map, where Ricks Institute was  
22 located. And where the RUF guesthouse in Sinkor on the  
23 boulevard, to give you a distance between the two, we are talking  
24 about three to five miles in terms of distance. We kept them far  
10:58:48 25 apart. He is put up at the hotel. There are meetings. He's  
26 meeting with government officials because --

27 Q. Which government?

28 A. The Government of Liberia.

29 Q. Yes.

1 A. The Government of Liberia, the deputy minister of foreign  
2 affairs and the defence minister meets with him. There's a full  
3 debriefing period, and those reports are given to me about what  
4 happened to him and what were some of his concerns.

10:59:26 5 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, because I would like us to take  
6 this with care. Apart from contact between him and the  
7 Government of Liberia, was there contact between Koroma and the  
8 Government of Sierra Leone?

9 A. At this particular time not to my knowledge, no. He was  
10:59:49 10 strictly dealing with the Government of Liberia and the  
11 Government of Liberia at this time was dealing with our  
12 colleagues, the Government of Sierra Leone, the Government of  
13 Nigeria and so on.

14 Q. Right. And you were going on to say?

11:00:07 15 A. Well, he expressed his concerns. The first thing I wanted  
16 to get a hold of, what were his concerns, because I wanted to  
17 communicate that immediately to our colleagues that had agreed  
18 for him to come. The UN, everybody is waiting to hear what  
19 Johnny Paul Koroma has to say. Also, even more important, we  
11:00:30 20 want the UN officials released because, don't forget, he comes  
21 because the UN officials that are - I mean, that have been  
22 intercepted by the West Side Boys, they are ECOMOG people. So we  
23 begin to see how we can get them released.

24 So the first thing he asks for is that he wanted to see a  
11:00:52 25 delegation from the West Side Boys in Sierra Leone at Okra Hills.  
26 So I then communicate with President Kabbah and the UN, and we  
27 arrange for a delegation of his boys to leave Okra Hill - in  
28 fact, that was coordinated by President Kabbah and the UN - to  
29 have them brought to Liberia. They were taken by UN people and I

1 think, if I'm not mistaken, either the press secretary from Tejan  
2 Kabbah or somebody from his office even accompanied that group to  
3 Monrovia. They went to Lungi, they were taken to Lome and flown  
4 into Liberia to meet with Johnny Paul Koroma in Monrovia, and  
11:01:40 5 they met --

6 Q. And just give us an idea. What kind of numbers are we  
7 talking about?

8 A. That group that came, they could have numbered about 10 or  
9 so that came in. I think, if I'm not mistaken, the leader of  
11:01:57 10 that group at that time came along with that delegation.

11 Q. So they arrive in Monrovia, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And do they meet with Koroma?

14 A. Yes.

11:02:09 15 Q. Do you meet with them?

16 A. No, no, no. Not at this time. No, no, I've got nothing to  
17 do with them. My business is with their leader. They meet with  
18 Koroma, hold all of their discussions. Arrangements are made for  
19 the release of the people behind them at Okra Hills, and then  
11:02:31 20 there's a sigh of relief by all of us that at least this is  
21 taking place, yes.

22 Q. So the captured UNAMSIL and ECOMOG personnel eventually are  
23 released?

24 A. Eventually, yes, they are released.

11:02:51 25 Q. Just give us a time scale, Mr Taylor. Because we know that  
26 Koroma arrives on 7 August. How long does it take for all of  
27 what you've just explained to play out?

28 A. These people are released - this takes about two, three  
29 weeks before the process is really concluded with the release of

1 the people. In fact, a part of that delegation that comes to  
2 Monrovia is sent back there to effect the whole process. I would  
3 put it to not more than three weeks.

4 Q. Now meanwhile, where is Mr Sankoh?

11:03:28 5 A. Sankoh is still out of Liberia. I'm not sure - at about  
6 this time Sankoh is either still in Lome or has gone to - because  
7 what I learned from Eyadema at the time was that he travelled to  
8 - he let him travel to Libya and Sankoh also travelled to - if my  
9 recollection is correct, it had to be to Tunisia, I think. He  
11:04:10 10 probably also travelled to Tunisia, and then this could be around  
11 that time. But he's not in Lome. I think he's on the road.  
12 He's probably in Libya while this is going on.

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, it is necessary for us to keep several  
14 balls in the air at any one time. Now, apart from Johnny Paul  
11:04:37 15 Koroma and the release of the hostages is concerned, what else is  
16 going on in this month of August 1999?

17 A. To the best of my recollection, there is a second attack on  
18 Lofa.

19 Q. A second attack on Lofa from where?

11:05:04 20 A. This time it's coming from around the Guinea-Sierra Leone  
21 border side. This time it is mostly from Guinea and it is not on  
22 Voinjama this time. It's on the town of Kolahun. There's an  
23 attack around this time.

24 Q. And help me, did the Government of Liberia issue a press  
11:05:29 25 release about this?

26 A. Yes. The ministry of information, cultural affairs and  
27 tourism issued a very strong press release on this particular  
28 matter.

29 Q. Can I invite your attention, please, to behind divider 47

1 in bundle 1 of 2 for week 32. So divider 47, bundle 1 of 2, week  
2 32. Yes, do you have it, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. I'm looking at the second page, because it's merely an  
11:07:06 5 attachment and I'm not really interested in the first page. The  
6 Government of Monrovia, the ministry of information, culture and  
7 tourism, Liberia, press release, August 14, 1999:

8 "The Government of Liberia is calling on the Guinean  
9 government to arrest and extradite terrorists and bandits who  
11:07:41 10 abducted and held aid workers hostage in Lofa County this week.

11 The terrorists and bandits, when extradited, will be given  
12 due process in Liberia.

13 Information minister Joe Mulbah in a press briefing today  
14 said the defence pact between Liberia and Guinea provides for  
11:08:06 15 joint security of both countries.

16 He said a threat against a partner is a threat to the  
17 other.

18 He said Guinea has all along demonstrated commitment to  
19 regional peace and stability.

11:08:18 20 Minister Mulbah noted that at this point in time, he hopes  
21 Guinea will not renege on its commitments to international  
22 agreements.

23 The ministry of information, culture and tourism, quoting  
24 defence ministry sources, said the situation in Lofa is being  
11:08:40 25 contained by national security forces.

26 People in Montserrado and elsewhere in the country are  
27 advised to go about their normal business and not panic.

28 The Government of Liberia has also called on the UN to lift  
29 the arms embargo on Liberia."

1           Why did you choose that moment to make that request?

2       A.     We are under attack and we have no means to defend  
3 ourselves, so the best thing to do is to ask for the lifting so  
4 we can have a means to defend ourselves.

11:09:12 5       Q.     Now, Mr Taylor, we perhaps need to remind ourselves,  
6 there'd been a ceremony of arms burning on 26 July, wasn't there?

7       A.     That is correct.

8       Q.     So this was, what, just over two weeks later?

9       A.     Yes.

11:09:31 10      Q.     "Minister Mulbah said it is imperative that Liberia be  
11 given the right to defend and protect its territory as a  
12 sovereign nation. He said the attack by the bandits from Guinea  
13 comes at a time when the Liberian government had decided to burn  
14 all arms surrendered by ex-combatants."

11:09:52 15           Yes?

16      A.     Yes.

17      Q.     Now, how serious was that particular incident, Mr Taylor?

18      A.     It was rather serious. The town of Kolahun was attacked  
19 and actually captured by this invading force, and so they took  
20 hostage some UN personnel - well, aid workers, non-governmental  
21 agencies; not UN, I stand corrected. Also they took some  
22 Liberian personnel. But the fact that they captured the town of  
23 Kolahun, it was a very substantial force and our government had  
24 to take some time to begin to move people from long distances to  
25 counter such attacks. So it was very serious.

26           MR GRIFFITHS: Before we move on and before I forget, shall  
27 we say press release issued by Government of Liberia on 14 August  
28 '99 regarding attack on Lofa, MFI-101, please, Mr President.

29           PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-101 for

1 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in relation to this same incident, do you  
4 recall the Government of Liberia writing to the  
11:11:40 5 Secretary-General?

6 A. Yes, this matter was brought forward. In fact, foreign  
7 ministers met. There were a lot of activities going on at that  
8 time, yes.

9 Q. Because we looked at a document a couple of weeks ago which  
11:11:56 10 had been evidently misdated and can we look again at this  
11 document, please. It's in binder 2 of 3 for week 31 behind  
12 divider 21.

13 I apologise, Mr President. There will be a slight hiatus.  
14 I assumed that these previous binders were still in court, only  
11:13:47 15 to learn that I had taken the Court Manager by surprise. It's my  
16 fault because I didn't notify her in advance.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: We could proceed if you don't insist on  
18 having it put on the overhead for the public.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:14:09 20 Q. Mr Taylor, do you recall this document? It is a document  
21 which reads as follows. It's issued by the ministry of foreign  
22 affairs, Monrovia, Liberia, and it's directed to the  
23 Secretary-General of the United Nations and it's dated August  
24 1999 and it says:

11:14:33 25 "The ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of  
26 Liberia presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the  
27 United Nations and has the honour to inform the government" --

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: If I could interrupt. I'm looking at the  
29 document behind divider 20.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: 21, Mr President. It's the second page  
2 behind divider 21.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I've got it now. Thank you,  
4 Mr Griffiths.

11:15:13 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Not at all:

6 Q. Have you got it, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. "The ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Liberia  
9 presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United  
11:16:03 10 Nations and has the honour to inform that the Government of  
11 Liberia has received security reports which have been confirmed  
12 of an armed incursion into Liberian territory from the Republic  
13 of Guinea along the Liberian-Guinea border in the Foya district  
14 of Lofa County, Liberia.

11:16:20 15 The ministry wishes to further inform the Secretary-General  
16 that the armed incursion begun at 5 a.m. on Tuesday 10 August  
17 1999. The following border villages in Lofa County, Liberia, are  
18 under the control of the attackers from Guinea: Konjo, Sarhdu,  
19 Benduma, Mendekoma and the major town of Kolahun.

11:16:49 20 The Government of Liberia has submitted a note of protest  
21 to the Government of Guinea through its representative in  
22 Monrovia and has demanded that the government takes the necessary  
23 steps to bring this situation under control. The Government of  
24 Guinea was also informed that the Government of Liberia reserved  
11:17:11 25 the right to defend its territorial integrity against such  
26 aggression.

27 The ministry of foreign affairs wishes to inform the  
28 Secretary-General that this is the second incursion into Liberia  
29 from Guinea, the first occurred on 21 April 1999.

1 While the ministry of foreign affairs will keep the  
2 Secretary-General of the United Nations apprised of the situation  
3 as it further develops, it would be appreciated if this  
4 information is brought to the urgent attention of the Security  
11:17:42 5 Council.

6 The ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Liberia  
7 avails itself" - and the normal salutation.

8 Pause there. Mr Taylor, why did you want this brought to  
9 the attention of the Security Council?

11:18:06 10 A. This involves an attack on a sovereign republic by another  
11 republic, so this is a matter that must be brought to the  
12 Security Council. Now to say it's not going to also be discussed  
13 with ECOWAS, but such matters are brought to their attention.

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help us. Now, from the nature of that  
11:18:30 15 letter to the Secretary-General, this on the face of it appears  
16 to be a much more serious attack than the one that took place on  
17 Voinjama in April?

18 A. Definitely. Definitely.

19 Q. How seriously did you take this attack?

11:18:46 20 A. Well, very seriously. Let's get some more details about  
21 the second paragraph in this. The town of Mendekoma, that has  
22 come up before. Mendekoma is the last border town coming out of  
23 Liberia into Sierra Leone. Remember we've gone through the map  
24 where we come from Voinjama, Kolahun, Foya, Mendekoma on that  
11:19:17 25 side and Guinea on the other side. So we see there is this  
26 section of Liberia that is referred to as - it was referred to in  
27 some UN documents after that as parrot's beak, parrot like the  
28 bird, parrot's beak. The three countries come together really at  
29 this point. You have Liberia coming, Guinea coming in and Sierra

1 Leone. This is a very dangerous area and so because now we see  
2 it coming from the Sierra Leonean side where Mendekoma is under  
3 control and the Guinea side, this is very, very serious and you  
4 can see the number of towns. But of all of these towns the  
11:20:06 5 border town is Mendekoma on that side. So for us this is now two  
6 countries come in in the V shape formation that is troubling for  
7 us.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, it might be useful if we just indicate on a  
9 map what it is you're talking about so we can get a clearer idea  
11:20:32 10 of what we're talking about here. Can we have a look at map L1,  
11 please. Yes, if you could just change seats for a moment and  
12 unhelpfully this map doesn't have on it all the names mentioned  
13 in that document, but if you could just indicate for us all to  
14 see, please, the area you're seeking to describe.

11:21:18 15 A. I'm not sure how helpful this is to me.

16 Q. See if you can find Kolahun first of all?

17 A. Yes, this is Kolahun up here. There is Foya here. The end  
18 of the line here, it may be seen better on another map, is  
19 Mendekoma. That's here. Now that's going towards Sierra Leone.

11:21:44 20 Here is Guinea up here. So they come in and they come in through  
21 here to Kolahun is the main town of the attack. So when you look  
22 at Kolahun coming from here and extending all the way through  
23 Foya to here, this is that V formation I'm talking about. From  
24 this way and from this way formed that V. So it's significant,  
11:22:13 25 because we're talking about the Sierra Leonean border on this  
26 side and the Guinean border on this side.

27 Q. Yes, I'm grateful. Yes, if we could put that map away,  
28 please.

29 Now before I move on could I ask, please, that that letter

1 to the UN Secretary-General in August 1999 referring to the Lofa  
2 incursion be marked for identification MFI-102.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Which letter was that? That was the  
4 previous one we dealt with, not the present one that's behind  
11:23:05 5 divider 21?

6 MR GRIFFITHS: No, this is one that I'm looking at. The  
7 ministry of foreign affairs letter to the Secretary-General of  
8 the United Nations.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: It is down the bottom. Yes, of course.  
11:23:17 10 That document is marked for identification MFI-102.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you will recall that in his response to the  
13 drifting back to instability request from Under-Secretary-General  
14 Prendergast, Mr Downes-Thomas had referred to regular reports he  
11:23:43 15 provided, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So far as this Lofa incursion is concerned, do you recall  
18 whether any report was sent back to headquarters in New York by  
19 Mr Downes-Thomas?

11:23:58 20 A. Yes, yes. He sent a report, because if you see there are  
21 non-governmental personnel involved. He sent a very strong  
22 report back to UN headquarters reporting the situation. In fact  
23 readjusting some of the other programmes that we had as far as  
24 what the NGOs were doing in that area, the fact that lives had  
11:24:35 25 been lost. And our own fear in fact we had expressed to him and  
26 he wrote this in that report, our own fear was that the  
27 individuals that had been captured by these rebels, our attempt  
28 in trying to push them out, the exchange of fire could - you  
29 know, was a threat to their lives and we were very concerned

1 about that and he wrote back conveying that concern to the  
2 government and asking for the UN to also make public statements  
3 as we had made demanding the release of these people.

11:25:14 4 Q. Let's look behind divider 22 in the bundle we've just been  
5 looking at. Yes, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now we see this is a code available again stamped  
8 "Immediate and only" from Mr Downes-Thomas to Prendergast and  
9 it's dated 17 August 1998, headed "Lofa, overall situation". Do  
11:25:44 10 you see that, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, I do. This is it, yes.

12 Q. "The incursion into Lofa County has exercised the energies  
13 of the Government of Liberia authorities." And did it?

14 A. Yes.

11:25:57 15 Q. So, Mr Taylor, just so we get the picture, we've got the  
16 Johnny Paul Koroma negotiations going on in Monrovia, yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Plans to bring in West Side Boys from Okra Hills, yes?

19 A. That is correct.

11:26:12 20 Q. Negotiations taking place for the release of those  
21 hostages?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And at the same time you're occupied with this security  
24 situation in Lofa?

11:26:24 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. That's the picture in August, yes?

27 A. That is correct, yes.

28 Q. "It has also been, up to now, the main focus of the local  
29 media."

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. "Yesterday President Taylor met with a group of eminent  
3 persons to brief on and discuss with them the situation in Lofa.  
4 Alluding to the attackers of Lofa, he assured the group that  
11:26:47 5 nobody is going to remain on one inch of Liberian soil. Of some  
6 significance is the statement by the President that, 'Under  
7 international law we have a right to defend ourselves, but we  
8 can't because our hands are tied'."

9 What did you mean by "our hands are tied"?

11:27:09 10 A. We have no weapons, none. What is not burned yet is still  
11 under lock and key with the international community. We have no  
12 means to defend ourselves. That's what I'm talking about.

13 Q. "He went on to say, 'I can assure you Liberia will seek  
14 military assistance from our friends in terms of troops'." Which  
11:27:40 15 friends?

16 A. Anybody that wanted to help in the sub-region, they would  
17 be our friends and we would take it because we were desperate.  
18 Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, whoever, we were going to  
19 take it.

11:27:56 20 Q. "The mood in Monrovia is sombre. Accounting for this is  
21 the recent tragic plane crash in which the lives of the police  
22 top brass were lost."

23 Is that right, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Yes, the police director to be --

11:28:15 25 Q. What was the name of the police director?

26 A. Joseph Tate.

27 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I apologise for interrupting,  
28 but I have a notation that this evidence was traversed on 3  
29 August.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: I think we started on it.

2 JUDGE DOHERTY: On these particular paragraphs you're  
3 putting now, but not the entire document.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Not the entire document, the reason being  
11:28:41 5 because we then realised that it was out of place and that the  
6 date was wrong, so that's why I'm revisiting it now.

7 JUDGE DOHERTY: I understand, thank you.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Not at all.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: And you've got about two minutes, I  
11:28:52 10 think, Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I think I can go a little further in  
12 the time available:

13 Q. "... in which the lives of the police top brass were  
14 lost." And that, you say, included Joe Tate?

15 A. Yeah, police director Joseph Tate, yes.

16 Q. "The antiwar sentiment currently being expressed by the  
17 populace is laced with incipient jingoism. 'We are tired of  
18 fighting. We don't want war any more. We will defend our  
19 country. We will never again run away from Liberia to become  
11:29:27 20 refugees.' The ministry of defence informs that ex-combatants  
21 are reporting at its headquarters voluntarily and in significant  
22 numbers for recruitment as fighters in Lofa."

23 Would that be a useful point, Mr President?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. We'll take  
11:29:49 25 the short break now and resume at 12 o'clock.

26 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

27 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Before the short adjournment, Mr Taylor, we were looking at

1 this code cable from Downes-Thomas, which is unhelpfully dated 17  
2 August 1998 and can I pause at this point and ask that we correct  
3 the date.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could you just pause there one moment.

12:02:34 5 Yes, go ahead, please, Mr Griffiths.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I invite everyone, please, to correct  
7 the date at the top of this document we are looking at which is  
8 clearly wrong and misled us in the first place when we first  
9 approached it. The date should be 17 August 1999:

12:03:05 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just before the break, we had looked at  
11 paragraph 2 in this document, do you recall?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Now, we see again in the last sentence in that paragraph  
14 reference to, "The ministry of defence informs that ex-combatants  
15 are reporting at its headquarters voluntarily and in significant  
16 numbers for recruitment as fighters in Lofa." A recurrence of  
17 the same problem identified by Downes-Thomas to Prendergast in  
18 that earlier response on 30 May, yes?

19 A. Yes.

12:03:47 20 Q. And were they so reporting to be recruited?

21 A. Yeah, they were in large numbers, just as the defence  
22 minister said, which for all intents and purposes is a very bad  
23 development. It's a very bad development. This is not the type  
24 of thing that I would have ever wanted or dreamed of. We were  
25 trying to get these combatants away from the war and here we are  
26 now faced with war and they are, as trained fighters, begin to  
27 pour in to volunteer their services. This was not a very good  
28 development for us.

29 Q. "It would appear that the Government of Liberia has

1 embarked on the following three-pronged approach in its efforts  
2 to address the Lofa situation.

3 Sub-regional approach.

4 (a) This involves principally the use of the good offices

12:05:00 5 of ECOWAS. An ECOWAS delegation led by the Togolese foreign  
6 minister, accompanied by the Togolese defence minister and the  
7 Nigerian minister of cooperation and integration met with  
8 Government of Liberia authorities over the weekend. Their visit  
9 was preceded, hours earlier, by that of a delegation of the

12:05:25 10 Government of Sierra Leone, led by the minister of foreign  
11 affairs. Both delegations examined with the Government of  
12 Liberia authorities offers aimed at a peaceful resolution of the  
13 Lofa conflict, in which Guinea has been associated in one form or  
14 another. These sub-regional activities have given rise to the  
12:05:49 15 speculation that a mini summit (Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone,  
16 Liberia, Guinea and possibly Mali) is to take place some time  
17 this week in Conakry."

18 Pause. Did it take place?

19 A. No. It took at another time. But no, not in Conakry, no.

12:06:14 20 Q. It is not unlikely that such a meeting will indeed take  
21 place. What appears unlikely, however, is the venue, Guinea,  
22 which at present is, as it were, a party to the conflict. Given  
23 the time needed for preparatory activities leading up to such a  
24 meeting, it seems unlikely that a mini summit could be convened  
12:06:37 25 during this week.

26 It is worth noting that immediately after the Government of  
27 Liberia's meeting with these delegations, it issued a fairly  
28 conciliatory statement pointing out that Guinea has all along  
29 demonstrated commitment to regional peace and stability and

1 expressed the hope that Guinea will not renege on its commitments  
2 to international agreements. Following that statement, another  
3 was issued with an appeal to the Government of Guinea to  
4 return/extradite the dissidents or insurgents residing in Guinea.

12:07:15

5 The Guinean minister of internal affairs and security also  
6 visited Liberia recently and discussed with the Government of  
7 Liberia authorities the Lofa situation. He conveyed his  
8 government's position that Guinea is in no way encouraging or  
9 training either Liberian dissidents or others to destabilise  
10 Liberia."

12:07:37

11 Let us pause again for a moment. Mr Taylor, you told us  
12 recently that you had never really got on with President Lansana  
13 Conte. Do you recall telling us that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

12:07:53

15 Q. So help us, this is the second time there has been an  
16 incursion from Guinean territory. Why are you adopting this  
17 conciliatory tone?

18 A. Well, it's necessary if we want to keep peace. But I'm  
19 also aware of the fact that, in dealing with these forest areas  
20 in West Africa, it is possible - or it was possible, may I say,  
21 and even probable, that these attacks could have come out of  
22 Guinea without the knowledge of President Conte. So what we are  
23 trying to do is not to jump the gun, being presumptuous of  
24 certain facts that had not been really put, you know, to the  
25 test. And so we wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt and  
26 leave doors open for discussion and cooperation. That's all we  
27 are trying to do.

12:08:57

28 Not that in one little part of our minds we are not  
29 thinking that he is involved, but again we have no real evidence.

1 And again it's possible, like I said probable, that it could have  
2 happened without his knowledge and/or consent because of the  
3 forest and people could have been lurking in the forest over  
4 months and years. They could have hidden arms and ammunition and  
12:09:35 5 were just looking for an opportunity. So we wanted to keep it  
6 open, at least give a hand of friendship.

7 Q. "Earlier communications to headquarters advised that the  
8 Government of Liberia intends to raise this matter of  
9 Lofa/insurgents/Guinea in one form or another with the Security  
12:10:00 10 Council."

11 Now we saw from the press release that you had already  
12 mentioned that fact?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "By its note of 11 August, the ministry of foreign affairs  
12:10:10 15 brought to the attention of the Secretary-General this matter of  
16 an armed incursion into Liberian territory and requested that the  
17 information conveyed to the Secretary-General be brought to the  
18 urgent attention of the Security Council.

19 I am reliably informed that the Liberian foreign minister,  
12:10:26 20 who left Monrovia yesterday afternoon for Cote d'Ivoire, is  
21 likely to request an opportunity to address the Security Council  
22 on the overall Lofa situation and related matters, under the  
23 Arias formula."

24 What is the Arias formula?

12:10:48 25 A. I really don't know. I can't help.

26 Q. "During yesterday morning's meeting with the foreign  
27 minister, he did confirm to me that he would be heading for the  
28 United States to meet with officials of State Department to whom  
29 he would explain Liberia's position on the matter. He was also

1 going to advise them on the Government of Liberia's intention to  
2 obtain an appropriate Security Council resolution that is likely  
3 to be submitted by a member state on behalf of ECOWAS.

4 The foreign minister should be in the United States shortly  
12:11:22 5 and would wish to have an audience with the Secretary-General  
6 anytime during the period between Friday of this week and early  
7 next week. He was unable to be more specific, since he was not  
8 too sure how long his Washington consultations would take. He  
9 promised to be in touch on this matter with either myself or his  
12:11:44 10 permanent representative to the United Nations. In the meantime,  
11 it would be useful to advise the EOSG" - who is that?

12 A. That's another UN, EOSG.

13 Q. "... accordingly.

14 As has been communicated earlier, the Government of Liberia  
12:12:12 15 authorities have expressed some surprise and disappointment with  
16 the fact that to date, there has been no condemnation by the  
17 international community of the incursion into Lofa."

18 Is that right?

19 A. That is correct.

12:12:25 20 Q. "It would, therefore, not be surprising if this diplomatic  
21 offensive would seek to obtain such a condemnation.

22 Military activities.

23 These are in progress and, mercifully, in a relatively  
24 restrained manner. Based on earlier conversations with the  
12:12:48 25 President, it would seem that this restraint reflects an  
26 awareness on his part that sub-regional stability and the peace  
27 of Sierra Leone could be adversely affected if military  
28 operations on the part of the Government of Liberia were not  
29 appropriately defined."

1 Now, pause there, Mr Taylor.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "Based on earlier conversations with the President, it  
4 would seem that this restraint reflects an awareness on his part  
12:13:29 5 that sub-regional stability and the peace in Sierra Leone could  
6 be adversely affected if military operations on the part of the  
7 Government of Liberia were not appropriately defined."

8 What does that mean?

9 A. Well, here we have many coming under attack. We have it on  
12:13:54 10 the other Guinea side. We are amassing, people are volunteering  
11 to come to fight. Remember, every time we - there are  
12 accusations coming out of Sierra Leone that Liberia is planning  
13 to attack Sierra Leone. There is this report, as has been before  
14 the Court, of 5,000 men assembling at the borders. That is not  
12:14:18 15 true. And so amassing these forces, these accusations could all  
16 come again, so we have to properly define what our objectives are  
17 and make it very clear to the Sierra Leonean government if they  
18 could be construed that we are planning to attack Sierra Leone.  
19 So we are just trying to be careful, you know, to make sure that  
12:14:42 20 we do nothing that would upset the peace that is about to prevail  
21 in the sub-region.

22 Q. "Within certain quarters in the Government of Liberia  
23 hierarchy, there are those who advocate that Guinea should be  
24 taught a lesson once and for all."

12:14:59 25 Was there such a sentiment being expressed?

26 A. Yes, I mean, but in some of our opinion, they were foolish.  
27 We didn't have the means to teach Guinea a lesson. So speaking  
28 about teaching a lesson is like saying that a rat should go and  
29 attack an elephant. We didn't have guns. So it was just foolish

1 to us, so we didn't give it any credence.

2 Q. "I am hoping to meet with the President soon and to  
3 reinforce the idea that the sub-regional approach and other  
4 diplomat initiatives need some time to yield results and in that  
12:15:37 5 context advise him that military activities should be maintained,  
6 if necessary, at the mark time level."

7 Now, mention is made there, Mr Taylor, of the diplomatic  
8 approach. In due course, was there a diplomatic meeting in  
9 relation to this incursion in Lofa?

12:16:08 10 A. Yes. The ECOWAS foreign ministers, we had an ad hoc  
11 committee meeting of the ECOWAS foreign ministers to look into  
12 this problem followed by an ad hoc meeting of Heads of State on  
13 this matter. And even I remember a case where even Conte and I  
14 met in Abuja to discuss this matter. So we, while trying to  
12:16:40 15 control the situation, still opted for the diplomatic approach.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I move on to that topic in detail,  
17 can I ask, Mr President that that code cable from Felix  
18 Downes-Thomas to Prendergast dated 17 August 1999 be marked for  
19 identification.

12:17:06 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document, the code cable, is  
21 marked for identification MFI-103.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful.

23 Q. Now, we have mentioned before on several occasions,  
24 Mr Taylor, that such meetings are on concluded with a communique?

12:17:53 25 A. Yes, there was a communique published at the end of that  
26 meeting.

27 Q. Can I now invite attention to binder 1 of 2 for week 32 and  
28 behind divider 48, please. This is the communique, Mr Taylor?

29 A. This is it, yeah.

1 Q. Now, let us see. It is headed, "Ad hoc Committee Meeting  
2 of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the Dissident Armed Attack on  
3 Liberia, Final Communique." Date, "Lome, 26 August 1993", yes?  
4 A. 1999.

12:19:17 5 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, if you could hold on,  
6 please. We are still trying to find it.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Oh, I am sorry. I am sorry.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we have that. Thank you,  
9 Mr Griffiths.

12:20:03 10 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

11 Q. Now, we see, Mr Taylor, dated 26 August 1999, yes?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. So it's what, a week and a half or so after the attack?

14 A. Yeah, just about a week and a half, yeah.

12:20:24 15 Q. "On the initiative of his Excellency of the Togolese  
16 Republic and current chairman of the Economic Community of West  
17 African States, and within the framework of normal consultations  
18 on peacekeeping, security and stability in the sub-region, an ad  
19 hoc committee of ministers of foreign affairs met in Lome on 26  
12:20:54 20 August, 1999.

21 The committee considered the situation in Liberia following  
22 the recent attack on that ECOWAS member state."

23 It then goes on to list who was represented at the meeting,  
24 and you note that the Republic of Guinea, along with Liberia,  
12:21:16 25 were represented, Mr Taylor, yes?

26 A. That is correct, yes.

27 Q. "The ECOWAS executive secretary participated at the  
28 meeting, which was also attended by the special representative of  
29 the United Nations Secretary-General to Liberia."

1 That's Mr Downes-Thomas, yes?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. "A list of participants is attached as an annex."

4 We need not trouble with that?

12:21:44 5 "The joint Togo-Nigeria mission undertaken to Guinea and  
6 Liberia, under the leadership of the foreign affairs and  
7 cooperation of Togo, presented a report to them. The ministers  
8 of the two sister countries also briefed them on the situation.

9 The ministers exchanged views on the situation in Liberia  
12:22:05 10 in the light of the information provided.

11 The ministers strongly condemned the attack by Liberian  
12 dissidents which could destabilise Liberia, the sub-region, and  
13 mar the relations of good neighbourliness existing between the  
14 two member states.

12:22:24 15 The ministers demanded the dissidents to desist forthwith  
16 from what they described as further criminal activities. They  
17 clearly stated that no member state or official should give them  
18 any form of support.

19 They called on the international community to condemn the  
12:22:42 20 attack and to cooperate with ECOWAS and the two countries, to  
21 take measures to prevent and discourage any further subversive  
22 activity that could destabilise the sub-region.

23 Furthermore, they underscored the need for immediate  
24 re-establishment of the environment of peace, security and trust  
12:23:04 25 between Liberia and Guinea.

26 The ministers noted with satisfaction the great restraint  
27 demonstrated by Guinea and Liberia which made it possible to  
28 avoid a conflict between the two member states.

29 They expressed satisfaction with the measures that had been

1 taken to ensure security at the borders and commended the  
2 initiatives taken initiatives taken by ECOWAS to find negotiated  
3 solutions to the crisis."

12:23:39 4 What measures had been taken to ensure security at the  
5 borders, Mr Taylor?

6 A. They had sent - you know, each side announced that they  
7 will have security forces sent. We could not really verify if  
8 Guinea had done that, but just the promise - the public promise  
9 of sending forces to the border to prevent these kind of actions  
12:24:02 10 was what happened.

11 Q. "The ministers agreed to establish a joint commission  
12 comprising Liberia, Guinea, and ECOWAS in order to find solutions  
13 to common security problems threatening the peace and stability  
14 of the two sister countries.

12:24:20 15 The ministers stressed the need for the two countries to  
16 resume dialogue with a view to promoting understanding and  
17 cooperation. In this regard, the ministers recommended to the  
18 Heads of State of Togo, Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina  
19 Faso and Sierra Leone to facilitate an early meeting of the two  
12:24:44 20 Presidents."

21 Did such a meeting take place?

22 A. Yes, we finally met.

23 Q. When was that?

24 A. A little later. I think somewhere in September. I think  
12:24:54 25 we met in Abuja.

26 Q. Consequently the minister called on Guinea and Liberia to  
27 observe the relevant provisions of the ECOWAS treaty and the  
28 protocol of nonaggression signed in Lagos on 27 April 1978. The  
29 ministers expressed sincere appreciation to the Republic of

1 Guinea for the invaluable effort it has been making by welcoming  
2 and providing shelter for refugees and other persons displaced as  
3 a result of the conflicts in the sub-region. They called on all  
4 refugees to be law-abiding and to refrain from any subversive  
12:25:34 5 activity. They appealed to the international community to give  
6 every assistance to Guinea."

7 Now, Mr Taylor, the problem with former combatants, which  
8 we've looked at in a little detail this morning, was that  
9 difficulty confined to Liberia?

12:25:56 10 A. No, no, no. They had the same problem in Guinea and  
11 Sierra Leone.

12 Q. Anywhere else?

13 A. Oh, former combatants? All around. Everywhere you had  
14 crisis, Ivory Coast before then, everywhere you have had crisis  
12:26:12 15 in Africa, you have had problems with former combatants.

16 Q. "The ministers also appealed to the international community  
17 to lend appropriate assistance to Liberia to enable it to address  
18 the humanitarian crisis created by the armed attack on  
19 Lofa County."

12:26:30 20 Describe that crisis for us, please?

21 A. Well, you have a large amount of Sierra Leoneans in  
22 Liberia; more than 100,000. Now you are beginning to have, what?  
23 We have internally displaced Liberians as a result of the crisis  
24 that have still not been sent back to their regions. Now, those  
12:26:58 25 are that are in the Kolahun, Mendekoma, Foya area are now  
26 displaced, and so now there are additions to the internally  
27 displaced. These are the type of problems that we are having.  
28 So it's just adding what you call insult to injury, more  
29 burdening on the non-governmental agencies that are in the

1 country. These are the problems we are having.

2 Now people, you know, are changing their lives altogether  
3 again all over.

12:27:40 4 Q. And, Mr Taylor, the part of Liberia where this conflict is  
5 taking place, that is that finger pointing into both Guinea and  
6 Sierra Leone, did that have any potential consequences for the  
7 recently found peace in Sierra Leone?

8 A. Yes, yes. Mendekoma is on the Sierra Leonean side. So  
9 that meant that if we - the war, the fighting at the town of  
12:28:09 10 Mendekoma could spill over into Sierra Leone that already has  
11 securities on their side of the border, also the fact that  
12 combatants are amassing again also had a possible threat to the  
13 Sierra Leonean situation. So in those two ways I would say it  
14 did have some effect on the possible peace in Sierra Leone.

12:28:37 15 Q. Now, as we note, this communique is issued towards the end  
16 of August, yes?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. Are there any further initiatives on this topic in that  
19 month of August, Mr Taylor?

12:28:55 20 A. Well, there are initiatives as far as getting the Heads of  
21 State meeting organised, but that comes a little later. But  
22 that's about the end of this particular matter, as far as the  
23 foreign ministers are concerned, until we get into the Heads of  
24 State meeting in September.

12:29:24 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Right. Before I move on to that, could I  
26 ask, please, that that document, and it might be  
27 economical - although we have disclosed this document in toto -  
28 if we merely mark for identification those two first pages to  
29 which I referred, because it is not my intention, unless I am

1 invited to do so, to refer to any further part of it.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, all right. The two pages that have  
3 just been discussed in evidence from the ECOWAS Review and that  
4 are entitled "Final communique" will be marked for identification  
5 MFI-104.

12:30:15

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

7 Q. Now, before we continue with the saga regarding the Lofa  
8 incident, Mr Taylor, earlier in 1999 we had looked at a letter  
9 written by General Yerks, did we not?

12:30:43

10 A. Yes, we had.

11 Q. Was there ever a response by the United States  
12 administration to that letter?

13 A. Yes. The Assistant Secretary of State --

14 Q. Who is that?

12:30:58

15 A. Susan Rice at the time, did respond to this letter in early  
16 September outlining what she felt that the views were of the  
17 United States government as far as Liberia was concerned.

18 Q. Let's look, please, behind the next divider in the same  
19 volume. Is this the response, Mr Taylor?

12:31:50

20 A. Yes, this is it.

21 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I don't have anything after  
22 49. Could you pause one moment and I'll try and get a copy,  
23 please.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Might it be in volume 2 at the beginning?

12:32:21

25 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I don't wish to delay things  
26 so if you proceed on and I will follow it on the screen whilst  
27 someone looks for a hard copy.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I enquire if everybody else has this  
29 document? I am grateful:

1 Q. As we see, the letter is headed "United States Department  
2 of State, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,  
3 Washington DC" and it is dated 8 September 1999:

4 "Dear General Yerks, thank you for your fax letter of 14  
12:33:01 5 August, and your observations about Liberia and the sub-region.

6 President Taylor has been positively engaged in the  
7 Sierra Leone peace process, which we fully commend, and we hope  
8 he will continue on this track. We especially hope he will  
9 continue to encourage Foday Sankoh to return to Freetown to  
10 implement the peace process. This is absolutely essential if the  
11 Lome Accord is to succeed."

12 Let us pause. At this stage, Mr Taylor, what contact did  
13 you have with Foday Sankoh?

14 A. We had telephone contact. We tried to get - before Foday  
12:33:53 15 Sankoh left Lome, and this is not just Susan Rice's idea, we are  
16 all sitting on pins and needles. By "we" I mean the ECOWAS  
17 states responsible for Sierra Leone, because we want for Foday  
18 Sankoh to hurry up and go to Freetown. And I mentioned to this  
19 Court that we had already agreed that we would not let him go  
12:34:22 20 back into his controlled area in the bush, that he would come  
21 through Monrovia and fly into Freetown because going back by road  
22 - in fact, he had spoken about wanting to come to Monrovia and  
23 drive into his area and all of our colleagues were agreed, no, we  
24 are not going to let that happen, we want him into Freetown.

12:34:46 25 So we made sure that wherever he went we knew before he  
26 went there. In fact, while we didn't have control what happened  
27 in those countries, but we knew. So we knew he wanted to go to  
28 Libya and we knew that he wanted to go to Tunisia. So President  
29 Eyadema at the time helped him a lot to get to those places. And

1 I was in telephone contact with him. Eyadema was. And I am sure  
2 some of the other leaders were, especially in Nigeria. I am sure  
3 one like Obasanjo he would really do that. Everyone wanted to  
4 make sure and we were pressing, and I particularly was pressing,  
12:35:30 5 "Hurry up, we have got to - you know, you have got to hurry up  
6 and come. We have got to get you down". And especially when  
7 Johnny Paul Koroma came to Monrovia we also used that. We said,  
8 "Well, look, there are some serious problems. You have to hurry  
9 up. Johnny Paul is waiting for you here for discussions." So we  
12:35:47 10 were in contact with him via telephone.

11 Q. Mr Taylor, I noticed that you've mentioned there that he  
12 wanted to go to Libya. Now, on that particular note, do you  
13 recall that in 1996 we looked at, in this Court, two letters  
14 written on behalf of Foday Sankoh to the Libyan embassy in Accra?  
12:36:12 15 Do you recall that?

16 A. That is correct, I do.

17 Q. Acknowledging assistance given in the past and requesting  
18 more. Do you recall that?

19 A. Yes.

12:36:20 20 Q. Now, at the time in August 1999, when Foday Sankoh was  
21 requesting that he be allowed to go to Libya, were you or your  
22 colleague Heads of State aware of that contact between him and  
23 the Libyans in 1996?

24 A. No. I first became aware of that contact and those letters  
12:36:46 25 in this courtroom.

26 Q. Now, help us. Had you and your fellow Heads of State known  
27 of this historic link between Sankoh and the Libyans, how would  
28 you have viewed such a visit by him to Libya hot on the heels of  
29 a newly agreed peace agreement in Lome?

1 A. Well, I tell you this and I am going to be very, very blunt  
2 about this. Quite frankly, I personally, and I will speak for me  
3 and the other Heads of State will have to do that for themselves,  
4 had I known then what I know now I still do not think - in the  
12:37:39 5 typical way that we behave as Africans, I would have tried to  
6 discourage it, but I would not have stopped it.

7 I think because Gaddafi being an African Head of State,  
8 doing a lot for the African Union and in fact in some of these  
9 meetings, even though these meetings are occurring in Togo,  
12:38:07 10 helping to fund a lot of these trips across Africa for Heads of  
11 State and everything is still being done by Libya. I benefitted  
12 from it and many other leaders. These costs are very  
13 extraordinary and some countries cannot bear them.

14 So unlike the outside, we would not have viewed a Libya and  
12:38:31 15 Gaddafi as a pariah state and say, "No, you cannot go." And I am  
16 being very bold about this. I would have probably discouraged  
17 it, but I would not have stopped it.

18 What I would have done, I would have spoken to Gaddafi at  
19 length telling him that don't let him stay too long, but I am not  
12:38:50 20 going to sit here and say I would have discouraged it at that  
21 time. No, I would have discouraged it, but not stopped it.

22 Q. I really do need to press you a little further on that,  
23 Mr Taylor, and for this reason: You will recall that the second  
24 of those two letters in 1996 is dated in December, a matter of  
12:39:13 25 days after the Abidjan Peace Agreement, yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Now, even with that knowledge, would your stance remain the  
28 same?

29 A. It depends on the situation. There is a little

1 different stuff. This is why we were pressing for Sankoh to come  
2 and go to Freetown. In the case of the Abidjan agreement, Sankoh  
3 was still, you know, I mean aloof and he was permitted to come,  
4 go into his area, come out. We were convinced that we were not  
12:39:51 5 about to do that again. But we must understand, when you are  
6 dealing with states, sovereign states, and how they interact with  
7 individuals, Foday Sankoh being a free man, like I am saying, I  
8 would have discouraged any action on the part of the Libyan  
9 government, but I would not have stopped him because that would -  
12:40:18 10 in our part of the world that would be considered an insult if  
11 you tell a free man you cannot go to this country.

12 In other words, that is tantamount to an accusation against  
13 Libya that Libya, by having Sankoh as a guest, would do something  
14 that would contravene the agreement. So I would have at that  
12:40:42 15 particular point dealt more with Libya as a government than  
16 ultimately stopping him. And I am being very, very honest about  
17 this.

18 Q. Very well. Let's move on:

19 "The International Monetary Fund has worked with the  
12:40:59 20 Government of Liberia to implement a number of reforms in the  
21 economy that could lead to increased international assistance in  
22 development projects and attract international investment so  
23 necessary to Liberia's reconstruction."

24 Pause there. Firstly, had the IMF been involved with  
12:41:24 25 Liberia?

26 A. Discussions, discussions, discussions. That's it. That's  
27 the involvement.

28 Q. Now, you note that the Assistant Secretary of State  
29 recognises that international investment is necessary to

1 Liberia's reconstruction. Had the United States provided any  
2 such necessary assistance?

3 A. Not a dime. Not a dime.

12:42:06

4 Q. Let's go on: "The IMF recommends action on three key  
5 economic issues. The rice monopoly." Let's take them in turn.  
6 What's the rice monopoly?

12:42:41

7 A. Really I do not know what Susan Rice is talking about here.  
8 But let me tell you what they perceived at that time as the rice  
9 monopoly. In 1989, or thereabout, there was a problem in  
10 Liberia, '87/'89. Rice is a staple of Liberia. Staple of  
11 Liberia. We wanted and the government had approved a system  
12 where in fact there was not a monopoly; that there would be an  
13 oligopoly established because of the nature - rice could cause  
14 rioting, war, anytime in Liberia. These people were talking  
15 about, "Oh, let's open up the market."

12:43:14

16 Well, Liberia, a little population of about 4.5 million  
17 people, you say we should open up the market to everyone. The  
18 market is opened up to everyone, but what are we talking about?

12:43:40

19 We are talking about small petty traders that are bringing in  
20 1,000 bags from across the border, maybe another 2,000 they would  
21 import, 5,000. Rice is always off the market. So what the  
22 government took as a decision was that we would permit a total of  
23 three major importers - major importers, because no investor is  
24 going to invest millions of dollars in importing several hundred  
25 thousand tons of rice in the country that would not get sold  
26 because every Tom, Dick and Harry and his cousin is bringing in  
27 rice. So we proposed an oligopoly of such that would permit  
28 investors to invest, keep the price low, but that there would  
29 always be sufficient rice in the market.

12:44:11

1           They jump in. Well, you have to open it to everyone. And  
2 we say we cannot, because I studied economics in the  
3 United States and there are certain parts, if you go back, there  
4 are - in fact, there were oligopolies created in the United  
12:44:47 5 States from time to time, okay, depending on the situation. So  
6 why do you tell us that it's not good for Liberia at this  
7 particular time? So they are pressing us and using this as an  
8 excuse not to help: Oh, the rice monopoly.

9 Q.     Mr Taylor, can I interrupt? Why would a product like rice  
12:45:07 10 be of interest to a superpower like the United States? The  
11 supply of rice to a country of four million people, why is that  
12 important? Can you help us?

13 A.     Well, I tell you what, it would beat me, really, of why it  
14 would be of such a major issue for them, but there is a little  
12:45:31 15 side issue with this. We had a programme in Liberia - it was not  
16 a real monopoly situation. Let me tell you what the problem was.  
17 There was a programme in Liberia with the United States. It was  
18 called PL 480. What PL 480 was, it was a programme that the  
19 United States gave Liberia up to \$25 million worth of rice. That  
12:46:03 20 rice is then sold at a particular price, and then --

21 Q.     Might I interrupt for a moment, Mr Taylor, and I apologise.  
22 So the United States are a major producer of rice, are they?

23 A.     Oh, yes, the United States produces a lot of rice.

24 Q.     And a major exporter of rice, yes?

12:46:25 25 A.     Oh, definitely. Definitely. Definitely this PL 480 rice  
26 programme was supposed to sell the rice and then use the money  
27 for development purposes. Now - but that particular programme  
28 set the price for the bag of rice. That was a little high. Now,  
29 I studied economics in America. I knew the tricks. So what I

1 said to them, I said: Well, look, instead of giving us the rice,  
2 just give us the \$25 million. They said: No, you have to take  
3 the rice and you sell the rice, but you take the rice and you  
4 sell the rice, but you have to sell it at a particular price, and  
12:47:09 5 it's high, and people cannot buy. So what I did when I became  
6 President, I said: Well, if we cannot get the money, we will  
7 import our rice and put it out there.

8 So this is really trying to squeeze. This was - so when we  
9 go back to your question, why would a superpower - this is just  
12:47:27 10 trying to squeeze us back into the PL 480 programme. That's all  
11 this is about really.

12 Q. But why would they do that? Who would benefit?

13 A. Oh, it would benefit them. It would benefit them, and I  
14 can tell you how it benefits them, okay? The farmers in America  
12:47:45 15 produce grain, wheat. All this stuff is packed up in warehouses  
16 from small states like Iowa going all the way south. These are  
17 all rice/grain producing areas. Rice and grain in America will  
18 stay in warehouses. If there were no wars, even a lot of their  
19 food would get rotten there. So all this food must coming out  
12:48:05 20 must come out so farmers can be able to clear their warehouses  
21 and plant more. So economically, the benefit goes to the  
22 American farmer. When you get that rice out, it opens the way  
23 for new rice to be produced. If these warehouses are stocked  
24 with rice that cannot get out, the farmers will not grow rice  
12:48:25 25 because they need the money from the sale of the rice, okay - the  
26 sale of the rice to the United States government. So it is a  
27 whole economic movement that is very important.

28 So even if you look at international assistance in grain  
29 and different things, it is all a part of that process. Why it

1 is a good process? It benefits them: The farmers get money;  
2 they make contributions to various political parties; they make  
3 contributions to congress, main senators and other people from  
4 areas. It is a whole part of the whole economic movement. So it  
12:49:06 5 is important to them in this way in that they manage to get the  
6 rice out so that farmers can continue to produce. Farmers cannot  
7 produce unless what they have produced before is moved out, and  
8 so it benefits them.

9 Q. Now, apart from rice, we note that the other two areas of  
12:49:23 10 concern mentioned by the Assistant Secretary of State in this  
11 rather short letter is the petroleum monopoly and compensation of  
12 Mobil Oil for losses suffered in 1996. Do you see that,  
13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes.

12:49:45 15 Q. Now, do you recall the General Yerks letter set Mobil as a  
16 priority as well?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. "Eliminating monopolies, creating an environment in which  
19 government contracts are awarded in a transparent manner, and  
12:50:03 20 protecting the business interest of foreign investors will go a  
21 long way to improve Liberia's image abroad."

22 What did you think she was telling you?

23 A. What Secretary Rice was really saying here was that, you  
24 know, we need you to look after what is of vital interest to us.  
12:50:34 25 This is all about Mobil again. Our vital interest is Mobil. You  
26 wonder why they would be so interested, and they even - you're  
27 talking about compensation to a little country. We don't have  
28 the money anyway. Let's not forget what happened in 1996. She  
29 knows what happened in 1996. What is 1996? It's a situation

1 that we had, what? Conflict in Monrovia.

2 So they are just calling for things that are impossible.  
3 These are conditionalities that really don't make sense because  
4 if you are serious about helping the country, you would not raise  
12:51:16 5 these kinds of issues. It's just another way of telling General  
6 Yerks: Okay, we will make some things available that we know  
7 that Liberia will not be able to meet. And so they write these  
8 letters, and we get them, and we deal with them.

9 Q. Now, bearing in mind the content of General Yerks's letter,  
12:51:43 10 which we looked at yesterday, and the road map for success he set  
11 out for Liberia on the second page, it's useful to note what the  
12 Assistant Secretary of State goes on to say: "We are pleased  
13 that Liberia has friends who can help guide it in the right  
14 direction." You see that, Mr Taylor?

12:52:05 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. "Thank you for your good efforts and kind words of support.  
17 Please stay in touch with me concerning developments in Liberia."  
18 Now, were you ever contacted by Susan Rice directly, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Throughout my presidency, I never spoke to Secretary Rice."

12:52:29 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, we can put this particular volume away  
21 now, please.

22 Can I ask that that letter be marked for identification  
23 MFI-105, please. It's the letter from Susan Rice, United States  
24 Department of State dated 8 September 1999.

12:53:05 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that letter is marked for  
26 identification MFI-105.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, when looking at the communique from the  
29 meeting in Lome on 26 August, do you recall that?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. Mention was made of a future meeting that would take place  
3 in September?

4 A. That is correct.

12:53:43 5 Q. Did such a meeting take place?

6 A. Yes, a meeting of the Heads of State did occur by  
7 mid-September.

8 Q. And where did that meeting take place?

9 A. To the best of my recollection, it could have been in  
12:53:58 10 Abuja. I am not too - but it did occur around September 16. If  
11 I am not mistaken, about that time.

12 Q. Have a look behind divider 50 in the second bundle for week  
13 32, please. Do you have it?

14 A. No, not yet. It's coming.

12:55:30 15 MR GRIFFITHS: It's the slimmer of the two volumes.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we have those.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we see that this document is entitled  
19 "Declaration of the Ad Hoc Committee of ECOWAS Heads of State and  
12:55:49 20 Government," and in the bottom right-hand corner it is dated 16  
21 September 1999. Do you see that?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. And jumping forward just to come back, if we go to the  
24 penultimate page we see your signature second from the bottom,  
12:56:11 25 don't we?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Let's go back to the second page then, please, the start of  
28 the document. Before we come to deal with the detail contained  
29 within it, can I ask you this: What was the purpose of this

1 summit held in Abuja on 16 September?

2 A. That is to deal specifically with the report and  
3 recommendations coming from the ad hoc committee meeting of the  
4 foreign ministers on the Liberia-Guinea situation.

12:56:51 5 Q. Okay. Now, the document reads as follows:

6 "We, the Heads of State and government, meeting as an ad  
7 hoc committee of ECOWAS Heads of State and government, met at  
8 Abuja on 16 September 1999 under the chairmanship of  
9 His Excellency, General Gnassingbe Eyadema."

12:57:19 10 Now, what was - Eyadema, was he still chairman of ECOWAS at  
11 this time?

12 A. Yes, he is still chairman. It changes not too far from  
13 here, but he is still chairman.

14 Q. "... President of the Togolese Republic and current  
12:57:34 15 chairman of the Economic Community of West African States,  
16 considered important issues relating to regional peace and  
17 security, particularly the situation prevailing at the border  
18 zone between Guinea and Liberia.

19 We Heads of State and government, after taking note of the  
12:57:54 20 report of President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of  
21 Nigeria, in which he referred to the outcome of the meeting of  
22 the ad hoc committee of ministers of foreign affairs on Liberia,  
23 which was held in Lome on 26 August 1999."

24 Culminating in the communique we looked at earlier. Is  
12:58:17 25 that right, Mr Taylor?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. "And after listening to the statements of Their  
28 Excellencies, the Heads of State of Guinea and Liberia, exchanged  
29 views on relations between the two sister countries?

1 We strongly condemn the attacks on Liberia and Guinea."

2 Pause there. As far as you were aware, were there any  
3 attacks on Guinea?

4 A. Well, under hot pursuit there were some little altercations  
12:58:55 5 as we pushed these individuals out, and so what Conte did very  
6 cleverly, he said, "Well, Liberia is not only under attack. I am  
7 under attack too." So that's what they are talking about here.

8 Q. "Which threatened the peace and security of both countries  
9 and which could destabilise the region as well as mar the  
10 relations of good neighbourliness existing between the two ECOWAS  
11 member states.

12 We demand that the armed groups desist forthwith from  
13 further criminal activities against Liberia and Guinea. In this  
14 regard, we recall the provisions of the ECOWAS protocol on mutual  
12:59:37 15 assistance on defence matters and agree that no ECOWAS member  
16 state shall give the armed groups any support.

17 We, Heads of State and government, express our  
18 determination to work towards the immediate establishment of good  
19 neighbourliness which is needed for the consolidation of peace,  
12:59:57 20 security and trust between Guinea and Liberia. In this respect,  
21 we agree as follows:

22 The three countries of the Mano River Union, namely Guinea,  
23 Liberia and Sierra Leone, shall exchange amongst themselves the  
24 list of persons suspected of involvement in subversive activities  
13:00:17 25 against their respective countries with a view to their expulsion  
26 in accordance with the Mano River Union treaty."

27 Can we pause for a minute. Was the compilation of such a  
28 list practically possible, Mr Taylor?

29 A. No and yes. Practically possible, no. But we did give it

1 a try and we did come up with a limited - a few names.

2 Q. Now I ask for this reason: If it would have been  
3 practically possible for you to list those you claim were  
4 dissidents invading Liberia from Guinea, would it in the same  
13:01:10 5 sense have been possible to put together lists of Liberians, for  
6 example, fighting with the STF for the Sierra Leonean government,  
7 do you follow me?

8 A. That's the whole point. It's not practical in that sense  
9 because, number one, you really don't know the people, you have  
13:01:30 10 no control over them, so it's very difficult to come up - you can  
11 guess just like in Sierra Leone we could guess about  
12 those - about the leadership maybe, but elements, no, it's very  
13 difficult.

14 Q. "The three member countries of Mano River Union shall  
13:01:50 15 establish a joint security committee to monitor and ensure the  
16 security of their common borders in line with the provisions of  
17 the Mano River Union security pact.

18 Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone shall reactivate the Mano  
19 River Union with the participation of ECOWAS secretariat as an  
13:02:09 20 observer. In this regard, the three Heads of State agreed to  
21 hold their summit in Freetown during the first week of November  
22 1999."

23 Did such a summit take place?

24 A. November 1999, yes. This summit, to the best of my  
13:02:40 25 recollection, I didn't attend it though, but it probably did  
26 happen. Because this is further on, we are just planning in  
27 advance.

28 Q. "The Heads of State of Guinea and Liberia shall establish  
29 early a direct line of communication between them to facilitate

1 regular consultation.

2 We note, with satisfaction, the solemn undertaking by Their  
3 Excellencies Lansana Conte and Charles Taylor to embrace good  
4 neighbourliness and non-aggression as these will enhance regional  
13:03:15 5 peace and security. This conforms with the relevant provisions  
6 with the ECOWAS treaty and the protocol on non-aggression signed  
7 in Lagos in 1978.

8 We express sincere appreciation for the role played by the  
9 Republics of Guinea and Liberia in hosting refugees and other  
13:03:39 10 displaced persons as a result of the conflicts within the region.  
11 We call on the refugees to comply with the laws of their host  
12 countries and to refrain from any subversive activities. We also  
13 appeal to the international community to give the Republics of  
14 Guinea and Liberia all the necessary assistance to enable it to  
13:04:08 15 cope with the problems of the refugees."

16 Now, I would like us to pause again, please, Mr Taylor, and  
17 seek your assistance on the content of that particular paragraph.  
18 "The role played by the Republics of Guinea and Liberia in  
19 hosting refugees and displaced persons", yes?

13:04:35 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, you have already explained we've got Liberian refugees  
22 in Sierra Leone?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia?

13:04:45 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Liberian refugees in Guinea?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Liberian refugees in Cote d'Ivoire?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So you have these floating masses of displaced persons from  
4 across the border in these various areas, yes?

13:05:05 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And we're talking about people - because we appreciate that  
7 these borders are artificial - who nonetheless share cultural  
8 historical trading links with people across the borders from  
9 which they have escaped, yes?

13:05:24 10 A. That is correct, yes.

11 Q. Now tell me, Mr Taylor, in the same way that you  
12 acknowledge that President Conte had difficulty or could  
13 potentially have difficulty in controlling what was going on in  
14 that border area bordering Liberia - yes?

13:05:42 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you have similar difficulties controlling  
17 Sierra Leoneans displaced from across the border in Kailahun,  
18 say, within Liberia? Did you have similar difficulties?

19 A. Very similar. In fact maybe greater difficulties.

13:06:03 20 Remember we led evidence here before where at one point we had  
21 suggested even trying to back people away from the border.

22 You have no control because, number one, once you accept  
23 refugees in your country, even though they are there, but they  
24 are still in a way being protected by the United Nations through  
13:06:31 25 the United Nations committee responsible for refugees. So they  
26 are there and you cannot - under these arrangements, once you are  
27 given refugee status in a country the UNHCR has certain rules.  
28 You cannot restrict their movements. You know, they are in your  
29 country, but still they are protected by international law, in

1 other words.

2 And so going through these bush paths and going backward  
3 and forward you have difficulties. Not just I; all countries  
4 have difficulties dealing with these kinds of matters because you  
13:07:18 5 are advised as a refugee to follow the laws of the country and  
6 they try to do. But control is not total. That's the point I am  
7 trying to make. You do not have total control over them. They  
8 must be given as much freedom and protection by the UNHCR under  
9 international law, even though they are within your country.

13:07:45 10 Q. "We appeal to the international community to assist Liberia  
11 and Guinea to address the humanitarian crisis created as a result  
12 of the attack by the dissidents.

13 We express satisfaction at the adoption of the ECOWAS  
14 mechanism for conflict prevention, resolution, peacekeeping and  
13:08:05 15 regional security during the 21st ordinary session of the  
16 authority of Heads of State and government held in Abuja on 30  
17 and 31 October 1998 and direct the executive secretary to  
18 continue the efforts aimed at ensuring its speedy implementation.  
19 In this regard, we express gratitude to the European Union for  
13:08:29 20 the financial assistance granted to ECOWAS for the implementation  
21 of this regional mechanism.

22 We, Heads of State and government, express our deep  
23 gratitude to His Excellency Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, President of  
24 the Republic of Nigeria, to the government and people of Nigeria  
13:08:48 25 for the brotherly welcome extended to us and for the excellent  
26 facilities made available during our stay in Abuja."

27 Now, let's just pause and have a look at the signatures.  
28 Now, we have already looked at your signature, so we know you  
29 were there. Go over the page. It's also signed by

1 President Kabbah, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So Kabbah was present at this meeting. Is that right?

4 A. Well, yes.

13:09:23 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I appreciate that it would appear that the  
6 main topic on the agenda and the main focus of this document  
7 we've just looked at is what had recently occurred in Lofa in  
8 Liberia.

9 A. Yes.

13:09:46 10 Q. But when you and other Heads of State meet on these  
11 occasions, is the discussion totally monopolised by the one  
12 topic?

13 A. No, not at all. Liberia is - in fact Liberia and Guinea  
14 are on this, but if there are other matters concerning, for  
13:10:09 15 example, Sierra Leone, of course that will be discussed. And  
16 this is why this is an ad hoc meeting, so Kabbah would be able to  
17 say whatever he wants to say because this is a threat about the  
18 Mano River Union countries and so there will be more than one  
19 subject matter in short on the agenda.

13:10:33 20 Q. I ask for this reason, you see: Because we know that  
21 running in tandem with this incident in Lofa is the presence of  
22 Johnny Paul Koroma in Monrovia. So would you have discussed that  
23 with Kabbah?

24 A. Yes, and the rest of the Heads of State there. It would  
13:10:55 25 come up in the meeting and I would - at a meeting like this I had  
26 to tell them what was going on. If there is anything specific  
27 that Kabbah wanted to discuss with me, of course he could pull me  
28 aside during the break to talk about it. But there is no secret  
29 about this. It will come back this entire group. When the Heads

1 of State meet, especially, if you look here, this is an ad hoc  
2 meeting, so there is nothing secret there. It will come out in  
3 the meeting.

13:11:42

4 Q. Now, let's move on. So you had travelled to Abuja for that  
5 meeting concluding on 16 September, Mr Taylor, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Did you travel anywhere else within September?

8 A. September? Yes. I did make a trip to Mali. I made a trip  
9 to visit with Alpha in Mali.

13:12:14

10 Q. Pause there and hold that thought. Whilst I ask that the  
11 declaration of the ad hoc committee of ECOWAS Heads of State and  
12 government, Abuja, 16 September 1999, could that be marked for  
13 identification, please.

13:12:35

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-106 for  
15 identification.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Have a look behind the next divider, please, Mr Taylor,  
18 divider 51. Yes?

19 A. Yes.

13:12:51

20 Q. Go to the last page dated 22 September 1999, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And do you see your signature?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. Let's go back to the first page:

13:13:10

25 "At the invitation of His Excellency Alpha Oumar Konare,  
26 President of the Republic of Mali, the President of the Republic  
27 of Liberia, His Excellency Dankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor,  
28 accompanied by a high level delegation paid a friendly working  
29 visit to the Republic of Mali from September 21 to 22, 1999?"

1 The two Presidents held talks in a conducive and cordial  
2 atmosphere which dealt with peace, stability and progress on the  
3 African continent while their respective delegations held  
4 discussions around bilateral relations, social, political and  
13:13:56 5 economic issues.

6 Concerning continental issues, both Presidents applauded  
7 the decision taken at the fourth extraordinary session of the  
8 Organisation of African Unity, Heads of State and government held  
9 in Sirte, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on September 8 and 9, 1999,  
13:14:18 10 with specific reference to the establishment of the African Union  
11 and the strengthening of regional economic organisations."

12 Pause. Did you attend that OAU meeting?

13 A. Oh, yes. This was a very, very important meeting.

14 Q. Why?

13:14:36 15 A. We were discussing at this meeting the transformation,  
16 moving from the Organisation of African Unity and for some that  
17 were trying to get the united states of Africa, for others trying  
18 to find a way, but moving - at least expanding on the original  
19 idea of the creation of the OAU, which was a watered down version  
13:15:16 20 of what the intent was at the time of the creation of the OAU.  
21 It was not supposed to be OAU. At the very beginning it was  
22 watered down to the OAU.

23 Now, looking at the European Union, some of us  
24 pan-Africanists were pushing for us to move away from the OAU to  
13:15:39 25 a European Union style programme. And so we were all anxious to  
26 be here because this gave us an opportunity to really begin to  
27 produce white papers, non-papers, and all on the subject matter.

28 So there was a very important meeting. Libya was hosting  
29 it and had practically rebuilt the city of Sirte for this

1 particular purpose. And so this marks the real beginning of this  
2 AU that you see now which was the final compromise after this  
3 meeting. So for us it was very important.

4 Q. So let's put all of that together then. So on 8 and 9  
13:16:29 5 September '99, you are in Libya?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Then on 16 September you are in Abuja?

8 A. Abuja, yes.

9 Q. Then by 22 September --

13:16:43 10 A. 21, 22.

11 Q. 21, 22 you are in Mali?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. And, meanwhile, Johnny Paul Koroma is in?

14 A. Monrovia.

13:16:54 15 Q. Monrovia. And you just had to deal with the incursion into  
16 Lofa, yes?

17 A. All of that is going on.

18 Q. So that's the picture?

19 A. That is correct.

13:17:02 20 Q. We need to constantly have this picture in mind.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. "With specific reference to the establishment of the

23 African Union and strengthening of regional economic

24 organisations, Presidents Taylor and Konare reaffirmed their

13:17:21 25 commitment to pursue and consolidate the sub-regional integration  
26 process in collaboration with other member states of ECOWAS.

27 Reviewing the security situation in the sub-region, the

28 Presidents agreed to work towards sustaining the atmosphere of

29 peace, stability, security and harmonious relations among member

1 states of ECOWAS for the achievement of economic integration.

2 To this effect both Presidents express their support for  
3 the implementation of the decision by Heads of State at the mini  
4 ECOWAS summit held September 1999 in Abuja, Nigeria, to work  
13:18:13 5 towards the establishment of good neighbourliness which is needed  
6 for the consolidation of peace, security and trust between the  
7 Republics of Guinea and Liberia."

8 The President of Liberia expressed his thanks and  
9 appreciation for the hospitality, and President Taylor then  
13:18:31 10 extended an invitation to the President Mali to pay a visit to  
11 Liberia which was accepted. And we see that it's signed by the  
12 two of you, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we are now approaching a very critical  
13:18:57 15 stage so far as Sierra Leone is concerned, aren't we, end of  
16 September 1999?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, in half a dozen sentences, tell us what period we are  
19 coming into?

13:19:16 20 A. We are now entering the period where all the work had been  
21 done on the ground with Johnny Paul Koroma. We are now waiting  
22 for Foday Sankoh to arrive. We now have word that Foday Sankoh  
23 is going to be in Monrovia by the end of September. So we are  
24 now preparing - after I rush back from this meeting in Bamako,  
13:19:51 25 which is the capital of Mali, we are now preparing to put these  
26 leaders together and harmonise all of the little jagged edges  
27 that are left untouched. And when you see --

28 Q. Prior to what?

29 A. To the arrival of Sankoh in Monrovia.

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. So let's just put in the mind of the Court, these trips do  
3 not leave untouched all of these things that are happening.

4 Wherever we are, we are also exchanging ideas about the Johnny

13:20:30 5 Paul Koroma presence in Monrovia, getting Foday Sankoh back. In

6 fact, a part of this trip to Mali is not all stated, but we are

7 talking about this peace process. Because if you look at the

8 Heads of State meeting in Abuja Konare is not there. So these

9 trips are not for nothing. It's a briefing period. You are

13:20:52 10 briefing. You are getting advice. You are getting comments on

11 what they think. So this whole process - in the meantime of

12 course I am in touch with Monrovia making sure that Johnny Paul

13 is still there and --

14 Q. Mr Taylor, I said half a dozen sentences.

13:21:09 15 A. Well, it's important to get the picture because when you

16 look at what the Prosecution is saying, nobody knows this. I am

17 just a wild missile being fired from my capital, doing whatever I

18 want to do, meddling in countries. So it's important, counsel,

19 that the Court knows that these trips are in terms of

13:21:32 20 consultations and nothing is hidden and I am not this loose

21 cannon firing all over Sierra Leone. That's why - I am sorry I

22 went beyond the six, but this is it.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, so preparations are underway for the return  
24 of Sankoh to Sierra Leone?

13:21:54 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Now, as far as you are aware at the time, was the RUF

27 across the border equally engaged in making preparations for the

28 return of Foday Sankoh?

29 A. Oh, yes, yes.

1 Q. Now, with that in mind, I would like us now, please, to  
2 look at exhibit D-9, which we will find behind divider 52 in the  
3 same bundle. Now, I want us to take a little time, Mr Taylor,  
4 looking at this extremely important document.

13:22:47 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Does everyone have the document?

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

13:23:01 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Now we see it's the Revolutionary United Front of  
12 Sierra Leone, defence headquarters and it's a salute report that  
13 we have looked at in the past, haven't we, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes.

13:23:12 15 Q. With various Prosecution witnesses, yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Now, as I understood their explanation as to the nature of  
18 this report, it's in order to brief their returning leader as to  
19 what has been going on within the ranks of the RUF during his  
13:23:35 20 almost three year absence, yes?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Because let us remind ourselves, Sankoh had left in  
23 November 1996, yes?

24 A. No, far earlier. Sankoh left at the beginning almost of  
13:23:55 25 1996.

26 Q. My fault. My error. And he had endured arrest in Nigeria,  
27 trial in Sierra Leone, conviction and incarceration in  
28 Sierra Leone as well. So his leaders had much to fill him in on,  
29 yes? Over three years of briefing, yes?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. "The leader sir, before leaving the ground in November  
3 1996, you placed me in command as the battlefield commander of  
4 the RUF Sierra Leone and instructed me to take command in your  
13:24:40 5 absence and to maintain the ground by any means necessary."

6 Now, we note that this report has been prepared by Major  
7 General Sam Bockarie?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. "In that light I have acted in the capacity you saw fit to  
13:24:58 10 entrust me with and done all in my power and wisdom to maintain  
11 the ground until your return to Sierra Leone.

12 Upon your departure, I initiated contact with ULIMO as per  
13 your instructions in a bid to buy materials to repel the vicious  
14 attacks of the Kamajors at a time when there was a peace document

13:25:26 15 in place and we were not expecting to fight. At first, ULIMO  
16 arrested me, thinking that I had come to them to surrender.

17 Later I was able to convince them to release me and we commenced  
18 a mutually beneficial relationship. I used the 7,000 US dollars  
19 to purchase vitally needed materials that gave us the stance to  
13:25:55 20 fight and challenge the SLPP government until they were ousted by  
21 the AFRC coup. The efforts of the civilians must be highlighted  
22 as they provided agricultural produce which I traded for  
23 materials during the same period."

24 Now, help us, Mr Taylor. Were you aware that upon Sankoh's  
13:26:25 25 departure in '96, the RUF had initiated such contact with ULIMO?  
26 Were you aware of that in '96?

27 A. No, not at all.

28 Q. Were you aware that a mutually beneficial relationship had  
29 been developed across that fluid border we've just been talking

1 about between the RUF and ULIMO? Were you aware of that?

2 A. Not at all. Not at all. Not at all.

3 Q. Were you aware that your underling Foday Sankoh had given  
4 this instruction to establish such contact?

13:27:10 5 A. Not at all. Not at all.

6 Q. Had you ordered Foday Sankoh to give the instruction to  
7 organisation such contact?

8 A. I had no contact with Foday Sankoh to have given him such  
9 orders. None whatsoever.

13:27:26 10 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor. Hindsight is a wonderful thing,  
11 but do you recall a letter from your embassy in Guinea dated  
12 August 1998?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And do you recall the mention in that letter of one

13:27:49 15 Varmuyan Sherif?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. What had he been in an earlier life before he became  
18 assistant director of the SSS?

19 A. One of the most senior, I think second in command of ULIMO  
13:28:04 20 forces, the most senior generals in ULIMO-K.

21 Q. So help us, when in 1996 this instruction was given to  
22 establish contact with ULIMO, where was Mr Sherif?

23 A. Mr Sherif at that time was somewhere in Lofa. And don't  
24 let's forget what 1996 is now. 1996 I am not President yet.

13:28:32 25 Elections have not been held in Liberia. That area is fully and  
26 totally controlled by ULIMO. So Sherif is either somewhere there  
27 in Lofa or wherever else, I don't know. But I am not President  
28 of the Republic of Liberia yet.

29 Q. And help us, we are talking about a period when the

1     disarmament process was commencing in Liberia, aren't we?

2     A.     That is correct.

3     Q.     When people were supposed to be handing in their arms for  
4     nothing; is that right, Mr Taylor?

13:29:12 5     A.     That is correct.

6     Q.     And here we have a situation where the acting leader of the  
7     RUF, in a situation where demobilisation and disarmament is  
8     taking place across the border, is establishing a commercial  
9     relationship for arms and ammunition across that same border. Is  
13:29:40 10    that correct?

11    A.     That is 100 per cent correct.

12    Q.     And then that same Sheriff says that after you became  
13    President, you ordered him to take arms and ammunition to  
14    Sierra Leone. You are aware of that allegation, aren't you?

13:30:01 15    A.     Yes, I am.

16    Q.     Now, accepting for the sake of argument that he is correct,  
17    Mr Taylor, who had the earlier commercial relationship with the  
18    RUF, him or you?

19    A.     He did, of course. He did. He did.

13:30:23 20           MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Mr President.

21           PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. We will  
22    take the lunch adjournment now and resume at 2.30.

23                                 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

24                                 [Upon resuming at 2.32 p.m.]

14:29:39 25           PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

26           MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

27    Q.     Mr Taylor, before lunch, we began looking at this document,  
28    exhibit D-9.

29    A.     Yes.

1 Q. Yes. Now, I do want us to spend a little time on this  
2 document. Now, we were dealing with the second paragraph, were  
3 we not, on the first page?

4 A. Yes.

14:33:42 5 Q. Now, just help us, Mr Taylor. Were you aware of these  
6 long-standing contacts between ULIMO and the RUF at the time?

7 A. Had no idea.

8 Q. When did you first discover that there were these links?

9 A. Quite frankly, I had heard about most of these links right  
14:34:08 10 here in this courtroom about the details of what was going on.

11 Q. Tell me, Mr Taylor, when you received that letter in August  
12 of 1998 from your ambassador in Guinea, even at that time, were  
13 you aware of the connection between Mr Sherif, this long-standing  
14 connection with the RUF?

14:34:30 15 A. No, I had no idea that Sherif, Varmuyan had been dealing  
16 with the RUF. Had no idea.

17 Q. Did the juxtaposition in that letter of his name, a  
18 Liberian member of the SSS, and a senior member at that, with  
19 various other RUF individuals, did that not alert you that maybe  
14:34:58 20 something was afoot?

21 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes, it did alert us, that how was it that  
22 there was this contact in Monrovia with Sherif who is working in  
23 the SSS. Oh, yes, it did come as a very, very, very serious  
24 point of concern for us.

14:35:23 25 Q. But were you aware that there was this historical  
26 background to the relationship?

27 A. No, not at all. Not at all. Not at all.

28 Q. Let's continue with the document, shall we, the next  
29 paragraph: "It came as a surprise to learn that the leader had

1 been arrested in Nigeria." Now, we know that to be March 1997.

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And then he goes on to deal with "... an even bigger  
4 surprise when Captain Philip Palmer and others announced a change  
14:36:02 5 in the leadership of the RUF." Now, were you aware of those  
6 events, Mr Taylor?

7 A. No, not aware.

8 Q. But you now understand that those events took place whilst  
9 RUF external delegation was based in La Cote d'Ivoire?

14:36:21 10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 Q. And he goes on to deal with how there were lured to come  
12 back across the border through to Guinea and then arrested. That  
13 need not detain us. Over the page, please. Second paragraph on  
14 that page: "On receiving instructions from the leader" - is that  
14:36:48 15 you, Mr Taylor?

16 A. No, not at all. No. No.

17 Q. "... calling on the RUF to join the AFRC, I decided to put  
18 the Bradford issue to rest until the return of the leader", and  
19 then goes on, "and instructed Superman to head the advance team  
14:37:09 20 to Freetown from the Western Area jungle, later to be joined by  
21 Colonel Isaac." Yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, to what extent were you privy to any  
24 instruction for the RUF to join the AFRC?

14:37:31 25 A. Not privy to any of this information. From what I got to  
26 hear here from evidence was that this was based on instruction of  
27 Foday Sankoh and it was recorded and played on a radio station.

28 Q. With consequent effects for Sankoh in terms of his ability  
29 to communicate, do you recall?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Let's jump the next two lines and, indeed, the next  
3 paragraph.

4 "Sir, within the marriage, a diamond was sold by a Lebanese  
14:38:11 5 businessman with a commission given to the government out of  
6 which an amount of 9 million leones was given to  
7 Colonel Superman."

8 Pause there. Mr Taylor, I thought you were supposed to be  
9 the one who was the, in effect, diamond dealer for the RUF.

14:38:33 10 A. No, not at all. No. Not at all.

11 Q. Tell me, do you know anything about this - the RUF dealing  
12 with Lebanese businessmen for diamonds?

13 A. Have no idea, no.

14 Q. Let's go over the page, shall we. Third paragraph:

14:38:56 15 "In Freetown, I was met by Mr Steve Bio and Gibri I  
16 Massaquoi who informed me that Mr Bio had been sent to me with  
17 instructions from the leader."

18 Again I ask: Is that you?

19 A. No, that's not me. That's Foday Sankoh.

14:39:29 20 Q. Now, let's go over to the next page. Do you have it?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Second to last paragraph on that page:

23 "We also rescued JP Koroma and his family, and under the  
24 escort of Brigadier Issa and Brigadier Mike, he was brought to  
14:39:54 25 Kailahun as was advised by your brother."

26 Who is that?

27 A. I have no idea.

28 Q. What if it's suggested, Mr Taylor, that's you?

29 A. I would say that's total nonsense. It's a lie. It would

1 not be me because I'm not in contact with Foday Sankoh and this  
2 has been written at this time. He would have simply said, "It  
3 was done by Charles Taylor." No, I have no idea who he is  
4 referring to here as his brother. This could be maybe an older  
14:40:35 5 man in the area because in Africa, tribal brothers are one thing.  
6 I have no - that would not be me. Although it would be the -  
7 some people would want to suggest it, but they would be totally  
8 wrong.

9 Q. Over the page, please. Last three lines in the second  
14:40:56 10 paragraph: "After our Freetown invasion in January 1999, I was  
11 again promoted by JP Koroma to the rank of major general." Note  
12 "again promoted." Mr Taylor, did you at any time promote  
13 Sam Bockarie, also known as Mosquito, to the rank of general?

14 A. Never did. Never did. And, in fact, to the best of my  
14:41:26 15 recollection, when I finally met Sam Bockarie, he was a major  
16 general. I think we need to distinguish here, if you just use  
17 the terminology loosely "general", in the armed forces - I'm sure  
18 people on the other side understand this very well because they  
19 know military also, if you just leave the word "general", it  
14:41:53 20 refers to a four star general. But you have to qualify it. A  
21 brigadier is one star, a major is two stars, lieutenant general  
22 is three stars, and then you become a general. Even though  
23 general is used all along, but if you leave it unqualified and  
24 just say "general", it means that you - and I stand corrected on  
14:42:18 25 this. Others may know more. But that's my understanding of how  
26 that military title is. And Sam Bockarie was a major general up  
27 until the time I met him, okay?

28 Q. But, Mr Taylor, don't you recall it being said that  
29 Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia and came back and he had three

1 stars on his hat because you had promoted him to a three-star  
2 general? Do you remember hearing that evidence?

3 A. But that's total nonsense, that's what I'm saying. They  
4 just make up things. They just make up things.

14:42:53 5 Q. Now, let us just pause and look at the detail of that  
6 suggestion, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Bockarie goes to Monrovia, returns a three star general,  
9 yes?

14:43:04 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. A three star general, is that a major general?

12 A. That's a lieutenant general.

13 Q. A lieutenant general?

14 A. Yes.

14:43:17 15 Q. But, in any event, you have given evidence to the effect  
16 that Bockarie first came to Monrovia in the autumn of 1998. Is  
17 that right?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now, note looking at this, when it was it's claimed he was  
14:43:32 20 promoted to major general. Do you see? January 1999; around the  
21 same time he's supposed to have gone to Monrovia and come back.  
22 Do you see that?

23 A. I see it. Here in other words, he was supposed to have  
24 been promoted by me to general even - I mean to lieutenant  
14:43:56 25 general before he's promoted to major general just after January.

26 Q. By whom?

27 A. That's what they are suggesting and they know now that it's  
28 is Johnny Paul, okay - I mean he is saying that Johnny Paul  
29 Koroma had promoted him and so this whole thing is just what they

1 made up to say that I did. That's all.

2 Q. And let's just go back to this document so we know which  
3 period he is talking about. But before we do, remind ourselves:  
4 You have told us he came to Liberia in the autumn of 1998, yes?

14:44:34 5 A. That is correct to be --

6 Q. First in September?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Second trip when?

9 A. October.

14:44:39 10 Q. Third trip when?

11 A. November.

12 Q. Right. And what was the purpose of giving him access to  
13 Monrovia at that time, Mr Taylor?

14 A. For the peace process to take hold and begin the whole  
14:44:52 15 process of bringing the war in Sierra Leone to an end.

16 Q. And also this is the time when you set up, as was done in  
17 Cote d'Ivoire in 1996, a guesthouse in Monrovia?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. For what purpose?

14:45:12 20 A. Making sure that there is adequate contact for them when  
21 they come in and, secondly, as a security precaution.

22 Q. And to assist them to contact whom?

23 A. Other members of - I mean their own individuals in  
24 Sierra Leone and other members outside of the environs of Liberia  
14:45:30 25 if they chose to.

26 Q. Now, look at the document now in light of that. "Sir,  
27 during this period" - and remember we're talking about the period  
28 going up to '99?

29 A. That's correct.

1 Q. "... I had been in contact with various diplomats and other  
2 international agencies such as the UN, Commonwealth, OAU, ECOWAS  
3 and even the Sierra Leonean government."

4 Mr Taylor, who made it possible for Sam Bockarie in that  
14:46:08 5 period to make those contacts?

6 A. I would not just take credit alone. I would say I along  
7 with my colleagues in ECOWAS made this possible.

8 Q. And help us, who was head of the OAU in that period?

9 A. Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso.

14:46:29 10 Q. When Bockarie passed through in November, where was he  
11 going?

12 A. To meet with the chairman of the OAU.

13 Q. Who is that?

14 A. Blaise Compaore.

14:46:43 15 Q. Next paragraph: "Back at headquarters, I renewed my  
16 contact with ULIMO and tried to secure materials from them." Now  
17 let's pause again.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Remember, first contact with ULIMO, according to this  
14:47:13 20 document, is when?

21 A. 1996.

22 Q. "I renewed my contact with ULIMO." What's the date of that  
23 letter from the embassy in Guinea?

24 A. August of 1998.

14:47:31 25 Q. Bear that thought in mind; August, 1998.

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Bearing also in mind allegations about an operation called  
28 Fitti-Fatta in the autumn of 1998. Do you recall that  
29 allegation?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. Back at --

3 MS HOLLIS: We would like a specific reference to that,  
4 because the evidence is actually that Fitti-Fatta was actually  
14:48:04 5 much earlier than the autumn of 1998. So we would like the  
6 reference they're citing to that it's in the fall of 1998.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. We'll do that. That was my  
8 understanding but I could well be wrong and I'm grateful for the  
9 correction if I am wrong:

14:48:20 10 Q. But, in any event:

11 "I renewed my contact with ULIMO and tried to secure  
12 materials for them. It was out of these materials that I gave  
13 Superman a good quantity to attack and capture Kono. This move,  
14 I thought, would pressure the government into abandoning their  
14:48:43 15 mock trial against you."

16 Now when did Sankoh's trial begin? Autumn of 1998, wasn't  
17 it?

18 A. In Sierra Leone, yeah.

19 Q. Autumn of 1998 was the trial, wasn't it?

14:48:59 20 A. That is correct, yes.

21 Q. "Superman used the materials to attack Kono and was able to  
22 control parts of Koidu Town. Though they were able to raise the  
23 ammo dump, they then concentrated on looting and later withdrew,  
24 leaving the enemy to reoccupy the town. Even prior to that all  
14:49:21 25 instructions to maintain the ground were not implemented. With  
26 the captured materials from Kono, Superman went to the Kabala  
27 axis to join SAJ Musa."

28 Now help us, Mr Taylor, did you know anything about that,  
29 this Superman going to join with SAJ Musa and so on and so forth?

1 A. I knew nothing about it, but there is something interesting  
2 here that we ought to bring before the Court. Look, when we look  
3 at this whole charade of accusations, why wouldn't Sam Bockarie  
4 say here, "Well, sir, while I was in Liberia for the times I met  
14:50:11 5 President Taylor I made some arrangements for some material"?  
6 But he says here "back at headquarters I renewed".

7 By this time he's going in and out of Liberia. He could  
8 have said that. You understand me? These people know that  
9 Fitti-Fatta or Fatta-Fitti, they know very well why wouldn't Sam  
14:50:32 10 Bockarie say, "Well, sir, guess what happened? I was lucky to  
11 manage to get into Liberia and I've renewed my contact with your  
12 old friend and brother Charles Taylor"? Because that was not the  
13 way that things were going.

14 So this whole situation here as we look back, the Varmuyan  
14:50:51 15 Sherif - and I'm sorry but I really have to get into this now.  
16 The Varmuyan Sherif that came before this Court, let's look at  
17 it. In 1996 Sankoh goes to Abidjan. He writes two letters to  
18 the Libyan government through their ambassador. In late 1996  
19 there's evidence before this Court there is a major problem in a  
14:51:26 20 place called Zogoda. There's a retreat. People come into  
21 Liberia.

22 One of the individuals whose name I wrote on that paper  
23 says that he passed through Liberia and he went to Sankoh.  
24 Sankoh is in Abidjan which borders with Liberia. He could have  
14:51:50 25 come. He could have sent. There is no evidence led before this  
26 Court that there was any contact between Sankoh and myself during  
27 this period. None of them have said so. Okay. He had all  
28 opportunities to do so; he did not.

29 Here we have a situation where in August my ambassador

1 writes and there's no - we will have to get these people - the  
2 best we can to get them here because, you know, this has to come  
3 to an end, these lies and fabrications and everything. My  
4 ambassador writes a letter obviously describing a situation where  
14:52:28 5 he doesn't - we don't know Sam Bockarie that these people are  
6 trying to make their way to come to Liberia. Finally, we have  
7 consultations, see this as an opportunity, bring them to Liberia,  
8 September, October, November, Sam Bockarie is moving up and down.  
9 He goes, he meets the OAU chairman, he talks with other leaders  
14:52:54 10 and all of this. He goes back. He is doing a report for Sankoh.  
11 There is nowhere in this report that he talks about Charles  
12 Taylor. Even at this point where he is preparing to attack Kono  
13 he doesn't say, "We have been lucky. Guess what, we made a  
14 breakthrough. We finally caught up with Taylor." Again he  
14:53:11 15 doesn't say so. He says he's renewed his contact.

16 So all this thing, I just don't understand why this has to  
17 continue to linger with all these lies and deceptions. Whether  
18 it's autumn, spring and all that type of thing, the fact of the  
19 matter is there's been no contact with Sankoh. There is not any  
14:53:30 20 arms coming, he doesn't say so here and it doesn't happen.

21 So I'm sorry if I went a little off the line but I mean  
22 it's just so clear that we put these pieces together to show the  
23 world that this has been a lie from the beginning, it is a lie  
24 now and it will be a lie in the future no what happens or what  
14:53:52 25 they succeed in doing to me. It's a lie. As simple and plain as  
26 that.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, let's just go over the page and continue, shall I  
28 we. Second paragraph on the next page:

29 "Prior to this, diamonds mined in Kono were given to

1 Brigadier Issa in order to make contact and delivery to a  
2 business associate of yours."

3 Now Mr Taylor, help me. Let's think. Where did we see  
4 that phrase "business associate" written down? Oh, yes, I  
14:54:34 5 remember. It's those two letters to Mohamed Talibi in 1996.  
6 Remember that?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. "My business associates will be in touch with you." Do you  
9 remember that?

14:54:45 10 A. That is correct. That is correct.

11 Q. And then we see: "... of yours. At his transit point,  
12 while awaiting General Ibrahim." Now help me, who was one of the  
13 first two people to arrive in Monrovia to travel en route to  
14 Lome?

14:55:08 15 A. Ibrahim Bah and Omrie Golley were the two.

16 Q. "At his transit point while awaiting General Ibrahim,  
17 Brigadier Issa reports that he had gone to a nearby tea shop and  
18 on his way back to the hotel he realised the diamonds were  
19 missing from his pocket. His claims of the diamonds dropping  
14:55:39 20 from his pockets were substantiated by radio announcing that  
21 diamonds had been found on the streets of the city."

22 Mr Taylor, were you receiving diamonds from the RUF?

23 A. Never. Never received any diamonds from the RUF and all of  
24 those by God's holy grace that have been named will be brought  
14:56:10 25 here to see. Never, ever received any diamonds. And it was  
26 simple. If these diamonds were meant for me he wouldn't have  
27 said "business associates". This is a young man, this is a man  
28 that has come through. He would have said, "Sir, diamonds mined  
29 were given to Brigadier Sesay to take to President Taylor." He

1 would have said so. He would never have said "business  
2 associate". He would have been - he knew. He had come through.  
3 He would have said mined and given to General Issa for President  
4 Taylor.

14:56:40 5 Q. And whilst we're on the topic, Mr Taylor, let us remind  
6 ourselves that this document is dated September 1999?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Four years before any indictment against you was dreamt up?

9 A. Yes.

14:56:57 10 Q. So would he have known back then not to put your name in  
11 the document?

12 A. Of course not. I mean, if there was anything that was  
13 authentic about the facts, the facts are what we have here. No  
14 one except God could have anticipated this. I surely didn't and  
14:57:17 15 I'm sure he didn't.

16 Q. Last paragraph on the page, please:

17 "During your absence, many contacts were made to  
18 sympathisers to promote the image of the movement, details of  
19 which will be presented to you in manner so as not to cause any  
14:57:35 20 breach of security."

21 Mr Taylor, I'll ask you quite clearly, is that some kind of  
22 coded reference to you?

23 A. No, it cannot be. Cannot be. It is not.

24 Q. Because, you see, it continues: "Out of these contacts, I  
14:57:54 25 was able to get the basic needs and facilitate our military move  
26 to Kono and onwards past Machine." Do you see that?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Reference to you?

29 A. No, but he has already said before where he got the

1 materials from for Kono.

2 Q. Over the page, please. No, sorry, could we go to page 10.

3 Have we got it?

4 A. Yes. Yes.

14:58:41 5 Q. Last paragraph:

6 "When we first retreated from Freetown, I contacted the  
7 government of the Ivory Coast and in particular the foreign  
8 minister, Mr Amara Essy."

9 Now, we've come across that name before haven't we,

14:59:03 10 Mr Taylor?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. "I also contacted the guarantors of the Abidjan Peace

13 Accord to impress on them the fact that our leader was still

14 illegally being held by the Nigerian government and that a

14:59:20 15 negotiated settlement was the only way in which peace and  
16 security could return to Sierra Leone."

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. Now --

19 A. This return from Freetown - retreat from Freetown, this I

14:59:47 20 think has to be qualified here, I'm sure. And the reference to  
21 Amara Essy must be February 1998.

22 Q. That's what I was coming to you, you see. And the reason

23 why I'm coming to that, Mr Taylor, is this: Remember you told us

24 that you spoke to Sam Bockarie on the day of the Freetown

15:00:10 25 invasion?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. And we note that here he doesn't mention speaking to you.

28 He is speaking to Mr Amara Essy of the Government of the Ivory

29 Coast, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. No mention of Charles Taylor:

3 "I also contacted the guarantors of the Abidjan Peace  
4 Accord to impress on them the fact that our leader was still  
15:00:37 5 illegally being held by the Nigerian government and that a  
6 negotiated settlement was the only way in which peace and  
7 security could return to Sierra Leone. I even contacted the  
8 government of Tejan Kabbah in Freetown to convince them to  
9 release you and to threaten that if they continued to exercise  
15:00:59 10 the military option, we, the RUF, would push for total military  
11 victory and would escalate the war to a point beyond imagination.  
12 All this talk fell on deaf ears as even the international media  
13 refused our calls. With our capture of Kono and the raising of  
14 four mechanised battalions of the Nigerian ECOMOG force, our  
15:01:30 15 phones began to ring with calls from the worlds' elite press, and  
16 the very people who only a few weeks back were ignoring our  
17 calls, assuming that we were going to be flushed, as Tejan Kabbah  
18 had vowed, were now virtually begging to talk. I knew that the  
19 heat was on Kabbah.

15:01:50 20 Our attack of Freetown put Kabbah in a position where he  
21 was forced to talk, as I had earlier promised he would. He fled  
22 the city as did his cabinet, the latter with a view of  
23 re-grouping in Conakry and launching a counteroffensive as they  
24 had done when ousted by the AFRC."

15:02:12 25 Let's jump nine lines:

26 "We now had the edge over Kabbah and his government and  
27 asked for talks to take place under the auspices of the OAU  
28 chairman, President Blaise Compaore. This on the grounds that it  
29 was, in effect, ECOWAS that had been fighting us and thus no

1 troop contributing member state could impartially host such  
2 talks. This basic premise for moving us to the table was eagerly  
3 accepted by Mr Francis Okelo."

4 Of course, we know who he is, don't we?

15:02:56 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. "After the initial joy of hearing your voice on set for the  
7 first time in a long time, military instincts alerted me that you  
8 were under duress and that slowly the Kabbah government would use  
9 you to diffuse the explosive state of affairs and move us from  
10 our position of strength and seek to move the talks from our  
11 neutral ground of choice.

12 In my opinion, this would not only cause us to lose our  
13 military edge but would have put your life in danger."

14 Now, I'm going to miss the next section, and then let's  
15:03:56 15 look, please, at the political front. Do you have it?

16 A. Uh-huh. Yes.

17 Q. "Our move to capture Kono earned marked gains for the RUF  
18 in the political front. The international press was effectively  
19 used to educate the world as to the aims and objectives of the  
20 RUF.

15:04:27

21 The government of Tejan Kabbah was forced to negotiate with  
22 us, a move they had consistently refused to make, vowing instead  
23 to execute the leader and flush the RUF out of Sierra Leone.

24 The UN and other international organisations were also  
15:04:50 25 forced to talk to us.

26 After much military pressure from us and diplomatic  
27 pressure from the on-looking world, the leader was released to go  
28 to Togo with a delegation from within the RUF on the ground in  
29 Sierra Leone. A peace agreement was reached between the RUF and

1 the SLPP government."

2 Let's put that together.

3 A. Uh-huh.

15:05:28

4 Q. "Our move to capture Kono earned marked gains for the RUF  
5 in the political front." Yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. "The government of Tejan Kabbah was forced to negotiate  
8 with us."

15:05:43

9 "The UN and other international organisations were also  
10 forced to us."

11 In terms of timing, Mr Taylor, when did all that occur,  
12 when people were forced to talk to them?

15:06:13

13 A. From what I can see here, he is speaking - if I can put a  
14 time area on this, this has got to be somewhere just before the  
15 Lome talks begin around April, I would guess. This is the  
16 general period before that time, I would say.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we've spent a little time, and not for the  
18 first time, going through this document. Do you see any mention  
19 of you?

15:06:40

20 A. That's the whole point. There is no mention here of me in  
21 this document. And that's why an important piece of evidence led  
22 before this Court about arms movement, we are beginning to see -  
23 I'll tell you, if Sam Bockarie in this document has not mentioned  
24 my name, which he doesn't, and if it is true I am the one  
25 supplying them with arms and I'm the guy being good to them, then  
26 he's one ungrateful - I don't want anybody to hear the other  
27 word. You understand me? Because there is - here is  
28 Foday Sankoh having been away for all these years. It would make  
29 proper sense that this man left in charge, reporting to his

1 leader, must be grateful to those that are giving him assistance  
2 that would perpetuate the organisation. There is no mention here  
3 of Charles Taylor giving them any material assistance whatsoever.

4 Come now the period, a gentleman called Varmuyan Sherif,  
15:08:08 5 who in 1996 had been selling arms where Bockarie says that the  
6 contact is made, they sell arms, he is the general in that area -  
7 and I know why Sherif sat here and drew maps of the forest.

8 Those are his trade routes that he was using, so he has to know  
9 them very well. I don't know them. You understand me? I don't

15:08:36 10 know them. And he knew them because he was using them. That's  
11 why he could sit before this Court here and lie and draw this  
12 because he was the businessman that was selling arms in 1996 and  
13 going on. He was the same top general that contacts were made  
14 with again and again. So, of course, he had a to know. There is

15:08:57 15 absolutely nothing here about Charles Taylor.

16 And, on the diamonds issue, if diamonds had been sent to  
17 Charles Taylor, why wouldn't he say to Sankoh, "Oh, sir, we sent  
18 some diamonds to Monrovia by General Issa for President Taylor,  
19 but he lost them"? Why - why is this such a big secret? It's  
15:09:25 20 not a secret. It just never happened. It just never happened.

21 Here I am, an archenemy, a former general who tried to kill  
22 me for many years that couldn't kill me, Varmuyan Sherif, who  
23 comes into my government by virtue of this process of trying to  
24 rebuild, is making contacts behind my back all this time, as  
15:09:52 25 described in my ambassador's letter of August 1998, making  
26 arrangements behind my back. Eventually, it must be clear that  
27 Varmuyan was moved from the SSS and sent far from me, at the  
28 mansion, and sent over to immigration.

29 So this whole thing looked at in its totality it's just

1 what it is: A pack of lies. Phantom bush routes that we're  
2 supposed to be sending arms and ammunition through when the  
3 people - we have a choice, and that's what I'm before this Court  
4 for. I don't make the decisions. But we have a situation here  
15:10:36 5 where, if the people in charge, who acted and who reported and  
6 who had responsibility, don't say, "I did something," and these  
7 little fellows coming around, guessing - I sat here listening to  
8 one of the witnesses explaining or trying to explain at the - and  
9 I'm calling it "explaining at" - the situation involving Johnny  
15:11:05 10 Paul Koroma's coming to Monrovia. The boys don't know what  
11 happened.

12 Just as I heard some of them explaining, "Sam Bockarie is  
13 coming to Liberia in 1999." They have no idea of what happened.  
14 Sam Bockarie was brought to Monrovia in 1999. Some of them have  
15:11:27 15 described it as him running away. They have no idea.

16 And this is the type of guesswork, okay, and misreading -  
17 because of their levels, they do not know what's going on. They  
18 make it appear as something that is out of the ordinary. And as  
19 soon as you ask them something with some money around, "Oh, yes  
15:11:46 20 he went to Monrovia." Well, yes, Johnny Paul came to Monrovia.  
21 We know how he got there. We know Sam Bockarie came. We know  
22 how he got there. We know how he left. But then around the  
23 fringes of this they make up all of these little lies and  
24 stories. It's regrettable.

15:12:03 25 It's regrettable that this is going on, but there is  
26 nothing here in this document unless we say this document is a  
27 lie. One, Bockarie didn't do it. Then that's a different  
28 matter. If we agree that Bockarie did this document, then we  
29 must agree that it's a factual document. He cannot be lying to

1 his leader after almost four years of his absence. So how does  
2 Charles Taylor play in this? It just doesn't fit. It doesn't  
3 fit.

15:12:41 4 It's just like I remember the OJ Simpson case with the  
5 gloves, it just doesn't fit, as simple as that, of Charles Taylor  
6 being involved in diamonds and arms smuggling through little bush  
7 trails going into Sierra Leone. My God, where do we go with  
8 this? Maybe the next time I will have arms on my head taking  
9 them to the RUF. It doesn't fit. It doesn't.

15:13:04 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I think in future if you  
11 could lead evidence rather than submissions on the evidence it  
12 would be a lot more helpful.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well, Mr President:

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, as we know, that report was put together in  
15:13:25 15 order to brief the absent leader who was about to return, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now you've told us also that for some time efforts were  
18 being made to get Sankoh to return to Freetown?

19 A. Yes.

15:13:55 20 Q. Was he to go directly to Freetown or was he to go via any  
21 other place?

22 A. Via Monrovia to Freetown.

23 Q. Why via Monrovia?

24 A. To conclude the outstanding matters that were still  
15:14:11 25 lingering out there of what to be done with the SLA that's under  
26 Johnny Paul Koroma and to solve that matter internally before  
27 letting him go on to Freetown.

28 Q. Now, in anticipation of his arrival, were arrangements made  
29 in Monrovia?

1 A. Oh, yes.

2 Q. And was a programme of events planned by the Government of  
3 Liberia?

15:14:49

4 A. Yes, there was a full itinerary of what he would do while  
5 he was in Monrovia before going on to Freetown.

6 Q. Have a look behind the next divider 53, please. Yes,  
7 Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Is this the itinerary?

15:15:11

10 A. This is it, yes.

11 Q. Let's just have a look at it. Are we to understand by the  
12 heading that he was due to arrive on 28 September?

13 A. That is correct.

15:15:27

14 Q. So that's two days after that report prepared by  
15 Sam Bockarie, yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. And he was to stay for a couple of days. Is that right?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now, the 28th, as we see, was a Tuesday?

15:15:43

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And on that day at 12.30 p.m. Mr Sankoh was due to arrive  
22 at Roberts International Airfield?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. He was then to proceed to Monrovia and check in at where?

15:16:05

25 A. At the guesthouse for the RUF that had been given for the  
26 RUF.

27 Q. So when we see "official guesthouse", what are we talking  
28 about?

29 A. That particular guesthouse for the RUF that had been given

1 to Bockarie at the second visit to Liberia.

2 Q. And was it an official address, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes, it was.

4 Q. Why was it official?

15:16:30 5 A. Because everybody, diplomats, non-governmental  
6 organisations, all of those interested in the peace process in  
7 Sierra Leone could go there.

8 Q. And that's where he was due to stay. Is that right?

9 A. That is correct.

15:16:49 10 Q. And then we see the first item on the agenda would be lunch  
11 with the Sierra Leonean ambassador?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. So can we take it that everyone knew he was going to  
14 Monrovia?

15:17:11 15 A. Oh, yes.

16 Q. He had the Tuesday evening free, but the Wednesday  
17 programme began at 10 a.m. on the 29th?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Courtesy call on the acting minister of foreign affairs,  
15:17:26 20 yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Followed by a courtesy call on the Vice-President of  
23 Liberia?

24 A. Yes.

15:17:34 25 Q. Then a private lunch?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Who with?

28 A. You know, this would be arranged for him and he would  
29 invite whoever he wanted to.

1 Q. I see. And then he would meet with the UN  
2 Secretary-General's special representative Felix Downes-Thomas?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Who we are now very familiar with, yes?

15:17:59 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And then he would meet with the ambassador of the  
7 United States?

8 A. That is correct. Bismarck Myrick, yes.

9 Q. And only then would he see you?

15:18:12 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And after that you would meet the honourable Johnny Paul  
12 Koroma, yes?

13 A. That is correct

14 Q. And then you would meet both of them together?

15:18:28 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Pause. Why were you seeing each individual before seeing  
17 both together?

18 A. Well, remember I have met Johnny Paul Koroma several times  
19 since his arrival in Monrovia.

15:18:49 20 Q. Yes?

21 A. Foday Sankoh is just coming, so it would take that I would  
22 have to see him first, get his views, and then I will know how to  
23 approach the joint meeting. You don't want to go into a meeting  
24 right away without feeling out what we'll call, you know, feeling  
15:19:08 25 the pulse and knowing how to manage the meeting. You could call  
26 them to a meeting and it just wouldn't work, but you get the -  
27 you feel it out first and then you call the meeting.

28 Q. So then you had the discussion with the two of them?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Can you give us a flavour of that, please?

2 A. Yes. I knew what the concerns of Johnny Paul Koroma were.  
3 The concerns were basically two or three. One, the role of the  
4 SLA. That was very important. The second concern was this  
15:19:58 5 language in the agreement that had to do with why the SLA were  
6 not mentioned in the agreement and I tried to impress upon his  
7 mind that it was all inclusive.

8 But also the third thing was that there was nothing in this  
9 whole thing for Johnny Paul Koroma. Foday Sankoh had come back  
15:20:20 10 from the peace talks as Vice-President. He is now  
11 Vice-President. Johnny Paul Koroma has nothing. So I knew the  
12 three issues that he was concerned with and what was even simply  
13 the fourth one probably was about his treatment by the RUF. So I  
14 had that very well.

15:20:43 15 We go into the meeting and first they meet. They embrace  
16 each other, you know, and then we begin to just throw some  
17 general ideas around, get to know what Sankoh is thinking, get to  
18 know what Johnny Paul Koroma is thinking. I gave them my views  
19 about the peace and what ECOWAS and the international community  
15:21:12 20 is expecting of them, and then we let them go off to what we call  
21 a plenary. I don't get involved in the immediate discussions  
22 thereafter. I shift them off to talk with the diplomats to put  
23 the pieces together at the plenary.

24 Q. Then we see on Thursday, 30 September, you were receiving  
15:21:44 25 both of them at 11 a.m.?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Followed by lunch, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And then on the Friday there was a closing press briefing

1 in the parlours of the Executive Mansion prior to their departure  
2 for Roberts International Airport, yes?

3 A. Yes.

15:22:40

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask, please, that this document be  
5 marked for identification MFI-107, please.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I note the document is behind the  
7 divider 53. There's actually two copies of the one document. I  
8 think that's just a mistake.

15:23:14

9 MR GRIFFITHS: It is exactly that, Mr President, and I  
10 think it might be best if we just ignore that.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We'll mark the top copy  
12 MFI-107 for identification.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:23:34

14 Q. Now we see, Mr Taylor, that the final event marked on that  
15 itinerary was for there to be a closing press briefing in the  
16 parlours of the Executive Mansion. Is that right?

17 A. Yes, that is correct.

18 Q. And what was to happen at that briefing?

15:24:02

19 A. Well, that briefing was to announce publicly what had been  
20 achieved as a result of the two days of discussions.

21 Q. And what did it in fact involve so far as the parties who  
22 had been involved in the discussion, what were they expected to  
23 do?

15:24:26

24 A. They were expected to announce the decisions that had been  
25 - and agreements that had been reached and announce their  
26 departure from Liberia onward to Freetown.

27 Q. And did each in turn make a statement?

28 A. Each in turn made a statement. It may be important to  
29 note, counsel, that these arrangements are being done and all of

1 the results have been already transmitted to our colleagues in  
2 ECOWAS because it did involve some very intricate discussions,  
3 especially on the armed forces business. That was very  
4 technical. So it's important to note here that those decisions  
15:25:15 5 and agreements were in fact ECOWAS decisions and agreements and  
6 so it is not just their briefing. I also speak first on behalf  
7 of the ECOWAS decisions in that particular meeting.

8 Q. So who spoke first?

9 A. I spoke first.

15:25:35 10 Q. Okay. That being the case, can we look behind divider 57,  
11 please. What do we see behind that divider, Mr Taylor?

12 A. This is my statement at this meeting.

13 Q. And we see the document is headed "Statement by His  
14 Excellency Dankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of the  
15:26:38 15 Republic of Liberia, at the conclusion of reconciliatory talks  
16 with Corporal Foday Sankoh, chairman of the RUF, and Lieutenant  
17 Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the AFRC, on implementation  
18 of the Sierra Leonean peace agreement." We note that it's dated  
19 2 October, 1999, Executive Mansion, Monrovia, Liberia?

15:27:03 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. "Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen:

22 Today the prospects for peace in the Republic of  
23 Sierra Leone are self-evident by the presence of Corporal Foday  
24 Sankoh of the Revolutionary United Front and Lieutenant Colonel  
15:27:23 25 Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC in Monrovia as they prepare for  
26 their historic return to Sierra Leone.

27 The Government of Liberia, which along with the leadership  
28 of ECOWAS, brokered the peace process, is also serving as the  
29 intermediary to facilitate the early return of Corporal Sankoh

1 and Lieutenant Colonel Koroma to Freetown to help implement the  
2 Sierra Leonean peace plan.

3 We commend ECOWAS leaders for their sacrificial support and  
4 the endurance they have shown in restoring peace to Sierra Leone.

15:28:04 5 We particularly laud the efforts of President Olusegun Obasanjo  
6 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for his dynamism in helping to  
7 give the sub-region a new sense of direction for peace and  
8 stability. Special note is made of the 39th Independence  
9 Anniversary of Nigeria and our best wishes for the peace,  
10 progress and prosperity of the people of that great nation.

11 We applaud the President of Togo and chairman of ECOWAS  
12 Gnassingbe Eyadema as well as the ECOWAS secretariat for the  
13 steady leadership in hosting and directing the negotiations that  
14 brought about the Lome Peace Agreement for Sierra Leone.

15:28:56 15 We make particular mention of other leaders in the  
16 sub-region with whom we have interacted over the past several  
17 days to realise success in these reconciliatory talks. The  
18 President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore; the President of  
19 Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah; the United Nations  
15:29:28 20 Secretary-General, Kofi Annan; the United States ambassador to  
21 Liberia, Bismarck Myrick; our special negotiator, former minister  
22 of foreign affairs, D Musuleng-Cooper; the officials of the  
23 ministry of foreign affairs, all deserve favourable mentioning  
24 for their tireless efforts in the process.

15:29:52 25 Our special thanks go to the wonderful people of Liberia,  
26 the legislature, and all those involved with these talks for  
27 their hospitality, brotherliness and understanding. Our people  
28 have always been a warm and caring people. They can be proud  
29 that once again Liberia served as a stage for peace and progress

1 among the comity of nations.

2 From the outset of the Sierra Leonean civil war, Liberia  
3 has believed in constructive engagement for the resolution of the  
4 conflict. What we have tried to do in the last few days by  
15:30:28 5 hosting these meetings is to provide an atmosphere for  
6 stabilising and maintaining the momentum of the peace process in  
7 Sierra Leone by sharing our experience on conflict resolution.

8 We have endeavoured for Sierra Leone to benefit from the  
9 hindsight of our own process that brought peace to Liberia and  
15:30:55 10 ushered in a new democratic order. This is what we are pursuing  
11 to ensure the perpetuity of good neighbourliness. We believe  
12 that the last chapter in Sierra Leone's bitter crisis is at its  
13 terminal point, which will bring durable and lasting peace for  
14 our brothers and sisters. We realise, however, that final peace  
15:31:21 15 rests with Sierra Leoneans themselves. They must develop the  
16 courage to forgive and forget.

17 Our contribution has thus been based on the strength of our  
18 conviction that we are one people with a common destiny; that  
19 there cannot be peace and progress in Liberia without a  
15:31:41 20 corresponding peace and progress in Sierra Leone.

21 The Lome Peace Agreement signed on July 7 this year must be  
22 fully implemented to ensure the smooth transition envisaged by  
23 the peace-loving leaders of ECOWAS.

24 The strengthening of relations between Sierra Leone and  
15:32:06 25 Liberia benefits the Mano River Union and also the sub-region.  
26 The potential for the Mano River Union to be the engine of  
27 progress and development in the sub-region is untapped. Our rich  
28 flora and fauna, marine life, mineral wealth and human potential  
29 is unparalleled, and these God-given untapped wealth can best be

1 developed not by a single country but our Mano River Union. This  
2 is what the peace in Sierra Leone means to Liberia. The Mano  
3 River unites us.

15:32:54

4 We see peace in Sierra Leone and the strengthening of the  
5 Mano River Union as an important contribution to the speeding up  
6 of the integration of the economies of the rest of the  
7 sub-region. Every action we have taken has been done in the  
8 supreme interest of ECOWAS. We have an opportunity to integrate  
9 and synchronise our national planning and development objectives,  
10 particularly in the areas of telecommunications, energy, roads  
11 and transport, banking, insurance, health, education and mining.

15:33:16

12 We have the opportunity now to integrate our socioeconomic  
13 systems in keeping with the noble objectives of the ECOWAS  
14 treaty. The socioeconomic unification will naturally lead to  
15 political integration. And I daresay that nothing prevents us  
16 now from thinking about and planning towards a Mano River Union  
17 parliament. The legislative contacts being advanced now should  
18 be speeded up in light of the continental parliament mandated by  
19 the Sirte declaration in Libya last month.

15:34:02

20 Presently, the Liberian government is contemplating  
21 re-opening the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border and working  
22 collectively for the revitalisation of the Mano River Union."

15:34:27

23 Pause there. Mr Taylor, we recall and should remind  
24 ourselves that the border with Sierra Leone was declared closed  
25 in December of 1998. Is that right?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. You're now talking about re-opening the border.

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Had the border been closed throughout that period?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "In this light, we look forward with great anticipation to  
3 attending the Mano River Union summit scheduled to be held in  
4 Freetown early November. Meanwhile, we will continue to  
15:34:54 5 constructively engage the Guinean government in solidifying our  
6 relations, because our three countries are inextricably yoked by  
7 the Mano River Union heritage.

8 We believe when our relations are in full bloom, our  
9 problems of security, reconstruction and development will gain  
15:35:16 10 added impetus. It will buttress our confidence building and  
11 normalisation of relations between our two nations.

12 We close this statement with optimism. This sub-region is  
13 now on the road to peace and progress and no one will be  
14 permitted to derail our noble journey.

15:35:36 15 As our brothers return to their native land, we wish them  
16 God speed and success in their endeavours. To ensure solidarity  
17 on this historic occasion, I have selected a high level  
18 delegation headed by the President pro tempore of the Liberian  
19 Senate, the Honourable Kpoto, to accompany Messrs Sankoh and  
15:36:02 20 Koroma to Freetown. They are being joined by the minister of  
21 overseas cooperation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,  
22 Professor Jerry Gana; the minister of defence of Togo; the US  
23 ambassador to Liberia; and representatives of the United Nations  
24 and ECOWAS. A ten-member press team has also been approved to  
15:36:25 25 accompany the delegation." And then you wish them God speed.

26 Now, who was present at that press conference, Mr Taylor?

27 A. The diplomatic corps, press corps, other ECOWAS officials  
28 were all present.

29 Q. Why were they all invited?

1 A. Well, this was a tremendous effort that we had made, and we  
2 had accomplished a great deal, because, like I said, people were  
3 - we were still sitting on pins and needles. The whole  
4 international community was worried. How do we get Sankoh back  
15:37:17 5 into Freetown as quickly as possible? Finally, he is going. The  
6 issue of the SLA had been settled. They will become a part of  
7 the - they will be reinstated as the armed forces of  
8 Sierra Leone. Johnny Paul Koroma's problem with the RUF had been  
9 resolved. He had been given a position by the Sierra Leonean  
10 government as - he was given the position of chairman for the  
11 consolidation of peace, CCP. He had a position in the government  
12 for the consolidation of peace. So all seemed right, and  
13 everybody was just anxious. I mean, this was an anxious moment  
14 out there in the international community, and everybody was just  
15:38:10 15 happy and came to grace the occasion. That's why we had it in  
16 the parlours of the Executive Mansion, which is the official  
17 place for such large ceremonies.

18 Q. Now, that was the first such speech made, yes? Is that  
19 right?

15:38:32 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Who was the next to speak?

22 A. There was a release. Johnny Paul Koroma spoke also.

23 Q. Now, let's look behind divider 54, shall we.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we move on, can I mark that document,  
15:38:47 25 Statement by President Charles Taylor at the Conclusion of  
26 Reconciliatory Talks between Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma  
27 at the Executive Mansion on 2 October 1999, MFI-108, please,  
28 Mr President?

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for

1 identification MFI-108.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

3 Q. Let's look behind divider 54, please. Do we have it?

4 A. Yes, we do.

15:39:16 5 Q. This is the statement, as we see, of Johnny Paul Koroma,  
6 chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, made at the  
7 Executive Mansion, Monrovia, on 2 October 1999, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. "It is with great relief and joy that we are able to  
15:39:37 10 announce to our people in Sierra Leone, especially the West  
11 African sub-region and the world at large that, under the  
12 auspices of His Excellency President Charles Taylor of Liberia,  
13 the Honourable Foday Sankoh and myself have had a very successful  
14 two days meeting at which we were able to clear any  
15:40:00 15 misunderstanding or disagreement that would impede the ongoing  
16 peace process that started with the signing of the Lome Peace  
17 Agreement on 7 July 1999.

18 The success of this meeting has greatly strengthened the  
19 alliance between the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the  
15:40:24 20 Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone. We firmly believe  
21 that this alliance is not only very good, but also very necessary  
22 for our people and peace in Sierra Leone. We are now agreed that  
23 enough time has been wasted and it's high time that we return  
24 home and put this process on the road.

15:40:46 25 Before I conclude this statement, I wish to make two  
26 appeals. The first one is to the press, especially the  
27 international press, who are quick to read danger in any small  
28 delay or hiccup in the process, as a major danger to the peace  
29 processor a very serious disagreement between the AFRC alliance.

1 This kind of speculative journalism unnerves our people who have  
2 greatly suffered from almost a decade of war.

3 To our people, we say that we understand their impatience  
4 to see us disarm and demobilise so that normalcy could return to  
15:41:33 5 our country, Sierra Leone. We, however, appeal to them to be  
6 patient and give us time to handle this process with the greatest  
7 care it needs. It would take time, probably more time than had  
8 been anticipated at the time of signing the agreement, but  
9 believe me, by the grace of God/Allah, we will eventually get to  
15:42:02 10 the promised land. One welcome assurance I wish to give our  
11 people and the world at large is that the Honourable  
12 Foday Saybana Sankoh and myself have agreed that there will be no  
13 more war in Sierra Leone. The 'War, War' is now over and it's  
14 now the time to 'Jaw, Jaw'. In this, we hope and believe that we  
15:42:21 15 are in understanding with the views of President Kabbah and his  
16 people and that we have the total support of the international  
17 community.

18 We will end this statement by giving profound gratitude and  
19 thanks to President Charles Taylor and the people of Liberia who  
15:42:36 20 have been patient, helpful and encouraging in helping us to take  
21 one faltering step after the other along the long road to peace.  
22 We say to them thank you and God bless you."

23 Did Mr Sankoh make a statement, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Yes, Sankoh made a statement but I think that was a little  
15:42:56 25 - after they got on the ground Johnny Paul spoke here and, to the  
26 best of my recollection, I recall Sankoh's statement in  
27 Sierra Leone. I think he did speak also.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask that that document, statement made  
29 by Johnny Paul Koroma - I am helpfully reminded that this

1 document has already been exhibited as exhibit D-78,  
2 Mr President.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. We'll note  
4 that.

15:43:55 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, we did mark for identification  
6 the statement made by President Taylor, did we not?

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Was that --

8 MR GRIFFITHS: The one before. I'm grateful.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. I think there was another one that  
15:44:17 10 you didn't mark.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Was that the itinerary?

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Was there a joint communique, President  
13 Taylor and President Konare of Mali? That's the one I thought  
14 you were referring to that hadn't been marked.

15:44:43 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, that one is not marked. So what number  
16 would that be? 109. Could I ask for that one to be marked,  
17 please.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we'll mark that for identification  
19 now. That will be MFI-109.

15:45:38 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Following those two speeches, Mr Taylor, was there a joint  
22 press release from both men?

23 A. Yes, there was what they call the alliance for peace.  
24 There was a joint press conference read by Sankoh.

15:45:56 25 Q. Read by Sankoh?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Look behind divider 56, please. Is that the document?

28 A. Yes, this is the document made by Sankoh now when they  
29 arrive in Freetown.

1 Q. Are we looking at the same document, Mr Taylor, behind  
2 divider 56? Look at the last page - at the bottom of that page.  
3 No, sorry, my fault. Could I just have a moment to sort out a  
4 couple of things here, please, Mr President?

15:46:53 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Can we have a look at the document behind divider 55,  
8 please, first. This document behind 55, Mr Taylor, what is it?

9 A. This is the document that was read by Foday Sankoh in  
10 Monrovia now. This is the document that was read called the  
11 alliance for peace.

12 Q. And we see that it's the statement of the alliance of the  
13 Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone and the Armed Forces  
14 Revolutionary Council on the occasion of the return of the  
15 Leadership of the alliance for peace to Freetown, Sierra Leone,  
16 facilitated by His Excellency President Charles Ghankay Taylor on  
17 behalf of the ECOWAS authority:

18 "We the Leadership and the joint high command of the  
19 RUF/AFRC alliance express on behalf of the peace loving people of  
20 Sierra Leone our profound gratitude and appreciation to His  
21 Excellency Charles Ghankay Taylor, his government and the  
22 courageous people of Liberia for the sacrifices that they  
23 continue to make to the consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone.

24 We take this opportunity to thank the Heads of State,  
25 government and people of the member states of ECOWAS and the  
26 chairman, His Excellency President Gnassingbe Eyadema of the  
27 Republic of Togo for standing by the people of Sierra Leone  
28 throughout the crisis. We remind ourselves also of the  
29 monumental contribution of His Excellency President Henri Konan

1 Bedie, the government and people of Cote d'Ivoire to the cause of  
2 lasting peace in Sierra Leone and in the sub-region. We also  
3 express our appreciation for the distinctive role of the United  
4 Nations, the organisation of African union, the European Union,  
15:49:35 5 and the Commonwealth. We say thank you to the non-governmental  
6 organisations and civil society groups who have kept the people  
7 alive and the flame of democracy, good governance, accountability  
8 and transparency burning in all our hearts.

9 When we pause and reflect, we can only see that we are not  
15:50:00 10 alone in this our struggle to create a new Sierra Leone of equal  
11 opportunity, freedom and justice for all. There is a great deal  
12 of goodwill towards Sierra Leone so far as our focuses on peace,  
13 national reconciliation and development. The courageous people  
14 of Liberia through their President have demonstrated this  
15:50:24 15 goodwill towards us and we shall never fail them in our  
16 commitment to peace. We do agree with His Excellency President  
17 Charles Ghankay Taylor that there can be no peace in Liberia when  
18 there is no peace in Sierra Leone.

19 There has been a great deal of concern expressed in  
15:50:47 20 Sierra Leone and within the international community about the  
21 alleged split in the RUF/AFRC alliance. Truly, we experienced  
22 some internal problems, but these have been put behind us with  
23 the timely intervention of His Excellency President Charles  
24 Taylor, supported ably by his brother Heads of State of the  
15:51:15 25 ECOWAS authority.

26 It is important for us to express the fact that we took  
27 notice of the concern that our internal problems could threaten  
28 the cause of peace consolidation in Sierra Leone. We would like  
29 to thank the people of Sierra Leone and members of the

1 international community for their concerns and their wish for our  
2 alliance to hold in the supreme interest of peace. The people of  
3 Sierra Leone know that the RUF and the AFRC came together to end  
4 the war. The people of Sierra Leone know that our alliance is  
15:51:59 5 for peace. We are happy to proclaim on this 2nd day of October  
6 1999 that our alliance for peace is strong, for we know that when  
7 you are strong nothing will be wrong. We are going to Freetown  
8 to help consolidate the peace and contribute to the  
9 transformation of our society.

15:52:21 10 Once again we thank the courageous people of Liberia and  
11 the member states of ECOWAS and their leaders for facilitating  
12 this historic encounter between the leaders of the RUF/AFRC  
13 alliance and their eventual return to Freetown, Sierra Leone, in  
14 the cause of peace and stability in the Mano River Union and in  
15:52:46 15 the West African sub-region."

16 And then, in true revolutionary fashion, he wishes long  
17 life to virtually the whole world, but we won't deal with that.

18 Can I ask, please, Mr President, that that joint statement  
19 read by Foday Sankoh on 2 October 1999 be marked for  
15:53:23 20 identification MFI-110, please.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-110.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

23 Q. This was quite an historic occasion, wasn't it?

24 A. It was.

15:53:52 25 Q. And it was followed by the world's press, Mr Taylor, yes?

26 A. That is correct, yes.

27 Q. Can we just remind ourselves of exhibit D-23, please. We  
28 see this is a BBC news report dated 1 October, Friday, 1999.

29 Yes, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "The Sierra Leone rebel leader, Foday Sankoh, has delayed  
3 his return home. Mr Sankoh heads the Revolutionary United Front,  
4 had been expected back in Freetown on Friday along with the head  
15:54:46 5 of the former military government, Johnny Paul Koroma. But  
6 Mr Sankoh told the BBC he would not return to Sierra Leone until  
7 next week.

8 The BBC correspondent in Freetown says the country has  
9 ground to a standstill in anticipation of their homecoming which  
10 would mark a key stage in the peace process. But he adds that a  
11 growing dispute among the rebels is making their leaders' return  
12 difficult.

13 Neither Mr Sankoh nor Major Koroma, erstwhile allies, have  
14 returned to Sierra Leone since a peace pact was signed with the  
15:55:22 15 government of the President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on 7 July putting  
16 an end to a bloody eight-year civil war.

17 The two men held more than three hours of reconciliation  
18 talks in Monrovia, mediated by Liberian President Charles Taylor  
19 on Thursday. Afterwards the two rebel leaders appeared in jovial  
15:55:49 20 mood as they spoke to reporters.

21 'I am satisfied. Everything is fine now', Major Koroma  
22 said. He would not elaborate on what was decided about his  
23 earlier complaints, notably that the accord did not give him and  
24 soldiers loyal to him a role in the Sierra Leonean army.

15:56:07 25 Mr Sankoh said the fate of the former soldiers could be  
26 discussed with President Kabbah. 'We have no problems with them.  
27 They are our brothers', Mr Sankoh said.

28 Under the peace pact Mr Sankoh is to become head of a  
29 commission for post-war construction and strategic mineral

1 resources. But many of his own movement have questioned his  
2 ability to govern and said they will seek to replace him if he  
3 did not take up his duties.

15:56:44 4 Sierra Leonean foreign minister Sama Banya called for the  
5 swift deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force,  
6 cautioning that any further delay in the start of the disarmament  
7 process would produce 'a dangerous void'.

8 The Security Council is considering sending in a 6,000  
9 strong peacekeeping force to help monitor the truce and disarm  
15:57:06 10 the rebels, although security will be left in the hands of the  
11 West African led ECOMOG peacekeepers already in the country.

12 Speaking at the United Nations in New York, Mr Banya urged  
13 donors to be generous to Sierra Leone to help it rebuild and also  
14 to allow Sierra Leone to follow through with the more  
15:57:33 15 controversial aspect of the peace agreement, an amnesty for  
16 fighters."

17 Now upon their return to Freetown, Mr Taylor, you've  
18 already mentioned there was a joint statement made by the two  
19 men?

15:57:55 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is that the document we find behind divider 56?

22 A. No, the document in my view behind divider 56 is the same  
23 document as seen behind divider 55. It's just retyped in my  
24 opinion. I stand corrected.

15:58:28 25 Q. Yes, it is. I'm grateful. Now, Mr Taylor, what was the  
26 mood within ECOWAS when this movement back to Freetown had  
27 finally been achieved?

28 A. It was a very, very happy mood. Because of the burden on  
29 me I received substantial assistance from Nigeria. In fact

1 President Obasanjo sent an aircraft that was used to ferry the  
2 two individuals plus the - in fact it was a presidential plane  
3 that he sent that would carry Sankoh, Koroma and the diplomats  
4 that - the US ambassador and others. An aircraft was provided by  
16:00:08 5 the Nigerian government and he was kind to also send along 25,000  
6 United States dollars to be given to the two of them in a typical  
7 African vein as brothers returning home. And so that was very  
8 great.

9 All of the other leaders sent messages of congratulations  
16:00:35 10 before they left. We on our part were able to provide a second  
11 aircraft that we chartered with the assistance of the Libyan  
12 leader to get the second aircraft that took the rest of the  
13 delegation - the family members of Johnny Paul and whoever were  
14 in Liberia that had to go went back on the second plane. So they  
16:01:04 15 were very happy. They helped. And these two men, along with all  
16 of the other officials, boarded the two aircrafts and then flew  
17 off to Freetown.

18 Q. Who was present at the airport when they went?

19 A. The international press corps, everybody. The  
16:01:24 20 international press corps, local press corps.

21 Q. Were you the only President present?

22 A. Yes, I was the only one there.

23 Q. Now you said that President Obasanjo had provided some  
24 financial and physical assistance?

16:01:41 25 A. That is correct. An aircraft and \$25,000.

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you thank him for that?

27 A. Yes. I wrote a letter to him afterwards thanking him for  
28 the aircraft and the assistance that he had given in the name of  
29 ECOWAS to help to facilitate this trip.

1 Q. Have a look behind divider 58, please. Do you have it?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. What are we looking at?

4 A. This is the letter that I wrote to President Obasanjo

16:02:31 5 thanking him for the funds that he had given and the aircraft -  
6 you know, the assistance that he had given to get the two men  
7 back to Freetown.

8 Q. I want us to look at this, Mr Taylor, because you recall  
9 evidence being given by Prosecution witnesses about you giving

16:02:50 10 money to Johnny Paul Koroma?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. 3 October, 1999.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "I write with a high degree of elation over the events of

16:03:04 15 the past week in Monrovia, which culminated in the successful  
16 conclusion of the reconciliatory talks between the leaders of the  
17 Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary  
18 Council. With expressions of commitment to peace and  
19 reconciliation by both Corporal Foday Sankoh of the RUF and  
16:03:31 20 Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC, as they embark  
21 on their historic return to Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS region is  
22 once again assured that peace will prevail.

23 Your wise counsel and cooperation during the talks in

24 Monrovia, as well as your kind dispatch of 25,000 US dollars and

16:03:56 25 an aircraft to help convey the parties to Sierra Leone, are noted  
26 with appreciation.

27 My government and people are honoured to have played the

28 role of mediator to help ensure successful implementation of the

29 Sierra Leonean peace plan, for we are convinced that peace,

1 stability, and economic integration are the bedrock of progress  
2 and development in our region.

3 We look forward to attending the Mano River Union summit  
4 next month in Sierra Leone during which time we expect to press  
16:04:40 5 forward for the achievement of our collective objectives. Once  
6 again I extend to you appreciation for your statesmanship and  
7 cooperation as we continue to work together as brothers for the  
8 welfare of our people."

9 What about the United Nations, Mr Taylor? Were they  
16:05:04 10 apprised of matters?

11 A. Yes, the special representative of the Secretary-General of  
12 the United Nations represented the Secretary-General at these  
13 talks. He was on the aircraft to Freetown that took he, like I  
14 said, and the US ambassador and everyone else and upon his return  
16:05:23 15 it would be normal for him to file a report. He did. We saw a  
16 copy of that, I read it, detailing all of the things that  
17 happened during that period.

18 Q. Let's have a look behind divider 59, please. What do we  
19 see there, Mr Taylor?

16:05:46 20 A. This is the public side of the report sent by Felix  
21 Downes-Thomas.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Can we before we move on mark the letter to  
23 President Obasanjo for identification, please, MFI-111?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That document is marked MFI-111.

16:06:30 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Let's have a look at this document now, Mr Taylor, please.  
27 We see it's dated the same day. It bears the same date as your  
28 letter to President Obasanjo, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. And you note that copied in on this code cable is Francis  
2 Okelo in Freetown?

3 A. Yes.

16:07:00

4 Q. And the subject is Sankoh and Koroma's departure from  
5 Monrovia and return to Freetown?

6 A. Yes.

16:07:19

7 Q. "RUF Leader Corporal Foday Sankoh and AFRC Leader Johnny  
8 Paul Koroma left Monrovia for Freetown at 1300 hours along with  
9 selected international observers/guarantors. The departure of  
10 the two rebel leaders which was scheduled to take place on 2  
11 October 1999, immediately following the ceremony at the Executive  
12 Mansion, was delayed due to protracted negotiations which took  
13 place before the commencement of the ceremony. Although the  
14 Government of Liberia was able to organise one flight to

16:07:44

15 Freetown, it was not possible to ferry Sankoh and Koroma on that  
16 day due to the lateness of the hour. Those who accompanied the  
17 two Sierra Leonean rebel leaders at the request of President  
18 Taylor are: Mr Keikura Kpoto, President pro tempore, Liberian  
19 Senate, Mr Daniel Chea, minister of defence, Professor Jerry  
20 Sana, minister of overseas cooperation, Federal Republic of  
21 Nigeria, General Assani Tidjani, minister of defence, Republic of  
22 Togo, special representative Felix Downes-Thomas and Mr Bismarck  
23 Myrick, United States ambassador to Liberia.

16:08:11

24 While the two rebel leaders and the international  
25 observers/guarantors accompanying them left on board an executive  
26 jet provided by the Nigeria government, some 70 of their  
27 supporters and members of their immediate family were ferried by  
28 commercial planes provided by the Government of Liberia. At the  
29 Robert International Airport, the two were seen off by Sierra

16:08:36

1 Leoneans residing in Monrovia, senior officials of the Government  
2 of Liberia, including Vice-President Enoch Dogolea, members of  
3 the diplomatic corps and other well wishers."

4 A. Yes.

16:09:11 5 Q. "The send off was preceded by an elaborate ceremony which  
6 was held yesterday at the parlours of the Executive Mansion  
7 during which Sankoh and Koroma reiterated their commitment to  
8 return home and make their contribution towards the consolidation  
9 of peace in their country. During the ceremony held in the  
16:09:35 10 presence of President Charles Taylor other senior members of his  
11 government and members of the diplomatic corps the two made brief  
12 statements (text of the statements are attached).

13 In reaffirming his commitment to abide by the Lome Peace  
14 Accord, Koroma underscored the importance he attaches to the  
16:09:58 15 alliance between AFRC and RUF and the constructive role which the  
16 two groups are likely to make to the implementation of the peace  
17 accord. He appealed to the press not to be quick to read danger  
18 in any small delay or hiccup in the process as a major danger to  
19 the peace process. He also appealed to the people of  
16:10:22 20 Sierra Leone to exercise patience. Lastly he thanked the  
21 Government of Liberia and other governments within the ECOWAS for  
22 their respective contributions and commended them for their  
23 tireless efforts in search for peace in Sierra Leone.

24 RUF leader Foday Sankoh stated that his movement and the  
16:10:39 25 AFRC had come together to end the war."

26 I'm not interested in the rest unless I'm asked to read it,  
27 because it's just merely a repetition of what we've already gone  
28 through. Can I ask that also be marked for identification,  
29 please, Mr President. Code cable from Felix Downes-Thomas to

1 United Nations headquarters dated 3 October 1999, MFI-112.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-112.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

16:11:50

4 Q. Now, can I inconvenience everyone at this late hour by  
5 asking you to take up, please, binder 1 of 4 for week 33 behind  
6 divider 26, please. Do you have the document, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that the outgoing code cable, the  
9 subject is "Sankoh and Koroma return to Freetown"? Thank you.

16:13:07

10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Now, we note that this one is from Okelo, special  
12 representative in Freetown.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just pause one moment, please,  
14 Mr Griffiths.

16:13:21

15 MR GRIFFITHS: Not at all.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Now, what we have here, is it not, Mr Taylor, is a similar  
19 report to that filed by Felix Downes-Thomas?

16:13:45

20 A. I'm sorry, counsel, I still don't have it.

21 Q. Behind divider 26, 1 of 4.

22 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me, Mr President, but before the witness  
23 is shown that, can we have a bit more foundation as to how he  
24 gets it or knows about it? It doesn't show a cc to him,  
16:14:18 25 certainly, or even to Downes-Thomas that I could find.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, this was a - I'll be quite blunt,  
27 Mr President. This was a document disclosed to us by the United  
28 Nations. I thought that given the nature of this issue, that  
29 it's - we're not talking about a contentious issue here, but in

1 order to provide the Court with as complete a picture as possible  
2 as to what was going on in this event, brokered by Mr Taylor, I  
3 didn't anticipate an objection to this particular document. But  
4 if my learned friend doesn't want us all to see the full picture,  
16:14:54 5 I'm quite happy to ignore it.

6 MS HOLLIS: I take exception to that remark. There are  
7 some foundations that have to be laid. This Trial Chamber has  
8 indicated, if it was part of this accused's archive, even though  
9 it wasn't his product and he had seen it, that that would be  
16:15:10 10 sufficient foundation. But here, it does not appear there is  
11 even that foundation, and there are other means to attempt to put  
12 evidence in. But I do take exception to Defence counsel's last  
13 remark.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll note that, Ms Hollis.

16:15:28 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, let us all, having inconvenienced you  
16 all, close this folder and put it away:

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, were your efforts in brokering that  
18 agreement between Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma recognised  
19 in any way by the US government?

16:16:11 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. How?

22 A. I received a letter from the Secretary of State then of the  
23 United States, Madeleine Albright, commending us for the good  
24 works that we had done within the whole framework of the Lome  
16:16:35 25 agreement and following.

26 Q. Can we go back to week 32, binder 2 of 2, please, behind  
27 divider 60. Do you have that document, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. And we see that it's addressed to you. Is that right?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. By - dated 13 October 1999?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And it's from Madelaine K Albright, yes?

16:17:44 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. "Dear Mr President;

7 I would like to extend my sincere appreciation and  
8 gratitude to you for the critical role you have played recently  
9 in supporting the peace process in Sierra Leone. Your work in

16:17:57 10 promoting dialogue among key players and persuading the rebel  
11 leaders to return to Freetown is an important contribution to the  
12 implementation of the Lome accord. We encourage continuing  
13 positive efforts on your part to assist in the difficult process  
14 of national reconciliation and reconstruction in Sierra Leone.

16:18:17 15 For there to be a durable peace in Sierra Leone, neighbouring  
16 countries must participate by denying safe haven to combatants  
17 who seek to continue the war and by preventing weapons from being  
18 cached in their territory."

19 Now, looking at that statement, Mr Taylor, how did you  
16:18:47 20 understand that?

21 A. I think what the Secretary of State is just trying to say  
22 here, that we should promote the process, keep it up, and don't  
23 permit ex-combatants to remain in Liberia or encourage anything  
24 outside of the peace process.

16:19:10 25 Q. "I urge you to continue to support efforts in the region to  
26 foster peace and stability. This includes building on the  
27 success of the September ECOWAS mini summit in Abuja and  
28 supporting the Mano River Union agreements which will lead to  
29 increased cooperation and stability along your borders. At the

1 upcoming summit in Freetown, we anticipate constructive  
2 participation by all sides, which should lead to positive  
3 results, including the return of the refugees in the region to  
4 their homelands. I am committed to ensuring that the US  
16:19:52 5 government is appropriately represented at this event.

6 The United States looks forward to working with you and  
7 other leaders in the region to build the peace and stability that  
8 is desperately needed to recover from the devastation wrought by  
9 nearly a decade of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. While  
16:20:15 10 I regret that I am unable to visit Liberia on my trip later this  
11 month, I want to thank you for your recent support for regional  
12 peace."

13 Now, was she the only person or leader who wrote to you at  
14 or about this time, Mr Taylor?

16:20:40 15 A. October, there is - also President Kabbah writes me.

16 Q. Have a look over the page, please, behind divider 61. Do  
17 you recognise that letter?

18 A. Yes, this is the letter from Kabbah.

19 Q. Yes.

16:21:19 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask that the letter from Madeleine  
21 Albright to Charles Taylor be marked for identification MFI -113.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-113 for  
23 identification.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

16:21:49 25 Q. "Mr President and Dear Brother,

26 I think the Sierra Leone telephone engineers will have to  
27 do some more work to make it possible for me to get you on the  
28 phone because I've never been able to get to you either at home  
29 or in the office. This explains why I am writing to you.

1           Our brother, President Obasanjo, telephoned me yesterday  
2           that he would like to visit Freetown on 5 November as a  
3           confidence building mission. On our part, we have been doing  
4           everything possible to get the peace process moving. Our people  
16:22:28 5           have been listening to me. The only problem is that the  
6           disarmament process has been rather slow, and I have identified  
7           that the main problem for this is that Sankoh and Koroma do not  
8           seem to trust each other."

9           Pause there. Was that apparent to you in Monrovia,  
16:22:47 10          Mr Taylor?

11          A. No, it was not apparent. In fact, quite to the contrary.  
12          They appeared to want to get along, at least.

13          Q. Look at the date of the letter. It's 27 October, yes?

14          A. Yes.

16:23:01 15          Q. So this is 25 days, just over three weeks, after they left  
16          Monrovia?

17          A. That is correct.

18          Q. "I am continuing with my efforts to build confidence  
19          between them, and I hope that with the arrival of President  
16:23:16 20          Obasanjo, he also will have an input into the process. Of  
21          course, whatever you can do from your end will be very much  
22          appreciated.

23                 Ambassador Salia-Bao had communicated with us earlier that  
24                 a number of former RUF and SLA combatants wanted to return home  
16:23:47 25                 to take part in the DDR programme."

26                 Now, help us. Who is Ambassador Salia-Bao?

27          A. He is now the Sierra Leonean ambassador that has changed.

28          Q. Sierra Leonean ambassador where?

29          A. Accredited near Monrovia.

1 Q. And he tells us: "... that a number of former RUF and SLA  
2 combatants wanted to return home to take part in the DDR  
3 programme. While we were making arrangements for their  
4 transportation home, we have heard that the RUF element is now  
16:24:29 5 taking the position that they would like to return to  
6 Sierra Leone through Kailahun with their arms. This, of course,  
7 signals some problem which I know you will understand, and which  
8 has given us some cause for concern."

9 Pause there. What that suggests, Mr Taylor, is that there  
16:24:56 10 are elements of the RUF in Liberia bearing arms. Who are they?

11 A. Well, I don't - this - I'm not sure what Tejani is  
12 referring to here, because there are no Sierra Leonean military  
13 personnel in Liberia with arms. But I guess maybe those refugees  
14 or people that came across the border that want to return, some  
16:25:29 15 of them may have hidden rifles. But I respond to this later on  
16 and clear up a few things.

17 Q. "This, of course, signals some problem which I know you  
18 will understand, and which has given us some cause for concern.  
19 Whatever you and your security people can do to see to it that  
16:25:51 20 either these people are disarmed in Liberia before they leave, or  
21 they make use of the transportation being arranged by the  
22 government so that they can be disarmed upon their departure from  
23 Liberia or arrival in Sierra Leone, will be appreciated.

24 I thank you in advance for your usual cooperation."

16:26:16 25 Now, the tone of this letter, Mr Taylor, is this indicative  
26 of the manner in which you both got on with each other?

27 A. Yes. We were always very open, asking for and informing  
28 each other, and this is just typical.

29 Q. Now also clear from that, it would appear, Mr Taylor, is -

1 no, before I move on and before I get ahead of myself can I ask  
2 that this letter from President Tejan Kabbah, President Taylor,  
3 dated 27 October 1999, be marked for identification, please,  
4 MFI-114?

16:38:10 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-114.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, I note the time, Mr President, but I  
7 was hoping to go on to another document at this stage which is  
8 slightly more substantial and I wondered whether that would be a  
9 convenient point.

16:38:11 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Unless you think you can finish the other  
11 document in a couple of minutes.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: There is no way I could do that.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: In other words, that's a convenient  
14 point. We're going to adjourn, Mr Taylor, but I'll remind you  
16:38:11 15 once more you are ordered not to discuss your evidence with any  
16 other person. We'll adjourn until 9.30 Monday.

17 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.  
18 to be reconvened on Monday, 17 August 2009 at  
19 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR 26687

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS 26687