



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 14 JULY 2010  
9.03 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding  
Justice Richard Lussick  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Erica Bussey

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Nicholas Koumjian  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Ms Terry Munyard  
Mr Silas Chekera  
Ms Logan Hambrick  
Ms Fatiah Balfas

1 Wednesday, 14 July 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.]

09:00:53 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances  
6 first, please.

7 MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,  
8 your Honours and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this  
9 morning, Brenda J Hollis, Maja Dimitrova, and Nicholas Koumjian.

09:04:33 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,  
11 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay  
12 Griffiths, with me Mr Silas Chekera, Ms Logan Hambrick, Mr Terry  
13 Munyard, Ms Fatiah Balfas and we're also joined by Mr Tor Krever.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is Mr Krever here for the first time?

09:05:04 15 MR GRIFFITHS: It's the second time. He's been here  
16 before.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. He is still welcome to the  
18 Court.

19 Mr Sesay, good morning. As we continue I remind you of  
09:05:13 20 your oath that still binds you today to tell the truth. Please  
21 continue, Mr Griffiths.

22 WITNESS: DCT-172 [On former oath]

23 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Cont'd]

24 Q. Mr Sesay, yesterday when we adjourned overnight we were  
09:05:27 25 looking at a Prosecution exhibit P-264. I would like us to  
26 complete that process this morning, please. I would like us to  
27 begin at page 8711 of this document. In fact, Madam Court  
28 Manager, can we begin at page 8709, please.

29 Now, Mr Sesay, we began to look at this particular message

1 from you to Smile dated 4 August 1999. And just to put this in  
2 context, this was a message referring to the Okra Hills situation  
3 and the abduction of various individuals by the West Side Boys.  
4 Do you remember us commencing that discussion yesterday?

09:06:59 5 A. Yes, I remember, sir.

6 Q. Looking again at this page, about two-thirds of the way  
7 down, you are reporting to Smile, that is Mr Sankoh, that  
8 Brigadier Bazil and his boys have made the following statement:  
9 "The AFRC/SLA were not recognised in the Lome, Togo, Peace

09:07:31 10 Agreement." As far as you're aware, Mr Sesay, were any members  
11 of the AFRC or the SLA present at the peace talks in Lome?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Who was present on their behalf?

14 A. Well, one former minister for the AFRC called Kai Gbanja  
09:08:02 15 was there. Leather Boot too was a council member for the AFRC  
16 was there and one Captain Jalloh, Musa Jalloh, he too was there.

17 Q. Now, help us --

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, Mr Griffiths. Mr Interpreter, we  
19 didn't hear that first name properly. What did you say?

09:08:21 20 THE INTERPRETER: Kai Gbanja.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, as far as you're aware, was Foday Sankoh  
23 representing the interests of the AFRC/SLA in Lome?

24 A. Yes.

09:08:48 25 Q. He was. Can you help us then with this: What was the  
26 foundation for this complaint being made by Bazy and the West  
27 Side Boys that the AFRC/SLA were not recognised in the Lome,  
28 Togo, Peace Agreement? What's the foundation for that?

29 A. Because he and his followers had the idea that Johnny Paul

1 did not go to Lome because of that reason. And they who were the  
2 senior members like Bazzy, Gullit, Brigadier Mani, they did not  
3 go to Lome. But indeed Mr Sankoh invited them as you could see  
4 the previous messages. So if they went to Kailahun they would  
09:09:39 5 have gone to Lome, but they refused to go to Kailahun.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you mean Johnny Paul did not go  
7 to Lome because of that reason? Because what of reason?

8 THE WITNESS: Well, because Foday Sankoh did not invite  
9 Johnny Paul to Lome. That's one of the reasons. And the second  
09:10:01 10 reason is they said that they were not part of the Lome Accord.  
11 And Mr Sankoh sent a message for them to go, Brigadier Mani,  
12 Gullit and others.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Yes, we looked at that message yesterday. A message sent  
09:10:17 15 to Gullit, Brigadier Mani - yes, to Black Jah, Brigadier Mani.  
16 Do you recall those messages yesterday?

17 A. Yes, I recall.

18 Q. Now help us. Why was Johnny Paul Koroma not present in  
19 Lome?

09:10:37 20 A. Well, what I understood was when Mr Sankoh sent the message  
21 in Makeni for this delegation, that is Mani, Gullit, Superman,  
22 Massaquoi, to go to Lome, they said they were not going through  
23 Kailahun. But Massaquoi left Makeni through Kamakwie and went  
24 through Guinea and he went to Lome. And when he went to Lome he  
09:11:08 25 told Mr Sankoh that Johnny Paul made no effort while he was Head  
26 of State during the nine months for the release of Mr Sankoh  
27 while he was in Nigeria, so he incited Mr Sankoh against Johnny  
28 Paul that he had no interest for Mr Sankoh to be free. So that  
29 was the reason why Mr Sankoh had no interest in letting - in

1 inviting Johnny Paul.

2 Q. What was the reaction of people like Bazzy, members of the  
3 AFRC, to the fact that their leader, Johnny Paul Koroma, had not  
4 been represented at Lome?

09:11:56 5 A. Well, that's why those people were arrested. They were  
6 setting ambushes on the highway. They said they did not  
7 recognise the Lome Accord and that they were not part of it.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Court Manager is having problems with  
9 her LiveNote but she says the technician can quietly come in and  
09:12:24 10 look at it while you proceed, so please do proceed.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Let us now go, please, to page 8711. Mr Sesay, this is  
13 another message from Foday Sankoh to Brigadier Bazil and you've  
14 been copied in on this message. SSS, that's you, isn't it?

09:13:13 15 A. Yes, it's me.

16 Q. "Subject, directive. Reference the message received from  
17 SSS on 4 August 1999." That's the message we've just looked at.

18 "By my directive, you are you are ordered to release the  
19 people you arrested today, the UN and the other delegates from  
09:13:37 20 Freetown. I am working on the release of the men who were  
21 arrested in Guinea and those at Port Loko.

22 Nobody should try to cause problem by going with the idea  
23 that the peace accord signed in Lome is not in their interest.  
24 The men should discipline themselves. Such attitude amounts to  
09:13:58 25 breaking of the peace agreement and is a violation of the  
26 ceasefire.

27 Nobody should talk to the UNOMSIL or any other organisation  
28 without consulting me.

29 I will talk to you all tomorrow in the morning."

1 And that's sent at 8 o'clock on the morning of 4 August  
2 1999. Now, at this stage, Mr Sesay, as far as you were aware,  
3 taking into consideration the tone of this message, was  
4 Foday Sankoh serious about peace in Sierra Leone?

09:14:44 5 A. Yes, at this stage he was serious.

6 Q. As far as you were concerned, did he continue to remain  
7 serious about peace in Sierra Leone?

8 A. Well, in 2000 he was not very serious about it. He was not  
9 dedicated to the peace process because of certain reasons.

09:15:17 10 Q. We'll come to that when we come to 2000. So let's leave it  
11 at that for now. Go over the page, please. I only want us to  
12 look at this message because it might assist in relation to  
13 something else. This is a message to the leader from command HQ,  
14 Makeni. Who was the commander at HQ in Makeni, Mr Sesay, at this  
09:15:57 15 time, 5 August 1999?

16 A. At this time there was Brigadier Mani, Black Jah, Superman,  
17 Gibriil Massaquoi, Isaac Mongor. All of them were there. They  
18 were all commanders for the AFRC and RUF.

19 Q. Now, it deals with the arrival of humanitarian aid, but the  
09:16:39 20 reason I want to bring your attention to this message is this.  
21 Count up five lines from the bottom of the page. Have you got  
22 it? Do you see a reference to "Delta Brigadier TAB Yahya  
23 (Gudith) departed this headquarters on 29 July 1999 with 200  
24 armed men"? And then look at the next page 8713, and we see a  
09:17:27 25 further reference to Brigadier TAB Yahya. Now, we encountered  
26 that name when we were listening to that BBC report from  
27 Freetown, exhibit P-279B. Could we just quickly look at exhibit  
28 P-279B to make the connection, please? And can we look at page 4  
29 of 5 of that document? When we look about just below halfway,

1 you see, "So who was actually in charge today?" Robin White, the  
2 journalist, asks. And the answer given is, "The most senior  
3 brigadier for this operation is Brigadier TAB Yahya. TAB Yahya."  
4 So when we go now back to the radio log, 8712, we see again a  
09:19:04 5 reference to Brigadier TAB Yahya and Gudith.

6 Who was the PLO-2 also known as Brigadier TAB Yahya, also  
7 known as Gudith? Who is that?

8 A. That is Tamba Alex Brima. He is Gullit. That's the same  
9 person.

09:19:29 10 Q. So when a man called Sesay was speaking to the BBC during  
11 the Freetown invasion and made reference to Brigadier TAB Yahya,  
12 who was he talking about as being in control of the Freetown  
13 invasion?

14 A. He was talking about Gullit.

09:19:54 15 Q. Thank you. We can put that additional exhibit 279B away,  
16 please. And can we go now to page 8714 in exhibit P-264, please?  
17 And we can deal with the remaining messages fairly swiftly, I  
18 hope. I think we can continue. This is a message to Smile,  
19 Foday Sankoh, from SSS, that's you, on 5 August 1999.

09:21:20 20 "At quarter past 8 in the evening on 5 August 1999, General  
21 Joshi contacted on the satellite phone and confirmed that two  
22 people had been released by Brigadier Bazil."

23 Now, was that a call from General Joshi that you received?

24 A. Yes, it was General Joshi who called.

09:21:58 25 Q. And the satellite phone on which you received that call,  
26 who did it belong to?

27 A. It was Sam Bockarie's phone that he left in Buedu whenever  
28 he was going out.

29 Q. And at this time, in early August 1999, where was Bockarie?

1 A. I said Bockarie went to Monrovia when Mr Sankoh invited him  
2 to come to Monrovia. From there, he invited him to go to Lome.  
3 Bockarie was there for some time and he told him to return. So  
4 Bockarie returned, and in September he was invited again.

09:22:30 5 Q. So Bockarie was in Monrovia in August 1999, for how long?

6 A. He was there, I think, for about a week or two, a week to  
7 ten days, and he returned and he went back because Mr Sankoh  
8 invited him in September, that Bockarie should wait for him,  
9 Bockarie should go to Monrovia. So Superman and himself, all of  
10 them will go and meet him in Lome. But Bockarie went. He was in  
11 Monrovia, and Superman with us. When they were there, Mr Sankoh  
12 sent a message that they should wait for him there, that he would  
13 meet them in Monrovia. So Johnny Paul himself was in Monrovia.  
14 So he was there, and Sam Bockarie, Superman and others, Bazzy

09:23:23 15 himself came, because when he had released those people - when he  
16 was told to release those people, he did. So they made  
17 arrangements for him to go and meet Johnny Paul and Sankoh in  
18 Monrovia.

19 Q. Now, I just want us to be clear about this. When Bockarie  
09:23:40 20 visited Monrovia in August and September 1999, at whose request  
21 did he travel to Monrovia?

22 A. Mr Sankoh's. He was the one who sent the radio message to  
23 him.

24 Q. And just so that we're clear, was it Charles Taylor who  
09:24:03 25 invited Bockarie to Monrovia on those two occasions?

26 A. No. It was on Mr Sankoh's instructions.

27 Q. Thank you. Let's go back to the message. Skip the names  
28 of the two detainees who were released. The message continues:

29 "According to them, the others are still under the arrest



1 of Brigadier Bazil, who stated that their leader, Lieutenant  
2 Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma, is still under arrest and duress. He  
3 was under duress when speaking to them this morning. They  
4 maintain that they were not part of the Lome Peace Agreement and  
09:24:52 5 demand to be recognised. They said that they will continue to  
6 hold on to the people till their demands are met. They also  
7 asked for food and medicine to be available for them.

8 General Joshi, in accordance with the foreign affairs of  
9 the various citizens placed under arrest by Brigadier Bazil are  
09:25:20 10 again appealing to the leadership and the high command of the  
11 RUF/SL to intervene swiftly and most urgently to bring this  
12 matter to a rest. They will continue contacting throughout the  
13 night."

14 Can I ask you about another detail, please, Mr Sesay? On  
09:25:37 15 page 8714 --

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'm sorry to have to  
17 interrupt. It appears that the problem with the Court Manager's  
18 machine is bigger than we thought, and this is as a result of  
19 something that must have happened during the course of yesterday.

20 MR GRIFFITHS: I fully understand.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Now, unfortunately, her machine is  
22 connected to the transcriber's machine and the Court Manager,  
23 being the Court Manager, cannot proceed without her machine  
24 working.

25 MR GRIFFITHS: We fully understand.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: So we're constrained now to adjourn  
27 briefly to allow the STL technicians to also come in because we  
28 don't know what they did. So we will rise momentarily and  
29 adjourn for a few minutes.

1 [Break taken at 9.25 a.m.]

2 [Upon resuming at 9.57 a.m.]

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Hopefully the machines have now been  
4 rectified.

09:57:43 5 Mr Griffiths, continue.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Could we go back, please, to page 8714? Now, I want your  
8 assistance with a little detail here, Mr Sesay. If you look just  
9 about two-thirds of the way down the page - in fact, to put it in  
10 context, let's start with the paragraph beginning:

11 "According to them, the others are still under the arrest  
12 of Brigadier Bazil who stated that their leader, Lieutenant  
13 Colonel JP Koroma, is still under arrest and duress. He was  
14 under duress when speaking to them this morning."

09:59:09 15 It's that part that I want to ask you about: "when  
16 speaking to them this morning." I ask for this reason. You've  
17 told us previously that following the discovery of diamonds in  
18 the possession of Johnny Paul Koroma, he was deprived of access  
19 to radio communication. Do you recall telling us that?

09:59:36 20 A. Yes, I recall.

21 Q. So how was it that here in August 1999, that "he was under  
22 duress when speaking to them this morning"?

23 A. Johnny Paul was not under duress. It was when they had  
24 arrested those people that General Joshi called Buedu. He asked  
10:00:08 25 whether Bockarie was there, but I said Bockarie was not there.

26 Then he informed me. I sent the message to Mr Sankoh, and  
27 Mr Sankoh later responded that I should take the radio set to  
28 Kangama so that Johnny Paul would be able to talk to Bazzy and  
29 his men, and I took the set to Kangama when Johnny Paul spoke to

1 his men. And he was not under duress. And indeed, he told them,  
2 whilst he was talking with them, that - he told Bazy that he was  
3 not under duress and that he was not under any threat.

10:00:47

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Excuse me, Mr Witness, what was Johnny  
5 Paul doing in Kangama?

10:01:11

6 THE WITNESS: After Mosquito and I had asked for the  
7 diamonds, that was the time he decided that Johnny Paul should be  
8 taken to Kangama together with his family, and he was living  
9 there in one former minister's house. And that was from March  
10 1998. But at times, Mosquito would call him, he would send a  
11 vehicle to collect him, and he will come to Buedu and then go  
12 back. So that was where he was until the time he went to  
13 Monrovia in August 1999.

10:01:27

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

15 Q. During that period, from March 1998 until August 1999, was  
16 Johnny Paul Koroma being detained against his will by the RUF?

10:02:03

17 A. No, he was not locked up. He was in Kangama, and, in fact,  
18 he, in fact, cultivated a farm there in 1999 together with his  
19 family. He and his family were there. They were not under any  
20 threats. There were times Mosquito will send a doctor to go and  
21 treat him and his family. He was there freely. He was not under  
22 lockup. And Mosquito even used to send food and some provisions  
23 for him.

10:02:18

24 JUDGE LUSSICK: What I would like to know, Mr Griffiths, is  
25 how long Johnny Paul was in Kangama before a radio set was made  
26 available to him so that he could contact his men.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. You've told us, Mr Sesay, that Johnny Paul was in Kangama  
29 from March 1998 until August 1999. During that period, when was

1 a radio set first made available to him?

2 A. Well, it was at this time in August when Mr Sankoh  
3 instructed me that I should go with the radio set so that Johnny  
4 Paul will be able to talk to Bazzy. But before this time, at any  
10:03:10 5 time Bockarie wanted him to talk to his men, he will send a  
6 vehicle to him, to collect him from Kangama. He will come to  
7 Buedu, speak to his men and then later return.

8 Q. Speak to his men in Buedu through what medium?

9 A. Through the radio set that Sam Bockarie was using, Sam  
10:03:31 10 Bockarie's radio set.

11 Q. And just help us with a few more details on that. Such  
12 access to the radio as you've just described, involving the  
13 transport of JP Koroma from Kangama to Buedu, how regular was  
14 that during that period, March 1998 through to August 1999?

10:04:00 15 A. Well, from March '98 up to the time I left Kailahun, he  
16 never used to talk to his men. But when his men withdrew from  
17 Freetown after the attack, and when Gullit joined Superman in  
18 Makeni, Bockarie requested for Johnny Paul to come and talk to  
19 his men, and he did that on two or three occasions. And he was  
10:04:35 20 telling Gullit to stop supporting Superman, for him not to turn  
21 against us.

22 Q. Now, just to get a time frame for that. In that answer,  
23 you told us, "But when his men withdrew from Freetown after the  
24 attack, and when Gullit joined Superman in Makeni." Question:

10:04:59 25 Roughly when did Gullit join Superman in Makeni?

26 A. That was early April 1999.

27 Q. So this contact between Johnny Paul Koroma and Massaquoi  
28 that took place on two or three occasions, just help us, did they  
29 all take place in the same month, or what?

1 A. It was not Massaquoi. It was between Johnny Paul and  
2 Gullit. That took place between April to May.

3 Q. Of which year?

4 A. 1999.

10:05:48 5 Q. And thereafter, just to bottom out this point, when next  
6 did Johnny Paul Koroma have access to radio communication?

7 A. Well, it was when Mr Sankoh instructed me to take the radio  
8 to him in Kangama.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, just to be clear, Johnny  
10:06:13 10 Paul Koroma was in Kangama incommunicado with his men between  
11 March 1998 and April 1999. That would be a period of over a  
12 year; is that correct?

13 THE WITNESS: Yes.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Was that out of his own choice, not to  
10:06:39 15 communicate with his men for a year?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, because he did not ask Bockarie, request  
17 from Bockarie, that he wanted to communicate with his men. He  
18 did not request from him that he wanted to talk to his men. And  
19 if he wanted, he would have sent - because all the operations  
10:07:04 20 that the AFRC did from March to December 1998, it was SAJ Musa  
21 who led the operations. That was the reason why Bockarie said --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
23 it slow down and repeat that area?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please slow down and repeat what you were  
10:07:25 25 saying. You were saying SAJ Musa was the one who led operations  
26 and that was the reason why Bockarie did what?

27 THE WITNESS: No, I said from March 1998 - I can even say  
28 from February, because SAJ Musa never used to talk to Johnny Paul  
29 and he did not request for Johnny Paul to talk to him. So SAJ

1 Musa did not consider Johnny Paul about - in all the operations  
2 in 1998, even before the time he died in December '98. He had  
3 declared himself leader of the AFRC. He did not consider Johnny  
4 Paul, nor did he send any reports or consulted him about all the  
10:08:13 5 things that he and his men were undertaking.

6 JUDGE DOHERTY: I would like to clarify the first answer to  
7 Justice Sebutinde's question. At page 14 line 20, you said,  
8 "After Sam Bockarie and I asked Johnny Paul for the diamonds, he  
9 decided that Johnny Paul be taken to Kangama." Who is the "he"  
10:08:40 10 referred to there?

11 THE WITNESS: It was Sam Bockarie who said Johnny Paul  
12 should be taken to Kangama.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Why Kangama? What was in Kangama?

14 THE WITNESS: Well, Kangama was inhabited by only  
10:09:05 15 civilians. The G5 and the civilians, they were the only people  
16 in Kangama, and Kangama is about three miles away from Buedu.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Mr Sesay, as of March 1998, which troops did Johnny Paul  
19 Koroma have control over?

10:09:33 20 A. Johnny Paul Koroma was not controlling troops. It was only  
21 that Bockarie used to go and consult him about things he wanted  
22 to do, or maybe to brief him on things that were happening around  
23 the Kono and Kailahun flank, because Bockarie too did not know  
24 the things that were happening at the Koinadugu axis.

10:10:00 25 Q. And just to clarify that, "Bockarie did not know what was  
26 happening at the Koinadugu axis." Who occupied the Koinadugu  
27 axis at that time?

28 A. Well, it was the AFRC and some STF under the command of SAJ  
29 Musa, Brigadier Mani and General Bropl eh.

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Is the witness saying that, at that time,  
2 Johnny Paul Koroma was no longer recognised as the leader of the  
3 AFRC?

4           MR GRIFFITHS: I was coming to ask that question, Madam  
10:10:44 5 President:

6 Q.       When you tell us, Mr Sesay, that Johnny Paul Koroma was not  
7 controlling troops as of March 1998, taking things in stages,  
8 first of all, why not?

9 A.       Well, from February, SAJ Musa did not consider Johnny Paul  
10:11:08 10 any more as the head. All the operations he conducted in the  
11 Koinadugu District, he gave his instructions and the troops  
12 reported to him. So he was now - he declared himself as the head  
13 of AFRC at that stage because he was not reporting to Johnny  
14 Paul, and because, in February, the instruction that Johnny Paul  
10:11:32 15 gave, he did not obey that instruction, for us all to go to Kono  
16 and proceed to Kailahun. He said he was not going there. So  
17 since that time, he never used to talk to Johnny Paul, he never  
18 called to talk to Johnny Paul, and he never sent messages, and he  
19 did not send message to Johnny Paul until the time he died in  
10:11:50 20 December '98.

21 Q.       Pause there. "Because in February the instruction that  
22 Johnny Paul gave, he did not obey that instruction." Who is the  
23 "he"?

24 A.       That is SAJ Musa.

10:12:05 25 Q.       So as of March 1998, up until the death of SAJ Musa, who  
26 controlled the AFRC?

27 A.       It was SAJ Musa.

28 Q.       Between December 1998 and February 1999, who controlled the  
29 AFRC?

1 A. Well, in that case it was Gullit, Alex Tamba Brima.

2 Q. Still on same topic: Did Johnny Paul Koroma have control  
3 of the AFRC elements in RUF territory outside of SAJ Musa's  
4 group?

10:13:11 5 A. Yes, yes those who were in Kailahun, because in Kono they  
6 only had few of them there, but the few who were in Kono, they  
7 recognised Johnny Paul. I, like him, he was there in Kono, he  
8 was the battalion commander at Gandorhun in 1998. He - Leather  
9 Boot was in Kailahun; he recognised Johnny Paul, Adams and  
10 honourable Sammy, so the AFRC who were in Kailahun, they still  
11 recognised Johnny Paul and they used to visit him in Kangama.

12 Q. And help us. What was Johnny Paul Koroma's position within  
13 the RUF in the period March 1998 through to August 1999?

14 A. Well, whatsoever Bockarie did at that time, he used to go  
10:14:08 15 and brief and consult Johnny Paul for his own advice, and, even  
16 before I went to attack Kono, myself, Mike Lamin, Sam Bockarie,  
17 we went to Kangama with Kaisuku when Sam Bockarie went and  
18 informed Johnny Paul that he was sending me to go and attack  
19 Kono, and Johnny Paul supported the idea. So he also gave his  
10:14:30 20 own advice for us to concentrate on the operation that we were  
21 going on in Kono.

22 Q. Just give us an idea, Mr Sesay. The AFRC forces in  
23 Kailahun at the time you've just described, what were their  
24 numbers? Just a rough idea, please?

10:15:02 25 A. Well, the AFRC, who were the targets, they were up to 150  
26 in Kailahun.

27 Q. And what about in Kono?

28 A. Well, at the time Superman had left Kono they were up to a  
29 platoon, which is 60.



1 Q. And can you help us with this. Those AFRC troops in Kono,  
2 can you help us as to when they discovered that Johnny Paul  
3 Koroma was in Kangama?

4 A. Yes, like Akim. Because all of us went to Kailahun in  
10:16:07 5 February, and it was around April that Sam Bockarie sent him as  
6 battalion commander to Gandorhun, so from March they knew that  
7 Johnny Paul had gone to Kangama, from March of '98.

8 Q. And a couple more matters on this, please. Firstly this:  
9 You told us of a promotion given to Sam Bockarie by Johnny Paul  
10:16:43 10 Koroma. Do you remember telling us that?

11 A. Yes, I recall.

12 Q. By what authority did Johnny Paul Koroma promote him?

13 A. Well, Bockarie was recognising him as the head because  
14 Mr Sankoh had said that we should take instructions from him.  
10:17:07 15 And Johnny Paul too recognised himself as the chairman for both  
16 the AFRC and the RUF.

17 Q. And just remind us, when was that promotion by Johnny Paul  
18 Koroma of Bockarie?

19 A. It was in March of '98.

10:17:27 20 Q. The other matter I want your assistance with is this. The  
21 AFRC troops who were located in Kailahun and Kono, what was their  
22 status, if any, within the RUF?

23 A. Okay. Like in Kono, Akim was the battalion commander in  
24 Gandorhun; and you had Mohamed Banya who was also a battalion  
10:17:59 25 commander around the Guinea Highway. And in Kailahun they had  
26 Honourable Sammy, Samuel Kargbo, who was the deputy brigade  
27 commander in Pendembu for Kailahun, and Leather Boot was attached  
28 to Sam Bockarie. He used to come to Pendembu and other places  
29 with Sam Bockarie. They will come and visit us if there was any

1 discussion he was with Sam Bockarie, and together with Eddie  
2 Kanneh and Honourable Adams. They were based in Buedu. They  
3 were stationed there with Bockarie. So they were the senior  
4 officers that Bockarie recognised within the administration in  
10:18:44 5 Kailahun.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: But Mr Griffiths, if the witness says  
7 that from March 1998 Johnny Paul Koroma was recognised by  
8 Bockarie as the head or chairman for both the RUF and the AFRC,  
9 as per instructions from Foday Sankoh, at what stage did this  
10:19:07 10 change? At what stage did it change to the point that Johnny  
11 Paul Koroma now had to ask for permission to speak to his men  
12 from Bockarie?

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Let's deal with that.

14 Q. Did Johnny Paul have to ask permission from Bockarie to  
10:19:24 15 speak to his men?

16 A. Johnny Paul did not ask for permission. It was Bockarie  
17 who requested Johnny Paul to talk to Gullit, when Gullit and  
18 others went and joined Superman in April 1999 after the  
19 infighting in Makeni.

10:19:47 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: But the witness just told us a few  
21 paragraphs before that for one year Johnny Paul Koroma could not  
22 speak to his men because he didn't ask to speak to his men. You  
23 just said that, and I'm asking you if he was recognised by  
24 Bockarie as the leader of both of the AFRC and the RUF, as you  
10:20:08 25 now say, was that necessary for Johnny Paul to ask anybody to  
26 speak to his men?

27 THE WITNESS: Well, when we arrived in Buedu in late  
28 February to early March of '98, Sam Bockarie recognised Johnny  
29 Paul as the leader, but, after that incident took place when

1 Johnny Paul said he wanted to go out to go to Ghana to go and try  
2 to get some material for us to continue the fight against ECOMOG,  
3 when Rambo informed Sam Bockarie that Johnny Paul had diamonds  
4 and that if they allowed Johnny Paul to go he will not return,  
10:20:46 5 that was when Bockarie decided that Johnny Paul should go to  
6 Kangama; but, before that time, Bockarie recognised Johnny Paul  
7 as the head.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: So after Johnny Paul went to Kangama the  
9 recognition stopped, he was no longer recognised by Bockarie as  
10:21:02 10 leader of both the RUF and the AFRC; is that correct?

11 THE WITNESS: Well, Bockarie no longer regarded him the way  
12 he used to, at the time he initially arrived in Buedu. But at  
13 this time now he only used to consult him. He was no longer  
14 taking instruction from him, as he used to take instructions  
10:21:30 15 before that incident. But, after the incident, he only used to  
16 seek his advice to - seek his advice and then brief him about  
17 things and consult with him to get his own advice about how they  
18 did things.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:  
10:21:49 20 Q. So just to clarify matters, Mr Sesay, after the discovery  
21 of diamonds in Johnny Paul Koroma's possession, was he still  
22 regarded in the same way by Sam Bockarie?

23 A. No. No.

24 Q. After the discovery of those diamonds in his possession,  
10:22:24 25 was Johnny Paul Koroma still allowed access to senior officers in  
26 the AFRC, such as Akim and the others you've named?

27 A. Yes, they used to visit him in Kangama.

28 JUDGE LUSSICK: What I just can't quite come to terms with,  
29 Mr Griffiths, is if Johnny Paul, as head of the AFRC, had some

1 diamonds and that was seen as something that he shouldn't have  
2 had, why? Who should have had the diamonds, if not the head of  
3 the AFRC?

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Let me approach that in this way:

10:23:20 5 Q. At the time that diamonds were discovered in Johnny Paul  
6 Koroma's possession, Mr Sesay, what was the position of the RUF  
7 and those elements of the AFRC who had retreated to Kailahun?  
8 What kind of position were they in?

9 A. Well, the AFRC, who came to Kono, and the RUF who went to  
10:23:49 10 Kailahun, still recognised Johnny Paul as the head.

11 Q. And in terms of material, what was the position of those  
12 forces?

13 A. Well, at that time we did not have fighting materials. We  
14 did not have fighting materials.

10:24:09 15 Q. And help us with this. How were diamonds regarded within  
16 the RUF?

17 A. Well, we considered diamonds as something belonging to the  
18 organisation.

19 Q. And what was expected of Johnny Paul Koroma, as leader of  
10:24:37 20 the AFRC, if he had access to diamonds? What was expected of  
21 him?

22 A. Well, Johnny Paul had rights to have diamonds in his  
23 possession because he was the head, but what we expected of him  
24 was for him to utilise what he had with him in the interests of  
10:25:02 25 the organisation.

26 Q. And was it thought that he was intending to utilise those  
27 diamonds for the interests of the organisation?

28 A. Well, at the initial stage, yes, because he had explained  
29 to Sam Bockarie - he called Sam Bockarie and told Sam Bockarie

1 that he was going to Ghana to try and get fighting materials and  
2 Sam Bockarie accepted. But it was later that Rambo came and told  
3 Sam Bockarie - he informed us that the diamonds that Johnny Paul  
4 had in his possession, if Sam Bockarie allowed Johnny Paul to go  
10:25:47 5 to Ghana he would not return, because Johnny Paul had decided to  
6 take with him his family members and his tribesmen, who were his  
7 securities, and that if Johnny Paul went he would not return. So  
8 that was the problem. It was not the case of Johnny Paul just  
9 possessing the diamonds that was the problem, but what caused the  
10:26:06 10 possible then was when Rambo, who was the CSO to Johnny Paul,  
11 told Sam Bockarie that if we allow Johnny Paul to go he will not  
12 come back; if Johnny Paul went to Ghana, and that he had seen the  
13 people that Johnny Paul wanted to go with, then Johnny Paul would  
14 not return, and if Sam Bockarie sat by and allowed Johnny Paul to  
10:26:28 15 go and leave us in the hot fire, then that will not be nice.  
16 That was the thing that brought about that.

17 Q. So as far as people like yourself, Bockarie, Mike Lamin  
18 were concerned, to whom did those diamonds belong or for whom  
19 should those diamonds be used?

10:27:04 20 A. Well, we knew - I knew that Johnny Paul had those diamonds  
21 - got those diamonds from the mining that the AFRC were  
22 conducting in Kono at the time Johnny Paul was in power. So, if  
23 he had those diamonds, then he should have utilised it in the  
24 interests of the organisation, and at that time ECOMOG was  
10:27:30 25 chasing us.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: What organisation? In the interests of  
27 what organisation?

28 THE WITNESS: The AFRC and RUF, because it was those two  
29 groups as an organisation that he was heading up to the time we

1 retreated in 1998. Had Rambo not given that information to Sam  
2 Bockarie, Sam Bockarie wouldn't have blocked Johnny Paul from  
3 travelling because when Johnny Paul told Bockarie the reason for  
4 which he was going to Ghana and that he will come back, Sam  
10:28:16 5 Bockarie thought it fit that, yes, it was a good idea, but when  
6 his own CSO came and leaked this information, that was what  
7 created the problem.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. When whose CSO leaked this information?

10:28:30 10 A. Johnny Paul's CSO, Moses Kabia alias Rambo.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't know if there is any further  
12 clarification required before I move on.

13 JUDGE LUSSICK: I'm sorry, what I was going to ask,  
14 Mr Griffiths, is the witness has just said that had Rambo not  
10:29:03 15 given that information to Sam Bockarie, Sam Bockarie wouldn't  
16 have blocked Johnny Paul from travelling. What information are  
17 we talking about? The fact that Johnny Paul had diamonds? Or  
18 the fact that Johnny Paul was planning to travel with his family?

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:29:24 20 Q. Let's just deal with that, please, Mr Sesay. Initially  
21 when the idea was mooted of Johnny Paul travelling to Ghana, what  
22 was your understanding as to the purpose of his travel?

23 A. Well, I understood that Johnny Paul had told Bockarie that  
24 he was going to travel, to go and get some ammunition from Ghana,  
10:29:56 25 because he said he had some friends in Ghana, so that we will  
26 come and continue with the fight against ECOMOG and the SLPP.

27 Q. And was Bockarie happy to allow Johnny Paul Koroma to go to  
28 Ghana for that purpose?

29 A. Yes. When Johnny Paul told Bockarie, Bockarie agreed.

1 Q. Did Bockarie's approval of that plan change at some point?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And what caused Bockarie to change his approval?

4 A. It was because of what Rambo told Bockarie and what he told  
10:30:43 5 us later, when he said if Sam Bockarie allowed Johnny Paul to go,  
6 he would not return, and that Johnny Paul wanted to betray the  
7 cause.

8 Q. Had Johnny Paul Koroma's CSO not provided that information,  
9 would Bockarie have allowed Johnny Paul Koroma to travel to  
10:31:08 10 Ghana?

11 A. Yes, that was the plan.

12 JUDGE LUSSICK: So I think I'm getting what the witness is  
13 saying now. The fear was - what the witness is saying is that  
14 the fear was that if Johnny Paul travelled to Ghana, he would not  
10:31:28 15 return, but had that information not been conveyed, Johnny Paul  
16 would have been allowed to go to Ghana.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: That's my understanding of the testimony.

18 JUDGE LUSSICK: And would the diamonds have been returned  
19 to him so that he could go to Ghana with something to spend on  
10:31:49 20 ammunition?

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Had the CSO to Johnny Paul Koroma not provided that  
23 information, firstly, would Johnny Paul Koroma have been allowed  
24 to go to Ghana?

10:32:12 25 A. Yes. I said yes, that was the plan.

26 Q. For what purpose?

27 A. To go and try and get ammunition.

28 Q. And what was he going to use to pay for it?

29 A. Well, he did not tell Bockarie what he was going to use.

1 He only said he was going to Ghana to get some ammunition, to  
2 come back and continue the fight, because he said he had friends  
3 there that he wanted to go and meet.

4 Q. So at the time when he initially said he wanted to go to  
10:32:51 5 Ghana to obtain ammunition, was it known at that point that he  
6 had diamonds in his possession?

7 A. No. At that time, he did not talk about diamonds, and  
8 Bockarie too did not know that he had diamonds.

9 Q. So at what point was it discovered that he did have  
10:33:14 10 diamonds in his possession?

11 A. It was Rambo who told Bockarie and told us later that  
12 Johnny Paul had diamonds and if he had gone, he will not return  
13 and he did not have any plans to return because he planned to go  
14 with the - his entire family and a few of his tribesmen and his  
10:33:37 15 security. Those were the people he planned to go with.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Of course, this is AFRC Rambo.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. That is Moses Kabia.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if I can move on from this topic  
19 now.

10:33:58 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

22 Q. Can we go to page 8715 of this document, please? We see in  
23 the middle of the page a message dated 5 August 1999, and it's  
24 from Smile, Foday Sankoh, to Colonel Isaac. Who is Colonel  
10:34:41 25 Isaac?

26 A. That is Isaac Mongor.

27 Q. Where was Isaac Mongor based at this time in early August  
28 1999?

29 A. He was in Makeni.



1 Q. How far is Makeni from Okra Hills?

2 A. It would be around 50 miles, 50 plus.

3 Q. Help us: Where were the closest forces to Okra Hills based  
4 at this time in early August 1999?

10:35:32 5 A. I don't understand the question.

6 Q. Where did the RUF, on 5 August 1999, have forces located  
7 the nearest to Okra Hills?

8 A. Well, except Superman's group that was at Lunsar, but  
9 that's a little far. It's a far distance from Okra Hills.

10:36:07 10 Q. And was Superman at this time taking orders from Bockarie  
11 or from Sankoh?

12 A. Superman took orders from Sankoh.

13 Q. Now, Mongor's group in Makeni, were they closer to Okra  
14 Hills or further from Okra Hills than the Superman group?

10:36:38 15 A. Well, Isaac was in Makeni, but he and Superman were on the  
16 same operation. He took instructions from Superman. So if  
17 Superman wasn't around, Isaac would have authority over the men  
18 in Lunsar because he was the one that Superman left in charge.

19 Q. Let's look at the message now, shall we? From Smile,  
10:37:25 20 Foday Sankoh, to Isaac Mongor. "Directive. By my directive I  
21 would like you to proceed to C/S Vulture." What is C/S vulture?

22 A. Call sign Vulture. That is the station, field radio  
23 station.

24 Q. Which field radio station?

10:37:50 25 A. Field radio, the radio set. Every radio set had its code  
26 name.

27 Q. I know. But this particular radio set, where was it  
28 located?

29 A. This was the West Side Men's radio set.

1 Q. "I would like you to proceed to C/S Vulture, the field  
2 radio for the West Side Boys, and investigate about the arrest of  
3 the people arrested by Brigadier Bazil and make sure that the  
4 people are released but not by means of force. I repeat, do not  
10:38:33 5 use any military force. Convince them as brothers to release  
6 those people. Make them to understand that we are not bandits to  
7 make such demands. Best regards."

8 Now, Mr Sesay, was it possible for you to monitor that  
9 message?

10:38:56 10 A. Yes, I knew about this.

11 Q. And help us: Was that mission, given to Isaac Mongor by  
12 Foday Sankoh, was it successful?

13 A. No, it was not successful.

14 Q. But did Isaac Mongor carry out that mission as ordered by  
10:39:20 15 Foday Sankoh?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Go to the next message, please. Now, this is from Smile,  
18 Foday Sankoh, to Bazil.

19 "I am still advising you to release the people under your  
10:39:38 20 arrest. That is not part of our motive, to hold people as  
21 hostages and make demands. Lieutenant Colonel JP Koroma is not  
22 under any arrest or duress, as we are telling people in Freetown  
23 that he was under duress this morning while talking to you on  
24 field radio."

10:40:08 25 Then we see this response from Bazil to Smile, and you will  
26 see the message from Sankoh to Bazil is on 5 August 1999 and it's  
27 timed at quarter to 10 in the evening. Do you see that?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. We then have a response at 0920 hours, what appears to be

1 the next day, 6 August, and it's to this effect:

2 "Reference your signal message dated 5 August 1999, you  
3 are hereby requested to release our leader. When he talks under  
4 arrest or duress he should come to our location and release the  
10:41:08 5 hostages. Failure to do that, we are not ready to subdue  
6 ourselves under any other command."

7 What did you understand that last sentence to mean?

8 A. That they were not taking command from any other person  
9 except Johnny Paul Koroma.

10:41:35 10 Q. Did that refusal to take command from any other person  
11 include, from your understanding, Foday Sankoh, to whom this  
12 message is addressed?

13 A. Yes, that was inclusive of Foday Sankoh.

14 Q. Let's go to the next page, please, page 8717. This is on  
10:42:10 15 the same day, 7 August 1999. It's from Major Gibriil Massaquoi to  
16 Sankoh, with Concord, Sam Bockarie, copied in; is that correct,  
17 Mr Sesay?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. "Sir, no RUF Sierra Leone soldier on this side and not  
10:42:39 20 even all SLA soldiers are involved in the current act. Myself,  
21 CO Isaac, CO Nya and other SLA senior officers have been trying  
22 and are still trying to secure the release of those people. I  
23 will be leaving this evening to escort three ACF NGO vehicles to  
24 Makeni and at the same time to get in touch with Brigadier Mani  
10:43:20 25 wherever he is because he (Brigadier Mani) sent a message this  
26 morning to all SLAs that no one should be involved in such an act  
27 as it was the wrong method.

28 Brigadier Bazzy and others involved in this act are all  
29 former bodyguards of the former NPRC criminals and are injected

1 in their brains with drugs and power consciousness. When I left  
2 Togo, I visited their end, as you instructed. They brought up  
3 this same grievances of Lieutenant Colonel JP Koroma, still being  
4 detained. Peace may be talked today and they are capable of  
10:44:13 5 destroying it. Again if not considered them as they said they  
6 were not properly represented, and therefore asked their  
7 reservation of the above. I spoke to them so as to calm them  
8 down and I deemed it necessary to send the message on 22 June  
9 1999 but CS Mavel refused to receive the message. So far for  
10:44:47 10 Lunsar Kambia and Makeni axis were not involved in the present  
11 ongoing problem. No problem, as I am in constant contact with  
12 the other axes. Your message was received from Colonel Isaac  
13 and we will continue to see means of solving the present problem.  
14 I will never be an obstacle to your orders in connection with the  
10:45:10 15 problem of Brigadier Morris Kallon."

16 Two more messages I would like to look at before we  
17 conclude this chapter. The next message --

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, before you leave, what does  
19 CS Mavel that's referred to here, "CO Mavel refused to receive  
10:45:38 20 the message", what does that mean?

21 THE WITNESS: Call Sign Mavel. That is the field radio.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. And where is that field radio located?

24 A. I think that was the station that was in Makeni.

10:46:04 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that an RUF radio station?

26 THE WITNESS: That was the set he used and it was under  
27 Brigadier Mani, AFRC.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. The set which - who used that set?

1 A. Call Sign Mavel was Tee. He was an AFRC man, Colonel Tee.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: And again, "CS Vulture" was that an AFRC  
3 field radio?

10:46:55

4 THE WITNESS: Yes. I said it was an AFRC field radio that  
5 was in Makeni, because Gibril was in Lunsar when he sent this  
6 message.

10:47:23

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we're talking about two different  
8 things. First, Mr Witness, I asked you about CS Mavel; you said  
9 that was an AFRC field radio in Makeni. Then I asked you: What  
10 about "CS Vulture"? You said it was a field radio of the West  
11 Side Boys, so I asked you now: Was it an AFRC field radio also.

12 THE WITNESS: Call sign Vulture? Yes, ma'am. It was at  
13 the West Side. That was Bazy's station.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:47:45

15 Q. Let's just make sure that we fully understand this. Call  
16 Sign Mavel and Call Sign Vulture, were they both AFRC radio sets?

17 A. Yes, that's what I said.

18 Q. Call sign Vulture was located where?

19 A. It was at the West Side.

10:48:11

20 Q. Who was in control of the West Side where Call Sign Vulture  
21 was located?

22 A. Bazy was controlling the West Side.

23 Q. Call Sign Mavel was located where, that other AFRC set,  
24 where was that located?

10:48:36

25 A. Makeni.

26 Q. Who had control over that radio set?

27 A. Colonel Tee.

28 Q. And to whom did Colonel Tee report?

29 A. He reported to Brigadier Mani because at this time

1 Brigadier Mani had moved to Makeni. He had based in Kamabai. He  
2 was in Kamabai in August. You can see from the message that  
3 Gibril Massaquoi was telling Mr Sankoh that he was to escort  
4 three NGO vehicles to Makeni and he was to meet Brigadier Mani  
10:49:19 5 wherever he was, because he was not in Makeni Town.

6 Q. So Massaquoi was not in Makeni?

7 A. No, he sent the message from Lunsar. Because you see where  
8 he says he was to escort three NGO vehicles to Makeni.

9 Q. That's on the previous page: "I will be leaving this  
10:49:43 10 evening to escort three ACF NGO vehicles to Makeni." So he was  
11 escorting those vehicles from where to where?

12 A. He was escorting the vehicles from Lunsar to Makeni.

13 Q. Thank you. Go back to page 8718, please. The second  
14 message on that page, 7 August 1999. It's from Smile,

10:50:17 15 Foday Sankoh, to all commanders.

16 "By my directive, all commanders are to ensure that  
17 maximum security is provided for all relief organisations. I  
18 don't want to hear any stories about looting and harassment of  
19 them.

10:50:44 20 Superman, Brigadier Five-Five and Major Jackson Swarray  
21 will be arriving by helicopter today at Makeni. Please receive  
22 them properly. All roads leading to Makeni and" what's the next  
23 word, please? Is that "linking provincial towns"? "Should be  
24 made accessible. Provide security to and for civilian  
10:51:17 25 population. Only this way will the military win support and  
26 goodwill of people."

27 Now, Brigadier Five-Five, remind us, who is that?

28 A. That is Santigie Borbor Kanu.

29 Q. And Major Jackson Swarray, is that the same Major Jackson

1 Swarray who was the Black Guard commander?

2 A. Yes, that is it.

3 Q. And from where were they to arrive by helicopter?

10:52:12

4 A. Well, Jackson Swarray, Five-Five, Superman, they came to  
5 Freetown to see Mr Sankoh and they met Mr Sankoh. They were to  
6 meet Mr Sankoh at - in Monrovia. That was where they were to  
7 meet. But Five-Five and Swarray, Mr Sankoh had told them to  
8 return, so it was only Superman that stayed in.

10:52:44

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat and  
10 speak slowly.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. So only Superman what?

10:52:59

13 A. Superman and Patrick PS Binda, they were the ones who  
14 stayed in Monrovia, because Mr Sankoh called them through the  
15 radio and sent a message that they were to travel to Freetown and  
16 he was making arrangements with the Government of Sierra Leone  
17 for them to be airlifted to Monrovia. So they should wait for  
18 him there and all of them would meet there. But they went to  
19 Monrovia and Mr Sankoh sent a message that Jackson and Five-Five  
20 should return to Makeni.

10:53:23

21 Q. So had Jackson and Five-Five reached as far as Monrovia  
22 when they received that message from Sankoh?

23 A. Yes, and they left PS Binda, Superman in Monrovia to wait  
24 for Mr Sankoh.

10:53:48

25 Q. So when on 7 August this message was sent by Sankoh, does  
26 it follow that Five-Five and Major Jackson Swarray were en route  
27 from Monrovia?

28 A. Well, they were en route from Freetown to Makeni and they  
29 were to be airlifted by the helicopter.

1 Q. Now, we can move fairly swiftly now because just skimming  
2 the next message, which is from Dr SS Williams, and it may assist  
3 if we pause for you to explain. Who is Dr SS Williams?

4 A. Dr SS Williams was a civilian and he was the head of OSM.

10:54:42 5 That is an RUF organisation. OSM stands for Organisation for the  
6 Survival of Mankind. He was the coordinator.

7 Q. And if one skim reads that message, and indeed the next  
8 message on 8721, it's quite clear that those messages relate to  
9 relief operations, which need not detain us. But can we go,

10:55:36 10 please, to page 8723. This is the final message in this message  
11 book I want to refer your attention to. We're returning to the  
12 topic of Johnny Paul Koroma. This is a message from you, SSS; is  
13 that correct?

14 A. Yes.

10:56:04 15 Q. To Concord, Sam Bockarie; is that correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. With Smile, Foday Sankoh, also copied in on the message,  
18 yes?

19 A. Yes.

10:56:21 20 Q. "Sir, one helicopter landed at Kangama this afternoon with  
21 five UN personnels. According to them, it was a request made by  
22 Lieutenant Colonel JP Koroma for General Joshi to assist airlift  
23 his family from Kangama to Monrovia."

24 Then he goes on to list the names of those who came with  
10:56:52 25 the helicopter.

26 "I have apprehended them, including the helicopter.

27 Awaiting to receive further instruction from you on the above  
28 issue."

29 We see the message is dated 31 August 1999. By that date



1 in August 1999 where was Johnny Paul Koroma?

2 A. Johnny Paul was in Monrovia.

3 Q. How had Johnny Paul travelled from Kangama to Monrovia.

10:57:52

4 A. Well, Mr Sankoh sent a message in which he said Johnny Paul  
5 was to be taken from Kangama and to Foya where a helicopter will  
6 airlift him to Monrovia. That was in August '99.

7 Q. And the helicopter which airlifted him to Monrovia in  
8 August '99, to whom did that helicopter belong?

10:58:22

9 A. That helicopter belonged to the Liberian government, the  
10 one that took Johnny Paul from Foya to Monrovia.

11 Q. Now, this helicopter which landed at Kangama on the  
12 afternoon of 31 August, whose helicopter was that?

13 A. This was a UN helicopter.

10:58:47

14 Q. And who told you, as stated in this message, that the  
15 helicopter had arrived in order to airlift Johnny Paul Koroma's  
16 family from Kangama to Monrovia? Who told you that?

10:59:15

17 A. Well, the helicopter came. It flew over Buedu and went to  
18 Kangama. And myself, together with some other men, we drove  
19 because when it got to Kangama somebody brought a bicycle and  
20 said helicopter had landed in Kangama and had come to take Johnny  
21 Paul and his family and I said, oh, if they are making

10:59:35

22 arrangements for Johnny Paul and his family to be taken away I  
23 was on the ground, why was it I was not informed. So that was  
24 why I went there to meet the crew of the helicopter and the other  
25 people with whom they had all come and asked them. And they said  
26 they were given instruction by General Joshi to take Johnny Paul  
27 and his family. So I told them to wait until I sent message to  
28 my own commanders and my leader to inform them that they had come  
29 to collect Johnny Paul and his family.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Was it to collect Johnny Paul or to  
2 collect Johnny Paul's family?

3 THE WITNESS: My Lord, that's a slip of tongue. That was  
4 to collect Johnny Paul's family, because Johnny Paul was in  
11:00:07 5 Monrovia.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. And Johnny Paul had travelled from Foya by helicopter but  
8 this helicopter had landed in Kangama. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes, because Johnny Paul was in Monrovia.

11:00:24 10 Q. And the helicopter which collected him from Foya as you  
11 told us earlier belonged to the Liberian government, whereas the  
12 helicopter which landed at Kangama was a United Nations  
13 helicopter. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

11:00:41 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: If I may ask, why was it necessary for  
16 these people, the owners of the UN helicopter, to consult you,  
17 Mr Sesay, before airlifting Johnny Paul Koroma's family? Why was  
18 it necessary?

19 THE WITNESS: But, my Lord, I was the one whom Mr Sankoh  
11:01:06 20 sent with the radio to talk to Johnny Paul. I was the one that  
21 Sankoh sent a message to to drive Johnny Paul to Foya, and it's a  
22 long distance from Buedu. And if a helicopter was coming to  
23 airlift his family and I was on the ground, I think for common  
24 understanding a message was supposed to have been sent to me so I  
11:01:29 25 will go there to make sure that the people were - the people  
26 boarded the helicopter and they would go.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Because if we go back to page --

29 A. And yes, ma'am. And I was looking at it at that stage that

1 Bockarie did not know and even Mr Sankoh did not know because  
2 none of them sent an information to me regarding that.

3 Q. And if we go back to page 8708, which is a message dated 4  
4 August, we see there reference to General Joshi contacting you on  
11:02:17 5 the satellite phone left behind by Sam Bockarie. Now, going back  
6 to page 8723, did it surprise you that on this occasion the same  
7 General Joshi didn't do you the courtesy of telephoning you on  
8 the satellite phone?

9 MR KOUMJIAN: Objection. Leading.

11:02:44 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Did you still have that satellite phone in your possession  
12 on 31 August, Mr Sesay?

13 A. Yes, the satellite phone was at Bockarie's house. Every  
14 morning it was switched on up to 8 o'clock at night.

11:03:00 15 Q. Did you still have access to it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Was it in working order?

18 A. Yes, it was in working order.

19 Q. As far as you're aware, did General Joshi still have the  
11:03:14 20 number for that phone? He obviously had it on 4 August. Did he  
21 still have the number?

22 A. Yes, he had it.

23 Q. And did you receive a call from him on the 31st to say that  
24 a UN helicopter would be arriving to take Johnny Paul Koroma's  
11:03:33 25 family?

26 A. No, he did not call.

27 Q. Did that surprise you?

28 A. Yes, because none of them informed me.

29 Q. Thank you very much. And in due course did Johnny Paul

1 Koroma's family leave on that helicopter?

2 A. Well, he did not go with the helicopter because  
3 Foday Sankoh had said he was not informed and the helicopter  
4 should go back.

11:04:19 5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness go over  
6 this part of his testimony.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Pause there. Did Johnny Paul Koroma's family leave from  
9 Kangama on that helicopter: Yes or no?

11:04:41 10 A. No.

11 Q. Why not?

12 A. Mr Sankoh said Johnny Paul did not inform him and even  
13 General Joshi did not inform him so the helicopter should return  
14 and he would arrange for the family of Johnny Paul to join him in  
11:04:58 15 Monrovia.

16 Q. And in due course did the family of Johnny Paul join Johnny  
17 Paul in Monrovia?

18 A. Yes.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, I note the time.

11:05:14 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. It had escaped my attention.  
21 We will take 30 minutes' break and reconvene at 35 past 11.

22 [Break taken at 11.05 a.m.]

23 [Upon resuming at 11.40 a.m.]

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please continue, Mr Griffiths.

11:40:21 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Mr Sesay --

27 MS HOLLIS: Madam President, by our reckoning at the end of  
28 today's proceedings this witness will have been testifying for  
29 something over 42 hours. So for our planning purposes we would

1 I like to know when this witness's direct examination will be  
2 concluded. And I wanted to ask now so that I didn't wait until  
3 the end of the day when we had run out of tape. Thank you, Madam  
4 President.

11:41:02 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, perhaps we could have your  
6 response, please.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, we have proceeded a lot slower than  
8 I had anticipated and, frankly, my current belief is that we  
9 probably won't conclude Mr Sesay's evidence-in-chief until about  
11:41:24 10 the Tuesday after the break.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. There you have it, Ms Hollis.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: And on the same note I wonder if the  
13 Prosecution are in a position to reciprocate by indicating how  
14 long their cross-examination of this witness is likely to last  
11:41:44 15 because of course it will affect issues as to when we bring any  
16 further witnesses up to The Hague.

17 JUDGE DOHERTY: Can I just make sure what you mean by  
18 Tuesday after the break. That's Tuesday, the 27th?

19 MR GRIFFITHS: That's correct.

11:42:08 20 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, the length of the  
21 cross-examination will depend upon what Mr Sesay says in  
22 substance during the rest of the direct examination. As your  
23 Honours have seen in general, an approximation is the Prosecution  
24 takes about the same amount of time in cross as the direct  
11:42:25 25 examination.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: There we have it. And of course in the  
27 meantime we shouldn't forget that the Prosecution will be  
28 reopening their case to some extent in the course of Mr Sesay's  
29 testimony. But do proceed, Mr Griffiths.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Mr Sesay, through looking at those radio messages, we've  
3 reached a point now towards the end of August 1999. Now, just  
4 taking things in stages, at the end of August 1999, where was

11:43:21 5 Foday Sankoh?

6 A. Foday Sankoh was in Lome.

7 Q. Did he in due course leave Lome?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And travel to where?

11:43:43 10 A. Well, I understood that he went to Burkina Faso, he went to  
11 Libya before he came down to Monrovia.

12 Q. Do you know why he went to Burkina Faso?

13 A. Well, he went to Burkina Faso to his friends and that was  
14 the same for Libya.

11:44:13 15 Q. Who were his friends in Burkina Faso who he went to visit?

16 A. Like General Diendere was his friend.

17 Q. Anybody else?

18 A. That was the person I knew more that he was Foday Sankoh's  
19 friend.

11:44:41 20 Q. And who were his friends in Libya?

21 A. Well, the Libyan leader was his friend.

22 Q. And after Libya, to where did Mr Sankoh travel?

23 A. Well, after Libya, I understood that he came through  
24 Monrovia and later went to Freetown.

11:45:13 25 Q. When he arrived in Monrovia, were any members of the RUF  
26 there to welcome him?

27 A. Yes. Sam Bockarie was there, Superman was there, Patrick  
28 PS Binda was there.

29 Q. And can you help us as to a rough date when Foday Sankoh

1 arrived in Monrovia?

2 A. Well, I cannot be specific as to the date but it was in  
3 October that he arrived in Monrovia.

4 Q. Now, when he arrived in Monrovia, where was Johnny Paul  
11:46:03 5 Koroma?

6 A. He too was in Monrovia.

7 Q. And as far as you're aware, did the two men, Johnny Paul  
8 Koroma and Foday Sankoh, meet in Monrovia?

9 A. Yes.

11:46:20 10 Q. Why?

11 A. Well, they met in Monrovia for them to be able to discuss,  
12 to talk about unity, how they would work together to move on with  
13 the Lome Accord. That was what I understood.

14 Q. And in due course, when Sankoh left Monrovia, did he travel  
11:46:50 15 back to Sierra Leone?

16 A. Yes. From Monrovia, he and Johnny Paul travelled together  
17 and came to Freetown.

18 Q. Were they accompanied by any representatives of the  
19 Liberian government?

11:47:11 20 A. Well, I was not present, I cannot confirm that.

21 Q. Now, thereafter, following Foday Sankoh's return to Sierra  
22 Leone, where did you, Issa Sesay, first see him upon his return?

23 A. In Makeni.

24 Q. And in what circumstances?

11:47:44 25 A. Well, he came to talk to the combatants and the civilians  
26 in respect of the Lome Accord.

27 Q. Have a look, please, at exhibit P-379. Mr Sesay, have you  
28 seen this document before?

29 A. I do not recall.

1 Q. Well, let's have a look at it and see. It is entitled,  
2 "Sierra Leone People's Army, army headquarters, Makeni, northern  
3 region, Makeni." It's addressed to all security commander, from  
4 the - is that overall IDU commander?

11:51:15 5 A. Yes, overall IDU commander.

6 Q. And at this time, and we see the date, 22 November 1999,  
7 who was the overall IDU commander?

8 A. Well, I knew Augustine Gbao as the overall IDU commander  
9 and at the same time he was the security commander. We had the  
10 IDU commander for the northern region who was called Bangali.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, what is the Sierra Leone  
12 People's Army exactly?

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Mr Sesay, what is or was the Sierra Leone People's Army, as  
11:52:05 15 of 22 November 1999?

16 A. Well, at that time we were not using this expression,  
17 People's Army, in the RUF. The expression people's army was the  
18 joint forces of the AFRC/RUF that Foday Sankoh referred to as the  
19 People's Army.

11:52:31 20 Q. And when had Foday Sankoh referred to those joint forces as  
21 the People's Army?

22 A. It was in May 1997.

23 Q. By November 1999, did that label, People's Army, still have  
24 currency amongst the RUF?

11:53:01 25 A. No, they were not using it, no. We were using RUF.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: What about amongst the AFRC?

27 THE WITNESS: Well, during this time, my Honour, the AFRC  
28 were no longer in Makeni, in November 1999, because the AFRC left  
29 Makeni in October '99.



1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Now, we will see that the subject of this document is the  
3 visitation of the leader, Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh,  
4 representatives of the international communities and ECOMOG  
11:53:47 5 securities: "Sir, the long awaited leader and chairman, Corporal  
6 Foday Sankoh, visited Makeni on Sunday, 14 November 1999."  
7 You'll see that in the second paragraph, it goes on to say that  
8 he arrived by helicopter, further details of that are given in  
9 the third paragraph. Then we see at paragraph 4 that on Monday,  
11:54:22 10 14 November 1999 he went from Makeni to Magburaka returning to  
11 Makeni on Tuesday, 16 November 1999, paragraph 5. Go over the  
12 page, please. Let's pick up the narrative at this stage:

13 "The leader took the microphone whereby he introduced four  
14 journalists. He further emphasised that the war is finished and  
11:55:01 15 that peace had come to our beloved land, Sierra Leone. He said  
16 there would be no more war and that the RUF is not prepared to  
17 wage any other war. Its mission in Makeni and Tonkolili is to  
18 explain the Lome, Togo, Peace Accord which the RUF, AFRC and  
19 President Tejan Kabbah had signed."

11:55:38 20 Paragraph 10:

21 "He further apologised to all for the atrocities which the  
22 Kamajors, RUF/AFRC had committed against the innocent people and  
23 the violation of human rights and pleaded for forgiveness and to  
24 turn to a new chapter in the history of Sierra Leone in which  
11:56:06 25 peace and reconciliation will move this country ahead."

26 Do you recall him expressing these sentiments, Mr Sesay?

27 A. Yes, I recall. Foday Sankoh spoke about - he apologised to  
28 the people of Makeni for whatsoever things the RUF organisation  
29 might have done to the people of Makeni.

1 Q. Paragraph 11:

2 "He further lamented on the developments of this country  
3 and blamed those who had connived with politicians to deteriorate  
4 the country to where it is. He also denounced the principles of  
11:57:09 5 nepotism that had been practiced by other leaders of this country  
6 and further said that his visit is a clear indication for peace  
7 and confidence building. He said the struggle was a national  
8 issue to liberate and eradicate corruption in this country which  
9 caused people, unable to feed themselves, and to emancipate all  
11:57:43 10 Sierra Leoneans from this civilised slavery. He also said that  
11 the revolution which he launched in 1991 forced the AFRC  
12 government to reintroduce the multi-party system and told all  
13 combatants to transform into a political wing and must be ready  
14 to hand over weapons to ECOMOG and United Nations disarmament  
11:58:17 15 team at any time he instructs us to do so. He also blamed the  
16 educated people of this country, the crooked politicians and  
17 their allies, from the time of independence. He also said that  
18 taking the arms from us doesn't mean that our mouths are kept  
19 shut and this is the time we are to get in full fledge with  
11:58:54 20 politics, which he refers to us as the real battle.

21 He also called on UNOMSIL observers for absolute intention  
22 for peace in Sierra Leone, commented that though war is bad, but  
23 the most important issue is that the people will gain after the  
24 war, and promised that the RUF/SL will surely wipe tears of  
11:59:27 25 sorrow from the people of this country and that the wealth of  
26 this country must be in the hand of the people of Sierra Leone."

27 Then this:

28 "He further went to say that the RUF still stands to be the  
29 name for our new party and that its symbol should be a lion's

1 head with green colours and he will never tolerate any commander  
2 for further attack in this country. He added that I noted we are  
3 to respect the customs and traditions as a basis of true  
4 revolution. He also said that he instructed Brigadier General  
12:00:23 5 Issa Sesay to come in Makeni on October 15th. He said complaints  
6 of looting, harassment and other violations of human rights have  
7 been going on from certain members within the SLA. This  
8 motivated him to instruct Brigadier General Issa to come and put  
9 situation under control within Makeni and the north as a whole."

12:00:54 10 Two things I want to ask you about that paragraph,  
11 Mr Sesay. First of all, did Foday Sankoh say that he would not  
12 tolerate any commander launching further attacks in the country?

13 A. Yes, he did say that during that meeting, because the  
14 meeting was held at the stadium, the town field, in Makeni.

12:01:39 15 Q. And is it correct that you had been ordered by Mr Sankoh to  
16 go to Makeni on 15 August - October, in order to put a stop to  
17 looting, harassment and other violations of human rights by  
18 members of the SLA?

19 A. Yes. He ordered me, through Sam Bockarie, for me to move  
12:02:10 20 from Buedu and come back to Makeni and take over command because  
21 he said he had been getting reports about how the SLA and RUF had  
22 been harassing civilians in Makeni, so that was why he said  
23 I should leave Buedu and come over to Makeni.

24 Q. And tell me, from whom did you take over control in Makeni?

12:02:37 25 A. I took over command from Superman.

26 Q. And who were - who was in charge of those SLAs who were  
27 behaving in this way in Makeni?

28 A. They were Brigadier Mani and Colonel Tee.

29 Q. And were you able to bring the situation under control?

1 A. Yes. I was able to bring the situation under control, but  
2 on the very day that I arrived in Makeni, I went and stayed at  
3 the Teko Barracks because, before I came to Makeni, there had  
4 been a problem between Superman, Isaac Mongor, Gibriil Massaquoi,  
12:03:28 5 that is their own group, against the AFRC. There was a problem,  
6 so when I got to Makeni on that very day, Superman moved from  
7 Lunsar, they came and attacked the AFRC in Makeni and pushed them  
8 out of Makeni and, during that attack, Superman, Gibriil Massaquoi  
9 and Isaac Mongor looted some NGO vehicles that they left behind  
12:03:54 10 in Makeni and went to Lunsar. So I stayed in Makeni and took  
11 over command.

12 Q. Thank you. Let's go to the next page, please, skipping the  
13 next couple of paragraphs. Let's go to paragraph 18: "The G5  
14 personnel, Mr Benjamin Kargbo". Pause, did you know him?  
12:04:30 15 Paragraph 18, Mr Sesay?

16 A. Well, to me, the name Benjamin is not familiar, but I knew  
17 a Pa Kargbo, who was a G5, and I know the other names but this  
18 name, Benjamin, is not familiar to me.

19 Q. Very well. Let's just look at the rest of that paragraph:  
12:05:08 20 "Noted that the visit of Corporal Foday Sankoh in Makeni  
21 has been celebrated on four occasions. The people of Makeni, he  
22 said, have celebrated the molestation, harassment and  
23 intimidation and persisted to live in harmony with his  
24 combatants. The people of Makeni were greatly hopeful that the  
12:05:35 25 DDR programme would be successfully implemented in the north.  
26 The people of Makeni, he said, had suffered the greatest  
27 degradation for the fact that they had all been branded as rebels  
28 and rebel collaborators. He thanked Pa Sankoh for sending  
29 Brigadier Issa Sesay in Makeni who has done all his best to

1 maintain security in the township."

2 Is that correct, Mr Sesay, that you had done your best to  
3 do that?

4 A. Yes, because when I came to Makeni, the following day,  
12:06:15 5 after the infighting - in fact, that very day, before the  
6 fighting took place, when the civilians in Makeni heard that I  
7 had arrived, a large crowd of civilians moved from Makeni Town  
8 dancing and they met me at the Teko Barracks, and it was when  
9 they had come to me with their dancing, it was then that we heard  
12:06:40 10 the shooting.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
12 to slow down and repeat.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. It was then what we heard the shooting. Carry on from  
12:06:51 15 there, please.

16 A. The civilians, the crowd was at the barracks, realised they  
17 were dressing, children were dressed, they were dancing cultural  
18 dancing and, whilst this was going on, we heard gun shots in the  
19 town, so I sent people to go and check. I sent some of my  
12:07:11 20 bodyguards to go and check to know what was happening and when  
21 they returned they said it was Superman, Gibril and Isaac who had  
22 attacked the AFRC. So he said that was the fighting that was  
23 going on in the Makeni Town. So I too advised the men that I had  
24 brought with me, I gave them instruction that they should not -  
12:07:31 25 they should not involve in that fighting. By then they were also  
26 with me at the Teko Barracks. And the crowd of civilians that  
27 had come, because there were younger children among them, young  
28 girls who were dancing the cultural dance, I advised all of them  
29 to stay with me in the barracks until there was a ceasefire in

1 Makeni Town. So that the evening, when the firing had subsided  
2 and ceased, so I gave some of my men to escort them from the  
3 barracks to Makeni township.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr Sesay. Let's go back to the document,  
12:08:09 5 paragraph 21:

6 "Talking on behalf of the combatants, the battlefield  
7 commander, Brigadier Issa Sesay, confirmed their loyalty to  
8 Chairman Sankoh and their commitment to the Lome Peace Accord  
9 signed by the leader and chairman and the Tejan Kabbah  
12:08:34 10 government. He commented that they are ready to work with the  
11 ECOMOG brothers to bring lasting peace in Sierra Leone. He,  
12 however, urged the authorities not to rush with the DDR programme  
13 before the welfare of the combatants. He expressed on the  
14 absence of the former AFRC chairman, Lieutenant Colonel Johnny  
12:09:06 15 Paul Koroma, from Pa Sankoh's team and he was expected to talk to  
16 the SLA brothers who are numerous amongst the RUF combatants  
17 here."

18 Pause there for a minute. Now, is it the case, Mr Sesay,  
19 that all RUF combatants at this time were "committed to the Lome  
12:09:39 20 Peace Accord"?

21 A. Yes, at this time, in November, the only person who, in  
22 late November, was not that committed, because he had said he  
23 will not disarm to ECOMOG, was Sam Bockarie; but that started in  
24 late November, between him and Mr Sankoh, but for also we were in  
12:10:07 25 the north, because by then I was now in the north, we were ready  
26 to carry on with the programme because the area that the  
27 disarmament had taken place in December I was present, and I was  
28 the one who organised the men in the other areas before Mr Sankoh  
29 and the UNAMSIL authorities and the military officers for the

1 Sierra Leonean army arrived there. That was in Fadugu because it  
2 was initially Lunsar that the disarmament started.

3 Q. You mentioned a name Fadugu?

4 A. Yes, Fadugu.

12:10:50 5 Q. How do you spell it, please?

6 A. F-A-D-U-G-U.

7 Q. Thank you. And then you went on to say that it was in  
8 Lunsar that the disarmament had started.

9 A. Yes. Because Mr Sankoh had sent - should come to Port Loko  
12:11:17 10 to witness the kickoff of the disarmament where Superman was to  
11 assemble his men in Lunsar, and ECOMOG should transport them to  
12 the DDR camp. So Foday Sankoh kicked off the disarmament. So,  
13 after the RUF disarmament and RUF and - in Lunsar and the  
14 surroundings and Foday Sankoh --

12:11:40 15 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak  
16 slowly and speak clearly.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. So after the RUF disarmament in Lunsar and the  
19 surroundings, Foday Sankoh did what?

12:11:53 20 A. Foday Sankoh said I should go to Fadugu two days ahead  
21 because he and the UNOMSIL authorities, including some armed  
22 officers who were in Kabala before they were there, said I should  
23 go to mobilise the combatants, so all of those who were in the  
24 surrounding villages around Fadugu should assemble in Fadugu for  
12:12:25 25 the disarmament.

26 Q. Now looking again at paragraph 21 in this document, the  
27 second point I want to ask you about is this: Why were you,  
28 according to this document, urging the authorities not to rush  
29 with the DDR programme before the welfare of the combatants?

1 Why?

2 A. No. I don't recall saying that. I could not dictate to  
3 Mr Sankoh at that time.

4 Q. Thirdly, in that paragraph, did you express any sentiments  
12:13:07 5 as to the absence of Johnny Paul Koroma from Pa Sankoh's team?

6 A. No. I don't recall asking for Johnny Paul Koroma because  
7 I saw the representative of Johnny Paul Koroma's with Mr Sankoh.  
8 I saw Savimbi, one of the officers in the AFRC, and other - and  
9 another person. There were two who were Johnny Paul's reps, they  
12:13:40 10 were with Mr Sankoh.

11 Q. Very well. Paragraph 22:

12 "He" - apparently you in the context of paragraph 21 -  
13 "also appeared to ECOMOG, UNAMSIL and the government to address  
14 the problems of the combatants and their families. A spokesman  
12:14:06 15 for the SLA combatants, Captain ET Amara, disclosed that there  
16 are over 2,000 SLA soldiers among the RUF combatants, they were  
17 all moving in harmony and there was mutual understanding and  
18 respect for each other. He further said that they are unhappy  
19 about the absence of their leader, Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul  
12:14:37 20 Koroma. Papay Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma are the same. They  
21 are working together and anything said by Corporal Foday Sankoh  
22 will be accepted by all SLA soldiers in Makeni and the north as a  
23 whole."

24 Now, first of all, Captain ET Amara, did you know him?

12:15:04 25 A. No. I don't recall this name.

26 Q. Do you recall an SLA representative making a speech at this  
27 meeting in Makeni where Foday Sankoh was present?

28 A. No. Savimbi and the other guy whom I saw as JP's  
29 representatives did not speak. And during this time, when Foday



1 Sankoh first visited Makeni, the SLAs - before he came, the SLAs  
2 had left Makeni in October. So the SLAs who were with us, they  
3 were in Kono and in Kailahun but in Makeni, the SLAs were there  
4 but they were not up to a platoon even who had stayed there for  
12:16:02 5 the RUF in Makeni, because some MPs stayed behind. Like the MP  
6 commander, he stayed, and Kawa and some other ones but there were  
7 not many.

8 Q. So this figure of over 2,000 SLA soldiers among the RUF  
9 combatants, is that true?

12:16:25 10 A. No, that is not true.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness named the MP commander stayed  
12 and someone else. We didn't hear the name.

13 THE WITNESS: I said MP Kawa.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:16:43 15 Q. How do you spell Kawa?

16 A. K-A-W-A.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that was the MP commander and then  
18 you named someone else. Looking at page 59, line 11, where he  
19 says, "Like the MP commander, he stayed and" - there is a space -  
12:17:12 20 "some other ones, but they were not many."

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Just go over that again for us, please, Mr Sesay. Of the  
23 SLAs in Makeni, who had remained behind?

24 A. I said like the MP commander, MP Kawa was there and a few  
12:17:37 25 of the SLAs. I cannot recall all of them now. I said where the  
26 SLAs were, some of them were in Kono and some others were in  
27 Kailahun at this time.

28 Q. Thank you. Turn over the page. Now, according to these  
29 minutes, that meeting took place on Tuesday, 16 November.

1 Turning to paragraph 24, "On Thursday, 18 November" - and I want  
2 us to jump down a few lines, eight lines. We see:

3 "The leader at the end of his speech handed over to the  
4 Guinean ECOMOG the one 40 barrel missile guns that was disarmed  
12:18:46 5 from them by the RUF around the Kambia axis to prove to the  
6 ECOMOG contingent and the United Nations representative that we  
7 are ready to be disarmed at any time."

8 Do you recall that taking place, Mr Sesay?

9 A. Yes, that happened.

12:19:09 10 Q. And thereafter, paragraph 25:

11 "At the end of the whole exercise, the leader was airlifted  
12 in a helicopter together with the former President, Joseph Saidu  
13 Momoh, to Freetown."

14 Help me: Prior to Sankoh arriving in Makeni, where was  
12:19:31 15 Joseph Saidu Momoh, the former President?

16 A. Well, before I left Makeni, when I was attacked in late  
17 March to early April 1999, Joseph Saidu Momoh was at Brigadier  
18 Mani's. From the time he was taken from Freetown he was at  
19 Brigadier Mani's. He was there until around August when  
12:20:02 20 Brigadier Mani left Makeni and he went to stay in - in a town  
21 between Binkolo and Fadugu. I had once mentioned the town when  
22 I was testifying this morning. That's the only big town between  
23 Binkolo and Fadugu because that's where Brigadier Mani went in  
24 August. He left Pa Momoh to go and stay with a civilian who was  
12:20:57 25 the chairman of the traders union in Makeni called --

26 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat the  
27 name.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. What was the name of the person he went to stay with?

1 A. Mr Alie Menjor Sesay. That was where he was until this  
2 time that I came to Makeni, and even the very day of this  
3 meeting --

12:21:22 4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Pause. Please pause. We asked for a  
5 clarification of a name. We don't have it and we are not sure we  
6 heard a name. Before you go running off with some other  
7 testimony, let's clear that first. Please.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Did you say Alimamy John Sesay.

12:21:39 10 A. No, I said Alie Menjor Sesay.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you please say those names,  
12 Mr Interpreter, one by one rather than one long, running name?

13 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, it's supposed to be three  
14 names, and the first name the witness pronounces it in two  
12:21:56 15 different ways.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, when the interpreter is  
17 addressing the Court you don't talk because we can't listen to  
18 two people at the same time. Now I asked the interpreter for a  
19 clarification and we are trying to hear what he is saying.

12:22:16 20 Mr Interpreter, please say again, the three names separately.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Alie Menjor Sesay.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. How do you spell the first name, Mr Sesay?

24 A. Alie, A-L-I-E.

12:22:36 25 Q. How do you spell the second name?

26 A. M-E-N-J-O-R.

27 Q. And is the third name spelled the same way that your  
28 surname is spelled?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. And if I understand what you've told us, it was with that  
2 man that Momoh had gone to stay with in Makeni. Is that correct?

3 A. Yes. When Brigadier Mani went to the town called Kamabai,  
4 that's the name of the town.

12:23:17 5 Q. What's the name of the town?

6 A. Kamabai.

7 Q. Could you spell that name for us, please?

8 A. K-A-M-A-B-A-I.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, can I please ask you to  
12:23:35 10 speak clearly. We are having difficulty understanding.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours --

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Let me finish. We are having difficulty  
13 understanding what you're saying because you, like the witness,  
14 are also running.

12:23:51 15 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, your Honours.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. And so is it the case that Momoh did, indeed, return to  
18 Freetown with Foday Sankoh?

19 A. Yes. During the meeting, that was when Mr Sankoh asked me  
12:24:16 20 about the whereabouts of Pa Momoh and I said he was at Alie  
21 Menjor's. Then Mr Sankoh said I should go and bring him to the  
22 meeting and I drove my vehicle to Pa Momoh and told him that Pa  
23 Sankoh was calling him. And he packed his bag. He said, "Maybe  
24 I'll be going to Freetown today." And we drove to where

12:24:42 25 Mr Sankoh was at - he addressed the people at the meeting. From  
26 there he travelled together with Pa Sankoh to Freetown, Pa Momoh  
27 together with Pa Sankoh with the helicopter.

28 Q. Thank you. Now, we are coming towards the end of November  
29 1999, Mr Sesay. You've already mentioned the difficulties that

1 began arising so far as Bockarie was concerned. I want us now to  
2 deal with that topic. Do you follow me?

3 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, does that mean you're now  
4 going to complete the questions arising from exhibit P-379?

12:25:34 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Your Honour, yes.

6 JUDGE DOHERTY: I would like, before you do that, to  
7 clarify paragraph 2 and 3 of that document in which it said the  
8 helicopter gunship and the white helicopter landed at 2.10 hours  
9 and at 2.15 hours. That's 2 o'clock in the morning. Is that  
10 when they arrived?

12:25:52

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Mr Sesay, can I invite your attention back to the first  
13 page of that document, please? You will see that on the second  
14 line, reference is made to, "Foday Sankoh visited Makeni on  
15 Sunday, 14 November 1999." Go now to paragraph 2:

12:26:26

16 "On Sunday, about 2.10 hours, a helicopter gunship and a  
17 white helicopter landed with international communities rep and  
18 ECOMOG high commands."

19 Help us: What time of the day did the helicopters arrive  
20 bearing Mr Sankoh?

12:26:54

21 A. It was in the afternoon, during the day.

22 Q. So that reference to 2.10, is that 2.10 in the morning or  
23 2.10 in the afternoon?

24 A. 2.10 in the afternoon.

12:27:18

25 JUDGE DOHERTY: Thank you.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Not at all.

27 Q. Now, let's move on then. You were telling us earlier about  
28 the difficulties which began to arise with Sam Bockarie at the  
29 end of November. Now, Mr Sesay, this chapter in your evidence is

1 important so I want to ensure that it's taken down clearly and  
2 comprehensively on the transcript. So I hope you don't mind if  
3 I interrupt you at times in order to ensure that that takes  
4 place. Let's start off with a time frame. Roughly when did  
12:28:02 5 difficulties start to arise with Bockarie over the Lome Peace  
6 Accord?

7 A. Yes, Mr Lawyer. I would want to ask the President to use  
8 the gents.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly. Mr Sesay may be escorted out,  
12:28:31 10 please.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President before we proceed, can  
12 I invite everyone's attention to page 51 of the transcript at  
13 line 16? It's been helpfully brought to my attention by  
14 Mr Taylor that, in referring to paragraph 13 of exhibit P-379, I  
12:31:53 15 have wrongly referred to "in 1991 force the AFRC government".  
16 That should be the "APC government".

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: What page was that again?

18 MR GRIFFITHS: 51 line 16.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is noted, and I don't know how that  
12:32:30 20 will be corrected, but perhaps your comments will reflect the  
21 correction.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, as I said, I want us now to deal with Sam  
24 Bockarie. Towards the end of November 1999, what was Bockarie's  
12:32:54 25 attitude towards the Lome Peace Accord?

26 A. His attitude was negative.

27 Q. Why?

28 A. Well, when Mr Sankoh arrived in Freetown in October 1999,  
29 first he visited Kailahun and he went to Buedu. He held a

1 meeting there with Sam Bockarie and other RUF commanders and he  
2 held a general meeting, but before he held a general meeting in  
3 Kailahun Town --

4 Q. Go on.

12:33:37 5 A. -- when he got to Buedu, he had a meeting with Sam  
6 Bockarie, so Sam Bockarie handed over some diamonds to Mr Sankoh  
7 which he said "those are the diamonds."

8 Q. Which what?

9 A. Those were the diamonds that he was mining, he kept some of  
12:34:01 10 them, so those were the diamonds he gave to Mr Sankoh. So from  
11 there they travelled to Kailahun Town where Mr Sankoh held a  
12 meeting and addressed the civilian population of Kailahun about  
13 the Lome Accord, and to declare to the people that the war was  
14 over, and it was only a matter of time now to start the  
12:34:26 15 disarmament that was to commence soon and he returned to  
16 Freetown. He was in Kailahun for three days and he returned to  
17 Freetown.

18 Q. Before you go any further, I want to clarify certain  
19 details here. These diamonds which Bockarie handed over to  
12:34:48 20 Sankoh, over what period of time had they been mined?

21 A. Well, those were the diamonds that I reported to Bockarie  
22 from the mining unit, some of them was what he reported to  
23 Mr Sankoh, because some of them were sold, but I can't be  
24 specific about the time period now, but it was in 1999.

12:35:16 25 Q. Very well. Secondly, where had those diamonds been mined?

26 A. Kono.

27 Q. And remind us, who was mining commander in Kono?

28 A. Matthew Kennedy Sesay.

29 Q. Okay. So having spent three days in Kailahun, Sankoh

1 returned to Freetown. What happened next?

2 A. When he returned to Freetown was when he paid this visit to  
3 Makeni, at the - and when he returned to Freetown he told Sam  
4 Bockarie that he was going to start the disarmament in Lunsar.

12:36:12 5 Q. When he returned to Freetown from where, did he contact  
6 Bockarie to say that he was going to start the disarmament in  
7 Lunsar?

8 A. Freetown. When he returned from Makeni he went back to  
9 Freetown, so he was in Freetown when he told Bockarie that the  
12:36:35 10 disarmament was to commence in December and he would want the  
11 Port Loko district to first disarm, and that disarmament was to  
12 go on under the supervision of the ECOMOG and the Nigerian  
13 contingent. He said they were the ones to carry out the  
14 disarmament. At that time it was the Nigerian contingent that

12:37:02 15 was based in Port Loko. So during the conversation between -  
16 that message Sankoh sent to Bockarie, Bockarie received the  
17 message and he grumbled that he was not going to disarm to ECOMOG  
18 because it was ECOMOG who had been fighting RUF, and it was  
19 ECOMOG who had reinstated President Kabbah, so he was not really  
12:37:35 20 safe to disarm to ECOMOG, that his life would not be safe in the  
21 hands of ECOMOG. So Mr Sankoh got this information through his  
22 security in Kailahun because, like the radio operators, they were  
23 all informants to Mr Sankoh.

24 Q. Go on.

12:37:51 25 A. So Mr Sankoh decided to call Sam Bockarie on the radio to  
26 tell him that he had decided to disarm Port Loko, but before the  
27 disarmament to visit Kambia district, so the combatants --

28 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this  
29 part of his answer.



1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Pause there, Mr Sesay. So Mr Sankoh decided to call Sam  
3 Bockarie on the radio to tell him what?

12:38:35

4 A. To tell him that he had decided to disarm Lunsar, but  
5 before he will disarm Lunsar he would have to visit Kambia.

6 Q. Go on.

12:38:59

7 A. To go and address the combatants in Kambia and the  
8 civilians. So Sam Bockarie told Mr Sankoh that he would not  
9 disarm under ECOMOG and he was going to assure Mr Sankoh that the  
10 RUF in Kailahun District will never subdue themselves without  
11 instruction to disarm under ECOMOG.

12 Q. Go on.

12:39:21

13 A. So he and Mr Sankoh had an argument and Mr Sankoh said,  
14 "Are you challenging me as a leader? I have given you an  
15 instruction, and I've told you this is what you should do and  
16 you're not going to do it?" And they got into a bitter argument.

12:39:45

17 And all the stations monitored that argument. So the following  
18 day was when Mr Sankoh prepared to go to Kambia, and he sent a  
19 message to me in Makeni that I should leave Makeni to come to  
20 Port Loko to join him to go to Kambia, and Bockarie's station  
21 monitored the message that Mr Sankoh had sent to me. And  
22 Bockarie sent another message to me saying that I shouldn't go to  
23 Port Loko because, if I went to Port Loko, ECOMOG would arrest  
24 me. He said I should not follow Mr Sankoh because Mr Sankoh - it  
25 seemed as if Tejan Kabbah had paid him some money to betray their  
26 cause.

12:40:10

27 Q. Pause there?

28 A. So I should not follow him.

29 Q. Pause there. We are missing line 6, please. It seems as

1 if Tejan Kabbah had paid him some money to betray their cause.

2 So the missing words, Mr Stenographer, is "Tejan Kabbah".

3 Sorry, Mr Sesay. Can you pick it up from there, please?

12:40:50

4 A. I said Sam Bockarie said it seemed as if Tejan Kabbah had  
5 paid money to Foday Sankoh so that Foday Sankoh would betray his  
6 own cause, so he said I should not go to Port Loko, and I should  
7 not join Mr Sankoh to go to Kambia.

8 Q. Go on.

12:41:13

9 A. So at that time I was with CO Lawrence, Morris Kallon in  
10 Makeni, Augustine Gbao and I asked them, I said, "Oh, this is a  
11 problem that is about to crop up because Foday Sankoh is a leader  
12 and Sam Bockarie is the field commander, because when Mr Sankoh  
13 returned to Freetown he said he did not recognise the position of  
14 chief of defence staff for Sam Bockarie." He said, as far as he

12:41:34

15 was concerned, Sam Bockarie was field commander. And I said, "So  
16 if Mr Sankoh has said I should go and Sam Bockarie has said  
17 I should not go, how is this going to work?" And my colleague  
18 said, "No, Mr Sankoh is the leader. So what Mr Sankoh tells you,  
19 that's the truth. That's what you should do". And I said,

12:42:00

20 "Okay, that's the fact." And I went to Port Loko and I met  
21 Mr Sankoh there. When I got to Port Loko --

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please pause. The witness said at line  
23 19, of page 69, where the words "Sierra Leoneans" appears should  
24 be "CO Lawrence" instead of the words "Sierra Leoneans". That,  
12:42:21 25 of course, is because you all are speaking too fast, including  
26 you, Mr Interpreter.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Line 19 it should read "CO Lawrence, Morris Kallon and  
29 Augustine Gbao". So, Mr Sesay, you went to Port Loko and you met

1 Mr Sankoh there, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And slowly, what happened in Port Loko?

4 A. So I met Mr Sankoh at that time, he had come from Freetown  
12:42:59 5 together with Gibril Massaquoi, so I met him at the paramount  
6 chief's compound, because they had just arrived there when I got  
7 there myself, at the regent chief at that time. And I greeted  
8 him and he asked me, he said, "Oh, I thought you too were going  
9 to disobey my instructions because Bockarie has said he is not  
12:43:21 10 going to take orders from me any more." And he said, "I will not  
11 tolerate any of you who want to sabotage this peace process, so  
12 whosoever says we will not disarm under ECOMOG, except you would  
13 have to go your own way, but my RUF, I have said it's ECOMOG who  
14 will carry on with the disarmament." He said, "ECOMOG - I have  
12:43:46 15 accepted that ECOMOG was an enemy to the RUF, what Bockarie said.  
16 He said, "But the Lome Accord has changed the mandate of ECOMOG.  
17 Now the ECOMOG troops should be peacekeepers. For as long as  
18 their mandate has changed we should disarm under ECOMOG." And he  
19 said what Sam Bockarie was doing - as far as he knew he was the  
12:44:16 20 leader, so Sam Bockarie will see what he will do. And from there  
21 we went to Kambia.

22 We went to Kambia, Foday Sankoh addressed the fighters on  
23 one school compound at a field and at the time he was addressing  
24 the fighters he spoke to civilians later. From there we went  
12:44:39 25 back to Port Loko.

26 Q. And?

27 A. We returned to Port Loko and he, Mr Sankoh, was picked up  
28 by a helicopter and he went to Freetown and I drove back to  
29 Makeni. So this situation continued between him and Sam Bockarie

1 to a point that Foday Sankoh called me, asking me to report to  
2 Port Loko in the next two days and he said he was now moving to  
3 go and kick off the disarmament. That was then in December,  
4 early December. So he instructed Superman to assemble the men  
12:45:22 5 together with their commanders for them to move and that ECOMOG  
6 was coming to transport them.

7 Q. So he instructed Superman to assemble the men. Which men  
8 and where?

9 A. The RUF fighters in Lunsar. Superman assembled all the  
12:45:46 10 fighters in Lunsar, Mamusa, a town ahead of Lunsar going towards  
11 Gberi Junction. That was where they assembled.

12 Q. What's the name of that town going towards Gberi Junction?

13 A. Mamusa.

14 Q. How do you spell it, please?

12:46:07 15 A. M-A-M-U-S-A.

16 Q. And Gberi Junction is G-B-E-R-I-E. Is that right?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. So Superman was instructed to assemble the men. Did he so  
19 assemble them?

12:46:33 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And did what?

22 A. ECOMOG sent their personnel and their trucks that  
23 transported the RUF armed men to the DDR camp in Port Loko where  
24 they were disarmed. And they stayed in the DDR camp. Because  
12:46:55 25 Foday Sankoh himself was present, he was the first person who  
26 disarmed, the first RUF fighter, and he handed over the gun to  
27 ECOMOG and the disarmament continued for days before it ended.  
28 Because after the kickoff, after Foday Sankoh had kicked off the  
29 disarmament, he returned to Freetown and he told Superman to

1 continue --

2 Q. Continue what?

3 A. To continue the supervision of the disarmament of the men  
4 in Lunsar until ECOMOG completed their transportation, because it  
12:47:33 5 did not only take place for one day, it was for about two to  
6 three days. At any time ECOMOG transported them to the  
7 disarmament camp they will disarm. And it went on like that  
8 until they concluded the disarmament in Lunsar.

9 Q. And when was the disarmament in Lunsar concluded?

12:47:56 10 A. Well, it was the same week that it started. It was early  
11 December that the disarmament was concluded.

12 Q. Now, let's go back to our kicking off point which is Sam  
13 Bockarie's attitude. While this disarmament was going on in  
14 Lunsar, to its conclusion, did you have any contact with

12:48:20 15 Bockarie?

16 A. With Bockarie, no, because he had sent a radio message that  
17 I should not answer to Mr Sankoh's call and that I did not take  
18 his instructions. Since then he stopped speaking to me. So then  
19 the problem between him and Mr Sankoh continued. He would call  
12:48:43 20 Mr Sankoh's station and start blasting and sometimes whilst  
21 talking with Mr Sankoh they entered bitter arguments. So that  
22 went on and even at one time when Foday Sankoh's wife in Buedu.

23 Mohamed Tarawalli's wife in Buedu and some other people gathered  
24 and went to the radio to speak to Mr Sankoh to talk to Mr Sankoh  
12:49:14 25 for - to try and resolve the problem between him and Bockarie.

26 And Mr Sankoh said, "Oh, look, am I the one that you are supposed  
27 to talk to or is it Bockarie that you are supposed to talk to to  
28 apologise to me, not to chide me, because I'm the leader, I'm his  
29 father." So this situation continued for some time in Makeni so

1 Lawrence, Augustine Gbao, Morris Kallon, we decided that -  
2 I decided that I should send one of my bodyguards with a letter  
3 in a bid to advise Sam Bockarie for him to stop arguments with  
4 Mr Sankoh on the radio and that --

12:49:56 5 Q. And that what?

6 A. And that he, Sam Bockarie, should send people to Mr Sankoh  
7 in Freetown to apologise so that the whole matter could come to a  
8 rest. But when I sent my bodyguard with a bike, XL-125, from  
9 Makeni, he went. He went to Buedu. He presented the letter to

12:50:25 10 Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie read through the letter and he  
11 responded to the bearer who took the letter that, "Oh, Issa is my  
12 subordinate. Is Issa supposed to be telling me what I should  
13 do?" He said, "No. I will not heed to Issa's advice." So he  
14 threatened - so he threatened my security that I had sent. So  
12:50:45 15 the fellow too returned to Makeni and when I later decided also  
16 that, okay, if Bockarie has refused I'm still going to give you  
17 another letter and then the security said, "Oh, I'm afraid. I  
18 don't think I'll go back to Kailahun. I don't think I will go  
19 back to Buedu."

12:51:03 20 So it was then that Lawrence Womandia advised that the best  
21 thing that I have seen is that we too should go to Kailahun, meet  
22 Sam Bockarie and talk to him. And I said okay. I said that was  
23 a good idea. So I, Lawrence Womandia, Kallon, Lion, we left  
24 Makeni, we got to Kono, I sent a message that I should inform  
12:51:31 25 Bockarie that I was coming to see him, so if we would like it  
26 would be good for us to meet in Pendembu and then what Bockarie  
27 did, he sent a message to Bunumbu and asked the boys to set an  
28 ambush for me. That the commander in Bunumbu should set an  
29 ambush for me in front of me to kill me. So we drove and arrived

1 in Bunumbu but even before we arrived in Bunumbu, very close to  
2 Bunumbu, when we got to a certain place we saw people running in  
3 the bush and the bushes were shaking. But honestly --

4 Q. Pause a minute. We will come back to the narrative but  
12:52:08 5 I don't want to lose this point. How did you discover that  
6 Bockarie had given orders to set up an ambush for you in Bunumbu?

7 A. Well, it was when we arrived in Bunumbu that I knew that.

8 Q. Very well. And then you were going on to say you saw the  
9 bushes shaking but honestly what?

12:52:34 10 A. I said when we went very close to Bunumbu before crossing  
11 the bridge we saw that in some areas the bushes were shaking, but  
12 my mind did not run there. I only thought these were bush  
13 animals running in the bush.

14 Q. Go on.

12:52:48 15 A. So when we arrived in Bunumbu, as we alighted from the  
16 vehicles the commander in Bunumbu called Alpha Fatoma, Alambo.  
17 And then he came and met me and he said, "Oh," because the son  
18 that he had got with his wife was named after me.

19 Q. Pause. What was the name of the commander in Bunumbu?

12:53:15 20 A. Alpha Fatoma.

21 Q. So his son was named after you. Go on.

22 A. Yes. His son was named after me, so when we got to Bunumbu  
23 I saw some of the RUF running away from us, running away from us.  
24 So I asked - when he came and saluted me, I said, "Why are these  
12:53:42 25 men running away from us like this?"

26 Q. Go on.

27 A. And then he said, "My son, you are lucky. You have crossed  
28 through an ambush on that way. There is an ambush there for you  
29 but I refused to go there because it wouldn't have been good for

1 me to kill my own son." He said, "Your brother sent an  
2 instruction to me for me to set an ambush in order to kill you."

3 Q. So what happened after that?

12:54:15

4 A. And I said, "Oh, you see, Mr Lawrence, you see the kind of  
5 situation? You see the kind of things Bockarie is doing?" And  
6 I said, "I am not going to continue from here." I said, "I'm  
7 going to return."

8 Q. Pause there. Line 9, "I said oh, you see", not Mr Lawyer.  
9 Mr Lawrence, thanks.

12:54:35

10 JUDGE DOHERTY: Before I lose sight of this, the witness  
11 referred to Lawrence Womandia, the Lion and someone else going.  
12 Who was the Lion?

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Who was the Lion?

12:54:52

15 A. Lion was one of my colleague vanguards and then Morris  
16 Kallon.

17 Q. Thank you. Now, so you said I'm going to return to where?

18 A. I said I was returning to Makeni. And then Lawrence said  
19 yes. He said this situation was going out of hand, so we

12:55:16

20 shouldn't go further. And then I said okay. So we turned the  
21 vehicles and I told Alambo goodbye and we drove ten miles off to  
22 Bandajuma and I said it is better for us to get to Bandajuma  
23 Yawea.

24 Q. Who did you tell goodbye?

12:55:40

25 A. I told Alpha Fatoma who is alias Alambo.

26 Q. How do you spell Alambo?

27 A. A-L-A-M-B-O.

28 Q. So you told him goodbye, turned the vehicles round and  
29 drove ten miles off to where?



1 A. It was a town called Bandajuma Yawea, because I was with my  
2 radio set so I told the operator to put on the radio so that we  
3 would be able to inform Mr Sankoh in Freetown what had happened.

4 Q. Bandajuma what is it called?

12:56:29 5 A. Yawea.

6 Q. How do you spell Yawea?

7 A. I think it's Y-A-W-E-A or Y-A-W-W-E-A.

8 Q. And so you decided to pause there to contact Mr Sankoh in  
9 Freetown. Did you contact Foday Sankoh?

12:56:58 10 A. Yes. Just as my operator assembled the radio, and he put  
11 the radio on, whilst he was calling Mr Sankoh's station it was  
12 then that Sam Bockarie's radio operator called - intercepted and  
13 called, and that was Daf and when Daf called he said Bockarie  
14 wanted to speak to me. So the operator then said that Bockarie

12:57:27 15 wanted to talk to me. So as he, Bockarie, came on the mic, he  
16 said you, he - he insulted me at first and he said, "I do not  
17 blame you." He said, "It's because Alambo and others - it's  
18 because Alambo and others did not execute my instruction." He  
19 said, "By now you would have been a dead man."

12:57:50 20 Q. What else was said by him, if anything?

21 A. Yes. He said, "It's because Alambo and others did not  
22 implement my orders." He said by now I would have been a dead  
23 man. A dead man. He said, he told me that I should not follow  
24 Foday Sankoh to go by his instruction, ECOMOG would arrest all of  
12:58:11 25 us, and he said he would never disarm to ECOMOG so I too - we  
26 insulted each other on the radio and then I told the radio - the  
27 radio operator to shut off the radio. And then we moved and went  
28 to Kono and when I got to Kono that was when I sent a message to  
29 Mr Sankoh.

1 Q. What did the message say that you sent to Mr Sankoh?

2 A. Well, I explained what our decision was for us to go and  
3 talk to Sam Bockarie and the response of Sam Bockarie to us.

4 That was what I explained to Mr Sankoh on the radio and Mr Sankoh

12:58:50 5 too said, "Okay, if that is the case, just leave him alone, come  
6 back to where you were." And then I also moved and went to

7 Makeni. And from that point, Sam Bockarie had to send - he sent  
8 some RUF groups from across the Moa River, and those were CO Big  
9 Daddy and - CO Big Daddy, Amara Ambush, he sent about 80 armed

12:59:27 10 men across the Moa River, for them to come to Gegbwema and disarm  
11 Momoh Rogers and arrest him because Momoh Rogers too was not  
12 cooperating with him, Sam Bockarie.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Momoh Rogers, Rogers is the missing word.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is it possible to have a time frame for

12:59:51 15 some of these events, please?

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Mr Sesay?

18 A. Well, these events started in late November and it  
19 continued up until mid-December when Sam Bockarie resigned from  
13:00:14 20 the RUF and went away.

21 Q. Thank you for that, but I want to pick up the narrative  
22 where Bockarie had sent CO Big Daddy, Amara Ambush, with some 80  
23 armed men across the Moa River for them to come to arrest Momoh  
24 Rogers. Pick it up from there, please.

13:00:40 25 A. Yes. He sent 80 armed men, including Big Daddy and all the  
26 officers, to come and disarm and arrest Momoh Rogers, and disarm  
27 the men in Segbwema, so that they will take over command in  
28 Segbwema. So when they came, Momoh Rogers played on them and he  
29 was able to arrest and disarm all of them, so he too disarmed and

1 arrested and detained them, and so he presented this message to  
2 Mr Sankoh, and Mr Sankoh told me to go to Kailahun and try - for  
3 us to try and put the situation under control. So I too  
4 travelled.

13:01:26 5 Q. To where?

6 A. From Makeni to Kono, and then to Segbwema, and then from  
7 Segbwema I came to Daru where I met the Nigerians, the ECOMOG,  
8 from which Colonel Vincent was the battalion commander. So  
9 I spoke with him, and he too explained to me that the

13:01:52 10 developments that was going on within the RUF was sending a very  
11 bad signal.

12 Q. Pause. It was Colonel Vincent, was it not?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. The ECOMOG commander at Daru. And is that V-I-N-C-E-N-T?

13:02:10 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Grateful. So Colonel Vincent said "it's sending a very bad  
17 signal for the RUF." Go on?

18 A. Yes, because I travelled with Kallon. We were the ones who  
19 met him in Daru. And he asked me, he said, "We have heard what  
13:02:32 20 happened in Segbwema. And we heard what was occurring between  
21 Bockarie and Mr Sankoh", and he said, "This was a very bad signal  
22 that we were sending to the world, that the RUF was not committed  
23 to the peace process." And then he said "they were in  
24 support of" --

13:02:50 25 Q. Of what?

26 A. Of - he said "they were in support of those of us who were  
27 showing interest in the peace, and that Sam Bockarie who did not  
28 want peace, that would be his own business", but he said they  
29 were going to support those of us who wanted peace. So he served

1 us lunch, we took lunch together with him, and from there, he  
2 provided fuel for me to be put in my vehicle for me to continue  
3 my journey to Pendembu. So, upon arrival in Pendembu, myself and  
4 Kallon, we then heard that Sam Bockarie had sent messages to all  
13:03:32 5 station that is he was no longer a member of the RUF and that he  
6 had left Buedu, he had moved over to Liberia, together with  
7 bodyguards and his family members. So we passed the night in  
8 Pendembu that evening, and the following day we continued to  
9 Kailahun Town and we went to Buedu, and before we could reach  
13:03:51 10 there he had gone to Liberia. It was only the men whom he had  
11 arrested and tortured that I met, including Kposowa and Daf,  
12 because he had arrested Daf.

13 Q. Including Kposowa and Daf. How do you spell Kposowa?

14 A. K-P-O-S-O-W-A.

13:04:15 15 Q. And what had happened to Kposowa and Daf?

16 A. No, nothing happened to Kposowa, because Kposowa had just  
17 arrived there, because all along he had not been within the RUF  
18 zone, so he had just arrived, so I met him, Prince Taylor and  
19 some other people.

13:04:36 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, who had moved over to Liberia  
21 together with his bodyguards?

22 THE WITNESS: Sam Bockarie, ma'am.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. And from where had Kposowa just arrived?

13:04:51 25 A. Well, Kposowa arrived in October 1999, two days before  
26 I departed Makeni, when he came and rejoined the RUF; because,  
27 since 1996, when Mr Sankoh sent him out he had not been part of  
28 the RUF since then, up to that time, in October 1999.

29 Q. So where had he been up until October 1999 from 1996?

1 A. Kposowa used to be the general adjutant and he and  
2 Mr Sankoh had travelled to Abidjan. So around October,  
3 September, to October, 1999, Mr Sankoh sent him to buy some  
4 ammunition in Monrovia from the ECOMOG. That he would have been  
13:05:47 5 able to pay the ECOMOG to transfer the ammunition to the Sierra  
6 Leone/Liberian border. So when he came, I was able to understand  
7 from Mr Sankoh, or from him also that, the money was seized from  
8 him from ECOMOG. That was why he did not return back to join  
9 Mr Sankoh, so he stayed in Monrovia up until this time in October  
13:06:11 10 1999 when he came back to rejoin the RUF in Kailahun.

11 Q. Thank you. So had anything been done to Daf?

12 A. Yes. Sam Bockarie arrested Daf and Junior Vandi because  
13 they were with Mr Sankoh in Lome and Sam Bockarie arrested them,  
14 that the things that he was planning in Buedu during the  
13:06:40 15 confusion that he had with Mr Sankoh, he said it was Daf and  
16 Junior Vandi who were sending information to Mr Sankoh's radio in  
17 Freetown. So he arrested them, he tied them, they flogged them  
18 seriously, and they were - they were put into cell rooms at the  
19 MP detention. So they were there but the day Sam Bockarie left  
13:07:02 20 to go to Liberia, because the MP too went with Sam Bockarie, so  
21 the MPs had to release them. But they were seriously - because  
22 when we met them, they could not even walk on their own.

23 Q. Pause. Who went with Bockarie into Liberia?

24 A. His bodyguards, the man who operated his satellite phone,  
13:07:43 25 that was Martin Koker and the MP commander, Kaisuku, they were  
26 the ones who went with Sam Bockarie to Liberia, together with his  
27 family.

28 Q. Let's just get a couple of spellings, please. Who was it  
29 who operated Bockarie's satellite phone?

- 1 A. Martin Koker.
- 2 Q. Martin M-A-R-T-I-N, Koker, K-O-K-E-R; is that correct?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. And is MP commander - what's his name?
- 13:08:22 5 A. Kai suku.
- 6 Q. How do you spell Kai?
- 7 A. K-A-I.
- 8 Q. How do you spell Suku?
- 9 A. S-U-K-U.
- 13:08:31 10 Q. And when you say that his bodyguards accompanied him, how  
11 many bodyguards?
- 12 A. Well, maybe there were up to 30 to 35.
- 13 Q. And did members of Bockarie's family accompany him into  
14 Liberia?
- 13:08:55 15 A. Yes, his mother went, his wife and children.
- 16 Q. By what means did they travel to Liberia?
- 17 A. Well, they used vehicles, because there were some trucks in  
18 Buedu that Sam Bockarie had retreated with from Kenema in  
19 February 1998. So they used those vehicles, they went through  
13:09:24 20 Dawa, Foya Tinkia and then they went to Foya in Liberia.
- 21 Q. They went through where?
- 22 A. They went through Dawa, that is the border between Sierra  
23 Leone and Liberia, and they crossed.
- 24 Q. Pause. Dawa, how do you spell it?
- 13:09:43 25 A. D-A-W-A.
- 26 Q. And they went somewhere else, you told us, ending in  
27 Tinkia?
- 28 A. Foya Tinkia, because that is the first village after the  
29 Liberian side.

1 Q. So Foya Tinkia?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So Tinkia, is it spelt T-I-N-K-I-A?

4 A. Yes.

13:10:06 5 Q. And next this: Bockarie and his group who left for  
6 Liberia, can you assist us as to whether they were armed or not  
7 when they left?

8 A. Well, when they left Buedu, the bodyguards had arms.

9 Q. How do you know that?

13:10:33 10 A. Because when we arrived in Buedu, I asked, I spoke to the  
11 people whom we met. They were the ones who told me that those  
12 people had gone, he said the bodyguards had gone with Sam  
13 Bockarie.

14 Q. And were you able to ascertain whether or not Bockarie had  
13:10:56 15 received permission to enter Liberia with armed men?

16 A. Well, I did not know at that time because at this time  
17 I was not speaking to Bockarie, but what I know is that no sooner  
18 Bockarie crossed the border they closed the border, because the  
19 man I sent, soon as they could be able to speak to some of the  
13:11:24 20 bodyguards to return, or even the MP commander, telling them that  
21 I did not have anything against them, Kaisuku, the Liberian  
22 securities arrested him and gave him serious beating, and they  
23 said that their border was now closed and that nobody was allowed  
24 to cross that border.

13:11:44 25 Q. I just want to be sure that I understand what you're  
26 telling us. So having arrived in Buedu, discovering two  
27 seriously injured men, you sent someone to the border with  
28 Liberia, did you?

29 A. Yes. I sent Momoh Rogers, because all of us travelled from

1 Segbwema.

2 Q. And what happened when Momoh Rogers arrived at the Liberian  
3 border?

4 A. Well, I sent him, for him to go and tell Kaisuku to come  
13:12:26 5 back, because we understood they were still at the borderline.  
6 So, when they went and met Kaisuku, he said Kaisuku and the  
7 bodyguards, who were with Sam Bockarie, we had nothing against  
8 them. As far as we knew them, we knew that they were RUF  
9 personnel, they should come back. But he said the Liberian  
13:12:44 10 securities arrested Momoh Rogers and he was given a serious  
11 beating. And when he came back, in fact he was sent to Freetown.  
12 He was admitted there. He was there taking treatment with  
13 Mr Sankoh. He was --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, that last bit was not clear  
13:12:59 15 to the interpreters.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. He was there receiving treatment with Mr Sankoh, yes?

18 A. I said Momoh Rogers, since then he was now in Freetown,  
19 taking treatment staying with Mr Sankoh in Freetown, until the  
13:13:13 20 time for the May incident in Freetown when he was arrested and he  
21 was sent to prison to Pademba Road.

22 Q. And who was it who arrested and beat Momoh Rogers?

23 A. He said those were the Liberian border guards, the  
24 securities at the border.

13:13:33 25 Q. And did the border remain open thereafter?

26 A. No. The border remained closed. It remained closed until  
27 - until - until May 2000. And it was only one person who crossed  
28 that border as far as I know, but there was no movement from  
29 mid-December to May 2000. It was only Ibrahim Bah who crossed



1 that border at one time.

2 Q. And when was it that Ibrahim Bah crossed that border?

3 A. Well, it was just few days after this incident and that was  
4 in December that he came from Liberia with - because he came from  
13:14:38 5 Liberia just few days after this incident of Bockarie's going in  
6 December 1999, because --

7 Q. Go on.

8 A. When Sam Bockarie went to Liberia, he went to Monrovia,  
9 Mr Sankoh too left Freetown and went to Monrovia. When he came  
13:15:03 10 back he told us, because from Monrovia a UN helicopter flew him  
11 to Pendembu where he met us.

12 Q. Pause. I'm losing track of this and this is important  
13 testimony so I want it to be clear. "When Sam Bockarie went to  
14 Liberia, he went to Monrovia, Mr Sankoh too left Freetown and  
13:15:30 15 went to Monrovia." How soon after Bockarie left and entered  
16 Liberia did Sankoh himself go to Monrovia?

17 A. Well, it was about three days in between when Sam Bockarie  
18 left that Mr Sankoh too went because the situation was alarming,  
19 Bockarie used to talk over the BBC and at the same time Mr Sankoh  
13:15:59 20 too, interviews were conducted with him, asking him about what  
21 the problems were they were encountering, so the matter became  
22 alarming.

23 Q. Pause. I want you to hold that thought about the BBC and  
24 its use by Bockarie, but I want to clarify something else before  
13:16:21 25 we come back to that. What I want to clarify is this: The  
26 answer containing the matter about which I seek clarification was  
27 to this effect: "When Sam Bockarie went to Liberia, he went to  
28 Monrovia, Mr Sankoh too left Freetown and went to Monrovia." We  
29 now know that's about three days later. "When he came back",

1 when who came back?

2 A. When Mr Sankoh came to Kailahun, Pendembu, with a United  
3 Nations helicopter. It was a UN helicopter that dropped him in  
4 Pendembu.

13:17:07 5 Q. From where?

6 A. From Monrovia.

7 Q. Thank you. Now, before we lose sight of it, what you told  
8 us about Bockarie being on the BBC, where was it that that was  
9 taking place?

13:17:24 10 A. Well, he spoke on the BBC whilst he was in Buedu before he  
11 left. And even Mr Sankoh spoke on the network when Robin White  
12 interviewed him about the problem because I will never forget  
13 what Mr Sankoh said that day because he spoke until at the end of  
14 the day he ended up speaking Krio. He said Bockarie was a child

13:17:52 15 and a child was a child. So when Bockarie went to Monrovia, that  
16 was the time Mr Sankoh went there. And when Mr Sankoh came to  
17 Pendembu he later made us to understand that when he went to  
18 Monrovia, he had a meeting between him, Obasanjo, the President  
19 of Nigeria, and President Taylor of Liberia saying: Being that  
13:18:19 20 Sam Bockarie was now becoming an obstacle to the peace process  
21 they said that they would prefer that Sam Bockarie stays in  
22 Monrovia, Liberia, for that moment whilst Mr Sankoh carries on  
23 with the peace programme in Sierra Leone. That was what  
24 Mr Sankoh told me and the others who were in Pendembu with me.

13:18:36 25 Q. Pause. I want to go back to what Bockarie was saying on  
26 the radio. You've told us about the broadcasts involving  
27 Mr Sankoh which you recollect because at the end he started  
28 speaking in Krio. But what was Bockarie saying on the radio at  
29 about this time?

1 A. Well, Bockarie said he had never come across someone as  
2 ungrateful as Mr Sankoh. He said he has stayed, he had  
3 maintained the RUF in Mr Sankoh's absence, he had led the RUF and  
4 when Mr Sankoh was not there he was able to capture large areas  
13:19:19 5 from ECOMOG when Mr Sankoh was not there, he defeated ECOMOG in  
6 the Makeni area too and when Mr Sankoh has now returned he does  
7 not want to listen to him.

8 Q. Stop and let's start again because I want this. He said he  
9 has maintained the RUF in Mr Sankoh's absence. Just slowly,  
13:19:40 10 please, Mr Sesay. As best you can recall, in bite-sized chunks,  
11 give us that account again, please.

12 A. I said Sam Bockarie was saying that when Mr Sankoh was  
13 arrested in Nigeria he was the one who had been leading the RUF,  
14 he fought off the ECOMOG and when he had achieved and done a very  
13:20:12 15 good work and he had flushed the ECOMOG from Kono right up to  
16 Makeni, and he had made Mr Sankoh to be released from prison, now  
17 that Mr Sankoh has returned he didn't want to listen to him and  
18 that he had never seen anybody as ungrateful as Mr Sankoh. He  
19 said Foday Sankoh was the most ungrateful man on earth. So those  
13:20:34 20 were the things he said on radio.

21 Q. And pausing, we will pick up the account in due course, but  
22 just pausing to analyse this a little further, what impact were  
23 these words from Bockarie having on the rank and file RUF members  
24 in Sierra Leone?

13:20:59 25 A. Well, it had an impact because - it had an impact because  
26 everybody saw the way Bockarie ran the RUF and the way he was  
27 bragging that he will never surrender to anybody; nobody would  
28 ever disarm him until Mr Sankoh was released from prison. So for  
29 loyalty he was indeed loyal. So that had an impact and some

1 people had started buying his story. RUF combatants, some of  
2 them were buying his story. That was why he was able to mobilise  
3 a task force. So if they were able to get Segbwema that would  
4 have been a very serious problem.

13:21:48 5 Q. Mobilise which task force?

6 A. He mobilised RUF fighters that were to come and take  
7 command in Segbwema because they had started buying Sam  
8 Bockarie's idea that Mr Sankoh was an ungrateful man. And even  
9 in Kono there were mixed feelings now, and even in Tongo Field,  
10 saying that if Bockarie was talking to Mr Sankoh and Mr Sankoh  
11 refused to listen, who else would Mr Sankoh listen to? So that  
12 had an impact.

13 Q. Pause there. From your standpoint, Mr Sesay, as a senior  
14 commander in the RUF, and as someone who was following  
15 Mr Sankoh's order to disarm and give peace a chance, help us.  
16 Did you consider that Bockarie's behaviour at this time posed a  
17 threat to the Lome Peace Agreement?

18 A. Yes. I considered it that way. Yes, I considered it,  
19 because he had said the ECOMOG should not disarm us and at that  
20 time where the RUF controlled it was - it was ECOMOG that was  
21 there and the United Nations peacekeepers were not there, there  
22 were only military observers. So if we had listened to what  
23 Mr Sankoh said even the problem of UN wouldn't have come up. It  
24 was ECOMOG who would have done the disarmament of the RUF in  
25 Sierra Leone.

13:23:37 26 Q. Now you mentioned that when Foday Sankoh returned by UN  
27 helicopter from Monrovia he went to where in Sierra Leone?

28 A. Pendembu. He met us there. Kailahun District.

29 Q. And he told you - he gave you an account of a meeting that

1 he had had with whom in Monrovia?

2 A. He explained to me and Kallon, those of us who were there,  
3 together with Akim, because he came together with Akim but he  
4 came by road. When he came he said he went to Monrovia and they  
13:24:33 5 had a meeting about Sam Bockarie's issue and that himself,  
6 President Taylor, President Obasanjo of Nigeria attended that  
7 meeting and they decided that, because Sam Bockarie was an  
8 obstacle in respect of the Lome Peace Accord, Sam Bockarie should  
9 stay in Liberia and Foday Sankoh should implement the peace  
13:24:58 10 process, that Foday Sankoh should go and head the RUF and carry  
11 on with the peace process.

12 Q. When Foday Sankoh was in Monrovia for that meeting with  
13 President Taylor and President Obasanjo, where was Bockarie?

14 A. Bockarie was in Monrovia now at that time.

13:25:25 15 Q. During that visit to Monrovia by Sankoh, did Sankoh meet  
16 with Bockarie?

17 A. Mr Sankoh said they were all in the meeting, that he  
18 himself attended the meeting, that is Bockarie, Foday Sankoh,  
19 Obasanjo and President Taylor, when they decided that Bockarie  
13:25:50 20 should stay in Liberia and Mr Sankoh should implement the peace  
21 process.

22 Q. And just to be clear, Mr Sesay, because these are extremely  
23 important matters, who made the decision that Bockarie should  
24 stay in Liberia?

13:26:15 25 A. Well, according to Mr Sankoh, he said it was Obasanjo  
26 because they were the guarantors to the Lome Accord. Mr Taylor  
27 was a guarantor, Obasanjo himself was a guarantor. He said it  
28 was the guarantors who decided that Sam Bockarie was to stay in  
29 Liberia so that Mr Sankoh would implement the Lome Peace Accord.

1 Q. Help us, who were the guarantors to the Lome Peace Accord?

2 A. The ECOWAS Leaders, like President Obasanjo and  
3 President Taylor, President Blaise Compaore, representatives from  
4 the Ghanaian government. The ECOWAS people, they were the  
13:27:14 5 guarantors. I cannot name all of them now.

6 Q. And at the time that Foday Sankoh told you that this  
7 decision had been made by, amongst others, himself, Obasanjo and  
8 President Taylor, did Foday Sankoh tell you to keep that fact  
9 secret?

13:27:45 10 A. No. It was not a secret. He said it. It was not a  
11 secret.

12 Q. Was it public knowledge within the RUF that it was a joint  
13 decision involving more than one individual that Bockarie should  
14 stay in Liberia?

13:28:12 15 A. Yes. Foday Sankoh used to say it. It was not a secret.

16 Q. So help me. Was it the case that this decision for  
17 Bockarie to stay in Liberia was made by Charles Taylor alone?

18 MR KOUJIAN: The last series of questions have been  
19 leading and suggestive.

13:28:37 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think this question is pertinent. This  
21 is a Prosecution position that should be put to this witness.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. This Prosecution say --

24 MR KOUJIAN: Your Honour, the Prosecution position is that  
13:28:53 25 Charles Taylor is the sovereign leader of Liberia.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Koumjian, just let the question be put  
27 as counsel has said he's going to put it.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Was the decision for Sam Bockarie to go to Liberia made by

1 Charles Taylor alone, as alleged by this Prosecution?

2 A. No. It was not Charles Taylor's singular decision.

3 Obasanjo was involved in the decision for Bockarie to stay in  
4 Monrovia, including Mr Sankoh.

13:29:34 5 Q. Help me: Did Bockarie go to Liberia, as far as you know,  
6 at the invitation of Charles Taylor?

7 A. No. Bockarie went there - he was not invited by Charles  
8 Taylor. He went to Liberia because, one, he had been challenging  
9 Mr Sankoh, and, two, he had sent men to disarm the commander and

13:30:03 10 arrest the commander, the commander was arrested, the men there  
11 did that. So he knew that what he had been doing was a bad

12 thing. So that's why he resigned and went to Liberia to seek  
13 refuge, because he knew at that time if we arrested him, we were

14 to discipline him on Mr Sankoh's instructions, because he himself

13:30:25 15 knew that the words that he had been telling Mr Sankoh right up  
16 to this time, he knew he was going to face disciplinary action.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I notice the time.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. I just wanted to know, what time  
19 was this that Bockarie crossed? Has the witness told us that?

13:30:45 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Can you help us with a date, Mr Sesay, as to when Sam  
22 Bockarie crossed into Liberia?

23 A. My Lord, it was mid-December, but I cannot be specific now  
24 about a date.

13:31:04 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Koumjian, we will take  
26 your comment after the luncheon break, Mr Koumjian, and we will  
27 break now and reconvene at half past 2.

28 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

29 [Upon resuming at 2.32 p.m.]

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Please continue,  
2 Mr Griffiths.

3           Of course I note a change of appearance, Mr Koumjian.

4           MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honours, Brenda J Hollis has left us.

14:32:43 5           I think as we broke I just had one comment or observation.  
6 The witness has not given us a date or time frame for the meeting  
7 with Obasanjo. That would be helpful.

8           MR GRIFFITHS: Madam President, can I first of all announce  
9 a change of appearance? Mr Munyard is no longer with us.

14:33:06 10           I will deal with my learned friend's query, let me just  
11 make a note of that. So that's a meeting with Obasanjo, time.

12           PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, was Mr Munyard with you?

13           MR GRIFFITHS: He was with us this morning.

14           PRESIDING JUDGE: I do beg your pardon. Perhaps he was  
14:33:28 15 sitting in your vision line.

16           MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, he was behind me.

17           Madam President, the other matter that I would like to  
18 raise with you is this - and I raise it in light of the  
19 difficulties all parties have had in ensuring a clear and  
14:33:49 20 accurate translation and transcription of this witness's  
21 evidence. I enquired through the court managers during the  
22 luncheon adjournment whether it was possible to display the  
23 transcript in front of the witness, because it may be that if the  
24 witness can see where, for example, aspects of his evidence have  
14:34:14 25 not been transcribed, it may assist him in pacing his delivery to  
26 the courtroom.

27           Now, I appreciate that there could potentially be some  
28 difficulties with that, which is why I raise it at this stage, so  
29 that everyone can consider it, because, for one, it may be



1     distracting to the witness and, for two, there may well be an  
2     objection from those opposite on the basis that it would give the  
3     witness an opportunity to correct aspects of his evidence where  
4     he can see the transcript of it. There are those practical  
14:34:54 5     issues, but I offer it as a suggestion in the hope that it might  
6     be of assistance to all parties ensuring greater accuracy with  
7     the transcript.

8             PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Koumjian, before your clarification is  
9     addressed, what is your response to the request?

14:35:15 10            MR KOUMJIAN: I think we are willing to try it, at least  
11     during the direct examination, and see how it goes, if your  
12     Honours are.

13            PRESIDING JUDGE: We are of the view on the Bench that it  
14     is not a good idea for the witness to see what he is saying on  
14:37:48 15     the transcript for two reasons: One, we think it is a  
16     distraction for him; and, two, we think that it can aid him in  
17     either correcting himself or whatever, which we do not think is  
18     really right or regular.

19            However, having said that, Mr Sesay, the issue we are  
14:38:16 20     dealing with now, we are discussing and considering, relates to  
21     the speed at which your testimony is being given. That speed is  
22     affecting - or let me say the speed at which you speak,  
23     naturally, it is affecting the way the interpreters are able to  
24     interpret; it is affecting it adversely. It is affecting  
14:38:41 25     adversely the speed and accuracy of the court transcribers. And  
26     ultimately, it affects the quality of the evidence that you are  
27     giving. Counsellor Griffiths has tried very hard to keep you  
28     going but at the same time to keep the record accurate, and I  
29     think he has come to the end of himself in trying.

1 Now he was suggesting that we let you look at the  
2 transcript, but, as judges, we cannot allow this to be, thinking  
3 perhaps that it might help you if you saw the gaps, to slow down  
4 by yourself, but we think that is going to distract you and also  
14:39:23 5 it is not good for a witness who is testifying naturally and  
6 spontaneously to be able to read what he is saying and maybe to  
7 review the ideas.

8 So I am going to ask you one more time, for you to make an  
9 extra effort to slow down. If you hear how I am speaking and you  
14:39:42 10 hear how Counsellor Griffiths is speaking, and in your mind you  
11 know that there is an interpreter somewhere who is running,  
12 trying to keep up with you to interpret every word you say, you  
13 can slow down. So please, I am going to ask you, we are going to  
14 continue as we have been doing, but to try and slow down, having  
14:40:04 15 in mind that there is an interpreter, on the one hand, and a  
16 court reporter, on the other, who are trying to keep up with what  
17 you're saying. And your evidence is important. So it needs to  
18 be accurately reflected, because even if they replay the tape  
19 again to try and hear what you said, if it is too fast, it won't  
14:40:23 20 help, we will have missed it, and everything will have been in  
21 vain. So it is important for you, please, to slow down.

22 Now, Mr Griffiths, perhaps you can address the date.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes. I am going to address the date with  
24 the witness now:

14:40:39 25 Q. Mr Sesay, nobody is being critical, but it is essential  
26 that you do - that everything you do say, because it is so  
27 important, is accurately recorded, all right? So I hope you  
28 don't take offence when I am constantly interrupting you. Okay.

29 Now, going back to a question raised by Mr Koumjian, you

1 mentioned before we broke for lunch, Mr Sesay, that Foday Sankoh  
2 told you, when he arrived in Pendembu by helicopter, that there  
3 had been a meeting involving President Obasanjo and Taylor and  
4 himself and Bockarie, at which it was decided that Bockarie  
14:41:27 5 should stay in Monrovia. Can you help us as to when that meeting  
6 took place?

7 A. Well, I wouldn't know the exact date but if you want the  
8 time frame, the time when Foday Sankoh moved from Freetown to  
9 Monrovia, Sam Bockarie left mid-December 1999 and within three  
14:42:00 10 days Foday Sankoh travelled from Freetown to Monrovia. When  
11 Foday Sankoh got to Monrovia he passed the night in Monrovia for  
12 a night and the following afternoon towards the evening he came  
13 to Pendembu in a helicopter and he said when he got to Monrovia  
14 the very day they held that meeting for Sam Bockarie to stay in  
14:42:33 15 Monrovia, Liberia, and it was the following day that Foday Sankoh  
16 travelled to us in Pendembu. So the day he left Freetown was the  
17 day he attended that meeting and after that it was the following  
18 day that he came to Pendembu to meet us. I couldn't tell you the  
19 exact date now, but the way I look at it, it's between - because  
14:42:53 20 Sam Bockarie left around 14 or 15 December, so this could be  
21 around the 15th towards the 19th of December, around that time,  
22 because it was around those dates that Mr Sankoh met us in  
23 Pendembu.

24 Q. Now after that visit by Sankoh by helicopter to Pendembu  
14:43:23 25 where did Sankoh go?

26 A. When he met us in Pendembu?

27 Q. After that.

28 A. Well, after Pendembu he returned to Freetown because he was  
29 in Pendembu for two days and the helicopter picked him up again

1 and took him to Freetown, the UNAMSIL helicopter. But before  
2 Foday Sankoh travelled to Freetown, when he left Monrovia,  
3 because he was together with CSO Akim, they left for Monrovia  
4 when they attended a meeting and he came.

14:44:11 5 But the very day he arrived in Pendembu that afternoon it  
6 was the very evening that a truck came. That truck was brought  
7 by General Ibrahim. General Ibrahim, Akim and two white men,  
8 they were called Michel and Louis. But these white men, I had  
9 known them before that time and they met with Mr Sankoh in  
14:44:40 10 Monrovia. Then Ibrahim introduced them to Mr Sankoh and they  
11 came together with General Ibrahim for them to join me to go to  
12 Kono. So when we got to Pendembu with the truck that had mining  
13 equipment, like pumping machine, like shakers, these - we have  
14 machines, this was mining equipment. That night Mr Sankoh called  
14:45:16 15 me and Ibrahim Bah was there together with these two white  
16 people, they had come from Belgium, and Akim. And Mr Sankoh told  
17 me that while are you going to Kono the following day I should  
18 drop those guys in Kono because Akim was going there.

19 Q. Pause there. I think we have got a wrong translation  
14:45:48 20 there. The witness actually said, "Whilst you are going to  
21 Makeni the following day, I should drop these guys in Kono." Is  
22 that what you said, Mr Sesay?

23 A. That is what I said, yes.

24 Q. Thank you.

14:46:04 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Who was this other person he was supposed  
26 to go with them. You said he called me and something was there  
27 to go with these two white people.

28 THE WITNESS: That is Akim Turay. He was the CSO to  
29 Mr Sankoh.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Now I just want to clarify one or two details about that,  
3 okay, because you have given us a lot of information there. And  
4 initially I want to ask you about timing. You tell us that  
14:46:45 5 Sankoh left from Freetown to go to Monrovia. Is that right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And the meeting which Sankoh attended which and Sankoh  
8 attended with Obasanjo and Taylor took place on the same day he  
9 arrived from Freetown. Is that right?

14:47:07 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. He spends the night in Monrovia. Is that right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. He arrives in Pendembu the afternoon of the following day?

14 A. Yes.

14:47:25 15 Q. The evening of that same day when he arrived, is that when  
16 the truck arrived with Ibrahim Bah and the two white men?

17 A. Yes. Late in the evening by 7 p.m. That was when the  
18 truck arrived in Pendembu.

19 Q. Had Sankoh met Ibrahim Bah and these two white men in  
14:47:50 20 Monrovia when he was there for that meeting with Obasanjo and  
21 Taylor?

22 A. Yes, because he met them in Monrovia so that's where  
23 Mr Sankoh saw these men. That's why he - because he travelled  
24 with Akim from Freetown to Monrovia, so it was Mr Sankoh who said  
14:48:14 25 that Akim and Ibrahim Bah use the civilian truck that Ibrahim Bah  
26 and others had hired to come to Kailahun. So Akim came with them  
27 with the truck and Mr Sankoh used the helicopter.

28 Q. And then was it the next day that you took these people to  
29 Kono?

1 A. Yes, it was the next day when they arrived in Pendembu.

2 Q. What was loaded on that truck?

3 A. I said there were mining equipments, like milling machines,  
4 shakers for plants and shovels, pick axes, they were the ones in  
14:49:05 5 the truck.

6 Q. And another detail which I want to clarify at this stage so  
7 we don't have to revisit it later: Had you met these two men  
8 before, Michel and Louis?

9 A. Yes, Ibrahim Bah had brought them around June/July.

14:49:31 10 Q. Of which year?

11 A. Of 1999, when they started doing business with Sam  
12 Bockarie. Those are the same men that Ibrahim Bah had brought  
13 and introduced them to Sankoh in Monrovia when they brought them.

14 Q. And to where did Ibrahim Bah bring them in June/July of  
14:49:53 15 1999?

16 A. Those are not the - it was not the mining equipment that  
17 they had brought. It was the diggers that he had brought in July  
18 - the diamond dealers that he brought in June/July 1999, that is  
19 Michel and Louis.

14:50:15 20 Q. It's my fault, Mr Sesay, and it's therefore my  
21 responsibility to clear it up. You first met these two men in  
22 June/July of 1999. Is that correct?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. Where?

14:50:34 25 A. Ibrahim Bah brought them to Buedu to Sam Bockarie.

26 Q. Was that the first time you had seen them?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. On that occasion when they came did they bring anything  
29 with them?

1 A. Yes. They transacted business with Bockarie on that first  
2 occasion.

3 Q. But did they bring any mining equipment with them on that  
4 occasion?

14:51:07 5 A. No.

6 Q. So when was the first time that they brought shovels,  
7 bailers and the like?

8 A. That was in December 1999 at that time when they came with  
9 Mr Sankoh.

14:51:27 10 Q. As far as you were aware, Mr Sesay, where had Bockarie  
11 first encountered these men, Louis and Michel?

12 A. He had first known them in Buedu when Ibrahim Bah brought  
13 them.

14 Q. How did it come about that you met these men in June/July  
14:52:03 15 of 1999?

16 A. It was when General Ibrahim Bah brought them to Sam  
17 Bockarie. At the same time I was in Buedu myself, so that was  
18 the time I knew them.

19 Q. Now when the men arrive in December with a truckload of  
14:52:28 20 mining equipment, was there any attempt made in Pendembu to  
21 disguise the fact that they were there or what they were carrying  
22 with them?

23 A. No, no. They did not disguise anything. It was the leader  
24 who said the men should come with the men, so there was nobody to  
14:53:04 25 hide from.

26 Q. And help us: When the truck arrived was it common  
27 knowledge that the truck bearing that equipment had come from  
28 Liberia?

29 A. Well, civilians saw the truck when it came through Dawa,

1 Buedu and it came to Kailahun Town and drove to Pendembu. People  
2 saw the truck and when the truck came - when the truck came to  
3 Pendembu where it was parked, the Land Cruiser pick-up was the  
4 one that they used to be transporting the items.

14:53:55 5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak a  
6 little bit slower.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Pause there. You say it came to Pendembu and it parked?

9 A. Yes.

14:54:05 10 Q. Where did it park in Pendembu?

11 A. It was parked right by the house where Mr Sankoh was  
12 lodged, the other house, it was parked there.

13 Q. And help us. Was it possible for a bystander to be able to  
14 see what was inside the truck?

14:54:35 15 A. Yes, because the truck was not covered; the back was not  
16 covered. There were just some irons at the back, but it was not  
17 covered, it was not sealed.

18 Q. You then went on to mention a Land Cruiser pick-up. What  
19 were you telling us about the Land Cruiser pick-up?

14:54:56 20 A. It was a Land Cruiser pick-up that I was using. The truck  
21 could not go to Manowa ferry because there was a bridge there  
22 that was damaged. It was only the van, the Land Cruiser pick-up  
23 that could go there. So it was the Land Cruiser pick-up that  
24 transported the mining equipment.

14:55:18 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you asked the witness at  
26 103 line 6 whether the men had attempted to disguise the fact  
27 that they were there and what they were carrying with them and  
28 the witness's and was, "They didn't disguise anything." It  
29 shouldn't be "discuss anything", it should be "disguise



1 anything".

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful.

3 Q. So is it the case then that the truck was unloaded in  
4 Pendembu and the items put into your Land Cruiser pick-up to be  
14:55:58 5 taken to Kono?

6 A. Yes. My Land Cruiser van transported the items to the Moa  
7 River and I sent to Matthew Kennedy Sesay to Kono, I sent a radio  
8 message, he was the mining commander, to dispatch the mining  
9 truck that he was using. So he dispatched the Toyota truck that  
14:56:23 10 left Kono to Manowa ferry and loaded the items the following day  
11 and we proceeded to Kono; myself, Ibrahim Bah, Akim and Louis and  
12 Michel.

13 Q. Now who drove the Land Cruiser truck across the bridge to  
14 meet with Matthew Kennedy on the other side with the truck? Who  
14:56:54 15 drove the Land Cruiser?

16 A. I drove the Land Cruiser but from Pendembu the Land Cruiser  
17 transported the items from Pendembu to Manowa ferry and after we  
18 had transported the items I drove through Daru then to Segbwema,  
19 then I came to Manowa ferry.

14:57:24 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, are these people called  
21 Louis and Michael or Louis and Michel? We have had both  
22 varieties.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, I know.

24 Q. Mr Sesay, what's the name of the two white men? Just tell  
14:57:38 25 us slowly.

26 A. The one was Michel, and the other one is Louis.

27 Q. And where are they from?

28 A. They are from Belgium.

29 Q. Do you know how to spell Michel?

1 A. I think it is M-I-C-H-E-L.

2 Q. Okay. Now, Mr Sesay, that journey to Kono with Ibrahim Bah  
3 and the two white men in your Land Cruiser, how long did it take?

14:58:43

4 A. Well, from Manowa Ferry, because the Land Cruiser was in  
5 good order, and it was high, because the road is bad, it would  
6 take about four hours 30 minutes to five hours, but if it is a  
7 Hilux it would take about six hours, but it's a five-hour drive  
8 from the Moa River to Koidu Town.

14:59:07

9 Q. During that time, Mr Sesay, and this is what I am coming  
10 to, did you speak to Mr Ibrahim Bah and the two white men?

11 A. Yes, I spoke to them.

12 Q. What about?

14:59:30

13 A. Well, Mr Sankoh had briefed me about their mission, that  
14 those men were going to be in Kono to be doing some mining and at  
15 the same time they would be buying diamonds. So what I - because  
16 I had got the news to Ibrahim Bah before this time even.

17 Q. Go on.

14:59:52

18 A. And Mr Sankoh had told me that Akim was to come and stay in  
19 Kono with them and I would return to Makeni because at this time  
20 I was based in Makeni. So Ibrahim Bah were talking about the  
21 Mosquito issue, and after that I asked him how long they were  
22 going to stay in Kono, and he said they were coming to start the  
23 mining and at the same time they would be buying diamonds. But  
24 all the time was dependent on how successful the operation would  
25 be, and it was also dependent on Mr Sankoh, because they were  
26 going to be in Kono until Mr Sankoh go there to meet them.  
27 Indeed, later, Mr Sankoh went to Kono and he met them before they  
28 returned through Liberia with Ibrahim Bah.

15:00:19

29 Q. Now, firstly, when did Sankoh go to meet them in Kono?

1 A. It was in late January 2000.

2 Q. Secondly, when did they return through Liberia with Ibrahim  
3 Bah?

15:01:03

4 A. When Sankoh visited Kono, that is late January, almost the  
5 end of January, the very day that Sankoh left, I think 29th or  
6 30th January, it was at that time that they too returned. I gave  
7 them my pickup, the Land Cruiser, for them to be driven back to  
8 the border on the instruction of Mr - to drive them back to  
9 Kailahun on the instruction of Mr Sankoh, before Mr Sankoh  
10 himself travelled to Masingbi and they came to Makali and he then  
11 went to Makeni.

15:01:30

12 Q. Pause again. When the men left in late January, did they  
13 take the mining equipment with them?

14 A. No, no. They left them.

15:01:51

15 Q. Next, at this time, in December/January - December  
16 1999/January 2000, did Foday Sankoh have a position within the  
17 Sierra Leonean government?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What was that position?

15:02:19

20 A. He was the chairman for strategic mineral resources in  
21 Sierra Leone.

22 Q. And strategic mineral resources, did that include diamonds?

23 A. Yes, for all minerals in Sierra Leone, he was the head.

15:02:48

24 Q. So when these men came to Sierra Leone in December 1999, it  
25 was with the knowledge of the chairman of the Ministry of  
26 Strategic Minerals, yes?

27 A. Yes. He [i ndi scerni bl e] them.

28 Q. And I want to go back to the beginning. So you have told  
29 us there was no attempt to disguise the arrival of this truck

1 bearing that mining equipment; is that correct?

2 A. No, we did not disguise it.

3 Q. And when the truck was unloaded in Pendembu, for the items  
4 to be transported via the Land Cruiser to the Moa River, was  
15:03:31 5 there any attempt to disguise that?

6 A. No, no.

7 Q. And whilst Mr Sankoh was in Pendembu, did he make a point  
8 of explaining to the civilians where this truck and its contents  
9 had come from?

15:03:54 10 A. No. He did not talk about that during the meeting with the  
11 civilians.

12 Q. So, so far as the civilians are concerned, they would have  
13 seen a truck arrive from Liberia containing mining equipment,  
14 yes?

15:04:12 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Not having been told of Foday Sankoh's involvement with  
17 that, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19

15:04:28 20 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, did Charles Taylor send that truckload of  
21 mining equipment?

22 A. No, no. It was Mr Sankoh who had arranged with Ibrahim Bah  
23 and others to bring that truck, and when Mr Sankoh told me to go  
24 with the men to guard the mining equipment to Kono, he did not  
15:04:57 25 mention anything about Mr Taylor.

26 Q. Now, earlier this morning you told us that after Sam  
27 Bockarie departed, that border was sealed, apart from one  
28 incident when Ibrahim Bah crossed it. Do you remember telling us  
29 that?

1 A. I remember.

2 Q. And you told us that the border remained closed until when?

3 A. I said after Ibrahim Bah passed through the border, from  
4 December it was only Ibrahim Bah who had passed there. From

15:05:37 5 December 1999 to May 2000 that border was closed.

6 Q. Thank you. Now, in May --

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Excuse me, Mr Griffiths. How does this  
8 witness know, unless he was stationed at the border? How does he  
9 know it was only Ibrahim Bah who passed through that border? How  
10 can he tell that?

15:06:01

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Well, you answer that question, Mr Sesay. How do you know  
13 that?

14 A. Well, my Lord, the commander in Buedu used to report to me,  
15 and, secondly, when Mr Taylor called me in late May 2000, I

15:06:12

16 understood from even the Sierra Leone civilians who were refugees  
17 across the Liberian border, that they wanted to go back home but  
18 the border was closed, and even the civilians who were in Buedu  
19 who had their family members in Liberia, who wanted to return to  
20 Sierra Leone, they told me, when I got to Buedu - and I was the  
21 first person who used a vehicle on that road from that time that  
22 Ibrahim Bah left the border. So the border was closed.

15:06:43

23 JUDGE LUSSICK: What's the connection with the border being  
24 closed with Mr Taylor phoning the witness in late May 2000?

15:07:04

25 MR GRIFFITHS: I am coming to that:

26 Q. In late May 2000, Mr Sesay, did you speak to Mr Taylor?

27 A. No, I did not talk to Mr Taylor. I spoke to Mr Taylor when  
28 I went to Monrovia.

29 Q. In late May 2000, did you speak to anyone?

1 A. No, on telephone in Liberia, no, no.

2 Q. How did you come to cross the border, as you told the  
3 I learned judges, in May 2000?

15:07:56

4 A. After the incident, that is the arrest of the UNAMSIL  
5 peacekeepers, I was in Makeni in late May 2000 because the  
6 incident happened early May. I was in Makeni when I got the  
7 radio message from the commander who was in Pendembu, and he was  
8 called Denis Lansana. Now, he sent a radio message to me.

9 Q. To do what?

15:08:17

10 A. He said a helicopter had landed in Pendembu and the person  
11 that landed in Pendembu with the helicopter was Benjamin Yeaten.  
12 He said when he came, he asked for him, the commander, and he  
13 told him - he asked for me and the commander told him that I was  
14 in Makeni.

15:08:37

15 Q. Go on.

16 A. Benjamin in turn told him that he should inform me that  
17 President Taylor wanted to see me, so I should come because  
18 President Taylor wanted to see me. That was how I got the  
19 information and travelled to the border from Makeni.

15:08:54

20  
21 JUDGE LUSSICK: Look, I definitely heard the witness say,  
22 "When Mr Taylor called me in late May 2000," and when you tried  
23 to expand that, Mr Griffiths, the witness said, "I did not talk  
24 to Mr Taylor."

15:09:09

25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Well, when you said --

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can I refer you precisely to the text?  
28 That is at page 109, at line - it begins at line 18.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: 109.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, line 18, where the answer is:

2 "Well, my Lord, the commander in Buedu used to report to me and,  
3 secondly, when Mr Taylor called me in late May 2000. I  
4 understood from even the Sierra Leone civilians who were  
15:09:53 5 refugees," et cetera, et cetera.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Mr Sesay, let us clarify this. When in answering that  
8 question, you said, "When Mr Taylor called me," What did you mean  
9 by "When Mr Taylor called me"?

15:10:15 10 A. What I mean, when he sent for me, when he sent for me,  
11 because that was the only means Mr Taylor used to call me when he  
12 sent for me to go to Monrovia.

13 Q. Now, just so that we are clear about this, because I don't  
14 want to go into the details of this now, I want to deal with  
15:10:39 15 things sequentially. When Sam Bockarie left in December 1999,  
16 did he take his satellite phone with him?

17 A. Yes, he went with the satellite phones.

18 Q. After Bockarie left in mid-December 1999, did you, Issa  
19 Sesay, have a satellite phone?

15:11:06 20 A. Yes, Mr Sankoh sent a satellite phone for me in January  
21 2000 in Makeni with his bodyguard. He was operating a satellite  
22 phone.

23 Q. Now, this was the satellite phone - because you remember a  
24 few days ago we discussed satellite phones; do you remember?

15:11:26 25 A. Yes, I remember.

26 Q. Was this the satellite phone which you tell us had no  
27 credit on it?

28 A. That's the phone, yes. It was only Mr Sankoh who called me  
29 on that phone until that May incident when he was arrested, and

1 there was no credit in the phone for me to make a call. That's  
2 the phone.

3 Q. Right. And the reason why I don't want to open up this  
4 issue of you going to Monrovia in too much detail is because we  
15:11:59 5 need to deal with the issue of Sankoh's arrest and deal with  
6 matters sequentially. So, just to clarify this issue: That  
7 satellite phone which Sankoh gave you in January 2000, as far as  
8 you were aware, did Mr Taylor have the number of that phone?

9 A. No, no, he did not have it.

15:12:29 10 Q. Did Mr Taylor ever call you on that phone?

11 A. Never, he did not call me on that phone.

12 Q. So when, in late May, you say Mr Taylor called you, what  
13 did you mean?

14 A. Well, I mean that he sent someone to invite me because,  
15:13:00 15 honestly speaking, had Mr Taylor had my satellite phone number or  
16 if any of his commanders had my satellite phone number then there  
17 would haven't been the need for Mr Taylor to send a helicopter  
18 with Benjamin to come to Pendembu to invite me. But it was  
19 Benjamin who used the helicopter. He landed in Pendembu and told  
15:13:25 20 the commander, Denis Lansana, to call me, saying that Mr Taylor  
21 wanted to see me and that was the only means by which they could  
22 reach me. So Denis sent a radio message to Makeni and that was  
23 the reason why I travelled to the border.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the interpreter just  
15:13:47 25 make the something clear. The word "call" in Krio could either  
26 mean invited me or called me. So that was where I think the  
27 misunderstanding was. But in this sense he is talking about  
28 invitation.

29 JUDGE LUSSICK: I'm just trying to make sense out of the



1 evidence, Mr Griffiths. If you recall, the Presiding Judge asked  
2 this witness how does he know it was only Ibrahim Bah who passed  
3 through that border? How can he tell that? Then he answered -  
4 I'm referring to page 109, the last few lines of 109. He  
15:14:34 5 answered, "Well, my Lord, the commander in Buedu used to report  
6 to me and, secondly, when Mr Taylor called me in late 2000 I  
7 understood", et cetera. And then I asked what's the connection  
8 with the border being closed with Mr Taylor phoning the witness  
9 in late May 2000? Well, my question now is: What is the  
15:14:59 10 connection with the border being closed with Mr Taylor calling  
11 the witness in May 2000? Are they related at all?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

13 JUDGE LUSSICK: Why did the witness say in the context of  
14 the border being closed that Mr Taylor called him in late May  
15:15:16 15 2000?

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well, I will clarify that.

17 Q. Mr Sesay, did you hear all of that?

18 A. Yes, I heard it.

19 Q. Right, so let's take things in stages. Stage one: How did  
15:15:31 20 you come to know that the border was closed from when Bockarie  
21 left until late May 2000? How did you know?

22 A. The first time I knew was when we arrived in Buedu when I  
23 sent Momoh Rogers to invite the MP commander, saying that he  
24 shouldn't follow Sam Bockarie. That is the time that Momoh  
15:16:03 25 Rogers was arrested and beaten up and he had scratch on his head.  
26 So it was at that time when the Liberian border securities said  
27 that they had closed down the border.

28 Q. Move on to your next point.

29 A. It was at that time I knew. And then the commander in

1 Buedu used to send information to me. He used to report to me  
2 through the radio and I knew and since then I never heard that  
3 people were moving - doing a cross-border movement from Liberia  
4 to Sierra Leone or from Sierra Leone to Liberia across that  
15:16:51 5 border, except for Ibrahim Bah.

6 Q. Pause. Detail. Who was the commander in Buedu?

7 A. It was Copor Meh after Sam Bockarie had departed.

8 Q. Could you spell that name, please?

9 A. No, I find it difficult.

15:17:16 10 MR KOU MJIAN: I think he is saying Cooper Miller.

11 THE WITNESS: No, I said copper man.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Interpreter, are you able to spell  
13 that name.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honours. It's C-0-P-0-R, one  
15:17:34 15 word, M-E-H, another word.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you.

17 Q. And what did he tell you about the state of the border?

18 A. He said since the time Bockarie crossed the border and when  
19 I came there later, he said since then it was only Ibrahim Bah  
15:18:05 20 who came across there and went to Kailahun and when they returned  
21 late January he said the Liberian securities had closed the  
22 border.

23 Q. Three: In the context of the border being closed, why did  
24 you mention Charles Taylor?

15:18:25 25 A. The reason why I made mention of Mr Taylor is because he  
26 was the one who invited me when I went and passed through that  
27 border. It was since then that they did not close the border any  
28 longer. That was the reason why I said except for the time that  
29 Mr Taylor invited me when I went through that border. But before

1 that time there was no movement going on across that border. My  
2 Lordship, that is what I mean.

3 Q. And the next point that you had mentioned was refugees in  
4 relation to the closure of the border. What were you saying  
15:19:03 5 about refugees and their relevance to the border being closed?

6 A. I said even the refugees who were in Liberia who wanted to  
7 cross over into Sierra Leone during this time of the peace  
8 process now, because the borderline was closed they were unable  
9 to do so. So it was only when I came and passed through there in  
15:19:30 10 May that the border was opened and people were able to return to  
11 Sierra Leone. And they were just one and the same people, those  
12 settling on the Sierra Leonean side and those across on the  
13 Liberian side. They were the same Gissi people.

14 Q. On that same point, when you crossed the border in late May  
15:19:58 15 did you speak to any refugees?

16 A. Yes. People who were in Foya Tinkia who were Sierra  
17 Leoneans and people who were in Foya who were Sierra Leoneans.

18 Q. And did you speak to them about the state of the border?

19 A. Yes. People met me and said, oh, we had wanted to return  
15:20:24 20 but they said the border had been closed, so we hoped that being  
21 that you had started passing through this place, we hope that we  
22 also will be able to return. And indeed when I went and met with  
23 Mr Taylor he had a discussion with me, from then I came back to  
24 Sierra Leone to get the UNAMSIL peacekeepers who were under the  
15:20:48 25 RUF custody and when I went to the border I crossed with them  
26 over the border into Liberia and it was since then that the  
27 civilians also started crossing back into Sierra Leone.

28 Q. By what means did you cross the border in late May 2000?

29 A. Well, I used the pick-up. The pick-up. The man who was

1 contract - in charge of the contract in Kailahun, it was his  
2 pick-up that I used. When I came I came to Dawa, I met with my  
3 men. I asked them and they said the commander in Foya had been  
4 sending messages, asking them if I had got to the border.

15:21:37 5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
6 to slow down and repeat that where I stopped.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Pause. "I met with my men. I asked them and they said the  
9 commander in Foya had been sending messages asking them if I got  
10 to the border." Go on from there, please?  
15:21:55

11 A. Yes. Because I later understood that Benjamin Yeaten gave  
12 instructions that the commander in Foya should receive me, or  
13 that his men should receive me at the border. And when I got  
14 there, when I got at the border, the officer who was at the  
15:22:14 15 border also told me that they had got instruction for them to  
16 receive me and escort me to Foya. So four of them came on board  
17 the pick-up and we drove to Foya where we met the commander who  
18 communicated with Monrovia and from where I was collected.

19 Q. Collected by what means?

15:22:34 20 A. They collected me on board the helicopter and took me to  
21 Monrovia.

22 Q. Let's put that issue to one side now. I want to come back  
23 to that chunk of time from Bockarie's departure down to May  
24 whilst you tell us the border is closed. During that period,  
15:23:01 25 Mr Sesay, what were your responsibilities?

26 A. Well, during that time that Sam Bockarie had departed, it  
27 was I that Pa Sankoh appointed as field commander of the RUF.

28 Q. And when were you given that appointment?

29 A. When Pa Sankoh returned from Monrovia and met us in

1 Pendembu, that was the time he gave me the appointment that I was  
2 now the new field commander for the RUF. That was in Pendembu.  
3 That was in December 1999.

4 Q. And following that appointment where were you based?

15:23:47 5 A. Well, I was based in Makeni. I was in Makeni, Teko  
6 Barracks.

7 Q. And in your new capacity as field commander, did other  
8 commanders, such as the commander in Buedu, have to report to  
9 you?

15:24:06 10 A. Yes. They used to report to me. They used to send  
11 messages to me through - it comes through me to be forwarded to  
12 Mr Sankoh.

13 Q. And is it through those channels that you discovered from  
14 the commander at Buedu that the border was closed?

15:24:28 15 A. Yes. I knew that through - I knew that through the  
16 commander and people used to come from Kailahun, fighters used to  
17 come from Kailahun, come to Makeni, you know. And even I,  
18 myself, at one time Mr Sankoh sent me on one or two occasions  
19 when I went to Kailahun between January - between January to  
15:24:52 20 February, I went to Kailahun. And the other time it was Gibriil  
21 Massaquoi and I who went to Kailahun.

22 Q. Now just in general terms, between December, your  
23 appointment, and late May were you based in Makeni?

24 A. No. I did not continue to be based in Makeni, because in  
15:25:23 25 February Mr Sankoh moved me from Makeni and sent me to Kono.  
26 Because, you know, a certain development took place in a meeting  
27 between him and I, so he became angry with me, so he decided to  
28 push me to Kono. He said I should move from Makeni to Kono.

29 Q. What was that difficulty that arose between you and him?

1 A. In February Mr Sankoh came from Freetown, he visited  
2 Makeni. He went with - the people who went with him were Gibri I  
3 Massaquoi, Akim Turay, Rashid Sandy, Jackson Swarray and other  
4 bodyguards like Cisse and others. I cannot name all of them now  
15:26:22 5 because the others are low ranking bodyguards and the ones I have  
6 referred to were the senior bodyguards who went with him to  
7 Makeni. And when he arrived there we had a meeting where he  
8 addressed the civilian population.

9 Q. Go on.

15:26:39 10 A. And after that, after that, he had a meeting with the  
11 officers, starting from the rank of captain, opposed to those of  
12 us, the senior men, capitals, majors, lieutenant colonels,  
13 colonels and brigadiers. We had a meeting in the compound where  
14 he was lodged. So after that meeting, because he asked a series  
15:27:07 15 of questions during that meeting - he asked questions that he  
16 knew that some officers had people's vehicles who were civilian  
17 vehicles, so what were they going to do about it, and that some  
18 people had looted civilian Hondas, they had those Hondas with  
19 them, what are they going to do with the motor bikes? So he said  
15:27:27 20 it was better for us to behave and it would be better for us to  
21 show to the civilians that the RUF was now going to be  
22 transformed into a political party. So those were some of the  
23 concerns and questions he was asking. So when he asked me, he  
24 said, "Yes, Mr Field Commander, what do you say? What are we  
15:27:47 25 going to do now?" And then I said, "Yes. If you are talking  
26 about the forming of the political party as a leader" --

27 Q. Go on?

28 A. "And you are talking about RUF officers having people's  
29 vehicles and motor bikes," I said, "the best would be for us to

1 return those motorcycles and the vehicles to the civilians." And  
2 he said, "Oh, my man, keep quiet." So I said, "You have asked me  
3 a question and I have responded, and now you are telling me to  
4 keep quiet." So we - up to the end of that meeting in the  
15:28:25 5 evening. The following day, he went back to his house where he  
6 was lodged, you know. We were there until the UNAMSIL, who were  
7 the ECOMOG - I mean the Nigerian contingent, they were the ones  
8 that used to escort him, they drove him, they were - served as  
9 drivers for him.

15:28:47 10

11 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
12 to slow down and repeat from where I stopped?

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. "They served as drivers for him." Pick it up from there,  
15:28:56 15 please.

16 A. Yes. I said even the garrison commander in Freetown, all  
17 of them joined him on that patrol. That morning they went to  
18 greet him. That was Musa Buhari - I mean Buhari Musa.

19 Q. Buhari Musa, help us with the first name. Musa is  
15:29:13 20 straightforward.

21 A. Mr Interpreter, I know that is a Nigerian name and I am not  
22 familiar with it.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, it is B-U-H-A-R-I.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:29:38 25 Q. B-U-H-A-R-I. And you were saying they used to escort him.  
26 Go on.

27 A. So Mr Sankoh - some other people came, like the G5s and  
28 other people came to visit him, to say hello to him. That very  
29 day he had to return back to Freetown. In the afternoon he

1 called me because by then --

2 Q. Go on.

3 A. That very time, when they came to invite me, I was in the  
4 barracks, and I had gone to my quarters at Teko and someone came  
15:30:28 5 and said the Pa was inviting me. So when I arrived there, he  
6 called me.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, the second name was not  
8 clear to the interpreter.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:30:38 10 Q. He called you to where?

11 A. Mr Sankoh invited me and the other two brothers, Augustine  
12 Gbao and Morris Kallon where he was lodged. That was where he  
13 invited us to. So when we came, he invited us into his room, we  
14 went to his bedroom together with Gibril Massaquoi, Rashid Sandy,  
15:31:06 15 Akim Turay, Jackson Swarray, we were all in Mr Sankoh's bedroom  
16 with them. And it was then that Mr Sankoh said, he said, "Field  
17 commander, I invited you and your brothers." And I said, "Yes,  
18 sir." So he was seated in the bed, we were sitting in the  
19 chairs, and some people were sitting by the edge of the chairs

15:31:36 20 because we were many in the room. So that was when he said, "Mr  
21 Field Commander, I want you to organise some men. I want them to  
22 dress in Kamajor fatigue," because, you know, the Kamajors had a  
23 special type of clothing that they call of Ronko, "and they  
24 should go - you should organise an ambush. They should go and  
15:32:00 25 set an ambush between Makeni and Lunsar, organise these men to go  
26 and set an ambush. They should be divided into two groups. When  
27 they set this ambush, the instruction I give you is what they  
28 should do. They shouldn't arrest a black man. They should  
29 arrest the white men who are among the peacekeepers. Those are



1 the ones they should arrest. And they should arrest the military  
2 observers." And I said, "Oh, Pa," I said, "What's happened?"  
3 And he said, "Are you asking me?" He said, "The UNAMSIL's  
4 mission in Sierra Leone was only in the interests of Tejan  
15:32:43 5 Kabbah, so they want us, the RUF, to become a victim of peace,"  
6 and he said, "I am not going to accept that. I'm not going to  
7 agree with that." And then he said, "Fellow, UNAMSIL is just  
8 pressurising me to disarm the RUF, while they are not asking  
9 Tejan Kabbah to implement the provisions that the Lome Accord had  
15:33:09 10 given to the RUF. Instead they are just pressurising me to  
11 disarm my own men." And I watched him for a long time, and I  
12 said, "Pa, the best that I think, if you think Pa Kabbah is not  
13 implementing the Lome Accord, why don't you complain to the  
14 guarantors? They were - they sat as witnesses to the Lome. They  
15:33:33 15 signed the Lome." And Mr Sankoh became angry, and he said, "Look  
16 at this man. This man is not even fit" --  
17 Q. "This man is not even fit" for what?  
18 A. He said, "This man is not even fit to be the field  
19 commander of the RUF." He said, "I did it. I am instructing  
15:33:52 20 you, and you are advising me. Are you the one who tells me what  
21 I should do?" And then Mr Sankoh became angry with me, and he  
22 started using insulting languages against me. And when he became  
23 angry, he said - and the other said, "Pa, leave Issa. If Issa is  
24 not ready, we are ready." He said, "We will displace the United  
15:34:14 25 peacekeepers in Sierra Leone just as what happened to them in  
26 Somalia." And Mr Sankoh became extremely angry, and he said they  
27 should pack his bag, he is going back to Freetown. And when he  
28 said that, Jackson Swarray started packing his bags - packing his  
29 things into his bag, and he called the Nigerian drivers, the

1 UNAMSIL who were driving with him, and they all went into the  
2 vehicle, on board the Land Cruiser, and then he drove down to the  
3 helipad where the helicopter was parked waiting. The helicopter  
4 was already around, waiting for him. So he went to the helipad.  
15:34:49 5 As he went to the helipad, I also went on board my own car. I  
6 went on board my car. We drove slowly behind him, and we got to  
7 the helipad. The helicopter, the engine was started, and then  
8 when he went on board the helicopter, he only turned round and  
9 said goodbye to Kallon. He did not even tell me goodbye. So on  
15:35:12 10 board the helicopter, he went back to Freetown. When he returned  
11 to Freetown in the evening, around 6.30 to 7, towards 8 o'clock,  
12 my operator had a contact from Freetown. Foday Sankoh's radio  
13 called, and he sent a radio message saying that the following  
14 morning I should leave Makeni and go to Kono and go and take over  
15:35:41 15 the mining, I should go and supervise the mining. So when my  
16 operator received this message and gave it to me, I read through  
17 the message. It was about 8 o'clock at night. And I said, "Oh,  
18 how can I, as field commander, go to Kono and supervise mining?"  
19 I said, "No." I said, "This will not be good." So I had to call  
15:35:59 20 Lawrence and I explained to Lawrence, and I said, "Well" --

21 Q. Who is Lawrence?

22 A. Lawrence Womandia.

23 Q. And what did you say to him?

24 A. I told Lawrence Womandia and Eddie Bockarie was there, and  
15:36:15 25 I said, "Look at this kind of message that Pa Sankoh have sent.  
26 He said I should go to Kono and take over the mining." I said,  
27 "How can I, field commander, go and become mining commander?" I  
28 said, "Really, I am fed up with the situation." I said, "In  
29 fact, I want to surrender myself." It was then that Lawrence and

1 others had to persuade me. They persuaded me, they said, "Oh,  
2 the man is the leader. If he has said this, then go to Kono."  
3 And I too that night, I drove and went to Magburaka, and I could  
4 not dare - I decided to go back to Makeni that same night. So  
15:36:51 5 the following morning, Mr Sankoh sent a second radio message  
6 around 8 tonight inquiring whether I had left Makeni to go to  
7 Kono, and then - he then called on the satellite phone. And when  
8 the operator answered the call, that was my bodyguard, he said,  
9 "Where is Issa?" And my operator called on me, and then he went  
15:37:15 10 and gave me the mike, the phone, and then I said, "Good morning,  
11 sir." He said, "Are you still in Makeni? Have not I told you to  
12 go to Kono? Now, you should go to Kono, and if you don't abide  
13 by my instruction it will not be good for you. You should not  
14 sleep in Makeni tonight because, this morning, you should - I  
15:37:33 15 will call you again in the afternoon to enquire whether you are  
16 still in Makeni." And I said, "Yes, sir." So when he switched  
17 off the - the thing, I also told my bodyguard to pack the phone,  
18 and we went on board the vehicle, pickup, we drove to Magburaka.  
19 I was in Magburaka until the evening, and Lawrence said we should  
15:37:51 20 go to Kono. And I drove to Kono, myself, Lawrence, Eddie  
21 Bockarie and Lion. So the four of us drove to Kono, we went to  
22 Kono.

23 Q. Pause there.

24 A. So later, that was the following day --

15:38:04 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Who? Lawrence, Eddie who?

26 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. I said Lawrence Womandia, Eddie  
27 Bockarie and Lion, all of us drove from Makeni to Kono. So after  
28 two days Abu Keita also joined us in Kono.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Pause there. Firstly, this argument with Sankoh which  
2 resulted in you being sent to Kono, when did it take place?

3 A. That was in February 2000.

15:38:49

4 Q. Can you give us an idea whether it was at the beginning,  
5 middle or end of February 2000?

6 A. Well, I think it was around the middle.

7 Q. And why did you object to the suggestion by Foday Sankoh  
8 that you dress up in Kamajor uniforms and ambush and kidnap white  
9 UNAMSIL observers? Why?

15:39:28

10 A. Well, I thought that if I had taken that instruction, then  
11 we will be starting to destruct the peace programme. So here Mr  
12 Sankoh, who had said we should abide by the peace, if he turns  
13 around again in two or three months' time and begin to tell me  
14 something like that, something from which he had become angry  
15 with Sam Bockarie, then I was wondering.

15:39:49

16 Q. So by this stage in February 2000, Mr Sesay, did you  
17 consider Foday Sankoh, your leader, to be sincere about peace?

18 A. No. At that time, when he said I should leave Makeni that  
19 February, so I was not doubtful of him, but he had his own story  
20 that he was telling.

15:40:21

21 Q. Now, you mentioned that when you got to Kono, Abu Keita  
22 arrived. From where?

23 A. From Makeni. We were all in Makeni, so he joined us in  
24 Kono.

15:40:38

25 Q. Why?

26 A. Well, I came together with him from Buedu, that October  
27 1999, when we came to Makeni. So when he had seen that and he  
28 heard that Pa Sankoh had said I should move to Kono, that's why  
29 he said he should follow me himself and the other commanders,

1 because we were all moving together.

2 Q. And when you were moved by Sankoh to Kono from Makeni, did  
3 you keep your same rank?

4 A. Yes. I had the rank and the title but at this time he sent  
15:41:18 5 direct messages to my commanders in Makeni and the commanders  
6 sent direct reports and messages to him in Freetown. And it  
7 happened in other areas too.

8 Q. The second matter is this: Were you sent to Kono - no, let  
9 me start again. Were the RUF engaged in mining in Kono at the  
15:41:46 10 time that you were sent there by Foday Sankoh?

11 A. Yes, yes.

12 Q. Was such mining important at that time to the RUF?

13 A. Yes, it was important.

14 Q. How important?

15:42:11 15 A. Because it provided revenue to the RUF, and Mr Sankoh had  
16 brought Ibrahim Bah and the men, they came to Kono, and even when  
17 I went to Kono myself, he sent mining equipment to me from  
18 Freetown that were loaded by UNAMSIL personnel in the UNAMSIL  
19 military trucks, from Freetown to Kono, two loaded trucks.

15:42:37 20 Q. So that was mining under the RUF in Kono developing at this  
21 time in 2000?

22 A. Yes, when Foday Sankoh posted me to Kono and when he sent  
23 those mining equipments, although when the mining equipments got  
24 there, because it was Gibril and the Nigerian UNAMSIL personnel  
15:43:06 25 that went with the mining equipment in two trucks, so from that I  
26 introduced a policy and that was the policy that we used to mine.  
27 That was two pile system. That was the policy we used to mine  
28 until the disarmament.

29 Q. Now I will come back to the two pile system in a moment

1 but, Mr Sesay, bluntly: Were you sent to Kono as the most senior  
2 military commander because of the value of the mining to Foday  
3 Sankoh, or were you sent there because you disagreed with Foday  
4 Sankoh over the proposed ambush? Which one?

15:44:05 5 A. Well, why Mr Sankoh sent me to Kono was because he had  
6 realised that I was not taking his orders to arrest the military  
7 observers to set an ambush and kidnap them. That's why he sent  
8 me to Kono. He said I should leave Makeni, I should have nothing  
9 to do with Makeni. If I had accepted to enforce Mr Sankoh's  
10 order and to set up the ambush I wouldn't have been sent to Kono.

11 Q. Very well.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Was being sent to Kono a demotion?  
13 Mr Sesay, was it a demotion for you to be sent as mining  
14 commander?

15:44:53 15 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord. The rank was not taken from me  
16 but I saw that a field commander shouldn't be a mining commander.  
17 If I had not refused Mr Sankoh's instruction he wouldn't have  
18 posted me there. But when he realised that I was advising him  
19 and that was not in line with his instruction, that is why he  
20 said I should leave Makeni for Kono.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: What I am asking you, and now you say the  
22 rank was not taken from you, what rank was that? Are you saying  
23 you remained field commander or what?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, I continued to be the field commander  
15:45:28 25 and I was a brigadier. He did not take the - remove the rank  
26 from me. He did not change my assignment but he limited my  
27 operations, like when he said I should not have anything to do  
28 with Makeni.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Now, for how long did you remain in Kono, Mr Sesay?

2 A. Well, from February 2000 when Sankoh deployed me in Kono I  
3 was there until the disarmament when I left Kono. That was  
4 August 2000 - August 2001 to September.

15:46:11 5 Q. Now we will come to those later periods in a moment but for  
6 now I want to concentrate on this. During that period --

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, what exactly - what is he  
8 saying? You asked him how long did he remain in Kono and look at  
9 the answer he gave us. "That was in August 2000 - August 2001 to  
10 September." What is that?

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. How long did you stay in Kono, Mr Sesay?

13 A. I said I stayed in Kono, I was in Kono in August - from  
14 February 2000 to August/September 2001, the disarmament time.

15:46:53 15 That's what I said.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's not what you originally said but  
17 now you have clarified it.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Now you went to Kono in February, Mr Sesay. Is that right?

15:47:16 20 A. Yes, you're correct.

21 Q. And at the beginning of May 2000 did anything happen to  
22 Foday Sankoh?

23 A. Yes. May 8 Foday Sankoh was arrested.

24 Q. Where was he arrested?

15:47:41 25 A. In Freetown.

26 Q. Where in Freetown?

27 A. Well, people demonstrated against him, they went to his  
28 house and he escaped from his house. I don't know where he went  
29 to hide and later he was arrested. Because I was not in

1 Freetown.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness's answer was "May 8th".

3 Isn't that what you said, Mr witness?

4 THE WITNESS: That's what I said, ma'am.

15:48:12 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. So on 8 May 2000 Foday Sankoh was arrested, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Following the incident at his house. Is that right?

9 A. Yes.

15:48:28 10 Q. Where was his house?

11 A. Spur Road.

12 Q. And what was the incident at his house?

13 A. People demonstrated against him and there was firing.

14 Q. And was this a high profile event?

15:49:02 15 A. Yes, yes. It was an event that caused alarm in the whole  
16 country, especially Freetown.

17 Q. I am not allowed you to lead you on these obvious matters,  
18 you see, Mr Issa. This is why I am having to take time. And  
19 following his arrest, what happened to Mr Sankoh?

15:49:32 20 A. Well, when people demonstrated against Mr Sankoh after the  
21 arrest of UNAMSIL personnel and people demonstrated against  
22 Mr Sankoh in Freetown he escaped from his house for a few days  
23 and later he was arrested and the government imprisoned him.

24 Q. Now where were you at the time of Mr Sankoh's arrest?

15:50:01 25 A. I was in Makeni.

26 Q. What were you doing in Makeni?

27 A. Well, at this time the situation that obtained in Makeni  
28 was that the UNAMSIL personnel had been arrested and the  
29 government helicopter gunships used to fly and bombard Lunsar,



1 bombard Makeni, go to Kono and Tongo Field. That's what  
2 obtained. So it's like the war had returned after the arrest of  
3 Mr Sankoh.

15:50:58 4 Q. And just to get the sequence correct, Mr Sesay: What  
5 happened first, the abduction of the UNAMSIL or the arrest of  
6 Mr Sankoh?

7 A. It was the UNAMSIL kidnapping.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness said the arrest of UNAMSIL  
9 personnel. That's what he said at page 132 line 11. He said the  
15:51:24 10 arrest of UNAMSIL personnel.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Mr Sesay, what happened to the UNAMSIL personnel?

13 A. Well, UNAMSIL personnel had a problem in Makeni that caused  
14 some of their arrest in Makeni and the UNAMSIL in Lungi airport,  
15:52:04 15 the force commander instructed his men to go and reinforce their  
16 men in Makeni and Magburaka. So Mr Sankoh knew about that and he  
17 instructed Gibriil Massaquoi to send - to talk to Komba Gbundema  
18 and Gibriil conducted a dialogue with Komba Gbundema from  
19 Mr Sankoh's house in Freetown.

15:52:24 20 Q. Give me that will name again?

21 A. Komba Gbundema.

22 Q. Could you help me with the spelling?

23 A. K-U-M-B-A G-B-U-D-E-M-A.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Who arrested the UNAMSIL personnel? This  
15:52:52 25 is what we don't understand yet.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: I am coming to that.

27 Q. Who arrested the UNAMSIL personnel, Mr Sesay?

28 A. It was the RUF.

29 Q. Who in the RUF arrested the UNAMSIL personnel?

1 A. Well, the problem started with in Makeni - that is with  
2 Kailondo, Kallon and Gbao. The problem started there.

3 Q. What was the first name you gave us?

4 A. Kailondo.

15:53:32 5 Q. How do you spell it?

6 MR KOUJIAN: It's on the record.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Who was the second person you named?

9 A. Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao.

15:53:46 10 Q. And help us with numbers. How many personnel were  
11 arrested?

12 A. Well, the first day that the incident started they arrested  
13 up to 20 to 25 UNAMSIL personnel in Makeni Town, including  
14 military observers.

15:54:14 15 Q. And where had they come from?

16 A. Well, they were in Makeni Town. They were deployed there,  
17 the observers and the UNAMSIL. Some from Kenya, some from  
18 Europe. I wouldn't name the countries now, I don't know them.

19 Q. And were any other UNAMSIL personnel arrested?

15:54:44 20 A. Yes, because Mr Sankoh told Gibriil Massaquoi to inform  
21 Komba Gbundema and Gibriil conducted a dialogue with Komba  
22 Gbundema and instructed him to come from Kambia and set up an  
23 ambush between Makeni and Lunsar.

24 Q. Go on.

15:55:06 25 A. To ambush the Zambian troops they were coming from Port  
26 Loko to go and reinforce their brothers in Makeni and Magburaka  
27 and that was the largest troop among the arrested UNAMSIL because  
28 they were many.

29 Q. How many were they, the Zambians, ambushed on instructions

1 sent by Foday Sankoh through Gibril Massaquoi?

2 A. Well, the Zambians and the Kenyans, because the Kenyans  
3 were among them, they were over 300.

4 Q. So in total how many UNAMSIL personnel were arrested?

15:55:59 5 A. I think there were almost 400, something like that.

6 Q. When those individuals were arrested where were you?

7 A. I was in Kono when the incident started. And even when the  
8 first batch was arrested and the second batch - I was not in  
9 Makeni on the scene. The very night around 7 to 8 when I arrived

15:56:29 10 in Makeni, that was when I saw these Zambians being brought and  
11 the Kenyans in a truck - in trucks that they had been ambushed in  
12 Makoth, between Lunsar and Makeni. And when I asked --

13 Q. You gave an initial name there where they had been ambushed  
14 in where?

15:56:49 15 A. Makoth.

16 Q. How do you spell it?

17 A. I think it is M-A-K-O-T-H.

18 Q. Now, when you say arrest Mr Sesay, on what charges were  
19 these UNAMSIL personnel arrested?

15:57:14 20 A. I think I did not use the right word. It should be  
21 capture, because there was no --

22 Q. What do you mean by capture?

23 A. Well, when you capture somebody against his will and take  
24 that person to where he doesn't want to go. But these were armed

15:57:37 25 people, they were not civilians. They too were armed men. And  
26 even the ambush in which they fell where they were captured, they  
27 were in combat readiness because from Lunsar they had got  
28 information that the RUF had blocked - that they had placed some  
29 road blocks. So from Lunsar to Makeni, when they were moving

1 towards Makeni they were in combat readiness and they fell in  
2 Komba Gbundema's ambush because Komba - Komba himself later, I  
3 understood that he played a trick. That is how he overcame them.

4 Q. Now these captured men, where were they taken?

15:58:23 5 A. When they arrived in Makeni - when they were brought to  
6 Makeni I asked and they said it was Komba Gbundema's ambush that  
7 had captured those people and they said, "Oh, they are many."  
8 And they said --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this  
15:58:47 10 last part. He said something about a Land Rover.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. "When they arrived in Makeni, when they were brought to  
13 Makeni I asked and they said it was" what?

14 A. Komba said it was Pa Sankoh who had sent order to set that  
15:59:08 15 ambush, so he was the one who had captured those people.

16 Q. Now you tell us that this was before the incident at  
17 Mr Sankoh's house in Freetown. How long before?

18 A. Well, this was the incident that led to Mr Sankoh's arrest.  
19 I think - because this happened around 2nd, 3rd May and Mr Sankoh  
15:59:38 20 was arrested on the 8th.

21 Q. Thank you. And having arrived in Makeni, Mr Sesay, what  
22 was your involvement thereafter?

23 A. Yes, I was involved, because when the things started in  
24 Makeni, the commanders in Makeni sent reports to Mr Sankoh  
16:00:10 25 directly saying that the men, that is the RUF, were coming from  
26 Magburaka to Makeni and when they got there - when they come to  
27 Makump where the DDR was, the DDR camp, they said the UNAMSIL  
28 guys forcefully disarmed three of them. So when the RUF  
29 commanders went to the UNAMSIL guys at DDR camp to retrieve their

1 arms and their men they said the UNAMSIL guys put up resistance  
2 and firing occurred that caused the fight in Makeni.

3 Q. Go on.

4 A. That was the message that they sent to Mr Sankoh and --

16:00:56 5 Q. Go on.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: We are having trouble understanding the  
7 interpreter and I don't know whether the interpreter - this is  
8 the same interpreter we have had all these months, I don't know  
9 what the problem is, but I am wondering that even when this tape  
16:01:13 10 is played back for scoping the transcribers will not be able to  
11 tell what this interpreter is saying. Mr Interpreter, are you  
12 having a problem? Is the evidence coming out too fast or what is  
13 the problem?

14 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honour, that is the problem and  
16:01:30 15 I have to keep with the pace of the witness, your Honours.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Because you must realise that we have new  
17 transcribers that are struggling and doing their best to keep up  
18 but even we, the judges, who have been at this for the last three  
19 years, we are having trouble keeping up with this evidence and  
16:01:52 20 understanding what is being interpreted. I don't know any more  
21 what to say to this witness to make him understand and I have  
22 just about given up on the speed at which the witness speaks.

23 Mr Sesay, I did caution you earlier when counsellor pleaded  
24 with you. I don't understand why you failed to comply.

16:02:31 25 MR GRIFFITHS: I think it important for me to make this  
26 observation, that I do think that the witness has striven very  
27 hard during the course of a very long day to comply with  
28 everyone's desire for his testimony to be intelligible and to be  
29 accurately recorded and I am not sure that the full blame for the

1 difficulties with the transcript can be laid at his door.

2 Q. But, in any event, Mr Sesay, let's try. There's only half  
3 an hour to go. Start again. What happened when you arrived in  
4 Makeni.

16:03:16 5 A. Well, I said the commanders in Makeni sent a message to  
6 Mr Sankoh wherein they claimed that the RUF fighters were moving  
7 from Magburaka and coming to Makeni and when they got to the DDR  
8 camp at Makump.

9 Q. How do you spell that?

16:03:46 10 A. M-A-K-O-M-P.

11 Q. Grateful. Go on.

12 A. So they said the UNAMSIL forcefully disarmed the RUF. They  
13 were three RUF in number. So when they went to the camp to  
14 retrieve the arm, the arms of the disarmed RUF they said the  
16:04:16 15 UNAMSIL put up resistance and a firing ensued. So they said that  
16 caused a fight between them, between the RUF and the UNAMSIL in  
17 Makeni. That was the message that Mr Sankoh sent to me. He said  
18 if fighting was going on in Makeni he said I should go there. So  
19 another incident he said had taken place in Magburaka that I did  
16:04:37 20 not know about at that time. So I got this information, I think  
21 it was in the evening, so I too decided to wait for the following  
22 day. So I passed the night and the following day myself, Lion  
23 and some armed men, we moved from Kono. Lion and the others were  
24 in a truck and I was using a pick-up, so we came up to Matotoka,  
16:04:59 25 from Kono we came through Masingbi, Makali and when we got to  
26 Matotoka I told Lion and the others to stop, because they were  
27 going ahead. So they stopped at Matotoka and I also stopped and  
28 I asked the commander who was at Matotoka, Colonel Jungle - this  
29 is not Daniel Tamba. It's another Jungle.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 A. So I asked him, I said, "What's the situation in Magburaka  
3 and Makeni?" And he said, well, he had overheard firing in  
4 Magburaka. He said even yesterday he overheard firing in

16:05:41 5 Magburaka he said but he did not check there. He said that was  
6 what he heard but he just decided to stay at his own place of  
7 assignment. And I said okay. I too told Lion and others that we  
8 should go. So Lion and others were ahead of me, as - when coming  
9 from Matotoka approaching Magburaka there is a deep curve and  
16:06:05 10 after the curve you would meet the Arabic college. That was  
11 where the UNAMSIL were deployed. So when they saw the truck  
12 taking the curve --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
14 to slow down there and repeat from where I stopped.

16:06:19 15 MR GRIFFITHS: All right.

16 Q. The deep curve by the Arab college. What happened there?

17 A. So the UNAMSIL who were at the college had taken a position  
18 on the road and they opened fire. So Lion stopped the truck. So  
19 as a result of the firing that I heard, I did not come to the  
16:06:41 20 main road. I used a bypass and entered Magburaka through the  
21 police station. So when I got to the police station I met Bai  
22 Bureh, CO Peper and I asked them, I said, "What has brought about  
23 all of these things?"

24 Q. You were met by who? Bai Bureh?

25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Spelling please?

27 A. B-A-I B-U-R-E-H.

28 Q. What is the next one you met?

29 A. CO Peper.

1 Q. How do you spell Peper?

2 A. I think it is P-E-P-E-R, Peper.

3 Q. And who was the next person you met?

4 A. I met the commander of Magburaka who was there, he was  
16:07:29 5 called Alfred Turay. They were all at the police station. I met  
6 them. So I asked them, I said, "What has happened when these  
7 people just saw us coming and they opened fire?" And then Peper  
8 told me that even this morning they had gone to the Arab college  
9 to meet the UNAMSIL to demand for their brothers and the arms  
16:07:52 10 that they took away from them the previous day. They said the  
11 people put up resistance and firing ensued between them in  
12 Magburaka. He said that was the incident for which they said  
13 they had opened fire.

14 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, having been captured, what happened to those  
16:08:20 15 UNAMSIL soldiers?

16 A. Well, the UNAMSIL soldiers, because those who were in  
17 Magburaka had to withdraw, they went to Bumbuna and through that  
18 cause even one of the tanks fell over the bridge and two Kenyans  
19 died. So the remaining ones went to Bumbuna, so those whom they  
16:08:43 20 had arrested or captured in Makeni in the ambush and those who  
21 were arrested in Makeni Town. So when I too arrived in Makeni  
22 that day, firing was all over in the town. So I said okay, the  
23 way the situation is now and you have arrested these people, let  
24 me pull out of this town, because by then I was the most senior  
16:09:04 25 officer.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Pause, Mr Sesay. The question that was  
27 put to you was: Having been captured, that's the UNAMSIL  
28 personnel, what happened to the UNAMSIL personnel? That was the  
29 simple question asked.



1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Let me ask the question slightly differently, Mr Sesay:  
3 How were the UNAMSIL personnel treated after they were captured?

16:09:40

4 A. Well, those who were captured in the ambush, they stripped  
5 them off their shirts, their jackets, their trousers, their  
6 boots, and they brought them to Makeni and I told them to take  
7 them to Kono. When they went there they took them to Yengema,  
8 that was where they were. Some were at Yengema and some were at  
9 Number 11.

16:09:57

10 Q. Now when you told them to take them to Kono, did you give  
11 an instruction that their clothing should be given back to them?

16:10:25

12 A. Well, those who took them to Kono were not the ones who  
13 captured them. So when Komba came I asked him how he managed to  
14 capture those people and he told me - I asked him, I said, "Where  
15 are their clothings?" He said the soldiers, the RUF, who were in  
16 the ambush --

17 Q. Go on. The RUF who were in the ambush. Go on?

18 A. Yes, they were the ones who stripped them of their  
19 clothing. Some had some clothes on and some did not have.

16:10:47

20 Q. When you gave the order for them to be taken to Kono, at  
21 that point where was the clothing which had been stripped from  
22 these men?

23 A. They had - they had left them 15 miles behind to where they  
24 met me. It happened - I was in - they captured them in Makoth in  
25 the ambush and it was in Makeni that I met them.

16:11:16

26 Q. So when you sent them on to Kono, was there clothing  
27 available at that stage to give them?

28 A. No, some did not have clothes. Some had clothes, but they  
29 were mixed, because for those who were in Makeni, they had their

1 clothes on, and the ones who were brought from the ambush, some  
2 of them had clothes on and some did not have.

3 Q. And help me, were any of these captured personnel  
4 maltreated?

16:12:03 5 A. No. Where they brought them in Makeni and where they met  
6 me from there to Yengema, nobody maltreated them until they were  
7 released. And I never gave anyone an instruction to maltreat  
8 them.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you don't consider being  
16:12:26 10 stripped naked maltreatment or, to put it differently, what do  
11 you mean by maltreatment.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: My opinion does not really matter. It is  
13 the opinion of the witness.

14 Q. Mr Sesay, I am sure it is my fault, so let me ask the  
16:12:45 15 question differently. As far as you are aware, were any of these  
16 captured stripped men beaten?

17 A. Well, some who were stripped naked, those who were arrested  
18 in Makeni before I came to Makeni, yes, they tied some of them  
19 and they took them to the barracks. Those who were in the  
16:13:26 20 barracks they were tied. I think there were about - I don't  
21 remember the figure, but those who were arrested in Makeni, who  
22 were arrested by Kailondo, yes, he said he tied them.

23 Q. What about those who fell into the ambush?

24 A. No. Those from the ambush, they just stripped them of  
16:13:51 25 their clothing. They did not tell me that any one of them was  
26 either tied or beaten.

27 Q. And were all of those who were abducted sent to Kono by  
28 you?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Under what conditions were they kept in Kono?

2 A. Well, I sent instruction to the brigadier commander for him  
3 to take care of them and they should stay in Yengema and no one  
4 should maltreat them, nobody should torture them, nobody should  
16:14:32 5 beat them, and that they should provide food for them. And the  
6 Brigadier Commander used to provide food for them because we had  
7 food in the store there. He used to provide food for them.

8 Q. Under what conditions were they housed?

9 A. Well, they were in a school compound at Yengema, while  
16:14:52 10 those who were at the Mine 11, they were at the NDMC quarters.

11 Q. What is number 11?

12 A. Number 11 is a mining place where the NDMC Mining Company  
13 built quarters before. Those were the quarters that they refer  
14 to as number 11.

16:15:17 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I would like to know  
16 whether those that have been stripped naked were provided with  
17 clothing in detention or not.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Were they, Mr Sesay?

16:15:30 20 A. Yes. I understood that the brigadier commander had some  
21 used clothing that he had got from Koidu Town that he sent to  
22 Yengema to them.

23 Q. And how long did they remain captured?

24 A. Well, I think for three weeks - two or three weeks three  
16:16:04 25 days, something like that, because it was not up to full one  
26 month when Mr Taylor sent a message inviting me.

27 Q. And you have already gone to some lengths to describe how  
28 that invitation came and you recall telling us that a helicopter  
29 came from Liberia and landed where?

1 A. And I landed in Pendembu Kailahun District.

2 Q. And on board that helicopter was Benjamin Yeaten?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. At the time that the helicopter arrived you were in Makeni,  
16:16:50 5 yes?

6 A. Yes, I was in Makeni.

7 Q. And a message was sent to you that this helicopter arrived  
8 and they wanted to speak to you, yes?

9 A. Yes.

10

11 Q. And, as a consequence - and we don't have to rehearse all  
12 of the details - you, in due course, drove to Foya in Lofa  
13 County; is that right?

14 A. Yes.

16:17:22 15 Q. Who did you meet in Foya?

16 A. I met the commander who was in Foya because the border  
17 guards, the securities, when I got at the border, four of them  
18 joined me in the pick-up I was using and we drove to Foya where I  
19 met the commander and the commander communicated with Monrovia  
16:17:46 20 and they came to collect me. It was Joe Tuah who came with the  
21 helicopter to collect me to Foya.

22 Q. And you were taken to Monrovia; is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And did you, in due course, meet Charles Taylor?

16:18:02 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Was that on the same day or another day?

27 A. No, it was on that very day that they flew me into  
28 Monrovia.

29 Q. What time of day was it that you met Mr Taylor?

1 A. Well, it was around 4 to 5 o'clock in the afternoon,  
2 towards the evening.

3 Q. Where in Monrovia did you meet him?

4 A. At the Executive Mansion.

16:18:38 5 Q. And when you met him was anybody else present?

6 A. Well, Joe Tuah, who collected me, was there.

7 Q. Anybody else?

8 A. No. It was only Joe Tuah and few of his guards that I met  
9 with him.

16:19:02 10 Q. Did anyone go with you on this trip?

11 A. On this trip it was only my adjutant that went with me, he  
12 was Samuel Jabba.

13 Q. And how long did the meeting with Charles Taylor last?

14 A. Well, about - about 45 minutes; he spoke to me for about 45  
16:19:32 15 minutes.

16 Q. And what did he say to you?

17 A. When I got there, he asked me, he said, "Oh, are you the  
18 Issa?" And I said, "Yes, sir." And he said, "Oh." He said,  
19 "This is the worst mistake that Foday Sankoh will ever do in his  
16:19:51 20 life. "

21 Q. Now pause before we pick up the narrative. Prior to this  
22 had you ever spoken to Charles Taylor before?

23 A. No. No. This was the first time.

24 Q. Now go on. Having said that about Mr Sankoh, what else was  
16:20:13 25 said, if anything?

26 A. He said, "This is the worst mistake that Mr Sankoh has  
27 done." He said, "So those of you who are the young men behind Mr  
28 Sankoh", he said, "this thing that he has done, all the suffering  
29 that you have gone through behind Mr Sankoh, will go in vain

1 because", he said, "the Lome Accord was the thing that gave Mr  
2 Sankoh the last chance, and he is about to destroy it."

3 Q. Pause. What was Mr Taylor's mood when he was saying this?

4 A. Well, he appeared angry, and he continued telling me that  
16:21:02 5 if Foday Sankoh or I thought that we can fight the UN, he said,  
6 "This is a very big dig disappointment that Mr Sankoh has created  
7 for himself."

8 Q. Go on.

9 A. He said and this, about this, what other the people are  
16:21:19 10 feeling in the war now like America and Britain, British  
11 government, they will now be feeling that it is the handiwork of  
12 Mr Taylor. He said but God in heaven knows that I --

13 Q. Go on.

14 A. He said, "As long as God in heaven knows that I have no  
16:21:35 15 business with Mr Sankoh towards what has obtained," he said,  
16 "God will take control." He said, "You cannot fight the UN." He  
17 says, "So do you know why I called you?" I said, "No, sir." He  
18 said, "These people, I have a mandate from the guarantors with  
19 whom we have all signed the accord, the ECOWAS leaders, and the  
16:21:58 20 ECOWAS leaders have received mandate from the Security Council to  
21 facilitate the release of the UN peacekeepers." And he said, "So  
22 that is why my colleagues have asked me to contact you guys to  
23 get these people released." He said, "Where are those people?"  
24 And I told him that the people were in Kono. And he said, "Are  
16:22:18 25 you sure that they are in Kono?" And I said, "Yes, sir."

26 Q. What else was said, if anything?

27 A. That was when he said he would only allow me to pass the  
28 night in Monrovia that night and the following day the helicopter  
29 will take me back to Foya and that I should travel back to Kono

1 and transport those people to Foya, he will send a helicopter to  
2 collect them. And then he asked me, "Have you heard that?" And  
3 I said okay.

16:22:49 4 Q. Now the helicopter which took you from Foya to Monrovia and  
5 back, whose helicopter was it?

6 A. Well, it was Mr Taylor's helicopter.

7 Q. Now you have told us that meeting lasted about 45 minutes  
8 and you have given us a flavour of what was said. How did the  
9 meeting conclude?

16:23:13 10 A. So I told him that the problem that I am now faced with is  
11 that for me to transport the people from Kono to Foya I will need  
12 some diesel I said because I did not have diesel around --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
14 to repeat from where I stopped.

16:23:32 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Mr Sesay, you said, "So I told him that the problem that I  
17 am now faced with is that for me to transport the people from  
18 Kono to Foya I will need some" what?

19 A. I said I will need some diesel to load the vehicles so that  
16:23:52 20 I will transport the personnel to Foya.

21 Q. Is that word diesel?

22 A. Yes, yes. Fuel, diesel.

23 Q. So what was Mr Taylor's response?

24 A. So he said, okay, he would provide \$5,000 and he told Joe  
16:24:17 25 Tuah to give it to me later. Joe Tuah met me at the guesthouse  
26 at night and he handed over the money to me.

27 Q. Dealing with that, this guesthouse at which you spent the  
28 night, whose guesthouse was it?

29 A. Well, it was the guesthouse that Mr Taylor had given to the

1 RUF.

2 Q. Is that the same guesthouse you told us about days ago?

3 A. Yes, that is the same guesthouse.

4 Q. Were you given the \$5,000?

16:24:56 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And before I forget, you told us that Mr Taylor told you  
7 this?

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, was that US dollars or Liberian  
9 dollars?

16:25:14 10 THE WITNESS: US dollars.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. And you told us this, page 148 line 21: "I said no, sir.  
13 He said these people have a mandate from the guarantors." Which  
14 people had a mandate from the guarantors?

16:25:41 15 A. No, I said he told me that the ECOWAS - the guarantors who  
16 were the ECOWAS leaders had given him mandate for him to  
17 facilitate the release of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers and he said  
18 the ECOWAS leaders had also got mandate from the Security Council  
19 for them to negotiate with the RUF to release those people. So  
16:26:08 20 he said that was the reason why his colleagues had said that he  
21 should talk to the RUF to get the UNAMSIL released.

22 Q. So the colleagues were to talk to who to secure the release  
23 of the UNAMSIL?

24 A. I said the ECOWAS leaders, his colleagues, who were Heads  
16:26:31 25 of State, told Mr Taylor that Mr Taylor should talk to the RUF to  
26 secure the release of the UNAMSIL, that he should contact the RUF  
27 to facilitate the release of the UNAMSIL.

28 Q. Now I want to be clear about this, Mr Sesay. Was Mr Taylor  
29 talking to you because he controlled the RUF, or was he talking



1 to you because he had a mandate from the guarantors?

2 A. Well, he talked to me because he had got mandate from the  
3 guarantors, but he was not controlling the RUF. The RUF was  
4 under Mr Sankoh's control.

16:27:14 5 Q. And when Mr Taylor spoke to you in these terms, did you  
6 agree to do what he suggested?

7 A. Yes, because for the reasons he outlined to me, I realised  
8 that they were sensible ones, because I knew that we could not  
9 fight the UN, we could not fight the world; that was one. And  
16:27:43 10 two, it was causing a problem for the Lome Accord. So when he  
11 said that "if those people are under your custody, it will be a  
12 problem for you, so you have to go and bring them over." So that  
13 was the reason why I brought them.

14 Q. Mr Sesay, again I ask you bluntly: Did you agree to comply  
16:28:05 15 because effectively Mr Taylor was and had been your boss?

16 A. Mr Taylor was not my boss. My boss was Mr Sankoh.

17 Q. Now, at the time that you went to Monrovia for this meeting  
18 with Charles Taylor, where was Mr Sankoh?

19 A. At that time, Mr Sankoh had been arrested. He was in  
16:28:38 20 prison, in the hands of the Government of Sierra Leone.

21 Q. And did he have facilities to communicate with, for  
22 example, you?

23 A. No, no. He did not have any means.

24 Q. And in due course, Mr Sesay, did you return to Sierra  
16:29:03 25 Leone?

26 A. Yes. The following day I returned to Sierra Leone.

27 Q. Did you have with you the \$5,000 US when you returned?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. To what use did you put the \$5,000 US?

1 A. Well, when I arrived in Kono, I sent one of my guards,  
2 Kamara, the very day I arrived, at night, I told him to use one  
3 of the pick-ups to go to Magburaka to buy diesel, and the truck  
4 went the following morning to collect the diesel, and we used  
16:29:44 5 those diesel to transport the UNAMSIL. Although it was not all  
6 the money that I used to buy the diesel, but that was how I used  
7 part of the money.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Madam President, and we  
9 still have a little way to go with this topic.

16:30:07 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think this is an appropriate time to  
11 adjourn for the day. Mr Sesay, you are not to discuss your  
12 evidence. The proceedings are adjourned until tomorrow at  
13 9 o'clock.

14 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.31 p.m.  
16:31:03 15 to be reconvened on Thursday, 15 July 2010 at  
16 9.00 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

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